

# The war in Ukraine and food security in Eastern Europe

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## ABSTRACT

This dispatch outlines some of the immediate consequences and long-term challenges posed by the Ukraine war on food security and production systems in Eastern Europe. We draw particular attention to the food aid and provisioning realities around many million (and increasing) numbers of Ukrainian refugees, and the current lack of systemic, government-coordinated responses to the humanitarian crisis. Further, we outline the distinct forms of agriculture characterising Eastern Europe, notably, the short supply chains and farming networks that are socially and environmentally unique and valuable, and are a result of the persistence of smaller, family-led farms. However, these farms and farmers are facing increasingly difficult times as a result of inflation, rising fuel prices, rationing, climate stress, export bans, and now large numbers of refugees arriving to some already very poor rural areas. We highlight the need for these multiple stresses to be discussed together, for their consequences on food production in the short- and long-term, especially as the effects of the war extend beyond the region. These stresses include, in the immediate, a lack (and a lack of reliability) of state aid and infrastructures for refugee hosts and food aid organizations and, in the longer-term, persisting EU-policy and market pushes towards intensification that will greatly challenge the smallholder system in Eastern Europe.

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This paper focuses on food security issues in Eastern Europe<sup>i</sup> in the context of the war in Ukraine. NATO countries and their allies<sup>ii</sup> have introduced new economic sanctions against Russia which have wider repercussions for local, regional and international food systems. Even if predictions of global food shortages are widely discussed in media and industry reports,<sup>iii</sup> the impact of the war on the immediate region has been largely overlooked. Our paper fills this gap by focusing on the countries bordering Ukraine that have also absorbed the most refugees. This region has a large and resilient agricultural sector that has historically fed millions of people during wars and major political and social crises while continuing exports to countries near and far. As regional food supply chains are increasingly strained, these economies are facing existential risks. Without a clearer understanding of how these agri-food systems function, we cannot fully grasp the scale and overall impact of the war on food security in the broader region.

There are several short- and long- term consequences to Russia's invasion of Ukraine when it comes to food. In the immediate, Ukraine's tragic transformation into a war zone means that the fate of produce from the highly fertile arable regions in the country's east (including the Donbas) has been called into question – part of this year's wheat crop, for example, will

either not be harvested, or will be redirected to Russian markets (Polityuk, 2022). Less tangibly, there are several far-reaching consequences stemming from Russia's trade embargo and the war that require close attention and systemic, coordinated action and response. These consequences pose challenges not only to food production and networks, but come at a time of heightened human precarity, as millions of people seek refuge both in and outside of Ukraine at the same time as Europe (and the world) enters economic recession.

This paper arose from a panel discussion - "Feeding Resistance and Refugees of Ukraine: The Humanitarian Crisis in Eastern Europe"<sup>iv</sup> - that covered a range of issues, from the immediacy of providing food and provisions to refugees, to the consequences of economic sanctions and long-term food security in the region. Thus this dispatch is an urgent call for research and scholarly attention to rapidly developing issues identified during this exchange. In this short dispatch, we aim to examine the unique challenges that the Eastern European region faces. The ability of the region's governments and producers to overcome and adapt to input and food shortages has ramifications for food and production networks all over the world. The current crisis also offers an opportunity to observe and appreciate the networks of sustainable food provisioning that have persisted throughout the region. These grant a unique insight into domestic forms of 'everyday environmentalism' that underpin diverse household- and local- level food strategies, which continue to fill the gaps in regional and global commodity production systems for many (Schlosberg and Coles, 2016; MacGregor, 2021; Mincyte, 2009). These networks may be under threat, however, as a result of the challenges to come, and merit ongoing critical attention and re-visitation.

In the following, we first introduce the current pressures facing the food security system as a result of the war in Ukraine and the refugee emergency. We then unpack the uneven capacities of different states, and between rural and urban areas, in adapting to these pressures and the arrival of unprecedented numbers of refugees to their diverse countrysides. We finally examine what these uneven capacities mean in the broader context of Eastern European agriculture and smallholder farming environments.

## **Feeding and provisioning refugees in an Eastern European context**

The impact of the war on Eastern European food systems was felt immediately after the Russian invasion, as hundreds of thousands of people were forced to flee their homes. At time of writing, the number of internally displaced persons and refugees from Ukraine has affected over five times as many people as at the height of the so-called EU<sup>v</sup> refugee 'crisis' of 2015. As of late April 2022, over 5 million Ukrainians have fled their country: 2.8 million to Poland; 757,000 to Romania; 471,000 to Hungary; 426,000 to Moldova; 342,000 to Slovakia, 550,000 to Russia and 24,000 to Belarus.<sup>vi</sup> There has been little international coordination in the efforts to resettle and assist Ukrainian refugees to date (a notable

exception is an E.U.-financed logistical hub in Suceava, Romania;<sup>vii</sup> Fodor, 2022). This means that some of the poorest countries in Europe are now providing the most aid to refugees, which for reasons we cover below, is not sustainable in the long-term.

Poland, as the country receiving the largest number of refugees, provides a useful insight into the often-overwhelming physical materialities of aid flows. These can be characterized as the essential dumping of goods with little research or forethought into actual refugee needs or in-country storage and distribution capacities. A large amount of humanitarian aid from domestic and international sources (in the present situation, from countries such as Ireland, Germany, France, Italy or Norway<sup>viii</sup>) are collected and processed in Poland to be sent to Ukraine, as well as distributed domestically. In practice, the delivery of goods has occurred without much warning or coordination and with very limited help from state agencies. This has meant that the Polish public and various civil society organisations have taken on the full spectrum of roles involved in aid: from welcoming and coordinating to supporting refugees, a set-up that veers between crisis and solidarity (Thieme et al., 2020).

The significance of civil society work may be surprising considering what some scholars have characterised as a sector that is weak in Eastern Europe (Jacobsson et al., 2017). Polish support and welcome to Ukrainian refugees are based entirely on grassroots mobilisation of individuals, businesses, educational institutions, neighbourhood centers, non-governmental organisations, and local councils. From a refugee perspective, this means that food and essentials are available from a variety of *ad hoc* distribution points, from railway stations to special “no-money” shops.

Social solidarity and generosity needs coordination for long-term sustainability. As support – including food aid – has been based on a myriad of initiatives rather than coordinated and overseen at a system level, aid is characterised by its dispersed, emergency-oriented, and often chaotic approach (Kozak, 2022). This is true across the region, not only characteristic of post-socialist states (Simsa, 2017). Aid has been delivered under pressing time circumstances with limited skills and financial resources, and food aid is one of the most difficult parts of the aid process as a result of perishability and inadequate long-term planning. Currently, Polish support centers complain frequently of a persistent lack of foodstuffs, and a surplus of clothes and toys. This speaks to discrepancies between refugees’ actual and imagined needs, and the challenges organisations face, from sourcing (fresh and storable) produce, to packaging and distributing it.

The current uncoordinated aid system leads to enormous amounts of waste, a symptom of both overlapping informal networks and a top-down approach to aid, particularly on the part of large international donors that send goods and supplies without grounded knowledge or reconnaissance of existing needs. Waste comes in many forms, as poorly packed or perishable goods do not reach their destination before spoiling, but also as bulky items (especially clothes) are sent where there is no need or capacity for them. These donations waste enormous amounts of volunteer time, give rise to storage and transport problems, and

in many cases, end in air pollution as donations are burned or dumped. Waste, then, consists of wasting time, labor, clean air, and people's skills.

In this context, the absence of the state and its agencies has been stark. After more than two months of war, the Polish government has not assumed the role of coordinator nor food and infrastructure provider to refugees. State efforts and laws are entirely reactionary – for example, at the end of March, Poland introduced a new law granting Ukrainian refugees a personal identification number that grants them access to public services, lawful employment, and some basic financial support. Apart from formalising refugees' rights, however, state agencies have not developed linking and integration strategies to aid refugees in accessing essential items, accommodation or work. Refugees are often left alone or rely on personal support. For many, mostly women, one of the first survival strategies is to turn to informal food production (mainly dumplings, simple home-made dinners or cakes), which operate entirely through social media platforms or local networks.<sup>ix</sup>

This passive response harkens back to the 2015 EU refugee 'crisis' (Mica et al., 2020) when local governments, (following from national policy) resisted establishing specialised institutions or response pathways to meet refugee needs.<sup>x</sup> Reliance on the uncoordinated work of volunteers, NGOs, and other non-governmental entities means that refugees have had vastly different experiences and access to resources, including food, and there is no formal insight into their diverse situations from which aid may be better provided.

We use Poland here as an example of the conditions and realities that welcome refugees throughout the region. Crucial to note is the extent to which civil and informal support networks are being eroded by the growing inflationary crisis affecting many domestic and regional economies. This means that the refugee crisis joins many already developing crises. These include unprecedented increases in food and energy prices in the aftermath of governments' stimulus packages during the Covid pandemic, and global supply and trade issues as a result of the ongoing war (Sas, 2022; Polish Inflation, 2022; Rushe et al., 2022). Reduced household purchasing power has knock-on effects on individuals' abilities to contribute to refugee provisioning and reception, as people increasingly struggle to make their own ends meet. We look at these dynamics next through the prism of smallholders in the region.

## **European farms and environments**

In order to better understand the challenges that food systems are facing post-Russia's invasion of Ukraine, this section presents a brief overview of the region's prevalence of small-scale farms and short supply chains.

Unlike Western Europe, a large proportion of the region's land continues to be farmed by smallholders. Smallholder farming was an inseparable part of the socialist agricultural economy that operated informally as household plots or subsidiary farms. Yet it was only

after land privatisation and titling reforms in the early 1990s that smallholders gained prominence in regional supply chains (Davidova et al., 2009; Wegren and O'Brien, 2018). At the same time, there was a sustained growth in large monopolies and agribusinesses, particularly those capitalising on the former collective and state-run farms. Today, many of these enterprises are owned by new elites with close ties to the ruling political parties or classes or to international corporations. Unlike in Western Europe, many of the largest farm businesses have had to maintain relations of mutual dependence with local smallholders as often small family farms formally own the land and also provide cheap if highly skilled labour in exchange for access to technologies (Allina-Pisano 2004; Visser, 2008; Kovacs, 2019).

Smallholder farms hold complex local roles that are extra-economic. This means that they are not only driven by profit, but also by complex considerations that arise as a result of their embeddedness within local networks of production and consumption (Aistara, 2018; Bachórz and Parasecoli, 2021; Matijevic and Boni, 2019; Tisenkopfs et al., 2020). These farms are depicted as inefficient by mainstream economic institutions, which promote larger, more intensive, mechanised, and market-oriented family farms (e.g., Juska 2007). This approach was also adopted by national and EU institutions in the post-accession phase as well as by governments with EU integration aspirations and is reflected in the structure of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) payments, which exclude the smallest farmholdings (Mincyte, 2011; Piras et al., 2021; Varga, 2019). While national policies and additional support schemes differ across the region, many smallholders cannot receive subsidies or incentives through the EU's CAP for the environmental and social benefits they generate, either because their farms are smaller than a minimum size threshold (1 hectare), or because they do not operate as economic agents and do not engage in commercialisation. A strong bias against smallholders, driven by a search for scale economies that dates to the Soviet period, is also present in Russia (Visser et al. 2015).

Today, unsustainable economic incentive structures (low food prices, high production costs, limited support), together with the challenges posed by food safety and other regulations, have made it nearly impossible to turn a smallholding farm into a viable business. This has driven many smallholders out of agriculture (Piras et al., 2018; Piras et al., 2021). In Moldova and Ukraine there is no equivalent to the single payment system of the EU's CAP. Any funding is usually assigned on a competitive basis by the national government or the many international donors following the elaboration of a business development plan (which in Moldova has replaced an equally unfair first-come, first-served basis) within which smallholders are neither recognised nor competitive. In parallel, large-scale land acquisitions facilitated by integration within global markets result in a replacement of farms that could already have been considered large, by even larger corporate entities without local embeddedness from owners, workers, or land use (Kuns, 2017). This is the case especially in Ukraine and Moldova but also in the EU, primarily Romania.<sup>xi</sup>

The ongoing consolidation of land holdings has had an immediate negative impact on rural livelihoods. Being heavily mechanised, the new large farms do not require much labour –

thus rural youth or older laborers are left with few local employment opportunities. Out-migration to cities and abroad has significantly grown, even if patterns of circular and returning migration can be observed. On many smallholding farms, the elderly (mostly women due to longer life expectancy) are left to manage farms with limited resources.<sup>xii</sup> As a result of outmigration and ageing, the rural purchasing power is reduced and these areas are not attractive to the modern food retail system (often Western-owned companies).

Despite these trends and challenges, smallholder farms have proven more resilient than expected by the institutions advocating for market reforms: many individuals and families have retained land ownership, and many continue to grow food, some for subsistence, others as different forms of adaptation to local conditions (Visser et al., 2019; Mamonova, 2015). This culture of food self-provisioning not only persists, but has expanded to cities outside of major financialised centers (Bilewicz and Śpiewak, 2019). As scholars have noted, it is not necessarily related to coping with poverty (Smith and Jehlička, 2013; Spilková, 2017; Bachórz, 2018). Neither is it unanimously politically mute: despite a lack of representation in most parliaments, there are examples of ‘back-to-land’ movements across Eastern Europe, or even of smallholders increasingly engaging in national politics and international movements, most notably with *Via Campesina*, an international organisation of peasants aimed at advancing local and regional food sovereignty goals (Velicu and OGREZeanu, 2022).

Countering trends towards consolidation and intensification of agricultural production, there are also signs of smallholder intensification across the region (Kuns, 2017; Piras et al., 2021). These developments underscore a particular positionality of smallholder farmers as capable agents of change and thus exceeding functionalist and/or poverty-reductionist readings of their roles (Blumberg, 2021). Among the many dimensions of smallholder agriculture in Eastern Europe, sustainability politics is a key arena in which farmer livelihoods have unfolded (Kovacs, 2021; Kopczyńska, 2020; Pungas, 2020). Small-scale and family farms in the region play a central role in maintaining low-impact agricultural landscapes. Only recently have such environmental labors been acknowledged as contributing to resilience, multifunctionality, and biodiversity of rural ecologies.<sup>xiii</sup> Greenwashing critiques of the current policies notwithstanding, such views are suggestive of changes in how Eastern European smallholders are viewed in Europe’s bureaucracies. Despite this discursive recognition, neither the new CAP nor the European Green Deal promises meaningful change to better support smallholders, as the broader and better-funded arms of the CAP remain geared towards supporting unsustainable consolidation and financialisation of land and agriculture.

To take a long view of these developments, the push towards neoliberalisation of agricultural politics in the EU has had profound negative consequences for Eastern European smallholders, and for rural communities in general. Despite decades of disinvestment and marginalisation, it is also clear that they have secured a foothold in the regional food economy and have roles to play in any efforts towards sustainability.

## A region in crisis?

The war in Ukraine poses considerable challenges and dangers to the ‘slow sustainability’ culture of Eastern European countries and the long-term survival of family farms. Besides the issues detailed above, additional dangers stem from the ‘shock’ policies typically encouraged and adopted during times of crisis and war, whereby protectionist investment and land acquisition regulations are slackened for the purpose of encouraging capital inflows to the region. These not only tempt local sellers of land, but also price out potential local buyers. Further, farmers are incentivised to farm more intensively to make up for predicted crop shortfalls through national-level crop export bans and increasingly nationalist government rhetoric to achieve domestic ‘food sovereignty’. The erosion of smallholders is already a trend within the EU (Burkietbayeva and Swinnen, 2018); the combination of disaster capitalism (Klein, 2007) with the added pressures of refugees and uncertain cropping and harvest seasons will strongly challenge a sector that does not have many safeguards.

A further challenge is a temporal one: in the EU we are currently at the beginning of a CAP financing cycle to farmers. This offers both an opportunity for rapid public policy intervention in the form of incentives, as well as a risk that farmers decide to break previous land use agreements and elect to farm more intensively for the coming years. This may result in higher crop yields but will potentially undo years of ‘greening’ that have led to some biodiversity gains. As greening and generational renewal are key goals of the new CAP cycle (together with the digitalization of agriculture), it is urgent to design incentives and broader support structures that make possible farms’ take-overs by a new generation of smallholders, so that they may continue practices of food provisioning and distribution locally.

Understanding the complex smallholder agri-food system in Eastern Europe is impossible without recognising the role of horizontal ties linking producers, urban and rural consumers, traders, local shopkeepers, farmer- market sellers, tractor and car repair shops, veterinary offices, and many other agents involved in the making and moving of food. This network combines formal and informal arrangements; it is as complex as it is agile, ranging from sales in the smallest of farm stands and deliveries to the largest retail chains and food processing plants. The units of production are just as diverse: they can include kin and close friendship networks, multi-generational family members as well as single, often women-led households (Kuns, 2017; Roger, 2014; Piras et al., 2021; Varga, 2017). Once such an intricate system is broken or disrupted it can only be restored with difficulty, if it can be restored at all.

Tapping directly into such food networks, current volunteering efforts to refugees in Poland (and beyond) become an ecology of diverse forms of organisation and activities. As we showed above, it is uneven, often unjust, grossly underfunded and stretched to its limits: on April 23, 2022, Warsaw’s mayor announced that the city’s infrastructures are at full capacity after the population grew by 20 percent in less than two months (Higgins, 2022). And yet, as many observers have noted, Polish and other neighbouring countries’ societies continue to operate in ways that show remarkable if uneven resolve. Informality with all its inefficiencies and human tolls continue to provide a safety net, at least this early in the war. As we write

this, there are signs of bottom-up coordination and institutionalization of volunteering networks in Poland. The process of collective learning has led to hybrid forms of civic action, or a mixture of bottom-up informal actions and an attempt to develop more stable and better-managed forms (Simsa, 2017). In light of the ongoing debates around the possibilities of political organisation (Graeber and Wengrow, 2021) it is suddenly possible to imagine that these structures and tools (volunteers' networks, digital tools, knowledge, etc.) might create pathways for a continued civil engagement and meaningful political change.

## **What lies ahead**

In this paper we have tried to tackle popular misperceptions of the broader Eastern European region as “backwards” or left behind, and/or as belonging predominantly to Russia’s sphere of influence. With more than 180 million residents, Eastern Europe is more populous than Germany and France combined – or Russia itself. Assuming any regional dependency on or orbit around Russia - or even the EU-15 - not only deprives residents of this diverse region of their political self-determination, rights and complex agencies (Jehlička et al., 2020), but has led to misguided international interventions that have undermined its agricultural systems, with far-reaching consequences. Efforts to ‘modernize’ agriculture through top-down funding schemes to consolidate land, overhaul and mechanize farming, making farmers dependent on expensive machines and inputs without local sourcing or maintenance options, are a case in point. Similarly, World Bank and other international efforts to commercialize agriculture ended up squeezing smallholders even further. These processes also undermined food sovereignty goals at local and regional levels (Varga, 2019).

More broadly, the crisis amplifies already existing problems that have plagued the regional agricultural sector for decades. How states are dealing with the current situation cannot be isolated from their overall geopolitical strategy vis-a-vis the EU. In fact, for some governments the decision to deal with the crisis on their own is deliberately political and meant to reinforce resistance to EU pressure in other areas, such as a bloc-wide migration policy, or rule-of-law measures and oversight. There is also a need to acknowledge the extent to which agricultural policies have failed many across the EU. European governments’ uncoordinated, inefficient, and wasteful efforts often lack long-term or systematic planning, making everyone more precarious; EU incentives have not been advantageous to the smallest, most biodiverse farms.

In this context, informality remains an important and necessary strategy against state inefficiencies or inadequate regulatory systems, if horizontal networks and small-scale farming are to remain alive and central to food security in the region. Current international trade embargoes and difficulties in transport and supply links highlight the advantages of local-scale supply chains and household subsistence practices. These grassroots activities not only deserve greater attention and fostering, but may serve as an instrumental insight into re-seeding similar practices and values elsewhere. Just as bottom-up support responses to



refugees have arisen from within civil society in the region, such localized dynamics can tap into local capacities and sustainabilities. These could be creatively merged with more institutionalized or vertical approaches to food policy, providing a holistic ‘safety net’. The current events provide an opportunity to appreciate Eastern Europe, and primarily its rural areas, not as a test-bed for policy interventions tailored for different contexts, or as a region which needs to develop and ‘learn’, but as a source of unique, embedded practices around growing and distributing fresh food that has proven resilient. Moreover, the experiences from this area may inspire new initiatives towards imagining alternative political futures.

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<sup>i</sup> We use ‘Eastern Europe’ to denote the post-socialist states that are today a part of the European Union, in addition to Moldova and Ukraine.

<sup>ii</sup> The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a military alliance between European states and the USA and Canada, established in 1949. There are currently thirty countries who are NATO members, with significant numbers of new members joining from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (USSR) in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Northern Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia). In addition to formal NATO members, the ‘Western alliance’ also includes countries that usually align militarily with the USA, such as Argentina, Brazil, Australia and countries from the Middle East and North Africa.

<sup>iii</sup> For example, Fiona Harvey, "Ukraine War Piles Pressure on Global Food System already in Crisis." *The Guardian*, March 9, 2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/food/2022/mar/09/ukraine-war-piles-pressure-on-global-food-system-already-in-crisis>

<sup>iv</sup> held online and organised through the Food Studies at New York University on March 22, 2022

<sup>v</sup> The European Union (EU) is an international political and economic organization that includes 27 European countries. Eleven countries previously belonging to the socialist bloc or to the USSR itself joined the EU between 2004 and 2013. Four EU countries (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania) border Ukraine. Ukraine and Moldova signed Association Agreements with the EU (including free trade agreements) in 2014, and have submitted formal requests to join the EU after the start of the war. The initial refusal of former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich to sign the Association Agreement with the EU triggered the Euromaidan protests and his removal in 2014.

<sup>vi</sup> See UNHCR:

[https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine#\\_ga=2.130221839.1423492494.1649352382-1384216343.1647421963](https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine#_ga=2.130221839.1423492494.1649352382-1384216343.1647421963)

<sup>vii</sup> In addition, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia have received some support that come from the EU React Fund:

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_22\\_1961](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_1961),

<https://reliefweb.int/report/poland/ukraine-17-billion-eu-funds-help-refugees>,

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<https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/eu-funds-to-help-refugees-are-insufficient-frontline-countries-warn/>

<sup>viii</sup> For example: <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/an-example-of-huge-generosity-large-aid-convoy-departs-dublin-for-ukraine-1.4821685>, [https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/humanitarian-efforts/neighbour\\_support/id2908141/](https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/humanitarian-efforts/neighbour_support/id2908141/), <https://www.acted.org/en/humanitarian-convoys-for-ukraine-live/>, <https://www.gdansk.pl/wiadomosci/Lubeka-ruszy-la-z-pomoca-Do-Gdanska-docieraja-kolejne-transporty-z-darami,a,215383> (transl.: "Lübeck started to help. More transports with gifts for Ukraine arrive to Gdansk"), <https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/40028/italian-organizations-send-aid-to-poland-to-help-ukranians>

<sup>ix</sup> For example: <https://www.facebook.com/groups/3048442818805030> (The name of the Facebook group where products are sold is: "Ukrainian women cook. Cook and share" (*Ukrainki gotujq. Ugotuj i siq podziel/Готуйте і діліться*)).

<sup>x</sup> It is important to note that in comparison to other parts of the world, the 2014-2015 refugee crisis in Europe was a product of politics and media hype; Europe and the US have strikingly low levels of refugee acceptance.

<sup>xi</sup> To the best of our knowledge, there is no assessment of the broader socio-economic impact of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements between Moldova, Ukraine and the EU, besides the trade flows and their change across time.

<sup>xii</sup> Based on qualitative interviews by Piras and Botnarenco (2015) as well as statistical data from the 2011 Agricultural Census (National Bureau of Statistics, 2014, Women and men in agriculture of the Republic of Moldova. Available at: [https://statistica.gov.md/public/files/Recensamint/Recensamint\\_agricol/Femei\\_barbati\\_agr/Femei\\_barbati\\_agric\\_eng.pdf](https://statistica.gov.md/public/files/Recensamint/Recensamint_agricol/Femei_barbati_agr/Femei_barbati_agric_eng.pdf)); see also Blumberg (2022).

<sup>xiii</sup> An example are ongoing debates concerning the role of agriculture within the EU's Green Deal, where it is considering adopting a 'Farm to Fork' strategy. See <https://www.eufic.org/en/food-production/article/the-eu-farm-to-fork-strategy-can-we-make-the-european-food-system-healthier-and-sustainable>

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