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Strategy-Proof Compromises

Postl, Peter; (2011) Strategy-Proof Compromises. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics , 11 (1) , Article 20. 10.2202/1935-1704.1684. Green open access

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We study strategy-proof decision rules in the variant of the canonical public good model proposed by Borgers and Postl (2009). In this setup, we fully characterize the set of budget-balanced strategy-proof deterministic mechanisms, which are simple threshold rules. For smooth probabilistic mechanisms, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for dominant strategy implementation. When allowing for discontinuities in the mechanism, our necessary condition remains valid, but additional conditions must hold for sufficiency. We also show that, among ex post efficient decision rules, only dictatorial ones are strategy-proof. While familiar in spirit, this result is not the consequence of any known result in the literature.

Type: Article
Title: Strategy-Proof Compromises
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1684
Publisher version: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1684
Language: English
Additional information: This version is the version of record. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions.
Keywords: compromise, public good provision, dominant strategy implementation, strategy-proof, dictatorship
UCL classification: UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10157807
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