Forming Conflict Identities: The Role of Subgroup Leaders in Combatant Socialization

Samuel A. Erkiletian

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Department of Political Science

University College London
I, Samuel A. Erkiletian, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm this has been indicated in the dissertation.

*Cum Honore*
Abstract

What explains the variation in socialization outcomes in armed organizations? Why do some combatants adopt the intended norms of their organization while others resist them? The socialization processes of armed organizations profoundly shape the behaviors and attitudes of combatants and directly influence their repertoires of violence. Recent scholarship on the internal dynamics of armed organizations has advanced our understanding of within group factors that shape combatant preferences, but there are still significant theoretical and empirical gaps on combatant socialization. This dissertation presents and tests a framework that socialization is in part driven by subgroups—the smaller social units within armed organizations that form the informal structure and environment of combatants. Specifically, subgroup leaders—the small unit, junior and mid-level commanders of an organization—regulate the socialization processes of combatants by reinforcing or undermining the official norms of the organization. Subgroup leaders occupy a unique position of authority within both the formal and informal social networks of an armed organization that enables them to control the normative environment of combatants.

I test this expectation using a mixed-method nested research design that leverages unique archival data from the American (1944-1945) and British (1945-1948) re-education programs for German POWs which sought to ‘democratize’ them. First, I conduct a controlled comparative case study of German POW camps in the UK, where British officials installed pro-democratic POWs into subgroup leadership positions in select camps. Second, I conduct a large-N analysis using a novel dataset constructed from British administrative reports to compare the variation in socialization processes and outcomes based on the subgroup leadership type of each camp. Third, I present a cross-case comparative study of the British and American re-education programs, which differed in their policies towards German subgroup leaders. Together, these analyses lend support for the argument that subgroup leaders shape socialization outcomes.
Impact Statement

My dissertation advances and tests an original theoretical argument that has important implications for both academic and policy research. My research addresses critical gaps in our understanding of how and why combatants in armed organization form their preferences. Academically, this research makes four contributions. First, I draw on and synthesize a diversity of concepts and theories from different literatures to develop a new framework that positions combatant socialization from the intraorganizational, subgroup-level. This bottom-up approach explains how norms are interpreted and adopted by combatants at the subgroup-level, which enables researchers to examine the micro-level variation in combatant socialization. Second, I expand on the important role of subgroup leaders within armed organizations, demonstrating the influence of junior commanders on shaping combatant preferences. Third, I present compelling evidence for when conformity and resistance to official norms form. Finally, methodologically, I collected and processed a wealth of previously unused archival data from one of the largest socialization initiatives in history to construct a novel dataset in which to test my theoretical argument. This effort generates new data for future researchers as well as contributes to the growing scholarship of conflict research that utilizes historical data with quantitative and qualitative methods.

My findings have direct implications for policymakers and military practitioners. My analysis demonstrates the significant role that subgroup leaders have in maintaining norms in armed organizations, which suggests that policy interventions targeting subgroup leaders can significantly shape the attitudes and behaviors of combatants. State militaries and international peace keeping forces can leverage the influence of subgroup leaders to more effectively instill and uphold norms of restraint and adherence to international humanitarian law. Relatedly, state militaries attempting to mitigate adverse behaviors in specific units can focus on their subgroup leadership. My research also has important policy implications for post-conflict initiatives. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs can also utilize the influence of subgroup leaders to assist in postwar peace initiatives.
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Chapter I

Introduction

In November 2020, the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) published the Afghanistan Inquiry Report which found credible evidence that from 2009 to 2013, members of the Australian special forces had killed 39 non-combatants in Afghanistan and committed other war crimes (Brereton Report 2020). The report details that special forces members belonging to specific units developed a divergent ‘culture’ that led to the regular abuse of detainees and the ‘blooding’ of junior soldiers—forcing new members to kill non-combatants (Brereton Report 2020: 26-30). The report notes that this criminal behavior was isolated, and that the overall Special Operations Task Group of the ADF operating in Afghanistan, particularly at the higher organizational levels, had adhered to international laws and norms of restraint (Brereton Report 2020: 31-32).

In 2018, US Navy SEAL Eddie Gallagher was arrested for alleged war crimes committed in Iraq during the Battle of Mosul against the Islamic State in 2017 which included murdering a bounded detainee and deliberately sniping Iraqi civilians (Phillips 2021). The investigation revealed a distinct cultural divide within the Navy SEALs between the ‘pirates’—SEALs who prided themselves on aggressive behavior, close quarters combat, amassing kills, and breaking the rules to accomplish their objectives, and the SEALs who followed orders and adhered to international law (Phillips 2021: 78-
Again, only some soldiers within specific units were implicated. Why did deviant norms and subcultures develop in certain units of the ADF and the US Navy SEALs and not others?

The criminal investigation into the war crimes committed by ADF special forces revealed that “a distorted culture was embraced and amplified by some experienced, charismatic and influential non-commissioned officers and their proteges” (Khalil 2020: 2) and that these “cultural issues...may have contributed to the creation of an environment in which this conduct could take place” (Brereton Report 2020: 26). The investigation further revealed that the targeting of civilians and the killing of detainees was reinforced by patrol commanders at the small-unit level, “at the corporal or sergeant level,” where “to a junior...trooper...the patrol commander is a ‘demigod’” (Brereton Report 2020: 30-31).

In the US Navy, “for generations the SEALs had secretly clashed with a dark subgroup in their own ranks,” the ‘pirates’ who subscribed to their own deviant norms of violence (Phillips 2021: 68). SEALs like Eddie Gallagher were the product of a ‘pirate’ subculture whose norms were espoused by certain leaders that “built a tradition that celebrated brotherhood, rule-breaking, and blood...where men were more loyal to the tribe than to the nation they served (Phillips 2021: 368). These examples illustrate an often-overlooked phenomenon within armed organizations, that not all combatants socialize into the intended norms of their group and can instead establish different, sometimes divergent subcultures and norms.

This variation in the formation of combatant preferences has a significant impact on the behaviors and patterns of violence within armed organizations. For example, in the Vietnam War, significant resistance to official norms formed within certain units in
the US Army, leading to group-level insubordination, drug use, indiscriminate violence against non-combatants, and even the act of ‘fragging’—deliberately killing or maiming officers with fragmentation grenades (Cortright 1975; Lepre 2011). In certain units, this resistance developed into a distinctive ‘counterculture’ that crippled combat capabilities and led to an “Army on the verge of collapse” (Cortright 1975: 24-25). Similarly, during the Spanish Civil War, desertion and defection was largely a small-unit, subgroup phenomenon that substantially weakened Republican forces (McLauchlin 2020). In the Second World War, certain units of the Japanese Imperial Army were considered particularly brutal even by their horrendous standards. Combatants within these Japanese units were socialized into violence by their junior commanders. For example, Tominaga Shōzō recounted his initiation and socialization when joining the 39th Division in 1941 in China as a new junior officer:

The day after I arrived, a special field-operations training exercise was announced for all 22 of the new candidate officers. For a week Second Lieutenant Tanaka, our instructor, took us to the scenes of battles that had been fought in our area...[he then] took us to the detention center. Pointing at the people in a room, all Chinese, he announced, ‘these are the raw materials for your trial of courage.’ He said that it was to be a test to see if we were qualified to be platoon leaders. He said ‘we wouldn’t be qualified if we couldn’t chop off a head.’ (Cook and Cook 1992: 40-44).

After participating in this initiation ceremony, which was overseen by his company commanders, Tominaga reinforced this behavior within his own platoon, making new recruits kill non-combatants. He recalled in an interview that “a new conscript became a full-fledged soldier in three months...everyone became a demon within three months” (Cook and Cook 42-43).
As these examples illustrate, norms are not distributed evenly across armed organizations. Combatants throughout history—in different cultural and political contexts and in both intrastate and interstate conflicts—have varied in their conformity to the expected norms of their armed organization. The norms instilled in combatants through socialization directly impact their repertoires of violence and can lead to variation in indiscriminate violence (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010; Thaler 2012; Oppenheim and Weintraub 2017; Leader Maynard 2022), sexual violence (Wood 2009; Cohen 2013b, 2017), and levels of restraint (Bell 2016, 2022; Hoover Green 2017, 2018). Understanding the factors that drive socialization is critical to evaluating the norms of combatants that underpin conflict dynamics and outcomes, yet “significant theoretical and empirical gaps remain in scholarship on socialization” (Bell and Terry 2021: 830). This dissertation seeks to address these gaps by explaining how and why combatants develop norms differently. Specifically, what explains the variation in socialization outcomes in armed organizations and why do some combatants adopt the intended norms of their organization while others resist them?

This chapter proceeds in five sections. The next section outlines the theoretical argument, establishing the core concepts and expectations that are expanded on in Chapter II. The second section discusses the literature on the formation of combatant and armed group preferences, identifying remaining gaps that my theory seeks to address. The third section justifies the case selection of prisoner of war (POW) camps while the fourth section presents the research design and an overview of empirical Chapters II, III, IV, and V. The final section presents the latest developments in using archival data and secondary sources in conflict research—outlining its advantages and disadvantages as well as its increased use as a source of data.
1.1 The Argument in Brief

To determine and explain how and why combatant norms develop unevenly, this dissertation focuses on the subgroup dynamics of armed organizations—the within-group subcultures that develop at the micro, rank-and-file level that can align with or diverge from the expected practices of the wider organization. Subgroups are the smaller social units of armed organizations that form the immediate environment and daily interactions of combatants at the small-unit level. Subgroups develop at the lower organizational levels of armed groups—at the squad, platoon, company, and battalion levels (approximately 12, 50, 200, and 1000 soldiers respectively)—and are integral at shaping combatant preferences. I argue that the task of socialization is ultimately delegated to subgroup leaders—the small-unit, junior and mid-level commanders of an organization who filter norms down to the subgroup level and can either reinforce or undermine the official socialization process. The primary expectation is that combatant preferences are shaped by subgroup leaders who moderate socialization processes and outcomes.

Subgroup leaders occupy a unique position of authority within both the formal organizational hierarchy and the informal social networks of combatants that enables them to control the normative environment of socialization. As lower ranking commanders with close ties, frequent interactions, and authority over combatants, they wield significant influence over the expected norms and practices of their social environment. As described by a US Army platoon leader in Iraq, “those men were my responsibility. I'm their mother, I'm their father, their counselor, police officer, principal—whatever you want to call it, that's what I am” (Frederick 2010: 236). Subgroup leaders are critical in maintaining organizational norms, for example, norms of restraint.
In his memoir, James McDonough described his role as a US Army platoon leader during the Vietnam War:

I had to do more than keep them alive. I had to preserve their human dignity. I was making them kill, forcing them to commit the most uncivilized of acts, but at the same time I had to keep them civilized. That was my duty as their leader...a leader has to help them understand that there are lines they must not cross. He is their link to normalcy, to order, to humanity. If the leader loses his own sense of propriety or shrinks from his duty, anything will be allowed. And anything can happen. (McDonough 1985: 77-78).

Subgroup leaders like James McDonough reinforce the expected norms of the wider organization, in this instance restraint, and in turn socialize their soldiers to align with official norms. Conversely, leaders like Navy SEAL Eddie Gallagher espouse contradictory norms that undermine the official goals of the organization, leading some soldiers to adopt preferences that diverge from the expected behaviors of the organization. The direct influence and control of subgroup leaders is important; however, I contend that it is also their impact on the overall social environment of combatants that influences the formation of combatant preferences.

I develop a theoretical argument on how subgroup dynamics and leaders shape socialization processes and outcomes. First, subgroup leaders leverage their authority to suppress or support certain norms. They can suppress combatants with contradictory norms through mechanisms of control like formal disciplinary procedures and isolation or they can protect and empower combatants with norms that they support. Second, subgroup leader control can establish prevailing attitudes and practices within a subgroup that creates a stable environment of socialization that is normatively cohesive. Within normatively cohesive environments, the intensity of horizontal socialization
increases—when combatants themselves exert pressure on each other to conform and are “both targets and agents of socialization” (Bateson 2017: 644). Horizontal socialization occurs through the daily interactions between combatants—the informal practices, relationships, and conversations of squad mates that shape expected behaviors and attitudes (Parkinson 2021; Checkel 2017; Williams 1989). I argue that horizontal socialization and in turn the formation of combatant preferences becomes more likely when there is normative cohesion within an environment which is shaped by subgroup leaders.

In this framework, subgroup leaders are more than authority figures, they are also gatekeepers of norms who choose which practices and attitudes to introduce and reinforce that eventually permeate the content of horizontal socialization between combatants. As aptly concluded by the Brereton Report (2020), “commanders set the conditions in which their units may flourish or wither, including the culture which promotes, permits or prohibits certain behaviours” (p. 32). The unlawful, divergent behavior of certain units within the ADF in Afghanistan was driven by the influence of its subgroup leaders, whose role in armed organizations, has and will continue to shape combatant preferences. As the next section illustrates, this focus on subgroup dynamics addresses several empirical and theoretical blind spots in the conflict and combatant socialization literatures.

1.2 Existing Approaches
The illustrative examples above demonstrate the need for a theory that can account for variation in the formation of combatant preferences and socialization outcomes. These accounts also reveal that to better understand how and why this variation unfolds it is
necessary to specify the subgroup-level dynamics of combatants. As this section outlines, existing theories from the political science literature are largely unable to explain how norms are distributed at the rank-and-file level or why combatants in the same organization develop different norms. To address this gap, I draw on the longstanding military sociology and cohesion literature (Shils and Janowitz 1948; Stouffer 1949; Kellett 1982; King 2013) and its collective findings on the internal dynamics of armed organizations and synthesize them with recent conflict research on combatant socialization (Checkel 2017; Hoover Green 2017, 2018; Manekin 2020; McLauchlin 2020; Parkinson 2021; Bell 2022; Cantin 2021). By drawing on these complementary literatures, I formulate a theory that predicts within group variation in socialization outcomes, something that the existing literature is largely unable to explain. In this section, I first outline the previous conflict research on armed organizations and combatant preferences and discuss the current literature on combatant socialization and how it has made significant advancements on earlier studies. I then identify some of the remaining gaps in the literature and how this project addresses them with the theoretical argument developed in Chapter II.

Previous research on the formation of combatant preferences and armed group behavior focused on strategic and individual explanations. For example, the recruitment practices of armed organizations and the motivations of recruits to secure resource endowments or social rewards (Weinstein 2006; Valentino 2014) or the broad strategic choices that influence armed group behavior (Downes 2006, 2008; Kalyvas 2006). Earlier studies also focused on macro-level factors for explaining armed group and combatant behaviors, such as their military doctrines (Balcells and Kalyvas 2010) or the cross-national, top-down motivations of state and non-state groups (Chenoweth and
Lawrence 2010). However, these strategic approaches generally underestimate “the power of socialization and training practices in melding recruits” (Wood 2009: 140), and often treat combatants as “disciplined, obedient, uniform, and silent” (Lyall 2020: 3). These macro-level approaches generally overlook or oversimplify the internal dynamics of armed groups and often fail to account for within organization factors such as socialization processes for explaining combatant behaviors. In response to these limitations, scholars shifted their focus to the internal dynamics of armed organizations—specifically their ideologies and institutions—to explain the formation of combatant preferences.

Research on the ideology of armed organizations shows how it can impact combatant preferences. Armed organizations can indoctrinate combatants with specific political and social goals that guide the expected behaviors and attitudes of the group and creates a collective identity (Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood 2014). Shared ideological norms can shape combatant preferences for violence (Thaler 2012) and are introduced and reinforced through formal institutions of socialization such as training and political education (Hoover Green 2017, 2018; Oppenheim and Weintraub 2017). These top-down institutions disseminate and reinforce organizational wide social and political goals, often through official agents of socialization (Hoover Green 2016, 2018). Similarly, ideological training can significantly impact the behaviors and motivations of combatants in state militaries (Bartov 1989; Bradbury and Meyers 1968). While these studies have advanced our understanding of the broader institutions and doctrines that shape combatant preferences, their focus on the structures and senior leadership of organizations limit explanations for the “striking variations...in the repertoires of actions of different combatants within the same organization” (Cantin 2021; 1569).
More recent research on combatant preferences and the behaviors of armed groups is characterized by a general motivation to unpack the internal dynamics of organizations to explain conflict processes and outcomes, to move away from studying “variation among armed groups” to “the patterns of participation within these groups” (Manekin 2020: 3, emphasis in original). These recent studies have shifted their analytical focus to “peer inside the ‘black box’ of armies,” acknowledging that “armies are not uniform, nor are soldiers universal” (Lyall 2020: 39). For example, in the literature on civilian violence, examining the impact of training on individual attitudes towards norms of restraint and indiscriminate violence in state militaries (Bell 2016, 2022), how ideologies are spread and interpreted within groups (Leader Maynard 2019, 2022; Parkinson 2021), or how ideologies mobilize individuals (Costalli and Ruggeri 2015, 2017). Other studies have further unpacked intra-organizational dynamics, acknowledging that armed organizations are complex and hierarchical, featuring multiple, interacting networks and subgroups.

Armed groups are heterogenous organizations that often feature “internal contradictions” (Lyall 2020: 39), where “soldiers identify with multiple social groups...both as subordinates and as actors immersed in overlapping, potentially contradictory, sets of social relations” (Hudman and Parkinson 2019: 651). Combatants are embedded in both a formal military command structure and within their immediate unit which forms its own informal social network that can conflict with the wider organization (Wood 2009: 139). This tension between informal and formal networks has been used to explain deviant behavior such as sexual violence (Moncrief 2017; Wood and Toppelberg 2017), shirking and foot-dragging (Manekin 2017, 2020) and desertion, defection, and surrender (McLauchlin 2015, 2020; Lyall 2020; Lehmann and Zhukov
This disaggregated approach to examining armed groups has also extended to combatant socialization studies.

Armed organizations invest significant resources into shaping the behaviors and attitudes of their recruits through formal, top-down military socialization processes (Guimond 1995; Hoover Green 2018). However, as discussed in introducing my theoretical argument, horizontal socialization is also critical in shaping the preferences of combatants but was largely overlooked by conflict research until the 2017 publication of the “Special Issue on Socialization and Violence” collated by the *Journal of Peace Research*.¹ This special issue highlighted the phenomenon of *layered socialization*—that combatants experience multiple sources of pressure to socialize, vertically from official institutions and agents of socialization as well as horizontally from fellow combatants (Checkel 2017; Bateson 2017). This approach emphasizes that socialization is not a “uni-directional process shaping beliefs and behaviors,” acknowledging the agency of combatants and their capacity to resist socialization as well as the peer-pressure to conform that they exert on each other (Manekin 2017: 606). The inclusion of combatant agency has led to further research on this important dimension of armed organizations and socialization outcomes. For example, on the pathways to violence against civilians (Cantin 2021), the underproduction of violence in the Israeli Defense Forces (Manekin 2020), the formation of norms of restraint (Bell 2022), and the micro-level bonds that develop between combatants (McLauchlin 2020). Together, these studies address some of the limitations of the institutional and organizational socialization literatures that often

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¹ Notable exceptions are Elisabeth Jean Wood’s (2009) article on sexual violence which presciently discussed the interaction between high-ranking military leaders and ‘small-group dynamics’ in producing combatant norms and Dara Cohen’s (2013) article on rape during civil wars which found additional evidence that layered socialization drives combatant preferences.
overlook the “lived experiences, motivations, and trajectories” of the combatants themselves (Cantin 2021: 1573).

The growing research from the internal dynamics of armed groups and combatant socialization literatures have expanded our understanding of the formation of combatant preferences, however, there are still theoretical and empirical gaps that remain. While we know that armed organizations consist of overlapping informal and formal networks, it is still unclear how these networks interact to produce combatant norms (Parkinson 2021: 8). Relatedly, layered socialization shapes combatant preferences, but there is still a limited understanding of how vertical and horizontal sources of socialization shape the normative environment of armed organizations. More generally, it is still uncertain how norms develop and transmit at the rank-and-file level. The theoretical argument of this dissertation outlined above and developed in Chapter II address these gaps by presenting a framework that incorporates formal and informal social networks and the phenomenon of layered socialization to predict combatant socialization outcomes. In developing my theory, I draw on findings from the military sociology literature which has long acknowledged the critical role of subgroups in armed organizations to help remediate these gaps in the conflict literature.

The daily motivations of combatants and the bonds between them at the rank-and-file level are a central theme of military sociology studies. Military sociology studies originated during the Second World War in large part because the American military devoted significant resources to understanding the experiences and concerns of average
combatants (Shils and Janowitz 1948; Stouffer 1949).\(^2\) The evidence from these early studies revealed that the overwhelming majority of American soldiers were motivated to fight because of their immediate squad, not for ideological or personal reasons (Stouffer 1949; Williams 1989). While grand strategies and doctrines are dictated from the top of an armed organization, they are interpreted and executed at the squad and platoon levels which form a soldier's ‘primary group’ and their center or orientation (Shils and Janowitz 1948; Zurcher 1967). At these small-group levels, individuals often develop strong attachments to their immediate social group and experience extreme pressure to conform to them (Kellett 1982; Siebold 2007). Studies repeatedly find that intensive social cohesion at this micro-level motivates combatants to participate in high-risk activities (Shalom et al. 2005; King 2013; MacCoun and Hix 1993). Subsequent studies have also found that these rank-and-file bonds also play an important role in military socialization processes, shaping how recruits interpret norms (Arkin and Dobrofsky 1978). Beyond academic studies, combatant memoirs and firsthand accounts of life within armed organizations often stress the importance of small-group dynamics in shaping attitudes and behaviors.\(^3\)

Taking seriously the importance of small-group dynamics from the military sociology literature and from the firsthand accounts of combat veterans, I position my theory on socialization from the subgroup-level. This bottom-up theoretical framework makes five contributions to the combatant socialization literature. First, by shifting the

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\(^2\) For example, the US government funded the American Soldier Project which issued approximately 500,000 surveys to American combat and non-combat troops during the Second World War to determine patterns of combat motivation (Stouffer 1949).

\(^3\) See the memoirs of Eugene Sledge (2007) and Robert Leckie (2010) for examples of group cohesion in the US Marines in the Pacific War during the Second World War. Conversely, see Cook and Cook’s (1992) collection of interviews with Japanese combat veterans from the Pacific War.
focus to the subgroup-level and subgroup leaders, it enables the examination of how norms promoted at the top of an organization are interpreted and reinforced by combatants at the rank-and-file level. This positions the analysis to more closely explore and unpack the micro-level variation in combatant socialization. Second, it proposes and tests a theoretical framework for the role of subgroup leaders in combatant socialization. Despite the critical role of subgroup leaders, their involvement in socialization has remained understudied, as most research focuses on organizational elites (Leader Maynard 2022) or use theories that simplify “the relationships between ‘commanders’ and combatants, eliminating the mediating role of mid-level officers” (Hoover Green 2016:629; Daly 2014).

Third, the framework accounts for both subgroup resistance and conformity to the intended norms of the organization. It can predict when combatants are more likely to resist official socialization and potentially develop divergent norms or when they are more likely to follow and adopt the sanctioned norms of their organization. This not only accounts for how aligned and divergent norms emerge, but also how these conflicting norms can then destabilize social environments. Fourth, the argument moves beyond just the impact of influential leaders and emphasizes the normative environment of combatants in shaping preferences. In this framework, it is the overall environment or culture of a subgroup that changes the preferences of combatants. Subgroup leaders moderate the social environment and the normative content within it, but it is ultimately the repeated interactions between combatants themselves through horizontal socialization that change preferences. Finally, as described in Chapter II, this framework draws on the extensive military sociology (Williams 1989; King 2013), organizational socialization (Settersten 2002; Ostroff and Kozlowski 1992) and prison socialization
literatures (Scott 2011; Decker and Pyrooz 2019; Lyman 1989) to form the expectations of this study. Synthesizing these longstanding theories from different strands of literature with more recent studies on combatant socialization in political science (Hoover Green 2018; Manekin 2020; Parkinson 2021) enables the creation of a framework that accounts for both the informal and formal social networks of combatants to predict socialization outcomes. The final sections of the chapter justify the case selection of the project and outline the research design and structure of the dissertation. In the next section, I argue how my theoretical argument on combatant socialization can travel to the unique social environment of prisoner of war camps.

1.3 Case Selection: Why Prisoner of War Camps?

This project uses two cases to explore and empirically test the role of subgroup leaders in combatant socialization: the American and British re-education programs for German POWs during and after the Second World War. These cases are selected for three reasons. First, they provide fine-grain data on subgroups and combatant preferences. Access to data on combatants and their socialization outcomes, particularly within contemporary state militaries, is incredibly limited (Bell, Gift, and Monten 2022). Furthermore, it is difficult to collect accurate data on conflict processes, particularly those created in or gathered in conflict zones (Lyall 2014; Gonzalez-Ocantos and LaPorte 2019). To measure the effect of subgroup leaders on combatant norms, it is necessary to have both detailed information on the small-unit, junior commanders of subgroups and their preferences (e.g., do they diverge or align with the organization) as well as data that tracks the changing attitudes of combatants over time. For socialization scholars, there is an
additional obstacle to data collection, as it is difficult to acquire or generate data that accurately determines preference change (Hoover Green 2018: 43), and because of this barrier, “scholars lack data regarding core aspects of military socialization” (Bell and Terry 2021: 830). As detailed in Chapters II, III, IV, and V, these cases offer exceptional archival data on the role of subgroup leaders and on the socialization outcomes of tens of thousands of combatants that enable the testing of my theoretical argument.

Second, POW camps offer a closed and controlled environment for examining the effect of subgroup leaders on socialization outcomes. Compared to the rapidly changing conflict environments of state forces operating in the field, POW camps are a relatively stable setting with well-defined boundaries and objectives (Krammer 1979: 49; Bernard et al. 2011; Faulk 1977) that make the mechanisms of subgroup leader control and combatant preference changes easier to measure. Furthermore, in both cases, exposure to subgroup control and the norms of the re-education programs was largely involuntary, which helps limit selection bias, as the combatants within both cases did not self-select into their normative environment.

Most importantly, the conditions and subgroup dynamics within POW camps are comparable to socialization within armed organizations. In the context of the German POW camps in Britain, “the camps were run by the military” and “POWs were subject to a regimen that was every bit as strict as in the [German Army]” (Quinn 2015: 89-90). In accordance with the Geneva Convention, both American and British officials allowed German combatants to administer their own camps (Smith 1996; Krammer 1979). As a result, the social dynamics within German POW camps in America and Britain closely resembled life within the German military. For German POWs in America, historian Ron Robin (1995) notes that the camps provided an environment of hierarchy and routine
similar to an armed organization. He quotes a German POW whose experience was shared by most combatants, “the first thing that struck me as I entered Camp Hood, Texas...was that German discipline re-created itself right away, with its orders, its commands...[the Americans] let us develop right away a parallel hierarchy...I had come home (p. 34, emphasis in original). As detailed in section 2.3 in Chapter II, both the military and prison socialization and prisoner of war literatures share a theoretical foundation. Armed organizations and prison environments like POW camps feature similar social conditions, subgroup dynamics, and mechanisms of socialization that make my framework applicable to settings of POW camps with re-education programs. As the next chapter discusses, I view preference formation within POW camps with re-education programs as another instance of combatant socialization in a unique setting.

1.4 Research Design and Chapter Structure

This dissertation employs a mixed method, nested research design to test the theoretical argument (Lieberman 2005). This approach enables the use of qualitative and quantitative evidence and diverse empirical strategies to isolate the effect of subgroup leaders on socialization outcomes while ruling out potential alternative explanations. Specifically, the dissertation is divided into three distinct empirical chapters that examine two cases—the British and American re-education programs for German POWs during and after the Second World War. The goal of both the British and American re-education programs was to ‘democratize’ German combatants before their repatriation back to Germany. Surviving archival data and extensive primary and secondary sources provide data on the changing political attitudes of German combatants. Most importantly, this
data provides information on the subgroup leadership type of combatants within the POW camps which enables me to test the relationship between different subgroup leaders and socialization outcomes. Chapters III and IV conduct a within-case analysis on variations in German subgroup leadership types within the British re-education program. Meanwhile, Chapter V presents a cross-case comparison between the socialization outcomes of the British and American re-education programs.

Chapter III process-traces the causal mechanisms of subgroup leader control and their effect on the normative environment and socialization outcomes of combatants in a controlled comparative analysis. I compare three POW camps from the British re-education program that feature similar characteristics, populations, and starting political attitudes, but differ on the key explanatory variable—subgroup leadership type. To facilitate re-education, British officials installed pro-democratic POWs into subgroup leadership positions in select camps. Leveraging this variation in subgroup leadership types, I compare the socialization outcomes of camps with pro-re-education subgroup leaders to camps with apolitical or Nazi subgroup leaders. Specifically, POW Camp 118 features aligned subgroup leaders who are in support of and reinforce the intended pro-democratic norms of re-education. Conversely, Camp 70 features a divergent subgroup leadership of pro-Nazi leaders while Camp 239 has a mixed subgroup leadership consisting of both democratic and anti-democratic leaders. These cases expand on the theoretical mechanisms of subgroup leadership control and sequence of socialization, demonstrating the influence of aligned and divergent subgroup leaders on the overall environment and process of socialization. Furthermore, they lend support for the general expectation that subgroup leaders moderate socialization.
In Chapter IV, I employ a within-case large-N regression analysis, again returning to the case of the British re-education program for German POW camps. Using a hand-coded dataset constructed from surviving monthly administrative reports from British re-education officials that features 2803 unique German subgroup leaders, I test the effect of subgroup leaders on the socialization outcomes of 64 POW camps. The results from the two-way fixed effects analysis of Chapter IV lend strong support for the theoretical argument, finding that camps with pro-democratic subgroup leaders were more likely to have positive socialization outcomes compared to those with apolitical or divergent Nazi subgroup leaders. Furthermore, camps with a stable environment and normative cohesion were also more likely to have positive socialization outcomes. This chapter also explores the variation in characteristics of the subgroup leaders themselves, finding that Germans with certain junior officer ranks were more likely to influence political attitudes. This suggests that individuals with previous experience as a squad or platoon leader closest to the subgroup level are more likely to influence combatant preferences.

Importantly, three alternative explanations—contact with British civilians, preferences falsification, and the starting political attitudes of each camp—are controlled for in both Chapter III and IV by leveraging unique characteristics of the case and external shocks caused by British policy changes. These alternative explanations are expanded on in Chapter II as well as in Chapters III and IV, but in short, changes in British policies enable the analysis to control for when POW camps came into increased contact with civilians that presented an alternative source of norms. Similarly, a change in British repatriation policy in the summer of 1947 removed material incentives for participating in re-education initiatives which I argue reveals the real preferences of combatants and I use this change in repatriation policy to control for opportunism. Finally, the British
recorded the starting political attitudes of each POW camp, making it possible to control for the initial prevailing norms of each camp (e.g., pro-democratic or Nazi) on socialization outcomes.

Chapter V, the last empirical chapter, is a mixed-method cross-case comparison between the American and British re-education programs for German POWs. I use surviving polling data from US officials on the attitudes of German POWs as well as primary and secondary accounts to compare socialization outcomes with the British case. The US re-education program, which is largely considered a failure by historians (Robin 1995; Krammer 1979), features key differences from the British program that I argue resulted in mostly failed socialization outcomes. Similarly to the British, American officials screened POWs to identify anti-Nazis and sent them to special camps for additional re-education. However, American officials then removed anti-Nazis from the main camps and in turn their potential influence on rank-and-file combatants. Conversely, British officials empowered anti-Nazi subgroup leaders in the camps, inserting them into key camp position in select camps. As the findings demonstrate, this fundamental difference in strategy to remove pro-democratic leaders from the main camps allowed pro-Nazi subgroup leaders to maintain normative control which resulted in mostly failed socialization outcomes in the American case.

Before proceeding to the theoretical argument in Chapter II, it is necessary to discuss the current state of archival data and methods in conflict research, as it is the central source of data for this project and is still a relatively ‘new’ empirical approach in conflict research.
1.5 Archival Data and Methods in Conflict Research

Conflict researchers are increasingly employing primary sources found in archives to effectively develop and test theories (Balcells and Sullivan 2018; Costalli and Ruggeri 2019). Data extracted from archives can offer unique insights into the changing strategies and motivations of combatants because primary documents—typically in the form of reports, memos, and letters—are often created “contemporaneously with violence...reveal[ing] how actors understood the strategic environment in real time” (Balcells and Sullivan 2018: 138). Archival data is particularly useful for process-tracing because the sequential nature of evidence enables researchers to examine a “theory’s causal mechanisms at work” which is ideal for generating and testing theories as well as alternative hypotheses (O’Rourke 2020: 143; Lyall 2014; Bulutgil, Mylonas, and Schenoni 2023). The chronological evidence often found in archives can provide the decisive evidence necessary for testing hypotheses through process-tracing which requires showing the “various steps leading to the outcome of interest...to show there is indeed an uninterrupted pathway...connecting cause and effect” (Gonzalez-Ocantos and LaPorte 2019: 2-3; Bennett and Checkel 2015). These approaches are further discussed in Chapter III, where I process-trace the causal mechanisms of subgroup leader control in a controlled comparative case study.

In addition to providing temporal evidence for process-tracing, archival sources can provide fine-grain, large-N data for explaining individual motivations as well as rich subnational data on the “micro-foundations of conflict” (Costalli and Ruggeri 2019: 59). For example, archival evidence used to examine the individual level motivations of armed mobilization (Costalli and Ruggeri 2015) and the desertion and defection of combatants (McLauchlin 2020), as well as data for explaining subnational variation in the forced
resettlement of civilians (Zhukov 2015; Balcells 2018), state repression and dissent (Sullivan 2016; Scharpf 2018; Zhukov and Talibova 2018), and civilian violence (Zhukov 2017). As these studies and the large-N analysis of 64 POW camps across the UK in Chapter IV demonstrate, “data from conflict archives typically contain better coverage (across space and time) and more information (on actors, behaviors, beliefs, and context) than most other systematic collections of materials” (Balcells and Sullivan 2018: 138).

However, there are notable limitations to using archival data. The first and arguably most important question when accessing primary sources is why did this document or evidence survive? In the context of state archives, which documents are selected for preservation and declassified for public access by government officials is a heavily politicized process (Trachtenberg 2020; Subotić 2020). Government officials choose which documents to destroy and to withhold from the public. When forced to make information available through procedures like Freedom of Information Act requests can heavily redact and ‘sanitize’ documents of their sensitive information most relevant to researchers (Trachtenberg 2020: 138; Hassan and O’Mealia 2018: 168). For example, in my correspondence with an archivist at the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland, I was informed that “only about 1-3% of the textual records created by the Executive Branch agencies of the United States government are appraised to be of permanent legal or historical value” and that the “remaining 97-99% are eventually destroyed by the creating agencies”. The shockingly high number of documents destroyed by the US government reflects the practices of most state archives and raises a serious issue of missing data for researchers using historical data.

Turning to the politicized nature of state archives, the relatively recent access to documents from the Spanish Civil War and from Franco’s postwar regime were made available around the time of the passing of the ‘Law of Historical Memory’ in Spain in 2007. The controversial law acknowledged the victims of Franco’s repressive policies and was part of a wider effort across Spanish states and local archives to reveal the violence carried out by the Francoist regime. Some critics framed these new laws and initiatives as a ploy by the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party to mobilize support against conservative political parties still aligned with the historical legacies of the Francoist dictatorship (Boyd 2008; Preston 2015). Access and control of ‘displaced archives’—documents taken or destroyed by colonial administrators in the often-abrupt transitions during decolonization—further illustrates the political nature of primary sources (Lowry 2019). Lastly, if a primary source does survive and is accessible, researchers need to then address the context and motivations behind who originally created it and account for their biases. For example, when dealing with the covert, often illegal actions of state governments (O’Rourke 2018) or ideologically motivated violent state repression (Sullivan 2016). In short, there are inherent biases in the data accessible at archives as “the availability of these data is not random,” and in response, researchers have proposed ‘best practices’ for conducting archival research that guide the approach of this dissertation (Costalli and Ruggeri 2019: 61).

While historians have long engaged with primary source data (Lustick 1996; Kalyvas and Fedorwycz 2022), archival methods in conflict research are relatively new. Researchers are still developing “methodologies for sampling, cataloguing, and analyzing historical documents” (Balcells and Sullivan 2018: 137) and serious challenges and questions concerning the ethics of using archival data for researching political violence
and conflicts remain (Subotić 2020). However, conflict researchers have proposed best practices in archival research to meet the standards of other methodologies in the discipline. Laia Balcells (2021) recommends four practices: (1) understanding the creation of the archive and how the collection is organized by consulting archivists, (2) transparency about the biases in the data, (3) transparency about the sampling and coding of the data, and (4) making data and protocols accessible for replication. Jelena Subotić (2020) proposes a similar approach that stresses data transparency and replicability for addressing ethical and empirical challenges to using archival data. These approaches can help address the multitude of potential biases in the generation and preservation of archival data, which once identified, can be controlled for (Trachtenberg 2020: 138).

Another recommendation is to triangulate archival data with other primary sources (preferably from another archive) or secondary sources to confirm the biases or missingness in a set of data. For example, Stefano Costalli and Andrea Ruggeri (2019) recommend drawing on the ‘deep knowledge’ of historians on specific cases to mitigate some of the risks involved in using archival data (p. 62). Zeynep Bulutgil, Harris Mylonas, and Luis Schenoni (2023) argue that secondary sources used as descriptive evidence are valuable for developing and testing theories. Additionally, Ian Lustick (1996) argued that the relative consensus of historians on specific events can be used to confirm and control for biases or fill in missing data from the archives. Furthermore, historians can help narrow down the location of certain documents within archives as well as give valuable insights into the structure of record groups and how they were generated (O’Rourke 2020: 5)

For example, Jelena Subotić (2020) raises the issue of using sensitive, potentially harmful information on deceased participants who are unable to give their consent on evidence that may violate the privacy of their descendants.
In short, having an in-depth knowledge of a case and drawing on the secondary sources pertaining to them can help identify and address biases and missingness in archival data.

In alignment with these recommendations, the data collection and analysis of this dissertation seeks transparency and replicability. Throughout the data collection effort at both The National Archives of the UK (TNA) and the Imperial War Museum Collections (IWM), archivists were consulted on the structure and generation of the documents and record groups. Next, in constructing the dataset used for the large-N analysis in Chapter IV, which draws on hundreds of administrative reports collected at the TNA, I cross-referenced these re-education reports with the private papers of Colonel Henry Faulk (the head of the British re-education program) housed at the IWM and discovered additional reports, memos, and documents not preserved by the TNA that provide additional evidence and insights (likewise I found documents at the TNA that contradict Faulk’s recollection of events).

Next, all reports accessed at these archives are digitized for future researchers and the coding protocols used to score the variables of the analysis (see codebook in Appendix II) were constructed from the feedback of two pilot analyses and then improved with the involvement of a research assistant who tested the reliability and accuracy of the coding scheme with no previous knowledge of my theoretical argument. Finally, I draw on existing secondary sources to mitigate potential biases in the data, for example that the

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6 See Stathis Kalyvas and Daniel Fedorowycz’s (2022) extended discussion on political scientists using and misusing historical data. They contend that political scientists will need to engage with historical processes and adhere “to the best practices of historians” (p. 117).
reports are written by British officials and not the German POWs themselves, which are fully discussed in the empirical chapters.

In the next chapter, I develop the theoretical framework and present five hypotheses that are used to test theoretical argument.
Chapter II

Theory: The Role of Subgroup Leaders in Combatant Socialization

What explains the variation in socialization outcomes in armed organizations? Why do some combatants adopt the intended norms of their organization while others resist them? To answer these questions, this chapter develops a theoretical argument that explores the role of subgroup leaders in socialization. The theory presented in this chapter seeks to predict the variation in the socialization outcomes of combatants and their subsequent behaviors by building on recent research on the internal dynamics of armed organizations (Lyall 2020; McLauchlin 2020; Cantin 2021) and synthesizing them with long-standing theories from the military sociology (Stouffer 1949; Williams 1989; Kellett 1982; King 2013), organizational (Feldman 1981; Ashforth and Saks 1996), and prison socialization literatures (Wheeler 1961; Jacobs 1974; Lyman 1989; McGuire 2018). Together, this combined approach constructs a theoretical framework that explains conformity and resistance to norms within armed organizations. This approach complements conflict researchers who are also pushing back against “depictions of soldiers” as “largely homogenous” by examining the underexplored yet critical dimension of subgroup dynamics that drive armed group behavior (Manekin 2017: 608).
This project focuses on what I term conflict identities—the prototypical behaviors and attitudes that armed organizations seek to instill in their recruits through processes of socialization. As this chapter will show, the conflict identities of combatants vary, ranging from alignment with the official norms of their organization to significant divergence, sometimes to the point of active resistance. The existing literature on combatant socialization provides important insights into the broader structures and mechanisms of how norms are developed and transmitted within armed organizations (Checkel 2017; Parkinson 2021). In particular, the phenomenon of layered socialization is central—that combatants experience multiple sources of pressure to socialize, vertically from official institutions and agents of socialization as well as horizontally from fellow combatants (Bateson 2017; Bell 2022: 182-183). Along these axes of vertical and horizontal socialization are also overlapping formal and informal social networks that influence combatant preferences (Parkinson 2021; Lyall 2020: 12-14). While these theoretical advancements expand our understanding of socialization, they still struggle to account for and predict within-group variation.

Existing institutional approaches can explain organizational-level patterns of socialization outcomes. For example, how Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) combatants in El-Salvador (Hoover Green 2016, 2017, 2018) or People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) soldiers in Angola generally exhibited low levels of violence against civilians because of their political education and training, which emphasized restraint (Thaler 2012). Similarly, studies on state militaries, such as Thomas Ricks’ (2009, 2010) analysis of the US military in Iraq from 2003 to 2007, have also shown how the top-leadership and institutions of armed organizations can shape combatant norms. However, these institutional approaches are largely unable to account
for the combatants that did target civilians. Despite intensive socialization into norms of restraint in both the FMLN and the MPLA, some combatants within these organizations still committed indiscriminate violence. Likewise, in the US military, despite a strategic shift to adopt norms and tactics of restraint in Iraqi cities like Mosul, some American soldiers continued to carry out violence against civilians. Deviant behavior such as the targeting of civilians has been attributed to a lack of effective training (Bell 2016, 2022), from preexisting individual motivations that conflict with the goals of the group (Weinstein 2006), or as strategic responses (Downes 2006; 2008). However, as the examples presented in the introductory chapter demonstrate, divergent behaviors are often a subgroup phenomenon rather than an individual or organizational one. How do these within-organization, subgroup dynamics develop? How do combatants within the same organization that undergo the same formal training develop different conflict identities?

I argue that these within-organization dynamics and differences in conflict identities can be explained by the role of subgroup leaders. By subgroup leaders I refer to the small unit, junior and mid-level commanders of an organization who are responsible for filtering norms to rank-and-file combatants. For example, the squad and patrol leaders in the ADF and US Navy SEALs discussed in Chapter I who promoted unsanctioned behaviors in their units. I develop a two-step argument about the role of subgroup leaders in socialization. First, the proximity of subgroup leaders to the average combatant and their frequent interactions allows them to moderate the overall normative environment and daily lives of combatants. Leveraging their authority as leaders in both the formal organizational hierarchy and informal social networks, subgroup leaders use various mechanisms of control to support certain norms while suppressing others.
Second, subgroup leader control can create a stable environment of socialization that is normatively cohesive which increases the intensity of horizontal socialization between combatants. Combatants are not just following their subgroup leaders but are responding to their normative environment which is shaped by them.

This chapter proceeds in five sections. First, I discuss the literature on socialization in armed groups and resistance to socialization. The second section presents the theoretical argument, outlining the overall causal pathway of how different subgroup leaders can socialize combatants into aligned or divergent norms and develops five corresponding hypotheses for testing the theory. The third section demonstrates how the theoretical framework travels to settings of socialization within POW camps, discussing the overlapping military and prison socialization literatures. In the fourth section I introduce three alternative explanations that are controlled for in the empirical analyses before presenting the conclusion.

### 2.1 Socialization in Armed Organizations

Political scientists are increasingly interested in the internal dynamics of armed organizations, particularly how norms and behaviors develop and impact conflict and post-conflict outcomes (Daly et al. 2020; Bell 2022). These scholars generally examine *military socialization*—the processes within armed organizations that “strip away pre-military norms and identities” of recruits (Hoover Green 2016: 621) and “rebuild[s] them in the organizational image” to create a shared identity (Manekin 2017: 607). A primary goal of military socialization is to create a *normative consensus* among combatants—“a
cohesive social community, with shared expectations about what is right” (Manekin 2017: 610).

Formal military socialization is delivered vertically through institutions and practices such as recruitment, training, ideological instruction, isolation, and disciplinary measures that reward conformity and punish behaviors that contradict the values and objectives of the organization (Hoover Green 2017, 2018; Jackson et al. 2012). Intensive vertical socialization through repeated training and political re-education can reshape the normative preferences of combatants and directly impact their patterns of violence (Cantin 2021; Bell 2022). Simultaneously, individuals are also influenced by their fellow combatants and are managing multiple sources of socialization, or layered socialization, with pressure to conform from both organization officials (vertical) and fellow group members (horizontal) (Checkel 2017; Bateson 2017; Hoover Green 2018: 28). The extent to which combatants change their behaviors and attitudes through layered socialization leads to different socialization stages and outcomes.

**Socialization: Stages and Outcomes**
Scholars across different subfields typically theorize the socialization process as a stage model with three distinct phases and outcomes (Kelman 1958; Feldman 1981; Guimond 1995; Checkel 2005, 2017). These three stages of socialization range in intensity, from a practical acceptance of group norms—“simple behavioral adaptation”—to full *internalization* of the groups principles, which is when an individual fully accepts the norms and values of a group and conforms their identity around them (Checkel 2017: 594; Parsons 1951; Aronfreed 1969). The first stage, typically referred to as the ‘shock’ or
‘encounter’ period, is when an individual first joins a new group or environment and simply adapts their behavior to comply with group norms (Guimond 1995). When individuals are in this first stage of compliance, for example combatants forcibly recruited or conscripted (Gates 2017; Lyall 2020), it is considered Type 0 socialization—where no internalization occurs—and behavior is based on rational calculations to receive rewards and avoid punishments (Checkel 2017: 597).

The second, or ‘association’ stage, is when individuals associate themselves positively with the group and fulfill expected behaviors but may not internalize the group’s norms (Gates 2017). This is considered Type I socialization—where some internalization occurs because the individual “exhibits pro-group behavior” and acts “in accordance with group expectations” but may abandon those norms after leaving the group (Checkel 2017: 597, 2005). If an individual reaches the third, or ‘metamorphosis’ stage, they have achieved Type II socialization—when they fully internalize the norms of the group and structure their identity around them (Guimond 1995; Bateson 2017; Feldman 1981). Internalization is “making adherence to group norms ‘desirable’,” it is the “theoretical endpoint of armed-group socialization” and, put differently, is a “near synonym for preference change or predisposition change” (Hoover Green 2018: 39).

Synthesizing these stage models and assumptions from the military and organizational socialization literatures, this project conceptualizes the phases and outcomes of military socialization as a pyramid (see Figure 2.1). The blocks of the pyramid show both the stages and the outcomes of military socialization, as a combatant who leaves the organization while at the Type II stage is assumed to have a Type II outcome—complete internalization of the organization’s norms and conflict identity. Put differently, a Type II combatant changes their preferences to align with the official norms of their
armed organization while they are active members of it and after they exit group. This visualization also has demographic implications, as it shows that many members within an armed organization merely comply with expected behaviors (Type 0) and that only a minority fully internalize the values of the organization (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008; Walter 2017; Leader Maynard 2019: 643). Put differently, the base of the pyramid is comprised of nominal members while the top are the ‘hard-core’ members who have fully adapted their identity around the conflict identity of the organization.

Figure 2.1. The Military Socialization Pyramid

Note: The sections of the pyramid show the different potential stages and outcomes of socialization. Layered socialization—vertical and horizontal pressures to adopt norms—is what pushes and pulls combatants into different stages and outcomes. A combatant who leaves an armed organization while in the Type I stage is expected to have a Type I socialization outcome—partial internalization of their group’s intended conflict identity. The different sections also show the average distribution of conflict identities in an armed organization, as only a minority of combatants form a Type II conflict identity. This model is adapted from McCauley and Moskalenko’s (2008) political radicalization pyramid model.
Type 0 combatants are uncommitted members whose norms are unaligned with the organization. For example, forcibly recruited combatants in the Lord’s Resistance Army who display expected behaviors to avoid punishments (Gates 2017; Vermeij 2014) or opportunists seeking rewards (Cohen 2013; Guitèrrez-Sanín and Wood 2014). From the perspective of an armed organization, a Type 0 combatant is a failed socialization outcome as they did not adopt the preferences of the group. Type I combatants develop a positive association with the expected norms of their organization and have partially shifted their preferences to align with them (Cantin 2021). Conversely, Type II combatants internalize the values of their armed organization and significantly shift their preferences and are committed members that display the prototypical conflict identity of their organization. For example, a combatant in the Korean People’s Army who is also a dedicated member of the Workers’ Party of Korea and a staunch supporter of the Kim dynasty (Bradbury and Meyers 1968).

While demographically smaller, Type II combatants wield significant influence over both vertical and horizontal socialization processes. Type II’s exemplify the prototypical conflict identity that other combatants should emulate. Type II’s are likely to be middle to high-ranking officers that occupy formal or informal leadership roles within armed organizations and can use their authority to influence Type o’s and Type I’s (Bell and Terry 2021). “These mid-level leaders...possess ‘highly specialized training and knowledge,’ operational and tactical experience, and the direct contact with and loyalty of the foot soldiers” (Daly 2014: 336). The leadership skills of Type II commanders, particularly within the tightly controlled environment and hierarchical structure of armed organizations, allows them to “yield a considerable degree of socializing power” (Cantin 2021: 1571).
From the perspective of armed organizations, effective socialization results in combatants adopting at least a Type I but ideally a Type II conflict identity. Type I and Type II conflict identities are considered positive socialization outcomes, as combatants move beyond instrumental compliance and shift their preferences to align with the organization. For example, for the US Military Academy, which reinforces ethics, international law, and professionalism throughout its four-year training and curriculum (Bell 2022: 185), a positive socialization outcome is when combatants demonstrate adherence towards norms of restraint. Conversely, a US Military Academy cadet or graduate who does not value or adhere to norms of restraint (i.e., targeting civilians) is considered a Type 0, negative socialization outcome. While it is difficult to accurately determine preference change (Hoover Green 2018: 43), socialization scholars use a combination of attitudinal and behavioral changes from combatants to observe and track combatant preferences (McLauchlin 2020: 15-36; Vermeiji 2014; Checkel 2017, 2005).

Socialization can have a non-linear pattern where individuals fluctuate between these different stages (Long and Hadden 1985: 47; Ashforth and Saks 1996). Socialization is a fluid process in which individuals are constantly “reinterpreting and adapting to shifting, often demanding conditions” (Manekin 2017: 609). Combatant norms and preferences can change in response to the stability, conditions, and duration within their environment. The vertical and horizontal pressures on combatants from layered socialization can work in tandem to engender conformity, moving combatants towards Type I and Type II stages and outcomes, but they can also contradict and compete, causing combatants to remain or revert to Type 0 (see Figure 2.1). For example, combatants are more likely to adopt preferences of restraint when they are reinforced by both formal agents of socialization (vertical) and by their fellow squad members.
(horizontal) (Bell and Terry 2021). However, squad members can also support norms that contradict the expected behaviors and attitudes of the organization. If the members of a combatant’s immediate unit do not support restraint towards civilians and or reinforce deviant behavior such as indiscriminate violence, it can complicate their socialization process. Building on this framework, scholars have further investigated how norms are diffused and why some combatants resist socialization.

Resisting Socialization
Military socialization is a process closely linked to the structure of armed organizations. Armed groups are complex, heterogenous organizations in which combatants are simultaneously nested in overlapping formal and informal social networks (Bell and Terry 2021; Hundman and Parkinson 2019). Formal networks are structured around the official institutions and hierarchies of an organization that are administered from the top-down by agents of socialization who seek to maintain adherence to the norms and goals of the group. For example, officials involved in the recruitment and basic training of combatants (Wood 2009: 138; Manekin 2020; Hoover Green 2017). Informal networks are the immediate social groups of a combatant at the primary group and small-unit levels (Shils and Janowitz 1948; Stouffer 1949). Combatants associate with both the official goals and expectations of the wider group as well as the distinct norms of their immediate unit which can have its own rules and rituals (Arkin and Dobrofsky 1978: Kellet 1982).

Interactions between the formal and informal networks of armed organizations extend directly to the socialization process. Within this overlapping social network, combatants are managing multiple sources of socialization from both organization
officials (vertical) and group members (horizontal) (Bell 2022: 182-183). When the norms of a combatant’s informal social system diverge from the official norms of the organization, it can lead to contradictory behaviors that disrupt the intended socialization process (Manekin 2017, 2020; Parkinson 2021; McLauchlin 2020). However, informal networks can also actively reinforce formal socialization objectives by “exercising mutual surveillance—monitoring each other’s levels of conformity and obedience” to ensure that everyone is adopting the expected norms and behaviors of the group (Scott 2011: 89; Wamsley 1972). While scholars acknowledge that the interactions between these formal and informal networks are important, it is still unclear which social network is driving the process (Bell and Terry 2021: 830; Parkinson 2021: 8).

Recent studies on the microlevel dynamics of armed organizations demonstrate the importance of informal networks. Breakdowns in unit cohesion, such as desertion, defection, and surrender can be explained by the various ethnic and socioeconomic composition of armed organizations that often define its informal networks (Lyall 2020). The microlevel linkages between combatants, specifically their “bonds of trust”, “create norms of cooperation” and “social rules” that motivate them to keep fighting or to desert (McLauchlin 2020: 2, 2015). Resistance to formal authority in armed groups, such as disobedience, foot dragging, and shirking, are often a subgroup phenomenon that develop when there is a normative conflict with the expected behaviors and attitudes of the wider organization (Manekin 2017, 2020). Additionally, while the political and ideological goals of an armed organization are established by formal leadership and maintained through

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7 Combat motivation at the subgroup level has been a longstanding focus of military sociology and cohesion studies (Shils and Janowitz 1948; Kellet 1982).
institutions, they are interpreted and reinforced through the everyday, informal interactions between combatants at the small-group level (Parkinson 2021).

Building on this research, I argue that socialization largely occurs within informal networks, specifically at the small-unit, subgroup level. This expectation is also informed by the military sociology and organizational socialization literatures which have long discussed the significance of informal networks and their unofficial norms in the socialization process. Individuals in new social environments rely on fellow group members to learn expected norms and behaviors (Ostroff and Kozlowski 1992; Settersten 2002). After basic training, recruits are no longer directly supervised by official agents of socialization and join their combat unit which becomes their “center of orientation” and their primary group (Zurcher 1967: 93; Shils and Janowitz 1948; Kellet 1982). Primary groups—the immediate social unit of a combatant—can form larger subgroups that vary in size and can exist at the squad, platoon, or company level and have their own mechanisms for socialization based on unique “norms and habits” that are sometimes unsanctioned by the wider military organization (Siebold 2007: 289; King 2013). These subgroups can use peer-pressure, hazing, initiation rituals, and their own forms of re-education to impose “their own set of norms and values that soldiers must learn and follow,” which can lead to resistance against the official goals and wider culture of the armed organization (Manekin 2020: 83).

Horizontal socialization at the micro level is guided by Type II agents of socialization who wield significant influence and represent the prototypical identity of their subgroup and environment. Subgroup leaders occupy a unique position as they are leaders in both formal and informal social networks, operating directly alongside combatants while also in the official command structure of the organization (Bell and
Terry 2021; Hundman and Parkinson 2019; Williams 1989). Subgroup leaders directly shape “informally structured social networks” and “mediate the impact of formal organizations on individual members” (McEwen 1980: 161). In short, subgroup leaders are the “moral compass” of their units” (Bell 2022: 192). This project theorizes that subgroup leaders are the bridge between formal and informal networks within armed organizations and can act as moderators who filter and interpret the norms that flow down to the subgroup level which makes their role in the socialization process pivotal.

2.2 Theoretical Approach: The Role of Subgroup Leaders in Socialization

Subgroup leaders are agents of socialization that occupy small-unit officer positions, for example as squad, platoon, or company leaders. Subgroup leaders occupy a key position within the command structure of an armed organization and the socialization process. As junior commanders, they interact with rank-and-file combatants in the field, often outside the direct control of formal institutions and leadership. Outside of formal supervision, “centralized control decreases considerably, and the control and leadership exercised by small-unit commanders begin to play a much larger role” (Manekin 2020: 8).

For example, after the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the US Marine Corps expanded rapidly, strategically forming new and pre-existing divisions around the leadership of ‘the Old Breed’—Marine veterans who, although “small in number...like a drop of dye in a gallon of water...gave the whole division an unmistakable hue...there were enough of them to leaven the Division and to impart to thousands of younger men a share of...the unique spirit which animated them” (Frank 1992: 47-48). These veterans formed the backbone of their units by instructing the thousands of young enlistees on the expected norms of the Marine Corps (Sledge 1981: 38-41).

In Western military organizations, these junior positions are often occupied by noncommissioned Officers. Official representatives of the state embedded within units, for example political commissars in the Soviet, Vietcong and North Vietnamese, or Chinese communist armies, are considered formal agents of socialization. In this theoretical framework, these types of official agents are part of the formal social networks of combatants and are not considered subgroup leaders.
For example, in El-Salvador, training in the FMLN emphasized restraint towards civilians, however, “the mere existence of political education did not accomplish this goal; rather, commanders consistently reinforced and repeated lessons” in the field which led to “very low levels of violence against civilians” (Hoover Green 2018: 45). The task of socialization and maintaining conformity to the official norms of the organization is delegated directly to subgroup leaders, where they can choose to reinforce or undermine the official socialization process (see Figure 2.2).

Figure 2.2. The Role of Subgroup Leaders in Layered Socialization

Note: Figure 2.2 shows a hypothetical armed organization that contains two distinct subgroups. The leadership of Subgroup 1 are aligned in their norms with the wider organization and in turn reinforce sanctioned norms at the subgroup level while the leadership of Subgroup 2 has divergent norms that contradict the
official goals of the organization which can undermine the intended socialization process. Figure 1 illustrates the unique position of subgroup leaders as the mediators between formal and informal social networks as well as how conflicting norms can also impact horizontal socialization between combatants at the subgroup level.

I argue that combatant socialization is mainly driven by subgroup leaders who control the environment and direction of socialization. Subgroup leaders can shape the prevailing norms of a social environment by leveraging their organizational authority and proximity to rank-and-file combatants to reinforce or undermine the intended socialization process of the organization. I posit that subgroup leaders use three mechanisms of control to influence social environments: (1) emulation and participation, by displaying and encouraging the prototypical Type II behaviors and attitudes of the organization that are mimicked by combatants, (2) empowerment and protection, by supporting combatants adhering to sanctioned norms, and (3) suppression, by minimizing combatants who hold divergent norms (see Table 2.1). Subgroup leaders can effectively monitor and exert control over environments because they are embedded in the formal and informal social networks of combatants which gives them reliable information on subgroup dynamics. Using these mechanisms of control, subgroup leaders can create a normatively cohesive and stable environment that increases horizontal socialization between combatants.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanisms</th>
<th>Observable Implications</th>
<th>Link to Theoretical Argument</th>
<th>Selected Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emulation and Participation</td>
<td>Subgroup leader personally encourages and demonstrates expected norms;</td>
<td>Introduces and maintains expected norms within subgroup through direct actions which</td>
<td>Training combatants to be aggressive towards civilian populations—see Frederick (2010) for the US Army in Iraq and the Brereton Report (2020) for the ADF in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subgroup leader participates directly in socialization processes.</td>
<td>shape normative environment.</td>
<td>Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Or</td>
<td>Exercising restraint towards civilian populations—see Bell and Terry (2021) for Australian and Philippine armies and Hoover Green (2018) for the FMLN in El-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Salvador.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowerment and Protection</td>
<td>Subgroup leader supports combatants with shared norms;</td>
<td>Moderating normative environment by increasing the influence of certain combatants with</td>
<td>Promoting combatants with divergent norms—see Frederick (2010) and Phillips (2021).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elevates combatants with shared norms to positions of power within the subgroup and or</td>
<td>shared norms.</td>
<td>See Manekin (2020: 73-109) for examples from the Israeli Defense Force in the Second Intifada. For protection, see Wood and Toppelberg (2017) who discuss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>protects them from organization officials and other combatants.</td>
<td></td>
<td>officers covering up sexual assaults in the US military.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suppression</td>
<td>Subgroup leader minimizes contradictory norms through isolation, punishments, and or</td>
<td>Moderating normative environment by minimizing the influence of certain combatants with</td>
<td>Hazing, peer-pressure, and isolation of combatants from contradictory norms—see Cantin (2021) for isolation and suppression of norms in the Revolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>lack of support for combatants with different norms; Monitors normative content (e.g.,</td>
<td>different norms and monitoring normative content to media).</td>
<td>United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone. For monitoring normative content, see Bradbury and Meyers (1968) for examples from the North Korean army.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As shown in Figure 2.2, this project conceptualizes two main types of subgroup leaders, *aligned* and *divergent*. Aligned subgroup leaders support the official norms and prototypical conflict identity of their armed organization. Aligned subgroup leaders themselves can act as Type II agents of socialization, directly reinforcing sanctioned norms and activities through their own behavior and rhetoric that combatants can emulate. They can act as mentors, “informally induct[ing] a new peer to the normative and behavioral expectations of the group” (Cantin 2021: 1578), or they can support individuals within the subgroup who act as political entrepreneurs that spread “shared conceptions of priorities and political meaning...translat[ing] ideas into practice” (Costelli and Ruggeri 2017: 925). Aligned subgroup leaders control social environments by suppressing individuals with divergent norms and by supporting individuals propagating sanctioned norms.

Combatants supported by aligned subgroup leaders are allowed to diffuse their ideas and influence social environments unimpeded, sometimes with an expanded platform and resources from organization officials. Meanwhile, the influence of combatants with divergent norms can be suppressed through methods of ‘coercive persuasion’ such as peer-pressure, hazing, and isolation, as well as through formal disciplinary procedures (Hoover Green 2017; Kellet 1982). By minimizing exposure to divergent norms and increasing the influence of individuals spreading sanctioned norms, aligned subgroup leaders can create a stable social environment with a normative consensus that establishes prevailing attitudes and expected behaviors of combatants. By creating a socially cohesive environment and reinforcing norms through these mechanisms of control, aligned subgroup leaders increase the intensity of horizontal
socialization—when combatants themselves exert social pressures on each other to conform to shared norms. These assumptions lead to the formation of the first hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 1:** Combatants in subgroups with aligned leaders are more likely to adopt the official norms of an organization.

Conversely, divergent subgroup leaders are unsupportive of or even hostile towards the official norms and conflict identity of their organization. Divergent subgroup leaders can espouse and reinforce contradictory norms that can socialize combatants with values and behaviors that go against the goals of the wider organization. For example, in the US Army, the leaders of 1st Platoon, Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, within the 502nd Infantry Regiment of the 101st Airborne Division operating outside of Baghdad in 2006 did not adhere to norms of restraint towards Iraqi civilians and socialized their unit accordingly. In direct opposition to their official US Army training to adhere to norms of restraint (Hoover Green 2018: 43; Bell 2022) and an organizational wide strategic shift to establish positive relations with Iraqi civilians, 1st Platoon had “redraw[n] moral and social codes that they believed applied only to them” (Frederick 2010: 173). “Suspected insurgents were beaten as a matter of course, with the full blessings and...insistence of some team leaders and squad leaders...Sergeants would egg the younger soldiers on, making fun of privates who didn’t hit the detainees hard enough” (Ibid.: 244).

Divergent subgroups like 1st Platoon can openly signal their normative differences and take pride in them, conflicting with aligned subgroups and destabilizing the overall environment and goals of socialization. When combatants “subscribe to competing norms” and have the backing of a “social support network that validate their divergent choice, resistance is likely to increase” (Manekin 2017: 608). Divergent subgroup leaders
can have a particularly negative effect on an environment of socialization, as they present an alternative identity for participants to associate with that undermines the intended norms of the wider armed organization. This leads to the formulation the second hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 2:** (A) Combatants in subgroups with divergent leaders are less likely to adopt the official norms of an organization; and (B) Combatants in divergent subgroups are more likely to resist official socialization initiatives.

Subgroups can also have a *mixed* leadership type—when there are both aligned and divergent leaders within the same subgroup. In mixed subgroups, only some leaders are active in socialization processes and there is often a lack of a normative consensus and, in turn, uneven horizontal socialization among combatants. Subgroups with a mixed leadership type are inconsistent in their support for the official norms of their organization, which can increase the likelihood of a negative socialization outcome—combatants failing to adopt the intended conflict identity of the group. The normative environment within mixed subgroups can be unstable and fragmented, with multiple, potentially contradictory practices present without prevailing norms for combatants to emulate. This leads to the development of the next hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 3:** Combatants in subgroups with mixed leaders are less likely to adopt the official norms of an organization.

The three subgroup leadership types and their expected socialization outcomes are summarized in Table 2.2. The final hypothesis of this project turns to the impact of a cohesive normative environment for increasing horizontal socialization.
Table 2.2. Expected Socialization Outcomes by Subgroup Leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subgroup Leadership Type</th>
<th>Support for Official Socialization</th>
<th>Expected Socialization Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aligned</strong></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Divergent</strong></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mixed</strong></td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A key condition for effective socialization is a stable environment in which “learning opportunities” are consistently administered and the influence of contradictory norms are limited (McGuire 2018: 8). Dissent and conflicting norms can lead to active resistance against socialization which can make the environment of identity formation unstable (Settersten 2002; Long and Hadden 1985). Environments that lack a normative consensus because of diverging norms can cause “strain, confusion, and social disorganization” and trigger a normative contest between opposing subgroups that disrupts the official objectives and environment of socialization (Mortimer and Simmons 1978: 432; Feldman 1981; Ashforth and Mael 1989). Unsanctioned norms that openly conflict with the expected behavior of the wider group can complicate a combatant’s socialization by presenting unclear or rival norms to adopt. Within unstable and normatively divided environments, horizontal socialization is less likely.

Horizontal socialization through informal interactions between combatants is critical to shaping collective attitudes and preferences. As discussed by Sarah Parkinson (2021), the everyday interactions between rank-and-file members forms a ‘practical ideology’, the “sets of quotidian principles, ideas, and social heuristics that reflect

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10 See Phillips (2021) for an overview of the normative contest between different subgroups in the US Navy SEALS (pp. 68-84).
relational worldviews rather than specific published political doctrines” (p. 1). Combatants “spread practical ideologies through often banal, everyday behaviors—jokes, gossip, unsanctioned rituals” that “shape social relations” and “collective practices...[that] socialize militants...into associated practices” (Ibid.: 9). As put by Colonel Henry Faulk (1977), the head of the British re-education program for German combatants after the Second World War, the daily ‘barrack-room’ discussions and interactions between combatants make them “aware of attitudes” and reinforce certain norms (p. 75).

Whether individuals are active, supportive members of a subgroup, or opportunists seeking material benefits, their surrounding environment will influence their rational calculations and how they navigate socialization (Feldman 1981; Mortimer and Simmons 1978). While few combatants fully internalize the norms of the group (Leader Maynard 2019: 643; Walter 2017), their social environment, particularly peer-pressure from fellow combatants, still impacts their behavioral patterns which can lead to positive associations (Type I) and eventually significant attitudinal changes to match the prevailing norms of their subgroup (Type II) (Guimond 1995). Peer-pressure from Type II ‘hardliners’ are “particularly influential in socializing their moderate peers...incentivizing even initially moderate members to adopt views that are more radical” (Cantin 2021: 1577). In short, individuals are more likely to adopt norms if they are consistently reinforced by their subgroup in an environment with a normative consensus. This leads to the formulation of the final hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 4**: Horizontal socialization between combatants is more likely in environments with a normative consensus
Together, these hypotheses underpin the two-step theoretical argument of this project, that subgroup leaders leverage their authority and close contact to combatants to promote certain norms while suppressing others, which can create a normative consensus that influences the content of an environment’s practical ideology which in turn impacts horizontal socialization and socialization outcomes (see Figure 2.3).

Figure 2.3. The Potential Impact of Aligned Subgroup Leaders on Socialization

This theoretical argument suggests several observable implications. First, if subgroup leaders control and shape the norms of a social environment, then they require sufficient resources and authority to monitor, support, and suppress the norms of combatants. In this theoretical framework, subgroup leaders are low to mid-level commanders with some degree of institutional authority and leadership experience to act directly as agents of socialization and or to empower or subdue combatant norms. If subgroup leaders are moderating norms and are aligned with the official goals of their organization, we would observe that they are active in socialization—leading or supporting socialization initiatives and propagating the intended norms of the organization. Meanwhile, divergent subgroup leaders are unsupportive of official socialization processes, potentially espousing their own distinct norms that contradict the goals of the wider organization. Second, if subgroup leaders form a normative consensus,
then it should be observed that divergent norms are limited and there is no significant resistance or disruptions to official socialization initiatives. Environments with a normative consensus feature attitudinal and behavioral cohesion which is observed through widespread participation and support for official socialization initiatives and no salient divergent subgroups. These observable implications are summarized and expanded in Table 2.3 and potential alternative explanations are fully discussed in section 2.4.
### Table 2.3
#### Observable Implications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Observable Implications</th>
<th>Testable Data and Link to Chapters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>H1:</strong> Combatants in subgroups with aligned leaders are more likely to adopt the official norms of an organization.</td>
<td>Subgroup leaders are active in socialization processes; Subgroup leaders openly support the official norms of the organization.</td>
<td>Individual level data on the political attitudes and activities of subgroup leaders to determine subgroup leadership type and involvement in socialization. Measure of subgroup attitudes over time to determine socialization outcomes. Tested in Chapters III and IV.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H2A:</strong> Combatants in subgroups with divergent leaders are less likely to adopt the official norms of an organization.</td>
<td>Subgroup leaders are not active in official socialization processes; Subgroup leaders display and support alternative norms that diverge from the official organization.</td>
<td>Individual level data on the political attitudes and activities of subgroup leaders to determine subgroup leadership type and involvement in socialization. Measure of subgroup attitudes over time to determine socialization outcomes. Tested in Chapters III, IV, and V.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H2B:</strong> Combatants in divergent subgroups are more likely to resist official socialization initiatives.</td>
<td>Combatants in subgroups with divergent leaders disrupt and or refuse to participate in formal socialization.</td>
<td>Evidence of disruptions and resistance to socialization. Group level data on the social environment, political attitudes, and participation of combatants in socialization. Tested in Chapters III and V.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H3:</strong> Combatants in subgroups with mixed leaders are less likely to adopt the official norms of an organization.</td>
<td>Lack of normative cohesion among subgroup leaders; Uneven participation and support for official socialization from subgroup leaders; Normative contest between subgroup leaders with conflicting norms.</td>
<td>Individual level data on the political attitudes and activities of subgroup leaders to determine subgroup leadership type and involvement in socialization. Measure of subgroup attitudes over time to determine socialization outcomes. Tested in Chapters III and IV.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H4:</strong> Horizontal socialization between combatants is more likely in environments with a normative consensus.</td>
<td>No divergent subgroups or normative contests present; Contradictory norms are minimized; No significant disruptions to socialization initiatives; Clear, dominant political attitudes; Mass participation in socialization initiatives and widespread displays of expected behaviors.</td>
<td>Group level data on the social environment, political attitudes, and participation of combatants in socialization. Evidence of rank-and-file combatants reinforcing expected norms. Tested in Chapter IV.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Lastly, it is important to outline the theoretical scope and time horizon of this argument. Research has outlined the long-term effects of military socialization on the attitudes of former combatants (Jennings and Markus 1977; Arkin and Dobrofsky 1978; Settersten 2006) and how these attitudes can negatively impact postwar societies and peace initiatives (Daly et al. 2020; Bowd and Özerdem 2013; Jha and Wilkinson 2012). While this framework has implications for post-conflict research, which are explored in Chapter VI, the theoretical focus of this project is on the role of subgroup leaders in the socialization processes of combatants during conflict. This project is interested in how norms are transmitted and developed within armed organizations and how they influence the preferences of combatants while they are still within the social environment of their armed group and subgroup.

Relatedly, the prewar attitudes and socialization experiences of combatants are largely outside of the scope of this theoretical framework. Individuals with certain pre-existing attitudes often self-select into armed organizations (Bachman et al. 1987; Jackson et al. 2012) and these prewar norms and experiences can impact military socialization processes (Bell, Gift, and Monten 2022; Lyall 2020; Guimond 1995). The theoretical framework of this project acknowledges that combatants are not ‘blank slates’ and have preexisting attitudes and agency, taking a largely bottom-up approach to how individuals navigate socialization processes at the small-group, micro-level. Empirically, issues of self-selection and prewar attitudes are in part addressed by the case selection, which involves a large sample of German combatants who were a combination of volunteers and conscripts. Furthermore, the archival data used in this project provides information on the prewar experiences and attitudes of subgroup leaders enabling the analysis to control for prewar, civilian socialization. Ultimately, this project focuses on
what forms the preferences of combatants that underpin their behaviors and repertoires of violence during conflict, which the extensive socialization literature outlined in this chapter largely attributes to the extreme pressures to conform within armed organizations.

2.3 Re-education in Prisoner of War Camps

A key assumption of this project is that the theoretical framework outlined in this chapter is testable in settings of state-operated POW camps with re-education programs. As discussed in section 1.3 in Chapter I, the case selection for this project was in part motivated by the lack of accessible fine-grain observational data on subgroup leaders within armed organizations. However, I contend that both armed organizations and POW camps share key characteristics that make my theoretical framework applicable to re-education programs for POWs. Similarly to armed organizations, POW camps with re-education programs are also total institutions—environments where “members are immersed and enclosed” within an institution that aims to “fundamentally change their identities” through cognitive and behavioral socialization (Scott 2011: 2; McEwen 1980; Cushman 1989). Both military and prison socialization studies emerged from this early concept of total institutions and share a theoretical foundation that discuss environments with similar conditions and mechanisms of identity reformation (Wheeler 1961; Scott 2011; Hoover Green 2018: 28). In this section, I show how theories on resocialization in prison settings overlap with the previously discussed theories on combatant socialization in armed organizations and apply to POW camps with re-education programs. Furthermore, I discuss how POW camps with re-education programs are fundamentally
militarized prisons with goals of preference reformation and subgroup dynamics similar to armed organizations. Ultimately, this section shows how my theory on the role of subgroup leaders applies to settings of total institutions with combatants.

The concept of the total institution was developed by Goffman (1961) and is defined as a highly controlled and hierarchical environment that is largely closed to the outside world and whose primary objective is to change the identity of its participants. They are settings where individuals live together in a well-defined environment with a regimented routine, clear goals, expectations, and where people are treated en masse and not as individuals (Goffman 1961). All aspects of a total institution are directed “towards a single rational plan or goal—namely that of resocialization” (Scott 2011: 9; Mortimer and Simmons 1978). Resocialization is the process “by which a person learns the values, norms, and required behaviors” of an organization while often “relinquishing” some of their previous attitudes (Van Maanen 1976: 56, 65). Note that this conceptualization of resocialization is nearly interchangeable with the definition of military socialization used in section 2.1, as the primary goal is for individuals to learn new norms and change some of their preexisting preferences (Guimond 1995). Total institutions are principally “resocialization systems” whose “formal purpose is to make up for or correct some deficiency in earlier socialization” (Wheeler 1966: 68) and seek to create a “deep initial break with past roles” (Cushman 1986: 10). Armed organizations and prison environments are considered archetypical total institutions because they feature “collective socialization” where preference formation is achieved through processes that change the norms of individuals (Ashforth and Saks 1996: 150).

In describing the social environments within British POW camps during WWI in Germany, historian Oliver Wilkinson (2017) notes that they are “consistent with Erving
Goffman’s assessment of ‘Total Institutions’ in that all phases of the day’s activities are
tightly scheduled, with one activity leading at a prearranged time into the next, the whole
sequence of activities being imposed from above by a system of explicit formal rulings and
a body of officials” (p. 78). Similarly to armed organizations, whose primary goal is to
socialize “the newcomer to the norms and practices of the total institution” and strip away
their preexisting norms (Hoover Green 2018: 28), the American and British re-education
programs for German POWs were also total institutions that sought to fundamentally
alter combatant preferences (Smith 1996). As the empirical chapters illustrate, the goal
of American and British re-educators was to ‘denazify’ and ‘democratize’ German POWs
before sending them back to Germany (Krammer 1979; Robin 1995; Faulk 1977). Given
the overlapping goals and characteristics of armed organizations and rehabilitative prison
environments, socialization scholars often interchangeably apply key mechanisms of
identity formation and reformation between these different settings.

Prison socialization studies find that layered socialization also unfolds in prison
like settings which are influenced by subgroups that can reinforce or disrupt the official
identity formation process (Scott 2011: 100; Decker and Pyrooz 2019; Lyman 1989). Just
as in armed organizations, subgroups in prison like environments have observable
behaviors, norms, and leaders that are salient enough to discern if they are in support of
or against socialization (Jacobs 1974; McGuire 2018). Prisons are also complex social
environments with overlapping formal and informal networks that can align or diverge in
their preferences (Wheeler 1961; Ruddell and Winterdyk 2010). Prisons can also feature
multiple subgroups led by influential leaders that can shape the expected behaviors of

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11 See Robin (1995) for discussion on POW camps during the Second World War as total
institutions (p. 30).
their environment and undermine official socialization programs (Lyman 1989; Jacobs 1974: 402; Ruddell and Winterdyk 2010). Individuals navigating these dual pressures of socialization can develop varying levels of conformity to either the ‘prison-inmate’ subculture or the official socialization goals of their captors (Edwards 1970). These dynamics also extend to contemporary re-education and reintegration programs, for example, deradicalization programs in Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Gunaratna and Ali 2009; Gunaratna and Hussin 2019; El-Said 2015) or South Korea’s Hanawon program for North Korean defectors (Demick 2010). I argue that these shared dynamics, developed by parallel literatures, apply to POW camps which are militarized prison environments that feature subgroups and layered socialization.

In addition to both settings being total institutions, another important condition that makes my theoretical framework applicable to POW camps is that within both armed organizations and POW camps, individuals are designated and treated as combatants. POWs are combatants that experience a social environment of control, routine, and hierarchy comparable to an armed organization (Kramer 1979: 49; Bernard et al. 2011). Under the Hague and Geneva Conventions, POWs are “subject to the laws, regulations, and orders enforced in the army” (Wilkinson 2017: 95; Moore 2010: 111-121) and are legally considered “captured enemy combatants” (Wallace 2015: 2). As a result of this

12 This distinction between combatant and ex-combatant is theoretically important. The motivations, environments, and dynamics of socialization within re-education programs in POW camps is fundamentally different from initiatives of postwar disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs for ex-combatants. DDR programs often seek to dissolve the wartime bonds of combatants and as a result generally attempt to minimize the influence of former commanders and comrades (Humphreys and Weinstein 2007; Muggah and O’Donnell 2015). Additionally, unlike armed organizations and POW camps, most DDR programs do not meet the scope conditions to qualify as a total institution. Ex-combatants are typically free to participate in DDR programs and are no longer bound to an enclosed social environment with other combatants and are instead often influenced by other sources of socialization such as civilian communities (Kaplan and Nussio 2015; Osborne et al. 2018). While former military ties
designation and the guidelines provided by the Geneva Convention, the social structures of POW camps are often strikingly similar to armed organizations. For example, German POWs held by both America and Britain during the Second World War “were treated as soldiers by the Geneva Convention...as such, their camp social structure duplicated the military hierarchy of the German Army” (Krammer 1979: 49-50) where “officers exercised the same authority they had before capture” (Quinn 2015: 89-90). In the American and British administered POW camps analyzed in Chapters III, IV, and V, captured combatants were allowed to recreate and maintain their wartime social structures. Historians emphasize the “considerable relief” that German combatants felt when they arrived at POW camps because it marked a “return to normalcy and to a social structure not too dissimilar [from the army],” where “the privileges of military rank are restored” and combatants are again “a member of a closely organized, supervised, and regimented group” (Smith 1996: 59; Krammer 1979; Robin 1995). However, there are some key differences between armed organizations and POW camps.

State-operated reeducation programs for POWs are a specific type of socialization initiative. They are often compulsory for the participants involved and are primarily within a context where the socializer and the socializee are former enemies. For example, the American re-education program for North Korean and Chinese POWs during the Korean War (Bradbury and Meyers 1968; Tovy 2011), the Soviet re-education program for Japanese POWs during and after the Second World War (Barshay 2013; Kuznetsov and subgroup dynamics are important in postwar settings (Themnèr 2012, 2015; Daly et al. 2020), and my theoretical argument has implications for postwar socialization which are discussed in Chapter VI, my framework categorizes POWs as combatants and not as ex-combatants who are in postwar settings where subgroup dynamics are less salient.
1997; Muminov 2017), or contemporary deradicalization programs for extremists across the Middle East and North Africa (El-Said 2015; Gunaratna and Hussin 2019). These are examples of forced socialization within a closed, penitentiary like environment where the formal agents of socialization are often former enemies and the goals of socialization are centered around norms that were previously viewed as negative (e.g., democratizing communists). This fundamental difference between socialization within armed organizations and POW camps and its empirical implications is partially mitigated by the case selection of this project, as the re-education initiatives in German POW camps in America and Britain were largely voluntary and were directed by the German POWs themselves. As the empirical chapters will detail, German POWs were responsible for managing internal camp affairs and led re-educational activities, meaning that socialization was not directly implemented by former enemies and that the subgroup dynamics within the German military largely recreated themselves in the camps.

Lastly, another important difference between these settings is the absence of combat. While the conditions of POW camps can be life threatening and organized violence can still occur within them, POWs are typically moved far away from active combat zones and are no longer participating in combat. Wartime experiences and participation in combat are important factors in socialization processes, particularly in accelerating the bonds developed between soldiers (Williams 1989; Kellet 1982). The absence of combat in POW camps may impact the intensity or trajectory of socialization outcomes within them. Additionally, combatants in POW camps with re-education programs are no longer training for combat or combat related tasks and are instead directed towards learning new ideological norms. However, as discussed in Chapters III, IV, and V, the overall social structures and subgroup dynamics featured within both the
American and British re-education programs for German POWs featured socialization conditions similar to the environment of the German military.

My theoretical argument synthesizes key mechanisms from the overlapping military, prison, and organizational socialization literatures. Total institutions like armed organizations and POW camps with re-education programs share similar goals, conditions, subgroup dynamics, and mechanisms of identity formation. As a result, my theoretical framework is applicable to total institutions with combatants. Ultimately, I view preference formation within POW camps with re-education programs as another instance of combatant socialization in a unique setting.

2.4 Alternative Explanations

This section details three potential factors outside of subgroup leader influence that could also impact combatant preferences and socialization outcomes. These alternative theories are controlled for and addressed in the empirical analyses of Chapters III, IV, and V.

Prewar and Wartime Attitudes

A potential explanation for the socialization outcomes of combatants is that they were predetermined by already established prewar and wartime norms. It is possible that combatants, regardless of their subgroup leaders, were already going to adopt certain preferences based on their previous attitudes and socialization experiences. For example, in the context of the British and American re-education programs, that German combatants who were already committed Nazis were incapable of developing pro-
democratic norms. Prewar characteristics are important, as identity formation is a life-long process where previous socialization experiences are cumulative and can continue to influence later periods of socialization even within total institutions like armed organizations (Inkeles 1969; Long and Hadden 1985; Guimond 1995). As a result, it is imperative to control for the pre-socialization attitudes of individuals in order to accurately measure the influence of subgroup leaders on normative preferences.

Available data from the British and American programs allows me to control for prewar and wartime attitudes. Both British and American officials screened German combatants for their political preferences prior to re-education (Quinn 2015; Krammer 1979). British officials invested substantial resources into screening and categorizing German combatants by their political attitudes (Sullivan 1979; Faulk 1977). As a result, prior to the implementation of re-education, each POW camp was categorized by their prevailing political attitudes (e.g., Nazi, anti-Nazi, politically mixed). The analyses of Chapters III and IV demonstrate that even when controlling for starting political attitudes, there is a significant relationship between subgroup leadership type and the variation in socialization outcomes. For example, even in camps with large populations of combatants considered hardcore Nazis—those that were early members of the Nazi Party and its armed wings the SS and SA—are still capable of developing democratic norms if there is support from their subgroup leaders. Unfortunately, in the American context, there is a lack of data on the individual attitudes of each camp. However, US Army surveys provide the average distribution of political attitudes in the camps prior to re-education which is leveraged in Chapter V.
**Civilian Contact: Alternative Sources of Norms**

Another factor potentially driving combatant socialization outcomes is influence from other sources of norms outside of subgroups. While armed organizations and POW camps are relatively enclosed institutions where combatants have limited contact with outside influences, it is still possible that alternative norms are influencing attitudes. For example, combatants operating in urban or rural areas where they come into direct contact with civilians, such as American soldiers living in and patrolling civilian communities during the Iraq and Vietnam War (Frederick 2010; McDonough 1985). Longstanding studies from different subfields of social psychology show that direct contact with an outgroup, in this instance civilians, can moderate the formation of ingroup preferences (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008; Gatner and Dovidio 2012; Kruglanski et al. 2014). In these instances, it is possible that combatant preferences are being shaped by outside norms rather than by the environment of their subgroup.

In both the British and American cases, there was the potential of contact between German combatants and civilians that could have provided an additional source of democratic norms. In the American case, contact with civilians was extremely limited as German POWs were largely confined to their geographically isolated camps and only traveled outside of them for supervised labor (Krammer 1979; Robin 1995). However, in the British case, the lifting of a ‘fraternization’ ban in December 1946 and increased ‘walking-out’ privileges awarded in the summer of 1947 significantly increased contact between German combatants and British civilians (Clarke 2006; Sullivan 1979). German combatants were no longer isolated to the normative environment of their camp but could travel outside of it and develop new relationships with British civilians. As detailed in
Chapters III and IV, British civilians did provide an alternative source of norms and generally had a positive impact on shaping pro-democratic attitudes.

I utilize archival data and temporal aspects of the case to control for this competing source of norms outside of subgroup leader influence. First, the re-education reports I collected feature the addresses of each camp used in the analysis. By cross-referencing these addresses with government maps from the 1940s and 1950s, I code for if a camp was located near a civilian population center as a proxy for civilian contact. Additionally, British re-education officials recorded if there was significant contact between German combatants and British civilians which is also leveraged as an indicator to control for civilian contact. As discussed in Chapters III and IV, even with increased contact with civilians, the influence of subgroup leaders within the camps continued to significantly shape socialization outcomes.

*Opportunism and Coercion*

Another potential explanation for combatant behaviors, particularly in the setting of POW camps, is opportunism and coercion—that individuals are falsifying their actual preferences to gain rewards and avoid punishments. As previously discussed, POW camps are a unique type of militarized total institution, as combatants are monitored by their active or former enemy. Within these settings, combatants can collaborate or comply with their captors for material benefits or to avoid physical punishments. For example, for Japanese POWs held in the Soviet Union after the Second World War, they were clearly coerced into participating in communist re-education. Japanese prisoners that joined the “Democratic Movement” within the camps, which entailed participating in communist
lectures, study groups, and meetings, received additional food and exemption from hard manual labor (Barshay 2013: 88-89). Additionally, Japanese POWs in the Soviet camps were uncertain about when they were going to be released and repatriated, which motivated many to show a “maximum display of ideological ardor” in the hopes that it would increase their chances of being sent back home (Ibid.:114).

There is also the threat of punishment from fellow combatants for collaborating with the enemy. For example, during the Korean War, there was widespread violence among North Korean and Chinese POWs in the American administrated camps. Committed communists in these camps branded fellow combatants as traitors for participating in the American ‘democratization’ program and for denouncing communism (Bradbury and Meyers 1968). Similarly, pro-democratic North Korean and Chinese prisoners, some of them political dissidents pressed into military service against their will, committed violence against communists (Hermes 1992: 233-254). In this type of coercive environment where combatants risk physical punishment for signaling their real attitudes, preference falsification is highly likely, making it is difficult to measure actual socialization outcomes.

The British re-education program for German combatants is selected as a case in part because aspects of it enable me to control for opportunism and coercion. In the British case, there was a clear window of opportunism where German combatants would have materially benefited from participating in re-education initiatives and ‘acting’ more democratic. British policy prioritized the repatriation of anti-Nazis, meaning that they

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13 The Soviet re-education program for Japanese POWs is excluded from the analysis in part because of this issue of widespread preference falsification engendered by coercive conditions and policies. Additionally, there is a lack of data on the political attitudes of Japanese combatants.
were released and sent back to Germany first. In December 1946 and in January 1947, British officials revealed the ‘political grades’ of each German combatant which informed them if they were categorized as Nazis or anti-Nazis (Faulk 1977: 85). Combatants categorized as Nazis would have benefitted from ‘upgrading’ their political grade through participation in re-education with the possibility of earlier repatriation. However, by June 1947, all German POWs were informed of their permanent date of repatriation and there was now limited material incentives for participating in re-education. As Chapters III and IV fully discuss, I argue that this period of increased opportunism can be leveraged to control for preference falsification and that the attitudes of combatants before and after this window are likely their actual norms.

The British and American cases are selected because combatants were not coerced to participate in re-education. In accordance with the Geneva Convention, both the British and American re-education programs were entirely voluntary and German combatants could not be forced to participate (Robin 1995; Krammer 1978; Quinn 2015). Furthermore, both British and American authorities took a ‘hands-off’ approach to administering their POW camps, allowing the Germans themselves to operate them and organize re-education (Smith 1996; Faulk 1977). This means that British and American officials could assist the Germans in organizing re-education and encourage it but did not punish combatants that chose not to participate. Concerning coercion from fellow combatants, in both cases, violence in the camps had largely ended by the start of the re-education program. While there was initially violence in the camps led by Nazi leaders that targeted ‘defeatists’ and collaborators, by the end of the war and the start of re-education, British and American authorities implemented polices that ended overt violence in the camps (Krammer 1979). These policies created safe environments where
combatants could choose if they wanted to participate in re-education with a minimal risk of punishment from fellow combatants. These aspects of the cases enable me to control for opportunism and coercion as a potential driver of combatant norms.

2.5 Conclusion
To summarize, I argue that the proximity of subgroup leaders as mid-level and junior commanders to the average combatant allows them to shape the overall normative environment which influences horizontal socialization and in turn conflict identity formation outcomes. Combatants are more likely to change their attitudes and behaviors if they are supported by fellow group members in their immediate social environment. If subgroup leaders align with the official norms of the organization and choose to reinforce them, then it is more likely that an individual within that subgroup will adopt the prescribed norms and attitudes of the official organization. Conversely, if a subgroup’s leaders diverge from the official norms of the organization and undermines them, then individuals within that subgroup are less likely to adopt the norms of the organization and resistance against official socialization initiatives is more likely. Subgroup leader conformity or disruption directly impacts the stability and normative cohesion of an environment, and whether dominated by aligned or divergent norms, socialization is more likely when there is a normative consensus. Finally, I contend that these assumptions and mechanisms also unfold in POW camps with re-education programs which are also total institutions featuring subgroup dynamics.
In the next chapter, I process-trace the key mechanisms and casual pathway of the theoretical argument, conducting a comparative case analysis between POW camps in the British case with different subgroup leadership types.
Chapter III

The British Re-education Program for German POWs: Comparative Case Analysis

In the beginning of 1948, the last of the hundreds of thousands of German POWs held by the British were repatriated back to Germany. For some German soldiers captured in North Africa or Italy in 1942 and 1943, it marked the end of six years of captivity and uncertainty. For others, they returned home three or four years after being forcibly conscripted in the final months of the Second World War. Regardless of their duration of captivity, allegiance to the Nazi regime, and wartime experiences, nearly all German POWs held by the British from 1945 to 1948 were exposed to a comprehensive re-education program to democratize them before their repatriation back to Germany. British officials, eager to evaluate the effects of their re-education program, invested substantial resources into tracking the changing political attitudes of German POWs, including a series of final screenings within POW camps prior to repatriation. These final screenings, which were conducted after German prisoners were notified of their official repatriation date and assured that the results would not impact their return home, reveal extreme variation in the political attitudes of German POWs. In some camps, the re-education program was deemed successful—POWs developed and exhibited pro-democratic and pro-British attitudes and abandoned Nazism. However, in other camps, re-education had failed, and German POWs retained or intensified their anti-British and
or Nazi attitudes. In this chapter and in Chapters IV and V, I demonstrate that this variation in socialization outcomes was largely driven by the subgroup leadership of each camp and their support for re-education.

In this chapter, I leverage qualitative evidence from administrative reports written by British re-education officials to show the sequence and mechanisms of subgroup leader control on the formation of combatant normative preferences from the theoretical argument developed in Chapter II. I focus on how the timing of subgroup leaders suppressing, supporting, and displaying prototypical behaviors can shape the overall normative environment of combatants, gradually spreading ideas and practices that can become the prevailing, expected social norms that are then reinforced amongst the rank-and-file through horizontal socialization. In the context of the British re-education program, German subgroup leaders maintained their normative influence because British policies allowed the Germans themselves to administer the POW camps. As a result, when re-education was introduced into the camps, German subgroup leaders played a pivotal role in supporting or undermining re-education initiatives. Supportive subgroup leaders could actively participate in re-education, leading activities and empowering other pro-democratic combatants in the camps. Meanwhile, Nazi or apolitical subgroup leaders could undermine pro-democratic norms by not organizing or participating in re-educational activities or by promoting anti-democratic combatants to leadership positions. As the analysis will show, these mechanisms of normative control shaped the prevailing attitudes of each camp and in turn impacted the direction and intensity of horizontal socialization.

This chapter is designed to expand on these mechanisms and the timing of subgroup leader influence developed in Chapter II that also underpin the findings of the
large-N analysis in Chapter IV. Specifically, I compare three German POW camps that are also part of the large-N analysis in Chapter IV, which each have a distinctive subgroup leadership type discussed in Chapter II—aligned, divergent or mixed—and in turn have different socialization outcomes. Comparing camps with the three different subgroup leadership types enables me to run initial tests on hypothesis 1—that combatants in subgroups with aligned leaders are more likely to adopt official norms, hypothesis 2A and 2B—combatants in subgroups with divergent leaders are less likely to adopt official norms and are more likely to resist socialization initiatives, and hypothesis 3—that combatants in subgroups with mixed leaders are less likely to adopt official norms.

These camps are selected because they share similar characteristics but diverge on their subgroup leadership type. All three camps were considered overtly Nazi in their political attitudes prior to the start of re-education, featured large contingents of disillusioned members of the SS and Hitler Youth, and were all located near civilian populations with opportunities to interact with the British. However, because of British policies that installed pro-re-education leaders in certain camps but not others, the subgroup leadership type of each camp varies. The similarities in camp characteristics enables a controlled case comparison that accounts for other potential factors that may also influence socialization outcomes.

As discussed in Chapter II, there are three main alternative explanations that are addressed in this chapter using characteristics of the British case. First, it is plausible that socialization outcomes were predetermined by the prewar or wartime attitudes of combatants. Using British screening data, which classified the prevailing political attitudes in each camp prior to the start of re-education, I selected three camps with similar political attitudes to control for prewar and wartime preferences. Second, it is
plausible that contact with British civilians provided an additional source of pro-
democratic norms outside of the subgroup leadership of each camp. The three camps in
the analysis were selected because they each had opportunities for potential contact with
British civilians. Finally, it is possible that German combatants were not displaying their
true preferences because of opportunism and coercion.

As POWs, German combatants had clear incentives to falsify their preferences for
better treatment and for early repatriation. Additionally, it is possible that combatants
were coerced by their fellow prisoners and British officials to take on certain behaviors.
The analysis controls for opportunism by leveraging the timing of British repatriation
policy. By June of 1947, all German prisoners were informed of their date of repatriation
regardless of their political attitudes or how they behaved in the camps (Quinn 2015: 312,
318; Clarke 2006: 201). This means that from the summer of 1947 until their repatriation
in early 1948, German combatants had few incentives to falsify their preferences and the
attitudes recorded in the final reports and screenings likely reflect their actual norms.
Concerning coercion, by the start of the re-education program in 1946, overt violence in
the camps by Nazi leaders was practically non-existent and physical punishment was no
longer a viable form of coercion (Sullivan 1979: 284; Faulk 1977: 74). Furthermore,
participation in re-education was completely voluntary. This meant that there was no
threat of punishment from British officials if German prisoners chose not to engage in re-
education. By utilizing these unique characteristics of the British case to control for these
alternative explanations in the comparative analysis, it provides additional support for
the theoretical argument that subgroup leaders shape normative environments and
socialization outcomes.
The chapter proceeds in five sections. First, I present part one of the research design which gives an overview of the empirical strategy. Second, I provide background on the British re-education program, outlining the goals of the program, its structure, and how it was implemented. In the third section, I present part-two of the research design, discussing the data and evidence used in the analysis, specifically how interventions by the British within the camps to install certain leaders is used to identify the subgroup leadership type of each camp. Additionally, I detail how I use re-education reports to interpret the changing political attitudes of German combatants and discuss observable implications. Third, I conduct a controlled comparative case analysis on three POW camps with different subgroup leadership types—Camp 118 (aligned), Camp 70 (divergent), and Camp 239 (mixed). I use process-tracing to test how different subgroup leadership types created distinct normative environments and in turn different socialization outcomes. In the final section, I engage with alternative explanations which are further addressed in Chapter IV.

3.1 Research Design Part One: Comparative Case Analysis

This section provides an overview of the research design of the chapter, outlining the empirical strategy and visualizing how the expected theoretical argument developed in Chapter II will unfold in the comparative case study. Part two of the research design is presented after the case background section, as it is necessary to understand the full context of the British re-education program before detailing the case selection and observable implications.
This chapter conducts a most similar case comparison—comparing three German POW camps with similar characteristics that differ on the key explanatory variable—subgroup leadership type. This case selection enables me to demonstrate “that the difference in the value of the independent variable of interest...accounts for the difference in outcomes” (Bennett and Elman 2007: 175). In this research design, I compare three camps with distinct subgroup leadership types—Camp 118 (aligned), Camp 70 (divergent), and Camp 239 (mixed)—and trace their socialization outcomes, which in this context, is the extent that German POWs ‘democratized’. As the next section expands on, British officials intervened in only some camps to install pro-democratic subgroup leaders, and this variation is used to determine the subgroup leadership type of each camp. The theory developed in Chapter II anticipates that German POW camps with divergent or mixed subgroup leaders will have a negative socialization outcome—in this case, retaining Nazi attitudes and or failing to democratize—while camps with aligned subgroup leaders are expected to have a positive socialization outcome—adopting pro-democratic and pro-British attitudes. I argue that the impact of subgroup leaders on combatant norms is not immediate but occurs gradually over time as a result of the control they have on the wider social environment, making it necessary to unpack the temporal dynamics of the theory.

Leveraging the timing of British interventions to install pro-re-education German leaders, which created aligned subgroup leadership in some camps but not others, it is possible to compare the impact of aligned, divergent, and mixed subgroup leaders on the formation of combatant norms and socialization outcomes. As seen in Figure 3.1, the theory developed in Chapter II anticipates that after British intervention (T1 on the x-axis), the camp with aligned subgroup leaders will begin to shift its attitudes towards
becoming more pro-democratic while camps with divergent subgroup leaders will maintain or intensify its contradictory norms. Camps with a mixture of aligned and divergent subgroup leaders will have uneven socialization and largely fail to adopt intended preferences, as the normative contest between leaders will destabilize the environment and in turn disrupt horizontal socialization. Each case study in the analysis is structured around key steps in the theoretical argument. First, the starting political attitudes, social environment, and subgroup leadership of each camp are examined (T1). Second, the impact of British interventions or the lack of them on the overall normative environment are discussed (T4). Third, the socialization outcomes of each camp are discussed leveraging the final screening reports conducted by the British (T6).

Figure 3.1. Expected Socialization Outcomes by Subgroup Leadership Type

![Graph showing expected socialization outcomes by subgroup leadership type.](image)
Figure 3.1 visualizes the timing of the theoretical argument. The y-axis represents the range of norms a combatant can be socialized into, with the top of the y-axis representing aligned norms that an organization wants combatants to learn and a successful socialization outcome while the bottom of the y-axis are unsanctioned, divergent norms and a failed socialization outcome. The expectation is that combatants with divergent subgroup leaders will have a failed socialization outcome and adopt unsanctioned norms while combatants with aligned leaders will internalize the intended norms of the group. Combatants in mixed subgroups will experience uneven socialization, with sporadic norm adaptation and potentially limited socialization outcomes.

The goal of this design is to trace the sequence of different subgroup leadership control on the variation in socialization outcomes while ruling out alternative theories that could also be driving combatant norms (Collier 2011: 827; Mahoney 2010: 124). The qualitative data available from the monthly re-education reports are ideally suited for examining the ‘intermediate steps’ in my theoretical argument and addressing potential alternative causal pathways and the degree to which they influenced socialization outcomes (Bennett and Checkel 2014: 6; Evangelista 2014: 168). I use process tracing to engage with three competing theories: (1) that the starting political attitudes of POWs predetermined their socialization outcomes, (2) that contact with British civilians influenced the degree of adopting pro-democratic norms, and (3) that opportunism and coercion—falsifying preferences to obtain material rewards and to avoid punishments (i.e., German POWs pretending to be democratic or anti-democratic) is driving attitudes. I show that these explanations are present in the cases but cannot account for the variation in socialization outcomes which are instead largely driven by the subgroup leadership of each camp.
3.2 The British Re-education Program for German POWs (1945-1948)

This section draws on a combination of primary sources in the form of collected archival documents and secondary sources. Secondary sources are particularly useful in providing accounts from German POWs, which are generally lacking within the memorandums and reports created by British re-education officials. This section details the aims, structure, and implementation of the re-education program, Nazi control within the camps, and how camp leaders were selected which is critical for understanding subgroup dynamics within the POW camps featured in the analysis of this chapter and Chapters IV and V.

From 1944 to 1948 hundreds of thousands of German POWs were detained in camps across the UK. At its peak in September 1946, the British Prisoner of War Division (POWD) was responsible for 402,177 German POWs spread across roughly 220 camps ("Progress reports," Foreign Office (FO) 939/419; "Strength lists of prisoners," FO 939/245). The majority of German POWs were deployed as agricultural and industrial laborers to meet critical postwar manpower shortages in economic sectors across the UK (Quinn 2015: 101-11). As illustrated by Figure 3.2, the total POW population increased dramatically in the first half of 1946 due to large transfers of POWs from North America and Europe and then decreased towards the end of 1946 due to the gradual repatriation of POWs back to Germany.14 While the primary goal of the POWD was to stabilize and

14 British officials controversially circumvented the Geneva Convention which requires POWs to be immediately released and repatriated upon cessation of hostilities by labelling German soldiers ‘Surrendered Enemy Personnel’ or ‘Disarmed Enemy Forces’, enabling them to detain prisoners indefinitely (Smith 1996: 2; Malpass 2020; MacKenzie 1994: 503). Tens of thousands of POWs from North America were promised that they were going back to Germany in 1946 but were instead transferred to POW labor camps in the UK which sparked a “renewed distrust of democracy” (Clarke 2006: 181).
rebuild the British economy through prison labor, a secondary objective was to ‘democratize’ and ‘de-nazify’ German POWs through re-education which was carried out by the Political Intelligence Department (PID).

Figure 3.2. German POWs in the UK 1945-1948

In alignment with the aims of denazification and democratization for postwar Germany declared at the Potsdam Conference, the PID formulated a comprehensive re-education program for German POWs which was developed and piloted in 1944 and 1945 and then implemented across most camps in the UK during the summer of 1946 (Smith 1996). The specific goals of the re-education program were to first “eradicate National
Socialist ideology and German militarism from the minds” of former German combatants and to then “inculcate...the principles and practice of democracy” to ensure that “prisoners shall return to Germany after the war as pro-Allied advocates of democratic ideals” (“Prisoners of War Division Work and Requirements,” FO 939/214: 1; The Re-education of Prisoners of War,” May 26, 1944, FO 939/445: 1). In the words of Colonel Henry Faulk, the head of the re-education program, “the task was to convince the German that they could be a good German without being a Nazi...to [make] them proud of a new ethos based on humanity and tolerance” (Faulk 1987: reel 3). Some historians have instead assessed that the “hundreds of thousands of [German] prisoners” were “acting as guinea pigs for the re-education of Germany itself” in an increasingly ideological struggle with the Soviet Union (Quinn 2015: 162; Smith 1996).

In practice, re-education was deployed in the camps through a combination of exposure to pro-democratic media sources in the form of newspapers, magazines, radio broadcasts, books, and films as well as through lectures from visiting British professors, discussion groups, English courses, and participation in political activities like town hall debates and camp parliamentary elections (FO 939/445). While British officials supplied the materials and framework for re-education, the activities were administered by the German POWs themselves in compounds which were “completely self-contained units, where all the facilities provided were run by the [POWs]” and “under the direction of a minimum British staff” (Quinn 2015: 99; Faulk 1977: 32).

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15 Participation in re-educational activities was largely voluntary, except for radio programs broadcasted via loudspeaker and the viewing of footage of concentration camps which German POWs were forced to watch at gunpoint. See “Reactions of German POWs to Atrocity Film,” FO 898/330, Political Warfare Executive and Foreign Office. Political Intelligence Department: Papers, Directorate of Plans and Campaigns, P.I.D. Progress Reports. TNA.
The overall strategy of the PID re-education program was to take an indirect approach through ‘self-re-education’—believing that it would be more effective if “the pace of re-education was governed in intensity by the readiness and the demand emanating from the [POWs] themselves and not by any forceful means” (“Activities of the PS/W Division,” FO 939/454: 2). This meant that German POWs were responsible for organizing re-educational activities such as discussion groups, camp parliaments and elections, and camp publications—which led to high variation in the administration of re-education across camps. The idea was that these activities, often led by a small minority of active anti-Nazis, would gradually spread, and shift the wider attitudes of the entire camp (Faulk 1987: reel 3). As noted by Colonel Henry Faulk (1977):

It was not necessary that every man should join in active discussion...nor was it necessary that every member of the group should be persuaded and converted. But it was necessary that all should be sufficiently conscious of discussion to become aware of attitudes. Only a minority of men was articulate and the mass remembered little of the reasoning of discussion, but every man became aware of attitudes...the original forms of stimulus and the numbers of original participants did not matter, provided that the [ideas] finished up where all the men were inevitably involved, that is, in the relaxed informality of barrack-room gossip, barrack room-discussion, and barrack-room argument (p. 75).

While ostensibly taking a ‘hands-off’ approach, British officials often meddled in the internal dynamics of the camps by installing pro-democratic, anti-Nazi leaders into influential camp positions to spur re-educational activity (Faulk 1977; Clarke 2006). Potential pro-democratic leaders were identified by British re-education agents—known as Segregators and Training Advisors—through an elaborate series of screening processes and interviews that ‘graded’ each POW based on their political attitudes.
The main goal of Segregators and Training Advisors (TAs) was to “locate the men capable of initiating new norms” and “to name the men actively hindering the acceptance of those norms” (Faulk 1977: 82). Put differently, their job was to identify anti-Nazis in the camps that could assist in re-education and active Nazis that would undermine it. Segregators were responsible for the initial interviews with German POWs that determined their political grading while TAs visited the camps to compile monthly reports on re-education. These re-educators were agents of the Field Section under the POWD and were mainly former intelligence officers and interpreters that could speak German (Sullivan 1979: 94). They were personally trained by the head of the Field Section Colonel Henry Faulk, who had lived in Germany in 1933 and served as an interpreter in 1945 at Camp Carburton where he successfully dismantled a ring of Nazi leaders controlling the camp (Ibid.: 69-73). There were approximately 50 TAs who regularly visited the POW camps and often rotated their inspections, meaning that multiple TAs commented on the socialization trends of each camp relatively independent of each other (there is evidence that they sometimes read the previous TA’s report). In total, there were 27 Segregators who carried out the first crucial step of re-education—categorizing German combatants by their political attitudes (Smith 1996: 72).

The PID relied on a political grading system to categorize POWs as Nazis or anti-Nazis. Those graded as an ‘A+’, ‘A’, or ‘B+’ were considered anti-Nazis with a pro-democratic political outlook, while those graded a ‘C+’, ‘C’, or ‘B-’ were deemed “steeped in Nazi ideology...with no intention of helping” in re-education (see Table 3.1). British officials also interchangeably used a ‘colour’ grading system to refer to the political attitudes of POWs—‘black’ was considered Nazi, ‘grey’ politically neutral, and ‘white’ anti-Nazi.
Table 3.1. Political Classification Systems for German POWs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Letter Grade</th>
<th>Equivalent ‘Colour’ Grade</th>
<th>British Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A+</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>POW who is a genuine anti-Nazi. He must have a positive intelligent political outlook. Potentialities as an active pro-Allied force in the future must be considered. He must have a democratic and human point of view and be capable of constructive work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>POW who is a genuine but not necessarily active anti-Nazi. He holds anti-Nazi views and has a positive outlook with which to replace Nazism but will, in all probability, have no wide circle of influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-</td>
<td>White-Grey</td>
<td>POW who is a definite anti-Nazi, but is a social nuisance in that he has defects of character or temperament which make him unsuitable for special employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B+</td>
<td>Grey-White</td>
<td>POW who is very nearly ready to be upgraded to “A”. A sound, decent, honest character who will be a highly reliable worker. A genuine anti-Nazi who has not yet found a positive philosophy to take its place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Grey</td>
<td>POW who is a “Grey” with a non-Nazi or non-political outlook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-</td>
<td>Dark-Grey</td>
<td>POW who in the opinion of the segregator, has just graduated up from the “C’s”. A man with a Nazi record who is honestly on the road to realising the true character of Nazism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>POW whose mind is still infected by Nazism, but can still be redeemed, or an innocuous Nazi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C+</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>POW still steeped in Nazi ideology and with no intention of helping us, generally of an age to have assisted in the building of the Party, and still prepared to say “the Party was all right”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Content in British Description column is quoted directly from an official memorandum that instructed segregators on the various classifications (“Report of Meeting of Segregation Section”, FO 939/457: 2). See Appendix I for original document.
The initial grading of a POW was determined by Segregators who interviewed prisoners directly in the camps. They asked individuals questions about their family background, political history (e.g., memberships in political parties and trade unions), and attitudes on postwar Germany and Britain ("Interrogation Report", FO 939/460) (see Appendix I for full list of screening questions asked by Segregators). The accuracy of the responses to these questions were verified by the political profiles of each prisoner that were created when they first entered the UK.

Segregators consulted the political profiles of each POW which were created from interrogation reports following the capture of German soldiers and were then updated at various processing centers in the greater London area before transfer to POW camps (Sullivan 1979: 41-59; Normann 1996: 20-30; Clarke 2006: 172; “Interrogation Reports,” War Office (WO) 208/3645-3660). These profiles contained detailed information on the prewar and wartime political, military, and socioeconomic background of the POW (e.g. Nazi Party membership, enlistment date, prewar profession) and were used by Segregators during screenings to help determine the political grading of the person in question. Using Nazi Party and military records captured in occupied Germany, British officials could verify the accuracy of responses from prisoners (Sullivan 1979). At the time of the first screenings, the political gradings were kept secret from prisoners and “to the prisoners the process had no particular significance” (Faulk 1977: 80). TAs then used the

---

16 For example, Herbert Sachtleben—a POW held in Camp 38—was initially graded a ‘C’ for maintaining his Nazi views at the time of his interview and for joining the Nazi Party in 1934 and then enlisting in its military wing the SS in 1935 (FO 1120/211). Meanwhile, Heinrich Meyer in Camp 28 was graded an ‘A’ for being a judge that was dismissed by the Nazis and for his outspoken anti-Nazi views (FO 1120/209). Training Advisors also had the authority to ‘upgrade’ the political grading of POWs based on their re-education progress. Hypothetically, an ardent Nazi initially graded as a ‘C’ could eventually become an ‘A’.
gradings and reports from Segregators to identify potential pro-democratic Germans to select for leadership positions in the camps.

Once selected as potential pro-democratic leaders that could assist in re-education, POWs were inserted into key positions within the camps. As shown in Figure 3.3, camp positions ranged from formal administrative roles like Camp Leader and Deputy Camp Leader to those more involved in the daily lives of POWs such as Hostel and Study leaders. The leadership structure of the camps gave German POWs authority and influence over the social environment of the camps which developed “two disciplines in a POW camp, the discipline imposed by the [British] military and the communal discipline among the POW themselves” (Faulk 1977: 39, 36). Importantly, the individuals in these positions were often the leading personalities of the camps and wielded influence in the smaller compounds and hostels at the subgroup level, producing “new norms that gradually permeated the group” (Faulk 1977: 66). In this leadership structure, Hostel and Study leaders were often closest to the subgroup level, as they interacted with and impacted the normative environment of average combatants in the smaller hostels and compounds.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the typical leadership structure of POW camps and the various positions where TAs could intervene. Leadership changes by TAs were not limited to main camps and occurred in the smaller hostels surrounding them. Hostels were smaller compounds with their own German leaders that typically housed around 50 to 75 POWs. TAs were also involved in assisting and choosing suitable leaders directly involved in re-education such as the organizer of studies, study leaders, and the camp newspaper editors and librarians who were all responsible for disseminating pro-democratic media and spurring political discussions.

However, this strategy of leadership replacement did not occur in every camp due to a limited pool of candidates dwindled by the priority repatriation of POWs graded ‘A+’ and ‘A’ and because some British camp officers were against re-education interventions (Faulk 1977: 75). Furthermore, there was limited time and resources for carrying out leadership changes. For example, a fuel shortage in the winter of 1947 severely limited the ability of TAs to visit camps and there was an average of 1 TA per 12,000 POWs (Faulk
These uneven leadership interventions meant that in some camps, the subgroup leadership was still dominated by Nazis with attitudes antithetical to the objectives of the re-education program, which as the next section will show, fundamentally impacted the social structure of camps with divergent leaders.

**Nazi Control in the Camps**

This section describes the Nazi leadership in the camps, focusing on the period prior to the introduction of the re-education program to demonstrate the mechanisms of divergent subgroup leader control. My theory anticipates that under divergent leader control, in this instance Nazi and or anti-democratic camp leaders, combatants are less likely to adopt official norms and more likely to retain their divergent preferences. This period shows the entrenched Nazi leadership in some camps that British officials attempted to replace with anti-Nazis. While Nazi influence was diminished by 1946 as a result of the postwar segregation polices, these earlier examples of the pervasive influence of Nazi leaders illustrates their enduring authority in camps where they maintained power and disrupted re-education. It is important to note that overt violence by Nazi leaders within the camps decreased dramatically after the end of the war in May 1945. By the rollout of the re-education program in the summer of 1946, Nazi led violence had ended in the camps and German prisoners no longer faced the threat of physical punishments or reprisals (Sullivan 1979: 285). However, many active Nazis remained in important camp leadership positions and influenced the normative environment through other means of indirect control detailed in the analysis.
The hands-off approach of the British towards administering POW camps and their initial concern of discipline enabled most camps in 1944 and 1945 to be dominated by Nazis. In these earlier stages, “it was accepted that the highest-ranking Nazi was also the leader of that camp—in any camp, the men who were the real Nazis would go straight to the leadership and take over control” (Faulk 1987: reel 3). Nazi subgroup leaders preferred methods of coercive control and intimidation to suppress anti-Nazi norms. Once in control, these Nazi leaders, who were often Type II non-commissioned officers, “continued to indoctrinate their comrades” and used violence to control and suppress anti-Nazis (Kettenacker 1985: 73). For example, some camps developed a ‘RollKommando’, “an unofficial, self-appointed, vigilante group” of “hard-core Nazi fanatics” that imposed “disciplinary measures against the anti-Nazi element” within a camp (Clarke 2006: 176). In a POW camp in Comrie, Scotland in 1944, an anti-Nazi German POW was tried and executed in the night by a Rollkommando comprised of SS soldiers for acting as an informant for the British (Normann 1996). Henry Faulk (1987) estimates that at least one anti-Nazi was murdered in each camp during the war (reel 3), likely an accurate estimate given the number of suspicious drownings and hangings that occurred in the camps (“Nominal Roll of German POWs 1945-1949,” FO 1005/2246).

Nazi domination of the camps in 1944 and through most of 1945 alarmed British officials and prompted the creation of new polices which led to the previously discussed political grading and segregation system. The policy of allowing British Commandants to select Nazi camp leaders was scrutinized, as stated in the House of Lords in May 1944 by Lord Strabolgi:
In practice it means that the ardent Nazis rule the roost. They keep order and take very good care to suppress, and in some cases oppress, their fellow-countrymen who have seen the error of their ways...great care should be taken to separate these dyed-in-the-wool Nazis, these strong party men who are probably incorrigible, from the others (Quinn 2015: 99).

The new segregation policies called for the screening of all German POWs to identify and remove “C+” and “C” ‘black’ Nazi leaders, sending them to isolated camps (Quinn 2015: 41). In practice, some overtly disruptive Nazi leaders were removed and placed in special ‘black’ camps for “C+” POWs, however, as later screening figures in 1946 demonstrate, almost every camp still contained a Nazi element and some British Commandants still preferred to keep Nazis in charge to maintain discipline and an efficient output of labor. Furthermore, attempts to segregate POWs could engender violence and tension, as recounted by POW Eberhard Wendler in Camp 16, when anti-Nazis were placed in a separate hut “they were attacked by SS men and nearly killed” (Quinn 2015: 40). However, these segregation policies, coupled with the collapse of the Nazi state, led to an end of overt Nazi violence in the camps (Sullivan 1979: 113).

Even after screenings and segregation, the average political attitudes across POW camps by the start of the re-education program in the spring and summer of 1946 was about “10% Nazis, 10% anti-Nazis, and 80% politically neutral or ‘grey’” (Clarke 2006: 182; “Monthly Progress Reports 1945-1948”, FO 939/247). The smaller element of Nazis and anti-Nazis were referred to as ‘activists,’ political entrepreneurs that my theoretical framework categorizes as Type II leaders, who had a disproportionate influence on the attitudes of the ‘grey’ majority. These Type II ‘activists’, whether Nazis or anti-Nazis, established the overall political ‘tone’ of their camps and the “attitudes to which the mass conformed...emanated from the small active element” (Faulk 1977: 66). As a result of the
normative contest between the Nazi and anti-Nazi activists in the camps, “a ‘white’ “camp leadership had to be established before any positive change in group-attitudes could occur” (Clarke 2006: 182). It was within this complex political environment of normative contests between Nazis and anti-Nazis that British re-education officials attempted to install anti-Nazi, pro-re-education leaders, which my theory anticipates should lead to changes in combatant norms.

Leadership Selection

German camp leaders were selected by two distinct sets of actors, by the British camp Commandant and by re-education TAs who made recommendations on who was suitable or unsuitable for leading re-educational efforts. The level of cooperation between TAs and British camp officials on selecting leaders varied, as a primary goal of British Commandants was to maintain order and a steady output of labor which could contradict the leadership recommendations of TAs. Similarly to Segregators, TAs were hired and trained by the Field Section of the POWD under the direction of Colonel Henry Faulk and were primarily former interpreters or intelligence officers familiar with Nazi German society (Faulk 1977). As fully discussed in the next sections, their primary goal was to provide progress reports on the state of re-education and attitudes in the camps but could also make leadership recommendations (Ibid.: 75). While some Commandants enthusiastically supported re-education and implemented the leadership recommendations of TAs, others viewed re-education as a secondary objective and instead appointed German leaders that could maintain discipline rather than lead re-
educational efforts. This variation in leadership selection directly impacted the overall levels of support for re-education from German camp leaders.

The qualitative data available from TA reports makes it possible to determine how leaders were selected and the level of cooperation from British Commandants and their supporting staff. For example, a report on Camp 48 from August 1946 states that the Commandant “openly admits having absolutely no interest in re-education. His sole concern is the smooth running of the camp and a good labour output” (FO 1120/214: 1). In Camp 259, the TA recorded how “the Commandant and Interpreter have no interest in re-education...and obviously prefer the efficient militarist or even Nazi to the political type” (“December 1946 Report”, FO 1120/238: 1). A Commandant’s attitude towards discipline and re-education influenced their overall selection of German camp leaders, as the German leader of Camp 48 was “a poor type but liked by the [Commandant] as he is able to maintain good discipline; he knows very little...in regard to re-education” (“August 1946 Report”, FO 1120/215: 2). Discipline minded Commandants often appointed German leaders based on their seniority and military rank with little consideration for their political attitudes or previous history in the Nazi Party or in its auxiliary military institutions like the SS or SA.\textsuperscript{17}

TAs “had the right to remove an unsuitable Camp Leader...[who] was inimical to the re-educational effort” (Faulk 1977: 75). When TAs started visiting POW camps in the summer of 1946, most of the leadership in the camps had been selected by Commandants

\textsuperscript{17} The hostility towards re-education from some Commandants stemmed partly from an institutional divide, as TAs operated as agents of the PID under the auspices of the Foreign Office and were viewed as civilians outside of the British military and the War Office which was responsible for administering POW camps. As noted by a TA in Camp 30, “political re-education was viewed with cynical contempt as intellectual rubbish by the Commandant” (“January 1947 Report,” FO 1120/209: 1). In short, “The Foreign Office owned the prisoners’ minds while the War Office owned their bodies” (Quinn 2015: 165).
to maintain camp discipline and increase labor output. These original camp leaders were typically older men who had already occupied leadership positions in the German military and were either unconcerned with politics or still supportive of Nazism. For example, during W.G Cook’s TA visit to Camp 240 in August 1946, he noted that “the Camp Leader is...a regular soldier without much drive or imagination. The deputy [Camp Leader], a builder, is reliable, but without personality. Both were selected by a previous Commandant and are unsuitable to be in charge...they are being replaced” (FO 1120/235: 2). In his July 1947 report on Camp 47, TA L.A. Bloxham commented that “the camp staff is a dreadful set of mediocrities and yes-men...future progress will be slow unless vigorous new blood is introduced” (FO 1120/214: 5).

When camp leaders were deemed unsuitable, TAs had several methods for selecting new leaders. The first, and often preferred option was to search for suitable candidates already in the camp that could quickly assume power, for example a pro-democratic Deputy hostel or Study leader already liked by his fellow POWs and familiar with the camp. The second option was to train leaders by sending potential re-education organizers to Wilton Park, an intensive 6-week re-education program which offered university level courses on democracy and history that was modelled on the Oxford tutoring and seminar system (Sullivan 1979: 240-257). Approximately 4000 POWs received additional training at Wilton Park which is further discussed in Chapter IV (FO 1120/165; FO 1120/160). TAs then inserted Wilton Park graduates into leadership positions of their camps to either sustain or jumpstart re-education. A TA report from Camp 47 in October 1947 illustrates this overall strategy:

On my first visit to the camp in July, I found re-education almost non-existent, and very few men capable of doing anything...accordingly I
searched the HQ camp and all Hostels for men capable of benefitting by a course at [Wilton Park]. As a result, eight men are at present at [Wilton Park], and on their return to the camp in December, I propose to spread them over the various units in order to get a re-educational programme going in as many hostels as possible. (FO 1120/214: 4)

The third potential source of new leaders came from other camps. While not used as frequently, TAs could request pro-re-education leaders from other camps to be transferred. Regardless of the source of new leaders, TAs were faced with a dwindling pool of candidates caused by gradual and then rapid repatriation. By late 1947, TAs were constantly searching for replacements to mitigate the adverse effects of repatriation on re-educational activities. A report from Camp 76 in January 1948 during the final months of captivity captures the issue of repatriation that confronted every camp, stating “this has been a good camp, but it is now in a state of disintegration...speedy repatriation form[s] an insurmountable handicap to re-education” (“January 1948 Report,” FO 1120/219: 4). Ultimately, full pro-democratic leadership interventions only occurred in select camps because of this shortage of suitable pro-democratic leaders (Faulk 1977: 75). This variation in camp leadership selection created a distinct subgroup leadership type within each camp that differed in its support for re-education, which as the next section shows, informs the general approach to testing the effects of subgroup leaders on socialization.

Now that the goals, structure, and implementation of the re-education program through leadership interventions and the political conditions within the camps are contextualized, the entire research design and observable implications can effectively be explained.
3.3 Research Design Part Two
This section discusses the case selection, the data, and the evidence and corresponding observable implications used in the controlled comparative case analysis. To empirically test my argument that subgroup leaders moderate socialization outcomes, I process-trace the effect of aligned, divergent and mixed subgroup leadership types developed in Chapter II on the normative preferences of POWs. The expectation is that POWs in camps with pro-re-education, aligned subgroup leaders will have more positive attitudes towards democratic principles and the British ‘way of life’. Specifically, that aligned leaders (anti-Nazis) will support re-education initiatives and democratic norms and that divergent leaders (Nazis or anti-re-education) will instead undermine and disrupt re-education. The support or lack of support for re-education initiatives will then shape the overall normative environment of the POW camp and in turn horizontal socialization. In a camp with a mixed subgroup leadership of Nazis and anti-Nazis, the theory anticipates that there will be a lack of normative cohesion and inconsistent support for re-education initiatives and in turn limited or no changes in the democratic attitudes of POWs.

Camp 118 (aligned), Camp 70 (divergent), and Camp 239 (mixed) are selected for the analysis because they share similar characteristics but diverge on their subgroup leadership type and socialization outcomes. Specifically, they were all initially categorized as ‘black’ camps with similar starting political attitudes, they each have a large element of “C’s” and “C+’s” Nazis and SS, similar camp sizes and youth populations of around 30% (the assumption that German youth were more indoctrinated with Nazism) and were all located near civilian populations with the potential to come into direct contact with the British. The subgroup leadership type of these camps is determined by the degree of British intervention to install pro-re-education leaders. Camp 118 is categorized as
aligned because both the British Commandant and TA worked closely together to install pro-re-education leaders throughout the camp. Conversely, Camp 70 is categorized as divergent, as the Commandant was inimical towards re-education and chose to install German leaders based on seniority and on their ability to maintain discipline and the camp did not feature interventions by a TA. Camp 239 is considered to have a mixed subgroup leadership type, as it had inconsistent and limited interventions by both the Commandant and TA to install pro-re-education leaders, resulting in a combination of anti-Nazi and Nazi leaders (see Table 3.2 for case summary).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.2. Summary of Cases and Divergent Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camp Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subgroup Leadership Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Re-education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Starting Political Attitudes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Similar Youth Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with Civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialization Outcome</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These three cases present a ‘tough test’ for the theory, as they are camps that were categorized as ‘black’ by the British for their large element of Nazi Party members and former members of the SS and SA, making the task of democratization in these contexts
more difficult (Bennet and Elman 2007). Sequential evidence on subgroup leader influence, the social environment of the camp, and the changing attitudes of combatants is necessary for the analysis.

Lastly, it is important to note that within all camps, including those without pro-re-education leadership interventions, there was a baseline of re-educational activity such as exposure to pro-democratic media, opportunities to attend lectures from visiting speakers, and information rooms to organize and attend discussions and classes. Furthermore, every camp had POW(s) in charge of organizing and implementing re-education. Again, while the combination of British camp staff and TAs were responsible for selecting camp leaders, the overall strategy of allowing the Germans to run the camps and their re-education programs means that once in leadership positions, intra-camp dynamics and socialization processes were primarily dictated by POWs (Faulk 1977).

Archival Evidence

Chapters III, IV, and V leverage monthly administrative reports written by re-education TAs and Segregators to measure the effect of subgroup leadership type within the camps on the political attitudes and social environments of POWs in the British case. To monitor the overall progress of re-education, the PID sent TAs into the camps to make “thorough investigations into the situation with regard to re-education, the general state of the camp, its political complexion” and to note “the effect of [re-education] measures” (“The Re-education of German Prisoners of War,” FO 939/214: 10). The overall task of the TAs was to “present a report following [their] visit to a camp” which gave “a clear and concise picture” of re-education (“Report Writing,” September 24, 1945, FO 939/449: 1). Training
Advisors typically spent two to four days in a camp per visit, immersing themselves in its social environment by interviewing both German leaders and regular POWs and observing camp activities. These reports maintain a similar rubric and are broadly structured around sections titled ‘political progress’ and ‘re-educational activities’ which give updates on the overall state of re-education and the general changes in attitudes in the camps (see Figure 3.4 and Appendix I for the full report).
Figure 3.4. Camp 26 Training Advisor Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp Address</th>
<th>No. &amp; Type of Camp</th>
<th>Date of Visit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barton Field</td>
<td>26 C.P.W.</td>
<td>14-16/5/1947</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tel. No.</th>
<th>Name of Visitor</th>
<th>Object of Visit</th>
<th>No. of Visits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ely 436</td>
<td>Oliver Nash</td>
<td>Re-educational Survey</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Offs: 2</th>
<th>G.R.'s: 1351</th>
<th>TOTAL: 1353</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Screening figures</th>
<th>of which:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>1319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>779 at HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>593 at West Pen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50 at Hostfield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29 at Welney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>90 in billets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 in Hospital etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| No. of appeals pending | Nil |
| No. of appeals heard by T.A. | Nil |
| No. of Pw/N repatriated to date | 649 |

Personnel:

- O.C. : Major G.O. Williams
- Interpreter : S/Sgt Levy
- S/Sgt Burstyn
- Camp Leader : Hfw. Witthaus, Eugen (B+)
- Deputy C/L : Fw. Henke, Albert (B)
- German M.O. : S/Arzt Dr. Beysiegel, Kurt (B)
- Hostel Leaders:
  - West Pen: Hptmsa Seiwert, Friedrich (B+)
  - Hostel: Klose, Karl (B)
  - Hptmsa: Bittner, Rudolf (B+)

1. Exception

The C.O. Major Williams has recently arrived, but has had experience in P/C work in Scotland and assured me of his desire to co-operate. S/Sgt Levy is very efficient and deeply interested in his work. S/Sgt Burstyn at West Pen has had little previous experience but is shaping well under S/Sgt Levy's guidance.

2. German Camp Staff

- C/L: Hfw. Witthaus, Eugen A4 078224 (B+/29), age 27, joined the army in 1938. Dairyman from Eastern Germany, member of R.I. & P.A. Good type but unimaginative.
- M.O.: S/Arzt Dr. Beysiegel, Kurt (B/21) now taking an active part in re-education, contributing to the Camp magazine.
Lovy and P/W staff. I did not meet him.

Satellite C/1, West Fen: Hptscha Seiworth, Friedrich B 214,825 (B/29) age 54,
agricultural expert, Volkdeutscher from Rumania, served in the Austro-Hungarian
Army in 1914 war, joined SS by government decree in 1941. Upright bluff man who
leads the democratic discussion group at West Fen.

Hostel Leader at Westfield House, Klosa, Karl B 366,854 (B/21) joined the
Police Force in 1927 and stayed until captured in 1944 in a police battalion a.d.V.
He is most co-operative and his behaviour is unimpeachable but he is Croussos
wanted.

Hostel Leader at Welney: Uffz. Bittner, Rudolf A 966,703 (B+) takes little
active interest in re-education.

3. MOBILIZATION

This is high, due to excellent treatment and manifestly fair administration.
Bad news from Germany and the failure of the Moscow conference have had an adverse
effect. There is also some remission at the long captivity, but the greater
relaxations and the new permission to send one sealed letter per month are very
much appreciated. High cigarette prices are affecting the will to work. The ban
on visiting the nearby town of Ely has been lifted at the request of the City Council,
and the slight improvement there has now been lifted with a gratifying improvement in morale.

4. POLITICAL PROGRESS

Due to S/Sgt. Lovy's untiring efforts, re-education has not suffered seriously
by the repatriation of A's. The Rumanian Volkdeutsche, who form a large proportion
of the Welney group, are definitely democratic in leanings. Welney Hostel displays
lack of interest; there has been little support from the camp leader for re-education.

5. YOUTH

Presents no problem in this camp with its strong re-educational tendency.

6. RE-EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES

Five new students from the Training Centre have further strengthened the
already good re-educational staff and all material facilities are made available
by British Staff.

Personalities:

1) Re-education Leader Uffz. Gralle, Horst B 62a 302 (B/18) age 31, edits the
camp magazine. Was assessor by profession and became a member of the N.S.D.A.P.
1934, N.S.D.A.P. B 1935 and the S.A. 1936. Quiet, highly intelligent and makes
an honest impression.

2) Pte. Hochmuth, Paul 788,982 (B/21) age 36. Hotel employee by trade, belonged to
the NS only, heads the discussion group and contributes to the camp magazine.
Very quiet, earnest man.

Mechanic with elementary education only, he was described by the Training Centre as
consuming of his lack of education but he is now developing. Prepared the
information room. He is at present away in hospital.


5) West Fen: Also Student Leader Gschr. Huber, Reinhard, D 706,39 (B/21) age 32.
Training Centre Student. Mechanic from Dresden. Very sincere and is shaping
well.
These camp reports were collected from two locations—The National Archives of the UK (TNA) and the Imperial War Museum Collections (IWM). Out of the roughly 400 POW camps that existed, reports on 305 of them survive between these two archives. However, only 124 camps feature 5 or more reports. These gaps in the data exist primarily because of missing reports that did not survive the transfer from the POWD’s and Dr. Koeppler’s records to TNA and because smaller camps were frequently closed or absorbed by larger camps. Additionally, some camps were designated specifically for Italian, Austrian and Ukrainian POWs where re-education reports were not conducted. It is also likely that due to postwar resource constraints, British officials were unable to regularly send TAs into every camp, particularly the smaller, specialized ones such as the Royal Air Force administered or special Bomb Disposal camps. The surviving data suggests that British re-education officials concentrated their efforts on monitoring the larger labor camps located throughout England and Wales which on average held around 1500 POWs. By cross-referencing reports at both TNA and the IWM, I am confident that I have accessed most surviving reports and that missing reports were likely not preserved following the end of the re-education program and or transfer to the archives. The analysis in this chapter and in Chapter IV uses a purposive archival sample (Balcells and Sullivan 2018: 141), selecting camps with the best surviving data on socialization outcomes and German camp leaders.

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18 Monthly camp reports in TNA are in the Foreign Office record group 1120 (FO 1120) under Wilton Park: Records, “Re-educational Survey Visit Reports,” while documents relating to the overall structure, functions, and goals of the re-education program are located throughout Foreign Office 939 Record Group (FO 939), German Section: Prisoners of War. Camp reports at the IWM are located under the “Private Papers of Lieutenant Colonel H. Faulk” in Faulk HF Box 1, 1/1-3 and Faulk HF, Box 2 1/4-6.
As discussed in Chapter I, there are limitations and explicit biases present in archival data, specifically in documents created and preserved by a state (Subotić 2020). First, there are issues of missingness in surviving reports and sometimes significant gaps in the reporting periods due to the limited resources and staff of the PID, meaning that in some camps there are three or four months in between reports. Second there is potential biases on what records were selected for preservation. Based on the widespread knowledge of the re-education program and that the British government was publicly proud of their efforts to ‘denazify’ and democratize their POWs, and that surviving archival evidence includes documents critical of re-education efforts and procedures, I do not believe that the missing reports were purposefully destroyed or withheld from preservation, and it is likely that they simply did not survive transfer to the archives at TNA and IWM.

Third, the reports used in this analysis were written by British re-education officials and the perspectives of the German POWs themselves are unfortunately largely unrepresented. However, the reports themselves are derived primarily from interviews with German POWs and observations of daily life within the camps. When possible, I deploy secondary sources and memoirs that incorporate the perspectives of Germans to help verify the patterns in the data (Sullivan 1979: Clarke 2006; Quinn 2015). Next, each TA had their own motivations and different quality in writing reports. For example, L.P.D. Cooper often wrote the bare minimum required for a report, leaving out key details on the leadership and conditions within a camp (his reports along with other uncertain or short reports are controlled for in the analysis in Chapter IV). Importantly, TAs often rotated their inspections for each camp, meaning that multiple TAs commented on the state and socialization trends of each camp relatively independent of each other. For the
comparative analysis of this chapter, each camp was visited by a minimum of three different TAs.

Overall, I am confident in the accuracy of the reports because TAs were supposed to be critical of re-education and the British staff in each camp. TAs operated as civilian agents of the Foreign Office, “while the day-to-day running of the camps was the responsibility of the War Office,” and there was “a standing conflict between the two authorities” (Quinn 2015: 165). As agents outside of the War Office, they could report without repercussions for their personal careers. Furthermore, throughout the over one thousand re-education reports that I processed, the majority of TAs openly report when re-education, even after their own interventions, is not working as planned (potential biases between TAs and the British camp and their personal interventions are controlled for in the large-N analysis in Chapter IV). I argue that the organizational independence of TAs coupled with their rotating inspections give their reports a high degree of accuracy with limited biases.

Observable Implications

In order to test my expectation that subgroup leaders moderate socialization outcomes, it is necessary to identify evidence that demonstrates subgroup leader influence impacting the attitudes of POWs over time. My theoretical argument suggests several observable implications. First, if either aligned and divergent subgroup leaders are supporting and or suppressing certain norms, we would observe that they are either active or inactive in re-education initiatives. For example, an aligned, pro-democratic leader would directly lead re-education initiatives or support other POWs in their compound or hostel that do.
Conversely, a divergent leader would not participate or lead re-education and may also espouse contradictory, Nazi or anti-British norms. The control of subgroup leaders can also be gauged from the political preferences of the individuals they select, for example, a divergent leader selecting an ardent Nazi as his Deputy Hostel Leader or Study Leader or an aligned leader selecting a Wilton Park graduate to further re-education.

Next, if subgroup leader control does create a normative consensus, prevailing pro-democratic or Nazi norms would be observed, and conflicting subgroups would not be present. For example, to use the terminology of British re-educators, there would be clear ‘political tone’ within the camp that stems from a prominent group of Nazi or anti-Nazi ‘activists’ (Faulk 1977, 1987). In a camp with aligned leaders, a normative consensus would be a stable social environment evidenced by few disruptions to re-education initiatives, no noticeable Nazi subgroups, and most of rank-and-file POWs exhibiting pro-democratic behaviors norms. The next step in the theoretical argument is that a normative consensus will lead to increased horizontal socialization. In an aligned camp, horizontal socialization would be observed through widespread participation in communal re-educational activities and pro-democratic behaviours. For example, well attended discussion groups and lectures or the organization of a camp parliament or newspaper. Finally, the conflict identities and socialization outcomes of camps is observed through the actual attitudes of combatants derived from various sections of each re-education report that comment on the overall norms and prevailing political attitudes of each camp. Furthermore, for the camps used in this analysis, there is a final report conducted by TAs prior to repatriation that involve a series of interviews with a sample of POWs to gauge the socialization outcome of that camp. The alternative explanations are expanded on in the final section of the chapter.
3.4 Comparative Analysis: POW Camps 118, 70, and 239

Camp 118, Camp 70 and Camp 239 offer variation on subgroup leadership type and enable the testing of the hypotheses that different subgroup leaders moderate socialization processes and outcomes. These cases expand on the theoretical mechanisms and sequence of socialization, demonstrating the influence of aligned, divergent, and mixed subgroup leaders on the overall environment and process of socialization. These camps feature similar characteristics, populations, and starting political attitudes, but differ significantly on the involvement of German leadership within the smaller hostels at the subgroup level. Based on the political profiles of each prisoner that detailed their prewar and wartime characteristics, the British categorized all three camps as ‘black’ for featuring combatants with predominantly Nazi attitudes. In Camp 118, interventions to install pro-re-education leadership in the hostels gradually formed a normative consensus within the camp that led to a positive socialization outcome. Conversely, in Camp 70, the subgroup leadership remained unchanged, and re-education was not supported by subgroup leaders within the hostels which led most POWs to retain their Nazi attitudes. Meanwhile in Camp 239, there was a hybrid subgroup leadership of Nazis and anti-Nazis and an unstable environment of socialization that resulted in limited re-education.

POW Camp 118

Camp 118 located in Mardy, Abergavenny, Wales was initially categorized as a ‘black’ camp by re-education officials for its prevailing Nazi attitudes and camp leadership that was largely unsupportive of re-education. Out of the population of 1802 POWs screened in October 1946, 603 were given a ‘C’ political grading, POWs who “still think that
National Socialism was the best thing for Germany” and there was a “large proportion of minor [Nazi] Party Officials and many members of the Allgemeine SS” in the camp (October 1946, FO 1120/227: 3-4). The first Camp Leader, Julius Etzien, a 41-year-old professional soldier, was a “poor personality with no initiative” and the leaders at Wonastow and Bwlch hostels were still openly Nazis, one of them, Rudolf Kramer, admitted “being an opportunist…and makes no effort to further re-education” (Ibid.: 2).

The initial social environment was dominated by the ‘black’ Nazi elements of the camp who “hold the upper hand in political thought and...blame democracy for every major or minor occurrence...in camp life or in world affairs which is not to their liking...and few [anti-Nazis] make any effort to propagate their ideas, finding the task too difficult under the circumstances” (Ibid.: 3). In response to the camp’s prevailing Nazi attitudes, British TAs made numerous leadership changes at the end of 1946 and in early 1947 which dramatically shifted the environment and then political attitudes of the camp.

In January 1947, the Camp Leader was deposed and replaced with Hans Hlawan, who recently attended a pro-democracy course at Wilton Park and immediately took “an active part in re-education”, leading discussion groups at the main camp “pressing home wherever possible, tolerance in politics” and offering full re-educational support to Hostel Leaders. (January 1947, FO 1120/227: 1-4). At Chepstow Hostel, the previously ‘black’ leadership was removed and replaced with a “new white camp staff”, including Gerhard Zimmer, who “although previously a Nazi, appears to be genuinely trying to live down the past and takes an active part in camp life” (Ibid.: 2). There were now active political discussion groups in half the hostels and the black elements in the camp were “gradually and slowly beginning to show an upward trend...although it is evident that the majority do not yet comprehend the fundamentals of Democracy” (Ibid.: 3). These new pro-re-
education leaders introduced and supported democratic norms which slowly began to permeate the social environment and daily ‘barracks talk’ of the main camp and hostels.

By September 1947, more Wilton Park graduates had been installed throughout the hostels to lead discussion groups and 70% of Camp 118’s German leadership was actively involved in re-education (September 1947, FO 1120/227: 2-5). There was now widespread participation in re-educational activities and high normative cohesion within the camp. As noted by TA A. Heron, “this camp can hardly be characterised as ‘black’ nowadays…the habit of tolerance in discussion has been learned by the great majority…[and] re-educational activities have been carried on at a remarkably intensive level” (Ibid.: 3). Camp 118, which a year before held only a small minority of anti-Nazi POWs involved in re-education and was run by Nazi leaders, now featured robust re-education initiatives throughout the main camp and hostels that approximately half of the camp’s POWs participated in (Ibid.:4). Support for re-education and interest in political discussions persisted into January 1948 when in most camps activity began to decline considerably, in large part because “the leaders in the individual hostels are keen and active…[and] have achieved a measure of success” (March 1948, FO 1120/227: 4-5).

In a final screening of Camp 118 in March 1948, prior to the final wave of repatriations, 75% of POWs were:

ready to give [the British the] benefit of [the] doubt” and “show[ed] a much better understanding of the reasons behind the English outlook on life and are appreciative of the value of many things about which they were previously sceptical—freedom of speech, the power of the vote, intercourse between nations, etc…re-education in this camp has achieved a very considerable amount of success…the constant efforts of good type [POWs] in camp activities has resulted in a great step forward (Ibid.: 2-5).
The pro-re-education leadership gradually installed across Camp 118 at the end of 1946 and in the beginning of 1947 was able to change the trajectory of socialization by actively supporting and propagating democratic norms. These aligned camp leaders, particularly at the subgroup level within the hostels, introduced and sustained democratic norms which became the dominant attitudes of the camp. This normative consensus, as evidenced by the mass participation in re-educational activity and changing attitudes of the camp, formed the ‘practical ideology’ of the camp which led to a positive socialization outcome in the eyes of the British. Importantly, re-education was almost entirely administered by the Germans themselves, as “no member of the British staff play[ed] any active part in re-education” (Ibid.: 1).

POW Camp 70

Camp 70, also originally categorized as a ‘black’ camp with approximately 30% of its population graded as ‘black’ with a similarly large contingent of former SS and Nazi Party officials instead had a negative socialization outcome. Unlike in Camp 118, the subgroup leadership of Camp 70, particularly within the hostels, remained largely unchanged and unsupportive of re-education. The first reports on Camp 70 in late 1946 and in early 1947 detail an unstable environment of socialization that lacked normative cohesion. There was a small faction of POWs, “about 10% [of the camp with a] limited interest in re-education” and another faction of roughly 10% that “still nourish...the Nazi spirit” (January 1947, FO 1120/218: 2). While similar in size, the Nazi POWs received considerable support from the “SS and ‘black’ Hostel Leaders” who were “bad political influences” that “swamps the small white element which has been trying to build up the
anti-Nazi spirit and develop the Democratic spirit” (Ibid.: 5; February 1947, FO 1120/218). As later reports outline, the small pro-democratic element was unable to overcome dominant Nazi norms and establish a re-education program that could influence the wider camp.

When the camp was fully screened in February 1947, the political gradings revealed that over half of the hostels leaders were still ardent Nazis. For example, the leaders of Penycoed and Eglwyswrw hostels, Manfred Huellemann and Willy Beckmann, were categorized as ‘C+s’, the most extreme grading reserved for fanatical Nazis (FO 1120/218). Because of the hands-off approach of the British, these Nazi leaders were allowed to select the Study Leaders in their respective hostels and in turn appointed active Nazis. In Penycoed hostel, the Study Leader in charge of administering pro-democratic re-education was graded a ‘C+’ and had been a member of the SA since 1933, the Nazi Party’s first paramilitary organization. While the two ‘C+’ hostel leaders were eventually removed, their replacements selected by the discipline minded Commandant were also unsupportive of re-education and by July 1947 the general state of re-education in the camp remained poor. With the exception of Portfield hostel, whose leader Heinrich Gummels and his Study Leader Ernst Gernsheimer were actively involved in re-education, and sporadic activity in the main camp, pro-democratic norms received almost no support from German leaders within the rest of the hostels.

By September 1947, re-educational activities were still “practically non-existent” and by January 1948 any “active participation in camp political activities [was] on the decline...due largely to the shortage of good POW political leaders” (September 1947: 2, January 1948: 4, FO 1120/218). Ultimately, Camp 70 was considered a failed socialization outcome by the British, as the final screening report on Camp 70 conducted in April 1948
noted widespread dislike and distrust of the British ‘way of life’ and there was “still a hankering after the good life in Germany under the Nazis” (April 1948, FO 1120/218: 4). Despite interventions by British TAs to change certain leaders and introduce Wilton Park graduates to spur re-education, these changes were made primarily in the main camp and the hostels remained Nazis against re-education. When examining the hostel leadership closest to the subgroup level, only 34% of hostel leaders from Camp 70 were involved in re-education compared to Camp 118 where 67% of hostel leadership supported re-education. Pro-democratic norms failed to become the ‘practical ideology’ of Camp 70 because they were unsupported by the divergent subgroup leadership within the hostels.

**POW Camp 239**

In Camp 239, neither the active ‘white’ anti-Nazi or ‘black’ Nazi elements of the camp were able to gain normative control which resulted in uneven re-educational activity and in turn only partial socialization towards democratic and pro-British norms. As this section shows, re-educational activity was limited to small groups of anti-Nazis in some of the hostels while in other hostels Nazis or apolitical leaders maintained control, leading to an unstable socialization environment. British re-education and camp officials did attempt to install some pro-re-education leaders, particularly Wilton Park graduates, but these interventions were sporadic and largely limited to the position of Study Leaders who were unable to make an impact with the lack of support from their politically contradictory or apathetic Hostel Leaders that remained. However, the limited political progress that did occur was attributed overwhelmingly to contact with British civilians,
which is addressed here and further expanded on in the next section on alternative explanations.

The first report in May 1946 notes that the German leaders across camp 239 were “appointed by the [Commandant] on seniority” who had “little understanding for re-education,” and the political complexion of the camp was estimated to be “10% A, 40% B, and 50% C” (FO 1120/233: 1). As noted previously, German leaders appointed on seniority were often Nazis and accordingly the Hostel Leaders at Banstead and Staines Laleham were considered ‘C’s’ within “predominantly black” hostels (Ibid.: 2). There was some re-educational activity by a handful of anti-Nazis, but “the white element in the hostel[s] is not strong enough to exercise any influence on the others” (Ibid.: 1). In the next report conducted by a team of Segregators in August 1946, the official political gradings confirmed an influential element of pro-re-education ‘A’s’ and ‘B+’ but also an equally significant contingent of Nazis still within the camp. They concluded that “there is a general lack of direction in the hostels and in the main camp (FO 1120/233: 3).

The lack of prevailing norms and support for re-education in these opening months was largely engendered by the mixed subgroup leadership across the hostels. For example, Staines Laleham hostel was led by Karl-Fredrich Matthews, graded as a ‘C’ by Segregators and deemed “most unsuitable as hostel leader” (FO 1120/233, August 1946: 2). Despite his overt Nazi attitudes and lack of support for re-education, and that he was still considered a “young Nazi” at the end of 1946 who is a “permanent danger if left in his present state of mind” and that as a result his “hostel is thoroughly disillusioned,” he remained in power until June 1947 (September 1946, FO 1120/233: 3). While “anti-British and anti-democratic sentiment [was] in evidence” in some hostels and compounds, in others, there was some re-educational activity spearheaded by the 25% of
‘whites’ and ‘light-greys’ like Study Leaders Rohnert and Rudolph in Hinchley Wood hostel who were both graded as ‘A’s’ and noted for “doing excellent work” in re-education where the “presence of a democratic group is effectively in evidence” (FO 1120/233, September 1946: 2-3). TA A. Reynolds concluded that “this is a grey/black camp and will remain so, unless [PID] succeeds in installing an energetic and capable camp leader and a study leader to take charge of re-educational work on the whole camp” (Ibid.: 4).

In response to the uneven re-educational activity, TAs installed pro-re-education leaders, in particular Wilton Park graduates, as Study Leaders across the main camp and the hostels throughout early 1947. For example, in January 1947, Wilton Park graduates Rudolph (A+) and Bernhard (B+) at Hinchley Wood hostel as well as the Study Leader at Billet Road hostel and the Hostel Leader of Banstead Kressier were lauded for their active support of re-education. The proportion of subgroup leaders active in re-education jumped from 31% in January 1947 to 55% in June 1947 during this period of intervention, however, this period marked the peak of support for re-educational activities, and the British were puzzled that despite these interventions most of the camp was “definitely not interested any longer in political theories, they dislike organised political activities in the camp. There is a sense of frustration and an apathetic attitude towards politics” (June 1947, FO 1120/233: 2). Sporadic interventions to install energetic Wilton Park graduates continued as late as January 1948, but re-educational activity remained limited to the small groups of anti-Nazis that were dwindling from priority repatriation (January 1948. FO 1120/233: 1-3).

These interventions were unsuccessful because the subgroup leadership of the camp remained mixed throughout 1947. Specifically, many of the hostel leaders remained unsupportive of re-education. For example, despite inserting two Wilton Park graduates
as Study Leaders into Hinchley Wood hostel, the Hostel Leader was Roedel, a former member of the SA and of the Nazi Party who was graded a B- and was unsupportive of re-education. From January 1947 to January 1948, there were only three recorded instances of hostel leaders actively supporting re-education, an abysmal rate of only 12% support from hostel leaders for re-education during this 12-month period. The clear divide in support in re-educational activity between the study and hostel leaders resulted in a normatively divided camp that ultimately ended in a socialization outcome that was considered “rather disappointing” by the British (March 1948, FO 1120/233: 2).

In the final report in March 1948, the political attitudes of the camp towards the British were estimated to be: “Hate and Dislike: 2%, Distrust: 25%, Indifference: 35%, and Liking: 38%” (FO 1120/233: 2-3). The high percentage of POWs liking the British was in part from the isolated activities of some Wilton Park graduate, but they largely stemmed from contact with British civilians. TA’s consistently noted the positive contact between the camp and the surrounding civilian population, particularly from the efforts of the local Quaker community which worked closely with re-educational officials to coordinate activities once restrictions on contact with civilians was lifted in the summer of 1947. As noted in the final report, the “overwhelming evidence contributing” to the relatively high percentage of those ‘liking’ the British “points to the kindly treatment by British families and other civilian friends” (March 1948, FO 1120/233: 3). From this perspective, re-education was a partial success as a large contingent of POWs became more pro-British, however, POWs did not necessarily become pro-democratic, as widespread political activity never materialized in Camp 239 and this limited success was attributed to civilian contacts and not the subgroup leadership within the camp.
Summary of Case Comparison

As visualized in Figure 3.4, the socialization processes and outcomes of each camp were impacted by the involvement of subgroup leaders in re-educational activity. The timing of subgroup leadership influence mattered, as the leadership intervention in Camp 118 (represented by the left dashed line in Figure 3.4) gradually altered prevailing norms and created a cohesive, stable environment which led to a positive socialization outcome.

Figure 3.5. Socialization Outcomes of Camps 118, 70, and 239

![Graph showing socialization outcomes of Camps 118, 70, and 239](image)

Figure 3.4 shows the changing political attitudes and socialization outcomes of Camp 70 (Divergent), Camp 118 (Aligned), and Camp 239 (Mixed). It visualizes the socialization trajectories of each camp leveraging qualitative data from Training Advisor reports that record if there has been an improvement, decline, or no change in ‘political progress’. The left dashed line represents the pro-re-education leadership intervention in Camp 118 while the right dashed line shows the month when restrictions on fraternization between German POWs and British civilians were lifted. Note the first report for each camp begins at different times.
This lends support for hypothesis 1 that combatants with aligned leaders are more likely to adopt official norms. Meanwhile, the divergent subgroup leadership in Camp 70 maintained and arguably strengthened Nazi and anti-British norms, disrupting re-education, and engendering a negative socialization outcome, which supports hypothesis 2A and 2B that combatants in subgroups with divergent leaders are less likely to adopt official norms and are more likely to resist socialization initiatives. In Camp 239, progress occurred to a limited extent after the interventions in January 1947 but was unsustainable because of a lack of support from hostel leaders and re-education was mainly attributed to the contact with British civilians. As expected, the hybrid subgroup leadership in Camp 239 led to uneven socialization, with periods of progress and decline, lending support for hypothesis 3 that combatants in subgroups with mixed leaders are less likely to adopt official norms. The main mechanisms of subgroup leader control in these camps were support and emulation. In the Nazi dominated compounds and hostels in Camps 70 and 239, re-education efforts floundered without the backing or direct involvement of hostel and study leaders. Meanwhile in Camp 118, hostel leaders supported their study leaders and led by example, directly leading discussion groups and other initiatives.

3.5 Alternative Explanations

In this final section of the chapter, I engage with three alternative explanations that could also shape combatant norms and socialization outcomes within the camps: (1) that the starting political attitudes of the camps predetermined their socialization outcomes, (2) that contact with British civilians is what shaped norms, and (3) that opportunism and the threat of coercion shaped behaviors in the camps as prisoners falsified their
preferences to gain rewards and avoid punishments. I acknowledge that these factors are present and important but argue that they alone cannot account for the variation in socialization outcomes of POW camps 118, 70, and 239. These three rival explanations are further expanded on and controlled for in the large-N analysis in Chapter IV.

Camp Color: Controlling for Starting Political Attitudes

A potential explanation for the variation in socialization outcomes is that they were predetermined by the initial political attitudes of the population in each camp. For example, camps originally categorized as ‘black’ by British officials for holding more pro-Nazi POWs may have lacked the capacity and support for re-education initiatives regardless of leadership interventions. Furthermore, it is possible that ‘black’ camps were different from ‘white’ camps which held more anti-Nazis or ‘grey’ camps which were more politically mixed and in turn were treated differently by the British with either less or more interventions. If the starting political attitudes of a camp determine its socialization outcome, then we would observe that all ‘black’ camps have similar socialization trajectories.

For this chapter, the case selection uses three ‘black’ camps with similar populations of Nazis and anti-Nazis. Specifically, each camp features a large contingent of former Nazi Party, SS, and SA members, which are presumably the most difficult types of combatants to ‘denazify’ and ‘democratize’. Again, these color gradings were based on the first rounds of screenings that produced the initial political profile of German combatants which were used to summarize the prevailing attitudes of each camp. This comparative analysis not only shows that ‘black’ camps are capable of political progress,
but that the socialization trajectories and outcomes of these camps were not predetermined by the starting political attitudes of their POWs. Chapter IV further explores the impact of starting political attitudes on socialization outcomes, showing that initial norms may effect the extent of political progress.

_Civilian Contact: Alternative Sources of Norms_

Another factor that did in part influence German attitudes towards the British ‘way of life’ was contact with civilians which increased throughout the duration of captivity. In December 1946, the ‘fraternization ban’ was lifted permitting POWs and civilians to formally interact and starting in July 1947, POWs were allowed to travel within a 10-mile radius of their camp (Monthly Progress Reports nos. 29 and 30, FO 939/247; Sullivan 1979: 185, 203). For POWs in camps located near urban areas, from the summer of 1947 until their repatriation, they could freely travel into cities for entertainment and to visit British friends. The ‘walking out privileges’ awarded in July 1947 fundamentally altered life within the camps as POWs were exposed to different experiences and sources of socialization beyond the immediate environment of their camp. Unsurprisingly, after the easing of travel restrictions, most POWs preferred to spend their free time outside of their prison camp which led to a general decline of within camp re-educational activities in late 1947 and in 1948. The camps used in the comparative analysis were selected in part because they were not isolated from civilian populations and shared similar access to outside contacts after the lifting of restrictions.

In addition to increased contact with civilians, the easing of restrictions also augmented re-education initiatives, as many TAs coordinated interactions between POWs
and local cultural, civic, and academic groups. For example, as noted in the analysis of Camp 239, TAs organized re-educational activities with the local Quaker community, including “educational visits to London organised by Quakers” and fieldtrips to meetings in the House of Commons (June 1947, FO 1120/233: 3). In Camp 239, these outside activities significantly impacted the attitudes of some combatants during a time of instability and a lack of leadership within the camp, as noted in the summer report, “there is a sense of frustration and an apathetic attitude towards politics. Contact with civilians, however, are leading to political progress. Their civilian friends make many [POWs] more broadminded and tolerant” (Ibid.: 2). In engaging with the competing source of norms from outside contacts in the analysis, it is important to note the timing of subgroup leader control and the lifting of restrictions in the summer of 1947.

If civilian contact determines pro-British and pro-democratic attitudes, then we would observe that all camps make political progress after the lifting of restrictions in June 1947. Referring back to Figure 3.4, the right dashed line represents the full lifting of restrictions on civilian fraternization. In Camp 239, it is clear from the evidence presented in the TA reports that starting in June 1947 and onward, civilian contact had a positive influence on re-education for some of the POWs in the camp and largely accounts for the two periods of recorded progress. However, as anticipated by the theory, prior to civilian contact, the mixed subgroup leadership of Camp 239 created an unstable environment of contradictory norms that disrupted socialization within the camp. Even after civilian contact, re-educational activities within Camp 239 remained sporadic and the camp was considered a negative socialization outcome politically, as the limited progress was attributed to the positive influence of civilians.
In Camp 118, it is clear from the reports that prior to civilian contact in the summer of 1947 the political progress was a result of activities within the camp organized and supported by the aligned subgroup leadership. However, civilian contact did potentially sustain and augment activities in the final months of captivity, as in the final report, the “very considerable” success of re-education was attributed to both the “constant efforts of good type[s] of [POWs] in camp activities...coupled with a friendly civilian population” (March 1948 FO 1120/227: 2). Regardless of civilian contact, the high levels of re-educational activity within the camp and the multiple periods of progress prior to the summer of 1947 would have resulted in positive socialization outcome.

Lastly, Camp 70 offers strong evidence for the theoretical argument because despite civilian contact and friendly relations cited in some of the reports, political progress did not occur (January 1948, April 1948 FO 1120/218). However, it should be noted that some TAs considered parts of the camp isolated from civilian contact, which is why it is categorized as having low contact with civilians in Table 3.2. If civilian contact alone was driving pro-British and pro-democratic norms, then Camp 70 would have made progress in the summer or 1947 but instead further declined. In Chapter IV, I further control for the effect of civilian contact on attitudes in the statistical analysis of 64 POW camps and show that even after the lifting of restrictions, on average, the subgroup leadership of each camp still significantly shaped combatant socialization.

**Opportunism and Coercion**

Controlling for opportunism is critical to the analysis, as German POWs had clear incentives to falsify their attitudes and behaviors to gain rewards. A POW’s, ‘political
grading’, the initial letter grade assigned to them after rounds of interrogations, which was then upgraded or downgraded by re-education officials in later screenings, was directly linked to their date of repatriation (Clarke 2006). The British strategy was to prioritize the repatriation of anti-Nazis, those with the political grade of an ‘A+’ or ‘A’, to infuse pro-British norms into the reconstruction of Germany. In one instance of preference falsification, the original Camp Leader and organizer of re-education in Camp 185, Wilhelm Biedorf, was categorized as an A+ and noted for directing “much re-education and cultural activity under [his] able direction”. However, after his early repatriation, it was discovered that “his attitude was two-faced, being agreeable and friendly to the British and yet expressing very anti-British opinions.” (November 1946, 2, FO 1120/231). While other opportunists like Wilhelm Biedorf were undoubtedly able to manipulate the screening system for early repatriation, certain aspects of the case and data from the reports can help control for preference falsification.

Political gradings were not revealed to POWs until the very end of 1946 and in January 1947. Additionally, during the first screenings to determine the ‘color’ gradings of each prisoner and camp, re-education or repatriation had not started and German combatants did not yet know the significance behind the screenings (Faulk 1977: 80). Furthermore, the act of rescreening POWs to upgrade their political grade ended by the summer of 1947 which is also when all POWs were informed of the permanent date of their repatriation (FO 939/246; Quinn 2015: 312). POWs had less incentives to falsify their preferences before and after this window from January 1947 to June 1947 where they had an opportunity to upgrade their political grade and potentially move up their repatriation date. This window of opportunism is referenced throughout numerous reports, for example, in a September 1947 report for Camp 70 which notes a decline in re-
educational activity “now that the old ‘A’ incentive has gone” (FO 1120/218: 2). Furthermore, re-educational activities were voluntary, meaning that when POWs knew their official repatriation date, they would have had few material incentives to continue participating in re-education. Similarly to controlling for civilian contact, I argue that examining the sequence of subgroup leadership influence during this window of increased preference falsification is necessary for isolating the factors influencing socialization. If opportunism is driving pro-re-education activity and attitudes, then we would expect to observe political progress and higher levels of participation during this period of increased incentives for POWs to ‘upgrade’ their political grading.

In Camp 118, participation in re-educational activities and political progress is noted in October 1946, prior to POWs knowing their political grade or the general policies of the repatriation scheme. As seen again in Figure 3.4, British leadership interventions first occurred in January 1947, the time when POWs were most incentivized to falsify their preferences to upgrade their political grading and it is likely that opportunists increased the high levels of re-educational activity in the winter of 1947. However, opportunism is unlikely to explain the continuously high levels of activity and political progress that persisted throughout late 1947 and 1948, long after POWs knew their date of repatriation. As noted previously, the TA for camp 118 recorded in September 1947 that re-education was still occurring “at a remarkably intensive level” (September 1947: FO 1120/227: 3)

Turning to Camps 70 and 239, there is consistently low levels of re-educational activity, even during the window of increased opportunism. In Camp 70, a TA reflected on the low levels of support for re-education throughout the first half of 1947, noting that “any re-education seems to have been of a passive nature” and that “very little...had been done in the way of re-education” (July 1947, FO 1120/218: 3-5). In Camp 239, a TA noted
during his visit in January 1947 that there is “indifference bordering on antagonism towards re-education” which persisted throughout the winter and spring of 1947 (FO 1120/233: 5). Instead of observing increased support for re-education, there is instead a consistent lack of support for it in both Camp 70 and Camp 239 from January 1947 to June 1947. Considering that these camps are comprised of large numbers of ‘C’s’ who have more incentives to falsify their preferences to upgrade their political grade, we would expect a general increase in support for re-education during early 1947 but instead continue to see low levels of activity and progress. Together, the continued support for re-education in Camp 118 and the lack of it in Camps 70 and 239 suggest that opportunism alone cannot account for the variation in socialization.

Finally, it is possible that German combatants adopted certain behaviors to avoid punishments from their fellow combatants or British officials. For example, a German combatant in Camp 70 or Camp 239 with Nazi leaders who felt pressured to not participate in re-education or combatants in Camp 118 that were forced to attend group discussions and lectures by pro-re-education leaders. Additionally, it is possible that there was formal pressure from above to participate in re-education activities—that British re-educational officials coerced combatants to attend re-education initiatives. First, in all three cases in the comparative analysis, there is no record of violence or threats of physical punishments in the camps mentioned in the TA reports. The absence of violence in the camps during the re-education program is supported by secondary and primary sources that state that violence in the camp ceased after the war ended in May 1945 (Sullivan 1979; Quinn 2015). Instead, Nazi leaders in the camps generally shifted their tactics from violence to undermining re-education by attempting to maintain National Socialist attitudes and minimizing pro-democratic norms (Faulk 1977: 82). If there was violence
or major disruptions in Camp 118, Camp 70, or Camp 239, the TAs would have reported it and created a ‘special report’ on the specific issue which was the standard procedure. In collecting and processing over a thousand TA reports, I can confirm that in the rare instances of major events or disruptions to re-education, ‘special reports’ were conducted to investigate the issue.

Second, in all three camps in the analysis, the involvement of the British camp Commandants and their staff in re-education was minimal, and there is no evidence of prisoners being coerced to participate in re-educational activities. In Camp 118, where the British Commandant and his staff were supportive of re-education and implemented the suggestions of the TA, it was consistently recorded that “no member of the British staff plays an active part in re-education” (March 1948, FO 1120/227: 1). Similarly in Camp 70, the British camp staff did not play a significant role in organizing re-education and maintained a ‘hands-off’ approach (January 1948, FO 1120/218: 1). In Camp 239, Captain Hilton the British Interpreter Officer was active in re-education, but the rest of the British staff remained uninvolved, and Captain Hilton is noted for being “popular” with the prisoners and having a good relationship with them (October 1947, FO 1120/234: 1).

Finally, I am confident that British coercion was unlikely because a fundamental aspect of the British re-education program was that it was voluntary. The British planners of re-education were adamant that it must be entirely voluntary “and not by any forceful means” for it to be effective (“Activities of the PS/W Division,” FO 939/454: 2). Even in camps like 118 that were highly active in re-education, activities remained voluntary and large portions of the prisoner population (estimate 30-40%) still chose not to participate. Finally, the British largely maintained living conditions for POWs stipulated by the Geneva Convention which were monitored by representatives of the International Red
Cross who made regular visits to the camps (Quinn 2015: 80). Under the Geneva Convention, forced re-education is explicitly prohibited, which is also why it remained voluntary and was instead considered an ‘intellectual diversion’ and an optional recreational activity for POWs (Smith 1996; Krammer 1979). Together, these aspects of the British case minimize the likelihood that opportunism and coercion were driving normative preferences in the camps.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter provides initial support for the overall expectation of the theoretical argument, that subgroup leaders moderate socialization outcomes. Specifically, evidence from Camp 118 supports hypothesis 1—that combatants in subgroups with aligned leaders are more likely to adopt official norms while the data from Camp 70 supports hypothesis 2A and 2B—that combatants in subgroups with divergent leaders are less likely to adopt official norms and are more likely to resist socialization initiatives. Additionally, the mixed Nazi and anti-Nazi leadership of Camp 239 showed how a lack of normative cohesion can negatively impact socialization, lending support for hypothesis 3—that combatants in subgroups with mixed leaders are less likely to adopt official norms. Importantly, this chapter demonstrates the timing of the theoretical argument, that subgroup leader influence gradually shapes combatant preferences through the environment of socialization while engaging with three important alternative explanations. In the next chapter, I bolster these initial findings with a large-N quantitative analysis on the socialization outcomes of 64 German POW camps in the UK.
Chapter IV

The British Re-education Program for German POWs: Large-N Analysis

Chapter III focused on the timing and mechanisms of subgroup leadership control on combatant socialization outcomes by conducting a comparative case study of three German POW camps with distinct leadership types—aligned, divergent, and mixed. Through process-tracing, Chapter III provided evidence for the temporal dynamics of the theoretical argument, showing how Nazi and anti-Nazi leaders first shaped the norms of their camps through their involvement in re-education which then created a cohesive normative environment and in turn drove the variation in socialization outcomes. Additionally, the destabilizing impact of mixed subgroup leaders with contradictory norms was discussed. Chapter III established the plausibility of the theoretical argument and provided initial support for the hypotheses developed in Chapter II that combatants in subgroups with aligned leaders are more likely to adopt official norms while combatants in subgroups with divergent or mixed leaders are less likely. This chapter builds on the findings from the comparative case analysis in Chapter III by again testing the effects of different subgroup leadership types using a novel dataset on the socialization outcomes of 64 German POW camps subjected to the British re-education program.
The hand-coded dataset used in this chapter leverages both the qualitative and quantitative data from the monthly re-education reports of British Training Advisors (TAs) and Segregators, which provides fine-grain data for statistically testing the theoretical argument. In addition to testing the effect of subgroup leadership types on socialization outcomes, this chapter also utilizes the individual-level data on the German leaders of each camp to investigate if the different characteristics of subgroup leaders also impacted socialization. This individual-level data enables an important analytical pivot to the subgroup leaders themselves, allowing me to explore if variation in military rank, political gradings, and extra re-educational training at Wilton Park also shaped socialization processes. Importantly, the camp position of each German leader is coded, allowing me to test whether different positions (e.g., Camp Leader, Hostel Leader, Study Leader, Magazine Editor) had a different effect on influencing socialization within the camps.

In addition to leveraging aggregate data on the characteristics of subgroup leaders, this dataset also codes the overall levels of re-educational activity within each camp, which has important implications for investigating normative cohesion and horizontal socialization which are key aspects of the theoretical argument. I contend that it is the overall normative environment of combatants that ultimately influence their preferences, as prevailing attitudes and behaviors form a ‘practical ideology’ that inform the content of horizontal socialization between the rank-and-file (Parkinson 2021). Put differently, I argue that the content that pervades a social environment is curated and controlled by subgroup leaders, but it is ultimately peer-pressure from fellow combatants that shape socialization outcomes. When an environment features dominant norms, or in the terminology of British re-educators, a clear political ‘tone’, there is normative cohesion
which increases the likelihood that combatants socialize each other into expected norms. This led to the development of hypothesis 4 that horizontal socialization between combatants is more likely in environments with a normative consensus. As fully discussed in the research design, I test this expectation by leveraging the overall levels of re-educational activity within the camps as an indicator for normative cohesion and horizontal socialization.

To preview the results of this chapter, the statistical analysis confirms the findings from Chapter III, that camps with aligned leaders were more likely to experience periods of political progress and have positive socialization outcomes when compared to camps with divergent or mixed subgroup leadership. Furthermore, camps with aligned leaders on average feature higher levels of re-educational activity and aligned leaders were nearly twice as more likely to be active in re-education compared to divergent leaders. Turning to the characteristics and positions of subgroup leaders, the results find that leaders within the hostels had the largest impact on whether a camp improved in its pro-democratic attitudes. On average, higher ranking junior officers had the largest impact on political progress and graduates of Wilton Park—the intensive course on re-education—have a positive yet insignificant effect on political attitudes within the hostels.

This chapter proceeds in five sections. First, the research design and empirical strategy is presented, expanding on the construction of the original dataset and the variables leveraged from it for the analysis. Additional case background on the sorting of the camp populations and on Wilton Park are also discussed. Next, the statistical results are presented in two distinct subsections. In section 4.2.1, the results of the subgroup leadership type analysis are presented, comparing the different socialization trajectories and outcomes of camps with aligned, divergent, and mixed leaderships. In section 4.2.2,
the individual leader analysis is presented, discussing the potential effects of direct re-educational activity, military rank, camp position, political grade, and Wilton Park graduation status on political progress in the camps. Fourth, the alternative explanations developed in Chapter II and discussed in Chapter III—starting political attitudes, civilian contact, and opportunism and coercion—as well as the issue of uncertainty and biases in the reports are addressed. To address civilian contact and opportunism, I exploit the timing of British repatriation and civilian fraternization policies that created clear windows of increased opportunism and contact with civilians. Similarly to Chapter III, I control for the starting political attitudes of camps as a possible determinant of socialization outcomes by using the British ‘colour’ system which categorized the prevailing norms of each camp prior to re-education. In the final section, I discuss the implications of the British case for theoretical argument.

4.1 Research Design
The analysis in this chapter is the quantitative part of the mixed-method nested research design. This chapter seeks to reinforce the evidence on the mechanisms and sequence of subgroup leader influence on socialization detailed in Chapter III with a statistical analysis of 64 German POW camps. The analysis is divided into two sections. First, similarly to the comparative case design used in Chapter III, I compare the socialization processes and outcomes of German POW camps with variation on the key explanatory variable, subgroup leadership type. This approach allows me to test my hypotheses developed in Chapter II which are summarized in Table 4.1. In the second part of the statistical analysis, section 4.2.2, I focus on the individual traits of subgroup leaders,
estimating the potential effects of variation in subgroup leader characteristics on re-educational activity and socialization outcomes.

Table 4.1 Summary of Hypotheses Tested in Chapter IV.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Proposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 1</td>
<td>Combatants in subgroups with aligned leaders are more likely to adopt the official norms of an organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 2A</td>
<td>Combatants in subgroups with divergent leaders are less likely to adopt the official norms of an organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 3</td>
<td>Combatants in subgroups with mixed leaders are less likely to adopt the official norms of an organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 4</td>
<td>Horizontal socialization between combatants is more likely in environments with a normative consensus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Data and Case Selection

This chapter statistically analyzes an original dataset on the subgroup leadership and socialization outcomes of 64 German POW Camps in the UK from 1946 to 1948. The dataset was constructed from monthly Training Advisor (TA) reports (n = 489), with an average of 7 reports per camp. Coding decisions were made from interpreting the various qualitative and quantitative evidence featured in each report (see example report in Appendix II). For replicability and transparency, a comprehensive codebook (see codebook in Appendix II) was constructed based on feedback from two pilot analyses and
then improved with the involvement of a research assistant who tested the reliability and accuracy of the coding scheme with no previous knowledge of my theoretical argument. Uncertain coding decisions, which arose in interpreting the subjective or sometimes ambiguous qualitative sections of the reports, are recorded and controlled for in the analysis.

In certain instances, previous or future reports are used to impute data. For example, if a report from February is ambiguous about the involvement of a hostel leader in re-education, but the reports from January and March state that he is active in re-education, then it is assumed that he was still active in re-education in February. Additionally, in some instances, previous coding decisions made on earlier reports were updated based on new information presented in later reports (e.g., learning in later reports that a hostel leader was highly active in re-education in certain months). Finally, the quality and level of detail on the changing political attitudes of POWs in each report varies, and reports can feature a combination of relative and absolute statements. In instances where reports do not use absolute statements on the overall changes in political attitudes, (e.g., there’s been considerable progress or an improvement in democratic attitudes), a ‘qualitative assessment’ variable is used, which scores the coders’ interpretation based on their knowledge of the camp on whether there was a decline, improvement, or no change in political attitudes since the previous report. The analysis

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19 The research assistant coded a set of monthly re-education reports (n = 97) using Version 1 of my codebook with an explicit set of coding instructions. When comparing our coding results, which were done independent of each other, we achieved a Krippendorff alpha score of 0.79 on key variables of the analysis, meaning that our coding decisions matched 79% of the time (see Appendix II).
and its results hold when rerunning the models with just reports that have absolute statement on changing political attitudes (see Table 4.15).

The case selection is purposive, using 64 camps that feature the best available data on the selection and composition of camp leaders and socialization outcomes. However, despite the non-random selection of camps, they are relatively balanced on their characteristics and offer a fairly representative sample of German POW camps in the UK. The 64 camps in the analysis represent a combined population of 115,387 POWs at the start of the re-education program in the spring and summer of 1946, a substantial proportion of the total population of German POWs that were in captivity across the UK which at that time was around 350,000 (see Figure 3.2 for total population of POWs from 1945-1948). The selection of camps also captures the geographic diversity of camp locations (see Figure 4.1).

Based on the initial ‘color’ grading of British official, the screening system that categorized the prevailing political attitudes of camps prior to re-education (i.e., ‘black’ are Nazi camps, ‘white’ anti-Nazi, and ‘grey’ are politically mixed camps), 26 camps were initially categorized as ‘black’, 26 camps as ‘grey’, and 12 camps as ‘white’ or ‘light grey’. This distribution of starting political attitudes is supported by secondary sources, which note the fewer number of ‘white’ camps (Quinn 2015; Clarke 2006). Concerning the balance in the dataset based on subgroup leadership types, 29 camps featured aligned subgroup leaders, 17 divergent, and 18 camps with a mixed subgroup leadership. The covariate balance between camps is further addressed at the end of the research design section (see Table 4.3).
The locations of the 64 camps in the dataset varied widely, ranging from within cities like London and Birmingham to isolated outposts in the Scottish Highlands and in the Welsh countryside, with the majority of camps located in England, particularly in the Midlands. Note the location of Wilton Park in southern England. Only fragments of reports from the few POW camps in Northern Ireland survive which is why they are excluded from the analysis.
As noted in Chapter III, according to the head of the re-education program, the general distribution of political attitudes within the camps, regardless of their starting political ‘color’, was approximately 10% anti-Nazi, 10% Nazi, and 80% politically neutral or apathetic (Faulk 1977, 1987). Using the political gradings totalled on Segregator reports, which was the first and often most comprehensive screening of political attitudes, Figure 4.2 illustrates the average distribution of starting political gradings for the 64 camps in the dataset. The ‘white’ ‘A’s’ are on average only 6% while the ‘black’ ‘C’s’ are roughly 12%. However, there is more variation than just anti-Nazis, Nazis, and neutrals.

Figure 4.2. Average Distribution of Political Grades in Each Camp

Note: The A+, A, and A- political grades are combined into ‘A’s’ and the C+ and C categories are combined into ‘C’s’. The average total population is 1,526.
There is also a large element of ‘B+’s’ at approximately 15% and ‘B-’s’ at 11%. These political grades represent POWs that my theoretical framework categorize at Type I combatants, not hardliners that have internalized either anti-Nazi or Nazi norms like Type II A’s and C’s, but those with some positive association and identification with either side of the spectrum. This means that around the start of re-education program, on average, 56% of POWs in each camp were categorized as politically neutral, Type 0 ‘B’s’. When combining ‘A’s’ and ‘B+’s’ together as a general block of anti-Nazis, they constitute around 21%, while combining the ‘C’s’ and ‘B-’s’ together as those with more Nazi attitudes make up approximately 24%. Substantively, the breakdown of average political grades in each camp illustrates the fairly balanced population of Nazis and anti-Nazis within each camp and underscores the importance of the large block of politically indifferent ‘B’s’. Framed differently, the normative control of the camps was a contest between the minority Nazis and anti-Nazis on who could influence the majority of POWs graded ‘B’.

*The Sorting of Camp Populations*

Before detailing the outcome and explanatory variables, it is necessary to discuss how combatants were sorted into the camps which has important implications for the analysis, as I argue that the populations of the camps were quasi-random. The population of the camps were not randomized, however, the source of combatants for each camp varied immensely and soldiers were often separated from their units and thrust into completely new social systems. From their capture to arrival in British POW camps, German POWs were sorted numerous times and often separated from their original unit based on their
date and location of capture. For example, a German combatant captured by American forces in North Africa in 1942 could have surrendered or been captured with only a fragment of his original unit which was then transferred to America or Canada where they were again sorted into different POW camps scattered across North America (Krammer 1991; Robin 1995). For German soldiers captured in Western Europe in 1944 or 1945, they were either held in France or Belgium or transferred to the US or UK. By late 1944, Britain and America “agreed to share responsibility for the prisoners...the general rule was that those [POWs] whose surnames began with a letter in the first half of the alphabet were to be imprisoned in the US, and the remainder in Britain” (Quinn 2015: 29; Sullivan 1979). As illustrated in Figure 3.2, the population of German POWs in the UK roughly doubled in 1946 from 200,000 to 400,000 from the influx of prisoners from camps in North America and in mainland Europe.

When POWs arrived in the UK, they traveled by boat and typically disembarked at Southampton where they were then divided and sent for their first political screening and medical examinations at a facility in Kempton Park outside of London (Sullivan 1979). As recounted by German POW Eberhard Wendler, when he arrived in Britain in the summer of 1944, “we didn’t know anybody else, only one or two you’d been captured with...we were all mixed up” (Quoted in Quinn 2015: 31). Sometimes, “after disembarking, prisoners were marched from the boat in a double column which divided in different directions. Friends who were side by side never met again” (Sullivan 1979: 29). After

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20 For most of the Second World War, Britain did not hold more than a few thousand German POWs and had an agreement with the US and Canada to have them held in North America due to limited resources. However, as the threat of attack and resource constraints eased, Britain began to hold more German POWs, and by February 1945, housed approximately 140,000 captives (Krammer 1991; FO 939/419).
processing at Kempton Park, POWs were either sent to interrogation camps in London for further questioning (typically for suspected war criminals or high value prisoners) or POW transit camps known as ‘base’ camps (Clarke 2006; Sullivan 1979). Once inside these base camps, German POWs were again subdivided and transferred piecemeal to permanent labor camps across the UK which are the camps used in the analysis.

Once POWs arrived at their labor camp, they were again divided into smaller groups (Quinn 2015: 30). German POW Hans Behrens described his arrival to his labor camp:

There were army, navy, air-force, all mixed up. After a few roll calls and initiations we were divided into various huts and naturally you look around at your hut-mates and you strike up a relationship. Sometimes it’s with someone from another hut, so you ask for permission to move so you’re nearer each other—someone from your area or your hometown. (Quoted in Quinn 2015: 79)

Eberhard Wendeler further recalled that he was in hut 13, “and I was together with two or three others who I was captured with” (Quoted in Quinn 2015: 79). After settling down in their permanent labor camps, German POW’s were again subjected to more transfers, as Segregators removed ardent Nazis from some camps and requested transfers of ‘A’s’ and ‘B’s’ from other camps to balance political attitudes in the camps (Faulk 1977). Additionally, when new camps were opened to accommodate the wave of POWs from North America, they often pulled POWs from other camps which created a completely mixed population or spread the new arrivals from American and Canada throughout existing camps.

These examples and policies are detailed to demonstrate that while German combatants were not randomly sorted into POW camps, the camp populations were often an amalgamation of different units from separate branches of the
military. I argue that by the start of re-education in the spring and summer of 1946, these numerous sorting policies and screenings made most camps a new social environment for combatants. This is important for the analysis, as the mixed populations of the camps means that pre-existing, wartime relationships between combatants in the same unit cannot explain the variation in socialization outcomes. Now that the case selection, average political attitudes, and the sorting of the camp populations are outlined, the next section turns to the key variables used in the analysis.

Outcome Variables: Political Progress, Political Outlook, and Socialization Outcomes
In order to test my expectation that subgroup leaders moderate socialization outcomes, it is necessary to track the attitudes of POWs over time. I leverage data from TA reports to operationalize the changing political attitudes of each camp. The dependent variable ‘political progress’ measures a camp’s attitudes towards the intended pro-democratic and pro-British attitudes of the re-education program. This variable is derived from the various qualitative sections of each monthly report, where re-education officials record the prevailing political attitudes of each camp based on observations and interviews with POWs.

TAs recorded the progress or lack of progress in re-education since the time of the last report, which was seen as the level of democratization that had occurred since their previous visit—the improvement in political attitudes away from Nazism and towards democratic principles and the British ‘way of life’. Leveraging this data, the ‘political progress’ variable measures if there has been a decline, no change, or an improvement in
pro-democratic attitudes since a TA’s previous visit. While reports feature individual level information on the leaders of each camp, this variable measures attitudes at the camp level, as TAs recorded the overall trends of each camp.

‘Political outlook’ measures the cumulative political progress and socialization trends of each camp. It translates changing attitudes into a measurable numerical value by triangulating the initial political ‘colour’ given to each camp as a starting value which then changes with the ‘political progress’ variable. For example, a ‘grey-black’ camp containing some anti-British or Nazi elements is initially scored a 2. If this camp makes an improvement in ‘political progress’ in the next reporting period, then it’s ‘political outlook’ increases to a 3 or decreases to a 1 if there has been a decline. The political progress and political outlook variables enable me to evaluate the relationship between changing political attitudes and the key explanatory variable, subgroup leadership type.

The ‘socialization outcome’ variable leverages the final reports on each camp to determine if it had improved, declined, or remained the same in its democratic attitudes compared to its starting political attitudes. For example, if a camp that started with predominantly democratic attitudes in the first report is then hostile towards democracy or is displaying anti-British attitudes in the final report, it is considered a negative socialization outcome. Meanwhile, camps that started with primarily Nazi norms that improved and ended as pro-democratic are considered a positive socialization outcome. Camps that remained the same or failed to develop a dominant political attitude are considered a mixed socialization outcome (see Figure 4.3).
Figure 4.3. ‘Socialization Outcome’ Variable

Figure 4.3. visualizes the ‘socialization outcome’ variable. The y-axis represents the range of norms from democratic (top of the y-axis) to anti-democratic (bottom of the y-axis). The ‘socialization outcome’ variable is scored by comparing the political norms of camps at T-1 on the x-axis (starting attitudes) to T-6 on the x-axis (attitudes prior to repatriation) to determine whether a camp improved, declined, or maintained its political attitudes since the start of the re-education program.

Explanatory Variables

Subgroup Leadership Type

The main expectation is that the variation in socialization outcomes of each POW camp can be largely explained by the involvement of a camp’s German leadership in re-education and their normative preferences. The first key independent variable, ‘subgroup
leadership type’, aims to measure the extent that the subgroup leadership of a camp is aligned with or diverges from the goals of the re-education program. This variable approximates the degree to which the German leaders within each camp were supportive or unsupportive of re-education, enabling me to test if subgroup leadership preferences predict socialization outcomes. The subgroup leadership type variable operationalizes three types of subgroup leaders—divergent, mixed, and aligned—which is determined by how the German leaders of each camp were selected.

As fully discussed in Chapter III, there were leadership interventions by British officials to install pro-re-education German leaders in certain camps (see Figure 3.3. for leadership structure and camp positions). Interventions only occurred in certain camps due to limited resources, the dwindling pool of anti-Nazi leaders that were continuously repatriated, and because some British commandants did not support re-education initiatives and in turn did not implement the leadership recommendations of Segregators and TAs. While some camps featured close coordination between re-education officials and British Commandants which resulted in robust pro-re-education leadership interventions, other camps experienced few or no leadership interventions and were run by apolitical or Nazi leaders.

How German leaders came to power and who selected them is used to approximate the subgroup leadership type of each camp and their level of support for re-education (see Table 4.2). The assumption is that camps with more interventions by British officials to install pro-re-education German leaders, particularly those where camp Commandants and TAs coordinated their efforts, have an aligned subgroup leadership type with high support for re-education. Conversely, camps under the administration of Commandants who selected apolitical or Nazi leaders to maintain discipline rather than promote re-
education and did not have leadership interventions by re-education officials are assumed to have divergent subgroup leaders with low support for re-education. Camps that either had leaders selected by a pro-re-education British Staff or at some point received an intervention by a TA are expected to have a mixed subgroup leadership type with partial support for re-education. Mixed camps generally featured less pro-re-education leadership interventions or had inconsistent support from British camp staff members and re-education officials. As demonstrated by Camp 239 in Chapter III, mixed subgroup leaders lack cohesion in their political attitudes.

Table 4.2. Expected Socialization Outcomes by Leadership Selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership Selection</th>
<th>Subgroup Leadership Type</th>
<th>Re-education Support</th>
<th>Expected Socialization Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unsupportive Commandant with no Training Advisor Intervention</td>
<td>Divergent</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supportive Commandant or Training Advisor Interventions</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supportive Commandant and Training Advisor Interventions</td>
<td>Aligned</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Re-educational Activity

The second independent variable, 're-educational activity', is a proxy for measuring the normative consensus of a camp. An important part of the theoretical argument is that subgroup leader control forms a stable environment with cohesive norms that can
increase horizontal socialization among fellow combatants. Re-educational activity measures how much of the camp was participating in re-education initiatives at the time of a report and ranges from 1 (no activity) to 5 (widespread activity). It is derived from interpreting sections of TA reports that comment on the levels of participation in re-education across the main camp and hostels. The assumption is that the overall levels of participation and support for re-education in a camp can serve as a proxy for measuring the collective preferences of a camp—low or mixed activity signalling a lack of a normative consensus and resistance towards re-education and high activity signalling conformity to pro-re-education norms. The theory anticipates that the higher the proportion of subgroup leaders supportive of re-education, the more likely there will be a pro-re-education normative consensus.

Leader Activity

The third key independent variable, ‘leader activity’, measures the proportion of German camp leaders active in re-education at the time of a monthly report. This provides a more precise indicator for linking the impact of subgroup leaders to socialization outcomes because it looks at the direct involvement of camp leaders in re-education over time, regardless of how they were selected. This variable is derived from TA reports which track each German leader’s support or lack of support for re-education ranging from camp and hostel leaders to priests and medical officers. For example, in a report on Camp 266, the TA notes that the camp leader Fritz Kindervater “is an extremely good type with sound political ideas. He is very keen on re-education” (September 1946, FO 1120/240: 2). Meanwhile in camp 259, the deputy camp leader Franz Demacker “takes no part in
political re-education” (December 1946, FO 1120/238: 2). If half of a camp’s leadership is active in re-education, then ‘leader activity’ is scored a 0.5 for the time of that report. My theory anticipates that the higher the proportion of camp leaders involved in re-education, the more likely combatants will achieve political progress.

Covariate Balance

Before proceeding to the statistical results, it is useful to present a summary of the key explanatory and control variables used in the analysis. Table 4.3 shows the covariate balance of POW camps based on their subgroup leadership type—aligned, divergent and mixed. As the next sections will fully discuss, Table 4.3 previews the variation on the main explanatory variables re-educational activity and leader activity. As expected, re-educational activity and the proportion of subgroup leaders directly involved in re-education is on average higher in camps with aligned subgroup leaders compared to camps with divergent and mixed leaders. Table 4.3 also shows the relative balance between camps on control variables leveraged from the monthly reports. Camps with aligned, divergent, and mixed subgroup leadership have comparable population and youth population sizes, a similar number of hostels (the smaller compounds surrounding main camps), equal access to re-education materials, and a similar distribution of combatants with ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’ political gradings.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subgroup Leadership Type</th>
<th>Aligned</th>
<th>Divergent</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Re-educational Activity</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader Activity</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>1498</td>
<td>1509</td>
<td>1571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostels</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Population</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-education Materials</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Contact</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Center</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Grade ‘A’</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Grade ‘B’</td>
<td>1448</td>
<td>1474</td>
<td>1399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Grade ‘C’</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The re-educational activity variable is on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (no activity) to 5 (widespread activity). The re-education materials variable measures the quality of resources available for a camp to implement a re-education program which is recorded by TAs. The variable is on a three-point scale: 1 (inadequate materials), 2 (adequate), 3 (above average and or a surplus of materials).

The population size and the youth population of camps are included, as it is possible that re-education was more difficult to administer in larger camps and in camps with younger POWs (aged 20-25) with presumably more exposure to Nazi indoctrination through participation in organizations like the Hitler Youth (Sullivan 1979: 94-95; Clarke 2006: 184). The number of hostels attached to each camp is included to measure the potential geographic dispersity of the camps, with more hostels signalling a more
dispersed camp population. The quality of re-education materials provided by the British—books, radios, classrooms—is included to control for access to resources for implementing a re-education program. The relative balance on the average political gradings in the camps raises confidence that socialization processes and outcomes were not determined by preestablished political attitudes in the camps. For example, that aligned camps featured a higher number of combatants graded ‘A’ and in turn had more positive socialization outcomes or that divergent camps had more combatants graded ‘C’ leading to more negative socialization outcomes. The potential issue of prewar and wartime norms driving socialization outcomes is further addressed in the alternative explanations section 4.3.

Lastly, contact with British civilians is controlled for throughout the analysis, as they were a potential source of pro-democratic norms outside of the camps and subgroup leader control. ‘Civilian contact’ is a dummy variable that codes for anytime a TA records significant interactions between a POW camp and British civilians. The ‘civilian center’ variable codes for if camp was located within a British civilian population center. Table 4.3 shows that camps with aligned leaders were more likely to be located within a British population center, one of the only significant imbalances between the three camp types which is expanded on in section 4.3 in the discussion on alternative explanations. Additionally, these variables are controlled for in the statistical analyses and in the robustness checks in section 4.3. Overall, the similar characteristics between camps controls for other factors besides subgroup leadership type that could be driving the variation in socialization outcomes.
4.2 Statistical Results

This section presents the statistical results in two parts. In the first section, 4.2.1, I present the wider patterns of socialization processes and outcomes based on the subgroup leadership type of each camp. In this first section, the unit of analysis is at the camp-level, leveraging data from monthly re-education reports (n = 489) to compare the variation in socialization processes and outcomes. Specifically, I compare patterns of re-educational activity (Figure 4.4.) and socialization outcomes (Figure 4.5) by plotting regression lines based on the subgroup leadership type of each camp (i.e., aligned, divergent, or mixed).

Figure 4.4. shows that on average, camps with aligned subgroup leaders feature higher levels of re-educational activity compared to camps with divergent and mixed leadership types. Put differently, camps with aligned leaders were more likely to have a pro-democratic normative consensus while camps with divergent leaders were more likely to maintain anti-democratic norms. Figure 4.5. plots the political outlook of aligned, divergent and mixed camps, illustrating their average socialization trajectories and outcomes. Figure 4.5. shows that on average, camps with aligned leaders were more likely to achieve periods of political progress and in turn have more positive socialization outcomes compared to mixed and divergent camps.

These camp-level socialization patterns are further reinforced in section 4.2.1. Table 4.4. reports the proportion of periods of political progress across all camps—whether a camp improved, declined, or maintained its political attitudes. Table 4.4. shows that 38% of periods of progress towards democratic norms occurred in camps with aligned leaders while most periods of decline occurred in camps with divergent leaders. Table 4.5. provides a summary of socialization outcomes by subgroup leadership type, showing that the majority of positive socialization outcomes occurred in camps with
aligned leaders while no camps with divergent leaders achieved a positive socialization outcome. The camp-wide analyses presented in section 4.2.1 provide strong support for the findings from the comparative case analysis in Chapter III, showing that on average, camps with aligned subgroup leaders were more likely to achieve periods of political progress and have positive socialization outcomes compared to camps with divergent and mixed subgroup leaders.

The second part of the analysis in section 4.2.2 focuses on the individual-level variation in subgroup leaders—estimating a series of logistic regression models that test the relationship between different characteristics of German subgroup leaders and political progress and political outlook. This section estimates a series of two-way fixed effects regression models, as each observation in the dataset is a monthly report which corresponds to a specific camp. Section 4.2.2 leverages the unique, individual-level data on the 2,803 different German subgroup leaders in my dataset. Specifically, I examine three important characteristics of subgroup leaders.

First, I estimate the relationship between the direct involvement of subgroup leaders in re-education and political progress. I find that across all camps, a higher proportion of subgroup leaders involved in re-education is associated with a statistically significant increase in both political progress and political outlook (Table 4.6). Second, I examine the variation of subgroup leaders by their different camp position (e.g., camp leader, hostel leader, study leader) and political gradings (i.e., were they graded an ‘A’ or a ‘C’). Interestingly, I find that no specific camp position or political grading is associated with political progress (Table 4.7). However, when collapsing the various camp positions into two categories—whether they were located in the main camp or in the hostels—I find
that hostel leaders selected by re-education officials are significantly associated with periods of political progress (Table 4.8).

In the final part of the analysis, I examine the variation in the military ranks of German combatants to see if different levels of leadership experience impact the likelihood of political progress. The military rank of subgroup leaders has important implications for the theoretical argument, as it can suggest which ranks are more effective at influencing their normative environment. I find that non-commissioned officer ranks of Unteroffizier and above (the equivalent of a Corporal) have a statistically significant relationship with political progress (see Table 4.9), which suggests that higher ranking junior officers are more effective at moderating norms. Table 4.9 also estimates whether there is a relationship between additional re-education training at Wilton Park and political progress, finding that attending Wilton Park is associated with political progress in the main camps but not in hostels.

After the two-part analysis in section 4.2, I engage with three alternative explanations introduced in Chapter II and engaged with in the comparative analysis in Chapter III: contact with British civilians, opportunism leading to preference falsification, and preestablished political attitudes determining socialization outcomes. Addressing these three alternative theories controls for other factors beyond subgroup leadership control that could be driving socialization outcomes. Additionally, I control for potential biases in the reports from TAs that had a negative relationship with the British camp staff and also control for unclear reports where coding decisions were uncertain. These additional robustness checks provide further evidence for the findings presented in sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.
4.2.1 Subgroup Leadership Type

This section analyzes camp-level socialization trends grouped by subgroup leadership type. As developed in Chapter II, there are three subgroup leadership types that vary in their support for re-education—divergent (low support), mixed (partial support), and aligned (high support)—which are based on how the leaders of each camp were selected (see Table 4.2). The first step of the theoretical argument anticipates that the normative preferences of subgroup leaders will shape the prevailing norms of their social environment. Specifically, I developed three hypotheses in Chapter II that correspond to these different subgroup leadership types: hypothesis 1—that combatants in subgroups with aligned leaders are more likely to adopt the official norms of an organization, hypothesis 2A—that combatants in subgroups with divergent leaders are less likely to adopt the official norms of an organization, and hypothesis 3—that combatants in subgroups with mixed leaders are also less likely to adopt the official norms of an organization. In the context of this case, the expectation is that German combatants with pro-re-education, anti-Nazi subgroup leaders are more likely to develop democratic and pro-British norms while combatants with apolitical or Nazi leaders are less likely to adopt the expected norms of the re-education program. In camps with a combination of pro-re-education and anti-re-education leaders, the expectation is that there will be uneven or limited socialization towards democratic and pro-British norms because of the lack of normative cohesion.

Figure 4.4 compares the average level of re-educational activity by subgroup leadership type and shows that on average there was more participation in re-education initiatives in camps with aligned and mixed subgroup leadership types. I argue that the re-educational activity variable can be used as a proxy for measuring the normative
consensus of a camp because it reflects collective political behaviors. Put differently, Figure 4.4 shows that camps with more pro-democratic German leaders were on average more cohesive in their collective participation and support for re-education. Conversely, camps with divergent subgroup leaders on average featured limited re-educational activity isolated to small groups of POWs and collectively maintained their pre-existing norms. Figure 4.4 lends support for hypotheses 1, hypotheses 2A, and hypotheses 3, that the preferences of subgroup leaders impact the prevailing behaviors and norms of a social environment. Additionally, it presents evidence for validating hypothesis 4, suggesting that the relative normative consensus in either aligned or divergent camps impacted levels of horizontal socialization, in this case collective participation in re-educational activity.
Figure 4.4. Re-educational Activity by Subgroup Leadership Type

Re-educational activity on the y-axis is on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (no activity) to 5 (widespread activity). Re-educational activity also serves as an indicator for the normative cohesion of each camp. On average, across all camps, within camp re-educational activity diminished in late 1947 and in 1948 in part from the repatriation of re-education organizers and from the lifting of restrictions on contact with British civilians.

The next step in the theoretical argument predicts that the normative consensus engendered and sustained by subgroup leaders will directly shape socialization outcomes. Figure 4.5 compares the average ‘political outlook’ of camps, their overall changes in democratic and pro-British attitudes, grouped by subgroup leadership type. As expected, Figure 4.5 illustrates that on average, camps with an aligned subgroup leadership type have a higher democratic political outlook than camps with divergent or mixed subgroup leaders and were more likely to have periods of political progress and positive
socialization outcomes. The difference in means in ‘political outlook’ between camps with aligned and divergent subgroup leaders is 1.34 and becomes more pronounced in the final five months of reporting at 2.38. On average, the political outlook of divergent camps remains relatively static throughout 1946 and 1947 then declines considerably in 1948, suggesting that anti-democratic norms persisted or intensified in camps with divergent subgroup leaders.

Figure 4.5 Political Outlook by Subgroup Leadership Type

Political Outlook measures the socialization trajectories and outcomes of each camp, tracking their cumulative periods of political improvement or decline.
Table 4.4 provides a useful breakdown for the statistical data driving the patterns visualized in Figure 4.5. As discussed in the research design, ‘political progress’—whether a camp improved, maintained, or declined in its democratic and pro-British attitudes—drives the ‘political outlook’ of a camp which shows its overall socialization trajectory. Table 4.4 shows that camps with aligned leaders achieved political progress in 38% of their reporting periods, compared to only 12% progress in camps with divergent leaders. It also shows that camps with divergent and mixed leaders proportionally had the highest periods of political decline at 23% and 22%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subgroup Leadership Type</th>
<th>Decline</th>
<th>No Change</th>
<th>Progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Divergent</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aligned</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.5 totals the socialization outcomes of all 64 camps grouped by subgroup leadership type. As shown by Figure 4.3, socialization outcomes are determined by comparing the starting political attitudes of a camp to its political attitudes at the time of its final report prior to repatriation. While the groups are numerically imbalanced, Table 4.5 makes clear that most positive socialization outcomes occurred within camps with aligned subgroup leaders. Conversely, 9 out of 13 negative socialization outcomes occurred within camps with divergent subgroup leaders that were unsupportive of or directly undermined re-educational efforts. The role of subgroup leader involvement in socialization is further reinforced when examining the proportion of leaders active in re-
education by subgroup leadership type. Camps with divergent subgroup leaders—POWs who were apolitical or still openly Nazis—had the lowest proportion of leaders active in re-education and the most negative socialization outcomes. The percentages of leaders active in re-education also lends potential support for hypothesis 4, as the overall levels of participation in re-education by leaders can serve as another indicator for the normative consensus of a camp. Through this lens, the lack of participation by divergent leaders typically created a normative consensus of anti-re-education norms while aligned leaders fostered an environment of prevailing pro-re-education norms.

Table 4.5. Distribution of Socialization Outcomes by Subgroup Leadership Type: Evidence for Hypotheses 1, 2A, and 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subgroup Leadership Type</th>
<th>Leaders Active in Re-education</th>
<th>Negative Outcome</th>
<th>No Change</th>
<th>Positive Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Divergent</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aligned</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Together, Figures 4.4 and 4.5 and Tables 4.4 and 4.5 demonstrate that on average, camps administered by pro-re-education, aligned German leadership were more likely to experience periods of political progress and positive socialization outcomes, have a higher political outlook, and have higher levels of re-educational activity compared to camps with divergent leaders. This lends clear for support for hypothesis 1, hypothesis 2A, and hypothesis 3, that subgroup leaders moderate socialization processes and outcomes. Specifically, that combatants in subgroups that have leaders who are aligned with the official norms of the organization are more likely to adopt those norms compared to those
in subgroups with divergent or mixed leaders. Lastly, the patterns of re-educational activity and proportion of leaders active in re-education supports the plausibility of the theoretical argument that combatants are more likely to change their attitudes in normatively cohesive environments.

4.2.2 Subgroup Leader Analysis

This section estimates a series of logistic regressions that test the relationship between variation in German subgroup leader characteristics and political progress and political outlook. These models examine the direct role of German leaders within the camps and their composition. Beyond aggregate data at the camp-level, re-education reports also provide detailed information on German camp leaders. This includes the camp position of the individual, their military rank, and their support or lack of support for re-educational activities. There are a total of 2,803 unique German POW leaders in the dataset. Apart from POWs involved with apolitical activities such as organizers of the camp orchestra or theater, all German leaders mentioned in the reports are included in the dataset. This information enables the tracking of the various leaders within the camps (see Figure 3.3 for camp positions) and their involvement in re-education over time.

Each observation in the dataset is a monthly report which corresponds to a specific camp, enabling the estimation of two-way fixed effects models. Fixed effects models control for both within camp and over time confounders. The time fixed effects are particularly useful for controlling for potential shocks linked to the political attitudes of POWs, such as news on the status of repatriation, the relaxing of restrictions on POWs, and the material and political conditions in postwar Germany. Time fixed effects can also
account for other time varying factors potentially linked to political attitudes such as distance from the end of the Second World War, recovery from wartime trauma, and developing social bonds within and outside the camps. In all models, I include additional controls relevant to re-education within the camps (see ‘Covariate Balance’ subsection in 4.1) and re-run the models clustering standard errors to the camp-level (see models in Appendix II).

This section of the analysis proceeds in three parts. First, the direct involvement of subgroup leaders in re-education on political progress is examined using the ‘leader activity’ variable (see Table 4.6.) Next, the variation in camp positions, location (i.e., were they leaders in the main camps or in the hostels), and political gradings of subgroup leaders are explored (see Tables 4.7 and 4.8). Third, I leverage the different military rankings of German camp leaders recorded in the monthly reports to explore if different leadership experiences impacted the influence of subgroup leaders in the camps (see Table 4.9).

Leader Activity
This section focuses on the direct participation of subgroup leaders in re-education on shaping the normative environments of their camps. The ‘leader activity’ variable measures the proportion of leaders directly involved in re-education activities at the time of a monthly report. The ‘Progress Models’ in Table 4.6 estimate the effect of leadership activity in re-education initiatives on political progress and the ‘Outlook Models’ estimate the effect on political outlook while both controlling for time and camp fixed effects. Across all estimated models, an increase in the proportion of camp leaders directly
involved in re-education resulted in a statistically significant positive increase in both political progress and political outlook at standard levels of significance (p < 0.01). Substantively, increased involvement of German camp leaders in re-education is strongly associated with periods of political progress and the likelihood of positive socialization outcomes. Both results remain significant when clustering for standard errors at the camp level and when including controls.

Table 4.6: Effect of Leader Activity on Political Progress and Political Outlook (logit): Evidence for Hypothesis 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Progress Model 1</th>
<th>Outlook Model 1</th>
<th>Progress Model 2</th>
<th>Outlook Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leader Activity</td>
<td>1.051***</td>
<td>1.404***</td>
<td>0.997***</td>
<td>1.245***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.198)</td>
<td>(0.251)</td>
<td>(0.203)</td>
<td>(0.244)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.00003</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.00004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00001)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostels</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.045*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Population</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.379***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.378)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.455)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-education Materials</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.253***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td>(0.089)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Contact</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.493***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.089)</td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Center</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>3.880***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.329)</td>
<td>(0.397)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp FEs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month FEs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations | 489 | 489 | 489 | 489 |
R²           | 0.313 | 0.781 | 0.324 | 0.805 |
Adjusted R² | 0.154 | 0.731 | 0.156 | 0.757 |
Note: The dependent variable for Progress Models 1 and 2 is whether a camp made political progress and improved in its democratic attitudes. The dependent variable for Outlook Models 1 and 2 is a camp’s overall socialization trajectory, its cumulative periods of political improvement or decline.

"p < 0.01; "p < 0.05; 'p < 0.1

Outlook Model 2 also flags other factors potentially driving socialization within the camps. First, contact with civilians and whether a camp was located near a civilian center are associated with a statistically significant positive increase in political outlook. However, as discussed in the alternative explanations section 4.3, the majority of leadership interventions and in turn camps with aligned subgroup leaders were typically located in areas near British civilians. There is also a statistically significant relationship between the quality of re-education materials and positive socialization outcomes. Put differently, camps with better re-education materials and facilities (i.e., more books and classrooms) have more positive socialization outcomes. Finally, an increase in the youth population of a camp is negatively associated with political outlook, strongly suggesting that it was more difficult to democratize younger German combatants that had more exposure to Nazism.

Camp Positions and Political Gradings

This section estimates the relationship between the different camp positions and political gradings of subgroup leaders and political progress. Table 4.7 examines the various positions within each camp, estimating the effect of German leaders active in re-education on political progress by their camp position. Re-education was primarily carried out through the dissemination of pro-democratic media and through political discussion groups. Study leaders were responsible for organizing discussion groups throughout the
main camp and the hostels. However, re-educational efforts could be spearheaded by POWs in any camp position, including medical officers, camp priests, and deputy camp leaders. Furthermore, it is plausible that leaders with a higher political grading, for example Germans scored as an ‘A’ or ‘B+’, were more influential in spreading democratic norms than their ‘C’ or ‘B-’ counterparts. In the ‘Camp Position Model’ in Table 4.7, no leadership position is significantly associated with political progress. The Camp Leader, Study Leader, Magazine Editor, and Organizer of Re-education positions are positively associated with political progress but are statistically insignificant (the reference level is camp medical officers). Turning to political gradings, there is a statistically insignificant relationship between the political grades of German camp leaders active in re-education and political progress.

What explains the lack of statistically significant relationships between camp positions and political gradings with progress in re-education? The results of Table 4.7 are puzzling, as it would be expected that certain camp positions with high levels of authority—for example camp, hostel, and deputy leaders—would presumably have more of an impact on influencing the normative environment of their camps. Specifically, the theoretical argument anticipates that leaders closest to the subgroup-level, which in this case are hostel, deputy hostel, and study leaders, would have the most influence on moderating norms. Similarly, it is intuitive to imagine that a leader with an ‘A’ political grading—presumably an avid anti-Nazi—would be more effective at spreading democratic norms.
Table 4.7. Effect of Camp Position and Political Letter Grade on Political Progress (logit): Examining Positions at the Subgroup-Level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Camp Position Model</th>
<th>Political Grade Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camp Leader</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Camp Leader</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostel Leader (Subgroup-Level)</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Hostel Leader (Subgroup-Level)</td>
<td>-0.111</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic Priest</td>
<td>-0.144</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazine Editor/Librarian</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant Priest</td>
<td>-0.090</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizer of Re-education</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study Leader (Subgroup-Level)</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade ‘C’</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade ‘B-’</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade ‘B’</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade ‘B+’</td>
<td>-0.117</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade ‘A’</td>
<td>-0.062</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader Activity</td>
<td>0.14*</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>6,671</td>
<td>5,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.305</td>
<td>0.314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.291</td>
<td>0.299</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A potential explanation is that political progress was typically the result of a camp-wide effort instead of linked to the actions of a single position or individual. This intuition is supported by the previous findings on the overall subgroup leadership type of each camp. Evidence from the comparative case analysis in Chapter III showed that isolated support for re-education from only a handful of subgroup leaders was ineffective at impacting the norms of the wider camp. For example, in Camp 70, the subgroup leaders in Portfield Hostel were highly active in re-education but their efforts were unable to shift the prevailing divergent norms of the camp. Importantly, the ‘Leader Activity’ variable—the proportion of all camp positions involved in re-education—remains statistically significant and positive in the ‘Camp Position’ model. The results of ‘Leader Activity’ in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 lend support for the theoretical argument that normative cohesion is an important part of shaping combatant preferences (*hypothesis 4*). Specifically, that coordinated action and cohesion among subgroup leaders themselves is needed. In Table 4.8, I examine two broader levels of leadership within the camps, comparing the effect of leaders in the main camps to those in the smaller hostels. Table 4.8 collapses the numerous camp positions and groups them by their location in either the main camp or the surrounding hostels.

Interventions to install pro-re-education leaders varied by camp position and time, sometimes occurring only within the main camp or within the hostels and could unfold gradually across positions. Table 4.8 estimates the effect of two different levels of pro-re-
education leadership on political progress—main camp leaders and hostel leaders. Both are dummy variables that code if the leaders at these different levels of camp positions were selected by British officials to support re-education. The theory anticipates that leaders closest to the subgroup level, in this case the hostel leaders who controlled around 50 to 100 combatants, will have more influence on moderating norms and socialization.

Table 4.8. Effect of Camp Position on Political Progress (logit): Examining Positions at the Subgroup-Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Camp Leaders</td>
<td>0.215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.165)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostel Leaders (Subgroup-Level)</td>
<td>0.353**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.141)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0.00002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostels</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Population</td>
<td>0.259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.383)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-education Materials</td>
<td>0.146**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Contact</td>
<td>0.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Center</td>
<td>0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.371)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Leader * Hostel Leader</td>
<td>-0.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.213)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp FEs</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month FEs</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.139</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The dependent variable is whether a camp improved in its democratic attitudes.

**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
Model 1 in Table 4.8 reports a statistically significant positive increase in political progress when a camp’s hostel leaders were selected by a pro-re-education official and a positive but statistically insignificant increase when camp leaders are installed. The results of Model 1 suggest that on average, hostel leaders played a more important role in reinforcing and spreading pro-democratic norms, which lends support for the expectation that aligned leaders at the subgroup level have a larger impact on socialization. Interestingly, the interaction between camp and hostel leaders, if both levels were handpicked by the British to support re-education, is statistically insignificant and negative, suggesting that socialization was primarily moderated by hostel leaders closest to the subgroup level. In the final section of the statistical analysis, I leverage the variation on the military ranks of German camp leaders to explore if previous leadership experience impacted their influence on socialization.

Military Rank and Wilton Park Attendance

Military rank fundamentally structures life within armed organizations and is important in shaping combatant socialization (Bell and Terry 2021; Daly 2014). Military rank is often commensurate with the organizational and leadership experience of an individual and can be used to approximate their authority and influence. Within POW camps, military rank continues to play a significant role as in accordance with the Geneva Convention, detained combatants are allowed to recreate and observe the military hierarchies of their armed organizations ‘behind the wire’ (Wilkinson 2017; Krammer 1979). British adherence to the Geneva Convention as well as their ‘hands off’ approach
to the internal administration of the camps meant that German POWs continued to observe their military ranks.

My theory frames subgroup leaders as the ‘middle-managers’ of armed organizations, the junior officers who interact with the rank-and-file at the squad, platoon, and company-levels. Table 4.9 estimates the effect of camp leaders active in re-education by their military rank and if they attended Wilton Park. The ‘All Camp’ model incorporates camp leaders across an entire camp while the ‘Hostels’ model subsets the data to leaders that operated within the hostels closest to the subgroup level. In the ‘All Camp’ model, leaders active in re-education with the ranks of Unteroffizier to Stabsfeldwebel have a positive, statistically significant association with political progress. In the German military, Unteroffizier is a junior non-commissioned officer rank typically responsible for acting as the second-in-command in platoons, commanding squads of around 9 combatants. Meanwhile, the ranks of Feldwebel to Stabsfeldwebel are senior non-commissioned officer ranks, responsible for coordinating larger sized units such as entire platoons (approximately 40 combatants) or companies (approximately 200-400 combatants).

---

21 Unteroffizier translates roughly to the Western equivalent of a Corporal. See Table 7.3 in Appendix II for the Western equivalents of these ranks and the approximate number of combatants under their command.
Table 4.9. Effect of Rank and Wilton Park Attendance on Political Progress (logit)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>All Camp</th>
<th>Hostels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gefrieter</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.353*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.133)</td>
<td>(0.203)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obergefreiter</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td>(0.194)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unteroffizier</td>
<td>0.234*</td>
<td>0.410**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
<td>(0.182)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feldwebel</td>
<td>0.250**</td>
<td>0.360**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
<td>(0.180)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oberfeldwebel</td>
<td>0.231*</td>
<td>0.320*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
<td>(0.184)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haputfeldwebel</td>
<td>0.245*</td>
<td>0.344*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
<td>(0.207)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabsfeldwebel</td>
<td>0.329**</td>
<td>0.451**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.149)</td>
<td>(0.205)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilton Park Graduate</td>
<td>0.197**</td>
<td>0.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td>(0.169)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0.00003</td>
<td>0.00003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00004)</td>
<td>(0.00005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostels</td>
<td>0.017**</td>
<td>0.016*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Population</td>
<td>-0.162</td>
<td>-0.185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.133)</td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-education Materials</td>
<td>0.169***</td>
<td>0.187***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp FEs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month FEs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>3,825</td>
<td>2,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.304</td>
<td>0.355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.281</td>
<td>0.319</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The dependent variable is political progress. The military ranks are presented in order from the lowest (Gefrieter) to most senior ranks (Haputfeldwebel and Stabsfeldwebel). The reference level is the lowest rank Soldaten, the Western equivalent of a Private.

*p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
When examining leaders within the hostels, the ‘Hostels’ model shows that the effect size of all ranks increases, notably that the positive effect of Unteroffizier nearly doubles from 0.234 to 0.410 and becomes more significant. This intuitively suggests that junior officers are more effective at moderating smaller social groups and environments. The results of Table 4.9 show that rank matters in moderating socialization. Specifically, that higher ranking junior officer positions with presumably more leadership experience and or authority are on average more influential in controlling the normative environment of combatants compared to lower ranking combatants. While the results on the influence of junior officers like Unteroffiziers and Feldwebels who frequently interact with combatants are in alignment with the theoretical framework, the effect of higher-ranking junior officers like Haputfeldwebels and Stabsfeldwebels was unexpected. These higher-ranking officers still operate at the smaller unit level, however, they typically occupy a more administrative role and may not interact as much with rank-and-file combatants compared to squad and platoon leaders. These findings suggest that the experience of higher-ranking junior officers can play an important role in disseminating and controlling norms, potentially as leaders closest to the upper echelons of an armed organizations command structure.

Concerning if a German leader attended Wilton Park for additional re-education training, the models in Table 4.9 report that it had a positive association at the camp level but diminishes and is no longer significant within the hostels. Additionally, the size of the effect for attending Wilton Park is generally lower than military rank, suggesting that a combatant’s training and position within the hierarchy of their armed organization is more important than leadership experiences outside of it. It is also possible that Wilton Park graduates were viewed suspiciously and as agents of the British by average POWs,
as they were sometimes viewed as outsiders or mockingly referred to as ‘super-democrats’ (Sullivan 1979: 240-257).

Section 4.2.2 leveraged the fine-grain individual data available on the German leaders of each camp to explore the variation in subgroup leaders. The results suggest that increased subgroup leader influence was not predicted by a specific camp position or political grading, but by the previous rank and leadership experience of the individual. Furthermore, the ‘Leader Activity’ indicator lends strong evidence for the normative cohesion aspect of the theoretical argument, demonstrating that socialization was on average more likely when subgroup leaders were unified in their efforts. The final section of the chapter addresses four potential alternative explanations—civilian contact, opportunism and coercion, the starting political attitudes of combatants, and biases and ambiguity in the reporting of TAs.

4.3 Alternative Explanations

This section addresses four alternative explanations for the statistical results presented in section 4.2. As developed in Chapter II and engaged with in Chapter III, there are other potential factors besides subgroup leaders influencing the normative preferences of German combatants. First, it is possible that contact with British civilians determined the democratic preferences of combatants, as they provided an alternative source of democratic norms outside of the camps. Second, given the clear incentives for early repatriation, it is possible that many German combatants were opportunists who participated in re-education in hopes of securing an early release home. Additionally, German combatants could have been coerced by their fellow combatants or British
officials to participate or not participate in re-education. Third, it is possible that the socialization outcomes of each camp were predetermined by the established prewar and wartime attitudes of combatants prior to re-education. Lastly, tension between re-education officials and British camp staff may have biased the reports. These four potential alternative explanations are addressed in turn.

Civilian Contact: Alternative Sources of Norms

As discussed in Chapter III, contact between German POWs and British civilians was an important alternative source of norms that could impact the socialization trajectory of combatants. Throughout 1945 and 1946, most German POWs had limited contact with British civilians through agricultural and factory labor outside of their camps. However, in the summer of 1947, restrictions on fraternization with civilians were lifted and German combatants could freely travel within a 10-mile radius of their camp including into urban areas (FO 939/247; Clarke 2006). The lifting of restrictions also created new opportunities for re-education initiatives. For example, a TA in Camp 253 organized an exchange where POWs attended “various City and County Council Meetings” as well as events at “the Fabian Society, Rotary Club, [and] Norwich City College (April 1948, FO 1120/237: 2). At Camp 167, roughly 100 POWs attended classes at the University of Leicester and Cambridge University held a summer school for young POWs (FO 939/247). Additionally, on average, each camp had 137 POWs billeted with civilian families (often on farms) and ultimately around 10,000 POWs chose not to return to Germany and instead ‘civilianized’ (Quinn 2015).
Leveraging the addresses of camps from TA reports and verifying their locations through two historical preservation projects, it is possible to code for variation in exposure to British populations. As seen in Figure 4.1, the camps in the dataset were located across England, Wales, and Scotland. Two variables are used to control for contact with British civilians—the ‘civilian contact’ dummy variable, which codes for anytime significant interactions between POWs and surrounding civilian populations are reported by TAs, and the ‘civilian center’ dummy variable which codes for if a camp was within a civilian population center.

Contact with civilians is an important factor that is a potential moderating variable on the influence of the German leadership and subgroup dynamics within the camps. Consistent with longstanding social psychology theories on the attitudinal effects of an ‘ingroup’ interacting with an ‘outgroup’ (Gatner and Dovidio 2012; Kruglanski et al. 2014; McCauley and Moskalenko’s 2008), statistical results as well as qualitative evidence from the reports suggest that contact with British civilians did in part increase the likelihood of ‘democratizing’ German POWs. Referring back to Table 4.6, the results of ‘Outlook Model 2’ show that camps located within a civilian center had on average a higher political outlook of 3.88. Additionally, out of the 139 periods of recorded political progress, 92 of them (66%) occurred in camps located within a civilian center and 68% of positive socialization outcomes were in camps also located within a civilian center. However, civilian contact alone does not explain the total variation in socialization outcomes as the

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22 Malcolm G., “WW2 P.O.W. Camps in the UK,” https://www.ww2pow.uk/home/camplist/; Martin J. Richards, “Repatriated Landscape: The Search for WWII POW Camps in the British Landscape,” https://repatriatedlandscape.org. The ww2pow project uses official Ordnance Survey maps that show the locations of the POW camps in the 1940s, 50s, and 60s, raising confidence in the accuracy of the locations of the camps and their level of contact with British civilians.
location of leadership interventions are unbalanced and contact with British civilians is controlled for in the regression models.

Table 4.10. Urban Location of Camps by Leadership Interventions: Controlling for Civilian Contact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subgroup Leader Selection</th>
<th>Outside Civilian Center</th>
<th>Inside Civilian Center</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unsupportive Commandant with no Training Advisor Intervention (Divergent)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supportive Commandant or Training Advisor Interventions (Mixed)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supportive Commandant and Training Advisor Interventions (Aligned)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown in Table 4.10, most camps that received leadership interventions were located within civilian centers, including 21 out of 29 camps with an aligned subgroup leadership type. Camps with an aligned subgroup leadership received interventions from both TAs and pro-re-education British commandants and in turn had on average more subgroup leaders in support of re-education. The higher rates of political progress and political outlook for camps within civilian areas are likely driven by the disproportionate number of leadership interventions within population centers. Archival records and secondary sources unfortunately do not provide a direct explanation for why more leadership interventions occurred in camps within civilian population centers but given limited postwar resources and that re-education officials often travelled using public transportation, it was likely easier for TAs to visit camps near civilian areas which may have resulted in more leadership interventions.
When subsetting the data to examine during and after fraternization restrictions, Table 4.11 shows that the effect of German camp leadership on political progress decreases from 1.33 to 0.86, suggesting that the intensity of subgroup leader influence diminished as POWs were allowed to spend more time outside of the camps. While Table 4.11 shows the declining influence of German camp leaders, it also demonstrates their lasting impact which persisted even after increased contact with civilians, suggesting that the dissemination and approval of norms by subgroup leaders remained important. The declining influence of German camp leaders could also be attributed in part to the rapid acceleration of repatriation in late 1947 which led to a higher turnover rate of qualified camp leaders.
Table 4.11. Effect of Leader Activity During and After Restrictions on Civilian Contact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Restrictions</th>
<th>Post Restrictions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leader Activity</td>
<td>1.328***</td>
<td>0.863***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.362)</td>
<td>(0.322)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0002)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostels</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Population</td>
<td>-0.213</td>
<td>0.816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.849)</td>
<td>(0.635)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-education Materials</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Contact</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.195)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Center</td>
<td>-0.740</td>
<td>0.670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.594)</td>
<td>(0.490)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp FEs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month FEs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.542</td>
<td>0.363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.251</td>
<td>0.093</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The dependent variable for both models is whether a camp made political progress and improved in its democratic attitudes. Restrictions on contact with civilians and travel into urban areas was lifted in June and July of 1947.

**p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; *p < 0.1

Lastly, another alternative explanation related to camp location is that the British placed ‘black’ Nazi camps in isolated areas to protect civilians from the potentially more dangerous detainees while ‘white’ camps with more anti-Nazis were placed closer to urban areas. Table 4.12 shows that the geographic distribution of ‘black’, ‘grey’, and ‘white’ camps in or outside of civilian centers was relatively balanced, with 14 ‘black’ camps located directly within civilian populations.
Table 4.12. Urban Location of Camps by Political Color Grading

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp Color</th>
<th>Outside Civilian Center</th>
<th>Inside Civilian Center</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grey</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Opportunism and Coercion*

German POWs had clear incentives to falsify their political attitudes because of the priority repatriation of anti-Nazis (Clarke 2006; Quinn 2015). German opportunists faking their political preferences to return home early is a potential alternative explanation for the changes in attitudes recorded in re-education reports and was taken seriously as a threat to the re-education program by British officials (Sullivan 1979). As introduced in Chapter III, certain aspects of this case, particularly the timing of the announcement of the repatriation program, and data from re-education reports can be used to control for preference falsification.

First, the political gradings of POWs were not revealed to POWs until the very end of 1946 and in January 1947. Next, the policy of updating the political grade and in turn the repatriation date of POWs through re-screenings ended in June 1947 which is also when POWs were informed of their permanent repatriation date (FO 939/246). I argue that POWs had less incentives to falsify their preferences before and after this window from January 1947 to June 1947 where they had an opportunity to update their political grade and repatriation date. As seen in Table 4.13, which re-runs the models from Table 4.6, dropping this period from the analysis still shows a significant relationship between
subgroup leader involvement and political progress, showing that the results are not just driven by this period of opportunism.

Table 4.13. Opportunism Robustness Check: Effect of Leader Activity on Political Progress and Outlook

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Progress Model 1</th>
<th>Outlook Model 1</th>
<th>Progress Model 2</th>
<th>Outlook Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leader Activity</td>
<td>1.110***</td>
<td>1.361***</td>
<td>1.064***</td>
<td>1.177***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.220)</td>
<td>(0.283)</td>
<td>(0.226)</td>
<td>(0.277)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostels</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.050*</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Population</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>-1.486***</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.307***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.428)</td>
<td>(0.524)</td>
<td>(0.084)</td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-education Materials</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.307***</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.428***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.084)</td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Contact</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.714</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.399)</td>
<td>(0.489)</td>
<td>(0.399)</td>
<td>(0.489)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp FEs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month FEs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.306</td>
<td>0.806</td>
<td>0.318</td>
<td>0.827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.749</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.772</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Leadership activity remains statistically significant in all models when dropping reports from January 1947 to June 1947, the timeframe when POWs were most incentivized to falsify their preferences for early repatriation.

***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1

Second, British officials were aware of the potential for falsified preferences, as noted in a December 1946 report, “knowledge of [political] gradings has roused political interest to the extent that all re-educational activities are now better attended, but fully 50% is mere attempted opportunism”, and another report acknowledges that “the termination of screening make[s] it no longer profitable for opportunists to visit
discussion groups and lectures” (December 1946, FO 1120/224: 2; August 1947, FO 1120/218: 3). British officials filtered out opportunists through a combination of repeated screenings and through camp informants. While the use of German informants has been categorically denied by Colonel Henry Faulk, it is clear from other archival documents and memoirs that they were used by British officials for political gradings and to acquire intelligence in the camps (Faulk 1987, reel 2). Informants and hidden recording devices were used at the first POW interrogation center at Kempton Park to find war criminals (Neitzel and Welzer 2012; Sullivan 1979: 42-46). Furthermore, an official memo on screening notes the “classification of German [POWs] is based chiefly on interrogation...documentary evidence, such as letters and the reports of reliable informants are also utilized” (“Segregation of German Ps/W,” FO 939/459: 2) and a discovered German informant in Camp Comrie was murdered by his fellow POWs (Normann 1996). While imperfect, the British attempted to mitigate opportunism through intelligence gathering and interrogation.

Third, POWs were allowed to appeal their political grading and could request a ‘rescreening’. The number of appeals is recorded on the monthly TA reports and was used by POWs that felt they were wrongfully graded. Across the 64 camps in the dataset, only 14,711 POWs requested an appeal, at an average rate of 229 appeals per camp. The relatively low number of appeals suggests that the political grading system of the British was fairly accurate in identifying Nazis and anti-Nazis. Furthermore, the individual leaders featured in the camp reports were carefully watched and vetted in addition to the regular screenings, presumably making their political gradings more reliable. Finally, the outcome variables are based on the general attitudes of POWs at the camp level. While there were opportunists, it is unlikely that there were enough to impact the group level
trends of the camps measured in the reports and the results suggest that opportunism alone cannot explain the variation in socialization outcomes.

It is also possible that German POWs were coerced by their fellow pro-democratic combatants or by British officials to participate in re-education. Additionally, some combatants may not have revealed their true democratic preferences in fear of punishment from Nazis in the camps. As discussed in Chapter III, re-education was entirely voluntary and, in accordance with the Geneva Convention, British officials could not force German combatants to participate (Faulk 1977; Quinn 2015; FO 939/454: 2). Furthermore, by the start of the re-education program in 1946, most POW camps were no longer surrounded by razor wire or under armed guard, and POWs were increasingly given more privileges to choose their own activities (Clarke 2006; Sullivan 1979). Together, these factors make the threat of British punishments and pressure to participate in re-education minimal.

The threat of punishment from fellow POWs for participating or not participating in re-education was also minimal. While there was initially Nazi led violence in the camps in 1944 and early 1945 that targeted anti-Nazis (see ‘Nazi Control in the Camps’ in section 3.2), after the war ended in May 1945, overt violence virtually ended (Sullivan 1979: 284). After the end of the war, Nazis could no longer threaten fellow combatants with reprisals back in Germany and the British Prisoner of War Division devoted significant resources to removing Nazi leader that were inciting violence (Faulk 1977). Additionally, the stigma of cooperating with the British also largely ended by the start of re-education, as the total collapse of Nazi Germany freed combatants from their oaths to Hitler and the Nazi Party (Quinn 2015). Furthermore, as evidenced by camps with mixed leadership, it was common for ideologically opposed subgroups to coexist without violence or threats of
violence. For example, in Camp 79, three distinctive subgroups—democratic, communist, and national socialist—operated their camp without any recorded violence (FO 1120/219). The almost non-existent levels of violence within the camps during re-education, the removal of violent Nazi leaders, and that oppositional subgroups generally coexisted in the camps without overt threats to each other, raises my confidence that coercion among combatants was not a significant factor in shaping socialization processes and outcomes.

**Camp Color: Controlling for Starting Political Attitudes**

Another potential explanation for the variation in socialization outcomes is that they were predetermined by the initial political attitudes of the population in each camp. The design of the comparative case analysis in Chapter III mitigated this potential issue by selecting camps that shared similar starting political attitudes. However, in the analysis of this chapter, the dataset includes a mixture of ‘white’, ‘grey’, and ‘black’ camps, and it is possible that these starting political attitudes set their camps on a specific socialization trajectory. For example, that ‘black’ camps that started re-education with predominantly Nazi attitudes were incapable of making political progress or that ‘white’ camps with prevailing anti-Nazi norms were already going to develop democratic norms. Leveraging these different starting categories, it is possible to subset the camps by their starting ‘color’. As seen in Table 4.14, German leader involvement in re-education is still significantly associated with an increase in political progress for all camps regardless of their starting color. This demonstrates that regardless of prewar and wartime attitudes or whether a camp was initially dominated by Nazi or anti-Nazi norms, that variation in
subgroup leader involvement in re-education is still significantly associated with periods of political progress in the camps.

Table 4.14. Effect of Leader Activity by Camp Color

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White Camps</th>
<th>Grey Camps</th>
<th>Black Camps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leader Activity</td>
<td>1.129*</td>
<td>0.931***</td>
<td>1.143***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.672)</td>
<td>(0.343)</td>
<td>(0.324)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.00000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0004)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostels</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Population</td>
<td>-2.779*</td>
<td>0.307</td>
<td>1.139*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.516)</td>
<td>(0.644)</td>
<td>(0.588)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-education Materials</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>-0.173</td>
<td>0.247*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.230)</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Contact</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.484***</td>
<td>-0.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.260)</td>
<td>(0.156)</td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Center</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>0.330</td>
<td>-0.168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.468)</td>
<td>(0.396)</td>
<td>(0.373)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp FEs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month FEs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.498</td>
<td>0.396</td>
<td>0.436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.207</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The outcome variable is political progress. The camps in each model are subset by their starting political ‘color’ as identified by re-education officials during the time of their first reports on each camp.

***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1

Uncertainty and Biases in the Data

Chapter I discussed the potential biases of using archival data, especially documents created and persevered by state actors (Trachtenberg 2020; Subotić 2020). In Chapter III I stated my confidence in the reliability of the data which stems from cross-referencing
re-education reports from two archives and that sensitive documents critical of the re-education program survived. However, there are still two issues that threaten the reliability of the data—uncertainty in the data and the biases of British re-education officials. As noted in this chapter, TAs were sometimes inconsistent in their reporting on the changing political attitudes of German POWs. While most reports used absolute statements that clearly gauge whether a camp has improved, declined, or maintained its political attitudes, others use ambiguous language or fail to address the key outcome variable directly. Additionally, some reports are unclear about how new camp leaders came to power. In these instances, I code for uncertainty in the reports. In Table 4.15, I re-run the models from Table 4.6 while dropping reports where there was uncertainty in the explanatory and outcome variables, and the effect of ‘Leader Activity’ statistically significant.
Lastly, there is the possibility that adversarial relationships between TAs and unsupportive British Commandants biased the reports. As noted previously, re-educational officials were civilians outside of the military which sometimes led to confrontations with discipline minded Commandants that did not support re-education. In these instances, it is possible that TAs wrote negative reports to undermine an unsupportive British camp staff. Table 4.16 includes the control variable ‘Training Advisor Bias’, which codes for anytime there was a negative relationship between the Training Advisor and the British Camp Staff at the time of a report. For example, if the
Training Advisor is upset that the British camp staff did not implement their recommendations or if they obstruct or are hostile towards re-educational efforts. This addresses potential bias in the reporting of TAs, controlling for if they are negatively scoring a camp because of their personal dislike for the British staff.

Table 4.16. Training Advisor Bias Robustness Check

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Progress Model 1</th>
<th>Outlook Model 1</th>
<th>Progress Model 2</th>
<th>Outlook Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leader Activity</td>
<td>1.064***</td>
<td>1.406***</td>
<td>1.012***</td>
<td>1.241***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.198)</td>
<td>(0.252)</td>
<td>(0.203)</td>
<td>(0.245)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Advisor Bias</td>
<td>-0.151</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>-0.136</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.094)</td>
<td>(0.119)</td>
<td>(0.095)</td>
<td>(0.114)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.00004</td>
<td>-0.00004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostels</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.045*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Population</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>-1.382***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.377)</td>
<td>(0.456)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-education Materials</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.254***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Contact</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.495***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.089)</td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Center</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>3.875***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.329)</td>
<td>(0.398)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp FEs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month FEs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.318</td>
<td>0.781</td>
<td>0.328</td>
<td>0.805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>0.730</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>0.756</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
4.4 Conclusion

Combatant socialization is typically framed as a process driven by the top leadership and institutions of armed organizations or the pre-conflict motivations of individuals. However, Chapters III and IV have shown how subgroups and their leadership play a critical role in combatant socialization. Chapters III and IV provide a mixed-method analysis of the British re-education program for German POWs during and after the Second World War leveraging an original dataset. To my knowledge, this is the first comprehensive systematic analysis to leverage re-education reports on these POW camps. These chapters provide compelling evidence for the overall expectation of this dissertation that subgroup leaders moderate socialization outcomes and shape conflict identities. First, the proportion of subgroup leaders involved directly in re-education is consistently associated with political progress and positive socialization outcomes. It is clear that the more German camp leaders were involved in re-education, the more likely combatants were likely to achieve political progress. Additionally, the patterns of overall re-educational activity coupled with the proportion of leaders active in re-education provide support for hypothesis 4, that combatants are more likely to socialize in environments with a normative consensus.

Second, the quantitative analysis in this chapter strongly reinforces the evidence presented in Chapter III that variation in subgroup leadership type impacts socialization outcomes. The patterns of socialization and re-education presented in part one of the statistical results show that on average, the subgroup leadership type shaped the social environment of each camp and in turn the socialization outcomes of combatants. This lends support for hypothesis 1, that combatants in subgroups with aligned leaders are more likely to adopt official norms, for hypothesis 2A that combatants in subgroups with
divergent leaders are less likely to socialize into official norms, and for hypothesis 3 that combatants with mixed subgroup leaders are also less likely to adopt official norms. Third, the fine-grain data available on the German leaders of each camp enabled the exploration of different subgroup traits on socialization, finding in part two of the analysis that higher-ranking junior officers were more likely to drive political progress. These findings provide strong evidence that subgroup leaders significantly shape the conflict identities of combatants.

In the next chapter, I conduct a cross-case comparison between the British re-education program and the American re-education program for German POWs to show that the impact of subgroup leaders on socialization travels outside of the British context.
Chapter V

Cross-Case Comparison: The American and British Re-education Program for German POWs

Chapters III and IV demonstrated that in the British re-education program, the subgroup leaders of German POWs critically shaped the environment and outcomes of socialization. Combatants in camps with pro-democratic, anti-Nazi leaders were more likely to develop democratic norms and have positive socialization outcomes while those in camps with Nazi or politically indifferent leaders were less likely to democratize. Overall, the British re-education program was partially successful in changing the political attitudes of German combatants. Out of the 64 camps in my dataset, 28 achieved a positive socialization outcome with combatants appreciably changing their political attitudes to align with the pro-democratic, pro-British norms of the re-education program. I argue that this success was largely from interventions to alter the subgroup leadership within the camps, which was only possible because of the comprehensive screening system used by British officials. The British Political Intelligence Department (PID) committed extensive resources towards categorizing the political attitudes of German POWs, which enabled them to identify Nazis as well as the anti-Nazis to replace them with. This chapter introduces and compares the American re-education program to democratize German POWs to the British program, which despite sharing similar goals and methods, largely failed to change political attitudes (Robin 1995; Reiss 2005). This comparative case analysis provides additional evidence for the role of subgroup leaders
in moderating socialization and demonstrates that subgroup dynamics unfold in other settings beyond the British case. Specifically, this chapter highlights the pervasive influence of divergent subgroup leaders and their ability to undermine official socialization initiatives.

Similarly to the British, American re-educators sought to influence the attitudes of German combatants through exposure to pro-democratic media, established special camps to provide intensive re-education, and eventually attempted to segregate ardent Nazis from the main camps (Bernard et al. 2011: 11). American re-educators also took a hands-off approach to administering the camps, allowing the POWs themselves to run them (Robin 1995: 33). However, unlike the British, American leadership interventions were severely limited in scope and were unable to break the firmly established Nazi leadership and influence within most camps. Out of the population of roughly 370,000 German combatants held in hundreds of camps across America, where the US War Department estimated that 40,000 of them were ardent Nazis, only 4,550 Nazis were removed from the main camps (Krammer 1979: 179).

When anti-Nazi leaders were identified, they were not empowered, but instead removed along with their potential influence on the rest of the camp. American re-education officials prioritized training and repatriating already established anti-Nazi German POWs. As noted in a US Army intelligence report in February 1946, “the re-education program was undertaken to equip relatively small groups of carefully selected German prisoners of war for leadership in post-Hitler Germany” (“The Re-education of a PW,” 4-4.1 BB 2, C 2, Combined Arms Research Library (CARL)). This approach “ignored the rank-and-file” and focused “on a marginal and numerically insignificant intellectual subculture within the camps,” leaving the overwhelming majority of combatants under
the control of Nazi leaders (Robin 1995: 10). Instead of seeking to maximize the influence of anti-Nazis over average combatants, American re-educators chose to focus their efforts on combatants that were already pro-democratic. As this chapter will demonstrate, this difference in re-education strategy fundamentally impacted socialization outcomes by enabling hardcore Nazis to dominate and undermine re-education in the main camps.

In this chapter, I leverage secondary and archival evidence to show that the failures in the American re-education program were engendered by the divergent, Nazi subgroup leadership of most camps. These sources provide an in-depth examination of divergent subgroup leaders and their mechanisms of normative control, enabling me to further test hypothesis 2A—that combatants in subgroups with divergent leaders are less likely to socialize into sanctioned norms. Additionally, the detailed accounts of disruption to re-education orchestrated by Nazi leaders in American camps allows the testing of hypothesis 2B, that combatants with divergent subgroup leaders are more likely to resist official socialization initiatives.

This chapter proceeds in five sections. First the research design is presented, discussing the similarities and differences between the American and British re-education programs. Next, the analysis is chronologically divided into three sections—starting with the initial goals of the program and leadership structures of the camps in 1943 and early 1944. Next, the attempted re-education and segregation interventions in late 1944 and in early 1945 and their impact on subgroup dynamics within the camps are discussed. In the last part of the analysis, the average socialization outcomes of German combatants departing America in 1945 and early 1946 are presented. Specifically, I leverage survey data from American questionnaires to German POWs as well as sections of British re-education reports that comment on the political attitudes of German POWs when they
arrived from American camps. In the final section, I discuss two potential alternative factors that likely contributed to the mostly negative socialization outcomes of the American re-education program—limited contact with American civilians and the timing of the war.

5.1 Research Design

Chapters III and IV presented a mixed method, within-case analysis of the British re-education program for German POWs. This chapter conducts a controlled, cross-case comparison of the American and British re-education programs to provide further evidence that subgroup leaders shape socialization outcomes. Specifically, this chapter tests hypothesis 2A and hypothesis 2B, that combatants in subgroups with divergent leaders are less likely to adopt sanctioned norms and are more likely to resist official socialization initiatives. My theoretical argument expects subgroup leaders to control the normative content of a combatant’s social environment which then impacts the direction and intensity of horizontal socialization. Evidence from the American case demonstrates how Nazi subgroup leaders were able to suppress democratic norms in the camps and reinforce wartime attitudes. As a result, most German combatants held in America maintained their conflict identity and failed to develop democratic norms.

The case selection and incorporation of the American re-education program into the analysis is motivated by three factors. First, a paired comparison can demonstrate that subgroup dynamics and the influence of its leaders also unfolds within different settings (Tarrow 2010). Leveraging an additional case lends support for the generalizability and external validity of the theoretical argument by showing that the
results of Chapters III and IV were not determined by factors unique to the British case (Slater and Ziblatt 2013).

Second, the similar conditions and populations of both cases enables a most-similar research design, which minimizes the “differences between the systems being compared” except for the key explanatory variable—subgroup leadership type (Tarrow 2010: 234; Bennett and Elman 2007). As summarized in Table 5.1 and shown in the analysis, the administration of the POW camps, the goals and methods of the re-education programs, and the political attitudes of the camp populations were similar in both the American and British cases. Not only do both cases involve German combatants that participated in the same conflict with similar training and exposure to Nazi ideology, but the overall political attitudes of the camp populations are balanced. As noted in Chapter IV, most British camps were comprised of small anti-Nazi and Nazi elements while the majority of combatants were politically neutral (see Figure 4.2). Similarly, both secondary and primary sources on the American re-education program note a similar distribution of political attitudes, with an estimated 13% Nazi, 13% anti-Nazi, and 74% politically neutral (Reiss 2005: 97; Krammer 1979: 225; Smith 1996: 75). Controlling for political attitudes addresses the potential alternative explanation that the predominantly negative socialization outcomes in the American case was driven by a preponderant number of Nazis compared to the populations of the British case. Additionally, as developed in Chapter II and controlled for in Chapters III and IV, contact with civilians is an important alternative source of norms outside of subgroups that could be impacting socialization outcomes. Contact between German combatants and American civilians was limited compared to the high level of interactions with civilians in the British case. This potential alternative explanation is further discussed in section 5.3.
Where the cases diverge is on the subgroup leadership type of the camps which was determined by key policies implemented only by American officials that empowered divergent subgroup leaders in most camps. While both American and British officials initially allowed the highest-ranking Nazis to administer the camps, the British were eventually able to dismantle and replace divergent subgroup leaders through a comprehensive screening process and leadership interventions. Meanwhile, American attempts at segregation and subgroup interventions were extremely limited and their
policy of removing anti-Nazis from the main camps often strengthened the control of divergent subgroup leaders. As a result of these different policies, in America, “Nazi influence within the camps continued to grow” (Krammer 1979: 169).

The approach of this design is to compare the sequence of American and British re-education policies on the overall subgroup leadership of the camps and their socialization outcomes. Because Chapters III and IV detail the historical background, policies, methods, and results of the British program, the contextual focus of this chapter is on the American case. The analysis examines three distinct phases of the American re-education program and parallels them to the British case: (1) the starting structures and subgroup leadership of the camps in 1943 and 1944, (2) the implementation of limited segregation and re-education initiatives in late 1944 and in 1945, and (3) the political preferences of German combatants at the time of repatriation or transfer to labor camps in Europe in early 1946. Each step within this chronological framework is compared to the subgroup dynamics that unfolded in similar stages of the British case.

*The Data and Observable Implications*

This chapter uses a combination of secondary and primary source archival data. Unfortunately, American officials were less comprehensive than the British in tracking the changing attitudes of German POWs over time and did not conduct monthly reports. However, American officials were still interested in measuring the effects of the re-education program and implemented sporadic screenings, polls, and interviews. Notably, the US War Department issued an anonymized questionnaire to a cross-section of 22,153 German POWs at Camp Shanks, New York before their departure from the US in late 1945.
and early 1946 ("Poll of German Prisoner of War Opinion", 4-4 EC, CARL). These polls attempted to gauge political attitudes by asking German combatants about their views on subjects like democracy and National Socialism and provide useful snapshots.\(^{23}\)

To provide additional evidence and fill the gaps between these intermittent quantitative sources, I draw on a variety of secondary sources. Secondary sources can provide valuable evidence for theory testing (Bulutgil, Mylonas and Schenoni 2023; Mahoney 2000, 2010). Historians are trained to weigh the official record of events often found within state archives against personal accounts (Trachtenberg 2006). Triangulating primary and secondary sources, researchers can evaluate and leverage the arguments of historians as data (Costalli and Ruggeri 2019). Certain secondary sources on the American re-education program are particularly useful because they synthesize the multitude of memoirs and accounts of German POWs (Krammer 1979; Robin 1995; Koop 1988; Thompson 2006). The first-hand accounts of German POWs and their shared experiences provide compelling evidence on subgroup dynamics within the camps. Importantly, these personal accounts detail the often covert actions of subgroup leader control within the camps that were overlooked or minimized by American authorities and, in turn, are largely missing from the archival sources (Reiss 2005). Lastly, the British Training Advisor reports used in the analyses of Chapters III and IV are again leveraged as an original source of new data on the socialization outcomes of German POWs in America. Some British reports comment on the overall political attitudes of German

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\(^{23}\) Archival records from the US War Department are held by the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at Fort Leavenworth. Many of the documents relating to the American re-education program are available digitally. See ‘Prisoner of War Special Projects Division’ identifier. https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/search/searchterm/Prisoner%20of%20War%20Special%20Projects%20Division.field/keywor/mode/exact/conn/and.
POWs arriving from America, which I use as additional evidence to show that most combatants failed to develop democratic norms in America.

There are several observable implications of hypothesis 2A and hypothesis 2B which state that: (A) combatants in subgroups with divergent leaders are less likely to socialize into the intended norms of the organization and (B), that combatants with divergent subgroup leaders are more likely to resist official socialization. In the context of American and British re-education programs, divergent leaders are Nazis that seek to maintain the wartime political attitudes of their subgroups and suppress democratic norms. Official socialization is re-education initiatives whose goals are to democratize German combatants. Similarly to the British case, I consider subgroup leaders the German combatants that occupied leadership positions in the POW camps—ranging from administrative roles like camp spokesman and compound leader to the camp librarian. The mechanisms of subgroup leader control developed in Chapter II propose that subgroup leaders influence social environment through suppression—limiting contact with contradictory norms, protection and empowerment—supporting combatants sharing similar norms, and emulation—displaying and encouraging prototypical Type II behaviors.

In the context of the American and British cases, divergent (Nazi) subgroup leader suppression is observed through acts of limiting and censoring pro-democratic material. Nazi leaders primarily suppressed democratic norms by censoring information such as camp newspapers and libraries and by discouraging participation in re-education initiatives (Thompson 2006; Billinger 2009). Support occurred when divergent leaders empowered fellow Nazis into other camp leadership positions, gave them preferential treatment, and protected them from punishments from American camp authorities for
disobeying orders. Divergent subgroup control is also observed through overt displays of Nazi norms. For example, camps that celebrated Hitler’s birthday and other National Socialist festivals, widespread usage of the Nazi salute, and displaying swastikas and Nazi flags. Additional public displays of support included reinforcing the discipline and expectations of the German Army through strict adherence to uniforms, rank, and other traditions like funerals with full military honors when POWs died in the camps (Krammer 1979). Divergent subgroup leaders organized and participated in these public displays to reinforce expected behaviors and attitudes of the German Army and the Nazism.

Finally, divergent leaders are expected to not support re-education initiatives or collaborate with American authorities. For a camp to be considered under the control of divergent subgroup leaders, these deviant activities need to be consistent and widespread. Conversely, in the rare instances of camps under anti-Nazi control in America, subgroup leaders are involved in re-education and support democratic norms like free speech and voting. Similarly to Chapters III and IV, from the perspective of American re-educators, a negative socialization outcome is if a German combatant maintains their conflict identity and or fails to democratize. A negative socialization outcome is observed by the retention of Nazi attitudes and or the lack of adopting pro-democratic behaviors.

5.2 Cross-Case Analysis

The empirical analysis proceeds in three sections that are divided chronologically. These three distinct time periods are important for comparing the temporal variation in subgroup leader control in both cases. In part one of the analysis, I provide important context to the American case that details how the starting leadership of most camps fell
under Nazi control in 1943 and early 1944. In the second section, I cover the period of November 1944 to the end of 1945, when American officials implemented their re-education program and segregation policies. Specifically, I compare the limited segregation and screening policies of the US War Department to the robust interventions of the British PID which ultimately hampered American leadership interventions and led to most camps maintaining their divergent subgroup leaders. In the third section, I discuss the mixed effects of both re-education programs, highlighting the mostly negative socialization outcomes of German combatants in America.

**Part I: Starting Camp Leadership (1943-1944)**

In this section, I discuss how the early policies for administering the camps, which were structured around the guidelines of the Geneva Convention, inadvertently empowered Nazi, divergent subgroup leaders in most American camps. From the summer of 1943 to the winter of 1946, the US War Department was responsible for hundreds of thousands of German prisoners of war housed in approximately 300 camps scattered across America (Bernard et al. 2011) (see Figure 5.1). In total, 378,898 German combatants were at one point imprisoned in the US (Robin 1995: 6). The high number of prisoners resulted from an agreement between the US and Britain where most German combatants were placed under the administration of the US War Department (Clarke 2006).

24 While small

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24 From 1943 through most of 1944, the US agreed to absorb the majority of German POWs. In the aftermath of the Allied invasion of Normandy in June 1944, Britain began funneling roughly half of German POWs to the UK (Quinn 2015: 29). Controversially, Britain took ‘ownership’ of the other half of prisoners sent to the US, reclaiming them in 1946 and sending them to the labor camps where re-education unfolded in Chapters III and IV.
numbers of German POWs were in the US since 1941, often members of the German Navy captured during the Battle of the Atlantic, the first large influx of combatants arrived after the surrender of the German *Afrika Korps* in Tunisia in May 1943 (Billinger 2009).

Figure 5.1. Map of Major German Prisoner of War Camps in June 1944

![Map of Major German Prisoner of War Camps in June 1944](image)

Source: Rickey Robertson Collection 2013.

After the disorienting experience of capture, processing, and living in temporary camps with inadequate supplies in North Africa, the first wave of German combatants comprised of *Afrika Korps* members were transported to America in May and June of 1943 (Krammer 1979: 1-42). When they arrived, German combatants were separated into different camps based on their military branch (i.e., army, navy, air force) and rank (Ibid: 174). In accordance with the Geneva Convention, which American authorities followed
closely in the hope that German officials would reciprocate the same treatment to captured American combatants, rank-and-file enlistees were given access to a small number of their officers (Bernard et al. 2011: 9; Krammer 1979: 33). Importantly, at this initial stage of sorting German combatants, the US War Department had no policies for screening or separating prisoners by their political attitudes, meaning that Nazis and anti-Nazis were mixed into the same camps (Koop 1988: 28). One of the first decisions in a new POW camp that could cement its subgroup leadership was the selection of a camp spokesman and his administrative staff.

Following the Geneva Convention, the War Department allowed each POW camp to select their own leadership. Given that the first influx of prisoners were members of the Afrika Korps, who were a highly cohesive and professional force with a disproportionate number of ardent Nazi officers, the first leaders of many camps were Nazis (Thompson 2006: 94; Doyle 2011). Afrika Korps members exploited this leadership policy and “established the political patterns within the camps from the moment of their arrival. They elected the camp spokesmen from among themselves, and while appearing to be cooperative with authorities...often controlled the later, less Nazified, arrivals” (Krammer 1979: 162; Billinger 2009: 61). The Geneva Convention policy of allowing German officers to access the main camps enabled junior, non-commissioned Afrika Korps officers to reassert military discipline and act as enforcers and “keepers of the [National Socialist] flame” (Robin 1995: 34). When German combatants later captured in Sicily, Italy, and France arrived in the US, they found their camps often dominated by Afrika Korps veterans and under Nazi control (Koop 1988: 31). Historian Arnold Krammer (1979) summarizes the general experience of the “thousands of later arrivals” to the US who were
“stunned and apprehensive” to find their camps under Nazi control, quoting an account from Corporal Hein Severloh who wrote:

We had arrived at Camp McCain, near Jackson, Mississippi. We were a group of 250, all taken in Normandy...the first thing that struck me was that those who were in the camp were all in light grey, the bleached-out khaki of the Afrika Korps, and we, in the midst of them, were all in grey-green...they made us feel right away that we were second-class men...and in this camp everything was stupefying: the discipline, the guys from the Afrika Korps who posted each morning bulletin of victory, official German communiques; imagine the effect that had on us! (p. 162)

In most camps, the small groups of Nazi leaders who seized power during this initial stage were able to influence the majority of combatants through direct and indirect mechanisms of control. These leaders, who are divergent because of their continued to adherence to Nazi norms, in part used violence and intimidation to suppress democratic norms. For example, by exercising control through Nazi vigilante groups and ‘Kangaroo’ or ‘Honor Courts’ that intimidated, beat, and sometimes tried and executed suspected anti-Nazis (Robin 1995: 35; Mallett 2013). These informal institutions operated covertly, meting out punishments and ‘holding court’ at night. In Camp Concordia, Kansas in October 1943, Felix Tropschuh was found guilty of treason by a Nazi ‘Honor Court’ for collaborating with American authorities and was “expelled from the German community of fellowship” and forced to commit suicide (Krammer 1979: 170-171). Estimates vary, but around 100 to 300 combatants were executed by Nazis in the camps and likely thousands were beaten and threatened (Thompson 2006: 102). Most commonly, intimidation was used, specifically threatening anti-Nazis with reprisals against their family’s back in Germany (Koop 1988: 31-32).
It is important to note that overt violence within the camps was often exaggerated by both the public and governments officials. Newspapers sensationalized stories of gestapo agents living near American communities and government officials later blamed Nazi violence on the limited results of the re-education program (Krammer 1979). However, historian Ron Robin (1995) notes that when analyzing archival evidence from the War Department, it was poor coordination and limited interventions by re-educators that instead hampered the results of the program, not Nazi violence alone (p. 11). The results of the Camp Shanks questionnaire given to a cross-section of 22,153 Germans combatants prior to their departure suggests the actual extent of Nazi intimidation within the camps. When asked, “did you feel free to express anti-Nazi opinions without fear of mistreatment of your comrades?”, 72% of participants answered yes (4-4 EC: 17, CARL). While some Nazi leaders did use direct violence to control their camps, it was a relatively rare occurrence that affected a small percentage of the total population of prisoners and ultimately only 17 Nazi leaders were found guilty of “assaulting their fellow prisoners” (Mallett 2013: 110). By the start of the American re-education program in 1945, overt violence in the camps had largely ended. Instead, it was the more subtle and indirect suppression of democratic norms and the reinforcement of Nazi norms through maintaining expected military behaviors that shaped the normative environment of combatants.

Divergent subgroup leaders used more subtle methods of control to influence the social environment of their camps. They leveraged their authority as camp leaders to appoint fellow Nazis to positions that monitored normative content. For example, the camp librarians who would hide democratic books and the canteen managers who would only sell certain magazines and gave preferential treatment to fellow Nazis (Krammer...
1979: 163). They also censored and removed newspapers to limit democratic or anti-Nazi influences in the camps and organized their own information sessions that highlighted German victories (Koop 1988: Bernard et al. 2011: 7-8). Importantly, Nazis often gained control of the camp mailrooms, enabling them to read the letters of other prisoners to determine their political preferences and to censor information (Thompson 2006: 97).

Divergent subgroup leaders again exploited other aspects of the Geneva Convention to reinforce Nazi norms in the camps through public displays. For example, German combatants were permitted to wear their military uniforms, maintain the privileges and status of their rank, and observe customs of the German army, including the Hitler salute (Thompson 2006). Prisoners were also entitled to the funerary rights of the German Army, which Nazi leaders utilized as opportunities to emblazon swastikas and organize large gatherings in the camps (see Figure 5.2). Divergent subgroup leaders also organized celebrations of nationalistic German holidays and overtly Nazi celebrations for events like Hitler’s birthday (Krammer 1979).
Figure 5.2. Funeral at Camp Crowder, Missouri

Source: (“POW Funeral,” Camp Crowder Collection, 1944). Note the German Army flag draping the coffin and the flags with swastikas. POWs continued to wear their military uniforms and displayed their ranks. Also note the bleached khaki uniforms of Afrika Korps members that differentiated them from later German combatants. Large gatherings like funerals were an opportunity for Nazi leaders to reassert military control and nationalist attitudes.

Together, these direct and indirect methods of control used by divergent subgroup leaders suppressed contradictory democratic norms and maintained the expected behaviors of the German army. The small minority of Type II Nazi leaders were able to significantly influence the social environment and attitudes of most camps. By 1945, Nazi control of the camps was widespread, with an estimated 200 camps under the control of
Nazi leaders (Krammer 1979: 170). Harvard University professor Warren A. Seavey, who led an investigation into conditions within the camps wrote, “the Nazi element has succeeded in getting control…the United States policy in prisoners’ camps was strengthening Nazism among the war captives” (Ibid., 165). Continued adherence to Nazi norms during the initial months of captivity lends support for hypothesis 2A, that combatants in subgroups with divergent leaders are less likely to adopt official norms.

Paradoxically, American officials in the War Department were aware of Nazi control within the camps but generally welcomed it as a means of maintaining discipline which they did not have the personnel to adequately enforce (Robin 1995: 36). American officials favored the apparent discipline of Nazi run camps and were actually more negative towards anti-Nazis, blaming them for any disorder in the camps (Koop 1988: 29). “American indifference towards Nazi rule in the camps” was also motivated by the stereotype that all Germans were supporters of National Socialism and simply not caring if their active enemy “fought among themselves” (Smith 1996: 62; Clarke 2006). The lack of resources and German-speaking personnel for administering the camps further exacerbated the view of prisoners as a politically “monolithic group” and led most American commanders to rely on the German camp spokesman to maintain order (Bernard et al. 2011: 7; Robin 1995: 33). While authorities of the War Department were content with having a Nazi controlled “self-policing prisoner population”, stories of Nazi violence within the camps led to mounting public pressure to address the political attitudes of German prisoners (Koop 1988: 7-8). The public outcry against Nazi

25 In some rare instances, anti-Nazis were able to take over the leadership of some camps. For example, Camp Stark in New Hampshire, which contained members of the 999th Division, a penal unit filled with political dissidents of Nazi Germany (Koop 1988) and in Camp Blanding, Florida (Thompson 2006: 96).
domination in the camps as well as postwar concerns for occupied Germany led to the implementation of political segregation and re-education in late 1944.

In both the British and American cases, government officials were initially concerned with maintaining order and labor output in the POW camps. As discussed in Chapter III (see subsection ‘Nazi Control in the Camps’), British officials also initially took an indirect approach to running their POW camps, similarly allowing most camps to fall under Nazi subgroup control (Faulk 1977; 1987). During these first months of captivity, there were similar patterns of violence between Nazis and anti-Nazis and the formation of oppressive Nazi vigilante groups in British camps (Sullivan 1979; Clarke 2006; Normann 1996). Interestingly, in both cases, non-commissioned officers were instrumental in influencing norms, specifically the lower-ranking Unteroffizieres who in the German army were junior squad and platoon leaders. As shown in the results of Chapter IV (see section ‘Subgroup Leader Analysis’), Unteroffizieres were significantly correlated with influencing political attitudes in the camps, suggesting that junior officers closest to rank-and-file combatants have an increased influence over subgroup dynamics. As the next section shows, in response to Nazi control of the camps, both American and British officials responded with segregation policies and re-education initiatives. However, only the British, with their more robust system of screening, segregation, and leadership interventions, were able to diminish divergent subgroup control in the camps.

Part II: Re-education and Segregation (1944-1945)

This section first compares the goals and methods of re-education in the American and British cases before turning to their different systems of political segregation. While they
shared similar approaches to re-education, American segregation policies removed many anti-Nazis from the main camps, severely limiting the influence of aligned leaders on rank-and-file combatants. Conversely, the British concentrated their efforts on democratizing average combatants, inserting influential anti-Nazi leaders into leadership positions in select camps. I argue that the American policy to place anti-Nazis into separate camps enabled the divergent, Nazi subgroups to maintain their control and in turn led to mostly negative socialization outcomes.

The American Re-education Program

The creation of both the British and American re-education programs was motivated by competition with the Soviet re-education program for German prisoners and the desire to repatriate pro-democratic leaders that could assist in the reconstruction of postwar Germany (Clarke 2006; Robin 1995; Bernard et al. 2011). The underlying goal of the American and British re-education programs was to expose German POWs “to a study of democracy” and “to provide ideological alternatives to National Socialism” (Smith 1996: 69; Robin 1995: 4). To carry out re-education, the American War Department created the Special Projects Division (SPD) in April 1944 whose objective was to ‘Americanize’ and ‘democratize’ German combatants before their repatriation (Morina 2008).

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26 Both British and American officials were initially unsupportive of re-education but grew alarmed over reports of successful Soviet re-education. For information on the Soviet re-education program for German POWs, see Arthur Smith (1996) and Andreas Hilger (2005). The Soviet re-education program is excluded from the analysis of this dissertation because it was forced and structured to provide material incentives for combatants that participated. Additionally, there is a lack of reliable data to determine the socialization outcomes of participants.

27 Ron Robin (1995) notes that re-educational officials in the SPD were “for the most part, mobilized professors from the humanities” (p. 4).
the British approach, American planners wanted to avoid overt political propaganda and adopted a strategy of indirect, ‘self-indoctrination’, where combatants were “offered information about the...American way of life which would presumably speak for itself” (Reiss 2005: 18). An official US Army study summarizes the goals of the program:

> If a large variety of facts could be presented convincingly, perhaps the German [POWs] might understand and...come to respect the American people and their ideological values, and upon repatriation to Germany might form the nucleus of a new German ideology which will reject militarism and totalitarian controls and will advocate a democratic system of government. (Ibid., 18).

The US War Department viewed the roughly 370,000 German soldiers under their control “as a golden opportunity to expose [them] to the true facts of democracy and of the American way of life” (“Story of the PW Reeducation Program,” 4-4.1, BA 2, C 2: p. 2) CARL). Re-education materials and activities were first deployed in the main camps in November and December of 1944 and continued throughout most of 1945.

In practice, information about the ‘American way of life’ was spread through exposure to pro-democratic media sources in the form of books, magazines, newspapers, and movies which were overseen by SPD agents posted to each camp. Major camps featured libraries that were stocked with pro-democratic books approved by the SPD (Thompson 2006; Billinger 2009: 142). To curate their re-education materials, the SPD relied on a small group of a few hundred anti-Nazi German prisoners who were sent to a special camp known as the ‘Idea Factory’ where they developed and approved materials for circulation in the camps (Reiss 2005: 93). Prisoners at the ‘Idea Factory’, who were predominantly anti-Nazi intellectuals and writers, started a newspaper called Der Ruf which in March 1945 was circulated in every camp (Robin 1995). While material in Der
Ruf was generally viewed as overly academic and political by average combatants, most camps also had their own newspapers that published more relevant and widely read pro-democratic content (Ibid.: 75-91).

German combatants engaged most with two forms of indirect re-education in America, watching films selected by the SPD and participating in seemingly apolitical English, history, and vocational courses. Movie producers in Hollywood created high-budget films specifically for German prisoners that were popular (Robin 1995: 107-123). For example, The Moon is Down based on the novel by John Steinbeck which highlights the oppression of authoritarian regimes (Krammer 1979: 54). In one of the few involuntary re-educational activities in Both Britain and American, German combatants were forced to view footage and images of concentration camps (Reiss 2005: 94). In some camps under the control of divergent leaders, Nazis were able to convince some combatants that the footage of liberated concentration camps was Russian propaganda (Koop 1988: 86). Many German combatants also enrolled in various educational courses that were offered in classrooms constructed in the camps.28 In an arrangement coordinated by the German Red Cross and the Reich Ministry of Education, prisoners were notified that they could earn university credits while taking courses in captivity (Krammer 1979: 62-63). Many of the courses were apolitical, however some, particularly English and Western history classes, provided an additional source of pro-democratic norms.

The SPD also established a series of special schools in 1945 where select anti-Nazi prisoners could receive additional re-education. The objective of these schools was to

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28 For photos of life within the camps, including examples of POWs attending English language classes, see Krammer 1979.
provide training to “specially qualified prisoners of war who were to be repatriated with the purpose [of serving the] military government authorities as administrative assistants and police officers in Germany” (“Historical Monograph, Supplement,” 4-4.1, BA 2, C 2: p. 2, CARL). The selection criteria for the four special re-education schools were strict. Only anti-Nazis who were “the most cooperative prisoners whose political records were clean” were selected (Ibid., 2).29 The US War Department considered these special prisoners the “cream of the prisoner of war crop” because of their anti-Nazi records and political attitudes (“Press Release,” March 6, 1946, 4-4.1, BA 2, C 2: p. 2, CARL). In effect, these special schools removed potential anti-Nazi leaders from the main camps and repatriated them back to Germany, nullifying their influence on the wider POW population.

A total of 24,200 German combatants carefully selected by prisoners at the ‘Idea Factory’ received additional training in practices of democracy, American history, and courses on German history such as “Why the Weimar Republic Failed” (Krammer 1979: 222; Smith 1996: 68).30 1,016 of these students attended special schools at Fort Getty, Kearney, and Wetherhill for administrative and police training to work directly for the American occupational government in West Germany while the rest attended an intensive 6-day crash course on democracy at Fort Eustis in Virginia (Morina 2008: 83). The curriculum at Fort Eustis was developed by American professors working for the SPD with approval from anti-Nazis at the ‘Idea Factory’, and in total 12 cohorts ‘graduated’

29 The selection criteria demanded that potential applicants already have a “genuine interest in and understanding of democratic principles and ideals” and were mainly individuals persecuted by the Nazi Party (“Fact Sheet Concerning the PW Special Project Center Ft. Eustis, VA,” 4-4.1, BA 2, C 2: pp. 1-2, CARL). See this document for the full selection criteria.
30 For the full planning and curriculum of these courses, see “Re-education of Enemy Prisoners of War: Projects II and III”, 4-4.1, BB2, C2, CARL.
from the school and were immediately repatriated back to Germany (Robin 1995: 149; Clarke 2006: 180). Beyond the questionable efficacy of condensing a semester worth of material into a 6-day period, the Fort Eustis school was highly exclusive and did little to influence the political attitudes of average combatants in the main camp as graduates were sent directly back to Germany.

As noted in Chapters III and IV, the British also developed a special school at Wilton Park that offered intensive re-educational training to combatants with a diversity of political attitudes (Sullivan 1979; Faulk 1877). The purpose of Wilton Park was to reinsert graduates back into the main camps so that they could lead re-educational activities and spread democratic norms among average combatants (FO 1120/165). The statistical results in Chapter IV confirm the effectiveness of this strategy (see Table 4.9), as subgroup leaders that attended Wilton Park were significantly associated with periods of political progress in the British camps. Conversely, American officials not only limited the selection criteria of these school to combatants with no affiliation with the Nazi Party, but also funnelled these potential anti-Nazi subgroup leaders out of the main camps and did not return them (“Historical Monograph,” 4-4.1, BA 2, C 2: p. 2, CARL; Reiss 2005). Unlike the British re-educational efforts, SPD authorities under the guidance of American university professors and intellectuals at the ‘Idea Factory’ tailored their re-education program to target anti-Nazis instead of all German combatants. Re-education initiatives like the camp newspaper Der Ruf “failed to accomplish its goals because its editors and mentors maintained their studious detachment from the concerns of ordinary POWs” and in general the SPD “consciously ignored the rank-and-file (Robin 1995: 192, 10). The impact of initiatives like Der Ruf were also limited as Nazi leaders destroyed or censored copies of pro-democratic materials (Reiss 2005: 94).
I argue that this critical difference between the American and British re-education programs fundamentally shaped socialization outcomes. As the next section will show, by choosing to focus on and isolate anti-Nazis, American officials failed to break the influence of divergent subgroup leaders which resulted in mostly negative socialization outcomes as the majority of German combatants maintained or even intensified their wartime conflict identities (Reiss 2005; Robin 1995; Thompson 2006). Instead of amplifying the influence of aligned subgroup leaders and combatants, American authorities diminished it. This misguided approach was made worse by the American segregation system which further removed potential aligned subgroup leaders from the main camps.

American Segregation Policies: Strengthening Divergent Norms

In response to public pressure to curb Nazi violence and control of the camps, American authorities implemented a limited system of segregation that removed both ardent Nazis and anti-Nazis from the camps. The first attempt at segregation was a policy launched in February 1943 that allowed anti-Nazis to request removal to select anti-Nazi camps (Krammer 1979: 175). However, relatively few anti-Nazis came forward as “it meant that they were forced to identify themselves without receiving guarantees that Americans could protect them or their families against later Nazi reprisal” (Koop 1988: 32). This early “policy of isolating the most strident anti-Nazis and placing them, rather than the fanatic Nazis, in separate camps” further solidified the control of divergent subgroup leaders in the early stages of captivity (Robin 1995: 140).
In July 1944, the segregation policy was revised to include the removal of Nazi leaders to Camp Alva, Oklahoma and anti-Nazis were permitted to request immediate transfer to Camp Campbell, Kentucky and Fort Devens, Massachusetts (Koop 1988: 32). As a result, roughly 5,000 anti-Nazis were placed in segregated camps and later around 25,000 pro-re-education combatants were sent to the special SPD re-education camps discussed in the previously (4-4 EC, CARL). American commanders with SPD guidance prioritized removing openly Nazi officers, particularly National Socialist Leadership Officers (NSFOs) who specialized in ideological indoctrination and were inexplicably allowed to live among average combatants (Robin 1995: 41). However, the segregation of Nazi leaders was limited.

While the US War Department publicly proclaimed that its segregation policies had successfully “cleansed” the “atmosphere” of all camps “of undesirable influences” ("Story of the PW Reeducation Program,” 4-4.1, BA 2, C 2: p. 7, CARL), in reality, only 4,550 Nazis were eventually relocated to Camp Alva, with the War Department still estimating that approximately 40,000 active Nazis remained in the main camps (Krammer 1979: 179). By removing the higher-ranking Nazi officers, it actually strengthened the authority of divergent junior officers (Unteroffizieres) within the camps (Robin 1995: 41). For example, at Camp Blanding, Florida, American officials removed the Nazi camp leader Alfred Paschke, but “his followers continued his policies” (Billinger 2009: 62). American segregation policy reinforced the authority of divergent leaders closest to the subgroup level and again removed potentially influential anti-Nazi, aligned subgroup leaders from the main camps.

American segregation policy was limited due to a lack of resources and qualified German speaking personnel to comprehensively screen the political attitudes of German
combatants (Koop 1988; Mallett 2013). In a rare admission to the failure of US segregation policies, a memo circulated by the Army Service Forces in March 1945 admitted that “personnel is limited” and that “American Military Government officers have extreme difficulty in selecting anti-Nazis...as a result, the selected key Germans have often been Nazis” (“Army Service Forces Memorandum,” 4-4.1, BB 2, C 2: p. 1, CARL). When segregation was implemented, the untrained and uninformed American authorities often made mistakes. For example, American officials transferred around 1000 Type II Nazis in the spring of 1945 to Camp Dermott which was an anti-Nazi camp. As anticipated by my theoretical framework, which expects social environments with mixed subgroup leaders to destabilize socialization, a normative contest between Nazi and anti-Nazi subgroups developed in Camp Dermott and the “political environment had changed significantly for the worse” (Mallett 2013: 112). Many of the Nazis transferred into the originally anti-Nazi camp were “Afrika Korps men who would not permit [anyone] to either read American newspapers or listen to American news broadcasts” or were members of the SS that “attempted rigid censorship of all reading material” (Ibid.: 112). American officials in Camp Dermott noted that this intake of Nazis significantly influenced life and re-education within the camps throughout the rest of 1945 and until repatriation through their spreading of Nazi norms and censorship of democratic material (Ibid.: 113).

This is also evidenced by events in Camp Blanding, Florida. Originally considered an anti-Nazi camp because of its largely apolitical prisoners from the German Navy, Camp Blanding was thrown into turmoil by the arrival of Afrika Corps members at the end of 1943 (Billinger 2009: 61). Led by Alfred Paschke, Afrika Corps members quickly took over various camp positions and immediately began disrupting collaborations with
American authorities and disseminating pro-Nazi content. They led multiple labor strikes that halted work in the camp, agitated American authorities, and stoked tensions with the original anti-Nazi prisoners. By the start of the re-education program, Alfred Paschke was removed, but other Afrika Korps members remained in power (Ibid.: 62-63). In 1945, re-education officers still noted the clear divide between the Nazi and anti-Nazi groups within the camp and that despite having adequate re-education facilities and resources, there was “no active re-education programs” in part because of “POW leadership attitudes” (Ibid.: 151). Divergent subgroup leaders in Camp Blanding continued to manipulate re-education materials and suppress democratic norms. For example, the camp’s interpreters were Nazis who manipulated the message of American authorities and editors of the camp newspaper published articles critical of American policies (Ibid.: 62-63, 162). Ultimately, in a surviving report on Camp Blanding, a re-education official noted the lack of re-educational activity, stating, “General impressions: a little dull, inactive, disappointing” (Ibid.: 163-164). The examples from Camp Blanding and Camp Dermott capture the experiences of camps under divergent control. Overall, the US War Department lacked the resources and policies to screen the political attitudes of German combatants which generally led to divergent subgroup leader control of the camps.

Comparatively, British officials invested significantly more resources into developing their screening process and segregation system. As discussed in Chapter III, the British Prisoner of War Division (POWD) relied on a series of political gradings (see Table 3.1) to categorize the attitudes of German combatants. The British grading system was more robust than the binary American system of Nazis or anti-Nazis and included 8 different categories ("Instructions to Segregators," FO 939/457). Even before the implementation of re-education and segregation in 1946, the POWD had already
conducted preliminary screenings on the political histories and attitudes of each German prisoner when they first arrived (Faulk 1977). Most importantly, the POWD and later the Political Intelligence Department (PID) responsible for administering re-education utilized a trained staff of German speaking personnel (Sulzbach 1979, reels 1-3). British ‘Segregators’, the agents responsible for interviewing German combatants in the camps to determine their political grading could speak German and were often paired with a German émigré familiar with Nazi German society (Sullivan 1979; Faulk 1977). Furthermore, when re-education was introduced, the frequent reports on political attitudes within the camps conducted by British Training Advisors gave them valuable information on the subgroup dynamics of each camp. While British screening was flawed, compared to the American system, it was much more effective at categorizing the political attitudes of German combatants.

This difference in screening and segregation policies directly impacted the subgroup leaders of each camp. In Britain, their extensive intelligence gathering efforts allowed them to identify divergent and aligned leaders. As the analysis of Chapters III and IV show, this knowledge of individuals and subgroup dynamics within the camps allowed British re-education officials to make significant leadership interventions in the camps to replace Nazis with pro-democratic, anti-Nazis that could actively lead re-educational efforts. Conversely, American officials had severely limited information on the political attitudes and dynamics of their camps which resulted in limited or misguided segregation. Importantly, British segregation policy did not isolate anti-Nazis but instead sought to empower them in the main camps. Interestingly, American officials were aware of the British segregation system but declined offers to coordinate policies and resources (Krammer 1979: 41, 174; Smith 1996: 70). While both the American and British camps
were initially dominated by divergent subgroup leaders, only the British were able to effectively dismantle and replace Nazi subgroup leaders with anti-Nazis in some camps. As the next section of the analysis demonstrates, the differences in re-education and segregation policies between the American and British programs significantly impacted socialization outcomes.

**Part III: Socialization Outcomes (1945-1946)**

In this section, I present secondary and archival evidence for the mostly negative socialization outcomes of German combatants in the American re-education program. I have argued that American segregation and re-education policies isolated and removed potential anti-Nazi, aligned subgroup leaders that could have spread democratic norms and influenced the preferences of average combatants in the main camps. Unlike in the British case, American officials were generally unable to change or contain the divergent subgroup leaders that seized important camp positions in the early stages of captivity because of these policies. As a result, most combatants maintained their wartime political attitudes or even increased their association with Nazism and negative attitudes towards democratic norms.

Most secondary sources consider the American re-education program a failure (Reiss 2005; Robin 1995; Thompson 2006; Mallet 2013; Billinger 2009: 164).\(^3\) Arnold

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\(^3\) Based on an analysis of 120 former German combatants who maintained contact with one of their re-education teachers in America, Christina Morina (2008) argues that re-education was partially successful. However, her analysis is based on anti-Nazis that attended the special re-education school at Fort Getty which makes it unrepresentative of the attitudes and experiences of average German POWs in America. Similarly, a questionnaire issued to 78 former Fort Getty students living in Germany in 1947 found that 23% of them were active members of political
Krammer (1979) quotes Professor Harold Deutsch, an intelligence officer involved with the re-education program, who recounts: “we made mistake after mistake...the Nazis weren’t segregated until after the damage had been done” (p. 225). Hermann Jung, who interviewed former German soldiers, reflected that “re-education had hardly any effect on the overwhelming majority of German POWs in America” (Reiss 2005: 92). Historian Ron Robin (1995) concludes that the American re-education program was a “misconceived effort riddled with fundamental errors” that “played a marginal role in the transformation of German...political attitudes” because of its focus and isolation on small group of anti-Nazis (pp. 9-10). These conclusions are also supported by quantitative evidence in the form of questionnaires and interviews administered by the US government during and after the re-education program. These surveys and screenings show that “no meaningful change in the worldview of the vast majority” of German POWs occurred (Robin 1995: 11).

While American officials were not as consistent in tracking the changing attitudes of German combatants in comparison to the British who compiled monthly re-education reports, a series of intermittent studies were conducted to gauge the attitudes of German combatants. First, the US Office of War Information carried out a three-month inspection of 32 major POW camps in early 1945 months after the re-education program was officially launched. The report concluded that, “5 to 10 percent of personnel in practically every camp were fanatics who controlled the activities of all other prisoners” and that “the trend towards political control of the prisoner camps by a minority of Nazis was correctly

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parties compared to the public average of about 5% (see Merritt and Merritt 1970 *Public Opinion in Occupied Germany*, pp. 200-201).
diagnosed” (Krammer 1979: 167-168).\(^{32}\) It is possible that this report, conducted in the first months of re-education in the main camps, was done too early to show the potential changes in political attitudes. However, two other surveys carried out by the US government at the end of 1945 and prior to the departure of German POWs provide further evidence that German political attitudes remained largely unchanged.

In the fall of 1945, the US Department of State initiated a study to determine the number of German combatants that were deemed politically ‘safe’ and ‘unsafe’. 500 POWs at Camp Halloran and a group of anti-Nazis at Fort Getty were given a questionnaire designed to measure the political attitudes of combatants. The results for the Halloran group revealed that only 8% were considered ‘safe’, 16% untrustworthy, and 76% ‘unsafe’ (Reiss 2005: 97). More comprehensive evidence comes from the results of the previously mentioned questionnaire distributed at Camp Shanks to a cross-section of over 22,000 German combatants prior to their repatriation. The Camp Shanks survey provides strong evidence for the average socialization outcomes of German combatants in America, as it was distributed to a large, representative sample of individuals at the end of their re-educational experiences (4-4 EC, CARL).

This questionnaire was distributed to three different camps. At Camp Shanks, the questionnaire was administered over the course of four weeks to twelve cohorts of combatants prior to their repatriation or transfer to European labor camps. Camp Atlanta in Nebraska was used as another anti-Nazi group, as it represented a POW camp active in

\(^{32}\)The original reference for this report provided by Arnold Krammer (1979) is “Memo, Lieutenant Colonel John S. Myers, CMP, Special Assistant to the PMG, to Major General Archer L. Lerch, PMG, March 9, 1945. Subject: Public Relations Problems of PW Special Projects Division, RG 389, PMGO, Prisoner of War Operations, Administrative Branch, Decimal File, 1943-46, 383.6, General, MMB-NA.”
re-education overseen by an SPD agent and a supportive American camp commander (Ibid., 2-3). The final group was from Fort Getty, one of the special camps for intensive re-education with predominantly anti-Nazis, which provides the attitudes of presumably the most pro-democratic combatants. The questionnaires were anonymized, and to prevent spillover effects, “each successive group polled was collected from an entirely new shipment of prisoners” (Ibid., 4). The questionnaire presented 13 prompts, however the results of the most relevant questions pertaining to political attitudes are discussed (see full questionnaire background in Appendix III). Together, the results suggest that most German combatants maintained their wartime attitudes, a failed socialization outcome given the goals of the re-education program.

The second question in the survey asked, “what type of government would you prefer in the future of Germany?” (Ibid., 7). The results as they were originally reported are presented in Table 5.2 which breaks down responses by camp and age (Ibid., 7).
Table 5.2. Results of Question Two: “What Type of Government Would you Prefer in the Future Germany?”

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Control</th>
<th>22153 PW’s at Camp Shanks</th>
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<td>Ft. Eustis</td>
<td>Camp Atlanta</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constitutional</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Monarchy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communism</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Socialism</td>
<td>.5%</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>.5%</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The questionnaire for control Camp Atlanta did not feature this question.

Table 5.2 provides some support for limited democratization among German combatants, with 62% of respondents at Camp Shanks preferring democracy and only 5% selecting National Socialism. The overwhelming majority of Fort Eustis students (96%) selected democracy. However, the respondents at Fort Eustis were committed anti-Nazis receiving intensive re-education at the time of their survey. A more difficult result to interpret is the 19% of Camp Shanks respondents that provided no answer. American officials interpreted the ‘no answer’ to this question as likely an “unfavorable answer” (Ibid.: 7). It is possible, particularly given the higher percentage of non-responses from German
combatants under the age of 25 who were on average more supportive of Nazism, that more respondents did not select National Socialism due to social desirability bias. This suggests few changes in political attitudes, as it is likely that around 10% or more of respondents were still in support of Nazism which is close to estimates of starting attitudes (Billinger 2009: 164).

Table 5.3. Results of Question Four: “Do you Believe that Jews were the Cause of Germany’s Troubles?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control</th>
<th>22153 FW’s at Camp Shanks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL All Ages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>89% 86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partly</td>
<td>10% 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entirely</td>
<td>0 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1% 4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3 provides the results for question four, “do you believe that Jews were the cause of Germany’s troubles?”, which still demonstrates widespread antisemitism among average German combatants. Only a third of respondents at Camp Shanks responded no, while 57% blamed Jews for issues in Germany with 10% non-responses. Antisemitism was a cornerstone of National Socialist ideology and policies, suggesting that the majority of German combatants leaving the US still maintained these Nazi attitudes. These results lend support for the failures of American re-education, as an emphasis of courses was to
correct the anti-semitic historical narratives crafted by the Nazi Party (“Re-education of Enemy Prisoners of War: Projects II and III”, 4-4.1, BB2, C2, CARL).

Table 5.4. presents the results to question eight which asked, “you have seen moving pictures and a booklet concerning concentration camps in Germany. Do you believe that such conditions did exist—or do you think it was just some false propaganda we dreamed up?”. Despite the leading nature of the question, nearly a third of respondents at Camp Shanks believed that the footage of concentration camps was propaganda, and another third gave non-responses. These results suggest the strong normative control of divergent Nazi subgroup leaders to suppress re-education materials and narratives within the main camps. As discussed in part I and II of the analysis, Nazi camp leaders often suppressed democratic and anti-Nazi norms through various mechanisms of censorship. In response to the forced viewing of the concentration camp footage, some Nazi leaders mobilized their information networks to spread disinformation and provide counter arguments (Krammer 1979).

Table 5.4. Results of Question 8 on Existence of Concentration Camps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Ft. Eustis</th>
<th>Camp Atlanta</th>
<th>Total All Ages</th>
<th>Age U-21</th>
<th>Age 21-25</th>
<th>Age 26-30</th>
<th>Age 31-35</th>
<th>Age 36-40</th>
<th>Age 0-40</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>True</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propaganda</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>22153 Pw's at Camp Shanks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age U-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Lastly, questions 12 and 13 provided a written portion of the survey which asked participants to write a response to the prompt, “from your contact with America and Americans through personal observation, newspapers, magazines, movies, books, radio, etc., what impressed you most about life in this country?” American officials then read and interpreted the written sections of the test, categorizing responses as favorable or unfavorable. The full results are presented in Appendix III, but the aggregate results from interpreting the written responses from the Camp Shanks group are 41% favorable impression, 18% unfavorable impression, and 41% no answer (4-4 EC: pp. 19-21, CARL). It is important to note that the non-responses for this question include participants that could not express themselves clearly (Ibid., 20). Question 13 asked a similar prompt, “what is the most important single idea you have learned during your internment in America?” with a lower proportion of favorable answers at 34% and a slightly higher rate of unfavorable at 19%. The full results of question 13 are also provided in Appendix III. Again, these results are close to the initial starting attitudes of German combatants prior to re-education (Robin 1995: 11), which suggests mostly failed socialization outcomes as few POWs changed their attitudes. Similarly to when they arrived in America, German combatants left with the following political attitudes: 10-15% Nazis, 10-15% anti-Nazi, and the remaining 70% as politically neutral (Krammer 1979: 224-225). In the last section of the analysis, I turn to a new source of data on the socialization outcomes of German POWs in America—the British Training Advisor reports I collected and utilized in Chapters III and IV.

The quantitative evidence presented in this section thus far is the best available surviving data recorded by American officials and is unfortunately not as comprehensive as the monthly British Training Advisor reports. However, certain aspects from British
reports can be used to measure the general political attitudes of German POWs from America. British re-education officials were concerned about the large transfers of German POWs arriving from America in the summer of 1946 and in some instances recorded the prevailing political attitudes of them in their reports. Given that the British devoted more resources to their screening procedures and political grading system—their observations on the attitudes of POWs arriving from America can provide some evidence for their average political attitudes.

The novel dataset used in Chapters III and IV on the 64 German POW camps in Britain provides more evidence for the generally Nazi attitudes of German prisoners arriving from America in 1946. There are 51 recorded instances of Training Advisors commenting on the arrival of German POWs from America into British camps. Typically, these are the first reports conducted by Training Advisors or Segregators in the summer of 1946 which feature a unique section titled ‘History’ or ‘Camp History’ which comments on the founding population of each camp. Out of the 51 reports that mention arrivals from the US, nearly half of them (22) observe that German prisoners from America still predominantly held Nazi views and were negatively impacting re-education efforts. For example, in Camp 263, the Training Advisor commented on Northleach Hostel comprised of transfers from America stating:

The political complexion of the intake to this hostel is very black. The [POWs] have been held in many different camps in the USA and do not seem to have been touched by any re-education at all. 20% are C+, completely faithful to Hitler...50% are grade C; they still believe national socialism to be good (“July 1946 Report,” FO 1120/239: 1).

(Note: Germans graded as a ‘C’ or ‘C+’ or referred to as ‘black’ were considered by the British to be active Nazis. See Chapter III for a discussion on British political grading).
At Camp 71, the Training Advisor noted, “1000 [POWs] arrived from [the] USA...there has been little change of colour among those screened. These at Condover (the main camp) are considered mainly ‘C’” (November 1946 Report, FO 1120/218: 1-2). Similarly, at Camp 38, most POWs were from the US and considered predominantly Nazi, and a report of Camp 73 noted that “the political state of mind [of American transfers] is one reminiscent of the date of their capture” (“July 1946 Report,” FO 1120/211: 1; May 1946, FO 1120/218: 4). The persistent Nazi attitudes of former German \textit{Afrika Korps} members is also noted. For example, in Camp 118, the Training Advisor recorded that many POWs in the camp were “captured in the fighting in North Africa...they all still think that National Socialism was the best thing for Germany (October 1946, FO 1120/227: 3). Only 3 out of 51 of reports that reference US transfers recorded that German POWs from America arrived holding anti-Nazi or pro-democratic views. The remaining 26 reports that mention German prisoners from America do not provide specific information on their political attitudes and simply note their arrival. As summarized by Matthew Sullivan (1979) who was a British re-education official:

The arrival of the ‘Americans’, as they came to be known—127,000 of them—had a generally negative, even disastrous effect on the morale of many camps. At [Camp] Carburton they marched in giving the Nazi salute. At Langdon Hills in April 1946 they managed to hoist a swastika on Hitler’s birthday...[they created] a hardened atmosphere, even a turning back towards National Socialism (p. 171).

Before turning to the final chapter, two important factors that potentially contributed to negative socialization outcomes in the American case that were not fully present in the British case are discussed.
5.3. Alternative Explanations

Two factors specific to the American case related to the overall timing of the war and its termination potentially contributed to the mostly negative socialization outcomes of German combatants. Unlike the British case, where German POWs did not arrive until the final months of the war or after it, American authorities primarily dealt with German prisoners while the war was active. First, compared to the British case, contact with American civilians was limited. Due to security concerns, the US War Department generally constructed POW camps in isolated rural areas away from critical war industries (Krammer 1979: 26). As a result of these wartime policies, German prisoners in America were never given the same ‘going out’ privileges to experience surrounding communities. German prisoners in America were limited to traveling to where they worked, which were generally in rural locations. However limited, interactions between American civilians and German combatants did occur. For example, at Camp Stark in New Hampshire, German combatants were able to interact with the local community (Koop 1988).

Because American officials did not track the political attitudes of German combatants in each camp, it is not possible to control for civilian contact like the analyses in Chapters III and IV. However, given the importance of civilian contact as a source of democratic norms in the British case, it is likely that a general lack of contact with American civilians did in part contribute to negative socialization outcomes. As noted by Arthur Smith (1996):

The vast territories in the United States prevented the German war prisoners there from gaining any intimidate knowledge of American society. In England, with the war over, it was possible for German [POWs] to visit towns, observe local councils in action, have dinner in civilian homes, and just generally become well acquainted with British life (p. 64).
While contact with American civilians could have provided an external source of pro-democratic norms and had a similarly positive effect on re-education as illustrated in Chapter IV, it is unlikely that it would have fully mitigated the pervasive normative control of divergent subgroup leaders in most camps.

A second factor also related to the timing of the war is the potential strength of divergent subgroups within the camps. In both the American and British cases, Nazi leaders seized early control of the camps during the war. However, most German POWs in Britain spent less time in their camps during the war and were generally held from late 1944 to early 1948. Conversely, most German POWs in America spent their time in captivity when the war was still active from the summer of 1943 to early 1946. It is likely that divergent leader control was stronger when Nazi Germany was still in existence when there was still the possibility of victory and the looming expectation of supporting their homeland even in captivity. In both British and American camps, overt Nazi violence mostly occurred during the war in late 1943 and in 1944 (Faulk 1977; Krammer 1979). Furthermore, the threat of reprisals back in Germany by Nazi leaders would no longer have been credible after the collapse of the Nazi state. These factors mean that divergent subgroup leader control was potentially more influential in America.

Unfortunately, in both cases, there is a lack of necessary fine-grain data on the political attitudes of each POW camp before and after the war. American officials did not conduct detailed screenings on the initial political attitudes of POWs to compare to postwar norms and the British re-education program and political grading system was not fully implemented until the spring and summer of 1946. However, the results of this chapter as well as Chapters III and IV demonstrate the enduring influence of divergent subgroup leaders even after Germany was defeated.
5.4 Conclusion

Evidence from secondary sources, the results of surveys conducted by American officials, and British reports on the political attitudes of German POWs suggest that most German combatants experienced a negative socialization outcome and largely failed to 'democratize'. I have argued that the divergent subgroup leadership control of most camps in America is what drove these negative socialization outcomes. Even after the start of re-education and limited segregation in the end of 1944, most American camps remained under the control of divergent subgroup leaders. The results of the three-month report on 32 camps in March 1945 showed that most camps were still under Nazi control, and as late as November 1945, the overwhelming majority of German combatants were still deemed politically ‘unsafe’. Furthermore, the results of the camp Shanks questionnaire show that the average political attitudes of German combatants leaving the US remained relatively unchanged with many still retaining their belief in Nazism.

It is clear that American policies of segregation and re-education targeted the small subsect of visible anti-Nazis and largely neglected rank-and-file combatants. While the British strategy was to identify and empower anti-Nazi subgroup leaders in the main camps, American officials instead isolated them (Smith 1996: 73). This difference in policies drastically impacted the subgroup leadership in the camps. As Chapters III and IV demonstrated, British officials were able to replace Nazis leaders in certain camps with pro-democratic, aligned subgroup leaders which on average led to positive socialization outcomes. The carefully chosen pro-democratic leadership inserted into select British camps were generally able to shift the normative environment of them by creating an atmosphere conducive to re-education and in turn horizontal socialization between combatants. Conversely, most American camps remained under the influence of Nazi
subgroup leaders who continued to undermine democratic norms and created unstable environments of socialization. Nazi leaders in American camps suppressed democratic norms and were largely able to maintain adherence among the rank-and-file to the expected National Socialist conflict identity. These results lend support for hypothesis 2A and 2B, that combatants with divergent subgroup leaders were less likely to socialize into the intended norms of the organization and more likely to resist socialization initiatives. In the next chapter, I summarize my argument and findings and discuss their theoretical contributions and policy implications. Additionally, I consider future avenues of research to further expand on the findings of this dissertation.
Chapter VI

Conclusion

Reflecting on the British re-education program for German POWs from 1946 to 1948, Colonel Henry Faulk (1977) observed that preference change was a group phenomenon, and that even though:

The individuals of the mass were always convinced that change was an act of self-will...the transfer of attitudes was not a process of cumulative individual conversion but of gradual permeation and identification...the mass moved in a bulk as a process...of group cohesion...it was a question of group [not individual] attitudes (p. 95).

I have shown that preference formation can be a subgroup phenomenon and that what is guiding this ‘mass’ cohesion are subgroup leaders who control normative environments and moderate socialization outcomes. My dissertation develops a novel theoretical approach for explaining how and why combatants in armed organizations develop their preferences. My framework moves beyond institutional, top-down approaches to understanding combatant socialization by focusing on the micro-level, informal social networks and environments of rank-and-file combatants. I argue that socialization is a process that largely occurs at the subgroup level and is controlled by the subgroup leaders of combatants. Leveraging their authority as junior commanders and proximity to rank-and-file combatants, subgroup leaders shape normative environments and in turn the direction and intensity of horizontal socialization. Subgroup leaders can support, display,
and suppress norms that influence their immediate social environment, disseminating ideas and practices that can become the expected norms of the subgroup that are then reinforced by combatants themselves. Ultimately, it is the different preferences of subgroup leaders that drive the variation in socialization processes and outcomes.

I theorize that there are three distinct subgroup leadership types that vary in their support for the expected norms of an armed organization. Aligned subgroup leaders are in full support of the official norms and objectives of their organization and support and promote sanctioned behaviors and attitudes. Conversely, divergent subgroup leaders are unsupportive of the official norms of their organization and may advocate their own distinctive behaviors that contradict the expected behaviors of the organization. Divergent subgroups can disrupt the intended socialization process by presenting alternative norms for combatants to adopt. Third, there are mixed subgroups with a combination of aligned and divergent leaders. Mixed subgroups lack a normative consensus and in turn experience uneven socialization, as the absence of clear norms to adopt complicates horizontal socialization between combatants. I argue that combatants with aligned subgroup leaders are more likely to socialize into the official norms of their organization while combatants in subgroups with divergent or mixed leaders are less likely. Additionally, whether it is adopting sanctioned or unsanctioned norms, I contend that combatants are more likely to adopt a specific conflict identity (i.e., aligned or divergent) in environments with a normative consensus.

Through a mixed-method, nested research design that leverages original archival data, I find strong support for my theoretical argument. In the context of the British re-education program, Chapters III and IV provide compelling evidence that the socialization outcomes of German POWs were significantly shaped by the subgroup
leadership type of their camps. Camps with aligned subgroup leaders were more likely to experience periods of political progress, achieve positive socialization outcomes, and have higher levels of re-educational activity. Meanwhile, German POW camps with divergent or mixed subgroup leaders were less likely to develop democratic norms and more likely to maintain their wartime conflict identity. These findings provide support for hypothesis 1, that combatants with aligned leaders are more likely to adopt official norms, as well as evidence for hypothesis 2A and hypothesis 3, that subgroups with divergent and mixed leaders are less likely to develop sanctioned norms. The generally low levels of support for re-education in divergent camps shown in the quantitative analysis and the opposition to democratic norms spearheaded by Nazi subgroup leaders in Camp 70 also lend support for hypothesis 2B, that combatants in divergent subgroups are more likely to resist official socialization initiatives. The results of Chapter IV also reveal potential characteristics of subgroup leaders that may increase their influence over socialization processes. While the political gradings and camp positions of German leaders did not significantly impact political progress, specific military ranks were associated with shaping norms. Higher-ranking subgroup leaders were significantly associated with political progress, suggesting that previous leadership experience and certain positions in a military hierarchy can significantly impact socialization.

The American case introduced in the cross-case comparison in Chapter V also provides additional evidence for the disruptive influence of divergent subgroup leaders. American policies failed to remove the Nazi leadership of most camps and instead isolated potential pro-democratic aligned leaders, creating environments where most German combatants remained under the influence of divergent leaders. As a result, German
combatants largely maintained their wartime conflict identities and failed to develop pro-democratic norms.

The socialization outcomes of the British and American cases also provide important evidence for the impact of a combatant’s overall normative environment on the formation of their preferences. A key aspect of my theoretical argument is that the normative content of a combatant’s social environment is what ultimately drives socialization outcomes. While subgroup leaders introduce and maintain normative content and expected behaviors, preferences are formed through the everyday informal interactions of combatants. Hypothesis 4 contends that the intensity and likelihood of horizontal socialization increases when subgroup leaders form a normative consensus. Findings from the British and American cases provide evidence in support of hypothesis 4. In the British context, the overall levels of re-educational activity in the camp were associated with socialization outcomes. Camps with high levels of participation in re-educational activity were more likely to develop collective democratic norms and have positive socialization outcomes. Conversely, camps with consistently low levels of re-educational activity maintained their wartime conflict identities. This is further reinforced by patterns of the leader activity variable, which shows that normative cohesion among subgroup leaders is associated with either negative or positive socialization outcomes. The overwhelmingly anti-democratic norms that permeated German POW camps in America also demonstrate the potential effect of a normative consensus. Together, these findings make several theoretical contributions to the combatant socialization and internal dynamics of armed groups literatures.
6.1 Theoretical Contributions

Combatant socialization is typically framed by conflict researchers as a process driven by the top leadership and institutions of armed organizations (Hoover Green 2018; Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood 2014; Thaler 2012) or the pre-conflict motivations of individuals (Weinstein 2006; Valentino 2014). However, this dissertation has shown that subgroups and their leadership play a critical role in shaping combatant norms. My theoretical argument and the findings from my analyses make five contributions to the combatant socialization and internal dynamics of armed groups literatures. First, shifting the analysis to the subgroup level enables researchers to examine the micro-level variation in combatant socialization. This approach provides a framework for explaining how rank-and-file combatants interpret and reinforce norms and why socialization often develops unevenly within organizations. The findings from the German POW camps demonstrate that the development and diffusion of norms can unfold at the subgroup level and that socialization is partly a subgroup phenomenon. Researchers examining intra-organizational factors for understanding conflict processes and outcomes should account for the importance of subgroup dynamics and their leaders.

Second, my theory synthesizes findings from the longstanding military sociology (Shilz and Janowitz 1948; Stouffer 1949; Kellett 1982), organizational socialization (Ostroff and Kozlowski: 1992; Ashforth and Saks 1996), prison socialization (Wheeler 1961; Decker and Pyrooz 2019; Lyman 1989) and research on the internal dynamics of armed groups (Manekin 2020; Parkinson 2021; McLauchlin 2020; Hoover Green 2016) to emphasize the important role of junior commanders in combatant socialization. I show that while formal training and the wider ideological goals of an armed organization are important, the task of maintaining official norms is ultimately delegated to junior
commanders at the subgroup level. Despite the critical role of subgroup leaders, their involvement in socialization has remained understudied, as most research focuses on organizational elites or use theories that simplify the relationship between commanders and combatants (Hoover Green 2016:629; Daly 2014; Leader Maynard 2022). My theoretical framework addresses this gap by accounting for the influential role of junior commanders in armed organization—developing key mechanisms and predictions on the timing of subgroup leader control on normative environments.

Third, by focusing on junior commanders who intersect formal military hierarchies and informal combatant interactions, I develop a theory that accounts for both formal and informal social networks in the socialization process. This approach builds on and complements mounting research that acknowledges the overlapping formal and informal social networks of armed organizations and how their interactions effect conflict processes (Lyall 2020; Hundman and Parkinson 2019; Manekin 2017; Bateson 2017). Specifically, my framework advances understandings of layered socialization—that combatants are simultaneously experiencing vertical and horizontal socialization. Researchers have acknowledged the importance of layered socialization (Checkel 2017; Bateson 2017; Bell 2022), but it remains unclear how these complementary or contradictory forces interact to produce combatant norms (Parkinson 2021: 8). I have shown that subgroups provide an effective unit and level of analysis for observing and measuring the confluence of these dual vertical and horizontal pressures which can be leveraged by future researchers. My findings suggest that informal social networks are more influential in shaping combatant norms.

Fourth, my theoretical argument moves beyond just the impact of influential leaders or institutions (Hoover Green 2018; Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood 2014) and
emphasizes the overall normative environment of combatants in shaping preferences. In this framework, it is the environment or culture of a subgroup that changes the preferences of combatants. Subgroup leaders moderate the social environment and the normative content within it, but it is the repeated interactions between combatants themselves through horizontal socialization that impact preferences. This distinction has important temporal implications for the changing attitudes of combatants. The normative environments of subgroups are not static but are constantly evolving in response to internal and external factors. As demonstrated in Chapters III and IV, German subgroups within British camps changed over time in response to external shocks from repatriation policies and increased contact with civilians. The dynamic nature of subgroups and their changing normative environments demonstrate the need for researchers to account for temporal variation when examining combatant socialization. Future studies should ideally leverage panel data and focus on the timing of socialization, especially in protracted conflicts with distinct phases where combatant preferences are likely to change.

Fifth, subgroup dynamics and the role of small-unit commanders can also enhance explanations of other conflict processes. My theoretical framework accounts for both resistance and conformity within armed organizations which can extend to understanding other dynamics of intragroup conflict processes. For scholars of deviant behaviors within armed organizations (Bell 2022; McLauchlin 2015, 2020; Wood and Toppelberg 2017), divergent subgroups and their leaders could help explain patterns of defection, desertion, indiscriminate violence, and active resistance. For example, civilian killings in Afghanistan committed by Australian special forces (Khalil 2020: 2), the ‘fragging’ of officers during the Vietnam War by American soldiers (Lepre 2011), or the phenomenon
of Gekokujō within the Imperial Japanese Army, the insubordination of lower-ranking officers that sparked the Manchuria and Marco Polo Bridge incidents (Toland 2003). Conversely, the role of aligned subgroups can provide a framework for understanding cohesion and the lack of fragmentation within armed groups (Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour 2012) and adherence to international humanitarian law (Bell 2022). The next section outlines potential directions for future research.

6.2 Future Research
This section first discusses the methodological limitations of this dissertation that future research can address as well as other potential applications of my theoretical framework for research on rebel groups and post-conflict reintegration. Methodologically, there are limitations to the surviving archival data used in this dissertation that future research on the role of subgroups in socialization could address. First, the available data was created by British and American officials and the perspectives of the German POWs themselves are unfortunately largely unrepresented. I attempted to mitigate this issue by employing secondary sources that draw on the memoirs of German combatants (Krammer 1979; Robin 1995; Quinn 2015; Koop 1988; Thompson 2006). However, future research should leverage data that includes more perspectives from both the socializer and the socializee, ideally at the individual and group levels. Expanding the unit of analysis to the individual level would enable a more fine-grain approach that examines variation in individual rather than group socialization outcomes.

Second, this dissertation provides high within-case variation and internal validity but would be strengthened by additional cases. For example, other re-education programs
such as the Soviet re-education program for Japanese POWs after the Second World War and the American re-education program for North Korean and Chinese POWs during the Korean War. Both cases offer potential data for tracking the changing attitudes and socialization outcomes of combatants and present different environments to explore additional mechanisms of combatant socialization and subgroup dynamics. In both cases, socialization occurred within extremely coercive environments which permits the testing of forced socialization by oppressive subgroup leaders. In the Soviet camps, Japanese POWs were subjected to hard manual labor and forced re-education where Soviet officials demoted commanders and empowered rank-and-file combatants (Barshay 2013). By leveraging available archival data as well as the large body of published memoirs by Japanese POWs, it is possible to explore the different dimensions of forced socialization within a coercive environment with a different type of subgroup leadership. In the context of the American re-education program during the Korean War, there was again an environment of coercion as communist and anti-communist POWs battled behind the wire for normative control of their camps (Bradbury and Meyers 1968; Tovy 2011). Examining how combatants navigate socialization within coercive environments could provide insights into preference formation in oppressive armed organizations.

Third, the re-education reports used in the analysis only track attitudes until the point of repatriation, preventing the analysis from measuring the longer-term effects of subgroup leaders on combatant socialization. Access to longer panel data could show if the influence of subgroup leaders is temporary or extends outside of armed organizations.
For example, comprehensive follow-up interviews and surveys with former German combatants in postwar Germany.33

Relatedly, future studies could examine the post-conflict influence of former subgroup leaders. Daly, Paler, and Samii (2020) find a strong connection between former military ties and postwar crime in Colombia. Specifically, they find that former commanders involved in crime maintain and exploit meaningful relationships with their ex-combatants. However, former commanders can also have a positive impact on postwar reintegration. In Colombia, some former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) combatants demobilized and reintegrated with their subgroup leaders. In some instances, FARC commanders were directly involved in the demobilization process of their units, establishing new communities or veteran organizations in practices of ‘collective reintegration’ that helped maintain peace initiatives (Kaplan and Nussio 2018; Atuesta 2019). Likewise, Themnér (2012 and 2015) finds evidence for the mixed effects of former mid-level commanders on postwar stability in Liberia, showing that they can remobilize ex-combatants or reinforce peace initiatives. Leveraging this type of postwar variation, researchers could compare the experiences of combatants that demobilize and

33 Sullivan (1979) and Sulzbach (1979, reel 3) discuss their correspondence with former German combatants they re-educated in Britain. Morina (2008) analyses the correspondence between 120 former German combatants and their American re-educator and Merritt and Merritt (1970) present survey results from a questionnaire administered to 78 former graduates of the special Fort Getty re-education camp in America. Additionally, Wienand (2015) discusses the memory and narratives of returning German POWs. The results on the long-term attitudinal effects of re-education from these studies are mixed. Overall, these studies only provide fragments of data that are limited in their explanatory power as they pertain to a small number of the total former combatant population and do not provide enough evidence for evaluating the long-term effects of subgroup leader control. Quinn (2015) notes that many former combatants were overwhelmed by the sheer devastation of Germany and were predominantly concerned with survival upon their return home.
reintegrate with their subgroup leaders to those that transition into post-conflict societies individually.

Additionally, my theoretical framework could potentially explain how combatants transition out their conflict identity in postwar settings and provide insights for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) studies. Most DDR studies tend to focus on the economic reintegration of former combatants (Muggah and O'Donnell 2015; Blattman and Annan 2010; Phayal et al. 2015; Gilligan et al. 2012; Munive and Jakobsen 2012; Williams 2014) or the social dynamics of community networks for reintegration (Osborne et al. 2018; Gilligan et al. 2014; Özerdem 2012; Kaplan and Nussio 2015). However, the subgroup dynamics that form the conflict identities of combatants could provide expectations for the potential mechanisms and outcomes of transitioning into a postwar identity. For example, instead of focusing on individual reintegration outcomes, DDR studies could examine the potential positive or negative effects of group reintegration. Framing DDR processes through the lens of subgroup dynamics also has policy implications which are explored in the next section.

Finally, while this dissertation focuses on armed organizations, the theoretical framework is informed by research on both state (Bell 2022; Lyall 2020; Kellett 1982; Manekin 2017) and non-state armed groups (Hoover Green 2016, 2017, 2018; Gates 2017; Checkel 2017; McLauchlin 2015, 2020). Given the similarities between combatant socialization across state and non-state groups, my theoretical framework on subgroup dynamics could travel to rebel organizations. Future research could test if the role of subgroup leaders in socialization remains significant in non-state armed groups with different command structures from state militaries.
6.3 Policy Implications

The theory I develop in this dissertation and my subsequent findings have important policy implications. First, my findings highlight the role that subgroup leaders play in maintaining norms in armed organizations. State militaries and international peacekeeping forces prioritizing adherence to international humanitarian law should leverage the outsized influence of subgroup leaders for instilling and upholding norms of restraint. The everyday relationships and attitudes between international peacekeeping forces and local populations are critical to the effectiveness of peace initiatives (Bove and Ruggeri 2018). Sexual abuse and other deviant behaviors committed by peacekeepers can significantly undermine the credibility of missions and in turn threaten peace initiatives (Karim and Beardsley 2016). Commanders of peacekeeping operations could focus on providing additional training to subgroup commanders or centering the composition of their forces around a well-trained core of junior officers for maintaining norms of restraint.

Similarly, research has shown that additional training directly increases adherence to norms of restraint in state militaries (Bell 2022; Bell and Terry 2021). As an additional safeguard to prevent violations to international humanitarian law, state militaries could provide more training that highlights norms of restraint for junior, non-commissioned officers that would then presumably influence their wider units. Relatedly, when state militaries are faced with divergent subgroups, for example, the special forces units in the Australian Defense Force that were abusing and murdering Afghan civilians (Brereton Report 2020), they should target the subgroup leadership of deviant units. As shown by British interventions in German POW camps, replacing the subgroup leadership of combatants can significantly alter attitudes and behaviors. My findings suggest that
deviant norms often pervade entire units. When rank-and-file combatants commit war crimes, for example, US Army platoons in Iraq operating in southern Baghdad in 2006 (Frederick 2010), state militaries should assume that they are not isolated incidents but a direct product of a wider subgroup culture. Only by confronting or changing the subgroup leadership of deviant units can armed organizations deter and mitigate the risk of human rights violations.

My findings also have important policy implications for post-conflict interventions, specifically DDR programs. Wartime socialization can continue to affect former combatants after conflict, posing barriers to reintegration initiatives and other postwar peace programs (Kaplan and Nussio 2015; Daly et al. 2020; Themnér 2012, 2015). The conflict identities of former combatants are often incompatible with or detrimental to postwar societies (Grossman, Manekin, and Miodownik 2015; Jha and Wilkinson 2012). Applying understandings of combatant socialization and subgroup dynamics to postwar settings could provide insights for effective reintegration policies. For example, in addition to economic reintegration, DDR programs could also develop ‘resocialization’ initiatives to assist former combatants in their transition out of their conflict identity. My findings suggest that subgroup leaders could play a pivotal role in identity reformation after conflict. DDR programs could develop initiatives that empower former or new subgroup leaders to guide former combatants through the reintegration process. For example, state military officials or actors from non-governmental organizations could identify influential subgroup leaders within a unit. These subgroup leaders could then receive support and resources for monitoring and supporting their former combatants through the reintegration process which could help prevent recidivism or participation in postwar crime.
References


Hilger, Andreas (2005) “Re-education the German Prisoners of War: Aims, methods, results, and memory in East and West Germany.” In Bob Moore and Barbara Hately-


Jackson, Joshua, Felix Thoemmes, Kathrin Jonkmann, Oliver Lüdtke, and Ulrich Trautwein (2012) “Military training and personality trait development: Does the military make the man, or does the man make the military?” *Psychological Science* 23(3): 270-277.


Kelman, Herbert (1958) “Compliance, identification, and internalization three processes of attitude change.” *Conflict Resolution* 2(1).


Archival References

The citations listed below are for materials I directly refer to in the main text. There were a multitude of additional archival documents that I consulted throughout my data collection and processing that I did not cite in the main text. However, here are the general record groups that I consulted for the British case. The “Training Advisor” and “Segregator” camp reports that I used to construct my dataset are primarily located at The National Archives (TNA), in record group Foreign Office: Wilton Park: Records, ranging from the reference number FO 1120/206 to FO 1120/249 with the description “Re-educational survey visit reports.” Additional camp reports are also located at the Imperial War Museum Collection (IWM), “Private Papers of Lieutenant Colonel H Faulk,” under the catalogue number Documents 16767 (this collection spans seven boxes). The IWM collection also holds digitized recordings of interviews with Henry Faulk and Herbert Sulzbach under catalogue numbers 9743 and 4338. Meanwhile, documents relating to the overall structure, functions, and goals of the re-education program are located throughout the Foreign Office 939 record group at TNA (FO 939), German Section: Prisoners of War: Files. For an overview of record groups relating to prisoners of war held in Britain, see the “Prisoners of war in British hands” guide https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/help-with-your-research/research-guides/prisoners-of-war-british-hands/.

Archival records from the US War Department are held by the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at Fort Leavenworth. Many of the documents relating to the American re-education program are available digitally. See ‘Prisoner of War Special Projects Division’ identifier. https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/search/searchterm/Prisoner%20of%20War%20Special%20Projects%20Division/field/keyfor/mode/exact/con n/and. The archival references are organized in ascending order by their record group reference number (e.g., 4-4 EC, FO 939/200, FO 939/201, FO 1120/200). This means that sources for the American case from CARL are listed first followed by the TNA and then IWM.

“Poll of German Prisoner of War Opinion”, Re-education of enemy prisoners of war: poll of German prisoner of war opinion, 4-4 EC, CARL.

"Story of the PW Reeducation Program,” 4-4.1, BA2, C2: p. 2. CARL.

“Historical Monograph, Supplement,” November 1945 – February 1946, 4-4.1, BA2, C2: p.2. CARL.

“Press Release, 20,000 Selected German Prisoners of War Given Chance to Learn about Democracy,” March 6, 1946, War Department Bureau of Public Relations, 4-4.1, BA2, C2: p. 2. CARL.

“Fact Sheet Concerning the PW Special Project Center Ft. Eustis, VA,” 4-4.1, BA2, C2: pp. 1-2. CARL.
“Historical Monograph,” 4-4.1, BA 2, C 2: p. 2. CARL.

"Story of the PW Reeducation Program,” 4-4.1, BA 2, C2: p. 7. CARL.

“Re-education of Enemy Prisoners of War: Projects II and III”, 4-4.1, BB2, C2, CARL.

“Army Service Forces Memorandum,” 4-4.1, BB2, C 2: p. 1. CARL.

“Re-education of Enemy Prisoners of War: Projects II and III”, 4-4.1, BB2, C2, CARL.

“POW Funeral,” MS262-068-051, 1944, MS262 Camp Crowder Collection, Missouri State Archives. 


“Reactions of German POWs to Atrocity Film,” FO 898/330, Political Warfare Executive and Foreign Office. Political Intelligence Department: Papers, Directorate of Plans and Campaigns. P.I.D. Progress Reports. TNA.

“Prisoners of War Division Work and Requirements,” FO 939/214: 1. Control Office for Germany and Austria and Foreign Office, German Section: Prisoner of War: Files. Directors’s files, Political re-education reports. TNA.

“Strength lists of prisoners of war in the UK,” FO 939/245. Control Office for Germany and Austria and Foreign Office, German Section: Prisoner of War: Files. TNA.

FO 939/246. Control Office for Germany and Austria and Foreign Office, German Section: Prisoner of War: Files. Policy: general. TNA.


“Progress reports,” Foreign Office (FO) 939/419. Control Office for Germany and Austria and Foreign Office, German Section: Prisoner of War: Files. Directors’s files. TNA


“Activities of the PS/W Division,” FO 939/454: 2. Control Office for Germany and Austria and Foreign Office, German Section: Prisoner of War: Files. Field Section, Progress reports. TNA.

“Report of Meeting of Segregation Section”, FO 939/457: 2. Control Office for Germany and Austria and Foreign Office, German Section: Prisoner of War: Files. Field Section, Instructions to segregators. TNA.

“Segregation of German Ps/W,” FO 939/459: 2. Control Office for Germany and Austria and Foreign Office, German Section: Prisoner of War: Files. Field Section, Classification and Segregation of German PWs: policy. TNA.

"Interrogation Report", FO 939/460. Control Office for Germany and Austria and Foreign Office, German Section: Prisoner of War: Files. Field Section, Classification and segregation of German PWs: policy. TNA.

“Nominal Roll of German POWs and list of German POWs who died in British custody 1939-1948,” FO 1005/2246. Foreign Office and Predecessors: Control Commission for Germany (British Element): Records Library: Files. TNA.


FO 1120/218. Foreign Office: Wilton Park: Records. Re-educational survey visit reports for camps 66 to 74. TNA.


FO 1120/224. Foreign Office: Wilton Park: Records. Re-educational survey visit reports for camps 100 to 106. TNA.

FO 1120/231. Foreign Office: Wilton Park: Records. Re-educational survey visit reports for camps 177 to 186. TNA.


FO 1120/237. Foreign Office: Wilton Park: Records. Re-educational survey visit reports for camps 252 to 256. TNA.


FO 1120/240. Foreign Office: Wilton Park: Records. Re-educational survey visit reports for camps 266 to 276. TNA.


Chapter VII

Appendices

7.1 Appendix I

This section contains archival documents I collected at The National Archives (TNA) to supplement the analyses of the British re-education program in Chapters III and IV. Below are the recommended questions that British Segregators and Training Advisors asked German combatants to screen their political preferences (Figure 7.1), the official criteria of the political letter grading system (Figure 7.2), and an example report from Camp 26 (Figure 7.3). For full list of archival materials cited, see archival references section.
### Figure 7.1. Segregator and Training Advisor Screening Questions
Source: “Interrogation Report,” Classification and Segregation of German PWs: FO 939/460

#### INTERROGATION REPORT

**PERSONAL DETAILS**

1. **Number**
2. **Name**
3. **Service**
4. **Unit**
5. **Rank**
6. **Date and place of capture**
7. **Date of birth**
8. **Name**
9. **Service**
10. **Unit**
11. **Rank**
12. **Date and place of capture**
13. **Civilian occupation**
14. **Education**
15. **Environment (locality)**
16. **Father's name**
17. **Father's occupation**
18. **Father's residence**

#### 2. GENERAL BACKGROUND

1. Education in detail (include here also technical education)
2. Occupational history
3. Home Environment (political views and economic background of family)
4. Appraisal of intelligence, character, etc. (This is, of course, up to a point, subjective).

#### 3. P/W HISTORY

1. Which camps since capture
2. Interpreter's report when available.
3. If P/W was on any work projects, give history.
4. Attitude of P/W towards work.
5. Medical disabilities or classification.

#### 4. POLITICAL HISTORY

1. Youth organizations
2. Party affiliations and progress in party
3. Party contacts
4. Membership in other organizations (Trade unions, etc.)
5. Membership in pre-Hitler parties
6. Attitude to Hitler
7. Attitude to prominent Nazis
8. Views on outcome of war
9. Views on home front
10. Attitude to U.K.; U.S.A.; U.S.S.R.
11. Postwar expectations
   a) re- Germany
   b) re- himself

#### 5. MILITARY HISTORY

1. Date of joining up
2. Where
3. Which unit
4. Subsequent transfers
5. Which fronts
6. Attitude toward officers
7. Attitude toward N.C.O.'s.
8. Liking for army life

#### 6. CAMP INFORMATION

#### 7. EXAMINER’S REMARKS

(Personality - truthfulness - reliability, etc.)
Summary of Classification System

Source: “Report of Meeting of Segregation Section to Discuss Basis of Screening Standard,” 2, Instructions to Segregators, FO 939/457, TNA.

II. CLASSIFICATION AND SEGREGATION OF P.W.

In order to ensure uniform standard and approach, the basis of gradings was amplified as follows:

1. "A" P.W. who is a genuine anti-Nazi. He must have a positive, intelligent political outlook. A P.W.'s potentialities as an active pro-allied force in the future must be considered. He must have a democratic and human point of view and be capable of constructive work.

2. "A-" P.W. who is a genuine but not necessarily active anti-Nazi. He holds anti-Nazi views and has a positive outlook with which to replace Nazism but will, in all probability, have no wide circle of influence. It is essential to make allowances for the intelligence and the type of individual the P.W. is.

3. "A-" P.W. who is a definite anti-Nazi, but is a social nuisance in that he has defects of character or temperament which make him unsuitable for special employment. An explanatory note is necessary when his grading is forwarded to Control Commission.

4. "B+" P.W. who is very nearly ready to be upgraded to "A". A sound, decent, honest character who will be a highly reliable worker. A genuine anti-Nazi who has not yet found a positive philosophy to take its place. Most probably he has no constructive ideas through ignorance.

5. "B" P.W. who is a "Grey" with a non-Nazi or non-political outlook.

6. "B-" P.W. who, in the opinion of the segregator, has just graduated up from the "C"'s. A man with a Nazi record who is honestly on the road to realizing the true character of Nazism.

7. "C" P.W. whose mind is still infected by Nazism, but can still be redeemed, or an innocuous Nazi.

8. "C-" P.W. still steeped in Nazi ideology and with no intention of helping us, generally of an age to have assisted in the building of the Party, and still prepared to say "the Party was all right".
### Figure 7.3. Camp 26 Training Advisor Report


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp Address</th>
<th>No. &amp; Type of Camp</th>
<th>Date of Visit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barton Field</td>
<td>26 G.P.W.</td>
<td>14-16/4/1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel. No.:</td>
<td></td>
<td>Report handed in:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28.5.1947</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Visitor</th>
<th>Objective of Visit</th>
<th>No. of Visits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oliver Nash</td>
<td>Re-educational Survey</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strength:</th>
<th>Offs: 2, O.R.'s: 1351, TOTAL: 1353</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>of which:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>779 at HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>398 at West Pen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>319 at Holnley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29 at Holnley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>90 in billets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 in Hospital etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of appeals pending:</th>
<th>Nil</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of appeals heard by T.A.:</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Pts repatriated to date:</td>
<td>649</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Personnel:

- **O.C.**: Major G.C. Williams
- **Interpreter**: S/Sgt Levy
- **C/O**: S/Sgt Burstin
- **Camp Leader**: Hfw. Witheraus, Eugen (B)
- **Deputy C/O**: Fw. Henke, Albert (B)
- **German M.O.**: S/Arzt Dr. Boysiegel, Kurt (B)
- **Hostel Leaders**: Hptt, Seiwert, Friedrich (B)
- **Hptt, Elisse, Karl (B)**
- **Oftt, Bittner, Rudolf (B)**

#### 1. RECEPTION

The C.O., Major Williams, has recently arrived, but has had experience in P/A work in Scotland and assured me of his desire to co-operate. S/Sgt Levy is very efficient and deeply interested in his work. S/Sgt Burstin at West Pen has had little previous experience but is shaping well under S/Sgt Levy’s guidance.

#### 2. GERMAN CAMP STAFF

- Q/O: Hfw. Witheraus, Eugen AA 078224 (B/29), age 27, joined the army in 1938. Dairyman from Eastern Germany, member of H.J. & P.A. Good type but unimaginative.
- M.O.: SS/Arzt Dr. Boysiegel, Kurt (B/21) now taking an active part in re-education, contributing to the Camp magazine.

Satellite C/O, West Pen: Hptchna Seiwert, Friedrich B 214525 (B+/29) age 54, agricultural expert, Volksdeutsche from Rumania, served in the Austro-Hungarian Army in 1914 war, joined SS by government decree in 1943. Upright bluff man who leads the democratic discussion group at West Pen.

Hostel Leader at Westfield: Klose, Karl B 180054 (B/21) joined the police force in 1927 and stayed until captured in 1944 in a police battalion s.d.f. He is most cooperative and his behavior is unimpeachable but he is Crowson's waist.

Hostel Leader at Weining: Uffs. Bittner, Rudolf 966703 (B+) takes little active interest in re-education.

3. MOBLE

This is high, due to excellent treatment and manifestly fair administration. Bad news from Germany and the failure of the Moscow conference have had an adverse effect. There is also some resentment at the long captivity, but the greater relaxations and the new permission to send one sealed letter per month are very much appreciated. High cigarette prices are affecting the will to work. The ban on visiting the nearby town of Ely, imposed at the request of the City Council, has now been lifted with a gratifying improvement in morale.

4. POLITICAL PROGRESS

Due to S/Sgt Loy's untiring efforts, re-education has not suffered seriously by the repatriation of A's. The Rumanian Volksdeutsche, who form a large proportion of West Pen Cmp, are definitely democratic in leanings. Weining Hostel displays lack of interest; there has been little support from the camp leader for re-education.

5. YOUTH

Presents no problem in this camp with its strong re-educational tendency.

6. RE-EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES

Five new students from the Training Centre have further strengthened the already good re-educational staff and all external facilities are made available by British Staff.

Personalities:

1) Re-education Leader Uffs. Orlie, Horst B 624 302 (B/18) age 31, edits the camp magazine. Was Assessor by profession and became a member of the N.S.D.A.P. 1934, N.S.D.A.P. 1935 and the S.A. 1938. Quiet, highly intelligent and makes an honest impression.

2) Pow. Wochnik, Paul 788828 (B+/21) age 36, Hostel employee by trade, belonged to the NSV only, heads the discussion group and contributes to the camp magazine. Very quiet, earnest man.

3) Training Centre Student O/Gefr. Killian, Heinrich B 185995, (B+/21) age 25. Mechanic with elementary education only, he was described by the Training Centre as conscious of his lack of education but he is now developing. Prepared the information room. He is at present away in hospital.


6) Ospfr. Roth, bugayn 976602 (4/21) age 27. Commercial clerk from Westfalen. Just returned from the Training Centre and has now been sent to Neutfield Hostel.


Wochenpost & Ausblick: See Appendix B.

Newspapers: Adequate supplies of English papers and Swiss newspapers regularly obtained from welfare fund.

Library: This has been improved by a recent consignment of new English books.

Lectures: Lectures visit West Pen & Neutfield Hostels and a truck is made available to bring Welney Pgs/W to H.Q. though little use of this facility is made by Pgs/W. A recent lecture by the Swiss Durrersept on "Freedom of the Press" was very well attended and much appreciated as representing a neutral's views. Attendance at G.I.D. lectures is about 50% of the personnel.

Discussion Groups: There are discussion groups at H.Q. and West Pen (Wochnik and others).

Films: YMCA and travelling film circuits.

Wireless: satisfactory installations at H.Q. and hostels.

Camp Magazine: Edited by Gralle and Wochnik. 250 copies every fortnight. Paper supply is adequate. The new influx of Training Centre students has increased the number of contributors.

Press Review: The Press review with discussion instituted by me in January has proved a great success, due to the good human material at this camp. Attendances are mounting and now number about 70 men. At H.Q and West Pen arrangements have been made for the press review leaders to visit the hostels.

English Instruction: The camp has just been visited by Major Raffles.

Information Room: Regular exhibitions are made and shown at H.Q. and hostels.

7. OTHER CAMP ACTIVITIES

Religion: The Protestant Padre Heck is resident and has a congregation of about 50/60. He has a very good influence. The R.C. Pgs/W are catered for by a visiting priest from Camp 85. His flock numbers about 40.

Education: There are a few courses at H.Q. and West Pen of no special significance. The teachers are politically reliable.

Entertainment: Theatre Group, band and choir provide light entertainment for all the camp and hostels. The choir has also proved very popular with civilian churches.

8. CONCLUSIONS

The arrival of Training Centre students and the re-grouping suggested by me will undoubtedly improve the position.

9. RECOMMENDATIONS

None.

P.D.
7.2 Appendix II

**Support for Coding Decisions**

This section presents support for the coding decisions of the quantitative analyses in Chapter IV. The final codebook (Tables 7.1 and 7.2) provides the scoring criteria as well as examples for coding decisions. The codebook is divided into two sections—camp-level indicators and individual-level indicators for the characteristics of subgroup leaders. This is the final version of the codebook for all variables used in this dissertation. This version of the codebook and some of the key variables are different from the pilot codebook used in the verification exercise with a Research Assistant. Notably, the original research design that informed the pilot codebook was structured around attempting to measure monthly leadership changes within the camps. The idea was to measure the effect of a shift from divergent leadership to aligned leadership using a regression discontinuity design.

After running two pilot analyses using ‘leadership changes’ as the key explanatory variable, which I first presented at University College London’s PhD Research Seminar and then at George Washington University’s Institute for Security and Conflict Studies Research in Progress Workshop, I decided it would be more effective to collapse ‘leadership changes’ into the ‘subgroup leadership type’ variable used in this dissertation (see Table 4.2 for more information on determining subgroup leadership type). Even after these updates, I am still confident in the reliability of the final codebook for replicating the data, as the other key explanatory variables and the outcome variable verified in the exercise with a Research Assistant remain the same. For example, when comparing our coding results, which were done independent of each other, we achieved a Krippendorff
alpha score of 0.79 on the key outcome variables ‘political progress’ and ‘qualitative assessment’ and the other key explanatory variable ‘re-educational activity’. The full datasets and code used to run the analyses are available upon request.

Table 7.1 Coding Decisions for the “camp_data” Dataset
*RE stands for re-education and TA stands for Training Advisor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“CO_support”</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>“POWs are left very much to themselves as far as re-education is concerned, the British Staff showing almost complete indifference as to what they do”</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>“All possible assistance was given by the Commandant who encourages re-education”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the British</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commandant (the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>permanent administrator of the camp) support re-education?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“RE_materials”</td>
<td>Low/inefficient (1)</td>
<td>Adequate (2)</td>
<td>Well-Supplied (3)</td>
<td>POWs have access to most materials for carrying out RE but could benefit from more</td>
<td>POWs have everything or mostly everything that they need for RE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the availability/state of RE materials in the camp? (books, radios, materials for publications)</td>
<td>“Films, books, wireless sets, paper and materials are all lacking...POWs lack materials which are urgently requested”</td>
<td>“Material, particularly paper, is in very short supply and this results in a curtailing of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Who selected the German leadership of the camp? The first report on a camp will often include a ‘camp history’ subsection that details how the starting leadership of a camp was selected. Subsequent reports will note if leaders were purposively replaced to spur re-education (e.g., removing a Nazi leader to install a pro-democratic leader) or if leaders were simply replaced due to the previous leader being repatriated. Use the “CO_support” variable to determine if a British camp staff is supportive of re-education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>“Subgroup_leadership type”</strong></th>
<th><strong>Apolitical (0)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Re-education Intervention (1)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Mixed Intervention (2)</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Who selected the German leadership of the camp?</td>
<td>Leadership selection made by a Commandant unsupportive of re-education without involvement or endorsement from Training Advisors. The original camp staff was selected by the Commandant for discipline and labor without consideration for political attitudes or re-education.</td>
<td>Leaders of the camp are selected or recommended by a Training Advisor with the support of a pro-re-education British staff. “The camp staff is very helpful and greatly interested in our point of view...they support all suggestions for re-educational activities.”</td>
<td>Leaders selected by supportive commandant or TA Intervention. These are camps where there is inconsistent support for re-education from the British without consistent cooperation between the camp staff and TAs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>“HL_Type”</strong></th>
<th><strong>No, Apolitical (0)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Yes, Pro-re-education (1)</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Were any of the Hostel Leaders at the time of the report selected by a TA or by a pro-re-education British Commandant?</td>
<td>The Hostel Leaders were not selected by a TA or by a pro-re-education British camp staff.</td>
<td>A Hostel Leader at the time of the report was selected through TA intervention or by a pro-re-education British staff.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Some activities” “There is a general lack of material”
leaders that were selected because of their seniority or for apolitical reasons.

“The German staff at HQ and the hostels was appointed by the CO on seniority”

“The Camp and hostel staff was chosen by the British staff”

member to support re-educational efforts.

Any POW who attended or “graduated” from Wilton Park (also referred to as the “Training Centre” or “Beaconsfield”) is considered a pro-re-education leader.

Any POW transferred from another camp by a TA is also considered pro-re-education

“He was recommended by the TA when the former camp leader was repatriated”

"All hostel leaders are suitable, replacements for 8 hostel leaders and interpreters of group 12 have been selected by me and approved by the Commandant"
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>“CL_type”</strong></th>
<th><strong>“re_activities”</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Was the Camp Leader or Deputy Camp Leader at the time of the report selected by a TA or by a pro-re-education British Commandant?</td>
<td>How widespread is RE activity in the camp at the time of the TA’s visit?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much of the camp is impacted/exposed to RE activities?</td>
<td>RE activities are: Discussion groups Press reviews Classes Lecture attendance Camp publications Camp elections/parliament Field trips to British institutions Use of camp information centres and exhibits Exposure to film and radio</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No activity (1)</th>
<th>Isolated Activity (2)</th>
<th>Moderate Activity (3)</th>
<th>High Activity (4)</th>
<th>Widespread (5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“re-education has not started”</td>
<td>RE activity limited to small number of hostels or small groups in the main camp (HQ) Small discussion groups that meet infrequently, low attendance to lectures, “with the exception of a small discussion group in hostel X, there is very little re-educational activity”</td>
<td>RE activities operating in about half of camp facilities. Moderate interest and participation in RE activities “Main camp and Woodcrest both have active discussion groups...Brissenden and Stumblewood have no groups”</td>
<td>The majority of the camp participates in or is exposed to RE activities. Discussion groups in most facilities, high lecture attendance “discussion groups have started in all but one of the hostels” Camp elections and parliaments also demonstrate a high level of activity</td>
<td>The entire or almost the entire camp is participating in RE related activities For example, Discussion groups in almost every facility, well-attended lectures and fieldtrips, or an active camp parliament “There is a comprehensive...”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**“political_progress”**

Since the previous period, what kind of progress has been made in re-education? (the changing political attitudes of POWs in the camp)

This is scored using any absolute statement provided by TA’s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Declined (1)</th>
<th>Remained the Same (2)</th>
<th>Improved (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“organized political activity is at present at its lowest ebb”</td>
<td>“No marked progress can be claimed for this period”</td>
<td>“the general position has improved ...interest in re-education has increased since the last visit”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“progress received a setback from the many changes which upset the camp routine and from the new intakes from the USA and Canada”</td>
<td>“interest in re-education has been maintained”</td>
<td>“re-education is making good progress”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**“qualitative_assessment”**

Based on all the information in this report and your knowledge of this camp, do you consider that this camp’s political progress in re-education has declined, remained the same, or improved since the previous period?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Declined (1)</th>
<th>Remained the Same (2)</th>
<th>Improved (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Use the same criteria as the ‘political progress’ variable</td>
<td>“ “</td>
<td>“ “</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**“soc_outcome”**

The ‘socialization outcome’ variable leverages the final reports on each camp to determine if it had improved, declined, or remained the same in its democratic attitudes compared to its starting political attitudes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negative Socialization Outcome (1)</th>
<th>Mixed Socialization Outcome (2)</th>
<th>Positive Socialization Outcome (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Since the start of re-education, the camp has declined in its support for democratic</td>
<td>Camps with uneven socialization or inconsistent</td>
<td>Camps that have developed democratic and or</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This is scored by comparing the political attitudes of camps during their first periods of reporting to the political attitudes of camps at the final period of reporting.

Some camps feature special final reports called “Re-educational Assessment” that specifically comment on the socialization outcomes of the camps.

Use the ‘political progress’ and 'qualitative assessment' variables to track the overall trajectory of socialization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Color”</th>
<th>Black (1)</th>
<th>Black/grey (2)</th>
<th>Grey (3)</th>
<th>White grey (4)</th>
<th>White (5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What is the starting ‘color’ of the camp as noted by British re-education officials?</td>
<td>The majority of the camp is still considered under the influence of Nazi ideology and or is against the British, the British way of life, and or democratic principles</td>
<td>The camp is largely politically neutral but there is still an element of support for Nazism “the camp is a dirty grey”</td>
<td>Most of the camp is generally apolitical or considere d neutral. The main concerns of POWs are their day-to-day realities of “the camp is a dirty grey”</td>
<td>There is an active anti-Nazi element in the camp that takes interest in democrat ic politics</td>
<td>Most of the camp takes an interest in politics and participates in political activitie s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
section titled “History” or “Camp History”

In these sections, TA’s or Segregators will explicitly state the color grading of a camp. If a clear grading is unavailable, use other pieces of evidence from the first reports that note the prevailing political attitudes of the camp.

Code “N/A” if there’s not enough information or if the TA admits to not knowing

“Owing to the intake of about 600 POWs whom very little is known, it is hardly possible to estimate the political colour of the camp”

| “civilian_contact” |
| No (0) | Yes (1) |
| Does the camp have significant outside contact with the surrounding civilian population? |
| TA’s will often note whether a camp interacts with the surrounding British population either through supplementary re-educational activities (e.g., fieldtrips, cultural of civic activities, attending lessons) or is isolated from British civilians |
| The TA does not mention contact with British civilians or explicitly states that the camp is isolated from civilian contact |
| The camp has significant contact with the surrounding civilian population. POWs regularly go into the nearby town/urban area or have established/reoccurring exchanges (e.g., regularly attending local council meetings) |
“uncertainty”

Take note of any uncertainty in the data. For example, an incomplete or short report that lacks detail, potential errors in the data. You can also record any difficult coding decisions that you had to make here.

“leader_uncertainty”

Use if unsure about how the leadership of a camp was selected. Instead of imputing “N/A”, use all the evidence available to score what you think most likely occurred.

Then mark the uncertainty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No (0)</th>
<th>Yes (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Senior Leadership (1)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Camp leaders and Deputy Camp Leaders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“TA_Bias”

At the time of the report, is there any clear tension between the TA and the British commandant and or camp staff?

Record if there is open hostility between re-education officials and the camp staff.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No (0)</th>
<th>Yes (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>There are good relations between the TA and the British camp staff</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“The commandant is 100% cooperative towards suggestions made by me”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“We were well received...the [British staff] is interested in re-education and in harmony with our aims”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>There is clear tension between the TA and the British camp staff.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The recommendations of the TA are being ignored or the TA has been offended by the camp staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“the commandant took only a perfunctory interest in my visit...there was a peculiar lack of hospitality—I was not once”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Invited into the Officers’ Mess</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>“Population”</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Record the total population of the camp. Includes all hostels, satellite camps, and main camp population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>“Youth_pop”</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Record the youth population of the camp. This appears in the subsection of reports titled “Youth”. Youth population is often reported as a total percentage of the camp.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>“Political Gradings”</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 8 separate columns, record the number of POWs in the camp by their recorded political gradings:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A+, A, A-, B+, B, B-, C, C+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political grades are recorded on the first page of TA reports or broken down by hostels and main camps on Segregator reports.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>“Special Notes or Camp Incidents”</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Record any notable events or incidents that are important to the process and outcomes of re-education in the camp that are not captured by the other variables. For example, events that could disrupt camp life such as an escape attempt, the murder of a POW, riots, the changing of the type of camp (from a working camp to a repatriation camp).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This is also where to comment on unique demographic trends of the camp—for example a large population of Czech Germans or of Waffen SS soldiers in the camp.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Camp_ID”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The camp number</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Date”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The month of the TA’s visit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Name”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The name of the POW. If possible, include the initial of their first name followed by their surname</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henrich Muller is coded as H. Muller.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“unique_ID”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each individual in the dataset is given a unique ID number. When a new individual appears in a TA report, their number is the next one to sequentially appear.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If H. Muller’s unique ID is #54, then the next person to enter the dataset is #55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Rank”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Record the military rank of the POW. Rank is often found in the personnel section of each report or right before the full name and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typical ranks of POWs are:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O/fw</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O/Maat.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2. Coding Decisions for the “subgroup_leader_data” Dataset
*The “camp_data” and “subgroup_leader_data” datasets are merged on the “Camp_ID” and “Date” variables. These variables need to correspond to the correct camp and date of report.
political letter of a POW. Record how the rank as it appears in the report

For example **O/Gefr** Jaeger, Gottfried (A). In this example O/Gefr is the rank

See Table 7.3 for hierarchy of ranks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gefr.</th>
<th>O/gefr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H/Gefr</td>
<td>Fw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uffz.</td>
<td>Soldaten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oberarzt</td>
<td>H/s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ob.</td>
<td>Obfhr.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**“Score”**
Record the political letter grading (the letter score of the POW as a numeric)

The political letter of a POW can change. Record their score for the period of the report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Score”</th>
<th>Numeric translation of letter grades</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A+ = 3.5</td>
<td>A = 3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A- = 2.5</td>
<td>B+ = 2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B = 1.5</td>
<td>B- = 1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C = 0.5</td>
<td>C+ = 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**“Camp_Position”**
Record the leadership position of the individual POW in its abbreviated form

POWs can occupy multiple positions, for example a Hostel Leader who is also a Magazine Editor is coded as HL/ME

Any individual holding one of the positions in the adjoining column that appears in a report is recorded in the dataset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp Positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camp Leader = CL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Camp Leader = DCL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostel Leader = HL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Officer = MO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazine Editor = ME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(includes any POW involved with any camp publications)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study Leader = SL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(includes any POW involved with re-educational studies, sometimes referred to as the Student Leader or Studienleiter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-education Leader = REL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(This can include POWs labeled as the director of studies or organizer or re-education. This is any POW who is in charge of the overall RE program)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant Priest = PP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic Priest = RP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
"Camp_facility"
Record where the individual is located in the camp. If they are operating in the main camp, record HQ
If they are operating in a Hostel, record the full name of the hostel (e.g. “Horns Lodge” or “Portfield”)

"Profession"
Record the profession of the individual if included in the reports (e.g. teacher, laborer, electrician, salesman)

"RE_Activity"
Is the individual actively involved in organizing or leading re-educational activities?
If there is not enough information on their involvement in re-education, code “N/A”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No (0)</th>
<th>Yes (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>They do not lead or participate in RE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“He does not have sufficient political conviction to start any re-education”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“He has no political influence and takes no active part in re-education”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They actively participate in RE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“He co-operates in re-educational activities”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“He assists in re-education”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Camp Leader of the Satellite Camp, Woodchurch is a very active type and is ably assisted by Gaebler (B+) Studienleiter and Ehrecke (A) Librarian. Uffz. Meyer (B+) the deputy camp leader is also active”. In this example, all named leaders are considered active in RE and coded (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>“PW_leadership_selection”</strong></td>
<td><strong>Apolitical (0)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coded similarly as the “subgroup leadership type” variable in Table 7.1. This variable records how an individual came to occupy their camp position and who selected them. If unsure of how they gained their position, code “N/A”</td>
<td>Leadership selection made by a Commandant unsupportive of re-education without involvement or endorsement from Training Advisors The original camp staff was selected by the Commandant for discipline and labor without consideration for political attitudes or re-education POW was selected for apolitical reasons—management of labor rather than RE, filling in for transfers, medical grounds.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>“Wilton Park”</strong></th>
<th><strong>0</strong></th>
<th><strong>1</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Record if the POW attended the Wilton Park program or was selected to attend Wilton Park is also referred to as the “Training Centre” or “Beaconsfield”</td>
<td>Did not attend Wilton Park</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>“Party_membership”</strong></th>
<th><strong>0</strong></th>
<th><strong>1</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The year the POW joined the Nazi Party (NSDAP) If they were never a member, score “2000”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>“Nazi_organizations”</strong></th>
<th><strong>0</strong></th>
<th><strong>1</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Record the acronym for any additional memberships to Nazi affiliated organizations (SS, SA, PG, HJ, DAF, conscripted into the SS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enlisted</strong></td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, the POW did not enlist in the armed forces and was drafted or “called up”</td>
<td>Yes, the POW voluntarily enlisted/joined the armed forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**“army_join”**
Record the year that the POW joined the German armed forces

**“Age”**
Record the age of the POW

**“Notes”**
Record any additional information about the POW that could impact their involvement in re-education (e.g. part of the German resistance, of Jewish heritage, arrested by the Gestapo, a youth leader)
Table 7.3 Effect of Camp Position and Political Letter Grade on Political Progress (logit): Examining Positions Closest to the Subgroup-Level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp Position Model</th>
<th>Political Grade Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camp Leader</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.089)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Camp Leader</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostel Leader (Subgroup-Level)</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Hostel Leader (Subgroup-Level)</td>
<td>-0.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic Priest</td>
<td>-0.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazine Editor/Librarian</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant Priest</td>
<td>-0.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizer of Re-education</td>
<td>0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.210)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study Leader (Subgroup-Level)</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.088)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade ‘C’</td>
<td>0.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.221)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade ‘B-’</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.169)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade ‘B’</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.163)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade ‘B+’</td>
<td>-0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.164)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade ‘A-’</td>
<td>0.137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.274)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade ‘A’</td>
<td>-0.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.167)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostels (Subgroup-Level)</td>
<td>0.010*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Population</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-education Materials</td>
<td>0.185***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader Activity</td>
<td>0.14*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp FEs</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month FEs</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>6,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.291</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The dependent variable in both models is whether a camp made political progress. The ‘A+’ and ‘C+’ political grades are dropped due to collinearity, as there were no instances of a ‘C+’ leader being active in re-education or of an ‘A+’ leader not supporting re-education. The reference level for the Camp Position model is the medical officer position. See Appendix II for full tables with control variables.

***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
Table 7.4. German Army (*Wehrmacht*) and Hierarchy of Ranks and US/UK Equivalents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Number of Combatants Under Command</th>
<th>US/UK Equivalent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Soldaten</em></td>
<td>soldat</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Gefreiter</em></td>
<td>gefr</td>
<td>1-4 (Section leader)</td>
<td>Junior Lance Corporal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Obergefreiter</em></td>
<td>Ogefr</td>
<td>1-4 (Section leader)</td>
<td>Senior Lance Corporal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Unteroffizier / Fahnenjunker unteroffizier</em></td>
<td>uffz</td>
<td>9 (Squad leader)</td>
<td>Sergeant (Junior NCO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Feldwebel / wachtmeister</em></td>
<td>fw</td>
<td>40 (Platoon leader)</td>
<td>Staff Sergeant (Senior NCO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Oberfeldwebel and oberwachtmeister Fahnenjunker</em></td>
<td>ofw and owm</td>
<td>200-400 (Company leader)</td>
<td>Master Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Hauptfeldwebel</em></td>
<td>hptfw</td>
<td>500-1000 (Company/Battalion Leader)</td>
<td>Sergeant Major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Stabsfeldwebel</em></td>
<td>stfw</td>
<td>500-1000 (Company/Battalion Leader)</td>
<td>Sergeant Major</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.3 Appendix III

Figure 7.4 Background Information and Results for the "Camp Shanks" Questionnaire (Note: This includes results for questions referenced but not shown in Chapter V.)

Source: "Poll of German Prisoner of War Opinion", 4-4 EC, CARL

POLL OF GERMAN PRISONER OF WAR OPINION

Purpose

On 6 September 1944, the Deputy Chief of Staff approved a study prepared by The Provost Marshal General recommending a program for the re-education of German prisoners of war. Subsequently this program was implemented by the distribution of selected media and by the selection and assignment of a specially trained officer to each prisoner of war base camp and service command headquarters. With the repatriation of all German prisoners of war from the United States, information was desired concerning the attitudes and opinions of the prisoners in order to evaluate the re-educational program and also to provide Military Government authorities with analyses of the political attitude of this specially conditioned group of Germans. Accordingly, a questionnaire was devised to be administered to a large cross-section of German prisoners of war immediately before their repatriation.

Composition of Prisoner Poll

Three general groups of prisoners were polled. At Camp Shanks, the New York Port of Embarkation, 22, 163 German prisoners of war representing all nine service commands were given the questionnaire over a period of four weeks. These prisoners formed the basis for measurement of the attitude of the average German prisoner of war.
at the time of his repatriation. In order to obtain a control group
the poll was also given to prisoners of war who were attending a
special school at Fort Eustis, Virginia, after being selected by
their camp commanders as the most cooperative, democratically inclined
and anti-Nazi prisoners in their camps. A third control group was
provided by the administration of an almost identical questionnaire at
Prisoner of War Camp, Atlanta, Nebraska. In the analyses and charts
which follow, the answers received from the Camp Shanks prisoners are
compared against the two control groups, Fort Eustis and Atlanta.

The Fort Eustis prisoners were considered to be anti-Nazi and
cooperative. Their records were carefully checked against the
criteria used in the European Theater for employment in official
positions. No prisoner whose records showed any cooperation or
affiliation with the Nazi party was admitted to this camp no matter
how cooperative his attitude during his internment. In spite of
this careful screening, a few prisoners who were not entirely demo-
cratic in their attitude passed through Fort Eustis due to faulty
intelligence at certain camps and to the inefficacy of records as a
measurement of political loyalty. The Fort Eustis group, however,
may be generally considered to be "white".

The poll administered at Atlanta, Nebraska, in December 1945
represents a normal, good prisoner of war camp. The prisoners
were a mixed group of "whites, grays, and blacks". Some of the
"whites" were eventually sent to Fort Eustis. This group provides a
contrast to the over-all cross-section of prisoners polled at Camp Shanks since it is known that the re-education program was effec-
tively presented by the special officer assigned to this camp and
thoroughly supported by the commanding officer. It provides an eval-
uation of the re-education program under favorable conditions. At
some prisoner of war camps the re-education program was feebly
administered because of the inability of the special officer or the
hostility of the commanding officer towards such an idealistic project.
The Shanks group combined prisoners from both types of camp and
therefore demonstrates the average effectiveness of the program.

It is believed that the Camp Shanks group represents the main
body of "run-of-the-mill" prisoners detained in this country, even
though the proportion is small: 22,153 as opposed to the total peak
strength of 378,898. Prisoners were polled in groups of about 2,000
as they passed through this camp from collection points all over the
United States. The fact that the reactions of each group followed
very closely the pattern set by the others seems to indicate that the
pattern would remain fairly constant had it been applied to all
370,000 prisoners.

In reviewing the answers of the Camp Shanks group, consideration
should be given to the fact that these prisoners were probably at the
nadir of their morale. Many resented the fact that they had not been
chosen to attend special courses at Fort Getty and Fort Bustin.
Attendance at these schools was governed by quotas and not by avail-
ability of suitable candidates; consequently, many "white" prisoners
could not attend. Practically all of the Shanks prisoners shared the
opinion that they were destined, upon their arrival in France, to
serve in labor battalions for the French Government and this belief
greatly embittered them against democracy.

Administration of Poll

It is believed that the questionnaire was administered under
favorable circumstances. The poll was conducted during the prisoners' free time. Explanatory and instructional remarks by the German-speaking American officers were carefully designed to create an informal atmosphere. The fact that names, serial numbers, or other means of identification were not desired was reiterated (See Tab 21, Page 51 - Translation of questionnaire). Most questions were multiple choice and prisoners were instructed to print the essay answers if they feared identification of their handwriting. A joke was made of the fact that they could turn their pages with a pencil eraser if they feared fingerprint identification. There was no time limit. Throughout the poll, prisoners displayed a cooperative attitude which at times bordered on eagerness. In order to prevent the possibility of one group who had just been given the poll relaying the questions to another group or discussing the answers, each successive group polled was collected from an entirely new shipment of prisoners.

There are many indications that the prisoners answered honestly. Logically, any dishonest answers would have been favorable answers. In the essay type questions even favorable answers frequently included unfavorable qualifications. The unfavorable answers usually contained very strong and positive language and statements were made which could be extremely damaging to the writer if his identity were known.
Analyses of the Results Obtained

The results of the poll are considered to be very favorable considering the causes for embitterment noted above and also considering the fact that approximately 25,000 anti-Nazi prisoners had previously been withdrawn from the main group to attend special schools. It is difficult to give a single percentage of favorable answers since reactions varied considerably, and since some of the questions included in the questionnaire were not intended to test the prisoner's attitude toward democracy.

By combining the results of eight questions which reflect the results of Nazi indoctrination, the total percentage of favorable answers obtained is 64 per cent. A combination of four questions which deal more exclusively with Nazi ideology reveals 74 per cent favorable replies. These figures give only a general indication, however, of prisoner attitudes. In the following pages each of the 13 questions included in the poll is summarized. A breakdown of the percentages according to age groups is included.
Question 12. “From your contact with America and Americans through personal observation, newspapers, magazines, movies, books, radio, etc., what impressed you most about life in this country?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ft.</th>
<th>Camp</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>ALL</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Age</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>Atlanta (Age)</td>
<td>17-21</td>
<td>21-25</td>
<td>26-30</td>
<td>31-35</td>
<td>36-40</td>
<td>O-40</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>13%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Free speech &amp; Press</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of individuals</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
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<td>The fact that Democracy works</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quality of entertainment, Radio, movies, magazines, etc.</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humaneness of Americans</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
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<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical &amp; scientific progress</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
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<td>1%</td>
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<td>Misc. Favorable</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-Total Favorable Impressions</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>50%</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>3%</td>
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<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Too much free speech, Unreliability of press</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Too much propaganda</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<td>0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of culture</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>American ignorance of European problems</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High crime, divorce rate, Low morality, etc.</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americans too mercurial</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americans not really free. Actually controlled by Jews, politicians.</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low living standard (rural areas)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<td>0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Race discrimination</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too many labor disputes</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misc. Unfavorable impressions</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-Total Unfavorable Impressions</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO ANSWER</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
The great percentage of "no answers" is attributed to the natural
difficulties which many people experience when they are called upon to
express themselves on paper. It is interesting to note the lack of
unanimity among the unfavorable impressions and also that unfavorable
replies do not follow Nazi indoctrination to any great degree.

Following are some of the actual answers received from the Camp
Shanks group for question 12:

"I was most impressed by the fact that everybody may express his opinions
freely without being submitted to any pressure. It surprised me to find
that the family life is on an entirely different basis than in Germany
and that dances and similar entertainments are of prime importance."
(Age group under 21)

"Your newspapers printed also the enemy bulletins. In Germany it was
impossible to judge what was going on in the other part of the world."
(Age group 21-25)

"I am proud to be a German and after living in the United States I am
a better Nazi than before."

Typical answers from the Bostis group are:

"American soldiers, with only a few exceptions, are good natured. I
admire the makeup of magazines such as Life, Time, etc. Radio programs
could be better—there is too much sentimental advertisement."
(Age group 31-35)

"Free and natural manners of people who are strangers. Exchange of
opinion of all people, and not only adults. Respect of the individual,
also mutual respect between worker and employer. Discussions about all
questions concerning the people. No clinging to traditions, but progress
and development."
(Age group 31-35)
"The people seem to have a safe existence and therefore feel themselves really free. I have never met an American who hated or was too arrogant. I was also impressed by the friendly way between officers and enlisted men.

(Age group 36-40)

"I had the impression that the Americans topped us by far in inner value. We Germans don't all have a superiority complex. I am ashamed to be a German."

(Age group 36-40)

"I have admired the freedom and the objectivity of the American people. They are aware of their own faults and do not try to hide them."

(Age group over 40)

"The letters to the editor in magazines like Life and Newsweek, in which everyone, be he a soldier, civilian or government official, can express his views. I was also impressed by the active interests of the public in current events."

(Age group over 40)
Question 13.

What is the most important single idea you have learned during your internment in America?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FAVORABLE REACTION</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>22153 P.W.'s at Camp Shanks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ft. Rustis</td>
<td>Camp Atlanta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMANENESS OF OTHERS</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRACY, FREEDOM FOR ALL IS A GOOD THING</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCREASED KNOWLEDGE OF PEOPLE, COUNTRY, LANGUAGE</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOCATIONAL TRAINING</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISCELLANEOUS FAVORABLE</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB-TOTAL FAVORABLE REACTIONS</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFAVORABLE REACTION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO HATE AMERICA</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAD TREATMENT OF P.W.'S (ESPECIALLY AFTER VE-DAY—OUT OF GUM, NOT DRUGS), AMBR. INSINCERE.</td>
<td>.5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEARNED NOTHING</td>
<td>.5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRACY IS FAULTY</td>
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<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISCELLANEOUS UNFAVORABLE</td>
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<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB-TOTAL UNFAVORABLE REACTIONS</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO ANSWERS</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following are typical answers:

"I have learned how fast the Nazis turned to become good democrats."
(Age group 21-25)

"If Germany would dominate America there wouldn't be any jobless."
(Age group 21-25)
"I was impressed by the freedom of the press. I was dismayed to find
the horrible housing conditions for the working classes. Provisions for
old age pensions, and health insurance are very poor."
(Age group 26-30)

"I realize that I had known very little about America. I believe that
the American people would never have approved a war with Germany had the
Nazis not assumed the power in Germany."
(Age group 26-30)

"...that we were treated worse by the people of German descent."
(Age group 31-35)

"How is it possible that the United States of America supplied Japan
with scrap iron while the situation was dangerous? Only for money’s
sake of high finance. How many poor Americans had to die for that?"
(Written in English—FW under 21)

"I have learned that the Negro is given the same education as the white;
can feel and think the same as the white."
(Age group under 21)

"We expected to find mostly gangsters but we found out the Americans
are no different from the Germans."

"America conducts a propaganda campaign against any nation that becomes
too powerful. First it was directed against Germany, now against Russia."
(Age group 21-25)

"Americans drink too much. Americans don’t like to work and cheat
their government."
(Age group 26-30)

"I learned to pick cigarette butts from six a.m. to 6 p.m. This was
ordered by Major General _________."
(Age group 31-35)