Characterising curricular goals for students' written historical arguments after exposure to 'recontextualised' academic scholarship

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I, James Edward Carroll confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

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Abstract

History education stakeholders in England have consistently judged that some students find historical writing difficult. The resources provided by such stakeholders, however, have often demonstrated wastage, incoordination, and replication. For example, two largely disconnected discourses have developed initiatives regarding history students' extended writing: 'genre theorists' and the 'history teachers' extended writing movement'. Drawing on Basil Bernstein's work, some participants in both discourses have suggested they are 'recontextualising' academic history for the purposes of secondary education. Participants in these two discourses, however, have tended to talk past one another. One reason communication has been difficult is because of differing assumptions between the two discourses regarding what the curricular goals for students' extended historical writing should be. Using Bernstein's model as an interpretative framework, this thesis therefore aimed to perform curricular theorisation in order to help establish more commonly held curricular goals for history education stakeholders.

A case study of a sequence of A-Level lessons on the causes of the Salem witch trials was conducted. During lesson planning, texts by historians and philosophers of history were analysed to determine teachable curricular goals for extended written historical causal explanations. Students' essays were analysed to determine which of the goals the students had appeared to achieve, as well as to identify further possible goals that had not been pre-empted during the planning of the lessons. Finally, feedback was received from academic experts on the Salem witch trials on the appropriacy of the curricular goals and the extent to which the students had achieved them. The thesis identifies a variety of curricular goals from academic history which A-Level students with a range of prior-attainment levels were able to achieve. Based on the study, these goals and criteria for history curriculum designers when determining further curricular goals for students' extended historical writing are recommended.

Impact Statement

This interdisciplinary research makes connections between the discourses of applied linguistics, history education, and history. Bridging these discourses may help limit the wastage, incoordination, and replication in resourcing that currently occurs. I propose commonly held curricular goals more in line with the field of production of academic history in the twenty-first century for the teaching of secondary history students' written causal arguments. These goals have implications for curriculum design and pedagogy in secondary schools, as well as research traditions and methods of enquiry in terms of constructing knowledge regarding students' writing. This characterisation of curricular goals might also act as a heuristic for future investigations which could, unlike this study, determine causal relationships, or the efficacy of an approach to teaching them. Although the study concentrates on later secondary history education, it may have broader implications: for instance, in terms of progression models at lower-secondary level; for historians as teachers and assessors in university; or providing avenues for history-discipline specific research in applied linguistics.

Since 2017, I have published peer-reviewed articles based on this research in *The Curriculum Journal*, *The Journal of Curriculum Studies* and *The History Education Research Journal*. So far, these works have been cited nine times and viewed over 650 times. These articles discuss practical recommendations for future history curriculum design. For example, my most recent article in 2021 in *The History Education Research Journal* proposes reforms to national history examinations in England recommending an epistemology- rather than genre-led approach. I also present my research, such as to the Institute of Education, University College London's History Education Special Interest Group.

Since 2016, I have published articles condensing this research in practitioner journals such as England's *Teaching History* and New South Wales, Australia's *Teaching History*.

These works have been cited twenty-five times; since 2018 they have been downloaded over 1,000 times; and since 2017 they have been viewed on nearly 4,000 occasions. Since 2017, I have also written a blog summarising my research which has had more than 13,000 views from over 8,000 visitors. A forthcoming article in *Teaching History* scheduled for 2022 will discuss teaching history students how to use metaphor in their extended written arguments. I have also been approached to provide a chapter on extended writing for a proposed book called *A Practical Guide to Teaching History in a Secondary School* provisionally scheduled for publication in 2023. Additionally, I present this research at conferences to teaching practitioners such as at the Historical Association Conference, the West London Free School Conference, and EducatingLincs Conference. Furthermore, I provide INSET to history teachers' organisations such as for the Harris Federation and the East Sussex History Network and regularly lead History PGCE Subject Studies sessions at universities such as Cambridge, Reading, and Leeds Trinity. I am also a member of the OFSTED History Subject Working Group which has provided advice on OFSTED's new inspection framework's development and implementation. In this role, I provide guidance on how the teaching of extended historical writing might be inspected nationally.

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1. Introduction

In history education in England, many stakeholders tend to agree on the importance of students being able to construct extended written argument at the end of their compulsory history education. In some cases, however, these stakeholders hold starkly different views of *what*, in a curricular sense, teachers should be aiming for their students to achieve in their writing, resulting in wastage, incoordination and replication in resourcing. In this thesis' Literature Review, I compare two discourses – Australian genre theory and the history teachers' 'extended writing movement' in England – which exemplify such divergences and the epistemic assumptions that underpin their differing views. Furthermore, I demonstrate this divergence is more the result of lack of inter-discursive communication rather than informed argument, meaning many tensions between the discourses remained unrecognised. Specifically, participants in the discourses differ on issues such as the levels or respective importance they attribute to students reading academic historical scholarship in lessons and to teachers modelling lexicogrammar (structures of words).

Drawing on Basil Bernstein's work, some participants in both discourses have suggested they are 'recontextualising' academic history for the purposes of secondary education, implying this is desirable in history curriculum design. Despite such claims, in both discourses rationales for decision making when 'recontextualising' have rarely been provided. Using Bernstein's model as an interpretative framework, I therefore conducted theorisation designed to integrate, where possible, the recommendations of genre theory and the 'extended writing movement', while systematically incorporating the conventions of academic historians to identify curricular goals for secondary history students' extended historical writing. Consequently, my two research questions were:

- **Research Question 1**

What are the opportunities and limitations for a history curriculum designer when ‘recontextualising’ academic historical causal arguments?

- **Research Question 2**

  How does the lexicogrammatical modelling by a teacher of the properties of the language of academic scholarship (that the students had already read) manifest itself in A-Level history students’ written historical causal arguments?

As detailed in the ‘Methodology’, to enable such curricular theorisation I conducted a theory-building case study of my teaching of one of my own A-Level classes, in which I planned and taught the students a sequence of lessons on the causes of the Salem witch trials of 1692.

In ‘Findings – Research Question 1 planning curricular goals’, I discuss how I thematically analysed texts by academic historians and philosophers of history to determine essential features of academic historical causal explanation. In so doing, I identified potential teachable curricular goals for historical causal explanation, as well as outlining potential opportunities and limitations for a secondary history curriculum designer ‘recontextualising’ academic history for the purposes of secondary schooling.

In the ‘Overview of the Lesson Sequence’, I demonstrate how, while planning the sequence of lessons, I drew on the recommendations of genre theorists and the ‘extended writing movement’, but only if they did not contradict the conventions of academic historians and philosophers of history I had identified. I also detail how, for ethical reasons, I gave the highest priority in my planning to ensuring that my students had the greatest possible opportunity to succeed in their examinations as judged by the awarding body’s specifications – even if this meant contradicting the recommendations of genre theorists, the extended writing movement, or academic historians and philosophers of history.

In both ‘Findings – Research Questions 1 (continued) experts’ feedback’ and ‘Findings – Research Question 1 (continued) experts’ feedback’, I detail how I thematically analysed my students’ essays to determine which curricular goals they had appeared to achieve. I also recount the feedback the essays received from academic experts on the Salem witch trials regarding the appropriacy of my identified curricula goals and the extent to which my students had achieved them.

The thesis identifies a variety of curricular goals from academic history which A-Level students with a range of prior-attainment levels were able to achieve. In the ‘Discussion’, I outline certain broadly applicable goals for students’ written historical causal explanations, as well as detailing the extent to which the recommendations of genre theorists and the extended writing movement and awarding body examination-board specifications currently reflect these. Finally, in the ‘Conclusions and Recommendations’ I make suggestions for future history curriculum design regarding extended historical writing so that it better reflects academic history, as well as including proposing possible reforms to national examinations in history to better enable such design.

2. Literature review

2.1. From divergent evolution to witting cross-fertilisation: the need for more awareness of potential inter-discursive communication regarding students' extended historical writing

2.1.1. Background

2.1.1.1. Why history writing is hard

As I agonise over this sentence, I am reminded once again that formal academic writing is hard. Furthermore, historical writing presents its own particular challenges. History teachers and education researchers in England have consistently judged that some students find formal historical writing prohibitively difficult because the subject demands the simultaneous mastery of a multitude of variables in order to produce a coherent piece of extended written historical argument (Counsell, 1997). Many of these demands are rooted in the fact that school history in England requires students to construct their *own* extended written historical arguments in order to achieve the highest levels of attainment (Coffin, 2006). These arguments that students are expected to construct are in response to historical questions that are open-ended and permit a number of plausible responses that may be credited.

Additionally, students must also be alert to the lexical conventions of historical prose. Such prose often includes especially conceptualised, subject-specific vocabulary (Counsell, 1997; Harris, 2001; Woodcock, 2005). Historical lexicogrammar (structures of words) often requires students to appreciate that historical information is packaged into highly abstracted concepts to give it meaning (Bakalis, 2003). Attempting to command and formulate such lexicogrammar presents challenges for students. For example, while some concepts in history resonate with commonly held human understandings typically expressed in everyday spoken language, formal historical writing instead demands such concepts be articulated in increasingly technical, abstract and 'uncommonsense' expression (Schleppegrell, 2011). For instance, students encounter causation in ‘everyday’ contexts from a personalised perspective over short time scales – such as appreciating they got into trouble with their teacher *because* they forgot their homework. Historical discourse, however, demands the re-appropriation of this ostensibly straightforward concept to depersonalised abstractions across timescales beyond the realm of their lived experience – for example in arguing that the Puritan worldview that had developed from the 1620s in New England was a precondition for the Salem witch trials of 1692 (Howson & Shemilt, 2011). This level of formal abstraction often proves taxing for students.

Furthermore, different *types* of discipline-specific argument are required depending on the – or combination of – what came to be dubbed ‘second order concept(s)’ the students are being asked to analyse (Lee & Ashby, 2000). Although not yet referred to as ‘second-order concepts’, these have been enshrined in the English National Curriculum since 1991 (Department of Education and Science, 1991). Second-order concepts are also sometimes referred to as ‘metahistorical’ or ‘disciplinary’ knowledge and include – but are not limited to - ‘cause and consequence’, ‘change and continuity’, ‘similarity and difference’, and ‘evidential thinking’. These concepts relate to the type of questions historians conventionally ask, historical methodologies, how historical claims are made and can be challenged, and how substantive content regarding the past is structured into historical knowledge (Counsell, 2017; Fordham, 2016a; Lee, 2005). These ‘second order concepts’ all demand their own particular compositional and linguistic conventions when argued in extended historical writing (e.g. causation Woodcock, 2005; Carroll 2016a, 2016b, 2017a, 2018; change and continuity Donaldson, 2018; Fielding, 2015; Foster, 2013. 2016; Jarman, 2009; similarity and difference Bradshaw, 2009; Black, 2012; evidential thinking Foster & Gadd, 2013).

As a consequence of the exacting emphasis on conceptually specific argument, many history teachers have attested to substantial demands on students’ short-term memory when planning, organising and writing history essays (Counsell, 1997; Fordham, 2017; Gadd, 2009). Accordingly, some history teacher-researchers advocate alleviating the strain on short-term memory in terms of recall of substantive knowledge to allow the memory to focus on the construction of argument. For example, some teachers recommend 'card sort' activities utilising knowledge cards to support recall. Such activities allow students to concentrate on the thematic organisation of their response to the specific type of second-order problem that needs to be argued in writing (e.g. Carroll, 2016a; Evans & Pate, 2007). A further response to the issue of memory demands developed by some history teacher-researchers is to emphasise the necessity of substantive knowledge being consolidated in students' long-term memory to ensure that short-term memory can be free to make vocabulary recognition and formulation of specific argument possible (e.g. Hammond, 2014; King, 2015). The recall, selection and organisation of knowledge relevant to particular types of question therefore represent a significant challenge for secondary students when arguing in their extended historical writing. Because success in history is dependent on proficiency in arguing in analytic writing, exacting requirements such as these at the levels of overall structure and lexicogrammar are sometimes cited as the reason why lower-attaining students are denied access to a historical education beyond the compulsory phase (Andrews, 1995; Banham, 1998; Coffin, 2006; Donaghy, 2013; Harris, 2001; Ward, 2006).

2.1.1.2. Policy makers' concerns

Policy makers in England have been alert to this critical factor affecting the exclusion of the majority of students from post-compulsory study of history (Counsell, 2011a). Until the 1990s, the norm for most of England's secondary school students was not to write extended analytical prose, for while the traditional essay was a fixture of the History O-Level examination, fewer than 20 per cent of students sat these exams (Phillips, 1998). A consequence of this exclusivity of access to formal, historical academic argument was the angst caused by the School Examinations and Assessment Council's (1993) findings in the early 1990s which highlighted the alarming standards of students' extended historical writing. Since then, successive governments have made concerted – yet uncoordinated – attempts to raise standards. Initially, the School Curriculum Assessment Authority (SCAA) created widely disseminated materials partly based on consultation with history education experts (SCAA, 1997).

While the anxiety at the standard of students' extended historical writing remained, the approach to remedying the issue altered with the Labour government in the 2000s with their National Literacy Strategies. Although much centralised guidance was still produced, it tended to de-emphasise the subject-specific advances of history teachers (Counsell, 2004a). Instead, a more generic, genre theory-inspired approach to literacy in history was privileged, in which students were instructed to recognise and reproduce strictly delineated genres (Department for Education and Skills, 2002). This guidance (a) tended to ignore the way in which those genres were blended in history education practice; (b) failed to note the key drivers of advances in history education – particularly the development of using the subject's constituent second-order concepts as a framework to construct argument.

For example, although the *Key Stage 3 National Strategy – Literacy in History* of 2002 claimed to be an example of 'genre theory' providing discipline-specific guidance to literacy, unlike the Australian research it claimed to derive from in fact the guidance only focused on generic 'non-fiction genres' (DfEaS, 2002, pp.19-20). In history, the National Literacy Strategy recommended that students be taught generic text types; especially the 'main categories of non-fiction writing' such as 'instruction, recount, explanation, information, persuasion, discursive writing, analysis, and evaluation' (DfEaS, 2002 pp. 19–20). This strict delineation of 'genres' based on generic application of 'non-fiction writing' conventions conflicted with some teachers' history-specific recommendations that were emerging at the time. For example, Lang (2003) argued that the artificial demarcation of school history genres had led to school history becoming divorced from its academic antecedent. Academic history, Lang argued, was characterised by being generally narrative (recount); while also being highly explanatory, informative, persuasive, discursive, analytical, and evaluative. Furthermore, there was little latitude with these generic text types applicable to all 'non-fiction' for history teachers to fine-tune them specifically to the second-order concepts that the government's own history curriculum demanded. Generic 'analysis' or 'discursive writing', for example, offered only general guidelines relevant to the particular types of analyses required with different historical second-order concepts: such as causation as opposed to change and continuity. In sum, it would appear that while policy makers have agreed that students need support in their historical writing, recurring themes in resourcing have been wastage, incoordination and replication.

2.1.1.3. Development of differing discourses regarding students' historical writing

Lack of practical coordination in policy is only one symptom of the way in which history teacher-generated solutions, even where the resulting discourse is internally coherent, cumulative, theorised and published, fail to travel into the parallel spaces of the discourse of genre theory, resulting in replication, misrepresentation or waste. Two concurrent but largely disconnected discourses have emerged that have sought to develop and communicate ideas and initiatives relevant to students' extended historical writing: 'genre theorists' and the 'history teachers' extended writing movement'. As these discourses have crystallised and become more specialised, the likelihood of their interaction appears to have lessened (Becher, 1993; Clark, 1963). This lack of communication may be partly the result of what Campbell (1969) identified as 'tribalism or nationalism or ingroup partisanship' (p.328) which, in some senses, has promoted an 'artificial alienation and distance between even closely-related specialities on either side of a boundary' (Becher, 1993, p.40).

2.1.1.3.1. Australian Genre Theory

First, genre-based approaches to school literacy inspired by Hallidayan systemic functional linguistics (SFL) have been influential for some time. As early as the 1960s the originator of SFL, Michael Halliday, was invited to develop an English Curriculum proposal for the Nuffield Foundation, leading to the *Nuffield/Schools Council Programme in Linguistics and English Teaching* (1964-71). This programme produced extensive materials for schools which were 'influential in their day, and some of which remain in use' (Christie, 2007, p.5; Hasan & Martin, 1989; Christie & Unsworth, 2005). By the 1990s, SFL had a 'reasonably well-established history of involvement in education, having been drawn upon in a number of educational projects and reports in the UK' – for example in the development of the Language in the National Curriculum Project (Christie, 1998, pp.52-53).

In fact, Hallidayan ideas were so influential that they were institutionally enshrined with the Labour government's National Literacy Strategies (DfEaS, 2002, p.20) which were heavily inspired by repurposed SFL genre-based pedagogies as advocated by the 'Sydney School' of 'genre theorists' (e.g. Martin, 1985; Christie, 1985). A further enduring legacy of these initiatives in English schools were the recommendations, building on Australian genre theory, of Maureen Lewis and David Wray (e.g. 1997) at Exeter University of 'writing frames' to support and develop students' extended writing.

Genre theorists have been heavily influenced by Halliday's notion of 'functional grammar' which suggests that the context in which language is produced strongly determines the grammatical choices that one makes. A great deal of work of the 'Sydney School' and its supporters, particularly initially by Martin (e.g. 1992), has attempted to apply Halliday's ideas pedagogically by identifying the text types and genres common in school history in a variety of international contexts (e.g. Christie & Derewianka, 2008; Coffin 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006; Coffin and Derewianka 2008a and b; Eggins, Martin & Wignell, 1993; Martin 2002, 2003; Martin & Rose, 2003, 2008; McNamara, 1989; Oteíza, 2003; Schleppegrell, 2011; Schleppegrell, Achugar & Oteíza 2004; Unsworth, 1999; Veel & Coffin, 1996). In this view, writers typically make particular choices according to particular social contexts, leading to 'predictable text structures or genres' (Coffin 2006, p.27). 'Genre', in this view, has a specifically narrow meaning referring to *why* language was produced, and has been described as a 'staged, purposeful, goal-directed activity represented in language' (Christie, 1998, p.53).

Once genres have been deconstructed, they can be explicitly taught to pupils who can be 'apprenticed' into reproducing them (Donaghy, 2013). Many genre theorists argue that due to their importance in building and communicating written information such genres need to be 'the subject of overt teaching and learning' so that students can become more competent in their uses (Christie & Misson, 1998, p.11). For example, one history practitioner advocating this genre-based approach, Donaghy (2013), guides students to produce genres such as 'factorial explanation' or 'argument – exposition'.

This SFL model has therefore been the predominant theoretical framework applied to genre theorists' linguistic data analysis to discern genres (e.g. Coffin, 2000, 2004). This has usually involved analysing corpuses of school history texts (e.g. Christie & Derewianka, 2008; Coffin, 2006) including students' written work, textbooks and examination rubrics. Some of these genre theorists have conducted empirical studies which have produced robust evidence of both the types of genres that students currently tend to produce at particular points in their secondary history schooling and/or the effectiveness of genre-based pedagogies in enabling students to reproduce these delineated 'school history' genres (e.g. Christie & Derewianka, 2008; Coffin, 2006).

2.1.1.3.2. English history teachers' 'Extended Writing Movement'

A second discourse to emerge in the last thirty years related to students' historical writing has been dubbed the English history teachers' 'extended writing movement' (Counsell, 2011a, p.16). While this label is necessarily imperfect and members of the 'movement' may not recognise themselves by such a term, for the purposes of this thesis it will be applied to a group of approximately forty researchers which has been largely, though not exclusively, teacher-led and have independently developed approaches to improving students' extended written arguments.

This movement has developed in the wider context of a distinctively substantial community of history-teacher authors whose work ranges from systematic qualitative research to reflective professional enquiry with theoretical implications. For example, 171 articles were written for the professional journal *Teaching History* in the period from 1998 to 2013 by practising history teachers and/or former history teachers typically working in teacher education but drawing on their prior practice and adopting a 'teacher voice' (Fordham, 2016a, p. 140).

Compared to genre theory, the discourse of the extended writing movement is not grounded in large-scale research regarding how students currently write or the efficacy of these history teachers' approaches. Instead, the movement's participants have predominantly undertaken curricular theorising. This involves theorisation more of the curricular 'what' to be taught in history lessons than the pedagogical 'how' (Counsell, 2016a). Fordham (2016a) demonstrated empirically through citation analysis that the substance and structure of this curricular theorisation amounts to a 'sustained and coherent research tradition that transcends the boundaries of particular contexts and, as such, represents a coherent and codified form of professional knowledge' (p. 147). In this sense, the movement has produced a discourse that is cumulative, theoretically powerful and generative by elaborating, challenging and refining earlier instances of theorisation (Counsell, 2011a). For example, in the period from 2005 to 2013 Woodcock's (2005) influential article on teaching secondary students the language of historical causation was cited 15 times for this purpose (Fordham, 2016a). Furthermore, representatives of the discourse have exerted influence on national policy regarding students' construction of extended historical argument in England: for instance, by directly influencing redesigns of the National Curriculum through consultancy positions (e.g. Department for Education, 2014) and authoring centralised guidance on historical essay writing (e.g. Counsell, 1997).

Similarly to the English policy makers, this movement had its origins in the concern of the 1990s regarding the standard of students' extended historical writing and sought to give the teaching of written historical argument a specific focus. Those in the extended writing movement have sought to solve a problem of practice based on an awareness that extended historical writing was still avoided by many history teachers despite lengthy historical argument being the mode of expression through which most academic historical knowledge is constructed (Counsell, 2011a). In trying to solve this pedagogical problem, often these teachers have attempted to characterise the disciplinary characteristics of written historical argument by (a) adopting, theorising around and building on the syntactic or 'second-order' concepts of the discipline originally identified by researchers such as Shemilt (1980) and (b) explicitly drawing on historical scholarship for models. From this starting point, many of these teachers began to consider what characterises academic historical writing and to identify which of these historically specific characteristics students find challenging.

In beginning this theorisation, these teachers and education researchers took the initiative themselves by placing primacy on the disciplinary underpinnings of historical writing (Banham, 1998; Counsell, 1997; Dove, 2000; Harris, 2001; Laffin, 2000; Mulholland, 1998; Waters, 2003; Wiltshire, 2000). Consequently, many teacher-researchers over the last thirty years have attempted to ensure literacy is not 'bolted on' (Counsell, 2004a, pp.4 & 111) to the history, but instead serves and emerges organically from the discipline, distinct from other subjects (Counsell, 2011a; Ward, 2006; Woodcock, 2005). Perhaps as a reaction against the centralised national push for historical approaches to literacy in the National Literacy Strategies - that failed to adequately integrate subject-specificity even while trying to provide guidance on it - participants in the extended writing movement have increasingly used the subject's second order concepts as a framework to explore how to enable students to construct the particular types of historical written arguments required (e.g. causation Woodcock, 2005; Carroll 2016a, 2016b, 2017a, 2018; change and continuity Donaldson, 2018; Fielding, 2015; Foster, 2013. 2016; Jarman, 2009; similarity and difference Bradshaw, 2009; Black, 2012; evidential thinking Foster & Gadd, 2013).

In recognising commonly experienced difficulties students face with historical writing, the extended writing movement shares a number of aims with many genre theorists. For example, like some genre theorists (e.g. Christie, 2007), this 'movement' intended to ensure that extended historical writing was made accessible to the whole ability range, rather than an exclusive elite: an ambitious task that required a 'discrete and systematic teaching focus of its own' (Byrom, 1998, p.32). An additional point of agreement between most genre theorists and teachers influenced by the approach (e.g. Donaghy, 2013) and the extended writing movement (e.g. Foster, 2015), therefore, is that history teachers should take more responsibility for this subject-specific literacy instruction. Furthermore, both discourses emphasise the need for students to be made explicitly aware of the formal registers valued in academic historical writing (Andrews, 1995; Coffin, 2006; Evans & Pate, 2007; Waters, 2003).

Figure 2.1. Patterns of development between the discourses of genre theory and history teacher research.



Genre theorists

Extended writing movement

Unwitting cross – fertilisation e.g.

- Explicit focus on text types
- Paragraph heuristics
- Writing frames

Convergent evolution e.g.

- ‘Nominalisation’ / ‘Big points’,
- ‘Showing processes’/ ‘Telling and suggesting’
- ‘Cause within the clause’/ Woodcockian causal language
- ‘Colouring’/Interpretations

Witting cross – fertilisation e.g.

- Martin, Coffin & North 2007
- Nichol, 2011
- Donaghy 2013

Divergent evolution e.g.

- Explicit focus on lexicogrammar
- Acceptance of ‘bias’, ‘reliability’ and ‘truthfulness’

Divergent evolution e.g.

- Lack of explicit focus on lexicogrammar
- Rejection of ‘bias’, ‘reliability’ and ‘truthfulness’

Yet despite certain goals held in common by many genre theorists and the history teachers' extended writing movement the two discourses have tended to talk past one another, even though participants in both discourses make claims about improving secondary history students' extended writing. Here, I have used Fordham's (2016a) definition of a published 'discourse' where themes have emerged which have been addressed by a number of teachers and/or researchers in their writing, with subsequent teachers and/or researchers advancing the conversation further by explicit reference to those who wrote before (p.139). In surveying these two territories, I have discerned a systemic lack of communication between the two discourses (Carroll, 2017b). First, I shall outline the trends of limited cross-traffic between the two discourses with salient examples (Figure 2.1.), and sketch concomitant issues with resourcing that have developed as a consequence. In doing so I will argue that a more activist stance is required to ensure meaningful inter-discursive communication between genre theorists and the history teachers' extended writing movement to ensure more efficiency in developing approaches to improving students' extended historical writing (Campbell, 1969).

2.1.2. A taxonomy of the interrelationship between the discourses

2.1.2.1. Witting yet unsystematic cross-fertilisation

First, a chronological perspective of the literature reveals the collective amnesia and rediscovery of genre theory by history education stakeholders. For example, centralised initiatives rooted in SFL like the National Literacy Strategies (e.g. DfEaS, 2002) have garnered history education advocates in English primary and secondary schools with some history teachers extolling their 'mind-blowing ideas of functional literacy and its genre theory that underpinned their pioneering and radical creation of writing frames' (Nichol, 2011, pp.8-9). Despite some history educators suggesting 'genre theory was a blinding revelation, an epiphanic moment' (Nuffield Primary History Project, 2012, p.20), these epiphanies have often not been built upon, partly because the lineage of initiatives have not been made explicit.

For example, these insufficient explanations of the genealogy of even such established approaches as the National Literacy Strategies has resulted in isolated practitioners continuing to make similar ‘breakthroughs’ afresh that in reality mirror pre-existing, widely disseminated materials. For example, the history teacher and blogger Donaghy (2013) argued that after an ‘enormous amount of thought into my approach to teaching over the past 2 years’ it was ‘vital’ to share his ‘new-style’ ‘genre-based pedagogy’ heavily influenced by Halliday and the Sydney School. As well as his reading of Coffin (2006) in particular, his reflection was inspired, in part, by a reaction to the increasing orthodoxy in English schools of ‘painfully limited and limiting’ paragraph structure heuristics such as ‘P-E-E’ (Point, Evidence, Explanation). ‘P-E-E’ and other models designed to enable students to organise paragraphs coherently (e.g. ‘PEEL’ (Point, Evidence, Explanation, Link) Fordham, 2007, p.37; ‘PEGEX’ (Point, Evidence, Explanation) Evans & Pate, 2007, p.26; ‘hamburger paragraphs’ Banham, 1998, p.10; and ‘evidence sandwiches’ Mulholland, 1998, p.17) have become increasingly ubiquitous in English secondary schools (Foster & Gadd, 2013).

Ironically, however, it is highly likely that these scaffolds were, like Donaghy’s genre-based pedagogy, in fact directly influenced by genre theory – particularly Martin’s (1992, pp.454-456) suggestion that students’ paragraphs be clearly organised by *hypertheme,* evidence and *hypernew.* A hypertheme refers to a statement – usually, but not always, the first sentence in a phase of discourse - which represents a higher layer of information in the discourse and predicts what follows (Martin & Rose, 2003, p.181). At the end of a phase of discourse, a new layer of information is introduced that reminds the reader what they have encountered. This hypernew therefore encapsulates and extends the previous discussion, helping the reader understand the broader relevance of the phase of discourse which has just unfolded. These therefore might help form a ‘sandwich’ structure, with the hypetheme predicting what is to come, the body unfolding relevant information, and the hypernew distilling what has been said (Piriyasilpa, 2009). In this structure, ‘topics are introduced in the Hypertheme, and grounds (evidence) are in the middle of paragraphs’ and ‘it is important to notice the end of paragraphs as this is where the hypernew or claims tends to be most explicit’ (Nesi & Gardner, 2012, p.110). As Counsell, Burn, Fordham, and Foster (2015) noted, ‘intellectual cross-currents such as Australian genre theory are all too easily hidden. But they matter. We need to know who has followed (or reacted against) what and why. Otherwise we re-invent wheels both round and square’ (p.17).

2.1.2.2. Unwitting cross-fertilisation

Second, a further consequence of centralised initiatives like the National Literacy Strategies not being clearly demarcated as Hallidayan in their origin has been *unwitting cross-fertilisation* between the two discourses – where history teachers seeking to improve students’ extended writing have been influenced by genre theory without apparently being cognisant of the stimulus for their approach. This unwitting cross-fertilisation has been most evident in the form of heavy emphases on ‘text types’ and ‘writing frames’ which became commonplace in history departments in the early 21st century. For example, following governmental guidance, students have increasingly been instructed to write ‘narratives, descriptions, explanations and interpretations’, so ‘that any question chosen fits neatly into one of these writing types.’ (Scott, 2006, p. 28). However, teachers advocating such focus on text types have been doing so without any apparent awareness of the fact that these centralised initiatives had Hallidayan origins.

Similarly, around the turn of the century, early developments in the extended writing movement clearly displayed vestiges of the SFL-influenced National Literacy Strategies. This influence, however, was apparently often unwitting and usually failed to cite its genre theory antecedents. For example, many genre theorists suggest the explicit teaching of essay structure and paragraph cohesion, suggesting that it is essential in developing the ‘textual metafunction’ – the intention to engender or create cohesion in texts (Coffin, 2006, p.39). Similarly, history teachers recommended whole-text (e.g. Banham 1998; Harris, 2001); paragraph (e.g. Bakalis, 2003; Banham, 1998; Mulholland, 1998) and sentence starter (e.g. Banham, 1998; Carlisle, 2000; Wiltshere, 2000; Smith, 2001) writing frames.

Very quickly, however, some history teachers in the extended writing movement sought to distinguish their scaffolding of writing structures from genre theory-inspired guidance. In particular, teachers in the extended writing movement attempted to shun cross-subject genericism in order to render such frames disciplinarily historical. As Counsell (2011a) suggested, teachers grew frustrated because Lewis and Wray’s writing frames ‘treated writing (and reading) as managing free-floating, non-subject specific ‘information’ rather than examining its role fostering the relational structures, substantive concepts and evidential modes particular to individual disciplines’ (p.68). Consequently, some history teacher-researchers began to react against the perceived limiting of students’ *historical* analysis as a result of using such frames (e.g. Counsell, 1997; Evans & Pate, 2007).

Furthermore, starting with Woodcock (2005), debates regarding students’ historical literacy began to shift from structure to incorporate debates about style specifically tailored to enable argument in relation to history’s specific second order concepts (e.g. causation Woodcock, 2005; Carroll 2016a, 2016b, 2017a, 2018; change and continuity Donaldson, 2018; Fielding, 2015; Foster, 2013. 2016; Jarman, 2009; similarity and difference Bradshaw, 2009; Black, 2012; evidential thinking Foster & Gadd, 2013). In sum, history teachers have been, on occasion, unwittingly influenced by *and* critical of SFL-inspired approaches without necessarily being cognisant of the inter-discursive quality of their contributing to, critiquing and developing of public knowledge.

It would appear then that even on the rare occasions that there has been cross-fertilisation between the discourses of genre theory and the extended writing movement – either wittingly in collaborative projects between genre theorists and teachers (e.g. Martin, Coffin, & North, 2007) or teachers clearly citing genre theory (e.g. Nichol, 2011), or unwittingly through development of techniques actually Hallidayan in origin – this inter-discursive cross-traffic has not resulted in this potentially cumulative knowledge being sufficiently identified and/or suitably disseminated as examples of potentially fruitful cross-fertilisation. This inadequately cumulated *cross- fertilisation* has led to repetition and therefore wastage for history teachers and policy makers who appeared to have cyclically and collectively discovered, forgotten, critiqued and rediscovered genre theory and the potential it has for developing students' historical writing (e.g. Donaghy, 2013).

Additionally, with rare exceptions (e.g. Martin, Coffin, & North, 2007), this cross-fertilisation has been almost uniformly one-way. While history teacher-researchers in England have occasionally drawn on genre theory, systemic functional linguists have been seemingly incognisant of the possibility of drawing on the cumulative, disciplinary knowledge of English history teachers. Although there are points of divergences between genre theorists in terms of the degree to which they directly deploy Hallidayan analysis and meta-language, the boundaries between the discourses may be more closely defended from the genre theorists' side. Genre theory's disciplinary community is more tightly knit and clearly self-defining with shared fundamental ideologies, common values, and stronger awareness of belonging to a unique tradition and therefore more likely to defend well-defined external disciplinary frontiers (Becher, 1993). Conversely, the extended writing movement is more divergent and loosely knit lacking such a clear sense of mutual cohesion and identity, resulting in their border zones being more ragged and less easy to defend, causing a semi-permeable membrane. Furthermore, the extended writing movement has largely been teacher-led. Consequently, many academics might not recognise the movement as an academic discourse which is cumulative, theoretically powerful and generative (Counsell 2011a, 2011b; Fordham 2016a). In short, even when potentially fruitful cross-fertilisation might have taken place systematic measures have not yet been taken to maximise the yield, resulting in unnecessary duplication and wastage in labour and resourcing. Further inter-discursive work is needed to ensure that such a time loop is broken. This communication only seems plausible through the allowance of greater latitude between the discourses' adjoining and overlapping boundaries.

2.1.2.3. Convergent evolution

Third, in fact the wider trend has been for the two discourses to largely ignore one another entirely. In some instances, this lack of communication has led to examples of potentially unnecessary reinvention because, despite representing different lineages, the two discourses have been faced with similar ecological niches in the history classroom. Consequently, both discourses have independently developed similar responses in a form of *convergent evolution* resulting in further duplication of labour.

One example of convergent evolution has been both discourses' attempts to make the need for abstracted generalisation in formal historical writing explicit to students. Some genre theorists have increasingly argued for the need for history students to be made aware of the importance of 'nominalisation' in formal academic writing. Especially in 'everyday' conversation there is stratal harmony with experience construed congruently (Christie & Derewianka, 2008). In other words, in conversational interaction grammar tends to match semantics with a 'natural pairing off' (Martin, 2007, p.52) of processes with verbs,

Figure 2.2. Abridged version of Martin's (2007) schema of 'grammatical metaphor'.


Without 'grammatical metaphor'
With 'grammatical metaphor'
semantics
process
participant
quality
logical relation
noun
conjunction
verb
adjective
participant
quality
logical relation
process
noun
conjunction
verb
adjective
Lexicogrammar

participants with nouns, qualities with adjectives and logical relations with conjunctions. For example, an informal sentence might read ‘the villagers in Salem village in 1692 [noun/participants] were confrontational [adjective/quality] and argued a lot [verb/process] so [conjunction/logical relation] they began accusing [verb/process] each other’.

In formal discourse, however, Halliday (e.g. 1998; Halliday & Matthiessen, 1999) identified what some genre theorists believe to be a vital phenomenon distinguishing informal discourse from formal academic writing – ‘grammatical metaphor’ (Figure 2.2.). Grammatical metaphor acts in a similar way to lexical metaphor, except with lexicogrammar (structures of words) instead of words (Martin, 2007). In formal discourse, processes, qualities and logical relations are often instead realised as nouns, and logical relations realised as prepositional phrases, verbs and nouns – resulting in stratal tensions where there is a non-matching between grammar and semantics. For example, in historical discourse a sentence might read ‘Accusations [noun/process] – as the case of George Burroughs and other community leaders show – grew from [verb/logical relation] local conflict [noun/qualities and processes] (Baker, 2015, pp.151-153)’. As a result of this tension, there is an ensuing mismatch between what the reader might typically expect (the ‘literal’) and the unexpected realisation of these meanings (‘the metaphorical’) (Christie & Derewianka, 2008, pp. 24-25). The key derivation of this ‘grammatical metaphor’ is ‘nominalisation’ during which activities are reconstructed as abstract things. This type of ‘thingification’ (Martin, 2007, pp.44-45) involves reconstruing and distilling activities presented in a whole clause as an abstracted nominal group and, according to many genre theorists, is a recurrent feature of technicalised historical discourse (Christie & Derewianka, 2008; Schleppegrell, 2011).

Allied to this focus, in this view these nominalisations act upon one another in a similarly abstracted manner (Schleppegrell, Achugar & Oteíza 2004). For example, some genre theorists have identified older students’ tendency to bury ‘the cause within the clause’

(Martin, 2007, pp.45-46). Martin has suggested that historical discourse compared to, for example, science, generally avoids explicit conjunctions. Instead, causal relations in particular tend to be portrayed as prepositional phrases, nouns or verbs. Martin argued that this tendency enables 'historians to fine tune causality' and 'enact finely differentiated types of cause and effect relations' (pp.45-46). So, for example, a historian would rarely write that 'Salem had a witch crisis *because* of Puritan beliefs' but might instead argue 'the *foundation* of the witchcraft crisis *lay in* Puritan New Englanders' singular worldview' (Norton, 2002, p.295). Whereas conjunctions such as 'because' or 'so' are essentially neutral, the use of prepositional phrases, nouns, and verbs allows for simple inter-causal relationships to be 'transformed into a finely nuanced clause-internal repertoire for interpretation as these resources are brought to bear' (pp.45-46).

For example, Coffin (2006) argued that students should be taught a linguistic repertoire that allows them to characterise different causal roles: particularly by distinguishing between necessary conditions and sufficient causes. Drawing on Martin's (1992) general analysis of English grammar, Coffin claimed that the terms 'enablers' (for necessary conditions) and 'determiners' (for sufficient causes) 'can also be applied to prepositional phrases realising circumstances of cause' (pp.122-125). In this case, we encounter how the *Key Stage 3 National Strategy – Literacy in History*'s iteration of 'genre theory' was heavily mediated and bowdlerised. The National Strategy recommended teachers instruct students to use connectives to 'establish cause and effect, e.g. because, since, therefore, so' (p.21) but made no distinction between logical or historical causal relationships.

Although English history teachers and researchers have approached the issue from a predominantly disciplinary rather than lexicogrammatical perspective, the focus on this type of abstraction is a pertinent example of convergent evolution between genre theory and the extended writing movement. As early as 1967, Thompson argued that ‘in using colligation as a basis for the arrangement of events in school history the teacher is reflecting the practice of historians and to this extent he [sic] can claim to be giving some guidance in the discipline of thinking historically’ (p.103). In this view, colligatory generalisations are encapsulating abstractions that package events (e.g. ‘the outbreak of the Second Indian War in 1688’; ‘Betty Parris and Abigail Williams’ initial accusations’, ‘Tituba’s confession’ and so on) under one umbrella term which allows the thematic organisation of historical knowledge (‘The Salem witch crisis of 1692’). Furthermore, these generalisations do not have direct experiential referents and therefore cannot be explained by referring solely to a concrete object, person or event. The cognitive research of the educational researchers Howson and Shemilt (2011), which has been influential in the extended writing movement’s discourse, has noted that sophisticated historical argument tends to be driven by ‘colligatory generalisations’ (p.73) such as the ‘the scientific revolution’; ‘The Second Indian War’; or ‘English colonial policy’.

Here, Howson and Shemilt built on the analytic philosophy of history of W. H. Walsh (1942) who argued that a specifically historical explanation depended on ‘colligation’. The term ‘colligation’ was first coined by the philosopher William Whewell in the mid-nineteenth century and derives from the Latin *colligere* meaning to bring things together (McCullagh, 2011, p.152). According to McCullagh, ‘Walsh’s greatest contribution to analytical philosophy of history has been the identification of colligatory terms and the investigation of their functions in historical writing’ (p.267). This is the definition of ‘colligation’ I will be using as opposed to how it is defined in the SFL tradition. For systemic functional linguists, ‘colligation’ tends to mean the attraction between a lexical item (e.g. the verb ‘budge’) and a grammatical category (e.g. the modal auxillary ‘will/won’t’ (‘won’t budge’)) (Hoey, 2005; Lehecka, 2015; Stubbs, 2001; Tognini-Bonelli, 2001). The concept of colligation in the SFL

Figure 2.3. Examples of colligation to summarise causal debates in the historiography of the Salem.

Colligated causes **in bold**

New books come out regularly, each with their explanations of what happened: it was **a religious crisis, an outbreak of ergot poisoning** (or encephalitis or Lyme disease), **the result of a land squabble in Salem Village, an outbreak of frontier war hysteria**, **a misogynist statement of patriarchy**. So, it is not without considerable humility that I now offer this book... In many ways, the Bay Colony was a wonder – a great success story of the establishment and growth of a prosperous colony. Yet by the 1690s **growing tensions were developing across Massachusetts.** A range of factors, including **a new charter and government**, **a lethal frontier war**, and **a decline in religious fervour**, would serve as kindling for a bonfire in 1692. If Massachusetts was the tinder box, Salem was the match, and **the religious and political conflict that consumed it** made it ripe for a witch hunt (Baker, 2015, pp. 6 & 9-10).

It would be impossible to review all of the answers historians have offered to this question. The most persuasive have pointed to **the economic, political, social and religious turmoil into which New England was plunged at the end of the seventeenth century**; to **New Englanders' beliefs that the turmoil from which they suffered had resulted from their fall from grace as God's chosen people**, thereby making them vulnerable to a 'conspiracy of witches and the Devil', to **the mistreatment of the Salem Village youngsters who first fell victim to some form of psychic, if not spiritual, affliction**, promoting **uncontrollable fear on the part of some** and **fraud on the part of others**; to **the Court's inappropriate use of evidence in hearings for the accused against which there was hardly any defence**; to **inordinate pressure brought to bear upon the accused to confess and name their accomplices in order to escape almost certain execution** and, finally, to **the failure of authorities to act earlier and more decisively when serious questions were raised regarding the conduct of the Court**. These explanations are central to this book (Le Beau, 1998, p. ix).

How did the idealistic Bay Colony arrive – three generations after its founding – in such a dark place? Nearly as many theories have been advanced to explain the Salem witch trials as the Kennedy assassination. Our first true-crime story has been attributed to **generational, sexual, economic, ecclesiastical, and class tensions**; **regional hostilities imported from England; food poisoning**; **a hothouse religion in a cold climate**; **teenage hysteria**; **fraud, taxes, conspiracy**; **political instability**; **trauma induced by Indian attacks**; and to witchcraft itself, among the more reasonable theories. You can blame **atmospheric conditions**, or simply **the weather**: Historically, witchcraft accusations tended to spike in late winter. Over the years various parties have played the villain, some more convincingly than others (Schiff, 2015, p.4).

Three hundred years later, explanations for this turbulent episode have proliferated. Adapting approaches from psychology, cultural geography, anthropology, and gender studies, scholars have implicated a host of causes: **Puritan narrow-mindedness**; **hallucinations caused by ergot poisoning**; **conflict between rival socio-economic factions**; **hysteria brought on by the actual existence of practising witches**; **quarrels among neighbours over social obligations**; **restrictive child-rearing practices and family dynamics**; **external political threats from English colonial policy**; **anxiety's about women's ownership of property**; and **the warfare between colonists and Native Americans** (Latner, 2006, p.92).

tradition might also apply to multi-word phrases. For example, the phrase 'naked eye' is often preceded by a preposition and a definite article (e.g. 'to the naked eye') (Sinclair, 1998, p.15).

Colligation in Walsh's sense enables the historian to condense and organise vast swathes of historical data, allowing pithy summaries and the interrelations of key themes in writing. According to Kuukkanen (2015), 'colligatory concepts seem to be like shorthand for organising historical data' (p.107). For example, in the historiography of the Salem witch trials historians often use dense colligation when summarising the debates regarding the causes of the crisis (Figure 2.3.). For instance, Baker (2015) used colligations such a 'misogynist statement of patriarchy', 'an outbreak of frontier war hysteria', and 'a decline in religious fervour' when encapsulating historians' arguments regarding the causes of the Salem witch trials (pp.6-10).

For example, Demos (2008) used colligation to summarise the debates and begin prioritising their persuasiveness:

> Divine retribution. Fraud. Class conflict. Village factionalism. Mental illness. Cultural provincialism. Vulnerable children. Hysteria. Political repression. Shifting social boundaries. Actual witchcraft. Approaching capitalism. Ergot poisoning. Patriarchal privilege. Encephalitis. Fear of Indians.
>
> One inevitable, irrepressible question, with many different answers. Yet the answers are not of equal weight; indeed, some can be discarded completely. Forget class conflict. Forget ergotism. Forget encephalitis. The match with the evidence is too weak to support any of them (p.213).

Pronounced colligation enables the historian in one or two paragraphs to summarise the theses of dozens of works of academic literature and popular interpretations of a centuries-wide historiography which may be discussed at length elsewhere in the text (e.g. 'divine retribution' (Hale, 1702); 'fraud' (Hutchinson, 1764; Rosenthal, 1993); 'class conflict'

(Bancroft, 1854); ‘village factionalism’ (Boyer & Nissenbaum, 1976; Upham, 1867); ‘mental illness’ (Beard, 1882); ‘cultural provincialism’ (Adams, 1921; Parrington, 1930); ‘vulnerable children’ (Caulfield, 1943); ‘hysteria’ (Hansen, 1970; Starkey, 1949); ‘political repression’ (Miller, 1988); ‘shifting social boundaries’ (Erikson, 1966); ‘actual witchcraft’ (Hansen, 1970); ‘approaching capitalism’ (Boyer & Nissenbaum, 1976); ‘ergot poisoning’ (Caporael, 1976; Mattosian, 1982); ‘patriarchal privilege’ (Karlsen, 1989); ‘Encephalitis’ (Carlson, 1999); ‘fear of Indians’ (Norton, 2002).

Such examples by Demos (2008) display conspicuous colligation in which the historians encapsulate countless actions and dispositions by the historical agents in the Salem witch craze. For example, (*Q*) ‘village factionalism’ might encompass any number of lower-level generalisations constituted by countless events such as the Parris-Porter family feuds over whether: (*x*) to develop commercial links with Salem Town and beyond to the east or rely on Salem Village’s agriculture to the west; (*y*) Salem Village should become religiously independent with its own ‘full’ church and ordained minister separate from Salem Town or; (*z*) once a separate church was achieved in 1689, to support the ordained ministry of Samuel Parris in Salem Village, including whether to pay his wages from 1691 (Boyer and Nissenbaum, 1976). By bringing together a collection of happenings *x, y,* and *z* and colligating them as *Q* we can speak pithily and collectively about *x, y,* and *z* (Dray, 1959).

According to some of its theorists, colligation should not be synonymous with ‘generalisation’ or ‘grouping’. For example, McCullagh (1978) argued:

> there is a fine but important line to be drawn between proper names of historical processes or periods which are colligatory and those which are not. Those which are colligatory refer to a concept of the whole which is not merely the sum of its parts. Others name a collection of events but leave quite open the question whether the collection is unified or not (pp.278-279).

Figure 2.4. Example the colligation (*Q*) of individual actions/lower-level generalisations *x, y,* and *z.*

x. believed the “afflicted” girls (Ray, 2015, p.46)

+

y. disregarded legal precedent in failing to require the complainants to post a monetary bond with their complaints, which was mandatory in all capital cases (Ray, 2015, pp.66-67)

+

z. conducted the preliminary hearings not in private but in public before large and prejudicial crowds (Ray, 2015, pp.66-67)

=

Q. zeal of the Salem magistrates in 1692 (Ray, 2015, pp.66-67)

For example, a generalisation such as ‘the magistrates’ attitudes and actions’ would not qualify as a colligation because while it groups these men’s outlooks and activities, it provides no indication of a shared policy or disposition. By contrast, ‘zeal of the Salem magistrates in 1692’ unifies the magistrates’ behaviour in terms of their shared disposition of zealousness (Ray, 2015, pp.66-67; Figure 2.4.).

Furthermore, colligation should ‘constitute an identifiable whole which is more than just the sum of its parts’ (McCullagh, 1978, p.283). For Cebik (1969):

> the colligation of events (and/or conditions) *x*, *y*, and *z* as a *Q* allows one to see *x*, *y*, and *z* as one could not seem them before, i.e., logically prior to the colligation. Colligation adds something, but not new empirical information. Rather, it adds (or perhaps better, it changes) a conceptual framework, a kind of discourse (p.45).

For example, by colligating the believing of the afflicted, the failure to demand bonds, and the holding of examinations in public as ‘zeal of the magistrates’, Ray ‘both sums the individual events and tells us how to take them’ (Walsh, 1974, pp.136-137). In so doing, the historian might impose categoreal understandings (placing an object into a category under a conceptual framework) onto the configurational (selecting and narrative ordering of individual events) (Dray, 2006). In short, the colligation should ‘illuminate’ the colligated facts by making them ‘intelligible’ in a way they were not prior to being colligated by providing a generalisation that points toward a causal explanation (Walsh, 1942, pp.133-135; 1974, pp.140-141).

Furthermore, in the English history teacher research tradition, Counsell (1997) likewise identified students’ difficulty in distinguishing between ‘big points’ (the abstracted generalisation that forms the point of argument in each paragraph) and ‘little points’ (supporting evidence that substantiates the overarching point). Similar ideas have been proffered by Palek (2015) who focused on the relationship between literacy and the construction of substantive abstractions and Fordham (2016b) who explored the necessarily interpretative nature of such abstractions. Although they present it largely as a disciplinary rather than linguistic issue, these two traditions within the discourse of the extended writing movement bear striking similarity to many genre theorists' suggestion for more explicit focus on nominalisation. These separate identifications of students' difficulty in creating generalised abstractions indicate certain commonalities that suggest at least some duplication of labour.

Similarly, echoing some genre theorists' suggestion that historical discourse often 'buries' overt causal language, Lee and Shemilt (2009) identified the tendency in historical discourse to bury the analytical 'ductwork' (pp.42-49) of causal analysis. Equally, in the history teacher researcher tradition, there has been a trend starting with Woodcock (2005) in attempting to endow students with this type of causation-specific vocabulary to allow the characterisation and prioritisation of causes. As with the case of nominalisation, despite the clear scope for meaningful collaboration, there has been little attempt hitherto to combine the extended writing movement's focus on the disciplinary and the genre theorists' lexicogrammatical technology to support students' arguments when constructing complex, nominalised abstractions and the causal relationships between them in historical prose (Carroll, 2016a).

For example, some in the extended writing movement argue students should be made aware of the causal roles historians ascribe such as 'conditions', 'precipitants', and 'triggers' (e.g. Counsell, Foster, McConnell, and Burn, 2019, p.25). For instance, Baker (2015) argued 'many preconditions led to the Salem outbreak' (pp.123-135). Here, 'conditions' are descriptions of a situation at the beginning of a process of change (Suganami, 2011). A description of conditions allows more direct 'causes' to be placed in a broader historical context (Evans, 1997; Topolski, 1991). According to Gaddis (2002), ‘causes always have contexts, and to know the former we must under the latter’ (p.97). For example, Norton (2002) argued regarding the importance of the condition of the Puritan New Englander mentality:

> The wartime context could well have influenced the onset of those fits – that the afflicted first accused an Indian of tormenting them certainly suggests as much – but more important than such plausible, if not wholly provable, origins was the long-term impact of the young women’s charges in the context of Puritan New Englanders’ belief system (pp.296-297).

‘Conditions’ constrain but do not necessarily determine human agency in that they inform repetitious behaviours and occurrences (Gaddis, 2002; Førland, 2004; Hewitson, 2015; Maza, 2017). They are often supra-personal, collective factors couched in conceptual or even statistical terms and, therefore, tend to privilege analyses of circumstances rather than actions (Furay & Gardiner, 1961; Megill, 2007; Stone, 1987). Consequently, conditions tend to be ‘structural’ in that they often pertain to gradual trends in geography, demography, economy, technology, ideology, institutions, culture, society, or politics (Fulbrook, 2002). Conditions can be concrete (e.g. a bureaucratic institution) or abstract (e.g. a prevailing ideology). Conditions may be ‘latent’ or ‘underlying’ in the sense that contemporaries might not have been aware of the condition affecting their circumstances (Gottschalk, 1954; Suganami, 2011; Tosh, 2006). Conditions such as military conflicts and *mentalités* tend to be long-term and slow moving and therefore ‘remote’ in the sense that they might begin far beyond the phenomenon to be explained (Conkin, 1974; Smith, 2011; Stone, 1979; Tranøy,1962; Van Bouwel & Weber, 2008; Weingartner, 1961). Conditions can also exist simultaneously and after the consequence being explained. As Bloch (1963) observed, conditions ‘make possible’ the consequence but also ‘precede’ and ‘outlast’ it (p.192). For example, Norton referred to the conditions of King William’s War (1688-97) which began four years before the witch trials but continued after the witch crisis for a further five years. According to Marwick, ‘structural, ideological, and institutional circumstances both establish the possibilities that there are for change and set the constraints which inhibit that change’ (p.204).

For instance, Boyer and Nissenbaum (1976) noted the importance of the pre-existing, structural circumstances of Salem Village’s geography, economy, and political structure:

> The inner tensions that shaped the Puritan temper were inherent in it from the very start, but rarely did they emerge with such raw force as in 1692, in little Salem Village. For here was a community in which tensions were exacerbated by a tangle of external circumstances: a community so situated geographically that its inhabitants experienced two economic systems, two different ways of life, at unavoidably close range; and so structured politically that it was next to impossible to locate, either within the Village or outside it, a dependable and unambiguous centre of authority which might hold in check the effects of these accidents of geography (p.181).

Historians might deem conditions to be ‘necessary’ prerequisites in the sense that without the particular condition, the particular consequence could not have occurred (Atkinson, 1978; Barzun & Graff, 1985; Cohen, 1942; Evans, 1997; Frankel, 1957; Gallie, 1964; Stanford, 1994; Topolski, 1991). Stanford (1998), for example, noted ‘a necessary condition does not guarantee the result; it only guarantees that the result cannot occur without it’ (p.87). Norton (2002), for instance, argued ‘had the Second Indian War on the northeastern frontier somehow been avoided, the Essex County witchcraft crisis of 1692 would not have occurred’ (pp.296-297).

Some historians distinguish ‘conditions’ from direct ‘causes’ with the latter brining the consequence into effect. In his taxonomy of historical causes, Stone (1979) differentiated conditions from ‘precipitants’ which, in his view, make an event probable and tend to be medium-term (Fischer, 1970). In the historiography of the Salem witch trials, for instance, Ray (2015) employed such a characterisation when arguing ‘the conflict between Samuel Parris and his opponents precipitated fears of witchcraft’ (pp.188-200). Others in the field of production, however, use ‘precipitant’ equivalently with what Stone termed as ‘triggers’: immediate occasioning causes or ‘releasers’ which set the consequence in motion (Gay, 1974, p.11; Atkinson, 1974; Gottschalk, 1954; Tranøy, 1962; White, 1965). For example, Schiff (2015) argued ‘there had been New England witch trials before, but none precipitated by a cohort of bewitched adolescent and preadolescent girls’ (p.10). Similarly, for Breslaw (1996) the impact of [Tituba’s] confession triggered the witchhunt that defied all past experience with witchhunting in New England’ (p.117). In other words, triggers are sufficient (in combination with all the other conditions) for the occurrence of the particular consequence and therefore represent the terminal phase in a causal sequence (Evans, 1997; Froeyman, 2009; Gaddis, 2002; Gallie, 1964; Gardiner, 1961; Marwick, 2001; Munslow, 2000; Scriven, 1966; Stanford, 1994, 1998; Topolski, 1991; Tucker, 2009). Direct causes (such as Abigail Williams and Betty Parris’ accusations or Tituba’s confession), unlike latent conditions, tend to be manifestly visible actions by individuals or small groups (Marius & Page, 2007).

Furthermore, an existing tradition exists in the discourse of the extended writing movement of encouraging students to employ metaphor when characterising causal roles in the manner of academic historians. For example, when summarising history teachers’ curricular theorisation regarding causal arguments, Counsell, Foster, McConnell and Burn (2019) noted many have managed to:

> develop analogies or metaphors to show pupils the difference between different types of causes. For example, a barrel of gunpowder is often used for the underlying conditions of Europe in the years prior to 1914, the match is the assassination and the fuse the triggering of the alliance system by the decisions of the ‘July Days’ (p.27).

For example, in the historiography of the Salem witch trials we encounter dramatic metaphors such as ‘centre stage’ (Hoffer, 1996, p.103); ‘dramatic act’ (Breslaw, 1996, pp.105-106); ‘players in the drama’ (Baker, 2015, p.10); ‘set the stage’ (Baker, 2015, p.23); ‘stage-managed’ (Ray, 2015, p.46); and ‘starring role’ (Hoffer, 1996, p.106).

A further salient example of this duplication of labour has been the two discourses' similar approaches to making students alert to the 'constructedness' of historical texts, with the intention that this type of analysis will make the argumentative nature of written historical discourse more explicit. The genre theorist Coffin (1996) recommended approaches to allow students to discern the grammatical means by which school history authors (especially textbook writers) 'colour' texts to position the reader to see an argument from the writer's viewpoint. By showing students these 'colouring' techniques, Coffin argued that students will come to recognise school history textbooks as works of interpretation and will be less likely to accept such texts at face value. Coffin identified a number of 'colouring strategies' that textbook writers adopt including tacitly expressing ideological perspective by adopting language affect, judgement and evaluation; and using language that effaces the writer as interpreter and submerges processes of deduction (Unsworth, 1999). Furthermore, Coffin recommended that students be made aware of how interpretation is obscured through nominalisation (when multiple events are repackaged as an abstracted noun). In this view, such nominalised generalisation (such as 'period of lawlessness' as opposed to 'period of resistance') often means interpretations become naturalised as deceptively objective.

In some senses, history teachers in the extended writing movement have developed strikingly similar methods to attempt to alert students to the fact that all works of history are results of interpretation – representing an example of convergent evolution. For example, a number of practising and former history teachers (e.g. Burnham & Brown, 2009; Carroll, 2016a; Counsell, 2011b; Fordham, 2016b) have advocated making children aware of how colligatory generalisations tread the penumbra between the substantive and the disciplinary and must therefore be deconstructed as historical interpretations. Genre theorists and the extended writing movement have therefore occasionally – and independently – arrived at similar solutions (e.g. encouraging students to identify the interpretative quality of historical texts (e.g. Counsell, 2003)). This type of convergent evolution has meant that opportunities have been missed to co-construct knowledge regarding extended historical writing and has resulted in a duplication of exceedingly similar ‘innovations’.

Similarly, genre theorists are concerned with empowering students with subject-specific lexis (Christie & Derewianka, 2008). History teachers in the extended writing movement have also focused on atomised vocabulary (e.g. causal connectives (Bakalis, 2003, p.22); superlatives and adjectives (Ward, 2006, p.11); causal and temporal connectives (Counsell, 1997, p.16); and verbs focused on causation (Woodcock, 2005, p.9)). Within this lexical focus, there has been further evidence of convergent evolution. For example, history teachers have advocated highlighting the inferential nature of discussing evidence through using distancing verbs such as ‘suggest’ (Carlisle, 2000; Murray, 2015; Smith, 2001; Wiltshire 2000). This lexical focus is strikingly analogous to some genre theorists’ suggestion that students be encouraged to adopt ‘showing processes’ such as ‘suggest’ and ‘indicate’ (Christie & Derewianka, 2008, pp.120-122). Similarly, both history teacher-researchers (e.g. Counsell, 2004a, p.22) and genre theorists (e.g. Coffin, 2006) have advocated using modal verbs to indicate to students the tentative nature of historical claims. In terms of supporting students’ vocabulary then, there also appears to be evidence of wastage due to lack of communication between the two discourses.

2.1.2.3. Parallel/divergent evolution

Finally, in some instances the two discourses have evolved in parallel or indeed veered from the other. This *parallel* and/or *divergent evolution* has manifested itself in a number of ways resulting in hitherto undetected – and therefore unresolved – tensions between the two discourses. If left unsettled these discrepancies have the potential to ultimately result in unresolvable disagreements and missed opportunities to marry the two discourses because there will be little in terms of commonly shared constructions of knowledge on which to hang the debates.

What has largely distinguished genre theorists has been their advocacy of explicitly focusing on teaching students how to construct meaning at a level that has hitherto been generally underexplored by the extended writing movement - by combining words together at the lexicogrammatical level of the sentence or clause (Coffin, 2006; Martin, 2007; Christie & Derewianka, 2008; Schleppegrell, 2011; Donaghy, 2013; Foster, 2015 provides an exception and possible nascent example of convergent evolution). There is scope for the extended writing movement to build on the pre-existing knowledge of genre theory and consider how students may be made more alert to how historical meaning is constructed at the lexicogrammatical level (Carroll, 2016b).

One exception to this general trend has been some members of the extended writing movement's recommendations that students be taught to construct counterfactual conditionals to characterise and prioritise causes similarly to academic historians (e.g. Chapman, 2003; Worth, 2013). For example, when explaining why the Salem witch trials of 1692 occurred Ray (2015) argued:

> if the magistrates had initially decided not to act on the girls' accusations, the legal processes would never have started, and Salem would hold a very different place in America's historical self-consciousness (pp.66-67).

Statements such as Ray's can be referred to as a counterfactual, contrary-to-fact, or subjunctive conditional (Ritter, 1986, pp.70-71). A counterfactual is a conditional where the antecedent (in this example, the term following 'if') runs counter to the facts (Bulhof, 1999). So, while the magistrates acting on the girls' accusations is a fact, the magistrates *not* acting is a counter-fact from which Ray speculated hypothetical effects (e.g. the legal process would not have started). Paradigm examples of counterfactuals include 'would' although other constructions are possible (Nolan, 2013). For example, ‘might’ can be used such as when Baker (2015) argued:

> one wonders what would have happened had Parris and the judges not coerced Tituba into confession. The Salem witchcraft outbreak might conceivably have been limited to three people – a fairly typical case of no particular note, and certainly not a pivotal moment in American history (p.156).

Counterfactuals are modal in the sense that they describe possibilities. In this example, it is possible that Parris, Hathorne, and Corwin could not have forced Tituba to confess.

The aforementioned history teachers often recommended what Megill (2007) deemed ‘restrained counterfactuals’: the type of counterfactuals most often found in traditional, ‘serious’ histories (pp.151-156; Bulhof, 1999, p.168; Black, 2015; Evans, 2014; Ritter, 1986). ‘Restrained’ counterfactuals move from an actual, observed effect and hypothesise how the consequence might not have come to pass, or come to pass in a different way. The restrained counterfactualist then identifies hypothesised constituent causes and mentally removes one of the operative factors, speculating about the residual in order to assess the causal importance of the removed cause (Stanford, 1986). The examples by Ray (2015) and Baker (2015) are both examples of ‘restrained’ counterfactuals because they speculate how a known consequence (the Salem witch trials) might have differed had a hypothesised cause (such as the Salem magistrates’ credulity or Tituba’s confession) been different.

Furthermore, some history teachers (e.g. Carroll, 2016b) have suggested using counterfactuals to highlight to students how historians ascribe ‘necessity’ – meaning ‘that without which not’ - to causes (Stanford, 1994, pp.202-204; Kaye, 2010). According to Black (2015), counterfactualism ‘makes explicit the practice of research and writing of thinking in counterfactual terms before establishing and arguing that something was decisive or an absolutely necessary precondition for something else’ (p.197). To return to Ray’s (2015) counterfactual, the historian argued that the magistrates' initial legitimation of the girls' claims was a prerequisite for the crisis that ensued.

Furthermore, some teachers (e.g. Chapman, 2003; Carroll, 2018) have suggested students be made to see that counterfactualism is a heuristic by which historians prioritise causes by relative causal importance. In this view, such prioritisation is achieved by assessing how the presence or absence of a particular cause might have altered the final outcome and the path-dependent interplay of the other causal factors (Black, 2015; Bulhof, 1999; Stanford, 1986, 1994). Maar (2014), for instance, argued that 'the most solid answer to the question of the utility of counterfactual thought experiments with respect to actual history has to do with the weighting of causes – and this is undeniably an activity performed by actual historians' (p.93). For example, when stressing its importance in contributing to the events in Salem Norton (2002) argued 'had the Second Indian War on the northeastern frontier somehow been avoided, the Essex witchcraft crisis of 1692 would not have occurred' (pp.296-297).

Some history teachers in England have also recommended that the counterfactuals be taught in conjunction with what amounts to Mill's (1843) 'method of difference' (e.g. Buxton 2010, 2016; Carroll, 2018). This method is designed to prioritise non-trivial causes via a process of eliminative induction distinguishing the causal from the incidental (Baldwin, 2004; Barraclough, 1991; Bloch, 1953; Cohen & O'Connor, 2004; Fredrickson, 1980; Haupt, 2007; Lorenz, 1987; Mackie, 1974; Miller, 2004; Paul, 2015; Ritter, 1986; Sewell, 1967). In this 'method', a 'positive' case in which the phenomenon to be explained and the hypothesised cause are present is contrasted with another 'negative' case where the phenomenon and cause are both absent but in all other aspects the case is overarchingly similar (Berger, 2003; Hewitson, 2015; Skocpol & Somers, 1980). In other words, the historian aims 'to match the exceptional effect (which is what usually calls for explanation) with an exceptional cause' (Stanford, 1998, p.139). The logic can be encapsulated as there are two cases: a positive one where A, B, C, D, and E are present and F does happen. The other is a negative case where A, B, C, and D are always present and F never happens. In such a scenario, the historian might ask counterfactually whether F would have happened had E not happened (Stanford 1994, pp.198-99; Figure 2.5.).

Figure 2.5. Mill's 'method of difference' (1843).

	Positive case	**Negative Case**
Causes	**A**	**A**
	B	**B**
	C	**C**
	D	**D**
	E	***Not E***
Consequence	**F**	***Not F***

Overall similarities

Crucial difference

For example, Boyer and Nissenbaum (1974) argued:

> If [Salem Village] had enjoyed anything like political parity with the Town, their political impulses might have found meaningful expression, and their grievances at least partial resolution…The contrast here between Salem and other towns which experienced similar separatist conflicts in these years is striking. In Dedham, Massachusetts, for example, no fewer than five distinct outlying communities managed early in the eighteenth century to form ad hoc political alliances with each other which enabled them to manoeuvre very effectively in the arena of Dedham politics…If any one of these circumstances had been significantly different, it is possible that Salem would be remembered today simply as the oldest town in the colony, and as the home of Nathaniel Hathorne – not as the site of one of the most notorious events in New England history (pp.107-109).

Here, Boyer and Nissenbaum paired an exceptional cause (Salem Village's semi-autonomous status from Salem Town) to an exceptional event (the Salem witch crisis). They did this by comparing their positive case with a negative one (Dedham) which was similar to Salem

Village but had more independence and, as a consequence according to this line of argument, did not experience a crisis.

Not only have opportunities for fruitful collaboration been missed, the two discourses have also in certain instances developed in directly antithetical ways. Due to the genre theorists' debt to Halliday, some teachers are 'utterly convinced' (e.g. Donaghy, 2013) that the metalanguage of functional grammar should be used in classrooms. This is opposed to the discourse for discussing language used in formal, traditional grammar which currently predominates. The metalanguage of functional grammar seeks to emphasise how meaning is made beyond the atomised level of the word. Some genre theorists then, for example, advocate substituting 'verb' with 'process'; 'subjects and objects' with 'participants'; 'topic sentence' with 'hypertheme; and 'introduction' with 'macrotheme' (Coffin, 2006, p.121; Donaghy, 2013). This elaborate metalanguage is so crucial to SFL pedagogy that '"Sydney School"' literacy programmes in fact involve doubling the instructional discourse, since disciplines are factored as systems of genres (and thus of field, tenor, mode constellations and of their realisation in language and attendant non-verbal modalities of communication)' (Martin, 2007, p.56). Martin (2007) suggested that teachers, who are often not linguists by training, find the array of technicalisation associated with SFL 'a shock', and it is for this reason that they choose to forego adopting genre-based pedagogies. Instead, in Martin's view, teachers are content to prevaricate in adopting genre theory because 'the new knowledge about language required costs time and therefore money, teachers are busy, and stratified learning outcomes are blamed on the ability levels of individual students' (p.58). The development of this elaborate metalanguage, as conceded by some genre theorists, has helped shape their cultural identity but has also, unintentionally, served an exclusionary function (Becher, 1993). Not only has the language become highly technicalised, but it is also increasingly redundant to the history teachers in England who have developed their own metalanguage which is more specifically designed to their requirements. Only once genre theorists examine history teachers' discourse and make a connection with it might such ultimately redundant avenues be avoided.

A particularly instructive example of divergent evolution is the recommendation by some genre theorists (e.g. Christie and Derewianka, 2008) of students 'testing and evaluating' the 'reliability', 'truthfulness' and 'bias' of historical sources (pp.89 & 140-141). In order to exemplify a 'benchmark' (pp.5-6) 'well-developed text' representative 'of the most demanding of the history genres' (p.139) Christie and Derewianka suggested a student commendably judged the historian Martin Gilbert as:

> having great expertise: 'he is a distinguished historian who was a Fellow at Merton College Oxford'. Because of his training in historical investigation, his views can be considered 'reliable'. However, as a 'Jew' and an 'expert on the Holocaust' his account could be regarded as 'biased' (p.144).

By contrast, in the extended writing movement responses similar to this have not only been considered achievable for students of lower age groups – they have actually been considered reductive, imitative and fundamentally anti-historical. As Fordham (2014a) suggested, among the published history teacher research community in England, pedagogies that valorise this type of source analysis have been 'criticised consistently, coherently and relentlessly since Lang's 1993 article "'What is bias?"' Far from conceptualising examples such as the one above as a curricular goal for her 11-year-old students Le Cocq (2000), expounding on Lang, rejected her pupils' similar responses as unsuitably reductive for the age group. Instead, Le Cocq aimed for her students to 'avoid the formulaic, low-level responses that are often parroted in response to any source deemed "untrustworthy"' (p.51). In this view, the ascription of such value to responses which offer what is deemed to be seemingly trite, mechanical and non-evaluative responses to historiography by pedagogies such as genre theory is inappropriate. It would appear that if genre theorists wish to make a more meaningful contribution to history teachers’ practice, then they need to be more receptive to the trends currently driving the extended writing movement. Without doing so, the recommendations of genre theorists may be deemed irrelevant to history teachers’ needs.

2.2. Epistemic explanations for divergent evolution in discourses regarding students’ extended historical writing in England

In terms of their respective curricular theorisation, some representatives of both genre theory (e.g. Christie, 1985, 2007; Schleppegrell, 2011) and the extended writing movement (Fordham, 2016) have been influenced by the work of Basil Bernstein (1981, 1986). Bernstein devised a model for the creation of pedagogic knowledge, arising from the actions of specialised agents in three distinct settings. First, new knowledge is created in the field of ‘production’ which usually occurs in academic contexts. To be practicable for the purposes of schooling, however, all academic knowledge must be transformed into pedagogic knowledge and be de-located (the selective reappropriation of a part of the academic discourse from the field of production) and re-located. This process takes place within the field of ‘recontextualisation’. The final field is that of ‘reproduction’ where a pedagogic practice takes place in schools (Bernstein, 2000, pp. 113–114). Some genre theorists have increasingly adopted this Bernsteinian framework, with Schleppegrell (2011), for example, noting that ‘the current dialogue between Systemic Functional linguists (SFL) and Bernsteinian sociologists focuses attention in new ways on how features of the knowledge itself shape its recontextualisation for purposes of schooling’ (p. 98; e.g. Christie 2007).

Similarly, Fordham (2016) has characterised the curriculum theorisation of the extended writing movement as an exercise in ‘recontextualisation’ (p. 147). This recontextualisation is of a distinctive type which operates in the Stenhousian tradition by strongly emphasising curriculum construction and evaluation in teacher research (Counsell, 2011; Stenhouse, 1975). Fordham has described these teachers' processes of curriculum design as the 'working out of [the] disciplinary boundaries of a subject at a pedagogical site' (p. 136). In doing so, these teachers have created a collective, portable knowledge that has furnished teachers with commonly held constructs for theorising historical argument.

Despite certain goals held in common by genre theorists and the history teachers' extended writing movement the two discourses have tended to talk past one another, resulting in wastage, incoordination and replication in resourcing (Carroll, 2017a). One possible reason for these divergent discourses is that inter-discursive communication is difficult owing to fundamental epistemic differences regarding what the curricular goals regarding students' extended writing should be (Becher, 1993). In particular, while some representatives of both genre theory and the extended writing movement have acknowledged debts to the Bernsteinian model, in practice an unidentified tension has developed between the two discourses. Genre theorists appear to have predominantly focused on the field of reproduction in the form of 'school history'. By contrast, the extended writing movement have seemingly concentrated on the field of recontextualisation of historical academic knowledge while also conceptualising the school classroom as a potential site of academic production in its own right. A variety of unrecognised and therefore unresolved tensions have emerged between genre theorists and the extended writing movement in England in terms of how best to teach students to write historically as a result of this bifurcated epistemic starting point.

In the remainder of this literature review, rather than attempting to provide a comparison of the relative efficacies of the two discourses' recommendations, first I will compare their curricular conceptions and provide a theoretical critique of the limits of genre theorists' focus on the field of reproduction from the perspective of the extended writing movement's realisation of the Bernsteinian model (Carroll, 2019). I will concentrate on a core group of the extended writing movement who in practice have predominantly focused

Figure 2.6. Christie & Derewianka's (2008) topological description of genres of school history from childhood to late adolescence.


Chronological
Recording
Empathetic autobiography
Biography
Personal recount
Historical recount
Individualised participants
Generalised participants
Historical account
Cause-and-effect
Non - chronological
Setting in space
Site study
Site interpretation
Descriptive
Explanatory
Factorial explanation
Period study
Consequential explanation
Setting in time
Rhetorical
History focus
Historical exposition
Historical discussion
One-sided argument
Multi-sided argument
Historiographical exposition
Historiographical discussion
Historiographical focus
Childhood
Late adolescence

Table 2.1. Summary of Coffin’s (2006) taxonomy of school history genres.

	Recording (narrative) genres	***Explaining genres***	***Arguing genres***
Age groups	Years 7-8 (approx. ages 11-13)	Years 9-10 (approx. ages 14-16)	Years 11-13 (approx. ages 16-18)
Key characteristics	• Record past events • Organised chronologically • Mono-causal • ‘Everyday’ lexis • Concrete participants	• Explain why past events occurred • Organised rhetorically • Multi-causal • Specialised lexis • Nominalised participants, whereby events (normally expressed as verbs) and logical relations (normally expressed as logical connectors such as conjunctions) are packaged as nouns. • Monoglossia (one-voicedness) – only the author’s interpretation is reported • Presented as declarative, ‘categorical, objective facts rather than a set of propositions that have to be argued for’. • Modality is avoided • Eschew attitudinal lexis • Hide the interpersonal metafunction • Solidarity between reader and writer assumed	• Argue over competing interpretations of why past events occurred • Organised rhetorically • Multi-causal • Specialised lexis • Nominalised participants • Heteroglossia (multi-voicedness) – different interpretations operate and are reported in relation to the author’s own. • Purpose of arguing ‘for’ or ‘against’ a particular interpretation. • Process of interpretation made explicit • Indicate a finely graded continuum of probability through the use of modality • Adopt attitudinal lexis • Foreground the interpersonal metafunction • Less categorical and more open to debate • Foreground the debateable nature of historical knowledge

their attention on the field of recontextualisation. In primarily basing their curricular theorisation on what in their view are the defining characteristics of academic scholarship, many have implicitly operated with a theoretical assumption that historical writing is always argumentative. What unites this group is a shared insistence that a sustained focus on historical argument is required to develop students' historical writing. Although these predominantly English published history teachers, former history teachers who have been active in publication, and education researchers would not recognise themselves by such a term, for the remainder of this literature review this largely teacher-led sub-set of the extended writing movement will be referred to as 'sustained argumentalists'. Finally, I will argue that until the participants of these discourses resolve these implicit tensions and identify commonly held curricular goals regarding what students should be aiming to achieve in their extended writing, current trends in wastage of resourcing may continue indefinitely (Kuhn, 1970).

2.2.1. Genre theorists' taxonomies of school history genres

Genre-based pedagogies are founded in the patterning of predetermined genres that genre theorists have identified in school history, only some of which are non-argumentative. Beginning with Martin (2002), a number of genre theorists have created history-specific taxonomies of the most common school history genres for each stage of schooling (Christie & Derewianka, 2008; Figure 2.6.; Coffin 2006, Table 2.1.; Martin & Rose 2003, Martin & Rose, 2008). Christie and Derewianka, for example, recommended three 'families' of school history genres: 'narrative' (Coffin, 2006, p. 47) or 'chronological' genres; 'non chronological' genres; and 'finally to various types of argumentation in '"later adolescence"'(Christie & Derewianka, 2008, p. 89). Genre theorists such as Coffin (2006) recommended that 'school' history genres such as these should be 'pinned down' (p. 169) and that students, depending on age and circumstance, need to structure their writing according to which genre they wish to produce. Furthermore, some genre theorists often suggest a strict delineation between genres, with Coffin (2006) claiming, for example, that categorical 'explanations' and 'interpretative' arguments have often been 'unhelpfully' conflated (p. 67). Because the majority of these genres are non-argumentative, however, some genre theorists on occasion purposefully separate the discipline of history from the construction of written argument.

2.2.2. Epistemic explanations for divergent evolution

2.2.2.1. How to ensure replicability of one-off products?

For genre theorists then historical teaching should revolve around conditioning students to reproduce target genres and, in this sense, is genre- rather than epistemology-led. Genre theorists place a heavy emphasis on students creating a recognisably patterned and predictable 'product', and the word '(re)produce' punctuates their discourse heavily. For example, one history practitioner advocating this genre-based approach, Donaghy (2013), suggested that when planning new schemes of work with his colleagues, the overriding consideration is 'what do you want the pupils to know about…and which genre(s) do you want them to be able to produce?'. Genres are assumed to be 'prototypical' (Christie & Misson, 1998, p.11) and once students are familiar with them the pupils will become competent in manipulating genres to suit their purposes when charged with completing new tasks.

Contrastingly, sustained argumentalists envisage the construction of individual argument and 'reproduction' as fundamentally incompatible. While similarly emphasising the absolute importance of the final product, sustained argumentalists insist than an initial high level of performance will only be replicable for students in similar but different contexts if they are made cognisant of the historical disciplinary conventions that underpinned the writing's construction. As Counsell (2011a) suggested:

> what makes the product living and usable is the intellectual framework to which it refers and the elements of that framework that its designer deemed critical. Without this, we are forever condemned to erstwhile excellent products that go wrong in transit. They become a twisted proxy for the deeper learning they were designed to express (p.83).

Consequently, sustained argumentalists tend to emphasise the importance in raising metacognition of the entire *process* of historical argument (e.g. Bakalis, 2003; Banham, 1998; Byrom, 1998, Chapman & Facey, 2009; Counsell, 2004a). From this perspective, the 'mere production of a final outcome', no matter how effective in itself, is meaningless if the students 'have learnt nothing' (Evans & Pate, 2007, pp.23-24). This is one issue informing wider scepticism, extending beyond history education, of genre-based pedagogies which have been accused of being 'too concerned with finished texts and not sufficiently concerned with thinking' (Barrs, 2004, p.11). In this view, therefore, the compositional process needs to be problematised historically so that the ability to produce sophisticated written arguments can endure.

2.2.2.2. Hierarchical or cumulative models of progress?

Not only do genre theorists see 'school history' as being sub-divisible into a taxonomy of genres, but some also conceive these genres as being linear, sequential and hierarchical (e.g. Coffin, 2006). In effect, some genre theorists' pedagogies strongly presuppose the feasibility and necessity of creating history curricula with hierarchies of progression based on conceptual change with clear epistemic ascent (Winch, 2013). Coffin suggested that there is a 'trajectory' from the early to later years of schooling whereby students begin with the lesser-valued recording genres before advancing to categorical explanations, until finally progressing to tentative arguments (p.170). What is more, some genre theorists suggest that ‘each genre, to some extent, assumes competency in the previous one’ (Coffin, 2006, p.170), with the earlier, non-argumentative genres being ‘foundational’ (Christie & Derewianka, 2008, p.112). Accordingly, some genre theorists advocate pedagogically instrumentalising this conceptualisation of progression, suggesting that genres should be used as a ‘linguistically informed pedagogical pathway’ (Coffin, 2006, pp.92-93). From this perspective, it is only at ‘adolescence, with all the developing language capacities potentially unleashed’ (Christie & Derewianka, 2008, pp.112-113), that students should ultimately progress to the argumentative ‘rhetorical genres’ which, unlike the earlier text types, involve ‘evaluating significance of events’; ‘evaluating the validity of sources of evidence’; ‘engaging with members of the historical community and alternative perspectives’; ‘acknowledging the constructedness of different historical meanings’; and seeing ‘historical interpretations as provisional rather than categorical’ (Christie & Derewianka, 2008, p.117). As the historiographical genres concentrate more on the abstract and technical tools of historical enquiry, according to this view it is only in mid- to late-adolescence that ‘the more advanced learners’ are eventually ‘inducted’ into ‘the methodologies of the discipline’ (Christie & Derewianka, 2008, p. 116).

Some genre theorists, therefore, place strong emphasis on the necessity of hierarchical progress models. Nonetheless, some genre theorists have also attempted to apply SFL models to Bernstein’s conception of history as a horizontal knowledge structure (Christie, 1985). Bernstein delineated two discrete knowledge structures: ‘hierarchical knowledge structures’ (e.g. physical sciences) and ‘horizontal knowledge structures’ (e.g. arts and humanities) (Bernstein, 2000, p. 161). Hierarchical knowledge structures ‘take the form of a coherent, explicit, and systematically principled structure, hierarchically organised, as in the sciences’ (Bernstein, 1999, p. 151). By contrast, history in this view is a ‘horizontal knowledge structure’, with the consequence that it spawns a number of languages (theoretical lenses) for reasoning the events of the past, with each new language offering possibly new perspectives, questions, connections and speakers. Possible ‘languages’ in history may include the myriad theoretical approaches such as Rankean empiricism, Marxism or post-modernism. These ‘languages’ are not easily relatable and in fact are often incommensurable (Christie, 1985). As a horizontal knowledge structure, history develops as a discipline through the development of these new languages as each new theoretical lens might resonate with contemporary values, perspectives and sensibilities (Schleppegrell, 2011, pp. 199–200). In horizontal knowledge structures, there is less agreement about ‘content’ and more concern instead about development of disciplinary reasoning (Schleppegrell, 2011).

Genre theorists such as Martin (2007) have identified an ‘affinity of Sydney School research with Bernstein’s developing concern with knowledge structure’ (p. 38). Consequently, ‘one goal of the dialogue between Hallidayan linguists and Bernsteinian sociologists has been to explore the challenges in building verticality in the recontextualisation of knowledge for purposes of schooling, especially in disciplines with horizontal knowledge structures’ (Schleppegrell, 2011, pp. 198–199). Genre theorists’ models of progression, however, appear to indicate a lack of consistency in this conceptualisation of history as a horizontal knowledge structure. Instead, genre theorists’ ‘pedagogical pathways’ have often attempted to impose models of progression based on notions of conceptual change more appropriate to hierarchical knowledge structures onto the horizontal/cumulative knowledge structure of the discipline of school history (e.g. Christie & Derewianka, 2008; Coffin, 2006).

Sustained argumentalists have critiqued such models of linearity and their equation toward progress when applied to the discipline of history as they cut across the processes, goals and concerns of history teachers in at least four distinct ways. First, some genre theorists’ hierarchical models are largely based on the assumption that is possible and meaningful to assess progress in ‘skills’ and/or conceptual change. These types of progressions model, however, have been routinely critiqued by some history teachers since they first appeared in the English National Curriculum in the form of ‘Attainment Targets’ (Department for Education & Science, 1991; e.g. Counsell, 2000a; Counsell, 2004a; Brown & Burnham, 2014; Fordham, 2014b). Ever since, some sustained argumentalists have suggested that such models based solely on the assessment of conceptual change are ‘*a priori* going to fail’ when applied to the discipline of history (Fordham, 2014c). This scepticism has been borne from history teachers’ experiences of skills-based and second-order concept-driven hierarchical models over the last twenty-five years. This suspicion of hierarchical models of progress is partly derived from such models’ tendency to promote teach-to-the-mark scheme activities. These activities, some sustained argumentalists have argued, may result in the attributes of the model being demonstrated yet also lead to the models being followed so ‘slavishly’ that they reduce historical thinking to ‘a strange, algorithmic practice, a series of “history skills” and dry routines’ (Counsell, 2011a, p.57). Accordingly, some history teachers’ models often instead presuppose that the defining epistemic characteristic of history as a discipline – that it is a process of argument – be made explicit to students early in their schooling and should be absorbed more consistently, gradually and systematically. This process should be part of their general induction into the discipline alongside intensive exposure both to diverse arguments and to thorough learning of layers of substantive knowledge. This view reflects Stenhouse’s proposition (1975) that ‘one can think in a discipline at elementary as well as advanced levels’ (p.38). In greater congruence with Bernstein’s identification of history as a horizontal knowledge structure, therefore, sustained argumentalists have been sceptical of such strictly hierarchical models of progress, often implicitly adopting cumulative models instead.

Furthermore, hierarchical progression models assessing conceptual change such as the types advocated by some genre theorists have been criticised by sustained argumentalists due to such models' apparent dismissiveness of substantive knowledge. In this view, history is not a collection of facts, but a 'structured field of knowledge' where there are intricate interrelationships between its factual elements, its epistemic status and its relations structured by language (Counsell, 2000a). From this perspective, the history teacher 'shuttles between representations of the material that the discipline studies (substantive knowledge) and induction into the tradition of epistemic rules that made such representations possible (disciplinary knowledge)' (Counsell, 2016b; Schwab, 1978). In terms of this model's implications for extended historical writing, a number of sustained argumentalists have drawn on empirical research regarding memory by cognitive psychologists (e.g. Brown, Roediger III, & McDaniel, 2014; Willingham, 2010) to argue that once new substantive knowledge is proceduralised and secure in long-term memory, it allows for the assimilation of new substantive and/or disciplinary knowledge. Consequently, some sustained argumentalists have theorised that in essay writing short-term memory can then be applied to the shaping of written argument with language secure in knowledge retention (Counsell, 1997, 2011a; Hammond, 2014; King, 2015). From this perspective, substantive content security has been neglected because it is cumulative rather than hierarchical in nature and therefore does not map neatly onto hierarchical progress models such as those recommended by genre theorists. Those arguing for more systematic learning and recall of substantive knowledge have suggested that the absence of such an emphasis has had continuing negative ramifications for historical extended writing. As a consequence, some sustained argumentalists have instead recommended task-specific mark schemes that explicitly assess substantive as well as disciplinary knowledge (e.g. Fordham, 2014c).

Second, there is growing exasperation among sustained argumentalists at the seemingly dismissive manner which narrative is regarded as a ‘lower-order skill’ (Hawkey, 2006, p.1; Counsell & Mastin, 2014; Foster & Goudie, 2019; Gadd, 2009; Kemp, 2012) due to the fact that much academic history is written in the narrative mode. Lang (2003) in particular railed against the portrayal of ‘mere’ narrative by some teachers, examiners, and policy makers noting ‘it is difficult to think of any subject which so consistently and illogically denigrates its own central activity in the way that school history disregards and even penalises narrative’ (p. 8). Lang noted that narrative is the main mode that academic historians adopt; can be highly analytical, argumentative and interpretative; and can be multi-voiced. From this perspective, which situates school history in the context of the public knowledge of academic scholarship, the portrayals such as genre theorists’ of ‘narrative’ as a foundational lower-order skill is illogical.

Much hinges on how ‘narrative’ is defined. Broadly, narrative can be viewed as a mode which involves the ‘organisation of material in a chronologically sequential order, and the focusing of the content into a single coherent story, albeit with subplots’ (Stone, 1987, pp.74-75). Narrative’s defenders, however, tend to make a further distinction between what Walsh (1958) dubbed ‘plain’ and ‘significant’ narratives. From this perspective, much of the denigration of narrative stems from a failure to distinguish these two manifestations (Hewitson, 2015). While the ‘plain’ narrative aims only to give a description of facts restricted to a straightforward statement of what occurred, the ‘significant’ narrative aims to ‘make clear not only what happened, but why it happened too’ (Atkinson, 1978, p.130; Butterfield, 1968; Munz, 2006; Stanford, 1998). In other words, the ‘significant’ narrative is subject to empirical refutation; constructed rather than repeated; question-focused; purged of irrelevance (where the agreed criterion for relevance is the production of a satisfactory explanation of change); and provides new perspectives on previously asked questions or answers new questions (Carr, 2008; Fulbrook, 2002; McCullagh, 1969).

Third, the genre theorist Coffin (2006) conceded that the ‘jump’ from categorical ‘explanations’ to tentative ‘arguments’ is a ‘challenging shift for many students’ (p.77). From the sustained argumentalists’ perspective, this type of uncertainty for students is the result of models of progression such as those advocated by some genre theorists. In this view, the ‘challenge’ occurs from confusingly – and unnecessarily – shifting the epistemic foundations on which the students had originally been taught to moor their understanding. Counsell (1997) encapsulated this view when she suggested students ‘are poorly served if they are not explicitly taught to construct an argument until the sixth form’ (p.13). From this perspective, teaching students to produce ‘categorical explanations’ as Coffin (2006) recommends – which are presented as objective ‘facts’ rather than a set of propositions to be argued – is confusing for students who then must fundamentally recalibrate what their understanding of the subject is in their later schooling (p.71). In fact, many have argued that a pedagogy that at any point condones portraying the historical endeavour as anything *other* than argument is in fact not history at all (e.g. Chapman & Facey, 2009; Fordham, 2007; Harris, 2001; Husbands, 1996). This stance is derived from the view that a typifying feature of the discipline of ‘history proper’ is argument. As Counsell (2004a) suggested ‘all historical writing has an argumentative edge to some degree. There are different shades of explicitness in that argument, but there is always something to be explained or a case to be made’ (p.100). In these teachers’ view, the idea of intentionally teaching a ‘categorical causal explanation’ which deliberately deemphasises interpretation as Coffin suggested is anti-historical.

Finally, a number of sustained argumentalists have rejected the notion that students seeing history as argumentative is a higher-order accomplishment to which the pupil must ascend (Freedman & Pringle, 1984; Husbands, 1996). Far from being the preserve of ‘advanced learners’ in ‘mid- to late- adolescence’, many of genre theorists’ criteria for the rhetorical ‘argumentative’ genres have been shown to be realisable for far younger and lower-attaining students. For example, specifically in the English context, teachers have typically enabled students aged nine to thirteen to show awareness of the argumentative ‘unresolving dialectic’ of history by articulating degrees of certainty (Megill, 2007, p.2, 2016, p.159; e.g. Bakalis, 2003; Byrom, 1998; Counsell, 2004a; Riley, 1999); arguing a case systematically in a work of extended analytical writing (e.g. Banham, 1998); evaluating historical significance (e.g. Brown & Woodcock, 2009; Counsell, 2004b); evaluating sources in constructing historical accounts (e.g. Banham, 1998; Byrom, 1998; Riley, 1999; Woolley, 2003; Worth, 2016); acknowledging the constructedness of historical meanings (e.g. Brown & Wrenn, 2005; Card, 2004; Howells, 2005; Mastin & Wallace, 2006; Smith, 2016) and engaging in historiographical debates (e.g. Foster, 2011) and methodological issues (e.g. Hammond, 2007). These findings have been replicated internationally, with Wineburg (1991) noting that ‘when we put our assumptions about children’s capabilities to the test, we find that, under the right conditions, even third graders can grasp something of history’s indeterminate nature to arrive at sophisticated interpretations of the past’ (p.518). From this perspective, it is actually teachers’ reluctance to allow students the opportunity to perceive history as argument from the beginning of their schooling - as is the case in progression models advocated by genre theorists - that accounts for pupils’ arrested development to writing argumentatively.

2.2.2.3 Recontextualisation of academic history?

One reason why genre theorists consider it legitimate to teach ‘school history’ genres that are not argumentative is due to these researchers’ conceptualisation of the relationship between ‘academic’ and ‘school history’. Genre theorists have appeared to largely focus their attention on the field of reproduction rather than that of recontextualisation, resulting in their occasional advocacy of linguistic choices alien to the field of production in academia. For example, Coffin (2006) exclusively analysed school history in the form of over 1000 texts produced by ‘textbook authors, school-teachers, literacy consultants and students, some of which are effective examples of history, some of which are less so’ when demarcating her three genres (p. xiv). Similarly, Christie and Derewianka (2008) analysed their corpus of school history texts and, in conjunction with teachers and examiners, identified texts which represented a ‘benchmark of what is possible at each phase of development’ (pp. 5–6). The gauge for ascertaining students’ ‘ability’ (Christie & Derewianka, 2008, p. 118) was the students’ existing practice in the field of reproduction. From this primarily descriptive endeavour, teachers such as Donaghy (2013) have used these genres prescriptively. The analyses of what students already tend to do are utilised as exemplars and explicitly taught to students. These models are therefore firmly from the field of reproduction, post-recontexualisation, and little attempt is made to evaluate their relationship with the original academic knowledge.

Because school history genres are given their identity through their continued use in classrooms, an implication of prescribing these genres is that some genre theorists advocate teaching linguistic choices that are commonplace in *school history* but are seldom found in *academic history.* For example, when teaching ‘factorial explanations’ Coffin (2006) recommended avoiding modality (words such as ‘may’, ‘might’ and ‘perhaps’ that indicate degrees of speculation to the reader) which soften or open up the students’ interpretation to negotiation (p.35). This is despite the fact that such hedges are a typifying feature of academic historical discourse (Crismore, 1984). Instead, when teaching ‘factorial explanations’ some genre theorists suggest advising students to use categorical, positive

Figure 2.7. Genre theorists' and the extended writing movement's respective 'benchmarks'/'gold standards' in relation to Bernstein's model for the creation of pedagogical knowledge.


Bernstein's model for creation of pedagogical knowledge
Field of intellectual production
e.g. 'academic' history in universities
Extended writing movement
'gold standard'
(Fordham, 2014a, p.17)
Field of recontextualization
e.g. curriculum design
Field of reproduction
e.g. 'school' history
Genre theory
'benchmark'
(Christie & Derewianka, 2008, pp.5-6)

declaratives that presume an authoritative stance; a pre-existing alignment between writer and reader; and close down the negotiability of propositions made. Such approaches, as Coffin noted, ‘encourage a reader to assume that the proposition is unproblematic and that it enjoys a broad consensus’ (p.143). In sum, genre theorists consider it legitimate, on occasion, to teach genres that are not argumentative. Consequently, they occasionally deconstruct and model existing practice by school history students, even if they are not examples of historical argument.

As Maton and Muller (2007) have noted, limits exist in terms of Bernsteinian recontextualisation. These limits are dependent on ‘evaluative rules’ that ensure that pedagogised artefacts in the classroom continue to bear relation to their parent academic knowledge (pp. 28–29). Once the recontextualised artefact becomes too far divorced from its academic antecedent, it ceases to be the same subject. Sustained argumentalists have concentrated their attention on the field of recontextualisation to ensure that educational knowledge remains commensurate with its academic antecedent. For many sustained argumentalists, the ‘gold standard’ (Figure 2.7.; Fordham, 2014a, p. 17) for students’ attainment is an ‘aspirational description what the very best history does. What dispositions of thought underpin the best history? What attitudes do good historians adopt? These are vital questions for history teachers to address’ (Ford, 2014, p. 33). Consequently, sustained argumentalists tend not to advocate approaches to teaching extended writing that are directly at variance to academic historical discourse.

For example, the genre theorists’ willingness to, on occasion, deliberately avoid modality is antithetical to sustained argumentalists’ stance. Many see modality as central in allowing students to write discursively and explore a range of viewpoints and possibilities (Carroll, 2016b; Counsell, 1997). Possibly as a result of wishing to avoid perpetuating such limitations as eschewing modality in students’ work, a number of sustained argumentalists instead recommend intervening. As an alternative to focusing on what students currently do, they theorise about what their students should preferably do and attempt to facilitate this ideal (Counsell, 2004). In many instances, this involves determining the discrepancy between their students' work and academic scholarship and seeking to minimise this disconnection (Howells, 2005). From this perspective, 'school' and 'academic' history are not discrete entities and because historians unfailingly write argumentatively then students should similarly try to (Fordham, 2007). In this view, the fact that students produce non-argumentative writing in their early schooling is a consequence of the history curricula based on faulty notions of epistemic ascent that they are currently exposed to rather than the students' innate cognitive thresholds. Furthermore, for the teachers operating in this discourse, more emphasis has been placed on the classroom as a pedagogical site where historical academic knowledge should be produced that is activated by and contributes to the wider historical academic community.

Additionally, for both genre theorists and sustained argumentalists there has been little explicit discussion of either the particular issues involved in the recontextualisation of historical academic knowledge, nor justification for the choices made when recontextualising. Indeed, certain genre theorists have tended to exclusively rely on 'school history' texts from the field of reproduction. While sustained argumentalists have, comparatively, been more willing to draw on the field of production, the choices for the loci of authority are often highly selective with little accompanying rationale for the choice of academic works being recontextualised, particularly relying on methodologies of history by practising historians such as those by Carr (1990), Evans (1997), and Megill (2007).

For example, in the years 2004 to 2013 the single most cited work by history-teacher researchers in the professional journal *Teaching History* was E. H. Carr's (1990) *What is History?* first published in 1961 (Fordham, 2016, p.145). Furthermore, the two most influential works regarding causation based on number of citations in the discourse based their general claims predominantly on a small sample of theories of history by practising historians and, to a lesser extent, authentic causal explanations by historians (Chapman, 2003; Woodcock, 2005). Both drew on Carr's view of historical causation. The only other works from the field of production cited across both articles were one other theory of history (*In Defence of History*, Evans, 1997)*;* a compilation of counterfactual 'virtual' histories (*Virtual History,* Ferguson, 1997); and one work of historical scholarship (*A History of India,* Stein, 1998). From such a sample the authors made claims regarding 'what exactly characterises the sophisticated and complex pieces of causal reasoning that historians present us with' and also what constitutes 'better history' (Chapman, 2003, p.47; Woodcock, 2005, p.6). Neither work, however, provided any rationale for their choice of works to 'recontextualise'. Furthermore, neither article referred to other potential loci of authority such as analytic philosophies of history. Finally, possible limits on the curriculum designer's attempts at recontextualisation beyond the abilities of their students, such as national awarding bodies' examination specifications and the extent to which they (mis)align with historical causal argument in the field of production, were only fleetingly referred to.

An overreliance on Carr's narrowly Marxian view of historical causation runs the risk of enshrining a selective and outmoded version of explanation in history curricula in England (Jenkins, 1995; Watts, 2016). Indeed, the historian Fernández-Armesto (2002) argued Carr's arguments 'now seem old-fashioned; but they were probably already rear-guard actions in their day and can be set aside' (p.157). Similarly, the historian Maza (2017) noted 'Carr's blunt distinction between rational and accidental causes, and his view that the only causes that matter in history are those which allow for lessons or predictions have been roundly criticised by later historians and philosophers of history as a severely restrictive view of causality' (p.172). For sustained argumentatlists, therefore, the process of recontextualisation

Table 2.2. A functional model of language adapted from Christie & Derewianka (2008, p.7).

CONTEXT	**CONTEXT OF CULTURE** **Genres** as social processes for achieving purposes within the culture		
	CONTEXT OF SITUATION **Registers** as particular configurations of the field, tenor and mode		
	FIELD *(subject matter or topic)* ↕	*TENOR* *(roles and relationships)* ↕	*MODE* *(along a continuum from 'most spoken' to 'most written')* ↕

LANGUAGE	**IDEATIONAL** METAFUNCTION	**INTERPERSONAL** METAFUNCTION	**TEXTUAL** METAFUNCTION
	Language for representing our experience and the relationship between aspects of experience **Experiential sub-metafunction** How language organises experience **Logical sub-metafunction** Logical relations between elements	Language for interaction with others	Language for achieving cohesion in texts

currently risks misrepresenting academic history in the field of production due to a lack of systematic rationales being provided for the process.

2.2.2.4. Examiner or historical community as interlocutor?

Hallidayan genre theorists place great emphasis on the relationship between specific social contexts and the limiting role they play in linguistic choices (Christie & Derewianka, 2008; Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004; Martin, 1997). As Christie (2007) suggested, ‘for Halliday, the study of language necessarily involved the study of language in use, as part of the social system. What mattered about language was *what people did with it*’ [original italics] (pp. 5–6). A salient manifestation of genre theorists distinguishing between reproduced ‘school’ and ‘academic’ history is their portrayal of the writing’s social context and its effect on the work produced. Following Halliday’s guidance, a level of context that genre theorists focus on is register, which is then subdivided into three areas: field (what the text is about); the tenor (who is taking part in the communication); and the mode (the method of communication) (Coffin, 2006, p. 29; Table 2.2.). Ostensibly, there would seem little scope for disagreement between genre theorists and sustained argumentalists in terms of field (history – or the particular topic being taught within the domain of history) and mode (generally, assessed written work). As discussed, however, there are divergences in both of these areas of register. First, whereas some genre theorists envisage the field to be reproduced ‘school history’, sustained argumentalists visualise the text to be closer to its academic precursor. Similarly, while some genre theorists recommend temporally determined models of development, the mode may change depending on what genre the student is required to produce at what age. For those who advocate argument, however, the mode should be largely static in the sense it should unfailingly display evidence of written, historical argument.

Similarly, the tenor is a facet of register that reveals divergences between the two discourses. As Coffin (2006) suggested, in the genre theorists' view, the '"audience" construct is an integral part of the teaching/learning design' (pp. 158–159). Genre theorists interpret this literally and proximally, and the intended audience is accepted to be the 'examiner/teacher' (Coffin, 2006; p. 80; Christie & Derewianka, 2008; pp. 5–6). Consequently, students are encouraged to argue not because it is more faithful to the historical epistemology but because 'for several decades arguing about the past has held a privileged position in schools and in public exams' (Coffin, 2006, p. 66). In this view, audience-awareness is necessary because it enables strategic production of genres leading to exam success. It also implies a monologic relationship between the students' writing and their intended audience, because it assumes that the examiner has the power in the relationship and it is anticipated (and borne out) that beyond marking there will be no historical riposte to the student's argument.

Conversely, sustained argumentalists, while equally emphasising the importance of an imagined audience, instead visualise this construct far more figuratively. In this view, students' work is public knowledge for the academic historical community. For example, some teachers have arranged for their students to present their work to professional historians for critique of its suitability for its intended audience (e.g. Chapman & Facey, 2009). This focus on the academic community as hypothetical audience is a consequence of the permanency of attempting to portray history as argument, which presupposes an audience that needs to be convinced (Andrews, 1995). As Fordham (2007) suggested, 'historical arguments are context-specific; they interact with an existing and vibrant world occupied by the views and interpretations of other historians' (p. 38). From this perspective, an interaction with public knowledge is what makes historical thinking possible for students, because entering into a historical argument necessarily requires engaging with, positioning oneself in relation to, and altering others' interpretations. Furthermore, it presumes a potentially continuing dialogue with power equally distributed. In Fordham's view, an argument that 'does not do this is, quite literally, meaningless' (Fordham, 2007, pp. 32–33).

2.2.2.5. The importance of reading?

Similarly, the difference in the conceptualisation of the relationship between 'school' and 'academic' history has implications for where the two groups turn for both bases of curricular planning and model texts for students. Some genre theorists do ascribe importance to reading and 'have come to see reading and writing as so intimately interrelated that we cannot understand the one without the other' (Christie & Misson 1998, p.4). Despite this acknowledgement of reading's potentially transformative power, for many genre theorists reading academic history is deemphasised and instead students only tend to read examples of the key curriculum genres (Barrs, 2004). Because 'recording' and 'explaining' genres (as Coffin (2006) defines them) are exclusive to school history, academic history cannot be used as a model of these genres. Accordingly, a number of genre theorists have instead sought to identify the linguistic features of history textbooks (e.g. Coffin 1997; Eggins, Martin & Wignell 1993; Martin, 2002; McNamara, 1989; Oteíza, 2003; Unsworth, 1999; Veel & Coffin, 1996). Schleppegrell (2011), for example, developed a series of activities for teachers that asked students to engage in rudimentary systemic functional linguistic analysis of history textbooks, arguing that 'recognising and talking about how language is used in the textbooks supports students' comprehension of history… It also helps students see meaningful variation in language choices, giving them tools for understanding what they read and providing models for them to adopt in their writing' (p.210). Schleppegrell justified such an approach by arguing that the 'primary source of disciplinary knowledge' in history 'is the textbook' (Schleppegrell, Achugar & Oteíza 2004, pp.72-73). Similarly, in searching for 'school history' genres, teachers like Donaghy (2013) often create 'inauthentic' models for students to imitate (2013). Consequently, although he remarks that he is providing examples of 'how historians write', his students must take on trust that his approximations are representative of historical discourse because they are generally not exposed to academic historians' writing.

Conversely, while also perceiving an explicit and identifiable connection between reading and writing, sustained argumentalists seem more amenable to turning to academic history for 'authentic models' – extracts written by professional historians that have not been simplified (e.g. Banham, 1998; Carroll, 2016a, 2016b, 2018; Foster, 2011, 2015, 2016; Hammond, 2007; Howells, 2005). From this perspective, in order to write like historians students need to read academic scholarship, and by doing so teachers might create 'writers from the readers' (Ward, 2006, p.9). Due to sustained argumentalists seeing history as exclusively argumentative, they see reading scholarship as vital because these are the only texts where the linguistic tools of argument such as hedging, weighing and emphasising are overt (Counsell, 2004a). Textbooks and non-argumentative school history genres, unlike academic historians, do not tend to use the language of 'metadiscourse' – the indications of judgement, persuasive emphasis and hedges indicating uncertainty, and generally avoid interweaving reference to the evidential base in their prose. Instead, textbooks and non-argumentative school history genres often present history as objective, unelaborated and straightforward; with an anonymous, truth-giving, authoritative author presenting history as a 'closed story' consisting of a categorical 'body of facts' (Crismore, 1984, pp.279 & 292; Schrag, 1967 c.f. Counsell, 2004a, p.101; Wineburg, 1991, pp.501 & 514). The implications of this presented objectivity, as Crismore (1984) suggested, is that students who only read textbooks have difficulty in moving beyond the literal. For Crismore, 'when bias is not overt (as it is *not* in most textbooks) are young readers not being deceived?' [original italics] (pp.295-296). Sustained argumentalists therefore argue that although teachers may feel that they are simplifying the issue for students by giving them textbooks, if we consider history as a discipline, it makes it *harder* for them to see the subject as interpretative which is then reflected in their writing (Carroll, 2017a; Fordham, 2007). In this view, students will only be able to conceptualise and articulate their own historical arguments after seeing how a real historian tackles similar problems because this is the only literature where such subtext is discernible.

2.2.2.6. The importance of speech?

Similar to their lack of emphasis on reading, genre theorists are dismissive of the importance of speech in helping to develop students' historical writing. As Barrs (2004) suggested, genre theorists 'are intent on drawing a sharp distinction between spoken and written language, rather than looking at continuities between them' (p.8). For example, Christie (1998) was critical of approaches to literacy that 'fail to grasp how different written language is from speech' (p.48). For Donaghy (2013), every-day speech has the potential to contaminate students' writing. Speech is tolerated, but not in its natural form, as he instructs students to answer his questions with 'reporting back-type' talk where full sentences are asked for to imitate in speech 'written-like language' (Donaghy, 2013).

Due to their emphasis on the primacy of argument, some published history teachers (e.g. Banham, 1998; Carroll, 2017a; Evans & Pate, 2007; Woodcock, 2005) and educational researchers (e.g. Safford, O'Sullivan & Barrs, 2004) do not display such dismissiveness toward speech. In viewing history exclusively as argument, speech is seen as a vital 'oral rehearsal' where ideas are organised, critiqued and honed before being committed to paper. Written argument is seen as closer to speech than other genres, due to the fact that arguments share an immediate sense of audience; involve an interchange of views; are context-dependent; are contingent of circumstances and power relations; are dialogic; and are multi-voiced and social. Consequently, Counsell (2004a) suggested arguments need to 'be explored and tested out through talk' (p. 36). Approaches such as genre theory, therefore, have been critiqued as they deny writing's status as a 'second order symbolic system that is dependent on speech' (Andrews, 1995, p. 52) and because 'it suggests that children's speech resources are not going to be particularly useful to them in learning to write, which is manifestly not the case' (Barrs, 2004, p. 8).

2.2.2.7. Lexical and/or disciplinary specificity?

For many genre theorists, recontextualisation of a horizontal knowledge structure such as history is predicated on the assumption that history is 'embedded' in linguistics' (Martin, 2007, p. 56). Accordingly, some genre theorists believe that linguistic specificity achieves disciplinary specificity. As Christie and Misson (1998) suggested, 'various school subjects or "disciplines" represent ways of building information. In order to understand the different kinds of information and their associated methods of reasoning, students must learn the language patterns in which these things are encoded' (p. 10). In recontextualising horizontal knowledge structures, genre theorists aim to achieve historical specificity in relation to other domains by focusing only on linguistic differences. For some genre theorists, the language of the genre does not simply express historical thinking, it *is* historical thinking (Martin, Coffin, & North, 2007). In a genre-based pedagogy, 'the language of history (or science, geography, maths) is the knowledge and content of history, which in turn is the language which in turn... you get the picture' (Donaghy, 2013). Because language is seen as synonymous with knowledge, epistemic distinctiveness, if it exists, is achieved through building a repertoire of the linguistic tools of the genre's domain, and this is the same process 'for any school subject' (Donaghy, 2013).

Consequently, even when working on 'argumentative' genres, students are asked to work towards a pre-defined result that is presented to them as inarguable. For example, Donaghy (2013) likened his pedagogy to teaching a child to tie a shoelace – purely imitative with one correct, indisputable result. Accordingly, his lessons involve activities in which students are 'building up to the sentence I had in mind at the start', and success is achieved if the students 'arrive at a sentence very similar to the one I had written before the lesson and was aiming toward' (Donaghy, 2013). In this conceptualisation of history, there are a priori historical explanations that are indistinguishable from algebraic equations or descriptions of photosynthesis. The importance of constructing individual argument is therefore de-emphasised. Disciplinary specificity is achieved through the subject-specific lexis acquired as opposed to the conceptual processes that underpin the work's production, and consequently, the disciplinary is unchallengeable. The representatives of this discourse appear to display a greater agnosticism towards the differences between a historical claim and, for example, a scientific claim. Somewhat paradoxically then, while SFL is a model of language that emphasises the importance of social context in the production of linguistic form, it has been criticised for resulting in a 'transmission pedagogy' (Barrs, 2004, p. 9) – for example, in bypassing the social aspect in the problematisation of the discipline of history for students. Consequently, students' texts are often 'completely shaped by the teacher, and by the generic form' (Barrs, 2004, p, 10). The necessarily social aspect of individual argument construction in particular is deemphasised.

As a result, in genre-based pedagogies the conceptual apparatuses of argument that historians utilise are often deliberately glossed over. For example, while 'jointly constructing' a factorial explanation, Donaghy (2013) provided causal categories and hierarchies for his students, deproblematising them to his students by suggesting that he had given them the 'logical' answers. The students were not encouraged to consider how argument might be conveyed via the categorisation, linking or prioritisation of causes or indeed how these processes represent a compositional and historical problem.

While both genre theorists and sustained argumentalists suggest that to conceptualise the discipline of history and the language used to express it as separate is a false dualism, their reasoning and methods differ based on the emphasis they place on argument. In striving for subject-specificity through lexis, genre theory or effective products of its influence have been accused of sacrificing history's epistemic specificity – particularly by ignoring the importance of enabling a student to frame their own written historical arguments (Counsell, 2000a, 2011a). In this view, suggesting that attaining knowledge of history (or science, geography, or maths) is only a case of mastering the subjects' respective genres might result in, from the students' perspective, the subjects attaining a common deep structure where all disciplines become detached from experience and can be measured by tests that have a single right answer (Wineburg, 1991). By presenting history in this way, historical writing is reduced to 'a test of understanding, perhaps, and choices to be made about clarity, perhaps, but no real work of explanation as we understand it in history' (Counsell, 2004a, p. 35). Consequently, the genre theorists' approach which pre-empts structures has been critiqued for 'constraining and limiting' expression of students' own arguments (Barrs, 2004, pp. 9–10). Without understanding the conceptual apparatuses of argument underpinning the production of the genre, it is claimed students will never progress beyond 'precocious imitation' or 'explanatory pastiche' (Lee & Shemilt, 2009; pp. 43–46).

Instead, sustained argumentalists have attempted to make writing historical arguments easier by historically problematising the compositional process and allowing students to see that there is an organisational puzzle to be solved. In sustained argumentalists' eyes, raising metacognition of historical concepts allows students to organise their ideas which directly and positively affect their ability to structure effective written arguments (Foster, 2011, 2016). Subsequently, sustained argumentalists have endeavoured to ensure that students select evidence (Foster & Gadd, 2013); develop their own categories of causes (Carroll, 2016a; Chapman and Facey, 2009; Counsell, 1997; Evans & Pate, 2007); differentiate between general points and supporting evidence (Bakalis, 2003; Counsell, 1997); prioritise causes to construct an argument (Banham, 1998; Carroll, 2016a; Chapman and Facey, 2009; Woodcock, 2005); and focus on causes' interrelationships (Chapman, 2003). As Counsell (2004a) suggested, such conceptual analysis is 'at the same time the work of choosing themes for paragraphs, how to order those paragraphs into a thematic analysis, exploring the best supporting evidence within those paragraphs and, above all, understanding the power of a paragraph when it becomes cohesive' (p. 36).

2.3. Purpose of the investigation

2.3.1. Bridge divergent evolution

Despite a widespread recognition by history education stakeholders of the need for disciplinary-specific approaches to students' extended writing, small-scale successes have not been scaled up into widespread solutions. As a result, guidance and recommendations have often been pluralistic to the point of contradiction. Rather than merely adding yet another approach, a new direction in empirical research could uncover and exploit hitherto unexplored connections and continuities within this corpus. Adjoining discourses laying claim to the same pieces of 'intellectual territory' 'does not necessarily entail a conflict between them' but instead can 'mark a growing unification of ideas and approaches' (Becher, 1993, p. 38). I recommend a more interventionist approach, seeking to move beyond simply identifying opportunities for unification to actively breaking down increasingly formalised boundaries.

For example, I have attempted to identify some commonalities and incongruities between the two discourses of genre theory and the extended writing movement. While there have been some limited attempts by English history teachers to draw on genre theory, this has largely been a one-way relationship. From both sides, inter-discursive communication is necessary. This would potentially have a number of benefits in developing students' historical writing. First, wastefully repetitive 'discoveries' of genre theory by English history teachers and policy makers might be avoided. Second, history teachers' unwitting critiques and developments of genre theory may be clearly identified as such, allowing for both discourses to develop solutions in light of each other's evaluations. Third, duplication of similar 'innovations' by both discourses in response to similar identifications of students' difficulties might be avoided. Finally, genre theorists might avoid making further recommendations that are increasingly redundant for history teachers' needs. Without attempts to redress this pluralism by resolving issues and developing a context where there is a closer alignment in terms of theories and methods of inquiry, systematic advances in the knowledge regarding students' extended historical writing, as has been evidenced, might be disallowed (Kuhn, 1970; cf. Becher, 1993).

2.3.2 Establish commonly held curricular goals

Attempts to redress the pluralistic and sometimes contradictory recommendations regarding students' extended historical writing in England may be undermined, however, until a context is developed where there is a closer alignment in terms of the curricular goals that history education stakeholders are working towards (Kuhn, 1970). First, in terms of the curriculum, these differences between the discourses of genre theory and the extended writing movement include both the form students' extended historical writing should take and also the relationship between the product of writing and the argumentative discipline of history in the field of academic production. Second, the two discourses privilege different pedagogical emphases, with sustained argumentalists within the extended writing movement in particular stressing the primacy of students practising argument in constructing extended historical writing and genre theorists being more likely to adopt a ‘transmission pedagogy’. Third, the two discourses have developed separate research traditions and methods of enquiry, manifested in further ontological, epistemological and methodological differences in terms of knowledge construction regarding the phenomenon of students’ extended historical writing. A pertinent example of this is the extent to which Bernstein’s ideas are applied in the process of recontextualisation of historical knowledge to the pedagogical site of the classroom.

But are these epistemic tensions irresolvable? Closer inter-communication in terms of curricular theorisation – and in particular of curricular goals related to students’ extended historical writing – may help to obviate the production of resources that those outside of the respective discourses consider redundant. Hitherto, however, systematic rationales for the processes of recontextualisation of academic history have been lacking in both discourses. In particular, further inter-discursive curricular theorisation using the Bernsteinian model may help to establish a greater consensus regarding curricular goals in three key and interrelated aspects. First, what should qualify as an acceptable historical claim in students’ extended historical writing at different points in their schooling? Second, where and how should teachers find examples of ideal written historical claims: in students’ current recontextualised writing or in academic scholarship? Third, to what extent should teachers attempt to induct students in the processes of the academic historical discipline? While genre theorists imply that the (re)-production of certain historical claims is synonymous with the historical thinking that underpins the construction of such language, those who advocate an unswerving focus on argument instead insist that written claims are only historical when they are produced in the academic field of public historical argument.

These epistemic tensions matter and need to be resolved. Any history teacher is unlikely to pay heed to empirical research that proves a positive causal correlation between a particular approach and an outcome that they deem to be undesirable. Until there is a closer alignment regarding what history stakeholders’ curricular goals are in terms of students’ historical writing, investigations regarding the most efficacious methods of achieving said goals are, at best, destined to appeal only to limited audiences demarcated by their discursive ‘tribes’ (Becher, 1993).

3. Methodology

3.1. Research questions

My research involved a novel amalgam of the hitherto largely disconnected discourses of genre theory and the extended writing movement. Consequently, I primarily designed this study as an exercise in curricular theorisation – that is, theorisation of the curricular 'what' to be taught in history lessons rather than the pedagogical 'how' (Counsell, 2016a). In particular, I aimed to furnish teachers with the tools to identify the desired properties of thinking in students' written arguments after encountering a type of instruction which had reconciled certain recommendations made by genre theorists and those in the extended writing movement. My primary objective, therefore, was not to weigh the effectiveness of a method, although I recognised there may be methodological implications of the study. Instead, I intended the study to have a wider professional significance by contributing to professional theorising by history teachers and/or curriculum designers, in both substantive and second-order terms, about the curricular goals of a new approach which combines recommendations by the extended writing movement and genre theorists. In other words, given the lack of agreement on some issues between the two discourses, what should history teachers be aiming to achieve, in practical terms, for their students to accomplish in their extended writing after this type of explicit linguistic instruction in history lessons? This characterisation of future curricular goals might then act as a heuristic for future research. Future investigations, whether conducted by teacher-researchers examining their own practice or analyses produced by academics examining multiple settings might, unlike this study, determine causal relationships, or the efficacy of an approach to teaching them.

As we have seen, some participants in the discourses of both genre theory and the extended writing movement have suggested their respective curricular theorisation represents an exercise in Bernsteinian recontextualisation. In practice, however, many genre theorists' claims regarding effective historical writing have been based on analyses of 'school history' texts from the field of reproduction (e.g. Coffin, 2006; Christie & Derewianka, 2008). Teacher researchers in the extended writing movement, meanwhile, have been more willing to attempt to locate warrant for their claims in the field of production – particular in theories and methodologies of history by a select group of practising historians such as Carr (1990), Evans (1997), and Megill (2007). Thus far, however, there has been little explicit discussion in this discourse regarding the epistemological, practical, and ethical considerations the history curriculum designer may encounter when attempting to recontextualise academic historical knowledge, nor explicit justifications for the texts from the field of production to recontextualise.

My first research question, therefore, was 'What are the opportunities and limitations for a history curriculum designer when 'recontextualising' academic historical causal arguments?'. I wanted to systematise and render explicit a possible approach to the recontextualisation of historical causal arguments. I chose 'opportunities' because participants in both discourses seem to operate with the assumption that recontextualisation is a desirable activity. Similarly, I wanted to explore 'limitations' in the sense of possible ethical, practical, and epistemological hindrances to recontextualisation. For example, considerations such as the need of teachers to ensure their students achieve in national examinations have hitherto often only been fleetingly considered by the extended writing movement in particular. I was therefore not necessarily presupposing that a model of relations should obtain between school and university history, but only theorising how such a model might operate in practice.

Additionally, I was intrigued by two tensions that I had noted between the recommendations of genre theorists and the extended writing movement. First, with some exceptions, genre theorists' insistence on the importance of explicit lexicogrammatical instruction has not been matched in the recommendations of the extended writing movement. While history teacher researchers in England and education researchers more broadly have not necessarily referred to genre-based pedagogies specifically in their critiques, many of these researchers have shown some concern that overreliance on linguistic scaffolding may 'make students fall' and result in pupils producing homogenised, depersonalised 'precocious imitation' (Evans & Pate, 2007; Lee & Shemilt, 2009, pp.43-46). When reviewing the literature, I questioned whether a focus on lexicogrammar as genre theorists advocate necessarily involves bypassing the historical thinking that sits behind the compositional process. If I were to make lexicogrammar explicit would my students inevitably perceive the historical epistemology differently and produce 'deadening' responses devoid of individualised argument (Barrs, 2004, pp.9-10)? Or could the linguistic input recommended by genre theorists - if situated in a pedagogy that elucidates the disciplinary apparatuses of history as recommended by the extended writing movement - liberate students' arguments? In particular, would such a scheme of work not only allow students to express their arguments in a more sophisticated manner but also consolidate, extend, or indeed release the conceptual thinking that underpins the construction of such historical claims (Woodcock, 2005)?

Furthermore, some genre theorists and participants in the extended writing movement ascribe different levels of importance to reading in improving students' writing. Many genre theorists downplay reading, and some teachers adopting genre theorists' recommendations provide teacher-made exemplars of school history genres when modelling writing. Conversely, many 'sustained argumentalists' in the extended writing movement insist on a discernible connection between reading academic scholarship and students' writing. For example, Counsell (2004a), building on the work of Safford, O'Sullivan, and Barrs (2004), argued 'I doubt if anyone but a reader of history ever becomes a writer of history' (p. 101). Moreover, many of these teachers emphasise the primacy of using authentic, unmediated texts by professional historians as inspiration in curricular design and models for students. The benefits of such an approach are often assumed by the extended writing movement to be a positive model of style (e.g. Ward, 2006), as well as exposing students to the metadiscourse of historical argument in historical academic scholarship which in turn, some argue, will positively affect students' historical writing.

Consequently, my second research question was 'how does the lexicogrammatical modelling by a teacher of the properties of the language of academic scholarship (that the students had already read) manifest itself in A-Level history students' written historical causal arguments?' The focus on 'lexicogrammatical modelling' was a reference to the influence of genre theorists' emphases not only on vocabulary but also combination of words at the level of the clause in historical writing. 'The properties of the language of academic scholarship' which 'students had already read' related to the influence of participants in the extended writing movement's insistence on the potential for reading and modelling academic scholarship's metadiscourse of historical argument. The emphasis on 'academic' scholarship also refers to the theoretical framework of Bernsteinian recontextualisation of academic knowledge. I chose the verb 'manifest' to make explicit that this is not an efficacy study designed to establish causal relationships.

- **Research Question 1**

  What are the opportunities and limitations for a history curriculum designer when 'recontextualising' academic historical causal arguments?

- **Research Question 2**

Table 3.1. Overview of the research design.

Epistemology	***Theoretical Perspective***	***Methodology***	***Research questions***	***Methods***	
				Data Collection	*Data Analysis*
Social constructionism	Hermeneutical phenomenology	Instrumental, theory building, local knowledge case study	RQ1. What are the opportunities and limitations for a history curriculum designer when ‘recontextualising’ academic historical causal arguments?	Philosophies of history regarding causal explanation Theories of history by practising historians regarding causal explanation Causal explanations in the historiography of the Salem witch trials My lesson resources Students’ written work from lessons. Rankings of students’ work by academics with explanatory comments.	Thematic analysis Comparative judgement
			RQ2. How does the lexicogrammatical modelling by a teacher of the properties of the language of academic scholarship (that the students had already read) manifest itself in A-Level history students’ written historical causal arguments?		

> How does the lexicogrammatical modelling by a teacher of the properties of the language of academic scholarship (that the students had already read) manifest itself in A-Level history students' written historical causal arguments?

3.2. Research design

3.2.1. Epistemology and theoretical perspective

For my research, I adopted social constructionism as defined by Crotty (1998) as my epistemology and Heideggerian-Gadamerian hermeneutical phenomenology as my theoretical perspective (Gadamer, 1976; Heidegger, 1962; Table 3.1.). For Crotty, social 'constructionism' focuses on the intersubjectively shared, social constructions of meaning and knowledge shaped by the conventions of language and other social processes. Social constructionism therefore emphasises the hold culture has on us in shaping our perceptions of our world, and this culture can be both liberating and constricting. Here, 'phenomenology' refers to, as far as possible, laying aside cultural preunderstandings of phenomena and instead revisiting our immediate experiences of them – in the course of which new meaning may emerge to us or perhaps enhance or authenticate former meanings. Social constructionism and phenomenology are an epistemology and a theoretical perspective that, according to Crotty, complement one another other.

3.2.1.1. Subjectivities of my object

Both of my research questions demanded making my interpretations of individuals' subjective meaning-making the objects of study (Bryman, 1998; Crotty, 1998; Hammersley, 2012). In the case of Research Question 1, I decided I needed to interpret how participants in the academic field of historical production realise their essential beliefs, thoughts, and attitudes regarding historical causal explanation in written texts such as philosophies of history, theories of history by practising historians, and authentic causal explanations in the particular historiography the students would be answering a question on (the Salem witch trials of 1692).

For Research Question 2, I was required to interpret the extent to which students appeared to manifest essential, desirable characteristics of historical causal explanations of the Salem witch crisis, where I judged ‘desirable’ as characteristics that participants in the field of production valued as aspects of effective historical causal argument. In both cases, my ‘object(s)’ of research represented complex webs of subjectivities: although essential similarities may be discernible to the reader, the authors of the texts would reach somewhat different conclusions regarding historical causation in general and the causes of the Salem witch crisis in particular due to the non-categorical nature of historical causal explanation. Such divergences in the construal of historical causation could be due to differences in perception, interpretation, and understandings of language so I also wanted to investigate the social, cultural, and historical underpinnings of participants’ claims (Baronov, 2004; Bassey, 1999; Sokolowski, 2000). I therefore presupposed that when investigating social reality human subjectivities become the object of research (Counsell, 2009).

3.2.1.2. My subjectivity in construing knowledge

Both of my research questions involved my - as a researcher as well as historian-by-training, participant in the extended writing movement, experienced curriculum designer, and the participating students’ regular history teacher – interpretation of the object. In the case of Research Question 1, I had to distil what I considered to be the essential features of historical causal explanation from the field of production and recontextualise them for the purposes of my teaching. For Research Question 2, I was required to judge whether (and if so, how) my students manifested essential characteristics of successful historical causal argument in their writing. For both questions, therefore, I was necessarily exercising judgment and making meaning; I could not enquire into my object without my subjectivity engaged. Consequently, I was obliged to consider the role of my own subjectivity in the construal of knowledge (Counsell, 2009).

Both of my research questions, therefore, involved researching the phenomenon of my own lived experience as a 'recontextualising' history teacher. According to Van Manen (1997), 'phenomenology aims at gaining a deeper understanding of the nature or meaning of our everyday experiences' (p.9). In this sense, phenomenological research is a personal engagement. For Crotty (1998) phenomenology is a 'first-person exercise. Each of us must explore our own experience, not the experience of others' (Crotty, 1998, p.84). Furthermore, phenomenology is appropriate if, as in my case, the phenomenon to be investigated represents a deep, personal interest of the researcher's everyday life. As Van Manen stated (1997):

> to truly question something is to interrogate something from the heart of our existence, from the centre of our being. Even minor phenomenological research projects require that we not simply raise a question and possibly soon drop it again, but rather we 'live' this question, that we 'become' this question (p.43).

In this view, phenomenological research 'always begins in the lifeworld' which in my case was my initial 'commonsense' understandings of how to teach historical causal explanations (Van Manen, 1997, p.7). The 'lifeworld' represents one's natural, pre-reflective, taken-for-granted attitude to everyday life prior to conscious reflection (Dilthey, 1985; Husserl, 1970a). Phenomenology therefore enables a more deliberate, disciplined, and systematic approach to 'everyday' understanding, 'intellectualising' comprehensions of reality that social actors may otherwise consider unproblematic (Schutz, 1964; Van Manen, 1997).

Both social constructionism and phenomenology presuppose an indissolubility of object and subject. For both, although phenomena may be pregnant with potential meaning,

meaning is only achieved when the conscious subject engages with them (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). According to Crotty (1998), 'objectivity and subjectivity need to be brought together and held together indissolubly. Constructionism does precisely that' (pp.43-44). This indissolubility of subject and object is congruent with the phenomenological notion of 'intentionality' which similarly suggests the dichotomy of subject and object is untenable. According to Van Manen (1997) 'phenomenological research and writing is a project in which the normal scientific requirements or standard of objectivity and subjectivity need to be reconceived. In the human sciences, objectivity and subjectivity are not mutually exclusive categories' (p.20). In this view, no object can be adequately described separate from the conscious being-in-the-world experiencing it, and furthermore no experience can be adequately described isolated from its object (Spiegelberg, 1982). In other words, reflective consciousness is always transitive, it is always oriented toward something.

Nonetheless, in this view even if the phenomenon in isolation is, literally, meaningless it is an essential partner in the generation of meaning and therefore needs to be taken seriously (Crotty, 1998). Social constructionism, therefore, does not represent unfettered subjectivism. Meaning emerges from but is also circumscribed by the object. Accordingly, the possibilities of the meaning the object bears are limited in a process that Adorno (1977) deemed 'exact fantasy' (p.131). According to Buck-Morss (1977), 'exact fantasy' 'acknowledged the mutual mediation of subject and object without allowing either to get the upper hand' (p.86). The stress on the object is also evident among phenomenologists: most famously in the slogan of 'back to the things themselves'! (e.g. Heidegger, 1962, pp.49-51; Husserl, 1970b, p.252; Van Manen 1997).

Both social constructionism and phenomenology stress the preunderstandings that the interpreter brings to phenomena. In order to reflect on my lived experience of planning, teaching, and assessing recontexualised historical causal arguments in some respects I sought to push aside certain preconceptions that might limit my potential for (re)interpretations: particularly certain concepts I had been acculturated to by influential discourses such as those of genre theory, the extended writing movement, and awarding body specifications (Bryman, 1998; Counsell, 2009). Such acculturation can result in deep-rooted and widespread reification: the confusion of 'the sense we make of things' with 'the way things are' and therefore the privileging of certain meanings at the exclusion of others (Crotty, 1998, pp.58-59).

For example, I questioned whether some of the existing concepts pertaining to historical causal explanation in the influential discourses in history education in England had overly reduced, distorted, or displaced the rich reality of historical causal explanation in the field of production they purport to describe. In some cases, the concept in the field of reproduction may even have substituted that from the field of production, perhaps leading to a situation for teachers 'living on top of a culture that has already become false' (Ortega y Gasset, 1958, p.100). This trend may therefore also apply to some of the terminology in secondary history education: either in that such terminology has lost its original meaning in the field or production or has failed to adapt with changing meanings in academic history (Van Manen, 1997). As far as possible, therefore, I wanted to explore 'everything that has slipped through the conventional conceptual net' (Adorno, 1981, p.240).

I therefore adopted social constructionism as my epistemology and phenomenology as my theoretical perspective because both indicate scepticism toward culture with both advocating that interpreters, as far as possible, 'bracket' out culture and the assumptions it imposes and look at phenomena afresh. For Crotty (1998), 'there are social constructionists aplenty who recognise that [culture] is limiting as well as liberating' (pp.58-59). Similarly, Van Manen (1997) argued that:

> The problem of phenomenological inquiry is not always that we know too little about the phenomenon we wish to investigate, but that we know too much. Or, more accurately, the problem is that our 'common sense' pre-understandings, our suppositions, assumptions, and the existing bodies of scientific knowledge, predispose us to interpret the nature of the phenomenon before we have even come to grips with the significance of the phenomenological question (p.46).

Phenomenology therefore allows the interpreter to experience the unadulterated phenomena more directly rather than in an overly mediated form - shorn of the interpreters' private preferences, inclinations and expectations or the existing theories, conceptions, and thematisations that currently overlay the phenomena (Heidegger, 1962; Marton, 1986; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Palmer, 1969; Sadler, 1969; Spiegelberg, 1982; Wolff, 1984). According to Husserl (1931), phenomenological 'reduction' invites us to 'set aside previous habits of thought, see through and break down the mental barriers which these habits have set along the horizons of our thinking' (p.43). In my literature review, therefore, I had tried to make explicit my preliminary understandings, beliefs, biases, assumptions, presuppositions, and theories to attempt to try and hold them deliberately at bay if they were at variance with the meanings I encountered in the field of production (Van Manen, 1997).

My epistemology and theoretical perspective were, therefore, self-consciously critical in that I was seeking to call into question the current meanings curriculum designers assign to phenomena (Farber, 1991; Husserl, 1970b; Larrabbe, 1990). For Crotty (1998), social constructionist research 'requires that we not remain straitjacketed by the conventional meanings we have been taught to associate with the object. Instead, such research invites us to approach the object in a radical spirit of openness to its potential for new or richer meaning' (p.51). Similarly, according to Zaner (1970), 'phenomenological philosophy is first of all philosophical criticism…I disengage from a claim in order to criticise it' (pp.79-80). In this sense, phenomenology is particularly appropriate for studies such as mine which are exercises in theorisation (Bassey, 1999). According to Crotty (1998) phenomenology 'may be viewed as essentially a starting point. One may wish to argue that it is a most valuable starting point – an essential starting point, even' (p.85). In this view, practice generates theory. As Van Manen (1997) states 'practice (or life) always comes first and theory comes later as a result of reflection' (p.15).

In particular, phenomenological research is designed to transform lived experienced and its internal structures of meaning into textual descriptions of its essence(s), reflectively revealing what our pre-reflective attitudes tend to obscure (Counsell, 2009). In Merleau-Ponty's (1962) view, 'phenomenology is the study of essences' (p.vii). 'Essence' of lived experienced is a meaning constituted of a phenomenon which make it what it is and without which it would no longer be what it is (Husserl, 1982). It is a linguistic construction describing the phenomenon which reveals the structure of the lived experience in a hitherto undeveloped way (Van Manen, 1997). According to Kelly (2003), 'phenomenology takes its start in the fundamental problem of describing accurately and completely the essential features of our everyday lived experience' (p.112).

While the social constructionist and phenomenologist might be suspicious regarding culture, they accept that culture is nonetheless what makes interpretation of meaning possible (Crotty, 1998). In certain senses, therefore, I did not and could not aim for a presuppositionless description of phenomena but instead attempted a richer, fuller reinterpretation of how the fields of production and reproduction might interrelate. Accordingly, I aimed to exploit my insider's perspective and make my own subjectivity a positive condition of the enquiry, which I judged would be in-keeping with a phenomenological theoretical perspective which privileges intuition (Counsell, 2009).

I therefore adopted a Heideggerian-Gadamerian phenomenological-hermeneutical theoretical perspective which stressed the circular interplay between myself as researcher and my phenomena (my lived experience as a 'recontextualising' history teacher) (Gadamer, 1976; Heidegger, 1962). 'Hermeneutic' phenomenology is both 'descriptive' in that it aims to more directly describe the phenomena of lived experience while at the same time being 'hermeneutical' in that it accepts there is no such thing as uninterpreted phenomena: in other words, one accepts that the phenomenological lived experiences are always meaningfully experienced via the expressions of lived experience (Sliverman, 1984; Van Manen, 1997). As Gadamer (1986) noted, 'when we interpret the meaning of something, we actually interpret an interpretation' (p.68). I therefore aimed to move back and forth between my existing assumptions and what appeared to me, repeatedly re-examining one in the light of the other (Counsell, 2009).

In Heidegger's view, structures of consciousness arise from a person's lived experience, and understanding can only be achieved via the interpreter's subjectivity in an interpretative phenomenology. As Macfarlane (2003) noted, 'a raft of largely undetectable assumptions and preconceptions affects the way we perceive and behave in a place. Our cultural baggage – our memory – is weightless – but it impossible to leave behind' (p.195). In other words, for Heidegger (1962), ontology, phenomenology, and hermeneutics were essentially unitary (Baronov, 2004; Richardson, 1963; Smith, 2018; Van Manen, 1997).

Gadamer viewed such pre-understandings as primarily historical. The tradition – which is wedded to language - that the interpreter stands in when encountering phenomena is the core of understanding the phenomena. According to Gadamer (1989), 'understanding is to be thought of less as a subjective act than as participating in an event of tradition, a process of transmission in which past and present are constantly mediated' (p.290). In other words, understanding involves an interpretative dialogue which includes the reader taking up the

Figure 3.1. The Heideggerian-Gadermerian hermeneutical circle between me (the subject) and the phenomenon (object) under investigation.


Me
Subject
Phenomenon
Object
My lived experience as a recontextualising history teacher

- Analyse my nebulous, rudimentary and undeveloped ‘pre-understandings’ of my object
- Fuller understanding of phenomenon achieved in light of systematic, estranged subjective interpretation

- Analyse the object by unfolding my nebulous, rudimentary and undeveloped ‘pre-understandings’ in light of analysing the object tradition in which one finds oneself (Van Manen, 1997). I began with rudimentary, nebulous pre-understandings about historical causal explanation derived from my past experiences – such as my postgraduate training in history, experience as an A-Level history teacher, and participation in the extended writing movement - and turned to the phenomena which were already pre-understood. By adopting a hermeneutic consciousness involving a deliberate strategy of estrangement to interrupt my pre-understandings and make the familiar strange, I hoped my data would ‘speak to me’ and I would be able to unfold, modify, or refute my previously unfledged presumptions. Then, in a hermeneutic circle, I tried to enrich and develop the starting point, iteratively repeating the process throughout the study (Crotty, 1998; Figure 3.1.).

In some respects, my research also involved analysing my own interpretative processes, hermeneutically moving between the phenomena of my lived experience and myself. In part, therefore, my own subjectivity had become part of my own object of research (Counsell, 2009). I therefore was reflecting consciously on the possibilities associated with my interpretative processes. In effect, not only was I asking ‘How do I know this to be true?’ but also ‘Why do I interpret the truth to be this?’ by considering how the phenomena appeared to me, how I could allow myself to see the phenomena in a somewhat unmediated form, and how I could use my interpretations to inform my planning, teaching, and assessment (Baronov 2004, p.123; Counsell, 2009, p.254). I adopted phenomenology, therefore, because ‘phenomenologists study *the act of interpretation* by which an object appears to our consciousness’ [original italics] (Counsell, 2009, p.270).

3.2.2. Methodology

3.2.2.1. Instrumental, theory-building, local knowledge case study

In order to answer my research questions and align with my epistemology and theoretical perspective, I adopted an instrumental, theory-building, local knowledge case study as my methodology (Crotty, 1998). I required an in-depth, multi-faceted and interpretative investigation of my class from multiple perspectives. Therefore, I sought a methodology that was 'strong in reality' by conducting a case study of my teaching of students to write an extended historical causal explanation (Adelman, Jenkins, & Kemmis, 1976, p.148; Bassey, 1999; Simons, 2009). In Flyvbjerg's (2001) view, 'getting close to reality' enables the researcher to think with their own experience and possibly enable major reappraisals of how ideas are built regarding what happens in schools. My case study was driven by a need to answer two research questions rather than a desire to understand this particular case so, in this sense, I conducted what Stake (1995) termed an 'instrumental case study' (p.3). Furthermore, I was aiming to investigate an instance thoroughly for the purposes of developing theory (Yin, 2003). In this regard, my research was a 'theory-building' case study designed to build a framework of ideas that need not necessarily display allegiance to pre-existing understandings but instead enable the researcher to open themselves to new interpretations (Thomas, 2013, p.597). Finally, the research was a 'local knowledge case study' in that I sought to take advantage of the substantial access and usable information of an institution I had previously amassed while working there (Thomas, 2013, p.598).

3.2.2.2. The research site

The research took place in a state, sixth-form college (ages 16-18) of approximately 2000 students in the south of England where I was working. The college tends to be high achieving in comparison to national averages. For example, in 2019 over 99% of students passed their General Certificate of Education Advanced Level (A Level) examinations, and over 55% achieved the grades A*-B. The college also achieved a positive rating in their most recent inspection by the Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills (OFSTED). For history specifically, in 2019 there was a 100% pass rate with over 65% of students achieving A*-B.

Given that my study involved identifying curricular goals, I deemed that this high-achieving, sixth-form college represented an opportunity to gain access to high-attaining students approaching the end of their secondary schooling who might ordinarily be expected to produce work of a high standard as judged by external examiners. These students' work, therefore, could be used to characterise the goals that younger and/or lower-attaining students might aspire to. The site therefore maximised the potential of what could be learnt in relation to the research questions (Stake, 1995). Furthermore, it was a site which was easily accessible to me as a researcher, hospitable to my enquiry, and provided participants who might be possibly willing to comment on certain draft materials (Merkens, 2004).

3.2.2.3. Bounding the case

In a doctoral project, time and resources were limited. If I had tried to focus on a case involving all of my teaching of Year 13 at my college in one academic year, more data would have been collected than could be analysed. A 'winnowing' process meant that the best analytic time could be spent on the 'best' data for answering the research questions (Stake, 1995; Wolcott, 1990). In the first instance, I bound the case by focusing on one of my Year 13 A-Level history classes (students aged 17-18) who represented a 'convenience sample' in that the participants were readily available and relevant to the aims of the study (Waterfield, 2018, p.403). The primary criterion in selecting this class was 'opportunity to learn' because I had a pre-existing relationship with them (Stake, 1995, pp.56-57). The participating class consisted of 12 students with a range of attainment levels (Table 3.2.). The students' prior

Table 3.2. Overview of the participating students.

Pseudonym	***Gender***	***Prior attainment (Mean GCSE grade)***	***Submitted booklet***	***Submitted essay***	***Final A-Level centre assessment grade***	***Class A-Level rank (/12)***	***Cohort A-Level rank (/187)***
Abigail	F	6.67	*X*	✓	B	6	86
Agnes	F	5.69	✓	✓	B	7	109
Ava	F	6.8	✓	✓	A	2	36
Cameron	M	6.22	*X*	*X*	C	10	138
Caroline	F	6.06	✓	✓	C	8	124
Elena	F	4.94	✓	✓	E	12	186
Isabella	F	5	*X*	✓	C	11	158
Jason	M	7.61	✓	✓	A*	1	8
Madeleine	F	7.23	✓	✓	A	3	45
Naomi	F	5.07	✓	✓	C	9	137
Sophie	F	6.9	✓	✓	B	4	71
Stella	F	6.9	*X*	✓	B	5	85

attainment calculated by their General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) grade ranged from 4.94 to 7.61 (with the maximum possible score being 9). Due the Covid-19 pandemic, these students did not sit A-Level examinations in 2020. Instead, secondary schools were asked to rank their cohorts based on their teachers' judgements of the students' performance over the course of their two-year A-Level course and grades were then assigned by the awarding body. The 12 students' assigned grades ranged from A* to E, and out of a department-wide cohort of 187 their ranks ranged from 8 to 186.

This class were taking my college's 'Power and Belief' early modern history A-Level pathway. In their course they studied a module titled 'The witch craze in Britain, Europe, and North America, c.1580-c.1750' (Pearson Edexcel, 2017a, pp.88-89). The case was bound temporally to the planning, teaching, and assessing one of the depth studies from this module: 'Cotton Mather and Salem Witch Hunt 1692-93' (Pearson Edexcel, 2016a, p.89). I chose this topic because I judged my existing knowledge of both the historiography in the field of production and of teaching the specification to be relatively strong based on my prior studies and teaching experience. Furthermore, the question focused on the second-order concept of causation. Causation has been a particular focus of philosophers and theorists of history, and much historiographical debate regarding the Salem witch trials has hinged on why it happened. The students studied the topic for approximately five weeks in February and March 2020 in a total of nine lessons, usually spending two 65-minute periods on the topic each week. This was the students' first experience of explicit lexicogrammatical instruction to such an extent in their history classes and none had studied the Salem witch trials in their previous schooling. They had, however, focused on the National Curriculum second-order concepts of 'causation' to some extent in their prior academic careers.

Figure 3.2. Steps of the case.

Step 1	• Read philosophies of history, theories of history by practising historians, and causal explanations from the historiography of the Salem witch trials. • Identify curriculum goals for teaching historical causal explanations of the Salem witch trials. • Adapt curriculum goals in light of reading other loci of authority such as awarding body specifications.
Step 2	• Plan resources for a 9-Lesson sequence on the Salem witch trials in light of identified curriculum goals. • Adapt curriculum goals where necessary in light of planning process.
Step 3	• Teach a 9-Lesson sequence on the Salem witch trials. • Adapt curriculum goals where necessary in light of teaching.
Step 4	• Assess students’ written work using curriculum goals. • Adapt curriculum goals where necessary in light of assessment.
Step 5	• Assess participating academics’ feedback on students’ written work using the academics’ own criteria of success. • Adapt curriculum goals where necessary in light of academics’ feedback.

When considering how to bound my case in terms of time, I also reflected on the case's 'sequence of steps' with 'each step understood as preceding in time the one that follows it' (Becker, 1992, p.209; Figure 3.2.). Step 1 involved my reading of philosophies of history, theories of history by practising historians, and the historiography of the Salem trials with the purpose of distilling historical causal explanation into essential curricular goals for the purpose of recontextualisation. It also involved refamiliarising myself with materials from the field of production that I was not allowed to ignore such as the awarding body's specifications. Step 2 entailed my planning of the nine lessons in light of my established curricular goals and adapting them where necessary: for example, if I judged them to be unattainable for 17-18-year-old students or if they might potentially negatively affect the students' chances of success in their A-Level examinations. Step 3 involved my teaching of the lessons, altering my curricular goals if necessary, when confronted with the reality of the classroom. Step 4 entailed my assessing of the students work against my curricular goals, remaining alert to the possibility that new curriculum goals may emerge in the students' work that I had not pre-empted in my planning. Step 5 involved approaching experts on the Salem trials to provide feedback to me on the students' essays to see if their judgements according to their own criteria of successful historical causal explanation aligned with mine and adapting my goals accordingly.

For Step 5, I took a purposeful 'expert' sample of participants who are especially experienced in and knowledgeable about the causes of the Salem witch crisis and were willing to share their expertise (Patton, 2018, pp.648-649; Palinkas et al. 2015). I judged an 'expert' as an individual who possessed context-dependent knowledge and experience of researching and teaching the Salem witch crisis in the field of production (in other words, at university level) (Flyvbjerg, 2006). I wanted, however, to ensure that my criteria were not so exclusionary as to overly minimise variation in participants' view to a degree that would

Table 3.3. Overview of participating academics.

Pseudonym	Based	Faculty	Example of Salem credentials	Students’ essays assessed	Rankings	Comments
A1	USA	History	Book on the Salem witch crisis	Agnes, Caroline, Jason, Madeleine, Naomi, Stella	✓	✓
A7	USA	History	Book on the Salem witch crisis	Elena, Isabella, Madeleine, Naomi, Sophie, Stella	✓	✓
A13	USA	History	Book on the Salem witch crisis	Abigail, Caroline, Elena, Jason, Madeleine, Sophie	✓	✓
A20	USA	History	Book on the Salem witch crisis	Elena, Jason, Madeleine, Naomi, Sophie, Stella	✓	✓
A22	USA	Religious Studies	Book on the Salem witch crisis	Abigail, Elena, Isabella, Jason, Madeleine, Stella	✓	✓
A2	USA	History	Book on individual in the Salem witch crisis	Agnes, Elena, Isabella, Jason, Madeleine, Sophie	✓	✓
A18	USA	Divinity	Book on individual in the Salem witch crisis	Abigail, Agnes, Ava, Elena, Madeleine, Naomi	✓	✓
A8	USA	History	Article on the Salem witch crisis	Abigail, Agnes, Ava, Caroline, Isabella, Madeleine	✓	✓
A9	UK	History	Article on the Salem witch crisis	Abigail, Caroline, Elena, Jason, Naomi, Stella	✓	✓
A11	USA	History	Article on the Salem witch crisis	Abigail, Caroline, Isabella, Jason, Madeleine, Sophie	✓	✓
A5	UK	History	Chapter on the Salem witch crisis	Abigail, Ava, Caroline, Elena, Jason, Naomi	✓	✓
A23	Canada	Social Science	Chapter on the Salem witch crisis	Abigail, Caroline, Elena, Isabella, Sophie, Stella	✓	✓
A10	USA	History	Chapter on the Salem witch crisis	Agnes, Ava, Caroline, Jason, Madeleine, Stella	*X*	✓
A14	USA	History	Chapter on the Salem witch crisis	Abigail, Agnes, Caroline, Isabella, Jason, Sophie	✓	✓
A16	USA	History	Chapter on the Salem witch crisis	Abigail, Agnes, Elena, Madeleine, Naomi, Sophie	✓	✓
A17	USA	History	Chapter on the Salem witch crisis	Abigail, Ava, Isabella, Jason, Sophie, Stella	✓	✓
A15	UK	History	Public history on Salem for national media	Agnes, Ava, Caroline, Isabella, Naomi, Sophie	✓	✓
A6	UK	History	Book covering the Salem witch crisis	Agnes, Ava, Caroline, Jason, Naomi, Stella	✓	✓
A21	UK	History	Book covering the Salem witch crisis	Abigail, Agnes, Ava, Madeleine, Sophie, Stella	✓	✓
A19	USA	History	Course on the Salem witch crisis	Agnes, Ava, Caroline, Elena, Jason, Naomi	✓	✓
A3	USA	History	Course covering the Salem witch crisis	Abigail, Agnes, Elena, Isabella, Jason, Naomi	✓	✓
A4	UK	History	Course covering the Salem witch crisis	Agnes, Ava, Isabella, Jason, Naomi, Sophie	✓	✓
A12	USA	Art History	Course covering the Salem witch crisis	Abigail, Elena, Isabella, Jason, Naomi, Stella	✓	✓
A24	Canada	History	Course covering the Salem witch crisis	Abigail, Ava, Caroline, Elena, Isabella, Naomi	✓	✓

prohibit in-depth understandings of the phenomenon (Patton, 1990). I therefore determined a possible participant's expertise if they met at least one of the following inclusion criteria: written a history book on the Salem witch crisis; written a historical biography or edited collection of writings by a key individual in the Salem witch crisis; written a historical journal article on the Salem witch crisis; written a history book chapter on the Salem witch crisis; taught a university history course on the Salem witch crisis; contributed as an expert to a national media production on the Salem witch crisis; written a history book on witchcraft that covered the Salem witch crisis; taught a university history module on either early colonial America or witchcraft that covered the Salem witch crisis (Table 3.3.).

I began by searching for the contact details of the academics from the historiography of the Salem witch trials whose works I had read and/or whose works appeared in the bibliographies of other academics whose works I had read and then approaching them by email. I then used the top ten most popular search engines in the world to find examples where 'Salem witch' was mentioned on university history department websites' academic staff information, prospectuses, and syllabuses to find the contact details of further academics who teach the Salem witch crisis at university (Chris, 2021). I repeated this process with all the search engines until I could find no more new potential participants. In total, I approached 77 academics via email. 24 of the academics I approached agreed to participate in the study.

I reconciled this inclusion of expert participants with my 'first-person' theoretical perspective in two ways. First, phenomenology can be criticised for failing to corroborate interpretations produced (Hammersley, 2012). The experts' participation, therefore, was designed to ensure my interpretation of what academic historians value regarding causal explanation applied in practice. Second, Van Manen (1997) argued the phenomenological researcher may 'borrow' others' experiences to reach a deeper understanding of the meaning of an aspect of human experience. For Van Manen (1997), 'we gather other people's experience because they allow us to become more experienced ourselves' (pp.62-63). I therefore canvassed these experts' viewpoints so that I might become more experienced as a 'recontextualising' teacher.

3.2.2.4. Limited aims

3.2.2.4.1. Manifestations

In light of my epistemology, theoretical perspective, and methodology, the status of the claims I could make was affected. First, it was inappropriate to make categorical claims about cause-and-effect relationships as a result of my teaching (Allwright & Bailey, 2004; Hammersley, 2012). Van Manen (1997), for instance, noted 'phenomenology cannot be used to show or prove, for example, that one reading is more *effective* than another reading method, or that certain instructional techniques produce higher achievement, and so forth' [original italics] (p.22). Consequently, for Research Question 2 I had deliberately limited goals for my study, searching instead for possible 'manifestations' of my scheme of work in my students' essays. I chose 'manifestation' because it allowed me to investigate *possible* examples where my teaching appeared to reveal itself in my students' work while concurrently acknowledging that any such examples cannot be definitively attributed to my teaching. I considered this conscious limitation of goals justifiable for three reasons. First, I was required to investigate natural, lived experience with a holistic methodology which precluded the formal experimentation on which positivist causal claims are predicated. Second, I envisage this research's identification of curricular goals will provide an interpretative framework for future enquiries which might seek to isolate variables and determine the approach's efficacy (Stake, 1995). Third, while my methodology forbade the assertion of causal claims, it does allow the search for patterns, consistency within conditions, and 'correspondence' (Stake, 1995, pp.78-79).

3.2.2.4.2. Trustworthiness and phenomenological nod

Similarly, in eschewing a (post-)positivist epistemology I judged it would be more appropriate to employ the concept of 'trustworthiness' rather than 'validity' and 'reliability' in my methodology (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). In investigating my lived experience, the possibility of an external researcher repeating my study and replicating it in an 'externally reliable' sense was immediately precluded. Furthermore, I wanted to explore my 'lifeworld' in its naturalistic context instead of manipulating variables to investigate cause-and-effect relationships, thus removing the possibility of achieving 'internal validity' in the sense of formal experimentation. Finally, claims regarding 'external validity' are dependent on large, randomised samples and statistical techniques regarding probability, whereas I was seeking to understand a particular case in all of its idiosyncrasy and complexity (Stake, 1988). As Van Manen (1997) noted, 'phenomenology does not allow for empirical generalisations, the production of law-like statements, or the establishment of functional relationships' (p.22).

Nonetheless, I intended the study to be rigorous and systematic in the sense that it would be well-grounded in its conclusions, dependable in its data, convincing in its analysis, and most importantly illuminating in the area being studied (Allwright & Bailey, 2004). I therefore instead adopted the concepts of 'trustworthiness' and 'phenomenological nod' as appropriate alternatives to 'reliability' and 'validity' (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Van Manen, 1997, p.27). Here, 'phenomenological nod' refers to a 'way of demonstrating that good phenomenological description is something that we can nod to, recognising it as an experience that we had or could have had' (Dowling, 2007, p.133).

Lincoln and Guba subdivided the concept of 'trustworthiness' into four criteria: credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. 'Credibility', as opposed to content validity, addresses the 'fit' between respondents' views and the researcher's representation of them (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). In terms of data collection, I ensured my prolonged engagement with the data by winnowing the case to one specific scheme of work with my smallest class of students to ensure enough time was spent to immerse myself in its issues and avoid misleading ideas (Bassey, 1999). Furthermore, to ensure that my data had been adequately checked against their sources I informed participants that a draft of my report would be made available to them so that I could check whether my interpretations accurately exemplified their intended arguments (Stake, 1995, pp.115-116).

For the data analysis, due to my phenomenological theoretical perspective in this study triangulation was not a strategy toward validity or objectivity (Fielding & Fielding, 1986; Silverman, 1985). Instead, I incorporated ‘triangulation’ to add greater breadth and depth to my knowledge of the issue under investigation and ‘trustworthiness’ (Bassey, 1999). Denzin (1978) suggested a taxonomy of triangulation protocols appropriate for case studies, of which some were appropriate to my research design. First, I adopted ‘data source triangulation’ such as drawing on different varieties of texts from the field of production when recontextualising historical causal explanation (Stake, 1995). Second, Denzin also recommended ‘investigator triangulation’ and therefore I arranged for expert academics to act as ‘surrogate readers’ and assess the students’ essays to see the extent their goals of historical causal explanation aligned with mine (Stake, 1995, p.112; Flick, 2004). Third, to some extent I achieved what Denzin termed ‘theory triangulation’ due to the fact that ‘no two investigators ever interpret things entirely the same, whenever multiple investigators compare their data, there is some theory triangulation’ (Stake, 1995, p.113).

A further criterion of ‘trustworthiness’ is dependability – where researchers ensure the process is logical, traceable, and clearly documented (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). When reporting, I have aimed to ensure that the account of the research is sufficiently detailed to give the reader confidence in the findings and also provide a 'case record' from which an external auditor might assess the research's systematicity (Stenhouse 1988, p.77).

'Confirmability', rather than 'construct validity', can only be achieved once the prerequisites of credibility, transferability, and dependability have been met. Confirmability also refers to the researcher establishing interpretations which are clearly derived from data, and demonstrating how their conclusions have been met (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). To ensure during data analysis that working evaluations were trustworthy reflections of the data, I iteratively re-tested emergent themes against the data and amended them when necessary until I judged that they accurately reflected the case. I also used my scheduled supervisions with my supervisors as 'peer debriefings' where they acted as critical friends who provided constructive criticism of drafts of the report of my research processes and outcomes.

My aims were limited in a further sense in that I was making no claims regarding generalisability and instead aimed only for tentative propositions appropriate to a phenomenological approach (Bassey, 1999). Lincoln and Guba (1985) argued that 'trustworthiness' can be achieved via 'transferability' from case to case: meaning the case is described well enough so that the reader can judge whether the findings might transfer to their site. Similarly, for Van Manen (1997) 'phenomenology goes beyond an interest in 'mere' particularity' (p.22). In this view, a successful phenomenological description adequately elucidates some essential structure of meaning in the lifeworld in that it resonates with a commonly shared sense of lived life. Accordingly, such a description should elicit a 'phenomenological nod' from the reader who is powerfully animated because they can recognise it as an experience they have had or could have had (p.27). In other words, I made no absolute claims of knowledge borne from this case study, with my tentativeness implying a possibility yet no empirically demonstrable guarantee that results *may* be replicated in different contexts. I anticipate that a particular form of analytic generalisability will be achieved not through the random assignment of subjects but instead through comparability, transferability and apparent similarity in similar but different classrooms. Furthermore, in line with my theoretical perspective, I operated with the assumption that by more fully reinterpreting the potentialities of language this study might help shape curriculum designers' inter-subjective lifeworlds, creating and changing experiential possibilities in that texts transmit meaning between individuals or communities (Crotty, 1998). I therefore had practical purposes in view in terms of how texts should be applied.

3.2.3. Methods

3.2.3.1. Data collection methods

Having settled on a case study methodology, I was obliged to use methods that ensured sufficient data were collected to explore significant features of the case, as well as ensure that the methods were appropriate and practical in relation to the research questions (Bassey, 1999). For Research Question 1, involving me researching my lived experience of 'recontextualising' historical causal explanation in the field of academic production, my data sources were philosophies of history, theories of history by practising historians, and authentic causal explanations from the historiography of the Salem witch trials.

Research Question 2 related to how students expressed their historical causal explanations in their writing. Accordingly, in a tradition common in English history-teacher research, I used the students' written work in lessons and their outcome essays as the main source of data (Counsell, 2009). Had it not been for the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, these students would have sat their final examinations that summer. In such examinations they could have been asked to answer a 45-minute essay question on this topic. At the end of the scheme of work, I therefore asked the students to answer the Pearson Edexcel (2014) sample assessment causation question '"It was the unusual political conditions operating in

Massachusetts in 1692 that explain the extraordinary events in Salem”. How far do you agree with this explanation of the Salem witch hunt of 1692?’ (p.355). My original intention had been to set a timed essay for the students in class, but due to the lockdown of schools in England from March 2020 this was not possible. Instead, I asked the students to write their essays at home under timed conditions and then submit their essays electronically.

Research Question 2 required me to investigate how the students’ classroom experiences –their reading of academic scholarship in the classroom and/or of my explicit linguistic instruction – manifested themselves in their classroom written work and essays. I therefore collected ‘supporting data’ in the form of my resources the students interacted with in order to begin clarifying the properties of their prior experience. Here, my supporting data included the extracts written by academic historians the students read in the lessons as well as the lesson resources I had created highlighting academic historians’ language that I gave to the students.

Furthermore, in order to ensure my curricular goals coincided with academics’ understandings of successful historical causal explanation, I sent a Dropbox™ link via email to each participating academic containing a random sample of six pseudonymised essays. I asked the participating academic to rank their sample from 1 (Best) to 6 (Worst). I limited the sample to six essays for ethical reasons to limit the ‘bureaucratic burden’ for the participants. I randomised the samples to ensure I had a very broad set of combinations of paired judgements for the purposes of comparative judgement. I asked the participants to draw on their professional expertise in the Salem witch trials, particularly their own views regarding what constitutes an effective academic causal explanation for the crisis. The participants were also given the option to include any justificatory comments for their rankings. I did not give the participants any indication of what specific curricular goals I had attempted to teach the students. Using the academics’ comments, I thematically analysed whether their articulated criteria for assessing the essays incorporated one of my goals; they recognised one of my goals in any discussions of the historiography of the Salem witch trials; they praised a student's essay for achieving one of my goals; they criticised a student's essay for failing to achieve a legitimate goal; or if the academic criticised my goal itself.

Such an activity aligned with my theoretical perspective for a number of reasons. First, writing fixes thought on paper and distances the text from its author and their immediate social, physical, and biographic context. At this point, what the text says rather than what the author meant to say increases in importance (Van Manen, 1997). I wanted to see the extent to which, after such a process of 'distanciation', the students' texts could realistically travel from the field of reproduction to production where they could not be 'rescued', for example by ostensive references by the author in face-to-face interactions with their teacher/assessor (Ricoeur, 1979, pp.78-80). Second, I deemed a ranking task appropriate because Ricoeur (1979) argued that competing interpretations can be ordered by 'criteria of relative superiority' (p.91).

3.2.3.2. Data analysis methods

In order to achieve a congruence with my epistemology and theoretical perspective, for both research questions I adopted qualitative data analysis methods allowing for hermeneutics. According to Van Manen (1997), 'in order to come to grips with the structure of meaning of the text it is helpful to think of the phenomenon described in the text as approachable in terms of meaning units, structures of meaning, or themes' (p.78). I employed a thematic analysis to distil the sense I made of my lived experience. Here, theme was defined as 'the form of capturing the phenomenon one tries to understand' (Van Manen, 1997, pp.87-88). A theme, however, is always, necessarily, a simplification of the fullness of the life so can only ever be a fuller description of a lived experience.

Figure 3.3. Hermeneutical circle between the ‘whole’ of students’ essays and ‘parts’ of vocabulary, clauses, sentences and paragraphs used for data analysis.



- Analyse the student’s whole essay and the nature of their historical argument.
- Analyse how the student’s whole essay relates to parts of text at the level of vocabulary, clause, sentence and paragraph.
- Draw on expert academics’ judgements about relative quality of essays.

- Analyse parts of the student’s essay at the level of vocabulary, clause, sentence and paragraph text and how these might convey historical argument.
- Analyse how parts of the student’s essay relates to their whole essay and the nature of their historical argument.

I employed a thematic analytical model for the six reasons. First, this method seemed synergistic with my epistemology of ‘exact imagination’ in that theme development is a ‘process of insightful invention, discovery, or disclosure’ (Van Manen, 1997, pp.79-86). Second, themes can be generated inductively or deductively from theory and prior research. My initial reading, my pilot study data analysis, as well as my ‘pre-understandings’ made me cognisant of potentialities of historical causal explanation to be alert to, but I did not want to preclude the possibility of themes that I had not pre-built into the research design emerging from the data. Third, Boyatzis (1998) recommended that researchers should be grounded in the field of study to best recognise codable moments, which complimented my Heideggerian-Gademerian use of hermeneutics to employ my ‘pre-understandings’ to be more aware of the potential for latent codes underlying the data. Fourth, my study was naturalistic and thematic analysis involves the process of ‘clarifying, and of making explicit, the structure of meaning of lived experience’ (Van Manen, 1997, p.77). Fifth, my data was exclusively textual, and this method of analysis allowed a phenomenon to be understood through the ‘reflective activity of textual labour’ (Van Manen, 1997, p.77). Sixth, hermeneutics often determines meaning with ‘practical purposes in view’ in that it is a form of enquiry into how texts can and should be applied (Crotty, 1998, p. 91). This practical focus was consistent with my desire for my study to serve as a heuristic for curricular re-evaluation in the characterisation of curricular goals.

I analysed the data through selected reading, where statements or phrases that seemed especially meaningful were highlighted and annotated to gain a rich but general understanding (Bassey, 1999; Figure 3.3.). I then adopted a sentence-by-sentence detailed-reading approach whereby each sentence, the basic unit of discourse, was analysed for what meaning it might reveal, with annotations again made (Ricoeur, 1979; Van Manen, 1997). This method achieved synergy with my theoretical perspective because hermeneutics - in its traditional philological sense – allowed me to systematically relate how the macro and the micro of the texts circularly acquire meaning by association and extension with one another (Crotty, 1998; Okrent, 1988). I therefore wanted to interrelate, hermeneutically, the ‘parts’ of the texts – at the levels of vocabulary, clause, sentence, and paragraph – with the ‘whole’ and analyse how historical causal explanation is conveyed in the interplay between the two in an exegetical interpretation of signs fixed in writing (Ricoeur, 1979).

I categorised data items and nascent themes emerged at which point I began developing a code. I approached the texts with certain preunderstandings about was salient and worth teaching regarding historical causal explanation. I also, however, aimed to remain open to inductive themes which might emerge. Adopting Boyatzis’ (1998) suggestion, I gave each theme a ‘label’ which attempted to communicate the essence of the theme in the fewest word possible and was close to the data; a working ‘definition’ of when the theme occurs; and ‘indicators’ of when to flag direct and indirect manifestations (p.31). I recorded examples in data matrices.

This hermeneutical analysis seemed pertinent to my study because ‘hermeneutics is at once grammatical and psychological’ – it allows the hermeneuticist to place themselves in the writer’s position and decipher the hidden intentions and assumptions behind texts, perhaps even better than the original author understood themself (Palmer, 1969, pp.88-90; Baronov, 2004; Counsell, 2009). This hermeneutical understanding itself involves a hermeneutic circle: the interpreter moves from the text to the historical and social situation of the author, reconstructing and situating the world in which the text was created, and back again (Crotty, 1998). In this sense, this philosophical-historical variation of hermeneutics can be particularly apt for interpreting historical traditions linked to interpretative communities (Crotty, 1998). In adopting a phenomenological theoretical perspective, achieving data ‘saturation’ – the point at which you can stop exploring the data because new meaning becomes undiscoverable

Figure 3.4. The hermeneutical circle between the 'main' data and the 'supporting' data to analyse manifestations Research Question 2.



Main data

Students' essays

- Confirm manifestations of the secondary data in the main data
- Identify possible manifestations from the supporting data to be analysed having analysed the main data.
- Reformulate possible manifestations in supporting data having analysed main data.
- Eliminate possible manifestations from the supporting data that were not manifested in the main data.

- Identify possible manifestations in supporting data to be confirmed in analysis of main data
- Reformulate possible manifestations in supporting data having analysed main data.
- Eliminate possible manifestations from the main data that were not manifested in the supporting data.

Supporting Data			
Direct			Indirect
Resources focusing on language students had read in context by academic historians	Language students had read by academic historians but was not focused on further in resources	Language by academic historians focused on in resources that the students had not read in context	Language similar but different to the language the students had encountered in lessons
RQ2			

- is impossible because one is, by definition, unable to construct an exhaustive interpretative description of a lived experience which will always be more complex than any written explication could encapsulate (Van Manen, 1997). Any phenomenological description can only be a single interpretation, and the possibility will always remain of another complementary or potentially richer interpretation being developed. In this sense, 'saturating the data does not make sense when doing phenomenology' (Van Manen, et al. 2016, p.4). My aims were therefore more limited and instrumental. Drawing on and adapting grounded theory, I continued to the point at which I was no longer generating new themes and/or new theoretical insights having achieved 'conceptual depth' (Nelson, 2016). Furthermore, I aimed to reach a point at which, in my case, further data collection and analysis would become 'counterproductive' (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p.136; Given, 2016; Saunders et al. 2018; Urquhart, 2013)

3.2.3.2.1. Corroborating manifestations from the supporting data in the main data

For Research Question 2, I first identified the properties of students' prior experience of the lesson sequence in the supporting data (the resources I had provided for students in lessons). These properties of experience were what I then aimed to see if they were manifested in the 'main' data – what the students went on to write. The distinguishing of 'main' and 'supporting' data allowed me to systematically answer Research Question 2 by analysing manifestations of the students' classroom experiences in their academic writing (Figure 3.4.). In analysing the data, I adopted a further hermeneutic circle relating the 'supporting' data with the 'main'.

Having identified possible themes in the supporting data I might expect to see manifested in the students' work, I then turned to the main data (the students' written work). When analysing the students' essays, I either confirmed defensible thematic manifestations of the prior experience; identified further thematic manifestations that I had not considered when analysing the supporting data; reformulated existing thematic manifestations for further analysis so that they more accurately reflect the data; or eliminated potential thematic manifestations that did not appear in the main data. I then returned to the supporting data in light of having read the main data and reformulated possible thematic manifestations to further test against the main data. This circular, iterative process was retested until the code of the thematic manifestations accurately reflected the case.

I identified corresponding examples in the main and supporting data of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ indicators. These manifestations in students’ work were intended to act as a medium for my own curricular theorising (Fordham, 2015). I subdivided ‘direct manifestation’ into three sub-divisions.

- Direct manifestation: reading and resources.

These manifestations were where I identified in a student’s written work their drawing on the language from academic history that the class had read in context in in our lessons and that I had also highlighted in my resources. For example, in Lesson 6 the students read an extract from Baker (2015) in which he argued ‘from the start it was clear that the judges **accepted** the presence of witches and dedicated themselves to rooting them out (pp.183-186). I chose to highlight the verb ‘accepted’ in my resources, for example in Lesson 8 where I asked the students to consider the counterfactual question ‘What if the Salem magistrates had not **accepted** spectral evidence?’. If and when students used the verb ‘accepted’ to characterise an individual’s actions as legitimising the events in Salem in 1692 I recorded this as a direct manifestation of reading *and* resources.

- Direct manifestation: reading

These manifestations were when I identified students manifesting in their written work language from the academic history that they had read in class that I had not thought to or had not had time in lessons to further highlight in my resources. For example, in Lesson 3 the students read an extract from Hansen (1970) in which he argued 'hysterical hallucinations of the afflicted persons were **confirmed** by some concrete evidence of actual witchcraft and by many confessions, the majority of them also hysterical' (pp.145-146). If and when students used the verb 'confirmed' to characterise an individual's actions as legitimising the events in Salem in 1692 I recorded this as a direct manifestation of reading.

- Direct manifestation: resources

Direct manifestations: resources were when I had identified language in my reading of academic history of the Salem witch trials which I highlighted in my resources to students but I had not had the time in lessons for the students to read the historian's extract from which the language came from. For example, in Lesson 6, I gave the students a resource with the model phrase '**allowed** the crisis to reach the heights it did'. I chose to include this phrase because I had read Norton (2002) where she had argued 'the governor, council, and judges of Massachusetts must shoulder a great deal of blame for **allowing** the crisis to reach the heights it did' (pp.306-308). The students, however, did not read this particular extract by Norton in lessons. If and when students used the verb 'allowed' to characterise an individual's actions as legitimising the events in Salem in 1692 I recorded this as a direct manifestation of resources.

- Indirect manifestations

I also categorised students' prior experiences into 'indirect manifestations'. Indirect manifestations were where I identified language in students' written work that was similar but different to the language that students had encountered in class and where I could later find examples of the language in the historiography of the Salem witch trials. For example, the verb ‘enabled’ to characterise an individual’s actions as legitimising the events in 1692 was not included in any of the reading and/or resources I provided to the students but was similar to verbs such as ‘accepted’, ‘allowed’, and ‘confirmed’. Although the students had not read this extract in class, I later found examples in the historiography of the Salem witch trials such as Boyer and Nissenbaum (1974) who argued ‘only a forceful counter-speech by Cotton Mather, who was in attendance that day, **enabled** the authorities to proceed with Burroughs’ hanging’ (p.13). In such circumstances I recorded this as an indirect manifestation of the students’ prior experience.

I used such analysis to help determine the extent to which my students’ achievement of my curricular goals meant they had managed to participate in the ‘discourse community’ of those who produce academic knowledge regarding the Salem witch trials (Paltridge, 2012; Swales, 1990). I drew on my analysis of the texts’ ‘parts’ to gauge the extent to which my students employed the specialised terminology of the discourse community by counting the manifestations at the sentence level to determine the extent to which students appropriated its language.

Furthermore, a discourse community tends to have a shared set of common goals; mechanisms for providing the exchange of information among one another; particular ways of communicating including its own genres; beliefs, norms, and views regarding appropriateness; and a high level of expertise in their own particular area which includes a threshold of expertise before someone is admitted to membership. To judge the extent to which my students, relative to one another, achieved these characteristics of the discourse community, I drew on the participating academics’ judgements of the ‘wholes’ of the students’ work. I used the academics’ rankings of the students as the basis of comparative judgement using the website *No More Marking*'s™ (www.nomoremarking.com) software to create a rank order in terms of effective participation in the discourse community (Benton & Elliott, 2015; Heldsinger & Humphry, 2010; Humphry & McGrane, 2015; Whitehouse & Pollitt, 2012). I ranked the students by both mean rank as well as the CJ distribution parameter θ. Comparative judgement uses the professional judgement of assessors. A judge is asked to compare the work of two students and decide which piece of work is better. From many such comparisons, a measurement scale can be created showing the relative quality of each student's work (Pollitt, 2012).

I chose to employ comparative judgement for two main reasons. First, comparative judgement might be more reliable in that people find it easier to judge one impression against an another than judging an impression in isolation. For example, it is easier to decide which of two weights is heavier rather than to estimate an individual object's weight (Jones & Inglis, 2015). In this vein, I used the CJ reliability measure of Scale Separation Reliability (SSR) (Bramley, 2015). Furthermore, one reason why I decided against using a rubric including prose descriptions of performance is because most descriptors can often be interpreted by the marker in different ways (Wolf, 1998). Comparative judgement therefore may be particularly useful when assessing responses to open tasks such as long pieces of academic writing which involve a complex mixture of criteria when judging quality (Pollitt, 2012). Comparative judgement limits the scope for assessor bias if making binary decisions rather than assigning marks. For example, a harsh assessor is likely to assign lower marks than a lenient assessor. In comparing two pieces of work, however, those same two assessors must decide which work is better, so they are more likely to produce the same outcome (Marshall, Shaw, Hunter, Jones, 2020). Furthermore, given that comparative judgement does not depend on common-person or common-item equating designs, it makes the method suitable in situations such as mine where it was not feasible to provide training to the participating academics (Wheadon, Barmby, Christodolou & Henderson, 2020).

Second, comparative judgement rather than designing a rubric may help to achieve greater confirmability in my study. Without pre-empting, I wanted to gain an insight into what academics involved in the historiography of the Salem witch trials valued in the students' essays. A rubric attempts to pre-emptively capture a construct using explicit assessment criteria and guide judges toward these predefined dimensions (Van Daal, Lesterhuis, Coertijens, Donche & De Maeyer, 2019). In this sense, rubrics can become 'hyperspecific' and define quality so narrowly that they preclude legitimate approaches to the task (Wheadon, Barmby, Christodolou & Henderson, 2020). By contrast, comparative judgement might be more suitable in assessing constructs that are deemed important but difficult to specify in mark schemes (Jones & Inglis, 2015). In this sense, it relies on the collective understanding of a relevant community of experts. Such an approach allows for flexibility in accepting that the participating experts' conceptualisation of the construct (effective historical causal explanation) might vary from one participant to another. This approach seemed more suited to my study because I wanted to allow for and avoid homogenising the diversity of thinking in the field of production and did not want to impose my goals on the participating academics.

I analysed with a Spearman Correlation Coefficient the correlation between the students' manifestations of my lesson resources that they had read in context and their rankings by the historians. I conducted this analysis to determine the extent to which my planned curricular goals were valued by the historians. I also analysed the correlation between prior attainment (as judged by attainment at GCSE) and ultimate attainment (in terms of final Centre Assessed Grade at A Level) and how the academics ranked the students' essays. Finally, I analysed the correlation between prior and ultimate attainment with how often the students' manifested the lesson resources they had read in context. I conducted this analysis to provide an indication of whether the curricular goals I aimed for in my lessons were inaccessible to students who broadly had been lower attaining in their formally assessed history education.

3.2.4. Potential risks and ethical considerations

My research received clearance from the Institute of Education, University College London's Ethics Committee and met British Educational Research Association's (BERA) guidelines. In trying to ensure my research met high ethical standards, I adopted Wilson and Stutchbury's (2009) guidelines for ethics in educational research under the categories of external/ecological; consequential/utilitarian; deontological; and relational/individual considerations (pp.69-70).

In terms of external/ecological considerations, I discussed the nature of my study with all of my relevant colleagues – for example, my principal, divisional director, and head of department – before beginning data collection. My college has partly funded my PhD and I took their views into account. In conducting my pilot research and in preparing for the main study I discussed its nature in-depth with my college's senior management and my head of department to gain their prior approval.

As the class' teacher, I was confident that I was already familiar with the values, norms, and roles of our existing classroom environment. All of the participants were over 16 years of age when the study took place, so I asked them to sign a consent form having read an accompanying information sheet outline the rationale and nature of the research. I was particularly cognisant of the unequal power relationship between my students and me. I therefore ensured that all of the activities the students participated in were routine for their A-Levels and no students were obliged to participate in additional data collection activities. One potential risk was that the students' dedicated A-Level study time would be affected due to my research. I therefore ensured that all classwork and homework was directly relatable to the students' examination specifications.

The Covid-19 lockdown of schools in England in March 2020 required me to make changes to my research design in line with ethical considerations. Due to the closure of schools, I only was only able to complete nine of the planned ten lessons in class. The tenth lesson, therefore, was conducted online via Microsoft Teams™ as per my college's policy. It was now impossible for me to collect in the students' booklets of written classwork so instead I asked the students, if they were able, to photograph or scan their work and upload it to a password-protected collaboration site. Seven of the twelve participating students did so. Furthermore, because the students' summer exams had been cancelled, in keeping with my college's policy I set the students core assignment regardless. I judged this to be ethical for the following reasons:

- The Office of Qualifications and Examination Regulation (OFQAL) and the DfE had not yet instructed colleges what evidence would be required when assigning students their A-Level grades. Until instructed otherwise, I operated with the assumption that planned core assignments might be able to contribute to a portfolio of evidence for assessing the students' grades.
- Students were informed that if they were dissatisfied with their Centre Assessment Grade then they would be allowed to enter an exam scheduled for early in the next academic year. Feasibly, therefore, at least some of the students participating in the study might need to sit such an exam on this particular topic and therefore this activity would serve as preparation for them.

- The students had worked hard on the topic for six weeks and I wanted them to have the opportunity to showcase what they had learnt and receive feedback so that they did not feel their time had been wasted.
- Some of the students intended to study history at university in the following academic year so this task could serve as preparation for them.

Beyond the usual measures I would take as their teacher to monitor their submission of core assignments, I applied no additional pressure on the students to submit their essays, which eleven of the twelve participating students did. The academics' participation could have been considered a 'bureaucratic burden', so I only sent them a sample of six of the total eleven essays so that the task did not last longer than 45 minutes. I also made clear to participants that providing additional comments explaining their rankings was wholly optional.

For relational/individual considerations, the participants were my students of several months' standing when the research commenced and, therefore, I was confident that I had built a constructive relationship with them before the research started. In my research design, I had also attempted to systematically ensure the trustworthiness of my findings in light of rigorous, specific criteria.

In regards to consequential/utilitarian considerations, I reiterated the consent form verbally to my participating students as well as explaining that they could withdraw their consent at any point. The consent form also provided details of a contact besides me who was not involved in the research that they could approach to discuss any concerns they might have. Students' data and privacy also needed to be protected. To obviate potential risk, all students' data was password-protected and pseudonymised.

I chose the focus for this study partly in response to a departmental target at my college encouraging students to read academic historical scholarship and consequently I anticipated that the study would be of immediate value to my colleagues. I have already reported the findings of my pilot at departmental meetings at a college-wide INSET day. The pilot study has already been disseminated to the wider history teaching community and I have begun the process with the main study (Carroll, 2017b, 2018, 2019). I also planned to ensure that I collected enough quality evidence on which to base my conclusions and write a good thesis.

Finally, for deontological considerations I strove to be open, honest, fair and respectful to all participants. The participants were made aware that they will be able to access my final report and although I may need to report on things that they dislike their work would be pseudonymised. I chose the topic partly due to limitations I have encountered in my students' written arguments and I therefore expected that all content and essay writing techniques covered in class were directly relatable and beneficial to the students' examination specification. In developing the study in light of their needs in this way, I was convinced that the topic would be a worthwhile area to research and would bring immediate benefits for my students. I also informed my co-workers that although I might have to report negative findings, it is extremely unlikely that my report will disparage my college as an institution.

4. Findings - Research Question 1 planning curricular goals

4.1. Findings - Research Question 1a limitations

4.1.1. RQ1aT1 – Historical causal explanation is pluralistic in the field of production

In terms of how and why historical enquiries should be conducted, the discipline is very pluralistic and context dependent because of a lack of commonly agreed canons of knowledge, substantive objects of study, technical methods, theories, and approaches (Black & MacRaild, 1997; Jordanova, 2000; Mabbett, 2007; Maza, 2017; Megill, 2007; Ritter, 1986; Tosh, 2006; Table 4.1.). As Fulbrook (2002) noted, 'the very plurality of approaches in history suggest there is in fact no single disciplinary approach' (p.7).

The case of historical causal explanation in the field of production exemplifies this lack of consensus. In twentieth-century Anglo-American analytic philosophy of history – the main form that critical philosophy of history has taken in the British and American traditions – historical explanation elicited not only 'prolonged' but 'fierce' debate (Martin, 1989, pp.8-9; Cohen, 1942; Dray, 1974; Gallie, 1964; Goldstein, 1976; Gottschalk, 1954; Mandelbaum, 1974; Stanford, 1994, 1998; Strong, 1952; Wogau, 1962). For Tucker (2004), 'historiographic explanation has probably been the main reason for philosophical interest in historiography within the analytic tradition from the Second World War to about 1970' (p.185). Practising historians concerned with theory also participated in similar debates with Dray (1964) observing 'few theoretical questions about their discipline seem to have bothered historians more than this one' (pp. 41-42). These debates were exhaustive and, in Conkin's (1974) view, 'one could suggest philosophers or historians have somewhere said everything that either could or should be said about the causal relationships cited by historians' (p.1).

Table 4.1. Overview of themes Research Question 1a limitations.

Limitations for history curriculum designer when ‘recontextualising’ causal explanation in the field of production	
Theme	***Sub-theme***
RQ1aT1 Historical causal explanation is pluralistic in the field of production	**RQ1aT1S1** Historical causal ‘explanation’ has multiple meanings in the field of production
	RQ1aT1S2 ‘Causes’ are ontologised in a variety of ways in the field of production
	RQ1aT1S3 The use of metaphor is contested in the field of production
	RQ1aT1S4 The use of counterfactuals is contested in the field of production
	RQ1aT1S5 The use of the comparative method is contested in the field of production
	RQ1aT1S6 Colligation’s causal explanatory power is contested in the field of production
RQ1aT2 Claims made by philosophers of history regarding historical causal explanation may lack empirical warrant	
RQ1aT3 Historical causal explanation has been undertheorised by practising historians	
RQ1aT4 A single historiography does not necessarily represent historical causal explanation in the field of production generally	**RQ1aT4S1** One historiography represents too small a sample to make general claims regarding historical causal explanation in the field of production
	RQ1aT4S2 Only recontextualising historical causal explanation from one historiography risks potentially promoting unfettered explanatory relativism
RQ1aT5 The awarding body homogenises historical causal explanation	**RQ1aT5S1** The awarding body portrays its view of narrative/description as incontestable
	RQ1aT5S2 The awarding body presents narrative/description as separate from historical causal explanation
	RQ1aT5S3 The awarding body presents narrative/description as undermining higher-level historical explanation
	RQ1aT5S4 The awarding body forbids choice of mode as argumentative choice

Even if the debates regarding historical causation were exhausted though, this is not to say they were resolved. After a great deal of 'non-lethal cross-fire', by the later twentieth century the debates had flagged with little consensus reached (Danto, 1965, p.215; Gardiner, 1961; Munslow, 2000; Topolski, 1991). For example, according to Martin (1989) these debates 'subsided not because the philosophical questions they addressed got answered to the satisfaction of most philosophers of history, but rather because the way these questions were debated became redundant and tiresome' (p.11).

Consequently, philosophers in the field of production have increasingly highlighted the variety of possible of types of historical causal explanation (e.g. Goode, 1977; Hammer, 2008). For example, Atkinson (1978) noted 'it is as certain as anything that there must be more than one sort of explanation in history. The first thing that becomes apparent if one tries to pick out explanatory passages from history books is their great variety' (p.95). Such plurality is evidenced even in the work of a single author. Froyeman (2009), for instance, stated 'historians use different definitions of causation in different kinds of research and, more important, different definitions of causation within the same historical study' (p.119).

For example, when surveying the historiography of the Salem witch trials, Price (2020) noted the variety of causal explanatory models found there:

> historians have used a number of interpretative models in an attempt to understand both why the 1692 Salem witch hunt occurred, and why witch prosecutions diminished in the aftermath of the Salem trials. Most theoretical models available to modern scholars have been applied to these issues (p.27).

Philosophers (e.g. Van Bouwel & Weber, 2008) and historians (e.g. Fischer, 1970) have also cautioned against making exclusivity claims regarding the inherent superiority of any one causal explanatory model. For Stanford (1994), 'historians use many types of explanation. That only one model of explanation is valid and that all the other ways of explaining things are invalid seems improbable' (p.217).

Accordingly, recently many in the field of production have increasingly called for an ‘ecumenicism’ which permits a plurality of causal explanatory models contingent on the particular question being answered (Førland, 2004, p.322; Maza, 2017, p.174; Gaddis, 2002; Gay, 1974; Jordanova, 2000; Rigby, 1995; Smith, 2011; Tosh, 2006). According to Ritter (1986), ‘by training and temperament, academic historians are traditionally pluralists and instinctively reject the idea that their mode of reasoning can be reduced to one logical form; different problems, they believe, call for different explanation procedures’ (p.148).

Such an ecumenical view can be seen in the historiography of the Salem witch trials. When surveying this historiography, trials Latner (2008) noted:

> An outpouring of scholarship has illuminated many aspects of this event, but it has not resulted in a consensus about what happened in 1692. Rather, a variety of interpretations vie for attention, most of them, happily, not incompatible with others. In the world of Salem scholarship, arguments do not close off discussion so much as add explanatory ingredients to the mix (p.137).

In sum, according to Gardiner (1961):

> remember that historical explanation is in many ways a curious affair. We might, without being too misleading, perhaps compare it to a game where there is no clearly formulated set of rules; the more we try to tighten the rules, the more difficult it is to play the game (p.99).

4.1.1.1. *RQ1aT1S1 – Historical causal ‘explanation’ has multiple meanings in the field of production*

In the field of production there is no universal consensus regarding crucial definitions such as ‘cause’, ‘causation’, and ‘explanation’ (Atkinson, 1978; Maza, 2017; Passmore, 1962; Schneider, 2015). For example, Graham (1983) observed ‘there is no obvious or entrenched applications of the concept of ‘historical explanation’ (p.24). When answering a causal question most historians tend to interpret ‘explain’ as meaning ‘explain *why*’: ‘making clearer the cause, origin, or reason' for an event and/or 'accounting for' it (Marwick, 2001; Smith, 2011, Suganami, 2011). For example, while acknowledging that in history his was not the only accepted definition, Megill (2007) stated:

> I mean by an *explanation* an attempt to say why something is the case (why it exists or existed, why it happened). One can equally well say that an explanation is an attempt to answer the question, 'What causes (or caused) E?' [original italics] (p.154).

Many in the field of production in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have viewed historical causal explanation so described as the historian's 'chief task'; 'most important responsibility'; and 'recognised duty' (Mandelbaum, 1942, p.40; Smith, 2011, p.382; Stanford, 1998, p.85; Hewitson, 2015). For instance, Førland (2004) noted 'most historians, it seems, think it is their job is to explain, that is, to tell why what happened happened' (p.322). According to Megill (2007), this definition tends to be employed most strongly by historians operating with interpretative frameworks influenced by the social sciences (e.g. Benson & Strout, 1961; Bloch, 1953; Burke, 1969; Carr, 1990; Gay, 1975). Furthermore, many in the field of production have noted that the centrality of 'explaining why' in the discipline of history is borne out by analyses of authentic historical causal explanations (e.g. Fischer, 1970; Marwick, 2001; Tucker, 2009). In Gardiner's (1961) view 'it is an obvious fact that explanation, the 'seeing of connections', runs through all history' (pp.68-69). 'Explaining why' also seems to have been the predominant causal historiographic exercise for historians of the Salem witch trials. Ray (2015), for instance, observed 'historians have repeatedly asked *why* Salem's witch hunt became so widespread, lasted so long, and spiralled so dangerously out of control' [my italics] (p.2).

For some in the field of production, however, this definition of causal explanation should be broadened to include (or perhaps even be replaced with) 'explain what'. Watts (2016) noted, 'I wonder how much today's historians are really concerned with causation' (p.157). Here, 'explain what' is synonymous with 'explicate', 'elucidate', 'make plain or intelligible', 'make clear', or 'make known in detail' (Atkinson, 1978, p.98; Danto, 1965, p.211; Megill, 2007, p.131; Suganami, 2011, p.271; Bevir, 1999; Dray, 1964, Lemon, 1995, Marwick, 2001; Veyne, 1984). Such scepticism toward 'explaining why' has been driven by a number of disciplinary developments. Such recent trends include a growing suspicion regarding employing natural-scientific methods into history and the linguistic, semiotic, cultural, and post-colonial 'turns' in certain historical sub-disciplines (Bevir, 2007; Hewitson, 2015). Such views are evinced in the historiography of the Salem witch trials with Ray (2015), for example, choosing to causally explain *how* the trials unfolded rather than *why*:

> This book, then, not only concerns the history of the Salem witch trials but it also lays bare some of the challenges of writing that history. It focuses on how the witch trials unfolded and less on the question of why, which is more limiting and often results in a simplistic verdict of a single cause. The Salem witch trials are not a 'cold case' to be solved but a tragedy to be investigated in all of its complexity of who, what, where, when, and how (p.13).

4.1.1.2. RQ1aT1S2 – 'Causes' are ontologised in a variety of ways in the field of production

In the field of production, there is no universal consensus regarding how the historian should ontologise a 'cause'. For instance, interpretative frameworks influenced by social science which stressed the causal importance of 'conditions' such as Freudian psychohistory, Marxism, and the *Annales* school were particularly influential in the mid-twentieth century (Gay, 1974; Maza, 2017; Megill, 2007). The ascription of causal importance to conditions might sometimes be due to historians' metaphysical assumptions regarding how human behaviour works (Gottschalk, 1954). Northcott (2008), for instance, noted 'a claim often heard, from Marxists and others, is that the deep structural factors underpinning history are the only truly important ones' (p.85). Fischer, writing in 1970, observed:

> historians have assumed that a causal explanation is one that identifies 'underlying conditions' which were of such a nature that they rendered the effect probable. This is perhaps the most common of all forms of causal explanation in historical scholarship (pp.185-186).

Historians in the historiography of the Salem witch trials such as Boyer and Nissenbaum (1976), Demos (1982), and Karlsen (1989) particular stressed the causal importance of 'conditions'. For example, when discussing the patriarchal conditions of seventeenth century New England witchcraft beliefs Karlsen argued:

> witchcraft possession in early New England, then, was an interpretation placed upon a physical and emotional response to a set of social conditions that had no intrinsic relationship to witches or the Devil. The conditions were in some respect specific to Puritan New England, but they are also evident in other societies. Like women in other times and places, the New England possessed were rebelling against pressures to internalise stifling gender and class hierarchies (pp.250-251).

In the view of their critics, such arguments stressing conditions tend to produce mechanistic explanations of human behaviour which downplay human agency. 'A reduction', according to Turner (1999):

> of history to long-term, impersonal causes easily gives rise to a deterministic version of the past that lends a spurious air of high probability to what happened and blots out the effects of contingencies that spring from immediate circumstances and individual choices (p.305).

Others in the field of production, for instance those influenced by 'idealists' of the mid-twentieth century such as Collingwood (1946) and Oakeshott (1933), are more likely to stress that history, unlike science, is the study of rational human beings who exercised free will. Accordingly, such historians often instead adopt an intentionalist ontology where the object of study becomes individuals' 'outside' actions which are understood by empathising with the agents' thoughts, intentions, and reasons (Dray, 1957). According to Oakeshott, 'in the individual human will is to be found the cause of all events; all other causes are subsidiary to this; history cannot look behind it and does not require to look beyond it for a principle of explanation' (p.100). Robinson (1991) provides an overt example of an intentionalist argument in the historiography of the Salem witch trials. In emphasising the importance of Putnam and Parris, Robinson argued 'at the core of this tragedy lies a darker explanation, which form the subject of this book. The Salem witch hunt was driven by conspiracies of envious men intent on destroying their enemies' (p.xiv).

For many in the field of production, however, condensing historical causal explanation to a discussion of intention is reductionist (e.g. Graham, 1983). According to Bloch (1963), 'we should seriously misrepresent the problem of causes in history if we always and everywhere reduced them to a problem of motive' (p.195). Consequently, Collingwood's model has never won majority support among historians (Atkinson, 1978). According to Tucker (2004), 'idealists and phenomenological self-consciousness cannot form the foundation for historiographical consensus' (p.204). Most routinely, the model is accused of completely eliminating the causal role conditions play in shaping human action. For Tucker, 'understanding historical agents in their own terms, ignoring the vast evidence for the factors that change their consciousness, can only offer a shallow and superficial knowledge of history' (p.202).

Even among those in the field of production who also stress the importance of individual human action in historical causal explanations, Collingwood's model has been accused of eliminating other drivers of change such as emotion, unconscious decision-making, irrational choices, and unintended consequences which are often evoked in historians' causal explanations (Gallie, 1964; McCullagh, 1998; Paul, 2015; Stanford, 1998; Topolski, 1991). In the historiography of the Salem witch trials, for instance, we encounter causal explanations alluding to irrationality (e.g. 'an irrational burst of scapegoating' (Fels, 2017, p.127)); lack of consciousness (e.g. ‘Parris unconsciously helped set the scene for the climax’ (Boyer & Nissenbaum, 1976, p.168)); emotion (e.g. ‘emotional tinderboxes’ (Hoffer, 1996, pp.63-65)); and unintended consequence ‘(e.g. ‘Samuel Parris did not deliberately provoke the Salem witchcraft episode’ (Boyer & Nissenbaum, 1976, pp.176-177)), none of which appear to neatly conform to the Collingwoodian model.

If broadened to include non-intentional explanations of individual action, some in the field of production judge the exercise of human will to be ultimately what makes history happen – therefore assigning it greater causal importance (e.g. Elton, 1970). For example, in the historiography of the Salem witch trials, particularly in the 1990s, a number of historians stressed human action widened from a strict focus on intention (e.g. Gragg, 1992; Le Beau, 1998). For instance, Baker (2015) stated ‘key events in history are tied to a web of contingency in which the choices people make alter the course of human events. This is no less true of the Salem witch trials’ (p.12). Furthermore, according to some in the field of production the historian might seek to explain the human actions that caused a structural condition to exist (Elton, 1970; Little, 2010; Tranøy, 1962). According to Hewitson (2015), ‘individuals’ actions help to set the conditions, including the organisational ones, in which later actions occur’ (p.221). Some historians in the historiography of the Salem witch crisis argued to this end. For example, Robinson (1991) argued ‘Cotton Mather skilfully and cunningly had laid the groundwork for the witchcraft delusion which erupted in February 1692’ (pp.54-55).

The debate regarding the inherent causal superiority of any one type of cause has not been settled conclusively in the field of production. Fulbrook (2002), for instance, noted ‘the issue of structural determination versus individual agency has continued to perplex and divide historians, with some tending to emphasise the former, others the latter’ (p122). As a consequence, in the field of production historians are generally vaguer in their definitions of terms such as ‘causation’ and ‘cause’ than participants in other disciplines such as experimental science (Atkinson, 1978; Schneider, 2015; Maza, 2017; Tranøy, 1962; Walsh, 1962; Weingartner, 1961). For Ritter (1986), historians ‘normally display loose conceptions of causality’ (p.34). Weigall (2002) provided an example of this type of broad definition, characterising historical ‘causation’ as ‘the representation of historical events, conditions, and process as consequences of prior conditions and/or human actions’ (p.108).

Correspondingly, the phenomena historians might assign the role of ‘cause’ are heterogenous, incorporating both the natural and the human (Olafson, 2001; Stanford, 1998). According to Tosh (2006), historical ‘causation in particular is always multiple and many-layered, owing to the manner in which different areas of human experience constantly obtrude on one another’ (pp.152-153). Generally, therefore, those in the field production now accept an explanatory bricolage is required – a conclusion exemplified by most works of authentic academic history (Førland, 2004; Furay & Salevouris, 2000; Hewitson, 2015; Iggers, 1985; McCullagh, 1998; Stanford, 1998; Paul, 2015; Topolski, 1991). In the historiography of the Salem witch trials, for instance, Ray (2015) argued ‘it is essential that we understand the religious and sociocultural context as well as the diverse historical contingencies and individual human actions that came together in Essex County in 1692’ (p.5).

Accordingly, some in the field of production have noted it is unusual for historians to use connectives such as ‘so’, ‘therefore’, or ‘because’ to explain historical causal relationships because they nullify one’s ability to argue regarding the great variety of causal roles present in historical causal explanation (Berlin, 1966; Gallie, 1964). Gardiner (1961), for instance, observed:

> The historian may make singularly little use of explanatory signposts like ‘because’, ‘since’, ‘on account of’, ‘for the reason that’, and so forth. A look through any history book shows that the comparative rarity of the occurrence of these terms (pp.67-68).

According to Fischer (1970), while connectives such as ‘because’ may be found in historian’s explanations, they instead tend to be used as a conjunction in a logical proposition rather than a causal one (p.180).

Similarly, according to some in the field of production words broadly applicable across different causal questions such as ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ are used relatively sparingly by historians (Atkinson, 1978; Cohen, 1942; Fischer, 1970; Gardiner, 1961; Scriven, 1966; Tranøy,1962; Wogau, 1962). Veyne (1984), for instance, observed that ‘the word “cause” is much more used in books on history than in history books, in which you can go through five hundred pages of narrative without coming across it even once’ (p.91). In this view, historians are instead more likely to employ circumlocutions in the form of ‘causal verbs’ and noun phrases rather than overt explanatory signposts (Nolan, 2013, pp.325-326; Dahl, 1967; Dray, 1957; Scriven, 1966). For Gottschalk (1954), ‘historians ought to use the word *cause*, and even the word *causes*, sparingly and instead, breaking down the concept into its component parts, cultivate more precise words’ [original italics] (p.227). In this quest for argumentative precision, some in the field of production even warn against other broadly applicable causal language such as ‘due to’ or ‘led to’. Storey (2013), for instance, advised ‘“due to” is a bullet worth dodging’ and ‘saying “led to” is often vague’ (p.116).

4.1.1.3. RQ1aT1S3 – The use of metaphor is contested in the field of production

Little consensus exists in the field of production regarding the appropriacy of metaphors in written historical causal explanations. In terms of philosophy of history, for the positivist philosopher Hempel (1942) any historical causal explanation incorporating metaphor is necessarily explanatorily deficient because, by definition, metaphors lack empirical warrant.

Gardiner (1961), meanwhile, cited Marxians' use of imagery such as 'base' and 'superstructure' to warn that metaphors can lead to the historian manipulating evidence into a priori arguments. For Gardiner, 'metaphor may be dangerous, [and] may outlast its temporary *ad hoc* function of providing a picturesque but not too serious analogy, and live on to colour the remainder of a historian's work' (p.57).

By contrast, for other philosophers, metaphor is central to historical causal explanation. For deconstructionists influenced by White (1999), causal explanations on the macro level occur not through referential correspondence or inferential thinking. Instead, causal explanation is achieved precisely through the type of metaphoric prefiguration Gardiner warned against as the historian 'emplots' their perceptions of evidence into already widely understood modes such as tragedy, romance, satire, and comedy (Munslow, 2000). According to White (1978):

> properly understood, histories ought never to be read as unambiguous signs of the events they report, but rather as symbolic structures, extended metaphors, that 'liken' the events reported in them to some form with which we have already become familiar in our literary culture (p.84).

Accordingly, for Munslow (2007) 'if a history is emplotted as a tragedy, it is 'explained' as a tragedy' (p.38). For other philosophers, metaphors in historical causal explanation are employed at the micro level of the singular descriptive statement (e.g. McCullagh, 1998) or colligatory generalisation (e.g. Dray, 1964). For example, the philosopher Kellner (1989) identified in historiography:

> Middle-level, regulative metaphors of history, which generate explanations rather than adorn them: the organic features of growth, life-cycles, roots, seeds and so on; the figures of time with their rises and falls, weather catastrophes, seasons, twilights; the figures of movement

> (flow of events, crossroads, wheels); the technical figures of construction, gears, chains; theatrical figures of stage, actors, context (p.8).

In this limited sense, for McCullagh (1993) ‘there is no doubt that historical interpretations often do rest upon metaphors’ (p.23).

Similarly, disagreement exists among historians regarding the suitability of metaphor in historical causal explanation. On one hand, while not dismissing metaphor outright, Marius and Page (2007), Marwick (2001), and Storey (2013) all recommended judiciousness because metaphor can quickly descend into cliché and fail to ring true to the reader. By contrast, some such as Jordanova (2000) suggested metaphor is important for historians when they characterise historical periods’ epitomes. Furthermore, Gaddis (2002) claimed that metaphor is useful in theory generation. According to Gaddis:

> I make no apologies for metaphors…If metaphors help us think – if, to use yet a final one, they can open windows and let in fresh air – then we have every reason to rely on them, and to do so unashamedly. We need all the help we can get (p.128).

Middle-level metaphors are evidenced in the historiography of the Salem witch trials. For example, Boyer and Nissenbaum (1976) argued:

> When ‘Salem witchcraft’, like some exotic cut flower, is plucked from the soil which nurtured it – or, to change the image, when the roles assigned to the actors of 1692 are shaped by a script not of their own making then this terrible event cannot rise above the level of gripping melodrama. It is only as we come to sense how deeply the witchcraft outbreak was rooted in the prosaic everyday lives of obscure and inarticulate men and women, and how profoundly those lives were being shaped by powerful forces of historical change that the melodrama begins to take on the harsher contours of tragedy (p.12).

In this example, Boyer and Nissenbaum compared the Salem witch crisis to a plant and play (‘script’, ‘roles’, ‘actors’, ‘melodrama’, ‘tragedy’) in a single paragraph.

4.1.1.4. RQ1aT1S4 –The use of counterfactuals is contested in the field of production

Counterfactuals – even in their ‘restrained’ form – are a matter of ‘fierce debate’ in the Anglophone field of production – particularly from historians operating with interpretative frameworks that attempt to subsume historical causal explanations under regularities such as the *Annales* school and Marxism (Kożuchowski, 2015, pp.337-338; Maar, 2014; Nolan, 2013; Roberts, 2004; Ritter, 1986). For instance, Black (2015) noted there is a ‘perception that [counterfactualism] is not of particular value in individual branches of the subject’ (pp.187- 188). Some of the most categorical dismissals of counterfactuals have come from Marxian historians such as Carr (‘a parlour game’, 1990, pp.96-98); Thompson (‘unhistorical shit’, 1978, p.108); and Hobsbawm (1997). Dismissals of counterfactualism often hinge on the fact that, in this view, counterfactuals fail to conform to the historical epistemology regarding what can be known about the past (Evans, 2008a, 2008b). According to Hobsbawm, for example, ‘arguments about counterfactual alternatives cannot be settled by evidence, since evidence is about what happened and hypothetical situations did not happen’ (p.370). While such critics might concede that counterfactualism regularly appears in authentic historical causal explanations, in this view it does not follow that this is necessary or desirable (e.g. Gerschenkron, 1967). Evans (2014), for instance, stated that for the purpose of historical causal explanation counterfactualism ‘is not central at all’ (p.176).

By contrast, others in the field of production stress counterfactualism’s centrality in historical causal explanation and that is regularly employed by historians, even if only implicitly (e.g. Black, 2015; Bunzl, 2004; Cochran, 1969; Green, 1970; Hewitson, 2015; Jordanova, 2000; Kaye, 2010; Lewis, 1973; Maar, 2014; Stanford, 1994; Tetlock & Parker, 2006; Walsh, 1967). For Gaddis (2002), ‘historians use counterfactual reasoning all the time in establishing causation' (p.103). In the strongest form of this view, counterfactuals alone provide the justification for causal claims in history because historical causation is defined as

Figure 4.1. Boyer and Nissenbaum's series of structural counterfactuals.

Boyer & Nissenbaum (1974) pp.107-109

The answer, obvious perhaps, seems to lie in the convergence of a specific and unlikely combination of historical circumstances at this particular time and place.

To begin with, *physical setting.* **If** the village **had been** an isolated agricultural community, off in the back country, then Salem Town **would hardly have loomed** so large in its consciousness. A dissident group **might still have arisen**, but its presence, lacking any nearby source of real or symbolic support, **would not have seemed** so acutely threatening to the Village's stability.

Lack of autonomy. But whatever its physical proximity to the Town, **if** Salem Village **had been granted** full political and ecclesiastical independence in 1672 (or even, conceivably, in 1689) it **might have been** able to develop strong institutions of its own – institutions which **would have given** it the political strength to resolve its factional problems.

But a *taste of independence***. If,** alternatively, "Salem Farms" **had remained** completely a part of the Town the region **would not have developed** any institutions at all – meetinghouse, legal meetings, Committee, or minister – and so **would have had** no peg on which to hang its separatist impulses. Even though serious problems **would certainly have persisted** after 1672, a single town, physically and institutionally undivided, **might have been** able to contain those problems within tolerable limits.

Coupled with a *lack of power in Town politics.* The Villagers, were, after all, still able to vote in Town elections and eligible to hold Town offices. **If** they **had enjoyed** anything like political parity with the Town, their political impulses **might have found** meaningful expression, and their grievances at least partial resolution. But as matters turned out, their numerical weakness was such that only on rare occasions were they able to use the Town's political apparatus as a weapon in Village conflicts. (The contrast here between Salem and other towns which experienced similar separatist conflicts in these years is striking. In Dedham, Massachusetts, for example, no fewer than five distinct outlying communities managed early in the seventeenth century to form ad hoc political alliances with each other which enabled them to manoeuvre very effectively in the arena of Dedham politics).

Finally, *a weak stick in Boston.* **If** authorities at the provincial (not to say imperial) level **had exerted** a stronger and more consistent hand in settling matters, Salem Village factionalism **would certainly never have flowered** as luxuriantly as it did. But like vacillating or argumentative parents, the provincial authorities evoked neither affection nor deference from either Village faction. Those authorities had to be reckoned with at every point, to be sure, but more as an unpredictable and capricious obstacle than as a firm source of policy.

If any one of these circumstances **had been significantly different**, it is possible that Salem would be remembered today simply as the oldest town in the colony, and as the home of Nathaniel Hawthorne – not as the site of one of the most notorious events in New England history.

a counterfactual dependence between two events (Ankersmit, 1983; Kożuchowski, 2015; Megill, 2007; Stanford, 1998). According to Lebow (2008) ‘counterfactuals are critical to good history. They are fundamental to all causal statements. If we claim that *x* caused *y* we assume *y* would not have happened – *ceteris paribus* – in the absence of *x*’ (p.92). As a consequence, in this view ‘counterfactuals, causes, and explanations are three sides of the same strange three-sided coin; you cannot have one without the other two’ (Bulhof, 1999, p.147). In the historiography of the Salem witch trials, perhaps the most pronounced example of counterfactualism came from Boyer and Nissebmaum (1974) who posited an extended series of counterfactuals regarding the institutional arrangements of Salem Village in relation to Salem Town and how these arrangements contributed to the crisis (Figure 4.1.).

Given the historian is discussing the contrary to fact, many in the field of production consider it inappropriate to talk of the ‘truth’ of counterfactuals (e.g. Evans, 2014; Fischer, 1970). According to Vincent (2005):

> The issue raised is whether B could have happened had A been absent. Or, with a slight difference of inflection, had A (say, American slavery) persisted, could B still have happened? Nobody can know, for A was not in fact absent or left to persist. We are in the realm of insight…not truth (p.74).

Instead, historians often appear to employ ‘certain rules’ when assessing the *plausibility* of counterfactual claims (Gaddis, 2004, pp.100-102; Stanford, 1998; Lebow, 2008). For example, ‘counterfactual history’, according to Black (2015), ‘benefits from being subject to the same disciplined analytical rules as conventional approaches, in order to exclude anachronism, possibilities without evidence, and unweighed likelihoods’ (p.190). Some advocates of counterfactuals such as Bunzl (2004), Ferguson (1997), and Tetlock and Parker (2006) have sought to render such plausibility conditions explicit. These criteria, however, are not universally acknowledged, accepted, or employed by historians (Evans, 2014). Kożuchowski (2015), for instance, argued such theorists ‘advocate adhering to more rigid criteria which virtually dismiss the vast majority of counterfactuals as they appear in historiography' (pp.337-338).

The case of counterfactualism can also be used to exemplify a broader debate regarding the appropriacy of ascriptions of responsibility in historical causal argument. Critics of counterfactualism suggest it can descend into an unsuitable moral judgement of historical agents because they over-rely on hindsight; anachronistically adopt the moral standards of the historian's time when re-enacting the historical agent's decision making; and often descend into wishful thinking because the counterfactual historian, perhaps unconsciously, will want to indicate that they are of at least equal moral fortitude, boldness, and acumen as the historical actor they are judging (Hobsbawm, 1997). Evans (2014), for instance, criticised some counterfactualists because they:

> all do what historians should never do: they lecture the people of the past how they should have done better. Do we really think we could have avoided the mistakes they made? Of course, it's easy to succumb to the temptation. But we should resist it (p.30).

An anti-moralist stance, perhaps best exemplified by Demos (1970), is most evident in the historiography of the Salem witch trials in the 1970s and 1980s when social science methodologies were particular dominant. While acknowledging that Salem scholarship up until the mid-twentieth century 'can be viewed, in large measure, as an unending effort to judge the participants and, above all to affix blame', Demos argued:

> clearly these questions of personal credit and blame can still generate lively interest, but are they the most fruitful, the most important questions to raise about witchcraft? Will such a debate ever be finally settled? Are its partisan terms and moral tone appropriate to historical scholarship? (pp.1311-1312).

For more recent advocates of counterfactualism, value judgements – both positive and negative – regarding the wisdom of historical actors according to the historian's moral or ideological standards are appropriate and the heuristic can be employed to this end (Kożuchowski, 2015). In this view, the historian considers the options available to the agent in the past, the way the agent considered those options, and the reasons for the agent's ultimate choices (Black, 2015). For Bulhof (1999), 'in order to think that one individual made the right choice, we have to think counterfactually, to think along the lines of 'if she had not done *x*, some good thing would not have happened…history is bound to make such judgements' (p.147). In this view, this type of counterfactual evaluation allows the historian to judge whether an individual such as a 'general', 'politician', or other 'important figure' was 'good'; determine the appropriateness and extent of 'regret' and 'pride' they should generate; and ascribe 'praise' or 'blame' accordingly (Bulhof, 1999, pp.145-146; Kożuchowski, 2015, p.340; Nolan, 2013, pp.331-332). Such value judgements can then also be applied to ascriptions of causal responsibility for historical events.

We encounter this type of counterfactual value judgement in some causal arguments from the historiography of the Salem witch trials, particularly from historians who seek to emphasise human 'choice' (e.g. Hoffer, 1997, p.6). For example, when explaining Parris' responsibility after the initial accusations against Tituba, Sarah Good, and Sarah Osborne Hoffer argued that:

> Although the girls had extended their accusations to Nurse, whose status and reputation in the Village were impeccable, [Parris] refused to stem the tide or even divert it. There were demons and he wanted to exorcise them. It **would have taken** a special kind of courage to try and stop the momentum of accusation, and **he had never shown** such courage (p.98).

Value judgements such as Hoffer's are indicative of the wider 'new ethical direction' in the historiography of the Salem witch trials since the 1990s in which historians have been more willing to adopt victim-perpetrator paradigms (Fels, 2017, pp.131-133).

4.1.1.5. RQ1aT1S5 –The use of the comparative method is contested in the field of production

The appropriacy of the ‘method of difference’ in historical explanation is also disputed in the field of production. Haupt (2007), for instance, dubbed comparison for the purposes of causal explanation ‘the contested method’ (p.697). For some, comparison is almost ubiquitous in historical causal explanation, even if it often remains implicit, eclectic, and ad hoc (Berger, 2003; Baldwin, 2004; Bloch, 1953). For Kershaw and Lewin (1997), ‘in some senses, all history is comparative, even if unwittingly so. Like Molière’s Monsieur Jordain who did not know that he was using prose, we engage in comparison without always realising it’ (p.2). In this view, for example, the identification of historical causal questions is predicated on comparison, because the historian generally seeks to explain an abnormal or unusual course of events (Barraclough, 1991; Bloch, 1953; Van den Bramebussche, 1989; Marwick, 2001; Stanford, 1998). Kocka (2003), for instance, argued that ‘the comparative approach is indispensable for asking and answering causal questions’ (pp.40-41). For some who stress comparison’s ubiquity, any such appeal to uniqueness, peculiarity, or unusualness relies on a comparison with (a perhaps implicit) ‘contrast class’ which is common, ordinary, and normal (Lorenz, 1987).

For example, many historians have stressed the uniqueness of the Salem trials in the broader context of seventeenth-century New England with Ray (2015) noting that the ‘notorious Salem witchcraft episode of 1692 is different from any other witch-hunt in New England. More extreme in every respect, it lasted longer, jailed more suspects, condemned and executed more people, and ranged over more territory’ (p.1). Salem’s very exceptionality means historians such as Norton (2002) have argued that ‘the sheer numbers of accusers and accused alone cry out for explanation’ (p.8).

On the other hand, the value of the comparative approach is questioned by some in the field of production - particularly among those who question the 'scientificity' of history. Such critiques tend to stress that many of the prerequisites of the scientific comparative method are unfeasible in historical causal explanation. First, such critics are sceptical regarding the possibility of isolating causes when causally explaining historical phenomena. As Cohen (2004) warned, 'is it in fact possible to build arguments by isolating critical factors? And how do historians, who are, after all, not white-coated rationalists operating in a laboratory, disentangle one factor from another?' (pp.62-64). Consequently, some such as Espagne (1994) argue comparison risks downplaying the interplay between causes. According to Stanford (1998), causes 'are not independent of each other. In practice they react upon each other, so that the presence of one can strengthen or weaken the effect of another' (p.137). Furthermore, as Haupt (2007) conceded, 'in adopting the comparativist method, the danger of reductionism is a given' (pp. 707-708). The isolation of causes has led some critics to suggest comparison downplays the ecological, multi-causal, nature of historical causal explanation. According to Cohen (2004) for instance, 'comparativists are often caught in a mono- or bicausal trap' (pp.62-63). Finally, the historian's inability to generate their own data means a relative scarcity of comparable cases (Froeyman, 2009). As Kershaw and Lewin (1997) admitted:

> a conventional theoretical objection is embodied in the claim that historical knowledge is derived from unique, non-repeatable events – in contrast to those fields of knowledge which relate to phenomena capable of repeating themselves, about which generalisations can be drawn and conceptual constructs erected (p.1).

By the late twentieth century, even the comparative method's advocates accepted it did not represent a complete or infallible path to historical causal explanation (Kershaw & Lewin, 1997; Skocpol & Somers, 1980). Miller (2004), for instance, urged caution when noting 'it is not a panacea and scarcely 'the best way'' (p.131).

4.1.1.6. RQ1aT1S6 – Colligation’s causal explanatory power is contested in the field of production

Some in the field of production suggest colligation is an inherent feature of historical language (e.g. Kuukkanen, 2015) (for a definition of ‘colligation’ see ‘1.1.2.3. Convergent evolution’ pp.37-43). Initially, Walsh (1951) claimed that colligation was a ‘peculiarity’ of historical causal explanation, suggesting that it encapsulated the specificities of the historical epistemology more fittingly than strict positivist or idealist theories (pp.23-24; Dray, 1989). Furthermore, in his view his theory had greater empirical warrant than competing philosophical claims. According to Walsh, colligation was a process ‘which historians do use, and therefore any account of historical explanation should find a place for it’ (p.62).

Walsh’s initial claim that colligation was in itself, causally explanatory ignited a debate: ‘does colligation give us a legitimate mode of explanation?’ (Stanford, 1998, p.82). Perhaps the most thoroughgoing critique came from Levich (1965) who argued that Walsh’s theory offered no issue to positivist accounts of historical causal explanation. In Levich’s view, colligation (‘how should *it* be regarded?’) and positivist causal explanations subsumed under covering laws (‘why did *it* happen?’) answer fundamentally different questions [original italics] (Dray, 1989, pp.40-41). Particularly in response to Levich’s critique, Walsh (1974) later tempered his views by suggesting that colligation should instead be seen as a broader interpretative undertaking which facilitates historical understanding in a more general sense. He came to argue ‘we use [colligation] for other purposes too, to characterise and analyse, and in doing so commonly aim at producing understanding and enlightenment rather answers to the question “Why?”’ (pp.136-137). Additionally, Walsh (1951) always acknowledged that colligation was only one explanatory procedure (although, in his earlier view, colligation was the only specifically historical one).

Furthermore, concern exists among some historians regarding the overuse of nominalisation in academic historical writing. Antanova (2020), for instance, pointed out that nominalisations might be appropriate when the historian wishes to emphasise the result of actions with little interest in who acted (for example, ‘organisation’) (p.143). If, however, the historian wishes to emphasise process or action then the verb (for instance, ‘organise’) provides more argumentative clarity.

4.1.2. RQ1aT2 – Claims made by philosophers of history regarding historical causal explanation may lack empirical warrant

Claims made by analytic philosophers of history regarding historical causal explanation have been criticised by their peers for being highly oversimplified, lacking empirical warrant, or incorrect (Dray, 1964; Goldstein, 1976; Goode, 1977; Ling, 1966; Mandelbaum, 1942; Olafson, 1979; Passmore, 1962; Tucker, 2009; Weingartner, 1961). According to Van den Braembussche (1989), analytic philosophers of history ‘have not provided sufficient empirical validation for their explanatory theories’ (pp.1-2). Consequently, according to this view analytic philosophy is often prescriptive and normative rather than descriptive: it answers questions regarding historical causal explanation a priori and then uses said answers as the basis of methodological recommendations (Graham, 1983). For instance, Gardiner (1961) noted ‘the philosopher who claims to have discovered the essence, simple and distilled, of historical explanation is in danger of laying himself [sic] open to the embarrassing accusation that he [sic] is trying to teach the historian how he [sic] ought to write history’ (pp. xi-xii). From this perspective, philosophers have neglected the practical realities of writing historical causal explanations (Martin, 1989; Teggart, 1942). ‘Discussions of historical explanation have suffered’, according to Topolski (1991), ‘from being isolated from analysis of the changing praxis of historians’ (p.324). Furthermore, philosophers have been accused of failing to conduct systematic analyses of authentic historical explanations (Froeyman, 2009). Weinryb (1975), for example, stated that the ‘original sin of analytical philosophy is its unsystematically causal use of historical examples. Philosophers have based pretentious theories on a deplorably small number of examples’ (p.33).

4.1.3. RQ1aT3 – Historical causal explanation has been undertheorised by practising historians

According to some participants in the field of production, there is a scarcity of theorisation of historical causal explanation by practising historians (Ball, 1972; Martin, 1982; Passmore, 1962; Teggart, 1942; Tranøy, 1962). For example, Atkinson (1978) noted ‘if there is a key to an understanding of history and with it historical explanation, it is that it is a study which has achieved the highest level of sophistication and professionalism, *without becoming theoretical*’ [original italics] (p.138). Historians have also noted this tendency among their peers (Fischer, 1970; Hewitson, 2015; Megill, 2007). Gay (1974), for instance, pointed out ‘normally, the historian is reluctant to theorise about causes’ (p.3). Furthermore, historians have also often been leery about appropriating theorisation regarding historical causal explanation from analytic philosophy of history, resulting in what Olafson (1979) dubbed a ‘*dialogue de sourds’* [dialogue of the deaf] (p.3; Dray, 1966; Elton, 1969; Evans, 1997; Jordanova, 2000; Mandelbaum, 1942; Martin, 1989; Mink, 1966; Newman, 1968; Tucker, 2004; Weinryb, 1975). For example, Munslow (2000) noted ‘historians do not tend to read much of what is written on philosophy of history. A great deal of thinking about historical explanation tends, therefore, to be neglected’ (p.123).

For example, regarding the use of counterfactuals in historical causal explanations Hughes-Warrington (2019) pointed out ‘our understanding is circumscribed by the continuing sketchiness of our grasp of the relations among counterfactuals, causal relations, and conditionals in historiography, and the ways in which we build meanings, concepts, and texts using conditionals' (p.269). Developed theorisation regarding counterfactuals only began in earnest with the cliometricians' 'New Economic History' in the 1960s with a second wave following the 'Virtual Histories' starting in the 1990s (Fogel, 1966; Kaye, 2010; Maar, 2014; Ritter, 1986; Vincent, 2005). According to Black (2015), 'the lack of any accepted organising principle for writing counterfactual history is a problem' (pp.187-188). The issue of undertheorisation appears especially pronounced for 'restrained' counterfactualism, despite this manifestation being far more likely to be found in 'ordinary historical texts' (Bulhof, 1999, p.146). As Evans (2008b) noted, 'I don't see much discussion of this particular, very limited use of counterfactuals in the literature on counterfactuals generally. Perhaps there should be' (pp.126-127). Furthermore, much of the existing theorisation is not necessarily rooted in the writing of academic historians. According to Kożuchowski (2015) the literature:

> virtually ignores the practice of writing 'conventional history', focusing on alternative history or on the rare cases of 'insightful' counterfactuals in historiography, leaving behind the vast majority of them. In short, it concerns historiography as it ought to be and not as it is (p.338).

Even among its advocates who claim historical counterfactualism underpins all historical causal claims, there is a lack of agreement when implicit counterfactual thinking should be rendered explicit in writing. According to Nolan (2013), 'there are interesting and difficult issues about how to go about investigation of which counterfactuals are correct in particular historical situations' (p.334).

A further example of such undertheorisation in the field of production is the use of comparison to causally explain events in history (Ritter, 1986). In fact, according to Cohen & O'Connor (2004), even by the early twenty-first century 'basic questions remain not simply unanswered, but even unasked' (p.x). For instance, broadly comparison's advocates still lack agreement regarding fundamental issues such as whether it should be considered a 'method' (e.g. Bloch, 1953); a 'logic' (e.g. Sewell, 1967); or 'logics' (e.g. Van den Brambussche, 1989; Skocpol & Somers, 1980). As Cohen and O'Connor observed 'for all the term's ubiquity, there is little consensus about precisely what comparison means for the historian' (p.xii). Along with this under-theorisation, little methodological guidance exists (Kershaw & Lewin, 1997). In Cohen and O'Connor's view, 'practical advice for the would-be practitioner is in short supply' (p.x).

4.1.4. RQ1aT4 – A single historiography does not necessarily represent historical causal explanation in the field of production generally

4.1.4.1. RQ1aT4S1 – One historiography represents too small a sample to make general claims regarding historical causal explanation in the field of production

Some in the field of production suggest that, due to the plurality of historical causal explanation, a survey of one historiography will represent too small a sample to make general claims (Donagan, 1957). Martin (1989), for instance, noted 'not all historiographical problems are the same. Thus, there is bound to be some variation regarding which concepts and models are going to be useful' (pp.13-14). Consequently, Graham (1983) questioned whether a survey of some history books would be able to settle debates regarding historical causal explanation. According to Graham:

> this procedure is not altogether straightforward. We have first to decide which books to survey and what weight we are going to give to the relevant items we find there, and this is not something we can do without some prior understanding of what history is and what explanation is. Consequently, the results of our survey are unlikely to settle much (p.32).

Similarly, Megill (2007) noted 'to find what historians really were – and are - thinking about such matters would require a research project of impossible complexity, and the results would be problematic' (p.80).

4.1.4.2. RQ1aT4S2 – Only recontextualising historical causal explanation from one historiography risks potentially promoting unfettered explanatory relativism

Some in the field of production state that extrapolating essential features from historiography – especially an individual historian's work which has been chosen solely by virtue of being written by 'a historian' - risks encouraging an unhelpful relativism (Bloch, 1963; Donagan, 1957; Graham, 1983; Stanford, 1998; Skinner, 2002; Van Bouwel & Weber, 2008). Førland (2004) warned, for instance, 'a discipline that conflates practice and methodology by letting often unreflective explanatory practice be the sole judge of what is acceptable, however, risks granting legitimacy to pseudo-explanation' (p.328). In other words, an approach which allowed 'every historian' to be 'a law to himself [sic]' might wrongly imply the sacrosanctity of the practice of any one historian (Teggart, 1942, p.3).

4.1.5. RQ1aT5 – The awarding body homogenises historical causal explanation

4.1.5.1. RQ1aT5S1 – The awarding body portrays its view of narrative/description as incontestable

When discussing their view of 'description' and 'narrative' in history, the awarding body tends to make declarative statements which imply their assumptions should be treated axiomatically by history curriculum designers (Carroll, 2021). For example, in the awarding body's A-Level reports to teachers in 2017, 2018, and 2019, they advised candidates should 'avoid a narrative/descriptive approach; this undermines the analysis that is required for the higher levels' (Pearson Edexcel, 2017b, p.35, 2018, p.41, 2019a, p.51).

Such categorical statements regarding the status of narrative are similar to claims in the field of production made by 'anti-narrativists' in the mid-twentieth century, exemplified by interpretative frameworks particularly receptive to social scientific methodologies such as Marxism, the French *Annales* School, Freudian psycho-history, and cliometrics. Furthermore, some in the field of production have suggested that the comparative method influenced by social science itself acts as a negative check on historians narrating unbroken series of events (e.g. Maza, 2017; Skocpol & Somers, 1980). By the 1970s, such interpretative frameworks had become so influential that the analytical mode approached paradigmatic orthodoxy with Ricoeur (1984) dubbing this period the 'eclipse of narrative' (p.95ff; Barzun & Graff, 1985; Black & MacRaild, 1997; Munz, 2006; Stone, 1987; Tamura, 2011). In the historiography of the Salem witch trials, for example, trends in the historiography in the 1970s and 1980s meant 'the narrative format that was once popular among historians…[had] fallen out of favour' (Le Beau, 1998, pp. xi-x).

In the later twentieth century, however, many in the field of production defended narrative's role in historical causal explanation in what Stone (1979) dubbed the 'revival of narrative'. According to Roberts (2006), by the early twenty-first century 'talk about the value of narrative as a mode of explanation and understanding is ubiquitous in both academia and public discourse' (p.203). The 'revival of narrative' is evident in historiography of the Salem witch trials, particularly from 1990 onward (e.g. Hoffer, 1996, 1997). In his overview of the trials' historiography, Demos (2008) recognised this re-emergence by noting that the tricentennial anniversary of the crisis in 1992 coincided with a surge of 'narrative retellings of the trial sequence' (pp.207-208). In this period, for example, Hill (*The Full Story of the Salem Witch Trials,* 1996); Le Beau (*The Story of the Salem Witch Trials,* 1998); and Rosenthal (*Salem Story*, 1993) all titled their books as a 'story'.

Consequently, in the field of production in mid- to late-twentieth century debate regarding narrative's status in historical causal explanation was fierce but ultimately unresolved (Carr, 2008; Dray, 2006; Goldstein, 1976; Roberts, 2001). As Ritter (1986) noted:

> since the 1950s the issues surround the relationship of history and narrative – the art of storytelling and story forms – have been closely interwoven with the debate over the nature of

> historical explanation. The questions have been approached in a variety of way, and no consensus has thus far emerged (pp.279-282).

The failure of either the narratavists or the revivalists to score a decisive victory has led to a current state of pragmatic ecumenicism regarding modes in historical causal explanation. Stone (1987), for instance, argued:

> history has always had many mansions and must continue to do so if it is to flourish in the future. The triumph of any one *genre* or school eventually always leads to narrow sectarianism, narcissism and self-adulation, contempt or tyranny towards outsiders, and other disagreeable and self-defeating characteristics [original italics] (p.75).

4.1.5.2. RQ1aT5S2 – The awarding body presents narrative/description as separate from historical causal explanation

The awarding body who administered the A-Level examinations in my context provided reports to teachers in 2017, 2018, and 2019 in which they advised candidates should 'avoid a narrative/descriptive approach; this undermines the analysis that is required for the higher levels', implying 'narrative/description' is separate from successful historical causal explanation (Pearson Edexcel, 2017b, p.35, 2018, p.41, 2019a, p.51). Similarly, in the board's GCSE resources teachers are advised that candidates should write 'explanation rather than description' (Pearson, Edexcel, 2015a, p.14). Furthermore, the board employs discrete genre-based question stems such as 'Describe two features of…' and 'Write a narrative account…'. In the case of the latter, the board states the stem is designed to 'ensure students don't confuse [narrative] with questions requiring causal explanation' (Pearson, Edexcel, 2015a, pp.7 & 14).

The separation of description from causal explanation is congruent with some participants in the field of production's views– especially positivist philosophers and historians influenced by social science methodologies in the mid-twentieth century

(Atkinson, 1978; Megill, 2007). For example, in a work designed to set the agenda for social scientific history in the United States of America in 1954, the Social Science Research Council's bulletin stated 'the truly scientific function begins where the descriptive function stops. The scientific function involves not only identifying and describing temporal sequences, it also involves explaining them' (Social Scientific Research Council, Committee on Historiography, 1954, p.86).

At least some philosophers of history and historians from the later twentieth century onwards, however, have considered the division of 'description' and causal 'explanation' as a false binary (Dray, 1959). Newman (1968), for instance, stated 'describing is more than part of the explanatory process; it *is* the explanation. The practising historian might well take this as a much fairer way of depicting his [sic] explanatory model' [original italics] (p.64). In this view, description's contribution to causal explanation is not limited to a preparatory process establishing what is being explained before explanation proper begins. For Hewitson (2015), 'description does not precede explanation: rather, the two are linked reflexively' (p.133). For example, once historians commit themselves to answering a causal question, they simultaneously oblige themselves to describe historical phenomena in particular ways as 'causes' and 'consequences' (Danto, 1965). How one describes causes and consequences, therefore, forms a part of the historian's causal explanatory argument (Feltzer, 1975; Graham, 1983). In Førland's (2004) view, for instance, 'one and the same phenomenon, under one and the same description, can be explained in more than one way, just as one and the same phenomenon under different descriptions can also be explained in more than one way' (p.336).

Furthermore, from such a perspective if both cause and consequence are described so as to imply the covering causal mechanism – for example, by positioning like cause with like consequence – the remaining causal 'explanation' may become elliptical (Davidson, 1984;

Martin, 1989; Roth, 1989; Weinryb, 1975). According to Weingartner (1961), when it comes to historical causal explanation, ‘if the much advertised Aha! experience is to occur, the explanans and the explanandum must in some way “hang together”’ (p.36). Accordingly, in this view seemingly descriptive passages can, at the same time, causally explain. Atkinson (1978) suggested, for instance, ‘causal claims, or assumptions, are embedded in what for many purposes would be accepted as simple description of situations and occurrences’ (p.144).

Similarly, the awarding body’s portrayal of narrative as separate from causal explanation is aligned with at least some in the field of production: again, particularly philosophers and historians influenced by positivism and/or social scientific methodologies writing in the mid-twentieth century. In this view, the ‘analytic’ mode - meaning the distillation of a historical time into constituent non-chronological abstracted causal ‘factors’ that led to a consequence - was preferred (Furay & Salveouris, 2000; Roberts, 2001; Stanford, 1986). At this point, a view that narrative inherently lacked causal explanatory power became pervasive. Roth (1988), for instance, noted that for the anti-narratavists, ‘there exists a prima facie distinction between narratives and the standard form of proper scientific explanation’ (p.2).

The analytical ‘explanatory’ mode is exemplified in the historiography of the Salem witch trials (Demos, 2008; Harrison, 2004). In the 1970s and 1980s, a number of studies emerged ‘exploring the psychological, social, and economic dimensions of the witchcraft crisis. Many have employed a number of social scientific techniques from a variety of disciplines, notably sociology, anthropology, and psychology’ (Gragg, 1992, p.209). Perhaps most influentially, *Salem Possessed* by Boyer and Nissenbaum (1976) was indicative of this ‘analytical’ approach. Boyer and Nissenbaum began their work with a narrative prologue of ‘What happened in 1692’ (pp.1-22). The majority of the rest of the work was divided into analyses of preconditions that contributed to the Salem witch crisis: in particular the deficiencies of local institutions in settling Village disputes; growing class tensions between an increasingly prosperous mercantile class in the east of the Village and the traditional agrarian class in the west of the Village; and growing family factionalism in the Village between the Porters and the Putnams. By drawing on evidence 'ignored by narrative historians', Boyer and Nissenbaum were able to 'understand the experiences and patterns of life which preceded and undergirded the events of 1692' (Greven, 1974, pp.513-514).

Many in the field of production, however, have argued for narrative's explanatory power and therefore insist it should not be separated from historical causal explanation. Narrative's strongest defence has come from philosophers who have insisted that the mode inheres an autonomous mode of historical causal explanation which owes little or nothing to the explanatory methods or criteria from other disciplines (Fain, 1970; Gallie, 1964; Louch; 1969; Renier, 1961). For example, Roth (1989) claimed:

> rather than attempting to look beyond conventions of narrative, perhaps the proper strategy is to insist that it is these very conventions which do the work of explanation. In this respect, narrative conventions are constitutive of historical practice and determinative of historical explanation (p.459).

Some philosophers and historians, for instance, have argued that narrative is the best mode of emphasising change over time in explanation – a distinguishing characteristic of history compared to some disciplines (e.g. Furet, 2001; Munz, 2006; Stanford, 1994, 1998). For example, from this perspective chronological ordering itself can explain in ways that the analytical mode forbids (e.g. Lowenthal, 1997; Atkinson, 1978). For Tuchman (1981), when events 'are arranged in a sequence as strictly as possible, down to the week and day, sometimes even time and day, cause and effect which may have previously been obscure will become clear' (p.70). In the historiography of the Salem witch trials in the 2000s, for example, one encounters scholarship with subtitles such as 'A day-by day chronicle of a community under siege' (Roach, 2004) and 'chronology and collective violence in 1692' (Latner, 2008). Norton structured *In the Devil's Snare* according to the 'developing day-today dynamics during 1692' because 'a chronological approach *reveals* the chaotic overlapping of incidents involving the various people accused of malefic practices' [my italics] (p.7).

Furthermore, some historians have suggested that chronological narrative provides explanatory power supposedly lacking in 'analyses' such as that by Boyer and Nissenbaum (1976). Mackenthun (1995) praised Rosenthal's (1993) *Salem Story* for piecing:

> together 'elements of the narrative' in order to reveal a 'comprehensible tale', but also something like a 'developmental logic' of the Salem case. Taking on board the sociological theories of Boyer, Nissenbaum, and Karlsen, he also criticises their inability to grasp the complexity of the phenomenon. Rosenthal's own well-researched and sceptical 'reading' presents both a good (detective) 'narrative' and, in spite of his disclaimer, an implicit theory. Both are convincing due to the transparent organisation of the book, which discusses the development of the trials along the interrelated cases of each execution date (p.257).

A manifestation of the ecumenicism regarding historical causal explanation around the turn of the twenty-first century is that some philosophers (e.g. Mandelbaum, 1977) and historians (e.g. Elton, 1989; Furay & Salevouris, 2000; Megill, 2007; Roberts, 2001, 2006; Stone, 1987; Tamura, 2011) have increasingly emphasised that historians should not restrict themselves to writing in one mode. Maza (2017), for instance, noted 'while a majority of popular histories remain wedded to a traditional narrative form, most academic works engage, analytically, in a little of this and a little of that' (p.197). For example, the sole adoption of one mode has been criticised by some historians for failing to argue the relationship *between* structural conditions and human precipitating actions. For instance, Antonova (2020) noted:

> There are a few established categories, or genres, that describe the most common approaches, although recent studies are likely to combine several of them. Today we tend to worry that a

> work that too closely follows any one genre or method can err by leaving out important context and connections (p.170).

To enable causal explanation of connections, some historians instead advocate a ‘synthesis’ of modes (Burke, 1993, p.237; Marwick, 2001). Tosh (2006) encapsulated this view:

> the truth is that historians need to write in ways that do justice to both the manifest and the latent, both profound forces and surface events. And in practice this requires a flexible use of both analytical and narrative modes: sometimes in alternating sections, sometimes more completely fused throughout the text. This is in fact the way in which most academic historical writing is carried out today (p.156).

The willingness to mix modes in response to a historical question has been evidenced in more recent work in the historiography of the Salem witch trials. For example, Robinson (1991) argued:

> historical accounts of Salem witchcraft largely have dealt with events in a chronological sequence. These studies can be usefully augmented by an examination of the cross section of family structures. When integrated, the chronological and cross-sectional approaches help clarify many of the complex inter-relationships which fuelled the witch hunt (p.60).

Historians from the later twentieth century onward have been more likely to emphasise that a unifying feature that helps characterise all modes as ‘historical’ – be they narrative or analysis - is their argumentative nature. For example, Fischer (1970) noted:

> [a historian’s] explanatory paradigm may take different forms: a statistical generalisation, or a narrative, or a causal model, or a motivational model, or a collectivised group-compositional model, or maybe an analogy. Most commonly it consists not in any one of these components but in a combination of them. *Always, it is articulated in the form of a reasoned argument* [my italics] (p. xv).

4.1.5.3. RQ1aT5S3 – The awarding body presents narrative/description as undermining higher-level historical explanation

In A-Level examination-board materials ‘narrative/description’ is also presented as ‘undermining’ higher order ‘analysis’ (Pearson Edexcel, 2017b, p.35, 2018, p.41, 2019a, p.51). This view of ‘description’ as lower order is also manifested in the awarding body’s GCSE specifications. Here, papers begin with question starting with the designated stem ‘Describe two features of…’. These questions are assigned the fewest marks (four) because ‘describe questions target demonstration of knowledge only. This eases students into the paper’ (Pearson, Edexcel, 2015a, p.7). Furthermore, ‘description’ is positioned as the entry point of a genre-based progression model ‘with answers improving from: generalised to more specific but essentially descriptive, to focused explanation, and finally to substantiated evaluative answers’ (Pearson, Edexcel, 2015b, p.29). The board also presents historical description as wholly non-interpretative. For instance, the board advises:

> to avoid the problem of students merely writing everything they know in the form of description they need to practise explanatory sentences. Start with a series of statements that are purely factual and then have the students add to each saying why they are important (Pearson, Edexcel, 2015a, p.7).

For the GCSE, the board also includes one question with the stem ‘write a narrative account…’ worth eight marks, less than higher valued questions with ‘explanatory commands such as ‘Explain why…’ (twelve marks) and ‘‘[Statement]’ How far for you agree? Explain your answer’ (twenty marks) (Pearson, Edexcel, 2015a, pp.7-8).

Many in the field of production, however, have criticised portrayals of description as lower order by insisting that ‘description’ cannot be disassociated from ‘argument’. Any typical historiographical causal statement relies on the description of at least one cause, one consequence, and a (possibly implicit) asserted causal mechanism covering the two. From this perspective, therefore, strictly speaking one never argues about causes but always descriptions of causes (Tucker, 2004). Danto (1965), for example, noted ‘phenomena as *such* are not explained. It is only phenomena as *covered by a description* which are capable of explanation, and then, when we speak of explaining them, it must always be with reference to *that* description' [original italics] (p.218). In this view, the denigration of description betrays a positivist misapprehension that the facts which are to be causally explained in history are fixed (Bevir, 2007; Graham, 1983). Megill (1989) characterised such claims by positivists as 'hermeneutic naiveté' which misleadingly represses the interpretative dimension of historical description by confusing it with the lower-order activity of data collection (p.636). According to Megill, 'on this point, positivism holds to a position that most historians will recognise as faulty' (p.636).

Correspondingly, from this perspective historical description must be argued just as an explanatory statement must be (Megill, 2007). For example, Tucker (2004) stated 'there is no epistemic distinction between descriptive and explanatory historiographic propositions, both are the best explanations of the evidence' (p.187). It therefore follows that how causes are described are often themselves the crux of historical causal debates, with much controversy hinging on whether a described putative cause was present and/or actually effective (Martin, 1982, 1989). Description, according to this view is therefore challenging (Jordanova, 2000). Mandelbaum (1974), for instance, stated that in history 'the description of particular events is an extremely difficult task' (pp.64-65).

Similarly, in line with the awarding body's presentations of narrative as lesser order, 'the eclipse of narrative' during the mid-twentieth century saw anti-narratavists attack the mode for only being able to answer perceived unproblematic *what* and *how* questions but not higher-valued explanatory *why* questions (Carr, 1986; McCullagh, 1969). For example, Atkinson (1978) noted this period resulted in 'the not uncommon belief that analytical history is explanatory in a higher degree than narrative' (p.136). More broadly, anti-narratavists helped create an impression that narrative was inherently lesser order. Megill (2007), for instance, noted such critiques contributed to ‘the prevalent suspicion that narrative *as such* is epistemologically defective’ [original italics] (pp.87-88).

A facet of the ‘revival of narrative’, however, has been some historians’ emphasis on narrative’s difficulty, at least in its ‘significant’ guise (e.g. Barzun & Graff, 1985; Butterfield, 1968; Marius & Page, 2007). Turner (1999), for instance, noted:

> some advocates of what are now fashionably regarded as more sophisticated modes of scholarship seem to believe that producing an accurate narrative of past events that accounts for their causes is child’s play, a simple task unsuitable for great minds. But anyone who has ever undertaken the taxing task of reconstructing a complex chapter of past happenings knows how naïve that notion is (p.302).

A number of philosophers and historians, for example, have suggested analytic modes encourage simplistic, stratified, and monocausal answers compared to narrative which, in this view, tends to be more interconnected and multicausal (e.g. Elton, 1989; Fischer, 1970; Hexter, 1972; Stone, 1987). According to Stanford (1998), ‘when the parts have been examined, how can they be shown to fit together into the living whole that constitutes history?’ (pp.104-105).

In the early twentieth-first century, part of the increasing ecumenicism in the field of production regarding causal historical explanation has been the growing acceptance that it is now impossible to argue that either ‘analysis’ or ‘narrative’ is inherently higher order. ‘Neither’, according to Elton (1989):

> is superior to the other, and he [sic] who dissects problems need not look down upon the narrator as a mere teller of tales, nor deed the story-teller despise the concerns of his [sic] analysis colleague as absence of imagination. The complete historian, in any case, is both. Both are truly important forms of intelligent and intellectual activity (p.176).

4.1.5.4. RQ1aT5S4 – The awarding body forbids choice of mode as argumentative choice

At A Level, the awarding body penalises description/narrative regardless of the historical question asked (Pearson Edexcel, 2017b, p.35, 2018, p.41, 2019a, p.51). At GCSE, candidates are only permitted to produce descriptive or narrative modes when instructed by the relevant question stems 'Describe two features…' or 'Write a narrative account…' (Pearson, Edexcel, 2015a, pp.7 & 14), irrespective of the historical object of description or explanation. For example, the awarding body advises that 'the sample assessment materials indicate that the scope of a narrative may vary considerably in its chronology and that question wording may very slightly, according to the narrative being sought' (Pearson Edexcel, 2015b pp.33-34). Furthermore, the 'stimulus points' which are included in questions to acts as prompts for students regarding causes to include in their narrative may be long-term, supra-personal, and structural (for example, ideological conditions such as 'attitudes towards Mormons' (Pearson Edexcel, 2019b, p.4)) or short-term individual actions (such as 'the actions of Nasser' (Pearson Edexcel 2016b, p.166)).

Due to the lack of resolution in the debates regarding the status of narrative in history, however, at least some in the field of production have instead suggested that one's choice of mode should be based on epistemic criteria such as the question being asked, the substantive topic of study, and the type of argument to be made (Carr, 2008). Goldstein (1976), for example, noted:

> it cannot be reasonable that the essential nature of the discipline is defined by the literary form in which its results are conveyed rather than by the kind of inquiry it is. That so many serious writers think that that is exactly how history is to be characterised is precisely the mark of how far conceptual analysis and the elucidation of modes of discourse have managed to submerge real epistemology (pp.142-143).

The historian's choice of mode might be a reflection of the type of historical reality they are attempting to causally explain (Gaddis, 2002). Stone (1987), for instance, noted 'narrative is a mode of historical writing, but it is a mode which also affects and is affected by the content and the method' (pp.74-75). For example, since the 'revival of narrative' a variety of philosophers (e.g. Lemon, 1995; Olafson, 1970) and historians (e.g. Elton, 1989; Hexter, 1972; Vincent, 2005) who favour an individualist, action-based ontology tended to argue that only narrative enabled certain types of historical explanation which 'analyses' necessarily marginalise (Stone, 1987; Barzun & Graff, 1985). Bevir (2007), for example, noted 'narrative explanations typically relate actions to the beliefs and desires that inform them. Their abstract form is: an action X was done because the agent held beliefs Y to which doing X would fulfil a desire Z' (p.305). From this perspective, the narrative mode better explains human intentions and actions (Black & MacRaild, 1997; Butterfield, 1968; Carr, 2008; Clark, 2013; Mabbett, 2007; Roberts, 2001; Turner, 1999) and chance, contingency, and unintended consequences (G Roberts, 1996).

In the historiography of the Salem witch crisis, Gragg (1992) deliberately adopted the narrative mode in order to highlight the causal importance of human agency:

> I have adopted a narrative style that presents the events in chronological order. Within that framework, I have focused on the impact that individuals' decisions had on the outcome of events. This is an old-fashioned approach, one based on the belief that history is first and foremost a good story (p.ix).

Gragg's work was judged explanatorily successful by some of his peers, partly due to his employment of the narrative mode. 'There are distinct advantages to such an approach' claimed Gragg's reviewer Gildrie (1993), for example, because 'lack of interest in the nuances of individual character and choice is precisely why so many social science explanations, however clever, almost always seem abstract and clumsy' (pp.640-641).

Since the failure to resolve the debate regarding the status of historical narrative, exclusive use of either mode of historical writing – structural factorial analyses or narrative – have been critiqued for reductionism. In this view, certain modes appear to have more explanatory power for certain subdisciplines of history. Burke (1993), for instance, stated 'cultural and social trends cannot be analysed in the same way as political events. They require more structural explanation' (p.16). By the same token, 'the political sphere…appears to lend itself so well to narrative' because political historians generally tend to emphasise precipitating causes by individuals (Tosh, 2006, p.154). Furthermore, Atkinson (1978) argued for question-relatively when selecting modes because, in his view, 'the truth surely is that some questions require narrative, others analytic answers' (p.136). Finally, because some phenomena may be approached from more than one interpretative framework, some in the field of production note that one's choice of mode may be argument-driven – perhaps in order to stress the relative causal importance of structural conditions vis-à-vis human actions or vice versa (Fulbrook, 2002). As Marius & Page (2007) pointed out:

> keep in mind that argument, in the sense of developing a thesis, is fundamental to all the modes in writing history essays. The modes overlap, and you may use all of them in a single essay; certainly we have in our own writing…when you write an essay, try to determine which modes will best advance your argument (pp.56-57).

4.2. Findings - Research Question 1b opportunities

4.2.1. RQ1bT1 - Precise ontologisation of 'historical' causal explanation in the field of production compared to causal explanation in other disciplines

4.2.1.1. RQ1bT1S1 – Precise ontologisation of 'historical' causal explanation in the field of production compared to causal explanation in experimental natural sciences

Historical writing is often inter-disciplinarily permeable meaning it can include other types of causal explanation beyond the 'historical' (Atkinson, 1978; Conkin, 1974; Joynt & Rescher, 1959; Stanford, 1994; Walsh, 1951; Wisdom, 1976). According to Graham (1983), ''explanation in history', where this expression is taken to refer to the explanations we find in history books, is not the same as historical explanation' (p.69). As we shall see, in the historiography of the Salem witch trials, for example, as well as pathological explanations we also encounter sociological, anthropological, and psychological ones. In other words, judging an explanation-type as 'unhistorical' is not a simultaneous insistence that such explanation-types never appear in historical writing.

Some in the field of production in the mid-twentieth century adopted what Tucker (2009) dubbed the 'unificationist' view of causal explanation: that the logic of scientific explanation was the explanatory ideal and should be applied across all disciplines (p.98. Table 4.2.). From this perspective, the logic, syntax, and semantic rules of 'explanation' are the same invariant of discipline (e.g. Brodbeck, 1962; Frankel, 1957; Hempel, 1942; Petty, 1967; Tranøy; 1962). Conkin (1974), for example, claimed it 'makes no sense to talk of 'historical explanations'. There is no such animal' (p.11). In this view, for a causal explanation to be genuinely explanatory it must conform – or at least try to conform – to the scientific ideal otherwise it is denied the status of 'explanation'. Though their works have failed to gain traction among historians (Demos, 2008), some accounts of the Salem witch trials have proffered pathological explanations for the accusers' behaviour in the form of ergotism (Caporael, 1976; Mattosian, 1982) and encephalitis (Carlson, 1999).

On the whole, however, such unificationist arguments have failed to achieve much support in the field of production. Historians and philosophers of history instead tend to emphasise how the objects studied in different disciplines result in distinctive logical and linguistic structures of explanations. Bevir (2007), for instance, referred to the 'philosophical

Table 4.2. Overview of themes Research Question 1b opportunities.

Opportunities for history curriculum designer when ‘recontextualising’ causal explanation in the field of production	
Theme	***Sub-theme***
RQ1bT1 Precise ontologisation of ‘historical’ causal explanation in the field of production compared to causal explanation in other disciplines	**RQ1bT1S1** Precise ontologisation of ‘historical’ causal explanation in the field of production compared to causal explanation in experimental natural sciences
	RQ1bT1S2 Precise ontologisation of ‘historical’ causal explanation in the field of production compared to causal explanation in observational natural sciences
	RQ1bT1S3 Precise ontologisation of ‘historical’ causal explanation in the field of production compared to causal explanation in social sciences
	RQ1bT1S4 Precise ontologisation of ‘historical’ causal explanation in the field of production compared to causal explanation in literature
	RQ1bT1S5 Precise ontologisation of ‘historical’ causal explanation in the field of production compared to causal explanation in everyday life
RQ1bT2 Philosophy of history and theories of history provide general conceptions of historical causal explanation	
RQ1bT3 Historiography provides indications of when general claims regarding historical causal explanation are most applicable	**RQ1bT3S1** Historiography substantiates philosophers and theorists of history’s claims regarding historical causal explanation
	RQ1bT3S2 Historiography indicates when certain historical causal explanatory models are most appropriate

collapse of the positivism that informs social science history with its attempts to explain historical particulars by reference to mid-level or even universal generalities' (p.308). Critics of 'unificationism' pointed to history's myriad differences to science in terms of epistemology, metaphysics, and praxis (Ball, 1972; Goode, 1977; Graham, 1983; Hammer, 2008; Weingartner, 1961). In this view, historical explanation is *sui generis* and the historian must seek to 'do justice to the specificity of historical explanation' (Ricoeur, 1984, p.228). Eschewing unificationism also has implications for language. Bevir (1999), for example, noted 'although historians and scientists may study the same things, they do so by using different languages, which commit them to different forms of explanations' (p.178). Similarly, Storey (2013) noted:

> historians share a common goal with all writers; to communicate ideas effectively. Historians differ from other writers on some of the conventions for achieving this goal. This causes some confusion among writer who hail from other disciplines, but even so, no historical convention is arbitrary (p.99).

First, in the anti-unificationist view, because there are few – if any – truly universal empirical 'covering laws' in history, any attempt at deductive-nomological arguments can only result in causal explanations that are either false, trivial, or non-universal (Dray, 1957, 1964; Ling, 1966; Marwick, 2001; Nowell-Smith, 1970; Smith, 2011; Topolski, 1991; Veyne, 1984). Second, historical causal explanations are 'timebound' in that they are specific to time and places as well as incorporating change over time. This does not apply to scientific explainers who can restore conditions and repeat experiments in different times and places (Cohen, 1942; Furay & Salevouris, 2000; Stanford, 1998). Third, historians' inability to test hypotheses through repeatable experiments under fixed conditions; limit and separate variables; and achieve consensus regarding the established 'facts' from which one builds the explanation all mean that historians cannot verify their causal claims the same way as the experimental scientist (Berry, 2009; Donagan, 1957; Fischer, 1970; Green & Troup, 1999; Munslow, 2000; Stampp, 1959). Fourth, in history there is less consensus than in experimental science regarding the standards of explanatory efficacy needed to conclusively settle causal debates (Gallie, 1964; Gardiner, 1961; Tucker, 2004). Finally, the fragmentary nature of historical evidence and the countless number of possible causes that might be incorporated into a historical causal explanation both mean the historian cannot hope to attain the same level of 'completeness' as scientific explanation (Atkinson, 1978; Newman, 1968; Stanford, 1994).

As a consequence, one of the few instances of near unanimity in the field of production is the insistence that, particularly in contrast to other disciplines such as experimental science, a *historical* 'categorical explanation' is a contradiction in terms (Atkinson, 1978; Bloch, 1963; Gardiner, 1961; Hughes, 1960; Mabbett, 2007; Megill, 2007; Tosh, 2006). For example, Donnelly and Norton (2011) noted:

> Even theorists who are largely optimistic about historians' ability to explain change over time accept that no scholar can provide a wholly satisfactory account of why something happened. This is why they tell us that historians can give only 'provisional answers', 'tentative conclusions', or 'plausible hypotheses' in relation to the past (p.85).

Consequently, the language of historical causal language tends to reflect a desire to ensure claims go no further than the evidence permits, often writing in a 'deliberately diffident manner' with qualifying terms such as 'perhaps' or 'probably' (Southgate, 2001, p.139; Berlin, 1966; Gottschalk, 1954). The inability to achieve 'categorical' explanation also drives the ultimate irresolvability of many historiographic arguments (Furay & Salevouris, 2000; Gay, 1974; Marius & Page, 2007; White, 1965). According to Tosh (2006), 'questions of cause and consequence have been at the heart of many of the most heated historical controversies' (pp.149-150). Similarly, for Antanova (2020) university students of history should view the audience-construct as the community of academic historians who need to be convinced through persuasive argument:

> You know your writing must be revised to suit the needs of your reader. Who is that person? Your literal reader (your professor or a teaching assistant) is not quite the same as the theoretical academic reader we write for professionally and for whom you should practise writing in your assignments…You please your grader by appealing successfully to the metaphorical reader rather than by catering to what you imagine are the individual desires of the one person grading you (pp.24-25).

Historians in the historiography of the Salem witch trials have noted such issues with any claims of categorical explanation. Baker (2015) stated he could not isolate causes or include all possibly relevant causes meaning it is 'almost impossible either to disentangle all of its component parts or to fully explain what happened' (p.6). Furthermore, in some instances the incomplete evidence base means 'we only have tantalising clues' (Rosenthal, 1993, pp.6-7) and some things are 'unknown and probably unknowable' (Norton, 2002, pp.296-298). Additionally, competing theories 'are not easy to test' (Rosenthal, 1993, p.7). Due to such issues, in the historiography of the Salem witch trials many have recognised the fundamentally uncategorical and argumentative nature of debates surrounding the causes of the crisis (e.g. Baker, 2015; Demos, 2008; Hoffer, 1998; Le Beau, 1998; Ray, 2015; Robinson, 1991; Schiff, 2015). Rosenthal (1993) noted:

> Attempts to explain by a single theory what happened in 1692 distort rather than clarify the events of that year, although anyone who offers to adjudicate once and for all the various competing theories about the Salem witch trials should be a soldier not a scholar (pp.3-4).

By extension, some in the field of production are more likely to highlight the benefits of reading academic histories to improve one's writing because scholarship serves as a repository of models of argument (e.g. Antonova, 2020; Loughran, 2017). 'One way your writing is sure to undergo improvement' noted Brundage (2002), 'is through the active and critical reading of many well-written histories' (p.78). In contrast to textbooks, in this view historical scholarship provides a model for non-categorical, metadiscursive, argumentative causal explanations. According to Townsend (2019), historians 'include not only a discourse (which offers knowledge about a subject) but a great deal of metadiscourse (which gives an analysis of how it is they know whatever they know about that subject)'. By contrast, 'most textbooks' 'tell a story directly and authoritatively, including absolutely no "metadiscourse" whatsoever, as if the present state of knowledge about a field has always existed' (p.213). Similarly, Mabbett (2007) argued textbooks:

> are not required to offer documentation for all their assertions, like research-based publications. Their purpose is not to compel readers to accept their statements by reasoning rigorously from public evidence, but simply to assist people unfamiliar with the subject to find out about it. In some ways, they can be self-indulgent. They can make highly interpretative statements without having to prove them as far as possible…What is acceptable in a textbook may not be acceptable in a student essay (p.38).

For example, when discussing her university-level teaching of the Salem witch crisis, Kamensky (2008) noted that 'the story wasn't there in plain sight, prettied up and pre-digested, CliffNotes style. ("The five leading causes of the Salem Witch Trials are…")' (pp.391-392). Furthermore, some historians in the historiography of the Salem witch crisis have warned teachers relying on textbooks as their source of disciplinary knowledge. According to Ray (2010), 'a profound tension exists between what scholars now believe they understand about the Salem witch trials and the stories most history textbooks continue to tell about it' (p.41).

4.2.1.2. RQ1bT1S2 – Precise ontologisation of ‘historical’ causal explanation in the field of production compared to causal explanation in observational natural sciences

Some in the field of production have also attempted to distinguish historical causal explanation from its analogues in the observational sciences such as meteorology, geomorphology, or cosmology which also seek to explain complex systems outside of a laboratory (Tucker, 2009). Such arguments tend to focus on the fact that the substantive phenomena being explained in observational science are natural, while the historian generally explains human behaviour operating in societies. Consequently, in this view, the logical difference between causal explanation in history and natural science is one of order rather than degree because the historians’ explanations must encompass psychological realms (D’Oro, 2009; Furay & Salevouris, 2000; Graham, 1983; Hewitson, 2015; Smith, 2011; Topolski, 1991).

4.2.1.3. RQ1bT1S3 – Precise ontologisation of ‘historical’ causal explanation in the field of production compared to causal explanation in social sciences

Some participants in the field of production have argued that causal explanation in history and the social sciences such as non-behaviourist psychology, sociology, and anthropology are similar because they all seek to explain human behaviours (Hempel, 1966; Tranøy, 1962). Similarly, in the historiography of the Salem witch trials from the 1970s onwards some historians overtly incorporated social scientific methods in order to place the events of 1692 into the wider context of New England witchcraft (e.g. Karlsen, 1989). For example, Demos’ (1970, 1982) variegated explanation depended on a multi-disciplinary interpretative framework drawing on sociology (a clash between the ethics of communalism and individualism as the economy transitioned to market capitalism); functionalist anthropology (a mechanism for conflict resolution and boundary-setting); and Freudian psychohistory ('narcissistic injury' and 'projection').

While social scientific explanation tends to identify general rules across units of comparison, some participants in the field of production have stressed that history tends to be concerned with explaining the unique event (Antonova, 2020; Atkinson, 1978; Goode, 1977; Mabbett, 2007; Stanford, 1994). According to Clayton Roberts (1996), historians tend to 'study the battle of the Marne, not battles in general; they study the causes of the Enlightenment, not of enlightenments in general; they study the rise of Hitler, not of dictators in general. Things in general they leave to the sociologists' (p.8). While explanations influenced by social science such as those by Demos and Karlsen have been highly influential, critics such as Gragg (1992) argued that the 'greatest weakness' of such scholarship is they 'do not adequately explain why Salem Village's outbreak of accusations, unlike those that had come before, turned into a thorough witch hunt' (p.213).

Furthermore, Walsh (1942), argued that historical colligation differs from the generalisations of scientists who begin by relating events of the same class. For example, when explaining how the Second Indian War contributed to the Salem witch crisis, Norton (2002) did not begin by relating it to other wars outside of colonial New England (pp.296-297). Instead, she related it to other subordinated entities from its own period such as the status of native Americans in the Puritan colonists' belief system; the first 'afflicted' accusing the native American Tituba; and the 'afflicted's' fits appearing to resemble Wabanaki raids. In Walsh's (1951) early view, therefore, historians do not explain a historical consequence by reference to general laws but instead 'by tracing its intrinsic relations to other events and locating it in its historical context' (p.59). Similarly, some in the field of production have argued historical colligation, unlike scientific laws tend to be delimited both temporally and spatially (Ball, 1972; Graham, 1983; Helmer & Rescher, 1959; Passmore, 1962; Rescher, 1988; Walsh, 1951). According to Kuukkanen (2015), colligations ‘have clear and restricted temporal and spatial references, while theoretical concepts apply to a large set of phenomena, which is perhaps infinite in some cases’ (p.110). For example, Ray (2015) argued regarding the ‘zeal of the Salem magistrates in 1692’ which is bound spatially (‘Salem’) and temporally (‘1692’) (pp.66-67). A colligation might also be overtly individuating by indicating unusualness or uniqueness. Baker (2015), for instance, argued regarding ‘the legal irregularities in the proceedings’ (pp.183-186)

4.2.1.4. RQ1bT1S4 - Precise ontologisation of ‘historical’ causal explanation in the field of production compared to causal explanation in literature

While both history and literature attempt to explain human behaviour, history tends to be more bound by empirical warrant. Furay and Salevouris (2000), for instance, stated ‘the basic difference between a great historian and a great novelist is that the historian’s story must conform to the known facts’ (p.247). A number of historians in the historiography of the Salem witch trials, for instance, have noted in *The Crucible* – probably the most famous literary depiction of the trials – by Arthur Miller (1988) made unevidenced and demonstrably incorrect assertions (Baker, 2015; Demos, 2008; Fels, 2017; Rosenthal, 1993). Hoffer (1997) praised the drama as ‘one of the most chilling and brilliant stage plays of the twentieth century’, but also reminded the reader that Miller ‘took some liberties with the facts’ and ‘the historian cannot invent facts in this way’ (pp.7-8).

4.2.1.5. RQ1bT1S5 - Precise ontologisation of ‘historical’ causal explanation in the field of production compared to causal explanation in everyday life

Furthermore, in some senses historical causal explanation bears similarities with explanations in one’s daily life (Veyne, 1984). Passmore (1962), for example, stated ‘if we understand how explanation functions in everyday life, we shall have few difficulties with the procedures of the historian' (p.106). Certain distinguishing characteristics between the two explanation-types, however, have been identified in the field of production. First, the historian more routinely operates on geographical and/or causal temporal scales that reaches beyond any single human's lived experience (Scriven, 1966). Second, while single-cause explanations often suffice in everyday circumstances, monocausal explanations are rarely accepted by historians (Antonova, 2020; Atkinson, 1978; Bloch, 1963; Carr, 1990; Elton, 1989; Evans, 1997, 2014; Furay & Salevouris, 2000; Gardiner, 1961; Gay, 1974; Jordanova, 2000; Mandelbaum, 1977; Megill, 2007; McCullagh, 1998; Southgate, 2001; Stanford, 1998; Tosh, 2006). In Gaddis' (2002) view, for historians 'multiple causation is the only feasible basis for explanation, which in turn – most of the time at least – is the only thing they think it is feasible to try and do' (p.105). Similarly, in the historiography of the Salem witch trials historians also adhere to multi-causal disciplinary conventions (e.g. Demos, 2008; Ray, 2015). Rosenthal (1993), for instance, observed 'no single cause can explain the end of the Salem episode, any more than a single cause can explain the beginning' (p.175).

4.2.2. RQ1bT2 – Philosophy of history and theories of history provide general conceptions of historical causal explanation

While there is a great diversity of historians' practice, analytic philosophy of history aims to seek a coherent, consistent, and general conception of historical causal explanation on the basis of abstract argument (Topolski, 1991; Weinryb, 1975). Graham (1983), for instance, noted 'the philosopher wants to give an account of historical explanation which will have sufficient generality to enable us to pick out a class of explanations in a way which shows them to be, in some sense or other, of a kind' (pp.7-8). Similarly, theories and methodologies of history by practising historians might provide generally applicable characteristics of

Figure 4.2. Tripartite model of historical causal explanation incorporating different ‘covering’ mechanisms.


DESCRIPTION OF CAUSE
DESCRIPTION OF CONSEQUENCE
Conditions
Comparison
Counterfactualism
Human intentions and actions
Unintended actions, chance, and contingencies

historical causal explanation. Gay (1974), for instance, stated he sought to uncover some 'essential unity of historical reality and the unity of method that underlies the diversity of historical investigation' (p.32). According to Megill (2007), 'the best we can do is look at what some historians have *said* about explanation' [original italics] (p.80).

Most (but not all) in the field of production seem to adopt a position of 'causal realism' – the assumption of the reality of causal mechanisms in the real world, even if the historian cannot always epistemologically explain them (Tucker, 2009). In this sense, most historians seem to view causal explanations as also being metaphysical in that they must be founded on some known reality (Stanford, 1998). After a statement of the initial conditions, most in the field of production appear to employ a tripartite structure of historical explanation (Tucker, 2004, pp.185-186, Figure 4.2.).

1. A description of a cause or causes that purports to explain the consequence (*explanans*).
2. A (sometimes implicit) causal mechanism that 'covers' the cause and consequence, justifying their causal association.
3. A description of the consequence to be explained (*explanandum*).

Furthermore, certain conventions regarding historical causal explanation, while not having universal consensus, appear broadly accepted. While none of the following are unique to history, their combination as a totality might help to distinguish historical causal explanation from explanation in other disciplines.

- Both non-human and human phenomena can be given the assignation 'cause'
- A variety of causal mechanisms are permissible
- The phenomenon to be causally explained is a unique event from the realm of human affairs

- Causal explanations are non-categorical arguments
- Causal explanations must have empirical warrant
- Causal explanations are multi-causal
- Causal explanations incorporate change over time, with temporal and spatial scales that might exceed one person's lived experience

4.2.3. RQ1bT3 – Historiography provides indications of when general claims regarding historical causal explanation are most applicable

4.2.3.1. RQ1bT3S1 – Historiography substantiates philosophers and theorists of history's claims regarding historical causal explanation

Some philosophers of history have called for more exhaustive surveys of authentic historical causal explanations to substantiate theorisation. As Martin (1989) noted:

> If we are ever to know how historians defend the explanations they propose – which in the case of the best, available work is probably close to how historians ought to defend the explanations they propose – we shall have to find out by means of detailed case studies of a number of explanatory controversies in historical studies and careful generalisations on the basis of such studies. In the philosophy of history literature, there are few such case studies, despite intense interest over the last forty years in the question of historical explanation (p.52).

Accordingly, Graham (1983) noted 'in order to formulate the rules of the practice it is clearly essential to look at what the participants in that practice do' (p.6). As Newman (1968) noted, when it comes to historical causal explanation 'what is needed is a sensitivity to both the generality of the issue and the particularity of it' (p.12).

4.2.3.2. RQ1bT3S2 –Historiography indicates when certain historical causal explanatory models are most appropriate

Detailed case studies of specific historiographies might provide indications of the circumstances under which historians employ particular causal explanatory models. First, different historiographic research traditions may consider different historical causal explanatory models to be appropriate (Tucker, 2004). Furthermore, such traditions are themselves historical phenomena subject to change over time (Passmore, 1962; Smith, 2011). As Stanford (1986) noted, ‘historians, at least, should not fall into the anachronism of attributing to all other centuries the modes of causation of the twentieth’ (p.159). For example, as already noted many in the field of production suggest historians, particularly in the mid-twentieth century, who employed interpretative frameworks influenced by social sciences were more likely to define ‘historical explanation’ as ‘explain why’; argue in the analytic mode; view historical description as unproblematic; stress the causal importance of conditions; and eschew counterfactualism.

Similarly, some in the field of production suggest historians more receptive to social scientific approaches to economic, social, demographic, and political history and who argue in the analytical mode are more inclined to systematically employ the comparative approach to historical causal explanation (Haupt & Kocka, 2004; Haupt, 2007). For example, Bloch (1953), whose programmatic essay ‘Toward a comparative history of European societies’ served as a springboard for longer-term theoretical development regarding individualising comparison for the purposes of causal explanation, was particularly influenced by the methodologies of sociology, comparative linguistics, and anthropology. In other words, historians who consider it feasible to adopt a quasi-experimental stance are more inclined to import an explanatory model from experimental science such as comparison (Sewell, 1967). Baldwin (2004), for instance, suggested that comparison is ‘the closest history can come to laboratory conditions and falsifiability and that comparison is the historical experiment’ (p.18).

Finally, Megill (2007) noted that interpretative frameworks which emphasise conditions – particularly mid-twentieth century examples influenced by social science such as Freudian psychohistory (id/culture); Marxism (base/superstructure); and the *Annales* school (deep currents/surface waves) – will often employ 'metaphors of verticality' and/or 'differential visibility' (pp.82-89). Such explanations tend to imply that what was more or less directly observable is less causally important than the hidden, 'underlying' conditions. Furthermore, historians might use plant metaphors, for example by referring to 'roots' or 'fertilising factors' (Fischer, 1970, p.165; Gardiner, 1961, pp.103-104; Veyne, 1984, p.103). Maza (2017), for instance, noted that 'owing to the influence of schools such as Marxism and the *Annales*, many historians in the mid-twentieth century tended to privilege deep-rooted social and economic factors' (p.171).

The causal explanatory models developed within particular historiographic traditions may, in part, be a response to the substantive objects being explained – be they economic, psychological, sociological, medical, military, political, religious, and so on (Mandelbaum, 1977; Tranøy, 1962). In Froeyman's view (2009), 'varying with the research problems and the definition of the subject of historiographical inquiry, different concepts of causation are used' (p.126). A historian's employment of explanatory model(s), therefore, may be a response to their sub-disciplinary focus (Tucker, 2004). Atkinson (1978), for example, noted historians tend to explain political or military phenomena with more focus on intentions and actions on individuals which, by contrast, are afforded less explanatory weight in social or economic causal explanations. 'It is worth pausing to wonder whether the truth is', according to Atkinson, 'that *some* things are explicable one way, *other* things the other' [original italics] (p.167). This level of explanatory specificity, therefore, not only changes from sub-discipline to sub-discipline but also from specific consequence to consequence (Gallie, 1964). Graham (1983) stated 'of course, just *how* one event has a bearing on the end to be explained will differ not just from subject to subject but from one case to another' [original italics] (p.62). Historians who have theorised historical causal explanation have echoed such views (e.g. Burke, 1991; Gay, 1974). For instance, Fischer (1970) argued:

> there are many different kinds of causal explanation, and they have different requirements and different uses. The specific kind of causal explanation that a historian employs must be selected according to the nature of the effect to be explained and the nature of the object of explanation (p.168).

For example, the employment of counterfactualism tends to be particularly pronounced in interpretative frameworks which stress individual human intentions and agency as well as contingency (e.g. Black, 2015; Ferguson, 1997; Roberts, 2004). For example, Yerxa (2008) noted:

> contingency (along with complexity) may be the core notion in the contemporary historian's functional philosophy of history. With contingency has also come growing interest in counterfactuals. If humans indeed shape history by their actions and ideas, then things might have been very different (p.4).

In some counterfactualists' view, therefore, the best quarry for counterfactual analysis is military and political history where contingent events, human actions, and short-term causes are more intuitively central (Beardsley, 1971; Cowley, 1999. 2008; Kaye, 2010; McNeill, 2008). Additionally, in these sub-disciplines of history we are perhaps more likely to encounter documentary evidence of historical agents considering 'what if?' scenarios in real time – perhaps in the form of 'war games' records or cabinet meetings minutes (Black, 2008). According to Black (2015) these emphases mean counterfactuals tend to be argued more in the narrative mode. In counterfactualism's critics' eyes, counterfactuals therefore overstate individuals' powers to effect change – and therefore accuse counterfactualists of attempting to reverse the broader moves among historians away from the methodologically conservative

Figure 4.3. Examples from historiography of the Salem crisis of counterfactuals focused on actions.

Dr. William Griggs
If the first people who exhibited signs of diabolical influence in Salem Village in the early months of 1692 **had been diagnosed** as possessed, the course of events **would have been** quite different (Le Beau, 1998, p.xii).

Samuel Parris and Thomas Putnam
Indeed, as the key accusers were girls and young women who lacked legal status, there **would have been** no trials unless charges **had been pressed** by the male heads of the families of the afflicted (Baker, 2015, pp.98-99).

John Hathorne and Jonathan Corwin
If the magistrates **had initially decided** not to act on the girls' accusations, the legal processes **would never have started**, and Salem would hold a very different place in America's historical self-consciousness (Ray, 2015, pp.66-67).'

Tituba
Parris' act in submitting his servant to legal action pushed Tituba to the forefront of the witchscare and set the stage for the extraordinary persecution that would follow her reluctant confession. It is possible that **if** the Indian woman **had maintained** her silence during the subsequent interrogation, that witchhunt **might not have occurred**, or, at least, **would have followed** a different course. (Breslaw, 1996, p.114).

The defendant Susannah Martin
Had the defendant **been** able to win her point, the whole machinery of the court **might have fallen** in pieces at the magistrates' feet; for if the dreadful spectres haunting the girls were no more than free-lance apparitions sent out by the devil, the court would have no prosecution case at all (Erikson, 1966, 151).

William Phips and William Stoughton
While there can be no single explanation for the Salem witch trials, we may reasonably assume that something radically different **would have happened had** Phips **stayed** home and the obsessive William Stoughton **had not been** in a position of power (Rosenthal, 1993, pp.193-195).

Cotton Mather and the authors of the 'Return of Several Ministers'
If they **had been** wholehearted about the unreliability of spectral evidence, they would have suggested barring the girls from the courtroom. Then the cases against most of the accused **would have collapsed** and the trials **would have ceased**. But the ministers chose to be swept along by the dangerous tide instead of trying to stem it (Hill, 1996, p.165).

Rebecca Nurse
There are several points at which, **had** circumstances **been** slightly different, the course of events at Salem **might have changed** entirely, and one of these is the examination of Rebecca Nurse. **If** she **had held** the stage alone her evident sincerity **might have convinced** the community that they **had been** mistaken (Hansen, 1970, pp.77-78).

‘great man theory of history’ (Evans, 2008a, 2008b; Hunt, 2004; Jordanova, 2000). According to Evans:

> [counterfactualism] not only assumes but also implicitly preaches a history where politics and warfare are the most important subjects to be studied; in other words, it advocates a narrow, traditional approach to the past that most historians have long since moved beyond, an area, however, where counterfactuals are almost impossible to deploy (p.154).

Many – but not all – of the examples of counterfactuals in the historiography of the Salem witch crisis causally explain the actions of powerful male individuals and small groups such as medical diagnoses (Le Beau, 1998, p.xii) or decisions made regarding legal procedure (Baker, 2015, pp.98-99; Figure 4.3.). For example, Baker employed counterfactualism to argue:

> key events in history are tied to a web of contingency in which the choices people make alter the course of human events. This is no less true for the Salem witch trials... No single decision guaranteed the deaths of twenty-five innocent people, but if even one of the actors in this terrible drama had made a different choice, the witch trials would not have happened, or would have ended differently (p.12).

The other individual whose actions tended to be counterfactualised was Parris’ female servant Tituba (e.g. Schiff, 2015, pp.59-60). In some instances, Tituba’s actions were still attributed to the powerful men around her (e.g. Baker, 2015, p.156). Demos (2008), for instance, argued ‘thus, in early March, was Tituba pushed to centre stage. It is tempting to think that without her – or to be more accurate, without the suspicions and pressures directed against here – the rest **might never have happened**’ (p.160). In other instances, however, counterfactualism was employed to highlight the actions of individuals whose agency had previously been marginalised (e.g. Breslaw, 1996, pp.107-108 & 114). Hoffer (1996), for example, argued:

> But for one woman, an outsider, the ‘Other’, there **would have been** no witchcraft crisis in Salem. She is Tituba, and by beginning our story with her, she gains a voice, and we gain an ‘alternative perspective’ on the people who became the Devil’s disciples (p.xviii).

Some of its advocates have also noted that there is not necessarily a deterministic relationship between the use of counterfactuals and the prioritisation of individual actions (Førland, 2004; Froeyman, 2009). Black (2015), for instance, suggested that counterfactuals ‘can be employed when discussing branches of history that are neither military nor political’ (pp.10-11). For example, the first extended historical theorisation of counterfactuals was undertaken in the 1960s and 1970s by ‘New Economic’ historians who applied econometric theory involving hypothetic-deductive models to large-scale historical counterfactuals (e.g. Fogel, 1964). As we have already seen, in the historiography of the Salem witch trials we also encounter examples of counterfactuals regarding structural conditions rather than individual actions (e.g. Boyer & Nissenbaum, 1974, pp.107-109 (Figure 4.1.); Norton, 2002, pp.296-297).

Furthermore, for some in the field of production the incorporation of moral judgements of responsibility are dependent on the substantive topic – especially if contemporaries at the time of the event considered the consequence to be explained to be a moral catastrophe. According to Nolan (2013):

> Some might object that it is not the historian’s job to make value judgements, especially of actors or institutions in the distant past. I suspect this is not a very popular position at the moment, and it is hard to see how it could be correct in general. Even if some historians are pursuing a project that does not require judgements, who is to say that it is no part of any historian’s job to engage in them: different historians have different jobs, even as historians, and see their roles in different ways, and sometimes this is just because different working historians occupy different roles (p.333).

For example, many historians writing about the Salem witch trials state it represents a 'tragedy' (e.g. Baker, 2015, pp.10-11; Boyer & Nissenbaum, 1974, pp. xii; Breslaw, 1996, p. xix; Fels, 2017, p.123; Le Beau, 1998, p.192; Ray, 2015, p.6; Rosenthal, 1993, p.215). When explaining what Ray (2015) deemed 'a grand moral catastrophe' (p.6), at least some of these historians note that this is not anachronistic moralising because many contemporaries during the crisis voiced or acted out their displeasure regarding the trials. For example, victims' families petitioned, judges resigned in protest, and pamphlets criticising the proceedings were produced. According to Fels (2017), since the 1990s a 'new ethical direction' exhibiting victim-perpetrator paradigms has been evident because, in his view, 'it was always impossible *not* to affix blame' [original italics] (pp.131-133).

Additionally, for some in the field of production certain substantive phenomena are more amenable to the comparative approach to historical causal explanation than others (Sewell, 1967). Haupt and Kocka (2004), for instance, argued 'particular subjects seem to have lent themselves more readily to comparative inquiry' (p.23). In particular, because the historian cannot generate their own data the approach depends on identifying and comparing two or more sufficiently similar social systems (Fulbrook, 2002; Froeyman, 2009; Kershaw & Lewin, 1997; Stanford, 1998). Consequently, Bloch (1953) recommended that the most appropriate units of comparison in history are contemporaneous regions which influence one another because they are less heterogenous than larger units meaning comparison can better take into account the totality of structures, experiences and values (Berger, 2003; Hill & Hill, 1980). For Miller, 'the most fertile territory for certain comparative topics may remain within national boundaries' (p.125).

Because of the relative latitude afforded in history regarding how one might select, characterise, and prioritise causes, a historian's explanatory model may also be shaped by their (conscious or unconscious) interpretative framework (Frankel, 1957; Gardiner, 1961;

Gay, 1974; Gottschalk, 1954; MacDonald & MacDonald, 2009; McCullagh, 1998; Topolski, 1991; Tucker, 2004). For Stanford (1994), ‘the sort of explanations that historians favour usually depends on their outlook or ‘philosophy’ – how they see the world as a whole’ (p.227). Historians have reached similar conclusions (Burke, 1991; Carr, 1990; Donnelly & Norton, 2011). For instance, according to Jordanova (2000) ‘there are different views on where the resting point in any explanation should be. The differences derive from theoretical commitments, aesthetic preferences, ideologies, beliefs, and so on’ (pp.107-108). These choices may be influenced, though not determined, by broader historiographical trends. Mabbett (2007), for example, observed ‘historians usually have in mind favoured notions about the sort of factors that are likely to provide explanations, and favoured notions follow fashions’ (p.60).

For example, whether a historian privileges conditions or direct actions in their causal explanations may in part be influenced by their interpretative framework (Fulbrook, 2002; Maza, 2017). According to Gay (1974), ‘the historian inclined to discover causes in the larger social sphere is likely to look for them in distant preconditions; the historian committed to the influence of world-historical individuals is more likely to concentrate on private wills in action just preceding the event’ (p.12).

The roles played by historiographic trends and historians’ individual framework is evident in the historiography of the Salem witch trials (Kamensky, 2008). For example, Myles (1995) noted the importance of the individual historian’s approach:

> if the Salem witch trials have a lasting grip on our historical unconscious, they have also served as a sort of Rorschach test of historiographic practice, producing a never-ending stream of interpretations that reveal the shifting mind of academia while perhaps getting perhaps no closer to a definitive explanation (pp.144-145).

Given that the merits of any historical causal explanation can only be judged in terms of its adequacy as a response to the particular question posed, some philosophers and historians have noted different types of causal question might presuppose certain explanatory models in response (Antonova, 2020; Atkinson, 1978; Mandelbaum, 1977). As Van Bouwel and Weber (2008) noted:

> for every social and historical phenomenon, there are many interesting and legitimate explanation-seeking questions that can be asked. In some cases, the relevance relations that are inherent in these questions are different, so that it is impossible to answer all of them by means of one type of explanation (pp.175-176).

Alternatively, a question may be so vague as to permit combinations of models because a particular relevance relation is not built into it (Van Bouwel & Weber, 2008).

In the historiography of the Salem witch trials, many of the historians did not set themselves imprecise causal questions such as ‘Why was there a crisis in 1692?’. Instead, they usually reformulated their ‘why-question’ in ways which privileged different types of causal explanation. For instance, Rosenthal (1993) noted ‘different conclusions about Salem follow from different questions asked about the events and from different methodologies applied to answering those questions’ (p.4).

For example, historians might set themselves causal questions which demand what Van Bouwel and Weber (2008) referred to as ‘structural’, ‘macro-explanation’ (pp.171-174). With such questions, materialistic or idealistic properties or groups might be more causally relevant (Topolski, 1991). For instance, Boyer and Nissenbaum (1976) noted that in explaining the Salem crisis of 1692 that ‘what we have been attempting through all the preceding chapters is to convey something of the deeper historical resonances of our story’ (p.179).

By contrast, some historians’ questions might lend themselves to what Van Bouwel and Weber dubbed ‘intentional, ‘micro-level’ explanation which require explanation of the ‘activities of particular agents with particular beliefs and desires to respond to these conditions at the particular time they did. This can only be done by means of a fine-grained intentional explanation' (pp.173-180). Some historians in the historiography of the Salem witch trials explicitly set themselves questions which required the foregrounding of human intentions and actions. Hoffer (1997) for instance, asked 'how can we recover and reassert the human agency of the characters in the Salem witch trials?' (p.6).

Similarly, the comparative historian is guided by a problematic which guides their research when comparing their constellations of structures (Barraclough, 1991; Berger, 2003; Bloch, 1953; Haupt, 2007; Skocpol & Somers, 1980). For example, in the historiography of the Salem witch trials Norton (2002) explicitly posed a 'deceptively simple but rarely asked question: why was Salem so different from all previous witchcraft episodes in New England?' (p.8).

Causal questions focusing on individuals' actions – especially when the phenomenon being explained is the execution of twenty (probably) innocent people – are more likely to result in causal explanations incorporating evaluation of moral responsibility. Suganami (2011), for example, argued that certain questions historians set themselves such as 'what went wrong?' or 'what wrong things were done?' might imply moral judgement. In the historiography of the Salem witch trials, for instance, historians have posed the question '*how could they?'* as well as 'why did it happen?' [original italics] (Demos, 2008, p.189).

5. Overview of the lesson sequence

For Research Question 1, I had turned to the phenomenon of historical causal explanation in the field of production. My aim had been to distil what I considered to be historical causal explanation's essential features in order to establish potential curricular goals. In doing so, I meant to experience this phenomenon in an unadulterated rather than mediated form, disrupting my 'habits of thought' that I had been acculturated with in the field of reproduction – for example through awarding-body specifications or the discourses of the extended writing movement and genre theory. By critiquing the preferences, inclinations, and expectations I had previously accrued, I aimed to enable re-interpretations. I then planned my scheme of work on the causes of the Salem witch trials with the purpose of 'recontextualising' afresh historical causal explanation. My objective was to provide a less reductive, distorted, or displaced conceptualisation of historical causal explanation in the field of reproduction in relation to its antecedent in the field of production. I still needed to be alert, however, to practical and ethical considerations of recontextualising historical causal explanation.

5.1. Levels of priority informing principles of curriculum design

5.1.1. Top level of priority in curricular decision making

For ethical reasons, I had to ensure that my students were given the optimum opportunity to succeed in their A-Level studies. Accordingly, when making decisions in my planning I gave the greatest priority to both the awarding body's examination specification and my professional judgement as an experienced A-Level teacher regarding what was feasible for 17- and 18-year-old students of a range of attainment levels to achieve their best possible results (Figure 5.1.). In both cases, these concerns took precedence over other considerations

Figure 5.1. Levels of priority for decision-making in curriculum design.


Most priority
Examination specification
My judgement regarding what is feasible for a Year 13 student
Philosophies of history by philosophers
The historiography of the Salem witch trials
Theories and methodologies of history by practising historians
Least priority
Recommendations of genre theorists
Recommendations of the extended writing movement

– even if the awarding body's guidance directly contradicted the claims of academics in the field of production, genre theorists, or the extended writing movement.

5.1.2. Middle level of priority in curricular decision making

Beyond the uppermost level of priority, I aimed to ensure I could justifiably claim I was conducting Bernsteinian 'recontextualisation'. Accordingly, the second level of priority in my decision-making when planning the lessons was the claims of academics in the field of production regarding historical causal explanation. I sub-divided the field into three sub-loci of authority: philosophies of history by philosophers; theories and methodologies of history by practising historians; and authentic works of academic historical explanation by historians from the historiography of the Salem witch trials. (These sub-loci, however, do not represent discrete categories and in some cases academics' works might represent two or more of the sub-fields of philosophy, methodology, and historiography). I gave these sub-loci equal weight and cross-referenced them against one another.

5.1.3. Bottom level of priority in curricular decision making

I assigned the third level of priority to the recommendations of genre theorists and the extended writing movement when planning the lessons. For ethical reasons, if either of these discourses' recommendations contradicted the awarding body specification or what I deemed would enable my students to achieve optimally in their A Levels, I ignored the recommendations. Furthermore, in order to legitimately 'recontextualise' academic history in the field of production I dismissed any recommendations from either discourse that failed to correspond with the views of philosophers and historians regarding historical causal explanation. If, however, the recommendations of genre theorists and the extended writing movement were congruent with the two higher levels of priority then I aimed to incorporate

Figure 5.2. Overview of the lessons in the enquiry.

Enquiry Question *Why was there a witch crisis in Salem in 1692?*				
Lesson no.	Lesson question	Scholarship read in class	Causal focus	Linguistic focus
1	Did Indian raids create a ‘tinder box’ for the Salem witch crisis?	Norton (2002) pp.296-297 Robinson (1991) p.189 Ray (2015) pp.4 & 198-201	Conditions and metaphors of verticality/differential visibility	Cause within the clause
2	Did political instability in New England ‘provide fertile ground’ for the Salem witch crisis?	Baker (2015) pp.54 & 64-67 Ray (2015) p.3 Rosenthal (1993) pp.3-4		
3	Was the Puritan worldview the ‘foundation’ of the Salem witch crisis?	Baker (2015) p.126 Ray (2015) p.5 Hansen (1970) pp.145-146		
4	Did village tensions ‘underlie’ the Salem witch crisis?	Boyer and Nissenbaum (1974) pp.50-52 & 68-69 Ray (2015) pp.3-4 & 188-200 Rosenthal (1993) p.3		
5	Did Cotton Mather ‘lay the groundwork’ for the Salem witch crisis?	Robinson (1991) pp.39, 49 & 251 Hansen (1970) pp.84-85 & 204	Agents’ actions	
6	Did societal gatekeepers ‘legitimise’ the Salem witch crisis?	Baker (2015) pp.183-186 Norton (2002) p.72 Ray (2015) pp.35, 46, 66-67, 94-96, 144-145 & 149-150 Rosenthal (1993) pp.193-195		
7	Why did the Salem crisis ‘spiral so dangerously out of control’?	Baker (2015) pp.31 & 127 Ray (2015) pp.7-8, 33-34, 40-41, 89-90, 116-117 &136-137 Starkey (1949) p.183		
8	Why was Salem so different from previous witchcraft episodes in New England?	Norton (2002), pp.8, 34-36, 77-78 & 296-297 Ray (2015) p.29 Rosenthal (1993) pp.3-7	Causes that made the difference Counterfactual conditionals	Counterfactual conditional clauses and cause within the clause
9	So why was there a witch crisis in Salem in 1692?		Colligation	Nominalisation

Figure 5.3. Example of resource from preparatory homework note-taking activity in advance of Lesson 1.



Physical destruction of towns

Casualties

Effects of raids on the ‘afflicted’ girls

- E.g. Mercy Lewis’ family members killed 1689

Wabanaki alliance with New French and Spanish

Did Indian raids create a ‘tinder box’ for the Salem witch

Influx of ‘outsiders’ into Salem escaping from raids

Puritan attitude to ‘Indians’

Parris’ servant Tituba

Economic effects of First Indian War and Navigation Acts

TASK

Read pp.156-57

Make notes on these consequences of Indian raids

Figure 5.4. Example of academic scholarship reading resource from Lesson 1.



M. B. Norton *In the Devil's Snare: The Salem Witchcraft Crisis of 1692* (2002) pp. 296-297

In early 1692, several children and teenage girls begun having fits of a sort previously recorded elsewhere in old and New England. The wartime **context could well have influenced** the onset of those fits – that the afflicted first accused an Indian of tormenting them certainly suggests as much – but more important than such plausible, if not wholly provable, origins was the long-term impact of the young women's charges **in the context of** Puritan New Englanders' belief system. Since Puritans insisted that the devil could do nothing without God's permission, they logically decided that God bore the ultimate responsibility for the witches' malefic activities…

…So too had God brought about their losses in the war, especially through providential actions during the 1690 campaigns against targets in New France…The Lord, in short, was simultaneously punishing New England in two different ways – through the Second Indian War on the northeastern frontier and through the operations of witchcraft in Essex County. As the evidence presented in this book has demonstrated, the assaults from the visible and invisible worlds became closely entwined in the New Englanders' minds. Those connections **permeated** the witchcraft examinations and trials, as revealed by repeated spectral sightings of the "black man", whom the afflicted described as resembling an Indian; and in the threats that the witches and the devil – just as the Wabanakis had – would "tear to pieces" or "knock in the head" those who opposed them…

…Accordingly, **had** the Second Indian War on the northeastern frontier somehow **been avoided**, the Essex County witchcraft crisis of 1692 **would not have occurred**. This is not to say the war "caused" the witchcraft crisis, but rather that **the conflict created conditions that allowed the crisis to develop** as rapidly and extensively as it did.

TASK

Why, according to Norton, did the Second Indian War increase the likelihood of a witch crisis in Salem?

Consider

- The New English's poor performance in the early years of the Second Indian War/King William's War

According to Norton, how did the fear of the Wabanaki manifest itself in the trials?

Consider in particular what the girls claimed the spectres threatened to do and looked like.

L1 – So *did* Indian raids create a 'tinder box' for the Salem witch crisis?

their recommendations into my planning.

5.2. Overview of the enquiry

I designed a nine-lesson scheme of work in which the students studied the enquiry question ‘Why was there a witch crisis in Salem in 1692?’ (Figure 5.2.). My use of an ‘enquiry question’ followed the increasing orthodoxy in English secondary history classrooms where a sequence of lessons is planned so that students construct an argument to a particular overarching question by the lessons’ completion (Byrom & Riley, 2003; Husbands, Kitson & Pendry, 2003; Riley, 2000). Although this structuring principle came from the extended writing movement in the field of reproduction, I deliberately chose a question which echoed research by academic historians of the Salem witch trials in the field of production (Ray, 2015). Such an approach is evident in the extended writing movement, where certain teacher-researchers have introduced their students to genuine historiographical debates with their enquiry questions (e.g. Foster & Goudie, 2015).

Each lesson was preceded by a preparatory homework note-taking activity involving either watching a documentary (Lesson 1; Collins and Wolfinger, 2004) or reading extracts from the examination-board endorsed textbook (Lessons 1-5, Bullock, 2016); a supplementary textbook (Lesson 5, Farmer, 2016); arguments by academic historians (Lesson 6); or resources I had written (Lessons 7-8). I spent the start of each lesson checking the students’ understanding of the preliminary task (Figure 5.3.). I chose to incorporate the reading of academic scholarship in every lesson. I therefore designed the preparatory homework activities so the students would take notes on the aspects of the Salem witch crisis they would need to understand before reading scholarship in class (Figure 5.4.).

Figure 5.5. Examples of generally applicable causal language from the historiography of the Salem witch trials that the students read in lesson.

Lesson 1
This is not to say the war “caused” the witchcraft crisis, but rather that the conflict **created** conditions that allowed the crisis to develop as rapidly and extensively as it did (Norton, 2002, pp.296-297).

The wartime context could well have influenced the onset of those fits – that the afflicted first accused an Indian of tormenting them certainly suggests as much – but more important than such plausible, if not wholly provable, origins was the long-term **impact** of the young women’s charges in the context of Puritan New Englanders’ belief system (Norton, 2002, pp.296-297).

Lesson 2
Many preconditions **led to** the Salem outbreak, and there was more than one explanation for people’s torments (Baker, 2015, pp.123-125).

The county courts could not meet until they were re-created by the legislature. This **meant** that unresolved conflicts would continue to grow and even boil over, with some disputes even helping to fuel witchcraft allegations (Baker, 2015, pp.64-67).

Lesson 3
When a community looks only for evidence of guilt and ignores or suppresses all contradictory evidence, the **result** is a witch hunt (Hansen, 1970, pp.145-146).

It has also been argued that the outbreak was **due to** Protestantism (Hansen, 1970, pp.145-146).

Lesson 4
Such an interpretation also reduces the episode to an easy-to-understand **product** of modernization – a clash between premodern and modern mentalities (Ray, 2015, pp.3-4)

Lesson 5
Because of his morbid fascination with the diabolical and his cravings for power, Cotton Mather **contributed** greatly to the fuelling of the flames of witchcraft in 1692 (Robinson, 1991, p.251).

Lesson 6
At the end of March, following the accusations of Cory and Nurse, Parris declared, “Christ knows how many devils there are among us”. He estimated there might be as many as twenty, **thus** encouraging more suspicion and more witch-hunting (Ray, 2015, pp.149-150).

As time went on, the young accusers warmed to their part and played it with increasingly dramatic flair and deadly **consequences** (Ray, 2015, p.46).

Lesson 7
The executions of 19 July had a profound **effect** upon the other witches awaiting their turn at trial (Starkey, 1949, p.183).

Figure 5.6. Example of resource for class debate activity on academic scholarship from Lesson 1.



Indian raids an important condition for the witch crisis

Indian raids a less important condition for the witch crisis

M B Norton

B C Ray

TASK

Review your homework and today's readings

Whose argument do you find more convincing and why?

Consider;

- The New English's poor performance in the early years of the Second Indian War/King William's War
- How fears of the Wabanaki did (not) manifest themselves at the trials

L1 – So *did* Indian raids create a 'tinder box' for the Salem witch crisis?

In class, students read extracts by academic historians arguing the relative importance of causes of the Salem crisis and answering comprehension questions on the historians' arguments. Some of this reading included broadly applicable causal language, although I did not explicitly highlight this to students (Figure 5.5.). At the end of each lesson, the students participated in a class debate regarding which historians' argument they found most convincing and why (Figure 5.6.).

5.2.1. Lessons 1-4: conditions

Some questions that the awarding body set explicitly demand the students argue the relative causal importance of 'conditions' such as 'the unusual political *conditions* operating in Massachusetts in 1692' [my italics] (Pearson Edexcel, 2016a, p.355). Furthermore, in order to achieve the highest levels candidates are required to 'employ criteria for making judgements about [causes']' which might include characterising causes as 'underpinning' (Pearson Edexcel, 2016c, p.8).

In Lessons 1-4, therefore, I wanted to highlight to the students how they might describe conditions and explain conditions' causal mechanisms. In each lesson, the students read extracts of academic scholarship where historians argued regarding the relative importance of Indian raids, political instability in Massachusetts, the Puritan worldview, and village tensions in the Salem crisis. For example, in Lesson 1 the students read Norton who argued regarding the Second Indian War that:

> Had the Second Indian War on the northeastern frontier somehow been avoided, the Essex County witchcraft crisis of 1692 would not have occurred. This is not to say the war "caused" the witchcraft crisis, but rather the conflict created **conditions** that allowed the crisis to develop as rapidly and extensively as it did (pp.296-297).

Figure 5.7. Example of resource from Lesson 2 outlining possible characteristics of ‘conditions’.



Historians sometimes talk about ‘**conditions**’

Conditions don’t *directly* cause the consequence.

Instead, they set the context and make the consequence possible.

They often
1. shape or limit the choices available to people
2. are slow moving and long-term
3. precede and outlast the event itself
4. are latent (‘underlying’ i.e. not obviously visible to people at the time)
5. are to do with ‘circumstances’ rather than individual people
6. are often abstract and general
7. are usually to do with long-term geographical, demographic (i.e. population growth), economic, technological, ideological, cultural, social, or institutional developments

‘Many **preconditions** led to the Salem outbreak, and there was more than one explanation for people’s torments…A disastrous and costly war had exacerbated existing economic, political and spiritual tensions’

(Baker, 2015, pp.123-125).

E W Baker

L2 – So *did* political instability ‘provide fertile ground’ for the Salem witch crisis?

Figure 5.8. Examples of atmosphere and fire metaphors for conditions and conditions' causal mechanisms in the historiography of the Salem.

> [Phillip English's] origins and mercantile pursuits made him a marked man in the **climate** of fear **pervading** Essex County in 1692 (Norton, 2002, p.144).

> With other communities emmeshed in so many of the same kinds of difficulties, it was easy for the **spark** of panic, once **ignited** in Salem Village, to spread through **the volatile atmosphere** of the province (Boyer & Nissenbaum, 1976, p.191fn).

> The magical experiment with the witchcake can explain the beginning of the witchhunt but not the extraordinary **atmosphere** of social tensions that **permeated** Massachusetts for the rest of the year (Breslaw, 1996, pp.105-106).

> An overwhelming and **highly toxic climate** of fear (Demos, 2008, p.215).

> Accusers, then, can be viewed as those individuals who were somehow especially sensitive to the problems created by their **environment** (Demos, 1970, p.1326).

> In the **tinderbox** of inevitable and angry recriminations, the witch hunt **caught fire** (Robinson, 1991, p.189).

Figure 5.9. Example of resource from Lesson 1 highlighting historians' language for atmosphere and fire metaphors.



in the climate of fear pervading Essex County in 1692

spread through the volatile atmosphere of the province

the extraordinary **atmosphere** that **permeated** Massachusetts

an overwhelming and **highly toxic climate** of fear

the tinderbox of inevitable and angry recriminations

the **atmosphere** was so charged so as easily to spark

TASK

Construct at least one sentence using one of these chunks explaining the extent to which the Indian Wars acted as a condition for the Salem witch crisis.

Include at least one example to justify your claim.

Be prepared to argue your reasoning.

L1 – So *did* Indian raids create a 'tinder box' for the Salem witch crisis?

In the first four lessons, the students also read historians argue regarding 'context' (Lesson 1, Norton 2002, pp.296-297); 'structure' (Lesson 4, Boyer & Nissenbaum, 1974, pp.50-52); and 'circumstances' (Lesson 4, Ray, 2015, pp.3-4). In Lesson 2, I explicitly highlighted to students some of the common characteristics of conditions (Figure 5.7.).

5.2.1.1. Metaphors of verticality and/or differential visibility

In Lessons 1-4, I also introduced students to metaphors of verticality and/or differential visibility when arguing regarding conditions. For instance, in the historiography of the Salem witch crisis some historians used metaphors of atmosphere and/or fire. Perhaps to circumvent accusations of determinism, such metaphors tend to imply conditions increased the possibility of a witch hunt while still allowing for the exercising of free human will. For example, In Lesson 1 - titled 'Did Indian raids create a 'tinderbox' for the Salem witch crisis? - the students read Robinson (1991) who argued 'in the **tinderbox** of inevitable and angry recriminations, the witch hunt caught fire' (p.189). In the same lesson, the students read Norton (2002) who argued:

> the assaults from the visible and invisible worlds became closely entwined in the New Englanders' minds. Those connections **permeated** the witchcraft examinations and trials, as revealed by repeated spectral sightings of the "black man", whom the afflicted described as resembling an Indian; and in the threats that the witches and the devil – just as the Wabanakis had – would "tear to pieces" or "knock in the head" those who opposed them (pp.296-297).

I identified further examples in the historiography of historians using such metaphors to describe conditions (e.g. 'atmosphere' and 'climate'); and their causal mechanisms (e.g. 'pervaded' and 'so charged so as easily to spark') that I highlighted to the students (Figures 5.8. & 5.9.).

Figure 5.10. Examples of plant metaphors for conditions and conditions' causal mechanisms in the historiography of the Salem witch crisis.

> (Increase Mather's *Remarkable Providences*) planted the seed which **sprouted into** the rankest harvest of witchcraft in the history of New England (Robinson, 1991, pp.45-46).

> New England witchcraft **had its roots in** the villages and towns of England (Karlsen, 1989, p.2).

> The community's endemic divisions – **rooted** as they were **in** real economic, geographic, and social differences – far from diminishing, only intensified in the 1690s (Boyer & Nissenbaum, 1974, p.161).

> In addition to this uncertainty about the charter, itself a symptom of ongoing political disputes with England, were persistent threats from "Indians" (i.e., Native Americans) against the colony and a decline of power among orthodox clergy – all ingredients for broad social instability, **providing fertile ground for** the discovery of enemies and the invisible world (Rosenthal, 1993, p.4).

> The case against John Alden **stemmed from** every possible root of accusation: social, political, religious, sexual, geographical, and military (Baker, 2015, p.147).

Figure 5.11. Example of resource from Lesson 2 highlighting historians' language for plant metaphors.



sprouted into witchcraft

cases **stemmed from**

accusations **grew from**

Salem's divisions **were rooted in**

provided fertile ground for the discovery of witches

Salem witchcraft **had its roots in**

TASK

Construct at least one sentence using one of these chunks explaining the extent to which political stability acted as a condition for the Salem witch crisis.

Include at least one example to justify your claim.

Be prepared to argue your reasoning.

L2 **–** So *did* political instability 'provide fertile ground' for the Salem witch crisis?

Figure 5.12. Example of resource from Lesson 3 highlighting historians' language for building metaphors.



the foundation of the witchcraft crisis **lay in**

underlay many of the witchcraft accusations

TASK

Construct at least one sentence using one of these chunks explaining the extent to which the Puritan worldview acted as a condition for the Salem witch crisis.

Include at least one example to justify your claim.

Be prepared to argue your reasoning.

L3 – So *was* the Puritan worldview the 'foundation' of the Salem witch crisis?

In Lesson 2 (‘Did political instability in New England “provide fertile ground” for the Salem witch crisis’?) the students read examples from the historiography of the Salem witch crisis of historians using plant metaphors such as Rosenthal (1993) who noted:

> A common explanation for the “witchcraft” outbreak spreading beyond Salem Village centres on the political and social turmoil facing the colony, particularly in view of its lack of a charter. That is, the colony’s charter had been revoked in 1684, and although Increase Mather was soon expected to arrive with a new one, a situation of instability and anxiety prevailed. In addition to this uncertainty about the charter, itself a symptom of ongoing political disputes with England, were persistent threats from “Indians” (i.e., Native Americans) against the colony and a decline of power among orthodox clergy – all ingredients for broad social instability, providing **fertile ground** for the discovery of enemies and the invisible world (pp.3-4)**.**

I identified further examples in the historiography of the Salem witch crisis of historians employing such metaphors to describe conditions (e.g. ‘roots’ and ‘fertile ground’) and conditions’ causal mechanisms (e.g. ‘sprouted into’; ‘grew from’; ‘stemmed from’; ‘rooted in’) that I highlighted to the students (Figures 5.10. & 5.11.).

Finally, some historians in the historiography of the Salem witch crisis employed building metaphors. For instance, in Lesson 3 (‘Was the Puritan worldview the “foundation” of the Salem witch crisis?’) the students read Norton (2002) who argued ‘the **foundation** of the witchcraft crisis **lay in** Puritan New Englanders’ singular worldview, one they had inherited from the first settlers of Massachusetts Bay more than sixty years earlier’ (p.295). I identified further such examples in the historiography of the Salem witch trials - such as Boyer and Nissenbaum (1974) who argued ‘the witchcraft trials themselves offer the most persuasive evidence of the passionate emotions which **underlay** these longstanding divisions’ (p.103) and highlighted them to the students (Figure 5.12.).

In deciding to introduce metaphors of verticality/differential visibility to the students, I formulated the following criteria for judging the students' use of such imagery. First, the students would need to avoid manipulating evidence so as to conform to an a priori metaphor (Atkinson, 1961). Second, a metaphor should 'appeal to some familiar experience or perception to illustrate the less familiar' (Marius & Page, 2007, p.161). In other words, the metaphorical object – such as a tragedy, flower, or outbreak – should be relatable to the reader and therefore help the writer communicate something that would otherwise have been more difficult to understand. Third, the use of metaphor can all too quickly transgress into banality which needs to be avoided. As Marwick (2001) noted, 'when it comes to writing history, pains (literally!) have to be taken to write precisely and explicitly, avoiding the temptation to reach for ready-made metaphors and clichés' (p. xiii). Fourth, the metaphor must 'ring true to your audience's ears' (Storey, 2013, pp.112-113). While a metaphoric statement cannot be literally true, it still needs to be metaphorically apt (McCullagh, 1993). The metaphor therefore should display an adequate resemblance between the metaphor (such as a tragedy) and the object being metaphorised (for example, the Salem witch trials). In sum, as Storey (2013) recommended, I wanted students to 'use metaphors and similes judiciously' (pp.112-113).

5.2.2. Lessons 5-7: actions

5.2.2.1. Agents' actions create conditions

Beginning with Lesson 5 ('Did Cotton Mather "lay the groundwork" for the Salem witch crisis?'), I focused on human actions, with this lesson concentrating on how individual agents help create conditions. I identified examples in the historiography of such argumentation where historians employed metaphors such as 'supplied the framework' ('it was Tituba who **supplied the framework** of, and the inspiration for the belief in, a diabolical conspiracy in

Figure 5.13. Example of resource from Lesson 5 highlighting historians’ language for metaphors regarding actions creating conditions.



planted the seed which sprouted into witchcraft

created a dark and foreboding atmosphere that legitimated accusations

laid the groundwork for the witchcraft delusion

supplied the framework of a diabolical conspiracy in Massachusetts

TASK

Construct at least one sentence using these chunks to explain the extent to which Cotton Mather contributed to the conditions for the Salem witch crisis.

Include at least one example to justify your claim.

Be prepared to argue your reasoning.

L5 –So *did* Cotton Mather ‘lay the groundwork’ for the Salem witch crisis?

Massachusetts' (Breslaw, 1996, p.xxiii)); 'planted the seed' ([Increase Mather's *Remarkable Providences*] **planted the seed** which sprouted into the rankest harvest of witchcraft in the history of New England' (Robinson, 1991, pp.45-46)); and 'created a dark and foreboding atmosphere' ([Samuel Parris'] aggressive preaching about the devil at work against his ministry **created a dark and foreboding atmosphere** that legitimated the accusations and shaped his congregation's reactions' (Ray, 2015, pp.144-145)). I then highlighted such metaphors to students (Figure 5.13.).

5.2.2.2. Agents' actions

Regarding the actions of individuals at the outset of the crisis - such as the accusers, the first confessor Tituba, or the influential men in Massachusetts society who Norton (2002) dubbed societal 'gatekeepers' - I identified that historians assigned these agents' actions at least four types of role: triggering, pressuring, legitimising, and encouraging (p.72). For example, in Lesson 6 ('Did the 'societal gatekeepers' "legitimise" the Salem witch crisis?), the students read Ray (2015) who argued:

> When Ann Putnam Jr., along with Betty Parris, Abigail Williams, and Elizabeth Hubbard began to suffer torments from spectres sometime in mid-February 1692, Ann's father, Thomas Putnam, joined by Samuel Parris and other Putnam men and elders of the church, were the first to write out the official complaints that **launched** the hunt (pp.94-96).

Furthermore, some in the field of production have suggested historians might indicate how those in positions of power 'force' their will onto those with less power (Hewitson, 2015, p.217; Scriven, 1966, pp.238-239). For example, the students also read Ray (2015) argue:

> It appears likely that Parris wanted a confession from Tituba and that she refused; he may have beaten her to **force** her to confess the next day in court. At any rate, such a scenario is the most plausible explanation for her compliance before the magistrates. Tituba did what her master **forced** her to do (p.35).

Figure 5.14. Examples of agents' actions as triggering/pressuring/legitimising/encouraging in the historiography of the Salem witch trials.

Triggering
There had been New England witch trials before, but none **precipitated** by a cohort of bewitched adolescent and preadolescent girls (Schiff, 2015, p.10).

The accusers **ignited** the witchcraft crisis in Salem (Ray, 2015, p.132).

The little girls, then, **initiated** the crisis (Norton, 2002, pp.306-308).

Thomas Putnam, joined by Samuel Parris and other Putnam men and elders of the church, were the first to write out the official complaints that **launched** the witch-hunt (Ray, 2015, pp.94-96).

The impact of [Tituba's] confession **triggered** the witchhunt that defied all past experience with witchhunting in New England' (Breslaw, 1996, p. 117).

Pressuring
Titutba's cooperation in court was in fact **coerced** by her master (Ray, 2015, p.35).

No mob **forced** a guilty verdict; the judiciary did (Rosenthal, 1993, pp.93-94).

The court poured fuel on the flame in the form of confessions **wrought** by intimidation and apparent extortion (Ray, 2015, p. 132).

Legitimising
The crucial role of adult men in **legitimising** the complaints of the afflicted persons (Norton, 2002, p.72).

The little girls then, initiated the crisis, but it would not have persisted without the participation of the older teenagers and (especially) the afflicted and confessing adults, whose age and maturity **lent weight to** the children's accusations (Norton, 2002, pp.306-308).

When the interrogations began, it was the Putnam clan that sat by their girls, took notes alongside the clerk and the justices of the peace, and **put their weight behind** the prosecutions (Hoffer, 1996, p.103).

The governor, council, and judges of Massachusetts must shoulder a great deal of the blame for **allowing** the crisis to reach the heights that it did (Norton, 2002, pp.306-308).

No one would have died without the **sanction** of the judges (Baker, 2015, pp.162-164).

Encouraging
Subsequent sermons served to **motivate** church members to continue making accusations against new suspects (Ray, 2015, pp.149-150).

It took [Cotton Mather's] aggressive and inflammatory arguments to **persuade** key authorities that witchcraft was the major enemy of New England (Robinson, 1991, pp.54-55).

[The Puritan old guard] **urged forward** the witchcraft persecutions in a desperate attempt to retain the power of their old Puritan theocracy (Robinson, 1991, p.252).

[Authors of books about witchcraft such as Increase and Cotton Mather] played a vital part in **promoting** the witch-hunt (Hill, 1996, p.7).

Witchcraft charges were supported by the authorities and **encouraged** to spread to the whole colony (Rosenthal, 1993, pp.6-7).

Figure 5.15. Examples of resource from Lesson 6 highlighting agents' actions as triggering/pressuring/legitimising/influencing.

the witch trials were **precipitated by**	**ignited** the crisis	**initiated** the crisis	**launched** the witch hunt	**triggered** the witch hunt
coerced cooperation	**forced** verdicts	**wrought** confessions	confessors **yielded to the pressure of**	women **acceded to**
motivated people to make accusations	**persuaded** people that witchcraft was the major enemy	**urged forward** the witchcraft prosecutions	played a vital part in **promoting** the witch hunt	**encouraged** the spread of accusations
legitimised the accusations	**lent weight** to the accusations	**put their weight behind** the prosecutions	**allowed** the crisis to reach the heights it did	no one would have died without the **sanction** of

TASK

Construct at least one sentence explaining the role one of the following played in the Salem witch crisis:

The 'afflicted'; Samuel Parris; Thomas Putnam; Hathorne & Corwin; or Stoughton.

Include at least one example to justify your claim.

Be prepared to argue your reasoning.

L6 – So did 'societal gatekeepers' 'legitimise the Salem witch crisis?

Hewitson (2015) noted historians might characterise powerful agents' actions as 'allowing' in the sense that those in authority had the power to stop an event occurring but did not (p.217).

In the context of the Salem witch trials, this might take the form of 'legitimation' where authority figures lent authority and respectability to the proceedings. For example, the students also read Ray (2015) who argued:

> Although Parris cannot be said to have caused or instigated the witch-hunts, since he was only one of several authorities initially involved, it seems clear that, before the accusations began, his aggressive preaching about the devil at work against his ministry created a dark and foreboding atmosphere that **legitimated** the accusations and shaped his congregation's reaction (pp.144-145).

Finally, some in the field of production have suggested that historians might characterise powerful agents' actions as 'encouraging' (Hewitson, 2015, p.217). In the same lesson, the students read Ray (2015) who argued 'at the end of March, following the accusations of Cory and Nurse, Parris declared, "Christ knows how many devils there are among us". He estimated there might be as many as twenty, thus **encouraging** more suspicion and more witch-hunting' (pp.149- 150). I identified further examples in the historiography of the Salem witch trials of historians characterising agents' actions in these four types which I highlighted to students (Figures 5.14. & 5.15.).

Once the crisis had been initiated, I pinpointed roles historians assigned to agents' actions such as those by the accusers, confessors, and 'societal gatekeepers' that contributed to the scale and nature/direction of the crisis as well as its rate of change. Scriven (1966) suggested a cause may be 'enhancing' in that that it widened the scope of a consequence (pp.238-239). For example, in Lesson 7 ('Why did the Salem crisis "spiral so dangerously out of control"?') the students read Ray (2015) who argued 'The identification of Burroughs as the leader of a large-scale conspiracy helped to crystallise the surge of fear in Salem Village.

Figure 5.16. Examples of agents' actions as enlarging/catalysing/shaping in the historiography of the Salem witch trials

Enlarging
Tituba's confession in Salem in 1692, combining as it did elements of those Indian beliefs with that of English folklore, would **heighten** the fear of a Satanic conspiracy in Massachusetts (Breslaw, 1996, p.17).

The afflicted girls [Abigail Williams, Mary Walcott, Mercy Lewis, and Ann Putnam] **widened** the circle of suspicion (Baker, 2015, pp.27-28).

Confessed witches **enlarged** the scope of the plot (Ray, 2015, p.5).

Confession was a likely, if only temporary, way to save one's life, even as it equally served to corroborate the seeming truth of the accusations, thus **intensifying** and **widening** the panic (Fels, 2017, p.6).

The identification of Burroughs as the leader of a large-scale conspiracy helped to crystallise the surge of fear in Salem Village. He was the perfect choice to **escalate** the unfolding drama (Ray, 2015, pp.89-90).

Catalysing
When events got under way [Parris] helped **drive** them **on** (Hill, 1996, p.2).

Thomas Putnam and his family were central players in **pushing forward** the unfolding drama of Satan's apparent attack on Salem Village (Ray, 2015, pp. 94-96).

[Danforth's endorsement of the initial pre-trial examinations] **gave** the girls and their allies even greater authority and the process of arrests and examinations a new, unstoppable **impetus** (Hill, 1996, p.105).

From the beginning of the Salem witchcraft proceedings, the many confessions **spurred on** the legal process (Ray, 2015, pp.116-117).

The accusation of Burroughs **served as a catalyst** for the escalation that had already begun (Ray, 2015, pp.136-137).

The addition of Rev. George Burroughs to the ranks of the accused certainly was important for **propelling** the witch hunt **forward** (Fels, 2017, p.212n).

Shaping direction and/or nature
The Salem witch hunt was **driven by** the conspiracies of envious men intent on destroying their enemies (Robinson, 1991, pp. xiii-xiv).

One can say that Putnam was far from a disinterested and objective party and that he and his family played a significant role in **shaping** the course of the trials (Baker, 2015, p.121).

[Parris'] zealous engagement in the legal process played a central role in **setting the direction and scope** of the proceedings (Ray, 2015, pp.144-145).

Their families and the authorities, both ministers and magistrates, **stage-managed** the girls' actions every step of the way (Ray, 2015, p.46).

The magistrates' questions and the responses of the afflicted and accused demonstrate one way the judges **steered** the process towards their predetermined verdict of guilty (Baker 2015, pp.183-186).

The judges **directed** the course of these trials (Hoffer, 1996, p.161).

[Though Tituba's] apparently witless wanderings she **laid down a pattern** which would wreck the peace of mind of Massachusetts for months and even years to come (Starkey, 1949, pp.141-142).

[Bridget Oliver Bishop and Abigail Hobbs] **established a new pattern** that would endure throughout the remainder of the crisis (Norton, 2002, pp.78-79).

[Abigail and Deliverance Hobbs' confessions] **provided the template for** later similar revelations (Norton, 2002, pp.305-306).

Figure 5.17. Example of resource from Lesson 7 highlighting agents' actions as enlarging/catalysing/shaping.



heightened the fear of a Satanic conspiracy	**widened** the circle of suspicion	**enlarged** the scope of the plot	**intensified and widened** the panic	**escalated** the unfolding drama	**extended and broadened** the number of accusations
drove events on	**pushed forward** the unfolding drama	**gave** the process **impetus**	**spurred on** the legal process	**served as a catalyst** for the escalation	**propelled** the witch hunt **forward**
the witch hunt was **driven by**	**played a significant role in shaping** the course of the trials	**set the direction and scope** of the proceedings	**stage-managed** every step	**steered** the process	**directed** the course of the trials
provided a persuasive framework to interpret the girls' behaviour	**laid down a pattern** which would wreck the peace of mind of Massachusetts	**established a new pattern** that would endure throughout the crisis	**provided a template for** later similar revelations	**a script emerged**	**followed a standard formula**

TASK

Construct at least one sentence explaining how Tituba's confession, Rebecca Nurse's conviction, or George Burroughs' conviction contributed to the witch crisis using these chunks.

Explain either the crisis' scale, speed, direction, or nature.

Include at least one example to justify your claim.

L7 – So why *did* the Salem crisis 'spiral so dangerously out of control'?

He was the perfect choice to **escalate** the unfolding drama' (pp. 89-90). The students also read Ray argue that 'from the beginning of the Salem witchcraft proceedings, the many confessions **spurred on** the legal process' (pp.116-117). Finally, the students read Ray argue 'a close analysis of Tituba's confession also reveals the largely unrecognised role that magistrate John Hathorne played in **shaping** the basic content of her testimony' (pp.33-34). I identified further examples in the historiography of the Salem witch trials of historians characterising agents' actions in terms of enlarging, catalysing, or shaping the crisis which I highlighted to students (Figures 5.16. & 5.17.).

5.2.3. Lesson 8: counterfactuals and comparison

In my planning, I chose to introduce counterfactualism in Lesson 8 after students had studied the actions of key individuals in the Salem witch crisis in Lessons 5-8. I did this to ensure students would be able to construct counterfactual conditionals that met three plausibility conditions proposed by some of counterfactualism's advocates in the field of production. First, some theorists insist on a 'rule of minimum rewrite' (Tetlock & Belkin, 1996; Tetlock & Parker, 2006). This rule includes a *ceteris paribus* clause where the historian hypothetically alters one examined cause but keeps the remaining historical 'reality' constant (Tucker, 1999). Gaddis (2004) argued that to do otherwise would 'produce a historiographical witches' brew where anything goes and no particular outcome is any more probable than any other' (pp.100-102). Furthermore, in this view short-term counterfactuals are necessarily more plausible because they do not require a ramification through of many complicated and impossible-to-predict processes (Black, 2015; Brunzl, 2004; Bulhof, 1999; Kershaw, 2008; Nolan, 2013). In this view, longer-term counterfactuals posit not only that if A had happened instead of B then C would have followed but also that D and E would have resulted instead of Y and Z (Clark, 1997; Figure 5.18.). Kożuchowski (2015), for instance, warned of 'the primordial sin

Figure 5.18. Comparison of short-term and longer-term counterfactual reasoning.


Time
Event
Consequence X
Alternative consequence B
Shorter-term counterfactual
Event
Consequence X
Alternative Consequence B
Consequence Y
Alternative Consequence E
Alternative Consequence C
Alternative Consequence F
Consequence Z
Alternative Consequence G
Alternative Consequence H
Alternative Consequence I
Alternative Consequence D
Alternative Consequence J
Alternative Consequence K
Alternative Consequence L
Longer-term counterfactual

of long-run historical counterfactuals' (p.349).

Second, according to some in the field of production for a historian's counterfactual claim to be plausible the counterfactual antecedent itself needs to be feasible and not a *deus ex machina* (Lebow, 2008; Nolan, 2013). For example, Ferguson (1997) suggested counterfactualists should limit their analyses to possible courses of actions that were considered by individuals or small, united groups at the time which can be evidenced by primary sources (Black, 2015). Gaddis (2004) suggested that it is not:

> appropriate to change a single variable if the action involved could not have taken place at the time…Such speculation can make for bad, and less often good, science fiction; but it's not history because it fails the test of plausibility. These weren't options that would have seemed feasible to decision-makers at the time (p.103).

Third, according to some of its advocates counterfactuals can – and should – be (indirectly) 'evidenced' in a further sense. From this perspective, counterfactuals will only be considered plausible if the chain of logic linking antecedent to proposed consequent(s) is itself plausible (Bunzl, 2004; Lebow, 2008). Here, 'plausibility' is assessed by critiquing the historian's implicit thesis regarding how the world tends to unfold, but this assessment can only be achieved through wider knowledge of how people in the society under investigation generally acted (Black, 2015; Bulhof, 1999; Maar, 2014; Stanford, 1998). Counterfactuals' plausibility, therefore, may be assessed by reference to comparative examples which provide evidence of what would have happened in 'normal' circumstances (Hewitson, 2015; Stanford, 1994). According to Black (2015), 'a comparative approach is adopted to lend substance to the counterfactual argument' (p.191). These comparisons may be synchronic (same time, different place) or diachronic (different time, same place) (Berger, 2003, p.167; Tosh, 2006; Weber, 1972). For Mackie (1974), the 'key is [having] a picture of what *would* have

Figure 5.19. Examples of counterfactual conditionals related to short-term individual actions that students read in Lessons 5-8.

If Cotton Mather, who had shown himself in Boston more interested in curing the Goodwin children than in catching witches, **had been** present then Mary Warren **would probably have** retained her sanity (Hansen, 1970, p.204).

While there can be no single explanation for the Salem witch trials, we may reasonably assume that something radically different **would have** happened **had** Phips **stayed** home and the obsessive William Stoughton **had not been** in a position of power (Rosenthal, 1993, pp.193-195).

If the magistrates **had initially decided not** to act on the girls' accusations, the legal process **would never have started**, and Salem would hold a very different place in America's historical self-consciousness (Ray, 2015, p.29).

Figure 5.20. Examples of resource from Lesson 8 highlighting short-term counterfactuals.



Language for counterfactual reasoning

‘In his diary, Mather says that at the beginning of the outbreak in Salem Village he offered to take all six of the afflicted girls, to “see whether…*Prayer* and *fasting* would not put an end unto these heavy Trials”, but his offer was declined.

Had Parris and the families of the girls **agreed** to this, it seems obvious that the afflictions **would have stopped** and the authorities **would have been** given time to reconsider further legal actions.’

We know Cotton Mather treated Martha Goodwin with ‘isolation therapy’ in 1688 and her afflictions stopped.

B C Ray

L8 –So why *was* Salem so different from previous witchcraft episodes in New England?

Figure 5.21. Examples of ‘What if?’ activity to prompt students’ counterfactual reasoning.



What if…?

Precedents for a different option for the people in the trials	***What if…?***
• Normal legal procedure in New England was the accusers should post a bond. • Normal legal procedure in New England was that the accusers should not sit together. • In 1671, Samuel Willard refused to accept the ‘touch test’. • In 1671, Willard refused to believe Knapp’s confessions – diagnosing possession instead. • In 1671, Willard concluded that the inconsistencies in Knapp’s stories was evidence the devil was trying to trick them. • In 1671, Willard argued that the devil was using innocent women’s ‘shapes’ to trick them. • In 1692 *The Return of Several Ministers* warned about relying solely on spectral evidence. • In 1688, Goody Glover confessed and was executed. • In 1688, the magistrates did not follow up Glover’s claim that she had worked with other witches. • It was very unusual for a judge to intervene after a jury had delivered their verdict. • Prior to 1692, only 26% of Massachusetts witchcraft cases ended in conviction.	• Hathorne and Corwin had demanded bonds for accusations? • The girls had not been allowed to sit together in court? • The Salem magistrates had not accepted the touch test? • The Salem magistrates had not accepted spectral evidence? • The magistrates had not believed Tituba’s confession? • Tituba had been immediately put on trial after her confession? • The magistrates had explored inconsistencies in the girls’ claims? • The magistrates in Salem had not assumed the witches’ guilt? • Stoughton had not intervened after Rebecca Nurse’s initial acquittal?

TASK

Pick one of these ‘what if’ scenarios.

Construct a counterfactual conditional. Support your claim with comparative evidence.

L8 –So why *was* Salem so different from previous witchcraft episodes in New England?

happened if things had been otherwise, and this is borrowed from some experience where things *were* otherwise' [original italics] (p.57).

For example, in Lesson 8 the students read Ray (2015) who argued:

> In his diary, [Cotton] Mather says that at the beginning of the outbreak in Salem Village he offered to take all six of the afflicted girls, to see "whether…*Prayer* and *fasting* would not put an end unto these heavy Trials", but his offer was declined. **Had** Parris and the families of the girls **agreed** to do this, it seems obvious that the afflictions **would have stopped** and the authorities **would have been** given time to reconsider further legal action [original italics] (p.29).

In this example, Ray hypothesised regarding one short-term antecedent (Parris' and Putnam's decisions not to accept Cotton Mather's offer to treat the afflicted away from Salem Village) shortly after the young women had first started having fits but before the crisis escalated. Ray had evidence from Mather's diary that an alternative option was available to Parris and Putnam and, presumably, was considered but declined. 'Evidence' that could be provided to substantiate such a counterfactual include the fact that, in 1688, Cotton Mather had provided this type of isolation therapy to another afflicted girl, Martha Goodwin, who in time stopped making accusations (diachronic comparison). Similarly, soon after the afflictions in Salem Village started, Parris did send his daughter Betty away from Salem Village to stay with his cousin Stephen Sewall, where she duly recovered (synchronic comparison).

In Lessons 5-8, the students read further examples of historians writing short-term counterfactuals related to individual human action (Figure 5.19.). In Lesson 8, I then modelled for the students the lexicogrammar of Ray's counterfactual conditional (p.29; Figure 5.20.). Afterwards, I asked the students to construct their own counterfactual conditionals using a series of 'What if?' questions as prompts (Figure 5.21.).

Figure 5.22. Schema of Rosenthal's and Norton's comparisons of the Goodwin case (1688)/the Branch case (1692-1693) compared to the Salem (1692).

Goodwin children case/Goody Glover trial in Boston (1688)			
Cause A ✔	**Cause B ✔**	**Cause C ✔**	**Cause D ✗**
Political turmoil	Social turmoil	Young people made accusations	Male societal gatekeepers gave further accusations credibility
Result: Case ended after trial, conviction, and execution of Goody Glover.			

Salem witch trials (1692)			
Cause A ✔	**Cause B ✔**	**Cause C ✔**	**Cause D ✔**
Political turmoil	Social turmoil	Young people made accusations	Male societal gatekeepers gave further accusations credibility
Result: Witch hunt. 19 convicted and executed. 1 pressed to death.			

Kate Branch case/Elizabeth Clawson & Mercy Disborough trials in Stamford (1692-1693)			
Cause A ✔	**Cause B ✔**	**Cause C ✗**	**Cause D ✗**
Head of household made formal complaints	Young person made accusations	Close to the war frontier with the Wabanakis	Credulous magistrates
Result: Only two accused women brought to trial. Case ended after both women eventually acquitted after trial.			

Salem witch trials (1692)			
Cause A ✔	**Cause B ✔**	**Cause C ✔**	**Cause D ✔**
Heads of households made formal complaints	Young people made accusations	Close to the war frontier with the Wabanakis	Credulous magistrates
Result: Witch hunt. 19 convicted and executed. 1 pressed to death.			

Furthermore, in Lesson 8 I chose to make the comparative method of difference explicit to my students. For instance, in Lesson 1 the students had read Rosenthal (1993) who argued:

> A common explanation for the "witchcraft" outbreak spreading beyond Salem Village centres on the political and social turmoil facing the colony, particularly in view of its lack of a charter…This traditional explanation centring on political and social turmoil is plausible but not satisfying: **essentially the same elements** existed in 1688 when the Goodwin case occurred, but the colony did not then lose its way on the witchcraft issue. **Differences** do exist, of course, between what happened to the Goodwin children and what happened in the Parris household, one being the effort made by Cotton Mather in the Goodwin case to keep secret the names of others besides Glover who were similarly accused of witchcraft. **Such differences**, along with others, come closer to explaining the Salem witch trials, which only make some kind of sense after the examination of multiple causes (Rosenthal, 1993, pp.3-4).

In this example, Rosenthal employed diachronic comparison to falsify historical causal explanations by demonstrating that a putative cause (political and social turmoil in the colony) was present in both a negative case (the Goodwin case in Boston in 1688) and a positive case (the Salem witch crisis of 1692) (Figure 5.22.). Rosenthal then employed the method of difference by identifying a cause that made the difference between the positive and negative cases: for example, the difference in behaviour between Cotton Mather in 1688 compared to Parris and Putnam in 1692.

Similarly, in Lesson 8 the students read Norton (2002) who argued:

> The Connecticut accusations are notable for **the contrast** they provide to the contemporaneous Salem Village outbreak. Southern Connecticut remained almost untouched by the war to the north; the region suffered few significant losses of men, houses, livestock, or crops. Although Kate Branch's fits mimicked those of the Village afflicted, no one else ever

> followed her lead in the Stamford area. Moreover, the only people she named as witches fell into the most common categories: women with longtime local reputations for malefice and their relatives. The authorities too, moved slowly and cautiously against those Kate accused… the atmosphere in which [Branch's] torments occurred **differed greatly** from that in Essex County, and so the consequences were equally **different.**
>
> …Kate's fits closely resembled those she would have learned about in news from Massachusetts, and their timing was too exact to be coincidental. Of course, the absence of a Connecticut crisis comparable to that in Essex County does not by itself prove that the looming presence of war on the northeastern frontier was *the* crucial factor in creating **the contrast** between the two regions. Yet at the same time it is highly suggestive that a teenage maidservant could experience severe and prolonged fits in 1692 in southern New England and not set off a regionwide panic like that which occurred simultaneously two hundred miles north in Massachusetts [original italics] (pp.77-78 & 296-297).

In this example Norton employed synchronic comparison to falsify putative causes (a young woman making accusations and the head of her household pressing formal charges) because both were present in a negative case (the Branch case in Stamford in 1692-93) and the positive case (Salem 1692) (Figure 5.22.). Norton also identified the causes that made the difference in the positive case: in her example the magistrates in Stamford's scepticism which itself was a consequence of not being as affected by the need for a scapegoat due to the failing war effort.

Before Lesson 8, the student's preparatory homework task had been to research three 'negative cases' of Groton 1671, Boston 1688, and Stamford 1692 - regions close to Salem where young people made accusations in the late 17th Century but there was not a witch crisis. A prerequisite in avoiding selective, superficial, and overly asymmetrical comparison is a close familiarity with more than one context (Berger, 2003; Cohen & O'Connor, 2004; Fischer, 1970; Fulbrook, 2002; Ritter, 1986; Stanford, 1998; Thrupp, 1958). Although the

Figure 5.23. Example of preparatory homework resource before Lesson 8 on the Groton case of 1671.

Samuel Willard, Elizabeth Knapp, Groton, 1671-72

In 1671, before the outbreak of the First Indian War in 1675 or Charles II's revocation of the Massachusetts Bay Colony Charter in 1674, a sixteen-year-old servant girl called Elizabeth Knapp was working in the household of Reverend Samuel Willard in Groton, Massachusetts. Knapp began to complain of terrible pains in her legs and breasts and claimed she felt as if someone was trying to strangle her. Knapp then began to have severe fits similar to the girls in Salem in 1692 would go on to have. While Willard was away from Groton, Knapp then said she saw the spectre of a neighbouring woman which attempted to strangle her. The accused was a full-church member in Groton. The accused was brought to Knapp, at which point the afflicted girl reached out to touch the woman and her afflictions suddenly stopped. This was known as 'the touch test' and was a traditional form of identifying witches: the logic being that once the afflicted touched their tormentor the evil could flow back to its original source. Unlike in Salem where the magistrates did allow the 'touch test' to be admitted (for example against John Alden), when Willard returned and learned of the accusation he treated this evidence and the allegation generally with caution and scepticism. He refused to make a legal complaint and instead encouraged Knapp to pray with the accused woman. This led to Knapp retracting her accusation and concluding that the devil must have been trying to deceive her.

Knapp herself repeatedly implied that she had made a diabolic pact and that she had seen other names in the Devil's book. She also claimed that the Devil had instructed her to kill Willard's family. She would then retract her confessions – perhaps because she had begun to realise they would probably result in her being accused of being a witch herself. Willard continued to treat Knapp with prayer and fasting. Eventually, a doctor diagnosed the cause of Knapp's fits as being 'diabolic'. Knapp, in a fit, then accused a second woman. Again, differently to the magistrates in Salem who often overlooked inconsistencies in the girls' stories, Willard treated the claim cautiously after noting that Knapp often contradicted herself. Knapp then began to verbally assault Willard in a low, grumbling voice that seemed to imply the Devil was talking through her. Willard eventually concluded that Knapp had been 'possessed' by the Devil rather than being attacked by a human witch working for the Devil or because Knapp had made a diabolic pact. He also concluded that the Devil had been impersonating innocent women by adopting their shapes and controlling Knapp to try and have innocent people accused of being witches. Ultimately, no one was formally accused. Knapp eventually recovered, married, and had six children. Willard wrote a formal account of the case and sent a copy to Increase Mather, who then recounted it in his popular essay about witchcraft *An Essay for the Recording of Illustrious Providences* in 1684. In 1692 Willard began to give sermons casting doubt on the Salem girls' claims, which led to the girls hinting that they were about to accuse him. This led to Willard temporarily halting his criticism but once public opinion turned against the girls from September 1692 he began his criticisms again.

L8 –Why was Salem so different from previous witchcraft episodes in New England?

Figure 5.24. Example of preparatory homework resource for students' notetaking on 'negative cases' before Lesson 8.

	Political limbo?	Indian Wars?	Endorsement by 'societal gatekeepers'? • Guardians • Ministers • Magistrates	Unconventional legal procedure?
How similar/different were the cases below to the Salem witch craze 1692 (if mentioned)?				
Groton 1671 Elizabeth Knapp Samuel Willard No formal accusations				
Boston 1688-89 The Goodwin Children John Goodwin Cotton Mather 1 formal accusation 1 execution (Goody Glover)				
Stamford 1692-93 Kate Branch Sergeant Daniel Westcott 2 upheld formal accusations 2 acquittals				

L8 –Why was Salem so different from previous witchcraft episodes in New England?

Figure 5.25. Examples of the method of difference in the historiography of the Salem witch trials.

Falsifying putative causes

In its early stages (that is, prior to mid-April 1692), the episode that originated in Salem Village **resembled** several other witchcraft incidents in seventeenth-century New England. Although the afflictions of Abigail Williams and Betty Parris were unusual, they were **by no means unique**, nor were adults' initial reactions to these afflictions unprecedented (Norton, 2002, pp.296-297).

The behaviour of the Salem afflicted, **far from being unique**, **resembled** various prior counterparts, other physicians, much more distinguished than Dr. William Griggs, had pronounced children bewitched on the basis of **similar** evidence (Norton, 2002, pp.38-40).

Identifying cause that made the difference

There was **nothing extraordinary** about either the charge of witchcraft, the nature of the afflictions, or the judiciary determining the validity of the charges. The **new element** that occurred in 1692 concerned the spread of charges and the credibility given by the judiciary to claims of a broad conspiracy of witches (Rosenthal, 1993, p.3).

[Tituba] also told about the devil recruiting witches in Salem Village and about witches' spectres meeting together, first in Samuel Parris' house and then elsewhere, and tormenting the children in the Village. These themes became **the distinctive feature** of the Salem narrative and the substance of the subsequent confessions (Ray, 2015, pp.116-117).

What **differed** in 1692 was not simply William Stoughton's influential insistence that a spectre could not represent an innocent person, and his consequent outspoken belief in guilt of anyone who was so represented...Goody Nurse's conviction constitutes one of the most persuasive pieces of evidence that the Massachusetts authorities in general believed unhesitatingly in the truth of the witchcraft allegations (Norton, 2002, pp.225-226).

The Connecticut accusations are notable for **the contrast** they provide to the contemporaneous Salem Village outbreak (Norton, 2002, pp.77-78).

The Massachusetts Bay Colony legal system was self-invented under the charter, it followed the English system in many of its principles and procedures, as well as much of its content, but in some ways it **diverged**. One **marked difference** was that the Puritans' assumption of religious and moral infallibility prompted an inquisitorial attitude in their examinations and trials (Hill, 1996, pp.80-81).

Allegations of witchcraft in Massachusetts had historically been given little support by clerical and judicial authorities. **What set the Salem episode apart** from other outbreaks of 'witchcraft' is that for the first and last time in the colonies the authorities actively supported the accusers rather than seeking to supress them (Rosenthal, 1993, pp.3-7).

What made Salem Village disputes notorious, and ultimately so destructive, was the fact that structural defects in its organisation rendered the Village almost helpless in coping with whatever disputes might arise. It is probably in this way alone that Salem Village may be considered a "**deviant"** community among its New England neighbors (Boyer & Nissenbaum, 1974, pp.50-52).

Tituba's testimony about Satan's arrival in the Village to recruit witches and attack the minister's family made Salem's story **unique** in the annals of New England witchcraft, and it was immediately convincing (Ray, 2015, pp.33-34).

Granting such prominence to the young "afflicted", as they were often called, was **extremely rare** in New England (Ray, 2015, pp. 44-46).

The Court of Oyer and Terminer tried twenty-eight people for witchcraft, and all twenty-eight were found guilty. This is the sort of record one would expect to find only in show trials in an authoritarian state, such as the Soviet Union in the 1930s or North Korea today. It is a prosecutorial success rate **unparalleled** in American history before or since (Baker, 2015, pp.183-186).

Figure 5.26. Examples of resource highlighting the method of difference from Lesson 8.



Less important?

Background conditions			
essentially the same elements existed in [another society]	the episode that originated in Salem Village resembled several other incidents	far from being unique, Salem resembled various prior counterparts	such [conditions] had been previously recorded and similarly handled at other times in the preceding [time period]

Causes that made the difference				
there was nothing extraordinary about [condition]. The new element that occurred in Salem Village was [cause]	the atmosphere in which [condition] occurred in Salem Village differed greatly from that in [another society], and so the consequences were equally different...	Salem Village did not differ from [another society] in [condition] but rather in [cause]	differences do exist between Salem Village and [another society] which come closer to explaining [consequence]	[cause] became a distinctive feature of Salem Village
what differed in Salem Village was [cause]	Salem Village is notable for the contrast it provides with the contemporaneous [other society]	in some ways Salem Village diverged. One marked difference was [cause]	what set Salem Village apart from [other societies] was that for the first and last time [cause]	the contrast between Salem Village and [another society] here is striking
it is probably in this way alone that Salem Village may be called deviant among [similar societies]	[cause] made Salem Village unique in the annals of [wider geographic area]	[cause] was extremely rare in [time period/wider geographic area]	[cause] is unparalleled in history both before and since	[cause] was unique and unprecedented in Western history

More important?

L8–So why *was* Salem so different from previous witchcraft episodes in New England?

time spent on these negative cases was far less than the positive case of Salem, I judged this legitimate because, as Kocka (1999) noted, ‘for dissertations and other projects subject to narrow time limits, asymmetric comparison is often the only way to open oneself to comparison at all’ (p.49). In Lesson 8, students read extracts from Norton comparing the Salem case to Groton in 1671 and Stamford in 1692 as well as Ray and Rosenthal making comparisons with Boston in 1688 (Norton, 2002, pp.34-36, 77-78 & 296-297; Ray, 2015, p.29; Rosenthal, 1993, pp.3-7; Figures 5.23. & 5.24.). I identified further examples of the language historians in the historiography of Salem used when employing the method of difference which I highlighted to students (Figures 5.25. & 5.26.).

5.2.4. Lesson 9: colligation

In Lesson 9, I planned for the students to focus on colligation. First, I wanted the students to employ colligation for the purpose of organisation of lower-order, inchoate historical data into pervasive themes, essences, and trends (Walsh, 1942; 1974; Munslow, 2000). For example, in Lesson 6 the students had read Ray (2015) who argued regarding ‘the zeal of the Salem magistrates’ (pp.66-67). In doing so, Ray colligated isolated lower-level generalisations or actions referred to elsewhere in the extract such as ‘believed the “afflicted” girls’ (p.46); ‘disregarded legal precedent in failing to require the complainants to post a monetary bond with their complaints, which was mandatory in all capital cases’; and ‘conducted the preliminary hearings not in private but in public before large and prejudicial crowds’ (pp.66-67) (Figure 2.4.).

Many in the field of production have noted that colligation is interpretative and argumentative (e.g. Walsh, 1942, 1974). The ‘known data’ that the historian colligates is not necessarily agreed upon by all colligators, and the principles of selection might not be unanimously shared (White, 1965, pp.252-253). As consequence, in historiography ‘some of the fiercest controversies have centred on how groups of events are most appropriately colligated' (Dray, 2000, pp.228-229). These debates are also a consequence, in part, of the fact that colligations must meet (often tacit and not unanimously agreed) criteria which warrant their acceptance according to a probative community of scholars (Cebik, 1969; McCullagh, 2011). First, in many theorists' view, an exemplified relationship must exist between the colligation and its subsumed entities (Kuukkanen, 2015). According to Walsh (1974):

> the general test of whether this condition is satisfied lies in the evidence with which statements embodying such concepts are supported. For every authentic statement containing a colligatory concept it must be possible to produce a series of relevant and connected lower-level statements which count in its favour, are framed, by comparison, in untheoretical terms, and about whose acceptability historians are generally agreed (pp. 138-139).

Accordingly, in this view, the historian should avoid manipulating data into a priori, procrustean structures (Mandelbaum, 1977; Walsh, 1974). Instead, according to McCullagh (2011), 'conscientious historians will carefully consider which patterns best fit the data available to them' (p.156). Furthermore, while counterexamples are perhaps inevitable, according to some in the field of production the historian should aim for coherent and comprehensive colligations where the colligation maximally 'fits' the data as a whole (Kuukkanen, 2015, p.126). If exceptions become too numerous or omissions are too salient the colligation becomes untenable (McCullagh, 2011).

For example, in Lesson 4 the students had read Ray (2015) who challenged Boyer and Nissebnaum's (1974) argument:

> Nor, as Boyer and Nissenbaum proposed in *Salem Possessed,* was Salem Village geographically divided between religiously conservative agrarian accusers in the western part of the Village and their secular and commercially minded victims in the east. An up-to-date

> map of the accusations in Salem Village does not bear out a geographic and economic division. Such an interpretation reduces the episode to an easy-to-understand product of modernisation – a clash between premodern and modern mentalities (pp.3-4).

In this example, Ray questions the persuasiveness of Boyer and Nissenbaum's argument by suggesting that colligatory propositions such as 'geographic and economic division'; 'product of modernisation'; and 'a clash between premodern and modern mentalities' fail, in Ray's view, to coherently and comprehensively describe the known data.

Some in the field of production maintain that colligation serves an important preliminary function in historical causal explanation. For Walsh (1974), 'we have recourse to colligatory concepts in the interests of explaining something' (pp.136-137). In this view, historians explain the causal relationships between colligations which act as both subjects and objects (Dray, 2006; McCullagh, 2011). For example, in Lesson 6 the students read Ray (2015) who argued that 'the rampant confessions fuelled more accusations as confessors named more and more suspects, which, in a vicious judicial circle, continued to legitimate the court's arrests and convictions' (pp.66-67). Here, colligations such as 'rampant confessions' and 'a vicious judicial circle' adopt agentive properties such as 'fuelling' and 'legitimating'.

In some theorists' view, it is possible to create a taxonomy of historical colligation (McCullagh, 1978). According to Cebik (1969), 'one may (and often does for pedagogical purposes) distinguish classes of colligatory concepts' (p.49). Different types of colligation might point toward different types of causal explanatory models. First, colligation might represent a supra-personal condition (Atkinson, 1972; Cebik, 1969; McCullagh, 1978; Paul, 2015; Walsh, 1974). For example, a colligation in the historiography of the Salem witch trials might indicate a pathological explanation. In Lesson 3, for instance, the students read Hansen (1970) who argued regarding 'an outbreak of epidemic hysteria in Salem Village' (pp.145-146). Additionally, in Lesson 3 the students read of purposive, supra-personal dispositions such as when Baker (2015) argued that the trials represented ‘an effort to bolster Puritanism’ (p.126). Furthermore, dispositional conditions might be held by a large group of people even if they are non-purposive (Dray, 1989; McCullagh, 2011; Ritter, 1986). For example, when the students read Rosenthal (1993) in Lesson 2 argue regarding ‘a situation of instability and anxiety’ he was not suggesting that individuals collaboratively planned a policy to be anxious (pp.3-4).

Walsh (1974) emphasised colligation should indicate the ‘importance of the notion of process’ (p.128). McCullagh (1978) dubbed colligations in this vein as ‘formal’ in that they describe a structural change in form (p.268). According to McCullagh (2011):

> historical events can often be colligated as constituting a change of a certain kind, such as an instance of economic growth, or political decline, or a scientific revolution. Such phrases describe the kind of change brought about by a collection of historical events (p.153).

McCullagh suggested indicators of formal colligations may be terms such as ‘decline’; ‘polarisation’, and ‘conflict’ (1978, p.278; 2011, p.153). In Lesson 2, the students read Rosenthal (1993) argue regarding ‘a decline of power among orthodox clergy’ (pp.3-4); in Lesson 3 Ray (2015) about ‘a controversial and polarising figure’ (p.5); and in Lesson 8 Norton (2002) concerning ‘ongoing conflict within Salem Village’ (pp.296-297).

Finally, according to Walsh (1951) a colligation might encapsulate the actions of an individual or small group that represent the realisation of intentions or policy. For example, in Lesson 6 the students read Rosenthal (1993) argue regarding the colligated intentions and actions of an individual – Chief Justice William Stoughton – when Rosenthal referred to ‘the almost monomaniacal role of Stoughton’ (pp.193-195). In the same lesson, the students read Baker (2015) who argued regarding the small group of Salem magistrates’ ‘assumption of guilt and eagerness to convict' as well as their 'overriding need to find and convict witches and to mete out severe sentences' (pp.183-186).

Accordingly, in Lesson 9 I had originally planned a 'card sort' activity in which I would have asked groups of students to thematically organise 'evidence' cards (Figure 5.27.). I had to abandon this plan, however, because Lesson 9 was taught remotely on Microsoft Teams™ due to the Covid-19 pandemic. I had planned to give groups of students information cards summarising some of what they had learnt in the first eight lessons. I had intended to inform the students that any 'evidence' cards that they considered irrelevant to the question could be discarded in order to highlight that the 'facts' from which historians colligate might themselves be disputed. I had intended to try and make clear to students the constructed quality of colligation by instructing the groups that they all had to agree with the themes that they collaboratively built from their cards. If there were disagreements, I would have instructed the students to argue with their classmates about the appropriateness of their choices until they reached a consensus.

Instead, I asked the students to individually plan their essays by completing an essay plan (Figure 5.28.). I explained to the students that these organised themes might form the basis of the planning for the paragraphs in their essays. I asked the students to construct and name their own themes besides the one specified in the question ('unusual political conditions operating in Massachusetts in 1692') which might then facilitate their construction of introduction, conclusions, and topic sentences. If students named themes that were solely organisational but not argumentative such as 'legal factors', I attempted to intervene by asking them how they could rename their theme to help them answer the question. I did this though prompting questions such as 'do legal factors help you explain why there was a crisis in 1692 and not before?' or 'does it help you explain why the crisis began in Salem Village and not somewhere else'? I also aimed to highlight to students that their colligations had to be

Figure 5.27. Example of evidence cards for the originally planned ‘card sort’ activity.

In 1684 Charles II revoked the Massachusetts Bay Colony’s Charter. James II then created the Dominion of New England instead in 1686. The change meant Puritanism lost its privileged position. Toleration was now guaranteed to Anglicans, Quakers and Baptists. James II’s new governor Edmund Andros attempted to enforce High Anglican services. The Dominion’s government was now to be appointed by the English monarch rather than being elected by Puritan full church members. Non-church members could now vote, act as jurors, and serve as magistrates. Andros also declared all landownership titles issued under the old Charter void leading to land disputes. Andros also raised taxes to pay for defences against Indian raids. Additionally, he more vigorously enforced the Crown’s Navigation Acts which hurt the colony’s economy.

After news of the Glorious Revolution in 1688 reached New England, Puritan rebels overthrew James II’s governor Edmund Andros in 1689. The rebels re-implemented the pre-1684 Charter without royal authorisation. The rebels reinstated the ex-governor Simon Bradstreet who was now very elderly and had no constitutional authority. The inter-charter government oversaw a number of calamities in the Second Indian War which had broken out in 1688. Perhaps due to the confusion, after witch accusations began in Salem Village in February 1692 there was a delay in bringing defendants to trial until *after* the new charter arrived in May 1692. In the meantime, accusations and arrests began to accumulate.

When William III and Mary II’s new charter arrived in the colony in May 1692 it disappointed many Puritans. In many ways it was more similar to James II’s system than the pre-1684 Charter. It guaranteed liberty of conscience to all non-Puritan Protestants; non-Puritan Church members would be allowed to vote in elections and act as jurors; and the Governor would continue to be appointed by the English Crown. The Governor would have the power to veto choices of councillors and the Assembly’s bills. The Governor would have full control over appointments of sheriffs, judges and other officials. The first Salem trial and execution (Bridget Bishop) took place in June 1692 after the new Governor had William Phips arrived.

Salem Village’s minister from 1689 was Samuel Parris. From around 1691 Parris had used his sermons (*jeremiads)* to attack his enemies in Salem Village who were withholding his pay. The first ‘afflicted’ girls were Parris’ daughter and niece (Betty Parris and Abigail Williams). Unlike previous ministers in similar situations (e.g. Samuel Willard in Groton in 1671) Parris believed the girls’ claims and filed formal complaints. The first accused witch was Parris’ enslaved servant Tituba. Parris may have beaten her to confess. Parris then acted as court secretary for many of the pre-trial court examinations.

After the girls in the Parris household had begun to show symptoms, the ‘afflictions’ soon spread to the young women in Thomas Putnam’s household. Putnam had approved Parris’s appointment in 1689 and supported Parris in Parris’ pay disputes with the Village from 1691. Like Parris, Putnam also took the girls’ accusations seriously and personally wrote 120 depositions and testimonials – approximately 1/3 of the entire total during the crisis. Some of the accused had had financial disagreements with the Putnams in the past (e.g. Salem’s ex-minister George Burroughs over a debt in 1683 and Rebecca Nurse’s family over a land dispute with neighbouring Topsfield).

Prominent Puritan minister Cotton Mather was influential in developing the *jeremiad* genre of sermons. He also wrote prolifically (over 450 pamphlets and books), often on similar themes. Mather’s account of the Goodwin children’s witchcraft afflictions in Boston in 1688 called *Memorable Providences* was widely read. The first afflicted girls in Salem, Abigail Williams and Betty Parris, appeared to mimic the Goodwin children’s symptoms. Cotton Mather was also in contact with the judges during the trials and failed to unambiguously criticise their actions - especially their admission of spectral evidence.

Figure 5.28. Example of essay-planning resource from Lesson 9.



Point 1
Unusual political conditions operating in Massachusetts in 1692
Importance?

Role?

Evidence?

Point

Importance?

Role?

Evidence?

Question
'It was the unusual political conditions operating in Massachusetts in 1692 that explain the extraordinary events in Salem.'

How far do you agree with this explanation of the Salem witch hunt of 1692?

Point

Importance?

Role?

Evidence?

Point

Importance?

Role?

Evidence?

Figure 5.29. Example of resource from Lesson 9 modelling the use of colligation as causal agent.



✗ Another reason why there was a witch hunt in Salem in 1692 was **the unusual political conditions operating in Massachusetts in 1692.**

Chunk indicating importance

✓ **The unusual political conditions operating in 1692** are central to our understanding of the Salem witch hunt in 1692…

Chunk characterising role

✓ **The unusual political conditions operating in 1692** simmered beneath the Salem witch hunt in 1692…

demonstrably substantiated with evidence. I attempted to organise an online debate where the students presented their colligations and exposed them to the public scrutiny of their peers. I then modelled to students how they might construct sentences where colligations act as causal agents (Figure 5.29.).

Having taught the planned lessons, I assessed my students' work using my pre-planned curricular goals as a preparatory framework, while remaining cognisant to the possibility that goals I had not pre-empted may emerge in the data. I also received feedback from experts on the Salem witch trials on the students' essays in order to ascertain the extent to which their own criteria for successful causal explanation in this historiography was congruent with my own.

6. Findings - Research Question 1 (continued) experts' feedback

6.1. Findings - Research Question 1a limitations (continued)

6.1.1. RQ1aT5 - The awarding body homogenises historical causal explanation (continued)

In the field of production there is little consensus regarding the prioritisation and separation of 'analysis' from description and/or chronological narrative (4.1.1. RQ1aT5 pp.155-169; e.g. Bevir, 2007; Førland, 2004; Hewitson, 2015; Jordanova, 2000; Marius & Page, 2007; Tucker, 2004). Similar lack of consensus was apparent in the academics' feedback on the students' essays (Table 6.1.). For some participants, 'analysis' was explicitly privileged. For example, when outlining their criteria for assessing the students' essays the academic A15 noted that 'I placed a slightly greater emphasis than I would normally have when grading on the specific aspect of causal analysis'. Furthermore, four academics praised certain students for their analysis. For instance, A9 praised Jason's essay for 'excellent deployment of detailed analysis'. Additionally, A6 criticised Agnes' essay for her failure to achieve the legitimate goal of causal analysis, noting that in her essay there was 'no analytical discussion of alternatives'.

Some participants appeared to suggest that successful causal analysis was not separate to but in some senses dependent on effectively 'explaining what' through description, making clear, and exposition (4.1.5.2-3 RQ1aT5S2-3 pp.158-159 & 163-164; e.g. Davidson, 1984; Førland, 2004; Graham, 1983; Hewitson, 2015; Martin, 1989; Roth, 1989, 2019). For example, when outlining their views on the historiography of the Salem witch trials A16 stated 'I teach the history of early New England witchcraft & witch-hunting from an explicitly historiographical approach, where the main goal is to explore how participants and historians have described what happened and why it happened'. Furthermore, A6 praised parts of Naomi's essay for her

Table 6.1. Overview of academics’ feedback related to manifested sub-theme Research Question 1a Theme 5.

Theme	***Academics’ feedback***				
	Criteria incorporating goal	*Recognition of goal*	*Praising essay for achieving goal*	*Criticising essay for failing to achieve goal*	*Criticising goal*
RQ1aT5 The awarding body homogenises historical causal explanation	‘causal analysis’ A15 ‘general theories’ ‘particulars’ A22	‘how historians have described what happened’ A16 ‘historical narratives’ A10 ‘chronology’ ‘easy to see why’ A22	Particular students ‘Jason’ ‘good balance of detail, explanation and analysis’ ‘Naomi’ ‘begins well enough’ ‘attempt at analytical thinking’ A4; ‘Ava’ good initial attempt at analysis’ ‘Caroline’ ‘some attempts at sophisticated analysis’ ‘fairly clear analytical conclusion’ ‘Stella ‘effectively analytical conclusions’ A6; ‘Caroline’ ‘detailed analysis’ commended’ A8 ‘Jason’ ‘excellent deployment of detailed analysis’ ‘Naomi’ ‘obvious analytical intelligence’ A9 ‘Naomi’ ‘analytical exposition’ A6 ‘Jason’ Madeleine’ ‘follow developments closely’ A2; ‘top candidates’ ‘timeline’ A15; ‘Ava’ better sense of order’ ‘Isabella’ ‘better sense of chronology’A17 ‘Better answers’ ‘macrocosm’ ‘microcosm’ A5; ‘Stella’ ‘worthwhile’ ‘broader context’ A6; ‘Abigail’ ‘several layers’ A8; ‘top candidates’ ‘relate causes to context’ A15	Cohort ‘not made clear’ A2, ‘none of them define the group’ A9 ‘sequence of events lost’ A2 Particular students ‘Agnes’ ‘no analytical discussion of alternatives’ A6 ‘Agnes’ ‘social gatekeepers not defined’ ‘Stella’ ‘not always well expounded’ ‘Ava’ ‘Jason’ ‘look to me like political conditions’ A6 ‘Abigail’ confused on sequence’ A17; ‘lower-ranked students’ ‘errors in chronology’ A18	Cohort ‘losing some focus on the thesis’ ‘given the nature of the assignment, I would have done the same thing’ A13 ‘different from university level’ A4 ‘modes’ so ‘different’ A4 Particular students ‘Isabella’ ‘bit descriptive narrative’ A4 ‘Isabella’ ‘descriptive narrative’ A4; ‘Naomi’ ‘partly narrative’ A6

‘analytical exposition’. Similarly, A2 and A9 both criticised the students as a cohort for their failure to achieve the goal of ‘making clear’. For example, A2 noted:

> I was disturbed in particular by the misunderstanding of the idea of religious freedom as something lost with Toleration. Puritans certainly were not characterized by nor as believers in religious freedom and they objected to including all Protestants as equal in their society. They may have lost their freedom to make decisions, but the rest of their society gained some religious freedom through toleration. That is not made clear in the essays.

Similarly, A6 criticised particular students for failing to achieve the goal of satisfactorily ‘explaining what’ when noting Stella’s essay ‘not always well organised or expounded’. A4, meanwhile, criticised Isabella’s essay stating it was ‘a bit of a descriptive narrative’. Such responses appear to confirm that the general goal of description in isolation was undesirable, and that it needed to be used in serving the purpose of ‘explaining why’.

A comparable ambivalence was apparent in the participants’ views of ‘narrative’ (4.1.3-5 RQ1aT3-5 pp.152-154; 157-159; 161-166). When discussing the historiography of the Salem witch trials, A10 noted that historians construct narratives. For example, A10 stated ‘I think students can only really integrate academic research into their own essays if they understand how academic historians use primary sources to construct their historical narratives’. On the other hand, two academics criticised certain students for the possible curricular goal of writing in the narrative mode. For example, A6 said of Naomi’s essay that it was ‘partly narrative’ – perhaps revealing a distinction between undesirable ‘plain’ and desirable ‘significant’ narratives.

In the field of production, some participants stress that chronological ordering can facilitate aspects of causal explanation that non-chronological ‘analysis’ forbids (4.1.5.2. RQ1aT5S2 pp.160-161; e.g. Atkinson, 1978; Lowenthal, 1997; Tuchman, 1981). A number of the academics noted the importance of students having a secure sense of chronology – both in terms of their

internal grasp of the sequence of events and their articulation of this sequence in their writing - when constructing causal explanation. When discussing the historiography of the Salem witch trials, A22 noted the importance of chronology in causal explanation:

> One of the basic things about Salem is that we have so much documentation of content and chronology that we can see who the principals are and what the personal and social issues in almost all the main cases. And this puts most of the general theorizing into the background, so that it's easy to see why Salem was the center of the outbreak, how it started and how it progressed involving accusations in 24 other communities.

Three academics all praised certain students for their sense of chronology. For example, A15 noted ‘the top candidates were those who compared different types of cause and their timelines/contexts’. Similarly, A2 criticised the students’ essays for their failure to achieve the legitimate goal of coherent chronology when noting ‘events are jumbled together in all the essays with insufficient indication of the relationship of one idea or event to another. The sequence of events was lost’. Furthermore, two academics criticised particular students for their failure in achieving the goal of coherent chronology. A18, for instance, pointed out ‘lower-ranked students’ ‘had errors in chronology’.

The sole adoption of one mode – either structural factorial analysis or narrative - has been criticised by some in the field of production for failing to enable the historian to argue the interrelationship between structural conditions and human precipitating actions (4.1.5.2. RQ1aT5S2 pp.161-162; e.g. Atkinson, 1978; Burke, 1993; Fulbrook, 2002; Marius & Page, 2007; Tosh, 2006). One of A22’s criteria was whether students were able to explain the interrelationship between background conditions and individual actions. For example, A22 wrote they were looking for ‘How clearly do the general theories relate to the particulars of the time and place of the beginning of the accusations in Salem Village?’. Four academics praised certain students for achieving the goal of explaining the interrelationship between conditions and actions. For example, A5 wrote ‘the better ones structured factors into an argument, for example differentiating preconditions and triggers, and relating overarching colonial factors to more local social and political ones, providing a convincing picture of the macrocosm and microcosm of the witch trials’.

Additionally, for some participants the awarding body’s specifications and rubrics appeared to impose a particular vision of historical causal explanation of the Salem witch trials that does not necessarily represent the field of production in the twenty-first century. A13 stated that the nature of the awarding body’s sample A-Level question hindered the student’s potential as a cohort to achieve the goal of expounding a thesis. For example, A13 noted:

> Understandably, although the students provided a thesis – or a preferred historiographical position – at the start, they obviously felt the need to include and discuss in some depth the alternatives, at the risk, in a few cases, of losing some focus on their thesis. Jason’s essay – although very well done – is a good example of how this happened. He might have provided more evidence for the “essential” nature of the confessions. But again understandably, given the nature of the assignment, I would have done the same thing.

Similarly, A4 noted that, in their experience, A-Level specifications do not reward the goal of knowledge of recent historiographical trends. For example, A4 noted:

> From where I'm sitting, the A-Level syllabus still looks surprisingly similar to the one that I studied in the 1980s, with some of the same debates and books being quoted. There is good scholarship there, but it's different from University level.

Table 6.2. Overview of academics' feedback related to manifested sub-theme Research Question 1b Theme 1 Subtheme 1.

Theme	***Sub-theme***	***Academics' feedback***		
		Criteria incorporating goal	*Praising essay for achieving goal*	*Criticising essay for failing to achieve goal*
RQ1bT1 Precise ontologisation of 'historical' causal explanation in the field of production compared to causal explanation in other disciplines	**RQ1bT1S1** Precise ontologisation of 'historical' causal explanation in the field of production compared to causal explanation in experimental natural sciences (argument - general)	'clear thesis' A3; 'structure and range of argument' A9; 'defined and defended a position' A18; 'coherence of arguments' A20; 'argument logical and coherent' A23 'different lenses' A14; 'awareness of competing explanations' A23	Cohort 'all deserve credit' 'formulate strong and coherent arguments' A8'; 'students provided a thesis' A13'; 'clear thesis statements' 'everyone' A19 'students demonstrated ability to challenge simplistic theory of the question' A7 Particular students 'Jason' 'well-argued' 'better job at debunking' A3; 'better ones' 'structured factors into an argument' A5; 'Naomi' 'quite a good argument' 'Jason' 'plausible argument' A6; 'Jason' 'argument organised and developed effectively' 'Naomi' 'clear ability to develop an argument effectively' A9; 'Caroline' 'clear thesis statement' 'Jason' well argued' 'Sophie' 'strong position' 'commendable' A11; 'Madeleine' 'subtle argument' A16. 'Best essay writers' 'invoking counterarguments' 'Elena' 'many-sided thesis' 'Ava and Elena' did better in addressing counterarguments that they later set aside' A19 Jason 'not only recapitulating' A11; Stella 'thinking not regurgitating' A17 'Jason' 'clear engagement with set question' 'Ava' 'answers the question' A4; 'best answers' 'challenged underlying assumptions of the question' A5; 'Sophie' 'strong position' 'counter to the prompt' 'commendable' A9	Cohort 'most influenced by' A7; 'how the material was taught' A8; 'teacher must have emphasised' A10; 'obsession with the term' A15; 'same story' A17 Particular students 'Jason' 'better job at debunking than fully proving his argument' A3; 'Ava' 'could have a stronger argument' A4; 'Caroline' 'argument not clearly presented' A6; 'Caroline' 'development of argument garbled' 'Elena' 'argument can get lost' 'must be encouraged to select details to sustain her argument' A9; 'Caroline' 'not shapely/coherent as a whole argument' 'Madeleine' 'thesis statement' 'less clear than Jason's' A11; 'few cases' 'losing some focus on their thesis' A13; 'lower-ranked students' 'did not develop their arguments very well' 'not organised in their argumentation' A18; 'Agnes' 'difficult following her argument' A19. 'Sophie' 'limited direct engagement with the question' 'Agnes' 'problems with focus' A4; 'Agnes' 'effectively treats the question's phrase 'How far do you agree' as being 'Show that you agree' A6; 'Abigail' tries immediately to address the issues raised by the question' 'does not work' A9

Theme	***Sub-theme(s)***	***Academics' feedback***				
		Criteria incorporating goal	*Recognition of goal*	*Praising essay for achieving goal*	*Criticising essay for failing to achieve goal*	*Criticising goal*
RQ1bT1 Precise ontologisation of 'historical' causal explanation in the field of production compared to causal explanation in other disciplines	**RQ1bT1S1** Precise ontologisation of 'historical' causal explanation in the field of production compared to causal explanation in experimental natural sciences (scholarship – opposed to textbook)	'judged them' 'knowledge of the scholarship' A20 'mis-citations' A9; 'explicit reference' 'the arguments of specific [named] historians A14; 'identify their authors' A22 'How clear are the student evaluations of these theories' A22	'understood the piece' A19 'explore' 'historians' 'described what happened and why it happened' A16 'even the very best students find it difficult to state in just a sentence what the main argument or thesis is' A10 'critical reading from the start; A4	Cohort 'textbook looked pretty good!' A16 'collectively, these students very able to digest the work of academic historians' A19 'collectively these students' 'read the works carefully' A19 Particular students 'Ava' 'awareness of different scholars' arguments' A6; 'Abigail' 'clearly thought about Norton' A11' 'varying degrees' 'students understand the historiography' A13; 'best ones' 'well informed by historians' A21 'best answers' 'impressive ability to deploy historiography' A5' 'Agnes' 'used MBN's 'gatekeeper' theory well' 'Madeleine' 'use historiography most effectively' A16 'Isabella' 'some effort to engage with historiography' A4; 'best answers' 'read more deeply' A5 'Ava' 'students have read the book with more attention than I did!' 'Madeleine' 'robust discussion' 'historiography' A8' 'close and detailed engagement with scholars' A11; 'Abigail' 'engaging in the historical conversation; 'Elena' 'deft hand at exploring historical arguments she has read' A16; 'better' 'students who had read more deeply' A18 'Jason' 'effective and well-informed discussion of named scholars' A6; 'most able' to accurately cite the works of major historians' A7; 'Abigail' 'only student of the six I read who used MBN's name' 'Madeleine' 'used historians' names' A16; 'Isabella' 'cites historians correctly' A17 'Ava' 'most historiographically fluent so far' A8; 'Madeleine' 'admirable job' 'laying out the historiographical landscape' A16; 'Jason' 'best so far' 'accurate and meaningful presentation of historians' A17 'Ava' 'evaluates evidence and historiography' A4; 'Ava' 'pitting Ray's argument' 'against Norton, which is commendable' 'Isabella' 'wow' 'pitting even more historians against each other' A8; 'Jason' 'weighing them against the evidence they marshalled' A11	Particular students 'Sophie' 'does not reflect the historiography that many of the other essays called on' Sophie' 'uses' 'but does not do so explicitly' 'Abigail' 'used it reasonably although not completely' A16 'Sophie' 'no engagement with scholarly argument' A11 'Stella' 'if you are going to cite works make sure you get the titles right' A9; 'Caroline' 'without naming scholars' A11; 'Abigail' 'only student of the six I read who used MBN's name' 'A16	Cohort 'Mmm, I can see where the textbook could be a problem' A22

Furthermore, A4 stated that modes rewarded at A-Level modes do not reward the goal of writing similarly to an academic historian. For example, A4 stated:

> The mode of argument is so different - the A-Level summing up on both sides, with a conclusion stating some kind of an argument (or at least that's how my first year students describe it to me), as distinct from an argument of your own based on critical reading from the start. I wouldn't necessarily argue for more alignment between the two modes of teaching, but I do think that University academics and teachers could have an interesting conversation about this.

6.2. Findings - Research Question 1b opportunities (continued)

6.2.1. RQ1bT1S1 – Precise ontologisation of 'historical' causal explanation in the field of production compared to causal explanation in experimental natural sciences (continued)

One instance of near unanimity in the field of production is that, in history, non-categorical argumentation is required (4.2.1.1. RQ1bT1S1 pp.169-173; e.g. Atkinson, 1978; Bloch, 1963; Donnelly and Norton, 2001; Gardiner, 1961; Hughes, 1960; Mabbett, 2007; Megill, 2007; Tosh, 2006). A similar unanimity was evident in the expert academics' feedback (Table 6.2.). Five academics all made clear that a criterion they would use to evaluate the students' essays was their ability to construct an argument. For example, A20 stated 'I judged [the essays] by coherence of the arguments they advanced'. Three academics praised the students as a cohort for their written arguments. For instance, A8 noted 'they all deserve credit for learning so much about the Salem witch trials and being able to formulate strong and coherent arguments about what happened'. Six academics praised certain students for their arguments. For example, A3 stated Jason 'wrote a well-argued and well-organized essay'. Eight academics criticised certain students' essays for a failure to achieving the legitimate goal of arguing effectively. For example, A18 noted that ‘the lower-ranked students did not develop their arguments very well, had errors in chronology or facts, and were not as organised in their argumentation’.

Two academics stated in their criteria for evaluating essays they would privilege non-categorical, heteroglossic, arguments – where different plausible interpretations are acknowledged and reported in relation to the author’s own (Coffin, 2006). For example, A23 stated ‘What I would like for in an answer to the essay question is some awareness of competing explanations’. A19 praised certain students for heteroglossic arguments. For example, A19 stated ‘the best essay writers understand that historical outcomes can have many factors flowing into them, and they understand that invoking counterarguments can strengthen their own argument.’

Some of the academics seemed to reward originality of arguments. For example, two academics praised certain students’ arguments’ uniqueness with A17 noting of Stella’s essay that ‘this student clearly *thinking* rather than merely regurgitating, and this is something I give credit for [original italics]’. Similarly, five academics criticised the students as a cohort for drawing too closely on the teaching materials from Lesson 6 regarding ‘social gatekeepers’. For example, A10 noted ‘It also seems clear that Norton had been discussed in class, especially the idea of “social gatekeepers,” which every single essay mentioned specifically and which the teacher clearly must have emphasized.’

Some academics also appeared to privilege question-focused argument. A7 praised the students as a cohort for constructing an argument in answer to the question, noting ‘the students demonstrated an ability to challenge the simplistic theory offered in the question’. Three academics praised certain students for their focus on the question with A4, for instance, praising Jason for his ‘clear engagement with [the] set question’. Three academics criticised certain students for their failure to achieve the legitimate goal of constructing an argument answering the question. A4, for example, criticised Sophie's essay for 'limited direct engagement with the question'.

Some in the field of production highlight the benefit of reading academic history as opposed to textbooks to improve one's historical writing because, in this view, scholarship provides models of written argument (pp.170-171; e.g. Antonova, 2020; Brundage, 2002; Loughran, 2017; Mabbett, 2007; Townsend, 2019). Such a view broadly corresponded with the academics' feedback. For example, while A16 did reservedly praise the examination-board endorsed textbook - noting 'the textbook looked pretty good!...it far surpasses what American textbooks do'- A22 criticised it by stating 'mmmm, I can see where the textbook can be a problem'.

Furthermore, some of the academics appeared to privilege familiarity with the historiography of the Salem witch trials in the students' work. A20 partly judged the students' work 'by their knowledge of the scholarship'. A19 noted that it is feasible for university students to understand academic scholarship on the trials:

> I've had to put a lot of effort over the years to get students comfortable with historians' academic writing generally. It was especially difficult to locate an article on witch crisis historiography that students would find intelligible. I found one, after trial and error. I found that I had to have us read the article while in class, and I had the students write briefly on how they understood the piece while still in class.

A19 went on the praise the students as a cohort for their understanding of the scholarship when noting 'collectively, these students seem very able to digest the work of academic historians. The students understand the historians' big points and not just minutiae, while showing that they have read the works carefully'. Four academics praised particular students for their understanding of historiography. For example, A21 noted 'the best ones (Madeleine and Ava) develop an answer throughout the text, well informed by historians' opinions'. Two academics praised certain students for displaying knowledge of historiography in their essays.

For instance, A5 noted ‘the best answers were full, rounded, nuanced and confidently delivered. These displayed solid understanding and an impressive ability to deploy historiography’. A16 criticised certain students for failing to achieve the legitimate goal of familiarity with recent trends in historiography as effectively. For example, A16 wrote of Sophie’s essay that ‘holding Cotton Mather individually responsible for the crisis is not very compelling, and does not reflect the broader historiography that many of the other essays called on’.

As well as a familiarity with historiography, a number of the participating academics appeared to value the students’ engagement with the writing of academics. For example, A16 noted it is feasible for university students to engage with historiography: ‘I teach the history of early New England witchcraft & witch-hunting from an explicitly historiographical approach, where the main goal is to explore how participants and historians have described what happened and why it happened.’ A19 praised the students as a collective for ‘showing that they have read the works carefully’. Five academics praised certain students for engaging with historiography. For instance, A18 noted ‘overall, it seems clear to me that students who had read deeply in the historiography had a better grasp of issues and could articulate them more coherently’. A11, meanwhile, criticised Sophie’s argument for failing to achieve the legitimate goals of engagement with historiography, noting there was ‘no engagement with scholarly argument’.

Furthermore, a number of academics seemed to value the accurate citation of historiography. Three academics all noted that one criterion they would use for evaluating the students’ essays was accurate and appropriate citation. For example, A14 ‘privileged papers’ that ‘made explicit reference to historiography (I think it shows a higher level of understanding that they recognize different historians have different lenses about this and disagree about explanations) and the arguments of specific (named) historians’. Four academics praised particular students for their citation of historians. For example, A7 noted that 'most' of the students 'were able to accurately cite the works of major historians on what happened'. Three academics all criticised particular students for failing to achieve the legitimate goal of accurate or comprehensive citation. For example, A9 wrote of Stella's essay that 'if you are going to cite works, make sure you get the titles right'.

Additionally, a number of academics appeared to value the critical evaluation of historiography. Two academics stated university students engage in critical evaluation of historiography, although A10 noted that this goal is difficult for even these students. 'Even the very best students find it difficult to state in just a sentence what the main argument or thesis is of a journal article or historical monograph. They can easily see what the article is about, but it's main conclusion? That's a lot harder.' Three academics praised certain students for their presentation of historians' arguments in their essays. For instance, A16 wrote that 'Madeleine did an admirable job of surveying the central arguments in her first paragraph; laying out the historiographical landscape she is going to build from is a mark of confidence and sophistication'. A22 noted that one criterion that they would use for judging the students' essays was the students' evaluation of historiography. For example, A22 noted that two criteria to be used were '1. How clearly do students explain the general theories/explanations about the Salem witch-hunt and identify their authors? 2. How clear are the student evaluations of these theories, if any?' Three academics praised particular students for their evaluation of historiography. For example, A8 praised Ava and Isabella for evaluating historians' competing arguments against one another. A8 wrote 'Ava has grasped the details very well, and seems to be the most historiographically fluent thus far, pitting Ray's argument (I'm assuming this is Benjamin Ray) against Norton, which is commendable'. A11 praised Jason for evaluating historians' arguments against their supporting evidence, noting his essay was 'well structured, well argued, not only

Table 6.3. Overview of academics' feedback related to manifested sub-theme Research Question 1b Theme 1 Subtheme 4.

Theme	***Sub-theme***	***Academics' feedback***		
		Criteria incorporating goal	*Praising essay for achieving goal*	*Criticising essay for failing to achieve goal*
RQ1bT1 Precise ontologisation of 'historical' causal explanation in the field of production compared to causal explanation in other disciplines	**RQ1bT1S4** Precise ontologisation of 'historical' causal explanation in the field of production compared to causal explanation in literature (empirical warrant)	'concrete' 'evidence' A3; 'illustrative examples' 'particulars' A22	Cohort 'students' 'know points need evidence to support them' A19 Particular students 'Jason' 'great detail' A3; 'Jason' 'good balance of detail' 'Isabella' 'knowledge' A4; 'best answers' 'full' 'rounded' 'nuanced' A5; 'Ava' 'grasped the details very well' 'Abigail' 'liked' 'nuanced' A8; 'Abigail' 'lots of detail' 'number of historical details' A11; 'they are substantive' A13; 'Elena' 'specific detail' 'Madeleine' 'subtle' A16 'Isabella' 'accurate and purposeful', 'Jason' 'accurate and relevant details' A17 'Ava' 'evaluates evidence' 'Naomi' 'relevant knowledge' A4; 'best answers' 'apply their knowledge' A5; Caroline 'detailed analysis' 'Madeleine' 'robust discussion of historical details' A8; 'Jason' 'detailed analysis' A9; 'Madeleine' 'tremendous marshalling of detailed evidence' 'Jason' 'detail serves larger argument' A11; 'Elena' specific detail' 'supports argument' 'Madeleine' 'valid evidence' A16; 'Jason' 'relevant detail' 'Stella' 'subtle' A17; 'Ava, Jason, Caroline' 'eye for important detail' A19; 'best ones' 'well informed by evidence' A21	Cohort 'Errors' 'all students' A17 Particular students 'Sophie' 'lacks weight' A2; 'Naomi' 'vague' 'imprecise' A3; 'weaker answers' 'more vague' A5; 'Agnes' 'lack of detail' A6; 'Sophie' 'little detail' A11; 'Abigail' 'weak on specifics', 'Stella' 'needed more heft' A17; 'Naomi' 'lacks detail' A21 'Elena' 'silly errors' 'wrong' A9; 'lower-ranked' 'errors in chronology or facts' A18; 'Stella' 'inaccurate' A21 'Isabella' 'needs more evaluation' of detail' A4; 'weaker answers' 'lacking meaningful data' A5; 'Stella' 'random information' A6; 'Elena' 'must be encouraged to select key detail' 'welter' 'irrelevant' 'Stella 'too much detailed information' A9; 'Jason' 'might have provided more evidence' A13;

recapitulating historians' arguments but weighing them against the evidence they marshalled'.

2.1.1. RQ1bT1S4 – Precise ontologisation of 'historical' causal explanation in the field of production compared to causal explanation in literature (continued)

For many in the field of production, one aspect of historical causal explanation that distinguishes it from other causal explanations of human behaviour (such as in literature) appears to be the necessity of empirical warrant (4.2.1.4. RQ1bT1S4 p.177; e.g. Baker, 2015; Demos, 2008; Fels, 2017; Furay and Salevouris, 2000; Hoffer, 1997; Rosenthal, 1993). Such a requirement was also a feature of some academics' feedback on the students' essays (Table 6.3.). Two academics made clear that one of their criteria for evaluating the students' essays was whether there was sufficient empirical warrant for the students' claims in terms of depth of detail. For example, A3 'graded' the essays, in part, by considering 'the amount of concrete details (that is, evidence)'. Seven academics praised particular students for their specific detail. For instance, A3 praised Jason's essay because it was 'a well-argued and well-organized essay (with great detail)'. Seven academics criticised certain students' essays for failing to achieve the legitimate goal of specificity. For example, A6 criticised Agnes' essay for its 'lack of detail'.

As well as depth of detail, the academics also appeared to value its accuracy. A17 praised particular students for factual accuracy, for example noting of Jason's essay that 'this is best so far because of accurate and relevant details'. A17 criticised the students' essays as a cohort, however, for failing to achieve the legitimate goal of factual accuracy stating 'I am getting the same story with same errors (e.g. theocracy) being told by all students'. Furthermore, three academics criticised certain students for factual inaccuracy. For example, A18 noted 'the lower-ranked students' 'had errors in chronology or facts.

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Table 6.4. Overview of academics’ feedback related to manifested sub-theme Research Question 1b Theme 1 Subtheme 5.

Theme	***Sub-theme***	***Academics’ feedback***			
		Criteria incorporating goal	*Recognition of goal*	*Praising essay for achieving goal*	*Criticising essay for failing to achieve goal*
RQ1bT1 Precise ontologisation of ‘historical’ causal explanation in the field of production compared to causal explanation in other disciplines	**RQ1bT1S5** Precise ontologisation of ‘historical’ causal explanation in the field of production compared to causal explanation in everyday life (multicausality)	‘multi-causal context’ A14	‘so many other factors’ A2; ‘events with big causal matrices’ A15	Cohort ‘good sense’ ‘many causes’ A7; ‘strength of entire group’ A10; ‘all of them’ ‘multiple causes’ A18; ‘students understand’ ‘many factors’A19 Particular students Ava’ ‘good analysis’ ‘other factors’ A6; ‘Madeleine’ ‘complex combination of factors’ A8; ‘Jason’ ‘effective criticism of mono-causal analysis’ A9; ‘best essay writers understand’ ‘many factors’ A19	Particular students ‘Agnes’ ‘no discussion of alternatives’ A6

Certain academics also seemed to value the application of detail toward an argument, thus transforming ‘information’ to ‘evidence’. A19 praised the students as a cohort for their awareness that evidence was required in service of an argument, stating ‘the students write well, and they know that their points need evidence to support them’. Nine academics praised certain students for employing information as evidence to support an argument. For example, A11 praised Jason’s essay because ‘detail serves a larger argument’. Five academics criticised particular students for failing to achieve the legitimate goal of employing information in the service of their argument. For example, A9 noted of Elena’s essay that ‘she knows an enormous amount of detail and is reluctant to abandon any of it. But in the welter of examples (some wrong; more irrelevant) the argument can get lost’.

2.1.2. RQ1bT1S5 – Precise ontologisation of ‘historical’ causal explanation in the field of production compared to causal explanation in everyday life (continued)

In the field of production, a near unanimity exists that historical causal arguments should be multi-causal, and that this tenet helps differentiate historical causal argument from other types of causal explanation of human behaviour such as those found in everyday life (4.2.1.5. RQ1bT1S5 pp.177-178; e.g. Antonova, 2020; Evans, 2014; Furay & Salevouris, 2000; Gaddis, 2002; Jordanova, 2000; Megill, 2007; Southgate, 2001; Tosh, 2006). Similarly, a number of the academics appeared to stress the importance of multi-causal arguments when providing feedback on the students’ essays (Table 6.4.). A14 made clear that one of their criteria for evaluating the students’ essays would be whether they had constructed a multi-causal argument for the Salem crisis, looking for whether students ‘did an effective job of conveying the multi-causal context necessary to really understand the outbreak’. When outlining their views on the historiography of the Salem witch trials, two academics noted the necessity of multi-causal argumentation. For example, beyond the political conditions, A2 stated:

> there were so many other factors--fear of Indians, diseases, personal conflicts, changing economic conditions, religious concerns, and of course Tituba's willingness to confess and confirm their fears. Everyone who studies the Salem events has to weigh all of those factors.

Four academics praised the students as a cohort for their multi-causal explanations. For example, A10 noted:

> All the essays demonstrated that historical events like what happened in Salem in 1692 are usually not monocausal, but the result of several underlying factors. And this is clearly a strength of the entire group.

Four academics praised particular students for their multi-causal explanations. For instance, A9 praised Jason’s essay for his ‘effective criticism of monocausal analysis’. A6 criticised Agnes’ essay for its failure to achieve the legitimate goal of multicausality by noting there was ‘no analytical discussion of alternatives; effectively treats the question’s phrase ‘How far do you agree’ as being ‘Show that you agree’.

7. Findings – Research Question 2

7.1. Overviews of experts' rankings of and manifestations in students' essays

23 of the academics provided rankings of random samples of six students' essays. Jason's essay was the highest ranked with a mean average rank of 1.33 and *No More Marking* comparative judgement θ of 3.22 (scale separation reliability of 0.96). Madeleine ranked second (1.70/2.68) and Elena third (2.21/1.73). Sophie ranked tenth (5.38/-2.55) and Naomi's was the lowest ranked essay (5.5/-2.7) (Table 7.1.).

Madeleine's essay displayed the most direct manifestations of my lesson resources she had read in context (53). Elena's had the second most (45) and Jason's the third (42). Sophie's essay had the second lowest amount of these direct manifestations with 26 and Naomi the least with 22 (Table 7.2.). Albeit with a small sample size of participating academics (N=23), there was a strong Spearman Correlation Coefficient of 0.86 with a 2-tailed significance of 0.003 between manifestations of my lesson resources students had read in context with the ranking of the essays by the historians (Figure 7.1.).

There also did not appear to be a deterministic relationship between prior GCSE attainment or ultimate A-Level attainment and how the academics ranked the students' essays or how often the students' essays manifested the resources they had read in context. For example, while Jason (7.61) and Madeleine (7.23) were the two highest scoring students in terms of prior attainment judged by mean GCSE grade achieved, Elena (4.94) was the lowest scoring of the twelve participating students. Furthermore, Jason was the highest scoring student in terms of ultimate A-Level attainment with his Centre Assessment Grade being A*; his rank in the class being 1/12; and his rank in the entire college cohort of history students

Table 7.1. Overview of rankings of students' essays by academics

Overall rank (/11)	***Student***	***Individual academics' rankings***																								***Average rank (/6)***	***No More Marking comparative judgement θ ****
		A1	*A2*	*A3*	*A4*	*A5*	*A6*	*A7*	*A8*	*A9*	*A10*	*A11*	*A12*	*A13*	*A14*	*A15*	*A16*	*A17*	*A18*	*A19*	*A20*	*A21*	*A22*	*A23*	*A24*		
1	*Jason*	2	1	1	1	1	1			1	*No ranks*	1	1	1	2			1		3	1		2			1.33	**3.22**
2	*Madeleine*	1	2					2	1			2		3					1		3	1	1			1.7	**2.68**
3	*Elena*		3	2		2		1		2			2	2			2		2	1	2		4	4	2	2.21	**1.73**
4	*Ava*				2	3	2		5							2		5	3	2		2			1	2.7	**0.612**
5	*Isabella*		4	5	3			3	2			3	4		1	1		4					5	3	4	3.23	**0.30**
6	*Caroline*	3				5	4		4	5		4		4	3	3	1			4				1	5	3.54	**-0.39**
7	*Stella*	4					3	4		3			6					2			4	4	3	6		3.9	**-0.44**
8	*Abigail*			4		4			3	6		5	3	5	4		3	6	6			3	6	2	3	4.2	**-0.74**
9	*Agnes*	5	6	3	4				6						5	4	4		4	5		5				4.64	**-1.72**
10	*Sophie*		5		5		6	5				6		6	6	5	6	3			6	6		5		5.38	**-2.55**
11	*Naomi*	6		6	6	6	5	6		4			5			6	5		5	6	5				6	5.5	**-2.70**

* Scale separation reliability 0.96

Table 7.2. Overview of number of manifestations of my resources in the students' written work

Academics' rank (1/11)	***Total***	***Direct Manifestations***												***Indirect Manifestations***			***Total Manifestations***		
		Reading and Resources			*Only Reading*			*Only Resources*			*Direct Total*								
		Booklet	***Essay***	*Total*	*Booklet*	*Essay*	*Total*	*Booklet*	*Essay*	*Total*	*Booklet*	*Essay*	*Total*	*Booklet*	*Essay*	*Total*	*Booklet*	*Essay*	*Total*
1	Jason	25	**42**	50	7	15	19	7	8	13	39	65	82	5	10	11	44	75	93
2	Madeleine	20	**53**	55	5	16	19	6	10	13	31	79	87	1	8	8	32	87	95
3	Elena	23	**45**	51	5	18	20	6	11	15	34	74	86	2	13	13	36	87	99
4	Ava	10	**34**	36	3	10	11	3	2	5	16	46	52	3	3	5	19	49	57
5	Isabella	0	**27**	27	0	19	19	0	5	5	0	51	51	0	12	12	0	63	63
6	Caroline	6	**31**	34	2	13	14	1	5	6	9	49	54	0	5	5	9	54	59
7	Stella	0	**28**	28	0	12	12	0	9	9	0	49	49	0	3	3	0	52	52
8	Abigail	0	**33**	33	0	14	14	0	8	8	0	55	55	0	5	5	0	60	60
9	Agnes	8	**33**	36	0	13	13	1	4	5	9	50	54	1	8	8	10	58	62
10	Sophie	17	**26**	32	4	6	9	5	5	8	26	37	49	4	3	6	30	40	55
11	Naomi	11	**22**	27	2	4	5	8	5	10	21	31	42	1	2	3	22	33	45

Figure 7.1. Overview of correlation number of manifestations of my resources in the students’ written work and academics’ rankings



Table 7.3. Overview of students' prior attainment (GCSE) and final attainment (A Level)

Academics' rank (1/11)	***Student***	***Prior Attainment (Mean GCSE grade)***	***Final A-Level centre assessment grade***	***Final Class A-Level rank (/12)***	***Final Cohort A-Level rank (/187)***
1	Jason	7.61	A*	1	8
2	Madeleine	7.23	A	3	45
3	Elena	4.94	E	12	186
4	Ava	6.8	A	2	36
5	Isabella	5	C	11	158
6	Caroline	6.06	C	8	124
7	Stella	6.9	B	5	85
8	Abigail	6.67	B	6	86
9	Agnes	5.69	B	7	109
10	Sophie	6.9	B	4	71
11	Naomi	5.07	C	9	137

Table 7.4. Overview of manifested themes Research Question 2.

Indirect and indirect manifestations of…	
RQ2T1	general causal argument
RQ2T2	characterisation of conditions
RQ2T3	characterisation of nature of conditions
RQ2T4	characterisation of conditions’ causal mechanisms
RQ2T5	characterisation of nature of actions
RQ2T6	characterisation of actions’ causal mechanisms
RQ2T7	metaphors of verticality and/or differential visibility
RQ2T8	method of difference

being 8/167, with Madeleine third highest in the class (A, 3/12, 45/167). Elena, however, again scored lowest in the class by these measures (E, 12/12, 186/187). Similarly, while Naomi scored eleventh in terms of prior attainment at GCSE (5/07), Sophie was joint third highest by this measure (6.9). Furthermore, in terms of ultimate A-Level attainment, while Naomi ranked ninth in the class (C, 9/12, 137/187) Sophie was fourth (B, 4/12, 71,187) (Table 7.3.).

7.2. Manifested themes in students' essays

7.2.1. RQ2T1 Direct and indirect manifestations of general causal argument

7.2.1.1. RQ2T1S1 Direct and indirect manifestations of general causes

I identified eight thematic manifestations of the goals of my teaching in the students' essays (Table 7.4.). First, the students directly and indirectly manifested general causal argument (Table 7.5.). All eleven students argued generally about causes which I defined as a person or thing that gives rise to an action, phenomenon, or condition. My indicators of direct manifestations were 'cause'; 'created'; 'contributed'; 'impact'; 'led to', 'meant'; and 'thus' within a clause. I chose 'indicators' that served as descriptions to 'flag' when the theme occurred (Boyatzis, 1998, p.31). The indicators had to occur directly in the data and display a thematic unity – for example by being synonyms. For instance, in Lesson 5 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was '**created** a dark and foreboding atmosphere'. Furthermore, in Lesson 6 the students had read Ray who argued (2015):

> Although Parris cannot be said to have **caused** or instigated the witch-hunts, since he was only one of several authorities initially involved, it seems clear that, before the accusations began his aggressive preaching about the devil at work against his ministry **created** a dark

Table 7.5. Overview of manifested sub-themes Research Question 2 Theme 1.

Theme	***Sub-theme***	***Definition***	***Indicators of direct manifestations***		***Indicators of indirect manifestations***
			Reading and resources	*Reading*	
RQ2T1 Direct and indirect manifestations of general causal argument	**RQ2T1S1** Direct and indirect manifestations of general causes	A person or thing that gives rise to an action, phenomenon, or condition.	Within a clause ‘cause’; ‘created’	Within a clause ‘contributed’; ‘impact’; ‘led to’; ‘meant’; ‘thus’	Within a clause ‘brought about’; ‘added to’
	RQ2T1S2 Direct manifestations of general effects	A change which is an outcome of a cause.	Within a clause ‘consequence’; ‘due to’; ‘effect’; ‘result’	Within a clause ‘product’	
	RQ2T1S3 Direct and indirect manifestations of general links	A relationship between two things or situations, often implying one affects the other.	Within a clause ‘linked’	Within a clause ‘connection’	Within a clause ‘correlated’; ‘no coincidence’
	RQ2T1S4 Direct manifestations of general causal importance	Making clear the relative causal weight in bringing about the consequence.	Within a clause ‘significant’; ‘vital’	Within a clause ‘crucial’; ‘key’; ‘satisfactory’ Counterfactual conditional	
	RQ2T1S5 Direct manifestations of general explanation	An interpretative process making clear the cause, origin, or reason for an event.	Within a clause ‘explain’; ‘why’		

> and foreboding atmosphere that legitimated the accusations and shaped his congregation's reaction (pp.144-145).

In his essay, Jason wrote:

> In Salem there was a distinct divide between the more Puritan and agricultural Salem Village, and the less Puritan more commercial Salem Town. Some historians such as Boyer and Nissenbaum have argued that this **created** a societal divide so drastic that it necessitated the following craze.

Furthermore, Stella wrote that 'both the fear of the devil on their perfect society, and the political instability since the Glorious Revolution, **caused** mass hysteria and fear – which in turn, **caused** a witch craze'.

Three of the students argued generally about causes similarly to historians in the historiography of the Salem witch crisis although they had not read the language in the lessons. These indirect manifestations may indicate either that students a) had drawn on language they had learnt in other previous learning, b) had drawn from other aspects of our lessons on the Salem witch trials and/or c) students were attempting to inhabit the discourse community rather than simply mimicking the language they had encountered. Here, my indicators of indirect manifestations were 'brought about' and 'added to' found within a clause. For example, in her essay Madeleine wrote 'New Englanders felt distant forces were disrupting their community which **brought about** anxiety and distrust among the colonists'. Although the students had not read this extract in class, Francis (2005) argued that 'the terrible events that began in the Parris parsonage in Salem Village were ultimately **brought about** by anxiety that the whole Christian adventure in the New England wilderness had been based on a superannuated dream' (p.xiv).

Table 7.6. Overview of academics’ feedback related to manifested sub-themes for Research Question 2 Theme 1.

Theme		**Academics’ feedback**			
Theming code	*Sub-theming code*	*Criteria incorporating goal*	*Recognition of goal*	*Praising essay for achieving goal*	*Criticising essay for failing to achieve goal*
RQ2T1 Direct and indirect manifestations of general causal argument	**RQ2T1S1** Direct and indirect manifestations of general causes		‘my angle about the causes’ A22	‘well-argued’ / ‘causes’ A3; ‘good’ / ‘causes’ A7; ‘strength’ / ‘cause’ A10; ‘top’ / ‘cause’ A15; ‘purposeful with cause’ A17; ‘rightly’ / ‘cause’ A18; ‘promising’ ‘better’ / ‘causes’ A19	‘weaker’ / ‘meant’ A5; ‘not entirely clear’ / ‘impact’ A7; ‘cannot explain’ / ‘cause’ A16; ‘wrong’ / ‘cause’ A21
	RQ2T1S2 Direct manifestations of general effects		‘result’ A2	‘strength’ / ‘result’; A10; ‘purposeful’ / ‘consequence’ A17	
	RQ2T1S4 Direct manifestations of general causal importance	‘assessing relative contribution of factors’ A22	‘key’ A1; ‘possible to give the most weight’ A2; ‘most of the essays singled this out as the most important of the diverse causes’ A10	‘rightly so’ A18; ‘’good sense’ A7; ‘plausible’ A6	‘tautology’ / ‘significant’ ‘key’ A9’; ‘only’ / ‘significant’ A10;
	RQ2T1S5 Direct manifestations of general explanation	‘clearly explain’ A22; ‘explain’ A23	‘why it happened’ A16; ‘easy to see why’ A22	‘good explanation’ A4; ‘effectively analytical’ / ‘explanation’ A6; ‘elevated’ / ‘explanation’ A7; ‘good’ ‘successful’ / ‘explain’ ‘explanation’ A10; ‘good’ / ‘explanations’ A11; ‘well informed’ / ‘explain’ ‘A21	‘lacking precise explanation’ A5; ‘explanation is insufficient’ A8’ ‘less successfully’ / ‘explain’ A10; ‘cannot explain’ A16

When discussing the historiography of the Salem witch trials, A22 indicated recognition of the legitimacy of the goal of arguing regarding general causes when indicating that ‘my angle about the **causes** are more specific to Salem Village and the conflict over the minister’ (Table 7.6.). Seven of the academics praised certain students’ essays for their arguments regarding general causes. For example, A3 noted that Jason ‘wrote a well-argued and well-organized essay (with great detail) addressing missing ‘**causes**’ he didn’t believe were sufficient’. Four academics criticised certain students’ essays for failing to achieve the legitimate goal of persuasive explanation involving causes. For example, A16 criticised Agnes’ causal explanation, noting ‘seeing their Puritanism as the **cause** of the 1692 crisis cannot explain why Salem experienced such a dramatic witchcraft episode, when dozens of other equally-churched towns did not’ [original underscore]. In the particular case of Cotton Mather and his role in the Salem witch trials, A7 criticised the six essays they had read for failing to adequately explain the minister’s impact. For example, A7 noted ‘it was not entirely clear how Mather had an **impact**’. A5 also criticised the ‘weaker’ essays for ‘lacking in meaningful detail and precise explanation (e.g. regarding the exact role of ‘social gatekeepers’, and what this **meant** in a town like Salem’).

7.2.1.2. RQ2T1S2 Direct manifestations of general effects

All eleven students argued generally about effects which I defined as a change which is an outcome of a cause. My indicators of direct manifestations were ‘consequence’; ‘due to’; ‘effect’; ‘result’; and ‘product’ found within a clause. For example, in my resources in Lesson 7 the students read ‘possession neuroses as a **result** of the belief in Satan, witches, and demons’. Furthermore, in Lesson 3 the students had read Hansen’s (1970) argument that ‘when a community looks only for evidence of guilt and ignores or suppresses all contradictory evidence, the **result** is a witch hunt’ (pp.145-146). In her essay, Sophie wrote

‘Tituba, for example, was a native American slave and as a **result** was easy to marginalise’. Additionally, in Lesson 4 the students had read Ray (2015) who argued that Boyer and Nissenbaum’s argument ‘reduces the episode to an easy-to-understand **product** of modernisation’ (pp.3-4). Isabella wrote ‘the fear of witches was a **product** of fears of the visible and invisible worlds’.

When discussing the historiography of the Salem witch trials, A2 recognised the legitimacy of the goal of causally explaining regarding effects. For example, A2 noted:

> certainly the political conditions in 1692 were a part of the problem because of the lack of a permanent court system to try the cases and the lack of legal expertise on the part of the prosecutors. The court of Oyer and Terminer was an ad hoc system with no experience in such cases. This was complicated by the absence of a Governor and the top political leadership and the **resulting** confusion over what was to happen to the colony in the future.

A10 praised ‘all the essays’ because ‘they demonstrated that historical events like what happened in Salem in 1692 are usually not monocausal, but the **result** of several underlying factors’. A17 praised Isabella’s essay in comparison to Abigail’s and Ava’s in part due to her emphasis on causal effects. For example, A17 noted Isabella’s essay was ‘more accurate and purposeful with detail and cause/**consequence**’.

7.2.1.3. RQ2T1S3 Direct and indirect manifestations of general links

Five students argued generally about causal links which I defined as a relationship between two things or situations, which might imply one affects the other. My indicators of direct manifestations were ‘link’ and ‘connection’ found within a clause. For instance, one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources in Lesson 4 was ‘if any one factor **links** all of the accused, it has to be…’. The students had read the phrase in context in Lesson 3 when

Baker (2015) argued ‘if any one factor **links** virtually all of the accused, it has to be religion’ (p.126). In his essay, Jason wrote ‘Abigail Williams testified that the leader of the witches was a “black man”, which could **link** to fears of the Wabanaki as “the devil’s soldiers”’. Furthermore, in Lesson 1 the students had read Ray (2015) who argued ‘The Indian attacks are barely mentioned in the Salem court records; and very few individuals involved in the Salem trials had any **connection** with the Maine frontier and the Indian wars’ (pp.198-201). Jason wrote ‘all of the initial accessors [sic], Betty Parris, Abigail Williams (cousin), Anne Putnam Sr. and Junior, Mary Walcott (cousin), and their servant Mercy Lewis, were all part of the Putnam household, further suggesting a **connection** between the accessors [sic], the accused and the Putnam/Porter feud’.

Three of these students argued generally about causal links in a way similar to historians in the historiography of the Salem witch crisis although they had not read the language in lessons. My indicators of indirect manifestations were ‘correlate’ and ‘no coincidence’. For example, Elena wrote ‘tensions arose when older generations thought that the younger generations were not being devout enough. **It is no coincidence** that of the first accused witches, Sarah Osbourne, had not been to church in three years’. Although the students had not read the extract in lessons, Baker (2015) argued ‘**It is not a coincidence** that the age of witch hunts also saw the birth and development of capitalism’ (p.119).

7.2.1.4. RQ2T1S4 Direct manifestations of general causal importance

All eleven students argued generally about relative causal importance which I defined as making clear the relative weight in bringing about a consequence. My indicators of direct manifestations were ‘significant’; ‘vital’; ‘crucial’; ‘key’; and ‘satisfactory’ found within a clause and counterfactual conditional clauses to emphasise importance. In Lesson 7, one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was ‘played a **significant** role in shaping the course of the trials’. The students had also read this extract in context in Lesson 6 where Ray (2015) argued ‘given the central role of the sermon in Puritan communities, Parris’ sermons about Satan’s threats to the community played a **significant** role, as the editors of Parris’ sermons point out, in influencing the congregation’s reaction to the girls’ afflictions’ (pp.149-150). In her essay, Madeleine wrote ‘having a powerful family responding to accusations was **significant** and made them partly responsible for escalating the witch-hunts’. In Lesson 6, the students had read Norton (2002) argue regarding ‘the **crucial** role of adult men in legitimising the complaints of the afflicted persons’ (p.72). Stella directly referred to this reading when she wrote:

> The role of certain individuals, known as ‘societal gatekeepers’, was important for allowing the spread of the exceptional events that took place at Salem. This is an idea from **MB Norton**, where she explained the ‘**crucial** role’ of men in the community at Salem in legitimising the complaints of those who claimed to be bewitched.

Furthermore, in Lesson 1 the students had read Norton (2002) arguing the causal importance of Indian raids in the events of Salem which included the counterfactual conditional ‘had the Second India War on the northeastern frontier somehow been avoided, the Essex County witchcraft crisis **would not have occurred**’ (pp.296-297). Jason used a counterfactual conditional to prioritise causes when he wrote:

> However, this was not the cause of the crisis, as if political conditions were the most **important** cause, it is likely that the crisis **would have erupted** earlier than 1692, when the new charter was introduced and the uncertainty came to an end.

A23 made clear that a criterion they would use to assess the students’ work was their ability to construct an argument built around the prioritisation of causes. A23 stated ‘I ranked the essays according to two criteria – first, whether the student was able to articulate a method of rationale for assessing the relative contribution of the different factors to the origin and unfolding of the Salem trials.' Four academics recognised the goal of prioritisation of causes when discussing the historiography of the Salem witch trials, with A2, for example, noting that 'it is still possible to give the most weight to one or another'. Furthermore, A1 used a counterfactual when stating:

> there were also a few **key** decisions made during 1692 which **if** they were different, **could have** changed things, starting with Tituba's confession, or Stoughton's unwillingness to accept the not guilty verdict for Rebecca Nurse, or even going back to Salem Village not being so very desperate for a minister that they offered the job to Parris!

Three academics praised certain students' essays for their prioritisation of causes. For instance, in reference to the six essays they had read, A7 noted that the essays 'demonstrated a good sense that most major developments have many causes and sorting out which was most important is a true intellectual challenge'. Two academics criticised some of the students' essays for their failure to persuasively achieve the legitimate goal of ascription of causal importance. For example, A10 noted 'only two of the essays mention spectral evidence specifically, however, and why this might be **significant**. Without the use of spectral evidence, it is unclear **if** any of the 20 victims who were executed **would** even **have been** convicted'. Similarly, A9 wrote 'all your students see **significance** in the **key** role of the 'social/societal gatekeepers' in the development of the trials. Is this the line that you prefer in your own reading of the problem? But none of them define the group, and there is an element of tautology in their assertions'.

7.2.1.5. RQ2T1S5 Direct manifestations of general explanation

Nine students metadiscursively indicated they were causally explaining which I defined as an interpretative process making clear the cause, origin, or reason for an event. My indicators of direct manifestations were ‘explain’ and ‘why’ found within a clause. For example, in Lesson 8 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was ‘differences do exist between Salem Village and (another society) which come closer to **explaining** (consequence).’ In Lesson 4, the students had read an extract where Rosenthal (1993) argued:

> **Why** this radical departure from the past? The most ambitious modern attempt to **explain** the Salem Village episode appears in *Salem Possessed,* where an old idea is probed with new sophistication and insight. From this perspective, a pattern of village quarrels led to accusations as the community divided along lines of those supporting the embattled minister, Parris, and those opposing him. The argument brilliantly reveals much of the tension and underlying agendas in Salem Village, although the study stops short of inquiring into **why** the outbreak spread throughout Massachusetts Bay and caught in its net people having nothing to do with the quarrels of that particular village (p.3).

In his essay Jason wrote:

> However, it is not the most important cause, as this political uncertainty was happening across the entirety of the Massachusetts bay [sic], for a few years prior to the crisis actually erupting. It does not **explain why** the crisis was unique to Salem, and **why** it happened when it did.

Two academics made clear that one of their criteria for evaluating the students’ work would be in their effectiveness in explaining why. For example, A23 noted ‘What I would look for in an answer to the essay question is some awareness of competing **explanations** for **why** Salem village- **why** 1692- and **why** Massachusetts Bay.’ When discussing the historiography of the Salem witch trials, two academics recognised the goal of explaining why, with A22 for instance noting ‘it’s easy to see **why** Salem was the center of the outbreak, how it started, and how it progressed’. Three academics praised certain students for the effectives of their causal

Table 7.7. Overview of manifested sub-themes Research Question 2 Theme 2.

Theme	*Sub-theme*	*Definition*	*Indicators of direct manifestations*			*Indicators of indirect manifestations*
			Reading and resources	*Reading*	*Resources*	
RQ2T2 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of conditions	**RQ2T2S1** Direct manifestations of general conditions	A situation that must exist before something else is possible or permitted.	Within a clause 'circumstance'; 'condition'; 'context'; 'precondition' Counterfactual conditional	Within a clause 'structure'		
	RQ2T2S2 Direct manifestations of latent conditions	Of a hidden quality or state existing but not yet developed or manifest.			Within a clause 'latent'	
	RQ2T2S3 Direct manifestations of long-term conditions	Occurring over a long period of time.	Within a clause 'long-term'			
	RQ2T2S4 Direct manifestations of series conditions	A number of events, objects, or people of a similar or related kind coming one after another.		Nominalisation 'ongoing'; 'persistence'; 'series'		
	RQ2T2S5 Direct and indirect manifestations of necessary conditions	A state or fact being required for the consequence to happen.	Counterfactual conditional			Within a clause 'necessary'

why explanations. A4, for instance, praised Jason's essay for 'good balance of detail, **explanation** and analysis'. Four academics criticised other students' essays for failing to achieve the legitimate goal of persuasively explaining why. For example, A5 noted that 'the weaker answers were on the whole shorter and more vague; lacking in meaningful detail and precise **explanation**'.

7.2.2. RQ2T2 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of conditions

7.2.2.1. RQ2T2S1 Direct manifestations of general conditions

The students directly and indirectly manifested my curricular goal of characterising conditions (Table 7.7.). Ten students argued generally about conditions which I defined as a situation that must exist before something else is possible or permitted. My indicators of direct manifestations were 'circumstance'; 'condition'; 'context'; 'precondition'; and 'structure' found within a clause and counterfactual conditionals emphasising conditions. For example, in Lesson 2 I introduced students to '**conditions**' in my resources as distinct from 'direct causes'. Furthermore, in Lesson 1 the students had read Norton's (2002) argument where she characterised Indian raids' role as a condition distinguished from a direct cause:

> Accordingly, **had** the Second Indian War on the northeaster frontier somehow **been avoided**, the Essex County witchcraft crisis of 1692 **would not have occurred**. This is not to say the war 'caused' the witchcraft crisis, but rather that the conflict created **conditions** that allowed the crisis to develop as rapidly and extensively as it (pp.296-297).

Abigail used a counterfactual conditional when characterising circumstances:

> The overwhelming toxic climate created by the horrors of the Indian wars triggered **circumstances** that allowed the witchcraft crisis to develop so rapidly as it did, without those fearful **conditions**, the number of accusations **would not have been** so extensive.

Table 7.8. Overview of academics' feedback related to manifested sub-themes for Research Question 2 Theme 2.

Theme		**Academics' feedback**			
Theming code	*Sub-theming code*	*Criteria incorporating goal*	*Recognition of goal*	*Praising essay for achieving goal*	*Criticising goal*
RQ2T2 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of conditions	**RQ2T2S1** Direct manifestations of general conditions	'conditions' 'context' A14	'conditions' A2	'good' / 'conditions', 'worthwhile' / 'context' A6; 'liked' / 'context', 'circumstances' / 'highly commended' A8; 'strength' / 'conditions' A10; 'creative' / 'conditions' 'top candidates' / 'context' A15	'weed' / 'condition' A16
	RQ2T2S3 Direct manifestations of long-term conditions			'promising' A19	

Instances such as this may indicate evidence of mimicry – albeit with some understanding of the language's meaning - rather inhabitation of the discourse community. Furthermore, Ava wrote:

> The unusual political conditions operating in Massachusetts in 1692 did create political instability and so the atmosphere of tension, fear and uncertainty that was needed to spark a witch craze. This instability was certainly a **condition** in the craze, but wasn't the direct cause of the events in Salem.

In Lesson 12, the students had read Boyer and Nissenbaum (1974) who argued 'given the ineffectiveness of the Village's institutional **structures**, private grievances escalated with a rapidity which must have startled even those embroiled in them, until the entire community, willy-nilly, was drawn in' (pp.50-52). Caroline wrote 'the **structure** of the village meant disputes were inevitable yet they had no real method to figure them out'.

Two of A14's criteria for privileging essays was whether they argued regarding conditions (Table 7.8.). For example, A14 noted they looked for whether students 'made reference to other witch trials in the area that did not emerge into an outbreak (what made the **conditions** ripe specifically in 1692 as opposed to some other time)' and also if the students 'did an effective job of conveying the multi-causal **context** necessary to really understand the outbreak'. When discussing the historiography of the Salem witch trials, A2 appeared to recognise the legitimacy of the goal of arguing regarding causal conditions. For example, A2 noted:

> But there were so many other factors--fear of Indians, diseases, personal conflicts, changing economic **conditions**, religious concerns, and of course Tituba's willingness to confess and confirm their fears. Everyone who studies the Salem events has to weigh all of those factors.

Six academics praised certain students’ essays for arguing regarding conditions. For example, A8 wrote ‘I like Abigail’s essay because it was nuanced, with several layers and a broad historical **context**’. Similarly, A8 wrote ‘Caroline also has the most detailed analysis of the local **circumstances**, which is to be highly commended’. A6 judged that the ‘better’ essays ‘structured factors into an argument, for example differentiating **preconditions** and triggers’.

A16, however, criticised the goal of using counterfactuals to argue regarding causal conditions when evaluating Agnes’ essay. For example, A16 wrote Agnes:

> indulged in a lot of counter-factual claims ("if the unusual political **conditions** were harsher...then...") which is common among high school students, but at the University level I try hard to weed it out. (So, it's hard for me to read this essay without that informing my reading.)

7.2.2.2. RQ2T2S2 Direct manifestations of latent conditions

Two students characterised conditions as latent which I defined as a hidden quality or state existing but not yet developed or manifest. Here, my indicator of direct manifestations was ‘latent’ found within a clause. For example, in my resources in Lesson 2 the students read that conditions are often ‘**latent** (‘underlying’ i.e. not obviously visible to people at the time)’. Ava wrote ‘the words used by the afflicted girls to describe the ‘devil’s’ threats related to the wars e.g. ‘knock in the head’. However, this was clearly a **latent** factor’. Although the students had not read the extract in class, Hill (1996) argued ‘the atmosphere in the parsonage was so charged as easily to spark the **latent** madness’ (p.36).

7.2.2.3. RQ2T2S3 Direct manifestations of long-term conditions

Three students characterised conditions as long-term which I defined as occurring over a long period of time. Here, my indicator of direct manifestations was 'long-term' within a clause. For example, in my resources in Lesson 2 the students had read that conditions are often 'slow moving and **long-term**'. Furthermore, in Lesson 1 the students had read Norton's (2002) argument:

> The wartime context could well have influenced the onset of those fits – that the afflicted first accused an Indian of tormenting them certainly suggests as much – but more important than such plausible, if not wholly provable, origins was the **long-term** impact of the young women's charges in the context of Puritan New Englanders' belief system (pp.296-297).

Madeleine wrote 'the political instability following the absence and introduction of a new Charter was a **long-term** precondition'. A19 praised aspects of Agnes' essays for characterising longer-term conditions noting Agnes' 'promising introduction on **longer-term** causes'.

7.2.2.4. RQ2T2S4 Direct manifestations of series conditions

Three students characterised conditions as a series which I defined as a number of events, objects, or people of a similar or related kind coming one after another. My indicators of direct manifestations were nominalised colligations including 'ongoing'; 'persistent'; or 'series'. For example, in Lesson 3 the students had read Hansen (1970) who argued regarding 'a long **series** of village quarrels' (pp.145-146). Madeleine wrote of 'a **series** of wars between the colonists and the native Americans'.

7.2.2.5. RQ2T2S5 Direct and indirect manifestations of necessary conditions

Ten students characterised conditions as 'necessary' which I defined as a state or fact being required for the consequence to happen. My indicator of direct manifestations was counterfactual conditional clauses with the modal verb 'would'. For example, in Lesson 1 the students had read Norton (2002) arguing that the Indian raids were a necessary precondition of the Salem witch trials: '**had** the Second India War on the northeastern frontier somehow **been avoided**, the Essex County witchcraft crisis **would not have occurred'** (pp.296-297). Elena wrote:

> Mass fear created underlying tensions that were built on by social gatekeepers, leading to the unprecedented events of Salem in 1692. **Had** it not had [sic] **been** for the underlying mass fear, the gatekeepers **would have had** less influence; people needed preexisitng [sic] fear in order to fully believe the claims.

Eight of these students characterised necessary conditions in a way similar to historians in the historiography of the Salem witch trials although they had not read the language in lessons. My indicator of indirect manifestations was 'necessary' within a clause. For example, Jason wrote 'political uncertainty was a highly contributing factor to establishing a tense atmosphere in Salem and could perhaps be argued as a **necessary** pre-condition in allowing the crisis to erupt'. Although the students had not read the extract in lessons, Breslaw (1996) argued 'there is no doubt that a particular combination of social tensions, exacerbated by the factional conflict within the community of Salem Village, contributed to the atmosphere of fear so **necessary** for the advent of the witchscare' (pp.105-106).

7.2.3. RQ2T3 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of nature of conditions

7.2.3.1. RQ2T3S1 Direct and indirect manifestations of systemic dysfunction conditions

Students directly and indirectly manifested my curricular goal of characterising the nature of conditions. Seven students characterised conditions as systemic dysfunction which I defined as an abnormality or impairment in the operation of a specified system. My indicators of direct manifestations were nominalised colligations including ‘instability’; ‘lack’; ‘no man’s land’; ‘crisis’; ‘limbo’; or ‘weakness’ (Table 7.9.). For example, in Lesson 2, one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was ‘political **instability**’. In the same lesson, the students had read Rosenthal (1993) arguing regarding ‘broad social **instability’** and that ‘a common explanation for the “witchcraft” outbreak spreading beyond Salem Village centres on the political and social turmoil facing the colony, particularly in view of its **lack** of a charter’ (pp.3-4). Madeleine wrote:

> the unstable political conditions had a significant part to play. There was uncertainty surrounding the **lack** of a Charter [sic] from 1684, unpopularity with the new Charter in 1691 and the legal **instability** which led to unresolved conflicts among the people of Massachusetts.

In Lesson 2, the students had read Baker who argued regarding ‘something of a legal **no-man’s-land**’ (pp.64-67). Jason wrote of a ‘**no mans’** [sic] **land** period’. Additionally, in Lesson 4 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was ‘political and **legal limbo**’. Jason wrote of ‘the period of political **limbo**’. Although the students had not read the extracts in class, Francis (2006) argued regarding ‘executive and administrative **limbo**’ (p.112).

Four of the students characterised conditions as systemic dysfunction similarly to historians in the historiography of the Salem witch trials although they had not read the language in lessons. My indicators of indirect manifestations were nominalised colligations including ‘absence’; ‘disruption’; and ‘upheaval’. For example, Madeleine wrote of the ‘the political and social **disruption** that consumed Massachusetts’**.** Although the students had not

Table 7.9. Overview of manifested sub-themes Research Question 2 Theme 3.

Theme	***Sub-theme***	***Definition***	***Indicators of direct manifestations***			***Indicators of indirect manifestations***
			Reading and resources	*Reading*	*Resources*	
RQ2T3 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of nature of conditions	**RQ2T3S1** Direct and indirect manifestations of systemic dysfunction conditions	An abnormality or impairment in the operation of a specified system.	Nominalisation ‘instability’; ‘lack’	Nominalisation ‘no man’s land’	Nominalisation ‘crisis’; ‘limbo’; ‘weakness’	Nominalisation ‘absence’; ‘disruption’; ‘upheaval’
	RQ2T3S2 Direct and indirect manifestations of non-purposive disposition conditions	An inclination, tendency, or personal qualities of mind without a specific resolve or determination to act in a particular way.	Nominalisation ‘anxiety’; ‘fear’; ‘tension’	Nominalisation ‘aggression’; ‘panic’; ‘uncertainty’	Nominalisation ‘attitude’; ‘trauma’; unease’	Nominalisation ‘concern’; ‘disappointment’; ‘disapproval’; ‘discontent’; ‘distress’; ‘mood’; ‘resentment’; ‘sense’; ‘strain’;
	RQ2T3S3 Direct and indirect manifestations of purposive disposition conditions	An inclination, tendency, or personal qualities of mind with a specific resolve or determination to act in a particular way.	Nominalisation ‘belief’; ‘presumption’; ‘puritanism’; ‘scapegoating’; ‘worldview’	Nominalisation ‘orthodox’; ‘prejudice’; ‘zeal’	Nominalisation ‘ideology’; ‘patriarchy’; ‘stereotyping’; ‘theocracy’; ‘view’	Nominalisation ‘desire’; ‘identity’; ‘mindset’; ‘willingness’
	RQ2T3S4 Direct manifestations of perception of threat conditions	The way in which something is regarded, understood, or interpreted as intending to perform a hostile action which might restrain a person’s freedom of action.	Nominalisation ‘attack’; ‘threat’	Nominalisation ‘assault’		
	RQ2T3S5 Direct and indirect manifestations of negative relationship conditions	The way in which two or more people or groups regard and behave towards each other.	Nominalisation ‘conflict’; ‘disputes’; ‘division’; ‘factionalism’	Nominalisation ‘difference’	Nominalisation ‘acrimony’; ‘feud’	Nominalisation ‘disagreement’; ‘issue’; ‘relations
	RQ2T3S6 Direct and indirect manifestations of pathological conditions	Effects as typical behaviour of a disease or illness.	Nominalisation ‘hysteria’			Nominalisation ‘panic attack’; ‘Post Traumatic Stress Disorder’
	RQ2T3S7 Direct and indirect manifestations of power conditions	Relative social or professional standing which determines their rights and responsibilities.	Nominalisation ‘authority’; ‘gatekeeper’; ‘influence’; ‘member’; ‘outsider’; ‘power’			Nominalisation ‘control’
	RQ2T3S8 Direct and indirect manifestations of information conditions	What is conveyed or represented when someone learns about something or someone.	Nominalisation ‘news’	Nominalisation ‘gossip’; ‘story’	Nominalisation ‘idea’	Nominalisation ‘knowledge’
	RQ2T3S9 Direct manifestations of process conditions	A systematic series of actions or steps to achieve a particular end.	Nominalisation ‘practice’; ‘proceedings’; ‘process’			

Table 7.10. Overview of academics’ feedback related to manifested sub-themes for Research Question 2 Theme 3.

Theme		**Academics’ feedback**			
Theming code	*Sub-theming code*	*Recognition of goal*	*Praising essay for achieving goal*	*Criticising essay for failing to achieve goal*	*Criticising goal*
RQ2T3 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of nature of conditions	**RQ2T3S1** Direct and indirect manifestations of systemic dysfunction conditions	‘absence’ ‘lack’ A2	‘good’/‘instability’ A4	‘muddled’/‘instability’ A8	
	RQ2T3S2 Direct and indirect manifestations of non-purposive disposition conditions	‘concern’ ‘fear’ A2	‘elevated to top rank’/‘fear’ A7; ‘deft hand’ / ‘concerns’ A16	‘would have been interesting if’/ ‘fear’ A10	
	RQ2T3S3 Direct and indirect manifestations of purposive disposition conditions		‘interesting’ / ‘patriarchy’ A4; ‘commended’ ‘patriarchy’ A8; ‘strength’ ‘good job’ / ‘Puritan’ A10; ‘pretty well’ / ‘Puritan’ A16; ‘understand’ / ‘Puritan’ A19	‘disturbed’ / ‘Puritan’ A2; ‘doesn’t explain’ / ‘Puritan’ A16; ‘static’ / ‘Puritan’ A19	‘not as strong’ / ‘theocracy’ A16; ‘nope’ ‘error’ / ‘theocracy’ A17
	RQ2T3S4 Direct manifestations of perception of threat conditions	‘threat’ A22	‘read so carefully’/‘threat’ A19.		
	RQ2T3S5 Direct and indirect manifestations of negative relationship conditions	A2 ‘conflict’; ‘conflict’ A22 ‘issues’ A22		‘issues’/‘does not work’ A9; ‘dispute’/‘unclear’ A17	
	RQ2T3S7 Direct and indirect manifestations of power conditions		‘effectively analytical’/‘gatekeeper’A6; ‘read the book with attention’/‘gatekeeper’ A8; ‘works really well’/‘gatekeeper’ A14; ‘compelling’/ ‘used well’/‘gatekeeper’ A16 ‘deft hand’/‘outsider’ A16	‘less successfully’/’gatekeeper’ A10; ‘too focused on’/ ‘gatekeeper’ A17.	‘wonder why’/‘gatekeeper’ A8; element of tautology’/’gatekeeper’ A9; ‘obsession with’/’gatekeeper’ A15
	RQ2T3S8 Direct and indirect manifestations of information conditions			‘would have been interesting if’ A10	

read the extract in class, Boyer and Nissenbaum (1974) wrote of ‘a time of severe political and legal **disruption**’ (p.19).

When discussing the historiography of the Salem witch trials, A2 appeared to recognise the legitimacy of the goal of characterising conditions as systemic dysfunction (Table 7.10.). For example, A2 wrote:

> certainly the political conditions in 1692 were part of the problem because of the **lack** of a permanent court system to try the cases and the **lack** of legal expertise on the part of the prosecutors. The court of Oyer and Terminer was an ad hoc system with no experience in such cases. This was complicated by the **absence** of a Governor and the top political leadership.

A4 praised certain aspects of Isabella’s essay when she characterised conditions as systemic dysfunction. For example, A4 noted ‘good knowledge of political **instability**’. A8 criticised Ava’s essay for lacking logic when discussing political instability and therefore failing to achieve the legitimate goal of arguing persuasively regarding conditions as systemic dysfunction. For instance, A8 wrote ‘unfortunately, the thinking seems a little muddled in the second paragraph where Ava claims that political **instability** did not matter much, and then goes on to argue that the political **instability** with the charter, etc., of 1691, mattered’.

7.2.3.2. RQ2T3S2 Direct and indirect manifestations of non-purposive disposition conditions

All eleven students characterised conditions as non-purposive dispositions which I defined as an inclination, tendency, or quality of mind without a specific resolve to act in a particular way. My indicators of direct manifestations were nominalised colligations including ‘anxiety’; ‘fear’; ‘tension’; ‘aggression’; ‘panic’; ‘uncertainty’; ‘attitude’; ‘trauma’; and ‘unease’. For example, in Lesson 4 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was ‘socio-economic **tension**’. Furthermore, in Lesson 2 the students had read Baker (2015) argue regarding ‘existing economic, political and spiritual **tension**’ (pp.123-125). Elena wrote of ‘increasing religious **tensions** within an already hostile environment’. Furthermore, in Lesson 2 the students had also read Baker’s (2015) argument regarding ‘the **uncertainties** (critics would go as far as to label it anarchy) of the inter-charter years’ (pp.64-67). Elena wrote of ‘conditions of **fear** and **uncertainty**’. In my resources in Lesson 7 the students read of ‘**trauma** induced by Indian attacks’. When referring to the consequences of the Second Indian War, Jason wrote of ‘the manifestation of this **trauma**’. Although the students had not read this extract in class, Ray (2015) argued regarding ‘deep psychological **trauma**’ (pp.44-46).

Ten of the students characterised conditions as non-purposive dispositions similarly to historians in the historiography of the Salem witch trials although they had not read the language in lessons. My indicators for indirect manifestations were ‘concern’; ‘disappointment’; ‘disapproval’; ‘discontent’; ‘distress’; ‘mood’; ‘resentment’; ‘sense’; and ‘strain’. For instance, Jason wrote of ‘a build-up of **resentment** and **unease**’. Although the students had not read these extracts Demos (1970) argued regarding ‘a powerful underlying **resentment**’ (p.1319) and Hoffer (1996) a ‘state of mental tension and **unease**’ (pp.128-129).

When discussing the historiography of the Salem witch trials, A2 appeared to recognise the legitimacy of the goal of characterising conditions as non-purposive dispositions. For example, A2 wrote:

> **fear** of Indians, diseases, personal conflicts, changing economic conditions, religious **concerns**, and of course Tituba's willingness to confess and confirm their **fears**. Everyone who studies the Salem events has to weigh all of those factors.

A7 particularly praised Elena's essay for characterising the non-purposive disposition of fear. For example, A7 noted:

> What elevated Elena's paper to top rank was her ability to dig into an important aspect of the events of 1692 that the others failed to acknowledge to any great degree. The profound **fear** that the people of Salem and Salem Village had of an invasion of Satan in their midst is often given little space in explanations offered by historians.

Similarly, A16 praised Elena's essay because 'Elena managed to marry the various theories pretty well, and avoided seeing religion/puritanism as the "bad guy," instead weaving the changing position of the Massachusetts Bay colony after 1688 into religious **concerns** the colonists might have had'.

A10 criticised the students' essays for missing the opportunity to achieve the legitimate goal of arguing regarding non-purposive dispositions by failing to stress the importance of fear. For example, A10 noted:

> Given that Norton also mentioned in her introduction that there were no local newspapers in Salem and that all information spread orally, it would have been interesting if the students had thought about gossip and sermons as the social media of 1692, and how **fear** and misinformation could be spread just as easily through them as through Facebook.

7.2.3.3. RQ2T3S3 Direct and indirect manifestations of purposive disposition conditions

All eleven students characterised conditions as purposive dispositions which I defined as an inclination, tendency, or quality of mind with a specific resolve to act in a particular way. My indicators of direct manifestations were nominalised colligations including 'belief'; 'presumption of guilt'; 'Puritan'; 'scapegoat'; 'worldview'; 'orthodoxy'; 'prejudice'; 'zeal'; 'ideology'; 'patriarchal'; 'stereotypical'; 'theocracy'; and 'view'. For example, in Lesson 3 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was '**Puritan worldview**'. Furthermore, in the same lesson the students had read Norton's (2002) argument regarding '**Puritan** New Englanders' singular **worldview**' (p.296). Elena wrote of the '**puritan worldview**'. Furthermore, in Lesson 6 the students had read Ray (2015) argue regarding the '**zeal** of the Salem magistrates' (pp.66-67). Elena wrote of the '**zeal** of the judges'. Additionally, in my resources in Lesson 7 the students had read of '**patriarchal** pressures'. Abigail wrote of 'the **patriarchal** and hierarchical society'. Although the students had not read this extract in class, Baker (2015) argued regarding 'the repressive **patriarchal** nature of Puritan society' (pp.103-104).

Ten of the students characterised conditions as purposive dispositions similarly to historians in the historiography of the Salem witch trials although they had not read the language in lessons. My indicators of indirect manifestations were nominalised colligations including 'desire'; 'identity'; 'mindset'; and 'willingness'. For example, Jason wrote of 'a social **desire** for a scapegoat'. Although the students had not read this extract in lessons Rosenthal (1993) argued regarding 'a seemingly insatiable **desire** by the judiciary for the names of more witches' (p.8).

When discussing the historiography of the Salem witch trials, A2 appeared to note the legitimacy of the goal of constructing a historical explanation with focus on conditions as purposive dispositions. For example, A2 wrote:

> But there were so many other factors--fear of Indians, diseases, personal conflicts, changing economic conditions, religious concerns, and of course Tituba's **willingness** to confess and confirm their fears. Everyone who studies the Salem events has to weigh all of those factors.

Two academics praised Isabella's essay for discussion of the purposive dispositional condition of patriarchy. For example, A8 wrote 'Isabella is also to be commended for bringing up the issue of **patriarchy**'. A10 praised the students for the causal explanation involving Puritanism as a condition of purposive disposition. For example, A10 wrote:

> Another strength is that five of the six also discount "the unusual political conditions" as the main underlying cause, a few even pointing out these conditions existed outside Massachusetts without producing a witch hunt like in Salem. The same is true of **puritanism**, which most of the essays mention, as it also existed outside Massachusetts yet did not produce a witch hunt as in Salem. So, they all make a good effort at trying to explain why this happened in Salem and nowhere else.

Two academics praised some of Agnes' classmates' essays while criticising Agnes' for their characterisation of Puritanism as a condition of purposive disposition. For example, A19 noted 'Agnes's classmates understand **Puritan** worries about moral declension over the longue duree and through "halfway covenants," whereas **Puritanism** seems more static for Agnes'. A2 criticised the students' understanding of Puritanism and therefore failing to achieve the legitimate goal of persuasive explanatory argument involving purposive disposition conditions. For example, A2 wrote:

> I was disturbed in particular by the misunderstanding of the idea of religious freedom as something lost with Toleration. **Puritans** certainly were not characterized by nor as believers in religious freedom and they objected to including all Protestants as equal in their society.

Two academics criticised students' arguments regarding purposive dispositions when employing the terms the term 'theocracy'. For example, A16 wrote of Agnes' essay:

> her decision to blame the "**theocracy**" of Massachusetts Bay is not as strong. Massachusetts Bay is not a theocracy (no ministers were allowed to serve in elected office). The better way to look at it, in the words of David D. Hall, is as a "churched society".

7.2.3.4. RQ2T3S4 Direct manifestations of perception of threat conditions

Seven students characterised conditions as perceptions of threat which I defined as the way in which something is regarded or interpreted as intending to perform a hostile action which might restrain a person's freedom of action. My indicators of direct manifestations were nominalised colligations including 'attack'; 'threat'; or 'assault'. For example, in Lesson 7 in my resources the students had read of 'trauma induced by Indian **attacks**'. In Lesson 3, the students had read Baker (2015) who argued regarding 'an orthodoxy under **attack** on multiple fronts'. Madeleine wrote that 'Puritan authorities in New England feared the **attack** on their religious freedom'. In Lesson 1, the students read Norton (2002) who argued regarding 'the **assaults** from the visible and invisible worlds' (pp.296-297). Isabella directly quoted this when she wrote 'As **Mary Beth Norton** argues, 'the **assaults**' from the visible and invisible worlds became closely entwined in the New Englanders' minds'.

When discussing the historiography of the Salem witch trials, A22 appeared to note the legitimacy of the goal of characterising conditions as perceptions of threat. For example, A22 noted 'my angle about the causes are more specific to Salem Village and the conflict over the minister who began to talk about devils in the community – the cutting off of his salary and **threats** to take away the parsonage'. A19 praised Agnes' essay because 'she has read contemporary jeremiad sermons so carefully (1680s **threats** under James II to the Massachusetts charter threatened New England Puritanism in its purity)'.

7.2.3.5. RQ2T3S5 Direct and indirect manifestations of negative relationship conditions

Ten students characterised conditions as negative relationships which I defined as the undesirable way in which two or more people or groups regard and behave toward each other. My indicators of direct manifestations were nominalised colligations including 'conflict';

‘dispute’; ‘division’; ‘factionalism’; ‘difference’; ‘acrimony’; or ‘feud’. For instance, in Lesson 2, one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was ‘Salem’s **divisions**’. Additionally, in Lesson 4 the students had read Boyer and Nissenbaum (1974) argue regarding ‘the **division** within the Village’ (pp.68-69). In her essay, Elena wrote of ‘the **division** between town and village’. Furthermore, in Lesson 2 the students had read Baker (2015) who argued regarding ‘a reservoir of pent-up local complaints and **differences**’ (pp.64-67). Isabella wrote of ‘a pile of unresolved local complaints and **differences** between neighbours’. Furthermore, in Lesson 4 in my resources the students read of the ‘Porter-Putnam **feud**’. Jason wrote of ‘the Putnam / Porter **feud’**. Although the students had not read the extract in class, Schiff (2015) wrote of ‘a long-standing **feud** divided the Putnams of Salem and the Townes of Topsfield’ (pp.236-237).

Three of these students characterised conditions as negative relationships similarly to historians in the historiography of the Salem witch trials although they had not read the language in lessons. My indicators of indirect manifestations were nominalised colligations including ‘disagreement’; ‘issues’; and ‘relations’. For example, Madeleine wrote of ‘social **issues** such as the Indian Wars’. Although the students had not read this extract in class, Baker (2015) argued regarding ‘religious **issues**’ (pp.96-97).

When discussing the historiography of the Salem witch trials, two academics appeared to note the legitimacy of the goal of constructing a historical explanation with focus on conditions as negative relationships. For example, A2 wrote:

> But there were so many other factors--fear of Indians, diseases, personal **conflicts**, changing economic conditions, religious concerns, and of course Tituba's willingness to confess and confirm their fears. Everyone who studies the Salem events has to weigh all of those factors.

Similarly, A22 noted ‘one of the basic things about Salem is that we have so much documentation of content and chronology that we can see who the principals are and what the personal and social **issues** in almost all the main cases’. Two academics criticised certain students’ essays for failing to achieve the legitimate goal of persuasive causal explanation involving conditions characterising negative relationships. For example, A9 noted that Abigail’s ‘introduction, in which she tries immediately to address the **issues** raised by the question concerning government does not work’. Similarly, A17 criticised Ava’s essay for being ‘unclear on origins and implication of charter **dispute**’.

7.2.3.6. RQ2T3S6 Direct and indirect manifestations of pathological conditions

Three students characterised conditions pathologically which I defined as effects as typical behaviour of a disease or illness. My indicator of direct manifestations was ‘hysteria’. For example, in my resources in Lesson 7 the students read of ‘mass **hysteria**’. In Lesson 3 the students had read Hansen (1970) argue regarding ‘an outbreak of epidemic **hysteria**’ (pp.145-146). Stella wrote of ‘the spreading of **hysteria**’. Two of these students characterised conditions pathologically similarly to historians in the historiography of the Salem witch trials although they had not read the language in lessons. My indicators of indirect manifestations were nominalised colligations including ‘panic attack’ or ‘post-traumatic stress disorder’. For instance, Jason wrote of ‘the manifestation of this trauma (what we would know today as **PTSD**)’. Although the students had not read this extract in class, Norton (2002) discussed ‘the phenomenon known today as **post-traumatic stress disorder**’ (pp.306-308).

7.2.3.7. RQ2T3S7 Direct and indirect manifestations of power conditions

Ten students characterised power conditions which I defined as relative social or professional standing which determines rights and responsibilities. My indicators of direct manifestations were ‘authority’; ‘gatekeeper’; ‘influence’; ‘member’; ‘outsider’; and ‘power’. For instance, Lesson 6 was titled ‘Did “societal **gatekeepers**” “legitimise” the Salem witch crisis?’ and students read an extract from Norton (2002) where she argued regarding ‘a number of adult male **gatekeepers**’ (p.72). Madeleine wrote of ‘the actions of societal **gatekeepers** in the community’. Sophie also characterised power conditions similarly to historians in the historiography of the Salem witch trials although she had not read the language in lessons. My indicator for indirect manifestation was ‘control’. Sophie wrote of ‘the **control** that individuals had over the judges’. Although the students had not read this extract in class, Ray (2015) argued regarding ‘the **control** of the adults who employed [the afflicted maidservants]’ (pp.44-46).

A16 praised Elena’s essay when she had referred to social ‘outsiders’. For example, A16 noted Elena ‘seems to simply have a more deft hand at exploring historical arguments that she had read, Rebecca Nurse challenges the ‘**outsider**’ theory she refers to, and she works to integrate the Nurse case’. Three academics praised certain students for characterising power conditions as ‘gatekeepers’. A14, for instance, noted that ‘I was interested in [the students’] use of ‘social **gatekeepers**’. It works really well’.

Two academics criticised the students’ essays for failing to achieve the goal of arguing persuasively regarding power conditions regarding ‘gatekeepers’ with A17, for instance, noting of Sophie’s essay that she was ‘maybe a bit too focused on social **gatekeepers**’. A8, meanwhile, was more ambivalent regarding the term ‘gatekeeper’. In regard to Agnes’ essay, A8 noted that ‘OK, she too uses ‘social **gatekeepers**’ so obviously this was part of how the material was taught. I wonder why this term was used instead of magistrates or elites?’. Later, when commenting on Ava’s essay A8 wrote ‘Ah! Ava reminds me that it is MB Norton who deployed 'social **gatekeepers**'. Your students have read the book with more attention than I did!'.

A9 and A15 appeared more critical of the goal of using the term 'gatekeeper' to characterise power conditions itself. For example, A9 wrote:

> All your students see significance in the key role of the 'social/societal **gatekeepers'** in the development of the trials. Is this the line that you prefer in your own reading of the problem? But none of them define the group, and there is an element of tautology in their assertions. The **gatekeepers** are those who promote the trials, but what of those of manifestly similar status who don't? The list of **gatekeepers** incorporates Parris, Cotton Mather, Putnam, Hathorne, Corwin, Stoughton - men very different in status and roles in the tragedy. Is Phips a **gatekeeper**?

7.2.3.8. RQ2T3S8 Direct and indirect manifestations of information conditions

Six students characterised information conditions which I defined as what is conveyed or represented when someone learns about something or someone. My indicators for direct manifestations were nominalised colligations including 'news'; 'gossip'; 'story' or 'idea'. For example, in my resources in Lesson 1 the students read of '**news** of the [Glorious] Revolution**'.** In Lesson 7, the students had read Ray (2015) who argued regarding the 'shocking **news** of a sizeable plot against God's faithful' (pp.33-34). Ava wrote of '**news** of the Glorious Revolution'. In Lesson 1, the students had read Ray (2015) argue regarding 'a point of **gossip**'. In her essay, Agnes wrote of 'long-standing and existing **gossip**'. In Lesson 7 in my resources the students read of 'the **idea** of a large, Satanic conspiracy'. Elena wrote of 'the **idea** that the Devil was at work in Salem'. Although the students had not read this extract in class, Fels (2017) argued regarding 'the **idea** that a personalised Satan was responsible' (p.190n11).

Two of these students also characterised information conditions similarly to historians in the historiography of the Salem witch trials although they had not read the language in lessons. My indicator for indirect manifestations was ‘knowledge’. For example, Elena wrote of ‘the **knowledge** within the town that his parents had supported leaders of a Puritan breakaway group’. Although the students had not read this extract in class, Baker (2015) argued regarding ‘direct **knowledge** of several recent outbreaks’ (pp.112-113).

A10 criticised the students’ essays they had read for failing to achieve the legitimate goals of persuasive argument regarding information conditions by underemphasising the importance of gossip. For example, A10 noted:

> Given that Norton also mentioned in her introduction that there were no local newspapers in Salem and that all information spread orally, it would have been interesting if the students had thought about **gossip** and sermons as the social media of 1692, and how fear and misinformation could be spread just as easily through them as through Facebook.

7.2.3.9. RQ2T3S9 Direct manifestations of process conditions

Four students characterised process conditions which I defined as a systematic series of actions or steps to achieve a particular end. My indicators of direct manifestations were nominalised colligations including ‘practice’; ‘proceedings’; or ‘process’. For example, in Lesson 7 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was ‘direction and scope of the **proceedings**’, an expression which the students had also read in context Lesson 6 in an extract from Ray (2015, pp.144-145). Elena wrote of the ‘questionable legal **proceedings**’.

Table 7.11. Overview of manifested sub-themes Research Question 2 Theme 4.

Theme	*Sub-theme*	*Definition*	*Indicators of direct manifestations*		*Indicators of indirect manifestations*
			Reading and resources	*Reading*	
RQ2T4 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of conditions’ causal mechanisms	**RQ2T4S1** Direct manifestations of characterisation of conditions’ causal mechanism as common thread	A theme or characteristic found in various stories or situations.	Within a clause ‘common thread’		
	RQ2T4S2 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of conditions’ causal mechanism as allowing	Making a process or action possible, easier, or easy.	Within a clause ‘allowed’	Within a clause ‘more likely to’	Within a clause’ ‘facilitated’; ‘made susceptible’
	RQ2T4S3 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of conditions’ causal mechanism as manifesting	Show a quality through one’s acts or appearance.	Within a clause ‘manifested’		Within a clause ‘reflected’; ‘translation of’
	RQ2T4S4 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of conditions’ causal mechanism as influencing	Having an effect on the character, development, or behaviour of someone or something.		Within a clause ‘influenced’	Within a clause ‘prompted’
	RQ2T4S5 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of conditions’ causal mechanism as determining	Cause something to occur in a particular way or to have a particular nature.		Within a clause ‘driven by’	Within a clause ‘determined’
	RQ2T4S6 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of conditions’ causal mechanism as escalating	Make something increase rapidly and/or increase in seriousness or intensity.		Within a clause ‘escalated’; ‘spread’	Within a clause ‘heightened’; ‘multiplied’
	RQ2T4S7 Indirect manifestations of characterisation of conditions’ causal mechanism as perpetuating	Make something continue indefinitely.			Within a clause ‘perpetuated’
	RQ2T4S8 Indirect manifestations of characterisation of conditions’ causal mechanism as propelling	Push something forwards			Within a clause ‘propelled’

7.2.4. RQ2T4 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of conditions' causal mechanisms

7.2.4.1. RQ2T4S1 Direct manifestations of characterisation of conditions' causal mechanism as common thread

Students directly and indirectly manifested my curricular goal of characterising conditions' causal mechanisms (Table 7.11.). Jason characterised a condition's causal mechanism as a common thread which I defined as a theme or characteristic found in various stories or situations. My indicator for direct manifestation was 'common thread' within a clause. For example, in Lesson 4 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was 'a **common thread** runs through the whole series of events'. Furthermore, in Lesson 3 the students had read the extract in context when Ray (2015) argued 'a **common thread** runs through the whole series of events' (p.5). Jason wrote 'as **B. C. Ray** explains, the factionalism in Salem actually stemmed from a religious divide between full-church members and non-church members. This is a **common thread** between all the trials'.

7.2.4.2. RQ2T4S2 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of conditions' causal mechanism as allowing

Six students characterised a condition's causal mechanism as allowing which I defined as making a process or action possible, easier, or easy. My indicators for direct manifestations were 'allowed' or 'more likely to' within a clause. For example, in Lesson 6 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was '**allowed** the crisis to reach the heights it did'. In Lesson 1, the students had read Norton (2002) use this expression in context when she argued 'this is not to say the war "caused" the witchcraft crisis, but rather that the conflict created conditions that **allowed** the crisis to develop as rapidly and extensively as it did' (pp.296-297). Jason wrote that ‘political uncertainty…could perhaps be argued as a necessary precondition in **allowing** the crisis to erupt’. Furthermore, in Lesson 4 the students had read Ray (2015) who argued ‘whatever grudges the accusers harboured against their neighbours, they were far more **likely to** finger individuals who were not members of the congregation’ (pp.188-200). Stella wrote, ‘E.W. Baker argues that witch hunts were more **likely to** take place under puritan rule’.

Two of the students also characterised a condition’s causal mechanism as allowing similarly to historians in the historiography of the Salem witch trials although they had not read the language in lessons. My indicators for indirect manifestations were ‘facilitated’ and ‘made susceptible’ within a clause. For example, Madeleine wrote ‘historians such as E. W. Baker have suggested legal limbo **facilitated** unsettled disputed among neighbours which may have helped “fuel witchcraft allegations”’. Although the students had not read this extract in class, Ray (2015) argued ‘the lack of a requirement to post a bond **facilitated** the filing of multiple complaints on behalf of a dozen people in the first five weeks’ (pp.185-186).

7.2.4.3. RQ2T4S3 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of conditions’ causal mechanism as manifesting

Six students characterised a condition’s causal mechanism as manifesting which I defined as showing a quality though one’s actions or appearance. My indicator for direct manifestations was ‘manifestation’ within a clause. For example, in my resources in Lesson 1 I posed the students the question ‘according to Norton, how did the fear of the Wabanaki **manifest** itself in the trials?’. In Lesson 5 the students read Robinson (1991) who argued ‘the present Indian war was only the outward **manifestation** of the assault; there were also witches who would tear down New England from within' (pp.54-55). Jason wrote, 'Mercy Lewis, one of the girls afflicted with fits, had lost her family in a Wabanaki raid in 1689, some argued that these fits are [sic] the **manifestation** of this trauma'.

Three of the students characterised a condition's causal mechanism as manifesting similarly to historians in the historiography of the Salem witch trials although they had not read the language in lessons. My indicators of indirect manifestations were 'reflected' and 'translation of' within a clause. For instance, Madeleine wrote 'Puritans in New England felt they were the chosen by God to spread Gods [sic] message and were not accepting of 'outsiders'. This ideology is **reflected in** the girl's [sic] accusation of certain individuals that were perceived as a threat to Puritanism'. Although the students had not read this extract in class, Baker (2015) argued 'Sarah Holten's accusations against her neighbour Rebecca Nurse **reflects** this neighbourly conflict' (pp.151-153).

7.2.4.4. RQ2T4S4 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of conditions' causal mechanism as influencing

Three students characterised a condition's causal mechanism as influencing which I defined as having an effect on the character, development, or behaviour of someone or something. My indicator of direct manifestations was 'influenced' within a clause. For example, in Lesson 1 the students had read Norton (2002) who argued 'the wartime context could well have **influenced** the onset of those fits – that the afflicted first accused an Indian of tormenting them certainly suggests as much' (pp.296-297). Elena wrote 'this idea that the Devil was at work in Salem **influenced** not just the legal procedures, but the attitudes of those who were in a position to cement this reasoning'.

Abigail also characterised a condition’s causal mechanism as influencing similarly to historians in the historiography of the Salem witch trials although she had not read the language in lessons. My indicator of indirect manifestations was ‘prompted’. Abigail wrote ‘the unusual political conditions operating in Massachusetts in 1692 could explain the extraordinary events in Salem as it disrupted their secure theocratic government and **prompted** social instability’. Although the students had not read this extract in class, Hill (1996) argued ‘the Puritans’ assumption of religious and moral infallibility **prompted** an inquisitorial attitude in their examinations and trials’ (pp.80-81).

7.2.4.5. RQ2T4S5 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of conditions’ causal mechanism as determining

Four students characterised a condition’s causal mechanism as determining which I defined as causing something to occur in a particular way or to have a particular nature. My indicator of direct manifestations was ‘driven’. For example, in Lesson 6 the students had read Ray (2015) who noted ‘recent studies portray Parris an insecure man who was **driven by** his obsessions and played a crucial role in the witchcraft crisis’ (pp.144-145). Madeleine argued ‘accusation [sic] were largely religiously **driven** against those who posed a threat’. Elena also characterised a condition’s causal mechanism as determining similarly to historians in the historiography of the Salem witch trials although she had not read the language in lessons. My indicator of indirect manifestations was ‘determined’. Elena wrote ‘fear **determined** the distinctive legal proceedings’. Although the students had not read this extract in class, Boyer and Nissenbaum (1974) argued ‘the witchcraft accusations of 1692 moved in channels which were **determined** by years of factional strife in Salem Village’ (p.181).

7.2.4.6. RQ2T4S6 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of conditions' causal mechanism as escalating

Seven students characterised a condition's causal mechanism as escalating which I defined as making something increase rapidly and/or increase in seriousness or intensity. My indicators of direct manifestations were 'escalated' or 'spread' within a clause. For example, in Lesson 2 the students had read Rosenthal (1993) who noted 'a common explanation for the 'witchcraft' outbreak **spreading** beyond Salem Village centres on the political and social turmoil facing the colony' (pp.3-4). Stella wrote 'the lack of stability was also a fundamental cause in the Salem witch craze, and the **spreading** of hysteria'.

Two of the students also characterised a condition's causal mechanisms as escalating similarly to historians in the historiography of the Salem witch trials although they had not read the language in lessons. My indicators of indirect manifestations were 'heightened' and 'multiplied'. For example, Agnes wrote 'the unusual political conditions fuelled the witch trials as they enabled cases to be taken further and to **multiply**'. Although the students had not read this extract in class, Karlsen (1989) argued:

> if the spiritual leaders of the community did not think an accused person had committed herself or himself to the Devil, or if there was no community consensus that someone had been specifically harmed, a witchcraft trial would most likely end in an acquittal, if indeed the case ever came to court…When both concerns were particularly widespread and intense, accusations could **multiply**, affecting the lives of not just one or two people but many: as in the case of Salem in 1692 (p.5).

7.2.4.7. RQ2T4S7 Indirect manifestations of characterisation of conditions' causal mechanism as perpetuating

Jason characterised a condition's causal mechanisms as perpetuating which I defined as making something continue indefinitely similarly to historians in the historiography of the Salem witch crisis although he had not read the language in lessons. My indicator of indirect manifestations was 'perpetuated' within a clause. For example, Jason wrote 'unusual political conditions operating in Massachusetts up to 1692 helped to **perpetuate** a feeling of unease across the puritan theocracy that was New England'. Although the students had not read the extract in class, Karlsen (1989) argued 'Puritan rituals, symbols, and myths **perpetuated** the belief that women posed ever-present dangers to human society' (p.155).

7.2.4.8. RQ2T4S8 Indirect manifestations of characterisation of conditions' causal mechanism as propelling

Caroline characterised a condition's causal mechanism as propelling which I defined as pushing something forwards similarly to historians in the historiography of the Salem witch crisis although she had not read the language in lessons. My indicator of indirect manifestations was 'propelled' within a clause. For example, Caroline wrote 'the first Indian war **propelled** this tension killing off 1/10 of all military aged men in New England'. Although the students had not read the extract in class, Breslaw (1996) argued:

> The concept of the Indian *kenaima*, the evil stranger, had entered into Puritan thought. They retained the vision of an outside force that could be blamed for the evil among them, an idea that in turn would **propel** the witchhunt into unexpected paths (p.128).

7.2.5. RQ2T5 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of nature of actions

7.2.5.1. RQ2T5S1 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of general actions

Students directly and indirectly manifested my curricular goal of characterising the causal nature of historical agents' actions (Table 7.12.). All eleven students characterised general actions which I defined as the fact or process of doing something, typically to achieve an aim. My indicators for direct manifestations were 'played a role' within a clause; nominalised colligations including 'action', 'involvement', or 'part'; and counterfactual conditionals emphasising human action. For example, in Lesson 7 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was '**played a** significant **role** in shaping the course of the trials'. The students had read this extract in context in Lesson 6 where Ray (2015) argued 'given the central role of the sermon in Puritan communities, Parris' sermons about Satan's threats to the community **played a** significant **role,** as the editors of Parris' sermons point out, in influencing the congregation's reaction to the girls' afflictions' (pp.149-150). Abigail wrote 'the Chief Justice, Stoughton, allowed the use of spectral evidence, which ordinarily was not though [sic] to be substantial enough to give a conviction. This allowance **played a** key **role** in sentencing witches'. Furthermore, in a sample examination question included in my resources the students read of 'the **involvement** of children'. In Lesson 3, the students read Ray (2015) who argued regarding the 'significance of Samuel Parris' **involvement**'. Ava wrote of 'the **involvement** of the 'social gatekeepers''.

Additionally, in Lesson 6 one of the model phrases I gave the students was 'a vital **part** in promoting the witch hunt'. Caroline wrote that Stoughton, Hathorne, Corwin, and Putnam had 'a vital **part** in promoting the witch hunt'. Although the students had not read this extract in class, Hill (1996) argued authors on witchcraft such as the Mathers 'played a vital **part** in promoting the witch-hunt' (p.7). Finally, in Lesson 6 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was 'no one **would have died** without the sanction of the judges'. In Lesson 8, the students had read Ray (2015) who argued '**had** Parris and the families of the girls **agreed** to this, it seems obvious that the afflictions **would have stopped**

Table 7.12. Overview of manifested sub-themes Research Question 2 Theme 5.

Theme	*Sub-theme*	*Definition*	*Indicators of direct manifestations*			*Indicators of indirect manifestations*
			Reading and resources	*Reading*	*Resources*	
RQ2T5 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of nature of actions	**RQ2T5S1** Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of general actions	The fact or process of doing something, typically to achieve an aim.	Within a clause 'played a role' Nominalisation 'action'; 'involvement' Counterfactual conditional		Nominalisation 'part'	Nominalisation 'contribution'
	RQ2T5S2 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of reasons for actions	An explanation or justification for an action in an agent's mind.	Nominalisation 'reason'	Nominalisation 'decision'; 'motive'	Nominalisation 'policies'	Nominalisation 'intention'; 'strategy'
	RQ2T5S3 Direct manifestations of characterisation of actions as failure	An unsuccessful person in terms of neglecting or omitting to perform an expected or required action.		Nominalisation 'failure'		
	RQ2T5S4 Direct manifestations of characterisation of actions as accusation	A claim that someone has done something wrong.		Nominalisation 'accusation'; 'claim'; 'complaint'	Nominalisation 'fraud'	
	RQ2T5S5 Direct manifestations of characterisation of actions as confession	A formal statement admitting that one is guilty of a crime.	Nominalisation 'confession'			

Table 7.13. Overview of academics' feedback related to manifested sub-themes for Research Question 2 Theme 5.

Theme		**Academics' feedback**		
Theming code	*Sub-theming code*	*Criteria incorporating goal*	*Recognition of goal*	*Criticising essay for failing to achieve goal*
RQ2T5 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of nature of actions	**RQ2T5S1** Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of general actions			'weaker' / 'role' A5; 'unclear' / 'role A7; 'none' / 'role' A9.
	RQ2T5S2 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of reasons for actions		'decisions' A1	
	RQ2T5S4 Direct manifestations of characterisation of actions as accusation	'accusation' A22	'accusation' A16; 'accusation' A22	
	RQ2T5S5 Direct manifestations of characterisation of actions as confession	'confession' A1; 'confession' A2		

and the authorities **would have been given** time to reconsider further legal action' (p.29). Jason wrote 'without the involvement of social gatekeepers to facilitate it, it is likely that the Salem witch hunts **would never have occurred'**.

Two of these students characterised general actions similarly to historians in the historiography of the Salem witch trials although they had not read the language in lessons. My indicator for indirect manifestations was nominalised colligation including 'contribution'. For example, Elena wrote of 'the social gatekeepers [sic] **contribution**'. Although the students had not read this extract in class, Schiff (2015) argued regarding Tituba's '**contribution** to the events of 1692' (p.57).

Three academics all criticised certain students' essays for failing to achieve the legitimate goals of persuasive causal explanation regarding individuals' roles in the Salem witch crisis (Table 7.13.). For example, A5 criticised the 'weaker' answers for 'lacking in meaningful detail and precise explanation (e.g. regarding the exact **role** of 'social gatekeeepers', and what this meant in a town like Salem)'.

7.2.5.2. RQ2T5S2 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of reasons for actions

Six students characterised agents' reasons which I defined as an explanation or justification for an action in an agent's mind. My indicators for direct manifestations were nominalised colligations including 'reason'; 'decision'; 'motive'; or 'policy'. For example, in my resources in Lesson 7 the students read of 'possible **reason[s]** for accusation[s]'. In Lesson 7, the students had read Baker (2015) who argued George Burroughs' 'story will help to illuminate those of others, for there appear to be a multitude of **reasons** he could have been charged' (p.127). Elena wrote of 'a **reason** for the magistrates to continue in their proceedings'. Additionally, in Lesson 6 the students had read Ray (2015) who argued that 'one of the magistrates' most crucial **decisions**' was allowing the afflicted to sit together in court' (p.46). Elena wrote of a 'judge's **decision** to ask leading questions and presume guilt'. Furthermore, in my resources in Lesson 6 the students read of 'the magistrates' **policy** to confessors'. Naomi wrote of the 'unique **policy** towards those accused'. Although the students had not read this extract in class, Rosenthal (1993) argued regarding 'a **policy** of eliciting confession' (pp.42-43).

Two of the students also characterised agents' reasons similarly to historians in the historiography of the Salem witch trials although they had not read the language in lessons. My indicators for indirect manifestations were nominalised colligations including 'intention' or 'strategy'. Elena wrote of 'a **strategy** to maintain the very foundations of the colony'. Although the students had not read this extract in class, Baker (2015) argued regarding magistrates' '**strategy** when questioning the accused' (p.186).

When discussing the historiography of the Salem witch trials, A1 appeared to recognise the legitimacy of the goal of arguing regarding individuals' decisions. For example, A1 noted:

> There were also a few key **decisions** made during 1692 which if they were different, could have changed things, starting with Tituba's confession, or Stoughton's unwillingness to accept the not guilty verdict for Rebecca Nurse, or even going back to Salem Village not being so very desperate for a minister that they offered the job to Parris!

7.2.5.3. RQ2T5S3 Direct manifestations of characterisation of actions as failure

Abigail characterised an agent's failure to act which I defined as an unsuccessful person in terms of neglecting or omitting to perform an expected or required action. My indicator of direct manifestations was nominalised colligations including ‘failure’. In Lesson 1, the students read Ray (2015) who argued regarding Samuel Parris’ ‘**failure** as pastor of Salem Village’. Abigail wrote of Parris’ ‘**failure** to perform sufficiently as a Salem Pastor [sic]’. Such examples may represent mimicry.

7.2.5.4. RQ2T5S4 Direct manifestations of characterisation of actions as accusation

Seven students characterised actions as accusations which I defined as a claim that someone has done something wrong. My indicators of direct manifestations were nominalised colligations including ‘accusation’, ‘claim’, ‘complaint’, or ‘fraud’. For example, in Lesson 8 the students had read Rosenthal (1993) who argued regarding ‘**claims** of a broad conspiracy of witches’ (p.3). Elena wrote of ‘**claims** that the Devil was openly attacking the ministry’. Furthermore, in my resources in Lesson 7 the students read of ‘the “afflicted” accusers’ deliberate **fraud**’. Stella wrote of ‘**fraudulent** cases’. Although the students had not read this extract in class, Hill (1996) wrote of ‘deliberate scheming and **fraud**’ (pp.53-54).

When outlining criteria for assessing the students’ essays, A22 noted the characterisation of action as accusation. For instance, A22 noted ‘How clearly do the general theories relate to the particulars of the time and place of the beginning of the **accusations** in Salem Village?’ and How clearly does the essay explain the social & religious dynamics of Salem Village which gave rise to the **accusations**?’ In their discussions of the historiography of Salem, two academics appeared to recognise the legitimacy of the goal of characterising action as accusation. For example, A22 noted ‘it’s easy to see why Salem was the center of the outbreak, how it started and how it progressed involving **accusations** in 24 other communities’.

Table 7.14. Overview of manifested sub-themes Research Question 2 Theme 6.

	Sub-theme	***Definition***	***Indicators of direct manifestations***			***Indicators of indirect manifestations***
			Reading and resources	*Reading*	*Resources*	
RQ2T6 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of actions' causal mechanisms	**RQ2T6S1** Direct manifestations of characterisation of actions' causal mechanism as creating conditions	Causing a situation that must exist before something else is possible or permitted through one's actions.			Within a clause 'provide a template'	
	RQ2T6S2 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of actions' causal mechanism as triggering	A particular action, process, or situation that causes an event or situation to happen or exist.	Within a clause 'initiated'; 'launched'; 'triggered'			Within a clause 'stimulated'
	RQ2T6S3 Direct manifestations of characterisation of actions' causal mechanism as responsibility	The state or fact of being accountable or to blame for something		Within a clause 'responsible for' Counterfactual conditional		
	RQ2T6S4 Direct manifestations of characterisation of actions' causal mechanism as zealously prosecuting	Showing great energy or enthusiasm in the pursuit of legal proceedings against someone in respect of a criminal charge.	Within a clause 'assumed guilt'	Within a clause 'zealously prosecuted/convicted'		
	RQ2T6S5 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of actions' causal mechanism as legitimising	Declare or decide that someone or something is legal, acceptable, or conforms to the rules.	Within a clause 'accepted'; 'legitimised'	Within a clause 'confirmed' Nominalisation 'credibility'	Within a clause 'allowed'	Within a clause 'enabled' Nominalisation 'acceptance'; 'legitimacy'
	RQ2T6S6 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of actions' causal mechanism as endorsing	Public approval of something or someone.	Within a clause 'endorsed'	Within a clause 'supported' Nominalisation 'support'	Within a clause 'promoted'; 'put weight behind' Nominalisation 'endorsement'	
	RQ2T6S7 Direct manifestations of characterisation of actions' causal mechanism as pressuring	Attempt to coerce someone into doing something.	Nominalisation 'pressure'		Within a clause 'wrought'; 'yielded to pressure'	
	RQ2T6S8 Direct manifestations of characterisation of actions' causal mechanism as influencing	Having an effect on the character, development, or behaviour of someone of something, especially through one's status.	Within a clause 'convinced'; 'motivated'; 'persuaded'	Within a clause 'influenced'		
	RQ2T6S9 Direct manifestations of characterisation of actions' causal mechanism as directing	Aim something in a particular direction or at a particular person			Within a clause 'directed'	
	RQ2T6S10 Direct manifestations of characterisation of actions' causal mechanism as exploiting	Making use of a situation in a way considered unfair or underhand.		Within a clause 'exploited'		
	RQ2T6S11 Direct manifestations of characterisation of actions' causal mechanism as extending	Causing something to cover a wider area or make something larger.			Within a clause 'extended'; 'heightened'; 'intensified'; 'widened'	
	RQ2T6S12 Direct manifestations of characterisation of actions' causal mechanism as catalysing	Accelerate a reaction.			Within a clause 'catalysed'; 'urged forward'	

7.2.5.5. RQ2T5S5 Direct manifestations of characterisation of actions as confession

Five students characterised actions as confessions which I defined as a formal statement admitting that one is guilty of a crime. My indicator of direct manifestations was nominalised colligations including ‘confession’. For example, in my resources in Lesson 5 the students read of a ‘spate of **confessions**’. In Lesson 7 the students had read Ray (2015) who argued regarding ‘the many **confessions**’ (pp.116-117). In her essay, Caroline wrote of the ‘large number of **confessions**’.

When discussing the historiography of the Salem witch trials, two academics appeared to recognise the legitimacy of the goal of characterising actions as confessions. For instance, A1 noted:

> there were also a few key decisions made during 1692 which if they were different, could have changed things, starting with Tituba’s **confession**, or Stoughton’s unwillingness to accept the not guilty verdict for Rebecca Nurse, or even going back to Salem Village not being so very desperate for a minister that they offered the job to Parris!

7.2.6. RQ2T6 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of actions’ causal mechanisms

7.2.6.1. RQ2T6S1 Direct manifestations of characterisation of actions’ causal mechanism as creating conditions

Students directly and indirectly manifested my curricular goal of characterising the causal mechanisms of historical agents’ actions (Table 7.14.). Sophie characterised actions’ causal mechanism as creating conditions which I defined as causing a situation that must exist before something else is possible or permitted through one’s actions. My indicator for direct manifestations was ‘provided a template’ within a clause. For example, in Lesson 7, one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was '**provided a template** for later similar revelations'. Sophie wrote 'Tituba **provided a template** for later similar revelations'. Although the students had not read the extract in class, Norton (2002) argued Abigail and Deliverance Hobbs' confessions '**provided the template** for later similar revelations' (pp.305-306). Examples such as this may represent instances of mimicry.

7.2.6.2. RQ2T6S2 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of actions' causal mechanism as triggering

Six students characterised actions' causal mechanism as triggering which I defined as a particular action, process, or situation that causes an event or situation to happen or exist. My indicators for direct manifestations were 'initiated', 'launched', and 'triggered' within a clause. For example, in Lesson 6 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was '**initiated** the crisis' and in the same lesson the students read an extract from Ray (2015) who argued 'in addition to his collaboration with Samuel Parris, Putnam teamed up with three of his relations (Edward Putnam, John Putnam Jr., and brother-in-law Jonathan Walcott) and two prominent church members (Nathan Ingersoll and Ezekiel Cheever) to **initiate** forty-two accusations' (pp.94-96). Madeleine wrote 'the young accusers **initiated** the witch craze by accusing members of the community'.

Agnes characterised actions' causal mechanisms as triggering similarly to historians in the historiography of the Salem witch crisis although she had not read the language in lessons. My indicator of indirect manifestations was 'stimulated' found within the clause. For example, Agnes wrote 'these sermons were direct to the people of New England, majority [sic] being Puritan, again directly **stimulating** a sense of panic which continued accusation [sic] and the hunt for witches'. Although the students had not read the extract in class, Norton

Table 7.15. Overview of academics' feedback related to manifested sub-themes for Research Question 2 Theme 6.

Theme		**Academics' feedback**		
Theming code	*Sub-theming code*	*Recognition of goal*	*Praising essay for achieving goal*	*Criticising essay for failing to achieve goal*
RQ2T6 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of actions' causal mechanisms	**RQ2T6S2** Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of actions' causal mechanism as triggering		'better' / 'trigger' A5	
	RQ2T6S3 Direct manifestations of characterisation of actions' causal mechanism as responsibility	'responsible' A16		'none seemed interested' / 'responsible' A9; 'surprised did not' 'not very compelling' / 'responsible'. A16
	RQ2T6S5 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of actions' causal mechanism as legitimising	'confirmed' A2		
	RQ2T6S6 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of actions' causal mechanism as endorsing	'give weight' A22		'none seem interested' / 'promote' A9; 'none queried why' / 'supported' A10

(2002) argued ‘all the talk of witches in Salem Village in the first months of 1692, in short, **stimulated** the memories, and the mouths, of Hale’s neighbours’ (p.113). A5 judged the ‘better’ essays to be ones that characterised triggering causal mechanisms (Table 7.15.). For example, A5 noted they ‘structured factors into an argument, for example differentiating preconditions and **triggers**’.

7.2.6.3. RQ2T6S3 Direct manifestations of characterisation of actions’ causal mechanism as responsibility

Three students characterised actions’ causal mechanism as responsibility which I defined as the state or fact of being accountable or to blame for something. My indicators of direct manifestations were ‘responsible for’ within a clause and counterfactual conditionals to emphasise responsibility. For example, in Lesson 6 the students had read Ray (2015) who argued ‘Thomas Putnam and the women in his household – his wife, daughter, and maidservant – were **responsible for** more than 160 accusations’ (pp.94-96). Referring to the Putnams, Madeleine wrote ‘having a powerful family responding to accusations was significant and made them partly **responsible for** escalating the witch-hunts’. Furthermore, in Lesson 6 the students also had read Rosenthal (1993) who argued:

> we may reasonably assume that something radically different **would have happened had** Phips **stayed home** and the obsessive William Stoughton **had not been** in a position of power. Stoughton pursued his cause to the end, and when others later retreated in shame from what they had done, Stoughton held fast (Rosenthal, 1993, pp.193-195).

Madeleine wrote:

> It is important to acknowledge that if the magistrates did not act [sic] on the girl's [sic] accusations despite pressure from the Parris and Putnam family [sic], there would not be [sic] a witch craze. The Magistrates [sic] were **responsible for** intensifying the witch-hunt.

A16 appeared to recognise the legitimacy of the goal of arguing regarding individual responsibility. For example, A16 noted 'pushing MBN's theory to its logical conclusion would suggest that the ultimate gatekeeper – Samuel Parris – is largely **responsible** for the explosion of accusations in 1692'. Furthermore, two academics criticised certain students' essays for failing to achieve the goal of persuasively ascribe responsibility to certain agents for their roles in the crisis. For instance, A16 noted 'I was surprised that Elena did not directly hold Parris **responsible**; I thought that was where she was headed'.

7.2.6.4. RQ2T6S4 Direct manifestations of characterisation of actions' causal mechanism as zealously prosecuting

Two students characterised actions' causal mechanism as zealously prosecuting which I defined as showing great energy or enthusiasm in the pursuit of legal proceedings against someone in respect of a criminal charge. My indicators of direct manifestations were 'assumed/presumed guilt' or 'zealously prosecuted/convicted' within a clause. For example, in Lesson 8 a question I posed the students in my resources was 'what if the magistrates in Salem had not **assumed** the witches' **guilt**?' In Lesson 6 the students had read Baker (2015) who argued 'even before the questioning began of Sarah Good, Tituba, and Sarah Osburn, Hathorne and Corwin had **assumed** their **guilt**' (pp.183-186). Elena wrote 'the combination of the judge's decision to ask leading questions and **presume guilt**, along with the fact that many people were making confessions due to the absence of legal bonds led to an acceleration of accusations'. Furthermore, in Lesson 1 the students had read Ray (2015) who argued ‘what persuaded the Salem magistrates to **zealously prosecute** suspected witches was not the Indian attacks on the frontier but the leaders of the local community closer to home’ (p.4). Madeleine wrote of ‘how **zealous** and determined the magistrates were to **convict** witches’.

7.2.6.5. RQ2T6S5 Direct and indirect manifestations of characterisation of actions’ causal mechanism as legitimising

All eleven students characterised actions’ causal mechanism as legitimising which I defined as declaring or deciding that someone or something is legal, acceptable, or conforms to the rules. My indicators of direct manifestations were ‘accepted’; ‘legitimised’; confirmed’; or ‘allowed’ within a clause and nominalised colligations including ‘credibility’. For example, in Lesson 6 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was ‘**legitimised** the accusations’. In the same lesson, the students had read Norton (2002) who argued regarding ‘the crucial role of adult men in **legitimising** the complaints of the afflicted persons’ (p.72). Stella wrote:

> The role of certain individuals, known as ‘societal gatekeepers’, was important for allowing the spread of the exceptional events that took place at Salem. This is an idea that came from **MB Norton**, where she explained the ‘crucial role’ role of men in the community at Salem in **legitimising** the complaints of those who claimed to be bewitched’.

Furthermore, in Lesson 3 the students read Hansen (1970) who argued that ‘hysterical hallucinations of the afflicted persons were **confirmed** by some concrete evidence of actual witchcraft and by many confessions’ (pp.145-146). Elena wrote ‘Tituba was the first to confess that she was part of a conspiracy of witches, **confirming** people’s fears’.

Additionally, in Lesson 8 the students had read Rosenthal (1993) who argued regarding the '**credibility** given by the judiciary'. Isabella wrote of the afflicted receiving 'attention and **credibility** for accusing'. Finally, in Lesson 6 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was '**allowed** the crisis to reach the heights it did'. Ava wrote 'the actions of the magistrates Hathorne and Corwin **allowed** for a large number of accusations as they did not demand bonds'. Although the students had not read this extract in class, Norton (2002) argued 'the governor, council, and judges of Massachusetts must shoulder a great deal of the blame for **allowing** the crisis to reach the heights that it did' (pp.306-308).

Five of these students characterised actions' causal mechanisms as legitimising similarly to historians in the historiography of the Salem witch crisis although they had not read the language in lessons. My indicators of indirect manifestations were 'enabled' within a clause and nominalised colligations including 'acceptance' or 'legitimacy'. For example, Sophie wrote 'social gatekeepers **enabled** the witch craze as they **allowed** the accusations to be publicly heard'. Although the students had not read this extract in class, Boyer and Nissenbaum (1974) argued 'only a forceful counter-speech by Cotton Mather, who was in attendance that day, **enabled** the authorities to proceed with Burroughs' hanging' (p.13). Furthermore, Stella wrote of 'the **acceptance** of spectral evidence'. Although the students had not read the extract in class, Baker (2015) argued regarding 'uncritical **acceptance** of spectral evidence'.

When discussing the historiography of the Salem witch crisis, A2 appeared to note the legitimacy of the goal of arguing causes as legitimising and confirming. For example, A2 noted:

> fear of Indians, diseases, personal conflicts, changing economic conditions, religious concerns, and of course Tituba's willingness to confess and **confirm** their fears. Everyone who studies the Salem events has to weigh all of those factors.

7.2.6.6. RQ2T6S6 Direct manifestations of characterisation of actions' causal mechanism as endorsing

Seven students characterised actions' causal mechanism as endorsing which I defined as public approval of something or someone. My indicators of direct manifestations were 'endorsed', 'supported', 'promoted', or 'put weight behind' within a clause or nominalised colligations including 'support' or 'endorsement'. For example, in my resources in Lesson 5 the students read 'Cotton Mather gave a sermon further **endorsing** the hunt'. In Lesson 8, the students had read Ray (2015) who argued 'what, then, was Parris' motive for keeping Abigail at home and **endorsing** her accusations?' (Ray, 2015, p.29). Caroline wrote 'individuals facilitated confessions **endorsing** the cases'. Furthermore, in Lesson 8 the students had read Rosenthal (1993) who argued 'for the first and last time in the colonies the authorities actively **supported** the accusers rather than seeking to suppress them' (pp.3-7). Abigail wrote 'allegations were **supported** by the judicial system'. Similarly, in Lesson 6 the students had read Ray (2015) argue regarding 'Putnam's aggressive **support** for the prosecution'. Stella wrote of 'the **support** of these significant members of society'. Additionally, in Lesson 6 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was '**put their weight behind** the prosecutions'. Madeleine wrote 'Parris and Putnam had a direct effect on the number of people accused and **put their weight behind** the prosecutions'. Although the students had not read the extract in class, Hoffer (1996) argued 'it was the Putnam clan that sat by their girls, took notes alongside the clerk and the justices of the peace, and **put their weight behind** the prosecutions' (p.103). Also, in my resources in Lesson 8, the students read of the ‘endorsement by “societal gatekeepers”’. Naomi wrote of ‘the **endorsement** of officials’. Although the students had not read this extract in class, Ray (2015) argued regarding ‘the clergy’s **endorsement**’ (pp.47-48).

When discussing the historiography of Salem in 1692, A22 appeared to note the legitimacy of characterising causal mechanisms as endorsing. For example, A22 noted:

> Phips, realizing that spectral evidence was the problem, and wrote to London saying this was the case, and he closed down the court. The new Superior Court was told by Phips not to **give weight** to spectral evidence, and the convictions stopped.

Two academics criticised certain students’ arguments for failing to achieve the legitimate goal of satisfactory explanation regarding individuals’ endorsing actions. For example, A9 noted:

> All your students see significance in the key role of the 'social/societal gatekeepers' in the development of the trials. Is this the line that you prefer in your own reading of the problem? But none of them define the group, and there is an element of tautology in their assertions. The gatekeepers are those who **promote** the trials, but what of those of manifestly similar status who don't? The list of gatekeepers incorporates Parris, Cotton Mather, Putnam, Hathorne, Corwin, Stoughton - men very different in status and roles in the tragedy. Is Phips a gatekeeper? None of your students seem interested in Phips once he arrives in Mass. He is certainly responsible for the end of the trials; so why didn't he act earlier?

Similarly, A10 noted:

> none but Stella queried why some of them, like Phips and the Mathers, suddenly changed their minds about spectral evidence, thus ending the witch hunt they had **supported** for months.

7.2.6.7. RQ2T6S7 Direct manifestations of characterisation of actions' causal mechanism as pressuring

Three students characterised actions' causal mechanism as pressuring which I defined as attempting to coerce someone into doing something. My indicators of direct manifestations were nominalised colligations including 'pressure' and 'wrought' or 'yielded to pressure' within a clause. For example, in Lesson 7 in my resources the students read of 'patriarchal **pressures'**. In the same lesson, the students had read Ray (2015) who argued regarding 'the **pressure** of Hathorne's questioning' (pp.33-34). Madeleine wrote of 'the **pressure** from the [sic] Parris and Putnam family'. Furthermore, in Lesson 6 I gave the students the model phrase 'confessors **yielded to the pressure of'** in my resources. Jason wrote 'the jury **yielded to the pressure of** judges such as Stoughton'. Although the students had not read this extract in class, Baker (2015) argued that 'by admitting guilt, [female confessors] **yielded to the** impossible **pressure** of the community's expectations of female behaviour' (p.157).

7.2.6.8. RQ2T6S8 Direct manifestations of characterisation of actions' causal mechanism as influencing

Seven students characterised actions' causal mechanism as influencing which I defined as having an effect on the character, development, or behaviour of someone or something, especially through one's status. My indicators of direct manifestations were 'convinced', 'motivated', 'persuaded', or 'influenced' within a clause. For example, in Lesson 6 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was '**persuaded** people that witchcraft was the major enemy'. Furthermore, in Lesson 1 the students had read Ray (2015) who argued:

> What **persuaded** the Salem magistrates to zealously prosecute suspected witches was not the Indian attacks on the frontier but the leaders of the local community closer to home: the minister of Salem Village, the influential parents of the afflicted girls, the Village doctor, and several ministers of neighbouring communities (pp.4).

Jason wrote 'Parris' inflammatory sermons **persuaded** people that witchcraft was the real enemy'. Similarly, in Lesson 6 the students had read Rosenthal (1993) who argued 'it would oversimplify what happened in Massachusetts Bay to lay at Stoughton's feet the whole affair, but there seems little reason to doubt that he, more than anyone else, **influenced** the judicial course of the court' (pp.193-195). Sophie wrote 'Mather also wrote a pamphlet in 1689 which became the basis for all Salem trials, again showing his **influence** over society'.

7.2.6.9. RQ2T6S9 Direct manifestations of characterisation of actions' causal mechanism as directing

Jason characterised actions' causal mechanisms as directing which I defined as aiming something in a particular direction or at a particular person. My indicator of direct manifestations was 'directed' within a clause. For example, in Lesson 7 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was '**directed** the course of the trials'. Jason wrote 'Titubas [sic] confession inadvertently **directed** the course of the trials'. Although the students had not read the extract in class, Hoffer (1996) argued 'the judges **directed** the course of these trials' (p.161).

7.2.6.10. RQ2T6S10 Direct manifestations of characterisation of actions' causal mechanism as exploiting

Two students characterised actions' causal mechanisms as exploiting which I defined as making use of a situation in a way considered unfair or underhand. My indicator of direct manifestations was 'exploited' within a clause. For example, in Lesson 5 the students had read Robinson (1991) who argued that 'searching for more and more effective means to lash the conscience of New England, Cotton Mather seized on a fear lying ripe for **exploitation**, witchcraft' (p.49). Madeleine wrote 'individuals needed to **exploit** the conditions to make witch accusations and convictions more likely'.

7.2.6.11. RQ2T6S11 Direct manifestations of characterisation of actions' causal mechanism as extending

Four students characterised actions' causal mechanisms as extending which I defined as causing something to cover a wider area or make something larger. My indicators of direct manifestations were 'extended', 'heightened', 'intensified', or 'widened' within a clause. For example, in Lesson 7 I gave the students the model phrase '**intensified** and **widened** the panic' in my resources. Jason wrote 'George Burroughs [sic] accusations **intensified** and **widened** the panic, as now anyone could be accused'. Although the students had not read this extract in class, Fels (2017) argued 'confession was a likely, if only temporary, way to save one's life, even as it equally served to corroborate the seeming truth of the accusations, thus, **intensifying** and **widening** the panic' (p.6).

7.2.6.12. RQ2T6S12 Direct manifestations of characterisation of actions' causal mechanism as catalysing

Five students characterised actions' causal mechanisms as catalysing which I defined as accelerating a reaction. My indicators of direct manifestations were 'catalyst' or 'urged

Table 7.16. Overview of manifested sub-themes Research Question 2 Theme 7.

	Sub-theme	***Definition***	***Indicators of direct manifestations***			***Indicators of indirect manifestations***
			Reading and resources	*Reading*	*Resources*	
RQ2T7 Direct and indirect manifestations of metaphors of verticality and/or differential visibility	**RQ2T7S1** Direct and indirect manifestations of atmosphere metaphors of verticality and/or differential visibility	A non-literal reference to an envelope of gases to describe the pervading tone or mood of a place.	Within the clause 'atmosphere' (condition) 'permeated' (causal mechanism)		Within the clause 'climate' (condition)	Within the clause 'environment' (condition) 'brewed' (causal mechanism)
	RQ2T7S2 Direct manifestations of fire metaphors of verticality and/or differential visibility	A non-literal reference to a destructive burning process in which fuel combines with the air giving out light, heat, or smoke.	Within the clause 'tinderbox' (condition)	Within the clause 'boiled over'; 'erupted'; 'fuelled'; 'exploded' (causal mechanism)	Within the clause 'sparked'; 'ignited' (causal mechanisms)	
	RQ2T7S3 Direct and indirect manifestations of building metaphors of verticality and/or differential visibility	A non-literal reference to the construction of a structure with a roof and walls over a period of time.	Within the clause 'foundation'; 'framework' (conditions); 'underlying' (causal mechanism)			Within the clause 'basis' (condition)
	RQ2T7S4 Direct manifestations of plant metaphors of verticality and/or differential visibility	A non-literal reference to a living organism typically growing in a permanent site by absorbing water and substances through its roots and synthesising nutrients through photosynthesis.	Within the clause 'fertile ground' (condition) 'grew'; 'stemmed' (causal mechanisms)		Within the clause 'root' (condition)' planted the seed'; 'sprouted' (causal mechanism)	
	RQ2T7S5 Indirect manifestations of festering metaphors of verticality and/or differential visibility	A non-literal reference to a wound becoming worse, especially through long-term neglect or indifference.				Within the clause 'festered' (causal mechanism)

forward' within a clause. For example, in Lesson 7 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was 'served as a **catalyst** for the escalation'. Abigail wrote 'the social gatekeepers [sic] role was significant in explaining the extreme events in Salem as it can be seen as a **catalyst** because they made the vast amount of accusations credible'. Although the students had not read the extract in class, Ray (2015) argued 'the accusation of Burroughs served as a **catalyst** for the escalation that had already begun' (pp.136-137).

7.2.7. RQ2T7 Direct and indirect manifestations of metaphors of verticality and/or differential visibility

7.2.7.1. RQ2T7S1 Direct and indirect manifestations of atmosphere metaphors of verticality and/or differential visibility

Students directly and indirectly manifested my curricular goal of metaphors of verticality and/or differential visibility in causal explanation (Table 7.16.). Ten students used atmosphere metaphors of verticality and/or differential visibility which I defined as a non-literal reference to an envelope of gases to describe the pervading tone or mood of a place. My indicators of direct manifestations of using such a metaphor to characterise a condition were 'atmosphere' and 'climate' within a clause. For example, in Lesson 5 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was 'a dark and foreboding atmosphere'. The students then read this extract in context in Lesson 6 where Ray (2015) argued that '[Parris'] aggressive preaching about the devil at work against his ministry created a dark and foreboding **atmosphere** that legitimated the accusations and shaped his congregation's reaction' (pp.144-145). Madeleine wrote '[Parris'] aggressive preaching created a dark and foreboding **atmosphere** within the community which encouraged witch accusations'. Examples such as this may represent examples of mimicry. Additionally, in Lesson 1 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was ‘an overwhelming and highly toxic **climate** of fear’. Madeleine wrote ‘Indian Raids [sic] created a **climate** of fear amongst the people of Salem’. Although the students had not read this extract in class, Norton (2002) argued ‘[Philip English’s] origins and mercantile pursuits made him a marked man in the **climate** of fear pervading Essex County in 1692’ (p.144).

My indicator of direct manifestations when using such a metaphor to characterise a condition’s causal mechanism was ‘permeated’ within a clause. For example, in Lesson 1 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was ‘the extraordinary **atmosphere** that **permeated** Massachusetts’. In the same lesson, the students had read this extract in context where Norton (2002) argued:

> the assaults from the visible and invisible worlds became closely entwined in the New Englanders’ minds. These connections **permeated** the witchcraft examinations and trials, as revealed by repeated spectral sightings of the ‘black man’, whom the afflicted described as resembling an Indian (pp.296-297).

Jason wrote ‘an **atmosphere** of tension and unease **permeated** the air of Salem, created by religious tension and political uncertainty’.

Four of the students also used atmosphere metaphors of verticality and/or differential visibility similarly to historians in the historiography of the Salem witch crisis although they had not read the language in lessons. My indicator of indirect manifestations of using such a metaphor to characterise a condition was ‘environment’ within a clause. For instance, Elena wrote ‘the overthrow of Massachusetts’ Bay Colony led to political limbo, increasing religious tensions within an already hostile **environment** due to the threat of the Indian wars’. Although the students had not read the extract in class, Demos (1970) argued ‘accusers, then, can be viewed as those individuals who were somehow especially sensitive to the problems created by their **environment**’ (p.1326).

My indicator of indirect manifestations when using such a metaphor to characterise a condition’s causal mechanism was ‘brewing’ within a clause. For example, Caroline wrote:

> Puritans were particularly angered by this new charter as liberty of conscience was granted to all protestant’s [sic] and it threatened their theocracy. Not only was frustration **brewing** due to this outside threat but also the colony had been left in a political limbo.

Although the students had not read this extract in class, Baker (2015) argued ‘a great storm was **brewing** in Massachusetts during the winter of 1691-1692, and one cause of the dark clouds was a disastrous war dragging into its fourth year’ (Baker, 2015, p.43).

7.2.7.2. RQ2T7S2 Direct manifestations of fire metaphors of verticality and/or differential visibility

Nine students used fire metaphors of verticality and/or differential visibility which I defined as a non-literal reference to a destructive burning process in which fuel combines with the air giving out light, heat, or smoke. My indicator for direct manifestations of using such a metaphor to characterise a condition was ‘tinderbox’. For example, in Lesson 1 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was ‘the **tinderbox** of inevitable and angry recriminations’. In the same lesson, the students had read the extract in context where Robinson (1991) argued ‘with the loss of Maine and the ill-fated Quebec expedition New England suffered its worst humiliation. In the **tinder box** of inevitable and angry recriminations, the witch hunt caught fire’ (p.189). Jason wrote:

> the fear pervading the atmosphere of New England created a societal desire for a scapegoat for [sic] fear and uncertainty could be directed toward, resulting in a **tinderbox** situation **exploding** into a violent witch hunt once a suitable scapegoat was established.

My indicator of direct manifestations when using such a metaphor to characterise a condition's causal mechanism non-agentively were 'boil over'; 'erupted'; 'fuel'; 'explode'; and 'spark'. For example, in Lesson 2 the students had read Baker (2015) who argued 'county courts could not meet until they were re-created by the legislature. This meant that unresolved conflicts would continue to grow and even **boil over**, with some disputes even helping to **fuel** witchcraft allegations' (Baker, 2015, pp.64-67). Jason wrote 'victims of accusatory sermons started becoming those withholding Parris' pay, demonstrating how village tensions between the Porters and Putnams **boiled over** into witchcraft accusations'. Furthermore, Madeleine wrote 'historians such as **E. W. Baker** have suggested legal limbo facilitated unsettled disputes among neighbours which may have helped '"**fuel** witchcraft allegations"'. Additionally, in Lesson 6 one of the model phrases I gave my students in my resources was 'the atmosphere was so charged so as easily to **spark**'. Ava wrote 'the unusual political conditions operating in Massachusetts in 1692 did create political instability and so the atmosphere of tension, fear and uncertainty that was needed to **spark** a witch craze'. Although the students had not read the extract in class, Hill (1996) argued 'the atmosphere in the parsonage was so charged as easily to **spark** the latent madness' (p.36).

My indicator of direct manifestations when using such a metaphor to characterise an agent's causal mechanism was 'ignite'. For example, in Lesson 6 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was '**ignited** the crisis'. Stella wrote 'the role of these gatekeepers was vital in the **igniting** of these events, as the gatekeepers allowed for the claims and accusations to be taken more seriously'. Although the students had not read this extract in class, Ray (2015) argued ‘the accusers **ignited** the witchcraft crisis in Salem’ (p.132).

7.2.7.3. RQ2T7S3 Direct and indirect manifestations of building metaphors of verticality and/or differential visibility

Seven students used building metaphors of verticality and/or differential visibility which I defined as a non-literal reference to the construction of a structure with a roof and walls over a period of time. My indicators of direct manifestations of using such a metaphor to characterise a condition were ‘foundation’ and ‘framework’ within a clause. For example, in Lesson 3 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was ‘the **foundation** of the witchcraft crisis **lay in**’. In the same lesson, the students had read the extract in context where Norton (2002) argued ‘the **foundation** of the witchcraft crisis **lay in** Puritan New Englanders’ singular worldview’ (p.295). Elena wrote ‘the prevalence of mass fear laid the **foundations** for events that would proceed in Salem, Massachusetts’. My indicator of direct manifestations of using such a metaphor to characterise a condition’s causal mechanism was ‘underlying’ within a clause. For example, in Lesson 4 the students had read Boyer and Nissenbaum (1974) who argued:

> To understand why Salem Village responded as it did, we clearly need to know more about the village. One way to approach such an investigation is to return to the witchcraft accusations themselves, looking this time not at the reaction or at the surface flow of events, but probing for **underlying** patterns which may deepen our understanding (p.31).

Caroline wrote ‘**underlying** village tensions partially led to the Salem witch craze’.

Sophie also used building metaphors of verticality and/or differential visibility similarly to historians in the historiography of the Salem witch crisis although she had not

Table 7.17. Overview of academics' feedback related to manifested sub-themes for Research Question 2 Theme 7.

Theme		**Academics' feedback**		
Theming code	*Sub-theming code*	*Praising essay for achieving goal*	*Criticising essay for failing to achieve goal*	*Criticising goal*
RQ2T7 Direct and indirect manifestations of metaphors of verticality and/or differential visibility	**RQ2T7S3** Direct and indirect manifestations of building metaphors of verticality and/or differential visibility	'clear strength'/'underlying' A10		
	RQ2T7S4 Direct manifestations of plant metaphors of verticality and/or differential visibility	'good' A6; 'dramatic flair' A8; 'strong' A21	'wrong' A21	'interesting' A15

read the language in lessons. My indicator of indirect manifestations of using such a metaphor to characterise a condition was ‘basis’ within a clause. For example, Sophie wrote ‘Mather also wrote a pamphlet in 1689 which became **the basis** for all Salem trials’. Although the students had not read the extract in class, Karlsen (1989) argued regarding the ‘demographic **basis** of witchcraft’ (p.46).

A10 praised the students whose essays they had read for characterising conditions as ‘underlying’ (Table 7.17.). For example, A10 noted ‘all the essays demonstrated that historical events like what happened in Salem 1692 are usually not monocausal, but the result of several **underlying** factors. And this is clearly a strength of the entire group’.

7.2.7.4. RQ2T7S4 Direct manifestations of plant metaphors of verticality and/or differential visibility

All eleven students used plant metaphors of verticality and/or differential visibility which I defined as a non-literal reference to a living organism typically growing in a permanent site by absorbing water and substances through its roots and synthesising nutrients through photosynthesis. My indicator of direct manifestations of using such a metaphor to characterise an action’s causal mechanism as creating conditions was ‘planted the seed’ within a clause. For example, in Lesson 5 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was ‘**planted the seed** which **sprouted into** witchcraft’. Sophie wrote ‘Cotton Mather **planted the seed** which **sprouted into** witchcraft’. Although the students had not read the extract in class, Robinson (1991) argued that Increase Mather’s *Remarkable Providences* **‘planted the seed** which **sprouted into** the rankest **harvest** of witchcraft in the history of New England’ (pp.45-46).

My indicator of direct manifestations of using such a metaphor to characterise a condition was ‘fertile ground’ within a clause. For example, in Lesson 2 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was ‘provided **fertile ground** for the discovery of witches’. In the same lesson, the students had read the extract in context when Rosenthal (1993) argued:

> In addition to this uncertainty about the charter, itself a symptom of ongoing political disputes with England, were persistent threats from “Indians” (i.e., Native Americans) against the colony and a decline of power among orthodox clergy – all ingredients for broad social instability, **fertile ground for** the discovery of enemies and the invisible world (pp.3-4).

Madeleine wrote ‘the political instability following the absence and introduction of a new Charter [sic] was a long-term precondition which provided **fertile ground** for a witch-craze to **grow**’.

My indicator of direct manifestations of using such a metaphor to characterise a condition’s causal mechanism were ‘grew’; ‘stemmed’; ‘sprouted’; and ‘rooted in’. For example, in Lesson 6 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was ‘cases **stemmed from**’. In Lesson 1, the students had read Ray (2015) who argued:

> The individual with the most prominent connection [to the Indian frontier] was the Reverend George Burroughs, but as we have seen, the charges against him **stemmed from** his failure as pastor of Salem Village and from his unorthodox practices and suspicions of spousal abuse (pp.198-201).

Jason wrote ‘rather than some economic divide between merchants and farmers, it’s far more likely that such resentment **stemmed from** a religious divide, as historians such as **B. C. Ray** argue’. Furthermore, in Lesson 2 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was ‘Salem’s divisions were **rooted in**’. Madeleine wrote ‘the events in Salem in 1692 were **rooted in** the religious tensions’. Although the students had not read this extract in class, Boyer and Nissenbaum (1974) argued ‘the community’s endemic divisions – **rooted** as they were **in** real economic, geographic, and social differences – far from diminishing, only intensified in the 1690s' (p.161).

Two of the academics commented positively on Agnes' use of plant metaphor to characterise conditions. For example, A6 stated 'metaphor of **fertile ground** and **seed** is good'. A21 criticised Agnes' essay for failing to achieve the legitimate goal of arguing persuasively when employing plant metaphors. For example, A21 ambivalently noted 'Agnes has a stronger sense of the **root** cause of the crisis in 1692, but I think she is wrong!'. A15 appeared to criticise the goal itself, noting 'It was interesting to see so much obsession with the term "gatekeepers" and invocation of different metaphors to help think about causal reasoning ('triggers', **'seeds'** etc.)'.

7.2.7.5. RQ2T7S5 Indirect manifestations of festering metaphors of verticality and/or differential visibility

Two students characterised a condition's causal mechanism with festering metaphors of verticality and/or differential visibility which I defined as a non-literal reference to a wound becoming worse, especially though long-term neglect or indifference, although they had not read the language in class. For example, Caroline wrote 'social anxieties from the Indian raids and villages [sic] tensions had been **festering** underneath the surface'. Although the students had not read the extract in class, Hoffer (1996) argued 'endless lawsuits did not resolve differences, clarify status, discharge animus, or re-establish dignity, however; the animus that spurred them **festered** unabated' (p.45).

7.2.8. RQ2T8 Direct and indirect manifestations of method of difference

Table 7.18. Overview of manifested sub-themes Research Question 2 Theme 8.

	Sub-theme	***Definition***	***Indicators of direct manifestations***			***Indicators of indirect manifestations***
			Reading and resources	*Reading*	*Resources*	
RQ2T8 Direct and indirect manifestations of method of difference	**RQ2T8S1** Direct and indirect manifestations of resemblances to falsify putative causes	The state of being alike.	Within a clause ‘other’; ‘resemble’; ‘same’			Within a clause ‘across’; ‘wider’
	RQ2T8S2 Direct manifestations of continuities from before to falsify putative causes	The unbroken and consistent existence of something from the period of time preceding.	Within a clause ‘before’; ‘previous’; ‘prior'			
	RQ2T8S3 Direct manifestations of differences from before to establish causes	A point or way in which people or things are dissimilar from the period of time preceding.	Within a clause ‘before’; ‘previous’; ‘prior’	Counterfactual conditional		
	RQ2T8S4 Direct and indirect manifestations of formal changes to establish causes	An alteration in the configuration of something over time.	Nominalisation ‘decline’; ‘increase’; ‘spread’	Nominalisation ‘build-up’; ‘modern’		Nominalisation ‘change’; ‘growing’
	RQ2T8S5 Direct manifestations of specific time to establish causes	Clearly defined or identified statement relating uniquely to a particular instance of something happening or being done.	Nominalisation ‘1691’; ‘1692’		Nominalisation ‘1684’	
	RQ2T8S6 Direct manifestations of departures from normality to establish causes	A deviation from a standard, typical, or expected course of action.		Within a clause ‘generally’; ‘normally’		
	RQ2T8S7 Direct manifestations of unusualness to establish causes	Remarkable or interesting because not habitually occurring or done.	Within a clause ‘extraordinary’ ‘rare’; ‘unique’; ‘unusual’ Nominalisation ‘difference’; ‘distinctiveness’; ‘irregularity’			
	RQ2T8S8 Direct manifestations of specific place to establish causes	Clearly defined or identified statement relating uniquely to a particular position, point, or area in space.	Nominalisation ‘New England’; ‘Salem’ ‘village’	Nominalisation ‘colony’; ‘local’	Nominalisation ‘Massachusetts’	
	RQ2T8S9 Direct manifestations of comparative explanation	Estimating, measuring, or noting the similarity or dissimilarity between for the purposes of explanation.	Within a clause ‘compare’			

Table 7.19. Overview of academics' feedback related to manifested sub-themes for Research Question 2 Theme 8.

Theme		**Academics' feedback**			
Theming code	*Sub-theming code*	*Criteria incorporating goal*	*Recognition of goal*	*Praising essay for achieving goal*	*Criticising essay for failing to achieve goal*
RQ2T8 Direct and indirect manifestations of method of difference	**RQ2T8S1** Direct and indirect manifestations of resemblances to falsify putative causes			'good point' A6; 'strength' A10	'cannot explain' A16
	RQ2T8S2 Direct manifestations of continuities from before to falsify putative causes			'brilliant point' A8	
	RQ2T8S3 Direct manifestations of differences from before to establish causes			'creative' A11; 'delighted' A16	
	RQ2T8S4 Direct and indirect manifestations of formal changes to establish causes		'changing economic conditions' A2	'pretty well'/'changing' A16; 'understand longue duree' A19	'static' A19
	RQ2T8S5 Direct manifestations of specific time to establish causes	'specifically in 1692' A14; 'the particulars of the time and place of the beginning of the accusations in Salem Village?' 'why 1692' A23	'1692' A1; '1692' A16		'less successfully'/'particular moment' A10
	RQ2T8S6 Direct manifestations of departures from normality to establish causes				'norm' A16
	RQ2T8S8 Direct manifestations of specific place to establish causes	'Salem Village' A22; 'why Salem Village, why Massachusetts Bay' A23	'the colony'A2; 'the people of Salem and Salem Village' A7; 'the norm of early New England reformed ministers' A16; 'New England Puritanism' A19; 'local dynamic' A22	'better'/ 'colonial factors'/ 'local ones' A5; 'highly commended'/'local circumstances' A8; 'pretty well'/'Massachusetts Bay Colony' A16	'not as strong'/'the 'theocracy of Massachusetts Bay Colony' A16
	RQ2T8S9 Direct manifestations of comparative explanation			'delighted' A16	

7.2.8.1. RQ2T8S1 Direct and indirect manifestations of resemblances to falsify putative causes

Students directly and indirectly manifested my curricular goal of the method of difference in causal explanation (Table 7.18.). Nine students noted resemblances which I defined as the state of being alike between the Salem crisis and a negative case in order to falsify putative causes. My indicators of direct manifestations within a clause were ‘other’, ‘resemble’, and ‘same’ within a clause. For example, in Lesson 8 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resource was ‘essentially the **same** elements existed in’. Furthermore, in Lesson 2 the students had read the phrase in context when Rosenthal (1993) argued ‘essentially the **same** elements existed in 1688 when the Goodwin case occurred, but the colony did not then lose its way on the witchcraft issue’ (pp.3-4). Madeleine wrote ‘it is important to note that there are examples of cases in which the political climate was the **same** as Salem in 1692 but did not lead to a witch-craze’.

Three of these students also noted resemblances in order to falsify putative causes similarly to historians in the historiography of the Salem witch crisis although they had not read the language in lessons. My indicators of indirect manifestations were ‘across’ and ‘wider’ within a clause. For example, Jason wrote ‘however, it is not the most important cause, as the political uncertainty was happening **across** the entirety of the Massachusetts bay [sic], for a few years prior to the crisis actually erupting’. Although the students had not read this extract in class, Baker (2015) argued ‘the theory rests on there being one communal supply of rye that was infected. Yet those complaining of witchcraft came not only from **across** Salem Village but from neighbouring towns as well’ (p.110).

Two academics praised certain students for identifying resemblances to falsify putative causes (Table 7.19.). For example, A10 noted of the essays that they had read:

> Another strength is that five of the six also discount "the unusual political conditions" as the main underlying cause, a few even pointing out these conditions existed outside Massachusetts without producing a witch hunt like in Salem. The same is true of puritanism, which most of the essays mention, as it also existed outside Massachusetts yet did not produce a witch hunt as in Salem. So, they all make a good effort at trying to explain why this happened in Salem and nowhere else.

Furthermore, A16 criticised Agnes – who had attempted to argue that Massachusetts' Puritanism was the most important cause of the Salem crisis – for failing to identify similarities to falsify putative causes. A16 noted 'aside from being unfair to 17th century New England, seeing their Puritanism as the cause of the 1692 crisis cannot explain why Salem experienced such a dramatic witchcraft episode, when dozens of other equally-churched towns did not' [original underscore].

7.2.8.2. RQ2T8S2 Direct manifestations of continuities from before to falsify putative causes

Four students noted continuities from before defined as the unbroken and consistent existence of something from the period of time preceding between the Salem crisis and a negative case to falsify putative causes. My indicators of direct manifestations were 'before', 'previous', or 'prior' within a clause. For example, one of the model phrases I gave to the students in Lesson 8 was '**previously** recorded and similarly handled at other times'. In Lesson 1, students had read Norton (2002) argue 'in early 1692, several children and teenage girls began having fits of a sort **previously** recorded elsewhere in old and New England' (pp.296-297). Jason wrote:

> however, it is not the most important cause, as this political uncertainty was happening across the entirety of the Massachusetts bay [sic], for a few years **prior** to the crisis actually erupting It does not explain why the crisis was unique to Salem, and why it happened when it did.

A8 praised Caroline for identifying continuities to falsify putative causes. For instance, A8 noted that ‘Caroline does a brilliant job of questioning the political instability argument by contrasting 1692 with 1688 and the Godwin case’.

7.2.8.3. RQ2T8S3 Direct manifestations of differences from before to establish causes

Eight students noted differences from before to establish causes. ‘Differences from before’ were defined as a point or way in which people or things are dissimilar from the period of time preceding between the Salem crisis and a negative case. My indicators of direct manifestations were ‘before, ‘previously’, or ‘prior’, within a clause and counterfactual conditional clauses emphasising diachronic comparison. For example, in Lesson 8 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was ‘unparalleled in history **before** or since’. In Lesson 6 the students had read the phrase in context when Baker (2015) argued:

> this is the sort of record one would expect to find only in show trials in an authoritarian state, such as the Soviet Union in the 1930s or North Korea today. It is a prosecutorial success rate unparalleled in American history **before** or since. Prior to 1692 Massachusetts courts produced only eight guilty verdicts for witchcraft in thirty-one decisions – a 26 percent conviction rate’ (pp.183-186).

Elena wrote:

> **before** the Salem witch craze, the conviction rate was 26% which rose to 100% in the Salem witch trials, a significant increase. These events went against 30 years of increasing sceptical

> attitudes towards witches, now taking the accusers' claims with certainty, even where there was a lack of evidence.

Furthermore, in Lesson 6 the students had read Baker (2015) who argued '**had** the trials **taken** place **earlier**, therefore, it is quite likely that they **would have ended** differently – with acquittals or witch convictions carrying lesser penalties, as happened in cases heard by many of the same men' (pp.183-186). Jason wrote:

> without such influence the crisis **would not have occurred** at all. This can be shown by the Goodwin case in 1688. John Goodwin's four children were examined by Cotton Mather, and the Irish, Gaelic-Speaking, Catholic 'Goody' Glover was accused of bewitching them and was found guilty when failing to recite the lords [sic] prayer. Mather then took one of the accused, Martha, into his care. Then, when Martha began to make further accusations, Mather simply ignored her. Mather was in the same situation as the other social gatekeepers of Salem, having the power to facilitate accusations and begin a witch hunt. He was even under the same political limbo as these other gatekeepers, with the overthrowing of Andros happening that same year. Therefore, since no crisis erupted in 1688, we can hypothetically reason that without the actions of the social gatekeepers in Salem, no crisis **would have erupted** in 1692**.**

Two academics praised certain students for identifying differences from before in order to establish causes. A16 praised Naomi for identifying the difference in behaviour between Samuel Willard during the Knapp case of 1671 in Groton and Samuel Parris in 1692. For instance, A16 noted:

> Delighted to see her use the Elizabeth Knapp case; after many years of teaching an upper-level course on Witchcraft & Witch-hunting in early America where we spend considerable time on Willard's handling of Knapp, I am convinced that Willard is a superhero compared to Parris. (Talk about 'if only…').

A11 praised Caroline – who had noted that the actions of people in position of power such as Stoughton, Putnam, Hathorne, and Corwin differed to their counterparts in the Goodwin case in 1688 – for her 'creative use of counter-factuals (i.e. same conditions applied in 1688 but not craze)'.

7.2.8.4. RQ2T8S4 Direct and indirect manifestations of formal changes to establish causes

Nine students noted formal changes defined as an alteration in the configuration of something over time between the Salem crisis and a negative case in order to establish causes. My indicators of direct manifestations were nominalised colligations including 'decline'; 'increasing'; 'spread'; 'build-up'; and 'modern'. For example, one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources in Lesson 6 was 'the **spread** of accusations' and in Lesson 4 the students had read Ray (2015) who argued regarding 'the initiation and **spread** of the accusations' (pp.188-200). Stella wrote of 'the **spread** of accusations'. Furthermore, in Lesson 4 the students had read Ray (2015) who characterised Boyer and Nissenbaum's (1974) argument as 'an easy-to-understand product of **modernisation** – a clash between **premodern** and **modern** mentalities' (pp.3-4). Jason wrote of 'growing tensions between the **pre-modern** puritan demographic and the newer, less religiously centred and more economically motivated settlers'. Six of the students also noted formal changes in order to establish causes similarly to historians in the historiography of the Salem witch crisis although they had not read the language in lessons. My indicators of indirect manifestations were nominalised colligations including 'change' and 'growing'. For example, Jason wrote of 'a **growing** atmosphere of unease and anxiety'. Although the students had not read this extract in class, Baker (2015) argued regarding '**growing** war panic' (pp.64-67).

When discussing the historiography of the Salem witch trials, A2 appeared to note the legitimacy of the goal of explaining by incorporating formal changes as causes. For example, A2 noted that:

> But there were so many other factors--fear of Indians, diseases, personal conflicts, **changing** economic conditions, religious concerns, and of course Tituba's willingness to confess and confirm their fears. Everyone who studies the Salem events has to weigh all of those factors.

A16 praised Elena for identifying the changing religious circumstances in Massachusetts as a cause of the crisis. For example, A16 noted that 'Elena managed to marry the various theories pretty well, and avoided seeing religion/puritanism as the 'bad guy' instead weaving the **changing** position of the Massachusetts Bay colony after 1688 into religious concerns the colonist might have had.' A19 both praised Elena's, Ava's, Jason's, Caroline's, and Naomi's work for identifying formal changes as causes while criticising Agnes for failing to do the same. For example, A19 noted 'Agnes' classmates understand Puritan worries about moral declension over the longue duree and through 'halfway covenants', whereas Puritanism seems more static for Agnes'.

7.2.8.5. RQ2T8S5 Direct manifestations of specific time to establish causes

Six students noted specific times defined as clearly identified statements relating to particular instances of something happening or being done in order to establish causes. My indicators of direct manifestations were nominalised colligations including '1691', '1692', or '1684'. For example, in my resources in Lesson 2 the students read of 'the new **1691** charter'. In Lesson 6 the students read Ray (2015) who argued regarding 'the arrival of the new charter of **1691**' (pp.66-67). Ava wrote of 'the introduction of the New Charter [sic] in **1691**'. Furthermore, in my resources in Lesson 2 the students read of 'political instability in New England **1684**-91'. Madeleine wrote of 'uncertainty surrounding the lack of a Charter [sic] from **1684**'. Although the student has not read the extract in lessons, Starkey (1949) argued regarding 'the loss of the charter in **1684**' (pp.11-12).

When outlining their criteria for assessing the students' essays, two academics noted that they would reward students who could satisfactorily explain why the witch crisis occurred specifically in 1692. For example, A14 'privileged papers (ranked them higher)' if 'they made reference to other witch trials in the area that did not emerge into an outbreak (what made the conditions ripe specifically in **1692** as opposed to some other time)'. Two academics appeared to recognise the legitimacy of the goal of such explanation when discussing the historiography of the Salem witch trials. For example, A1 noted 'as I suggest, there were also a few key decisions made during **1692** which if they were different, could have changed things'.

A10, however criticised certain students' essays for failing to achieve the goal of satisfactorily explaining why the crisis occurred in in 1692 but not before or after. For instance, A10 noted that:

> What they do less successfully is explain why this happened in 1692 rather than sooner or later. That is, why were the social gatekeepers the essays all stress so keen to blame witches for their problems at this particular moment in the colony's history? Several of them do mention the arrival of Gov. Phips in 1692, as the dozens of accused already jailed for months were awaiting trial until his arrival. Only two of the essays mention spectral evidence specifically, however, and why this might be significant. Without the use of spectral evidence, it is unclear if any of the 20 victims who were executed would even have been convicted. And given the emphasis all the essays place on social gatekeepers, none but Stella queried why some of them, like Phips and the Mathers, suddenly changed their minds about spectral evidence, thus ending the witch hunt they had supported for months.

7.2.8.6. RQ2T8S6 Direct manifestations of departures from normality to establish causes

Two students noted departures from normality - defined as a deviation from a standard, typical, or, expected course of action - between the Salem crisis and a negative case in order to establish causes. My indicators of direct manifestations were ‘generally’ and ‘normally’ within a clause. For example, in Lesson 7 the students had read Baker (2015) who argued ‘previously witchcraft had been a crime common to poorer and marginal members of society. Rebecca [Nurse]’s religious, economic, and political standing **normally** would have protected her from charges, or at least kept them from being taken seriously’ (pp.31-32). Caroline wrote that the magistrates’ ‘bonds were **normally** good at deterring false convictions so without them accusations grew’.

A16 slightly criticised Elena’s essay for failing to achieve the goal of persuasive explanation by appeals to departures from the norm when Elena failed to recognise that George Burroughs’ abnormal behaviour as a minister in New England may have contributed to his being accused. For example, A16 noted ‘I was especially impressed with her comment that the Burroughs case proved that "anyone could be a witch." (Although GB certainly fell outside the **norm** of early New England reformed ministers...)’.

7.2.8.7. RQ2T8S7 Direct manifestations of unusualness to establish causes

Nine students noted unusualness defined as remarkable or interesting because not habitually occurring or done between the Salem crisis and a negative case in order to establish causes. My indicators for direct manifestations were ‘extraordinary’, ‘rare’, ‘unique’, and ‘unusual’ within a clause and nominalised colligations including ‘difference’; ‘distinctiveness’ or ‘irregularities’. For example, in Lesson 8 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was ‘was extremely **rare** in**’.** Furthermore, in Lesson 7 the students had read Baker

(2015) who argued ‘Burroughs’ accusation, conviction, and execution signalled a turning point in the proceedings. Men had **rarely** been charged with witchcraft in the past, and ministers never fell under suspicion’ (p.127). Agnes wrote ‘spectral evidence was **rarely** used outside the Salem witch hunt’. Additionally, in Lesson 8 one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources was ‘a **distinctive** feature of Salem Village’ and in Lesson 7 the students had read Ray (2015) who had argued regarding a ‘**distinctive** feature of the Salem narrative’ (pp.116-117). Elena wrote of the ‘**distinctive** legal processes in Salem’.

7.2.8.8. RQ2T8S8 Direct manifestations of specific place to establish causes

Eight students noted specific places defined as clearly identified statements relating to particular position, point, or area in space in order to establish causes. My indicators of direct manifestations were nominalised colligations including ‘New England’; ‘Salem’; ‘village’; ‘colony’; ‘local’; ‘or ‘Massachusetts’. For example, one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources in Lesson 4 was ‘Puritan anxiety at declining religiosity in **New England’**. In Lesson 1, the students had read Norton (2002) who argued regarding ‘Puritan **New Englanders**’ belief system’ (pp.296-297). Madeleine wrote of ‘the decline in religiosity in **New England**’. Furthermore, in Lesson 2 the students had read Rosenthal (1993) who argued regarding ‘persistent threats from ‘Indians’ (i.e. Native Americans) against the **colony**’ (pp.3-4). Elena wrote of ‘the Devil’s destruction within the **colony**’. Finally, one of the model phrases I gave the students in my resources in Lesson 7 was ‘a diabolical conspiracy in **Massachusetts**’. Elena wrote of ‘the belief that the Devil was openly attacking **Massachusetts** Bay Colony’. Although the students had not read the extracts in lessons, Breslaw (1996) argued regarding ‘the fear of a Satanic conspiracy in **Massachusetts**’ (p.17).

When outlining their criteria for assessing the students' essays, two academics stated they would reward students who satisfactorily explained why the crisis occurred in the specific geographical area that it did. For example, A23 noted 'what I would look for in an answer to the essay question is some awareness of competing explanations for why **Salem Village** – why 1692 – and why **Massachusetts Bay'**.

When discussing the historiography of the Salem witch trials, five academics also appeared to recognise the legitimacy of the goal of explaining why the Salem crisis took place in a specific place. For examples, A2 referred to 'confusion over what was happen to the **colony** in the future'; A7 noted 'the profound fear that the people of **Salem** and **Salem Village** had'; A16 referred to how George Burroughs 'fell outside the norm of early **New England** reformed ministers'; and A22 noted 'the **local** dynamic'.

Three academics praised certain students' essays for explaining why the crisis began in a particular geographical area. For example, A5 praised the 'better' essays for 'relating overarching **colonial** factors to more **local** social and political ones'. A16 criticised Agnes' essay for having failed to achieve the legitimate goal of satisfactorily explaining why the crisis occurred in the particular geographical area it did. For example, A16 wrote of Agnes' essay that 'aside from being unfair to 17th century New England, seeing their Puritanism as the cause of the 1692 crisis cannot explain why Salem experienced such a dramatic witchcraft episode, when dozens of other equally-churched towns did not' [original underscore].

7.2.8.9. RQ2T8S9 Direct manifestations of comparative explanation

Ava metadiscursively indicated she was causally explaining comparatively defined as estimating, measuring, or noting the similarity or dissimilarity between for the purposes of explanation. My indicator of direct manifestations was 'compare' within a clause. For example, in my resources in Lesson 8 the students read ‘when answering causal “why” questions, historians sometimes **compare** with similar societies where the end result was different’. In the same lessons, the students read Norton (2002) who argued:

> Of course, the absence of a Connecticut crisis **comparable** to that in Essex County does not by itself prove that the looming presence of war on the northeastern frontier was *the* crucial factor in creating the contrast between the two regions. Yet at the same time it is highly suggestive that a teenage maidservant could experience severe and prolonged fits in 1692 in southern New England and to set off a regionwide panic like that which occurred simultaneously two hundred miles north in Massachusetts [original italics] (pp.296-297).

Ava wrote:

> It is clear that the role of the social gatekeepers was also the cause that made the difference since other areas experienced the political instability and social anxiety caused by the Indian raids, but never has [sic] a witch craze. The importance of this fact can be especially seen when **compared** to the Goodwin case. During this time (1688-89) there was news of the Glorious Revolution, so unusual political conditions, and the second Indian war [sic] was beginning to break out. However, following the accusation, confession and execution of Goody Glover, Cotton Mather prevented further accusations from the children who accused Goody Glover.

A16 praised Naomi’s essay for employing comparison to causally explain. For example, A16 wrote:

> Delighted to see her use the Elizabeth Knapp case; after many years of teaching an upper-level course on Witchcraft & Witch-hunting in early America where we spend considerable time on Willard's handling of Knapp, I am convinced that Knapp is a superhero **compared** to Parris.

8. Discussion

Although the sample is small, students who tended to display more evidence of having drawn on my resources tended to be judged more favourably by the assessing academics. This finding perhaps suggests that, broadly speaking and with certain exceptions, my planned curricular goals were valid in terms of being congruent with what these participating academics value in a causal explanation of the Salem witch trials.

8.1. Certain broadly applicable curricular goals for historical causal explanation

First, broad consensus exists in the field of production that historical writing – irrespective of whether the mode is ‘analytical’, ‘descriptive’, ‘narrative’, or a combination of any of the three – is ‘always’ ‘articulated in the form of a reasoned argument’ (Fischer, 1970, p. xv; 4.1.5.2-4. RQ1aT5S2-4 pp.157-170; 4.2.1.1. RQ1bT1S1 pp.169-174; 4.2.2. RQ1bT2 pp.178-180). Indeed, one’s choice(s) of mode(s) may itself represent an argumentative choice based on epistemic criteria. The most significant exception to this general tendency was among ‘unificationist’ positivist philosophers and historians influenced by social science methodologies who were particularly influential in the mid-twentieth century. By the early twenty-first century, however, those who seek to repress the interpretative, argumentative dimension of historical description and narrative lay themselves open to accusations of ‘hermeneutic naiveté’ (Megill, 1989, p.636). Strict ‘unificationists’ aside, the essential non-categoricalness of historical written argument is a distinguishing characteristic of historical causal explanatory arguments compared – in a sense apophatically - to some other disciplines such as the experimental sciences. In other words, those in the field of production seem more likely to stress how the objects of historical study, epistemology, metaphysics, and praxis result in distinctively historical logical and linguistic structures (4.2.1.1. RQ1bT1S1 pp.169-174).

Second, in the field of production broad consensus exists that historical causal explanation centres on explaining the abnormal, unusual, or unique event (4.1.1.5. RQ1aT1S5 pp.148-149). In contrast to some other disciplines such as the natural and social sciences, the historian does not tend to generally relate historical events to events of the same class (for example, the Salem witch crisis to other witch crises), but instead to causally related events in its own historical context (such as Charles II's revocation of the Massachusetts Bay Charter or the Second Indian War) (4.2.1.2-3. RQ1bT1S2-3 pp.174-176; 4.2.2. RQ1bT2 pp.178-180). In such senses, historical causal explanations tend to be spatially and temporally bound and incorporate change over time. This bounding does not apply to the same extent in disciplines such as the experimental sciences where spatial and temporal context are less central. In such sciences, in contrast to history, one has ability to generate one's own data by precisely restoring conditions and repeating experiments in different times and places.

Third, a broad consensus exists in the field of production that propositions in historical causal explanation – unlike those in, for example, historical fiction - require empirical warrant and conformity to the known facts (4.2.1.4. RQ1bT1S4 p.177; 4.2.2. RQ1bT2 pp.178-180). For example, part of the scepticism regarding the use of metaphor in historical writing for some in the field of production derives from the fact that metaphors are literally untrue and therefore lack empirical warrant (4.1.1.3. RQ1aT1S3 pp.140-142).

Fourth, a broad consensus exists in the field of production that historical causal explanations - unlike those in everyday life - are multicausal, heterogenous and might extend in scope beyond an individual's lived experience. Consequently, monocausal explanation should be avoided and explanations ought to incorporate the different types of phenomena –

natural and human – that affect human experience (4.1.1.2-3. RQ1aT1S2-3 pp.135-142; 4.1.1.5. RQ1aT1S5 pp.148-149; 4.2.1.5. RQ1bT1S5 pp.177-178). None of this is to say that historical writing does not often include causal explanation-types from disciplines such as the sciences, literature, or everyday life (4.2.1.1. RQ1bT1S1 pp.169-174). 'Explanation in history' is not synonymous with 'historical explanation' (Graham, 1983).

Finally, many in the field of production emphasise the importance of reading academic scholarship because it exemplifies argument and provides a model for writing (4.2.1.1. RQ1bT1S1 pp.169-174). Historiography, not textbooks, in other words, is viewed as the main source of disciplinary knowledge.

Such broadly acceptable facets of historical causal explanation appeared to be corroborated in the academics' feedback when they encountered them in my students' essays. When evaluating the students' work, the academics praised the essays that demonstrated original, non-categorical, heteroglossic, question-focused arguments; spatial and temporal specificity to establish causes; incorporation of change over time; specific, accurate detail in service of an argument; multicausality; and knowledge of, understanding of, engagement with, and evaluation of recent historiography of the Salem witch trials (6.2.1. RQ1bT1S1 continued pp.248-252; 6.2.2-3. RQ1bT1S4-5 continued pp.255-256; 7.2.3.4. RQ2T3S4 p.289; 7.2.3.7. RQ2T3S7 pp.291-293; 7.2.8. RQ2T8 pp.330-343). While the academics criticised certain students' essays for failing to achieve the aforementioned goals, none of the academics criticised the legitimacy of these goals in themselves. The evaluating academics' judgements regarding the students' ability to successfully achieve these goals as a cohort suggests that they were realisable for the majority of the participating students, even those whose prior attainment in formal assessments at GCSE and A Level was comparatively weaker.

Although some of the participating academics disagreed regarding the quality of the examination-board textbook I used with the students, no academics stated the textbook to be *better* as a source of disciplinary knowledge than historiography of the Salem witch crisis, or that the textbook should be used in lieu of academic scholarship (6.2.1. RQ1bT1S1 continued pp.248-252). Furthermore, although the sample size was too small to make generalisable claims, the results suggest that students who had engaged more with academic reading, as judged by employing resources that they had read in their original contexts, tended to produce better arguments as judged by the academic historians.

8.2. Certain curricular goals reflecting ecumenicism

In the early twenty-first century in the field of production, a near-consensus exists that historical causation is pluralistic, a phenomenon that cannot be reduced to any one logical form (4.1.1. RQ1aT1 pp.130-151). For example, competing definitions of historical causal 'explanation' – 'explaining why' and 'explaining what' – are permissible. 'Causes' are defined vaguely and ontologised in a variety of ways, to enable inclusion of both supra-personal conditions and individual actions. The variety of different types of causes in turn results in the inclusion of a variety of accompanying causal mechanisms. Furthermore, the use of metaphors and counterfactual conditionals in the field of production is controversial (4.1.1.3-4. RQ1aT1S3-4 pp.140-147). In sum, most historical causal explanations in the field of production are often an explanatory bricolage (4.1.1.2. RQ1aT1S2 pp.135-140).

Accordingly, an ecumenicism now seems to exist in the field of production regarding different explanatory models as well as the separation and ascription of status to modes such as 'narrative', 'description', and 'explanation'. Such ecumenicism enables the historian greater latitude in their argumentation, such as allowing one to argue the causal interrelationship between causes and conditions as well as employing modes according to epistemic criteria (4.1.5.1-4. RQ1aT5S1-4 pp.155-169). Such ecumenicism also extends to the commonplace inclusion of 'non-historical' explanations in historical writing, with, for example, the historiography of the Salem witch trials often including pathological, sociological, anthropological, and psychological explanations (4.2.1.1. RQ1bT1S1 pp.169-174; 4.1.5.2. RQ1aT5S2 pp.157-162; 4.2.1.3. RQ1bT1S3 pp.175-176).

Such pluralism regarding historical causal explanation appeared to be corroborated by the academics' evaluation of the students' essays. Certain academics recognised and privileged 'analysis', 'description' and 'narrative' to different extents (6.1.1. RQ1aT5 continued pp.241-248). While 'descriptive narratives' were criticised, 'analytical exposition', chronological fluency, and argumentation interrelating conditions and direct actions were all praised, perhaps suggesting the academics were distinguishing between non-explanatory 'plain' and explanatory 'significant' narratives. Furthermore, certain academics appeared to disagree regarding the appropriacy of using metaphors and counterfactual conditionals (7.2.2. RQ2T2 pp.276-282; 7.2.7. RQ2T7 pp.323-330).

One of the most common criticisms of my intended goals by the academics pertained to how I had taught the students to *describe* historical causes such as 'social gatekeepers' and 'Puritan theocracy' (7.2.3.3. RQ2T3S3 pp.286-288; 7.2.3.7. RQ2T3S7 pp.291-293). For the former, which I had adopted from the historian Norton (2002, p.72), the academics disagreed regarding the appropriacy of the term. In the case of the latter, which I had borrowed from Starkey (1949, pp.11-12 & 250-251), Robinson (1991, p.252), and the awarding-body endorsed textbook author (Bullock 2016, p.158) – none of whom were trained historians – the academics who commented on the term 'theocracy' all either implied or explicitly noted its unsuitability. Such criticisms of my intended goals appear to suggest these academics viewed descriptive, historiographic propositions not as 'lower order' but instead as arguments based on evidence, and consequently that the effectiveness of historical causal explanations can hinge on whether a described putative cause existed and/or was effective.

Although my methodology meant I cannot make generalisable claims, the academics' feedback suggested that the participating A-Level students across the attainment range were able to employ nominalisation, the cause within the clause, and lexicogrammatical structures such as counterfactual conditionals to argue the prioritisation of causes; metadiscursively explain; characterise different types of causes, explain different types of causes' causal mechanisms; as well as adopt particular explanatory models such as the comparative method (4.1.1.2. RQ1aT1S2 pp.135-140; 4.1.1.6. RQ1aT1S6 pp.150-151; 7.2.1.4-5. RQ2T1S4-5 pp.270-276; 7.2.2-8. RQ2T2-RQ2T8 pp.276-343). While much of such language might be transferable to different causal historiographical problems, others – such as those referring to pathological or legal explanations – appear more specific to topics such as the events of Salem in 1692 involving witch trials (7.2.3.6. RQ2T3S6 p.296; 7.2.5.4-5. RQ2T5S4-5 pp.312-315; 7.2.6.4. RQ2T6S4 pp.318-319).

8.3. Certain curricular goals relative to epistemic criteria

The pluralism in historical causal explanation in the field of productions is subject to a relativity based on interrelated, epistemic criteria. First, by the early twenty-first century, many in the field of production have recommended that - given that the merits of any historical causal question can only be assessed in terms of its adequacy as a response to the specific question asked - the choice of explanatory model and/or mode should be contingent on the particular type of causal question (4.1.1. RQ1aT1 pp.130-151; 4.1.5.4. RQ1aT5S4 pp.165-169). This relativity derives from the fact that different historical causal questions often presuppose specific relevance relations inherent in that question, meaning no one model and mode can be applied to every type of causal question (4.2.3.2. RQ1bT3S2 pp.181-191).

For example, a question’s wording might privilege either structural, comparative, or intentional (perhaps including discussion of moral responsibility) explanations. Such distinctions might have implications for the mode, with factorial ‘analysis’ often employed for structural and/or comparative explanations but intentionalist, action-based explanations more often argued in the narrative mode. For the participating academics to praise certain students for providing an argument specific to the question, the students were required to include in their essay an argument regarding the political ‘conditions’, perhaps better suited to the analytical mode (6.2.1. RQ1bT1S1 continued pp.248-252).

Second, a historiography such as the Salem witch trials may have its own research traditions –themselves a historical phenomenon subject to change over time - which in turn inform the type of causal explanatory models employed (4.1.1.2. RQ1aT1S2 pp.135-140; 4.1.3. RQ1aT3 pp.152-154; 4.1.5.2. RQ1aT5S2 pp.155-162; 4.1.5.4. RQ1aT5S4 pp.165-169; 4.2.1.1. RQ1bT1S1 pp.169-174; 4.2.1.3. RQ1bT1S3 pp.175-176; 4.2.3.2. RQ1bT3S2 pp.181-191). Different research traditions, for instance, may differ on the ‘uniqueness’ of *historical* explanation; definitions of ‘explanation’; the ascription of causal importance to conditions as opposed to human actions; the acceptance of counterfactuals, attributions of moral responsibility, metaphors, or the comparative method; and attitudes regarding ‘analytic’, ‘descriptive’, and ‘narrative’ modes. For example, a historiography influenced by social scientific approaches such as Marxism in the mid-twentieth century is perhaps more likely than others to stress the causal importance of conditions over individual actions (including the employment of metaphors of verticality and/or differential visibility); eschew counterfactuals with accompanying ascriptions of individual moral responsibility; and write in the ‘analytical’ mode (4.1.1.3. RQ1aT1S3 pp.140-142; 4.1.5.1. RQ1aT5S1 pp.155-157).

Third, the substantive objective of study may be more or less amenable to certain explanatory models and modes (4.1.5.4. RQ1aT5S4 pp.165-169; 4.2.3.2. RQ1bT3S2 pp.181-

191). For example, topics where the actions of individuals are considered to be more intuitively central – such as short-term military or political histories – are more likely to include counterfactual conditionals, moral ascriptions of responsibility, or be argued in the narrative mode (4.1.1.4. RQ1aT1S4 pp.144-147). Historical topics explaining longer-term, supra-personal conditions such as those associated with society, culture, demography, and the economy, meanwhile, are more likely to be argued in the analytical mode (4.1.5.2. RQ1aT5S2 pp.157-162).

While in the field of production more broadly ascriptions of moral responsibility and the comparative method are controversial, the academics of the Salem witch trials did not criticise essays which displayed evidence of them (4.1.1.4-5. RQ1aT1S4-5 pp.144-149; 7.2.6.3. RQ2T6S3 pp.312-313; 7.2.8. RQ2T8 pp.330-343). In this instance, the substantive content of this particular historiography – the execution of twenty innocent people taking place in an area where many contemporaneous nearby regions might act as broadly similar 'contrast classes' – perhaps meant that these academics were more accepting of such controversial aspects of historical causal explanation than those operating in different historiographies might have been.

Finally, while a historian's individual argument and accompanying (conscious or unconscious) interpretative framework might be influenced by their causal question, the research traditions in the particular historiography, and the substantive topic under investigation, their frameworks are not determined by them (4.1.1.2. RQ1aT1S2 pp.135-140; 4.1.5.4. RQ1aT5S4 pp.165-169; 4.2.3.2. RQ1bT3S2 pp.181-191). Indeed, the relationship is circular. The historian's individual beliefs, theoretical approaches, or aesthetic preferences might shape the causal questions they pose themselves, the historiographical traditions they gravitate toward, or the emphases they place on individual actions.

8.4. Compromise with competing loci of authority when establishing curricular goals

The aforementioned plurality in historical causal explanation means it is problematical to establish its essential features (4.1.1. RQ1aT1 pp.130-151). Such difficulties are compounded by the fact that the loci of authority one might draw on to attempt such a task in isolation present their own problems. First, claims made by philosophers of history regarding historical causal explanation have been criticised by their peers for being highly generalised, oversimplified, lacking empirical warrant, and prescriptive rather than normative in that they ignore the praxis of actual historians and fail to be based on systematic analyses of authentic historiography (4.1.1.6. RQ1aT1S6 pp.150-151; 4.1.2. RQ1aT2 pp.151-152).

Second, although historical causal explanation is highly sophisticated, historians themselves rarely systematically theorise regarding historical causal explanation (4.1.2. RQ1aT2 pp.151-152). The general unwillingness to theorise themselves is accentuated by the fact that many historians are similarly unwilling to consult philosophy of history, considering it too far divorced from their practice. For example, by the early twenty-first century, even advocates of counterfactualism and the comparative method displayed concern regarding their respective under-theorisation and the propensity of claims to be made without reference to authentic historiography.

Third, due to the plurality of historical causal explanation, a single work by a historian - or indeed a single historiography - may represent too small a sample to make general claims regarding historical causal explanation (4.1.4. RQ1aT4 pp.154-155). Accordingly, any one survey of historical writing is unlikely to settle debates regarding the essential features of historical causal explanation. As well as being potentially non-representative, basing general claims on the works of individual historians without clear rationale being provided for their selection risks an unfettered relativism (4.1.4.2. RQ1aT4S2 p.155). If any one historian’s work is chosen solely by virtue of the fact that they are a practising historian, the danger is that non-representative or ineffective examples of historical causal explanation are misleadingly held to be emblematic, as well as possibly implying that the explanation of any one historian is unimpeachable.

Fourth, the awarding body has already recontextualised historical causal explanation in such a way that homogenises it (4.1.5. RQ1aT5 pp.155-169). While the board's axiomatic portrayal of 'description' and 'narrative' as separate and inferior to 'analysis' can perhaps be justified with reference to social-science influenced interpretative frameworks popular in the mid-twentieth century, such a view is highly contentious in the early twenty-first where the explanatory qualities of description and narrative are more likely to be emphasised. Furthermore, the delineation and denigration of 'description/narrative' betrays the currently prevailing ecumenical view regarding historical causal explanation. It might also neutralise one's potential to argue causally – for example by deemphasising change over time; understating the causal importance of human intention and action, chance, contingency, and unintended consequences; disabling the ability to argue the relationship between background conditions and human action; or nullifying choice(s) of mode(s) based on epistemic criteria. Similarly, minimising the argumentative, interpretative quality of narrative/description as 'lesser order' may encourage hermeneutic naiveté by de-problematising them as an intellectual challenge.

Some participating academics also showed concern that the awarding body's specifications, set questions, and endorsed materials provided barriers to students writing historically: for example, by disabling a student's ability to expound a thesis; failing to reward students' knowledge of the latest developments in historiography; and forcing the student to write in artificial modes (6.1.1. RQ1aT5 continued pp.241-248).

9. Conclusion and recommendations

9.1. Broadly applicable recommendations

As Maton and Muller (2007) noted, limits exist in terms of Bernsteinian recontextualisation. These limits depend on ‘evaluative rules’ that ensure that pedagogised artefacts in the classroom continue to bear relation to their parent knowledge in the field of production (pp.28-29). Once the recontextualised artefact becomes too far divorced from its academic antecedent, it ceases to be the same subject.

Broadly applicable tenets – which nonetheless cannot be considered strict methodological precepts – of written causal historical explanation in the field of production appear to exist that A-Level students of a variety of attainment levels are able to attain as judged by academic experts. Such tenets might serve as broadly applicable curricular goals. These include students producing a historically specific causal argument (4.1.1.2-3. RQ1aT1S2-3 pp.135-142; 4.1.1.5. RQ1aT1S5 pp.148-149; 4.1.5.2.-4. RQ1aT5S2-4 pp.157-169; 4.2.1.1-5. RQ1bT1S1-5 pp.169-178; 4.2.2. RQ1bT2 pp.178-180; 6.2.1. RQ1bT1S1 continued pp.248-252; 6.2.2-3. RQ1bT1S4-5 continued pp.255-256; 7.2.3.4. RQ2T3S4 p.289; 7.2.3.7. RQ2T3S7 pp.291-293; 7.2.8. RQ2T8 pp.330-343). Furthermore, academic scholarship should act as the primary source of disciplinary knowledge in terms of functioning as the basis of curricular planning and as a model of students’ writing (4.2.1.1. RQ1bT1S1 pp.169-174; 6.2.1. RQ1bT1S1 continued pp.248-252).

Some of these findings might have implications for those employing genre-based pedagogies in their current form if they wish to also insist that they are ‘recontextualising’ the historical discipline. First, those in the field of production insist almost unanimously that historical causal explanation involves the creation of one’s own argument. Consequently, the issue arises as to whether a historical ‘categorical explanation’ – where students are specifically encouraged to present causal explanations as objective facts, eschew modality, and avoiding conflation with ‘argument’ genres - represents a contradiction in terms, and therefore breaks evaluative rules (2.2.2.2. Hierarchical or cumulative models of progress? pp.60-67; Coffin, 2006, p.67).

Examples such as Elena’s (7.1. Overview of experts’ ranking and manifestations in students’ essays pp.258-264) – whose prior attainment would presumably mean that according to linear, sequential, and hierarchical progression models she would have been denied induction to argument with the more ‘advanced learners’ in her class – perhaps raises issues regarding ‘linguistically informed pedagogical pathways’ (2.2.2.2. Hierarchical or cumulative models of progress? pp.60-67; Christie & Derewianka, 2008, p.116; Coffin, 2006, pp.92-93). This study cannot make general claims regarding all A-Level students, or claims about younger learners. In the example of the lower-attainer Elena, however, the argument she required competency in foundational, non-argumentative genres did not appear to apply. In Elena’s case, it is not clear how it would have been necessary or desirable to differentiate the teaching according to her prior academic performance and teach her to write ahistorical ‘categorical explanations’ prior to historical argument. Furthermore, her performance suggests she might have been advantaged by being exposed to a cumulative rather than hierarchical progression model earlier in her schooling: one that inducted her to the epistemic characteristics of history – namely, history as argument – earlier, more consistently, and systematically.

In my attempts to linguistically scaffold the students’ writing in an argumentative genre, in some cases I may have downplayed the conceptual apparatuses of historians’ argument that underpin such writing’s construction and how these processes reflect compositional and historical problems. I presented certain substantive conceptual terms – ‘social gatekeepers’ or ‘theocracy’ for instance – as somewhat indisputable (7.2.3.3. RQ2T3S3 pp.286-288; 7.2.3.7. RQ2T3S7 pp.291-293). In some ways, I had hoped that the students would work toward writing something ‘very similar to what I had written before the lesson and was aiming toward’ (Donaghy, 2013). In aiming for disciplinary specificity – terms such as ‘theocracy’ are clearly appropriate for historians when answering particular questions – the students’ writing had been shaped into a generic form pre-empted by their teacher inappropriate for this particular question on the causes of the Salem witch trials. This finding perhaps implies that ‘description’ – often denigrated in genre-based curricular design – is neither easy nor non-argumentative but represents an argument from evidence (4.1.5.2-4. RQ1aT5S2-4 pp.157-169; Tucker, 2004). It may also suggest that linguistic scaffolding, when divorced from the disciplinary underpinnings that actualise academics’ writing, can result in mimicry and therefore ultimately unconvincing ‘explanatory pastiche’ (2.2.2.7. Lexical and/or disciplinary specificity? pp.79-82; Lee & Shemilt, 2009; pp. 43–46).

Furthermore, in the field of production there is scepticism regarding the inherent superiority regarding nominalisation as opposed to verbs. For some (e.g. Antonova, 2020), overuse of nominalisation – for instance when one is required to emphasise individual action – can result in loss of clarity in causal argument. These issues reflect the broader issue of how and when one chooses to describe – for instance, how and when one chooses to construct a nominalised, colligatory generalisation (2.1.2.3. Convergent evolution pp.35-41). If the option to construct a nominalised colligatory generalisation is exercised, such a construction should not be confused with a ‘grouping’ (such as ‘the magistrates’ actions’). In a causal explanation, it needs to clearly serve an argumentative purpose in helping to explain the consequence to qualify (for instance ‘the zeal of the magistrates’). Consequently, ‘description’ when defined in this limited sense is not a lower-order, non-argumentative consideration but instead constitutes a part of the causal argument. I therefore chose to ignore the awarding body’s claims that ‘description’ was ‘lower-order’ and non-argumentative, at least when ‘description’ is defined as colligation because students ‘describing’ in this particular sense did not appear to risk students their penalised by markers (4.1.5.1-3. RQ1aT5S1-3 pp.155-165).

Second, ‘unificationists’ aside, most in the field of production tend to view historical causal explanation as *sui generis* in relation to causal explanation in other disciplines (4.2.1.1. RQ1bT1S1 pp.169-174). This has implications for genre-based pedagogies, at least in terms of the mediated and bowdlerised from they have occasionally been applied in history curriculum design in England (2.1.1.2. Policy Makers’ Concerns pp.18-20; 2.1.1.3.2. English history teachers’ ‘Extended Writing Movement’ pp.23-27; 2.1.2.3. Convergent evolution pp.33-47). If the ‘unificationist’ thesis of positivist philosophy of the mid-twentieth century accurately represented practice in the field of production, then students could be taught one (scientific) model of causal explanation across all subjects. For example, the guidance of the genre-theory inspired *Key Stage 3 National Strategy – Literacy in History* (2002) – which in fact only provided guidance of causal explanation broadly applicable to ‘non-fiction genres’ (pp.19-21) – would suffice in providing the specificity required for *historical* causal explanation. Similarly, one teacher influenced by genre theory suggested that learning is the same ‘in any school subject’ (2.2.2.7. Lexical and/or disciplinary specificity? pp.79-82; Donaghy, 2013), downplaying the epistemological, metaphysical, and practical particularities of historical causal explanation as envisioned by most in the field of production. Such an approach manifested itself in guidance which recommended students should be encouraged to use broadly applicable causal connectives such as ‘so’, ‘therefore’, and ‘because’ - supposedly applicable in any school subject - to establish historical causal relationships (p.21).

Many historians in the historiography of Salem *do* occasionally use ‘so’, ‘therefore’, and ‘because’ for explaining causation. Most of these historians, however, use this language for different *types* of causation that are not specifically historical. For instance, some historians such as Bernard Rosenthal (1993) might use such language to make clear their processes of logic. For example:

> One need not press the issue that the kind of testimony offered against Burroughs was less than adequate for a civil libertarian; but one cannot easily let go of the discrepancy between the rigorous standards of evidence set by Increase Mather and his willingness to embrace the conviction of Burroughs. **So** we have something of a puzzle; why did Mather make such an eloquent case against spectral evidence, a case for strict criteria in the discovering of witchcraft, and yet conclude, on the basis of evidence that defied his criteria, that George Burroughs had been tried fairly? (p.143).

Here, Rosenthal wanted to show the processes he went through in deciding the questions he wanted to investigate. In this instance Rosenthal is *not* using 'so' to argue the relationship between abstract historical causes and consequences but instead to lay out his chain of logic.

Ultimately, a deadening, homogenising and distorting effect will be the consequence of frames such as the one below if a student continues to employ them later in their school career.

> 'There was a witch hunt in Salem in 1692 because…'

Far from being the 'language of the historian', most historians from the historiography of Salem avoid using 'so', 'therefore', or 'because' in this way because it strangles argumentation at birth. Counter-intuitively, as Martin rightly identified (2007), rather than using 'connectives' most of these historians instead often realise historical causal relationships in 'uncommonsense' ways by using prepositional phrases, verbs, and nouns and positioning 'the cause within the clause' (pp.45-46; 2.1.2.3. Convergent evolution pp.33-47) By doing so, these historians are able to argue regarding the role and relative importance of causes that essentially neutral words like ‘because’ do not allow. The use of ‘so’, ‘therefore’, and ‘because’ might have a place in disciplines in which causal explanations only involve isolated variables and therefore do not require characterisation or prioritisation (for example, perhaps, ‘the apple fell to the ground *because* of gravity’), but that usually does not apply in history.

By drawing on analyses of school textbooks (e.g. Walsh, 2001), Coffin (2006) recognised that students should be taught a linguistic repertoire which facilitates the characterisation of different causal roles and mechanisms: particularly by distinguishing between sufficient causes and necessary conditions (2.1.2.3. Convergent evolution pp.34-47). Drawing on Martin’s (1992) general analysis of English grammar, Coffin claimed that the terms ‘enablers’ (for necessary conditions) and ‘determiners’ (for sufficient causes) ‘can also be applied to prepositional phrases realising circumstances of cause’ (pp.122-125). While the essential claim that students should be taught to characterise different types of causes and causal mechanisms can be validated against claims made and practice in the field of production (4.1.1.2. RQ1aT1S2 pp.131-140; 4.1.5.2. RQ1aT5S2 pp.157-162; 4.1.5.4. RQ1aT5S4 pp.165-169; 4.2.3.2. RQ1bT3S2 pp.181-191; 6.1.1. RQ1aT5 continued pp.241-248; 7.2.2-4. RQ2T2-4 pp.276-279), the application of the generic terms ‘enablers’ and ‘determiners’ is problematical when cross-referenced against the historiography of the Salem witch trials. Such terms were rarely used by these academics, and when they were they tended to have very different meanings to what Coffin implied. For example, ‘determine’ was rarely used for occasioning causes, and instead employed by historians who wanted to emphasise the systemic conditions that leant a long-term inevitability to the events of Salem. Boyer and Nissenbaum (1974), for instance, argued ‘the witchcraft accusations of 1692 moved in channels which were **determined** by years of factional strife in Salem Village’ (p.181).

I therefore aimed to make explicit to students how to 'finetune causality' within the clause as genre theorists such as Martin (2007) recommended by emphasising specific prepositional phrases, nouns, or verbs drawn specifically from the historiography of the Salem crisis. Similarly, I did not choose to particularly highlight to students more generally applicable causal language such as 'led to' and 'due to', although the historians in this historiography use them with relative regularity, meaning the students, therefore, did happen to encounter such general language in their reading of academic history during the nine lessons. I also did not use generically applicable terms such as 'determiner' and 'enabler' because I found little evidence of their use in the way Coffin suggested in the historiography of the Salem witch trials.

Third, most in the field of production view academic scholarship as the primary source of disciplinary knowledge, suggesting that curriculum designers should reiteratively draw on evolving scholarship – in effect taking ownership of recontextualisation themselves - to inform their planning and to provide models for students of argumentative historical causal explanation (4.2.1.1. RQ1bT1S1 pp.169-173; 6.2.1. RQ1bT1S1 continued pp.248-252). This contradicts at least some genre theorists who suggest that the textbook is the 'primary source of disciplinary knowledge' (2.2.2.5. Importance of reading? pp.76-78; Schleppegrell, Achugar & Oteíza, pp.72-73) and that textbooks should be used as 'models' for students' own writing (Schleppegrell, 2011, p.210). Curriculum designers are also required to theorise to a certain extent to make up for a shortfall in explicit theorisation by academic historians regarding historical causal explanation (4.1.3. RQ1aT3 pp.152-154).

9.2. Ecumenicism

Van Manen (1997) argued that culture, concepts, and linguistic terms can become 'silted, crusted, or fossilised' in such a way as that original contact with the experiences the language signified is broken (p.61). For the recontextualising history curriculum designer, the discipline of history in the field of production is a moving target, with regular developments in areas such as substantive objectives of study, technical methods, and interpretative frameworks (4.2.3.2. RQ1bT3S2 pp.181-191). Inattention to such developments has resulted in national examinations and genre-based pedagogies continuing to privilege a particular conception of historical causal explanation that reached its apogee in the mid-twentieth century but can no longer necessarily claim to be the dominant paradigm (4.1.5. RQ1aT5 pp.155-169). In future, recontextualising history curriculum designers, therefore, should more explicitly and reiteratively reference their claims against developments in the field of production. This is an issue that Coffin (2004) began to broach but did not explore further:

> The question that emerges from these observations of the wider context is 'what are the implications for the recontextualisation of historical knowledge at the level of secondary schooling? Are school history genres stabilised for now? Or are they too evolving in response to the wider environment?' (p.260).

For example, the dismissal of narrative and description as lesser order does not appear congruent with certain current practice in the field of production, suggesting students should be made aware earlier in their schooling of the intellectual challenges of these modes (4.1.5. RQ1aT5 pp.155-169). Indeed, much of the denigration of 'narrative' and its separation from 'explanation' and 'argument' in genre-based curriculum design instead seems to reveal a category error. 'Narrative' is dismissed in history curricular design when, in fact, 'plain narrative' is being criticised (2.2.2.2. Hierarchical or cumulative models of progress? pp.60-67; 6.1.1. RQ1aT5 continued pp.241-248). 'Significant' narratives, by contrast, are the mode that least some in the field of production consider the most efficacious mode for historical causal explanation. Furthermore, instead of seeing modes as 'unhelpfully conflated' (Coffin, 2006, p.67), historical causal explanation in the field of production commonly mixes modes to epistemological ends – for example in arguing the interaction of conditions and causes (4.1.5.2. RQ1aT5S2 pp.157-162; 4.1.5.4. RQ1aT5S4 pp.164-169; 6.1.1. RQ1aT5 continued pp.241-248). The student who only writes in strictly delineated modes therefore has certain aspects of the historians' argumentative repertoire denied to them.

Not only is the discipline of history a moving target, but there are innumerable possible bullseyes for the recontextualising history designer to aim at, with many competing arguments available regarding which is the best to shoot for. As we have seen in the case of historical causal explanation, practice in the field of production has become so pluralistic it has led to a prevailing pragmatic ecumenicism (4.1.1. RQ1aT1 pp.130-151; 4.1.5.1-3. RQ1aT5S1-2 pp.155-165). A reflection of such pluralism appears feasible in the field of production. For example, these findings suggest that, through lexicogrammatical instruction, students can construct causal argument at the level of the clause (7.2.1.2-8 RQ2T1S2-8. pp.268-343). A-Level students of a variety of prior-attainment levels constructed counterfactual conditional clauses to argue causally regarding prioritisation of causal importance; characterised causes as (necessary) conditions or examples of individual responsibility; and employed the method of difference. Furthermore, such students were able to construct metaphors of verticality and/or differential visibility of a variety of types. In the case of both counterfactuals and metaphor, however, a curriculum designer using the field of academic production as their benchmark for what constitutes a desirable goal for their students should be cautious (4.1.1.3-4. RQ1aT1S3-4 pp.140-148; 7.2.2. RQ2T2 pp.276-282; 7.2.7. RQ2T7 pp.323-330). The curriculum designer cannot decide that counterfactualism or metaphor is an unambiguously desirable goal for their students to achieve given the controversy regarding their use among academic historians.

For ethical reasons, however, I could not teach the students to write in the narrative mode so therefore it was beyond the scope of this study to investigate whether A-Level students could also argue successfully – as judged by academic experts in the field of production – in (a combination of) different modes. I judged that to teach my students to write their arguments in an explicitly narrative mode would be unethical because it might disadvantage candidates in their examinations - even if unequivocal denigrations of narrative represent a niche, outmoded view in the field of production (4.1.5. RQ1aT5 pp.155-169).

Such findings might therefore suggest that throughout their second history education students should be exposed to a representatively broad sample of the diversity of practice regarding historical causal explanation in the field of production. A-Level students appear capable of arguing using various types of ontologised causes (and their accompanying causal mechanisms); causal explanatory models; and methods and students might be expected to have built a repertoire of causal explanation(s) incorporating these by their A-Level studies (7.2.1.2-8 RQ2T1S2-8. pp.268-343).

This panoply of views in the field of production, however, presents a problem for the recontextualising history curriculum designer. It becomes difficult for the designer to make a categorical claim about what historians do in the field of production that is both generally applicable *and* true. If the designer attempts to recontextualise history's academic analogue in such a way as to present principles to students that are universally true for all historians, the principles risk being so broad as to be pedagogically banal. Alternatively, if the recontextualiser attempts to be too specific, they are liable to misrepresent the fundamentally catholic nature of the historical discipline (Megill, 2007). The latter approach might 'run the risk of freezing historical explanation in a kind of Procrustean bed that would present a glaring contrast with the present remarkable pluralism in the practice of explanation' (Van den Braembussche, 1989, p.1).

Furthermore, using any one sub-locus of authority in isolation to recontextualise historical causal explanation presented limitations: philosophers of history's claims may lack empirical warrant; historians tend not to theorise their practice; the diversity of historical causal explanation means one historiography represents too small a sample to make general claims; and accepting any historical causal explanation by a historian as a model of success risks endorsing uncontrolled explanatory relativism (4.1.2-4. RQ1aT2-4 pp.151-155). For example, genre-based progression models which value factorial 'explanations' in analytical modes with generalised participants map far more neatly onto positivist, social scientific historical causal explanations than other types (Christie & Derewianka, 2008, p.116; Coffin, 2006, pp.92-93). While the influence of such positivist/social scientific models of causal explanation reached its apogee in the mid-twentieth century, it can no longer claim to the dominant paradigm, and therefore is problematical when claiming it represents historians' practice in its generality (4.1.5. RQ1aT5 pp.155-169).

Similarly, participants in the extended writing movement have often been selective with their choice of academic works to recontextualise, providing little rationale for their selections, and making generalised claims about the discipline of history from small samples (2.2.2.3. Recontextualisation of academic history? pp.67-74). But a curriculum designer cannot make general claims regarding causal explanation from a single historiography, let alone a single work (4.1.4. RQ1aT4 pp.154-155). For example, the extended writing movement's reliance on theorists such as E. H. Carr (1990) risks enshrining an unrepresentative and outmoded view of historical causal explanation in the field of reproduction (Fernández-Armesto; Fordham, 2016; Jenkins, 1995; Maza, 2017). Marwick (2001) encapsulated this view. He argued that Carr's *What is History* 'ought to have been titled *What E. H. Carr Thought History Ought to Be*' and that it contained 'many misconceptions' (p.300). Such an approach to recontextualisation might promote an unfettered relativism in that curriculum designers select any work of history as paradigmatic solely on the basis that it is written by an academic historian (4.1.4.2. RQ1aT4S2 p.155).

In my planning, therefore, I judged triangulating the three sub-loci of authority (philosophies of history, theories of history, and an authentic historiography) might ameliorate, at least in part, some of these limitations (4.2.2-3. RQ1bT2-3 pp.178-191). Cross-referencing specificities in the historiography of the Salem witch trials with normative philosophies and theories might provide curriculum designers with the grounds for making more general claims beyond a particular work or even historiography regarding the typical patterns or types of causal explanation that historians employ. Alternatively, described models or theories derived from authentic explanations in one particular historiography might provide empirical warrant or contradict the general claims made by philosophers and theorists, thereby linking the descriptive and the normative.

In designing my lessons, therefore, I aimed to avoid relying solely on either a potentially overgeneralised apriorism or, alternatively, a relativistic, unrepresentative posteriorism (Goode, 1977). Before committing to incorporate claims and examples from the field of production into my planning, a curriculum designer might aim to ensure that the portrayal of historical explanation in philosophies, methodologies, and an authentic historiography are broadly congruent in order to be able to justifiably claim one is recontextualising causal explanation in the discipline of history writ large. Planners therefore need to avoid exclusivity-claims regarding inherent superiority of explanatory ontologised causes (and their accompanying causal mechanisms); models; modes; and methods, as well as ensuring students encounter and construct these in the course of their secondary history education.

9.3. Relativity

Reducing historical causal explanation, however, to (relatively) agreed facets applicable across different causal enquiries risks pedagogical banality in that it robs the phenomenon of much of its richness. Similarly, curriculum designers cannot simply adopt an 'anything-goes-so-long-as-a historian-has-once-done-it' attitude to historical causal explanation. Curriculum designers instead require a sensitivity for when teaching particular causal historical explanatory models, ontologised causes (and their accompanying causal mechanisms), modes, and methods might be more appropriate in relation to particular historiographic research traditions, objects of study, interpretative frameworks, and questions posed. Furthermore, when confronted with broader questions without in-built logical relations, students might be made to see how such decisions represent an argumentative choice (4.2.3.2. RQ1bT3S2 pp.181-191). Recontextualisation may provide guidance to the curriculum designer regarding under what epistemic circumstances such decisions are particularly appropriate. In my planning I tried to pay attention to such conditions when exposing the students to different explanatory models, cause-types, causal mechanisms, and methods. In other words, current genre-based curricula tend to prioritise genre over epistemology, and therefore rob historical causal explanation of much of its subtlety and internal logic in the field of production.

For instance, genre-based hierarchical progression models tend to downplay the importance of substantive knowledge and might therefore run the risk of encouraging students to visualise conceptual thinking as a 'process' or 'skill' (2.2.2.2. Hierarchical or cumulative models of progress? pp.60-67). It might be all too easy for a student to think that when they encounter a new topic all they need do to answer a causal question is reach for their trusty toolbox, grab the appropriate 'tool', and apply the same repeatable, tried-and-tested processes for explaining why things happened in history. Such approaches, however, might lead the student to believe that historical substantive content is free-floating, inert information that does not affect the disciplinary, essentially another interchangeable slab students just need to set to work on. But this is not how historical argument always works. In

Table 9.1. Possible overview of relativistic considerations for curriculum designers when planning causal explanation

Possible substantive focus	**Example historiographical trend**	**Example interpretative framework**	**Ontologised cause**	**Causal mechanism**	**Mode**	**Causal explanatory model**	**Example enquiry question**
Society Demography Economy	The historiography of the Salem witch trials in the 1970s and 1980s	Marxism, the French *Annales* School	Longer term, supra-personal, conditions	Made consequence possible	Analysis	Conditions	Why were most witches in early American society women? Karlsen (1989) p.xiii
						Comparison and/or counterfactuals	Why was Salem so different from all previous witchcraft episodes in New England?’ Norton (2002) p.8
Politics Military	The historiography of the Salem witch around the tricentenary of 1992	Idealism	Shorter term, individual, direct causes	Bring about consequence	Narrative	Intentions and actions, unintended consequences, chance, and contingency	What possessed the clergy and magistrates in Salem in 1692? Hill (1996) p. xvi

reality, the disciplinary and the substantive often do not operate in discrete silos. Disciplinary conventions and unique substantive content meet, mesh, and modify one another in in order to construct historical knowledge.

As indicated in Table 9.1., in a curriculum designer's planning they might factor such relativity into their planning. Plans for progression might ensure that students encounter in their compulsory secondary history career a variety of causal enquiries questions with clearly complimentary substantive foci, historiographical trends and accompanying interpretative frameworks, ontologised causes and accompanying causal mechanisms, explanatory models, and written modes. These, however, should be treated as general guidelines rather than inviolable methodological precepts, otherwise the curriculum designer will be failing to allow for the ecumenicism in historical causal explanation (4.1.1. RQ1aT1 pp.130-151; 4.1.5.1-3. RQ1aT5S1-2 pp.155-165). This is also not to say that one mode is 'better', 'distinct', or only applicable to certain types of questions. If a response answers the question set, it is an effective answer regardless of mode(s). Similarly, hierarchical progression models should not be imposed on modes, otherwise we reach the untenable conclusion that 'analytical' causal argument is, all other things being equal, *necessarily* better than a 'narrative' response – a conclusion that cannot be validated against the field of production (4.1.1. RQ1aT1 pp.130-151; 4.1.5. RQ1aT5 pp.155-169; 4.2.3.2. RQ1bT3S2 pp.181-191).

9.4. National examinations

Finally, the curriculum designer's attempts at recontextualisation are constricted by national examination specifications and the extent to which they (mis)align with historical causal argument in the field of production, as evidenced by some of the participating academics' comments regarding examination modes and resources (4.1.5. RQ1aT5 pp.152-166; RQ1aT5 continued; 6.1.1. RQ1aT5 continued pp.241-248). Furthermore, because of high-stakes accountability and awarding bodies' reputation as a locus of authority for 'school history', such characterisations of the discipline may have implications for history curriculum design for younger students where the examination specifications should not yet apply.

For example, in the field of production in the early twenty-first century a number of philosophers and historians are of the view that narrative is higher order, causally explanatory, and argumentative; one should not operate in discrete modes; and that one's choice of mode should be contingent on epistemic considerations such as the question asked, the phenomenon being explained, or the historian's argument (4.1.1. RQ1aT1 pp.130-151; 4.1.5. RQ1aT5 pp.155-169; 4.2.3.2. RQ1bT3S2 pp.181-191). Assumptions that at least one awarding body and certain genre theorists treat as self-evident – that in history narrative is inherently a separate mode from analytic explanation and the former is of a lower order to the latter – are therefore not substantiated by a survey of philosophies of history, theories of history by practising historians and authentic historical explanations by historians in at least one histography from the later twentieth century onward (2.2.2.2. Hierarchical or cumulative models of progress? pp.60-67). The awarding body, however, axiomatically casts the mode as lesser order, non-explanatory, and non-argumentative, thus disabling students' ability to choose modes according to epistemic considerations.

Furthermore, genre-based pedagogies - in stressing the intended audience construct to be the examiner/teacher to enable strategic production for examination success - have derived warrant for their taxonomies of school history genres for younger students in part from analysis of examination specifications (2.2.2.4. Examiner or historical community as interlocutor? pp.74-76; e.g. Christie & Derewianka, 2007; Coffin, 2006). Authors of genre-based progression models often claim that genres are only 'prototypical' (Christie & Mission, 1998, p.11) and once students achieve competency in lower order genres they will be able to manipulate them to complete new types of tasks. With genres so strictly delineated at the highest level of secondary schooling in England due to genre-based assessment at A-Level, however, it is far from clear how or when students can be expected to display such manipulation to argumentative ends. As a consequence, in the case of terms such as 'historical narratives' for the purpose of causal explanation, we find students aged fourteen to eighteen – and often younger - being asked to produce 'school history genres' with a tenuous relationship with their purported analogues in the field of production.

While the process of recontextualisation necessarily demands adapting the parent knowledge to make it practicable for the purposes of schooling, the fact that some history teachers – freed of the restrictions placed on them by examination specifications – have constructed Key Stage 3 (ages 11-14) history curricula more obviously founded in trends in the field of production might suggest that the issue is not simply one of inability of younger students to access this particular academic knowledge (e.g. Foster & Goudie, 2019; Gadd, 2009; Worth, 2014).

If the history curriculum designer approached the recontextualisation of historical narrative for causal explanation at the expense of practical/ethical considerations, they may feel obliged to construct curricula that makes explicit to students that a historian's choice of mode(s) is dependent on epistemological criteria such as the question asked, the student's interpretative framework, the substantive phenomena under investigation and the student's particular argument (4.1.5. RQ1aT5 pp.155-169; 4.2.3.2. RQ1bT3S2 pp.181-191). To do so with students studying national examinations such as the GCSE and A Level, however, would in some cases jeopardise their chances of success – even if the student's response was closer to knowledge produced in the field of production.

For example, while the awarding body states candidates should 'avoid a narrative/descriptive approach; this undermines the analysis that is required for the higher levels' (e.g. Pearson Edexcel, 2017, p.35; 2018, p.41; 2019a, p.51), in the 1990s a number of historians in the historiography of the Salem witch crisis have employed the narrative approach precisely because, in their view, it provides greater explanatory power than the analytical mode (e.g. Gragg, 1992; Hill, 1996; Hoffer, 1996, 1997; Le Beau, 1998; Rosenthal, 1993). In future, therefore, greater appreciation should be made of the historical discipline's essentially catholic nature by ensuring that if specific claims regarding historians' general practice are made, they are demonstrably substantiated with reference to the field of production. National examinations in history, in other words, should be more explicitly and reiteratively referenced against developments in the field of production.

Finally, with command verbs necessitating responses in certain modes, in national examinations genre is currently prioritised over epistemology (4.1.5.4. RQ1aT5S4 pp.165-169). Instead, the prioritisation should be reversed, enabling students to employ the narrative or analytical mode (or a combination thereof) in light of the question being asked and the student's argument (Carroll, 2021). In such a scenario, modes would not be demarcated or prioritised in terms of marks awarded. The merits of any causal explanation can only be judged in terms of its adequacy as a response to the particular question posed. Some philosophers have, therefore, noted different types of causal questions may imply certain explanatory models in response, which in turn might have implications for the appropriacy of the mode (Atkinson, 1978; Mandelbaum, 1977; Van Bouwel & Weber, 2008).

For example, at GCSE a candidate might be posed the following question and stimulus points which demand focus on long-term structural conditions:

> 'It was the unusual political conditions operating in Massachusetts in 1692 that explain the extraordinary events in Salem.'
>
> How far do you agree with this explanation of the Salem witch hunt of 1692?
>
> You may use the following in your answer

- The unusual political conditions operating in Massachusetts in 1692
- The trauma resulting from the Second Indian War 1688-97

Such a question, at least when the candidate discusses the structural conditions in the stimulus points, may perhaps be more amenable to a response in the analytic mode, although both modes should be permissible if the question set is answered. Similarly, a question more focused on shorter-term individual action might be asked such as:

> How far does the role of Governor Phips explain the end of the Salem witch hunt (1692–93)?
>
> You may use the following in your answer

- The role of Governor Phips
- The role of Increase Mather

Such a question may lend itself more obviously to a narrative causal explanation, although successful responses in the analytic mode would also be credited. Finally, a question may be set so as to obviously permit either mode or combination thereof because a particular relevance relation is not built into it (Van Bouwel & Weber, 2008). Such questions would enable candidates to use the choice of mode as an argumentative choice to stress the relative causal importance of structural conditions in relation to individual actions or vice versa.

9.5. Conclusion

In conclusion, although history curriculum designers, including genre theorists and members of the 'extended writing movement', have claimed to have 'recontextualised' academic history, this study demonstrates both the lack of systematicity of their approaches so far, as well as instances where some of their recommendations contradict the discipline of history in the field of production. Furthermore, this study's explicit and systematic approach to recontextualisation has revealed opportunities and limitations to a history curriculum designer when identifying curricular goals for students' extended historical writing that hitherto have been unrecognised or underemphasised.

In terms of opportunities, explicit and systematic recontextualisation might better allow the history curriculum designer to consider the specificities of *historical* causal explanation as opposed to explanation in generic 'non-fiction genres'. Recontextualisation might also indicate the few tenets of the historical discipline that are broadly agreed on in the field of production in the early twenty-first century – for example that history is non-categorical argument, and that artificial delineation and prioritisation of written modes is problematic. Such findings have implications for current history curriculum design and national examinations which on occasion promote genre-based progression models and encourage the teaching of non-argumentative modes. Recontextualisation might also enable the curriculum designer to more precisely consider how and why one's explanatory model expressed in writing is more contingent on particular causal question types, historiographical research traditions, substantive focuses, and the writer's individual argument. In this sense, the interrelationship between disciplinary and substantive knowledge in history curriculum design might be more meaningfully considered.

Regarding the processes that the recontextualising history curriculum designer undergoes when identifying curricular goals, this study suggests certain limitations that until now have been downplayed and require more consideration. 'Recontextualising' academic history is far from straightforward – the discipline is pluralistic, relatively undertheorised, and general philosophical claims regarding history often lack empirical warrant. What is more, discourses and awarding-body examination specifications already exist that claim to have, with varying degrees of explicitness and persuasiveness, ‘recontextualised’ academic history. Existing curriculum and assessment structures on occasion deny the history curriculum designer the ability to ‘recontextualise’ academic history while still enabling students to achieve. These limitations may need to be consciously navigated if the ‘recontextualisation’ of academic history for the purposes of schooling is to be more than empty rhetoric.

Finally, A-Level students across the attainment range were able to use lexicogrammar such as nominalisation, the ‘cause within the clause’, and counterfactual conditionals in order to prioritise causes, metadiscursively explain, characterise causes and their causal mechanisms, and employ a variety of explanatory models in a fashion judged desirable by academic historians. Prior to their lexicogrammatical modelling, the students had read the language in the context of authentic academic scholarship. Such scholarship was also identified by academic experts to be how and where disciplinary knowledge is constructed. This study might therefore provide an example of how parallel discourses such as those of genre theory and the extended writing movement might be practically integrated in a fashion congruent with the academic discipline of history.

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