Dominance: The Desire for Social Power, and its Ramifications on Unethical Behavior

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Declaration

I, Kyoo Hwa Kim, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

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Date

21st June 2022

Abstract

Social power has long been associated with unethical behavior. This thesis sought to contribute to the understanding of how power corrupts by conducting experimental and correlational studies with a focus on ecological validity. The examination of individual differences was conducted in tandem with the natural acquisition of power. Likewise, the examination of situational influences was accompanied by the consideration of the common experiences of the powerful. Firstly, dominance, an individual difference intertwined with the desire for power, but a concept that is discrete from power, was associated with increased unethical behavior, such as cheating in die throws and puzzles, and breaking of Covid-19 containment rules (Chapter 2). The tendency of the powerful to engage in dishonesty was explained by the concentration of dominant individuals occupying the top of social hierarchies. The association between dominance and unethical behavior extended to engaging in questionable research practices (QRPs) among students and career academics (Chapter 3). This link emerged for aggressive conceptions of dominance, but less so for softer facets of dominance, such as leadership motivation. Evidence supporting the hypothesis that power amplifies dominant individuals' propensity to engage in dishonesty was not found (Chapters 2 & 4). Secondly, the unique effects of power were examined. Power did not boost dishonesty, in either morally ambiguous, or clear decisions (Chapter 5). Nevertheless, compared to the powerless, the powerful displayed more dishonest behavior in gain frames (to pursue a positive outcome), suggesting that the frequent exposure to gain frames for the powerful may explain why the powerful seem to engage in unethical behavior. In loss frames (to avoid a negative outcome), dishonesty was high regardless of power levels (Chapter 6). Lastly, meta-analyses revealed close connections between individualism (perceiving

individuals as independent from the group), dominance, and dishonesty (Chapter 7).

Overall, this thesis established that dominance predicts dishonesty. The influence of

dominance was present controlling for numerous associated variables including social

power, individualism, and was not easily amplified by situational or personal factors.

Furthermore, power did not trigger unethical behavior. The association between power

and unethical behavior in natural settings was explained by the over-representation of

dominant individuals at the top.

Keywords: dominance, social power, dishonesty, power affordance, gain/loss
frame, individualism

Impact Statement

The current research set out to explain the common perception that power leads to unethical behavior. I investigated dominance, an individual difference that is associated with the desire to climb the social hierarchy to gain influence and personal advantages. It was demonstrated that dominance is a stronger predictor of unethical behavior than social power, and that dominant individuals are over-represented in positions of power in ecological settings. This finding adds to the list of individual differences that are associated with malevolent behavior, and contributes to research on power attainment. More importantly, for organizations looking to improve individual behavior, a careful re-examination of the promotion processes, including competition or self-selection, may be necessary.

Dominance predicted the breaking of Covid-19 containment rules. The influence of professional power on rule-breaking became non-existent when dominance was accounted for. The pervasive disregard for Covid-19 containment rules demonstrated by the upper echelons of U.K. politics may be due to the types of individuals that rise to power, and not the effect of power itself.

Questionable research practices (QRPs) undermine the value of and trust in science. An association between dominance and reliance on QRPs was identified among academics in psychology and students in various fields. Perceptions of prevalence and relaxed attitudes towards research integrity were characteristic for dominant individuals, and justified their behavior. These findings provide insight into the role of the person in research misconduct, an under-examined area compared to situational factors such as performance pressure. In addition, the inclusion of student populations raises novel considerations for research training in higher education. The observation that dominant academics engage in QRPs, while academics high on

prestige attain career success, may enlighten dominant academics who are tempted to engage in QRPs in the belief that it will lead to career success.

Amid multiple facets of dominance, the display of aggressive and forceful behavior was the strongest predictor of unethical tendencies. Subjective feelings of prestige, and leadership motivation did not lead to an increase in unethical behavior. Individualism (perceiving individuals to be discrete from the group) was closely aligned with dominance. These findings inform personality researchers of the overlaps between individual differences concerned with social standings, and the boundary conditions under which misconduct occurs, such as the distinction between aggressiveness and assertiveness.

The powerful displayed heightened dishonesty compared to the powerless when they were pursuing a potential positive outcome (gain frame). Such differences in dishonesty across power levels were not detected under loss frames (striving to circumvent a possible negative outcome). This finding is particularly meaningful as the powerful frequently encounter gain frames in natural settings. For organizations, this is a demonstration of the moral implications of goal framing (e.g., targets), for its executives and managers.

The key findings of the current thesis support and validate the claim that power corrupts, but for reasons not caused by power. What sets the current research apart is how it sought to consolidate empirical findings with the natural environment, by considering the surroundings of the powerful, and the kind of people that society afford power to.

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Finally, M – Thank you for letting me try, and persisting with me.

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Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. Preface

Cases of dishonest and unethical behavior among the powerful are common. Cyclist Lance Armstrong engaged in doping for many years. He then used his position of influence to aggressively bully those who called out his behavior. Elizabeth Holmes, the founder and CEO of the fallen start-up company Theranos, lied to and misled investors and patients about the effectiveness of the company's technology. She used her connections with prominent business and political leaders to exert influence, suing and firing numerous whistle-blowers. More recently, leaders of the British government have received widespread condemnation by flouting the rules set up to contain the spread of Covid-19 and hosting parties. Behaviors such as these incur social damage, including the erosion of justice, and the loss of social trust and mobility. Not surprisingly, social scientists, the media, and the public have devoted a great deal of effort trying to understand the links between power and unethical behavior, and in particular, dishonesty. The present thesis investigates the role of an individual difference associated with power, trait dominance.

Transparency International defines corruption as 'The abuse of entrusted power for private gain' (Pope, 2000), implying that corruption is often a by-product and consequence of social power (Bendahan et al., 2015; Giurge et al., 2019). Plenty of evidence documents a linear and uniform effect of power, whereby the acquisition of power leads to a deterioration in moral standards (Case & Maner, 2015; Foulk et al., 2018; see also Kipnis, 1972). This seems logical, as the powerful are given greater discretion and autonomy, and possess the resources, opportunities and ability that make corruption possible should they wish to engage in it.

However, direct empirical evidence that social power leads to unethical behavior is mixed, inconsistent, and nuanced (Lammers et al., 2015; Lindsey et al., 2011), and the mechanisms and boundary conditions are not yet fully understood. It remains possible that transgressions of the powerful are simply more visible due to power holders' oversized influence and prominence. People in positions of power make more decisions that have social ramifications compared to those not in power positions. That is, the narrative of the powerful engaging in unethical behavior could be an illusory correlation (Fiedler, 1991; Hamilton & Sherman, 1989), rather than a real effect.

Existing research on power and unethical behavior has predominantly focused on individual differences or situational influences (Trevino, 1986). This refers to attributing (often bad) behavior to either innate traits of the actor (individual differences, Lee-Chai et al., 2001; D'Souza & Lima, 2015), or the environment that the actor operates under (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999; Zimbardo, 1973). At times this debate is referred to as bad apples versus rotten barrels. Both sides can provide insight, albeit at different times (Fleeson, 2004). The current thesis seeks to integrate both sides of the debate, by delving into the types of people power is afforded to in the competitive social hierarchy, and the priorities of such people who rise up to positions of power. Individual difference dominance is discussed in detail. In this line of enquiry, power would simply be a correlate of dishonesty, or a moderator. This is the first question the thesis will address.

Interestingly, the powerful and powerless seem to engage in different types of unethical behavior, in line with the specific aims and desires that stem from the power differences they experience (Dubois et al., 2015; Trautmann et al., 2013). This adds an extra layer of inconsistency to the power holder's propensity to act unethically. The

second aim of the thesis is to identify the boundary conditions under which power uniquely triggers dishonesty, independent of predispositions, and explore underlying mechanisms.

Before presenting the empirical chapters, I will first review the literature on power, power motivation among the dominant, unethical behavior, and goal pursuit. The first section of the introduction will cover literature investigating the association between power and unethical tendencies, including dishonesty and self-serving biases. I divide this section into three intertwined parts; the influence of the person, the situation, and the construal of the power role. In the second section, I discuss dominance in detail, including its multi-faceted nature and the ways in which dominance is closely connected to, but discrete from situational power. In the section that follows, I describe existing research on the facilitators of unethical behavior, focusing on dishonest behavior in particular. While this section does not refer directly to power research, it provides insight on the factors that precede and explain unethical behavior. In the fourth section, I discuss the effect of power on goal pursuit. By reviewing prominent theories of social power, I discuss the unique consequences of power, and derive how power affects attention, cognition, and behavior. The two sections together provide clues to which facilitators of unethical behavior may differentially trigger power holders. Lastly, the final section of the introduction will outline the research question and provide an overview of the six empirical chapters that follow.

The triggers of power abuse are complex. Both power affordance and goal orientation of the powerful are crucial in extending the understanding of when and why the powerful disproportionately display unethical behavior. The overarching aim of the thesis is to contribute to the person-situation debate of power abuse, in a way

that is closely aligned with people's actual decision-making processes and behavior within the social hierarchy.

1.2. Does Power Corrupt?

Power has been defined in the social sciences as the ability to produce intended effects, for instance, to have an impact on the social environment (Russell, 1938), and carry out one's wishes in the face of resistance (Deprét & Fiske, 1993). People in positions of power and authority exercise their power according to their personal, organizational, or societal goals, often in ways that best suit their vision and priorities.

Power can be grabbed or granted through multiple avenues (de Waal-Andrews et al., 2015). Power can materialize as a result of a person's desire to have power, access to resources, expertise, or other socially influential and desirable features. Generally, society has moved on from force-based hierarchical structures toward socially consented power (Hamilton & Biggart, 1985). Power has been increasingly awarded to people who advance the collective goals of groups and provide shared vision (ten Brinke & Keltner, 2020). Yet, alongside legitimized processes, power-grabbing through conflict, or competition remain common (Overbeck et al., 2010).

Structural or formal power, such as organizational seniority, tangible economic resources or social class, are not always necessary for an individual to hold power. What is more important is that the individual is able to produce desired changes in others. Nevertheless, power frequently emerges through resource control (Fiske, 1993), as control of resources signify the *potential* to influence (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007). As such, an asymmetric control over resources often signifies power, as long as the resource is meaningful to those who depend on the power holder. A meaningful resource could be any tangible or intangible means that others rely on, need, and value

(Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Power holders can exert influence with harsh means (punishments, rewards), soft means (expertise, status) (French Jr & Raven, 1959), and the creation of coalitions or strategies (organizational politics, Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974).

1.2.1. Power and Unethical Inclinations

Power's relationship with unethical tendencies is well documented. This may be related to power holders' uninhibited behavior stemming from their lack of dependence on others. Power orients individuals to behave in an unconstrained, automatic way, and focus on rewards (Keltner et al., 2003). Power holders are more likely to take action (Galinsky et al., 2003). Manifestations of such inclinations include behavior such as eating more, with greater abandon (Galinsky et al., 2003; Keltner et al., 2003). Another is that power holders are less likely to conform to social norms and constraints (Hays & Goldstein, 2015). People even confer higher status to individuals who display non-conforming, rule-breaking behavior (Van Kleef et al., 2011). This is explained by perceiving non-conforming individuals as having more autonomy (Bellezza et al., 2014), which itself is a form of power (Lammers et al., 2016).

Power is associated with dehumanizing (Lammers & Stapel, 2011) and objectifying others (Gruenfeld et al., 2008), which may explain why powerful men display sexual aggression (Bargh et al., 1995) and patronizing behavior towards subordinates (Vescio et al., 2005). In addition, the powerful exhibit higher levels of prejudice (Guinote et al., 2010) and stereotyping (Fiske, 1993). Some studies found direct evidence between power and self-serving tendencies. In a controlled experiment, participants assigned to leader roles demonstrated selfish behavior by taking more from common resources, compared to participants assigned to follower

roles (de Cremer & van Dijk, 2005). Another study found higher levels of lying in a die throw linked to monetary gains among participants induced to feel powerful, compared to those induced to feel powerless (Lammers, Stapel, et al., 2010). In this study, powerful participants were more condemning of others' lying behavior, exhibiting hypocrisy (Lammers, Stapel, et al., 2010). Other studies revealed that higher socio-economic status (SES), a construct associated with power and social rank through the control of resources, directly predicts unethical behavior (Piff et al., 2012, but see Jung et al., 2023; Stamos et al., 2020). This was observed in a wide array of situations including the breaking of road safety rules, lying in negotiations, incentivised die rolls, and stealing from work. The tendency for individuals high in SES to engage in unethical behavior was especially pronounced when there was a large inequality in the distribution of those resources (Côté et al., 2015).

Evidence discussed thus far supports the corruptibility of power. Yet, the responsibilities that come with positions of power can lead to compassionate behaviors rather than exploitive behaviors (Cartwright & Zander, 1968, as cited by Jurkiewicz & Brown, 2000). Indeed, there is a long list of studies where power's influence on unethical behavior is absent, or where power is associated with ethical tendencies. A survey with employed adults in the U.S. saw no differences between supervisors and subordinates in their previous use of, and intentions to use deception. Supervisors, however, underestimated their subordinates' ability to lie (Lindsey et al., 2011). A study of CEOs showed that their desire for power positively correlates with *higher* levels of ethical reasoning (Jurkiewicz & Brown, 2000). Turning to empirical evidence, in a controlled experiment, participants primed with power took more action compared to the powerless, regardless of whether their action entailed taking from or contributing to a common resource pool (Galinsky et al., 2003). This suggests that

power leads to heightened action that is neutral on moral inclinations. In another study, the powerful were more willing to provide truthful feedback, because they were less concerned about conforming (Galinsky et al., 2008).

In a similar vein, Dubois and colleagues found that power leads to selfish behavior, which is different from unethical behavior (Dubois et al., 2015). For example, in one of their experiments, participants were assigned to high, neutral, or low power conditions. Half of the participants subsequently answered their likelihood of lying for self-benefit, while the other half answered their likelihood of lying on behalf of another person. This was across a number of contexts, such as school assignments and personal paperwork. There was no main effect of power, demonstrating that power does not lead to increased lying. However, there was an interaction, in a way that indicated that high power led to lying for self-benefit, while low power participants were more likely to lie for others.

This leads to the idea that power's corrupting influence may depend on the type of unethical behavior**.** For example, survey data from employees found that supervisors are more likely to lie by controlling information, while subordinates are more likely to lie in order to get time off (Lindsey et al., 2011). A large population survey of Dutch adults showed no difference between social classes in general ethical tendencies (Trautmann et al., 2013). The powerful, however, were more likely to engage in certain types of unethical behavior, such as cheating on taxes, and committing adultery (Trautmann et al., 2013; see also Lammers et al., 2011). These examples highlight that the motives for unethical behavior differ between the powerful and powerless. Arguably, power is neither ennobling nor innately corruptive (Lasswell & Rogow, 1963), and how power is exercised would depend on the goal of the individual, that is influenced by numerous factors.

Direct evidence examining the mechanisms underlying power's bias towards unethical behavior can be divided largely into three perspectives. These are individual differences (bad apple), the situation that renders such behavior more likely (rotten barrel), and how power is understood by the power holder and their subordinates. These perspectives are not discrete, and dynamically interact with one another. For example, predispositions can influence how a power holder views their power. In the next section, each perspective is discussed.

1.2.2. Person, Situation, and Construal of Power

Firstly, the predispositions of power holders play an important role in their ethical conduct. This could be independent of the experience of power, or influence how one exercises their power. Self-centred personalities are strongly associated with power abuse (Lee-Chai et al., 2001). For example, entitlement - the pervasive and one-sided view that one deserves more than others regardless of one's ability or effort (Campbell et al., 2004) - is a predictor of dishonesty (Stiles et al., 2018), and self-benefits at the cost of others (de Cremer & van Dijk, 2005). Crucially, entitled individuals are motivated to attain status (Lange et al., 2019). They strive to acquire dominance and prestige (Lange et al., 2019), which are avenues for social ascent (Maner & Case, 2016).

Dispositional relationship orientations influence ethical conduct among the powerful. Chen and colleagues found that exchange-oriented individuals (those who try to maintain a balance in benefits and ensure they get their fair share) used power for selfish ends. In comparison, the communally-oriented (willing to benefit others) responded to power in socially responsible ways (Chen et al., 2001; see Guinote et al., 2012; Lee-Chai et al., 2001). Such divergence in ethical conduct was driven by different goals that were activated by power. Exchange-oriented individuals linked

power with self-interest goals, whereas for communally-oriented individuals, power activated responsibility goals (Chen et al., 2001).

The sense of power, or subjective power, refers to the degree to which one feels powerful or powerless on a moderately consistent basis (Anderson et al., 2012). It is a baseline individual difference that is often independent of formal or structural power afforded externally by the situation. Heightened sense of power is associated with increased cheating, such as in self-reports of die throws for financial gain (Haselhuhn & Wong, 2012). Moreover, a high sense of power can be accompanied by decreased feelings of empathy for others, which may explain their tendency to cheat. In one study (van Kleef et al., 2008), participants interacted with a partner who disclosed their past experiences of suffering. Upon hearing their partner's experience, those who had a high (versus low) sense of power reported to have experienced less distress and compassion. This was accompanied by physiological responses that protected them, and inhibited emotional responses towards their partner's distress. The findings were explained by the decreased need to affiliate with others, and was not due to a deterioration in emotion decoding accuracy (van Kleef et al., 2008). This line of reasoning argues that some individuals may be particularly predisposed to unethical behavior (see also Stellar et al., 2012). Consequently, power abuse may become more likely when these individuals come into positions of power, whether by chance, or by actively seeking out power. In such cases, an investigation into the kinds of individuals who rise into power positions becomes crucial in the detection of unethical behavior among the powerful.

Furthermore, the influence of predispositions on unethical behavior can be amplified due to power. Power provides the freedom to self-express, leading people to act more in line with their authentic inclinations (Guinote et al., 2002; Kraus et al.,

2011). For example, self-interested behavior, which is predicted by one's baseline level of moral awareness, was amplified under the experience of power (DeCelles et al., 2012). In this study, participants were reminded of their previous experience of power (versus control condition). Only those who had a low baseline level of moral identity distributed resources selfishly, and admitted to engaging in organizational deviances, such lying about working overtime (DeCelles et al., 2012). Thus far, I discussed literature examining the influence of the person in ethical conduct. Next, I examine the situational perspective.

Power abuse is closely tied to the environment, such as organizational culture, perceptions of permissibility, and checks on power. An example that came recently to the fore is the case of Harvey Weinstein in the entertainment industry and the subsequent #Me Too movement (Cobb & Horeck, 2018). Sexual harassment in the workplace is not just a result of power differences in a hierarchy (Pina et al., 2009), but a culmination of the organizational or industry-wide climate where permissive attitudes prompt the acceptance of such behavior (Fitzgerald et al., 1997). Conversely, cooperative contexts can shift power holders to become generous towards the powerless, because they feel socially responsible in such contexts (Handgraaf et al., 2008).

Systematic checks on power can shift behavior. The separation of powers under the United States Constitution (legislative, executive, and judicial) is one such tool. For organizations, the existence of a vigilant board can balance out a CEO's power, and lessen the negative effects on company performance often brought on by hubristic CEOs (Park et al., 2018). Power holders who receive candid feedback from subordinates on their performance and competence allocated resources less selfishly. This was explained by feelings of guilt invoked (Oc et al., 2015). Similarly, in-group

communication that impact the reputation of the powerful, such as gossip, reduces the risk of power abuse (Keltner et al., 2008).

In times of economic uncertainty or threat, people find dominant or authoritarian leaders more appealing, compared to respected and admired leaders (Kakkar & Sivanathan, 2017; van Kleef et al., 2021; but see Jiménez et al., 2020). In such situations, the public is more permissive of their leader's aggressive and morally questionable behavior. Similarly, aggression by the powerful, such as high status males, is at times perceived as socially acceptable (Porath et al., 2008). These findings together imply that unethical behavior by the powerful is not a stable cognitive process, but contextually malleable.

Lastly, the nature of power, or how power holders understand their power role, influence their ethical conduct. For instance, power can be perceived either as an opportunity to benefit the individual, or as a responsibility over the collective welfare of the group. When the powerful view their power as an opportunity, power is deemed more attractive (Sassenberg et al., 2012). At the same time, caring for others decreases (Sassenberg et al., 2014), along with the willingness to take advice from subordinates (De Wit et al., 2017). Another way of understanding power is to view power as the ability to influence others (social power), or as being free from others' control (personal power, Lammers et al., 2009). When the power holder perceives their power as influence over others, aggression and exploitation increases, but not when it is perceived as autonomy (Cislak et al., 2018). Both illustrate how the construal of the power role determines power holders' ethical behavior.

The ways in which power is awarded influence the nature of power. A common path to power entails competitive processes through self-selection or promotion into power positions. Historically however, some public positions of

influence, such as magistrates or judges, were randomly appointed (e.g., sortition in Ancient Greece) or rotated (Mccormick, 2006), as it was seen as a vital way to increase humility among the powerful (Duxbury, 2020). Supporting this idea, a controlled experiment demonstrated that leaders who were appointed randomly displayed significantly less hubris compared to those selected competitively (Berger et al., 2020). In a similar vein, in hierarchies where power is grabbed rather than granted, force based agentic behavior is a better predictor of power compared to communal behavior such as popular appeal (de Waal-Andrews et al., 2015), demonstrating the divergence in behavior according to the type of power affordance.

Illegitimate power (Lammers, 2009) loosens, and at times even reverses many characteristics associated with power. When the powerful feel their power is illegitimate or under threat, they are not as approach-oriented (Lammers et al., 2008). Instances of hypocritical behavior (Lammers, Stapel, et al., 2010), stereotyping (Rodriguez-Bailon et al., 2000) and self-serving behavior (de Cremer & van Dijk, 2005) are reduced. They are more likely to conform to social norms (Hays & Goldstein, 2015). For instance, when the powerful face a threat to their ego (Fast & Chen, 2009), or to the stability of their position, they are likely to experience a mismatch between personal goals (e.g., maintain power) and that of the group which they lead (Maner, 2017). When such a conflict arises, some power holders choose to sacrifice group goals for the sake of maintaining their power (Williams, 2014; Wisse & Rus, 2012), by engaging in aggression and self-serving behavior. This tendency is especially strong for leaders high in trait dominance (Maner & Mead, 2010), demonstrating that individual differences and the nature of power roles can interact to influence unethical behavior.

To summarize, power has long been associated with unethical inclinations. The inconsistencies in evidence have led to a deeper examination of the reasons why the powerful would act unethically. I discussed the three main perspectives that explain unethical behavior among the powerful (individual differences, situation, and the nature of power). All three perspectives assist in the understanding of dishonesty among the powerful, at times amplifying or deterring the effects of one another. The advantage of examining unethical behavior through discrete frames such as these, is that often findings are clear and easy to comprehend. However, exploring one perspective at a time, independent of the others will not allow for an integrated understanding of the three perspectives. Throughout the thesis, I seek to focus on how these perspectives are interwoven with one another. The next section combines the person perspective with power affordance. I examine the type of individuals that are biased towards unethical behavior, that are also likely to rise to positions of power in ecological settings. Specifically, dominance, both as a trait or displayed behavior, is discussed.

1.3. Dominance and the Desire for Power

A growing number of societies have moved on from force based absolute authoritarian structures toward legitimized power based on social consent. Nowadays, power is more likely than not to be afforded to people who advance the collective interests of groups (Carney, 2020; Keltner et al., 2008; ten Brinke & Keltner, 2020). Across political, religious, educational or organizational settings, power provides an important and necessary function (Hamilton & Biggart, 1985; Parsons, 1957; 1970), as power holders manage and organize people, provide vision, and make decisions for the shared benefit of the group. Nevertheless, alongside legitimized processes, power grabbing through acts of conflict and coercion remain common (Overbeck et al.,

2010), especially in competitive and performance-oriented settings, such as corporations (Charness et al., 2014), sports (Van Yperen et al., 2011), and education (Choi et al., 2011). Even when power is granted through processes based on consensus, it is usually granted to those who put themselves forward. Therefore, in natural settings, selection into power roles is skewed towards certain types of individuals.

Certain demographics and individual traits (e.g., extraversion, Anderson et al., 2001) may be over-represented in positions of power. For instance, women showed a more pronounced preference towards roles that are associated with 'people' skills while shying away from roles perceived to require 'brawn', or physical strength (Lordan & Pischke, 2022). Individuals from lower social classes show less interest in positions of power, because they feel uncomfortable with engaging in political behavior (Belmi & Laurin, 2016). Hence, in order to better understand whether power leads to unethical behavior, it is important to distinguish between naturally occurring correlates of power and the actual effects of having power. In this case, an unexplored predisposition of the person in power would be the cause of unethical behavior, and not power itself.

Who rises to power? Some personalities are conducive to the attainment of advantageous positions in social networks (Fang et al., 2015). A meta-analysis that examined the relationship between individual traits and leadership found masculinity, dominance, and intelligence to be strong indicators of leadership attainment (Lord et al., 1986). In particular, dominance stands out among correlates of power, as it is closely related to not only the desire for and attainment of power (Mast et al., 2010), but also numerous self-serving and anti-social tendencies. Dominance refers to the propensity to exhibit aggressive and fearless behavior in interpersonal relationships in order to obtain social advantages (Barrick et al., 2002; Maner & Case, 2016). With a

desire to outperform others and express their will (de Waal, 1986; Mehta et al., 2008), dominant individuals can appear more competent than they actually are (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009) and generate compliance from others (Cheng & Tracy, 2014). This makes them likely to achieve structural power, especially in competitive settings involving conflict (Jiménez et al., 2020; van Kleef et al., 2021).

Dominant individuals are rated by others as low in ethicality, morality, helpfulness, cooperativeness, altruism, and agreeableness (Cheng et al., 2010). In addition to an array of such anti-social inclinations (Maner, 2017), dominance is associated with a number of self-serving tendencies, including hubristic pride (Cheng et al., 2010), narcissism (Bradlee & Emmons, 1992), and entitlement (Brown et al., 2009). These tendencies could function as mechanisms that justify unethical behavior. For example, because dominant individuals are socially savvy, they can be highly skilled at deception (Burgoon & Dunbar, 2000; Keating & Heltman, 1994). Yet there is a surprising lack of direct evidence examining whether dominance produces unethical behavior.

Dominance is associated with the desire to have power (Suessenbach et al., 2019). In a simulated experiment, the tendency to prefer a powerful role over a powerless role was more pronounced for individuals high in dominance, compared to those lower in dominance (Mast et al., 2010). This was present despite individuals having no prior experience or expertise to lead (wanting to be an art gallery owner). Dominant individuals have a strong desire for positions of power, because it enables them to coerce others through the control of resources, such as the prospect of rewards or punishments (Maner & Case, 2016).

Crucially, dominance is so deeply aligned with the ability to acquire power that it is viewed as a pathway to social ascent that govern status hierarchies (Cheng et al., 2021). Dominance-based individuals - individuals high in trait dominance, or

those choosing to practice dominant behavior in a given situation – use conflict, force, and intimidation to attain power (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Cheng and colleagues studied the formation of hierarchy within a group of individuals who did not know each other. They found that individuals who displayed dominant behaviors during a group task were evaluated by their group members as having more influence, and received more visual attention (Cheng et al., 2013). Social rank attained through dominance is frequently associated with power abuse, such as hoarding information (Maner & Mead, 2010) and preventing the formation of coalitions among subordinates (Case & Maner, 2014; see also Maner & Case, 2016).

More generally, power is obtained through social consensus, which is garnered through respect and prominence in the eyes of others (Anderson et al., 2001). This pathway to power emerges out of prestige (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Maner, 2017), which forms the other well-trodden pathway to power. The prestige route refers to attaining status through attributes such as competence, skill, experience or expertise (Durkee et al., 2020; Judge et al., 2004). It is often granted by others rather than grabbed from others (Blader & Chen, 2014; see also de Waal-Andrews et al., 2015), and therefore perceived as impermanent (Hays & Bendersky, 2015). Unlike dominance, prestige is frequently associated with prosocial and selfless tendencies (Henrich et al., 2015; Ketterman & Maner, 2021; Maner & Case, 2016), such as conscientiousness (Cheng et al., 2010). Dominance is accompanied by hubristic pride, while prestige is accompanied by authentic pride (Cheng et al., 2010). Some even suggest that dominance leads to power, whereas prestige leads to status (Magee & Galinsky, 2008).

1.3.1. Conceptions of Dominance

Thus far, I have referred to dominance as an individual difference that is closely linked with power motivation and attainment. Whereas power is often (although not exclusively) defined as the formal control of resources as a source of influence, dominance involves the informal use of aggression and force as a means of influence (e.g., school bully, Maner, 2017). Dominance in this case, is an interpersonal behavior that can be observed externally (Burgoon et al., 1998). Conceptualising dominance as the use of intimidation and coercion to assert one's will stems from evolutionary psychology (Cheng et al., 2013). In this case, dominance is often regarded in contrast to prestige as a competing strategy for social ascent. It is also considered a style of interpersonal communication, or leadership style (Van Vugt & Smith, 2019) that demonstrates social competence (Burgoon & Dunbar, 2000).

More positive conceptions of dominance exist. People rate dominant individuals to be high in agency, social energy, extraversion, assertiveness, and crucially, leadership (Cheng et al., 2010). Jackson (1984) conceptualized dominance as the desire to lead, advancing collective goals. This notion of dominance focuses on human's unique motivation to take responsibility, lead, and provide vision (McClelland, 1970; Winter, 1973). In this case, dominance refers to leadership motivation at the core, whereby stereotypically dominant behavior is one of multiple ways to lead. Dominance can also be conceptualised as a stable trait that can be defined through a collection of personal attributes that are not necessarily tied to actual interpersonal behavior. Here, dominance sits on a continuous spectrum towards submissiveness (Burgoon et al., 1998; Smith et al., 2008; Wiggins et al., 1988).

Suessenbach and colleagues went further and distinguished between dominance and leadership motives. In their work, dominance is limited to aggressive behavior (Suessenbach et al., 2019). Specifically, they found that while dominance,

prestige, and leadership form three discrete power motives, only dominance is associated with retaliatory behavior, and a decrease in prosocial donating behavior. In contrast, prestige was linked to helping behavior, and leadership was linked to higher professional rank. Such differentiation between the positive, negative, and neutral facets of power motive offers insight into multiple representations of dominance, whereby one facet of dominance can include aggression (taking from others) while the other, assertiveness (not letting others take).

To sum up, dominance is closely associated with the desire for and ability to grab power. In ecological settings, dominant individuals may be more likely to rise to power positions. Dominance is also linked to self-serving and anti-social inclinations. Dominance and prestige together form the two main paths to power. While dominance is typically associated with aggressive behavior and anti-social inclinations, neutral and positive facets of dominance also exist, such as leadership motivation and assertiveness. It would then be sensible to assess whether dominant individuals are more likely to engage in unethical behavior, and if so, whether this tendency can explain the common portrayals of the powerful acting unethically. In the next section, I discuss some of the factors that enable dishonesty, a well-defined form of unethical behavior. Specifically, I identify the characteristics of dishonesty with a low barrier to entry, and individual inclinations and motivations that are conducive to dishonesty.

1.4. The Facilitators of Dishonesty

The study of unethical behavior entails numerous challenges. Firstly, defining unethical behavior can be tricky, as the interpretation of ethicality can be subjective and malleable to context. Frequently, discussions spill over to moral dilemmas (e.g., Fleischmann et al., 2019) that encompass fairness, rights and loyalty, involving philosophical decision-making. Secondly, it is difficult to observe and measure

unethical behavior. Instances of unethical behavior are low, requiring large samples to capture small effects (see review by Trevino, 1992). More importantly, individuals under-report or actively hide unethical behavior, as it poses a threat to their reputation and self-concept (Mazar et al., 2008). This challenge carries over to controlled experimental settings where participants may try to second guess the study aims and act unnaturally (demand effects, Randall & Fernandes, 1990).

The current thesis concentrated on a type of unethical behavior, dishonesty. Dishonesty is easier to define, enabling a focused examination of the mechanisms that lead to it. Dishonesty refers to behavior that violates pro-social norms (Gino & Mogilner, 2014) or socially accepted rules (Shu et al., 2011), in a way that is generally self-beneficial. It involves deception and deviant behavior (Harding et al., 2004). Dishonesty cannot be understood with rational cost benefit analysis (Haidt, 2001). Some engage in transgressions with a limited upside, with a high chance of getting caught, and risk losing much more (e.g., reputation, family, Soltes, 2016). At the same time, some choose not to engage in dishonesty even when there is no risk of ever being caught, and the benefits clearly outweigh the costs. Whereas the association between power and undesirable inclinations have been extensively documented (stereotyping, Fiske, 1993; objectification, Gruenfeld et al., 2008; hypocrisy, Lammers et al., 2010), there is noticeably less evidence examining the direct empirical effects of power on dishonesty.

Individuals engage in dishonesty for many reasons, but an over-arching facilitator of dishonesty is the ease of justification (Schweitzer & Hsee, 2002) combined with self-benefit. By justifying and rationalizing dishonest behavior, one can reduce the ethical dissonance they feel (Ayal & Gino, 2011), and preserve their self-concept (Mazar et al., 2008). Social norms, such as perceiving dishonesty as

common, is a strong predictor of dishonesty. In a controlled experiment, students were more likely to cheat for personal financial gain when they saw their peers engage in cheating (Gino, Ayal et al., 2009). Frequently, individuals cheat in small increments rather than to the maximum (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). Dishonesty is associated with an accumulation of small impulsive steps rather than pre-meditated leaps (Miller et al., 2007). Moreover, people are more accepting of a gradual erosion of ethical standards, referred to as the slippery-slope effect, as it is easier for the actor to justify (Gino & Bazerman, 2009). Others are less likely to notice small changes in behavior, and sometimes, the individuals committing the deed themselves may not realize they are being dishonest (ethical blind spot, Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). Hence, dishonesty could stem from the ease of deceiving oneself (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004), as individuals tend to vastly over estimate their competence in the ethical domain (Kern & Chugh, 2009).

Another example of dishonesty aided by justifiability is when the dishonest deed can be reclassified as problem solving. This explains why lawyers who provide legal but morally questionable solutions to clients are every so often labelled as competent, creative, and skilled (McBarnet, 1988). A related concept is decision frames. The frame of a decision vastly influences the permissibility of behaviors. For instance, people use different criteria to make business decisions compared to ethical decisions (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). A well-known example is that of the day-care centre that introduced fines for parents collecting their children late (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000). The fines actually led to an increase in late collection, as parents transitioned from a social frame (feeling guilty about keeping teachers waiting) to a monetary frame (a fair price to pay for the teacher's time) (Gneezy et al., 2011).

Dishonesty in morally ambiguous situations is easier to justify, compared to morally clear situations. For instance, individuals with creative personalities were more likely to cheat on a morally ambiguous visual perception task compared to those without creative personalities, because they were better at coming up with self-serving interpretations of the task at hand (Gino & Ariely, 2012). In the same research, creative individuals lied more on an incentivised die throw, and this was directly explained by justifiability, which creative individuals rated as higher. The examination of morally ambiguous situations is particularly important, as it reflects many aspects of actual dilemmas people encounter.

For example, some academic researchers engage in research practices that are questionable in nature, in order to inflate their findings (Simmons et al., 2011). In doing so, researchers knowingly mislead others to accrue personal benefits. Examples of questionable research practices include collecting data until a significant result is found, or changing the study hypothesis after looking at the results (Kerr, 1998). The resulting research output is deceptive, even if they do not contain explicit falsehoods. This shows that it is possible to be dishonest by being selective with which information to provide, and omitting key information. Such behavior, referred to as *paltering*, is deemed more justifiable by those who commit it, but is judged to be just as dishonest as lying explicitly by those on the receiving end (Rogers et al., 2017).

Thus far, I focused on the ease of justifiability to describe when dishonesty is more likely to occur. Turning to individual differences, higher levels of entitlement are not only related to status-seeking (Lange et al., 2019), but also dishonesty (Stiles et al., 2018). A meta-analytic review of academic dishonesty and the Big Five personality found that conscientiousness and agreeableness are negatively associated with dishonesty (Giluk & Postlethwaite, 2015; but see Ashton & Lee, 2005). It is

worth noting that conscientiousness and agreeableness are positively associated with prestige, but not dominance (Cheng et al., 2010).

The motivation of the individual also drives dishonesty. Dishonesty is associated with high levels of performance motivation, which is the desire to outperform. Performance motivation focuses on the relative advancement in comparison to others. This contrasts with mastery motivation, which is the desire to learn and improve, focusing on absolute advancement (Ames & Archer, 1988; Dweck, 1986). Performance motivation is often accompanied by dishonest behaviors compared to mastery motivation (Van Yperen et al., 2011). This line of research implies that a concern with one's relative social standing may be an important trigger of dishonesty, demonstrating parallels with power, or more specifically, the desire for power.

Relatedly, the motivation to gain a positive outcome (approach motivation) and the motivation to avoid a negative outcome (avoidance motivation) (McNaughton et al., 2016) differentially influence dishonesty. Instances of dishonesty are higher when individuals fear negative outcomes, compared to when they are enticed by positive outcomes (Grolleau et al., 2016; Schindler & Pfattheicher, 2017). This was observed when the economic payoff was identical between the gain/loss frames, but just with different reference points (Cameron & Monin, 2008). Feelings of deservingness felt by individuals in the loss frame explained this occurrence. This suggests that the key to understanding dishonesty lies in not only the justifiability of the behavior, but also the goals and motivations of individuals.

Crucially, dishonesty should be examined in conjunction with the effects of power, as not all facilitators of dishonesty will differentially affect individuals across power levels. To address why certain factors strengthen the dishonest tendencies of

the powerful, while others do not, it is necessary to inspect what motivates the powerful, and their priorities. Moreover, an examination of how power transforms the power holder is necessary. I discuss each point in the section that follows.

1.5. Power and Goal Pursuit[1]

Power is a social relational concept that involves the exercise of control and influence over others (Keltner et al., 2003). The exercise of power is equivalent to a power holder's pursuit of their most prominent goals (Schmid, Schmid Mast, et al., 2015). Therefore, it is important to understand how power affects goal related behavior. Often power asymmetries are legitimized and deemed necessary, as they provide efficiencies in advancing collective goals that require social coordination, in organizations such as schools or corporations. Under these circumstances, the goal of the power holder would align with that of the group, which could take multiple forms such as revenues, justice, social order, the transfer of knowledge, and the operation of organizations. As such, absolute power is rare in ecological settings, and the exercise of power tends to be a negotiated process, even when power hierarchies are stable (Boehm & Flack, 2010). Given the uncertainty of the social environment and the dynamic nature of organizational politics, power roles require fast and decisive goal directed action.

Power relations can also exist in the absence of shared group goals, whereby powerful individuals wish to be free from the interference of others (autonomy, Lammers, 2009), or accumulate resources for self-benefit. In such cases, power holders are free to pursue their personal aspirations, and resist social influence (Galinsky et al., 2001). Regardless of whether the power holder's desire is to influence

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[1] This section is a complete adaptation of my published review chapter (Guinote & Kim, 2020). Permission has been granted from the co-author to adapt the contents of the paper to be used in this PhD thesis.

others, or to escape the influence from others, power comes with a chronic desire to attain goals that are often social in nature.

People in positions of power have a variety of goals. Sometimes they focus on group goals, such as the management of operations and people in organizational settings (Yukl, 2002). Other times, they focus on personal goals, such as the desire to prevail and win over others (Anderson & Brion, 2014). Regardless of whether the goal is organizational or personal, goal orientation is associated with prioritizing one's will over other people's desires. The powerful are goal-oriented (Guinote, 2007c), and are less likely to adopt goals set by others. For instance, powerful individuals were more likely to drop an achievement goal when they perceived it to be set by their mothers (Inesi & Rios, 2013). In partnerships, those with less power tend to adopt the goal of their partners, and make necessary changes to converge and assimilate emotionally to their stronger partner (Anderson et al., 2003; Laurin et al., 2016).

More generally, goals are carried out through different stages involving *goal setting, initiating,* and *striving and persisting in the face of obstacles* (Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987). They typically require awareness but can operate in an automatic manner (Latham et al., 2017). During goal pursuit, individuals engage the help of cognitive and neuropsychological pathways that energize behavior and sustain goal directed action (Salamone & Correa, 2012). Goal pursuit involves effort, self-control and persistence, especially when the goals are challenging and difficult (Locke & Latham, 2002).

To sum up, the exercise of power is closely aligned with the power holder's goal, regardless of whether the goal is collective or personal. In the next two sections, I discuss two theories of power that demonstrate how power transforms the power holder, in a way that affects their goal pursuit.

1.5.1. Power and Approach

The approach-inhibition theory of power (Keltner et al., 2003) has shown that as the powerful are less constrained by others in achieving their goals, they orient towards rewards and positive outcomes, activating approach-related inclinations (behavioral approach, Gray, 1990). The powerful tend to experience positive emotion. Moreover, increased power is associated with the tendency to engage in effortless (Deprét & Fiske, 1993), automatic cognitive processes and disinhibited behavior (Keltner et al., 2003). These effects of power lead power holders to be optimistic and tolerant to risk (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006), inoculating them against the threat of losses (Inesi, 2010). Crucially, the powerful take action more readily (Galinsky et al., 2003). Power holders have the tendency to initiate the first move in competitive interactions such as negotiations (Magee et al., 2007). Their frequent use of automatic information processing allow them to make faster decisions, often by engaging in the use of mental shortcuts and heuristics (Keltner et al., 2003; Keltner et al., 2008). These include stereotyping (Fiske, 1993; Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Guinote & Phillips, 2010), anchoring (Lammers & Burgmer, 2017), relying on first impressions (Briñol et al., 2012), and poor perspective-taking (Galinsky et al., 2006).

The possession of power facilitates action (Galinsky et al., 2003) in ways that are consistent with the power holder's authentic selves (Kraus et al., 2011). This explains why the same experience of power can result in different behavior, depending on individual differences (e.g., relationship orientation, Chen et al., 2001). They do not shy away from expressing their true attitudes and priorities (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002). Accordingly they are more confident (Briñol et al., 2007), original (Galinsky et al., 2008), and at times, creative (Galinsky et al., 2008; Smith & Trope, 2006). Individuals who feel powerful can appear more persuasive than those who feel powerless, which influences how they perform in job interviews (Lammers et al., 2013). Power even helps to deter the negative effects of stereotype threat, by

preventing the loss of working memory, which typically precedes the fall in

performance under stereotype threat (van Loo & Rydell, 2013). Some researchers

maintain that power reduces the press of the situation, as power protects people from

outside influence. Specifically, the powerful are less swayed by pre-set examples, and

the opinions of others. They base negotiations on their chronic social values, rather

than be influenced by their negotiating partner (Galinsky et al., 2008; but see

Lammers & Burgmer, 2017).

    In contrast, because the powerless must depend on others to achieve their

goals, powerlessness is associated with focusing on potential negatives and threats,

activating avoidance related tendencies (behavioral inhibition, Gray, 1990). The

powerless experience negative affect, such as a chronic state of vigilance. Their

behavior tends to be inhibited and cautious, often a result of deliberate cognitive

process (Keltner et al., 2003). As the powerless need to pay attention to the external

environment, which they rely on, they are more accurate in reading the emotions of

others (Kraus et al., 2010).

    In summary, the approach-inhibition theory of power depicts the powerful as

confident, willing and ready to take decisive action, uninhibited by external

influences. Plenty of empirical evidence support such effects of power, establishing

this theory as a core pillar of social power research. Nevertheless, it is worth stating

that the powerful are more likely to find themselves in situations where they are

striving for positive outcomes that require decisive action, because of their power.

This suggests that the contexts and situations that the powerful encounter should be

considered. That is, it is necessary to examine what is accessible to the power holder.

To illustrate, I use the example of anchoring which was introduced earlier. Since

power holders are non-conforming, they are less swayed by examples set by others

(Galinsky et al., 2008). Yet, because power holders prefer to engage in mental

shortcuts, power is also associated with increased anchoring (Lammers & Burgmer, 2017). The key to reconciling this seeming contradiction may lie on whether the anchoring information is accessible and applicable in the given situation. In Galinsky and colleagues' study, the opinions of other participants that were provided as pre-set examples were unambiguously negative, as they were opining on an extremely tedious and boring task. The participants who felt powerful were more likely to express their true opinion (e.g., the task was boring), regardless of others rating it as interesting. The context triggered behavioral disinhibition. In contrast, Lammers and Burgmer asked participants to rate a task that was not as tedious, which meant that the opinions formed by others may have been neutral, and potentially informative (Study 3, Lammers & Burgmer, 2017). In this case, the powerful participants referred to others' responses to quickly form their opinions, utilizing the signals that were accessible to them in the moment. This illustrates that the effects of power may be nuanced, and malleable to accessible constructs provided by the situation. In the next section, I discuss how power heightens the acuteness of goals, and how power guides individuals to rely on accessible signals that lead them to goal attainment. This line of research focuses on power's ability to trigger purposeful and deliberate behavior.

1.5.2. Power and Flexible Goal Pursuit

The situated focus theory of power (Guinote, 2007a; Guinote, 2008) posits that power enables individuals to more readily adapt their processing strategies in line with the desires that arise on a moment-to-moment basis, compared to the powerless. Powerful individuals prioritize important and salient goals (Slabu & Guinote, 2010). Across multiple domains including the planning of leisure time, work or social activities, powerful individuals processed information selectively, and acted in situationally congruent ways (Guinote, 2008). Their attention is selective, only focusing on information that is relevant, accessible, and assists in the pursuit of their

primary goal (Guinote, 2007c). Hence, the situation shapes the cognitive processes, strategies, and behavior that the powerful employ (Guinote, 2008). In fact, the power of the powerful reside in their versatility in various aspects of goal pursuit. They exert effort, self-regulate (DeWall et al., 2011) and delay gratification (Joshi & Fast, 2013b) to meet their primary goals, while flexibly disregarding other potential or secondary goals (Min & Kim, 2013). People in power roles persist when faced with obstacles, and make more attempts to solve problems they encounter (Guinote, 2007c). They are motivated to engage in, and enjoy the activity that leads them to attain their goals (Steidle et al., 2013). In contrast, powerless individuals find it difficult to prioritize. Powerless individuals are more likely to multi-task under multiple goal contexts, and waste resources by switching between tasks (Cai & Guinote, 2017). In addition, the lack of power can impair self-regulation, jeopardizing goal attainment as a result (Jäger et al., 2017).

The adaptability of power can be observed in multiple domains. Despite power being generally associated with poor attention to others (Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Keltner et al., 2003) such as stereotyping (Fiske, 1993), powerful individuals are able to adapt to situation specific goals. In a study, powerful participants who were assigned people-centred goals were able to individuate low-power targets (Overbeck & Park, 2006b). Their attention was flexible depending on the goal, compared to powerless participants. Similarly, for the powerful, the amount of time they spent on reading information depended on whether the information was relevant to the situation (Guinote, 2008; Min & Kim, 2013). For powerless participants, the time they spent did not vary materially between situations.

In a similar vein, despite power being associated with automatic cognitive processes, they can deploy effortful thought when so doing is helpful for goal pursuit.

This suggests that the powerful only resort to habitual and automatic responses in the absence of situational demands. In a controlled experiment (Scholl & Sassenberg, 2015), participants were randomly assigned to manager roles (powerful) or employee roles (powerless). Those assigned to be managers engaged in less pre-factual thought ("what would happen, if…") compared to low power participants, demonstrating behavioral disinhibition. However, when the structure of the task indicated that pre-factual thinking could be beneficial for performance, managers engaged in more pre-factual thinking (Scholl & Sassenberg, 2015). In another study on creativity, powerful individuals became more creative in a name generation task compared to powerless participants, only when doing so was useful for goal attainment (Gervais et al., 2013). In contrast, powerless individuals were not sensitive to the situation in their creativity.

This line of research suggests that the powerful can change their behavior flexibly in line with active goals. Experimental and quasi-experimental research found that being in a high power position facilitates the pursuit of any desired end state (Guinote, 2007c), regardless of whether they are chronically or situationally accessible (Guinote et al., 2012). The focus on goals and the adoption of flexible strategies for goal attainment forms the second core pillar of power research. Powerful individuals are motivated not by hedonic attributes but by seeking and wanting salient goals (Guinote, 2017). Hence in order to understand how power affects dishonesty, it may be useful to specifically focus on the goal directed adaptability of the powerful, rather than general overarching characteristics of the powerful.

1.5.3. The Side Effects of Goal Focus[2]

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[2] This section is a complete adaptation of my published review chapter (Guinote & Kim, 2020). Permission has been granted from the co-author to adapt the contents of the paper to be used in this PhD thesis.

As the powerful have the ability to focus on primary goals and flexibly adjust their behaviors to best fit the situation, it is not surprising that they are effective in goal attainment. The goals of the powerful are less likely to be challenged, because power elicits compliance from subordinates. Powerful individuals achieve better social evaluations (Boksem et al., 2012; Schmid & Schmid Mast, 2013), as their confidence is often interpreted as a sign of competence (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009). In negotiations, they enjoy a bargaining advantage (Magee et al., 2007). This is especially prominent in high-pressure negotiations (Kang et al., 2015), such as in job interviews (Lammers et al., 2013). Leaders with power not only strive to obtain their own goals, but also influence subordinates' path to goal attainment (House, 2012; Martin et al., 2018). To do so, they use any means necessary, including rewards, coercion, vision, expertise, and belonging (Lunenburg, 2012).

Conversely, enhanced focus on one's primary goals could lead to socially undesirable behavior, including unethical behavior. As discussed above, for the powerful, the link between hierarchical position and interpersonal accuracy depended on their goals (Overbeck & Park, 2006b). This demonstrates that the powerful use social sensitivities as a limited resource at their disposal that can be strategically utilised depending on their needs (Hall et al., 2015). In a similar vein, when subordinates are seen as means for the goal of the powerful, social objectification can occur. The powerful are more likely to value others instrumentally, that is, by their utility in goal achievement (Gruenfeld et al., 2008; Civile & Obhi, 2016). This tendency increases in line with the saliency of the goal. For example, perceptions of sexual interest from others were only enhanced for the powerful when a mating goal was activated (Kunstman & Maner, 2011). Similarly, the tendency of the powerful to stereotype others can be explained with goal focus, as stereotyping assists in

maintaining one's power position, which is a frequent goal among the powerful (Guinote & Phillips, 2010). The powerful have the motivation to maintain their status quo, and subsequently they are biased to label those seeking change as extremists (Keltner & Robinson, 1997).

The framing of goals influences unethical behavior (Ordóñez & Welsh, 2015). The ability to focus on salient goals is typically considered an attractive feature of being powerful, as it boosts goal attainment. However, the same goal orientation can lead to myopic goal focus. This includes disregarding the moral repercussions of decisions. For example, company leaders focused on specific targets (e.g., revenue, market share) may not recognize the moral implications of their decisions (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). Since powerful people identify more strongly with their organization (Joshi & Fast, 2013a), and internalize their organization's goals (Scholl et al., 2018), they are less likely to notice unethical processes within their organization (Kennedy & Anderson, 2017).

To sum up, power holders single-mindedly initiate and pursue salient goals, which dictate their behavior. They are more effective in goal attainment, which can at times lead to socially undesirable behavior. How does this apply to dishonesty? As dishonesty is norm-breaking behavior, one needs to be motivated enough to engage in it (Gino & Mogilner, 2014), implying that in addition to personal and situational factors that influence the nature of power roles, goals are particularly important in the understanding of dishonesty among the powerful. For example, the powerful and powerless seem to engage in different types of dishonest behavior, in line with their specific aims and desires in the provided by the situation (Dubois et al., 2015; Lammers et al., 2011; Trautmann et al., 2013), which could at times, stem from the power differences they experience. This demonstrates that for the powerful to engage

in disproportionate levels of dishonesty, they should be faced with a situation whereby the fruits of dishonesty help achieve a primary and salient goal that is important to them. This could include goals provided by the power role, or goals fulfilling personal desires that awarded them power in the first place.

1.6. The Present Research

Casual observations and anecdotes are filled with narratives of the powerful engaging in dishonest and unethical behavior. However, this could be an illusion, and direct evidence on this link is mixed, suggesting that the trigger for dishonesty among the powerful is possibly complex. Although numerous individual differences have been associated with causing different expressions of power, I focused on dominance for two reasons. Firstly, it is closely tied with socially undesirable behavior and anti-social inclinations. More importantly, dominance is a natural correlate of power, because dominant individuals desire power, and are better at grabbing positions of power in ecological settings. Previous individual differences that explored anti-social behavior under power were not related to the affordance of power. In addition, I reviewed literature covering the direct effects of power on unethical behavior through three intertwined perspectives, which are individual differences, the situation, and the nature of power roles. In parallel, dishonesty is more likely to occur when the behavior is easy to justify, such as in morally ambiguous situations. Questionable research practices (QRPs) are one example of morally ambiguous behaviors. Moreover, entitlement and performance motivation (the desire to be better than others) is closely associated with dishonesty.

Nevertheless, what may be more insightful is to explore when and why some and not all facilitators of dishonesty are triggered and amplified under the experience of power. The key to this puzzle can be found through a careful and detailed look into the goals of the powerful, and what can be achieved by engaging in the unethical

behavior. While power is generally associated with approach, action, and automatic cognitive processes, power holders are able to focus on their primary goals, and flexibly adjust their attention, strategies and behaviors in ways that maximize their chance of attaining those goals. The goals of the powerful will be influenced by their understanding of the power role, the task at hand, and how they perceive their immediate environment, such as culture, in addition to individual differences. Then the question that arises is, if dominant individuals are over-represented in powerful positions, and if the powerful are goal-oriented, what are the specific conditions under which the powerful would be more susceptible to dishonesty?

In the present research, I consider each point in turn. In Chapter 2, I examine whether dominance predicts dishonesty, thereby examining an individual difference. What makes this chapter unique is that I examine power motivation and power affordance among dominant individuals, as a way to explain why the powerful seem to disproportionately engage in dishonesty (Studies 1, 2, 3, 4, 5a and 5b). Dominance was assessed as a chronic trait, while power was assessed (natural professional power), or experimentally manipulated. Dishonesty was observed through multiple domains involving die throws, performance in puzzles, and breaking of Covid-19 containment rules. In Chapter 3, I continue to examine the role of dominance on dishonesty, but narrow the scope of enquiry in two ways. Firstly, dishonest behavior is limited to questionable research practices (QRPs). Secondly, I consider multiple conceptions of dominance to determine how different forms of dominance predict QRPs, using exploratory factor analyses (Studies 6, 7, 8 and 9). Chapter 4 explores the magnifying effects of power that bring out the power holder's pre-existing inclinations. Specifically, it examines the moderating effect of felt power on the relationship between dominance and dishonesty (Study 10). In addition, I consider

other related predispositions, such as prestige, individualism, moral disengagement, and subjective power in terms of their effect on unethical behavior.

In Chapters 5 and 6, I move on from individual differences, and dominance in particular, to extend the understanding of the direct effects of power on dishonesty. Chapter 5 focused on morally ambiguous behavior that is easy to justify (Studies 11, 12, and 13). It demonstrates how power alone may not be a reliable predictor of dishonesty, which is analogous to the findings from Chapter 2. Chapter 6 examines an ecologically valid boundary condition that triggers the powerful to behave dishonestly. Specifically, I discuss whether a contextual moderator - gain/loss frame - can motivate the powerful and powerless differently (Study 14).

Next, building on the central role of dominance in predicting dishonesty, I examine a close correlate of dominance; individualism. In Chapter 7, a series of mini meta-analyses explored the relationship between individualism (vertical individualism in particular) and dominance, and their implications on unethical behavior, using data collected from a selection of aforementioned studies (Studies 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, and 14).

In the final chapter (Chapter 8), I summarize the empirical findings, and discuss how the findings merge with and builds on the existing body of work devoted to dominance, power, and unethical behavior. I discuss the strengths and limitations of the findings, including but not limited to the measurement of variables and unanswered questions, before proposing directions for future research. Throughout the chapters, I aim to identify triggers and facilitators of unethical behavior that can be observed in the real world, or of particular importance to the goals of the powerful. An overview of all 14 studies appears in Appendix 1.

*Ethical approval was obtained for all studies.

Chapter 2: Dominance and Power Affordance[3]

2.1. Abstract

To understand the association between power and dishonesty, the influence of a personal factor that is closely aligned with social power was examined. I argue that individual difference dominance is a better predictor of dishonesty, compared to social power. Six studies (N = 1,534) involving incentivized tasks, moral disengagement, and Covid-19 containment rules tested this hypothesis. Dominance and dishonesty were correlated (Study 1, 2, 3, 4, 5a). The propensity for individuals with actual professional power to be dishonest was explained by the over-representation of dominant individuals at the top (Studies 2, 5a). The effect of manipulated power on dishonesty was inconsistent (Studies 3, 4). Predispositions closely related to dominance (e.g., desire to outperform others) were considered. Self-construal in terms of entitlement and perceived invulnerability to risk were assessed and their mediating roles were discussed (Studies 5a, 5b). The findings suggest that dominant individuals are afforded power, which contributes to the observed links between power and dishonesty in ecological settings.

Keywords: dominance, power, dishonesty, power affordance, prestige

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[3] Chapter 2 is a complete adaptation of my published empirical article (K. Kim & Guinote, 2021). Permission has been granted from the co-author to adapt the contents of the paper to be used in this PhD thesis. The copyright owner has consented to the re-use of the contents for this purpose.

2.2. Introduction

This chapter aims to disentangle the observed effects of power on dishonesty by differentiating the unique effects of experiencing power, with natural correlates of power. The types of people who attain power may engage in higher instances of dishonesty, leading to the common opinion that power corrupts. Specifically, I focus on a predisposition that motivates people to seek and obtain power, which is trait dominance. Dominance is an individual difference linked to the display of assertive, forceful, and coercive behavior (Mast et al., 2010), especially in interpersonal relationships. Individuals high in dominance desire power, status and admiration from others (Barrick et al., 2002; Cheng et al., 2013; Lord et al., 1986; Maner & Case, 2016), as a means to accrue personal advantages. With a competitive orientation (de Waal, 1986; Mehta et al., 2008) and the ability to appear competent (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009), dominant people are concentrated in positions of influence. For example, managers within the British civil service scored higher in dominance compared to the general public, and managers' seniority coincided with dominance (Melamed & Bozionelos, 1992).

The association between trait dominance and ecological social power is well established (Maner, 2017; but see ten Brinke & Keltner, 2020). However, whether dominance directly coincides with dishonesty remains mostly untested. In the present chapter, I test the hypothesis that dominance is positively correlated with dishonest behavior, independent of power. I argue that it is the combined effect of dominant individuals being dishonest, with their over-representation at the top that explains misconduct of the powerful.

Along with dominance, the accumulation of prestige is another well documented strategy for social ascent (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Maner, 2017). The

prestige pathway involves the display of competence, skills, or expertise. Individuals garner respect and reputation, which leads to enhanced social status (Cheng et al., 2013; Durkee et al., 2020; Judge et al., 2004). Whereas dominance is associated with hubristic pride, prestige is associated with authentic pride (Cheng et al., 2010) and other prosocial inclinations (Henrich et al., 2015; Ketterman & Maner, 2021). Yet, individuals can also signal altruism and enhance their status for selfish reasons (competitive altruism, Case et al., 2018; Griskevicius et al., 2010). I propose that unlike dominance, prestige and dishonesty are not correlated.

2.2.1. Power, Dominance, and Dishonesty

Dishonesty is associated with high levels of self-serving motivations (Engelmann & Fehr, 2016). A number of motivational mechanisms have been implicated in the uptake of dishonesty, such as the desire to outperform others (performance motivation; Ames & Archer, 1988; Dweck, 1986; Nicholls, 1984) and feelings of entitlement. Performance motivation precedes dishonest behaviors in multiple domains, including education, work, and sports (Van Yperen et al., 2011). Entitlement, which is the persistent but one-sided view that one deserves more than others regardless of one's ability or effort (Campbell et al., 2004), is related to status-seeking (Lange et al., 2019), and is a predictor of dishonesty (Stiles et al., 2018). Crucially, both feelings of entitlement and performance motivation are associated with, but distinct from dominance (Franken & Brown, 1995; Raskin & Terry, 1988; Van Yperen, 2006; Yamaguchi, 2001). Testosterone - a glucocorticoid hormone linked to dominant behavior - predicts both entitlement (Mead et al., 2018) and cheating (Geniole et al., 2014; ten Brinke et al., 2015; see also Kuepper et al., 2010). These connections give rise to the hypothesis that dominance could trigger dishonesty.

Power and Dishonesty

The powerful exercise their power with the tangible and intangible means they control (French Jr & Raven, 1959). Tangible resources may refer to those that others who are dependent on the power holder, need (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Keltner et al., 2003). It also includes influence stemming formal social positions (Carney, 2020). Intangible means include influence by social network, the use of coercion, or inducing fear. It is worth noting that power is a social relational concept, and interpersonal processes such as dominance or prestige are vital in the affordance of power (Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Guinote, 2017).

Power abuse has been documented in empirical studies. Leaders can selfishly take from common resources (de Cremer & van Dijk, 2005), break rules (Bellezza et al., 2014; Van Kleef et al., 2011), and impose stricter moral conduct on others, while engaging in morally less strict behavior themselves (hypocricy, Lammers et al., 2010; perspective taking, Galinsky et al., 2006). High socio-economic status (SES), a related concept with power through the control of resources, is associated with various unethical behavior (Piff et al., 2012; see also Côté et al., 2015).

Yet, the effect of power on unethical behavior is not uniform. Predispositions play an important role in power holders' ethical conduct. For example, exchange-oriented students used power selfishly, but not communally oriented students (Chen et al., 2001; Guinote et al., 2012; Lee-Chai et al., 2001). Crucially, power encourages the expression of one's authentic self (Guinote et al., 2002; Kraus et al., 2011), magnifying the behavior that is in line with their inclinations (Case & Maner, 2015; Chen et al., 2001; Lundman & Clinard, 1991; Pitesa & Thau, 2013). The powerful only exhibit self-interested behavior in the presence of a weak moral identity (DeCelles et al., 2012). That is, baseline moral awareness leads to differentiated ethical conduct under the experience of power. Past research has predominantly

examined the role of predispositions that are unrelated to power. In this chapter, I consider a predisposition that is closely related to the attainment of power, for a differentiated understanding of the links between power and dishonesty, especially as a way to explain what is frequently observed in ecological settings.

The links between power and dishonesty should depend on the situation as well as the person. The situated focus theory of power (Guinote, 2007a; Guinote, 2010) posits that the powerful can strategically adapt their priorities and attention according to the social context, such as the nature of the power role and organizational norms. For example, a permissible organizational culture can foster sexual harassment, especially among the powerful (Fitzgerald et al., 1997; Pina et al., 2009). As such, the ethical conduct of the powerful is flexible (Overbeck & Park, 2006b), situated (Guinote & Chen, 2017), and complex (Fleischmann et al., 2019).

How individuals understand their power role influences their behavior. When the power holder perceive their power as an opportunity to better oneself (Sassenberg et al., 2014), power holders show less care for others (De Wit et al., 2017; Scholl et al., 2018). In a similar vein, power can afford the power holder with influence over others (social power), or autonomy (personal power) (Lammers et al., 2009). Of the two forms of power, only social power was associated with aggression (Cislak et al., 2018). To sum up, power should affect ethical behavior in a nuanced manner, which will depend on the person, the situation, and the nature of the power. All three components can be causally interrelated with one another.

Dominance and Dishonesty

Dominance triggers the Dominance Behavioral System (DBS; Johnson et al., 2012), a system that includes various biological, emotional, cognitive and behavioral components that aid the pursuit of power by monitoring the environment for

opportunities and threats. The activation of the DBS involves efficient learning of behaviors that make it more likely that the dominant will acquire personal advantages (Duriez et al., 2007). This leverages their potential to influence even when individuals do not possess actual, or formal power. Drawing on this evidence, I hypothesize that dominance enhances people's propensity to use dishonest means in order to accrue social advantages, such as the attainment of power and status.

Despite the lack of evidence directly establishing the link between dominance and dishonesty, dominance has been associated with numerous selfish emotions and behaviors (Maner & Mead, 2010) that are in turn associated with dishonesty. For example, dominance is linked to narcissism (Bradlee & Emmons, 1992), feelings of superiority, entitlement (Brown et al., 2009) and arrogance (Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010). Dominance is also associated with risky behavior (Demaree et al., 2009) and feeling fearless and invulnerable (Bronchain et al., 2019), all of which may facilitate and justify dishonesty.

In summary, I hypothesize that dominance will trigger dishonesty because dominant individuals are strongly motivated to acquire personal advantages, and have a heightened attentional and behavioral system that allows for the use of any means necessary to advance their (often selfish) goals. This should include dishonest means, and their goals should include social power. Examining whether dominance is linked to dishonesty will contribute to the theory surrounding the DBS, and the understanding of dishonesty among the powerful. In addition, I compare the effect of dominance with felt prestige and social power.

2.2.2. Overview of Studies

The present chapter has four objectives. Firstly, I distinguish between the effects of dispositional (dominance, prestige) and situational (tangible power) sources

of power on dishonesty. I hypothesize that dominance will be associated with the increased use of dishonest means to accrue self-benefits. Within this chapter, I refer to dominance as forceful, coercive, and aggressive interpersonal behavior (Burgoon et al., 1998; Cheng et al., 2013; Mast et al., 2010). Secondly, I test the hypothesis that dominant individuals are over-represented in powerful positions. This suggests that self-selection processes may be at play when power seems to trigger dishonesty, with enhanced dominance levels among power holders. Furthermore, I hypothesize that although individuals high in felt prestige would also be over-represented in positions of power, prestige will not be associated with dishonesty. Finally, I explore possible mediators related to dominance that could be used to justify dishonest behavior. Specifically, I examine whether entitlement and perceived invulnerability enable dishonesty among the dominant.

Throughout this chapter, I employed the dominance-prestige scale to measure individual levels of dominance and prestige (Cheng et al., 2010). This scale assesses prestige as the subjective feeling of enjoying respect and admiration. Dominance is measured as the tendency to engage in aggressive and forceful behavior towards others. Study 1 sought initial evidence to establish the relationship between dominance and dishonesty. Power was not included as a variable. In subsequent studies, power was assessed or manipulated in different roles and contexts. Studies 2 and 5a investigated how dominance, and natural professional power, influence dishonesty. Studies 3 and 4 manipulated power experimentally, while dominance continued to be assessed. This was in order to determine the influence of power and power motivation across dominance levels. In Study 3, power was induced through a dyadic task, and in Study 4, through a recall-writing task.

Multiple forms of dishonesty were examined. Participants reported their level of moral disengagement as a proxy for dishonesty (Study 3). In Studies 1, 2 and 4, participants were presented with various tasks that gave them opportunities of increasing their earnings by being dishonest. Incremental levels of dishonesty were assessed to detect small differences in participants' attitudes towards unethical behavior, and to mirror the tendency to cheat just a little, and not to the maximum (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Gino, Ayal et al., 2009; Mazar et al., 2008). To improve the generalizability of the findings, and to present participants with nuanced decision making closely tied with their daily lives, Studies 5a and 5b considered rule-breaking behavior, assessed in relation to the containment efforts regarding Covid-19. To explain the association between dominance and dishonesty, Studies 3, 5a and 5b examined entitlement and perceived invulnerability as mediators.

*Data files: https://osf.io/v97dx/?view_only=2f16d0c0a308448f862a88fe0c01ca08

2.3. Study 1: Dominance and Incentivized Die Throw

In this first study, I investigated the correlational relationship between dominance and dishonesty. Dominance and prestige were assessed (Cheng et al., 2010), and dishonesty was inferred through an incentivised anonymous die throw (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Hao & Houser, 2017; Shalvi et al., 2011). I tested the hypothesis that levels of dominance and self-reported die scores would be positively correlated, signalling dishonesty. Prestige would not be related to dishonesty. Age and gender were controlled for, due to their possible links with dominance.

2.3.1. Methods

Participants

Two hundred and eleven students attending a university in the U.K. participated in Study 1. The sample size was pre-determined using GPower software, assuming $(1 - \beta) = .90$, $\alpha = .05$, and $\rho^2 = .05$ (assuming .20 correlation). Seven participants were excluded for correctly guessing the aims of the study, and I report data from the remaining 204 participants (61 Male; $M_{age} = 20.12$ *years*, $SD = 2.18$). Eighty-seven participants (52.6%) identified as Asian, and 78 (38.2%) participants identified as Caucasian.

Procedure

Participants were presented with a study in the laboratory that focused on social interactions. They completed the dominance-prestige scale (Cheng et al., 2010) before they were given a die and asked to report the result of their throws (Haselhuhn & Wong, 2012). Subsequently, participants provided feedback on their study experience, which included trying to guess the study aims. Upon receiving a detailed debrief, participants gave final consent before being dismissed.

Measures

Dominance and Prestige. The dominance-prestige scale (Cheng et al., 2010) contains a dominance subscale of eight items measuring dominance, such as 'I am willing to use aggressive tactics to get my way', on 7-point Likert scales (1: *strongly agree* to 7: *strongly disagree*; 8-item $\alpha = .84$). It also includes a subscale measuring prestige, with items such as 'Others seek my advice on a variety of matters' (8-item $\alpha = .83$)[4].

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[4] The prestige subscale has 9 items, but one was mistakenly omitted in Study 1. This error has been fixed in all subsequent studies. All studies in the thesis used standardized values of dominance and prestige for data analyses.

Dishonesty. Participants were provided with a die. They were asked to throw the die twice and report the sum of the two numbers they threw. This number would correspond to the number of raffle tickets they would win. The raffle tickets would then be entered into a lottery with numerous vouchers as prizes. Participants were spaced apart from others to provide anonymity. Although individual level of dishonesty is unknown, levels of cheating can still be inferred as die throwing does not involve skill. A correlation between dominance and reported die performance allows for the detection of dishonest behavior at an aggregate level.

2.3.2. Results

Dominance and die score were positively related $r(204) = .255. p < .001$. Compared to female students (n = 143), male students (n = 61) scored higher in dominance ($M_{Male} = 4.26$, $SD_{Male} = 1.232$, $M_{Female} = 3.64$, $SD_{Female} = 0.864$, $t(202) = 4.106$, $p < .001$ $d = 0.583$). Participants higher in dominance felt a higher sense of prestige $r(204) = .223$, $p < .001$, and tended to be older $r(204) = .318$, $p < .001$.

A multiple linear regression was carried out with dominance, prestige, and their interaction as predictor variables, age and gender as control variables, and die performance as the outcome variable. The result was statistically significant $F(5,198) = 3.364$, $p = .006$, $R^2 = .078$, Cohen's $f^2 = .085$. Dominance predicted dishonesty $B =.552$, $p = .004$, and no other effects were obtained (dominance $\times$ prestige: $B = -.012$, $p = .934$, gender: $B =.248$, $p = .218$, age: $B = -.017$, $p = .840$). Prestige was not associated with heightened dishonesty ($B =.192$, $p = .299$).

2.3.3. Discussion

Only dominance and not prestige was related to dishonesty. This study found initial support for the idea that the more dominant participants are, the higher their

tendency to misreport higher scores in order to increase their likelihood of winning prizes. This relationship remained when controlling for gender and age.

2.4. Study 2: Dominance, Natural Power, Virtual Die Throw

In Study 2, the effects of professional power were considered. The study tested three hypotheses. Firstly, as in Study 1, it tested whether dominance predicts dishonesty, but not prestige. Next, it investigated whether dominant individuals are concentrated in positions of professional power. Most importantly, it examined whether power holders' tendency to engage in dishonesty is driven by higher dominance. Specifically, I hypothesized that while professional power would predict dishonesty, it would no longer do so when dominance is accounted for. Testing these hypotheses allow for a better understanding of the origins of dishonesty frequently found among power holders. Study 2 was an online study, and participants were recruited through a recruiting platform (prolific.co). Participants were employees in various industries such as education or healthcare (Table A2.1), and I assessed their professional power. Dishonesty was measured through a virtual die throw (Dubois et al., 2015; Piff et al., 2012).

2.4.1. Methods

Participants

One hundred and ninety-four employed adults living in Europe participated. The sample size was predetermined using GPower software, assuming $(1 − β) = .90$, $α = .05$, odds ratio = 2.8. Fifteen participants were excluded for correctly guessing the study aims, leaving a final sample of 179 ($M_{age} = 34.43$ *years*, $SD = 9.63$). A majority of the respondents identified as female (n = 126), or Caucasian ($n = 160$).

Procedures

This study was advertised as focusing on social interaction styles. After giving consent, participants read that at the end of the survey a majority would continue on to an additional study, depending on the results of virtual die throws. Per minute, the alleged additional study paid more. Participants were then presented with a virtual die. After indicating their die score, participants completed questionnaires measuring dominance and prestige. Finally, participants answered questions related to their hierarchical position at work (Kraus & Keltner, 2013), before receiving a debrief and giving final consent.

Measures

Dominance and Prestige. The same measure as in Study 1 was used (8-item dominance α = .83, 9-item prestige α = .88).

Dishonesty. Participants virtually threw a die five times, and reported the sum of the five throws. Participants learned they needed to throw 14 or more to qualify for the additional study. The alleged additional study was more lucrative (50% of base pay for 20% of time spent). This was used to provide a rationale for and motivate participants to cheat, creating an incentive to inflate their result. The virtual die throw was in fact pre-programmed to add up to 12 (Dubois et al., 2015; Piff et al., 2012), but participants were not made aware of this. Those who claimed to have thrown 14 or more were classified as dishonest. Hence dishonesty in Study 2 was a dichotomous measure.

Professional Power. I utilized two measures of professional power: participants' relative position in an organigram (*1: Highest*, *7: Lowest*) showing the hierarchical structure of one's workplace, and a dichotomous question on participants' supervisory responsibilities at work (Appendix 2.2). The two measures of professional power were positively correlated (η = .441). Participants were classified as powerful

only if they located themselves in the middle or top level of the hierarchy (levels 1 to 5 in the organigram) *and* had supervisory responsibilities. This is a realistic adaptation of the typical distribution of power in organizations across top and middle management (Raes et al., 2011). All others were classified as having low professional power.

2.4.2. Results

Sixty-five participants (36.3%) were classified as powerful. Compared to those classified as having low power (n = 114), powerful participants were more dominant ($M_{HighPower}$ = 3.50, $SD_{HighPower}$ = 1.060, $M_{LowPower}$ = 3.18, $SD_{LowPower}$ = 1.010, $t(177)$ = 1.988, p = .048, d = 0.310). Powerful participants also scored higher on felt prestige ($M_{HighPower}$ = 5.06, $SD_{HighPower}$ = 0.833, $M_{LowPower}$ = 4.75, $SD_{LowPower}$ = 1.004, $t(177)$ = 2.067, p = .040, d = 0.336). Professional power was not significantly linked to gender $t(177)$ = 1.621, p = .107. Dominance and prestige were positively correlated $r(179)$ = .159, p = .033. Older participants scored lower in dominance $r(179)$ = -.164, p = .029.

Among 179 participants, 63 were classified as dishonest (35.2%). I ran a stepwise multiple binary logistic regression with professional power as the independent variable, control variables age and gender, and dishonesty as the dependent variable in Step 1. Dominance and prestige were included as additional independent variable in Step 2. Step 3 added interaction variables between power, dominance and prestige. In Step 1, power significantly predicted dishonesty B = .360, *Wald* = 4.751, p = .029, however the overall regression was not significant $\chi^2(3)$ = 5.688, p = .128. Step 2 yielded an overall significant regression $\chi^2(5)$ = 14.774, p = .011. Dominance predicted dishonesty B = .526, *Wald* = 8.483, p = .004, while power was only marginally related to dishonesty B = .299, *Wald* = 3.019, p = .082.

Prestige was unrelated to dishonesty $B = -.030$, *Wald* $=.031$, $p = .861$. In Step 3, the model fit was worse than that of Step 2, $\chi^2(9) = 16.285$, $p = .061$, and only dominance $B = .519$, *Wald* $= 7.940$, $p = .005$ continued to predict dishonesty (power $\times$ dominance $B = -.127$, $p = .469$).

2.4.3. Discussion

Study 2 corroborated and extended the findings of Study 1. Powerful roles were disproportionately occupied by individuals who perceived themselves as dominant and high in felt prestige. However, only dominance and not prestige predicted dishonesty. Consistent with hypotheses, while both dominance and natural professional power predicted dishonesty, dominance predicted dishonesty above and beyond levels of power. Differences in dishonesty across power levels became marginal after accounting for dominance, prestige and other control variables.

2.5. Study 3: Dominance, Manipulated Power, Moral Disengagement

A common way of distancing from one's dishonest deed is to interpret the behavior as permissible, or to morally disengage (Bandura, 1990). Higher moral disengagement is associated with unethical behavior (Barsky, 2008; Pulfrey et al., 2018), and moral disengagement is a cognitive mechanism that fosters dishonesty (Shu et al., 2011). As such, Study 3 used moral disengagement as a proxy of unethical behavior. It investigated whether dominance, prestige, and power affect moral disengagement.

Because in Study 2 both dominance and power were assessed, it remains a possibility that heightened dominance among power holders is a by-product of having power. Then, the effects of dominance on dishonesty would still be caused by power rather than from baseline levels of dominance. To rule out this possibility, and to

examine trait dominance that is independent of power, in Study 3, dominance (and prestige) were assessed one week prior to the study (Anderson et al., 2012). Power was experimentally manipulated to examine its causal effects on dishonesty. This allowed dominance and felt prestige to be assumed equivalent across power conditions. Study 3 tested the hypothesis that dominance, but not prestige, or manipulated power, would predict moral disengagement.

Another aim of the study was to look into power motivation. I hypothesized that if dominant individuals are motivated to acquire power, then they should prefer being in a powerful position compared to a powerless position. Finally, I examined whether self-construal is implicated in heightened moral disengagement of dominant individuals. Specifically, entitlement can license individuals to break rules (Lee et al., 2019; Stiles et al., 2018). I investigated whether dominant individuals experience greater entitlement, which in turn would elicit moral disengagement. Thus, feeling entitled could precede and mediate the effects of dominance on dishonesty.

2.5.1. Methods

Participants

One hundred and forty-six students from a university based in the U.K. took part. The sample size was pre-determined by power analysis, assuming $(1 - \beta) = .90$, $\alpha = .05$, and Effect size $f^2 = .10$. Five participants were subsequently excluded for correctly guessing the study aim, leaving a final sample of 141 participants (42 Male; $M_{age} = 21.49$ $years$, $SD = 3.45$). Seventy-three participants (51.8%) identified as Asian, and 53 participants (37.6%), as Caucasian. A majority (n = 99, 70.2%) were paid for participation, and others (n = 42, 29.8%) received course credit.

Procedures

Participants were recruited into a study on decision making and problem solving in pairs. First, participants completed measures of dominance, prestige, and provided basic demographic information online. A week later, participants came into the laboratory in person and were assigned to dyads (groups of two). Power was manipulated with a procedure from Mast et al. (2010). Participants were given different roles (manager, or assistant) to work as a team. The experimenter was blind to participants' roles until later in the study, in order to minimize the risk of demand effects (Doyen et al., 2012). The managers chose a task for their assistants, and participants discussed the task at a shared table.

Next, participants went into individual cubicles in order to continue the study in private, where they stayed until they were dismissed. All participants were told that the assistants would work on their allocated task, while the managers would evaluate their work. Actually, participants were checked for the effectiveness of the power manipulation, and completed the entitlement scale. Participants were provided with visual puzzles with an incentive to be dishonest, before they completed the moral disengagement scale. Participants gave feedback on their study experience and guessed the study aims, before receiving the study debrief and being dismissed.

Measures

Dominance and Prestige. The dominance-prestige scale was used (8-item dominance α = .82, 9-item prestige α = .81), presented as a pre-questionnaire prior to the in-person study (Cheng et al., 2010).

Power Manipulation. Participants learned that the pre-questionnaire was a leadership questionnaire that was used to determine their roles (Guinote, 2007a). In fact, participants were randomly assigned to their roles. Half of the participants were assigned to be art gallery managers (high power), and the remaining to be assistants

(low power). Role legitimacy was reinforced by informing participants about the supposed efficacy of the leadership questionnaire, the skills of the managers, and the secondary nature of assistants' roles. Participants were told that the manager would choose a task for their assistant. In addition, everyone would be entered into a lottery, whereby the assistants' prize amount would be determined by their manager's evaluations. Thus managers controlled the outcomes of assistants, and had actual power (Fiske & Depret, 1996) (Appendix 2.3).

Manipulation Check. To assess the effectiveness of the power manipulation, participants indicated the degree to which they felt influential and in charge, using two item 7-point Likert scales (1: *strongly disagree*, 7: *strongly agree*).

Entitlement. Feelings of entitlement were assessed with the psychological entitlement scale (PES). The scale contained eight items, such as 'I demand the best because I am worth it', on 7-point Likert scales ($\alpha = .86$, Campbell et al., 2004; Raskin & Terry, 1988).

Moral Disengagement. Firstly, participants were made aware that they could leave the study considerably early, but unbeknownst to them, it was only possible by being dishonest. Six visual puzzles, allegedly to measure their problem-solving capabilities, were presented to participants. Only three puzzles were solvable, but participants were not made aware of this (Pulfrey & Butera, 2013). Participants were informed that if they solved four or more puzzles, they would be able to skip a second test (Flynn et al., 1987) and leave early. Initially in a pre-test (n = 38), participants reported the number of puzzles solved. However, participants (all students) were strongly opposed to lying on university premises, and the instance of dishonesty was much lower than assumed. Thus, rather than answering how many puzzles they solved after being exposed to the temptation to cheat under the puzzle paradigm, participants

filled in the moral disengagement scale instead (6 items, 7-point Likert scales, α = .70). An example item is, 'If others engage in cheating behavior, then the behavior is morally permissible.' This scale has been used as the dependent variable in previous research (Shu et al., 2011; Moore et al., 2012).

Power Motivation. To inspect participants' power motivation, participants indicated their enjoyment and perceived suitability of the role assigned to them (manager, assistant), on two item 7-point Likert scales (1: *does not suit me at all,* 7: *suits me extremely well*).

2.5.2. Results

Manipulation check

Seventy-two participants (51.1%) were assigned to be managers. No material group differences in age, gender, race, or English proficiency between managers and assistants were observed on an independent-samples t-test. Participants' judgements of their influence and control $r(141) = .721$, $p < .001$ were merged into one measure of felt power. The managers felt more powerful than the assistants ($M_{Manager} = 5.76$, $SD_{Manager} = 1.058$, $M_{Assistant} = 4.27$, $SD_{Assistant} = 1.492$, $t(139) = 6.891$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.152$), suggesting effective power manipulation.

Power motivation

Participant's enjoyment and perceived suitability of their assigned role $r(141) = .797$, $p < .001$ were merged into one measure of role preference. A multiple linear regression with power condition (high, low), dominance, prestige, and their interactions as predictors, and role preference as the outcome variable, was overall significant, $F(7,133) = 6.787$, $p < .001$, Adjusted $R^2 = .224$. Both power × dominance

$B = .485$, $p < .001$, and power × prestige $B = .233$, $p = .027$ influenced role preferences. Dominance was positively related to prestige $r(141) = .194$, $p = .021$.

The interactions showed that for participants assigned to the manager role, higher dominance ($B = .387$, $p = .027$, Table 2.1) and felt prestige ($B = .555$, $p < .001$, Table A2.2) coincided with higher power preference. For participants assigned to the assistant role, dominance ($B = -.605$, $p < .001$) was associated with lower preference for being assigned as assistants (prestige: $B = .093$, $p = .566$). It is possible to deduce that participants preferred positions that were congruent with their dominance level (Figure 2.1).

Table 2.1

Role Preference by Power and Dominance – Studies 3 and 4

Study 3				95% Confidence Interval	
Dominance Level	Power Condition	Role Preference	Std. Error	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
High	High	5.393	.230	4.938	5.848
High	Low	4.759	.216	4.331	5.188
Low	High	5.396	.212	4.976	5.816
Low	Low	5.847	.227	5.397	6.296

Study 4				95% Confidence Interval	
Dominance Level	Power Condition	Role Preference	Std. Error	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
High	High	5.323	.251	4.828	5.818
High	Low	4.750	.235	4.285	5.215
Low	High	4.341	.245	3.858	4.823
Low	Low	4.697	.214	4.275	5.118

Role preference on 7-point Likert scale. Higher mean indicates higher preference for the power condition

Figure 2.1

Role Enjoyment and Perceived Suitability by Power and Dominance – Study 3

The vertical axis represents assigned role preference on a 7-point Likert scale. This shows that participants low in dominance preferred to be assistants, while participants high in dominance preferred to be managers.

Moral disengagement

A stepwise hierarchical linear regression tested the main hypothesis. Step 1 had power, age and gender as inputs, and moral disengagement as the outcome variable. Key predictors dominance and prestige were added in Step 2. Step 3 included role preference as a control variable. Finally, in Step 4 the interaction variables between power, dominance and prestige were included. Step 1 was significant $F(3,137) = 4.048$, $p = .009$, Adjusted $R^2 = .061$, showing that power marginally predicted *lower* levels of moral disengagement $B = -.146$, $p = .052$, along with males being more morally disengaged $B = .240$, $p = .004$. Adding dominance and prestige in Step 2 improved the model fit (significant $\Delta F = .006$, $F(5,135) = 4.735$, $p < .001$, Adjusted $R^2 = .118$). Dominance coincided with higher moral disengagement $B = .234$, $p = .005$, while prestige was with *lower* moral disengagement $B = -.173$, p

= .036. Power condition continued to negatively influence moral disengagement $B =$ -.167, p = .038, along with gender B =.247, p = .006. Neither Step 3 (significant ΔF = .818, $F(6,134) = 3.927$, $p < .001$, Adjusted R^2 = .111) nor Step 4 contributed to explaining the outcome variance (Table 2.2). Neither role preference $B = -.007$, p = .915 nor any of the interaction variables predicted moral disengagement (power $\times$ dominance $B = -.008$, $p = .928$).

Table 2.2

Stepwise Regression on Moral Disengagement – Study 3

Step	R	R^2	Adjusted R^2	Std. Error of the Estimates	ΔR^2	ΔF	df1	df2	Sig. ΔF
					Change Statistics				
1	.285	.081	.061	.9689	.081	4.048	3	137	.009
2	.386	.149	.118	.9393	.068	5.376	2	135	.006
3	.387	.150	.111	.9426	.000	.053	1	134	.818
4	.393	.155	.090	.9541	.005	.201	4	130	.938

1. Predictors: (Constant), Age, Power, Gender
2. Predictors: (Constant), Age, Power, Gender, Dominance, Prestige
3. Predictors: (Constant), Age, Power, Gender, Dominance, Prestige, Role Preference
4. Predictors: (Constant), Age, Power, Gender, Dominance, Prestige, Role Preference, Power $\times$ Dominance, Power $\times$ Prestige, Dominance $\times$ Prestige, Power $\times$ Dominance $\times$ Prestige

Entitlement

Dominance was positively correlated with entitlement $r(141) = .444$, $p < .001$. However, entitlement was only marginally related to moral disengagement $r(141)$ = .144, p = .089. Therefore, I cannot conclude that entitlement explains and mediates the relationship between dominance and moral inclinations (Table 2.3).

Table 2.3

Associations of Moral Disengagement and Dominance, Prestige and Entitlement –
Study 3

		Dominance	Prestige	Entitlement
Prestige	Pearson Correlation	.194*		
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.021		
	N	141		
Entitlement	Pearson Correlation	.444**	.483**	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	
	N	141	141	
Moral Disengagement	Pearson Correlation	.216*	-.123	.144
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.010	.146	.089
	N	141	141	141

* Significant at .05 threshold ** Significant at .01 threshold

2.5.3. Discussion

Dominance coincided with higher levels of moral disengagement across power conditions. Manipulated power had the opposite effect, as managers scored lower on moral disengagement. It is possible that the elevated status of power holders as gallery managers elicited responsibility, and consequently moral engagement. Prestige was also related to lower moral disengagement. Despite being positively correlated, dominance and prestige demonstrated opposite associations with moral disengagement. This suggests that even if individuals high in prestige and dominance both strive for power, their attitudes in the moral domain can diverge.

2.6. Study 4: Dominance, Manipulated Power, Puzzle Performance

Using a different power manipulation from Study 3, I tested the hypothesis that dominance, more than power, predisposes individuals to be dishonest for direct and monetary gains. Power was manipulated with a writing exercise on memory recall

(Galinsky et al., 2003), which enables the recreation of power experiences that vary across participants, and not necessarily linked to formal positions.

In Study 4, the visual puzzle task that was introduced in the previous study was used to measure dishonesty, except this time participants actually reported their performance. Study 4 was conducted online, and participants were not associated with a university or any one organization. In addition, the desire to outperform others (performance motivation; Ames & Archer, 1988; Dweck, 1986) was assessed as a control variable. This was because the outcome variable (performance in a puzzle) could be perceived as a measure of skill rather than luck. The measure of dishonesty in Studies 1 and 2 were based on chance, and did not require the use of any skill. Performance motivation is closely related to, but distinct from dominance (Franken & Brown, 1995; Yamaguchi, 2001). As in Study 3, I assessed participants' preferences for power. I hypothesized that dominance would predict dishonesty, as well as a preference for power. Prestige would predict a preference for power, but not dishonesty.

2.6.1. Methods

Participants

U.K. based working adults were recruited online, through a recruiting platform (prolific.co). Data was collected in two stages. Two hundred and twenty adults participated in the first stage measuring participants' chronic predispositions. Out of 220 participants, 180 completed the second stage. The sample size was pre-determined assuming $(1 - \beta) = .90$, $\alpha = .05$, and effect size $f^2 = .10$. Two participants were excluded for suspicion, leaving a final sample size of 178 (66 Male; $M_{age} = 35.58$ *years*, $SD = 11.16$). A vast majority of participants identified as Caucasian (n = 146,

82%). Participants were randomly assigned to either high (n = 81, 45.5%) or low power conditions (n = 97, 54.5%). Participants received £2, and bonus compensation.

Procedure

In the first stage, the study was introduced to participants as focusing on social interactions, where participants reported their predispositions. Seven days later, participants were invited to participate in Stage 2. Participants wrote about a past event, allegedly as a memory recall exercise (Galinsky et al., 2003). They then completed a manipulation check, followed by a question on how much they enjoyed the writing task. Participants were shown puzzles to solve, which were ostensibly unrelated to the writing exercise (Pulfrey & Butera, 2013). Participants were informed that their bonus compensation would be determined by the number of puzzles solved. After self-reporting their puzzle performance, participants indicated how motivated they were to complete the task.

Measures

Dominance and Prestige. The dominance-prestige scale was used (dominance subscale 8-item α = .80, prestige subscale 9-tiem α = .85) (Cheng et al., 2010).

Power manipulation. Participants wrote about a past experience (Galinsky et al., 2003). Half of the participants were asked to write about an experience when they had power over another person (high power), such as a situation in which they controlled the ability of another person to get something they wanted. The other half wrote about when another person had power over them (low power). Participants were requested to write in detail and as vividly as possible, and had to write at least 600 characters, and spend more than 7 minutes on writing, in order to fully immerse themselves in the past experience.

Manipulation Check. Participants completed the same manipulation check used in Study 3.

Dishonesty. Participants were shown six visual puzzles (Pulfrey & Butera, 2013) and informed that they would receive a bonus payment depending on their performance. The bonus would be 10p for every puzzle solved (50p for solving all puzzles). Since only three puzzles were solvable, all participants who solved three or less were classified as honest, and re-coded to a score of 3. Thus, dishonesty was constructed as a continuous variable with 3, 4, 5, and 6 as possible values (3: honest, 4: slightly dishonest, 5: dishonest, 6: very dishonest).

Performance Motivation. One question adapted from Van Yperen and colleagues (2011) measured participants' performance motivation (Appendix 2.4).

Power Motivation. Participants indicated their level of enjoyment of the writing task (7-point Likert scale, 1: *strongly agree*, 7: *strongly disagree*).

2.6.2. Results

Across power conditions, participants did not materially differ in gender or race, although participants assigned to the powerful group were marginally younger ($M_{HighPower}$ = 33.85 *years*, $SD_{HighPower}$ = 10.077, $M_{LowPower}$ = 37.02 *years*, $SD_{LowPower}$ = 11.855, $t(176)$ = -1.900, p = .059). There was no difference in the enjoyment of the writing task between power conditions ($M_{HighPower}$ = 4.83, $SD_{HighPower}$ = 1.611, $M_{LowPower}$ = 4.71, $SD_{LowPower}$ = 1.534, $t(176)$ = 0.490, p = .625). One hundred and eleven participants (62.4%) were classified as honest, 36 (20.2%) were slightly dishonest, seven (4.9%) were moderately dishonest, and 24 (13.5%) were considered very dishonest.

Manipulation check

The degree to which participants felt they were in control and influenced the situation they wrote about in the writing task were merged into one score $r(178)$ = .794, $p < .001$. Participants assigned to the high power condition felt more in control and influential compared to those assigned to the low power condition ($M_{HighPower}$ = 6.00, $SD_{HighPower} = 0.879$, $M_{LowPower} = 2.67$, $SD_{LowPower} = 1.373$, $t(176) = 18.837$, $p <$ 0.001, $d = 2.889$), and accordingly the power manipulation was deemed effective.

Power motivation

A multiple linear regression with power, dominance, prestige, and their interactions as inputs, and role enjoyment as the outcome variable was overall not significant $F(7,170) = 1.383$, $p = .215$. There was neither a power × dominance interaction ($B = .143$, $p = .238$, Table 2.1), nor an interaction of power × prestige (B = -.116, $p = .331$, Table A2.2). For participants assigned to the high-power condition, high dominance ($B = .335$, $p = .058$) marginally coincided with their enjoyment of the recall task (but not prestige: $B = .092$, $p = .603$). In contrast, for those assigned to the low power condition, high prestige ($B = .349$, $p = .030$) was associated with the enjoyment of the recall task (but not dominance: $B = .050$, $p = .751$).

Dishonesty

A stepwise multiple linear regression tested the main hypothesis. Step 1 had power condition, control variables age and gender as inputs, and puzzle score as the outcome variable. Dominance and prestige were added in Step 2. I added the control variables role enjoyment and performance motivation in Step 3. Finally, all possible interaction variables between power, dominance and prestige were included to explore moderation effects (Step 4). Step 1 was not significant $F(3,174) = 1.008$, $p = .391$, and power was not a significant predictor of dishonesty $B = .068$, $p = .396$. Adding dominance and prestige in Step 2 marginally improved the model fit (significant ΔF

= .055), although the overall regression in Step 2 was still not significant $F(5,172) = 1.799$, $p = .115$. Nevertheless, dominance predicted dishonesty, $B = .162$, $p = .046$.

Step 3 was significant $F(7,170) = 2.150$, $p = .041$, Adjusted $R^2 = .044$ with a marginal improvement in the model (significant $\Delta F = .056$). Dishonesty was related to higher performance motivation $B = .103$, $p = .035$, and marginally dominance $B = .139$, $p = .088$. No other variables approached significance (power: $B = .054$, $p = .495$, prestige: $B = .054$, $p = .500$, enjoyment: $B = .044$, $p = .394$, age: $B = -.005$, $p = .532$, being male: $B = -.055$, $p = .506$). Step 4 did not contribute to the model (Table 2.4), and the influence of power $\times$ dominance ($B = -.010$, $p = .907$) was not significant.

Although dominance was positively associated with dishonesty, its effect became marginal when control variables were taken into account. In particular, performance motivation was positively related to dominance $r(178) = .164$, $p = .028$ as well as dishonesty $r(178) = .207$, $p = .006$, but not prestige $r(178) = .117$, $p = .121$ (Table 2.5). An exploratory bootstrapping analysis indicated that performance motivation did *not* statistically mediate the relationship between dominance and dishonesty (Indirect Effect = .315, 95% CI [-.0011, .0750], PROCESS model 4; 5000 resamples) (Hayes, 2012).

Table 2.4

Stepwise Regression on Dishonesty – Study 4

			Adjusted	Std. Error of the	Change Statistics				
Step	R	R^2	R^2	Estimate	ΔR^2	ΔF	df1	df2	Sig. ΔF
1	.131	.017	.000	1.05326	.017	1.008	3	174	.391
2	.223	.050	.022	1.04163	.033	2.953	2	172	.055
3	.285	.081	.044	1.03016	.032	2.925	3	170	.056
4	.295	.087	.027	1.03913	.006	.270	4	166	.897

1. Predictors: (Constant), Age, Power, Gender
2. Predictors: (Constant), Age, Power, Gender, Dominance, Prestige

3. Predictors: (Constant), Age, Power, Gender, Dominance, Prestige, Role Enjoyment, Performance Motivation

4. Predictors: (Constant), Age, Power, Gender, Dominance, Prestige, Role Enjoyment, Performance Motivation, Power × Dominance, Power × Prestige, Dominance × Prestige, Power × Dominance × Prestige

Table 2.5

Associations of Dishonesty, Dominance, Prestige, and Performance Motivation –

Study 4

		Dishonesty	Dominance	Performance Motivation
Dominance	Pearson Correlation	.180*		
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.016		
	N	178		
Performance Motivation	Pearson Correlation	.207**	.164*	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.006	.028	
	N	178	178	
Prestige	Pearson Correlation	.094	.106	.117
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.214	.160	.121
	N	178	178	178

* Significant at .05 threshold ** Significant at .01 threshold

2.6.3. Discussion

Dominance was positively associated with dishonesty, while manipulated power and prestige were not. Dominance was marginally associated with the enjoyment of recalling experiences of power. Consistent with past research, dominance was positively correlated with performance motivation, which in turn predicted dishonesty above and beyond dominance.

2.7. Study 5a: Dominance, Natural Power, Covid-19 Rule-Breaking

Thus far, Studies 1 to 4 investigated dishonesty that accrues personal benefits in the form of money or time. However, the social consequences of dishonesty were relatively trivial. To complement these measures of unethical behavior, Study 5a

focused on common daily transgressions, but with severe social consequences, such as endangering others and prolonging a pandemic. Specifically, I concentrated on the tendency to break lockdown rules imposed by the U.K. government to contain the spread of Covid-19. Study 5a investigated the relationship between dominance, prestige, professional power, and Covid-19 related rule-breaking.

The study had three aims. Firstly, it tested whether dominant individuals are more likely to break Covid-19 containment rules. This would not be the case for individuals high in felt prestige. Next, as in Study 2, Study 5a tested the hypothesis that professional power is disproportionately occupied by individuals with high levels of dominance and prestige, and that the association between power and Covid-19 offenses should be driven by elevated dominance among power holders, rather than power itself. Lastly, I explored cognitive mechanisms that may prompt and justify dominant individuals to break rules, which are entitlement (as in Study 3), and perceived invulnerability to suffering badly from Covid-19. Perceived invulnerability is associated with the fearless and risk taking inclinations of dominant individuals (Bronchain et al., 2019; Demaree et al., 2009), and could prompt risk-taking behavior for selfish reasons.

Study 5a was an online field survey. Participants were recruited through local community online groups. Data were collected within a three-week period in July and August 2020. Demographic information and other control variables that could influence rule-breaking, such as the prevalence of Covid-19 in a participant's local area, were assessed.

2.7.1. Methods

Participants

Six hundred and seventy-eight adult members of local community Facebook groups participated in the study[5]. The survey took less than 10 minutes to complete, and participants did not receive payment. Fourteen participants were excluded for suspicion, leaving a final sample of 664 participants (Mage = 45.17 years, SD = 12.95). A majority of the respondents were female (n = 573, 86.3%), Caucasian (n = 565, 85.1%) and were employed (n = 500, 75.3%). Residents of all 33 local boroughs within London, U.K. took part.

Procedures

The study was introduced to participants as focusing on behavior and decision making during the Covid-19 pandemic. After giving consent, participants completed a questionnaire that measured dominance, prestige, entitlement, and perceived vulnerability to catching and suffering from Covid-19. One question checked whether participants were paying attention. First, past behavior between 23 March and 15 June 2020 was assessed. During this period, the government had imposed strict rules to limit most social contact, asking people to stay at home, with a few exceptions. Then I asked participants about their plans to adhere to future Covid-19 containment rules. Participants indicated whether they had medical conditions that would make them more vulnerable to Covid-19, followed by the borough they reside in, the degree to which the virus had impacted their local area, and other basic demographic data. Professional power was assessed through the presence or absence of supervision responsibilities. Finally, participants provided feedback on the study experience, were checked for suspicion, received a detailed debrief, and gave final consent before exiting the study.

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[5] 1,264 people clicked on the link, of which 678 (53.6%) completed the survey.

Measures

Dominance and Prestige. The dominance-prestige scale was used (dominance subscale 8-item α = .79, prestige subscale 9-item α = .80) (Cheng et al., 2010).

Rule-breaking. Participants answered six questions regarding their past behaviors. The questions covered unlawful transgressive behavior, such as the degree to which participants had left their home for *un*essential reasons (5-point Likert scale, 1: *never*, 5: *more than 3 times*), or adhered to social distancing (reverse coded) (7-point Likert scale, 1: *all of the time*, 7: *never*). The questions were standardized to account for scale differences (6-item α = .62), and subsequently one measure of past rule-breaking was constructed. Participants then reported their planned behavior in the following four weeks. The questions were adapted to reflect rule changes that had occurred during the year. Examples include the intention to wear face coverings (reverse coded), or attend large gatherings of more than 30 people (7-point Likert scale, 1: *extremely unlikely*, 7: *extremely likely*). Again, answers were standardized (4-item α = .59), and collapsed to form one measure of planned rule-breaking (Appendix 2.5). Past and planned rule-breaking were positively correlated $r(664)$ = .494, p < .001, and for brevity and simplicity, collapsed into one measure of Covid-19 rule-breaking[6].

Professional Power. Participants who indicated they were employed answered whether they hold a managerial, supervisory, or leadership position at work (*yes*/*no*).

Entitlement. As in Study 3, the PES scale was used (8-item α = .82, Campbell et al., 2004).

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[6] The results of Study 5a remain consistent when rule-breaking is separated between past and planned behavior.

Perceived Vulnerability. Participants' perceived vulnerability to contracting and suffering from Covid-19 was assessed with nine items, adapted from the perceived vulnerability to disease scale (Duncan et al., 2009; see also Ahorsu et al., 2020; YouGov., 2020). Examples include statements such as, 'It does *not* make me anxious to be around people who may have Coronavirus (reverse coded)' and 'I have been afraid I would contract Covid-19' (Appendix 2.5). Participants indicated their level of agreement to these statements on 7-point Likert scales (1: *strongly disagree*, 7: *strongly agree*) (9-item α = .76).

Control Variables. Demographic information age, gender, race, education level, and household income were collected. In addition, participants reported whether they had pre-existing medical conditions that would make them more likely to suffer badly from Covid-19 (*yes/no/prefer not to answer*). Participants then rated the level of local Covid-19 prevalence compared to the rest of London, on a 5-point Likert scale (1: *much fewer*, 5: *many more*).

2.7.2. Results

Rule-breaking

Participants who had power at work (supervisory responsibilities, n = 293) were more dominant ($M_{HighPower}$ = 3.30, $SD_{HighPower}$ = .912, $M_{LowPower}$ = 2.96, $SD_{LowPower}$ =.835, $t(498)$ = 4.297, $p < .001$, d = 0.393), and felt higher on prestige ($M_{HighPower}$ = 5.19, $SD_{HighPower}$ =.667, $M_{LowPower}$ = 5.00, $SD_{LowPower}$ =.765, $t(498)$ = 2.952, p = .003, d = 0.265) compared to participants who did not have power at work (n = 207). Notably, professional power was associated with higher levels of rule-breaking (*standardized* $M_{HighPower}$ = .0901, $SD_{HighPower}$ = .585, $M_{LowPower}$ = -.0155, $SD_{LowPower}$ =.525, $t(498)$ = 2.073, p = .039, d = 0.190).

A stepwise multiple linear regression was used to test the study hypotheses. Step 1 included power, and control variables age, gender, education, income, pre-existing medical conditions, and local Covid-19 prevalence. The collapsed measure of past and future rule-breaking was entered as the outcome variable. Key predictors dominance and prestige were added in Step 2. In Step 3, the interaction variables between power, dominance and prestige were added. Finally, feelings of entitlement and perceived vulnerability to Covid-19 were added as covariates (Step 4).

Step 1 was significant, $F(7,419) = 5.244$, $p < .001$, Adjusted $R^2 = .065$, and professional power coincided with higher levels of rule-breaking compared to lacking power ($B = .121$, $p = .035$). Adding dominance and prestige in Step 2 improved the model (significant $\Delta F = .048$, $F(9,417) = 4.799$, $p < .001$, Adjusted $R^2 = .074$). Dominance predicted rule-breaking ($B = .065$, $p = .018$), while prestige did not ($B = .013$, $p = .633$). Crucially, the association between power and rule-breaking was no longer significant, but marginal ($B = .103$, $p = .073$).

Step 3 did not improve the model (significant $\Delta F = .109$, $F(13,413) = 3.937$, $p < .001$, Adjusted $R^2 = .082$). Younger participants ($B = -.009$, $p < .001$), and those without a pre-existing medical condition ($B = -.184$, $p = .004$) were more likely to have relaxed views on Covid-19 rules. The interaction variable power × dominance approached, but did not reach, statistical significance ($B = .110$, $p = .053$). That is, among those with professional power, dominance predicted rule-breaking $F(1,291) = 13.108$, $B = .122$, $p < .001$, whereas no such effects were observed among those without professional power $F(1,205) = .021$, $p = .886$. In Step 3, power was marginally related to rule-breaking ($B = .106$, $p = .064$), and dominance was no longer significant ($B = -.005$, $p = .910$). This tendency suggests that in this instance power could magnify the likelihood of dominant individuals to break lockdown rules.

Step 4 led to an improvement in the model (significant $\Delta F = .001$, $F(15,411) =$ 9.0814, $p < .001$, Adjusted $R^2 = .222$) (Table 2.6). Professional power ($B = .097$, $p = .066$), dominance ($B = -.039$, $p = .365$), and their interaction variable ($B = .089$, $p = .093$) were not associated with rule-breaking. Feeling entitled ($B = .070$, $p = .011$) and *in*vulnerable to Covid-19 ($B = -.209$, $p < .001$) coincided with rule-breaking behavior[7].

Table 2.6

Stepwise Regression on Rule-breaking – Study 5a

Step	R	R^2	Adjusted R^2	Std. Error of the Estimate	ΔR^2	ΔF	df1	df2	Sig. ΔF
						Change Statistics			
1	.284	.081	.065	.54118	.081	5.244	7	419	.000
2	.306	.094	.074	.53854	.013	3.061	2	417	.048
3	.332	.110	.082	.53622	.016	1.903	4	413	.109
4	.499	.249	.222	.49386	.139	37.943	2	411	.000

1. Predictors: (Constant), Age, Gender, Power, Borough, Education, Medical Condition, Income

2. Predictors: (Constant), Age, Gender, Power, Borough, Education, Medical Condition, Income, Prestige, Dominance

3. Predictors: (Constant), Age, Gender, Power, Borough, Education, Medical Condition, Income, Dominance, Prestige, Dominance × Power, Dominance × Prestige, Power × Prestige, Dominance × Power × Prestige

4. Predictors: (Constant), Age, Gender, Power, Borough, Education, Medical Condition, Income, Dominance, Prestige, Dominance × Power, Dominance × Prestige, Power × Prestige, Dominance × Power × Prestige, Entitlement, Invulnerability

Entitlement

Dominance was not only positively correlated with higher levels of past $r(664) = .104$, $p = .007$ and planned $r(664) = .133$, $p < .001$ rule-breaking, but also feeling entitled $r(664) = .307$, $p < .001$. Heightened feelings of entitlement was itself

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[7] No evidence of moderated mediation was detected for entitlement and vulnerability.

associated with rule-breaking (past $r(664) = .161$, $p < .003$, planned $r(664) = .150$, $p < .001$). A bootstrapping mediation analysis was performed using PROCESS (model 4; 5000 resamples) (Hayes, 2012), with past and planned rule-breaking collapsed into one variable. Entitlement was a statistical mediator of the relationship between dominance on rule-breaking (Effect = .0254, $SE = .0085$, 95% CI [.0099, .0437]). Nevertheless, reverse models were also significant[8].

Perceived vulnerability

The higher participants' dominance, the less vulnerable to Covid-19 they felt $r(664) = -.138$, $p < .001$. Feeling vulnerable was associated with adherence to rules, both past $r(664) = -.340$, $p < .001$ and planned $r(664) = -.424$, $p < .001$. Perceived vulnerability statistically mediated the association between dominance and rule-breaking behavior (PROCESS; Indirect Effect = .0326, $SE = .011$, 95% CI [.0123, .0539])[9]. Although these models suggest that dominant individuals are more likely to break rules because they feel entitled and less vulnerable to Covid-19 (Figure 2.2), as alternative models were also significant in this correlational study, the effects may be mutual, and the relationships remain tentative.

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[8] Alternative model with IV = entitlement M = dominance was also significant (Effect = .0152, $SE = .0067$, 95% CI [.0027, .0290])

[9] Alternative model with IV = vulnerability M = dominance was also significant (Effect = -.0058, $SE = .0032$, 95% CI [-.0132, -.0006]).

Figure 2.2

Serial Mediation between Dominance, Entitlement, Vulnerability and Rule-breaking – Study 5a Model 6, (Hayes, 2012)

*. Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

In contrast, professional power was unrelated to entitlement ŋ = -.042, or perceived vulnerability ŋ = -.068, suggesting that dominance and power may jointly amplify, yet still independently influence Covid-19 related offenses. Prestige was positively related to entitlement $r(664) = .218, p < .001$, but not to feeling invulnerable to Covid-19 $r(664) = -.031, p < .418$. Other indicators of social hierarchy such as education and income were positively related to dominance (education $r(664) = .157, p < .001$, income $r(564) = .215, p < .001$). Education and income were also associated with higher prestige (education $r(664) = .236, p < .001$, income $r(564) = .254, p < .001$), and professional power (education ŋ = .161, income ŋ = .400) (Table 2.7). However, these variables were either unrelated to rule-breaking (income $B = -.009, p = .492$), or predicted *less* rule-breaking (education $B = -.079, p = .004$), demonstrating the unique concept of dominance in eliciting rule-breaking behavior, that differs from education or income levels.

Table 2.7

Associations of Rule-breaking and Power, Dominance, Prestige, Entitlement, and

Perceived Vulnerability – Study 5a

		Power	Dominance	Prestige	Entitlement	Vulnerability
Rule-breaking	Pearson Correlation	.092*	.138**	.029	.180**	-.444**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.039	.000	.448	.000	.000
	N	500	664	664	664	664
Power	Pearson Correlation		.189**	.131**	-.042	-.068
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.003	.350	.129
	N		500	500	500	500
Dominance	Pearson Correlation			.168**	.307**	-.138**
	Sig. (2-tailed)			.000	.000	.000
	N			664	664	664
Prestige	Pearson Correlation				.218**	-.031
	Sig. (2-tailed)				.000	.418
	N				664	664
Entitlement	Pearson Correlation					-.121**
	Sig. (2-tailed)					.002
	N					664

*. Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

As exploratory analyses, I examined item level transgressions. The intention to

break the rule on wearing face coverings correlated with both dominance $r(664)$

$= .128. p < .001$, and professional power $r(500) = .115. p < .010$. In contrast, the

intention to break social distancing rules was correlated with dominance $r(664)$

$= .125. p < .001$, but not professional power $r(500) = .014. p < .758$. This may suggest

that the desire for social contact may diverge between the powerful and the dominant.

2.7.3. Discussion

Study 5a provided support for the notion that more dominant individuals are

likely to break Covid-19 related rules. This inclination was explained by feeling more

entitled and invulnerable to contracting Covid-19 among the dominant, although the

mediations remain correlational. In contrast, felt prestige did not influence rule-breaking. As in Study 2, powerful roles were disproportionately occupied by dominant individuals and those high in felt prestige. Individuals with professional power were more likely to break Covid-19 containment rules, but professional power no longer significantly predicted rule-breaking after controlling for dominance.

2.8. Study 5b: Entitlement and Covid-19 Rule-Breaking

Study 5a found that entitlement was a statistical mediator of the relationship between dominance and rule-breaking behavior. However, reverse models were also significant, and the effects could be reciprocal. To test a causal chain of mediation (Spencer et al., 2005), Study 5b examined the causal effect of feelings of entitlement on Covid-19 rule-breaking. It was designed as an experiment that manipulated entitlement, and tested the hypothesis that feeling entitled triggers rule-breaking behavior.

2.8.1. Methods

Participants

One hundred and seventy-eight adults living in London, U.K. participated in this online experiment (prolific.co). The sample size was pre-determined using GPower software, by assuming $(1 - \beta) = .90$, $\alpha = .05$, effect size .50. The survey took about 10 minutes to complete, and participants were paid for their time. Ten participants were excluded for guessing the study aims, leaving a sample of 168 ($M_{age} = 32.46$ *years*, $SD = 11.50$). A majority of the respondents were female (n = 109, 64.9%) and Caucasian (n = 93, 55.4%).

Procedures

The study was pre-registered (https://aspredicted.org/FLV_RAN). It was introduced to participants as a study on the interpretation of external events. After giving consent, participants completed writing exercises to induce feelings of high or low entitlement. Participants' level of entitlement was measured thereafter to check the effectiveness of the manipulation. One question checked whether participants were paying attention to the instructions. Subsequently, participants reported their planned behavior in relation to Covid-19 restrictions. Participants filled in demographic information age, gender, race, education and income levels, as well as whether they had pre-existing health conditions, before being checked for suspicion and receiving a full debrief.

Measures

Entitlement. A previously used manipulation of entitlement was employed (Redford & Ratliff, 2018; Stamkou et al., 2019; Zitek & Vincent, 2015). Half of the participants were asked to provide two reasons each on why they should demand the best in life, why they deserve the lifestyle they want, and why they should be treated with respect (high entitlement). The other half provided the same number of reasons why they should not always demand the best in life, why they should not necessarily get the lifestyle they want, and why they should not always be expected to be treated with respect (low entitlement). Participants spent at least four minutes to provide six reasons in total (Appendix 2.6).

Manipulation Check. The effectiveness of the manipulation was assessed with the psychological entitlement scale (PES, $\alpha = .84$, Campbell et al., 2004; Raskin & Terry, 1988), consistent with past research (Redford & Ratliff, 2018; Stamkou et al., 2019; Zitek & Vincent, 2015).

Rule-breaking. Participants answered six questions on 7-point Likert scales regarding their planned behavior ($\alpha = .75$). The questions were similar to that of Study 5a, with some changes to account for rule changes that occurred (Appendix 2.6).

2.8.2. Results

Seventy-nine participants (47.0%) were assigned to the high entitlement group, and the rest (n = 89, 53.0%), to the low entitlement group. Between entitlement conditions, participants did not materially differ in age, gender, race, education, income level, or underlying health.

Manipulation check

Participants assigned to the high entitlement conditions scored higher in the PES compared to those assigned to the low entitlement condition ($M_{High} = 4.07$, $SD_{High} = .972$, $M_{Low} = 3.70$, $SD_{Low} = .947$, $t(166) = 2.479$, $p = .014$, $d = 0.38$).

Rule-breaking

An analysis of covariance yielded marginal results $F(7,160) = 2.047$, $p = .052$. There were no significant effects of entitlement condition on planned rule-breaking behavior ($B = -.002$, $p = .984$), after controlling for age, gender, race, education, income, and underlying health condition. Older participants ($B = -.019$, $p = .009$) and those with underlying health conditions ($B = -.346$, $p = .045$) were more likely to indicate adherence to Covid-19 rules. Hence, the study hypothesis was not supported. A marginal moderation of entitlement condition $\times$ gender was observed ($p = .083$), showing a heightened tendency for entitled males to break lockdown rules. Finally, I carried out an exploratory analysis whereby higher PES scores were associated with increased planned transgressions $r(168) = .298$, $p < .001$. This was consistent with the

results of Study 5a, which assessed participants' baseline levels of entitlement on the PES.

2.8.3. Discussion

Study 5b did not find evidence supporting a causal relationship between entitlement and rule breaking behaviors related to Covid-19. Therefore, the statistical mediation of entitlement observed in Study 5a remains inconclusive.

Table 2.8

Measure of Dishonesty across Studies 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5a

		Study 1	Study 2	Study 3	Study 4	Study 5a
Measure of Dishonesty		Die Throw	Virtual Pre-programmed Die Throw	Moral Disengagement	Puzzle performance	Covid-19 Rule-breaking
Dominance	Pearson Correlation	.255**	.222**	.216*	.180*	.138**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.003	.010	.016	.001
	N	204	179	141	178	664
Prestige	Pearson Correlation	.133	.039	-.123	.094	.029
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.058	.602	.146	.214	.448
	N	204	179	141	178	664
Power	Pearson Correlation	-	.173*	-.149	.080	.092*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	-	.020	.078	.286	.039
	N	-	179	141	178	500

2.9. General Discussion

Power has a long-standing association with corruption, rule-breaking behavior and dishonesty. In the current chapter, I proposed a differentiated examination of the relationship between power and dishonesty, considering not only tangible, structural power, but also predispositions that afford power in the first place, dominance and

prestige. The objective of this chapter was to consider self-selection processes that may elicit disproportionate dishonesty among the powerful. I hypothesized that dominance would predict dishonesty. This is because dominant individuals strive to accrue self-serving advantages (Boehm & Flack, 2010) such as time, money (e.g., getting out of a study earlier, getting a bonus), or freedom from constraints (e.g., Covid-19 restrictions), with a disregard for social rules (Shu et al., 2011). Even though aggressive and manipulative tendencies among dominant individuals have been extensively documented (e.g., de Waal, 1986; Maner & Case, 2016), whether dominance is directly linked to dishonesty was largely unknown.

Consistent with past research, I further hypothesized that dominant individuals would strive for power (Barrick et al., 2002; Mast et al., 2010) and be over-represented at the top (Lord et al., 1986; Winter, 1973), contributing to the links between power and dishonesty. Specifically, I hypothesized that in settings involving self-selection processes, power holders should be more dishonest compared to individuals who do not have power. However, this association between power and dishonesty should be explained through the over-representation of dominant individuals among powerful positions.

Across five studies[10], dominance was consistently associated with dishonesty (Table 2.8). The hypothesis that dominant individuals want power, and are more likely to attain power, was supported. Dominance was on the whole associated with the enjoyment of power (Studies 3 and 4). Crucially, dominant individuals were over-represented in positions of power, and this effect was stronger than the effect of power on dishonesty (Studies 2 and 5a). These findings demonstrate both that dishonesty is a common strategy used by dominant individuals to attain their self-serving aims and

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[10] With the exception of Study 5b, which did not measure dominance

desires, and that dominant individuals are concentrated at the top. This over-representation could naturally shift the ethical practices among the powerful observed in society at large.

In contrast to dominance, power's link with dishonesty was mixed (Studies 2 and 5a: marginally positive, Study 3: negative, Study 4: no effect). To allow diverse expressions of power, I assessed power in various contexts (Studies 2 and 5a: natural professional power, Study 3: simulated roles in a dyad, Study 4: recall of past experiences). Crucially, in naturalistic studies (Studies 2 and 5a), those with professional power were more dishonest, but this effect became marginal when dominance was controlled for. When power was temporarily induced in a differentiated status setting, power actually improved moral engagement (Study 3). When power was randomly allocated with a recall of past experiences that varied across participants, power did not influence dishonesty (Study 4). I posit that the active goals of power holders, in particular those linked to power roles, vary across contexts (e.g., industries) in a situated manner (Guinote, 2007a; 2010).

Subjective feelings of prestige were overall positively related to dominance (Studies 1, 2, 3 and 5a). Like dominance, higher levels of felt prestige coincided with positions of power (Studies 2 and 5a), and enjoyment of powerful roles (Study 3). Unlike dominance, prestige was not associated with dishonesty, with the exception of Study 3, where prestige was linked to *lower* moral disengagement. These findings parallel previous research demonstrating that prestige is gained by complaisant strategies (Ketterman & Maner, 2021).

In Studies 1 and 2, males scored higher in dominance than females. While gender generally did not explain the variance in dishonesty, an exception was found in Study 3 where males demonstrated higher moral disengagement. In Studies 2 and 4,

which examined a varied sample of employed individuals, younger participants tended to be more dominant. Nevertheless, age did not account for elevated dishonesty with the exception of Study 5a, which can be understood as specific to the context of Covid-19, as younger people are known to suffer less from it.

Beliefs associated with dominance were examined as possible mediators[11]. Dominance was associated with entitlement (Studies 3, 5a), and feeling invulnerable (Study 5a). These inclinations predicted a disregard for Covid-19 containment rules (Study 5a). However, the influence of these variables may be reciprocal. Specifically, an experimental manipulation of entitlement did not lead to a disregard for ethical rules (Study 5b). Thus, it remains possible that even if dominance is accompanied by elevated entitlement, entitlement may not be the reason why dominant individuals are dishonest. The present findings concerning causal mediation remain preliminary, and future research is necessary to determine this relationship. Lastly, dominant individuals were performance-oriented, and this leaning was related to dishonesty (Study 4).

The studies employed diverse populations, involving students in controlled laboratory settings (Studies 1, 3), working populations (Studies 2, 4, and 5b) and other adults in the field (Study 5a) tested online. Dishonesty was assessed with simple behavioral tasks widely used to quantify dishonesty (Studies 1, 2, 4) while guaranteeing anonymity (Trevino, 1992), with self-report of moral disengagement as a proxy of dishonesty (Study 3), and rule-breaking behavior with social consequences (Studies 5a, 5b).

2.9.1. Dominance, Power and Self-Serving Motivations

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[11] Dominant individuals were more likely to view themselves as smart (Studies 1 and 2). Nevertheless, this did not correlate with dishonesty (Appendix 2.1 and 2.2).

That dominance is correlated with increased dishonesty adds to the understanding of dominance, and the Dominance Behavioral System (DBS, Johnson et al., 2012). Existing research on dominance focused mainly on its link with power, such as power motivation (Mast et al., 2010). The current chapter implies that dominant individuals are willing to break social norms and moral rules in order to obtain resources and self-benefits, independent of their experience of power.

Dominant individuals may compete for power as a way to control limited resources. As the present research shows, in non-social contexts and in the absence of competition, dominant people nevertheless strive disproportionately for personal advantages. While dominance is a relational hierarchical construct, its functions are to secure resources and other advantages. Furthermore, dominant individuals tend to construe access to resources as a zero-sum game. They easily engage in competition and show little empathy, not feeling the need to conform to norms. This conception of dominance is consistent with animal models that have defined dominance in terms of priority access to group resources (e.g., food, space, and mates). Resources can be any commodity, social or physical (Kaufmann, 1983). It is possible that the desire for power among the dominant are only a means for the monopolization of resources that they ultimately strive for (Overbeck, 2010). Indeed, people often desire power in order to gain autonomy rather than to influence others (Lammers et al., 2016).

A related concept to trait dominance is social dominance orientation (SDO). SDO refers to the degree to which one endorses maintaining the social hierarchy or inequality (Pratto et al., 1994). It is a term used to describe intergroup relations, and is a discrete concept from trait dominance as an individual difference. Nevertheless, a number of commonalities exist. Those who prescribe to SDO tend to want professional status (Pratto et al., 1997), and view intergroup relations as zero-sum

(Sidanius et al., 1994). They often emerge as leaders, and make unethical decisions, especially in the presence of an agreeable follower (Hing et al., 2007). Furthermore, leaders high on SDO can be aggressive and domineering (Lippa & Arad, 1999), and exercise harsher influence tactics (Aiello et al., 2013). SDO is associated with decreased awareness of corruption (Altemeyer, 1998; Tan et al., 2016), as corruption can reinforce existing unjust hierarchies.

2.9.2. Power and Dishonesty

Power is known to magnify the predispositions of the person (Guinote & Chen, 2017; Guinote et al., 2012; Kraus et al., 2011). In this chapter, I did not find evidence for an interaction between power and dominance on dishonesty, although in Study 5a, having professional power marginally increased the likelihood of dominant individuals to break Covid-19 containment rules. Given that work responsibilities sometimes grant exceptions for Covid-19 rules, dominant individuals in power, more so than non-dominant individuals in power, may have judged their rights in a self-serving manner. Excessive rule-breaking by dominant individuals did not occur when individuals lacked power. However, these arguments need to be made with caution as the interaction between power and dominance was not detected across studies overall. A post-hoc mini meta-analysis across Studies 2, 3, 4 and 5a showed no cumulative effect of power $\times$ dominance on dishonesty (Appendix 2.7). I address this question directly in Chapter 4.

Past research failed to clarify why corruption among the powerful appear common. I propose that this is due to the over-representation of dominant individuals at the top, a tendency that should be particularly prominent when power is won by competitive self-selections processes. The findings of this chapter have implications for employee selection and the appointment of powerful positions of authority (e.g.

social class, Belmi & Laurin, 2016). How power is granted (competitively, or by rotation) could be a key determinant of dishonesty among the powerful. In fact, the random allocation of authority positions, such as judges and magistrates, is understood to increase humility among leaders (Duxbury, 2020).

2.9.3. Limitations and Directions for Future Research

The present chapter demonstrated that power does not reliably trigger dishonesty. However, multiple conceptions of power exist. Certain types of power could increase dishonesty, whereas others may decrease dishonesty (e.g., responsibility, Sassenberg et al., 2014). In Study 3, when power was presented in a high-status role with responsibilities, moral disengagement decreased. Focusing on specific and realistic contexts, as demonstrated in Study 5a and 5b, could provide deeper insights (Gino & Bazerman, 2009; Moore et al., 2006; Smith-Crowe et al., 2015). Even if power does not prompt more instances dishonesty, dishonesty among the powerful could still be more socially consequential due to their influence and decision-making capabilities.

Moreover, the links between power and dishonesty require an examination of how power is exercised and its context, including the number of followers (Giurge et al., 2019), culture (Chen et al., 2001), and feelings of inequity (Gino & Pierce, 2009b). Of importance are the active goals stemming from power roles (Guinote & Chen, 2017). The effects of power on ethical conduct should be situated depending on the person in power and the contextual factors related to the power roles (Guinote, 2007a; 2010). Future research on the unique role of power on unethical behavior is warranted, and I explore this avenue in Chapters 5 and 6.

Another consideration is whether participants were sufficiently motivated in the study environments to be dishonest. To address this, Study 4 paid participants

according to performance. In so doing, the study directly and linearly incentivized dishonesty (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). It remains unclear whether the amount of incentive differentially motivates high and low power individuals. Future research could examine the effects of dominance and power on dishonesty, when stakes are higher, and across time. In particular, longitudinal studies could allow for quasi-support for causal claims. Selfish motivations and dishonesty are distinct concepts (Dubois et al., 2015). While the present research focused on dishonesty for selfish reasons only, whether dominance would also trigger selfless, prosocial forms of dishonesty requires validation. I argue it would not, as the dominant's tendency to cheat is to accrue self-benefits.

Throughout this chapter dominance was defined as aggressive, forceful behavior. This covers only a small part of the dominance concept. For example, dominance can be associated with assertiveness, leadership and collective undertakings (Jackson, 1979; Winter, 1973). Keeping the dominance measurement consistent (Cheng et al., 2010) enabled for comparisons across studies. However, further research should broaden the scope to more positive forms of dominance that encompass leadership, warmth-hostility axis (Wiggins, 1979), or achievement and performance motivation. I address this in the chapter that follows (Chapter 3).

2.9.4. Conclusion

Consistent evidence was found that dominance is associated with heightened dishonesty. The dominant desire power, and are likely to reach positions of power through self-selection processes. In contrast, the effect of power on dishonesty was inconsistent. Feelings of prestige, another well-defined path to power, did not predict dishonesty. The findings of this chapter suggest that the common observation of power and corruption may be due to the concentration of dominance at the top. In this

case, competitive self-selection processes in natural settings may inherently increase

dishonesty rather than caused by power itself.

Chapter 3. Conceptions of Dominance and Questionable Research Practices[12]

3.1. Abstract

There is consensus that questionable research practices (QRPs) reflect systemic problems in academic research stemming from how research is evaluated. However, the role of the person in the engagement of QRPs is not yet fully understood. In this chapter, I examine the link between dominance and QRPs. Four studies involving academics and university students (N = 705) examined dominance, attitudes towards, past engagement of, and plans to engage in QRPs with self-reports. Individuals who were dominant were more likely than those who were not, to report engagement of and plans to use QRPs (Studies 6, 7, 9). The association between dominance and QRPs transpired for aggressive and forceful conceptions of dominance (Studies 6, 7, 9), rather than for leadership motivation (Study 9) or manipulated states of dominance (Study 8). The reliance on QRPs by the dominant was present controlling for academic pressure, and biased reporting due to concerns on social desirability. Use of QRPs was driven by permissive conceptions of the research environment - perceived pervasiveness (Study 6) and defensibility of QRPs (Study 7), both of which dominant individuals judged to be higher compared to peers lower in dominance.

Keywords: dominance, questionable research practices, prestige, social desirability, dishonesty

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[12] I have plans to submit a shortened and adapted version of this chapter to an academic journal with a co-author.

3.2. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I found evidence supporting the contention that dominance predicts dishonesty and rule-breaking behavior. Dominance was a stronger predictor of such behavior compared to social power, and prestige. In this chapter, I put social power aside and focus on one specific type of unethical behavior, which is questionable research practices (QRPs). QRPs are procedures used within all phases of an academic research project that are methodologically and morally questionable, but perceived as widespread, and typically benefit the researcher personally (Simmons et al., 2011). They range from adding participants until results become statistically significant (p-hacking), or changing the study's hypothesis to fit the data (harking; Kerr, 1998), to outright fabrication or falsification of data (US Department of Health and Human Services Office of Research Integrity, 2000). Although serious offences such as data fabrication and falsification are extremely rare, morally ambiguous research practices are very common, with some studies finding that over 50% of researchers engaged in p-hacking (John et al., 2012). Because they are so common, morally ambiguous research practices are detrimental to the integrity and value of scientific research (Gilbert & Denison, 2003; Martinson et al., 2005), and crucially, public trust in science (Rekker, 2021).

Academics face immense pressure to publish novel findings in world-leading journals, with rejection rates reaching as high as 94% in some cases (Science; 86% for PNAS; Editorial and Journal Policies, Journal Metrics Overview, 2020). Such pressure has steered many researchers to engage in poor research practices that some believe contributed to a replication crisis in science (Banks, O'Boyle, et al., 2016; Simmons et al., 2011; but see Fanelli, 2018). Not surprisingly, much effort has been devoted to identifying and understanding the prevalence of QRPs in numerous

domains of science, such as psychology (John et al., 2012; Open Science Collaboration, 2015), biomedicine (Ioannidis, 2005; Macleod et al., 2014), organizational sciences (Banks, Rogelberg, et al., 2016; Bedeian et al., 2010), and economics (Camerer et al., 2016).

While systemic problems linked to the research environment have been identified (Bakker et al., 2012; Munafò et al., 2017), little is known about the role of the person in research conduct. Building on the findings from Chapter 2, I investigate whether individual differences in dominance is implicated in the take up of QRPs. In doing so, I aim to shed light on the role of the person on QRPs, as well as extend the scope of undesirable behavior associated with trait dominance and social hierarchies.

3.2.1. Explaining Questionable Research Practices

Research practices are influenced by the social context. The scarcity of academic positions, publication pressure (Tijdink et al., 2014), social comparisons (Edelman & Larkin, 2015), and cultural norms (Rabelo et al., 2020) all influence the take up of QRPs. Nevertheless, the cognitive construal of the context plays a role, in particular, justifiability. Academics perceived QRPs as more defensible when they had a justifiable reason, and this tendency was stronger when the morality of research practices was ambiguous (Sacco et al., 2019). In a similar vein, researchers judged QRPs to be more defensible when they believed the research practice to be necessary for career progression, and inconsequential to science or society at large (Sacco et al., 2018). A study found that academics in psychology who were motivated to *demonstrate* their skills were more likely to report the use of QRPs than those who wished to *develop* their skills. This tendency was amplified when the desire to publish trumped the desire to pursue scientific rigor (Janke et al., 2019). Thus, a concern with social standings seems to be at the core of loose conceptions about scientific integrity.

This line of research on QRPs is consistent with the broader pattern of dishonest behavior. Dishonesty refers to behavior that benefits the actor personally, that violates wider social norms (Shu et al., 2011). Individuals systematically have positive illusions about their ability to make ethical decisions (bounded ethicality; Kern & Chugh, 2009). This bias explains why dishonesty is often associated with subtle or minor transgressions that occur in an automatic, impulsive manner (Shalvi et al., 2011). Such transgressions reduce the cognitive dissonance the actor may experience, especially, when a small change in behavior can tip the outcome in the actor's favour (Shalvi, 2012). Similarly, dishonesty is more likely when it is easier to justify (Ayal & Gino, 2011; Shalvi et al., 2015), as it reduces the cognitive dissonance between the behavior and maintaining a positive self-view (Mazar et al., 2008). Interestingly, when the accepted norms of a sub-group (Gino, Ayal et al., 2009) or industry (McBarnet, 1988) diverge from that of the wider group or society at large, the questionable behavior is likely to be viewed by the in-group members as justifiable. Therefore, individual perceptions of permissibility of the immediate surroundings contribute to justification of questionable behavior, which in turn can enable actual behavior.

Furthermore, enquiries dedicated to students' research misconduct in higher education are limited, despite comprehensive literature on other forms of academic misconduct, such as cheating and plagiarism (Hard et al., 2006; McCabe et al., 2001). Preliminary evidence from a study by Newstead and colleagues (1996) found that 37-48% of students admitted to data misconduct. Individual differences such as age, gender, academic discipline, and academic achievement all influenced academic cheating. Again, judgements of prevalence play a crucial role. For example, students who believed academic cheating to be common among their peers (Farnese et al.,

2011) were more likely to engage in cheating themselves (Genereux & McLeod, 1995). Equally, students who engaged in academic cheating justified their behavior by stating it as more common, compared to students who did not cheat (Jordan, 2001). Thus, academic misconduct in higher education cannot be understood without considering its social nature.

3.2.2. Status Motivation and Conceptions of Dominance

For career academics, QRPs provide advantages in publications, jobs, promotions, and ultimately status within the scientific community. For university students, QRPs offer opportunities for higher grades and better career prospects post-graduation. I hypothesize that dominance prompts QRPs among academics and students undertaking research, as it increases the chance of social ascent (Barrick et al., 2002; Magee & Galinsky, 2018; Maner, 2017).

Throughout the previous chapter, dominance was referred to as aggressive and forceful behavior towards others (Mast et al., 2010), or using manipulative, coercive and controlling tactics in order to achieve one's goals (Maner & Case, 2016). Such conceptions of dominance are closely related to evolutionary and ethological origins (e.g., testosterone), and is discrete from prestige (Cheng & Tracy, 2020; Maner, 2017). In the present chapter, I expanded the conception of dominance, by adding alternative scales to reflect diverse conceptions of dominance. Doing so would enable an understanding of the boundary conditions under which dominance predicts unethical behavior.

Dominance can be envisaged as a collection of personal attributes and traits that are not necessarily tied to interpersonal behavior, but as being on a continuous spectrum towards submissiveness. Wiggins and later Smith established a scale of dominance where participants indicate their baseline inclinations on a series of

adjectives along a continuous spectrum, such as 'insecure-confident', 'unassertive-assertive', and 'dominant-submissive' (Smith et al., 2008; Wiggins et al., 1988). It is noteworthy that the description of dominance here includes assertiveness, which is different from aggressiveness (Bakker et al., 2010; Galassi & Galassi, 1975). Whereas aggressiveness pertains to intruding on others' rights for self-advantages, assertiveness refers to not letting others violate your rights for their benefit.

In addition, while dominance is more generally accepted as a stable, individualized trait, it can also be viewed as a situational social skill (Burgoon & Dunbar, 2000), or a strategy for social ascent (Cheng et al., 2013; Maner & Case, 2016). Other conceptions have emphasized human's unique (although not exclusive) motives to influence others in order to advance collective goals, within a leadership framework (Van Vugt & Smith, 2019; for reviews see Burgoon et al., 1998; Suessenbach et al., 2019), emphasizing power motivation to provide vision (McClelland, 1970; Winter, 1973). An example of a scale that conceptualises dominance as leadership motivation is Jackson's need for power scale (1984). This scale asks individuals the degree to which they agree to statements such as 'The ability to be a leader is very important to me', and 'I feel uneasy when I have to tell people what to do (reverse coded)'.

I posit that dominance should be associated with higher engagement of QRPs for two reasons. Firstly, dominance is aligned with the desire to attain one's goals with a disregard for the cost to others (Johnson et al., 2012). Secondly, research is competitive and research publications are valued, resulting in hierarchal differentiation among academics and students. Dominance reflects the inherent desire to climb up the competitive social ladder (Boehm & Flack, 2010), and QRPs can enhance the likelihood of achieving publications, promotions, higher grades, and

ultimately status in the eyes of others. Both reasons create optimal conditions for questionable beliefs and practices in research among the dominant.

More generally, people can ascend educational and academic hierarchies by building a reputation based on competence or expertise. This strategy of prestige (Cheng et al., 2013), along with dominance, should allow higher status and power. However, prestige is largely associated with prosocial leanings (Henrich et al., 2015; Ketterman & Maner, 2021). I hypothesize that while both dominance and prestige may be associated with career success in academia, only dominance would be related to a reliance on QRPs.

In summary, academic researchers and university students who commit QRPs may not explicitly realise the immoral nature of their behavior, especially if they are driven for status and power, and if the research practice is deemed to be common within ones' sub-field. QRPs have the unique attribute of being both a type of dishonesty that is easy to justify, and a key tool in the ascent of the academic status ladder. While numerous personal factors coincide with interpersonal competition, I focus on dominance for its association with self-serving means to achieve hierarchical success.

3.2.3. Overview of Studies

I hypothesize that dominance predicts decreased standards in research conduct, and that this is associated with permissible conceptions of research integrity. I examine the role of other forms of hierarchy formation – prestige, along with wider conceptions of dominance. This implies that dispositional tendencies to engage in QRPs are specific to dominance and not to prestige, or other hierarchical pursuits.

One challenge in researching QRPs is participants' potential under-reporting of these practices to protect their self-image. I adopted a number of measures to gauge and minimize such effects. Studies 6 and 7 assessed three questions per research practice. Specifically, estimates for self and others' engagement of QRPs, and the likelihood that others would admit to these practices were taken, as these three questions enable the deduction of estimates of prevalence given admission rates (John et al., 2012). To estimate participants' willingness to share their engagement in undesirable behavior, social desirability was controlled for in Studies 8 and 9. Social desirability refers to the desire to construct a positive image of oneself, that could deviate from truth-telling (Rajah-Kanagasabai & Roberts, 2015; Sacco & Brown, 2019).

In Studies 6 and 7, participants shared their past research behavior, and perception of their peers' behavior. In Studies 8 and 9, in order to assess attitudes towards QRPs free from participants' own experience, I measured participants' intentions to engage in future QRPs. Planned behavior tends to follow actual behavior, which has been validated to apply specifically to students' use of QRPs (Rajah-Kanagasabai & Roberts, 2015). Past engagement of QRPs was assessed dichotomously (*yes/no*), however, intentions to engage in QRPs were measured incrementally.

Studies 6, 7, and 9 assessed participants' base level of trait dominance. To examine possible causal effects of dominance, in Study 8 participants were assigned to feel either high or low in dominance, inducing a state of dominance (Mast, 2002) by demonstrating their previous use of dominance strategies (Burgoon et al., 1998). Study 8 examined whether past recollection of engaging in such strategies and the ensuing temporary state dominance could spill over to QRP intentions.

To inspect the generalizability of the links between dominance and QRPs, I investigated samples of both career academics of psychology (Study 7) and university students (Studies 6, 8, and 9). By establishing whether the association between dominance and QRPs is unique to academics or occurs more broadly, it is possible determine whether it is uniquely driven by dominance, and independently of the type of people who enter academic jobs. In Studies 6, 7, and 9, dominance and prestige were assessed with the dominance-prestige scale (Cheng et al., 2010), the scale used throughout Chapter 2. Nonetheless, to account for multiple conceptions of dominance, Study 6 employed a scale of dominance that conceptualised dominance as being on a continuous spectrum towards submissiveness (Smith et al., 2008; Wiggins et al., 1988). Study 9 utilised yet another scale that focus on the leadership facet of dominance (Jackson, 1984). Both scales of dominance (Smith et al., 2008; Jackson, 1984) refer to less negative forms of dominance (e.g., assertiveness) compared to the dominance-prestige scale (Cheng et al., 2010), which draws a stark contrast between dominance and prestige.

The scope of the present research was to extract the unique contributions of dominance to engaging in QRPs. I explored cognitive mechanisms of dominant individuals that could justify QRPs. Specifically, perceived prevalence and defensibility judgements of QRPs were considered (Studies 6 and 7). The association between dominance and career success in academia was assessed (Study 7). Studies 8 and 9 were pre-registered. I report results from all studies conducted.

Data files: https://osf.io/q8m3e/?view_only=e2f2ae0fb9314203894b36006dde3df8

3.3. Study 6: Dominance and QRP among Students

Study 6 investigated the relationship between dominance and engagement of QRPs, as measured by participants' own and perceptions of their peers' behavior.

Perceptions of peer behavior was assessed as it was expected that participants would be more open to disclosing peer engagement of QRPs compared to one's own use of QRPs (John et al., 2012). Social projections of in-group behavior made by the group's members tend to be quite accurate (DiDonato et al., 2011). Study 6 was a between-subjects study for U.K. based university graduates, focusing on their undergraduate dissertation project experience. Study 6 firstly tested the hypothesis that dominance is positively correlated with QRPs. I distinguished between aggressive dominance, subjective prestige (Cheng et al., 2010), and dominance on a continuous dominant-submissive spectrum (Wiggins et al., 1988). Unlike aggressive dominance, prestige and high scores on the dominance-submissiveness spectrum may not be related to QRPs. Secondly, I examined whether dominant students judged QRPs to be more widespread, compared to students with lower levels of dominance. Situational factors that could affect QRP usage were controlled for, such as academic pressure and career prospects post-graduation.

3.3.1. Methods

Participants

Participants who had successfully completed an undergraduate degree with a research dissertation project in the past 5 years were recruited through various alumni associations across U.K. universities. A target sample size of 140 was pre-determined using power analysis, assuming $\alpha = .05$, $(1 - \beta) = .90$, effect size $f^2 = .10$. One hundred and forty-nine university graduates from various academic disciplines participated online. Three participants were excluded for correctly guessing the study aims, leaving a sample of 146 ($M_{age} = 24.32$, $SD = 5.49$). Thirty-four (23.3%) respondents identified as male. On average, participants had obtained their degrees 1.18 years ago ($SD = 1.24$). Participants did not receive payment.

Procedures

The study was introduced to participants as focusing on final-year research projects. Participants first answered questions on various types of research practices, then questions measuring aggressive dominance, prestige, and dominance-submissiveness spectrum. After indicating their academic field, students answered a number of questions on their study environment. Next, participants indicated their satisfaction with their undergraduate study experience. Participants were checked for suspicion, received a written debrief, then gave final consent.

Measures

Questionable Research Practices. Research practices were chosen from previous research on QRPs (John et al., 2012), and modified to cater for students' dissertation projects across academic disciplines. Examples include, 'Deciding whether to collect more data, or stopping data collection earlier than planned, after looking at the results.' A pilot study ($n = 23$) was conducted to check the relevance of QRP items across academic disciplines, and 15 items were selected (Figure 3.1). Students answered three questions for each QRP item. Firstly, participants estimated the prevalence of each practice among their peers (0-100%) to measure how common they perceived the QRP to be (prevalence estimate). They then judged how likely it is that their peers would admit to the QRP item (0-100%). Finally, participants answered whether they themselves have ever engaged in the practice (1: *yes*, 0: *no, Not Applicable*), which was aggregated to create a sum total score of self-admission to QRPs per participant ($M = 2.92$, $SD = 2.971$). For example, a participant who answers 'Yes' to all 15 items will have a score of 15.

Dominance and Prestige. Participants completed the dominance-prestige rating scale on 7-point Likert scales (1: *strongly agree* to 7: *strongly disagree*;

dominance subscale 8-item α = .84, prestige subscale 9-item α = .80) (Cheng et al., 2010). Additionally, participants indicated the extent to which 17 pairs of adjectives described them, where seven pairs were related to the dominance-submissiveness continuum (9-point Likert scales, 7-item α = .85) (Smith et al., 2008; Wiggins et al., 1988). The two scales of dominance were positively, but not highly, correlated $r(146)$ = .464, $p < .001$. A factor analysis revealed that the three constructs (aggressive dominance, prestige, and dominance-submissiveness) formed three distinct factors (Appendix 3).

Control Variables. Academic pressure was assessed with four statements, such as 'I felt pressure from family to do well in the research project' on 7-point Likert scales (1: *strongly disagree* to 7: *strongly agree*; α = .45). Participants then indicated how dire their career prospects were (3-item α = .50), before judging the likelihood of getting caught for research misconduct. Participants' subjective view of the relative reputation of their university was assessed (1: *very low* to 5: *very high*). Finally, participants indicated the level of satisfaction with their undergraduate studies (1: *Not satisfied at all* to 5: *Very satisfied*) (Appendix 3).

3.3.2. Results

Engaging in QRPs

Despite running a pilot study, engineering and life science students found over 30% of QRP items not applicable to their academic field (Figure A3.1). A stepwise multiple linear regression was carried out, with the sum total score of QRPs per participant as the dependant variable. The main predictor variables aggressive dominance, prestige (Cheng et al., 2010), and dominance-submissiveness continuum (Smith, Wigboldus, et al., 2008) were entered in Step 1. Control variables age, gender, academic pressure, career prospects, institution reputation, satisfaction, and chance of

getting caught were added in Step 2. Step 1 ($F(3,138) = 2.708$, $p = .048$, Adjusted R^2 = .035) showed that higher dominance was associated with higher QRP use ($B = .067$, CI[.020, .115], $p = .006$), but not prestige ($B = -.019$, $p = .468$), or dominance-submissiveness continuum ($B = -.035$, $p = .182$). Including control variables (Step 2, significant $\Delta F = .121$, $F(10,131) = 2.011$, $p = .037$, Adjusted $R^2 = .067$), dominance was still a predictor ($B = .050$, CI[.001, .099], $p = .045$), along with higher academic pressure ($B = .050$, CI[.002, .098], $p = .042$). Neither prestige nor dominance-submissive continuum were associated with QRPs.

Prevalence estimates of QRPs

The estimates of QRP prevalence, participants' own admission to QRPs, and participants' estimates of the degree to which their peers will admit to QRPs, makes it possible to infer an estimation of prevalence given admission rates per research practice item (self-admission rate divided by admission estimate; John et al., 2012). Throughout QRP items, there was a tendency to under-report one's own engagement of QRPs, compared to what was inferred as the estimate of prevalence. Participants were more willing to admit to engaging in data analysis misconduct (data-peeking, 35%), compared to unprofessional behavior during data collection (Failing to follow best practice in informed consent, 8%) (Figure 3.1).

A multiple linear regression analysed the influence of aggressive dominance, prestige, and dominance-submissiveness spectrum on prevalence estimates of QRPs, including all control variables $F(10,135) = 2.879$, $p = .003$, Adjusted $R^2 = .115$. Dominant participants judged QRPs to be more common ($B = .203$, CI [.009, .397], $p = .009$) compared to less dominant participants. Prestige and dominance-submissiveness spectrum were unrelated to prevalence estimates of QRPs.

To assess whether the judgement of prevalence explains the association between dominance and QRPs, a bootstrapping mediation analysis was performed using PROCESS (model 4; 5000 resamples) (Hayes, 2012). Perceiving QRPs as more common statistically mediated the relationship between dominance and engaging in QRPs (Effect = .0200, *SE* = .0079, 95% CI [.0052, .0363]), consistent with the hypothesis that perceived social norms influence students' engagement of QRPs.

Figure 3.1

Estimated QRP Prevalence – Study 6

3.3.3. Discussion

Study 6 provided initial evidence that aggressive dominance, as measured by the dominance-prestige subscale, coincides with higher engagement of QRPs among students. Students high in dominance were more likely to perceive QRPs as common, compared to their peers lower in dominance, which explained their higher likelihood of admitting to engaging in QRPs in the past. The findings did not extend to felt prestige, or the less aggressive conception of dominance on the dominance-submissiveness spectrum. I leave open the possibility that only aggressive dominance based on interpersonal behavior predict the use of QRPs.

3.4. Study 7: Dominance and QRP among Academics in Psychology

Study 7 further examined the relationship between dominance and the engagement of QRPs. Study 7 continued to assess participants' own and perceptions of peer behavior, in order to measure the discrepancy between participants' admission of engaging in QRPs, with their social projections. In Study 7, career academics in the field of psychology were recruited. The aims of the study were the following: firstly, it tested the hypothesis that dominant academics are more likely to engage in QRPs. Secondly, it tested whether the use of QRPs by dominant academics is explained by viewing those research practices as more widespread, and defensible. Finally, while both dominance and prestige will predict success and seniority in academic positions, only dominance would be associated with higher engagement of QRPs. Situational and demographic factors that could affect QRP usage were controlled for. For Study 7, I recruited psychology researchers who were members of various academic associations across Europe.

3.4.1. Methods

Participants

One hundred and forty-nine academics in psychology based in Europe completed the online survey[13]. The sample size was pre-determined using GPower software, assuming (1 – Type 2 probability) = .90, Type 1 error probability = .05, and effect size f^2= .15. The survey took around 20 minutes, and participants were not compensated. Three participants were excluded for correctly guessing the study aim, leaving a final sample of 146 participants. A majority of respondents identified as female (63.7%). The largest number of researchers worked in social psychology (39.0%), followed by health psychology (12.3%). Sixty-one participants (41.8%) were tenure track academics. Thirty-seven percent of participants had research experience of five years or less, followed by those who had more than 15 years (26.7%).

Procedures

The study was introduced as identifying trends in research practices in psychology. After clicking onto the survey link and giving consent, participants first completed a questionnaire on QRPs, where they were asked about the behavior of their colleagues as well as the participant's own behavior. Participants completed the dominance-prestige scale (Cheng et al., 2010), and described their work status and research environment, including doubts on research integrity, work pressure, and chances of getting caught for research misconduct. I collected demographic information age, gender, sub-field within psychology, academic rank, and the reputation of participants' host institution. Subsequently, participants indicated the number of years in research, research productivity, and satisfaction. Finally,

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[13] 330 academics started the survey (drop-out rate 55.2%).

participants provided feedback on their survey experience, were checked for

suspicion, received a detailed written debrief, and gave final consent.

Measures

Questionable Research Practices. Eleven research practices of varying

severity were chosen (adapted from John et al., 2012). Items include, 'In a paper,

"rounding off" a *p* value (e.g., reporting that a *p* value of .054 is less than .05)', and

'In a paper, failing to report all of a study's dependent measures' (Figure 3.2). As in

Study 6, participants first estimated the percentage of other researchers in their field

that may have engaged in the practice at least once (0 - 100%) (11-item α = .88).

Participants then estimated the percentage that would admit to having engaged in the

practice among those that have engaged in the practice (0 – 100%) (11 item α = .89).

Participants proceeded to answer whether they themselves had ever engaged in the

practice since the beginning of their research career (1: *yes*, 0: *no*). These responses

were aggregated to create a count of QRPs per participant ($M = 3.37$, $SD = 2.011$).

Defensibility of QRPs. For each QRP that participants had engaged in, a

follow up question enquired how defensible they judged the practice to be (1:

absolutely indefensible to 5: *absolutely defensible*).

Dominance and Prestige. As in Study 6, the dominance-prestige rating scale

(Cheng et al., 2010) was used (8-item dominance subscale α = .81, 9-item prestige

subscale α = .83).

Control Variables. I controlled for additional factors that could influence the

use of and perceptions on QRPs. Participants specified their academic rank ranging

from doctoral student to professor. They assessed the relative reputation of their

psychology department nationally, as well as internationally (5-point Likert scales, 1:

poor to 5: *excellent.* 2-item α = .63). Participants answered the number of years in active research (*0-5*, *6-10*, *11-15*, *16+*, *not applicable*). Research productivity was measured by the number of peer-reviewed publications in the past 2 years (*0*, *1-2*, *3-5*, *6-9*, *10 or more*). Finally, participants answered how satisfied they were with the amount of recognition their research was receiving (5-point Likert scale, 1: *not satisfied at all* to 5: *very satisfied*). Doubts on research integrity was assessed by asking the degree to which participants had doubts about the research of others such as colleagues, collaborators, students, as well as their own research (4-point Likert scales 1: *never*, 4: *often,* 5 item α = .80). Work pressure was assessed on five dimensions including the availability of academic jobs (reverse coded) and pressure to obtain external funding (5-point Likert scales,1: *very low* to 5: *very high,* 5-item α = .49, Appendix 3). Participants evaluated the chance of getting caught for research misconduct, also on a 5-point Likert scale (1: *very low* to 5: *very high*).

3.4.2. Results

Engaging in QRPs

A stepwise multiple linear regression was carried out with dominance and prestige as predictor variables, and participants' count of QRPs they had engaged in as the dependant variable in Step 1. In Step 2, control variables gender, work pressure, academic rank, institution reputation, doubt, satisfaction, productivity, and chances of getting caught were added. Age and number of years in research were highly correlated with academic rank (age $r(146) = .726$, $p < .001$, years in research $r(146) = .815$, $p < .001$), rendering them redundant. I focused on academic rank given its

importance in the context of status and power[14]. Finally, interaction variable

dominance × academic rank was included to explore moderation effects (Step 3).

Step 1 was statistically significant $F(2,143) = 8.938$, $p < .001$, Adjusted R^2

= .099, with both dominance (B =.608, CI [.293, .924], $p < .001$) and prestige (B

= .335, CI [.019, .651], $p = .038$) coinciding with higher engagement of QRPs. Step 2

improved the model fit (significant $\Delta F = .001$, $F(10,135) = 5.024$, $p < .001$, Adjusted

$R^2 = .217$). Dominance was still a predictor (B =.562, CI [.258, .866], $p < .001$), along

with work pressure (B =.492, CI [.067, .917], $p = .023$) and academic rank (B =.238,

CI [.086, .390], $p = .002$). Prestige no longer a predicted the use of QRPs (B =.201, p

< .208). Step 3 did not show an improvement in the model (significant $\Delta F = .938$),

and there was no evidence of moderation.

Estimates of QRP prevalence given admission rates (John et al., 2012)

demonstrated under-reporting of QRPs among academics, because rates of self-

admission to QRPs were consistently lower across all eleven QRP items surveyed,

compared to what was inferred through their evaluation of peer behavior. Participants

were more willing to admit to engaging in morally subtle behavior (e.g., trying out a

variety of different methods of analysis until one is found that yields a significant

result, 55%), compared to clearly immoral behavior (e.g., falsifying data, 6%) (Figure

3.2).

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[14] Swapping academic rank with number of years in research ($B = .568$, CI[.263, .872], p < .001) or age ($B = .531$, CI[.220, .841], $p < .001$) show similar results.

Figure 3.2

Estimated QRP Prevalence – Study 7

Judgements of Defensibility

      Dominance was positively associated with judging QRPs to be defensible $r(146) = .241$, $p = .003$, which was in turn correlated to participants' engagement of QRPs $r(146) = .914$, $p < .001$. To assess whether the judgement of defensibility mediates the relationship between dominance and QRP usage, a bootstrapping

mediation analysis was performed (PROCESS model 4; 5000 resamples) (Hayes, 2012). Perceiving QRPs as defensible statistically explained why dominant academics were more likely to engage in questionable research conduct (Effect = .0396, *SE* = .012, 95% CI$_{95\%}$ [.0152, .0637]).

Judgements of Prevalence

Dominant academics were more likely to view QRPs to be widespread among peers $r(146) = .167$, $p = .044$, which was linked to higher engagement in QRPs $r(146) = .354$, $p < .001$. However, judging QRPs as widespread did not statistically mediate the relationship between dominance and engaging in QRPs (Effect = .0096, *SE* = .0058, CI$_{95\%}$[-.0003, .0225]). In addition, viewing QRPs to be widespread was linked to perceiving QRPs to be more defensible $r(146) = .339$, $p < .001$. Perceiving QRPs as defensible statistically explained why dominant academics were more likely to view QRPs to be widespread among peers (Effect = 1.4370, *SE* = .5661, CI$_{95\%}$ [.4466, 2.6541]).

Career Success

Dominance did not coincide with markers of success in academia (academic rank: $r(146) = -.011$, $p = .899$, years in research: $r(146) = -.041$, $p = .626$, published papers: $r(146) = .122$, $p < .143$, research satisfaction: $r(146) = -.021$, $p = .799$). In contrast, prestige was strongly associated with career success (academic rank: $r(146) = .225$, $p = .006$, years in research: $r(146) = .227$, $p = .006$, published papers: $r(146) = .264$, $p < .001$, research satisfaction: $r(146) = .264$, $p < .001$). Dominance and prestige were not correlated with one another $r(146) = -.071$, $p = .396$ (Table 3.1).

Table 3.1

Dominance, Prestige, and Career Success – Study 7

		Prestige	Academic Rank	Years in Research	No. of Papers	Satisfaction
Dominance	Pearson Correlation	-.071	-.011	-.041	.122	-.021
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.396	.899	.626	.143	.799
	N	146	146	146	146	146
Prestige	Pearson Correlation		.225**	.227**	.264**	.264**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.006	.006	.001	.001
	N		146	146	146	146
Academic Rank	Pearson Correlation			.815**	.581**	.303**
	Sig. (2-tailed)			.000	.000	.000
	N			146	146	146
Years in Research	Pearson Correlation				.503**	.259**
	Sig. (2-tailed)				.000	.002
	N				146	146
No. of Papers	Pearson Correlation					.360**
	Sig. (2-tailed)					.000
	N					146

3.4.3. Discussion

Study 7 provided support for the contention that dominant academics in psychology are more like to engage in QRPs. Dominant individuals perceived QRPs to be prevalent. The higher the dominance, the more researchers found QRPs to be defensible, which explained why they more were likely to engage in them. These results held after controlling for academic rank and work pressure, both of which were associated with higher use of QRPs. Interestingly, dominance did not predict a successful academic career. In contrast, feelings of prestige did not predict QRPs, but were associated with various markers of career success.

3.5. Study 8: State Dominance and QRP

In Studies 6 and 7, the association between dominance and QRPs was assessed. The studies were based on participants' chronically accessible inclinations to prevail in social contexts. In contrast, Study 8 aimed to investigate whether induced dominance state affects QRPs. State dominance refers to acting in more dominant ways in response to situational cues, such as competitive environments (de Waal, 1986; Mazur & Booth, 1998). State dominance was experimentally manipulated by adapting a commonly used recall exercise (Galinsky et al., 2003). Participants simulated past experiences of state dominance (high or low), which naturally varied across participants. Subsequently, instead of reporting their own or peers' past behavior, participants indicated their intentions to use QRPs in future research. Social desirability was added to control for under-reporting of QRP intentions, as QRPs are socially undesirable behavior. Specifically, I tested the hypothesis that state dominance increases QRP intentions for students. Study 8 was pre-registered (https://aspredicted.org/2SS_683).

3.5.1. Methods

Participants

Two hundred and fifty-two U.K. based university students of psychology participated through an online platform (prolific.ac) for payment. The sample size was pre-determined assuming $(1 - \beta) = .90$, $\alpha = .05$, and effect size .40. Eight participants were excluded for correctly guessing the study aim, or failing the attention check, leaving a final sample size of 244 ($M_{age} = 23.75$, $SD = 6.506$). Fifty-seven (23.4%) participants identified as male, and 165 (67.6%) were enrolled in undergraduate level courses.

Procedure

The study was introduced as focusing on memory recall and opinions on research. Participants first wrote about a past event, alleged to be a memory recall exercise (adapted from Galinsky et al., 2003; see also Deuter et al., 2016; Stamkou et al., 2016). They completed a manipulation check, followed by a question on effort. Participants indicated their intentions to engage in QRPs, before answering questions on social desirability, and other control variables including basic demographic information.

Measures

Dominance Manipulation. Participants wrote a short essay. Half of the participants were asked to write about an experience when they felt dominant over another person (dominant condition), and the other half wrote about when they felt submissive under another person (submissive condition). Participants were asked to write in detail, and as vividly as possible (Appendix 3). This manipulation was deemed effective on a pre-test ($n = 19$). One hundred and eighteen participants (48.4%) were assigned to the dominant condition, and 126 (51.6%) were assigned to the submissive condition.

Manipulation Check. To assess the effectiveness of the dominance-submissiveness manipulation, participants indicated the degree to which they tried to get their way, or felt passive (revers coded), during the experience they wrote about (1: *strongly disagree*, 7: *strongly agree;* 4-item $\alpha = .79$, Appendix 3).

Questionable Research Practices. A simplified version of the research practice items used in Study 6 were employed. Instead of reflecting back on past behavior or impressions of peers formed from previous research experience, participants answered the likelihood that they will engage in 14 QRPs, on 7-point Likert scales (1: *very unlikely*, 7: *very likely*, $\alpha = .88$) (Table A3.3 for list, and score

per item). An average score of QRP likelihood was calculated per participant ($M =$ 2.39, $SD = .975$).

Control Variables. Participants indicated on a 7-point Likert scale how much effort they exerted into the writing task. Participants' level of social desirability was assessed using the 10-item truncated scale from Marlowe-Crowne's social desirability scale, which included statements that are socially desirable, but unlikely to be true. Examples include, 'I have never intensely disliked anyone', and 'When I don't know something I don't at all mind admitting to it' (*True / False*, α = .54) (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Fischer & Fick, 1993; Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972). Academic pressure was assessed with five statements similar to that of Study 6 (5-item α = .29). Participants judged the likelihood of getting caught for research misconduct as well as their satisfaction with their university studies (Appendix 3).

3.5.2. Results

Across state dominance conditions, participants did not significantly differ in age, gender, degree level (undergraduate, post-graduate), or claimed effort on the writing task. Participants assigned to the dominant condition felt they got their way and dominated the situation, compared to those assigned to the submissive condition ($M_{Dominant} = 5.35$, $SD_{Dominant} = .841$, $M_{Submissive} = 2.72$, $SD_{Submissive} = .969$, $t(242) = 22.552$, $p < .001$, $d = 3.195$). Thus the manipulation of state dominance was assumed effective.

Plans to engage in QRPs

An independent samples t-test showed no group differences in intentions to engage in QRPs between dominance conditions ($M_{Dominant} = 2.42$, $SD_{Dominant} = .916$, $M_{Submissive} = 2.37$, $SD_{Submissive} = 1.031$, $t(242) = .474$, $p = .636$). Participants with higher

social desirability were less likely to express their plans to engage in QRPs $r(244) =$ -.135, $p = .035$.

As prescribed at the pre-registration stage, a one-way ANCOVA was conducted to determine the differences between dominant and submissive conditions on plans to engage in QRPs, with control variables age, gender, university satisfaction, academic pressure, social desirability, effort, chances of getting caught, and interaction variable dominance condition × social desirability. There was no effect of dominance condition $F(1,234) = .011$, $p = .908$. Older students $F(1,234) = 9.310$, $p = .003$, partial $\eta^2 = .038$, and students who exerted more effort into the writing task $F(1,234) = 16.373$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .065$ were more likely to indicate their willingness to engage in QRPs. Interestingly, the interaction variable dominance condition × social desirability had an effect $F(1,234) = 4.525$, $p = .034$, showing exploratory moderation. For students who scored lower than the median on social desirability, inducing a high dominance state marginally increased QRP intentions $F(1,102) = 3.237$, $p = .075$, compared to those assigned to a low dominance condition. Such difference in QRP intentions was not observed among participants higher in social desirability $F(1,138) = 1.283$, $p = .259$ (Figure 3.3).

Figure 3.3

QRP Intentions by Dominance and Social Desirability – Study 8

Note. High/Low dominance was manipulated. High/Low social desirability was split at the median.

3.5.3. Discussion

Study 8 did not find evidence supporting a causal relationship between state dominance and intentions to use QRPs. As such, there is no evidence that the positive association between trait dominance and QRP engagement observed in Studies 6 and 7 extend to state dominance or causal associations.

3.6. Study 9: Scales of Dominance and QRP among Students

In the final study of this chapter, I continued to examine the prevalence of QRPs among psychology students. Study 9 returned to assessing baseline levels of dominance through scales. As in Studies 6 and 7, it differentiated between prestige and aggressive dominance (Cheng et al., 2010). Additionally, Study 9 considered a more positive facet of dominance (e.g., leadership motivation, Ashton et al., 1998) that is discrete from both dominance and prestige (Suessenbach et al., 2019), by using the personality research form need for power scale (Jackson, 1984). Like the dominance-prestige scale, Jackson's need for power scale considers dominance as a standalone construct, and not on a dominance-submissiveness continuum. As in Study

8, participants answered questions on their future intentions to use QRPs, and social desirability was included as a control variable. I hypothesize that psychology students high in trait dominance would have more relaxed attitudes towards using QRPs. Study 9 was a pre-registered (https://aspredicted.org/4LV_NXS), between-subjects online survey.

3.6.1. Methods

Participants

One hundred and seventy-three U.K. based university students of psychology took part. The sample size was pre-determined assuming $(1 - \beta) = .90$, $\alpha = .05$, and effect size $f^2 = .15$. Four participants were excluded for correctly guessing the study objective, leaving 169 participants ($M_{age} = 18.96$, $SD = 1.761$). Out of 169 participants, 150 received course credit. Nineteen participants were further recruited through an online recruiting platform (www.prolific.ac) for payment, to obtain the pre-determined target sample size. A vast majority of participants were female (n = 154), and enrolled in undergraduate level studies (n = 156).

Procedures

The study was introduced to participants as focusing on opinions on research. Participants answered a series of questions on QRPs, then filled out questionnaires measuring dominance, prestige, need for power, and social desirability. The order of questionnaires was counter-balanced among participants. Questions related to academic pressure, chances of getting caught for research misconduct were presented, and participants indicated their overall satisfaction with their university studies.

Measures

Questionable Research Practices. The same items used in Study 8 were used (14-item α = .89, Table A3.3 for score per item). An average score of QRP likelihood was calculated per participant on 7-point Likert scales ($M = 2.46$, $SD = .973$).

Dominance and Prestige. The dominance-prestige rating scale (Cheng et al., 2010) measured dominance (8-item α = .84) and prestige (9-item α = .78). The personality research form need for power scale includes 16 statements such as, 'I feel confident when directing the activities of others', and 'The ability to be a leader is very important to me' (1: *True*, 0: *false*, α = .78, Jackson, 1984). The two measures of dominance were positively correlated $r(169) = .505$, $p < .001$. A factor analysis revealed that aggressive dominance, the need for power, and felt prestige indeed formed three distinct factors (Appendix 3, see also Suessenbach et al., 2019).

Control Variables. Participants answered the same truncated social desirability scale used in Study 8 (10-item α = .53, Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Fischer & Fick, 1993; Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972). Academic pressure was assessed as in Study 8 (5-item α = .51), along with the likelihood of getting caught for research misconduct and satisfaction with their studies.

3.6.2. Results

Plans to engage in QRPs

A stepwise multiple linear regression was carried out with QRP intentions as the outcome variable. The main predictor variables dominance, prestige (Cheng et al., 2010), and need for power (Jackson, 1984) were entered in Step 1. In Step 2, age, gender, academic pressure, social desirability, satisfaction, and chances of getting caught were added as control variables. Step 1 of the regression ($F(3,165) = 6.004$, $p < .001$, Adjusted $R^2 = .082$) showed that dominance predicted higher QRP intentions

(B = .322, CI[.153, .491], p < .001, while felt prestige (B = -.136, p = .076) and need

for power (B = -.157, p = .075) did not. In Step 2 (significant ΔF = .066, $F(9,159)$ =

3.420, p < .001, Adjusted R^2 = .115), dominance continued to predict plans to engage

in QRPs (B = .281, CI[.094, .467], p = .003). Prestige (B = -.129, p = .092) and need

for power (B = -.130, p = .158) were not associated with QRP intentions. Dominance

was negatively correlated with social desirability $r(169)$ = -.390, p < .001, while

prestige and need for power were unrelated to social desirability (Table 3.2).

Table 3.2

Individual differences and QRP intentions – Study 9

		Need for Power (Jackson)	Prestige sub-scale (Cheng)	QRP Intention	Social Desirability
Dominance sub-scale (Cheng)	Pearson Correlation	.505**	.076	.232**	-.390**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.329	.002	.000
	N	169	169	169	169
Need for Power (Jackson)	Pearson Correlation		.214**	-.024	-.086
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.005	.760	.266
	N		169	169	169
Prestige sub-scale (Cheng)	Pearson Correlation			-.146	.026
	Sig. (2-tailed)			.059	.734
	N			169	169
QRP Intention	Pearson Correlation				-.188*
	Sig. (2-tailed)				.014
	N				169

Severity of QRP item

To explore the strength of the link between dominance and QRP intentions

depending on the severity of the QRP item, 14 research practices were split into two

groups, as rated by two independent raters who were blind to the study aims (interrater correlation .69). Eight items were classified as severe misconduct (α = .81), and 6 items as less severe (α = .78). Aggressive dominance was associated with both types of QRPs (severe QRPs: B = .254, CI [.101, .408], p < .001, less severe QRPs: B = .217, CI [.067, .367], p = .005). Prestige predicted lower intentions on severe types of QRPs (B = -.196, CI [-.349, -.043], p = .013), and was unrelated to less severe misconduct (B = -.111, p = .145). The need for power scale was not associated with either type of QRP.

3.6.3. Discussion

Consistent with Studies 6 and 7, aggressive dominance as measured by the dominance-prestige scale (Cheng et al., 2010) coincided with relaxed attitudes towards engaging in QRPs. Dominance as captured by Jackson's need for power scale did not explain QRP intentions.

3.7. Exploratory Factor Analysis

To address the concern arising from the variance in dominance conceptions across studies, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted. The three scales used accounted for nuanced differences in the conceptions of dominance, such that Jackson's need for power scale focused on leadership (Suessenbach et al., 2019), while Cheng's dominance emphasized aggressive and coercive forms of dominance (Eisenbarth et al., 2018). A factor analysis allows for the validation of whether the three scales measure discrete constructs (Ashton et al., 1998). It also enables a better understanding of the boundary conditions under which the main findings of the present chapter are most prominent. Additionally, it enables an investigation into the potential overlaps between scales. Factor analysis of personality scales is common, as

was the case when Jackson's personality research form demonstrated a large overlap with extraversion among the Big Five (Ashton et al., 1998; Jackson, 1984).

Results of the exploratory factor analyses showed that within the dominance-prestige scale (Cheng et al., 2010), dominance and prestige subscales assessed distinct constructs. The dominance-submissiveness continuum (Smith et al., 2008; Wiggins et al., 1988), need for power (Jackson, 1984) each captured a different construct from either dominance-prestige subscales. These results support the notion of multiple, discrete conceptions of dominance used in this chapter. Multiple constructs under the broad umbrella of dominance, or status and power motivation exist, and not all of these constructs are related to ethical decision-making processes. The analysis yielded results that are in agreement with the notion that power motives are comprised of three distinct accounts, namely dominance, prestige, and leadership, whereby only dominance is associated with aggression and anti-social behavior (Suessenbach et al., 2019; see also Magee & Langner, 2008) (see Appendix 3 for EFA method and results).

3.8. General Discussion

Dominance is associated with self-serving behavior, and the desire for power and status. QRPs are dishonest behaviors that assist the researcher's pursuit up the academic career ladder. Even though environmental factors surrounding the academic community's engagement of QRPs, and person-related traits affecting academic cheating among students, have been extensively documented (McCabe et al., 2001), whether dominance is linked to higher engagement of QRPs remained largely unknown. In the current chapter, I examined the direct association between dominance and the use of QRPs.

I proposed that dominant individuals strive to accrue benefits for the self, such as publications, promotions, or higher grades, with means that violate widely accepted social norms. I considered multiple conceptions of dominance in order to extend the understanding of dominance, including which facet of dominance best aligns with QRP engagement. Across the studies, aggressive trait dominance was associated with higher engagement of QRPs (Studies 6, 7, 9). Related concepts representing a more positive form of social differentiation, such as prestige (Studies 6, 7, 9), dominance-submissiveness spectrum (Study 6), the need for power (Study 9), and manipulated state dominance (Study 8) did not directly support this finding. To examine the effect of dominance independent of the type of people who enter academic jobs, I investigated samples of both career academics of psychology (Study 7) and students (Studies 6, 8 and 9, summary in Table 3.3). Perceptions of prevalence (Study 6) and judgements of defensibility (Study 7), which were obtained prior to questions concerning self-admissions, contributed to the positive association between dominance and QRP engagement.

Table 3.3

Summary of Studies 6, 7, 8, 9

	Study 6	**Study 7**	**Study 8***	**Study 9***
Population	Undergraduates in all disciplines	Academics in Psychology	Students of Psychology	Students of Psychology
Location	U.K.	Europe	U.K.	U.K.
Dominance Scale	Cheng et al (2010), Smith et al (2008)	Cheng et al (2010)	Experimentally manipulated	Cheng et al (2010), Jackson (1967)
N	146	146	244	169

Pearson Correlation	$r = .128$	$r = .289$	$\eta^2 = .030$	$r = .120$
p value	$p < .123$	$p < .001$		$p < .119$

* Pre-registered

To rule out the possibility that levels of self-reporting could differ across dominance levels, I included perceptions of prevalence among peers, social desirability measures, and hypothetical behavior intentions. I used social desirability as a control for truth-telling in self-reports of socially *un*desirable behavior. Dominant individuals displayed lower social desirability (Study 9). Lower social desirability coincided with higher admission of QRP intentions (Study 8, 9), which was congruent with past research (Jann et al., 2012; Rajah-Kanagasabai & Roberts, 2015). Students and academics reported their actual past behavior (Studies 6, 7). I controlled for environmental factors that could influence an individual's decision to use QRPs, such as the pressure to perform. Three-way questioning was utilized where QRP prevalence can be deduced from participants' perception of peer behavior, to complement their own admissions (John et al., 2012).

Contrary to hypothesis, dominance did not correlate with a successful academic career. This is in contrast with the findings from Chapter 2, which found that in ecological settings, dominant individuals are concentrated at the top. Prestige did however, predict success in academic careers (Study 7). This may be specific to the academic community, and remains to be explored further.

3.8.1. Mini Meta-Analysis

Through four studies, I sought to answer whether dominance coincides with higher engagement of QRPs, and found varying results across multiple conceptions of dominance. To clarify the cumulative effects of trait dominance on QRP engagement,

a mini meta-analysis across three studies (excluding Study 8 which considered manipulated state dominance) was conducted to address the issue of different dominance scales and uneven sample populations across studies (Goh et al., 2016).

Simple Pearson's correlation coefficients between dominance and engagement of QRPs, weighted by sample size were entered as inputs. In studies that had two measures of dominance (Studies 6, 9), the two measures were collapsed into one by averaging the standardized score of each scale. In Studies 6 and 7, where QRP engagement was measured with both self and peer reports, participants' own admission to QRPs were used, for reasons of comparability with Study 9, which measured behavior intentions. As the sample population was inconsistent through studies, I used Hedges-Vevea random-effects model (Field & Gillett, 2010; Hedges & Vevea, 1998), which showed a mean r of .178, $p < .002$ and CI$_{95\%}$ [.068, .284]. The exclusion of 0 in the confidence interval demonstrates an overall tendency of dominance to coincide with higher use of QRPs.

3.8.2. Limitations and Directions for Future Research

In this chapter, I found evidence to support the notion that individual differences in dominance uniquely predicts QRPs, controlling for situational demands such as the pressure to perform, academic rank, and social desirability. Furthermore, I considered diverse conceptions of dominance, to deepen the understanding of the underlying effect, including its boundaries. This paves the way for future research to verify the types of dominance that better predicts unethical behavior in general. Three studies (6, 8, and 9) provided a snapshot of student research misconduct in higher education, which remains an under-examined area, in comparison to academic misconduct such as cheating or plagiarism. Moreover, the present chapter contributes

to dishonesty research, by presenting the mediating role of normative behavior that is deemed defensible and justifiable.

Throughout four studies, participants' use of QRPs was self-reported, either on past or intended behavior. Although concerns on truth-telling were addressed and accounted for (e.g., social desirability, self and peer reports), the limitation remains that actual behavior was not observed. Despite this shortfall, ecologically valid responses on real, complex and nuanced ethical decisions people face was gathered, where the outcome is of high importance to the decision maker. This provides a balanced input towards other research on dishonesty, where studies measure actual behavior, but in narrowly defined, simplified experimental tasks, such as die throws or visual puzzles.

Why some styles of dominance affect QRPs, and others do not, deserves further examination. Although this chapter found an over-arching effect of trait dominance on QRP engagement through a mini meta-analysis, it has not been explicitly tested why only aggressive dominance coincides with QRP use. It would be useful to examine whether such tendencies can be generalised to broader domains of ethical decision making, and not limited to QRPs.

3.8.3. Conclusion

I found overarching evidence that dominance is associated with elevated use of QRPs, which was explained by defensibility judgements. Dominant individuals were likely to perceive QPRs to be more common. The evidence was stronger when dominance was measured by the dominance-prestige scale (Cheng et al., 2010). Two correlates of dominance; self-serving tendencies and enhanced motivation to ascend the social hierarchy, may have created optimal conditions for questionable research conduct, although dominance was not linked to higher academic career status. This

knowledge provides novel insight into the understanding of the challenges to ethical

and reproducible science.

Chapter 4. Power, Amplifier of the Dominants' Dishonesty?

4.1. Abstract

Power emboldens the individual to engage in uninhibited behavior (Keltner et al., 2003). Therefore, power magnifies the expression of predispositions (Guinote et al., 2012; Kraus et al., 2011), demonstrating that power can moderate the determinants of behavior. In this chapter, I examine whether the positive relationship between dominance and dishonesty may be moderated by the experience of power. Specifically, I hypothesize that power emboldens dominant individuals to engage in unethical behavior. Consequently, increased dishonesty among the dominant may be more prominent when dominant individuals feel powerful. This was tested through one study (N = 183), where dominance was assessed, and power was experimentally manipulated. Participants were provided with opportunities to cheat on die throws. Related predispositions — prestige, moral disengagement, individualism-collectivism, and the sense of power — were assessed as exploratory variables. The findings did not provide clear evidence of moderation. Nonetheless, the data largely supports the contention that the amplifying influence of power may be limited to predispositions that are relevant and accessible in the given context.

Keywords: social power, dominance, dishonesty, person × situation interaction

4.2. Introduction

The American politician R. Ingersoll famously said, "If you want to test a man's character, give him power" (1884)[15]. Dominant individuals seek and often attain power. Power subsequently gives individuals a certain level of freedom from constraints (Lewin, 1947; Overbeck, 2010). One question that arises then is whether having power alters the dominant's propensity to engage in unethical behavior, in a way that further brings out their (dominant) character.

I argued in Chapters 2 and 3 that dominant individuals are more likely to engage in unethical behavior. The experience of social power may embolden the dominant. In Chapter 2, power was considered as an ecological correlate of dominance, and I compared which factor was a better predictor of unethical behavior between dominance and social power. In fact, a post-hoc exploratory mini meta-analysis across Studies 2, 3, 4, and 5a showed no cumulative effect of power amplifying the relationship between dominance and dishonesty (Appendix 2.7). In the present chapter, I address this question directly, and examine how the dominant's tendency to engage in dishonesty is affected by the experience of power. An examination of power's role to amplify unethical behavior will enable a better prediction of *when* the dominant corrupts.

4.2.1. Power Magnifies Predispositions

As discussed in previous chapters, the effects of power on unethical behavior are nuanced, and often inconsistent (Foulk et al., 2020; Fleischmann et al., 2019). One avenue of power research seeking to reconcile these inconsistencies has focused on the influence of predispositions. This line of research examined individual differences

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[15] This quote is often misattributed to Abraham Lincoln. It was a quote about him, not by him (Reuters Fact Check, 2001).

associated with unethical behavior, to determine which traits are more likely to lead to power abuse (see review by Lee-Chai et al., 2001). Predispositions that have been identified as preceding unethical behavior frequently share a concern for social standings, and self-centred comparisons against others, such as dominance (Chapters 2 and 3), narcissism (Menon & Sharland, 2011) and entitlement (Lee et al., 2019).

What makes the study of predispositions interesting is to then examine how they may interact with power to influence ethical conduct. For example, individual differences in relationship orientation differentially affects self-serving behavior when experiencing power (Chen et al., 2001). Individuals who perceived social relationships as communal were more likely to engage in pro-social forms of power use. In contrast, those who perceived relationships as a fair exchange of benefits and costs were prone to using power for personal gains. A similar effect on selfish behavior was observed among individuals who understood their power as responsibility, compared to those who understood it as an opportunity (Sassenberg et al., 2014). These examples show that pre-existing inclinations manifest in different forms of power use.

Power magnifies the expression of predispositions (Guinote et al., 2012). Power emboldens and enables the power holder to behave freely, through the resources and influence they yield. Thus, power holders possess the confidence to show their authentic selves (Guinote et al., 2002; Kraus et al., 2011), often through uninhibited behavior (Keltner et al., 2003). The magnifying effects of power has been found across multiple domains. For example, the relationship between self-other focus and perspective taking in romantic relationships was moderated by feelings of power (Gordon & Chen, 2013). Crucially, individuals with weak moral identities were more likely to display self-interested behavior when given power. In contrast, individuals with strong moral identities showed reduced self-interested behavior in the presence

of power (DeCelles et al., 2012), demonstrating that firstly, power amplifies an individual's pre-existing level of moral awareness, and secondly, that power does not uniformly lead to poor behavior but rather a moderating role.

In the current chapter, along with dominance, I explored a number of other predispositions pertaining to unethical behavior or social standings. Moral disengagement is an individual state that can facilitate unethical behavior (Barsky, 2008), as it assists individuals to distance themselves from their unethical behavior (Bandura, 1990). Additionally, individualism and collectivism are two ends of a continuous spectrum that describe an individual's place within a group. Individualism refers to perceiving individuals as independent from their group, where personal goals are prioritized over that of the group (Triandis, 2001). In contrast, collectivism is described as prioritizing the goals of the group over an individual. Collectivistic individuals value social norms, interdependency, and communal relationships. Collectivism is associated with the notion that power serves collective goals (see Torelli & Shavitt, 2010). While individualism is strongly associated with self-enhancing tendencies compared to collectivism (Heine et al., 2001; Kurman & Sriram, 2002), collectivism is linked to the engagement of bribery, as collectivistic individuals feel less responsible for their individual behavior, (Mazar & Aggarwal, 2011) especially in the face of widespread social norms. It is possible that the experience of power differentially affects individualistic and collectivistic individuals in the ethical domain.

Lastly, I explored the sense of power. Sense of power, or subjective power, is the chronic feeling of power or powerlessness that individuals experience (Keltner et al., 2003), which is related to, but at times independent of socio-structural factors (Anderson et al., 2012; Mahadevan et al., 2021). For example, a person in a position

of power may experience powerlessness when they feel incompetent, threatening their ego. Such feelings of inadequacy is known to induce aggression (Fast & Chen, 2009). On the other hand, individuals with a higher sense of power experience less distress and compassion towards others' suffering, as they have less motivations to connect with others (van Kleef et al., 2008). Only when objective power (power positions) was coupled with subjective power (high sense of power) did power lead to overconfidence (Fast et al., 2012). This suggests that a person-situation match may be necessary for power abuse to occur. Crucially, subjective power is associated with dominance (Anderson et al., 2012). As such, situationally induced temporary feelings of power may moderate the influence of chronic sense of power on unethical behavior. This chapter will explore these avenues to power abuse, in addition to dominance.

4.3. Study 10: Manipulated Power, Dominance and Die Throw

Study 10 examined the moderating role of power in the relationship between trait dominance and dishonesty. In a controlled laboratory experiment, the experience of power was manipulated among participants using differentiated roles in a dyad (high power, low power). I tested the hypothesis that the interaction of dominance and power condition would influence dishonesty. Specifically, I investigated whether power escalates the tendency for dominant people to be dishonest. This may be due to disinhibition and self-expression, which are consequences of power. Dishonesty was inferred through a die throw. In addition, prestige (as in Chapters 2 and 3), moral disengagement, individualism-collectivism, and sense of power were assessed as exploratory variables, to guide future research. The pre-registration (https://aspredicted.org/S3Q_KGL) clearly differentiates the main predictor variable (dominance) with exploratory variables.

4.3.1. Methods

Participants

Two hundred and one students of a U.K. based university were recruited through the university's participant pool. This study had a target sample size of 180 participants, which was calculated assuming effect size $f^2 = .10$, $\alpha = .05$, and $1 - \beta = .90$. The study took 35 minutes on average, across two stages. Eighteen participants were excluded for correctly guessing the study aims, and findings from the remaining 183 participants are reported (43 male; Mage = 21.39 years, SD = 4.008). A majority of participants identified as Caucasian (n = 75, 41.0%) or Asian (n = 92, 50.3%). Eighty-two (44.8%) participants were native English speakers, and 86 participants (47.0%) were fluent speakers of English. Participants received either course credit (n = 71, 38.8%) or £4 (n = 112, 61.2%).

Procedures

Data was collected in two stages. In Stage 1, participants completed an online questionnaire that assessed dominance, prestige, individualism-collectivism, moral disengagement, and sense of power. In addition, participants reported their age, gender, race, and English proficiency.

Stage 2 took place 7-10 days after the online questionnaire measuring predispositions. Participants came into the laboratory in person, and took part in pairs. Participants met with their partner and completed the consent form at a shared table. On sessions where the participant did not have a partner, the participant was informed that their partners had to leave early, but will complete the study afterwards with their input. Participants were told that they would be working as a team of two with different roles. After reading brief job descriptions of the roles (owner of an art gallery, assistant to the owner), participants indicated their role preferences. Participants were told that their responses on the questionnaire from Stage 1 were

used to infer their fit between the two roles. In fact, role assignment was random. Participants worked at the shared table with their partners, and subsequently alone in individual cubicles. Participants learned that they would be entered into a prize lottery according to their performance on a die throw. Subsequently, participants provided feedback, were checked for suspicion, debriefed, given a final opportunity to withdraw, and then dismissed.

Measures

Dominance. The dominance-prestige rating scale was used to measure dominance (8-item α = .82) (Cheng et al., 2010).

Power Manipulation. Power was manipulated by assigning participants to either the art gallery owner role (high power condition), or the assistant role (low power condition) (Mast et al., 2010). Participants were informed that the online questionnaire they filled out in Stage 1 in fact measured their leadership skills, and that their responses determined their role allocation. In fact, participants were assigned randomly to their roles. In order to minimize the risk of demand effects altering the study outcome (Doyen et al., 2012), the roles were assigned before participants came into the session, and the experimenters were blind to participants' role assignment until participants went into individual cubicles. To this end, experimenters gave out worksheets to the group, and not to individual participants.

Role legitimacy was further reinforced by affirming the historical efficacy of the alleged leadership questionnaire, and restating to participants that the gallery owners are good at leading others and making decisions, and that assistants are better at following instructions. The owners chose from a list of tasks deciding which ones they wanted their assistants to work on. The assistants were told to work on the tasks that their boss chose for them. Subsequently, all participants went into individual

cubicles to work on computer tasks. The owners wrote how they would evaluate the quality of their assistant's work. The assistants wrote their action plans on each task their bosses had assigned to them. Both gallery owners and assistants spent a minimum of 7 minutes and wrote more than 500 characters on these writing tasks to allow for immersion in their respective roles.

Manipulation Check. Participants answered on 7-point Likert scales the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with statements ranging from how in charge of the situation they felt, to whether they had influence over others in describing the contents of their writing exercises.

Dishonesty. The measure of dishonesty used in Study 1 was employed (Haselhuhn & Wong, 2012). After completing the writing exercises, Participants were told that in addition to £4 or course credit of baseline compensation, they would be entered into a lottery to win vouchers ranging from £5 to £30. There were more than 20 prizes on offer, which implied that participants had a reasonable chance of winning. Participants were led to a private cubicle and provided with a die. Participants threw the die twice, and the sum of the two throws became the number of lottery tickets allotted to them. Participants self-reported their sums (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Lammers et al., 2010). This measure allows for the detection of dishonesty by inferencing group level differences in average scores, while maintaining complete anonymity. This measure also allows participants to cheat incrementally, as participants can inflate their scores a little, or to the maximum (e.g., double sixes).

Control Variables. To control for factors that may influence dishonesty, participants answered questions on role suitability and enjoyment. This was done after the power manipulation into owner or assistant roles, but before the die throw.

Exploratory Variables. Participants' prestige, moral disengagement, individualism-collectivism, and sense of power were assessed online in Stage 1. The dominance-prestige rating scale was used to measure prestige (9-item α = .80, Cheng et al., 2010). Participants answered questions on their moral disengagement using a six item measure on 7-point Likert scales (1: *Strongly disagree* to 7: *Strongly agree*), with items such as 'Rules could be flexible enough to be adapted to different situations' (6-item α = .68, Shu et al., 2011). Individualism-collectivism was measured using a 16-item scale (1: *Strongly disagree* to 7: *Strongly agree*), with sample items such as 'I would rather depend on myself than others', and 'It is important to me that I respect the decisions made by my groups (reverse coded)' (16-item α = .65, Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). Sense of power was assessed through an eight item scale (1: *Strongly disagree* to 7: *Strongly agree*), which included statements such as 'I can get others to listen to what I say' (8-item α = .84, Anderson et al., 2012). In addition, in order to gauge the relationship between dominance and power motivation, participants indicated their role preferences (1: *Prefer to be assistant,* to 5: *Prefer to be gallery owner*).

4.3.2. Results

Manipulation Check

Ninety-three participants (50.8%) were assigned to gallery owner roles, and the rest (n = 90, 49.2%) were assigned to assistant roles. An independent-samples t-test showed no material group differences between owners and assistants in age, gender, ethnicity, or English proficiency. The owners felt more in control of the situation, and felt they had more influence over others than the assistants (M_{Owner} = 5.71, SD_{Owner} = .848, $M_{Assistant}$ = 3.83, $SD_{Assistan}$ = 1.257, $t(181)$ = 11.909, $p < .001$, d = 1.753). Therefore, the power manipulation was deemed effective.

Participants' felt level of power, as measured by the manipulation check questions after power manipulation, did not significantly correlate with baseline predispositions; dominance $r(183) = .086$, $p = .245$, prestige $r(183) = .077$, $p = .299$, moral disengagement $r(183) = -.045$, $p = .544$, individualism-collectivism $r(183) = .125$, $p = .093$, and sense of power $r(183) = .103$, $p = .163$. This demonstrates that how powerful participants felt after the power manipulation was not a reflection of their chronic predispositions prior to the power manipulation. Compared to participants who were assigned to assistant roles, gallery owners enjoyed their roles more ($M_{Owner} = 5.74$, $SD_{Owner} = 1.151$, $M_{Assistant} = 4.88$, $SD_{Assistant} = 1.373$, $t(181) = 4.621$, $p < .001$, $d = .679$), and thought their role suited them more ($M_{Owner} = 5.54$, $SD_{Owner} = 1.138$, $M_{Assistant} = 4.60$, $SD_{Assistant} = 1.467$, $t(181) = 4.840$, $p < .001$, $d = .716$), which is indicative of an overall preference to be owners rather than assistants.

Dominance

A stepwise multiple linear regression analysed the influence of the interaction variable dominance × power condition on die score as the outcome variable (Step 1). In a subsequent step, main predictor variables dominance and power condition were added (Step 2), and in Step 3, control variables age and gender were included. Step 1 showed a moderation effect in the hypothesized direction, although this trend did not reach statistical significance at conventional levels $F(1,181) = 3.344$, $p = .069$. Step 2 did not improve the model fit (significant $\Delta F = .672$, $F(3,179) = 1.373$, $p = .253$). Neither dominance $B = .062$, $p = .744$ nor power condition $B = .157$, $p = .408$ influenced dishonesty. The influence of the interaction variable dominance × power condition was still marginal $B = .343$, $p = .072$. Step 3 was not significant (significant $\Delta F = .528$, $F(5,177) = 1.077$, $p = .375$). Therefore, the main hypothesis of moderation

was not definitively supported. Interestingly, dominance was not correlated with higher die scores $r(183) = .028$, $p = .705$. There were no material differences in die score across power conditions ($M_{Owner} = 7.94$, $SD_{Owner} = 2.497$, $M_{Assistant} = 7.62$, $SD_{Assistant} = 2.629$, $t(181) = .827$, $p = .410$).

Power Motivation

The desire and preference to be the gallery owner were positively correlated with dominance $r(183) = .358$, $p < .001$, prestige $r(183) = .204$, $p = .006$, moral disengagement $r(183) = .167$, $p = .024$, and sense of power $r(183) = .205$, $p = .005$, but not individualism-collectivism $r(183) = -.095$, $p = .200$ (Table 4.1).

Table 4.1

Associations of Dishonesty and Power Motivation with Individual Differences - Study 10

		Power Motivation	Dominance	Prestige	Moral Disengagement	Individualism	Sense of Power
Die Score (Dishonesty)	Pearson Correlation	.003	.028	.087	.076	-.095	.004
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.970	.705	.243	.307	.199	.956
	N	183	183	183	183	183	183
Power Motivation	Pearson Correlation		.358**	.204**	.167*	.095	.205**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.006	.024	.200	.005
	N		183	183	183	183	183
Dominance	Pearson Correlation			.037	.292**	.330**	.262**
	Sig. (2-tailed)			.617	.000	.000	.000
	N			183	183	183	183
Prestige	Pearson Correlation				.025	-.028	.638**
	Sig. (2-tailed)				.737	.708	.000
	N				183	183	183
Moral Disengagement	Pearson Correlation					.208**	.104
	Sig. (2-tailed)					.005	.159

			183	183
Individualism	Pearson Correlation			.004
	Sig. (2-tailed)			.961
	N			183

Exploratory Findings

Prestige. A stepwise linear regression analysed the influence of prestige on dishonesty. Step 1 had prestige as input, and die score as the dependent variable. The interaction of prestige × power condition was added in Step 2. There was no main effect of prestige on die score $F(1, 181) = 1.374$, $p = .243$. Step 2 did not improve the model (significant $\Delta F = .630$, $F(2,180) = .801$, $p = .451$), and no evidence of moderation was detected ($B = .092$, $p = .630$).

Moral Disengagement. An identical stepwise linear regression as above, but with moral disengagement as the predictor variable, showed no main effect of moral disengagement on dishonesty $F(1, 181) = 1.049$, $p = .307$, and no moderation of moral disengagement × power condition $B = .112$, $p = .559$ in Step 2 (significant $\Delta F = .559$, $F(2,180) = .694$, $p = .694$).

Individualism-Collectivism. A stepwise linear regression examined the influence of individualism-collectivism on dishonesty. Step 1 had individualism-collectivism as the predictor, and die score as the outcome variable. The interaction of individualism × power condition was added in Step 2. No main effect of individualism was detected $F(1, 181) = 1.664$, $p = .199$. However, there was a significant improvement of the model in Step 2 (significant $\Delta F = .026$, $F(2,180) = 3.382$, $p = .036$, Adjusted $R^2 = .026$). The interaction variable individualism × power condition was significant $B = .428$, $p = .026$, $CI_{95\%}[.053, .804]$, and power moderated the relationship between individualism and dishonesty. Specifically, for participants assigned to the powerful condition, individualism did not predict dishonesty $F(1, 91)$

= .251, p = .618. For participants assigned to the powerless condition, higher collectivistic traits[16] were associated with heightened dishonesty $F(1, 88) = 6.917$, $B = -.731$, $p = .010$.

Sense of Power. A further stepwise linear regression that is identical to the one above, but with the sense of power as the predictor variable, showed no main effect of the sense of power on dishonesty $F(1, 181) = .003$, $p = .956$. Step 2 was also not statistically significant (significant $\Delta F = .040$, $F(2,180) = 2.134$, $p = .121$, Adjusted $R^2 = .012$). Nevertheless, the interaction variable sense of power × power condition was significant $B = .391$, $p = .040$, $CI_{95\%}[.017, .764]$. The direction of moderation was such that for participants assigned to the powerful condition, higher sense of power was associated with dishonesty, whereas for participants assigned to the powerless condition, *lower* sense of power was associated with dishonesty. This suggests that participants who were given power roles that matched their chronic sense of power were more likely to inflate their die score.

4.4. Discussion

Study 10 did not find evidence to support the hypothesis that power moderates the relationship between dominance and dishonesty, in a way that increases dishonesty for dominant individuals, but not for submissive individuals. This is consistent with the post-hoc mini meta-analysis explored in Chapter 2. Such findings raise the possibility that previous research demonstrating the amplifying effect of power on the expression of predispositions (Guinote et al., 2012; Mead et al., 2018; Williams, 2014) may not extend to dominance. There is a crucial distinction between dominance and other predispositions previously examined in the context of power and unethical

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[16] Lower individualism score

behavior. Moral inclinations (DeCelles et al., 2012; Lammers et al., 2010; Wang & Sun, 2016), social responsibility differences (Sassenberg et al., 2012), or exchange-communal relationship orientation (Chen et al., 2001), are not associated with power attainment in natural settings.

In contrast, dominance is a close correlate of ecological power (Lord et al., 1986) that often consists of interpersonal power moves. Dominant individuals tend to be self-expressed, independent of power. For instance, they speak more than submissive individuals (Guinote, 2017; Keltner et al., 2008). Therefore, their behavior may not be affected by power. Dishonesty among dominant individuals could be more frequent because they feel fearlessness, emboldened (Bronchain et al., 2019), and self-serving, which may precede power. That is, these individuals may permit themselves to behave unethically independent of power. Hence, the magnifying effects of power for self-expression may be less evident for dominance.

While not forming the main hypothesis, exploratory findings suggest the moderating effect of power condition on the relationships between individualism-collectivism and dishonesty, as well as subjective power and dishonesty. Predispositions are best magnified by power when they are accessible in the immediate surroundings (Guinote et al., 2012). An interesting avenue for future research could consider the goals of dominant individuals, such as when dishonesty directly leads to hierarchical differentiation, where participant's trait dominance is more likely be accessible.

This is perhaps demonstrated by the exploratory moderations detected in the current chapter. Participants who were assigned to roles that were a better "fit" to their chronic subjective power (i.e., gallery owners with high subjective power) cheated more than those assigned to roles that did not match (i.e., gallery owners with low

subjective power). It is possible that situationally induced feelings of power made participants' baseline sense of power more accessible. In addition, for participants assigned to gallery assistant roles, collectivism was associated with increased dishonesty. This is consistent with research that find higher levels of corruption in collectivistic cultures (Jha & Panda, 2017; Zheng et al., 2013; but see Ang, 2020). This is an ongoing debate, which I cover in more detail in Chapter 7.

These findings are exploratory and non-conclusive. A relatively large number of variables were considered concurrently as exploratory variables. Nevertheless, they suggest the possibility that power can influence people differently according to a number of predispositions, and that this applies for unethical behavior. Future research examining each predisposition in detail would allow for a deeper understanding of the full moderating influence of power. Ultimately, the amplifying effects of power on the active self will depend on whether power is relevance in the context (Guinote & Chen, 2017). In Study 10, the measure of dishonesty was unrelated to power use. Reporting results of a die throw for personal gain (e.g., lottery) was discrete from the experience of power. Future research could consider measuring dishonesty whereby the dishonest deed is the direct exercise of one's power (power abuse).

In contrast to the results from Chapters 2 and 3, I did not find increased dishonesty among the dominant in Study 10. One possible explanation is that university students may have been averse to lying in university premises, which is a tendency already observed in Study 3 (Chapter 2). In Study 3, the dependent variable was subsequently changed to a self-report of moral disengagement, as a proxy to unethical behavior. Then a point of further concern arises, as no association between moral disengagement and dishonesty was detected in Study 10. This may be due to inadequate sensitivity of the dishonesty measure employed in the study, and future

research is necessary to confirm this. Crucially, Study 10 may be under-powered, despite running a power analysis at pre-registration stage. A post-hoc analysis showed that the effect size was smaller than previously assumed ($f^2 = .031$, $1 - \beta = .44$), leading to the need for a bigger sample size than initially anticipated.

4.4.1. Conclusion

The current chapter examined whether the experience of power amplifies the dominants' tendency to engage in dishonesty. Evidence gathered from Study 10 was not supportive, and further research is necessary to clarify this notion of moderation that examines *when* predispositions magnify in the presence of power. In the next two chapters, I move on from individual differences and the examination of dominance, to inspect the direct and unique effects of power on unethical behavior.

Chapter 5: Power and Easily Justifiable Dishonesty

5.1. Abstract

The present chapter examines the unique experience of power, independent of trait dominance. Three studies (N = 563) investigated the effects of increased power on engaging in morally ambiguous behaviors. Morally ambiguous behaviors occur more frequently compared to clearly immoral behaviors, because they are easier to justify (Ayal & Gino, 2011). Power was induced in a dyadic task (Study 11), manipulated through a recall of past experience (Study 12), and assessed as the sense of power (Study 13). Morally ambiguous dishonesty involved visual perception tasks (Study 11) and paltering (Studies 12 and 13), which is the communication of technically true statements with the intention to mislead, often through omission of key information (Rogers et al., 2017). Across studies, power did not lead to disproportionate levels of morally ambiguous behavior. Lenient perceptions justified morally ambiguous dishonesty, which occurred more frequently compared to telling the truth, or lying by commission.

Keywords: social power, moral ambiguity, paltering, dishonesty, justification

5.2. Introduction

In Chapters 2 and 3, trait dominance was a better predictor of unethical behavior than social power. Social power was described as an ecological correlate of dominance, as dominant individuals were over-represented in powerful professional positions (Studies 2, 5a, but not Study 7). The dominants' tendency to cheat was observed in multiple contexts: lying in a die throw, inflating performance in a puzzle, attitudes toward moral disengagement, the breaking of Covid-19 containment rules, and questionable research conduct. The findings were consistent across studies that collected self-reports of unethical behavior as well as those that observed actual behavior. Some studies examined the correlational relationship between dominance and unethical behavior without considering the role of social power (Studies 1, 6, 8, 9). In other studies, natural power was assessed (Studies 2, 5a, 7) or temporarily induced (Studies 3, 4) as an additional variable. Dominance was not only a predictor of unethical behavior, but also outperformed power as a predictor of unethical behavior. This trend was stronger for aggressive and forceful forms of dominance, rather than leadership motivation or the dominance-submissiveness spectrum (Chapter 3). More generally, power can magnify an individual's chronic predispositions (Guinote et al., 2012; Kraus et al., 2011). However, in Study 10, the experience of power did not significantly increase the tendency of dominant individuals to engage in dishonesty (Chapter 4). I speculated that the dishonesty measure employed in Study 10, a report of die throws, may not have been sensitive enough to pick up trends in dishonesty given the sample size.

In any case, throughout Chapters 2, 3 and 4, the primary concern was for dominance and dishonesty, and not social power. In the present chapter, to better understand the direct effects of power, I move away from dominance and examine

social power as a standalone factor influencing unethical behavior. While there are many studies that demonstrate power's ability to corrupt (Bendahan et al., 2015; Case & Maner, 2015; Foulk et al., 2018; Giurge et al., 2019; see also Kipnis, 1972), many other studies report null or opposite effects (Lammers et al., 2015; Lindsey et al., 2011). This implies that power may not lead uniformly to dishonesty, and the specific situations under which the powerful may engage in disproportionate dishonesty compared to the powerless needs to be identified. In order to do so, it is necessary to examine the environments that are particularly conducive to dishonesty, and more crucially, the unique effects of power on the power holder's priorities and motivation.

Power has the ability to transform the individual's attention, their way of thinking, their desires (Guinote, 2017), and their behavior (Guinote, 2008). This phenomena is unique to the experience of power and independent of other natural correlates to power, such as dominance. Power can orient individuals towards action (Galinsky et al., 2003), rewards (Keltner et al., 2003), or goals (Guinote, 2007a). These insights are all built on the notion that power energizes individuals in ways that is independent of the person. Therefore, to understand the relationship between power and unethical behavior, I examine the distinctive effects of power that could pave the way for self-interested behavior. To this end, this chapter follows an experimental approach involving three studies.

5.2.1. Power and Automatic Cognition

Elevated power increases the reliance on automatic processing of information, positive affect, and disinhibited behavior (Keltner et al., 2003). Automatic cognition refers to making fast and effortless judgements by relying on mental shortcuts, such as heuristics (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999), and top-down processing instead of deliberate and effortful decision making. Power increases the tendency for individuals to make

judgements based on the ease of retrieval (Weick & Guinote, 2008) and accessible

constructs (Guinote et al., 2012). At times, automatic cognition can lead to a

deterioration in judgement quality. For example, the powerful are prone to systematic

biases, such as stereotyping (Fiske, 1993; Guinote & Phillips, 2010), the planning

fallacy in regards to time (Weick & Guinote, 2010), bias to maintain the status-quo

(Keltner & Robinson, 1997), anchoring (Lammers & Burgmer, 2017), and relying on

first impressions (Briñol et al., 2012). In contrast, powerlessness is associated with

systematic, deliberate cognition and behavior inhibition (Keltner et al., 2003).

Interestingly, whereas power typically increases automatic cognition (Keltner

et al., 2003) and action (Galinsky et al., 2003), these inclinations can be superseded by

the activation of goals. That is, when the powerful are motivated towards achieving

their goal, their reliance on automatic cognition can be overturned, to display

deliberate and controlled thought (Schmid et al., 2015). Crucially, the goals of the

powerful can change due to external influences, demonstrating the importance of the

situation in power holders' conduct.

5.2.2. Power and Myopic Goal Focus

Power is associated with the ability to pay attention to a goal, and enhanced

motivation to achieve the desired outcome (Guinote, 2007c). When confronted with

multiple goals, individuals with power prefer to prioritize on one primary goal,

whereas those who lack power tend to multitask (Cai & Guinote, 2017; Schmid et al.,

2015). It has also been observed that the powerless are less adept at distinguishing

situation relevant goals, leading to goal neglect (Smith, Jostmann, et al., 2008). Since

the powerful are energized towards primary goal pursuit, they can be situationally

responsive (Guinote, 2008). This tendency manifests in selectively allocating

resources to the process that best achieves their goals, such as time (Guinote, 2008) and attention towards others (Overbeck & Park, 2006).

The ability to focus and be energized make the powerful very efficient goal achievers. However, their goal orientation can bias them towards goals that yield self-benefits (Williams, 2014), and such self-orientation can lead to poor perspective taking (Galinsky et al., 2006). More importantly, prioritising one goal over others can lead to myopic goal focus. This includes disregarding the moral nature of decisions. For example, corporate executives who focused on a specific outcome (e.g., revenue, market share) were less adept at recognizing the moral implications of their decisions. They were more likely to perceive decisions as solely business in nature, and unable to see the nuanced complexities (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999).

5.2.3. Ease of Justification and Dishonesty

The ability to justify, rationalize, and reframe one's action is a key driver of dishonesty (Shalvi et al., 2011; Vincent et al., 2013). By engaging in self-serving justifications, it is possible to reduce ethical dissonance, which refers to the disparity between the ideal moral self, and the actual self that can be inferred by their outwardly displayed behavior (Barkan et al., 2012). By reducing ethical dissonance, one can enjoy the benefits of their dishonest deeds while still preserving their positive self-view (Mazar et al., 2008). Remarkably, the ease of justification applies to both before and after the unethical act (Shalvi et al., 2015). Shalvi and colleagues noted that pre-violation justification re-classifies the unethical behavior as defensible. Post-violation justification eases the guilt felt by the violator, and explains why individuals morally disengage after cheating (Shu et al., 2011), or distance from their own deeds by judging others' transgressions harshly (Barkan et al., 2012).

A number of emotions and judgements coincide with increased dishonesty. For example, financial inequity increases cheating behavior among those who feel they were treated unfairly (Gino & Pierce, 2009a; Gino & Pierce, 2009b), and did not receive what they rightfully deserved (Cameron & Monin, 2008; Lee et al., 2019). Unethical behaviors that are perceived as common within one's in-group tend to have a low barrier to entry (Gino, Ayal et al., 2009). I covered this in Chapter 3 by examining questionable research practices. Altruistic cheating, which benefit not only the individual but also others, is easier to justify (Shalvi et al., 2015). This extends to collective or collaborative cheating (Conrads et al., 2013; Pulfrey et al., 2018), which collectivistic societies tend to be more accepting of (McCabe et al., 2008; Yukhymenko-Lescroart, 2014). When misconduct occurs through small steps rather than one abrupt leap, it is judged as less blameworthy (slippery slope, Gino & Bazerman, 2009). These emotions and frames make it easy for the individual to justify their behavior. Indeed, creative individuals who are more able to rationalize their behavior, are also more likely to cheat (Gino & Ariely, 2012). Positive affect, which improves cognitive flexibility, enables individuals to morally disengage (Vincent et al., 2013). Furthermore, the ability to morally disengage can lead to increased dishonesty (Bandura et al., 1996; Farnese et al., 2011).

To summarize, powerful individuals engage in automatic cognition, where salient mental shortcuts are favoured. At the same time, they possess a heightened desire to meet the objectives that they deem important. Put together, the powerful rely on easily accessible constructs provided within their surroundings that assist goal pursuit. Power holders' goals are often selfish in nature. Furthermore, justifiability is a key driver of dishonesty. It is possible to reason that when faced with a potential behavior that accrues self-benefits, the powerful would be highly motivated to achieve

the self-benefit. It is also possible to deduce that when the potential behavior is easy to rationalise, this aspect of the behavior renders the behavior greatly accessible to the power holder. That is, power holders may engage in easily justifiable dishonesty that assists the attainment of goals. The current chapter tests this idea.

In this chapter, I concentrate on morally ambiguous behavior (Ayal & Gino, 2011) as a form of unethical behavior that is easy to justify. The ethically grey nature of morally ambiguous behavior makes it commonplace enough to be detected in controlled studies. This is a critical advantage as quantitative studies on extremely rare behavior with low base rates (e.g., clearly unethical behavior) can be challenging to study empirically. In addition, it is more common to encounter morally ambiguous decisions in day-to-day life, compared to morally clear decisions. More importantly and related to power, the barrier to engage in morally ambiguous behaviors may be particularly low for individuals with power, as they are motivated towards goal attainment, and engage in automatic cognition. For these reasons, they may be less questioning of the unethical means to achieve their goals. I propose that in situations where the power holder is faced with an easily justifiable, easy to commit choice of action that accrues self-benefits, there would be higher instances of unethical behavior, compared to the powerless.

One example of morally ambiguous behavior is paltering. Paltering refers to the motivated communication (Schweitzer & Hsee, 2002) of technically true statements that are cherry-picked and curated with the intention to mislead (Rogers et al., 2017). Paltering is morally ambiguous because the person who engages in paltering believes they are being honest, thereby maintain their positive self-view. However, those on the receiving end of paltering feel they have been lied to (Rogers et al., 2017). Although paltering does not involve outright fabrications or blatant lies, it

is still considered a form of deception (Vrij, 2000). Deception comes in many forms, including concealment, omission, misdirection, and exaggeration (Buller & Burgoon, 1994).

5.2.4. Overview of Studies

Through three studies, I examine the effect of power on unethical conduct. Specifically, I test the hypothesis that in a morally ambiguous context, the powerful will engage in higher instances of dishonesty, compared to the powerless. This will be caused by powerful individual's reliance on automatic processing of information, utilizing easily accessible contextual prompts, combined with their goal focus. Such differences in dishonesty among power levels would not emerge in morally *un*ambiguous contexts that are harder to rationalise. Overall, participants would be more dishonest in morally ambiguous decisions compared to morally clear decisions.

Study 11 observed actual cheating behavior when feelings of power were induced in a group task. Power was based on formal positions within a group, where the powerful participants made decisions that had consequences for the powerless participants (Guinote, 2007d). Then, in a computer based visual task, participants switched between decisions that had ambiguous visual boundaries, and decisions that were unambiguous. In both cases, participants could earn more money by lying. In Studies 12 and 13, a negotiation paradigm was used. Information asymmetries in negotiations foster deception and what is referred to as 'marginally ethical' tactics (Lewicki & Robinson, 1998). I distinguished between lying by commission (the use of explicit untrue statements), paltering, and telling the truth[17]. Paltering is the morally ambiguous, more acceptable version of dishonesty, compared to lying by commission.

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[17] Lying by omission, another form of deception, was not included. Paltering differs from lying by omission, as it entails the selective *inclusion* of true statements.

Power was experimentally induced in Study 12 with a well-validated manipulation involving writing of past experiences (Galinsky et al., 2003). In Study 13, participants' chronic sense of power was assessed. Many studies that examine the effects of power (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Fast et al., 2012) utilize both situationally induced temporary feelings of power, and the sense of power (subjective power) which is relatively stable. Sense of power is often correlated with, but not identical to formal power, which stems from validated positions in social hierarchies (Anderson et al., 2012). Sense of power is an individual difference that can be assessed generally, or activated experimentally (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006).

In Study 12, moral disengagement was assessed as a possible post-violation justification, as it is implicated in justifying unethical behavior (Shalvi et al., 2015). In Study 13, as power was not experimentally manipulated but assessed, I controlled for factors that could influence the sense of power. In addition to basic demographic information, participants' base levels of moral disengagement and individualism-collectivism were collected, as control variables of the sense of power, and as exploratory variables. Moral disengagement is regarded as a proxy of unethical behavior on its own right (Barsky, 2008; see also Study 3 in Chapter 2), or at least as a cognitive mechanism of unethical behavior (Shu et al., 2011). Individualism-collectivism, which refers to the degree to which an individual is prioritized over their group (Hofstede, 1980; Hui & Triandis, 1986), can act as a trigger of unethical behavior that is context sensitive (Jha & Panda, 2017; Miller et al., 1990; Zheng et al., 2013).

5.3. Study 11: Morally Ambiguous Through Dot Task

Study 11 was an in person controlled experiment, and two types of dishonesty were observed through an incentivized visual computer task (Gino et al., 2010).

Participants were provided with opportunities to lie, or be honest, in morally ambiguous decisions as well as morally clear decisions. It tested the hypothesis that dishonesty will depend on power and ambiguity such that the powerful will cheat more than the powerless only in morally ambiguous decisions. The powerful will not cheat more than the powerless in morally clear decisions. In addition, it tested whether individuals are more likely to cheat in morally ambiguous decisions compared to morally clear decisions.

5.3.1. Methods - Study 11

Participants

One hundred and seventy-six adults living in London completed the study in the laboratory at a London based university, in exchange for monetary compensation. The sample size was pre-determined, assuming $(1 - \beta) = .90$, $\alpha = .05$, and $\rho^2 = .05$ (.20 correlation). Ten participants were excluded for correctly guessing the study aims, leaving a final sample of 166 participants (41 Male; $M_{age} = 25.36$ *years*, $SD = 7.197$). A majority of participants identified as either Caucasian (n = 52, 31.3%), or Asian (n = 88, 53.0%).

Procedure

Participants came into the laboratory in groups of three, and were informed that the study focused on game theory and human-computer interaction in teams. After observing that they were part of a group of three, participants went into individual cubicles, where they stayed until they were dismissed. Firstly, all participants completed a questionnaire, which was allegedly a measure of their leadership skills. The experimenter collected the completed questionnaire and pretended to mark them. Subsequently, the experimenter assigned participants to be

either a manager, or two workers. Next, participants worked on paper-based tasks that were differentiated by roles, before completing the manipulation check questions. Participants completed a series of visual perception tasks on the computer, with opportunities to be dishonest for increased monetary compensation. Finally, participants provided feedback on their study experience, were checked for suspicion, received a detailed debrief both on paper and in person, before giving final consent.

Measures

Power Manipulation. Participants filled out a questionnaire that was allegedly a leadership questionnaire that determined their roles in the study (Guinote, 2007d). In fact, participants were randomly assigned to their roles. Half of the participants were assigned to the manager role (powerful condition), and the remaining, to the worker role (powerless condition). Role legitimacy was reinforced by informing participants about the efficacy of the leadership questionnaire based on its past track record. In groups of three, participants were told that one would become the manager, and the other two would be workers. In fact, in half of the sessions there were two managers and one worker, in order to assign an equal number of participants between power conditions, but the participants were not made aware of this. All participants were told that the manager will be in charge of dividing a number of tasks between the two workers.

In their private cubicles, participants assigned to the worker role briefly wrote about their skills and preferences. They then wrote a short proposal of a recycling project for the university building. Workers were informed that their skills and preferences would be used to inform their manager to decide the task allocation between the two workers. In addition, their recycling proposal would be evaluated by their manager for a differentiated entry into a lottery. That is, proposals deemed good

by their manager would be entered into a lottery for £20, while proposals rated as not good would be entered into a £16 prize lottery. This gave the impression that the managers had tangible power, as they controlled the workers' outcome (Fiske & Dépret, 1996). In fact, all participants, including the managers, were entered into a £18 lottery.

In their private cubicles, the managers were given 11 tasks to delegate and divide among the two workers. Managers were provided with some basic information about their workers, but had full discretion and authority in their allocation of tasks, as their decisions were final.

Manipulation Check. Participants indicated the degree to which they felt influential and in charge, on 2-item Likert scales (1: *Strongly disagree*, 7: *Strongly agree*).

Dishonesty. Workers were informed that while their manager allocate the tasks between the two workers, they would be working on a computer based visual task as a pilot for an unrelated future study. The managers were told that their workers would be working on the tasks they had assigned to them, and during that time, the managers would work on the computer visual task.

In the visual task, participants were shown a series of squares containing 20 red dots, with a diagonal line crossing from the upper left corner to the bottom right corner (examples shown in Figure 5.1) (Gino et al., 2010; Gino & Ariely, 2012). Some dots were situated on the bottom left of the square, while other dots were scattered in the top right. Each square was shown for just 1 second, after which the participants had to identify which side contained more dots (*more on the left*, *more on the right*). Each time the participant clicked on 'more on the left', they received 0.5p, and each time they clicked on 'more on the right', they received 10 times more, 5p.

Therefore, on every trial that contained more dots on the left, participants could increase their payment by being dishonest and click 'more on the right'. Participants were shown two rounds of 50 trials (100 trials with a break halfway). There were two levels of dishonesty (clear, ambiguous). Each round contained 17 unambiguous trials where it was very clear which side contained more dots (clear), and 23 ambiguous trials where it was harder, although still possible, to identify the side with more dots (ambiguous). With two rounds, participants had 34 clear trials, and 46 ambiguous trials to cheat on. After the first round (50 trials), participants were given truthful feedback on how much money they had earned so far, and were informed the range of money they can earn in the next round. After 100 trials, participants received a base pay of £2, and their actual earnings from the visual perception task, ranging from £0.5 to £5.0.

Figure 5.1

Example of Visual Perception Task - Choosing the Side Containing More Dots – Study 11

5.3.2. Results - Study 11

Eighty (48.2%) participants were assigned manager roles (powerful condition), and 86 (51.8%) became workers (powerless condition). An independent-samples t-test showed no material differences in age, gender, race, or English proficiency between managers and workers. The managers claimed to feel more influential and in charge, compared to the workers ($M_{Manager} = 5.88$, $SD_{Manager} = 0.952$, $M_{Worker} = 4.14$, $SD_{Worker} = 1.259$, $t(164) = 9.994$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.559$), and thus the power manipulation was deemed effective.

Dishonesty by Type

I ran a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with dishonesty type (clear, ambiguous) as the within-subjects outcome variable, and power condition (powerful, powerless) as the between-subjects predictor variable. There was a main effect of dishonesty type $F(1,164) = 204.777$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .555$, showing that dishonesty was higher in ambiguous trials compared to clear trials (percentage of lying: $M_{Ambiguous} = 39.59$, $SD_{Ambiguous} = 2.450$, $M_{Clear} = 17.75$, $SD_{Clear} = 2.409$). Power did not influence dishonesty $F(1,164) = .036$, $p = .851$, and crucially, the interaction dishonesty type $\times$ power condition did not reach statistical significance $F(1,164) = .2.698$, $p = .102$. Actually, the powerless showed a bigger variance in dishonesty across clear and ambiguous trials, although the difference in variance did not reach statistical significance levels (Figure 5.2).

Participants who cheated in clear trials were also more likely to cheat in ambiguous trials $r(166) = .800$, $p < .001$. Dishonesty was not influenced by participants' age $r(165) = -.103$, $p = .187$ or gender $t(164) = -.092$, $p = .926$.

Figure 5.2

Dishonesty by Type (Ambiguous, Clear) and Power Condition – Study 11

Dishonesty across Time

To explore the effects of time and receiving feedback, a repeated measures ANOVA with trial round (first 50, last 50) as the within-subjects outcome variable, and power condition (powerful, powerless) as the between-subjects predictor variable was carried out. There was a main effect of time $F(1,164) = 15.97$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .089$, showing that participants were more likely to cheat in the second round compared to the first ($M_{First} = 7.529$, $SD_{First} = .691$, $M_{Second} = 9.591$, $SD_{Second} = .823$). Neither power condition $F(1,164) = .019$, $p = .892$, nor the interaction variable time × power condition $F(1,164) = .171$, $p = .680$ was significant. Hence, the propensity to cheat more in the second round was not differentiated across power conditions.

5.3.3. Discussion – Study 11

Study 11 did not find evidence to support the hypothesis that the powerful would cheat more than the powerless in morally ambiguous choices. Since neither a

main effect of power nor an interaction of power and dishonesty type were detected, situationally induced power did not influence dishonesty, regardless of dishonesty type. As the powerful lean towards automatic cognition and goal focus, I had reasoned that they may decide to simply keep clicking right for higher payment. This idea was not supported. A possible explanation is the conflict of multiple goals in the visual perception task. Participants were asked to choose the side of the square that contained more dots. As a result, they had two conflicting goals; to be correct, or to maximize monetary gains. I hypothesized that the self-serving inclinations of the powerful would steer them towards monetary rewards as the primary goal. However, it is possible that as the study was conducted on university premises, participants assigned to the powerful condition may have focused on accuracy over compensation. In addition, the monetary compensation was very small per trial (0.5p or 5p), and may not have motivated participants enough. Two competing goals may have interfered with the power holder's ability to focus on one primary goal, cancelling out the effects of power.

Consistent with previous research (Gino et al., 2010; Gino & Ariely, 2012), higher levels of dishonesty were observed in ambiguous trials, compared to clear trials. It is likely that cheating on morally ambiguous decisions were easier to justify as honest mistakes.

5.4. Study 12: To Palter, or to Tell the Truth

In this next study, it was important to ensure no goals other than self-benefit be present. In Study 12, the morally ambiguous decision was paltering in a negotiation. Paltering is defined as the use of technically true statements with the intention to mislead others (Rogers et al., 2017). Paltering is different from lying by commission which involves actively manufacturing false statements for self-benefit. It also differs

from lying by omission, where one passively fails to bring up information that may be disadvantageous to them. Lying by commission is perceived as the least ethical of the three types of deception, followed by paltering, and then lying by omission (Rogers et al., 2017). Paltering is relatively easy to justify, as it does not involve any untrue verbal statements. Hence individuals engaging in paltering perceive themselves to be 'almost honest'. Nevertheless, Rogers and colleagues (2017) found that people who are on the receiving end of paltering judge the behavior to be as blameworthy as lying by commission.

In this online experiment, power was manipulated, and participants were presented with the choice to either palter, or to tell the truth in a hypothetical negotiation. It tested the hypothesis that the powerful would choose to palter over telling the truth, more frequently that the powerless. In order to gauge participants' tendency to justify their decision to palter, perceptions towards paltering were assessed. In addition, participants' moral disengagement was measured to gauge post-violation rationalization (Shalvi et al., 2015), as individuals can morally disengage after committing unethical deeds (Shu et al., 2011).

5.4.1. Methods - Study 12

Participants

Two hundred and thirty-five adults based in London completed the study through an online recruiting platform (prolific.ac) in exchange for payment. The sample size was pre-determined, assuming $(1 - \beta) = .90$, $\alpha = .05$, odds ratio $= 2.6$ (binomial X distribution assumed). Six participants were excluded for guessing the study objectives correctly, and I report data from the remaining 229 participants (60 Male; $M_{age} = 37.83$ *years*, $SD = 12.429$). A vast majority of participants identified as Caucasian (n = 211, 92.1%) and native English speakers (n = 216, 94.3%).

Procedure

The study was introduced to participants as focusing on writing abilities and styles. Participants wrote about a past experience, as a memory recall activity, before completing a manipulation check. The next phase was allegedly a separate study on negotiations that was part of a pilot study for future research. Participants were presented with a negotiation scenario, and were given the opportunity to palter in order to achieve a positive outcome in the negotiation (Rogers et al., 2017). Specifically, participants imagined they were selling their used car online, and were given information about their hypothetical car. They chose how they would answer to a question from a potential buyer. They had two options; to palter, or to tell the truth. Subsequently, participants specified whose responsibility they thought it was to bring up the engine problems of the car, between the seller and the buyer. Participants indicated how ethical it was to palter to the potential buyer. Participants' moral disengagement was assessed, before they provided some basic demographic information. Lastly, participants gave feedback on their study experience, were checked for suspicion, received a detailed debrief, and gave final consent, before being dismissed.

Measures

Power Manipulation. On the computer, participants wrote a short essay (Galinsky et al., 2003). Half of the participants were asked to write about an experience when they had power over another person (powerful condition), and the other half wrote about when another person had power over them (powerless condition). Participants were asked to write in detail and as vividly as possible. Participants wrote at least 500 characters, for eight minutes or more, to immerse themselves into the experience they were describing.

Manipulation Check. In order to check the effectiveness of the power manipulation, participants indicated how in charge of the situation they felt, and whether they had influence over others' outcomes (1: *Strongly disagree* to 7: *Strongly agree*). The two items were positively correlated $r(229) = .843$, $p < .001$.

Paltering. I assessed participants' tendency to palter over telling the truth. Participants were introduced to a car selling paradigm (Rogers et al., 2017) in which they were trying to sell their used car online. They read two pieces of information about their car, which were both true. The statements were, 'Twice in the last year this car would not start and both times I had to have a mechanic fix it', and 'This car drives very smoothly and is very responsive. Just last week it started up with no problems when the temperature was -10C'. Next, participants received a message from a potential buyer, asking if the car has ever had problems. Participants had to choose one of the two statements above to respond to the buyer. Participants who chose 'Twice in the last year this car would not start and both times I had to have a mechanic fix it' were categorized as honest. The rest, who chose 'This car drives very smoothly and is very responsive. Just last week it started up with no problems when the temperature was -10C', were classified as paltering, and therefore, dishonest. Hence the measure of dishonesty was dichotomous (palter, honest).

Exploratory Variables. To better understand paltering behavior and possible post-violation justifications, after participants chose their response to the potential buyer, perceptions on paltering were assessed. All participants answered the same set of questions regardless of which response they chose (palter, honest). Firstly, participants indicated how much responsibility the seller had to bring up potential engine problems of the car (0: *fully the buyer's responsibility*, to 100: *fully the seller's responsibility*, $M = 59.37$, $SD = 23.261$). Next, participants indicated how honest,

ethical, and deceptive (reverse coded) they thought the paltering response was, on 7-point Likert scales. The three responses were then averaged to create one measure of ethicality perception (M = 3.70, SD = 1.390). Lastly, participants responded to six statements assessing their moral disengagement (6-item α = .77, Shu et al., 2011). To clarify, moral disengagement was assessed *after* participants chose their response to the buyer, therefore was considered a measure of post-violation rationalization, and not a chronic individual trait.

5.4.2. Results - Study 12

Power and Dishonesty

One hundred and eleven (48.5%) participants were assigned to the powerful condition, and the rest (n = 118, 51.5%), to the powerless condition. There were no differences in age or gender between power conditions. Participants assigned to the powerful condition felt more in charge, and believed they controlled others' outcomes, compared to participants assigned to the powerless condition ($M_{Powerful}$ = 5.959, $SD_{Powerful}$ =.927, $M_{Powerless}$ = 1.78, $SD_{Powerless}$ =.953, $t(227)$ = 33.639, $p < .001$, d = 4.445), suggesting effective power manipulation.

One hundred and forty-six (63.8%) participants decided to palter instead of telling the truth. A stepwise binary logistic regression was carried out, with power as the predictor variable, paltering as the outcome variable, and age, gender as control variables in Step 1. Step 2 included exploratory variables; responsibility, ethicality perception, and moral disengagement. Step 1 was not significant $\chi^2(3) = 1.387$, p = .709, and power did not predict paltering $B = .003$, $p = .981$. Paltering was also unrelated to age and gender. Step 2 showed a marked improvement in the model $\chi^2(6)$ = 88.101, $p < .001$, Nagelkerke R^2 = .437. However, power condition still did not influence paltering $B = -.013$, $p = .942$. The improvement in the regression came from

perceptions related to paltering, such as judging paltering to be ethical ($B = 1.246$, $Wald = 33.012$, $p < .001$), higher moral disengagement ($B = .771$, $Wald = 14.409$, $p < .001$), and marginally, attributing the responsibility to the buyer ($B = -.313$, $p = .099$).

Perceptions of Paltering

Individuals who paltered were less likely to attribute the responsibility of bringing up the engine problems of the car to the seller, thereby deflecting the responsibility to the buyer $M_{Palter} = 55.35$, $SD_{Palter} = 23.485$, $M_{Honest} = 66.43$, $SD_{Honest} = 21.209$, $t(227) = -3.554$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.495$. They also judged paltering behavior as more ethical compared to those who had chosen to answer truthfully $M_{Palter} = 4.20$, $SD_{Palter} = 1.286$, $M_{Honest} = 2.81$, $SD_{Honest} = 1.091$, $t(227) = 8.329$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.166$. Finally, participants who paltered scored higher on moral disengagement $M_{Palter} = 3.96$, $SD_{Palter} = .822$, $M_{Honest} = 3.35$, $SD_{Honest} = .705$, $t(227) = 5.662$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.797$. As these perceptions were assessed after participants chose their response to the potential car buyer, they could serve as self-justifications after the act of paltering. However, as baseline measures were not taken, I cannot rule out the possibility that this is a display of predispositions influencing ethical conduct. No difference in perceptions was detected across power conditions.

5.4.3. Discussion – Study 12

More participants (63.8%) chose to palter rather than be honest, demonstrating that paltering is a type of dishonesty with a low barrier to entry. Those who paltered had a more lenient view of the behavior, displaying post behavior rationalisation. However, power did not influence paltering behavior, and the study hypothesis was not supported. In addition, feelings of power did not lead to more lenient perceptions

on paltering compared to feelings of powerlessness. It seems most probable that power does not affect morally ambiguous dishonesty.

Nevertheless, in Study 12, participants were forced to choose between paltering and telling the truth. The effect size may have been smaller than assumed a-priori during power analysis, and the sample size may have been insufficient to detect power level differences on a binary response, which can be less reliable. Furthermore, in Studies 11 and 12, power was experimentally manipulated. Although both studies employed well validated manipulations of power, it is possible that situationally induced, and therefore temporary, feelings of power may not be robust enough to influence paltering behavior. The following study addresses these limitations.

5.5. Study 13: Paltering, Lying, and Telling the Truth

In the final study in this chapter, I continue to examine the effect of power on dishonesty. As in Study 12, dishonesty was assessed with the framework of selling a used car. In addition to paltering and telling the truth, a third possible response to potential buyers of the car was introduced. Participants could lie by commission, which involves making up untrue statements and communicating them. To enable the fine-grained detection of opinions and attitudes, participants indicated their likelihood of engaging in each of the three behaviors on Likert scales, and not as a forced choice between possible responses. Furthermore, in Study 13, the chronic sense of power was assessed. The sense of power is a subjective and relatively stable state (Anderson et al., 2012) that can mediate the effects of objective power, such as randomly assigned dyadic power (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002). Hence the sense of power may be a more direct predictor of behavior compared to situationally induced, temporary power.

This correlational study tested the hypothesis that higher sense of power is positively associated with relaxed attitudes towards paltering behavior. In contrast, sense of power would not be associated with telling the truth, or lying by commission.

That is, the powerful would cheat more than the powerless only in morally ambiguous, easy to justify situations such as paltering. In addition, it also examined whether the likelihood of paltering would be higher than the likelihood of lying by commission. As in Study 12, attitudes toward paltering were gauged, through perceptions of ethicality and responsibility.

As power was naturally assessed, I controlled for basic demographic factors and predispositions that could be correlated with subjective power. Specifically, I considered predispositions associated with social comparisons and conscientiousness. Moral disengagement and individualism-collectivism were assessed for this purpose, and also as exploratory variables that could independently affect paltering and lying by commission. Whereas in Study 12 moral disengagement was employed as a measure of post-violation justification, in Study 13 it was deemed a dispositional measure and assessed days before participants were introduced to the car selling paradigm.

5.5.1. Methods - Study 13

Participants

One hundred and sixty-eight adults based in London completed the study online (prolific.ac) for monetary compensation. The sample size was pre-determined, assuming $(1 - \beta) = .90$, $\alpha = .05$, effect size $f^2 = .07$. No one correctly guessed the study aims, and I report data from all 168 participants (43 Male; $M_{age} = 36.15$ *years*, $SD = 11.377$). A vast majority of participants identified as Caucasian (n = 155, 92.3%).

Procedure

The study was conducted over two separate phases. Phase 1 was introduced as a study on opinions on social relationships. Participants answered questions measuring their sense of power, moral disengagement, and individualism-collectivism, before

filling out basic demographic information. Phase 2 occurred 7-15 days later.

Participants who had completed phase 1 were invited to take part in a follow-up study

on decision making styles. In phase 2, participants were presented with the car selling

paradigm. Participants indicated their likelihood of responding to potential buyers in

three different ways (paltering, telling the truth, lying by commission). As in Study

12, participants specified the relative responsibility of the seller to raise the engine

problems of the car, before answering questions on how ethical they judged the

paltering response to be. In order to make the car selling experience immersive and to

deter participants from guessing the study aims, a number of filler questions related to

selling cars online were inserted throughout phase 2. Subsequently, participants

provided written feedback on their study experience, and were checked for suspicion,

before being debriefed and giving final consent.

Measures

   Sense of Power. In phase 1, participants completed the sense of power scale

(Anderson et al., 2012), where they indicated their agreement to statements such as 'I

can get others to do what I want', and 'My wishes do not carry much weight (reverse

coded)' (1: *Strongly disagree* to 7: *Strongly agree*, 8-item α = .91).

   Dishonesty. In phase 2, participants were introduced to the same car selling

paradigm used in Study 12 (Rogers et al., 2017). Participants indicated how likely it is

that they will respond to a potential buyer of the car, on 7-point Likert scales (1: *Very*

unlikely to 7: *Very likely*). Participants were provided with three possible responses.

Firstly, participants answered how likely it is that they will respond 'This car drives

very smoothly and is very responsive. Just last week it started up with no problems

when the temperature was -10C' (paltering, dishonest). Next, they indicated their

likelihood of answering 'Twice in the last year this car would not start and both times

I had to have a mechanic fix it' (truth, honest). Finally, participants answered how likely it is that they will respond 'This car has had no problems' (lying by commission, dishonest). For each participant, a likelihood score per response (paltering, honest, and lying) was derived.

Control Variables. In phase 1, along with the sense of power, participants' dispositional moral disengagement and individualism-collectivism were assessed as control variables, to be able to distinguish the unique effects of subjective power. Levels of moral disengagement was assessed using the same scale from Study 12 (6-item $\alpha = .72$, Shu et al., 2011). Moral disengagement also allows for an examination of participants' perception of paltering before behavior. In addition, individualism-collectivism measured the degree to which participants viewed themselves as discrete from their group. Items include 'My personal identity, independent of others, is very important to me' and 'Family members should stick together, no matter what sacrifices are required (reverse coded)' (16-item $\alpha = .63$, Triandis & Gelfand, 1998).

Exploratory Variables. As in Study 12, perceptions on paltering was evaluated. Participants specified how much the seller was responsible for raising any potential engine problems of the car (0: *not the seller's responsibility*, to 100: *fully the seller's responsibility*, $M = 63.83$, $SD = 26.427$). Participants judged how honest, ethical, and deceptive (reverse coded) they considered the paltering response to be ($M = 4.19$, $SD = 1.337$).

5.5.2. Results - Study 13

Dishonesty

Among the three possible responses that were displayed, participants' likelihood of engaging in paltering was the highest ($M = 4.86$, $SD = 1.766$), followed

by telling the truth ($M = 3.21$, $SD = 1.772$), and lying by commission ($M = 2.54$, $SD = 1.791$). Paired samples t-tests showed the differences in means to be statistically significant across all pairs (Palter-True: $t(167) = 2.049$, $p < .001$, True-Lie: $t(167) = 3.079$, $p < .001$, Lie-Palter: $t(167) = -2.591$, $p < .001$).

Next, I examined the influence of sense of power on each possible response. A stepwise multiple linear regression, with sense of power as the predictor, paltering as the outcome variable, and age, gender as control variables (Step 1, $F(3,164) = 2.294$, $p = .080$) showed that contrary to hypothesis, sense of power ($B = -.126$, $p = .359$) was unrelated to paltering. Adding moral disengagement and individualism in Step 2 led to an improvement in the model fit (sig $F\Delta = .021$, $F(5,162) = 3.004$, $p = .013$, Adjusted $R^2 = .057$). However, this was not driven by the sense of power ($B = -.156$, $p = .251$). Rather, paltering was influenced by higher moral disengagement ($B = .400$, $p = .006$, $CI_{95\%}$ [.114, .686]), and being male ($B = .402$, $p = .013$, $CI_{95\%}$ [.085, .719]).

An identical stepwise linear regression, but with telling the truth as the outcome variable, was not significant in either step (Step 2: $F(5,164) = 1.130$, $p = .346$), and none of the input variable approached statistical significance. Lastly, lying by commission (Step 2: $F(5,164) = 1.771$, $p = .122$) was influenced by being male ($B = .447$, $p = .008$, $CI_{95\%}$[.119, .774]), but not sense of power or other control variables.

Male participants scored higher on sense of power ($M_{Male} = 4.63$, $SD_{Male} = 1.027$, $M_{NotMale} = 4.26$, $SD_{NotMale} = 1.014$, $t(166) = 2.087$, $p = .038$, $d = 0.363$). Sense of power was neither correlated with moral disengagement $r(168) = .096$, $p = .217$, nor individualism-collectivism $r(168) = .049$, $p = .531$.

Perceptions on Paltering

Higher likelihood of engaging in paltering was associated with attributing the responsibility of bringing up the engine problems of the car to the buyer $r(168) = -.263, p < .001$. It was also linked to judging paltering to be more ethical $r(168) = .467, p < .001$. Participants who had lenient views on paltering had lenient views on lying by commission $r(168) = .481, p < .001$. However, paltering was only marginally related to attitudes towards telling the truth $r(168) = -.134, p < .084$. This contrasts with lying by commission, which was negatively correlated to telling the truth $r(168) = -.263, p < .001$ (Table 5.1). This demonstrates the ambiguous moral nature of paltering, as it was correlated with lying, but not (negatively) correlated with telling the truth.

Table 5.1

Paltering and Perceptions, Predispositions – Study 13

		Truth	Lie	Seller's Responsibility	Ethicality Judgement	Moral Disengagement	Individualism
Palter	Pearson Correlation	-.134	.481**	-.263**	.467**	.189*	.011
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.084	.000	.001	.000	.014	.882
	N	168	168	168	168	168	168
Truth	Pearson Correlation		-.263**	.250**	-.144	-.035	-.151
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.001	.001	.063	.653	.051
	N		168	168	168	168	168
Lie	Pearson Correlation			-.306**	.274**	.080	.041
	Sig. (2-tailed)			.000	.000	.305	.594
	N			168	168	168	168
Seller's Responsibility	Pearson Correlation				-.114	-.177*	-.114
	Sig. (2-tailed)				.143	.022	.142
	N				168	168	168
Ethicality Judgement	Pearson Correlation					.173*	-.019
	Sig. (2-tailed)					.025	.803
	N					168	168
Moral Disengagement	Pearson Correlation						.321**
	Sig. (2-tailed)						.000
	N						168

Exploratory Analysis

I examined the relationship between the exploratory variables, moral disengagement and individualism-collectivism on paltering. Firstly, a stepwise multiple linear regression with moral disengagement as the predictor, paltering as the outcome variable, and age, gender as control variables (Step 1: $F(3,164) = 4.019$, $p = .009$, Adjusted $R^2 = .051$) showed that higher moral disengagement ($B = .336$, $p = .017$, $CI_{95\%}$ [.061, .610]) was associated with higher instances of paltering. Adding the interaction variable sense of power × moral disengagement did not lead to an improvement in the model (Step 2: sig $F\varDelta = .609$, $F(4,163) = 3.066$, $p = .018$, Adjusted $R^2 = .047$), and the interaction was not significant ($B = -.066$, $p = .609$).

Secondly, a stepwise multiple linear regression with individualism-collectivism as the predictor, paltering as the outcome variable, and age, gender as control variables was conducted (Step 1). In Step 2, the interaction between sense of power × individualism-collectivism was added. Individualism-collectivism was unrelated to paltering tendencies (Step 2: $F(4,163) = 1.615$, $p = .173$, $B = -.084$, $p = .562$), as well as the interaction variable ($B = .058$, $p = .639$).

5.5.3. Discussion - Study 13

The current study identified initial evidence showing paltering as the middle ground between telling the truth and lying by commission, and as the most favoured choice of action among participants. This demonstrates that morally ambiguous responses such as paltering are preferred, as individuals do not like to lie outright, but still accrue self-advantages (e.g., sell their car). Lenient ethicality perceptions towards paltering was associated with higher likelihood of engaging in paltering behavior, displaying that ease of justification influences ethical behavior.

Higher sense of power did not predict increased likelihood of paltering, and the study hypothesis was not supported. Moreover, sense of power did not influence the tendency to tell the truth, or lie by commission, and therefore sense of power was not implicated in attitudes towards (un)ethical conduct. Nevertheless, sense of power was higher among males who were also more open to paltering, and lying by commission. Exploratory findings suggested that moral disengagement may predict paltering, but not lying by commission, or telling the truth. Subjective power was unrelated to moral disengagement (Table 5.1).

5.6. General Discussion

In this chapter, I examined the role of power on morally ambiguous misconduct. In previous studies, power was inconsistently associated with dishonesty (Chapter 2), and literature remains inconclusive (Lammers et al., 2015). Moreover, there is a long line of research that argue that it is the interaction of power and individual differences that cause undesirable behavior, rather than main effects (Chen et al., 2001; Sassenberg et al., 2014). This was not supported for dominance (Chapter 2, Chapter 4). Nevertheless, I reasoned that since the powerful are oriented towards a primary goal (Guinote, 2008) that is frequently self-beneficial (Keltner et al., 2010, pp. 190-192), and since the powerful tend to engage in automatic cognition and disinhibited action (Galinsky et al., 2003; Keltner et al., 2003), they would more easily engage in morally ambiguous behavior compared to the powerless. That is, morally ambiguous decisions would be accessible to the powerful, more so than the powerless, as justifiability would fit well with automatic thought and uninhibited behavior. However, across three studies (Studies 11, 12, 13), the hypothesis was not supported, and power did not influence a higher take up of morally ambiguous behavior. These results suggest that making dishonesty very easy, such as by making the choice

morally ambiguous, does not trigger power's tendency to take action in an automatic manner.

Typically, powerful individuals enjoy resources and influence that the powerless do not have. They are less constrained in their choices and less restricted by social norms (French Jr & Raven, 1959). Indeed, norm breakers are perceived to be powerful by others (Van Kleef et al., 2011), and power is even afforded to those who break rules (Van Kleef et al., 2012). Leaders who take bold action are viewed as capable (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011). It is conceivable that the powerful are fearless, and emboldened to take whichever action that best serves their goals, with a disregard for social norms. It is therefore possible that the morally ambiguous choices presented in this chapter did not entice the powerful any more than the morally clear choices. In Study 11, it was actually the powerless who cheated more in ambiguous decisions and showed a bigger sensitivity to dishonesty type, although this tendency did not reach statistical significance.

Consistent with past research (Gino, Ayal et al., 2009), morally ambiguous behavior was preferred over clearly immoral behavior (Studies 11, 13), or being honest (Studies 12, 13). Lenient perceptions towards paltering behavior were associated with engaging in it. It is noteworthy that moral disengagement was not associated with lying by commission (Study 13). A possible explanation could be that lying by commission requires a separate cognitive mechanism to cross the bridge of unjustifiable dishonesty. It is also plausible that the sample size was not large enough to detect difference in attitudes towards lying by commission, as the tendency to admit to engaging in such unethical behavior can be very low. Not forming the study hypotheses, moral disengagement was closely aligned with paltering, both as post-violation justification (Study 12), and as an individual difference (Study 13). These

observations regarding moral disengagement and paltering remain exploratory and further research examining them in detail would be desirable.

Study 11 presented a conflict of goals, between accuracy and maximizing profit in the visual task. As a result, some power holders may have decided to focus on accuracy, while others, on profitability. In subsequent studies participants were faced with the choice of maintaining a positive self-view by being honest, or engaging in dishonesty to accrue advantages. Nevertheless, it remains possible that the incentives offered for dishonesty (Study 11: increase in payment, Studies 12, 13: a favourable outcome in a hypothetical negotiation) did not motivate participants differentially across power levels. Indeed, power is understood to boost performance only in high pressure negotiations, when the powerful are highly motivated (Kang et al., 2015). After Studies 11 and 12 failed to find evidence supporting the study hypotheses, I explored the possibility that experimentally induced feelings of power may not be ingrained enough to influence dishonesty. Relatively chronic subjective power was assessed in Study 13, however the main hypothesis was still not supported.

Perhaps the most plausible explanation is that power differences do not manifest in altered behavior in ethical behavior, and that this includes morally ambiguous behavior. Whereas this study made it evident that dishonesty is more likely in morally ambiguous situations compared to clearly immoral ones, I found no evidence to support the notion that this tendency is differentially activated by power. That is, moral ambiguity is a facilitator of dishonesty that may not motivate the powerful any more than the powerless. The powerful may be able to take whichever action that best serves their goals. In that case, the powerful would not feel the need to justify their questionable behavior. This suggests that to identify situations where the powerful may be more dishonest, a careful consideration of the motivational triggers

that are unique to the experience of power is key. The following chapter addresses this point.

Chapter 6. Gain/Loss Frames Moderate Power and Dishonesty[18]

6.1. Abstract

Prior research on power abuse has predominantly focused on gain contexts. The powerful are no strangers to loss contexts, yet research on the powerful facing potential losses remain limited. In this chapter, I examine dishonesty across power levels not only motivated by potential gains, but also by the threat of losses. Power flexibly orients individuals' attention and subsequent behavior to best suit the goals of the power holder (the situated focus theory of power, Guinote, 2007). When facing a potential gain, the powerful should be more motivated to cheat compared to the powerless, in order to attain these gains. Loss aversion is generally associated with powerlessness, compared to having power. Nonetheless, I argue that when facing a potential loss, the powerful should be able to flexibly activate loss aversion, in order to protect themselves. The powerless should experience a chronic activation of loss aversion. As a result, differences in dishonesty by power levels should only occur under gain frames, and not under loss frames. I test this through one study (N = 321), where natural power was assessed, and frame was experimentally manipulated. The findings suggest that in order to deepen the understanding of when power corrupts, an examination of the contextual frame plays a role.

Keywords: power, framing, dishonesty, goals, loss aversion

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6.2. Introduction

Transparency International defines corruption as 'The abuse of entrusted power for private gain' (Pope, 2000), demonstrating that corruption is often a by-product and consequence of social power (Bendahan et al., 2015; Giurge et al., 2019). Plenty of evidence documents a linear effect of power, whereby the acquisition of power leads to a deterioration in moral standards (Case & Maner, 2015; Foulk et al., 2018; see also Kipnis, 1972). Power shifts individuals to focus on self-serving goals, and limits their willingness to adhere to social norms (Dubois et al., 2015; Galinsky et al., 2006). They are given greater discretion, autonomy, and possess the resources and ability that makes corruption possible should they decide to engage in it. However, such enquiries often only focus on the power holder's pursuit of gains and positive outcomes (money, influence, sex). Analogous to looking at only one side of a coin, this does not take into account the full range of pursuits the powerful encounter. This could be one of the reasons that can explain why the tendency for power to corrupt is inconsistent, especially in empirical studies (Foulk et al., 2020; Fleischmann et al., 2019).

While there are studies of power abuse focusing on individual differences, studies where the role of the person is absent or nuanced also exist (Foulk et al., 2020; Scholl et al., 2018). In other studies, situational contexts play a role in the ethical conduct of the powerful (Lammers et al., 2011; Fitzgerald et al., 1997). Crucially, past research predominantly focuses on contexts associated with gains (Bargh et al., 1995; Lammers et al., 2011). Whether power affects dishonesty in the same manner when losses are at stake is much less understood. In this chapter, I investigate the links between power and dishonesty, in the presence of gains (pursuit of a positive outcome), as well as losses (avoidance of negative outcome). By examining the frame

of losses, I consider both sides of the coin (gain, loss frames), and motivational pathways across power levels. Such endeavour may enable a better prediction of when power leads to dishonesty.

Based on the situated focus theory of power (Guinote, 2007a; 2010), I argue that the powerful can be flexibly motivated to attain gains or avoid losses, depending on what the situation demands. Past research has shown that the powerless are loss averse (Inesi, 2010; Keltner et al., 2003; Smith et al., 2008; Steidle et al., 2013), and possess less flexibility to respond to situational cues, compared to the powerful.

6.2.1. Power and Gain/Loss Frames

Power can stimulate a part of the self that is relevant to the situation (Guinote, 2007c), triggering individuals to engage in the best strategy towards goal attainment (Guinote & Chen, 2017). That is, the powerful are flexible. For instance, depending on the given context, the powerful can pursue self-serving goals as well as pro-social goals (Galinsky et al., 2003; Guinote, 2008). Goals can be chronically or situationally triggered. Chronic goals would be closely linked to predispositions, while situationally triggered goals would be linked to the specific context, such as a given task. Both chronically and temporarily accessible constructs can grab the attention of powerful individuals (Guinote et al., 2012), and dictate subsequent behavior.

Pro-social individuals with power were more willing to share limited resources compared to the powerless. At the same time, power holders who were pro-self were less willing to share, compared to their powerless counterparts, demonstrating power's tendency to amplify existing predispositions. However, and interestingly, this tendency was no longer evident when the situation called for strategies that went against the power holder's predispositions. This shows that the powerful are able to

flexibly override their predispositions, and access alternative constructs depending on the goals at hand.

Power has been conceptually linked to the activation of the behavioral approach system (BAS; Gray, 1987; Keltner et al., 2003; Smith & Bargh, 2008), which implies focusing on opportunities, rewards and gains. Nevertheless, this proclivity may occur only when gains are salient. The dynamic environment of organizations necessitates the powerful to be attentive to potential setbacks and losses, as well as breakthroughs and gains. Previous research showing the adverse effects of power when the powerful are under threat (e.g., legitimacy, Lammers, 2009; competence and ego, Fast & Chen, 2009) suggest that the powerful adapt and react to threats. Therefore, power holders seem to be able to pursue gains (chronically accessible) and avoid losses (temporarily accessible), depending on the goals triggered by the context.

Framing influences how individuals make choices under uncertainty. Generally, individuals assign more value to avoiding losses compared to acquiring an equivalent unit of gains. This propensity is called loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). As a result, framing influences dishonesty in an asymmetric manner (Grolleau et al., 2016; Kern & Chugh, 2009). That is, people cheat more to avoid a negative outcome compared to when faced with possible gains. For example, the motivation to avoid a negative outcome (avoidance goal) predicted academic cheating among students, while the motivation to obtain a positive outcome (approach goal) did not (Niiya et al., 2008). This demonstrates that loss aversion applies to dishonesty. Furthermore, among men (a group associated with power), cheating was heightened under approach goals, which contributed to the overall effect of gender on academic cheating (Niiya et al., 2008).

6.2.2. Frame Preferences by Power

Gain Focus

The powerful are highly sensitive to gains, wins, and rewards (Keltner et al., 2003), and more readily take uninhibited action (Galinsky et al., 2003). Power increases optimism in risk perception, leading to increased risk taking (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002). Powerful individuals are oriented towards positive goals and opportunities compared to the powerless (Guinote, 2007c; 2017; Schmid et al., 2015). For instance, in a taste study, power holders ate more chocolate (appetizing food), and ate less radishes (unappetizing food) compared to their powerless counterparts (Guinote, 2010). It can be argued that goals framed as gains are a better chronic fit for the powerful, because they frequently encounter and seek opportunities for gains compared to the powerless. This suggests that under gain frames the powerful may be motivated towards goal attainment, and consequently more dishonest than the powerless (Table 6.1).

Loss Aversion

Under uncertainty, where multiple outcomes are possible (e.g., Corr & McNaughton, 2012), potential losses often appear larger than gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Such aversion to losses has been documented across numerous contexts (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Kahneman et al., 1990). As mentioned above, loss aversion influences ethical behavior (Grolleau et al., 2016). For instance, people were more likely to be dishonest in order to avoid a negative status change (loss frame), compared to when trying to realise a positive status change (gain frame) (Pettit et al., 2016). In a similar vein, when people were faced with potentially losing money for every puzzle they failed to solve, instances of lying about their performance increased, compared to when one could earn money for every puzzles they

successfully solved (Cameron & Monin, 2008). Both findings demonstrate that when a potential outcome is framed in loss terms rather than gain terms, the likelihood of dishonesty rises (Kern & Chugh, 2009; Schindler & Pfattheicher, 2017).

Since the powerless often lack resources or influence, they are more likely than the powerful to be exposed to challenges and constraints. The powerless are often met with threats and punishments, negative affect, and behavioural inhibition, all of which are associated with loss aversion (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Keltner et al., 2003; but see Inesi, 2010[19]). In addition, continued exposure to negative environmental cues could activate a chronic sense of avoidance motivation among the powerless. Hence, powerless individuals should be highly motivated to achieve their goals in a loss frame, as loss frames better fit the goals that they frequently encounter, and their chronic sense of loss aversion.

Whereas the link between powerlessness and sensitivity to threats is well established (Keltner et al., 2003), how increased power influences loss aversion is less straightforward, and remains an under-researched area. Having power can reduce the anticipated threat of a potential negative outcome, and lead to a decrease in loss aversion (Inesi, 2010), suggesting that the powerful may not be chronically loss-averse. However, loss aversion among the powerful is not hard to observe, in the face of objective or subjective threats (Deng et al., 2018; see also Bugental, 2010). For example, CEOs make conservative and defensive decisions when faced with organizational change (inertia, Ryan, 2016; keeping the status quo, Maner et al., 2007). It remains possible that the link between having power and avoidance motivation, a motivational state contributing to loss aversion, is not as strong as the

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[19] No increase in loss aversion among the powerless was observed compared to control (neutral power) condition (Inesi, 2010).

link between having power and approach motivation (Smith & Bargh, 2008). This makes it difficult to argue whether the powerful may be just as motivated to avoid losses as the powerless, when losses are salient.

In the presence of such mixed evidence, the situated focus theory of power (Guinote, 2007a) has examined the effects of power in response to the context at hand. Power enables the individual to flexibly access a part of themselves that is most relevant to the situation (Guinote & Chen, 2017), motivating individuals towards goal attainment. Individuals who are empowered are able to flexibly strategize their attention and behavior towards desired end states (e.g., social attention, Overbeck & Park, 2006). The pursuit of gains may be typically and chronically accessible for the powerful (Keltner et al., 2003). However, avoidance of losses could also become accessible for the powerful when they are faced with an environment that requires them to. Loss aversion in this case would be temporarily accessible for the powerful. For instance, bank executives with experience dealing with financial crises were more conservative and risk averse in business decisions, compared to their peers who did not have such experience (Ahmed et al., 2019).

In debating the relationship between having power and loss aversion, it is important to point out that the outcome behavior of the present chapter is dishonesty. Dishonesty is a motivated behavior, as it involves the violation of social norms (Murdock et al., 2001; Van Yperen et al., 2011) to engage in behavior that is generally socially undesirable. The behavior of the powerful are guided by their primary goals (Guinote, 2008). As a result, if dishonesty is necessary for goal attainment, the powerful would not miss the opportunity, regardless of whether the decision entails accessing a chronic or less chronic construct. Therefore, I argue that the powerful can be as loss averse as the powerless, in their engagement of dishonest behavior (Table

6.1). Since the powerful have more control over resources and often find themselves exposed to positive opportunities, they may frequently find themselves striving for gains. Nevertheless, I argue that the powerful can adapt to exhibit loss aversion when it is contextually relevant (e.g., maximizing available time), resulting in as much loss aversion as the powerless.

Table 6.1.

Interaction of Power and Frame on Accessible Goals and Dishonesty – Study 14

	Powerful		Powerless
Gain	Chronically accessible goal	> Powerful more dishonest than powerless	Chronically *in*accessible goal
Loss	Situationally and temporarily accessible goal	= No difference	Chronically accessible goal

6.3. Study 14: Puzzle Performance in Gain/Loss Frames

In Study 14, I tested the hypothesis that powerful individuals will be more dishonest than powerless individuals in the pursuit of gains, but not in the pursuit of losses. This would occur because the powerful are more motivated than the powerless to attain gains. Such differences in dishonesty between power levels would not transpire when losses are salient, because the powerful and the powerless should be equally motivated to avoid losses.

Time, which is a universally valued and limited resource (Schwartz, 1974), was framed in gain terms (saving time) or loss terms (losing time). I recruited

participants through two separate studies. Participants' actual professional positions functioned as a proxy of power. All participants were provided with the opportunity to be dishonest, but the opportunity to be dishonest was presented differently between participants. Half of the participants could cheat in order to save time (gain frame), and the other could cheat in order to avoid having to spend additional time (loss frame). As power was not manipulated, demographic variables potentially associated with naturally occurring power positions were assessed to control for their influence.

6.3.1 Methods

Participants

Four hundred and seventeen adults in the U.K. who were employed participated in the study. A target of 75 participants per condition in this 2 (Power: High, Low) $\times$2 (Frame: Gain, Loss) between-subjects study was pre-determined using power analysis, assuming $(1 - \beta) = .90$, $\alpha = .05$, and effect size $f = .20$. Participants were paid for taking part. They were recruited through two separate study links on an online recruiting platform (www.prolific.ac), based on their answers to a standard pre-screening question related to participants' professional seniority. When signing up to the recruiting platform, all participants had answered a list of pre-screening questions set up by the online platform. For the powerful condition, only employed adults who had responded "yes" to 'At work, do you have any supervisory responsibilities? In other words, do you have the authority to give instructions to subordinates?' were eligible to participate. Those who had answered "no" were invited to participate in the powerless condition study.

As participants' professional position could have changed since they completed the set of pre-screening questions, all participants were asked the same question again at the beginning of the study. Any participant whose up-to-date

professional position no longer fitted the study condition were excluded (n = 86). Responses from ten further participants were excluded for guessing the study objectives correctly. As such, I report data from the remaining 321 participants (118 male; M_{age} = 38.67 years, *SD* = 10.603). Most of the participants were Caucasian (90.3%), and native English speakers (91.6%). 65.4% had an undergraduate degree or higher.

Procedures

After being checked that their up-to-date professional position fitted with the power condition, participants were introduced to a study allegedly on executive's problem-solving skills. Participants were given visual puzzles to solve (Pulfrey & Butera, 2013). Half of the participants were told of the benefits of success (gain frame), while the other half were told of the undesirable consequences of failure (loss frame) in this puzzle paradigm. The goal of either frame could only be achieved through dishonest reporting, but participants were not made aware of this. Participants were given four minutes to solve and self-report their performance. After reporting their puzzle scores, participants reported their feelings of approach and inhibition. Participants provided some basic demographic information, before being checked for suspicion. Subsequently, all participants received a detailed debrief, and gave final consent.

Measures

Power. To remind participants of their actual professional power, participants in the powerful condition were asked to give examples of exercising their power at work, while those in the powerless condition wrote examples of their superior's power being exercised on them. Two additional measures of participants' professional power was gathered to validate participants' felt power across power conditions. First was by

participants indicating their position in an organigram (1: *top* to 7: *bottom of the organization*). Secondly, they reported the degree to which they felt powerful at work, on 7-point Likert scales (2-item α = .76, Appendix 4). The two measures of professional power were correlated $r(321) = -.546$, $p < .001$, and those who felt powerful at work were more likely to view themselves as being higher up in the organigram. As expected, compared to those in the powerless condition, participants in the powerful condition judged themselves to be higher in the organigram ($M_{Power} = 3.56$, $SD_{Power} = 1.318$, $M_{Powerless} = 5.07$, $SD_{Powerless} = 1.348$, $t(319) = -10.114$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.133$). They also felt more powerful at work ($M_{Power} = 5.33$, $SD_{Power} = 1.082$, $M_{Powerless} = 3.70$, $SD_{Powerless} = 1.285$, $t(319) = 12.133$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.372$).

Frame and Dishonesty. Dishonesty was measured by the self-reporting of puzzle performance, used in Study 4 (Chapter 2). Participants had four minutes to solve six puzzles. Only three puzzles were solvable, but participants were given the impressions that all six were (Pulfrey & Butera, 2013), creating opportunities to be dishonest. Frame was manipulated under the paradigm of gaining or losing time. Participants assigned to the gain frame condition were informed that they would take two tests. In test 1, if they succeed in solving four or more puzzles, they would automatically skip test 2 that would take 11 minutes and finish early. Those assigned to the loss frame condition found out that they would take one test. If they failed to solve four or more puzzles, they would be required to take an additional test that would take 11 minutes (Flynn et al., 1987). In fact, the 11-minute test did not exist, but was set up as a cover story to motivate participants to cheat, by claiming they solved four or more puzzles (Appendix 4). After four minutes, all participants self-reported the number of puzzles they solved. Participants could inflate their performance to gain time or to avoid losing time. The measure of dishonesty was

dichotomous, that is, those who reported to have solved four or more puzzles were classified as dishonest, and the remaining, honest.

Approach and Inhibition. As an exploratory mediator that may explain the pathways between power and dishonesty across gain/loss frames, I assessed participants' activation of approach and inhibition. Specifically, I examined whether power holders' tendency to lie under gain frame could be explained by their heightened sense of the Behavioral Activation System (BAS), or depressed Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS). The 20-item behavioral inhibition and behavioral activation scale was used. Seven items measured BIS, while 13 items measured BAS, both on 5-point Likert scales (Carver & White, 1994). BIS measures include statements such as, 'I worry about making mistakes' and 'I have very few fears compared to my friends' (reverse coded). BAS measures include, 'If I see a chance to get something I want, I move on it right away' and 'I'm always willing to try something new if I think it will be fun' (1: *Strongly disagree*, to 5: *Strongly agree*). This measure was presented to participants after they had indicated the number of puzzles they solved.

Control Variables. As naturally occurring power according to participants' actual professional power was gathered, I controlled for demographic variables that could potentially coincide with these power levels (age, gender, and education level).

6.3.2. Results

One hundred and forty-six (45.5%) participants completed the powerful condition study, while the rest (n = 175, 54.5%) completed the powerless condition study[20]. Participants in the powerful condition were more likely to be male $\chi^2(1) =$

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[20] Powerful & Gain condition: 20.9% (n = 67), Powerful & Loss condition: 24.6% (n = 79), Powerless & Gain condition: 26.5% (n= 85), Powerless & Loss condition: 28.0% (n = 90).

6.938, $p = .008$, and received higher education $t(319) = 2.681$, $p = .008$. There was no difference in age $t(319) = 1.213$, $p = .226$.

Between participants assigned to the gain frame (n = 152) and those assigned to the loss frame (n = 169), there were no statistical differences in their demographic variables, or work power, suggesting random assignment.

Dishonesty

In the self-report of number of puzzles solved, 183 participants (57.0%) were classified as honest (solved three or less). A stepwise binary logistic regression tested the study hypotheses. In Step 1, the predictor variable power condition, with control variables age, gender, and education were regressed against dishonesty. Frame (gain, loss) was added in Step 2. Finally, the key interaction variable power × frame was included in Step 3. Step 1 was statistically significant $\chi^2(4) = 12.534$, $p = .014$, demonstrating that the powerful were more likely to be dishonest ($B = .248$, *Wald* = 4.336, $p = .037$), controlling for education ($B = -.260$, *Wald* = 4.691, $p = .030$), gender ($B = -.200$, $p = .101$), and age ($B = -.021$, $p = .060$). Step 2 yielded a significant improvement to the model $\chi^2(5) = 29.015$, $p < .001$. A main effect of frame was detected, whereby participants were more likely to lie when losses were salient, compared to when gains were salient ($B = -.479$, *Wald* = 15.890, $p < .001$). Power remained a predictor of dishonesty ($B = .254$, *Wald* = 4.261, $p = .039$). Importantly, in Step 3 $\chi^2(6) = 33.826$, $p < .001$, the interaction variable power × frame was positively associated with dishonesty ($B = .263$, *Wald* = 4.757, $p = .029$, Figure 6.1). The interaction showed that differences in dishonesty between the powerful and the powerless only occurred under gains frame $\chi^2(4) = 11.938$, $p = .018$, with the powerful engaging in more dishonesty compared to the powerless ($B = .574$, $p = .003$). Under loss frame $\chi^2(4) = 8.808$, $p = .066$, no difference in dishonesty was detected between

the powerful, and powerless participants ($B = .028$, $p = .862$). This demonstrates that the powerful are only disproportionately more dishonest than the powerless when goals are framed as gains. Main effects of power ($B = .291$, $Wald = 5.423$, $p = .020$) and frame ($B = -.470$, $Wald = 14.995$, $p < .001$) remained[21].

Figure 6.1.

Dishonesty by Power and Frame – Study 14

Note. Percentage of participants who were classified as dishonest under each 2x2 condition. Powerful participants were more likely to be dishonest compared to powerless participants under gain frame. Under loss frame, no material differences were detected.

Loss Aversion

Powerless participants $\chi^2(4) = 26.200$, $p < .001$ were more dishonest under loss frame compared to gain frame ($B = -.752$, $Wald = 18.493$, $p < .001$), displaying loss aversion. Powerful participants did not materially differentiate between frames in their dishonesty $\chi^2(4) = 6.271$, $p = .180$, frame: $B = -.200$, $p = .240$. Powerful participants

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[21] Without control variables (age, gender, and education), the binary logistic regression (step 3) was significant $\chi(3) = 21.395$, $p < .001$. Power × frame ($B = .237$, $p = .044$) and frame ($B = -.441$, $p < .001$) predicted dishonesty, but not power ($B = .186$, $p = .114$).

were motivated to gain time, as well as to avoid spending additional time, and were dishonest across frames to maximize the time available to them.

Approach and Inhibition

BAS. In order to examine the mediating role of BAS, I first ran a multiple linear regression with power, frame, and their interaction power × frame as inputs, age, gender, and education as control variables, and BAS as the outcome variable. This was statistically significant $F(6,314) = 3.020$, $p = .007$. Having power at work was linked to heightened BAS ($B = .142$, $p = .031$). Frame ($B = .057$, $p = .302$) and the interaction variable ($B = .056$, $p = .315$) were unrelated to BAS. At the same time, BAS was associated with increased dishonesty $r(321) = .153$, $p = .006$. Hence I examined whether BAS would explain the interactive effects of power and framing on dishonesty. A bootstrapping moderated mediation analysis was performed using PROCESS (model 7; 5000 resamples) (Hayes, 2012)[22]. The overall index of moderated mediation was *not* significant (Index = .0296, *SE* = .0362, 95% CI [-.0270, .1209]), and the direct effect of power on dishonesty did not reach significance (Effect = .2149, *SE* = .1208, $p = .075$). However, under gain frame, the indirect effect of power on dishonesty by way of heightened BAS was significant (gain frame: Effect = .0525, SE = .0358, 95% CI [.0023, .1428]).

BIS. A multiple linear regression with power, frame, the interaction of power × frame as inputs, BIS as the outcome, and control variables age, gender, education level, was significant $F(6,314) = 6.646$, $p < .001$. Yet key predictors power ($B = -.058$, $p = .288$), frame ($B = .004$, $p = .935$), and their interaction ($B = .016$, $p = .764$) was not significant (being female $B = -.290$, $p < .001$, younger age: $B = -.014$, $p = .007$). Thus

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[22] Independent variable (X) = power, Dependent variable (Y) = dishonesty, Mediator (M) = BAS, Moderator (W) = frame, Covariates = age, gender, education level

a mediation analysis was deemed unnecessary. An inspection of whether BIS could explain the effects obtained under the loss frame showed that this was not the case, as the indirect effect of power on dishonesty by way of lowered BIS was not significant (loss frame: Effect = .0040, SE = .0138, 95% CI [-.0260, .0338]. To summarize, neither BAS nor BIS explained dishonesty under loss frame.

The data of Study 14 can be found in the following location: https://osf.io/3wv7t/?view_only=56b87d450f52435881308380052b453d

6.3.3. Discussion

I hypothesized that the powerful would engage in increased dishonesty compared to the powerless under gain frames, but not under loss frames. The findings of Study 14 supported the hypothesis. In order to save time (gain frame), participants who had actual professional power reported higher instances of dishonesty compared to those who did not have power at work. In order to avoid a loss of time (loss frame), participants engaged in similar levels of dishonesty across power levels. This suggests that the powerful and powerless may be both motivated under loss aversion in their ethical conduct. The powerful displayed sensitivity to the context in their goal pursuit (Guinote, 2007a), and were able to attain their goal of maximizing time. Even though the powerful chronically lean towards, and are more typically exposed to rewards and opportunities (the approach-inhibition theory of power, Keltner et al., 2003), they are responsive to the threat of losses.

Approach, as measured by the BAS, was related to not only power but also dishonesty. However, this association did not extend to direct statistical mediation explaining the links between power and dishonesty. Nevertheless, under a gain frame, BAS indirectly mediated the effect of power on dishonesty. These findings are consistent with the idea that approach motivation is triggered under gain frames

(Gray, 1987; McNaughton et al., 2016). It also shows that that the powerful are sensitive to gains, display behavioural approach (Keltner et al., 2003), which influences dishonesty. No such direct or indirect effects of inhibition (BIS) were detected, demonstrating that the links between power and inhibition are not as prominent as the links between power and approach (Smith & Bargh, 2008).

There are numerous limitations to Study 14. Despite relying heavily on goal accessibility across power levels in the development of the hypothesis, I did not explicitly examine the processes underlying the dishonesty reported by participants. Therefore, the reason why the powerful are more dishonest compared to the powerless under gain frame remains untested. It remain possible that their chronic gain focus (Keltner et al., 2003; but see Inesi, 2010), their flexible goal pursuit (Guinote, 2007c), or both, are behind the findings. Untangling the mechanisms in a way to directly assess goal accessibility will be an appropriate next step in this line of research.

Similarly, it is not possible to conclude that the powerful and the powerless tap into differentially accessible constructs under loss frames. I have argued that loss aversion is a temporarily accessible construct for the powerful, whereas it is chronically accessible for the powerless. The powerful may experience less threat under loss frames (Inesi, 2010), but nevertheless engage in dishonesty because they are motivated to maximize their time. Study 14 only measured observed behavior. In order to have a clearer understanding of the underlying mechanisms, further research should examine the cognitive processes that lie below the surface of behavior.

In Study 14, power was not experimentally manipulated. Therefore, the effect of power on dishonesty remains correlational and not causal. Although basic individual differences (education, age and gender) were controlled for, by the nature of study design it is impossible to rule out other environmental or dispositional factors

that may coincide with power in ecological settings, such as dominance. A natural next step would be to validate the findings through randomly assigning participants across different power levels (e.g., powerful, control, powerless).

Study 14 contributes to the under-examined area of research of the powerful in negative domains, such as the experience of threat (Deng et al., 2018), and adds to the growing list of literature demonstrating that the powerful can deviate from typical power moves when their power is under threat (Hays & Goldstein, 2015; Lammers et al., 2008; Rodriguez-Bailon et al., 2000). I utilised time as the way to measure dishonesty, and future research could employ other valuable resources to ascertain the generalizability of the study's findings.

6.4. General Discussion

In the current chapter, I focused on a situation that may trigger different levels of motivation across power levels. The key finding of Study 14 builds on the insights from the previous chapter (Chapter 5) and demonstrate that context is critical in the ethical conduct of the powerful. Through Study 14, I demonstrated a situational boundary condition that is more conducive of dishonest behavior for the powerful. The ability to focus on a primary goal (operationalised here as maximizing time), and flexibly adapt their active self, is key to understanding *when* power corrupts.

Chapter 7. Partners in Crime: Vertical Individualism and Dominance as Predictors of Dishonesty

7.1. Abstract

The social relational concepts of individualism (perceiving individuals as independent from the group) and collectivism (perceiving individuals as a part of the group) were applied to extend the understanding of dominance, and its link with dishonesty. Specifically, this chapter examines the intersection between dominance and components of the individualism-collectivism spectrum. The effect of individualism on dishonesty was considered, to offer insight on mechanisms linking dominance and dishonesty observed in previous chapters. Using data from six independent studies (N = 1,206) which have been discussed in previous chapters, I conducted a series of mini meta-analyses to determine the cumulative effects of the association between individualism-collectivism and dominance. Dominance resides on the individualism end of the spectrum. The vertical component of individualism (being better than others) was associated with dishonesty. Nevertheless, dominance uniquely predicted dishonesty when individualism-collectivism was controlled for. Heightened individualism did not magnify the dominant's tendency to engage in dishonesty.

Keywords: individualism-collectivism spectrum, dominance, dishonesty, vertical individualism

7.2. Introduction

Individualism and collectivism are generally understood as opposite ends on a continuous spectrum that describes how individuals view themselves in comparison with others around them, such as their group (e.g., community, country, Triandis, 2001). Individualism refers to recognizing each person as independent from the group, where personal goals are prioritized over that of the group. Individualistic people have higher agency (Hui & Triandis, 1986; Triandis, 2001). In contrast, collectivism is described as prioritizing the goals of the group, compared to that of the individual. Collectivistic cultures focus on social norms, interdependency, and communal relationships. Collectivistic individuals are more likely to share resources, be concerned about loss of face, and value the opinions of others. Collectivism is associated with the notion that power serves collective goals (see Torelli & Shavitt, 2010).

The individualism-collectivism spectrum has been widely and predominantly used to study national cultures (Hofstede, 1980), where East Asian countries are generally regarded as collectivistic, and Western countries as individualistic (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Such cultural distinctions influence how power is conceptualised, as well as how the powerful behave. For example, in the West, power is characterised by influence and entitlement, while East Asians are more likely to conceptualise power as responsibility that affect others (Zhong et al., 2006). When making managerial decisions such as pay cuts, or firing of employees, individuals from Japan, a collectivistic culture, felt higher levels of responsibility towards the employees as well as the families of the fired employees, compared to their peers from the U.S., which has an individualistic culture (Maddux & Yuki, 2006). The same research

found that Japanese leaders were more aware of the indirect and distant consequences of their decisions, and thus demonstrated restraint in their actions.

In addition to national and cultural differences, individualism-collectivism can be understood as a personality-like individual difference (Triandis, 2001). This stems from the simple observation that a variety of individual traits reside within members of a culture (Yamawaki, 2012). For example, collectivistic cultures can have highly individualistic members. A study with Chinese students, a collectivistic culture, found that a good proportion of students were individualistic, and they were also more entitled (Cai et al., 2012). Triandis and colleagues (1985) introduced the terms *idiocentrism* and *allocentrism* to distinguish individualism and collectivism at a personal level. Idiocentrics (people with individualist traits) value competition, self-reliance and self-direction, while allocentrics (people with a collectivistic orientation) value tradition, interdependence, conformity, and sociability (Schwartz, 1990). Indeed, individualism-collectivism as personality trait is a distinct construct from cultural differences. A case in point is the study that found a deterioration in the mental well-being of individuals who live in cultures that do not match their individual level of individualism-collectivism (Caldwell-Harris & Ayçiçegi, 2006). In this chapter I will continue to use individualism and collectivism to describe individual differences of social relationship perceptions, and self-construal.

Individualistic individuals emphasize exchange-oriented relationships, that is, they try to maintain their fair share of benefits when interacting with others. In contrast, collectivistic individuals prioritize communal relationships, and are more willing to benefit others (Mills & Clark, 1982). Such differences in relationship orientations manifest in how the powerful behave. In the study that has been mentioned multiple times in the preceding chapters, exchange oriented individuals

used power selfishly, but not their communally oriented peers (Chen et al., 2001; Lee-Chai et al., 2001). This suggests that individualism-collectivism may be the underlying reason behind different manifestations of power. Relatedly, when power was perceived by the power holder as an opportunity, and not a responsibility (Sassenberg et al., 2014), power holders showed more selfish behavior (Scholl et al., 2018). Collectivistic individuals possess a broader view of social responsibility, and believe a wider range of decisions to be moral in nature, and not only personal (Miller et al., 1990). These pieces of evidence show that individualism-collectivism can influence not only how power is understood, but also subsequent moral conduct.

It is important to point out that the individualism-collectivism spectrum is not a moral spectrum. Ample evidence shows associations between collectivism and unethical behavior. Corruption is understood to be higher in collectivistic societies (Jha & Panda, 2017; Zheng et al., 2013; but see Ang, 2020). Collectivism is associated with higher levels of lying in negotiations, possibly in order to better the interest of one's group (Triandis et al., 2001). Collectivistic leaders are more likely to show hubris when their peers do, compared to individualistic leaders who are less likely to be swayed by peer behavior (Li & Tang, 2013). This is analogous to the finding that feeling psychologically connected to others impacts judgement as well as behavior in the moral domain (Gino & Galinsky, 2012).

Students high on individualism are less likely to engage in collaborative cheating (Thomas, 2017), although they are more likely to plagiarise others' work (Martin, 2012). Morality for collectivistic individuals is contextual, in that it is influenced by peers, and the welfare of the collective (Zhang & Yin, 2020). A big focus is on saving face (Ma, 1988). To sum up, individualists and collectivists construe power differently, and engage in unethical behavior to fulfil different

objectives. Thus, inferring unethical behavior through the lens of individualism-collectivism necessitates an investigation of the goal that could be attained by the unethical behavior.

7.2.1. Vertical and Horizontal Individualism-Collectivism

One critique of viewing cultures and self-construal of social relationships as individualistic or collectivistic is that it lumps together several, often unrelated, constructs. For example, individualism contains broad concepts of autonomy, self-containment, and competitiveness (Wong et al., 2018). To address this potential over-simplification of cultural differences on the individualism-collectivism spectrum, Triandis introduced another dimension, drawing on the idea that some cultures emphasize equality, while others, hierarchy (2001). Combining this horizontal-vertical axis with individualism-collectivism, makes up four types of cultures and individual traits. Horizontal individualism (HI) supports one's uniqueness, and values the freedom to be oneself. Vertical individualism (VI) has the added element of competition, achievement, and being better than others, on top of the desire to be unique. HI values independence and autonomy, whereas VI values competitiveness[23]. Horizontal collectivism (HC) refers to the tendency to adapt oneself to the group's expectations, whereas vertical collectivism (VC) is the willingness to sacrifice oneself for the group, or authority figures, as well as being accepting of inequality. VC is positively correlated with modesty, while HC is not (Kurman & Sriram, 2002).

7.2.2. Vertical Individualism and Dominance

As individualism-collectivism differs across individuals, prior research has examined its association with other traits. Of interest in the current thesis, is the

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[23] A related concept is personal power (power to be free from others' control), and social power (power to influence control on others) (Lammers et al., 2009).

observation that individualists tend towards dominance, while collectivistic individuals tend to be communal (Moskowitz et al., 1994; see also Triandis, 2001). However, there is a surprising lack of evidence on the direct relationship between individualism-collectivism and trait dominance. Nevertheless, research that examine other traits concerned with social comparisons do exist. Individualists are more likely than collectivists to self-enhance (Heine et al., 2001), although others have posited that self-enhancement is a universal desire, and that collectivists are just as likely to self-enhance, just on collectivistic attributes which they find important (Sedikides et al., 2003) such as modesty and cooperativeness (Sedikides et al., 2015; see also Kurman, 2001). Individualism is linked to higher levels of narcissism (Foster et al., 2003), which in turn is positively correlated with self-enhancement (Morf et al., 2011; see also Paulhus et al., 2003), agency (Bradlee & Emmons, 1992), low communion (Campbell et al., 2002), and crucially, dominance (Emmons, 1984). For instance, dominance preceded and caused the positive association widely found between narcissism and self-esteem (Brown & Zeigler-Hill, 2004).

Direct evidence linking individualism-collectivism with dominance seems to reside predominantly in the VI component of individualism-collectivism. VI societies such as the U.S. have different attitudes towards dominance compared to VC societies such as Japan (Triandis, 1995), which has been confirmed in a subsequent fMRI study (Freeman et al., 2009). In the U.S., an individual's conquest of power is fostered as success, while in Japan, emphasis is given to the communication of subordination (e.g., bowing, Morsbach, 1988). That is, VI cultures value dominance more than VC cultures (Charafeddine et al., 2019). On personality questionnaires, Americans score higher on dominance, while their Japanese peers are more likely to identify themselves with statements on subordination, although this study was conducted on a

very small sample (Freeman et al., 2009), and its universality has not been validated

with multiple scales of dominance. Interestingly, individuals high in VI desire

positions of status (Komarraju & Cokley, 2008), and engage in higher levels of

deception compared to HIs (Triandis et al., 2001). Out of the four dimensions (HI, VI,

HC, VC), VI was most aligned with self-enhancement (Kurman & Sriram, 2002),

narcissism, and seeing others as a means to an end (Le, 2005), all of which are

correlates of dominance.

To summarize, individualism, and more specifically VI, shares a number of

direct and indirect commonalities with trait dominance. In the current chapter, I

hypothesize that individualism is positively correlated with dominance, and that of the

four dimensions of horizontal-vertical $\times$ individualism-collectivism, VI is the best

predictor of dominance. In addition, I explore the dimension that is best aligned with

felt prestige, another interpersonal trait associated with power that has been examined

throughout the thesis. I used data from six independent studies that have been

introduced in previous chapters. As the current chapter uses secondary data, mini

meta-analyses across studies were conducted in order to validate observations made in

discrete studies that have already been discussed in preceding chapters, with distinct

research questions.

I argued previously in this chapter that individualism-collectivism is not a

moral spectrum. Rather, whether one end of the spectrum is associated with

heightened dishonesty would depend on what is to be gained by the immoral deed.

The six studies discussed in this chapter operationalised dishonesty in various ways

(Table 7.1), including die throws and performance in visual puzzles. What the six

studies have in common is that they personally benefit the actor, and only the actor

(e.g., increased pay, saving time). Hence, the second hypothesis of this chapter is that

individualism is positively associated with dishonesty, and that VI in particular, would

predict dishonesty. This would be limited to the nature of the dishonesty being

examined, as they accrue self-benefits rather than communal benefits. In addition, the

anonymity of online studies and laboratory studies in private cubicles make it unlikely

that participants would be tempted to lie to save face, which is associated with

cheating in collectivistic cultures.

Finally, as exploratory analyses to guide future research, I examined how

individualism, and VI, are implicated in the relationship between dominance and

dishonesty. I considered individualism as a moderator that could amplify dominant

individual's reliance on dishonesty. That is, a combination of dominance and

individualistic traits may interact to reinforce dishonesty. Additionally, I looked at

individualism and VI as a control variable, to determine whether dominance uniquely

predicts dishonesty, above and beyond what is explained by individualism. This

would also allow a deduction of which individual difference (dominance or

individualism-collectivism) is a stronger predictor of dishonesty.

Table 7.1

Overview of Studies – Meta Analyses

Studies	Age (in years)	% Male	% Caucasian	Sample size	Dishonesty measure	Dominance (7-point Likert)	Individualism (7-point Likert)
Study 1	20.12 (2.190)	29.9	42.6	204	In-person Dice throw	3.82 (1.026)	3.77 (.974)
Study 2	34.43 (9.633)	29.6	89.4	179	Online Dice throw	3.30 (1.037)	3.73 (.512)
Study 3	21.49 (3.447)	29.1	37.6	141	Moral disengagement	3.44 (.991)	3.84 (.521)
Study 4	35.58 (11.164)	37.1	82.0	178	Visual puzzle	3.19 (.957)	3.76 (.515)
Study 10	21.39 (4.008)	23.5	41.0	183	In-person Dice throw	3.45 (1.024)	3.85 (.544)

| Study 14 | 35.58 (11.164) | 36.8 | 90.3 | 321 | Visual puzzle | 3.13 (1.032) | 3.69 (.485) |

Note. Numbers in parenthesis denote *SD*.

7.3. Overview of Mini Meta-Analyses

Six studies discussed in earlier chapters (Studies 1, 2, 3, 4, 10 and 14) assessed participants' level of individualism-collectivism. This data was collected for a variety of reasons; as exploratory variables, filler questions, and to support other researchers in collaborative projects. Although the sample was varied (e.g., students, employed adults), the population was not specifically recruited to measure cultural influences, and did not collect participants' country of origin. Therefore, I focus only on individual level trait analysis.

Throughout six studies (N = 1,206), individualism-collectivism was assessed with the scale by Triandis and Gelfand (1998), which contains 16 items on 7-point Likert scales (1: *Strongly agree*, 7: *Strongly disagree*). This scale is comprised of the four components (4 items each); horizontal (H) and vertical (V), individualism (I) and collectivism (C). A sample item measuring HI is 'I'd rather depend on myself than others'. VI is measured with statements such as, 'Competition is the law of nature'. The HC component has a sample statement of 'I feel good when I cooperate with others', and VC, 'It is important to me that I respect the decisions made by my groups'. When the 16 items are aggregated, the scale produces a measure of individualism and collectivism on opposite ends of a spectrum[24]. The scale has been validated, and widely used. Specifically, it has been tested that the scale measures all four components (HI, VI, HC, VC) across cultures, regardless of whether the individual is from an individualistic or collectivistic culture (Triandis & Gelfand,

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[24] Higher score implies higher individualism, and lower collectivism.

1998). All six studies employed the dominance-prestige scale (Cheng et al., 2010), which assessed participants' (aggressive) trait dominance, and felt prestige.

Consistently across all six studies, a positive correlation was observed between dominance and individualism. The studies were conducted with uneven sample populations (Goh et al., 2016), with different research questions, and at times, for discrete research projects. Throughout this chapter, I used the simple Pearson's correlation coefficient between variables, weighed by sample size per study. As the sample population was heterogeneous (Table 7.1), the Hedges-Vevea random-effects model was used (Field & Gillett, 2010; Hedges & Vevea, 1998). Every study I conducted that collected data on individualism-collectivism have been included in the meta-analyses.

7.4. Results of Mini Meta-Analyses

7.4.1. Dominance and Individualism

Firstly, a cumulative effect of the simple correlation between dominance and individualism was analysed. This showed a mean r of .437, $p < .001$ and $CI_{95\%}$ [.345, .521], showing an overall tendency of trait dominance to coincide with higher individualism, as expected (test of homogeneity was insignificant $\chi 2(5) = 5.030$, $p = .412$). Prestige was unrelated to individualism-collectivism ($r = -.036$, $p = .593$). Contrary to hypothesis, individualism was not associated with dishonesty $r = .031$, $p = .734$ across the studies.

A further analysis explored whether individualism moderated the influence of dominance on cheating behavior. This was achieved by using the simple Pearson's correlation coefficients between the interaction variable dominance $\times$ individualism, and dishonesty, from the six studies as inputs. Although there was a trend towards

higher individualism strengthening the relationship between dominance and dishonesty, this did not reach statistical significance $r = .057$, $p = .089$.

In addition, I assessed the unique influence of dominance on dishonesty, controlling for individualism, by calculating partial correlations for each study, and using them as inputs in the meta-analysis $r = .156$, $p < .001$, $CI_{95\%}$ [.097, .214]. This demonstrated that dominance predicts dishonesty, controlling for individualism. In contrast, the partial correlation of individualism and dishonesty, controlled for dominance, was not significant $r = -.045$, $p = .581$. It is possible that individualism may be a spurious, correlated variable with dominance, and that individualism as a control variable makes it possible to move closer to quantifying the true effect of dominance on dishonesty. Alternatively, it is also possible that VI determines what individuals want (e.g., goals), while dominance dictates the means individuals deploy to achieve these goals.

7.4.2. Vertical Individualism

The cumulative effect of the simple correlations between dominance and VI was analysed across studies. This resulted in a mean r of .481, $p < .001$, $CI_{95\%}$ [.365, .581], showing a strong tendency of trait dominance to coincide with higher VI. A multiple linear regression, with VI, HI, VC, and HC as inputs, and dominance as the outcome variable, showed a positive association with VI at $p < .001$ level across all six studies. No other component (HI, VC, HC) consistently predicted dominance.

Overall, VI was positively associated with dishonesty $r = .156$, $p < .001$, $CI_{95\%}$ [.097, .214], and VI was the only component on the individualism-collectivism dimension that coincided with dishonesty (Table 7.2) [25]. A further analysis examined

[25] The partial correlation between VI and dishonesty, controlled for HI showed a mean r of .077, $p < .008$, $CI_{95\%}$ [.020, .133].

the relationship between the interaction variable dominance × VI and dishonesty across studies. This was not significant, and there was no evidence of moderation r = .044, p = .132.

Next, the partial correlation between dominance and dishonesty for each study, controlled for VI was used as inputs. The meta-analysis showed an overcall correlation r = .120, p < .001, $CI_{95\%}$ [.046, .193], demonstrating that dominance uniquely predicts dishonesty, controlling for VI. In contrast, the cumulative effects of the partial correlations of VI and dishonesty, controlled for dominance, was not significant r = .031, p = .316, again demonstrating that dominance is a stronger predictor of dishonesty compared to VI.

To explore whether a component of the individualism-collectivism scale coincides with prestige, a similar multiple linear regression with VI, HI, VC, and HC as inputs, but with prestige as the outcome variable was conducted. In all but one study (Study 3), there was a negative association between HC and prestige at p < .01 level, showing that individuals higher on HC reported higher levels of felt prestige[26]. A cumulative effect of the simple correlations between prestige and HC showed a mean r of -.187, p = .046 and $CI_{95\%}$ [-.358, -.004], suggesting a tendency of felt prestige to coincide with higher HC.

Table 7.2

Summary of Results – Meta Analyses

	Dominance	Prestige	Dishonesty

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[26] Higher HC scores indicate lower collectivism, as the scale measures individualism-collectivism on one linear scale.

Individualism-Collectivism	$r = .437, p < .001^{**}$, CI[.345, .521]	$r = -.036, p = .593$	$r = .031, p = .734$
VI	$r = .481, p < .001^{**}$, CI[.365, .581]	$r = .134, p = .004^{**}$, CI[.044, .222]	$r = .100, p = .003^{**}$, CI[.034, .166]
HI	$r = .175, p = .007^{**}$, CI[.049, .295]	$r = .132, p = .003^{**}$, CI[.046, .217]	$r = .077, p = .250$
HC	$r = .277, p < .001^{**}$, CI[.176, .372]	$r = -.187, p < .046^{*}$, CI[-.358, -.004]	$r = -.030, p = .703$
VC	$r = .098, p = .014^{*}$, CI[.020, .176]	$r = -.126, p = .064$	$r = -.050, p = .402$

Note. * denotes significance at .05 threshold, ** denotes significance at .01 threshold. CI = 95% confidence interval.

7.5. Discussion

In this chapter, I introduced the self-concept of individualism-collectivism in order to deepen the understanding of trait dominance. Dominance as measured by the dominance-prestige scale (Cheng et al., 2010) was positively associated with individualism, and specifically VI. While individualism was not directly linked with heightened dishonesty, its VI component was. This may be related to the competitive nature of VI, which is associated with the desire to be better than others. Indeed, the results from the meta-analyses show that there exist a high level of overlap between VI and dominance. Both are associated with agentic, competitive individuals who desire status and success. This is also analogous with the exploratory findings in Study 4 (Chapter 2), which observed performance motivation (the desire to do better than others) is predictive of increased cheating. Future research could explore whether dominance as leadership, or vision for group collective gains, would be related to a different component of individualism-collectivism, which may be unrelated to dishonesty. Such research would make it possible to build on the findings from Chapter 3, which found different levels of association between the various concepts of dominance and questionable research practices (QRPs).

The current chapter focused on individualism-collectivism as an individual difference. Expanding on the close associations observed between VI and dominance, and VI and dishonesty, future research could explore how this expands to cultural, group level differences. Such research should take care to be conscious of cultural differences within the concept of dominance itself, as it remains possible that some scales of dominance may be more sensitive to a subset of trait dominance, be it aggressive dominance (and not leadership motivation), or the Western constructs of dominance, which may differ from East Asian concepts of dominance.

I hypothesized that individualism would be associated with dishonesty, when dishonesty accrues benefits to the actor personally. This was largely supported, especially in the case of VI. Cheating in collectivistic cultures is swayed by communal interests and maintaining one's reputation (Jha & Panda, 2017; Triandis, 2001). Future research could investigate dishonesty that accrues group benefits, or saves the actor from public humiliation. Such endeavour would establish boundary conditions of the connection between individualism and dishonesty observed in the current chapter.

Data from previously discussed studies were utilised to extract a differentiated understanding of dominance and unethical behavior. The observation that neither individualism, nor VI, magnified the dominant's tendency to engage in dishonesty is noteworthy. I have noted in earlier chapters (mini meta-analysis in Chapter 2, and Chapter 4) that evidence of the magnifying role of power, on the relationship between dominance and dishonesty, remains elusive. It is possible that the dominant are already emboldened, and self-interested, such that their proclivity to cheat may not be amplified by other factors, such as situational power, or individualism.

In addition, although VI was associated with dishonesty, the association was no longer significant when dominance was taken into account. This parallels the

finding from Chapter 2, which found that the association between power and dishonesty became non-existent when dominance was accounted for (Studies 2, 5a). These findings across chapters demonstrate the strength and the stability of dominance as a predictor of dishonesty.

Chapter 8. General Discussion

8.1. Summary of Findings

Common sense argues that power often corrupts. The current thesis sought to explain why unethical behavior appear common among power holders. Building on the Person × Situation debate, I explored individual differences that coincide with unethical behavior, as well as the situational triggers of unethical behavior among the powerful compared to powerless individuals. Furthermore, I considered power affordance in natural settings and the typical environment under which the powerful operate. In so doing, I concentrated on individual difference dominance because dominant individuals are likely to want to, and rise up to positions of power in competitive settings. In addition, to determine dishonesty that are more likely to be triggered by the experience of power, I considered goal pursuit. Power holders possess the ability to attend to their primary goals by adjusting their attention, strategies and behaviors (Ana Guinote, 2007a). I explored situations where the powerful would lower their ethical standards in order to attain goals. Both situational goals related to power, and personal desires that are unrelated to power were examined.

In this chapter, first I summarize the key findings from previous chapters, before discussing possible mediators and moderators that were considered. Then I propose how the previous chapters can be consolidated to contribute to the existing body of research, both in terms of advancing theory, and their practical implications. I discuss the limitations of the studies and analyses carried out, including issues related to measurement, and suggest future directions for research.

8.1.1. Dominance and Dishonesty

In Chapters 2 and 3, the role of dominance in relation to power, and its effect on unethical behavior was examined. Dominance was chosen because it is an individual difference closely aligned with social power, as well as numerous anti-social inclinations (Bradlee & Emmons, 1992; Brown et al., 2009; Burgoon & Dunbar, 2000; Cheng et al., 2010; Keating & Heltman, 1994; Maner, 2017). Whereas numerous studies have investigated the role of individual differences in how power is expressed (Chen et al., 2001; Sassenberg et al., 2014), not many are as closely tied with power as dominance is. In particular, dominance is related to the desire for power, and the ability to attain influential positions in ecological settings, which tend to be competitive. In Chapter 2, dominance consistently predicted dishonesty (Studies 1, 2, 3, 4, 5a). Dominant individual preferred positions of power (Study 3), and felt powerful roles suited them better (Study 4), to a greater degree than less dominant peers. Dominant individuals were over-represented in positions of professional power (Studies 2, 5a). Although individuals with professional power were more likely to cheat in die throws (Study 2) and break Covid-19 containment rules (Study 5a) compared to individuals without professional power, this effect was no longer present when the influence of dominance was accounted for. Specifically, the effect of power was only observed because of the natural overlap between dominant and powerful individuals, with dominance being the stronger predictor of dishonesty. When power was experimentally manipulated (Studies 3, 4), its influence on dishonesty was mixed.

Chapter 3 affirmed the findings from Chapter 2, as it found that dominance correlates with higher use of, and plans to engage in questionable research practices (Studies 6, 7, 9), for students and psychology researchers alike. This propensity was stronger for aggressive and forceful forms of dominance, compared to assertive and

visionary forms of dominance, such as leadership motivation, dominance on a spectrum towards submissiveness, and temporary state dominance.

I contrasted the findings above with other individual differences implicated in social ascent, prestige (Cheng et al., 2013; Maner, 2017). Prestige was not associated with dishonesty (Chapters 2, 3). Individuals with professional power reported higher feelings of prestige, as well as dominance (Studies 2, 5a). Interestingly, career success in academia, as measured by academic rank or research productivity, was tied with felt prestige, but not dominance (Study 7). This demonstrates that in academia, dominance may not lead to professional power. Whereas both dominance and prestige were associated with social ascent, only dominance predicted unethical behavior.

The influence of power on unethical behavior was mixed in Chapter 2. This is mostly consistent with existing research that the direct effect of power on unethical behavior depends on numerous factors, such as individual differences, the context, and the nature of the power role. Power energizes the individual, in ways that the power holder feels confident to display their authentic selves (Guinote, 2007d; Kraus et al., 2011), with a disregard for other's opinions (Galinsky et al., 2008). As such, power typically magnifies the expression of predispositions (Ana Guinote et al., 2012). The notion that power may magnify the dominants' unethical tendencies was tested in a mini meta-analysis in Chapter 2 (Studies 2, 3, 4, and 5a), especially since Study 5a showed a marginal interaction effect of dominance × power on the breaking of Covid-19 containment rules. However, the mini meta-analysis did not show evidence of overall moderation. In Chapter 4, I directly tested whether power magnifies the dominant's tendency to engage in dishonesty (Study 10). Again, the hypothesis was not supported, and it is possible that power does not magnify the dominants' dishonest tendencies.

This possibly demonstrates the key difference between dominance and other individual differences that influence behavior under the experience of power (Chen et al., 2001; Sassenberg et al., 2014). Whereas power may free individuals to express their true selves, for dominance, a dimension closely related to extraversion, having power may not make a material difference, as dominant individuals are already self-expressed (e.g., speaking time, Mast, 2002). Following this line of reasoning, dominant individuals may be emboldened to pursue their desires, regardless of the experience of power.

8.1.2. Triggers of Dishonesty for the Powerful

The subsequent two chapters examined the unique effects of power on unethical behavior, considering the context, that is independent from individual differences. In Chapter 5, I focused on a context where dishonesty is particularly easy to occur. I reasoned that combined with power holder's tendency to engage in automatic cognition (Keltner et al., 2003), reliance on accessible constructs (Ana Guinote et al., 2012), and more, uninhibited action (Galinsky et al., 2003), justifiable behavior stemming from moral ambiguity would motivate the powerful more than the powerless. However, the hypothesis that heightened power will lead to an increase in morally ambiguous dishonesty was not supported (Studies 11, 12, 13). Perhaps the ease of justification does not elicit dishonesty for the powerful. Indeed, other evidence demonstrate that power holders engage in behaviors that suit their goals, with a disregard for judgements from others (Galinsky et al., 2008). The powerful may not feel the need to justify their behavior to others, which would explain why justifiability did not lead to a difference in dishonesty across power levels. Overall, dishonesty was more frequent for morally ambiguous behavior, compared to morally clear behavior.

This is consistent with prior research that demonstrated that justifiability enables dishonesty (Ayal & Gino, 2011).

Chapter 6 examined a context that the powerful may be more likely to encounter. Specifically, I focused on decision frames. Power holders are more likely to chase positive outcomes, such as rewards and opportunities (gain frame). In contrast, powerless individuals would be exposed to trying to avoid negative outcomes, such as punishments (loss frame). Such divergence in the external environment surrounding individuals across power levels has led to the theory that power is associated with approach, and powerlessness, with avoidance (Keltner et al., 2003). Moreover, power increases the ability to adapt flexibly to the given situation in order to attain goals (Guinote, 2008). It was hypothesized that the powerful would cheat more than the powerless under gain frames, but not under loss frames. Consistent with hypothesis, Study 14 found that power is linked to an increase in dishonesty compared to the powerless, only in gain frames. In general, participants lied more under loss frames, compared to gain frames, demonstrating loss aversion (Grolleau et al., 2016; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Chapters 5 and 6 together demonstrate that although there are triggers of dishonesty among the powerful, in order to identify them a careful examination of their goals, motivations, and accessible means is necessary.

8.1.3. Individualistic Cheaters

The empirical research ended with Chapter 7, which consisted of a series of meta-analyses that examined individualism-collectivism in tandem with dominance. Both are individual differences that are concerned with social relationships, and individualism-collectivism in particular is the construal of the self in relation to the social context. Moreover, collectivism is a key determinant of the construal of power

as responsibility (Miller et al., 1990; Zhong et al., 2006), which in turn influence unethical behavior (Sassenberg et al., 2014). Using data from studies already discussed in the thesis (Studies 1, 2, 3, 4, 10 and 14), it was reasoned and demonstrated that dominance and individualism would be positively correlated. In particular, vertical individualism, which is the dimension of individualism that focuses on comparisons with others to differentiate oneself (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998), was associated with dominance, as well as dishonesty. Nevertheless, dominance remained a stronger predictor of dishonesty compared to vertical individualism. This parallels the results of Chapter 2, which showed that dominance was a stronger predictor of dishonesty compared to power. Unlike dominance or prestige, individualism was not linked to professional power.

8.1.4. Mechanisms and Moderators

Drawing on past research on dominance, I sought to explain the association between dominance and dishonesty. Possible mediators were examined. In Chapter 2, I first explored the mediating role of entitlement. In Study 3, entitlement was positively correlated with dominance, but not with moral disengagement. Therefore no mediation was detected. Study 5a re-examined entitlement, and it was hypothesized that feelings of entitlement would be associated with higher instances of breaking of Covid-19 containment rules. Entitlement statistically mediated the relationship between dominance and rule-breaking behavior. However, as the reverse model was also significant, it remains possible that the effects are reciprocal. To eliminate this possibility, Study 5b concentrated on establishing a causal link between manipulated entitlement and rule-breaking. However, this was not supported, and therefore the claim that entitlement is the reason why dominant individuals are likely to break rules remains tentative. In addition, Study 5a examined perceived invulnerability to

suffering badly from Covid-19 as a possible mediator of the relationship between dominance and rule-breaking. This was specific to Study 5a, as the rule breaking behavior concerned Covid-19 containment rules. Perceived invulnerability was a mediator of dominance and rule-breaking. Nevertheless, a causal link has not been determined.

In Study 4, performance motivation, or the desire to outperform relative to others, was added as a control variable to assist in measuring the effect of dominance on dishonesty. As performance motivation was positively correlated with both dominance and puzzle performance (dishonesty), an exploratory mediation analysis was carried out. However, performance motivation did not significantly mediate the relationship between dominance and dishonesty.

Permissive conceptions of the academic research environment mediated the use of questionable research practices among dominant researchers (Chapter 3). Specifically, Study 6 found that judging QRPs to be widespread among peers explained why dominant students engaged in QRPs. Similarly, in Study 7, career academics in psychology who scored higher in dominance were also more likely to view the use of QRPs as defensible. Such judgements of pervasiveness and defensibility were correlated with higher use of QRPs. Social power was not discussed in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, the finding that relaxed attitudes towards QRPs was the driver behind dominant individuals' use of QRPs informed Chapter 5, which examined the role of justifiability in morally questionable behavior as a possible trigger of dishonesty among the powerful (Studies 11, 12, 13).

A number of moderators were examined. As discussed above, the data from Chapter 4 (Study 10) and the mini meta-analysis of Chapter 2 (Studies 2, 3, 4, 5a) suggest that it is unlikely that the experience of power influences the degree to which

dominant individuals engage in dishonesty. Exploratory data from Study 10 raises the possibility that power roles may moderate the association between subjective feelings of power and self-reports of die-throws. That is, individuals with power roles that matched their chronic sense of power were more likely to be dishonest. As such, the sense of power may be an individual difference where the effects on dishonesty is moderated by the experience of power. Nevertheless, as the analysis was exploratory and did not form the study hypothesis, further research is necessary.

The latter part of the thesis examined moderators of the relationship between power and dishonesty. Specifically, I sought out situational triggers that may increase the power holder's inclination to engage in dishonesty. In Chapter 5, it was hypothesized that dishonesty type (morally ambiguous, morally clear) would influence the take up of dishonesty among powerful individuals (Studies 11, 12, 13). This was not supported. Chapter 6 examined decision frame as a possible situational trigger. As hypothesized, the powerful cheated more in the reporting of puzzle performance than the powerless when pursuing a positive outcome (gain frame), but not when striving to avoid a negative outcome (loss frame) (Study 14). The moderation suggests that the common notion that power corrupts may apply only to gain frames, and not to loss frames.

8.2.   Contributions

Thus far, key findings from the studies and analyses carried out have been summarized. Next, I discuss how the findings add to existing research by means of two approaches; the effect of the individual, and the effect of power. I draw comparisons with and consolidate theories on power. Then I derive practical implications.

8.2.1.   The Person Perspective with External Validity

In the last few decades, research on power and corruption have evolved from attributing the deterioration of behavioral standards solely to having power (Kipnis, 1972), to considering the personal traits and characteristics of the individual, as well as their environment (see Lee-Chai et al., 2001; Sassenberg et al., 2014; Wang & Sun, 2016; Williams, 2014; see also Trevino, 1986). These studies have predominantly approached the question of power abuse from a Person × Situation perspective. The current thesis provides support for the notion that power does not uniformly lead to unethical behavior. The findings that dominance is a key driver of dishonesty contributes to the individual difference perspective of power abuse, which has already identified a list of individual differences, such as relationship orientation (Chen et al., 2001), moral awareness (DeCelles et al., 2012), and self-centred personalities (Dean & Malamuth, 1997).

The current thesis differs most materially from existing research on this topic because it considered the external environment. Rather than simply adding dominance to the list of individual differences linked to power abuse and unethical behavior, it focused on individuals that seek power, and the type of individuals who are likely to rise to positions of power. Consistent with prior research (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009; Maner & Case, 2016), I demonstrated that dominance is associated with a strong desire to acquire power as well as the ability to acquire power, in actual professional positions (Studies 2, 5a). Other individual differences that were considered in previous research were not as closely tied to power affordance in ecological settings. By examining the dominant's tendency to act unethically concurrently with their power affordance, Chapter 2 adds insight to the Person × Situation debate. The casual observation that power often corrupts can be explained with a person perspective

(individual difference dominance) that reflects the situation perspective (dominant individuals are often powerful).

8.2.2. Theoretical Contributions to the Effects of Power

Expression of Dispositions

The latter part of the thesis concentrated on the unique influences of power on the individual. Firstly, I considered the magnifying effect of power on the expression of dispositions (DeMarree et al., 2014; Guinote et al., 2012; Kraus et al., 2011). Dominant individuals cheated regardless of their power (Chapters 2, 4), and hence the moderating role of power was not observed. Exploratory data suggested the possibility of chronic sense of power being moderated by situational power (Study 10). The observation that power magnifies some individual differences but not others is particularly thought-provoking, as it requires an examination of both the characteristics of the individual difference, and also the accessibility (Ana Guinote et al., 2012) of the individual difference in the context. It could be reasoned that dominant individuals, through the activation of the Dominance Behavioral System (DBS, Johnson et al., 2012), already possess efficient strategies for acquiring personal benefits that do not rely on power. In such case, the activation of the DBS could precede and mediate the dominant's unethical inclinations, in parallel with entitlement. In contrast, it is possible that individuals with chronically high sense of power only express their desires and true attitudes when they have actual power, such as structural power. In Study 10, the operationalization of dishonesty (self-reporting of die throw) was unrelated to the exercise of power. That is, participants' power, or the lack of power, were not prominent or accessible in participants' decision to engage in dishonesty. Therefore, it remains to be verified whether the association between dominance and unethical behavior can still be moderated by power, when the

unethical behavior is directly related to exercising one's power. Pointing towards this possibility, a study on leaders showed that when their position was tenuous, only those high in dominance prioritized their personal grasp on power over group goals (Maner & Mead, 2010). This demonstrated the moderating effect of dominance, on power and power abuse, suggesting an interactive effect.

Effective Goal Pursuit

Secondly, power energizes individuals towards achieving their goals (Ana Guinote, 2017). Power holders can flexibly orient their attention, priorities, and behavior in line with the situation, in ways that help with goal pursuit (Ana Guinote, 2007c). In this sense, the powerful are highly tuned in to their surroundings and affordances provided. When pursuing goals, power holders are better than the powerless in activating the means that are goal-relevant (Slabu & Guinote, 2010). Supporting the situated focus theory of power (Guinote, 2007a; Guinote, 2008), I found evidence that powerful individuals focus on not only the pursuit of gains, but also the avoidance of losses, to accrue self-benefits (Study 14). Power's alignment with behavioural approach is one of the key characteristics of power (Keltner et al., 2003; Lammers et al., 2010). It has been argued that power decreases focus on threats (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; but see Smith & Bargh, 2008), and the anticipated loss from threats (Inesi, 2010). Study 14 suggests that power holders are able to switch from their natural approach orientation to focus on threats, when the situation demands it. This does not contradict the approach-inhibition theory of power (Keltner et al., 2003) which posit that power's association with behavioural approach, action (Galinsky et al., 2003), and risk-taking tendencies (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006) derive from their control of resources, both tangible and intangible, which they are likely to possess by the nature of having power. Therefore, in situations where the

powerful feel threatened, they can over-ride the common associates of power to focus on goal pursuit, as demonstrated in Study 14. For instance, Lammers and colleagues showed that when power is under threat (due to perceptions of illegitimacy), the powerful are no longer approach oriented (Lammers et al., 2008). In a similar vein, the powerful display heightened conformity to others when their power is under threat (Hays & Goldstein, 2015).

On the other hand, powerless individuals in Study 14 did not display the ability to switch from their natural avoidance orientation (Keltner et al., 2003) to focus on gains. This is consistent with prior research that the powerless are less adept at distinguishing goal relevant information that is demanded by the situation (Smith, Jostmann, et al., 2008). It is also in line with research that powerlessness impairs the ability to find suitable means for goal pursuit (Steidle et al., 2013). As such, the powerless are more easily distracted (Straub & Schmid, 2018; see also Cai & Guinote, 2017).

In addition to contributing to research that the powerful are responsive to social cues, the examination of gain and loss frames advances the ecological validity of research on social power. Powerful individuals possess the resources and influence to exercise their power in ways that they deem desirable. Therefore, in the natural environment, they are more likely to encounter the pursuit of gains and rewards, rather than the avoidance of losses or punishments. If the powerful cheat disproportionately compared to the powerless only in gain frames, but if the powerful predominantly operate under gain frames, this could explain why observations of the powerful being unethical remain pervasive.

Automatic and Deliberate Thought for Nonconformists

Thirdly, the observation that the powerful may *not* engage in disproportionate levels of dishonesty just because the behavior is easy to commit (Chapter 5), adds to the understanding of the conditions under which the powerful act based on intuition or the most accessible construct. In general, power increases automatic information processing (Keltner et al., 2003), and the reliance on easily retrievable thoughts based on momentary subjective experiences (Weick & Guinote, 2008) and feelings (Ana Guinote, 2010). Following this line of research, in Chapter 5, I designed a set of studies where cheating was made as easy as possible, by increasing the justifiability of cheating behavior. The results did not support the notion that power leads to increased cheating on morally ambiguous decisions, which are easier to justify.

It is conceivable that the null-effects of Studies 11, 12, and 13 can be explained by another key consequence of power, that powerful individuals are less likely to conform to social norms (Galinsky et al., 2008), as they are not reliant on others and therefore feel distant from others (Magee & Smith, 2013). As long as the behavior helps goal pursuit, the powerful may not feel the need to justify or rationalize their behavior to others, rendering the ease of cheating inconsequential to them. In this sense, the powerful are uninhibited in their actions (Galinsky et al., 2003; Keltner et al., 2003), and do not resort to default inaction. As such, this opens up the possibility that the powerful may be prone to automatic processes only on tasks they deem secondary in importance, or when they are not motivated. In this respect, deliberate thought or self-control would be a scarce resource allocated only for primary goal attainment (DeWall et al., 2011).

It remains without a doubt that both sides of the Person $\times$ Situation perspective are necessary to explain behavior. When trying to understand how individuals act on average, the person perspective (e.g., individual differences) is useful. However, as

individual behavior varies widely from moment to moment, the study of processes that explain situational responses is also crucial (Fleeson, 2004). Recent research has predominantly focused on the interactive effects of the two perspectives on behavior. The current thesis sought to advance the Person × Situation perspective by integrating the two sides. That is, whereas previous research has focused on the two perspectives with the implicit assumption that they are useful at different times to address different research questions, I argue that the two sides can be applied at the same time to answer one research question. The consideration of power affordance for dominant individuals (Chapter 2), and the decision frames frequented by power holders (Chapter 6) suggest that integration may be possible. Such integrated approach is particularly informative in power research, as power leads to an increase in behavior variability (Guinote et al., 2002; Guinote, 2007a). Put another way, as the behavior of the powerful vary widely from moment-to-moment, research on their behavior cannot be complete without addressing the situational demands that befall the powerful (see Fleeson, 2001).

8.2.3. Practical Implications

The current thesis offers a number of practical suggestions. It clearly identified a pathway to power that is associated with dishonesty. Whereas dominance predicted unethical behavior, prestige did not. This suggests that not all desires for power are malevolent, and a creation of organizational processes where power is afforded to those who pursue the strategy of prestige, through the accumulation of expertise, skills or experience, and the respect of others, may be critical in reducing the instances of power holders acting unethically. Even within dominance, it was apparent that aggressive and forceful forms of dominance is particularly detrimental to behavioral standards. In comparison, dominance as manifested as leadership motivation was less

damaging. It is noteworthy that unlike employed adults in multiple sectors, for career academics conducting psychology research, dominance was not associated with markers of career success. Felt prestige was a constant correlate of ecological power, as measured by professional power, and career success in academia. This may be a demonstration of organizational or sector specific processes that are more favourable towards promoting individuals who adopt the prestige pathway to ascend the social hierarchy, rather than that of dominance. More evidence is necessary to confirm this idea, and could in due course inform decision makers within organizations, as well as social consensus on who power is granted to.

Dominance was associated with higher instances of Covid-19 containment rule-breaking (Study 5a). It may be difficult to change the level of dominance in individuals, as it tends to be a chronic trait that is relatively stable across time. Nevertheless, the identification of perceived invulnerability as a mediator implies that by changing perceptions of the likelihood of suffering badly from Covid-19, it may be possible to reduce rule-breaking behavior among the dominant. This could inform health policy.

The examination of research conduct has multiple implications. The finding that dominance is associated with QRP engagement but not career success, together with the finding that prestige is associated with career success but not QRP engagement, is of particular value. This implies that the dishonest means dominant researchers choose in order to climb the academic hierarchy may not be effective. In addition, judgements of peer prevalence and defensibility of QRPs mediated dominant researchers' dishonest inclinations. This implies that by educating researchers of the unethical nature of QRPs, and by informing researchers that QRPs may not be as common as they think, it may be possible to reduce QRP engagement especially

among researchers who are aggressively dominant. The estimates of QRP prevalence that Study 7 provided is informative, as it is a direct comparison with earlier studies on the same topic (Janke et al., 2019; John et al., 2012), providing an updated view on recent research trends (Chapter 3). Moreover, measuring how widespread QRPs are for student research projects may be helpful to educators of research methods and conduct in higher education, in how they design and evaluate student assignments.

Lastly, the results of Chapter 6 on decision frames suggest that organizations should be particularly vigilant in the monitoring of power holders (e.g., CEOs, executives, managers) when they are chasing gains. This similarly applies to the appointment and monitoring of political leaders, in their display of hubristic behavior after success (Kroll et al., 2000). Of particular importance is how goals are set for members of society in the upper echelons (see also Gino & Margolis, 2011).

8.3.   Strengths, Limitations and Future Directions

In the next section, I discuss the choice of measures used throughout the thesis, with an emphasis on their advantages and limitations. I then examine the limitations of the thesis, stemming from study design and unanswered questions. At the same time, I suggest specific areas that future research should explore to advance this subject further.

8.3.1. Having Power or Lacking Power

In the current thesis, power was operationalised in multiple ways. In Studies 2 and 5a (Chapter 2), actual professional power was assessed, in order to test the hypothesis that dominant individuals are over-represented in positions of influence in natural settings. Study 14 (Chapter 6) also gauged actual professional power, and participants were reminded of their power (or powerlessness) through recruitment into

separate studies. Relatedly, in Study 7 (Chapter 3), although power was not directly considered, I assessed the actual seniority and research productivity of academics in psychology, as markers of career success. The advantage of utilizing participants' actual, natural power is that it grasps a realistic experience of power, where the effects of power can be stronger and sustained for longer periods of time, compared to experimentally induced experiences of power. As power is not randomly assigned, the obvious disadvantage is having to control for factors that is correlated with power that may also influence unethical behavior. For instance, gender remained a crucial control variable throughout these studies. Although no strong evidence of the effects of gender (e.g., being male) across studies was observed, the use of natural power constrains the ability to draw causal claims.

In other studies, power was experimentally manipulated, in order to establish casual claims, and in order to create distinct groups with different power levels, with dominance equally distributed between groups. This was particularly important as dominance was found to be unevenly distributed across positions of professional power (Studies 2, 5a). Studies 4 and 12 employed the task of writing past experiences (Galinsky et al., 2003), which has the benefit of not being constrained to formal or structural positions of power, as participants can write about any form of power or powerlessness. In addition, the formation of distinct power groups are still based on participants' actual, real experiences. Yet, the ease of retrieving past experiences of power or powerlessness could influence the effectiveness of the manipulation (Lammers et al., 2017). In Studies 3, 10, and 11 power was manipulated in person, using a dyad (Mast et al., 2010). Participants were assigned to roles where they experienced being powerful or powerless compared to other participants in the same study, for a brief period of time. Since the context and task are pre-fixed and same for

all participants (e.g., art gallery), the manipulation of power in dyads have the benefit of a highly controlled environment.

In the current thesis, although power was assessed and manipulated in multiple ways, it did not include a control group. This was primarily because the effects of power were not prominent or consistent. Nevertheless, it is difficult to ascertain whether the effects of power that were observed are caused by having power, or by lacking power. This limitation is especially acute in Chapter 6, where participants with professional power were more dishonest compared to those without professional power, only under gain frames. A control group where participants were not reminded of their professional power was not present. Including a control group would allow for a detailed look into the effects of power under gain/loss frames, and strengthen the evidence presented. Moreover, Chapter 6 consisted of only one study (Study 14), and the argument that the powerful are more likely to encounter gain frames in ecological settings has not been directly tested.

8.3.2. The Matter of Measurement

Unethical Behavior

The measurement of unethical behavior can be challenging, as unethical behavior is rare, socially undesirable, and can be difficult to define. The current thesis sought to address each point. Among many forms of unethical behavior, the current thesis predominantly dealt with dishonesty, as its definition is established (Shu et al., 2011), and an extensive body of dishonesty research exist (Bazerman & Greene, 2010; Shalvi et al., 2015). Adding the layer of social power to a prolific and validated area of research made it easier to clarify the contributions of studies. Even within dishonesty, I only considered behaviors that accrue benefits to the individual committing the dishonesty. That is, the scope was limited to selfish and individualistic

dishonesty. In addition, I considered defensibility and justifiability as key drivers of dishonesty, and examined morally ambiguous behaviors such as QRPs (Chapter 3) and paltering (Studies 12, 13). Consequently, other forms unethical behavior have not been examined, such as selfless, altruistic, or collectivistic dishonesty, or decisions involving moral dilemmas (Fleischmann et al., 2019).

The low base rate of unethical behavior provides an additional challenge in the design of qualitative studies, and studies often need relatively large sample sizes. In all studies, a priori power analyses were conducted, using effect sizes obtained in previous, similar studies. Studies 5b, 8, 9, and 10 were pre-registered. Morally ambiguous behaviors also had the advantage of being relatively common, making them easier to detect in controlled studies. Indeed, in Study 13, participants' likelihood of engaging in paltering was higher than telling the truth. To provide a balanced view, behavior intentions were measured on Likert scales in a number of studies, where participants could express their opinions on hypothetical behaviors, free from their past experiences (Studies 8, 9, 12, and 13). The use of Likert scales allowed for a fine-grained measurement of subtle differences in attitudes that may not be picked up through dichotomous measures which some studies did employ to gauge past behavior (Studies 6, 7).

The socially undesirable nature of unethical behavior makes it likely that participants would under-report instances of past engagement of unethical behavior. This was of particular concern in Chapter 3, which assessed participants past use of QRPs (Studies 6, 7). In order to get closer to the real instances of QRP engagement, participants reported perceptions of peer behavior, as well as the degree to which they believed their peers would admit to the behavior. This enables the deduction of more realistic estimates of QRP prevalence (John et al., 2012). Moreover, as the desire to

maintain a positive image of oneself towards others may deter participants from being honest about their dishonesty (Mazar et al., 2008), I controlled for participants' level of social desirability (Studies 8, 9). Nevertheless, it remains a limitation of Chapter 3 that all four studies used some form of self-report. Future research should corroborate the findings by using other signals of QRP engagement, such as the *p*-value distribution of published papers (Ioannidis & Trikalinos, 2007; Pounds & Morris, 2003), or changes to effect sizes between dissertations and subsequent published papers (Kepes et al., 2022). The addition of other academic disciplines, such as biomedical sciences, and the inclusion of a larger career academic sample could vastly widen the research implications.

It was crucial that some studies measured displays of actual dishonest behavior. Stated and actual behavior often diverge (Sheeran, 2002), as individuals can be poor at predicting their behavior, especially in the domain of ethicality (Kern & Chugh, 2009). Thus, in addition to behavioral intentions (Studies 8, 9, 12, 13) and surveys of past behavior (Studies 5a, 5b, 6, 7), participants were provided with opportunities to cheat. Die throws (Studies 1, 2, 10) and performance in puzzles (Studies 4, 14) are validated and widely used measures of dishonesty. In particular, die throws in Studies 1 and 10 gave participants complete anonymity in order to make it more likely that participants can cheat without the fear of repercussions. However, utilizing actual behavior in controlled experiments often entail simple behaviors. They can lack the nuances of daily choices faced by people. In reality, most ethical decisions are complex, and are a result of multiple, contradictory motives. Therefore, a number of studies investigated real ethical decisions, such as the breaking of Covid-19 containment rules (Studies 5a and 5b), and QRPs (Studies 6, 7, 8, 9).

The current thesis sought to provide a balanced representation of unethical behavior. The self-accruing benefits included freedom from constraints (Covid-19 rules), possibility of increased status (QRPs), money and time. However, an important direction of future research would be to examine dishonesty that is directly related to power, such as in the exercise of power, and situations where having power or lacking power is highly accessible and salient within the behavior.

Dominance

In a large number of studies (Studies 1, 2, 3, 4, 5a, 6, 7, and 9), I employed Cheng and colleagues' dominance-prestige scale (J. T. Cheng et al., 2010), as it has been extensively used and validated. More importantly, it differentiates between dominance and prestige. By measuring both dominance and prestige, it was possible to gauge the two most well-trodden strategies for social ascent (J. T. Cheng et al., 2013), while separating out the individual difference that is associated with anti-social tendencies (dominance), and pro-social tendencies (prestige) (Ketterman & Maner, 2021; but see Charness et al., 2014). Consistency across studies using the same scale enables a direct comparison between studies, especially where the operationalisation of other variables, such as power, and the outcome variable, unethical behavior, differed across studies.

Nevertheless, in order to extend the understanding of dominance, and to identify boundary conditions under which the effect of dominance on unethical behavior is most prominent, multiple conceptions of dominance were examined. This step was necessary as dominance forms a core part of the current thesis, and any claims stemming from the data would be constrained had dominance only been measured with one scale. Chapter 3 was an appropriate series of studies to explore this, as the outcome variable was limited to QRPs and social power was not

considered. In Study 6, dominance was conceptualised as being on the end of a dominance-submissiveness spectrum. Study 8 sought to test the effects of state dominance, perceived as temporary states that can be situationally induced. Finally, in Study 9, dominance was conceptualised as the desire to be a leader. The consistent findings that it is the aggressive, forceful facet of dominance that predicts unethical behavior, demonstrates that not all forms of desire for power result in unethical behavior.

Individualism

The findings of Chapter 7 that dominance and individualism are positively correlated and that vertical individualism is also associated with unethical behavior offer multiple avenues for future research. As the findings were derived from meta-analyses of studies dotted around the thesis, collecting primary data would be key. The sample population of the meta-analyses comprised of individuals with numerous nationalities, nevertheless a vast majority were residents of the U.K., an individualistic country. Although in Chapter 7 individualism-collectivism was considered an individual difference and not a national culture, it would be prudent to validate the findings within a more culturally diverse population.

8.4.   Conclusions

I sought to explain why powerful individuals frequently appear unethical. Trait dominance was the hidden driver. The effect of power on unethical behavior was more complex. Power did not encourage dominant individuals to engage in more unethical behavior. It also did not increase morally ambiguous behavior. It did however boost dishonesty in the pursuit of gains. This thesis switched between the Person perspective and the Situation perspective (Fleeson, 2004), while keeping ecological validity at its core. Theoretically, I examined the relationship between power and attention to

situational cues. The powerful are not attentive to situational cues, unless the situation demands it. The ability to determine whether the situation demands attention implies that the powerful are chronically aware of their surroundings, even when they do not need to rely on others. I argue that power does not corrupt, but they are acutely tuned in to their surroundings, and necessity can induce the powerful to behave unethically.

Appendix 1. Overview of All Studies

	Study 1	Study 2	Study 3	Study 4	Study 5a	Study 5b*	Study 6	Study 7	Study 8*	Study 9*	Study 10*	Study 11	Study 12	Study 13	Study 14
Population	University students	Employed adults in Europe	University Students in a European city	Employed adults in the U.K.	Residents in a Large European City	Residents in a Large European City	University graduates in all disciplines	Academics in Psychology	Students of Psychology	Students of Psychology	University students	Adults in London	Adults in London	Adults in London	Employed adults in the U.K.
n	204	179	141	178	664	168	146	146	244	169	183	166	229	168	321
Age	20.12 (2.190)	34.43 (9.633)	21.49 (3.447)	35.58 (11.164)	45.17 (12.95)	32.46 (11.50)	24.32 (5.49)	n.a.	23.75 (6.506)	18.96 (1.761)	21.39 (4.008)	25.36 (7.197)	37.83 (12.429)	36.15 (11.377)	38.67 (10.603)
Compensation	Course credit, Prize lottery	Payment, with bonus	Course credit or payment, Prize lottery	Payment, with bonus	None	Payment	None	None	Payment	Course credit or payment	Course credit or payment, Prize lottery	Payment	Payment	Payment	Payment
Type	In-person lab	Online	In-person lab experiment	Online experiment	Online	Online experiment	Online	Online	Online experiment	Online	In-person lab experiment	In-person lab experiment	Online experiment	Online	Online experiment
Dominance	Cheng et al (2010)	Cheng et al (2010)	Cheng et al (2010)	Cheng et al (2010)	Cheng et al (2010)	n.a. (Entitlement)	Cheng et al (2010), Smith et al (2008)	Cheng et al (2010)	Manipulated in writing exercise	Cheng et al (2010), Jackson (1967)	Cheng et al (2010)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Power	n.a.	Actual professional power	Manipulated in dyad	Manipulated in writing exercise	Actual professional power	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Manipulated in dyad	Manipulated in dyad	Manipulated in writing exercise	Sense of power	Actual professional power
Dishonesty	Die Throw	Virtual Die Throw	Moral Disengagement	Visual Puzzle	Covid-19 rule-breaking	Covid-19 rule-breaking	QRP	QRP	QRP	QRP	Die Throw	Dot task	Paltering	Paltering	Visual Puzzle
Chapter	2, 7	2, 7	2, 7	2, 7	2	2	3	3	3	3	4, 7	5	5	5	6, 7

*Pre-registered

Appendix 2. Materials Used and Supplemental Tables – Chapter 2

The following information represents a detailed description of procedures, verbatim instructions and measures used. It also includes additional data analyses and discussions that were not included in the main thesis. Inserted at the end are two supplemental tables.

A2.1. Study 1: Dominance and Incentivized Die Throw

Methods

 Instructions given for measure of dishonesty. You will see a dice on your desk. Throw the dice twice, then add up the two numbers. That is the number of raffles tickets assigned to you for the lucky draw. (For example, if you throw a 5 followed by a 3, you get 8 raffles tickets.) Input the number of raffles tickets you won below.

Results

 Self-enhancement. In Study 1, I assessed participants' affect and feelings of smartness. Power is associated with positive mood (Guinote, 2017; Keltner et al., 2003) and heightened self-enhancement (Pfeffer & Fong, 2005). I explored whether higher dominance would be positively related to positive affect and feeling smart. As additional control variables, participants' mood (happy/sad, content/discontent, relaxed/tense, good/bad) (Weick & Guinote, 2008) was recorded. Participants rated how smart they believed they were (0: *not smart at all*, 10: *smarter than anyone else*). Dominance positively correlated with feelings of smartness $r(204) = .357$, $p < .001$, but not positive mood $r(204) = -.048$, $p = .494$. A multiple linear regression analysis was carried out with dominance, prestige, their interaction, as well as perceived smartness, mood, age, and gender as inputs, and die score was the outcome variable. The overall regression was statistically significant $F(7,196) = 2.423$, $p = .021$, $R^2 = .080$, Cohen's $f^2 = .087$. Only dominance was a predictor of dishonesty (dominance: $B = .548$, $p = .006$, prestige: $B = .225$, $p = .273$, dominance $\times$ prestige: $B = -.011$,

$p = .943$, feeling smart: $B = -.025$, $p = .852$, mood: $B = -.002$, $p = .647$, gender: $B = .253$, p $= .222$, age: $B = -.010$, $p = .910$).

A2.2. Study 2: Dominance, Natural Power, and Virtual Die Throw

Methods

Instructions given for measure of dishonesty. <Game of Chance> A subset (85%) of participants will participate in an additional survey that takes 2 minutes. The participants who complete the additional survey will be paid 50p extra for their time. A quick game of chance will determine who will participate in the additional survey. Throw the virtual die 5 times, by clicking on the button that says "Roll". If the sum of the 5 throws add up to 14 or more, you will be directed to the additional survey at the end of this survey. Statistically, 85% participants will score 14 or more when they throw a die 5 times. You are responsible for tracking the total of the 5 rolls to report at the end of the game.

Instructions given for Professional Power. The triangle below represents the hierarchy in an organization. Please indicate your position in your organization, by choosing a horizontal line across the triangle at the level that best represents your position. (For example, if you position within the organization at mid-level, please choose horizontal line 4)

Do you hold a manager or leadership position at work? By this we mean whether you have any supervisory responsibilities such as evaluating subordinates, or having the authority to give out instructions or advice to others as part of your work (*Yes/No*). *(Participants who*

answered "Yes" were given the following additional question). You indicated you have supervisory responsibilities at work. How many people do you have the authority to give instructions to at work?

Results

Self-enhancement. The measure of participants' mood and feelings of smartness used in Study 1 were used. Professional power was unrelated to mood $t(177) = 1.365$, $p = .174$ or perceived intelligence $t(177) = .410$, $p = .682$. Dominance was positively correlated with feelings of smartness $r(179) = .232$, $p = .002$, but not mood $r(179) = - .065$, $p = .390$. To the stepwise multiple binary logistic regression carried out in Study 2, I added mood and perceived smartness as an extra step (Step 3). The regression does not materially differ with or without mood and perceived smartness. Power significantly predicted dishonesty $B = .366$, *Wald* $= 4.852$, $p = .028$ although the overall regression was not significant $\chi^2(5) = 7.125$, $p = .212$. Adding dominance and prestige (Step 2), yielded an overall significant regression $\chi^2(7) = 15.178$, $p = .034$. Dominance predicted dishonesty $B = .511$, *Wald* $= 7.518$, $p = .006$, and power was only marginally related to dishonesty $B = .308$, *Wald* $= 3.165$, $p = .075$, while prestige was not $B = -.081$, *Wald* $=.182$, $p = .670$. In Step 3, the model fit was worse than that of Step 2, $\chi^2(11) = 16.708$, $p = .117$.

A2.3. Study 3: Dominance, Manipulated Power, and Moral Disengagement

Methods

Power Manipulation. *Participants assigned to the manager role read the following.* Based on your choices on the questionnaire, you have been identified as having manager skills, and thus assigned to the role of <u>Art Gallery **Manager**</u>. This means that you are very good at leading important projects, motivating people, and making decisions. As the manager of the art gallery, you are responsible for the gallery's good reputation and its continued

business success. You are planning for next season's exhibition. A number of influential international critics and buyers will be visiting the gallery soon, and it is very important you set the right direction and theme for the gallery. You tell the assistant, whom you hired, what kind of work you would like him/her to do for you. You will also evaluate the assistant. What your assistant can do for you is listed below. From this list, choose by circling 1 task you want the assistant to do for you. It is entirely up to you how you choose the task. Your assistant cannot dispute your choice, and your decision is final.

Participants assigned to the manager role read the following. Based on your choices on the questionnaire, you have been identified as having worker skills, and thus assigned to the role of Art Gallery **Assistant**. This means that you are good at working on tasks and following instructions from leaders. As an assistant to the art gallery, you work for the manager, and try to satisfy the job requirement s/he has. Your boss is planning for next season's exhibition. A number of influential international critics and buyers will be visiting the gallery soon, and it is very important for your boss to set the right direction and theme for his/her gallery. Your boss (who hired you), will tell you what kind of work s/he would like you to do. Your boss will also evaluate you.

Excerpts from the experimenter script include the following. Upon completion of the study, all participants will be entered into a lottery to win vouchers. We will give out prizes to 2 participants. If you are the gallery manager and you win the lottery, your prize will be £40 in vouchers. However, it is slightly different for the assistants, and will depend on how many stars you receive. If you are an assistant, and receive 3 stars from the manager, your prize will be £60. If you get a 2-star rating, your prize will be £40. For 1-star, your prize on winning the lottery will only be £20.

Power Motivation. Indicate the degree to which you agree to the following statements on 7-point Likert scales (1: *strongly disagree* to 7: *strongly agree*).

I enjoyed the role that was given to me.

The role that was given to me suits me.

Puzzle Paradigm Instructions. PSC (Problem Solving Capabilities) is the second project our lab is working on, in consultation with the University's curriculum team, with the objective of improving how undergraduate courses are taught. Carry out the following diagnostic test to find your level in problem-solving. You have 4 minutes to solve 6 problems. You may find some problems easier than others, but they are all solvable. If you succeed in solving 4 or more problems (out of 6), as a reward you will skip Test 2 (11 minutes) and finish EARLY!

Puzzle task is given to students. After 4 minutes, students see the next prompt on their screen.

Did you succeed in solving 4 or more problems? Please proceed to the next page.

Students not actually given opportunity to answer this question

Moral Disengagement Questionnaire instructions. We are investigating how people perceive and evaluate everyday behaviours. Please indicate the extent to which <u>you agree</u> with the following statements by ticking a circle from *(1)* 'Strongly agree' to *(7)* 'Strongly disagree' that best corresponds to your view. There are no right or wrong answers - we are simply interested in people's perceptions.

A2.4. Study 4: Dominance, Manipulated Power, and Puzzle Performance

Methods

Power Manipulation. The task you are about to complete is a writing exercise. This exercise focuses on memory, and you will be asked to recall an event from the past. Imagine

you are re-living the situation provided on the next page, and write as vividly, detailed, and realistically as you can.

The high power group:

> Please recall a particular incident in which you had power over another individual or individuals. By power, we mean a situation in which you controlled the ability of another person or persons to get something they wanted, or were in a position to evaluate those individuals. Please describe this situation in which you had power in detail - what happened, how you felt, etc.
>
> You can take as long as you need, and write as much as you need, to complete this writing exercise. Please note you will not be able to proceed until you have written at least 600 letters, and minimum of 7 minutes.

The low power group:

> Please recall a particular incident in which someone else had power over you. By power, we mean a situation in which someone had control over your ability to get something you wanted, or was in a position to evaluate you. Please describe this situation in which you did not have power in detail - what happened, how you felt, etc.
>
> You can take as long as you need, and write as much you need, to complete this writing exercise. Please note you will not be able to proceed until you have written at least 600 letters, and minimum of 7 minutes.

Dishonesty. Those who solved two puzzles (out of six) earned 10p. The bonus increased by 10p per every puzzle, up to 50p for solving six puzzles. Participants reported their scores on a multiple-choice scale with a default pre-set at '6 out of 6'. They had five minutes to solve six puzzles.

<Spatial Reasoning Test>

Carry out the following diagnostic problem-solving test to find your level in problem-solving.

You will be given 4 minutes to solve 6 problems. The time limit is in place to see your ability to solve problems under time pressure.

Draw each figure **without** lifting your finger off the screen and **without retracing** any line twice:

Performance Motivation. 'I was motivated to solve more problems than other participants'. 7-point Likert scale (1: *strongly disagree* to 7: *strongly agree*)

A2.5. Study 5a: Dominance, Natural Power, and Covid-19 Rule Breaking

Methods

Rule-breaking. *Past rule-breaking:* Now we ask you a few questions about the period between 23rd March and 15th June 2020, when The Government introduced measures to contain the virus in England. During this period, all shops except those providing essentials were closed. At the end of March, Greater London area reported one of the highest rates of Covid-19 cases in the U.K. There are no right or wrong answers. We are simply interested that you share your experience during this time.

1. During this period, on average how many times a day did you leave your home – other than for essential activities? (5-point Likert Scale, 1: *never*, 5: *more than 3 times*)
2. During this period, how many people did you meet up with in person, outside your household? (7-point Likert Scale, 1: *nobody*, 7: *more than 15*)
3. During this period, to what extent did you have physical contact (e.g. hugging, shaking hands) with someone who is not a member of your household? (7-point Likert Scale, 1: *never,* 7: *all of the time*)
4. During this period, to what extent did you adhere to the 2-meter social distancing rule? (7-point Likert Scale, 1: *all of the time,* 7: *never*)
5. During this period, how often did you wear a face covering, such as a mask outside your home? (7-point Likert Scale, 1: *all of the time,* 7: *never*)
6. During this period, how many times did you visit other households? (7-point Likert Scale, 1: *never*, 7: *more than 10 times*)

Planned rule-breaking: Now we ask you a few questions about the next few weeks. Throughout June and July 2020, The Government changed some measures in England. Greater London area no longer reported high rates of Covid-19 cases compared to the rest of the U.K. Again, there are no right or wrong answers. We are simply interested that you share your opinions.

1. In the next 4 weeks, to what extent do you plan to adhere to the 1-meter plus social distancing rule? (7-point Likert Scale, 1: *all of the time* to 7: *never*)
2. In the next 4 weeks, how often do you plan to wear a face covering, such as a mask outside your home? (7-point Likert Scale, 1: *all of the time* to 7: *never*)
3. In the next 4 weeks, how likely is it that you will attend a gathering of more than 30 people? (7-point Likert Scale, 1: *extremely unlikely* to 7: *extremely likely*)
4. In the next 4 weeks, how likely is it that you will attend or host a gathering of more than 2 households indoors? (7-point Likert Scale, 1: *extremely unlikely* to 7: *extremely likely*)

Perceived Vulnerability. 7-point Likert scales (1: *strongly disagree*, 7: *strongly agree*)

1. It really bothers me when people sneeze without covering their mouths.
2. My past experiences make me believe I am NOT likely to get very sick with the Coronavirus (R).
3. I am worried about my risk of contracting Covid-19.
4. I am more likely than the people around me to catch the Coronavirus.
5. It is unlikely that I will catch the Coronavirus, even if it is going around (R).
6. It does NOT make me anxious to be around people who may have the Coronavirus (R).
7. My immune system protects me from most illnesses that other people get (R).
8. I have been afraid I would contract Covd-19.
9. I believe I already had the Coronavirus (R).

A2.6. Study 5b: Entitlement and Covid-19 Rule-Breaking

Methods

Entitlement Manipulation.

High entitlement group:

We are investigating how people think about events that happen to them.

In general, when we strive to get what we want, we most frequently get what we want.
Please write more than 75 characters, and spend at least 75 seconds per question to proceed.

Provide 2 reasons as to why you should demand the best in life.
Provide 2 reasons as to why you deserve the lifestyle you want.
Provide 2 reasons as to why you should be treated with respect.

Low entitlement group:

We are investigating how people think about events that happen to them.
In general, even when we strive to get what we want, we cannot always get what we want.
Please write more than 75 characters, and spend at least 75 seconds per question to proceed.

Provide 2 reasons as to why you should *not* always demand the best in life.
Provide 2 reasons as to why you should not necessarily get the lifestyle you want.
Provide 2 reasons as to why you should not always expect to be treated with respect.

Rule-breaking.

Planned rule-breaking:

In the next page, we will ask you 6 questions related to Covid-19.
There are no right or wrong answers. We are simply interested that you share your views and plans in relation to the Covid-19 pandemic.

1. In the next 4 weeks, to what extent do you plan to adhere to the governmental social distancing rule (e.g. 1-meter plus)? (7-point Likert Scale, 1: *all of the time* to 7: *never*)
2. In the next 4 weeks, how often do you plan to wear a face covering, such as a mask, in places where it is mandatory to do so (e.g. shops, public transport)? (7-point Likert Scale, 1: *all of the time* to 7: *never*)
3. In the next 4 weeks, how likely is it that you will follow governmental advice for attending or hosting social gatherings? (7-point Likert Scale, 1: *extremely likely* to 7: *extremely unlikely*)
4. In the next 4 weeks, how likely is it that you will self-isolate (stay at home except for food/medicine, and not receive any visitors) if you are told to do so because you have been in contact with someone who has tested positive to Covid-19? (7-point Likert Scale, 1: *extremely likely* to 7: *extremely unlikely*)
5. In the next 4 weeks, to what extent do you plan to self-isolate and get tested if you (or your household member) develop Covid-19 like symptoms? (7-point Likert Scale, 1: *extremely likely* to 7: *extremely unlikely*)
6. In the next 4 weeks, how likely is it that you will make exceptions to governmental indoor meeting rules for people from different households (rules prescribing whether people can meet indoors, and the number of people who

can visit?) For example, how likely is it that you will make exceptions for people that you feel close to (e.g. family or a romantic partner)? (7-point Likert Scale, 1: *extremely unlikely* to 7: *extremely likely*)

A2.7. Mini Meta-Analysis

A meta-analysis was employed to establish the robustness of the findings concerning the effects of the interaction power × dominance on dishonesty across Studies 2, 3, 4 and 5a. Simple Pearson correlation coefficients weighted by sample size were employed. As the sample population was not homogeneous, Hedges-Vevea random effects model (Field & Gillett, 2010; Hedges & Vevea, 1998) was used. This analysis yielded a mean *r* of .082 and $CI_{95\%}$ [-.008, .171], *p* = .074. The inclusion of 0 in the confidence bounds show the interactive effects of power × dominance on dishonesty are insignificant.

Table A2.1

Participants by Industry – Study 2

	Number	
Accommodation or food services	10	5.6%
Admin, support, waste management or remediation services	11	6.1%
Arts, entertainment or recreation	8	4.5%
Construction	9	5.0%
Educational services	27	15.1%
Finance or insurance	9	5.0%
Health care or social assistance	13	7.3%
Information	4	2.2%
Manufacturing	13	7.3%
Other services (except public administration)	25	14.0%
Professional, scientific or technical services	23	12.8%
Real estate or rental and leasing	4	2.2%
Retail trade	17	9.5%
Transportation or warehousing	3	1.7%
Unclassified establishments	1	.6%
Wholesale trade	2	1.1%
Total	179	100.0%

Table A2.2.

Role Preference by Power and Prestige – Studies 3 and 4

Study 3				95% Confidence Interval	
Prestige Level	Power Condition	Mean	Std. Error	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
High	High	5.829	.220	5.393	6.265
High	Low	5.293	.225	4.848	5.738
Low	High	4.960	.222	4.520	5.400
Low	Low	5.313	.219	4.880	5.746

Individuals high in felt prestige marginally preferred high power positions compared to low power positions $t(67) = 1.982$, $p < .052$.

				95% Confidence Interval	
Study 4					
Prestige Level	Power Condition	Mean	Std. Error	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
High	High	4.833	.242	4.355	5.312
High	Low	4.889	.229	4.436	5.342
Low	High	4.830	.253	4.331	5.330
Low	Low	4.558	.220	4.123	4.992

Mean: Role preference on 7-point Likert scales. Higher mean indicates higher preference for the power condition

Appendix 3. Materials Used, Supplemental Tables, and Factor Analysis – *Chapter 3*

The following information represents a description of procedures and measures used,

Exploratory Factor Analysis on dominance, and supplemental tables and figures.

A3.1. Study 6: Dominance and QRP among Students

Questionable Research Practices

1. *Gathering data in a suboptimal environment (e.g. rushing or interrupting participants, contaminated specimens, and inadequate noise or temperature levels).*
2. *Not following full instructions that should be given to participants. (e.g. not following a pre-set script, therefore participants received varied instructions).*
3. *Failing to follow best practice in informed consent (e.g. forgetting to ask participants to sign consent, not providing the information sheet, signing on behalf of participants)*
4. *Not debriefing participants at the end of a study.*
5. *Asking inadequate participants to take part in the study (e.g. friends, people who do not meet the desired criteria, such as age, language, or health status).*
6. *Completing responses on a questionnaire or device yourself pretending to be a participant.*
7. *Entering, recording, or coding data inaccurately, therefore, altering or misrepresenting data.*
8. Not following best practice in data safeguarding (e.g. emailing data containing identifiable personal information without encryption, leaving completed survey forms in public spaces unattended)
9. *Not informing your project supervisor of issues concerning data quality that were important.*
10. Failing to report all of a study's dependent measures that are relevant for a finding.*
11. Deciding whether to collect more data, or stopping data collection earlier than planned, after looking at the results ("data-peeking").*
12. Rounding off a *p* value or other quantity to meet a pre-specified threshold (e.g. reporting *p* = .054 as *p* < .05 and therefore significant.*
13. Claiming to have predicted an unexpected result *(Changing the project hypothesis after looking at the result).**
14. Trying out a variety of different methods of analysis until one is found that yields a significant result.*
15. *Excluding data points (e.g. outliers) without justification, or after looking at the impact of doing so on results.**

(* denotes items that overlap in Study 7)

Academic pressure

(1: *Strongly disagree* to 7: *Strongly agree)*

1. I had difficulty collecting data (e.g. recruiting participants)

2. I experienced explicit pressure from my supervisor to engage in the research practices discussed earlier in this questionnaire.
3. I was worried my marks would suffer if I did not complete data collection.
4. I felt pressure from family to do well in the research project.

Additional environmental factors

(1: *very low* to 5: *very high)*

1. Availability of academic positions after graduation
2. Difficulty in finding a job related to the degree after graduation
3. Chances of getting caught for research misconduct if occurs
4. Chances of your project getting published
5. The relative prestige and reputation of your university

Level of satisfaction

(1: *Not satisfied at all* to 5: *Very satisfied*)

How satisfied are/were you with your university studies in general?

A3.2. Study 7: Dominance and QRP among Academics in Psychology

Questionable Research Practices

1. Failing to report all of a study's dependent measures that are relevant for a finding.
2. Deciding whether to collect more data, or stopping data collection earlier than planned, after looking at the results ("data-peeking").
3. In a paper, failing to report all of a study's conditions.
4. Rounding off a p value or other quantity to meet a pre-specified threshold (e.g. reporting $p = .054$ as $p = .05$ or $p = .013$ as $p = .01$
5. In a paper, selectively reporting studies that "worked".
6. Deciding whether to exclude data points (e.g. outliers) without using a pre-determined rule, or after looking at the impact of doing so on results.
7. Claiming to have predicted an unexpected result.
8. Falsifying data (e.g. deleting data points without justifying and reporting this, or filling in missing data points)
9. In a paper, claiming that results are unaffected by control variables (e.g. gender) when one is actually unsure (or knows that they do)
10. Reporting NHST (null hypothesis significance testing) only and not effect size, CI (confidence interval), or power.
11. Trying out a variety of different methods of analysis until one is found that yields a significant result.

Work pressure

1. Availability of academic positions (R)
2. Difficulty in obtaining tenure
3. Pressure on researchers to obtain external funding
4. Pressure on researchers to publish
5. Chances of publishing findings that are negative or inconclusive

(5-point Likert scales, 1: *very low* to 5: *very high*)

A3.3. Study 8: State Dominance and QRP

Dominance Manipulation

Dominant condition.

People often persuade others to follow their views and their will in a forceful manner.

Please recall and describe a particular incident in which you felt dominant over another individual or individuals. By feeling dominant, we mean the feelings you experienced when asserting your opinion in a confident way to impose your views, or to get something you wanted. This includes occasions when you needed to be strategic, and occasions when others may have perceived you as pushy or aggressive.

Please describe this incident in which you felt dominant - as vividly, and as detailed as possible - what happened, how you felt compared to the other person (or people), etc.

You can take as long as you need, and write as much as you need, to complete this writing exercise. Please note you will not be able to proceed until you have written at least 500 characters, and minimum of 6 minutes.

Submissive condition.

People often give way and follows others' views, especially if others behave in a forceful manner.

Please recall and describe a particular incident in which you felt submissive under another individual or individuals. By feeling submissive, we mean the feelings you experienced when someone asserted their opinion, in a way was pushy or aggressive. They may have been strategic or confident - to impose their views or get something they wanted.

Please describe this incident in which you felt submissive - as vividly, and as detailed as possible - what happened, how you felt compared to the other person (or people), etc.

You can take as long as you need, and write as much as you need, to complete this writing exercise. Please note you will not be able to proceed until you have written at least 500 characters, and minimum of 6 minutes.

Manipulation Check

Please indicate to what degree you agree or disagree with the statements below, in describing the incident you just wrote about. (7-point Likert scales, 1: *Strongly disagree* to 7: *strongly agree)*

1. I tried to get my way regardless of what other people thought.
2. I felt passive (R).
3. I strived to dominate the situation.
4. My views and opinions were NOT heard.
5. I enjoyed the writing task.*
6. I put in as much effort as possible in the writing task. **

Item with * measures enjoyment of writing task, and item with ** measures effort exerted on writing task, presented within the same questionnaire.

Academic pressure

(1: *Strongly disagree* to 7: *Strongly agree)*

1. It is difficult to find a job related to my degree programme unless I get excellent grades.
2. It is likely that I will receive higher grades engaging in the research practices discussed earlier in this questionnaire.
3. I worry my marks would suffer if I do not complete data collection in a research project.
4. I feel pressure from family to do well academically.
5. It is very likely I will get caught for research misconduct.*
6. My university has high expectations on the students.

Item with * is not part of academic pressure, but presented within the same questionnaire.

Level of satisfaction

(1: *Not satisfied at all* to 5: *Very satisfied*)

How satisfied are/were you with your university studies in general?

A3.4. Exploratory Factor Analysis

Methods

Across three studies (Studies 6, 7, 9), an initial analysis based on Eigen value of 1 was conducted. After looking at the Scree plot and running a parallel analysis (Patil et al., 2008), the appropriate number of factors were determined. Subsequently the prescribed fixed

number of factors were entered to extract their loadings, with Varimax rotation and cutting off coefficients smaller than .40 (Field, 2013; Yong & Pearce, 2013).

Study 6

In Study 6 which employed aggressive dominance, prestige (Cheng et al., 2010), and the dominance-submissiveness continuum (Smith, Wigboldus, et al., 2008), four factors explained 55.47% of the variance[27], whereby all three measures were distinct from one another (Table A3.4).

Study 7

The two subscales of the dominance-prestige scale (Cheng et al., 2010) had two factors that explained a cumulative variance of 45.67%[28], showing that dominance and prestige were distinct constructs that are distinguishable from one another (Table A3.5).

Study 9

Four factors explained 46.372% of total variance[29] (Table A3.6). The first and fourth factors showed that Jackson's need for power (1984) operationalised a discrete construct compared to the dominance-prestige scale, with the first factor showing a small overlap between the need for power and aggressive dominance. The second factor showed the uniqueness of the dominance subscale (Cheng et al., 2010), that was discrete from the prestige subscale, and also Jackson's need for power. Finally the third factor demonstrated that Cheng's prestige subscale measures a separate construct compared to both dominance measures; aggressive dominance (Cheng et al., 2010) and need for power (Jackson, 1984).

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[27] Study 3 KMO MSA = .853, Bartlett's test of sphericity $\chi^2(276) = 1411.24$, $p < .001$. Parallel Analysis input (24, 146, Principal Components, 500, 95, 1000)
[28] Study 1 KMO MSA = .807, Bartlett's test of sphericity $\chi^2(136) = 868.41$, $p < .001$
[29] Study 4 KMO MSA = .818, Bartlett's test of sphericity $\chi^2(528) = 2128.39$, $p < .001$. Parallel Analysis input (33, 169, Principal Components, 500, 95, 1000)

Figure A3.1

*QRP Engagement by Academic Field – Study 6*

Table A3.1

Predispositions and Environmental Factors – Study 6

		Dominance submissive continuum	Prestige	Dire Prospects	Academics Pressure	Study Satisfaction
Dominance	Pearson Correlation	.464**	.350**	-.140	.081	-.022
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.093	.333	.790
	N	146	146	146	146	146
Dominance submissive continuum	Pearson Correlation		.423**	.005	-.071	.037
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.948	.394	.658
	N		146	146	146	146
Prestige	Pearson Correlation			-.136	-.181*	.177*
	Sig. (2-tailed)			.103	.029	.033
	N			146	146	146
Dire Prospects	Pearson Correlation				.170*	-.068
	Sig. (2-tailed)				.040	.417
	N				146	146
Academic Pressure	Pearson Correlation					-.139
	Sig. (2-tailed)					.093
	N					146

Table A3.2

Admission Rates of Research Practices[30] *- Study 7*

Item	Self-admission Rate (%)		*t*(144)	*p*-value
	High Dominance	Low Dominance		
Failing to report all of a study's dependent measures that are relevant for a finding.	42%	23%	2.441	.016*
Deciding whether to collect more data, or stopping data collection earlier than planned, after looking at the results ("data-peeking").	38%	25%	1.704	.090
In a paper, failing to report all of a study's conditions.	25%	12%	2.057	.041*
Rounding off a p value or other quantity to meet a pre-specified threshold (e.g. reporting p = 0.054 as p = 0.05 or p = 0.013 as p =0.01).	20%	18%	.321	.749
In a paper, selectively reporting studies that 'worked'.	51%	34%	2.091	.038*
Deciding whether to exclude data points (e.g. outliers) without using a pre-determined rule, or after looking at the impact of doing so on results.	45%	31%	1.718	.088
Claiming to have predicted an unexpected result.	38%	27%	1.343	.181
Falsifying data (e.g. deleting data points without justifying and reporting this, or filling in missing data points)	6%	6%	-.173	.863
In a paper, claiming that results are unaffected by control variables (e.g. gender) when one is actually unsure (or knows that they do).	12%	4%	1.766	.079
Reporting NHST (null hypothesis significance testing) only and not effect size, CI (confidence interval) or power.	62%	49%	1.577	.117
Trying out a variety of different methods of analysis until one is found that yields a significant result.	59%	53%	.747	.456
11 item Average	36%	26%	3.535	.001**

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[30] Split at median dominance score

Table A3.3

List and Mean Scores of QRPs – Study 8, 9

How likely is it that you will…? (1: *very unlikely*, 7: *very likely*)

Research Practice	Study 8		Study 9	
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
Forget to ask participants to sign consent, or forget to provide them with the information sheet.	1.87	1.34	2.01	1.30
Gather data in a suboptimal environment (e.g. rushing or interrupting participants, inadequate noise or room layout).	2.40	1.57	2.49	1.51
Fail to follow a pre-set script, therefore giving participants varied instructions	2.21	1.47	2.13	1.32
Fail to debrief participants at the end of a study (e.g. because you ran out of time).	1.91	1.24	2.32	1.37
Ask ineligible participants to take part in the study (e.g. your friends)	2.64	1.79	3.10	1.85
Complete responses on a questionnaire or device yourself pretending to be a participant.	2.12	1.68	2.20	1.60
Enter, record, or code data inaccurately, therefore, altering or misrepresenting data.	1.89	1.18	2.16	1.32
Leave completed survey forms in public spaces unattended.	1.62	1.10	1.90	1.23
Not inform your supervisor of issues concerning data quality and integrity.	2.25	1.43	2.34	1.38
Exclude data points (e.g., outliers) after looking at the impact of doing so on results.	2.93	1.75	2.83	1.63
Decide whether to collect more data, or stop data collection earlier than planned, after looking at the results.	3.46	1.80	2.95	1.69
Round off a p value or other quantity to meet a pre-specified threshold (e.g. reporting p = 0.054 as p < .05 and therefore significant).	2.50	1.69	2.53	1.70
Claim to have predicted an unexpected result (Changing the project hypothesis).	2.37	1.58	2.26	1.42
Try out a variety of different methods of analysis, until one is found that yields a significant result.	3.34	1.93	3.15	1.79

Table A3.4

Rotated Component Matrix – Study 6

	Component				
	1	2	3	4	Item
Cheng's Prestige 1			.502	.546	Members of my peer group respect and admire me.
Prestige 2			.742		Members of my peer group do NOT want to be like me.
Prestige 3				.711	Others always expect me to be successful.
Prestige 4			.694		Others do NOT value my opinion.
Prestige 5			.486	.555	I am held in high esteem by those I know.
Prestige 6				.633	My unique talents and abilities are recognized by others.
Prestige 7				.557	I am considered an expert on some matters by others.
Prestige 8				.621	Others seek my advice on a variety of matters.
Prestige 9			.800		Others do NOT enjoy hanging out with me.
Cheng's Dominance 1	.712				I enjoy having control over others.
Dominance 2	.688				I often try to get my own way regardless of what others may want.
Dominance 3	.681				I am willing to use aggressive tactics to get my way.
Dominance 4	.691				I try to control others rather than permit them to control me.
Dominance 5	.582				I do NOT have a forceful or dominant personality.
Dominance 6	.704				Others know it is better to let me have my way.
Dominance 7	.577		.453		I do NOT enjoy having authority over other people.
Dominance 8	.569				Some people are afraid of me.
Smith's Dominance 1	.468	.512			Submissive – Dominant
Dominance 2		.613			Passive – Active
Dominance 3		.703			Unassertive – Assertive
Dominance 4		.787			Timid – Firm
Dominance 5		.707			Uncertain – Certain
Dominance 6		.801			Insecure – Confident
Dominance 7		.577			Dependent - Independent
Eigen Values	6.772	2.729	2.182	1.629	

% of Variance	28.219	11.371	6.789

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 8 iterations.

Table A3.5

Rotated Component Matrix – Study 7

	Component		
	1	2	Item
Dominance 1		.690	I enjoy having control over others.
Dominance 2		.635	I often try to get my own way regardless of what others may want.
Dominance 3		.693	I am willing to use aggressive tactics to get my way.
Dominance 4		.733	I try to control others rather than permit them to control me.
Dominance 5		.587	I do NOT have a forceful or dominant personality.
Dominance 6		.590	Others know it is better to let me have my way.
Dominance 7		.647	I do NOT enjoy having authority over other people.
Dominance 8		.625	Some people are afraid of me.
Prestige 1	.759		Members of my peer group respect and admire me.
Prestige 2	.635		Members of my peer group do NOT want to be like me.
Prestige 3			Others always expect me to be successful.
Prestige 4	.678		Others do NOT value my opinion.
Prestige 5	.776		I am held in high esteem by those I know.
Prestige 6	.717		My unique talents and abilities are recognized by others.
Prestige 7	.685		I am considered an expert on some matters by others.
Prestige 8	.748		Others seek my advice on a variety of matters.
Prestige 9	.570		Others do NOT enjoy hanging out with me.
Eigen Values	4.034	3.731	
% of Variance	23.729	21.945	

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a.　Rotation converged in 3 iterations.

Table A3.6

Rotated Component Matrix – Study 9

	Component				
	1	2	3	4	Item
Cheng's Prestige 1			.771		Members of my peer group respect and admire me.
Cheng's Prestige 2			.598		Members of my peer group do NOT want to be like me.
Cheng's Prestige 3					Others always expect me to be successful.
Cheng's Prestige 4			.589		Others do NOT value my opinion.
Cheng's Prestige 5			.724		I am held in high esteem by those I know.
Cheng's Prestige 6			.644		My unique talents and abilities are recognized by others.
Cheng's Prestige 7		.445	.557		I am considered an expert on some matters by others.
Cheng's Prestige 8			.714		Others seek my advice on a variety of matters.
Cheng's Prestige 9			.558		Others do NOT enjoy hanging out with me.
Cheng's Dominance 1	.411	.684			I enjoy having control over others.
Cheng's Dominance 2		.756			I often try to get my own way regardless of what others may want.
Cheng's Dominance 3		.693			I am willing to use aggressive tactics to get my way.
Cheng's Dominance 4		.724			I try to control others rather than permit them to control me.
Cheng's Dominance 5		.532			I do NOT have a forceful or dominant personality.
Cheng's Dominance 6		.671			Others know it is better to let me have my way.
Cheng's Dominance 7	.465	.520			I do NOT enjoy having authority over other people.
Cheng's Dominance 8		.712			Some people are afraid of me.
Jackson's Dominance 1	.680				I feel confident when directing the activities of others.
Jackson's Dominance 2	.570				I would make a poor military leader.
Jackson's Dominance 3				-.407	I would like to be a judge.
Jackson's Dominance 4	.684				I avoid positions of power over other people.
Jackson's Dominance 5		.559			I try to control others rather than permit them to control me.
Jackson's Dominance 6	.714				I don't like to have responsibility for directing the work of others.
Jackson's Dominance 7	.460				I would like to play a part in making laws.
Jackson's Dominance 8	.716				I have little interest in leading others.
Jackson's Dominance 9				.556	In an argument, I can usually win others over to my side.
Jackson's Dominance 10	.599				I feel uneasy when I have to tell people what to do.
Jackson's Dominance 11	.655				The ability to be a leader is very important to me.
Jackson's Dominance 12	.492				Most community leaders do a better job than I could possibly do.

Jackson's Dominance 13				.487	I am quite effective in getting others to agree with me.
Jackson's Dominance 14					I am NOT very insistent in an argument.
Jackson's Dominance 15	.549				I would like to be an executive with power over others.
Jackson's Dominance 16				-.603	I would NOT want to have a job enforcing the law.
Eigen Values	7.125	3.761	2.707	1.710	
% of Variance	21.590	11.398	8.204	5.181	

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations.

Appendix 4. Materials used in Chapter 6

A4.1. Study 14: Puzzle Performance in Gain/Loss Frames

Felt power between studies

Participants in both the powerful and powerless condition studies reported on a 7-point Likert scale the degree to which they agreed (1) or disagreed (7) with the following statements:

I feel in charge at work.

At work, I have influence over other people's outcomes.

Puzzle Paradigm Instructions

Gain Frame:

If you **succeed** in solving 4 or more problems (out of 6), as a reward you will **skip** test 2 that takes 11 minutes, and **finish early**!

Loss Frame:

If you **fail** to solve 4 or more problems (out of 6), you will be redirected to an **additional** test that takes 11 minutes!

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