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THE PERSONAL MALADY OF AMOUR-PROPRE

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I, *Dilara Küçük*, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

ABSTRACT

The topic of this thesis is the phenomenon of inflamed amour-propre which is a desire to seek moral superiority or inferiority in the eyes of others. I ask the following research question: What is the main personal malady of inflamed amour-propre?

In the first chapter, I investigate the nature of amour-propre to understand the structure of inflamed amour-propre. I introduce the general characteristics of amour-propre and provide an account of amour-propre that explains these general characteristics in terms of three basic desires that constitute amour-propre.

In the second chapter, I investigate the moral psychology of amour-propre. I argue that the psychological basis of amour-propre is composed of two beliefs: self-perception and individual worth. Self-perception comes in the form of inflamed self-perception and egalitarian self-perception while individual worth comes in the form of self-worth and conditional worth. I argue that the psychological basis of inflamed amour-propre is the combination of inflamed self-perception and conditional worth.

In the third chapter, I investigate the personal malady of inflamed amour-propre within the context of my accounts of the nature of amour-propre and the psychological basis of amour-propre. I argue that the psychological basis of amour-propre and the components of amour-propre are such that they make demands that are unattainable due to the limitations of human nature. When the individual with inflamed amour-propre attempts to pursue these unattainable demands, she denies her own nature and drives herself to a state of inauthenticity which constitutes one of the main personal maladies of inflamed amour-propre.

I conclude this thesis with the following answer to my research question: One of the main personal maladies of inflamed amour-propre, which there is a need in the literature to address, is inauthenticity.

IMPACT STATEMENT

The focus of my thesis is the individual psychology of inequality. I investigate the psychological phenomenon of desiring superiority or inferiority in the eyes of others, a phenomenon that many people experience as they go through life.

The knowledge and analysis presented in my thesis can be put to a beneficial use both inside and outside academia. Inside academia, my research has three main impacts: (1) it contributes to the literature on Jean Jacques Rousseau by providing a novel account of a phenomenon that is a key topic of his work, (2) it contributes to the discipline of political philosophy by providing insight into why and how individuals might seek unequal treatment from others in social, political and economic contexts, and (3) it shows that social, political and economic environments are impacted by the psychological experiences of individuals, showing the need for interdisciplinary research into equality studies.

Outside academia, my research has four main impacts: (1) it provides useful information about the individual psychology of relational equality that can be used in the development of emotional intelligence and interpersonal skills classes in different levels of education, starting from preschool to higher education, (2) it introduces detailed insight about how the early stages of one's life impacts the development of self-worth, therefore presenting knowledge that can be used in the context of psychotherapy, (3) it shows that the nature of human psychology is such that external conditions such as political and social norms co-determine how people relate to one another and treat each other, therefore providing insight into the potential positive impact policy design can make on interpersonal relationships between individuals, and (4) it produces knowledge regarding the plasticity of human psychology in the face of changing external environments, indicating hope that legal reform and lawmaking can carry humanity forward, towards a more egalitarian society where people perceive themselves as equals in relation to others.

Overall, the practical intention of my research is to highlight the possibility of positive progress towards equality through reform in the fields of education, psychotherapy, public policy and law. My research shows that any positive change made in these fields has a significant impact on human psychology at the individual level, and therefore has the potential to change the way individuals think, act and live among others.

Both the academic and practical impacts of my research are likely to occur incrementally over many years. I believe the practical impacts of my research are likely to occur over a longer period of time than the academic impacts due to the slow nature of social change, however once it has occurred such social change is likely to be long-lasting.

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I dedicate this thesis to the life and work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

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THE PERSONAL MALADY OF AMOUR-PROPRE

The main argument of this thesis is that one of the main personal maladies of inflamed amour-propre, defined as the desire to seek superiority in the eyes of others, is inauthenticity.

The scope of this thesis is limited to the individual psychology of inflamed amour-propre. I focus exclusively on the personal malady of inflamed amour-propre. I investigate what happens within the personal experience of the individual when she has inflamed amour-propre, and how this personal experience constitutes inauthenticity.

The purpose of this research is to contribute to the literature by providing a novel account of the personal malady of inflamed amour-propre that explains the phenomenology of inflamed amour-propre in terms of inauthenticity.

While this research is inspired by the work of Rousseau, it is not my intention to suggest that the content of this research is Rousseau's view. Therefore, this thesis should not be regarded as an interpretation of Rousseau.

After explaining what I take to be Rousseau's view, I pick up a strand in Rousseau's comments and build on it. I use Rousseau's view as an inspiration for providing a novel account of how inflamed amour-propre makes your life go miserably on a personal level.

In Chapter 1, I introduce my account of amour-propre. The purpose of this chapter is to explain what amour-propre is.

In Section 1, I argue that the characteristics of amour-propre, which an account of the nature of amour-propre must explain, are the presupposition of self-perception, demand for external validation, action guidance and plasticity.

In Section 2, I provide an explanation of these characteristics of amour-propre in terms of three basic desires: amour de soi, the concern for evaluation and the concern for respect. I argue that the combination of these three desires constitute amour-propre.

In Section 3, I compare my account of the nature of amour-propre with Kolodny's account of the nature of amour-propre. I argue that my account provides a more comprehensive understanding of the nature of amour-propre.

In Chapter 2, I introduce the psychological basis of amour-propre. I argue that the psychological basis of amour-propre is composed of two beliefs: self-perception and individual worth. The purpose of this chapter is to explain the content of the psychological foundation that creates a suitable environment for the development of inflamed amour-propre.

In Section 1, I introduce self-perception as the first component of the psychological foundation of amour-propre. I argue that self-perception comes in two forms: inflamed self-perception and egalitarian self-perception.

In Section 2, I introduce individual worth as the second component of the psychological foundation of amour-propre. I argue that individual worth comes in two forms: self-worth and conditional worth.

In Section 3, I present the overall psychological framework of amour-propre. I explain the interaction between the two forms of self-perception and the two forms of individual worth. I argue that the psychological basis of egalitarian amour-propre is the combination of egalitarian self-perception and conditional-worth while the psychological basis of inflamed amour-propre is the combination of inflamed self-perception and conditional-worth.

In Chapter 3, I argue that one of the main personal maladies of inflamed amour-propre is inauthenticity.

In Section 1, I argue that there are particular limitations of human nature, namely time and epistemic access, which make the successful pursuit of inflamed amour-propre practically impossible.

In Section 2, I argue that attempting to pursue the goals of inflamed concern for evaluation and inflamed concern for respect is a denial of human nature.

In Section 3, I introduce an account of inauthenticity. I argue that pursuing inflamed amour-propre is a denial of human nature, and that this denial of human nature confines one to a state of inauthenticity.

Furthermore, I differentiate between alienation based accounts of inflamed amour-propre and my account of inflamed amour-propre, showing that my account makes a novel contribution to the literature by explaining the personal malady of inflamed amour-propre in terms of inauthenticity.

Lastly, I conclude that (1) inauthenticity is one of the main personal maladies of inflamed amour-propre according to the account of amour-propre I provide, and (2) inauthenticity is a distinct phenomenon that provides a novel explanation of the personal malady of amour-propre. Therefore, it is useful to investigate the individual phenomenology of inflamed amour-propre from the perspective of inauthenticity.

CHAPTER 1

THE NATURE OF AMOUR-PROPRE

The purpose of this chapter is to identify what an account of the nature of amour-propre needs to explain and provide an explanation. It aims to give a comprehensive answer to the question “What is amour-propre?”.

1. Amour-Propre

Amour-propre, in its generic or neutral form, is defined as the abstract desire that other members of the species value one as one values herself. It is a desire to be valued by others where what I want is others to value me in the same way as I think of myself as having value.¹

a. Characteristics of amour-propre

Amour-propre is not a desire to have a certain value or a belief that one has a certain value. The person who has amour-propre must already believe that she has a certain value. Instead, amour-propre is a desire that other people value her in accordance with the value she believes she has. It is a desire to be seen as valuable in accordance with one's belief about her own value. Therefore, amour-propre presupposes that she perceives herself as having a certain value.

i. Presupposition of Self-Perception

The first characteristic of amour-propre is its presupposition of self-perception. Since amour-propre is a desire that others value me as I value myself, in order to have amour-propre, I must value myself. I cannot have amour-propre unless I think of myself as having a certain value because I cannot desire others to value me as I value myself unless I think of myself as having a certain value.

In other words, amour-propre is a desire that others' match my perception of myself in their valuing of me: I think of myself as having a certain value, and I want others to match this value in their thinking of me. The value I think of myself as having can be high or low, but the fundamental desire of amour-propre is desiring others to match this value.

It is important to note that the individual does not determine her own value in the sense of conferring value to herself. She believes that she has a certain value, and this

¹ It's not important whether the person actually has this value. For amour-propre, what is important is that she believes that she has this value, and she wants others to recognize her as having this value - which constitutes her perceived value of herself.

value is determined by her in the sense that she forms this belief herself, independently of the opinions of others.

When I talk about the individual believing that she has a certain value, I am not talking about her making it the case that she has such value. Instead, she makes it the case that she believes that she has this value. Therefore, what the individual with amour-propre determines is their own belief about their value.

ii. Demand for External Validation

The second characteristic of amour-propre which an account of the nature of amour-propre must explain is its demand for external validation. Since amour-propre is a desire that others value me as I value myself, it contains a demand that others validate that I have the value I think of myself as having.²

The desire that constitutes amour-propre depends on the validation of others for its satisfaction. No matter what moral value one believes she has, for amour-propre to be satisfied, she must receive approval from others that she is regarded as having the value she believes she has.

iii. Action Guidance

The third characteristic of amour-propre is action guidance. The desire of amour-propre is not a passive but an active one. While amour-propre itself does not constitute or include action, it includes dispositions to act. In particular, the desire that constitutes amour-propre motivates one to practically orient oneself around it, therefore guiding one to act a particular way.

Amour-propre is action guiding in two ways: (1) it guides the dispositions of the person who has amour-propre, and (2) it guides the dispositions of others towards the person who has amour-propre. By guiding action, I do not mean including or constituting action but instead including dispositions to act.

² Neuhausser, 2014, 65.

Firstly, amour-propre guides the actions of those who have amour-propre in the following way: The person who has a desire that others value her as she values herself actively seeks that others value her in this way. She practically orients her actions around making sure that others value her in this way.

For example, she might ask people whether they value her, get into arguments with those who do not value her as she desires to be valued, actively make plans to spend time with those who do, try to convince others to value her in accordance with the value she believes she has through making them favours, inviting them to social occasions, engaging in charity work or other kinds of activities that are associated with creating the social reputation of a person who is valued by others, etc.

On this account, what a person with amour-propre is not going to do is sit at home passively, wishing that others value her in accordance with the value she believes she has. Instead, amour-propre guides one's dispositions to act towards things and people that may lead to the satisfaction of one's amour-propre.

Secondly, amour-propre guides the actions of those who interact with the person who has amour-propre in three ways: (1) they may value one as one values oneself, (2) they may not value one as one values oneself, and (3) they may opt out of engaging with the person's amour-propre.

The reason why amour-propre guides others' dispositions to act towards the person who has amour-propre is because "valuing", which is the demand of amour-propre, constitutes a cluster of different kinds of dispositions to act.

Unlike judgements of value, valuing has a practical orientation that includes dispositions to act in particular ways. When you have inflamed amour-propre, you don't only want others to have the judgement that you are valuable (the concern for

evaluation). You also want others to value you (the concern for respect).³ The nature of valuing is such that it guides one's dispositions to act.

As Sheffler argues, merely believing that something or someone is valuable is not the same as valuing that thing or person. While judging something or someone to be valuable does not necessarily include any disposition to act, valuing something or someone does.

For example, one may judge Hungarian poetry to be valuable but not value it. She might never engage with Hungarian poetry in her entire lifetime, and still hold the belief that it is valuable. However, the same is not true about valuing Hungarian poetry because this requires some kind of engagement with Hungarian poetry. Valuing includes some kind of real engagement with the object of value.

Consider the following passage by Sheffler:

“Valuing has deliberative significance: to value X involves seeing X as a source of reasons for action. One who values X is disposed to treat X-related considerations as constituting reasons for action in relevant contexts. For example, if I value my privacy, then I will be disposed in relevant contexts to treat considerations about the impact of proposed courses of action on my privacy as having deliberative relevance... Similarly, if I value my relationship with my brother, then I will be disposed in suitable contexts to treat considerations about the impact of proposed courses of action on the state of our relationship as having deliberative relevance. If I had no dispositions at all to do this, then it would not be correct to say that I valued the relationship.”⁴

The desire of *amour-propre*, which is a desire to be valued in a particular way, falls within the scope of valuing as well as believing to be valuable. A part of this desire

³ For the definition of the concern for evaluation see Chapter 1(2b). For the definition and explanation of the concern for evaluation, see Chapter 1(2c).

⁴ Sheffler, 2010, 27-28.

constitutes a desire to be valued, and therefore can be evaluated through the lens of Sheffler's account of valuing.

According to Sheffler, "valuing any X involves at least the following elements: (1) a belief that X is valuable, (2) a susceptibility to experience a range of context-dependent emotions regarding X, (3) a disposition to experience these emotions as being merited or appropriate, and (4) a disposition to treat certain kinds of X-related considerations as reasons for action in relevant deliberative contexts."⁵

When one values someone, then, she experiences a disposition to treat considerations related to that person as reasons for action, therefore being guided to act in particular ways as a result of valuing that person.

iv. Plasticity

The fourth characteristic of amour-propre which an account of the nature of amour-propre must explain is the plasticity of amour-propre. The nature of amour-propre is such that the particular form in which amour-propre is expressed depends on the social and political conditions in which one's amour-propre is developed.

Amour-propre is highly sensitive to external circumstances such as social, economic and political conditions that surround the individual. Since amour-propre is highly sensitive to such conditions, the psychology involved in the development and manifestation of amour-propre must be such that depending on what position one believes one has in society, one's beliefs contribute to the development of different forms of amour-propre.⁶

The basis of the argument that amour-propre is highly sensitive to external circumstances can be found in the Second Discourse where Rousseau presents

⁵ Sheffler, 2010, 29.

⁶ Kolodny, 2010, 176.

amour-propre as a desire that can have good or bad consequences depending on the social, political and economic conditions in which it is developed.

According to Rousseau, men in the longest lasting and happiest stage of human development already have expressions of amour-propre in their behaviour.⁷ However, there is not much outlet during this stage for their amour-propre to be inflamed due to the absence of sources of social, political or economic inequality such as private property, division of labour and socially assigned power.

As metallurgy, private property and division of labour develop, conceptions of social, economic and political power follow. As a result of these developments, generic amour-propre - the desire to have a certain value and to be evaluated by others as having this value - turns into inflamed amour-propre - the desire to have more or less value in comparison with others and to be regarded by others as morally superior or inferior.

The genealogy of inflamed amour-propre is important because it shows that amour-propre becomes inflamed not as a necessary condition of amour-propre but as a circumstantial result of amour-propre's nature as a desire that is highly sensitive to external conditions.

Amour-propre has plasticity so that in combination with certain comparative beliefs about one's position in society it produces inflamed amour-propre while in combination with other comparative beliefs about one's position in society, it has the ability to produce egalitarian amour-propre.⁸

The plasticity of amour-propre aligns with Rousseau's claim that justice is a possible state in society that can be achieved through the presence of suitable social,

⁷ Rousseau, 1984, 115.

⁸ Kolodny, 2010, 176.

political and economic conditions. The particular form in which amour-propre expresses itself is dependent on conditions that are, at least partially, created and maintained through collective consent and participation of the members of society.

Consequently, it is - at least theoretically - possible for particular kinds of human intervention, such as educational, institutional or legal changes, to shape the way in which individuals' amour-propre is expressed such that they seek to create and maintain conditions that are suitable for egalitarian amour-propre.⁹

As Kolodny explains, this claim - also called the thesis of possible goodness - suggests a possible human psychology such that in the presence of current social, political and economic conditions, amour-propre is expressed in the inflamed form of a concern to be evaluated by others as a moral superior or inferior while in the presence of other social, political and economic conditions it can be expressed in the egalitarian form of a concern to to be evaluated by others as an equal.¹⁰

b. Expressions of Amour-Propre

There are two different expressions of amour-propre which are explained by the plasticity of generic amour-propre. These expressions are inflamed amour-propre and egalitarian amour-propre. Inflamed amour-propre entails a concern to be considered a moral superior or inferior to others while egalitarian amour-propre entails a concern to be considered a moral equal.¹¹

i. Inflamed Amour-Propre

Inflamed amour-propre presupposes a kind of self-perception in which the individual perceives her moral value in the form of unequal relative value. It is defined as the desire that others value one as she values herself where she values herself more or less than she values others.

⁹ Neuhouser, 2014, 73.

¹⁰ Kolodny, 2010, 166.

¹¹ Kolodny, 2010, 169-70.

In the case of inflamed amour-propre, X believes that the particular moral value others should believe X has is either more or less than the particular moral value others believe they themselves have. Inflamed amour-propre, therefore, is defined as a desire to be evaluated by others as having more or less moral value in comparison with them.¹²

The moral aspect of the value one wishes to receive in the eyes of others is crucial. When one believes that she has a certain value, this perceived value is moral value.

For instance, desiring to be perceived as better at something compared to other people - for example dancing, coding or philosophy - does not fall within the territory of inflamed amour-propre. It is only when one believes she is morally superior or inferior to others because she is better at such activity that she falls within the territory of inflamed amour-propre.

Consider the following example: Maria believes she is a great dancer - a better one than everyone else. She is angry because her friends don't recognize that she is a better dancer than everyone else.

This in itself does not fall within the territory of amour-propre. It is only when Maria thinks of herself as morally superior to others because she is a better dancer than everyone else that she falls within the territory of inflamed amour-propre.

Inflamed amour-propre stems from one's perception of oneself as more or less morally valuable than others. It is based on one's understanding of one's moral worth as relatively more or less than that of others, which creates a desire to seek superiority or inferiority.

¹² Kolodny, 2010, 170.

The person who has inflamed amour-propre positions herself in a hierarchy of moral value and desires that others recognize this hierarchy of value. Where exactly she places herself in this hierarchy is not important to whether she has inflamed amour-propre or not. As long as she places herself in this hierarchy and desires that others recognize her place in this hierarchy, she has inflamed amour-propre.

For example, she may think that some particular group of people are morally inferior to her while another particular group of people are morally superior to her. Or she may think that she is a part of a group of people who are superior and among this group of people everyone has equal moral value while those outside this group have inferior value.

All of these examples are considered inflamed amour-propre because all variations of the thought that everyone doesn't have equal moral value followed by a desire that others recognize this unequal value are different variations of inflamed amour-propre.

As Cohen explains, however, *"inflamed amour-propre is not original to human nature and derives instead from the desire for relative advantage developed as a result of particular social arrangements. The roots of this desire lie in social inequality present in society."*¹³

The main significance of Cohen's argument for my research is its emphasis that although amour-propre has the potential to manifest itself in the form of inflamed amour-propre, this manifestation is not a fact necessitated by the laws of human nature.

Instead, it is a manifestation of amour-propre that results from a particular combination of basic desires and psychological conditions that are developed due to particular social arrangements. In the presence of alternative combinations of basic

¹³ Cohen, 2010, 115.

desires and psychological conditions, the same characteristics of amour-propre can manifest themselves in other, more egalitarian forms.

ii. Egalitarian Amour-Propre

Egalitarian amour-propre is defined as the desire that others value one as much as they value themselves. In the case of egalitarian amour-propre, X thinks of himself as having equal value as others, and desires that others regard X as not less or more valuable but as much valuable as they find themselves.

Egalitarian amour-propre presupposes a form of self-perception in which one's perception of his value is equal to his perception of the value of others. Egalitarian amour-propre stems from one's knowledge of her moral value, independent of others' evaluations of her moral value.¹⁴

The independent knowledge of one's true value involved in egalitarian amour-propre consists in one's belief that one is morally valuable regardless of others' evaluations of her moral value.

Egalitarian amour-propre shows that under suitable social and political conditions, it is possible for humans to express the features of amour-propre, which are currently manifested in the form of inflamed amour-propre, in ways that support moral equality. In particular, it emphasises that it's possible for humans to express their individual worth in the form of moral equality.

The two types of amour-propre explained here, then, are particular manifestations of generic amour-propre which is a desire that others recognize that one has a particular kind of moral value that is in alignment with the moral value she believes she has.

I have identified that the characteristics of amour-propre that an account of the nature of amour-propre needs to explain are presupposition of self-perception, demand

¹⁴ Kolodny, 2010, 192.

for external validation, action guidance and plasticity. Having done so, I move onto providing an explanation for these characteristics of amour-propre in the form of particular basic desires.

The overarching question I ask is: what are the basic desires that make up the principles of human psychology that explain why a desire to have a certain value in comparison with others becomes a desire to have more value in comparison with others under some external conditions and a desire to have equal value in comparison with others in other external conditions?

2. Basic Desires

I argue that (a) there are three basic desires: amour de soi, the concern for evaluation and the concern for respect, and (b) these basic desires, when combined, explain the four generic features of amour-propre - presupposition of self-perception, demand for external validation, action guidance and plasticity.

a. Amour de Soi

Amour de soi is a concern for one's self-preservation. It constitutes a desire to have all that is necessary for one's survival.¹⁵ For example, in the state of nature, amour de soi may express itself in a desire for food, water and shelter. In the state of society, however, amour de soi may extend to other necessities of life such as employment or money.

Amour de soi is different from amour-propre because the former is concerned with one's own wellbeing while the latter is concerned with one's moral value in the eyes of others. An individual who is guided by amour de soi is moved by the desire to preserve her wellbeing while an individual who is guided by amour-propre is moved by the desire to have a certain kind of moral value in the eyes of others.¹⁶

¹⁵ The desire one has to maintain her wellbeing is not necessarily a self-conscious desire but rather an extension of her unconscious urge to survive.

¹⁶ Neuhaus, 2014, 65.

I argue that amour de soi explains the plasticity of amour-propre. Amour de soi, when combined with the concern for evaluation and the concern for respect, constitute generic amour-propre which is characterised by its plasticity. According to my account, the plasticity of amour-propre can be explained by this plasticity of amour de soi, which is one of the three components that make up generic amour-propre.

The goods that amour de soi encourages one to seek are those that ensure one's continuous survival over time. Once humans start living together, amour de soi has the potential to develop into a more complex desire through the transformation of attitudes.

For example, if one's safety depends on others' acceptance of her into their tribe, then amour de soi might transform into a desire to receive acceptance from other members of the tribe in order to ensure one's safety. The attitudes that constitute amour de soi can change over time depending on what is needed to ensure one's survival.

On the one hand, the attitudes that constitute amour de soi are always limited to those that are aimed at survival - defined as the continuation of one's life. Amour de soi, therefore, is not expansive in its scope. For instance, it does not automatically include cases of inflamed amour-propre. It only includes attitudes that are aimed exclusively at preventing one's death.

On the other hand, the particular attitudes that are manifestations of one's amour de soi can change over time as one's requirements for survival change. The attitudes that constitute amour de soi, are susceptible to the conditions of one's external environment. The conditions of one's external environment determines what one needs to survive. Amour de soi seeks these things. What amour de soi seeks, then, is determined by one's external environment.

For example, one requires warm clothing or shelter for survival if the external environment is such that the weather is incredibly cold or weapons if the external environment is such that there is war. In this sense, the nature of amour de soi is such that amour de soi has an inflexible aim (survival - understood as staying alive) and a flexible approach to seeking this aim (desiring whatever it is that one requires to survive given the external environment).

Amour de soi is a basic desire that is only one component of amour-propre. By itself, amour de soi does not constitute or lead to amour-propre. It is only when it is combined with the concern for evaluation and the concern for respect that these three basic desires all together make up amour-propre.

The plasticity of amour de soi is not the plasticity of amour-propre. Instead, as one component of generic amour-propre, amour de soi brings its plasticity into the combination of basic desires that all together make up amour-propre.

One's amour de soi expresses itself in a desire for non-relative goods.¹⁷ For example, if amour de soi expresses itself in a desire for food, amour de soi will incline one to obtain this non-relative good. Since amour de soi is not relative or comparative, whether other people have food or not will be irrelevant to one's inclination to seek food.

Although generic amour de soi is expressed as a non-comparative interest in one's self-preservation in the state of nature, its variations can also be expressed as the desire to seek relative advantage in the presence of unjust social and political circumstances.

¹⁷ Neuhaus, 2014, 65.

While amour de soi itself is an inherent part of human nature, its extended expression in society is not necessitated by human nature but rather determined by how one regards oneself in comparison to others.¹⁸

According to Kolodny, there are two variations of amour de soi in the state of society: prereflective amour de soi and reflective amour de soi. Prereflective amour de soi is a desire that is guided by instinct to have things that are truly necessary for one's wellbeing.

For instance, one's prereflective amour de soi might include a desire to have food, shelter and safety.¹⁹ Prereflective amour de soi can only include things that one believes is truly good for one's wellbeing. It is important to note that the goods in question do not have to be actually good for one's wellbeing. It is sufficient for one to believe that they are good for her wellbeing.

For example, if one is hungry and has a desire to eat some mushrooms in the forest because she believes that these are good for her nutrition, then this desire to eat these mushrooms falls within the boundaries of prereflective amour de soi - even if these mushrooms are poisonous and therefore bad for her wellbeing.

The belief that something is good for one's wellbeing, however, must originate from the individual's own desire to survive as opposed to being regarded as good for one's wellbeing by others.

For example, if one eats kale everyday because others think that eating kale everyday means one is a healthy individual, and she wants others to believe that she is a healthy individual, then the activity of her eating kale does not fall within the

¹⁸ Cohen, 2010, 105.

¹⁹ "Include" in this context means to be the object of prereflective amour de soi.

boundaries of prereflective amour de soi because it is not motivated exclusively by her desire to stay alive.

Reflective amour de soi, on the other hand, is a conscious desire to preserve one's wellbeing. It leads one to reflect on what promotes one's wellbeing. Consider the following example to understand the difference between prereflective and reflective amour de soi: A hungry person - without reflection- develops a desire for food. Similarly, a cold person -without reflection - develops a desire for warmth. These can be considered unconscious desires that one's nature necessitates for the purpose of survival. These desires are examples of prereflective amour de soi.

Reflective amour de soi, on the other hand, produces reflective desires. For example, upon reflection, one may realise that working out or showering promotes one's wellbeing. Consequently, one's amour de soi may extend to include a desire to work out or shower.

It is important to note that at this stage, reflective amour de soi is not comparative. Therefore, it only includes desires that are produced by one's concern to fare well in nature.²⁰

However, through the development of an additional basic desire, namely the concern for evaluation, one's original desire to fare well in nature extends beyond the mere necessities of physical life to include a relative desire to fare well in the eyes of others.

Although amour de soi explains the plasticity of amour-propre, it does not give us a complete picture of what an account of the nature of amour-propre needs to explain.

²⁰ Kolodny, 2010, 173-74.

As I explained in 1(a), the four characteristics of amour-propre are the presupposition of self-perception, the demand for external validation, action guidance and plasticity. Amour de soi only explains the plasticity of amour-propre, leaving us the burden of explaining the demand for the presupposition of self-perception, external validation, and action guidance.

Amour-propre presupposes that one has a perception of oneself as a person. One does not need to have a perception of oneself to have a desire to survive (amour de soi). For instance, we do not generally think of bacteria as having a perception of themselves as bacteria.

However, we do know that bacteria try very hard to survive, that is, they seek their continuous survival. It does not follow from (a) bacteria seek their survival, that (b) bacteria have self-perception. It is in this sense that amour de soi, defined as a desire to seek one's survival, does not explain why amour-propre would presuppose that one perceives oneself as a person.

Amour de soi does not explain the demand for external validation. One may desire to survive and it does not necessarily follow from this desire that one also desires the validation of others.

In its basic form, one can satisfy her amour de soi by having shelter, food, and water. The desire for external validation arises only when the transformation of amour de soi into reflective amour de soi is combined with particular social circumstances that make external validation advantageous for the individual.

Finally, amour de soi fails to explain action guidance. This might sound tricky at first: isn't a desire to survive one of the most action guiding desires one can have? There are thousands of examples of people overcoming enormous obstacles to survive, showing that the desire to survive can guide one's dispositions to act.

It is true that amour de soi is action guiding, but not in the sense that amour-propre is action guiding. Amour de soi, in its generic form, guides action if and only if the action in question is absolutely required for one's survival. Amour-propre, on the other hand, always guides one's dispositions to act - without reference to whether the actions in question are necessary for one's survival.

Amour de soi is instrumentally action guiding, that is, the action guidance involved is a means to the end of survival. Amour-propre is inherently action guiding, that is, the action guidance involved is not a means to anything but a characteristic of the nature of amour-propre itself.

b. The Concern for Evaluation

Reflective amour de soi itself does not involve a desire for or an awareness of others' evaluations of one as it only involves one's own reflections of what promotes her own wellbeing.²¹ However, reflective amour de soi leads to the development of a concern for evaluation, defined as a desire to be morally valuable in the eyes of others.

The desire to survive develops into a desire that others believe that you are morally valuable. How does this happen? As one reflects on what promotes her wellbeing in the state of society, she acquires the awareness that her wellbeing is partially related to the relationships she has with others which are inevitably impacted by how others evaluate her.

When she realises that she is being evaluated by others, and that these evaluations may potentially impact her wellbeing, this awareness leads to the discovery of an interpersonal dimension in which things do not only fare better or worse in nature but also in society.²²

²¹ Kolodny, 2010, 173-74.

²² Kolodny, 2010, 173-74.

As she reflects on her wellbeing, she gains a conception of what promotes her wellbeing relative to that of others.²³ Consequently, her desire, guided by reflective amour de soi, for faring well in nature extends to the interpersonal dimension of faring well in the eyes of others.

The result is that the individual has a desire for survival (generic amour de soi) and a desire for faring well in the eyes of others (reflective amour de soi). As she enters social relationships, she realises that faring well in the eyes of others does not sufficiently serve the aim of continuing her survival.

She realises that if others believe that she fares well, this means that others believe that her wellbeing is high. However, just because others believe that her wellbeing is high does not mean that they value her. They might judge her as someone who is doing well in life but is nevertheless morally worthless as a person.

Others might believe that one is faring well but is unworthy of moral value, which would then impact how and whether one is accepted by others, potentially risking one's survival by increasing the chances of exclusion and isolation. It is at this stage that one realises that one does not only need to fare well in the eyes of others but also needs to be considered worthy in the eyes of others. This gives birth to the concern for evaluation.

It is important to note that the concern for faring well in the eyes of others is not the same as the concern for evaluation. The concern for faring well in the eyes of others is a desire that others believe that one is doing well while the concern for evaluation is a desire that others believe that one has a certain moral value.

²³ Kolodny, 2010, 173.

The goods that the concern for evaluation seeks include not only things that are in fact good for one but also things that one believes will make her more morally valuable in the eyes of others.

It is crucial to note that the concern for evaluation is not a means to faring well in nature. When I say that the concern to fare well in nature extends to include a concern for being morally valuable in the eyes of others, I do not mean that the concern for being morally valuable in the eyes of others is merely an instrumental concern that serves the end of faring well in nature.

The concern for being morally valuable in the eyes of others is a distinct concern in itself that originates from our interpersonal relationships with others. As we interact with others in society, a fundamental part of our existence as social beings depends on how others evaluate us.²⁴

The interpersonal dimension of our self-consciousness, which is developed as a result of one's awareness of others' awareness of her, leads to the creation of a new concern called the concern for evaluation, one that is separate from but is connected to the concern for faring well in nature.

On the one hand, the concern for evaluation is separate from the concern for faring well in nature because the satisfaction of one's concern for evaluation does not necessarily lead to the satisfaction of one's concern for faring well in nature.

Consider the example of the Egyptian King Tutankhamun: King Tut was regarded very highly by others. He had loving family members, friends and servants. Others evaluated him as a person who had lots of power, one that deserves respect from others. Let's assume that King Tut's concern for evaluation was satisfied and everyone believed that he was morally valuable.

²⁴ Kolodny, 2010, 174.

While his concern for being considered morally valuable in the eyes of others might have been satisfied, his concern to fare well in nature surely was not. He was born with various severe impairments that disrupted his daily life. He had an extremely weak immune system which led him to suffer from many diseases. He lived a painful and short life. Although his desire for being morally valuable in the eyes of others, which is the concern for evaluation, was satisfied, his desire for faring well in nature, which originates from generic amour de soi, nevertheless was not.

The good that the concern for evaluation seeks is relative because what is being sought is an external condition, namely that others believe that one is morally valuable. Therefore, the nature of the concern for evaluation is such that satisfying one's concern for evaluation demands the external validation of others.

The concern for evaluation, then, explains the demand for external validation and the presupposition of self-perception that characterise generic amour-propre.

Because the concern for evaluation is completely dependent on the evaluations of others - that is, dependent on others' belief about one's moral worth - the concern for evaluation necessarily demands external validation.

Similarly, because the concern for evaluation is a desire that others evaluate one as morally valuable, it presupposes that one perceives oneself as a person who can be evaluated as morally valuable by others. Therefore, as one constituent of amour-propre, the concern for evaluation explains the demand for external validation as well as the presupposition of self-perception that characterise amour-propre.

The concern for evaluation, in its generic form, is a desire that others believe that one is morally valuable but not a desire that others believe that one is morally valuable in comparison to others.

On the other hand, the concern for evaluation is connected to the concern for faring well in nature because in the state of society whether others believe that one is morally valuable or not often impacts how one fares in nature. For example, if others believe that one is morally valuable, one may be invited to more social events, and therefore have more opportunities to network with others.

As a result, one may have an easier time finding a job or getting a promotion, therefore having an easier time affording food and shelter. Consequently, being morally valuable in the eyes of others can, but does not necessarily have to, impact how one fares in nature.

As I argue, amour de soi explains the plasticity of amour-propre while the concern for evaluation explains the presupposition of self-perception and the demand for external validation. The final characteristic that an account of the nature of amour-propre explains, then, is action guidance.²⁵

One might object that the concern for evaluation explains action guidance because when one desires that others evaluate her as morally valuable, one might shape her actions according to what she believes would make others evaluate her as morally valuable.

I argue that this is not the case: although the concern for evaluation might sometimes encourage the development of certain dispositions to act, it is not necessarily action guiding. It is possible for the concern for evaluation to remain a passive desire, one that an individual has but does not act on.

²⁵ Note that amour-propre aims both at judgement of value (which is explained by the concern for evaluation), and valuing (which is explained by the concern for respect).

The target of the concern for evaluation is judgements of value. The concern for evaluation is a desire that others judge one as valuable. Judgements of value, as explained earlier, are quite different from valuing. The former constitutes a passive belief that one is valuable that does not necessarily involve action while the latter constitutes an action and requires practical orientation.

The concern for evaluation can be non-action guiding in two ways: Firstly, it can be non-action guiding from the perspective of the individual because it does not necessarily guide the dispositions of the person who has it to act. One can desire that others evaluate her as morally valuable and do absolutely nothing to ensure that they actually do evaluate her in this way.

Secondly, it can be non-action guiding from the perspective of others because it does not necessarily guide others' dispositions to act toward the individual who has it. Evaluating someone in a certain way, for example as morally valuable, does not necessarily involve any dispositions to act. One might evaluate another person as morally valuable, and do absolutely nothing about this evaluation. The concern for evaluation, therefore, does not explain the action guidance of amour-propre.

c. The Concern for Respect

In addition to the concern for evaluation, I argue that the reflective form of amour de soi leads to a further concern, the concern for respect. The concern for respect is defined as a desire to be respected as a person. While the concern for evaluation seeks judgments of one's value, the concern for respect seeks being valued. What does it mean for one to be respected as a person in this sense?

The term respect as applied to the concern for respect refers to a particular kind of respect, namely recognition respect. According to Darwall, "*to have recognition respect for something is to regard that fact as itself placing restrictions on what it is permissible for one to do.*"²⁶

²⁶ Darwall, 1977, 40.

As Darwall explains, *“the object of recognition respect is a fact. Recognition respect for that fact consists in giving it the proper weight in deliberation. Thus to have recognition respect for persons is to give proper weight to the fact that they are persons.”*²⁷

According to this understanding of recognition respect, to respect someone is to appropriately weigh the fact that they are a person in the way we interact with them.²⁸ The object of recognition respect is a fact, which in this case is the fact that someone is a person.²⁹

The concern for respect explains the presupposition of self-perception that characterises amour-propre. In order to have a concern for respect, which is a desire that others respect one as a person, one must have a perception of oneself as a person.

Not only that self-perception is a necessary component of the concern for respect but it is one of the catalysts of it. When one has (a) a perception of themselves as a person, combined with (b) a desire that the external reality in the world matches one’s internal reality that one is a person, this gives rise to the concern for respect - the desire that others recognize one as a person.

The concern for respect adds a practical orientation to the demands that rise out of amour-propre. The fact that someone is a person comes with particular considerations that we must take seriously when deciding what to do and not to do in our interactions with them. Recognition respect as applied to persons requires

²⁷ Darwall, 1977, 39.

²⁸ Darwall, 1977, 38.

²⁹ Darwall, 1977, 39.

appropriately recognizing the fact that they are persons in our considerations about how to act in relation to them.³⁰

The notion of recognition respect that I endorse in the concern for respect is a moral attitude. According to Darwall, a fact is an appropriate object of the moral attitude of recognition respect if inappropriate weighing of that fact would constitute behaviour that is morally wrong.³¹ For example, the fact that someone is a person is an object of recognition respect of this kind because the inappropriate weighing of this fact would result in morally wrong behaviour.

The concern for respect, in its generic form, is a desire that others recognize the fact that one is a person, and consider this fact in deliberations about how to act in relation to her. It is a desire that others regard one as a person, and restrict their actions in relation to them to those that are morally acceptable because of the fact that one is a person.³²

The concern for respect, in its generic form, is not a desire that others give one credit for something in particular. For example, it is not a desire that others credit one for her physical appearance, material possessions, personal skills or abilities. In other words, it is not a desire to receive judgements of value of any kind that are related to the skills, traits and abilities of a person. Instead, it is a desire to be valued as a person.

The desire for respect is a desire that (a) others recognize a particular fact about one, namely that she is a person, (b) take this fact seriously in their considerations of how to act, and (c) put moral constraints on their actions in relation to her by limiting them to those that are considered morally right.³³

³⁰ Darwall, 1977, 40.

³¹ Darwall, 1977, 40.

³² Darwall, 1977, 40.

³³ Darwall, 1977, 46.

Since I understand the concern for respect to mean a desire for recognition respect, and since a desire for recognition respect constitutes not only (a) but also (b) and (c), the concern for respect is action guiding, that is, it aims to guide one's dispositions to act and others' dispositions to act based on the fact that one is a person with moral value.

When one engages with another who has a concern for respect, whether this another is actually another person or herself, she has two choices: (a) to respect, and (2) to not respect. The former involves recognizing that the other is a person with moral worth and practically orienting oneself around this recognition. The latter involves disregarding that the other is a person with moral worth, therefore refraining from placing moral constraints on one's actions.

In its generic form, the concern for respect - understood as a desire for recognition respect - is applied in two different ways. Firstly, it is applied to the self by the self. I call this self recognition respect. Self recognition respect is your acknowledgement of your own moral value. The concern for respect as applied to self recognition respect is my desire that I recognize the fact that I am a person, and I consider this fact in deciding how to treat myself.

Secondly, the concern for respect is applied to the self by others. I call this mutual recognition respect. Mutual recognition respect is others' acknowledgement of your own moral value. The concern for respect as applied to mutual recognition respect is my desire that others recognize the fact that I am a person, and consider this fact in deciding how to treat me.

To summarise, the concern for respect - which is a desire for recognition respect - demands that two different applications of recognition respect are satisfied. The first application of recognition respect that needs to be satisfied is the application of

recognition respect to the self by the self (self recognition respect). The second application of recognition respect that needs to be satisfied as part of the concern for respect is the application of recognition respect to the self by others (mutual recognition respect).

Self recognition respect constitutes one's sense of her own moral value as well as her confidence in her capacity to maintain this value.³⁴ It is one's own recognition of her moral worthiness, and her ability to preserve this worthiness.

In this sense, to respect oneself is to acknowledge one's moral worth as a worthy individual among other individuals and to take one's moral value into consideration in her deliberations on how to treat herself.

Therefore, self recognition respect does not only include a recognition of the fact that one is morally worthy but also a commitment to practically orient one's actions around living in a way that one believes is in accordance with the standards of her moral worth as a worthy being.³⁵

Living in accordance with the standards of one's moral worth requires that one (a) considers what moral constraints are placed on her by the fact that she is a person, and (b) practically orients her behaviour and actions according to the result of this consideration.

The concern for respect, then, is not only action guiding as applied to the self by others but also action guiding as applied to the self by the self. Self recognition respect, like mutual recognition respect, guides dispositions to act by requiring one to practically orient herself.

³⁴ Massey, 1983, 250.

³⁵ Massey, 1983, 249.

In the case of self-recognition respect, the practical orientation required is toward oneself, that is, one is required to practically orient herself in accordance with the recognition of the fact that she is a person with moral value, and therefore she must place moral constraints on her behaviour towards herself.

According to Darwall, when we appeal to the phrases “do you not have any self-respect” or “have some self-respect”, self recognition respect is the kind of respect that we are referring to in order to help one guide her actions and behaviour in accordance with the fact that she is a person.³⁶

In the following passage, Darwall provides some examples of the absence of self recognition respect that might help us understand what kind of respect this constitutes:

“One’s behaviour can express a lack of recognition self-respect in different ways. It may have a negative effect on one’s ability to continue to function as a person. Such behaviour is self-destructive, and therefore manifests a lack of appropriate regard for oneself as a person. If not actually self-destructive, behaviour may be degrading in expressing a conception of oneself as something less than a person, a being with a certain moral status or dignity. Submitting to indignities, playing the fool, not caring about whether one is taken seriously and being content to be treated as the plaything of others may or may not be self-destructive but nevertheless manifests lack of self-respect.”³⁷

Having self recognition respect, then, requires that one acknowledges her moral worth as a person and acts according to the moral constraints put on her behaviour towards herself as a result of the fact that she is a person.

³⁶ Darwall, 1977, 47-48.

³⁷ Darwall, 1977, 47-48.

One does not have a concern for self-respect in the state of nature because she is not aware of her existence as a moral agent and others are not aware of her existence as a moral agent.

Since recognition respect one has for oneself involves an understanding of one's moral worth, and recognition respect others' might have for one involves the existence of social interactions with others, the concern for respect is not a part of one's basic desires in the state of nature where relational concepts such as moral worth do not exist.³⁸

However, as individuals start to live together and develop relationships with each other, they develop a conception of themselves as moral agents as well as a conception of others as moral agents. This leads to the gradual emergence of moral worth.

As individuals develop an understanding of their moral worth, their reflective amour de soi gradually produces in them a desire for recognizing their own moral worth. Consequently, they develop a concern for self recognition respect.

Although self recognition respect is developed within the individual, it is highly impacted by external factors including how one is recognized and treated by others. It is in this context that the concern for self recognition respect is related to the concern for mutual recognition respect.

Mutual recognition-respect is defined as a desire for external recognition of one's moral value. It is my desire that others recognize the fact that I am a person with moral worth, and that they consider this fact in deciding how to treat me.

³⁸ Bird, 2004, 226.

Unlike self recognition respect, the source of mutual recognition-respect is other people. When the individual develops an understanding of her moral value, she does not only develop a concern for recognizing her own moral value but also a desire for others to recognize her moral value. This desire is a concern for mutual recognition respect which seeks that others recognize one's own moral value and act accordingly.³⁹

Mutual recognition-respect is not a part but a result of reflective amour de soi. As one reflects on what promotes her moral value, she realises that others' recognition of her moral value in society promotes her moral value by encouraging others to treat her in accordance with her moral value. At this stage, mutual recognition respect does not involve a desire for receiving better or more recognition than others.

As Neuhouser explains,

"The demand to be respected as a person expresses a desire to be treated in accordance with standards of dignity or civility that apply equally to all persons, rather than to be esteemed as someone who stands out in some way as better than others."⁴⁰

In its generic form, the concern for respect is a desire for (a) one's own recognition of one's moral value and one's acting in accordance with this recognition, and (b) others' recognition of one's own moral value and others' acting in accordance with this recognition.

At this stage of concern for respect, the moral value which one wants oneself and others to recognize and act in accordance with is the moral value of a human being who deserves to be treated according to the standards of dignity.

³⁹ Bird, 2004, 221.

⁴⁰ Neuhouser, 2014, 68.

Concern for respect, as explained, is only one component of amour-propre. When amour de soi, the concern for evaluation and the concern for respect are combined, they make up generic amour-propre. The three components of generic amour-propre explain the four general characteristics of amour-propre.

Amour de soi explains that amour-propre has high plasticity because one of the components that constitute it is highly susceptible to external influences. The concern for evaluation explains that amour-propre presupposes self-perception because one must perceive oneself in order to desire that others also perceive her, and that amour-propre demands external evaluation because satisfying one of the components that constitute it requires the external evaluation of others. The concern for respect explains that amour-propre is action guiding because one of the components that constitute it requires practical orientation.

Amour de soi, the concern for evaluation and the concern for respect together provide an explanation for what an account of the nature of amour-propre needs to explain. In particular, these three components of amour-propre provide an explanation for the four characteristics of amour-propre explained earlier in this chapter.

3. Comparison of Accounts: Kolodny vs Küçük

There are two main differences between my account of the nature of amour-propre and that of Kolodny. Firstly, Kolodny argues that the content of the desire of amour-propre is twofold while I argue that it is not.

According to Kolodny's account, amour-propre is a desire with two components: First, amour-propre contains a desire to have a certain value, equivalent to the value the individual believes she has, in comparison with other members of society. The individual considers herself to have this value in comparison with others, regardless of others' acceptance of it.⁴¹

⁴¹ Kolodny, 2010, 169.

Second, amour-propre contains a desire to be regarded by others as having the value one believes she has in comparison with others.⁴² Therefore, according to Kolodny, amour-propre is (a) a desire to have a certain value, and (b) a desire that others recognize this value.

I, on the other hand, argue that amour-propre is only one desire which is the desire that other people value one in accordance with the value she believes she has. On my account, the person who has amour-propre must already have a conception of her value - that is, she must already believe that she has a certain value - prior to developing amour-propre. The belief that one has value is not a component of amour-propre itself. Instead, it is a prerequisite of amour-propre.

I argue that the desire to have a certain value is not a part of amour-propre because when we ask the question “what is amour-propre?”, it is not an accurate answer to respond that it is a desire to have a certain moral value. We can think about many examples of someone having a desire to have a certain moral value, and yet not have any signs of amour-propre.

Amour-propre is a relational phenomenon. It only exists in relation to other people. A desire to have a certain moral value, on the other hand, does not necessarily need to be relational. For instance, one may desire to have a certain value in the sense of feeling valuable as a person in his own eyes - independently of what others might or might not think about her as well as independently of whether or not others think about her at all.

The nature of amour-propre is widely different from the nature of a desire to have a certain value. While a desire to have a certain value might or might not have to depend on others in its development, maintenance and constituents, amour-propre depends on others in its development, maintenance and constituents.

⁴² Kolodny, 2010, 169.

If the nature of amour-propre is such that the desire that defines it seeks value in the eyes of others, then the person who has such a desire must already, prior to developing this desire, needs to have a belief that she has a certain value because without such a belief about her value, it seems impossible for her to desire that others recognize her value.

Defining amour-propre as one desire (to have value in the eyes of others in accordance with the value one believes she has) allows us to address the relational nature of the development, maintenance and constitution of amour-propre. My account is based on such a definition.

Secondly, Kolodny does not mention respect in his account of what an account of the nature of amour-propre has to explain. I argue that we must include the concern for respect in our explanation of the generic features of amour-propre because the concern for respect provides an explanation for action guidance, one of the four generic features of amour-propre.

Without an account of the concern for respect, it is unclear why amour-propre guides one's dispositions to act. None of the basic desires and beliefs that Kolodny provides explain why a desire to seek value in the eyes of others in accordance with the value one believes she has would be an inherently action guiding desire.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I introduced three main arguments. Firstly, I argued that an account of the nature of amour-propre needs to explain four general characteristics of amour-propre: presupposition of self-perception, demand for external validation, action guidance and plasticity.

Secondly, I argued that these general characteristics can be explained in the form of three basic desires: amour de soi, the concern for evaluation and the concern

for respect. I concluded that these basic desires, when combined, constitute amour propre.

Thirdly, I contrasted Kolodny's account of the explanation of the nature of amour-propre with my account. I argued that my account provides a more comprehensive understanding of amour-propre by providing an advantageous definition of amour-propre and addressing the concern for respect.

Having provided an account of the nature of amour-propre as well as an explanation of that account, I move onto the psychological foundation of amour-propre in order to explain the individual phenomenology of amour-propre. I ask the following question: what is the psychological experience of the individual who has amour-propre?

CHAPTER 2

THE MORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF AMOUR-PROPRE

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an account of the psychological foundation of amour-propre at the individual level.⁴³

In Section 1, I introduce self-perception as the first component of the psychological foundation of amour-propre. In Section 2, I introduce individual worth as the second component of the psychological foundation of amour-propre. In Section 3, I provide an overall framework of the psychological foundation of amour-propre.

1. Self-Perception

The purpose of this section is to explain what I take to be the structure of egalitarian and inflamed beliefs about the self in relation to others. I define self-perception as one's beliefs about herself in relation to others. Self-perception,

⁴³ Not foundational in the sense that these psychological states constitute amour-propre but foundational in the sense that one couldn't have amour-propre without experiencing these psychological states.

according to this definition, is relational. I cannot perceive myself in the inflamed or egalitarian sense if there are no other individuals for me to relate to. Furthermore, it

a. Inflamed Self-Perception

I define inflamed self-perception as an overall evaluation of oneself in terms of one's own moral value in relation to others that involves superiority or inferiority.⁴⁴ Inflamed self-perception is the belief that we aren't necessarily of equal moral value and that there may be differences in moral value between individuals.

The mere belief that there are differences in moral value is enough for one to have inflamed self-perception. For example, if one believes that there is one person who is superior to her, this is enough for her to have inflamed self-perception.

Inflamed self-perception also includes the belief that although everyone is of equal moral value now, people could fail to be of equal moral value in the future. For example, one could believe that there is a particular crime that, if committed, would make one lose her moral value and therefore become morally inferior to everyone else.

Even if this crime has not been committed by anyone in human history, this belief would still endorse the view that it's possible for people to be of inferior moral value. Therefore, it would fall within the scope of inflamed self-perception.

It is important to note that inflamed self-perception is a belief that is distinct from the desire that is inflamed amour-propre. It does not constitute amour-propre. Instead, it is one component of the psychological foundation of amour-propre.

Inflamed self-perception is the belief that one may have less or more moral value than others. This belief, by itself, does not result in inflamed amour-propre. It is only

⁴⁴ Note that in Kolodny's view this belief about one's moral worth is a part of inflamed amour-propre itself while in my view it is one of the psychological foundations of inflamed amour-propre but not a part of inflamed amour-propre itself.

one particular form of one belief (the inflated form of self-perception), among two beliefs (self-perception and self-worth), which together constitute the psychological foundation of amour-propre.

It is only when the psychological foundation of a particular form of self-perception and self-worth is combined with particular manifestations of three basic desires (amour de soi, the concern for evaluation and the concern for respect) that we get inflated amour-propre.

One might develop inflated amour-propre in the presence of inflated self-perception only if (a) her inflated self-perception is combined with other psychological states such as conditional worth, and (b) the three components of amour-propre - amour de soi, the concern for evaluation and the concern for respect - are present. Inflated self-perception by itself does not indicate that one has inflated amour-propre.

Inflated self-perception is believing that you are of superior or inferior moral value. Inflated self-perception, therefore, is the belief that there are differences in moral value between individuals, and that your own moral value is superior or inferior to others in accordance with this difference in moral value between individuals.

The individual with inflated self-perception has the belief that she is morally superior or inferior not as applied to a particular activity, for instance swimming, or a particular aspect of life, for instance financial success but as applied to the entirety of herself.

An inflated self-perception, therefore, should not be confused with a specific self-evaluation as applied to a particular aspect of life. For example, if someone completing a triathlon perceives themselves as better than five of their competitors in

the swimming category, it does not follow from this that they have an inflamed self-perception of themselves in relation to others.

Moral superiority and inferiority involved in inflamed self-perception, then, only applies to things that the individual with inflamed self-perception believes correspond to moral value. As explained later, the things in question that the individual believes correspond to moral value are called conditions of worth.⁴⁵

Inflamed self-perception involves a constant desire to seek positive external validation from others. Therefore, inflamed self-perception is dependent on the opinion of others.

Inflamed self-perception leaves the individual with a constant craving for the validation of others. Firstly, she has a desire to constantly seek others' opinions of her. Secondly, she demands that others' opinions of her are in alignment with the superior or inferior moral value she believes she has. In this sense, she requires the approval of others in order to uphold her own perception of herself.

b. Egalitarian Self-Perception

I define egalitarian self-perception as the belief that we are necessarily of equal moral worth. The individual with an egalitarian self-perception views themselves as necessarily equally morally valuable as others.

One may ask whether it is possible for a person to have an egalitarian self-perception and think that everyone is equally worthless. The answer to this question is yes. A person with egalitarian self-perception can believe that everyone has equal moral worth which is none.

It is possible for one to have egalitarian self-perception and believe that everyone is equally worthless because egalitarian self-perception doesn't contain a

⁴⁵ See Chapter 2(2b.i).

positive evaluation of your moral value. It only contains an evaluation of your moral value that is equal to that of others.

It is important to note that egalitarian self-perception is a distinct belief that does not constitute egalitarian amour-propre. While egalitarian self-perception is a belief that everyone has equal moral worth, egalitarian amour-propre is a desire that others recognize the value one believes she has which is equal to the value of others.

While inflated self-perception feeds off the opinions of others, egalitarian self-perception feeds off one's own evaluative knowledge. As Kolodny explains, the individual with an egalitarian self-perception uses their evaluative knowledge to understand their position in relation to others.⁴⁶

According to Kolodny, evaluative knowledge is *“the true, settled belief, justified by one's own reflection, that the scale of value appropriate to one's nature is the scale of natural value, which consists in one's standing as a human being, which is based on the possession of reason and freedom, and which in turn is the basis of moral value, and natural virtues, abilities that have value independent of convention and consent, such as strength, courage, wisdom, as well as more familiar moral virtues, such as generosity.”*⁴⁷

Evaluative knowledge does not necessarily exclude the opinions of others. It integrates them but is not entirely dependent on them. The individual with an egalitarian self-perception whose view of themselves depends on evaluative knowledge takes others' opinions of her under consideration. She approaches such opinions with curiosity and remains open to the possibility that they may be right or wrong.

⁴⁶ Kolodny, 2010, 193.

⁴⁷ Kolodny, 2010, 193.

She critically evaluates others' opinions of her and comes to her own conclusion about whether they represent the truth about herself. In *Emile*, Rousseau writes "*Emile is to learn to value things according to their real worth, rather than according to the imaginary worth assigned to them by others' prejudices*"⁴⁸.

Building on Rousseau's notion of learning to value things according to their real worth, it seems to me that depending on evaluative knowledge in one's perception of oneself makes it possible for one to approach things in the external world - such as the opinions of others - with an independence of mind.

On the one hand, it allows one to think critically about external insight (what others think of her), in the face of her internal insight, (what she thinks of herself). On the other hand, it allows her to remain open to the possibility that she might not know everything about herself, and that others might be right in their positive or negative evaluations of her.

2. Individual Worth

In this section, I argue that there are two kinds of beliefs that an individual can have about her own moral value as a human being: self-worth and conditional-worth. The former is the belief that one has unconditional moral value while the latter is the belief that one has conditional moral value.

The main difference between self-perception and individual worth is as follows: The belief about one's moral value (whether one believes it is equal to others or not) is a matter of whether one has egalitarian self-perception or inflated self-perception, and is therefore the concern of self-perception.

The belief about how this moral value is obtained and maintained (whether obtaining and maintaining it requires meeting conditions or not) is a matter of whether

⁴⁸ Kolodny, 2010, 181.

one has self-worth or conditional worth, and is therefore the concern of individual worth.

Consequently, the belief about one's moral value (self-perception) is separate from the belief about whether one needs to do anything to obtain and maintain this moral value (individual worth).

a. Self-Worth

I define self-worth as the moral value one believes she unconditionally has. Self-worth is internal. It is the worth I attach myself from within, independent of the worth others attach me from without.

Self-worth is something you believe you have independently of what others think about you or what you do with your life. According to this definition of self-worth, you do not have to prove yourself to others or accomplish anything in particular to have or maintain the moral value you believe you have. Therefore, self-worth does not give rise to a need to seek approval from others.

First, I focus on how egalitarian self-perception interacts with self-worth. Unlike egalitarian self-perception, self-worth includes a conception of positive value. The person who has self-worth believes that she has positive moral value. Therefore, having self-worth is incompatible with believing that we are all equally worthless.

A person can have egalitarian self-perception, and think everyone has equal value which is none. However, she cannot have self-worth, and believe that everyone has equal value which is none. She must believe that everyone is equally positively valuable - no matter how big or small the value. In particular, the person who has self-worth must believe that (a) she has some moral value, no matter how big or small, and (b) that this value is unconditional.

For the belief of self-worth to be compatible with the belief of egalitarian self-perception, she must believe that (a) she has some moral value, no matter how big or small, (b) this moral value is unconditional, and (c) everyone else also has the same moral value as she does. Therefore, only a particular form of egalitarian self-perception, not all forms, are compatible with self-worth.

Second, I focus on how inflated self-perception interacts with self-worth. It is possible for one to have self-worth and inflated self-perception at the same time. Let's consider the example of someone who has inflated self-perception in the form of a belief that she is morally superior to some other members of society.

Imagine a member of the royal family who believes that (a) she has unconditional moral worth and (b) she is morally superior to everyone outside her family because members of the royal family are morally superior to everyone else. There is nothing in the definition of self-worth that constrains her from combining these beliefs. When her self-worth is combined with her inflated self-perception, the resulting combination of her two beliefs is that, as part of royalty, she is unconditionally morally worthy and superior to everyone else.

However, this combination does not include a desire to seek moral value in the eyes of others. Since she believes that she is unconditionally morally worthy and morally superior, she does not have a desire or a need to seek the approval of others that this is true. She passively holds this belief, and does not demand that others affirm or recognize it. Therefore, this combination does not give rise to amour-propre.

It is important to note that self-worth does not contribute to the psychological foundation of amour-propre. If one has self-worth, then this precludes her from developing one of the three components of amour-propre, the concern for evaluation. The individual with self-worth does not have the desire that others evaluate her as morally valuable because she believes that her moral value is unconditional.

In the case that one believes that she has worth only if she meets a certain condition, then she does not have self-worth at all. Instead, she has another kind of individual worth, namely conditional worth.

b. Conditional Worth

Conditional worth is the belief that one is worthy as a human being if and only if she meets particular conditions of worth. According to this belief, one is not inherently morally valuable as a human being and therefore must meet particular external conditions in order to become morally valuable.

Conditional worth can coexist with self-worth. In fact, it seems to me that most people in society have some combination of conditional worth and self-worth. It is possible for it to be the case that most of my sense of individual worth is conditional while only a small part of my sense of individual worth is unconditional.

Neither self-worth nor conditional worth have to constitute the entirety of a person's sense of individual worth. Instead, an individual can have some of the former and some of the other.

i. Conditions of Worth

The individual who has conditional worth believes that her moral value is dependent on her meeting particular conditions called conditions of worth. She deems herself-worthy only to the extent that she meets these conditions and receives confirmation from others that she has done so.

Conditions of worth are not externally imposed on the individual by another person. They are internally imposed on the individual by herself in the sense that she endorses the belief that these are the conditions that, when met and approved, make her morally valuable.

Meeting one's conditions of worth is insufficient for her to feel morally worthy. She also needs approval from others that she has met these conditions. The individual

with conditional self-worth, therefore, holds the belief from within that she can only attach worth to herself to the extent that she receives external validation from others that she has met her conditions of worth.

The particular conditions one attaches to her worth are unique to the individual. For example, one might believe that she is morally valuable as long as she is financially successful. If her condition of worth is financial success, this means that her sense of moral value comes from the external approval of others of her moral value resulting from her wealth.

Another person, on the other hand, might believe that they are worthy only to the extent that someone loves them romantically. If their condition of worth is romantic love, their sense of value comes from the external approval of others of their romantic lovability.⁴⁹

Note that in both cases the individual does not only need to be rich or loved. Others must also reassure her that she is rich or loved. Therefore, one's idea about her moral worth is not just conditional on particular things. In order for her to believe that she is morally worthy after meeting her conditions of worth, she needs the approval of others.

The external approval in question is not a condition of worth. Instead, it is confirmation that the person has met their conditions of worth. In this sense, external approval is an additional element to conditions of worth rather than a condition of worth. One may ask: where does this additional element of needing the approval of others come from?

⁴⁹ Other examples of conditions of worth can be being physically attractive, competitive at a particular sport, good at a particular activity or in possession of particular material items such as a car or a house.

One response could be that it comes from epistemic uncertainty. According to this response, I cannot be sure that I've met my conditions of worth unless people keep confirming that I have. However, this gives rise to a further objection: Why is this epistemic problem inevitable? Can't there be people who are certain that they've met their conditions of worth?

Imagine a person whose condition of worth is having hands. She believes that she is morally valuable as long as she has hands because she believes that handless people don't have any moral value. It is possible for her to be completely certain that she has hands. She does not need other people to confirm that she has hands. Therefore, she does not face epistemic uncertainty about her condition of worth.

This example shows that it is possible for one to pick out a condition of worth that doesn't give rise to an epistemic problem which then indicates that conditions of worth does not necessarily have to be accompanied by the additional element of the need for approval.

This objection doesn't hold because there are particular constraints on what one's conditions of worth can be. The individual does not pick her conditions of worth randomly. Instead, these conditions are ingrained in her from the early stages of her life, mainly by her primary caregivers.

In order to understand why there are constraints on the content of conditions of worth, it's necessary to understand the origins of conditions of worth. The following genealogy of conditions of worth explains why there are constraints on the content of conditions of worth as well as why the additional element of the need for approval accompanies conditions of worth.

ii. The Genealogy of Conditional Worth

Conditions of worth are internalised by the individual during the early stages of their life, particularly childhood and adolescence. Therefore, the chronological origins

of conditions of worth is one's childhood and adolescence. During these early stages of life, the psychological series of events that one experiences causes the development of a belief that one must meet certain conditions to be morally valuable.

How individuals see themselves is - to a substantial extent - influenced by how their primary caregivers respond and relate to them in the early stages of their life as they are developing their sense of self.⁵⁰ Whether one values herself conditionally or unconditionally is rooted in some of her first relational experiences with her primary caregivers.

Understanding the origins of conditions of worth shows that conditions of worth are not selected randomly but as part of a deeply rooted psychological process of conditioning that happens in the early stages of life, therefore constraining what one's conditions of worth are to things that one was conditioned to believe are her conditions of worth during childhood and adolescence.

As Perry argues, babies and children need to be reassured that they matter.⁵¹ *Amour de soi* - the concern for self-preservation, includes a desire to have all that is necessary for one's survival. During the early stages of one's life, this includes the need for being cared for, attended to and reassured. One's *amour de soi*, then, expresses itself in a desire for care, attention and reassurance.

⁵⁰ This argument comes from the psychoanalytic tradition of psychology which focuses on the connection between childhood experiences and the adult mind. It dates back to Freudian school of psychotherapy. For the purpose of this thesis, I don't endorse the entirety of Freud's theory of psychoanalysis. However, I endorse the argument that how adults see themselves has to do with how their primary caregivers relate to them in their childhood. See Perry, 2020, 25.

⁵¹ Perry, 2020, 144-147.

Those who don't get these from their primary caregivers are at high risk of developing conditional worth as adults because the reassurance of their worth - as far as they have known - has been conditional. They have learned - through years - that this is the way they relate to themselves.

The particular things that individuals believe are their conditions of worth are things that their primary caregivers emphasised- either implicitly or explicitly - that make them loveable and morally valuable. As adults, they are conditioned to believe that these are the things that they have to do or to be in order to be loveable and morally valuable.

For instance, if one is neglected as a baby, a child and a teenager, then her first and most long lasting impression of the world is that she is not welcome here as she is. Therefore, she might develop the belief that she must prove herself to others in some way in order to be morally valuable.

To make sense of how such beliefs may develop, imagine the following example: The only way Jessica could get love from her parents was through scoring well in school and being told "well done". Therefore, focusing on schoolwork became her means of receiving love from her parents. This leads Jessica to believe that the condition of her worth is academic success because it is only through academic success that she has been able to receive love in her past.

She cultivates the belief that she is worthy only if she does well in university. Her sense of worth then depends on excelling in her academic career, and seeking the confirmation from others in the form of grades.

When babies and children don't get their relational needs met, for instance if they don't feel seen, cared for or loved, they may develop the belief that (a) they are not inherently worthy as they are, since how they are does not have the precedent of

getting them what they need, and (b) they must do something other than or in addition to being as they are in order to be seen as morally valuable.

Whatever they do other than or in addition to being as they are that successfully gets them anything remotely close to feeling morally valuable becomes their condition of worth as adults. They then mistake the source of their own moral value and look for it in the validation of other people.

Bear in mind that the primary givers in question do not have to be neglectful, critical or unloving for the child to develop conditions of worth. In some cases, children can have horrible primary caregivers. But this is not a necessary condition for the development of conditional worth. One might also have decent primary caregivers and develop conditions of worth.

The idea behind the origins of conditions of worth isn't that primary caregivers intentionally train their child to directly care about their approval. Instead, if the primary caregivers respond to the child's needs in inconsistent or insufficient ways, the child learns which conditions - if she was to meet them - are more likely to get her needs met. She associates being morally valuable with meeting these conditions and getting approval from her primary caregivers.

Having explained the role that the genealogy of conditions of worth plays in determining what one's conditions of worth are, let's go back to the example of having hands as a condition of worth - an example that aims to illustrate that not every condition of worth creates epistemic uncertainty.

According to the constraint on what one's conditions of worth can be (namely, the constraint that they can only be things that she grows up being taught and believing are her conditions of worth), it is theoretically possible for one to believe that having hands is the condition she needs to meet in order to be worthy. For this to be

her condition of worth, she would have to be taught and conditioned to believe by her primary caregivers that she is seen, cared for and reassured if and only if she has hands.

Although there is a theoretical possibility that she develops having hands as her condition of worth, this is highly unlikely in practice. What one's primary caregivers teach her as things that make her worthy are likely to be things that they were taught by their own primary caregivers or things that society as a whole views as things that make one worthy. Neither of these are likely to be having hands.

Furthermore, although it is true that - in the unlikely case that one's primary caregivers teach her that having hands make her seen, loveable and cared for as a person - one can be certain that she has hands, and does not need anyone to confirm that she has hands, the nature of the epistemic uncertainty involved is not one in which factually knowing that something is true or false determines whether one is certain or uncertain about something.

The need for approval is not a rational need to confirm the truth or falseness of a particular fact because one can otherwise not be sure that it is true that she has met her conditions of worth. It is a nonrational mental condition that results from one's history of developing conditional worth and psychologically associating particular conditions of worth with receiving some kind of approval from her primary caregivers.

The additional element for the need of approval which accompanies conditions of worth is explained through the mechanism through which one acquires conditions of worth, which is such that she forms the belief that meeting conditions of worth gets her approval from other people which help her feel morally valuable as a person.

Since she has this belief, she uses meeting her conditions of worth as a way to get approval that helps her meet her needs, and comes to expect that meeting her conditions of worth is followed by receiving such approval.

The history of developing conditions of worth creates an additional element, which is a need for the approval of others to maintain one's sense of moral worth, because part of the fundamental pattern of this history is seeking such approval.

There is a direct relationship between the fact that one has acquired conditions of worth during childhood and her current beliefs about her moral worth because the human brain is such that we form deeply rooted beliefs about ourselves and our role in the world as a result of our interactions with our primary caregivers.

The genealogy of conditions of worth shows that the nature of this relationship is such that the fact that one has acquired particular ideas about what makes her morally worthy through a gradual process of parental approval and disapproval means that (a) she is likely to carry these conditions of worth into adulthood and (b) her confidence that she meets these conditions of worth are likely to be conditioned on being approved by others.

Having understood the role of genealogy of conditions of worth in explaining why the need for approval accompanies these conditions, I return to the initial question of why epistemic uncertainty about whether one has met one's conditions of worth is inevitable.

In some cases, it is the case that one has epistemic uncertainty about whether she has met her conditions of worth or not in the rational sense that it is factually not possible for her to know whether she has met these conditions without someone approving that she has.

For example, if my condition of worth is being a professor, I cannot factually know that I am a professor unless someone approves that I am in the form of a job offer. However, the boundaries of epistemic uncertainty involved in conditions of worth are not limited to epistemic uncertainty in the factual sense.

The epistemic uncertainty in question does not have to be a rational uncertainty where the individual is factually not certain that she has met her conditions of worth. Regardless of whether the individual has factual epistemic uncertainty or not, in the absence of approval she experiences a nonrational uncertainty resulting from the psychological expectation that meeting a condition of worth is followed by approval.

This nonrational epistemic uncertainty is inevitable even when factual epistemic uncertainty can be avoided because the particular condition of worth in question can be factually known without approval.

If meeting conditions of worth is generally followed by receiving approval and not meeting conditions of worth is generally followed by receiving disapproval during one's childhood and adolescence, the individual is likely to believe that this remains to be the case about the way she interacts with the world and carry this belief into adulthood. The inductive belief involved here is not one that comes out of conscious and rational reasoning. It's an unconscious assumption developed over many years.

The individual remains uncertain about whether she has met her conditions of worth not in the sense that she cannot factually know whether she has, but in the sense that in the absence of approval it does not feel like she has met her conditions of worth because she expects to receive approval when she meets her conditions of worth. The absence of such approval creates a state of unconscious confusion about her experience of meeting her conditions of worth.

Imagine someone whose condition of worth is to be rich. Even if he accumulates billions, and can factually see in her bank account that she is rich and therefore she has met her condition of her, she is unlikely to feel or believe that she has done so unless a considerable amount of people give her approval in the form of confirming that she is considered to be rich.

This is not because she rationally evaluates her finances and cannot be factually certain that she accumulated lots of money. It's because she is conditioned to receive approval after meeting her condition of worth and such approval is absent, creating a nonrational sense of psychological uncertainty and confusion.

One objection against the inevitability of uncertainty about whether one has met her conditions of worth or not in the absence of external approval is the argument that one does not always need approval to psychologically feel that she has met her conditions of worth.

Imagine someone whose condition of worth is having a good relationship with God where such a relationship is between her and God. She has grown up being conditioned to believe that a good relationship with God is what makes one worthy, and therefore she pursues this relationship in order to feel worthy. For the purpose of this example, let's assume that God is not considered "an other".

Why would this person need to prove herself to anyone? As long as she knows she has a good relationship with God, she feels that she has met her condition of worth without needing anyone else to approve of her.

In the case of conditional worth, I argue that this person will still need approval from other people that she has met her condition of worth of having a good relationship with God because the psychological expectation she has been conditioned to have is that when you meet your condition of worth, people around you approve of this.

The particular content of the condition of worth, that is whether it actually depends on or includes other persons, is irrelevant to your need for approval that you have met it. The need for approval is something that you're conditioned to seek in relation to your conditions of worth, regardless of whether seeking this is rational or nonrational, because this is how you feel morally valuable as an individual as a result of your lifetime history of this being the case.

3. The Psychological Foundation of Amour-Propre

The purpose of this section is to explain (a) how self-perception and conditional-worth interact with each other to make up the psychological foundation of amour-propre, and (b) how the basic desires explained in Chapter 2 interact with this psychological foundation.

As explained earlier, self-perception and conditional-worth make up the psychological foundation of amour-propre. When together, particular forms of self-perception and conditional worth create a suitable environment for the development and the maintenance of particular manifestations of amour-propre.

The answer to the question "what is amour-propre?" is "it is a combination of amour de soi, the concern for evaluation and the concern for respect that, when together, constitutes a desire to seek value in the eyes of others in accordance with the value one believes one has".

The answer to the question "what individual psychological environment is needed for one to develop amour-propre?" is "a psychological foundation of self-perception and conditional-worth".

a. The Interaction Between Self-Perception and Individual Worth

self-perception and conditional-worth are the two components of the psychological foundation of amour-propre. For this psychological foundation to exist, they both must be present.

A certain kind of individual worth (conditional worth or self-worth) by itself, does not indicate the presence of a certain kind of self-perception (inflamed or egalitarian). Instead, self-perception and individual-worth are distinct beliefs that operate separately, and can come in various combinations.

For example, it is possible for one to have unconditional self-worth and inflamed self-perception. Because she has unconditional self-worth, it does not follow from this that she has egalitarian self-perception. One may believe that she has superior or inferior moral worth and also believe that this moral worth is unconditional, and therefore not attached to her meeting any conditions.

It is also possible for one to have conditional-worth and egalitarian self-perception. Because she has conditional self-worth, it does not follow from this that she has inflamed self-perception. For instance, one may believe that she has equal moral worth, meaning everyone is equally valuable, and also believe that everyone, including herself, must meet particular conditions of worth in order to maintain their equal moral worth.

I argue, however, that it is only one kind of individual-worth, namely conditional-worth that can contribute to the making of the psychological foundation of amour-propre. This is because the other kind of individual-worth, which is self-worth, is such that it is unconditional, meaning it does not involve a need to seek approval from others.

Since amour-propre is a desire to seek value in the eyes of others in accordance with the value one believes she has, its nature is such that it includes a need to receive approval from others. Consequently, its psychological foundation must accommodate for the inclusion of this need which is not found in instances where the individual has self-worth.

Furthermore, as explained in Chapter 1, one of the three components of amour-propre is the concern for evaluation which is a desire to be judged by others as having a certain moral value. In the case that one's psychological foundation of individual worth is unconditional, this psychological foundation is incompatible with the development of amour-propre.

b. The Psychological Framework of Amour-Propre

As explained, self-perception and conditional worth are two beliefs that make up the psychological foundation of amour-propre. When the basic desires that constitute amour-propre (amour de soi, the concern for evaluation, and the concern for respect) are present, this psychological foundation facilitates the development of amour-propre. Based on the particular interactions between these beliefs and basic desires, amour-propre is then manifested in its inflamed or egalitarian form.

On the one hand, the role of conditional worth in the psychological foundation of amour-propre is to create the suitable environment for the development of a desire to seek value in the eyes of others.

On the other hand, the role of self-perception in the psychological foundation of amour-propre is to determine whether the desire to seek value in the eyes of others is in the form of egalitarian or inflamed amour-propre.

The combination of conditional worth and self-perception provides the psychological environment where the individual develops and maintains particular forms of amour-propre.

Below is a chart that explains the particular combinations of self-perception and individual-worth that provide the psychological foundation for particular kinds of amour-propre (inflamed or egalitarian) in the presence of the three components of generic amour-propre.

	Egalitarian Self-Perception	Inflamed Self-Perception
	I believe that everyone is necessarily of equal moral worth.	I believe that everyone is not necessarily of equal moral worth. I may be of superior or inferior moral worth.
Self-Worth I believe that I have positive and unconditional moral worth.	I believe that everyone necessarily has equal moral value and this value is positive and unconditional. Since my moral value is unconditional, and I don't need others to approve of my moral value, I don't have a desire to seek value in the eyes of others in accordance with the value I believe I have. Result: No psychological foundation for amour-propre.	I believe that we are not necessarily of equal moral value, and therefore I may have superior or inferior value. Whatever value I have is unconditional and does not need to be approved by others. Therefore, I don't have a desire to seek value in the eyes of others in accordance with the value I believe I have. Result: No psychological foundation for amour-propre.
Conditional Worth I believe that I have moral worth and that this moral worth is conditional on meeting certain conditions and receiving approval from others that I have done so.	I believe that everyone necessarily has equal moral value and this value is dependent on meeting certain conditions of worth and receiving approval from others that I have met these conditions of worth. Therefore, I desire to seek equal moral value in the eyes of others, in accordance with the equal moral value I believe I have. Result: There is the psychological foundation for egalitarian amour-propre.	I believe that we are not necessarily of equal moral value and therefore I may have inferior or superior moral value compared to others. Whatever moral value I have is dependent on meeting my conditions of worth and receiving approval from others that I have met these conditions. Therefore, I desire to seek inferior or superior moral value in the eyes of others, in accordance with the inferior or superior value I believe I have. Result: There is the psychological foundation for inflamed amour-propre.

In the presence of the three components that constitutes amour-propre, amour-propre develops only if the psychological foundation involves either one of the

two of the following combinations of self-perception and individual worth: (1) conditional worth + egalitarian self-perception, and (2) conditional worth + inflamed self-perception. The former gives rise to egalitarian amour-propre while the latter gives rise to inflamed amour-propre.

The psychological foundation of inflamed amour-propre, then, is the combination of inflamed self-perception and conditional worth. This combination results in the following twofold belief: I believe that there necessarily are differences in moral value, and I believe that my moral value is conditional on meeting certain conditions and others confirming that I meet them.

In the case of inflamed amour-propre, then, the individual experiences the following combination of beliefs that create the appropriate environment for the development of inflamed amour-propre:

- i. Self-perception: I believe that there are differences in moral worth and I fall in a particular place in the hierarchy of these differences where I am either superior, inferior or both.
- ii. Conditional Worth: I believe that my moral worth is dependent on me meeting particular conditions and receiving approval from others that I have done so.

These beliefs create a suitable environment for the transformation of the three generic components of amour-propre into the three inflamed components of inflamed amour-propre. The inflamed form that the three components of amour-propre take are as follows:

- i. Inflamed Amour de Soi: A desire to preserve what is essential to my life.
- ii. Inflamed Concern for Evaluation: A desire that others evaluate me as an inferior or superior.
- iii. Inflamed Concern for Respect: A desire that others recognize that I am a superior or inferior person, take this fact seriously in their considerations of how to act, and put moral constraints on their actions in relation to me by limiting

them to those that are considered appropriate ways to treat a superior or inferior person.

When these desires are combined with the two beliefs that constitute the psychological foundation of inflamed amour-propre, the individual gets inflamed amour-propre.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I argued that the development and maintenance of amour-propre requires a psychological foundation that is composed of particular combinations of self-perception and conditional worth. I asked the question: what is the psychological experience of the individual who has amour-propre?.

I responded that (1) the psychological experience of the individual who has egalitarian amour-propre is that she believes that everyone necessarily has equal moral value and this value is dependent on meeting certain conditions of worth which must be approved by others, and (2) the psychological experience of the individual who has inflamed amour-propre is such that she believes that one may have inferior or superior moral value compared to others, and this value is dependent on meeting certain conditions of worth which must be approved by others.

In the next chapter, I focus on the individual experience of the person who has inflamed amour-propre. I argue that one of the main personal maladies that this person experiences as a result of inflamed amour-propre, which makes one's life go miserably, is inauthenticity.

CHAPTER 3

THE INAUTHENTICITY OF INFLAMED AMOUR-PROPRE

In this chapter, I argue that one of the main reasons inflamed amour-propre makes one life go miserably at the individual level is because it makes one live inauthentically.

The psychological basis of inflamed amour-propre and the components of inflamed amour-propre, as explained in the first two chapters, are such that they require the denial of one's own nature which is characterised by a state of inauthenticity.

1. Limitations of Human Nature

There are particular limitations of human nature that act against the attainment of inflamed amour-propre and make its satisfaction practically impossible. These limitations are time and epistemic access.

I argue that these work against two particular components of inflamed amour-propre: the concern for evaluation (desire that others evaluate me as an inferior or superior) and the concern for respect (desire that others recognize that I am a superior or inferior, take this fact seriously in their considerations of how to act, and put moral constraints on their actions in relation to me by limiting them to those that are considered appropriate ways to treat an inferior or superior).

a. Time

The person with inflamed amour-propre seeks superiority or inferiority in the eyes of others. This means that what she desires to get, which is confirmation from others that she is superior or inferior, is dependent on others' provision of it.

In order to ensure that the person with inflamed amour-propre receives confirmation from others, she must actively (a) seek this confirmation from people she interacts with, and (b) make sure that these people practically orient their actions in accordance with her perceived superiority or inferiority.

What inflamed amour-propre seeks is others to have the belief that she is superior or inferior, and respect her accordingly where that means integrating their perception of her as a superior into their dispositions to act.

In practice, this means that in order to pursue inflated amour-propre, she must spend a considerable amount of her time in life trying to convince others that she is superior or inferior so that they give her confirmation that this is the case.

Trying to attain the confirmation that inflated concern for evaluation demands requires the individual to shape her time in life around the goal of convincing others to give her approval of her perceived superiority or inferiority.

For example, she needs to engage in conversation with others about her superiority or inferiority, find out what would make these people think that she is superior or inferior, adopt lifestyles, fashion styles, activities, and habits that would make others think she is superior or inferior, and repeat this all over again every time a new person enters her life.

At first look, it might seem that the desire of inflated amour-propre gets inflated, shifting from desiring superiority or inferiority in the eyes of others into desiring superiority or inferiority in the eyes of all others.

This, however, isn't my argument. The desire of inflated amour-propre does not need to get inflated in order to run into the constraint of time. My argument is that inflated amour-propre is practically impossible to pursue due to the constraint of time even when the individual wants to seek superiority or inferiority in the eyes of some but not all others.

Even when what one wants is to be regarded as a superior or inferior by a handful of individuals, she still does not have enough time in her life to ensure that she is approved as such by these individuals because however many people one seeks such approval from, inflated amour-propre demands that she seeks it regularly.

An additional pressure on the pursuit of this approval, which exacerbates the difficulty of attaining it, is the nature of the demand that the inflamed concern of evaluation makes. The inflamed concern for evaluation is not a desire to receive one time approval from someone, after which the individual can rest assured that they have the approval they needed.

Instead, the approval that the person with inflamed concern for evaluation seeks is a regular and repeating approval that continues over time. It is not sufficient for the individual with inflamed concern for evaluation for someone to confirm that she is superior or inferior once.

She desires that others continue to hold the belief that she is superior or inferior, and confirm that they hold this belief on a regular basis. Therefore, in order to seek such regular confirmation, she needs to constantly engage in actions and behaviours that she believes might get her such confirmation.

Even when she wants such regular approval from a limited number of individuals, it is nevertheless incredibly time consuming to maintain this approval because it requires going from one person to the other, ensuring that none of the individuals have changed their mind in the meantime and that their approval continues to hold.

The person with inflamed amour-propre spends her days trying to receive the approval of others so that some time in the future she can finally be at peace, knowing that others value her in accordance with the superior or inferior value she believes she has.

The problem with this state is that she never reaches the point where she has secured all the confirmation she needs since people's minds can change and new people might enter her life, meaning she constantly needs to be seeking confirmation,

never reaching an end point where she has secured all that is necessary to satisfy her inflamed amour-propre.

A further objection to this explanation is that as long as one does not desire to seek approval from everyone in the universe, it is possible for one to secure enough approval to satisfy her inflamed amour-propre with the help of a well-entrenched shared sense of superiority or inferiority in one's environment.

For instance, in racist societies there is a well-entrenched shared sense of superiority among white people over black people. It seems that a white person living in such a society does not need to spend all her time making sure that other people around her accept her superiority over black people.

There is already a deeply rooted belief among other white people surrounding her that emphasises the approval of her perceived superiority. She can satisfy her desire to seek confirmation in the eyes of others in her racist group that her race, including her, is superior to the other group without exhausting her time. Therefore, the objection concludes that the satisfaction of inflamed amour-propre is possible without running into a time constraint.

It is theoretically true that if (a) the only thing that one's inflamed amour-propre makes one seek is superiority or inferiority in the eyes of one's own group, (b) one lives in a sheltered group that consists only of its own members all of whom have a shared belief that their group is superior or inferior, and (c) there are no outside factors that disrupt this group, then it is possible for one to satisfy her inflamed amour-propre in this group without running into significant time constraints.

My argument isn't that satisfying inflamed amour-propre is a theoretical impossibility. It is that most people, when they have inflamed amour-propre, do run into

the time constraint which makes their inflamed amour-propre practically impossible to satisfy.

One may ask: why is it that the overwhelming majority of people who have inflamed amour-propre run into the time constraint in question if it is theoretically possible to avoid this constraint?

This is because it is very difficult if not impossible for one to meet the conditions described for avoiding this time constraint. The first condition, which is that the only thing that one's inflamed amour-propre makes one seek is superiority or inferiority in the eyes of one's own group is generally not met by individuals because most people's condition of worth is not merely superiority or inferiority in relation to their particular group but also superiority or inferiority in relation to particular individual features of themselves.

For example, a racist person with inflamed amour-propre may seek superiority in the eyes of her own group confirming that her group is superior. However, her other condition of worth may be that she desires superiority in the eyes of other white people, confirming that she is morally superior to other members of the group because she is richer or more talented than them.

In this case, the desire isn't satisfied without seeking it all the time because there is no well-entrenched shared sense among all members of the group that this particular person is morally superior due to her excessive wealth.

The second condition one must meet for her inflamed amour-propre to avoid the constraint of time is that she lives in a sheltered group that consists only of its own members all of whom have a shared belief that their group is superior or inferior.

While theoretically possible, it is very rare for individuals to live in communities that are completely sheltered from the outside world, therefore having no interactions with non-members of the group who do not share the sheltered community's approval of superiority or inferiority.

Perhaps an example of a sheltered community that could meet this condition would be a remote commune that rejects all virtual or in-person contact with others. However, very few communities are truly so sheltered that no individual in them interacts with anyone outside the community.

This brings us to the third condition for avoiding the time constraint, which is that there are no outside factors that disrupt the sheltered group. Any community that is not strictly sheltered in the abovementioned sense is eventually going to face outside factors that disrupt the shared sense of superiority in the sheltered community.

For instance, at least some previously racist members of the community might no longer be racist or might become less racist than the average member of this society after being exposed to content about the negative consequences of racism, evidence about the findings that race is a social construct instead of a natural fact, or discussions with people of colour that highlight racial equality.

When this happens, members of the sheltered group who remain to be racist can no longer rely as much or at all on the shared sense of racism in the community, and must seek approval more regularly and individually, that is from each member of the group, therefore running into the time constraint.

Hence, even though it is theoretically possible for one to avoid the time constraint, it is practically close to being impossible for one to meet the conditions necessary for such avoidance, meaning that most people, if not everyone, who have inflamed amour-propre do run into the time constraint.

In addition to seeking to satisfy her inflamed concern for evaluation, the person with inflamed amour-propre seeks to satisfy her inflamed concern for respect which comes in the form of a desire that others practically orient themselves in accordance with her perceived superiority or inferiority.

Since what the inflamed concern for respect seeks is not only a passive recognition of one's moral superiority or inferiority but also an active effort to shape one's actions around the recognition of this superiority or inferiority, seeking to satisfy one's inflamed concern for respect requires that one tries to convince others to not only regard her as a superior or inferior but also actively treat her as such in their daily interactions with her.

When the demands of the inflamed concern for evaluation are combined with the demands of the inflamed concern for respect, the individual who has them needs to spend most of their time in life trying to satisfy these demands. Even if they do so, it is nevertheless the case that they will fail to meet all the demands of inflamed amour-propre due to limitations of time.

The average life expectancy of a person in the UK is around 4,200 weeks. This finite amount of weeks are spread across many necessities of life. Most people spend a considerable amount of time securing an income of some kind in order to afford basic necessities, running errands such as gathering these necessities, making food, cleaning the house, doing laundry, going to school, etc. Managing these necessities of life falls under satisfying one's amour de soi, that is, ensuring the continuity of one's survival.

The number of things one must accomplish in order to continue a decent life seems to be endless. Everyone gets 24 hours and 7 days a week to fit all these necessities of life in. When this is the case, it does not seem likely that an individual

who satisfies her amour de soi, by accomplishing the list of tasks one needs to fulfil on a day to day basis in order to continue one's life, will also have the time to do everything necessary to satisfy her inflamed concern for evaluation and inflamed concern for respect.

My argument, then, is that the limitation of time, which is a constraint that every human experiences as part of her nature, is such that it is practically impossible for a person who is occupied with managing necessities of life to have enough time to ensure, on a regular basis, that people around her evaluate her in a particular way and also to make sure, on a regular basis, that these people practically orient their actions in accordance with their evaluations.

Even if she dedicates all her time in life to obtaining the approval of others, she will still fail to satisfy the demands of her inflamed concern for evaluation and respect because of a particular aspect of human beings' relationship with time which is a phenomenon called opportunity cost.

Opportunity cost describes the reality that whenever one decides to do something with a given minute, she is automatically deciding not to do all the other things she could have done with that given minute. The relationship human beings have with time is such that we are constantly missing out on everything we are not doing at any given moment.

In practice, the opportunity cost of time means that one will certainly have to disappoint many people during her lifetime. By choosing to meet one person at a given time, she will choose not to meet others. By doing something that one person will think makes her morally valuable, she will upset some other people who disapprove of that thing. She will have to make difficult decisions about who to disappoint and who to please.

Receiving disapproval from others is an unavoidable part of the human experience because one simply does not have the time to engage in every interaction that is made available to her or please everyone she deems valuable. Our relationship with time, therefore, involves the inescapable disapproval of others which is detrimental to the realisation of inflamed amour-propre.

According to this argument, the person with inflamed amour-propre is chasing something (which is the goal of making sure others evaluate her as a superior or inferior, recognize the fact of her perceived superiority or inferiority, and practically orient their actions in accordance with such superiority or inferiority) that is impossible to attain.

One objection against this argument is that it is possible for one to excel in time management so that she can do everything she needs to do to continue her survival and still find the time to seek the confirmation of others that her inflamed concern for evaluation and respect demands. The objection concludes that satisfying one's inflamed amour-propre is not an impossible pursuit but a matter of time management.

The objection in question doesn't hold because the idea that one can seek regular approval from others (that is, not only ensure that at any given time others value her as a moral superior or inferior but also that they practically orient themselves in accordance with such superiority or inferiority) if she manages her time well is an illusion.

The more one manages her time well to seek approval from others, the more approval there is for one to seek. By the time she confirms that one person values her in a certain way, another person could have changed their mind.

It is better for the satisfaction of one's inflamed amour-propre that one seeks approval as regularly as she can because the longer one does not seek approval from

any given person whose approval had previously been gained, the more time that person has to change their mind.

When the person with inflamed amour-propre improves her time management skills, she uses the time she saves as a result of this improvement on seeking approval more regularly, engaging in an endless behaviour pattern of going from one person to another to confirm that she maintains their approval in order to better satisfy her inflamed amour-propre.

Furthermore, the more time she has to spend with others, the higher chances she has of being introduced to new people, therefore making new connections and experiencing a potential increase in the number of people she desires to seek approval from.

The impossibility of satisfying the demands of inflamed amour-propre due to limitations of time is not a matter of poor time management but a matter of an incompatible relationship between the nature of the demands of inflamed amour-propre and limitations of human nature.

In addition to time, there is a second limitation of human nature, namely epistemic access, that constrains one's ability to attain these goals. Together, the limitations of time and epistemic access make the successful pursuit of inflamed amour-propre practically impossible.

b. Epistemic Access

As explained, the goal of the inflamed concern for evaluation is to seek that others evaluate one as morally superior or inferior while the goal of the inflamed concern for respect is to seek that others recognize the fact of one's superiority or inferiority and shape their actions according to this fact.

Both of these goals assume that it is possible for one to know how others evaluate her, if they evaluate her at all. I argue that the goals of inflamed amour-propre are practically impossible to attain because humans do not have the epistemic access into others' minds that would be necessary for us to know what others think of us at any given time on a regular basis.

In order for the person with inflamed amour-propre to satisfy her inflamed concern for evaluation and inflamed concern for respect, she must try to find out what other people think about her on a regular basis as well as whether these people are practically orienting themselves in accordance with what they think about her.

This means that, for any given person in her life whose evaluation she values, the person with inflamed amour-propre needs to know what this person thinks about her, that is whether this person thinks that she is morally superior or inferior, and whether this person is practically orienting herself in accordance with this evaluation of her.

Furthermore, she needs to confirm with this person at regular intervals of time that what this person thinks about her has not changed over time and that this person is still practically orienting themselves in accordance with their evaluations of her.

Considering that there will likely be many people involved in the life of a person with inflamed amour-propre who the person with inflamed amour-propre will have to find and regularly maintain this information about, the demand that inflamed amour-propre makes gives rise to an epistemic problem.

It is very difficult for one to know on a regular basis what another person is thinking about her at any given time and whether they are practically orienting themselves in accordance with their thoughts. If one needs this kind of information only from one person, then perhaps, if one is willing to dedicate a substantial amount of

time, effort and other resources into seeking this information, she might be able to obtain it.

However, when one needs this information from many people, the pursuit of such information becomes impossible because as humans we simply do not have the time to gather this kind of information from multiple people at any given time and on a regular basis.

Furthermore, it is not the case that we can just find out about what others think about us with little effort as we do not have the kind of epistemic access into their thoughts that would make the obtaining of such information quick, effortless or guaranteed.

Perhaps with the exception of people who are closest to us such as our family members, spouse or best friend, most of the time we have little information, if any, about what other people we interact with are thinking about us and whether they are practically orienting themselves in accordance with their evaluations of us unless we engage in a conversation with them where we ask them what they think about us. In fact, most of the time, we don't even know whether others are thinking about us at all as they might be thinking about other things and might simply have no evaluations of us at all.

Since we do not have the power to predict or control other people's evaluations of us, and we do not have the time or epistemic access to know what many people think of us on a regular basis and at any given time, the kind of information that inflamed amour-propre demands for us to attain is impossible to obtain due to limitations of our nature.

A notable objection to my argument that the demands of inflamed amour-propre are impossible to attain due to particular limitations of human nature, such as time and

epistemic access, is the counterargument that these limitations of human nature apply to egalitarian amour-propre as well. Therefore, egalitarian amour-propre is just as impossible to attain as inflamed amour-propre, emphasizing the impossibility of all amour-propre.

The person with egalitarian amour-propre has a desire to seek equal value in the eyes of others. As part of her egalitarian concern for evaluation, she seeks to receive confirmation from others that they evaluate her as an equal. As part of her egalitarian concern for respect, she seeks that others recognize the fact that she is an equal and practically orient themselves in accordance with her moral equality.

According to the objection, just like the person with inflamed amour-propre, the person with egalitarian amour-propre seeks various kinds of confirmations from others. Therefore, she is subjected to the same limitations of time and epistemic access that the person with inflamed amour-propre faces.

For instance, the person with egalitarian amour-propre seeks to receive confirmation from others that they evaluate her as a moral equal. However, due to her nature as a finite human being, she does not have enough time to complete all the tasks necessary to ensure her survival and also make sure that the people she interacts with perceive her as an equal.

Similarly, she does not have the time to make sure on a regular basis that the people she interacts with are practically orienting themselves in accordance with her moral equality. In fact, she will likely live her life not knowing what most people think about her or whether they think about her at all.

Just like the person with inflamed amour-propre, the person with egalitarian amour-propre also does not have the epistemic access into other people's minds, meaning that she cannot know what other people think about her without taking the

time and making the effort to initiate conversations with them about their opinions of her.

The particular limitations of human nature that I list as my reasons for why inflated amour-propre is impossible to attain, then, also apply to egalitarian amour-propre, making both forms of amour-propre impossible.

In theory, it is true that the limitations of time and epistemic access also apply to egalitarian amour-propre. However, I respond to this objection by arguing that, in practice, there are particular societal measures in place that mitigate these limitations when it comes to egalitarian amour-propre, making egalitarian amour-propre attainable for individuals.

There is consensus among most societies that it is preferable to build and maintain some sense of moral equality between individuals. There are particular social and political measures in place in most countries that create a sense of confirmation from others that one is a moral equal, without her necessarily having to put the time and effort into seeking this confirmation.

For instance, in most countries, every individual has an equal vote in important political matters such as presidential elections and referendums. Whatever the basic provisions of a country are - for instance, healthcare, free education, and public areas, every individual has equal access to these. These are some examples of political measures in place that confirm one's moral equality without her necessarily having to seek such confirmation.

There are also social measures that give a person with egalitarian amour-propre confirmation that she is a moral equal without her having to spend considerable amounts of time seeking such confirmation. For example, in most societies, it is

socially unacceptable to treat others in ways that are not in accordance with their humanity and dignity.

The political and social measures that confirm one's moral equality make it likely that a person with egalitarian amour-propre will be able to satisfy her concern for evaluation and her concern for respect without running into the limitations of time because in the presence of these measures the confirmation she seeks is much less time consuming to attain and does not require any kind of epistemic access into the minds of others.

One may raise a further objection to my response, arguing that the force of the original objection remains because inflamed amour-propre and egalitarian amour-propre are on a par when it comes to running into the epistemic access problem.

I respond to the original objection by arguing that there are institutional structures that go around the epistemic access problem in the case of egalitarian amour-propre. However, it is possible to have the same kind of institutional structures that take care of the epistemic access problem of inflamed amour-propre by reassuring some people that they are superior.

In fact, there are a lot of social and political measures in a lot of places to give a public expression to a shared understanding of social hierarchy. There are, for example, public institutional infrastructure that give expression to the differences of moral value in different casts, racial groups or genders in various parts of the world. These can circumvent the epistemic access problem for inflamed amour-propre.

If the response to the original objection is that there are institutions that alleviate the epistemic problem in the case of egalitarian amour-propre, this is not a sufficient response because the same applies to the case of inflamed amour-propre. Therefore,

egalitarian amour-propre is just as practically impossible to satisfy as inflamed amour-propre.

My response to this further objection brings us back to the conditions I draw for avoiding the limitation of time in the case of inflamed amour-propre in a racist society. These conditions, as explained earlier, are (a) the only thing that one's inflamed amour-propre makes one seek is superiority or inferiority in the eyes of one's own group, (b) one lives in a sheltered group that consists only of its own members all of whom have a shared belief that their group is superior or inferior, and (c) there are no outside factors that disrupt this group.

As I argue, what makes inflamed amour-propre practically impossible to satisfy is that it is not possible for inflamed amour-propre to avoid running into the limitation of time and epistemic access without meeting these conditions. However, these conditions are unattainable - at least in the case of the overwhelming majority of the current human population.

My response to this further objection is that egalitarian amour-propre is not practically impossible to satisfy because the conditions that make inflamed amour-propre practically unattainable don't apply to egalitarian amour-propre.

The first condition, which is that the only thing that one's amour-propre makes one seek is a certain moral value in the eyes of one's own group, doesn't apply to egalitarian amour-propre because the desire of egalitarian amour-propre seeks equality more generally. One's egalitarian amour-propre cannot make one seek equality exclusively in the eyes of one's own group, therefore excluding others from the sphere of such equality.

In fact, if one seeks that only other members of her own group recognize and treat her as an equal, accepting that those outside this group can recognize and treat

her as an unequal, the desire that she has falls within the boundaries of inflamed amour-propre, not egalitarian amour-propre.

This is because any arrangement in which one seeks to be recognized and treated as a moral equal only by some people and not others implies that one accepts being recognized treated as an unequal, at least by some others, in which case one does not seek moral equality but a particular placement within a hierarchy of moral value where there is moral equality within the group she is in, outside of which moral inequality is acceptable.

The second and the third condition, (which are that one lives in a sheltered group that consists only of its own members all of whom have a shared belief that their group has a certain moral value, and that there are no outside factors disrupting the group), don't apply to egalitarian amour-propre. Egalitarian amour-propre doesn't require a sheltered community with no outside influences in order to avoid the limitations of time and epistemic access.

Those with egalitarian amour-propre not only desire to be recognized and treated equally. They also recognize and treat others as equals in accordance with their egalitarian self-perception. In the case of inflamed amour-propre, people who have it need a sheltered community with no outside disruptions to maintain an assurance of moral superiority or inferiority.

People who have egalitarian amour-propre already perceive everyone else as equals, meaning anyone joining from the outside of their community is also regarded and treated as a moral equal.

In the case of egalitarian amour-propre, the shared sense of equality expands to include newcomers while in the case of inflamed amour-propre the shared sense of superiority or inferiority is threatened by them. In the latter case, the less strength this

shared sense has in the community, the more constrained one's inflamed amour-propre is by the limitations of time and epistemic access.

Therefore, in practice, the only kind of amour-propre that is impossible to attain due to limitations of human nature is inflamed amour-propre because the unattainable conditions that inflamed amour-propre must meet to avoid the limitations of time and epistemic access don't apply to egalitarian amour-propre

2. Denial of Human Nature

Attempting to ensure that others think we are morally more or less valuable than them is an attempt to deny the limitations of our nature as human beings with finite time and limited epistemic access. It is an attempt to gain a level of control over the external world that is incompatible with the laws of our nature.

When one pursues the demands of inflamed amour-propre, there are two mentalities she may have towards such pursuit. The focus of my argument is the latter. Firstly, she might know that it is impossible to achieve these demands and pursue them anyways, acknowledging that she will never achieve them. In this case, she would be acknowledging the limitations of human nature and voluntarily wasting her time.

Secondly, she might have the false belief that it is possible to achieve these demands and pursue them with the intention to achieve them. In this case, she is in denial of her own nature because she is convinced that she can achieve something that her nature prohibits.

As part of our nature, humans are not able to have limitless time to seek the approval of others or the ability to control the minds of others to ensure that they think a certain way about us.

In the absence of political and social mechanisms that maintain a sense of collective confirmation of moral value, such as those present in the case of egalitarian amour-propre, the burden of satisfying amour-propre is on the individual who does not have the time or epistemic access to accomplish this task successfully.

People with inflamed amour-propre who believe that they can satisfy their inflamed concern for evaluation and respect live in a deep state of denial about how finite their lives are and how limited access they have to the evaluations of others.

The problem isn't that such people aren't aware that they will die or that they can't literally access the minds of other people. It is that they convince themselves otherwise. They live in a state of denial because they refuse to accept the reality of their limitations.

Pursuing the demands of inflamed amour-propre is a way in which the individual keeps herself busy and distracted so that she can avoid facing the reality of her nature. She maintains a comforting illusion that there is always more time to seek the approvals she needs to satisfy her desire to be valued in the eyes of others as superior or inferior, therefore avoiding facing the reality of her nature as a finite being with limited epistemic access.

One may object to this argument by raising the counterargument that receiving the approval that inflamed amour-propre seeks is not impossible. According to this objection, it is not outside the limits of human nature to successfully satisfy one's inflamed amour-propre.

Let's imagine that Elon Musk has inflamed amour-propre where his condition of worth is being one of the richest people in the world. The content of his inflamed amour-propre is the following: (a) a desire to continue his survival, (b) a desire that others value him in accordance with the value he believes he has which is superior to

the value of poorer people, and (c) a desire that others recognize that he is morally superior to them and practically orient themselves in accordance with his moral superiority.

According to this objection, Musk can satisfy his inflamed amour-propre without denying the limitations of time and epistemic access. He meets his condition of worth because he is one of the richest people in the world. He does everything necessary to ensure the continuity of his survival. Many people evaluate him as a superior and practically orient themselves in accordance with this evaluation.

The example of Musk shows that one does not need an infinite amount of time or endless epistemic access into the minds of others in order to be able to satisfy her inflamed concern for evaluation and respect. Therefore, it is possible for one to satisfy inflamed amour-propre without denying the limitations of human nature.

I respond to this objection by arguing that the example of Elon Musk shows that, even for those who are able to meet their conditions of worth, inflamed amour-propre's demand to seek approval remains practically impossible to satisfy.

Although many people approve that Musk is superior, many others react to his lifestyle and wealth with strong disapproval. Although many people approve of him, there are many others who publicly announce their disapproval of him. He often receives public criticisms about his lack of morality, dignity and respect for humanity. Many of such negative evaluations come from people whose opinions are valuable to him for various reasons such as emotional, romantic, financial or professional ties he has with them.

To make his case worse, even someone like Musk who has a wide range of resources available to him does not have the time or the epistemic access to know, on

a regular basis, whether all the people who approve of him still approve of him at any given time or whether some or all of them have changed their minds.

The example of Musk highlights that no matter how extensively someone with inflamed amour-propre meets their condition of worth, they are still left in a state of mind where they have to seek the regular approval of others which they are unable to do in a way that is satisfactory due to limitations of their nature.

3. Inauthenticity as the Personal Malady of Inflamed Amour-Propre

a. Inauthenticity

I define authenticity as a state in which one fulfils the following conditions:

- (1) one is aware of their emotional states, needs, and desires,
- (2) one takes themselves to be accountable to others in their interactions with them that involve such emotional states, needs, and desires,
- (3) one recognizes and respects the freedom of others,
- (4) one is aware and in acceptance of her own limitations.

Inauthenticity is the absence of one or more of these conditions.

The first three of these conditions are widely accepted in the scholarly literature as the defining elements of authenticity. The fourth condition is an element I add because I believe it helps provide a more complete understanding of authenticity.

The first condition of authenticity focuses on self-awareness. Three of the most popular accounts of authenticity that highlight this condition are those of Rousseau, Guignon and Rings. Rousseau argues that for one to be authentic, one must be the author of her own life, that is, the key decisions about her conduct must come from her introspection.⁵²

According to Rousseau, in order for one to make authentic decisions about her conduct, she must be able to notice her impulses, feelings and desires that guide her

⁵² See Rousseau, 2008.

conduct. Furthermore, she must be able to distinguish between impulses, feelings and desires that are in agreement with her central values from those that are in conflict with them.

This introspection and self-reflection requires the kind of self-awareness described in the first condition. Echoing Rousseau, Guignon agrees that in order to be authentic, one must be aware of her feelings, needs and desires.⁵³

In alignment with the self-awareness condition that Rousseau and Guignon emphasises, Rings argues that self-awareness is a requirement of authenticity because the conduct in question must be decided in the context of one's understanding of facts about her own past experiences, present motivations and future goals, therefore adding an epistemic criterion of self-knowledge to the conditions of authenticity.⁵⁴

The second condition of authenticity focuses on accountability relations to others. Here, I endorse Darwall's account of moral accountability which argues that accountability implies the authority to hold accountable.⁵⁵

According to Darwall, taking oneself to be accountable to others in one's interactions with them includes giving others the authority to hold one accountable in relevant situations.⁵⁶

If one believes that one is accountable for how one behaves in one's interactions with others as well as the consequences that result from the behaviour involved in such interactions, this itself is not enough to meet the condition of accountability. One must also accept that others can hold one to account, for instance demand an explanation, in relation to the behaviour and interactions in question.

⁵³ Guignon, 2008, 288.

⁵⁴ Rings, 2017.

⁵⁵ Darwall, 2007, 113-120.

⁵⁶ Darwall, 2007, 113-120.

One might argue that accountability is not a condition for authenticity. According to this objection, authenticity is about doing what one wishes with her life without reference to other people.

According to this objection, an example of an authentic person can be a person who abruptly leaves their wife and children to join a commune in a remote island after realising that he wishes to pursue such a lifestyle.

Similarly, people who follow their desire to cheat on their partners, violate laws that conflict with their personal preferences or neglect their children's care to pursue their hobbies can be considered authentic individuals. Authenticity, then, is doing what you want with your life without allowing others to impose expectations or demands on you that impact your actions.

The authentic individual does not hold themselves accountable to others at all. In fact, she does quite the opposite, refusing to accept such accountability altogether and viewing it as a constraint to living an authentic life which requires freeing oneself from the expectations of others.

There are various responses in the literature to this objection. The one I wish to highlight is that of Bauer who argues that authenticity is not only a condition that one can be in but also an ethical ideal.⁵⁷

According to Bauer, expressing one's individual personality and preferences is only one part, and importantly not the entirety, of authenticity. While such an individual expression is necessary for authenticity, authenticity also requires being a morally responsible person who can be held to account for their actions in relation to others. Neglecting one's key moral commitments to others in the name of individual pleasure is not an example of authenticity but an example of destructive self-centredness.

⁵⁷ Bauer, 2017.

The individuals who neglect or ignore their key moral commitments to others in the name of authenticity - such as those in the examples of the husband who leaves his wife and children to run away to a remote island, the person who violates laws that conflict his interests or the partner who cheats as he desires - cannot be considered authentic individuals because while expressing their individuality, they fail to meet the accountability condition of authenticity.

Including the condition of accountability in our definition of authenticity safeguards us against an ethical subjectivism that otherwise rises. In the absence of the accountability condition, authenticity runs the risk of becoming a condition that encourages anti-social, unethical, and destructive behaviour.

An understanding of authenticity that defines authenticity as doing what one wishes to do without any regard to one's accountability to others encourages destructive behaviour and conduct under the name of authenticity. Lasch highlights this worry, arguing that authenticity understood in this way can breed lack of empathy and destructive behaviour towards others.⁵⁸

For example, if authenticity is simply doing what one wishes to do without being held accountable by others, and one wishes to rape or murder others, then it is authentic for one to do so without being held accountable by others.

It seems to me that Lasch's conclusion provides a sufficient reason to revise our understanding of authenticity to include the accountability condition, therefore maintaining authenticity as an ideal while avoiding the worry of ethical subjectivism. For this reason, I include the accountability condition in my understanding of authenticity.

⁵⁸ See Lasch, 1979.

The third condition of authenticity focuses on recognizing and respecting the freedom of others. It supports a moralised understanding of authenticity where authenticity is not only about individual expression but also about the moral constraints around one's interactions with others. Three of the most prominent scholars that support this condition are Slater, Taylor and Sartre.

Slater argues that a crucial part of the authentic self is its interpersonal ties with others. According to Slater, the individual cannot be regarded as completely separate from her environment because this environment is part of the foundation of the self. The interpersonal bonds one has fundamentally influences the authentic self, therefore playing a crucial role in its making.⁵⁹ Part of being authentic is recognizing and respecting the role of others in the development of our self.

Similarly, Taylor argues that disregarding the demands of our interpersonal bonds is contradictory to authenticity.⁶⁰ According to Taylor, a fundamental condition of authenticity is the existence and maintenance of values, such as freedom, that constitute our collective moral compass. Recognizing and respecting the freedom of others is a condition for authenticity because without meeting this condition, we are not able to give expression to the part of ourselves that is influenced and formed by our ties with others.

Sartre endorses an account of authenticity that combines the first three of the conditions I describe in my understanding of authenticity.⁶¹ He argues that authenticity constitutes having a lucid consciousness of oneself (which I understand as self-awareness), assuming accountability to others in one's interactions with them (which I understand as taking oneself to be accountable to others), and accepting the

⁵⁹ Slater, 1970, 15.

⁶⁰ Taylor, 1991, 35.

⁶¹ Sartre, 1948, 90.

demands that such accountability makes (one of which, as Heter argues, is the demand of recognizing and respecting the freedom of others.)⁶²

The first three conditions of authenticity that I list are widely accepted in the scholarly literature on authenticity. In addition to these three conditions, I argue that it is important to add a fourth condition that focuses on being aware and in acceptance of one's own limitations.

The underlying premise of this argument is that for something to be authentic, it needs to be what its nature professes it to be. For something's nature to profess it to be that thing is for it to profess not to be other things, therefore putting particular constraints on the kind of thing it is. For example, the nature of water is such that it cannot boil below a certain temperature while the nature of wood is such that it cannot talk.

Similarly, the nature of humans is such that they are limited in particular ways. These limitations are a part of what constitutes a human, and therefore parts of one's being. In order for a human being to be authentic to themselves, she must be in awareness and in acceptance of these parts of herself that are determined by her nature. Adding this fourth condition accounts for the importance of such awareness and acceptance.

Authenticity and inauthenticity understood in relation to the four conditions I describe are not mental states that one either has or does not have. Instead, they are conditions that one can be in, which are a combination of a complex set of dispositions that can come in various degrees, meaning that one can have some degree of authenticity and some degree of inauthenticity at the same time.

⁶² Heter, 2006, 17.

For instance, one can be authentic with certain aspects of their life and not others. It is possible for one to be an authentic leader at work and an inauthentic partner in her romantic relationship.

One can be authentic, but only sometimes as opposed to the entire duration of their lifetime. For example, it is possible for one to be mostly authentic in their life while going through a particular period of time when they show signs of inauthenticity. Similarly, one can be mostly inauthentic during their lifetime, only showing occasional signs of authenticity in particular situations.

Authenticity and inauthenticity, then, are two extreme points of a scale of being a certain way in relation to the self and others. Between these two extreme points, there are many variations that incorporate different degrees of authenticity and inauthenticity.

The degree to which one is authentic depends on (a) how many of the conditions of authenticity one meets, and (b) how regularly one meets these conditions. The more conditions one meets, the more authentic she is at any given moment. The more regularly she meets them, the more authentic she is in a continuous sense. Similarly, the degree to which one is inauthentic is determined by how many of these conditions one fails to meet and how often she fails to meet them.

I argue that one of the main personal maladies of inflamed amour-propre, that is, one of the main reasons why inflamed amour-propre makes one's personal life go miserably, is inauthenticity understood in accordance with the account of authenticity described in this section.

Inflamed amour-propre pushes one toward inauthenticity as a result of particular effects its psychological basis and components have on one's ability to meet the conditions of authenticity.

b. Inauthenticity and The Psychological Foundation of Inflamed Amour-Propre

In what follows, I describe the way in which the psychological basis of inflamed amour-propre (inflamed self-perception and conditional worth) affect the conditions of authenticity in a way that pushes one toward inauthenticity.

i. Inauthenticity and Inflamed Self-Perception:

Inflamed self-perception, which is the belief that there are differences in moral value and one is a moral superior or inferior to others in accordance with such difference, interacts negatively with the second and third conditions of authenticity.

In regard to the second condition - which is that one takes oneself to be accountable to others - inflamed self-perception decreases one's incentive and ability to take accountability.

If one's inflamed self-perception is such that she believes she has superior moral value compared to others, then she does not have an incentive to be accountable to others who she believes are morally inferior.

Since others are not as morally valuable as her, the consequences that her actions might have on them don't matter as much, therefore decreasing the need for her to account for them. Furthermore, since others are morally inferior, they are not in a position to hold her, who is morally superior, to account.

In order to understand the reasoning behind the thought that there is a positive linear connection between one's incentive to take herself to be accountable to others and the moral value one believes the others in question have, it might be useful to consider the example of how humans treat animals.

Most people eat animals and support the meat industry which farms animals to slaughter them later on so that people can eat them. When asked why they act in a way that harms animals, a considerable number of people respond with the answer

that animals are not as morally valuable as humans, therefore decreasing the importance of how human actions might affect them.

Similarly, the incentive one has to take herself to be accountable for hitting a human with her car is significantly higher than the incentive she has to take herself accountable for hitting a deer with her car, provided that the car accident is caused by the driver's negligence.

For example, in the former case, one is obliged by law to take herself to be accountable to others for her actions. She is likely to face consequences for her actions, and how well she accounts for them has the possibility of impacting the harshness of such consequences.

In the latter case, however, she does not need to explain her actions to anyone. She does not face any consequences for her actions. The concern in such accidents tend to be prioritising the repair of one's car and filing insurance claims to pay for repairs instead of being held to account for the fact that one's actions have resulted in the injury or death of an animal.

At least part of the reasoning behind why we deal with claims of accountability in relation to harm caused to humans differently from claims of accountability in relation to harm caused to animals is that humans are perceived to be more morally valuable than animals.

It seems, then, that the way we perceive the concept of accountability and take ourselves to be accountable for our actions is such that whether we have an incentive to take ourselves to be accountable to others is linked to the extent to which we perceive them as morally valuable.⁶³

⁶³ I am not making the argument that this ought to be the case or that this is the morally preferable way to perceive the concept of responsibility. Instead, my argument is simply that,

morally inferior or cause harm to others that might constitute a violation of their freedom such as preventing them from taking on certain roles, making them work in dangerous environments, or even physically abuse them.

ii. Inauthenticity and Conditional Worth:

Conditional worth, which is the belief that the moral value one has is dependent upon her meeting particular conditions, interacts negatively with the first condition of authenticity, which is that one is aware of her emotional states, needs and desires.

The nature of conditional worth is such that one does not have to know that she has conditional worth in order to have it. Since conditions of worth are developed during the early stages of life, it is possible for one to develop conditional worth without knowing that she is developing conditional worth, and then go on with her life feeling worthless unless she meets particular conditions but never realise that there are particular conditions she is attaching to her moral worth.

Unless the individual recognizes that there is a problem with her understanding of her moral value and decides to investigate this problem by seeking psychotherapy or otherwise educating herself about her own psychology of individual worth, she might never realise that she holds an unconscious belief of conditional worth.

Since the belief of conditional worth is such that it can, and often is, held unconsciously, it interferes with the first condition of authenticity to be aware of one's emotional states, needs and desires.

Although conditional worth itself is not an emotional state, need or a desire but instead a belief, it is a belief that gives rise to emotional states, needs or desires. Due to the unconscious nature of conditional worth, one might not be able to make rational sense of emotional states, needs and desires that might come out of her conditional worth. It is in this sense that conditional worth allows for a lack of awareness of one's emotional states, needs and desires.

c. Inauthenticity and The Components of Inflamed Amour-Propre

In what follows, I describe the way in which two among the three components of inflamed amour-propre, which are inflamed concern for evaluation and inflamed concern for respect, push one toward inauthenticity.

i. Inauthenticity and Inflamed Concern for Evaluation:

Inflamed concern for evaluation, which is a desire that others believe that one is morally superior or inferior, interacts negatively with the fourth condition of authenticity, pushing her towards inauthenticity.

The fourth condition of authenticity is that one is aware and in acceptance of her own limitations. The desire that others believe that she is morally superior or inferior is incompatible with the limitations of time and epistemic access.

As explained earlier, humans do not have the epistemic access necessary to the minds of others to know what they think about them or whether they think about them at all. In the absence of such epistemic access, it requires a substantial amount of time that one does not have within the lifespan of a human being to find out what others think of us on a regular basis.

The person with inflamed concern for evaluation is either not aware of her limitations of time and epistemic access or she is not in acceptance of these limitations of her nature. Either way, the inflamed concern for evaluation prevents her from meeting the fourth condition of authenticity.

In the case that one is completely unaware that she has limited time in the world and limited access into the thoughts of others, then there is the possibility that she can change her attitude once this information becomes available to her, for instance, once someone tells her that she is a finite being with limited epistemic access.

The case of someone being truly unaware of these limitations, however, is rare. As I argued earlier, for most individuals, the problem is not that this information is unavailable to them, for instance that they truly do not know they are going to die at some point, but that they are not in acceptance of the information available.

When one is not in acceptance of the limitations of her nature, she is inauthentic because she attempts to live a life that is incongruent with who she is. The term “who she is” does not refer to her particular identity as a person but the fact that she is a human being. It is inauthentic for a human being to attempt to live otherwise than she is, a human being.

ii. Inauthenticity and Inflamed Concern for Respect:

Inflamed concern for respect, which is a desire that others recognize one as a moral superior or inferior, and practically orient themselves in accordance with this moral superiority or inferiority is incompatible with the third and fourth conditions of authenticity.

Inflamed concern for respect is incompatible with the third condition of authenticity because it makes one fail to respect the freedom of others. It is important to note, however, that failing to respect the freedom of others does not necessarily require engaging in an action to violate the freedom of others.

For example, one can think she is morally superior to her neighbours but be powerless to do anything about this belief. Even though she does not have any actual power to act on her belief that her neighbours are her inferiors, it would still be true that if she had the opportunity to force them into submission, then she would because she believes they are morally inferior.

Even though she is powerless to violate their freedom, she is nevertheless not a respecter of their freedom because she does not recognize it and given the opportunity she would willingly violate it.

People with inflamed amour-propre have a psychological intention in relation to the third condition not because they are in an opportunity to violate the freedom of others and then they do actually violate the freedom of others but because given the opportunity they would, which is sufficient to fail to respect the freedom of others.

Furthermore, inflamed concern for respect is incompatible with the fourth condition of authenticity, which is that one is aware and in acceptance of her own limitations. Similar to the inflamed concern for evaluation, inflamed concern for respect requires one to either lack awareness or acceptance of the limitations imposed on her by her nature, therefore resulting in her attempting to live in ways that are against her nature.

While inflamed concern for evaluation asks that others value one as an unequal, inflamed concern for respect goes beyond such a demand, also asking that others shape their actions around the recognition of this inequality. Therefore, although both are outside the boundaries of human nature, inflamed concern for respect requires even more time and epistemic access to achieve than inflamed concern for evaluation.

Although quantifying this is outside the scope of this research, ensuring that others act a certain way in addition to ensuring that they think a certain way requires the kind of time that certainly exceeds the normal lifespan of a human being, while knowing how others are acting on a regular basis is impossible due to the lack of epistemic access one has into their lives.

One of the main reasons inflamed amour-propre makes one miserable on a personal level is that it confines her to this state of inauthenticity where she attempts to live in ways that are incompatible with her nature.

d. Objection and Response

i. Objection:

One may argue that my inauthenticity-based account of the personal malady of inflamed amour-propre does not do much other than repeat the content of alienation based accounts of inflamed amour-propre.

According to this objection, inauthenticity and self-alienation describe the same phenomenon. This makes my account unnecessary because there already are various alienation-based accounts of inflamed amour-propre in the literature that explain the malady of inflamed amour-propre in terms of self-alienation.

Some examples of such accounts are those of Wood, Hardimon and Jaeggi. While these accounts vary in their definition of alienation, they generally agree that alienation is a cause of many social ills, one of which can be a desire to seek superiority over others.

Wood conceives of alienation as a separation between a subject and an object, for instance the self or others, which properly belong together.⁶⁴ According to Hardimon, on the other hand, there are two kinds of alienation which must be analysed separately: objective alienation and subjective alienation.⁶⁵

Jaeggi criticises these accounts of alienation, arguing that they compromise the strength of our understanding of alienation because they either commit to objectivist accounts of what constitutes a good life or essentialist accounts of the self that claim the existence of a self that is separate from and develops prior to one's interaction with the outside world.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Wood, 2004, 3.

⁶⁵ Hardimon, 1994, 119–122.

⁶⁶ Jaeggi, 2014, 40.

Jaeggi introduces her own account of alienation which does not rely on objectivist or essentialist commitments. She defines alienation as a failure to interpret one's own desires and play an active role in shaping one's interactions with others.⁶⁷

According to Jaeggi, alienation manifests itself in a feeling of being incapable of influencing one's life, as if she is not an active participant but a passive passenger in her own life.⁶⁸

On this account, alienation is not a disconnection between one's inner self and its outer expression to the external world. Instead, it is a psychological disruption of one's relation with herself and others that prevents her from properly influencing her actions in the world.

Overall, the objection in question concludes that - since self-alienation is the same phenomenon as inauthenticity and there are many plausible accounts of self-alienation in the current literature - my account does not contribute a novel perspective to the literature.

According to alienation based accounts of inflamed amour-propre, inflamed amour-propre initiates and maintains the various psychological pressures and problems that lead to alienation which then makes the individual's personal life go miserably. This state of alienation is the same condition that the individual experiences when she becomes inauthentic. Consequently, the terms alienation and inauthenticity can be used interchangeably to describe the same personal malady of inflamed amour-propre.

ii. Response:

I argue that while it is true that inflamed amour-propre may lead to self-alienation, self-alienation is a separate phenomenon than inauthenticity. Therefore,

⁶⁷ Jaeggi 2014, 40.

⁶⁸ Jaeggi, 2014, 43-50.

self-alienation accounts of the personal malady of inflamed amour-propre fail to address concerns over inauthenticity. Instead, there is a need for a distinct account of inflamed amour-propre that explains the personal malady of inflamed amour-propre in terms of inauthenticity. This is precisely what my account provides.

On my account, self-alienation and inauthenticity are two distinct conditions that a person can be in. While self-alienation distances the individual from herself, inauthenticity distances her from her nature as a human being. Self-alienation is a clash between different problems and processes of an individual's psychology while inauthenticity is a clash between what is possible for the individual as a human being.

As understood by Jaeggi, self-alienation is an internal psychological problem. It's a conflict between different mental states, beliefs, and dispositions that one has where one no longer feels like herself due to contradictory mental states, beliefs, and dispositions she experiences at any given time. Therefore, she becomes unable to influence her own life. Instead of an active decision-maker in her own life, she becomes a passive participant.

While this account of alienation does not presuppose the existence of a true inner self prior to one's interactions with others, it is nevertheless the case that - at least in the case of mentally healthy individuals, people tend to have key life projects, values, personality traits and personal goals that give sense to their life and create a sense of personal identity as a unique individual that constitutes them at a given time.

When asked who one is at any given time, for instance, she might respond by identifying key aspects of her lifestyle, values and personal goals as defining aspects of her identity in order to describe who she believes she is as a person.

On the other hand, when one becomes alienated from herself, she finds herself doing things and engaging in actions that contradict the ways in which she defines

herself. Through various psychological pressures and processes, she starts acting contrary to her key life projects, values and personal goals.

She becomes incapable of making active decisions that intentionally guide her life towards directions that she wishes to go. It is still her who acts in such ways, however, the ways in which she acts is incompatible with her sense of self.

The problem with alienation - at least, as Jaeggi understands it, is that one fails to influence the important aspects of her own life due to a disruption of her relationship with herself and the world. If we think about one's life as a road, alienation can be described as sitting in the passenger seat and passively waiting to see where the car drives instead of driving the car yourself, therefore making the important decisions such as what routes to take and where to go.

The problem with authenticity, however, isn't that one is incapable of influencing one's own life due to a disruption of her relationship with herself or others. It is that the structure of the goals one pursues are such that they are unattainable due to limitations of human nature. Inauthenticity, then, is not an internal psychological conflict the individual has within herself but an external psychological conflict one has between herself and the human condition.

For example, one is self-alienated if she strongly believes that it is not in alignment with her personal values to cheat on her partner and then she cheats on her partner. In this situation, she engages in an activity that goes against the way she defines herself as a person, and this points out an inner conflict within this individual. She does things that are unlike her, in the sense that they are things that are incompatible with her personal identity.

Inauthenticity, on the other hand, is when an individual is (1) not aware of her emotional states, needs and desires, (2) does not take responsibility for her actions, (3)

does not recognize and respect the freedom of others, and (4) is not aware and in acceptance of her own limitations. As explained earlier, the more of these conditions she fulfils, the more inauthentic she is. A person who is completely inauthentic fully fulfils all four of these conditions.

In relation to the fourth condition, an individual who denies her own limitations is inauthentic because she denies what is impossible for her, and attempts to become something she can never become, something that is outside the laws of her nature.

An individual demanding to attain something that requires an infinite amount of time, for instance, is demanding something that is not possible for a human being to achieve because the nature of the human condition is such that human beings have limited time in life.

An individual who makes such a demand is analogous to a human being who desires to become God. A desire that requires the complete abandonment of one's nature as a human, a kind of abandonment that is impossible due to the limitations of that same nature itself.

Furthermore, self-alienation is a subjective condition. It is about the individual who is experiencing psychological problems and therefore acting contrary to her own description of herself. Inauthenticity, on the other hand, is also about the fact that it's a fact about us humans that we are unable to achieve a particular goal.

In the case of inauthenticity, the individual who is subjected to a particular fact due to being human is denying this fact and attempting to act as if she can achieve a goal that is unattainable. In asking for what is impossible for her, she is denying a part of herself that is authentic to her being, and therefore confining herself to a state of inauthenticity.

My inauthenticity account of inflamed amour-propre makes a novel contribution to the literature on inflamed amour-propre by providing an explanation for the individual phenomenology of inflamed amour-propre in terms of inauthenticity which is a distinct condition from alienation.

CONCLUSION

My main goal in this thesis was to argue that, according to my account of the nature of amour-propre, one of the main personal maladies of inflamed amour-propre is inauthenticity.

In Chapter 1, I introduced my account of the nature of amour-propre. First, I argued that the general characteristics of amour-propre that an account of the nature of amour-propre must explain are the presupposition of self-perception, the demand for external validation, action guidance and plasticity.

Second, I argued that these general characteristics are explained in terms of three basic desires which constitute amour-propre: amour de soi, the concern for evaluation and the concern for respect.

Third, I argued that my account of the nature of amour-propre is preferable to that of Kolodny. I concluded that amour de soi, the concern for evaluation and the concern for respect together constitute amour-propre and explain its general characteristics.

In Chapter 2, I introduced my account of the psychological basis of amour-propre. First, I argued that the first component of the psychological basis of amour-propre is self-perception which comes in two forms: inflamed self-perception and egalitarian self-perception.

Second, I argued that the second component of the psychological basis of amour-propre is individual worth which comes in two forms: self-worth and conditional worth.

Third, I argued that self-perception and individual worth interact with each other in particular ways to produce the environment for the development of inflamed amour-propre and egalitarian amour-propre. I concluded that the psychological basis of egalitarian amour-propre is the combination of egalitarian self-perception and conditional worth while the psychological basis of inflamed amour-propre is inflamed self-perception and conditional worth.

In Chapter 3, I argued that when inflamed amour-propre is understood within the context of my account of the nature of amour-propre and the psychological basis of amour-propre, one of the main personal maladies of inflamed amour-propre is inauthenticity.

First, I argued that two particular limitations of human nature - time and epistemic access - put constraints on one's ability to pursue the demands of inflamed amour-propre.

Second, I argued that attempting to pursue the demands of inflamed amour-propre in the face of these limitations is a denial of human nature.

Third, I argued that such a denial of human nature confines one to the condition of inauthenticity, making inauthenticity one of the main personal maladies of inflamed amour-propre.

Finally, I argued that inauthenticity is a distinct phenomena from alienation. There is a need in the literature for a separate account of the personal malady of inflamed amour-propre that addresses inauthenticity because the existing accounts of

the personal malady of inflamed amour-propre focus mainly on alienation which is a phenomenon that is different from inauthenticity.

I conclude that my thesis addresses this gap in the literature and provides a novel account that addresses inauthenticity as one of the main maladies of inflamed amour-propre.

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