

Title: 'Compound dispossession' in southern Ontario: converging trajectories of colonial dispossession and inter-Indigenous conflict, 1886-1900

Introduction

Edward Said's contention that "the actual geographical possession of land is what empire in the final analysis is all about" (Said 1994, 78) has been echoed by many historians of settler colonialism, from Patrick Wolfe's claim that "the primary object of settler-colonization is the land itself" (Wolfe 1999, 163) to Gerald Alfred's assertion that "the essential harm of colonization is that the living relationship between our people and our land has been severed" (Alfred 2017, 11). Dispossession unfolded in different ways across colonies and empires, so that "in no two colonies was [land] transferred in the same way" (Banner 2007, 3). Nevertheless, comparative histories of dispossession in the British settler colonies have proposed at least two stable generalizations. The first revolves around methods of dispossession. Although historians range from a greater focus on the discourses of property rights (Bhandar 2018; Nichols 2020) to a greater focus on everyday practices and technologies (John Weaver 2003; Greer 2018; Harris 2002), there is a general consensus that the primary methods of dispossession were extinguishment by treaty and rejection of tenure via the doctrine of terra nullius (Banner 2007, 3). The second generalization revolves around the direction of dispossession: it seems almost too obvious to require explication that settler societies were the dispossessors and Indigenous societies were the dispossessed.

However, on the ground and across historical time these generalizations do not always hold true. In the case of South Africa, for instance, Cherryl Walker argues that there are two competing histories of dispossession. The "actual" history is made up of "a cascading mass of particular histories of dispossession, resistance and/or accommodation" (Walker 2005, 809), whereas the "popular" history reifies white-black antagonism so that "past conflict and competition for land within and between black communities is largely erased, along with

unsettling evidence of alliances or intrigues that linked black and white in historically more ambiguous relationships around land than are now considered possible" (Walker 2005, 808). The same holds true throughout the settler colonies, and yet the existing histories of dispossession often fail to address the agency of Indigenous peoples to make decisions which do not align with simplistic narratives of settler perpetrators and Indigenous victims. Some scholars do attempt to reconsider such narratives. Allan Greer, for instance, suggests that Indigenous peoples were "actors" in histories of dispossession rather than "pure victims," and that "those who survived the colonizers' onslaught had a hand in shaping the course of colonial property formation" (Greer 2018, 2). But Greer writes about early dispossession in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when settler hegemony was little more than a far-off fantasy, and histories of dispossession anchored in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are rarely willing to consider these issues. Perhaps this is because, as Pamela Scully observes, "historians have tended to represent indigenous peoples as victims only, as if acknowledging their attempts to shape their futures in the context of a new imperial or colonial world makes them and the author complicit with colonialism" (Scully 2012, 591).

In this paper, I explore a history of dispossession in which two First Nations – the Chippewa of the Thames and the Six Nations of the Grand River - attempted to dispossess two other First Nations – the Munsee of the Thames and the Mississauga of the Credit – in the late nineteenth century. As will be seen, however, this is not a history in which any of these Nations were "complicit with colonialism." On the contrary, I argue that these attempted dispossessions were simultaneously the legacies of previous dispossessions at the hands of the British and Canadian governments, as well as responses to growing economic pressures of settler land hunger and intensifying encroachments on Indigenous sovereignty. The overlapping pressures of historical dispossessions, settler land hunger, settler sovereignty, and competition between First Nations leads me to propose the term "compound

dispossession" to describe the experiences of the Chippewa, Munsee, Mississauga, and Six Nations. Not only did the impacts of historical dispossessions by the British and Canadian governments compound over time, moving like a wave through longitudinal time as well as latitudinal space, but the settler colonial project also compounded with the different needs of four individual First Nations groups so that the Munsee and the Mississauga experienced land pressure from two directions at the same time. It is also important to observe that the events examined in this paper were *attempted* dispossessions and did not take effect, but their failure to take effect was not due to some romanticized "nobility": both the Chippewa and the Six Nations were serious in their desire to take land from the Munsee and Mississauga and persisted in their attempts for multiple decades, and it was only through concerted diplomacy and negotiation that settlements were arranged in the early twentieth century.

The histories of inter-Nation conflicts discussed in this paper are significant for two reasons. First, the proposed concept of "compound dispossession" contributes to a rethinking of the histories of colonialism in which assimilation and resistance are not necessarily binary oppositions, but fluid registers of adaptation to the enfolding colonial world. Ojibwe/Dakota scholar Scott Lyons explores this problematic binary in reference to Indigenous treaty-making in the United States. Lyons challenges patronizing assumptions that Indigenous nations only signed away their land because they were forced to or because they did not understand what they were doing. On the contrary, Lyons argues that treaties signing away land were often more than misunderstandings or necessities, but "commitments to living a new way of life" according to the nature of modernity that was taking shape (Lyons 2010, 8-9). Adopting a binary of assimilation/resistance "denies the actually existing diversity of Indian life, and/or confuses modern practices and institutions with the assimilation of a 'white' or 'Western' identity" (Lyons 2010, 12). Instead, to understand Indigenous histories

that run counter to binary assumptions of assimilation/resistance we need to attend to the discursive formations within which such histories took place.

Lyons applies this approach to literature, where he observes that Indigenous writers who adopted racist discourses like "native savagery" and "Protestant ethics" were simply utilizing the discourses available within their episteme to navigate their world (Lyons 2010, 29-33), but this approach can also be applied to the dispossession of land. Goenpul scholar Aileen Moreton-Robinson emphasizes that property rights, and the use of law to transfer property rights from Indigenous peoples to settlers, are themselves a discursive formation "born of the episteme of Western culture" (Moreton-Robinson 2015, xxiv). By combining this view of property rights as a discourse with Lyons's approach to Indigenous adaptations to the discursive formations of colonial modernity, I suggest that compound dispossession can itself be understood as an adaptation to the discursive formation of settler property rights. To recognize compound dispossession as an adaptation to modern property regimes is not to apologize for it, and there are certainly many problematic aspects to consider. For instance, Dene scholar Glen Coulthard argues that accommodations or engagements with settler colonial discourses can often work to perpetuate inequalities, since the terms of accommodation or engagement within a context of unequal power relations will always be defined by and in the interest of the hegemonic power (Coulthard 2014, 17-18).

Yet, as Mohawk scholar Audra Simpson demonstrates, accommodating a hegemonic partner can also be approached as "a political strategy that is cognizant of an unequal relationship, understands the terms of bondage, and chooses to stay within them in order to assert a greater principle: nationhood, sovereignty, jurisdiction" (A. Simpson 2014, 24). Simpson as well as Chickasaw scholar Jodi Byrd both emphasize the importance of Indigenous sovereignty in contextualizing Indigenous policies that appear to outsiders as illiberal or oppressive. Byrd argues that when the Cherokee Nation disenfranchised Cherokee

Freedmen (the African-Cherokee descendants of slaves held by the Cherokee Nation) in 2007, it was a response to the incommensurability of American multicultural policy, which insists on the right to dictate belonging within the Cherokee Nation, and Cherokee sovereignty, which demands the right to determine belonging on its own terms as a sovereign nation (Byrd 2011, 125-146). Similarly, Simpson argues that when the Mohawks of Kahnawà:ke evicted non-Indigenous spouses and partners from the reserve in 2010, it was a response to the difficulties of being a sovereign First Nation within a sovereign Canada, or what she calls "nested sovereignty" (A. Simpson 2014, 10-12). To dictate membership within the Nation is an inherent element of sovereignty, and so Simpson argues that these evictions constitute a strategy for the Mohawks of Kahnawà:ke to be seen as what they are: "nationals with sovereign authority over their lives and over their membership and living within their own space" (A. Simpson 2014, 16). Importantly, Simpson and Byrd are both critical of such exclusionary tactics and point towards alternative pathways of Indigenous citizenship based on deep histories of kinship and relationality that move beyond the recognition politics of state-based membership. Yet they draw an important connection between Indigenous politics that "appear anomalous, illiberal, or illogical" (A. Simpson 2014, 178) and the complications of asserting Indigenous sovereignties within settler colonial paradigms.

I argue that the concept of incommensurable nested sovereignties is useful for understanding compound dispossession, with the only difference being that compound dispossession involves three levels of sovereignty rather than two. The Six Nations of the Grand River and the Chippewa of the Thames were sovereign nations nested within the Canadian state, while the Munsee of the Thames and the Mississauga of the Credit were sovereign nations within Six Nations and Chippewa territory. The compound dispossessions explored in this paper thus need to be understood as manifestations of the need to act as nations in the complex environment of triple nested sovereignty. I offer the concept of

compound dispossession as one way for historians to address the complexities of nested sovereignties and build on efforts to complicate binaries of assimilation/resistance. It is a framework for understanding historical dispossession not as a one-way process but a compounding process where different parties participate for different reasons and where participation is contextualized by different histories. Compound dispossession highlights how original moments of dispossession create spaces for new moments of dispossession to occur in different ways by different people. All four Nations discussed in this paper were to some extent resisting historical and continuing dispossessions, and all four did so by assimilating to some extent to a dispossessory discourse formation. We need a historiographical language that can recognize this complexity without whitewashing the violence and imbalance of power that contextualises histories of settler colonialism, and compound dispossession is one possible way forward.

The second significance of this history lies in the complex lived experiences of dispossession they reveal. The historiography of dispossession privileges a unidirectional settler-Indigenous narrative in which Indigenous peoples fought a one-front battle with settler governments for the recognition of their land rights. In doing so, the historiography reflects Jodi Byrd's critique of narratives that collapse diverse Indigenous nations into a singular "colonized" group in relation to a central "settler" antagonist. On the contrary, Byrd insists upon attending to the inherent "cacophony" of settler colonialism, where there was no singular or unidirectional experience of dispossession, but rather a cacophony of "competing interpretations of geographical spatialities and historicities" (Byrd 2011, xxxiv-xxxv). They categorizes this cacophony into vertical colonizer-colonized conflicts and horizontal conflicts between an array of groups "with competing claims to historical oppressions" (Byrd 2011, xxxiv-xxxv). Byrd contends that privileging vertical conflicts contributes to the reification of European arrival as "the defining event within settler societies" (Byrd 2011, xxxiv-xxxv) as

well as the "transformation of more than five hundred and sixty Indigenous nations into a single racial minority" (Byrd 2011, 125-126). Attending to horizontal conflicts, on the other hand, subverts the transformation of diverse and sovereign Indigenous nations into a singular "colonized" identifier, and recognizes the individuality of Indigenous experiences that may include but are not limited to conflicts with settler states. Byrd specifically applies this concept to conflicts between Indigenous peoples and African Americans, but it is equally applicable to conflicts between First Nations. This paper builds on this work, demonstrating that First Nations in southern Ontario fought a vertical battle against settler governments as well as horizontal battles against other First Nations who, because of their own histories of dispossession, were dealing with land and sovereignty issues of their own. Thus, not only did dispossession compound over time, but the dispossessions of individual Nations also compounded against each other.

In attending to these horizontal conflicts, I also contribute to recent analyses of the complexities and contradictions of pan-Indigenous political activity. Tk'emlupsemc scholar Sarah Nickel challenges narratives which flatten the long history of pan-Indigenous politics in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by representing the modern Indigenous rights movement as a reaction to the 1969 White Paper. "This direct causality implies that Indigenous politics exists, and is relevant and conceivable, only in relation to the settler state" (Nickel 2019, 19). Rather, by attending to conflicts and divisions within pan-Indigenous groups like the Allied Tribes of British Columbia in the 1920s and the Native Brotherhood of British Columbia in the 1930s, Nickel demonstrates that focusing on a simplistic Indigenous-settler dynamic "ignores the reality that colonialism was simply one phenomenon out of many...that Indigenous peoples have always navigated and adjusted to" (Nickel 2019, 54). Similarly, Métis scholar Daniel Voth points to Métis conflicts with the Sioux in the 1860s and the 1960s as evidence that "Métis people exist in complex, awkward, and even

contradictory relations within the colonial context" far more complicated than Indigenous-settler frameworks capture (Voth 2015, 100). This paper continues this work of deconstructing simplistic binaries in which Indigenous action is necessarily a response to settler action, and for resisting essentializing discourses of Indigeneity that gloss over the unique historical experiences and the sovereign independence of individual First Nations.

This paper unfolds in three sections. I first survey the longer histories of dispossession that contextualize the experiences of the Munsee, Chippewa, Mississauga, and Six Nations in the late nineteenth century. I then provide a narrative of the late nineteenth-century land conflicts between the Munsee, Chippewa, Mississauga, and Six Nations in three stages. This narrative begins with rising inter-Nation tensions in the mid-nineteenth century, continues with the outbreak of conflict in the 1880s, and ends with the resolution of conflict in the early twentieth century. Lastly, I conclude by exploring some of the implications of my proposed concept of compound dispossession for Canadian and colonial histories more widely. But first, it is important to recognize my positionality in relation to this research and define some terms (Moffat 2016).

I am not an Indigenous scholar, nor am I trained in Indigenous studies. I am a historian of British imperialism quite broadly, and I did not contemplate writing a history of southern Ontario when I began my current research in London, U.K.. However, as I was browsing the archives of the British Colonial Office and the British Aborigines' Protection Society I came across letters from the Munsee chiefs Scobie Logan and William Waddilove in opposition to eviction by the Chippewa in the 1880s. Upon further research I began to identify an entirely different story of dispossession than any I had encountered previously, which held the potential to significantly contribute to historical understandings of dispossession. This is the perspective I write from. I do not intend or claim to write a comprehensive history of any of the Nations discussed in this paper, and it would not be my

place to. Rather, my intention is to interrogate these events, as described by Indigenous voices in letters from each of the four Nations to the Canadian and British governments, for insights into the conceptual history of dispossession in British settler colonies. I acknowledge the long history of harm done by imperial and colonial scholars producing knowledge about Indigenous peoples and the risk of perpetuating this harm myself (L. Smith 1999). I take my cue from Haudenosaunee historian Susan Hill, who emphasizes that while the production of Indigenous historical knowledge must be led by Indigenous historians, there is space for non-Indigenous historians in the examination of settler-Indigenous and inter-Indigenous relationships as long as we remember that such historians have tended to be "keen observers of what they saw around them but poor analysts of its meaning" (S. Hill 2009, 488-489). Consequently, I limit this paper to an analysis of inter-Nation and settler-Indigenous relations without drawing conclusions on Indigenous histories or societies themselves. I also seek to centre Indigenous perspectives and meanings by situating my arguments within Indigenous scholarship and contextualising my narrative with the voices of knowledge keepers from all four Nations. Nevertheless, my perspective will always be that of an outsider, and I offer the following historical observations for more situated community-based analysis without any claim to an interpretive monopoly.

There are also several terms used throughout this paper that deserve explanation. Most broadly, I switch at times between the terms "Indigenous" and "First Nations" in order to differentiate moments when my argument is relevant to colonial contexts globally and moments when I am specifically referring to Indigenous contexts within Canada. I use the name "Munsee" as a short-hand for the Munsee-Delaware Nation, the name "Chippewa" as a short-hand for the Chippewa of the Thames Nation, the name "Mississauga" as a short-hand for the Mississauga of the Credit Nation, and the name "Six Nations" as short-hand for the Six Nations of the Grand River Reserve. Importantly, the Six Nations are not one Nation, yet

those who live on the Grand River Reserve do share one council, and I use the metonym of Six Nations to refer to the decisions made by that singular council. Some use the term Haudenosaunee, but that term is much broader and encompasses all who joined the Iroquois Confederacy, while this paper is specifically referring to those living on the Six Nations of the Grand River Reserve. Similarly, many use the term "Anishinaabe" in reference to both the Chippewa and the Mississauga, but this also is a broader term that captures many different individual Nations. Additionally, any historical quotations referencing the Munsee will read as "Muncey" because that is how the Munsee-Delaware Nation was referred to in the period, but in my own writing I adopt the Nation's own modern spelling of Munsee.

Converging trajectories of dispossession

The Six Nations, Mississauga, Chippewa, and Munsee all experienced independent trajectories of dispossession that stretched throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and each was contextualized by a range of fraudulent land deals, broken treaty promises, and discursive logics of elimination on the part of British, American, and Canadian governments.¹ And each of these four Nations lived on and continue to maintain on-going ties to different traditional territories: Munsee territory around modern-day Manhattan and Pennsylvania, Six Nations territory around New York and Vermont, and Mississauga and Chippewa territory spanning from Ontario to Manitoba and Minnesota. Yet, as this section demonstrates, these trajectories did not remain independent. Over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, their independent trajectories pushed these four Nations from disparate territories onto the same two reserves in southern Ontario, setting the preconditions for tensions over nested sovereignty and compounding dispossession.




Figure 1: Approximate traditional territories juxtaposed to Thames and Grand River reserves. Based on the author's interpretation of archival documents and not to be used as official data. Created by author, base map in public domain.

For those members of the Haudenosaunee who would end up at the Grand River reserve as well as the Munsee who would end up on the Thames River reserve, this trajectory can be traced back to a series of alliances from 1677 between various Nations and the British government often referred to as the Covenant Chain. Both the Haudenosaunee and the Munsee were original parties to these alliances while the Mississauga and Chippewa joined the Covenant Chain after the Seven Years War. Munsee Chief Mark Peters explains that these historical alliances guided its signatories in the following centuries to act honourably towards the British government and expect honourable treatment in return, but this treatment rarely materialized (Peters 25 October 2020).² The Haudenosaunee built upon the Covenant Chain with many treaties over the eighteenth century: the Nanfan Treaty in 1701, transferring claims to hunting grounds in the Great Lakes region in return for British protection; the

Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768, transferring claims to land in Pennsylvania in return for a strong boundary against white settlement; and the Haldimand Treaty of 1784, accepting nearly 700,000 acres of land in the Grand River Valley as compensation for losses and in recognition of loyalty during the American Revolution (1775-1783). But one after the other, Britain and then Canada failed to uphold these treaties and protect Haudenosaunee rights to their land as well as funds held in trust, most notably regarding the Haldimand Treaty (Monture 2017).³

There were issues around the Haldimand Treaty from its very beginning. Rumours circled that the Crown was going to reduce the grant, and it later turned out that Haldimand had not signed the Treaty with the proper seal, so that it remained unclear whether the Treaty was even valid (S. Hill 2017, 148). Joseph Brant travelled to London in 1785 to petition the Home Secretary Lord Sydney to establish the still ambiguous boundaries of their land (Jace Weaver 2014, 170–72), but it was not until 1791 that the Grand River territory was surveyed and the boundaries of the grant defined (S. Hill 2017, 151). It quickly became apparent that the Crown and the Six Nations had different interpretations of the land rights conveyed by the Haldimand Treaty. The Six Nations maintained that the Treaty granted them fee simple title and the freedom to lease and sell their land as they wished, while the Crown held that the Treaty granted only usufructuary rights to use the land. Additionally, the territory defined in 1791 was a third smaller than the original Treaty set out, because Haldimand had failed to purchase a section of Anishinaabeg land to include in the grant (S. Hill 2017, 151).

Further delegations to London by John Norton in 1804 and John Brant in 1821 were undertaken to petition for Six Nations land rights (Morgan 2015, 197–98). Norton's mission aimed to find the original Haldimand Treaty and obtain recognition from the imperial government of their fee simple title, but was shut down largely by Norton's Six Nations opponents (Morgan 2017, 26). John Brant's mission protested that the Canadian government

had finally purchased the remaining third of the original Haldimand grant but had sold it to settlers instead of bequeathing it to the Six Nations. Brant brought the Six Nations claim before the Colonial Office, but their claims were refuted by the imperial government's stance that since Haldimand's original purchase had never taken place, its inclusion in the Haldimand Treaty was invalid (Elbourne 2012, 506–10). Over sixty years later, William Smith formed the Six Nations Union Association to convince the Grand General Indian Council to renew the Six Nations land claims. In 1889 he became the third delegate to bring the issue before the British government, but Smith was informed that the government's stance had not changed and that his petition was rejected (Trevithick 1998, 39–44). Six Nations claims dating back to the 1784 Haldimand Treaty continue to this day and have yet to be upheld honourably by the Canadian government.

Not far from the Six Nations's struggles over land in the Grand River Valley, the Mississauga were facing their own struggles over their land on the Credit River. The Mississauga are a part of the larger Anishinaabe cultural group and prior to the eighteenth century lived around the north-eastern regions of Lake Huron, but following the Beaver Wars (c. 1640s–1701) the Mississauga had moved south to repel the Haudenosaunee and found themselves occupying around four million acres of land at the western end of Lake Ontario (Wybenga 2021). The Mississauga fought alongside France prior to their defeat in the Seven Years War, and then subsequently joined the Covenant Chain with Britain as sovereign allies. When the Haudenosaunee needed lands following the American Revolution, the Mississauga signed the Between the Lakes Treaty of 1784 with Britain to provide the Haudenosaunee a new home. And although the land was bought for a pittance, Mississauga knowledge keeper Darin Wybenga recounts that it was a good deal since it required the Crown to recognize Mississauga sovereignty, and also because "it's gratifying to know that we could be a help in relocating [the Haudenosaunee] here in southern Ontario" (Wybenga 2021). Yet Wybenga

also explains that this and later treaties proved disastrous in the future, as these treaties were made under incompatible concepts of land tenure between the Mississauga, who believed they had merely rented out the use of their land, and the British, who believed they had extinguished Mississauga land title entirely (Wybenga 2021). Between 1805-1820 all of the Mississauga's remaining lands were purchased. Some groups such as the Chippewa managed to secure their own individual reserves, as discussed below. For the majority of the Mississauga, however, they were left with only a 200-acre reserve along the Credit River.⁴

When Lieutenant-Governor Sir Francis Bond Head came to the Credit River in 1836 to convince the Mississauga to relocate to Manitoulin Island as part of his relocation scheme, the Mississauga commissioned Peter Jones on a delegation to the Colonial Office to demand full title to the Credit Reserve (Hutchings 2020, 207–9). The Secretary of State for War and the Colonies Lord Glenelg gave Jones a vague promise of support for his land claims and Queen Victoria subsequently acknowledged Glenelg's promise, but titles never materialized and the land was put up for sale in 1847 (den Otter 2012, 260). The Mississauga therefore began searching for a new plot of land of sufficient size and arability that was also further removed from settler interference. They were first invited by the Saugeen First Nation to take up a reserve on Owen Sound, but the offer was turned down due to the low quality of available land. And then in 1847 the Six Nations, hearing rumours that the original owners of their own reserve were now in search of land, invited the Mississauga to take up a 4,800-acre plot on their Grand River reserve, which was later extended to 6,000 acres (Walters 1998, 43; D. Smith 2013, xviii). The Mississauga fully acknowledged that they possessed usufructuary rights only (Mississauga 19 November 1889) and they submitted to three restrictions on the occupation of the land. They were not allowed to sell or lease their land to anyone other than members of the Six Nations. They were to reimburse the Six Nations for all improvements previously made to the land to be occupied. And no Mississauga family was to hold farms

larger than 100 acres (Vankoughnet 13 June 1892, 7). It was far from a perfect situation, as the Mississauga were forced to give up significant infrastructural investments they had made on the Credit River, and the restrictions placed on their possession hampered economic development. Yet the Haudenosaunee offer of land was generous, and Wybenga directly connects it to the Between the Lakes Treaty: "[the Six Nations] did it because they remembered what we had done for them" (Wybenga 2021).

The Chippewa are a branch of the Mississauga who moved south to repel the Haudenosaunee during the Beaver Wars, and have been living along the Thames River since the mid-seventeenth century. The Chippewa experienced similar trajectories of dispossession as the Mississauga more generally: joining the Covenant Chain after the Seven Years War, fighting alongside Britain in the American Revolution (and subsequently the War of 1812 and both world wars), and losing access to millions of acres of traditional territory in late eighteenth-century treaties. As a member of an Anishinaabeg alliance now known as the Waawayaanong Anishnaabeg Southwest Treaty Council, the Chippewa maintain partial stewardship of well over three million acres of treaty lands and traditional territory (Chippewa 2016). However, the Chippewa's trajectory of dispossession changed course in the 1820s with their signing of the Longwoods Treaty in 1822 and the Huron Treaty in 1827. They were approached in the early nineteenth century by the Canadian government to surrender "all the lands belonging to them the Chippewas lying north of the River Thames," estimated at around 712,000 acres (Plain 2007, 102). The Chippewa agreed in return for four reserves amounting to 23,054 acres in addition to grain, blacksmiths, husbandmen, and an annuity of £1375. However, the two treaties that were eventually signed – the Longwoods Treaty the Huron Treaty – were massively altered. The land surrendered was increased from 712,000 acres to 2.8 million acres, the land reserved was reduced to 17,951 acres, the annuity was reduced to £1100, and the grain, blacksmiths, and husbandmen never materialized (Plain

2007, 103). Compounding the government's backhanded and dishonourable approach to treaty-making was the same issue of divergent understandings of property rights that contextualize the treaties signed by the Six Nations and the Mississauga. The Chippewa's 2016 consultation protocol thus asserts that "there are no Anishinabemowin transcriptions of treaties that use the word *adaawaage*, meaning 'to sell'", and that "we regard all of our ancestral lands as part of our consultation territory" (Chippewa 2016).

The Munsee are a branch of the Lenape or Delaware who originally lived around modern New York and Pennsylvania, but a series of land losses at the hands of dubious speculators - Chief Mark Peters argues that calling these losses "transactions" only legitimizes fraudulent practices (Peters 25 October 2020) – pushed the Munsee further and further northwest over the eighteenth century. For the most part they rented land from the Haudenosaunee and maintained the Covenant Chain with Britain, distinguishing between British policy and corrupt local official and speculators, but they briefly joined with France for the first half of the French and Indian Wars (1754-63) in protest to their treatment by British colonists (Peters 8 November 2020). The Covenant Chain was restored with the Treaty of Easton in 1758, when Britain pledged protection of Munsee land in return for the resumption of their old alliance. The Munsee joined the Haudenosaunee in fighting alongside Britain in the American Revolution, but the Munsee were not included in the Haldimand Treaty, and the Treaty of Easton's promises of protection were not upheld. They nevertheless followed the Haudenosaunee north and were invited by the Chippewa to settle alongside them on the Thames River, and records indicate that Lieutenant Governor John Simcoe promised the Munsee a deed to their land measuring twelve miles by six miles (roughly 186 square kilometres) in recognition of their alliance, but the deed is said to have burned in a house fire (Peters 20 April 2021). The British government, and later the Canadian

government, would continually capitalize on the loss of this document to dispossess the Munsee.

Most significantly, when the British Government began negotiating the Longwoods Treaty with the Chippewa between 1818-1822, the Munsee were deliberately excluded. In the face of Chippewa demands to respect Munsee land rights and a series of petitions and delegations from the Munsee to demand a seat at the table, the Indian Department feigned ignorance and wrote the Munsee out of the Longwoods Treaty (Peters 20 April 2021). The Chippewa agreed to grant the Munsee a square mile section of their reserve, a 98% reduction of the deed promised by Simcoe, but the Munsee never gave up their claim. As a consequence, the Munsee spent the entirety of the nineteenth century fighting to prove their ownership of their settlement on the Thames River while the British and Canadian governments refused to recognize them as anything more than guests of the Chippewa.

And so by the end of the 1840s, the Six Nations, Mississauga, Chippewa and Munsee had found their independent trajectories of dispossession had converged, and they had come together to assist each other in solidarity against the wave of dispossession facing them all. It is important to recognize that such solidarity was part of a long history of inter-Nation diplomacy. As the *Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples* explains, "when the Europeans arrived on the shores of North America they were met by Aboriginal nations with well-established diplomatic processes — in effect, their own continental treaty order" (Canada 1996, 112). Part of this treaty order included the formation of confederacies and alliances, such as the Haudenosaunee Confederacy to which the Six Nations belong (S. Hill 2017), the Three Fires Confederacy to which the Chippewa belong (Bellfy 2011), and the Western Confederacy to which both the Mississauga and the Munsee briefly belonged in the eighteenth century (White 1991). Such alliances could lead to polarization and conflict, as

during the Beaver Wars, yet Indigenous diplomacy also involved significant international protocols to foster good relations and manage shared resources.

One of the most prominent of these protocols is the Dish with One Spoon Treaty, an ancient philosophy of good relations between nations that was ratified into a treaty at the end of the Beaver Wars in 1701 (Jacobs and Lytwyn 2020). The Dish with One Spoon Treaty was principally between Anishinaabe and Haudenosaunee nations, but Haudenosaunee knowledge keeper Rick Hill Sr. explains that it was also an attitude that was to be applied to all neighbouring nations (R. Hill Sr. 3 December 2020). The idea behind the treaty is that the Earth (the Dish) is not to be owned or fought over in a zero-sum manner, but that what the Earth produces is meant to be shared by everyone. Anishinaabe historian Leanne Simpson asserts that "it is important to remember that sharing territory for hunting did not involve interfering with one another's sovereignty as nations. It represented harmony and interconnection, as both parties were to be responsible for taking care of the Dish" (L. Simpson 2008, 37). Thus, it is important to remember that the Dish was not established to deal with issues of nested sovereignty that would arise on the Thames and Grand River reserves by the end of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the Dish provides context to understand the attitudes towards solidarity and resource sharing that led the Six Nations and the Chippewa to invite the Mississauga and the Munsee to share the land and resources on their reserves. Although the Munsee may not have been signatories to the Dish treaty, the Chippewa expressed similar sentiments of relational cooperation when they invited the Munsee to their reserve, and Chief Mark Peters suggests that the Chippewa acted towards the Munsee based on an understanding of shared ancestry (Peters 20 April 2021).

The solidarity and good relations between the Six Nations, Mississauga, Chippewa, and Munsee were not perfect. The Munsee were grateful to the Chippewa yet often resented that the Canadian government considered them guests in lands they held valid claims to.

When the Indian Department conducted an enquiry into Indian affairs under Richard Pennefather in 1856, the Munsee brought forth their claims to land on the Thames reserve, but the commission decided that without missing deed to back their claim the Munsee should be happy with their square mile allotment (Talfourd 28 March 1884; Talfourd 17 June 1884; Leslie 1983). And by 1877 the Mississauga had grown weary of the restrictions placed on them by the Six Nations and unsuccessfully requested that the restrictions on their occupancy might be removed (Jones 2 June 1877). Nevertheless, these moments of solidarity in the 1840s illustrate how disparate victims of dispossession recognised their shared challenges and worked together to resist settler encroachment. However, by the 1880s, these solidarities crumbled under the weight of settler land hunger and challenges to Indigenous sovereignty as the convergences that in the 1840s were a source of strength became yet another site of competition.

Rising tensions

Troubles arose differently on the Thames and the Grand River reserves, but both revolved around worsening shortages of land. On the Thames reserve, conflict between the Munsee and the Chippewa had three sources. First, land shortages in Ontario starting from the 1860s were driving demand for the Chippewa to surrender their land for substantial prices, an economic strategy that the Munsee – without title to their land - could not participate in. This became a particular bone of contention in 1871, when the Chippewa surrendered 42 acres of their reserve to the Canada Southern Railway Company for \$890 or roughly \$21 per acre (Chamberlin 1891a, 294). This was a huge sum of money considering that in 1895 the going price of land on the Thames reserve between residents was only \$4 per acre (Hawk 1895). The Munsee, who had no ability to surrender land, protested that they should receive some of the proceeds of the land sale. They wrote a petition to Superintendent-General of Indian Affairs David Laird on 24 June 1874, requesting the Indian Department

"not to send any of the money which we claim on the prize of the land which the Southern R. Company bought...for we are quite confident that we have just as much rights to this...therefore we think the prize of the land should be kept in your hands until some sort of settlement can be made" (Waddilove et al. 24 June 1874). The Indian Department concluded that none of the improvements included in the purchase belonged to the Munsee, and since they also had no documents proving title to the land itself, no compensation could be offered (Livingston 18 December 1874).

The second source of hostility came from Chippewa economic development policies. In 1849, the Chippewa applied for the construction of an industrial school and model farm "in anticipation of the benefit which will arise," and surrendered 200 acres for the purpose (Chippewa 13 February 1849).⁵ Later, in 1881, the Chippewa conducted a large-scale lease of land to address a shortage in livestock. Perceiving that farmland was next to useless without livestock to till it, the Chippewa planned to lease their land to generate funds to purchase more livestock, and then after the leases had terminated proceed to till the land (Fish 26 May 1881). They therefore leased a swath of vacant lots throughout the entire reserve (see Figure 1), so that by the 1880s the amount of available land within the Thames reserve was significantly reduced from its original 15,300 acres (Chippewa 3 November 1881; Chamberlin 1891b, 184–99).




Figure 2: Chippewa land transactions on the Thames reserve. Based on the author's interpretation of archival documents and not to be used as official data. Created by author, base map in public domain.

And the third source of conflict came from Munsee expansion. According to a Chippewa petition in 1886, the Munsee had been granted a single square mile of land because "there were comparatively but few families of the said Band who were originally allowed to settle here, but subsequently additional numbers of them came and settled upon the Reserve without the consent of the Chippewa Band, some have even come at much later period from the United States" (Chippewa 27 April 1886). An Indian Department investigation in 1896 confirmed that "the Muncseys, who were from time to time joined by others, overstepped the thousand acre limit and encroached on other land until they finally occupied 3108 acres, or 2108 acres additional to the tract allotted to them" (Mayne Daly 29 January 1894). Combined with settler pressures to alienate land and Chippewa pressures for economic development, Munsee expansion outside the lot originally granted to them by the Chippewa contributed to a

festering rift between the Munsee and the Chippewa over land that both sides perceived to be rightfully their own. This rift boiled over in the 1880s into an extended conflict that travelled all the way to England.

On the Grand River reserve, conflict primarily arose from the quickly expanding populations of the Six Nations and the Mississauga. Much of the settler pressure to sell land and internal expansion that affected the Thames reserve were not present at the Grand River. Unlike the Munsee, who tripled the amount of land they were permitted to occupy, the Mississauga did not expand beyond their 6,000-acre plot. And unlike the Chippewa, who leased or sold around 5,000 acres between 1850 and 1890 (Chamberlin 1891a, 94, 125, 146, 162, 267; 1891b, 143–46, 294), the Six Nations sold or leased less than 10 acres in the same period (Chamberlin 1891b, 250). Population growth, on the other hand, presented an acute problem on the Grand River reserve. Population was not such a concern on the Thames reserve, where 612 Chippewa and Munsee in 1870 had fallen to 592 in 1890. Conversely, on the Grand River reserve, 3061 Six Nations and Mississauga in 1870 had grown to 3681 in 1890, an increase of 20% (Indian Department 1890; 1870). By 1896, the Six Nations were complaining that they "have not any land to spare," and particularly that they "have no wild or unimproved lands" on which to build more housing (Jones 28 May 1896). And so just as Munsee expansion and settler pressure for land created a rift between the Munsee and the Chippewa the led to a battle over title to the Thames reserve, Six Nations population growth created a rift between the Six Nations and the Mississauga that, in the 1880s and 1890s, resulted in a battle over title to the Grand River reserve.




Figure 3: Six Nations and Mississauga reserves. Created by author, base map in public domain.

Although it is not cited explicitly in these primary documents, the Canadian government's escalating campaign to eliminate Indigenous sovereignty also contributed to rising tensions. Through the Gradual Civilization Act of 1857, the Gradual Enfranchisement Act of 1869, and the Indian Act of 1876, the Canadian government legislated itself with the power to determine community membership through the "status Indian" mechanism as well as to interfere in self-government through elected band councils (Milloy 1983). Further amendments and laws were rapidly enacted in the immediate years before conflict between the Chippewa, Munsee, Six Nations, and Mississauga broke out: the 1880 Indian Act amendment reinforced the state's ability to force the creation of band councils; the 1884 Indian Advancement Act expanded the powers of Indian Department superintendents to dictate the size, regulations, and elections of band councils; the 1884 Indian Act amendment created government and church funded residential schools and further increased the powers of Indian Department superintendents over the election of band leaders (Tobias 1983). These

developments represented Canada's policy to eliminate Indigenous peoples and cultures,⁶ exerted extraordinary pressure on Indigenous determination to act as sovereign nations, and acted in combination with land and population pressures to push the Chippewa and Six Nations to defend and assert their sovereignty by attempting to evict the Munsee and the Mississauga.

Conflict

In 1886, both the Munsee/Chippewa and the Six Nations/Mississauga tensions over land erupted into outright conflict. First came a petition from the Chippewa to the Indian Department on 27 April 1886. The petition complained that the number of Munsee living on the Thames reserve had grown since they were first allowed to settle there, and that while "only about a mile square of land was originally set apart for the occupation of the said band...those who came here recently soon began to settle and occupy land outside of the said one square mile of land against the will of the Chippewa" (Chippewa 27 April 1886). They challenged the Munsee's claims to equal land rights, asserting that "the Chippewa were the original owners of the land and which our forefathers reserved, as you will see in the Treaty of 1822," but they did not challenge the right of the Munsee to live on the reserve entirely. Instead, they asked the Indian Department "that the said Munsee be confined to occupy the said one square mile of land originally set apart for their occupation" (Chippewa 27 April 1886). The Indian Department promised to look into the matter, and asked the Chippewa to provide a map of the lots occupied by the Munsee, details of how they obtained the lots, and whether they were within the mile boundary (Chippewa 27 April 1886).

Just a few months later, on 26 October 1886, the Mississauga received a letter from the Six Nations council informing them that "your occupation to the southeast corner of the reserve consisting of six thousand acres of land shall discontinue one year from this date" (J. Hill 26 October 1886). The Mississauga were to be paid for all of their improvements to the

land, but otherwise were to be entirely displaced from the land they had lived on for the past five decades. The reason given for this eviction was that the Six Nations population "having increased to about one thousand in thirty years rendered necessary that the council should provide homes for them, but are unable to do so without getting the land you occupy which belongs to them" (J. Hill 26 October 1886). Neither the Munsee nor the Mississauga had any intention of leaving the land they occupied, and they both jumped into action to dispute their eviction notices.

The Munsee's response was to dispute the Chippewa's right of eviction and assert the Munsee's greater right to the land. There had been rumours back in 1881 that the Chippewa were going to attempt an eviction, and the Munsee had launched two delegations. One, led by Charles Halfmoon and William Waddilove, went to Philadelphia to hunt down documentary proof of the Munsee's land claims. The second, that of Scobie Logan, went to Britain to petition the Colonial Office to uphold the Easton Treaty and British promises to land in southern Ontario as expressed by Lord Simcoe as well as Lieutenant Colonel John Butler, under whom the Munsee had fought during the American Revolution. Halfmoon died while on route to Philadelphia (*The Standard* 16 June 1882), but Logan spent over a year in London pursuing the Munsee's claim to the Thames reserve.⁷ Logan was an elected Munsee chief who had been personally impacted by the land dispute with the Chippewa: his second wife Mary suffered from "fits" that required constant attention, and Logan had tried to lease his land to pay for full time care (Logan 20 December 1895). But his lease was disallowed because his land was outside the Munsee's original square mile allotment, and he was informed that "the rule has been laid down that no land claimed by the Muncseys outside the Mile Limit shall be leased" (Reed 5 March 1896). Logan arrived in London in June 1882 and presented the Colonial Office with an account of the Munsee's history, of their claim to the land based on promises from the British government, and their fears that the Chippewa were planning to

evict them (Colonial Office June 1882). The Colonial Office conducted a preliminary investigation, but they concluded that the Munsee's concerns were "merely an 'apprehension' at present" (Colonial Office June 1882). The Colonial Office then wrote to the Canadian government for a report on the Munsee claims, and Lawrence Vankoughnet, the Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, reported that "the allegation of Chief Wah-bun-ah-kee alias Scobie Logan, that a movement is on foot to deprive the Indians occupying the Caradoc Reserve of their lands therein is totally without foundation" (Vankoughnet 13 October 1882). Without any physical proof that the Chippewa were planning to evict the Munsee, the Colonial Office decided that Logan had come to Britain under false pretences and had no legitimate claim upon the British government. The Secretary of State for the Colonies closed the file with the conclusion that "Scobie Logan may be 'moral,' but he is a humbug evidently" (Colonial Office 14 October 1882).

Five years passed before the rumours of an attempted eviction materialized in the Chippewa's petition in 1886, and another three years passed before the Indian Department completed its investigation into the matter. In 1889 the Department proposed a settlement in which the Munsee would give up 500 acres of the land outside their square mile (a quarter of the land under dispute) and be recognized as the owners of the rest, and the Chippewa would be compensated \$16,000. The Chippewa signed the settlement but the Munsee refused (Hogg 16 March 1896), and in retaliation wrote to the Department of Agriculture that the Munsee had a greater claim to the land than the Chippewa. They started their argument by contrasting the Munsee's history of loyalty to Britain ("we have fulfilled our promises as a loyal British subject made allegiance with the England") with the Chippewa's history of loyalty to France ("the Chippeways had never made a treaty with the England, whatever and beside they were on the side of the French flag against the England") (Wilson 18 February 1889). These claims were not entirely accurate. The Chippewa had been allied with France, but so had the Munsee

briefly during the French and Indian War. And the Munsee did have a long history of alliance with the British, fighting alongside them in the American Revolution, the War of 1812, and various other conflicts, but so did the Chippewa. The Munsee's loyalist rhetoric was to a large extent a manifestation of their on-going commitment to the Covenant Chain and treaty relationships going back to the Treaty of Easton, as well as a demand to be compensated for substantial losses incurred while fighting for British interests (Peters 20 April 2021). But such rhetoric also reflected the very common strategy used by Indigenous peoples across the world of positioning petitions through a discourse of deference and loyalty to navigate nation-to-nation relationships contextualized by an unequal balance of power (O'Brien 2018; Korieh 2010).

The Munsee also contrasted their own dedication to European civilization ("we mean to work our lands as the white people does, improving the land and clearing the land and making rails") with the Chippewa's alleged lack of such civilization ("the Chippewas most of their lands improvements made by the whiteman and I am safe to say today that many of them are not at home...this shows what kind of people they are wandering from place to place") (Wilson 1889).⁸ Again, this rhetoric should be interpreted cautiously. As Lyons demonstrates, Indigenous peoples frequently appropriated such Eurocentric and racialized discourses in their efforts to navigate modernity, and such strategies do not necessarily represent submission to assimilation (Lyons 2010, 8-12). Indeed, Chief Mark Peters emphasizes that the Munsee have possessed their own distinct form of advanced civilization far pre-dating European contact and over the centuries have resolutely refused to adopt European notions of civilization in lieu of their own (Peters 25 October 2020; Peters 17 April 2021). Yet it is also striking that the Munsee utilized European concepts of improvement and terra nullius to assert their claim to land against the claims of the Chippewa, demonstrating how dispossession discourses were not necessarily limited to use

by European colonizers but rather made up a much broader dispossessionary episteme that many parties operated within. The Indian Department was notified of the Munsee's petition to the Department of Agriculture and assured the Munsee that there was no agitation to remove them from their land, and the issue was dropped for the time being (Indian Department 5 March 1889). Importantly, the Indian Department interpreted the \$16,000 settlement as failed since the Munsee had refused to sign it, but the Chippewa were not informed that the deal was off. As will be seen, this pushed the Chippewa into yet further grievance when no money materialized over the coming years.

On the Grand River, the Mississauga similarly turned to the government to protect them from eviction. They reached out to Lawrence Vankoughnet (Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs) stating that "the Indian department officers are our guardians and it is our desire that you will inform us in what way to act in this matter" (Wood 28 December 1886). Just as in the Munsee's experience, however, the government's response was entirely unhelpful, amounting to Vankoughnet's dismissive "I am not prepared to offer any suggestion to you" (Vankoughnet 11 January 1887). Regardless, the Mississauga refused to leave the Grand River, and in 1889 the Six Nations approached them again with three options for moving forward. They proposed that the Mississauga either: 1) assimilate into the Six Nations and thus share the land; 2) buy the land and pay for all improvements made prior to 1847, or 3) surrender the land and work with the Indian Department to find a new home (J. Hill 10 September 1889). The Mississauga rejected all three options. They insisted that the Mississauga had already paid for the improvements forty years ago and that even if they had not, the Statute of Limitations surely applied to such an old grievance. As for the threat of eviction, the Mississauga argued that "you may still remain the *owners*, but it is a mere *naked ownership* or *proprietary*, we having the perpetual usufruct and right to occupy" (Mississauga 1889). Nevertheless, the Mississauga offered the Six Nations \$10,000 as "a friendly

settlement...for a discharge of all liabilities, and for a clear deed" (Mississauga 1889). The Six Nations rejected the offer and instead countered that the Mississauga had violated the original 1847 agreement by allowing non-Mississauga to settle on the reserve, by not restricting family plots to 100 acres, and by not allowing Six Nations full access to timber on the reserve (Wood 5 September 1889). The Mississauga repudiated all of these claims and countered with arguments of ancestral title ("all the land in this section of Ontario formerly belong to our Band") as well as Lockean property rights ("We have turned the wild forest of this Reserve into a fine agricultural district...and made the Reserve in every way a fit comparison to the white townships surrounding") (Wood 5 September 1889). For the next eleven years the Mississauga and Six Nations remained in this deadlock, and although the Indian Department determined in 1894 that the Six Nations had no right to evict the Mississauga, the dispute persisted over whether the Mississauga had paid for the improvements to their land as stipulated in the original 1847 agreement (Reed 8 June 1894).⁹

Resolution

Both the Thames and the Grand River land disputes were settled by the turn of the twentieth century. On the Thames reserve, the Chippewa renewed their dispute with the Munsee in a petition dated 25 May 1893, when they challenged the previous settlement over the Munsee's land. The Chippewa declared that the 1886 settlement for \$16,000 was agreed to "in ignorance of their rights in the premises, without any legal advisor, and without any time to consider the matter," and that they now realized the agreement to be "grossly improvident" (Chippewa 25 May 1893). According to their own calculations, the land occupied by the Munsee was worth at least \$63,000 on the open market. And what is more, they pointed out that "Her Majesty has not carried out or performed her said offer" despite repeated demands to make the promised payment, revealing that they were unaware that the 1886 settlement had failed. As such, the Chippewa petitioned that the 1886 settlement be

voided and a new settlement agreed upon. They proposed three possible settlements. First, that the Munsee be evicted from all the lands outside their one square mile lot. Second, that the land remain in Munsee occupation but its value reassessed and an increased sum paid to the Chippewa. Third, if neither of those options were possible, then at least the \$16,000 should be paid at last (Chippewa 25 May 1893). The Indian Department refused to contemplate the first two proposals, but they also recognized that they were in the exact same position as in 1886: they could approach the Munsee to sign the settlement again, but if the Munsee refused then the feud would continue. Thus, the Indian Department concluded that it "would be of more value to the Government to have settled in some shape than to have the question of right between the parties fought out" (Indian Department 27 April 1896). In 1896 Canada agreed to pay the Chippewa a slightly re-assessed sum of \$17,640 in compensation for the extinguishment of their claim to the land occupied to the Munsee, without making a final decision about the Munsee's land claims (Indian Department 22 October 1896). With this settlement the land dispute between the Munsee and the Chippewa was laid to rest.

On the Grand River reserve, the Mississauga and Six Nations continued to petition and counter-petition each other throughout the 1890s over whether the agreement of 1847 had been violated or not. In 1896 the Six Nations laid down three conditions for a settlement: that the land be occupied in common so that both nations could use it, that the Mississauga pay for the improvements they had failed to pay for in 1847, and that there be one superintendent to preside over both Nations instead of separate superintendents for each Nations as was the case previously (W. Smith 3 February 1896). And the Mississauga, again, rejected all of these conditions: they would not live in common just as they would not assimilate to another Nation; they considered the cost of the improvements to have been either paid or lapsed; and they believed that having only one superintendent for two Nations would be biased towards the larger Nation, i.e. the Six Nations (Jones 27 April 1896).

However, by 1900 the Mississauga had been searching for nearly two decades for proof that they had paid for the improvements in 1847 and they had found nothing, and so they once again offered to pay \$10,000 in compensation. On 25 September 1900 a settlement was agreed upon, "under which by the payment of the sum of \$10000 by the Mississaugas to the Six Nations the former will secure for all time, in settlement of a dispute of many years' standing, the right of undisturbed use and occupancy of the lands on the Six Nations Reserve" (Mississauga and Six Nations 25 September 1900).

While these two particular land disputes were amicably settled by the turn of the twentieth century, all four of these nations continue to pursue unresolved land claims with the Canadian government into the present. It would not be until 1967 that the Munsee-Delaware Reserve would be "recognized" by the Canadian government, but what the government recognizes as the Munsee reserve is only a small three-square kilometre slice of the much larger 186 square kilometre grant of land promised by Lord Simcoe. In some ways this illustrates Glen Coulthard's observation that acts of recognition within unequal balances of power will always reflect only what the hegemon is willing to recognize (2014, 17-18). The Munsee continue to pursue their claims to this land, and "to be treated as the allies we were and for the government to live up to the promise it made to us based on that alliance for lands in Upper Canada" (Peters 20 April 2021). The Chippewa also continue to pursue various claims against Canada's failure to honour historical obligations, with two claims under assessment and negotiation at the time of publication. The Caradoc Reserve 1834 Surrender Claim holds that "Canada breached its fiduciary duties and duty of honour and integrity in relation to the 1834 Surrender," and the Railway Expropriate claim holds that "the Crown breached both statutory and fiduciary duties owed to the First Nation in taking reserve land for railway purposes" (AANDC 2022). The Mississauga have three land claims currently under assessment. The Treaty 22 and Treaty 23 claim argues that the government predatorily

purchased Mississauga land during a time of austerity for far undervalue, and that the land was not maintained or used for the benefit of the Mississauga (Duric 2017). The Rouge Tract claim contends that the 1923 William Treaty transferred Mississauga land to the Crown without their input or consent, and the Mississauga now assert their unextinguished aboriginal title and the return of the lands in question (Mississauga 2015a). And the Aboriginal Title Claim to Waters within the Traditional Lands of the Mississaugas holds that there is no valid mention of water in any of the treaties between the Mississauga and the Crown, and they assert unextinguished Aboriginal title to all water, beds of water, and floodplains within their traditional territories (Mississauga 2015b). The Six Nations have 29 outstanding land claims to over 900,000 acres of land which were arbitrarily closed by the Canadian government in 1995 without assessment or settlement, and they continue to pursue these claims through the courts with trials scheduled for 2023 (Six Nations 2020). Thus, while the land disputes between the Munsee, Chippewa, Mississauga, and Six Nations were resolved by the early twentieth century, these disputes make up only a very small part of a much broader history of dispossession that continues into the present.

Conclusion

As this narrative demonstrates, the disparate trajectories of dispossession experienced by the Munsee, Chippewa, Mississauga, and Six Nations had, by the late nineteenth century, converged and compounded in significant ways. Each Nation could point to a different trajectory of dispossession at the hands of British and Canadian governments, and yet by the 1880s these different trajectories had compounded together so that each of these Nations felt land pressures contextualized by all four trajectories of dispossession. And the compounding interest of these trajectories over the nineteenth century, together with rising settler land hunger and government attacks upon Indigenous sovereignty, led to new moments of

attempted dispossession when the Chippewa tried to evict the Munsee from the Thames Reserve and the Six Nations tried to evict the Mississauga from the Grand River Reserve.

These histories complicate unidirectional models of dispossession as something done by settlers to Indigenous peoples. I have shown that dispossession may originate from an original imperial/settler act, but that it can then reverberate through time to be appropriated and articulated by an array of actors. Building upon Scott Lyons's concept of Indigenous resistance/assimilation as a continuum of strategies based upon available discourses, and combining it with Aileen Moreton-Robinson's concept of possession as a settler colonial discursive formation, I argue that the dispossessory actions of the Chippewa and the Six Nations should not be understood as either resistance or assimilation. Instead, I propose that dispossession itself was an available strategy within the episteme of the historical moment, and that choosing to employ that strategy did not render them "complicit with colonialism." On the contrary, by considering Chippewa and Six Nations material need for land amidst population growth and political need to protect and express sovereignty in the face of the Indian Act and related legislation, and applying Audra Simpson's lens of the inherent tension and conflict that arises from nested sovereignties, we can see that the choice to dispossess was inherently in opposition to the settler colonial project of elimination. For while these attempted dispossessions may appear colonial in nature, they were also rejections of the Canadian government's assumed right to unilaterally determine residence and belonging on the Thames and Grand River reserves. Similarly, while Munsee and Mississauga strategies of seeking recognition from the Indian Department reflect Glen Coulthard's trap of propagating oppression through accepting settler terms of recognition, their more urgent need to protect land and sovereignty recall Simpson's argument that remaining within an oppressive dynamic can be justified when greater principles are at stake. Yet Simpson's concept of nested sovereignty is limited in its articulation by attending only to tensions between Indigenous and

settler sovereignties, and this paper expands upon it by attending to the tensions between inter-Indigenous sovereignties as well. By approaching these histories through the concept of compound dispossession, I offer one means of recognizing diverse Indigenous responses to colonialism that do not fit comfortably within the binary of resistance/assimilation, without losing sight of the contingent legacies of colonial violence and injustice that preceded them.

These histories also contribute to a historiography of Indigenous lived experiences that were not confined to reified "Indigenous-settler relations." Settler land hunger and efforts to extinguish Indigenous sovereignty were certainly fundamental issues for all four of these Nations, but they were not the only issue. Utilizing Jodi Byrd's framework of distinguishing between vertical Indigenous-settler conflicts and horizontal conflicts between diverse colonised and racialized groups, I work towards recentring histories of dispossession in southern Ontario around the horizontal conflicts they experienced and thereby contribute towards Sarah Nickel's call to deconstruct narratives positioning Indigenous politics as necessarily a response to settler politics. Indeed, while the histories of compound dispossession discussed in this paper were contextualized by the settler colonial project, they began and ended with Indigenous agency, both in the decisions to attempt eviction and the later successes at reaching diplomatic settlements. Daniel Voth proposes that such horizontal conflicts can be the result of zero-sum mentalities, through which Nations can fall into a trap of "anti-relational politics that result in the entrenchment of zero-sum inter-Indigenous competition" (Voth 2015, 135). Such was not the case for the four Nations discussed here, none of which attempted to entirely strip the others of land or resources. The Chippewa only wanted the Munsee to adhere to the previously agreed upon boundaries, and the Six Nations were willing to pay for any improvements to the land or welcome the Mississauga into their community. And the eventual diplomatic successes further demonstrate the absence of zero-sum politics. Instead, I argue that compound dispossession better explains these particular

horizontal conflicts: there was no intention to take land at another's expense, only a desire to counteract the harms of historical dispossessions which were being exacerbated over time.

Attending to these horizontal conflicts highlights the long history of inter-Indigenous diplomacy and contingency of the present on successful resolution of inter-Nation conflicts. It is not implausible that either the Munsee or the Mississauga could have relocated because of their disputes with the Chippewa and the Six Nations. For one thing, there is ample historical evidence that the Canadian government did not consider Indigenous reserves to be permanent and did at various points in time reduce reserves and relocate First Nations to serve settler interests, Sir Francis Bond Head's Manitoulin Island relocation scheme in the 1830s and Sir Joseph Trutch's massive reduction of British Columbian reserves in the 1870s being only two examples. It was therefore not at all implausible at the time that the Canadian government could have recognized the Chippewa's and Six Nations's right to evict the Munsee and the Mississauga. What is more, both the Mississauga and the Munsee had already relocated within living memory. The Mississauga had moved in 1847 to the Grand River, and had even been offered alternative land by the Saugeen First Nation on Owen Sound. The Mississauga's fervent efforts throughout the 1880s and 1890s to remain on the Grand River and their previous declination of the Saugeen's offer suggest that such a relocation would only have taken place as a last resort. Nevertheless, it is still possible that the Mississauga could have relocated again if their conflict with the Six Nations escalated further. And the Munsee had also been recently relocated, although on a smaller scale. In 1856 a large block of land across the Thames River that the Munsee had been cultivating for decades but which did not belong to the Chippewa Reserve was sold and the Munsee living on the land evicted, depriving them of improvements to the land estimated at around £5000 which were never compensated. The Muncey petitioned the Indian Department from 1877-1889 to gain compensation for their stolen land and improvements (Gordon 9 March 1877;

Gordon 7 February 1878), and even tried to send a delegation to Ottawa in 1880 to press their claims (Gordon 11 March 1880). But the Indian Department declined to receive the delegation, and finally concluded that "their claims if they ever had any have lapsed and become void" (Vankoughnet 20 August 1879), and the Munsee were not to be allowed either repatriation or compensation to their lands across the Thames river. Chief Mark Peters points out that the Munsee had already been offered by the Governor of Michigan to relocate there, and had contemplated accepting the offer if their rights to land along the Thames were not acknowledged (Peters 20 April 2021). And so both the Mississauga and the Munsee, despite strongly resisting eviction, knew that forced eviction was not an impossibility if they failed to reach settlements with the Chippewa and Six Nations. Modern histories of dispossession in Canada stress the importance of Indigenous persistence in the face of settler expansion, and I argue that it is also important to recognize persistence in the face of inter-Nation conflict. If not for the settlement of inter-Nation compound dispossessions in the late nineteenth century, the Munsee and Mississauga may have been forced to relocate yet again and their histories may have looked very different than they do today.

This paper has several limitations that are important to recognize. I have placed archival voices from each of the four Nations at the centre of my narrative as well as incorporated the voices of contemporary knowledge keepers and historians from each Nation. Nevertheless, archival methodologies can only take one so far, and textual records of Indigenous voices recorded in colonial archives can be particularly problematic (Stoler 2002; Luker 2017). I have treated these records with as much caution and attention to context as possible, yet I also insist that my findings are inherently tentative and open to reconfiguration, elaboration, and even refutation by future oral historical research. Moreover, my positionality as a non-Indigenous historian provides an entirely different perspective from those of the historical subjects of this paper. I have built my analysis around Indigenous

scholarship, but again, my outside perspective has inherent limits. As such, this paper is meant to be understood through the lens of subjective historical representation, in which arguments are only proposals for possible ways to think about the past (Ankersmit 2001, 91-92). More research by oral historians and analysis by Indigenous scholars is certainly needed, and I hope that the concept of compound dispossession may prove a useful lens for this work.

¹ These are certainly not the only unique trajectories of dispossession in Ontario's history: from challenges faced by Métis to be included in treaty-making processes to the dispossession of the Lac le Croix Nation by wilderness conservation, the histories of dispossession in Ontario are multifarious and complex. For more see McNab (1999).

² The concept of honourable nation-to-nation relations was later enshrined in the Royal Proclamation of 1763, when Britain recognized aboriginal title and the need for fair treaty-making. "The honour of the Crown" has since become an important framework for challenging historical dispossessions and modern injustices. For more see McMorrow (2018).

³ The Haldimand Treaty itself was a result of Britain's betrayal of the Haudenosaunee and many other Indigenous allies when it ceded their lands, which Britain had promised to protect in numerous treaties, over to the United States in the Treaty of Paris 1783. And the Haldimand Treaty would not have been signed without vigorous lobbying by Joseph Brant. For more see S. Hill (2017, 128-131).

⁴ This brief overview glosses over an incredibly complex and multifaceted history of Anishinaabe treaty-making which is beyond the scope of this paper. For more, see Corbiere (2019).

⁵ The Mount Elgin Industrial School operated as a residential school until 1946. The Chippewa requested it be built in order to teach their children useful academic skills, but in reality it operated as a hard labour residential school. For more see Chippewa (2022).

⁶ Settler colonialism as inherently eliminationist has manifested in a variety of ways throughout history: Lorenzo Veracini proposes 26 different categories of elimination ranging from military destruction ("necropolitical transfer") to cultural appropriation ("transfer by settler indigenisation") (Veracini 2010, 33-52). For more on elimination in Canada, see Palmater (2014).

⁷ Logan's delegation to London, in addition to those of the Mississauga and Six Nations mentioned above, represented both a lack of good faith in the Canadian government as well as a dedication to maintain treaty relationships that were forged with Britain and not with Canada. Such delegations were a common strategy for Indigenous peoples throughout the settler colonies. For more see Carter and Nugent (2016).

⁸ This reference to "improvement" is an invocation of John Locke's theory of property, which became a powerful tool to legitimize settler dispossession of Indigenous land through the logic that settlers could make the land more productive. For more see Murray (2022).

⁹ The dispute over original payment for the New Credit reserve was more complicated than can be discussed here, involving historical debts incurring by the Six Nations to clear European squatters from the reserve just prior to the Mississauga's arrival as well as calculations of annual interest payments. For more see Sherwin (2012, 99-102).

References

- AANDC. 2022. "Reporting Centre on Specific Claims." Accessed May 21, 2022. https://services.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/SCBRI_E/Main/ReportingCentre/External/externalreporting.aspx.
- Alfred, Gerald. 2017. "It's All about the Land." In *Whose Land Is It Anyway?: A Manual for Decolonization*, edited by Peter McFarlane and Nicole Schabus, 10–13. Federation of Post-Secondary Educators of BC.
- Ankersmit, Frank. 2022. *Historical Representation*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Banner, Stuart. 2007. *Possessing the Pacific: Land, Settlers, and Indigenous People from Australia to Alaska*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Bellfy, Phil. 2011. *Three Fires Unity: The Anishnaabeg of the Lake Huron Borderlands*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Bhandar, Brenna. 2018. *Colonial Lives of Property: Law, Land, and Racial Regimes of Ownership*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Byrd, Jodi. 2011. *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Canada. 1996. *Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples*. Volume 1. Ottawa: The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples.
- Carter, Sarah, and Maria Nugent, eds. 2017. *Mistress of Everything Queen Victoria in Indigenous Worlds*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Chamberlin, Brown. 1891a. *Indian Treaties and Surrenders, from 1680 to 1890, Volume 1*. Ottawa: Brown Chamberlin.
- . 1891b. *Indian Treaties and Surrenders, from 1680 to 1890, Volume 2*. Ottawa: Brown Chamberlin.
- Chippewa. 13 February 1849. RG 10 Vol. 1844 IT 144, 58-1/2c. Library and Archives Canada.
- . 3 November 1881. RG 2, Privy Council Office, Series A-1-a. Library and Archives Canada.
- . 27 April 1886. Letter to John A. Macdonald. RG 10 Vol. 2337 File 68.173. Library and Archives Canada.
- . 25 May 1893. "Petition of Chiefs and Councillors of the Chippewa Band of the Thames to The Queen's Most Excellent Majesty." RG 2 Series 1 Vol 596, Privy Council Minutes, 9 May - 24 May 1894. Library and Archives Canada.
- . 2016. "Chippewas of the Thames First Nation Wiindmaagewin Consultation Protocol, Final." <https://www.cottfn.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Wiindmaagewin-CONSULTATION-PROTOCOL-Final-Nov-2016-2.pdf>.
- . 2022. "Mt. Elgin Industrial Institute - Indian Residential School." Chippewas of the Thames First Nation. Accessed May 21, 2022. <https://www.cottfn.com/mt-elgin-industrial-institute-indian-residential-school/>.
- Colonial Office. June 1882. "Statement of the Case of the Muncey Tribe." CO 42-773 no. 11452. The National Archives, Kew.
- . 14 October 1882. "The Muncey Indians." CO 42-772 no. 18952. The National Archives, Kew.
- Corbiere, Alan. 2019. "Anishinaabe Treaty-Making in the 18th-and-19th-Century Northern Great Lakes: From Shared Meanings to Epistemological Chasms." PhD dissertation, Toronto: York University.

- Coulthard, Glen Sean. 2014. *Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- den Otter, A. A. 2012. *Civilizing the Wilderness: Culture and Nature in Pre-Confederation Canada and Rupert's Land*. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press.
- Duric, Donna. 2017. "12 Mile Creek, 16 Mile Creek and Credit River Reserves – Treaty Nos. 22 and 23 (1820) - Mississaugas of the Credit First Nation." Mississauga of the Credit First Nation. May 28, 2017. <http://mncfn.ca/treaty2223/>.
- Elbourne, Elizabeth. 2012. "Broken Alliance: Debating Six Nations' Land Claims in 1822." *Cultural and Social History* 9 (4): 497–525.
- Ferris, Neal. 2009. *The Archaeology of Native-Lived Colonialism: Challenging History in the Great Lakes*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
- Fish, Joseph. 26 May 1881. Letter to Thomas Gordon. RG 10 Vol. 2142 File 29.654 Part 1. Library and Archives Canada.
- Goddard, Ives. 1978. "Delaware." In *Handbook of North American Indians*, edited by William C. Sturtevant, 15:213–39. Washington [D.C.]: Smithsonian Institution.
- Goodspeed, C.L., and W.A. Goodspeed. 1889. *History of the County of Middlesex, Canada: From the Earliest Time to the Present, Containing an Authentic Account of Many Important Matters Relating to the Settlement, Progress and General History of the County, and Including a Department Devoted to the Preservation of Personal and Private Records, Etc. ; Illustrated*. Toronto: W.A. and C.L. Goodspeed.
- Gordon, Thomas. 9 March 1877. Letter to Edmund. RG 10 Vol. 2028 File 8896. Library and Archives Canada.
- . 7 February 1878. Letter to Thomas Johnson. RG 10 Vol. 2028 File 8896. Library and Archives Canada.
- . 11 March 1880. Letter to Indian Department. RG 10 Vol. 2105 File 19.301. Library and Archives Canada.
- Greer, Allan. 2018. *Property and Dispossession: Natives, Empires and Land in Early Modern North America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Grumet, Robert. 2009. *The Munsee Indians: A History*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Harris, Cole. 2002. *Making Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance, and Reserves in British Columbia*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
- Hawk, Daniel. 1895. "Receipt for Purchase of Land." RG 10 Vol. 2758 File 149,769. Library and Archives Canada.
- Hill, Josiah. 26 October 1886. Letter to James Wood. RG 10 Vol. 2358 File 72,566. Library and Archives Canada.
- . 10 September 1889. Letter to Mississauga Council. RG 10 Vol. 2358 File 72,566. Library and Archives Canada.
- Hill Sr., Rick. 2020. "Lunch and Learn Dish With One Spoon Wampum with Rick Hill Sr." Online lecture, 1:09:17. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SiU5uvGXhxA>.
- Hill, Susan. 2009. "Conducting Haudenosaunee Historical Research from Home: In the Shadow of the Six Nations-Caledonia Reclamation." *American Indian Quarterly* 33 (4): 479–98.
- . 2017. *The Clay We Are Made Of: Haudenosaunee Land Tenure on the Grand River*. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press.
- Hogg, W.D. 16 March 1896. Letter to E.L. Newcombe. RG 2 Series 1 Volume 685. Library and Archives Canada.
- Holtz, Menja. 2018. "An Unexpected Find: Self-Representation in Nineteenth-Century Portrait Photographs of Canadian Lenape." *Journal of Moravian History* 18 (2): 187–220.

- Howe, Stephen, ed. 2010. *The New Imperial Histories Reader*. London: Routledge.
- Hutchings, Kevin. 2020. *Transatlantic Upper Canada: Portraits in Literature, Land, and British-Indigenous Relations*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Indian Department. 1870. "Report of the Indian Branch of the Secretary of State for the Provinces." *Indian Affairs Annual Reports, 1864-1990*. Library and Archives Canada.
- . 5 March 1889. Letter to Josiah Wilson. RG 10 Vol. 2399 File 82.709. Library and Archives Canada.
- . 1890. "Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs." *Indian Affairs Annual Reports, 1864-1990*. Library and Archives Canada.
- . 27 April 1896. "Order-in-Council 1896-1450." RG 2 Series 1 Volume 685. Library and Archives Canada.
- . 22 October 1896. "Order-in-Council 1896-3579." RG 2 Series 1 Volume 706. Library and Archives Canada.
- Jacobs, Dean, and Victor Lytwyn. 2020. "Naagan Ge Bezhig Emkwaan: A Dish with One Spoon Reconsidered." *Ontario History* 112 (2): 191–210.
- Johnson, Walter. 2003. "On Agency." *Journal of Social History* 37 (1): 113–24.
- Johnson, William. 1758. *The Minutes of a Treaty Held at Easton, in Pennsylvania, in October, 1758: By the Lieutenant Governor of Pennsylvania, and the Governor of New-Jersey; with the Chief Sachems and Warriors of the Mohawks, Oneydos, Onondagas, Cayugas, Senecas, Tuscaroras, Tuteloos, Nanticokes and Conoys, Chugnuts, Delawares, Unamies, Mohickons, Minisinks, and Wapings*. New Jersey: James Parker.
- Jones, Peter Edmund. 2 June 1877. Letter to David Mills. RG 10 Vol. 2358 File 72,566. Library and Archives Canada.
- . 27 April 1896. Letter to Six Nations Council. RG 10 Vol. 2358 File 72,566. Library and Archives Canada.
- . 28 May 1896. "Report of Conference of Six Nations Council with a Deputation from the Mississaugas of the Credit." RG 10 Vol. 2358 File 72,566. Library and Archives Canada.
- Korieh, Chima. 2010. "'May It Please Your Honor': Letters of Petition as Historical Evidence in an African Colonial Context." *History in Africa* 37: 83–106.
- Leslie, John. 1983. *The Report of the Pennefather Commission: Indian Conditions and Administration in the Canadas in the 1850s*. Ottawa: Treaties and Historical Research Centre.
- Livingston, William. 18 December 1874. Letter to David Laird. RG 10 Vol. 1935 File 3588. Library and Archives Canada.
- Logan, Scobie. 20 December 1895. Letter to Hayter Reed. 1895. RG 10 Vol. 2831 File 169.866. Library and Archives Canada.
- Luker, Trish. 2017. "Decolonising Archives: Indigenous Challenges to Record Keeping in 'Reconciling' Settler Colonial States." *Australian Feminist Studies* 32 (91–92): 108–25.
- Lyons, Scott Richard. 2010. *X-Marks: Native Signatures of Assent*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Mayne Daly, Thomas. 29 January 1894. Letter to John Hamilton-Gordon. RG 2 Series 1 Volume 685. Library and Archives Canada.
- McMorrow, Thomas. 2018. "Upholding the Honour of the Crown." *Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice* 35 (May): 311–36.
- McNab, David. 1999. *Circles of Time: Aboriginal Land Rights and Resistance in Ontario*. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.

- Milloy, John. 1983. "The Early Indian Acts: Developmental Strategy and Constitutional Change." In *As Long as the Sun Shines and Water Flows: A Reader in Canadian Native Studies*, edited by Ian Getty and Antoine Lussier, 56–64. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
- Mississauga and Six Nations. 25 September 1900. "Agreement between the Six Nations of the Grand River and the Mississauga of the Credit." RG2, Privy Council Office, Series A-1-a. Library and Archives Canada.
- Mississauga. 19 November 1889. Letter to Six Nations Council. RG 10 Vol. 2358 File 72,566. Library and Archives Canada.
- . 2015a. "The Rouge River Valley Tract Unsurrendered Traditional Lands, Statement of Claim." <http://mncfn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/SOC-MNC-RRV-March-31-2015-KAFBS.pdf>.
- . 2015b. "Aboriginal Title Claim to Water within the Traditional Lands of the Mississaugas of the New Credit." <http://mncfn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/MNC-Aboriginal-Title-Report.pdf>.
- Moffat, Michele. 2016. "Exploring Positionality in an Aboriginal Research Paradigm: A Unique Perspective." *International Journal of Technology and Inclusive Education* 5 (1): 750-755.
- Monture, Phil. 2017. "A Global Solution for the Six Nations of the Grand River." Online lecture, 55:40. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G_BQiOc8m2E.
- Moreton-Robinson, Aileen. 2015. *The White Possessive: Property, Power, and Indigenous Sovereignty*. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
- Morgan, Cecilia. 2015. "Site of Dispossession, Site of Persistence: The Haudenosaunee (Six Nations) at the Grand River Territory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries." In *Indigenous Communities and Settler Colonialism: Land Holding, Loss and Survival in an Interconnected World*, edited by Zoë Laidlaw and Alan Lester, 194–213. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.
- . 2017. *Travellers through Empire: Indigenous Voyages from Early Canada*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Murray, Calum. 2022. "John Locke's Theory of Property, and the Dispossession of Indigenous Peoples in the Settler-Colony." *American Indian Law Journal* 10 (1): 1–12.
- Nickel, Sarah. 2019. *Assembling Unity: Indigenous Politics, Gender, and the Union of BC Indian Chiefs*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
- Nichols, Robert. 2020. *Theft Is Property! : Dispossession and Critical Theory*. Duke University Press.
- Karen O'Brien. 2018. *Petitioning for Land: The Petitions of First Peoples of Modern British Colonies*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Palmater, Pamela. 2014. "Genocide, Indian Policy, and Legislated Elimination of Indians in Canada." *Aboriginal Policy Studies* 3 (3): 27-54.
- Peters, Mark. 25 October 2020. "Munsee-Delaware Nation History with Chief Mark Peters." Online lecture, 1:08:05. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vRyJ0XDdh-s>.
- . 8 November 2020. "Munsee-Delaware Nation History with Chief Mark Peters." Online lecture, 1:15:30. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s3Iofjv_Ow.
- . 17 April 2021. "Life on the Susquehanna." Online lecture, 42:10. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ARNgYxUTMM>.
- . 20 April 2021. "Munsee-Delaware Nation History with Chief Mark Peters." Online lecture, 1:40:49. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cr070C_3RSQ.
- Plain, David D. 2007. *The Plains of Aamjiwnaang: Our History*. Trafford.

- Reed, Hayter. 8 June 1894. Letter to Thomas Mayne Daly. RG 10 Vol. 2358 File 72,566. Library and Archives Canada.
- . 5 March 1896. Letter to A. McDougall. 1896. RG 10, Vol. 2831 File 169.866. Library and Archives Canada.
- Said, Edward. 1994. *Culture and Imperialism*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Schutt, Amy. 2007. *Peoples of the River Valleys: The Odyssey of the Delaware Indians*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Scully, Pamela. 2012. "Indigeneity, Agency and Modernity." *Cultural and Social History* 9 (4): 589–93.
- Sherwin, Allan. 2012. *Bridging Two Peoples: Chief Peter E. Jones, 1843–1909*. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.
- Simpson, Audra. 2014. *Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life Across the Borders of Settler States*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Simpson, Leanne. 2008. "Looking after Gdoo-Naaganinaa: Precolonial Nishnaabeg Diplomatic and Treaty Relationships." *Wicazo Sa Review* 23 (2): 29–43.
- Six Nations. 2020. "Six Nations of the Grand River: Land Rights, Financial Justice, Creative Solutions." <https://www.sixnations.ca/LandsResources/SNLands-LandRightsBook-FINALyr2020.pdf>.
- Smith, Donald. 1989. "The Dispossession of the Mississauga Indians: A Missing Chapter in the Early History of Upper Canada." In *Historical Essays on Upper Canada: New Perspectives*, edited by J.K. Johnson and Bruce Wilson, 23–51. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- . 2013. *Mississauga Portraits: Ojibwe Voices from Nineteenth-Century Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Smith, Linda Tuhiwai. 2021. *Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples*. London: Bloomsbury Academic & Professional.
- Smith, William. 3 February 1896. Letter to Six Nations Council. RG 10 Vol. 2358 File 72,566. Library and Archives Canada.
- Stoler, Ann Laura. 2002. "Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance." *Archival Science* 2 (1-2): 87-109.
- Talfourd, 28 March 1884. Froome. Letter to Frederick Chesson. MSS. Brit. Emp. s. 18 C148/216. Bodleian Libraries.
- . 17 June 1884. Letter to Frederick Chesson. MSS. Brit. Emp. s. 18 C148/218. Bodleian Libraries.
- The Standard*. 16 June 1882. "A Redskin Mission." British Library.
- Tobias, John. 1983. "Protection, Civilization, Assimilation: An Outline History of Canada's Indian Policy." In *As Long as the Sun Shines and Water Flows: A Reader in Canadian Native Studies*, edited by Ian Getty and Antoine Lussier, 39–55. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
- Trevithick, Scott. 1998. "Conflicting Outlooks: The Background to the 1924 Deposing of the Six Nations Hereditary Council." MA thesis, University of Calgary.
- Voth, Daniel. 2015. "The Devil's Northern Triangle: Howard Adams and Métis Multidimensional Relationships with and within Colonialism." PhD dissertation, University of British Columbia.
- Vankoughnet, Lawrence. 11 January 1887. Letter to James Wood. RG 10 Vol. 2358 File 72,566. Library and Archives Canada.
- . 20 August 1879. Letter to Thomas Gordon. RG 10 Vol. 2028 File 8896. Library and Archives Canada.

- . 13 October 1882. Letter to Francis de Winton. CO 42-772 no. 18952. The National Archives, Kew.
- . 13 June 1892. "Memorandum by the Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs upon the Controversy between the Six Nations of the Grand River and the Mississaugas of the Credit." RG 10 Vol. 2357 File 72,563. Library and Archives Canada.
- Veracini, Lorenzo. 2010. *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Waddilove, William, Charles Halfmoon, James Huff, Isaac Dolson, and N Timothy. 24 June 1874. Letter to David Laird. RG 10 Vol. 1935 File 3588. Library and Archives Canada.
- Walker, Cheryl. 2005. "The Limits to Land Reform: Rethinking 'the Land Question.'" *Journal of Southern African Studies* 31 (4): 805–24.
- Walters, Mark. 1998. "According to the Old Customs of Our Nation: Aboriginal Self-Government on the Credit River Mississauga Reserve, 1826-1847." *Ottawa Law Review* 30 (1): 1–46.
- Weaver, Jace. 2014. *The Red Atlantic: American Indigenes and the Making of the Modern World, 1000-1927*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Weaver, John. 2003. *The Great Land Rush and the Making of the Modern World, 1650-1900*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- White, Richard. 1991. *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wilson, Josiah. 18 February 1889. Letter to John Carling. RG 10 Vol. 2399 File 82.709. Library and Archives Canada.
- Wolfe, Patrick. 1999. *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event*. London: Cassell.
- Wood, James. 28 December 1886. Letter to Lawrence Vankoughnet. RG 10 Vol. 2358 File 72,566. Library and Archives Canada.
- . 5 September 1889. Letter to Six Nations Council. RG 10 Vol. 2358 File 72,566. Library and Archives Canada.
- Wybenga, Darin. 2021. "The Mississaugas of the Credit: We Are Still Here." Online lecture, 1:53:25. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PZZY6wwLh4o>.