Zalabardo, José L;
(2023)
Humility and metaphysics.
Analytic Philosophy
, 64
(3)
pp. 183-196.
10.1111/phib.12259.
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Abstract
David Lewis has argued that we cannot identify the fundamental properties. It is generally accepted that we can resist Lewis's conclusion if we are prepared to accept a structuralist account of fundamental properties, according to which their causal/nomological role is essential to their identity. I argue, to the contrary, that a structuralist construal of fundamental properties does not sustain a successful independent strategy for resisting Lewis's conclusion. The structuralist can vindicate our ability to identify fundamental properties only if she accepts epistemic principles that suffice for blocking Lewis's conclusion even if fundamental properties are not construed along structuralist lines.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Humility and metaphysics |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1111/phib.12259 |
| Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12259 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher's terms and conditions. |
| Keywords: | David Lewis, humility, metaphysics, quidditism, structuralism |
| UCL classification: | UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10145174 |
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