Sung, Leora Urim;
(2023)
Saving the Greater Number: Arguments from Rationality.
Doctoral thesis (Ph.D), UCL (University College London).
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Abstract
Most people have the intuition that, given the choice between saving many people or only a few, we ought to save the greater number (SGN). However, several philosophers have argued against this intuition. This thesis develops and defends arguments in support of SGN which avoid appealing to the notions that these philosophers are likely to reject. My arguments appeal to what we are rationally required to do given certain moral requirements on our attitudes. First, I argue that, unless we are absolutely certain that SGN is wrong, we are rationally required to save the many rather than the few. This is because we morally ought to be conscientious, and when we are, saving the many weakly dominates saving the few. Second, I argue that we morally ought to desire that everyone is saved, and that, given this desire, other things equal, we are rationally required to choose to save the greater number. By endorsing a rational rather than a moral requirement to save the many, we can explain away some of the counterintuitive implications that SGN has in certain situations. And doing so also allows us to take a novel position in the debate about effective altruism, by supporting a conditional rational obligation to give to the most effective charities. I end the thesis by considering whether we are obligated to give to charity at all. I argue that, given that we tend to display near-future bias, our duties of aid may be more demanding than we tend to think. This is because giving to charity usually entails a reduction in our distant-future well-being rather than in our immediate well-being. This conclusion calls into question the morality of saving up to secure our distant future at the expense of the current suffering of those in poverty.
| Type: | Thesis (Doctoral) |
|---|---|
| Qualification: | Ph.D |
| Title: | Saving the Greater Number: Arguments from Rationality |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | Copyright © The Author 2023. Original content in this thesis is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) Licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/). Any third-party copyright material present remains the property of its respective owner(s) and is licensed under its existing terms. Access may initially be restricted at the author’s request. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10174353 |
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