Adapting ‘internationalization’ to integrate ‘troublesome’ minorities: Higher education policies towards Hong Kong and East Jerusalem

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Abstract
We analyze the policies of China and Israel towards students from Hong Kong and East Jerusalem respectively. We demonstrate that they are treated as International students and subject to a form of ‘internationalization’ designed to consolidate national forms of identity and extend state control over ‘troublesome’ minorities within the nation state. This domestic adaptation of the structures designed to support internationalization within Universities, through which the state deploys higher education as a tool of ‘soft power’ to control parts of the nation, operates within a broader program of ‘internal colonization’ that is neither well developed in the literature nor explained by prominent typologies of internationalization.

Keywords: internationalization; international students; China; Hong Kong; Israel; East Jerusalem

Introduction
Internationalization is a key feature of higher education systems worldwide. While research has focused on the institutional and the student/scholar level, recently, there has been an increasing focus on the role of the state and on national policies for promoting internationalization (e.g. Buckner, 2020; Lomer, 2017a; Sanders, 2019). This has focused on international student and staff mobility and to a lesser extent research and university partnerships. While there are multiple, overlapping rationales for internationalization policy at the national level, these are commonly portrayed as economic, academic, competitive, and - increasingly political. However, the political dimension of internationalization tends to be limited to ‘soft power’ portrayed as an attempt by nations to secure and promote their global influence (Lomer, 2017b; Mulvey & Lo, 2020).
We investigate the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) relationship with Hong Kong (HK) and Israel’s relationship with East Jerusalem through an analysis of national and institutional policies and programs which promote student mobility. We explore these as they provide a basis to expand our understanding of how internationalization is operationalized, particularly its political articulations – and how it is portrayed in the literature. These cases we argue represent a political rationale for a form of internationalization which has been adapted to integrate domestic populations, which are viewed as rebellious and in need of ‘integration,’ into the dominant national society through the exercise of soft power. Current analyses of the rationales for and modes of internationalization are limited in their capacity to understand this form and shed light on its features. We portray these cases as a form of internationalization because the residents in both territories (Palestinians in East Jerusalem, Hong Kongers): are supported through the structures and processes designed for international students within the HE systems of both Israel and the PRC; have separate passports/identity documents from Israel/China; follow different systems of schooling and curricula; and they have an identity distinct from and in conflict with the national identity. Further, the PRC officially defines HK students as international students. We will demonstrate, how both national policies and HE institutions in both nations treat them as a distinct type of international student and provide them with a distinct form of ‘internationalization’.

We employed a multiple case study methodology, which allows researchers to describe, document and critically analyze the existence of a phenomena in context and its impact on theory construction and evolution in a particular field (Stake, 2013). Multiple case studies likewise provide greater confidence in their claims of the phenomena under investigation, while their similarities and differences, can provide important indicators for explanatory mechanisms and the development of theory (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Landman, 2008; Stake, 2013). Our cases were purposefully chosen because they illuminate how the processes and structures of internationalization have been harnessed by the state to serve its nationalizing/nation building project. However, whilst the two cases represent an under analyzed form of internationalization there are significant differences in the two populations, a major difference in the relationship between the ‘target’ populations and the state. In China, Hong Kongers are viewed as Chinese who, by virtue of their colonial past, have lost their ethno-cultural identity and become a troublesome and ungrateful minority that require re-education and reunification with the motherland. Whilst in Israel, in marked contrast to the Jewish diaspora, Palestinian Arabs from East Jerusalem are neither treated as part of the (Jewish) nation nor sharing its identity; rather, they are solicited to join the Israeli state, for largely economic reasons, and to become not part of a national ‘family’ or identity but a loyal, or at minimum not a hostile, ethnic minority. That relationship has parallels with that between the Chinese state and its other ‘troublesome’ minorities, in Tibet and Xinjiang. This key difference resulted in considerable variance in the discourse related to integration between the Israeli and PRC government policies and programs – even if the motivations were similar. Likewise, differences in the form of governance and level of autonomy of the universities in the two cases, resulted in differing interpretations of the state agenda. Overall, the two cases are indicative of a similar phenomenon, that of state sponsored internal colonialism, operating through the policies and structures of internationalization. However,
we recognize the very different political, social, historical and cultural aspects of these two cases and our analysis focusses on comparing how their HE systems have harnessed ‘internationalization’ to develop a form of internal colonization.

Our data collection and analysis focused on two levels; firstly, the national policies designed to promote student mobility, as well as recent developments to integrate the respective ‘troublesome’ minorities into the state (e.g. the Greater Bay Area initiative; 2000 Jerusalem Master Plan) and subsequently the policies and programs of two universities which were dedicated to providing international education and heavily involved in delivering those national policies. In keeping with the case study methodology, we draw on multiple sources: national and local government policies, reports and decisions; decisions and programs from the national higher education authorities and their steering/advisory committees; monitoring reports from local NGOs; university websites and noticeboards; domestic media coverage and interviews with staff in the two institutions. The Israeli case also draws on an in-depth study of internationalization over time in the HE institution (Bamberger, 2020b). The data was collected by different members of the research team, depending on their familiarity with the case context and compared across levels (i.e. national and institutional). Employing a critical policy perspective (Apple, 2019) we used inductive qualitative analysis to analyze the documents using an approach (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005) that sought to understand the local contexts in which the policies were developed along with an analysis of the documents stated aims and assumptions, discursive constructions, and the development of policy over time and their effects. Throughout, we compared the data from the different sources within and across the two cases. The bulk of the documents were in Chinese and Hebrew; translation was undertaken as necessary. We provide a robust audit trail of our (publicly available) sources to bolster the trustworthiness of our analysis (Bassey, 1999).

We begin by reviewing prominent typologies of internationalization which we use to ground and examine our cases, and to which we will return in the Discussion and Conclusion. We then analyze the two cases, focusing on state policies related to hosting ‘international’ students and integrating them’ into the dominant narrative.

Rationales for and typologies of internationalization
The main rationales for internationalization identified in the literature are academic, socio-cultural, political and economic in nature (de Wit et al, 2015). While these are viewed as mutually inclusive, they have been portrayed as shifting over time and space from the pursuit in the post-World War II period of peace and mutual understanding; to aid and development in the Cold War period; to the contemporary period dominated by economic motives (e.g. Knight, 2015; Qiang, 2003). However, Guo and Guo (2017) argue the primary shift was from political to economic motives, as the peace and mutual understanding rationale after WWII and the development rationale during the Cold War were motivated by clear political considerations. This shift, from the political to the economic, is traced to a period in the late 1990s - corresponding to the fall of the Soviet Union and the global rise of neoliberalism - when international students became an important source of revenue for many institutions in the West and the rise of the ‘global knowledge economy.’ Bamberger, et al (2019b) argue that the literature has favored this Western narrative and consequently the economic
rationale is now portrayed as the driving force behind internationalization on all levels: students in the pursuit of the cosmopolitan capital that is perceived to increase access and opportunity in local labor markets; institutions in pursuit of financial revenues, international branding, reputation and global rankings (Knight, 2015); and nations in a bid for the wider economic benefits of an influx of overseas students and skilled immigration to drive competition in the ‘global knowledge economy’ (Lomer, 2017a; Trilokekar, 2010). However, there is an increasing focus on the intertwined nature of political and economic rationales. For example, Lomer (2017b) argues that the political rationale of ‘soft power’ is used in UK international student policy, in the state’s pursuit for global status and influence; and this is also connected to views of international students as future elites, and trading partners, and/or hailing from countries rich in natural resources, which could be exploited for further economic expansion and development.

The exercise of state power through international education has a long and well-documented history through the Cold War (Chomsky et al., 1997), with the US and USSR competing for the ‘hearts and minds’ of global youth. The goal was to influence international students towards a particular political ideology - socialist or capitalist- and this involved the use of a spectrum of what is now described as soft power in contrast to harder economic power (Nye, 1990). Recently with the shift towards examining national-level internationalization policies, this rationale has reemerged, with considerable efforts taken to attract international students. The rationale has shifted from promoting an overtly political ideology, towards a more economic orientation, in which countries seek to bolster their geopolitical positions, by enhancing access to knowledge and research through the mobility of international students and staff. While national policy discourses are riddled with contradictions, international students are often portrayed as elites, sources of skilled migration supporting a globally competitive economy, and future trade partners (Lomer, 2017a). Overall, internationalization is viewed as a way to influence students - as outsiders - and over the last decade, China and Israel have created a number of international student exchange and scholarship programs, targeted at particular populations that have been portrayed as an extension of the states’ foreign policies (e.g. Bamberger, 2020b; Hong, 2020; Mok & Marginson, 2021; Mulvey & Lo, 2020).

Overall, the dominant economic/political framing of internationalization within a globally competitive world order is encapsulated in two typologies: one which is critical of this shift towards economic, competitive and soft power rationales and argues for the re-centering of internationalization on ‘values’ – prescribed as liberal, progressive, humanitarian possibilities of internationalization for the global public good (e.g. Knight, 2015; Brandenburg & de Wit, 2011); and one which is more radical that employs post-modern perspectives to expose the ‘violence’ of internationalization and attempts to draw attention to the systemic oppression by the current system and the need to imagine it differently (e.g. Stein et al., 2016). Belonging to the former category is Knight’s (2004) descriptive typology which is designed to be value-neutral and provides a range of rationales, strategies and enactments of internationalization, across different levels (i.e. institutional; sectoral; national; global). This is critiqued for its neutrality; its presumption of internationalization as a process, inferring linear progression (Larsen, 2016); its lack of attention to history and limited
engagement with change over time; and its emphasis on description and prescription, as opposed to explanation (Bamberger et al., 2019a).

Within the latter genre of critical scholarship, Stein et al. (2016) argue that internationalization is positioned within a dominant social imaginary which has its roots in European colonialism. Its core features are racism, appropriation, coercion, and dominance of the other. It is based in capital accumulation and the appropriation of resources by the Global North/West from the Global South and this colonial global imaginary continues to support capitalist social relations; normalize liberal Western notions of politics and governance; and naturalize a racialized social hierarchy. Thus, Stein et al. (2016), situate internationalization within a system of (Western) domination and oppression of the Global South, which is designed to serve Western interests ignoring domestic issues and national contexts. It likewise situates the global imaginary as the supreme imaginary, with the assumption that the nation-state’s interests are aligned with that of the global – global competition, domination, etc. Against this backdrop, Stein et al. (2016) develop a social cartography that identifies different forms of internationalization in relation to the metanarrative of the ‘modern/colonial global imaginary.’ The typology includes four articulations viewed on a continuum, with internationalization for a global knowledge economy, based in a human capital approach designed to maximize competitiveness in the global economy, as dominant.

Thus, both typologies view economic/political rationales as dominant and as driving internationalization at the state level and they lament the current state of internationalization. However, whilst they proceed from very different epistemologies, they share a focus on the relationships between nations and on the power of the West over the rest. Consequently they tend to pay less attention to both the use of internationalization as a tool for projecting influence by non-Western states and the ways it has been adapted to serve as a form of ‘internal colonization’ (Calvert, 2001; Turner 2017; Van De Grift 2015). Internal colonialism is a polysemous concept and at least four distinct meanings are associated with it: the conquest of territory within a national boundary; the subjugation of a minority group; a region subject to lower economic status; and, the dismantling of the commons by the ruling elite. Calvert (2001) argues that ‘internal colonization parallels in all important respects external colonization, characterized as it is by settlement; extension of political control; relations of superordination/subordination; implied or actual use of coercion’ (p. 53) and Pinderhughes (2010) defines it as a ‘geographically-based pattern of subordination of a differentiated population, located within the dominant power or country’ (p. 236). These conditions prevail in HK and Israel; a minority group are subject to the extension of political control, their local identities are being subordinated and the potential for legalized coercion exists. We analyze, how ‘internationalization’ has been harnessed to support the process of ensuring political control and their subordination by the state.

Mainlandization of Hong Kong(ers)
After 1997 HK became a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China following the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ principle based on the Basic Law. Whilst this describes HK as an inalienable part of China over which the central government has sovereignty it also indicates that a great level of autonomy shall be given to HK which developed separate legal and economic systems from Mainland China. Under the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ principle, HK is formally allowed to maintain its own language—Cantonese as the co-official and native language, currency—the HK dollar, a free-market economy with low taxes and to expect low government interference, an independent media and legal system, etc. This principle was formulated to allay the concerns of the local community which had forged a distinct local Cantonese identity that did not, for most citizens, include an allegiance to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Morris & Vickers, 2015); and foreign governments in the West which feared oppression of Hong Kongers and the disruption of its capitalist system under PRC rule. Antecedents which have shaped the HK identity include: a massive influx of refugees from the Mainland during periods of political turmoil in the 20th century; a school curriculum which was depoliticized and focused on pre-1949 China; an active civic society; a strong sense of Cantonese identity; and, a free media which held the government to account (Ibid). These factors combined to create a sense of local identity which differentiated HK from the Mainland. That differentiation became acute from 2012 onwards (Veg, 2017).

During the first 15 years after the handover the system of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ proceeded smoothly, the notable exception being the attempt to pass an anti-sedition law in 2003 which was abandoned after public protests. It appears that the CCP was playing a long game and heeding Deng Xiao Ping’s dictum: ... ‘cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time.’ From around the time of Xi Jinping’s ascendency to the Presidency in 2012, the CCP became impatient with the slow pace of ‘reunification’ and expedited the process resulting in serious and increasingly violent public protests. Most notable were those against the imposition of Moral and National Education as a compulsory school subject in 2012; the Occupy Central Movement in 2014 demanding a democratic political system; and, the Anti-Extradition Movement in 2019. These clashes reflected very different interpretations of the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ policy as Beijing placed more emphasis on ‘One Country’, and implemented policies designed to ‘integrate’ HK into the PRC (Chan 2018). In parallel the PRC increased its control over HK’s media, political expression, education system, and governance. The goal is to ensure reunification while maintaining economic stability, as the 19th National Congress of the CCP in 2017 explained: ‘maintaining the long-term prosperity and stability of HK and Macao and realizing the complete reunification of the motherland are the inevitable requirements for realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ (GOV, 2017).

Many Hong Kongers, especially the younger generation, placed more emphasis on ‘Two Systems’ and in 2020 an Internal Security Bill was passed which quelled dissent as it effectively gave the government the legal power to suppress any form of public protest. The law was used to arrest all pro-democracy members of the Legislative Council (LEGCO) and now any candidates for LEGCO must be ‘patriotic.’ The rationale was signaled long before it was enacted:
‘We adhere to the principle of “HK people ruling HK” …..with patriots as the main body, to develop and strengthen the power of the people who love the country [PRC], love HK ….., to enhance the national consciousness and patriotism of our compatriots in HK ….., and let our compatriots in HK ….. share the historical responsibility of national rejuvenation and the great glory of our motherland’s prosperity with the people of our motherland’ (GOV, 2017).

The Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of The National People's Congress reported recently:

“‘Patriots administering HK’ is a necessary requirement of the One Country, Two Systems policy…Only when the principle of “patriots administering HK” is observed can the Central Authorities’ overall jurisdiction over the SAR be effectively implemented, the constitutional order as established by the Constitution and the Basic Law be effectively maintained, and the various deep-seated problems [e.g. “anti-China destabilizing activities” and “foreign interference”] be effectively resolved’ (China Daily, 2021).

Cultivating patriots from HK for leadership positions is central to Beijing’s long-term strategy to ‘integrate’ HK into the Mainland. These aims have spurred wide-ranging ‘reunification’ initiatives across the Greater Bay Area (Guangdong-HK-Macao) and have affected all areas of life in HK, including the policymaking processes, economy, local governance, and notably the education system. The strategy requires significant efforts to inculcate patriotic Hong Kongers, and the primary discourse for achieving that is the promotion of a shared Chinese identity and lineage. In 2020, President Xi explained the rationale:

‘We should…attract more young people from HK and Macao to study, work and live in the Mainland, promote extensive exchanges, comprehensive communication and deep integration among young people from Guangdong, HK and Macao, to increase their sense of belonging to the motherland’ (GOV, 2020).

Accordingly, schools have been required to promote the state’s messages and redefine the identity of Hong Kongers. This has involved the creation of ‘sister schools,’ educational exchanges, ‘boot camps’, and changes to the HK curriculum; most notably with the replacement of the (issues based) subject Liberal Studies with Citizenship and Social Development (Education Bureau, 2021a). Teachers expressing dissenting views have been sacked; plans are afoot to send HK teachers to the Mainland as part of their training and the main Teachers Union was disbanded after it was described by the Peoples’ Daily (2021) as ‘a malignant tumour…. inciting teachers and students to riot against the government.’ HE has become an element of the ‘reunification’ agenda with the establishment in 2016 of the University Alliance of Guangdong, HK and Macao to increase Mainland-HK exchanges, joint programs and the creation of joint-universities (CUHK, 2016; HMO, 2019). More recently some Universities have closed down their Student Unions and introduced modules designed to teach the benefits of the National Security Law. Beijing is also keen to promote integration through educational cooperation between HE institutions of the Mainland, HK and Macau. In 2019, the CCP and the National Council issued its plan for integrating HK and Macau into
the mainland (GOV, 2019b). A significant element of the plan is to recruit HK students to Mainland universities. It explains:

‘Young people from HK and Macao are encouraged to study in mainland universities. For students who study in the Mainland with HK and Macao residents’ travel permits [i.e. citizenship], the same preferential policies as those for mainland students are implemented, such as transportation and tourism tickets’ (GOV, 2019).

In 2013 14,000 HK students enrolled in PRC Universities and this increased to 16,000 in 2020. Whilst the numbers are significant, many more elect to study overseas (estimated over 45,000 in 2018) and the numbers electing to study in Taiwan saw the largest rate of growth from 2013 to 2018 (UNESCO, 2021).

Mobility has been facilitated by extending policies which have been long used to attract foreign students to study in China to HK students (e.g. preferential treatment in admissions; scholarships; bursaries; and additional student services). While students from HK have always applied via a separate system (in comparison to their mainland counterparts), in 2012, the Scheme for Admission of HK Students to Mainland HE Institutions allowed HK students to apply for undergraduate programs in some Mainland universities directly using their HKDSE exam results (Te & Postiglione, 2018). This simplified the admissions process and shortened the application time for HK students wishing to study in the Mainland. From 2012 to 2020, the number of Mainland universities included in this scheme expanded from 63 to 122 (Wang, 2020), while the number of HK students enrolled through this scheme rose sharply from 263 in the 2014/2015 academic year to 1,920 in 2020 (Education Bureau, 2021b). Most of the Mainland universities included in this scheme are prestigious institutions.

Additional financial incentives have been provided to encourage HK students to study in the mainland. Since 2005, they are eligible for the same rate of tuition and accommodation fees as their mainland counterparts (HMO, 2005). In 2006, the mainland introduced scholarships to ‘encourage students from HK, Macao and Overseas Chinese to study in mainland universities and research institutes, enhance their sense of motherland and encourage them to study hard and make progress’ (MOE, 2006). The policy was renewed in 2017, however, a new ‘basic requirement of receiving the scholarship’ was added: ‘ardently love the motherland and support the principle of “One Country, Two Systems”’ (MOE, 2017). It also specified why the scholarship could be cancelled; the first is ‘[if the student] has any speech or behavior against “One country, Two systems”’.

Since 2014, the HK government has provided students studying in the Mainland with scholarships (Education Bureau, 2021c) and additional benefits have been extended to them (e.g. coverage by the national medical insurance plan, MOE, 2013). Promotional activities have been introduced, including an annual Mainland China HE Expo targeting HK secondary school graduates. One Mainland institution, Jinan University (JNU) and its College of Four Seas (Sihai) has been particularly active in recruiting HK students. It is among the six Mainland
universities that can enroll HK students independently and according to official data, it is also HK students’ most popular choice for undergraduate study in the Mainland (Caijing, 2021).\(^1\)

**JNU and the College of Sihai**

JNU is a large comprehensive research institution, part of the strategic ‘211 Project’ and labelled as a ‘double first-class university.’ It was established in 1906 and was rehabilitated by the CCP in 1958 to recruit and enroll overseas Chinese students. Based in Guangzhou city just over 100 km from HK, JNU was the first in China to recruit international students and currently has the largest international student population in the country (out of 42,734 full-time students, it hosts 14,189 students from Overseas, HK, Macau and Taiwan (Jinan, 2020a). The University portrays itself as ‘outstanding in internationalization’ and claims that its guiding principle is ‘facing overseas, HK, Macau and Taiwan’ (Jinan, 2021) and aims to ‘popularize Chinese traditional culture to all over the world’. It proclaims that it ‘is always upholding the faith of diffusing the knowledge and caring for Overseas Chinese, the motto of loyalty, sincerity, integrity and respect and the policy of international orientation especially towards HK, Macao and Taiwan’ (Jinan, 2020b). JNU styles itself as ‘... the first choice for the students from HK, Macao, Taiwan as well as the Overseas Chinese and international students who intend to study in the mainland China’ (Jinan, 2018). In particular, it claims to ‘shoulder the great responsibility to fulfil the glorious mission of inculcating talents for overseas Chinese, HK, Macau and Taiwan’ (Jinan, 2021). In other words, the University is assigned the political task to inculcate future elites for these societies. Notably, in contrast to other Chinese universities, JNU is administered directly by the United Front Work Department of the CCP Central Committee, signaling its political status (Ibid).

JNU groups its students into two categories: the ‘students enrolled internally’ (*nei zhao sheng*) and ‘students enrolled externally’ (*wai zhao sheng*). The former refers to the mainland students who are enrolled through the highly competitive national examination (*gaokao*), while the non-Chinese overseas students, the Overseas Chinese students and students from HK, Macau and Taiwan comprise the latter category and are enrolled through a separate and less competitive enrollment procedure. The University admitted 2,271 ‘external’ students (31% of the total enrollment) in 2016, and half of them were from HK (Jinan, 2016).

In 2010, JNU established the College of Sihai (the Four Seas), a name which denotes the ‘spreading of Chinese culture around the world;’ and reflects JNU’s aim to ‘recruit students from all over the world’ and cultivate them with ‘the excellent traditional moralities and culture of the Chinese nation and modern science and technology’ (Sihai, 2019a). Sihai College was established to recruit Overseas Chinese students and students from HK, Macau

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\(^1\) In the academic year 2020/2021, t 2,117 HK students chose JNU in their university application, making it the most popular choice (Caijing, 2021). The HK official data also shows that in 2020/2021, JNU is the mainland university with the largest number of HK students who receive official scholarship/subsidies from the HK government (about 1,339 students, 35 percent of the total number) (HK 01, 2021). One possible explanation for its popularity is that JNU is given the largest quota for enrolling HK students, whereas other more prestigious universities such as Tsinghua do not have such a quota. Other factors for HK students’ choice of JNU include weather, food, language (Cantonese), and geographical proximity.
and Taiwan who comprise a distinct group of international students and are treated differently from mainland students and non-Chinese overseas students. They spend one year in the College, before transferring to the department of their major field of study in JNU. Every year there are about 500 – 800 students enrolled in the College, mainly studying humanities and social sciences (Sihai, 2019b). The College mission is to ‘...take the state-assigned political responsibility to cultivate students from HK, Macau and Taiwan and overseas Chinese students’ and ‘continually improve the quality of education for students from these regions’ (Sihai, 2019b). The dean explained that the College is committed to the cultivation of talents who ‘love the country, love HK and Macau and support the national unity’ and who ‘have political influence, social status, economic power and academic accomplishment’ (Sihai, 2018a).

The College provides an intensive formal and informal curriculum, each student is supported (and monitored) by an academic tutor, student counsellor and teaching assistants (Sihai, 2021a). The responsibilities of the counsellor include a ‘timely grasp of the ideological status [literally “state of thoughts”] of students, and to do a good job in the daily ideological education [literally ‘education of thought’] of students’, and to ‘do a good job in dealing with students' violation of regulation and educate them’ (Sihai, 2021a). This reflects a wider practice among Chinese universities to arrange such counsellors to monitor students.

The formal curriculum is broadly split into courses of liberal/general education; and basic education (Sihai, 2021b), with a series of compulsory and elective courses. Liberal/general education courses provide the foundations in the students’ intended major, as well as courses in language skills, mathematics, national situation education (guoqing jiaoyu), information and technology, and physical education (Ibid). There is a large selection of courses (at least three of which are compulsory) in Chinese language, literature, history and culture. As with international students, students from HK, Macau and Taiwan are not required to take the compulsory courses (e.g. Mao Tse-tong’s Thoughts, Marxist Philosophy, Deng Xiao Ping’s Theory) provided for mainland students. However, they are required to study a group of modules entitled ‘national situation’ which is viewed as a more implicit and palatable form of patriotic education.

A significant informal curriculum is provided, comprising: cultural events, political events, group tours, and other activities/formal ceremonies. Cultural events focus on deepening students’ connections with their Chinese roots, taking pride in Chinese morals, history, art and culture, and spreading Chinese culture. A series of competitions, exhibitions, clubs and tours were designed for this purpose (e.g. competitions of Chinese poetry, Chinese cultural festivals, calligraphy exhibitions). Regarding the Competition of Chinese Cultural Knowledge, the College described its purpose as to ‘promote and spread Chinese culture’ and ‘let students from outside of China have a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of the essence of superior traditional Chinese moral and culture as well as its historical and geographical culture’ (Sihai, 2012). Political events in contrast, involved seminars, lectures and courses designed to study CCP thought, political speeches, congresses and events (e.g. a seminar titled ‘Looking at the opportunities of HK from the 19th National Congress of the CCP’ or a class ‘Studying President Xi’s speech at the Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference’). Group tours, often to sites of historical importance to the CCP (e.g. Museum of the Communist Army, Mao Tse-Tong’s Home) were typical. Reflecting on these tours, the Dean encouraged students to ‘learn a lesson from history and feel a sense of attachment to the nation/country’ (Sihai, 2018b). Other activities and formal ceremonies included welcome receptions for students; alumni gatherings and graduation ceremonies. A vice-president of JNU addressing the 2018 graduation ceremony blesses the students quoting President Xi Jinping: ‘be patriotic, inspirational, truth-seeking and practical’ (Sihai, 2018a). The Dean also proclaimed that the College had ‘strengthened the ideological construction of a sense of belonging by exploring the informal curriculum of Chinese culture’ (Ibid). However, it emerged that the informal curriculum is not optional; academic credit is given for many of the activities and attendance is mandatory.

The University was thus created to provide Overseas Chinese with access to their cultural roots via a Chinese education, a classic form of internationalization operating as soft power. However, since President Xi’s visit in 2018, the University’s ‘international’ mission has been reoriented to focus on re-educating and subordinating the ‘troublesome’ minority from HK, instilling patriotic values and creating and strengthening allegiances to the Chinese nation and the PRC. The program is heavily based on propagating state orthodoxies and negating competing ambitions and desires for autonomy; a distinctly firmer form of ‘soft power’.

Interviews with teachers and a counsellor suggest these policy intentions may not be realized as many students were Mainland educated students with HK citizenship. It was opined that these students used their HK citizenship to gain access to the lower entry requirements and additional benefits. Two important implications arise which serve to undermine the state’s goals: first, most of these students, would presumably not be returning to HK; and second, alumni that had, given low levels of recognition of Mainland/HK credentials and differences in professional training (e.g. law studies), were at a disadvantage in the HK labor market, undermining the aim of the PRC to cultivate a cadre of HK elites loyal to the PRC.

‘Israelization’ of East Jerusalem(ites)

After the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Israel annexed East Jerusalem from Jordan – and asserted control over the land and its Arab population (Nuseibeh, 2015). While Israeli law and policy often references ‘East Jerusalem’ as a territory, given the expansion of Jewish settlement over the past half century into areas that were previously under Jordanian rule, Ben Avrahami, Deputy Advisor on Arab Affairs notes that ‘East Jerusalem’ is a demographic [i.e. referring to its Palestinian Arab residents] rather than a geographical definition’ (Tabakoff, 2018). Palestinian Arabs from East Jerusalem³ (PAfEJ) have a tenuous residency status in the city, pay taxes, receive health and social security benefits and can vote (but not stand for election as mayor) in municipal (but not national) elections (Maimon & Luster, 2012). They can apply for Israeli citizenship, however, many have not because of bureaucratic exigencies, political

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2 After 1997 many Mainland women travelled to HK to give birth, consequently their children were eligible for HK Identity Cards.
3 In Israeli government policy the term ‘Arabs from East Jerusalem’ is used.
pressures, and personal loyalties and identities (Hasson, 2019; Maimon & Luster, 2012). Of the approximately 330,000 PAfEJ (about 38% of the city’s population) only about 5% have Israeli citizenship (Korach & Chosen, 2018) reflecting their low level of integration into Israeli society.

While East Jerusalem was officially annexed by Israel after the 1967 war, and rhetoric about a ‘united’ Jerusalem has prevailed, it has long been considered to be part of a current (i.e. Jordanian) or future Arab (at times, Palestinian) state (Ramon, 2017). Until the resurrection of the Israeli separation wall in the wake of the Second Intifada in the early 2000s, PAfEJ moved freely between Jerusalem and the West Bank with their cultural and economic center in Ramallah/Bethlehem. The wall has divided these territories and forced PAfEJ closer to Israel (Abu-Lil, 2020; Kramersky, 2020; Tabakoff, 2018). Addressing this issue the Minister of Jerusalem and Heritage stated:

‘Today, the Arab neighborhoods of the city, those inside the security fence⁴, are connected in their belly to Jerusalem and cannot be divided...not only politically and ideologically, but also functionally. Today, economically, all parts of the city are interconnected. All of the surveys and studies conducted in recent years show that the Arab population in Jerusalem unequivocally prefers to remain in the Israeli part of the city. This is also true in the opposite direction: Jewish Jerusalem does not know how to function today without a workforce’ (Gamish & Nissani, 2017).

Thus, with PAfEJ cut off from the Palestinian Authority, and East Jerusalem increasingly viewed by the state as a permanent part of the capital, a shift occurred in thinking about East Jerusalem. The Minister explained:

‘A capital city cannot afford the gaps that exist today between West and East Jerusalem. We have to deal with it...many governments have not invested in the area properly. It cannot be that in our capital city, a five-minute drive from the Old City, in the heart of historic Jerusalem, infrastructure will look like it did in the Middle Ages...[It is] an impossible situation, which is also fundamentally incorrect, both harms our image as a state and also creates security challenges. It is the state’s duty to try and address this’ (Gamish & Nissani, 2017).

Israel is attempting to integrate PAfEJ into Israeli society, on a grand scale, with little consultation with them (Tabakoff, 2018). Recently there has been a concerted political effort to extend Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem, ‘integrating’ PAfEJ into Israeli society to create a ‘united’ Jerusalem, and bolster its annexation claim, currently disputed in international law. PAfEJ are being encouraged to integrate into Israeli society, with some taking up these opportunities, however, such integration policies are pursued against a backdrop of intimidation and under the menace of eviction and Israeli military intervention. Thus, with PAfEJ vulnerable to Israeli authorities, Israeli left-wing media and NGOs argue that the goal of such ‘integration’ schemes is to subordinate them – extending Israeli control over the people and the land. Such control would complicate any competing claims for East

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⁴ Separation wall/fence and security fence are value-laden terms used alternatively to refer to this structure.
Jerusalem(ites) to be part of a Palestinian state. Israeli education policies are part of the overall political strategy to urge PAfEJ to integrate, thereby subordinating their own nationalist ambitions – and discouraging those PAfEJ involved in such activities, to relinquish terrorism and violence.

PAfEJ secondary students sit the Palestinian matriculation, Tawjihi, which is run by the Palestinian Authority and is not widely recognized by Israeli universities as equivalent to the Israeli matriculation (Bagrut), although this has begun to change in recent years (see Hasson, 2017). Thus, PAfEJ that wish to attend Israeli HEIs, in many cases must first take a foundation course (Mechina) and only after successful completion, and in most cases a psychometric exam, students are eligible to apply to Israeli universities. Instead, many PAfEJ students attend HEIs in the Palestinian Territories, Jordan or elsewhere in the (Arab) world – a choice which Israeli policy narratives frame as a choice of convenience but probably reflects ideological inclinations as well (Arar & Haj-Yehia, 2010; 2016). Degrees and qualifications from abroad are not always recognized in Israel, or may require retraining and lengthy national recognition processes. Government authorities argue (e.g. Israel PBC Decision, 2015) that this coupled with a lack of Hebrew language skills, hinders PAfEJ integration into the Israeli labor market and has contributed to high poverty rates among this population: 75% of Arab residents in Jerusalem live below the poverty line, compared to 29% of Jewish residents (Korach & Chosen, 2018). State policy thus connects low participation in the Israeli education system with a lack of opportunity in Israeli labor markets, resulting in high levels of poverty. The state further connects this situation (i.e. a lack of social and economic integration into Israeli society) with terrorism, violence and dissent among the population (Israel Government Decision 1775, 2014). Notably absent in this framing is recognition of the historical and continued neglect of these residents by the state and the municipality (see Ramon, 2017) and the barriers described above, despite, government and NGO reports which detail decades of neglect of PAfEJ residents (e.g. Dagoni, & Wegner, 2020; Maimon & Luster, 2012; State Comptroller's Office and the Public Complaints Commission, 2018).

Several initiatives have sought to extend Israeli sovereignty and ‘integrate’ PAfEJ into Israeli society - - with education policy a major component of this strategy. In 2014, in response to a period of heightened violence in the city, government decision 1775 was passed, indicating a comprehensive, multi-ministerial and municipal effort to integrate PAfEJ into Israeli society. Subsequently, additional government decisions were passed (Israel Government Decision 2684; 3790), expanding government actions and budgets. Kramersky (2020) argues that this represents one of the most significant social, political and human experiments in the history of the state: the experiment of annexing and integrating a territory into the state, without extending citizenship to its residents. She argues that this could be a blueprint for the further annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The plan included significant measures to address education from early childhood to higher education in East Jerusalem. Part of these measures provided incentives for schools to teach the Israeli

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5 Until 1988, when Jordan relinquished its claims on the West Bank and East Jerusalem, East Jerusalemites maintained Jordanian citizenship with Israel’s consent and encouragement (Ramon, 2017).

6 Israeli universities do not recognize matriculations from many countries as equivalent to the Israeli Bagrut and often insist on foundation programs for these students.
curriculum (Bagrut) (see Dagoni & Wegner, 2020), incorporate greater Hebrew language instruction, and the development and funding of foundation courses for PAfEJ students, the first step towards admission to Israeli HEIs for those lacking Hebrew skills and the Israeli Bagrut.7

To support this strategy, Israel’s higher education accreditation and funding bodies, launched a program designed to fund foundation programs (Mechinot) for PAfEJ students; provide support to high school students in their transition to higher education; and prevent drop-out. The budget for these initiatives of 14.7 million NIS from 2014-2018 (Israel PBC Decision, 2015 was increased to 260 million NIS, with targets of PAfEJ students in the Mechina growing from 402 to 700 students and in undergraduate programs from 300 – 600 from 2018 – 2023 (Israel CHE/PBC Decision, 2018). In contrast to the PRC/HK case, the ‘integration’ aspect is unilateral: Israelis are not funded – or allowed/advised to visit – East Jerusalem universities (e.g. Al Quds University). There is little cooperation between Palestinian and Israeli universities and the blame for this has been ascribed to the Israeli/Palestinian authorities and the Boycott, Divestation and Sanctions (BDS) movement (Munayyer, 2016; Newman, 2016).

The outcome of these initiatives was to create and expand foundation courses in local Jerusalem HEIs - particularly the Hebrew University (HU) located in East Jerusalem - to prepare students for Israeli universities, help them gain admission, and prevent drop-out. Israeli HEIs located in other areas of the country were not included in these initiatives. In parallel, the plan was incorporated into national budgeting, so that HEIs had an incentive – and in some cases received sanctions – for preparing, admitting and guiding these students through their degrees after the Mechina; in the case of HU, this was linked to its annual state budgetary allocation (Israel PBC Decision, February 27, 2018). These policies and programs resemble domestic access/widening participation/affirmative action programs for students from marginalized backgrounds. Indeed, Israel does not define these students as ‘international’; because it would be tantamount to recognizing a Palestinian state (Bamberger, 2020b). However, at the institutional level, similar to Hong Kongers at Sihai, these students are treated as international students, processed through the structures established for international students and they do not have Israeli citizenship.

A foundation course for Palestinians
HU has been the largest supplier of foundation courses for international students in Israel (Bamberger, 2020b). Initiated in the 1950s, the Mechina has traditionally been a way to integrate new Jewish immigrants into Israeli HE – and society – making ‘Israelis’ (Ibid). Given the international character of the students, it was institutionalized under the Rothberg International School (RIS), HU’s longstanding department for international programs and considered as the institutional base for HU’s ‘comprehensive internationalization’ mission (Ibid). RIS was founded by a collaboration of Jewish diaspora working in tandem with the state, with one of its major aims to create transnational ‘ambassadors’ to enhance Israel’s soft power. Thus, the aim of creating increased engagement with and understanding of Israeli

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7 In 2017 HU began a pilot program to allow PAfEJ students to enter degree programs with the Tawjihi without a foundation course, however, they must have a sufficient level of Hebrew (Hasson, 2017).
society has remained, however, the target population and its discourses have shifted. The purpose of the program is to prepare students for admission to Israeli HE and to provide intensive Hebrew language study, address gaps in students’ knowledge – as compared to the Israeli education system, in language, history, culture, and specific subjects (e.g. mathematics, English, academic writing). It likewise has had an enduring informal curriculum, which aims to integrate new immigrants and foster Israeli national identity. The course has taken many forms over time, and usually is adapted to the needs of the current wave of Jewish immigration and over the years there have been foundation courses aimed at speakers of Spanish, French, Russian, English, Amharic, etc. Foundation programs have been heavily subsidized by the state, through the Ministry of Aliyah and Immigrant Absorption and the Student Authority. Thus, the RIS has extensive experience in administering foundation courses for diverse student populations. However, until 2015, it had always catered to Jewish immigrants. As State priorities changed HU inaugurated the Sadarah/Kidma foundation course, targeting PAFJEJ students and RIS was responsible for delivering it.

While there has been a minimal presence of PAFJEJ in the foundation courses at HU the Sadarah/Kidma program is the first specifically developed for this population. It focuses on intensive Hebrew, English and mathematics preparation, with additional courses in academic writing, scientific thought, European history, Israeli society and government, and courses specific to students’ intended fields of studies (e.g. humanities/social sciences or exact sciences). Several of the courses aim to familiarize PAFJEJ students with Israeli society and to facilitate critical thinking – the latter a skill they will need in their studies at HU and which represents a departure from the reliance on rote learning of the Tawjihi matriculation. However, critique and critical debate may arguably be the preferred democratic or ‘progressive’ path towards ‘integration’. Chomsky (2002) argues that critical debate [as expressed by the media, public critics] implies investment in the dominant system of power and that it narrows the bounds of acceptable solutions and perspectives. This is particularly relevant in this case because a major obstacle in peace negotiations has been the issue of the recognition of Israel’s legitimacy as a nation-state, an issue taken up in the Boycott, Divestation and Sanctions (BDS) Movement. Thus, the mere presence at the University of PAFJEJ students, a population which has had limited contact with Israelis and has little (if any) experience in a ‘mixed’ setting (e.g. education, neighborhoods, recreational activities) in itself may be viewed as a considerable step towards acquiescence to Israeli sovereignty and viewed as an asset in achieving other (political) goals. The University could be viewed as instilling knowledge of and experiences with Israeli society and its institutions as a way to understand its values, perspectives, and create common ground. This could be construed as creating positive attraction and persuasion to achieve political objectives – a central aim of soft power, in this case the ‘integration’ of PAFJEJ into Israeli society and acceptance of Israel’s legitimacy. The curriculum combined with preferential admissions procedures, scholarships, and support services likewise represent familiar actions used to promote international higher education as soft power.

The implementation of the program required new specialist courses, and significant academic and administrative staffing changes to accommodate Arabic language teaching.

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8 Aliyah is a value-laden term to describe Jewish immigration to Israel. It literally means ‘to ascend.’
The numbers on the HU Sadarah/Kidma program increased steadily: from 68 in 2015 to 200 in 2018 (about 400 in all HEIs). Encouraged by this success, in 2018, the CHE expanded its support for the foundation courses with a target of 3,000 students over the next 5 years and a budget of 260 million NIS (Israel PBC Decision, 2018). In a memo from the Rector to the academic staff, he explained: ‘In recent years, we have witnessed a substantial increase in the number of PAfEJ at the University. This trend has grown this year, and the ratio of this group of students among our first-year undergraduates is expected to reach 8%’ (Medina, 2018). Bamberger’s (2020b) study showed a disconnect between state and institutional motives; the Sadarah/Kidma program was widely viewed by RIS staff as promoting social cohesion and critical reflection on the conflict. A senior staff member elaborated:

‘Naftali Bennett [right-wing Minister of Education at the time] might not be happy that we’re empowering Palestinians to think critically about their situation, but they’re still advancing this Mechina. Why? Because they think that at the end of the day, educated, self-independent people who play the capitalistic game are going to be less apt to be violent in whatever way.’

With Naftali Bennett’s election as Prime Minister, we may see an expansion of such logic. However, the recent violent clashes in East Jerusalem beginning in May 2021, which spread throughout the country, could also shape government thinking on this matter if they are perceived as undermining such logic.

Many PAfEJ continue to attend Palestinian and Arab universities (shaping internationalization elsewhere, see Arar & Haj-Yehia, 2010; 2016). However, from a handful of PAfEJ students in HU each year, to a target of 3,000 over a period of five years, this is an on-going struggle which is currently being fought across the education system.

**Discussion and conclusion**

We began by demonstrating that the literature often views internationalization as driven by a range of rationales including a competition for global economic and political dominance and more humanitarian motives. In the case of China the dominant rationale for recruiting and supporting international students is portrayed as a form of ‘soft power;’ rationales in the Israeli case are portrayed as assimilating members of the Jewish diaspora into Israeli society/strengthening Jewish identity and forging ties with (emerging) superpowers (Bamberger et al., 2019b). We analyzed the rationales for and enactment of a form of domestic ‘internationalization’ in the PRC and Israel which involves adapting internationalization within HE to subordinate a troublesome minority group within the nation. Our analysis thus suggests that this form of domestic internationalization constitutes a form of internal colonization and challenges our understanding of internationalization both in these two specific contexts, and more broadly.

We demonstrated that the economic motives for internationalization are sometimes secondary, or negligible. We further demonstrated that a form of ‘soft power,’ usually thought of as a way to influence outsiders, can vary in its ‘softness’ and be directed at domestic populations as a way to tame ‘troublesome’ populations. While there is an extended literature on how schools and their curricula are harnessed to achieve political ends, and their
deep involvement in nation-building, there has been less of a focus on the role of higher education.

In both cases, the state has adapted its structures and processes of internationalization to create a form of ‘internationalisation’ designed to integrate a ‘troublesome’ population into the ideologies and structures of the more powerful nation-state. Through these domesticated international higher education programs, the state strives for students to shed ‘problematic’ competing national and local identities, shifting their political/ideological views and allegiances to those of the ‘motherland’. This form of internationalization was operationalized by extensive funding of mobility programs designed to attract students and incentivize universities to deliver programs. In both cases internationalization of HE was an element within a comprehensive strategy that included similar ‘reunification/integration’ initiatives targeted at school children, school curricula, teachers, and civil servants. In both cases, those communities are also faced with the rapid growth of dominant populations (and languages) into their territory (i.e. Jewish Israeli settlers in East Jerusalem, see Nasrallah, 2014; Mainland Chinese in HK).

This study challenges the existing typologies of internationalization. In terms of Knight (2004), it fleshes out a typology that is static and descriptive; in terms of Stein et al. (2016), it challenges the dominant ‘global imaginary’ of internationalization. We demonstrate that the current portrayal in the literature of internationalization as a form of neo-colonialism designed to maintain power imbalances and promote the West’s neoliberal agenda fails to recognize how it has been used by non-western nations to control local communities (cf Vickers, 2020) within a nation, or increasingly to project influence internationally. That meta-narrative, which frames internationalization as an extension of western hegemony, reinforces a global imaginary that obscures our understanding of how internationalization is deployed beyond the West and within nations for various purposes, in this case, for subjugating troublesome minorities. Whilst we focus on the PRC and Israel, ‘internal colonization’ has a long history, and has surfaced in myriad other contexts (Gouldner, 1977; Moyo, 2010; Wolpe, 2012); which suggests that internationalization as a form of ‘internal colonization’ is not limited to the cases we have studied.

We focused on two nations and the official programs of two institutions. We did not attempt to evaluate the enactment or effectiveness of the policies and forms of internationalization that we focused on. However, we did identify powerful barriers that will limit their potential to achieve their state mandated goals. JNU is fully aligned with the state’s goals to re-educate ‘troublesome’ students, however, given the loopholes in the criteria for admission, the actual students attending these foundation courses are not those which the state intended. Many of the students may not return to HK after graduation and even if they did so, they may not join the elites that could influence public opinion. Notwithstanding, the College will support the broader state plan and ‘United Front’ policy to produce ‘patriotic’ citizens. HU in contrast, is at odds with the state’s political agenda; it views state (financial) support for the Mechina as an opportunity to encourage critical thinking amongst Arabs and engagement with Israeli society. HU thus interprets the state program within its own mission and values. These divergent positions represent differences which can be explained by Maaseen and Olsen’s (2007) typology of university organization and governance. JNU
operates as an instrument for national political agendas, in which the constitutive logic of the University is organized around implementing political objectives, which guide both its assessment (i.e. the achievement of national goals), the extent of its autonomy and its governance by an external actor (i.e. the State) and in which there shared understanding of norms and objectives between actors. In contrast, HU’s operation and governance is more complex. While national goals are articulated through the University, and the government in recent years has been chipping away at University autonomy (Kirsch, 2018), it still contains aspects of an institution characterized as an autonomous rule-governed community of scholars in pursuit of academic truth, as a representative democracy in which internal affairs are governed by democratic practices and are viewed as enhancing democracy in the wider society, and as a service enterprise embedded in competitive markets, with the increasing influence of a strong administration and external market forces. Thus, in both cases the states may not achieve their intended aims; Israel because HU has a certain degree of autonomy, and China, because students may not return to HK after graduation or become elite influencers.

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