THE SPITALFIELDS DEVELOPMENT GROUP. A UNIVERSAL MODEL FOR COMMUNITY BASED RESPONSE TO DEVELOPMENT PRESSURE?

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Community Development Trusts were established as a mechanism by which to organise communities facing a multifarious collection of planning problems. Subsequently, Community Development Trusts have been promoted as a model mechanism by which to empower people and enable them to solve their own local difficulties. There are many examples of Community Development Trusts currently in operation throughout the country dealing with a vast range of local issues, from promoting the image of a town like Wirksworth in Derbyshire, to providing light industrial units in Hebden Bridge in West Yorkshire.

In this Thesis I will examine the role that Community Development Trusts can play in acting as a focus around which a community can organise in response to redevelopment in its locality. Many communities in Central London are under considerable threat from the demand of office development in their locality and therefore I have chosen the Spitalfields Community Development Group as my empirical example. I shall examine how the Community Development Group came into existence within the political context of the locality and
how it has responded to the threat of redevelopment on the Trumans Brewery and Bishopgate Goodseyard sites. From this empirical study I hope to draw out the lessons which can be learnt from this Community Development Group's experience, how they can be applied to the operation of Community Development Trusts in the future and the implication this mechanism will have for future planning practice.
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

BIC - Business in the Community
BWA - Bangladeshi Welfare Association
CAP - Community Areas Policy
CDG - Community Development Group
CDT - Community Development Trust
DLO - Direct Labour Organisation
DOE - Dept of the Environment
DTI - Dept of Trade and Industry
GLC - Greater London Council
ILEA - Inner London Education Authority
JTC - Job Training Consortium
LBH - London Borough of Hackney
LBTH - London Borough of Tower Hamlets
LCC - London County Council
LRC - London Research Centre
OPCS - Office of Population and Census Surveys
SHPRS - Spitalfields Housing and Planning Rights Service
SSBA - Spitalfields Small Business Association
INFORMATION

In 1714, the Church Commissioners authorised the construction of Christ Church Spitalfields under the powers given to them by the Fifty New Churches Act 1711. Since 1729, the year of its completion, the imposing new church designed by Nicholas Hawlsmoor has towered over Spitalfields. But what is the significance of this history to a discussion of a modern Community Development Group, and its interaction with a consortium of developers and with the kaleidoscope of interests to be found in the ward of Spitalfields?

In 1684 a report to the Crown referred to Spitalfields as “the most factious hamlet of the Tower Division, having many conventicles (dissenters) in it”. Christ Church Spitalfields was a symbol that the state religion and the royal writ ran in that “factious hamlet”. The Church Commissioners of the early 18th Century like the present Central Government, have perceived Spitalfields as a problem, as a “factious hamlet” one of “those inner cities”. A place which needs to be brought back into the mainstream of society. The location of this area on the edge of the City of London has rendered it visible and
hence a prime target for such attention. Those who have come to Spitalfields in the past three centuries have tried to achieve their polices through the methods of their times and with the ideology of their times. In the 18th century, it was through the promotion of the King James II authorised version of the Bible now, it is through such ideological tools as the vocabulary of "partnership" and "community". I use Mannheim's definition of Ideology - Ideologies "justify the status qua", unlike Utopian ideas which "justify social change." (Man M 1983 P164)

Spitalfields suffers from all the classic symptoms of the inner city. The local statistics illustrate an area suffering from above average levels of ill health, bad housing and low educational achievement. The history of the locality as a "first footing" area for newly arrived immigrants has not helped to improve the local statistics. This Thesis is about how a Community Development Group (CDG) came into existence in Spitalfields. It is about the local environment which enabled the creation of a (CDG) to take place and possibly dictate its future development. It is also about the interaction between different interest groups in Spitalfields. It is about the CDG, and its relationship to local political
institutions and the developers who wish to develop two sites in Spitalfields. It is this system of relationships and interactions between the CDG and other forces in Spitalfields and their interaction with the planning system which I wish to explore. My working hypothesis is that the CDG is a pluralist pressure group which has attempted to re-establish the accommodation between Corporate and Pluralist interests.

Before I illustrate the structure of my Thesis, I must highlight some facts. The CDG is a Community-based organisation whose membership is drawn from a wide cross-section of the local population anyone who lives or works in the area can join. It is only concerned with the site of the proposed combined British Rail Property Board, Grand Metropolitan and the London and Edinburgh Trust (LET) plans for the redevelopment of the former Bishopgate Goodsyard, and Truman Brewery site at Pedley Street. I will make references to the plans of the Spitalfields Development Groups for the redevelopment of the Spitalfields Market site in passing, but my discussion of the CDG is firmly located around the Bishopgate and Brewery sites, which the CDG covers and of which it hopes to manage a significant part.
when development begins, and the CDG is translated into a Community Development Trust (CDT).

This Thesis will follow a logical structure. I shall frame my working hypothesis in the Dual State Theory, and I shall then illustrate the methods I used to carry out and research my theoretical proposition about the CDG. At this point I must define two terms which will appear frequently in this thesis. They are “inner city” and “community”. I use the term Inner city to describe a spatially defined locality which suffers a high degree of social and economic problems usually labelled “deprivation”, whilst being aware that deprivation is not confined to merely inner city areas, but can be found in many types of locality across the country. I use the term “community” as it is defined by the Oxford Dictionary to mean “the people living in a locality”, or “a group of people having cultural, religious or other characteristics in common”. When one talks of community in Spitalfields, one can use both meanings of the word.

My working hypothesis is that in the locality of Spitalfields the local planning apparatus in the form of the London Borough of Tower Hamlets (LBTH) is not addressing the
expressed needs of this community. This feeling of alienation from the conventional planning system which should be addressing their needs has resulted in the community drawing up its own local plan. This alternative plan has been called Planning Our Future (1990), and I have chosen the CDG as a empirical illustration of a much wider phenomenon. I would argue that, despite the existence of public consultation exercises in the drawing up of plans, there are many communities whose interests are ignored. They are ignored because, as in the case of Spitalfields they are poor and powerless, they cannot effectively manipulate the conventional mechanisms of public consultation, due to language and cultural barriers, or it is in the perceived wider interests of the community to override the interests of one section of that community. The result is that in many parts of the country, the planning process results in outcomes which do not promote social and economic equity.

I shall illustrate the way the response of pressure groups in the locality towards the array of post-war planning policy and development pressure directed at Spitalfields, conformed to my initial hypothesis. I will examine the emergence of the CDG, illustrating with reference to my empirical findings how
the CDG did not emerge as a grass roots pluralist pressure group, but as a body which is a product of a configuration between state and corporatist policy interests. From this point I shall examine the lessons and implications for Planning of the CDG experience, and briefly illustrate how the empirical example of the Spitalfields CDG is illustrative of an approach to large scale development, which we can witness repeated in many areas of the country, naturally resulting in different modes of implementation and outcomes.
CHAPTER ONE

A DESCRIPTION OF THE CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENT OF SPITALFIELDS AND A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOCIETY.

(1) 1 A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS LEADING TO THE CREATION OF THE SPITALFIELDS COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT GROUP.

Spitalfields for the purpose of this thesis is defined as the area consisting of the wards of Spitalfields, Weavers and St Peters, and is located in the Bethnal Green neighbourhood of the London Borough of Tower Hamlets (LBTH), and forms the Borough’s western boundary with the Corporation of the City of London. When I first read the proposed community plan “Planning Our Future” (1990) by the Spitalfields Community Development Group (CDG), I decided to find out more about the locality. From my reading of secondary sources such as Formans (1989) and Eade (1989), I began to piece together a chronology of events which led to the creation of the Spitalfields Community Development Group in May 1989. The post-war planning and development history of Spitalfields I perceived as consisting of four broad periods.
(1) 1945 - 65 A period of neglect when Spitalfields received very little planning attention.

(2) 1967 - 77 A period of a joint exercise by the GLC and LBTH to tackle the housing crisis in the Spitalfields locality.

(3) 1977 - 86 The locality is subject to conflicting planning policies directed by the GLC and LBTH.

(4) 1986 The abolition of the GLC and the control of the LBTH by the Liberals marks a new planning era in the locality.

In the immediate post-war era, when Spitalfields was situated in the London Borough of Stepney, the Borough of Stepney was the centre of a London County Council (LCC) "comprehensive development area". Spitalfields lay outside this area and as a result maintained its physical fabric and hence many of the social problems which, as I will demonstrate later, would bring the actors, groups, and issues into play.

In 1967 the newly formed LBTH in conjunction with the GLC declared Spitalfields a comprehensive development area; from 1967 to 1977, a policy of slum clearance and the provision in
the area of new build council housing stock was pursued. The aim of both the GLC and LBTH was to address the housing crisis in the locality. This policy pursued by the GLC and the LBTH was representative of a widespread planning policy during the 1960s and early 1970s aimed at "the wholesale renewal, whether by comprehensive improvement or redevelopment, of obsolescent housing." (Ravetz 1986 P81) The result of this policy was the building in the area of large Council estates; the Holland and Chicksand estates in Spitalfields are a product of this wholesale renewal policy.

In the late 1970s the LBTH planning policy for Spitalfields began to shift from pursuing policies which dealt purely with the locality's housing crisis, to the promotion of office development in the locality. The Labour leadership of the LBTH in this period wanted to promote a "new east end". This policy was to be achieved by diversifying the housing stock so as to attract home owners to the Borough. The LBTH also wanted to foster the growth of the service economy in the Borough, in an attempt to replace the jobs lost in the Borough's traditional industries. During this period, in response to the encouragement of the LBTH as expressed in planning policy, such as the designation of West Spitalfields as a "preferred location for office development" (LBTH 1977),
this encouraged the steady eastward movement of City of London related office activities into the streets of West Spitalfields bounded by Bishopsgate and Commercial Street. The encroachment of City of London activities into Spitalfields throughout the 1960s and 1970s was smallscale and piecemeal. This form of office development often consisted of the conversion of workshop units and warehouses into office uses. This form of development was not marked as the contemporary proposals for development in Spitalfields are, by its greater scale and rapidity.

The Labour controlled LBTH attempted during the 1977 - 86 period to change the image of Spitalfields from a “no go area” for developers to a desirable office location, due to its proximity to the City of London and major transport interchanges like Liverpool Street station. This policy of encouraging office development in the Spitalfields locality might have been successful and met with little controversy if the locality had conformed to the conventional wisdom governing the decline of inner city areas. Spitalfields exhibits two features which give the area its unique character and have prevented the locality being transformed from a shadow area adjacent to the City of London into an extension of the central business district. These two
characteristics are Spitalfields' local economy and demography.

Spitalfields survived the post-war era with its physical fabric intact, and continued to function as a "first footing" area for immigrants. The arrival of new waves of immigration, predominantly Bangladeshi, encouraged the maintainence of the locality's traditional industries centred on the rag trade. The newly arrived Bangladeshis took over the trades and housing vacated by the previous wave of immigrants. The result of this social trend was the development by the late 1970s of a large Bangladeshi community in Spitalfields. Spitalfields economically is an area which is located in the competitive sector of the economy. The area has many small garment and retail firms; they are located in this area due to the low rents which existed in the area until recently. Also the location is due to the symbiotic relationship these firms have with the rest of the metropolitan economy. It is this local economy which binds the Bangladeshi community to Spitalfields. It is the existence of this community in this locality, which unlike the average profile of inner city population is not that of an aging and declining population, but a young and expanding one, which has retarded the gradual movement of City of London
activities encouraged by the LBTH since the late 1970s.

The LBTH policy towards the Bangladeshi population was to try and disperse this community and realise the land they occupied for development. This was the hidden agenda behind much of the LBTH housing policy, directed towards the Bangladeshi Community in the 1970s (Forman 1989). This newly emergent Bangladeshi community suffered from an array of social problems; the most acute problem was shelter. The LBTH policy was to address the Bangladeshi housing crisis by moving this community out of the E1 postal district and hence breaking up the community. The response of the now abolished GLC was to implement in the Spitalfields locality the “Community Areas Policy” (CAP). This policy was promoted by Mr G Nicholson in capacity as chair of the GLC planning committee. The aim of the CAP policy initiative was to create a “life belt” of living communities circling the central business district. The Spitalfields CAP policy encouraged the maintainence of the Bangladeshi community in Spitalfields and the local economy which maintained the social fabric of this community. By implication the CAP policy was aimed at preventing development and contradicted the hidden planning agenda of the LBTH.
I found then a locality which has moved from being subject to a planning policy in the 1970s aimed at addressing the social problems of the locality in terms of improving housing conditions, to a locality which, during the late 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, is subject to a conflicting set of planning polices coming from the two tiers of local government. At the municipal level the interests of the developers are promoted, and at the county or strategic level a policy of maintaining and improving the environment of the local community through the CAP policy was promoted.

The fourth period in the planning and development history of Spitalfields begins in 1986. For Spitalfields, 1986 is a watershed year. We find Spitalfields at the beginning of 1986, facing a housing crisis and a steady erosion of its local economy as traditional workplaces are taken over for office purposes. However Spitalfields in this period is receiving planning initiatives through the CAP policy aimed at solving some of the locality's problems, with the passive support of the LBTH. By the end of 1986 Spitalfields found itself in a completely changed political and hence planning environment. In May 1986 the Liberals took control of the LBTH and the GLC was abolished; with the abolition of the GLC went the CAP policy. The Liberal controlled LBTH intensified the planning
policy which the Labour controlled LBTH had first introduced.
The Liberal controlled LBTH had little concern for Spitalfields because it was a Bangladeshi locality and overwhelmingly supported the Labour Party. The change in political climate was matched by a change in the development climate, 1986 was the year of the "Big Bang", and the service industries of the City of London were set to expand. Spitalfields appeared to be one locality into which the City could expand.

Spitalfields in the late 1980s was to be threatened by a new wave of proposed office development in its locality, and this was to be development on a much larger scale and on a number of large sites, such as the Spitalfields Market, Bishopsgate Goodsyards, and the Trumans Brewery site. The release of these sites for development, due to their scale alone, would lead to the break up of the Bangladeshi community in Spitalfields. The community would be broken up because its local economy would be undermined, since the garment and catering industries could not meet the rise in rents that this form of development would bring into the area. In the 1970s an attempt was made to disperse the Bangladeshi community through the Borough's housing policy. Now this aim would be achieved by breaking the local economies which underpin the
Bangladeshi community.

From my background reading and the establishment of Spitalfields' planning and development history, I perceived an area which was neglected for many years and continued to function as a "first footing" area for immigrants who worked in the locality's traditional industries. During the 1960s and 1970s, Spitalfields remains a shadow area, but small scale development begins to encroach into the locality. Also during this period, the Bangladeshi community began to consolidate in the locality. After 1986 the changed political climate and the apparent encouragement of large scale redevelopment in the area which would amount to some 2,402,987 new sq ft of office floor space in the locality (Aaronovitch 1991 P28), led me to perceive Spitalfields as a besieged community whose destruction the operation of the development system must inevitably bring about.

From my background reading I developed a working hypothesis, that the Spitalfields CDG the body described in the Introduction was a pluralist pressure group, which had come into existence, on the one hand to challenge or negotiate the development process occurring in the locality, and on the other hand, to fill the vacuum left by the local states
unwillingness to deal with this locality's social problems, predominantly suffered by the local Bangladeshi population.

Whilst carrying out my background reading I discovered that the London Borough of Hackney (LBH) controlled a part of the Bishopsgate site, the part of the site where the bulk of the proposed office development was to be located. The London Borough of Hackney had little if any contact with the Spitalfields CDG and entered into a planning agreement through conventional channels of negotiation with the joint developers of the Bishopsgate Goodsyard site. The LBH successfully concluded a “Planning Gain” package through an agreement with the developers, under the provisions of a Section 52 agreement of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971. The nature of this agreement and the preliminary sums of money involved, I have seen but cannot illustrate in this thesis because of the sensitivity of this planning application. It is for this reason that only scant reference will be made to the LBH in this thesis, because it had no direct involvement with the Spitalfields CDG. The LBH did play an indirect role in promoting development pressure in the Spitalfields locality by its early granting of outline planning permission in late 1989 for the portion of the Bishopsgate site falling within the boundaries of the LBH.
My working hypothesis appeared to raise four broad planning questions and issues.

(1) How were the needs of the local community for shelter and space in which to develop their local economy going to be accommodated in the same 250 acres, on which the developers wished to build some 2,402,987 sq ft of office floor space?

(2) What planning role was the LBTH to play in trying to meet the needs of these two interest communities, i.e., the developers and the community?

(3) What role was the LBTH going to play in the development of Spitalfields? Would it play the role of mediator between the community and developers? Would the LBTH encourage the developers as a mechanism by which to promote office development and disperse a politically troublesome community?

(4) Had the local inhabitants of Spitalfields decided to address their own local housing and work needs and drawn up their community plan as a way of uniting and mobilising the community to tackle the threat that development posed?
If these were the four planning issues I identified in the Spitalfields area, the main planning issue must be to find out how legitimate as an agent safeguarding the interests of the residents of the Borough the planning apparatus is in the LBTH. It is this question surrounding the legitimacy of the LBTH planning apparatus which will determine the implications for the future governance and planning of Spitalfields. Through the establishment of the planning and development history of Spitalfields and the identification of the actors involved in the contemporary development process in Spitalfields, I developed a mental picture of a plurality of groups and interests. There were the interests of the local community both white and Bangladeshi, the various pressure groups in the locality, the developers, and the interests of the local and central state in the locality. This very plurality of interests, operating to further their interests with various degrees of resources, led me to adopt the Dual State theory as my model of theoretical explanation. The Dual State theory acknowledges that in an advanced industrial society, politics and the promotion of group interests, be they of developers or a deprived ethnic minority community, are more complex than just a simple struggle between the interests of capital and labour. The state does not automatically act to promote the interests of capital. The Dual State Theory
provided me with a theoretical model which mirrored the complexity of opposing interests which exist in the 250 acres of Spitalfields.

(1) 2 THE DUAL STATE THEORY AND THE CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM

I came to understand the contemporary situation in Spitalfields through a theoretical understanding of the relationship between the development system and the political economy of society. The "development system" is not an isolated activity, it is a major component of the political economy. Ambrose (1986) whose works are located in the Marxist tradition, describes the development system as consisting of four elements. (1) people, (2) finance (3) the state and (4) construction. It is the interaction of these four elements of the development system and how they operate to bring about often dramatic changes in our physical environment, with their subsequent social and economic consequences, that I now wish to explore. To reach a understanding of the development system, I have adopted Saunders Dual State Theory. The Dual State Theory states that the polity of contemporary society is divided into two broad interest communities, producer and consumer interests.
The producer body will promote its interests through intermediation with the State and its relationship with the state is corporatist. The consumer body interests are promoted through representation to the state, and are characterised by a pluralist relationship with it. To understand the applicability of this theory we must illustrate the development system, and examine the theoretical analysis surrounding its operation and then apply the Dual State Theory to the locality of Spitalfields.

When the Town and Country Planning Act 1947 was introduced, it was widely believed that the newly created statutory planning apparatus would promote the public interest in land use. The rational use of land would be promoted, for the greatest benefit of society Ravetz (1986). The undesirable consequences of speculative development such as the 1930s suburban sprawl would be prevented. Town planning by the late 1960s began to be criticised by the public. Critical questions were asked - was planning a device for the rational maximisation of land use? The results of town planning often appeared to be against the interests of some sections of the public. Critical analyses of the planning apparatus by Goodman (1972) and Simmie (1974) appeared. These works were critical of the planning profession and its
polices, they pointed to the conflicting nature of planning. Behind the apparent political neutrality of the planning apparatus, it was basically a conflict laden exercise because it allocated major resources in society. Such decisions obviously have a great impact upon people's lives, and the way decisions were arrived at and the societal groups who had the greatest influence in the planning process began to be analysed.

Ambrose uses the Marxist theory of M - C - C1 - M1 to explain the operation of the development system. “The development of land for profit is simply a special case of the general process by which entrepreneurs seek to accumulate wealth by involvement in a production cycle.” (Ambrose 1986 P2) The entrepreneur engages on a conversion cycle represented as M - C - C1 - M1. M initial capital outlay, C commodities are purchased to carry out the production process and labour employed, C1 a product resulting from the production process, M1 the value of the product when it is sold or realised on the market. For the entrepreneur to be successful he or she has to realise a greater value of M1 over M the original capital invested in the project. The M - C - C1 - M1 chain of conversion is the mechanism which describes the production cycle of the development system.
The state both at its central and local level is subject to public pressure in the form of voters, pressure groups and informal contacts to shape its policy towards the development system in accordance with the plurality of interest represented. Ambrose defines three types of pressure groups, (1) corporate ie, the road lobby, (2) professional Shelter, (3) citizen groups like the Community Development Group. The success of any pressure group will depend upon its resources and the quality of its personnel, and these factors give greater influence to pressure groups in categories (1) and (2).

The public have influence on the process, theoretically as citizens through channels of political action and as consumers of the commodities in the form, for example, of housing. The money which building societies and pension funds invest in development comes from the public in the form of savings. Although the public have little influence on the investment policies pursued by the pension funds, we have seen how the people, the state and the finance industry are interconnected. How do these components of the development system relate to the construction industry?

The construction industry consists of four major parts. (1)
speculative house building firms like Barratts, (2) property development, which is broadly the sector this thesis is concerned with, and (3) general contracting firms which carry out civil engineering projects, new build and renovation work. The final part of the construction industry (4) is the public authority direct works departments, known as DLO - Direct Labour Organisations. The construction industry is connected to and interacts with the public who buy products or oppose its building projects and with the finance industry who provide the finance for the construction costs and for the consumers to buy the commodity once built. The construction industry is heavily involved with Central Government due to fiscal policy. For example, the lowering or raising of interest rates can have a considerable impact on the construction industry. The construction industry is also involved with Central Government by partnerships and freehold.

The construction industry for the same reason is involved with Local Government, with whom they may enter into partnership. Local Government partnerships and development with the construction industry have increased due to legislation like section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Local Government and developer partnerships have also been encouraged by the DOE. The local state is also the
local planning agency, which results in a close relationship - often an antagonistic one - with the construction industry and also with the public as planning becomes an arena for conflict between these interests. From the examination of the development system as illustrated by Ambrose, I perceived a highly complex system of institutional public industrial and financial patterns of interaction and interdependence. How do I understand this development system theoretically and the way it operates to bring about such dramatic changes in the physical environment? What influence can individual citizens have on this process, how am I to understand the relationship between the economy and civil society?

Ambrose’s Marxist definition of the development system led me to the logic of Saunders Dual State Theory, which is located in the Weberian tradition. I perceived, from the examination of the development system, a major division between the interests of (1) people and the opposing interests of (2) finance and (4) construction. I can label these interest communities as “pluralist interests” and “corporate interests”. The third part of the development system, (3) the state, acts as the mediator between these opposing interests in an “ideal type” theoretical framework. I witnessed later in this thesis that the state’s role is far
Politics is about the distribution of resources. The figure above illustrates the three ideal type modes of resource allocation, and the social feature each ideal type will exhibit, ie the different forms the state, ideology, planning, political lobbying and so forth take. When studying the development system, I am studying the politics of collective
consumption. Using the Weberian theoretical model of ideal types, I identified three modes of resource allocation. These are identified by Cawson and Saunders as (A) market mode, (B) bureaucratic mode, (C) corporatist mode. Each ideal type of resource allocation exhibits certain features, for example the distribution of power in a market mode is diffuse and pluralistic, in a bureaucratic mode it is centralised and concentrated, and in a corporatist mode polycentric and hierarchical. These three types of resource allocation system are ideal types and, in an advanced society like Britain, all three types of resource allocation are in operation at the same time and at different levels. It is within this political theoretical framework I wish to examine the role the state, economy and citizens play in the shaping of planning policy.

To understand Dual State Theory and apply this theoretical framework to Spitalfields, I had to analyse the relationship between the state and economic organisations. Pahl claims, “It is time that we gave up the struggle to fit the state into the Procrustean bed of a single theory but recognise . . . the need for a typology of kinds of power and forms of social control.” (Pahl 1977 P12). I had to analyse the different social, economic and political elements which make up contemporary society. To do this I must examined the
formation and structure of the economy in an advanced industrial society. Advanced industrial societies have a three tier economy (Simmie 1989) consisting of (A) trans national corporations (TNCs) like IBM and Shell, and (B) competitive firms who, unlike the TNCs, operate in a system of economic pluralism. These firms, industries like retail, catering, hotels and various kinds of manufacturing, often have a symbiotic relationship with the TNCs. These firms are often locally based, depend on a workforce in their locality and are significant actors in their local economy. A third element of the economy is (C) the black economy. This can take many forms, and its scale due to its deviant nature is difficult to measure.

These three major elements of the economy will have a different relationship with the political structures of society and with the planning authorities. The first two parts of the economy are major actors in the land use planning system, the TNCs and competitive business sector are "major" land users and are therefore major actors in physically changing the environment. The Dual State theory argues that the role of the state, in this instance the physical change in the environment, can't be viewed in a unitary theoretical model, as the Marxists would suggest. The
state does not automatically promote the interests of large corporations over the interests of the competitive business circuit or the community of a locality. With state action in an advanced society like Britain, the state formulates and implements policy through a complex process of interaction between different interest communities. This interaction can be labelled as corporatism the TNCs will have more influence on the formation of state policy than many pressure groups. “The corporatist system is a non-egalitarian one in which privilege is accorded by virtue of contribution to the national product.” (Cawson and Saunders 1983 P17) Corporatism can often result in “imperfect pluralism.” The TNCs have more influence in the formulation of state policy due to the contribution they make to the national product.

The central state will promote TNC interests which can result in clashes with the local state, which often promotes the interests of “collective consumption”, being the body which is responsible for delivering services like education and housing. It cannot be theoretically predicted with any degree of certainty how the state will react to pressure from the array of policy communities who try to elicit state support. In the case of the Spitalfields CDG the central state played an active role in the apparent promotion of “consumer
interests”, whilst the local state remained ambivalent to this body.

(1) 3 THE DUAL STATE THEORY AND CONTEMPORARY BRITAIN.

The political system which governs the planning process in contemporary Britain can be labelled using Saunders' term, as “dual politics”. It is due to the dualism in the economy between producer and consumer, which produces dualism in the polity of society, that one witnesses the formation of a Dual State. “Partly as a result of these economic divisions the polity is also significantly divided between corporate interest intermediation and pluralist representation, corporatist organisations being concerned primarily with production while pluralist group interests focus mainly on consumption.” (Simmie 1987 P3) The result is that citizens promote their interests through the pluralist mode of politics and the oligopolies promote their political interests through corporatist political structures. We have seen how politics and economics combine to influence the land use planning system and its outcomes. The physical environment is a product of this Dual Political framework. It is a product over time of the politico administrative apparatus on the one hand, dealing with “corporatist interest intermediation” and on the
other hand with "pluralist interest representation." The development system is a political arena where corporate and pluralist interests consistently interact and shift. Which elements have the most influence will depend on the geographical location of an area and the political environment of that locality.

This accommodation, which preserved an equilibrium in society by advancing corporate interest whilst also safeguarding pluralist interests, has been undermined. Since the election of a Conservative government in 1979, the post war accommodation has been undermined. Thornley (1990) and Geddes (1990) illustrate the breakdown of this accommodation especially in the area of planning. I therefore saw the activities of the CDG as an attempt to renegotiate the previous accommodation which existed between labour and capital. I interpret the willingness of the corporate interests to negotiate with the CDG as an attempt to promote political stability in this locality, in the absence of the state's willingness to play the role of a mediator between these two groups. The corporate interests need stability in the locality to safeguard their investment. The break-down of this political accommodation due to Thatcherism in the 1980s, and the shift from the collective means of
consumption to the private provision of the means of consumption, has led to a polarisation in society between those who can meet their own needs and those relying on a system of collective consumption which is continually deteriorating. I therefore interpret the CDG as an attempt by a very disadvantaged group in terms of ethnicity, economics and political influence to use their limited resources and strengths - such as their ability to organise collectively - to re negotiate this political accommodation in their immediate locality.

(1) 4 A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF THE POSITION OF ETHNIC MINORITIES IN METROPOLITAN SOCIETY

The three wards of St Marys, (replaced by St Peters), Spitalfields and Weavers, the area covered by the Spitalfields CDG, is largely inhabited by people from the Syhlet region of Bangladesh. This community of Bengalis is rapidly expanding. "Tower Hamlets has the fastest growing population of any Borough in London. OPCS estimates between 1981 and 1987 a 9.5% increase from 145 200 in 1981 to 159 000 in 1987." (CDG 1989 P17) It is also one of the most deprived communities in Great Britain, according to some three volumes of reports submitted to the Home Affairs Select
Committee sitting between 1986 and 1987 (Eade 1989 P12). How can I understand the position of ethnic minorities like the Bangladeshis in what Rex calls “metropolitan society”. More particularly, how do I analyse the relationship of this group to the development system?

The works of Rex (1973) (1983), provide us with a theoretical framework in which to examine race relations in the urban social structure. Before I do this I think it is necessary to clarify one point. In most of the literature on the Bangladeshis, the terms “Bengali” and “Bangladeshi” are used interchangeably. Both names mean the same thing, they are both names for the people of Bangladesh. The word Bangladeshi was adopted after the 1971 war of succession from Pakistan, when the Bengalis lived in what was called East Pakistan. In this thesis I shall use the name Bangladeshi, because this is the name Bangladeshis use to describe themselves.

For Rex, contemporary race relations are governed by our historical experience of colonialism and imperialism. The ethnic minorities found in many western societies such as the Netherlands and France are originally from their former colonies. The newly arrived immigrant worker was seen as an
inferior colonial subject. To the indigenous worker they were an economic threat, labour which was prepared to work in worse conditions for less pay. Rex also put forward the theory that metropolitan society is stable, the antagonistic relationship between capital and labour has been resolved, the working classes have been accommodated, and that there is a "corporatist contract" between these two groups. The ethnic minority stands outside this accommodation, which the Dual State theory promotes, in that the immigrant worker is brought into metropolitan society to perform usually unpleasant work which capital requires. According to Rex this refusal to allow the immigrant to join the corporatist or social contract results in the creation of an "underclass" in society. The Bangaladeshis living in Spitalfields, isolated from the main stream of society and in conditions of poverty, fit the description of an underclass. Many contemporary observers would argue that the accommodation to which Rex believes ethnic minorities have been denied access, as previously illustrated, is currently being dismantled.

Why is there such a heavy concentration of Bangaladeshis in the Spitalfields area, and why has their social isolation taken on a spatial dimension. Rex and Moor, (1967) provided me with an explanation for the spatial segregation of this
community. Pahl identified the existence of urban managers, personnel such as housing managers, building society managers, social workers etc, who fall into this category. Such people are "gatekeepers" because they allocate resources such as housing. The gatekeeper is labelled by Pahl (1977) as a "middle dog", they exercise the power of discretion in the middle ranges of societal structures. Their power in overall terms is small, but their decisions can have a great impact on the lives of individual citizens, especially the most powerless individuals in contemporary society, such as ethnic minorities. It is such personnel and the history of Spitalfields as a "first footing area" which combined to create this social and physical segregation.

Rex (1973) has put forward the theory of "housing classes" which explains how the spatial segregation of ethnic minorities from the rest of society emerges. In the Victorian city there were two housing classes, the bourgeois and the Proletariat. In the 1930s two new housing tenures came into existence, the council tenant and the home owner. The result was a flight to the suburbs. Employing the Chicago School model an inner ring of housing in the large cities was left, which Burgess (Rex 1973) labelled the "Twilight or zone of Transition." Here were located the houses vacated by the
bourgeois, a housing class defined by the fact that they
rented privately or were in lodging houses. Weber would have
describe these housing classes as “status group.” In such
areas immigrants settled, along with the more transient
members of the host society. Immigrants settled in such
areas, because they were barred from other forms of housing
tenure provided through the council or a mortgage; in other
words they were barred by the policies pursued by the
gatekeepers. This is a description of Spitalfields where the
majority of the Bangladeshi population live in privately
rented accommodation. They form a housing class, and this
housing class or status group has created a specifically
Bangladeshi community in Spitalfields. A community brought
about by the operation of the land market, whose future
operation could now destroy it. Weber (Gerth, Mills Ed 1961)
said that a market situation could produce a class situation,
and in a sense this is what has happened in Spitalfields.

I use the word colony, to describe a place were people feel
comfortable and which affords them the security they need to
familiarise themselves with the surrounding metropolitan
society before entering it. The Bangladeshis have formed
what many people would label a ghetto. I prefer the word
colony. We have to understand the functions of a colony and
place it into the theoretical framework of the Dual State theory. It is the importance of Spitalfields as a colony which gives its true social meaning to the Bangladeshis who live there. A colony for an immigrant community has many functions, to employ Weber ideal types again, many immigrants come from traditional rural societies. This is certainly true of the Bangladeshis. In such societies daily life is governed by kin based economic and social structures, and moral and normative order in society is governed by religious sanctions. The immigrant in the western world comes to a society based on rational calculation, a capitalist society where social and economic relations are based upon individualism and "callous cash nexus". The colony for the immigrant is a social instrument which allows him or her to make the transition from traditional society to one based upon rational calculation. The colony therefore gives the immigrant psychological security whilst, the socialisation process introduces the immigrant to the host society whilst retaining links with their original culture. The colony acts theoretically as a springboard into the wider society.

One of the most important features of the Spitalfields colony is its economic function. To use Cooke's (1983) analysis the Spitalfields local economy exhibits the following features.
The local labour market and the local social structures are highly interrelated with the local residents, and the culture of the Spitalfields locality is based largely on its local economy, which is centred on the catering and garment industries. Such industries are centred in the competitive business sector, and they have a symbiotic relationship with the rest of the metropolitan economy. This economy provides windows of opportunity for the local economy, which in turn aids the maintenance of the colony, its social and cultural structures. In metropolitan society it is impossible to replicate social arrangements found in Bangladesh. The value system of the "primary community" could not continue to operate in an advanced industrial society like Britain. The Bangladeshis in Spitalfields have formed a colony or community with a value system inherited from their villages of origin in the Sylhet region of Bangladesh. The persistence of such a strong community sentiment could be interpreted as a result of the failure of the Bangladeshis to integrate into the wider society surrounding them. This community provides a "social mirror", it supports the shared normative and value system of this group, it prevents "alienation" and "anomie".

The role of the community for the Bangladeshis based upon
shared cultural values is that it provides them with a system of structured interaction. This formation of a strong community sentiment based upon a value system inherited from traditional society, has given the Bangladeshis in our society the ability to act collectively in the pluralist circuit of politics. The Bangladeshis in Spitalfields over the past two decades have been very successful in forming organisations such as the Bangladesh Welfare Association (BWA). Many of these organisations have been formed around kinship and even village solidarities originating in Bangladesh. This situation has often led to internal conflict in these organisations as illustrated by Eade (1989). The Bangladeshis have successfully engaged in pluralist circuits of political activity, they have successfully manipulated their traditions of collective action to achieve outcomes, such as access to council housing stock. Is the CDG a product of this long tradition of Bangladesh based community organisations operating in the locality?

(1) 5 SOME THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS

The Dual State theory is a non spatial urban sociology, it operates in a Weberian sense as an ideal type, which is an "exaggeration" of certain features which exist in reality.
From these features one constructs an "ideal type", to compare with concrete examples found in reality. The theoretical framework put forward by Saunders to illustrate the dimensions of the politics of intervention in the spheres of consumption and production revolve around four features. I feel they are comparable with Cooke's (1983) framework, who like Ambrose works in the Marxist tradition. (A) "The social interests involved in the mobilisation of a population to protest and agitate in the pluralist circuit of the political system". This defines the social groupings of the citizens in Spitalfields, who have been mobilised to form the CDG. This question obviously leads us back to the issue of ethnicity. The social base of the citizens is largely centred on ethnicity and the social and economic disadvantages this implies in contemporary Britain. This helps to explain why such groups form natural alliance with other citizens in the locality who are in the same position. It also explains the position of this ethnic minority and its relationship with the development system in this locality. (B) "The mode through which interests mobilise." Which in the case of the CDG is through a social movement operating in the representational pluralist political Circuit.

I also have to examine. (C) "The level of the state system
which is mobilised”. In the case of the CDG it is the local state which is the primary area where agitation is located. The local state in the form of Tower Hamlets plays the strategic role as the agent who gives planning permission to any development and any accommodation between the developers and the CDG; the local state plays a central role in the politics of consumption as noted by Freidland.

“The electoral - representative arrangements which underpin municipal governments make them vulnerable to popular discontent. Local authorities are often important loci for popular political participation because they are structurally accessible, the point of daily contact between citizen and state. The relative visibility of local government policies and the relative accessibility of local government agencies make them a more susceptible target of political opposition than other levels of the state.” (Friedland 1977 PP449 451)

Another issue in this process is, (D) “The sorts of values and ideologies which inform the state’s activities in each sphere.” In the case of the CDG the relationship between the developer and the local state will be corporatist and the relationship between the state and the CDG will be pluralist, as illustrated. We have examined how we arrive at the Dual
State framework, how the interests in society which centre around production will have a greater influence than those centred around consumption. For Saunders, the interests centred around production enjoy an “inside track” in the politico-administrative system. The interests centred around consumption have to use the pluralist path of negotiation to achieve their ends and due, to the operation of imperfect pluralism, their success is limited. This Ideal Type relationship, illustrated by the Dual State thesis, refers back to the political accommodation between capital and labour, which is the hallmark of the post-war era.

This theoretical overview of the relationship between the planning apparatus as a part of the state playing the role as mediator between Corporate and Pluralist interests in society is, as I have established, in decline as an ideal type. The situation in Spitalfields is due to the refusal of the local state to play the role of mediator between corporatist and pluralist interests. This theoretical position leads me directly to my working hypothesis that the CDG is a pluralist pressure group attempting to renegotiate the accommodation between production and consumption interests, which has been undermined by recent developments in British political culture. This leads me to ask three empirical questions. (1)
Why are the corporate interests directly negotiating with pluralist interests? (2) Have the circuits of political influence been dictated by the location of Spitalfields, its historical legacy of local government in action in the area and hostility towards its residents. (3) What is the importance of the CDG being a largely Bangladesh based organisation and has this enabled it to manipulate more effectively the pluralist circuits of political representation? Cooke (1983), gives us a framework of four elements to examine when studying the development system in any locality; (1) spatial development process; (2) local labour markets and the social structures and interrelationships of their residents; (3) the state, the local state and development planning and (4) planning and spatial outcomes. It is these elements I will examine through the theoretical framework which I have described.

The developers who wish to develop the Bishopsgate and Truman Brewery site firmly belong to the TNC sector of the economy and have their interests represented through corporatist political institutions. The local inhabitants and the small business interests in the area have to rely on pluralist methods of political representation. So why, given this situation of imperfect pluralism have the corporate
interests been willing to negotiate directly with the representatives of local pluralist interests?

**SUMMARY**

In this Chapter I have explored the chronology of events leading to the emergence of the Spitalfields CDG. I have identified the existence of "policy communities", which can be corporatist, pluralist, or even different tiers of the state, and how through various circuits these policy communities promote their interests. I have also addressed the issue of ethnic minorities in metropolitan societies, and identified the fact that these minorities have to compete in the pluralist circuit to get access to the collective means of consumption. My working hypothesis is that the Spitalfields CDG is a community group attempting, through the pluralist circuit, to gain access to potential resources which might become available to their community through the operation of the development system.
CHAPTER TWO

RESEARCH AIMS AND METHODS.

I have carried out a theoretical overview of the relationship of the development system to the political economy of contemporary society. I have explored how this development system interacts with the State and the relationship of pluralist pressure groups to the operation of the development system. In Weberian "Ideal Type" terms the State in the form of the planning apparatus has to try and achieve a balance of interests between corporatist and pluralist interests. My working hypothesis is that the CDG is a pluralist grass roots pressure group which has attempted to fill the vacuum left by the State in order to protect and promote the interests of the Spitalfields community as a whole.

(2) 1 RESEARCH AIMS

The planning apparatus claims to be a positive vehicle for achieving social and economic equity Ravetz (1986) claim this has been a central theme of the Town Planning movement since its origins in philanthropic pressure group activities in the 19th century. This is still a concern of many practising planners today as illustrated by the “Planning Aid Movement.” The Skeffington Report “People and Planning” 1969, this aimed at encouraging public participation in the planning process, formal channels for public participation were provide by the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971. The encouragement of direct public participation, in theory, should have rendered the authorities more sensitive to the needs of their client group the public, making the planning apparatus a tool which promotes social equity.
the needs of their client group the public, making the planning apparatus a tool which promotes social equity.

"The Council's intention is to respect the distinct and unique character of different parts of the Borough, to improve facilities for local people not in a way which would break up communities as earlier, more clumsy attempts at planning have done, but in a way which strengthens and supports them."

(LBTH 1988 P11)

This is the expressed aim of the LBTH according to its Planning Handbook (1988). My aims are to address three questions in relation to this desire to "preserve the distinct and unique character of the Borough" and prevent the "break up of communities", in the spatial context of Spitalfields. The theoretical overview of the development system and its relationship to the locality of Spitalfields raises a number of questions!

(A) Why have, primarily, the Bangladeshis in Spitalfields felt it necessary to draw up their own local plan and promote a CDG. Is this a grass roots body which has spontaneously emerged to deal with the imminent threat of large scale development in the locality?

(B) Is the CDG an attempt to restore the accommodation between pluralist and corporatist interests undermined during the Thatcher period and is this why the developers cooperated with the CDG. Is this also the explanation for the involvement of the Spitalfields Task Force and Business in the Community (BIC) in the CDG project?
(C) What is the Local Authority’s role in the CDG and have they vacated the role of mediator between corporate and pluralist interests. Is there instead operating in Tower Hamlets an accommodation at a higher level which excludes the specific locality of Spitalfields?

From an examination of the current Adopted Borough Plan it appears that the planning apparatus in Tower Hamlets is legitimate, it is trying to balance different pluralist and corporatist interests in the Borough and aims at protecting communities in identifiable localities. The Adopted Borough Plan was approved on the 12th March 1986 when the Council was under the control of the Labour Party. The Planning Handbook (1988) states, “so plans for the future of Tower Hamlets concentrate on three aims, more jobs, of a type which are suitable for local people, better homes - not just more houses but also more choice in the types of homes available, a better environment with the worst parts of the Borough improved and best retained and enhanced.” (LBTH 1988 P15) There appears to be little change in planning policy from the Labour to the Liberal administration of the Borough.

The history of planning in LBTH is an issue to which I shall return. To answer these questions and establish the political framework which is governing the redevelopment of Spitalfields and hence the context in which the CDG is operating, I have to talk to the actors involved using the Weberian theoretical stance. I have to make contact with these actors and elicit information from them on their perception of what is occurring in Spitalfields. To achieve this objective I
carried out a questionnaire survey and put a number of specific questions to my respondents.

(2) METHODS OF RESEARCH

I have identified in my background reading and research of primary documents, five main clusters of actors I needed to interview. My methodological approach is influenced and guided by the Weberian concepts of Value Freedom (Werterfreiheit) and Interpretative Understanding (Verstehen).

The actors I wish to form the basis of my empirical study are located in five cluster groups.

(1) THE STATE.

(A) The Central State - Members of Spitalfields Task Force.

(B) The Local State - Members and Officers of LBTH, also the Officers concerned with the part of the site which falls in the area of the London Borough of Hackney.

(2) CORPORATE INTERESTS.
The Consortium of Developers for the Bishopsgate Goods Yards and Truman Brewery sites.

(3) PLURALIST INTERESTS.

(A) Members of the Community Development Group.

(B) Members of other pressure groups with interests in

(C) Ordinary members of the public, whom I shall label Dis - Organised Public Opinion.

These are the main clusters of actors I interviewed. I had to try and gauge their impressions of the emergence of the CDG Plan. When I examined the composition of these various interest groups in Spitalfields, I noticed a great deal of overlapping in membership. It is not uncommon for one person to be a member of the CDG and the Spitalfields Housing Co op, or for that matter be a Councillor or a client of the BWA.

This overlapping of membership and hence perceptions of the CDG I took into account in my empirical work. It will become clear that Spitalfields is an area, with a large number of pressure groups operating in its locality, with a membership drawn from across many boundaries of ethnicity, gender, age, and social class.

Due to the limited resources at my command the questionnaire survey I carried out was clearly focused on key actors. The number of questions I asked was limited to nine questions and focused so as to yield good quality information. I wanted information about why people promote or oppose the CDG Community Plan, what was their explanation for the need to create this organisation and what was the value system of the actors involved in this process? These were my
information needs and once combined with other materials such as secondary literature, planning documents and other source material they would, I hoped, explain the social context of the planning process occurring in Spitalfields and hence answer my questions.

The most appropriate questionnaire survey method I felt for this study was a "Face to Face Interview Technique", employing the "Open ended Survey Method." I conducted a fifty six respondent survey, over a period of three months from November 1990 to January 1991. Once I had drawn up my nine questions, I had to identify potential respondents to put these questions to. My sample frame was stratified according to the Dual State theoretical model, and divided into three broad interest communities. These interests communities in turn could be sub divided.

I sub divided the State respondents into two groups, the Local and Central State. This Sample Group consisted of sixteen respondents. I made contact with Members and Officers of the Borough Central State Civil Servants through a letter followed up by a phone call. My second group of respondents was from the Corporate or Producer Interests. In this category I identified four respondents and arranged interviews, through the same method. The Third interest community was the Pluralist or Consumer interests, this broad grouping sub divided into three sub groups. These I identified as (A) CDG, (B) Organised Consumers and (C) Dis - Organised Consumers. I identified five potential respondents from the CDG I wished to interview. I identified these respondents from the CDG document
Planning Our Future (1990). I made contact with these respondents by contacting one respondent through the CDG Office at 2-4 Colchester Street and he furnished me with the telephone numbers of the other respondents.

I identified fifteen organised pressure groups in the Spitalfields area. I identified these pressure groups by referring to the East London Yellow Pages (1990) and consulting the list of pressure groups in a Borough Plan Report on Public Consultation (1982). Once I identified these pressure groups I telephoned these bodies, and arranged interviews with either the leaders of these pressure groups or personnel in these groups with a specific interest in the CDG and proposed redevelopment of the Bishopsgate and Truman Brewery sites. I also set out in my sample frame to try and gauge the opinion of the average resident of Spitalfields. I selected what I believe to be a "illustrative" as oppose to a "representative", cross section of Dis-Organised public opinion in Spitalfields. This sample broke down into four senior citizens, two male and two female, these respondents I contacted through the Montefiore Pensioners Co op. I also interviewed four teenagers, again two male and two female, I made contact, with these four respondents through two youth clubs in the locality.

The final component of my illustrative sample was to interview eight residents of the locality. I chose four Bangladeshi and four non Bangladeshi respondents. I made contact with these respondents by selecting their names from the Electoral Register and writing a standard letter to each potential respondent, followed
by a phone call. I set out to interview 56 respondents and of the respondents I identified from the Spitalfields CDG, Central and Local State and Organised pressure groups I achieved a 100% response rate. I set out to interview 16 respondents from the Disorganised section of public opinion. I selected some 30 respondents and contacted them as described, of these 13 were willing to cooperate when contacted by telephone and from this number I selected the 8 respondents who appear as Spitalfields residents. Finding 4 senior citizens and 4 teenagers willing to be interviewed was comparatively simple, I visited the Davenport Centre and Montefiore Pensioners Co op and had a captive and willing audience to choose from.
Out of 56 respondents only 15 were female. There are many reasons for absence of females from my Survey. The majority of my respondents where drawn from the representatives of pressure groups, developers and various State agencies and most of these representatives were male. It was quite impossible to interview Bangladeshi females. In my illustrative Sample of Dis - Organised opinion I deliberately divided this Sample equally between the sexes, apart from the four adult Bangladeshis, who were male.
Fig (6) COMPOSITION BY AGE GROUP.

SOURCES (Own Survey)

Most of my respondents 26 out of 56, fell in the age range 26 - 40. This reflects the career level of the personnel I was interviewing. The 3 respondents who fell in age range 19 - 25 and the 4 respondents falling in the 14 - 18 age group were all drawn from the Disorganised category of public opinion and were all local residents. The second largest age group in my sample were the 41+ age group, some 23 out of 56 respondents. This age group overlapped the most with the other independent variables, of social class, ethnicity, and gender.
When defining the social class of my respondents I asked them what their present or in the case of the 8 senior citizens their previous occupation was. From their response I defined their social class according to the Registrar General's six social class bands. Again the largest social class grouping was class 11 followed by class 1. The respondents belonging to social classes V, 1V and 111(M) were drawn from the Dis - Organised public opinion.
I have carried out a Survey concerning the operation of a Bangladeshi organisation in a predominantly Bangladeshi locality eighty per cent of the residents of Spitalfields are Bangladeshi, yet only 18 respondents were Bangladeshi, and of these 8 were drawn from Dis-Organised public opinion. I made a conscious effort to address this imbalance in my Survey when carrying out my illustrative Survey of Dis-Organised opinion. Of the three Afro-Caribbean respondents, two were drawn from Dis-Organised public opinion and were local residents and the third was a Local Government Officer. Of the 35 respondents falling in the category of white all had their origins in the British Isles, apart from two respondents, one was an American and the other a Canadian.

The average profile of my respondents was white, male, aged 26 - 40 and from social class 1 or 11. This is the
average profile I imagine of an average Central or Local State member or officer, developer, or pressure group leader.

This profile excludes females, ethnic minorities, and respondents from social class IV and V. It also excludes the very young, age groups 14 - 18 and 19 - 25 and the old, such as the four senior citizens I interviewed. This is the reality that my final Survey sample illustrates.

I stated earlier that my methodology is influenced by the Weberian concerns for Understanding. One has to understand the values and motives behind the actors involved in the social world and their response to external stimuli, which through their interaction has brought about the creation of the CDG. The numbers of actors actively involved in this process is small as, innovators or reactors to the social world they were able to give me key information.

A "cross sectional, "face to face ", "open ended survey" of key actors gave me insights into the social processes surrounding the operation of the development system in Spitalfields. The Community Plan has been agreed on by the developers and the representatives of the CDG, and now the plan enters its critical stage, the creation of a Community Development Trust and to organise the sections of the development which are to be given over to the Local Community, and its acceptance by LBTH, who will give its approval by granting planning permission. The situation described above made the nature of this survey a highly sensitive one. The ethical considerations of bias from myself and
from my information sources I have addressed, along with the need for confidentiality some of my respondents had demanded. I processed my empirical evidence using the Stat View 512+ System, by Feldman, Gagon, Hofmannn, (1986).

SUMMARY

I have stated my research aims, which are to find out how the CDG came into existence in Spitalfields and to find out what the "meaning" of the CDG is to its members, developers, Central and Local State. I also wish to find out the meaning of the CDG to the inhabitants of the locality, to the members of organised and Dis - Organised public opinion. I have also illustrated the method, the "open ended survey" and the Weberian concerns for "Werterfreiheit" and "Verstehen".
CHAPTER THREE

AN OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF SPITALFIELDS.

Fig (9) CIRCUITS OF INTEREST COMMUNITIES IN THE SPITALFIELDS LOCALITY.

CIRCUIT A
PRODUCER INTERESTS

DEVELOPERS

MEDIATION

BIC TASK FORCE
DEVELOPER
Joint Action

LOCAL STATE
PLANNING APPARATUS

CDG

CIRCUIT B
CONSUMER INTERESTS

ORGANISED AND DIS
- ORGANISED PUBLIC
OPINION. COMPETITIVE BUSINESS SECTOR.

CENTRAL STATE
SPITALFIELDS
TASK FORCE

REPRESENTATION
In this Chapter I wish to explore the contemporary environment of Spitalfields, I shall describe the Pre CDG political sociology of Spitalfields and how the political culture of the area has encouraged and reacted to the planning initiatives in the locality. I will then carry out an overview of the issues which have helped shape the political culture of Spitalfields and provide the context in which the CDG was to emerge.

(3) 1 THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF SPITALFIELDS

When discussing the contemporary political situation in Spitalfields, I became conscious of two separate but parallel political cultures operating in the locality. On the one hand we have to discuss the conventional politics of opposing political parties and the internal struggles which occur in such parties. In Spitalfields and mirroring the party political struggles there is a political struggle within the Bangladeshi community itself. These politics of party and community will interact and also manifest themselves in the politics of pressure groups.

(A) THE PARTY POLITICAL CULTURE OF LBTH

Let me refer to J Eade's work "The Politics of Community" (1989), which was an analysis of the relationship between
ethnic minorities and the operation of local policy, Eade's used Spitalfields as his empirical illustration. He gives one a very good account of the formation of the local political structures in the locality from the 1970s until 1986. Spitalfields is a part of LBTH created in 1965, an amalgamation of the three Metropolitan Boroughs of Stepney, Poplar and Bethnal Green, who had all been controlled by the Labour Party since the early part of the 20th century, from 1925 till 1986. This hegemony of the Labour Party led to the creation of a unique political culture in the Borough because, the only effective opposition to the Labour Party was the Stepney Communist Party. The Labour Party in the area formed itself into a 'Managerial Party'. Without any effective opposition, it became a party of management. The Borough was run by committee and members automatically voted for the polices approved by the party leadership. The managerial system promoted and defined the interests of council tenants and the Trade Union organised sections of the working class who made up the population of the Borough.

During the post-war era there was an accommodation between the people of the Borough and the party. The people voted for the party which provided them with housing, at one time 83% (1985) of all housing stock in the Borough was in
the control of the GLC or LBTH. When I examined Labour Party
manifestos of the period, they read like statements from a
management laying out the company's achievements and
future policy to be implemented. It is not unfair to say that
LBTH practised a diluted form of Tammany Hall or American
Machine politics.

This Managerialism of the Labour Party was to be challenged
from within by a struggle between Left and Right. The
challenge to the domination of the Managerialism came from
the Left. The personnel making up the right wing of the party
were often drawn from blue collar workers, men who had
learnt their politics in the Trade Union movement. The left
who emerged in the late 1970s were often young educated
working in one of the caring professions and involved in
white collar Trade Union activities. This new political
grouping gained control of the Labour Party in the
Spitalfields Ward, and gradually building up its strength
across the Borough, began in the early 1980s to undermine the
right wing of the Party.

Outside the Managerialist Labour Party, whilst the wider
accommodation as illustrated in Chapter One continued to
operate and whilst the LBTH continued to clear slums and
provide new council stock, the local accommodation between the inhabitants of the Borough and the Labour Party continued. The only form of opposition to the Labour Party came from groups who could effectively exploit the discontent felt by many working class people in the Borough, faced by the massive loss of jobs in the area with the closure of the docks and the loss of whole sections of the local economy and the continued deterioration of the environment and housing conditions due to Central Government cut backs.

The National Front was able to tap these frustrations and find a convenient “scapegoat” in the form of the Bangladeshi community to which it could attach blame to. The activities of the National Front have had little impact electorally, but its presence has had the effect of creating an atmosphere of suspicion and hostility in the locality. This atmosphere of hostility and violence can very easily come out into the open, when a situation provokes a heightening of tension.

It was the Liberal Party (I use the name Liberal Party because during my Survey no one described themselves as a member of the SDLP) in the late 1970s, who were able to exploit the discontent of the traditional Labour voter. They built up their support over a decade across the Borough through the
technique of "Community based politics." They drew members from the right wing of the Labour Party who initially defected to join the SDP. The strength of the Liberal party grew in the Borough through a combination of grass root politics centred around a newsletter called "Liberal Focus." They also stole the thunder from the National Front by operating policies like the "Sons and Daughters Policy." This policy gave priority on the housing waiting list if one was the son or daughter of a LBTH resident, which inevitably discriminated against the Bangladeshis. The Liberal Party became the main focus of opposition to the Managerialist Labour Party, and in 1986 they took control of the Borough at the May Local Government Elections.

(B) THE BANGLADESHI POLITICAL CULTURE OF SPITALFIELDS

"All these political parties have neglected the ethnic communities. They have never welcomed them, they have never given the ethnic communities the chance to develop their ideas and to take part in politics." (Eade 1989 P47)

The political climate in Spitalfields, the perceived atmosphere of institutional racism and the racism of the street, have encouraged the political mobilisation of the
Bangladeshi population. The Bangladeshis had traditionally aligned themselves with the Labour Party. The politicalization of the Bangladeshi Community begins around 1978 with the start of a series of confrontations between the National Front and the inhabitants of Spitalfields in Brick Lane. These events led to the emergence of a younger Bangladeshi leadership in the Community, a generation gap developed in political outlook and attitudes between first and second generation Bangladeshi Community Leaders.

The older generation of Bangladeshi leaders had not taken direct political action through the party system, but would often merely endorse a particular white candidate at a local election, as a person who would protect Bangladeshi interests. These Community leaders were drawn from religious elders in the mosque and well established businessmen in the locality. They often had their business premises in Spitalfields but lived elsewhere. Their power base was and still is the Bangladeshi Welfare Association (BWA). “The BWA is the Community face of Business and Elders. In the past this organisation has tightly controlled advice and welfare work in the area and has encouraged loyalty and deference in return.” (Eade1989 P77)
The BWA was the first Bangladeshi pressure group in the area and built its power base on the support of the newly arrived Bangladeshi Workers who often could not speak the language of the host community and state apparatus, the BWA acted as a go-between. The new Bangladeshi Community leaders were younger men (they are always men) who were born and educated in the UK and could speak English fluently. They could deal with the state apparatus on equal terms without the mediation of the BWA. It was also a secular leadership who could in turn more easily relate to the aspirations of the newly emerging English-speaking generation, providing them with a more effective mechanism of opposition to the threat of violence than their parent's generation.

Once the new political leadership had been formed and the threat of violence diminished, this newly emergent leadership, in alliance with organisations like SHAPR, and the Tower Hamlets Campaign for Homeless Families, embarked on campaigns over issues which affected the whole Bangladeshi Community. Bangladeshi politics was to take on the form of promoting Bangladeshi consumer interests in the pluralist circuit to access resources for Community from the local state. The Bangladeshi Community had to embark upon a campaign of representation to the local state to promote
their collective interests. This process was encouraged by the GLC ILEA and LBTH. The key issue which mobilised this community was housing and the allocation of housing by LBTH and the GLC.

"A part from an overall shortage of accommodation this Survey reveals that there are major problems of access to public housing facing the Asian community and that those households who do gain a tenancy are concentrated disproportionately in the least desirable property. Overall on every possible indicator Spitalfields Asian Community is facing worse housing conditions than the rest of the population taken as a whole. At the same time they are the group who most want to stay in the area but, perversely are also the group that has been subject to the greatest pressure to move out. Housing Officials, and senior GLC officials in particular have argued that conditions for Asians can only be improved if they move away from the E1 Postal District, and that policies should be geared to achieving such a dispersal in order to avoid creating ghettos."

(Eade 1989 P116)

A campaign was centred around the issue of housing. The provision of housing has remained and persists as a issue in
Bangladeshi politics and is one of the main issues underpinning the policies of the CDG. The issue of the poor state of Bangladeshi Housing and their wish to remain in the E1 postal district has remained the main currency of political debate amongst the Bangladeshis. Bangladeshi political groups were also encouraged by the creation of bodies to deal with specifically Bangladeshi needs at the ward level. The Spitalfields Community Forum, especially after the introduction of the GLC Community Areas Policy, was to have a great impact in the formation of Bangladeshi groups and provide them with channels to promote their communities, needs and build networks with other pressure groups in the area. The greatest impetus to the formation of Bangladeshi organisations was the Inner London Education Authority (ILEA). ILEA gave grants to groups from ethnic minorities who worked with young people of ethnic minority groups.

This activity by ILEA was to lead to the creation of many Bangladeshi youth groups, such as the Bangladeshi Youth League, Bangladeshi Youth Movement, Progressive Youth Organisation, Multi Racial Bengali Association, all led by the new generation of Bangladeshi leaders. These organisations often acted as the power base from which different Bangladeshi political factions operated. The grants provided
by ILEA encouraged their formation and provided the facilities and buildings plus, relatively well paid sinecures, for the new generation of Bangladeshi leaders to pursue their political careers. These political careers were dual political careers, both in the realm of formal party politics and in the realm of Bangladeshi politics.

Bangladeshis are not an ideological people, they do not practise the politics of conviction in Spitalfields, but the politics of pragmatism. Politics is an instrument through which one furthers one's personal political career and extracts access to resources such as the right to decent accommodation for the community. In this sense the Bangladeshis conform to Cohen's analysis of the significance of ethnic minorities in a cosmopolitan society. "Ethnic minority generally refers to the perception of group differences and so to social boundaries between sections of the population." (Cohen 1969 P41) This means ethnicity imposes homogeneity upon an ethnic minority in their negotiations with the state within whose border's they reside, and this is exactly the significance it has in Spitalfields. The state in the form of ILEA have acknowledged the ethnic minorities and sees them as being homogenous. It has singled out leaders of these communities to negotiate
with, on the behalf of their community. Eade illustrates how the Bangladeshis became a political force when encouraged to do so by the state in the face of a deteriorating situation on the streets. "The politics of the Community in Tower Hamlets has to be understood in terms of the constitution of political forces through the political process." (Eade1989 P15)

Bangladeshis despite the wishful thinking of state agencies are not a homogenous community, politics in Spitalfields are conducted in the value system and culture of Bangladesh. One does not vote for a Bangladeshi candidate because of their party affiliations, but for the candidate from one's village, family, region, or for the candidate who has been endorsed by the mosque elder or the BWA. "The campaign, has been complicated because voting intentions may not be dictated by loyalty to the Labour Party but by bonds related to Bangladeshi culture. Hannan is claiming the members of the Community should vote for him because they must be loyal to the village areas with which they have family ties in Bangladesh." (Eade1989 P76) Bangladeshi politics is highly fragmented, and this feature and the issue of housing are the two key issues underlining the operation of Bangladeshi politics as manifested in the CDG and hence the planning system. I came to realise that the concept of the Bangladeshis being a
homogenous group with uniform opinions and aspirations, is a fiction which gives the developers of the Bishopgate Goodsyard site along with the Spitalfields Task Force and BIC the necessary legitimation for their activities. This misconception has seriously undermined the credibility of the CDG.

(3) 2 THE PLURALIST REPRESENTATIONAL CIRCUIT OF SPITALFIELDS

Outside the arena of Bangladeshi politics throughout the period described in this chapter, one witnessed the creation of many pressure groups in the area. To coin a phrase, Spitalfields is a "pressure group rich environment". These pressure groups were often formed around a specific issue, such as the Spitalfields Small Business Association (SSBA), to provide affordable workshops for small local business, or to implement and run a specific project like the Spitalfields Farm. The pluralist circuit in Spitalfields is highly complex, hence fragmentation has led to the formation of many organisations in the area which promote a diversity of issues. Most organisations in the area like the Spitalfields Housing Co-operative and Spitalfields Trust, act as pressure groups, as do most of the Tenant's Associations in the area. Many of
these pressure groups were formed in the 1970s and have developed close links with one another, and most of the personnel live in the area and are known to each other. These groups have gained experience of working together through the Spitalfields Community Forum, which has brought them together into one organisation. They have established common interests and have worked out ways of cooperating to further these interests.

These diverse interest groups had come together on a number of occasions during the 1980s, under the umbrella of one organisation or another, especially after the abolition of the Spitalfields Community Forum by the Liberals in 1986. An early occasion was the attempt to set up a Community Development Trust, to develop the site known as the Whitechapel Shopping Centre (due to the long standing designation of this former Brewery site for the development of a shopping centre). This site is to the rear of the Whitechapel tube station on Whitechapel High Street. The Whitechapel Development Trust was founded in 1986 and at one time had some 500 members and a board of democratically elected conveners. The Trust had the support of all the pressure groups in the area. This Development Trust was initiated and co-ordinated by the leader of THET Mr J
Alderton. The plan put forward for Whitechapel was a “mixed use” development with the provision for 400 houses, workspaces, a primary school and some retail outlets. The plan was rejected by LBTH because they still hoped to attract development of a large retail outlet to the site, as proposed in the Borough Plan of 1986. (Refer Appendices (1) Fig (40) P204) It was the Whitechapel Trust which was to serve as the model for the initial suggestion of the creation of a Development Trust for the redundant site of the Bishopgate Goodsyard by Mr J Alderton of THET.

The response by these pressure groups when faced by the redevelopment of the Spitalfields Market was again to form an umbrella organisation, known as the “Save Spitalfields Campaign”, and it was Chaired by Ms G Cove, a local Labour Party activist. Under this umbrella organisation the various pressure groups in the area were able to launch an effective campaign centred around the redevelopment of the site. They did not succeed in preventing the redevelopment of the market, this was not their intention, but they did succeed in increasing the development gain for the community. Because the Spitalfields Market existed under a Royal Charter granted in 1684, this meant that the permission the City of London needed to relocate the market to Temple Mills in Newham and
the redevelopment of the site required an Act of Parliament.

The Save Spitalfields Campaign acted in an effective manner to present its case to the various committees in both Houses of Parliament which overlooked the passage of the Bill. When the Bill went to the House of Lords, the Save Spitalfields Campaign was able to present its arguments to the Committee. This resulted in the provisions of the Section 52 Agreement being substantially increased from £2.5 million to £5 million. The Save Spitalfields Campaign had thus achieved a significant improvement in social gains for the locality aimed at sustaining the area and the local people.

The struggle over the development of the market site is still continuing and on the 17. 7. 90 the then Environment Minister Mr C Patten called in the £500 million development plan of the Spitalfields development group. This was after their plan was described as “an Architectural disaster waiting to happen”, by the local conservation group the Spitalfields Trust. The Spitalfields Trust is able to mobilise a great deal of influential pressure. Their lobbying of Mr C Patten was supported by English Heritage, and the Royal Fine Arts Commission, who were able to have the plan called in by the DOE. Despite the protests of Mr J Shaw, Chairman of the
Bethnal Green Neighbourhood District, the Spitalfields Trust under the umbrella of the Save Spitalfields Campaign was able to combine to achieve common objectives with pressure groups concerned with social and economic issues of the locality.

This system of alliances I would label the "Oppositional Establishment" of Spitalfields, this Oppositional Establishment I would define as consisting of long established pressure groups in the locality like the SSBA. It also consists of the ward Labour Party, who are the minority party in the Borough, plus the Bangladeshi groupings associated with the Labour Party and involved with organisations like the Spitalfields Housing Co op. The Oppositional Establishment is made up of pressure groups from the pluralist circuit in Spitalfields and has promoted consumer interests in the locality. The campaign conducted by the pluralist circuit centred around the redevelopment of the Spitalfields market site conformed to my working hypothesis. This campaign conformed to the Ideal Type of a Pluralist Circuit oppositional action through the mechanism of representation to the state. The CDG lies outside this tradition.
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE PLANNING HISTORY OF SPITALFIELDS

Spitalfields was a part of the old Borough of Stepney. During WW2 Stepney Borough, like many parts of London's East End, suffered extensive air raid damage. Aerial bombing left large tracts of Stepney cleared and levelled presenting the planners of the London County Council (LCC) with an opportunity in the "Great Age of planning" to carry out rational re-planning of this Borough. The LCC planners aimed at removing the slums and rationally ordering the East End, introducing rational polices for the housing, social facilities, industrial and transport needs of the area.

Spitalfields in the post-war era was overlooked as a locality, and was not badly damaged by enemy air raids and in the post-war era was left to function much as it had in the pre-war era. As an area which acted as a "First Footing" location for newly arriving immigrants in the aftermath of WW2, mainly Poles and Ukrainians and as an area dominated by the operations of the Spitalfields Market, Trumans Brewery and the Bishopsgate Goodsyards, the local economy remained firmly rooted in the rag trade and the storage warehousing and transportation industries, which all provided unskilled jobs for the local population. The fact that Spitalfields did not receive the attention of the LCC planners, left Spitalfields to continue to function as it had done for over a century before, as a place of overcrowded living conditions and sweatshops. It was this lack of planning in Spitalfields which was to turn it into a battle ground.
between developers and its community, which unlike other parts of Stepney had not been displaced by LCC planning policy.

In 1967 the leader of the newly formed London Borough of Tower Hamlets (LBTH), Mr J Orwell with the cooperation of the Greater London Council (GLC) declared Spitalfields a "Comprehensive Redevelopment Area". This programme resulted in the large scale demolition of the Victorian tenement blocks in the area defined as slums, and this resulted in the dispersal of the population in the locality. After a decade of concerted effort to clear slums in Spitalfields and reduce overcrowding, the policy failed. In 1971 24% of all households in Spitalfields were overcrowded, by 1981 it was 28% of households. The GLC and the LBTH cannot be entirely held to blame for this policy failure, as much of the overcrowding stems from the increase in the population of Bangladeshis in the Borough, who are a predominantly young population and have a higher than average birthrate.

For the period 1967 to 1977 there was a policy of slum clearance with new council - built stock like the Chicksand Estate replacing the slums. This planning policy was based around the issue of meeting the housing needs of the locality. The second policy phase was introduced in 1977 and ran until 1986 at the Local Authority level. This new policy phase was initiated by Mr P Beasley the then Labour leader of LBTH the LBTH, wanted to promote a "New East End". Mr Beasley to attract private development to the Borough, especially office
development and create a diversity of housing stock, so as to attract new people to the Borough and retain the young, the skilled and the entrepreneurial, who traditionally left the Borough to improve their living conditions and become home owners.

Mr Beasley's policies were encouraged by planning initiatives such as the “Major Transport Interchange Policy” as expressed in the Adopted Borough Plan (1986). This policy was stated as “Planning permissions for development which exploits the advantages of inter changes will be granted, subject to compliance with other requirements of the plan, within 400 metres of Liverpool Street, Aldgate East, Whitechapel, Tower Hill and to a lesser extent, Mile End and Bethnal Green Underground Stations” (LBTH 1986 P76 7.92.1). The effect of this policy was to drive up the “hope values” of land in the Borough, especially in Spitalfields given its proximity to a number of transport interchanges.

The most significant planning policy pursued in Spitalfields during this period was the “Community Areas Policy” (CAP) of the GLC. The CAP was introduced in the 1981 by the newly elected Labour Controlled GLC, led by Mr K Livingstone until its abolition in 1986. This policy was well illustrated by Mr G Nicholson, former Chair of GLC Planning Committee. He set out to “Define and reclaim Communities”, to try and counteract with an alternative set of policies the central government’s market orientated path to inner city renovation. This policy was aimed at maintaining the “sense of place” inner city communities and “preventing the city from
becoming a commodity to be traded”. CAP was also described as a “Life Belt Policy”, circling the central business district of London. Its aim was to maintain the largely working class neighbourhoods found in these central zones. This concern for the preservation of these working class communities grew out of the “Community Movement” of the 1970s. By the end of this policy initiative with the abolition of the GLC in 1986, there were some seventeen designated “Community Areas” in central London.

The GLC and the LBTH worked closely in the formation and implementation of the CAP in Spitalfields. Between 1982 - 85 they facilitated the implementation of a number of major projects in the area, such as the East End Community School, whose role was to address the educational needs of Bangladeshi children and teenagers, and the Davenant Centre, on which some £1.1 million was spent to provide training and a resource centre for the community. The project resulted in the rehabilitation of two buildings of historical importance. The GLC also channelled funds to a whole array of tenant’s and community organisations like the Spitalfields Housing and Planning Rights Service (SHAPR). The idea was to give grants to bodies which would help local people to articulate their views, and give them a voice in local issues.

A unique feature of the operation of CAP in Spitalfields was the creation of the Spitalfields Local Community Forum founded in 1978, but greatly expanded and encouraged by the CAP policy. This was a representative forum for Spitalfields whose members were drawn from voluntary groups, local
people, members and officers of the local authority and the GLC. This body was jointly funded by LBTH, GLC and the Urban Programme initiative. The purpose of the Committee was to give pressure groups, officers and members concerned with policy in the area a chance to come together and discuss topics effecting the locality such as Environmental Health, Education, Women, Youth and Planning issues. It was to act as a forum for debate in which opinions could be aired and a consensus reached before policy for the locality was officially formulated and enacted.

This Community Forum was seen as a innovative mechanism by which to enable interested groups and individuals to voice their views. "In all its work the Committee is especially concerned with the needs of the local ethnic minority community. With much success to its credit, it can be regarded as a model for the way in which in the future all parties concerned with tackling the problems of areas like Spitalfields can constructively come together. " (Nicholson 1985 P37) The Spitalfields Local Community Forum played a strategic role as a focus around which pressure groups in the area operated. The GLC policy of giving grants to Community groups in the area, also played a role in promoting the creation of many of these new pressure groups in the locality, and in creating what was described to me as the "social economy of the GLC". I perceived Spitalfield's planning history as consisting of neglect followed, after the formation of LBTH in 1965, by a policy of slum clearance which was replaced by the "New East End" planning policy. The closing period consists of a contradictory planning
policy. On the one hand the Borough encouraged office development and on the other the GLC promoted the CAP policy.

(3) 4 ISSUES WHICH HAVE SHAPED THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF SPITALFIELDS

Spitalfields does not fit into the conventional typology of an inner city area, three features make Spitalfields unique, (A) its proximity to the City of London, (B) its local economy and (C) its demography. These three core issues are interdependent and they determine the social and political structures of the locality. They shape the response of the people of the locality to development pressure. To understand the creation of the CDG and its philosophy one has to examine these features of Spitalfields.
Fig (10) THE EASTERN EXPANSION OF THE CITY OF LONDON INTO SPITALFIELDS 1960 - 91.

Key 1960 - 79 ■
1980 - 91 ◘

North

SOURCES ( SSBA SURVEY 1989 Weatherall Green Smith 1990)
"The City Corporation having succeeded in converting the City into a business mausoleum looks set to stretch out its deadening hand and lay it on Spitalfields."

(Forman 1989 P46)

In 1980 the SHAPR published a report entitled, "What is Happening to West Spitalfields?" (1980). They illustrated, the rapid expansion of office development into the western fringe of Spitalfields, illustrating how the area bounded by the City of London, Whitechapel High Street and Commercial Street in the post-war era lost 40% of its population. The average rate of population loss across the whole of Spitalfields was 27% and across the whole borough 19% between 1945 - 71. The loss of population was due to a number of factors, on the one hand GLC slum clearance programmes and on the other hand private landlords selling their property off to office developers. The rate of population loss due to private Landlord speculation was particularly marked.
The Rate of decline in the private sector is four times that in the public sector. SOURCE (SHAPR 1980 P5)

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s one witnessed in West Spitalfields the gradual incursion of office development into the locality. This drove up land values and increased the dispersal of the population through the loss of cheap accommodation. The experience of Brushfield Street, Whites Row and Elder Street illustrate well the process of population dispersal and replacement by Office development.

"In 1951, 275 people lived in these streets, by 1978 only 29 remained. The main trend in all three streets has been for the
expansion of the Office's and services for office workers at the expense of privately rented housing.” (SHAPR 1980 P5) This process was actively encouraged by the policies of LBTH and the GLC. The GLC slum clearance policy failed to tackle the problem of replacement and improvement of domestic residents, and actively encouraged office development. The LBTH justified this policy by claiming they were extracting community benefit from the developers, through the provision of the Section 52 agreements of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971.

“This Council has a general presumption against purely office schemes but will consider mixed use proposals, offering some form of Planning Gain. Normally office development would have to be associated with new residential development - particularly in the conservation areas where revitalisation could take place.” (LBTH1977 P10)

The LBTH had designated West Spitalfields a “preferred location for office development”, due to its proximity to Liverpool Street Station. The active encouragement of office development in this “preferred location”, was well illustrated in a LBTH booklet, for developers wishing to apply for planning permission in the locality.
"Within the last four years, planning permission has been granted for more than one and a half million square feet of office space. The Council hopes that a further development along these lines will be undertaken and assures prospective developers that every assistance will be given in formulating acceptable schemes." (SHAPR1980 P10)

Throughout the late 1970s LBTH actively encouraged office development in the locality. It is a debatable point whether the residents of Spitalfields or the Borough as a whole have benefited in terms of a better environment, jobs opportunities, from office development. It is also clear that the local inhabitants did not benefit from the Planning Gain Agreements attached to most of these developments. The Development Gain did not replace the housing lost due to these office schemes, and much of the Planning Gain appeared inappropriate when one considers the area in which they were gained. For example in 1973 one Planning Gain agreement resulted in £200,000 being channelled to the restoration of Christ church Spitalfields. In the same year the GLC and LBTH devoted £200,000 as a part of their Special Project in Spitalfields, "to tackle deprivation" in the ward. Large sums of money were also raised through Section 52 Agreements, to pay for the restoration of the Whitechapel Art Gallery. The
partial restoration of Hawksmoor Church and the provision of an art gallery are undertakings worth funding, but I would argue that in an area of severe social problems the money raised through office development, should be spent on ameliorating some of the social problems of the locality. Housing remains the dominant social problem in the ward and the allocation of resources raised through Planning Gain Agreements in Spitalfields is reminiscent of Simmie's (1987) San Francisco Down Town Plan, discussion of Planning Gain, which in reality benefited the TNCS, promoting a "image of Urbanity."

From this discussion of the effects of office development in West Spitalfields it is obvious that this process has had a significant impact on that locality, changing the physical and social landscape of the area. In the decade following the publication of this report, the process has continued, becoming an office dominated area, the residential population has been largely displaced. This process accelerated during the office led property boom of the mid 1980s and intensified, giving the residents of the area east of Commercial Street cause for concern.
Table 2.8 Proposed property developments affecting Spitalfields

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development</th>
<th>Floorspace (Sq ft)</th>
<th>Offices</th>
<th>Retail</th>
<th>B1/B2/B3 or “Small business”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bishopsgate/Trumans (1)</td>
<td>1,474,700</td>
<td>230,750</td>
<td>609,791</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spitalfields Market (2)</td>
<td>857,297</td>
<td>224,726</td>
<td>10,689</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whitechapel (Albion Brewery)</td>
<td>71,000</td>
<td>60,000+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,402,987</td>
<td>515,476+</td>
<td>630,480</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Includes space in LB Hackney
(2) Excludes space in City of London (12,000 sq ft of offices)
(3) Land use categories

SOURCE (Aaronovitch Egans 1991 P28)

Contemporary Spitalfields is an area surrounded by ongoing development or potential sites for future development the scale of these developments is illustrated above. For the residents of Spitalfields it appears that the City of London will continue to expand eastwards out of the central business districts into the shadow areas of Spitalfields. The threat to Spitalfields became more apparent when in 1987, the City of London Corporation, following its policy of relocating produce markets such as Billingsgate outside the City, extended this policy to Spitalfields. The site would be released for the development of 1.9 million square feet of office space. The effect of this decision by the City of London
was to remove the market, which acted as a barrier, and allow development to enter Spitalfields. The area east of the market was left open to further development.

The threat to the community from development seemed to be confirmed when in the very heart of Spitalfields, Grand Metropolitan announced the closure of the Trumans Brewery in 1988. This was compounded by the announcement of a joint development of this site and the redundant Bishopsgate Goodsyard. If one were to add to these new proposed Office development schemes, the potential release and development of the London Hospital site on the Mile End Road, and the Whitechapel Shopping Centre site and potentially another Trumans Brewery site at the corner of Bethnal Green Road and the Mile End Road, the dispersal of the Spitalfields community looks inevitable, due to the scale of this potential development. "The most striking fact is that the character of the developments in the Spitalfields Task Force area especially, requires a labour force very different from that which exists in the area at present." (Aaronvitch Egans 1991 P29) Which leads one to ask, what kind of an area is this office development proposing to move into?
Fig (13) MAKE UP OF THE SPITALFIELDS LOCAL ECONOMY
SITUATED IN THE COMPETITIVE CIRCUIT OF THE ECONOMY.

SOURCE (White 1989 P12)
(B) THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LOCAL ECONOMY

"Spitalfields has had particular circumstances which have encouraged small business. They have been able to set up with little capital because it is cheap to rent places to work and to live. Small business and cheap housing have gone together. Working near home cuts costs - over half the people who live in Spitalfields walk to work. Particularly in the Bangladeshi community there is a close relationship between work and home. Men return home for all meals, are able to pick up children from school. Women work from home on their own machines. The closeness of the community allows for extended families to provide the entire workforce for a business" (SHAPR 1980 P18).

The local economy of Spitalfields holds the whole social fabric of the locality together. Work is closely connected with family, religious and cultural traditions of that community. In its 230 hectares a family can work, live, and attend religious and social events which the Community’s social structures are centred around. Spitalfield’s importance to the Bangladeshis is that the locality provides them with a whole support network, the Bangladeshi people are rooted to
this area because of the support, services and safety this locality affords them. For this reason, the area for this reason has been described as a ghetto. It is in fact a colony, an area where familiar cultural values are shared and an atmosphere of Tonnies, “Volk Geimennschaft” (a community as opposed to “Volk Gesellschaft” an association) pervades. It is essential to realise that underpinning the Bangladeshi community and the reason why this area has such meaning for them is the locality’s economy. The local economy of Spitalfields can be broken down into three main areas (A) garment production, (B) catering and (C) retail wholesale services.

The wholesale sector of the economy consists of selling products usually to other ethnic minorities, specialist products such as foodstuffs and fabrics for the garment trade. The largest manufacturing sector is garments, anything from women’s blouses to men’s handmade suites. A large section of the manufacturing economy is also made up of leather goods, such as shoes and jackets. Catering is also a large sector of the economy in Spitalfields, it makes up some 15% of business in the area. These trades have prospered as have the manufacture of expensive high quality goods such as handmade shoes and handbags, due to the
patronage of city based workers who will cross Commercial Street to purchase these goods and services.

The structure and ownership of the Spitalfields local economy also sheds light on its relationship to the social structures of the locality. Some 51% of all firms in Spitalfields are owned by a single owner and 31% are owned in partnership with family members. In reality these firms are largely family firms, worked in and run by members of the same family, often the extended family. The age of these firms varies a great deal, 45% had been in business for over five years and 22% between five and three years. Often in reality these firms would be much longer established, firms in Bangladeshi ownership often changing their names and starting life as apparently new firms when a new member of the family takes over the running. The City of London Polytechnic's, "Survey of Ethnic Minority Business in Spitalfields" (1989), found that 17% of firms in the locality were in their second year of operation and 15% in their first. The number of new firms start-ups amongst Bangladeshis was higher in Spitalfields than the other ethnic minorities in the area such as Sikhs and Pakistani firms. This fact can be traced to demographic trends I will illustrate.
The scale of this economy and its relationship to the extended family structure can be gauged by examining the numbers employed in those firms. "A minority of firms - 16% have one full time worker. The majority - 63% - have 2 to 5 full time workers. A substantial proportion - 21% - have 6 or more workers." (White1989 P61) Bangladeshi firms employed more than 6 workers on average, which is an indication that a large sector of the Bangladeshi firms are concentrated in the catering industry. To run even a small restaurant one would need at least 6 workers. The way personnel were employed gives one an insight into the scale of this local economy. "As far as part-time workers are concerned, the majority of firms - 63% - employed no part-timers, and a further 23% employed only one." (White1989 P61)

Yet another indication of the ethnic make up of the local economy of Spitalfields being largely Bangladeshis, is the fact that "A majority of firms in the sample 62% employ no women at all, and a further 22% are employing only a minority of women." (White1989 P62) This discussion of the types of employment, size and age of firms, especially now that Trumans Brewery has closed down and the Spitalfields Market has been relocated to Temple Mills, presents a picture of the local economy of Spitalfields consisting of numerous small
scale family firms, largely servicing the needs of the Metropolitan economy. For example, the garment trade sells its products in the West End fashion markets and the catering services cater for city personnel. It is a local economy which lies in the “pluralist competitive market circuit” and enjoys a “symbiotic relationship” with the Metropolitan economy.

Although the local economy of Spitalfields might have a symbiotic relationship with the Metropolitan economy, it is not fully integrated into that economy. I would argue that this local economy is only partially a member of the competitive market circuit. Firms run by ethnic minorities practice “Autarky”. A Bangladeshi catering or garment firm may sell its goods and services and operate in the Metropolitan economy. But in many other respects it will be economically independent of the mainstream of the economy. Some elements of the Spitalfields economy can slip into the black economy, for example a lax attitude towards PAYE contributions by employers and employees. Their isolation from the mainstream of the economy mirrors their social isolation from Metropolitan society.

The wholesale sector of the economy mainly consists of selling specialist goods to other ethnic minorities and
depends on the continuation of this patronage. This Autarky amongst firms who trade in the wider economy and with members of the wider society exhibits Autarky in the way it recruits staff. In the Spitalfields area Bangladeshi firms will recruit up to 77% of their staff from their own community. More importantly when a Bangladeshi firm wants to start up, or expand, it will either go to members of the extended family or to ethnic minority banks, such as the Bank Bumi Daya and not to the high street bank for a loan. We have seen in Spitalfields a local economy which operates a two tier economy, having a symbiotic relationship with the Metropolitan economy, but also practices Autarky. This local economy enables the cultural and social structures, of the Bangladeshi community to function.
Fig (14) Borough of Tower Hamlets. Mid Year Estimates of Population 1981 - 87.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mid-Year Estimates</th>
<th>Change On Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>145,200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>144,500</td>
<td>-700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>144,000</td>
<td>-500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>144,600</td>
<td>+600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>147,100</td>
<td>+2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>152,800</td>
<td>+5,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>159,000</td>
<td>+6,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OPCS

The table of population change for LBTH follows the usual population trend of decline until 1985, which conventional wisdom dictates in a inner city area. The OPCS estimates a 9.5% increase of population from 145,200 in 1981 to 159,00 in 1987, and the reason for this reversal in demographic trends is twofold. Firstly due to the building of large amounts of new housing in the Docklands for sale, there has
been an influx of people and families into the Borough who fall into the 30 - 44 age group. The second reason is the change in Bangladeshi social structures. Bangladeshi men in Spitalfields had traditionally lived as single men, leaving their families behind them in Bangladesh but making return trips every few years. Increasingly these men have been joined by their families. Now that families have been reunited in Spitalfields, there has been a rise in the birth rate amongst the Bangladeshi population, who have a higher fertility rate than the UK average. So in the Bangladeshi population there has been an increase in the 33 - 44 age bands and subsequently in the 0 - 4 age bands.
(SOURCES OPCS P17 1990)

The change in age structure across the Borough illustrates an increase, across the age bands 0 - 4, 5 - 14, 15 - 29, 30 - 44 which when analysed at a Borough level can be traced to changes in the demographic structure of the Bangladeshi population and the influx of people into the new housing developments in the Docklands. Other demographic trends in the age structure remain constant with the national picture, such as the increase in the 75+ age band, a increase of 18.5% over the 1981 - 87 period.
When I examined the demographic surveys carried out by the London Research Centre (LRC), at a sub Borough level which the OPCS does not undertake, I notice demographic trends in the Spitalfields area which went against the Borough-wide demographic trends. This is due to immigration by Bangladeshis into the area. The Bangladeshi population in Spitalfields and the UK as a whole are, as a community, fairly recent arrivals. Bangladeshi men have lived in the UK since the 1950s but only recently have their families joined them in Spitalfields.

In 1988 LRC was commissioned to carry out a report into the future demographic trends of the Bangladeshi population of Spitalfields. When I examined this report at a ward level, I find that the Bangladeshi population of Spitalfields is 80% of the population, 7081 out of 8822. The ward of Spitalfields also has the highest birth rate, 34.59% 1981 - 86 and a fertility rate of 257.93% 1981 - 86, of any ward in Greater London. Spitalfields ward also has the highest proportion of children under 16 years of any ward in the Borough - 23.1%. The key statistic to be drawn out of this analysis of the size and age structure of the Bangladeshi community is the startling fact that, "about 48% of the total projected 1989 Bangladeshi population are aged 0 -15." (CDG1990 P19)
It is always difficult to predict future population trends. It is possible to speculate about how the Bangladeshi population in Spitalfields will change in future, in comparison to the Borough population as a whole towards the close of the Century. These predictions are "indicative only", and trends may change if, for example, Bangladeshi families due to the process of socialisation adopt the norms of the host community and limit their fertility, or the trends might be perpetuated by the environment of Spitalfields. "A number of influences - cultural, the difficulty of getting housing, poverty - combined to encourage the large extended family formation so characteristic of the Bangladeshi Community at present." (CDG1989 P20) Whatever the future outcomes of the trends indicated by the two tables above, a "wave of births" has occurred within this community. This demographic phenomenon will naturally have implications for the provision of housing and employment opportunities, the high fertility rate, and the virtual absence of any policy to deal with the effects of this trend will lead to a deterioration of the situation.
The "Docklands Housing Needs Survey" (1985), which was carried out by the LRC, revealed that Spitalfields suffered the highest level of "housing stress," of any locality in the country. An indication of the level of "housing stress." "Of all the statutory overcrowded households (more than 1.5 persons per room) living in the Borough (2610), 42.5% (1109) were living in Spitalfields." (CDG 1990 P23) This represents some 14% of all households in the Spitalfields area. This overcrowding also manifested itself in families having to share facilities as well as overcrowded conditions. "The 1981 Census also showed that 35% of the households in...
Spitalfields in private rented accommodation did not have exclusive use of a bath and 11% of all households were without exclusive use of a bath or W.C.” (CDG1990 P23) Spitalfields is an area which has a high degree of overcrowding and hence a poor environment.

The true figure of people who are homeless in Spitalfields is hard to estimate because of the Bangladeshi extended family system one will observe many “concealed households” in any single property. Due to the demographic trends exhibited by the Bangladeshis one witnesses a mismatch between the average size of domestic dwellings, designed for the average family unit, of 2 to 3 bedrooms and the need of larger domestic dwellings of some 5 bedrooms and upwards for Bangladeshi families. It is undeniable that Spitalfields is an area of “housing crisis”. The Bangladeshi community due to their demographic characteristics, suffer a intolerable degree of bad housing. If it was the intention to maintain the Bangladeshi community in Spitalfields along the lines of the GLC Inner City Community Areas Scheme, it would be necessary to provide the Bangladeshi community with housing which met their needs. It would also have to be a tenure which met their needs, some form of affordable social housing. I will show that the key issue in the formation of
the CDG, which has played a crucial role in the support given to the CDG, is the issue of the provision of housing.

SUMMARY

In this Chapter I have briefly illustrated the Planning History and how the City of London since the 1960s has been expanding eastward and how it has largely enveloped West Spitalfields. I have illustrated the economic and social conditions which govern the daily lives of its inhabitants, how this environment has led to the emergence of the Oppositional Establishment which is made up of a diverse array of pressure groups and the ward Labour Party who are in opposition in the Borough. The political activity of this grouping is mirrored by and interacts with the Bangladeshi political culture of the locality. The political activity of both these groupings conforms to Dual State Theory. The political culture I have described in this Chapter I would describe as the Pre CDG Political Sociology of Spitalfields.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE POST CDG POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF SPITALFIELDS.

In this Chapter I will illustrate what a Community Development Trust (CDT) is, the origins of the Spitalfields CDG, and how this body went about drawing up the Community Plan, “Planning Our Future” (1990).

“The shield that for so long deterred the advance of the City of London into Spitalfields has been removed with the granting of planning permission for the redevelopment of the Spitalfields Market into one million square feet of offices. Now twenty seven acres of land straddling Brick Lane are also to be developed. Bishopgate Goods Yard (Pedley Street) and Trumans Brewery (Brick Lane). As a result City rents and land values could quickly supplant those of Brick Lane. Spitalfields is an “urban Village”, but could well find itself housing City-related activities and personnel, rather than the existing local community, largely Bangladeshi, which could be “squeezed out” in the process with potential dramatic repercussions on employment, income and livelihood”. (CDG 1990 P4)

The development proposed by the consortium of Grand Metropolitan, London and Edinburgh Trust (LET) and the British Rail Property Board, seems to signal the end of the Spitalfields Community and its inevitable break up by the driving up of local rents which would have a damaging impact on the local economy and housing.
Fig (17) LOCATION OF THE BISHOPSGATE AND TRUMANS BREWERY REDEVELOPMENT SITES.

SOURCE (CDG 1990 P11)
The outcome of the developers proposals should logically lead to a dispersal of this community. In this case the theory of Corporatism would be proved, the Corporatist circuits of power had overcome the Pluralist circuits of power and the Bangladeshi community of Spitalfields will be broken up to serve the Corporatist interests with the aid of the planning authorities. This is not to be the case in Spitalfields. According to the authors of the CDG Community Plan, the proposed development by Grand Metropolitan, LET and the British Rail property board will provide an "opportunity" for the community. "The joint developers of the 27 acres of land are committed to working in partnership with the local community and transferring control of land to a community development Trust." (CDG1990 P4) It would appear that the developers are interested in negotiating with the local community and carrying out a development which is socially desirable, which protects the community and does not threaten it. This is to be achieved through "partnership", between the community and the developers by using the mechanism of a CDT.

4 (1) WHAT IS A COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT TRUST?

"The Philosophy of Community Development Trusts is that Community's - should tackle physical change in their environment from a "Bottom Up" or "Grass Roots" basis. The basic concept of the CDT is that local people should be empowered to take control of their environment and change it for the better through their active participation. In many ways they are a response
to the changing role of Central Government and Local Government and a realisation that the Planning system by itself is unable to deliver many of the benefits which it originally held out in the post-war period". (Baily1990 P151)

Local and Central Government policy towards areas like Spitalfields has changed. Unlike the 1960s there is no comprehensive redevelopment to threaten the community. On the other hand large scale Government sponsored intervention in the physical environment has declined. It is this vacuum which the CDT has attempted to enter and fill, to achieve a multiplicity of aims which a particular locality demands. CDT acting as Trading Companies often with charitable status have attempted to define areas of community concern such as employment, physical environment, training, even the image of the locality. They have tackled these issues by acquiring and restoring buildings, land and hence providing affordable workspace, training schemes, and landscaping of open space. The CDT can take many forms depending upon the issues they are addressing, but whatever their structure they share a number of common characteristics.

CDT are Independent of party political control and will have independent management committees which will decide which projects are implemented. They "encourage Community involvement", essential if the CDT is to be a bottom up organisation, which is responsive to the needs of a community, if it is to "harness local skills and knowledge". "They can attract resources from the public, private and voluntary sectors." Due to the CDT independence they can attempt
to gain resources from a variety of sources, for instance a building on a favourable lease from a Local Authority, unsecured capital loan from a bank, funding for Training Schemes from the Manpower Services Commission etc. “They can pursue multiple objectives”, they are not restricted by legal or funding regulations like Housing Associations so they can carry out a multiplicity of functions. “They are area based”, again this aids local community involvement and will allow people to promote their area. “They are not - for - profit organisations”, this means they can engage in activities which private companies would find unprofitable, they can cross subsidise between a profitable sector of their activities such as renting out workspace and subsidise unprofitable activities. Trusts aim at a longevity of operation and to sustain this activity, they will try to develop services which create profits to maintain these activities.

The majority of existing CDT’s have been in operation for some five years, a few for over a decade. CDT’s break down into four types due to the policies they attempt to implement. They are (1) Property Development, (2) Neighbourhood Revitalisation, (3) Environmental Education and (4) Economic Development. The North Kensington Amenity Trust (NKAT) was founded in 1971, it took over and began to develop 23 acres of unpromising land under the Westway in West London, this land it leased from the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, and the Department of Transport held the freehold. “By 1987 the Trust had created spaces for 650 jobs and a rental income of £573000. It is now financially self - sufficient and most of the available land is developed or committed
for new sports facilitates or a large training centre. By the turn of the century it is estimated that in the region of half a million pounds will be available for other local initiatives in the area”. (Baily 1990 P155) This is an example of a very successful CDT which turned a potential derelict eyesore into a piece of profitable real estate.

Two Trusts engaged in Neighbourhood Revitalisation are the Hoxton and Fitzrovia Trusts in Central London. Both are densely populated and mixed use areas, and here Trusts have operated to develop infill sites, open new shops and convert the areas above the shops into residential use. The Hoxton Trust has even created a small public garden in the centre of Hoxton High Street. The Tower Hamlets Environmental Trust (THET) is a good illustration of a CDT which has been active in the area of economic development. As I illustrated in Chapter Four the local economies of areas like Tower Hamlets are under threat due to the expansion of City activities and hence City rents into the area. The change in the 1987 Use Classes Order has also had a detrimental impact on such areas and the small firms that clustered in these localities. THET in 1981 embarked on a successful policy called “the community land scheme”, where they provided technical architectural advice and arranged sources of finance for firms wishing to set up or expand. Community Development Trusts are independent bodies, who can pragmatically draw on a various sources of funding to implement a variety of activity in specific locality, whilst maintaining their independence and promoting the concept of a bottom up approach to tackling problems like neighbourhood rehabilitation, promotion
of workplace facilities and training. It is this tradition upon which the Spitalfields CDG claims to model itself.

(4) 2 THE ORIGINS OF THE SPITALFIELDS COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT GROUP

The Spitalfields CDG has its origins in the summer of 1987 when Mrs Thatcher stood on the steps of the Conservative Party Central Office in Smiths Square, after her third General Election victory and spoke of the need to win "those inner cities". The response of Central Government was to be an expansion of the the Conservative polices already directed towards the inner cities. Spitalfields was to be one of the beneficiaries of this concern for the plight of the inner city. A Task Force was dispatched to Spitalfields, the force was a part of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and created through the Central Government initiative called “Action For Cities.” Mrs Thatcher illustrated the aims of this policy. “Inner city revival that will last, requires co operation and partnership between all those involved, government, private companies and voluntary organisations as well as local people.” (DOE 1990 P1) Because of Spitalfields long tradition of community debate over the future of the locality, the response to the introduction of a Task Force was to seek ways of implementing, in a cooperative fashion, some of the policies of the Task Force aimed at rejuvenating Spitalfields. This body was the Jobs and Training Consortium (JTC), which acted as a forum like the old Spitalfields Community Forum, where people would come together to discuss the response to Task Force initiatives like Job Link. I interpreted the JTC as a pressure group operating in
the Pluralist Circuit promoting the interests of consumers centred around the issue of job training. It was from this body that the CDG initially evolved, when confronted by the implicit threat to the community from redevelopment. The threat to Spitalfields was a simple one, that City rents of £40 - £50 per sq ft and land values would replace the Spitalfields rents of £4 - £5 per sq ft. This escalation in rents would effectively destroy the Bangladeshi community in the area, it would “squeeze them out” and hence have a dramatic impact on employment, housing and ultimately on the whole social structure of the community.

This situation led to the creation of the Spitalfields CDG in May 1989, drawn from the members of the JTC. The CDG was initially to cover the wards of St Marys, Spitalfields and Weavers. Later, due to internal politics of LBTH, St Marys was replaced by St Peters. This was to keep CDG confined to the Bethnal Green neighbourhood, a Liberal controlled area and out of the Labour controlled neighbourhood of Stepney. The CDG discussed what the response to the proposed development on the Trumans Brewery and Bishopgate site should be. The CDG decided to see the proposed development as a “opportunity” and not a “threat”, they wanted development to help safeguard the community and to make positive gains from this development. The mechanism by which they would gain was by a Section 106 Agreement which has replaced the section 52 agreements and the creation of a CDT. The CDG exhibited the characteristics of a pluralist representational pressure group and conforms to my working hypothesis.
"The key aims and objectives of the CDG are to identify appropriate means for achieving the maximum degree of community influence and involvement in the redevelopment process, to promote housing, training, workshops, educational and leisure opportunities for local people, to seek to identify areas of agreement and options for choice, to provide information to people resident or working in the area on proposed major redevelopment, and any other proposals for change in land use and their subsequent impact on living and working conditions for people in the area, and to raise public awareness of these issues." (CDG 1990 P4)

To achieve these ends it was necessary for the CDG to draw up a plan which they could put forward as a point from which to negotiate with the officers and members of the Council as well as the developers. "In June 1989, the Government’s Task Force and Business in the Community (BIC) agreed to jointly fund a small professional team to produce a community plan through a combination of technical research input and widespread involvement of local people and organisations." (CDG 1990 P4) The funding for the community plan came from the Task Force and BIC. BIC is an organisation which receives funds from the TNCs like Grand Metropolitan whose Chief Executive is Mr A Sheppard, also the Chairman of BIC.

"Businesses need to be fully participating members of the environment in which they operate, to the greater benefit of the community and themselves. All firms in the private sector - be they large or small - should stand up and be counted in the 1990s on community and environmental involvement. It is not just sound
business sense for us to care about the community in which we work and live, it is also common sense to contribute to the quality of life in our communities.” (Sheppard1990)

BIC is a non political group and has charitable status. HRH the Prince of Wales is its President. BIC through a variety of mechanisms such as legal and commercial advice, provision of start up capital and the secondment of staff to encourage small firms and encourage the active involvement of large firms in the localities in which they operate. They attempt to promote the role of business in the community, giving the community “leadership.” The policies and philosophy of BIC are illustrated in its policy statement entitled “Beyond Charity.” BIC is a nationally organised charity and has extensive connections with Central Government agencies like the “Training and Enterprise Councils”, “Urban Development Corporations”, plus the various Task Forces. It was BIC which gave the CDG a grant of £30 000 to employ a small team of full-time and part-time planners, plus community liaison officers to draw up the Spitalfields Community Development Plan. The CDG with this grant was able to act as an umbrella organisation, under which widespread community consultation was to occur and lead to the CDG Community Development plan.

(4) 3 THE CREATION OF THE COMMUNITY PLAN

The Planning Team led by Mr M Parkes carried out an analysis of the needs of the locality, “A demographic and socio-economic profile of the area was assembled and out of this came a checklist of local needs.” (CDG
This team began a "Master Plan" of the 11.5 acres of the 27 acres site which was to be allocated to them, the plan was drawn up in consultation with the Bethnal Green Neighbourhood Planning Department and the architects for the non office portion of the site, Hunt Thompson Associates. By the end of July 1989 the CDG was able to put their Master Plan forward for a major exercise in "public participation." The main vehicle of public participation was a "planning for real exercise". At stage one, briefing papers were circulated to around 100 local groups and organisations. Stage two involved joint participation in the Bethnal Green Neighbourhood Office, public consultation exercise, which took place from the 11 - 14 of September 1989. Stage three saw a number of "outreach discussions" take place with some 50 groups in the area.

Stage four was the Planning for Real Exercise. The Planning for Real Exercise took place on three consecutive Sundays in October, and some 500 people who worked or resided in the area took part. The Planning for Real Exercise consisted of a map of the development site and models laid out on a scale of 1.200. Using this map, people could select models or write on cards what they would like to see developed on each particular part of the site. Stage five consisted of some 12 meetings held from November 1989 to May 1990 to discuss what the Community Plan should finally propose. Stage six aimed to encourage public participation and raise the profile of CDG in the area by the distribution of 17,000 leaflets to local homes and business. This publicity material was both in English and Bangladeshi.
From this process the final plan emerged. "The main debate revolved around competition between the claims on land for affordable housing or affordable workspace." (Interview Mr M Parkes Planning Advisor)

Out of the public meeting and debates surrounding the drawing up of the Community Plan and the allocation of land uses on the Master Plan the CDG was able to put forward its "preferred plan." It was this preferred plan which was to be the basis of negotiations between the CDG Local Authority and the developers. By December 1989 the developers had agreed to make over to the CDG all the land lying to the east of Brick Lane, which came to 11.5 acres. This land was valued at £25 million and the CDG was to receive some £3.3 million on top in the form of a Training Centre and Sports Hall. The joint developers also were willing to "open their books" for the inspection of the CDG, so they could verify the value of the land the CDG was receiving from the developers.

The preferred plan put forward by the CDG, divided the site into four distinct quarters. The Master Plan covered an area larger than the Brewery and Bishopsgate sites, it also covered Allen Gardens, a park in the area which would form the core of the Housing development. In the plan some 444,000 square metres would be given over to workplaces and a equal amount of land to housing. The housing element of the plan was hoped to provide 368 units, of which 280 units will be large family houses. These units would have up to 4 - 5 bedrooms to accommodate the shortage of this kind of accommodation in the locality. Also 12, 000 square metres would be given over to retail, the major
proportion of these retail outlets to be centred in a Bazaar called Banglatown, which would be located in the converted Keg House on the former Brewery site, and act as a centre in which Bangladeshi craftsmen would be able to sell their products directly to the public and act as a showroom for Bangladeshi products, a sort of Bangladeshi Convent Garden. There will also be a Fashion Centre of 11700 square metres and a Training Centre of some 19000 square metres. This ambitious plan has set out to be financially viable, elements of the plan such as the workspaces and fashion centres are potentially successful ventures and could subsidise the housing element of the plan. In theory "From the outset it was agreed by the team and the working party, that the community plan had to be financially as well as socially, sustainable." (Interview Mr M Parkes) The outcome of this planning process was an ambitious Community Plan, which was theoretically a product of a grass roots response to development pressure in the locality.

(4) 4 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CDG AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE DEVELOPERS

My empirical evidence overturned my working hypothesis that the CDG was a pluralist representational pressure group. The CDG is a body which has come into existence due to the intervention of the Central State in the form of the Spitalfields Task Force and corporate interests through BIC. Why have corporate interests promoted a CDG in alliance with the central state. The CDG members promote the image that they are a community group who, after a process of public consultation, drew up a plan to
protect and promote the interests of the community they represent. To understand this self perception of the CDG by its leaders one has to analyse the philosophy of this group, one has to see this group in the context of their relationship to the developers of the site, in particular Grand Metropolitan. The philosophy of the conveners of the CDG is pragmatic. "We accept that we are operating in a Thatcherite environment and that with the abolition of the GLC and ILEA, the old form of public sector funded opposition to development as pursued by people like SHAPR is over. We had to find an alternative way of dealing with developers. The CDG embarked on a policy of taking on the Central Government agencies's vocabulary of partnership."

"Vocabulary such as, "making inner city areas safe to live and work in." (DTI 1990 P2) The CDG accepted the Government's vocabulary and reworked it to reset the agenda in favour of the CDG and extract real partnership.

When Grand Metropolitan proposed redevelopment of its sites in Spitalfields it proposed the idea of some form of CDT to cover the site. Then Grand Metropolitan persuaded LET and British Rail Property Board to accept the idea of some form of community involvement in the development. Once this offer was made it was promoted by BIC and the Task Force to form the base of its "exit strategy" from the Spitalfields area. Once this offer was made the CDG accepted it along with a grant to draw up a Community Plan, which the CDG argued they pragmatically used as a Trojan Horse to take on the developers and Government propaganda of "community", so they could effectively re draw the agenda in a much
more extensive form of developer community partnership.

The CDG called for a “seat at the table” and “control of land” and the establishment of a long term partnership between the developers and the community which would last for decades and would act as a mechanism to combine development with the renovation of the Spitalfields area. The CDG sees these aims being achieved through the creation of a CDT, and partnership between the community and the developers would be exercised through this CDT, which would manage the 11.5 acres given over to the CDG. The CDT management committee would consist of a third of members appointed by the developers, Local Authority and people directly elected to the management committee by the members of the CDT.

It is this pragmatic approach which made the CDG so successful in the contemporary climate. They examined the experience of the Docklands Planning Forum and Save Spitalfields Campaign, two campaigns which were seen as merely oppositional politics not achieving any tangible or significant outcomes for the communities they were supposed to help. The Dockland Planning Forum was merely a "talking shop for white middle class professional activists." (Interview Mr N Ahmed) However, they saw the Save Spitalfields Campaign as "ideologically pure" and hence pursued opposition to development as a matter of principal. “All the left can offer the community is the slogan revolt, riot to oppose development, or merely wait till we are in power and we shall put everything right. This isn’t good enough and Spitalfields can’t wait.” (Interview Mr N Ahmed)
So the CDG accepted the invitation from the developers and used the opportunity, the alliance of interests between the developers particularly Grand Metropolitan, BIC, the fact that Mr A Sheppard is the Chairman of BIC and the Prince of Wales its President. This exploited the concern the Prince has for the area he calls an "urban village", and involvement of state agencies like the Task Force, and the Home Office Inner City Race Unit, which observes the area closely. All resulted in the CDG getting a "seat at the table" and the creation of a community plan which was a product of "messy planning", but stands some chances of actually being realised. One has to ask if the CDG is a direct product of corporate interest promotion or a product of an alliance of interests which provided a window of opportunity to bring about the creation of the CDG.

(4) 5 THE RESPONSE OF THE PLURALIST CIRCUIT TO THE CDG.

I used the term "oppositional establishment" to describe the pluralist circuit which is made up of an alliance of groups who emerged in the locality in the late 1970s and early 1980s and co operated in the Save Spitalfields Campaign. This oppositional establishment consists of a diverse array of groups such as the Spitalfields Farm, the Ward Labour Party, SSBA, THET and others. These groups are opposed to the CDG and would contest the account given earlier of the formation and creation of the CDG and its Community Plan.
The origins of the CDG lie with THET. Mr J Alderton, who is the head of THET failed in a bid to establish a working CDT for the Whitechapel Shopping Centre site. After the failure of this project in 1986, he became involved in the Iseldon Road project in Finsbury Park Islington, where he met Mr M Parkes who was then working for Planning Aid for London. Mr J Alderton realised that shortly the Bishopgate Goodsyard site would be coming up for redevelopment and engaged Mr M Parkes to carry out a Planning for Real Exercise for this site.

"John Alderton of THET contacted me through Planning Aid for London, he wanted us to carry out a Planning for Real Exercise on the Bishopgate site. This site interested me as did the locality as a planner both from a technical and social point of view. I started this process of Planning for Real with John Alderton but it was a disaster. I found myself boycotted when I attempted to hold a public meeting. I noticed the area was predominantly Bengali yet no Bengali attended my meetings, instead we were boycotted. I realised John Alderton didn’t represent the community.” (Interview Mr M Parkes)

Mr M Parkes perceived that THET and its Planning for Real Exercise was not representative of the community. Later, Mr M Parkes met Mr N Ahmed. "I felt I could work with Niser Ahmed and get something tangible achieved with him, he represented the community.” (Interview Mr M Parkes) But the origins of the CDG go back before the involvement of Mr M Parkes with THET. The origins lie in a sequence of parallel events and from its conception has been dogged by controversy and political
infighting in the ward between, for example, THET and the Bangladeshi interests centred around the BWA.

In July 1987 the Prince of Wales as President of BIC made a much publicised visit to the Spitalfields area. He focused attention on this area and mobilised the actors who would play out the CDG drama. The Prince said "something must be done", when he saw the living and working conditions in Spitalfields. BIC became involved and started promoting the idea of a CDG in the area, initially to cover the Spitalfields Market redevelopment. "What BIC proposed to the local community and the developers was that they should try to do something new. This was that the community should form a partnership with the developers which would give them a long term stake in the development and recognise the interdependence of business and the local community." (Interview Miss A Moynihan BIC) In March 1988 the Prince returned to Spitalfields to see what had been achieved and at a lunch in the Lloyds Board Room the Prince made all parties, "community" and "developers", agree to work for the good of the community. The community representatives were those that BIC had selected to be present at this meeting. At the same time the Trumans Brewery closed down and the Save Spitalfields Campaign began to hold a number of meetings to initiate discussions on the future of this site.

These discussions began to crystalize around the future of the two sites of the Bishopsgate and Trumans Brewery site. "When the Brewery vacated their Spitalfields site we began to hold a number of public meetings to discuss our response to the Brewery
closure and the possibility of development on the site. Many individuals and groups attended these meetings, SSBA, Spitalfields Housing Co-op, Spitalfields Farm, Tenants Associations etc. All these meetings were open and we thrashed out what our aims and objectives should be, that if this site was to be developed the community should gain from this process. These aims and policies and the public meetings were eventually taken over by Nisar Ahmed. I thought this was fine at first, ie the idea that Bengalis should take the initiative, however it was hijacked." (Interview Ms J Cove Save Spitalfields Campaign)

“Me and Kay Jordon were eventually excluded from these meetings, we were frozen out, so were other groups like Daniel La Marsh of the Farm. We were excluded for party reasons and community political reasons and also due to personality clashes with Nisar and Ashrafal.” (Interview Ms J Cove). These clashes led to the exclusion or withdrawal from the CDG of long established groups like the SSBA and the Spitalfields Housing Co-op, both organisations which could have made a significant contribution to the CDG. “We were accused of being racist by Nisar Ahmed and co, which is a convenient label to use against anyone who criticized their activities, along with white middle class.” (Interview Ms J Cove) The CDG it would appear excluded these groups because it wished to avoid the traditional oppositional approach to development. “The traditional response of deprived communities to development of this sort is to fight against them, fearing that they will be forced out by rising prices. Such a response may bring short term gain but in the long term the local community invariably loses out.”
Once the exclusion or withdrawal of the established opposition groupings had been achieved, the CDG became virtually a Bangladeshi organisation. It developed within the context of Bangladeshi political culture as described. "Bangladeshis have a tradition of self help especially when they can make a fast buck out of it. Community politics are also seen as a mechanism of personal promotion as well as community improvement, the political culture revolves around patronage. The CDG and its operation is a product of patronage politics, a group have control of the CDG and exercise patronage through it." (Interview Mr J Alderton THET)

The CDG is a product of corporate and state interests, who have financed it and through their patronage given it legitimacy. The result of this Corporate activity was to foster a CDG elite who are very articulate and have a clearly focused set of objectives to achieve. This group merely represents one section of the Bangladeshi community but is seen as credible and legitimate by outside agencies.

This perception of the CDG as a Bangladeshi elite who have taken over and run an organisation which should be democratically accountable to the people of the locality is also shared by people in the Bangladeshi community. "A group of people have come together who claim they represent the community and they genuinely feel perhaps that they can maximise the benefit from development for the community. I believe they do not represent the community, they are businessmen who are out to promote their personal and business interests. I believe the CDG represents its own
interests and those of the developers." (Interview Mr A Uddin Labour Councillor) This elite have successfully captured the pluralist representational circuit to promote their interests, be they the interests of personal political promotion or the interests of the competitive business circuit. They have done this through patronage and an alliance of state and corporate interests.

Mr A Uddin, a local Labour Councillor, is harshly critical of the CDG. "The CDG has presented a false face too, when they held their first meeting they selectively invited people and held the meetings in St Marys ward, so as to prevent people from Spitalfields from attending." (Interview Mr A Uddin) He sees the CDG as a product of external forces, which has no legitimacy because of its exclusion of people and groups who will not toe the CDG line. "The CDG is a product of BIC and Task Force money. With due respect to the leaders of the Task Force, it is impossible for white middle class professionals to make contact with ethnic minorities, unless they have taken the time to learn about these people and are prepared to meet them on their own terms and on their ground. The Task Force members didn't do this so they went out to meet people who spoke their language and can meet them in their environment, in the office or over lunch." (Interview Mr A Uddin) He also doubts the credibility of the Community Plan being a Community Plan and who it is written for. "The Community Plan is a document written for professionals, for City people, it isn't a consultation document. The Community Plan if it was a consultation document would be written in plain English, let alone Bengali no part of this, document has
been translated into Bengali for ordinary people to understand.” (Interview Mr A Uddin).

Others have described the operation of the CDG in an equally unfavourable light. “The CDG seems to be a product of decisions made in corners and has addressed self selected issues and people to consult.” (Interview Mr Cox Avenues Unlimited) “The CDG is treated by its management committee as its personal property and as an organisation by which they can dispense favours to their chums.” (Ms K Jordan SSBA) Also the CDG was discredited in the eyes of other people by its close association with the developers. “The CDG is nothing but a Trojan Horse, it is another example of where developers have stolen the language of progressive people, of community and turned them inside out to further their interests.” (Interview Mr P Maxwell, Labour Councillor)

These perceptions of the CDG could be viewed as the rough and tumble of political debate and struggle within a fragmented pluralist circuit, but the CDG is a product of outside interests and its claim to be representative of the locality is open to debate. “The CDG and its activities have been and will be attacked by a coalition of Greens, Pinks and Reds. I don’t think the antics of these people, who are vocal and articulate, should be allowed to dominate the Spitalfields area. These people take an oppositional approach. I don’t think they achieve much, and they don’t have the right priorities.” (Interview Mr M Parkes)

“We have intervened in the CDG to try and clean it up
Criticism of the CDG has steadily grown in the locality, thus criticism came to a head after the production of the Community Plan, when during the summer of 1990 it looked as if this plan might be realised. The local Council under the direction of Mr J Shaw the Chairman of the Bethnal Green Neighbourhood District decided to "turn this organisation round", to "widen its membership" and "make it accountable." Mr J Smith, a Local Economic Development Officer, was dispatched to implement this policy. He had to try and extended the membership beyond the "clique" who were perceived to control it and beyond the wider Bangladeshi community. It was at this point that the Local Authority insisted that the Ward of St Marys be replaced by the Ward of St Peters, so as to keep the CDG completely in the Bethnal Green neighbourhood and hopefully, by the inclusion of St Peters, to encourage the largely white working class population in that Ward to join.

The CDG was controlled by two groups defined by Mr J Smith, they were the "Academics Club" and the "Sports Club", one provided the Bangladeshi think tank and the other the necessary hands to deliver an affirmative vote for the Convener's policies. "Angela Moynihan has taken Nisar Ahmed as gospel and as a result BIC and the Task Force are desperate to maintain the credibility of the CDG." (Interview MR J SMITH) Mr J Smith attempted to get groups involved in the CDG such as the Boundary Estate Tenants Association and other groups in the area belonging to the pluralist circuit. The election to the Management Committee in October 1990 was
controversial. "Of the 450 people on the electoral list 377 were rejected, illustrating the extent of corruption." (Interview Mr J Smith) The CDG attempted to fix this election in their favour, and the extent of corruption of the poll was so widespread that the Electoral Reform Society who were overlooking the election declared it null and void. The situation has deteriorated and an inquiry is now being held into the conduct of this election. The electoral tribunal is chaired and run by representatives from the CDG, Task Force, and BIC. (Refer Appendices (1) Fig (41) P205). One can see the CDG is an organisation which is clearly controversial, it is seen by many people in the area as unrepresentative and closely associated with corporate interests, who have a vested interest in attempting to maintain the credibility of the Spitalfields CDG, along with the Task Force and BIC.

SUMMARY

I have illustrated the immediate threat posed by the potential redevelopment in the Spitalfields area and how this threat with the aid of BIC and the Task Force plus the encouragement of the developers was reinterpreted as an "opportunity", how a group of individuals set about the creation of a CDG. I considered the drafting of a CDG plan and the philosophy of the CDG group, and finally discussed the reaction of the pluralist circuit to the CDG and its Community Plan.
CHAPTER FIVE

LESSONS AND CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SPITALFIELDS CDG.

In this concluding Chapter I shall analyse, with the help of my empirical findings, the experience of the Spitalfields CDG, its outcomes and the meaning this experiment has had for the actors involved. From this point I shall examine the lessons to be learnt from the Spitalfields CDG and its implications for planning practice and the conclusions I have reached from my empirical study. My empirical findings overturned my working hypothesis. From my background reading I perceived the Spitalfields CDG as a pluralist pressure group, which had emerged from the tradition of active pressure group participation in planning issues in the Spitalfields ward as illustrated by my exploration of the Save Spitalfields Campaign.

This working hypothesis led me to ask three broad questions which I illustrated on pages 58 and 59 of Chapter Two. These broad questions were, (A) why is the CDG a predominantly Bangladeshi organisation? (B) Was the CDG an attempt to restore the accommodation between pluralist and corporatist interests which I felt had been undermined by Thatcherism?
(C) Had the Local Authority vacated its role as mediator between the pluralist and corporatist interests, the role it is suppose to play as a ideal type according to the Dual Sate theory. To find out the answers to these broad questions I carried out a questionnaire survey as illustrated in Chapter Two. For each broad question I asked three specific questions (refer P 91 for list of sample questions). These questions were aimed at establishing the facts about the emergence of the Spitalfields CDG and the response to the CDG from various planning actors involved in the process. Questions (A) 1 (A) 2 and (A) 3, all concentrated on trying to establish if the inhabitants of Spitalfields had actually drawn up the CDG “Community Plan”, and if they did was it because they felt their interests had been overlooked by the Bethnal Green neighbourhood.

Questions (B) 1 (B) 2 and (B) 3 are all questions aimed at trying to find out if the CDG was attempting to restore the accommodation between pluralist and corporatist interests. Question (B) 1 asks the respondents if the CDG belongs to the same tradition of political action in the locality as the Save Spitalfields Campaign. Questions (B) 2 was designed to find out if this method of a CDT was a model that other community could pursue. Questions (B) 3 again was a question which
asked for detail, if the developers had actively cooperated 
with the CDG was it because they were eager to re establish 
the accommodation between pluralist and corporatist 
interests.

Questions (C) 1 (C) 2 and (C) 3 concentrated on extracting 
information which would explain the role of the state in the 
CDG experience. I wanted to gauge the attitude of the 
councillors and council officers to the CDG, to find out if 
they had decided to withdraw from the role of mediator 
between corporate and pluralist interests. Question (C) 3 was 
initially aimed at extracting factual information, ie what 
was the role played by the Task Force and BIG in enabling the 
CDG to create its Community Plan. It is the response to these 
questions which I shall illustrate in this concluding chapter. 
If the response to questions (A) 1 (B) 1 and (B) 2 had been an 
overwhelming yes and the response to questions (B) 3 (C) 1 
and (C) 2 had been an overwhelming no, my working hypothesis 
would have been provide. However, this was not the response 
to my questionnaire survey with the result shall that my 
working hypothesis was overturned.
Fig (18) (A) 1 Have the inhabitants of Spitalfields drawn up and promoted their own local plan and created the Community Development Trust?

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SOURCE (My own survey)

From my survey it is clear that the inhabitants of Spitalfields as a whole did not come together to draft their own local plan. A large number of local inhabitants, 300 to 500 people, did play a role in giving their opinions on the formation of the CDG and the creation of a community plan. There is no doubt that a
substantial number of local people through the Planning for Real Exercise did have an "input" in the creation of this plan. But the plan was essentially a product of a small professional team of planners as there was no way, in the short time span (around two months) available, that uninformed public opinion could make any more than a superficial contribution. It is more likely that they chose between the options presented by the professional planners. I would argue that two months was not enough time for a local community to develop the necessary skills to make an informed contribution to a planning exercise of the scale portrayed in the Spitalfields CDG Community Plan. It was clear to me from my interviews that the planning philosophy and therefore the permissible outcomes from the Planning for Real Exercise had been defined by the Conveners of the CDG. This definition of permissible outcomes from this planning exercise, I feel went along way to dictate the composition and physical layout of the adopted Community Plan.
Fig (19) (A) 2 Has the borough wide planning strategy overlooked Spitalfields as a locality?

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SOURCE (My own survey)

My survey also revealed that many people felt that Spitalfields as a locality had been overlooked by the Local Planning Authority; 48% of respondents said yes. Bangladeshis in particular felt that Spitalfields needs were overlooked by the Local Authority, as did 48% of white respondents. Many respondents felt that Spitalfields was not the recipient of the kind of planning policy it needed. "The social and economic structure of the locality is under severe pressure and will have a negative impact on the local people and
economy. This situation should call for a strong planning response from the Local Authority, to protect the local community and their livelihoods. No such policy has come forward from the Authority, they are leaving Spitalfields to the developers.” (Interview Mr P Maxwell) “The area and its ecology has been left wide open to destruction by the development pressure and especially the change in the Use Classes Orders. No strategy has been drawn up to protect the area”. (Interview Mr A Uddin) The Local Authority would argue that they have given Spitalfields its fair share of planning. The Bethnal Green Neighbourhood Office did carry out its own public consultation exercise in the locality before drawing up its “Development Brief” for the two sites covered by the CDG.
Fig (20) (A) 3 Do the inhabitants of Spitalfields have confidence in the Bethnal Green Neighbourhood Office to safeguard their local interests?

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|        | 38%       | 34%   | 47%  | 28%    | 37%         | 67%   |    |

| No     | 13        | 9     | 4    | 10     | 9           |       |    |
|        | 28%       | 22%   | 30%  | 56%    | 26%         |       |    |

| DK     | 22        | 18    | 4    | 3      | 13          | 1     |    |
|        | 39%       | 44%   | 30%  | 16%    | 37%         | 33%   |    |

SOURCE (My own survey)

My survey also revealed that people who were informed, had confidence in the professionalism of the local planning officers in Bethnal Green to promote the best interests of the community. Many respondents felt the professionalism of the officers was undermined by the members of the Council. This impression was reinforced by the resignation (after many years of service) of two of the most experienced planning officers in the Bethnal Green Neighbourhood Office. My
respondents felt that the members of the Council, due to the polarisation between the Labour controlled ward of Spitalfields and the Liberal controlled Neighbourhood of Bethnal Green, were unable to cooperate effectively on a coherent policy for Spitalfields and hence the dissatisfaction of the local planners with the situation. There was also a widespread belief, which was evident amongst disorganised public opinion, that the locality was discriminated against by the Council. Hence 56% of the Bangladeshi respondents felt that Spitalfields was discriminated against, as did 80% of respondents from Social Class IV.
Is the CDG a product of its locality and the long tradition of community-based political action which people in the locality have engaged in?

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SOURCE (My Own Survey)

The large majority of people interviewed, ie 64% of respondents said yes. There was an overwhelming impression amongst the Bangladeshi respondents 80% answering positively, that the CDG was a product of the locality, though what they meant by product of the locality was open to interpretation. When they said the CDG was a product of the locality, the respondent's often meant that the CDG had "hijacked" the tradition of community-based politics in the area and had used
it as a mechanism by which to legitimise their activities. "It is an organisation brought in from outside and the product of outside agencies like BIC. I often call the Task Force the Raj Forces, it operates like the old British Empire. It selects a group of people who call themselves community leaders and deals with them, they are their creation. The idea that they represent the community and are based in the community, rooted in this community is a fallacy." (Interview Mr D Holloway PYO) Most respondents saw the CDG as a reflection of the political culture of the locality, as a product of a distortion of the political culture of the area due to the influence of outside groups and their considerable resources. For many respondents the CDG was created because of the wish of organisations like the Task Force to avoid involvement with the representative pluralist circuit of the locality.
Fig (22) (B) 2 Is the CDG a method of mobilising a local community you would recommend to other communities in a similar situation?

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SOURCE (My own survey)

The overwhelming majority of people, some 47 (84%) respondents out of 56, thought a CDG was a good method of encouraging a community to organise, define and promote its interests, when faced by the threat of large scale development. All 18 of the Bangladeshi respondents felt this, giving a 100% positive response to this question, as did the Afro Caribbean respondents and 83% of the white respondents. Again this reply has to be interpreted, it was not an overwhelming
endorsement of the CDG, but the theory of a CDG. “In theory it would be a good idea, if it was democratically accountable and represented the wider community. How one achieves this in Spitalfields I don’t know, this area is absolutely corrupted by all forms of political antagonism and struggle.” (Interview Mr J Smith) The qualification is that the model of a CDG is fine in theory, but has been distorted in the case of Spitalfields CDG by its imposition and financing by outside agencies ie its promotion by Corporatist interests and its close association to particular groups of interests in the Bangladeshi community.
Fig (23) (B) 3 Have the developers cooperated with the CDG?

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SOURCE (My own survey)

Again when I asked the question if the developers and the CDG had cooperated, 37 (66%) of respondents were aware of this close relationship and 19 (34%) did not know. The Don’t Knows were largely from the disorganised branch of public opinion for example 100% of the respondents from Social Class V, ie some 12 respondents, did not know about the nature of the relationship between the developers and the CDG. The CDG does not go out of its way to inform one of the extent or nature of its relationship to the developers. Those who did identify the close relationship between the CDG and the developers, felt this relationship
existed because BIC created the organisation. "We have accepted from the beginning that we were going to carry out a large scale development in a sensitive area, hence we wanted to take the community with. This is why we along with the Task Force and BIC promoted the idea of a CDG and funded the drafting of a community plan, which I think is very professional. We saw the role of the CDG as an organisation which we could negotiate with, in parallel with the Council." (Interview Mr T Brundson)

Mr T Brundson clearly states that they actively encouraged the creation of the CDG, it fits into their corporate development policy. "Due to our interests in promoting a good environment we also want to take people into consideration. When we carry out a major development we consult local people at length, again it is good for the quality of life and ultimately for business." (Interview Mr T Brundson) The high level of cooperation between the developers and the CDG is due to Grand Metropolitans corporate strategy. This organisation is planning another large development on the site of another former Brewery in Newton Heath in Manchester, and one element of their "Master Plan" is the creation of a CDT in the locality of Newton Heath. "The creation of a CDT is appropriate in an area where there is a pressure group vacuum, like Newton Heath, especially, when one wants to carry out a development without alienating the surrounding community. A CDT gives people a legitimate channel through which to
express their concerns.” (Interview Mr Brundson) It is important to realise that this philosophy is only held by Grand Metropolitan, probably due to the Chief Executives association with BIC. The other members of the consortium do not have the same confidence in the mechanism of a CDG.

“In reality, the CDG has become representative of a small Bengali clique, I wonder how representative it is of the community it claims to represent. I would be much happier if people like THET, SSBA, were still involved in the process. The affair of the electoral fraud has put me off the whole exercise. I would rather cooperate as we did in the Spitalfields Market development directly with organisations like the Spitalfields Housing Association, people with a proven track record. The CDG just seems like adding another layer of bureaucracy to me.” (Interview Mr Buggin LET)
Fig (24) (C) 1 Have the Councillors in the area cooperated with the activities of the CDG?

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SOURCE (My own survey)

Again the response to the question as to whether or not the local councillors have cooperated with the CDG needs analysis. The Labour Councillors who represent the Spitalfields ward, have not cooperated with the CDG, they are with the exception of Mr Mortuza hostile to the CDG. Mr Mortuza believes the CDG has "pragmatic credibility." The Liberal Councillors who control the Neighbourhood Office were initially neutral towards the CDG. "We have encouraged the CDG to turn itself around, to make itself more open and
accountable." (Interview Mr J Shaw Liberal Councillor)
Some 54% of the respondents felt that the Councillors had cooperated with the CDG, whilst some 44% of respondents did not know, because to answer this question positively or negatively would demand that the respondent was informed, ie that they took an active part in local politics.

Fig (25) (C) 2 Have Council Officers in the area cooperated with the activities of the CDG?

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SOURCE (My own survey)

The response to the CDG from the Council officers really depends on which level of officer one is addressing. The strategic planners of the Borough have
quite a different view of the CDG from the Neighbourhood planners. Mr T Chudleigh perceived the CDG as a means of achieving the strategic needs of LBTH like the proposed Railway Interchange. At the Neighbourhood level the perception of the CDG was quite different, the officers were at pains to point out that the CDG was just another pressure group, with a legitimate right to be consulted just like any other pressure group in the Borough. "It is important to realise that the CDG plan is very glossy and professional but it isn’t an official document, it has no more legitimacy than any other document submitted as a part of a public consultation exercise. It is the Borough which will take the decision about the future of these sites." (Interview Ms A Doherty LBTH Officer)

The majority of respondents could not answer this question positively or negatively, 70% of respondents did not know, and this was especially evident amongst the Bangladeshi respondents, with 67% responding as don’t knows.
Fig (26) (C) 3 How important was the role of the Spitalfields Task Force and BIC initiative in enabling the CDG to get off the ground?

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SOURCE (My own survey)

Again my informed respondents viewed the activities of BIC as essential for the creation of the CDG (66%) but it was seen largely as a negative feature, which they saw as distracting from the credibility of this body. Amongst the respondents to the questions (C1), (C2), (C3), there was a large percentage of Don’t Knows, especially from disorganised public opinion. This is because to respond affirmatively or negatively to these questions demanded a knowledge of the technicalities of the operations of the CDG. Many of my respondents
did not know of the existence of BIC for instance, the scale and the nature of the proposed development on the Goodsyard and Brewery sites, or the type of body a CDT is.

Fig (27) KNOWLEDGE OF PLANNED DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SPITALFIELDS AREA.

| Table 3.46 What Respondent knows about developments planned for the area |
|------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Ethnicity        | Sex            | Age            |                |                |                |
| Bangladeshi      | UK White       | Other          | Male          | Female         | 16 - 18        | 19 - 24        | 25 - 44        | 45 - 60        |
| Total            | 514            | 255            | 191           | 68             | 277            | 237            | 46             | 93             | 264            | 131            |
| Respondents      | 100%           | 100%           | 100%          | 100%           | 100%           | 100%           | 100%           | 100%           | 100%           | 100%           |
| Yes, have 'heard' of developments (have awareness) | 59             | 37             | 21             | 1              | 19             | 40             | 3              | 10             | 32             | 14             |
| Yes, have some knowledge of developments | 96             | 34             | 51             | 11             | 63             | 33             | 4              | 16             | 46             | 30             |
| A mention of some other developments in the area | 106            | 34             | 51             | 15             | 62             | 44             | 5              | 14             | 58             | 29             |
| Other kinds of comment | 8              | 4              | 4              | 0              | 6              | 2              | 0              | 2              | 4              | 2              |
| Don't know about/ nothing/no idea | 278            | 153            | 82             | 43             | 146            | 132            | 34             | 56             | 121            | 67             |

This apparent lack of knowledge as to the scale and nature of developments planned for the area was also illustrated in a survey carried out by Aaronovitch and Egans from the Local Economic Policy Unit, South Bank Polytechnic on behalf of the Spitalfields Task Force in a report entitled “Change in Spitalfields.” (1990) The above table illustrates, that there is an alarming lack of knowledge across a wide range of ethnic, gender and age groupings as to the imminent disturbance to the community by development. This survey was carried out.
in a period following widespread publicity by the Local Authority and the Spitalfields CDG that large scale development was potentially to occur in the locality. Refer to Appendices (1) for a further breakdown of Survey Sample by the independent variables of gender and social class.

(5) 2 POTENTIAL PHYSICAL OUTCOMES

The implementation of any part of the CDG preferred plan is dependent upon the developers being given planning permission by the London Borough of Tower Hamlets and the London Borough of Hackney. The developers will not submit their application for planning permission until a Parliamentary Bill is passed to allow the construction of a new Railway Interchange at the Bishopsgate site. Railway Bills have to be submitted in the November session of Parliament; the developers missed the November 1990 date and plan to submit the Bill in November 1991. When the members of the JTC and BIC came together to promote the concept of a CDG it was in 1988, a time of rising demand for office space. This situation is now completely reversed and I suspect that developers are now in no hurry to develop the Brewery and Bishopsgate sites.

The developers’ time scale for the development of the sites has been extended. “If we get planning permission
and the railway link we are looking at a time scale of getting onto and developing the site in four to five years. At the moment we have a grand plan, if it has to be scaled down due to economic problems, or the rail problem, the time scale will lengthen, maybe a decade? If we have to carry out piecemeal development this will have an impact on any future CDT. The Trust will also have to have more modest ambitions.” (Interview Mr J Brundson Grand Metropolitan)

Mr Buggin holds an even less optimistic outlook on the future of development on the Bishopsgate site. "It will be after we have rented out our office space in the Spitalfields Market site. Then we will start thinking about the Bishopsgate site. We are committed to develop this site, but as you can see the time horizon is high. All this then depends on other factors, the Gulf War, depressed markets, rail links etc. Any of these factors could knock our calculations out of kilter. The result is that we might start some small scale development. I might choose to develop parts of the site like the corners of Hanbury Street as a part of the Market site, not the Goodseyard.” (Interview Mr T Buggin LET) One can see that the developers are quite reticent about future development of the Bishopsgate site. The developers can afford to “mothball” this site for decades if need be.

The mothballing of the development site will inevitably have a detrimental impact on the CDG because the
implementation of any part of the CDG Community Plan demands full-scale and rapid development. Yet Mr N Ahmed at a conference held at the Architectural Association 21.2.91 on, “Urban Rehabilitation and Housing, Cities in Transition,” recognised the changed development climate but still remained confident of the Community Plan’s implementation. “All we need is the Transport issue resolved and planning permission and we will have our Trust and a twenty year partnership with the developers to look forward to.” (Speech Mr N Ahmed) This optimism was not shared by the Neighbourhood Planning Officers. “The developers stopped consulting us in November 1990 and hence the development is stored? The only people in the area who might end up benefiting from the redevelopment of Spitalfields, will be a Bengali or two who might own a freehold on a property in Brick Lane.” (Interview Ms A Doherty) I am drawn to the conclusion that the CDG will only achieve the physical outcome that the operation of the development system is prepared to sanction.

(5) 3 THE MEANING OF THE CDG TO THE ACTORS INVOLVED?

To answer this question, I had to ask the meaning of the CDG for whom? The CDG has a different meaning depending on which policy communities in the political circuit I found myself. The CDG for its members has quite a different meaning from that of the Local Authority officers and
members, the developers and organised and dis-organised public opinion. I shall explore the meaning of the CDG by addressing each group in turn.

(1) The Members of CDG - When discussing the meaning of the CDG to its members and those who worked on drawing up the plan, I firstly have to make a distinction between members and those involved on the technical production of the Community Plan. For people like Mr N Ahmed and Mr S Ashraful Islam the CDG is a legitimate organisation, where a group of people have come together and gained substantial support from the Bangladeshi Community to try and extract some tangible physical outcomes for the locality from the development system. To do this, they fully accept that they might not have deployed the most democratic means to achieve these legitimate ends. They would argue that criticism levelled at them comes from “professional critics”, who have failed with their methods to achieve any substantial gains from merely opposing the development system. “I see the CDG operating on two levels, CDG as a Democratic Assembly and the Management Committee as an elitist body which will actually manage the Trust.” (Interview Mr N Ahmed) The charge of unaccountability levelled at the CDG is justified if it achieves the potential
outcomes; for members of the CDG there is also a element of feeling victimised for their pragmatism. "The CDG has, as a result become a battle ground where opposing forces in the area have decided to fight their battles."  (Interview Mr N Ahmed CDG Convener) It has become a forum for the struggle between groups in the pluralist circuit. The technical advisors to the CDG accepted the Politics of the CDG as a product of that locality. "I believe in appropriate response to different situations. In Kings Cross we have to pursue a more oppositional course, the area is very different. In Spitalfields there was no way we could do this. This is the problem with the professional opposers. In Spitalfields one has to deal with the developers, play the Planning Gain Game." (Interview Mr M Parkes)

(2) Members of the Local Council and Officers - These two groups played a curiously detached role in the story of the CDG. The local ward Councillors (all Labour Councillors) except for Mr G Mortuzer, who is a Convener of the CDG, opposed this body. Mr A Uddin was opposed to the CDG for the simple reason that he saw it as being totally unrepresentative and lacking credibility. "They will justify their actions by saying that most people in the area are Bangladeshi, and that they have a Bangladeshi organisation.
This isn’t good enough, a CDG should represent the whole community, OAPS, youths, women, white, blacks, the unemployed etc, they haven’t done this.” (Interview Mr A Uddin) The exclusion from the CDG of such groups allows the CDG to remain in the control of a “clique”, according to Mr A Uddin. Other Councillors in the area dismissed the CDG as an extension of the developers. “Grandmet might give millions to the CDG but they stand to make billions, the CDG is there for Grandmet convenience.” (Interview Mr P Maxwell) The Liberal Councillors were quite indifferent to the CDG. I interpreted this apparent indifference in a variety of ways, firstly, they cannot see the CDG coming to anything, and hence it is not an issue. Secondly, they perceive the CDG as an internal struggle in the pluralist circuit. Thirdly in the final analysis the Councillors will control what happens on the Brewery and Bishopsgate sites - they, after all, are the Statutory Planning Authority and they grant or refuse planning permission. This was very much the attitude of the Local Planning Officers who saw the CDG as an interesting experiment, though surrounded by “sloppy thinking” and “buzz words” like “urban village.” But again in the last analysis it was the Council which controlled the process and would sanction policy in the best interests of the neighbourhood. I interpreted LBTH attitude towards the CDG as an illustration of the withdrawal
of the state as mediator between Pluralist and Corporate interests. But, if the CDG as I suggest is a product of Corporate interests, this then is not the case.

The Officers of London Borough of Hackney (LBH) took no interest in the CDG, they claimed the CDG had attempted to gain a monopoly of the community benefits which might come from this development. "If there is to be any sizable development in Hackney, then we must benefit. Not just the locality around the site, but the whole Borough, because there is no identifiable community in the Shoreditch area. The CDG said we had no rights to a share of the Planning Gain, but we disagree." (Interview Ms J Fraser, LBH Officer) The LBH therefore had no involvement with the CDG, but consulted with LBTH. "We have had some thirty meetings with the LBTH over the Bishopsgate development." The LBH interests in the development are not recognised by the CDG or the Task Force. Because the Task Force wished to keep the proposed plan for the creation of a CDG to cover the Bishopsgate site confined within the boundaries of the LBTH and hence in the area covered by the Task Force, whilst the CDG wanted to gain as many benefits from the development as possible by attempting to exclude the LBH. "They have not consulted us, they didn't invite us to any of their meetings or participate
in their Planning for Real Exercise. The Spitalfields Task Force haven't acknowledged Hackney's interests in this development." (Interview Ms J Fraser) The LBH have given the developers outline planning permission for the Bishopsgate development, and have arrived at a Planning Gain Agreement, which is open to further negotiation when the development is implemented. This Planning Gain Agreement covers the provision of funds for job training, social housing, and the refurbishment of the large number of railway viaducts in the area, for use as small work units. Ms J Fraser sums up the LBH approach to the redevelopment of Bishopsgate when she states, "We are trying to maximise the indirect benefits from the development, such as the improvement of Shoreditch High Street. The new East London line could help the Borough in social and economic terms, it might enable us to start tackling the Dalston area." (Interview Ms J Fraser)

(3) Developers - The developers Grand Metropolitan and LET have two very different attitudes towards the CDG. The promotion of the CDG is a product of Grand Metropolitan's development strategy, to create local bodies representing the Community to consult when executing a development. Whilst LET, who apparently are not aware of such "progressive" ideas, the CDG is just another "bureaucratic layer." Hunt
Thompson the architects employed by the consortium and a firm who also co operated with the CDG, had quite a different perception of it. “The Spitalfields CDG experience was a significant one. No matter what its detractors say of it, no matter what, if anything, comes of it, I feel that Michael Parkes has added a milestone to Community Planning, he has written a page in the history of Community Planning with the CDG.” (Interview Mr B Darbyshire, Hunt Thompson)

(4) Organised opinion - As I have illustrated, organised public opinion in the ward largely consists of groups with a long and proven track record in the area. They form the oppositional establishment, and they are adamantly that the CDG is a product of an alliance of interests between the Grand Metropolitan, BIC and the Task Force. That the CDG, no matter what the outcome, will act to further the interests of these groups, that Grand Metropolitan will get its development, BIC will be seen to be promoting partnership, and the Task Force will leave something tangible behind when it vacates the area. Above all, the CDG will provide good press coverage for the Central Government and vindicate its “Action for Cities Campaign.” It will not act to promote the interests of the pluralist circuit.
Dis-organised public opinion - I have gauged the meaning of the CDG to dis-organised public opinion through interviewing an “illustrative sample” of “ordinary people.” The majority of the respondents had heard of the CDG and thought it was just like any other of the pressure groups in the locality. None of them had taken part in the Planning for Real Exercise. I was left with the impression that most respondents did not see the redevelopment of the Bishopsgate or Brewery sites as having any significance for them. This is probably because the people I spoke to did not see how they could benefit from the proposed developments, statements like, “I don’t have any strong views about it”, “the place is always changing” were not uncommon. Also the respondents who were not Bangladeshi did not perceive the CDG as an organisation they “would”, as opposed to “could”, join. All respondents had knowledge of the scandal surrounding the CDG Election through reading the East London Advertiser. This was perceived as a matter of internal Bangladeshi politics and not any of their business. The concept of “our” business and “their” business was very apparent.

The Task Force and BIC - I place these two organisations together because they have acted as the catalyst bringing the CDG into existence. Both bodies exist to promote the ideology
of the “Free Market”, but an operation of the free market which can positively contribute to the solution of some of Society’s social ills. If the community and business were to cooperate they could have a mutually beneficial relationship, at the moment the Central Government policy is in support of this ideology. The result is that throughout the country, BIC and the Task Force cooperate to promote “partnership”, so as to bring “benefits to the community” and “improve the environment.” “The Local Community who are largely Bangladeshi genuinely believe that their long term interests are now secure as a result of the partnership.” (Interview Ms A Moynihan) I interpreted this action by Central State Agencies as an attempt to replace the old accommodation with a newly constructed ideology.

(5) 4 WHAT LESSONS CAN BE LEARNT FROM THE SPITALFIELDS COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT GROUP

I feel there are a number of lessons to be learnt from the experience of the Spitalfields CDG. These lessons are applicable to the planning actors involved in this process, which I define as (1) Community Groups, (2) LBTH, (3) Central Government, and (4) the Development Industry.
(1) LESSONS FOR COMMUNITY GROUPS - The empirical example of the Spitalfields CDG, the attempt to create a CDT, the apparent failure to achieve anything tangible to date or in the foreseeable future, does not invalidate the theoretical model of the potential benefits a CDT can bring about in a locality. I illustrated some very successful and well established CDT’s, Spitalfields could benefit from a local CDT depending on the type and scale of environmental problems it is trying to address. The model of the Hoxton CDT would be an appropriate one for the locality of Spitalfields. I would argue that CDTs are appropriate for addressing problems of the scale described in the Hoxton example. Any community group wishing to promote a Community Development Trust, injunction with the development industry has to be aware of their potential dependence on the developers, if their plan is dependent on the developers realising their development. Such an alliance will always place a community group at a disadvantage when negotiating the physical outcomes with the developers of their plans.

The basic flaw of the close relationship of the CDG to the developers is that they are totally reliant on them for the financing of their Community Plan. It was the developers
through BIC who provided the £30 000 for the drafting of the Community Plan. Any real outcomes in the form of workshops, new houses, or the development of Banglatown are totally dependent upon the consortium developers' decisions to develop or not to develop the site. If they decide to mothball the site for a decade there will be no CDG to develop into a CDT, because there will be no site in existence to manage. The CDG is totally dependent on the peripeteia of the developers.

(2) LESSONS FOR THE LBTH - The experience of the Spitalfields CDG can be viewed by the LBTH as an attempt to bypass the normal planning channels by the CDG and the consortium of developers and Central Government agencies who supported the CDG experiment. I would argue that this alliance of interests were able to do this, and might have successfully achieved these aims, if the development climate had remained buoyant, because it appeared that the LBTH had not initiated any planning policies in the locality that might have received popular support from the local inhabitants. LBTH needs to positively tackle the problems of the locality and raise the profile of the Local Authority as a vehicle for the resolution of some of Spitalfields' problems. Such a policy could be addressed through the preparation of the
Unitary Development Plan (UDP) for the Borough. The LBTH has entered the public consultation stage of the preparation of the Boroughs UDP. The public consultation exercise is centred around the preparation of “Part 2” of the UDP for the Borough and will be at an area level. However, the area level defined by the LBTH is at the neighbourhood level and not at the ward level, ie at the level of the Spitalfields locality. In the LBTH I had the impression that the different planning agencies ie Borough and neighbourhood level were developing planning policies, which often didn’t promote a uniform policy because the planning policy was aimed at responding to the wishes of different interest communities represented by the strategic and neighbourhood level planners. This impression I arrived at through my interviews, and it is difficult to say what the outcomes this divergence in planning policy will result in when the UDP is finally prepared. If it is accepted that the role of the planning profession is to be an agent of encouraging desirable change in the environment whilst also having concern to protect the interests of individual citizens, community and the physical environment and above all mediate between competing interests to achieve these desirable outcomes. I would argue that the LBTH planning apparatus is unable to carry out this function in relation to the locality of Spitalfields, largely due to the political
climate in the Borough. At the moment LBTH have put in a bid for a £13 million grant from the Central Government's initiative called “City Challenge”, promoted by Mr Heseltine. This application for a grant has been I understand drawn up and promoted without any form of public consultation with the local inhabitants of Spitalfields. It is also difficult to see how this proposal will fit into the Boroughs ongoing preperation of its UDP, and the public consultation exercise over the preperation of the UDP it claims to be committed to. The LBTH bid if accepted will be directed at Spitalfields; however the plans the LBTH aims to achieve with this money remain confidential, and the initiative has been greeted with hostility by the residents of Spitalfields, who see it as yet another attempt to break up the Community.

(3) LESSONS FOR CENTRAL GOVERNMENT - Central Government Departments like the DOE and DTI implement policies aimed at regenerating the inner city. To achieve these aims the DOE as illustrated have embarked upon a new policy initiative, “City Challenge”. The experience of the Spitalfields CDG teaches a basic lesson about the implementation of sustainable inner city regeneration. Which is that, if one really wishes to address the host of problems faced by the Spitalfields area, one would have to re introduce a policy similar to the GLC
CAP scheme and allocate the appropriate resources to address the issues of housing, training, environmental health etc. A CDG cannot effectively address the scale and nature of the problems facing Spitalfields as illustrated. The resolution of these problems if the will exists to resolve them must lie with state agencies. A CDT can help to ameliorate some of the problems and a CDG should have an important role to play in providing people in a locality with a channel by which to express their wishes. The long term resolution of the problems faced by inner city areas like Spitalfields, will only be realised by long-term policy initiatives which coordinate action and resources, from the public and private sectors the success of such policy initiatives and their long term effectiveness demand that such a policy be based on consensus politics and will therefore enjoy a large degree of support from the variety of agencies which will need to be deployed to achieve the regeneration of inner cities.

The immediate lesson the central state can learn from the Spitalfields CDG experience when promoting similar policies in other areas where the local population is predominantly drawn from the ethnic minorities, is the need to be better informed and sensitive to the client group toward which the policy is being directed. The overriding impression with
which I was left after a study of the Spitalfields CDG, is of an organisation which is a product of a configuration of outside forces who decided to create a CDG. This policy from all quarters appears to have been implemented in a most insensitive manner. I have the impression that the personnel in the Task Force and BIC were not familiar with the locality and the politics of the Bangladeshi community. This resulted in them financing and selecting the personnel who would make up the Management Committee of the CDG, who shared the CDG's value system. I perceived the role of the conveners of the CDG as reminiscent of indigenous rulers in the colonial period whom the "Imperial Authorities" selected as the intermediaries with whom to negotiate on behalf of the indigenous population. In this case, a Bangladeshi interest community where perceived by the "Colonial Authorities" in the form of the Spitalfields Task Force and BIC as representative of the wider community and where subsequently identified as the group with whom to negotiate. The CDG is not an accountable representative body of the Spitalfields ward.

(4) LESSONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT INDUSTRY - The Spitalfields CDG is a product of an alliance between corporate and state interests, but this does not make it an
illegitimate organisation. A CDT must be funded by someone, and if a TNC is prepared to fund such a body, even if it is part of their development policies, all well and good. The developers have a role to play in addressing some of the social problems a development may have on a Community. When the Spitalfields Development Group wished to develop the market site it had to pay for the relocation of the market. Likewise, if office development has a negative impact upon the garment industry, it should provide this industry with new facilities as in the case of the market.

Grand Metropolitan have created the CDG to promote its interests. The consortium of the developers were, in a period of economic buoyancy, eager to rapidly develop the Bishopsgate and Brewery sites. From the experience of the Spitalfields Market, they knew that development in the Spitalfields locality would be met with opposition and costly delays incurred. The necessity to avoid a confrontation with the pluralist circuit encouraged the developers to create a CDG they were especially encouraged by the presence of BIC and the Task Forces in the area, and this was compounded by the overlapping membership between BIC and the developers and the interest and patronage in the locality of a figure of the stature of HRH the Prince of Wales.
It is possible to imagine the strength of the coalition of forces and interests which could have turned the CDG into an unstoppable juggernaut, leaving LBTH and the pluralist circuit in a difficult position to criticise, let alone oppose. Some uncharitable souls would also argue that the CDG would have provided a convenient smokescreen from behind which the developers could extract their required planning permission. The result would be some gain for the community, though perhaps not in the form of the "preferred plan." The developers would have achieved their return on the M - C - C1 - M1 equation. Broadly the lessons which the development industry can draw from the experience of the Spitalfields CDG are the same ones which the central state can learn from the Spitalfields CDG experience.

(5) 3 SOME CONCLUSIONS

My working hypothesis was that the Spitalfields CDG is a pressure group operating in the pluralist circuit, to promote the interests of the local community. A community which because of its ethnic composition and apparent homogeneity was able to promote its interests more effectively in the pluralist circuit. Because of its homogeneity and the window
of opportunity provided by figures like the Prince of Wales and Central Government agencies in the locality, I imagined that the CDG was attempting to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of the accommodation in the Thatcher period. I also imagined that, due to the lack of interest if not outright hostility of the Liberal-controlled Borough towards the Spitalfields ward, the CDG was having to compete against the local state and corporate interests in a situation one could label "imperfect pluralism."

I found through my empirical research in Spitalfields that my working hypothesis was overturned. The CDG is a product of the alliance between corporatist and central state economic and ideological interests, which have been rationalised and promoted through agencies like BIC. They have overlapping central state and corporate personnel membership and they articulate their ideology through wards like "partnership", to promote this new ideology and achieve the capital return required by the corporate interests. This configuration or alliance of interests pursued its ideology through the creation of a CDG, which it imposed upon the Spitalfields ward, on one of "those inner cities", upon that "factious hamlet."
Outside the configuration of central state and corporate interests which produced the CDG, is the local state and the pluralist circuit consisting of dis-organised and organised public opinion. The local state would be right in feeling that an attempt at the "privatisation" of its statutory planning powers, had been attempted in the case of the Brewery and Bishopsgate sites with the Grand Metropolitan development strategy of "master planning." The policy pursued in the Spitalfields ward by the Liberal controlled Borough, and its apparent hostility to the locality (the abolition of the Spitalfields Community Forum) has provided the vacuum for the CDG to occupy and to claim it is filling. The resolution of the problems of a locality like Spitalfields, if one finds it desirable to maintain a Community in such an area, and upon such potentially valuable land, would require a multi-agency approach. A CDG could play a useful role but could not provide a definitive solution. Planning as a mechanism for the resolution of these problems, is only as effective as the powers and resources allocated to the planners to achieve a particular policy.

The Spitalfields CDG is not a pluralist pressure group representing Spitalfields. The pluralist circuit of Spitalfields, as a reaction to the CDG experience, has formed
another umbrella group called Spitalfields 2000, led by Mr R Staines of the Spitalfields Housing Co op, to draw up their own local plan, as a part of the process leading to the preparation of the Unitary Development Plan for LBTH. The Spitalfields CDG will not realise any portion of their preferred community plan because they are dependent upon the development of these sites to occur, which is unlikely in the present climate. The CDG could have been as successful as the Coin Street development if the forces which supported the creation of the CDG had continued to support this body. The Coin Street development on the South Bank of the Thames in Central London is described as a "triumph of popular planning", but it is a product of a window in history when the groups promoting the Coin Street Scheme found themselves in alliance with the Local State in the form of the GLC, who had the policy interests and resources to implement this "extraordinary community victory." As Brownill (1990) illustrates in her example of the "People Plan for Royal Docks", if a community plan is sponsored by any section of the Dual State interests, that plan will promote the interests of the sector of the dual state which supports it and will produce physical outcomes in proportion to the strengths or weakness of its supporting agent in that particular historical period.
Fig (16) The Mismatch of Dwelling size to House Hold in Spitalfields (P110).

Fig (17) Location of the Bishopgate and Trumans Brewery Redevelopment sites (P114).

Fig (18) Response to Question (A) 1 (P135).

Fig (19) Response to Question (A) 2 (P137).

Fig (20) Response to Question (A) 3 (P139).

Fig (21) Response to Question (B) 1 (P141).

Fig (22) Response to Question (B) 2 (P143).

Fig (23) Response to Question (B) 3 (P145).

Fig (24) Response to Question (C) 1 (P148).

Fig (25) Response to Question (C) 2 (P149).

Fig (26) Response to Question (C) 3 (P151).

Fig (27) Knowledge of the Planned Developments in the Spitalfields area (P53).

Fig (28) Response to Questions Across Gender Range. (Male Respondents) (P180).

Fig (29) Response to Questions Across Gender Range. (Female Respondents) (P181).

Fig (30) Response to Questions Across Ethnicity Range. (Bangladeshi and Afro Caribbean Respondents) (P182).

Fig (31) Response to Questions Across Ethnicity Range. (White Respondents) (P183).
Fig (32) Response to Questions Across Social Class Range.
(Positive Response) (P 184).

Fig (33) Response to Questions Across Social Class Range.
(Negative Response) (P185).

Fig (34) Response to Questions Across Social Class Range.
(Dont Knows) (P186).


Fig (37) Area Covered by the Spitalfields Task Force (P189).

Fig (38) Master Plan of combined redevelopment of the Bishopgate Goodsyard and Trumans Brewery sites (P190).

Fig (39) Spitalfields CDG Proposed Community Plan (P191).

Fig (40) Proposed Community Plan for the Whitechapel Shopping Centre Site. Whitechapel Community Development Trust(P192).

Fig (41) Letter to Ms C Murphy and Mr D Cox (P193).

Fig (42) Bishopgate Goodsyard site looking South East towards Canary Wharf (P194).

Fig (43) Bishopgate Goodsyard site looking South towards Broadgate and the City of London (P195).

Fig (44) Allan Gardens site looking North East, site of proposed Housing in the Spitalfields Community Plan (P196).

Fig (45) Trumans Brewery at Pedley street looking South towards Brick Lane (P197).
Fig (46) View of the Broadgate development looking West down Brushfield Street (P198).

Fig (47) New Office Development from the 1980s, at the junction of Bell Lane and Whites Row Spitalfields (P199).

Fig (48) New Office Development from the 1980s, at the junction of Crisp Lane and Whites Row (P200).
SAMPLE LIST

PRODUCERS

Mr J Brundson Grand Metropolitan Estates
Mr T Buggin London and Edinburgh Trust
Mr D Bucknell British Rail Property Board
Mr B Darbyshire Hunt Thompson Associates

CENTRAL STATE

Ms E Zimmer Spitalfields Task Force
Mr A Ferries Spitalfields Task Force

LOCAL STATE

LBTH COUNCILLORS

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Mr A Rohim Liberal Councillor
Ms B Wright Liberal Councillor
Mr S Miah Liberal Councillor
Mr P Maxwell Labour Councillor
Mr G Mortuza Labour Councillor
Mr A Uddin Labour Councillor

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Ms A Doherty Planning Officer
Mr P Studdart Planning Officer
Mr B Blair Economic Development Officer
Mr J Smith Economic Development Officer
Mr T Chudliegh Strategic Planner
LBH OFFICERS
Ms J Fraser Planning Officer
Ms A Onuoho

CONSUMER INTERESTS
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT GROUP
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Mr N Nisar Convener
Mr R Ahmed Convener
Mr S Ashraful Islam Convener
Mr M Chalkley Convener

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Mr A Ahad Bangladeshi Welfare Association
Mr R Staines Spitalfields Housing Co op
Mr I Lumly The Spitalfields Trust
Ms D La Marsh The Spitalfields Farm
Ms K Jordon Spitalfields Small Business Association
Mr J Alderton Tower Hamlets Environmental Trust
Mr J Backes Tower Hamlets Campaign For Homeless Families
Ms J Cove Save Spitalfields Campaign
Mr J Cox Avenues Unlimited
Mr S Choudbury Bangladeshi Youth League
Mr C Forman SHAPR
Mr S Uddin SHAPR
Revd E Stride Christ Church Spitalfields
DIS - ORGANISED PUBLIC OPINION
Four Senior Citizens Montefiore Pensioners Co op
Four Teenagers Davenant Centre
Resident of Hanbury Street
Resident of Deal Street
Resident of Princelet Street
Resident of Wheler House
Resident of Chicksand Estate
Resident of Dennington Point
Resident of Underwood Road
Resident of Old Montague Street
SAMPLE QUESTIONS

(A) 1 Have the inhabitants of Spitalfields drawn up and promoted their own local plan and created a Community Development Trust?

(A) 2 Has the Borough wide planning strategy overlooked Spitalfields as a locality?

(A) 3 Do the inhabitants of Spitalfields have confidence in the Bethnal Green Neighbourhood Office to safeguard their local interests?

(B) 1 Is the CDG a product of its locality and the long tradition of community based political action that people in the locality have been engaged in?

(B) 2 Is the CDG a method of mobilising a local community to defend its interests which you would recommend to other communities in a similar situation?

(B) 3 Have the developers cooperated with the CDG?

(C) 1 Have the Councillors in the area cooperated with the activities of the CDG?

(C) 2 Have Council Officers in the area cooperated with the activities of the CDG?

(C) 3 How important was the role of the Spitalfields Task Force and BIC initiative in enabling the CDG to get off the ground?
Fig (28) RESPONSE TO SAMPLE QUESTIONS ACROSS GENDER RANGE. (MALE RESPONDENTS)

Key
- male yes
- male no
- male d/know
Fig (29) RESPONSE TO SAMPLE QUESTIONS ACROSS GENDER RANGE. (FEMALE RESPONDENTS)

Key
- female yes
- female no
- female d/unknown

Source: My Own Survey
FIG (30) RESPONSE TO SAMPLE QUESTIONS ACROSS GENDER RANGE. (BANGLADESHIS @ AFRO CARIBBEAN RESPONDENTS)

Source: My Own Survey
Fig (31) RESPONSE TO SAMPLE QUESTIONS ACROSS GENDER RANGE. (WHITE RESPONDENTS)

Source: My own survey

Key
- W Yes
- W No
- W D/Know
Fig (32) RESPONSE TO SAMPLE QUESTIONS ACROSS SOCIAL CLASSES. (POSITIVE RESPONSE)
Fig (33) RESPONSE TO SAMPLE QUESTIONS ACROSS SOCIAL CLASSES. (NEGATIVE RESPONSE)
Fig (34) RESPONSE TO SAMPLE QUESTIONS ACROSS SOCIAL CLASSES. (DON'T KNOWS)
TABLE 6. BANGLADESHI POPULATION OF THE SPITALFIELDS, WEAVERS AND ST MARY’S WARDs 1989-1996 (INDICATIVE ONLY)

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Source: LRC 1989

SOURCE (CDG 1990 P21)
Fig (36) TRENDS IN RATE OF POPULATION INCREASE - TOWER HAMLETS TOTAL BANGLADESHI POPULATION OF SPITALFIELDS, WEAVERS AND ST MARY'S WARDS BY AGE, 1989, 1991, 1996. INDICATIVE ONLY.

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<tr>
<td>91-96</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KEY**

%age Increase/Decrease in:

- **Bangladeshi Population of 3 Wards**
- **Total Population of Tower Hamlets**

Source: LRC 1989

SOURCE (CDG 1990 P22)
Fig (37) AREA COVERED BY THE SPITALFIELDS TASK FORCE.

SOURCE (SPITALFIELDS TASK FORCE 1991)
Fig (38) MASTER PLAN OF THE COMBINED REDEVELOPMENT OF THE BISHOPGATE GOODS YARD AND TRUMANS BREWERY SITES.

Key to Masterplan

1 Offices with shops under
2 Shops and workshops with flats over
3 Workshops and offices
4 Trade and training centre
5 Shops with houses and flats over
6 Shops and workshops
7 Workshops and shops with houses over
8 Grand Metropolitan Headquarters
9 Work homes
10 Workshops and shops with houses over
11 Shops with flats over
12 Offices with shops under
13 Shops, restaurants and workshops
14 Workshops with offices over
15 Shops with houses and flats over
16 Community meeting rooms and assembly halls
17 Workshops, houses and flats
18 Sheltered housing
19 Houses and workhomes
20 Sports centre
21 Houses
22 Houses
23 Flats
24 Houses and shops

SOURCE (Hunt Thompson Associates 1990)
Fig (39) SPITALFIELDS CDG PROPOSED COMMUNITY PLAN FOR BISHOPGATE GOODSYARD AND TRUMANS BREWERY SITES.

Key to Community Plan

1 Mosque, workshops and offices
2 Workshops and office
3 Industry workshops and offices
4 Fashion and training centre
5 Industry shops, workshops and offices
6 Shops and family housing
7 Headquarters office
8 Workshops and offices
9 Family housing, workspace and shops
10 Restaurant, housing and shops
11 Shops, workshops and offices
12 Family housing and visitors centre
13 Family housing and shops
14 Shops and workshops
15 Housing
16 Housing, shops, offices and workshops
17 Family housing
18 Family housing
19 Family housing and workshops
20 Sports centre
21 Housing and study centre
22 Family housing and workshops
23 Family housing
24 Shops and housing
A Concentration of offices may be preferable to eastward extension of offices
B Temporary uses could include play space, allotments and housing
C To include shops for local needs
D Decking over railway
E Underground carpark to extend for Sunday market use

SOURCE (Hunt Thompson Associates 1990)
Fig (40) PROPOSED COMMUNITY PLAN FOR THE WHITECHAPEL SHOPPING CENTRE SITE. WHITECHAPEL COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT TRUST.

SOURCE (THET 1987)
Dear Ms. Clare Murphy and Mr. Derek Cox

I am writing on behalf of the Tribunal of Enquiry which has been established to investigate complaints of membership and ballot irregularities in the Community Development Group. The Tribunal is independent of the CDG and none of its members are involved in the elections to the Executive Committee of the CDG. The Tribunal consists of Alan Ferries, Leader, Spitalfields Task Force; Angela Monaghan, Business in the Community; and Nisar Ahmed, Director, Community Development Trust.

We have received a copy of your complaint about membership/ballot irregularities and wish to investigate matters further. The Tribunal is meeting on Monday 17th December 1990, between 2.00pm and 5.00pm, on Tuesday 18th December 1990, between 9.00am and 12am and on Wednesday between 10am and 4pm. The Tribunal will meet at the Spitalfields Task Force Office, unit 8, Whitechapel Technology Centre, 3 Whitechapel Road, London E1 (Telephone 071-375-1163).

I should advise you that we take your complaint very seriously indeed, but, it is up to you to produce evidence which substantiates your complaint. Therefore, the Tribunal does expect all those that have complained to either present evidence in writing or to attend the Tribunal in person.

Should you be unable to attend the Tribunal hearing because of its timing, it may be possible for you to attend the Tribunal at a different time. If this is the case please write to me, indicating a telephone contact number, and we shall do our best to hear you in person. But, should it be your intention to address the Tribunal in person, then you should make every possible effort to attend the Tribunal on the dates and times indicated.

Yours faithfully

ALLEN FERRIES
CHAIRMAN OF THE TRIBUNAL

HEADQUARTERS;
39 FOURNIER STREET
LONDON E1
APPENDICES (2)

A PHOTOGRAPHIC SURVEY OF SPITALFIELDS.

Fig (42) BISHOPGATE GOODSYARD SITE LOOKING SOUTH EAST TOWARDS CANARY WHARF.

SOURCE (Own Photograph)
Fig (43) BISHOPGATE GOODS YARD SITE LOOKING SOUTH TOWARDS BROADGATE AND THE CITY OF LONDON.

SOURCE (Own Photograph)
Fig (44) ALLAN GARDENS SITE LOOKING NORTH EAST, SITE OF PROPOSED HOUSING IN THE SPITALFIELDS CDG COMMUNITY PLAN.

SOURCE (Own Photograph)
Fig (45) TRUMAN'S BREWERY AT PEDLEY STREET LOOKING SOUTH TOWARDS BRICK LANE.

SOURCE (Own Photograph)
Fig (46) VIEW OF THE BROADGATE DEVELOPMENT LOOKING WEST DOWN BRUSHFIELD STREET.

SOURCE (Own Photograph)
Fig (47) NEW OFFICE DEVELOPMENT FROM THE 1980s ON THE JUNCTION OF CRISPEN LANE AND WHITES ROW.

SOURCE (Own Photograph)
Fig (48) NEW OFFICE DEVELOPMENT FROM THE 1980s ON THE CRISPEN LANE AND WHITES ROW.

SOURCE (Own Photograph)
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