

# Germany as a 'Global Nation' 1840-1930

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## Introduction

The main debates about nationalism during the last two decades have concentrated on the effects of changing means of communication and processes of de- and re-territorialization. The entangled web of relations which traversed national boundaries did not produce 'the utopia of a post-national history', but the 'stabilization and territorialization of the nation-state', in Sebastian Conrad's view.<sup>1</sup> Whereas the dynamics of nationalism have generally been located within nation-states, as 'imagined communities', 'invented traditions' or reactions to modernization, Conrad's own case studies show that 'the shifts and changes in the discourse of nationalism ... appear not only as effects of internal trajectories, as the familiar picture would suggest, but just as much of the larger process we retrospectively call globalization'.<sup>2</sup> The term, which came into common use in the 1980s and 1990s, denotes movement across space (transport and trade), communication between distant points (telegraphs and telephones), and shifting perceptions of distance and space, or what the sociologist Roland Robertson has called 'the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole'.<sup>3</sup> This reconfiguration of space has been linked to transnationalism, in which social interaction has been understood as 'flows' and 'networks', as well as spatially-defined (or imagined) 'structures'.<sup>4</sup> Transnational networks did not necessarily develop 'in opposition to the hardening boundaries of nationalism and of empire', which they regularly accompanied and reinforced, writes Emily Rosenberg: nonetheless, they did beckon 'beyond territoriality toward a newer world in which fast-moving technologies of representation, with multiple and shifting codes of meaning, challenged the fixity of space and identity'.<sup>5</sup> It is this relationship between networks of communicative interaction, on the one hand, and spatiality and territoriality, on the other, which transnational historians investigate.

Influenced by the 'spatial turn' and post-colonialism, historians of Germany have focused above all on the relationship between globalization and imperialism, including the development of a pre-colonial imaginary which modified, reinforced and subverted stereotypes of the 'other' and informed debates about Germany's place in the world.<sup>6</sup> Part of those scholars' case is predicated on a putative radicalization and racialization of national discourses, affecting the 'Germanization' of Prussia's eastern territories and the adoption and implementation of policies in German colonies, which issued in their most extreme form in massacres, famine and genocide in South West Africa during the Herero War in 1904-7 and in East Africa during the Maji Maji rebellion in 1905-7.<sup>7</sup> Another, less well defined part of the case concerns foreign policy during the alleged transition from a system of Great Powers to 'world empires'.<sup>8</sup> To what extent did contemporaries' fears of losing out in the partition of the world and their re-evaluation of the states' system alter their conception and judgement of Imperial, Weimar and Nazi Germany as a nation-state and an empire (or Reich)? Was there a

path, as Jürgen Zimmerer has put it, from Windhoek to Auschwitz?<sup>9</sup> Since Germany was the site of the most notorious and catastrophic instance of hyper-nationalism in the twentieth century, the question of the ‘roots’ or ‘mechanisms’ of nationalist radicalization has long informed historical debate there.<sup>10</sup> Over the last decade or so, much of this debate has centred on transnational and postcolonial approaches to a globalizing world, in the words of Thomas Kühne: ‘numerous articles and volumes have suggested that we should trace back the roots of the Holocaust, or more broadly of the Nazi violence, not so much to traditions of racism and anti-Semitism, to the brutalizing experience of the First World War or to radical nationalist ideologies, but to Europe’s and Germany’s colonial and imperial past.’<sup>11</sup> In the subsequent dispute between historians, the relationship between internal and external causes of extreme forms of nationalism has been subjected to renewed scrutiny, cutting across older theses about Germany’s ‘special path’ (*Sonderweg*), Pan-Germanism (looking back to the project of *Großdeutschland* in the 1850s and 1860s), expansion in Central Europe (*Mitteleuropa*) and the East (*Lebensraum* under the Nazis), and racial and anti-Semitic stereotyping and persecution.<sup>12</sup>

## Globalization and the Industrial State

It is tempting to assume that the varying economic and communicative flows and networks of globalization converged. Certainly, for German historians such as Cornelius Torp, the ‘compression of time and space was caused by the transportation and communication revolutions in the nineteenth century and the enormous, rapid increase in the worldwide economic integration which accompanied these revolutions’.<sup>13</sup> For this reason, economic and other historians have labelled the decade before 1914 the first wave of globalization, indeed, globalization’s *belle époque*.<sup>14</sup> The theoretical literature on economic and communicative interaction is more heterogeneous, however.<sup>15</sup> Theodore Levitt’s emphasis on ‘the emergence of global markets for standardized consumer products on a previously unimagined scale of magnitude’, which distinguished between global corporations producing goods for a world market and multinational companies varying their output in accordance with local peculiarities, differs from accounts which stress the integration, rather than standardization, of economies.<sup>16</sup> Even in respect of economic integration in the broad sense, scholars have identified distinct groups of ‘hyperglobalizers’ for whom ‘peoples everywhere are increasingly subject to the disciplines of the marketplace’, ‘skeptics’ for whom ‘globalization is essentially a myth’ concealing the reality of an international economy of regional blocs and powerful national governments, and ‘transformationalists’ for whom ‘contemporary patterns of globalization are conceived as historically unprecedented such that states and societies across the globe are experiencing a process of profound change as they try to adapt to a more interconnected but highly uncertain world’.<sup>17</sup> Critically, consciousness of the world as a whole rarely seems to coincide with economic integration or compression. Indeed, for the anthropologist Arjun Appadurai, it is the disjunctures between economy, culture and politics which stand out: his five dimensions of ‘global cultural flow’ are, correspondingly, ‘not objectively given relations which look the same from every angle of vision’, but are ‘deeply perspectival constructs, inflected very much by the historical, linguistic and political situatedness of different sorts of actors’, including nation-states, multinationals, diasporic communities, sub-national religious, political or economic groupings and movements, and, even, intimate face-to-face groups such as villages, neighbourhoods and families.<sup>18</sup> It is these disjunctions, together with ignorance of and indifference to globalization, which I investigate here.

The case made by Conrad and Torp rests on the ‘worldwide extension of economic activities and networks, a growing intensity of goods, services and capital flows beyond state borders and the increasing international interdependency of economic transactions’, which had begun in the mid-nineteenth century and had continued to the present.<sup>19</sup> By 1913, Germany’s share of world trade was 12.2 percent (compared to 9.5 percent in 1874-8) and its share of the world’s GDP was 8.7 percent (compared to 3.9 percent in 1820).<sup>20</sup> External trade – that is, the sum of imports and exports – had reached 34 percent of German gross national product by 1914, which was comparable to the figure for the Federal Republic of Germany’s ‘open’ economy of the 1970s, following a period of ‘deglobalization’ (Roland Robertson) in the interwar era.<sup>21</sup> Economic openness was linked to other challenges which had the potential to alter public opinion, including mass migration, industrialization and diversification, the insecurity of labour and changes of working practices, the creation of diaspora, new conceptions of territory, citizenship and identity.<sup>22</sup> Uncertainty, mobility and apparent proximity gave rise to three aspects of the transformation of the national which can be understood as specific products of the connection to processes of globalization, writes Conrad: first, the reinforcement of the borders of the nation-state; second, the unleashing of a debate about the ‘Germanization’ of the ‘eastern marches’, the plight of a so-called ‘*Auslandsdeutschtum*’, and about what it was to be German (*Deutsch-Sein*); and, third, the addition of ‘elements of racial thought’ to nationalism in Germany, giving it a colonial dimension and leading to ethnic stereotyping of Jews and migrant groups, visible in turn-of-the-century fears of a ‘yellow peril’.<sup>23</sup> Each of these aspects seems to have been exacerbated by defeat in the First World War, the reordering of the states’ system and expropriation of German colonies at Versailles in 1919, and economic crisis and political conflict during the 1920s and early 1930s. Autarky, racism and expansionism under National Socialism were purportedly the extension of such proclivities.

The destabilizing effects of capitalism and industrialization were profound but uneven in Germany between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. They were arguably felt most acutely during economic downturns, especially the 1840s, 1870s-80s, and 1920s. The fact that the Weimar Republic was widely perceived to be an ‘industrial state’ (*Industriestaat*), dependent on the world market, contributed to contemporaries’ anxiety and despair during the inflation and hyperinflation of 1918-24 and the depression of 1928-34.<sup>24</sup> The United States appeared to many to be pivotal to the functioning of a global economy, acting as an imperial power in Europe as well as in Latin America. The ‘offer of a loan by the U.S. is the first symptom and the first step towards a lasting seizure of property’, wrote one economist in the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* in 1923.<sup>25</sup> For Pan-Germans like Alexander von Brockdorff in *Amerikanische Weltherrschaft?* (1929), ‘We Germans are today the objects of dollar-diplomacy; look at the Dawes Plan and the fatal fact that at the end of November 1928 1,153 million dollars of German debt securities were circulating in the Union; today it is even more. And how many shares of German enterprises are in American hands; how many German enterprises are part of international businesses and agreements, over which the power of decision resides in New York!’<sup>26</sup> Even in the 1920s, however, criticism of America and fear of Germany’s exposed position in the world market were mixed with and countered by admiration and optimism. ‘Whoever goes through the world with an open mind dates a new period of his life from his trip to America,’ declared the social reformer Alice Salomon, looking back on her trips – and those of her contemporaries – to the United States in the 1920s: ‘He expands his European experiences to a “world view”. He learns to think without the assumptions with which he was raised. ... He grasps more sharply the past of his own nation. ... Simultaneously, he glimpses the future of humanity.’<sup>27</sup> Germany’s global predicament was never clear-cut. Thus, although the radicalization of nationalism which occurred in the 1920s and early 1930s was often tied by contemporaries to

judgements and assumptions about the workings of the world market and the activities of 'world powers' (or 'world empires'), the significance of such ambivalent perceptions is difficult to evaluate.

Throughout the century after 1840, external trade comprised a relatively small proportion of total production and commerce. At the high point of pre-war globalization in 1913, exports constituted 12.2 percent of the Reich's gross national product.<sup>28</sup> More than three quarters of those exports in the decades before the First World War went to other European states.<sup>29</sup> By 1919, the value of German exports had slumped to 2,588 million marks from 10,199 million in 1913.<sup>30</sup> Wilhelmine commentators such as Karl Helfferich, a former diplomat and director of the *Deutsche Bank*, were aware that Germany was participating in 'the peaceful competition of nations', but they – like much of the public – were captivated above all by what had been 'made in Germany', in the words of a pre-war slogan: 'If it has been the goal of our economic development to bring forth an ever greater mass of useful economic effects,... then one can say that organizational advances have brought us nearer to this goal at the same pace as have the achievements of economic technology.'<sup>31</sup> The consequences of such a transformation, during which the national wealth of the Reich (300 billion marks) had surpassed that of Britain (230-260 billion) and France (232 billion), seemed to be largely internal, even if eliciting envy 'in the outside world'.<sup>32</sup> At the same time, 'the great chasms in the internal construction of our national body (*Volkskörper*) – the relationship between city and countryside, in terms of occupational and social integration, property relations – have created conditions of tension which manifest themselves in the glaring restlessness of our age in all spheres of the life of the community,' wrote the author of *Deutschlands Volkswohlstand 1888-1913* (1913).<sup>33</sup> For critics like the sociologist Georg Simmel, writing in 1900, 'the instability and restlessness' of contemporary life was manifest in a 'mania for travelling', but also – and more importantly – in 'the tumult of the metropolis', the 'wild pursuit of competition' and 'the typically modern disloyalty with regard to taste, style, opinions and relationships'.<sup>34</sup> It was these forms of movement and change within Germany, together with the consolidation of what Charles Maier has termed the internal grids (railways, telegraph lines, industrial heartlands, regional produce, electricity networks), 'identity' and 'decision' space of a national territory, which attracted most attention.<sup>35</sup>

The movement of people in Germany was predominantly internal. There were, in the second half of the nineteenth century, marked increases in emigration, with more than one million people leaving the German states in 1846-57 and 1864-73 respectively, and 1.8 million in 1880-93.<sup>36</sup> Immigration also increased from 433,000 in 1890 to 1.26 million in 1910, to which seasonal and temporary migrants should be added, along with 5.1 million migrants – 'eastern Jews' and others – passing through Germany on their way to the United States and elsewhere.<sup>37</sup> Most recorded immigrants, however, came from surrounding European states (1,236,000), especially from Austria-Hungary (667,200), with the rest of the world accounting for a mere 24,000 residents. There are few indications that these German-speakers were viewed differently from those of the *Kaiserreich*'s individual states, whose burghers – as Thomas Mann reminded his readers in *Buddenbrooks* (1901) – had in the recent past been incomprehensible to each other. Transitory cities such as Berlin grew by 950,000 inhabitants between 1880 and 1910 and it saw a total of 11.3 million people arrive or leave during the same period.<sup>38</sup> Yet the majority of those migrants were Germans moving from the countryside, with 16-17 million settling beyond the state of their birth.<sup>39</sup> 20-40 percent of the population of German cities were rural migrants. Such mobility contributed to the turbulence and excitement of urban centres but it did not necessarily remind neighbours or onlookers of 'foreigners' or migration overseas. It has been estimated that there were only 207 Chinese inhabitants in Hamburg, the *Reich*'s largest Chinese community, by 1910. In this sense, globalization had not come home. Alfred Bell, a member of Cameroon's ruling family, was

not alone in remarking that few Germans had seen people whose ‘skin happens to be dark’: ‘We have always been represented as such wild cannibals and savages, that as yet they have had neither time nor opportunities to learn that intellectually, at all events, we are not quite as black as painted.’<sup>40</sup> Most contemporaries had little direct contact with foreigners, especially those from overseas, and little knowledge of globally-traded goods.

## Imperialism and World Empires

European states had come into extensive contact with the rest of the world during the nineteenth century, redirecting citizens’ attention to other parts of the globe. Partly because Germany only started to acquire colonies from 1884 onwards and was forced to give them up in 1919, historians’ attention has shifted towards ‘pre-coloniality’ and the ramifications of globalization for states without overseas empires.<sup>41</sup> For Conrad, ‘The colonial character of Imperial Germany can be grasped only by seeing it as part of the global interactions in a world deeply structured – albeit unevenly – by capitalism and imperialism’.<sup>42</sup> The ‘global turn’ has encouraged scholars ‘to abandon the *Schutzgebiete* (protectorates) paradigm of German colonialism’ and to look beyond Africa and Asia to European powers’ imperial relations with much of the rest of the world.<sup>43</sup> The ministers of German states, politicians, journalists and members of a reading public were all aware of a wider world and its colonization by European powers before and after the Reich’s own colonial era, modifying their understanding of ‘empire’ and challenging existing narratives of the nation-state. Global historians have rewritten the story of the nation-state, arguing for the perseverance of imperial structures into the twentieth century. In Germany, such structures were both continental and maritime, leading to an increasing entanglement of colonial knowledge and practice, ‘generated and disseminated under conditions of transnationality’, in Prussia’s eastern territories and in the Reich’s colonies overseas.<sup>44</sup> In this sense, the acquisition of colonies in the 1880s and *Weltpolitik* in the late 1890s would seem like a continuation of Germany’s status as an empire, not as a new departure. Globalization, territorial expansion, colonization, Pan-Germanism and nationalism are difficult to separate in this reading of events.

Few, if any, scholars would disagree with Matthew Fitzpatrick’s claim that ‘early German imperialism’ – that is, plans for an overseas empire from the 1840s onwards – was a ‘serious nation-building undertaking’, supported ‘by those liberals who campaigned for an active imperialist strategy and by those other conservatives, socialist and Catholic Germans who opposed the imperialist and nationalist projects of an emergent liberalism’.<sup>45</sup> Between 1884 and 1900, Germany had acquired the fourth largest overseas empire in the world, after the British, French and Portuguese empires, stretching from Togo and South West Africa to Kiautschou and Samoa.<sup>46</sup> As the explorer and founder of German East Africa Carl Peters pointed out, the Reich’s colonies had a surface area almost three times larger (2,670,000 km<sup>2</sup>) than that of the Reich itself (940,869 km<sup>2</sup>).<sup>47</sup> Such changing circumstances compounded the pre-colonial longings and assumptions of some observers and the increasingly global outlook of others to ensure that, by the turn of the century, ‘the focal points of foreign-policy attention moved to distant places like the Taku forts, Venezuela, Agadir, and Samoa’ (Conrad) and that the notions of ‘world empires’ and ‘world policy’ had become unobjectionable (Sönke Neitzel).<sup>48</sup> ‘It was not a question of simply reiterating a slogan,’ proposes Neitzel: ‘Rather, the idea of so-called world empires (*Weltreichslehre*) stood behind it, a theory according to which, not the military disputes of nation-states, but the economic conflicts of vast, powerful empires and trading blocs would determine the twentieth century.’<sup>49</sup> Although some parties, such as the National Liberals and Free Conservatives, were more enthusiastic than others, such as the Centre Party, all paid at least lip service to *Weltpolitik*, which had been

inaugurated by Secretary of State at the Foreign Office Bernhard von Bülow's speech to the Reichstag on 6 December 1897, when he had announced that 'we don't want to put anyone in the shade but we, too, demand our place in the sun'.<sup>50</sup> Even the radical socialist Rosa Luxemburg admitted in 1900 that 'the era of world politics is now here to stay'.<sup>51</sup> The question, though, is how important the goals of *Weltpolitik* were in comparison to those of domestic politics, including Germanization in the East, and the relations of the Great Powers in Europe.

There is little sign that the shift to *Weltpolitik* revolutionized policy-making. In the first phase of colonization, Bismarck and the supporters of colonialism in the press had insisted that the new venture should not upset the Great Powers.<sup>52</sup> Later, historians such as Otto Hintze predicted that a balance of power would be established between the new world powers similar to that which had existed between the states of the concert of Europe. 'The quest for supremacy is not irreconcilable with this', he went on: 'It has been, as it were, the motor of political progress in the history of states up until now, yet it has not led to the dominance of a single power, but rather to increased counter-efforts which have, indeed, always reconstituted and maintained the balance-of-power system.'<sup>53</sup> According to Theodor Schiemann, the historian and foreign-affairs specialist of the Conservative *Kreuzzeitung*, the states' system was still essentially European, with 'an English superiority (*Übermacht*) on the seas, a Russian superiority in the Orient, a French-English superiority in Africa, and the superiority of Germany on the European continent, which today again claims its rights, but which was artificially held back.'<sup>54</sup> As a consequence, Schiemann assumed that conflict during both the first and the second Moroccan crises in 1905 and 1911 – although war was unlikely to occur on such a flimsy colonial pretext – would be European in cause and effect, involving continental armies and deriving from the relations between European states. The Reich should use its continental superiority to gain concessions overseas, but it would probably not need to go war to achieve such aims, which were, in any case, secondary to its continental interests.<sup>55</sup> Hans Delbrück, the military historian and editor of the *Preußische Jahrbücher*, generally agreed: military conflict was unlikely, he wrote, despite the fact the European balance of power, which had still obtained during the first Moroccan crisis, was now only relevant insofar as it guided the actions of the other European powers and convinced them of the need to unite against the single most powerful continental state, Germany.<sup>56</sup> The principal danger of war was not to be found in 'individual questions' such as those of Morocco or Turkey nor in 'the thirst for revenge of the French or the desire of the Russians for Constantinople', but in 'the jealousy of England towards Germany', which in turn stemmed from British fears that the Reich's navy constituted a threat to the country's own security – 'a question of life or death' (*Lebensfrage*).<sup>57</sup> In other words, Delbrück explained even the Anglo-German antagonism in terms of European politics, not colonial rivalries.<sup>58</sup>

Much of the diplomatic establishment in Germany shared similar assumptions. The Reich Foreign Office was, to a greater extent than its more colonial-minded foreign counterparts, founded on the primacy of European affairs. Accordingly, the Political Division (IA), which constituted the fulcrum of the policy-making apparatus, concentrated on Europe.<sup>59</sup> The other departments, including the *Kolonial-Abteilung*, which was established in 1890 and only became an independent Colonial Office in 1907, were separate and were believed to be repositories for the least talented members of the service. All the secretaries of state after the turn of the century had passed through European embassies, which continued to be the most prestigious and the best staffed. Few wanted postings outside Europe. Bülow, who boasted that 'I have written and spoken French as fluently as my mother tongue' from childhood, spelled out in private correspondence that, although the task he was set 'was to make possible our transition to *Weltpolitik* (trade, shipping, overseas interests, the consequences of the huge development of our industry, our increasing prosperity, the increase in our population) and

above all the building of the German navy', he also had to persist in 'preserving German dignity and our position on the continent'.<sup>60</sup> In his public account, which came out first in an English translation early in 1914, the former Chancellor maintained that 'We did not plunge into world politics, we grew, so to speak, into our task in that sphere, and we did not exchange the old European policy of Prussia and Germany for the new world policy; our strength today is rooted, as it has been since time immemorial, in the ancient soil of Europe.'<sup>61</sup> 'It is the task of our generation at one and the same time to maintain our position on the continent, which is the basis of our international position,' he contended in November 1906: 'the task which Germany must perform at the present time, and, as far as one can judge, will have to perform in future' was 'an international policy based on the solid foundation of our position as one of the Great Powers of Europe'.<sup>62</sup> Bülow's successor as Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, continued this pursuit of a strong world policy by staying strong on the European continent, in the words of his famous speech to the Reichstag during the second Moroccan crisis.<sup>63</sup> Throughout the pre-war period, he referred almost exclusively to the alignment of European powers, the maintenance of European peace, and the possibility of a European – rather than world – war. His main policy was reconciliation with Britain, which was intended to 'decisively strengthen our position in the European concert in material and moral terms', and his 'main goal' arguably continued to be the 'loosening of the entente'.<sup>64</sup> As he attempted to counter the most extreme versions of naval policy in the years between 1911 and 1914, Bethmann was sensitive to the continental European basis of German power.

Political parties and public opinion followed such a lead, in part because pre-war diplomatic crises repeatedly focused their attention on the Russian, French and British threats to Germany's security on the European continent, and in part because the press was Eurocentric. In major political periodicals on the eve of the First World War, between 17.8 (*Grenzboten*) and 28.6 percent (*Hilfe*) covered colonial affairs, as a percentage of foreign coverage, and between 71.4 and 82.2 percent focused predominantly on European politics.<sup>65</sup> Even at the height of *Weltpolitik* after the turn of the century, there is evidence that the traditional European Great Powers remained the object of newspapers' attention. In the *Kreuzzeitung* in the same period (1900, 1906 and 1912), 36.9 percent of articles were on France, 28.6 percent on Britain, 26.6 percent on Russia, and only 7.9 percent on the United States. In the Catholic *Germania* and the left-liberal *Freisinnige Zeitung*, the corresponding figures were 35.7 and 32.3 percent on France, 31.1 and 31.6 percent on Britain, 21.6 and 24.6 percent on Russia, and 11.6 and 11.5 percent on the US.<sup>66</sup> Reportage of foreign affairs had increased – from 13.92 percent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* (excluding advertisements) in 1888 to 27.88 percent in 1913 – and the boundary between foreign and domestic politics had become less pronounced.<sup>67</sup> By 1910, the foreign section of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, *Vossische Zeitung*, *National-Zeitung*, *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*, *Kölnische Zeitung* and *Dresdener Nachrichten* was between half and three-quarters of the length of the domestic section.<sup>68</sup> In the *Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger* and *Neue Preußische Zeitung*, the section on foreign affairs was as long or longer than the domestic one.<sup>69</sup> Most foreign coverage was European, juxtaposed with domestic news, as the front-page headlines of the *BZ am Mittag* on 2 August 1909 and 19 March 1914 intimated: 'Murder in Berlin N', 'Kaiser-Friedrich-Museum Robbed', 'Iswolsky on the Political Situation', 'Z II in Cologne', 'Highseas Tragedy in the North Sea', 'Civil War in Ireland?' and 'Family Drama in Berlin N'.<sup>70</sup> Such reports hinted at the rivalry and proximity of European states, viewed through a national lens.

During the First World War, national competition and cooperation turned rapidly into national enmity, but it continued to be directed at the Great Powers – as nation-states – rather than at 'world empires'.<sup>71</sup> The lessons of the war which had been learned by German leaders seemed still to relate to the power politics of nation-states, including the United States and

USSR, which was usually referred to as 'Russia'.<sup>72</sup> Even advocates of greater cooperation on the European level normally started from a set of national lessons.<sup>73</sup> Interstate relations had changed, declared the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs Gustav Stresemann at the University of Heidelberg on 5 May 1928, in line with the transformation of the social basis of states and the introduction of ideological conflict from the French Revolution onwards.<sup>74</sup> Yet, whereas Otto von Bismarck had understood such transformations, exercising moderation in his conduct of power politics in order to construct a peaceful international order, his successors had failed to understand the same lesson, permitting a 'system of international anarchy ... of alliances and counter-alliances' and allowing Europe 'to tear itself apart' in 1914.<sup>75</sup> Stresemann's hope after 1919 was not to abandon the 'ruthless application of the principle of national power', since a majority of Germans and the French government – as it demonstrated with the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 – seemed unwilling to accept such a change of course, but to 'create a system of international understanding based on equal rights' of nation-states, given that most Europeans desired peace and that 'a new conflagration would deliver our continent to utter ruin as a result of the horrifying escalation of the technology of destruction'.<sup>76</sup> Politics in the 1920s had certainly become more 'international', as could be seen at the League of Nations in Geneva, but it continued to be dominated, as far as German politicians and commentators were concerned, by the national rivalries of European states.

## Radical and Ordinary Nationalism

Nationhood, writes Michael Billig, not only implies 'a distinctive imagining of a particular sort of community rooted in a particular sort of place', but also 'an international context, which itself needs to be imagined'.<sup>77</sup> 'Thus, foreigners are not simply "others", symbolizing the obverse of "us": they are also like "us", part of the imagined universal code of nationhood' (or an international world), and different from a 'secluded ethnocentric mentality', he goes on.<sup>78</sup> The formation of nation-states necessitates internal consolidation within an external 'world' of other nation-states over a long period. Transnational connections cut across such international – or inter-state – relations, but they rarely render them redundant.<sup>79</sup>

Conrad concedes that relations within Europe were of greater importance than entanglements with extra-European societies (except the United States).<sup>80</sup> He has also subsequently argued that the transformation of national discourses was as much the effect of internal trajectories as it was that of a larger process of globalization.<sup>81</sup> On this reading, German nationalism was shaped by a longer tradition that reached back at least to the Napoleonic wars, characterized by Romanticism, the 1848 revolution and the unification movement.<sup>82</sup> Such nationalism constituted a 'ubiquitous conceptual scheme', an 'internal paradigm of historical knowledge', and a 'space of social practice', not a form of 'false consciousness'.<sup>83</sup> Globalization around the turn of the century did not supersede the nation, in Conrad's opinion, but undermined and subverted it, provoking a radical backlash and a racialization of nationalist discourse. This account overstates the impact of transnational and global interactions at the same time as understating the resilience of pre-existing national traditions and institutions.

From the 1840s at the latest, the formation of a German nation-state was, for many liberals and democrats, at once a political project and a European question. 'Unification nationalism', more than separatism or reform nationalism in existing states, required the consent or inactivity of the Great Powers, which had an interest in the nineteenth-century states' system in maintaining the weak German centre of the European pentarchy.<sup>84</sup> Liberals such as Johann Gustav Droysen had hoped in 1848 that Prussia was in a position to decide 'the European



question’, preventing the return of the ‘unbearable aspects of the system of 1815’ which had led to ‘the disorder (*Unheil*) of 1848’, but it had failed to act, leaving reactionaries in Austria and elsewhere to dictate the course of events.<sup>85</sup> The Prussian government had sought the alliance of ‘barbarity’ against German unification and ‘educated Western Europe’, he went on.<sup>86</sup> For the historian Droysen, ‘reactionary’ powers – Russia, the Habsburg monarchy and, now, the Hohenzollern monarchy – had ‘tried to work against a powerfully acting European crisis, to remove from Prussia, Germany and, where possible, Europe, those extensive changes of conditions and attitudes which have already established themselves, to dam the breaches in the dykes and to prevent inundation.’<sup>87</sup> At the time, the press and public opinion, in Prussia as in the rest of Germany, were arguably less wary of the Great Powers than was Droysen, doubting that the states’ system, either in the form of a conservative Holy Alliance or a looser Concert of Europe, was sufficiently coherent and powerful to prevent German unification. Even in the autumn of 1850, as Austria and Russia imposed the London Protocol on Schleswig-Holstein in the face of Prussian opposition and liberal uproar throughout Germany, the *National-Zeitung* still ridiculed the idea that ‘the Great Powers have spoken’: ‘We can answer that diplomats have only found the courage to interfere because of our impotence and inactivity. Everywhere, they only impose their laws on the weak, whilst they always rush, faced with the strong, to recognise *faits accomplis*.’<sup>88</sup> The ‘old system of a European balance of power’ had lost much of its relevance, commented the *Preussisches Wochenblatt* in 1852: the Holy Alliance was ‘very nice in theory’, but in reality it had ‘mostly turned into its very unholy opposite.’<sup>89</sup> The reality of the ‘reaction’ of the 1850s made such opinions about the marginality of the states’ system in domestic affairs seem contestable. It did not banish the idea, however, that unification was a worthwhile, largely domestic political objective. As a consequence, unificatory German nationalism was informed by a domestic political agenda and ‘internal’ debates about a constitution.

By 1848, it seemed obvious to the majority of German commentators that a national culture and political structure should coincide. ‘Up until a few decades ago, the common inherited particularity (*Stammeseigenthümlichkeit*) of a population was only viewed by statecraft in a very secondary way’, wrote the Badenese academic and diplomat Robert von Mohl in 1860: ‘One was almost proud to be able to show a great exemplary map of nationalities.’<sup>90</sup> This had ‘altered radically’, he went on: ‘Conditions and demands based on nationality have taken up one of the most important places in practical policy. Acquisitions and partitions of lands, which in part have existed for centuries, are now fought over because they do not correspond to the borders of nationalities. The formation of individual states is demanded solely on the basis of the descent of their populations, even at the expense of secession from – and the destruction of – a great whole, or through the merger of hitherto divided fragments.’<sup>91</sup> By the mid-nineteenth century, argued the former deputy of the Frankfurt parliament, nothing could stand in the way of ‘claims resting on the observance of the particularity of the *Volk*’.<sup>92</sup> The elements making up nationality were barely contested: for Mohl, these were the ‘facts’ of ‘race’ and ‘tribe’, ‘climate, the fertility of the soil and its products, historical events too, religion, important personalities’, and ‘a bodily and mental individuality which manifests itself externally in physique, mentally above all in language, but also in manners and morals, which ultimately rest on innate and constant natural attributes, but which are then determined more closely by historical events and are cultivated in the individual’.<sup>93</sup> For most of human history, states – or ‘inclusion in a certain state organism’ – had not been ‘a significant feature’ of nationality, but as the state ceased to be ‘an end in itself’ and began to exist ‘only to further the purposes of the *Volk*’, it was forced to take nationality into account.<sup>94</sup> To liberals like Mohl, nations did not coincide with the old borders of dynastic states and they had rightly complicated, in a more representative era, state-building and politics.

Such supposedly self-evident linkages between nationality, statehood and the European states' system remained in place after German unification in 1871. Globalization and imperialism in the 1880s, 1890s and 1900s altered the scope and content of nationalism in Germany, reinforcing racial – or 'tribal' – assumptions about the nature of the *Volk* and politicizing the idea of a German nation, but in unpredictable and contradictory ways.<sup>95</sup> The posturing and paranoia of the far right became more and more extreme, combining racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia. There was, wrote one correspondent of the *Alldeutsche Blätter* in 1907, 'a broadly based conspiracy ... with the aim of harming Germandom', orchestrated by Jews, ultramontanes, Freemasons, and socialists at home, and by the same groups and other enemies such as the 'Slavs', the French, and the Anglo-Saxons abroad.<sup>96</sup> Yet the majority of their compatriots were not radical nationalists. Indeed, they were more likely to treat the 600,000 or so 'German-nationals', from an electorate of 14.36 million (1912), as an object of ridicule. The leagues exerted pressure through supporters in the National Liberal, Conservative and Free Conservative parties and, more erratically, through public campaigns, largely in the press, but their party backing was limited: 45 National Liberals, 17 Conservatives and 12 Free Conservatives in total between 1890 and 1914.<sup>97</sup> The *Alldeutscher Verband* was used 'as a favourite punchbag', as one supporter put it in 1911.<sup>98</sup> In the words of one liberal correspondent (and deputy) in *Die Hilfe* in 1910, 'the *Alldeutsche* were completely without influence in Germany, where the government viewed them as a "very little desired element in German journalism"', even if they were more troublesome in Germany's borderlands.<sup>99</sup> For the left-liberal editor of *Die Hilfe*, Friedrich Naumann, what marked out 'Teutonic' – or radical – nationalism was its diversity, with the 'the feeling of the difference separating the German race from other races' lapsing into anti-Semitism when 'questions of foreign policy recede in the popular consciousness during a long era of peace' and when 'the struggles between Germans and Poles, Czechs, South Slavs and Romanians are only felt strongly by the inhabitants of mixed areas'.<sup>100</sup> For other 'new nationalists', who were influenced by Nietzsche and distanced themselves from 'the old, particularistic nationalism', 'the word "race" loses its ethnographic content and becomes the expression of a better human quality altogether'.<sup>101</sup> Such radical nationalists continued to be opposed, in Naumann's opinion, by much more numerous adherents of Protestant and Catholic variants of nationalism, which referred, respectively, to the Enlightenment, Freiherr vom Stein, Bismarck and the National Liberals (whose politics were 'fundamentally German, but fully free of anti-Semitism and clerical Romanticism'), or to 'those elements of the Centre which are neither Welf nor particularist', coming in the process to represent 'moderate Catholicism'.<sup>102</sup>

Nationalists of different kinds had little need to abandon racial and ethnic commonplaces. The marginality of racial theory in varying branches of social and cultural science did not serve to discredit it amongst members of the public.<sup>103</sup> Scientific questions about 'race', after all, remained open and fascinating, whether involving the origins of humanity, the discovery of new peoples and ways of life, the search for missing links between humans and apes in the evolutionary chain, or the investigation of the means of transmission of human similarities (August Weismann's 'germ plasm theory').<sup>104</sup> In this context, older racial myths and stereotypes persisted without the need for precise scientific validation. Many popular theories – of Chamberlain, Paul de Lagarde, and Julius Langbehn – were mystical, ranging back to the 'Germanen' and summoning up vast military and cultural struggles for survival and ascendancy.<sup>105</sup> In future, prophesied Langbehn at the end of his best-selling work on a 'Germanic culture' encompassing Shakespeare and Rembrandt (which had reached its 39<sup>th</sup> edition after two years), Germans 'will laugh at their current "scientific" superstition', developing a 'sense of the essence' and becoming 'German again!'<sup>106</sup> In a similar vein, Chamberlain took issue in *Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* (1899) with Ernest Renan's contention that 'the fact of race ... is diminishing in importance daily', not least

because ‘the most important nations of Europe resulted from mixed blood’.<sup>107</sup> It was nonsensical, in the British-born author’s view, to search for the origins of a ‘pure race’ – ‘What is such a thing as a physiologically “pure race”?’ – instead of identifying new ‘individualities’, or nations, ‘which almost always derived from mixing, followed by in-breeding’.<sup>108</sup> Such theories swirled around turn-of-the-century Germany, enjoying considerable popularity in the ‘German-national’ constituencies of the right and rarely contested in detail on the left and in the centre. What mattered most, however, was the use made of racial theory in national politics. Here, there was a salient boundary between radical nationalists and other national-minded politicians and their supporters.

After the bloodletting of the First World War, the establishment of the *Vaterlandspartei* in 1917 and the incomplete defeat of 1918, right-wing nationalism in Germany became more radical.<sup>109</sup> The expropriation of colonies and the existence of diaspora in Eastern Europe contributed to this radicalization but the perceived ‘dismemberment’ of the *Kaiserreich* in the Versailles Peace Treaty (1919) was much more important, with German territory widely believed to lie beyond the Weimar Republic’s borders. A small but prominent group of conservative intellectuals and a much larger number of DNVP, DVP and, later, NSDAP politicians and voters toyed with ‘revolution’, or the replacement of the republic. ‘The new nationalism is a religious and cultural concept because it pushes towards totality and does not tolerate being limited to the purely political’, wrote Edgar Jung in ‘Germany and the Conservative Revolution’ in 1932, but it had been closely connected from the start to a ‘counter-revolution’ against the republican regime and the post-war international order.<sup>110</sup> As in ‘German-national’ circles before 1914, politics and nationality seemed inseparable, with opposition to the existing order pushing conservative revolutionaries and others on the right towards extremes. The ‘totality’ and millenarianism of Jung’s ‘Third Reich’, like that of Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, went beyond ‘a conceptual world referring to conquest, imperialism, militarism and de-nationalization’: ‘It will ruthlessly revise all human values and dissolve all mechanical forms. ... It will be a great Conservative Revolution which prevents the dissolution of Western humanity, founding a new order, a new ethos and a new Western unity under German leadership.’<sup>111</sup> As Oswald Spengler made plain in his best-selling *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (1918-22), which he had begun in 1912 but which he revised and largely wrote after 1914, the ‘new nationalism’ was framed against a transformed backdrop of Europe’s self-destruction in the First World War, the threat to the ‘West’ from ‘Slavs’ in the East, a punitive peace treaty and an illegitimate political regime.<sup>112</sup> For Spengler, Germany was the last dynamic nation in the West whose mission was to ward off, but not prevent, the inevitable decline of its ten-generation long ‘culture’.<sup>113</sup> This radical vision of the world corresponded to the changed political circumstances of Germany and Europe after 1918. Although it rested on a global history of humanity, it comprehended the threat to Germany in traditional, Eurocentric geographical (West versus East) and historical terms (the rise and fall of Greece and Rome).

‘Völkisch’ nationalism, together with the concepts of a ‘*Volksgemeinschaft*’, ‘*der völkische Gedanke*’ and ‘*die völkische Bewegung*’, entered common usage during the 1920s in order to distinguish radical right-wing variants of nationalist thought, which denoted a deep-rooted culture or ethnicity based on descent, from other forms of nationalism, with which right-wing variants continued to compete. In the pre-war period, the label ‘völkisch’ was neither widely deployed nor distinct, as Uwe Puschner concedes: it first appeared in *Meyers Grosses Konversations-Lexikon* in 1909 with a three-line entry, stating that it was ‘a Germanicization of the foreign word “national”’.<sup>114</sup> After 1918, the terminology of nationalism had altered, betraying the radicalization of the right in the post-war republic. A ‘völkische Weltanschauung’, according to Hermann Meyer in *Der deutsche Mensch* (1925), ‘places the word *völkisch* in direct opposition to its synonym *national*’.<sup>115</sup> ‘Nation’ and ‘national’ in this reading denote citizenship and political organization, close to the historical meaning of ‘*Staatsvolk*’ and

influenced by French and English references to the League of Nations. 'Völkisch' alluded to ethnicity and heredity, revealing the propinquity of 'race' and 'culture'. In Jung's opinion, the Germans would lead the conservative revolution because they were 'the biologically most powerful people (*Volk*) in Europe'.<sup>116</sup> To Moeller van den Bruck, race was 'the foundation of blood' underpinning all historical events.<sup>117</sup> Yet, for the author of *Das Dritte Reich* (1923) and many other right-wing commentators, culture – embodied in Spengler's definition of the *Volk* as 'a unity of the soul' – remained pre-eminent.<sup>118</sup> Race, which appeared to be traceable in the artefacts and buildings of historical groups, was an historical illusion, in Spengler's view, resulting from the fact that early histories were written about ruling dynasties, whose blood ties had been transferred mistakenly to the nation as a whole.<sup>119</sup> 'The *Volk* is a group of men who feel themselves to be a whole', he concluded, after examining the ways in which environment – or the 'soil' – and history had produced a sense of belonging and shared consciousness.<sup>120</sup> In contrast to biological determinism, with Darwin pitted against Nietzsche, 'race' was rarely objectionable in itself to those on the right – and to many in the centre and on the left – but it also regularly played only a secondary part in *völkisch* nationalism. When the National Socialists made race the foundation of their ideology, movement and regime, few of their supporters and collaborators seem to have been put off by the idea. Most, though, seem to have prioritized other elements – economic activism, scapegoating, authoritarianism, revision of Versailles – of the NSDAP's racist and nationalist programme. In this sense, despite its expansionism, its conspiracies of 'world Jewry' and its downfall in a world war, the 'hybrid', racial nationalism of the Nazis continued to be an internal or European affair.<sup>121</sup>

## Conclusion

Racial, ethnic and national distinctions and hierarchies are always founded on contemporaries' perceptions of a wider world, even if only referring to distant lands and unknown groups over 'there', yet what matters is how that world is understood and related to individuals' own society 'here'. The transnational case about the radicalization and racialization of nationalist discourse as a result of globalization is more specific than this general distinction, proposing that increased migration, economic integration in a world market and a transformation of the means of communication led to de- and re-territorialization, heightened uncertainty about the security of borders and fear of culturally different religious, ethnic and national groups. The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were characterized not merely by states' surveillance of borders but by their 'increased attention to the development of territory within those borders, devoting 'all [their] human energy and material resources' to territorial exclusion by means of infrastructure.<sup>122</sup> Borders assumed greater significance because no place within them 'should be free of state control' and because the state 'demanded more of its citizens (military service) and offered them more (social welfare)'.<sup>123</sup> Conrad disagrees with Charles Maier's claim that territorialization during modernity had been followed by de-territorialization after the 1970s, as states – especially but not only western ones – became entangled in 'processes of global networking'.<sup>124</sup> For the Berlin historian, processes of de- and re-territorialization were concurrent – not consecutive – throughout, helping to explain why nationals became preoccupied by borders – imposing immigration checks, hygienic controls, fingerprints, passports and citizenship laws – and why they were more likely to look on internal and external opponents or rivals in racial terms.<sup>125</sup>

Although some of these 'globalizing effects' can be discerned amongst 'German nationals' in the 1890s and 1900s and in the '*völkisch*' splinter groups and movements of the 1920s, they continued to be opposed by mainstream parties and majority opinion, which put forward alternative conceptions of a German nation-state, national interest, power politics

and German culture. Within the varying strands of unificatory nationalism which emerged and were consolidated in the mid-nineteenth century, the most significant questions concerned the enactment of a German – or Reich – constitution, the demarcation of a national territory, the creation of political institutions, the development of a national market and the conduct of foreign policy in a European states' system which had Germany at its centre. These moderate forms of nationalism, which rested on a more or less unquestioned attachment after 1871 to the territory and institutions of the *Kaiserreich*, continued to inform party politics, distancing many National Liberals and Conservatives from the radical Pan-Germanism of the extra-parliamentary leagues. 'We quite often supported [the government] against the attacks of the *Alldeutscher Verband* and other national hotheads', noted the Conservative politician Kuno von Westarp in his memoirs.<sup>126</sup> For his part, the Pan-German leader Heinrich Claß openly admitted that 'the *Alldeutscher Verband* stood almost always alone and out on a limb in its political struggle', which was understandable 'in an era in which attention to the wishes of those in the highest positions on the part of all national circles dampened down the unleashing of the struggle'.<sup>127</sup> 'The political parties standing on the national side saw in the Pan-German League an uncomfortable admonisher and kept their distance from it, even though many of their most reputable members belonged to the league,' he went on.<sup>128</sup> Attempts to set up connections 'diagonally' under his predecessor Ernst Hasse were bound to fail 'because the ties of the deputies to their parties were stronger than to the Pan-German business'.<sup>129</sup> In other words, contemporaries' national attachment to the German Empire outweighed their sympathy for individual policies – about the army, navy, colonies, eastern territories or Social Democracy – pursued by radical nationalist associations. The declaration of a republic in November 1918 amidst the contested conditions of Germany's defeat in the First World War altered that balance of affiliations and allegiances for many in the centre and on the right.

The racial schemes and conspiracies of the 1920s drew on those of the pre-war era, in which anxieties about racial mixing, world empires, assimilation, defence of the 'eastern marches', expulsions, anti-Semitism and xenophobia had started to merge with each other. However, it is misleading to suggest that the colonial practices or, even, global racial hierarchies of the German Empire were transferred to policies of expansion – or 'push' – towards the East.<sup>130</sup> Stereotypes of Poles, 'Slavs' and Jews had a long history in Germany, antedating German colonialism and globalization by many decades.<sup>131</sup> Historians who have accounted for the Holocaust by referring to German and European colonialism – rather than the longer histories of racism and anti-Semitism or the shorter-term impact of the First World War – have failed to explain why racially defined 'colonial archives' and massacres in the empires of other European states were not translated in the interwar era into 'genocidal totalitarianism', writes Kühne.<sup>132</sup> For Hannah Arendt, the 'totalitarian imperialism' of the Nazis was not preceded by 'the British, Dutch or French version of overseas rule' but by the 'German, Austrian and Russian version of a continental imperialism which never actually succeeded, and therefore is neglected by students of imperialism, but which in the form of the so-called pan-movements – pan-Germanism and pan-Slavism – was a very potent political force in Central and Eastern Europe', premised on the treatment of 'European peoples as colonials under the rule of a master race of Germanic or Slavic origin'.<sup>133</sup> The tribal nationalism of the Pan-Germans, which Arendt described, itself derived from and could still be found in the borderlands of Austria-Hungary, whose populations co-existed in mutual suspicion of each other and without a state of their own.<sup>134</sup> In the interwar period, after the supposed dismemberment of Germany and the dissolution of the Habsburg monarchy, with proxy wars on the eastern border and paramilitary violence at home, more *Reichsdeutsche* (or those living on the territory of the *Kaiserreich*) were willing – in an 'illegitimate' republic and in conditions of economic hardship – to countenance the racial stereotyping and

scapegoating of *völkisch* nationalism.<sup>135</sup> Yet a large majority, who had little knowledge of the eastern borderlands and whose political affiliations had long been tied to the German Reich (which continued to exist in the Weimar constitution as a legal and territorial entity), remained opposed to the precarious, self-evident truths of the radical nationalists. From this point of view, global mobility and transnational interactions played only a minor role in the transition after 1930 to the most notorious instance of racist hyper-nationalism in twentieth-century history.<sup>136</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> S. Conrad, *Globalisierung und Nation im Deutschen Kaiserreich* (Munich, 2006), 26.

<sup>2</sup> Conrad, 'Globalization effects: mobility and nation in imperial Germany, 1880-1914', *Journal of Global History*, 3 (2008), 64.

<sup>3</sup> R. Robertson, *Globalization* (London, 1992); 'Interview with Roland Robertson', *Globalizations*, 11 (2014), 447.

<sup>4</sup> J. Osterhammel, 'Transnationale Gesellschaftsgeschichte', 474-9.

<sup>5</sup> E. S. Rosenberg, *Transnational Currents in a Shrinking World, 1870-1945* (Cambridge, MA, 2012), 6.

<sup>6</sup> 'AHR forum: historiographic "turns" in critical perspective', *American Historical Review*, 117 (2012), 698-813. For a discussion of the meaning of 'pre-colonial imaginary', see S. Zantop, *Colonial Fantasies: Conquest, Family and Nation in Precolonial Germany, 1770-1870* (Durham, NC, 1997).

<sup>7</sup> On the 'East', see V. G. Liulevicius, *The German Myth of the East, 1800 to the Present* (Oxford, 2009), 71-219. On Africa, I. V. Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (Ithaca, NY, 2005); J. Iliffe, 'The effects of the Maji Maji rebellion of 1905-1906 on German occupation policy in East Africa', in P. Giffor and W. R. Louis (eds.), *Britain and Germany in Africa* (New Haven, CT, 1967), 557-75.

<sup>8</sup> S. Neitzel, *Weltmacht oder Untergang* (Paderborn, 1999); idem (ed.), *1900: Zukunftsvisionen der Großmächte* (Paderborn, 2002); H. Gollwitzer, *Die Geschichte des weltpolitischen Denkens* (Göttingen, 1972-82), 2 vols.

<sup>9</sup> J. Zimmerer, *Von Windhuk nach Auschwitz?* (Münster, 2011).

<sup>10</sup> L. L. Snyder, *Roots of German Nationalism* (Bloomington, IN, 1978).

<sup>11</sup> T. Kühne, 'Colonialism and the Holocaust', *Journal of Genocide Research*, 15 (2013), 339.

<sup>12</sup> R. Gerwarth and S. Malinowski, 'Der Holocaust als "kolonialer Genozid"?'', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 33 (2007), 439-66. For the discussion about Kleindeutschland and Deutschland, see M. Hewitson, *Nationalism in Germany, 1848-1866: Revolutionary Nation* (Basingstoke, 2010).

<sup>13</sup> C. Torp, 'Imperial Germany under globalization', in S. O. Müller and C. Torp (eds.), *Imperial Germany Revisited*, 297.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> R. Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* (London, 1992).

<sup>16</sup> T. Levitt, 'The globalization of markets', *Harvard Business Review*, 61 (1983), 92-102.

<sup>17</sup> D. Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations* (Oxford, 1999).

<sup>18</sup> A. Appadurai, 'Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy', *Theory, Culture, Society*, 7 (1990), 296.

<sup>19</sup> C. Torp, *Die Herausforderung der Globalisierung* (Göttingen, 2005), 13-14.

<sup>20</sup> C. Torp, *Herausforderung*, 62; A. Maddison, *Contours of the World Economy*, 379.

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- <sup>21</sup> S. Conrad, 'Transnational Germany', in J. Retallack (ed.), *Imperial Germany, 1871-1918*, 227.
- <sup>22</sup> S. Conrad, 'Globalization effects', *Journal of Global History*, 3 (2008), 43-66.
- <sup>23</sup> S. Conrad, *Globalisierung und Nation im Deutschen Kaiserreich*, 321-2.
- <sup>24</sup> G. D. Feldman, *The Great Disorder* (Oxford, 1997), 309-627; H. James, *The German Slump* (Oxford, 1986), 283-323.
- <sup>25</sup> Arthur Salz, 'Der Imperialismus der Vereinigten Staaten', quoted in E. Klautke, *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten* (Stuttgart, 2003), 159.
- <sup>26</sup> Cited *ibid.*, 164.
- <sup>27</sup> Quoted in M. Nolan, *Visions of Modernity* (Oxford, 1994), 9.
- <sup>28</sup> C. Torp, *Herausforderung*, 30.
- <sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 77, 81.
- <sup>30</sup> At 1913 prices: G. D. Feldman, *The Great Disorder*, 600. By 1922, they had recovered to 6,199 million marks.
- <sup>31</sup> K. Helfferich, *Deutschlands Volkswohlstand 1888-1913*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edn. (Berlin, 1914), 47.
- <sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 114-15, 126.
- <sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 125-6.
- <sup>34</sup> G. Simmel, *Philosophie des Geldes* (Frankfurt, 1989), 675.
- <sup>35</sup> C. S. Maier, 'Consigning the twentieth century to history', *American Historical Review*, 105 (2000), 816; *idem.*, 'Being there: place, territory and identity', in S. Benhabib (ed.), *Identities, Affiliations and Allegiances* (Cambridge, 2007), 76-7.
- <sup>36</sup> K. J. Bade et al. (eds.), *The Encyclopedia of European Migration and Minorities* (Cambridge, 2012), 69. Also, K. J. Bade, *Land oder Arbeit?*, 268; C. Torp, *Herausforderung*, 43.
- <sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 276; S. Conrad, 'Wilhelmine nationalism in global contexts', *ibid.*, 286.
- <sup>38</sup> T. Mergel, 'The *Kaiserreich* as a society of migration', in S. O. Müller and C. Torp (eds.), *Imperial Germany Revisited*, 271.
- <sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 272.
- <sup>40</sup> A. Bell, cited in R. Aitken and E. Rosenhaft, *Black Germany* (Cambridge, 2013), 33-4.
- <sup>41</sup> S. Zantop, *Colonial Fantasies*; T. Kontje, *German Orientalisms* (Ann Arbor, MI, 2004), 188-224.
- <sup>42</sup> S. Conrad, 'Rethinking German colonialism in a global age', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 41 (2013), 545.
- <sup>43</sup> *Ibid.* The model of 'protectorates' denoted to the control and administration of territory, whereas imperialism in a broader sense rested on spheres of influence and a European-led trading network.
- <sup>44</sup> S. Conrad, 'Rethinking German colonialism in a global age', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 41 (2013), 547. E. R. Dickinson, 'The German Empire: an empire?', *History Workshop Journal*, 66 (2008), 129-62; K. Kopp, *Germany's Wild East: Constructing Poland as a Colonial Space* (Ann Arbor, MI, 2012).
- <sup>45</sup> M. P. Fitzpatrick, *Liberal Imperialism in Germany* (New York, 2008), 5.
- <sup>46</sup> D. van Laak, *Über alles in der Welt* (Munich, 2005).
- <sup>47</sup> C. Peters, *England und Engländer*, in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 3, 179.
- <sup>48</sup> S. Neitzel, *Weltmacht*; *idem.*, *Kriegsausbruch. Deutschlands Weg in die Katastrophe 1900-1914* (Munich, 2002), 17-68.
- <sup>49</sup> S. Neitzel ed., *1900*, 56.
- <sup>50</sup> Quoted in M. Hewitson, *Germany and the Modern World, 1880-1914* (Cambridge, 2018), 1-2.
- <sup>51</sup> Luxemburg cited in Fröhlich, *Imperialismus*, 74.
- <sup>52</sup> *Preußische Jahrbücher*, 1887, vol. 59, 286.

- <sup>53</sup> O. Hintze, 'Imperialismus und Weltpolitik' (1907), in G. Oestreich ed., *Otto Hintze. Staat und Verfassung*, 2<sup>nd</sup> revised ed. (Göttingen, 1962), 469.
- <sup>54</sup> T. Schiemann, *Deutschland und die grosse Politik* (Berlin, 1906), 14 June 1905, 172.
- <sup>55</sup> Accordingly, Schiemann remained optimistic in 1911-12; *ibid.* (Berlin, 1912), 13 and 27 Sept., 18 Oct. 1911, 247, 265, 298.
- <sup>56</sup> Delbrück, *Vor und nach dem Weltkrieg*, 28 Nov. 1905, 26 July 1908, Oct. 1909, 24 July 1912, Dec. 1913, pp. 132-5, 205-212, 309-10, 368-78, 397-401.
- <sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 26 June 1908, p. 207.
- <sup>58</sup> H. Delbrück, 'Über die Ziele unserer Kolonialpolitik', *Preußische Jahrbücher*, 1912, vol. 147, 503-13.
- <sup>59</sup> L. Cecil, *The German Diplomatic Service, 1871-1914* (Princeton, 1976).
- <sup>60</sup> Bülow to Rath, 12 Feb. 1912, cited in K. A. Lerman, 'Bismarck's Heir: Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow and the National Idea, 1890-1918', in J. Breuilly (ed.), *The State of Germany* (London, 1992), 113.
- <sup>61</sup> B. von Bülow, *Imperial Germany*, 6<sup>th</sup> ed. (London, 1914), 10-11.
- <sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>63</sup> Cited in Fischer, *War of Illusions*, 90.
- <sup>64</sup> Bethmann cited in Jarausch, *The Enigmatic Chancellor*, 113, 126.
- <sup>65</sup> The sample comes from 1907: M. Hewitson, *Germany and the Modern World*, 47.
- <sup>66</sup> M. Hewitson, *National Identity and Political Thought in Germany* (Oxford, 2000), 9.
- <sup>67</sup> O. Groth, 'Die politische Presse Württembergs' (1915), in W. Schulz (ed.), *Der Inhalt der Zeitungen* (Düsseldorf, 1970), 117, 123.
- <sup>68</sup> P. Stocklossa, 'Der Inhalt der Zeitung', *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, 66 (1910), 560-1.
- <sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>70</sup> P. Fritzsche, *Reading Berlin 1900*, 140.
- <sup>71</sup> M. Stibbe, *German Anglophobia and the Great War, 1914-1918* (Cambridge, 2001).
- <sup>72</sup> V. G. Liulevicius, *The German Myth of the East, 1800 to the Present* (Oxford, 2009), 130-70.
- <sup>73</sup> M. Hewitson, 'The United States of Europe: the European question in the 1920s', in *idem* and M. D'Auria (eds.), *Europe in Crisis* (New York, 2012), 15-34.
- <sup>74</sup> Cited in J. Wright, *Stresemann*, 344-45.
- <sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 416-17.
- <sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>77</sup> M. Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London, 1995), 74, 83.
- <sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, 83.
- <sup>79</sup> S. Conrad and J. Osterhammel *Das Kaiserreich transnational* (Göttingen, 2004).
- <sup>80</sup> Conrad, *Globalisierung*, 12; J. Osterhammel, 'Europamodelle und imperial Kontexte', *Journal of Modern European History*, 2 (2004), 157-82.
- <sup>81</sup> Conrad, 'Globalization effects', *Journal of Global History*, 3 (2008), 64.
- <sup>82</sup> Conrad, 'Wilhelmine nationalism in global contexts: mobility, race and global consciousness', in S. O. Müller and C. Torp (eds.), *Imperial Germany Revisited*, 283.
- <sup>83</sup> S. Conrad, *Globalisierung*, 334-5; *idem*, 'Globalization effects', *Journal of Global History*, 3 (2008), 65.
- <sup>84</sup> J. Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Manchester, 1993), 96-122.
- <sup>85</sup> *Constitutionelle Zeitung*, 12 Dec. 1850, in Gilbert (ed.), *Droysen*, 291.
- <sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, 336.
- <sup>88</sup> *National-Zeitung*, 9 Oct. 1850, in N. Buschmann, *Einkreisung und Waffenbruderschaft* (Göttingen, 2003), 186. Prussia had gone to war against Denmark in 1848 over the duchies of



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Schleswig and Holstein. ‘Schleswig-Holstein’ subsequently became a popular national cause in Germany and the object of a second Schleswig war in 1864. The London Protocol (1850) made the question an international one.

<sup>89</sup> *National-Zeitung*, 3 Jan. 1852, *ibid.*, 209.

<sup>90</sup> R. v. Mohl, *Staatsrecht, Völkerrecht und Politik* (Tübingen, 1860), vol. 2, 333-4.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, 335.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 339.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, 339-40.

<sup>95</sup> A. Gat, *Nations.: The Long History and Deep Roots of Political Ethnicity and Nationalism* (Cambridge, 2013), 244-327; A. D. Smith, *The Cultural Foundations of Nations* (Oxford, 2008), 160-83; *idem*, *Chosen Peoples* (Oxford, 2003).

<sup>96</sup> Cited in R. Chickering, ‘*We Men Who Feel Most German*’, 79.

<sup>97</sup> K. Schilling, *Beiträge zu einer Geschichte des radikalen Nationalismus in der Wilhelminischen Ära 1890-1909* (Cologne, 1968), 519-23; R. Hering, *Konstruierte Nation* (Hamburg, 2003), 411.

<sup>98</sup> W. Lattmann, 9 Nov. 1911, *Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstages*, vol. 268, 7757.

<sup>99</sup> H. P. Hansen, ‘Nordschleswig’, *Hilfe*, 1910, vol. 16, no. 4, 56.

<sup>100</sup> F. Naumann, ‘Deutscher Nationalsinn’, *Hilfe*, 1914, vol. 20, no. 13, 198.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, 679.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>103</sup> L. Stein, ‘Rasse’, *Neue Zeit*, 1905, vol. 50, 92; F. Naumann, ‘Nationale Kultur’, *Nation*, 1903/4, vol. 21, 678-9.

<sup>104</sup> A. Weismann, *Das Keimplasma* (Jena, 1892). On the search for a missing link, see A. Zimmerman, *Anthropology and Antihumanism in Imperial Germany*, 62-85.

<sup>105</sup> H. S. Chamberlain, *Die Grundlagen des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Munich, 1899), 2 vols.; P. de Lagarde, *Deutsche Schriften* (Göttingen, 1886); J. Langbehn, *Rembrandt als Erzieher* (Leipzig, 1890). F. Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair* (Berkeley, CA, 1961), 3-182.

<sup>106</sup> J. Langbehn, *Rembrandt als Erzieher*, 380; see the second review, “‘Rembrandt als Erzieher’”, *Historisch-politische Blätter*, 1891, vol. 108, 900-10. B. Behrendt, *Zwischen Paradox und Paralogismus* (Frankfurt, 1984); J. Heinßen, ‘Kulturkritik zwischen Historismus und Moderne’, in W. Bergmann and U. Sieg (eds.), *Antisemitische Geschichtsbilder* (Essen, 2009), 121-38; A. Lobenstein-Reichmann, ‘Julius Langbehns “Rembrandt als Erzieher”’, in M. Müller and S. Kluwe (eds.), *Identitätswürfe in der Kunstkommunikation* (Berlin, 2012), 295-318.

<sup>107</sup> H. S. Chamberlain, *Grundlagen*, vol. 1, 344.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, 345, 347.

<sup>109</sup> K. Sontheimer, *Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik* (Frankfurt, 1978), 113-213.

<sup>110</sup> E. J. Jung, ‘Deutschland und die konservative Revolution’, *Deutsche über Deutschland* (Munich, 1932), 369-82.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>112</sup> O. Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (Munich, 1922-3), 2 vols.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, 781-3. Also, R. P. Sieferle, *Die Konservative Revolution. Fünf biographische Skizzen* (Frankfurt, 1995), 106-31.

<sup>114</sup> Quoted in U. Puschner, *Die völkische Bewegung im wilhelminischen Kaiserreich*, 27.

<sup>115</sup> H. Meyer, *Der deutsche Mensch* (Munich, 1925), 5. S. Breuer, *Grundpositionen der deutschen Rechten 1871-1945* (Tübingen, 1999), 148-55.

<sup>116</sup> E. J. Jung, ‘Deutschland und die konservative Revolution’, 369-82.

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- <sup>117</sup> A. Moeller van den Bruck, *Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus* (Munich, 1923), 50.
- <sup>118</sup> Moeller van den Bruck talked of 'geistige Rassezugehörigkeit'. O. Spengler, *Untergang*, 747.
- <sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, 696-754.
- <sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, 747.
- <sup>121</sup> S. Breuer, *Nationalismus und Faschismus* (Darmstadt, 2005), 146-61.
- <sup>122</sup> Conrad, *Globalisierung und Nation*, 325.
- <sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>125</sup> S. Conrad, 'Globalization effects', *Journal of Global History*, 3 (2008), 44-5.
- <sup>126</sup> K. v. Westarp, *Konservative Politik* (Berlin, 1935), vol. 1, 382.
- <sup>127</sup> H. Claß, *Wider den Strom*, 266.
- <sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*, 266-7.
- <sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*, 267.
- <sup>130</sup> S. Baranowski, 'Against "human diversity as such"', in V. Langbehn and M. Salama (eds.), *German Colonialism* (New York, 2011), 51-71, and Michael Burleigh, *Germany Turns Eastwards* (Cambridge, 1988).
- <sup>131</sup> R. Gerwarth and S. Malinowski, 'Der Holocaust als "kolonialer Genozid"?' , *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 33 (2007), 453.
- <sup>132</sup> T. Kühne, 'Colonialism and the Holocaust', *Journal of Genocide Research*, 15 (2013), 339.
- <sup>133</sup> H. Arendt, 'Totalitarian imperialism', *Journal of Politics*, 20 (1958), 37-8; D. A. Moses, 'Hannah Arendt, imperialism, and the Holocaust', in Langbehn and Salama (eds.), *German Colonialism*, 74.
- <sup>134</sup> H. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York, 1951), 224-46.
- <sup>135</sup> T. Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin* (New York, 2010).
- <sup>136</sup> For a long time, this debate was tied to the notion of Germany's 'special path' (*Sonderweg*): D. Blackbourn and G. Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History* (Oxford, 1984); J. Kocka, 'German History before Hitler: The Debate about the German *Sonderweg*', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 23 (1988), 3-16; J. J. Sheehan, 'Paradigm lost? The "*Sonderweg*" revisited', in G. Budde et al. (eds), *Transnationale Geschichte. Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien* (Göttingen, 2006), 150-60. On the connection between this debate and another about imperialism, see M. P. Fitzpatrick, 'The pre-history of the Holocaust? The *Sonderweg* and *Historikerstreit* debates and the abject colonial past', *Central European History*, 41 (2008), 1-27.