

Data and Safety Monitoring of COVID-19 Vaccine Clinical Trials

Brief Running Title: Monitoring COVID-19 Vaccine Trials

Steven Joffe, MD, MPH, Perelman School of Medicine, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, United States

Abdel Babiker, PhD, Medical Research Council Clinical Trials Unit, University College London, London, United Kingdom

Susan S. Ellenberg, PhD, Perelman School of Medicine, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, United States

Alan Fix, MD, MS, Center for Vaccine Innovation and Access, PATH, Washington, DC, United States

Marie R. Griffin, MD, MPH, Vanderbilt School of Medicine, Nashville, TN, United States

Sally Hunsberger, PhD, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease, Rockville, MD, United States

Jorge Kalil, MD, PhD, Faculdade de Medicina, Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil

Myron M. Levine, MD, DTPH, University of Maryland School of Medicine, Baltimore, MD, United States

Malegapuru W. Makgoba, MB, Dphil, Health Ombudsman, Office of Health Standards and Compliance, Pretoria, Republic of South Africa

René H. Moore, PhD, Rollins School of Public Health, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, United States

Anastasios A. Tsiatis, PhD, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, United States

Richard Whitley, MD, University of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, AL, United States

Correspondence to: Steven Joffe, MD, MPH, Department of Medical Ethics and Health Policy, Perelman School of Medicine, University of Pennsylvania, 423 Guardian Dr., BH1413,

Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA. Tel: 1-215-898-3055, Fax: 1-215-573-3036,

joffes@upenn.edu.

Alternate correspondence to: Richard Whitley, MD, Department of Pediatrics, University of Alabama at Birmingham, Suite 303, Children's Harbor, 1600-Seventh Ave. South,

Birmingham, AL 35233. Tel: 1-205-919-5485, Fax: 1-205-934-8559,

rwhitley@peds.uab.edu.

Summary of main point: The federal government has empanelled a data and safety monitoring board to oversee the SARS-CoV-2 vaccine trials that it funds. We describe the DSMB's mission and procedures and the challenges it has faced in overseeing these trials during a pandemic.

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Abstract

To speed the development of vaccines against SARS-CoV-2, the United States federal government has funded multiple phase 3 trials of candidate vaccines. A single 11-member data and safety monitoring board (DSMB) monitors all government-funded trials to ensure coordinated oversight, promote harmonized designs, and allow shared insights related to safety across trials. DSMB reviews encompass 3 domains: 1) the conduct of trials, including overall and subgroup accrual and data quality and completeness; 2) safety, including individual events of concern and comparisons by randomized group; and 3) interim analyses of efficacy when event-driven milestones are met. Challenges have included the scale and pace of the trials, the frequency of safety events related to the combined enrollment of over 100,000 participants, many of whom are older adults or have comorbid conditions that place them at independent risk of serious health events, and the politicized environment in which the trials have taken place.

Key Words

SARS-CoV-2

COVID19

Clinical trials

Vaccines

Data and safety monitoring

1 In May 2020, the United States federal government launched Operation Warp Speed (OWS),
2 an ambitious plan to “accelerate the development, manufacturing, and distribution of
3 COVID-19 vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics.”[1] Funded by almost \$10 billion in
4 Congressional appropriations, OWS is a partnership among the Department of Health and
5 Human Services (including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], the
6 National Institutes of Health [NIH], and the Biomedical Advanced Research and
7 Development Authority [BARDA]), the Department of Defense, and the private sector.[2] To
8 accelerate vaccine development, OWS funded multiple large randomized trials to assess the
9 safety and efficacy of several candidate vaccines based on diverse technologies. OWS also
10 agreed to purchase hundreds of millions of doses to assure timely manufacture of ample
11 quantities of vaccine. Finally, OWS has committed to financing the rapid, equitable, and
12 comprehensive distribution and delivery of vaccines within the United States that are
13 shown to be safe and effective.[3]

14 To ensure rigorous, independent, and unbiased scientific and ethical oversight of the
15 vaccine field trials that it is funding, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
16 Diseases (NIAID) empaneled a single independent data and safety monitoring board
17 (DSMB, alternately called a data monitoring committee or DMC) in June 2020, with
18 members invited by the Institute Director.[4] Single DSMBs have been used to oversee
19 multiple clinical trials within networks such as the AIDS Clinical Trials Group, the HIV
20 Prevention Trials Network, and the HIV Vaccine Trials Network.[5-8] However, their use in
21 the OWS COVID-19 clinical trial program, as well as in the Adaptive COVID-19 Treatment
22 Trial (ACTT), the Randomised Evaluation of COVID-19 Therapy (RECOVERY) program, and
23 the World Health Organization’s Solidarity Trial, to oversee multiple trials of products

24 targeting the same outcome in the setting of a global pandemic is precedent-setting.
25 Institute leadership recognized that, with independent but parallel trials aiming to test
26 multiple vaccines against a common virus, oversight by a single DSMB would facilitate
27 informed judgments such as those about interim analyses or about the relatedness of
28 adverse events and would ensure that reviews of individual trials would benefit from
29 insights gained from the complete trial portfolio. The structure of the DSMB, which is
30 formally known as the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Vaccine Data and Safety
31 Monitoring Board, and its operating processes have not previously been described.
32 Furthermore, although DSMBs usually operate in obscurity, the COVID-19 Vaccine DSMB
33 was recently the subject of considerable public attention related to disagreements about
34 results of an interim efficacy analysis.[9] We write as DSMB members and staff to inform
35 the medical, scientific, public health, and policy communities, and the general public, about
36 the workings of this Board.

37 Purpose and Structure of the COVID-19 Vaccine Data and Safety Monitoring DSMB

38 The purpose of the DSMB is to ensure the safety of study participants and the rigor and
39 integrity of the clinical trials that it monitors. It consists of eleven members from the United
40 States, Brazil, South Africa, and the United Kingdom, including experts in infectious disease,
41 vaccinology, immunology, biostatistics, pharmacoepidemiology, public health, and
42 bioethics. Members, who may receive an honorarium of \$200 per meeting from NIAID, are
43 free of financial relationships with companies developing vaccines against COVID-19,
44 including but not limited to those working in partnership with OWS. A biostatistician, who
45 is a full-time NIAID employee, serves as Executive Secretary to the DSMB. The Executive

46 Secretary sets agendas for meetings, drafts meeting reports, and facilitates communication
47 with vaccine manufacturers and with a three-person Oversight Group. Each clinical trial is
48 managed by its own Oversight Group, which includes representation from BARDA, NIAID,
49 and the vaccine company conducting that trial. Formally, the DSMB is advisory to the
50 Oversight Group for each trial.

51 The DSMB operates under a single charter, common to all the trials that it oversees, that
52 governs its structure, reporting relationships, and operations (Appendix). The Executive
53 Secretary drafted the charter in accordance with the NIAID's policy on DSMBs.[10] The
54 final version incorporates comments from members of the Accelerating COVID-19
55 Therapeutic Interventions and Vaccines (ACTIV) team[11] and from the DSMB members.
56 Members agree in writing to follow the principles of the charter and to maintain
57 confidentiality of all meeting discussions and materials. The charter can be amended for
58 clarity as needed, subject to the approval of the DSMB members and the NIAID; to date, it
59 has been amended three times, once to move the members' names into a separate
60 document, once to harmonize the description of the oversight group with that in the
61 cooperative research and development agreements (CRADAs) with company sponsors, and
62 once to allow the DSMB chair, with company permission, to discuss safety issues with the
63 Food and Drug Administration.

64 Study Review Process

65 Since the trials it is monitoring began, the DSMB has met by videoconference over 25 times,
66 generally reviewing one trial per meeting. Scheduled meetings typically last 2-3 hours.
67 When necessary, the DSMB holds ad hoc meetings to address emerging safety concerns

68 and, if accrual or event milestones are met between scheduled meetings, to review interim
69 analyses. Ad hoc meetings may be convened on short notice, including weekends, to ensure
70 rapid reviews and to minimize delays in trial progress. A seven-member quorum is
71 required to meet.

72 At initial meetings for each trial, the DSMB reviews study protocols, overall and subgroup
73 accrual goals, choice of endpoints, and statistical designs including interim analysis plans
74 related to futility, safety, and efficacy. Once trials begin, meetings focus on accrual
75 (including of important subgroups), data quality and completeness, and safety. To date, the
76 DSMB has reviewed three formal interim efficacy analyses, of trials from Moderna, Janssen,
77 and AstraZeneca.[12-14] The DSMB is currently monitoring the Moderna, Janssen,
78 AstraZeneca, and Novavax trials. The trial of the vaccine developed jointly by Pfizer and
79 BioNTech, which is not funded by OWS, has a separate DSMB.

80 Prior to each meeting, members receive study reports via a secure website. Two
81 members—one clinician and one statistician—serve as primary reviewers for each trial,
82 but all members are expected to review reports in advance of the meeting. Meetings begin
83 in executive session, attended only by DSMB members and the Executive Secretary, during
84 which members discuss issues noted on pre-review. The DSMB then moves into open
85 session, joined by representatives of the sponsoring company, NIAID, BARDA, COVID-19
86 Prevention Trials Network (CoVPN, an NIAID-supported network to facilitate recruitment
87 of diverse populations to COVID-19 vaccine trials),[15] and other study team members.
88 During the open session, company representatives present aggregate data on study
89 progress, accrual, data quality, and any anticipated changes to study conduct, along with

90 updates from other trials they may be conducting. Safety monitors, who remain blinded to
91 the groups to which participants are assigned and may include representatives of the
92 sponsoring company, also describe any serious adverse events or other safety data of
93 concern identified since the prior review.

94 The DSMB then moves into closed session, which includes members, the Executive
95 Secretary, and representatives from a statistical support group (SSG) that has a contractual
96 relationship with but is otherwise independent of the sponsoring company. The unblinded
97 SSG statisticians present demographic, data quality, safety, and efficacy data to the DSMB
98 by randomized group. Following this presentation, the DSMB moves back into executive
99 session, during which members agree on recommendations. Finally, the study-specific
100 Oversight Group rejoins the meeting to receive the DSMB's conclusions and
101 recommendations.

102 Following each meeting, the Executive Secretary prepares a draft memorandum outlining
103 the DSMB's conclusions and recommendations. Members offer comments and edits, after
104 which the memorandum is finalized and sent to the trial's Oversight Group.

105 The Figure summarizes the entities with which the DSMB interacts and the flow of data and
106 recommendations among them.

107 Content of DSMB Reviews

108 Once a trial begins enrolling, reviews focus on three main elements: trial conduct, safety,
109 and vaccine efficacy.

110 *Trial conduct:* At each review, the DSMB examines metrics to ensure that the trial is
111 proceeding as planned. The DSMB looks closely at accrual, including the numbers and
112 proportions of participants in relevant subgroups such as those defined by age, sex, race,
113 ethnicity, and presence of risk factors that predispose to severe COVID-19. The DSMB also
114 reviews measures of completeness of follow up, adherence to the allocated intervention,
115 and data quality, such as the proportions of participants with incomplete case report forms
116 or with unanswered queries from sponsoring companies to local sites. Recommendations
117 related to accrual have included increased representation of participants from racial and
118 ethnic groups that have suffered disproportionately from the pandemic and of
119 subpopulations that, based on the epidemiologic literature, have risk factors for severe
120 disease. For example, the DSMB requested that sponsors establish specific goals for
121 recruitment of demographic subgroups based upon their proportions of the United States
122 population. Sponsors followed these requests, even taking steps such as pausing accrual of
123 individuals from adequately represented groups in order to ensure that final samples
124 included appropriate demographic diversity in response to DSMB recommendations.
125 Recommendations related to data quality have included requests that sponsoring
126 companies evaluate whether missing data are disproportionately attributable to particular
127 sites, allowing focused remediation, and that they pause enrollment at sites that were not
128 keeping up with data entry.

129 *Safety:* Participant safety is a central responsibility of the DSMB, which devotes substantial
130 attention at each meeting to review of interim safety metrics. In addition, the DSMB
131 regularly receives reports of individual safety events between meetings and discusses via
132 email whether further information or actions in response are needed. When considering

133 serious adverse events that merit individualized evaluation, the DSMB is informed of the
134 group to which the participant was assigned in order to facilitates its ability to make
135 judgments about causation. Given the large number of participants in the trials that the
136 DSMB monitors, the need to review individual unblinded adverse event reports arises
137 frequently.

138 Evaluation of safety, a responsibility that the DSMB shares with regulatory agencies,
139 institutional review boards, and sponsoring companies, is the most demanding aspect of
140 the Board's role. The DSMB oversees multiple trials, each with tens of thousands of
141 participants. Furthermore, by design, trials include numerous participants who are older
142 adults or who have comorbidities that, independent of their participation in a vaccine trial,
143 place them at elevated risk of death or serious health events. Thus, some serious adverse
144 events, including deaths, are anticipated among study participants. When a vaccine
145 recipient experiences such an event, the DSMB must assess the likelihood that it was
146 related to the vaccine and, if so, whether it recommends changes to the protocol or to
147 informed consent documents. In the most concerning instances, the DSMB must decide
148 whether to recommend that trial accrual and administration of vaccine and placebo be
149 paused pending further investigation and, if a study is paused, whether and when to
150 recommend that it resume. As an example, the DSMB was involved in reviewing a case of
151 transverse sinus thrombosis associated with thrombocytopenia that occurred in a vaccine
152 recipient in Janssen's clinical trial, leading to a study pause. After careful consideration, the
153 DSMB endorsed the decision to resume accrual to the trial.[16] No further cases were
154 reported among trial participants. However, following Emergency Use Authorization (EUA)
155 of the Janssen vaccine by the FDA, additional cases of similar adverse events were reported

156 among individuals receiving the vaccine outside the trial, resulting in a recommendation by
157 the FDA and CDC to pause deployment. Ten days later, after further review and two
158 meetings of the CDC's Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, deployment of the
159 Janssen vaccine resumed.[17]

160 Early in the trial program, additional safety concerns related to the possibility that
161 administration of a COVID-19 vaccine might increase rather than decrease the incidence or
162 severity of disease.[18, 19] Increased incidence or severity could occur due to antibody-
163 dependent enhancement, as has been noted with dengue virus infection and, potentially,
164 with the Dengvaxia® vaccine.[20, 21] Alternately, vaccine-associated enhanced respiratory
165 disease, as was noted with the formalin-inactivated, alum-adjuvanted whole virion vaccine
166 developed to prevent respiratory syncytial virus illness in the 1960s, might be seen among
167 recipients.[22, 23] To ensure vigilance, protocols incorporate harm monitoring plans that
168 include frequent comparisons of the incidence of protocol-defined severe COVID-19
169 between groups. Were the DSMB to observe a paradoxically increased incidence of severe
170 COVID-19 among participants in a trial's vaccine group, it would consider recommending
171 that the trial be paused or terminated due to increased risk of harm. This situation has not
172 arisen to date.

173 The DSMB's role in overseeing a portfolio of multiple trials has facilitated its ability to
174 perform safety monitoring across all trials. For example, when concerns first surfaced
175 about thromboembolic events associated with AstraZeneca's vaccine in Europe, the DSMB
176 was able to review relevant categories of adverse events across its portfolio of trials to look
177 for broader patterns associated with SARS-CoV-2 vaccines as a class.

178 *Efficacy*: A third component of the DSMB’s mission is to review interim analyses of efficacy
179 outcomes. Each statistical analysis plan specifies an approach to efficacy analysis, including
180 the numbers of events (i.e., cases of symptomatic, laboratory-proven COVID-19) that would
181 trigger a formal interim efficacy analysis and the statistical decision rules that should be
182 applied in making recommendations about early termination of or modifications to
183 ongoing trials. The DSMB reviews two type of efficacy analyses. The first addresses
184 whether accumulating data suggest that it is highly unlikely that a vaccine will meet
185 specified criteria for effectiveness (i.e., futility analysis). The second addresses whether the
186 vaccine has shown convincing evidence of efficacy by surpassing stringent, prespecified
187 criteria. If the DSMB believes there is a compelling case for futility, or if there is
188 overwhelming evidence of efficacy without serious countervailing concerns about safety, it
189 can inform the study’s Oversight Group of the data and make a recommendation regarding
190 the future conduct of the study (as an example, the DSMB recommended that the
191 manufacturer and the sponsoring federal agencies be unblinded due to a marked reduction
192 in COVID-19 diagnoses among vaccine compared with placebo recipients after its first
193 interim review of efficacy data from Moderna’s clinical trial). Releasing such information to
194 the Oversight Group implies that the independent DSMB believes the data are compelling
195 and actionable and allows manufacturers to take actions such as submitting applications to
196 regulatory agencies for emergency use authorization or full approval or notifying
197 participants and the public of study findings.

198 Challenges

199 The DSMB has faced numerous challenges, including the trials' remarkable scale and pace,
200 the need to monitor a portfolio of related trials rather than a single trial, and the politicized
201 setting in which the trials have taken place.

202 The trials that the DSMB monitors are enrolling at hundreds of sites around the United
203 States (and, in some cases, in other countries as well) and have target sample sizes of
204 30,000 to 40,000 each. Participants enrolled at the rate of several hundred per day and,
205 particularly with the winter 2020-1 peak of the pandemic, multiple participants were
206 diagnosed with laboratory-proven symptomatic COVID-19 (the trials' primary endpoint)
207 each day. In addition, across the ongoing trials, the DSMB receives at least several reports
208 each week related to serious adverse events. This scale and pace have placed extraordinary
209 demands on sponsoring companies, which have worked diligently to collect, adjudicate,
210 compile, and analyze vast amounts of data on short timelines. It has also placed demands
211 on the DSMB and its staff to evaluate data in a timely fashion and to be available for urgent
212 ad hoc reviews as needed.

213 Another challenge has been harmonization among studies. Inconsistencies among trials
214 might have led to confusion about why different rules applied to different companies, and
215 although OWS sought to harmonize protocols across companies, differences remained. The
216 DSMB has recommended modifications that promote greater alignment across trials,
217 including the specification of endpoints, the numbers of events at which interim efficacy
218 analyses take place, the thresholds and corresponding numbers of events needed to assess
219 efficacy at final analyses, and the statistical approaches and boundaries used for futility and
220 efficacy monitoring. For example, while some protocols proposed one or two interim

221 analyses after prespecified numbers of events, others initially proposed continuous interim
222 efficacy monitoring starting after a small number of events. Although all interim analysis
223 plans were statistically valid, the DSMB recommended the consistent use of the former
224 approach across all protocols to ensure a uniform level of evidence needed to stop a trial
225 early for efficacy and to promote public understanding of and trust in the process.

226 Finally, the COVID-19 vaccine trials have been perhaps the most politicized trials in history,
227 even becoming embroiled in United States presidential election politics.[24, 25] The
228 politicization of these trials prompted prominent figures in the scientific community to
229 question whether vaccine approval might be rushed for political reasons and fostered
230 public concern about whether safety would be compromised.[26, 27] Notwithstanding
231 these controversies, the DSMB has focused throughout on its primary goals – the safety of
232 study participants and the integrity and scientific validity of the trials that it is tasked to
233 oversee – and has encountered no interference with its ability to fulfill its charge. The
234 DSMB’s reporting structure to an oversight group that consists of career officials within
235 NIAID and BARDA as well as a representative of the sponsoring company aids in ensuring
236 the board’s independence.

237 Conclusion

238 Operation Warp Speed is an unprecedented effort to develop safe and effective vaccines
239 that will help end the COVID-19 pandemic. Conducting clinical trials under these
240 circumstances requires the utmost attention to participant safety and to data integrity so
241 that the public and the medical community will ultimately have trust in the vaccines and
242 the process used to develop them. Although it operates behind the scenes, by virtue of its

243 access to unblinded interim data, its charge to recommend changes to ongoing studies
244 based on these data, and its ability to examine emerging data across multiple parallel trials,
245 the COVID-19 Vaccine DSMB is uniquely positioned to ensure that these goals are met.
246 Furthermore, the single DSMB approach can serve as a model for future situations in which
247 there is an urgent need for coordinated development of multiple therapeutic or preventive
248 interventions to address rapidly evolving public health threats.

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FIGURE

Figure legend: Structure and process of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Vaccine Data and Safety Monitoring DSMB (DSMB). The single DSMB reviews multiple protocols from multiple sponsors, each with a separate protocol team and independent statistical support group. The 3-person Oversight Group for each protocol includes a representative from the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA), and the corresponding sponsor.

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