Paths to "Centrist Populism"?
Explaining the Emergence of Anti-Establishment Reform Parties

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WORK IN PROGRESS

Abstract: We discuss an emerging group of successful parties in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) that combine anti-establishment appeals with support for moderate policies of political and social reform, which we term anti-establishment reform parties (AERPs). Examples include the Simeon II National Movement (Bulgaria), Res Publica (Estonia), New Era (Latvia), Freedom and Solidarity (Slovakia), and TOP09 and Public Affairs (Czech Republic). We carry out a comparative analysis using the two step Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) technique developed as proposed by Schneider and Wagemann to identify the conditions under which AERPs made electoral breakthroughs in the period 1998-2011. We identify five sufficient paths for AERP breakthrough representing distinct combinations of several causal conditions: low but rising corruption, rising unemployment, previous success of new parties, increasing turnout, the presence of market-liberal incumbents, and strength of radical outsider parties. We conclude by reviewing the implications of our findings for further research.

In recent years fears have been expressed that the falling away of the EU accession conditionalities and the impact of the global recession is the leading rise of radical-right and illiberal populist parties in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (Rupnik 2007, Bohle & Greskovits 2009). Electoral breakthroughs by groupings such as Jobbik in Hungary in 2010 are often taken as exemplars of this trend (Jordan 2010, Wolin 2011). However, without denying the importance of the growth on the radical right for European politics the nature of many new anti-establishment parties has in the region been incompletely understood.

A number of new parties in CEE – at least in their initial stages – have combined classically populist characteristics such as anti-elite, anti-establishment rhetoric, espousal of direct democracy, a stress on moral renewal or technocratic expertise (Schedler 1997) with *moderate*, pro-market policies and a liberal or relatively neutral stance on socio-cultural questions. Certain such parties such as, Simeon II National Movement in Bulgaria in 2001 (Barany 2002) or Res Publica in Estonia in 2003 (Taagepera 2006) enjoyed landslide electoral success and immediately became central players in new governing coalitions. Others achieved more modest success such as Public Affairs (VV) in the Czech Republic or Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) in Slovakia – which entered their respective parliaments in 2010 – but entered government coalitions with little difficulty. In other cases in CEE such parties have been conspicuous by their electoral marginality or absence.

The rise of such parties has potentially far-reaching consequences for party systems and democracy in CEE, as unlike more radical populist groupings, such parties can achieve spectacular overnight electoral breakthrough and, even when they do not, usually have high coalition potential. In this article we analyse the conditions under which the electoral breakthroughs of such parties, which we term *parties of anti-establishment reform* (AERPs), can occur using Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA).

We proceed as follows. We first define our concept of the *anti-establishment reform party* (AERP) relating it to relevant literatures on new and outsider parties, and discussing parties we classify as AERPs. We then present the fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) method and briefly review its earlier use as a technique for analysing the emergence of new parties. Following that, we present our own QCA-based strategy for analysing conditions of breakthrough for AERPs in contemporary CEE party systems and report our findings. Finally, we reflect upon the implications of our findings and discuss how the concept of AERPs and the analytical strategy used might be extended to West European cases.

ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT REFORM PARTIES

As Kevin Deegan-Krause (2010) observes, despite their diversity, there are clear commonalities between these new parties making it possible to speak of

> … not exactly a new party family (though in their cultural liberalism and anti-corruption emphases they share significant elements) and not exactly a new party type … but with strong and intersecting elements of both. Nor is it unique to Central Europe alone but elements of it have emerged also in the West.

Many authors who have studied the phenomenon have viewed such parties as expressing a sub-type of populism, speaking of 'new/centrist populism' (Pop-Eleches 2010), 'centrist populism' (Učeň et al 2005; Učeň 2007) or 'liberal populism' (Mudde 2007). Others have defined them more narrowly as based on a distinct (anti-)political appeal or issue dimension: Bågenholm & Heinö (2010), for example, term them 'anti-corruption parties, while Demker (2008) speaks of 'virtue parties'.

Figure 1: Core characteristics of anti-establishment reform parties

As shown in figure 1 we conceptualize these parties somewhat differently as *anti-establishment reform parties* (AERPs) that exhibit − to different extents − three overlapping core features: (1) *reformism* combining an ideologically mainstream discourse with a desire to reform the political system; (2) *anti-establishment* rhetoric and appeal to voters; and (3) *genuine organizational newness* as a party. By 'reformism' we understand two things: firstly, that programmatically a party is committed to mainstream models of liberal democracy and the market economy, share neither the inclination of radical right forces to 'illiberal democracy' (Mudde 2007) nor the anti-capitalism of the radical left (March & Mudde 2005); secondly, AERPs have an active commitment to *political reform* seeking to make major changes to the political institutions or to the way politics is conducted, to improve, modernize or unblock the working of liberal democracy or the liberal market economy. Such themes might, depending on context, take the form of appeals to fight corruption, replace corrupt or inefficient elites with energetic and competent personnel; tackle overlooked policy areas; or create new democratic structures

linking citizens and politicians (sometimes extending into anti-partyism); or novelty of political style or a 'project of newness' (Sikk 2011).

We also understand such parties as *anti-establishment* parties.[1] We derive this term from Abedi's work (2004) on 'anti-political establishment parties', that is parties that perceive themselves as challengers to establishment parties and see a fundamental divide between the people and the political establishment (Abedi 2004: 12). In our use of the term we focus on the first part of Abedi's definition: on how AERPs frame *themselves* in relation to established parties.[2]

The third element of our definition is that in organizational terms parties should be 'genuinely new'. In this article we use Sikk's (2005: 399) definition of new parties as those successful in elections for the first time that are "not successor to any previous parliamentary parties, have a novel name and structure, and do not have any important figures from past democratic politics among their major members" (Sikk 2005: 399; see also Sikk 2011). We thus exclude alliances and mergers between established parties, as well as parties which are products of breakaways from established parties.[3]

To identify AERPs empirically we scored parties on each of the three key characteristics discussed above (*political reformism*, *anti-establishment appeal*, *genuine organizational newness*) using a three point scale, judging these characteristics to be strongly present (2), partially present (1) or weak or absent (0).[4] The sum of the three scores generated a seven point (0-6) score. We included as AERPs parties with a total score of four or higher with a score of at least 1 on each of the characteristics. In all instances, the unit of analysis and scorings refer to a party *at the particular time* when a parliamentary election took place: CEE parties, both new and established, can experience considerable fluctuation and evolution in their identity and programmatic appeals.

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1 We avoid the term 'populist' because we feel it is imprecise: even minimal definitions such as that of Mudde (2004:542) tend conflate anti-establishment appeal and (moralistic) anti-political appeals, which while often empirically associated are, we contend, conceptually distinct.

2 Many AERPs do, however, use the 'populist' construction of People vs Establishment Abedi refers to. Abedi's definition also includes a third element: that a party challenge the status quo on major policy and political system issues. For our cases parties' political reformism challenges the status quo on a major 'political system issue'. We avoid label 'anti-political establishment party' because we find it ambiguous.

3 We take this to be to be parties formed where a majority of parliamentary deputies have come from a single established party. This is slightly different from Sikk (2005: 399), where the last condition excludes 'participation by prime ministers and significant portions of cabinet ministers and members of parliament'.

4 In some cases we scored parties more finely. Where relevant data was available for parties in relevant years we also referred to the UNC Chapel Hill expert surveys of party positions on economic and social (GAL-TAN) axes (Steenbergen & Marks 2007; Hooghe et al 2010) . On the ten point Chapel Hill index, the parties we identify as AERPs are (when they first enjoy electoral success) in the range 3.75 – 7.53 on economic issues and 6.33 and 2.58 on GAL-TAN Interestingly – and somewhat contrary to our initial assumptions in earlier work (Hanley & Sikk 2011). Unlike Pop-Eleches (2010) in his discussion of 'centrist populists' we do not regard euroscepticism as a non-mainstream position, although most AERPs are not eurosceptic.

Table 1. Selected CEE parties' scorings as AERPs

Election of 1st success	Party	Anti-establish-ment	Genuine newness	Political reformism	Total
BGR2001	National Movement Simeon II (NDSV)	2	2	2	6
CZE2010	Public Affairs (VV)	2	2	2	6
EST2003	Res Publica	2	2	2	6
LVA2002	New Era (JL)	2	2	2	6
SVK2010	Freedom and Solidarity (SaS)	2	2	2	6
BGR1994	Bulgarian Business Bloc	2	2	1.5	5.5
CZE2010	TOP09	2	1.5	2	5.5
HUN2010	Politics Can Be Different (LMP)	2	2	1.5	5.5
LTU2000	New Union (SL)	2	2	1.5	5.5
BGR2009	Citizens for European Development of Bulg. (GERB)	2	2	1	5
SVK1998	Party of Civic Understanding (SOP)	1	2	2	5
SVK1998	Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO)	1	2	2	5
LTU2008	National Resurrection Party (TPP)	2	2	1	5
LTU2008	Labour Party (DP)	2	1.5	1	4.5
CZE1998	Freedom Union (US)	1	1	2	4
EST2007	Greens (EER)	1	2	1	4
LVA1998	New Party (JP)	1	2	1	4
SVN2004	Slovene Youth Party (SMS)	1	2	1	4
SVK2002	Smer	2	1	1	4
POL2001	Law and Justice (PiS)	1	1	1.5	3.5
CZE2006	Green Party (SZ)	1	1	1	3
POL2001	Citizens' Platform (PO)	1	1	1	3
EST1995	Reform Party (ER)	0.5	0.5	1.5	2.5
LVA1998	People's Party (TP)	0.5	0.5	1	2
SVN200	Zares	1	0	1	2

As Table 1 shows, in parliamentary elections in CEE since 1994, 19 parties can be identified as successful AERPs.[5] Strikingly, as Pop-Eleches (2010) notes in relation to 'unconventional parties' more broadly defined, AERPs as a phenomenon of CEE is mostly confined to the last 10-15 years: only one AERP, the Bulgarian Business Bloc in 1994, enjoyed any electoral success entering parliament before 1998. Pop-Eleches (2010) explains this in terms of the dynamics of 'third generation' post-communist elections, when, having elected and been disappointed with the government performance of conventional parties of left and right, voters turn to unconventional new parties.[6]

We therefore investigate AERPs' performance focusing on 'third generation' elections (Pop-Eleches, 2010) to the lower house of CEE parliaments that took place between January 1998 and June 2011. In our preliminary analysis we encountered difficulties with explaining the complete absence of AERPs in Romania – even when generally favourable conditions were otherwise present. We contend that this may be related to the markedly low level of democratic freedoms in that country compared to other EU states (as

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5 In all states analysed 'founding elections' and/or elections which generated the basis of initially established post-communist party system took place no later than 1994. Some parties such as Smer in Slovakia or Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland combine AERP features with clear conventional ideological appeals, often using the latter as subsequent consolidation and party-building strategy to transform themselves into more mainstream parties of left or right. Some East European Green parties whose political make-up is distinct from West European counterparts (Sikk & Andersen 2010), are categorizable as AERPs, others with a stronger mainstream programmatic (environmentalist, liberal) appeals such as the Czech Greens are not.

6 More simply, it might be that parties and party systems in new democracies require a certain interval to become 'established' – both organizationally, electorally and in the public mind – implying a certain delay before anti-establishment parties can become meaningful challengers. Other authors make broadly the same point about timing Deegan-Krause & Haughton (2009), for example, posit the gradual erosion of parties which formed and established themselves in the immediate post-transitional period, because of accumulative effect of the post-communist environment (low levels of party identification with parties; weak party organizations; high (perceived) levels of corruption).

indicated by *Freedom House* political rights and press freedom scores); for the sake of analytical clarity excluded this country from our analysis.

QCA AS A TOOL FOR UNDERSTANDING PARTY EMERGENCE

To examine the emergence of AERPs we employ Fuzzy Set form of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), a comparative technique which seeks to formalize the logic of qualitative case-based comparison by identifying relevant configurations of causes (conditions) and effects (outcomes) using fuzzy algebra and sets (Ragin 1987, 2000; Rihoux and Ragin 2009). Rather than coding the presence or absence of conditions and outcomes dichotomously as in the original Crisp Set version of QCA (csQCA) (Ragin 1987), fsQCA codes cases in terms of their degree of set membership in outcome and causal conditions. Degree of membership in outcomes and conditions are expressed as values ranging from 1.0 (full membership) to 0.0 (full non-membership) with a 'crossover value' of maximum ambiguity set at 0.5.

QCA is well suited to the cross-national comparison of the varying success of new types of party, where a relatively high number of cases and high levels of casual complexity. By causal complexity we understand the fact variables can work in distinct configurations rather than individually and the fact that there may be several causal paths producing the same outcome (equifinality). QCA is able to capture a mix both of causes common to instances of a phenomenon and those distinct to specific paths, which conventional quantitative multivariate analysis can struggle with, while allows analysis of a large number of cases, which would overwhelm conventional qualitative case study methods. It has thus been used as an analytical tool to examine the comparative success of new emerging party types across Europe, for which such causal complexity – usually the configuration of multitude of social and institutional factors – is the norm (Redding & Viterna 1999; Veughlers & Magnan 2005; Hanley 2011 forthcoming; Gherghina & Jiglau 2011).

SELECTING AND OPERATIONALIZING QCA CONDITIONS

In accordance with standard fsQCA practice (Schneider and Wagemann 2010), we first define the outcome condition and potential causal conditions and expressing them in fuzzy set terms. However, as discussed below, in contrast to most QCA-based studies of new party emergence, we use elections rather than countries as our unit of analysis. Each election is assigned a degree of membership in each condition ranging from 1.0 (full membership) to 0.0 (full non-membership) with a 'crossover value' of maximum ambiguity set at 0.5. Although expressed numerically, the degrees of set membership are anchored in researchers' theoretically-based judgments, with at least three key anchor points (0, 0.5 and 1), each corresponding to a verbal description. Where raw data for conditions is continuous, set memberships are calculated using the calibration technique proposed by Ragin (2008: 85-105).

Outcome: AERP electoral breakthrough BREAKTHRU

In this article, we focus on the *initial breakthrough* of AERPs. These breakthroughs are clearly identifiable events with immediate consequences for democratic governance and longer term patterns of party system change. This focus also reflects our understanding of

AERPs more as a political strategy, than a party family *manqué*: unless they disintegrate, AERPs may transform themselves after initial breakthrough into more conventional programmatic parties of varying ideological hues, downplaying or dropping their anti-establishment appeals (Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2009). Such processes of transformation and consolidation are, however, beyond the scope of this article.

Accordingly, we use single *elections* as our units of analysis. In crisp set analysis, the coding of breakthrough would be straightforward – whether an AERP had achieved a certain level of electoral support (1) or not (0). For fuzzy set QCA analysis, the coding is more nuanced. We first defined the outcome set as *AERP breakthrough* and specified thresholds of full membership, full non-membership and maximum ambiguity (0.5 membership) (see Table 2), above which the case is more in than out of the set and below which it is more out than in. Based on these anchors, we then used the method of direct calibration suggested by Ragin (2008: 71-108) to transform the raw data (AERPs' electoral support in an election) and calculate individual cases' membership in the outcome set.[7]

Table 2. Electoral support for successful AERPs

Election	Votes %	Set membership in *BREAKTHRU*
BGR2001	42.7	0.99
BGR2009	39.7	0.99
LTU2004	28.4	0.94
CZE2010	27.6	0.94
EST2003	24.6	0.91
LVA2002	24.0	0.90
LTU2000	19.6	0.84
LTU2008	15.1	0.74
SVK2002	13.5	0.70
SVK2010	12.2	0.66
POL2001	9.5	0.58
HUN2010	7.5	0.52
LVA1998	7.4	0.51
EST2007	7.1	0.50
POL2005	0.0	0.10
SVK2006	0.0	0.10
CZE2006	0.0	0.10
HUN2002	0.0	0.10
CZE2002	0.0	0.10
HUN1998	0.0	0.10
BGR2005	0.0	0.10
LVA2010	0.0	0.10
SVN2008	0.0	0.10
EST2011	0.0	0.10
POL2007	0.0	0.10
HUN2006	0.0	0.10
LVA2006	0.0	0.10
EST1999	0.0	0.10
POL1997	0.0	0.10

Source: European Elections Database and websites of national electoral authorities.
Scores for parties with less than 4% were not used, resulting in formal raw score of 0.0.

How should 'electoral breakthrough' of an AERP be understood? AERPs have considerably greater vote winning potential than niche or radical parties that have been the focus of most earlier QCA studies of new party emergence (Redding & Viterna 1999; Veughlers & Magnan 2005; Hanley 2011 forthcoming; Gherghina & Jiglau 2011). In the

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7 Where two AERPs were successful – a very rare occurrence – we took their combined scores as our point of departure for coding. Empirically, there was only one such instance (Czech Republic 2010) where we judged that the combining the electoral support of the two AERPs was meaningful.

elections we study, there have been two cases – Bulgaria 2001 and 2009 – where an AERP was supported by more than a third of the electorate. We set the threshold of *fully in* the set at a level of massive electoral support (30 per cent of votes or more), when the AERP becomes the first or second biggest party and hence a major party in a coalition government or a major opposition party. We set the crossover point (0.5 set membership) at 7 per cent of the vote, which is sufficient to win parliamentary representation safely and a share of seats relatively proportional to the party's vote share, with the AERP becoming a minor governing or opposition party. Because of data limitations, we have only coded support for AERPs in cases where they entered the parliament. However, we noted empirically in all elections under study here the presence of small or tiny AERP-like parties that failed to enter the parliament. Even though such parties are fairly marginal and it is often hard to find reliable data on their political orientation – we must in all cases still acknowledge a residual degree of AERP presence. Therefore, we code the fuzzy set membership of all elections under study when an AERP did not enter the parliament at 0.1 – almost fully out, but indicating some residual level of AERP support in elections.[8] Our implementation of the lower threshold (full non-membership in the set) here thus differs from previous studies that have used the method of direct calibration, which usually setting a lower threshold where set membership approaches 0.

Causal conditions

The study of AERPs in CEE is a new area and unlike previous QCA studies of the emergence of new parties (Redding & Viterna 1999, Veugelers & Magnan 2005, Gherghina & Jiglau 2011) we cannot draw on a well-established literature to identify and operationalize favourable conditions for AERP breakthrough. In picking out such conditions we draw on a thin body of work which has so far addressed AERP-like parties directly, as well as on the literatures on the emergence of new parties and new party types, populism, and on our own specialist knowledge of key cases supplemented by secondary literature on CEE parties and elections.

Deploying the two-step approach to QCA proposed by Schneider & Wagemann (2006), discussed at greater length below, we distinguish between demand and supply side factors determining AERP breakthrough. *Demand side* factors are social conditions conducive for a breakthrough – such as the inability of established political actors to deliver reasonable economic conditions or to reduce perceived corruption. Under such circumstances voters may entrust dealing with these challenges to an AERP – a mainstream newcomer. Yet, a favourable set of supply-side factors – often termed political opportunity structures – is needed to translate potentially conducive background demand side conditions into an AERP breakthrough. In particular, a substantial proportion of voters must see new competitors as legitimate and viable and be willing to turn to an AERP in preference to more ideologically radical alternatives.[9]

Social/demand-side conditions

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8 There were no elections among the cases we analyzed where an AERP was supported by more than 3 per cent of the electorate yet fell below the electoral threshold.

9 We did not include the age of democracy or electoral systems: CEE countries democratized after 1989 under similar circumstances, where there is very limited variation between countries and cases. With the exception of Hungary and Lithuania, which use a mixed/parallel electoral systems, all countries proportional representation with similar legal thresholds. There were minimal changes to electoral systems in our cases during the period cover, mostly consisting of amendments to the formal or effective thresholds of list PR systems.

The inability of established political actors deliver reasonable economic conditions is widely understood as a potential driver of (anti-incumbent or anti-establishment) protest voting for new parties (see, for example Roberts 2009). We look at three economic conditions that could enhance the chances of AERP breakthrough[10]:

1. High levels of unemployment (HIUNEMP).

We hypothesize that cases with high levels of unemployment may create the potential for political or social protest. Countries where unemployment approaches 0% are fully out of the set while unemployment at 30% of the working age population can be considered so high as to be fully in the set. We set the crossover point at 10% – when the level of unemployment passes the psychologically important double-digit barrier.

2. Sharply increasing unemployment (INCUNEMP).

Even at relatively low levels, sharply increasing levels of unemployment can provide a favourable condition for an AERP breakthrough. Hence, we incorporate a condition of increasing unemployment over 2 years before the election. The crossover point is set at an increase of 2.5 percentage points and the maximum threshold is set at an increase of 5 percentage points corresponding to a drastic increase in the level of unemployment. We set the lower threshold ("fully out of set") at a 2.5 percentage point decrease in unemployment levels. Our rationale here is that neither the unemployed nor voters generally would not see constant unemployment levels as an improvement of any kind – and can hence provide a support base for a potential AERP.

3. Weak economic growth in previous year (NOGRO).

Governments in CEE can be expected to deliver economic growth at the levels where countries are catching up / and converging with other European Union countries. Hence, we set the cross-over point at +2% annual change in GDP, where there is essentially no catching up, yet neither any falling back. We set the threshold for full membership ("fully in") at -10% when there is a serious decline in a country's GDP. The minimum threshold ("fully out") is set at economic growth of 10% under which AERP breakthrough is made very difficult because of very fast economic growth, a phenomena empirically observed in CEE states at various points since 1989. We argue that it is more meaningful to look at economic growth level over two previous years, as the effects of economic growth might become visible with a slight delay; furthermore, only very few elections take place at the end of a year – hence, the indicator for previous year best reflects the state of economy at the time of election.[11]

AERP-like parties have been linked to levels of corruption and the politicization of corruption as a new issue dimension (Deegan-Krause 2010; Bågenholm & Heinö 2010). Corruption is often – quite rightly – considered to be one of the most difficult social phenomena to define and measure. We use Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for the following two conditions which we hypothesize have a

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10 All from the Quality of Government database, except Estonia 2011: unemployment level in Q1 2011 and change between Q1 2009-Q1 2011 (data from Statistics Estonia).
11 Our reasoning for unemployment is somewhat different: rising levels of unemployment are often preceded by many jobs being at risk for a period of time. We futher contend that the effects of unemployment are felt more immediately – change in GDP is a somewhat abstract economic indicator while being unemployed, loss of job in a family, a company or a community is much more tangible.

positive effect on AERP breakthrough.[12] Although often criticized as poorly reflecting the "real" levels of corruption, corruption perception is arguably a meaningful measure for our purposes as it is the social *perception* of high or increasing levels of corruption that may lead voters to turn to AERPs.

4. High level of perceived corruption (HICORR).

We hypothesize that a case is a full member of this condition if the CPI score falls below 2.6, around the worst empirically achieved levels in the region (Romania and Bulgaria). A case is full out of this set if CPI reaches the heights of 7.5 – benchmark level based on typical CPI in Ireland, West European country often seen as a model in the region with a relatively high level of patronage and corruption by West European standards. The crossover point of maximum ambiguity (0.5) is 4.5, reflecting the typical level of CPI in the most corrupt old EU member state (Greece).

5. Substantial increase in the level of perceived corruption (INCCORR).

A case is a fully out of this condition if a country's CPI score increases by 0.5 points over the preceding two years – i.e. there is a substantial improvement of corruption situation. The condition is fully present if CPI score decreases by 0.5 points – indicating a substantial perceived deterioration in corruption. We set the cross-over point at a 0 decrease in the CPI score where there is neither improvement nor deterioration.

Supply-side conditions

We then define five supply side conditions, which relate to the party-electoral context:

1. A history of support for genuinely new parties (GENEWP).

There are uneven levels of party and party system consolidation and stability and electoral volatility across the CEE region (Powell & Tucker 2010). Voters in states with more fluid, less consolidated party systems have acquired a greater habit of voting for new parties as a result of weak or absent bonds with established parties or weaker expectation that established parties will remain established. Therefore, we hypothesize that where there is a history of support for genuinely new parties, it reflects a presence of a significant pool of voters "available" to new parties, many of whom will perceive an emerging AERP as a credible challenger.[13]

To operationalize this condition we took the maximum support for genuinely new parties in the previous two elections. A case is a full member of this condition (Set membership = 1.0) if the combined support for genuinely new parties was 40% in an election – enough to generate one new major party or a number of more minor breakthroughs. A case is fully out of this set only if no genuinely new party won more than one per cent of votes in this period. The crossover point is set at 12 per cent – either substantial support for unsuccessful genuinely new parties or a moderate success of a breakthrough.

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12 Data from the Quality of Government dataset. CPI score was not available for Estonia 2011 at the time of writing, the 2010 score was used. In addition, as the 1995 CPI score was not available for Poland, we estimated the country's set membership in the condition Increasing corruption (INCORR) at 0.3 based on qualitative assessment informed by Economist Intelligence Unit analysis and European Commission accession progress reports.

13 We are interested in the willingness of electorates to vote for new parties, rather than shifting support between established parties. Our measure of support for new parties broadly corresponds to what others term Type B or Extra-System volatility (Mainwaring et al 2009; Powell and Tucker 2009).

2. Pro-market centre-right incumbent (MCRINC).

Although varying in their precise positioning on socio-economic issues, as well as in and the weight they assign to distributional issues and questions of political reform, AERPs generally situate themselves in market-liberal ideological terrain. Such market liberal appeals can overlap with those of established parties of the (neo-)liberal centre or centre-right. Adapting Pop-Eleches's (2010) reasoning – and taking into account the organizational weakness of centre-right parties in the region – the rise of AERPs may thus be interpreted as a response to the political failure or weakening of incumbent market-liberal parties. We therefore hypothesize that there is more potential for an AERP breakthrough if a country has been governed by a centre-right incumbent in the run-up to the election; in other words, a potential pool of voters may be provided by a (partially) failed centre-right government. The set of *pro-market centre-right incumbency* is intended to capture the presence of centre-right reformers in government, either in the form of established parties or previously successfully AERPs, whom voters may hold responsible for failures to implement liberal reforms effectively.

The question of which CEE parties can be categorised as centre-right or on the market-liberal centre is a complex one not reducible to ideological or party labels (Hanley 2004; Tavits & Letki 2009). In identifying market-liberal parties – and assessing their (level of) incumbency – we have drawn on our own case knowledge; the comparative literature on CEE 'liberal' and 'liberal-conservative' parties and party families (Lewis 2000, Hanley 2004, 2007, Vachudova (2008); and expert survey data on party positioning Steenbergen & Marks 2007).[14] Although they may be liberal-democratic and politically mainstream we thus exclude socialists and social democratic parties; market-sceptical conservative-national parties; regional-ethnic parties and incumbent AERPs.

Membership in the set *Pro-market centre-right incumbent* is defined ordinally as follows (see also Table 3):[15]

> 1.0 (fully in the set): a reasonably stable market-liberal party[16] is a dominant party in majority or near majority government.
>
> 0.67 (mainly in the set): market-liberal parties lead a majority or near majority government or play a dominant in a minority government. In coding we allow that in some cases numerical dominance in parliament may be offset by internal fractionalization of governing parties and coalitions.
>
> 0.5 (neither in nor out of the set, maximum ambiguity): a market-liberal party or parties is an equal coalition partner with other political forces, possibly in a Grand Coalition.
>
> 0.33 (mainly out of the set): a market-liberal party is a junior coalition partner.
>
> 0 (fully out of the set): no market liberal parties are in office in parliamentary term preceding election.

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14 We focused on parties' relative position on the LRECON variable in examining the Chapel Hill expert survey data (Steenbergen & Marks 2007)

15. We regard caretaker technocratic administrations as neutral, coded as maximally ambiguous (0.5)

16 By 'market liberal' we understand a political party with clear and consistent political/ideological commitment to free market approaches in the economy and public services, low taxes and/or the restriction or shrinkage of the public sector. In so doing, we are concerned principally with the nature of a party's identity and appeal, rather than political and policy record in office.

Table 3. Set membership in the condition *MCRINC*

Election	Set membership
LTU2000	1
LVA2010	1
EST2011	1
LVA1998	1
LVA2002	1
LVA2006	1
SVK2006	0.9
SVK2002	0.9
BGR2005	0.9
CZE2010	0.8
BGR2001	0.8
SVN2008	0.8
CZE2002	0.5
EST2007	0.5
EST2003	0.5
POL2001	0.2
LTU2008	0.2
HUN2010	0.2
CZE2006	0.2
HUN1998	0.2
BGR2009	0.2
HUN2006	0.2
EST1999	0.2
HUN2002	0.1
POL1997	0.1
LTU2004	0.05
POL2007	0.05
SVK2010	0.05
POL2005	0

3. Substantial increase in electoral turnout (TOINC). High or increasing electoral turnout is generally considered as a factor which can enhance new party success (and old party demise) (Birch 2003, Tavits 2008, Lago & Martínez 2011). In the case of AERPs, we hypothesize that the ability to mobilize − or channel the pre-existing mobilization − of newly enfranchised young voters or previous absentees may be significant. This may be especially significant for AERPs, as their appeal are often pitched in terms of newness and change in ways that may appeal disproportionately to young, first time voters (Sikk 2011). We operationalize cases as fully in the set of *substantial increase in turnout* if turnout increases by 10 percentage points and fully out of the set if it decreases by five percentage points. The crossover point (0.5 set membership) is set at a modest increase of 5 percentage points.

4. Strong radical anti-establishment outsiders (RADICAL). AERPs may face ideologically radical parties with anti-establishment appeals. Such radical outsider parties, we believe, may either hurt the chances of an AERP by capturing part of the protest vote or − conversely − increase them by mobilizing mainstream voters who may fear radicals gaining greater political influence given the declining support for discredited mainstream parties. [17] The category of 'radical' parties covers two groups: radical-right and radical-left, which we understand respectively in terms of illiberal ethno-centric nativism (Mudde 2007) and an egalitarian anti-system critique of socio-economic structures of contemporary capitalism March and Mudde (2005: 3). In a few cases, parties empirically overlap both categories, although radical left forces generally lack the nativism of radical right groups.

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17 Some small ideologically radical parties such as, for example, Latvia's Fatherland and Freedom (TB/LNNK) have been mainstay in many governing coalitions and have a limited ability to position themselves as anti-establishment. Such parties while often classified as radical-right or –left are therefore excluded from our calculations.

We define a case as fully in the set of strong *radical anti-establishment outsiders* if the combined vote share of radicals is 30 per cent and fully absent if their combined support is zero per cent. However, some radicals have won limited electoral support (below 1 per cent of the vote, in which cases we did not code the parties) or as individual candidates in some of the elections studied. Therefore, we code the set membership of all elections in which no radical outsider won more than 1 per cent of the vote at 0.1. The crossover point is set at 10 per cent – fairly strong support for radical parties.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

In our QCA analysis, we employ a modified form of the two-step fuzzy-set QCA approach proposed by Schneider & Wagemann (2006) to overcome the problem of limited diversity – that is to prevent a profusion of counter-factual configurations ('logical remainders') from overwhelming the number of real-life cases (Schneider & Wagemann 2006, Schneider 2008; Mannewitz 2011). In their cross-regional study of democratization, Schneider & Wagemann (2006) conduct a first stage fsQCA analysis of structural conditions promoting democratic consolidation, incorporating 'logical remainders' (counter-factual configurations) to achieve deliberately underspecified but highly parsimonious. Having thus isolated three key remote structural factors (and eliminated others), Schneider and Wagemann then analyse them in combination with more proximate institutional factors conducting parallel fsQCA analyses, each incorporating one of the structural conditions. These analyses use the conservative solution produced by fsQCA by excluding all logical remainders. The authors thus identify a number of highly consistent, sufficient pathways (configurations of conditions) leading to democratic consolidation,

Schneider and Wagemann justify their implementation of two-step QCA in this way on the grounds that structural conditions are logically prior and can be considered as providing broader context for political-institutional conditions – a distinction deeply embedded in the democratization literature. The authors are, however, careful to point out that none of the structural conditions identified in step 1 are to be regarded as necessary conditions for the outcome.[18] Moreover, as Schneider and Wagemann (2006) note in earlier work, for theory building exercises (such as our study) where there may be a lack of established literatures – the two step procedure is also advantageous because it allows propositions to be developed in a transparent step-by-step manner.

In our study of AERPs, following Lilliefeldt (2010) and Mannewitz (2011), we adapt this procedure, replacing a distinction between remote (structural) and proximate (institutional) factors with one reflecting different levels of externality/internality to parties and the party system. More concretely, we draw on the widely used metaphor of electoral markets in the party competition literature to distinguish *demand* side conditions reflecting (voter perceptions of) from the socio-economic context and *supply* side conditions, which relate to the party-electoral context and political opportunity structures.

In the first step of our analysis, we identify key *social / demand* conditions conducive for an AERP breakthrough – in the main, assumed to influence the attitudes and behaviour of voters. In a second step we then incorporate the key *demand* conditions that emerge in step 1 with supply-side factors relating to the party system and party-electoral

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18 Two of the ten sufficient paths Schneider and Wagemann (2006) ultimately identify contains no social-structural conditions. Step 1 conditions are also absent in the two of the four configurations in Lillefeldt's (2009) two-step fsQCA study.

environment: erstwhile party system stability; strength of radical outsiders; pro-market centre-right incumbents; and turnout increase. However, in line with good practice in QCA (Schneider 2010) we first individually tested all conditions for necessity. The highest consistency levels for necessity were found for absence of rising corruption (incorr, 0.87) absence of rising turnout (turnic, 0.81) and previous support for new parties (GENNEWP, 0.81). However, none of these approached levels of levels of consistency or coverage required for them to be considered necessary conditions.

Step 1: identifying social (demand-side) conditions

In step one we analyse the outcome BREAKTHRU in terms of five socio-political conditions experienced by voters assumed to be relevant to an electoral breakthrough by an anti-establishment reform party: HICORR, INCCORR, HIUNEMP, INCUNEMP, NOGRO.[19] As noted above, these relate to level and growth of perceived corruption; level and growth in unemployment; and economic growth (or lack of growth).

Table 4. Configurations of social (demand-side) conditions for AERP breakthrough

Configuration	HIUNEMP	INCUNEMP	HICORR	INCCORR	NOGRO	BREAKTHRU	N	Consist.	Cases	Inconsistent cases
1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0.92	P01	
2	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0.91	B01	
3	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0.87	C10	
4	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0.85		E99
5	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	0.84	Sk10	La10
6	1	1	0	1	1	1	2	0.76	H10	E11
7	1	0	0	1	0	1	2	0.73	Li04, E03	
8	1	0	1	1	0	0	4	0.68	B05, P05	La98, Sk02
9	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0.67	C02	
10	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	0.65	H98, H02	E07, Li08
11	1	0	1	0	0	0	2	0.65		La02, Li00
12	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0.62	P07	B09
13	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.59	P97, Sk06	
14	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0.51	La06, Si08 H06, C06	

Using the truth table generated − illustrated in Table 4 − the social conditions were logically minimized into a parsimonious solution arrived. Expressed in the Boolean term, where upper case denotes the presence of a condition; lower case it absence; + a logical OR; and * logical and, the solution read as follows:

INCUNEMP + (HIUNEMP*hicorr*INCCORR) → BREAKTHRU

Expressed in more natural language this states that there are two sets of social conditions (causal paths) consistent with AERP breakthrough: rising levels of unemployment and a particular configuration of high unemployment and rising corruption in a low corruption country. The largest number of cases of AERP breakthrough (five) had greater than 0.5 membership in the INCUNEMP condition (rising unemployment). [20]

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19 For all QCA analysis we used the fs/QCA 2.5 program and Longest and Vaisey's (2008) fuzzy module for Stata.

20 The complex solution (excluding all logical remainders) calculated was HIUNEMP*INCUNEMP*INCORR + HIUNEMP*INCUNEMP*INCCORR*nogro + HIUNEMP*hicorr*INCCORR*nogro + HIUNEMP*hicorr*INCCORR*NOGRO. Consistency was 0.69 and coverage 0.56. The intermediate solution calculated with a consistency cut-off of 0.73 and assuming for all four conditions that it contributes to the outcome was INCCORR*hicorr*HIUNEMP + NOGRO*INCCORR*HIUNEMP + HICORR*INCUNEMP*HIUNEMP.

The second term in the solution HIUNEMP*hicorr*INCCORR is intriguing in that it suggests that it is not corruption per se but a *configuration* of corruption and economic hardship that is associated with AERP success. Of particular interest is the finding that it is a combination of *low but rising* levels of corruption, rather than high corruption matters for AERP success. However, only three cases of AERP breakthrough (Estonia's *Res Publica* in 2003, Politics Can Be Different in Hungary (LMP) in 2010 and the Labour Party (DP) in Lithuania in 2004) had membership in this condition at or above the key 0.5 level and as a combination of three conditions, the HIUNEMP*hicorr*INCCORR lacks the level of parsimony desirable in a step 1 outcome of this kind. Moreover, while the configuration is not in itself empirically implausible, when we revisit the cases (elections) covered, it is difficult to interpret unemployment levels (HIUNEMP) as interacting strongly with corruption as an issue for voters.[21]

Conversely, the two corruption conditions configured in the term hicorr*INCCORR can be seen as tightly associated and interacting in a way, which is both theoretically plausible and squares with our case knowledge of the relevant national elections when AERPs broke through (see, for example, Haughton, Novotná and Deegan-Krause 2011): rising corruption in a context of relatively low corruption acts as a powerful and distinct demand-side configuration for AERP-like parties can be understood as generating a sense among voters that the political system is in crisis and has become dysfunctional and illegitimate. We therefore took the decision based on case knowledge to amend this configuration to highcorr*INCCORR, dropping the high unemployment condition.[22] Such a move reflects both the principle of iterating between case knowledge and formal solutions generated by the fsQCA program, which it at the heart of configurational comparative methods – the "dialogue between ideas and evidence" as Ragin (1987) termed it – and the nature of step 1 solution required in two-step QCA analysis. The objective in framing such an initial solution is to formulate a deliberately underspecified, and thus inclusive, parsimonious model of AERP-favourable social contexts, whose key terms can be integrated with conditions relating to political and party system contexts. Our stage 1 outcome was therefore re-specified as:

INCUNEMP + hicorr*INCCORR → BREAKTHRU

which states that the social conditions favouring AERP breakthrough are high levels of unemployment *or* rising corruption in the context of a relatively low level of corruption.

The consistency and coverage of this solution were found to be broadly similar to those of the initial INCUNEMP + (HIUNEMP*hicorr*INCCORR) → BREAKTHRU**.** The overall solution consistency of INCUNEMP + hicorr*INCCORR was only slightly lower: 0.6 as opposed to 0.62. The overall solution coverage increased from 0.59 to 0.65 and its coverage of positive outcomes (membership in BREAKTHRU > 0.5) is significantly better.

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21 As a robustness test (Skaaning 2011), we examined the consequences for the step 1 solution of imposing higher or lower consistency cut-offs. A 0.05 (five percent) upward or downward variation in consistency cut off produced variant solutions, which nevertheless reproduced essential features of that arrived using 0.7 cut-off. The solution with a 0.75 cut-off was INCUNEMP and, with a 0.65 cut-off, INCUNEMP + HIUNEMP*INCCORR + HICORR*INCORR. This indicates a reasonable level of robustness, highlighting the role of high unemployment as a high consistency condition and that of rising corruption as an important but less consistent condition.

22 In this solution the condition HIUNEMP appears to essentially distinguish two cases of non-breakthrough – Hungary 1998, Hungary 2002, bundled together with two cases of breakthroughs (Estonia 2007 and Lithuania 2008) from cases of breakthrough with an otherwise similar membership in in the social conditions.

Figure 2 Set membership of AERP elections and favourable social conditions

As Figure 2 shows, given the deliberately underspecified nature of the stage 1 solution – and the fact that a purely 'sociological' interpretation of new party breakthrough is theoretically implausible – it has (unsurprisingly) a significant degree of inconsistency: some elections with highly successful AERPs such as Bulgaria in 2009 (GERB - Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria) or Latvia in 2002 (New Era) have low membership in the solution set, suggesting that they may be driven by other factors. Conversely, some elections with high membership in the solution set of social conditions, such as Poland in 2001 (PiS: Law and Justice) or Slovakia in 2010 (SaS - Freedom and Solidarity) see relatively modest breakthroughs by AERPs or, in the case of Latvia in 2010, none at all. Such patterns might suggest that while high social potential for AERP breakthrough existed, it was blocked, blunted or diverted by other factors such as an unfavourable constellation of political/party system conditions.

Step 2: combining social and political conditions

In the second step, we combined the solution terms of social conditions favouring AERP breakthrough identified in step 1 analysis with conditions relating to the political and party system context: the strength of radical anti-establishment outsiders (RADICAL); the success of genuinely new parties in earlier elections (GENEWP); increase in voter turnout (TURNINC); and the presence in government of a pro-market centre-right incumbent (MCRINC). We did so by running two parallel fsQCA analyses, each incorporating one of the social paths identified in step 1 alongside the party-electoral conditions outlined above.[23] The configuration of corruption conditions derived from step 1

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23 To prevent the inclusion of logically inconsistent counterfactuals it is advisable practice in QCA to exclude logical remainders containing the negation of any necessary condition. This may be an pertinent consideration in two step QCA when the step 1 solution may be regarded as causally necessary to the outcome where, for example, step one conditions structurally or temporally encompass those in step 2. As we do regard our step 1 one conditions in this light, negations of the step 1 solutions are included in the two step 2 analyses. We are grateful for Carsten Schneider for raising this issue with us.

(hicorr*INCCORR) was treated as a single condition with set memberships in it calculated accordingly.

As we were seeking to identify clearly consistent pathways to AERP breakthrough in step 2, we used a higher consistency cut-off (0.8). In obtaining solutions we focused on producing an intermediate solution, incorporating some but not all logical remainders into the analysis chosen as 'easy counterfactuals' on the basis of clearly stated assumptions about the effects that conditions would have in counter-factual cases.[24]

For both second step analyses, with one exception, we assumed that each condition would consistently contribute towards the outcome (BREAKTHRU). The one exception was RADICAL (strength of radical outsider parties), for which we allowed the assumption that high levels of RADICAL might either contribute towards the outcome or detract from it. This reflected our theoretical uncertainty about the exact impact that the strength of radical parties might have on the prospects of AERPs. To reiterate, we were uncertain whether they would act as competitors for anti-establishment minded protest voters, or whether the presence of strong radical outsiders could be read as an indicator of the weakness of established mainstream parties, their inclining normal supporters to look for a new mainstream party to act as a bulwark against radicalism and extremism.

Table 5. Sufficient paths for AERP breakthrough

Path	Configuration	Coverage	Consistency	Cases, solution set membership in brackets
1	INCUNEMP*RADICAL	0.33	0.85	P01 (0.82), H10 (0.73), C10 (0.62)
2	(hicorr*INCCORR)*RADICAL	0.40	0.78	H10 (0.55), Li08 (0.52), Li04 (0.52), C10 (0.52)
3	TURNINC*MCRINC* INCUNEMP	0.22	0.90	B01 (0.8)
4	TURNINC *MCRINC*radical	0.30	0.87	B01 (0.8), Li00 (0.54)
5	GENEWP* mcrinc*turninc*radical	0.35	0.83	Sk10 (0.56), B09 (0.54), E07 (0.5)

Through our step 2 analyses we identified five sufficient paths for AERP breakthrough (with consistency greater than 0.7), which are presented in Table 5.[25] Taken together, this five-path composite solution with a total coverage of 0.66 and total consistency of 0.77 consistently accounts for 10 of the 14 cases of AERP breakthrough (set membership 0.5 and above) and furnished partial, although inconsistent (somewhat below 0.5 solution membership) explanations for two more.[26] There are, however, two important outliers

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24 Our use of an intermediate solution in stage 2 incorporating some 'logical remainders' (rather than a conservative excluding them) reflects the fact that our study is essentially an exercise in theory-building, dealing with short-term, contingent outcomes, where there is a greater need to balance parsimony allowing the identification of underlying dynamics with complexity capable of capturing the diversity of individual (groups of) cases. The logical remainders incorporated into the intermediate solution obtained from two second step analyses are covered by the following Boolean terms: 1) RADICAL*TURNINC + INCUNEMP*mcrinc*TURNIC + INCUNEMP*GENEWP*RADICAL, INCUNEMP*GENEWP*TURNINC + incunemp*genewp*MCRINC*TURNINC + INCUNEMP*genewp*MCRINC*radical*turninc and 2) lowinccorr*genewp*mcrinc*turninc + LOWINCCORR*GENEWP*mcrinc*radical + LOWINCCORR*GENEWP*MCRINC*RADICAL + LOWINCCORR*MCRINC*TURNINC. In the second set the configuration hicorr*INCCORR ('low but increasing corruption) is renamed LOWINCORR

25 A sixth high consistency path TURNINC*MCRINC*radical*GENEWP (coverage 0.26, consistency 0.88) is also technically produced, but this overlaps almost entirely with path 4 (of which it is a subset) and only covers one case (Lithuania 2000), which is already covered by path 4. Full outputs of step 2 analysis are available as supplementary material on the authors' websites.

26 SMER in Slovakia in 2002 (0.22 membership in path 2 in Table 5) and Res Publica in Estonia in 2003 (0.38 in Path 6).

which are not well covered by our solution: *Res Publica* in Estonia 2003 and New Era in Latvia 2002. Here, we suggest, the exceptional programmatic closeness of these AERP challengers to the main established incumbent centre-right party (see Sikk 2006, 2011) may have enhanced their success in winning over voters from these parties without their needing to mobilize large numbers of new voters, but are otherwise closest to path 4 in Table 5 (discussed in detail below).

 A weak mainstream and a deteriorating social situation

Only two of the five paths (1 and 2) include the social conditions relating to unemployment and corruption identified in step 1. Both of these paths, which have broad (if partly overlapping) coverage (0.33 and 0.44), combine deteriorating social situation condition (rising unemployment/rising corruption in a low corruption country) with the presence of strong radical parties (INCUNEMP*RADICAL, hicorr*INCCORR*RADICAL). Both are also quite geographically specific, covering a number of with AERP breakthrough in elections in core Central European states: Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland in 2001, Politics Can be Different (LMP) in Hungary in 2010, TOP2010 and Public Affairs in the Czech Republic in 2010. Path 2, however, additionally covers the breakthroughs made in Lithuania by the Labour Party (DP) and National Resurrection Party in the elections of 2004 and 2008.[27]

These paths also highlight a significant finding with regard to the relationship between moderate anti-establishment reformers and radical outsider parties. The strength of radical outsiders (RADICAL) in these contexts can be interpreted as reflected the constrained nature of support for mainstream parties – and the possible weakening of established parties. Overall, this path suggests a crisis of the political mainstream characterized by the discontent of moderate voters with a deteriorating social situation and possibly concerned about the strength of radical parties.

Mobilising voters disillusioned by pro-market incumbents

Pathways 3-4, which cover the massive breakthrough of the Simeon II National Movement (NDSV) in Bulgaria and that of the New Union (Social Liberals) (NS) in Lithuania in 2000 both include (and are thus subsets of) the combination TURNINC*MCRINC: that is to say, these AERP breakthrough elections feature increased turnout with pro-market centre-right parties incumbent. These conditions must be additionally combined with other factors such as rising unemployment (path 3) or the absence of radical outsiders (path 4). These two paths can be interpreted as contexts where new or previously demobilized voters turn to an AERP in preference to incumbent pro-market centre-right parties.

Rallying a weak centre-right opposition

The fifth path, GENEWP*mcrinc*turninc*radical covers the breakthroughs of Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) in 2009, Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) in Slovakia in 2010 and the (more ambiguous) case of the Greens in Estonia in 2007. The configuration states that AERPs will break through in unstable party systems when left parties (or market-sceptic conservative nationalists) are incumbent radical outsiders are weak and turnout is stagnant. In this context, emergent AERPs seem to serve as a means of rallying weakly organized or fragmented centre-right forces. This interpretation is supported by the fact that this path can be further simplified to a more

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27 Of the five pathways, this path also provides the most consistent solution for Slovakia's SMER in 2002, although the party's membership in the path is still weak (0.22).

parsimonious yet still highly consistent (0.72) term, which preserves the essence of this interpretation: mcrinc*GNEWP.[28]

Negations: blocks to AERP breakthrough

It is axiomatic in QCA that the causal paths leading to the *absence* of the outcome condition – in this study the absence of an AERP breakthrough – will almost never be simply the inverse of causal path leading to the outcome. Such causal asymmetry, as it is termed, makes it good practice to run separate analysis of this absence, the negation) of the outcome.

To do this we employed a similar two-step approach: that is, conditions blocking the breakthrough of an AERP (breakthru). Step one produced a two term parsimonious solution with overall consistency 0.78 and coverage of 0.56: hicorr*inccorr + INCUNEMP*INCCORR, with the first term – decreasing corruption in a low-corruption country – being the most consistent (0.85) condition. While intriguing, the second configuration (INCUNEMP*INCCORR) – a combination of rapidly rising unemployment and rising corruption – has low coverage and appears mostly to be a description of 2010 election in Latvia and 2011 election in Estonia.[29] It is notable that all cases covered by the term – partially including Estonia in 1999 in the wake of Asian/Russian financial crisis that hit the Baltic states hard – are cases of post-recession elections.

In the second step, combining social and supply-side conditions using a consistency cut-off of 0.8) two pathways appeared (see Table 6): first, *low and decreasing corruption* seems to be an almost magic formula to block AERP breakthrough; second, AERPs tend not to appear in countries with high levels of party system stability with a non-market-liberal incumbent. In other words, in all these cases, voters had the option of voting for a reasonably established opposition centre-right party, whether market-liberal or conservative-national. In such contexts, in partial contradiction to Pop-Eleches' (2010) generalised model of generations of CEE elections, it appears that the 'normal' dynamic of alternation between established parties of centre-right and centre-left continues to operate. Although beyond the scope of this article, such contrasts open up an important avenue for future case-based research on the comparative development of party systems in the region.

EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

As the concentration of cases in the top right corner of the diagram in Figure 3 shows, our findings provide a broadly consistent explanation of the political breakthroughs achieved in CEE by parties that we term anti-establishment reform parties and others call 'centrist populist' or 'anti-corruption' parties. However, the five identified sufficient paths can be distilled into three broader 'stories' with number of important implications for research on this emerging group of parties.

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28 Solution set membership in the parsimonious configuration is as follows: Sk10 0.87, B09 0.8, E07 0.5. This path also provides the most consistent explanation of 2003 election breakthrough of Estonia's Res Publica, in which it has 0.38 membership.

29 It also gave a partial description of mild AERP breakthroughs (Hungary and Slovakia 2010; Czech Republic 2010 and Poland 2001) which are inconsistent cases.

First, while the importance of rising unemployment in the emergence of new anti-establishment parties come as no surprise, our findings in step 1 highlight the need for a more nuanced understanding of how (perceived) corruption enables the electoral breakthrough parties of this kind. High corruption, however, does not seem to be favourable to emergence, perhaps because it leads to voter resignation and political disengagement or allows patronage networks co-opting new political forces to proliferate. However, rising corruption in a low corruption environment does seem to mobilize voters behind anti-establishment reformist alternatives. Interestingly, contractions in economic growth seem to have no *direct* role in AERP emergence, suggesting that AERPs do not emerge as 'crisis parties' until and unless concrete effects of recession on employment are felt.

Second, slightly contrary to our expectations, the results show that there are sufficient paths with quite broad coverage based exclusively on party-electoral 'supply side' conditions. This suggests that social conditions − or at least *trends* in social conditions highlighted in step 1− are not necessary for AERP breakthrough. Although in practice, many cases of AERP breakthrough also have memberships in paths including social conditions, some, including the breakthrough of the Simeon II National Movement in Bulgaria and Freedom and Solidarity in Slovakia emerge because of conjuncture of political and party system conditions.

This is not, of course, to say that the role of social conditions such as corruption and unemployment can be dismissed as casually unimportant. As Deegan-Krause (2007) notes that compared to regions such as Western Europe, CEE has a high general background level of (perceived and actual) corruption and high, engrained levels of public distrust in parties, politicians and politics. However, our analysis suggests that such background social conditions offer only partial explanation when *comparing* electoral breakthroughs within the region.

Figure 3. Membership in the combined set of pathways and AERP breakthrough

Third, like many QCA analyses, our analysis of AERP breakthrough highlights different paths leading to the outcome, which in some instances are overlapping: positive cases of AERP breakthrough often have high membership in several paths. However, the paths identified do suggest patterns of cross-national and cross-temporal variation. Cases of

AERP breakthrough in Central European countries with stable or consolidating party systems (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland until 2001 'earthquake election') are accounted for by paths 1 and 2 – weak(ening) mainstream parties and deteriorating social conditions. Countries to East and South East of this core follow different dynamics: Bulgaria 2001 is accounted for by paths 3 and 4 centring on the weakness of the incumbent pro-market centre right, and Bulgaria 2009 and Slovakia 2010 by path 5 in which the incumbency of the left is central. AERP breakthrough elections in Lithuania, the state with the highest number of such breakthroughs in our sample, are distributed across both paths 2 and 3. However, arguably greater interest, is the *sequencing* of AERP breakthroughs in Lithuania: while the first case of AERP breakthrough in 2000 is driven by failure of the incumbent pro-market right to appeal to new or previously demobilised voters (paths 4), *subsequent* AERP breakthroughs in Lithuania (2004, 2008) have been driven by the limited electorate of moderate mainstream parties and the effects of corruption rising rapidly from a low(ish) base. A similar pattern seems evident in the relationship between the initial AERP breakthrough in Bulgaria in 2001 (covered by paths 3 and 4) and the subsequent breakthrough of GERB in 2009.

This suggests that a crisis of established parties triggered by an initial AERP breakthrough can then feed on itself by generating conditions for further AERP breakthroughs. These findings provide partial support for Deegan-Krause's (2007) suggestion that CEE party systems will increasingly see the rise and fall of successive new anti-establishment parties using the corruption issue to mobilize voters. However, at the same time they again qualify the supposition that there is a *general* model driving such new parties' successful emergence in CEE: AERPs do not break through electorally with roughly equal likelihood in all CEE electoral contexts, and, when they do breakthrough they do not do so for same reasons. Here our findings for different elections in the same highlight the possible importance of studying the *sequencing* of types of breakthrough. One possible interpretation of the development of Bulgarian and Lithuanian party systems, for example, is that an initial causal path leading to AERP breakthrough (path 3-4) based on the failure of market liberals in office may have opened up further different paths for subsequent AERPs (path 2 for Lithuania, path 5 for Bulgaria).

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