French republican integration, British multiculturalism, and educational responses to terrorism

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Declaration

I, Jonathan Simon James confirm that the work presented in my thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.
Abstract

This thesis investigates how teachers and other local actors in France and England have enacted national-level responses to the context of terrorism. These include the Great Mobilisation of the School for the Values of the Republic and the duty to promote fundamental British values, which aim to promote core national values among young people to promote social cohesion and build resilience to radicalisation. France’s Policy for Preventing Violent Radicalisation in Schools and England’s Prevent duty outline procedures for identifying and reporting suspected cases of radicalisation. The common emphasis on shared values reflects the transnational trend towards civic integration, wherein Western democracies have placed a greater emphasis on liberal-democratic values as a tool for the integration of migrants and minorities. Despite these convergent trends, there is a tendency in the comparative literature to contrast the British ‘multicultural’ approach to immigrant integration with the French ‘republican’ or ‘assimilationist’ approach. Drawing on eight school-based case studies and further interview and observational data, this thesis provides an empirically grounded account of how these particularistic policy traditions and convergent trends are reflected in the enactment of the policies at the local level, as well as in teachers’ ideas. It finds that in both countries, policymakers and practitioners have drawn on institutionalised ideas and practices in their responses to recent terrorist attacks or their enactment of national policies, leading to some path dependencies. However, policymakers have also looked beyond prevailing paradigms in the face of emerging challenges. Some of the convergence observed at the national level is evident at the school level. The comparative research design also provides new insights into the governance of the two education systems and reveals that local actors in France have greater decision-making capacity than earlier comparative work would suggest.
Impact statement

This thesis contributes to the debate on national models of immigrant integration by providing an empirical account of how ideas associated with French republican integration, British multiculturalism, and civic integration affect educational responses to terrorism at the local level. Previous contributions to this debate have tended to focus on national policymaking as a level of analysis and few comparative studies have applied these ideas to educational responses to terrorism. By comparing four contrasting schools in France and England, the thesis demonstrates how convergent policy trends and common concerns about Islamist terrorism interact with more established ideas and institutions. Teachers have drawn on institutionalised ideas and practices in their responses to recent terrorist attacks and their enactment of national-level policies. These particularistic traditions are also evident in teachers’ understanding of their role as educators, leading some to resist more novel or convergent aspects of these policies. However, the data also point to the way context of terrorism and the civic integration trend are reflected in teachers’ ideas and practices. As such, some of the convergence observed at the national level is evident at the school level.

The comparative research design also provides new insights on the governance of the English and French education systems. It reveals that where the governance arrangements of an individual policy give a high degree of autonomy to local actors, there tends to be greater variation in local level enactments, with school level-factors playing a significant role. Where policies place more detailed requirements on local actors, there tends to be greater consistency in the way teachers enact policy. However, both countries have developed more detailed or restrictive policies and more enabling policies, complicating any notion of a strongly centralised French education system and a decentralised English education system. Teachers and other local actors in France have greater decision-making capacity over national-level responses to terrorism than previous comparative work would suggest. Similarly, the compulsory nature of the Prevent duty in England suggests that the laissez faire approach to policymaking that authors have associated with Britain may no longer prevail, at least in the domain of counterterrorism policy.
Finally, the thesis provides insights for future education policy and practice. Governments in both countries have developed policies aimed at promoting liberal-democratic values to strengthen social cohesion and build young peoples’ resilience to radicalisation. In England, however, the introduction of the duty to promote fundamental British values has coincided with the decline in the significance of citizenship education. In France, the values are addressed through a compulsory moral and civic education curriculum. This arrangement creates more space for meaningful engagement with these values and principles in the classroom. The thesis also highlights the challenges teachers in both countries face when addressing sensitive topics in the classroom. This points to a need for professional learning activities that strengthen their substantive knowledge of these issues and their capacity to manage classroom discussion.
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1. Introduction

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the United Kingdom and France have both been the site of terrorist attacks committed by citizens associated with violent Islamist groups such as ISIS. The security concerns brought on by these attacks have often articulated with pre-existing concerns about the ‘failed integration’ of the two countries’ Muslim populations (see Joppke 2014; Vincent 2019b; Wesselhoeft 2017; Moran 2017). There are striking similarities in the way governments in the two countries have turned to public schooling to address these concerns. Policies such as the Great Mobilisation of the School for the Values of the Republic (Grande mobilisation pour l’école pour les valeurs de la République, Great Mobilisation, 2015) and the duty to promote fundamental British values (FBV, 2014) promote liberal-democratic principles among young people as a way of promoting social cohesion and building resilience to radicalisation. France’s Policy for Preventing Violent Radicalisation in Schools (Politique de prévention de la radicalisation violente en milieu scolaire, PPVRS, 2019) and England’s Prevent duty (2015) address the threat of terrorism more directly, setting out the procedures for identifying and reporting suspected cases of radicalisation. The common emphasis on shared values reflects the transnational trend towards civic integration, wherein Western democracies have placed a greater emphasis on liberal-democratic values as a tool for the integration of migrants and minorities (James 2016; James and Janmaat 2019; see also McGhee and Zhang 2017; Mouritsen et al 2019; Joppke 2007a; Meer and Modood 2009; Goodman 2015).

Despite these convergent tendencies, comparative studies have tended to highlight the differences in the two countries’ responses to immigrant integration and cultural diversity. This literature tends to present Britain as having a more laissez faire approach to integration and a more accommodating approach to cultural diversity than France, where policies are more interventionalist and emphasise cultural homogeneity (see, for example, Favell 2001; Bleich 1998; Koopmans et al 2005; Meer et al 2009; Qureshi and Janmaat 2014; Mannitz 2004; Mannitz and Schifferauer 2004). As such, this thesis investigates how these convergent trends and particularistic tendencies are reflected in teachers’ and other local actors’ enactment of recent national-level
responses to terrorism. It provides insight on how prevailing ideas on immigrant integration and cultural diversity interact with the more institutional and contextual factors that influence policy enactment at the local level.

I begin this chapter by developing the background to the study, relating my personal interest in the topic to the theoretical framework. This leads to a discussion of the research problem and gap in the literature I address. In 1.3, I clarify the objectives of this thesis, setting out my research questions. I then set out my central thesis, highlighting the significance of my findings as well as their limitations. I end by outlining the structure of the rest of this thesis.

### 1.1. Background to the study

My interest in this topic stems from the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the Paris region in January 2015, and my original motivation for undertaking this PhD study was to apply findings from my master’s dissertation to the context of schools in England and France (James 2016). In the days following the attacks on the satirical newspaper *Charlie Hebdo*, there were confrontations between students and teachers in schools across France as some students appeared to qualify or justify the attacks. For many of these students, *Charlie Hebdo* had offended Islam by publishing cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. These events fed into concerns that schools had failed in their duty to integrate the descendants of post-war migrants from France’s former colonies, or that these populations were somehow deficient in the values of *liberté, égalité*, and *fraternité* said to underpin the French Republic (see James 2016; Moran 2017; Chabal 2017; Wesselhoeft 2017; Ogien 2013). As a British person who has lived in France for most of my adult life, I have a longstanding interest in the way issues around immigrant integration and cultural diversity are understood differently in the two countries. Following these events, I sought to better understand how these ideas were brought to bear on the challenges associated with domestic terrorism.

This interest led me back to the comparative literature on national models of immigrant integration I had studied as an undergraduate, notably Adrian Favell’s *Philosophies of Integration* (2001). Favell (2001) argues that the ‘policy frameworks’ that developed in
response to the challenges associated with the integration of minority ethnic and especially Muslim populations in Britain and France draw on two distinct ‘public philosophies’: ‘British multicultural race relations’ and ‘French Republican intégration’ (2). There is a broader tendency in the comparative literature to contrast ‘liberal’ ‘laissez faire’ or ‘multicultural’ responses to cultural diversity in Britain with a more statist, ‘culturally monist’ or ‘assimilationist’ approach in France (see Bleich 1998; Koopmans et al 2005; Bonjour and Lettinga 2012; Qureshi and Janmaat 2014). In contrast, Joppke (2007a; 2007b; 2017) has argued that Western states are converging towards a civic integration approach, characterised by an emphasis on the acceptance of liberal-democratic values as a pre-condition for citizenship. While Joppke (2017) has argued that this trend renders the idea of national models of immigrant integration less relevant, Mouritsen et al (2019) argue that civic integration ideas can ‘co-exist’ with established public philosophies and ‘translate’ into different policy solutions in different national contexts (599). My master’s dissertation explored whether the civic integration trend and the common threat of domestic terrorism would lead to convergence in responses to cultural diversity in the two countries – notably in the field of education policy - or whether these particularistic tendencies would persist (James 2016).

The previous study points to areas where the ideas and practices associated with British multiculturalism and French republicanism have persisted, as well as areas of convergence (see James 2016). In the English case, concerns about violent extremism and Muslim integration have led to the emergence of a discourse on the failure of multiculturalism, culminating in its outright rejection as an official policy framing. Politicians from across the political spectrum have sought to articulate and promote shared ‘British’ values, drawing on liberal-democratic principles. The ‘muscular liberalism’ doctrine that has informed recent anti-terrorism policies relates the active defence of British values to the fight against ‘non-violent extremism’ (see James 2016; Cameron 2011; Joppke 2014; McGhee and Zhang 2017). These trends find their expression in the FBV duty, introduced in 2014, which requires schools to ‘actively promote’ the values of ‘democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs’ (DfE 2014a; 2014b). The Prevent duty (2015) requires schools to give ‘due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’ including non-violent extremism, defined as ‘vocal or active opposition’ to FBV (HM Government 2015). It is in this respect that the
turn towards civic integration – driven, in part, by concerns about violent extremism - is most evident. At the same time, I have found that the political consensus on the idea ‘of Britain as a multi-racial and multicultural society’ identified by Favell (2001) has persisted and is evident in recent educational responses to terrorism (135; James 2016).

In France, the notion of integration through the republican values of liberté, égalité, and fraternité continues to frame debates on public schooling and has arguably become more salient in the context of recent terrorist attacks. The concept of laïcité – a uniquely French form of secularism – has featured prominently in recent policy responses. The Great Mobilisation was a direct response to the January 2015 terrorist attacks and encourages teachers and schools to promote republican values and laïcité (see MEN 2015a). More recent counterterrorism strategies reflect the notion that promoting these values could strengthen students’ resilience to radicalisation (Eduscol 2022b; see also Government of France 2018:9). The proximity of civic integration ideas to republican notions of integration through shared values makes it difficult to speak of a civic integration ‘trend’ in the French case (see Joppke 2007a:9; Mouritsen 2008:3; Goodman 2014:184). Rather, I have argued that the recent emphasis on promoting these values in schools consolidates a pre-existing tendency, and that England has moved further in the direction of France than vice versa (James 2016) However, recent education policies in France also represent some tentative steps towards practices authors have associated with the English education system. The context of terrorism has led to calls to strengthen the teaching of religious phenomena (enseignement des faits religieux) as a way of helping young people make sense of religious fundamentalism and challenging extremist narratives (see Debray 2002; Lemaire 2009). This thinking seems to inform recent policy responses to terrorist attacks, creating space for practices that are common in religious education in England (see MEN 2015a; Eduscol 2022b). Furthermore, Lorcerie (2015) has associated the Great Mobilisation with the more accommodating approach to cultural diversity that prevailed under the previous centre-left government. As in the case in England, recent developments in France reflect a departure from some established ideas and practices and the continuation of others.
Alongside the civic integration trend, I see the emergence of the idea of ‘education as national security’ (Davies 2016:6) as a policy trend connecting the two countries. Drawing on Bennet’s (1991) five dimensions of policy convergence, I argue that the common challenge of domestic terrorism has given rise to education policies with similar ‘goals’ and ‘content’ and which make use of similar ‘instruments’ (218). The Great Mobilisation and FBV require teachers to promote, uphold, or defend core national values through the curriculum and other aspects of school life; I refer to these as ‘values’ policies. Governments in both countries have also implemented ‘anti-radicalisation’ policies that require teachers to report radicalisation concerns to school leadership.

This study investigates how teachers and other local actors in England and France are enacting these policies, with particular attention to how prevailing ideas on immigrant integration and cultural diversity are reflected in their ideas and practices. This is informed by previous sociological work that conceives of policy as a dynamic process that occurs in different contexts, and which may ‘contested’ or ‘subject to different interpretations as it is enacted’ in schools (Ball et al 2012:2; see also Bowe et al 1993; Ball 1993). Policies conceived at the national level may look quite different once they enter different schools and classrooms and it cannot be taken for granted that the convergent tendencies I have highlighted above will be reflected in practice.

The notion that teachers have the capacity to reinterpret, contest, or even ignore policies opens the possibility that the novel or convergent aspects of the policies that are the focus of this study may fail to take hold in schools (see Ball 1993; Ball et al 2012). Bleich (1998) has suggested that distinctive ideas on integration and cultural diversity in England and France inform the ‘priors’ of gatekeepers in the two education systems. Priors ‘are the product of a gatekeeper’s socialization and the prism through which new policy proposals are filtered’ (Bleich 1998:93). He argues that while the ‘liberal’ priors of actors in the English education system have allowed multicultural practices to flourish, gatekeepers in France reject multicultural policies based on their belief in a Universalist, laïque conception of equality and social cohesion (Bleich 1998:93-95). Insofar as FBV represents a move away the laissez faire approach to integration that has prevailed in Britain, and a move towards a more monocultural conception of Britishness, teachers may resist or reinterpret the policy in line with their
multicultural ‘priors’ (see Bleich 1998:93). Similarly, French teachers’ *laïque* priors may lead them to resist recent attempts to promote the teaching of religious phenomena (Bleich 1998:93-95). Furthermore, Jensen (2019) has argued that the existing ideas and practices associated with national public philosophies of integration serve as a resource that social actors can draw on in response to new phenomena (see also Carstensen 2011). These actors’ cognitive and material limitations mean they are more likely to draw on familiar ideas than new ones, which can lead to the ‘stabilization’ of ‘public philosophies’ (Jensen 2019:627). This suggests that as well as *actively* resisting new ideas, teachers may also more *passively* draw on established ideas and practices in their responses to the policies and the context of terrorism.

It cannot be assumed, however, that teachers and other education actors are rooted within stable model or public philosophy. Indeed, although Bleich (1998) argues that ‘although priors may be national in scope […] they can be contested across segments of society’ and ‘can change over time’ (93;99). This draws attention to the fact that social actors within the two countries do not necessarily share the same ideas about cultural diversity. Recent policy changes and shifts in the prevailing discourse on integration are also likely to have had an impact on teachers. The context of terrorism and the discursive turn towards civic integration may mean that teachers in England share policymakers’ enthusiasm for promoting British values. In France, the recent turn towards a more accommodating approach to cultural diversity – notably attempts to promote the teaching of religious phenomena in schools – may have similarly affected the way that teachers think about and carry out their role. In both cases, actors at different levels of the system are likely to disagree on ideas relating to citizenship, nationhood, and cultural diversity. This thesis sheds light on these propositions by applying them to data from schools in the two countries.

### 1.2. Research problem

This study addresses a gap in existing research by providing insight into how convergent policy trends such as civic integration and the securitisation of education interact with established ideas, practices, and institutions in the English and French education systems. Contributions to the debate on national models of immigrant
integration and civic integration have tended to focus on policymaking rather than enactment. Favell’s (2001) study sheds light on how ‘contrasting understandings’ of ideas such as ‘citizenship’, and ‘nationality’ are reflected in responses to cultural diversity in Britain and France (2). More recent work by Joppke (2004; 2007a; 2007b; 2014; 2017), Mouritsen et al (2019), Mouritsen (2008) and Tonkens and Duyvendak (2016) highlight some of the convergent trends that have emerged in the context of concerns about violent extremism and Muslim integration. These studies provide a framework for understanding what convergence and divergence in prevailing ideas on immigrant integration might look like, but do not specifically address public schooling.

Several comparative studies point to the ways in which some of these convergent and divergent tendencies may be reflected at the school level. Bleich’s (1998) work sheds light on how the contrasting public philosophies described by Favell (2001) may feed into the ‘priors’ of actors in the field of education. Schiffauer et al’s (2004) study draws out the contrasting conceptions of ethnic difference and nationhood reflected in the practices of teachers in England and France. These studies draw on data from the context of policy implementation, but do not specifically address the question of convergence. Drawing on earlier work by Koopmans et al (2005), Qureshi and Janmaat (2014) use ideal-typical models to measure patterns of convergence and divergence in migrant incorporation policies in the English, French and German education systems. Studies by Osler and Starkey (2009) and Mouritsen and Jaeger (2018) point to the way citizenship education policies in the two countries reflect some of the common concerns I have highlighted here at the same time as drawing on more established ideas. However, none of these comparative studies use empirical data from schools to explore these convergent and divergent tendencies.

Other researchers have investigated the enactment of national-level responses to terrorism at the local level, with some drawing links to British multiculturalism, French republicanism, and the debate on integration in the two countries. Vincent (2019a; 2019b) has researched schools’ enactment of FBV and relates her findings to a prevailing climate of concern about Muslim integration and violent extremism. She finds that although the political climate has become less favourable to multiculturalism, several teachers draw on multicultural ideas and practices in their enactment of FBV (see Vincent 2019b). Similarly, McGhee and Zhang (2017) consider FBV as part of a
broader retreat from multiculturalism and a turn towards muscular liberalism. However, they argue that the design of the FBV policy enables teachers to ‘filter out some of [this] muscularity’, enacting the duty in ways that are consistent with their aims to prepare young people for life in multicultural Britain (948).

In the French case, fewer studies specifically address the ‘values’ and ‘anti-radicalisation’ policies that are the focus of this study. Studies by Laborde and Silhol (2018) and Laborde (2019) highlight the role of académie-level actors in enacting policies such as the Great Mobilisation and suggest that local enactments may differ from national-level policy. Orange (2016;2017) and Lorcerie and Moignard (2017) carried out research in schools in the period before and after the January 2015 terrorist attacks. Their findings provide insight on the way concerns about violent extremism feed into teachers’ practices around laïcité. At the time of writing, I am not aware of any comparative studies that use empirical data from schools to explore convergence and divergence in educational responses to terrorism.

1.3. Research aims, questions, and methods

This study aims to address a gap in previous research – as well as the limitations of my master’s dissertation (James 2016) – by investigating how teachers, school leaders, and other local actors in France and England are enacting recent national-level responses to terrorism. Of particular interest are the ways teachers’ responses to the policies and the context they emerged in reflect the tendencies authors have associated with French republican integration, British multiculturalism, and civic integration. Finally, the study aims to shed light on the way these prevailing ideas interact with the more material and institutional factors that influence policymaking at the local level, including the way policies are governed at the national level and the local contexts in which teachers operate.

Based on these aims, the study addresses one overarching research question (RQ1), and two sub questions (SQ1 and SQ2):

1 France’s education system is divided into 30 académies, each led by a rector directly appointed by the Ministry of National Education (Ministère d’Education Nationale, MEN) in Paris (see chapter 3).
RQ1: How are teachers, school leaders, and other local education actors in England and France enacting recent national policy responses to the context of terrorism and what responses have they developed on their own initiative?

SQ1: What are the similarities and differences in local level enactments within and between the two countries?

SQ2: How are prevailing ideas on immigrant integration and cultural diversity reflected in these enactments and actors’ broader responses to the context of terrorism?

RQ1 seeks to capture the activities and processes that make up schools’ enactment of the national policies that are the focus of this study, but also teachers’ self-initiated responses to the context of terrorism. Although my primary focus is on teachers and schools, I have become increasingly interested in the role of mid-level policy actors in enacting these policies as the study has progressed. SQ1 addresses within-country and between-country variation. Since this is a comparative study, I am interested in how between-country similarities or differences can be understood considering the literature on the two countries’ schooling systems and their approaches to immigrant integration. However, previous studies point to the way the specific institutional context of each school mean that teachers’ policy enactments may vary considerably within the two countries (see Ball et al 2012:20-26). These within-country differences are worthy of attention, since they may suggest that local factors are more important in explaining policy enactments than national factors. SQ2 deals with how French republican integration, British multiculturalism and civic integration are reflected in local actors’ ideas and practices.

To address these questions, I have carried out case studies of four contrasting schools in each country. These draw on observations, documentary analysis, and interviews. These are complimented by semi-structured interviews with policy officials at the local level in England and at the académie and national levels in France. In France, I have also observed teacher training and meetings in two académies (see chapter 4).
1.4. Significance of the study

This thesis makes a significant contribution to the debate on whether responses to cultural diversity in countries such as England and France are determined by particularistic traditions or whether these responses are converging. Moving beyond a dichotomy of national models versus civic integration, I show how particularistic traditions can co-exist with convergent trends and provide an empirically grounded account of how these ideas affect practices at the school level (see Mouritsen et al 2019: 597). I argue that teachers, like policymakers, ‘fall back’ on the institutionalised ideas and practices associated with French republican integration and British multiculturalism in their responses to the context of terrorism and their enactment of the policies that are the focus of this study (Jensen 2019:627). I also find evidence of teachers’ more active resistance to the policies. In France, some teachers’ laïque ‘priors’ have indeed hampered recent attempts to promote the teaching of religious phenomena (see Bleich 1998). The FBV policy comes into conflict with some English teachers’ multicultural ‘priors’ (see Bleich 1998). I argue that this leads to the ‘stabilization’ of some institutionalised ideas and practices, but that others have been ‘reinterpreted’ to address new challenges (see Jensen 2019:627; Carstensen 2011:156). While policymakers have also looked to new ideas to address these challenges, this has led to gradual, rather than revolutionary change at the school level (Carstensen 2011:163).

However, the data reveal that not all teachers share the same ideas on integration cultural diversity. There is also evidence that recent policy changes and the discursive shifts they reflect have impacted their ideas and practices. In France, the broad agreement on the continued importance of republican values and laïcité in the current climate conceals disagreements about what this should mean in practice. Several teachers identified with what they described as an ‘open’ conception of laïcité or distanced themselves from the more restrictive forms of laïcité they associated with the prevailing climate (see Lorcerie 2015; Baubérot 2015:89-102). I argue that this ‘open’ position reflects an openness towards cultural diversity with similarities to multiculturalism in England. In the English case, the turn towards civic integration and
muscular liberalism appears to have created a climate in which some teachers are prepared to be more assertive in their defence of values such as tolerance and respect for diversity.

Finally, this thesis provides new insights on the governance of the English and French education systems and the role of teachers as policy actors. I find that where governance arrangements give local actors a high degree of decision-making capacity, there is a greater degree of variation between schools, with school-level factors and teachers’ own preferences playing an important role. Where policies place more detailed requirements on local actors, there tends to be greater consistency between schools within one country. The French ‘values’ policy is partly enacted through a compulsory moral and civic education (EMC, enseignement moral et civique) curriculum. This gives teachers more guidance compared to FBV, leading to greater consistency in how they address the values. In contrast, the fact that Prevent is a compulsory duty meant that it was more widely implemented than anti-radicalisation policies in France. Overall, local actors in France have greater decision-making capacity over the policies that are the focus of this study than previous comparative work would suggest, while the data from England poses a challenge to the notion of a laissez faire policymaking tradition in England (see Bleich 1998; Favell 2001; Archer 2013; cf. Buisson-Fenet 2007).

1.5. Limitations of the study

Limitations arise from the fact that this study includes a small number of cases. This raises questions as to whether findings from my case schools can be applied to other schools in the two countries. Following other case study researchers, I argue that the cases should not be treated a representative sample of schools in England and France (see Alexander 2000:265; Yin 2014:59; Stake 1995:4). Rather, I use the empirical data from the cases to corroborate, falsify, or delimit propositions emerging from previous studies (Yin 2014:41). Although the comparison of four contrasting schools within the two countries points to some common tendencies, any generalisations I make should be taken as ‘fuzzy’ or tentative (see Bassey 1999). Further research would be required to establish how my findings apply in other contexts.
1.6. A note on terminology and translations

Education policy is a devolved responsibility in the UK and each of the four countries has a separate education system. However, the Westminster government retains responsibility for nationality and immigration, and some of the comparative studies I cite in this thesis take the UK as their unit of analysis (see HM Government 2020). I use ‘England’ to refer to the English education system - the focus of this study – and ‘Britain’ to refer to policies and debates relating to immigration and cultural diversity.

I have translated any direct quotations from French data or secondary sources myself. In the case of secondary sources, I include these as paraphrases with the source and page number in brackets. Some of the terms I use refer to policies, practices or concepts in France that have no direct equivalent in the England. In most of these instances, I include an approximate translation, adding the original French in brackets for reference. I do not translate the terms laïcité and académie. Laïcité roughly translates as secularism but has a broader meaning in French policymaking and public debate (see, for example, Favell 2001; Bowen 2007; Mabilon-Bonfils and Zoïa 2014). I use the French académie (a territorial administrative unit) to avoid confusion with the English term ‘academy’ (a type of school). In chapter 3, I briefly compare the French and English education systems and introduce key terms that will be useful to the reader.

1.7. Thesis outline

In this introductory chapter, I have set out the background to this study and the gap in previous research I seek to address. This led to an overview of my research aims, questions, and methodology. Finally, I have summarised the conclusions I will develop throughout this thesis as well as their significance and possible limitations.

In chapter 2, I develop the theoretical framework the study. Drawing on literature from fields such as migration studies and comparative education, I highlight and contrast some of the tendencies authors have associated with responses to cultural diversity in
England and France. I develop a frame for understanding how these responses may be converging, using concepts such as civic integration and the ‘culturalization of citizenship’ (Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016). Finally, I use the literature on the role of ideas in policymaking and policy enactments in schools to develop an account of how these ideas may be reflected in educational responses to terrorism at the local level.

Chapter 3 addresses the policies that are the focus of this study, the context in which they emerged, and recent empirical studies on their enactment at the local level. I begin with a brief introduction to the two education systems, before comparing the policies and pointing to the ways they reflect prevailing ideas on immigrant integration. The empirical studies provide insight on how teachers beyond the case schools are implementing the policies and how the climate engendered by recent terrorist attacks feeds into their ideas and practices.

In Chapter 4, I set out the methodology and research design for the study and my reflections on the research process. I address the questions of generalisability and external validity I have raised in this chapter and develop my rationale for using the findings from individual cases to address the research questions.

Chapters 5 and 6 present my analysis of the school-based case studies and other data from France and England respectively. The case studies are structured around the research and sub-questions. I begin by highlighting key features of each school’s enactment of the ‘values’ and ‘anti-radicalisation’ policies, pointing to the similarities and differences with the other cases (RQ1 and SQ1). The second part of each case study addresses the way prevailing ideas on immigrant integration feed into teachers’ ideas and practices (SQ2).

Chapter 7 draws together the findings from chapters 5 and 6 and relates them to the research and sub-questions. Following a similar structure to the previous chapters, I begin by comparing policy enactments across schools within one country and between countries. This lays the foundation for a discussion of how ideas such as French republican integration, British multiculturalism and civic integration are reflected in local actors’ policy enactments and their broader responses to the context of terrorism. I end
by discussing the significance and limitations of my findings, pointing to areas for further research.
2. Theoretical framework

In this chapter, I develop a comparative framework for the study. I begin by highlighting some of the contrasts in prevailing ideas and practices in the fields of immigrant integration, cultural diversity, and citizenship education in France and England that emerge from the literature. I have found the work of Favell (2001) useful in conceptualising some of these differences. He argues that the ‘policy frameworks’ developed in response to ‘the political, social, and moral dilemmas posed by the integration’ of minority ethnic and especially Muslim populations in Britain and France draw on two distinct ‘public philosophies’: ‘British multicultural race relations’ and ‘French Republican intégration’ (2). These philosophies draw on ‘contrasting understandings of core concepts such as citizenship, nationality, pluralism, autonomy, equality, public order, and tolerance’ and constitute ‘a set of consensual ideas and linguistic terms held across party political lines in each country’ (Favell 2001:2). I use Favell (2001) alongside other studies that compare responses to cultural diversity in England and France, notably within the education system. Within this literature, there is a tendency to contrast the British, liberal, multicultural approach, with a universalist, assimilationist French approach (see Bleich 1998; Koopmans et al 2005; Meer et al 2009; Qureshi and Janmaat 2014; Mannitz 2004; Mannitz and Schiffauer 2004; Schiffauer and Sunier 2004). Some authors use typologies or ‘national models’ to explain the differences in these approaches. This literature is significant for two reasons. Firstly, the tendencies authors associate with British multiculturalism and French republicanism may be reflected in teachers’ ideas and their responses to the policies that are the focus of this study. Studies that address educational responses to cultural diversity point to some of the practices they might draw on.

However, this comparative framework also addresses some of the limitations of the ‘national models’ approach (see Jensen 2019; Bertossi et al 2015). The first of these is that using national models as an analytical tool risks presenting the politics of immigration and integration as stable and failing to account for change over time (Jensen 2019; see also Bertossi et al 2015). Favell (2001), for example, claims that the policy frameworks governing immigration politics in Britain and France are path
dependent (26-33). The term path dependency, borrowed from the field of organisational economics, has been used by historical sociologists to account for the persistence of institutional practices or ‘patterns’, even when these are ‘sub-optimal’ (Mahoney 2000:507; Favell 2001:27). While other authors look to past events to explain these persistent patterns or policies, Favell (2001) argues that path dependency is a ‘symptom of the contemporary political forces that are invested in the status quo’ (27). Since the policy frameworks he describes evolved as imperfect compromises at moments of crisis, he argues, they cannot be abandoned without significant costs to mainstream political actors in Britain and France, notably the risk that extremist voices will enter the debate (Favell 2001:29). As a result, the frameworks are limited in their capacity to respond to new problems, such as the terrorist attacks that are the focus of this study (see Favell 2001:26-33). However, this claim fails to account for the convergent tendencies I identified in my master’s dissertation, and which I seek to explore in this study (see James 2016). As such, I use the concepts of civic integration and the ‘culturalization of citizenship’ to point to the ways teachers’ ideas and practices may be evolving in line with recent shifts in the policy discourse (see Mouritsen et al 2019a; Joppke 2007a;2007b;2017; Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016).

The national models approach has also been criticised for failing to provide ‘a theory of action regarding how ideas affect policies’ (Jensen 2019:616; see also Bertossi 2011). In section 2.2, I use the literature on the role of ideas in policymaking and the role of teachers as policy actors to develop an account of how ideas such as French republicanism, British multiculturalism, and civic integration affect policymaking at the school level. This section also points to some of the material, contextual factors that influence policy enactment in schools. I end by summarising the theoretical propositions emerging from the literature that I explore in this thesis.

2.1 Persistent differences or convergence?

The first section of this chapter addresses two perspectives on immigrant integration in France and England. The first emphasises the differences in the way policymakers
and education practitioners in the two countries have approached questions of cultural diversity and immigrant integration. I frame this discussion around Favell’s (2001) ‘philosophies of integration’: French Republican integration and British multicultural race relations. I develop Favell’s (2001) ideas drawing on studies that indicate how these public philosophies influence education policy and practice. Section 2.3 addresses the ‘civic integration’ perspective, which points to the ways in which ideas and practices in this field may be converging. Following Mouritsen et al (2019) I develop my understanding of civic integration as an ‘ideational/discursive phenomenon’ that emphasises shared values as a condition for successful integration and entrenches the role of the state in promoting these values (599-601). I argue that teachers and policymakers may draw on civic integration ideas and national model ideas in their responses to terrorism. I end this section by highlighting two tendencies that undercut the ostensible openness of civic integration: a tendency to present minority ethnic and Muslim populations as lacking in the shared values that underpin the national community; and a trend towards thicker or more ‘culturalized’ conceptions of citizenship (see Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016). These convergent trends are reflected in recent national-level responses to terrorism and may be evident in teachers’ ideas.

2.1.1 Republican integration and public schooling in France

Public debates on integration and cultural diversity in France are characterised by references to a coherent, uniquely French approach (see Favell 2001; Bowen 2007; Bertossi 2011; 2012; Bertossi et al 2015). Within this discourse, a particularly French ‘model’ of integration stretches back to the Third Republic and has successfully integrated waves of immigrants as France has become more diverse (Favell 2001:43-46). This ‘myth of republican citizenship’ belies the extent to which ideas on integration and French republicanism are internally contested and have changed over time (Favell 43-46). Favell (2001), Chabal (2017), and Bertossi et al (2015) see the politicisation of immigration during the 1980s as a significant turning point in debates on French republicanism. For Bertossi et al (2015) ‘there have been at least four different narratives used to describe the public problem of immigrant integration’ since this period (69). While this casts doubt on the empirical reality of a coherent French ‘model’ of immigrant integration, Bertossi (2012) argues that it is still ‘useful to look at how the
standard definition of French republican citizenship is negotiated and produced' in different institutional settings (440). This is especially true, he argues, since actors in different arenas believe the French model exists and use it to justify their actions (Bertossi 2012:440; Bowen 2007:11).

The republican discourse arguably envisages a more central role for the state and its institutions in promoting successful integration than is the case in Britain. Bowen (2007) invites us to see the divergent conceptions of citizenship and integration in Britain and France as emerging from differing conceptions of freedom; ‘freedom from the state’ in Britain and ‘freedom through the state’ in France (11; see also Favell 2001). This relates to the idea that in France, the state plays an active role ‘in positively forming the political citizen’ and guaranteeing their rights (Favell 2001:96; see also Bowen 2007:11). For Bonjour and Lettinga (2012), French notions of nationality imply that ‘citizenship is a state of mind […] based on universal values that can be acquired, for instance in public schools’ (268). A ‘strong, centralised’ state plays a crucial role in promoting these values (Bonjour and Lettinga 2012:268; see also Bowen 2007:11-33). This contrasts with the British public philosophy where, according to Favell (2001), the emphasis is ‘on negatively protecting the individual from the state’ (96).

This understanding of citizenship and the state means that teachers and schools feature prominently in public debates on integration. The education system of the Third Republic - held to have integrated the regional identities of 19th-century France into a national community - continues to be evoked in these debates to this day (see Weber 1978; Favell 2001; Bowen 2007; Mabilon-Bonfils and Zoïa 2014; Wesselhoeft 2017). In the context of increased cultural diversity, political elites have emphasised the role of the republican school in creating French citizens by giving students access to common knowledge and promoting the values of liberté, égalité, and fraternité (see James 2016; Favell 2001:74; Bowen 2007; Lemaire 2009; Meer et al 2009; Doyle 2006; Bonjour and Lettinga 2012). Events such as the January 2015 terrorist attacks have led to concerns that the republican school has failed in this mission, with policies such as the Great Mobilisation seeking to address these concerns (MEN 2015a; see Vallaud-Belkacem 2015; Wesselhoeft 2017; James and Janmaat 2019:93-95).
Studies on citizenship education in France point to the ways in which republican notions of citizenship are reflected in the curriculum. For Starkey (2000) the ‘hegemonic discourse of Republicanism’ imbibes French citizenship education with ‘clear objectives and a clear sense of values’, especially compared to England (291). Johnson and Morris (2012) find that ‘the republican discourse is depicted so forcefully’ in citizenship education programmes and textbooks that the scope for ‘exploring non-mainstream ideas or values’ is limited (292). This, they argue, reflects the ‘objectivist confidence of the French in Republican citizenship values and ideas’ (Johnson and Morris 2012:292). They contrast this with the ‘English relativist and multicultural notion of citizenship’ (Johnson and Morris 2012:292). Mouritsen and Jaeger (2018) develop ideal-typical models for citizenship education, giving France as an example of a country that is close to the ‘traditional republican-liberal model’ (5-6). In this model, ‘the state is entitled to shape its citizens to promote its vision of the common good’ (Mouritsen and Jaeger 2018:5). For this reason, ‘it may also be necessary to constrain parents’ ability to transmit particular cultural or religious traditions if they stand in the way of effective socialisation’ (Mouritsen and Jaeger 2018:5). This stands in contrast with the ‘Lockean or political-liberal model’ the authors associate with Britain, wherein schools ‘serve families and communities by protecting them from the state’ (Mouritsen and Jaeger 2018:5). This contrast mirrors the differing conceptions of ‘freedom through the state’ and ‘from the state’ discussed by Bowen (2007:11; see also Favell 2001:96).

Taken together, these citizenship education studies suggest that the centrality of the republican discourse and the state gives teachers considerable power to promote a very clear set of values, potentially over and above parental or communal values.

There is a tendency within the literature to characterise French responses to cultural diversity as assimilationist. This includes authors such as Bleich (1998) and Qureshi and Janmaat (2014), who use ideal-typical models to compare England and France’s education policy responses to immigration and cultural diversity. Both place France closest to the ‘assimilationist’ or ‘assimilation’ ideal types, although they find that policy positions in both countries have shifted over time (Bleich 1998:82; Qureshi and Janmaat 2014:716-717; see also Goodman 2014:186; Favell 2001:85). In Bleich’s (1998) definition, ‘assimilationist’ education policies aim at ‘erasing cultural differences and promoting cultural homogeneity’ (82). Qureshi and Janmaat (2014) define the ‘assimilation’ ideal type as low recognition of minority cultures and high acceptance of
migrants as equals (716-717). This builds on the work of Koopmans et al (2005), who contrast the French ‘culturally monist’ conception of citizenship with the British ‘culturally pluralist’ approach (52-53). Although the French conception of citizenship theoretically allows newcomers to express their cultural identity in the private sphere, they argue, the public sphere is interpreted so widely as to prohibit many of the cultural claims made by Muslim minorities (Koopmans et al 2005: 51-73). In chapter 3, I argue that recent education policies represent tentative steps towards a more accommodating approach to cultural diversity (see James 2016).

The concept of laïcité arguably plays a key role in the separation of public and private identities. In its original conception, laïcité relates to a set of laws passed between 1881 and 1905 that separate church and state. Since this time, religious education has been absent from the French curriculum. Religion has tended to feature in the history curriculum, with an emphasis on the contribution of world religions to civilisation, rather than on contemporary religious beliefs and practices (see Mannitz 2004; Petit 2018). There are also strict rules around the religious and political neutrality of teachers and other civil servants. As questions of immigration and cultural diversity became politicised in the 1980s, political and intellectual elites have increasingly come to see laïcité as a tool for promoting social cohesion, particularly within the education system (see Favell 2001; Bowen 2007; Baubérot 2015; Diallo and Baubérot 2015; Bertossi et al 2015). This understanding of laïcité as a tool for integration has become institutionalised through a series of policies and reports since this period, and I argue that it informs recent educational responses to terrorism (see Hajjat and Mohammed 2016; Mabilon-Bonfils and Zoïa 2014).

Despite its increasing salience in public debates, the definition of laïcité is unstable and contested in different arenas (see Bowen 2007; Baubérot 2015; Lorcerie 2015; Hajjat and Mohammed 2016; Pélabay 2017; Laborde and Silhol 2018; Laborde 2019). For Bowen (2007), it is the very lack of a stable definition that makes laïcité a useful resource for political argument; actors can use it to justify a range of positions while grounding their arguments within a cherished republican tradition (Bowen 2007:32). Baubérot (2015) identifies seven visions of French laïcité that have competed for political dominance since the late 19th century. While some of these visions reflect a more ‘open’ position on religious diversity, others seek to restrict religious practices
Baubérot 2015). This instability engenders varying understandings and practical manifestations of laïcité, both within the arena of policymaking and in the everyday life of schools (see Lorcerie 2015; Laborde and Silhol 2018; Laborde 2019).

Public debates on laïcité are also increasingly focused on Islam. The seemingly endless controversies around Islamic dress in public schools are notable in this regard. These begin with the first of many ‘headscarf incidents’ that took place in the city of Creil in 1989, when three young women were refused entry to school for wearing the Islamic veil. Following a period of intense public debate around similar incidents, France passed a law prohibiting Islamic veils and other ‘ostensible religious symbols’ in 2004 (see Bowen 2007; 2009; Baubérot 2014; Durpaire and Mabilon-Bonfils 2016).

For some authors, the 2004 law has expanded the definition of the public sphere by applying the principle of religious neutrality to students as well as teachers. Hajjat and Mohammed (2016) argue that while previous interpretations of the 1905 law governing the role of religion in schools guaranteed students’ freedom of religious expression, the 2004 law redefines the boundary between the public and the private sphere by restricting this freedom (143). Bowen (2007) also sees the debate on Islamic veils and the eventual ban on religious symbols as reflecting an ‘expansion’ of the ‘secularised public space’ and the definition of laïcité (31).

There is broader sense in which this trend towards increasingly restrictive interpretations of laïcité reflects the assimilationist tendency I discussed above. Quoting from an open letter published at the time of the first ‘headscarf incident’ (Debary et al 1989), Mannitz (2004) finds that the arguments used against Islamic veils work on the assumption that ‘the school needs to create a quasi-neutralised public setting before it can offer equal access to the republican projects of rationality and liberty’ (90). In this view, the aim of the school is to purify students of their cultural and religious particularities, which are an obstacle to reason, equality, and successful integration (Mannitz 2004:90; see also Mannitz and Schiffauer 2004; see Mabilon-Bonfils and Zoïa 2014). I argue that this ‘expanded’ conception of laïcité and the notion of the school as a ‘quasi-neutralised’ setting are evident in recent practices (Bowen 2007:31; Mannitz 2004:90).
In this section, I have highlighted key tendencies that authors have associated with responses to immigration and cultural diversity in France. These are intended to give an indication of what path dependency might look like in the French case, as well as which prevailing ideas teachers and other actors in the field of education might draw on. The studies I have discussed here emphasise the role of the state in shaping individual citizens and promoting social cohesion, with the republican values of *liberté, égalité, fraternité*, and increasingly *laïcité*, playing a key role (see Favell 2001:74; Bowen 2007; Lemaire 2009; Meer et al 2009; Doyle 2006; Bonjour and Lettinga 2012). As such, the state is empowered to promote these values through citizenship education and in other areas of school life, potentially at the expense of ‘non-mainstream’ values, such as communal or parental values (Johnson and Morris 2012:292; see also Mørupsen and Jaeger 2018:5; Starkey 2000). There is also a tendency to contrast France’s assimilationist responses to cultural diversity with Britain’s multiculturalist approach (see, for example Goodman 2014; Bleich 1998; Qureshi and Janmaat 2014). This implies that schools do not emphasise ethnic or religious diversity and promote equality by giving students access to universal knowledge and a common culture (see Bleich 1998; Qureshi and Janmaat 2014; Mannitz and Schifauer 2004). I have also drawn attention to the way increasingly expansive definitions of *laïcité* reflect the assimilationist tendencies highlighted by some authors.

At the same time, I have challenged the notion of a stable, coherent French ‘model’ of integration. Understandings of French republicanism, and especially concepts such as *laïcité*, are internally contested and have changed over time (see Favell 2001:43; Chabal 2017; Bertossi 2012; Bertossi et al 2015; Bowen 2007; Baubérot 2015). Importantly, the context of recent terrorist attacks has led to tentative steps towards addressing cultural and religious diversity more explicitly in the classroom. The changing and contested nature of republican ideas opens the possibility for variation in teachers’ ideas and practices.

2.1.2 ‘Multicultural race relations’ and schooling in England

A key point of contrast that emerges from the work of authors such as Goodman (2014) and Favell (2001) is that notions of citizenship and belonging in Britain are less explicit
than they are in France. Favell (2001) points to the absence of the kind of high profile ‘policy reflections’ on integration that took place in France in the 1980s and 1990s (96). As such, the ‘theory’ and ‘principles’ underlying British multicultural race relations must be ‘reconstructed’ from a ‘very fragmented set of ideas’ expressed in different pieces of legislation (Favell 2001:96). Considering that Britishness and British citizenship were poorly defined until the 21st century, Goodman (2014) argues that the recent British values discourse represents a break with the past (139-155). Despite these developments, however, she finds that the British state still plays a limited role in ‘directing or facilitating integration’ compared to countries such as France (Goodman 2014:140).

For Favell (2001), the combination of a ‘negative’ definition of freedom and a laissez faire tradition that favours non-interventionist policies has allowed multiculturalism to thrive in Britain (96). He finds that the preference for ‘negatively protecting the individual from the state’ leaves ‘a wide sphere of culture untouched or unstructured by the public political sphere’ (Favell 2001:96). As such, successful integration does not require newcomers to change their culture. Those who defend the right of minorities to maintain their cultural identity often evoke this notion of freedom (Favell 2001:138-141). What emerges instead is a kind of ‘multicultural nationalism’ where repressive immigration laws combine with a relaxed approach to integration (Favell 2001:115). Political debates since the 1980s have been characterised by a consensus on the ‘idea of Britain as a multi-racial and multicultural society, with no place for exclusionary discourse on culturally nationalist grounds’ (Favell 2001:135).

Recent shifts in the discourse on cultural diversity raise questions as to whether the consensus on the idea multicultural Britain persists, if indeed it ever existed. Bleich (1998) argues that while ‘passive acceptance’ of the idea ‘that Britain is a multicultural country’ is relatively widespread, some right-wing actors ‘still believe in an “essential” Britishness’ (94; see also Boswell and Hampshire 2016:138). He also finds that multicultural ideas have had more of an impact at the local level - notably in inner-city areas – than at the level of central government (Bleich 1998:95; see also Qureshi and Janmaat 2014; Meer et al 2009; Osler and Starkey 2009; Fetzer and Soper 2005; Vincent 2019b). For these reasons, he argues that the ‘priors’ of actors in the English education system are less ‘uniform’ than those in France (Bleich 1998:95). Vincent
(2019b) warns against ‘asserting a golden age of multiculturalism’ in discussing the recent backlash against the concept (12). She points out that multiculturalism has been long been subject to criticism from the left as well as from the right (Vincent 2019b:12). As with France, actors hold different ideas about cultural diversity and teachers may take up different positions within these debates.

Several of these notions of citizenship are reflected in approaches to citizenship and values education in England. For Starkey (2018), citizenship education in England reflects the ‘ambiguity’ of Britain’s political culture, where ‘[p]rinciples are often assumed rather than made explicit’ (6). Here, he points to the lack of a written constitution providing a ‘definitive’ or ‘consensual’ idea of what British values are (Starkey 2018:6; see also Starkey 2000:49). This finds its expression in a citizenship programme of study where the values guiding society are poorly defined (Starkey 2000:49). Similarly, Johnson and Morris (2012) find that while England’s citizenship programme of study aims to promote values such as ‘toleration’ and ‘respect’ the ‘specific ideological principles’ underlying these values ‘are left unspecified and ambiguous’ (291). They also find that the English citizenship education curriculum is shorter and less prescriptive than the French one (Johnson and Morris 2012:290). As Starkey (2018) points out, even the recent fundamental British values policy specifies little in terms of the substantive content of the values it seeks to promote (6; see also Vincent 2019b; McGhee and Zhang 2017). I return to this point in my comparative analysis of the two countries’ ‘values’ policies since it is an important point of contrast with France (see chapter 3).

There is also a sense that the laissez faire tradition and the negative conception of freedom are expressed in a relativist approach to values education. Johnson and Morris (2012) find that the English citizenship education curriculum gives greater space for young people to consider different viewpoints compared to France, where republican notions of good citizenship tend to dominate (292). They cite Dawkins (2008), who has found that teachers in England are reluctant to challenge extreme beliefs they believe arise from students’ religious or cultural backgrounds (Johnson and Morris 2012:292). Similarly, in the ‘Lockean or political-liberal’ model that Mouritsen and Jaeger (2018) associate with English citizenship education, schools ‘do not protect children from the normative pressures of their backgrounds’ (5). Such
findings imply a more limited role for schools in promoting the state’s ‘vision of the common good’ than is the case in France and suggest that communal or parental values may take precedence over state or school values (Mouritsen and Jaeger 2018:5).

Studies that focus on the schooling of migrants and ethnic minorities in England highlight the multicultural tendencies in this approach. Qureshi and Janmaat (2014) place England closest to the ‘integrationist’ ideal type, where both recognition of minority cultures and acceptance as equals are high. They find that governments and local authorities in England have tended to favour minority religious education, mother language provision, and multicultural education programmes, where the curriculum values and reflects diversity (Qureshi and Janmaat 2014:716-717). For Bleich (1998), responses to cultural diversity in English schools have tended towards ‘active’ and ‘passive’ multiculturalism. While passive forms of multiculturalism make allowances for ethnic and religious minorities without expecting any change on the part of the majority population, active multiculturalist policies imply the that the majority population will change as minority cultures increasingly form part of the national culture (Bleich 1998:83-84). Mannitz and Schiffauer (2004) find that of all the schooling cultures in their ethnographic study, cultural diversity was most visible in the London school they visited (61). They point to representations of multicultural Britain in textbooks and in the visual culture of schools. Ethnic categorisation was also salient in the school’s administrative culture and teacher discourses (Mannitz and Schiffauer 2004; see also Schiffauer and Sunier 2004). They conclude that ‘the dominant discourse on multicultural Britain depicts the population as consisting of different ethnic groups under the umbrella identity of Britishness’ (Mannitz and Schiffauer 2004:61). This suggests that the notion of Britain as a multicultural society is evident in the everyday life of schools, with teachers playing an important role in reproducing this discourse (Mannitz and Schiffauer 2004:61).

The role of religion in English schools differs significantly from the French case. Religious education (RE) is a compulsory subject in English schools, who are also expected to organise a daily act of worship. Even in non-faith schools, collective worship should be ‘wholly or mainly of a broadly Christian character’ (DfE 1994:21) and RE must ‘reflect that the religious traditions of Great Britain are in the main
Christian’ (DCSF 2010:10). In practice, however, they tend to reflect the population of the local community - giving them a multi-faith flavour in diverse areas – and often serve to promote respect for and understanding of diversity (see Mannitz 2004; Qureshi and Janmaat 2014:720; Fetzer and Soper 2005; 38-42; Farrell 2019). Mannitz (2004) finds that in the London school in her study, RE and collective worship aimed to promote ‘mutual recognition’ between the different faiths in the local area and within ‘the British mosaic of communities’ (115). Religious education also plays an important role in some schools’ enactment of FBV and Prevent and provides opportunities to address the topic of terrorism (see Farrell 2016; Vincent 2019b:116-121). This makes the subject especially pertinent to this study.

The studies I have discussed in this section suggest that notions of nationality, citizenship and British values are less explicit than they are in France (see Favell 2001; Goodman 2014; Starkey 2000). A laissez faire approach to public policy and a negative definition of freedom give rise to a comparatively limited role for the state in driving integration processes (see Favell 2001; Goodman 2014). These tendencies are evident in approaches to citizenship education, where national values are implicit or poorly defined, and teachers may be reluctant to challenge communal or parental values (see Starkey 2001; Johnson and Morris 2012; Mouritsen and Jaeger 2018). Favell (2001) also sees British conceptions of freedom as giving rise to a relaxed approach to integration, and a broad consensus on the idea of Britain as a multicultural society (see also Bleich 1998; Mannitz and Schiffauer 2004; Mannitz 2004). In the context of public schooling, this translates to policies and practices that tolerate or even celebrate minority cultures (see Bleich 1998; Mannitz and Schiffauer 2004; Mannitz 2004; Qureshi and Janmaat 2014). Finally, I have contrasted the role of religion in schools in the two countries, highlighting how RE and collective worship reflect these multicultural ideas (see Mannitz 2004).

The recent trend towards civic integration - evident in the FBV policy and the broader debate on British values and identity - calls these tendencies into question. In many ways, policy elites have turned to civic integration ideas to address the historical lack of reflection on British citizenship and British values even if, as I have argued, these ideas remain less explicitly defined than they are in France (see Goodman 2014; Starkey 2018). Furthermore, for some authors, recent policy trends reflect a move
away from multiculturalism towards the more assimilationist approach associated with France (see, for example Vincent 2019b; McGhee 2008; McGhee and Zhang 2017). I have also drawn attention to the ‘ambivalence’ of attitudes towards cultural diversity in Britain, which suggests that teachers may have different orientations towards Britishness (Vincent 2019b:5; see also Bleich 1998; Boswell and Hampshire 2016:138). I discuss the turn towards civic integration in the following section.

2.1.3 Civic integration as an ideational trend

In this section, I develop a frame for understanding how prevailing ideas on integration and cultural diversity in Britain and France have evolved in recent years and how they may be converging. In the previous study, I applied Joppke’s (2007a; 2007b) definition of civic integration to the field of education policy and found support for his claim that Western states are converging in this direction (James 2016). Joppke (2004:2007a) defines civic integration policies as those that place a greater responsibility on the migrant to integrate by seeking employment, learning the host country language, and by adhering to liberal-democratic values (see also Goodman 2014:1). He traces the origins of the concept to the Dutch 1998 Newcomer Civic Integration Law, which required new migrants to take civics and language courses (Joppke 2017). Governments in Britain, France, and other European states have since adopted similar policies (see Goodman 2014; Joppke 2017). In the previous study, I argued that the underlying philosophy and presuppositions of civic integration – notably the focus on core national values as a prerequisite for integration - informed attempts to resolve a ‘crisis of integration’ in England and France and to prevent young people from being drawn into extremism (see James 2016; see also Meer and Modood 2009; McGhee and Zhang 2017). I see the policies that are the focus of this study as expressions of this trend (James 2016).

Joppke’s (2017) definition is limited, however, because he only applies the concept of civic integration to citizenship and residence policies for newcomers. This excludes the education policies and broader discursive trends that are of interest in this study. Furthermore, while other scholars have argued that the civic integration trend can co-exist with - or is shaped by – existing national traditions or institutional frameworks, Joppke (2017) insists that the trend renders the idea of national models less
analytically relevant (c.f. Vertovec and Wessendorf 2009; Goodman 2014; Mouritsen et al 2019). The findings from my master’s dissertation broadly support the former position (James 2016). I found that national model ideas continued to frame the debate on integration and cultural diversity in the two countries, even as both countries introduced civic integration policies for entry and settlement and ‘values’ policies for schools (James 2016). This was especially true in the French case, where republican values and laïcité feature prominently in recent integration and education policies (see James 2016). In the British case, the move away from multiculturalism as an official policy discourse was more evident, but ‘frameworks for minority cultural recognition’ of the kind described by Vertovec and Wessendorf (2009) have persisted (27; James 2016).

Mouritsen et al’s (2019) conceptualisation of civic integration as an ‘ideational/discursive phenomenon’ provides a more useful basis for this study (599). The authors understand civic integration as a set of ‘abstract ideals’ relating to integration rather than as a set of policy instruments regulating settlement and citizenship (Mouritsen et al 2019:600). If civic integration relates to a set of ideas, these may be ‘refracted through’ existing public philosophies and ‘translate into quite different policy solutions as they pass through national structures [and] institutions’ (Mouritsen et al 2019:600). This perspective allows for the possibility of ‘both convergence and path dependency’ and provides a more dynamic account of how civic integration ideas interact with existing ideas, practices, and institutions (Mouritsen et al 2019:599). It also suggests that civic integration ideas may be taken up outside the arena of national policymaking. Indeed, Mouritsen et al (2019) argue that this understanding of civic integration requires scholars to broaden their scope from settlement and citizenship policies to include domains such as the ‘regulation of religion’ and ‘the teaching of history, civics and religion in schools’ (597-598, my emphasis).

Mouritsen et al (2019) identify four characteristics that distinguish civic integration from the more ‘functional’ characteristics of integration that prevail in the European Union’s Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy (2004) and in academic literature in the 1980s and 1990s (601). Two of these are particularly pertinent to this study. The first involves the ‘expansion’ of the definition of ‘desirable ‘good citizenship’ beyond functional aspects such as participation in the labour market and civil society
into the realm of ‘personal conduct and values’, religion, and the family (Mouritsen et al 2019:601). The second is increased ‘state involvement’ in bringing about ‘the mind sets and practices’ associated with successful integration, using either ‘incentives’ or ‘more moralistic, disciplinary interpellation of individuals’ (Mouritsen et al 2019:601). These tendencies are evident in the policies that are the focus of this study, which arguably reflect a notion of citizenship that includes private values as well as public norms and which envisage a more active role for the state education system in promoting these mindsets.

Other authors have applied the concepts of liberal nationalism and civic nationalism to the discourse on British values. Vincent (2019a; 2019b) sees the FBV policy as an expression of liberal nationalism. Liberal nationalists insist that in a multi-ethnic society, ‘liberal political ideals’ such as a redistributive welfare state can only flourish where there is a ‘shared national identity among citizens’ (Soutphommasane 2012:71). In contrast to the ethnic national identity advocated by the xenophobic right, liberal nationalists propose an identity based on a ‘commitment to the society, its values, and support for its institutions’ (Vincent 2019a:20; see also Soutphommasane 2012; Banting and Kymlicka 2017). For Vincent (2019a), the FBV policy represents an attempt to promote this kind of shared identity (19). McGhee (2008) has used civic nationalism to describe the debate on British values that emerged during the New Labour years (129-136; see also Jerome and Clemitshaw 2012). In a similar vein to Vincent (2019a), McGhee’s (2008) definition of civic nationalism emphasises respect for national institutions and shared values as a basis for belonging. McGhee (2008) argues that New Labour figures sought to articulate a British patriotism based on civic values as an alternative to the ‘ethnic’ nationalism proposed by the far right (130). There are overlaps between these concepts and civic integration, notably the emphasis on purportedly ‘civic’ identities and shared values as a condition for social cohesion. However, they do not fully correspond to the definitions of civic integration I discussed above. As such, I refer to them alongside the concept of civic integration as prevailing ideas that teachers and other actors may draw on.

The proximity of civic integration to French notions of integration through shared values and state intervention make it more difficult to speak of a recent ‘turn’ towards civic integration in France. Citing Favell (2001), Joppke (2007a) has argued that the idea of
integration through shared language and values 'resonates closely with the traditional 'philosophy' of republican assimilation' (9; see also Goodman 2014:184). In discussing the recent 'civic turn', Mouritsen (2008) argues that 'French concepts of integration and social cohesion' have spread to countries such as the United Kingdom (3). For these reasons, I have argued that the British approach has moved more towards the French approach than the other way around (James 2016; James and Janmaat 2019). This poses challenges in discerning whether any ideas and practices I identify in the French schools in this study reflect the transnational civic integration trend, or a more established public philosophy. I return to this challenge in chapters 3 and 7, where I highlight some of the ways recent debates on integration in France reflect the tendencies towards 'expansion' and 'state involvement' discussed by Mouritsen et al (2019:601).

2.1.4 The culturalization of citizenship and the Muslim other

For some authors, the civic integration trend implies a move away from assimilationist policies and ethnic conceptions of nationhood towards more inclusive notions of belonging. Joppke (2004) situates the emergence of civic integration policies in the context of the 'de-ethnicisation' of 'liberal nation states', where notions of belonging are increasingly grounded in the same liberal-democratic values (2004:5). Goodman (2014) finds that recent integration courses and exams reflect a 'functional' 'state identity', rather than a national identity that emphasises 'sameness' (2014:3). These integration policies require newcomers to demonstrate knowledge of the country's institutions, culture, and norms to facilitate their participation in everyday life, but there is no expectation that they should adopt the country's customs or beliefs as their own (Goodman 2014:3). In theory, such 'civic' notions of citizenship and belonging are accessible to individuals from any background.

However, I wish to highlight two interrelated tendencies that undercut this ostensible inclusiveness. The first relates to the ways 'civic' discourses around shared values and norms have been deployed against minority ethnic and especially Muslim populations. This tendency can be seen in civics tests and entry requirements that appear to target Muslim populations, as well as wider discourses on Muslim populations' refusal of, or deficiency in the norms and values of the majority population (see Joppke 2017;
Vincent 2019a; 2019b; Fozdar and Low 2015; McGhee 2008; Hajjat and Mohammed 2016; Holmwood and O’Toole 2017; Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016). Furthermore, some authors have argued that far from moving in a purely ‘civic’ direction, understandings of citizenship and belonging in France, Britain, and other European countries are increasingly tied up with culture and national identity (see Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016; Mouritsen 2008; Vincent 2018; 2019b; Bertossi 2012). This literature points to the ways in which the boundaries between a ‘civic’ identity – based on public values, norms, and institutions – and an ethnic identity – based on history, language, and culture – can easily become blurred (Kostakopoulou 2006; Mouritsen 2008; Vincent 2019b; Soutphommasane 2012). These tendencies are not intrinsic to the idea of integration based on shared values, nor are they evident in the policy texts that are the focus of this study. However, I argue that they are part of the wider climate in which the policies have emerged, and which may feed into teachers’ responses to terrorism.

Both tendencies are evident in the trend Tonkens and Duyvendak (2016) call ‘the culturalization of citizenship’ (3). This describes a process by which ‘culture’ – defined in terms of ‘emotions, feelings, norms and values, and symbols and traditions’ - has become increasingly salient in contemporary debates on citizenship (Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016:3). Their definition of citizenship encompasses the majority population’s symbolic recognition of immigrants and their children as fellow citizens as well as the acquisition of legal citizenship status (Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016:2). They argue that both dimensions of citizenship are increasingly denied to migrants and minorities as states introduce civic integration policies for newcomers, and as acceptance as part of society becomes conditional upon acceptance of ‘Western’ values, notably values around gender, sexuality, and secularism (Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016:3). Since 9/11, they argue, Muslim populations have come to be seen as a particular threat to ‘the dream of a unified, secular, and morally progressive nation’ (Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016:10). The ‘culturalization of citizenship’ articulates with the process of ‘expansion’ described by Mouritsen et al (2019) in the sense that understandings of citizenship increasingly draw on a broader set of domains, including private beliefs (601). Furthermore, since the concept relates to popular as well as formal notions of citizenship, it could apply to citizenship education policies as well as teachers’ common-sense notions of belonging (see Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016:2).
In chapter 3, I apply the concept to recent debates on education in England and France.

2.1.5 Persistent differences or convergence: Conclusions

In the first section of this chapter, I have presented two perspectives on approaches to immigrant integration and cultural diversity in Britain and France. One perspective highlights the differences in the two countries approaches and suggests that these emerge from two contrasting public ‘philosophies of integration’, which give rise to ‘path dependent’ policy frameworks (see Favell 2001). Studies that focus specifically on public schooling point to the way these public philosophies may be reflected in education policy and practice. The literature on civic integration points to convergent tendencies in recent debates, notably the influence of ‘French’ notions of integration on the discourse on British values (Mouritsen 2008:3). In both countries, these debates have increasingly come to focus on Muslim integration, with Muslim populations presented as deficient in the shared values that underpin notions of citizenship and belonging. The context of Islamist terrorism has fed into these concerns.

In the previous study, I found that aspects of these divergent and convergent tendencies were evident in the policies that are the focus of this study (James 2016). For this reason, I follow Mouritsen et al (2019) in conceptualising civic integration as a set of ideas that can ‘coexist’ and ‘intersect’ with ideas and practices we might associate with ‘national models’ (597). This allows for the possibility of convergence in some areas and path dependency in others (Mouritsen et al 2019:599). Abstract ideas about the importance of promoting shared values, or tendencies such as the ‘culturalization of citizenship’ find different expressions within the two institutional contexts (see Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016). In the following section, I develop an account of how more established ideas and practices and convergent policy trends may be reflected in educational responses to terrorism at the local level.

2.2 Responses to Islamist terrorism in the ‘context of practice’
This section addresses the question of how ideas such as such French republicanism, British multiculturalism, and civic integration affect practices at the school level. This responds to the criticism that ‘the national models approach […] lacks a theory of action regarding how ideas affect policies’ (Jensen 2019:616). I begin by reviewing literature on the role of ideas in policymaking. Notable among these studies is Bleich (1998), who points to the ways British multicultural and French republican ideas may be reflected in teachers’ ‘priors’. Since few of these studies focus on the specific institutional context of public schooling, however, I also draw on sociological studies on policy enactment in schools. These studies underscore the role of teachers as policy actors who interpret and enact policy based on their own values and the context they work in. As such, they draw attention to the importance of school-level factors in policy enactment, a dimension that is often lacking in work that focuses on the role of ideas. They also point to ways in which policies as conceived at the national level may look very different once they enter schools.

2.2.1 The role of ideas in policymaking

One of the debates in the literature on ideas and policymaking centres on the agency of social actors in relation to public philosophies. Boswell and Hampshire (2017) characterise this debate as a divide between instrumentalist and institutionalist accounts of how ideas affect policymaking. In instrumentalist accounts, ideas are tools that actors use to gain support for a course of action, or to attack another (Boswell and Hampshire 2016). This description calls to mind the ways in which French republicanism features as a rhetorical tool in political debates on cultural diversity, as well as the way ‘multiculturalism’ has been used to explain presumed policy failures in countries such as the UK and the Netherlands (see, for example, James and Janmaat 2019; Bowen 2007; Bertossi 2011; Bertossi et al 2015; McGhee 2008). In contrast, institutionalist accounts emphasise the ways in which national ‘paradigms’ or ‘frames’ constrain what policy actors consider appropriate or desirable (Boswell and Hampshire 2016:134). In this view, French Republicanism and British multicultural race relations shape and delimit teachers’ ideas and practices.
In his account of why multicultural ideas and practices are more widespread in England than in France, Bleich (1998) seems to lean towards the institutionalist perspective. He argues that the ‘laïque republican priors’ of ‘gatekeepers’ in France’s highly centralised education system ‘have frozen out’ multicultural education policies (Bleich 1998:82). ‘Priors’ are the ‘prism through which new policy proposals will be filtered’ (Bleich 1998:93). His notion of ‘priors’ draws on Hall’s (1989) contention that the ‘structure of political discourse’ and the ‘prevailing set of political ideas’ in a polity explain why some policy ideas are taken up while others are not (383, in Bleich 1998:93). Bleich (1998) finds that significant numbers of theorists, policymakers, and practitioners in France associate multiculturalism with a ‘community logic’ that runs counter to the conception of citizenship as an individual relationship between citizen and state, and a notion of equality that favours universalism and the neutrality of state institutions (94). In contrast, he argues that the ‘liberal priors’ of key gatekeepers in the English education system have facilitated the spread of multicultural ideas (Bleich 1998:94-95). These gatekeepers include Labour-party politicians, local authority officials, and teachers and school leaders (Bleich 1998:95). He also finds that the decentralised governance structure of the English education system increases the number of gatekeepers, which in turn increases the chance of new ideas entering the system (Bleich 1998:90-92). The decision-making capacity of local authorities and schools is important in this regard (Bleich 1998:90-92).

Bleich’s (1998) notion of priors leads to one of the propositions I explore in this study; that teachers’ ‘priors’ - grounded in the two countries’ ‘philosophies of integration’ – mean they will resist novel aspects of recent national-level responses to terrorism (see also Favell 2001). In the French case, teachers may reject recent calls to engage with religious ideas in the classroom based on their laïque priors. In England, teachers’ multicultural ‘priors’ could lead them to resist the civic integrationist discourses the FBV policy is embedded in, enabled by the decentralised nature of the education system (Bleich 1998:90-92). At the same time, Bleich (1998) departs from Hall (1989) in arguing that although priors ‘may be national in scope’ they may also be contested within one country (93). He also claims that priors can change over time, though does not give an account of how this occurs (Bleich 1998:99). This implies that although some teachers’ multicultural or laïque priors may lead them to reject more novel aspects of recent policies, this will not be case for all teachers. It also allows for the
possibility that teachers’ priors have shifted in line with prevailing ideas on cultural diversity.

Other authors have criticised the institutionalist perspective for underplaying the role of individual agency or collective interests in policymaking. Carstensen (2011) makes a convincing case that social actors ‘cannot cognitively internalize highly structured systems’ such as policy paradigms or public philosophies to the point they cannot think ‘critically or strategically about them’ (149; see also Boswell and Hampshire 2016:134; Bertossi 2011; 2012). He also challenges Hall’s (1993) claim that ideational paradigms are ‘incommensurable’ and that actors cannot think or act within more than one (Carstensen 2011:149). Indeed, although prevailing ideas on integration may lead teachers to reject recent policy proposals, it seems less plausible that they could internalise all the ideas I have discussed in relation to British multiculturalism and French republicanism, especially since these ideas are not internally consistent. Importantly, I have also found that debates on immigrant integration and cultural diversity in the two countries have shifted in recent years and are not impervious to foreign ideas (see James 2016).

However, it seems to me that the instrumentalist approach also has certain limitations. An excessive focus on the agency of individual actors would suggest that established ideas or structures place no limits whatsoever on what they consider to be possible, or what they can achieve. Furthermore, the notion that actors only use ideas strategically seems to rule out the possibility that they genuinely believe in them (Boswell and Hampshire 2016:134). Taken to its extreme, the instrumentalist perspective views the social actor as calculating and cynical and implies that they always have a predefined end goal. This calls for an ideational account that allows for the possibility that previous ideas and policies have a degree of influence on the way teachers carry out their work, but which does not negate their capacity for critical thought and agency.

Carstensen (2011) and Jensen (2019) go some way in resolving this apparent tension by conceiving of existing ideas, policies, and practices as resources that actors use to make sense of the different phenomena and develop policy solutions. Carstensen (2011) posits the idea of a social actor as a ‘bricoleur’ who, when faced with a problem ‘takes stock of his existing set of ideas, policies and instruments and reinterprets them
in light of concrete circumstances’ (Carstensen 2011:156). Although these pre-existing ‘symbols, frames, scripts, institutions’ may be grounded in a national culture, they are ‘loosely structured’ (Carstensen 2011:152). They also exist ‘outside the minds of actors’ meaning they have the agency to engage critically and creatively with them (Carstensen 2011:154). Since the prevailing set of ideas may be incoherent and contradictory, actors will frequently approach them with scepticism, or may even reject them (Carstensen 2011:154). They may also turn to ideas outside the dominant paradigm, taking ‘multiple political, cultural, or functional perspectives into consideration’ when devising solutions to the complex problems they face (Carstensen 2011:156). Following Hay (2010), Carstensen (2011) calls this process ‘inter-paradigm borrowing’ (156). This seems to resonate with the way policymakers in Britain have looked to ‘French concepts of integration’, while French policymakers have arguably made tentative steps towards the English approach to teaching religion in schools (Mouritsen 2008:3; see also James 2016; James and Janmaat 2019). Furthermore, the notion that actors take multiple perspectives into account resonates with the literature on policy enactment in schools, which points to the multiplicity of factors that come into play when teachers ‘do’ policy (see, for example, Ball et al 2012).

However, Carstensen (2011) argues that although the bricoleur has the agency to use ideas creatively, his ‘cognitive limitations’ means that he is likely – but not certain - to draw on ‘institutionalized’ ideas and practices (Carstensen 2011:163). Any new ideas must also fit within existing institutions and ideas to gain acceptance among stakeholders. For this reason, bricolage leads to evolutionary change, rather than a radical break with the past on one hand, or stability on the other (Carstensen 2011:163). While new ideas may emerge, they will be blended with more familiar elements.

Jensen (2019) develops a broadly similar argument in relation to national models of immigrant integration. He sees national model ideas as ‘resources’ that actors can use to ‘creatively’ or ‘pragmatically’ to make sense of the world or to ‘satisfy their political preferences (Jensen 2019:627). Like Carstensen (2011), he suggests that the challenges actors face in making sense of complex phenomena – notably ‘time-pressure and/or lack of creativity’ – creates a ‘strong bias’ towards familiar ideas (Jensen 2019:627). This contributes to the ‘stabilization of public philosophies in
national policy-making’ (Jensen 2019:627). Actors use can also existing policies as resource when confronted with new problems, leading to a degree of path dependency (Jensen 2019:627). Drawing on Mahoney (2000), Jensen (2019) argues that established practices can fix ‘actors […] beliefs about what is appropriate and morally correct’ (223). This suggests that national models as public philosophies can act as a resource at the level of ideas (e.g., the idea of laïcité as a way of promoting social cohesion) and that previous policies or practices can provide resources for action (e.g., religious education as a place where young people can talk about extremism).

Jensen’s (2019) and Carstensen’s (2011) accounts of the role of previous ideas in policymaking emphasise the agency of social actors while pointing to the cognitive, material, and institutional factors that limit their capacity to affect radical change. Given the competing demands placed on teachers, they may easily be tempted to ‘fall back’ on the ideas and practices I have associated with French republicanism and British multicultural race relations (Jensen 2019:627). The more institutionalist accounts of Hall (1993) and Bleich (1998) point to another potential source of path dependency; the idea that teachers’ ‘priors will lead them to resist new policy trends. Importantly, however, Bleich (1998) also allows for possibility that teachers’ priors may have evolved in line with shifts in the broader discourse.

### 2.2.2 Teachers as policy actors

Sociological literature on policy enactment in schools also deals with the question of agency, albeit with a different focus to the literature on the role of ideas in policymaking. These studies draw attention the role of teachers in policy enactment (Ball 1993; Ball et al 2012; Braun et al 2011). Agency in this sense relates to teachers’ and school leaders’ capacity to decide how - or whether - to enact a given policy.

Ball et al (2012) find that teachers’ agency is often elided in studies that treat policymaking as a ‘top-down’ process, wherein teachers simply ‘implement’ the decisions made by national politicians (Ball et al 2012:2). Instead, the authors understand policy as a dynamic process, which is ‘repeatedly contested and/or subject to different ‘interpretations’ as it is enacted (rather than implemented) in original and creative ways within institutions and classrooms’ (Ball et al 2012:2; see also Bowe et
al 1992; Ball 1993). Since teachers ‘bring their own experiences, scepticisms and critiques to bear on’ policy texts, and will ‘read’ them ‘from positions of their identities and subjectivities’, policy enactments are likely to vary between schools (Ball et al 2012:15). Some policy texts are less prescriptive than others, meaning they may be ignored or ‘collectively undermined’ by teachers (Ball 1993:12). This is an important point, since I argue that the policies that are the focus of this study vary in this regard. The notion that previous policies form ‘a discursive archive on which […] teachers can draw over and against contemporary policy’ is also pertinent to this study, since I have proposed that previous ‘multicultural’ or ‘laïque’ approaches may lead teachers to resist novel aspects of recent policies (Ball et al 2012:6).

Importantly, however, policy can also place limits on teachers’ agency. Ball (1993) has argued that over time, ‘collections of related policies’, or ‘policy ensembles’ come to define power relations and subject positions in schools, placing limits on what actors in the field of education can say and think (15). Policies often create new expectations for teachers, thus redefining their role. Ball (1993) develops this notion of ‘policy as discourse’ in relation to the neoliberal turn in English education policy, notably the ways in which mechanisms such as league tables and Ofsted inspections direct teachers’ work (see also Ball et al 2012). As well as being ‘actors and subjects’, teachers are therefore also ‘subject to and the objects of policy’ (Ball et al 2012:3).

Policies such as Prevent and FBV do not fit neatly within this neoliberal trajectory. In fact, Ball et al (2012) argue that the recent focus on learning outcomes has crowded out ‘social values’ (10-11). While the FBV policy arguably incites teachers to re-engage with this aspect of schooling, this sits in tension with the need to ensure students’ success in examined subjects (see Vincent 2019b:54). I would also argue that teachers are, in part, the ‘object’ of anti-radicalisation policies in the two countries (see Ball 2012:3). These policies involve teachers in new activities, notably identifying potential signs of radicalisation in their students. Like the standards agenda, they have the potential to change the way teachers understand and carry out their role.

Another significant insight from Ball et al (2012) is the importance of school-level contextual factors in policy enactment. They group these into four overlapping ‘contextual dimensions’ (Ball et al 2012:20-26). ‘Situated contexts’ relate to a school’s
location and history, including student demographics (Ball et al 2012:22). ‘Professional cultures’ refers to school ethos and teacher values (Ball et al 2012:26). ‘Material contexts’ relate to the aspects such as school buildings and infrastructure, budget and human resources, while ‘external contexts’ relate to external pressures such Ofsted inspections and league tables (Ball et al 2012:21). These ‘contextual dimensions’ – which are likely to vary considerably between schools in one country – may be at least as important in understanding policy enactment as the ideational factors I have discussed so far. The ‘situated context’ of schools, notably the proportion of Muslim students, is likely to be especially important in the enactment of policies that respond to elite concerns about Muslim integration and Islamist terrorism (see Ball et al 2012:22). I discuss the implications of school-level contextual factors for case selection and data analysis in chapter 4.

Ball et al (2012) also draw attention to the ‘messiness’ of policy enactment in schools and the multitude of variables and interpersonal dynamics involved in the process. Notable among these are teachers’ ‘impossible workloads’ and a subsequent lack of time and energy, which place limits on their agency and creativity (Ball 2012:71). On one level, these constraints increase the possibility of a bias towards familiar ideas and practices (see Jensen 2019; Carstensen 2011). At the same time, the more routine and embodied aspects of school life may mean that teachers have little time to think in abstract terms and that prevailing ideas on integration will not be the only concerns guiding their policy responses. Any account of how these ideas affect policy enactment at the school level must show how they interact with more material, institutional factors.

2.3 Conclusion: Key concepts and theoretical propositions addressed in this thesis

In the first section of this chapter, I drew on comparative studies on citizenship, citizenship education and responses to cultural diversity in France and England to highlight some of the particularistic and convergent tendencies I explore in this thesis. In the second section, I pointed to the ways these tendencies might affect school and local-level enactments of the policies that are the focus of this study. Drawing these
two sections together, I end this chapter by summarising the key concepts and theoretical propositions addressed in this thesis.

Table 2-1 illustrates the key concepts and how they interrelate. I use the terms ‘French republican integration’ and ‘British multicultural race relations’ to describe the ‘public philosophies of integration’ that have prevailed in the two countries (see Favell 2001). I use ‘civic integration’ as an umbrella term to describe a recent ‘ideational/discursive’ trend that is evident in the two countries, and which is characterised by an emphasis on shared values and norms as a pre-condition for successful integration (Mouritsen et al 2019:600). The ‘culturalization of citizenship’ describes a process wherein formal citizenship status and the symbolic recognition of migrants and ethnic minorities as citizens increasingly depends on their acceptance of ‘Western’ values (Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016:3). I see this process as part of the civic integration trend, since it involves the ‘expansion’ of the definition of good citizenship to include private values as well as public norms (Mouritsen et al 2019:601). Authors such as Vincent (2019a;2019b), McGhee (2008) and Jerome and Clemitshaw (2012) have used the terms liberal nationalism and civic nationalism to characterise the recent debate on British values. These concepts also relate to the civic integration trend since they emphasise civic identities and shared values as a condition for social cohesion. Muscular liberalism refers to the doctrine that emerged under British Prime Minister David Cameron, and which is expressed in the Prevent and FBV policies. I use the term to refer to specific turning point in British political discourse, although I have argued that the doctrine articulates with Mouritsen et al’s (2019) definition of civic integration. I use Mouritsen and Jaeger’s (2018) ideal-typical ‘models’ of civic education to characterise approaches to civic education in the two countries. I argue that practices in France are closer to the ‘the traditional republican-liberal model’, while practices in England draw on elements of this model and the ‘Lockean political-liberal model’ (see Mouritsen and Jaeger 2018:5).

Several of the propositions I explore in this thesis relate to the questions of convergence and path dependency that I have introduced in the previous sections. The literature on the role of ideas in policymaking points to two mechanisms that lead to the persistence of the institutionalised ideas and practices authors associate with French republicanism and British multiculturalism. The work of Bleich (1998) suggests
that some teachers’ ‘priors’ may be grounded in republican or multicultural ideas, leading them to actively resist novel elements of recent policies. This is likely to be more pronounced in the English case, where the recent discourse on British values represents a more radical break with the past. Contributions by Jensen (2019) and Carstensen (2011) suggest that these ideas and practices are resources that teachers are likely to draw on in response to the challenges posed by terrorism, but also when enacting government policies. For Jensen (2019), existing policies can serve as a resource in devising these strategies and can frame actors’ sense of what is appropriate (627). In this sense, path dependencies may emerge from teachers’ unconscious bias towards old ideas as well as their more active resistance to new ones.

As Bleich (1998), has pointed out, however, ‘priors’ may not be uniform within one country and may also change over time. Ideas on integration and cultural diversity in the two countries are subject to debate and contestation and teachers may take up different positions in these debates. Furthermore, I have argued that recent shifts in the policy discourse may be reflected in the way teachers think about integration and carry out their role. For example, the emergence of a discourse on British values may mean that teachers in England are more willing to promote certain values among their students than previous work would suggest (see Johnson and Morris 2012).

Alongside these ideational factors, the literature on policy enactments points to some of the more material, contextual factors that affect how teachers implement national-level policies. I argue that two of these factors are especially relevant to this study. The first relates to the degree to which policy texts or frameworks constrain or enable teachers’ agency. While some texts or governance arrangements limit teachers’ capacity to enact policies in ways that fit with their own preferences, others give them significant decision-making capacity (see Ball 1993). In chapter 3, I address how the two countries ‘values’ and ‘anti-radicalisation’ policies vary in this respect. I have also suggested that the ‘situated context’ of individual schools – notably the proportion of Muslim students – is likely to be an important factor determining schools’ enactment of policies that address concerns about Islamist terrorism and Muslim integration (see Ball et al 2012:22). This is evident in the empirical studies I review in chapter 3.
### Table 2-1 Key concepts used in this thesis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses to immigration and cultural diversity</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Both contexts</th>
<th>Britain/England</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French republican integration</td>
<td></td>
<td>Civic integration</td>
<td>British multicultural race relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic nationalism</td>
<td></td>
<td>Liberal nationalism</td>
<td>Culturalization of citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal nationalism</td>
<td></td>
<td>Culturalization of citizenship</td>
<td>British multicultural race relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culturalization of citizenship</td>
<td></td>
<td>Civic integration</td>
<td>British multicultural race relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideal-typical models of civic education</td>
<td></td>
<td>Civic integration</td>
<td>British multicultural race relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Mouritsen and Jaeger 2018:4)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Civic integration</td>
<td>British multicultural race relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal nationalism</td>
<td></td>
<td>Civic integration</td>
<td>British multicultural race relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culturalization of citizenship</td>
<td></td>
<td>Civic integration</td>
<td>British multicultural race relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional republican-liberal</td>
<td></td>
<td>Civic integration</td>
<td>British multicultural race relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lockean/political-liberal</td>
<td></td>
<td>Civic integration</td>
<td>British multicultural race relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **France**: Civic nationalism, French republican integration.
- **Both contexts**: Civic integration, Liberal nationalism, Culturalization of citizenship.
- **Britain/England**: British multicultural race relations, Muscular liberalism.
3. The policy contexts and policy enactment in schools

In this chapter, I compare the ‘values’ and ‘anti-radicalisation’ policies that are the focus of this study, provide further insight into the context in which they emerged, and review recent empirical studies on their enactment in schools. I begin by highlighting aspects of the French and English education systems that will be useful in reading this thesis. In section 3.2, I compare the policies, highlighting features I have found to be relevant to their enactment. I develop this analysis further in section 3.3, which addresses the impact of recent terrorist attacks on the debate on integration, cultural diversity, and public schooling in the two countries. In section 3.4, I review existing research on educational responses to terrorism. I begin with comparative studies that address the global trend towards countering violent extremism (CVE) through education, before reviewing studies that focus specifically and the French and English contexts.

3.1 The English and French education systems

In this section, I highlight aspects of the French and English education systems that are relevant to this study. I introduce key vocabulary that I return to in the following chapters and provide insight on institutional context in which teachers enact the policies I discuss in 3.2. Table 3-1 gives an overview of the schooling phases, grade levels and academic qualifications I refer to in this thesis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>England</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LEVEL OF SCHOOLING</td>
<td>ECOLE PRIMAIRE</td>
<td>PRIMARY SCHOOL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 - 5</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Reception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 – 6</td>
<td>GS</td>
<td>Year 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 – 7</td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Year 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7- 8</td>
<td>CE1</td>
<td>Year 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 – 9</td>
<td>CE2</td>
<td>Year 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 – 10</td>
<td>CM1</td>
<td>Year 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Schooling</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>College</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - 11</td>
<td>Year 6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - 12</td>
<td>Year 7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 - 13</td>
<td>Year 8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 - 14</td>
<td>Year 9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 - 16 Below</td>
<td>Year 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Certification</strong></td>
<td>Year 11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brevet (Diplôme national du brevet)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Schooling</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General and Technical or Professional Lycée</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 - 16 Seconde</td>
<td>Above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 - 17 Première</td>
<td>Year 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 - 18 Terminale</td>
<td>Year 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Certification</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic/technical/ professional baccalaureate</td>
<td>A-level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional aptitude certificate (CAP, certificat d’aptitude professionnelle)</td>
<td>Vocational qualifications (e.g., BTEC, apprenticeships)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One relevant difference between the two systems is that upper secondary programmes in England are more specialised than in France. Unlike many vocational programmes in England, the professional baccalaureate includes a core curriculum of French, history-geography, mathematics, art, modern foreign languages, and physical education. Importantly, all upper secondary students study moral and civic education (EMC), meaning those on vocational tracks have a minimum number of mandated hours in which they learn about laïcité and republican values.

There are also differences in the way the two education systems are governed. In several respects, France’s education system is one of the most centralised in Western

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2 Since history and geography are taught within the same timeslot by the same teacher in France, I refer to them in the hyphenated form.
Europe (see Dobbins 2014:284; Mons 2004). The control, regulation, and design of the education system remains largely with the Ministry of National Education and Youth (Ministère de l’Éducation Nationale et de la Jeunesse, MEN), with some elements of resource management devolved to local authorities (see Mons 2004; Dobbins 2014). Although policy is developed and coordinated at the central administration of the MEN in Paris, however, it is largely implemented by the académies. There are 26 of these administrative territorial units in mainland France, and 4 in France’s overseas territories. A rector, appointed directly by the MEN, has overall responsibility for the policy implementation and human resources in an académie, covering institutions from primary to higher education (see MEN 2021; 2022c). Mons (2004) describes this transfer of responsibility - where decisions are made by a local representative of a central administration - as de-concentration (42). She distinguishes this from delegation and devolution, where responsibility is transferred to local actors independent of the central government (Mons 2004:42). These terms are more appropriate to the English policy landscape.

However, Buisson-Fenet (2007) criticises what she sees as a disproportionate focus on the centralised state among scholars of France’s education system. For her, the hyper-centralising phase that begin in 1945 – which unified the structure, financing, and political direction of the education system – ended in the 1980s (Buisson-Fenet 2007:387). She argues that the memory this period obscures the fact that the day-to-day regulation of education policies often takes place at the local level (Buisson-Fenet 2007:386-388). Importantly, I have found that académie and school-level actors have significant decision-making capacity over recent national-level responses to terrorism (see also Laborde 2019).

Public schooling in England has been characterised by different school types with different governance arrangements since its conception. The expansion of the academies and free schools programme since 2010 has led to further decentralisation. While most publicly funded schools were previously maintained by local authorities, some 80% of secondary schools and 39% of primary schools were academies or free schools in the 2021/22 academic year (HM Government 2022). These schools receive their funding from the government but are independent from the local authority and have responsibility for areas such as budgets, staffing, and policy implementation.
Some academies belong to a Multi Academy Trust (MAT) made up of at least two schools. In some cases, MATs fulfil similar functions to local authorities, although several operate across the country rather than in one geographical area. In this respect, decision making in the English education system is less vertical than in France.

As Ball (2003; 2018) has pointed out, although this decentralised governance structure may appear to give schools and teachers a significant degree of autonomy, regulatory tools such as national assessments, comparative league tables, and Ofsted inspections play a crucial role in directing their work. Drawing on data from schools in England, Ball (2003) uses the term ‘performativity’ to describe a ‘technology, a culture and a mode of regulation that employs judgements, comparisons and displays’ rather than directives from a centralised authority ‘as means of incentive, control, attrition and change’ (216). Within this culture of ‘self-regulating regulation’, teachers are directed towards improving their own performance – as well as that of their school – in relation to comparative judgements and standards set by external authorities (Ball 2003:217). They may also face tough consequences if they fail to meet these standards. I will argue that the need to ‘perform’ well in Ofsted inspections was a significant factor driving policy enactment in two of the case schools (see also Ragazzi and Walmsley 2021:66).

3.2 The policies: Educational responses to terrorism at the national level

In this section, I highlight and compare key features of the England and France’s ‘values’ and ‘anti-radicalisation’ policies. I begin with the Great Mobilisation and the FBV duty, which both involve teachers in promoting liberal-democratic values in the context of concerns about violent extremism and failed integration. A significant difference is that in France, the values in question are addressed through a compulsory civic education curriculum. The discussion then turns to the two countries’ ‘anti-radicalisation’ policies. These policies identify procedures for identifying young people in the process of radicalisation and highlight the role of curriculum and pedagogy in building resilience to radicalisation. While Prevent is a compulsory duty for all schools and colleges, however, French anti-radicalisation policies did not require all schools to implement specific actions during the period of my data collection. I end with the
Upholding Laïcité initiative, which has no equivalent in the English context, and which sits somewhere between the ‘values’ and ‘anti-radicalisation’ categories. On one level, it aims to promote respect for the value of laïcité. However, my data indicate that it also serves to monitor and push back against radical religious activity, giving it a somewhat ambiguous status.

3.2.1 ‘Values’ policies

The Great Mobilisation, announced after the January 2015 terrorist attacks in the Paris region, brings together 12 measures under four themes: laïcité and the transmission of republican values; citizenship and civic engagement; reducing inequalities and school segregation and promoting a sense of belonging to the Republic; and mobilising higher education and research (MEN 2015a). Measures to promote republican values include the citizenship pathway (parcours citoyen). This brings together the EMC curriculum, a cross-curricular media and information studies programme (EMI, education aux médias et à l’information), and civic engagement opportunities in school and the local area (MEN 2015a:15). The policy text also encourages schools to organise activities to celebrate republican ceremonies and symbols such as the national anthem, the flag, and the motto of liberté, égalité and fraternité (MEN 2015a:15). Another key measure was the announcement of an exceptional teacher training plan on themes such as laïcité, the teaching of religious phenomena, EMC, and the fight against prejudice and discrimination (MEN 2015a:2).

Although the policy is coordinated at the national level, officials in the académies define and coordinate the roadmap for the Great Mobilisation based on their context (MEN 2015a:16). Schools determine their own citizenship pathway by implementing EMC and EMI and creating opportunities for civic engagement (MEN 2015a:16). They can address EMC as a discreet subject but are also encouraged to embed the programme across the curriculum (MEN 2015a).

The fact that the values at the heart of the Great Mobilisation are embedded in a compulsory civic education programme is an important point of contrast with England. While the Department for Education (DfE) guidance on promoting FBV is relatively thin, the EMC curriculum provides teachers with clear objectives and learning outcomes.
(2014a; 2014b; MEN 2018a). Furthermore, EMC is externally assessed in a written examination in the *brevet* and professional baccalaureate and through teacher assessment in the general baccalaureate, creating a strong incentive for teachers to engage with it. I argue that these arrangements explain why there was great consistency in how teachers addressed the values in the Great Mobilisation compared to FBV in England.

Although schools in England are required to ‘actively promote’ the FBV of ‘democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance for those of different faiths and beliefs’, the values do not feature in any specific curriculum area (DfE 2014b:3). Rather, the FBV duty is embedded in schools’ pre-existing requirement to promote students’ spiritual, moral, social and cultural development (SMSC, see DfE 2014a; 2014b). FBV also feature in the statutory Prevent duty guidance for further education (FE) providers, which states that states that Prevent training should ‘enable teachers […] to exemplify British values in their management, teaching and through general behaviours in institutions’ (Home Office 2021). As such, teachers at all schooling levels are expected to address FBV in their teaching.

The DfE guidance gives some indication of how schools might address the duty but is short and specifies little in terms of curriculum content or learning objectives. The guidance for maintained schools includes 6 bullet points describing the knowledge and understanding students should gain through schools’ promotion of FBV, and 5 ‘examples of actions that a school can take’ to address the duty (DfE 2014b:6). These include embedding learning about democracy in Britain and abroad in the curriculum; promoting democracy through school councils; teaching young people about different faiths; and organising extracurricular activities relating to the values (DfE 2014b:6). The guidance on promoting SMSC in academies and free schools was amended to include two pages on FBV that give similar guidance (DfE 2014a:6-7). In the case of FE providers, the guidance is even more limited. As one teacher-respondent pointed out, the Prevent guidance makes two references to FBV but provides no detail on how teachers can address them (Mary, interview 28/01/19; Home Office 2021).

I have found that this ‘loose, enabling’ policy design gives teachers considerable freedom to decide how to address the duty (Vincent 2019b:54; see also McGhee and
Zhang 2017). Importantly, they can present existing activities as evidence of FBV, obviating the need to take additional action. However, schools and colleges must demonstrate that they develop students' understanding of FBV to be rated 'good' in an Ofsted inspection (see Ofsted 2020; 2022). Since 'good' is effectively the passing grade for Ofsted, this creates an incentive to engage with the duty.

3.2.2 ‘Anti-radicalisation’ policies

Compared to England, countering violent extremism (CVE) through education in France is a relatively new and evolving policy space; several policy changes have taken place since I began this research in 2017. These changes have broadly extended the role of teachers and schools in CVE. There are currently two interrelated anti-radicalisation policies that have implications for schools: the National Plan for the Prevention of Radicalisation (plan national de la prévention de la radicalisation, PNPR 2018) and the Policy for Preventing Violent Radicalisation in Schools (PPVRS, 2019).

The PNPR identifies 5 areas of action and 60 measures across different policy domains. 10 measures under the heading ‘shielding minds against radicalisation’ refer to the education system (Government of France 2018). These includes defending the values of the republican school by improving teacher training and by developing local and national-level plans to support laïcité (Government of France 2018:9). The PPVRS essentially sets out in further detail how the education system will contribute to the PNPR and other counterterrorism strategies (see Eduscol 2022b). It highlights the role of schools in primary prevention, aimed at building resilience to radicalisation among whole populations of students. The Great Mobilisation features on the list of preventative actions, along with the nuanced and objective teaching of religious ideas and phenomena (Eduscol 2022b).

The notion that schools play a role in primary prevention is absent from earlier policy documents. A webpage I accessed in 2018 set out the procedures for identifying and reporting individuals suspected of radicalisation, but did not mention primary prevention or building resilience to radicalisation (Eduscol 2018). Furthermore, although the Great Mobilisation (MEN 2015a) includes measures to train teachers in preventing radicalisation, the PPVRS is more explicit in linking the promotion of
republican values to this aim (see MEN 2015a; Eduscol 2022b). In this respect, there are increasing similarities with Prevent, which makes an explicit link between promoting FBV and building resilience to radicalisation and includes similar references to curriculum and pedagogy (see DfE 2015b:5).

The PPVRS also sets out the procedures for identifying and reporting individuals suspected of radicalisation. Any member of school staff can report concerns about individual students to school leadership or via a hotline established by the Ministry of the Interior in 2014 (Eduscol 2022b). A key difference with Prevent is that anti-radicalisation policies in France do not require schools to train members of staff. Recent policy documents suggest that school leaders are now required to establish a monitoring group to advise on which referrals require further action, although this measure was voluntary in previous guidance (Eduscol 2018; 2022b). Overall, these policies did not require action at the school level during the period of my data collection.

In contrast, Prevent is a compulsory duty that requires all schools to take action. The Counterterrorism and Security Act 2015 requires schools, FE colleges, and other public bodies to have ‘due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’ (see HM Government 2015). In practice, this means assessing the risk of young people being drawn into terrorism in the local area and having ‘clear procedures in place for protecting children at risk’ (DfE 2015b:6; see also Home Office 2021; HM Government 2015). FE colleges are required to train all staff on the ‘factors that make people vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism’, how to ‘recognise this vulnerability’ and how to refer concerns (Home Office 2021). Schools have greater freedom to organise training based on their risk assessment, although Designated Safeguarding Leads (DSL) must undertake Prevent training to be able to support other staff (DfE 2015b:7). Schools and colleges are also judged on their work in this area in Ofsted inspections.

Another difference with France is that preventing violent extremism is presented to teachers as part of their safeguarding responsibilities. The DfE (2015b) guidance states that ‘[p]rotecting children from the risk of radicalisation should be seen as part of schools […] wider safeguarding duties’ and compares Prevent to schools’ work protecting young people from ‘other harms’, such as gangs and child sexual
exploitation (5). Following Busher et al (2017), I argue that this messaging explains why more teacher-respondents in England accepted monitoring and reporting students for radicalisation concerns as part of their role than in France (7).

The guidance also suggests that schools can ‘build pupils’ resilience to radicalisation by promoting fundamental British values’ and identifies similar curriculum areas and practices to the PPVRS (DfE 2015b:5). This includes citizenship education and broader opportunities to ‘influence and participate in decision-making’ or develop critical thinking (DfE 2015b:8). In this sense, both countries’ anti-radicalisation policies have a more securitisation or surveillance-oriented dimension and a more pedagogical dimension (Elwick and Jerome 2019).

3.2.3 The Upholding Laïcité in Schools initiative – an anti-radicalisation policy?

The Upholding Laïcité initiative, which has no equivalent in England, brings together different measures with the stated aim of supporting teachers and school leaders in responding to ‘violations of laïcité’ (see MEN 2022b). Despite its salience in the recent policy discourse, however, there is no stable institutional definition of this term (see Laborde 2019:35). It may refer to clear violations of the 2004 ban on religious symbols but is applied to an increasing range of behaviours that teachers interpret as inappropriate manifestations of religious belief (see also Laborde 2019; Orange 2016; 2017). Commonly cited examples include students refusing to take part in lessons or activities or challenging specific teaching points on religious grounds (see Bowen 2007; Laborde 2019; Orange 2016).

Measures in the Upholding Laïcité initiative include the Vademecum of Laïcité in Schools (Vademecum: La Laïcité à l’École), which provides school leaders with guidance on how to respond to presumed violations or requests for religious accommodations (see MEN 2018b; 2022b). It replaces the Laïcité Handbook (Livret de Laïcité) developed by the previous government following the January 2015 attacks (MEN 2015b). However, it goes further than the previous document by outlining which sanctions should be applied in different situations (MEN 2018b). The initiative also introduced an online platform that allows any member of school staff to report violations of laïcité directly to the MEN, without necessarily informing the school’s leadership.
Once received by the Ministry, these incidents are referred to *académie*-level officials for further action.

As part of the initiative, each *académie* has established a *laïcité* and religious affairs team made up of officials and school leaders. The teams support teachers in resolving situations arising from students’ religious beliefs and provide training on these themes (see MEN 2022b). In the two *académies* in this study, these training activities gave the *laïcité* coordinators a degree of influence over how teachers understood *laïcité* and applied it in their work. A national *laïcité* and religious affairs team provides operational support to the local teams and keeps a record of the incidents that occur across the country and how they have been resolved (MEN 2022b; Didier, interview 12/06/18). This team works alongside a *laïcité* Council of Sages made up of experts from disciplines such as law, philosophy, and the social sciences. The Council is charged with developing a clear and consistent institutional ‘doctrine’ on *laïcité* and religion in schools, drawing on legal and philosophical texts, but also the concrete situations that arise in schools (Didier, interview 12/06/18). In this sense, the initiative responds to the abstract nature of *laïcité* and the challenges teachers experience in applying it in the everyday life of schools.

While the initiative is not explicitly an anti-radicalisation policy, I argue that it relates to the context of terrorism for two reasons. Firstly, the policy design echoes one of the measures in the PNPR, which involves developing national and *académie*-level initiatives to support *laïcité*, although the webpage on Upholding *Laïcité* does not reference the PNPR or radicalisation (Government of France 2018:9; MEN 2022b). Furthermore, my interviews with Bertrand and Didier, two officials at the MEN in Paris, suggest that as well as addressing presumed ‘violations’, the initiative responds to concerns about radical religious activity. Bertrand indicated that some senior officials saw violations of *laïcité* as potential indicators of radicalisation. He argued that the rise of ‘retrograde’ forms of Islam such as Wahhabism and Salafism since the 1980s had coincided with a rise in the number of violations (field notes 28/06/18). For Bertrand, monitoring these violations through the online portal was a way of identifying problem areas (field notes 28/06/18). In a broader sense, he indicated that the emphasis on upholding *laïcité* was a way of pushing back against radical religious groups embedded in some communities (field notes 28/06/18). Since these groups might actively
encourage young people to challenge the authority of the education by testing the boundaries of laïcité, clarifying these boundaries gave the MEN a clear mandate to confront them (Bertrand, field notes 28/06/18). Didier expressed similar ideas during our interview, although I did not understand the full meaning of some of his comments until I had met with Bertrand. My overall impression was that the Ministry did not want to be explicit about these aims. I argue below that the presumed link between violations of laïcité and radicalisation reflects a broader tendency among political elites to associate visible manifestations of Islam with the spectre of ‘Islamism’ (see Bowen 2007:155).

3.2.4 Educational responses to terrorism at the national level: Comparative conclusions

I end this section by summarising the similarities and differences in the two countries respective ‘values’ and ‘anti-radicalisation’ policies. Drawing on Bennet’s (1991) five dimensions of policy convergence, I find that the ‘common policy problem’ of terrorism has led to the emergence of policies with similar ‘goals’ (218). There are also similarities in ‘policy content’ - ‘the formal manifestations of government policy’ - and ‘policy instruments, i.e., the institutional tools available to administer policy’ (Bennet 1991:218). The two values policies aim to promote social cohesion and build young peoples’ resilience to radicalisation by promoting ‘republican’ or ‘British’ values based on liberal-democratic principles. The anti-radicalisation policies address the threat of violent extremism more directly, setting out procedures for identifying and reporting radicalised individuals and training teachers in this field. They both also highlight the role of teachers in building students’ resilience to radicalisation by promoting shared values, civic competence, and critical thinking. Some of these similarities reflect the trend towards civic integration, in the sense they emphasise shared values as a condition for citizenship and belonging and envisage an active role for the state in in promoting or enforcing them (see Mouritsen et al 2019; James 2016).

However, there are differences in the specific content of the policies, the ‘institutional tools’ policymakers have used to achieve these common goals (Bennet 1991:218). Importantly, the policies vary in the degree to which local actors have the capacity to decide how or whether to enact them. While Prevent requires all schools and colleges
in England to implement training and update their safeguarding procedures, French anti-radicalisation policies do not place additional legal duties on schools. Although local actors have significant decision-making capacity over the two countries’ ‘values’ policies, the compulsory EMC curriculum creates a strong incentive for teachers in France to engage with the values in the policy and provides them with more guidance on how to do this. I find that these governance arrangements affect the degree of variation in local policy enactments.

3.3 Islamist terrorism, cultural diversity, and education policy in France and England

In this section, I discuss the impact of recent terrorist attacks on the debate on integration and cultural diversity in France and England. I highlight the way the discursive trend towards civic integration and the ‘culturalization of citizenship’ are reflected in the two national contexts, and how they interact with French republican and British multicultural ideas (see Mouritsen et al 2019; Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016). This provides a context for understanding how these convergent trends and particularistic tendencies are reflected in the policies that are the focus of this study, and in teachers’ ideas and practices.

I begin with the French case, where I argue that recent terrorist attacks have consolidated the notions of integration through republican values and laïcité I discussed in 2.1. Highlighting the salience of laïcité in recent policy responses, I address the debate on whether this emphasis is driven by concerns about violent extremism. Although recent debates and policy responses largely reinforce pre-existing tendencies, I point to the ways in which they articulate with the civic integration trend and the ‘culturalization of citizenship’ (Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016). Finally, I argue that the political climate in France has become more favourable to the teaching of religion in schools and that the context of terrorism has contributed to this trend. While this does not fit within the civic integration trend, it runs counter to some of the institutionalised ideas and practices I discussed in section 2.1 and represents an area of convergence with the English approach.
The English case represents a clearer move away from ‘multicultural race relations’ and towards civic integration (Favell 2001). I begin by discussing the rhetorical backlash against multiculturalism and the concurrent emergence of a discourse around British values. I argue that the ‘muscular liberalism’ of recent Conservative governments marks an official repudiation of multiculturalism and reflects an ‘expanded’ and increasingly ‘culturalised’ notion of citizenship (Mouritsen et al 2019:601; Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016). I also highlight the ways in which the muscular liberalism doctrine indicates a move away from the ‘relativist’ stance on values that authors such as Johnson and Morris (2012) have associated with citizenship education in England. Importantly, however, I argue that the notion of Britain as a multicultural society has endured and is evident in the guidance on promoting FBV. I end this section by highlighting some similarities and differences in the two policy contexts, pointing to the ways these prevailing ideas feed into local actors’ ideas and practices.

3.3.1 France

In France, the political consensus on the importance of republican values as a foundation for social cohesion has endured recent ‘crises’ of integration. Far from being called into question, there is sense in which political elites have ‘fallen back on’ or ‘re-interpreted’ republican integration ideas in response to the problems they associated with recent attacks (Jensen 2019:627; Carstensen 2011:156). After the January and November 2015 attacks, speeches by figures such as Education Minister Najat Vallaud-Belkacem drew on an image of the teacher as personification of the Republic, and of the school as the battleground in the fight for republican values (see Wesselhoeft 2017:628-631). These ideas are reflected in the Great Mobilisation policy text, which emphasises the role of public schooling in promoting integration through the values of liberté, égalité, and fraternité. The text refers to the January 2015 attacks as an attack on the heart of republican values and places schools in the front line of the government’s response to the challenges they highlighted, such as widening inequalities, communitarian tendencies, and the discrimination faced by some sections of the population (MEN 2015a:4). This seems to respond to concerns that the perpetrators of the attacks - and the young people in schools across France that
appeared to justify them - did not share the values of the Republic, but also that republican institutions had failed in their mission to promote integration and equality (see James 2016; Wesselhoeft 2017; Moran 2017; Durpaire and Mabilon-Bonfils 2016; Lorcerie and Moignard 2017). There was also a sense that promoting republican values in schools could strengthen social cohesion at a time of national tragedy (see Vallaud-Belkacem 2015; MEN 2015a). More recent anti-radicalisation policies highlight the role of republican values in building resilience to radicalisation (Eduscol 2022b; see also Service de Presse de Matignon 2018). In this sense, recent policies build on and entrench established ideas about republican integration, but also apply these ideas to the relatively new policy problem of radicalisation. What is significant in comparison to the English context is the absence of a ‘backlash’ against ‘republican integration’ (James 2016).

The salience of laïcité in recent national responses to terrorism builds on some of the trends I discussed in chapter 2. The emergence of violations of laïcité as a policy concern, and the recent focus on sanctioning these through the Upholding Laïcité initiative, reflect the trend towards increasingly restrictive interpretations of laïcité (see Bowen 2007; Hajjat and Mohammed 2016; Mannitz 2004). The emphasis on laïcité in the Great Mobilisation builds on the notion of laïcité as a tool for social cohesion and previous attempts to actively promote the value in schools. This includes a 2012 report from the High Council on Integration, which spoke of a need to develop a pedagogy of laïcité in schools with the aim of creating a homogenous social entity where students would feel part of a national community (HCI 2012, in Hajjat and Mohammed 2016:151). The EMC curriculum emphasises the role of laïcité in promoting ‘le vivre ensemble’ [living together] (MEN 2018a). This reflects the notion that as well as regulating the relationship between religion and state, laïcité is a foundation for solidarity inside and outside of the school community (see Bowen 2007; Diallo and Baubérot 2015; Mabilon-Bonfils and Zoïa 2014).

Perhaps more than any other idea associated with French republicanism, however, laïcité remains ‘an essentially contested concept’ (Bowen 2007:2). This is evident in contrasting approaches recent governments have taken to laïcité. The centre-left Education Minister Najat Vallaud-Belkacem (2014-2017) sought to emphasise laïcité’s role in promoting freedom of conscience and tolerance between different faiths and
spoke of her desire to recapture the concept from the political right, who have used it ‘as an attack on Muslims’ (in Chrisafis 2016). For Lorcerie (2015), Vallaud-Belkacem’s more inclusive conception of *laïcité* sought to move beyond the prohibition and sanctioning of symbols of Islam towards a more pedagogical approach, where teachers build consent around *laïcité* through dialogue with students and their families (5-6). She finds that the emphasis on dialogue is consonant with the ethos of the Great Mobilisation, while the more accommodating conception of *laïcité* reflects a more relaxed approach to integration under the centre-left government (Lorcerie 2015; see also Lorcerie and Moignard 2017; Orange 2016; 2017). In contrast, commentators have criticised right-wing Education Minister Jean-Michel Blanquer (2017-2022) for taking a more disciplinary approach to promoting *laïcité*. Teaching unions have complained that the Upholding Laïcité initiative emphasises the sanctioning of violations of *laïcité* over dialogue (Maes 2018). Blanquer has also been accused of stigmatising Islam following comments on the Islamic veil (Adams, Alaouf et al 2019). These competing conceptions of *laïcité* were evident among the teachers in this study.

There are questions as to the extent to which the salience of *laïcité* in the recent policy discourse is driven by specific concerns about violent religious extremism. For Hajjat and Mohammed (2016), linking the two phenomena risks legitimising popular narratives that blame Muslim populations - their religiosity, their self-segregation, or *communautarisme* [communalism] – for the prevailing climate of Islamophobia (105). Instead, they argue that the emphasis on developing a ‘pedagogy of *laïcité*’ in schools and the trend towards greater restrictions emerge from a desire to correct the mental structures of (presumed) Muslims, notably post-colonial migrants and their descendants (Hajjat and Mohammed 2016:151). These groups have confounded elite expectations that they would integrate by apparently becoming more - rather than less - religious, and by ‘refusing’ to participate in public schooling on the account of their religious beliefs (Hajjat and Mohammed 2016:101-117). In this view, the emergence of a ‘*nouvelle discipline laïque*’ [new secular discipline] relates more to concerns about Muslim ‘difference’ and the assimilationist tendency I discussed in 2.1, than to recent concerns about Islamist terrorism (Hajjat and Mohammed 2016:150).

Hajjat and Mohammed’s (2016) analysis is useful in highlighting the role of cultural difference and Islamophobia in contemporary debates on *laïcité*. However, it is limited
in accounting for the way more exclusionary manifestations of laïcité often coincide with moments of heightened anxiety about radical Islam. Bowen (2009) has argued convincingly that ‘French angst over [Islamic] scarves has risen and fallen in exact proportion to French concerns about political Islam’ (442). For example, he sets the spate of ‘headscarf incidents’ and other violations of laïcité reported in the media in the early 2000s in the context of 9/11, and fears that French Muslims posed a threat to national security (Bowen 2007; 2009). Wesselhoeft (2017) has linked the timing of recent controversies over the length of Muslim students’ skirts to the context of the 2015 terrorist attacks (636-637). I have previously pointed out that the controversies around the burkini in southern French towns in 2016 coincided with the terrorist attacks in Nice (James 2016; see also Chabal 2017). The timing of these incidents makes it difficult to ignore the link between more restrictive manifestations of laïcité and heightened concerns about Islamist terrorism. This calls for an account of these developments that considers the immediate context of terrorist attacks alongside pre-existing integration concerns.

Bowen’s (2007) analysis provides a useful basis for developing such an explanation. He finds that by the early 2000s, a significant proportion of political and intellectual elites in France had come to associate the Islamic veil with three other concerns they identified with young Muslims: ‘communalism, Islamism, and sexism’ (Bowen 2007:155). Like Hajjat and Mohammed (2016), Bowen’s (2007) account links elite concerns around the veil to the perception that young Muslims were poorly integrated and excessively religious (see also Bertossi 2012; Ogien 2013). However, he draws attention to the way media reports and political discourse during this period represented visible manifestations of Islam as indicators of religious radicalisation (Bowen 2007:155-181). In this sense, as well as being interpreted as a refusal of integration, certain types of Islamic dress and other apparent ‘violations of laïcité’ have come to represent illiberal values, conservative religious beliefs, or even terrorism. This logic seems to inform the Upholding Laïcité initiative, and was evident among some respondents in this study.

The policy trends I have highlighted so far arguably entrench the republican philosophy of integration I discussed in 2.1, making it difficult to speak of a recent ‘trend’ towards civic integration. However, some recent developments articulate with the
‘culturalization of citizenship’ (Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016) and Mouritsen et al’s (2019) definition of civic integration. Firstly, some authors point to the emergence of more ‘culturalised conceptions’ of French republicanism or an ‘identarian’ conception of laïcité in the 2010s (Bertossi et al 2015:71; Baubérot 2015:111-113). Many identify former President Nicolas Sarkozy, and his ‘Grand debates’ - on national identity in 2010 and on laïcité and Islam in 2011 – with this trend. In these debates, discussions on republicanism became entangled with discussions about national security and identity, with Sarkozy emphasising France’s Christian roots (see Chabal 2017; Laurence and Goodliffe 2013; see also Simon 2013; Baubérot 2015:111-113; Bertossi et al 2015:71). Islam featured prominently, with contributors questioning the loyalty of French Muslims to republican values (see Bertossi et al 2015; Chabal 2017; Laurence and Goodliffe 2013; see also Simon 2013). While not, strictly speaking, an expression of the civic integration trend, these developments reflect the tendency to ‘culturalize’ liberal-democratic values and to present Muslim populations as a threat to them (Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016; Mouritsen 2008; Mouritsen et al 2019; Fozdar and Low 2015).

There is also a sense in which recent education policies and practices reflect the ‘expansion’ of citizenship and a deepening of ‘state involvement’ in bringing it about (Mouritsen et al 2019:601). For Pélabay (2017), the notion that immigrants and their children should manifest an authentic belief in republican values violates the Rawlsian distinction between public norms and private morals (122). Here, she considers the Great Mobilisation alongside recent naturalisation polices that require applicants to demonstrate their commitment to the ‘values of the Republic’ (Pélabay 2017:129). For her, associating these values with the French Republic gives them a ‘thicker’, substantive character (Pélabay 2017:122).

I would also argue that the recent emphasis on promoting and enforcing laïcité in schools articulates with a broader trend, described by Tonkens and Duyvendak (2016), wherein the symbolic recognition of minorities as citizens depends on their acceptance of secular values. Bowen (2007) and Hajat and Mohammed (2016) allude to the ways the notion of good citizenship in France is increasingly premised on limiting expressions of one’s religious identity, since these may be interpreted as signs of insufficient integration. In a process they describe as the ‘extension of the domain of
the secular struggle' [extension du domaine de la lutte laïque], Hajjat and Mohammed (2016) argue that an increasing range of social situations are regulated by secular norms (150). Furthermore, developments such as the 2004 ban on religious symbols in school and the recent focus on violations of laïcité deepen the role of the state in regulating religious behaviours, with school students being subject to the kind of ‘disciplinary interpellation’ discussed by Mouritsen et al (2019:601; see also Laborde 2019).

Finally, the emergence of religious fundamentalism as a public concern has led policy elites to question institutionalised ideas about religion in the school curriculum. Although this not an expression of the civic integration trend, I argue that this is one way in which the French education system has moved in the direction of the English one. Soon after 9/11, the Ministry of Education commissioned a report from the philosopher Regis Debray on the secular teaching of religious phenomena (2002). Debray (2002) argued that failing to address religious ideas and practices within the confines of a rational and publicly controlled education system could leave young people vulnerable to fundamentalist readings of holy texts (12). He also argued that teaching young people about Islam specifically might help them make sense of the 9/11 attacks (Debray 2002). Such concerns may partly explain the emphasis on the teaching of religious phenomena in the Great Mobilisation and recent anti-radicalisation policies (MEN 2015a; Eduscol 2022b; see also Petit 2018; Laborde 2019).

3.3.2 England

In the previous study, I argued that the civil disturbances that took place in Northern English towns in the summer of 2001 and the 9/11 terrorist attacks that soon followed led to shifts in the debate on integration and cultural diversity in Britain (James 2016; see also Gillborn 2008; Cheong et al 2007; Meer and Modood 2009; Vincent 2019b). One of the long-term consequences has been the emergence of a discourse around the failure of multiculturalism. This ‘backlash’ has taken many forms, although two recurrent criticisms of multiculturalism feed into the current discourse on British values. The first positions multiculturalism as threat to social cohesion, with multiculturalism featuring as a cause of the social segregation that had led to the Northern Riots (see

The backlash against multiculturalism has been accompanied by attempts to promote a clear notion of British citizenship and identity based on shared values. Following the terrorist attacks on London in 2005, Prime Minister Tony Blair (2006) argued that the ‘right to call ourselves British’ was premised on adherence to ‘our essential values’, which he defined as ‘tolerance, solidarity across the racial and religious divide, equality for all and between all’. In the same year, Chancellor Gordon Brown (2006) spoke of the ‘enduring British values’, which he described as ‘liberty for all, responsibility for all, and fairness for all’. This was also the period of the New Labour’s ‘community cohesion’ agenda, which brought together a range of initiatives with a common focus on promoting shared values and positive relations between different ethnic groups (see Cheong et al 2007; McGhee 2005; Parker-Jenkins et al 2015). Between 2007 and 2012, schools were legally required to promote community cohesion. Government guidance stated that schools’ curriculum and ethos should engender ‘a common sense of identity and support diversity, showing pupils how different communities can be united by shared values’ (DCSF 2007:1). Following Meer and Modood (2009), I have called this a period of ‘civic rebalancing’, wherein politicians looked to civic integration ideas to address the perceived limitations of multiculturalism (see James 2016; see also McGhee 2008).

The emphasis on British values has continued under successive Conservative governments, although these governments have taken a more hostile position towards multiculturalism. For Joppke (2014) and McGhee and Zhang (2017), the ‘muscular liberalism’ doctrine emerged as an alternative to multiculturalism under Prime Minister David Cameron. Both read this doctrine from Cameron’s speech to the Munich Security Conference in 2011, which brought together several popular critiques of multiculturalism. Cameron (2011a) argued that ‘a doctrine of state multiculturalism’ had led to ‘weakening of our collective [British] identity’. This prevented some Muslim men from identifying with Britishness and British values, leaving them vulnerable to extremism (Cameron 2011a). The ‘muscular liberalism’ he proposed as an alternative
involves a zero-tolerance approach to non-violent extremism and a more active defence of values such as ‘democracy, the rule of law’ and ‘equal rights regardless of race, sex, or sexuality’ (Cameron 2011a). For Joppke (2014:293), this notion of liberalism goes further than the New Labour discourse on British values by insisting that it is no longer enough for citizens to simply ‘obey the law’ (Cameron 2011). To be tolerated within society, citizens must accept liberal-democratic values ‘for their own sake’ rather simply agreeing to them ‘instrumentally’ (Joppke 2014:293). This is a notion of citizenship that encompasses private beliefs as well as public behaviours.

The muscular liberalism doctrine finds its expression in Prevent and FBV. In 2011, the Conservative-led Coalition revised the existing Prevent counterterrorism strategy to target non-violent as well as violent extremism. This is reflected in the Prevent Duty guidance, where ‘non-violent extremism’ is defined as ‘vocal or active opposition to [FBV]’ (HM Government 2015:2). The FBV policy involves teachers in actively promoting these values. The DfE (2014b) guidance states that schools should promote ‘broad general knowledge of and respect for public institutions and services in England’, ‘encourage respect for democracy’ but also challenge ‘opinions or behaviours in school that are contrary to fundamental British values’ (5-6). This reflects a concern for promoting adherence to shared values and institutions, but also the notion that the state should be assertive in defending them (see James 2016; Joppke 2014; Mouritsen 2008; Mouritsen et al 2019). The ‘expansion’ of the definition of good citizenship into private beliefs, and the active involvement of the state in bringing about these dispositions, articulate with Mouritsen et al’s (2019) definition of civic integration (601: see also Joppke 2014; 2017; Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016; Mouritsen 2008).

The British values discourse also reflects more culturalised conceptions of belonging. As Vincent (2019b) has pointed out, the ostensible civic ‘purity’ of values such as democracy and individual liberty is ‘undercut’ by their framing as ‘British’ (34). Vincent also points to recent curriculum changes that centre English history and authors at the expense of world history and literature (2019b:34). Finally, she cites political pronouncements that articulate British values with ‘thicker’ notions of nationhood (Vincent 2019b:34). Notable among these is Cameron’s speech on the 400th anniversary of the King James Bible, in which he identified the Bible as the source of the ‘values and morals’ that Britain ‘should actively defend’ (2011b, in Vincent
2018:231). Here, there are parallels with the way right-wing politicians in France have emphasised Christianity in pronouncements about French republicanism (see James and Janmaat 2019).

The discourse has also emerged in the context of concerns about Muslim integration, specifically the notion that Muslims were somehow deficient in British values. Such narratives go back to the aftermath of the 2001 civil disturbances, when official reports appeared to identify the self-segregation of south Asian and Muslim communities as a cause of the riots (see Tomlinson 2008; Cheong et al 2007; Meer and Modood 2009). As Holmwood and O’Toole (2017) have argued, recent terrorist attacks have fed into pre-existing notions of British Muslims as a ‘special problem’ (28). For McGhee and Zhang (2017), as well as targeting violent extremism, the FBV policy targets illiberal ‘communal substantive values’ elites associate with Muslim populations (see also Holmwood and O’Toole 2017:38).

However, the timing of the FBV policy points to concerns raised by the Trojan Horse affair, which erupted in 2014. This involved an alleged plot by Salafists to gain control of a group of schools in Birmingham, although there is considerable doubt as to whether any such conspiracy existed (see Holmwood and O’Toole 2017; Vanderbeck and Johnson 2016). The affair nevertheless led to two public enquiries, with one speaking of a ‘co-ordinated campaign’ to impose ‘an intolerant and aggressive Islamic ethos’ in the schools concerned (Clarke 2014:14). Witnesses spoke of a widespread culture of intolerance, particularly in relation to religion, gender, and sexuality (Clarke 2014; see also Vanderbeck and Johnson 2016). Such concerns are reflected in the guidance on promoting FBV, which emphasises tolerance towards other religions and warns against indoctrinating students (James 2016; DfE 2014a;2014b). For some authors, the affair has also engendered a climate of suspicion around the involvement of Muslim parents and community groups in school decision making (see Holmwood and O’Toole 2017:53; Vincent 2019b).

Such concerns were reignited in the summer of 2019, when parents and religious groups protested against the teaching of lessons on LGBTQ+ equality and relationships (see BBC 2019). This was a live issue throughout my time in the field and several respondents commented on it, especially since it soon fed into the debate on
extremism and British values. A presentation from one of the schools involved in the protests presented work on LGBTQ+ equality as part of their strategy to ‘reduce radicalisation’ (Inclusive Mosque Initiative et al 2019). This prompted a group of ‘LGBT+ individuals and organisations’ to publish an open letter objecting to the way the issue of tolerance towards sexual minorities had become associated with Prevent and FBV in the public debate that followed the protests (Inclusive Mosque Initiative et al 2019). The authors argued that the ‘wider embrace of LGBT+-inclusive RSE [relationships and sex education] as the poster-child for the implementation of “Fundamental British Values” […] contributes to a harmful and inaccurate stereotype of an uncivilised and intolerant Muslim culture (Inclusive Mosque Initiative et al 2019). These criticisms merit attention here, since they relate to two of the tendencies I discussed in 2.4: the tendency to ‘culturalize’ progressive attitudes on sexuality by identifying them with ‘Western’ culture and the tendency to present Muslim populations as a threat to these ideals (see Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016; Mouritsen et al 2019; Mouritsen 2008; Fozdar and Low 2016). The idea that LGBTQ+ equality is a ‘British value’ can be traced back to David Cameron’s ‘muscular liberalism’ speech (2011a). As Tonkens and Duyvendak (2016) have argued in relation to the Dutch case, this is a somewhat dubious claim. Vanderbeck and Johnson (2016) point out that Cameron voted against the repeal of Section 28, which prohibited schools from teaching ‘the acceptability of homosexuality as a pretended family relationship’ (293). Clearly, these progressive attitudes are not universal among the White majority population or political elites.

The Trojan Horse affair and more recent debates on LGBTQ+-inclusive teaching raise questions about the respective roles of parents and the state in deciding which values and attitudes to promote among young people. In section 2.2, I argued that the British notion of citizenship as ‘freedom from the state’ (Bowen 2007:11) translates to a ‘relativist’ stance on values and privileges the right of parents to educate their children according to their beliefs (see Johnson and Morris 2012:292; Mouritsen and Jaeger 2018:5). Indeed, parents invoked this right during the protests in 2019 (see BBC 2019). In contrast, the muscular liberalism doctrine would seem to assert the right of the state to promote certain values in schools, even when these values are not shared by parents (see Vanderbeck and Johnson 2016; Holmwood and O’Toole 2017). The proposals for a statutory curriculum RSE curriculum, released in 2019, reflect a
somewhat uneasy compromise between these positions. They include a limited requirement to teach young people that ‘some people are LGBT […] and that the law affords them and their relationships recognition and protection’ and allow parents to opt out of sex education, but not relationships education (DfE 2019). As Staufenberg (2020) points out, this appears to be a strategy for avoiding conflict with parents. This policy solution, and the debates that proceeded it, suggest that England is caught somewhere between the ‘Lockean or political-liberal’ and the ‘traditional republican-liberal’ models of citizenship education identified by Mouritsen and Jaeger (2018:5). These tensions were evident in the data, and I return to them in chapters 6 and 7.

In several respects, the policy trends I have discussed in this section amount to a considerable move away from multicultural race relations. In the context of concerns about violent extremism and Muslim integration, recent governments have rejected multiculturalism as a policy frame and have arguably sought to promote a more ‘culturalised’ conception of Britishness. The civic integration trend is evident in the British values discourse and the muscular liberalism doctrine, which run counter to the *laissez faire* relativism I discussed in chapter 2. However, the popular conception of Britain as a multicultural society has endured, and this is reflected in responses to terrorism (James 2016). Importantly, the FBV policy text reflects a view of Britain as being made up of different religious, ethnic, and cultural communities and a sense that schools should promote respect for this diversity. It reminds schools of their duty to promote students' ‘appreciation of and respect for their own and other cultures’ through SMSC (DfE 2014b:5). It also includes several references to the Equality Act 2010, which requires schools to combat discrimination and promote equality based on protected characteristics such as race, religion, and sexual orientation (DfE 2014a;2014b). Moreover, FBV feature under the theme of ‘preparing learners for life in modern Britain’ in the Ofsted inspections framework, a strand that references the need to promote ‘understanding and appreciation of diversity’ (Ofsted 2019:11). In this regard, the FBV policy and the framework underpinning it reflect older multicultural ideas as well as the recent civic turn. I have found that the references to equality and diversity frame the way some school leaders understood FBV.
3.3.3 Islamist terrorism, the debate on cultural diversity, and education policy in England and France: Conclusions

I end this section by highlighting some key similarities and differences between the two policy contexts. In both countries, specific concerns about violent extremism interact with broader concerns about Muslim populations, notably their apparent ‘refusal’ of integration and the values and norms associated with the majority population. These interrelated concerns have contributed to the recent focus on promoting shared values in schools. Recent policies in both countries arguably ‘expand’ the definition of good citizenship by insisting that school students or newcomers demonstrate an ‘authentic’ commitment to these values, violating the distinction between private beliefs and public norms (Mouritsen et al 2019:601; Pélabay 2017:129; see also Joppke 2014). As such, they fit with Mouritsen et al’s (2019) definition of civic integration. Moreover, these trends have been accompanied by political and media discourses which draw on ‘thicker’ conceptions of belonging and ‘culturalize’ liberal-democratic values or progressive attitudes by identifying them with the nation or majority population (see Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016; Mouritsen et al 2019).

A key difference between the two policy contexts is that in the English case, the shift from multiculturalism towards civic integration and muscular liberalism is more pronounced. This raises the question of whether teachers will resist the British values discourse, or whether their ideas have shifted in line with recent debates. In the French case, I have identified the recent emphasis on teaching religious phenomena as a development may encounter teacher resistance.

In both countries, however, the debate on integration and cultural diversity remains contested. Different political parties have pursued different approaches, and the wider public debate reflects more inclusive notions of belonging as well as more exclusionary ones. Teachers and other local actors may take up different positions within these debates.
3.4 Educational responses to terrorism: Existing research

In this section, I review recent studies from the emerging field of research on educational responses to terrorism. I begin with studies that provide a global perspective on the trend towards countering violent extremism (CVE) in the education sector. Although these studies point to broad similarities between the policies that are the focus of this study and CVE policies in other countries, Prevent stands out as a compulsory duty that requires teachers to report radicalisation concerns. This literature also points to some of the challenges and risks associated with the enactment of CVE policies.

This is followed by a review of recent empirical studies from the English and French contexts. I highlight the insights these studies provide on the research questions outlined in chapter 1 and the propositions I developed in chapter 2. These studies foreground the findings I discuss in chapters 5 – 7 and point to how they might apply beyond the case studies. In the English context, the studies largely focus on the enactment of the Prevent and FBV policies. In the French case, I also draw on studies of recent practices around laïcité and the role of religion in schools.

3.4.1 Countering violent extremism (CVE) in education: A global perspective

Ragazzi (2018) and Kundnani and Hayes (2018) trace the recent emergence of a preventative, ‘whole-of-society’ approach to CVE to the mid-2000s and highlight the role of the Netherlands and Britain in its globalisation. Kundnani and Hayes (2018) cite a 2002 report by the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) that develops a model of the radicalisation process and which they argue introduced several ideas that would influence the development of CVE policies in other countries (Kundnani and Hayes 2018:5). Notable among these is the presumed link between ‘failed’ integration and terrorism which is evident in the CVE discourse in England and France (Kundnani and Hayes 2018:5; see also Ragazzi 2018:22). Kundnani and Hayes (2018) also credit AIVD with introducing the idea of ‘radicalisation as an essentially ideological process’ (6). Finally, they argue that policies developed by the Dutch Department of Public Order, Safety, and Security ‘became a template’ for other CVE policies (Kundnani and Hayes 2018:6). This includes measures to identify the
‘early warning signs’ of radicalisation and to train civil society organisations in identifying and reporting suspected cases (Kundnani and Hayes 2018:6).

The Dutch approach seems to have directly influenced the development of British CVE policies, which in turn became a model for other countries. Kundnani and Hayes (2018) attribute the shift in emphasis from terrorist organisations to ‘attitudes, mindsets, and dispositions’ after the 2005 London bombings to similar shifts taking place in the Netherlands at the time (7; see also Ragazzi 2018). This was also the period where policymakers began to associate the spread of extremism with multiculturalism, a notion that draws on the Dutch association of terrorism and integration problems (Kundnani and Hayes 2018:7). This understanding of extremism was ‘institutionalized’ in the Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) policy - introduced by the Blair government in 2006 - that would eventually become Prevent (Kundnani and Hayes 2018:7).

Ragazzi (2017) and Kundnani and Hayes (2018) highlight two initiatives that account for the spread of the Dutch and British approaches to other European countries: the European Union Strategy for Combatting Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism (2005) and the EU’s Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN, 2011). For Kundnani and Hayes (2018), the latest version of the EU Strategy (2014) reflects the Europeanisation of the Prevent’s ‘whole of society’ approach and its focus on ‘the individual’s vulnerability and resilience’ (19). Ragazzi (2018) points to two objectives of the strategy that have implications for the education sector, and which may account for some of the similarities between Prevent and CVE policies in countries such as France (26-27). Firstly, the Strategy envisages a role for teachers and other civil society actors in identifying early signs of radicalisation and points to a need to develop their capacity to do this (Council of the European Union 2014, in Ragazzi 2018:27). Secondly, it underlines the role of these actors in addressing the perceived causes of radicalisation by, for example, ‘strengthening education to enable opportunities and critical thinking’ or ‘promoting tolerance and mutual respect’ (Council of the European Union 2014, in Ragazzi 2018:27).

Ragazzi and Walmsley (2021) identify the recommendations of the RAN as one of the mechanisms through which ‘[p]olicies to tackle radicalisation in schools have entered the mainstream’ among EU member states (22). Established in 2011, the RAN is
comprised of eight working groups bringing together practitioners from different fields. It aims to promote the exchange of knowledge to support the design and implementation of CVE policies and projects (see Kundnani and Hayes 2018:23; Ragazzi and Walmsley 2021:22). In a similar vein to the EU Strategy, documentation from the RAN Youth and Education Working Group frames teachers ‘both as agents of “detection” and teachers of skills that build societal resilience to extremist discourse’ (Ragazzi 2018:27). This understanding of the role of teachers and schools is reflected in several European CVE policies, many of which have similar objectives to the French and English policies. Ragazzi’s (2018) identifies two objectives of CVE policies in Council of Europe member states that broadly correspond to the ‘values’ and ‘anti-radicalisation’ categories I use in this study: ‘spotting the signs of radicalisation’ and ‘building resilience and social cohesion’ (Ragazzi 2018:96).

Despite these broad similarities, however, Ragazzi and Walmsley (2021) highlight the United Kingdom’s as an ‘exceptional case’. This is largely due to the compulsory nature of Prevent. Although countries such as France, Belgium, and Spain have established similar procedures for identifying and reporting suspected cases of radicalisation, only the UK has made reporting such cases a statutory duty for schools (Ragazzi 2018:43). Ragazzi and Walmsley (2021) also highlight the role of Ofsted in monitoring compliance and potentially imposing sanctions, arguing that few other European CVE policies are regulated in this way (22). Citing Ball (2003), they argue that the pressures associated with such accountability measures are ‘conducive to “performatve” responses to prevention in schools’ (Ragazzi and Walmsley 2021:66). I return to the effects of these governance arrangements in chapters 6 and 7.

Comparative studies also point to some of the challenges teachers encounter when enacting CVE policies as well as the risks these policies incur for students. I wish to highlight four interrelated problems that are especially pertinent to this study. The first is that the ‘vagueness’ of terms such as ‘violent extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’ in CVE policies mean that professionals experience challenges in applying these concepts in their work (Ragazzi and Walmsley 2021:44; see also Ragazzi 2017; Kundnani and Hayes 2018). In their empirical analysis of eight school-based CVE projects in seven European countries, Ragazzi and Walmsley (2021) find that many teachers and students showed limited understanding of terms such as ‘radicalisation’ and
The ‘ambiguity’ of the ‘warning signs’ identified in CVE policies meant that educators experienced particular challenges ‘distinguishing between problematic behaviour that might indicate radicalisation from behaviour that can normally be expected of children’ (Ragazzi and Walmsley 2021:44). In one example from Belgium, confusion arose from the fact that teachers were warned against missing important warning signs while also being encouraged to avoid ‘knee-jerk reactions’ to cases (Ragazzi and Walmsley 2021:56). Teachers in this study experienced similar challenges.

The ambiguities around key terms and the indicators of radicalisation open the possibility for discriminatory practices. As Kundnani and Hayes (2018) point out, teachers and other professionals ‘are implementing policy in a broader political context that has powerfully embedded an implicit concept of violent extremism that associates it with radical Islam’ (11). For them, this explains their finding that, in practice, CVE policies have tended to focus on Muslims as an ‘at risk’ group (Kundnani and Hayes 2018:11). Respondents in Ragazzi and Walmsley’s (2021) study were alive to the concern that CVE polices could disproportionately target Muslims and other groups ‘associated with terrorism in the popular imagination’ (48). Muslim students spoke of their fear of being the subject of a referral, while others spoke of discriminatory attitudes among teachers (Ragazzi and Walmsley 2021:49). The authors conclude that the confusion around key concepts in CVE policy leads to ‘difficulty in applying these concepts to practice in a non-discriminatory way’ (Ragazzi and Walmsley 2021:52).

As well as leaving students open to the risk of discrimination, Ragazzi (2018) and Ragazzi and Walmsley (2021) point to the risk that CVE policies may impinge on fundamental rights, such as the right to freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and to a cultural identity. On the topic of freedom of expression, Ragazzi (2018) refers to a report from Rights Watch UK (2016), which argued found that that Prevent strategy ‘is having a chilling effect on discussion of political and religious issues’ in schools (4). This relates to the idea that students may moderate their speech for fear of being of being reported by their teachers. Drawing on empirical studies from the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK, Ragazzi (2018) also points to some of the practical challenges teachers face in distinguishing between ‘acceptable speech’ and statements that might ‘fall under the counter-radicalisation policy’ (47). As such, there is a danger that
teachers will report students who express non-mainstream opinions. Ragazzi and Walmsley (2021) suggest the impact of freedom of expression may be especially acute in England, where the pressures of accountability mean that when in doubt, teachers are more likely to make a referral (47). However, I argue that teachers in France experience similar challenges in relation to the pressure to report apparent ‘violations of laïcité’.

Ragazzi (2018) also considers whether ‘the targeting of individuals […] on account of indications of increased religiosity could constitute an interference with freedom of thought, conscience and belief’ (73). This is a particular concern given the broad definition of extremism in many CVE policies and the climate of anxiety around Islam in Western states (Ragazzi 2018:73; see also Ragazzi and Walmsley 2021). In a similar vein, Ragazzi (2018) suggests that in cases where speaking or foreign language such as Arabic may be considered an indicator of radicalisation, CVE policies also pose a threat to students’ right to preserve their cultural identity (73). I argue that these risks may be particularly pertinent in the French case, where concerns about violent extremism have contributed to a trend wherein an increasing range of student behaviours are framed as violations of laïcité (see Hajjat and Mohammed 2016; Orange 2016:110; 2017:77; see also Wesselhoeft 2017).

Finally, for Ragazzi and Walmsley (2021) and Ragazzi (2018), problems emerge from the ways in which CVE policies ‘recast’ common problems affecting young people as security problems (103). Ragazzi (2018) argues that although some of the problems CVE policies address are new – such as the phenomenon of young people leaving their countries to join terrorist organisations – many are ‘reformulations of old issues that educators […] should be equipped to deal with’ (103). These include issues relating to behaviour and school discipline, identity formation, and young people’s politicisation (Ragazzi 2018:103). Ragazzi and Walmsley (2021) find that reframing these issues as security problems ‘undermines the confidence of many educators in their ability to respond to traditional pedagogic challenges’, since the issues are ‘outsourced’ to law enforcement or security services (63). Like Ragazzi and Walmsley (2021), however, I have found that teachers and mid-level policy actors in both countries were alive to these concerns and have sought to address these more familiar challenges through pedagogy.
3.4.2 Republican values, *laïcité*, and anti-radicalisation policies in French schools

Lorcerie and Moignard (2017) and Orange (2016; 2017) conducted their research in schools immediately before and after the January 2015 attacks and my data suggest that the issues they highlight are still relevant to teachers. Lorcerie and Moignard (2017) point to a climate of mutual misunderstanding and mistrust between teachers and students in ethnically diverse schools in the period following the attacks. This climate was palpable in – and to some extent engendered by – classroom debates on republican values and *laïcité* (Lorcerie and Moignard 2017). Teachers in their study felt ill-equipped to deal with questions raised by the attacks, especially when faced by students who seemed confident in their convictions (Lorcerie and Moignard 2017:5). Students experienced the repetitive nature of these debates as propaganda, notably the injunction to ‘be *Charlie*’ and manifest their commitment to *laïcité* (Lorcerie and Moignard 2017:6). For Lorcerie and Moignard (2017), these challenges highlighted a need strengthen teachers’ capacity to manage sensitive issues in the classroom and to reflect on their own biases and professional positioning within these debates (6).

Studies by Laborde and Silhol (2018) and Laborde (2019) suggest that these concerns have informed teacher professional development activities at the *académie* level. One *laïcité* coordinator in Laborde and Silhol’s (2018) study attributed the ‘provocations’ following the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks to the ‘moralistic stance’ some teachers took in classroom discussions (17). Managing classroom discussion and teachers’ ethical positioning were therefore important themes in training activities in the *académie* in their study (Laborde and Silhol 2018; see also Laborde 2019). I argue that respondents in this study drew similar lessons from the events of January 2015.

My data also provide support for Orange’s (2016; 2017) finding that the January 2015 attacks led some teachers to pursue more restrictive interpretations of *laïcité*. Orange (2016) argues that these teachers sought to push back against the presumed religious radicalisation of their students, leading them to over-interpret the actions of Muslim students as expressions of religious faith, and subsequently as violations of *laïcité* (110; 2017). This included challenging or reporting students for wearing black, dressing modestly, or using common Arabic interjections such as *Wallah* [I swear to God]
(Orange 2016:110; 2017:77; see also Wesselhoeft 2017). As well as discriminating against Muslim students, she argues, these practices transgress an important boundary by interfering with private religious beliefs or practices that are outside of the remit of the school environment (Orange 2016:110). As such, they violate the distinction between public norms and private beliefs discussed by Pélabay (2017).

Laborde (2019) finds that the policies implemented after the January 2015 attacks have entrenched teachers’ roles in the regulation of the religious (32). She traces the emergence of religion as a policy problem to the first ‘headscarf incident’ in 1989 but finds the 2015 attacks led to a spate of media articles and scholarly works reporting an increase in challenges to teaching on religious grounds, and requests for religious accommodations (Laborde 2019:31). For her, this explains the emphasis on laïcité and religious facts in local professional development activities, the recent focus on ‘violations of laïcité’ as a policy issue, and successive attempts to involve teachers in the fight against radicalisation (Laborde 2019). In line with earlier studies, however, she finds that despite recent institutional injunctions to engage with religious phenomena, many teachers were not disposed to do so (Laborde 2019:34; see also Lemaire 2009). She argues that the recent emphasis on improving the teaching of religious phenomena runs counter to teachers’ professional socialisation into a restrictive form of laïcité that seeks to create a common identity by neutralising differences (Laborde 2019:34). In this regard, her findings support the proposition that some teachers’ ‘laïque priors’ lead them to resist recent policy trends (see Bleich 1998).

Petit’s (2018) study focuses specifically on the teaching of religious phenomena in primary schools and provides further support for Laborde’s (2019) findings. Her analysis of a 2016 survey of 345 primary school teachers reveals that only 35% supported the idea of teaching of religious phenomena and put this into practice (Petit 2018:10). The largest group, representing 37% of respondents, were against the teaching of religious beliefs and practices and did not include it in their teaching (Petit 2018:10). A further 24% who were favourable but did not put it into practice cited a lack of training (31%), teaching materials (26%), or time (17%) as key challenges (Petit 2018:10). This suggests that many teachers are unwilling to engage with religion in the classroom and that some of those who are willing struggle to do so. Petit (2018) also
finds, however, that the November 2015 terrorist attacks raised awareness of the urgency of these issues and accelerated this pre-existing pedagogical trend (9).

Another significant finding from Laborde (2019) and Laborde and Silhol (2018) is that local actors play a key role in enacting the policies that are the focus of this study. Laborde (2019) finds that the lack of a stable definition of ‘violations of laïcité’ means that académie officials played a crucial role in giving practical meaning to the Upholding Laïcité initiative (35). In the académie in her study, officials promoted local understandings of laïcité and its application in schools through professional development initiatives (Laborde 2019:35). These officials often framed problems around laïcité differently to national level actors; one respondent complained that themes relating to teachers’ positioning and were absent from the training organised by the central administration (Laborde 2019:38). Laborde and Silhol (2018) find that académie officials used their decision-making capacity over the training they organised as part of the Great Mobilisation to promote more inclusive notions of laïcité. They eschewed the ‘identity-based’, ‘anti-Islam’ laïcité they associated with the prevailing political climate and organised training that addressed Islamophobia and ethnic discrimination (Laborde and Silhol 2018:4). The commission that organised these activities included academic researchers with a background in issues such as ethnicity, religion, and discrimination in education, including the authors themselves (Laborde and Silhol 2018). Together, these findings support my contention that local actors in France have greater decision-making capacity than earlier comparative work would suggest (see Archer 2003; Bleich 1998). They also suggest that these actors may frame problems differently than national-level actors, leading to divergence between policy responses at the local and the national level, as well as between académies (Laborde 2019).

Laborde and Silhol (2018) also find that the ethnicity, religion, and socioeconomic profile of students plays a role in highlighting some schools as the target for laïcité interventions. Although a training coordinator in their study sought to challenge the perception that issues around laïcité were a particular problem for schools with a high proportion of minority ethnic and Muslim students, teachers and school leaders frequently made these associations (Laborde and Silhol 2018). This points the importance of a school’s ‘situated context’ in framing how teachers interpret policy (Ball
et al 2012). I return to the question of student demographics in chapter 4 since it informed my case selection.

Studies by Lorcerie and Moignard (2017) and Laborde (2019) paint an ambivalent picture of the enactment of French anti-radicalisation policies. Lorcerie and Moignard (2017) find that the anti-radicalisation policies implemented in 2016 remained on the margins of institutional concerns at the time of their study. Following an incident that had taken place after the publication of anti-radicalisation materials in the académie of Poitiers, there was a particular concern to avoid excessive radicalisation referrals (MEN 2014; Lorcerie and Moignard 2017:4). Those leading training therefore encouraged teachers to take a range of factors into account when assessing a suspected case (Lorcerie and Moignard 2017:4). In contrast, Laborde (2019) finds that académie officials actively engaged with their new role in preventing radicalisation (40). They had strengthened partnerships with the police and local intelligence services and organised radicalisation training for teachers and school leaders (Laborde 2019). In one activity Laborde (2019) observed, an official told teachers to report all behaviours that might cause suspicion (40). The contrasts between the two studies may suggest that local actors’ engagement with the fight against radicalisation has evolved in line with national-level policies.

However, the idea of referring students suspected of radicalisation generated significant discomfort among the teachers in Laborde’s (2019) study. Some were concerned that a referral would stigmatise individual students, while others spoke of the difficulties involved in distinguishing between students’ conversion to a more rigorous interpretation of Islam and a process that may lead to violent action (Laborde 2019:40). More broadly, Laborde (2019) argues that the idea of reporting students to the authorities came into conflict with teachers’ professional identities (40). This is an important point of contrast to England, where the data from this study and other empirical work suggest that teachers broadly accept CVE as part of their safeguarding duties (see Busher et al 2017; Elwick and Jerome 2019).

3.4.3 Teachers’ responses to FBV and Prevent in England
British values and the ‘policy sediment’ of multiculturalism

Recent studies suggest that many teachers in England see promoting certain values or attitudes among young people as part of their role, and that some associate these values with Britishness. However, they also point to the way previous multicultural policies and practices, and the ‘the notion of Britain as a multicultural society’ frame teachers’ understanding of Britishness and the values they seek to promote (see Favell 2001:135). In her study of schools’ enactment of FBV, Vincent (2019b) argues that the ‘sediment’ of multiculturalism and community cohesion are evident in teachers’ goals for educating young people and their emphasis on promoting the FBV mutual respect and tolerance (101). She develops her argument using Mitchell’s (2006) definition of multicultural education, where the goal is ‘the creation of a certain kind of individual, one who is tolerant of difference […] and who is able to work with others to find sites of commonality, despite differences’ (392, in Vincent 2019b:101). These ideas feed into teachers’ evident concern for preparing students for citizenship in a diverse school community and their life beyond school (Vincent 2019b:98). Focusing on the FBV mutual respect and tolerance enables them to enact the duty in ways that fit with these aims (Vincent 2019b:98). As such, this is not simply a case of teachers ‘falling back’ on previous policy approaches; previous multicultural policies also frame their understanding of their role (see Jensen 2019:627).

McGhee and Zhang’s (2017) analysis of schools’ and colleges’ statements on how they are enacting FBV also points to teachers’ concern for promoting tolerance and respect for diversity. These statements emphasise classroom debate as a means of exposing students to different viewpoints and promoting tolerance and respect for these views (McGhee and Zhang 2017). For McGhee and Zhang (2017), the enactment of FBV in these schools is focused on ‘building character in terms of the qualities that encourage good citizenship in the school’ which teachers understand ‘as a microcosm of and preparation for citizenship of an everchanging Britain’ (946). Qualities such as ‘empathy’, ‘tolerance’ and ‘respect for difference’ are important in this regard (McGhee and Zhang 2017:940).

Taken together, recent studies suggest that teachers see Britain and the schools they work in as being made up of different ethnic or religious communities and seek to
promote respect for and appreciation of this diversity among their students (Vincent 2019b; McGhee and Zhang 2017; see also Jerome and Clemitshaw 2012; Elton-Chalcraft et al 2017:36-37). This notion of multicultural Britain and of the role of the teacher is consistent with the studies I discussed in chapter 2 and was evident among teachers in this study (see Favell 2001; Bleich 1998; Mannitz 2004; Mannitz and Schiffauer 2004).

Empirical studies also support the proposition that teachers’ ‘priors’ lead them to resist the FBV policy, notably its monocultural and potentially exclusionary framing (Bleich 1998). A striking feature of these studies are teachers’ objections to the labelling of the values as British. Most of the teachers in Farrell’s (2016), Vincent’s (2019a), Maylor’s (2016) and Busher et al’s (2017) studies objected to this label. A common concern was that this framing was not reflective of multicultural Britain or was ill-suited to the diverse communities in their school (see Busher et al 2017; Farrell 2016; Vincent 2019a, 2019b; Maylor 2016). In some studies, teachers questioned the choice of the values in the policy and suggested that they were not exclusively British (Bowie and Revell 2016; Maylor 2016; Farrell 2016; Busher et al 2017; Vincent 2019b; Sant and Hanley 2018).

Teachers’ associations of the British values discourse with exclusionary notions of Britishness underlie some of these concerns. Sant and Hanley (2018) explore the relationship between teachers’ understandings of national identity and their responses to FBV. The two most vocal critics of FBV in their study understood Britishness as a ‘rigid’ and potentially exclusionary construct and seemed to reject the duty on this basis (Sant and Hanley 2018:329). While one associated Britishness with a sense of ethnic superiority, the other felt the British values framing evoked ‘colonisation and repression’ (Sant and Hanley 2018:329; see also Farrell and Lander 2019:476; Busher et al 2017:27). Similarly, 10 of the 88 of the trainee teachers in Elton-Chalcraft et al’s (2017) study described the inclusion of British values in the teachers’ standards as ‘veiled racism’, with one respondent rejecting the implication that ‘British values are superior’ (41).

In some cases, teachers’ discomfort with the British values discourse meant they sought to orient their enactment of FBV away from monocultural notions of Britishness. Most of the schools in Vincent’s (2019a) study and several in Busher et al’s (2017)
study presented the FBV as universal values, or school values. The RE teachers in Farrell and Lander’s (2019) study sought to ‘dissociate FBV from its nationalist connotations’ by highlighting the existence of the values in different faith traditions (478). Farrell and Lander (2019) see this ‘reassertion of pluralistic education’ as an act of resistance to the civic nationalist discourse the FBV policy is embedded in (480). In a process that Vincent (2019b) describes as ‘repackaging’, several of the schools in her study addressed the FBV duty through pre-existing activities (79). This often involved ‘auditing’ current practices to see where they aligned with FBV (Vincent 2019a:79). Vincent (2019b) finds that this response ‘allows schools to smooth out the potentially sharp nationalist edges’ of FBV and lists several ‘multicultural’ activities and practices that teachers ‘repackaged’ to address the duty (79). I argue that such responses are a way of refusing the ‘culturalization’ of liberal-democratic values and that teachers’ repackaging of multicultural activities is one of the mechanisms that leads to path dependencies (see Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016; Mouritsen et al 2019; Vincent 2019b:80).

In many ways, the design of the FBV duty enables teachers to re-interpret it duty in ways that reflect their own ‘priors’ (see Bleich 1998). Vincent (2019b) describes FBV as a ‘loose’, ‘enabling’ policy that ‘allows teachers to respond with creativity’ (54; see also Ball et al 2012; Ball 1993). McGhee and Zhang (2017) argue that embedding FBV in SMSC gives schools the ‘local discretion’ to ‘filter out some of the muscularity’ of the duty and enact it in ways that fit with their existing ethos (948). Somewhat optimistically, they argue that this ‘has helped to resolve the tensions between the ‘muscular’ dictates’ of government departments such as the Home Office and the concerns of local actors working in diverse schools (McGhee and Zhang 2017:942). As I discuss below, however, not all teachers have used this capacity to pursue a less muscular, or more multicultural, approach to the policy.

*Civic integration and muscular liberalism in English schools*

While recent studies point to teachers’ widespread discomfort with the FBV policy and the persistence of multicultural ideas, they also suggest that teachers’ ‘priors’ are not uniform and that recent shifts in the prevailing policy climate are evident at the school level (see Bleich 1998:93). The data from some studies point to narrower, more
culturalised conceptions of Britishness, both in teachers’ ideas and in their enactments of the FBV policy. Some of the trainee teachers in Elton-Chalcraft et al’s (2017) study saw the British values discourse as a way of regaining a sense of British identity that had been lost in the context of increased cultural diversity. The authors find that some 25% of these teachers ‘echoed assimilationist language’ in their responses (Elton-Chalcraft et al 2017:40). Comments in this vein reflected concerns that schools had become too diverse, or too ‘occupied with covering other cultures’, with one respondent referencing multiculturalism as a threat to ‘British culture’ (Elton-Chalcraft et al 2017:40). Elton-Chalcraft et al (2017) cite the British values discourse, recent counter-terrorism policies, and ‘continued anti-Muslim news coverage’ as factors contributing to this ‘assimilationist perspective’ (44). Their findings suggest that while many teachers have reacted against exclusionary discourses in the wider policy debate, others have absorbed these discourses.

In a similar vein, some teachers’ understanding and enactment of FBV reflect culturalised notions of Britishness. Six of the respondents in Sant and Hanley’s (2018) study were ‘particularly committed’ to promoting FBV in their teaching. Their comments on Britishness blended cultural symbols and stereotypes with ‘civic values explicitly or implicitly associated with the policy’ (Sant and Hanley 2018:328). For example, all six defined Britishness in relation to ‘having ‘tea’, ‘being friendly’ and ‘being polite’ (Sant and Hanley 2018:328; see also Elton-Chalcraft et al 2017:41). In their lessons, they tended to present Britishness as being ‘closed to competing interpretations’, with little room for critical engagement (Sant and Hanley 2018:328). Similarly, some teachers in Vincent’s (2019b) study emphasised British cultural symbols, icons, and practices in their enactment of FBV. This ‘representing Britain’ response ranged from a ‘minimalist’ approach involving FBV displays with Union Jack decorations to ‘a more maximalist version’, wherein schools presented activities such as afternoon tea or celebrations of the Queen’s birthday as examples of FBV (Vincent 2019b: 71-78). One ethnically diverse school stood out for teachers’ emphasis on ‘traditional British customs and Christian religious traditions’ at the expense of minority ethnic cultures (Vincent 2019b:75). This suggests that teachers working in diverse contexts do not necessarily avoid a monocultural response to the policy. Although this was a minority response in Vincent’s (2019b) study, Moncrieffe and Moncrieffe ‘s (2019) analysis of 27 FBV display boards in primary schools suggests it could be widespread. The most common
images on these displays were the Union Jack and the Queen, and the cultural icons featured were overwhelmingly White (Moncrieffe and Moncrieffe 2019:58).

Vincent (2019b) argues that this highly visible approach to FBV may be a ‘time-saving response’, allowing schools to demonstrate to Ofsted inspectors that they are meeting the duty (71). Indeed, some respondents were aware that this approach was somewhat ‘tokenistic’ but knew that visitors would ‘expect to see signs’ of FBV (Vincent 2019b:72). This is an important point, since it draws attention to the fact that irrespective of any ideas individual teachers hold about Britishness and cultural diversity, schools may still need to demonstrate compliance with the duty. Such responses nevertheless suggest that the FBV policy has given rise to more culturalised representations of Britishness.

Vincent (2019b) also finds evidence of what she describes as a ‘muscular liberalism’ approach, wherein teachers use FBV to target the ‘illiberal values’ they associate with particular communities (124-125). In one school with a majority British Asian and Muslim population, she finds that the principal saw the school’s work on equality and diversity as a ‘defence against […] incursions by religiously conservative parents’ (Vincent 2019b:122-3). His comments reveal a degree of antagonism with the local community, as well as some stereotypical views of gender relations in Muslim and south Asian families (Vincent 2019b:123). Vincent (2019b) argues that this headteacher’s ‘muscular liberalism’, in which the school serves to protect children ‘their parents, community and religion’, reflects a broader climate of ‘hyper-vigilance’ towards Muslim communities (124). Indeed, the headteacher explicitly referenced the Trojan Horse affair in relation to these issues (Vincent 2019b:124). In another school, it was White working-class students that were the focus of teachers’ concerns. Teachers in this school associated the local population with ‘prejudiced attitudes around race and religion’ and sought to challenge these attitudes in their practices (Vincent 2019b:122). This suggests that the British values discourse and the civic integration trend have created a climate wherein teachers are prepared to be more assertive in their defence of liberal values or attitudes than the notion of ‘freedom from the state’ would imply (Bowen 2007:15; see also Mouritsen and Jaeger 2018:5; Favell 2001). As I discuss in chapters 6 and 7, this tendency was evident in two of the case schools in this study.
Prevent in English schools

Busher et al’s (2017) study, based on a national survey of 225 school and college staff, and 70 qualitative interviews with education professionals across 14 schools, is among the largest-scale empirical studies on the implementation of the Prevent duty (see Jerome et al 2019, for an overview of empirical studies). Their data point to two contrasts with France that I develop in this study. Firstly, they find that most respondents understood the Prevent duty as part of their safeguarding responsibilities (see Busher et al 2017:23-24). This framing is not evident in French anti-radicalisation policies, nor in the data on their enactment in schools (see Lorcerie and Moignard 2017; Laborde 2019). Secondly, they suggest that the framing of ‘Prevent as safeguarding’ explains the lack of resistance to Prevent they encountered among teachers (Busher et al 2017:61). I will argue that this framing may explain why teachers’ discomfort with anti-radicalisation policies appears to be more widespread in France than in England.

Busher et al (2017) find that the idea of Prevent as safeguarding is one of the key messages the government has sought to promote about the duty (23). They point to the DfE (2015b) guidance and references to Prevent in the Ofsted framework that situate the duty in the context of safeguarding (Busher et al 2017:5; see Ofsted 2019). The teachers in their study saw Prevent as continuous with pre-existing safeguarding work and compared radicalisation to other safeguarding issues, suggesting they had absorbed this message (Busher et al 2017:23-24). This understanding of Prevent was ‘facilitated both by the training that staff had received and the way the duty was being operationalised within schools and colleges’ (Busher et al 2017:24). In each of the schools and colleges in their study, the DSL and safeguarding teams were responsible for implementing the duty. Most institutions organised Prevent training as part of regular safeguarding training (Busher et al 2017:24). Relating the duty to familiar safeguarding practices helped alleviate respondents’ initial ‘anxieties’ about their new role in preventing violent extremism (Busher et al 2017:32; see also Jerome et al 2019:834). The message that Prevent is about keeping young people safe may also serve to allay any ‘political’ or ‘ethical’ concerns teachers have about reporting their
students (Jerome et al 2019:830; see also Busher et al 2017:61-62; Elwick and Jerome 2019:350).

The fact that Prevent is a legal duty also seems to have helped those in charge of implementing the policy overcome teacher opposition. Respondents in Busher et al’s (2017) study reported that the compulsory nature of Prevent reduced the scope for discussion on the normative implications of the duty (62-63). This is a further point of contrast with France, where recent anti-radicalisation policies do not place additional legal duties on schools.

Despite the official message that Prevent targets all forms of extremism, several studies point to a tendency among teachers to associate the duty with Islam. These studies point to a widespread perception that Prevent is especially relevant to schools with a high proportion of Muslim students (see Busher et al 2017:24-26; Pal Sian 2015; Jerome et al 2019:826; Elwick and Jerome 2019). Elwick and Jerome (2019) also find that some teachers in schools with a large white working-class population expressed concerns about right-wing extremism, and that this fed into their enactment of Prevent (348-350; see also Busher et al 2015:25). As is the case with FBV, a school’s ‘situated context’ seems to play a role in how teachers respond to the Prevent duty (see Ball et al 2012:22).

Busher et al’s (2017) data also point to teachers’ ‘significant concern’ that Prevent might make Muslim students or communities feel stigmatised (54). Some 57% of respondents to their survey felt that the duty has made Muslim students ‘more likely’ or ‘considerably more likely’ to feel stigmatised; this figure rises to 76% among black and minority ethnic respondents (Busher et al 2017:54). This articulates with findings suggesting that Muslim teachers are especially sensitive to the idea that Prevent and FBV could stigmatise Muslim pupils (see Panjwani 2016; Farrell and Lander 2019). As Jerome et al (2019) point out, such concerns are perhaps unsurprising ‘given the prevailing social discourse around Muslims and extremism’ (833). Respondents in Busher et al’s (2017) study explicitly referred to this climate in their comments on the stigmatisation of Muslim populations (54-57). The wider discourse seems to undercut the message that Prevent targets all forms of extremism.
3.5 The policy contexts and policy enactment in schools: Conclusions

In the first part of this chapter, I highlighted relevant similarities and differences in the policies that are the focus of this study, the institutional context they are enacted in, and the ways in which recent terrorist attacks have impacted the debate on cultural diversity in England and France. This discussion complicated the notions of a highly centralised French education system and a highly decentralised English one that characterises some comparative studies (see Bleich 1998; Archer 2013; Mons 2004). This complexity is reflected in the way the two countries’ ‘values’ and ‘anti-radicalisation’ policies are governed. Local actors in France have significant decision-making capacity over the Great Mobilisation and the Upholding Laïcité initiative. Prevent is a compulsory duty that requires all schools to act and Ofsted inspections play an important role in monitoring compliance.

Section 3-3 illustrates how interrelated concerns about violent extremism and the ‘failed’ integration of Muslim countries have resulted in policies and discourses that ‘expand’ the definition of ‘good citizenship’ and entrench the role of the state in promoting the values associated with it (see Mouritsen et al 2019:601). This has been accompanied by a broader climate in which ‘culture’ has come to play an increasingly important role in contemporary debates on citizenship in the two countries (see Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016:2). In both cases, however, ideas on integration and cultural diversity are contested, and I have argued that local actors may take up different positions within these debates.

This was followed by a discussion of recent empirical studies that set the policies in the context of a broader trend towards countering violent extremism in the education sector. Several CVE policies developed by European states involve teachers in the fight against terrorism in similar ways to the UK and France: firstly, by detecting the signs of radicalisation, and secondly by promoting resilience to radicalisation and building social cohesion. Prevent stands out among these policies as a statutory duty that is regulated through accountability mechanisms. Recent studies point to some of the challenges and risks that the enactment of CVE policies incur, and I argue that these are pertinent to both contexts.
Empirical studies from the French and English contexts articulate with several of the findings I develop in chapters 5 – 7. In the French case, these studies highlight the challenges teachers experienced in managing controversial issues in the period following the 2015 terrorist attacks and suggest that these concerns have informed professional learning activities. Studies by Petit (2018) and Laborde (2019) suggest that recent terrorist attacks have accelerated the trend towards addressing religious phenomena in the classroom, but also support the proposition that some teachers’ laïque ‘priors’ mean they are likely to resist this trend (see Bleich 1998). Finally, Laborde and Silhol (2018) and Laborde (2019) highlight the important role local actors in France play in enacting policies the policies that are the focus of this study, as well as their capacity to promote more inclusive notions of laïcité that run counter to the prevailing political climate.

Studies from England point to the ways in which multicultural ideas, practices, and policies feed into teachers’ responses to the FBV policy. Notable among these is Vincent (2019b), who argues that the ‘sediment’ of previous multicultural policies is evident in teachers’ emphasis on the FBV mutual respect and tolerance, and their tendency to ‘repackage’ multicultural practices in their enactment of the duty (101). Several studies point to teachers’ widespread discomfort with the British values discourse and provide support for the proposition that this discourse does not fit with their ‘priors’ (see Bleich 1998). However, these studies also support Bleich’s (1998) contention that ‘priors’ may be contested within one country, and point to the ways in which the recent turn towards civic integration and muscular liberalism may be reflected in teachers’ ideas and practices. Studies on the enactment of Prevent point to two contrasts with France that I develop in chapters 6 and 7. The first is that teachers broadly understood Prevent as part of their safeguarding duties. The second was that framing Prevent in this way serves to allay some of the normative concerns that teachers may hold about the duty. I argue that this may explain why teachers’ resistance to CVE policies appears be more widespread in France than in England.
This chapter sets out the methodology and research design for the study and includes some reflections on the research process. I begin by reviewing the research questions and outlining how I address them through a case study approach. Criticisms of the case study approach often centre on the question of whether the findings from a single case can be applied to a population of cases, such as the schools in England and France that are the focus of this study. I address this debate in 4.1.3, developing my rationale for using findings from the individual cases to address the research questions. This rationale informed my selection of schools for the case studies, which I outline in 4.1.4. I end the first part of this chapter with a table summarising the data I have collected, including the relevant characteristics of the eight case schools and details on how I gained access. The second half of the chapter deals with the research process. I begin with a discussion of how I gained access to participants, pointing to the ways this may have impacted the data, and my reflections on the data collection process. The following section addresses my approach to data preparation, analysis and drawing conclusions. I end by highlighting some of the ethical considerations I identified at the beginning of the research, explaining how they have developed.

4.1 Research design and rationale

4.1.1 Research questions and the case study method

Considering the findings from my master’s dissertation (James 2016) and the propositions identified in chapter 2, this thesis addresses one overarching research question (RQ1) and two sub-questions (SQ1 and SQ2):

**RQ1**: How are teachers, school leaders, and other local education actors in England and France enacting recent national policy responses to the context of terrorism and what responses have they developed on their own initiative?

**SQ1**: What are the similarities and differences in local level enactments within and between the two countries?
SQ2: How are prevailing ideas on immigrant integration and cultural diversity reflected in these enactments and actors’ broader responses to the context of terrorism?

To respond to these research questions, I conducted case studies at four contrasting schools in each country. These drew on lesson observations, documentary analysis and unstructured and semi-structured interviews (see table 4.1; 4.2). I have also conducted interviews with policy officials; at the local level in England and at the académie and national levels in France (table 4.3). In France, I have observed meetings and teacher training in the académies in where two of the case schools are located (table 4.4).

I chose the case study approach for its suitability in exploring theoretical propositions in the real life of schools. Flyvbjerg (2006:227) and Yin (2014) see the case study approach as especially well-suited to this kind of theory testing. Flyvbjerg (2006) argues that being close to the situations under study allows the researcher to ‘close in’ them, and ‘test views directly in relation to phenomena as they unfold’ (235; see also Bassey 1999; Yin 2014:40 Crossley and Vulliamy 1984). The interaction between theory and real-life situations compels the researcher to specify and detail theories (Flyvbjerg 2006:227). Flyvbjerg (2006) also points to the power of a single case to falsify or delimit the propositions the researcher brings to the field; where the case does not support the proposition, the proposition ‘must therefore be either revised or rejected’ (227). Moreover, close contact with the phenomena of interest allows the researcher to explore rival explanations and demonstrate which are more compelling (Flyvbjerg 2006:227). This fits with my aim of contributing to a scholarly debate which often opposes two rival theories: particularistic national models of immigrant integration, and convergence towards civic integration. By applying the propositions emerging from this debate to my cases, I explore how the patterns of convergence and divergence I have observed at the level of policy debate and documentation are reflected in teachers’ ideas and practices.

The case study method also allows me to account for some of the more material, contextual factors that contribute to policy enactment in schools, holding these in
tension with the ideational factors that characterise the debate on national models. As Stake (1995) points out, the case study approach captures the multi-causal nature of human activity through attention to ‘coexisting happenings’ within a bounded setting (39; see also Flyvbjerg 2006:223). Attention to multiple factors helps to develop a more nuanced account of the policy process and avoids the kind of determinism that Bertossi et al (2015) have warned against, wherein national models are used to ‘explain’ the complex behaviour of individuals (4; see also Flyvbjerg 2006:223). Importantly, the approach has given me insight into the interpersonal dynamics within the case schools and the contexts in which they operate. I have argued that these may be at least as important in explaining policy enactments as the two countries’ historical approaches to immigrant integration (see Ball et al 2012:20-26).

4.1.2 Multiple sources of data collection

Following Yin (2014) I developed a table to plan out the research at the start of the process (27-37; see appendix 1). I began by breaking the research question and sub-questions into further questions that indicate the type of data and collection methods I could use to respond to them (see Yin 2014:27-37). I used findings from my master’s dissertation and previous theoretical and empirical work to develop a set of propositions that established the initial focus for data collection (James 2016; see Hammersley and Atkinson 1995; Stake 1995; Yin 2014). Following Yin (2014), these detailed a range of possible outcomes and allowed me to explore competing propositions, notably those relating to national models and civic integration. Finally, the table sets out the types of data to be collected and explains the logic linking the data to the research questions (see appendix 1; Yin 2014:27-37). I revised the table after the first round of data collection in 2018, based on the substantive and methodological insights that had emerged. I have subsequently made small changes to the overall research design, and the propositions have evolved throughout the process of data collection. I discuss these in 4.2.

The overall logic connecting the research questions, data sources, and analysis has broadly remained the same throughout. I address RQ1 through school-based case studies, through the semi-structured interviews with mid-level policy actors, and, in the French case, through the académie-level activities I have observed. While the case
studies shed light on policy enactment of the school level, the additional interviews and observations provide a picture of how schools beyond these cases are enacting the policies. Along with the data from empirical studies I discussed in chapter 3, they allow me to comment on the typicality of the eight case schools. They also provide insight into the role of mid-level policy actors in the two countries. I address SQ1 by comparing the data from the individual cases. Following Yin (2014) I began by analysing each case and writing an individual case report, before conducting a ‘cross-case synthesis’ focused on the similarities and differences within the two countries (59-62). In the final stages of analysis, I conducted a synthesis of data from the two countries, highlighting between-country similarities and differences and relating these to the literature. This analysis also provides a basis for addressing SQ2, which relates to prevailing ideas on immigrant integration and cultural diversity. While the interview data shed light on teachers’ ideas, the data on policy enactments addresses how teachers draw on the practices I have associated with French republican integration and British multicultural race relations.

One of the advantages of this approach is that I use multiple sources of data to draw conclusions. Each method has strengths and limitations in relation to the research questions, and the strengths of one method can compensate for the weaknesses of another (Yin 2014:106; Punch 2009 144-165; Stake 1995:60-68; Bassey 1999 81-83). Much of the analysis draws on interview data. This includes short, unstructured conversations with the teachers and other professionals I have encountered. These have largely addressed SQ1 by providing insight on policy enactment. Longer ‘semi-structured’ or ‘in-depth’ interviews are better suited to SQ2, since they allow for more sustained exploration of the ideas informing these practices (Fontana and Frey 1994; Punch 2009:145). For these, I prepared an interview guide based on my initial research questions and propositions (see appendix 2).

Observational data play an important role in giving access to the life of a school as it occurs in lessons and other activities. They also provide a counterweight to the tendency in interpretive studies to privilege insider ‘perceptions, perspectives and meanings’ (Punch 2009: 156). As well as paying attention to what people say they do and the meaning they give to these actions, it is important to pay attention to what they actually do (Punch 2009:156; see also Foster 1996:12). Classroom observations have
provided further insight into teachers’ ideas on concepts such as citizenship, nationality, and integration through the way they presented these to students. They have also given me access to students’ ideas on these concepts (see Foster 1996:12-13). In some cases, I was able to further these insights in interviews with teachers whose lessons I had observed (see Punch 2009:156; Alexander 2000:269).

Foster (1996) highlights some of the limitations of observational data, and I have tried to address these by using observation alongside other methods (1996:12-13). Some behaviour in schools may be hidden, intentionally or otherwise, and teachers and gatekeepers have decided which activities I could access (Foster 1996:12-13). It is also impossible to observe activities in the past, meaning that I have often relied on planning documents and teachers accounts of activities. Finally, although the activities I observed were ‘natural’ in the sense that most would have taken place without my presence, my presence has impacted how they unfolded (Foster 1996:12-13). There were times where I sensed that activities had been organised for my benefit, or that teachers emphasised ideas relating to my research.

I have also collected and analysed a range of documents throughout the research process. Many of these have been teaching and teacher training resources. Others are policy documents written at the local school level in direct response to national policies. Taken together, these documents provide an opportunity to verify evidence I have gained elsewhere (see Stake 1995; Yin 2014; Punch 2009).

Triangulating the data from different methods increases confidence in the study’s conclusions. Stake (1995:114) sees the case study method as lending itself to ‘methodological triangulation’ of data. He gives the example of using interviews to check one’s own interpretations and descriptions of events observed. In his definition of data triangulation, Yin (2014:120-123) distinguishes between using multiple sources of evidence to establish the same findings and using multiple sources of evidence to establish different findings. For him, it is the former that constitutes data triangulation (see Yin 2014:121). Both approaches contribute to the validity of my findings. On one hand, I have used different data collection methods to corroborate the facts of the case and gather ‘multiple views’ or ‘realities’ (Stake 1995:64; Yin 2014:122). At the same time, the semi-structured interviews address additional lines of inquiry relating to SQ2.
Beyond the policy enactments within individual schools, I am interested in how the two countries’ historical approaches to immigrant integration are reflected in teachers’ ideas and practices. At the aggregate level, the interviews within one country form the basis of my cross-country comparison of teachers’ ideas.

4.1.3 Case studies, generalisability, and external validity

Before discussing my approach to case selection, I address the issues of generalisability, typicality, and external validity as they relate to the case study method and a comparative study of this nature. Critics of the case study approach cast doubt on whether the findings from a particular case can be applied to a population of cases (see Bassey 1999:31-34; Yin 2014:20; Flyvbjerg 2006:224-229; Punch 2009 121-124; Stake 2005:7-9). This criticism is pertinent to the current study, which ultimately seeks to compare responses to terrorism in schools across England to those across France. This would seem to imply that the case schools should in some way be representative of their country and that the findings from each case could be applied elsewhere (see Alexander 2000:265). This conundrum has implications for case selection, analysis, and the validity of any claims I make.

Some case study researchers respond to this challenge by eschewing a statistical sampling logic in their research design. Alexander (2000) suggests that his comparative study of pedagogy – based on observations from schools in five different countries – would fail on a statistical basis (265). He makes a convincing case that the multiplicity of classroom and school-level variables renders the task of achieving a representative sample impossible. Yin (2014:59) and Stake (1995:4) reject the sampling logic on a similar basis.

In responding to the dilemma of representativeness, Alexander (2000) proceeds from the position that ‘classrooms within a given state system of education’ are likely to resemble one another both in terms of their ‘organizational and procedural’ characteristics and the prevailing ‘values and ideas’ of the wider culture to which teachers and pupils belong (266-268). It seems to me that the first of these – organisational and procedural characteristics – is the most persuasive. There are several characteristics - ranging from the governance of schools to teachers’ own
education and professional training – that will be broadly similar between schools within one country (see Alexander 2000:266-268). This provides a convincing basis upon which the case study schools can be taken to resemble, rather than represent, other schools in the same country. However, even these similarities cannot be taken for granted. This is especially true in the English case, where there is increasing diversity in the way schools are governed and in how teachers are trained. I have therefore sought to foreground the contextual features of the schools in my analysis and in producing this thesis, highlighting the ways these might differ from other schools in the same country (see Ball et al 2012).

With regards to ‘ideas and values’, Alexander (2000) proposes two conditions for ensuring a case is ‘both insightful and typifies more than itself’ (266). One of these is that researchers go beyond observable practice and seek to tease out the ‘values and meanings’ embodied in this practice (Alexander 2000:266). This broadly aligns with the aims of my interviews, which seek to draw out the similarities and differences in the way teachers in the two countries give meaning to their practices. The second condition is that researchers treat national culture as if it were ‘as powerful a determinant of the character of school and classroom life as the unique institutional dynamics, local circumstances, and interpersonal chemistries’ that make individual schools different from one another (Alexander 2000:266). Further, he argues that ‘[c]ulture drives and is everywhere manifested in what goes on in classrooms, from what you see on the walls to what you cannot see going on in children’s heads’ (Alexander 2000:266). These claims are more problematic given my theoretical positioning and the objectives of this study. Firstly, I have raised the possibility that local factors – notably the ‘contextual dimensions’ I discussed in chapter 2 - may be more important in determining teachers’ practices than national culture (Ball et al 2012). Furthermore, this study aims to explore how useful notions of national culture – or specifically national philosophies of integration – are in understanding these practices. As such, the existence of national culture cannot be taken for granted. Instead, I have sought to explore questions of national culture by applying the literature on national models to my data, open to the possibility that within-country variation may be more significant than between-country variation.
I follow other case study researchers in arguing that theory and existing empirical studies can contribute to the development of credible generalisations from a single case. Stake (1995) speaks of a process by which ‘grand generalizations’ derived from the theoretical or empirical fields can be explored in subsequent cases (7-9). This resembles the process of theory testing and falsification discussed by Flyvbjerg (2006), in that where a case does not support a grand generalization, the generalisation is rejected or modified (224-228). For Yin (2014), theory is essential to ensuring the external validity of a case study (40). His idea of ‘analytic’ generalisation works on the basis that theoretical propositions inform case selection, the development of propositions, and the collection of data. Findings from each case study then play a role in ‘corroborating, modifying [or] rejecting’ (Yin 2014:41) these propositions as the research develops. Ultimately, the researcher is aiming for generalisations that go beyond the initial case or cases.

These principles have informed my case selection, data collection, and analysis. I have selected cases to test propositions emerging from the literature and sought to modify or develop propositions emerging from the empirical field in subsequent cases. While Boblin et al (2013) appear to see the differences in Stake and Yin’s research paradigms as rendering their approaches incompatible, I would argue that my position sits somewhere between the two. One on hand, since the study is motivated by a desire to understand how theories of immigrant integration operate in an empirical context, it sets out to make the kind of ‘analytical generalizations’ discussed by Yin (2014; see also Boblin et al 2013). However, I share Stake’s (1995) scepticism about absolute claims to truth. I have more confidence in the findings that delimit or modify theoretical propositions. Any claims I make to generalisability should be taken as ‘fuzzy’ or tentative, especially since these could be falsified by a single non-conforming case (see Flyvbjerg 2006; Bassey 1999).

4.1.4 Case selection

The decision not to apply a sampling logic implies what Flyvbjerg (2006) has called an ‘information-oriented’ approach to case selection (230). This means that where possible, I have selected schools that I believe most likely to shed light on the research.
questions or emerging propositions, rather than aiming for ‘typical’ schools (see Flyvbjerg 2006:230; see also Stake 1995; Yin 2014). As Flyvbjerg (2006) points out, identifying such ‘critical’ cases is more easily said than done (231). As a guide, he suggests seeking out cases ‘most likely’ and ‘least likely’ to confirm a proposition (Flyvbjerg 2006:231). These considerations led me to recruit schools based on three analytically relevant characteristics, aiming for variety within the group of schools in each country (see Stake 1995:5-7). I discuss these characteristics below.

The first characteristic I identified was the ethnic composition of schools, notably the proportion of Muslim students. I aimed to recruit schools with contrasting ethnic profiles, but which all had a degree of ethnic diversity, and to recruit one school with a significant Muslim population in each country. Elite concerns about laïcité and republican values in French schools have tended to be ‘geographically’ focused on ethnically diverse urban areas and ‘demographically’ focused on Muslims, particularly in the context of recent terrorist attacks (Moran 2017:318; see also Wesselhoeft 2017; Ogien 2013; Laborde and Silhol 2018). As such, there are likely to be differences in the way different schools approach these themes. In the English case, multicultural practices have been especially prevalent in areas of ethnic and religious diversity (Bleich 1998; Qureshi and Janmaat 2014; Tomlinson 2008; Gillborn 2008; Vincent 2019b). Teachers working in diverse contexts are therefore ‘most likely’ to draw on multicultural ideas and practices (Flyvbjerg 2006:231).

Recruiting schools on this basis is not a straightforward process in France since public bodies do not collect data on individuals’ ethnicity or religion. The social taboo on talking about ethnicity in France also made it difficult to share this criterion with gatekeepers (see Favell 2001:3). Indeed, I was advised by a French researcher to remove references to ethnic diversity from my participant information sheets. I resolved this challenge by targeting schools in based on their location. Moreover, the two schools that I believe have the highest proportion of Muslim students were recommended to me by académie-level laïcité coordinators. My sense is that they directed me towards schools they felt were especially relevant to my research, considering the populations they served.
The lack of available data also makes it difficult to speak of the ethnic and religious composition of the French case schools with any certainty. Instead, I have relied on teachers’ comments, my own observations, and immigration data from the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Research (INSEE). The INSEE data give some indication of the ethnic diversity in the area local to the schools.

I also aimed to select schools from different parts of the two countries. A school’s location is part of the ‘situated context’ in which teachers operate, and I hypothesised that policy enactments would vary across the country (Ball et al 2012:22). Part of this context is the local authority or académie to which the school belongs. In the English case, local authority Prevent teams support and direct schools in their implementation of Prevent and in their responses to terrorism (see Busher et al 2017; Elwick and Jerome 2019). In the French case, académie-level actors play an important role in the enactment of the Great Mobilisation and the Upholding Laïcité initiative (Laborde 2019). I was successful in recruiting schools in different parts of France, although two are in the same académie. There is less geographical variety in the English case, where I recruited two schools in the southeast of England, and two in the West Midlands.

Another relevant characteristic I identified was the ‘type’ of school, although this means different things in the two contexts. In England, the aim was to select a mixture of maintained schools, free schools, and academies. This emerged as a potentially relevant characteristic when I hypothesised that First Academy’s status as a newly established free school fed into its enactment of the policies. The English cases also cover primary, lower secondary, and further education. In France, my aim was to select at least one of the three main types of secondary school – collège, academic lycée, and professional (vocational) lycée - and I was successful in doing this. The cases therefore reflect the full age range of secondary education. Furthermore, previous research has shown variation in civic education and civic outcomes between academic and vocational tracks in the English case, and I was interested in seeing how pedagogical approaches varied between tracks (see Janmaat 2018; Janmaat and Mons 2022).
Selecting contrasting schools within each country increases the validity of any cross-country findings. If I found between-country differences to be stronger than within-country differences, despite the differences in the contexts in which the case schools operate, this would suggest that national-level factors explain the outcomes more than local ones. If, on the other hand, within country differences were stronger than between country differences, this might cast doubt on the notion of national models of integration or suggest that local factors are be more important than national ones.
4.1.5 Overview of data collected

Table 4-1 Overview of cases (France)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School name</th>
<th>Education level and academic track</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Ethnic and religious characteristics of student population</th>
<th>Gained access through</th>
<th>Data overview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collège Aimé Césaire</td>
<td>Lower secondary</td>
<td>Inner city, South of France</td>
<td>Majority minority ethnic Majority Muslim</td>
<td>Ministry of Education (MEN) and Académie Laïcité coordinator</td>
<td>4 interviews 12 student activities observed 3 documents analysed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collège Lafayette</td>
<td>Lower secondary</td>
<td>outskirts of large post-industrial town, North of France</td>
<td>Majority minority ethnic Majority Muslim</td>
<td>Académie Laïcité coordinator</td>
<td>5 interviews 3 lesson observations 1 observation of teacher training 5 documents analysed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lycée Gustave Eiffel</td>
<td>Upper secondary vocational</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>Majority minority ethnic Significant Muslim population</td>
<td>Personal contact</td>
<td>2 interviews 2 lesson observations 1 document analysed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lycée Jean Moulin</td>
<td>Upper secondary general</td>
<td>Inner city, North of France</td>
<td>Majority White French Some Muslim students</td>
<td>Unsolicited email to school principal, support from MEN</td>
<td>2 interviews 3 observations of student activities 1 document analysed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 Pseudonyms
4 The lack of available data in France makes this difficult to speak of the ethnic and religious composition of schools with any certainty
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School name^5</th>
<th>Education level and school type</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Ethnic and religious characteristics of student population</th>
<th>Gained access through</th>
<th>Data overview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Westbrook Primary</td>
<td>Primary; local authority maintained</td>
<td>Inner city, Midlands</td>
<td>Majority minority ethnic Majority Muslim</td>
<td>Teach First regional office</td>
<td>1 interview 10 observations 2 documents analysed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercia Academy</td>
<td>Lower secondary; local; academy part of multi-academy trust</td>
<td>Inner city, Midlands</td>
<td>Majority minority ethnic Majority Muslim</td>
<td>Personal contact</td>
<td>4 interviews (2 unstructured) 2 documents analysed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Academy</td>
<td>Primary to upper secondary; free school</td>
<td>Outer London</td>
<td>75% minority ethnic Significant Muslim population</td>
<td>Personal contact</td>
<td>6 interviews 12 observations 7 documents analysed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast College Group (SCG)</td>
<td>Group of three further education colleges</td>
<td>3 campuses in southeast England</td>
<td>White British the largest ethnic group across 3 campuses Significant Muslim population in 2 campuses</td>
<td>Supervisor, teacher at the college</td>
<td>6 interviews 2 observations 6 documents analysed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

^5 Pseudonyms
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent name</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Gained access through</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Didier</td>
<td>Senior civil servant</td>
<td>MEN, Paris</td>
<td>Stéphane Villar, MEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bertrand</td>
<td>Senior civil servant</td>
<td>MEN, Paris</td>
<td>Stéphane Villar, MEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugo</td>
<td>Laïcité and radicalisation coordinator</td>
<td>South of France académie (SoF)</td>
<td>Stéphane Villar, MEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicolas</td>
<td>Laïcité coordinator</td>
<td>North of France académie (NoF)</td>
<td>Teacher at the Lycée Jean Moulin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alain</td>
<td>Teacher of history; coordinator of teacher training initiative on countering violent extremism (CVE)</td>
<td>South of France académie 2 (SoF2)</td>
<td>Referral from SoF académie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>Teacher of EMC and history-geography, Lycée Voltaire</td>
<td>South of France académie (SoF)</td>
<td>Personal contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dave</td>
<td>Prevent Education Officer</td>
<td>Inner London local authority</td>
<td>Personal contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim</td>
<td>Prevent Coordinator</td>
<td>Southeast local authority</td>
<td>School leader at SCG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 Pseudonyms
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Académie name</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| SoF           | 2 days of teacher training  
|               | 2 meetings of Laïcité and Critical thinking steering group  
|               | 1 meeting of religious phenomena and student beliefs working group  
|               | 1 student activity |
| NoF           | 1 training event for school leaders  
|               | 1 meeting of *laïcité* training group |
4.2 Data collection and analysis

4.2.1 Gaining access

The tables in the previous section outline how I gained access to research participants and sites. In most cases, this was either through my own professional network or those of my partner, who previously worked at the MEN. I know Mike, the Executive Principal at First Academy, through my participation in the Teach First programme and made initial contact through him. Teach First’s Midlands office arranged access to Westbrook Primary, and another Teach First contact facilitated access to Mercia Academy. Stephane Villar, an official at the MEN and a former colleague of my partner’s, has been instrumental in my gaining access to schools in France. He introduced me to Hugo, laïcité coordinator in the SoF, and this led me to the Collège Aimé Césaire. Stephane also arranged interviews with Didier and Bertrand, two senior officials at the MEN. Although I contacted Arthur at the Lycée Jean Moulin independently, Stephane later wrote to him stating the MEN’s support for my research, and I suspect that this was decisive in my gaining access. I recruited teachers for in-depth interviews on an individual basis. Once interview participants had agreed in principle, I sent them the participant information sheet.

Gaining access through these pre-existing contacts has implications for the data, although it was not always clear to me whether individual respondents were aware of these relationships. At First Academy, most respondents seemed aware that I had gained access through Mike and that we knew one another previously. I had also had common acquaintances with some of the teachers at First Academy; some had been Teach First participants and two former colleagues of mine had previously worked at the school. This familiarity, coupled with my gaining access through the leadership team, seems to have facilitated access within the site and contributed to a degree of openness among respondents. In the French case, the idea that I had been ‘sent’ by the Ministry – a phrase I heard more than once in the SoF (much to my embarrassment!) – seems to have opened doors, but may have also made respondents circumspect about my presence.
4.2.2 Data collection

I envisaged spending two consecutive weeks at each case school before moving onto the next site, although I soon realised that this would not be possible. Teachers tended to address the EMC curriculum, FBV, and themes related to terrorism sporadically. I also had to negotiate access to lessons with individual teachers, even after gaining consent from gatekeepers. This has involved working around teachers’ commitments and their willingness to participate. As a result, I had more contact with some sites than with others and had to be adaptable in my research design. This has sometimes involved sacrificing the depth that would have come from spending a longer period in one school for the breadth that comes from extending the data collection to other schools in the country.

I have also taken opportunities to observe activities that were not part of the original research design. Notable among these are the observations of académie-level teacher training and meetings in France. These began when Hugo in the SoF invited me to observe training activities. I took the opportunity to gain insight into the work that was going on across the académie and pursued this line of inquiry by observing similar activities in the NoF. I subsequently tried to access training activities in England but was unsuccessful. This makes the data uneven in some respects, with more school-level data in England than in France, and more ‘mid-level’ data in France than in England.

4.2.3 Data preparation and analysis

As Stake (1995) points out, in an interpretive study of this kind, ‘there is no particular moment when data analysis begins’ (71). Rather, analysis takes place in every encounter with data. One of my key concerns was to make the more informal aspects of analysis as visible as possible, recording my thoughts at different stages of the process. This began with taking handwritten field notes during school visits (see Stake 1995; Hammersley and Atkinson 1995). Following Miles and Huberman (1994), I aimed to produce a word-processed ‘write up’ of these within 48 hours of the research engagement (51). As well as recording what happened during the engagement, the
‘write ups’ included my reflections on substantive and methodological issues (see Miles and Huberman 1994:51). I recorded in-depth interviews on my mobile phone and computer with respondents’ permission. I listened to these recordings and made notes as soon after the interviews as possible. Finally, I transcribed the interviews and coded them in full using the NVivo software.

I conducted thematic analysis of the data using a ‘two-level scheme’ of ‘etic’ codes derived from the research questions, literature and propositions, and ‘emic’ codes derived from the research settings (Miles and Huberman 1994:61; see also Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006; Gibson and Brown 2009; Boyatzis 1998). This has broadly involved assigning segments of data to codes using NVivo. This serves the practical process of bringing together all the relevant data on a given theme, such as the enactment of a policy. It facilitated further analysis, since I could look through data under the individual codes to identify patterns. This process also involved exploring the relationship between different codes to develop overarching themes. Thematic analysis is an iterative process, and it was necessary to ‘interact’ the data codes and themes several times before the final themes were defined (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006:90).

This process formed the basis for the final analysis. I grouped most of the codes into three ‘code families’: educational activities and practices; enactment of government policies; and discourses on immigration and integration (see Gibson and Brown 2009). The codes in the ‘enactment of government policies’ family enabled me to address SQ1 by comparing the enactment of individual policies across the case schools. Addressing SQ2 required more interpretation and engagement with the literature on national models and civic integration. As such, I developed a spreadsheet to explore how propositions from the literature might shed light on each of the themes I had developed, as well as how my findings might refine or delimit these propositions. Appendix 4 describes the process of thematic analysis in further detail. It is based on the code log, a record I kept at different stages of analysis to make the process transparent (see Gibson and Brown 2009; Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006). I have included the final list of codes in appendix 5.
4.2.4 Ethical considerations

I considered the ethical implications of the study as part of the UCL Research Ethics Review process. Section 8 of my application outlines the ethical issues I anticipated at the start of the research process, and the steps I planned to take to address them (see appendix 6).

Many of the ethical issues relate to the sensitive nature of my topic, my positioning as a researcher, and the risk of professional harm to participants. Issues around cultural diversity, Islam and violent extremism are subject to a good deal of controversy and political debate in the two countries. Previous empirical work points to the ways in which Muslim and minority ethnic students have often been problematised in these debates, but also to teachers’ sensitivities around being perceived as racist or Islamophobic. While racism and Islamophobia are not the focus of this study, I am an anti-racist, and a researcher from a minority ethnic background. I am aware of the ways this informs my interest in the topic as well as how I have responded to the research situations. Some respondents have made comments on race, ethnicity, or Islam that I found problematic. The danger of bringing these normative judgements to bear on the analysis has been an ongoing consideration as I have been writing this thesis. As far as possible, I have sought to avoid this by relating participants’ statements to the prevailing ideas on immigrant integration and cultural diversity that inform my research questions. My supervisors’ comments have been useful in this regard. I recognise that this requires considerable interpretation on my part, although it has the advantage of focusing the interpretation on analytical, rather than normative concerns.
5 Educational responses to terrorism at the local level: France

In this chapter, I discuss the data from the four case schools in France along with the académie-level data. I begin with the académie-level data, which addresses the enactment of the Great Mobilisation and the Upholding Laïcité initiative. The findings provide a context for understanding policy enactment in the three schools in these académies and insight into the role of académie-level actors in steering policy enactment. Section 5.2 addresses the school-level data. I end by summarising the key findings from the case studies, pointing towards findings I develop in chapter 7.

The school case studies are structured around the research questions and sub-questions. I begin by addressing RQ1 and SQ1, highlighting key aspects of the school’s enactment of the policies that are the focus of this study and pointing to the similarities and differences with other contexts. I find that the decision-making capacity local actors have over the Great Mobilisation and the Upholding Laïcité initiative leads to greater within-country variation than previous comparative studies would imply (see Bleich 1998; Archer 2003; cf. Buisson-Fenet 2007). The two académie’s laïcité coordinators had significant influence over teachers’ professional learning on themes relating to laïcité and republican values, leading to variation in the scale and focus of these activities. At the school level, I argue that the inclusion of EMC in the assessment components for the brevet and baccalaureate means that this was the most widely implemented aspect of the Great Mobilisation. In contrast, schools varied with regards to their engagement with the other measures. French anti-radicalisation policies did not require all schools to implement actions at the time of my data collection. My data suggest that they are less widely implemented than Prevent in England, and that activities aimed at countering violent extremism (CVE) may be targeted at schools with a high proportion of Muslim students.

The second part of each case study addresses SQ2. I address the ways in which prevailing ideas on integration are reflected in teachers’ responses to the policies and the broader context of terrorism. I argue that the enactment of the Great Mobilisation and Upholding Laïcité consolidates institutionalised ideas about the role of republican
values and especially laïcité in facilitating integration (see Favell 2001; Bowen 2007 Bonjour and Lettinga 2012; Wesselhoeft 2017). Some teachers drew on these ideas in their responses to recent attacks. Although teachers broadly agreed on the continued importance of laïcité in the current climate, however, the data points to disagreements about what this should mean in practice. On one hand, recent terrorist attacks appear to have contributed to the emergence of more exclusionary manifestations of laïcité. Some actors also saw violations of laïcité as potential indicators of radicalisation, reflecting the logic I have argued informs the Upholding Laïcité initiative. Other respondents distanced themselves from these ‘harder’ manifestations of laïcité and advocated for a more ‘open’ conception of the concept. This ‘open’ position on laïcité reflects a broader openness to cultural and religious diversity, and there are similarities with multiculturalism in England (see Baubérot 2015: 91; Lorcerie 2015). This supports Bleich’s (1998) contention that ‘priors’ may ‘be contested within segments of society’ (93). Finally, I find that the emphasis on teaching religious practices in recent national-level responses to terrorism was evident at the local level.

5.1 Policy enactment at the académie-level

In this section, I discuss the findings from the académie-level data. I begin with the data from the SoF, the académie in the South of France where the Collège Aimé Césaire is located. This is followed by the North of France (NoF) académie, which includes the Collège Lafayette and the Lycée Jean Moulin. I end this section by drawing conclusions on the role of académie-level actors in steering the policies that are the focus of this study, pointing to some of the themes I develop in the case studies.
5.1.1 South of France académie (SoF)

Table 5-1 - Data collected: SoF académie

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviews</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Hugo’ – Laïcité and radicalisation coordinator; Marie’ – School principal, Collège Aimé Césaire (Joint interview, 15/11/18)</td>
<td>Initial teacher training (ITE) day on ‘Laïcité and critical thinking’ (10/12/18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Fred’ – Teacher of EMC and history-geography, Lycée Voltaire (02/12/19)</td>
<td>Meeting of the Laïcité and critical thinking steering group (11/12/18; 13/06/19)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meeting between académie officials and national-level inspector (11/12/18)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Continuing professional development (CPD) on ‘laïcité and critical thinking’ (12/12/18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meeting of ‘religious phenomena and student beliefs’ working group (14/06/19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Student activity at on ‘the monotheistic religions’ (14/06/19)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1.1.1 Laïcité, republican values, and teachers’ professional learning before and after January 2015

Académie-level actors have significant decision-making capacity over aspects of the Great Mobilisation and the Upholding Laïcité initiative. Each rector is charged with defining and coordinating the roadmap for the Great Mobilisation and identifying training and support needs as part of the Upholding Laïcité initiative (see MEN 2015a; 2022b). In the SoF and the NoF, Hugo and Nicolas – the two laïcité coordinators – oversaw the implementation of the training plan announced as part of the Great Mobilisation and led the académie’s Laïcité and Religious Phenomena teams.
The SoF stands out for the scale of professional learning activities. At the time of my visits, Hugo led a ‘laïcité and critical thinking’ steering group - composed of ten thematic working groups - that coordinates this work. These activities involved some 100 professionals, including teachers, school leaders, academic researchers, and académie-level inspectors. The groups organised professional development for pre- and in-service teachers and produced teaching resources on topics relating to their theme. A smaller académie-level Laïcité and Religious Phenomena team responded to presumed violations of laïcité as part of the Upholding Laïcité initiative. The large number of professionals involved gave the groups significant training capacity compared to the NoF, and respondents commented that few académies organised activities on this scale.

Despite the differences in scale between the two académies, there was a common focus on strengthening teachers’ capacity to manage controversial issues in the classroom. I argue that this emphasis responds to the challenges teachers faced after the Charlie Hebdo attacks in 2015. Christophe - an EMC teacher at the Collège Aimé Césaire who led training across the académie - said these events highlighted the difficulties some teachers already faced handling ‘sensitive topics’ (interview 10/06/19). For him, teachers’ ‘positioning’ in classroom debates and their neutrality on religious and political matters were important in ensuring they managed these topics effectively (interview 10/06/19). This was a recurrent theme in the activities I observed, suggesting it was still an important concern. One of the working groups dealt explicitly with teachers’ professional ethics and sought to develop their ‘reflexivity’ on their positioning (field notes 19/06/19). This included helping them manage ‘hot topics’ (field notes 19/06/19). Another group used philosophical principles to improve the quality of debate and reflexive thought and had supported teachers and students in their reflection on the 2015 terrorist attacks. The teacher leading the group underlined the importance of teachers being prepared to listen to ideas that they do not agree within order to build consent around republican values through debate (field notes 19/06/19).

The emphasis on managing classroom discussion and teachers’ positioning addresses concerns highlighted in studies conducted in the period following the attacks. Lorcerie and Moignard (2017) and Laborde and Silhol (2018) find that teachers’ competence in managing sensitive topics and the intransigent positions
some took in classroom debates on *Charlie Hebdo* may have contributed to the conflicts with students that occurred during this period.

### 5.1.1.2 Open laïcité

In addition to the scale of professional development activities in the SoF, Hugo felt his ‘open’ approach to *laïcité* differed qualitatively from other académies, and from that of the current government (interview 15/11/18). This approach was characterised by an openness to cultural and religious diversity that has parallels with multiculturalism in England. It also implied a preference for dialogue over sanctions as a way of resolving issues arising from students’ religious beliefs and a pragmatic concern for maintaining harmony and avoiding conflict within the school community. Speaking to a group of trainee teachers, Hugo defined open *laïcité* as a ‘tolerant’ *laïcité* that shows respect for students’ cultural and religious identities while leaving religion outside the school gates (field notes 10/12/18). These ideas were evident in my interviews with teachers at Aimé Césaire, but also in comments members of the working groups made during my observations. For example, Marie, the school principal at Aimé Césaire, stressed the importance of ‘unconditional respect for the student in his identity [and] his culture’ in resolving conflicts arising from students’ beliefs (interview 15/11/18). This ‘openness’ to cultural diversity articulates with the description of ‘open *laïcité*’ in Baubérot’s (2015) typology of French *laïcités*. Baubérot (2015) describes ‘open *laïcité*’ as a reaction to the dominant position that emerged in the late 1980s, which its critics reject as anti-religious and for seeking to eradicate difference (91).

Hugo’s positioning on *laïcité* also reflects the broader political divides on the concept and the legacy of previous policy approaches. He described his approach as a ‘transcription’ of the vision of *laïcité* advocated by former Education Minister Najat Vallaud-Belkacem and described by Lorcerie (2015), whose article he referenced in our interview. Lorcerie (2015) finds that Vallaud-Belkacem sought to move beyond a disproportionate focus on sanctioning symbols of Islam towards a more ‘pedagogical’ approach, where the value of *laïcité* is shared among students and families through dialogue (5-6). Hugo was involved in producing the *Laïcité Booklet*, which reflects this emphasis on dialogue (MEN 2015b). Lorcerie (2015) also argues that this approach
requires teachers to reflect on their professional positioning, which seems to partly explain the emphasis on teachers’ positioning in the SoF (8). In contrast, Hugo distanced himself from what he saw as disproportionate focus on ‘violations of laïcité’ under Education Minister Jean-Michel Blanquer. For him, this approach represented a step back towards ‘a more closed idea’ of laïcité ‘where the education system is more of a fortress to be protected’ (interview 15/12/18). In positioning himself against the current national-level approach to laïcité, Hugo illustrates how local actors can draw on previous policy approaches ‘over and against contemporary policy’ (see Ball et al 2012:6).

Hugo’s collaboration with academic researchers seems to have contributed to this ‘open’ approach. Researchers in fields related to education, ethnicity, and cultural diversity participated in the working groups, including some of the authors I cite in this thesis. Their published work offers a critical perspective on dominant discourses on laïcité and integration and is sensitive to issues around ethnic discrimination and Islamophobia in contemporary France. They offered such perspectives in some of the meetings I observed. Training activities invited teachers to question the idea of a universalist, ‘colour blind’ approach to integration and drew attention to the ways some manifestations of laïcité could exclude minority groups. During one roundtable, speakers questioned the idea that young people could leave their cultural identities and religious beliefs behind when they came to school (observation 12/12/18). Other discussions addressed the idea that some people use laïcité to stigmatise Muslim populations. In the sense that Hugo has used his decision-making capacity to promote a more accommodating approach to cultural diversity, there are parallels with the English context, where multicultural approaches have often prevailed in diverse local authorities, sometimes despite less accommodating approaches at the national level (see Bleich 1998; Qureshi and Janmaat 2014).

Hugo’s preference for dialogue over sanctions as a way of resolving laïcité ‘problems’ seems to reflect the ‘pedagogical’ approach described by Lorcerie (2015:5). Hugo contrasted his approach to the Upholding Laïcité initiative with other académies who called on the mobile security teams – charged with dealing with incidents such as violence and poor behaviour - to respond to presumed violations of laïcité (see MEN 2010). Hugo was somewhat ‘troubled’ by this ‘security’ approach, since he felt many
of these situations were ‘pedagogical’ in nature (interview 15/11/18). Hugo and Marie’s comments on this theme reflect a belief that teachers can build consent around values such as laïcité through dialogue. Referring to the incidents that occurred after the January 2015 attacks, Marie referred to this as ‘educability’:

“If we say to the student. “No. You didn't do it right. You're not thinking right. Bang – [taps on table] sanction!”. We lose him. Whereas if we give ourselves the possibility to discuss with him […] We open the possibility to make him mature and think. If we want a chance to make a difference and to shape future citizens, that's the only way to do it.”

(Marie, interview 15/11/18)

These comments suggest that as well as avoiding conflict, dialogue serves an importance function in developing students’ civic competence. Marie and Hugo saw this as teachers’ ‘core business’ (interview 15/11/18). This echoes comments respondents in Lorcerie’s (2015) study made about the ‘pedagogical’ approach to promoting republican values they associated with the Great Mobilisation (7).

5.1.1.3 Laïcité and radicalisation

The académie-level data underscore the link between contemporary practices around laïcité and the perceived threat of religious extremism. Like the officials I interviewed at the MEN, some local actors interpret violations of laïcité as potential indicators of radicalisation. For example, one participant in a meeting I observed said violations of laïcité were ‘often’ the beginning of the radicalisation process (field notes 11/12/18). Hugo took a more nuanced view, and said his role often involved explaining to teachers that ‘laïcité problems’ and ‘radicalisation problems’ were ‘not the same thing’ (interview 15/11/18). However, he suggested that laïcité problems ‘may come up against the question of radicalisation’ in some cases (interview 15/11/18). He also interpreted a spate of problems with religious clothing in schools and challenges to the curriculum on religious grounds in the early 2010s as evidence that Wahhabi and Salafist Islam ‘had continued to progress’ in the neighbourhoods concerned (interview
15/11/18). Marie made similar comments about the increased prevalence of concealing outfits among girls in the area local to Aimé Césaire (interview 15/11/18). Although they did not directly connect these phenomena to violent extremism, they seemed to view them as expressions of ‘radical’ or undesirable forms of Islam. Such responses suggest the presumed link between visible manifestations of Islam and ‘Islamism’ may be relatively widespread (see Bowen 2007:155-181).

The data also points to the way concerns about religious fundamentalism feed into some teachers more restrictive interpretations of *laïcité*. Several respondents spoke of the conflict between these ‘*laïcaird*’ teachers and those who advocated for a more open interpretation of the concept. Hugo associated the stricter position with concerns about ‘religious fundamentalism’ (interview 15/11/18). Speaking of the period following the terrorist attacks in 2015, Fred, a teacher in a school in the same city as Aimé Césaire, said concerns about jihadist movements in the local area had contributed to ‘rigidity’ among some teachers on questions relating to *laïcité* (interview 02/12/19). For him, the ‘frenzied’ tone of public debate on these issues in the period following the attacks fed into these staffroom conflicts (interview 02/12/19). These reports support findings from Orange (2016), who finds that teachers saw *laïcité* as a tool for pushing back against the presumed religious radicalisation of their students during this period (110).

### 5.1.1.4 The teaching of religious phenomena

The emphasis on promoting the teaching of religious phenomena in the Great Mobilisation and recent anti-radicalisation policies was evident in the SoF (see MEN 2015a; Eduscol 2022b; Petit 2018; Laborde 2019; Husser 2017). A dedicated ‘teaching of religious phenomena and student beliefs’ working group organised training to improve teachers’ practices in this area. During the 2018/2019 academic year, they also organised a workshop on the monotheistic religions in partnership with a local museum. This involved some 1000 primary school students and several groups of parents.

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7 *Laïcaird* is often used as a pejorative term by proponents of a more ‘open’ approach to *laïcité* to describe those who practice a hardline form of *laïcité* (see Baubérot 2015:90-93).
The monotheistic religions activity illustrates Husser’s (2017) finding that the new EMC curriculum encourages teachers to go beyond teaching religion as history, and to address contemporary beliefs and practices in the service of pluralism (50; see also Petit 2018). Indeed, Christophe explicitly linked the activity to the ‘accepting differences’ theme of the EMC curriculum, which includes objectives relating to mutual understanding, tolerance, and respect for religious diversity (field notes 14/06/19; see MEN 2018a). This pluralism function, along with some of the practices I observed in the workshop, point to the ways the approach to ‘teaching religious phenomena’ in France may be converging with English approaches to addressing religion in the classroom. During the workshop I observed, the museum’s education officer highlighted the similarities between Islam, Christianity, and Judaism using stories and artefacts from the different religions (see figure 5-1). He also questioned the students on beliefs and practices from their own religion – which in most cases was Islam - and connected these with the other faiths (field notes 14/06/19). In particular, the workshop served to deepen students’ knowledge of Judaism, which many appeared unfamiliar with (field notes 14/06/19). The workshop was clearly focused on teaching young people about religious diversity to prepare them for life in a pluralist society.
Mannitz (2004) finds that preparing young people for life in a pluralist society was an important function of religious education in the London school in her study. Mannitz (2004) contrasts this approach to teaching religion with the Paris school in her study, where religion featured as an object of history and philosophy, with little attention to contemporary beliefs and practices. The monotheistic religions activity points to the way practices in this area may have developed since Mannitz (2004) carried out her study. It reflects a broader policy climate which has become more favourable to teaching religious phenomena, with the context of terrorism contributing to this trend (see Debray 2002; Husser 2017; Petit 2018; Laborde 2019). These teachers’ apparent willingness to engage with religious diversity also articulates with the ‘open’ conception of laïcité I discussed above.

However, it is not clear how many teachers in the SoF - let alone in other parts of France – implement such practices. In a survey of teachers in Aimé Césaire’s priority
education network (REP+\(^8\)) that Christophe conducted as part of an action research project, some 11 of 20 secondary school teachers and 15 of 40 primary reported that they did not engage with religious phenomena in their teaching. They cited a lack of knowledge and confidence and anxieties around parental complaints as explanations. Christophe also felt that despite recent training efforts, some teachers were still ‘stuck’ in their ‘laïcaird’ position that religion did not belong in the classroom (interview 10/06/19). Indeed, at least one survey respondent suggested that religion should not be included in the curriculum. This seems to support Laborde’s (2019) finding that the recent emphasis on teaching religious phenomena runs counter to teachers’ professional socialisation into a restrictive form of laïcité (34; see also Bleich 1998). The survey results also paint a similar picture to Petit’s (2018) analysis, both in terms of teachers’ engagement with religious phenomena and challenges they experienced putting it into practice (see chapter 3).

5.1.2 North of France académie (NoF)

Table 5-2 – Data collected: NoF académie

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviews</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Nicolas’ – Laïcité coordinator (31/07/19)</td>
<td>Training for school leaders – ‘laïcité and professional ethics’ (14/03/19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meeting of laïcité training group (03/10/19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Whole staff training at the Collège Lafayette ‘ - Passing on and bringing to life the values of the Republic’ (27/11/20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1.2.1 Laïcité, republican values, and teachers’ professional learning before and after January 2015

\(^8\) REP are networks of schools with a high concentration of socio-economic disadvantage. The REP+ status indicates that the school is an isolated neighbourhood. They receive additional financial and human resources, and teachers are given additional time for collaborative planning and interdisciplinary projects (Eduscol 2022a).
As was the case in the SoF, the response to the Great Mobilisation in the NoF built on pre-existing local initiatives, notably those to promote the teaching of religious phenomena. When I asked Nicolas what had changed after the January 2015 attacks, he cited the creation of a team of laïcité teacher trainers as part of the Great Mobilisation as a key development. This training group was small compared to the 100 or so professionals involved in the SoF’s working groups. Some 10 to 15 people attended the meeting I observed. Following the launch of the Upholding Laïcité initiative, Nicolas established a smaller Laïcité and Religious Phenomena team (interview 31/07/19).

Professional learning activities addressed some similar themes to those in the SoF, notably the focus on classroom discussion and teachers’ positioning. At the time of my visits, the group offered training on four themes: understanding and promoting the values of the republic; teaching religious phenomena; the citizenship pathway; and information and conspiracy theories (field notes 03/10/19). They planned to introduce a dedicated course on ‘teaching sensitive issues’ in the 2020/21 school year, but trainers also addressed this issue in the existing courses (field notes 03/10/19). Nicolas said he ‘always address[ed] the question of positioning’ and in his work with teachers, since this was crucial to preventing or resolving laïcité ‘problems’ (interview 31/07/19). Indeed, both training activities I observed addressed teachers’ duty to be neutral on political and religious matters. At the Collège Lafayette, for example, Nicolas told teachers that resolving laïcité issues required ‘us [as teachers] to question our practices’ and that they should be prepared to hear views they did not agree with to build consent around republican values (field notes 27/11/20). This points to his concern for developing teachers’ reflexivity, and echoes some of the messages teacher trainers in the SoF sought to pass on.

In the NoF, there was a clearer sense that with hindsight, some actors in the French education system have questioned the appropriateness of teachers’ responses to the Charlie Hebdo attacks (see also Laborde and Silhol 2018; Laborde 2019). In both training activities, Nicolas cited the Je suis Charlie movement as an example of an opinion that was not politically neutral and should therefore not be promoted by teachers. His explanation was that Je suis Charlie was not a republican value, that its meaning was ambiguous, and that a parent could rightly take issue with a teacher
showing allegiance to the movement (field notes 14/03/19). Similarly, he argued that the right of freedom of expression did not mean that students should be ‘subjected’ to 14 cartoons of Muhammad and that approaching the topic in this way could create problems for teachers (field notes 14/03/19). These references suggest that the events of January 2015 have influenced Nicolas’ thinking on teachers’ positioning.

5.1.2.2 School-level factors and policy enactment

The data from the NoF point to the way the enactment of the policies that are the focus of this study may be influenced by school-level factors. My impression was that Nicolas’ team dealt with laïcité problems involving religious minorities in some parts of the académie, and racist incidents involving the White majority population in others. Some schools in the académie had a significant Muslim population and many of the examples of laïcité ‘incidents’ referenced in the activities I observed related to Islam. However, Nicolas and his colleagues raised similar concerns about the activities of groups such as evangelical Christians. Some were concerned that the focus on Islam in the media and policy discourse risked obscuring the challenges posed by other religious groups (field notes 03/10/19). Moreover, some of the ‘violations of republican values’ that Nicolas and his team dealt with involved racist incidents, and he encouraged school leaders to report these for monitoring purposes (field notes 03/10/19).

Nicolas also suggested that a school’s location and student population influenced the degree to which school leaders engaged with republican values and laïcité. He expressed frustration at some school leaders’ apparent lack of interest in the training his team offered. Here, he singled out school leaders in rural schools who ‘don’t see the point’ in promoting republican values, or who did not feel laïcité ‘problems’ applied to their context (interview 31/07/19). This seems to allude to the perception that some populations – notably Muslim and minority ethnic students in urban schools – are more in need of these values than others (see Laborde and Silhol 2018; Ogien 2013; Moran 2017). Hugo in the SoF characterised the schools in his académie in a similar way, suggesting that REP schools were strongest in this area.
This points to the importance of ‘situated context’ in how local actors interpret the policies that are the focus of this study (see Ball et al 2012:22). The location and student demographics of schools seems to inform whether and how school leaders and laïcité coordinators see the policies as relevant to them. Furthermore, although racist incidents were a concern for Nicolas, they did not appear to be a concern in the SoF. The dual focus on racism and religious issues in the NoF is more similar to the English context, where Muslim and white working-class populations are often the focus of concerns about ‘British values’ and radicalisation (see Busher et al 2017; Vincent 2019b; Elwick and Jerome 2019).

Nicolas also identified vocational upper secondary schools – and teachers of vocational subjects - as a ‘weak link’ in the promotion of republican values (interview 31/07/19). He received ‘very few requests’ for training from these schools (Nicolas, interview 31/07/19). For him, this emerged from the historical tendency to address republican values through the humanities subjects (interview 31/07/19).

5.1.2.3 An ‘open’ approach to laïcité?

Although Nicolas did not explicitly align himself with ‘open’ laïcité, there are similarities with the approach I described above. Like Hugo, Nicolas emphasised dialogue over sanctions as a way of resolving issues arising from students’ beliefs. At the training at Lafayette, for example, he showed teachers a slide on ‘dealing with crisis situations’. The slide includes ‘dialogue’ as the first step, defined as ‘listening to the student, families, and teacher’. During the presentation, Nicolas emphasised dialogue as the primary method of resolving these issues, followed by sanctions where necessary, although the word ‘sanctions’ did not feature on the slide (field notes 27/11/20; see figure 5-2).
The pragmatism that I identified with Hugo’s approach was even more palpable in the NoF. In the training activities I observed, Nicolas’ repeatedly told participants to emphasise the freedoms that *laïcité* guarantees – notably freedom of conscience – rather than what it prohibits. This seemed to be partly motivated by a desire to minimise conflict between teachers and students or families; at the Collège Lafayette he said this ‘positive’ framing would be ‘better received’ by students and their families (field notes 27/11/20). Similarly, he encouraged teachers and school leaders to counter the common perception that *laïcité* or the French Republic were anti-religious and suggested that this would ‘reassure’ students and their families (field notes 27/11/20). This concern for minimising conflict with students and their families was also evident in the SoF (see also Vivarelli 2014:190).

Nicolas did not align himself with the centre-left Education Minister Najat Vallaud-Belkacem in the way that Hugo did, but he seemed to share some of her ideas about *laïcité*. His emphasis on freedom of conscience over prohibitions chimes with the conception of *laïcité* that Lorcerie (2015) associates with Vallaud-Belkacem. Vallaud-Belkacem has also spoken of the need to reassure students and parents that *laïcité* is
not anti-religious (in Chrisafis 2016). As I have argued in relation to Hugo, Nicolas’ approach to laïcité may reflect the legacy of previous policies.

5.1.2.4 Laïcité and radicalisation

The data from the NoF provide further insight on the associations actors in the French education system make between violations of laïcité and radicalisation. Although Nicolas insisted that he ‘did not want to link’ the themes of laïcité and radicalisation, these distinctions often became blurred in practice (interview 31/07/19). Like Hugo, he sought to challenge teachers’ perception that violations of laïcité were necessarily indicators of radicalisation but believed that they could be in some cases (Nicolas, interview, 31/07/19).

This understanding of the relationship between violations and radicalisation informed Nicolas’ messaging to teachers in training. He told school leaders they should report even apparently isolated incidents since a spate of violations of laïcité within a 15 – 20km radius could indicate a ‘problem’ in that area (field notes 14/03/19). This relates to the idea, expressed by Bertrand at the MEN, that an increase in violations could indicate the presence of fundamentalist activity in a town or neighbourhood (interview 28/08/18). At Lafayette, Nicolas told teachers they should report seemingly isolated laïcité incidents involving students, since these may be part of a pattern of concerning behaviours (field notes 27/01/20). Far from stigmatising students, he argued, this could be a way of supporting a student who was becoming radicalised (field notes 27/01/20). Within this logic, repeated violations at the individual level could indicate that a student is in the process of radicalisation, while repeated violations at the school level could point to the presence of radical actors within a community.

This ambivalent link between laïcité and radicalisation leads to some confusion in the messages presented to teachers and school leaders. During the training at the Collège Lafayette, I was struck by the apparent contradiction between the idea that teachers should report even small concerns relating to laïcité and republican values and repeated message that students should be able to question these values. Nicolas told the story of a teacher who had referred a student for expressing offense at the
controversial cartoons of Muhammad following the murder of the schoolteacher Samuel Paty in October 2020 (field notes 27/11/20). He underlined students’ right to be offended and suggested that the teacher was wrong to make the referral. However, he also encouraged teachers to report all laïcité or republican values concerns, since these could be indicators of radicalisation (field notes 27/11/20). At the end of the session, I was unsure whether the participating teachers knew where to draw the line between students legitimate questioning of republican ideas and potentially concerning ideas that they should refer to the school leadership. I explored this question with teacher-respondents at the Collège Lafayette and return to it below.

5.1.3 Policy enactment at the académie-level – Comparative conclusions

The data suggest that académie-level actors such as Nicolas and Hugo have a significant degree of autonomy to define aspects of the Great Mobilisation and the Upholding Laïcité initiative. Notable among these are the professional learning activities implemented as part of the Great Mobilisation, which varied in scope and emphasis. The SoF stands out for the number of professionals involved in the working groups and the scope of their activities. In the neighbouring académie, where I interviewed a training coordinator, but did not visit any schools, the same training plan led to a large-scale training programme on preventing violent extremism (Alain, interview 10/05/19). Neither the NoF nor the SoF organised CVE activities on this scale. Moreover, the training and support the laïcité coordinators led as part of the Upholding Laïcité initiative gave them influence over how teachers, and especially school leaders, understood the principle of laïcité and responded to presumed violations (see also Laborde 2019).

Despite the differences in the scale and content of professional learning activities in the SoF and the NoF, the data point to some common pedagogical concerns. In both cases, the events of January 2015 seem to have led to an emphasis on improving teachers’ capacity to manage classroom debates and to reflect on their own ethical positioning. I have argued that this emphasis responds to challenges teachers experienced managing sensitive topics in the period following the attacks, but also to concerns that their positioning may have contributed to the heated confrontations with
students that occurred during this period (see Lorcerie and Moignard 2017; Laborde and Silhol 2018; Laborde 2019). Another common concern was the teaching of religious phenomena. Here, the direct influence of recent terrorist attacks is less evident at the académie level, although this context feeds into the national-level emphasis on teaching religious phenomena (see Petit 2018; Laborde 2019).

Overall, the académie-level data support Buisson-Fenet’s (2007) proposition that the hyper-centralising phase of France’s education policy in France has ended (387). On one level, this poses a challenge to earlier work by authors such as Bleich (1998) and Archer (2003) who contrast the ‘centralised’ French education system with the ‘decentralised’ English education system (see also Mons 2004). At the same time, the continued importance of the académies allows for coordination and collaboration on a scale that is difficult to imagine in the English context. As well as working with teachers in schools across the académie, Hugo and Nicolas also provided training for pre-service teachers. This stands in contrast to England, where academisation has reduced the influence of local authorities, and where the diversification of routes into teaching has reduced the role of universities in initial teacher training. Although decision-making in the French education system is less concentrated at the national level than earlier work would suggest, my findings suggest it is more vertically structured than in England.

I have argued that Hugo in the SoF used this autonomy to promote an ‘open’ conception of laïcité that he distinguished from the current government’s approach, and from académies that took a ‘security’ approach (interview 15/11/18). This was characterised by an openness to cultural and religious diversity, a preference for pedagogy and dialogue over sanctions as a way of resolving challenges arising from students’ religious beliefs, and a pragmatic concern for maintaining harmony and avoiding conflict within the school community (see Lorcerie 2015; Baubérot 2015; Vivarelli 2014). Elements of this approach were also evident in the NoF, notably the pragmatism and the emphasis on dialogue. The data on this theme suggests that the ‘contested’ nature of laïcité, and the autonomy of local actors, leads to varying understandings of the concept, and divergence between national and local-level practices (see Bowen 2007; Laborde and Silhol 2018; Laborde 2019).
5.2 Policy enactment at the school level

In this section, I report the data from the four school-level case studies. To facilitate comparison, I begin with the two lower secondary schools which also appear to have the largest proportion of Muslim students before turning to the two upper secondary schools, which have a smaller proportion of Muslim students. I begin each case study with an overview of the data I have collected and a brief description of the school. Next, I address RQ1 (policy enactments) and SQ1 (between and within country differences) under three headings: the Great Mobilisation and republican values; countering violent extremism (CVE); and violations of laïcité and the Upholding Laïcité Initiative. In these sections, I highlight the key features of each school’s enactment of the policies that are the focus of this study, pointing to the similarities and differences with the other case schools. The second part of each case study relates to SQ2, which address the ways in which prevailing ideas on immigrant integration feed into teachers’ ideas and practices.
5.2.1 Collège Aimé Césaire

5.2.1.1 Introduction

Table 5-3 - Data collected: Collège Aimé Césaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviews</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Documents</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Marie’ – School principal, Collège Aimé Césaire and ‘Hugo’ – Laïcité and radicalisation co-ordinator, South of France (Joint interview, 15/11/18)</td>
<td>April 2019</td>
<td>Materials from teacher professional development activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Clemence’ - Teacher of EMC and history-geography (03/04/19)</td>
<td>11 EMC lessons with students in 3ème including: 8 lessons on laïcité, republican values and republican symbols 3 lessons on freedom of the press and information literacy</td>
<td>Videos on gender equality produced by students in 3ème School newspaper produced after of the Charlie Hebdo attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Christophe’ – Teacher of EMC and history-geography; teacher trainer (10/06/19; 11/11/20)</td>
<td>Meeting between selected teachers and académie’s gender equality coordinator</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Manon’ – Teacher of EMC and history-geography (3/12/19)</td>
<td>June 2019</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Student activity on the Laïcité Charter involving students from 3ème and CM2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Collège Aimé Césaire is an inner-city lower secondary school in the SoF. Although the lack of available data makes it difficult to speak of the school’s ethnic or religious profile with any certainty, there was a perception among students and staff that their school was majority Muslim. Islam was also a salient feature of my conversations with teachers and the lessons I observed. Moreover, most of the students I encountered appeared to be from minority ethnic backgrounds. Data from INSEE suggests that the proportion of foreign-born residents in the neighbourhood around the school is almost three times in the national average (INSEE 2019). Data for the city suggests that much
of the foreign-born population comes from the Maghreb and the Comoros islands (INSEE 2019).

The neighbourhood around the school is often cited among the most socioeconomically disadvantaged in France. Marie, the school principal, said it was where new immigrants often first settled in the city and that many families lived in temporary or inadequate accommodation (interview 15/11/18). She also spoke of problems with gangs and criminality in the area that sometimes spilled over into the school. Perhaps due to this context, Aimé Césaire is part of a large REP+, along with 11 neighbouring primary schools. The school organised activities jointly with primary schools in the network, including the Republican Values Week I observed in June 2019.

5.2.1.2 The Great Mobilisation and republican values at Aimé Césaire

Along with the Lycée Jean Moulin in the NoF, Aimé Césaire stands out for its maximal approach to the Great Mobilisation. This response went beyond the citizenship pathway and touched on several aspects of school life. I argue that Marie’s leadership, the work on republican values and laïcité taking place across the SoF, and the school’s location and student population are key factors explaining this maximal approach.

Marie articulated the Great Mobilisation with her own educational philosophy and said it complimented work that was already taking place at the school. She placed particular value on the kind of republican symbols and ceremonies referenced in the Great Mobilisation document (MEN 2015a:15). These collective moments encouraged staff to ‘embody’ the values of the Republic ‘on a daily basis’ (Marie, interview 15/11/18). For example, our first meeting took place on the day of the school’s annual ‘republican ceremony’, in which the graduating class from the previous year received their brevet. During her speech, Marie told the students that the diploma was the ‘foundation of the Republic’, giving graduates an equal opportunity to succeed in life. The students ended the ceremony by singing the Marseillaise (field notes 15/11/18).

The student council played an important role in organising some of these activities, an approach encouraged in the Great Mobilisation policy document (MEN 2015a). The
REP+ also has an active parents’ association and hosts a regular parent’s café. Although these initiatives pre-date the Great Mobilisation, they point to the school’s alignment with the ‘spirit’ of the policy, which emphasises parental engagement and student voice was a way sharing the values of the Republic among the school community (MEN 2015a; Lorcerie 2015).

Marie’s leadership, and the alignment of the school’s ethos with the Great Mobilisation probably explain why Hugo suggested Aimé Césaire as a case study. During our interview, he singled out Aimé Césaire as a school where ‘lots of interesting things happen’ (Hugo, interview 15/11/18). Marie and the other teacher-respondents also shared many of the ideas on laïcité that Hugo sought to promote. As a teacher trainer and member of the SoF’s working groups, Christophe seems to have played an important role in bringing these ideas and practices into the school. As such, Aimé Césaire may not be typical for the académie.

**The EMC curriculum**

The EMC curriculum for the primary and lower-secondary phases is less prescriptive than the civic education curriculum that preceded it. While the former curriculum required teachers to cover content in a particular order, the EMC curriculum has objectives for the end of each teaching cycle, giving teachers greater freedom to organise the topics over the three years of each cycle (see MEN 2018a). However, the subject is assessed alongside history-geography in an external written examination in the Brevet. Students can also select the citizenship pathway as a topic for the oral examination. This creates a strong incentive for teachers to engage with EMC.

At the time of my visits to Aimé Césaire, history-geography specialists taught the EMC curriculum in the same timeslot as history and geography and the school did not give specific guidance on how much time they should spend on each subject. Christophe, Clemence, and Manon worked collaboratively to plan their curriculum, deciding on the order of topics and how to organise them alongside history and geography. During the 2018/19 academic year, they interposed EMC topics with history and geography.
topics. In 2019/20, they began the year with EMC topics before covering history and geography.

These three teachers clearly placed a good deal of importance on EMC. Manon said the collaborative approach to planning and the training she had participated in had developed her practice in teaching civic education:

“For a long time [civic education] was something I was not comfortable with at all. [...] It was really the poor relation, which I put aside and did in a basic way. It's one of the areas where I have evolved my practice a lot because I would say that more and more, we almost put it at the centre of our teaching.”

(Manon, interview 3/12/19)

Along with the EMC training she had participated in, Manon placed a lot of value on her collaboration with Clemence and especially Christophe, who drew on the knowledge he had gained as a teacher-trainer. She also said the decision to begin the school year with EMC topics had given republican values ‘a much more central place in the teaching’ (interview 3/12/19). Her comments suggest that the académie-level focus on republican values and EMC in teacher training has filtered down to the school level.

However, teachers at Aimé Césaire varied in the extent to which they engaged with republican values. Christophe said that when he approached one of the other two history-geography teachers about the possibility of taking part in my study, she refused on the grounds that she ‘didn’t do republican values at all’ (interview 10/06/19). Since I did not have the opportunity to speak to these teachers or observe their lessons, it is unclear to me how much of the EMC curriculum they covered in their lessons, or whether they covered EMC at all.

Furthermore, comments from Fred, who teaches at a general upper secondary school the same city, suggest that EMC does not have the same importance in all schools in the académie. For him, EMC was ‘still very much the poor relation’ of history and geography (Fred, interview 3/12/19). The demands of the history-geography syllabus
meant that EMC was often ‘what [teachers] deal with once we’ve done the rest’ (Fred, interview 3/12/19). This is a radically different picture from the one painted by Manon. One possible explanation is that the level of training and professional collaboration among some teachers at Aimé Césaire is not typical for the académie, much less for schools across France. Moreover, unlike history and geography, EMC is assessed internally rather than externally in the general baccalaureate. As such, teachers on the general upper secondary track may prioritise history and geography.

Media and Information Education (EMI)

While the three teacher-respondents planned their EMC work collaboratively, they approached EMI on an individual basis, and to varying degrees. Christophe and Manon approached EMI tangentially, through topics such as freedom of expression in EMC and by using different media sources to cover history or geography. Clemence taught an interdisciplinary media studies unit with Claire, the school’s teacher librarian, and I observed four lessons from this unit during one of my visits to the school. The lessons addressed themes such as press freedom, fake news, and misinformation (see figure 5-3). These were also important themes in the meetings and training activities I observed in the SoF and in the EMI resources I accessed at the Lycée Gustave Eiffel.
The citizenship pathway

In a similar vein to EMI, the school did not have a coordinated strategy for addressing the civic engagement components of the citizenship pathway, although Clemence and Manon cited some relevant activities. Clemence mentioned a visit to a former internment camp that was used during the Second World War, from which Jews were later transferred to Auschwitz. This included a discussion on why individuals submit to authority and transgress social norms. Manon mentioned a visit to an open court session which existed before the citizenship pathway, but which was now part of the school’s response to the measure.

Manon felt that she and her colleagues could be more explicit in linking such activities to the citizenship pathway and encouraging students to initiate their own activities in the local area. She said students only became aware of the citizenship pathway ‘when they arrive in 3ème, and they are told there is an oral’ (interview 3/12/19). As one way
of developing students’ awareness of the pathway, she mentioned on online tool that allows students to build a virtual portfolio of the activities and their reflections on them. However, she indicated that this would require a considerable amount of in-class time. It seems that while the oral examination gives a certain importance to citizenship pathway, the competing demands placed on teachers means it may have little material significance for students.

5.2.1.3 Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) at the College Aimé Césaire

I have already indicated that government anti-radicalisation policies did not require all schools to implement specific actions during the period of my data collection. However, the three teacher respondents at Aimé Césaire knew such policies existed and understood they should report any radicalisation concerns to the school leadership. Christophe knew of one such referral involving a student, while Marie had made a referral about a member of support staff. The school had also been the site of two one-off CVE activities: a staff training day and a student activity on the theme of radicalisation. This was not the case for two of the schools in this study, and I will argue that Aimé Césaire’s location and student population may explain why these activities had taken place.

The CVE training for teachers took place soon after the January 2015 attacks. It was led by Hugo - as radicalisation coordinator - and an academic researcher from a nearby university. Since the training had taken place some four years before my interviews and had not been repeated, both Clemence and Manon had a limited memory of its specific content. One of the key messages that Manon took from the training was that it was important not to over-report or to pathologize students’ religious behaviours:

“[The academic researcher] tried develop a nuanced picture so as not to confuse what could be a fundamentalist religious practice - those who have a deep religious conviction – with radicalisation […] Because it’s true that we serve a population who can be extremely pious. He really tried to get us to be careful not to label the pious behaviours we might observe as ‘radicalisation’.
This messaging is consistent with Lorcerie and Moignard’s (2017) finding that CVE training in the period following the attacks sought to avoid excessive referrals by urging teachers to consider a range of factors when assessing risk (4). Manon’s comment also alludes to the ‘situated context’ of the school, notably its majority-Muslim population, and her perception that many students may have a ‘deep religious conviction’ (interview 03/12/19; see Ball et al 2012:23). She seems to have interpreted the idea of ‘nuance’ in relation to this context.

The student activity reflects the policy trend I discussed in chapter 3, wherein the teaching of religious phenomena serves to challenge extremist ideas. It involved a play and workshop entitled Don’t let Anyone Steal Your Words. The play was written by the actor Selman Reda and tells the story of his father’s increasingly fundamentalist interpretation of Islam and Reda’s subsequent search for knowledge about his faith (Théâtre de la Cité, nd). As well as exploring a case of radicalisation, the activity aims to challenge myths about Islam by informing Muslim and non-Muslim students about the context in which the Koran was written and how it should be understood today (Lixon 2019). Christophe referred to this activity and its core messages in the EMC lessons I observed.

5.2.1.4 Violations of laïcité and the Upholding Laïcité initiative

The data from all four case schools suggest that teachers have limited knowledge of the Upholding Laïcité initiative. I have found that much of the activity related to the initiative takes place at the académie level. At Aimé Césaire, Christophe knew the initiative through his work as a teacher-trainer and Manon was vaguely aware that she could report violations of laïcité. Clemence, however, had no knowledge of the initiative and the school had also not organised any training in this area.

Manon and Christophe’s comments on violations of laïcité reflect some of the ideas I discussed in relation to open laïcité. Manon attributed the lack of laïcité problems in
the school to teachers’ emphasis on listening to students and respecting their cultural identities:

“We do a lot to listen to our students. We try to understand. For me, I always try to avoid judging [...] when a mum comes to school in a veil… not judging them at all, showing respect. I think all that is important for [students and families], to know that 'this is really accepted'. That’s what laïcité is all about, everyone really has their place. There is real equality of treatment.”

(Manon, interview 03/12/19)

Her comments echo those of Hugo and Marie, who both emphasised dialogue and respect as a way of avoiding conflict arising from student beliefs. Manon’s reference to the issue of veiled mothers and her insistence on not ‘labelling’ or ‘judging’ point to the ways in which her understanding of ‘equality of treatment’ - and ultimately laïcité - relates to the cultural, religious, and possibly ethnic identities of students and their families (Manon, interview 03/12/19). This underlines the connection between actors’ positioning on laïcité and their positioning on cultural diversity. The alignment with Hugo’s ‘open laïcité’ may emerge from Manon’s participation in training and her collaboration with Marie and Christophe. It points to the capacity of académie-level actors to promote local understandings of laïcité though professional learning activities (Laborde 2019:35).

Christophe’s comments on this theme reflect his own ‘open’ positioning on laïcité and suggest that some of his colleagues took a harder line. He used the term laïcairds to describe what he saw as an anti-religious tendency among some teachers at Aimé Césaire and across the académie. These were teachers who wanted to ‘ban veiled mothers from coming onto school premises’ or who ‘didn’t want students talking about religion at all’ (interview 10/06/19). Like the teachers in Orange’s (2016) study, they also interpreted Arabic interjections such as wallah [I swear by God] and starfallah [may God forgive me] as violations of laïcité and intervened to stop students using them (Christophe, interview 10/06/19). Students raised this tendency in two of the lessons I observed, suggesting it is relatively widespread. Like Orange (2016), Christophe related these expansive interpretations of laïcité to teachers’ concerns
about religious fundamentalism. Some teachers interpreted these interjections as ‘signs of radicalisation’, he said, because students were ‘calling to God… in Arabic!’ (Christophe, interview 10/06/19). This points to the way concerns about violent extremism feed into a climate of anxiety around expressions of cultural - as well as religious – difference.

5.2.1.5  Pedagogy, educability and republican values

Hugo and Marie’s ideas on the importance of pedagogy and young people’s ‘educability’ were also evident in Christophe, Manon and Clemence’s responses to students’ apparent refusal of republican and values and laïcité, notably their reactions to Charlie Hebdo’s publication of the cartoons of Muhammad. This issue continued to be ‘the sensitive subject’ in classroom discussions at Aimé Césaire some four years after the January 2015 attacks (Clemence, interview 04/04/19). All three teachers reported that students often raised the issue of the cartoons in EMC lessons on the topic of freedom of expression, leading to some challenging conversations.

Some of the official responses to this issue reflect a security or disciplinary framing. The emphasis on re-establishing teachers’ authority in the Great Mobilisation was, in part, a response to some students’ virulent reactions to the issue of the cartoons (MEN 2015a; see also Wesselhoeft 2017). Moreover, the introduction of the online portal for reporting presumed violations arguably takes these matters out of the classroom and into the domain of monitoring and surveillance. Following the tributes to Samuel Paty that took place in schools across France, some 150 students were reported to the MEN by their schools for ‘defence of terrorism’ (France Info 2020). This led to 14 minors being interrogated by the police and some being referred to youth offending services (Le Figaro 2021). Such responses risk treating students’ apparent rejection of the value of freedom of speech as a primarily disciplinary affair, with pedagogical concerns rarely featuring the political and media discourse.

In contrast, the teacher-respondents at Aimé Césaire felt that in most cases, students’ virulent reactions to the issue of Charlie Hebdo could be deconstructed in the classroom. Clemence said that although discussions on this topic were often heated, they were rarely ‘aggressive’ (interview 04/04/19). Rather, she felt that students had
‘interrogations’ relating to the topic, or ‘questions that arise that and they need to evoke, so that they can be clarified’ (interview 04/04/19). Christophe framed students’ reactions to ‘sensitive subjects’ such as Charlie Hebdo in strikingly similar terms:

“[sensitive subjects] do not pose so many problems as all that. It is just that students will have questions… interrogations… that these interrogations are valid, and that - in my opinion – you have to be ready to hear certain things in order to be able, after debate, to make the students change their opinion - if necessary - or to point out to them that what they sometimes say is in contradiction with the values of the Republic.”

(Christophe, interview 10/06/19, my emphasis)

All three teachers gave a degree of legitimacy to students’ feelings or questions about the cartoons while seeking to build consent around the principles and laws underpinning Charlie Hebdo’s right to publish them. Their experiences of the January 2015 attacks seem to have informed their thinking on these questions. For Manon, the attacks had made teachers ‘aware of the need to discuss while listening’ and ‘to [accept] that things are said without forbidding them, condemning them’ (interview 03/12/19). This echoes the sentiments of teacher-trainers in the SoF’s working groups, suggesting these ideas have either spread from the académie to the school level, or that Manon has drawn similar lessons from the 2015 attacks.

The preference for pedagogy over sanctions was also evident in school’s response to the incidents that occurred during the tribute to Samuel Paty. Christophe said that although some students appeared to qualify Paty’s murder, the school did report these incidents as violations of laïcité. He said the school felt it was better to allow students to express these ideas in class – so that students and their teachers could ‘think together’ – than to censure students or report them to the Ministry (interview 11/11/20). In this instance, a securitisation response would undermine the pedagogical objective of building consent around the values.
Christophe applied very similar ideas to the phenomenon of radicalisation. His comments on this theme reflect an unease with the way the problem of radicalisation is currently framed, and a belief in the power of education to challenge extremist ideas:

“I have a bit of a problem with... [pause] radicalisation exists. It's true that there are students who are radicalised because from their youngest age - it's as if they were brainwashed [...] I don't think that most of them are brainwashed. [They] sometimes have borderline conceptions... but they're not fixed conceptions”

(Christophe, interview 10/06/19)

Christophe highlighted the role of classroom discussion in exposing students to ideas that may be different to the ones they hear outside of school, and in challenging extremist narratives. In his view, ‘the school is the only place where they will be able to confront their ideas with those of their classmates [and] with the teacher’ (interview 10/06/20). Specifically, it was important to show students that the religious ideas they learned outside of school were ‘one vision of religion’ and that ‘other Catholics, other Jews, other Muslims, do not all think the same’ (Christophe, interview 10/06/19). This partly explains the importance he placed on teaching religious phenomena, which I discuss in the following section. In many ways, his view reflects the spirit of the new EMC curriculum, which Husser (2017) argues is informed by Ricoeur’s (1995) notion of a ‘laïcité of confrontation’. Within this logic, the confrontation of judgements through ‘reasoned discussion or debate’ is a means of putting moral convictions to the test (Husser 2017:46). Christophe seems to apply a similar logic to the idea of building students’ resilience to radicalisation.

In some senses, these teachers’ ‘pedagogical’ framing of these issues is a local problem framing that comes into conflict with the security framing that prevails at the national level. Elwick and Jerome’s (2019) finding that some teachers in England frame Prevent as an educational issue, rather than as a security one, has been useful in understanding how teachers at Aimé Césaire framed these issues. Like the teachers in Elwick and Jerome’s study (2019), their comments point to their ‘optimistic beliefs’ about the ‘transformative potential of learning’ and they emphasised the role of
classroom discussion in exposing students to different viewpoints and challenging extremist ideas (345). As I have argued in relation to Hugo and Marie, this framing seems to draw on the ‘pedagogical’ approach to sharing the values of the Republic that Lorcerie (2015) associates with the Great Mobilisation and previous centre-left governments. Importantly, it reflects the académie-level emphasis on classroom debate and teachers’ positioning, underlining Hugo’s capacity to promote an approach to these issues that diverges from the national-level one.

5.2.1.6 Religious phenomena in the EMC classroom

In the lessons I observed on laïcité, Christophe showed good knowledge of the major religions in contemporary France and was confident in managing class discussions in this theme. His participation in the ‘religious phenomena and student beliefs’ working group has clearly developed his competence in this area. As I have argued in relation to the monotheistic religious activity, however, recent studies suggest that this level of interest and competence is not typical among teachers in France (see Petit 2018; Laborde 2019). Instead, it is better to understand Christophe’s practices as an extreme case that illustrates recent trends in the teaching of religious phenomena in French schools, and points to the ways the French approach may be converging with the English one.

Like the ‘monotheistic religions’ activity, Christophe’s practices went beyond the heritage approach, where the teaching of religious phenomena primarily serves to give students access to a cultural heritage imbued with religion (Petit 2018: 9; see also Husser 2017; Mannitz 2004). In Christophe’s lessons, students learned about contemporary religious practices and the diversity of religious beliefs. This often served the pluralism function that Husser (2017) associates with the new EMC curriculum by promoting understanding of and respect for different convictions (50; see also Petit 2018).

In two of the lessons I observed, Christophe addressed many of these objectives through a class discussion based on a three-minute video on laïcité. The video addresses the history of laïcité and the current laws governing the role of religion in public life (Clés de la République 2014). In this regard, it covered similar content to the
lessons on *laïcité* I observed at Gustave Eiffel and Jean Moulin. However, Christophe spent more time discussing the beliefs and practices of different religious groups than the teachers at the other schools. The video began by introducing a series of characters, some of whom had a strong religious conviction, and others who were connected to a particular faith through their culture or past (Clés de la République 2014). This provided a stimulus for a discussion on the key beliefs and practices of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam wherein Christophe emphasised the idea that these traditions have equal value (field notes 02/04/19). In one lesson, he responded to a student’s question about Protestantism by spending ten minutes explaining the major currents within the three faiths. As such, although the video and the lesson were primarily about *laïcité*, much of the discussion addressed Christophe’s aim of promoting respect for and understanding of different religions and highlighting the diversity of beliefs within each faith.

These lessons also addressed religious fundamentalism and violent extremism. One of these conversations stemmed directly from the video, which states that most people in France agree with *laïcité*, aside from ‘fundamentalists’ (Clés de la République 2014). This led a discussion about the difference between a fundamentalist and an extremist and on whether the terrorist group ISIS were ‘true’ Muslims (field notes 02/04/19). In another lesson, a discussion on the 2004 ban on religious symbols provided an opportunity to challenge students’ misconceptions about Islamist terrorism. When Christophe asked why the Islamic veil had been banned, one student said this was because ‘people will worry that the person wearing it is a terrorist’ (field notes 03/04/19). Christophe responded to the student’s misconception with Socratic questioning and a touch of humour before pointing out that there was no connection between the veil and terrorism. The other students also played an important role in pointing out the flaws in her reasoning (field notes 03/04/19).

However, there were also important differences between the teaching of religious phenomena in Christophe’s classroom and RE in England. In the French case, the religious content is embedded in a civic education curriculum, rather than a religious studies curriculum. For Husser (2017), this invites a *civic* approach to education for pluralism, where the focus is on developing civic competence in a multi-faith society and promoting respect for the religious freedoms guaranteed by the state (52).
Teachers’ engagement with religious beliefs and practices ultimately serves to make the stakes of religious freedom more concrete for students (Husser 2017:52). In a similar vein, Petit (2018) finds that the teaching of religious phenomena primarily served the purpose of teaching students about laïcité among the teachers in her study.

Indeed, in Christophe’s lessons, discussions on religion often served to promote understanding of and respect for laïcité and freedom of conscience. The religious beliefs and practices in the laïcité video provided a basis for understanding the separation between private religious practices and public life, and how this applies in school. The video explains that for most French people, religion plays a secondary role in their lives, while for others, religion is primordial and guides many of their choices. Importantly, it states that these practices exist in the realm of private life, underlining the separation between public and private identities (Clés de la République 2014). Christophe stopped the video to reinforce this point. In one lesson, he told students that even if religion plays a primordial role in one’s life, this was not a reason for refusing to participate in school activities (field notes 02/04/19). In this instance, the discussion on religion served to promote students’ understanding of and compliance with the rules governing religious expression in the public sphere.

Another key difference between Christophe’s approach and common approaches to RE in England relates to the question of students’ religious autonomy. Since teaching about religious beliefs and practices serves to teach young people about laïcité and freedom of conscience, the aim is to allow each person to determine her religious conviction as freely as possible, whether this is religious, atheist or agnostic (Petit 2018:11). This relates to what Favell (2001) identifies as one of the central functions of public schooling in France; to develop a certain kind of autonomous citizen, free from the influence of cultural or religious traditions (176-179). Christophe saw the classroom as a space where students could interrogate the religious beliefs they inherited from their parents (interview 10/06/19). In the lessons I observed, it was the students, rather than Christophe, who raised this dimension of religious autonomy. One student spoke of her journey to atheism and her parents’ reluctance to accept that she had given up the Muslim faith, leading to a class discussion on this theme (field notes 02/04/19). A student in another class asked if fathers had the right to choose the religion for the whole family. Christophe responded that while in theory,
parents had no right to decide the religious or political views of their children, this was often what happened in practice. Ultimately, he said, the decision would come down to the individual (observation 05/04/19). As I discuss in chapter 7, this notion of religious autonomy was notably absent from the RE lessons I observed at First Academy and was not a feature of my conversations with teachers.
5.2.2 Collège Lafayette

5.2.2.1 Introduction

Table 5-4 - Data collected: Collège Lafayette

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviews</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Guillaume’ – School Principal (20/10/20)</td>
<td>Whole school professional development activity – ‘Passing on and bringing to life the values of the Republic’ (27/11/20)</td>
<td>PowerPoint presentation for teacher training - homage to Samuel Paty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>History-Geography and EMC teachers:</strong></td>
<td><strong>EMC lessons:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Documents</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Kevin’ (11/12/20)</td>
<td>Fighting for equality and against discrimination (Kevin, 11/12/20)</td>
<td>PowerPoint presentation for student activity - homage to Samuel Paty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Juliette’ (08/01/21)</td>
<td>Valery Giscard d’Estaing and the Fifth Republic (Emilie, 08/01/21)</td>
<td>Overview of EMC learning objectives for 6eme - 4eme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Emilie’ (22/01/21)</td>
<td>‘Justice’ (Juliette, 08/01/21)</td>
<td>Topic overview worksheets on 9 EMC themes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Margot’ (22/01/21)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Collège Lafayette is a lower secondary school in a post-industrial town in the NoF académie. The student population was more like the one at Aimé Césaire than I originally hoped. According to Kevin, the student population was ‘at least 80% culturally or even religiously Muslim’ (interview 11/12/20). While many students at Aimé Césaire seemed to be from North African or Comorian backgrounds, however, comments from Guillaume suggest Lafayette’s student population was more diverse: ‘We have everything: African origins, a lot of Central Asians - Pakistanis, Afghans […] Turks, Kurds’ (interview 20/10/20). I also saw more white students than I did at Aimé
Césaire. Finally, Lafayette is a REP school rather than a REP+ school, suggesting it serves a less socially and economically disadvantaged community than Aimé Césaire.

Teachers nevertheless saw the school’s socio-economic context as challenging; some referred to issues such as drug trafficking in the neighbourhood or challenges in students’ home lives. The town has also suffered the effects of deindustrialisation and has high levels of unemployment and poverty compared to the national average. Although the town is only a short ride from Paris, the school is some 30 minutes’ walk from the town centre, and therefore somewhat isolated compared to Aimé Césaire (INSEE 2019).

5.2.2.2 The Great Mobilisation and republican values at Collège Lafayette

The approach to promoting republican values through the school ethos was less evident at Lafayette than it was at Aimé Césaire or Jean Moulin. Respondents did not mention the kind of republican ceremonies that took place at these schools (see MEN 2015a). This may be because Guillaume had only arrived at the school three months before my visits. The principals in the other two schools had been in post for several years, giving them greater influence over the ethos.

Like these principals, however, Guillaume placed a high value on promoting republican values and his comments reflect prevailing ideas about the role of schools in promoting integration (see, for example see Favell 2001:74; Bowen 2007; Lemaire 2009; Meer et al 2009; Doyle 2006; Bonjour and Lettinga 2012). He said his experience as a history-geography teacher from an immigrant background had given him a ‘deeply rooted’ commitment to the values, and the notion that ‘integration into the Republic can only happen through the school’ (interview 20/10/20). For him, the values were especially important in schools like Lafayette, where many students had recently arrived in France and where they may not receive this ‘republican culture’ at home (interview 20/10/20). Events such as the 2015 attacks and the murder of Samuel Paty served as a reminder that ‘these themes require permanent, constant, daily vigilance’ (Guillaume, interview 20/10/20). His involvement in the preparing the school’s tribute to Paty testifies to his interest in this area. He had also called upon the NoF’s laïcité
and republican values training group to work with teachers on these themes during the 2020/21 academic year. This suggests the school’s work in this area may develop in the future.

The EMC curriculum

The arrangements for implementing the EMC curriculum were like those at Aimé Césaire. Teachers taught history, geography, and EMC in the same timeslot with no guidance how much time to spend on each subject. However, the history-geography team had produced a ‘skills progression’ document to guide their planning when the EMC curriculum was introduced in 2015. The EMC curriculum sets out three objectives with ‘end-of-cycle expectations’ for cycles 3 (6ème) and 4 (5ème to 3ème) and related knowledge, skills, and learning outcomes for each objective (MEN 2018a). It is up to teachers to decide the order in which to address these objectives and expectations across the different grade levels within each cycle. To produce the skills progression document, the teachers arranged them by grade level to give a clearer indication of which topics and skills should be covered in which order. They also produced a set of ‘overview sheets’ with key information on nine EMC topics using textbooks and online sources (Margot, interview 22/01/21). Teachers asked students to keep these sheets throughout cycle 4 so they had a record of what they have learned when they came to prepare for the written examination in the brevet (Juliette, interview 08/01/21). On a day-to-day basis, teachers tended to plan their lessons individually, although Juliette and Emilie mentioned more informal exchanges on teaching ideas.

This kind of structured, collaborative curriculum planning was more evident at the Lafayette than at the other case schools. Three of the teachers at the Collège Aimé Césaire worked collaboratively to plan the curriculum but had not produced a written progression document. They also changed the order of topics from one school year to another, giving the impression of a more ad hoc approach to planning. The upper secondary school teachers I have interviewed planned their curriculum individually. However, not all teachers at Lafayette made use of these collaborative planning documents. Kevin, who was relatively new to the school, said he had not yet ‘take[n] advantage of these common tools’ (interview 22/01/21).
Furthermore, Kevin and Margot reported similar challenges including EMC in their teaching to Fred in the SoF. These relate to the problem of curriculum overload and the low status of EMC compared to history and geography. Kevin and Margot both insisted on the importance of teaching EMC and republican values, especially considering terrorist attacks such as the murder of Samuel Paty. However, Kevin said the ‘really clear pressure’ from académie-level inspectors to complete the history and geography curricula meant that he tended to cover EMC topics if he had spare time after finishing a history or geography unit (interview 11/12/20). As such, he saw EMC as the ‘poor relation’ of history and geography (interview 11/12/20). For Margot, addressing all three subjects within the same timeslot was ‘a nightmare’ (interview 22/01/21). The ‘heaviness’ of the history and geography programmes and the ‘institutionalisation’ of these subjects meant that ‘it’s always the EMC that gets cut’ (Margot, interview 22/01/21). Emilie found opportunities to include EMC in her teaching, but said these challenges meant that ‘some people probably skip it and don’t take the time’ (interview 22/01/21). As I argue in chapter 7, there is a disconnect between the reality described by these teachers’ and successive governments’ ostensible commitment to promoting republican values through EMC.

**Media and information education (EMI)**

Another similarity with Aimé Césaire was that teachers addressed EMI to varying degrees. Margot described school’s approach to EMI as ‘transversal’ but ‘not coordinated’ (interview 22/01/21). Although some history-geography, art and French teachers addressed EMI, the subject was ‘clearly not implemented across the board’ (Margot, interview 22/01/21). This was confirmed by Kevin, who said he had not done any explicit teaching of EMI (interview 11/12/20).

However, the data from Lafayette point to the ways in which recent terror attacks have focused attentions on students’ information literacy. EMI and online radicalisation featured in the CVE activity that the school was involved in. The resources that the school used for the tribute to Samuel Paty in November 2020 highlight the role of social
media in the events leading up to his murder and encourage students to reflect on their online activities. I discuss these activities further below.

The citizenship pathway

Teachers cited several activities that contributed to the citizenship pathway. Juliette led an interdisciplinary unit on justice, where students worked with a French teacher, two teacher-librarians, legal professionals, and actors to research, rehearse and perform a fictional trial in a nearby court (field notes 08/01/21). She also mentioned an annual film festival on the theme of equality and diversity that the school organised with local voluntary organisations (Juliette, interview 08/01/21). Emilie referenced the ‘memory and history’ topic that she had recently taught in history and a fundraising activity that had taken place in previous years (interview 22/01/21). As was the case with EMI, not all teachers engaged with these aspects of the citizenship pathway in the same way. Kevin said he had not implemented any out-of-school or civic engagement activities to address the pathway (interview 11/12/20).

Teachers also sought to make the citizenship pathway meaningful for students. Some used a feature on the Pronote administrative platform to highlight activities that contributed to the pathway on students’ report cards. Despite these efforts, Emilie and Juliette shared Manon’s at Aimé Césaire’s concern that many students were not aware of the existence of the pathway. Margot felt that it was mostly history-geography teachers who used the Pronote feature, but said that teachers had talked about implementing a ‘citizenship passport’ during recent training on republican values and laïcité (interview 22/01/21). Although the Pronote feature is available to all schools who use the platform – most schools in France - teachers at the other case schools did not mention using it. This suggests that making the citizenship pathway more concrete was a particular concern at the school, and that teachers may take further action in the future.

5.2.2.3 Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) at the Collège Lafayette

The data from Lafayette confirms my finding that CVE teacher training and student activities are less widely implemented in France than they are in England, and that
they may be targeted at specific student populations. During the 2020/21 academic year, students in 3ème and some teachers at Lafayette participated in a project targeted at schools in socio-economically disadvantaged neighbourhoods. This included Kevin, Juliette, and Emilie, who took part in training in October 2020. However, schools participated on a voluntary basis, suggesting that some from this target group may not have been involved in the project. Furthermore, none of the three teachers who attended the training in October 2020 had previously participated in CVE training. Guillaume and Margot had still not been trained at the time of our interviews.

The project nevertheless stands out for the scale of activities involved, especially compared to the one-off activities that took place at Aimé Césaire; it involved several coordinated actions for students and a series of teacher training events. Student activities included a play that addressed the memory of Algerian War and a comic book exhibition explaining the concept of radicalisation and the role of critical thinking in combating it. Based on these activities, students were due to work with their teachers and other professionals to develop ‘a counter discourse’ to radicalisation using text or visual media. Teachers could enlist the support of the local youth offending team, a centre for EMI, or a local voluntary organisation to work on the counter discourse. The scale of these activities suggests there has been significant financial investment in the project and seems to reflect the increasing significance of CVE in schools as a national policy priority.

Guillaume’s understanding of the school’s ‘situated context’ may explain why he agreed to take part in the project (see Ball et al 2012:23). He spoke of a of ‘Salafist presence’ in the local area, and felt the ideas of these individuals or groups could ‘instil doubt’ in the ‘small minority’ of students who had contact with them (Guillaume, interview 20/10/20). As such, he was enthusiastic about the project’s focus on developing a discourse to counter that of the ‘enemies of the Republic’ (interview 20/10/20).

My analysis of the project’s online resources points to some links with national-level anti-radicalisation strategies, although these are not explicit. The play was funded by the Inter-ministerial Committee for the Prevention of Delinquency and Radicalisation (CIPDR). This committee supports theatre and film projects aimed at promoting a
‘counter-discourse’ to ‘extremist propaganda’ as part of the PNPR (see SG-CIPDR, nd). It also works closely with prefectures\(^9\) around the country on anti-radicalisation initiatives. The local prefecture commissioned the regional *Canopé\(^{10}\)* office to develop the project for schools, suggesting a link to the committee’s activities.

Another notable feature of the project is that the activities explicitly bring together integration and security concerns, reflecting the recent official anti-radicalisation discourse. The overarching aims of the project were to prevent radicalisation, Islamism, and ‘*repli communautaire*’ [community withdrawal] among young people and to train teachers in these areas. ‘Community withdrawal’ is a somewhat nebulous term that has found its way from popular discourse to official policy. It appears alongside radical Islamism as the object of the anti-terrorist Law to Reinforce Respect for the Principles of the Republic (*Loi du 24 août 2021 confortant le respect des principes de la République*, law against separatisms) which was in the legislative process at the time of my visits to Lafayette (see Vie Publique 2021). Despite its inclusion in the law, I have yet to find an official definition of the ‘community withdrawal’. According to one online definition, it involves members of a community (ethnic, religious, geographical, etc.) withdraw[ing] into themselves, living among themselves, isolating themselves instead of integrating into the wider group to which they belong (La Toupie, nd). As such, the term reflects longstanding concerns about ‘communitarianism’ and the presumed refusal on of minority religious groups to integrate (see Bowen 2007:155). Its inclusion in the *Canopé* project and the ‘law against separatisms’ seems to imply a causal link between failed integration and violent extremism.

The focus on immigration, cultural diversity and especially Muslim integration was evident in teachers’ accounts of the training they received and the resources I accessed online. Emilie said that during this training, a sociologist presented on the theme of ‘the heritage of parents’, specifically the differences in the way first, second, and third generation immigrants from the Maghreb understood their identity (interview 22/01/21). In her telling, the children of immigrants that came of age in the early 1980s

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\(^9\) *Préfectures* are administrative units belonging to the Ministry of the Interior. They have responsibilities for policing, security and immigration.

\(^{10}\) *Canopé* is a public body under the responsibility of the MEN with offices in each department and academic region. Its primary functions are teacher professional development and the publication of pedagogical resources.
identified more closely with France, whereas the ‘new generation’ was ‘sometimes a bit on edge about memorial issues’ relating to the Algerian War (interview 22/01/21). This is a common theme in elite concerns about the ‘failed integration’ of the descendants of post-colonial immigrants (see Hajjat and Mohammed 2016).

According to the description on the project’s website, the play deals with these inter-generational divides, as well as themes such as integration, racism, and identity. The activities in the teachers’ booklet encourage student discussion on these themes and seem to be targeted at Muslim and/or minority ethnic students. One question asks students whether the play made them want to know more about the Algerian War, immigration and ‘your family’, reflecting an assumption that students participating in the activity will be from immigrant - or specifically Algerian - backgrounds.

The focus on the memory of the Algerian War may emerge from a desire to address any grievances felt by young people of Algerian origin, thus preventing them from becoming radicalised. Here again, this reflects ideas in the official discourse. In a speech on the fight against separatisms, President Emmanuel Macron argued that France’s failure to unpack aspects of the history of the Algerian War could lead some young people of immigrant origin to fall into the trap of anti-republicanism and could feed into separatism (Macron 2020).

In this sense, the CVE project reflects prevailing discourses connecting the phenomenon of violent Islamist extremism to France’s colonial past, but also the ‘communalism’ of minority ethnic or Muslim populations. The association of ‘community withdrawal’ with Islamism and violent extremism in the project resources seems to emerge from a French republican understanding of the national community, in which communal identities or ‘separateness’ are seen as undesirable, or even dangerous (see Favell 2001; Bowen 2007; Hajjat and Mohammed 2016). However, the notion that Muslim ‘separateness’ or failed integration is an incubator for terrorism is also prevalent among the British political class (see James 2016; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2009). While the project seems to illustrate the way republican integration ideas inform the anti-radicalisation discourse in France, it also reflects a tendency among elites in both countries to articulate specific concerns about violent extremism with broader integration concerns.
The four teacher-respondents had limited knowledge of the Upholding Laïcité initiative before Nicolas presented it at the training I observed. Emilie had recently heard of the government portal from a relative who worked at the rectorat. Kevin had read the *Vademecum of Laïcité* but had not previously received training on the policy. Neither Juliette nor Margot had heard of the measures before the training.

The mixed messaging in Nicolas’ training left me unsure whether teachers would be able to identify potential violations of laïcité. I therefore asked all four EMC teachers if the activity left them better placed to respond to such an issue. Their responses suggest that the training has given them a better understanding of how to refer a violation of laïcité. However, Juliette, Kevin, and Margot spoke of the difficulties involved in identifying what kinds of behaviour they should refer. I was struck by the similarities in the three teachers’ comments, which suggest they may have spoken about the training before my interviews:

JJ: Now that you’ve had the training - you know that there is this system in place - do you feel more able to handle a situation?

Juliette: [Pause] To handle a situation? [pause] If it’s reporting, I know the procedure is there. Now, do I feel capable of recognising a situation that needs to be reported? I'm not necessarily convinced of that [...] I don't think I'd feel able to judge unless it was something really incredible; something that was said and then maintained with force. But in a discussion with a pupil, it's a discussion. So, depending on what the pupil says, how he receives what I say - is he able to go back on what he said? - It can't lead directly to a report, I don't think so.

(Juliette, interview 08/01/21)

“And what constitutes a violation of laïcité? Or where is the element of debate and discussion with the students? What are their ideas? What are their
feelings? And what do we try to deconstruct and what goes in the "violation of laïcité" box? That, for me, I admit that it's still not very clear..."

(Kevin, interview 11/12/20)

JJ: And after this training, would you be able to deal with a violation of laïcité?

Margot: No because I don’t think that’s necessarily my role. My role would be to report. When I say ‘report’, I don’t mean using the portal […] I’m not quite sure that a student who says in history class “anyway, we Muslims are the ones who are right to believe what’s written in the Koran”. Personally, I don’t think that’s reportable. I’ll explain things to the student, I’ll talk to my colleagues to ask their opinion, what to do etc., eventually I’ll talk to [Guillaume]. But at no point for me does it require using the portal.

(Margot 22/01/21)

As I suspected during the training, teachers seemed to struggle with where to draw the line between students' legitimate questioning of republican values, and attitudes that should cause concern. For Juliette, the fact that that laïcité ‘is a notion that is also often questioned in society’ meant that teachers ‘shouldn’t have to report [students] just because there are questions about’ it (interview 08/01/21). In this sense, teachers’ uncertainty may emerge from the lack of broad societal agreement about laïcité as well as the ambivalent messaging in the training. All three teachers’ comments suggest they felt most of the attitudes they encountered in the classroom fell into the category of legitimate questioning and could therefore be addressed through discussion, rather than by reporting their students. In this sense, like their counterparts at Aimé Césaire, they seemed to frame students’ apparent challenges to laïcité or republican values in pedagogical terms, and to prefer pedagogical solutions to disciplinary ones.

These teachers also seemed to push back against the idea that they should report all concerning behaviours as violations. One of the messages a recent training activity at
the school was that teachers should use the government portal to report even small concerns about *laïcité*, since ‘an accumulation of reports could allow something to be detected’ (Margot, interview 22/01/20). This relates to the idea that repeated violations of *laïcité* could indicate a problem with radical religious activity in the local area. Margot remained unconvinced that this was necessary: “I haven't made up my mind about that yet” (interview 22/01/20). Similarly, Kevin said that while his personal view was that some students’ ‘dogmatic’ religious ideas could be ‘deconstructed’ through discussion, he was uncertain whether the institution expected him to report them as violations of *laïcité* (interview 11/12/20). Such comments point to a degree of divergence between the way some school-level actors understand these issues, and the way they are framed by académie-level actors.

I would argue that the blurred boundaries between violations of *laïcité* and indicators of radicalisation in the institutional discourse goes some way in explaining these teachers’ hesitancy around reporting their students. It is clear from Laborde’s (2019) study that some teachers in France are uncomfortable with the idea of reporting students for concerns that explicitly relate to radicalisation. Many of the teachers she interviewed reacted against what they saw as an incitement to denounce their students, with some arguing that this was not part of their professional culture (Laborde 2019:40). Nicolas’ attempts to reassure teachers at Lafayette that reporting suspicions of radicalisation would not stigmatise students seemed to speak directly to these concerns (field notes 27/11/20). The message that violations of *laïcité* may also be indicators of radicalisation could understandably lead teachers to approach such referrals with caution, since these could be treated as radicalisation concerns. For some teachers, the ambivalent messaging on the relationship between violations of *laïcité* and radicalisation may contribute to a generalised unease about ‘reporting’ their students and a degree of uncertainty about what they are reporting them for.

5.2.2.5  The school’s response to the murder of Samuel Paty

By sheer coincidence, my first meeting with Guillaume took place four days after the murder of Samuel Paty. Much more than in the other cases, I was able to get a sense of how teachers respond to terrorist attacks as they occur, and how they approach them in the classroom. Guillaume and the history-geography team prepared a student
activity for the national tribute to Paty and a two-hour training session to support teachers in delivering it. While I unable to gain access to the activity, the teachers shared the resources for the training session and student activity with me. This section presents my analysis of the resources and teachers’ reflections on the activity.

Teachers’ responses to Paty's murder suggest it raised similar issues to the attacks on Charlie Hebdo. Both attacks were framed as attacks on republican values in the public debate that followed. Indeed, one of the slides from the school's tribute to Paty describes the murder in these terms. The fact that Paty was murdered after showing the cartoons of Muhammad in a lesson on freedom of speech was especially resonant considering the discourse on the role of teachers in promoting republican values (see Favell 2001; Bowen 2007; Mabilon-Bonfils and Zoïa 2014; Wesselhoeft 2017). All five teacher-respondents spoke of the emotions the attack generated and their need to process them before approaching the topic in the classroom. Paty’s murder also brought the controversial issue of the cartoons to the fore. The MEN had instructed schools across the country to organise a pedagogical activity to reaffirm republican principles such as freedom of speech (see Bénis and Kheniche 2020). Teachers knew from their experience of teaching this topic that students were likely to raise the issue of the cartoons, and that this would provoke strong reactions. This seems to have contributed to a sense of anxiety about the tribute.

The resources that Guillaume and the history-geography team prepared for the tribute respond to some of these anxieties. They also point to some of the lessons learned from the events of January 2015 and reflect a concern for avoiding the confrontations that occurred between students and teachers during this period. The slides for teachers emphasise the importance of open discussion on the issues raised by Paty's murder and provide detailed guidance on managing these conversations. One of the first slides says that teachers ‘should not be afraid of allowing the students to discuss’, which seems to anticipate their anxieties about managing classroom discussions. The presentation also states that one of the objectives of the activity is to ‘listen’, to the students, to ‘take their thoughts on board’ and to ‘diffuse’ any ‘latent conflicts’. Reflecting on the activity during the training I observed, Guillaume reinforced these messages, praising teachers for engaging students in ‘real dialogue’ during these conversations (field notes 27/11/20).
The approach to the specific issue of *Charlie Hebdo* and the cartoons of Muhammad is also important in this regard. The slides reflect a sensitivity towards students’ feelings on the topic and urge teachers to approach it with caution. Kevin and Emilie both anticipated that students would raise the issue of the cartoons in the discussion on freedom of expression sought to find ways of orienting the conversation away from *Charlie Hebdo*:

“As soon as we talk about freedom of expression, [the students] are focused on *Charlie Hebdo*. We tried to get them away from that because otherwise, we quickly get blocked […] In the slide show, we used a caricature by another author so as not to start with that straight away.”

(Emilie, interview 22/01/21)

The presentation for students uses a cartoon of President Emmanuel Macron, and the corresponding slide for teachers explains that this is ‘disassociate’ the idea of caricature from *Charlie Hebdo*. Another explicitly cautions teachers against mentioning *Charlie Hebdo* too early in the conversation, since students ‘may be subject to psychological blocks’ associated with the magazine (see figure 5-4). Instead, teachers were advised to ‘circumvent’ the topic until later in the activity, when students will ‘have acquired the necessary elements of reflection’ and the conversation will ‘be easier to manage’.

*Attention : éviter les références à Charlie Hebdo (du moins dans cette partie). Les élèves peuvent être sujets à des blocages psychologiques symbolisés par le simple nom « Charlie Hebdo » qu’il convient de circonvenir jusqu’à la dernière partie du débat où on a plus de temps. Une discussion sera plus facile à gérer quand les élèves auront acquis les éléments de réflexion nécessaires.*

*Figure 5-4 – Slide from teacher CPD*
The guidance for teachers also gives a degree of legitimacy to students’ emotional responses to the cartoons and points to teachers’ awareness of the broader political climate. One of the first slides notes that it is ‘legitimate for pupils to be shocked by caricatures’ and that ‘it is advisable not to deny them this right but to explain to them what the limits are’. Another states that ‘one often has the impression in the media that we want to forbid Muslims the right to be shocked by the cartoons of Muhammad’. This seems to speak to the somewhat frenzied media coverage at the time of Paty’s murder. It also seems to warn teachers against sanctioning students’ feelings about the cartoons or insisting that they actively support the magazine’s editorial choices, as some teachers appear to have done following the January 2015 attacks (see Lorcerie and Moignard 2017). While such responses would arguably violate the boundary between public norms and private beliefs, the materials from Lafayette encourage teachers to respect this boundary by focusing on French law and democratic processes (see Pélabay 2017). The implied objective is not to change students’ substantive views on the issues, but rather to explain and uphold the protections on freedom of speech afforded by the law.

More broadly, the guidance for teachers reflects the emphasis on teachers’ ethnical positioning and capacity to manage sensitive topics that was evident in training activities in the NoF and SoF. I have argued that this focus emerges from a sense that the challenges some teachers face in these areas may have contributed to the conflicts that took place after Charlie Hebdo (see also Laborde and Silhol 2018; Laborde 2019). Those who planned the activity at Lafayette seem to have drawn similar lessons from this period.
5.2.3 Lycée Gustave Eiffel

5.2.3.1 Introduction

Table 5-5: Data collected: Lycée Gustave Eiffel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviews</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Elodie’ – Teacher of English (07/06/18)</td>
<td>2 EMC lessons -</td>
<td>EMI teaching resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Pluralism of beliefs and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>laïcité</em> (Laurent, 07/01/19)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Laurent’ – Teacher of Literature-History and EMC (14/06/18)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Hubert’ – Teacher-librarian (unstructured interview, 02/05/18)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Lycée Gustave Eiffel is a vocational upper secondary school in Paris, where all students prepare for the professional baccalaureate. The school is in the north of the city but accepts students from the whole Paris académie, with many applying for its electronics specialism. This makes it more difficult to comment on its demographic profile than the other case schools, where I have used immigration data for the local area. Comments from Laurent suggest that many students were of North African origin; most students in the lessons I observed appeared to be either North African or Black. Although Laurent said many students were religious, Islam featured less in my conversations with teachers than at Aimé Césaire and Lafayette. Elodie contrasted Gustave Eiffel with her previous school in the northern suburbs of Paris, where she said there were problems with ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ (interview 07/06/18). While the school is surrounded by social housing, the local area is gentrifying, and the school is some five minutes away from some of the most expensive properties in the country. The académie of Paris, which covers the twenty Parisian arrondissements, is also relatively affluent and considered a good place to work by teachers.
I experienced challenges gaining access to interviews and observations at Gustave Eiffel, meaning the data is somewhat limited. Crucially, having initially agreed to an interview, the school principal did not respond to subsequent requests. As such, the data may not cover all aspects of the school’s enactment of the policies that are the focus of this study, and the conclusions I draw are tentative.

5.2.3.2 The Great Mobilisation and republican values at Gustave Eiffel

The limitations in the data make it difficult to give a full picture of the school’s enactment of the Great Mobilisation. An in-depth interview with the principal would have been especially useful in understanding whether the school implemented activities beyond the EMC curriculum. When I met with the principal to gain access, he explained that he was new to the school and had limited capacity to comment on what had been implemented before he arrived. I was also less familiar with the civic engagement aspect of the citizenship pathway at this stage of the research and did not ask the two teacher-respondents about these activities.

I have therefore had to piece together relevant information from my interviews with staff. My interview with Laurent gave me the impression that the school’s activities in this area were largely limited to the EMC curriculum and EMI. He was unaware of the Great Mobilisation as a policy framing and said the only changes he had noticed after the January 2015 attacks was the ‘emphasis on laïcité’ in the EMC curriculum (interview 14/06/18). Elodie had heard of the policy, although she thought it was ‘mainly her literature-history’ 11 colleagues who addressed it (interview 07/06/18). These teachers had arranged visits with lawyers and judges to work on themes such as ‘rights and responsibilities as a citizen’ and ‘respect for beliefs’ (Elodie, interview 07/06/18). In her role as European relations coordinator, she had organised a trip to the European Parliament. Although Elodie did not link these activities to the citizenship pathway, teachers in the other case schools addressed it through similar activities. Rachida, the deputy principal who arranged my access to the school, said the school

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11 In the upper-secondary vocational track, teachers train to teach history-geography and French (lettres-histoire) and generally teach both subjects
had recently organised philosophical debates outside of lessons. The Great Mobilisation policy document encourages schools to organise debate and philosophy workshops for students on the vocational track as part of the citizenship pathway (MEN 2015a:16). This suggests the school leadership and some teachers may have taken steps to address the policy, even if Laurent had limited awareness of it.

The EMC curriculum

As with the two collèges in this study, EMC was taught alongside history and geography with individual teachers deciding how long to spend on each subject. Another similarity is that EMC is assessed alongside history and geography in an external written examination as part of the professional baccalaureate. History and geography each represent 40% of the final grade, while EMC represents 20%. As I have argued in relation to the two collèges, this external assessment creates an incentive for teachers to address EMC, although some may prioritise history and geography. Laurent said he dedicated between four and six hours to EMC during the three-year course and could not afford to spend more time on the subject.

The laïcité and pluralism of beliefs topic seems to be an important theme in the curriculum, reflecting the renewed emphasis on laïcité following the January 2015 attacks. Laurent described this sequence as a more ‘practical’ and ‘up-to-date’ complement to the pre-existing history topic ‘the republic and religious phenomena 1870 – 1940’ (interview 14/06/18). For Laurent, the new topic sought to convey the message that ‘laïcité is good for living together (le vivre ensemble)’ (interview 14/06/18). Laurent somewhat cynically referred to this as ‘the value of the moment’, alluding to the fact that it has become somewhat of a buzzword in education policy since the January 2015 attacks (see Orange 2017). He also said the laïcité topic had featured in the written examination for EMC every year since the introduction of the new curriculum. This points to the importance policymakers have placed on learning about laïcité in recent years.
Media and information education (EMI)

As with the other case schools, it seems that the teacher-librarian and history-geography and French teachers were most likely to address EMI in their teaching. Even these teachers seemed to vary with regards to their engagement with the subject. Laurent said he tended to address EMI ‘implicitly’ rather than through a dedicated sequence of lessons (interview 14/06/18). Hubert, the teacher-librarian, said he had offered a sequence of EMI on fake news lessons to history-geography teachers in early 2018, but that not all teachers had taken him up on the offer (field notes 02/05/18). The teaching resources from these lessons suggest they addressed similar themes to the EMI lessons I observed at Aimé Césaire, such as fake news and misinformation (see figure 5-5).

![Figure 5-5 - EMI teaching resource](image-url)
5.2.3.3 Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) at the Lycée Gustave Eiffel

Gustave Eiffel stands out as a school that appeared to have a significant minority ethnic – and possibly Muslim – population but where no CVE activities had taken place. Laurent and Elodie were aware that there was system for teachers to report suspected cases of radicalisation to the school leadership but neither had participated in training. Elodie said she thought the principal had participated in external CVE training but was not clear on what this entailed.

This apparent anomaly may be explained by the timing of my visits, which took place some four years ago at the time of writing. I have argued that the official approach to preventing violent extremism has evolved during this period, giving schools a greater role in building resilience to radicalisation (Eduscol 2022b; Government of France; James and Janmaat 2019). As such, the school may have organised such activities since my visits. Another possible explanation is the school’s location in the académie of Paris. This is one of the most affluent académies in the country, and its schools do not tend to be associated with radicalisation and integration problems in the way schools in the northern suburbs of Paris do. Overall, the data from Gustave Eiffel suggest that although schools with a significant minority ethnic or Muslim population are more likely to be targeted for CVE activities, these activities have not reached all these schools.

5.2.3.4 Violations of laïcité and the Upholding Laïcité initiative

I conducted my interviews at Gustave Eiffel before I knew of the Upholding Laïcité initiative and decided to include it in the scope of my research. However, both teacher respondents raised the theme of violations of laïcité. Laurent said that teachers at the school ‘really had no problems’ in this area (interview 14/06/18). Elodie said she had experienced some challenges to the curriculum on religious grounds, mostly from students who belonged to evangelical protestant churches. She compared this to her previous school in northern suburbs of Paris, where she said it was ‘primarily Muslim students who raised these challenges’ (Elodie, interview 07/06/18). This points to the
ways in which a school’s ‘situated context’ informs teachers’ understanding of laïcité issues (see Ball et al 2012:23).

5.2.3.5 Discussion and controversy after Charlie Hebdo

Like several other teachers in this study, Elodie and Laurent reported challenges addressing the topic of Charlie Hebdo in the classroom, with some students qualifying or justifying the attacks. They had both also participated in training following the January 2015 attacks, suggesting officials in the académie of Paris had taken steps to address these challenges. Laurent attended an ‘emergency session’ at the académie’s teacher training provider aimed at helping trainees ‘manage’ students’ reactions to the topic (interview 14/06/18). There are similarities with the training Christophe led in the SoF, which aimed to help teachers manage classroom debate after the attacks. It is less clear whether these issues continue to be a focus of teachers’ professional learning in the académie of Paris.

Laurent questioned the wisdom of bringing the Je suis Charlie movement into schools. With hindsight, he felt the slogan was ambiguous and it may have contributed to some of the confrontations that took place following the attacks:

“The message wasn’t clear… ‘I am Charlie’, that doesn’t mean anything. Does it mean ‘I am democracy?’ ‘Freedom of expression?’ […] At the time, I got angry with the students who said, ‘I’m not Charlie’. Now I understand completely.”

(Laurent, interview 14/06/18)

This resonates with comments from Nicolas in the NoF, who said that Je suis Charlie lacked clarity, and was not a republican value. Laurent goes further than Nicolas in explicitly suggesting this may have contributed to the conflicts between students and teachers, although I have argued that this idea is implicit in the focus on teachers’ positioning in the NoF and the SoF (see also Laborde and Silhol 2018; Laborde 2019). Along with the data from these académies, it suggests that the events of January 2015 have focused attention on teachers’ neutrality and ethical positioning.
5.2.3.6 ‘Hard’ laïcité, national identity, and the January 2015 terrorist attacks

Laurent’s reflections on the January 2015 attacks also shed light on teachers’ positioning on laïcité. Indeed, since he was one of the first teachers I interviewed in France, it was his comments that drew my attention to this theme. He distinguished himself from teachers in his school who practiced what he described as ‘hard’ laïcité and sought to emphasise laïcité’s role in guaranteeing religious freedom in his teaching:

“There’s a bit of a difference between me and my colleagues [in that] I tend not to demean religious practice. What I tend to do in my lessons about laïcité is to show the reality of French law, which is that it protects religious practice.”

(Laurent, interview 14/06/18)

Laurent’s emphasis on religious freedom seems to place him in the ‘open’ laïcité camp (see Lorcerie 2015). He felt that the 1905 law separating church and state was ‘very good for believers’ since the state could not interfere with religion, and that laïcité allowed for greater religious freedom than in many other countries (interview 14/06/18). He emphasised these points in his lessons to ‘convince’ students that laïcité is ‘good for freedom of conscience’ and felt this stance explained why he rarely experienced conflict with students on these issues (interview 14/06/18). The emphasis was evident in the EMC lessons I observed. He also suggested that this was a minority position at the school. This articulates with Baubérot’s (2015) account of ‘open’ laïcité, which defines itself against dominant, anti-religious understandings of the concept (91). It is not clear, however, how Laurent felt his colleagues ‘demean religious practice’. Orange’s (2017) account of teachers contesting their students’ religious choices or treating these beliefs with contempt in the period following the 2015 terrorist attacks may give an indication of what Laurent means by this (77).

Laurent drew a direct link between the January 2015 attacks and the emergence of a ‘hard’ or ‘violent’ form of laïcité (interview 14/06/18). This manifested itself in ‘a certain
intransigence’ around laïcité among some teachers which was palpable in staffroom conversations during this period (interview 14/06/18). He related this tendency to the prevailing expressions of national identity after the attacks. Since French national identity had been somewhat ‘repressed’ prior to the attacks, he argued, it expressed itself ‘a bit violently’ in this moment of national crisis (Laurent, interview 14/06/18). This ‘identity crisis’ took a particular form among his colleagues:

“What’s funny is that in history and geography in France, there’s a sort of left-wing tradition […] not very patriotic… and to see everyone going on about French identity after the attacks, just made me laugh […] People rediscovered a French identity, but one that’s bit vague. As if French identity began and ended with laïcité when that’s totally not true”.

(Laurent, interview 14/06/18)

Since these teachers were unwilling to invest in national symbols traditionally associated with right-wing politics, he argued, the attacks led them to ‘overinvest’ in laïcité, ‘the only defensible [facet of national identity] in their eyes’ (Laurent, interview 14/06/18). While other respondents have linked more expansive conceptions of laïcité to the perceived threat of radical Islam, Laurent saw them as emerging from the articulation of laïcité with ideas of national identity and belonging. Although the emergence of this ‘identitarian’ form of laïcité arguably pre-dates the January 2015 attacks, Laurent points to the way they may have exacerbated this tendency (Baubérot 2015:111-113; see also Laborde and Silhol 2018). I return to this theme in chapter 7.

5.2.3.7 Laïcité and pluralism of beliefs in EMC

I observed the first two of four lessons from the laïcité and pluralism of beliefs topic. There were striking similarities between the content of these lessons and the other activities I have observed on laïcité, notably Christophe’s lessons at Aimé Césaire. Firstly, Laurent addressed the rules and laws governing laïcité and some of the normative principles underpinning this framework. Another similarity was that the students studied legal texts and other official documents relating to the topic. This
included the 1905 law separating church and state and the constitution of the Fifth Republic. Finally, the discussion focused on cases in which expressions of religious faith are allowed and cases where they are prohibited, such as in schools. Laurent used the texts to highlight the distinction between the rules applying to state agents such as teachers – who are prohibited from expressing their religious faith - and services users, who are free to wear religious symbols. He presented the 2004 law banning school students from wearing religious symbols as an exception to this rule (field notes 07/01/19). Like those I observed at Aimé Césaire, Laurent’s lessons aimed to promote students’ understanding of and respect for laïcité.

Laurent’s lessons also addressed the notion that laïcité promotes ‘living together’, pointing to the way the new EMC curriculum reinforces the notion of laïcité as a tool for social cohesion (see Bowen 2007; Mabilon-Bonfils and Zoïa 2014; Diallo and Baubérot 2015). The students read an extract from an interview with the philosopher Jean Baubérot where he describes laïcité both as a legal framework and an ‘art of living together’. The corresponding questions on the worksheet underline these two dimensions of laïcité (see figure 5-6). For homework, Laurent asked the students to write a short essay on the question ‘should we sometimes limit religious expression to allow everyone to live together?’. This framing seems to draw on the notion that the removal of religious symbols from institutions such as schools facilitates integration (Mannitz 2004; Mabilon-Bonfils and Zoïa 2014). However, Laurent also raised the possibility that more expansive interpretations of laïcité could threaten social cohesion. One of the case studies involved a town in the east of France that refused to offer an alternative menu to students on days when it served pork. Laurent told the students that while this was not illegal, it was perhaps not very good for ‘living together’ (field notes 07/01/19). This seems to reflect his ‘open’ positioning on laïcité.
The fact that EMC is a compulsory curriculum with common objectives seems to explain some of the similarities with the other lessons I have observed on this topic. These similarities are especially striking given that they transcend different levels of the education system: lower secondary and upper secondary. This points to a contrast with the English context, where the FBV guidance specifies very little in terms of the curriculum content (DfE 2014a; 2014b). I will argue that this results in greater variation in how teachers’ address each of the values in the policy.

At the same time, the curriculum framework allowed Laurent to emphasise the role of the laïcité in guaranteeing freedom of conscience and offer a mild critique of more inflexible interpretations of the concept. Furthermore, compared to Christophe, Laurent gave less time to the substantive discussion of religious beliefs and practices. Although some of the case studies he examined led to some brief explanations of
religious beliefs and practices, they did not lead to the kind of extended discussions that occurred in Christophe’s lessons. Rather, Laurent used these ‘borderline cases’ to help students identify how the legal and moral dimensions of laïcité apply to concrete situations (field notes 07/01/19). In this sense, the discussions on religious phenomena were more firmly grounded in the objective of giving practical meaning to laïcité and freedom of conscience than they were in Christophe’s lessons (see Husser 2017:52; Petit 2018). These differences underline Christophe’s interest in teaching religious phenomena, as well as the degree of autonomy the curriculum framework gives teachers.
5.2.4 Lycée Jean Moulin

5.2.4.1 Introduction

Table 5-6 - Data Collected: Lycée Jean Moulin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviews</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Arthur’ – School Principal (25/01/19)</td>
<td>EMC activities relating to: National Laïcité day (25/01/19)</td>
<td>PowerPoint presentation delivered to students – ‘The teaching of religious phenomena – a civic issue’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Audrey’ – History-Geography and EMC teacher (03/02/19)</td>
<td>International Women’s Day (08/03/19) International Day Against Homophobia, Transphobia, and Biphobia (17/05/19)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Lycée Jean Moulin is a general upper secondary school in the historic centre of a small city in the NoF académie. Like the Lycée Gustave Eiffel, the school accepts a proportion of students from outside of its immediate catchment area, based on its languages and performing arts specialisms. My impression was that the school had a majority-White student population. This is somewhat confirmed by immigration statistics for the town, which suggest the overall proportion of immigrants is below the national average (INSEE 2016). However, comments from Audrey suggest that the school had some Muslim students, and there were a small number of non-white students in each of the activities I observed. INSEE (2019) data suggest that average incomes in the city are lower than others in the region, although this masks disparities between the poorer neighbourhoods in the north of the city and the relatively affluent neighbourhoods from which Jean Moulin draws most of its population. In this sense, Jean Moulin does not fit the profile of schools normally associated with concerns about republican values or laïcité.

The data from Jean Moulin is also somewhat limited compared to the two collèges. Although I interviewed the school principal, I experienced similar challenges recruiting teachers for interviews and observations than I did at Gustave Eiffel. I spent three half
days observing student activities at the school, but these were all organised by Audrey, who took a particular interest in republican values and laïcité. None of the other teachers responded to my requests, meaning that the data is not necessarily representative of teaching at the school.

5.2.4.2 The Great Mobilisation and republican values at Jean Moulin

Like Aimé Césaire, the Lycée Jean Moulin stands out for its ‘maximal’ approach to the Great Mobilisation and republican values. This approach led me to identify Jean Moulin as a potential case study. I contacted Arthur after reading a journal article he authored where he described the wide-ranging work the school did to promote republican values.

The emphasis on republican values pre-dates the Great Mobilisation policy. For Arthur, it was important to ‘run a school based on a foundation of values’ and he saw his arrival at Jean Moulin in 2012 as an opportunity to establish a clear focus for students, staff, and parents (25/01/19). As such, he decided to include the promotion of republican values in the ‘school project’ (projet d’établissement), the set of objectives that forms the basis of the school’s contract with the rectorat, and on which the school is evaluated.

One of the ways the Arthur sought to address the objectives of the school project was by expressing the values through the school’s ethos. He placed particular importance on ‘declining’ republican values and laïcité in the everyday life of the school, ensuring they had concrete meaning for students:

“My idea [for the school project] was not just to repeat ‘liberty, equality, fraternity’. It’s to show how a school brings the values of the Republic to life on a daily basis. Because in my opinion and that of the teachers, we can only pass on these values by example”.

(Arthur, interview 25/01/19)
For him, this meant that all teachers should promote the values through their teaching and model them through their behaviour. His comments echo the language of the Great Mobilisation document, which encourages schools to bring republican values to life through concrete experiences, rather than simply declaiming these principles (MEN 2015a:9). There are also striking similarities with comments Marie at Aimé Césaire made on the importance of teachers ‘embodying’ the values ‘on a daily basis’ (interview 15/11/18). For both principals, promoting republican values went beyond the taught curriculum and touched on several aspects of school life. The inclusion of republican values in Jean Moulin’s school project arguably makes this commitment more explicit than it was at Aimé Césaire.

Another similarity with Marie was the value Arthur placed on republican symbols and ceremonies. He ‘believe[d] strongly in symbols’ and regretted what he saw as a decline in this kind of formality and symbolism in the French education system (Arthur, interview 25/01/19). At the start of every new school year, he organised a formal ceremony where he welcomed new students ‘solemnly’ and gave a speech ‘emphasis[ing] the values of the Republic’ and ‘insist[ing] on what I understand by laïcité’ (interview 25/01/19). He drew my attention to the French and EU flags around the school and said these were ‘prominently displayed’ during events such as the school’s graduation ceremony (interview 25/01/19). Like Marie, Arthur seemed aware that not all teachers shared his attachment to national symbols and conceded that his approach might seem ‘a bit old school’ (interview 25/01/19). It seems that such displays of national identity are an area where teachers disagree.

Arthur also encouraged teachers to organise interdisciplinary projects and whole-school events and on themes relating to laïcité and republican values. For example, teachers organised a series of ‘citizens debates’ in late 2018, in the context of the gilets jaunes movement and student protests against reforms to the baccalaureate and university admissions (Arthur, interview 25/01/19). Audrey organised the activities on the themes of laïcité, gender equality, and LGBTQ+ equality that I observed on my visits to the school. In keeping with the spirit of the Great Mobilisation, students were involved in organising some of these activities (see MEN 2015a). However, Audrey felt that some teachers were more invested in these kinds of ‘projects’ than others.
(interview 03/02/19). This indicates that not all teachers at the school engaged with the values in the way she did.

Arthur said the Great Mobilisation had ‘accentuated’ the work he was already doing as part of the school project and led the Ministry to develop additional ‘tools’, such as the *Vademecum of Laïcité* (interview 25/01/19). It also seems to have drawn attention to the work that was happening at the school. Jean Moulin became ‘somewhat of a flagship school’ on these themes after the Great Mobilisation was announced and has hosted several events organised within the *académie* (Arthur, interview 25/01/19). Arthur was also asked to join the *académie’s laïcité* and republican values team and delivered training across the *académie* (interview 25/01/19). As such, the school’s response to the policy may not be typical for the *académie*.

**The EMC curriculum**

Jean Moulin was the only case school where the timetable included a dedicated slot for EMC. At the time of my visits, students had one hour of EMC every two weeks. This arrangement seems to reflect the school’s particular emphasis on promoting republican values and avoids EMC being crowded out by history and geography.

A similarity with other schools was that it was mainly history-geography teachers who taught EMC, although a smaller number of philosophy or economic and social sciences (SES) teachers also taught the subject. The school had previously experimented with a system in which teachers of humanities subjects paired up with language teachers to teach EMC. This ‘experiment’ only lasted one academic year, since, according to Audrey, ‘the languages teachers felt less comfortable with teaching EMC’ (interview 03/02/19). Like several other respondents, she felt that humanities teachers’ training and knowledge of current affairs meant they were more inclined to address republican values and *laïcité* in the classroom. This initiative nevertheless indicates a commitment to involve teachers from different disciplines in promoting republican values that was not evident at the other schools.
Media and information education (EMI)

The organisation and content of EMI at Jean Moulin was similar to the other case schools. EMI was taught by EMC and French teachers along with the school’s teacher-librarians. These teachers organised an annual event during France’s National Press Week in March. For the two years following the Charlie Hebdo attacks, this activity focused on press cartoons, addressing questions such as ‘can we caricature everything? Can we make fun of any subject?’ (Audrey, interview 03/02/19). The focus had since shifted to other aspects of media and information literacy, such as how different news outlets cover the same story.

The citizenship pathway

Arthur established a ‘civic engagement internship’ for students in seconde as part of the school project and this has since become part of the citizenship pathway. Students spent one to two weeks on an activity in a club or voluntary organisation during the period where students in the last two years of schooling are sitting for examinations. However, the civic engagement activity was not compulsory; students could also choose to spend this time in the workplace. Students also had opportunities to address the civic engagement dimension of the citizenship pathway through their involvement in the student council or by organising activities as part of the school project.

5.2.4.3 Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) at the Lycée Jean Moulin

The school had not organised CVE activities for students or staff at the time of my visits. This seems more clearly related to the school’s location and student demographics that it was at Gustave Eiffel. As well as having what appears to be the smallest proportion of minority ethnic and Muslim students of the four French case schools, Jean Moulin is in the historical centre of the city, rather than the relatively disadvantaged neighbourhoods to the north. Audrey seemed to allude to this ‘situated context’ when I asked her why neither she nor her colleagues had requested the training the académie offered on this theme (see Ball et al 2012:23). For her, this was
‘because we’re in school that is not very often subject to this type of problem’ (Audrey, interview 03/02/19).

However, like most respondents, Audrey knew that successive governments had implemented anti-radicalisation policies and was familiar with the referral process. She said that teachers had been ‘particularly alerted’ to the ‘phenomenon’ of radicalisation since 2015 and that she regularly received emails directing her towards relevant resources (interview 03/02/19). She also knew of a small number of cases that had caused concern at the school. These involved students who had expressed views ‘at the limit of republican legality’ (interview 03/02/19). She cited conspiracy theories – such those surrounding the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York – as an example of an idea that could provoke concern among teachers.

5.2.4.4 Violations of laïcité and the Upholding Laïcité initiative

As with the Great Mobilisation, the school’s pre-existing work promoting laïcité and republican values laid the foundations for a ‘maximal’ response to the Upholding Laïcité initiative. Arthur said that teacher training in the ‘theory’ of laïcité was a ‘first effort’ in his implementation of the school project in 2013 that and he continued to ‘hammer home’ messages about laïcité and in annual training (interview 25/01/19). He described the Vademecum of Laïcité as ‘perfectly done’, and said his copy was covered in post-it notes (interview 25/01/19). He had used it as a training resource, notably the section that outlines scenarios and provides guidance on the appropriate response (interview 25/01/19). Similarly, Audrey said her ‘attachment’ to the values of the Republic had led her to read the document when it was published (interview 03/02/19). She was also the only respondent in France who said she used the Vademecum as a pedagogical resource. Arthur and Audrey’s engagement with the Vademecum seems to underline their particular interest in these themes, especially since many teacher-respondents had no knowledge of the document.

Arthur and Audrey’s efforts in this area are especially remarkable given the ‘situated context’ of the school and the fact that - by their accounts - laïcité ‘problems’ were rare (see Ball 2012:22). Arthur alluded to the fact that Jean Moulin did not fit the profile of
schools typically associated with laïcité problems, but insisted that such efforts were important for all teachers:

“You might say to me, ‘but your school is city-centre school’. Our school is actually quite heterogeneous. And laïcité does not only concern REP+ schools; laïcité is a daily struggle for all schools.”

(Arthur, interview 25/01/19)

On one hand, Arthur seems to refute the common perception that REP+ schools are more likely to experience challenges in this area (see Laborde and Silhol 2018; Ogien 2013). However, his reference to the heterogeneity of the student population seems to associate these problems with specific groups.

Arthur’s remarks on responding to apparent ‘violations’ of laïcité seem to articulate with the approach that Nicolas sought to promote within the NoF. Echoing Nicolas’ ‘positive’ framing of laïcité, he said it was important not to present the concept as ‘a list of prohibitions’, but as a principle that allowed the school community ‘learn together’ (interview 25/01/19). He also identified dialogue – or ‘exchange’ with students – as the first step in dealing with these problems (interview 25/01/19). The alignment with Nicolas’ ideas may emerge from Arthur’s role in the académie’s laïcité and republican values team, and the fact that he works closely with Nicolas on these issues. Along with the data from Aimé Césaire, it underlines the capacity of académie-level actors to influence practices at the school level.

5.2.4.5 Laïcité and ‘living together’

Of the four case schools, the notion that laïcité promotes social cohesion – or ‘living together’ – was especially salient in the data from Jean Moulin. I have argued that the salience of this notion in the EMC curriculum entrenches the idea of laïcité as a tool for integration that emerged in the 1980s (see Bowen 2007; Mabilon-Bonfils and Zoïa 2014; Diallo and Baubérot 2015). According to Audrey, the link between laïcité and living together was ‘particularly pronounced’ in Jean Moulin’s school project,
suggesting this emphasis pre-dates the new curriculum (interview 03/02/19). Furthermore, while respondents such as Christophe and Laurent approached this notion with a degree of scepticism, Arthur and Audrey manifested a deep commitment to the idea that the neutrality of the state and public schools facilitates social cohesion.

Arthur’s leadership seems to have played a role in emphasising the link between laïcité and social cohesion. In his dealings with students and staff, he insisted on the idea that laïcité played a crucial role in bringing the school community together:

“Laïcité – and I proclaim it and proclaim it – is a respect for neutrality that allows everyone – I don’t like the term ‘living together’ - to learn together”

(Arthur, interview 25/01/19)

Although he rejected the ‘buzzword’ ‘living together’ – arguing that ‘learning together’ has more meaning for students – these comments capture the idea that religious neutrality promotes togetherness within a community made up of students from different backgrounds (Arthur, interview 25/01/19). Audrey expressed this link in similar terms:

JJ: And how do you see the relationship between laïcité and living together?

Audrey: For me, laïcité is above all a fundamental value that allows the French to live together. That's it. With respect, tolerance and with this neutrality. For me, you cannot dissociate the two: if we all want to get along, religion should not take precedence in the public sphere and public services.

(Interview, 03/02/19)

While Arthur related the notion of ‘living together’ to the life of the school, Audrey applied the concept to the national community. Both seemed to suggest that the absence of religious symbols, or the relegation of religion to the private sphere, was a pre-requisite for ‘getting along’ with others. This seems to articulate with the ‘expanded’ definition of laïcité that Bowen (2007) sees as emerging in the early 2000s,
wherein the neutrality of the public sphere allows for the peaceful coexistence of diverse religions and cultures (29; see also Mannitz 2004; Mabilon-Bonfils and Zoïa 2014). Audrey also associated laïcité with respect and tolerance; ideas that feature in the FBV policy and that teachers in the English case schools placed a high value on. This suggests that teachers in the two countries might share ideas about social cohesion, even if, in the French case, some see this as being achieved through religious neutrality.

These ideas were evident in the National Laïcité Day activity I observed in January 2019, notably in the afternoon session led by Mr W, a volunteer from a local charity. Mr W made several links between laïcité and living together during his presentation, where he defined ‘living together’ as learning about one another, despite our differences (field notes 25/01/19). He illustrated this point by showing students a news report - entitled Fraternity Street – which highlighted the friendship and collaboration between a rabbi, a protestant pastor, and an imam in a suburb of Paris and the peaceful coexistence of the different religious communities living in the town (France Info 2018). Mr W highlighted this as a ‘perfect example of living together’ (field notes 25/01/19).

The posters students had created in the preceding EMC lessons suggest they had absorbed some of these ideas (see figure 5-7). Audrey displayed these during the session and asked the students to comment on recurring symbols and themes. In the discussion that followed, she highlighted words such as ‘tolerance’, ‘community’, ‘union’, and ‘respect’ (field notes 25/01/19). This reflects her emphasis on these concepts during our interviews, and points to similarities with the English context. That the word ‘multiculturalism’ featured on two of the student posters (though, tellingly, was not highlighted by Audrey in the discussion) suggests that students have connected what they learned in their EMC lessons and the idea of living in a multi-faith, or perhaps even multi-ethnic, society.
At the same time, Audrey and Mr W presented a particularly French notion of secularism - notably the removal of religious symbols in the public sphere – as the means for achieving the goal of social cohesion. Audrey related the posters to the idea that everyone can have their ‘secret garden’ - their religious beliefs – while existing in a common space (field notes 25/01/19). At several points in the activity, Mr W seemed to assert the superiority of French responses to cultural diversity. He said that laïcité was ‘the only solution’ to the problem of creating a common culture among diverse communities and claimed that other countries envied France’s success in this area (field notes 25/01/19). During the discussion around the posters, he defined ‘community’ against ‘communitarianism’, an idea often associated with ‘Anglo-Saxon’ multiculturalism in French debates on cultural diversity (field notes 25/01/19; see Bowen 2007:11). Although the activity addressed concepts that would not be out of place in an English classroom, these interventions highlight the singularity – or, in his view, the superiority – of French responses to cultural diversity.
Mr W also represents the clearest example of the ‘laïcaird’ position I have encountered in field. His interventions on laïcité reflect some of the ‘intransigence’ that respondents have associated with this position (Laurent, interview 07/01/19). While the other adults in the room emphasised that individuals held different positions on laïcité, Mr W told students that the concept was not adaptable, but universal. He also made several startling comments on Islam, giving the impression that he saw the faith as a particular threat to laïcité and social cohesion. This included his claim that if the laws protecting religion from the state did not exist, Muslims would be building mosques everywhere (field notes 25/01/19). His comments provide insight into how some actors might apply the emancipatory logic implied by more restrictive notions of laïcité to the phenomenon of radicalisation. Speaking on the prohibition of the Islamic veil in schools, he argued that the ban allowed critical thinking to flourish by creating a neutral space. This, he argued, was particularly important in the context of recent terrorist attacks, since these were caused by the kind of religious dogma that could be deconstructed through critical thinking (field notes 25/01/19). This reflects the idea that the removal of religious symbols from schools creates a ‘privileged’ space that enables ‘the exchange of ideas’ and autonomous thought (Bowen 2007:29; see also Favell 2001; Mannitz 2004; Mabilon-Bonfils and Zoïa 2014). For Mr W, this privileged space was more important in the current climate, since it may prevent young people from being radicalised.

5.2.5 Policy enactment at the school level: Comparative conclusions

Like académie-level actors, teachers and school leaders have significant autonomy to define key aspects of the Great Mobilisation, and this leads to variation between schools. I have argued that the inclusion of EMC in external assessment components provides a strong incentive to engage with the curriculum. Teachers in all four schools engaged with it to some extent, although there was some variation between and within schools. There was greater variation in the extent to which they engaged with the other aspects of Great Mobilisation (see MEN 2015a:15). Aimé Césaire and Jean Moulin stand out as ‘flagship’ schools in their respective académies (Arthur 25/01/19). Both school leaders articulated the Great Mobilisation with their own educational philosophy, the school’s ethos, and their pre-existing work to promote republican values. The teachers I interviewed gave significant importance to EMC and had
organised events to celebrate republican symbols and ceremonies. Comments from Fred in the SoF and teachers at Lafayette suggest that EMC may not have the same status in all classrooms.

In some ways, however, Jean Moulin is even more of an exemplary school than Aimé Césaire. The inclusion of republican values in Jean Moulin’s school project seems to make the school’s commitment to this ethos more explicit. Jean Moulin is also the only school where EMC was taught as a discreet subject. Finally, Audrey and Arthur stood out for their active engagement with the *Vademecum of Laïcité*. Arthur’s emphasis on promoting republican values and *laïcité* is even more remarkable given the school’s apparently White majority population, and its location in a relatively affluent neighbourhood. Ethnically diverse schools in working-class neighbourhoods tend to be the focus of *laïcité* concerns and the two *laïcité* coordinators I interviewed suggested that these schools do more work in this area (see Laborde and Silhol 2018; Ogien 2013). This seems to underline the importance of Arthur’s leadership in determining the school’s emphasis on promoting republican values.

My data suggest that in France, CVE activities for students and teachers may be targeted at schools with a high proportion of Muslim students. However, Gustave Eiffel stands out as a school which appeared to have a significant minority ethnic population but where no CVE activities had taken place at the time of my visits. I have given two possible explanations for this: the timing of my visits and the school’s location in the affluent *académie* of Paris. Overall, CVE activities were less widely implemented among the French case schools than they were among the English schools, where all teacher-respondents had participated in Prevent training.

The enactment of the Great Mobilisation – notably the EMC curriculum – reinforces the ideas and practices I have associated with French republican integration by creating more space for teaching and learning about republican values and *laïcité*. The notion that as well as regulating the relationship between religion and state, *laïcité* is a tool for promoting social cohesion in a diverse society - or ‘living together’ - was evident in the activities I observed, notably those at Jean Moulin (see Bowen 2007; 29; Mannitz 2004; Mabilon-Bonfils and Zoïa 2014). Furthermore, teachers such as Guillaume, Audrey and Arthur drew on notions of a republican values and *laïcité* as a
tool for integration in our interviews. For Guillaume, schools continued ‘vigilance’ around these ideas was more important in the context of recent terrorist attacks (interview 20/10/20). In this sense, events such as the January 2015 terrorist attacks have served to consolidate pre-existing tendencies in French responses to cultural diversity.

However, the data also point to some of the competing conceptions of laïcité that exist among actors in the French education system. In some cases, respondents’ positioning on laïcité reflects broader ideas about cultural diversity suggesting teachers in France do not necessarily share the same ‘priors’ (Bleich 1998:93). I have argued that comments from Christophe and Manon reflect some of the ideas I have discussed in relation to ‘open’ laïcité. Like Hugo, these teachers’ vision of laïcité emphasised respect for students cultural and religious identities. Christophe and Laurent distanced themselves from colleagues who practiced a ‘hard’ form of laïcité that involved placing excessive restrictions on apparent expressions of students’ religious beliefs (Laurent, interview 07/01/19). Both teachers associated these more expansive conceptions of laïcité with teachers’ concerns about radicalisation or to the climate engendered by recent terrorist attacks (see also Lorcerie and Moignard 2017; Orange 2016; 2017). Furthermore, teachers at Lafayette seemed to question the link between violations of laïcité and radicalisation implied by policies such as Upholding Laïcité initiative. Overall, the school data suggest that while recent terrorist attacks may have contributed to more expansive manifestations of laïcité among some teachers, others position themselves against this prevailing climate.

Finally, the emphasis on promoting the teaching of religious phenomena as a response to the challenges posed by recent terrorist attacks was evident at the school level. This points to the ways French approaches to teaching religious ideas and practices may be converging with an English approach. However, the operationalisation of the teaching of religious phenomena through EMC lessons on laïcité leads to subtle but significant differences in the content and focus of these activities (see Husser 2017). Furthermore, data from other studies suggests that Christophe’s practices in this area may not be widespread, and that some teachers’ laïque ‘priors’ make them reluctant to engage with religion in the classroom (see Bleich 1998:94; Laborde 2019; Petit 2018).
6 Educational responses to terrorism at the local level: England

This chapter presents my data from the four case studies in England, following a similar structure to chapter 5. I begin with Westbrook Primary and Mercia Academy, which apparently have the highest proportion of Muslim students, and end with First Academy and the SCG, which have a larger proportion of White British students. Each case is structured around the research and sub-questions and begins with an overview of the data and a brief description of the school.

The first two sections of each case study address teachers’ enactments of FBV and Prevent, highlighting the similarities and differences between each case (RQ1 and SQ1). I argue that the ‘loose’ ‘enabling’ design of the FBV duty leads to greater variation in the way the four schools address the values in the policy compared to the Great Mobilisation in France (Vincent 2019b:54). The guidance on FBV is short and specifies little in terms of expected knowledge or curriculum content (DfE 2014a; 2014b). Teachers can also address the duty through pre-existing activities or ‘absorb’ it into their school’s ethos (McGhee and Zhang 2017:938; see also Vincent 2019b:99). As such, although there were similarities in the activities teachers used to address the duty, there were differences between education levels, and in the values the different schools emphasised. Schools also varied in the extent to which teachers used the language of FBV in their work with students and implemented additional activities to address the duty. In contrast, the compulsory nature of the Prevent duty meant that all four schools had taken similar steps to implement it. Furthermore, the data support Busher at al’s (2017) finding that the notion of ‘Prevent as safeguarding’ has led teachers to accept preventing violent extremism as part of their role (32). However, teachers’ understanding of the ‘situated context’ of their school seemed to frame the extent to which they saw the duty as relevant to them and which types of extremism they were most concerned about (Ball et all 2012:22).

The second part of each case study addresses SQ2. Following Vincent (2019b), I argue that the ‘sediment’ of previous multicultural approaches is evident in teachers’ concern for promoting respect for diversity and that this explains their emphasis on the FBV mutual respect and tolerance (101). Moreover, their capacity to ‘repackage’
existing activities on the theme of equalities and diversity in response to the FBV duty leads to the persistence or ‘stabilization’ of multicultural practices (Vincent 2019b:79; Jensen 2019:627). I also find evidence of more active resistance to FBV, which supports my proposition that teachers’ multicultural ‘priors’ will lead them to resist the duty (see Bleich 1998). Importantly, however, the data suggest that not all teachers in England have the same ‘priors’ and that the recent turn towards civic integration and muscular liberalism may have filtered down to the school level (see Bleich 1998). This was evident in the muscular means teachers at Westbrook Primary and First Academy used to promote tolerance and to challenge the illiberal attitudes they associated with the local population (see also Vincent 2019b:124-125). Furthermore, while some teachers actively rejected the discourse on British values and the narrow notions of Britishness they associated with it, others were supportive of the FBV policy. Their comments reflect the climate of concern about violent extremism and Muslim integration in which Prevent and FBV have emerged.
6.1 Westbrook Primary School

6.1.1 Introduction

Table 6-1 Data Collected: Westbrook Primary

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<tr>
<th>Interviews</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Jane’ – School principal (24/01/19)</td>
<td>23/01/19 Year 6 literacy lesson</td>
<td>Curriculum overview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Year 5 lesson on Ancient Greece and discussion on current affaires</td>
<td>Ofsted report</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Year 4 literacy lesson</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Year 3 Maths lesson</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Year 1 lesson on respect</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Year 5 and 6 assembly on gender equality</td>
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<tr>
<td>24/01/19</td>
<td>Year 6 literacy lesson</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Reception - Unstructured time</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Year 6 maths lesson</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Training workshop on gender equality</td>
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Westbrook Primary is a local authority maintained primary school in a city in the Midlands. Census data suggest the neighbourhood around the school is almost 80% Muslim, while the most recent Ofsted report indicates that most students are from a minority ethnic background, with British Pakistani representing the largest ethnic group (City Population 2020). However, Jane also said the school had a growing Roma population and increasing numbers of students from continental European backgrounds. Finally, the school has an above-average proportion of students from
disadvantaged backgrounds. The proportion of those eligible for free school meals was more than twice the national average at the time of my visits (DfE 2021).

6.1.2 FBV at Westbrook Primary

The school’s enactment of FBV points to the ‘enabling’ nature of the duty (Vincent 2019b:54). My impression was that many of the school’s FBV activities built on previous work on equalities, notably gender and LGBTQ+ equality. When I asked Jane how she and her colleagues went about enacting FBV, she responded by talking about the school’s work to address the Equality Act 2010. She was also unfamiliar with the DfE (2014b) guidance on the duty, suggesting the school may not have referred closely to it when enacting it. In this respect, it seems that the ‘repackaging’ approach identified by Vincent (2019b), wherein teachers present pre-existing work as evidence of FBV, played an important role at Westbrook Primary (79).

Jane said that teachers at Westbrook addressed FBV through the transdisciplinary themes in the school’s curriculum, but that there were few discrete lessons on FBV. My lesson observations provide insight into how this works in practice. The lead teacher for reception said that since the Early Years curriculum was student-led, teachers addressed FBV on an ad hoc basis, through circle time discussions on equality and discussions on classroom rules and fairness (field notes 24/01/19). In the year-3 classroom I visited, a display on a unit on chocolate production highlighted keywords with links to FBV, such as fairness, equality, discrimination, and workers’ rights (field notes 23/01/19). The year-1 lesson on the theme of respect was the most explicit FBV lesson I observed. Other lessons touched on the values more tangentially.

However, Jane said the introduction of FBV led to renewed efforts to ‘weave in a little bit about Britishness or living in Britain’ into the curriculum and school ethos (interview 24/01/19). This emphasis was evident in several displays around the school and in my conversations with other teachers. I discuss the salience of Britishness further below, where I argue it reflects the muscular liberal ideas the policy is embedded in.
6.1.3 Prevent at Westbrook Primary

Westbrook Primary’s ‘situated context’ – notably its location and student population – seems to have framed Jane’s response to the Prevent duty (see Ball et al 2012:22). Her understanding of the neighbourhood around the school as a ‘terrorist hotspot’ meant she engaged with Prevent before it became a legal duty for schools in 2015 (interview, 24/01/19). She first attended training on radicalisation in 2013, having received a ‘random email from a training provider’ and deciding it would be important for her school:

“And I must have listened to a few bits and pieces about [extremist activity in the neighbourhood]. Thinking ‘right I need to take this seriously I’m headteacher in this area. I can’t just close my eyes and think ‘oh this isn’t me!’”

(Jane, interview 24/01/19)

Jane contacted a police officer working in counterterrorism after the event, which led to another officer delivering training to teachers at the school. At the time of my visits, the leadership team delivered Prevent training for all staff as part of annual safeguarding training. Jane’s proactive approach supports findings from other studies, in which teachers in schools with a high proportion of Muslim students saw Prevent as especially important to their context (see Busher et al 2017; Pal Sian 2015; Jerome et al 2019:826; Elwick and Jerome 2019).

6.1.4 Mutual respect, tolerance, and multicultural citizenship

Of the four values in the FBV policy, mutual respect and tolerance was especially salient in the data from Westbrook. As was the case in some of the schools in Vincent’s (2019b) study, the other FBV ‘tended to fade into the background’ in my conversations with teachers (99). Although Jane mentioned democracy, the rule of law, and individual liberty in our interview, all the examples of student activities she gave related to equalities or building tolerance, with gender and sexuality as recurrent themes
(interview 24/01/19). Several of the other teachers I spoke to also offered the school’s work on gender and sexuality as examples of FBV, giving the impression that some understood the duty as exclusively relating to these themes. One teacher connected the idea of classroom rules to the rule of law, and another cited the student council as an example of democracy, suggesting the school does indeed address the other values. Aside from a reference to democracy in a lesson on Ancient Greece, however, all the links to FBV in the lessons I observed related to mutual respect, tolerance, and equalities.

Following Vincent (2019b), I argue that teachers’ emphasis on mutual respect and tolerance draws on multicultural ideas. I have already indicated that teachers at Westbrook have ‘repackaged’ previous work on equalities as part of their response to FBV (see Vincent 2019b:79). I see this as an instance where a lack of time or creativity leads teachers to ‘fall back’ on multicultural practices in their response to the FBV duty, leading to the ‘stabilization’ of these practices (Jensen 2019:627). However, there is also a sense in which previous multicultural policies or ideas inform teachers’ goals for educating young people. Vincent (2019b) argues that the ‘sediment’ of previous multicultural policies persists in teachers’ concern for preparing students for citizenship in a diverse school community and in multicultural Britain, where they will encounter people who are different to them (98; see also McGhee and Zhang 2017:940). Such concerns are evident in the following quotation from Jane:

“Lucky for me, all of these laws [the Equality Act 2010 and the FBV policy] absolutely tick every box internally within me. And I really take it seriously that I’m an educator and I must fight for these things. So, it is a bit about English and maths but it’s also fundamentally about adding to the world and not taking away. And if you’re full of hatred, and us and them […] and women should do this and gays should do this, then you are not adding to the world, you’re taking away from the world”.

(Jane, interview 24/01/19)

Jane saw the FBV policy and the Equalities Act 2010 as enabling her to achieve her pre-given aim of promoting tolerance and challenging discriminatory attitudes among
her students. Like several of the teachers in Vincent’s (2019b) study, she seems to have ‘translated the FBV requirement to fit [her] own aims for educating young children’ by emphasising mutual respect, tolerance, and equality in the school’s enactment of the duty (99; see also McGhee and Zhang 2017:940). The ‘loose’ design of the policy enables teachers to do this (see Vincent 2019b:54; McGhee and Zhang 2017).

Teachers’ concern for promoting respect for difference was evident in the lessons I observed, notably the year-1 lesson on respect. The teacher began a discussion on the theme ‘we are all unique’ by referring a classroom display that said ‘we are all different and we are all friends’ (field notes, 23/01/19; see figure 6-1). The discussion addressed differences relating to religion, culture, and individual tastes, and the teacher emphasised the importance of getting along with others despite these differences. Many of these ideas came from the students, who made comments such as ‘we can’t all be the same because we’re individual’ and ‘it doesn’t matter if you’re Christian or Muslim’ (field notes, 23/01/19). The teacher expanded on the theme of religious diversity, pointing out that ‘we all celebrate each other’s celebrations’ and eliciting festivals such as ‘Eid’, ‘birthdays’ and ‘Christmas’ from the students (field notes, 23/01/19). Similarly, during a year 6 literacy lesson, the teacher emphasised the idea that the characters in the book students were reading were friends despite their differences (field notes, 23/01/19). These messages point to a concern for preparing students for their current life in school, but also the diversity they will encounter the wider world. The references to religious diversity in the year 1 lesson underline the importance teachers in England place on religion as a facet of diversity (see Mannitz 2004).
6.1.5 Muscular liberalism at Westbrook Primary

Although the broad focus on promoting mutual respect and tolerance at Westbrook arguably draws on multicultural ideas, the specific emphasis on gender and sexuality reflects some of the muscularity of the FBV policy. Jane’s comments revealed a perception of the local community as patriarchal and intolerant towards sexual minorities. The school’s work on gender and sexuality seemed to be partly motivated by a desire to target these ‘communal substantive values’, a function that McGhee and Zhang (2017) associate with muscular liberalism and the FBV policy (941). Jane identified two communities as especially patriarchal – Muslims and Roma – and saw it as her role to address these intolerant attitudes:

“We all live in patriarchal societies […] but when you work within a community that is very patriarchal - like Islam is – then all those things are exacerbated […] If we don’t tell these kids that boys and girls are equal, that two men can get
married, then nobody else is going to tell them that. And we have a duty to tell, make sure they understand it, make sure they challenge inequality when they see it. Because this isn’t just ‘miss says’, you have to feel it in here.”

(Jane, interview 24/01/19)

The goal of promoting progressive attitudes among a population perceived to be deficient in them reflects several of the tendencies I have discussed in relation to civic integration and muscular liberalism. There are striking similarities between Westbrook and one of the majority-Muslim schools in Vincent’s (2019b) study, where the principal’s somewhat stereotypical views of students’ home lives informed the school’s work on promoting equality (121-129). This tendency reflects a view of Muslim communities as intolerant - and in need of liberal values – that has become prevalent in debates on integration and national identity (see Fozdar and Low 2015:529; Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016:3; McGhee and Zhang 2017; Vincent 2019b:121-129).

Furthermore, Jane seems to insist that it is insufficient for students to show outward compliance with the vision of equality she seeks to promote – ‘this isn’t just ‘miss says’ - and that they must ‘feel it in here’ (interview 24/01/19). As Joppke (2014) has argued in relation to the muscular liberalism doctrine, this suggests that ‘it is not enough to agree to liberal democratic norms only instrumentally […] these norms must be accepted for their own sake, outside and apart from one’s own doctrinal or primordial preferences’ (Joppke 2014:293). This view also articulates with Mouritsen et al’s (2019) definition of civic integration, in the sense that the notion of ‘good citizenship’ that Jane seeks to promote touches on students’ private beliefs as well as their outward behaviours (601).

I also see a degree of this muscularity in the way Jane responded to the opposition she encountered to the school’s approach to promoting gender and LGBTQ+ equality. Religious conservatives within the local community – including some parents and staff – had challenged this approach, and Jane and her colleagues had experienced some aggressive and threatening behaviour in response to this work. Jane made it clear that there was little room for debate or negotiation among stakeholders on these issues. This was evident in advice she gave to other school leaders experiencing similar challenges:
“I did quite a bit of training [for school leaders] when people were going “oh my god. Tell me what you did. What did you do?” And these were “here are pieces of information that are the law. Treat them like mantras. Hand copies out. Say ‘goodbye. This is my school not yours. I’m the headteacher here not you’”. […] I have confidence to say that. Because you are the headteacher. And this isn’t their school.”

(Jane, interview 24/01/19, my emphasis)

Jane said the Equality Act 2010 and inclusion of the duty to promote FBV in the teaching standards were a useful way of ‘clos[ing] down’ conversations on these issues, since she could argue that the school’s approach was supported by ‘British law’ (interview 24/01/19). This is an important contrast with Mercia Academy, where the school’s work on these themes also raised concerns among some parents and staff, but where the leadership team took a more accommodating approach to these objections. Crucially, while Jane insisted that it was her school, rather than the parents’, Hamza and Graham at Mercia saw the school as serving the community and emphasised the role of ‘dialogue’ and ‘negotiation’ in resolving these conflicts (Hamza, interview 22/02/21).

As such, I argue that Westbrook and Mercia reflect two different positions on how to resolve the potential conflict between the values the state or individual schools seek to promote and parental or communal values. Along with the data from First Academy, the data from Westbrook suggest that not all schools in England tend towards the ‘Lockean’ or ‘relativist’ approach that authors have associated with citizenship education in England (Mouritsen and Jaeger 2018:5; Johnson and Morris 2011:292). Jane’s muscular approach to promoting tolerant attitudes seems to articulate more with the ‘traditional republican-liberal’ model of citizenship education that Mouritsen and Jaeger (2018) associate with France, wherein the state may promote ‘its vision of the common good’ to the exclusion of parental or communal values (5). Importantly however, Jane’s insistence that the school is ‘hers’ arguably grounds this notion of citizenship education firmly in the English education policy landscape, where school
leaders’ relative autonomy gives them the capacity to privilege values of their choosing.

6.1.6 Putting the ‘British’ in British values

Jane’s emphasis on promoting Britishness among her students sets her apart from the other school leaders in this study. Westbrook was also the only school that took what Vincent (2019b) has described as a ‘representing Britain’ approach to enacting FBV, wherein the values in the policy are associated with national symbols and cultural icons (71-78; see also Moncrieffe and Moncrieffe 2019). There are clear contrasts with school leaders at First Academy, who were critical of the nationalist discourses they associated with FBV and sought to de-emphasise them in their response to the duty.

As such, Jane’s comments on this theme provide a counterpoint to the vocal critics of the British values discourse I have encountered in this study. She had ‘no truck’ with the common criticism that the values in the FBV policy were ‘human values’ and were not exclusively British (Jane, interview 23/01/19; cf. Farrell 2016; Vincent 2019a; Maylor 2016; Busher et al 2017). For her, there were some things that were ‘idiosyncratic’ or ‘fundamental about being British’ (Jane, interview 24/01/19). Her account of what was fundamentally British was not limited to the liberal-political values in the policy and drew on more culturalised conceptions of Britishness. Alongside ‘democracy’, she referenced national institutions such as the ‘NHS’, cultural icons such as the comedy duo ‘Morecombe and Wise’, and character traits such as ‘humour’, ‘caring’, and the importance of ‘family’ (interview 24/01/19). This demonstrates how the boundaries between a civic or liberal nationalist discourse and a thicker conception of nationhood can easily become blurred (see for example, Kostakopoulou 2006; Mouritsen 2008; Fozdar and Low 2015; Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016; Mouritsen et al 2019). Although such slippages were rare among the respondents in this study, the data from other studies suggests this ‘culturalising’ tendency may be more common among teachers (Elton-Chalcraft et al 2017:41; see also Sant and Hanley 2018; Vincent 2019b; Moncrieffe and Moncrieffe 2019).

This tendency was also evident in the school’s FBV displays, which blended images that relate directly to the FBV with the kind of national symbols, cultural symbols, and
cultural icons that prevailed in display boards in Moncrieffe and Moncrieffe’s (2019) study (see also Vincent 2019b; 70-78). For example, one display on democracy included a picture of a ballot box, but also images of the Union Jack and the Queen (see figure 6-2). A display from a year 1 classroom combined Union Jack imagery with definitions of the five FBV. Four of the definitions include the references to the word Britain and situate the values firmly in the British context (see figure 6-3). As was the case in Vincent’s study (2019b), however, this approach was not widespread among the case schools. Aside from one FBV poster with a Union Jack at the Southeast College Group (SCG), I have not encountered any other examples of the ‘representing Britain’ response, and several respondents were critical of it (Vincent 2019b:71).
The fact most students at Westbrook are from minority ethnic backgrounds makes the emphasis on Britishness especially significant. Since previous studies have found that multicultural educational practices tend to prevail in areas of high ethnic diversity, one might expect a school such as Westbrook to avoid potentially narrow conceptions of Britishness (see Bleich 1998; Qureshi and Janmaat 2014; Vincent 2019b). At Westbrook, however, there was a sense that the school’s majority Muslim and South Asian population made promoting Britishness especially important. Jane linked her mission to promote a British identity to the need to prevent young people from being drawn into radicalisation. Here, she seemed to draw on ideas from David Cameron’s muscular liberalism speech (2011a), notably the notion that a lack of identification with Britishness could increase young Muslims’ vulnerability to radicalisation:

“We are educators, so we have to talk eloquently about being British or living in Britain. Because some children here think they’re Pakistani. And they’re not, they’re British. They’ve never been to Pakistan. [...] So, it’s great – everybody should be proud of their heritage - but this is where radicalisation really gets a hold of people because they [extremist groups?] play on that insecurity about identity. They go ‘They pretend you’re British, but you’re not really, are you? Do

*Figure 6-3 - Display in year 1 classroom*
Like Cameron (2011), Jane appeared to view some students’ hybrid or ‘insecure’ identities as a source of vulnerability and the promotion of British values as a way of building resilience. Jane was particularly well versed in recent government thinking on these issues and may even be familiar with the muscular liberalism speech. Her comments suggest that some teachers have absorbed the ideas informing the muscular liberalism doctrine and that this feeds into their work promoting FBV.

6.2 Mercia Academy

6.2.1 Introduction

Table 6-2 Data collected: Mercia Academy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviews</th>
<th>Documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Graham’ – CEO of Mercia Academy Trust (unstructured interview 24/06/19)</td>
<td>Ofsted report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Ayesha’ – School principal (unstructured interview 05/09/19)</td>
<td>SMSC curriculum overview (online)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Zainab’ – Director of Education, Mercia Academy Trust (11/12/20)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Hamza’ – Assistant Principal in charge of SMSC (22/02/21)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Mercia Academy is a lower secondary school some 6 kilometres to the north of Westbrook Primary. The school is part of a multi-academy trust (MAT) made up of a small number of schools. Like Westbrook, both the school and the surrounding neighbourhood have a significant Pakistani and Muslim population. Ayesha said the local community was ‘close-knit’ and that many residents had origins in the same region of Pakistan, while Hamza described the school as ‘almost 98%-99% Muslim’.
(field notes 05/09/19; interview 22/02/21). Census data for the ward surrounding the school broadly confirm these judgements (City Population 2020). My impression was that many teachers and other staff at the school were also from Muslim or south Asian backgrounds. The two members of Mercia’s school leadership team that I met – Ayesha and Hamza - were both Muslim. This sets Mercia apart from the other case schools, where the school leaders I encountered were overwhelmingly White.

6.2.2 FBV at Mercia Academy

Mercia Academy had received an ‘inadequate’ judgement in an Ofsted inspection some years before my visit to the school, with the school’s approach to preventing violent extremism and promoting equality and respect for difference highlighted as weaknesses. There have been significant changes in the leadership of the school and the MAT since this inspection. The new leadership team made significant efforts to respond to the concerns highlighted by Ofsted, implementing several practices that address aspects of Prevent as well as FBV. I highlight two of these before addressing FBV specifically. The school participated in the UNICEF Rights Respecting Schools Award scheme. The award is based on the principles of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN CRC) and requires schools to demonstrate that these are reflected in the curriculum, school climate, and leadership, and that students participate in decision-making (see UNICEF n.d; Starkey 2018). The school also participated in a cross-curricular project addressing the Holocaust and other genocides. It involved students collaborating with survivors and other school students from varied religious and cultural backgrounds. Zainab saw these activities as crucial in embedding the ‘deep-rooted change’ needed to address the concerns highlighted by Ofsted (interview 11/12/20). As well as contributing to the FBV mutual respect and tolerance, she suggested they played a role in building students’ resilience to radicalisation (interview 11/12/20).

The need to address the concerns highlighted by Ofsted may also explain the leadership team’s somewhat ‘maximal’ approach to FBV. The school addressed FBV through its spiritual, moral, social, and cultural development (SMSC) curriculum and the leadership team encouraged all teachers to make links to the values in their subject. Hamza described the school as ‘SMSC-led’ and sought to emphasise that the
FBV and the ‘human values’ expressed in the UN CRC were ‘embedded’ across the curriculum and other activities (interview, 22/02/20). In practical terms, this meant form tutors addressed these values in weekly 30-minute SMSC sessions, which were thematically linked to weekly assemblies. The SMSC curriculum covers topics one might expect to find in a PSHE curriculum as well as some that relate to citizenship education, Prevent and FBV. This includes themes such as local democracy, British values, and diversity. The school also addressed FBV through thematic ‘drop-down’ days and one-off activities led by external partners (Hamza, interview 22/02/20). The local authority Prevent team played an important role in establishing these partnerships. Finally, Hamza said the leadership team encouraged all teachers to make links to SMSC in their subject area, partly by including a space for SMSC links in the school’s lesson planning pro forma. As such, he said that FBV were ‘embedded throughout what we do every single minute of the day’ (Hamza, interview 22/02/20). The school’s most recent Ofsted report seems to confirm this statement, noting that the values are addressed across the curriculum.

6.2.3 Prevent at Mercia Academy

As with Westbrook, Mercia’s location in a majority-Muslim area with a reputation for extremist activity seems to have informed teachers’ responses to the Prevent duty. Ayesha said many students at the school may know ‘someone down the road’ who was involved in extremist activities and felt that the ‘close-knit’ nature of the local community made it difficult for them to raise such concerns (field notes, 05/09/19). As such, it was important for her to explain to students how the school responded to Prevent referrals and to reassure them that these did not always lead to police involvement (field notes, 05/09/19). However, Ayesha was careful to avoid stigmatising students and sought to emphasise that extremism was a concern for all British citizens and ‘not just because you’re a Muslim’ (field notes 05/09/19). In this sense, Mercia’s ‘situated context’ meant that Ayesha saw Prevent as priority, but that she approached the duty sensitively (see Ball 2012:22).

The MAT’s relationship with the local authority’s Prevent team was another important factor driving Mercia’s enactment of the duty. This team provided support with the securitisation and safeguarding elements of Prevent, but also did ‘a huge amount of
work on curriculum’, including student interventions and training and support for teachers (Zainab, interview 11/12/20). They delivered regular training to the school’s designated safeguarding leads (DSLs), which included the leadership team, heads of department, and a pastoral manager for each year group. In turn, the DSLs delivered whole staff Prevent training at least once per year. The school used the local authority’s screening tool to assess Prevent referrals and decide what action to take and had a dedicated contact within the Prevent team who could provide further guidance. Finally, the local authority team organised Prevent workshops for whole cohorts of students, interventions for students identified as being ‘at risk’ of radicalisation, and open-door clinics for students who had concerns about others (field notes 05/09/19). Curriculum work included training and support in achieving the Rights Respecting Schools Award. Several other schools in the local authority participate in the scheme.

This collaboration with the local authority on Prevent is somewhat surprising considering that Mercia is an academy and is therefore independent of the local authority. Dave, a Prevent education officer in an inner-London local authority said that he worked less with the academies and free schools in his jurisdiction than he did with the maintained schools (interview 24/11/17). In contrast, my impression was that the school collaborated more closely with the Prevent team than Westbrook, which is a local authority-maintained school. One possible explanation is that one member of the local authority Prevent team used to teach at Mercia. According to Zainab, this gave the school a ‘natural connection’ with the team (interview 11/12/20). As such, the data from Mercia suggest that academies and free schools are not necessarily less likely than maintained schools to draw on local authority support when enacting Prevent.

6.2.4 Mutual respect, tolerance, and multicultural citizenship

The FBV mutual respect and tolerance was also salient in the data at Mercia, although I would argue the focus on embedding the principles of the UN CRC meant that the other values in the policy did not ‘fade into the background’ in the way they did at Westbrook Primary (see Vincent 2019b:99). As with the other case schools, teachers’ comments on this theme reflect their concern for preparing students for life in
multicultural Britain (see Jerome and Clemitshaw 2012; McGhee and Zhang 2017:940; Vincent 2019b:96-106). Two notions of tolerance emerged as a recurrent theme in these conversations. The first relates to tolerance of and respect for people who may be different to us, while the second relates to respect for opposing viewpoints. Hamza referenced both notions of tolerance when I asked him how the school addressed FBV:

“We want our children to grow up knowing that you can have a difference of opinion but respecting someone’s opinion is very important. Respecting their individual values is very important, respecting their individual liberties; regardless of race, gender, sexual orientation.”

(Hamza, interview 22/02/21)

He applied similar ideas to the specific theme of tolerance for sexual minorities:

“For example, if [students] meet someone gay in society— they don’t necessarily have to agree with that, but it is about them being respectful […] We’re not being homophobic in our language, we’re not being discourteous, we’re there engaging with them, the way that you and I are engaging. Or the way that you and I engage with so many other people. And we’re able to do that because someone provided us that understanding, someone provided that opportunity for us to discuss and feel comfortable with what my personal values are, against what universal values are, and how I need to meet that middle path. And ultimately, that’s what school education is.”

(Hamza, interview 22/02/21, my emphasis)

Hamza relates the duty to promote FBV to the school’s mission to ensure that students treat those they encounter in their life beyond with courtesy and respect, despite any differences. His comments on enabling students to find the ‘middle path’ between their own values and the values held in wider society call to mind McGhee and Zhang’s (2017) findings on the role of FBV and SMSC in ‘facilitating the interface between personal (or private) values and public values associated with advanced liberal
democracies’ (944). Hamza seems to envisage an important role for classroom discussion in bringing this about.

The leadership team also sought to build tolerance by bringing students into contact with people who were different to them. Ayesha described this as ‘broadening students’ horizons’ and saw this as especially important given the monocultural nature of the local community (field notes 05/09/19). Zainab saw the curriculum project on genocide as important in promoting students’ respect and tolerance for people they would not normally encounter in their daily lives. This included the Jewish and Tutsi survivors the school partnered with, as well as the students from private schools and other parts of the country who also took part in the project (interview 11/12/20). The emphasis on promoting students’ contact with groups outside their community points to the ‘policy sediment’ of community cohesion (see Vincent 2019b:101). Under this policy agenda, schools with a monocultural intake were encouraged to organise joint activities with other schools to promote mutual understanding (see DCSF 2007).

Hamza’s comments on promoting respect and tolerance for sexual minorities reflect a more limited notion of tolerance compared to Jane at Westbrook. While Jane insisted that students must ‘feel’ tolerant attitudes on the inside (interview 24/01/19), Hamza’s comments suggest that it was enough for students to be courteous towards gay people, but that they ‘didn’t necessarily have to agree’ with homosexuality (interview 22/02/21). Rather than targeting students’ inner thoughts and feelings, Hamza’s notion of tolerance relates to their external behaviours (see Joppke 2014:289; McGhee and Zhang 2017).

Furthermore, in contrast to Westbrook, the leadership team’s response to parental and staff concerns around the teaching of sexual and relationships education (RSE) and LGBTQ+ equality reflect a more ‘Lockean’ and less muscular conception of the role of the school (Mouritsen and Jaeger 2018:5). This became evident in my meeting with Graham, the CEO of the MAT. Speaking of the protests that had taken place in response to some schools’ teaching of RSE and LGBTQ+ equality, he suggested that schools could avoid these conflicts through dialogue with the local community and sensitivity towards their views (field notes, 24/06/19). Hamza expressed similar ideas during our interview. He said the recent protests and the Government’s decision to
make RSE compulsory had ‘caused a lot of concern’ among parents (interview 22/02/21). Like Graham, he emphasised the importance of dialogue in resolving these conflicts, and expressed the view that schools existed to serve the needs of the community:

“Jonathan, essentially, I feel – and this is my personal view and also as a senior leader – when the communication breaks down between the school and the community that you’re serving - because essentially we’re serving that community - that’s where the issues are”

(Hamza, interview 22/02/21, my emphasis)

This contrasts with Jane’s insistence that Westbrook was ‘her school’ (interview 24/01/19) and reflects the ‘Lockean’ notion that schools primarily serve families and communities (see Mouritsen and Jaeger 2018:5; Favell 2001; Bowen 2007). Hamza also highlighted the flexibility of the government guidance on RSE, which he said enabled schools to enact the requirement ‘based on the needs of the community’ (interview 22/02/21). This sits in contrast with Jane’s insistence that ‘pieces of law’ such as the FBV duty and the Equality 2010 preclude any negotiation on these issues (Jane, interview 24/01/19). It seems that while the civic integration and muscular liberalism trends may have created a climate in which some teachers are prepared to be more active in their promotion of progressive attitudes, others envisage a more limited role for the school and are more willing to defer to parental or communal values.
First Academy is a free school in an outer London borough. The school covers the 4 to 18 age range, although my observations focused on the secondary phase. Although 1 in 4 students are White British, making this the largest ethnic group, most students are from minority ethnic backgrounds. According to one RE teacher, Islam was ‘the second biggest – or perhaps the biggest’ faith community in the school at the time of my visits (field notes, 09/02/19). Despite this ethnic diversity, the school’s location in a White-working class neighbourhood with a reputation for far-right activity seemed to
frame how teachers understood FBV and Prevent as relating to them. This sets First Academy apart from Westbrook and Mercia, where staff were more concerned with Muslim students.

6.3.2 FBV at First Academy

First Academy’s response to the FBV policy was the most limited of the four case study schools. While Mike, the executive principal, was able to describe the process the leadership team went through to implement Prevent, he said no such process had taken place for FBV: ‘We’ve just never done that’ (interview 12/03/18). This highlights the ‘enabling’ nature of FBV compared to Prevent, which is a legal duty (see Vincent 2019b:54; McGhee and Zhang 2017).

Mike seemed to somewhat overstate this case, however, when he said that FBV ‘didn’t change practice’ at the school (interview 12/03/18). There have at least been some attempts to demonstrate compliance with the duty, although these were largely confined to the ‘repackaging’ response described by Vincent (2019b:79). Like an increasing number of schools, First Academy had a set of core values it sought to promote among staff and students. Some relate to metacognitive or social emotional skills, while others are essentially civic virtues and with evident links to FBV. Ahead of its previous Ofsted inspection, the leadership team had produced a one-page document to demonstrate that the school’s values and pre-existing activities ‘align sufficiently’ with the FBV (Mike, interview 12/03/18). This served to reassure them that they did not ‘need to signpost’ the FBV or implement ‘extra stuff’ to address the duty (Mike, interview 12/03/18). For example, the school presented the student council as an activity that addressed the FBV democracy. Although Mike described some of these links as ‘a bit tenuous’, he felt the activities they highlighted addressed ‘something about how we want people to be in modern Britain’ (interview 12/03/18).
Although teacher-respondents felt the school’s values addressed the FBV implicitly, they did not use the explicit language of British values with students, and the duty was not evident in the visual culture of the school. The one FBV display I noted – which links the FBV to the school’s values - had been removed by the time of my last visit (see figure 6-4). Several respondents said the students would be unable to name the values in the policy, and Mike and Charlotte admitted that they could not name all four FBV themselves.

“I don’t think you could ask a child ‘what do you think the fundamental British values are?’ It’s not something we articulate formally […] However, I think that our own school values embody that idea of tolerance, that idea of fairness. I think that if you were to ask the students what values they think are important they would align with the British values. But that labelling, that language, isn’t something which we’ve explicitly taught them.

(Emma, interview 13/03/18)

“In terms of fundamental British values, I feel like that is something my school does very strongly but in terms of the ethos, it’s not necessarily explicit […] but
the values that we subscribe to and demand from our children, to do with respect, equality, and non-discrimination [...] I think there’s probably a lot of alignment.”

(Charlotte, interview 16/03/18)

Such comments point to a sense that the school’s pre-existing ethos and values - notably values associated with the FBV mutual respect and tolerance - meant it was unnecessary to promote the FBV explicitly. This underlines schools’ capacity to ‘absorb’ the FBV duty ‘into their existing structures and ethos’, enabled by the design of the policy (McGhee and Zhang 2017:938; see also Vincent 2019b).

I would argue that this implicit, ‘light touch’ approach to FBV was facilitated by First Academy’s strong position in performance and accountability measures. This has given school leaders a degree of confidence about the school’s pedagogy, ethos and values. Emma and Mike both said that this confidence meant they did not feel the need to ‘tick the boxes’ (both respondents used this phrasing) in their enactment of FBV:

“...I don’t think we see Ofsted as this scary spectre that is hovering over. Because we’ve been validated by that organisation, we are confident that our results speak for themselves. And I think that schools that are in more precarious positions in terms of outcomes [...] I think then you become more fixated on ‘oh we can’t let any of these plates drop’. So, you are more careful about ticking the boxes, such as FBV.”

(Emma, interview 13/03/18, my emphasis)

Emma contrasted the approach at First Academy with the ‘more tick-boxey’ approach at her previous school (Emma, interview 13/03/18). This school had produced a map showing where fundamental British values were addressed across the curriculum and included FBV as one of the standards of teacher observation. Maryam also felt that the school’s approach to FBV was ‘less explicit’ than other schools she had visited and linked this to the school’s Ofsted rating (interview 21/06/19). There are contrasts
with Mercia and the SCG, where I argue that the need to perform well in an inspection made enacting FBV explicitly a priority.

The school’s character education and pastoral curriculum, which draws on elements of citizenship education and PSHE, is the area where FBV were most directly addressed. This curriculum is taught in a weekly timetabled slot for years 7 to 11, weekly assemblies for years 12 and 13, and thematic ‘drop down’ days involving students in years 7 to 10. The curriculum map states that the subject ‘provides multiple opportunities for students to explore SMSC and British values’, although the curriculum is organised around the themes in the PSHE Association’s programme of study rather than around the FBV (see PSHE Association n.d.). As such, it is not evident that the introduction of the duty led to changes in the curriculum. Teacher-respondents also mentioned religious education, geography, and history as curriculum areas where they addressed FBV. However, these links were not written into schemes of work as they were at Mercia Academy and the SCG.

Although the planning document for the character education programme does not make explicit links between individual topics and FBV, I have identified two broad areas where they relate. Some of the topics relate to citizenship and democracy, including the procedural aspects of democracy and current affairs. This may be explained by the fact that Emma is a citizenship specialist and was responsible for the programme. During a ‘dropout’ day on the French Revolution, I observed a lesson on ‘comparative politics’ in which year-10 students learned about different forms of government and designed their ideal electoral system. Other activities included a debate on whether the UK should become a republic. Another key theme in the character education programme is equality and diversity. Topics such as prejudice, racism, sexism, homophobia, and religious discrimination feature in the curriculum map, and these themes were the focus of the ‘drop down’ day on fighting discrimination. Respondents made links between the school’s work on equalities and the FBV mutual respect and tolerance although they did not always present this work as a ‘response’ to the FBV policy. I discuss this further below.
6.3.3 Prevent at First Academy

In comparison to FBV, Mike saw Prevent as ‘more of a thing we’ve got to have in place’ (interview 12/03/18). When the duty was introduced in 2015, the school invited the local authority’s Prevent team to lead the Home Office’s Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP) for all members of the leadership team. Following the WRAP training, the school updated its safeguarding policy and Amanda produced a short document for staff summarising the key messages. More recently, the school had employed an outside agency to do an audit of its safeguarding procedures, with Prevent being one of many foci.

This is nevertheless a limited response compared to the other case schools. All six respondents at First Academy had taken part in Prevent training, but the school had only organised one training activity for the leadership team. Maryam, Charlotte, and Kathleen had participated in Prevent training before joining the school. In contrast, Westbrook and Mercia organised Prevent training for all staff at least once per year.

Teachers’ perceptions of the school’s ‘situated context’ may partly explain this limited response to Prevent (Ball et al 2012:22). First Academy’s location in White working-class neighbourhood seems to have framed how teachers saw the duty as relating to them and the extent to which they engaged with it. Respondents showed concern about the possibility of young people being radicalised in the abstract, but did not appear to see this as a major priority for their school. Maryam alluded to the to the perception that Prevent is especially pertinent to schools with a significant Muslim population and highlighted other issues that were of greater concern at First Academy (see also Busher et al 2017):

“The huge issue for us a school is crime rates, teenage pregnancies, we’re focused on White working-class boys underachieving […] I guess it depends on the area that you’re in. If you’re in an area that has - I’ve heard - a larger Muslim population and more extremist activities, maybe it would be more of an issue.”

(Maryam, interview 21/06/19)
In a similar vein, Amanda listed several safeguarding concerns she saw as more relevant to the school's context than radicalisation (interview 12/03/18). For Kathleen, the prevalence of far-right groups and racist attitudes in the local area meant that far-right extremism was a greater concern for the school than Islamist extremism (13/03/18). This was a theme in other studies, where authors have found that teachers in schools with a large White working-class population also understood the problem of radicalisation this way (see Elwick and Jerome 2019:348-350; see also Busher et al 2015:25).

A similarity with the other cases was that all six respondents understood Prevent as safeguarding. As Busher et al (2017) have found, this understanding seemed to emerge from the training teachers had received and the fact that the duty was implemented through the school's safeguarding procedures. Several respondents compared radicalisation to other safeguarding concerns such as gangs, female genital mutilation and child sexual exploitation (see also Busher et al 2017:32). For Amanda, grooming and radicalisation were similar since they both involved ‘getting a child to do something for someone else’ (interview, 12/03/18). She said that underlining these similarities helped staff better understand radicalisation. This messaging was evident in the Prevent document she had produced for teachers. Her comments support Busher et al’s (2017) finding that such ‘narratives of continuity’ alleviate teacher concerns about the Prevent duty and give them a degree of confidence in responding to it (32; see also Jerome et al 2019).

One of the things that stood out at First Academy was the way the ‘Prevent as safeguarding’ message seems to have led teachers to articulate the duty with the school's ethos and their own educational philosophy (Busher et al 2017:32). There was a sense among respondents that the duty aligned with the school’s pre-existing focus on student well-being and whole-child education. This is illustrated by a comment from Emma, who argued that as an educator ‘you can’t disagree with wanting to keep children safe […] no matter how much you think that it’s your job to teach them Pythagoras’ (interview, 13/03/18). Kathleen and Amanda spoke in very similar terms about how the school’s character education programme contributed to the Prevent duty by developing ‘the whole child’ and going ‘beyond the academic’. 

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Such comments point to the way the messaging around Prevent has led some teachers to accept the duty as part of their core functions.

Although the idea of Prevent as safeguarding has contributed to a willingness to engage with the duty, it does not seem to have alleviated all of teachers’ concerns about it. Some teachers at First Academy expressed the view that Prevent disproportionately targets Muslims or could make Muslim students feel stigmatised. Their comments point to their awareness of the wider climate of anxiety around Islam in which the policy has emerged. Maryam, the only Muslim respondent at First Academy, was especially alive to these concerns. Although she saw radicalisation as a serious concern considering cases such as the Bethnal Green trio, she felt it should be addressed as one of many safeguarding issues, rather than through a dedicated strategy. She was concerned that the explicit focus on radicalisation could create suspicion of Muslim students, leading teachers to take their words ‘with an extra pinch of salt’ (interview 21/06/19). She also felt that the process of identifying someone at risk of radicalisation was highly subjective, and worried that ‘if a teacher or a police officer or anyone has any kind of prejudice’, this could lead to more ‘brown’ people or Muslims being referred to the programme (Maryam, interview 21/06/19). Muslim teachers in other studies have expressed similar concerns (see Busher et al 2017:54; Panjwani 2016; Farrell and Lander 2019). Kathleen, said that in her experience, ‘Prevent as an organisation […] focuses very much on Islam’ (interview, 13/03/18). This impression was based on the training she had participated in, where she said, ‘no other religion was mentioned’ (interview, 13/03/18). She related what she saw as a disproportionate focus on Islam in the Prevent duty to a wider climate of Islamophobia in the media. She also felt the narrow focus on Islam distracted attention from right-wing extremism, which was more relevant to the context of her school (interview, 13/03/18).

6.3.4 Mutual respect, tolerance, and multicultural citizenship

In a similar vein to Westbrook, teachers’ emphasis on promoting the FBV mutual respect and tolerance was especially marked at First Academy. In the case of Mike and Charlotte, it was the only one of the four FBV they referenced without my
prompting. More than this, teachers’ comments reflect a sense that this emphasis pre-dates the FBV policy and emerges from the school’s culture and ethos:

“We have a very inclusive school and so the children know that there are children in every classroom who have very different special educational needs [...] and the children know that we don’t treat people differently because of that, and we don’t treat people differently because of their background, their religion, or their ethnicity - sexuality”

(Charlotte, interview 16/03/18)

“I guess, because of the culture we built up in the school - respecting one another - bullying doesn’t really happen here. Racism - there isn’t really an issue.”

(Amanda, interview 12/03/18)

“I feel like we’re quite values-driven, we promote tolerance, we’re clear about the importance of understanding difference”

(Mike, interview 12/03/18)

Like most of the respondents in this study, teachers at First Academy related the idea of tolerance to attitudes and dispositions associated with ‘getting along’ with others, ‘respecting and valuing difference’, and life in multicultural Britain (Vincent 2019b:101; Jerome and Clemitshaw 2012:30; see also Elton-Chalcraft et al 2017; McGhee and Zhang 2017; Vanderbeck and Johnson 2016). Following Vincent (2019b), I have argued that this emphasis emerges from the ‘policy sediment’ of multiculturalism and community cohesion, which feeds into teachers’ goals for educating young people (101; see also McGhee and Zhang 2017:940). Like Jane at Westbrook, teachers at First Academy seem to have ‘translated’ the FBV requirement to fit with these aims (Vincent 2019b:99; see also McGhee and Zhang 2017:940). The fact that I interviewed six teachers at First Academy meant the links between these multicultural ideas and teachers’ enactment of FBV were particularly evident.
The emphasis on promoting tolerance and respect for difference was evident in the activities I observed, notably in knowledge and attitudes the students displayed. In a sociology lesson on the family, both male and female students were quick to identify what was problematic in a 1950s Home Economics textbook for girls, which gave instructions on how to welcome one’s husband at the end of the working day. One student spoke openly about the division of domestic labour in his parents’ same-sex relationship (field notes, 12/03/18). During the workshop I observed on discrimination in politics, it became clear that students had requested to discuss the issue of anti-Semitism in the Labour Party with the Labour councillor leading the session (field notes, 18/10/18). They showed a high level of engagement with the discussion, with one student confidently challenging some of the councillor’s statements on the topic. Throughout the day of activities on the theme of discrimination - and in several of the other lessons I observed - students showed significant awareness of and sensitivity towards issues relating to equalities and discrimination.

Teachers’ perceptions of the neighbourhood around the school as intolerant – and specifically racist – informed this emphasis. Here, there are similarities with Westbrook, although in the case of First Academy it was White working-class communities that were the focus of teachers’ concerns. Mike said the school had ‘some quite racist White parents’ and expressed frustration that the school had not effectively ‘broken down’ these ‘parental prejudices’ (interview 12/03/18). Kathleen grew up near the school and continues to live in the area. While she had encountered racist attitudes more frequently in her previous roles in the borough, she said she still often had to challenge students’ racist and Islamophobic statements at First Academy (interview 13/03/18). The students in the sociology lesson I observed shared this view of the local area. One described the neighbourhood as ‘backwards’, citing his recollection that ‘there were UKIP banners all down my street’ ahead of the Brexit referendum (field notes 12/03/18). There was general agreement among these students that their school was more tolerant than others in the area.

As I have argued in relation to Westbrook, the goal of promoting tolerance to target illiberal attitudes teachers associate with the local population reflects some of the muscularity of the FBV duty (see Vincent 2019b:124-125; McGhee and Zhang
There was also a degree of muscularity in the way teachers at First Academy went about achieving this goal. I discuss this further below.

6.3.5 Religious education, FBV and teachers’ responses to terrorism.

In this section, I discuss the ways the religious education (RE) curriculum featured in teachers’ responses to FBV and the broader context of terrorism. I have already indicated that teachers at First Academy saw RE as an area where they addressed FBV, notably by promoting respect and tolerance for different religions. National politicians have made similar links (see Farrell 2016; 2019; Farrell and Lander 2019). I argue here that these links draw on institutionalised ideas about the role of RE in promoting ‘mutual recognition’ between the different faiths that constitute the ‘British mosaic of communities’ (Mannitz 2004:104-105). The RE curriculum also creates opportunities to address religious extremism and religious views on violence. Teachers at First Academy saw this as especially important in the context of recent terrorist attacks. I see these uses of RE as an example of what Carstensen (2011) calls ‘bricolage’. Teachers have ‘re-interpreted’ an existing ‘tool’ in response to the FBV duty and the challenges associated with recent terrorist attacks (Carstensen 2011:156).

At First Academy, RE is a compulsory subject for students in years 7, 8, and 9, and is a GCSE option in years 10 and 11. In years 7 and 8, students cover six major world religions. In year 9, students study thematic topics such as equality, the existence of God, and medical ethics. For the GCSE in Religious Studies (RS), they study the beliefs, teachings, and practices of two major religions and comparative themes such as ‘relationships and families’ and ‘religion, peace, and conflict’. At First Academy, GCSE students study Christianity as the major religion in the UK, and Islam since - according to one RE teacher - this is the ‘second biggest – or perhaps the biggest’ faith community in the school (field notes, 09/02/19).
The display in figure 6-5 exemplifies the links teachers at First Academy make between learning about other faiths and respecting and tolerating those who are different to us. Entitled ‘Why do we study religious studies?’, it lists reasons why the subject is important. In addition to the cultural, moral and philosophical understandings gained from the subject, the display suggests that RS helps prevent intolerance and discrimination, and that since ‘we live in multi-faith and multicultural society’ it is ‘important to understand others’ views and able to work with those who have different views’ (see figure 6-5). Such statements reflect a view of the school community and British society as being composed of different faith communities between whom it is the role of the school to promote understanding. The reference to the ‘varying
consequences' of religious devotion may allude to the role of RE in helping young people make sense of religious extremism (see figure 6-5).

Many of these ideas are reflected in the notion of ‘Religion as Each Community’s Own Path to the Common Good’ that Mannitz (2004) associates with the London school in her comparative study. RE in this context involves students learning about the beliefs of their classmates to better understand and get along with them:

“This way of organising religious education aims to reduce stereotypes, promote mutual respect, and contribute to a sense of tolerance by offering knowledge about all the faiths that coexist within one’s borough.”

(Mannitz 2004:107, my emphasis)

For Mannitz (2004), this understanding of RE is embedded in a multicultural discourse, since it is based on an idea of the local area and national community as being made up of different communities, with religion featuring as a ‘criteria for distinction in the rhetoric of multiculturalism’ (107). Since religion is a feature of cultural diversity, teachers see promoting religious tolerance as part of their role in preparing students for life in multicultural Britain.

These notions were evident in teachers’ comments on how RE addresses FBV. For Charlotte, the RE curriculum promoted mutual respect and tolerance by exposing students to different viewpoints and by developing their understanding of other faiths. This included faiths such as Judaism, which were underrepresented in the school community (field notes, 12/03/18). As such, the school arranged visits from different faith groups, including the workshop led by a Buddhist organisation that I observed. The teacher supervising the workshop opened the session by telling students that it was important for them to learn about other religions, including those practiced by those outside the school community, since they would encounter people from these faiths in their lives beyond school (field notes, 15/03/18). Emma said RE addressed FBV and Prevent by ‘building understanding’ of other religions (interview, 13/03/18). She sought to highlight the similarities in the core beliefs of major religions in her teaching as a way of promoting recognition (interview, 13/03/18). Finally, Emma,
Charlotte, and Maryam all saw RE as playing a role in challenging stereotypes. Charlotte said students ‘all come to school with lots of stereotypes […] on, for example Catholics, Muslims, particularly Jews’ (interview, 16/03/18). For her, the RE curriculum played a role in ‘breaking down some of those conceptual understandings by showing that not all Catholics believe the same thing, not all Muslims believe the same thing’ (interview, 16/03/18). Ultimately, she felt that developing ‘nuanced view of the world’ would make students ‘more open to difference’ (interview, 16/03/18). These responses point to the way institutionalised ideas about the role of RE led teachers to address FBV in this subject area (see Mannitz 2004).

In addition to its function in addressing the FBV mutual respect and tolerance, Charlotte and Emma identified RE as an area where they addressed the topic of terrorism. In some ways, this follows on from ‘bricolage’ that has taken place at the national level (see Carstensen 2011). Students at First Academy study ‘religious teachings, beliefs, and attitudes about terrorism’ as part of the as part of the ‘religion, peace, and conflict’ theme in the GCSE RS syllabus (DfE 2015a). The textbook Emma used to address this topic provides examples of terrorist attacks such as 9/11 attacks and the attacks on Charlie Hebdo (see figure 6-6). One activity invites students to suggest reasons why the major religions would be against terrorism, and to give reasons to agree and disagree with the statement ‘terrorism is never right’. The inclusion of this theme in the RS syllabus seems to reflect an attempt by policymakers to use an existing ‘tool’ to explore the issues raised by recent terrorist attacks (DfE 2015a; see Carstensen 2011).
However, teachers also used the RE curriculum in more ‘bottom up’ responses to terrorism, notably to challenge negative attitudes about Islam. Emma felt that the discrimination some communities faced could be a cause of radicalisation and therefore sought to challenge prevailing media narratives about Islam:

“I think often radicalisation comes from people feeling isolated, discriminated against. And isolation and discrimination are potentially the product of a lack of awareness and understanding […] So, if you can nip that in the bud through educating young people at school, then the dream is that they go on, and that they have… well, firstly that they have the knowledge, but also just that questioning mind, to not accept media accounts”

(Emma, interview 13/03/18)
Both she and Charlotte spoke of using the RE curriculum to debunk myths about Islam and to provide a nuanced understanding of the differences between mainstream Islamic views and radical Islamism. For Emma, this meant providing students with information about groups such as the IRA to demonstrate that terrorism was not a ‘Muslim or an Islamist’ problem (interview, 13/03/18). She also said that teachers explained ‘what jihad really means’, and that it doesn’t always relate to terrorism (interview, 13/03/18). Charlotte spoke of an RE lesson she taught after the terrorist attacks on Brussels in 2016, where students explored the notion that ISIS were ‘not Muslims’ (interview, 16/03/18). She felt it was important to point out to students that ISIS claim to act in the name of Sunni Islam, but also explained that not all Sunni Muslims subscribed to their views (interview, 16/03/18). The school’s character education programme addressed similar objectives. During the day on prejudice and discrimination, I observed a lesson the theme of ‘Islamophobia since 9/11’ that addressed concepts such as jihad and extremism and explored the role of the media in contributing to Islamophobia (field notes, 18/10/18). Teachers in Vincent’s (2019b) study also addressed terrorism through the RE curriculum and showed a similar concern for challenging the link perceived links ‘between ‘Muslim’ and ‘terrorist’” (118). In these instances, teachers seem to have ‘reinterpreted’ the RE curriculum to address the challenges associated with recent terrorist attacks (Carstensen 2011:156).

6.3.6 Multicultural resistance to British values?

Following Vincent (2019b), I have argued that teachers’ emphasis on the FBV mutual respect and tolerance draws on the ‘policy sediment’ of multiculturalism, which manifests itself in their concern for preparing students for life in a multicultural school community and multicultural Britain (101). In this account, teachers are not actively resisting the FBV policy due to their multicultural ‘priors’ (see Bleich 1998). Rather, they are enacting the duty in ways that fit with their goals as educators, and these goals draw on previous multicultural policies (see Vincent 2019b:101; McGhee and Zhang 2017). It is worth noting that this tendency was evident at Westbrook Primary, where Jane showed considerable enthusiasm for the FBV policy. In the case of First Academy, however, I have also found evidence of more active resistance to FBV. Of all the teachers I have interviewed, Mike, Emma, and Maryam were among the most
vocal critics of the British values discourse. I argue here that their criticisms often drew on multicultural ideas.

Like several teachers in other studies, Mike, Emma, and Maryam all objected to the framing of the values in the FBV policy as ‘British’ (see Farrell 2016; Maylor 2016; Busher et al 2017; Vincent 2019b). They associated this framing with undesirable forms of patriotism or nationalism or with Britain’s imperial past, and this fed into their response to the policy. Emma was ‘not 100% against the idea of promoting values’, but questioned the ‘labelling’ of the policy:

I think the labelling of it as being fundamental British values doesn’t help […] this idea of it being something which is peculiarly a British thing […] For me, it’s a little bit Brexit - a bit isolationist. Whereas we don’t own the concept of democracy, as a British thing. And I think that is something which makes some people more uneasy with this idea of fundamental British values and therefore maybe more disinclined to want to work with it.

(Emma, interview 13/03/18)

Here, she raises the common criticism that the values set out in the policy are not exclusively British and argues that the nationalist framing makes teachers less likely to engage with it (see Bowie and Revell 2016; Maylor 2016; Farrell 2016; Busher at al 2017; Vincent 2018).

In a similar vein, Mike associated some responses to FBV with undesirable forms of nationalism, notably in cases where schools had ‘put Union Jacks up everywhere’ (interview 12/03/18). Such nationalist manifestations of the policy did not fit with the school’s culture and ethos, or his values as an educator:

Mike: Historically, there’s a lot of BNP, if you go around [local area] you see a lot of Saint George crosses hanging out of people’s windows. I consider that to be an aggressive gesture […] I guess I don’t particularly like flags. I don’t feel like nationalism… is… […] I think as a community we wouldn’t say that nationalism is a particularly a force for good.
JJ: Ok so it’s not part of the school values?

Mike: I don’t think so. I think if anything, it would be more internationalism.

(Interview, 12/03/18)

This exchange underlines Mike’s resistance to nationalism and his association of some expressions of the FBV policy with the type of exclusionary, far-right nationalism he sees as being prevalent in the area. The slippage that he makes between his own values (“I don’t like flags”) and the school’s values (“as a community”) underscores the link between his own rejection of nationalism and the school’s enactment of the FBV duty.

Maryam was sceptical of what she saw as recent attempts to promote patriotism and counter the ‘stigma associated with Britain and their colonial past’ (interview 21/06/19). This included recent changes to the history curriculum that centre British history as well as the FBV policy:

“What exactly are British values? […] it seems like a term to - I don’t know - come up with this bespoke identity… it seems like there’s an identity crisis, and we’re trying to come up with ‘what we do we represent?”

(Maryam, interview 21/06/19)

The references to an ‘identity crisis’ and attempts to define a ‘bespoke identity’ speak to her resistance to recent attempts to articulate and promote a British identity based on ostensibly civic values (see McGhee 2008:129-136; Vincent 2019b:16; McGhee and Zhang 2017; James and Janmaat 2019).

A related point is that these teachers associated FBV with narrow and exclusionary understandings of Britishness that did not reflect the diversity of their school or of multicultural Britain. As a minority ethnic teacher, Maryam felt excluded by some contemporary discourses on Britishness, and felt the FBV policy and the changes the
history curriculum promoted a ‘sense of White British values rather than inclusive values’ (interview 21/06/19). She also said that students’ awareness of issues around cultural diversity meant that some would respond negatively if the school were to ‘put a display up that was like, ‘British values’ right up in their face’ (interview 21/06/19). Mike drew an analogy between the FBV and the daily act of worship. For him, both requirements were ‘a nonsense’ in that they ‘hark back to a time when [Britain] had a national religion’ and a more homogenous culture (interview 12/03/18). Emma felt that many students had ‘multiple identities’ and saw this as sitting uncomfortably with the idea of ‘British values’ (interview 13/03/18). Moreover, she said some students might have ambivalent feelings towards Britishness or British values due to the discrimination they faced in wider society (interview 13/03/18). Such objections arguably emerge from a conflict between these teachers’ understanding of the school, and contemporary Britain, as a ‘community of communities’ and the monocultural conceptions of Britishness they associate with the FBV policy (Parekh 2000; see also Mannitz and Schiffauer 2004:61).

Overall, these respondents seemed to associate FBV with a form of Britishness that they did not identify with and to reject it on this basis. There are similarities with the two student teachers in Sant and Hanley’s (2018) study who ‘explicitly rejected the promotion of British values’ (329). The authors argue that the ‘potentially primordialist nature’ of Britishness, notably its association ‘with discourses on genetic heritage and the colonial past’ led these teachers to reject ideas of Britishness and to refuse to promote British values in their teaching (Sant and Hanley 2018:332). At First Academy, the fact that two members of the school’s leadership team were critical the ‘British’ framing of FBV may partly explain the school’s minimal response to the duty. Like the teachers in Vincent’s study (2019b) who expressed similar discomfort about promoting Britishness, school leaders at First Academy have opted for a strategy of ‘repackaging’ pre-existing activities to show compliance with the duty (78). As Vincent (2019b) points out, this approach enables teachers to ‘smooth the potentially sharp nationalistic edges’ of the policy by maintaining a multicultural ethos that promotes respect for diversity (79; see also McGhee and Zhang 2017).

These teachers’ objections to FBV can also be read as a critique of the civic and liberal nationalist discourses the policy is embedded in. In questioning the necessity of
promoting a ‘bespoke identity’, Maryam seems to question the liberal nationalists’ contention that multicultural societies need a shared identity to function (see, for example, Soutphommasane 2012; Banting and Kymlicka 2017). In associating the FBV policy with an exclusionary form of Britishness, these teachers also seem to question the ostensible inclusiveness of the identities on offer. Their comments point to an awareness of the ways in which the boundaries between civic identities, based on liberal-democratic ideals and institutions, and ethnic identities, based on primordial characteristics, can easily become blurred (see Mouritsen 2008; Vincent 2019b; Mouritsen et al 2019).

6.3.7 Multicultural backlash and muscular liberalism

This is not to say that teachers at First Academy drew exclusively on laissez faire, liberal, or multicultural ideas. Charlotte was supportive of the idea of promoting British values, and her comments reflect some of the ideas I have discussed in relation to civic integration and the backlash against multiculturalism. However, she also manifested a commitment to promoting respect for diversity that drew on multicultural ideas (see Vincent 2019b; McGhee and Zhang 2017; Jerome and Clemitshaw 2012). More broadly, teachers at First Academy often achieved the ‘multicultural’ goal of promoting tolerant attitudes through muscular means. These apparent tensions demonstrate how multicultural and civic integrationist ideas can co-exist, both at the level of the individual teacher and at the level of the school. They also point to a need to distinguish between teachers’ conception of Britain ‘as a multicultural society’, on one hand, and the ‘relativist’ position on values associated with the English citizenship education on the other (see Favell 2001:135; Johnson and Morris 2012:292).

Charlotte’s comments reflect several ideas one might associate with the ‘backlash’ against multiculturalism and the discourse on shared British values. She felt it was important for the UK to have ‘values we aren’t willing to negotiate on’, since these helped to ensure that ‘everyone is on the same page’ (Charlotte, interview 16/03/19). She was also critical of the ‘anything goes approach’ that she said prevailed in Britain and compared this unfavourably to other countries that ‘have very high sets of standards’ or ‘codes of behaviour’ that even ‘foreigners’ must follow (interview
16/03/19). For example, she supported the French government’s decision to ban the burqa in 2010 and felt that the UK might have something to learn from this approach:

“Something that I have agreed with in the French policy is that, out in public places, and in schools for example, that fully veiled woman where you can only see eyes is not something that I’m comfortable with [...] I guess I wish that in the UK that we had more of that. That when you’re out in public, you should see peoples’ faces.”

(Charlotte, interview 16/03/18)

This seems to reflect ways in which ‘French concepts of integration’ permeate debates on cultural diversity in the UK (Mouritsen 2008:3; see also James 2016). Although Charlotte did not use the word multiculturalism, these comments reflect prevailing notions that multiculturalism fails to promote social cohesion, that shared values are essential for the functioning of multi-ethnic states, and that nation-states should be intransigent in defending these values (see Vertovec and Wessendorf 2009; Mouritsen 2008; Joppke 2014).

Another striking feature of Charlotte’s comments is the salience of concerns about Muslim integration, specifically issues around gender. During our exchange on British values, she expressed her discomfort with some ‘mainstream views of Islam’. This included:

“women who are in polygamous marriages [...] women whose male children rule the roost at home [...] Women who – if they want to cover, fine – but women who are maybe obliged to cover a lot more than they would want to…”

(Charlotte, interview 16/03/19)

Such concerns seemed to relate to her perception that some Muslim women are dominated by their husbands or male children, which she said manifested itself in some boys’ lack of respect for female teachers. She identified this lack of respect for women an example of beliefs that were ‘opposed to our fundamental British values’
As I have argued in relation to Jane at Westbrook, her comments reflect some of the tendencies I discussed in chapter 3, wherein Muslim populations are perceived as being deficient in the shared norms and values of the majority population, notably around sexuality and gender (see Fozdar and Low 2015; Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016; Larin 2019; Mouritsen et al 2019).

However, Charlotte’s comments on British values also drew on ideas that I have argued emerge from previous multicultural approaches. For example, she struggled to name the four ‘official’ FBV but identified the policy with ideas such as ‘respect, and equality and non-discrimination’ (Charlotte, interview 16/03/19). Like her colleagues, she saw promoting respect for diversity and preventing discrimination as part of her role as an educator. This suggests that a desire to prepare students for life in multicultural Britain can coexist with a concern for the muscular defence of ‘British values’, and a sense that some populations might be a threat to those values.

The influence of muscular liberalism is also evident in the way teachers at First Academy achieved their goal of promoting tolerance and preventing discrimination. The school took a ‘zero tolerance’ approach to discriminatory behaviours based on race, religion, sexuality, disability, or other ‘differences’. According to Amanda and Charlotte, these incidents normally led to a disciplinary intervention from the school’s leadership team and the school kept a record of them. I was particularly struck by the muscularity of the language teachers and some students used to describe this approach. For example, Mike said the school was ‘quite assertive’ in its defence of values around equality (interview 12/03/18). Charlotte said the school’s relatively small size and the cohesiveness of the teaching team meant that any ‘slipped comment’ of discriminatory nature was likely to be ‘pounced on’ by the leadership team (interview 16/03/18). When I asked a group of year-12 students why they thought their school was more tolerant than other local schools, one student said it was because homophobic and transphobic behaviours were ‘cracked down on’ at First Academy (field notes 12/03/18). On one level, this approach to challenging discrimination articulates with the school’s zero-tolerance approach to disruptive behaviour, which fits with a broader trend in the English policy landscape (see Ball 2017:23-29). At the same, it also seems to reflect the muscular turn in the practice of liberalism in Britain (see Joppke 2014; Vincent 2019b; McGhee and Zhang 2017).
While I have argued that multicultural ideas and policies feed into teachers' goals for educating young people, and that this was particularly evident at First Academy, teachers at the school sought to achieve these goals through the schools' disciplinary measures. Furthermore, their goal of promoting tolerance to target the intolerant attitudes they associated with the local community reflects some of the muscularity of the FBV policy (see McGee and Zhang 2017:941; Vincent 2019b:128-129). As I have argued in relation to Westbrook, this ‘assertive’ approach to promoting tolerance seems to articulate more with the ‘traditional republican-liberal’ model of citizenship education that Mouritsen and Jaeger (2018) identify with France than the ‘Lockean’ approach they associate with England (see also Johnson and Morris 2012). For this reason, it seems important to distinguish between the ‘multicultural’ goal of promoting respect for difference and the means teachers use to achieve this goal. While some accounts of British multiculturalism merely emphasise a positive attitude towards cultural diversity (see Bleich 1998; Qureshi and Janmaat 2014) others associate this cultural pluralism with a relativist approach to values (see Favell 2001:135; Johnson and Morris 2012:292). It seems that while the turn towards civic integration and muscular liberalism has created a climate wherein some teachers are prepared to be more assertive in their defence of values such as tolerance, the notion of Britain as a multicultural society, and the idea that schools should promote respect for this diversity, continue to hold sway.

In addition to this, comments from Maryam reflect a more relativist position towards the values students may bring to school with them. Our conversation took place amid the controversies over LGBTQ+ inclusive teaching, and religious attitudes towards sexual minorities were the focus of this exchange. Maryam saw it as important to ‘break down’ intolerant ideas towards sexual minorities and was broadly supportive of the school taking an official position on this issue (interview 21/06/19). At the same time, she felt it was important to not ‘to shut down different ideas’ or to ‘disregard people’s religious beliefs’ (interview 21/06/19). Rather, teachers should interrogate illiberal positions through ‘open debate’ in the classroom (Maryam, interview 21/06/19). She also seemed to call for a more limited conception of tolerance, in which the message to students would be:
“This is what we [as a school] believe. And if you choose to believe it or not it’s up to you but don’t - I guess - act on your prejudice. That becomes a form of discrimination”

(Maryam, interview 21/06/19)

Like Hamza at Mercia Academy, her view of tolerance distinguishes between prejudiced attitudes on one hand and active discrimination on the other. She also felt that ‘celebrat[ing] different ideas’ was something First Academy ‘could work on (interview 21/06/19). This seems to reflect a degree of unease towards the school’s muscular approach to these issues, and to call for greater values pluralism. As such, although the approach to promoting tolerance at First Academy reflects the muscular turn at the national level, Maryam’s comments suggest these ideas can vary between teachers within one school.
6.4 The Southeast College Group (SCG)

6.4.1 Introduction

Table 6-4 Data collected: the Southeast College Group

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviews</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Mary’ – vice principal in charge of student-wellbeing; designated safeguarding lead (28/01/19)</td>
<td>A-level history lesson on the Great Reform Act (03/10/18)</td>
<td>Health and social care ‘equality, diversity, and rights’ scheme of work and 10 PowerPoint presentations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Hannah’ – operational safeguarding lead (02/10/18)</td>
<td>Health and social care lesson on equality, diversity and rights (28/01/19)</td>
<td>Online safeguarding course for students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Liam’ – teacher of media and film studies (02/10/18)</td>
<td>Student parliament (03/10/18)</td>
<td>PowerPoint slides for staff safeguarding and Prevent training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Leonard’ – teacher of health and social care (01/10/18)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Safeguarding and Prevent policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘Barbara’ – pastoral middle leader; teacher of history (01/10/18)</td>
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<td>Safeguarding procedures document</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘Caroline’ – teacher of French (03/10/18)</td>
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<td>Equality and diversity report</td>
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</tbody>
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The SCG comprises three further education (FE) colleges in the southeast of England that have recently merged. The group has a core leadership team, but the campuses are in different towns. I collected my data at SE1, which was previously a stand-alone college. SE2 and SE3 belonged to another college group before the merger. Mary described SE1 as ‘a traditional sixth form’, since most students were between 16 and 18 years-old and studied full-time for A-levels and BTECs (interview, 28/01/19). The area around SE1 is probably the most affluent of all four cases. The college is in a Conservative safe seat in the Home Counties, and the local high street is littered with
cafés and a large Waitrose. In contrast, SE2 and SE3 have a higher proportion of students studying for vocational and part-time qualifications, including a large apprenticeship cohort. Hannah also spoke of a more disadvantaged socio-economic context and a more challenging disciplinary climate at SE2 and SE3 compared to SE1. According to college data, White British is the largest ethnic group at all three sites, but this varies between 75% White British at SE1, and 43% at SE3. British Asian is the second largest group; this group makes up 11%, 28% and 37% of students at SE1, SE2, and SE3 respectively. It is not clear what proportion of students are Muslim, although the town SE2 is in has a significant Muslim population and this is reflected in Hannah’s comments.

6.4.2 FBV at the SCG

Since the SCG is an FE provider, it operates within a different regulatory framework to the case schools. Strictly speaking, the FBV duty is part of the requirement to promote SMSC, which only applies to schools. In practice however, since FBV feature in the Ofsted inspection framework, it is difficult for FE colleges to ignore the duty (Ofsted 2020:58). Moreover, the Prevent duty guidance for FE providers states that training should enable ‘teachers and leaders to exemplify British values in their management, teaching and through general behaviours’ (Home Office 2021). Like the guidance for schools, it incites teachers to engage with FBV in the curriculum, and the leadership team at the SCG encouraged them to do this (Home Office 2021; DfE 2014a; 2014b).

Mary and Hannah’s negative experiences of previous Ofsted inspections seem to have been a driver for work on FBV and Prevent. The 2016 Ofsted inspection was an important one for SE1. The college had received an Ofsted grade 3 (requires improvement) in their previous report. Had they received another grade 3, they would have entered a process that could have led to closure. The enactment of the newly introduced FBV and Prevent duties was part of the drive to improve the college’s rating. Liam said the leadership team presented the duties as ‘a prerequisite’ to achieving a passing grade in staff briefings during this period (interview 02/10/18). SE1 was rated ‘good’ in the 2016 inspection, and the Ofsted report highlights the college’s ‘outstanding’ implementation of FBV and Prevent, suggesting these efforts
paid off. In contrast, the former SE2-SE3 College Group went from being judged ‘good’ to ‘requires improvement’ in an inspection that took place three weeks later, with Prevent and FBV featuring prominently in the criticisms. Since the merger, the leadership team has implemented some of the successful practices from SE1 at the other two colleges.

One of the messages that Hannah and Mary seem to have taken for these experiences is that Ofsted inspectors expect students and staff to speak knowledgably about FBV and Prevent. This seems to have led to a more explicit approach to enacting the duties than was the case at First Academy. Hannah said students’ inability to use the language of Prevent, and the crude associations some made between Prevent and Islam, explained the criticisms in the 2016 Ofsted report:

“[The inspectors] went out and they said to students ‘what’s the Prevent duty?’ and they all sort of looked gormlessly at them. I believe that one of them famously said to the lead inspector ‘That’s that Muslim thing, innit’ […] Within our tutorial programme we had talked more broadly about extremism and people that may wish you harm, and that kind of thing. And because they didn’t know the words [such as] radicalisation, we got absolutely battered for it.”

(Hannah, interview 02/10/19)

Hannah’s impressions are reflected in the language of the Ofsted report, which finds that some students could not ‘recall’ what they had been taught about safeguarding issues, including Prevent. Mary’s impression, having gone through ‘three inspections in four years’, was that that Ofsted inspectors had become increasingly ‘muscular’ about and FBV and asked more questions about the impact of the values on college life (interview 28/01/19). She had therefore ‘tightened things up’ by documenting the college’s work around the policies and by seeking to develop ‘more explicit understanding’ among students and staff (interview 28/01/19).

This ‘explicit’ approach to FBV and Prevent was evident in the visual culture of the college and in teacher training activities. During my first visit, I noted several FBV and Prevent posters displayed prominently around the buildings. This was especially
striking since I had recently visited First Academy, where the enactment of FBV was low key and implicit, and where the one FBV display I noted has since been removed. The SCG’s safeguarding policy includes an intention to maintain an ‘on-going dialogue’ around FBV and Prevent through staff training and regular briefings. New staff participate in online training on FBV and Prevent, and all staff participate in annual safeguarding training that addresses the duties. Hannah and Barbara spoke of the importance of keeping the policies ‘fresh’ in the minds of students and staff and Mary suggested that my presence at the college would be a welcome reminder of the duties (field notes 01/10/18). Teachers commented on the college’s ‘proactive’ approach to the duties and saw them as an important priority at the SGC compared to other institutions (Caroline 03/10/18). Some of the positive judgements in the Ofsted report for SE1 relate directly to the salience of the policies in the culture of the college, which seems to validate the importance Mary placed on making the policies explicit.

Teachers at the SCG addressed FBV and Prevent through the college’s tutorial programme and in their specialist subject areas. The tutorial programme includes a regular timetabled slot and one-off thematic activities with a similar format to the ‘drop down’ days at Mercia and First Academy. Barbara said she and the other pastoral middle leaders organised at least one thematic activity on FBV or Prevent per year. Mary expected teachers to make links between FBV and their subject curriculum, and the college’s scheme of work pro forma included a column for them to highlight these links (interview 28/01/19). Liam said that these links would be a consideration for the leadership team when they came to observe lessons (interview 02/10/18). The four teachers I interviewed all gave examples of where their subject addressed FBV. Barbara described a training activity in which teachers worked in cross-departmental teams to discuss how their subject curricula could address the duty. In this sense, the response to FBV at the SCG includes elements of the common ‘repackaging’ approach (Vincent 2019b:92).

However, the need to demonstrate compliance with the duty for Ofsted meant that implementing additional measures – or ‘doing more stuff’ – was a priority for Mary (interview 28/01/19). She and Hannah were also concerned that some teachers did not engage sufficiently with FBV in their subjects. Following the merger, they had therefore ‘hastily designed’ an online safeguarding course for students with modules
on FBV and Prevent (Mary, interview 28/01/19). The full cohort of students had taken the course. For Hannah and Mary, these modules – and the tutorial curriculum more broadly – played an important role in ensuring all students understood the duties.

The challenges Mary and Hannah experienced in embedding FBV across the curriculum partly emerge from the specialised nature of the upper secondary education in England. They also underline some of the differences between FBV in England and the French EMC programme. Mary and Hannah felt that teachers of humanities subjects were more likely to likely to find natural links between their subject and FBV than teachers of scientific or vocational subjects and were better equipped to deal with some of the sensitive topics that might arise. Mary felt that teachers in ‘craft subjects’ such as plumbing, bricklaying, and welding may not have the ‘confidence or interest’ required to introduce these topics into their curriculum (interview 28/01/19). Hannah said that since many apprenticeship assessors were ‘industry folk rather than teachers’, they were less likely to see the relevance of FBV, leading to ‘a lot of negativity’ in her training sessions at SE2 and SE3 (interview 02/10/18). There are similarities with France, where several respondents spoke of the role of history-geography specialists in addressing republican values and where Nicolas described professional lycées as a ‘weak link’ (interview 31/07/19). An important difference with the France is that EMC is a compulsory subject for all students preparing the general or vocational baccalaureate, as well as those taking the more professionally oriented CAP. At least in theory, all upper secondary school students in France should have opportunities to learn about republican values. In England, there is no compulsory curriculum area where the FBV could be easily embedded, and these comments suggest that students on vocational tracks and those studying only science subjects may be less likely to learn about FBV.

Mary felt that the FBV and Prevent agenda validated her pre-existing interest in promoting the skills for democratic participation and enabled her to develop this work at the college. This points to the way the design of the duty enables teachers to enact it in ways that fit with their goals as educators (see Vincent 2019b; McGhee and Zhang 2017).
“Students’ understanding of democracy and their contribution... all of those things are an important part of - I suppose - my educational philosophy and values. I’d done quite a lot of that anyway [...] it seemed like music to my ears really, with the Prevent duty. Not so much the hard edged, safeguarding, referrals and all that stuff, but the British values that was tucked into it [...] it gave validation to the other work that I was keen to do.”

(Mary, interview 28/01/19)

Having begun her career as a history teacher, Mary spent several years in a non-teaching role on a government-funded project on promoting skills for democratic participation in post-16 education. As such, she returned to school leadership with the ‘knowledge’, 'interest', and professional ‘contacts’ to implement this work in colleges (Mary, interview 28/01/19). The significance of Prevent and FBV in the policy discourse allowed her to ‘confidently assert’ the importance of citizenship education to other leaders at the college, pointing out that they could fail an Ofsted inspection if they did not address these themes (interview 28/01/19). This enabled her to ‘firm up’ pre-existing work in this area, expanding the college’s learner voice practices and introducing citizenship-related topics in the tutorial programme (interview 28/01/19). This included establishing a student union in each campus, as well as a student parliament that met three times per year. Tutorial activities included mock elections and thematic days led by the organisation Votes for Schools. In this sense, the Prevent and FBV – underpinned by the need to succeed in an Ofsted inspection – became a vehicle for advancing Mary’s objectives as an educator. There are similarities with the way Jane at Westbrook Primary used the FBV policy to achieve her aims of promoting gender and LGBTQ+ equality and had developed this work in response to the duty. This underlines the ways in which the ‘enabling’ nature of the FBV policy allows teachers to ‘[translate] the FBV requirement to fit their own aims for educating young children’ (Vincent 2019b:99; see also McGhee and Zhang 2017:940).

6.4.3 Prevent at the Southeast College Group

FE providers have similar duties to schools with regards to the Prevent duty. This includes implementing procedures for keeping students safe from radicalisation and
identifying those at risk (see HM Government 2015; Home Office 2021). One difference is that FE colleges must provide Prevent training for all staff, while schools are only required to train DSLs (Home Office 2021). This training should address referral procedures and ‘factors that make people vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism’, but also pedagogical themes, such as how to ‘use opportunities in learning to educate and challenge’ against extremism (Home Office 2021).

As with the other cases, teachers’ perceptions of the student population and local area framed their understanding of Prevent, notably the forms of extremism they were most concerned about. This was especially marked at the SCG, where this ‘situated context’ varied across the three sites (see Ball et al 2012:22). Hannah said she dealt ‘as much’ with right-wing extremism as she did with Islamist extremism, but clearly associated the problem of right-wing extremism with SE1, the college with the largest proportion of White students (interview 02/10/18). She cited historical ‘issues with EDL [English Defence League] and those kind of folk’ in the local area (interview 02/10/18). Liam also mentioned concerns with right-wing extremism ‘on the periphery of the local area’ (interview 02/10/18). However, he felt that since SE1 did not have ‘a broad, eclectic student populace’, issues such as ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and ‘kids running off to Syria’ were less relevant (interview 02/10/18). These comments reflect the perception that these issues may be more relevant for schools and colleges with a significant Muslim population (see Busher at al 2017:24-25; Jerome et al 2019; Elwick and Jerome 2019). Furthermore, Mary and Hannah both felt students with poor mental health or with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) were especially vulnerable to radicalisation. This focused their attention on SE2 and SE3 as sites of vulnerability, since these campuses had a higher proportion of students with special educational needs and disabilities.

Another similarity with the other cases is that all six respondents understood Prevent in relation to safeguarding, and the duty was enacted through the college’s safeguarding procedures. Like Amanda at First Academy, Hannah compared radicalisation to grooming, and said she and Mary emphasised these links in the way the presented the Prevent duty to staff and students at the college (interview 02/10/18). This was evident in the training materials for staff, where violent extremism
features as one of many safeguarding concerns they may encounter in their work with students (see figure 6-7).

The college’s policy documents and training materials for staff and students provide insight into how the ‘Prevent as safeguarding’ message may alleviate or pre-empt ‘anxieties’ or ‘political and ethical’ concerns they may experience in relation to the duty (Busher et al 2017:7; Jerome et al 2019:830). These materials seem to have been crafted to reduce any anxieties about making a referral and, in the case of teachers, to frame Prevent in educational terms while eliding the securitisation aspects of the duty (see Elwick and Jerome 2019). The staff training slides set the Prevent duty in the context of ‘supporting our learners to keep safe’ and relate this to teachers ‘educational mission and moral responsibility’. One slide suggests the duty involves ‘removing barriers to learning’ and ‘educating learners to be resilient, safe, successful, happy, well-adjusted people and active citizens’ (see figure 6-8). In contrast to the security and surveillance roles implied by Prevent, these are functions one might more commonly associate with the role of a teacher (see Lundie 2017; Jerome et al 2019). Throughout the materials, Prevent features as a support mechanism for vulnerable students and references to the Channel process or the police are minimal. For example, the online safeguarding course for students describes Prevent as a plan that aims to give people ‘advice and support if they have been groomed’ or ‘persuaded to take part in extremist activities’. Students are encouraged to report any concerns about their peers on the grounds that ‘someone who is being radicalised is probably a victim
of manipulation’. Such statements seem designed to reduce any anxieties students may have about reporting their peers. The only reference to the police in these documents is in the college safeguarding procedures document, which explains that radicalisation concerns may be referred to the police or other outside agencies. The online safeguarding course for students mentions that those who have been radicalised may commit crimes or pose a danger to themselves or others. Overall, however, these documents contain very little suggestion that as well as being vulnerable, students might also be terror suspects.

The Prevent Duty

- Supporting our learners to keep safe- part of our educational purpose and moral responsibility
- Educating learners to be resilient, safe, successful, happy, well-adjusted people and active citizens
- Removing barriers to learning- leads to academic and personal success
- Legal requirement/duty
  …but it’s a whole society issue first and foremost…

Comments from Hannah suggest she has internalised the message that Prevent is part of her duty of care to her students. She identified as ‘somebody who sees Prevent as a support mechanism, rather than something to beat people with’ (interview 02/10/18). In her memory, ‘all but one’ of the students she had referred to outside agencies for Prevent concerns had been students with learning difficulties (Hannah, interview 02/10/18). She saw students with ASD - and who had ‘easily-led personalities’ - as especially vulnerable to ‘grooming’ by extremists (Hannah, interview 02/10/18). This was an important message for the ‘stuck in the muds’ among staff who
refused to engage with the duty, as well as those who felt that the duty was a way of stigmatising Muslims (Hannah, interview 02/10/18).

Although respondents broadly accepted the 'Prevent as safeguarding' message, there was a sense among some that Prevent could make Muslim communities feel stigmatised (Bush et al 2017:7). Mary and Hannah had encountered the criticism that Prevent disproportionately targets Muslims in their dealings with staff, although they insisted that the duty addressed all forms of extremism. Mary had experienced more opposition to the Prevent on these grounds in the past – and had been called a ‘White middle-class apologist’ for her association with Prevent – but said these criticisms had become less prevalent as the duty had become embedded in the culture of the college (interview 28/01/19). She also felt the context of ongoing terrorist attacks had made teachers more accepting of the duty. This suggests that the safeguarding message and teachers’ increasing familiarity with the duty may have mitigated their resistance over time.

Hannah and Mary showed a degree of sympathy to the view that Prevent could make some groups feel stigmatised, although the need to ensure the successful implementation of the duty seemed to override these concerns. Hannah felt that while the current iteration of Prevent was ‘very careful to point out that it’s about any kind of extreme ideology’, the previous focus on Islam and a continued climate of hostility meant that some Muslims could still feel targeted by the duty (interview 02/10/18). However, since she and Mary felt they had insufficient training time with staff, they were unwilling to ‘spend two hours debating whether the Prevent duty is unfair to Muslims’ (Hannah, interview 02/10/18). It seems that in this context, the pragmatic need to enact a compulsory duty takes precedence over the normative questions raised by policy. In chapter 7, I argue that the compulsory nature of the Prevent duty, the safeguarding message, and the relative maturity of anti-radicalisation policies in England may explain why there is less resistance among teachers than there is in France.

6.4.4 Mutual respect, tolerance, and equality and diversity
As I have argued in relation to the other cases, the ‘policy sediment’ of multiculturalism was evident in teachers’ emphasis on the FBV mutual respect and tolerance, which articulates with a broader concern for preparing students for life in multicultural Britain (see Vincent 2019b:101). At the SCG, teachers often articulated work on FBV and Prevent with pre-existing work on equality and diversity. Mary felt the duties, along with the Equalities Act 2010, had ‘strengthened the importance’ of the college’s work in this area (interview 28/01/19). These associations may emerge from the Ofsted Inspections Framework, where the duty to promote FBV appears under the banner of ‘preparing learners for life in modern Britain’ alongside developing ‘understanding and appreciation of diversity’ and ‘promoting respect’ for the protected characteristics in the Equality Act 2010 (Ofsted 2019:58). The fact that Ofsted inspectors had previously highlighted the promotion of equality and diversity in apprenticeships at SE2 and SE3 as weakness seems to have led to combined efforts to embed FBV and equality and diversity in these programmes. Hannah led training activities where she used examples of Ofsted reports to illustrate good practice in embedding FBV in vocational subjects (interview 02/10/18). In these sessions, she encouraged teachers to make links between the diversity of contemporary Britain and students’ future professional lives, where they would serve clients from different backgrounds. This vocational ‘slant’ on the ‘multicultural’ objective of promoting respect for difference sets the SCG apart from the other cases and was evident in the health and social care lesson I observed.

The emphasis on the FBV mutual respect and tolerance, and its association with an equalities agenda are evident in the teaching materials and policy documents I have analysed. The FBV ‘mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs’ appears as two distinct values in these documents: ‘understanding and tolerance of other faiths’ and ‘equality and mutual respect’. This framing broadens the scope of mutual respect from religion to encompass other diversity characteristics and associates it with idea of equality. It also seems to give additional weight to the value. It is not clear why the Mary chose to present the values in this way, although Vincent (2019b) finds that other schools and advisory organisations have also ‘uncoupled’ tolerance and mutual respect, presenting the FBV as five values instead of four (70). Furthermore, the safeguarding policy states that the college promotes FBV and gives ‘students the opportunity to mix and learn with, from, and about those from different
backgrounds’. This establishes a clear link between the duty and ‘getting along’ with those who are different to us (see Vincent 2019b:101; see also Elton-Chalcraft et al 2017; McGhee and Zhang 2017; Vanderbeck and Johnson 2016). The slide on ‘equality and mutual respect’ in the ‘British values’ online course for students explains the college’s duties under the Equality Act 2010 and lists the protected characteristics, pointing to the way these characteristics frame teachers’ understanding of mutual respect and tolerance (see Vincent 2019b:18; Vanderbeck and Johnson 2016). Finally, the safeguarding document relates the college’s commitment to the ‘celebration of diversity’ to its work promoting ‘the ethos of Prevent’. This suggests that previous work on equalities and diversity frames some teachers’ understanding of Prevent as well as of FBV (see also Busher et al 2017).

Teacher-respondents drew on these associations during interviews. When I asked Caroline what she knew about the FBV policy, for example, she immediately began talking about multiculturalism:

“[FBV] is to promote and understand the values of multiculturalism and to celebrate the diversity. But then also, we are a democratic society and it’s about retaining what keeps us [pause] safe in a multicultural society”

(Caroline, interview 03/10/18)

These comments associate the FBV policy with multiculturalism as an empirical reality in contemporary Britain, but also as a policy response to this diversity. Caroline also seemed to suggest that FBV resolves an apparent tension between cultural diversity and the need to preserve safety and democracy. This may allude to the security and integration concerns the policy responds to. Leonard linked the Prevent duty to the idea of cultural diversity, although it was not clear to me how he understood these links. When I asked him about his involvement with the Prevent, he mentioned the ‘equality, diversity, and rights’ in the BTEC health and social care curriculum and the need for those employed in caring roles ‘to have a good knowledge of other’s people’s cultures in order not to cause offence and to attain a level of dignity and respect’ (interview, 01/10/18). This seems to reflect the vocational slant on the FBV mutual
respect and tolerance that Hannah said she emphasised in training, albeit somewhat misdirected towards Prevent.

The ‘equality, diversity and rights’ topic in the BTEC health and social care illustrates what promoting mutual respect and tolerance might look like in a vocational classroom. The lesson I observed aimed to develop students’ awareness of stereotypes and unconscious bias so they would avoid this in their professional lives. In the main activity, students worked in groups to assign the attributes and tastes on the cards they had been given to photos of people of different ages, genders, and ethnicities. They then moved around the room to see how other groups had assigned the cards and Leonard invited them to question the assumptions others had made (field notes, 28/01/19). This fed into a discussion on how individuals form judgements of others, and Leonard related this to students’ future roles in the caring professions. He told students they would encounter people of ‘different ethnicities’ in their professional lives and that it was important to treat them equally and use ‘solid evidence’ rather than personal judgement to understand their needs (field notes, 28/01/19). The resources Leonard shared with me suggest that this was a theme throughout the unit.

Liam and Caroline also cited activities that dealt with equalities and diversity as examples of work on Prevent and FBV, suggesting they had ‘repackaged’ existing work on these themes (Vincent 2019b:79). Liam said that events such as LGBT+ Pride Month and Black History Month encouraged him to make links between the film studies curriculum and FBV. Both teachers showed the French film la Haine as part of their A-level course and saw this as addressing FBV by promoting students’ knowledge and respect for diversity. Caroline also addressed issues around immigration and cultural diversity in France as part of the A-level French course. This involved explicit comparisons with the British approach, which she described as ‘more inclusive’ and ‘more about celebrating diversity’ (interview 03/10/18). Such comparisons directly reinforce the notion of a ‘multicultural’ British approach. More broadly, the fact that these teachers addressed FBV through pre-existing work on equalities and diversity points to the way the ‘repackaging’ response described by Vincent (2019b) can lead to path dependencies (79). While previous multicultural ideas and practices feed into teachers concern for promoting respect for difference, these existing practices are also a resource they can draw on in their response to FBV (see Jensen 2019:627).
6.4.5 Multicultural resistance to FBV

As was the case at First Academy, there was a degree of active resistance to FBV at the SCG. I place Liam in the group of vocal critics of FBV, along with Mike, Emma, and Maryam. He launched into a critique of ‘the whole idea of Britishness’ within the first minute of our interview and returned to this theme at several points (interview 02/10/18). I argue that like the teachers at First Academy, Liam’s comments drew on multicultural ideas and can be read as a critique of the civic integrationist discourses the FBV policy is embedded in.

Liam associated ‘the notion of British values’ with ‘patriotism’ and ‘nationalism’ and seemed to reject it on this basis (interview 02/10/18). He also seemed confident that others felt the same way as he did, reflecting a sense that these were commonly held ideas on national identity:

“Over here [Britain], being a patriot being patriotic and nationalism is kind a dirty thing. It’s associated with right wing extremism [...] I get the impression that a lot of people are not necessarily proud of their heritage, of their Britishness, of their Englishness. I don’t know if I identify with being British – European, yeah - but I guess that nametag doesn’t really mean a great deal to me.”

(Liam, interview 02/10/18)

On one level, Liam is talking about his own beliefs, specifically his rejection of the patriotism and far-right extremism he associates with the British values discourse. At the same time, he advances several (perhaps misguided) propositions about how others feel about Britishness. The resurgence of a populist English nationalism and the UK’s recent departure from the EU seem to loom large over these comments. Like one of the student teachers in Sant and Hanley’s (2018) study, Liam seems to reject Britishness as an identity for its ‘primoridalist nature’, and opts for an alternative European identity, which he may see as more inclusive (332). At the same time, he seems unaware of the ways in which recent developments cast doubt on his claim that
‘a lot of people’ feel this way (Liam, interview 02/10/18). He asserts a cosmopolitan or multicultural conception of Britishness that may not be a universal position, especially since data from Westbrook and other empirical studies suggests that teachers in England have different orientations towards Britishness (see Elton-Chalcraft et al 2017:40-42; Sant and Hanley 2018:328). His comments strike me as a reaction to, as well as a disavowal of, the ways in which discourses on British national identity have shifted in recent years.

6.5 Policy enactment at the school level: Comparative conclusions

Teachers and school leaders have significant capacity to decide how they promote FBV. Although I argue that this leads to greater within-country variation compared to the French ‘values’ policy, teachers in all four schools and colleges addressed themes relating to FBV in across the curriculum as well as in assemblies and tutorial activities. At the same time, there were differences in how teachers working at different education levels approached the duty. In particular, Mary and Hannah reported at the SCG reported challenges in embedding the FBV in scientific and vocational subjects. I have argued these challenges partly emerge from the specialised nature of upper secondary education in England and the fact that the FBV are not operationalised through a citizenship education curriculum. This is an important point of contrast with France, where EMC is compulsory for all upper secondary students, meaning they should all have opportunities to learn about republican values.

I would also argue that teachers’ capacity to draw on pre-existing activities or interests in their enactment of FBV leads to subtle differences in the values they emphasise. At First Academy and Westbrook, teachers’ enactment of the duty drew on a previous emphasis on promoting equality and preventing discrimination, meaning the FBV mutual respect and tolerance was especially salient. At the SCG, where Mary used FBV duty and Prevent to further her pre-existing interest in citizenship education, the FBV democracy was at least as important.

Finally, schools varied in the extent to which teachers implemented additional activities in response to the FBV duty and whether they explicitly used the language of FBV with their students. Teachers’ previous experiences of Ofsted inspections appears to be a
decisive factor determining the ‘explicitness’ of their response. At the SCG, the need to do well in future inspections meant Mary and Hannah saw Prevent in FBV as an important priority and sought to ensure that students and staff could speak knowledgeably about the duties. This contrasts with the approach at to FBV at First Academy, where the school’s strong position in performance measures gave the leadership the confidence to address the values implicitly.

All four schools had taken steps to implement the compulsory Prevent duty through staff training and by updating their safeguarding policies. However, I have found that each school’s location and student population – part of its ‘situated context’ – framed the extent to which teachers saw the duty as an important priority for their school and which kinds of ‘extremism’ they were likely to be more concerned about (Ball et al 2012:22). The data also confirm Busher et al’s (2017) that the framing of ‘Prevent as safeguarding’ has alleviated teachers’ concerns about the duty (32; see also Jerome et al 2019). This framing – along with the compulsory nature of Prevent - may explain why there is less resistance to anti-radicalisation policies than in France.

I have argued that the importance that teachers at all four schools and colleges placed on the FBV mutual respect and tolerance draws on multicultural ideas and was facilitated by the ‘enabling’ nature of the duty (Vincent 2019b:54; McGhee and Zhang 2017:948). Activities that addressed FBV reflected teachers’ concern for preparing students for a life in a multicultural school community, and in a society in which they would encounter those who were different to them. In some cases, teachers also ‘repackaged’ pre-existing activities aimed at promoting respect for diversity in response to the FBV duty (Vincent 2019b:79). In this sense, although the FBV policy reflects the turn towards civic integration and muscular liberalism, its enactment in the case schools often draws on multicultural ideas and practices.

Teachers at First Academy saw RE as addressing FBV by promoting mutual respect and tolerance for different religions. I have argued that this draws on institutionalised ideas about the role of RE in promoting ‘mutual recognition’ between the different communities that make up multicultural Britain (Mannitz 2004:115). Teachers also used RE to address the theme of terrorism, with a particular concern for challenging stereotypes or misconceptions about Islam. Here there are similarities with the
practices I observed at Aimé Césaire in France, although I argue in chapter 7 that the institutional climate in France is less favourable to the spread of these practices.

Multicultural ideas were also evident in some teachers’ active resistance to the British values discourse. Mike, Emma, and Maryam at First Academy, and Liam at the SCG associated the ‘British’ framing of the policy with monocultural, exclusionary conceptions of nationhood that did not reflect the diversity of multicultural Britain and seemed to reject it on this basis. Their criticisms of FBV draw on multicultural notions of Britishness and can be read as a critique of the civic and liberal nationalist discourses the policy is embedded in. As such, they support the proposition that some teachers’ ‘multicultural’ priors will lead them to resist the FBV duty (see Bleich 1998).

However, the data suggest that not all teachers have the same orientation towards Britishness and British values. Jane’s enthusiasm for promoting Britishness, and the salience of British cultural symbols in the school’s response to FBV, set Westbrook apart from the other schools in this study. Along with comments from Charlotte at First Academy, they support Bleich’s (1998) contention that ‘priors’ are not uniform within one country and point to the ways recent shifts in the discourse on integration and Islam may be reflected in teachers’ ideas and practices.

More broadly, I have argued that the turn towards muscular liberalism and civic integration are evident in the ‘muscular’ approach that teachers at Westbrook and First Academy took to promoting tolerance. At these schools, the approach to promoting tolerance was closer to the ‘traditional republican-liberal’ model of citizenship education that Mouritsen and Jaeger (2018) associate with France than the ‘Lockean’ or ‘relativist’ approach authors associate with English citizenship education (5: see also Johnson and Morris 2011:292). I have argued that this points to a need to distinguish between teachers’ conception of Britain as a multicultural society and a relativist position on values. While the former seems to be alive and well at among the teachers in this study, the picture in relation to Britain’s laissez faire tradition is more complex.
7 Discussion and conclusion

7.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I compare the findings from the case studies in relation to the research question and sub-questions set out in chapter 1. These are:

**RQ1:** How are teachers, school leaders, and other local education actors in England and France enacting recent national policy responses to the context of terrorism and what responses have they developed on their own initiative?

**SQ1:** What are the similarities and differences in local level enactments within and between the two countries?

**SQ2:** How are prevailing ideas on immigrant integration and cultural diversity reflected in these enactments and actors’ broader responses to the context of terrorism?

In 7.2, I address RQ1 and SQ1 by drawing out the similarities and differences in local-level enactments within each country and pointing to some of the similarities and differences between the two countries. I discuss each policy in turn, drawing on a ‘cross-case synthesis’ of the four case studies in each country (see chapter 4; Yin 2014:59-62). The interviews with policy officials serve two purposes in this section. Firstly, they shed light on the way the policies are governed, notably the role of mid-level policy actors in enacting them. Secondly, they provide insight on how schools beyond the eight cases are enacting the policies. Alongside data from other empirical studies, this allows me to comment on the typicality of the cases. I end this section by summarising my findings on RQ1 and SQ1, addressing the question of whether local enactments point to more significant between-country differences or more significant within-country differences.

The discussion on policy enactments lays the foundation for 7.3, which addresses SQ2. Returning to the comparative framework I developed in chapter 2, I discuss how French republican integration, British multicultural race relations and civic integration
are reflected in teachers’ enactments of the policies and their broader responses to the context of terrorism (see Favell 2001; Mouritsen et al 2019; Joppke 2017). I highlight areas where these ideas seem to be reflected in national and local-level responses to terrorism, as well as the findings that delimit propositions emerging from the literature. I conclude with a discussion of the significance and limitations of my findings, highlighting the implications for theory, education policy and practice, and further research.

7.2 Local enactments of national-level responses to terrorism

In this section, I address RQ1 and SQ1 by discussing my findings on local-level enactments of the ‘values’ and ‘anti-radicalisation’ policies that are the focus of this study. Following a similar structure to chapters 5 and 6 I begin by summarising the findings on the Great Mobilisation (2015) as a ‘values’ policy, before turning ‘anti-radicalisation’ policies such as the National Plan for the Prevention of Radicalisation (PNPR, 2018) and the Policy for Preventing Violent Radicalisation in Schools (PPVRS, 2019). I end with the Upholding Laïcité in Schools initiative (2018), which I argue sits between the two categories. In the English case, I begin with the Duty to Promote Fundamental British Values (FBV, 2014) before turning to the Prevent duty (2015).

7.2.1 The Great Mobilisation and promoting republican values in French schools

The Great Mobilisation is a set of 12 measures announced soon after the January 2015 terrorist attacks. They share the broad aim of promoting the French republican values of liberté, égalité and fraternité and the secular value of laïcité. While the overall strategy is coordinated at the national level, local actors are responsible for implementing several of the measures. Officials in each of France’s 30 académies define and coordinate the roadmap for the Great Mobilisation taking account of local specificities (MEN 2015a:15). It is up to individual schools to determine the citizenship pathway - moral and civic education (EMC), media and information studies (EMI), and civic engagement activities - and define actions to celebrate republican symbols and ceremonies (MEN 2015a:15). The decision-making capacity of these local actors leads to variation between académies and individual schools.
I begin this section by discussing policy implementation at the académie level. As well as highlighting the similarities between the académies I have visited, I argue that the decision-making capacity of académie-level actors enables them to pursue a distinctive approach to the Great Mobilisation. The discussion will then turn to policy enactment at the school level. While EMC was the most widely enacted aspect of the Great Mobilisation across the four case schools in this study, individual schools and teachers varied with regards to their engagement with it, and especially with the more peripheral aspects of the policy. I identify two key factors that explain this variation; the ‘situated context’ of the case schools - notably their location and student populations - and school leadership (Ball et al 2012:22). Considering these findings, I argue that the French education system is not as strongly centralised as previous comparative work would suggest (see Bleich 1998; Archer 2003).

**Académie-level policy enactments**

The governance arrangements of the Great Mobilisation gave laïcité coordinators in the North of France académie (NoF) and the South of France académie (SoF) significant influence over teachers’ professional learning activities on themes relating to laïcité and republican values. In both académies, these activities reflected their concern for strengthening teachers’ capacity to manage classroom discussion and reflect on their ethical positioning. In line with other recent empirical work, I have argued that this emphasis responds to the challenges teachers faced after the January 2015 terrorist attacks and concerns that their positioning may have contributed to the confrontations with students that occurred during this period (see Laborde and Silhol 2018; Lorcerie and Moignard 2017). Teacher training activities in the NoF and SoF also reflected the national-level emphasis on teaching religious phenomena (see Petit 2018; Laborde 2019).

However, the decision-making capacity of académie-level actors led to variation in how they enacted the training plan announced in the Great Mobilisation. The SoF stands out for the number of professionals involved in the laïcité and critical thinking working groups and the scale of their activities. In the neighbouring académie (SoF2), the same plan involved a training programme on countering violent extremism (CVE)
that involved 70 teachers (Alain, interview 10/05/19). Neither the NoF nor the SoF had organised CVE training on this scale. This suggests that local actors have considerable scope to define the content and scale of such activities.

I have also argued that this decision-making capacity allowed Hugo to promote an ‘open’ conception of laïcité that reflected with his positioning on the concept. This was characterised by an ‘openness’ to cultural and religious diversity, a preference for pedagogy and dialogue as a way of building consent around laïcité and republican values, and a pragmatic concern for maintaining harmony between different constituencies within a school community (see Lorcerie 2015; Baubérot 2015; Vivarelli 2014). Hugo contrasted this approach with other académies who took a ‘security’ approach to promoting respect for laïcité, and with the approach of the national-level government, which he saw as excessively focused on sanctions (interview 15/11/18). However, the emphasis on dialogue and pragmatism as a way of resolving laïcité ‘problems’ was also evident in the NoF. In both académies, I have found that these ideas had filtered down to the school level, with teachers’ participation in local training activities playing an important role. This points to the capacity of local actors to pursue an approach to republican values and laïcité that aligns with their own ideas, and to influence teachers’ practices (see Laborde 2019). This influence is limited, however, by the fact that not all teachers take part in these training activities.

The decision-making capacity of académie-level actors and the variation I have highlighted in approaches to policy enactment are somewhat surprising considering Bleich’s (1998) contention that the French education system is highly centralised (see also Archer 2013). My findings confirm propositions from more recent work by Buisson-Fenet (2007), who has argued that the hyper-centralising phase of France’s national education system ended in the 1980s (387; see also Laborde 2019:33). I argue below, however, that the role of the académies in governing the French ‘values’ policy suggests that the decision-making structure of the French education system remains more vertical than the English policy landscape.
The data from the case schools suggest that EMC is the most widely implemented aspect of the Great Mobilisation; teachers in all four schools had taken steps to implement the curriculum. There was greater variation in the extent to which teachers and schools engaged with EMI and the civic engagement activities that are part of the citizenship pathway. The fact that EMC is a compulsory subject and is assessed in the brevet and baccalaureate seems to go a long way in explaining this. The need to prepare students for these assessments provides an incentive for teachers to cover the curriculum. This is an important point of contrast with FBV, which is not linked to any curriculum area or summative assessment (see also McGhee and Zhang 2017; Vincent 2019b). The promotion of republican values through a compulsory curriculum seems in keeping with the state-centred tradition of civic education that authors have associated with France (see Bonjour and Lettinga 2012; Johnson and Morris 2012).

In some classrooms, however, EMC remains the ‘poor relation’ of history and geography. Respondents have indicated that the institutional status of history and geography and challenges related to curriculum overload mean that some teachers may not give sufficient time to EMC in their teaching or ‘skip it’ altogether (Emilie, interview 22/01/21). This problem may be particularly acute in the general track of upper secondary education, where EMC is evaluated through teacher assessment rather than external assessment. I see a disconnect between policymakers’ ostensible commitment to promoting republican values through EMC and the reality described by these teachers. While EMC appears alongside mathematics and French as fundamental knowledge in recent policy documentation, the challenges some teachers experience implementing the subject mean that it does not have this status in some classrooms (see MEN 2022a). Here, there are parallels with the English context, where schools often address FBV through lower-status subjects such as citizenship, RE, and PSHE (see Vincent 2019b:57). Although embedding the French ‘values’ policy in a compulsory civic education arguably gives the values a higher status, the distance between the two policy contexts may not be as great as it first appears.

I would place the four case schools on a continuum based on their engagement with the citizenship pathway and their implementation of actions to celebrate and value republican symbols and ceremonies (MEN 2015a:15). Two factors stand out as being decisive in their level of engagement with these measures: a school’s location and
student demographics – part of its ‘situated context’ (Ball et al 2012:23) - and school leadership. Hugo and Nicolas - the two laïcité coordinators I interviewed - referred to both factors when I asked them about the differences between the schools in their académies. They suggested that urban schools with diverse populations were most likely to engage with laïcité and republican values. This reflects the tendency among actors in France to see the students who attend these schools as being in particular need of these values (see Ogien 2013; Lorcerie and Moignard 2017; Wesselhoeft 2017; Laborde and Silhol 2018). Both also saw the enthusiasm of school leaders as an important factor, and cited two of my case schools and their principals as examples of good practice: Jean Moulin in Nicolas’ case and Aimé Césaire in Hugo’s case.

I would place these ‘flagship’ schools at one end of the continuum (Arthur, interview 25/01/19). Teachers had undertaken several actions to implement the citizenship pathway and the principals saw republican values as an important part of the school ethos and their own educational philosophy. They promoted the values through the kind of ceremonies and embodied experiences mentioned in the Great Mobilisation policy text, and teachers and student representative bodies organised whole-school events outside of the EMC curriculum (see MEN 2015a). The fact that work on laïcité and republican values was especially evident at Jean Moulin suggests that school leadership is at least as important in determining school-level responses as a school’s ‘situated context’ (see Ball et al 2012:22). While Aimé Césaire is exactly the type of school commonly viewed as being need of these values, Jean Moulin is not. The school is in a relatively affluent area and appeared to have the lowest proportion of minority ethnic and Muslim students of the four case schools. Arthur’s insistence on the importance of promoting republican values regardless of this ‘situated context’ underscores the importance of his leadership in determining the school’s work in this area (Ball et al 2012:22).

The Collège Lafayette sits somewhere in the middle of the implementation continuum. Teachers had produced common planning documents and resources for teaching EMC and identified several actions they undertook to implement the citizenship pathway and EMI. They were also the only school to use the function on the Pronote platform to report on the citizenship pathway. However, the school did not organise the kind of whole-school activities or republican ceremonies that had taken place at
the ‘flagship’ schools. This may be explained by the fact that Guillaume, the school principal, had only recently arrived at the time of my visits.

The limitations in the data from Gustave Eiffel mean I am less confident placing the school on this continuum. Comments from Laurent suggested the school’s response to the Great Mobilisation was largely limited EMC and EMI, although Elodie pointed to activities that could address the citizenship pathway. Like Guillaume at Lafayette, the principal was new to the school and may have implemented more activities since my visits.

To this limited data, we might add my interview with Fred at the Lycée Voltaire in the SoF. Despite his teaching in the same académie as Aimé Césaire, his comments on EMC place him – and possibly his school - at the opposite end of the continuum. He struggled to find time to address EMC and had rarely experienced teachers engaging with the citizenship pathway. The fact that Fred had not participated in any relevant training may explain this lack of engagement, and points to the limitations on académie-level actors’ capacity to affect practice in all schools.

The data from Gustave Eiffel and my interview with Fred raise questions about the representativeness of the other case schools. It is worth noting that while the other schools were chosen by me or by the laïcité coordinators based on their work in this area, I approached Fred and the Lycée Gustave Eiffel through personal contacts. That this more opportunistic form of sampling led me to two schools that appear to have taken a less active approach to the Great Mobilisation suggests that the other cases may not be typical.

Overall, my data on the Great Mobilisation suggest that the teacher training plan is the most widely implemented measure at the académie level and that the EMC programme is the most widely implemented measure at the school level. To the extent that these measures have been implemented, they create more space for students and their teachers to engage with republican values and laïcité. I return to this finding in the second section of this chapter, where I argue that this is one of the ways in which recent terrorist attacks have consolidated the French republican integration approach.
Although the inclusion of EMC in external assessment components makes this aspect of the policy difficult for teachers to ignore, however, individual schools varied in the degree to which they engaged with it and even more so with the other aspects of the Great Mobilisation. I have identified schools’ ‘situated context’ and leadership as two factors that determine their engagement with the policy (see Ball et al 2012:22). Moreover, local actors have significant autonomy over aspects of the Great Mobilisation, leading to variation between académies, between schools, and between the local and national level. This presents a challenge to earlier comparative work that presents the French education system as highly centralised, and supports Buisson-Fenet’s (2007) findings on the role of local actors in policy enactment (see also Laborde 2019; cf. Bleich 1998; Archer 2013).

7.2.2 Anti-radicalisation policies in France

There are important differences between the Prevent duty in England and French anti-radicalisation policies. Firstly, while Prevent is a compulsory duty that requires all schools to implement actions such as training key members of staff, the French policies do not place additional legal requirements on schools. The PPVRS specifies the protocol for identifying radicalised youth but does not require schools to organise regular training for staff (Eduscol 2022b). Another difference is that CVE is a relatively new and evolving field in French education policy. The Prevent duty came into effect in 2015 and has remained in place since this time. It builds on a trend that began with publication of the Learning together to be safe toolkit in 2008, in which English schools and teachers have increasingly become instruments in the fight against violent extremism (James and Janmaat 2019:103). This trend begins later in the French case, with a document on preventing radicalisation issued by the Académie de Poitiers in 2014 (MEN 2014). Successive governments have produced new policy documents or updated existing policies since this time. These changes have extended the role of schools in CVE, with increasing similarities to the English policy context. The PPVRS mirrors the language of the Prevent duty, identifying the promotion of republican values in schools as a way of building resilience to radicalisation (see Eduscol 2022b). The recent law against separatisms, with its twin focus on radical Islamism and community withdrawal, brings together radicalisation and integration concerns in
similar ways to David Cameron’s muscular liberalism discourse (Vie Publique 2021; see Joppke 2014).

I argue that these differences mean that anti-radicalisation policies and related CVE activities were currently less widely implemented in France than they are in England, but that this may change in the future. While all the teachers I interviewed in England had participated in Prevent training, only seven of the 13 teachers in France that I asked directly had participated in similar CVE training. Moreover, although three of the four case schools in England organised Prevent training at least once a year, the radicalisation training at Aimé Césaire and Lafayette were one-off events.

A school’s ‘situated context’, notably its location and student population, seems to be one factor determining whether teachers or students had taken part in CVE activities (see Ball et al 2012:22). The two schools where both student and teacher activities had taken place – Aimé Césaire and Lafayette – were both urban schools with a significant Muslim and minority ethnic population. This suggests that these activities may be targeted at specific population groups. However, the fact that these activities had not taken place at Gustave Eiffel suggests that student demographics only provide a partial explanation. I have suggested that Gustave Eiffel’s location in the relatively affluent académie of Paris could explain this apparent anomaly. Paris schools are not often the focus of elite concerns about Islam and integration, and it is possible that the académie does not organise CVE activities for this reason.

The evolution of French anti-radicalisation policies over the time I have been conducting this research may also explain these differences. When I began collecting data in 2018, CVE activities were mainly focused on identifying individuals in the process of radicalisation. This was evident in my meeting with Didier at the MEN in 2018 and the Eduscol (2018) webpage I accessed during this period. This was also the period when I visited Gustave Eiffel, the school where CVE activities were least evident. The Eduscol webpage has since been replaced with the PPVRS, with its references to primary prevention and building resilience to radicalisation through the curriculum (Eduscol 2022b). This seems to reflect a shift in the official position on the role of schools in CVE.
The recent CVE activity for students and teachers in the NoF seems to reflect some of these shifts. It explicitly aims to prevent radicalisation by developing critical thinking and addressing issues around identity. The focus on ‘community withdrawal’ alongside violent extremism seems to reflect the assumptions of the ‘law against separatisms’ (see Vie Publique 2021). It was also a large-scale and apparently well-funded initiative, which may reflect increased investment in this area at the national level.

The policy documentation and the data I have collected suggest that preventing violent extremism through education has become a more important policy priority over time, with a more explicit focus on building young people’s resilience to radicalisation. This raises the question of whether these activities will reach more schools in the future. It seems possible, for example, that CVE activities have taken place at Gustave Eiffel since my visits some four years ago. In this sense, the fact that these activities were less widely implemented in the French schools in this study than in England may be explained by the relative lack of maturity of French CVE policies. The apparent increase in the scale of these activities and the recent focus on building resilience suggest that France may be moving in the same direction as England. It is less clear, however, whether France is moving towards a compulsory duty requiring all schools to implement activities such as training. Although the CVE activity in the NoF was extensive, it was targeted at a subset of schools, and these schools could participate on a voluntary basis. It seems that while government CVE policies in France remain non-binding, there will continue to be greater between-school variation than in England.

7.2.3 The ‘Upholding Laïcité in Schools’ initiative

The ‘Upholding Laïcité in Schools’ initiative is based around five core elements with the stated aim of supporting teachers and school leaders in responding to apparent ‘violations of laïcité’. This includes an online portal through which teachers or other professionals can report such violations and ask for support. In accordance with the policy documentation, the laïcité coordinators in the NoF and SoF had convened an académie-level Laïcité and Religious Issues team (see MEN 2022b). In both cases, these teams worked with individual teachers or groups of teachers to resolve issues relating to laïcité, including violations reported through the portal. The laïcité training
groups established as part of the Great Mobilisation also offered training to schools where such incidents had occurred.

Although Upholding Laïcité is not explicitly an anti-radicalisation policy, I have argued that it also serves the purpose of monitoring and responding to concerns about radical religious actors. Actors at different levels of governance understood violations of laïcité as potential indicators of radicalisation, or the presence of ‘Islamists’ in a local area. In this sense, measures such as the online portal are a way of monitoring this activity. More broadly, Bertrand at the MEN indicated that the initiative was a way of establishing clear rules on which forms of religious expression were acceptable in schools, pushing back against any transgressions, and targeting the radical forms of Islam thought to underlie them (interview 28/08/18). Although Nicolas and Hugo sought to challenge the assumption that all violations of laïcité were indicators of radicalisation, it was clear they understood some violations in this way. Nicolas encouraged teachers and school leaders in the NoF to report violations of laïcité since these could indicate a problem with a radicalised individual or, at the aggregate level, the presence of radical actors in a geographical area. While this logic is not evident in the policy documentation, it seems to inform how some local actors understand the initiative (see MEN 2022b).

The message that violations of laïcité may also be indicators of radicalisation seems to explain some teachers’ reluctance to report them. Laborde (2019) has found that teachers were uncomfortable with the idea of reporting their students for concerns that explicitly relate to radicalisation, and this is evident in the data from the NoF and my interview with Alain in the SoF2. I have argued that the blurred boundaries between violations and radicalisation in the institutional discourse may mean that teachers transfer this discomfort to the idea of reporting violations. This was especially evident at Lafayette, where Nicolas had recently presented the portal for reporting violations.

The ambiguous status of the Upholding Laïcité initiative is important from a comparative perspective. On one level, France’s explicit anti-radicalisation policies are less widely enacted than Prevent. However, since the Upholding Laïcité initiative and the broader discourse on ‘violations’ appear to be a more palatable way of monitoring
and responding to concerns about radicalisation, the differences between the two countries are smaller than they might first appear.

7.2.4 The Duty to Promote Fundamental British Values

The ‘loose’, ‘enabling’ nature of the FBV policy sets it apart from the Great Mobilisation, a policy with similar goals (Vincent 2019b:54: see also McGhee and Zhang 2017). In the French case, republican values and laïcité are embedded in a compulsory EMC curriculum with clearly defined objectives. This led to a degree of similarly in the way the four case schools addressed the values in the curriculum. In contrast, the FBV guidance is relatively short and specifies little in terms of knowledge, skills, or curriculum content. The duty to promote FBV is embedded in schools’ pre-existing requirement to promote students’ spiritual, moral, social, and cultural development (SMSC). While SMSC only applies to schools, FBV feature in the Home Office’s Prevent duty guidance for FE providers (2021) and the Ofsted Inspections Framework (2019), which applies to all education providers. These arrangements provide an incentive for teachers to demonstrate compliance with the duty, but also give them the scope to enact it through different curriculum areas or through other activities. Importantly, teachers can ‘repackage’ pre-existing activities - presenting them as evidence of FBV - meaning there is little need to take additional action in response to policy (Vincent 2019b:79; see also McGhee and Zhang 2017).

I begin this section by highlighting some of the similarities in the way the four case schools addressed the duty before discussing the differences. The first difference relates to education levels. I argue that the difficulties respondents at the Southeast College Group (SCG) reported in embedding the FBV across the curriculum emerge from the specialised nature of upper secondary education in England, and that this is a significant difference with France. Secondly, I argue that the ‘enabling’ nature of the FBV policy framework leads to subtle differences in the values teachers emphasise (Vincent 2019b:54). Finally, I discuss my finding that schools varied with regards to how explicit and visible their responses to the FBV policy were and point to two factors that explain this variation. The first is teachers’ personal orientations towards the FBV policy. The second relates to teachers’ confidence that their school will achieve a positive rating in an Ofsted inspection and the perceived need to show compliance.
with the FBV. These findings place limits on the proposition that teachers’ multicultural ‘priors’ lead them to resist FBV (see Bleich 1998).

Despite the lack of an explicit FBV curriculum, the four case schools and colleges addressed the duty in similar areas. All four made links between FBV and related topics in different curriculum areas, especially the humanities subjects. They also addressed themes relating to FBV in regular pastoral activities such as assemblies and tutorial time. Respondents at three institutions also mentioned thematic ‘drop down’ days that addressed the duty.

Some of the similarities and differences may relate to the school’s respective education levels. In the two lower secondary schools, FBV featured in a school-based curriculum that drew on aspects of citizenship education, PSHE, and SMSC. Both curricula were implemented through a regular timetabled slot taught by form tutors, through weekly assemblies, and through dropdown days.

Mary and Hannah at the SCG experienced challenges in embedding FBV in vocational and scientific subjects. Here, there are similarities with the French context, where there was a widespread perception that history-geography teachers were more likely or better equipped to address republican values in their classroom, and where Nicolas expressed similar concerns about the vocational track. A key difference with France is that while all students preparing for the general or professional baccalaureate should study EMC, upper secondary programmes in England tend to be more specialised. Furthermore, the inclusion of EMC in external assessment for the professional baccalaureate creates an additional incentive for teachers to address the subject. These arrangements seem to provide upper secondary students in France with more opportunities to engage with republican values than their English counterparts do with FBV (see also Janmaat and Mons 2022).

Teachers’ capacity to address the duty through pre-existing activities or areas of interest also leads to subtle differences in which FBV they emphasised. For example, Jane at Westbrook showed considerable enthusiasm for promoting gender and LGBTQ+ equality and my impression was that much of the school’s work on FBV related to this theme. Mary at the SCG saw the FBV duty as a ‘proxy’ for civic
education and used the duty to further her aim of promoting this work at the college (interview 28/01/19). It seems that schools can meet the requirements of an Ofsted inspection without giving equal weight to all four FBV. This gives teachers scope to emphasise aspects of the duty that fit with the school ethos, their goals as educators, or their own interests or experience (Vincent 2019b:99; McGhee and Zhang 2017:940).

The four schools also varied with regards to how explicit or visible their approach to the duty was. This relates to the extent to which teachers emphasised FBV in school displays and in their interactions with students or implemented new activities in response to the duty. First Academy stands out for its minimal approach to the policy. Mike, the Executive Principal, said that the introduction of the duty ‘didn’t change practice’ at the school (interview 12/03/18), and I have argued that the school’s approach was broadly limited to the ‘repackaging’ response described by Vincent (2019b:79). One explanation for this ‘implicit’ and minimal approach to FBV was teachers’ orientations towards the policy. Mike and Emma, the two school leaders I interviewed at First Academy, were among the most vocal critics of FBV. Their criticisms were often grounded in multicultural ideas and support the proposition that teachers’ multicultural ‘priors’ lead them to resist the duty (Bleich 1998). However, I have also found that the school’s strong standing in relation to government performance measures gave them the confidence to adopt a minimal response to the duty. The contrasts with Mercia Academy and the SCG are instructive in this regard. Both schools had recent experiences of negative Ofsted inspections which highlighted FBV and Prevent as weaknesses and teachers had since made significant efforts to ensure the duties were enacted appropriately. At the SCG, Mary had sought to develop a ‘more explicit understanding’ of FBV and Prevent by emphasising the duties in student and staff activities and in displays around the college (interview 28/01/19).

Of the four school leaders I interviewed, Jane at Westbrook showed the most enthusiasm for FBV and the duty was palpable in the visual culture of the school. In this case, however, this ‘explicit’ approach was not driven by the ‘spectre’ of Ofsted. The school was rated ‘good’ in its most recent inspection, with FBV highlighted as a particular strength. Rather, Jane’s enthusiasm for the policy is the most convincing explanation.
My comparison of the four cases places two important caveats on the idea of ‘multicultural resistance’ to FBV. The first is that not all teachers in England have the same orientations towards Britishness or British values. Jane was enthusiastic about FBV, and this is reflected in her school’s enactment of the duty. The second caveat is that irrespective of individual teachers’ orientations towards FBV, schools must show a degree of compliance with the duty to pass an Ofsted inspection. Teachers in schools with previous negative experiences of Ofsted are likely to feel this pressure more acutely. Any reservations teachers may have about FBV become less relevant where the reputation or survival of the school is at stake. This draws attention to the importance of a school’s ‘external contexts’, notably the ‘pressures and expectations from broader policy context, such as Ofsted ratings’, in defining teachers’ capacity for refusal (Ball et al 2012:21). For this reason, it is important not to overstate the importance of teachers’ agency – and their ideas on integration and cultural diversity – in determining their responses to national-level policies.

7.2.5 The Prevent duty

A key point of contrast between Prevent and CVE policies in France is that Prevent is a compulsory duty that requires action at the school or college level. The duty requires schools and FE colleges to assess the risk of students being drawn into radicalisation and have safeguarding policies in place to ‘identify’ and ‘support’ individuals ‘who may be at risk’ (DfE 2015b:6; see HM Government 2015; Home Office 2021). FE colleges are expected to provide training for all teachers, while schools must provide training for Designated Safeguarding Leads (DSL) as a minimum (Home Office 2021; DfE 2015a:7). School and colleges’ work in this area is also monitored in Ofsted inspections (see Ofsted 2019).

I argue here that the compulsory nature of Prevent explains why CVE activities are more widely implemented in England than they are in France. All four case schools had taken steps to implement the duty, even if the scale of these activities varied. Furthermore, I have found that the message that Prevent is an element of safeguarding has led teachers to accept the duty as part of their role. This may explain
the relative lack of resistance to the idea of reporting students for radicalisation compared to teachers in France. Several teachers nevertheless expressed concerns about the Prevent duty. Many of these related to the idea that Prevent disproportionately targets Muslim communities. I end by discussing the ways in which the ‘situated context’ of the case schools fed into teachers’ approach to Prevent (see Ball et al 2012:22). While in some contexts, teachers seemed to identify Islamist terrorism as a primary concern, others were more focused on far-right extremism.

All four schools and colleges had implemented Prevent through their safeguarding arrangements. First Academy had organised one training activity for the leadership team and DSLs when the duty was introduced, while the other three institutions organised Prevent training at least once a year as part of regular safeguarding training. As such, all teacher-respondents were familiar with the duty and had participated in Prevent training. This is an important contrast with the French context, where several respondents had not received training in CVE, and few knew the policies by name.

My data overwhelmingly support Busher et al’s (2017) finding that ‘the idea of Prevent as safeguarding is facilitated both by the training that staff had received and the way the duty was being operationalised in schools and colleges’, notably through safeguarding policies, and by those in charge of safeguarding (24). 11 of the 12 respondents I interviewed at First Academy and Southeast Colleges made at least one reference to the idea of Prevent as safeguarding. The DSLs compared radicalisation to other safeguarding risks such as child sexual exploitation and highlighted these links in staff training and school policies.

I also find support for Busher et al’s (2017) contention that the ‘Prevent as safeguarding’ message has ‘played a fundamental role in allaying anxieties about the duty’ (7). For example, the training materials I accessed at the SCG seemed to have been crafted to pre-empt some of the concerns teachers or students may have about reporting suspected cases of radicalisation. Presenting the duty as a way of supporting

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12 Since I only interviewed members Jane at Westbrook Academy, and three members of the leadership team at Mercia Academy, it is difficult to comment on whether teachers broadly see Prevent as safeguarding. However, these four respondents all made at least one reference linking Prevent and safeguarding.
vulnerable students - rather than as a surveillance mechanism for dangerous students – serves the double function of making the duty more familiar to teachers and appealing to the more affective and normative dimensions of teachers’ professional identities, notably ideas around protecting and caring for young people. This seems to explain why none of the respondents seemed to reject the Prevent duty entirely. Even those who expressed concerns about Prevent saw preventing young people from being drawn into radicalisation as part of their duty of care to students.

The comparison with France, where CVE policies have a shorter history and are less widely implemented, are instructive in this regard. While most respondents in France were aware that they had a responsibility to report radicalisation concerns, they did not connect this to the idea of protecting or ‘safeguarding’ young people. This may explain the resistance towards reporting radicalisation concerns that some respondents in France have encountered, and that Laborde (2019) finds to be widespread among teachers. Furthermore, the fact that fewer teachers in France have been trained in this area may mean they are less likely than their English counterparts to see CVE as part of their core functions. Mary at the SCG said that she had encountered less resistance to Prevent as the policy had become embedded in the culture of the college (interview 28/01/18). This suggests that the relative maturity of Prevent may have contributed to teachers’ acceptance of the duty and that more teachers in France may come to accept this facet of their role over time.

This is not to say that the teachers in this study accepted Prevent uncritically. Eight of the 16 respondents I interviewed at the four case schools raised at least one concern about Prevent. Several more reported or refuted criticisms that other teachers had made, suggesting criticism was more widespread. Teachers’ concerns mostly fell into two categories: concerns that Prevent disproportionately focuses on Islam, and concerns that Prevent could have a negative impact on a school’s relationship with families and communities.

The concern that Prevent disproportionately targets Muslims is a recurrent criticism of the duty, and has been raised by teachers in other studies (see Busher et al 2017; Panjwani 2016; Farrell and Lander 2019). Respondents’ comments on this theme point to awareness of the climate of anxiety around Islam and Muslim populations in
which the policy has emerged. Maryam at First Academy seemed particularly alive to this climate, which she said made her feel more visible as Muslim teacher (see also Panjwani 2016; Farrell and Lander 2019). However, non-Muslim respondents such as Kathleen and Hannah also felt a prevailing climate of hostility towards Islam meant some Muslims could feel targeted by the duty. Vincent (2019b) has made similar points in relation to FBV policy, arguing that teachers’ responses to the duty are influenced by, and sometimes directed against ‘the ‘structure of feeling’ of living in a particular political and social moment’ (157). Compared to the FBV, however, teachers have limited capacity to ignore Prevent.

In all four cases, the school’s student population and teachers’ perceptions of the local area informed the extent to which they saw Prevent as a priority and the nature of their concerns about violent extremism. Westbrook and Mercia were both in neighbourhoods with a reputation for radical Islamist activity. Both principals referred to this context in our discussions about Prevent and saw the duty as an important priority. In contrast, First Academy stood out as the only school that did not organise regular Prevent training for staff, and I have argued that teachers’ perceptions of the local area – which had a majority White population - partly explain this difference. Such responses reflect the perception that Prevent is especially pertinent for schools with a significant Muslim population (see Busher et al 2017: Elwick and Jerome 2019). However, some respondents at First Academy and the SCG expressed concerns about far-right extremism, citing the presence of groups such as Britain First in the local area (see also Busher et al 2017: Elwick and Jerome 2019). For Kathleen and Hannah, these concerns were at least as significant as concerns about Islamist extremism. In this sense, the school’s ‘situated context’ framed the way teachers’ understood how the Prevent duty related to them (Ball et al 2012:22).

There are similarities with the French context, where I have argued that CVE activities were more likely to be enacted in schools with a significant Muslim population. However, the compulsory nature of Prevent means that all four schools in England had organised some CVE activities. Furthermore, the two English schools with a majority-Muslim population organised CVE training at least once per year, whereas these were one-off activities at Aimé Césaire and Lafayette. As such, although there seems to be a relationship between the enactment of CVE activities and the proportion
of Muslim students in a school in both countries, CVE activities were generally more widely and frequently implemented in English schools.

7.2.6 Policy enactments – comparative conclusions

I end this section by addressing the question of whether local enactments of England and France’s respective ‘values’ and ‘anti-radicalisation’ policies point to more significant between-country differences or more significant within-country differences. While the former would suggest that national-level factors are more important in determining local enactments, the latter would underline the importance of school-level factors, such as the contextual dimensions identified by Ball et al (2012) and the characteristics that informed my case selection.

I have found that the way individual policies are governed at the national level plays a significant role in determining the level of within-country variation. Where governance arrangements give a high degree of autonomy to local actors, there tends to be greater variation in local level enactments, with school level-factors playing a significant role. Where policies place more detailed requirements on local actors, there tends to be greater consistency in the way policies are enacted within a country. Importantly, however, England and France have both developed more enabling policies (FBV in England, anti-radicalisation policies in France) and more detailed or restrictive policies (the EMC curriculum in France, Prevent in England). This complicates the notion that the French education system is more centralised than the English one (see, for example, Bleich 1998; Archer 2013). In addition to this, the data suggest that the school-level factors that informed my case selection partly explain the within-country variation in policy enactments. Finally, the relative maturity of a policy may play a role in determining the level of within-country variation. As well as placing legal requirements on schools, Prevent is more mature and stable than French anti-radicalisation policies, meaning teachers have come to accept the duty as part of their role.

The relationship between the governance of individual policies and the degree of within-country variation becomes evident when comparing the two values policies and
the two anti-radicalisation policies. Although local actors in France have significant decision-making capacity over several of the measures announced as part of the Great Mobilisation, EMC is a compulsory subject with detailed curriculum objectives. This has resulted in a degree of consistency in how the values in the policy featured in the curriculum, and in the content of the lessons I observed in different schools. Moreover, the fact that the EMC is externally assessed in lower secondary and vocational upper secondary education provides an incentive for teachers to engage with the subject. In comparison, the lack of an FBV curriculum in England meant the values were addressed across different subject areas. With regards to the two anti-radicalisation policies, Prevent’s status as a legal duty meant that CVE activities for teachers and students were more widely implemented across the four schools in England than they were in France. In France, where CVE activities are not mandatory, there was greater variation between schools.

The data cast doubt on earlier comparative work that suggests that the French education system is highly centralised (see Bleich 1998; Archer 1983; cf. Buisson-Fenet 2007). Académie-level actors in France had a significant degree of influence over the form and content of the teacher training plan announced as part of the Great Mobilisation, while school-level actors had autonomy over aspects such as the implementation of civic engagement activities and whole-school activities to celebrate republican values. This led to a surprising degree of variation between académies and schools, and enabled Hugo in the SoF to pursue an ‘open’ approach that he felt differed from the national-level approach. The binding nature of Prevent complicates any assessment of the English education system as a decentralised one and suggests that the laissez faire tradition that Favell (2001) has associated with British policymaking may no longer prevail, at least in the domain of counterterrorism policy (96). Moreover, the inclusion of FBV in the Ofsted framework creates an incentive for schools to engage with the duty. This pressure may be more acute for teachers in schools such with previous negative experiences of Ofsted, with schools such as First Academy enjoying a degree of earned autonomy. In this sense, the decision-making capacity of local actors can vary from one policy to another and, in the case of England, from school to school.
There are two respects in which these governance arrangements conform with expectations based on the literature I discussed in chapter 2. The first is that EMC is a common, compulsory curriculum defined at the national level. I have argued that this is in keeping with the state-centred approach that authors associate with French republican integration and citizenship education (Bonjour and Lettinga 2012; Johnson and Morris 2012). While local actors have significant autonomy over more peripheral aspects of the Great Mobilisation, the state maintains control over the curricular aspect of this ‘values’ policy.

Secondly, the degree of institutional coordination within France’s *académies* – evident in the coordination of training activities for both pre-service and in-service teachers – has no equivalent in England. The declining influence of local authorities in England means that teachers may draw on multiple sources of support or supervision when enacting policies such as Prevent and FBV. At Mercia Academy, this included actors in the multi-academy trust (MAT) as well as in the local authority, suggesting MATs may be a middle layer for an increasing number of schools. Schools may also turn to actors in the private or voluntary sector (see also Vincent 2019b; Moncrieffe and Moncrieffe 2019; Elwick and Jerome 2019). In comparison, *académie*-level actors have a somewhat uncontested monopoly in steering the Great Mobilisation and the Upholding Laïcité initiative. In this respect, the decision-making structure of the French education system is more vertical and less fragmented than in England.

Alongside these governance arrangements, some of the variation in policy enactments can be explained by the three characteristics that informed my case selection: the ethnic composition of schools, school location, and school type. In the French case, I have found that a school’s location and ethnic and religious composition - part of its ‘situated context’ - were significant factors determining whether CVE activities had taken place and, to a lesser extent, the degree of teachers’ engagement with republican values (Ball et al 2012:22). The compulsory nature of Prevent meant that all four schools in England had implemented the duty, although I have argued that the ‘situated context’ of these schools informed the degree to which teachers saw the duty as a priority (Ball et al 2012:22). The data also provide insight into the role mid-level policy actors in different locations play in enacting the policies. The influence of the training provided in the NoF and SoF was evident in the schools in these *académies*,
pointing to the capacity of the two laïcité coordinators to promote a local approach to the Great Mobilisation and Upholding Laïcité. In contrast, schools in England varied in the extent to which they collaborated with local authority Prevent teams. With regards to school type, the comparatively loose design of the FBV policy meant there was a degree of variation in the way teachers at different education levels and across different academic tracks addressed the values in the policy. The case of the SCG suggests that upper secondary schools may experience challenges embedding the FBV across the curriculum.

In addition to the factors I outlined in earlier chapters, the relative maturity of the Prevent duty compared to French anti-radicalisation policies also seems to explain the comparative lack of within-school differences in the English context. I have argued that in England, teachers’ participation in training activities over time means that they have come to accept CVE as part of their role. In the French case, there still appears to be a degree of resistance around the idea of reporting students for radicalisation concerns, but this may change as CVE policies mature.

7.3 National models of immigrant integration, civic integration, and educational responses to terrorism

In this section, I address SQ2 by relating my findings to the literature on national models, civic integration, and the role of ideas in policymaking. I begin by reviewing the tendencies within this literature that I discussed in 2.1. For authors such as Favell (2001) and Bonjour and Lettinga (2012), the French approach to immigrant integration emerges from a particular notion of citizenship, wherein France is a political project to which all newcomers can sign up by adhering to ideals such as liberté, égalité, and fraternité. The state plays an active role in encouraging the dispositions associated with successful integration and citizenship (Bonjour and Lettinga 2012:268; see also Favell 2001:74; Bowen 2007; Lemaire 2009; Meer et al 2009; Doyle 2006). I have argued that this notion of ‘freedom through the state’ implies that the republican discourse may take precedence over communal or parental values in citizenship education (Bowen 2001:11; see also Mouritsen and Jaeger 2018:5-6; see also Starkey
The literature also often contrasts France’s ‘assimilationist’ or ‘culturally monist’ conception of citizenship and integration with the ‘multicultural’ or ‘culturally pluralist’ approach that prevails in Britain or England (see Qureshi and Janmaat 2014:713; Koopmans et al 2005:52; Bleich 1998:82-83; see also Favell 2001:85; Goodman 2015:186). Education policies and practices in France aim at promoting equal access to ‘universal’ republican knowledge, rather than emphasising or celebrating minority or immigrant cultures (Mannitz and Schiffauer 2004:67; see also Bleich 1998; Qureshi and Janmaat 2014). The concept of laïcité places limits on the expression of religious or even cultural identities in the public sphere, notably in schools. Since the 1980s, laïcité has increasingly been tied up with questions of integration, leading to increasingly expansive definitions of the public sphere (see Bowen 2007; Hajjat and Mohammed 2016; Favell 2001; Mannitz 2004).

The multicultural race relations approach I discussed in chapter 2 implies an accommodating approach towards expressions of cultural and religious diversity and a political consensus on ‘the idea of Britain as a multicultural society’ (see Favell 2001:135; Koopmans et al 2005; Bleich 1998; Qureshi and Janmaat 2014). These tendencies manifest themselves in education policies and practices that tolerate or celebrate minority cultures (see Qureshi and Janmaat 2014; Bleich 1998; Mannitz and Schiffauer 2004). For Favell (2001) this multicultural tendency emerges from a negative definition of freedom, whereby the focus is on ‘protecting the individual from the state rather than positively forming the political citizen’ (96; see also Bowen 2007). As such, newcomers are not expected to ‘break with the contingency of a particular culture’ to become part of the national community (Favell 2001:96). In chapter 2, I related this Lockean conception of freedom to the literature on citizenship education in England (see Bowen 2007:11). Johnson and Morris (2012) associate English citizenship education with a relativist stance on values, whereby teachers may be reluctant to question the parental or communal values that students bring with them to school (292; see also Mouritsen and Jaeger 2018:5).

However, I approach the idea of a coherent ‘French’ or ‘British’ model of integration with scepticism. In both states, ideas and practices on integration and cultural diversity are internally contested and have changed over time. In the case of France, this is often obscured by references to a uniquely ‘French’ model in public and scholarly...
debate (see Bertossi 2012:440; Bowen 2007:11; Favell 2001:43). In Britain, more accommodating conceptions of national identity and belonging have co-existed with more ‘exclusionary tendencies’, even before the emergence of the British values discourse (Boswell and Hampshire 2017:138; see also Vincent 2019b; Bleich 1998). Moreover, multicultural ideas have tended to have more of an impact in culturally diverse local authorities than at the level of national policymaking (see Bleich 1998; Qureshi and Janmaat 2014; Meer et al 2009; Osler and Starkey 2009).

Furthermore, in the previous study, I found support for the claim that Britain and France have converged towards civic integration approach (James 2016). This concept is most often applied to entry and settlement policies that emphasise knowledge of the host country’s language and culture and the acceptance of liberal-democratic values as a condition for successful integration (see Joppke 2007a:2007b; Goodman 2015). I argued that the underlying philosophy and assumptions of civic integration informed responses to a perceived ‘crisis of integration’ and concerns about violent extremism (James 2016).

In 2.3, I developed these findings using Mouritsen et al’s (2019) conception of civic integration as an ‘ideational/discursive’ phenomenon. In this view, civic integration is a set of ‘abstract ideals’ on integration, rather than a specific set of policies (600). This perspective implies that civic integration ideas can co-exist with French republican integration and British multicultural race relations, and that they find different expressions in different national contexts (Mouritsen et al 2019:600). This opens the possibility for convergence in some areas and divergence in others (Mouritsen et al 2019:600). Another implication is that as well as being taken up by national politicians, civic integration ideas may be taken up by teachers.

I have highlighted two tendencies that Mouritsen et al (2019) associate with civic integration that I argue are pertinent to this study. The first is the ‘expansion’ of the definition of ‘desirable good citizenship’ to include ‘personal conduct and values’ as well as the more functional aspects of citizenship (Mouritsen et al 2019:601). I related this tendency to what Tonkens and Duyvendak (2016) describe as the ‘culturalization of citizenship’. This is the process wherein the acquisition of legal citizenship and the symbolic recognition of migrants and minorities as citizens has increasingly become
conditional on their acceptance of ‘Western’ values, notably those around gender, sexuality, and secularism (Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016:3). The second tendency identified by Mouritsen et al (2019) is the increased ‘state involvement’ in bringing about the ‘mindsets and practices’ associated with successful integration, including through ‘moralistic, disciplinary interpellation of individuals’ (Mouritsen et al 2019:601). My discussion of civic integration in this chapter highlights how these tendencies are reflected in teachers’ enactment of the policies that are the focus of this study and their ideas on integration. I also discuss how civic integration ideas interact with French republican integration and British multiculturalism.

Based on the literature on the role of ideas in policymaking, I developed propositions on how institutionalised ideas associated with the two countries’ ‘philosophies of integration’ and newer ideas such as civic integration affect teachers’ practices. I proposed that the ideas and practices I have associated with French republican integration and British multicultural race relations are resources that policymakers and practitioners can draw on in response to the challenges posed by recent terrorist attacks (see Jensen 2019; Carstensen 2011). This is evident in policies such as the FBV and the Great Mobilisation. Although these actors may be biased towards institutionalised ideas and practices, however, they may also look beyond existing paradigms in response to new challenges (see Carstensen 2011:156). I argue that the turn towards civic integration and muscular liberalism in England, and the recent emphasis on teaching religious phenomena in France, are examples of this ‘inter-paradigm borrowing’ (Hay 2010, in Carstensen 2011:156). Bleich (1998) has argued that multicultural and republican ideas inform the ‘priors’ of several actors in the two education systems. This raises the possibility that teachers will resist these new developments. Bleich (1998) has also argued, however, that priors may be ‘contested’ within one country and can change over time (93-98). As such, teachers in the two countries are likely to hold different ideas about integration and cultural diversity, and the shifts in the discourse at the national level may have filtered down to the school level.

7.3.1 Republican integration and civic integration in French schools
In this section, I address SQ2 by relating my data to the literature on French republican integration and public schooling in France. I argue that like policymakers, local actors often ‘fall back on’ or ‘re-interpret’ French republican integration ideas in their responses to context of terrorism (see Jensen 2019:627; Carstensen 2011:156). This is evident in the enactment of the policies I discussed in 6.2, as well as in teachers’ self-initiated responses to terrorist attacks. In this sense, the context of terrorism has entrenched the ideas and practices I have associated with the French public philosophy. However, the process of ‘translating’ these abstract ideals into the everyday life of schools opens the possibility of disagreement and reveals that teachers and other professionals do not all share the same ideas about cultural diversity (see Jensen 2019:623). This underlines Bleich’s (1998) point that ‘priors’ are not necessarily uniform (93). The discussion then turns to the recent emphasis on teaching religious phenomena in French schools. I argue that this represents an example of ‘inter-paradigm’ borrowing, in the sense that policymakers and some practitioners have looked beyond institutionalised practices to address some of the challenges associated with terrorism (Hay 2010, in Carstensen 2011:156). My data point to the ways French practices in this area may be converging with the English context, although I find that some teachers’ laïque ‘priors’ may have inhibited this trend (see Bleich 1998). I end by addressing the question of how civic integration ideas are reflected in the data from France. I argue that the similarities between French republican integration and civic integration ideas pose challenges in identifying a civic integration ‘trend’ in France. I nevertheless point to the ways in which recent practices reflect a trend towards the ‘expansion’ and ‘culturalization’ of citizenship and increased ‘state involvement’ in promoting it (see Mouritsen et al 2019:601; Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016).

7.3.1.1 French republican integration as a resource for action

There is a clear sense in which recent terrorist attacks - along with broader integration concerns - have led policymakers and practitioners to double down on French republican ideas and the practices associated with them. Through the Great Mobilisation, policymakers placed republican values at the centre of France’s education policy response to the January 2015 attacks, primarily as a way of
promoting social cohesion at a moment of national tragedy (James 2016). Subsequent governments have continued this trend, with recent anti-radicalisation policies highlighting the role of republican values and public schooling in building resilience to radicalisation (Eduscol 2022b). In the previous study, I argued that the established notion of French republican values and laïcité as a tool for promoting social cohesion and belonging provided a language from which policymakers could draw on in January 2015 (James 2016). Drawing on the literature on the role of ideas in policymaking, I wish to argue here that teachers, as well as policymakers, have used these ‘institutionalized’ ideas, practices, and policies as resources to devise ‘strategies of action’ in response to the ‘concrete problems’ associated with recent terrorist attacks (Carstensen 2011:164; see also Jensen 2019).

Most of the teachers in this study had engaged with the new EMC curriculum, which places a particular emphasis on republican values as laïcité as a tool for ‘living together’ (le vivre ensemble). In both the NoF and SoF, the training plan announced as part of the Great Mobilisation led to the development of teachers’ professional learning activities on republican values and laïcité (see MEN 2015a). In this sense, the context of terrorism has created more space for teachers and students to engage with French republican ideas, even if not all schools and teachers engaged with recent policies to the same extent.

This sense of continuity is underlined by the fact that several teachers in this study saw recent efforts to promote republican values as the extension of an established republican tradition. For these teachers, the January 2015 terrorist attacks had ‘re-launched’ a pre-existing emphasis on republican values and laïcité as a tool for integration (Guillaume, interview 20/10/20). Some felt these ideas were especially important in the context of recent attacks.

Teachers also drew on republican ideas in their self-initiated responses to recent attacks. At Aimé Césaire, the notion that teaching students about republican values and laïcité was an appropriate response to terrorism was felt to be so self-evident as not to require an explanation. Christophe complained that rather than giving teachers specific guidance on how to approach the Charlie Hebdo attacks with students, the school principal made vague references to ‘Jules Ferry’, ‘the values of the Republic’
and said ‘You know what to do’ (field notes, 15/11/18). This points to the assumptions and ambiguities that underlie some of these school-level responses. While actors at different levels of the French education system evidently see republican and laïcité values as the solution to the problems they associate with terrorism, the logic informing these assumptions is not always apparent.

One explanation for this tendency is that attacks such as those on *Charlie Hebdo* and the murder of Samuel Paty were understood as attacks on republican values, notably the value of freedom of speech. Moreover, some students’ positions on *Charlie Hebdo*’s publication of the cartoons of Muhammad fed into pre-existing concerns about the failed integration of Muslim and minority ethnic youth, and their insufficient commitment to republican values (James 2016; Moran 2017; Wesselhoeft 2017; Ogien 2013). In this sense, the Grand Mobilisation serves to address the ‘failed integration’ of these groups. When I asked respondents how they understood the connection between the context of terrorism and the promotion of republican values, several also mentioned ideas relating to social cohesion and national unity, reflecting some of the ideas expressed in the Great Mobilisation and political speeches following the January 2015 attacks (MEN 2015; see also Wesselhoeft 2017).

Jensen’s (2019) contention that ‘time pressure and/or lack of creative ability’ biases actors towards ideas they ‘are already experienced in applying’ when making sense of new integration phenomena seems relevant here (627). Actors at different levels of the French education system have ‘fallen back’ on familiar ideas in response to the challenges posed by recent attacks (Jensen 2019: 627). This time pressure is arguably more acute for teachers than it is for policymakers following a terrorist attack, since they are often faced with students some hours after the event. For Jensen (2019), this bias towards familiar ideas and policies is one of the mechanisms that leads to path dependency (627). I see this process as occurring at two levels: firstly, at the level of national policies such as the Great Mobilisation, whose enactment in the schools in this study is perhaps the clearest example of the ‘stabilization’ of the French republican public philosophy, and secondly, in teachers’ own ‘bottom-up responses’ to terrorist attacks, which draw on similar ideas to policymakers (Jensen 2019:627).
7.3.1.2 Competing conceptions of laïcité

The abstract and unstable nature of laïcité and its increased salience in recent policy discourse means that a good deal of work goes into establishing a stable definition of the concept and interpreting it in the everyday life of schools. These factors also give rise to differing and conflicting interpretations of laïcité, illustrating Jensen’s (2019) contention that the process of ‘translating’ abstract public philosophies into concrete policy solutions opens the possibility for disagreement and ‘varying interpretations’ of national model concepts (623). I have argued that the Upholding Laïcité initiative is a response to the abstract nature of laïcité and the challenges teachers and other local actors experience in identifying and resolving ‘violations of laïcité. However, even this apparent solution requires them to engage in a good deal of ‘translation’ work (Jensen 2019:623). Académie-level actors such as Nicolas and Hugo played an important role in constructing local understandings of laïcité and its application in schools, but these understandings continued to be negotiated in staffrooms and individual classrooms (Laborde 2019). Despite recent policy efforts, conceptions of laïcité vary from the national to the local level, and between and within schools.

I argue here that recent terrorist attacks have contributed to the trend towards more restrictive manifestations of laïcité, and that these responses draw on institutionalised ideas about citizenship, integration, and cultural diversity. At the national level, I have found that the recent emphasis on sanctioning violations of laïcité is a way of pushing back against the radical forms of Islam thought to underlie them. At the school level, specific concerns about radicalisation and the climate of anxiety engendered by recent attacks have contributed to some teachers’ ‘rigidity’ around the principles of laïcité (Fred, interview 02/12/19). However, respondents in this study were more likely to distance themselves from these ‘hard’ forms of laïcité and some advocated a more ‘open’ interpretation of the concept. This ‘open’ laïcité runs counter to the assimilationist tendency authors have associated with French republican integration and reflects a more accommodating approach to cultural diversity (see also Baubérot 2015:91; Lorcerie 2015). These competing conceptions of laïcité underline Bleich’s (1998) contention that ‘priors’ may be ‘contested’ within one country (93). Here, there are similarities with England, where some local actors have pursued more ‘multicultural’ responses to cultural diversity despite the recent emphasis on
Britishness and British values at the national level (see McGhee and Zhang 2017; Vincent 2019b).

As I discussed in chapter 3, there are problems involved in making a straightforward association between ‘hard’ laïcité and the context of terrorism. Hajjat and Mohammed (2016) reject the notion that the emergence of what they call a new secular discipline in France can be explained by concerns about violent extremism (150). Instead, they invite us to see the increasing restrictions on presumed expressions of the Islamic faith as an attempt to promote cultural homogeneity and to address the excessive religiosity and failed integration Muslim students (Hajjat and Mohammed 2016:101-117). Their scepticism is convincing, not least because the phenomena they speak of predate the terrorist attacks that are the focus of this study (Hajjat and Mohammed 2016:101-102).

My data nevertheless point to a correlation between recent terrorist attacks and potentially exclusionary manifestations of laïcité. According to some respondents, teachers were more likely to advocate for ‘harder’ interpretations of laïcité or to report or sanction apparent violations after a terrorist attack. Some spoke of an ‘intransigence’ (Laurent, interview 14/06/18) among teachers around questions relating to laïcité in the period following the 2015 attacks, while others saw increased reports of violations as attempts to ‘stigmatise Islam’ in moments of heightened tension (field notes, 14/03/19; see also Orange 2016; 2017). This supports Bowen’s (2007; 2009) contention that controversies over Islamic dress and other perceived threats to laïcité often coincide with moments of heightened anxiety about political Islam.

As I argued in chapter 3, this calls for an explanation of the relationship between harder expressions of laïcité and the context of terrorism that accounts for the broader factors relating to religion, integration, and cultural difference discussed by Hajjat and Mohammed and others (2016; see also Bowen 2007; Baubérot 2015; Lorcerie 2015; Bertossi 2012). I follow Hajjat and Mohammed (2016) in arguing that the recent national-level focus on violations of laïcité aims at pushing back against the ‘excessive religiosity’ of Muslim and minority ethnic youth and resolving issues relating to their ‘failed’ integration. However, this explanation does not preclude a relationship between harder manifestations of laïcité and the context of terrorism. For some policymakers, the perceived religiosity of French Muslims may be a cause of terrorism, as well as...
failed integration. Bowen’s (2007) analysis points to the way French elites interpret Islamic veils and other presumed ‘violations’ as indicators of both problems (155-181). In pushing back against these expressions of religious faith, policymakers appear to be targeting radical religious ideas and an apparent refusal of integration, which they see as interrelated phenomena. Expressions of ‘hard laïcité’ at the school level may partly be explained by the fact that some teachers also interpret manifestations of Islam as signs of radicalisation. Orange (2016) offers a similar explanation for the emergence of a discriminatory laïcité after the 2015 terrorist attacks, finding that some teachers saw themselves as the last bastion against the religious radicalisation of their students (110).

Laurent at the Gustave Eiffel provided an alternative explanation for the emergence of a ‘violent’ form of laïcité among teachers during this period (interview 14/06/18). He argued that since these teachers were unwilling to invest in national symbols typically associated with the right, they ‘overinvest[ed]’ in laïcité - a value with more left-wing connotations - in a moment of national trauma (interview 14/06/18). This hypothesis suggests recent attacks may have exacerbated the trend towards more ‘identarian’ conceptions of laïcité I discussed in chapter 3, wherein the concept has increasingly become articulated with expressions of national identity (Baubérot 2015:111-113; see also Bertossi et al 2015; Chabal 2017; James and Janmaat 2019).

Finally, comments from Mr W, a volunteer who spoke at the Lycée Jean Moulin - and who I have argued reflected the ‘hard’ position most clearly - provide insight on how the emancipatory ideas authors have associated with laïcité in the French education system could apply to the phenomenon of radicalisation. He drew on the idea that removal of religious symbols from schools creates a ‘privileged’ space that enables ‘the exchange of ideas’ and, importantly, for religious dogma to be deconstructed (Bowen 2007:29; see also Favell 2001:176-177; Mannitz 2004; Mabilon-Bonfils and Zoïa 2014). This suggests that for some actors, ‘hard’ laïcité creates the conditions wherein dangerous religious ideas can be challenged through rational thought.

In these instances, institutionalised ideas about what constitutes successful integration - and the role of laïcité in promoting it - lead to responses that are difficult to imagine in the English context. The idea that the ‘problem’ of radicalisation calls for
more restrictions on religious expression draws on the notion that successful integration involves ‘freedom from sub-national collectivist and cultural forms’ and that this is facilitated by the neutrality of schools (Favell 2001:176; see also Bowen 2007:29; Mannitz 2004:90). Within this logic, students’ expressions of their religious faith may be interpreted as indicators of insufficient integration, or even dangerous religious devotion (see Bowen 2007:155). In England, the relationship between religion and state arguably precludes similar restrictions on religious expression in schools (see Fetzer and Soper 2005; Koopmans et al 2005). More importantly, I would argue that most teachers and policy actors do not attach the same meaning to expressions of religious faith as they do in France. I return to this point below, where I argue that contemporary practices regarding laïcité may represent a French expression of civic integration.

However, it was more common for respondents in this study to distance themselves from these restrictive forms of laïcité. Several identified with a more ‘open’ position on laïcité, characterised by ‘openness’ towards cultural diversity. In some cases, this positioning seemed to emerge from a desire to counter a climate of hostility towards Islam that has intensified in the context of recent terrorist attacks. Here, there are similarities with England where some teachers have sought to ‘work against’ a ‘prevailing climate of intolerance’ towards the ‘foreign’ by drawing on multicultural practices in their enactment of the FBV duty (Vincent 2019b:137; 101-102).

Moreover, the case of the SoF suggests that Bleich’s (1998) findings on the relationship between England’s decentralised governance arrangements and the spread of multicultural practices may also apply to France. Bleich (1998) finds that the decision-making capacity of local authorities and schools in the England means the system has several ‘spatially distributed gatekeepers’ (90-92). This arrangement creates opportunities for ‘non-governmental actors’ to introduce new ideas – such as multicultural education policies - into the system (Bleich 1998:90). I have argued that the French education system has become less ‘hyper-centralised’ in the period since Bleich (1998) published his article and that académie-level actors play a decisive role in enacting the policies such as the Great Mobilisation (see also Laborde 2019). In the SoF, Hugo worked with academic researchers with expertise in fields such as immigrant integration, ethnicity, and cultural diversity in education to develop his
accommodating approach to laïcité. The participation of these actors played an important role in challenging dominant ideas about laïcité and cultural diversity in the training activities I observed (see also Laborde and Silhol 2018). Although I would stop short of calling this approach ‘multicultural’, I would argue that it has been facilitated by the increasingly ‘spatial distribution’ of gatekeepers in the French education system and by the work of the kind of ‘non-governmental actors’ Bleich (1998) mentions in his article (90).

The idea that local actors are more accommodating of expressions of cultural diversity is complicated by some respondents’ accounts teachers of ‘laïcaird’ teachers, and the restrictive forms of laïcité they practice. It is not clear, however, what proportion of teachers tend towards the more ‘open’ or ‘hard’ positions. It is worth noting that no respondent openly identified with the ‘hard’ position. Somewhat paradoxically, although I have found more evidence of ‘open’ laïcité in this study, some of its proponents saw themselves as being in the minority. Hugo and Laurent defined themselves in opposition to what they saw as the ‘dominant’ the position on laïcité, either at the national level or within their school (see also Baubérot 2015:91). As I argue below, further research would be required to establish how widespread the ‘open’ position is. What does seem clear from my data is that ideas and practices around laïcité are the source of significant debate and disagreement among teachers, reflecting the ‘contested’ nature of the concept in French society (see Bowen 2007:2; Lorcerie 2015).

7.3.1.3 Teaching religious phenomena in the context of terrorism – towards an English approach?

In this section I highlight some of the ways in which the recent emphasis on teaching religious phenomena - driven, in part by the context of terrorism - represents an area of convergence with the English approach. I have previously made this argument in relation to national-level responses to terrorism (James 2016). In a report commissioned by the MEN soon after 9/11, for example, Debray (2002) argued that teaching young people about religion was essential in helping them make sense of the attacks and could help prevent them from being drawn into fundamentalism (12). These ideas seem to have informed more recent policy responses. The Great
Mobilisation includes measures to strengthen teacher training and resources in this area, while recent anti-radicalisation policies identify a nuanced and objective approach to teaching religious phenomena as an aspect of primary prevention (MEN 2015a; Eduscol 2022b). This emphasis was evident in the NoF and the SoF, where the training groups established as part of the Great Mobilisation organised activities on this theme. In the SoF, this included a workshop on the monotheistic religions attended by some 1000 students and groups of parents.

I argue that this trend represents an example of actors looking to ideas beyond the dominant republican paradigm in response to the problems associated with terrorism (Carstensen 2011:156). Bertrand, a senior official at the MEN, advanced the view that some conceptions of laïcité could contribute to the phenomenon of radicalisation, since they prevented teachers from engaging with religious ideas in the classroom. In this view, the historical lack of engagement with religion in the French education system creates a knowledge vacuum that could be filled by extremists (field notes 28/08/18). This seems to draw directly on ideas from the Debray Report (2002), in which the author argued that the failure to address religion within the rational, state-controlled education system could leave young people vulnerable to fundamentalist readings of holy texts (12). Bertrand’s comments suggest that these ideas continue to hold sway among policy elites. In a similar vein, an academic researcher leading a workshop I observed at Jean Moulin argued that institutional arrangements in the French education system made it difficult for teachers to adequately address the topic of religious extremism (field notes 25/01/19). There is a sense in which the recent emphasis on teaching religious phenomena responds to a perception that prevailing practices do not sufficiently address the challenges posed by terrorism.

Moreover, the practices I observed in the SoF point to areas where the French approach to addressing religion in the classroom may have converged with the English approach. I have argued that these went beyond the heritage approach described by Petit (2018) - where the teaching of religious phenomena primarily serves to give students access to a cultural heritage imbued with religion - towards an approach where students learn about contemporary religious beliefs and practices to promote understanding of and respect for religious diversity (see also Husser 2017; Mannitz 2004). As Husser (2017) points out, this shift may originate from the new EMC
curriculum, which incites teachers to engage with contemporary religious beliefs in the service of pluralism (50). Mannitz (2004) associates this ‘pluralism’ function with the London school in her comparative study, and it was evident in the ideas and practices of RE teachers at First Academy. Another similarity between Christophe’s lessons and RE lessons at First Academy was that they addressed the theme of religious extremism. In both contexts, teachers expressed a concern for addressing misconceptions about Islam. In this sense, the new EMC curriculum and the concurrent emphasis on teaching religious phenomena as a response to terrorism have given rise to practices that would not be out of place in an English RE classroom.

The data from this and other studies suggest that the practices I observed in the SoF are not typical, and that some teachers in France are either unwilling or ill-equipped to address religion in the classroom. Petit’s (2018) analysis of a survey of 345 primary school teachers revealed that only 35% favoured the teaching of religious phenomena and put this into practice (10). The largest group (37%) were unfavourable and did not put it into practice (Petit 2018:10). Christophe’s survey of teachers in Aimé Césaire’s REP+ paints a similar picture. His perception that some teachers refused to engage with religion because they were ‘stuck’ in their ‘laïcaird’ position finds support in other studies (Christophe, interview 10/06/19). Laborde (2019) finds that recent attempts to promote these practices conflict with teachers’ professional socialisation into a restrictive form of laïcité aimed at neutralising differences (35; see also Lemaire 2009). Other studies point to more material factors that may prevent teachers who are willing to engage with religious phenomena from putting this into practice, such as a lack of training and pedagogical resources (Petit 2018:10; Claus 2016). For these reasons, I argue that the practices I observed in the SoF represent an extreme case and exemplify a policy trend that has not taken hold across the system. Although the context of terrorism has led policy elites and some local actors to promote these practices at the school level, some teachers laïque ‘priors’, along with a lack of training and resources, mean these efforts have not always borne fruit (Bleich 1998:82; Laborde 2019:35; Petit 2018:10).

Furthermore, Christophe’s lessons on religious beliefs and practices addressed the theme of religious autonomy, a theme that was absent from the RE lessons I observed in England. One explanation may be that the primary focus in the non-statutory
guidance for RE and the GCSE syllabus for religious studies is on students' understanding of religious beliefs (see DSCF 2010; DfE 2015a). In contrast, teaching religious ideas in the context of a lesson about laïcité and freedom of conscience creates the conditions for discussions on autonomy. I would also argue that the notion that schools ‘do not protect children from the normative pressures of their backgrounds’ may mean that teachers in England are less willing actively encourage their students to interrogate their parents' beliefs in the way Christophe did (Mouritsen and Jaeger 2018:5; see also Favell 2001; Bowen 2007). These contrasts further delimit my proposition that the recent emphasis on teaching religious phenomena in France represents convergence towards an ‘English’ approach.

7.3.1.4 Civic integration in France

In chapter 2, I argued that ‘civic’ notions of integration through shared values - with the state and its institutions playing a key role - resonate with the French Republican ‘philosophy’ (Joppke 2007a:9; see also Mouritsen 2008:3; Goodman 2014:184; Bonjour and Lettinga 2012). This raises the question of whether recent education policies and practices represent a ‘civic turn’ in the way they do in England (Mouritsen 2008; see also James and Janmaat 2019). One possible answer is that the civic integration trend has accentuated pre-existing tendencies. I have argued that policies such as the Great Mobilisation and the Upholding Laïcité initiative reinforce notions on the role of republican values in promoting integration. The enactment of these policies in the schools and académies in this study has consolidated this tendency.

In chapter 3, however, I pointed to some of the ways recent policies and practices reflect two of the tendencies Mouritsen et al (2019) associate with civic integration: the ‘expansion’ of the definition of ‘good citizenship’ and the deepening of ‘state involvement’ in bringing it about (601). For Pélabay (2017), the notion that students should manifest an authentic belief in the values of the Republic violates the Rawlsian distinction between public norms and private morals (122). Taking this further, it could be argued that some teachers’ more robust attempts to promote a particular conception of freedom of expression following recent terrorist attacks also risk violating this distinction. Respondents reported that the shock caused by the 2015 attacks on Charlie Hebdo led some teachers to insist that their students ‘be Charlie’ or to sanction
them for criticising the magazine (see also Lorcerie and Moignard 2017). These practices go beyond merely challenging students who appeared to justify terrorism or underlining *Charlie Hebdo*’s right to publish the cartoons under French law, arguably representing the kind of incursion into the realm of personal values described by authors such as Pélabay (2017:122) and Mouritsen et al (2019:601).

The trend towards more restrictive practices around *laïcité* can also be seen as an expression of ‘civic integration’ or the ‘culturalization of citizenship’ (see Mouritsen et al 2019:601; Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016). These practices deepen the role of the state in bringing about the ‘desired mindsets and practices’ associated with successful integration (Mouritsen et al 2019:601). The more muscular response to violations of *laïcité* that prevailed under Education Minister Jean-Michel Blanquer, notably the government portal for reporting violations, arguably represents the kind of ‘disciplinary interpellation of individuals’ that Mouritsen et al (2019) associate with increased ‘state involvement’ (601; see also Laborde 2019). This disciplinary tendency is evident in the way some teachers have used the portal to report students for expressing their objections to the publication of cartoons of Muhammad or have over-interpreted student behaviours as ‘violations’ of *laïcité* (Orange 2017:77). In the sense that these interventions target ‘the practice of religious life’ they also constitute an ‘expansion’ of ‘the realms of desirable ‘good citizenship’ (Mouritsen et al 2019: 601; see also Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016). While immigration policies have seen veil-wearing women refused citizenship on the grounds of ‘insufficient assimilation’, expansive understandings of *laïcité* increasingly require students to demonstrate ‘good citizenship’ by embracing secular values and limiting expressions of their religious identities (Mouritsen et al 2019: 601; see also Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016; Joppke 2007; Bowen 2007).

In these instances, the trend towards ‘expansion’ and ‘increased state involvement’ manifest themselves in practices relating to a uniquely French notion of secularism (Mouritsen et al 2019:601). This points to the way ‘popular civic integration notions’ may be ‘refracted through historically embedded national philosophies of integration’ (Mouritsen et al 2019:599). Recent practices on *laïcité* reflect the notion that ‘excessive’ religious devotion is anathema to successful integration or good citizenship (see Hajjat and Mohammed 2016; Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016; Bowen 2007;
Bertossi 2012). The comparisons with England are instructive in this regard; while policies such as FBV envisage a more active role for the state in promoting integration, calls to regulate the expression of religious symbols have not gained acceptance.

Importantly, however, several respondents in this study were critical of these tendencies and many sought to push back against them. Some questioned the wisdom of bringing the *Je suis Charlie* movement into schools, with comments from Fred and Nicolas suggesting this may have violated the *laïque* principle of teachers’ neutrality. Other teachers saw students’ ‘interrogations’ on the issue of the cartoons of Muhammad as legitimate. Such responses reflect a more limited view of the role of civic or moral education in which the aim is to promote students’ respect for the norms and laws of society, rather than to change their private values (see Mouritsen et al 2019:601; Pélabay 2017). Finally, several respondents reacted against the disciplinary turn in practices around *laïcité*, notably the portal for reporting violations. I have argued that their discomfort emerged from their framing of these issues as primarily pedagogical, in contrast to the ‘security’ framing that seems to prevail at the national level. In this sense, the ‘expansion’ of the notion of good citizenship and the entrenchment of ‘state involvement’ have encountered resistance among some local actors (see Mouritsen et al 2019:601).

**7.3.1.5 Republican integration and civic integration in French schools: Conclusions**

In this section, I have argued that policymakers and education practitioners have used the ideas, practices, scripts, and frames associated with French republican integration to devise responses to recent terrorist attacks. Here, I draw on Jensen’s (2019) understanding of national models as ‘resources that actors can employ creatively and pragmatically’ (627; see also Carstensen 2011:164). This has led to the ‘stabilization’ of some elements of the republican philosophy of integration, and the ‘re-interpretation’ of others (Jensen 2019:627; Carstensen 2011:156). The stabilisation of the notion of republican values as a tool for integration is evident in the Great Mobilisation, which has created additional space for learning about republican values and *laïcité* through the EMC curriculum and teacher training (MEN 2015a). These ideas have also been reinterpreted as a tool in the fight against violent extremism, with recent anti-
radicalisation policies identifying the promotion of republican values as a way of building students’ resilience to radicalisation (Eduscol 2022b).

I have also argued that institutionalised ideas on laïcité, integration, and public schooling lead to educational responses to terrorism and expressions of the civic integration trend that would be difficult to imagine in the English context. This includes the national-level focus on monitoring and sanctioning apparent ‘violations of laïcité’ as well as ‘hard’ expressions of laïcité at the school level. I have found that these practices respond to concerns about radical Islam and violent extremism. They also articulate with Mouritsen et al’s (2019) definition of civic integration in the sense that they deepen ‘state involvement’ in regulating religious practice and bringing about the ‘desired mindsets and practices’ associated with successful integration (601; Laborde 2019:32). They draw on the notion that successful integration involves emancipation from religious dogma and ‘sub-national’ identities and that the neutrality of schools facilitates this process (Favell 2001:176; see also Bowen 2007:29; Mannitz 2004:90).

This understanding of citizenship and integration means that some policymakers and local actors interpret violations of laïcité as indicators of poor integration, or worse, of radicalisation (see Bowen 2007:155-177). In contrast, policies such as Prevent and FBV do not target visible manifestations of religious faith, arguably because actors in England are less likely to interpret them as signs of dangerous religious devotion.

However, the disciplinary turn in national-level practices around laïcité is not always reflected at the local level. Some respondents expressed discomfort with the disciplinary or ‘security’ turn in responses to violations of laïcité, notably the portal for reporting them. The ‘open’ laïcité that Hugo sought to promote in the SoF was characterised by an ‘openness’ to religious and cultural diversity and was partly directed against this prevailing climate. Here, there are similarities with the English context, where teachers working in diverse contexts have used their decision-making capacity to pursue more accommodating approaches to cultural diversity in the face of assimilationist turn at the national level (see Vincent 2019b:137; 101-102; McGhee and Zhang 2017). More broadly, the conflict between more ‘open’ and ‘hard’ conceptions of laïcité underlines the contested nature of ideas on integration and cultural diversity in France (see Bowen 2007:2; Lorcerie 2015; Baubérot 2015).
Finally, I have argued that the phenomenon of terrorism has caused elites and practitioners to look beyond the institutionalised paradigm for addressing religious phenomena in schools. The emphasis on strengthening the teaching of religious phenomena in recent national responses to terrorism was evident at the local level, leading to practices that would not be out of place in an English RE classroom. My findings nevertheless support data from earlier studies which indicate that teachers’ laïque ‘priors’ may lead them to resist calls to engage with religion in the classroom (Bleich 1998:82; see Laborde 2019; Petit 2018; Lemaire 2009). This points to the challenges policymakers can encounter when introducing new ideas into existing institutions (see Carstensen 2011:163).

7.3.2 British multicultural race relations and civic integration in English schools

This section addresses how the ideas I have associated with British multiculturalism and civic integration are reflected in teachers’ enactment of FBV and Prevent and their broader responses to the context of terrorism. Following Vincent (2019b), I argue that previous multicultural ideas and policies inform teachers’ concern for preparing students for citizenship in a diverse school community and society and that this is evident in their emphasis on the FBV mutual respect and tolerance (98-101; see also McGhee and Zhang 2017:946). They have also ‘repackaged’ previous multicultural practices in response to the duty (see Vincent 2019b:79). This illustrates Jensen’s (2019) point that path dependencies can ‘originate in existing policies’ (627). It also points to teachers’ capacity to resist the more exclusionary discourses in the prevailing policy climate by maintaining approaches that celebrate diversity. Importantly, however, I find that some teachers sought to promote tolerance among population groups they perceived to be deficient in them and that this reflects some of the muscularity of the FBV duty. Multicultural ideas were also evident in some teachers’ more active resistance to the FBV discourse, although others had a more positive orientation towards it. Finally, I see teachers’ use of the RE curriculum to address FBV and the theme of religious extremism as another instance where existing ideas and practices provide a resource for action in the face of new challenges (see Carstensen 2011; Jensen 2019). Here, teachers drew on institutionalised ideas about the role of
RE in a multicultural society and used this existing ‘tool’ to address the challenges associated with recent terrorist attacks (Carstensen 2011:156).

In end by drawing together my findings on civic integration. I argue that the ideas I have associated with civic integration and the ‘culturalization of citizenship’ were evident in the comments two of the teachers made on British values and Islam (Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016). Since these teachers were in the minority, however, the civic integration trend was most evident in the muscular approach to promoting tolerance I observed at First Academy and Westbrook Primary. This suggests that the turn towards civic integration at the national level may have created a climate in which some - though not all - teachers are more willing to be assertive in their defence of liberal ideas.

7.3.2.1 Multicultural race relations and teachers’ responses to FBV

I follow Vincent (2019b) in arguing that the ‘sediment’ of previous multicultural policies is evident in teachers’ concern for promoting respect for difference and an appreciation of diversity, and that this leads them to emphasise the FBV mutual respect and tolerance in their enactment of the duty (101). Vincent (2019b) draws on Mitchell’s (2006) definition of multicultural education, where the goal is to create is ‘a certain kind of individual, one who is tolerant of difference […] and who is able to work with others to find sites of commonality, despite differences’ (392, in Vincent 2019b:101; see also McGhee and Zhang 2017:940-946; Jerome and Clemitshaw 2012). In many ways, the policy framework invites teachers to make links between FBV and these goals. The DfE guidance on promoting FBV (2014b) states that schools should promote students’ ‘appreciation of and respect for their own and other cultures’ through SMSC and reminds teachers of their duty to promote equality and prevent discrimination under the Equality Act 2010 (5). FBV feature under the theme of ‘preparing learners for life in modern Britain’ in the Ofsted inspections framework; this strand also includes a reference to ‘developing [learners’] understanding and appreciation of diversity’ (Ofsted 2019:11). School leaders referenced the Equality Act 2010 and preparing learners for life in modern Britain in our conversations about FBV, pointing to the way these references frame their understanding of the duty (see also Vincent 2019b:18;
Moreover, the fact that the government guidance on promoting FBV specifies very little in terms of curriculum content gives teachers the capacity to emphasise respect for diversity in their response to the duty, or to ‘repackage’ existing activities that address these themes (see Vincent 2019b:99; see also McGhee and Zhang 2017:938).

Teachers’ concern for promoting tolerance and respect for difference was evident at all four schools, meaning the FBV mutual respect and tolerance was especially salient (Vincent 2019b:99). Several articulated their work to promote mutual respect and tolerance with the school’s ethos and culture or their own values as educators, suggesting this emphasis pre-dates the FBV duty. This tendency was particularly strong at First Academy and Westbrook Primary, two schools that did extensive work on promoting equality and preventing discrimination. Mutual respect and tolerance were also important at the SCG and Mercia but were less dominant. At all four schools, activities that addressed FBV reflected teachers’ concern for preparing students for multicultural citizenship within school and beyond. At the Westbrook Primary, for example, the emphasis was on ‘getting along’ with classmates despite any differences in religion, culture, or individual tastes (field notes, 23/01/19; see Vincent 2019b:99). At the SCG, Hannah encouraged teachers of vocational subjects to address FBV by making links between the diversity of contemporary Britain and students’ future professional lives. In some cases, teachers implemented new activities on these themes in response to the FBV duty. In others, they ‘repackaged’ existing multicultural activities as evidence of FBV (see also Vincent 2019b:79-81).

I see teachers’ concern for promoting the values associated with life in multicultural Britain, and the tendency of some to enact the FBV duty through pre-existing multicultural activities, as an instance where path dependencies ‘originate in existing policies’ (Jensen 2019:627). On one level, existing activities such as Black History Month are a ‘resource’ that teachers have drawn on in response to the new FBV duty (Jensen 2019:627). This leads to the ‘stabilization’ of these practices (Jensen 2019:627). Moreover, the ‘sediment’ of multiculturalism and community cohesion seem to play a role in defining teachers’ goals for educating young people and some have ‘translated’ the duty to fit these aims (Vincent 2019b:101). As such, previous
multicultural policies frame teachers’ ‘sense of what is appropriate’ as well as informing their practices (see Mahoney 2000:523, in Jensen 2019:627).

In some respects, emphasising respect for diversity allows teachers to orient their enactment of the FBV duty away from the more exclusionary or muscular discourses it is embedded in. As Vincent (2019b) points out, this emphasis may help teachers ‘manage any discomfort’ they may feel about the nationalist or ‘exclusionary’ connotations of the policy and ‘offer some critique’ of them (99; see also McGhee and Zhang 2017:948). This was especially evident at First Academy, where school leaders objected to the nationalist framing of the policy. Their understanding that they could address the duty through their pre-existing emphasis on promoting tolerance and respect for diversity gave them the confidence to avoid the ‘representing Britain’ approach described by Vincent (2019b:71-79; see also Moncrieffe and Moncrieffe 2019).

In the case of Westbrook and First Academy, however, the goal of promoting tolerance among students ‘against their apparently illiberal families’ reflects some of the muscularity of the FBV duty (see Vincent 2019b:130). At Westbrook, work on gender and sexuality targeted the ‘patriarchal’ and homophobic attitudes teachers associated with the local Muslim population (Jane, interview 24/01/19). At First Academy, teachers were concerned with challenging racist attitudes among White working-class families. There was also a degree of muscularity in the way teachers in both schools went about achieving this goal. Jane was uncompromising in the face of parental and staff complaints about the school’s approach to promoting gender and LGBTQ+ equality. Students and teachers at First Academy spoke in similarly muscular terms about the school’s approach to dealing with intolerant behaviour. These practices imply a more muscular defence of liberal values and articulate with the function of targeting problematic ‘communal substantive values’ that McGhee and Zhang (2017) associate with FBV (941).

As such, the data from Westbrook and First Academy cast doubt on McGhee and Zhang’s (2017) claim that schools have used their ‘local discretion’ to ‘filter out some of the muscularity’ of FBV (948). Although the two schools’ enactment of the duty reflected teachers’ concern for promoting respect for difference, they were prepared
to use muscular means to achieve their goals. I have argued that resolving this apparent tension requires us to reinterrogate what is meant by multiculturalism, notably to distinguish between a positive attitude towards cultural diversity and a *laissez faire* liberal approach to values. Some of the descriptions of British multiculturalism that I discussed in chapter 2 are broadly limited to the former (see, for example, Bleich 1998; Qureshi and Janmaat 2014). In contrast, Johnson and Morris (2012) also identify British multiculturalism with a ‘relativist’ approach to values, particularly in comparison to the ‘objectivist’ stance they associate with French citizenship education (292; see also Favell 2001:135). The ‘muscular liberalism’ I associate with the FBV policy and broader civic integration trend arguably implies a move towards a more ‘objectivist’ stance, wherein schools privilege a particular set of values (see Johnson and Morris 2012:292; James and Janmaat 2019; McGhee and Zhang 2017; Joppke 2014). While ‘the idea of Britain as a multicultural society’ described by Favell (2001) seemed to inform these teachers’ goals with regards to promoting mutual respect and tolerance, it would be difficult to describe their means for achieving this as *laissez faire* or relativist (135.) I return to this point in my discussion of civic integration.

One of the first propositions that I set out to explore in this study was that the ‘liberal’ or multicultural priors of teachers in England (see Bleich 1998) would lead them to resist the duty to promote FBV. I found support for this proposition in some of the empirical studies I discussed in chapter 3. Like the respondents in these studies, several of the teachers I interviewed were critical of the ‘British’ framing of the FBV policy, even if they understood promoting certain values or attitudes among young people as part of their role. Five teachers raised the common criticism that the values in the policy were not exclusively British, or that they were ‘human’ values (see Revell and Bowie 2016; Maylor 2016; Farrell 2016; Busher at al 2017; Vincent 2019a; 2019b; Sant and Hanley 2018). Others had encountered this criticism among teachers at their school, suggesting it is widespread. The idea that the UK does not ‘own’ values such as democracy may reflect the historical lack of reflection on British values, or the notion that in a multicultural society, a range of values exist (Emma, interview 13/03/18; see Favell 2001:96; Goodman 2014; Jerome and Clemitshaw 2012; Johnson and Morris 2012; Starkey 2018). In this sense, even this somewhat limited resistance to the British values discourse may emerge from tendencies I have associated with British
multicultural race relations. The comparisons with France are instructive in this regard; although teachers disagreed on the practical meaning of *laïcité*, they broadly accepted that *liberté, égalité, and fraternité* were the values of the Republic and that it was their job to promote them.

The most vocal opponents of the British values discourse drew more explicitly on multicultural ideas in their criticisms. They shared a concern that the ‘British values’ framing was not inclusive of minority ethnic populations, including some of the students in their school (see also Busher et al 2017; Farrell 2016; Vincent 2019a; Maylor 2016). Their objections to the British values discourse also seemed to emerge from their rejection of the nationalist, imperialist, or even racist ideas they associated with it (see also Sant and Hanley 2018:329; Farrell and Lander 2019:476; Elton-Chalcraft et al 2016; Busher et al 2017). Finally, I see their critiques of FBV as a rejection of the civic and liberal nationalist discourses the policy is embedded in (see Vincent 2019a:2019b; see also McGhee 2008; Jerome and Clemitshaw 2012). All four teachers seemed to reject the idea of patriotism or nationalism, even if these were ostensibly based on civic or liberal identities. They also seemed to question the ‘openness’ of the British values discourse, which they felt evoked ‘narrow’ (Liam, interview 02/10/18), ‘isolationist’ (Emma, interview 13/03/18), or even ‘White’ (Maryam interview 10/05/18) conceptions of Britishness. Their objection to the FBV seems to emerge from their conception of Britain as a ‘mosaic of communities’ and their aversion to the ‘culturally monist’ understandings of citizenship and nationhood they associate with the policy (Mannitz 2004:115; Koopmans et al 2005:52-53). This supports the proposition that teachers’ ‘liberal’ or multicultural ‘priors’ – the ‘prism through which new policy proposals will be filtered’ – lead them to resist the FBV policy (see Bleich 1998:93).

Importantly, however, not all teachers in this study had the same orientations towards Britishness and British values. There are stark contrasts between the vocal critics of FBV and Jane at Westbrook, who had ‘no truck’ with the argument that FBV were human values and insisted that ‘there are some things that are fundamental about being British’ (interview 24/01/19). Her account of what was ‘fundamentally British’ blended elements of a civic or liberal nationalist discourse with a thicker, more ethnicised conception of the nation. While the vocal critics of FBV explicitly rejected...
the ‘culturalization’ of liberal-democratic values such as democracy, Jane actively appropriated them as British (see Mouritsen 2008; Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016). The blurring of civic and ethnic identities was also evident in the school’s FBV displays, an approach that school leaders at First Academy and the SCG explicitly rejected. This supports findings from other studies which suggest that in some schools, the FBV duty has engendered more culturalised representations of Britishness (see also Elton-Chalcraft et al 2017:41; see also Sant and Hanley 2018; Vincent 2019b; Moncrieffe and Moncrieffe 2019).

The finding that teachers in England have different orientations towards Britishness should not be taken as a repudiation of Bleich (1998). Considering that some social actors in Britain subscribe to more monocultural conceptions of nationhood, he argues that the ‘priors’ of actors in the English education system are less ‘uniform’ than they are in France (Bleich 1998:95; see also Boswell and Hampshire 2017; Vincent 2019b). Importantly, however, Jane’s enthusiasm for promoting Britishness places her in the minority among teachers in this study (Vincent 2019b:71). As such, my findings support Vincent’s (2019b) contention that despite the climate of increasing hostility towards the ‘other’, many teachers continue to ‘celebrate diversity’ and ‘promote [...] the idea of Britain as a multicultural society’ (140). In some instances, teachers appear to have maintained these approaches in reaction to this prevailing climate (see also Vincent 2019b:37:101-102). Here, I see similarities with the way some teachers in France have reacted against more restrictive forms of laïcité.

7.3.2.2 Religious education as a resource for action

Teachers at First Academy used the RE curriculum to address FBV and the theme of religious extremism. This further illustrates how existing ideas and practices can provide actors with resources for action in the face of new circumstances (see Carstensen 2011; Jensen 2019). In both instances, teachers have ‘re-interpreted’ existing ‘tools [...] in light of concrete circumstances’; a process Carstensen (2011) describes as ‘bricolage’ (156). I have also argued that the use of RE curriculum to address the FBV mutual respect and tolerance draws on institutionalised ideas about
the role of the subject in promoting ‘mutual recognition’ between the faiths that constitute the ‘British mosaic of communities’ (Mannitz 2004:104-105).

National-level policies encourage teachers to use RE for these purposes, suggesting policymakers have also engaged in this kind of ‘bricolage’ (Carstensen 2011:156). The guidance on promoting FBV recommends that schools ‘use teaching resources from a variety of sources to help pupils understand a range of faiths’, and politicians have underlined the role of RE in promoting mutual respect and tolerance (DfE 2014b:6; Nash 2015, in Farrell 2016:285). The inclusion of the ‘religion, peace, and conflict theme’ in the GCSE religious studies (RS) syllabus - which addresses concepts such as ‘terrorism’ and ‘holy war’ - points to a desire to use the subject to help young people make sense of violent extremism (DfE 2015a:8).

The functions that Mannitz (2004) associates with RE were evident at First Academy and seemed to inform teachers’ understanding that the subject addressed the FBV mutual respect and tolerance. For Mannitz (2004), the focus on teaching young people about the different faiths in the local area serves to ‘reduce stereotypes, promote mutual respect, and contribute to a sense of tolerance’ (107). This articulates with teachers’ broader concern for promoting respect for difference and preparing students for life in a pluralist society (Mannitz 2004). RE teachers at First Academy sought to build tolerance by challenging stereotypes, providing a nuanced understanding of the different beliefs and practices within each faith tradition, and exposing students to different world views. As such, Charlotte and Emma both highlighted RE was an area where the school addressed FBV.

Teachers also highlighted RE as an area where they addressed themes relating to terrorism. They showed a particular concern for challenging misconceptions or negative stereotypes about Islam in the context of recent attacks. While some of the activities they emerged directly from the GCSE RS syllabus, others were more ad hoc discussions that followed a terrorist attack. They point to the importance teachers placed on the RE curriculum as a way of helping young people make sense of recent attacks and challenging some of the prejudices they might engender.
These national and school-level practices give the subject of RE - and the notion that it is important for social cohesion - renewed significance in the English education system. I see similarities with the way recent terrorist attacks have led policymakers and practitioners in France to ‘fall back’ on republican ideas, leading to the ‘stabilization’ or ‘re-interpretation’ of these ideas, albeit in a more limited way (Jensen 2019:627; Carstensen 2011:156). The ‘loose’ ‘enabling’ nature of the FBV duty means other schools in England may not necessarily use RE to address mutual respect and tolerance (Vincent 2019b:54). Respondents in the two other schools in this study did not mention using the RE curriculum in this way, although data from other studies suggest the practices at First Academy may be more widespread (see Farrell 2016; 2019; Farrell and Lander 2019; Vincent 2019b).

The comparisons with France illustrate the ways in which these practices are rooted in national institutions. I have found that some actors in France share similar ideas about the importance of teaching religious phenomena to promote social cohesion and to address the theme of terrorism, but that these ideas have not gained consensus among teachers. I have also pointed to some of the operational issues that make it difficult to put these ideas into practice in France, notably the lack of timetabled slot for RE and a lack of training and resources to support teachers (see Petit 2018; Claus 2016). In the English case, the institutional structures provided by the requirement to teach RE and established notions about the role of the subject in promoting social cohesion provide a more favourable climate for the spread of these practices.

7.3.2.3 Civic integration in England

I have argued that in the English case, the civic integration trend is expressed in the Prevent and FBV duties and the ‘muscular liberalism’ doctrine that gave rise to them (see James 2016; McGhee and Zhang 2017). As McGhee and Zhang (2017) have argued, the FBV policy is a ‘practical’ manifestation of the notion that it is not enough for citizens to comply with the law but must accept liberal-democratic values ‘for their own sake’ (Joppke 2014:289; Cameron 2011a). As such, it reflects the ‘expansion’ of the notion of good citizenship into the more private domain of ‘personal conduct and values’ (Mouritsen 2019:601). FBV and Prevent also reflect the trend towards
increasing ‘state intervention’ in integration processes by entrenching the role of the state and its institutions in promoting or defending ‘British’ values (Mouritsen 2019:601). In these respects, the civic integration trend implies a radical shift from the *laissez faire* notions of ‘freedom from the state’ that authors have associated with British citizenship and English citizenship education (Bowen 2007:11; Favell 2001:96).

A small number of teachers drew on civic integration ideas in interviews. Jane stood out from the other respondents for her proximity to recent government thinking on integration and British values. Her contention that a lack of identification with Britishness could leave Muslim students vulnerable to radicalisation directly reflects ideas from David Cameron’s ‘muscular liberalism’ speech (2011a). Similarly, Hannah at the SCG had absorbed the idea that students’ vocal opposition to FBV could be an indicator of radicalisation. This is one of the messages of the Prevent Duty policy documentation and reflects the presumed causal link between non-violent and violent extremism implied by the muscular liberalism doctrine (see Cameron 2011a; HM Government 2015; DfE 2015b; James and Janmaat 2019; Davies 2016; Durodie 2016; O'Donnell 2016). These examples point to way recent policy texts may have shaped teachers’ thinking on questions relating to integration and extremism.

Charlotte expressed more general ideas I have associated with the ‘backlash’ against multiculturalism and the British values discourse. Her comments reflect the notion that shared values are important for the functioning of multi-ethnic societies, and that nation-states should be muscular in defending them (see for example, Soutphommasane 2012; Mouritsen 2008; Joppke 2014). She also seemed to reject the ‘passive tolerance’ (Cameron 2013) of multiculturalism in favour of more ‘French concepts of integration’ (Mouritsen 2008:3). Charlotte showed less knowledge of specific policies such as FBV, suggesting she may have drawn these ideas from the broader debate on integration and national identity.

Charlotte and Jane’s comments point to specific concerns about Muslim integration, reflecting some of the tendencies I have discussed under the theme of the ‘culturalization of citizenship’ (Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016). Muslim populations often featured as those who may not share the norms and values they associated with Britishness, notably attitudes around sexuality and gender. This reflects a broader
climate wherein ostensibly ‘civic’ debates on shared values are often undermined by discourses that present Muslim populations as deficient in them (see Fozdar and Low 2015; Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016; Larin 2019; Mouritsen et al 2019).

Although few teachers explicitly drew on civic integration ideas in this way, I would argue that the broader influence of civic integration and muscular liberalism were evident in the way teachers at First Academy and Westbrook defended the ideas they associated with tolerance. It is in this respect that I see the most significant shift away from the practices authors have associated with citizenship education in England towards an approach more commonly associated with France. In chapter 2, I argued that British notions of citizenship - based on a negative definition of freedom ‘from the state’ - are expressed in a relativist approach to values in English citizenship education and a reluctance among teachers to challenge parental or communal values (Bowen 2007:11; see also Mouritsen and Jaeger 2018:5; Favell 2001:96; Johnson and Morris 2012:292). In contrast, the ‘statist’ conception of citizenship and integration in France, in which freedom is guaranteed through the state, means that the state is empowered ‘to shape its citizens to promote its vision of the common good’ in institutions at schools, potentially at the expense of parental or communal values (Mouritsen and Jaeger 2018:5; see also Johnson and Morris 2012:292;). The FBV policy, and the ‘muscular’ approach to promoting tolerance I observed at Westbrook and First Academy, align more closely with the latter approach. Teachers at the two schools were more willing to challenge intolerant attitudes and behaviours to defend a particular ‘vision of the common good’ than a ‘Lockean’ conception of the role of the state would imply (Mouritsen and Jaeger 2018:5). Far from deferring to parental or communal preferences, they sought to actively target illiberal ideas they associated with the local community.

However, my data suggest that some teachers subscribe to a more ‘Lockean’ conception of citizenship or values education (Mouritsen and Jaeger 2018:5; Bowen 2007:11). Comments from Graham and Hamza at Mercia reflect the notion that the school ‘is serving [the local] community’ and that it is therefore important to take their views into account when approaching sensitive topics such as relationships and sex education and LGBTQ+ equality (Hamza, interview 22/02/21). Furthermore, Hamza’s comments on promoting LGBTQ+ equality reflect a more limited notion of tolerance
than the one Jane sought to promote at Westbrook. For Jane, it was insufficient for students show outward compliance with tolerant attitudes towards sexual minorities; they must ‘feel it in here’ (interview 25/01/19). This understanding of tolerance aligns more closely with the muscular liberalism doctrine, in which individuals must internalise ‘liberal democratic norms’ rather than complying with them ‘instrumentally’ (Joppke 2014:293). In contrast, the notions of tolerance that teachers such as Hamza and Maryam at First Academy sought to promote focused on students’ outward behaviours towards LGBTQ+ individuals. It seems that while the FBV policy, the muscular liberalism discourse, and the civic integration trend may have created a climate wherein some teachers are willing to be more assertive in their defence of liberal attitudes, others subscribe to a more limited form of liberalism. In this regard, the English education system seems to be in a state of flux between the ‘Lockean or political-liberal’ model of civic education that Mouritsen and Jaeger (2018) have associated with England, and the ‘traditional republican-liberal model’ they associate with France (5).

7.3.2.4 British multicultural race relations and civic integration in English schools: Conclusions

In this section, I have argued that multicultural ideas are reflected in teachers’ emphasis on promoting mutual respect and tolerance as a way of preparing students for life in multicultural Britain. As such, the FBV mutual respect and tolerance was especially salient in teacher interviews, sometimes at the expense of the other values in the policy. I see this an example of where path dependencies can ‘originate in existing policies’ (see Jensen 2019:627). Following Vincent (2019b), I have argued that previous multicultural policies feed into teachers’ goals as educators. Furthermore, teachers in all four schools addressed the FBV duty through activities aimed at promoting respect for diversity - often ‘repackaging’ existing activities - leading the persistence of multicultural practices (Vincent 2019b:92). The design of the policy enables teachers to enact it in ways that fit with these pre-given aims and to counter some of the more nationalist or exclusionary discourses it is embedded in (see Vincent 2019b:99; McGhee and Zhang 2017:940).
Teachers’ use of the RE curriculum to address the FBV and the context of terrorism also illustrates how existing ideas and practices can provide actors with resources for action in the face of new challenges (see Carstensen 2011; Jensen 2019). Drawing on institutionalised ideas about the role of RE in promoting ‘mutual recognition’ between different faith communities, teachers at First Academy have ‘re-interpreted’ this ‘tool’ to meet the requirements of the FBV duty (Mannitz 2004:115; Carstensen 2011:156). They have also used the RE curriculum to help students make a sense of recent terrorist attacks.

I have also found support for my proposition that teachers’ multicultural ‘priors’ would lead them to resist the FBV policy and the discourses it is embedded in (see Bleich 1998). Comments from the four most vocal critics of FBV suggest that the ‘British’ framing of the policy conflicted with their multicultural conception of the nation. They also seemed to question the ostensible ‘openness’ of the British values discourse and the notion that a national identity based on shared values is a prerequisite for the functioning of multi-ethnic societies (see Soutphommasane 2012). However, comments from Jane and Charlotte support Bleich’s (1998) contention that ‘priors’ can vary within one country, and suggest that civic integration notions of integration through shared values may have filtered down to the school level (93).

More broadly, my data also the that the muscular liberalism discourse may have created a climate in which some teachers are willing to be more assertive in their defence of liberal values such as tolerance. This was evident at Westbrook and First Academy, where teachers took a muscular approach to challenging the intolerant attitudes they associated with the local community. Like the other teachers in this study, however, teachers in these schools manifested a commitment to promoting respect for diversity and preparing students for life in multicultural Britain. This points to a need to distinguish between a ‘multicultural’ concern for celebrating and valuing difference and laissez faire or relativist position on values. While some teachers reflected more ‘Lockean’ notions of citizenship education, and a more limited understanding of what tolerance means in practice, others draw on more maximal notions of tolerance, and were prepared to use muscular means to achieve it (see Mouritsen and Jaeger 2018:5).
In this sense, while my data point to the influence of civic integration ideas on teachers’ ideas and practices, civic integration has not ‘replaced’ multiculturalism. The FBV policy reflects ideas about the importance of shared values, and the tying together of integration and security concerns, but also draws on a multicultural conception of the role of the school. Furthermore, the ‘enabling’ nature of the duty gives teachers’ some capacity to enact it through multicultural practices and in ways that fit with their multicultural conception of citizenship and nationhood (Vincent 2019b:54). While some teachers may have leaned into the civic integration turn, many seem to actively work against it. In this sense, multicultural and civic integration ideas can co-exist at different levels of governance, but also between and within schools. This somewhat mixed picture seems to illustrate Carstensen’s (2011) point that the introduction of new ideas through ‘bricolage’ leads to evolutionary change, rather than a radical break with the past (163). Policymakers have arguably introduced civic integration ideas into the English education system, but these ideas have had to fit with existing institutional conditions, including the existing ideas and practices of teachers. This leads to somewhat tentative steps in the direction of civic integration.

7.3.3 National models of immigrant integration, civic integration, and educational responses to terrorism: Comparative conclusions

This section draws together my findings in relation to SQ2, returning to the propositions I developed in chapter 2. I have found that in both countries, policymakers and education professionals have used the institutionalised ideas and practices I associate with the two countries’ ‘public philosophies of integration’ as resources in response to the challenges posed by recent terrorist attacks (Jensen 2019:621; Carstensen 2011). This tendency is more evident in France, where the notion of integration through the values of liberté, égalité, fraternité and, increasingly, laïcité continues to hold sway among actors at different levels of the system. These ideas have informed recent policies such as the Great Mobilisation, and the enactment of these policies at the school level has led to their ‘stabilization’ (see Jensen 2019:627). Moreover, I have argued that the disciplinary turn in recent practices around laïcité and the tendency of some actors to interpret violations of laïcité as indicators of radicalisation draw on institutionalised ideas about what it means to be
successfully integrated. This leads to responses to terrorism that would be difficult to imagine in the English context.

In the English case, multiculturalism has fallen out of favour as an official policy framing, although I have argued that the FBV policy text draws on the notion of Britain as a multicultural society and reflects a continued concern for promoting respect for diversity. Furthermore, the ‘policy sediment’ of multiculturalism and community cohesion inform teachers’ concern for preparing students for life in multicultural Britain by promoting tolerance and respect for difference (Vincent 2019b:101; McGhee and Zhang 2017). This explains their emphasis on the FBV mutual respect and tolerance, and their tendency to address the FBV duty through practices that celebrate diversity. Drawing on multicultural ideas about the role of RE in promoting ‘mutual recognition’ between different faiths, teachers in England also have used the RE curriculum to address the FBV duty and the theme of terrorism (see Mannitz 2004:105). In this sense, path dependencies emerge through teachers’ ideas – which draw on existing policies – as well as their bias towards familiar practices (see Jensen 2019:627).

The challenges associated with recent terrorist attacks have also led policymakers in both countries to look beyond institutionalised ideas, leading to a degree of ‘inter-paradigm borrowing’ and convergence in policies and practices (Carstensen 2011:156). This is evident in the turn towards civic integration and muscular liberalism in Britain, which finds its expression in the Prevent and FBV duties. I have argued that this trend has created a climate in which some teachers are prepared to be more muscular in their defence of values such as tolerance. In this respect, ideas and practices in some English schools have moved towards tendencies I have associated with France, with teachers playing a more active role in promoting the values required for ‘good citizenship’ (see Mouritsen et al 2019:601; Favell 2001; Mouritsen and Jaeger 2018; Johnson and Morris 2012).

The proximity of French republican integration to civic integration makes it difficult to speak of a civic integration ‘trend’ driven by recent terrorist attacks. On one level, the context of terrorism has accentuated pre-existing tendencies that ‘resonate’ with civic integration (Joppke 2007a:9; see also Mouritsen 2008:3; Goodman 2014:184). I have also argued that concerns about violent extremism and Muslim integration have led to
the emergence of practices that ‘expand’ the definition of good citizenship and deepen the role of the state in bringing it about (Mouritsen et al 2019:601). These trends manifest themselves in contemporary practices around *laïcité*, pointing to the way civic integration ideas interact existing with national public philosophies and institutions (see Mouritsen et al 2019:599).

The recent emphasis on teaching religious phenomena in French schools represents a clearer example of policy elites introducing new ideas into the system. I have argued that this emerges from a sense that the prevailing paradigm for addressing religion in French schools is inadequate for addressing the challenges posed recent terrorist attacks. The emphasis on strengthening practices in this area at the national level has filtered down to the local level in some contexts, leading to similarities with England. In this instance, the French education system has made some limited steps towards the English education system.

Importantly, however, I have found that some teachers’ ‘priors’ have led them to resist more novel aspects of national policies, placing limits on these convergent trends (see Bleich 1998). In France, the notion that religion does not belong in school has led some teachers to resist calls to engage with religious ideas in the classroom (see also Laborde 2019). In England, some teachers’ multicultural ideas led them to reject the British values discourse. Furthermore, although some teachers took a muscular approach to promoting tolerance, others draw on more ‘Lockean’ notions of citizenship education, suggesting the influence of muscular liberalism is only partial (see Mouritsen and Jaeger 2018:5). This seems to demonstrate Carstensen’s (2011) point that since new ideas must gain acceptance among stakeholders and fit within existing ideas and institutions, ‘bricolage’ often leads to evolutionary change, rather than a radical break with the past (163). Although the patterns of convergence I have observed at the level of policymaking are evident at the school level, they exist alongside older ideas, and have not necessarily taken hold across the education system.

Finally, my findings underline Bleich’s (1998) point that ‘priors’ are not uniform within one country; teachers in both countries have different ideas about integration and cultural diversity. As has been found in other empirical studies, there was a sense that
teachers sought to promote more accommodating approaches to cultural diversity to counteract a prevailing climate of hostility towards difference or specifically towards Islam (see Vincent 2019b:101; Laborde and Silhol 2018). Comments from other teachers point to their alignment with this broader climate. There is less support, however, for Bleich’s (1998) claim that ‘priors’ are more uniform in France than they are in England (95). Rather, teachers in England overwhelmingly manifested a multicultural conception of nationhood and a commitment to celebrating diversity, while the picture in France is more complex. The staffroom conflicts over laïcité were a recurrent theme in interviews, suggesting there is significant disagreement among teachers on these issues. In this sense, my data suggest that ideas on cultural diversity and integration may be at least as contested in France as they are in England, if not more so.

7.4 Conclusion: Significance of the study, limitations, and further research

This study contributes to the debate on the analytical relevance of national models of immigrant integration and the recent turn towards civic integration by applying these ideas to empirical data from four schools in France and England. Several of the previous contributions to this debate have focused on national policymaking as a level of analysis and few comparative studies have applied these ideas to educational responses to terrorism. The comparative research design has enabled me to draw out the similarities and differences in teachers’ ideas and practices within and between the two countries and develop an empirically grounded account of how prevailing ideas on integration affect educational responses to terrorism at the school level.

The analysis reveals how civic integration ideas ‘coexist’ and ‘intersect’ with the two countries’ ‘philosophies of integration’ and how the common policy problem of terrorism is addressed in the two national contexts (Mouritsen et al 2019:597; Favell 2001). In the French case, the analysis provides new insights into how civic integration ideas and concerns about terrorism feed into contemporary practices around laïcité, both at the national level and at the school level. The data also shed light on the competing conceptions of laïcité that exist at the school level and reveal that ideas on cultural diversity may be more contested than Bleich (1998) has suggested (95). In the
English case, I have pointed to a need to distinguish between a ‘multicultural’ concern for promoting respect for diversity, and a ‘Lockean’ or ‘relativist’ approach to citizenship and values education; this distinction is not always evident in earlier work (see, for example Johnson and Morris 2012:292; Favell 2001;135). While the former was evident in all four case schools, the recent trend towards civic integration means the picture in relation to the latter is somewhat ambivalent. The comparison of the two education systems reveals that policymakers in both countries have looked beyond existing policy paradigms in response to the challenges posed by terrorism, leading to convergence in some areas. However, my analysis points to the way the scale of change is limited by existing ideas and institutions, including teachers’ ‘priors’ (Bleich 1998).

My research design also provides new insights into how governance arrangements determine the degree of variation in policy enactments between schools in one country. I have found that the limits policies such as the Prevent duty and the EMC curriculum place on teachers’ decision-making capacity means there is less variation in how they were enacted in different contexts. In contrast, the FBV duty gives teachers considerable freedom to determine how to promote the values in the policy, and anti-radicalisation policies in France do not require all schools to take significant action. These looser governance arrangements lead to more variation between schools. Overall, there is greater variation in local policy enactments in France than earlier comparative work would suggest, and the compulsory nature of the Prevent duty poses a challenge to the idea of a laissez faire approach to policymaking in Britain (see Bleich 1998; Archer 1983; see Favell 2001:96; cf. Buisson-Fenet 2007).

Moreover, this thesis provides an account of how the more material, contextual factors that affect policy enactment in schools interact with the ideational factors that tend to dominate the debate on national models of immigrant integration. Notable among these are the governance arrangements I discussed above. While in some cases, these enable local actors to enact the policies in ways that fit with their ‘priors’, they can also constrain their capacity for action (Bleich 1998). In both countries, local actors have used their decision-making capacity to pursue a more accommodating approach to cultural diversity that sometimes contrasted with the national-level approach. In particular, the design of the FBV policy has enabled teachers to ‘smooth out the
potentially sharp nationalist edges’ of the FBV duty (Vincent 2019b:79; 2018; McGhee and Zhang 2017:948). This supports findings from earlier work suggesting that the decentralised nature of the English education system means that multicultural practices have often prevailed at the local level, even when national governments have pursued more monocultural policies (see Qureshi and Janmaat 2014; Bleich 1998; Meer et al 2009). The decision-making capacity of académie-level actors means this proposition may increasingly apply to France (see also Laborde and Silhol 2018; Laborde 2019).

Although the design of the FBV policy gives teachers significant autonomy to decide how to enact the duty, however, the threat of failing an Ofsted inspection means that in some cases, the orientation of individual teachers towards the British values discourse may be immaterial. The compulsory nature of Prevent duty and the message that it an element of safeguarding also seem to foreclose possibilities for debate on the normative implications of the duty (see Jerome et al 2019:830; Busher et al 2017:61-62; Elwick and Jerome 2019:350). As such, teachers’ real or perceived ‘capacity to act’ may be at least as important as their ‘priors’ in explaining their response to individual policies (Elwick and Jerome 2019:339).

This study also contributes to the emerging field of research on CVE policies in the education sector by providing insight on their enactment and effects in two contrasting national contexts. I have found that the compulsory nature of the Prevent means that CVE policies are more widely implemented in England than they are in France. This, along with the ‘Prevent as safeguarding message’, and teachers’ familiarity with the duty seems to explain why I encountered less resistance to CVE policies among teachers in England compared to France (Busher et al 2017:7). On one level, this may suggest that the negative effects of CVE policies identified in the comparative studies I discussed in chapter 3 may be more acute in the English context. For example, Ragazzi and Walmsley (2021) find that the negative impact on students’ freedom of expression is more pronounced in England, since the compulsory nature of Prevent creates a ‘low threshold’ for referrals (47). If governance arrangements mean that teachers are more likely refer their students in cases of doubt, this increases the risk that a broad range of religious practices or political opinions will be treated as indicators of radicalisation.
However, I would argue that recent policies and practices in France incur similar risks. Firstly, my data suggest that CVE activities in France may be more targeted at schools with a significant minority ethnic and/or Muslim population than England. As such, the disproportionate and discriminatory focus on Islam that is common to CVE policies in other countries may be more pronounced in the French case (Kundnani and Hayes 2018:11; see also Ragazzi 2018:56-58). Furthermore, I have argued that while France’s CVE policies are less widely implemented than Prevent, the blurred boundaries between violations of laïcité and indicators of radicalisation - both in the official policy discourse and in the minds of some teachers - creates similar problems to explicit CVE policies. In a climate where apparent expressions of students’ religious or cultural identities were already framed as ‘violations of laïcité’ by some teachers, the message that these may also be indicators of radicalisation is likely to lead to further restrictions on students’ rights to freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and to cultural identity (see Ragazzi 2018:70-74).

The tendency to reframe common issues associated with educating young people as radicalisation or security issues was evident in both contexts (see Ragazzi 2018; Ragazzi and Walmsley 2021). This was especially salient in the data from France, where I have argued that issues such as students’ positioning on Charlie Hebdo’s publication of cartoons of Muhammad and laïcité ‘problems’ have often been ‘recast’ as security issues (Ragazzi 2018:103). This runs the risk of undermining teachers’ confidence in their ability to resolve these issues in the classroom (see Ragazzi and Walmsley 2021:63). Like some of the educators in Ragazzi and Walmsley’s (2021) study, however, teachers in this study expressed discomfort with the way these issues were framed in the policy discourse and sought to address them through classroom discussion. The data from the SoF suggest that some mid-level policy actors have sought to re-establish teachers’ ‘control and autonomy over issues that pertain to the pedagogical skillset’, notably by developing their capacity to manage controversial issues in the classroom (Ragazzi 2018:103; Ragazzi and Walmsley 2021:57-58). In a similar vein, the data from Mercia Academy suggest an attempt by school leaders to ‘relocat[e] prevention in a pedagogical context’ by addressing issues commonly associated with radicalisation through the curriculum (Ragazzi and Walmsley 2021:57; see also Elwick and Jerome 2019).
The comparison of the countries’ ‘values’ policies provides insights that could inform future policy and practice. In England, the introduction of FBV has coincided with the decline in the significance of citizenship education. Since the arrival of the Conservative-led Coalition in 2010, the content of the citizenship programme of study has been reduced, there has been a decline in the number of specialist teachers, and the subject is no longer mandatory for academies and free schools, which represent an increasing proportion of state-funded schools in England (see Vincent 2019b:44-47; Starkey 2018:4-6). Teachers also have limited guidance on how to promote FBV.

The limitations of these arrangements were especially evident at the SCG. Mary experienced challenges ensuring some teachers engaged with FBV and called for more training, guidance, and resources to support them in this area. Although respondents in France raised similar challenges, I would argue that addressing republican values through EMC programme creates more space for meaningful engagement with them. For example, the lessons I observed addressed how abstract principles such as equality and laïcité are expressed through French law and constitutional arrangements. The EMC curriculum also provides a stronger incentive for teachers to address the values in their teaching and more guidance on how to do this. As Starkey (2018) has argued, implementing the FBV through a citizenship programme could provide greater scope for students to discuss and interrogate them (4).

My findings are limited in the sense that they relate to a small number of schools. Other empirical studies support my finding that despite the recent ‘civic’ turn and a broader climate of hostility to cultural difference in England, teachers have a stronger orientation towards multicultural ideas (Vincent 2019b:140; Jerome and Clemitshaw 2012). Similarly, studies by Laborde and Silhol (2018) and Laborde (2019) point to the way the decision-making capacity of local actors in France has enabled some to pursue a more accommodating approach to laïcité and to address questions of ethnic difference more explicitly. However, since educational responses to terrorism in France have received less scholarly attention than in England, there is a need for further research to determine how widespread the ‘open’ approach to laïcité I have identified here is. Limitations also emerge from the timing of my data collection, which ended in January 2021. Anti-radicalisation policies in France evolved during my time
in the field, extending the role of schools and teachers in preventing violent extremism. Further research could investigate the impact of the recent ‘law against separatisms’ and the requirement on schools to establish a radicalisation monitoring group (see Vie Publique 2021; Eduscol 2022b). These developments suggest that CVE activities may have reached a larger number of schools than my data suggest and point to increasing similarities with the English context.


Eduscol. (2022b) Politique de prévention de la radicalisation violente en milieu scolaire [Policy for Preventing Violent Radicalisation in Schools]. [online] Eduscol. Available at: <https://eduscol.education.fr/1017/politique-de-prevention-de-la-radicalisation-violente-en-milieu-scolaire#~:text=En%20milieu%20scolaire%2C%20la%20politique,est%20port%C3%A9e%20de%20fa%C3%A7on%20partenariale.> [Accessed 26 September 2022].


INSEE. (2022) *Étrangers - Immigrés – Tableaux de l'économie française | Insee*. [online] Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques. Available at:


### Appendix 1 – Research design table

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research question</th>
<th>Propositions (if applicable)</th>
<th>Sources of data</th>
<th>Logic linking data to propositions</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>RQ1</strong>: How are teachers, school leaders, and other local education actors in England and France enacting recent national policy responses to the context of terrorism and what responses have they developed on their own initiative?</td>
<td>Need to prevent young people being drawn into terrorism is seen as part of schools’ pre-existing safeguarding duties (Busher at al 2017: First Academy). Safeguarding dimension under direction of Designated Safeguarding Lead (‘Dave’, personal communication, 28/11/17; Busher at al 2017; First Academy). Curriculum dimension comes through humanities and PSHE curriculum. Some schools have Prevent curriculum lead (Busher et al 2017; ‘Dave’, personal communication, 28/11/17; First Academy). Pastoral activities (eg. form tutor periods and assemblies) a forum for discussing controversial issues.</td>
<td><strong>Case studies</strong>&lt;br&gt;Observation&lt;br&gt;Lessons.&lt;br&gt;Pastoral activities (tutor time and assemblies).&lt;br&gt;Staff training.&lt;br&gt;Meetings. <strong>Interviews</strong>&lt;br&gt;Prevent/safeguarding leads.&lt;br&gt;Head teacher.&lt;br&gt;Teachers involved in Prevent.&lt;br&gt;Other staff. <strong>Documentary analysis</strong>&lt;br&gt;Lesson plans and resources.&lt;br&gt;Visual material around school (display).&lt;br&gt;Curriculum mapping documents.&lt;br&gt;Records of Prevent training and planning days.</td>
<td>Questions around implementation will largely be answered by the case studies. The data collection methods have been selected to cover the different activities - past and present - that may make up schools’ implementation of the policies. As well as focusing on the timeline of schools implementation of the policies, the data will shed light on how local and regional policy officials (such as Prevent Education Officers and référents laïcité and...</td>
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and dealing directly with terrorism ('Dave', personal communication, 28/11/17; First Academy).

Local authority and academy chains provide general support and guidance in implementation of policies (Interview with Dave; First Academy).

Consultants and edu-business provide teacher training and curriculum resources (Busher et al).

Letters and emails relating to Prevent. Policy documents. Records of previous or planned activities.

**Other interviews**

Prevent Education Officer in 2 local authorities.
Prevent lead in academy chains (if such positions exist)

**Secondary sources**

Previous studies in the field.
Press articles.

radicalisation) and other partners support and monitor the work of schools. As such, the study will highlight the differences in governance structure between the two countries.

The interviews with local and regional policy officials will provide a broader picture of how schools are implementing the policies. This understanding will guide data collection in the case study schools.

Overall, the hope is that a using a wide range of evidence and triangulating the data from different sources

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### How are schools in England responding to their duty to promote fundamental British values (FBV)?

Promotion of FBV ‘mapped’ across different areas of curriculum and school life (‘Dave’, personal communication, 28/11/17; Vincent, in press; Maylor 2016).

Fundamental British values mainly ‘taught’ in citizenship (where still taught), RE, History, and PSHE (First Academy; Vincent, in press).

Pastoral activities (eg. form tutor periods and assemblies) used for the promotion of FBV (First Academy; Vincent, in press).

Case studies

Observations

Pastoral activities (tutor time and assemblies).
Staff training.
Meetings.

Interviews

Prevent/safeguarding leads.
Head teacher.
Teachers of citizenship, PSHE, History, RE.
Other staff.

Lessons.
Extracurricular activities (e.g. debate club, school trips, mock trial) feature in promotion of FBV.

Local authority and academy chains provide general support and guidance in implementation of policies (‘Dave’, personal communication, 28/11/17)

Consultants and edu-business provide teacher training and curriculum resources (Vincent, in press; Moncrieff and Moncrieff 2017).

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<tr>
<th>How are schools in France responding to their role within the politique de lutte contre la radicalisation violente et les filières terroristes?</th>
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<tr>
<td>Children ‘at risk’ dealt with through ‘cellules de suivi’ under direction of school leaders and working alongside regional-level ‘référents radicalisation. (MEN 2016)</td>
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<td>Curricular dimension dealt with through the Grande Mobilisation.</td>
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<td>Curriculum mapping documents.</td>
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<td>CPE.</td>
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</table>

will increase the internal and external validity of the findings (see Yin 2014).
### How are schools in France responding to the *Grande Mobilisation de l'École pour les Valeurs de la République?*

**Parcours citoyen** as most concrete measure. Including:
- Civic and Moral Education
- Media and Information Education
- Focus on the promotion of debate and critical thinking

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Data Collection Methods</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(MEN 2016)</td>
<td>Headteacher. Teachers involved in implementation. Other staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MEN 2016)</td>
<td><strong>Documentary analysis</strong> Lesson plans and resources. Visual material around school. Curriculum mapping documents. Records of training and planning days. Letters and emails relating to policy. Policy documents. Records of previous or planned activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MEN 2016; ‘Hubert’, personal communication 28/06/18)</td>
<td><strong>Other interviews</strong> Civil servants working in the field of radicalisation Référents ‘radicalisation’. Secondary analysis Previous studies in the field. Press articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MEN 2016)</td>
<td><strong>Case studies</strong> Observation Lessons. Pastoral activities. Staff training. Meetings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Observation</strong> Lessons. Pastoral activities. Staff training. Meetings.</td>
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</table>
| Beyond activities directly related to government policies, what actions are schools taking to respond to the context of terrorism and extremism? | Introduction of Civic and Moral Education and philosophical debates in vocational tracks of upper secondary (MEN 2015a; Lorcerie and Moignard 2018; Lycée Gustave Eiffel)

Referents laïcité play a key role in the promotion of laïcité as a value and in training and support for schools (MEN 2015a).

Regional Committees for Health and Citizenship Education (CDESC) support schools in the implementation (MEN 2015a)

Schools to determine ‘parcours citoyen’, with input from elected student representatives (MEN 2015a).

| Interviews |
| CPE. |
| Headteacher. |
| Teachers involved in implementation. |
| Other staff. |

| Documentary analysis |
| Lesson plans and resources. |
| Visual material around school. |
| Curriculum mapping documents. |
| Records of training and planning days. |
| Letters and emails relating to policy. |
| Policy documents. |
| Records of previous or planned activities. |

| Other interviews |
| Inspecteurs académiques. |
| Référents laïcité and EMC. |

| Secondary analysis |
| Previous studies in the field. |
| Press articles |

| Case studies |
| Teacher interviews |

| England - extremism dealt with in RE curriculum with a focus on religious knowledge and debunking myths (First Academy) |
Assemblies and pastoral time used to talk about terrorist attacks as they occur (First Academy).

France
Focus on combatting ‘violations of laïcité’ tied up with fight against extremism (MEN 2018; ‘Hubert’, personal communication 28/06/18).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SQ1: What are the similarities and differences in local level enactments within and between the two countries?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>What similarities and differences exist in school responses within the two countries?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What similarities and differences exist in school responses between the two countries?</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### SQ2: How are prevailing ideas on immigrant integration and cultural diversity reflected in these enactments and actors’ broader responses to the context of terrorism?

| To what extent, and in which ways, are the British multicultural and the French Republican philosophies of integration reflected in educators’ responses to the policies under study? | National models hypothesis: National models of immigrant integration reflected in schools’ responses to terrorism. Educators draw on multicultural or French republican discourses in explaining their responses. England Salience of race/ethnicity and religion as markers of difference (see Favell 2001). Tendency towards ‘active’ and ‘passive’ multicultural approaches in responses to terrorism/policies (see Bleich 1998) Significant role for religious education and ‘daily active worship’ in responding to terrorist threat (Mannitz 2004; First Academy) In some cases, resistance to and discomfort with ‘British values’ leads to adaptations of policy in | Case studies Cross-case synthesis within and between countries. | In-depth interviews and focus groups will elicit practitioners’ responses to the policies (practical, intellectual, and emotional) as well as their explanations of these responses. A particular focus will be on the extent to prevailing discourses of integration – be they national models or civic integration discourses – might frame these responses. As the study progresses, there will be more and more opportunities to share practices from the other country with participants and to invite comment. It is hoped that this will elicit further similarities |
line with multicultural ‘priors’ of teachers (Bleich 1998; McGhee and Zhang 2017; First Academy; Vincent, in press; Maylor 2016; Busher et al 2017; Bowie and Revell 2016; Farrell 2016).

France
‘Colour blind’ responses to integration persist (Favell 2001)
Tendency towards ‘assimilation’ (Bleich 1998)
Laïcité significant part of responses to terrorism (see Orange 2016; 2017; Lorcerie and Moignard 2017).
Discomfort with anti-racist elements of grande mobilisation (Bleich 1998).
Lack of engagement with elements of policy that aim to bring parents closer to the school (Lorcerie 2010).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To what extent, and in what ways, are the common context of Islamist terrorism leading to convergence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic integration hypothesis: Schools adopt similar responses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse around the failure of multiculturalism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and differences in values and practices between the two countries.

Observations will be used alongside in-depth interviews to see how teachers’ values manifest themselves in their practice. I will also ask teachers and school leaders about what I have observed in order to analyse the discourses they draw on to explain their practice.

Data analysis will draw out the similarities and differences in how teachers in the two countries understand their role, and how they respond to the policies. It will also relate the data to the literature on national models of immigrant integration and civic integration.
| in educators’ values and practices? | Promotion of common culture and values seen as important. France Discourse around the failure of republican integration/the institutions of the republic Addressing race and religion in schools seen as important. |  |  |
Appendix 2 – Interview guides (indicative)

Interview questions – Teachers

I) School-level implementation

A) Can you tell me what you know about the Prevent duty and how your school is implementing it?

1. What’s happening now?
2. How, if at all, has the school’s approach changed shape over time? Key turning points. Actors.

Prompts:
- Curriculum
- Pastoral
- Extracurricular
- School policies
- Community activity
- Staff activities

B) The duty to promote fundamental British values is closely linked to the Prevent duty, but has a slightly different focus. I’d like you to tell me what you know about this duty and about how your school is promoting fundamental British values:

1. What’s happening now?
2. How, if at all, has the school’s approach changed shape over time? Key turning points. Actors.

Prompts:
- Curriculum
- Pastoral
- Extracurricular
- School policies
- Community activity
- Staff activities

II) Personal involvement

A) What role do you as an individual play in making sure the school meets its duty to prevent young people from being drawn into terrorism?

1. What is your day-to-day involvement with the Prevent duty?
2. When did you first become aware of it?
3. What involvement, if any, did you have in its implementation?
4. Can you tell me about the training and support have you received?

B) What about promoting FBV?

1. What is your day-to-day role in promoting FBV?
2. When did you first become aware of it?
3. What involvement, if any, did you have in its implementation?
4. Can you tell me about the training and support have you received?

III) School and individual approach and how it differs from others

A) School
Let’s start with the school. This might be a difficult question, but I’d like to know how you think your school’s implementation of the policies might differ to other schools?

Probe for things that make it different:

- School ethos.
- Staff.
- Leadership.

B) Individual
What about you personally? Let’s start with your experience of the policies and how you approach them.

1. Talk to me about how you promote fundamental British values as a teacher?
2. Talk me through a lesson/assembly/club that you have done that promotes FBV.
3. What about the curricular and other aspects of preventing terrorism? Could you tell me how you approach this in your work with students?
4. Talk to me about a time where you have had to deal with the topic of terrorism or extremism in your work with students.

   Probe for:
   - Lesson content?
   - Approach to planning?
   - Teaching methods?
   - Student responses?

5. What do you find challenging? How do you meet those challenges?

   Probe for examples of challenges faced and how they were met.

6. How do you think your approach might be different from other teachers in this school?

IV) Thoughts, feelings, values, and how these have changed

1. What, if any, have been the benefits of the Prevent duty and promoting FBV?

   School community?
   Staff?
   Students?
   Parents?

2. What, if any, have been the disadvantages?
3. Your school serves a community that is ethnically and religiously diverse. I’d like you to talk to me about how these policies have changed the way your school responds to this diversity.

4. If you can remember, I’d like you to tell me how you initially felt about the idea that you as a teacher should play a role in preventing terrorism?

5. How has this changed over time?

6. What about this idea of promoting fundamental British values?

7. How has this changed?

8. Domestic terrorism is clearly an ongoing problem. For example, here have been five terrorist attacks in the last year. These policies are aimed at responding to this threat. I’d like to get a sense of how this context of terrorism has affected the way you do your job and think about your role.
Interview questions – School leaders

I) Implementation

A) Talk me through your school’s implementation of the Prevent duty.

1. What’s happening now?
   - Curriculum (which areas? Which staff? How much time?).
   - Pastoral.
   - Extracurricular.
   - School policies.
   - Community activity.
   - Staff activities (initial and ongoing training. Meetings).

2. Can you tell me which steps you went through to make sure you were meeting the duty? Thinking back to when you first became aware of it.

3. How have you worked with others to implement the duty (LEA/academy chain/other schools/outside agencies)?

4. How, if at all, has the school’s approach changed over time? Key turning points.

5. Key people I should speak to.

B) FBVs are a strand of Prevent, and are closely linked, but have slightly different focus. I’d like you to talk about how your school is promoting these:

1. What’s happening now?
   - Curriculum (which areas? Which staff? How much time?).
   - Pastoral.
   - Extracurricular.
   - School policies.
   - Community activity.
   - Staff activities (initial and ongoing training. Meetings).

2. Can you tell me which steps you went through to make sure you were meeting the duty? Thinking back to when you first became aware of it.

3. How have you worked with others to implement the duty (LEA/academy chain/other schools/outside agencies)?

4. How, if at all, has the school’s approach changed shape over time? Key turning points.

5. Key people I should speak to.

III) School and individual approach and how it differs from others

1. Based on what you know, how might your school’s implementation of the Prevent duty differ to other schools in the borough? The country?

2. What, if anything, makes your school’s approach to the promotion of FBV different from other schools? Probe for things that make it different:
   - School ethos.
   - Staff.
   - Leadership/leaders own values.
3. What is your school doing well with regards to the two duties?
4. What would you like to see improve?

IV) Thoughts, feelings, values, and how these have changed

9. What have been the different responses from teachers and other staff to the policies? Positives? Criticisms? Reluctance? Resistance? How has this changed over time?
10. What, if any, do you think have been the benefits of the Prevent duty and promoting FBV?
   - School community?
   - Staff?
   - Students?
   - Parents?
11. What, if any, have been the disadvantages?
12. Your school serves a community that is ethnically and religiously diverse. I’d like you to talk to me about how you think these policies have changed the way your school responds to this diversity.
13. If you can remember, I’d like you to tell me how you initially felt about the idea that schools should play a role in preventing terrorism?
14. How has this changed over time?
15. What about this idea of promoting fundamental British values?
16. How has this changed?
17. Domestic terrorism is clearly an ongoing problem. For example, here have been five terrorist attacks in the last year. These policies are aimed at responding to this threat. I’d like to get a sense of how this context of terrorism has affected what happens in your school, but also you as an educator.

   Self: What about you as a school leader? What you do? What you think?
Interview questions – Local and regional level policy actors

I) Own role and Prevent in the local authority

1. Can you talk to me a bit about your role? How do you support schools in their implementation? Talk me through the process by which you establish and maintain contact with schools.

2. Where does this fit in the implementation of Prevent and FBV from a local authority perspective?

3. Can you talk to me about the profile of schools in the borough? Primary/secondary academy/LA secular/denominational mainstream/special?

4. How does the support you provide differ depending on whether the school is a LA or academy chain?

5. Based on your understanding, how does what you do in LA compare to other LAs?

II) Implementation of Prevent/FBVs

1. What kind of activities and policies are schools using to implement Prevent?

2. FBVs?

3. Is there a difference between types of schools - primary/secondary academy/LA secular/denominational mainstream/special?

4. What challenges do schools face in implementing the policies? How are they meeting these challenges?

5. Would your recommend any schools in the borough as interesting cases? Typically good or bad? Particular challenges or contexts? Typical of the borough? Interesting in terms of values.

III) Attitudes to the policies

1. What attitudes towards the policies have you encountered in your work?

Prompt for differences between:
Schools
Older and younger teachers
Teachers and school leadership

2. What does good implementation of the policies look like to you?

3. What does bad implementation look like to you?

4. What do you think are the benefits of the policies?

5. What do you think are the drawbacks?
Appendix 3 – Participant Information Sheets

Participant Information Sheet for Teacher Interviews in England

YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS INFORMATION SHEET

Title of Study:
An investigation into the impact of Islamist terrorism on education policy and practice in England and France

Department:
Education, practice and society

Name and Contact Details of the Researcher(s):
Jonathan James
[redacted]

1. Invitation Paragraph

You are being invited to take part in research project as part of a PhD programme. Before you decide it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what participation will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for reading this.

2. What is the project’s purpose?

The aim of the project is to investigate how policies developed in response to the threat of Islamist terrorism are being implemented in schools in England and France. In the English case, the focus is on the Prevent duty and the duty to promote fundamental British values. Similar duties have been placed on schools in France. The study seeks to understand how similar the policies in the two countries are. I am particularly interested in how policies might be shaped by the ethos of a school and by the values of the individuals who work in it. I also want to find out how the two countries’ historical approaches to immigration and diversity might feed into schools’ implementation of the policies. The study will look out how values and practices differ between England and France, but also within the two countries. The research will take approximately three years and will largely be based on case studies from schools in different parts of England and France. These will involve observations, analysis of documents, and interviews with staff.

The pilot study will take place in early 2018 and will involve one school in London and one school in Paris. Its aim is to help me better understand how schools are implementing the policies. This in turn will inform the planning of the main phase of the project. It will also give me a chance to test out the interview questions and other data collection methods.
3. Why have I been chosen?

I am approaching you because your head teacher has agreed to let me carry out case study research in your school. I am including schools based in a context of ethnic and religious diversity, and who might therefore have a particular interest in implementing the policies successfully. I am aiming for a representative sample of teachers. This means I will be looking for a mixture of genders, ethnicities, and years of service. I also want to speak to people at different levels of the school hierarchy, and with different levels of involvement in the policies.

4. Do I have to take part?

It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. You can withdraw at any time without giving a reason and without it affecting any benefits that you are entitled to. If you decide to withdraw you will be asked what you wish to happen to the data you have provided up to that point.

5. What will happen to me if I take part?

If you agree to take part, you will be interviewed in about your school’s implementation of the Prevent duty and the duty to promote fundamental British values. I would also like to get a sense of how you feel about the policies, and how they are changing your practice. I’m interested in your values as an educator and the role you think schools and teachers play in meeting the challenges of diversity and integration in the context of Islamist terrorism.

I would like to speak to you for roughly 45 minutes, at a time and place that is convenient to you. If you do participate, you will be given a copy of this information sheet to keep, and you will sign a consent form. I might approach you for a follow-up interview at a later stage in the project. You are under no obligation to agree to this.

You will receive a written record of your interview before my report is published. At this stage, you may wish to offer clarifications or corrections, or to withdraw some or all of your data from the study. A copy of the final report will be available on request.

6. Will I be recorded and how will the recorded media be used?

With your permission, I will audio record your interview. These audio recordings will be used only for analysis and for illustration in the final report. No other use will be made of them without your written permission, and no one outside the project will be allowed access to the original recordings.

To protect your personal data, recordings will be stored on unidentifiable password-protected files. These will be saved on a password-protected laptop and backed up onto a secure cloud drive.

7. What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?

Since the research deals with a sensitive topic, and with policies that have caused a good deal of public debate, there are potential risks in the collection and analysis of the data. Some people may be uncomfortable talking about terrorism or about students with extreme views. In
previous research on the topic, some teachers have expressed views that could be perceived as Islamophobic or racist. Racism and Islamophobia are not the focus of this study, and I am certain that such views are not tolerated within your community. It is nevertheless important to be mindful of the risks associated with the topic.

More broadly, there are risks involved in talking about your professional values and practice and about your school. It is not the purpose of this study to make judgements about the effectiveness of individuals or schools. At the same time, the study will make comparisons between schools and between countries, and this may cause discomfort to some participants.

In an interview situation, people sometimes end up expressing views that are critical of the policies, their colleagues or their school. Although your comments will appear anonymously, there is also a small chance that you will be recognised by people who know you professionally if they read the report.

8. What are the possible benefits of taking part?

All interview participants will receive a £20 Amazon voucher for their time.

In addition to this, your participation will help me shed light on how teachers are responding to the challenges of integration and diversity in the context of Islamist terrorism. Ultimately, I hope the study will inform policymaking in ways that will help us as educators better serve our students.

9. What if something goes wrong?

If you have a complaint about my conduct, or about any aspect of the research, please feel free to contact my principal supervisor, Dr Germ Janmaat [redacted]. If you feel your complaint has not been handled to your satisfaction, you can contact the Chair of the UCL Research Ethics Committee – [redacted].

10. Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential?

Given the sensitive nature of the topic, and the potential risks mentioned above, I will take steps to ensure that neither you nor your school can be identified. This applies to the final report as well as the raw data. I will use a pseudonym for your school and for you as an individual. Where possible, I will describe you and your school in general terms, avoiding particular details (such as your role in the school) that might make you identifiable within or outside of your community.

I will protect your data by ensuring your name does not appear on recordings, transcripts, field notes, or file names. Only my principal supervisor, my second supervisor, and I will have access to these recordings or notes.

11. Limits to confidentiality

Please note that confidentiality will be maintained as far as it is possible, unless in the course of the research I see or hear anything that makes me worried that someone might be in danger.
of harm. Under these circumstances, I might have to inform relevant agencies. If this were the case, I would inform you of any decisions that might limit your confidentiality.

While steps will be taken to prevent you from being identified, there is always a chance that people in your community will recognise you if they read the final report. This is a particular risk in smaller schools, where people can be more easily identified.

12. What will happen to the results of the research project?

The final results of the research project will be included in my PhD thesis, which I expect to be completed by September 2021. The thesis will be available in the UCL Institute of Education library and online. It will also be made available to you on request. With your written permission, parts of the research may be published in academic journals or presented at conferences. After the thesis is published, original recordings of any interviews will be destroyed.

13. Data Protection Privacy Notice

Notice:

The data controller for this project will be University College London (UCL). The UCL Data Protection Office provides oversight of UCL activities involving the processing of personal data, and can be contacted at [redacted].

Your personal data will be processed for the purposes outlined in this notice. The legal basis that would be used to process your personal data will be the provision of your consent. You can provide your consent for the use of your personal data in this project by completing the consent form that has been provided to you.

Your personal data will be processed so long as it is required for the research project and destroyed when the project is finished. If I am able to anonymise or pseudonymise the personal data you provide I will undertake this, and will endeavour to minimise the processing of personal data wherever possible.

If you are concerned about how your personal data is being processed, please contact UCL in the first instance at [redacted]. If you remain unsatisfied, you may wish to contact the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). Contact details, and details of data subject rights, are available on the ICO website at: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/data-protection-reform/overview-of-the-gdpr/individuals-rights/

14. Who is organising and funding the research?

The research is funded by the UCL Graduate Research Scholarship

15. Contact for further information

Jonathan James (Researcher)
[redacted]
Dr Germ Janmaat (Principal supervisor)
[redacted]

Dr Christine Han (Second supervisor)
[redacted]

Thank you for reading this information sheet and for considering to take part in this research study.
Participant Information Sheet for Local Authority and Academy Trust Interviews in England

YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS INFORMATION SHEET

Title of Study:
An investigation into the impact of Islamist terrorism on education policy and practice in England and France

Department:
Education, practice and society

Name and Contact Details of the Researcher(s):
Jonathan James
[redacted]

1. Invitation Paragraph

You are being invited to take part in research project as part of a PhD programme. Before you decide it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what participation will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for reading this.

2. What is the project’s purpose?

The aim of the project is to investigate how policies developed in response to the threat of Islamist terrorism are being implemented in schools in England and France. In the English case, the focus is on the Prevent duty and the duty to promote fundamental British values. Similar duties have been placed on schools in France.

The study seeks to understand how similar the policies in the two countries are by seeing how they are being implemented in schools. I am particularly interested in how policies might be shaped by the ethos of a school and by the values of individuals who work in it. I also want to find out how the two countries’ historical approaches to immigration and diversity might feed into schools’ implementation of the policies. The study will look at how values and practices differ between England and France, but also within the two countries.

The research will take approximately three years and will largely be based on case studies from schools in different parts of England and France. I’d also like to interview people who support several schools in their implementation of the policies.

3. Why have I been chosen?

I am approaching you because your role involves supporting schools in the implementation of Prevent and/or fundamental British values. I want to get a broader understanding of how schools beyond my case study schools are implementing the policies. I am also interested in finding what role multi-academy trusts and local authorities play in the implementation of the policies, and how this varies across the country.
4. Do I have to take part?

It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. You can withdraw at any time without giving a reason and without it affecting any benefits that you are entitled to. If you decide to withdraw, you will be asked what you wish to happen to the data you have provided up that point.

5. What will happen to me if I take part?

If you agree to take part, you will be interviewed about how the schools you work with are implementing the Prevent duty and the duty to promote fundamental British values. I will also ask how you how your organisation supports schools in their implementation. I am interested in your thoughts about the policies themselves and about what good implementation looks like.

I would like to speak to you for roughly 45 minutes, at a time and place that is convenient to you. If you do participate, you will be given a copy of this information sheet to keep, and you will sign a consent form. I might approach you for a follow-up interview at a later stage in the project, but you are under no obligation to agree to this.

You will receive a written record of your interview before my report is published. At this stage, you may wish to offer clarifications or corrections, or to withdraw some or all of your data from the study. A copy of the final report will be available on request.

6. Will I be recorded and how will the recorded media be used?

With your permission, I will audio record your interview. These audio recordings will be used only for analysis and for illustration in the final report. No other use will be made of them without your written permission, and no one outside the project will be allowed access to the original recordings.

To protect your personal data, recordings will be stored on unidentifiable password-protected files. These will be saved on a password-protected laptop and backed up onto a secure cloud drive.

7. What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?

Since the research deals with a sensitive topic, and with policies that have caused a good deal of public debate, there are potential risks in the collection and analysis of the data. Some people may be uncomfortable talking about terrorism or about students with extreme views. In previous research on the topic, some respondents have expressed views that could be perceived as Islamophobic or racist. Racism and Islamophobia are not the focus of this study, but it is important to be mindful of the risks associated with the topic.

More broadly, there are risks involved in talking about your professional values and practice and about the schools you work with. It is not the purpose of this study to make evaluative judgements about the practice of individuals or organisations. At the same time, the study will make comparisons between approaches in different schools, in different parts of the two countries and between the two countries. This may cause discomfort to some participants.
In the course of an interview, some respondents end up expressing views that are critical of individuals or organisations. It is worth bearing in mind that although your comments will appear anonymously in the report, there is always a small chance that you will be recognised if people you work closely with read the report.

8. **What are the possible benefits of taking part?**

All interview participants will receive a £20 Amazon voucher for their time.

In addition to this, your participation will help me shed light on how teachers are responding to the challenges of integration and diversity in the context of Islamist terrorism. Ultimately, I hope the study will inform policymaking in ways that will help us as educators better serve our students.

9. **What if something goes wrong?**

If you have a complaint about my conduct, or about any aspect of the research, please feel free to contact my principal supervisor, Dr Germ Janmaat-[redacted]. If you feel your complaint has not been handled to your satisfaction, you can contact the Chair of the UCL Research Ethics Committee – [redacted].

10. **Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential?**

Given the sensitive nature of the topic, and the potential risks mentioned above, I will take steps to ensure that neither you, your organisation, or the schools you work with can be identified. This applies to the final report as well as the raw data. I will use a pseudonym for your school and for you as an individual. Where possible, I will describe you and your organisation in general terms, avoiding particular details that might make you identifiable within or outside of your community.

I protect your data by ensuring your name does not appear on recordings, transcripts, field notes, or file names. Only my principal supervisor, my second supervisor, and I will have access to these recordings or notes.

11. **Limits to confidentiality**

Please note that confidentiality will be maintained as far as it is possible, unless in the course of the research I see or hear anything that makes me worried that someone might be in danger of harm. Under these circumstances, I might have to inform relevant agencies. If this were the case, I would inform you of any decisions that might limit your confidentiality.

Whilst steps will be taken to prevent you from being identified, there is always a chance that people in your community will recognise you if they read the final report.

12. **What will happen to the results of the research project?**
The final results of the research project will be included in my PhD thesis, which I expect to be completed by September 2021. The thesis will be available in the UCL Institute of Education library and online. It will also be made available to you on request. With your written permission, parts of the research may be published in academic journals or presented at conferences. After the thesis is published, original recordings of any interviews will be destroyed.

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Your personal data will be processed for the purposes outlined in this notice. The legal basis that would be used to process your personal data will be the provision of your consent. You can provide your consent for the use of your personal data in this project by completing the consent form that has been provided to you.

Your personal data will be processed so long as it is required for the research project and destroyed when the project is finished. If I am able to anonymise or pseudonymise the personal data you provide I will undertake this, and will endeavour to minimise the processing of personal data wherever possible.

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14. Who is organising and funding the research?

The research is funded by the UCL Graduate Research Scholarship

15. Contact for further information

Jonathan James (Researcher)
[redacted]

Dr Germ Janmaat (Principal supervisor)
[redacted]

Dr Christine Han (Second supervisor)
[redacted]

Thank you for reading this information sheet and for considering taking part in this research study.
Participant Information Sheet For School Leaders in English schools

YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS INFORMATION SHEET

Title of Study:
An investigation into the impact of Islamist terrorism on education policy and practice in England and France

Department:
Education, practice and society

Name and Contact Details of the Researcher(s):

Jonathan James
[redacted]

1. Invitation Paragraph

You are being invited to take part in a study as part of my PhD research project. Before you decide, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what participation will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for reading this.

2. What is the project’s purpose?

The aim of the project is to investigate how policies developed in response to the threat of Islamist terrorism are being implemented in schools in England and France. In the English case, the focus is on the Prevent duty and the duty to promote fundamental British values. Similar duties have been placed on schools in France. The study seeks to understand how similar the policies in the two countries are by seeing how they are being implemented in schools. I am particularly interested in how policies might be shaped by the ethos of a school and by the values of individuals who work in it. I also want to find out how the two countries’ historical approaches to immigration and diversity might feed into schools’ implementation of the policies. The study will look out how values and practices differ between England and France, but also within the two countries. The research will take approximately three years and will largely be based on case studies from schools in different parts of England and France. These will involve observations, analysis of documents, and interviews with staff.

3. Why have I been chosen?

One of the main reasons for choosing your school is its location. I am interested in how the policies are being implemented in different parts of the country, and in different local authorities. Since the pilot study was carried out in London and Paris, I am now seeking to recruit schools in other urban areas in England and France. I am also interested in recruiting schools that serve communities of ethnic and religious diversity. Another aim is to recruit
schools with different governance structures; having already worked with a free school, I am particularly looking to include maintained schools and convertor academies.

4. Do I have to take part?

It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. You can withdraw at any time without giving a reason and without it affecting any benefits that you are entitled to. If you decide to withdraw you will be asked what you wish to happen to the data you have provided up that point.

5. What will happen to me if I take part?

If you agree to take part, you will be interviewed about your school’s implementation of the Prevent duty and the duty to promote fundamental British values. Your school will be the site of a case study. I will also recruit teachers from your school to take part in interviews. I will give these teachers information about the project separately, and they will also sign a consent form.

The purpose of the case study is for me to understand how your school is implementing the policies by speaking to key people, analysing documents, and observing student and staff activities. Activities might include lessons as well as pastoral and extracurricular activities. They might also include staff briefings, meetings, and training. Documents might include curriculum and policy documents, as well as records of any past or future activities such as meetings or training.

To understand how teachers’ values feed into their implementation of the policies, I will conduct individual and group interviews. These will focus on how different members of staff within your school understand their role as educators in a multicultural context, and how this relates to their work with the policies.

If you agreed to take part, I would work with you and key people in your team to set up a schedule of observations and documentary analysis. These could be done in a single visit of approximately two weeks, or during several visits over the course of the school year. During these visits, I would also share information about my research with your staff and aim to recruit potential participants for interviews or focus groups.
The study may change shape over time. I may ask to conduct follow-up interviews or look at more documents. Any changes would only happen with the consent of those involved, and you have the right to refuse any additional requests.

Those involved in interviews and focus groups will be given access to any written record of their interview. You will receive a copy of the final written report after publication.

6. Will I be recorded and how will the recorded media be used?

With permission, I will audio record individual interviews and focus groups. These audio recordings will be used only for analysis and for illustration in the final report. No other use will be made of them without your written permission, and no one outside the project will be allowed access to the original recordings. To protect the personal data of all participants, recordings will be stored on unidentifiable password-protected files. They will be saved on a password-protected laptop, and backed up onto a cloud drive.

7. What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?

Since the research deals with a sensitive topic, and with policies that have caused a good deal of public debate, there are potential risks in the collection and analysis of the data. In general, staff may be uncomfortable talking about terrorism or about students with extreme views. In previous research on the topic, some teachers have expressed views that could be perceived as Islamophobic or racist. Racism and Islamophobia are not the focus of this study, and I am certain that such views are not tolerated within your community. It is nevertheless important to be mindful of the risks associated with the topic.

More broadly, there are risks involved with having your professional practice observed and analysed. This is not an evaluative study, and no judgements will be made about the effectiveness of individual teachers or schools. At the same time, the study will make comparisons between schools and between countries, and this may cause discomfort to some participants.

8. What are the possible benefits of taking part?

As an educator, and as an ethical researcher, I want to make a positive contribution to your community. I would be more than happy to talk to your students about my research, and about my educational and professional experiences. One of the benefits of comparing educational practice in different countries is that it provides opportunities for educators to learn from one another. With this in mind, I could talk to your teachers about how French schools are dealing with the challenges of diversity in the context of global terrorism. I look forward to discussing these and other opportunities with you.

In addition to this, your participation will help me shed light on how schools are responding to the challenges of integration and diversity in the context of Islamist terrorism. Ultimately, I
hope the study will inform policy in ways that will help us as educators better serve our students.

9. What if something goes wrong?

If you or any member of staff has a complaint about my conduct, or about any aspect of the research, please feel free to contact my principal supervisor, Dr Germ Janmaat - [redacted]. If you feel your complaint has not been handled to your satisfaction, you can contact the Chair of the UCL Research Ethics Committee – [redacted].

10. Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential?

Given the sensitive nature of the topic, and the potential risks mentioned above, I will take steps to ensure that your school and individuals in it cannot be identified. This applies to the final report as well as the raw data. I will use pseudonyms for the name of your school and people within it. Where possible, I will describe individuals and schools in general terms, avoiding particular details that might make them identifiable within or outside of your community.

I will protect participants’ data by ensuring that names do not appear on recordings, transcripts, field notes, or file names. Only my principal supervisor, my second supervisor, and I will have access to recordings or notes.

11. Limits to confidentiality

Please note that confidentiality will be maintained as far as it is possible, unless in the course of the research I see or hear anything that makes me worried that someone might be in danger of harm. Under these circumstances, I might have to inform relevant agencies. If this were the case, I would inform you of any decisions that might limit your confidentiality.

12. What will happen to the results of the research project?

The final results of the research project will be included in my PhD thesis, which I expect to be completed by September 2021. This thesis will be read by a team of examiners and made available in the UCL Institute of Education library and online. It will also be made available to you on request. With the written permission of those involved, parts of the research may be published in academic journals or presented at conferences.

After the thesis is published, original recordings of any interviews will be destroyed.

13. Data Protection Privacy Notice

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   **Dr Christine Han (Second supervisor)**
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Thank you for reading this information sheet and for considering taking part in this research study.
Appendix 4 – Thematic analysis and coding

I conducted thematic analysis of the data using a ‘two-level scheme’ of ‘etic’ codes derived from the research questions, literature and propositions, and ‘emic’ codes derived from the research settings (Miles and Huberman 1994:61; see also Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006; Gibson and Brown 2011; Boyatzis 1998). This has broadly involved assigning segments of data to codes using Nvivo. This serves the practical process of bringing together all the relevant data on a given theme, such as the enactment of a policy, or teachers comments on the role of education in preventing radicalisation. Being able to retrieve all the data relating to one idea facilitates further analysis, since the researcher can look through individual codes to identify patterns. However, thematic analysis also involves exploring the relationship between different codes to develop overarching themes. This has been a process of trial and error, and which has drawn on several of the works I cite in this section. The process I describe below is based on the code log, a record I have kept at different stages of analysis to make the process as transparent as possible (see Gibson and Brown 2009; Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006).

I developed a set of ‘start codes’ before my initial visit to First Academy (see Miles and Huberman 1994:57). Most of drew on the literature I discussed in chapter 2. I organised the codes around two contrasting hypotheses; one that the two systems would conform to the ‘national models’ literature and another the models are converging towards a civic integration model. As such, they were very close to the indicators developed for my master’s dissertation (James 2016). I essentially developed a new set of codes as I coded the data from First Academy, although there was some overlap with the initial set of codes. This was partly because many of the start codes were related to abstract ideas emerging from the literature. In contrast, many of the codes that emerged after my week in the field related to contextual factors and material aspects of policy enactment that I had previously neglected. These ‘descriptive’ codes were much more grounded in the life of schools (see Miles and Huberman 1994:58).
This left me with two sets of codes; one set that related more to the research questions, another that related more to the context of schools. The next step was to develop a codebook on NVivo using both sets of codes. I had done more reading on thematic analysis at this point and sought to organise the codes in a way that was both logical and manageable. I therefore arranged the codes around categories relating to the research questions (see Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006; Miles and Huberman 1994:55-69). This also involved developing new codes to cover aspects of the research questions I had previously missed, to make links between different ideas, or to allow for alternative possibilities. This process led me to develop the three largest 'code families', or groups of codes: educational activities and practices; enactment of government policies; and discourses on immigration and integration (Gibson and Brown 2009:127-144; see appendix 5). I also established a clear definition for each code so that I could apply them consistently (see Gibson and Brown 2009; Boyatzis 1998).

The process of turning codes into themes began with me writing each of the codes on a post-it note and moving these around to explore the relationships between codes. This came from the work of Braun and Clark (2006) and Fereday and Muir-Cochrane (2006) who speak of interacting individual codes to develop themes, and Coffrey and Atkinson (1996) and Gibson and Brown (2009) who advise doing this visually. This began an ongoing process of organising and re-organising the codes and themes in different ways. I clustered the codes based my own research questions, but also according to the links respondents made between different concepts. I was also interested in exploring relationships of cause and effect and in developing propositions.

As data collection advanced, I began refining the themes and the concepts they referred to by reviewing the coded segments of data within each code. This involved splitting, merging, and dis-continuing some codes, and rethinking some of the hierarchies and relationships between codes (see Gibson and Brown 2009; Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006). Although this was essentially a mechanical process, which involved going through each segment in each code, I was often guided by preoccupations emerging from the field. For example, after collecting a large amount
of data in France, I had a particular interest in better defining different aspects of ‘learning about laïcité’. I tried to identify these different aspects as I went through the data coded under ‘learning about laïcité’ and split the code accordingly. Thematic analysis is an iterative process, and it was necessary to ‘interact’ the data codes and themes several times before the final themes were defined (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006:90). Since I often had breaks between data collection periods, I was often able to analyse the data while the fieldwork as ongoing. This meant that I could explore emerging propositions in the field.

This process formed the basis for the final analysis. I grouped most of the codes into three ‘code families’: educational activities and practices; enactment of government policies; and discourses on immigration and integration (see Gibson and Brown 2009). The codes in the ‘enactment of government policies’ family enabled me to address SQ1 by comparing the enactment of individual policies across the case schools. Addressing SQ2 required more interpretation and engagement with the literature on national models and civic integration. As such, I developed a spreadsheet to explore how propositions from the literature might shed light on each of the themes I had developed, as well as how my findings might refine or delimit these propositions.
## Appendix 5 – Code book

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Files</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ad Hoc and self-initiated responses to violent extremism</td>
<td>Actions taken (by teachers, school leaders, or local and regional policy actors) in response to terrorist attacks or other occurrences of violent extremism that are not directly implied by the policies.</td>
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<td>71</td>
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<td>References to antisemitism among student population or the need to educate against antisemitism.</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>Cases of radicalised young people</td>
<td>References to high-profile cases of radicalised young people and their impact on educators.</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Challenges to the curriculum</td>
<td>References to students or parents questioning aspects of the curriculum on religious reasons.</td>
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<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conspiracy theories</td>
<td>References to conspiracy theories, and the need to educate against them.</td>
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<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Contextual features of a school (or territory) not directed related to policy enactment.</td>
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<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum overload</td>
<td>Challenges teachers experience addressing curriculum content within the time they have.</td>
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<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourses on integration and immigration</td>
<td>Respondents own direct or indirect discourses on immigration integration, social cohesion, nationality, or cultural diversity. Could relate to problems or solutions. Could come out in interview or in lessons/training.</td>
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<td>19</td>
</tr>
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<td>Positive or negative references to a British approach to immigrant integration.</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Files</td>
<td>References</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>Criticisms of British approach</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>Support for British approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>Britishness</td>
<td>Participant reflections on Britishness or teaching Britishness</td>
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<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communautarisme</td>
<td>References to communitarianism</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community of communities</td>
<td>Discourses presenting Britain as a society made up of different cultural,</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>religious, and ethnic communities, or associating Britishness with diversity.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French approach to immigrant integration</td>
<td>Positive or negative references to a French approach to immigrant integration.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticisms of French approach</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for French approach</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic dress</td>
<td>References to Islamic dress, including controversies and restrictions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Laissez faire</td>
<td>Ideological objection to the idea of transmitting particular values</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muscular liberalism</td>
<td>Discourses that suggest that violations of shared values should be</td>
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<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>challenged, sanctioned, or reported.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public intellectuals and academics</td>
<td>The involvement of public intellectuals in the production of discourses</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>around integration.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race talk</td>
<td>References to ethnicity or race</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<td>Role of republican school</td>
<td>References to the role of the republican school in integration</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>Issues arising from the conflict between the values the school or state</td>
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<tr>
<td>or communal values</td>
<td>seeks to promote and parental or communal values</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Files</td>
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<td>Shared values</td>
<td>Respondents’ reflections on the need to promote shared values or threats to shared values</td>
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<td>Discourses on laïcité</td>
<td>Understandings of <em>laïcité</em> evident in interviews, lessons or training.</td>
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<td>Respondents criticising or interrogating official or prevailing discourses on laïcité.</td>
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<td>References to the role of <em>laïcité</em> in promoting freedom of conscience</td>
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<td>Laïcité and pragmatism</td>
<td>Evidence of actors applying the principle of <em>laïcité</em> pragmatically</td>
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<td>Laïcité is not against religion</td>
<td>Statements suggesting that laïcité is not against religion</td>
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<td>Multiple laïcités</td>
<td>References to the existence of multiple ideas around laïcité, including misconceptions</td>
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<td>Laïcité dure or maximalist</td>
<td>References to ‘hard’ or ‘intransigent’ forms of laïcité</td>
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<td>Open laïcité</td>
<td>Explicit references to more open, adaptive interpretations of laïcité</td>
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<tr>
<td>Violations of laïcité and other 'incidents'</td>
<td>Examples of presumed ‘violations of laïcité or republican values. Includes more ambiguous ‘faits d’établissement’. These may be deemed valid or invalid.</td>
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<td>69</td>
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<td>Dialogue to resolve violations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Educational activities and practices</td>
<td>Teaching methods and content used in policy enactment or ad hoc responses to context of extremism (will also be coded under policy categories). These may be reported or advocated by respondents, or</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Files</td>
<td>References</td>
</tr>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic engagement</td>
<td>Learning about forms of civic engagement other than voting, such as volunteering, campaigning and protest.</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>Learning relating to democratic processes, politics or constitutional matters (see Mouritsen and Jaeger 2018)</td>
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<td>History and democracy</td>
<td>Lesson content which deals with the evolution of democracy in.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Learning about citizenship</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civic virtues</td>
<td>Teaching or learning about what it means to be a good citizen</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Critical engagement with the values</td>
<td>Activities or that engage students critically with the meaning of FBV or Republican values. Discourse that stresses importance of doing this.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Critical thinking</td>
<td>Activities aimed at getting students to think critically and/or discourse around the importance of developing critical thinking.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discussion debate and controversial issues</td>
<td>Activities in which different points of view are expressed or controversial issues are debated. References to challenges teachers face in this area.</td>
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<td>122</td>
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<tr>
<td>Charlie Hebdo and the cartoons</td>
<td>References to controversies surrounding Charlie Hebdo and the controversies around their publication of the cartoons of Muhammad</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other sensitive subjects</td>
<td>References to other subjects that cause controversy among students</td>
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<td>RSE and LGBT equality</td>
<td>References to controversies surrounding relationships and sex education (RSE) or LGBTQ+-inclusive education</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>Information and media literacy (including EMI)</td>
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<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Files</td>
<td>References</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>-------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning about equalities, diversity, and discrimination</td>
<td>Teaching and learning or pastoral activities relating to promoting respect for diversity, learning about different cultures within the nation, promoting addressing stereotypes and discrimination.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning about freedom of the press</td>
<td>Teaching and learning about freedom of expression or press freedom</td>
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<td>Learning about Islam</td>
<td>Learning about Islam as a response to terrorism, or about Islamic views on terrorism and violence</td>
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<td>23</td>
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<td>Curriculum content or extracurricular activity relating <em>laïcité</em> or aimed at promoting it. Could be explicit or implicit.</td>
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<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparative discussions on <em>laïcité</em></td>
<td>Teaching and learning that compares <em>laïcité</em> to what happens in other countries.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Laïcité</em> and vivre ensemble (lessons)</td>
<td>Teaching and learning that presents <em>laïcité</em> as a tool for social cohesion</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Laïcité</em> rules, laws, and their historical context</td>
<td>Teaching and learning about rules and laws about <em>laïcité</em>, and/or their practical application, and/or the historical context in which they emerged.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Laïcité</em>, freedom of conscience and freedom of worship (lessons)</td>
<td>Teaching and learning relating to the idea that <em>laïcité</em> allows from freedom of conscience and freedom of worship.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning about radicalisation, extremism and terrorism</td>
<td>Lessons or other activities where terrorism or extremism are addressed, either as the focus or tangentially.</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning about religion</td>
<td>Activities dedicated to learning about religion</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not learning about religion</td>
<td>Statements which discuss the boundaries of learning about religion. Examples of what is not appropriate.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RE and context of terrorism</td>
<td>Prevent and FBV enacted through religious education or daily act of</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Files</td>
<td>References</td>
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<tr>
<td>worship</td>
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<tr>
<td>Learning about republican values</td>
<td>Curriculum content or extracurricular activity relating to liberté, égalité, or fraternité or aimed at promoting it. Could be explicit or implicit.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning outside of the disciplines</td>
<td>Policy enacted/themes addressed through non-subject specific spaces such as assemblies, whole-school collapsed days, or conferences.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican symbols and ceremonies</td>
<td>Activities that involve symbols or ceremonies of the Republic</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student voice</td>
<td>Activities that give students a say in the running of the school presented as response to the policies.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values posters</td>
<td>Activities in which students make visual displays to show their understanding of national values. Displays of these values.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enactment of government policies</td>
<td>Activities and processes identified by respondents as constituting enactment of government policies aimed at responding to extremism and/or preventing radicalisation.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(England) Enactment of FBV</td>
<td>Activities and processes identified by respondents as constituting enactment of FBV.</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBV and 'our values'</td>
<td>Respondents reflections on how FBV (or implementation of the FBV) articulates with school or college values. Schools ‘relocating’ FBV within their own values (Vincent 2019)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relabelling FBV</td>
<td>FBV repackaged or labelled differently.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Repackaging</td>
<td>Pre-existing activities are labelled as enactment of FBV. Includes curriculum mapping.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representing Britain</td>
<td>See Vincent (2018) Enacting FBV through symbols or figures</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Files</td>
<td>References</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of FBV</td>
<td>Respondents’ understanding of FBV and the context in which the policy arose.</td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(England) Enactment of Prevent and school ethos</td>
<td>Activities and processes identified by respondents as constituting enactment of Prevent</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevent as safeguarding</td>
<td>References to Prevent being operationalised through schools’ safeguarding structures/Respondents present Prevent as an element of safeguarding.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevent referrals</td>
<td>Contact made with local authority Prevent team regarding a student (could be referral or request for advice)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of Prevent</td>
<td>Respondents’ understanding of Prevent and the context in which the policy arose.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>(France) Enactment of ‘faire respecter la laïcité’</td>
<td>Activities and processes identified by respondents as constituting enactment of the ‘faire respecter la laïcité’ policy.</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referrals through portal</td>
<td>References to the government portal for referring violations of laïcité</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of faire respecter la laïcité</td>
<td>Respondents’ understanding of Upholding Laïcité and the context in which the policy arose.</td>
<td>5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(France) Enactment of Grande Mobilisation</td>
<td>Activities and processes identified by respondents as constituting enactment of la Grande mobilisation de l’école pour les valeurs de la Republique.</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMC</td>
<td>References to teaching of EMC or lessons</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMC planning</td>
<td>Teachers’ accounts of how they plan the EMC curriculum</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMI</td>
<td>References to teaching EMI or lessons</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Files</td>
<td>References</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parcours citoyen</td>
<td>Mentions of activities linked to parcours citoyen</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of grandemobilisation</td>
<td>Respondents’ understanding of Great Mobilisation and the context in which the policy arose.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(France) Enactment of anti-radicalisation</td>
<td>Activities and processes identified by respondents as constituting enactment of anti-radicalisation policies</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referrals</td>
<td>References to referrals for radicalisation</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of anti-radicalisation policies</td>
<td>Respondents’ understanding of French anti-radicalisation policies and the context in which they arose.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Academy trust</td>
<td>References to the role of MATs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence</td>
<td>Respondents’ comment on theirs or others’ confidence in enacting the policies.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence FBV</td>
<td>References to own or others confidence in enacting FBV.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence Prevent</td>
<td>References to own or others confidence in responding to the Prevent duty.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context and policy enactment</td>
<td>Respondents relate policy enactment to school's contextual dimensions (see Ball et al 2013)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership and school ethos</td>
<td>References to school leadership and ethos in relation to policy enactment</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student population</td>
<td>References to the student population and ethos in relation to policy enactment</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuities with citizenship education</td>
<td>References to continuities with citizenship education and FBV enactment</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEA and rectorat</td>
<td>Partnerships between schools and local/regional authorities. Code for LEA/rectorat actors describing how they work with schools and schools describing how they work with these actors</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Files</td>
<td>References</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reactive pedagogical</td>
<td>Pedagogical interventions from local authority or rectorat in response to teacher concerns (extremist views, violations of laïcité)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partnerships</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-governmental partnerships</td>
<td>Involvement of non-governmental actors in policy enactment.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance measures</td>
<td>Respondents relate policy enactment to the performance measures (eg. OFSTED, league tables)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary prevention</td>
<td>References to interventions for individuals believed to be in a process of radicalisation.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ticking the boxes</td>
<td>References to the need to show compliance with either Prevent or FBV (could possibly apply to French context)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>References to training on the policies or extremism. Could be initial teacher training or continuing professional development.</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visibility and explicitness</td>
<td>Data relating to schools and colleges’ level of explicitness in policy enactment. Importance (or lack thereof) placed on students and/or staff knowing about policies and being able to use the language of it.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equalities and tolerance</td>
<td>Responses relating to equalities, discrimination, and tolerance. Links to Equality Act 2010.</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far-right extremism</td>
<td>References to far-right extremism as part of the problem to be addressed</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender issues</td>
<td>References to the need to promote gender equality</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamophobia</td>
<td>Explicit references to islamophobia (as a potential consequence of attacks) and educational approaches to combat it.</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2015</td>
<td>References to the national and institutional context after the January 2015 attacks</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laïcité and radicalisation</td>
<td>Respondents’ reflections on the link between laïcité and</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Files</td>
<td>References</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>radicalisation - could be inverse link between violations of laïcité and radicalisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Link between promoting values and preventing radicalisation</td>
<td>Respondents’ understanding of the link between promoting republican values and laïcité and preventing radicalisation</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediatisation</td>
<td>Interactions with the media, or references to the effect of the media on these issues</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2015</td>
<td>References to the national or institutional context after the November 2015 attacks</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents and parental engagement</td>
<td>Engagement with parents with reference to policy enactment or broader responses to terrorism.</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedagogy and teachability</td>
<td>Reflections on the role of pedagogy in preventing violent extremism or promoting shared values</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Islam</td>
<td>References to radical Islam (subjectively defined)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflections on the context of extremism</td>
<td>Respondents’ reflections on how the climate of extremism has changed the role of the school</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican values and the law</td>
<td>Lessons linking republican values to French law or constitution</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Paty</td>
<td>References to the murder of Samuel Paty</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School violence and discipline</td>
<td>References to violence and discipline in school</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student autonomy</td>
<td>References to the notion of religious autonomy</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student home lives and identities</td>
<td>Teacher perceptions of students’ home lives and identities</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher neutrality and posture</td>
<td>References to the importance of teacher neutrality, including ‘posture’ or positioning</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher subject areas and staff</td>
<td>Respondents link approach to policies to teachers’ subject training or</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Files</td>
<td>References</td>
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<tr>
<td>roles</td>
<td>to staff roles (AED etc)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher values and identities</td>
<td>Respondents references to their own or (other) teachers' personal or professional identities and values.</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of radicalisation and extremism</td>
<td>Explicit or implicit definitions of radicalisation or extremism. Assumed causes and/or solutions.</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of schools in preventing radicalisation extremism or terrorism</td>
<td>Respondents’ reflections or implicit assumptions on the role of schools in preventing terrorism, extremism, or radicalisation.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Views on government policies</td>
<td>Respondents’ own views or reported views on the policies</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advantages of FBV</td>
<td>Advantages of FBV identified by respondents</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advantages of Prevent</td>
<td>Advantages of Prevent identified by respondents</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticisms of FBV</td>
<td>Direct or reported criticisms of the FBV policy</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity</td>
<td>Criticism that FBV contradicts or fails to reflect multicultural Britain or multicultural classrooms.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empire and nationalism</td>
<td>Negative associations of FBV with nationalism or colonialism</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconsistencies within idea of British values.</td>
<td>Suggestions that British state does not apply FBV consistently</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not exclusively British</td>
<td>Idea that FBV are not exclusively British</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vague</td>
<td>Idea that FBV lack meaning</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticisms of Prevent</td>
<td>Direct or reported criticisms of the Prevent duty</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chilling effect</td>
<td>Criticism of the policies (particularly Prevent) on the grounds that referring students will lead them to shut themselves down in the classroom.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Files</td>
<td>References</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disproportionate focus on</td>
<td>References to criticisms of the policies on the grounds that they stigmatise certain populations. The respondent may or may not agree that they do.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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