Innovative Covid-19 diagnostics and testing strategies in Italy, Denmark, UK, Israel and Sweden: a comparative analysis including tests, incidence and mortality

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Abstract. Background and aim: Detecting SARS-CoV-2 remains a critical component in the global effort to control COVID-19, particularly with the emergence of variants. Since the outbreak, diagnostic techniques have evolved to meet different contexts and needs. Methods: In this study, we analyzed the use of these techniques in five countries (i.e. Italy, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Israel) based on their specific national testing and contact tracing strategies. We also examined the number of tests performed per week, the positivity rate of tests, and the mortality rate in these populations during the same time periods. These countries were chosen based on the directives of the consortium involved in the CORONADX project. Results: During the three-year period under review, Italy and Denmark adopted large-scale testing strategies over a long period of time, with different results: in Italy an average of 4.5% of the population adhered to diagnosis, in Denmark 21%, while Israel reached 6.5%. The UK prioritised mass testing for short periods, outperforming the other countries with 1,882,596,198 total swabs and an average adherence of 28.1% of the population. Despite this, it recorded the highest number of deaths related to COVID-19 (211,155), with a lethality rate of 0.87%, second only to Sweden with 0.88%, where the average adherence to diagnosis was 1.7% of the population. Significant are the data for Israel, where as deaths increased, so did testing ($r = 0.62$, $p < 0.001$). Conclusions: To control future outbreaks it’s fundamental satisfying the need for effective testing strategies and government communication, equitable healthcare access, and education in public health and hygiene principles. (www.actabiomedica.it)

Key words: SARS-CoV-2, Covid-19, test, CORONADX, strategy, policy, contact tracing, cases, deaths

Introduction

An outbreak of severe viral pneumonia emerged in Wuhan, Hubei, China in December 2019 (1). Upon deep sequencing analysis of lower respiratory tract samples, a novel coronavirus was identified and named “Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus type 2” (SARS-CoV-2) (2). Since then, this enveloped, single-stranded, positive-sense RNA virus has spread over the world, causing the extremely contagious “Coronavirus disease 19” (COVID-19) (3). From the outset, the Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO) outlined the importance of testing as the backbone of the COVID-19 response, urging all countries to prioritize testing (4).
Tests for COVID-19 can be categorized into three main groups: molecular swab tests, rapid antigenic tests, and serological tests (Table 1) (5).

Both the WHO and ECDC have endorsed molecular tests as the “gold standard” for COVID-19 diagnosis (6). These techniques combine nucleic acid amplification tests (NAATs) with real-time reverse transcription PCR (RT-qPCR) to amplify viral RNA from respiratory tract samples obtained through nasopharyngeal, oropharyngeal, or nasal swabs. However, these tests have practical limitations such as the need for trained operators, accredited laboratories, and time-consuming processing (7).

Furthermore, it should be noted that the aforementioned diagnostic tools have been made available diachronically, with varying availability throughout the pandemic’s various stages. As a result, testing policies have developed over time: Table 2 provides a quick synopsis of the history of Main COVID-19 Diagnostic Devices.

In order to address the growing demand for COVID-19 testing and expand testing capacity, there has been a need for tests that meet not only sensitivity and specificity criteria but also rapid testing characteristics that can facilitate their use in specific contexts, in order to develop mass-testing (15) Point of Care Tests (POCT), specifically Rapid Antigen-Detecting (RAD) tests detect SARS-CoV-2 proteins produced during replication in respiratory secretions or oral fluid/saliva in few minutes (16-18). Other advantages of these tests include their ease of use regardless of location, even at home or outside of healthcare facilities, and their lack of specialized staff, training, or medical instruments.

Serological antibody tests, on the other hand, can detect the presence or level of specific antibodies in the blood, which may suggest a previous infection or vaccination. However, these tests have significant variation in terms of sensitivity and specificity (19), and cannot establish whether an individual is currently infected or immune to the virus, as per the recommendations of the ECDC (20).

As a result of the high commercial demand for reliable diagnostic tests, and subsequent commercialization of a vast array of tests highly heterogenous in terms of diagnostic performance and reliability, the European Commission has published a searchable database of available data for commercial in vitro diagnostic (IVD) tests that are CE-marked, including analytical and clinical sensitivity and specificity (21).

By April 8th, 2023, a total of 283 medical devices have been recorded, and an increasing number of in-house lab-developed tests with performance data in scientific papers are reviewed and updated regularly.

Following the launch of the global SARS-CoV-2 vaccination campaign and the subsequent emergence of Variant of Concern (22) (i.e. clear evidence indicating a significant impact on transmissibility, severity,
and/or immunity that is likely to have an impact on the epidemiological situation), SARS-CoV-2 diagnostic tests were implemented to ensure genomic surveillance, allowing variants to be distinguished according to CDC (23) and WHO defined classifications. Because early diagnosis and reporting can have a significant impact on outbreak control and prevention, the CORONADx project was created as an EU-funded Horizon 2020 project to develop and deliver quick, portable, and cost-effective tools for on-site coronavirus diagnosis, allowing for fast case detection and surveillance. In order to properly design new diagnostic tests, a preliminary assessment of the impact of diagnostic tests and diagnostic policies on the pandemic was considered the cornerstone for adapting diagnostics solutions and properly design new diagnostic options. Therefore, the aim of this study was to compare how COVID-19 diagnostics were used in five different

### Table 2. Evolution of main COVID-19 Diagnostics Devices.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTRODUCTION DATE</th>
<th>TEST</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10/01/20</td>
<td>RT-PCR</td>
<td>British Public England has announced that it has a new oral swab-based real-time RT-PCR of Novacyt-Primedesign (15, 16).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/01/20</td>
<td>RT-PCR</td>
<td>TestCenter Denmark’s PCR test is accredited according by DANAK (Danish quality assurance authority for diagnostic tests) (17).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/01/20</td>
<td>RT-PCR</td>
<td>Charité University Hospital(German)developed a second RT-PCR, which formed the basis of 250,000 kits distributed by the World Health Organization (18).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/03/20</td>
<td>RT-PCR</td>
<td>LabCorp was the first among US commercial laboratories to announce the nationwide availability of new RT-PCR-based COVID-19 tests (19).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/03/20</td>
<td>RT-PCR</td>
<td>Hologic (20) Abbott Laboratories (21) Thermo Fisher Scientific (22) Cepheid (23, 24) LabCorp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/03/20</td>
<td>Antibody Test</td>
<td>US FDA granted the first EUA for the First American Antibody Test (25).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/05/20</td>
<td>Antibody Test</td>
<td>Swiss Quotient Limited announced the CE Mark for its MOSAIQ COVID-19 Antibody Test, which had a sensitivity of 100% and specificity of 99.8%, was designed as a specific serological screening (26).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/05/20</td>
<td>Antigen Test</td>
<td>Swiss Roche received the EUA for a selective ELISA serological test (27).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/05/20</td>
<td>Antigen Test</td>
<td>US Quidel Corp granted the FDA the first EUA for the antigen test: “Sofia 2 SARS Antigen FIA” (28).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/05/20</td>
<td>Antigen Test (Thz Spectroscopy)</td>
<td>Israel Ben Gurion University was ahead of its time by presenting the one-minute rapid test with 90% accuracy, based on the “resonance change in the THz spectral range” shown by the coronavirus through THz spectroscopy (29).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/11/20</td>
<td>Antibody Test</td>
<td>US FDA gave approval GenScript USA Inc’s first serological test that detected neutralizing antibodies from recent or previous infection linked to Sars-cov-2, and issued EUA authorization for the cPass SARS-CoV-2 Neutralization Antibody Detection Kit (30, 31).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/11/20</td>
<td>Antigen Test</td>
<td>Lucira Health obtained EUA clearance for the first US home rapid molecular diagnostic test, that made available to consumers, the use of the test kit without the need for a healthcare professional, for a rapid 30-minute testing procedure at home. (32, 33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/01/21 - 22/02/21</td>
<td>RT-PCR</td>
<td>Danish SSI - Delta PCR v1.0 Delta PCR v2.0 Delta PCR v3.0 Variant PCR v4.0 Variant PCR v5.0 (34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/06/21</td>
<td>Antigen Test</td>
<td>US Innova, SARS-CoV-2 Rapid Qualitative Test approved in UK (35).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
contexts by analyzing specific national testing strategies in Italy, Denmark, UK, Israel and Sweden, and finally to examine the effects in terms of the number of tests performed per day, the percentage of positive tests per day, and mortality rates.

Methods

Testing policies. An electronic search was conducted in the official websites and repositories of the five nations participating in the CORONADX project (i.e. Italy, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Israel, and Sweden). Italian Health Ministry (https://www.salute.gov.it) reconstructed testing policies from 2020 to 2022, Israeli Ministry of Health official statements by its website (https://www.gov.il/en/departments/ministry_of_health/govil-landing-page), Danish Ministry of Health papers (https://sum.dk/english), UK government website (https://www.gov.uk/coronavirus), documents from Public Health Agency of Sweden Trends in contact tracing were obtained from Find Dashboards (https://www.finddx.org/covid-19/).

Testing strategies were classified into four levels (0 to 3), whose working definition is provided as follows:

- Level 0: no specific COVID-19 testing policy;
- Level 1: testing of key groups, such as people presenting specific symptoms such as Influenza-Like-Illness (ILI) and Severe Acute Respiratory Infection, close contacts, high risk groups (25), and the most exposed for working conditions (first and foremost Health Care Workers);
- Level 2: testing of all people presenting any kind of symptoms linked to COVID-19 infection (26);
- Level 3: countries that have adopted Open Public Testing, including asymptomatic persons.


Data were initially retrieved at the national level and pooled as weekly estimates. As United Kingdom (68,138,484 inhabitants by 2023 estimates, with a population density of 270.7 inhabitants/km²), Italy (58,853,482 inhabitants by 2022 census, 201.3 inhabitants/km²), Sweden (10,481,937 inhabitants by 2022 census, 25 inhabitants/km²), Denmark (5,935,619 inhabitants by 2023 estimates, 138.2 inhabitants/km²), and Israel (9,702,560 inhabitants by 2023 estimates, 440 inhabitants/km²) are quite heterogeneous not only from a demographic standpoint, but also because of specific COVID-19 related features such as the timing for the implementation of non-pharmaceutical measures aimed at dealing with the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, as well as their overall extent, we arbitrarily chose to normalize weekly rates in percent values by dividing the point values by the maximum value reported during the entire assessed timeframe (i.e. January 2020 - March 2023).

This timeframe was arbitrarily divided into two phases: the first began with the first reports of COVID-19 cases in Italy, which could be considered the start of the out-of-China COVID-19 pandemic, and continued until July 31st, 2021, the day after the administration of booster doses was authorized in Israel: at that time, all countries in our study had recorded at least 60% administration of one anti-SARS-CoV-2 vaccine. The second phase began on August 1st, 2021 with the first booster doses provided in Israel and ended on March 31st, 2023.

Statistical analysis

Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to compare weekly estimates by participating countries, with Dunnet’s multiple comparisons tests used as a post hoc test for the whole of the assessed timeframe. Across the comparisons, Italian estimates were assumed to be the reference category. At last, the association between normalized rates was assessed at country level using Pearson’s correlation coefficient (r) and its corresponding p value. All comparisons were carried out using
been conducting free mass testing programs using lateral flow devices since November 2020 (33). A similar program was implemented in the Italian Region of Alto Adige Südtirol (34), but it was not duplicated at the national level. Vaccination efforts began in December 2020, with Israel serving as a model for their quick roll-out. Denmark initiated a major free testing campaign for asymptomatic adults between March and May 2021, with the goal of shifting testing to randomized population checks during the colder months (35).

The target initially envisioned by Danish health authorities during the second Phase (i.e. from first booster administrations to December 31st, 2022) was not met due to the discovery of new Variant of Concern, particularly the Delta Variant (B.1.617.2). A highly contagious SARS-CoV-2 virus strain, it was first detected in India during the early stages of the pandemic (i.e. October 5th, 2020), but it was not until the second half of 2021 that it emerged globally as the leading cause of COVID-19 infection: since late April 2021, the proportion of cases caused by the ancestral Wuhan strain (i.e. Alpha variant) fell from more than 70% to around 42% as of mid-June, with the rise of Delta driving much of that shift, becoming dominant in most of the world.

R 4.0.3 and the packages epiR (v. 2.0.19), EpiReport (v. 1.0.1), and fmsb (0.7.0).

Ethical approval

No ethical approval was needed for this study, as no individual data were identifiable, and only aggregated data were analyzed and presented.

Results

Testing policy

Analysing the first Phase (From first COVID-19 Wave to July 31th, 2021), Denmark was the only country in the study that was able to make testing open for everyone during first COVID-19 wave (Level 3). Italy (28) and Israel (29) permitted open public testing during the second COVID-19 wave, although the latter only for a brief time (30). Sweden (31) and the United Kingdom (32), on the other hand, continued to screen only symptomatic patients (Figure 1). The United Kingdom warrants special consideration because it has

Figure 1. Summary reporting of the testing policies across the whole of the assessed timeframe, i.e. from the first COVID-19 cases reported in Italy (February 2020) to December 31st, 2022, the last available update from the source Authorities.
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shortly before the emergence of the even more contagious Omicron Variant (B.1.1.529). The failure of mass screening tests in Denmark just before the winter season 2021 demonstrated how reinfection was probable, and decreasing tests would have been a bad idea: Denmark agreed to publish a document on testing on December 6th, 2021 (36) with a return to the open public testing policy. Sweden lifted most anti-COVID-19 restrictions by February 6, 2022, with RT-qPCR reserved for small groups. On April 1, 2022, the UK government announced the end of free testing for the general public, limiting the tests to key categories (37). During the second phase, Italy never changed its Open Public testing strategy. As the pandemic progressed, the government attempted to ensure that testing was available to everyone, regardless of financial circumstances, and provided funding for testing in both the public and commercial sectors. Testing was also available everywhere, including drive-throughs, hospitals, GP ambulatories, and at home with home-kits or USCA, units of doctors authorized to monitor patients’ infectious and health condition. The Italian government approved the use of COVID-19 rapid antigen tests in the general population, beginning with their usage in airports and ports for individuals crossing borders. The Italian Health Ministry also issued guidelines for their use, including recommendations on who should be tested, how frequently testing should be done, and how the tests should be performed and interpreted. Furthermore, the government was involved in the establishment and implementation of COVID-19 testing requirements for certain sectors such as healthcare and education. For example, the government has mandated frequent testing for healthcare staff and students, and has provided funding to support these efforts. It also imposed travel restrictions to prevent the entry of additional COVID-19 cases. Anyone entering Italy from outside the country must provide a COVID-19 test that was negative within 48 hours of arrival. Travelers from high-risk nations must additionally undergo a 10-day quarantine upon arrival in Italy. In 2021, the Italian Health Ministry changed its testing guidelines to include recommendations for testing people who have recently traveled to areas with high COVID-19 transmission levels.

In terms of contact tracing policies (Figure 2), the analyzed countries took a quite disparate approach, considering three levels of tracing activity: no tracing, restricted tracing, and complete tracing. Surprisingly,
Italy was the only country to sustain high contact tracing levels over both phases. During the first phase, Israel alternated between a broad spectrum tracking and a more limited approach in a few cases, eventually establishing a more comprehensive tracing in later stages until it was discontinued, whereas other countries (such as Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Sweden) only performed a more limited tracing in the


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>U.K.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Population</strong> (2020)</td>
<td>59,438,851</td>
<td>5,831,404</td>
<td>10,353,442</td>
<td>9,215,100</td>
<td>67,081,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Last available estimates (year)</td>
<td>58,853,482 (2022)</td>
<td>5,935,619 (2023)</td>
<td>10,481,937 (2022)</td>
<td>9,702,560 (2023)</td>
<td>68,138,484 (2023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inception of testing campaign (date)</strong></td>
<td>31/01/2020</td>
<td>27/02/2020</td>
<td>31/01/2020</td>
<td>23/01/2020</td>
<td>20/01/2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inception of NPI measures (date)</strong></td>
<td>23/02/2020</td>
<td>03/03/2020</td>
<td>25/03/2020</td>
<td>17/03/2020</td>
<td>13/03/2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total tests performed</strong></td>
<td>270,074,524</td>
<td>122,650,248</td>
<td>17,636,529</td>
<td>59,553,626</td>
<td>1,882,598,198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 (No./tot, %)</td>
<td>26,598,607 (9.8%)</td>
<td>6,535,240 (5.3%)</td>
<td>3,063,242 (17.4%)</td>
<td>7,798,269 (13.1%)</td>
<td>62,501,074 (3.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021 (No./total tests, %)</td>
<td>113,538,999 (42.0%)</td>
<td>95,106,382 (77.5%)</td>
<td>10,614,620 (60.2%)</td>
<td>36,439,118 (61.2%)</td>
<td>972,623,542 (51.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022 (No./total tests, %)</td>
<td>122,699,762 (45.4%)</td>
<td>20,820,726 (17.0%)</td>
<td>3,797,253 (21.5%)</td>
<td>14,899,135 (25.0%)</td>
<td>847,471,582** (45.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2023* (No./total tests, %)</td>
<td>7,237,156 (2.7%)</td>
<td>187,900 (0.2%)</td>
<td>161,414 (0.9%)</td>
<td>417,104 (0.7%)</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Test per people (%)</strong></td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total cases reported</strong> (No./total population, %)</td>
<td>25,695,311 (42.23%)</td>
<td>3,408,493 (58.45%)</td>
<td>2,701,687 (26.09%)</td>
<td>4,814,034 (52.24%)</td>
<td>24,311,933 (36.24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 (No./tot, %)</td>
<td>2,083,689 (8.11%)</td>
<td>161,230 (4.73%)</td>
<td>437,300 (16.19%)</td>
<td>419,660 (8.72%)</td>
<td>2,563,565 (10.55%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021 (No./total cases, %)</td>
<td>3,897,739 (15.17%)</td>
<td>622,472 (18.26%)</td>
<td>877,400 (32.47%)</td>
<td>962,277 (19.99%)</td>
<td>10,878,102 (44.74%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022 (No./total cases, %)</td>
<td>19,187,010 (74.67%)</td>
<td>2,604,737 (76.42%)</td>
<td>1,363,768 (50.48%)</td>
<td>3,381,613 (70.24%)</td>
<td>10,568,649 (43.47%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2023* (No./total cases, %)</td>
<td>526,873 (2.05%)</td>
<td>20,054 (0.59%)</td>
<td>23,219 (0.86%)</td>
<td>50,484 (1.05%)</td>
<td>301,617 (1.24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total deaths reported</strong></td>
<td>189,089</td>
<td>8,379</td>
<td>23,861</td>
<td>12,400</td>
<td>211,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 (No./tot, %)</td>
<td>73,604 (38.92 %)</td>
<td>1,256 (14.98%)</td>
<td>9,616 (40.31 %)</td>
<td>3,336 (26.90 %)</td>
<td>75,239 (35.63 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021 (No./tot, %)</td>
<td>63,643 (33.65 %)</td>
<td>2,000 (23.86 %)</td>
<td>5,719 (23.96 %)</td>
<td>4,923 (39.70 %)</td>
<td>74,688 (35.37 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022 (No./tot, %)</td>
<td>47,545 (25.14 %)</td>
<td>4,526 (54.01 %)</td>
<td>6,952 (29.13 %)</td>
<td>3,805 (30.68 %)</td>
<td>50,941 (24.12 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2023* (No./tot, %)</td>
<td>4,297 (2.27%)</td>
<td>597 (7.12)</td>
<td>1,574 (6.59 %)</td>
<td>336 (2.70 %)</td>
<td>10,287 (4.87 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Case Fatality Ratio (2020 – 2023) (%)</strong></td>
<td>0.74%</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>0.88%</td>
<td>0.26%</td>
<td>0.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mortality Rate (2020 – 2023) (%)</strong></td>
<td>0.32%</td>
<td>0.14%</td>
<td>0.23%</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
<td>0.31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

first phase, which was substantially lifted during the second phase.

Epidemiological data

As demonstrated in Table 3, the UK has completed the most tests (1,882,596,198) since the outbreak began, despite available series interrupts with May 19th, 2022. Even though Italy has a total population substantially comparable to that of the UK, between 2020 and 2023 total tests accounted to less than 15% of overall British estimates (i.e. 270,074,524). Despite the fact that Denmark has a population that is roughly one-tenth that of Italy, approximately 122,650,248 tests were performed (i.e. 45% of all Italian samples), which is nearly 8 times more than those performed in Sweden, a country with a population that is nearly double that of Denmark. In total, over 59 million tests were conducted in Israel alone. In other words, the UK did 28.1 tests per 100 people, compared to 21.0 per 100 people in Denmark, 6.5 per 100 people in Israel, 4.5 per 100 people in Italy, and 1.7 per 100 people in Sweden.

The majority of SARS-CoV-2 registered cases occurred in Italy (No. 25,695,311), followed by the United Kingdom (No. 24,311,933), Israel (No. 4,814,034), Denmark (No. 3,408,493), and Sweden (No. 2,701,687). In other words, SARS-CoV-2 had infected more than half of the total population of Denmark (58.5%) and Israel (52.2%), a sizable proportion of the total population of Italy (43.2%), the United Kingdom (36.2%), and just 26.1% of the Swedish population. The corresponding crude annual incidence rates were 19.5% in Denmark, 17.4% in Israel, 14.4% in Italy, 12.1% in the United Kingdom, and 8.7% in Sweden. Surprisingly, the vast majority of instances were reported in Italy (74.7%), Denmark (76.4%), and Israel (70.2%) in 2022, while Sweden had a proportion of 50.5%. In contrast, most of UK cases (44.7%) were reported in 2021 rather than 2022 (43.4%).

During the same time period, the UK (211,155 deaths), Italy (189,089), Sweden (23,861), Israel (4,923), and Denmark (2,000) had the highest number of deaths, with a case fatality ratio ranging from 0.88% in Sweden to 0.87% in the UK, 0.74% in Italy, 0.26% in Israel, and 0.25% in Denmark.

Figure 3a shows normalized incidence rates. As demonstrated, the peak for incident cases in all CONONADX countries occurred in the fourth quarter of 2021 and the first months of 2022, following the rise of the VOC “omicron.” Interestingly, two additional peaks were observed in both the United Kingdom and Israel in the initial weeks of 2021 and throughout the autumn months of 2021. No substantial differences were reported across the assessed countries, as the mean difference with the reference country (i.e. Italy) was estimated to 0.92% (95%CI -3.78 to 5.62, p = 0.970) for Sweden, 0.85% (95%CI -3.86 to 5.56, p = 0.977) for Denmark, 0.82% (95%CI -3.84 to 5.48, p = 0.979) for Israel, and 1.87% (95%CI -2.78 to 6.53, p = 0.723) for the UK.

When dealing with the performed tests (Figure 3b), a rapid increase in all estimates were reported in all of the assessed countries. In all countries, a sustained increase for performed tests was reported by the first semester of 2021 (i.e. VOC “delta”), and particularly in Denmark. Overall, the main peak was consistently identified in all countries between the last weeks of 2021 and the first ones of 2022. Assuming Italian estimates as the reference group, a mean difference of 10.37% (95%CI 2.99 to 17.75) was reported with Sweden (p = 0.003), and of 24.18% (95%CI 17.02 to 31.34) with Israel (p < 0.001), while no significant differences were reported with Denmark (mean difference 7.19%, 95%CI -0.36 to 14.73, p = 0.067), and United Kingdom (mean difference 5.52%, 95%CI -1.64 to 12.69, p = 0.175).

Regarding reported death rates (Figure 3c), visual inspection identified two early peaks in Italy, Sweden and United Kingdom during the first months of 2020 (i.e. the “First wave”), with a second peak at the end of the summer season 2020 (i.e. the beginning of the “second wave”). Since January 2021 (i.e. the start of global vaccination campaign), normalized death rates radically decreased in all of the assessed countries until the peak reported by Israel by the autumn of 2021. A third peak that only involved Israel, Denmark, and Sweden (all of them reporting a normalized rate comparable to that of the first wave) was reported during the first half of 2022, during the emergence of VOC “omicron”.

Epidemiological data

As demonstrated in Table 3, the UK has completed the most tests (1,882,596,198) since the outbreak began, despite available series interrupts with May 19th, 2022. Even though Italy has a total population substantially comparable to that of the UK, between 2020 and 2023 total tests accounted to less than 15% of overall British estimates (i.e. 270,074,524). Despite the fact that Denmark has a population that is roughly one-tenth that of Italy, approximately 122,650,248 tests were performed (i.e. 45% of all Italian samples), which is nearly 8 times more than those performed in Sweden, a country with a population that is nearly double that of Denmark. In total, over 59 million tests were conducted in Israel alone. In other words, the UK did 28.1 tests per 100 people, compared to 21.0 per 100 people in Denmark, 6.5 per 100 people in Israel, 4.5 per 100 people in Italy, and 1.7 per 100 people in Sweden.

The majority of SARS-CoV-2 registered cases occurred in Italy (No. 25,695,311), followed by the United Kingdom (No. 24,311,933), Israel (No. 4,814,034), Denmark (No. 3,408,493), and Sweden (No. 2,701,687). In other words, SARS-CoV-2 had infected more than half of the total population of Denmark (58.5%) and Israel (52.2%), a sizable proportion of the total population of Italy (43.2%), the United Kingdom (36.2%), and just 26.1% of the Swedish population. The corresponding crude annual incidence rates were 19.5% in Denmark, 17.4% in Israel, 14.4% in Italy, 12.1% in the United Kingdom, and 8.7% in Sweden. Surprisingly, the vast majority of instances were reported in Italy (74.7%), Denmark (76.4%), and Israel (70.2%) in 2022, while Sweden had a proportion of 50.5%. In contrast, most of UK cases (44.7%) were reported in 2021 rather than 2022 (43.4%).

During the same time period, the UK (211,155 deaths), Italy (189,089), Sweden (23,861), Israel (4,923), and Denmark (2,000) had the highest number of deaths, with a case fatality ratio ranging from 0.88% in Sweden to 0.87% in the UK, 0.74% in Italy, 0.26% in Israel, and 0.25% in Denmark.

Figure 3a shows normalized incidence rates. As demonstrated, the peak for incident cases in all CORONADX countries occurred in the fourth quarter of 2021 and the first months of 2022, following the rise of the VOC “omicron.” Interestingly, two additional peaks were observed in both the United Kingdom and Israel in the initial weeks of 2021 and throughout the autumn months of 2021. No substantial differences were reported across the assessed countries, as the mean difference with the reference country (i.e. Italy) was estimated to 0.92% (95%CI -3.78 to 5.62, p = 0.970) for Sweden, 0.85% (95%CI -3.86 to 5.56, p = 0.977) for Denmark, 0.82% (95%CI -3.84 to 5.48, p = 0.979) for Israel, and 1.87% (95%CI -2.78 to 6.53, p = 0.723) for the UK.

When dealing with the performed tests (Figure 3b), a rapid increase in all estimates were reported in all of the assessed countries. In all countries, a sustained increase for performed tests was reported by the first semester of 2021 (i.e. VOC “delta”), and particularly in Denmark. Overall, the main peak was consistently identified in all countries between the last weeks of 2021 and the first ones of 2022. Assuming Italian estimates as the reference group, a mean difference of 10.37% (95%CI 2.99 to 17.75) was reported with Sweden (p = 0.003), and of 24.18% (95%CI 17.02 to 31.34) with Israel (p < 0.001), while no significant differences were reported with Denmark (mean difference 7.19%, 95%CI -0.36 to 14.73, p = 0.067), and United Kingdom (mean difference 5.52%, 95%CI -1.64 to 12.69, p = 0.175).

Regarding reported death rates (Figure 3c), visual inspection identified two early peaks in Italy, Sweden and United Kingdom during the first months of 2020 (i.e. the “First wave”), with a second peak at the end of the summer season 2020 (i.e. the beginning of the “second wave”). Since January 2021 (i.e. the start of global vaccination campaign), normalized death rates radically decreased in all of the assessed countries until the peak reported by Israel by the autumn of 2021. A third peak that only involved Israel, Denmark, and Sweden (all of them reporting a normalized rate comparable to that of the first wave) was reported during the first half of 2022, during the emergence of VOC “omicron”. 
Figure 3. Time trend of weekly tests (a), incident cases (b), and reported deaths (c) associated with COVID-19 in Italy, Denmark, Israel, Sweden, UK, since the inception of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. All values are normalized as 100% value by maximum weekly estimate.
As for incident cases, non-significant differences were reported across the sampled countries, as the mean difference with the Italian figures was estimated to -2.77% (95%CI -8.48 to 2.94, p = 0.578) for Sweden, 4.10% (95%CI -1.64 to 9.84, p = 0.239) for Denmark, 2.55% (95%CI -3.12 to 8.23, p = 0.639) for Israel, and 5.12% (95%CI -0.55 to 10.80, p = 0.090) for the United Kingdom.

As shown in Table 4 and Figure 4, a positive correlation between incident cases and reported deaths...
associated with a diagnosis of COVID-19 was reported in Denmark (r = 0.648, 95%CI 0.547 to 0.730, p < 0.001), Italy (r = 0.181, 95%CI 0.029 to 0.324, p = 0.020), and United Kingdom (r = 0.171, 95%CI 0.019 to 0.315, p = 0.027). On the contrary, a positive correlation between performed tests and deaths was reported in Sweden (r = 0.198, 95%CI 0.032 to 0.353, p = 0.020), and Israel (r = 0.615, 95%CI 0.511 to 0.702, p < 0.001), while a positive correlation between performed tests and incident cases was identified in Israel (r = 0.196, 95%CI 0.045 to 0.338, p = 0.011), Italy (r = 0.428, 95%CI 0.252 to 0.577, p < 0.001), and United Kingdom (r = 0.494, 95%CI 0.370 to 0.601, p < 0.001). No significant negative correlation was found.

**Discussion**

Our study has stressed huge heterogeneities across the various countries included in the COR-ONADX project in terms of testing policies as well as epidemiological features. In fact, such differences may be only partially explained in terms of timely response to the diachronous nature of the COVID-19 pandemic, rather reflecting the underlying cultural
In Denmark, TestCenter Denmark (TCDK) (38), was established for coordination between government and regional test sites, while Italy (39) and Sweden (40) suffered from decentralization of the healthcare system and conflicting strategies between regions. Reasonably, a more focused approach allowed Denmark to perform more targeted interventions that in turn contributed to the better features in terms of CFR when compared to other countries.

Second, we reported an inconsistent attention on minorities groups. In Israel, at the beginning there was a lack of attention given to minority groups such as the ultra-Orthodox Jewish community and Arab population. In both communities, not only testing campaigns but even the implementation of NPI was particularly difficult to achieve, for both cultural and political reasons and both communities have been acknowledged as hot points for new COVID-19 outbreaks in later stages of the pandemic (41).

Despite its potential interest, our study is affected by several limitations. Firstly, our study relies on data provided by National Authorities, whose quality has been often questioned. Moreover, our data are affected by several interruption in the time series, and all our estimates should be therefore cautiously acknowledged as representative of the whole of the pandemic.

Conclusions

Comparison between countries outlined some necessities for the future, first of all editing national and regional testing strategies to control next epidemics, by allocating the available resources (in this case diagnostic devices) in the specific settings, ensuring appropriate roles for the parts involved and identifying the coordinator between healthcare system, government and laboratories infrastructures; Government role in creating trust among general population, with good communication, transparency in statements and data sharing. Another pillar is guaranteeing access to healthcare for all people, without social distinctions, focusing on vulnerable minority groups in view of their unique characteristics, needs, culture and behaviors. At
last, teaching everyone the importance of education in public health and hygiene principles.

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