

Organization Science

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
<http://pubsonline.informs.org>

How Catastrophic Innovation Failure Affects Organizational and Industry Legitimacy: The 2014 Virgin Galactic Test Flight Crash

Sen Chai, Anil R. Doshi, Luciana Silvestri

To cite this article:

Sen Chai, Anil R. Doshi, Luciana Silvestri (2021) How Catastrophic Innovation Failure Affects Organizational and Industry Legitimacy: The 2014 Virgin Galactic Test Flight Crash. Organization Science

Published online in Articles in Advance 16 Jul 2021

. <https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2021.1467>

Full terms and conditions of use: <https://pubsonline.informs.org/Publications/Librarians-Portal/PubsOnLine-Terms-and-Conditions>

This article may be used only for the purposes of research, teaching, and/or private study. Commercial use or systematic downloading (by robots or other automatic processes) is prohibited without explicit Publisher approval, unless otherwise noted. For more information, contact permissions@informs.org.

The Publisher does not warrant or guarantee the article's accuracy, completeness, merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, or non-infringement. Descriptions of, or references to, products or publications, or inclusion of an advertisement in this article, neither constitutes nor implies a guarantee, endorsement, or support of claims made of that product, publication, or service.

Copyright © 2021 The Author(s)

Please scroll down for article—it is on subsequent pages






With 12,500 members from nearly 90 countries, INFORMS is the largest international association of operations research (O.R.) and analytics professionals and students. INFORMS provides unique networking and learning opportunities for individual professionals, and organizations of all types and sizes, to better understand and use O.R. and analytics tools and methods to transform strategic visions and achieve better outcomes.

For more information on INFORMS, its publications, membership, or meetings visit <http://www.informs.org>

How Catastrophic Innovation Failure Affects Organizational and Industry Legitimacy: The 2014 Virgin Galactic Test Flight Crash

Sen Chai,^a Anil R. Doshi,^b Luciana Silvestri^c

^aESSEC Business School, Cergy-Pontoise 95021, France; ^bUCL School of Management, London E14 5AA, United Kingdom; ^cHarvard Business School, Boston, Massachusetts 02163

Contact: chai@essec.edu,  <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1243-3404> (SC); anil.doshi@ucl.ac.uk,  <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8489-3373> (ARD); lsilvestri@hbs.edu,  <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9828-8185> (LS)

Received: September 5, 2018

Revised: August 30, 2019; June 11, 2020; January 31, 2021


Accepted: February 21, 2021

Published Online in Articles in Advance: July 16, 2021

<https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2021.1467>

Copyright: © 2021 The Author(s)

Abstract. We examine how catastrophic innovation failure affects organizational and industry legitimacy in nascent sectors by analyzing the interactions between Virgin Galactic and stakeholders in the space community in the aftermath of the firm's 2014 test flight crash. Following catastrophic innovation failure, we find that industry participants use their interpretations of the failure to either uphold or challenge the legitimacy of the firm while maintaining the legitimacy of the industry. These dynamics yield two interesting effects. First, we show that, in upholding the legitimacy of the industry, different industry participants rhetorically redraw the boundaries of the industry to selectively include players they consider legitimate and exclude those they view as illegitimate: detracting stakeholders constrain the boundaries of the industry by excluding the firm or excluding the firm and its segment, whereas the firm and supporting stakeholders amplify the boundaries of the industry by including firms in adjacent high-legitimacy sectors. Second, we show that, in assessing organizational legitimacy, the firm and its stakeholders differ in the way they approach distinctiveness between the identities of the industry and the firm. Detracting stakeholders differentiate the firm from the rest of the industry and isolate it, whereas the firm and supporting stakeholders reidentify the firm with the industry, embedding the firm within it. Overall, our findings illuminate the effects that catastrophic innovation failure has over high-order dynamics that affect the evolution of nascent industries.

 **Open Access Statement:** This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. You are free to download this work and share with others, but cannot change in any way or use commercially without permission, and you must attribute this work as "Organization Science. Copyright © 2021 The Author(s). <https://doi.org/doi/10.1287/orsc.2021.1467>, used under a Creative Commons Attribution License: <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>."

Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at <https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2021.1467>.

Keywords: organizational innovation • innovation failure • catastrophic failure • legitimacy • stakeholder management

Introduction

Human progress relies on radical innovation for the development of new-to-the world products and services (Scherer and Harhoff 2000). Radical innovation has a significant impact on technical and economic outcomes: as it expands and alters our technological frontier, it upends existing industries while giving rise to new ones (Kennedy 2008, Anthony et al. 2016, Zuzul and Tripsas 2020). In some cases, radical innovation produces deep psychological effects by capturing public imagination and providing a glimpse of a future humanity never believed possible (Borup et al. 2006, Gartner 2007). Prior radical innovations such as the airplane or the vaccine were introduced amidst both acclaim and skepticism (Wolfe and Sharp 2002, Warden 2011); yet each gave rise to thriving new sectors in their respective industries. Presently, advances

in fields such as artificial intelligence, propulsion, and nanotechnology are likely to yield similar frontier-bending innovations such as self-driving vehicles, commercial space travel, and personalized medicine. Supported by some and criticized by others, these radical innovations—like those of the past—fuel nascent industries and sectors as they engage our imagination and redefine our aspirations for human progress and scientific and technological change.

In nascent industries that arise from radical innovations, firms frequently approach commercial development while building both industry and organizational legitimacy (Anthony et al. 2016, Zuzul and Tripsas 2020). Establishing industry legitimacy is necessary because nascent industries revolve around products, markets, or models of consumption that are unfamiliar to investors, current and prospective clients, regulatory

agencies, and other stakeholders. Nascent industries are also rife with ambiguity (Santos and Eisenhardt 2009, Zuzul 2019): they feature fuzzy market structures (Eisenhardt 1989b, Rindova and Fombrun 2001), uncertain market and product categories (Lounsbury and Glynn 2001, Kennedy and Fiss 2013), and unclear product standards (Hargadon and Douglas 2001). To counterbalance these issues, firms' legitimacy-building efforts seek to favor the industry by portraying the innovation in the public eye as socially desirable and technically and economically feasible (Navis and Glynn 2010, Garud et al. 2014). In parallel, establishing organizational legitimacy is essential, because it is often difficult for stakeholders to understand who these firms are and what they do (Lounsbury and Glynn 2001). Innovating firms carry out untested and incompletely understood activities (Tushman and Anderson 1986) with unproven logics to guide their actions (Kaplan and Tripsas 2008). Firms build their own legitimacy by depicting themselves as trustworthy and knowledgeable industry players (Suchman 1995).

Yet given the uncertain nature of the endeavor, firms engaged in developing radical innovations often face the prospect of experiencing catastrophic innovation failure. This kind of failure occurs in the pursuit of radical innovations during nonroutine activities and is "large-scale, unusually costly, unusually public, unusually unexpected, or some combination" (Vaughan 1990, p. 292).¹ Catastrophic innovation failure likely creates a *legitimacy jolt* (Garud et al. 2014)—a situation in which failure leads the firm and its stakeholders to redefine broad expectations. Considering the paucity of research on the nature and effects of catastrophic innovation failure, what exactly this legitimacy jolt consists of and what implications it has over the firm and the budding industry have not been explored in depth. Therefore, we ask, *how does catastrophic innovation failure affect organizational and industry legitimacy in nascent sectors?* Our paper aims to produce process theory that sheds light on how firms and stakeholders jointly reassess organizational and industry legitimacy following catastrophic innovation failure.

We answer our research question by examining a single case in depth (Siggelkow 2007). We study the 2014 crash of Virgin Galactic's SpaceShipTwo vehicle during a test flight, an event that caused the loss of valuable technology and killed one pilot while injuring another. Virgin Galactic (VG) is a player in the nascent commercial space industry, which encompasses for-profit firms that develop and send reusable vehicles into space. In particular, VG is engaged in the development of reusable vehicles to send individual customers near the boundary of Earth's atmosphere and outer space for recreational purposes—an activity broadly referred to as *space tourism*. VG's effort is a radical innovation that marks a significant departure from the single-use propulsion technologies produced in the past by

government agencies such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to carry career astronauts to space. To build our case, we assembled an archival data set from diverse sources where the firm and its stakeholders discussed the crash, including firm and client tweets, blog posts written by company executives, corporate website and video content, press releases, media articles, and government agency briefs.

We find that, in the aftermath of catastrophic innovation failure, industry participants interpret the event in starkly different ways, in terms of *what happened*, *why*, and *who owns the failure*—yet all try to sustain the legitimacy of the nascent industry. The firm's detractors do so by isolating the firm or its industry segment as illegitimate, whereas the firm and its supporters do so by embedding the firm's efforts into the industry at large. Detracting stakeholders fall into two camps. Some detracting stakeholders view the failure as a direct result of what they consider faulty firm practices and technology. They reject the firm's legitimacy and rhetorically cast the firm out of the industry on technological grounds—a move that, from their perspective, sustains the legitimacy of the industry at large. Other detracting stakeholders view the failure as a direct result of the firm's endeavor; they see the entire product category in which the firm operates as socially unnecessary or undesirable. They reject the legitimacy of both the firm and its segment based on a perceived lack of social value, and rhetorically cast both out of the industry—a move that, from their perspective, sustains the legitimacy of the rest of the industry. Supporting stakeholders and the firm itself view the failure as a direct result of difficulties inherent to the industry's innovative pursuits. They portray the firm's activities as both technically sound and socially desirable, simultaneously upholding the worthiness of the firm and of the industry. They rhetorically embed the firm within its industry and beyond, drawing links between the firm, its industry, and high-legitimacy adjacent industries. Moreover, in order to assert its legitimacy and defend its position as a rightful player in the industry, the firm makes use of two tactics to neutralize detracting stakeholders' arguments: it leverages findings by neutral stakeholders who provide unequivocal information about the causes of the catastrophic innovation failure (which neutralizes arguments that the firm's practices and technology are unsound), and it changes its organizational identity to describe itself in similar terms as it describes the industry (which neutralizes portrayals of the firm as an illegitimate industry member).

Our findings make several contributions to deepen our understanding of how legitimacy is constructed and sustained in nascent industries. First, we unpack the legitimacy jolt (Garud et al. 2014) brought about by catastrophic innovation failure and find that it creates

occasions for the firm and its stakeholders to jointly reassess organizational and industry legitimacy. In particular, the jolt leads all players to maintain the industry's legitimacy while taking different stances on organizational legitimacy. Second, we refine the process of legitimacy construction in nascent industries by considering how different interpretations of failure arise and interact with one another. We not only examine the firm's interpretation but also its responses to adverse interpretations from stakeholders that seek to stigmatize the firm or its industry segment (Hsu and Grodal 2020). Last, following calls from Lounsbury and Glynn (2019), we expand on higher-order dynamics that affect the evolution of nascent industries by unpacking identity processes and shifts in optimal distinctiveness. When nascent industries first arise, firms cooperate to establish and legitimize the industry in the eyes of stakeholders. As the industry evolves, firms differentiate by establishing optimally distinctive identities (Navis and Glynn 2010, 2011), that is, identities that are distinctive enough for stakeholders to individuate each firm through unique attributes but not so distinctive as to make them unrecognizable as members of the industry. Our work suggests that, in the wake of catastrophic innovation failure, the firm may revert and realign itself with the industry's collective identity (Ravasi et al., 2020) by reducing the degree of distinctiveness of its own identity.

Legitimacy Building in Nascent Industries Amidst Catastrophic Innovation Failure

The development of radical innovations is an endeavor fraught with uncertainty and ambiguity. Innovating firms face challenges associated with the unproven nature of their product or service (Zahra and Nielsen 2002, Nerkar and Shane 2007), the incomplete nature of their working knowledge (Kaplan and Tripsas 2008), and the unclear nature of the path to developing the necessary skills, practices, methods, and technologies to render their innovation goals attainable (Rousseau 1997, Sitkin et al. 2011). When radical innovation leads to the emergence of a new industry, uncertainty and ambiguity are compounded. Nascent industries are characterized by blurry boundaries (Santos and Eisenhardt 2009), poorly defined structures (Eisenhardt 1989b, Rindova and Fombrun 2001), uncertain market categories (Lounsbury and Glynn 2001, Khaire and Wadhvani 2010, Vergne and Wry 2014), a lack of dominant designs (Anderson and Tushman 1990), and unclear product standards (Hargadon and Douglas 2001). As a result, stakeholders of innovating firms in nascent industries have imperfect performance assessment guidelines and "find it difficult to consistently weigh risk/reward trade-offs" (Aldrich and Fiol 1994, p. 651).

To overcome these challenges and elicit stakeholder support, innovating firms make efforts to build legitimacy for themselves and for their budding industry (Lounsbury and Glynn 2001, 2019). These efforts are usually carried out in parallel, with organizational and industry legitimacy mutually strengthening one another, so that the organization's identity is strongly tied to the industry's identity (Santos and Eisenhardt 2009, Tripsas 2009). Efforts to build organizational legitimacy often involve portraying the firm as knowledgeable, that is, as employing sound practices and embracing socially accepted techniques and procedures (Scott 1977, Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002, David et al. 2013). In the absence of clear outcome measures, sound practices "may serve to demonstrate that the organization is making a good-faith effort" to innovate in an effective way (Suchman 1995, p. 580). Firms may also build both organizational and industry legitimacy by making key aspects of the innovation intelligible and attractive to stakeholders. The goal is to establish the innovation within a socially desirable product and market category whose existence stakeholders will come to take for granted over time (Zucker 1986, Rosa et al. 1999, Zhao et al. 2013). To do so, firms must present credible accounts explaining what they are doing and why (Suchman 1995). Firms lacking these credible accounts "are more vulnerable to claims that they are negligent, irrational, or unnecessary" (Meyer and Rowan 1977, p. 50). Innovating firms frequently establish such accounts by adopting coherent narratives (Lounsbury and Glynn 2001, 2019; Wry et al. 2011) that portray their innovative product, their organizational identity, and the emergent definition of the industry in an *optimally distinctive* way (Brewer 1991). Optimal distinctiveness involves balancing familiarity and novelty, that is, drawing links to well-understood preexisting categories and novel ideas that elicit excitement in stakeholders' eyes (Navis and Glynn 2010; Wry et al. 2011; Zhao et al. 2017, 2018). Hence, to build legitimacy, firms in nascent industries adopt identities that place them within the wider industry context to strengthen the position of the collective (Weber et al. 2008, Mathias et al. 2018) while simultaneously featuring their uniqueness (Navis and Glynn 2011, Zuckerman 2016). The more effective these narratives are in enabling innovating firms to build organizational and industry legitimacy, the more stakeholders will perceive them as worthy of receiving resources they own or control (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975, Ashforth and Gibbs 1990).

In the midst of these legitimacy-building efforts, firms involved in the development of radical innovations are highly vulnerable to innovation failure. Prior research in innovation has tended to focus on small-scale innovation failure. These kinds of failures tend to occur in the prototyping stage of the innovation

process. Prototypes often progress from lower definition to higher definition and from lower cost to higher cost (Kelley and Littman 2001). Although the cause of small-scale innovation failure is initially unknown, it is usually not costly to ascertain: the scale and the simplified nature of the prototype makes isolating the faulty components a relatively straightforward task, and firms are usually able to introduce improvements that enable them to test a new version relatively quickly. In fact, iterating is often the reason to prototype. The small scale of the failure also means that the event may not be visible to stakeholders and may consequently not threaten the firm's or the industry's legitimacy in a meaningful way. As a result, failure may not even require the firm to engage with stakeholders in any capacity. In cases when small-scale innovation failure is publicly visible, it can be expected to attract little negative attention and pose mild threats, if any, to legitimacy. Oftentimes, stakeholders understand failure of this kind as an expected, valuable, and critical aspect of the innovation process (Sitkin 1992, Kelley and Littman 2001, Thomke 2003, Cannon and Edmondson 2005) that allows firms to search for and identify faulty assumptions, discover unexplored lines of inquiry, test new hypotheses, and iterate toward a successful innovative outcome (Fleming 2001, McGrath 2011). Indeed, few studies exist on how firms engage with stakeholders when small-scale innovation failures do occur. Studies have mainly focused on firms' internal dealings following these failures, particularly on the lessons that can be learned from the failure itself (Khanna et al. 2015) and the opportunities that may follow for learning (Cannon and Edmondson 2005) and adaptation (Sitkin 1992).

In contrast, the innovation literature has devoted little attention to large-scale or catastrophic failures. A notable exception is the work of Vaughan (1990) on the Challenger disaster, which identified not only technical but also deeper organizational roots to the catastrophic event. As noted earlier, catastrophic innovation failures occur during the pursuit of nonroutine activities and are characterized by their outsized scale and costs, high visibility, and sudden or unexpected nature. Although the effects of catastrophic innovation failure have not yet been examined in depth, we pose that these kinds of failures can be expected to create legitimacy jolts (Garud et al. 2014) for both the firm and the industry as a whole. The jolt may be particularly acute in nascent industries because, in these contexts, the dual process of building organizational and industry legitimacy is still in progress.

The extent to which this legitimacy jolt affects organizational and industry legitimacy in nascent industries may be tied to its root causes. As a firm pursues radical innovation, some facets of the innovation process become well known, whereas others

remain poorly understood or even unknown. Hence, catastrophic innovation failure may originate in the firm's inability to obtain or adequately deploy the resources, capabilities, and management skills necessary to consistently and reliably run the facets of the innovation process it understands (Anheier 1999, Vaughan 1999) or in errors that arise from the trial-and-error nature of the facets it has not yet understood (Thomke 2003). In the aftermath of catastrophic innovation failure, it is not clear whether the failure occurred because of the firm's negligence in a part of the process where sufficient knowledge existed so as to prevent it or because of difficulties inherent to the innovative activity itself. In the absence of immediate unequivocal information, stakeholders tend to rely on highly subjective perceptions (Aldrich and Fiol 1994). They may question the trustworthiness and quality of the firm's processes and practices, the accurateness of the firm's preexisting narrative pertaining to its organizational identity, the feasibility and worthiness of the industry as a whole, and the social necessity and desirability of the innovation (Suchman 1995, Garud et al. 2014). Yet despite the relevance of these legitimacy threats to both the firm and the industry in the wake of catastrophic innovation failure, little research exists on how firms engage with stakeholders to address them.

The closest insights at hand come from studies of large-scale failures that occur during the course of highly routinized activities, that is, activities that constitute the backbone of the firm's daily operations. Such catastrophic operational failures are typically associated with the "action (or inaction) of organizational agents that threatens the legitimacy of the organization and has the potential to harm the well-being of one or more of the organization's stakeholders" (Gillespie and Dietz 2009, p. 128). The root cause of catastrophic operational failure can usually be found in negligence, oversight, error, or purposeful lack of adherence to known standards (Turner 1976, 1978; Petriglieri 2015). As a result, catastrophic operational failure "generates widespread, intuitive, and negative perceptions among evaluators" (Bundy and Pfarrer 2015, p. 350) and poses an obvious threat to the firm's legitimacy—but it does not necessarily affect the legitimacy of the industry. A firm's interactions with external stakeholders in the aftermath of catastrophic operational failure often seek to align both parties' views and expectations (Fiss and Zajac 2006). Firms usually seek to influence stakeholders' perceptions of both the firm and the event (Elsbach et al. 1998) in order to mitigate their responsibility (Bundy and Pfarrer 2015) and repair their legitimacy. Firms may deny wrongdoing and offer excuses, present justifications in order to diminish the perceived severity of the failure, apologize and take responsibility (Elsbach 2003), or signal willingness to learn and improve operations (Haunschild and Sullivan 2002, Baum and Dahlin 2007, Madsen and Desai 2010).

Although the occurrence of both catastrophic innovation and operational failures is large in scale, costly, highly visible, and unexpected, the differences between these types of failure suggest that catastrophic innovation failure may yield different firm-stakeholder interactions than those we have just described. In particular, the highly uncertain nature of the activities that elicit catastrophic innovation failure (versus the routine nature of the activities at the core of catastrophic operational failure) and the potential of catastrophic innovation failure to affect both organizational and industry legitimacy (rather than organizational legitimacy alone) point to a more nuanced scenario where firms must engage with stakeholders to do more than remediate an adverse situation. Our study constitutes an early step in exploring these critical firm-stakeholder dynamics.

Methods

Research Design and Setting

We used inductive qualitative research methods focusing on a single in-depth case: the crash of VG's SpaceShipTwo vehicle during a test flight on October 31, 2014. These methods are well suited to answering our research question for several reasons. Inductive methods facilitate exploration by allowing the researcher to dive deeply into the phenomenon. They are especially useful in areas where categories and processes are not yet well understood and where the researcher aims to build and elaborate, rather than test, theory (Edmondson and McManus 2007). A case-based approach enables the researcher to be embedded in rich empirical data and to understand the phenomenon from the perspective of its protagonists (Lincoln and Guba 1985). In particular, single cases often prove to be "unusually revelatory" (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007, p. 27) because the phenomenon of interest tends to be transparently observable, affording enough richness for detailed examination (Eisenhardt 1989a, Pettigrew 1990, Siggelkow 2007, Pratt 2009). Finally, because catastrophic innovation failure is rare, its occurrence makes it a natural candidate for qualitative inductive inquiry.

The Commercial Space Industry. Our research setting is the commercial space industry, which encompasses the set of for-profit activities involved in sending vehicles to the boundary of Earth's atmosphere and beyond. Segments include payload delivery (sending satellites and other deliverables into space), space tourism (transporting individuals to space for recreational purposes), and space mining (obtaining resources from space for terrestrial use). Apart from VG, participants in this industry include SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Planetary Resources, among others. The industry is an ideal research setting because it is in the nascent stage; it contains firms engaged in radical innovation; firms in the

industry face high degrees of environmental ambiguity and technical uncertainty; product development is risky, complex, and costly in terms of time, knowledge, and financial resources; rewards for innovating activities are highly uncertain and long term; innovation failure carries inordinate costs given the high stakes involved in the business and the sheer scale of the innovation effort; and much testing is carried out in the open, making large-scale failure easily observable by stakeholders.

VG as a Member of the Commercial Space Industry.

VG is an integral player in the commercial space industry and was, at the time of the crash, the only U.S. firm performing test flights in the space tourism segment. VG is part of Sir Richard Branson's Virgin Group, a conglomerate that operates in industries as diverse as air travel, telecommunications, finance, and energy, among others. VG was founded in 2004, when Branson licensed the technology behind SpaceShipOne, an experimental vehicle for suborbital space travel. Its designer, Burt Rutan (a high-profile aeronautical engineer), won the prestigious Ansari XPRIZE, which offered USD \$10 million to the first nongovernment organization to launch a reusable manned spacecraft into space twice within the span of two weeks. Rutan's spacecraft carried two people: a pilot and a copilot. VG set out to scale this design by developing a spacecraft that could transport a pilot, a copilot, and six passengers while withstanding repeated entry and exit to and from space. This posed a considerable technical challenge, considering the increased size and weight of the spacecraft and the need to adapt the initial technology from what was essentially a working prototype to a commercially viable vehicle. If successful, the firm would allow passengers to experience weightlessness for about 15 minutes and to see the Earth from a vantage point usually reserved for career astronauts. Branson pledged to be a passenger on VG's maiden voyage. Tickets were initially priced at \$200,000 and later increased to \$250,000. By 2014, more than 700 people had signed up.

In the decade between the company's inception and the catastrophic failure, VG set up operations in various locations, including spaceports in the Californian Mojave Desert and in New Mexico. VG partnered with Rutan's company, Scaled Composites, to build a spacecraft, SpaceShipTwo, and a carrier aircraft from which the spacecraft was to be air launched, WhiteKnightTwo. More than 100 test flights were carried out under different conditions to test the technology's performance.

On October 31, 2014, VG readied a test of its carrier aircraft, WhiteKnightTwo, and its commercial passenger spacecraft, SpaceShipTwo, for a powered flight meant to reach the boundary of the Earth's atmosphere with outer space. WhiteKnightTwo took off successfully at 16:28 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) from the Mojave spaceport. The launch vehicle released

SpaceShipTwo at 17:07 UTC. By 17:14 UTC, SpaceShipTwo was in pieces on the ground. The crash killed the copilot, severely injured the pilot, and led to the loss of valuable technology for VG. The crash occurred at a crucial moment in VG's relationship with key stakeholders. On the one hand, there was optimism concerning the company's maiden voyage. Earlier that year, several test flights had yielded encouraging results. Branson estimated that the first commercial flight would happen in the first quarter of 2015; he and the first clients who signed up were already undergoing space training. On the other hand, VG was under some pressure to deliver. The maiden voyage had been announced and postponed at least eight times since the firm's inception. Hence, the crash challenged the credibility of the firm's goals and its ability to fulfill them. It also cast a shadow on the suitability and worthiness of space tourism as an overall pursuit.

Data Collection

Firm-Level Data. We took the 2014 crash as a focal event and collected data before and after its occurrence. We placed emphasis on the month-long period following the crash, from October 31 to November 30, 2014, as it contained the most intense engagement by VG and its stakeholders surrounding the failure.² This period includes several key dates. On November 12, 2014, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the federal authority in charge of investigating the crash, concluded its on-scene portion of the investigation and shed considerable light on the apparent cause of the crash. On November 21, 2014, VG published a new website that evidenced a shift in the firm's organizational identity.

We assembled a rich archival data set from publicly available sources, including stakeholder and company tweets, executive blog entries, corporate website content, press releases, media articles, government publications, and multimedia. Our data provide a relatively comprehensive array of evidence of what the firm and its stakeholders said publicly leading up to and in the aftermath of the failure. Because our data contain real-time accounts of the event, they allowed us to minimize the risk of retrospective bias. Our data (described in Table 1) reflects the views of eight categories of stakeholders and thus reveals the diversity of individual and organizational industry participants: VG executives, partners, investors, clients, space organizations, space experts (including former astronauts, commercial test pilots, and engineers), members of the press, and federal authorities.

Social Media Sources. We performed a preliminary review to assess which social media platforms VG used most frequently to connect with stakeholders and found that Twitter was the platform of choice. We gathered all tweets published during our data collection period on seven accounts: VG's corporate account

(@virgingalactic) (73 tweets), founder Sir Richard Branson's account (@richardbranson) (200 tweets), and the accounts of five clients who frequently tweeted about VG (37 tweets). They include Sir Trevor Beattie (@trevorbmbagency), Yanil Silver (@yaniksilver), Vasily Klyukin (@VKlyukin), Namira Salim (@namirasalim), and P.J. King (@pjking).

Blog Posts. Branson kept a blog on VG's parent company website (www.virgin.com) where he discussed company business at length. We gathered the full text of the two VG-related posts he published in our data collection period.

Company Website. The content and structure of a firm's website provide evidence of its activities and priorities. Following a catastrophic innovation failure, website content is likely to convey the firm's preferred interpretation of the event, as well as legitimacy-sustaining statements. Using Archive.org's Wayback Machine, a tool that provides historical archives of a website on a regular basis, we gathered content (including text, photographs, videos, and site structure) on VG's website (www.virgingalactic.com) during our data collection period. On days when more than one archival version of the website was available, we collected the last version.

Company Press Releases. Company press releases are official statements meant to be picked up by media outlets. In the aftermath of a catastrophic innovation failure, press releases can be expected to convey the firm's preferred interpretation of the event, as well as legitimacy-sustaining statements. We gathered the five press releases published by VG during our data collection period.

Traditional Media Sources. We gathered online news articles and newscast transcripts on VG published during our data collection period. We restricted our data collection to content published by renowned news organizations in countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States (e.g., *The Washington Post*, BBC News), prestigious media agencies (e.g., the Associated Press, Reuters), popular science and space publications (e.g., WIRED, space.com), and renowned news shows and channels (e.g., CNN, CBS). Of the 534 articles and transcripts, 467 were sourced via LexisNexis, whereas the rest were collected manually from sources not included in that database. We prioritized pieces in which VG managers or stakeholders offered direct quotes related to the failure event.

NTSB Announcements. On November 1, 2014, the NTSB announced that it would send a team to the crash site to investigate the event. We collected all publicly available data related to their investigation, including four media briefing videos from YouTube, all 35

Table 1. Firm Representatives and Stakeholders Featured in the Data

Actor type	Individuals (firms)	Individuals' names, occupations, and organizations (when relevant)	
Panel A: VG and VG related			
VG executives	5 (1)	Sir Richard Branson, Chairman George Whitesides, CEO Will Whitehorn, former CEO	Mike Moses, VP Operations Matt Stinemetze, Engineer
VG investors	0 (1)	Aabar Investments	
VG partners	4 (6)	Aerospace partners Scaled Composites Burt Rutan, Founder Kevin Mickey, CEO Anonymous, Employee Mojave Air and Spaceport Stuart Witt, CEO	Other partners Grey Goose Vodka Jardine Lloyd Thompson Land Rover
VG clients on the flight list	16	Sierra Nevada Corporation Anonymous Ken Baxter Sir Trevor Beattie Jim Clash Bill Cullen Wilson da Silva Brett Godfrey John Goodwin	P.J. King Vasily Klyukin Igor Kutsenko Namira Salim Yanil Silver Ashish Thakkar Peter Ulrich von May Craig Willan
Panel B: Authorities			
Federal authorities	3 (2)	Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Christopher Hart, Acting Chairman Eric Weiss, Spokesperson Peter Knudson, Spokesperson	
Panel C: Members of the space community			
Space organizations	11 (9)	Not-for-profit organizations Challenger Center June Scobee Rodgers, Founding Chair and Director National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Charles Bolden, Administrator Wayne Hale, former Shuttle Program Manager National Aviation Hall of Fame Ron Kaplan, Enshrinement Director National Space Society (NSS) Mark Hopkins, Chairman of the Executive Committee Paul Werbos, Executive Vice President XPRIIZE Foundation Peter Diamandis, Chairman and Chief Executive Bob Weiss, President Yuri's Night For-profit organizations Bristol Spaceplanes David Ashford, Founder SpaceX Elon Musk, Founder zero2infinity Jose Mariano Lopez-Urdiales, CEO	
Former NASA astronauts	11	Buzz Aldrin Leroy Chiao Chris Hadfield Jose Hernandez Tom Jones Mark Kelly	Michael Massimino Lisa Nowak John Olivas Scott Parazynski Steve Robinson
Test pilots and commercial astronauts	6	Brian Binnie Chuck Coleman Bob Hoover	David Mackay Peter Siebold Paul Tackabury

Table 1. (Continued)

Actor type	Individuals (firms)	Individuals' names, occupations, and organizations (when relevant)
Other space experts	11	Marco Caceres, Senior Analyst and Director of Space Studies, the Teal Group Thomas Gangale, Aerospace Engineer Diane Howard, Assistant Professor, Commercial Spaceflight Operations Program, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Fredric Jenet, Director, Center for Advanced Radio Astronomy UT Brownsville Marshall Kaplan, Professor of Aerospace Engineering, University of Maryland John Logsdon, Retired Space Policy Director, George Washington University Jonathan McDowell, Astronomer, Harvard-Smithsonian Centre for Astrophysics Tim O'Brien, Professor, Jodrell Bank Observatory Sten Odenwald, Chair, National Institute of Aerospace Tomasso Sgobba, Executive Director, International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety
Experts in other fields	8	David Whitehouse, Scientist and consultant to space agencies Ryan Bourne, Head of Public Policy, Institute of Economic Affairs Carolynne Campbell-Knight, Rocket Engineer Geoff Daly, Mechanical Engineer Clive Irving, Aviation Expert Ann Karagozian, Professor of Mechanical and Aeronautical Engineering, UCLA Anthony Roman, former Corporate Pilot Neil Stevens, Chief Economist, Insurance Information Institute Steven Weisbart, Space Insurance Expert, Satellite Finance Network Advisory Board
Panel D: Members of the press		
Space analysts	+30	(selected) Geoff Brumfield, Science Correspondent, NPR Joel Glenn Brenner, Former Reporter, <i>The Washington Post</i> Jeffrey Kluger, Senior Science Editor, <i>TIME Magazine</i> Tariq Malik, Managing Director, <i>space.com</i> Doug Messier, Editor, <i>parabolicarc.co</i> Miles O'Brien, Aviation Analyst, CNN Jason Perlow, Senior Technology Editor, ZDNet Richard Quest, Aviation Correspondent, CNN Adam Rogers, Science Writer, WIREd
Reporters	+130	+30 television news anchors and general correspondents +80 article authors +20 news organizations and publications with no byline
Panel E: Other stakeholders		
Crash witness	1	Ken Brown, Photographer

NTSB tweets (@NTSB), and the final official report and press conference media related to the agency's findings.

Industry-Level Data. In parallel, we collected industry-level data published in 2014. We focused particularly on articles that spoke of the potential of commercial space and that discussed industry dynamics. We also collected self-descriptive data for two major players who, although not competing in the space tourism segment at the time, expressed an interest in providing this service in the future: SpaceX and Blue Origin. We gathered all content from their websites (www.spacex.com; www.blueorigin.com) and all available press releases and preflight press kits.

Data Analysis

Our goal was to understand how VG's 2014 catastrophic test flight crash affected the firm's and the commercial

space industry's legitimacy. We aimed to build process theory by identifying patterns of behavior that allowed VG and its stakeholders to engage with one another's interpretations of the event and reassess the legitimacy of the firm and its industry.

Industry Legitimacy. We started by reading extensively about space exploration, first as an endeavor funded by governments and public agencies and more recently as an opportunity tapped by private enterprises. We surveyed the array of segments that are taking shape in the commercial space industry, including payload delivery, space tourism, and space mining, and mapped the main players. We then explored the data for evidence of an industry identity. Navis and Glynn (2010) define industry identity as the set of attributes around which the industry is built, common to all participants. These attributes include technologies, product categories or core activities, and

characteristics of firms' business models, among others. We noted that, given the early fragmentation of the industry into at least three segments, no cohesive industry-level sense of *who we are* existed (Anthony et al. 2016). However, by analyzing the central focus and mission of industry participants, three common identity attributes emerged across players in the industry, including VG: the goal of *democratizing space* through the development of *reusable vehicles* following a *for-profit* business model. These attributes made the commercial space industry stand apart from government-led efforts, which restricted access to space to career astronauts, relied on single-use technology, and operated on a not-for-profit basis.

Organizational Legitimacy. We subsequently delved into VG-specific data. We made use of narrative analysis to map three distinct interpretations of the failure (Riessman 1993). A narrative is “a set of events and the contextual details surrounding their occurrence” (Bartel and Garud 2009, p. 108). Narratives evidence how actors attend to and interpret everyday experiences and communicate those experiences to others (Riessman 1993). In the aftermath of a given event, no single individual or data source can be expected to convey all relevant aspects or to have a complete picture (Boje 2008). Instead, each individual or data source tends to possess relevant fragments of the story that can be aggregated to produce a coherent *composite narrative* (Boje 2001). Composite narratives therefore “summarize collective constructions of meanings” in the wake of momentous events or processes (Sonenstein 2010, p. 483). We combined data sources to compose coherent narratives for sets of actors who appeared to share common interpretations of the event.

We then built VG's composite narrative. We immersed ourselves in VG's history and the context in which it operated at the time of the crash, and subsequently built a timeline of key company milestones. We then began our analysis by focusing on VG's Twitter account. We chose to start here because tweets may be the most immediate, straightforward, candid messages a firm can direct at its stakeholders, and vice versa. We then moved to the company press releases³ and founder's blog posts, because these were often referenced in tweets via links, and found that they typically contained expanded versions of themes stated in the tweets. We divided the data by day. Using these data sources, the first and third authors engaged in open coding separately, looking for emergent themes (Corbin and Strauss 1990, Charmaz 2006). As themes emerged, we generated *in vivo* codes and frequently came together to compare and contrast, building a common repository. We later worked together to aggregate these themes into higher-level categories (Corbin and Strauss 1990). Some categories

conveyed VG's interpretation of the event, and yielded codes such as *opportunity for firm learning* and *hinting at the cause (difficulty of activity)*. Other categories spoke to the firm's views on its own legitimacy, the legitimacy of the space tourism segment, and that of the commercial space industry at large. These yielded codes such as *asserting the morality of the endeavor*, *forecasting customer retention*, and *forecasting the firm's ultimate success*.

We subsequently moved to analyzing stakeholders' interpretations of the failure and their assessments of organizational and industry legitimacy. We did line by line coding of all client tweets, all media articles and videos, and all materials provided by the NTSB, and noticed the emergence of three main narratives. We observed that some stakeholders shared VG's views: they interpreted the failure in similar ways and defended both the legitimacy of the industry and that of the firm with similar arguments. Among these stakeholders were many clients on the flight list, a host of former NASA astronauts, test pilots, space organizations, and several space experts and analysts. We combined these data with VG's, collapsing insights from both into a single composite narrative. Among stakeholders who appeared to hold opposing views, two narratives emerged. First, some stakeholders, such as certain space organizations, space experts, experts in adjacent fields like propulsion, and a number of space analysts, focused on technical aspects of the failure and interpreted the event as the consequence of VG's faulty practices, design, and technology. Codes such as *hinting at cause (technology)* and *hinting at cause (managerial)* supported this view. The categories that questioned the firm's legitimacy yielded codes such as *questioning firm survival*, *forecasting investor reconsideration*, and *forecasting customer reconsideration*. A second group of detracting stakeholders, including certain space experts, journalists, and space analysts, focused on the worthiness of VG's innovation and interpreted the event as a consequence of VG's goals, which they considered socially wasteful. This was captured by codes such as *hinting at cause (product category)*. The categories that questioned the firm and the segment's legitimacy yielded codes such as *questioning morality of activity* and *forecasting continued challenges to industry segment*. As part of our analysis, however, we were unable to unequivocally map types of stakeholders to particular interpretations. In most cases, stakeholders in a given category did not univocally share a single interpretation but gravitated toward different individual interpretations. As befitting its role, the NTSB remained impartial and only shared factual information. We treated all NTSB data as either corroborating or disputing aspects of the narratives that emerged previously.

At this stage, the entire team came together to interpret unfolding findings. We engaged with research on legitimacy, innovation, failure, and nascent industries,

moving iteratively between the literature and our data. First, we drew links between extant definitions of legitimacy in the literature and the ways in which the firm and its stakeholders interpreted legitimacy in our data. This helped strengthen the internal coherence of our composite narratives. In particular, we found the distinction Suchman (1995) makes among moral, pragmatic, and cognitive legitimacy useful. Moral legitimacy reflects a normative evaluation of the organization and its activities (p. 579). Moral legitimacy is further refined into *moral-procedural* legitimacy, which hinges on evaluations of the quality of a firm's techniques and procedures, and *moral-structural* legitimacy, which is tied to the degree to which a firm's product category is considered socially acceptable. Pragmatic legitimacy hinges on self-interested audiences' expectations of the resources the firm may need and the economic value its activities may produce (p. 578). Finally, cognitive legitimacy refers to the passive acceptance of the firm as a necessary, inevitable, and taken for granted industry participant (p. 582). In our setting, pragmatic and moral legitimacy were present while cognitive legitimacy was not.

Second, as we reviewed studies of legitimacy in nascent industries, we noted that the dynamics we observed in the aftermath of catastrophic innovation failure represented an understudied instance in the evolution of nascent industries. We undertook another round of axial coding (Charmaz 2006) to focus specifically on industry-level implications of catastrophic innovation failure within the three emergent narratives. We noticed that when a legitimacy jolt occurs, all actors aim to preserve the industry's legitimacy, albeit in different ways. We saw direct links between actors' interpretations of the failure, their arguments for or against organizational legitimacy, and their efforts to sustain the industry's legitimacy. In particular, coding revealed (1) assertions of rightful industry membership to either *isolate* VG from the industry or *embed* VG within it; (2) rhetorical manipulation of industry boundaries to either *constrain* or *extend* them; and (3) arguments to either *increase* or *decrease* the degree of distinctiveness of the firm's organizational identity. Armed with these insights, we induced a process model of reassessing organizational and industry legitimacy in the wake of catastrophic innovation failure.

Findings: Organizational and Industry Legitimacy After Catastrophic Innovation Failure

After VG's catastrophic innovation failure, three competing interpretations of the failure began to take shape. Although divergent, all three interpretations aimed to sustain the legitimacy of the nascent industry—albeit in different ways. The first two interpretations, offered by detracting stakeholders, maintained the legitimacy of

the industry by isolating VG or isolating both VG and its space tourism segment. The third interpretation, offered by VG and its supporting stakeholders, sustained the legitimacy of VG and space tourism by embedding both in the broader commercial space community and beyond. We next describe these interpretations and the process by which they evolve and interact.

Figure 1 shows our emergent process model, whereas Tables 2–4 present evidence supporting each of the categories in our model. In the wake of catastrophic innovation failure, the legitimacy jolt experienced by the firm and the industry challenged their legitimacy via two pathways. First, their *moral legitimacy* (arrow 1a in Figure 1) was challenged: from a procedural standpoint, questions arose about the quality of the firm's practices and technology; from a structural standpoint, there were misgivings about the social value of space tourism (Suchman 1995). Second, the failure challenged the *pragmatic* legitimacy of the firm and the industry (arrow 1b): questions arose about the attractiveness of the firm and of its industry segment for both investors and customers (Suchman 1995). Facing this legitimacy jolt, the firm and different sets of industry stakeholders formed interpretations of the failure by considering what happened, why it happened, and who owns the failure. Those interpretations led to arguments that sustained the industry's legitimacy while either rejecting or upholding the firm's legitimacy. Some detracting stakeholders classified the event as an explosion and interpreted it as evidence that VG's practices and technology were unsound. They ascribed responsibility for the failure to VG alone (arrow 2a). Based on this assessment, they sought to sustain the industry's legitimacy by rhetorically shrinking industry boundaries and casting out VG as an illegitimate player (arrow 3a). Other detracting stakeholders classified the event as a tragedy in the pursuit of a joyride and declared space tourism to be a socially undesirable activity (arrow 2b). They rhetorically shrunk industry boundaries to cast out both VG and the space tourism segment as illegitimate while supporting other efforts in space exploration (arrow 3b). Last, VG and supporting stakeholders interpreted the failure as a natural consequence of the uncertainty inherent to the development of radical innovations (arrow 2c). They sought to maintain the legitimacy of the industry and of VG by rhetorically embedding VG within the commercial space industry and beyond, enhancing industry boundaries to include both for-profit and nonprofit organizations dedicated to space exploration (arrow 3c). Finally, VG sought to neutralize the interpretations of detracting stakeholders in two ways. First, in order to dispel the possibility of an explosion, VG leveraged unequivocal information provided by the NTSB (arrow 4a). Second, in order to suggest that its product was

Figure 1. Process Model of Reassessing Organizational and Industry Legitimacy Following Catastrophic Innovation Failure




Table 2. Sustaining Industry Legitimacy by Isolating VG

Categories	Subcategories	Supporting evidence and sources
Panel A: Interpretation of failure		
What happened?	Failure qualified as explosion	“All reports indicate that the explosion happened relatively soon after engine ignition.” (Hruska 2014)
Why did it happen?	VG has faulty practices	“They knew that three people were killed by this stuff, and yet they persisted in presenting it as safe, stable and benign.” (Garside et al. 2014)
	VG has failed to learn from past failures	“Based on the work we’ve done, including me writing a paper on the handling of nitrous oxide, we were concerned about what was going on at VG ... I sent copies of the paper to various people at VG in 2009, and they were ignored.” (Sky News 2014)
Who owns the failure?	Responsibility for the failure lies exclusively with VG	“The tycoon [Branson] was warned by engineers and scientists last year that the rocket was an explosion waiting to happen.” (Bucktin 2014)
Panel B: Role in legitimacy jolt		
Challenging firm legitimacy	Moral-procedural legitimacy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Questioning the quality of VG’s practices and technology • Questioning VG’s ability to learn 	“It is exactly what I was expecting. It was Russian roulette which test flight blew up.” (Brown 2014) “Now we’ve got another person killed, another person seriously injured ... We offered to talk, give our experience. It was either ignored or totally dismissed.” (Breaking News 2014)
	Pragmatic legitimacy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Questioning VG’s economic sustainability 	“After the failure of SpaceShipTwo, what will those Hollywood stars and hundreds of others this morning think about riding that rocket?” (Kerley 2014)
Sustaining industry legitimacy	Moral-procedural legitimacy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Portraying other players as having sound practices 	“Other commercial space operators, such as Elon Musk’s SpaceX and Blue Origin from Jeff Bezos, use totally different technologies to Virgin Galactic.” (Walker and Merrill 2014)
	Pragmatic legitimacy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Portraying other players as economically sustainable 	“The Virgin Galactic crash will not hinder efforts to establish Europe’s first commercial spaceport in the UK.” (McArdle 2014)
Panel C: Ultimate effects on legitimacy		
Player dynamics	Isolating VG as an illegitimate player	“There is no doubt in the space industry that mass space tourism will come to pass - eventually. But it doesn’t look like it will happen the Virgin way.” (Sandilands 2014)
Industry boundaries	Constraining industry boundaries to only include players deemed to have sound practices	“The first jet airliners crashed with serious problems but jet travel is still with us. ... It was the beginning of the end for the companies but the industries survived. Obviously it’s a setback for Virgin but there are several other companies looking into the same thing.” (Bristol Post 2014)

Notes. Proponents: adverse stakeholders. Prevalence in firm-stakeholder interactions: Interpretation begins to lose momentum on day 3, when the engine and fuel tanks (the supposed sources of the explosion) are recovered intact. It further loses momentum after day 5, when the NTSB’s preliminary report officially rules out the occurrence of an explosion. Full reference information is available in the online supplement.

more than a joyride, VG changed its organizational identity to bring it closer to the industry’s identity, reducing its degree of distinctiveness to find a new postfailure optimum (arrow 4b).

Sustaining the Industry’s Legitimacy by Isolating VG

Interpretation of Failure. A first group of stakeholders converged around the impressions of one of the first

Table 3. Sustaining Industry Legitimacy by Isolating VG and the Space Tourism Segment

Categories	Subcategories	Supporting evidence and sources
Panel A: Interpretation of failure		
What happened?	Failure qualified as an unnecessary tragedy	“One assumes that he [co-pilot Michael Alsbury] wouldn’t have wanted his death to derail the project. Whether he would have wanted it smothered in the language of bogus communitarianism is another question.” (Williams 2014)
Why did it happen?	VG is pursuing a socially wasteful, unnecessary activity	“A brave test pilot is dead and another one critically injured—in the service of a millionaire boondoggle thrill ride.” (Rogers 2014)
Who owns the failure?	Responsibility for the failure lies with VG and other high-profile firms	“That pilot died not for space but for a luxury service provider. His death doesn’t get us closer to Mars; it keeps rich people further away from weightlessness and a beautiful view.” (Rogers 2014)
Panel B: Role in legitimacy jolt		
Challenging firm/segment legitimacy	Moral-structural legitimacy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Questioning the social value of VG’s/segment’s product category 	“The creation of a market in space travel shows us the desperate need to reduce the gap between rich and poor This sort of travel amounts to what the economist Thorstein Veblen once described as ‘conspicuous consumption,’ serving little social purpose.” (Bourne 2014)
	Pragmatic legitimacy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Questioning VG’s/segment’s economic sustainability 	“It is less clear . . . whether manned spaceflight will remain a priority investment for Abu Dhabi [sovereign fund Aabar Investments is a VG investor] in a region where prominent officials and businessmen go to great lengths to avoid any negative publicity or perception of failure” (Reuters 2014)
Sustaining industry legitimacy	Moral-procedural legitimacy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Portraying other players/ segments as operating in socially valued categories 	“In the case of Virgin Galactic . . . this is not space travel for the sole benefit of science. It’s space travel as an adventure only the richest can afford to buy.” (Bitton 2014)
	Pragmatic legitimacy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Portraying other players/ segments as economically sustainable 	“A space program designed to get humanity off our native planet makes sense—but only a specific kind. Eventually this planet is going to be unlivable. . . . It’d be good to not be here when it happens. Elon Musk has made that part of his explicit rationale for SpaceX. . . . That’s being a pioneer.” (Rogers 2014)
Panel C: Ultimate effects on legitimacy		
Player dynamics	Isolating VG/segment as illegitimate	“My sense, from what they [VG] themselves have described what the business is, it sounds like, if it worked, it would be an amazing ride for some very wealthy people. I am not sure I see the connection between that and space exploration.” (Wisconsin Public Radio 2014)
Industry boundaries	Constraining industry boundaries to only include players/segments deemed to be socially valuable	“I root for SpaceX, and felt real disappointment at Orbital Sciences’ Antares disaster this week.” (Rogers 2014)

Notes. Proponents: adverse stakeholders. Prevalence in firm-stakeholder interactions: weeks 1 to 3. Interpretation begins to lose momentum as numerous VG partners and clients, alongside high-profile space experts, uphold the value of VG’s endeavors. The interpretation further loses momentum as VG brings its organizational identity closer to the identity of the industry. Full reference information is available in the online supplement.

Table 4. Sustaining Industry Legitimacy by Embedding VG Within the Industry

Categories	Subcategories	Supporting evidence and sources
Panel A: Interpretation of failure		
What happened?	Failure qualified as ‘anomaly’; ‘incident’; ‘accident’	“At approximately 10:12, we became aware of an in-flight anomaly and implemented our replanned response plan.” (Willis 2014)
Why did it happen?	Space exploration is a difficult and uncertain endeavor	“Travel to the edge of space and beyond has never been without risk. In the early days of the US program, rockets blew up on the launch pad or shortly after launch.” (Knickerbocker 2014)
Who owns the failure?	All players in the industry symbolically share the failure	“When we have a mishap from the test community, we find the test community is very small. And we’re human. And it hurts.” (Willis 2014)
Panel B: Role in legitimacy jolt		
Sustaining firm legitimacy	Moral-procedural legitimacy	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Upholding VG’s capabilities 	“We make sure the engineers are in charge and that’s what we’ve done from day one. The fact that the program has taken longer is a sign we are listening to the engineers. I find it ironic that people say we are rushing when the program has taken 10 years.” (Cronan 2014)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Portraying VG as eager to learn 	“We’ll now comprehensively assess the results of the crash and are determined to learn from this and move forward together as a group of friends and a company.” (Eleftheriou-Smith 2014)
	Moral-structural legitimacy	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Defending the social value of VG’s product category 	“The risks of space tourism are similar to those during the early development of commercial aviation ... You go back to 1903 and air travel was seen as a pretty silly thing by a lot of people, and it was seen as something for the rich and famous or playboys. It changed to be democratized the way it is today.” (O’Sullivan 2014)
	Pragmatic legitimacy	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Defending VG’s technical sustainability 	“It’s possible that test flights for the next spaceship could begin within six months, before the investigation is expected to conclude.” (Agence France Presse 2014)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Defending VG’s economic sustainability 	“I have no intention of ... getting a refund. I’m ready to rocket to outer space.” (Holt 2014)
Sustaining industry legitimacy	Moral-procedural legitimacy	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Likening failure in commercial space to failure in nascent industries of the past 	“In the early days of aviation there were incidents and then aviation became very safe. In the early days of commercial space travel there have been incidents and then, we hope, that one day the tests pilots will enable people to go into space safely.” (Power 2014)
	Moral-structural legitimacy	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Portraying all efforts in space as socially valuable 	“Taming space for the benefit of all, unmasking its truths and using the boundless resources available to us [...] Taking a chance allows us to seek new horizons — and we all benefit from being horizon hunters.” (Aldrin 2014)
	Pragmatic legitimacy	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Defending the attractiveness of space exploration to consumers and investors 	“I desperately want to try space. I think that Vasco da Gama, if he was around today, would be exploring space. This is really exciting, to be able to push humanity beyond the boundaries of the Earth.” (Samuels 2014)

Table 4. (Continued)

Categories	Subcategories	Supporting evidence and sources
Panel C: Ultimate effects on legitimacy		
Player dynamics	Embedding VG within the industry	“Virgin Galactic and Scaled Composites are engaged in one of the great efforts of our time: opening space for all humanity. That is a noble pursuit.” National Space Society (NSS); Oct 31; press release
Industry boundaries	Enhancing industry boundaries to encompass all space exploration (for profit and nonprofit)	“Space is important to all of our futures. At the end of the day, one of the things that I think is most powerful is that we’ll be able to get a new perspective on our planet as hundreds and eventually millions of people are able to go into space.” (Wallace and Crane 2014)

Notes. Proponents: firm and supporting stakeholders. Prevalence in firm-stakeholder interactions: weeks 1 to 4. Interpretation gains momentum after NTSB’s preliminary report, which ruled out the occurrence of an explosion. Interpretation further gains momentum after VG’s retelling of its organizational identity. Full reference information is available in the online supplement.

eyewitnesses to the crash, photographer Ken Brown, who was covering the test flight. He told the press that he saw a “midflight explosion and later came upon SpaceShipTwo debris scattered across a small area of the desert” (Prigg et al. 2014)⁴. This interpretation of the failure as an explosion was quickly picked up by other stakeholders. For example, Joel Glenn Brenner, former Washington Post reporter familiar with the development of SpaceShipOne under Burt Rutan, said: “The explosion came almost instantaneously, and suddenly pieces of the spaceship were raining out of the sky” (Baldwin 2014).

For these stakeholders, the failure brought back memories of a 2007 deadly accident when a fuel tank exploded during ground testing. This explosion was the only other large-scale failure on record for VG. On October 31, 2014, VG was testing a newly developed hybrid fuel combination. A prior test had revealed that the firm’s initial fuel combination would likely not generate enough propulsion for SpaceShipTwo to reach space. VG had not tested the spacecraft in the air since then. Hence, these stakeholders linked the cause of the catastrophe to the continual technological challenges VG had faced in connection with its engine and fuel technology since the 2007 incident. Tom Bower, Branson’s biographer, noted: “in 2007, three engineers were killed in an explosion when a rocket exploded on the ground. Ever since then it has become apparent that the science used to create this rocket is completely unreliable” (Brown 2014). Because they viewed the failure as a direct consequence of VG’s technological shortcomings, these stakeholders placed ownership of the failure solely onto VG.

Role in Legitimacy Jolt. These stakeholders challenged the firm’s legitimacy in two ways. First, they questioned VG’s moral-procedural legitimacy by negatively evaluating the quality of VG’s practices and technology and its ability to learn from the previous accident. To support their views, these stakeholders brought to light deep-

rooted issues connected with the firm’s technological and managerial choices. For instance, rocket scientists such as Carolynne Campbell-Knight at the International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety, said that VG had ignored warnings about the instability of their fuel:

Based on the work we’ve done, including me writing a paper on the handling of nitrous oxide, we were concerned about what was going on at VG... I sent copies of the paper to various people at VG in 2009, and they were ignored... I warned them... that the rocket motor was potentially dangerous (Sky News 2014).

Campbell-Knight also stated on her website that “if the truth about the 2007 accident had come out,” the SpaceShipTwo crash “would probably not have happened” (Associated Press 2014).

Given the continuous delays VG had experienced since its founding, these stakeholders believed that the firm had been rushed and was under time pressure to perform powered tests, especially as the spacecraft had not flown for more than nine months. Brenner noted:

The enthusiasm that’s been shown outwardly by VG and by Sir Richard certainly does not match at all with the technology behind the scenes. And there is a big gap there and has been for quite some time. And I will be documenting that... And it’s a real problem. (Baldwin 2014)

They also maintained that VG had shown overconfidence in downplaying the risks associated with its endeavor and in diffusing issues associated with the slow pace of the testing program. For example, CNN aviation analyst Miles O’Brien noted that “Richard Branson, while charming and a great PR man, has routinely downplayed the dangers and the challenges of space travel” (Camerota 2014). Jeff Kluger, senior science editor of Time Magazine, stated, “Well, this [i.e., the maiden voyage] has been around the corner for Branson every six months. We are always just half a year away from finally having these flights” (Tracy 2014). Hence,

Brenner noted, “they [i.e., VG] were concerned about the pace of the program” (Kerley 2014). Moreover, some also hinted that these organizational issues had caused the exits of several top executives just a few months before the crash:

VG has reportedly lost three of its senior executives in the last year, with the vice president for safety Jon Turnipseed having left just before Christmas, and Thomas Markusic, the vice president for propulsion, having left the company in January this year. It is also understood that the chief aerodynamics engineer left the company in recent months, according to reports (Eleftheriou-Smith 2014).

Stakeholders suggested that, in the absence of sound practices, trustworthy technology, and knowledgeable staff, VG’s technical viability was in question. For example, space blogger Doug Messier tweeted, “Ten years into #SpaceShipTwo program and they still don’t seem to have reliable and safe propulsion system. Doesn’t bode well” (Harwell 2014). Brenner said, “This engine that exploded today, even if they had had a successful flight... they would not have ever gotten anywhere near space with this engine, OK?” (Baldwin 2014). She added:

We have been talking a little bit today about setbacks and what this means for the future and now I have to tell you that I believe sincerely that this is the end for customers in space on VG—at least any time soon because they don’t have a vehicle anywhere near completion. I don’t see them at least being able to carry anybody into space in the next ten years. There’s no way.... So this really marks the end for what they can do (Baldwin 2014).

Second, this interpretation of the failure severely threatened the firm’s pragmatic legitimacy, particularly from a resource sustainability perspective. Not only had VG incurred the loss of its costly technology, the firm also potentially faced severe financial strain that could ultimately damage its economic viability, especially if key stakeholders such as customers, investors, and insurers stopped lending support for the endeavor. Indeed, stakeholders expected customers would reconsider going into space with VG and request refunds, and suggested that the deadly crash exposed the risk of space travel to customers who may not have fully considered it initially. Brenner explained that “customers weren’t necessarily paying attention [to the risk]. I think this might have been a wake-up call to them” (Kerley 2014). Soon, news reports that several customers had indeed requested refunds began to surface, bringing empirical support to the earlier worries:

Dozens of wealthy investors are considering pulling out of Sir Richard Branson’s VG programme, in a move which could cost the entrepreneur millions.... More than 30 people who signed up to be among the first space travellers are now said to be reconsidering

whether they want to make the flight in the wake of the crash of SpaceShipTwo (Owen and Walker 2014).

In parallel, uncertainty about whether investors would continue financing VG also threatened the pragmatic legitimacy of the firm. For example, aviation expert Clive Irving said:

There are many consequences to this failure. Not the least is what it implies for the financing of the project. After years of delays the costs have gone beyond a billion dollars.... By any measure, this accident will have set back the development program by years. Will backers want to pour ever more money into this black hole? (Knickerbocker 2014).

This was somewhat exacerbated by the fact that VG’s only external investor at the time, Aabar Investment, had a neutral rather than a positive stance with regard to its future commitment to the project, as one of its spokespersons noted:

As an investor, Aabar is concerned of course. It is a challenge—nothing can be decided until investigations are over. For now, it is a wait-and-watch situation. There is time to make an assessment of the future strategy (Reuters 2014).

Ultimate Effects on Legitimacy. Based on their interpretation of the event and their legitimacy concerns, these stakeholders isolated VG from the rest of the industry, suggesting it was no longer a rightful industry member. On the one hand, they rhetorically shrunk the boundaries of the industry to cast VG out. For instance, Campbell-Knight stated that “They [VG] should stop, give up. Go away and do something they might be good at like selling mobile phones—they should stay out of the space business” (Allen 2014). On the other hand, they portrayed VG’s competitors, as well as the industry writ large, as still legitimate and having sound practices. For example, reporter Scott Longmuir noted:

Several companies are vying to make their mark in the growing field of space tourism, offering a variety of services from brief sub-orbital visits (flying above a height of 100 kilometres) to spending several days or weeks on an orbiting space station. (Longmuir 2014)

Similarly, Jose Mariano Lopez-Urdiales, the CEO of zero2infinity, isolated VG by stating: “They [VG] were running things with a mindset on PR and making it look like there was progress and not actually solving the problems” (Postmedia Breaking News 2014). As a VG competitor, his comment implied tacit support for the industry’s legitimacy.

Despite these arguments, the interpretation of the failure as an explosion and stakeholders’ efforts to isolate VG as an illegitimate player in an otherwise legitimate commercial space industry sharply lost momentum following advancements of the NTSB’s investigation and preliminary findings. In a press conference on

November 2, the NTSB cleared VG to continue performing test flights. Then, on November 3, the NTSB confirmed that SpaceShipTwo's fuel tank and engine had been recovered intact and suggested that the premature deployment of the feathering system was the likely cause of the crash. The conversation around the fuel and engine further decreased following a November 5 NTSB statement (Rascon 2014): "We have a lot that we don't know. This [i.e., examining the fuel and engine] was one fact... in the several links of a chain to determine the totality of what caused this mishap."

Sustaining the Industry's Legitimacy by Isolating VG and the Space Tourism Segment

Interpretation of Failure. In parallel, a second group of detracting stakeholders interpreted VG's catastrophic innovation failure as a tragedy in the pursuit of a meaningless goal. They strongly objected to the product category—space tourism—and branded it useless from a societal point of view. For instance, WIRED journalist Adam Rogers remarked that such a frivolous activity was not worth the loss of life:

Space tourism is not worth dying for.... People get rich; they spend money. Sometimes it's vulgar, but it's the system we all seem to accept. When it costs the lives of the workers building that system, we should stop accepting it. (Rogers 2014)

These detracting stakeholders viewed space tourism as a superficial, expensive, and dangerous activity that consumed resources society could allocate toward worthier causes. For example, CNN commentator Sally Kohn objected to the steep price tag for space tourism by noting:

For \$9.99, you can rent *Gravity* [the movie]. For, like, 100 bucks, you could get a projector and watch it really big in your living room.... I just saved you a lot of money, everybody. There are other things to spend \$250,000 on. I'd be happy to give you a list later of like, you know, people are starving. But it's fine. People get to spend their money however they want to. I just rent *Gravity* instead. (Kohn 2014)

Consequently, these stakeholders believed that responsibility for the failure rested with VG and other high-profile firms competing in the space tourism segment. Journalist Ed Power noted:

The accident has focused attention on the extraordinary space race between a clique of billionaires seeking to turn the heavens into their private playground. The Virgin boss is just one among many high net worth individuals who, having become masters of the universe on terra firma, have cultivated what might be considered an obsession with outer space. (Power 2014)

Role in Legitimacy Jolt. These stakeholders dismissed VG's efforts because of the exorbitant cost of the trip

and the limited time actually spent in space. They questioned the social value of the product category, blaming the loss of life from the catastrophic failure on insignificant and wasteful pursuits for the wealthy. Thus, they not only challenged the legitimacy of VG but also rejected that of space tourism, as they perceived the activity to lack moral-structural legitimacy. Zoe Williams, a journalist, opined that "Richard Branson's space tourism shows what today's obscene inequality looks like, the space venture did little beyond illustrating the frivolity and emptiness of the human condition" (Williams 2014). Similarly, Rogers wrote that "Virgin Galactic is building the world's most expensive roller coaster, the aerospace version of Beluga caviar. It's a thing for rich people to do: pay \$250,000 to not feel the weight of the world" (Rogers 2014). Journalist Steve Connor also noted:

But even if VG shrugs off the latest tragedy and resume its test flights, there is still the question of whether commercial space travel will ever be anything other than expensive joyriding for the super-rich. VG's passengers...will spend only a few minutes in "space," at an altitude where the curvature of the Earth and its wispy stratosphere will be outlined by the blackness of space. And in the process of enjoying the view, they can contemplate how their cash and physical presence have contributed, just a little bit, to the further destruction of what lies below them—the atmosphere of Earth. (Connor 2014)

Besides questioning the social value of space tourism, detracting stakeholders also challenged VG's and its segment's pragmatic legitimacy by questioning their economic viability. In their minds, customers would be discouraged from signing up or maintaining their commitment to travel into space once they understood the risks associated with the endeavor. For instance, John Logsdon, a retired Space Policy Director at George Washington University who served as a member of the board that investigated the Columbia space shuttle disaster in 2003, noted that "It [the failure] is a real setback to the idea that lots of people are going to be taking joyrides into the fringes of outer space any time soon" (Achenbach and Harwell 2014). He further added:

This will inject a note of sobriety into the enthusiasm of those who would like the spaceflight experience. There was a whole juggernaut of ground training and private spaceports that were being set up to support an emerging space tourism industry, with a collective burst of maybe unrealistic expectations. This will certainly throw cold water on that. (Achenbach and Harwell 2014)

Similarly, reporter Stuart Nathan doubted the economic viability of VG in these terms:

We'll have to wait and see whether the effects of the SpaceShipTwo crash dampen the enthusiasm of the very rich to take on the freshly emphasised risk of

riding an explosion for kicks. Because ultimately, that's what'll determine whether space flight can make money for investors, and that's the sole key to the future of Virgin Galactic. (Nathan 2014)

Despite casting aside VG and the space tourism segment, these detracting stakeholders believed in the broad endeavor of space exploration for the advancement of humanity. They sustained the industry's moral-structural legitimacy by differentiating VG and its segment from others that, in their eyes, operated in socially valued categories. They also forecasted significant negative impact or even the demise of the space tourism segment while elevating the chances of success for the rest of the industry. Specifically, they sustained the commercial space industry's pragmatic legitimacy by portraying firms in other segments as being economically sound. For example, Ann Karagozian, professor of mechanical and aeronautical engineering at UCLA, said, "I don't think this spells doom for so-called commercial space. Many different companies are developing concepts that are experiencing a lot of success" (Spotts 2014). She subsequently mentioned SpaceX as one such successful company, in connection with its development of reusable rockets to send satellites into orbit and supply the International Space Station.

Ultimate Effects on Legitimacy. These stakeholders rhetorically isolated VG and the space tourism segment away from the rest of the commercial space industry by shrinking its boundaries to only include segments they deemed socially valuable. For example, speaking of the difference between SpaceX's intent to enable humanity to reach, and one day settle, on Mars and VG's goals, Rogers noted:

It's a mistake to lump that kind of endeavor [SpaceX's goal of getting humanity off Planet Earth] with Virgin Galactic. Exploration and evacuation are not its value proposition. The technology SpaceShipTwo employs is not, except perhaps in its broadest description, designed to take humanity off-world. It's genius engineering, but it isn't about exploring anything except the legitimately difficult challenge of a rocket plane that can go very, very high. It is about making space tourism into a viable business. (Rogers 2014)

This interpretation of the failure came to a natural close when the vast majority of customers reaffirmed their commitment to fly with VG, dismissing the notion that the failure would endanger space tourism as a viable activity. More importantly, as we will elaborate in the next section, customers' reaffirmation of commitment coincided with a shift in VG's organizational identity, which moved from a focus on tourism to a focus on space exploration, thereby defending the social value of the endeavor.

Sustaining the Industry's Legitimacy by Embedding VG within the Larger Space Community

Interpretation of Failure. As soon as the catastrophe occurred, VG adopted a neutral stance and announced on Twitter: "#SpaceShipTwo has experienced an in-flight anomaly. Additional info and statement forthcoming." (October 31, @virgingalactic account). As the day continued, VG's tweeting remained purely descriptive:

UPDATE: VG's partner Scaled Composites conducted a powered test flight of #SpaceShipTwo earlier today. (1 of 4)

During the test, the vehicle suffered a serious anomaly resulting in the loss of SpaceShipTwo. [WhiteKnightTwo] landed safely. (2 of 4)

Our first concern is the status of the pilots, which is unknown at this time. (3 of 4)

We will work closely with relevant authorities to determine the cause of this accident and provide updates ASAP. (4 of 4)

However, seeing adverse interpretations take shape in the media, VG and supporting stakeholders offered their own interpretation, portraying the failure as the result of difficulties inherent to the innovation process. For example, VG CEO George Whitesides said, "Space is hard. And today was a tough day" (Tracy 2014). Many industry experts echoed this sentiment, including former NASA astronaut Mike Massimino, who noted: "It's a reminder that things can happen when you try to do bold things in space. You can have setbacks ... It could be a rough business" (Baldwin 2014). Pinpointing the difficulties involved in space travel enabled VG and supporting stakeholders to remind audiences that the firm's failure, albeit catastrophic, was representative of the challenges faced by the nascent commercial space community as a whole. In doing so, the firm and supporting stakeholders symbolically transferred ownership of the failure to the industry writ large and rhetorically embedded VG within the space community, defending the firm's rightful membership. For example, NASA administrator Charles Bolden said:

While not a NASA mission, the pain of this tragedy will be felt by all the men and women who have devoted their lives to exploration. Space flight is incredibly difficult, and we commend the passion of all in the space community who take on risk to push the boundaries of human achievement. (US Official News 2014)

Role in Legitimacy Jolt. Portraying the failure as deriving from difficulties inherent to innovation served to counterbalance the interpretations put forth by detracting stakeholders, who challenged VG's legitimacy based either on the quality of its technology and

practices or on the worthiness of the endeavor at a social level. In response to the first set of detracting stakeholders, VG and supporting stakeholders sustained the firm's moral-procedural legitimacy by upholding its innovative capabilities and reinforcing the firm's commitment to safety. For instance, Richard Quest, CNN aviation analyst, said, "there's no question it [i.e., the maiden voyage] will be delayed but ... - when it does finally take passengers it will be as safe as it can be" (Cooper 2014). Similarly, Whitesides noted that "It was the first time the rocket had been flown using a new fuel formulation.... It had been proven and tested on the ground many times" (Perry 2014). The firm also reiterated the same message in a statement:

At VG, we are dedicated to opening the space frontier, while keeping safety as our 'North Star.' This has guided every decision we have made over the past decade, and any suggestion to the contrary is categorically untrue. We have the privilege to work with some of the best minds in the space industry, who have dedicated their lives to the development of technologies to enable the continued exploration of space.... This is not a mission that anyone takes lightly. (November 2, VG press release)

VG also portrayed the failure as an opportunity to learn and persevere in its goal of bringing tourists into space. Whitesides said:

We are going to be supporting the investigation as we figure out what happened today, and we're going to get through it.... We believe we owe it to the folks who were flying these vehicles as well as the folks who have been working so hard on them, to understand this and to move forward, which is what we'll do. (Adams 2014)

Similar views were espoused by supporting stakeholders. For example, client Sir Trevor Beattie tweeted "ad astra per aspera" ("a rough road leads to the stars") (November 1, @trevorbmbagency account), whereas former NASA astronaut Scott Parazynski noted "They will look at all the data and find out what happened... I am certain VG will persevere and get to the bottom of what's gone wrong" (Perry 2014).

To further maintain VG's moral-procedural legitimacy, the firm and supporting stakeholders also likened VG's failure to failures in nascent industries and innovation efforts of the past. For example, Fredric Jenet, the creator/director at the Center for Advanced Radio Astronomy UT Brownsville and STARGATE, compared VG's endeavor to early efforts in the automotive industry, commercial aviation, and nonprofit space exploration. He said:

A few failures are not going to stop private space flight, just as a few crashes are not going to stop the automobile industry.... Where would we be if the

Wright brothers decided not to pursue aviation because Otto Lilienthal, a pioneer of aviation, was killed in a glider accident? Failure is a necessary part of great success. In our efforts to travel to the moon during the golden age of space travel, there were 55 mission failures and only 41 successes. One of the most famous innovators of all times, Thomas Edison, knew that failure was intimately tied to success. When developing the electric light bulb, he reportedly failed over 10,000 times before getting it right. (Jenet 2014)

In response to threats to VG's pragmatic legitimacy in connection with alleged technological shortcomings, VG and supporting stakeholders defended the firm's economic sustainability by making positive forward-looking statements. They acknowledged the delay as inevitable following the catastrophic failure but cast the overall endeavor in a positive light. For example, XPRIZE Foundation chairman and CEO Peter Diamandis, who was a client on VG's flight list, said:

This is what exploring is all about. We risk our lives for what we believe in.... I believe in [VG] and know without a doubt that they will succeed, and I will fully trust them with my safety when my turn to fly materializes. (Walker and Merrill 2014)

Similarly, Beattie tweeted, "We'll be back. #StillBuildingTheDream #SpaceShipThree?" (November 7, @trevorbmbagency account).

VG's pragmatic legitimacy was also questioned regarding the firm's ability to obtain and deploy the necessary resources to pursue its goal, given media reports that suggested customers were requesting refunds. VG defended its economic sustainability by confirming that "less than three per cent of people have requested refunds" (Grossman and De Graaf 2014). Moreover, Branson minimized the impact of potential refunds to VG's financial health by indicating that none of the customers' money was ever used:

Anybody who ever wants a refund would be able to get a refund. We haven't used the money. We've always decided it's best not to use the money. It just gave us the confidence to do the program knowing that these people were so committed. (Whitfield 2014)

According to news reports, although some clients had indeed rescinded their tickets, a number of them were in fact swayed back after speaking directly with Whitesides (Crane 2014) or other fellow customers (November 10, NBC News). For example, Craig Willan, a veteran of the aerospace industry who is eighth on VG's passenger list, managed to convince another customer not to ask for a refund. He noted:

I told him, 'Don't do it. You don't want to get into that for a couple of reasons. One is, it would be a potential run on the bank. And the second thing is, it sends the wrong signal to humankind. This is a very important phase in the gestation of something new,

and we don't want to screw up this pregnancy... It turns out he did not ask for a refund. (NBC News 2014)

Many other vocal customers reaffirmed their commitment to fly with VG and made a positive assessment of space travel in general, thus sustaining the industry's pragmatic legitimacy. Vasily Klyukin, a VG customer, tweeted on October 31 that "Space is space. It's not like park walking. I'm planning to fly anyway," (October 31, @VKlyukin account) hence acknowledging the risks involved in the endeavor. Others also believed that the catastrophic failure did not automatically spell doom for the commercial space industry. For instance, Sten Odenwald, a NASA consultant, said that "the commercial drivers for space travel haven't changed and I can't imagine the business community turning their backs on it now" (Walker and Merrill 2014). Ryan Bourne, the head of public policy at the Institute of Economic Affairs, concurred:

We should therefore be very careful in implying that spacecraft technologies will never find mass markets. Similarly misguided predictions were made about aeroplanes, computers and even the electric light. Market economies have a history of innovating goods and services which meet the wants and needs of society. (Bourne 2014)

The second detracting interpretation aimed to isolate both VG and its segment by calling into question the social value of space tourism, which threatened the moral-structural legitimacy of the firm and the industry as a whole. In response, VG and supporting stakeholders defended the necessity and worthiness of VG's activities and of its product category by asserting the importance of the endeavor for all of humanity. For example, on November 7, VG retweeted (@virgingalactic account) an article by WIRED Magazine whose title read: "@WIRED: VG doesn't just benefit the rich—it's good for science." VG conveyed a similar message in a press release:

Everything we do is to pursue the vision of accessible and democratized space.... Just like early air or sea travel, it is hard and complicated, but we believe that a thriving commercial space industry will have far reaching benefits for humanity, technology and research for generations to come. This is an important mission and we have been overwhelmed and grateful for the outpouring of support we have received from our future astronauts, friends in the industry and people all over the world who are inspired by the work our industry is doing and who are urging us to continue. (November 3, VG press release)

Supporting stakeholders also defended the moral-structural legitimacy of VG and the space tourism segment by using analogies to compare the project to all efforts in space exploration, regardless of the industry

segment in which they fell. For instance, former NASA astronaut Lisa Nowak said that "Of course, risk is part of space flight. We accept some of that to achieve greater goals in exploration and find out more about ourselves and about the universe" (Whitfield 2014). Similarly, Stuart Witt, CEO of the Mojave Spaceport, noted: "My message to them [i.e., to VG] is stay the course. This business is worthy business. This is not easy. If it were easy it wouldn't be interesting to me or any of my colleagues standing with us" (Cooper 2014). In the same vein, Branson said: "We must push on. There are incredible things that can happen through mankind being able to explore space properly.... I'm absolutely convinced VG has a great future" (Bucktin 2014).

Neutralizing Tactics. The firm and its supporting stakeholders also responded to the first detracting interpretation that isolated VG from the rest of the commercial space industry by leveraging messages in the official voice of the NTSB, which on November 3 provided details on what happened in a press conference. The agency's acting chairman, Christopher Hart, specifically pointed to human error in the early deployment of the spacecraft's feathering mechanism designed for reentry, thus dissipating the notion that the failure was caused by an explosion: "Shortly after the feathering occurred, the telemetry data terminated, and the video data terminated. The engine burn was normal, up until the extension of the feathers." VG leveraged the NTSB's findings through its chairman, Sir Richard Branson, who noted:

It was quite hurtful for the 400 engineers at VG that so many self-proclaimed experts were reeled into the Sunday newspapers to say what caused the explosion and why an explosion was inevitable to happen, when in fact there was no explosion and the fuel tanks are fine and the rocket engines are fine.... I was grateful for the NTSB to come out very strongly last night to say the engines and fuel tanks were completely intact. It was insulting. It was the British press at its worst, and some of them should hang their heads in shame. (Sample 2014)

To neutralize the second detracting interpretation of the failure, VG shifted its organizational identity to make it less distinctive from the industry's overall identity. Although the commercial space industry was still nascent and showed early fragmentation into distinctive segments, all participants shared attributes regarding their technology (safe, reusable vehicles), business activity and ethos (space conveyance and democratization), and business model (for-profit operations). For instance, in its 2014 preflight press kits SpaceX described its technology as "proven designs... poised to revolutionize access to space," and saw itself as "the world's fastest-growing provider of

launch services. Profitable and cash-flow positive, the company has nearly 50 launches on its manifest, representing about \$4 billion in contracts. These include commercial satellite launches and NASA missions.” Similarly, Blue Origin saw itself as a “private company developing vehicles and technologies to enable commercial human space transportation” on a 2014 press release. Its website, from the same period, detailed its aim “to lower the cost of spaceflight, so that many people can afford to go and so that we humans can better continue exploring the solar system. . . . We’re currently focused on developing reusable launch vehicles utilizing rocket-powered Vertical Take-off and Vertical Landing (VTVL) technology.” These attributes from other industry participants share VG’s aim to democratize space, as stated by a VG executive on November 4: “Everything rests on our vision of creating accessible and democratized space that will benefit humanity in countless ways for generations to come” (Knapton 2014).

VG’s shift in organizational identity was a significant move. From its founding in 2004 until its October 2014 test flight crash, VG portrayed itself mainly as *the First Commercial Spaceline* across all its communications media. This identity differentiated VG from other players in the industry. It suggested that VG would launch operations before anyone else. It is further substantiated by VG referring to its clients on the flight list as “future astronauts” and portraying them as belonging to “perhaps the world’s most exclusive club.” At the time of the crash, VG had arguably made more strides than any other company in making space tourism a reality. Following the crash, VG’s identity morphed in alignment with its response to detracting stakeholders’ interpretations. VG now described itself as *the Spaceline for Earth*, embedded itself as part of the larger space community, and appealed to identity attributes it shared with its members. In particular, VG emphasized the safety and innovativeness of its reusable technology, its aim of providing access to space to the common man, and its goal of contributing to human progress through space exploration. This last attribute de-emphasized VG’s commercial business model and instead drew ties with the space community writ large, including not-for-profit entities like NASA. Branson would later state that the new identity tagline suggested “a renewed sense of purpose” for the firm (January 2, 2015; Branson’s Blog).

On November 21, 2014, three weeks after the crash, the firm published a new website aligned with its new identity.⁵ The homepage contained a tribute to the fallen pilot and displayed sections in vertical sequence, accompanied by photographs. The titles and content of many sections on the homepage conveyed the firm’s new identity, including “Human Spaceflight,” “Why we go,” “Who we are,” and “Our vision for the future,”

suggesting different ways in which Virgin Galactic’s contribution to improving life on Earth would materialize through its space exploration activities. In contrast, the precrash website⁶ presented engineering and marketing themes in horizontal sequence. The homepage emphasized the sophistication of VG’s technology and the uniqueness of assets such as its spaceport, designed by the renowned Foster + Partners, and encouraged client sign-ups for the service. Content on VG’s vision and purpose was shorter and less prominent.

Additionally, VG and supporting stakeholders countered detracting arguments regarding the firm’s and the segment’s pragmatic legitimacy by arguing that the cost of space tourism, although initially high, was meant to decrease over time. Clients on the flight list were described as pioneers who assumed the high cost of space travel to facilitate the diffusion of the innovation into the masses. Hence, Bob Weiss, president of the XPRIZE Foundation, said: “Advances in commercial space flight are about more than joyrides for the superrich. The whole notion is to get the cost down. That reduction in cost is critical to ultimately being able to live and work in space” (Andrew-Gee 2014). Client Namira Salim noted:

The misconception is that this is for the rich and the famous. This is going to create the gateway into space for researchers, scientists, payloads, satellites. And we are just the first to invest in the project to make it a reality for the common person, for all these other industries. (BBC 2014)

Ultimate Effects on Legitimacy. Finally, VG and supporting stakeholders sought to embed the firm’s activities within the industry’s innovative pursuits in an attempt to sustain the firm’s overall legitimacy. According to them, the industry’s endeavor, and consequently VG’s, were worthy and necessary for the advancement of humanity. They therefore portrayed VG’s failure as representative of the challenges that the nascent commercial space industry faced as a whole. In doing so, they rhetorically enhanced the boundaries of the commercial space industry to encompass all space exploration, both for profit and nonprofit, within the same community. For example, commenting on VG’s failure, Jenet spoke of the importance of space exploration and symbolically transferred ownership of the failure to the community:

Ultimately, we have two choices. We can play it safe, stifle creativity by being totally risk averse, and resign ourselves to being stuck on Earth for the rest of eternity. Or, we allow ourselves to dream big, take on huge challenges and claim a space for ourselves among the stars. I have no doubt that we will decide to pursue the second choice. But, be ready for more crashes, explosions and, unfortunately, fatalities. These failures signify that we are once again pursuing

great things, things that are going to define who we are as a human race, and take us to a future where we explore and shape the galaxy and the universe beyond. (Jenet 2014)

Supporting stakeholders endorsed VG and its effort in space tourism, predicting that the firm would ultimately prevail in its mission to bring noncareer astronauts into space despite this major setback. For example, former NASA astronaut Tom Jones explained:

I think space tourism is a promising development. It is going to expose more people to the experience of space flights which I think is going to broaden our interest in conducting business into space, expanding industry to space. Companies like VG are going to be important part of this. We knew that there would be accidents. Everyone knows that. (Willis 2014)

Similarly, June Scobee Rodgers, widow of a 1986 Challenger astronaut and Founding Chair and Director of the Challenger Center, stated in a letter to VG: “The setback is tragic, but the courage and commitment of your fellow team will soon help you all to recover, and from the energy of grief, the phoenix will arise with even more resolve and commitment” (Wallace and Crane 2014).

Discussion

We examined how catastrophic innovation failure affects organizational and industry legitimacy in nascent sectors by analyzing the interactions between VG and members of the space community in the aftermath of the firm’s 2014 test flight crash. Our findings show that catastrophic innovation failure creates a legitimacy jolt to the firm and its nascent industry, which provides an occasion for the firm and its stakeholders to jointly reassess organizational and industry legitimacy. Throughout the process, all actors sought to sustain the industry’s legitimacy, but differed in their treatment of VG’s legitimacy and the space tourism segment’s legitimacy. Some detracting stakeholders isolated VG from the wider commercial space industry by rhetorically shrinking the industry’s boundaries to exclude the firm. Other detracting stakeholders isolated both VG and its segment from the rest of the industry by rhetorically shrinking industry boundaries to encompass only those segments they viewed as socially beneficial. In contrast, VG and supporting stakeholders rhetorically embedded VG within the industry, asserting the firm’s rightful membership in it. Moreover, they enhanced industry boundaries to include for-profit and nonprofit players in the space community.

Our study makes contributions to the literatures on innovation failure and legitimacy building in nascent industries. First, our study situates catastrophic innovation failure as a distinct and understudied failure category. We conceptually distinguish catastrophic innovation failure from other types of failure frequently

examined in the literature—particularly, small-scale innovation failure (Sitkin 1992, Kelley and Littman 2001, Thomke 2003, Cannon and Edmondson 2005) and large-scale operational failure (Turner 1976, 1976; Gillespie and Dietz 2009; Bundy and Pfarrer 2015), and we provide an in-depth look into the firm-stakeholder interactions that ensue in its aftermath. In particular, previous work has shown that catastrophic operational failure almost exclusively threatens organizational legitimacy: the consensus is that the firm is likely to blame and must take remedial action. Firms engage with stakeholders either to diminish the perceived severity of the failure or to take responsibility (Elsbach 2003). In contrast, in the wake of catastrophic innovation failure, where ambiguity as to the cause of the failure reigns, interpretations of the failure differ (Anthony et al. 2016), and the ensuing legitimacy jolt (Garud et al. 2014) places both organizational and industry legitimacy at stake.

Second, we refine the process of legitimacy construction in nascent industries by considering how different interpretations of failure arise and interact with one another (Garud et al. 2014, Lounsbury and Glynn 2019) and by describing the role of neutral stakeholders in the process. We show how the firm not only puts forth its preferred interpretation of the failure but also responds to the interpretations of detracting stakeholders that seek to stigmatize the firm or its industry segment (Hsu and Grodal 2020). In our case, we traced direct links between actors’ interpretations of the failure, their efforts to sustain the larger industry’s legitimacy across the board, and their arguments to either uphold or reject organizational legitimacy. Firm-stakeholder interactions revolved around assertions of rightful industry membership to either isolate the firm away from the industry or embed the firm within it; rhetorical manipulation of industry boundaries to either constrain or enhance them; and arguments to either increase or decrease the degree of distinctiveness of the firm’s identity.

Our study also notes the role of neutral stakeholders in moving the collective discussion forward and making aspects of what happened and why, who owns the failure, and its implications for organizational and industry legitimacy more or less salient over time. Neutral stakeholders have the ability to bring clarity to the situation because they produce and have access to unequivocal information (Lee et al. 2017). This information may, over time, prove key in discrediting some interpretations while granting credence to others. In our case, the NTSB was instrumental in debunking the interpretation that VG’s catastrophic innovation failure had occurred because of faulty technology and practices. By producing indisputable proof that an explosion had not occurred, the NTSB weakened detracting stakeholders’ arguments to cast VG out of the industry and contributed to strengthening the

arguments of the firm and supporting stakeholders to consider VG a rightful and knowledgeable member of the industry.

Last, yet perhaps most fundamentally, our study illuminates higher-order dynamics that speak to the evolution of nascent industries. On the one hand, our study highlights the intimate relationship that exists between organizational and industry legitimacy in nascent sectors. Prior research has established that firms in nascent sectors tend to build both types of legitimacy simultaneously, so that the construction of one strengthens the other (Santos and Eisenhardt 2009, Navis and Glynn 2010, Wry et al. 2011). Our findings show that a jolt to one effectively threatens the other. Questions regarding the ability of the firm to deliver on its goal to produce a radical innovation cast a shadow of doubt on the social value, desirability, and appropriateness of the entire sector's endeavor. The firm-stakeholder dynamics that ensue redefine expectations regarding what constitutes rightful membership in the industry, how sound practices are defined and deployed, and what makes a socially valuable product. Our study complements recent research that explores how the success or failure of individual firms impacts the legitimacy of their product category as a whole (Hsu and Grodal 2020, Soublière and Gehman 2020), as well as work that examines how firms interact with vocal stakeholders as they construct and reconstruct their legitimacy over time (Gegenhuber and Naderer 2019).

On the other hand, our study illuminates dynamics vital to managing the degree of distinctiveness between organizational and industry legitimacy. Navis and Glynn (2010) demonstrate that, when an industry first arises, participants cooperate in order to establish the industry's legitimacy and narrate their own organizational identities in ways that suggest strong adherence to the industry's core attributes. However, as the industry begins to evolve, firms differentiate from one another by establishing optimally distinctive organizational identities (Navis and Glynn 2011, Wry et al. 2011, Zhao et al. 2017), that is, identities that highlight unique firm attributes while still identifying the firm as a rightful industry member. Although some firms in nascent industries may be reticent to change their identities even in the face of adversity (Zuzul and Tripsas 2020), we observe an interesting dynamic in which the firm and supporting stakeholders seek to reduce the degree of distinctiveness of the firm's identity, appealing to organizational attributes that align with industry attributes (Ravasi et al. 2020), while detracting stakeholders push to increase distinctiveness, separating the firm, and possibly its segment, from the rest of the industry. In the end, the firm redefines its organizational identity by finding a postfailure equilibrium that reimagines the balance between

identification with, and distinctiveness from, its industry. In our case, VG changed its organizational identity from a clearly differentiated stance (enabling clients to join "the coolest club on Earth") to a less differentiated one (presenting a narrative centered on the personal and social benefits of space exploration). Ultimately, VG's move suggests that the process of establishing optimal distinctiveness is not unidirectional, and that what may seem as an optimally distinctive identity at one point in time (prefailure) may no longer be so at another (postfailure) and require readjustment. In effect, our study implies that catastrophic innovation failure leads the firm to adjust its degree of distinctiveness to find a new equilibrium from which to reassert its legitimacy as a rightful industry member.

In this way, our study hints at considering the extent and timing of firms' differentiation efforts. For instance, firms pursuing radical innovations may wish to exercise caution and not rush to differentiate their organizational identities too early in the evolution of the industry, especially when the occurrence of catastrophic innovation failure is a real possibility. The firm's efforts to re-narrate its organizational identity in the aftermath of such failure must prove credible in the eyes of stakeholders whose support is essential to the firm's success. If the distance between the firm's pre- and postfailure identities is considerable, stakeholders may find it difficult to buy into the underlying narrative change (Garud et al. 2014). Still, further research is required to explore how organizational identity is affected by legitimacy jolts that stem from catastrophic innovation failure. Aside from shedding more light on the identity processes we touch upon here (i.e., increasing the firm's emphasis on certain identity attributes while deemphasizing others and adjusting the identity's overall degree of distinctiveness), future work can determine the conditions under which catastrophic innovation failure requires shifts in the firm's identity to begin with.

In-depth inductive qualitative case studies enable richness of data and description, but they reduce the degree to which findings generalize to other settings. For instance, detractors might not always isolate the firm or isolate the firm and its segment; rather, these represent two possible approaches. Similarly, the responses that the firm can use to counter detractors may not be limited to the ones we identified. Our model, however, should prove useful to forecast firm-stakeholder interactions following catastrophic innovation failure in other settings. A case in point could be the fairly recent event in which an Uber autonomous vehicle killed a pedestrian during a test drive, which raised questions about the social value of this emergent product category. Our results suggest that, regardless of context, firms pursuing radical innovations would benefit from cultivating relationships with supporting stakeholders who, in the event of

catastrophic failure, are prepared to engage publicly in support of the firm. The interpretations these actors generate may effectively act as a buffer that protects the firm from detracting stakeholders' negative interpretations of the failure event.

Finally, we must also consider for a moment the nature of our data, both in terms of the event we studied and the supporting evidence we were able to gather. The focal event in our study is a catastrophic innovation failure that was significant yet discrete. Future research may explore the interrelationship between organizational and industry legitimacy and identity in the presence of multiple, sequential catastrophic innovation failures. How might the firm and its stakeholders respond to a string of failures, and how resilient would adjustments to the degree of distinctiveness of the firm's identity prove over time? Alternatively, how might smaller or ongoing shifts in organizational actions (such as a change in leadership, or success or failure in obtaining financing, or a watershed customer) lead stakeholders to shape and reshape their interpretations of failure events?

Although our coverage of stakeholders is extensive and includes a wide array and high number of them, we found a paucity of comments from regulators such as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and from VG's competitors. We found no statements from the FAA and only came across three messages from competitors (none at the time were in VG's space tourism segment). Furthermore, our data set is also limited to publicly facing pronouncements. Critical to our analysis is the idea that most (if not all) relevant arguments in support or against VG in the aftermath of the crash were, at one time or another during our period of analysis, made public. In other words, we worked under the assumption that private conversations between VG and its stakeholders resembled publicly facing interactions. In numerous instances across our data, stakeholders such as reporters, space analysts, and clients acknowledged having spoken to VG employees and executives and gave accounts of what transpired in those conversations. In no instance did we see evidence of different arguments being used by the firm privately that were not used by VG and its management in the public arena as well. However, given the proper access, future research could examine inward- and outward-facing firm and stakeholder interactions simultaneously and ascertain whether and how private discussions influence the reassessment of organizational and industry legitimacy following a catastrophic innovation failure event.

Conclusion

Firms that experience catastrophic failure while pursuing radical innovations must navigate the experience concurrently with stakeholders. In the wake of the event,

stakeholders seek their bearings and interpret the event in ways that either push the firm away from the industry or pull it toward the broader industry and community. By embedding the firm and its failure within the larger community, firms and supportive stakeholders can symbolically transfer ownership of the failure to the industry and sustain the legitimacy of both the firm and the industry. In such circumstances, how the failure is ultimately perceived is nondeterministic and requires active management by the firm and its proxies.

Acknowledgments

The authors thank the editor, Mary Tripsas, for valuable guidance during the review process and the three anonymous reviewers for insightful comments and suggestions; and Anca Metiu, Martin Kilduff, Davide Ravasi, Laura Claus, Elizabeth Hansen, attendees of the UCL School of Management seminar, and the Paris Management Research Workshop, the SKEMA Knowledge, Technology and Organization seminar, the ESSEC YesWeQual seminars series, and conference participants at Strategic Management Society and Academy of Management for feedback.

Endnotes

¹ Vaughan's (1999) criteria were used to explain what events constituted disasters (these criteria were drawn, in turn, from Turner and Pidgeon 1997). Hence, our definition of catastrophic innovation failure effectively focuses on innovation failures that are disastrous in nature.

² Data collected outside of this month-long window ranged from VG's inception until the NTSB's final report about the crash in July 2015. We used these data for context in understanding both how prior events affected the firm's and stakeholders' dispositions amidst the post-crash legitimacy reassessments and the official findings on the cause of the crash.

³ Immediately following the crash, VG shut down its website and simply displayed press releases on a black background. Website content coincided with press release content for three weeks, at which point a new website was launched. The new website made no mention of the crash (except in archived press releases) but presented content that served to support the firm's arguments regarding organizational and industry legitimacy.

⁴ Full reference information can be found in the online supplement.

⁵ VG's November 21, 2014 homepage can be accessed here: <https://web.archive.org/web/20141121224807/http://virgingalactic.com/>.

⁶ VG's pre-crash homepage from October 28, 2014 can be accessed here: <https://web.archive.org/web/20141028201401/http://www.virgingalactic.com/>.

References

- Aldrich HE, Fiol CM (1994) Fools rush in? The institutional context of industry creation. *Acad. Management Rev.* 19(4):645–670.
- Anderson P, Tushman ML (1990) Technological discontinuities and dominant designs: A cyclical model of technological change. *Admin. Sci. Quart.* 35(4):604–633.
- Anheier HK, ed. (1999) *When things go wrong: Organizational failures and breakdowns* (Sage Publications Ltd., Thousand Oaks, CA).
- Anthony C, Nelson AJ, Tripsas M (2016) "Who are you? ... I really wanna know": Product meaning and competitive positioning in the nascent synthesizer industry. *Strategy Sci.* 1(3):163–183.

- Ashforth BE, Gibbs BW (1990) The double-edge of organizational legitimation. *Organ. Sci.* 1(2):177–194.
- Bartel CA, Garud R (2009) The role of narratives in sustaining organizational innovation. *Organ. Sci.* 20(1):107–117.
- Baum JA, Dahlin KB (2007) Aspiration performance and railroads' patterns of learning from train wrecks and crashes. *Organ. Sci.* 18(3):368–385.
- Boje DM (2001) *Narrative Methods for Organizational and Communication Research* (Sage Publications Ltd., Thousand Oaks, CA).
- Boje DM (2008) *Storytelling Organizations* (Sage Publications Ltd., Thousand Oaks, CA).
- Borup M, Brown N, Konrad K, Van Lente H (2006) The sociology of expectations in science and technology. *Tech. Anal. Strategic Management* 18(3–4):285–298.
- Brewer MB (1991) The social self: On being the same and different at the same time. *Personality Soc. Psych. Bull.* 17(5):475–482.
- Bundy J, Pfarrer MD (2015) A burden of responsibility: The role of social approval at the onset of a crisis. *Acad. Management Rev.* 40(3):345–369.
- Cannon MD, Edmondson AC (2005) Failing to learn and learning to fail (intelligently): How great organizations put failure to work to innovate and improve. *Long Range Planning* 38(3): 299–319.
- Charmaz K (2006) *Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through Qualitative Research* (Sage Publications Ltd, London).
- Corbin JM, Strauss A (1990) Grounded theory research: Procedures, canons, and evaluative criteria. *Qualitative Sociol.* 13(1):3–21.
- David RJ, Sine WD, Haveman HA (2013) Seizing opportunity in emerging fields: How institutional entrepreneurs legitimated the professional form of management consulting. *Organ. Sci.* 24(2):356–377.
- Dowling J, Pfeffer J (1975) Organizational legitimacy: Social values and organizational behavior. *Pacific Sociol. Rev.* 18(1):122–136.
- Edmondson AC, McManus SE (2007) Methodological fit in management field research. *Acad. Management Rev.* 32(4):1155–1179.
- Eisenhardt KM (1989a) Building theories from case study research. *Acad. Management Rev.* 14(4):532–550.
- Eisenhardt KM (1989b) Making fast strategic decisions in high-velocity environments. *Acad. Management J.* 32(3):543–576.
- Eisenhardt KM, Graebner ME (2007) Theory building from cases: Opportunities and challenges. *Acad. Management J.* 50(1):25–32.
- Elsbach KD (2003) Organizational perception management. *Res. Organ. Behav.* 25:297–332.
- Elsbach KD, Sutton RI, Principe KE (1998) Averting expected challenges through anticipatory impression management: A study of hospital billing. *Organ. Sci.* 9(1):68–86.
- Fiss PC, Zajac EJ (2006) The symbolic management of strategic change: Sensegiving via framing and decoupling. *Acad. Management J.* 49(6):1173–1193.
- Fleming L (2001) Recombinant uncertainty in technological search. *Management Sci.* 47(1):117–132.
- Gartner WB (2007) Entrepreneurial narrative and a science of the imagination. *J. Bus. Venturing* 22(5):613–627.
- Garud R, Schildt HA, Lant TK (2014) Entrepreneurial storytelling, future expectations, and the paradox of legitimacy. *Organ. Sci.* 25(5):1479–1492.
- Gegenhuber T, Naderer S (2019) When the petting zoo spawns into monsters: Open dialogue and a venture's legitimacy quest in crowdfunding. *Innovation* 21(1):151–186.
- Gillespie N, Dietz G (2009) Trust repair after an organization-level failure. *Acad. Management Rev.* 34(1):127–145.
- Hargadon AB, Douglas Y (2001) When innovations meet institutions: Edison and the design of the electric light. *Admin. Sci. Quart.* 46(3):476–501.
- Haunschild PR, Sullivan BN (2002) Learning from complexity: Effects of prior accidents and incidents on airlines' learning. *Admin. Sci. Quart.* 47(4):609–643.
- Hsu G, Grodal S (2020) The double-edged sword of oppositional category positioning: A study of the US E-cigarette category, 2007–2017. *Admin. Sci. Quart.* 66(1):86–132.
- Kaplan S, Tripsas M (2008) Thinking about technology: Applying a cognitive lens to technical change. *Res. Policy* 37(5):790–805.
- Kelley T, Littman J (2001) *The Art of Innovation: Lessons in Creativity from IDEO, America's Leading Design Firm*, vol. 10 (Broadway Business).
- Kennedy MT (2008) Getting counted: Markets, media, and reality. *Amer. Sociol. Rev.* 73(2):270–295.
- Kennedy MT, Fiss PC (2013) An ontological turn in categories research: From standards of legitimacy to evidence of actuality. *J. Management Stud.* 50(6):1138–1154.
- Khaire M, Wadhvani RD (2010) Changing landscapes: The construction of meaning and value in a new market category—Modern Indian art. *Acad. Management J.* 53(6):1281–1304.
- Khanna R, Guler I, Nerkar A (2015) Fail often, fail big, and fail fast? Learning from small failures and R&D performance in the pharmaceutical industry. *Acad. Management J.* 59(2):436–459.
- Lee BH, Hiatt SR, Lounsbury M (2017) Market mediators and the trade-offs of legitimacy-seeking behaviors in a nascent category. *Organ. Sci.* 28(3):447–470.
- Lincoln YS, Guba EG (1985) *Naturalistic Inquiry*, vol. 75 (Sage, London).
- Lounsbury M, Glynn MA (2001) Cultural entrepreneurship: Stories, legitimacy, and the acquisition of resources. *Strategic Management J.* 22(6–7):545–564.
- Lounsbury M, Glynn MA (2019) *Cultural Entrepreneurship: A New Agenda for the Study of Entrepreneurial Processes and Possibilities* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK).
- Madsen PM, Desai V (2010) Failing to learn? The effects of failure and success on organizational learning in the global orbital launch vehicle industry. *Acad. Management J.* 53(3):451–476.
- Mathias BD, Huyghe A, Frid CJ, Galloway TL (2018) An identity perspective on co-competition in the craft beer industry. *Strategic Management J.* 39(12):3086–3115.
- McGrath RG (2011) Failing by design. *Harvard Bus. Rev.* 89(4):76–83.
- Meyer JW, Rowan B (1977) Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony. *Amer. J. Sociol.* 83(2):340–363.
- Navis C, Glynn MA (2010) How new market categories emerge: Temporal dynamics of legitimacy, identity, and entrepreneurship in satellite radio, 1990–2005. *Admin. Sci. Quart.* 55(3):439–471.
- Navis C, Glynn MA (2011) Legitimate distinctiveness and the entrepreneurial identity: Influence on investor judgments of new venture plausibility. *Acad. Management Rev.* 36(3):479–499.
- Nerkar A, Shane S (2007) Determinants of invention commercialization: An empirical examination of academically sourced inventions. *Strategic Management J.* 28(11):1155–1166.
- Petriglieri JL (2015) Co-creating relationship repair: Pathways to re-constructing destabilized organizational identification. *Admin. Sci. Quart.* 60(3):518–557.
- Pettigrew AM (1990) Longitudinal field research on change: Theory and practice. *Organ. Sci.* 1(3):267–292.
- Pratt MG (2009) From the editors: For the lack of a boilerplate: Tips on writing up (and reviewing) qualitative research. *Acad. Management J.* 52(5):856–862.
- Ravasi D, Tripsas M, Langley A (2020) Exploring the strategy-identity nexus. *Strategic Organ.* 18(1):5–19.
- Riessman CK (1993) *Qualitative Research Methods*, vol. 30. Narrative analysis (Sage Publications, Inc, Thousand Oaks, CA).
- Rindova VP, Fombrun CJ (2001) Entrepreneurial action in the creation of the specialty coffee niche. Schoonhoven CB, Romanelli E, eds. *Entrepreneurship Dynamic* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA), 236–261.

- Rosa JA, Porac JF, Runser-Spanjol J, Saxon MS (1999) Sociocognitive dynamics in a product market. *J. Marketing* 63(4, suppl 1):64–77.
- Rousseau DM (1997) Organizational behavior in the new organizational era. *Annu. Rev. Psychol.* 48(1):515–546.
- Santos FM, Eisenhardt KM (2009) Constructing markets and shaping boundaries: Entrepreneurial power in nascent fields. *Acad. Management J.* 52(4):643–671.
- Scherer FM, Harhoff D (2000) Technology policy for a world of skew-distributed outcomes. *Res. Policy* 29(4–5):559–566.
- Scott WR (1977) Effectiveness of organizational effectiveness studies. *New Perspectives Organ. Effectiveness* 63:95.
- Siggelkow N (2007) Persuasion with case studies. *Acad. Management J.* 50(1):20.
- Sitkin SB (1992) Learning through failure: The strategy of small losses. *Res. Organ. Behav.* 14:231–266.
- Sitkin SB, See KE, Miller CC, Lawless MW, Carton AM (2011) The paradox of stretch goals: Organizations in pursuit of the seemingly impossible. *Acad. Management Rev.* 36(3):544–566.
- Sonenshein S (2010) We're changing—Or are we? Untangling the role of progressive, regressive, and stability narratives during strategic change implementation. *Acad. Management J.* 53(3):477–512.
- Soublière J-F, Gehman J (2020) The legitimacy threshold revisited: How prior successes and failures spill over to other endeavors on kickstarter. *Acad. Management J.* 63(2):472–502.
- Suchman MC (1995) Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. *Acad. Management Rev.* 20(3):571–610.
- Thomke SH (2003) *Experimentation Matters: Unlocking the Potential of New Technologies for Innovation* (Harvard Business School Press, Cambridge, MA).
- Tripsas M (2009) Technology, identity, and inertia through the lens of “The Digital Photography Company.” *Organ. Sci.* 20(2):441–460.
- Turner BA (1976) The organizational and interorganizational development of disasters. *Admin. Sci. Quart.* 21(3):378–397.
- Turner BA (1978) *Man-Made Disasters* (Wykeham Publications, London).
- Turner BA, Pidgeon NF (1997) *Man-Made Disasters*, 2nd ed. (Butterworth-Heinemann, Boston).
- Tushman ML, Anderson P (1986) Technological discontinuities and organizational environments. *Admin. Sci. Quart.* 31(3):439–465.
- Vaughan D (1990) Autonomy, interdependence, and social control: NASA and the space shuttle Challenger. *Admin. Sci. Quart.* 35(2):225–257.
- Vaughan D (1999) The dark side of organizations: Mistake, misconduct, and disaster. *Annual. Rev. Sociol.* 25(1):271–305.
- Vergne J-P, Wry T (2014) Categorizing categorization research: Review, integration, and future directions. *J. Management Stud.* 51(1):56–94.
- Warden JA III (2011) Strategy and airpower. *Air University Maxwell AFB Airpower J.* 63–77.
- Weber K, Heinze KL, DeSoucey M (2008) Forage for thought: Mobilizing codes in the movement for grass-fed meat and dairy products. *Admin. Sci. Quart.* 53(3):529–567.
- Wolfe RM, Sharp LK (2002) Anti-vaccinationists past and present. *BMJ* 325(7361):430–432.
- Wry T, Lounsbury M, Glynn MA (2011) Legitimizing nascent collective identities: Coordinating cultural entrepreneurship. *Organ. Sci.* 22(2):449–463.
- Zahra SA, Nielsen AP (2002) Sources of capabilities, integration and technology commercialization. *Strategic Management J.* 23(5):377–398.
- Zhao EY, Ishihara M, Lounsbury M (2013) Overcoming the illegitimacy discount: Cultural entrepreneurship in the US feature film industry. *Organ. Stud.* 34(12):1747–1776.
- Zhao EY, Fisher G, Lounsbury M, Miller D (2017) Optimal distinctiveness: Broadening the interface between institutional theory and strategic management. *Strategic Management J.* 38(1):93–113.
- Zhao EY, Ishihara M, Jennings PD, Lounsbury M (2018) Optimal distinctiveness in the console video game industry: An exemplar-based model of proto-category evolution. *Organ. Sci.* 29(4):588–611.
- Zimmerman MA, Zeitz GJ (2002) Beyond survival: Achieving new venture growth by building legitimacy. *Acad. Management Rev.* 27(3):414–431.
- Zucker LG (1986) Production of trust: Institutional sources of economic structure, 1840–1920. *Res. Organ. Behav.* 8:53–111.
- Zuckerman EW (2016) Optimal distinctiveness revisited: An integrative framework for understanding the balance between differentiation and conformity in individual and organizational identities. Michael GP, Majken S, Blake EA, Davide R, eds. *Handbook of Organizational Identity* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK), 183–199.
- Zuzul T (2019) “Matter battles”: Cognitive representations, boundary objects, and the failure of collaboration in two smart cities. *Acad. Management J.* 62(3):739–764.
- Zuzul T, Tripsas M (2020) Start-up inertia vs. flexibility: The role of founder identity in a nascent industry. *Admin. Sci. Quart.* 65(2):395–433.

Sen Chai is an associate professor of management at ESSEC Business School. She received her doctorate from Harvard Business School. Her research examines the entire developmental course of creative innovations from idea conception to commercialization, with the goal of helping managers and policymakers avoid failures, better support innovation, and increase their organization's chances of creating and financing commercially successful ideas.

Anil R. Doshi is assistant professor of strategy and entrepreneurship at UCL School of Management. He received his doctorate from Harvard Business School. His research interests include platforms, digital strategy, social media, and the relationship between the digital information environment and policy.

Luciana Silvestri is a research associate at Harvard Business School, where she also received her doctorate. Her research explores the relationship between doing and becoming in organizations. She is especially interested in the crafting of novel work, the construction of identity, and the emergence of interdependence among individuals and groups.