A Genealogy of
Reflective Practice

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Abstract

The thesis considers the phenomenon of Reflective Practice as it is deployed in Higher Education in the United Kingdom today. It draws on a Foucauldian notion of governmentality to provide the theoretical basis for understanding the proliferation of Reflective Practice as a discursive practice in Higher Education. It undertakes a genealogy of Reflective Practice with a view to examining a ‘history of the present’ and considers the ways in which the Reflective Practitioner is the touchstone for a policy framework that seeks to acculturate the student into Higher Education. It problematises the Lockean premise that subscribes to the notion that experience is the foundation of knowledge and that through reflection one can change or direct self conduct in ways that can be planned for.

The genealogy explores three distinct historical periods that engage with and reinforce the notion of the self as the site of knowledge construction and meaning making in the form of; the reflective practitioner of the 21st century; the entrepreneur of the self in the late 20th century; and the subject of the Commonwealth of Learning as conceived by John Locke, of the seventeenth century and early enlightenment. It notes the ways in which Reflective Practice recurs as a teleological dynamic that serves to facilitate a transition to a new governmental order, with recourse to the reflexive subject as the touchstone of liberal governance.

The thesis presents a case study of student writing to explore the relationship between discourses of education and actual processes of education that characterise Higher Education today. The concern is, after Fairclough (2006), that if we cannot provide adequate representations for processes of education we risk providing ideological ones.
Overview of the thesis

The thesis aims to undertake a history of the present in Higher Education in the United Kingdom today, through a focus on Reflective Practice as a technology of government that operates in relation to a political rationality of Advanced Liberal Democracy. A Foucauldian notion of Governmentality provides the theoretical basis for understanding the proliferation of Reflective Practice as a discursive practice that is co-constitutive of the new power/knowledge nexus currently shaping Higher Education. The thesis undertakes a genealogy of Reflective Practice with a view to examining a present day network of relations that is elaborate and complex; an ‘apparatus’ that constitutes an historically specific ‘dispositif’ in the form of: a set of strategies of the relation of forces supporting, and supported by certain types of knowledge. (Foucault in Gordon 1980:196). The genealogies of knowledge that support and are supported by this dispositif, revolve around human experience and subscribe to the notion that experience is the foundation of knowledge, wherein reflective practice is a form of personal ‘know-how’, a cognitive tenet through which one can change or direct self conduct in ways that can be planned for. The thesis considers the ways in which human experience genealogies of knowledge constitute a legacy that informs the power/knowledge nexus of our present day dispositif. It explores the dis/continuities of this legacy with recourse to two related but historically specific dispositif, in the form of a twentieth century set of strategies that were emergent in the Post Cold War period of the late 1980s and 1990s, and a seventeenth century set of strategies that were emergent in the 1680s and 1690s. The thesis traces the mutating genealogies of human experience in relation to recurrent hegemonic projects of governance that are characterised by liberalism: in its most mature form of Advanced Liberal Democracy today; in its emergent form during the late twentieth century; in its early form during the early enlightenment period of the seventeenth century. The thesis argues that Reflective Practice serves each historical hegemonic project, and co-constitutes each historically specific dispositif differently, in its deployment as a technology of government. It explores the ways in which Reflective Practice co-produces the ‘subjective conditions under which the contractual notions of mutual relations
between citizen and society’ (Rose and Miller:1992:180) can work. The thesis identifies the ways in which these genealogies of human experience knowledge, that inscribe the self as the site for knowledge construction, knowledge production and meaning making, inscribe historically specific subject effects; in the form of today's ‘reflective practitioner’; the Post Cold War ‘entrepreneur of the self’ and the seventeenth century ‘subject of the Commonwealth of Learning’. It goes onto consider the ways in which the human experience genealogies of knowledge subscribe to a notion of progress through developmental stages towards enlightenment or what we call today personal agency in a narrative of social evolution. It traces the teleological imperative of the ‘freedom of the individual’ to test out ideas not in relation to authoritites but the self and the extent to which this ethic of individual freedom and salvation is harnessed both to Christian eschatology and liberalism. Finally, it considers the problem posed by Foucault in relation to this legacy, which he referred to as the ‘humanist analytic’, and seeks to identify those voices after Foucault, attempting to articulate a new ‘outillage mental’ or conceptual framework, through which to think ourselves in relation to our new contemporary complexity. To this end, the thesis identifies three objects a moral form, of securitisation; an espistemological form, of post empiricism; and a distinctive idiom that makes the practice of Higher Education intelligible and practicable to the student in the form of a policy framework and idiom which I have called the Learning Lexicon. These three object forms characterise the political rationality of liberalism as a project of governmentality according to to Rose and Miller (1992:178-179): the ‘moral form’ in order to ‘consider the ideals or principles to which government should be directed; freedom, justice, equality, citizenship…. growth and the like’; the ‘epistemological’ form in order to give an ‘account of the persons over whom government is exercised’ and a ‘distinctive idiom’ in order to make the operations of the apparatus intelligible and practicable to all those who enrol on to its schema; the reflective practitioners, autonomous learners, and reflexive citizens. In this context, I conduct a history of the present through a genealogy of Reflective Practice.

Context: The proliferation of Reflective Practice as a technology of government in Higher Education.
Reflective Practice is deployed as a technology of government in the University in a multiplicity of ways: in the form of pedagogy, quality assurance and continuing professional development. It is familiar to everyone who works or studies in University in the UK. The Reflective Essay offers an alternative to the conventional essay and the examination for formal assessment purposes. The reflective journal or learning diary, blog and peer review activity are familiar forms of reflective practice that link to key characteristics of academic discourse in relation to experiential learning and evidence-based learning. Reflective Practice is associated with the work of Schon (1983) and Kolb (1975) whose ideas have provided a basis for the development of a body of theory by academics today. Reflective Practice ‘fleshes out’ University systems and processes such as the Virtual Learning Environment, the Staff Development Programme, The Institutional Review. It serves as an assessment criterion that links itself to a learning outcome in auditable Modular Descriptions and Programme Specifications. It articulates policy ideals, and has become a niche market area of the self help industry as well as a premise for rigorous reflexive research approaches. It is used to acculturate international students into UK Academic Discourse via English for Academic Purposes programmes, and as a basis for making an APEL claim. It provides a vocabulary for organisational learning literature and for the validation events of those in-house programmes that are accredited by the University. It is used to recruit students into the University in the form of the brochure/web page advertisement of the positive ‘Student Experience’ and by prospective students to apply to University in the form of the ‘Personal Statement’ which often acts as the criterion for acceptance and the allocation of funding. It is used as a basis for the student survey and the tutor’s formative feedback.

Its presence in the University has assumed a ‘naturalseemingness’¹ that makes it taken for granted. Like the notion of ‘learner autonomy’ or ‘excellence’ it evokes a vague ideal, that can however be assessed. Like the notion of the pastoral it assumes a soft ‘good in itself’ quality; a feminised, personalised literacy with a ‘common sense’ purpose; it is not contentious, it is common place; we are all reflective practitioners now said Ronald Barnett in 1999.
The ‘reflective practitioner’ is in this sense a familiar technology of self, like the ‘autonomous learner’ and ‘learning-managed learner’ that students in Higher Education engage with, as a subject position in written assignments or as a model for self conduct. It inscribes a reflexive, self motivating, self monitoring ethic; a checking mechanism that serves in the ‘care for the self’ (Foucault 1988) to regulate personal practice; a technology of self that is governable. The thesis considers the way in which reflective practice is deployed as a form of know-how in and by the University. It does this with recourse to a Foucauldian style genealogy of Reflective Practice, that tries to identify the conditions of emergence of Reflective Practice as a form of ‘knowhow’ in relation to the hegemonic projects of the late twentieth century (Chapter 5); and the means that that sustains its existence today as a flexible, transferable and exportable commodity, via a complex, strategic apparatus of international support (Chapter 4). It considers the way in which Reflection is theorised into existence as an epistemological tenet by John Locke via a seventeenth century apparatus or Commonwealth of Learning (Chapter 6) in relation to ‘empiricism’. It considers Reflective Practice as a discursive practice operating within a hegemonic project that linked the epistemic and ontological with the political agendas of the day in an early enlightenment matrix of power/knowledge relations. The thesis explores the dynamics of this (enlightenment) project, that recur through genealogies of knowledge to re inscribe experience as the foundation of knowledge, in ways that are formative and shape current Academic Discourse.

A genealogy has to be wide enough in scope to evaluate the heterogeneity of several domains in order to relate them to the imperatives of governance in any one domain, which in this case is education. It also has to take a broad approach to the ‘history of the present’. This has involved me in a study of texts from a cross-section of domains.

In this sense the thesis considers the discursive practices and orthopraxic processes that inscribe self regulatory ‘subject effects’ in relation to a contemporary hegemonic project of what Foucault calls ‘governmentality’.

Notes

*1. ‘Naturalseemingness’ is a term used by Derrida. See Of Grammatology trans. Spivak; 1997
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to set out the aim, objectives, structure and scope of the thesis. The title of the thesis is *A Genealogy of Reflective Practice*. A genealogy is a Foucauldian approach that focuses on a history of the present. It conceives the present in terms of an ‘apparatus’ which is a set of heterogenous practices and processes that include many kinds of elements; institutions, discourses, technologies, knowledgies, elements that are relational; it is this relationality according to Foucault that constitutes the ‘apparatus’. The apparatus is an articulation of the power relations of an historically contingent knowledge/power nexus. As this concept is both abstract as well as the defining term of reference for the thesis, I quote Foucault’s own attempt to explain ‘apparatus’.

> What I’m trying to single out with this term is, first and foremost, a thoroughly heterogenous set consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the network that can be established between these elements.....

> ...By the term “apparatus” I mean a kind of a formation, so to speak, that at a given historical moment has as its major function the response to an urgency. The apparatus therefore has a dominant strategic function...

> ...I said that the nature of an apparatus is essentially strategic, which means that we are speaking about a certain manipulation of relations of forces, of a rational and concrete intervention in the relation of forces, either so as to develop them in a particular direction, or to boc them so as to stabilize them, and to utilize them. The apparatus is thus always inscribed into a play of power, but it is also always linked into certain limits of knowledge that arise from it and, to an equal degree, condition it. The apparatus is precisely this: a set of strategies of the
relations of forces supporting, and supported by, certain types of knowledge.

(Foucault in Gordon 1980:194)

My objective in relation to the above excerpt is to undertake a ‘history of the present’ (2001-2011) after Foucault, by attempting to articulate a contemporary ‘apparatus’ in Higher Education that ‘supports and is supported by’ a discourse of Reflective Practice as a discursive practice that shapes Academic Discourse in Higher Education. To this end, I identify the discursive character of Reflective Practice in relation to a cross section of its functions in Higher Education: as a pedagogical discourse and set of learning technologies linked to experiential learning such as; the reflective essay, the learning style questionnaire, the learning diary, the learning contract, the on-line peer review; as a professionalizing discourse and set of professionalizing technologies linked to continuing professional development such as; the appraisal, the staff development programme, the social-network profile and blog; as a Quality Assurance discourse and set of regulatory technologies of audit, as in; the Learning Teaching and Assessment Strategy, the programme specification, the student feedback questionnaire and as a technology of government and vehicle for subjectivisation in relation to a project of what Foucault’s calls ‘governmentality’ that is characterised by liberal governance.

The thesis is concerned with a relationship between discourses and processes that implicates Reflective Practice in relation to current trends in Higher Education. This relationship between discourses and processes is necessarily symbiotic, because as discourse analyst Norman Fairclough says, “whatever processes are happening in the world they will be reflected upon, and will therefore need to be represented in discourses. The task then becomes to find representations that are ‘adequate for these processes’” (Fairclough 2006: 5).

My concern, after Fairclough, is that if we cannot provide adequate representations for the processes of education, we risk providing ideological ones that blur understanding and obscure the character of modern forms of political power and its ideological effects.
For example, processes of reflective practice in Higher Education include the academic assignments undertaken by students as part of the compulsory activity for successfully completing a degree programme; such as the reflective essay, the learning diary, the learning contract. These reflective technologies of learning are then assessed and marks are awarded to them. Benchmarks for the standardisation of such assessment practices are identified against criteria that are linked to learning outcomes. These are quality assured through formal validation exercises conducted by senior academics in ways that make the reflective assignment calculable and auditable, and I argue, the writer of the reflective assignment also governable. This notion is at odds with the discourse of reflective practice, in its (ideological) claim that, amongst other things, the subject can through reflection, change or direct self conduct in ways that can be planned for.

The genealogy considers the ‘conditions of emergence’ of Reflective Practice as a discourse in Higher Education with a focus on a particular cluster of knowhow that sees itself as characterised by the post Cold War settlement in the nineteen eighties and early nineties. It also considers the genealogy of Reflective Practice in relation to a seventeenth century paradigm of empiricism that inscribes experience as the foundation of knowledge and Reflection as a cognate cognitive tenet of empiricism, as theorised by John Locke. In this sense, it takes an historical approach to a present discourse which it problematises as an inadequate representation for the processes of education today.

A study of three historical ‘emergent paradigms’ or ‘apparatus’ enables me to historicise the relationality between them: the Commonwealth of Learning of the seventeenth century; the post Cold War knowhow of the late twentieth century; the Learning Lexicon of the twenty-first century. I consider these paradigms in terms of the ways in which genealogies of knowledge mutate, converge and separate over time, and are in effect recalled or rejected by new hegemonic projects at different historical moments as part of a new knowledge/power nexus, or apparatus in turn. In this sense, I consider the role of Reflective Practice in relation to three different historical moments, as a technology of government and vehicle for subjectivisation. The thesis infers a correlation between Reflective Practice as a technology of government and as being ‘operable’ in projects of
governmentality that are characterised by liberal governance after the
governmentality school of thinkers discussed in the thesis (Burchell, Gordon and

In order to achieve this project, I make recourse to an orienting question;
Reflective Practice: why now, why here, and in whose interests?

In the broadest sense, my method is characteristic of a modern social science
approach that prevails, to look to the detail of the everyday and its embedded
assumptions from which to identify patterns, structures and contours of
‘knowledge’. The case study of the thesis is a study of the academic writing of
four Teaching Assistants and the policy literatures informing their writing. The
Teaching Assistants are undertaking a Bachelor Degree in Work Based Learning.
Their writings are (historically specific) inscriptions, representative of a
particular apparatus in place at that time (2001-2011). With recourse to their
writing as inscriptions, I trace ‘as in a microcosm’ the characteristics of this
historically specific apparatus through a genealogy that historicises Reflective
Practice as a discursive practice. The claim, that four bachelor degree thesis
reports can be considered representative, is made in relation to an historical
analytic of governmentality and a linguistic analytic of critical discourse analysis
each concerned with structures that shape subjectivities; it is not made in relation
to a traditional quantitative social science discourse of representation.

In effect, the role of Teaching Assistants was much researched during the period
in question (2001-2011) in relation to a recruitment drive often referred to as
Education Education Education that aimed to introduce para-professionals into
the sphere of education.

Also, Teaching Assistants work in a sector that is statutory and in this context
they are particularly subject to government directives. In this sense, the
inscriptions of Teaching Assistants doing a work based learning degree
programme bear traces of elements of governmentality aimed at a particular
section of the population; mine is not a study of an elitist group of academic
students in a Russell Group University, or of high fee-paying international
students who have English as a second other language, but students recruited
through a ‘widening participation’ scheme designed to recruit class, race and
gender specific adult student *types* who were pre profiled by government policy
design, to fit them for purpose. I argue that the paradigms within which such
students learned, the empiricism paradigm and the security paradigm, were the
only ones made available to them. In this sense, because of the closed conditions
through which Teaching Assistants were enrolled, either as home-students or
overseas students from former colonies during the *Education Education
Education* campaign, the four bachelor degree thesis reports constitute a
representative sample. This does not mean the four narratives are the same, nor
that the individual agency of the writers is precluded from recognition. However,
as the Curriculum Leader for this group (which amounted to several hundred
over the designated period of research), I supervised many theses and took them
through many examination boards while working in a new University, in
partnership with the local borough to conduct a project called *Grow Your Own
Teacher*. It is this combination of contextual factors outlined above, that enables
me to claim that the patterns I identify in the four student narratives are
representative as traces of elements of a contemporary ‘apparatus’.

Methodologically, I draw on Critical Discourse Analysis as a framework of
analysis. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) not as “a holistic theory
methodology or approach to language analysis or data” but as Wodak and
Fairclough propose a ‘school’ or programme with a ‘set of principles’ wherein
Discourse is understood as a form of ‘social practice’ and as such,

> *implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive
event (and) the situation institution and social structures that frame
it: the discursive event is shaped by them but it also shapes them.*

(Wodak 2003:5)

According to this formative interpretation, Discourse is “socially constitutive and
socially conditioned” constituting “situations, objects of knowledge, identities
and relationships between people and groups of people”. “It is constitutive both
in sustaining and reproducing the status quo and transforming it”. (Wodak and
Fairclough 1997:258)

These writers construe discourse as “socially consequential” thus giving rise to
“issues of power” and helping to “produce and reproduce unequal power
relations between groups of people” “through the ways they (the discourses) represent and position people” (Wodak and Fairclough 1997:258).

This defining statement of ‘discourse’ by Fairclough and Wodak serves as a baseline for this thesis. The term ‘discourse’ however is used to signify different things by writers who are not only linguists, but also social theorists, psychologists, anthropologists and economists and although discourse analysis retains a ‘critical’ perspective in these applications, as a problematisation of a text and as a distancing on the part of the writer from the text, it does not necessarily assume the same political positioning as Fairclough and Wodak for all writers. Of relevance to the thesis, is the way it is used by Foucauldian discourse analysts. It is used as a critical lens through which to read policy by those writing in diverse but related fields: of development, Duffield (2001); of post Marxist economic analysis, Harvey (2003, 2005); of the Knowledge Based Economy, Jessop (2002); of education, Ball (2012).

In the work of all these writers above the term or practice of ‘discourse analysis’ relates to the notion of power. In relation Wodak writes;

Critical Discourse Analysis aims to investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, constituted, legitimised etc. by language use or in discourse.’

(Wodak 2003:6)

Here and above (1997) Wodak and Fairclough construe language as ideological; a contested concept, particularly in a Foucauldian style genealogy, it is discussed re currently in the thesis.

As part of this method of analysis, I make recourse to a ‘tool box of techniques’ for Critical Discourse Analayis, that Fairclough (2000: 161-164) defines in terms of: chains of equivalence, collocation, antithesis, lists, metaphor, modality, mood, nominalisation, processes (transitive/intransitive). I use this ‘tool box’ for the deconstruction of discourse in both the student writing texts and policy texts that I review with a view to highlighting the ideological effects of discursive practices.

In addition to this linguistic method, which emerged as part of the ‘linguistic turn’ that begins to characterise structuralist thinking in the mid twentieth
century, I use another form of analysis called the ‘governmentality analytic’ (Rose and Miller 1992). Its conceptual language is similar to another analytic of our time ‘network governance’ analysis (Ball 2012) and the current emergent ‘complexity science’ theories, such as biotechnology or cybernetics as a form of ‘living system’ (Duffield 2001:9) Such analytics acknowledge a perceived ‘neurological turn’ in the search for new conceptualisations of knowledge, that considers the relationship between brain science and culture, and how cultural factors ‘rewire’ the brain so that it changes; less to do with genetic determinism than the notion that knowledge is both a product of its world and an agency within it. These ‘complexity’ analytics resist the vocabulary and modality of the overtly political positioning of CDA as a lexicon of critique which inscribes reflexivity therefore, and adopt a lexicon of ‘diagnosis’ and a metaphor of systems; thus articulating a Foucauldian ethic. Where these analytics, of linguistics governance and complexity science, complement one another, is in relation to a desire to push the conceptual boundaries of knowledge and to bring a focus to bear on knowledge as produced through power (ideologically or discursively), as against that is, emerging organically ‘from experience’ as the foundation of knowledge. As new analytics, they seek to challenge current perceptions of problems or problematics which they feel reinforce the very problem being posed; they seek new representations of contemporary processes by starting with the praxis of everyday life and looking for the traces of theory and governance in relation;

they propose that embedded conceptual schema keep us prisoners of our own ideas; overall perhaps, these analytics are more concerned with contexts than ideas. Each seeks to ‘deconstruct’ the hegemony of conceptual schema in its own terms by questioning the possibility of signification in notions such as sovereign power freedom subjectivity individualization and those liberal juridico institutional structures that have kept such tenacious lineage in the project of modernity. Today’s critical thought is very much concerned with the ‘zones’ (Badiou 2010) and ‘intersections’ (Braidotti 2011) between “juridico institutional and bio political models of power” (Agamben 1998: 6) that produce exclusions. Despite their different approaches being ideologically or discursively led, and involving different subject positions (the ‘critic’ or the ‘diagnostic’) they
seek to ‘expose’ the normative practices of systems - linguistic, apparatuses or nuerological), as complex and cohered.

These analytics and their metaphors influence and delimit my own; I reproduce leitmotifs throughout the thesis, some invented, some borrowed, some hybrids; *outillage mental, genealogies of knowledge, screen memory, reversal, the right kind of, emblem, accumulation by dispossession* which I return to during the course of the chapters, to rework and elaborate, by way of assigning meaning; a discursive practice of course, that “systematically produces the objects of which (it) speak(s)” (Foucault 1972:49).

In many ways, as a writer I sustain a hybrid subject-position and subject-effects throughout the thesis; a symptom perhaps of a 21st century *outillage mental*¹, that somehow necessitates recourse to multiple, simultaneous and conflicting imperatives, in a way that is historically contingent to this moment.
Structure of the thesis

The thesis is structured in seven chapters, and a Conclusion. The Foucauldian notion of a ‘history of the present’ provides me with a rationale for the ordering of the chapters not in relation to a chronological sequence of events but in terms of the present as the point of departure. The objective, is to articulate an ‘apparatus’ of Reflective Practice that has taken hold in Higher Education today presented as a case study through an analysis of four teaching assistant’s narratives written between 2003-2008. The thesis goes on to identify the ‘conditions of emergence’ of this apparatus in relation to a post Cold War ‘apparatus’ in the late twentieth century. It goes on to present a third historical ‘apparatus ‘in the form of a seventeenth century Commonwealth of Learning, with a view to tracing the dis/continuities of this enlightenment legacy in relation to the subject effects and power effects that characterise academic discourse in Higher Education today. In this sense, by starting with the present, the chapters are ordered in reverse chronological sequence.

The aim of the thesis is to attempt to diagnose the history of the present in relation to these three historical moments. The case study is situated in the present day where data is more accessible and reliable to the researcher. The ‘working backwards’ from where I am as a researcher to where I am unable to go, is an approach to research much discussed by the historians of the Annales school (1929-1980)\(^1\) of which Foucault was briefly on the fringe. It was adopted by the English historian Henry Maitland who talked about ‘reading history backwards’; he entitled one of his books Beyond the Domesday Book wherein ‘beyond’ served to signify ‘before’. This ‘reading history backwards’ from the present, enables me to better resist a tendancy towards the much problematised linear account of the past that inscribe ethics of progression, or a genesis or filial reading of Reflective Practice in relation to origins, or a retroactive construction of the past as history.
Chapter 1 addresses the aim and objectives of the thesis and outlines the methodologies deployed. It presents a brief account of their techniques of analysis. It identifies ethical concerns and a rationale for choices made. It identifies a researcher positionality and a structure.

Chapter 2 provides the background to the historical context that informs the thesis. It illustrates some of the key thesis’ concepts. It identifies the key concerns of the thesis in terms of what is being problematised and discusses the main terms of reference in relation to the organising question of the thesis: *Reflective Practice why here, why now and in whose interest?*

Chapter 3 presents the genealogy as a research approach as it underpins this thesis as a deconstructional tool to analyse a ‘history of the present’, after Foucault. The genealogical analysis is structured through a set of five linked pathways, after Rose (1999): *problematisations, strategies, authorities, teleologies, techniques of the self* that map out the ways in which Reflective Practice operates as a discursive practice in Higher Education. This five-pathways template serves as an orienting mechanism with which to analyse the thesis reports of the four Teaching Assistants.

These first three chapters address the methodological aspects of the thesis, in terms of research approach, techniques for analysis, the researcher’s positionality and a substantial literature review which however is extended throughout thesis.

Chapter 4 is in three parts: Part 1 presents the ‘apparatus’ that supports and is supported by Reflective Practice as a technology of government.

Part 2 presents the case study *Grow Your Own Teacher* which consists in a detailed analysis of four narratives written by four Teaching Assistants and seeks to substantiate the claims made by the thesis.

Part 3 is a discussion of the themes that emerge from the close reading of the four narratives of the previous section. It identifies three emergent objects of the genealogy in the form of a post empiricism paradigm, a security paradigm and a Learning Lexicon.

Chapter 5 identifies the historical ‘conditions of emergence’ of Reflective Practice in relation to the *Thatcher effect* and the emergence of a whole cluster
of new ‘knowhow’ as part of a discrete post Cold War dispositif in the late twentieth century.

Chapter 6 identifies a seventeenth century apparatus in the form of the Commonwealth of Learning. The chapter serves to contextualise the legacy of the knowhow paradigms discussed in chapters 4 and 5 and especially the ‘legacy’ of Reflective Practice. It discusses many parallels between the three historical apparatus; the Commonwealth of Learning in the seventeenth century, the Post Cold War apparatus in the late twentieth century and the present day Advanced Liberal Democracy apparatus, in which the four narratives are situated. It argues that these three historically specific polities are characterised by a changing political rationality of liberalism, for which Reflective Practice serves as a the genealogy of knowledge which recurs across the three apparatus, albeit differently, to re-inscribe a reflexive technology of self in relation to a liberal “juridico institutional and bio political model of power” (Agamben, 1998: 6).

These three chapters, 4, 5 and 6 present a ‘history of the present’ through the discussion of three historically specific and linked ‘dispositifs’.

Chapter 7 discusses ‘three objects’ which emerge from the genealogy; as the post empiricism paradigm; an innovation on an enlightenment legacy that fits it for present day purpose; the security paradigm in education; a continuum of conflict that has shaped the 1689 Glorious Revolution 1989 Velvet Revolution and 2001 9/11; and the learning lexicon; a framework that inscribes an idiom of reflective practice as part of a code of conduct that serves to make the contemporary project of Higher Education practicable and amenable to its students. The chapter discusses the relationality of these three objects, which support the present day ‘apparatus’ of Reflective Practice as a technology of government. Specifically, it considers Reflective Practice in relation to the power effects and subject effects that subjectivise subjects into the schema of the powerful.

The conclusion claims to have undertaken a Genealogy of Reflective Practice as a distinct contribution to the field of knowledge.
Term of reference: The Foucauldian term ‘dispositif’ is a concept that is defined in the text, however I have used it sometimes interchangeably with ‘apparatus’ as the English translation of ‘dispositif’.

Ethics:

I have adopted a policy of informed consent as a rationale for ethical practice: Students consented to exit interviews and or my use of their written work for research purposes, verbally, on the proviso that they the student would not be traceable. I have also used an ethics release form that is standard University practice issued when students begin their research. For the writing up of the case studies, I have therefore invented names for the students’ narratives, and not named the schools or boroughs they worked in. I have not changed the gender or race of those students who have participated. Where I have filmed interviews I use only the transcripts of them in the research.

In this sense, the principal rationale for ethical consideration is the non traceability of the student. This seems appropriate to my sector and purpose. In comparison, the legal sector necessarily names its case study individuals, who cannot remain anonymous as the cases may be heard in a public court of law or may become the basis for new case law. The Psychotherapy sector practice changes the name and gender of the individuals in its case studies, with a view to ‘patients’ or ‘analysands’ not being recognisable in any publications on practice; it is in relation to these two practices from other sectors as points of reference, that I have situated my own rationale.

Where there are group interviews of students, the participants watched the filmed interview afterwards together, and informed me of any part of it that they did not wish to be represented in the transcript. This was a conscious decision taken on my part, in order to resist over-formalising a process wherein I was an adviser to the students, and wherein a level of trust was deemed important to the relationship. It is possible however that students whose work I have discussed, may recognise their own work when I publish it. It is also possible that they may object to or not agree with my interpretation of their writing. I am mindful of this
possibility and have proceeded in the discussion of the work as sensitively as possible.

The scope of the thesis is necessarily wide in order to meet the criteria of a genealogy which considers the heterogeneity of discursive practices across domains and necessitates historical research. The three domains I have addressed are education as a discipline in Higher Education, Development also a discipline in Higher Education and History. I have undertaken a wide literature review of these disciplines and a review of the policy literatures informing these domains. I have engaged with primary-source texts from the early modern period. The scale of material addressed in the thesis therefore is significant, and so I have attempted to signpost the points being made with summaries and other discourse markers, as well as the transitions being made between one domain and another or one chapter and another in a way intended to help the reader navigate their way through a complex and often abstract set of terms of reference, method and object. The ‘apparatus’ is the throughline object of the thesis, to which every chapter and section of chapters addresses itself, whether it be the specific apparatus of the seventeenth, twentieth, or twentyfirst century or the relationality of these three.

I turn now to Chapter 2 which provides the background to the historical context that informs the thesis.
Notes to Chapter 1

*1. ‘outillage mental’ is a term used by historian Lucien Febvre of the *Annales* school of historians in his book *The Problem of Unbelief in the sixteenth century; The Religion of Rabelais* (1988) trans. Beatrice Gottlieb. Harvard University Press. The term denotes the idea that in the sixteenth century there was no conceptual apparatus to allow for ‘unbelief’ in a Christian world view. Febvre argues that the term ‘atheist’ for example, although used, did not carry a modern meaning, and was a smear word. He makes an etymological study also of ‘missing words’ to argue that notions of impossibility or risk or speculation as we understand these phenomena, were not available to people at the time living within the conceptual apparatus of the sixteenth century. He discusses how conceptions of time and space and experience are different to the ones we know. Although his work has been challenged since by historians who have found evidence of unbelief in more recent data collections, the concept of a conceptual apparatus restricting or directing thinking and conduct enabling or inscribing subjectivities, has continued to hold currency amongst historians. As a concept it has value for the thesis in relation to the concept of ‘relationality’ as a kind outillage mental of our times.
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

This chapter provides background and context for the main case study in chapter 4 and the historical perspectives that support the case study discussed in chapters 5 and 6 that together make up the genealogy. It discusses key abstract terms of reference, such as the relationship between processes and discourses in education, in relation to the task as Fairclough (2006: 5) states, of finding representations that are ‘adequate for these processes’.

It makes recourse to cameo examples to illustrate some key concepts. For example, the way in which the reproduction of certain historical figurations can and do inscribe particular ‘subject effects’ (Butler, 1999) in student work and conduct; at an epistemological and ontological level. It qualifies certain positions in relation to theoretical assumptions regarding the circulation of knowledge, and disclaims the idea of individuals as genius. It presents an account of the formal and informal genealogies of knowledge that were in circulation in the early enlightenment period in order to contextualise the historical dimension of the thesis.

It discusses three perspectives that inform the genealogy of the thesis; historical, linguistic and political economic. It tells the story of the thesis, in the form of an overture, identifying the key motifs from the work to follow.

By addressing these background aspects the chapter serves to disencumber the rest of the thesis, and contextualise the three case studies.

The task, of seeking adequate representations for the processes of education is not only linguistic but historical. The discourses and processes of education that we work with today have genealogies. They derive from complex historical figurations that emerge as conceptual structures or moulds in particular historical moments, and then reform or reproduce to serve different interests in other historical moments. One example of a historical figuration is given by Foucault in the first chapter of Madness and Civilisation, which opens: “At the end of the middles ages, leprosy disappeared from the western world” (Foucault, 1983:3).
He defines the leper as a kind of religious signifier for the medieval era which imbues the leper with ‘divine meaning’. With the disappearance of the leper, in the Classical age, according to Foucault, the ‘slot’ left by his trace is filled by the ‘fool’ – who now becomes a new cultural signifier for an age obsessed by reason. The trace in this instance is not a word or an idea so much as an historical figuration or dynamic of exclusionary/inclusionary. It is a binary form of a particular stamp, which leaves a cultural impression, or ‘slot’ that can be refilled by a different signifier in another historical moment. Such historical figurations that form and reform across time and across domains, serving different purposes, are formative and dynamic, enduring and changing, and dis/continuous at the same time.

The thesis considers the conditions for the re-emergence of such historical figurations, which I argue, often happen in moments of crisis or tension, whether real or invented, when the need for stable structures to be recalled is declared by those in authority; in revolutions such as; the 1688-9 Glorious Revolution, or the 1989 velvet revolution, or the 2001 ‘war on terror’.

In this sense, this enlightenment figuration has formed and reformed to serve different interests at different historical moments and across different domains, to reinforce and reproduce a stable cultural ideal. It is a shell or mould, a ‘slot’ or conceptual frame which may be used to represent conflicting discourses. It is an ideological tenet.

The historical figuration as a phenomenon, is not therefore a fossil from a bygone era that lies dormant it is a ‘living thing’ that sheds its skin but not its nature, that metamorphoses like an Escher woodcut, retaining the original impression or trace through a series of intersections or mutations, in a way that, to use Wittgenstein’s lovely analogy, one sees ‘a family resemblance’ to the original. What remains in the trace is an imperative for conduct.

A comparison may be drawn in relation to the principle of American ‘frontier mentality’ (Turner 1893), a culturally embedded ethic and effect of a particular historical experience that deeply affects the American psyche, in terms of identity. ‘Frontier’ in this sense is an historical figuration.
It is perhaps the very tried and testedness of such historical figurations that single them out for new application in emerging fields, or for resisting change, or for reform at moments of ‘crisis’. They are arbitrary and formative at the same time and therefore make good rhetorical devices. They are embedded, socio-cultural, historical, linguistic formations that inscribe a ‘taken for granted’ appeal and lend a ‘common sense’ quality to their usage. They are ideological constructs and ideology carriers, whose effects often bridge a gap between actual processes and discourse about those processes.

One of the ways in which historical figurations become embedded concepts is through their reproduction or mutation across domains. Mythical, literary, iconographical ‘genealogies of knowledge’ all can and do reinforce an episteme-like figuration. Milton’s *Paradise Lost*, for example reinforces the reason/unreason binary identified by Foucault’s episteme – like dualism of reason/fool, in relation to the ‘fallen angels’ whose ‘falling away’ from the original Truth was considered ‘heresy’ that is a misreading of the Scriptures; and thus unreason. Milton’s epic is about the exercise of reason, the imperative of free will, and Truth. The exclusivity/inclusivity dynamic is projected here into the charismatic madness of the building of Pandemonium; as a trace of the original, the ‘slot’ left by Heaven, filled with Hell.

In this context the thesis identifies significant enlightenment, historical figurations which, it argues, recur and re-form over time and across domains to reinforce formative cultural ideals that continue to inform academic discourse today.

I turn now to a discussion of the three main perspectives informing the genealogy.

**Historical: the times the means and the man**

Historian E.E. Reynolds (1965) describes Luther’s role in the Reformation as part of an intersection whereby ‘the times the means and the man coincided’ to carry the message far beyond the place, time and plan of origin. Reynolds proposes that these three elements combined in a particular moment of history to make up the ‘dry tinder’ and ‘the spark’ which set the reformation movement
ablaze. (ibid:159) The times that concerns the thesis, is that of the seventeenth century, a time of intellectual crisis and innovation brought about by the ‘encounter with the new world’ (Wandel 2011:39).

If it were possible to have an aerial view of the myriad of formal and informal genealogies of knowledge that were travelling across the European continent in this ‘early modern period’, it would be as diversified as the canopy of trees of a tropical rainforest seen from above, that cover an under story of localised species, birds which never fly out into the open but stay close to the forest floor, a thick mat of fine roots layered over an ancient bedrock; a whole eco system of growth and movement and expanse impossible to see with the naked eye, let alone enumerate. Such was the dynamism of ideas that characterises the times of the early modern period.

This must be compared to the times up until circa 1500, where historian Wandel (2011:8) depicts a particular spatial organisation that defined European Christianity in terms of parishes and dioceses, and where knowledge of the Church was experienced through the local priest. Dangers beyond the parish and lack of infrastructure precluded much travel; people were generally born, married, and buried in the same parish. (ibid:18). Time itself was marked by the hora canonica of Church ritual, the parish church bells sounding the Angelus of Latin prayers at dawn and dusk and Vesperi on festival days. Food was local and seasonal. This temporal, spatial quotidian organisation of circa 1500, that characterised Christendom in Europe, changed with the advent of ‘the new world’ – a term coined by cartographer Sebastian Munster, to describe the southern land mass between Europe and Asia in 1540. (ibid:42).

Explorers, such as Christopher Columbus and Amerigo Vespucci, and missionaries such as the Jesuit priests travelling from the Vatican in Rome to China, puritans of the Reformation sailing for America in the early 1620s, and peripatetic webs of humanist confraternities and sodalities were generating multiple genealogies of new world knowledge in ways that came to challenge the assumptions of European Christianity. The map of Christendom changed accordingly, depicted in Wandel (ibid) as dotted by settlements of religious minorities by the end of the sixteenth century. The enlightenment ‘forest of knowledge’ was on the move, like Burnham Woods, as the word of God
travelled eastwards, and the ecology of the new world travelled westwards, changing the spatial and temporal organisation and ecological landscape of Europe in the early modern period.

Many of the new genealogies of knowledge to emerge from the ‘encounter with the new world’ were marked by an empirical character: the protestant project had ushered in a particular discourse of personhood in relation to a direct relationship with God, that needed not to be mediated by the hierarchy of the Church, but conducted by the individual self. The Orthodox Church was increasingly regarded with suspicion by protestants, as numinous and mystical, and practices such as transubstantiation were rejected. The humanist challenge to norms, and its philological engagement with text, established by its culture of correction in renaissance Europe (Grafton 2011), prepared leading protestants to focus on the ‘word’ and the ‘fact’ of the language of the bible in their challenge to the authorities and bid for a personalised form of religious practice.

In the sphere of natural philosophy, the ‘encounter’ triggered dissatisfaction with methods of research. Bacon challenged the Aristotelian method that was being taught in the universities, accusing it of creating obstacles to the generation of learning about the natural world. Bacon’s ‘scientific method’ appealed to empirical principles for those sciences dealing with the natural world, and required demonstration and the testing of conclusions against experience, in ways that profoundly challenged the intuitive model of Euclidean-based Scholasticism and Aristotelian syllogism (Dear 1991). Baconian ideology conflated experiment, personal observation, investment in a dynamic, mercantile and imperialising London, with self interest, and morality, in a Millennium view of the world that was concerned with both earthly and heavenly personal salvation.

In the sphere of the judiciary, Bacon the Lawyer and formerly Lord Chancellor, was also in part responsible for the extent to which ‘eye-witness testimony’ became central to the early modern trial. Even though law is typically characterised by a body of knowledge that is normative rather than empirical, ‘matters of fact’ and ‘matters of law’ became increasingly aligned in the early modern period, and second hand testimony (hearsay) was considered less
valuable than that received ‘from those that report of their own view’. (Shapiro 2000:15)

In the sphere of constitution, parliamentary representation, male suffrage, sovereignty of the people, freedom of conscience, and equality for all before the law - were enlightenment ideals petitioned for by the Levellers, presented to Cromwell’s court, and discussed and recorded during the Putney Debates of the Civil War. The seeds of early liberal democracy championing the rights of the ‘poorest he that is in England*2, had been enshrined by the Army Debates of 1647 just as encounters with the New World raised questions about the rights, personhoods and freedom of the ‘other’ begging questions about human nature, slavery and civilisation.

In philosophical circles, Descartes’s notion of cogito ergo sum represented another dimension of empiricist thinking that challenged the ‘old knowledgies’ of scholasticism, as part of a developing intellectual trend throughout Europe.

And linguistically, the need for new lexicons to meet the experimental, observational and theoretical ideas of scientists and practitioners of the early enlightenment period, was addressed by a new ‘linguistic technology’ (Browne 1658) developed across domains to produce nomenclature and lexical origination in physics, chemistry, embryology as well as in the rhetorical, philosophical and literary fields which coincided with them (Preston 2013). Classification and definition was a preoccupation of an era enthralled with the ‘new world’; the naming of flora and fauna from field trips and voyages sponsored by the Royal Society, the writing of encyclopaedias and dictionaries by men of letters such as Bayle, and the satires based on the ‘men of letters’ who inhabited these centres for excellence, produced rich neologisms from many sources; Latin, folkloric and constructed. Savants, who had been trained in the humanist tradition of classical philology, used their skills for lexical innovation even addressing the philosophical and philological issues this ‘linguistic technology’ raised, where, in the words of one linguistic historian, an etymological shift took place, a “shift from the immanence of the occult to the immanence of existing phenomena… (that) might stand for the entire programme of scientific revolution”. (Preston 2013).
Linguistic technology was one of many empirical genealogies of knowledge responding to the encounter with the new world, that interacted with and reinforced one another in an emerging culture and ideal of ‘human experience’.

What gave these ‘human experience’ genealogies of knowledge a particular edge, was the underlying sense in which they represented progress, progress as development through stages, towards enlightenment, a sense in which society was evolving along with scientific experiment, a society which did not yet differentiate between the words ‘experiment’ and ‘experience’ where in ordinary individuals and ‘scientists’ could test out their ideas not in relation to the authorities, but in relation to their self. Here the protestant notion of progress became harnessed to an eschatological, Christian teleology.

The means through which these ‘human experience’ genealogies of knowledge were transmitted, are technological, infrastructural, institutional and human: Printing matter was initially produced in Latin in the late fifteenth century, the language of the republic of letters, the clerics, the lawyers, doctors and scholars. It came to produce texts in the vernacular languages used by the mercantile world and common people in the early sixteenth century. Many of these texts were read aloud in groups and company in a society that was three quarters illiterate. But the impetus to read came with the Reformation, from Luther, who made personal devotional reading in the vernacular an imperative, whereby he said, each person male and female possessed the ‘divine right’ to read God’s Word for themselves. Luther advocated that every child be introduced to the Gospels before the age of nine or ten and that all secondary study should focus on reading Scripture for oneself. The pre Reformation book trade was provincial but expanded in relation to the expanding Reformation, and the Civil War decade when cheap print became available (Peacey 2013); school books, scholarly books, chapbooks, ballads and almanacs began to circulate as did maps and pictures as part of the printing and book-trade fare, quite apart from bibles and religious texts. One effect of the combined rise of the technology of print and the religious emphasis on reading was a gradual transition from a world of orality to a society of writing, which took place unevenly over the decades of the early modern period, until the availability of newsbooks, broadsheets and pamphlets to those beyond a narrow elite, was evident by the 1650s.
Different versions of events were reported in different rival pamphlets or newsletters, whereby the reliability of reports about the ‘facts’ became more obvious to those who read, inscribing a more sceptical approach on the part of the reader to the reporting of fact. As one Englishman commented in 1569: “We have every day several news, and sometimes contraries, and yet all put out as true”. (Shaber 1929:241 in Burke 2000:204).

Jurisprudence gave particular value to the eye witness statement as ‘matters of fact’, (Shapiro 2000) and became increasingly sceptical of the oral tradition’s engagement with demonology and witchcraft. Traces of the discrepancies between the questions of the judges and the replies of the accused – predominantly from the peasant class are evident in the transcripts of witches trials (Ginzburg, 1980). The decline of the oral tradition went hand in hand with a decline in popular beliefs in witchcraft, or the Royal Touch (Bloch 1961). It has been recurrently linked to the rise of printed matter which came ‘into fashion’ particularly ‘a little before the civil wars’ (Shaber 1929) but Ginzburg (1980) interprets the decline in terms of signalling a rift between high culture and popular culture that has hegemonic implications. The exclusions, prohibitions and limits through which the demise of the oral tradition comes into effect, surely includes a cultural memory of the Peasants’ War of 1524, and the reign of the Anabaptists in Munster, and a corresponding need on the part of the establishment to contain the masses and their peasant/oral tradition. For learned society, it was thought that the printed word “prompted a new view of the self and a spirit of abstraction. But here too, the self control that the new technology afforded to the middle classes gives rise to a level of bureaucratic centralisation, in the Weberian sense, that is unprecedented in history, in terms of an increase in the accumulation of information about individuals and the desire of rulers to control their populations; after the Council of Trent in 1563, parish priests of the Catholic Church were required to keep registers of births, marriages and deaths, and episcopal visits to parish churches thereafter, generated a lot of records concerning the physical state of the church, the level of education of parish priests, the number of confraternities and the morality of the laity. (Burke 1979:121). The printed word was transmitted through an infrastructure of book
sellers and news sellers, news about wars, religion, politics, propaganda, gossip, trade and justice, across the continent.

This cross fertilisation of genealogies of ‘know how’ identified London as a centre of new learning, information and a ‘commercial entrepot’. Historian Wrightson (2002:253) depicts how commerce drove Town and Country. Towns and industrial districts provided markets for agricultural produce and urbanisation. Markets and ports became centres for the exchange of commerce and news. An ethic of commercial entrepreneurship grew in relation to urban expansion and international trade. The urban population continued to grow during the seventeenth century and reached some 575,000 people by 1700. “Industrious and innovative yeomen and farmers diversified in order to serve the urban centres producing fruit, vegetables, industrial crops and hops, wherein the price of hops rose by almost a third between 1640 –79” (Wrightson 2002:253). Coffee Houses served coffee, newspapers, notice boards, lectures, information about shipping, and acted as an exchange for ideas people and news. The city of London hosted an infrastructure of commerce including a port, the East India Company, The Royal Society, The Royal Exchange, The Bank of England.

These ‘Town and Country’ relations for the transmission of enlightenment ideas and power dynamics, are probably most astutely represented in the satires of Restoration Comedy (1660-1710) : The Country Wife by William Wycherly or the darker play The Recruiting Officer by George Farquhar - chart a changing class system. As primary source texts, these plays are of value, given that, as Ginzburg notes, the peasant traditions of the subordinate classes of pre industrial Europe tends not to leave traces or at best distorted traces for the historian to analyse. However if we take ‘text’ to include the informal as well as the formal representations of genealogies of knowledge circulating in any period; literary, archaeological, iconographic, carnavalesque - they can provide traces. The juxtapositioning of the formal and informal texts indicate here, not only a demise of the oral tradition with the rise of the printed word, but also a rise in new forms of governmentality such as bureaucratic control as part of an effort by rulers to achieve hegemony; it reveals the ‘slot’ vacated by the lepers of the medieval period, to be filled in this instance by the witches and vagabonds of the 1650s and corresponds to the spread of the experimental method and empirical
genealogies of knowledge as they become the definitive knowledge making practice in the late seventeenth century.

**The human as technology of transmission.**

Bakhtin’s focus on the carnavalesque dimension of Rabelais’s work also provides an insight into the unrecorded oral tradition of the peasant classes, that informs Rabelais’ life and writing in the sixteenth century. In an increasingly familiar leitmotif of the literary and historicist turn, Bakhtin indicates that high culture and popular culture *circulates*, and is co-constitutive. Ginzburg (1980) reinforces this point in a study of an Italian Miller called Menocchio, living in Friuli at the same time as Rabelais. Ginzburg presents a biography of Menocchio by piecing together the transcripts of his two trials. It is the story of a man from the peasant tradition whose peasant cosmography meets the sophisticated debates of the most learned men of his times, in ways that seem inexplicable, and for which he was burned as a heretic; ‘my ideas come out of my head’ said Menocchio the peasant, when questioned under suspicion of fraternising with dissident intellectuals. In this sense, both Bakhtin and Ginzburg argue for the circular, co-constitutional nature of knowledge. As historians they see their subjects as filters through which to understand how knowledge came into being from a historical perspective, but filters also in terms of human transmitters of those subjugated knowledgies so difficult to trace.

John Locke the *man*, of Letters, distinguished philosopher, shadow statesman, political exile, and prolific writer of letters, is also a filter. In the 17th century, he produced a coherent, systematic, empiricist theory of perception, mind and knowledge. It claimed knowledge was gained from the senses and reflection. In a passage from his seminal *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1689) Locke describes how the *Self* is brought into being and experiences itself, as an infant without innate ideas, like a ‘tabula rasa’

> *Let us then suppose the mind to be as we say, composed of white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless mind of*
man hath painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the material of reason and knowledge? To this I answer in one word, from EXPERIENCE.

In that, all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation employed either about external, sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected upon by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all material thinking. These two are the foundation of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.

(Locke:1979,1689 11.1.2 25-6:104)

According to Locke, knowledge is derived from this parallel processing of sense impressions from the outer world to the inner world of the Self via introspection; a notion which acts as the basis for the pedagogical discourse of experiential learning and reflection on practice.

My thesis argues that the work of John Locke, as exemplified in the passage above, is fundamental to the formation of a lexical matrix and mode of reasoning, though which modern technologies of self such as ‘the reflective practitioner’, and modern ‘subject effects’ of responsibilization, re-emerged in the twentieth century, and endure.

Like Luther, this charismatic man Locke is a filter for his times, and ours. Here the term ‘filter’ is inadequate, and serves only to bracket the notion that Locke is a genius, or originator of ideas. As stated above, there were a myriad of formal and informal empiricist genealogies of knowledge, already in circulation when Locke was forming his theories. The case is made more eloquently however, by Karl Mannheim:

Strictly speaking, it is incorrect to say that the single individual thinks. Rather it is more correct to insist that he participates in thinking further what other men have thought before him. He finds himself in an inherited situation with patterns of thought that are appropriate to this situation and attempts to elaborate further their inherited modes of response or to substitute others for them in order to deal more
adequately with the new challenges which have arisen out of the shifts and changes in his situation. (Mannheim 1936:3).

And again,

Underlying even the profound insights of the genius are the collective historical experiences of a group. Where in practices and theories have their roots basically in a group situation in which hundreds and thousands of persons each in his own way participate in the overthrow of the existing society (ibid)

or, as Ashcroft, commenting on Mannheim adds, “in its maintenance”.

( Ashcroft 1986:8)

In this sense, the ‘revolutionary roots’ of the peasant revolt led by Wat Tyler in the England of 1381, the Twelve Articles of the German peasants in 1524, the Ninety – Five theses of Luther in 1517 and the Levellers’ petition to Cromwell in 1640, all contributed to the ‘dry tinder’ awaiting the spark of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 – and circulated in the atmosphere as John Locke began to scribe. Collectively, these political configurations and historical traces gave Locke the springboard to theorise them into a cohered framework, as self-appointed ‘under labourer’ to the ‘Commonwealth of Learning’. With recourse to the epistemological tenets of sense perception and reflection Locke theorises a cognitive process that inscribes self as the site of knowledge construction, meaning-making and salvation. This empiricist premise recurs across his theorisation as a base line for a series of the refutations of Royalist and Scholastic traditions. It enables him to challenge the old order: he refutes the definitive Royalist arguments led famously by Filmer, and proposes a moral justification for constitutional government. He refutes the definitive theological arguments based on metaphysical premises led by Descartes, which serves to counter a Cartesian alternative to the old order Scholasticism. He refutes the theory of the ‘divine right of kings’ led by Filmer, that would have condemned the replacement of (catholic) James 11 by (protestant) Mary and William, and counters this with a theory of the ‘Social Contract’ wherein he inscribes a chain of equivalence in the form of ‘rights and responsibilities’, the right to resist/responsibility to obey rulers, and the right through labour to individual private
property that have become the hallmark of British liberalism. He refutes definitive arguments about immortality led by Stillingfeet, by emphasising persons over bodies (responsibility over substance) in an account of personal identity as fixed and continuous through all time, up to and including, the ‘personal afterlife’. So Locke theorises into existence a cohered conceptual framework that serves as a hegemonic challenge to ‘the old order’ as well as providing a reason to motivate people to be concerned with their future actions, which as historian Forstrom says, ‘preserves a vehicle for both public and private morality’ (2010:115).

Locke scribes in order to inscribe self interest as a moral ethic and teleological imperative.

‘I think I may conclude that morality is the proper science and business of mankind in general’. (Locke 1979,1689 Essay IV, xii, 11).

Locke the man, is depicted in my thesis as a scribe of his times, who ‘fashions himself’, as Greenblatt (2005) would say, into a position of enduring influence; his scribing frames not only our understanding of his times, but also many features of current academic discourse.

Locke is the man, filter, scribe, point of contingency in the impersonal forces of history, and ‘grid’ against which modern day technologies of self, such as entrepreneur of the self, self as free agent, self as having a fixed and continuous identity, self as autonomous, can be read; subjectivities that are ‘in effect’ inscribed by discourses of reflective practice, and its claim, amongst other things, that the subject can through reflection change or direct self conduct in ways that can be planned for.

**Linguistic perspective.**

The thesis takes a discourse analytic perspective to explore the dis/continuities and mutations of John Locke’s theory of coherence by tracing some of the inherited discursive practices that continue to influence processes and practices in Higher Education; lexical chains of equivalence such as ‘freedom rights and individual’, epistemic binary opposites such as ‘truth/falseness’, nominalisations that inscribe responsibilisation, and conventions such as the rules of
argumentation in academic literacies configured as: *freedom to argue, obligation to give reasons, correct referencing, matter of fact modality*, and which align academic practice with the juridical practice (rule of law) and scientific practice (empiricism) of the early enlightenment.

In writing about the ‘problem of unbelief in the sixteenth century’ Lucien Febvre (1982) claims that there were not the ‘mental tools’ or conceptual structures available to *not* believe in God.

*Thus God is the creator and sustainer of the world. He is God-as-Providence as well. He does not remain impassive, inactive, deaf to his creatures’ prayers. He is the good Lord, giver of all good, the protector who does never forsake those that in him do put their faith and confidence.*

(Febvre 1982:249)

Febvre goes on to list words that were unavailable in the sixteenth century English lexicon concept-words such as ‘infinity’, ‘system’, ‘abstract’ – and proposes that the absence of these missing words ‘entails not only inconvenience but actual inadequacy or deficiency of thought’(ibid:355).

The struggle to find new linguistic technologies and make language ‘fit for purpose’ to serve the new technologies of expression that were emerging in the early modern period, was everywhere declared. Locke’s theory abounds with terms such as ‘simple ideas’ ‘plain method’ and ‘plain English’ as part of a demystification ethic. Descartes also, a member of the orthodox Church, wrote in French ‘the language of my country’ in order to shake off the shackles of a conceptual framework that was felt to be no longer adequate as a representation for the processes of thinking.

Febvre argues (1982/1942) that Latin, being the language shared by the men of letters in the sixteenth century, in effect belongs to their fathers and grandfathers, and that the tradition of thought embedded in its matrix, is inadequate as a mode of reasoning, for the technologies of expression and self that were emerging in the early modern period.

This idea of language as a ‘mental tool’ or conceptual structure for the abling/disabling of thinking, or as a practice that needs to be adequate to
contemporary knowledge making processes, is of significance to this thesis. The thesis echoes the question asked by Febvre, as to whether an enlightenment matrix can be adequate for the technologies of expression emerging in the twenty first century. And conversely, what kind of contemporary ‘mental tool’ is adequate for representing the processes of the past, that this thesis claims, inform it.

**Presenting the past.**

As the representation of the past in terms of a continuous and linear process has become problematised, historians and literary historians struggle with the traditional classificatory terms of reference that slot epochs, revolutions and transformations into place along a chronological line, indeterminate terms such as the ‘long eighteenth century’ have become commonplace. The attribution of dates by historians to the past has been found to be an inexact science in the light of modern technology, whereby ‘history’ has often been intercepted by the past; one printed news story may have different dates attributed to it simply because it had been reprinted or shared. The traditional status awarded to dates is felt by some historians to overdetermine the narrative of the story.

In effect, the late twentieth century inscribed a particular kind of critical reflexivity in much writing; a death of the author consciousness, so that a positionality of ambivalence characterises much contemporary writing in relation to research and theory. This consciousness has of course affected history, considered by many now as a contested discipline; a classic empirical view of history for example would argue that it is possible to render the past empirical world into an account of it that corresponds to the past reality. It is a correspondence theory of history that seeks to achieve a coherent reality of the past based on analytic objectivity of the historian in producing the truth so far as is possible.

This traditional view has been challenged by the ‘linguistic turn’ of the poststructuralist project, which gives rise to the notion of ‘the narrative turn’ in history, the main implication being one of emphasis, wherein the author is felt to be telling a story rather than the story, as based on truth. Contributors to the
debate include Barthes, (1970) who distinguishes between ‘history’ and ‘the past’ as two different categories, wherein one (history) cannot be attributable to the other (past). Munslow’s (2001) ‘deconstructionist’ view “holds that past events are explained and acquire their meaning as much by their representation as by their ‘knowable actuality’”. Jenkins, (1995) writes about history in terms of a ‘textualised discourse’ wherein “the author and his or her theories and values are understood to inform the account given”. Here, history is viewed as a mode of representation, the construction of a narrative about the past, but whilst this view may be considered fictive in so far that it has much in common with narratives of literature, it is not Munslow points out, fiction.

Much history however is being written through a literary lexicon of story, narrative, narrator and a self reflexive authorship wherein the narrator/historian’s presence stands out, and is not intended to be hidden or neutral (LaCapra 2004). Historians may produce a text about reality being presented in the conventions of literary structures and vocabularies. What this literary aesthetic brings according to some historians, is “an awareness of the text-like nature of contexts, and the way in which meaning is construed through language”, which in turn emphasises that “texts are constituted by social and cultural processes of production and reception, by dialogue and contest”. (Ditz 1999:61). What some historians object to is that “when techniques of literary criticism are applied to historical evidence, the result is an overly aestheticized view of context and experience” (ibid).

These debates circulate in academia. They do not in my experience, filter through to the field of education at the taught level, where, in the student writing there persists an assumed ‘classic empirical’ view of history that attempts to render the past empirical world into an account of it that corresponds to the past reality, and draw on representations of the past in terms of a continuous and linear process. The concern here, is in relation to how texts are read by students, how meaning is imparted in modern readings, how tacit knowledge is inscribed in inherited models such as those of Schon (1983) and Kolb (1975), with their teleologically informed metaphors, and adherence to notions such as: the correspondence theory of truth, the past as a continuous process, identity as fixed and identical to itself, derivative of the enlightenment project, notions that make possible the idea that reflective practice and experiential learning is a useful model which
‘converts a usable past into a viable future’ (Fuller 2000:12) or a form of personal ‘know-how’, a cognitive tenet through which one can change or direct self conduct in ways that can be planned for or what Zizek (1991:17) refers to as ‘retroactively’ constructing the past.

The concern is in relation to the way in which these inherited cognitive formations reproduce and reinforce teleological relations of self to self, producing ‘subject effects’ (Butler,1999) and representations that are not ‘adequate for the actual processes of education’ (Fairclough 2006:5) and are in this sense ideological.

**Framings.**

The ‘narrative turn’ means that the task for historians more generally becomes less one of exactitude than one of ‘framing’ when engaging in accounts of the past. One kind of framing that draws on a literary device to circumvent the problems of the linear trajectory of history, is the selection of a particular ‘moment’ of consciousness through which to tell the story; be that the story of a revolution, a lifetime, or a global transformation. This exegetic moment which frames the event in some way brackets out the past that leads up to the ‘moment’ as a kind of nondescript cotton wool as Virginia Woolf – (famous for the literary trope ‘moments of being’) puts it. It is a telescopic device, a close up, an evocative technique to frame a story. It provides a perfect point of entry for historians into what otherwise might feel like a risky endeavour given the vast and contested nature of ‘history’. In this vein Pincus’ book entitled *1688* describes the events leading up to and emanating from what he calls the ‘first modern revolution’, which triggered ‘an epochal break in the construction of the state’ (2009:9), Shapiro’s book(1988) entitled *1599*, recounts a revolutionary year in the life of William Shakespeare’s career, from which he ‘emerged’ as a great writer. Historian and ecologist Charles Mann’s book (2011) entitled *1493* tells the story of ‘the Columbian exchange’ recounting the moment in which the ecological collision of Europe and the Americas, he writes, resulted in a transformation to the first globalised economy.
These historians focus on a single year as the catalytic ‘moment’ in what was clearly part of a process that had been in progress for many years, whereby a convergence of forces came together and created the ‘conditions of emergence’ for something new and important; sometimes represented by an event as in the *Glorious Revolution* of 1688, or by a particularly charismatic individual as in Shakespeare, or by an epochal claim such as a globalised economy triggered by ecological trade.

These are editorial decisions rather than historical ones and some may say that the telescoping frame of a year is too narrow, or even arbitrary, nonetheless it is a way of making sense of the past, which, however much informed by primary-source material and however rigorous in relation to evidence, evokes artistic licence as History is a discursive practice.

I have in this vein, selected a particular year, of 2001, as the point of entry to my ‘history of the present’; it represents the catalytic moment for the transformation story I tell, a trigger year which accelerated something already in progress, a process which has since consolidated, though not ended. 2001 because: a combination of relative economic stability in the first term 1997-2001 under New Labour seemed to reassure the electorate that a *Third Way* was indeed possible. This coincided with the fact that *Lifelong Learning* was an already available vehicle through which Tony Blair could align his economic plan based on an investment philosophy of ‘human capital’; a neo classical conception of *homo economics* inscribing entrepreneurial technologies of self. The moment was perceived by academics in the field with some ambivalence; a mixture of hope for the democratisation of Higher Education and a concern about the implications of an overdetermined alignment of education with economic policy. The ambiguity that surrounded the Lifelong Learning project was framed, in the 2001 spring edition of the *Journal for Adult Education* by Richard Taylor, who asks: which direction will Lifelong Learning take – a social democratic one or a neoliberal one? It is not a question that could have been posed, except rhetorically, a year later as these processes already in progress crystallised then in relation to the advent of 9/11.

The point here, is that the spring (as against the autumn) of 2001 represented a watershed moment in relation to economic, political and educational policy, that
could have gone in one of two directions, or, as was the hope perhaps at the time, could have combined them in a Third Way. This was the promise that ensured a second term for New Labour in 2001.

1989, symbolises the ‘moment’ of the neoliberal turn in relation to the ‘velvet revolution’ characterised by the fall of the Berlin Wall and a discernable turn thereafter of political philosophy, as well as the emergence of Lifelong Learning as a new field of study spearheaded by Schon (1983) and Kolb (1975) in their work on Reflective Practice and ‘experiential learning’ - all of which coincided in the ‘moment’.

1689, the year after the Glorious Revolution, provides the exegetal ‘moment’ for a study of the year in which John Locke published two important works An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and the Two Treaties. These books address historically contingent processes to do with identity, rights and responsibilities, self responsibilisation and salvation that have enduring influence over the field of education today. The study traces the way in which Locke develops a comprehensive theory of coherence that privileges self as the site of knowledge construction inscribing reflective practice as a cognitive mechanism that works in conjunction with sense perception to legitimise this epistemology. In this chapter I explore how Locke theorises into existence a project of joined up governance under the rubric of a Commonwealth of Learning.

These three staging posts of 2001, 1989 and 1689, frame moments of transformation each towards its own historically specific hegemonic project and in relation to one another, wherein learning is harnessed as the vehicle of change: The Learning Lexicon as the ‘episteme’ which articulates a 21st century global hegemonic project that is liberal democratic in character; the Lifelong Learning project that aligned cognate technologies of know-how to the hegemonic project of the late twentieth century that was neoliberal in character; the Commonwealth of Learning project that harnessed learning to a hegemonic project that is early liberalism in character. The overall focus of the thesis in this context is on the lexical chains that interact between these three projects of learning, as political configurations and historical figurations, that are formed, reformed and performed across time, to serve different needs at different historical moments, and to reproduce teleological and hegemonic relations of personhood and power.
As the thesis often discusses abstract phenomena such as immaterial processes, representations, discursive practices, subjectivities, consciousness and effects, I occasionally draw on literary or drama lexicons with a view to using a metaphorical or parodic trope to make a point. Foucault’s own penchant for parody, after Erasmus’ impulse to ‘season the text with folly’, (Erasmus 1511 in Elmer 2000:91) after Bakhtin’s (1986) invocation of the carnival, and Brecht’s (1949) technique of verfremdungseffekt - a theatrical device designed to alienate the audience from the seduction of the narrative, are all creative variations on a theme, of critique. In the spirit of Lyotard (1979) they are mechanisms for inscribing doubt and resisting the ‘grand narrative’.

In this sense the intertextual style of presentation is intended to be part of the theoretical and philosophical intervention I am trying to make, through language, to show and not tell. It is also a way of contextualising the ‘Learning Lexicon’ which is an object of research and key concept that is never adequately defined, but which I intend as a kind of 21st century episteme.

**Political Economic perspective.**

The task of seeking out *adequate* representations for actual processes of education does not mean finding representations that reflect knowledge neutrally or objectively, but rather recognising or dismantling representations of processes that are ‘in themselves’ ideological. Neoliberalism is a theory of economic practice that is ideological ‘by nature’ (Konings 2010:5); in so far that it “presumes to produce a reality that resembles or approximates its idealised version, whose practitioners and the general public contract into this idea but whose theory does not correspond to its practices”. (Konings 2010:6) The way in which the historical figurations of neoclassical economic theory serve the ideological success of the neoliberal agenda and its theory of economic practice that has a philosophy about human well being, is salient however.

The discourses and processes of neoliberalism have permeated Higher Education in a particularly transformative way over the past ten to fifteen years, to produce a transition in the sector from a ‘non–market to a market sphere’ (Leys,2001). This transformation, often framed in terms of the *knowledge based economy* or
the digital economy is a contextual element of the thesis. The thesis problematises the way in which neoliberalism is based on a neo classical logic and the thesis argues that these methodological assumptions are not adequate as representations for processes of education, but that they serve to provide models for the organisation of education ‘as if’ they were.

Ball (1998) describes this phenomenon when he says

the core-periphery structure of the global economy and global national labour markets appear to be closely paralleled in the emerging star/sink school polarisations within market-reformed education systems

(Ball 1998:121)

The thesis identifies other ‘closely paralleled’ customs between neoliberal discourse and education practices, not least; the market imperative for outcome, paralleled with learning outcomes, or market autonomy paralleled with learner autonomy, or the notion of a self-regulated market with a self-regulated learner – worker- citizen.

This perspective too relates to the idea expressed by the other perspectives framed above, that ideological formations obfuscate relations of power and exploitation.

These three strands of history, linguistics and political economy provide an intertextual perspective that informs the genealogy.

I turn now to the next section, chapter 3, which considers the Foucauldian genealogy as an approach.
1. "In Our Times" is a series of radio programmes hosted by Melvyn Bragg covering subjects such as the History of Ideas Philosophy History Culture Religion and Science. The usual formula consists in Melvyn Bragg in discussion with academics who specialise in the topic under review. The mention of the programme in the text of the chapter is to illustrate an informed but informal usage of the notion *the times the means and the man* by contemporary historians and philosophers. www.bbc.co.uk


2. “the poorest he” comes from a speech made by Thomas Rainborough as part of the Army Debates opened by Cromwell and held in Putney Parish Church on 28 and 29th October 1647. Colonel Rainborough defended the Leveller views. The excerpt is taken from the Clarke MSS in Worcester College Oxford. The Army Debates are reproduced in *Revolutionary Prose of the Civil War* edited by Howard Erskine-Hill and Graham Storey (1983). Cambridge University Press
CHAPTER 3: The Genealogy as Approach

This chapter discusses the application of genealogy as a research approach to the thesis, used to conduct a ‘history of the present’ after Foucault. It discusses the ‘five pathways’ of the genealogy, after Rose (1998). It uses the genealogy as a deconstructional tool to analyse the processes and discourse of Reflective Practice in Higher Education today.

In the project of the ancients, the genealogy is used as a narrative of origins where the genealogist traces lines of development to confirm, recover, redirect, refound or deconstruct a tradition. So, just as Jerome used the biblical genealogies to differentiate the Latin from the Greek church, so Aquinas used them to reconcile an Aristotelian teleology with an Augustinian temporal one, in an effort to refound theology along Christian eschatological lines. And just as John Locke in the seventeenth century used the genealogies of Jerome, Aquinas and Augustine to disprove a theory (of innatism), so the Scholastics of his day used them to prove that same theory; the point being that genealogy is used by the ancients and the early moderns for very different purposes.

In the project of modernity, the genealogy is used as a narrative of origins to frame the staging posts of man’s progress: Marx’s genealogy (1867) gives us an account of ‘so-called primitive accumulation’ the basis for a critique of capitalism, in a narrative of history as a staged process towards progress; Tocqueville’s genealogy (1835-40) gives us an account of democracy in a narrative of history as a staged process towards progress, and Darwin’s genealogy (1844) gives us an account of Natural Selection as the scientific account of that staged progress; each genealogy is imbued with a radical humanist spirit and call to arms for the furtherance and betterment of the humanist project. Until Nietzsche’s The Genealogy of Morals (1887) which constitutes a critique of the humanist project, in the form of a deconstruction of Christian morality, and so turns the humanist project round on itself.

In the same spirit as Nietzsche, Foucault uses genealogy as a deconstructional tool to analyse ‘the history of the present’ and like Nietzsche, appoints himself
the task of ‘dismantling’ those inherited values which enslave us. According to this narrative, the genealogist is concerned with present day practices whose institutionalised processes and representations constitute imperatives for being in the world, and claim authority over us. According to this narrative, the genealogist’s task is to subvert the authority of origins; traditore traduttore (translator- traitor).

What is of interest in this brief retrospective, is the role of the interpreter-translator of genealogies, as a narrator of a story about origins related to a claim about ‘truth’; a story and claim which the genealogist as translator attempts to confirm, recover, redirect, refound or deconstruct highlighting the fine line separating fiction from non fiction in the historical narratives we live by.

**Foucault, Genealogy, History.**

In his essay, *Nietzsche Genealogy History* (NGH) written in 1971, Foucault discusses the genealogy as a mode for critical enquiry. He sees it as having a task to do, of ‘dismantling’ traditional accounts of knowledge as construed through ‘history as a handmaiden to philosophy’ (Bouchard 1977:156). According to Foucault this traditional history is immersed in a powerful teleological narrative of immortality, which it aims to conserve.

> The locus of emergence for metaphysics was surely Athenian demagogy, the vulgar spite of Socrates and his belief in immortality, and Plato could have seized this Socratic philosophy to turn it against itself. Undoubtedly he was often tempted to do so, but his defeat lies in its consecration.

(Foucault in Bouchard 1977:159)

From these ‘beginnings’, Foucault suggests, evolved other teleologies: of Christian eschatology, of civilisation, of progress, of science, of the dialectic, of humanism - at the centre of which is a notion of man as sovereign subject:

> Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces
warfare; humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination.

( ibid:151 )

In this sense, Foucault offers the genealogy as a diagnostic tool that will help history ‘become a curative science’ by dismantling the teleological narratives that inscribe the subject as sovereign. The task of the genealogy here is to encourage the kind of
dissociating view that is capable of decomposing itself, capable of shattering the unity of man’s being through which he could extend his sovereignty to events of the past. To dismantle belief in eternal truth the immortality of the soul and the nature of consciousness as always identical to itself …

and so facilitate another kind of history, effective history to
deprive the self of the reassuring stability of life and nature, and it will not permit itself to be transported by a voiceless obstinacy toward a millennial ending , to uproot its traditional foundations and relentlessly disrupt its pretended continuity

( ibid )

it will be a tool to dismantle the comprehensive view of history as a patient and continuous development. ( ibid )

Foucault draws on the work of Nietzsche to problematize the teleological character of traditional historical accounts based on Platonic modalities of reality, identity and truth.

The task of genealogical analysis here is to dismantle, diagnose, disrupt and parody these modalities: only then will the historical sense free itself from the demands of a suprahistorical history. Knowledge he says is not for understanding but for cutting. ( ibid )

In this sense, Foucault’s own genealogy does what he claims Plato should have done in relation to Socratic belief, and turns the history of renaissance man back
on itself; man as a spiritual individual, as reflexive, as *uomo singolare, uomo unico*, as transcendent and capable of self consciousness. This is a narrative of man taken up then by Hegel as a *subject-in-progress*, or journey man, where the *Spirit* passes through successive stages of self-consciousness, like a character in search of self knowledge, who learns from experience, on its way to an ultimate destination of absolute knowledge, or ontologically-as a complete subject. Man-in-progress is a similar narrative to that outlined in Brukhartdian demagogy, also a telos of hu-man-ess in progress, a dialectical movement *towards* a reconciliation with the self. This teleological trope is a very compelling one, that characterises nineteenth century narratives of being and of history, and that seeps into twentieth century consciousness, perhaps most evocatively problematised as ‘the green light’ in Fitzgerald’s *Great Gatsby*, where the eponymous protagonist

> *Gatsby, believed in the green light the orgiastic future that year by year recedes before us. It eluded us then, but that’s no matter – tomorrow we will run faster, stretch out our arms farther... And one fine morning – So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past.*

(Fitzgerald 2000:180).

It could be said that Nietzsche’s genealogy dismantles the green light of Christian morality, and Foucault’s genealogy dismantles the green light of the humanist subject, the notion of resolution, or the possibility of achieving absolute being, implicit in the Hegelian dialectic.

For Foucault, the way in which to understand power structures, knowledge and subjectivity, is not dialectically, not that is, in a way that ‘contains’ or brings ‘resolution’, but as a force that works pervasively, through multiple channels, generatively and in heterogeneous ways. His understanding of history is not in terms of singular sources such as origins, or a linear trajectory towards an absolute, not that is in beginnings and ends as with the traditional genealogical narratives, or those of the nineteenth century, but as dispersed and polyvalent.

Twentieth century scepticism is no doubt a response to nineteenth century optimism where the dream of modernity, of governing the world through
prediction, promising that uncertainty would disappear - melted with the advent of quantum mechanics and Heisenberg’s ‘uncertainty principle’ (1927) when the two centuries merged; telling us that the world is fundamentally uncertain and that at best we have only probabilities; shattering the project of modernity.

*Man, there is no doubt about it grows always ‘better’ – the destiny of Europe lies even in this – that in losing the fear of man, we have also lost the hope in man, yea the will to be man. The sign of man now fatigues – What is present day Nihilism if it is not that? We are tired of man.*

(Nietzsche 2003: 25)

In terms of Foucault’s contemporaries, the point has been made by Davies (1997), that perhaps the only thing that links a very diverse group of post-structuralist thinkers such as Barthes, Foucault, Derrida, Kristeva- is a rejection of this humanist ‘analytic of truth’.

*Our task at the moment is to completely free ourselves from humanism and in that sense our work is political work… all regimes, East and West, smuggle shoddy goods under the banner of humanism….We must denounce these mystifications*

(Foucault cited in Macey 1994:171)

Foucault took the impetus to move us even further from the humanist ‘analytic of truth’ away from the Lockean notion of identity as fixed (human nature), towards a notion of subjectivity as something more contingent and negotiable.

He also brought something quite distinctive to the debate, a systematic critique of the ‘category of the subject’ as a ‘unified and unifying essence’, or as a single, ‘meaning giving subject’ in terms of the ‘continuity of human being ness as subjects of history’ (ibid).

He introduced the notion of an ‘ethics of the subject’ wherein subjectivities are formed in relation to an imperative of the ‘care for the self’ as something not externally imposed, albeit implicated in processes of governmentality (Foucault 1988)
In a book called *Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (1982), Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rainbow account for Foucault’s thinking in terms of different stages which build on one another whilst also circling back to previous work. As Sarah Mills points out in her writing on Foucault (2003) such a developmental articulation of Foucault’s work would be something he himself may resist, but Dreyfus and Rainbow’s discussion of his work in terms of these ‘staging posts’ lends another layer of analysis that is worth considering. For them, the stages consist in: where Foucault engages in a critique of the Heideggerian and Gadamerelian project of the *hermeneutics of suspicion* (1) that is, *for the search for a deep truth which had been purposefully hidden* (Dreyfus and Rainbow 1982:xix) which is a reaction to the humanist tradition which, as Foucault saw it, Jean Paul Sartre belonged to, when writing in France of the 1940s and 1950s (*Existentialism is Humanism*). He calls this ‘an analysis of meaning’ (Macey 1994: 105 cited in Mills 2003:22). His ‘move’ to a second stage relates to his writings *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969,1989) and involves a method that is influenced by the theories of structuralism, which includes notions of ‘speech acts’ as ‘performative utterances’ where in Foucault constructs discourse as a rule governed *system*, as an autonomous *system* whereby the Archaeology comprises an ‘analysis of system’ compared to what he had called the humanist tradition’s ‘analysis of meaning’. The third stage according to Dreyfus and Rainbow, moves from an archaeology metaphor to a genealogy, in the form of an analysis of the kind made in *The History of Sexuality* (1981). This work is concerned with the ways in which the internal structures of knowledge and discourse are produced in relation to power and the effects of power-relations on individuals. On this view, the genealogy is a development of archaeological analysis, and concerned with ‘describing the workings of power’ in the ‘history of the present’ by ‘describing events in the past without making causal connections’, that is to provide the documentation rather than interpretation. (Smart 1985:48)

The difference between the two, is stated variously in the secondary literature of commentary, but for the purposes of a succinct analysis here, is a statement by Barry Smart.
whereas the archaeological investigations are directed to an analysis of the unconscious rules of formation which regulate the emergence of discourses in the human sciences’…. the genealogical analysis ‘reveals the emergence of the human sciences their conditions of existence to be inextricably associated with particular technologies of power embodied in social practices.

(Smart 1985:48)

This notion of a genealogy as an anti-humanistic, anti-essentialist, anti-hermeneutic analytic involves, according to Foucault:

*a mistrust of identities in history; they are only masks, a mistrust of appeals to unity and a belief that the deepest truth that the genealogist has to reveal is the secret that things have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms.*

(Foucault 1997: 142)

Dean (2010), considers the genealogy as an analytic that attempts to take a political distance from the Enlightenment philosophy of history and its ‘prospectus of progress’ (Gordon, 1986:77 cited in Dean 2010:54) Macey sees it as privileging an ‘analysis of system’ rather than an ‘analysis of meaning’ (Macey 1994:24).

In this sense, NGH does not present a didactic organum, like Aristotle or Bacon or Brecht, a self help guidebook on how to undertake a genealogical analysis, and it isn’t an ideology like Baconian ideology with a rich store of metaphors about knowledge and history, though it is rich in metaphors, and it isn’t a taxonomy of the kind used by Petrus Remus in the sixteenth century as the classificatory system. Nor is it the kind of normative framework for scientific progress, such as Kuhn’s Structures and it isn’t just a metaphor such as that used three hundred and fifty years before Foucault, of archaeology, by Alsted in 1612 (Burke,2000) to analyse the principles underlying the system of the disciplines in the university; it is a political project

*only then will the historical sense free itself from the demands of a suprahistorical history and knowledge is not made for*
understanding; it is made for cutting as a diagnostic tool.

(Foucault in Bouchard 1977:154)

Sometimes, the prefaces and introductions that Foucault writes to his larger works, contain a kind of exemplar of what then follows, like a good frontispiece providing a picture of what is inside the book. A cameo. One such cameo that expresses performativity, has served me as a ‘menu’ for my own research:

*The domain I will be analysing is made up of texts written for the purpose of offering rules, opinions, and advice on how to behave as one should: ‘practical’ texts which are themselves objects of ‘practice’ in that they were designed to be read learned reflected upon and tested out and they were intended to constitute the eventual framework of everyday conduct. These texts thus served as functional devices that would enable individuals to question their own conduct, to watch over and give shape to it, and to shape themselves as ethical subjects, In short their function was ‘etho-poetic’ to transpose a word found in Plutarch.*

(Foucault 1988:12).

At the end of their book, Dreyfus and Rainbow (1982) reproduce an interview with Foucault by way of a coda, entitled *The Subject and Power*, which looks forward to the idea of a ‘history of desiring man’ and a ‘hermeneutics of the desiring self’ developed later in the introduction cited above to the *Use of Pleasure* where the cameo is taken from. More generally, I have drawn on a cluster of theoretical concepts and metaphors that recur, sometimes more systematically than others, across the body of Foucault’s work to inform my own genealogy; an analysis of the desiring individual, discursive formulations, technologies of self, and the systematic critique of the ‘category of the subject’ as a ‘unified and unifying essence’, or as a single , ‘meaning giving subject’ in terms of the ‘continuity of human beingness as subjects of history’ an ethics of the subject and a care for the self. (Foucault *History of Sexuality* Volume 1(1978) 2 and 3 (1988))

And most importantly for me is, Foucault’s point about “the appropriation of vocabulary turned against those who had once used to it” (Foucault in Bouchard
1997:154) for example, the way in which the feminised discourse of reflective practice, intended initially to democratise and empower, is used to regulate in the context of the neo-liberalisation of the University. This appropriation of vocabulary is a leitmotif of the thesis.

**After Foucault.**

Dean (2010), Butler(1997), and Rose(1998) are writers who bring Foucault’s thinking into a contemporary debate about selfhood. They have extended Foucault’s understanding of subjectivity in genealogical terms and “the ways in which the conduct of the totality of individuals becomes implicated in the exercise of sovereign power” (Dean 2010: 173-4).

Dean’s work focuses particular attention on Foucault’s notion of governmentality, by presenting a framework of ‘four discrete but overlapping components’ that serve to disaggregate Foucault’s idea of ‘governmentalization of the state’. (Dean 2010)

Dean’s discussion is helpful in aiding me to develop a line of thought in relation to the ‘sovereign consumer’ autonomy and governance. I argue that this economistic subjectivity is partially inscribed through Lifelong Learning, which makes recourse to a nodal discourse of reflective practice. I argue that reflective practice as a pedagogical discourse is a variation on a strategic theme of responsibilisation, which works across domains in both the public and private spheres. I argue that personhood is a site of governance upon which subject effects of responsibilisations are inscribed. Dean’s discussion is useful to me for thinking through the genealogical implications of ‘sovereignty autonomy and subjectivity’ as inscribed through certain historical figurations that make up lexical chains in the project of a liberal tradition which began in seventeenth century England in an historically specific way. Specifically, Dean’s discussion
of the “transformation of the exercise of sovereignty by government” is of relevance in this context.

Dean takes Foucault’s model of the ‘governmentalization of the state’ into ‘three lineages’; sovereignty (the separation of sovereignty from government), discipline (the elaboration of practices and rationalities of government) and governmental management “which has population as its main target and the apparatuses of security as its essential mechanism” in the transformation of the exercise of sovereignty by government, (Foucault 2007:107 – 108 in Dean 2010:122). Dean adds a fourth dimension, with a view to “disaggregating” this idea of ‘governmentalization of the state’ by proposing a construal of sovereignty as “being outside government but also necessary to the fulfilment of governmental objectives” (Dean 2010:122). This lens entails both the separation of sovereignty from government and also the notion of subjectivisation as the effect of government. As a conceptualisation of sovereignty Dean, after Skinner (1989:118), locates the emergence of this sense of autonomy in the republican thinkers of Renaissance Italy, including Machiavelli (2010:123), that is not in the enlightenment period of John Locke.

This republican discourse of autonomy is reproduced most evidently today in the work of Giddens (1991) in the policy notion of the ‘reflexive subject’ as one who can avail himself or herself of the ‘opportunities’ that governments offer their citizens in order that the citizens fare well. According to this view, those ‘unreflexive subjects’ who do not or cannot avail themselves, necessarily become subject to the exercise of sovereign, that is government, power.

The reflexive subject/unreflexive subject is a discursive theme of the political philosophy of ‘austerity’ which inscribes technologies of self such as the ‘reflexive citizen’ or the ‘autonomous learner’. In the austerity discourse and practice, we see sovereign power exercised for example in relation to the ‘unreflexive’ adult benefit-claimants, asylum – seekers, and special-needs pupils in school as examples discussed at length in the Grow Your Own Teacher case study of chapter 4. The very exclusion or prohibition of these unreflexive
subjects, that is, their very *limits* - bring the regime of austerity into effect; this is a Foucauldian theme.

In this sense, Dean develops the foucauldian notion of sovereignty as ‘outside but necessary’ to the exercise of power or the fulfilment of governmental objectives. The notion is taken further by Agamben (1998) who understands the sovereign’s status as the ‘exception’ to the rule and proposes ‘the camp’, notably Guantanamo Bay camp, as the exemplification or model which best represents this type of sovereign-based regime of power.

In this historical context, Dean after Skinner and Giddens provide a point of entry into a discussion about the ‘autonomous learner’ of the thesis’ case study *Grow Your Own Teacher. Here the unreflexive subject unable to avail themselves*, of the ‘opportunities’ that governments offers their citizens, are subject to the exercise of sovereign power; for example as the benefit claimant in a ‘welfare to workfare’ policy; the refugee in an international utilitarian approach to Human Rights; the Overseas - trained teacher unable to complete a retraining programme in the UK in time when their visa is rescinded; or indeed the inanimate of Guantaamo Bay. These ‘unreflexive subjects’ are contemporary casualties of a new regime of power, austerity, that comes into effect during the period of 2001-2011 under a New Labour government. Their exclusions, prohibitions and limits are the trigger through which a neoliberal regime of power and a political policy of austerity, come into effect.

Judith Butler (1999) is also a writer whose work is relevant to the thesis in relation to the Foucauldina notion of subject hood and the exercise of power. She describes a genealogy as an investigation into how discourses function and the political aims they fulfil. “A genealogy investigates the political stakes in designating as an *origin* and *cause* those identity categories that are in fact the effects of institutions, practices, discourses with multiple and diffused points of origin” (1997:VIII-IX). In this context, she talks about the ‘subject effect’ (ibid:50) rather than subjectivity which is a distinction I adopt in my discussion of technologies of self. As with Foucault, there is a spirit of political subversion in Butler’s writing that problematises those terms by which subjects and
identities are constituted, not least in relation to and through the body, as a key site of governmentality in the form of bio power. She shares with many other post-structuralist thinkers, the notion that identities are constructed and can therefore be re-constructed, which she sees as a form of agency. I use Butler’s vocabulary to look at the identity category of the ‘autonomous learner’ and ‘reflective practitioner’ the ‘resilient citizen’ and other subject effects or subject positions assumed by the four teachers whose writing makes up the case study *Grow Your Own Teacher* in chapter 4. I consider how, the discourse of reflective practice is used as part of the learning-lexicon to produce a ‘subject effect’ of responsibilisation and self-regulation in the form of the ‘reflective practitoner’. I think that what Butler extends, that is distinctive, is a feminist lexicon that she uses to talk about gender, as well as a notion of ‘performativity’ which I believe Foucault also extends, but not so fully. Clearly both writers are concerned with the processes of subjectivisation. I make recourse to Butler’s notion of ‘speech acts’ in relation to my critical discourse analysis.

The third writer of interest, who has extended and challenged the work of Foucault, particularly in relation to a regime of selfhood is Nicholas Rose (1998) ; he does this in an account of how the idea of self as a coherent and unified entity has been delegitimised by the advent of poststructuralist and postmodernist notions such as the ‘death of the subject’, so altering the kind of self that proliferates nowadays, as not the ‘universal subject’ that is, the stable, unified, totalised, individualised, interiorized, and knowable subject. The Bartesian ‘death of the subject’ debate, according to Rose, has ushered in new possibilities of subjectivity, which populate the academy; “as socially constructed , as dialogic, as inscribed upon the surface of the body, as spatialized, decentred, multiple, nomadic” (Rose 1998:172).

What these three Foucauldian- inspired, post foucauldian writers contribute to the thesis, is a development of Foucault’s problematisation of the (Lockean) ‘category of the subject as a unified and unifying essence’ and Foucault’s problematisation of a (liberal) rationality of government that draws on a
humanist analytic of freedom. Dean (2010) Butler (1997) and Rose (1992, 1998, 2001) question further the category of the subject, in relation to sovereignty, and in relation to sovereignty as something separate from government. What they represent for me, that is what I take from their thinking for the purposes of the thesis, is a move that they signal towards a post liberal regime of power. The Foucauldian notion of a shift in thinking away from meaning towards system, and of this signalling an announcement of ‘the death of the subject’ or the death of the ‘humanist analytic’, is a concept these writers extend. This conceptual shift co-incides with a political shift, that took place (in the UK) at the end of the cold war (1989), away from the old ethic of state responsibility towards an apparatus of civic responsibility.

In relation to these two shifts I argue, the liberal ‘rights bearing subject’ (Chandler 2013) gives way to a post rights subjectivity or subject effect, of reflexivity as a particular kind of (republican) autonomy, in a regime of power characterised by austerity. Here, ‘autonomy’ is reinscribed as ‘capacity’, for example for enrolling oneself on the right schema (Latour 1986). The autonomous-learner is s/he who has the capacity, as subject, to make the right choice in an exclusionary schema inscribing an in/out positionality for the subject. Where the unreflexive subject fails, for whatever reason, to make the right choice, then s/he will be managed as ‘at risk’ by what Rose (1992) calls ‘systems of sovereign power’.

A fourth writer sympathetic to Foucault but not a Foucauldian, focuses on a discourse analysis of 21st century policy literature, Chandler (2013), and understands a post liberal policy imperative to be inscribing an ethic not of freedom, but necessity. What I explore in the case study Grow Your Own Teacher, is this process of subjectivisation as one of necessity for the four Teacher-writers. What I try to illustrate, is the extent to which this process of subjectivisation is facilitated by a (neoliberal) appropriation of a liberal vocabulary that has been turned against those who once used it to empower subjects (teachers), in order to disempower them; this is a Foucauldina theme.
The name I give to this discursive formation, which I identify as an object of the genealogy, is ‘the learning-lexicon’.

In relation to the learning-lexicon, what is especially relevant is Rose’s description of discursive formations as rationalities of governance, in the form of:

…regulatory practices which seek to govern individuals in a way more tied to their ‘selfhood’ than ever before… wherein … the ideas of identity and its cognates have acquired an increased salience in so many of the practices in which human beings engage. (Rose 1998:4)

Rose’s work however, is relevant to my thesis in at least three more ways:

a) Rose conducts a genealogy of subjectification in a work entitled Inventing Ourselves Psychology, Power and Personhood (Rose 1998). In this he develops the Foucauldian notion of a genealogy of the subject and the notion of the desiring subject.

b) Rose provides a critique as to the limitations of Foucault’s thinking which locates sexuality as the fulcrum of governmentality – and proposes that this may be an inadequate representation for today. This opens up a space for the contemplation of what would be an adequate representation for today’s ‘prosthetic character of the world around us’ (Davies 1997:38) that might act as a site of governmentality. Given that we think ourselves, not in terms of solid bodies but in terms of cyborg imagery as ‘assemblies of parts’ as a ‘matrix of complex determinations’ in relation to enhanced physical performance, via transplants, artificial limbs, and virtual persona (ibid)*2 perhaps Harroway’s ‘cyborg’ (Harroway 1991) offers an alternative conceptualisation of the ‘fulcrum of governmentality’ that has more currency nowadays. Similarly, Rose’s multiple self, Dean’s sovereign self and Butler’s performative self are conceptualisations that stretch forward and backwards from Foucault not least since the posthumous translations of his later work into English (the College Lectures)*3. They stray into other, not strictly Foucauldian schools of thought such as that represented by feminist and linguist Braidotti (1994) and her notion
of the ‘nomadic self’ or anthropologist Latour, and his notion of “self enrolled actors” onto “the schema of the powerful” (Latour 1986:271). These conceptualisations of self as a site of meaning construction, of subjectivisation and governance, as the effects of relations of power, are notions that associate with Foucault’s idea of biopower and biopolitics expressed in his lectures at the *College de France 1978-1979* entitled *The Birth of Biopolitics* where he says “power (is) directed not at man as body but man as species” and “political power (is) exercised on whole populations in every aspect of human life” (Foucault in Burchell 2008:16).

c) Rose provides an orienting device for my genealogy in the form of a theoretical and methodological framework for conducting a genealogy. It consists in a series of simultaneous linked pathways: *problematisations, technologies, teleologies, authorities, strategies* (Rose 1998:25)

**The five pathways framework.**

My application of Rose’s five pathways has them sometimes overlapping, so that the same terrain is ‘covered’ from a different pathway perspective or given a different emphasis which may at times feel repetitive but which attempts to produce an intertextual perspective, as layers of perspective are laid over the point in focus.

This framework for the conducting of a genealogy serves therefore in order to answer the orienting question of the thesis: *Reflective Practice; why now, why here, and in whose interests?*

**Problematisation:** Of the first pathway Rose asks the question,

*Where, how and by whom are aspects of the human being problematized, according to what systems of judgement and in relation to what concerns?*  
(Rose 1998:25)
The main notion being problematised by government, that the four narratives of the case study therefore address, is that of risk in relation to a governementality project of prevention. This meta area of problematisation is broken down in the four narratives of the case study, into aspects and kinds of risk in the domain of education; special educational needs (Heather’s narrative) pupils in transition (Judy’s narrative) gifted and talented pupils (June’s narrative) pupils with behavioural problems (Linda’s narrative) are considered groups of children ‘at risk’. A discursive formation in educational policy literatures develops and supports the risk thesis not least for example in relation to a lexicon of ‘rights and responsibilities’ which inscribes a problematisation of dependency, most easily recognisable in the sphere of Higher Education in the notion of the ‘autonomous learner’. This lexicon informs the policy of the New Labour administration wherein the idea of responsibilization is coupled with rights, drawing on discourses of citizenship that characterises the social democracy and liberal traditions of emancipation, as well as those ancien-regime traditions of classical Greece and Rome wherein to be a citizen was to have rights. I explore the ways in which the simple mechanism of coupling responsibilities with rights fuses those inherited, taken for granted meanings, associated with emancipatory discourse.

At a discursive level, this coupling also creates an equivalence where in one is synonymous with the other, and significantly, conditional upon the other. A review of policy documentation during this period (2001 – 2011) identifies the way in which New Labour’s appeal to citizenship is also an appeal to the individual, qua individual and qua agent whom – it is inferred, may or may not decide to take up these rights. The ‘rights and responsibilities’ discourse thus intersects with a discourse of ‘rational choice’ itself a genealogy of knowledge that informs neoclassical economics, in an intertextual discursive formation around a nodal premise of risk minimalisation in relation to the governance of the population.

Technologies: Of his second pathway Rose asks,
What means have been invented to the govern the human being to shape or fashion conduct in desired directions and how have programmes sought to embody these in certain technical forms?

(Rose 1998:26)

Here, I consider the pedagogical framework that serves to facilitate a successful transition in the domain of education from what Leys (2001) has defined as ‘a non market sphere to a market sphere’. This is achieved with recourse to a discursive formation that I have called the Learning Lexicon which heralds a new nomenclature and a new set of literacies of the personal, for ways of being and doing in higher education with recourse to ‘technologies of self’ such as: the reflective practitioner, the learner-managed learner, the autonomous learner, fashioned through technologies of learning such as: the portfolio, the reflective essay, the learning diary, the learning contract, the Learning Style Questionnaire, the National Student Survey, the personal statement. These technologies of self and learning, inscribe an ethic of responsibilization in relation to ‘enjoined’ worker-learner-citizen subject-effects; they inscribe a self-managing individual, a self-fashioning individual, an entrepreneur of the self, a global ‘participant-stakeholder’.

I consider these technologies of self in relation to a set of uneven subject-positions and subject-effects in the student narratives of the case study entitled Grow Your Own Teacher in chapter 4.

Authorities: Of his third pathway Rose asks,

Who is accorded or claims the capacity to speak truthfully about humans, their nature and their problems, and what characterises truth about the persons that are accorded such authority? Through which apparatuses are such authorities authorised? To what extent does the authority of the authority depend upon a claim to positive knowledge to wisdom to virtue to experience and practical judgement to the capacity to resolve conflicts? How are the authorities themselves governed – by legal codes, by the market, by the protocols of bureaucracy, by professional ethics.

(Rose 1998:27)
Here, I consider the phenomenon of the ‘knowledge-based-economy’ (Jessop, 2002) as a new economic paradigm that works within a ‘Shumpeterian Competition State’ (ibid), described by sociologist Jessop as aiming to secure economic growth and competitive advantage within its borders, even where they operate abroad, by promoting economic and ‘extra economic’ conditions (Jessop, 2002:96). In this sense, I consider the place of the university as an ‘extra economic’ dimension that assumes a valorisation role (Bellamy, 2010). The Schumpeterian ethic of ‘creative disruption’ (Schumpeter, 1934) as a technology which does not destroy what was there before, but disrupts and revises it, is itself a technology of government in the form of a co-constitutive force, that shapes the techno-economic paradigms of the knowledge-based economy. This authority, that emerged in the late twentieth century, is the prime contextualising backcloth against which the cluster of knowhows that are discussed in chapter 5, emerged.

The project of ‘governmentality’ then is the main authority shaping the writing and conduct of the four Teaching Assistants. A project that “has population as its main target and the apparatuses of security as its essential mechanism” (Foucault, 2007:108). This ‘authority’ in Rose’s words, or project of governmentality in Foucault’s words, is analysed by me with recourse to a ‘governmentality analytic’ (Burchell and Miller 1991) developed by a group of Foucauldian thinkers as a critical lens through which to analyse the complex material and immaterial processes of governance, amongst Advanced Liberal Democracies, that Foucault refers to when he talks of ‘governmentality’ in terms of

a certain way of thinking and acting embodied in all those attempts to know and govern the wealth, health and happiness of population

(Rose and Miller 1992:174)

Wherein,


Government as the historically constituted matrix…. within which authorities seek to shape the beliefs and conduct of others is desired directions by acting upon their will, their circumstances and their environment.

(Rose and Miller 1992:175)
The governmentality analytic attempts to identify how the system of governance or authority is sustained, and how its ideological practices are part of what sustains it, whereby for example “neoliberalism reactivates liberal principles” (1992:198). According to Nicholas Rose and Peter Miller,

*Power is not so much a matter of imposing constraints upon citizens as of making up citizens capable of bearing a regulated freedom.*


In relation to this pathway of ‘authority’, I make recourse to other thinkers, who whilst not part of the ‘governmentality analytic’ school, are influenced by Foucauldian conceptualisations of power/knowledge that complement the thinking of the governmentality analytic school. Latour (1986) in this case deploys similar kinds of metaphor in relation to the the Foucauldian concept of relationality with concept-terms such as ‘connectivity’ and ‘governing at a distance’ (Latour 1986) producing an intertextuality and interdiscursivity that indicates an emergent conceptual lexicon that calls for a post liberal analytic.

Latour writes about the exercise of power as an *effect* rather than a cause. (Law 1986: 266) According to this view, power is not something “you can hoard or posses” not a “substance” but a “set of relations”. Those who are powerful, he argues “are not those who ‘hold’ power in principle but those who practically define or define what holds everyone together”. (ibid:271). Power works, he claims by “enrolling many actors” (ibid). He goes on to say, that the sociologist should abandon study on the social and focus on the forms and in particular the “methods of association” (ibid) used by those who seek to enrol others. It is through such mechanisms that “methods of long distance control” can be deployed says Latour. He proposes two approaches of the analysis of power; the diffusion model and the translation model.

1) The diffusion model: commands are obeyed and disseminated because they obtain an initial impetus from their powerful source

2) The command model: commands are repeated if they are respected because they are personally passed from hand to hand by translators, agents or actors who do it for reasons of their own.

(Latour in Law 1986:268)
Power on this view, is a composition, a set of actors, “temporarily enrolled in the schemes of the powerful and who lend their efforts to the project” (ibid). This is a “method of association” where “material and extra somatic resources”, including ‘inscriptions’, offer ways of linking people in a project of connectivity” (ibid). Society here is not seen as a “referent of a definition but as being performed through the various efforts to define it”. (Law 1986 :18) In this sense, Latour proposes a shift in the conceptual understanding of power from “principle to practice” that is, “not as a cause of people’s behaviour but as a consequence of an intense activity of enrolling, convincing and enlisting practice” (Latour in Law 1986:273). On this view, authorities are an effect composed of a network of forces and power that is is accorded to them. Despite differences, it strikes me that these two schools of thought (the governmentality school after Foucault (1991) and the sociology of knowledge school after Latour (1986) do speak to one another, both in the way they look to forms of structuralism as diagnostic tools and invent conceptual lexicons attempting to articulate a new outillage mental that is adequate to our post-liberal times.

Finally, I consider the notion of experience as the foundation of knowledge, after Scott (1991) and after Rorty (1979, 1989) who both articulate a poststructuralist ‘shift’ from experience to language whereby the self is not ‘a ‘thing’ with attitudes so much as the set of attitudes themselves’ (Hall, 1994:97). Like those of the governmentality school, these writers from the disciplines of feminism and philosophy (New Pragmatism) problematise the Enlightenment view of human nature that liberal democracy perpetuates as a foundationalist discourse that presupposes experience as the foundation of knowledge; a notion Foucault problematises as the ‘humanist analytic’ (Foucault in Bouchard, 1977).

**Teleologies:** In his fourth pathway Rose asks,

*What forms of life are the aims ideals or exemplars for these different practices and working upon persons: What codes of knowledge support these ideals and to what ethical valorisation are they tied? In what ways are these modes of personhood heterogeneous and specific and historically contingent?*
I discuss a teleological strand of ‘self-help’ that is discernable in the student narratives and university curriculum and national policy under review. It manifests in discourses of learner autonomy, learner managed learning, entrepreneur of the self, flexible worker. It is traceable in the student narratives in terms of ‘subject effects’ of responsibilisation, that become ‘enjoined’ in worker – learner- citizen identities. This particular teleological strand of autonomy/self help/self-interest assumes a moral inflection, evident in the self/work ethic of the protestant reformation, where self interest is linked to morality in the teleological project of salvation, and where ‘ethic’ is intended as an imperative. It is a familiar teleological strand from the New Labour discourse of the third way as a via between the ‘hard market managerialism’ of the New Right, and the ‘ineffective philanthropy’ of the ‘old left’ which draws on a seventeenth century evangelical lexicon of rights and responsibilities.

The imperative for autonomy converges with a market imperative of laissez faire as an inherited discursive formation from the neo classical conception of economics, which still informs present day logic and practices of economics. This laissez faire ethos of disinterestness is implicit in some western styles of government that has little appetite to govern; that profess a non authoritarian, non interventionist, democratic character – as a style of ‘soft’ governance which allows ‘the individual’ ‘freedom of choice’ in a ‘stakeholder society’ whereby the notion of autonomy is inflected with a notion of freedom, individualism and choice. In this way, an historical formation that is linked to the neoclassical ideology of free market and a protestant ethic ideology of self determinism is reworked as a chain of significance that inscribes self help/interest as a democratic and thereby moral imperative. This moral inflection inscribes dependency as immoral.

The same market logic and discourse of economic and moral disinterestedness that inflicts global migration policy and practice, serves to purge national discourses of governance of politicised signifiers, whereby those who are discriminated in ‘society’ cannot be signified, wherein therefore there is no need for a state to assume the burden of care for them, according to a hollowed out
lexicon of market economy which serves to sanitise the social and underscore a need for individuals to assume a care for the self, in the Foucauldian sense.

In relation to this pathway, the genealogy documents the ways in which these logics are inscribed; dependency as a moral negative, self interest as a moral imperative, and a project of rights and responsibilities – teleological strands which constitute an ethics of the subject, inscribing modes for the care for the self. These teleological strands are traceable in the reading and writing practices of the student narratives, in the university curriculum and pedagogical texts, in the regulatory practices of national and international policy across other domains - in ways that are both heterogeneous and historically specific. The genealogy tries to illustrate how these lexical chains of the Learning lexicon are also historical figurations, that have formed and reformed to serve interests, different to but analogous with, those of seventeenth century and twentieth century Britain, at particular hegemonic ‘moments’. The genealogy traces the way in which the teleological strands have converged, separated and mutated to reproduce and reinforce present day processes, and representations of those processes, which are not always adequate to the actual processes, in which case they become ideological.

The dominant teleological theme of Third Way that characterises the New Labour administration is an enigmatic telos. It brings three quite disparate rationalities of government together; government as disinterested, as operating at a distance, as a neoclassical rationality of rational choice - and makes them chime, not least by reworking and reproducing them through a grid of structures and strategies that refine and regulate them.

A distinctive strand of the Third Way teleology is woven into Tony Blair’s ‘speech acts’ on war and security as a vehicle for regime change. In this sense the watershed moment of 9/11 (September 2001) as a catalytic moment is symbolic not literal. The regime change involves closer transatlantic relations between the USA and Britain, a move towards European Integration, and a promotion of Democracy as governmentality. This ‘reordering of the world’ according to ‘the right kind of democracy’ (Elliot Abrams) that is to be achieved through a ‘war on terror’ has its precedent in ‘Project Democracy’ of 1980s in
the USA. Its leitmotifs such as ‘the axis of rogue states’ recur across international and Leader speeches for subsequent generations.

Project Democracy was designed to spread the idea of freedom around the world and promote Democracy as governance. It was managed by the Office of Public Diplomacy which produced and disseminated dossiers with construals of the Contras as ‘freedom fighters’ in a war waged against ‘rogue states’.

Its lexicon of *freedom fighting, negative liberty, democracy, financial interests, social justice, political allegiances, immanence of threat and risk* are woven together in a moralistic even messianic narrative of the ‘right kind of’ democracy. This lexicon informs the ‘speech acts’ of *justum bellum* during Tony Blair’s time as Leader. In this sense, a complex ensemble of teleologies draw on; neoclassical economics in the form of notions of laissez faire, rational choice, methodological individualism - as strands informing present day neoliberalism; ‘just war’ genealogies as strands that inform the *Third* (evangelical) Way and liberal democracy, and human genealogies of knowledge such as empiricism that inscribes foundationalist notions of experience.

**Strategies:** Of the fifth pathway Rose asks,

*How are these procedures for regulating the capacity for persons linked into the wider moral social and political objectives concerning the undesirable and desirable features of populations, workforce, family society?*

(Rose 1998:28)

During the discussion of the four narratives I consider the many strategies that are deployed at different levels in relation to the transformation of Higher Education during the period of study between 2001-2011 which is characterised by a neoliberal agenda.

*What is this neoliberalism?’ asks Foucault ‘The problem of neo liberalism is rather how the overall exercise of political power can be modelled on the principles of a market economy... taking the formal principles of a market economy and referring and relating them to - of projecting them on a general art of government.*
Rose’s framework applies to the thesis in relation to the three linked chapters 4, 5 and 6 as these are the constituent parts of the genealogy. Overall the pathways serve to articulate and frame discursive formations in Higher Education and international domains such as Human Rights, Development and Security in order to illustrate the heterogeneous aspect of genealogical enquiry. The pathways serve to articulate and contain the scale and scope necessary to a genealogical account, and provide the structure for a genealogy of Reflective Practice, conducted in order to answer the orienting question of the thesis: Reflective Practice; why now, why here, and in whose interests?

To summarise, this chapter provides an overview of the genealogy. The three main writers reviewed above, Dean, Butler and Rose, who write after Foucault, extend and challenge a Foucauldian perspective of the genealogy as a ‘history of the present’ and critical ‘method’ in ways that are relevant to the thesis. The writers of the post Foucauldian ‘governmentality school’ extend an analytic which I have attempted to adopt, unevenly, with a view to practising an alternative analytic to that problematised by Foucault as the ‘humanist analytic’ (Foucault in Bouchard 1977:159) The before Foucault retrospective at the start of this section highlights the traditional dimension of the genealogy, in contrast to the way in which Foucault after Nietzsche, and others since, have used it for critique. It also highlights the way in which any genealogy is a narrative of its time - wherein the nineteenth century genealogy is predominantly one of human progress, the twentieth century genealogy is predominantly one of deconstruction and perhaps the twenty first century genealogy is one of securitisation. The fine line between the fictive and non- fictive accounts that the formal and informal genealogies tell (including my own), of who we are and the stories we live by, is the main emphasis of this section on methodology.

I turn now to the principal case study of the thesis which consists in an analysis of four narratives of self written by four Teaching Assistants on a degree course between 2003-2008 in a Grow Your Own Teacher project at a London University. Their documents act as traces of a ‘history of the present’.
Notes for chapter 3.

1. A good discussion of the similarities between Butler and Foucault’s thinking is made by Sarah Salih in *Judith Butler* 2002 Routledge

2. A good discussion of Harraway’s cyborg imagery is made by Tony Davies in *Humanism* (pgs 138-139 1997 Routledge) where he talks about the ‘prosthetic character of contemporary life’.

3. In his later works such as *The Birth of Biopolitics* and other lectures given from the series Lectures at the College de France 1978-1979 edited by Michael Senellart, Francis Ewald and Alessandro Fontana and translated by Geoffrey Burchell, Foucault talks about power in terms of disciplinary power, bio power and pastoral power. His point is that power is exercised only over free subjects and only in so far as they are free. It is here too that he develops the notion of power as operating Omnes et Singulatim in *Towards a Criticism of Political Reason* 1979. Government, in this view is understood not as an institution but as an activity. In relation and of importance to my thesis is the series of Lectures entitled *Security Territory and Populations 1978-1979* (part of the same series of lectures at the College de France edited by Michel Senellart translated Francois Ewald and Alessandro Fontana and translated by Graham Burchell published in 2009 Palgrave Macmillan), where Foucault talks about government as a form of political power that evolved with the emergence of modern state.
CHAPTER 4:

Part 1: The Apparatus of Reflective Practice and

The Case Study: Grow Your Own Teacher

Part 2: The Four Narratives: Heather, Judy, June Linda

Part 3: A Discussion of the Four Narratives
This chapter is presented in four parts. The first part presents the ‘apparatus’ of reflective practice. The second part presents the context in which the case study takes place during which four teaching assistants write a dissertation for a Work Based Learning degree between 2003 and 2008. The programme within which the four Teaching Assistants wrote their narratives, was organised in relation to a partnership-project between the University, the local borough and the schools in which they worked. The project was called ‘Grow Your Own Teacher’. The narratives are written within an epistemological paradigm of experiential learning and reflective practice.

The third part of this chapter consists in the Case Study analysis.

The fourth part is a discussion of the themes or findings that emerge from the Case Study analysis.

Part 1 of the chapter aims to frame the means that sustains Reflective Practice as a form of knowhow today via a complex apparatus. This part of the chapter presents the apparatus via a series of small sample-studies of some of the elements of the apparatus: reflection as an instrument of the ‘self-help’ industry; reflection as a genealogy of knowledge with classical roots and reflection as a technology of government in the form of human-centred policy that is legitimated by frameworks such as QAA and OECD. The elements combine to generate academic discourses and processes of Reflective Practice within the University.
Chapter 4 Part 1: The discursive apparatus of Reflective Practice

What I’m trying to single out with this term (apparatus) is, first and foremost, a thoroughly heterogenous set consisting of discourses institutions architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical moral and philanthropic propositions – in short the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the network that can be established between these elements.…

(Foucault in Gordon 1980: 194)

In part 1 of this chapter, I attempt to ‘flesh out’ some of the discursive elements of the apparatus that supports Reflective Practice in contemporary Higher Education, that make it practicable and amenable to those of us who study and work in the sector. I do this with recourse to a series of sample studies: the first is of a ‘screen shot’ which provides an instance of a multimodal representation of Reflective Practice on Amazon; the second sample study is of a seminal book that frames an instance of Reflective Practice upon which I base my case for reflection being a discrete genealogy of knowledge with classical roots; the third sample study is of Quality Assurance policy literature which serves as an instance of the legitimisation of Reflective Practice by the University authorities; and the fourth sample study is of a resource pack, as an instance of the popularisation and dissemination of Reflective Practice as a discursive and practice and regulatory form. These sample studies, collectively, serve to illustrate the means, that is the elements of the apparatus, that supports Reflective Practice as a discursive practice.

I go on then to present a brief analysis of the man and the times with a view to diagnosing the ways in which this strategic complex or apparatus brings thought to bear on our enrolment, as actors, into the schema of Reflective Practice in Higher Education. These sample studies serve to frame the means.
1) A ‘screen shot’ from Amazon

I begin with a ‘search’ of Reflective Practice via Google which takes me to an Amazon ‘screen shot’ (appendix A) of Reflective Practice. This screen-shot frames an embedded assumption that the reader (qua subject), can through reflection, change or direct self conduct in ways that can be planned for.

There are strong similarities amongst the ‘blurb-texts’ of the books being advertised through the Amazon ‘screen shot’. The ‘search’ is confined to the first ten books listed with the ‘look inside’ icon, to serve as a sample study that infers a level of topicality and possibly typicality. One notices at a glance that the main narrative which the blurb-texts inhere, is characteristic of the *self-help* genre; promising change, transforming practice (3,5), professionalizing the reader (1,2,3,4,6,9,10), assuring survival (10).

The ‘screen shot’ lists publications in domains other than Education: Health Studies, Nursing, Social Work, Professional Practice, Counselling and Psychotherapy. This framing of Reflective Practice as a flexible practice that is transferable over a cross-section of statutory, public and private and therapeutic sectors, is reinforced by the digital design mode of the Amazon platform to generate more publications along the same line; *if you enjoyed this book you will probably like these/others who have bought this book have also bought these* wherein the medium reinforces the message, that Reflective Practice is a joined up, user-friendly and popular tool for the professional practitioner.

The ‘screen shot’ links Reflective Practice to the notion of purpose: *for* gaining a qualification, (*Achieving QTLS* Barentsen and Malthouse, 2013); *for* accreditation, (*Counselling* Bager Charleston, 2010); and *for* developing knowhow. A ‘for purpose’ ethic is thus inscribed by the genre; ‘Beginning Reflective Practice’; ‘Pocket Guide to Reflective Practice’ and ‘Handbook of Reflective Practice’. The sample study serves to show the way in which Reflective Practice is construed on Amazon, as a seasoned field of theory and practice in its own right, and underpinned by epistemological credentials.

The blurb-texts in the ‘screen shot’ position the reader constructively and proactively, as ‘already professional’ but ‘busy’ or needing ‘support or help’ and desirous to become a ‘better’ professional. They position the authors of the books
as having the expertise to *get these needs met* providing always, that the reader qua subject follows a ‘simple method’ pathway to success, recovery or understanding; a ‘step by step practical method’ (1), an ‘accessible guide’ (6) some ‘tips and guidelines’ (7) a ‘practical guide’ (8) a ‘step by step journey’ (9).

Collocations of Reflective Practice recur in this set of blurb-texts with motifs of ‘learning’, ‘personal’, ‘development’ and ‘good practice’. Chains of equivalence are made between: ‘professional motivation satisfaction and deep levels of learning’ (1); ‘thoughts, feelings and actions’ (2); ‘reflective practitioner and teacher…and teaching’ (6); ‘understanding of reflective practice and good practice and counselling and psychotherapy’ (9).

A ‘list’ trope characterises the blurb-texts which produce equivalences by association and the books are presented as:

‘popular and highly readable’ (1); ‘she (the author) clearly explains reflection, reflexivity, narrative, metaphor, and complexity’ (1)

in a lexicon that equates Reflective Practice with *both* academic discourse and pragmatism.

The blurb-texts assume a categorical modality: ‘reflective practice has relevance to all healthcare practitioners’ (8); ‘Reflective Practice enables us to make sense of and learn from experience’ (5); ‘Reflective Practice is a key element in Teaching’ (6). The grammatical mood of the blurb-texts is declarative or imperative *even where* the interrogative is signposted; ‘get to the bottom of the What, Why and How’ (7).

The metaphors enlisted in the promotion of the books are of ‘progress’, that is as something which entails struggle whereby the book ‘helps practitioners how to’… ‘adapt and accommodate to different circumstances’ (8) or ‘takes students on a step by step journey’ (9).

Relationally, the modality, mood and metaphors deployed by this randomly selected set of blurb-texts from the ‘screen shot’ sample study evoke an evangelical narrative, wherein reflective practice is represented as *the way* to achieve something, albeit with difficulty, through stages a trope which is imitative of the archetypal journey full of challenges that the journeyman must overcome to find the ‘holy grail’; a coming of age narrative, a *bildungsroman*. 
‘Reflective Practice’ and ‘reflection’ are represented by nominalisations in all of the blurb-texts in a way that reinforces the notion of Reflective Practice as a process, even whilst keeping the meaning of these terms obscure and idealised. At the same time, the nominalisation lends a sort of material ‘thingyness’ to the idea of reflection or reflective practice and its equivalents, whereby ‘learning’ can be ‘captured’ (2) and ‘experience’ can be ‘used’ (5) and measured.

The presupposition that experience is the foundation of knowledge and reflection is a way of ‘converting a usable past into a viable future’ (Fuller 2000:12) informs all ten texts, sometimes stated explicitly (1, 5), but generally implicit; it is a ‘common sense’ given. The use of the gerund to inscribe imperatives of urgency transforming or perpetual action learning, developing, maintaining in a present continuous mode, is similar to that which characterises the ‘change literature’ as a genre.

The discursive purpose of the blurb-texts is to give the reader qua subject the knowhow to achieve the right kind of professional practice, regardless of the domain, through more and better self–management; a managerialist ethic (Clarke, J. 1997). The pronouns deployed by the blurb-texts vary (you/we/the practitioner) in their address to the reader but all inscribe personal agency as the imperative. The most frequently used word/verb-stem in this sample is ‘practice/practical/practitioner’. The ‘self-help’ characteristic frames a family-resemblance profile amongst the texts, which appertains to a cross-section of lexical fields of emotional intelligence, pragmatism, human-centred policy, evangelism, academia and the commercial.

Collectively, the texts in the ‘screen shot’ produce an ethos of ‘diversity’ and a ‘can do’ ethic for action; a ‘both/ and’ pluralism; a distinct ‘practice turn’ emphasis (Schatzki et al, 2001) in a ‘simple- method’ style that is infectious.
The element of the apparatus that supports Reflective Practice as knowhow is framed by this sample which illustrates the way in which thought is brought to bear, by the juxtaposition of the multi-modal composition of the ‘screen shot’ in the form of the blurb-texts, the digital design mode, and the monopolising power of Amazon as publisher. This combination works to fashion a niche market that acts on the reader, to ‘enrol’ herself (Latour, 1986) into the Reflective Practice order as a vehicle for self-change, that enables one to direct one’s conduct in ways that can be planned for.

2) Reflective Practice as a genealogy of knowledge

For this sample study, I have reviewed a small body of literature and selected a seminal book in relation to Reflective Practice that I consider indicative of a present-day genre that construes reflective practice as knowhow; a genre that has, as I discuss elsewhere in the thesis, classical roots. The literature, represented in the bibliography, has been published during the 21st century. From this small corpus, I have identified three categories that differentiate the kind of Reflective Practice being theorised currently in the academy; reflection theory, critical reflection, reflexivity. These categories are not always defined in the literature, as they may appear obvious, but where they are defined I have used those definitions to help me identify the different interpretations of Reflective Practice that represent present-day (21st century) conceptualisations and applications of Reflective Practice in relation to theory, epistemology, pedagogy and practice in Higher Education.

**reflective theory**; is a term used throughout the corpus that adopts the premise ‘that the object of study can have its form substance or actions explained in terms of a form substance or agency outside it’ (O’Sullivan et al 1994: 262). In this context, ‘representations and discourses are seen as reflecting an already-existing and self-evident reality that exists independently of its representation in discourses’ (ibid).

This conceptualisation assumes and inheres a notion of referentiality that understands reflection as a reflection of the real (not that is as something which is discursively constituted). This mirror-image metaphor inherited from an
enlightenment conceptualisation of knowledge (Locke 1689), which in turn is inherited it from a classical conceptualisation of knowledge (Cicero 50 BC) construes reflection as mirroring something ‘out there’ and informs the literatures reviewed here in different ways; not least in ways that tie reflection/critical reflection/reflexivity to the empiricist notion of experience as the foundation of knowledge.

**critical reflection;** is a term used in the corpus (including those books of the ‘screen shot’) often interchangeably with ‘reflective criticism’ and ‘critical reflective practice’; (e.g. Fook, J. & Gardner, F. 2007, Bolton, G. 2010, Pollard, A. 2002, Rushton, I. & Suter, M 2012). These are terms which denote ‘criticality’ as something which brings thought to bear in some way on the object. ‘Criticality’ is often deployed as a signifier for change in these literatures, with an emphasis on change of personal practice.

**reflexivity;** is a term less used in the corpus reviewed in comparison to ‘reflection’ or ‘critical reflection’. Where used (e.g. Fook, J. & Gardner, F. 2007, Bolton, G. 2001), it premises the self as the (primary or sole) site of knowledge-construction, meaning-making and (personal) transformation. In this context, ‘reflexivity’ inheres a continuous monitoring of one’s ‘thoughts feelings and actions’ (Fook & Gardner 2007:14) or ‘attitudes, thought processes, values, assumptions, prejudices and habitual actions’ (Bolton 2010:13). ‘Reflexivity’ is assumed by this genre of literatures reviewed, to be a technique for gaining knowhow, or self-understanding, or (work/learning-based) contextual knowledge via practices of self regulation; it is delivered through a narrative that proposes such action **will lead to** self-actualisation.

The organisation of reflective practice into these categories by the academy, attests to the classical roots and mutations of reflective practice as a genealogy of knowledge, that has reinvented itself after Cicero (50 BC), after a humanist-enlightenment paradigm (Locke 1689) to understand experience as the foundation of knowledge. According to this view, thinking ‘emerges’ in a (solipsistic) realm of reflection from where the ‘reflective practitioner’ **strives** to grasp the ‘real world’ as it were, ‘out there’. What emerges from the review of literature is Reflective Practice as a classical genealogy of knowledge that currently occupies a niche area of the book industry and international policy
literature, as *knowhow*; a genealogy of knowledge that ‘returns’ albeit in a different form, like Foucault’s recurrent ‘slot’ in the historical landscape, to be filled so as to serve the historically specific hegemonic interest, in this instance by inscribing, hailing, interpolating a *striving* subject position; to be a better citizen, Christian, in-mate, learner, professional, parent and manager of the self; it does this reflexively, as a genealogy of knowledge, by trading on classical imperatives of citizenship and enlightenment tropes of evangelism.

The three categorical principles that conjoin in the literatures reviewed constitute a genre of Reflection as knowhow. The genre innovates on an enlightenment legacy which has already theorised reflection as a genealogy of knowledge into existence in the seventeenth century through the writing of John Locke (after Cicero; please see chapter 6 below). Locke theorises the *role* of reflective practice as making recourse to a ‘usable past’ or memory in order to apply it to present action or identity in ways that are channelled towards spiritual salvation. In this sense, I propose that the early enlightenment genealogy of knowledge, of the past as a resource that is ‘retroactively’ (Zizek, 1991:17) changed to fit present concerns for purpose (salvation), is retained by the twenty-first century re-make of Reflective Practice as knowhow.

In this context, I discuss below a sample text from this emergent body of literature that deploys critical reflection as a form of personal knowhow, and subscribes to the notion that through reflection one can change or direct self conduct in ways that can be planned for. The (sample) book is ‘Practising Critical Reflection: a Resource Handbook’ published in 2007, written by Jan Fook and Fiona Gardner, both of whom are academics in the field of Professional Studies.

The authors contextualise critical reflection in relation to a notion of ‘productive reflection’ which is the title of a book (Cressey 2006) whose significance for the writers can probably be inferred from the fact that they quote from its title. Fook and Gardner use the Cressey definition as a way of rationalising ‘critical reflection’ as *capacity* (to be productive); ‘this capacity to unsettle, to challenge taken-for-granted disciplinary boundaries (is) the gift of critical reflection.’ (2007:14)
Their focus on ‘capacity’ is salient, in so far that as a term of reference it is emblematic of the innovative dimension of Reflective Practice as knowhow, that fits this enlightenment and classical episteme for purpose in our twenty first century. ‘Capacity’ is a leitmotif that characterises contemporary policy literatures, as a threshold signifier, in both the domestic spheres of Health, Education and Welfare policy literature and the international spheres of Human Rights, Development and Human Security policy literature. It informs the policy strategies of Special Needs and Gifted and Talented in schooling as a criterion for additional support; of Mental Health as an indicator of autonomy qua subjecthood; of Welfare as an indicator of benefit candidacy. In international policy, ‘capacity building’ is at the centre of strategic governance (UNSG 2010 23-24).

Its association with autonomy lends a quality of gravitas, as autonomy is that criterion which determines who can be awarded the status of subject in a rule of law tradition and logic that privileges rights over needs. In this sense, ‘capacity’ is the threshold-indicator that determines the right to aid and support, or not. Those deemed to have the right, have by definition autonomy and will be supported for their potential to build on that capacity; those deemed not to have the right-autonomy-potential-capacity, will be managed by external authorities (ofsted, the institution, the military). In this sense, ‘capacity’ is the fulcrum of human agency whether at an individual (local) or international (global) level. It is synonymous in the policy literatures with agency, subjecthood and in effect, subjectivity.

‘Capacity’ is a strangely familiar signifier; its heterogenous appearance across diverse spheres nonetheless inscribes an homogenising effect; it is at the same time an authoritative discourse which everyone wants to, and can hail into their schema - precisely because of its diverse application. Fook and Gardner construe ‘capacity’ as the capacity to challenge one’s own ideological assumptions that have emerged out of one’s ‘disciplinary boundaries’.

*Individuals can participate in their own domination by holding self - defeating beliefs about their place in the social structure their own power and possibilities for change* (Fook and Gardner 2007;35)
The term ‘disciplinary boundaries’ is also a leitmotif from the lexical field of Professional Studies (Costley, C. 2008) within which Fook and Gardner are writing; it signifies a problematisation of the system in Higher Education of separate disciplines. The field argues, unless stated otherwise, that transdisciplinarity is a new academic ethic which seeks to break down ‘disciplinary boundaries’ with a view to freeing (people) from the ideological binds that inform their disciplinary enclosures; Fook and Gardner deploy an idiom that appears progressive not least in that it imitates, through metalepsis, both the neoliberal economic discourse of breaking down barriers in order to open up free trade, and the post-structuralist discourse of deconstruction, as signposted by a third leitmotif taken for granted which is positioned in front of the disciplinary boundaries leitmotif, in order to problematise it.

The effect of juxtapositioning leitmotifs that belong to discrete lexicons and placing them, as it were, side by side (so as to disrupt their boundaries), along with the blending of discourses such as neoliberalism and post-structuralism as though there were no conflict in this coupling is less, confusing (as one might expect) than conflating; the bricolage style produces a kind of melting-pot effect. In this way, Fook and Gardner juggle leitmotifs from three different disciplinary discourses; policy making, deconstructionism and Professional Studies, in a condensed space to produce a compound effect. The ‘topical’ strategic policy strand is overlaid onto the ‘critical’ deconstructionist strand which is overlaid onto the ‘epistemological’ Professional Studies strand, in a way that blurs the boundaries between them. This ‘drag and drop’ technique of bringing together discrete disciplinary leitmotifs or lexical fields, which may not share the same conceptual premises, and may belong to different analytical paradigms that are conflictual, as though they shared a family resemblance, is a characteristic of the knowhow genre, of which I argue, Reflective Practice is one. This bricolage trope obscures difference, where too many ingredients are added to the broth as it were, in order ‘to spice it up’. ‘Spicing it up’ is a (perhaps necessary) way of making the book amenable to its readers in relation to an historically specific epistemic literacy, through which we are enjoined to read the world, where words stand for labels and meaning is not meant to be struggled over, where choice means variety and learning is lifestyled.
In other words, the writers produce in form what they are arguing in theory – a break down of ‘disciplinary boundaries’ rationalised as an ‘all inclusive approach’ to learning. Notwithstanding, their own discourse is predominantly situated in a organisation learning, professional practice, work- based learning- lifelong learning ‘field of study’ or trajectory. Modifiers of ‘inclusive’, ‘applied flexibly’ and ‘adaptable’ indicate the ideological values that (make it appealing and) are being pushed by these authors, which is that critical reflection is for action. In this sense it bears rather a family resemblance to the knowhow genealogies of knowledge that emerged at the end of the twentieth century discussed in chapter 5; Managerialism, New Public Management, Quality Assurance, Audit, Governance Theory – a cluster of knowhow that is legitimised epistemologically by Lifelong Learning’s recourse to an empirical paradigm of experiential learning and reflection on practice that locates itself within a foundationalist outillage mental that understands experience to be the foundation of knowledge.

The change imperative is nowhere more evident than in the prefix trans deployed by this field (Costley, C. 2008) in a desire to reconfigure the statutory or public or professional sector in terms that are less expert-oriented than managerially-oriented. According to Wikipedia - the prefix trans is a key morpheme in the English language that signifies a change from one state to another, one condition to another; a going through, across, over; transfer, transcend, transcribe, transform, transport. The notion of ‘transdisciplinarity’ is deployed in this sense in relation to an imperative for change; going through across over borders or boundaries as a transitive process which necessitates a composition of an ‘agent of change’ and an ‘affected’ or ‘object’ of change; it is coercive. It is a recurrent prefix in the change literatures that often works in a binary mode with the problematised notion of ‘disciplinary boundaries’. ‘Transdisciplinarity’, when deployed in the new knowhow literatures usually refers, unless stated otherwise, to a breaking down of resistance, evoking a revolutionary effect; down with the old order in with the new.

It appears to imitate a deconstructive spirit of the kind that pervades the Archaeology of Knowledge where Foucault urges us to ‘question those divisions or groupings with which we have become so familiar’ (2002: 24) ‘between
genres such as science literature philosophy religion history fiction etc’ (2002: 24) but the difference is, that whereas Foucault wishes to break down the barriers in order to problematise the ‘synthesising operation of the unities of discourse’ (2002: 24), the knowhow genre wishes to instil a unifying discourse that transcends the disciplines or reduces them to a one size fits all; in other words the intentions of these two strands are very different.

Foucauldian conceptualisations of discourses of power are signposted in Fook and Gardner’s text by phrases such as ‘structural and personal levels of power interact in any one person’s experience of power’ (2007: 12) but the Foucauldian premise of the ‘non acceptance of the pre eminence of structures in society’, is paradoxically turned into a set of guidelines for the acculturation of the self into those very structures. In this sense, the ‘Foucault-made-easy’ or simple method to ‘postmodernism and post-structuralism’ that is inferred by Fook and Gardner’s book oversimplifies the concepts out of one significance, and into another.

My point here, is that in presenting critical reflection as a capacity to change one’s own beliefs where they may be deemed ‘ideological’ and challenging structures such as ‘disciplinary boundaries’ also deemed to be ideological - the authors offer critical reflection as a kind of panacea, a ‘gift’ (2007:14) to produce a self-fashioned and usable past, present and future in a discourse considered to mirror reality, in a way that is itself ideological.

Furthermore, the formulaic trope of the knowhow genre leaves the way open for easy readings of Foucault’s notion of the subject as capable of its own constitution through what he calls the ‘care for the self’ (Foucault 1988) in a way that may be seen to affirm the panacea idea that Fook and Gardner are proposing.

Their objective however, is not to analyse structures in order to understand the mechanisms by which economic social and political power is distributed in society, nor to diagnose the operations of power, but to accept the operations of power - and survive; self- help. The Lockean notion that whilst “geometry and ethics and progress by reasoning” are amenable to us, there are ‘real world’ essences we cannot know, wherein we must make do with our experience and
observation, is imitated here with recourse to (enlightenment) empiricism, as a tried and tested paradigm, that can contain “the uncertainty complexity and risk” (Fook and Gardner 2007:17) that Fook and Gardner identify as part of everyday life-itself in a way that represents ‘uncertainty complexity and risk’ as natural and normal.

This innovation on an enlightenment legacy of theorisation, premised on the foundationalist idea that experience is the foundation of knowledge, brings Reflective Practice into the twenty-first century as a technology of government. This technology seeks to prevent risk through a new approach to governance that distances itself from the use of force (external agency) and looks to human agency as a site of risk prevention. The UN secretary general’s Human Security report to the General Assembly makes this clear.

*The use of force is not envisaged in the application of the human security concept. The focus of human security is on fostering Government and local capacities and strengthening the resilience of both to emerging challenges in ways that are mutually reinforcing preventive and comprehensive.*

(UNSG 2010 23-24 cited in Chandler 2013:122)

The technologies of self as regulated, managed, measured, league tabled, peer-reviewed and monitored, that characterise this discourse of Reflective Practice and the wider family of the *knowhow* genre are calculi of risk-minimalisation. Knowledge here is serving a particular purpose in an era where the technological means of the digital revolution, a knowledge-based economy, a 24/7 imperative and a post 9/11 sensibility inscribe imperatives for ‘uncertainty complexity and risk’; the effect of which is *as though* the boundaries between time and space have themselves been dissolved, in an “annihilation of space through time” which produces a “modus operandi (capitalism) that operates in continuous space and time” (Harvey 2003:87-88). This is the new ‘spatio temporal fix’ (ibid) that provides an “alternative means for recovering profitability and improving competitiveness” Moody 2007:13), in a ‘risk society’ (Beck 1992), wherein Reflective Practice may be understood in relation to risk-preventive technologies of self. Viewed in this way, Fook and Gardner’s ‘bricolage’ effect
may also be understood as an expression of the complexity of twenty-first century structures of knowledge that link to human security; biotechnology, cybernetics, the ‘neurological turn’ that proposes the brain changes itself, and other genealogical strands of the complexity sciences (Dillon 2000) often articulated in relation to algebraic formulae.

In this context, the recourse to bricolage may be thought of in terms of an oversimplified isomorphism of these complexity sciences, an attempt to link together ideas and society through a ‘drag and drop’ imitation of a postmodernist poetic of fragmentation. It brings a weak zeitgeist (at best) to bear on the subject effects of those who would enrol themselves into this schema of the reflexive good citizen; it is symptomatic of the hybrid-subjectivity that characterises contemporary technologies of self. Reflective Practice here is proposed as a normative technology of government, thought necessary for being in the world today - in a way perhaps not dissimilar to the catechism, the commonplace book, or the personalised bible of the Reformation.

One of the elements making up the apparatus of Reflective Practice is therefore its form as a discrete genealogy of knowledge; that recurs in different forms at different historical moments as a technology of government, to serve the hegemonic interests of its time.

3) Institutionalising Reflective Practice; Quality Assurance.

One form that Reflective Practice as a technology of government takes, is that of an assessment criterion and a learning outcome in the Module Descriptions and Programme Specs of a vast range of disciplines in Higher Education, not only in the Social Sciences but in Law, Accountancy and Medicine, in both the ‘new’ and ‘red brick’ Universities of the UK. In many cases the assessment criterion is linked to the learning outcome in a tied way.

Reflective Practice informs the Learning Teaching and Assessment strategies of Universities as well as other Quality Assurance technologies; from the promotional literatures and sites which deploy the ‘student reflection’ for recruitment purposes, to ‘the personal profile’ of the appraisal, and the Mission Statement of the Directorate that dedicates itself to ‘the enhanced student
experience’. Reflective Practice provides a strategic means for collecting data for Quality Assurance purposes via questionnaires and student surveys.

Reflective Practice operates as an assessable technology of learning that equates in status to the examination and the traditional essay in the form of; the Reflective Essay, the Learning Diary, the Blog and peer review activity. As an assessable technology it is deployed for league-table purposes in institutional assessments.

It operates as a quality assurable technology, wherein the QAA adopts the theorisations of Reflective Practice as knowhow for their legitimising base line. Reflective Practice is deployed by the QAA as a mode for institutional review, as audit, as policy, as a vehicle for Continuing Professional Development as a ‘model of good practice’ as a ‘benchmark’ for assuring standards and as a criterion for accreditation in programmes of APEL or validation.

It is deployed as evidence: to evidence ‘good practice’ in Enhancement Led Institutional Reviews (ELIR):

The Universities Scotland Teaching Quality Forum Project provides guidelines for good practice in Reflective Analysis when preparing for a ELIR. It is referred to as RA ‘reflective analysis’ and described as ‘evidence’

- **RA should act as a demonstration of the institution’s capacity for self reflection and critical evaluation in relation to the matters within the scope of the ELIR report.**

- **The evaluation will be evidence based and the RA should include the evidence or clear reference to the evidence on which any analysis is based.**

- **The RA is a central element of the ELIR process and the key means by which the ELIR team engages with the Institution under review.**

- **The RA also represents a significant outcome of the process of institutional self-reflection in preparation for the ELIR.**

Annexes, Indexes, Summaries and case-studies of good RA are provided on the ELIR web site.
• Its role is to “highlight the main and the distinctive features of the Institutions arrangements for enhancing student learning experience and securing academic standards”. The RA should “set out the institutions reflections on the effectiveness of its approach to those areas citing the evidence on which these reflections are based”.

• It has to act as a “demonstration of the institution’s capacity for self reflection and critical evaluation’ using ‘evidence based approach’”

• It serves to “limit the amount of descriptive text in the main section of the document.”

• It should “note the close link between the RA and the ELIR report”.

Furthermore,

• RA should make sure that the text of the case studies illustrate the linkage between the institutions strategic approach and its operational management

• RA will explain how student views have been elicited and incorporated and offer a view on the impact of the student engagement.

• The purpose of the RA is not a product in itself; it is a means of making the review work.

Commenters on the RA process are recorded on the website as saying that a reflective analysis calls for:

• A reflective tone with a willingness to reveal weaknesses; pride tempered by a becoming modesty

• A reasoned analysis admitting a problem is likely to lead to more productive discussion

• A truly reflective and analytical RA will be open and transparent… and honest

These collocations of criticality, analysis, evidence-based, transparency and honesty attribute an ideal ethic to the notion of reflective practice.
Elsewhere on the QAA web site, Reflective Practice is deployed as:

- **a means of securing employability in relation to the embedding of professional opportunities within the curriculum to enhance the employability of its students Critical Self reflection as employability (RG1136GP3 May 2013).**

- **a policy objective for effective and pastoral support which encourages self reflection to improve students skills and enhance progression through their studies (RG777GP2 August 2012).**

- **Peer observation providing formative and constructive feedback**

  Teaching and Learning Strategy (RG1055GP1 December 2012)

- **Audit Purposes (University of Worcester 2005)**

- **Staff Development reflection and participation in sharing good practice**

  (Integrated Quality Enhancement Review August 2011 RG777GP2)

- **Threshold Standards in the assessment of Teachers applying for National Professional Qualification for Headship (NPQH). They must;**

- **Reflect upon their further learning and development as they progress through the programme in ways that ‘prepare them for leadership and management’ (page 12 point 37)**

  (The Recording of Teachers’ Professional Development via Self Reflection (Strand 3) April 2007 Professional Development Framework for Teachers in Wales General Teaching Council for Wales).

An HEA/QAA organised Workshop at the University of Aston on Reflective Practice in 2009, stated that Reflective Practice is “crucial as the means of improving the student experience”. The workshop, taken by Liz McKenzie in January 2009, described Reflective Practice as the “capacity to reflect on action so as to engage in continuous learning” after Schon (1983). In a workshop handout, McKenzie features a series of academic writers who are well known in relation to the genre of Reflective Practice; Bolton, 2001; Moon, 2004; Gelter,
They describe reflective practice variously in the following ways on the handout:

Reflection on action reflection in action/ as transforming the social world through our thought and our action/ as capacity/ as more effective when conducted through discussion with others, peers or colleagues / as a way to make sense of experience / principled thinking/ as putting experience into practice/

Reflection is construed in these policy related literatures as purposeful, that is for action, to gain knowhow. In a paper on the QAA website from the ‘Centre for Recording Achievement’ it was noted that in the US the Association of American colleges and Universities (AAC&U) views reflection in terms of personal and social responsibility which is one of the major groups of learning outcomes essential for twenty first graduates;

Diversity learning service learning and integrative learning are part of high impact practices that the Association has championed as part of an educational framework designed for twenty first century education (O’Neill 2012.)

These sample fragments taken from the QAA website (2014) illustrate an interdiscursivity amongst the iterations of Reflective Practice as a form of knowhow imbued with a moral conviction. The connectivity of these iterations is legitimated via this Quality Assurance platform in a system that seeks to standardise its practice and regulate its practitioners in ways that are calculable, auditable, and comparable across heterogenous disciplines and domains of Higher Education and in this sense constitute Reflective Practice as a technology of government.

Governance: OECD.

Another discursive formation that sustains the apparatus of Reflective Practice as knowhow is the OECD. Its own self description as a ‘cohering organisation’ situates it as part of a complex, discursive space through and in which Reflective Practice is reproduced. Apart from linking member countries, the OECD links domains such as education and work through policy, where education for
example is rationalised through a prism of employment policy. This discursive connectivity is achieved primarily with recourse to technologies of calculus that make correlations and produce tables that serve as benchmarks in a context of international competitiveness. Emblematic of this ‘cohering organisation’ is the PISA project which claims to produce “a test that the whole world can take”. (OECD document PISA 2012 Results: Excellence through Equity: page 4).

This claim is based on an ‘equity in outcomes’ discourse that defines equity in education as providing all students (regardless of gender, family background or socio-economic status) with similar opportunities to benefit from education via a particular application of an “opportunity to learn” (ibid) formula, which it presents implicitly as a panacea for social inequality.

Discursively, the formula operates in relation to a logic that states socio-economic factors are not the only (or even the main) factor to be taken into consideration in this equation of ‘equity of outcome’. Once the socio-economic factor is minimalised other factors, which do not depend on the supply of material resources from the centre, are brought to bear as having equivalent weighting in the overall reckoning: the “family structure and student performance” factor (sub-heading, p 64); the “school location and student performance” factor (p 69). This levelling out of the variables as equal components of the formulary, shifts the (traditional) emphasis away from the centre as responsibility-bearing for socio-economic factors, to the periphery; whether that be an individual or smaller unit such as the school. A similar computation is applied to the categorisation of the ‘single parent’ perceived according to this logic of calculus, to be an obstacle to the ‘equity of outcome’.

The single parent is defined in relation to specific criteria X, Y & Z, as the given arithmetic that makes up a single parent. Necessarily, this arithmetic applies as the constant of ‘single-parent-ness’ across all domains, that is all countries, cultures and economies; this constant is construed as a difference that is counter-productive to a logic that seeks commensurability between international league tables. Those (single parents) to whom X, Y & Z does not apply therefore, risk falling outside the category, and may be excluded from possible access to resources. Or, they risk skewing the findings upon which benchmarks for policy are based, which would undermine the effectiveness of policy response. Either
way, anything outside or in addition to X, Y & Z signifies difference, which constitutes a risk factor and has to be calculated out of significance in order for the equation to work. X, Y & Z are in effect axioms, as is ‘single parent’ an axiom - not to be explained but accepted, as a premise for calibration and a spring board for mobilisation - as if there were no social, cultural, gendered or historical differences across the countries that take part in this calibration.

This representation produced in relation to a form of calculus, has the effect of abstracting the social and reconfiguring (traditional) values in ways that move the responsibility away from big government (a welfare state) from the centre that is - to the periphery; technologies of calculi that assess and measure the reflexive single parent, the autonomous learner, the ‘participant’ donor project beneficiary (Cooke 2001), the self-sufficient refugee (Duffield, 2001:) or the personal independent payment plan for disability(PIP) claimant. (DWP website: October 2013). The OECD ‘soft power’ complex produces policy responses that deploy a lexicon of empowerment and a rubric that calculates dependency out of the equation - obscuring the normative traces and quiet tyranny that is exercised behind the notion of the ‘reflective practitioner’ qua ‘single parent’, ‘autonomous learner’, ‘participant’, PIP claimant, as a technology of self and government.

This section above has attempted to identify the “facts of the discourse” of governance that “purport to be natural immediate entities” as Foucault says in Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault 2002:41) as further elements which sustain the Reflective Practice apparatus. In this sense, it may be possible to understand the existence of Reflective Practice as a form of knowhow sustained by this (partial) apparatus of relationality; “the relationality between statements; the relations between groups of statements; the relations between statements and groups of statements; the relations between statements and groups of statements and events of different kinds” (Foucault 2002: 32,33), as regulatory forms.

Dealing with Feelings: a resource pack for Teachers; a niche market
A fourth element of the apparatus may be represented by this cameo, presented below, of a resource pack for teachers as a sample of the way in which Reflective Practice is popularised, disseminated and commodified. This resource-pack for teachers called *Dealing with Feelings* (Rae 2007) frames a pedagogical-lite discourse that is characteristic of one genre informing the literature-reviews of the four teacher-writers of the case study *Grow Your Own Teacher*, discussed in the following section of Chapter 4. By tracing the bibliographic trails of the four student narratives of the case-study it has been possible to locate an industry of teacher-support resource-materials in relation to Reflective Practice that is available (originally) on line; written by practitioners in education for practitioners in a kind of do-it-yourself-self-help mode. Taken from Linda’s bibliography this now Amazon-advertised resource-pack consists of 40 lesson plans and a CD-ROM for teachers.

The 40 lesson plans correspond to 40 different ‘specific feelings’ that children between the ages of 7-14 might experience; *Feeling angry, Feeling intimidated, Feeling vain*. It’s objective is to help teachers to “develop pupils’ ability to recognise, label and cope with the range of feelings that they may have to experience on a daily basis” (Rae 2007:1) by engaging pupils in “self-reflection activity” (Rae 2007: 8).

It’s literacy is characteristic of the knowhow genre; it deploys a lexicon rather than a rationale to communicate its purpose; made up of emblematic terms and nominalisations such as “mental and physical health”, “academic achievement”, “contributing members of society”. It enjoins these with policy terms such as “enhanced experience”, “at risk”, “Individual Education Plans” and outcome terms in the form of “success lists” presented in bullet points which inscribe a (simplistic) cause and effect logic:

- *recognise their emotions in order to be able to label and find them*
- *understand their emotions in order to become effective learners*
- *appropriately express (their) motions in order to develop as rounded people who are able to help themselves and in turn those around them* (2007:2).
Its language is imitative of the evidence-based, quantitative research practice, quality assurance discourse,

> the incidence of problem behaviours decreases; the quality of relationships surrounding each child improves; students become the productive responsible contributing members of society that we all want.

(ibid)

It cites other authors who write about emotional intelligence to legitimise its purpose.

It is as though the nominalisations and imitative language stand in for credentials, as there is no rationale given to explain pedagogical objectives in relation to a body of theory or a policy-informed piece of curriculum design. It is as though such formalities are expected to be ‘read off’ from the emblematic terms that sign-post a “useful and flexible stand-alone resource”. The objective appears to be to produce “brief description” (Duffield, 2001:116) and use symbols as shorthand precisely so as not to explain. It is not only not ‘stand alone’, but axiomatic in the way it serves to meet ‘general standard’ learning outcomes.

The nominalisation in the text reifies ‘feelings’ into types, after the allegorical style of the (Honey and Mumford) learning style questionnaire. It reinforces the foundationalist notion that experience is the source of knowledge, and that reflection is a means of fitting the pupil for purpose in what Fook and Gardner call “a social environment that is preoccupied with uncertainty risk and complexity” (2007:11).

Its lexical style is in effect reminiscent of that adopted by Fook and Gardner in their (more sophisticated) text; there is therefore a strong family resemblance between the two texts even though they engage in different levels of complexity. This lexical familiarity works for the reader, because of its relation to other texts within the knowhow genre, as well as in relation to policy documents at both a national level, such as the Teacher Observation template, or international level, such as the PISA survey. It is this aspect of relationality that produces a ‘normative grammar’ (Gramsci 1977) through the organisation, codification and
legitimization of ways of speaking about experience that are unconscious and seem natural or ‘spontaneous’ as grammars, but which are in effect influenced by the political choices that shape such ‘normative grammars’.

Linguist and political theorist Ives (2004) writes about the way in which Gramsci’s idea of ‘normative grammars’ foregrounds poststructuralism and other critiques of structuralism by suggesting that the historical residues within language with which Gramsci is concerned, are fundamental in operations of power, prestige and hegemony (Ives 2004:88). Certainly this resonates with the Foucauldian concept of genealogy and dispositif, concepts which extend our understanding of the way in which ‘normative grammars’ are produced through mechanisms that feel natural because of a sense of familiarity that is produced relationally; ‘their coexistence their succession their mutual functioning their reciprocal determination and their independent or correlative transformation’ (Foucault 2002:32), and indeed historically – as genealogies of knowledge that recur in mutated forms. The ways in which thought is brought to bear via these interconnections and patterns of coordination is through consensus and cohesion, elements that substitute the need for (empirical) explanation with “brief description” (Duffield 2001:116).

These samples that I have explored above serve to ‘flesh out’ the elements of an apparatus as the means by which Reflective Practice is sustained as a discursive practice today. They signpost the conceptualisations of a matrix of power and knowledge in the form of a present day ‘dispositif’, ‘assemblage’ or episteme that inscribes ‘brief description’ and ‘calculus’ as the new tropes of epistemology that are reinforced relationally. Just as consensus and cohesion flattens out the need for explanation, calculus flattens out the singularity of difference (as against the plurality of diversity) in ways that make the ‘risk identification risk assessment risk management’ project of governance possible. These emblematics of ‘brief description’ and ‘calculus’ that I have identified in relation to an apparatus of Reflective Practice in this section, are expressions of a felt imperative for new ways to produce meaning in the twenty first century, not for expalantory purpose, but via consensus, for mobilisation. The emblematics that ‘stand in for’ knowledge as ‘stand alone’ imperatives are features of a new
lexicon of governance. What sustains Reflective Practice also lubricates the wheelbarrows of policy that carry responsibility away from the centre out to the periphery in a new world order, that conceives global liberal governance in relational terms of strategic complexes, human-centred policy and the self-regulation of actors who enrol themselves into schema of governance.

Instances of Reflective Practice as a project of governmentality have been presented in this section, in the form of elements of an apparatus that behave interrelationally to sustain Reflective Practice: a ‘screen shot’, as an instance of a multimodal representation of Reflective Practice on Amazon; a seminal book, as an instance of reflective practice as a genealogy of knowledge that recurs to serve hegemonic interests; Quality Assurance technologies, as technologies of government that inscribe the legitimisation and institutionalisation of Reflective Practice by the University authorities of Europe; a resource pack, as an instance of the popularisation, dissemination and commodification of Reflective Practice as a discourse into which all reflective practitioners needs must enrol themselves. These are the means.

The Man and the Times

In the three months following 9/11, the UK Prime minister Tony Blair travelled more miles than Colin Powell, the US Secretary for State, in his efforts to promote an anti-terrorist coalition meeting with leaders of more than seventy countries (Kempfner 2004:137); a kind of ‘world’s ambassador in Washington’ according to the New York times.

Certainly, Tony Blair’s foreign policy focus changed after 9/11 (2001) in terms of an intensified alliance with America, as compared to that which he had cultivated previously with Europe during his first four years in office as Prime Minister. The new focus emphasised matters of security. Tony Blair articulates this shift of emphasis in foreign policy in a statement he makes in response to the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, where he speaks of ‘standing shoulder to shoulder’ with ‘our American friends’ and not resting ‘until this evil is driven from our world’.
The emphasis on matters of security and alliance with the USA continues to characterise Tony Blair’s leadership during the second term of New Labour’s administration, from 2001–2004; recurrences of conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Weapons of Mass Destruction project, and the Hutton Inquiry. These events re-produce a lexicon of securitisation, that had already been circulating in USA Presidential speeches a decade earlier; ‘axis of evil’, ‘forces of good’, ‘doing the right thing’ and ‘just war’; terms that re-circulate in Tony Blair’s speeches relating to the five wars that took place during a six year period under the Prime Minister’s (second term) administration. The lexicon of securitisation was produced in part by ‘speech acts’ which shape and are shaped by a continuum of conflict; (the threat of) military intervention, peace missions (January 2002) and arms negotiations and sales. (Kempfner, 2004: 171). These speech acts inhere the idea that America and its allies (Great Britain), could bring to bear a capability of a different order, to do with a doctrine of pre-emption, as outlined in a speech made by President Bush in June 2002 at the US Military Academy:

*If we wait for threats to fully materialise we will have waited too long.*
*We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge.*

The significance of this section above, is to frame the (re) emergence of a particular narrative of securitisation, often referred to as the ‘Bush doctrine’. It denotes a policy of intervention as prevention. This policy informs and characterises the case-study narratives of the four teaching assistants as a kind of ‘normative grammar’ within a wider (hegemonic) problematic of government that inscribes an imperative for ‘risk identification, risk assessment risk management’.

During the second term of the New Labour administration (2001-2004), the government’s attention was also turned from Primary Education as its main priority, to Higher Education. While the DFEE (later becoming Department of Skills in 2001) was the entity through which legislation and monitoring was delivered in the schooling sector, the Dearing Report recommendations provided the framework to implement the same kind of change in Higher Education. The two frameworks ran in parallel. The Dearing Report made 93 recommendations
between 1997-2007. Of these, some of the most formative in relation to the contextualisation of the case study, are the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dearing Recommendations:</th>
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<tr>
<td>2003 David Blunket’s agenda for HEIs including links with employers and others, expanding new markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 Creation of 74 Centres for Excellence in Teaching and Learning (CETLs) of which the Institute of Work Based Learning became one in 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 TTA review of financial initiatives for teacher training (qualifications)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 Train to Gain skills broker service/employer training programme in relation to Further Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 National Skills Academy programme launched a partnership between government and industry to focus on vocational education and skills training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 Leitch Review of Skills Prosperity for all in the Global Economy of World class skills and employer engaged education</td>
</tr>
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An emphasis emerges from this framing, on Lifelong Learning as a discourse and practice being embedded in the new qualifications framework. The discourse inscribes a value of standards through themes of excellence; it promotes a new identity concept of professionalism for teachers; it advocates a neo liberal policy of collaboration between education sectors in a ‘stakeholder society’. The wider framework, sampled above, also promotes wider access to Higher Education for ‘first generation’ students in a human resource agenda and public-private partnerships through initiatives of accreditation wherein the University assumes a valorisation role as part of a New Deal white paper that promises ‘increased security return for clearer accountability’.
The Dearing Recommendations provides an instance of the apparatus of reflective practice, that exists at a specific historical moment of Higher Education in the UK. It frames a turn towards a form of governance that privileges a global economy trajectory and a project of securitisation, in what one might call an emergent outillage mental towards a post enlightenment, post liberal (Chandler, 2013) episteme. It frames the emergent hegemonic context in which the case study of Chapter 4 is situated.

Specifically, the four teaching assistants of the case study were attending a ‘new’ University in London, which went into partnership with three local boroughs and their schools, and devised a Grow Your Own Teacher project in response to the government’s perceived shortage of teachers in the inner-city London schools. This shortage of teachers perception gave rise to the rhetorical refrain Education Education Education as a governmental response to a felt ‘crisis in education’ (2003). The Grow Your Own Teacher project was managed between two University departments of Education and Work Based Learning with a view to training Teaching Assistants through a degree pathway to become Qualified Teachers (QTS). I was the senior lecturer and curriculum leader responsible for the smooth running of this programme at the time. The Teaching Assistants were recruited from a pool of overseas teachers from former UK colonies, and current classroom assistants in the UK. The Home Office made special provisions for work permits to facilitate the overseas trained teachers, which were revoked once the ‘perceived shortage’ ceased. The government proposed the introduction of ‘paraprofessionals’ into the sector of schooling, in the form of Teaching Assistants, who, along with the recruited Overseas Trained teachers were seen to address the problem of a shortage of teachers, and to ease the workloads of mainstream teachers in the inner-city schools. It was this set of historically specific circumstances that facilitated the four Teaching Assistants, whose writing is the focus of this study, to come into University on a degree pathway towards QTS.

In this sense, the man, the times and the means combined, converged and contrived to produce elements of an apparatus that sustains Reflective Practice as a technology of government; one that shaped and was shaped by an historically
specific ‘dispositif’, in the form of; *a set of strategies of the relation of forces supporting, and supported by certain types of knowledge.* (Foucault in Gordon 1980:196). The particular ‘type of knowledge’ discussed above subscribes to the foundational and Lockean notion, that experience is the foundation of knowledge and reflective practice is a form of personal knowhow, through which one can change or direct self conduct in ways that can be planned for.

I have argued thus far, that the apparatus of Reflective Practice cannot be understood solely in terms of structures, but also practices, speech-acts, normative grammars, personalities and times, as an historically specific, strategic complex of a power/knowledge apparatus. I have attempted to articulate some of the elements of this apparatus as instances; the digital technologies that publish personalised schema of lifestyle ‘on demand’, such as those featured in the ‘screen shot’, serves as an instance of how certain convictions of the self, in the form of moral obligations *get distributed* by theorists and celebrity academics, such as those listed on the Reflective Practice workshop handout available on the QAA website, to those at the periphery.

I have identified instances of ‘soft power’ institutions such as the OECD as think-tanks that are *positioned* either at the ‘top’ or the ‘centre’ of power structures, where few individuals serve to ‘create the convictions’ in question, such as; Stiglitz in the International Monetary Fund, author of the ‘Washington Consensus’, who creates the moral conviction of harmonising conflict in the world; Baroness Blackstone in the OECD, author of the Bologna Agreement, who creates the conviction of standardising Education in Europe.

I have identified four teaching assistants as *actors* in this ensemble who flesh out moral convictions”¹ by enrolling themselves onto a *Grow Your Own Teacher* programme, as the new bearers of responsibility in a human-centred policy project of governance.

These are some instances of the elements of an apparatus and hegemonic project that seeks to guide and assign individuals, such as the reflexive citizen, the autonomous learner, the self reflective refugee and specifically the four teaching assistants, as ‘the new bearers of responsibility’ in a human-centred policy
project of governance which operates from a distance, that is, “without having to assume their custody” (Castel 1991:295). It is this historically specific relationality between groups of people, structures and practices that makes up the apparatus of Reflective Practice.
The Case Study

At this point I undertake a textual analysis of four narratives of self, written by Teaching Assistants enrolled on a London University-London Boroughs partnership programme called *Grow Your Own Teacher*, in a degree-based pathway to Qualified Teacher Status between 2003-2008. I do this so as to present an in-depth instance of the ways in which four actors enrol themselves onto a University and hegemonic project, as ‘the new bearers of responsibility’ in a human-centred policy project of governmentality.

I present the textual analysis with recourse to Rose’s (1998) five pathways framework, as a genealogical approach to a history of the present, and also with recourse to a ‘governmentality analytic’ (Burchell et al 1991) as a co-conceptual framework of analysis, devised by post-Foucauldian theorists, as my case study.

The four narratives of self written by the Teaching Assistants are in effect a response to a hegemonic problematic described as a ‘risk identification risk assessment and risk management’ project (Castells, 1996). The problematisation of risk in relation to the education of children is contextualised within a decade that was affected by 9/11 and 2005 London bombings decade (2001-2011); a decade characterised by an increasing concern with securitisation. The four policy themes that define the narratives of the four Teaching Assistants’ are: Inclusion, Deviance, Excellence and Conflict Resolution. These themes are government directives that prevailed at the time in the sphere of education. The four narratives engage with these policy themes with a view to addressing the perceived problem identified by government of risk in relation to the school population; such as those with special needs who are now educated in mainstream schools (Heather’s narrative); those in transition from primary to secondary schools (Judy’s narrative); those who are deemed gifted and talented (June’s narrative) and those who are not performing and behaving as they should be (Linda’s narrative).
By analysing these four narratives of Reflective Practice, I too am responding to or diagnosing a problematic of risk and thereby contributing to this discursive practice that produces the ‘exclusions prohibitions and limits through which a regime of power comes into effect’ (Foucault in Gordon, 1980).

My objective is to attempt to find representations of power and knowledge, through this genealogy of reflective practice, that are “adequate to the complexity of present day processes of education and governance”.

100
Heather’s narrative of self

Heather is a Teaching Assistant in a large London Comprehensive school. She is white and a single parent. Her role is to support designated pupils with special needs who have been brought into mainstream schooling. Her research project is a case study consisting of the participant observation of the three pupils whom she supports, interviews with the teachers who come into contact with the pupils, and a literature review. The three pupils Heather writes about have significant special needs.

In the case of Heather’s narrative what is being problematised is the management of pupils with special needs in a mainstream school. The government response to this problematic is the introduction of Teaching Assistants as paraprofessionals to work one to one in support of those pupils with more severe special needs. Related policy sets out a series of directives under the umbrella term ‘Inclusion’ for schools to engage with in the management of this group of pupils designated as ‘at risk’. The authorities are no longer the Special Schools or the Warner Report recommendations of the late twentieth century, but the Schools themselves, who must manage the school population of which this category of ‘Special Needs’ is deemed to be one strand.

In her narrative, Heather engages with an array of subject positions such as the professional teacher, the autonomous learner and the advocate of children at risk. These subject positions are adopted in relation to a narrative of experience as the foundation of knowledge and of reflection as referential, that is of mirroring this foundation

*I will not make any assumptions about any information I receive and will always speak from experience that will reflect my truth* (11)

Knowledge is assumed here to be something that has a foundation or origin, that pre exists structures, that is not constructed and that can be revealed through (careful) reflection as a form of introspective observation:

*My observations revealed ….accurate impressions of unfolding events …* (13)
Experience is deployed often as synonymous with observation in collocations such as:

*I have worked in this school for seven years and have experienced and observed:* (14)

*I will use participant observation to record and analyse...experiences/*
*I will record my observations/ interviews will serve to gain insights into the teachers’ real feelings and their observed body language* (14)

Observation and experience also serve as evidence of knowledge

*I will provide much rich evidence on their view/ This source of information means I can see how strongly they felt/ I will record these experiences and draw on some examples to illustrate my findings* (14)

Within this logic of experience as the foundation of knowledge, is the corresponding notion of ‘character’ as a pre existing core or essence of a person, that cannot be seen at first glance:

*It is difficult to uncover an individual’s full character:* (13)

Notions of experience as the basis or source of knowledge, and experience as evidence of that knowledge, or of knowledge as seeing and transparent, as being reflected back through the behaviour, body-language or language, is part of a received wisdom, or conceptual framework that Heather takes for granted, that she has learned in University, and is inscribed by.

Given that she is writing within a context of Work Based Learning as a field of study, it is to be expected that Heather should reproduce this narrative of experience as the foundation of knowledge, of reflection as referential and of experience as evidence of knowledge, for the technologies of learning she is expected to draw on inscribe this conceptualisation: participant observation, the reflective essay, the learning diary. This technologies of self as the ‘reflexive researcher’ is deployed by the social sciences in relation to qualitative practices of research methodology. Although the constructivist paradigm, which counts amongst the theoretical frameworks of the social sciences, contests what it perceives to be the essentialism of the traditional empiricist paradigm, it adheres to a conception of experience as foundationalist by privileging the self as the site
of knowledge construction and meaning making. In effect, the much struggled
over area of qualitative research methodologies that inheres reflexivity, was
considered progressive in the academy whilst Heather was writing her narrative
of self. It signalled an epistemological break with what was felt to be the
fundamentalism of sciencism for many academics. Its recourse to the personal as
a valid site of knowledge construction and source of evidence (of knowledge)
was led by feminist critiques of (masculinist forms of) knowledge in a climate of
intellectual debate that ushered in great change in academic discourse and
enabled new disciplines to become established such as gender studies cultural
studies. Against this new progressive paradigm Work Based Learning as a field
and mode of study privileges experience as the site for knowledge construction
and invites experience as a form of ‘evidence’ for the students’ claims of
‘experiential learning’ which can be accredited. The notion of a foundation, of
the ‘originary point of explanation’ upon which (more) knowledge can be built,
is reinforced as ‘true’ when further validated by accreditation. In such contexts,
students’ own accounts of their experience is taken for ‘self knowledge’, and
experienced also as ‘self evident’ in a tautological or telological imperative that
is compelling. As historian Joan Scott says

When experience is taken as the origin of knowledge, the vision of the
individual subject (the person who had the experience or the historian
who recounts it) becomes the bedrock of evidence upon which
explanation is built. Then knowledge becomes self evident.

(Scott 1991:777)

Hence the compulsion to conceptualise experience in referentialist terms where
reflection on experience or learning stands for a reflection of the ‘real me’.
Heather’s writing makes recourse to this kind of referentiality when she uses the
words reflection or reflect, in their mirror-image sense, of reflecting an originary
reality back.

skills are reflected in their work (26) reflect my truth (11) a reflection
of the way we are perceived/messages that reflect… (25)

Of course, these terms are commonplace, inherited, part of our everyday
language, the stuff of metaphor, part of our folklore and traditions – but the
point is another one, which is that they are part of lexical chain that we use in higher education in relation to experiential and evidence-based learning, part of academic discourse, a discourse that is taken for granted in relation to certain ways of perceiving and conducting the self, as a site for knowledge construction, that precludes consideration of those discursive practices and structures that preexist experience. As such, those technologies of self such as the ‘reflective practitioner’ the ‘reflexive researcher’ or the ‘autonomous learner’, act as ‘normative grammars’ that preclude asking certain questions about how these subject selves are constituted.

The ways in which Heather makes recourse to the foundationalist discourse of experience with its lexical field of learning, reflection, truth, observation, witness, source, depth, progress and recollection, that aligns experience with knowledge is a way that is self evident, bears further analysis with recourse to this long extract:

From a position of responsibility, the research strategies I will employ will be observing pupils in their classes and conducting interviews with teachers. I am to take a proactive part in obtaining information to authenticate any observations that I make while engaging with the curriculum. I will identify any themes that re–occur and satisfy my criteria of discovering the effect of Inclusion on special needs pupils with particular reference to two autistic pupils who I will be observing....I will carry out two interviews with teachers who regularly teach these two pupils so that I obtain a professional perspective on my investigation.

I will reflect on incidents that may occur and describe the direction these events take (are they part of a sequence of events or isolated situations) in a descriptive and factual way and will highlight any aspects of re-occurring incidents that may occur. In this way I will demonstrate any pattern or a common thread that may run through my observations. I will then put the themes into a system in order to emphasise their significance. All these Research procedures will help me reach conclusions on the subject of Inclusion....
It is incumbent on me to provide value free data, to codify it and to unravel any valuations. The outcome will only be as good as the data is. I will update my diary as a means of continually responding to my Research Questions and describe my gut feelings – good and bad – to create a view of different groups of people; an expose.....

Hopefully my research diary will build a body of evidence that I can refer to and provide me with invaluable insights...and serve as a reflective research aid in which I can record fragments of concern. It will also contain authentic accounts of the pupils I am observing and any development that I can see; I will effectively be painting a portrait of incidents relevant to my research (10/11)

There is a cross section of lexical fields in the passage that Heather draws on in an attempt to give a rationale for her research methodology. Phrases ‘stand in’ emblematically for this lexical diversity that structures Heather’s argument. Contemporary and historical discourse signifiers are juxtaposed in order to give ballast to what reads like a rallying call for justice on behalf of the children with special needs. Heather’s argument is scaffolded in this way, by taking of a cross section of subject positions.

From a position of responsibility depicts a ‘duty of care’ positionality, which Heather uses to explain responsibility, her own and those of teachers in the school. The responsibility is related to her ‘position’ from which we might infer her professional position as a Learning Support Assistant, although we might also infer her position in relation to special needs children as an adult carer and citizen, as Heather is all of these, and the term is not qualified. The imperative of this responsibility is linked to the idea that she is also in a position to observe (the pupils) and provide observations that can be authenticated. In this sense, Heather adopts a subject position kin to that of ‘the expert witness’ in a trial. The formality of syntax and language here imitates that of legal discourse I will employ, obtain demonstrate, build a body of evidence wherein the account should be given in a descriptive and factual way. This value free account, the record of fragments of concern and reflection on incidents are terms which approximate those used in a law court; or at least it is possible to read off this effect from Heather’s text. There is more than a trace in this passage and others of the
evidentiary tradition of the lay juror, where in the ‘expert witness’ serves as a
determiner of ‘matters of fact’ according to English common law. What make
such individuals expert however, traditionally, is less their professional
standing, than their experience and knowledge (Shapiro 2000:17).

What makes the idea of an imaginary subject position of ‘expert witness’ in
Heather’s account more probable, is her expressed desire to produce an expose.
There is in the subtext of this page a sense in which different law court subject-
positions are being played out, sometimes that of the ‘expert witness’ and
sometimes that of the interrogator: *I will be asking questions; are these groups of
people being heard?*. The gatekeeper, the watch dog, the interrogator, the
prosecutor and the ‘expert witness’ compete and complement one another as
subject-positions on this page in a way that produces an intense and austere
effect. This may be read as an indictment of and testimonial to the traumatic
experience of *both sets of people* – the children with severe special needs and the
Teaching Assistants who are *put in their place* (30) to support them.

*People being heard* has become a zeitgeist of our present times according to
explores “a tension at the heart of current debates over the history of the
contemporary era” (2006:97) between historians and other professional areas
(including the university) “where individual expression comes into conflict with
intellectual discourse.” (ibid). Wieviorka charts the changing status of the
‘witness’ and the ‘testimonial’ since the end of the 1970s, when the systematic
collection of audiovisual testimonies of holocaust survivors began. She links this
to the contemporary “massive effort to seize control of public discourse” that
characterised the mass demonstrations in France of May 1968 where the
phenomenon of ‘life stories’ took hold of the public imagination and then as she
says, “spread to the humanities the social sciences the media….which
increasingly began to seek out the man in the street” (2006:97).

In this sense, the ‘evidentiary tradition’ (Shapiro 2000) of the lay juror, where in
the ‘expert witness’ was a determiner of ‘matters of fact’ in English common law
practise in the seventeenth century, is an historical figuration, that is reproduced
today in a multiplicity of ways and selected here by Heather as technology of
self as expert eye witness, as a Teaching Assistant whose and incapacity to
manage a situation of pupils at risk, is in question, given the degree of child cruelty she witnesses.

Her experience, as ‘the bedrock of evidence on which explanation is built’ (Scott 1991:777) is the only recourse she has to think with. The academic discourse that privileges experiential and evidence-based learning that legitimises her account, are the mainstays of a conceptual framework that cannot produce representations of these processes except in relation to experience as Scott points out.

The limitations of the experiential paradigm make it impossible for Heather to ask questions about the very discursive practices and processes of governmentality “without which there would be nothing to experience” (Scott 1991:777).

In effect, Heather can only make recourse to herself.

Heather projects the frustration into the writing reiterating her thesis statement in a different attempt to say what she has not been given the conceptual tools to articulate:

*It is clear that such pupils* as the two specials needs pupils she is supporting *derive little or no advantage from this system of inclusion* (21) *the emotional, physical and academic co-ordination of special needs pupils like Y and X are not being satisfied* (21) *these pupils are being deprived of a fulfilling and comprehensive education* (22) *is this oversight a result of the way in which special needs pupils are perceived in the school* (23) *Do they really get the specialised care they should receive* (27) *Like the pupils, we feel marginalised* (29).

Heather’s level of commitment to the claim she is making about the inefficiency of the Inclusion policy and practice in her school is categorical. In terms of truth-modality and in terms of obligation-modality, she is authoritative.

*I have defined, I will produce, this journal will be, I will identify, verify my claim* (16) *the situation is untenable* (32) *we need to make our concerns over Inclusion clear to the parents* (36)
The grammatical moods that Heather adopts are overall more declarative and imperative than interrogative. When they are interrogative they tend to be rhetorical. *Does Inclusion provide equal opportunities?* (6)

By the same token, there is a feminised subject-position as the tender carer. When describing one of the children she supports, Heather writes a character study of Y in a style that is reminiscent of the nineteenth century novel genre as written by women

*Y’s focus in on the present; her whole existence at school concerns itself with retrieving, processing and then reacting to information in her own inimitable way* (23) *She is an elusive mixture of apparent self reliance and pure innocence. Her peers receive her quirkiness with a bemused tolerance and steer her in the right direction when needed… Her nature is friendly and she does seem to empathise with people more than communicate with them. She can access deep concern around a pupil’s welfare. This rapport carries weight with other pupils.* (22).

Apart from the tenderness of this cameo portrait that Heather paints of Y, there is a sense in which it appears to be reassuring the reader that someone *is* looking after these vulnerable but likeable children. This section leads to a section where Heather describes the bullying and trauma that X and Y experience and act out in school. In this sense, both as Teaching Assistant and writer she is looking after those who depend on her kindness. This feminised subject position is the same one that complains about the menial jobs expected of the role, the invisible work of looking after, that is only noticed when not done, whether that is taking pupils with special needs to the toilet, or filling the wine glasses at the teacher’s barbeque.

As though to communicate the indignity of the invisible, gendered work of *baby sitting services* (30), *helpers* (29) *carrying the burden* (27) she adopts a direct address, as if to invite (female) readers in; a combination of the confessional and the chatty.

*Incidentally, social skills are taught to some pupils who cannot or will not control their natural urges, which manifests themselves in as*
swearing, spitting, lashing out at teachers and pupils alike and shouting out in the class-room (19)

This last ‘direct address’ feels very much like a last resort in terms of ways of finding ways to say what she needs to. It is as though Heather has tired every way imaginable to say it and account for it based on the evidence she has before her of her experience and observations, her knowledge. Why then, she asks, can she not articulate the matter in a way that will be heard by someone in authority?

The different subject positions she engages get played out in relation to an array of different often contrasting lexical fields and discourses; the expert witness of seventeenth century court room, the objective researcher of academia, the proactive professional of the neoliberal era, the ofsted inspector of the audit culture. In effect, all of these discursive fields are permitted by and constitute the contemporary learning lexicon which serves as a framework for human centred policy making and fashioning subject positions. The flexibility of policy ideals are always open to interpretation and Heather uses the term ‘learning’ to mean many things, all of which however are recognisably part of the discourse of learning. Her last attempt to find the right subject position or technology of self, as ‘flexible’, ‘good’, as the ‘Angel in the House’ that characterised women in the early twentieth century (according to Virginia Wolfe’s lecture) and characterised them again differently in the nineteen fifties, here characterises the last resort subject position in Heather’s narrative. It is a tidy in the self subject position, a technology of self as flexible, self- managed, self- monitoring, multitasking and caring

The ethic of responsibilisation that is inscribed by this learning lexicon as it is filtered through the ‘screen’ of experience as the foundation of knowledge, frames Heather in an untenable position. What is retained of this tidy in the self Victorian legacy by the innovative learning lexicon, is a peculiarly patriarchal gaze.

There are sections of her narrative however, where Heather critically evaluates the processes that constitute these conditions; her juxtapositioning of labelling terms for Special Needs pupils and Teaching Assistants very deftly makes her
point about the conflation of these two groups of people in the mind of the authorities:

*Over the years the titles attached to our role in schools have undergone many changes. We have been referred to as Welfare Assistants, Teaching Assistants, Teaching Support Assistants, Learning Support Assistants, Special Needs Assistants and Learning Mentors. These descriptions all come under the aegis of assisting teachers and all have got lost in translation. Why is such an effort made to label a group of people? Inconvenience breeds indifference and we experience a mutual condition – we are unknowns. Our position is vague and the pupil’s position is vague within the framework of mainstream education. The names given to special needs pupils have also altered: remedial, educationally sub-normal, special educational needs, mentally retarded, mentally deficient; now they are regarded in a more positive light – special needs and pupils with learning difficulties) But whichever term is chosen to describe these two categories of people the truth cannot be hidden. (29)*

This practice of naming the unknowns through a technique of nominalisation is astute. Heather names the discursive process of marginalisation in terms of a lack of specification about what has changed, except the name, over time. This linguistic device she deploys exposes the authorities as blindly conflating and confusing these two categories of people. The listing of names is an obvious but effective way of making the equivalence between the groups clear and serves as a reiteration of her thesis statement; these two categories of people are conjoined.

Heather’s ‘capacity’ for analysis in academic terms may seem descriptive at first glance, yet her analytic skill in academic terms is apparent in the exercise discussed above, both in the links that Heather makes and the devices she uses to represent them. The multiplicity of subject positions that Heather deploys, seems to be felt necessary by her, rather than as a choice. She ‘turns herself inside out’ seeking for a resolution that is neither within her gift nor admissible within the wider design of the Inclusion policy. She embeds and embodies the buffer-zone for the children’s protection.
I turn now to the second narrative, of Judy, and carry over the diagnosis raised in relation to Heather’s narrative about the felt need for a multiplicity of subject positions to be engaged with in the writing of the narrative, and the tidy in the self subject effect that characterises her narrative.
Judy’s narrative of self:

Judy is a Teaching Assistant in a large inner-city London School. She is white, British, in her late thirties, married and has two children. Judy was one of the Teaching Assistants recruited onto the Graduate Teacher Status Programme in 2004 that was part of the Grow Your Own Teacher project. She lives, and works full time in a London borough. She left school before taking GCSEs although she has since taken Maths and English GCSE as a requirement for Qualified Teacher Status. She has always worked but not had a ‘career’ as she says. For her research project Judy considered each of the following school related strategies: Inclusivity, Gifted and Talented, Literacy and Numeracy, Special Needs, Transition. These were all statutory themes in schooling during the mid decade years.

The organising question of Judy’s research- based project relates to smooth transfer and transfer efficiency:

*What effect if any does transfer from primary to secondary education have on pupils?*

The open-ended character of the organising question of Judy’s case study project, with its emphasis on the effect of transfer as a process on the pupil, frames an initial desire on the part of Judy to ‘understand from pupils own perspectives how they experience and accomplish the transition process’ (7:2,3) from primary to secondary school.

What the final study produces and recommends however, is a model of transfer proposed by the government that is in line with a supporting framework of established policy for children and youth, which seeks to identify risk in relation to the school population: Green Paper *Youth Matters* (HM Government 2005) and *Every Child Matters* (DfES 2003). In this sense the government’s proposed model pre-empts Judy’s research question with a purpose that inscribes a disciplinary rather than pastoral positionality on the part of the teacher (as the question infers). These national policies set the tone for local policy at borough and school level, and their influence infuses the work of those Teaching Assistants employed in the London boroughs.
As background, it is necessary to acknowledge the London bombings of 7 July 2005 which were very much part of the public consciousness as Judy was researching and writing her project. Education policy was inevitably affected during this decade by anti-terrorism legislation in the wake of this violence in Britain and the 9/11 violence in the USA. Tony Blair’s re-election slogan (2004) *tough on crime tough on the causes of crime* and media representations of ‘hoodie culture’ infected public perception of young people as potentially *deviant*, a notion framed, albeit not unproblematically, by a Mori survey at the time (Mori 2005), wherein 82 percent of those interviewed supported the ASBO in principle even though many were not convinced of their effectiveness. The use of ASBOs and youth Curfews became prominent topics of debate during those mid decade years of New Labour’s second and third terms. Constructions of youth as *deviant* received high public profile also in relation to the Jamie Bulgar case that construed the two youths as ‘evil’ and was juxtaposed with constructions of youth as *vulnerable* in the case of *baby P*, murdered child Victoria Ciumbe in London 2000. This case, along with the Soham murders case (2003) prompted the production of new policy and agencies for the ‘safeguarding’ of children in initiatives such as *The Children’s Act 2004, Children Now 2005* and *London Child Protection Committee*, 2005. The Education Act (2002) gave schools a ‘duty’ to safeguard and promote the welfare of pupils. In London boroughs, schools were being asked to identify anti-bullying policies during the mid decade years that were reviewed during OFSTED inspections.

The foray into this policy background, serves to contextualise Judy’s project against existing contemporary ‘problematisations’ in terms of “where how and by whom aspects of the human is being rendered problematic, according to what systems of judgement and in relation to what concerns?” (Rose 1998:25) An intensified focus on youth constructs youth as simultaneously deviant and vulnerable. This binary dynamic that hails both a disciplinary and pastoral response gets played out through the writing of Judy’s report in terms of a ‘subject effect’; as is generally the case with binary dynamics one pole is privileged (the disciplinary) over the other.
Judy chose the theme of *Transition* for her research project: Transition is the name given to the process where in children from the final year (year six) of primary school transfer to the first year of secondary school (year seven), which may or may not be in the same borough as the primary school. She chose this theme because she works with a ‘year seven’ group as a support teacher, and sees ‘how difficult this period of adjustment is for them’. Judy’s workplace approved her choice, and her line-manager, the SENCO was particularly pleased as ‘Transition’ had been flagged as an area of OFSTED concern in her school’s report. Given the well documented ‘dip’ in academic performance in general in year seven, the focus approved by the school was strategic, in terms of its own targets to raise or sustain, (SATs) standards.

The link between academic performance (as attainment) and behaviour (as attitude) is formalised in the policy literature and assumed in Judy’s report (3:10), and then again in relation to one of the project’s objectives, page (7:9,10). This embedded assumption is part of a meta discourse of governance to do with risk prevention that is articulated here through a lexicon of deviancy. This ‘normative grammar’ construes the pupil in relation to a default position of deficit either in terms of needs (provision) or behaviour (intervention) and a deficit lexicon which is reiterated throughout the introduction. (5: 3, 5, 15)

Judy reiterates this problematisation in relation to the transition pupils must make in a transfer to a secondary school, whereby they:

*become demotivated and (initial enthusiasm becomes) replaced by a lack of commitment* (3:14& 4:1) *become disenchanted* (4:4&7:2) *appear to be off task* (4:6) *at risk* (4:11) *give up* (4:13) *not developing* *academically or socially* (5:3,4) *which may result in dips in attitude, engagement and progress* (5:15) *Some slide down the ladder and underachieve* (10:19).

40 percent of pupils become demotivated and make no progress (10:15, 16) decline in progress and in a commitment to learning. (39:8,9) *Pupils were thought to be pushing boundaries in an attempt to negotiate power* (39:8,9)*These are some of the issues surrounding transfer for pupils’* (6:1,2)
An anti-social behaviour narrative and a bullying narrative is threaded through the report in contrast to the narrative of pupil deficit above

Pupil B often interacts with peers in an extremely negative way and work avoidance strategies are often employed within the classroom (29: 5,6,7) However when withdrawn this pupil is willing to comply and tries hard (29:7) A normally difficult pupil was ridiculed for volunteering the correct answer (32:7,8) anybody that does look like they’re enjoying a lesson or someone who seems to enjoy learning is deemed different and isolated from the rest of the group because it is not seen as cool to want to do well and that’s what’s sad. (32:4,5,6) it was felt that pupils were so self aware that they would do almost anything in order to fit in with the ‘right’ group. That it was easier to move away from their goals and ‘follow the rest of the clan’. (32:9,10,11)

Anxiety and vulnerability are themes constituting a third narrative that also recurs throughout the report

The transition process has been difficult for this pupil this pupil is a conformist who is eager to please not easily lead and works alone. Unfortunately pupil A often goes unnoticed by teachers. Pupil B often finds it difficult to form trusting relationships with peers. This pupil experienced difficulties in primary and is finding it difficult being the youngest again and at times displays signs of anxiety (29:1-5) pupils experience some anxiety and changes in behaviour (35:9,10) pupils (are) seriously at risk of falling behind, or failing. I used to be popular in my old school and have lots of friends, but nobody here likes me (30:1,2) pupils (are) seriously at risk of falling behind, or failing.

A positive narrative of the pupil as enjoying a time of success and satisfaction of their confidence growing (33:16,17) also recurs in the project report, albeit much less frequently than those narratives which problematise pupil behaviour; significantly only half of the pupils are thought to be happy which compares with my original data from the primary questionnaire where 50% of pupils felt happy or excited about starting secondary school (35:1-3). The effect of constructing
pupils in positive terms serves also to reinforce their problematisation, through inscriptions of normativity helping pupils to take learning seriously (39:18,19)

The deficit lexicon is one that problematises; it both articulates and constitutes a conceptualisation of the pupil as ‘other’

**The tension between theory and experience.**

In her literature review, Judy is critical of the contemporary policy premise of ‘academic attainment’ as the rationale for transition and transfer strategies, and polarises this rationale with a (preferred) rationale of pupil ‘well being’. In this sense she signposts an affective alignment with the potentially traumatised pupil at this stage of the degree programme. The implicit objective of the project is to ‘bridge the gap’ between the school’s (statutory) performance targets and the pupil’s ‘well being’. In this way Judy embeds and embodies the ‘bridge’ as a subject position in a way that subsequently generates a series of binary positions for her to inhabit.

Her Literature Review was presented in the form of an essay and indicated a reflexive understanding of the way national policies were shaping and underpinning her research focus and subject position. Her subject position was aligned with ‘the pupil experience’ which she would represent, as ethnographer, in relation to a potentially traumatic process. At this stage, her research intention is still to re-present pupil perceptions in order to give them a voice thereby enhancing their experience. What the term ‘transition’ signifies in the Literature Review assignment, relates to a notion of the struggle involved in the loss of one’s environment and one’s place within it and the need to adjust to a new environment; a struggle that children may experience when moving school. In Judy’s data collection assignment however the instrument she designs and analyses construes the term ‘transition’ in more literal terms, of a place between one stage and the next, that is, in structural terms, terms that are systems related, performance related and governance related; terms which subordinate the human experience to the audit criterion.

To gather data, Judy used a ‘participant observation’ approach where personal observations of pupils in class were written down and recorded in her reflective
learning diary. The format of the learning diary as a means for data collection was unspecified, but the aims and objectives of her research proposal did inform Judy’s observations of those pupils whom she was supporting in her role as Teaching Assistant. Another formal ‘classroom log’ technology that was designed as a template, issued by the school as part of their appraisal system, was used as a second means for data collection on which to record responses to school-designed criteria concerned with behavioural management. An interview transcript of a ‘focus group’ interview with three teaching staff made up a third source of the data collection. A literature review of relevant policy and theoretical perspectives was triangulated with the empirical data sets with a view to identifying some preliminary themes across the set that were colour coded. They were presented in this form at a tutorial for discussion (Table 1).
Table 1: Judy’s data analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colour coded thematic analysis of focus group transcript</th>
<th>Red coloured phrases for attainment, raising standards, academic performance</th>
<th>Blue coloured phrases for behaviour/classroom management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Academic achievement = red</td>
<td>Don’t stretch them enough <em>so</em> needs to be more competitive</td>
<td>They think they can get away with it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behaviour management = blue</td>
<td>our expectations of them are low</td>
<td>misbehaving is ‘cool’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rewards = peach</td>
<td>pitch our lessons more at the gifted and talented level <em>so as</em> to be more</td>
<td>naughty children set a bad example for the weak ones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pupil perception = purple</td>
<td>inclusive</td>
<td>the bright ones get bullied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school experience = green</td>
<td>coming in on a grade 5 and then slipping down to a 4 by the end of the</td>
<td>influenced by older children to misbehave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>second term is worrying</td>
<td>tighter classroom management needed for deviants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>it’s GOT to be cool to do well in year seven.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purple coloured phrases for Pupil Perception</th>
<th>Peach coloured phrases or words for Incentive</th>
<th>Green coloured phrase for Primary School</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>the</em> socialising kicks in, in secondary school you know and also puberty, <em>their</em> hormones, <em>they</em> are so busy talking to each other that sometimes it’s very difficult like <em>am I wearing the right shoes, am I going to fit in with the gang if I look like a person who wants to listen and learn</em> <em>they</em> go through puberty and so on <em>they</em> withdraw into themselves as well as give up <em>they</em> copy the big ones and think they can get away with it</td>
<td>Prizes are a good incentive</td>
<td>The way it used to be in primary would be helpful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quizzes is something they can enjoy</td>
<td>All safe, a closer environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rewards and recognition</td>
<td>Softer and safer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Competition, competition, competition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>They respond to lots of praise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hall assemblies - some kids feel embarrassment about moving down</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Motivational prompts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It’s GOT to be cool to do well in Year 7.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The organisation of the data into these themes and categories positions the pupils predominantly in deficit terms: ‘attitudes’ (being troublesome) ‘peer group pressure’ (being counter productive) and ‘motivation’ (lack of). A recurrence of the pronoun ‘they’ here as well as the repeated use of the definite article in the analysis of the transcript of the focus group, produces an effect of nominalisation:

- *the* socialising kicks in, in secondary school you know and also puberty
- *their* hormones
- *they* are so busy talking to each other that sometimes its very difficult like *am I wearing the right shoes, am I going to fit in with the gang if I look like a person who wants to listen and learn*
- *they* go through puberty and so on
- *they* withdraw into themselves as well as give up
- *they* copy the big ones and think they can get away with it (teacher focus group)

The bullet point literacy that Judy adopts inscribes a declarative voice that contributes to an objectification of the pupils which is reinforced by the standardised appraisal schemata widely used in the sector of schooling and epitomised by Judy’s ‘observation log’. Cumulatively, the features of this institutionalised literacy and learning lexicon schematise the pupils in deficit terms, teachers in auditor terms, and ‘learning’ in universal and fixed terms like a system:

> Everybody – people pretty much all thought the same

**The wrong decision.**

In a discussion of her data presentation as work in progress in the tutorial, I asked Judy about the design and the (new) categorical modality of her writing and the shift in subject position that could be read off from her presentation. I asked her whether she thought anything had ‘got lost’ in the process and she responded that
she had not meant the analysis to ‘go that way’. She wrote later in her reflective learning diary:

The language that I have used is impersonal and cold and unfeeling: once again this is really not me. These are terms that I have heard and not generally terms that I would use. By using these strong terms in my learning diary to record my classroom observations, I may have given the impression that these children are bad and worthless individuals which of course is proposeterous. I feel terrible that I have inadvertently created this impression about these children; because that is what they are after all just children. On reflection I believe that words such as deviant obviously stuck in my mind because they are very powerful words that express anger and annoyance, and while I admit at times I become extremely frustrated with pupils I never really feel the level of anger that the words seems to imply. From now on I shall try to speak with my own words and not the language of the workplace or from some book I have read.

It appears that what was being signified by the signifier ‘transition’ in the Literature Review stage, was turned around in the data collection stage. Significantly, the intended audience for the project’s recommendations was no longer only the University, but also the workplace at this stage; perhaps a shift of allegiance was a necessary gesture on Judy’s part that involved her as ‘bridge’ between the two institutions.

Judy’s researcher positionality was struggled over in relation to the conflictual feelings about ‘torn loyalties’ between polarised parental or authorial establishments; both evaluating the worker-learner according to different, and seemingly contradictory criteria; the one supposedly asking for action and valuing certainty the other supposedly asking for reflection and valuing ambivalence. In this sense Judy was positioned between two clashing titans of the workplace- the schooling sector already acculturalised into the modernisation agenda, and the University- still relatively resistant or unaffected by it.

New Labour’s aim at the time was to equip the workforce for global economy which entailed a skilled workforce with a university education. Education
Education (2003/4) was a campaign that launched a recruitment drive for teaching paraprofessionals of which Judy was one. Workforce Development was a budgetary strategy designed to lower the financial costs of employing conventional teachers. A framework of diversified roles such as Learning Support Assistants, Teaching Assistants, Higher Level Teaching Assistants - with and without Qualified Teacher Status was put in place in order to render the coordination of the teaching sector more flexible.

Policy developments aiming to change the conception of teacher professionalism (Gray and Whitty 2010) via workforce development remodelling initiatives included the White Paper Schools Achieving success (DfES 2001), Every Child Matters (2002) and the Raising Standards and Tackling Workload national agreement (2003). According to Gray and Whitty (2008) a policy of diversification provided the opportunity for professionals in the field of education to position themselves according to their dispositions; those with a ‘reflexive disposition’ towards their own careers, and those with an unreflexive dispositions, effectively excluding themselves from the competition.

A learning lexicon of inclusion, participation, professionalism, autonomy, identity and reflective practice makes the modernisation agenda imperatives for co-operation and compliance amenable to workers, learners and citizens in relation to a work/self ethic. The effect of this aligns the individual with the interests of the work place. At odds with this work/self ethic is the teaching assistant role itself, contested by conventional teachers, unions and other paraprofessionals, and subject to the kind of ‘role creep’ (Blatchford 2010) and boundary blurring that all such contested positions entail.

Judy, as a Teaching Assistant whose school had paid for her to undertake a degree in work based learning in order to go on to QTS, is a point of intersection for these conflicting forces. Her own account of being caught between conflicting dynamics is located in a polarisation between the Literature Review assignment as having a theoretical focus, and the data collection assignment as having a ‘real world’ focus. In another reflective learning diary entry she wrote about her feelings after the tutorial in which she had presented her data, in this way:
I was just devastated, and angry, and felt stupid that all my hard work amounted to nothing, worse than nothing, was all wrong.

I’d wanted to seem professional, I didn’t want to seem uneducated was the bottom line, but attainment is not my big thing, my job is caring for them I’m just a TA, I was talking the talk that’s all. I’m scared now because it is too big, it is so big and I am confused really.

The wording was wrong, I worded my learning diary academically I thought that was the right thing to do because I thought that was what the University wanted, I worded the interview wrong too - it was the language I used, like ‘deviant’ –its just words that I have read and heard and now I have started to think that way too.

Then my literature review went the other way and so my project had to go the other way –the literature review seems to have changed everything –I know its supposed to underpin the project, but I feel it has totally directed it. and that’s alright in theory but in reality that’s not how it is in school. In school it is ALL about behaviour management and attainment not trauma not the pupil’s experience?

The point is that it is easier to research the teachers, I think it is very hard to research the pupil’s perception because we don’t have access to it. All we can do is just reinforce the present practice in school and I don’t know if that is research or not – what I wanted to do was help the kids – I really do care about them.

Amidst the other binaries perceived by Judy in this extract is that of theory versus practice, that’s alright in theory but in reality that’s not how it is in school; a need to be practical I don’t know if that’s research or not and an assumption that knowledge in reality is based on experience and experience is evidence of knowledge. In this sense, experience too is an authority.

The intensification of bureaucratic processes that accompanied the ‘performance culture’ in the late Thatcher administration and early New Labour administration of the last decade of the twentieth century, contributed to the discourse of teacher workload and conditions of employment that prompted a review to be undertaken by Pricewaterhouse Cooper in 2001. This review recommended an extension of
the support staff role in schools as a way of lessening workload for classroom teachers. This resulted in a New Labour government objective to widen the role of Teaching Assistants an initiative given force by the White Paper *schools achieving success* (DfEs 2001). The project was awarded 350 million pounds to recruit an additional 20,000 Teaching Assistants. (Blatchford: 2010)

In this sense, the Pricewaterhouse Cooper review, itself a response to the ‘performance culture’ constitutes a strategic framework for support knowledge workers of that period to meet the need and rights of classroom teachers, to manage their workload in ways that support, not oppose political objectives such as performance-related pay. The rationality of government was that of modernising the sector through new opportunities for professionalizing its workforce. It sought the co-operation and compliance of the sector’s professionals in improving standards. New Public Management was the political discourse that ushered in new strategies such as performance-related pay with a view to establishing a new social and political settlement, and a third way, calling for a different kind of reflexive citizenry. The plan of developing employment and training initiatives as part of a European and International perspective of industry and commerce assumed to be driven by global economic forces.

Work Based Learning as a field of study is also a strategy for learning that ‘complies with programmes of government’. Already identified with strategies of widening participation and access and Lifelong Learning one of the most controversial and equitable features of Work Based Learning was the accreditation of prior experiential learning as a means of validating experience (as learning) acquired from outside of formal educational frameworks. Drawing on epistemological narratives of experiential learning and reflective practice for its theory base, Work Based Learning offers an alternative model to the pedagogical models of conventional education. The ‘Portfolio’ with its implicit notion of transportability offers a more flexible alternative to classical technologies of learning such as the exam or the essay. The absence of specification in terms of a defined theoretical base, a scholarly pedagogical approach, and a disciplinary history, inscribes a user-friendly ethos to the field of study, making it less intimidating for people who were first generation University
students in their mid-thirties and forties, as many of the Teaching Assistants were. Its usage of the credit system mirrors that of the USA, and its basic premise of the self as a site of meaning-making and knowledge-construction, knowledge which can be turned into credit, like straw into gold, or labour-power into profit, makes it a flexible mode of study for the Teaching Assistants to engage in. However, this same flexibility and looseness that characterises the field of study makes Work Based Learning open to different interpretations and practices in terms of a theoretical base, mode of delivery or scheme of assessment, and those Universities who teach Work Based Learning, mainly new universities, deploy diverse approaches. At the time when Judy was writing her narrative (2005) the ethos and flexible remit of this strategy of learning suited the New Labour focus on personalised technologies of learning, workforce development and an increasing emphasis on employer-facing education, elements that are framed by the Leitch Report, 2006.

In response to government initiatives such as these, and the funding that accompanied them, Work Based Learning at Undergraduate and Postgraduate level became increasingly administered through a quality assurance grid of practices which tightened the modes and the content of delivery in ways that privileged an employer-facing trajectory. This shift in policy emphasis resulted in 2011, in a ‘New Framework’ that engaged predominantly with organisational learning and the accreditation of in-house programmes of staff development in companies and corporations on a public-private partnership basis.

Work Based Learning is one example of how, as the marketisation of education increased in relation to 2001 Schools White Paper and the 2002 Education Act, and the 2005 Modernisation White Paper in Higher Education, quality assurance mechanisms that regulate content delivery and assessment increased, with the effect in Work Based Learning, that they became privileged over a discourse of equity. This point is encapsulated by Pitman and Vidovich discussing practices of a sister term ‘RPL’, in Australia:

*Quality and equity discourses can and are being manipulated to support position taking in a competitive higher education market place. The evidence from this study is that of the two constructs, quality is the more dominant* (2012: 772)
The extent of ‘quality’ technologies of learning in the sector of education signals a shift in the purpose and practice of education in the period between 2001 and 2011, towards an alignment with the working domain, as part of an economistic project of ‘human capital’ perceived as necessary to meet the demands of a global economy, exemplified by the *Grow Your Own Teacher* project. In many ways however, the democratisation of Higher Education and feminisation of academic literacies through discourses of personhood, equity and quality, has provided fertile terrain for a strategic field of government programmes to ‘delimit the sphere of the political’ through such welfare to workfare initiatives as these.

In this sense, the deficit premise that organises Judy’s data analysis and informs her revised positionality, is facilitated by a rationale of raising standards that exemplifies the ‘asymmetry of power between state and teacher’ (Gray & Whitty 2010) in this period. The discourse of raising standards is structured through a triangular Learning Teaching and Assessment framework that operates in a closed system, in many ways along a principle of audit. One of the texts that Judy and many other teaching assistants on the programme consulted, was *In the Black Box* (2002), an influential pamphlet for teachers about raising standards through classroom assessment, produced by the Assessment Reform Group - an independent body which however receives funding from HEFCE. The writers Paul Black and Dylan Williams construct a model of learning teaching and (formative) assessment practice as a ‘method’ for raising standards. This triangular framework consists in identifying the learning deficit via formative assessment practices, designing the teaching programme to fix the deficit, and check in the process via a technique of learning outcomes being linked to assessment criteria. In this sense, it performs as a ‘self generating system’ which, like much audit, is deemed successful or not in terms of its own criteria and judgement. (Power 1997)

This triangular framework is reproduced in Universities at the time via strategies of Learning Teaching and Assessment. These are designed to frame quality assurance processes of transparency and measurable outcomes. The framework is designed so that learning is demonstrable via benchmarks of achievement, markers which serve also to determine the thresholds of what constitutes
standards. These emergent strategies were being reinforced via a series of evaluative agencies such as SEDA, SEEC, LSDA, LTAS where an increasing alignment between quantitative practices, managerial practices and audit practices characterised the discourse of standards. It was not therefore only the learning teaching and assessment practices, that were being standardised but knowledge itself.

In its embrace of standardisation as ostensibly a means of equitable and accurate representation a model of curriculum is put into place that operates as an auditing system which ‘preserves institutional structures of self regulation’. (Power 1994:8)

In his book The Audit Explosion Michael Powers (1994) discusses how the practice of Audit has come to be so dominant in the public sector. This financial auditing, according to Powers, has produced the model which influences the design of audit in all other fields. He talks of how it constitutes a normative influence, the power being in its benchmarking potential for all other audit practices. He says it consists in a constant checking and verification in a style of accountability which is the ruling principle. He talks about how it perpetuates its own practices and preserves institutional structures of self regulation.

He identifies audit as a regulatory practice coming from private company accounting which began to inform the public sector in the UK in the 1980's. It was thereafter that institutions such as the National Audit Office and the Audit Commission were established and schemes to institutionalise accountability were written onto civic policy such as the Citizen’s Charter and more recently the Citizen’s Manifesto.

The notion of an ‘audit explosion’ happening as a reaction to corporate corruption is wide spread; principles of transparency and accountability in relation to the financial statements of corporate enterprise were demanded particularly during events of corporate greed such as began to surface in the 1980s.

Audit serves an administrative function rather than a cognitive one. Within this system, knowledge assumes a utilitarian ethic, where what counts is what can be
measured reinforced and reproduced as technologies of calculus reshaping policy emphases; *Modernisation, Widening Participation, Continuing Professional Development* as narratives of Lifelong Learning. University statutory guidelines for assessment policy inscribed through quality assurance documents such as the QAA *Guidelines for External Examiners*, the Learning Teaching and Assessment Strategy, and the Validation of Programme Specification reproduce auditable, regulatory practices that serve to standardise not only knowledge, but pupil, student, teacher lecturer *behaviours* also.

Lifelong Learning constructs learning and teaching within a capability and competency-based paradigm, of skills, as strategies which produce regimes of diagnostic testing and remedial programmes both in schooling and Higher Education that address the needs of a skilled workforce.

There exists in this sense a ‘literacy economy’ (Lankshear 1997:7 ) wherein literacy is taught as a decontextualised set of ‘graduate’ skills, technological competencies and keyboarding skills. It is intended so as to have an adequately trained and literate work force in order to meet the objective of low unemployment rates, which were commonly perceived to be linked to low levels of literacy. The ‘literacy economy’ operates through principles of drilling, diagnostic testing and performance indicators along audit lines which necessarily works on a basis of checking which inscribes notions of both deficit, mistrust and fraud. (Power 1994)

Whilst seeming to be a neutral mechanism the audit system of education with its recourse to checking assumes a deficit that inscribes also a lack of trust or implication of fraud where in the notion of criminalisation creeps in as a normative grammar that is traceable in Judy’s narrative.

The shift of allegiance that Judy chose during the process of her research project indicates that she was unable or unwilling to steer her research in the direction
she had originally planned. The tutorial which brought this shift into view triggered the learning diary entry which expressed Judy’s devastation. The context in which it was written is one in which she is aware she will be assessed, not directly, but possibly indirectly in relation to the ‘learning she can evidence’. This diary entries may well be intended to signal to me, a stance which shows the student’s ‘reflection on practice’, or ‘reflexivity’ or ‘learning curve’, assessment criteria that Judy may suppose I as her assessor, value. In this case, the reflective learning journal serves as a source for evidentiating certain learning outcomes for me to base my assessment on.

This use of the reflective learning journal is not inappropriate, but here it also signposts a defence to something which Judy felt as an accusation on my part. The defence expresses a series of selves:

one who has been tricked by the University system or requirements I thought that was what the University wanted, one who is vulnerable I’m scared now, one as misunderstood I’d wanted to seem professional, as misrepresented the kids – I really do care about them, as misled the literature review seems to have changed everything, I know it is supposed to underpin the project but I feel as though it has totally directed it, as torn, easier to research the teachers, I think it is very hard to research the pupil’s perception because we don’t have access to it as wrong footed

the literature review seems to have changed everything –I know its supposed to underpin the project, but I feel it has totally directed it. and that’s alright in theory but in reality that’s not how it is in school. In school it is ALL about behaviour management and attainment not trauma not the pupil’s experience.

This last point indicates that Judy is aware that she is discursively acted upon against her better judgements by the various authorities she can name, but that she has made the wrong choices.

I worded my learning diary academically I thought that was the right thing to do because I thought that was what the University wanted, I worded the interview wrong too … A kind of no win situation

And feels disempowered.
I'm scared now because it is too big, it is so big and I am confused really.

In this sense, Judy is identified with the (deviant) pupils she is helping and regulating and acts out this disempowerment with recourse to a ‘confessional’ trope in her reflective learning diary writings, constructed largely through a particular use of I which invites a ‘voyeuristic’ reading, of a subtext, written in some sense to me, her adviser and assessor.

As I have argued elsewhere (Bellamy 2010) this confessional I holds a family resemblance to the I signifier of many competency based academic literacies that is intended to inscribe agency through an ‘active voice’ and by inference a proactive subjectivity. It is the preferred voice of those paradigms which draw on notions of experiential learning as in work based learning to make accreditation claims for Prior learning, wherein the I is legitimated epistemologically through a philosophical legacy which is peculiarly British, (Locke, Hume, Berkley) that privileges experience as the basis and evidence of knowledge.

I is the signifier of an active voice, one that is privileged in the essentialist mode of the ‘learning style questionnaire’ instrument (LSQ) such as those designed by Honey and Mumford (1984). Other designs which bear a family resemblance are those of Dunn and Dunn, Chris Jackson, Ehrman and Learer, whose work generally identifies the four VAKT cardinal styles; visual, auditory, kinaesthetic and tactile, whose instruments are used in further and Higher Education to identify student learning styles.

Professor Frank Coffield frames an example of the ways in which these LSQ instruments epitomise an entrepreneurial ethic in this ‘slide’ below:

(Coffield, conference Institute of Education London, 2004)

- My plans almost always lead to success
- I am sure of achieving most of my goals
- I am confident that I will succeed
This entrepreneurial *I* appears in a change agent mode in many of the public speeches by Prime minister Tony Blair where in the pronoun *I* conflates ‘change agent’ with the ‘citizen’ and identifies the prime minister as an ordinary man of the people’, who however is empowered.

In New Labour’s white paper on *Modernisation* for example the way in which the signifier *I* is used to place an onus and a potential upon the citizen to be an autonomous and choosing subject, able to make decisions in relation to rights and responsibilities.

Although such points of grammar do not in and of themselves construct meaning or reflect it, they are used discursively by all of us to construct effects that assume meaning. What is apparent in the confessional trope of Judy’s use of *I* in the excerpts above, is the extent to which the discursive practices of a literacy economy here disempowers Judy who expresses a failed entrepreneur of the self subject effect when she writes:

*what I wanted to do was help the kids – I really do care about them.*

The fault, she feels as mistress of her fate, lies in herself, that she was underling to the Colossus of theory in the guise of a Literature Review that deceived her into making the wrong choices.

The last point about choice begs the question as to what mechanisms were in place to dictate or define the right choice for Judy. Citing the Professional Standards for Teachers document by the Training and Development Agency for Schools (TDA) Gray and Whitty write:

*Teacher’s compliance in relation to government policy of this kind has increasingly been regarded by governments as a mark of professionalism, with co-operation being rewarded by social positioning as a ‘prospective citizen’ who is viewed as being contemporary and ahead of time rather than a retrospective citizen who is viewed as being out of touch and behind time.*

(Gray & Whitty 2010: 8)
Gray & Whitty suggest this new policy emphasis indicates that some members of the profession are being prepared for Leadership, whereas others are being restricted to a model of professionalism.

The implication is that some teachers will ‘navigate these changes more successfully or pragmatically than others’ (Gray & Whitty 2010:8). The possibilities provided by the re-professionalisation of teaching are in the form of differentiated roles being available. Gray & Whitty cite three categories: Higher Level Teaching Assistants (HLTA) Teach First and Advanced Skills Teachers, but there were more including Classroom Support Assistants and Learning Mentors that add to the diversification of roles within the profession as paraprofessionals. In effect, the Teaching Assistant like Judy who is doing a Graduate Teacher Status Programme has already self-selected to become a classroom teacher and by embracing the raising standards, performance-related pay structure of national agreements, and aiming for QTS, Judy shows herself to be a ‘prospective citizen’. In effect, Judy goes on to complete her degree and work as a fully qualified teacher in an inner city London School, tripling her salary.

However, Judy’s initial impulse or desire to prioritise the wellbeing of the pupil had to be subordinated to the pragmatism of supporting the policy focus of raising standards. In order to be professional as a teacher she navigated changes that ensured this policy derived outcome, albeit painfully. Of the many subject positions she engaged with, she chose to become a ‘prospective citizen’ in the last instance, an identity that may also be said to be policy constructed in this case. Her subjectivity however was not so easily navigable. Feelings of failure and frustration characterise her reflective learning diary and report, as discussed above. A difference between a self-fashioned ‘subject position’ and a ‘subject effect’ (or subjectivity) can therefore be distinguished. Judy’s concern to make the ‘right’ choices was linked to becoming a ‘prospective citizen’. That the choices she made ultimately were right for her personally in terms of her disposition, is debatable.

This section above raises the question as to whether Judy is a product of the ‘segmentation’ within the teaching profession that Gray & Whitty suggest has been going on for a long time (2010), as part of the ‘remodelling’ of teacher
professionalism that induces an ‘asymmetry of power between state and teacher’ (ibid) that subordinates ‘disposition’ to a particular type of ‘citizenship’? Is there a missing technology of self between the governed and self-governing subject called ‘the autonomous subject’?

Autonomy is a powerful discourse within Education. On its narrow construal, it is a learning outcome of every programme specification. Autonomy as competency in a set of procedures that are not content neutral is one way in which the discourse of autonomy facilitates policy design. The philosopher Rawls (1980) points out that autonomy signifies a certain ideal of the person as a cornerstone of his or her moral edifice. For Mills, (1859:73) autonomy means pursuing our own good in our way meaning that the state or no man should interfere by telling us what to do. This liberal neutrality is also a legal one enshrined by the rule of law and applicable in terms of deciding whether a person is a ‘subject’ with rights or not, in which case they must have their needs represented by others. Autonomy is these cases is the antithesis of dependency.

However, its cognate concepts such as liberty and agency make it very accommodating to the discursive practices of an education system in a market sphere, as an ideal marker of capacity, both in terms of setting the boundaries of state power and in terms of inscribing reflexive citizens, that is as a practice of self government. Autonomy as a fundamental human ideal of the kind Locke describes in his Essay (1689) means a vehicle for self transformation, for ascribing responsibility, the object of reflective practice. In a competencey-based education system autonomy is a signifier for capacity refashioned for the purposes of liberal democracy; it represents the kind of innovation on an enlightenment legacy that characterises the learning lexicon. Autonomy is a cognate for the ‘reflexive citizen’ (Giddens 1991), the ‘sovereign subject’ (Dean 2010), who navigates their own way through, or takes responsibility for not doing so, and thereby erases the need for ‘big government’ and in this sense facilitates the doctrine of disinterested government; the fitness for purpose of the reflective practitioner and autonomous learner.

The question that this section above raises is, if the reflexive technologies of self are not wholly policy derived how do we make sense of Judy’s narrative of selves? Why have the reflexive technologies of personhood as Locke calls them,
or selfhood as we say today, re-entered Higher Education as part of the reflective practice canon, now?

They connect with the outcome-based model of autonomy that makes autonomy dependent on one’s choices, as the model that appears to dominate in educational discourses and policy emphasis, even though other models of autonomy (Taylor 2005) as context-based or relational or even as irreconcilable with liberalism, contest this view.

The choice model that Judy engages with in relation to having made the ‘wrong choice’, also connects with narratives that characterise the neo classical theory of political economy of ‘comparative advantage’, that supposes an ideal form of competition is possible and can work to everyone’s advantage, a form of ‘methodological individualism’ that supposes that individuals will maximise their own interests and have the capacity to do so.

Market metaphors of risk, efficiency, user-friendliness and market devices of diversification, self regulation and market disinterestedness characterise Judy’s report. An ethic of self-interested maximisation is inscribed through market related normative grammars of a choosing, self-fashioning, entrepreneur of the self who can achieve success by making the right choices, that is, it is implied, via reflection on learning.

The choice model that influences Judy’s relation to herself infers that outcomes depend on one’s own autonomous self that does not depend on structural processes or historical factors in any way. The imperative for conduct is to make use of the opportunities made available by a ‘disinterested’ as in non interfering, democratic government in anticipation that the ‘prospective citizen’ will avail themselves, and those without capacity will eliminate themselves from the competition; failure therefore is attributable to non compliance, a choice. As with Heather however, there seemed to be no choice of conduct for Judy, who embeds and embodies a ‘bridge’ positionality, in a way that generates a series of binary oppositions or splits, for her to inhabit.

I turn now to the third narrative, of June, with a view to addressing some of the questions raised by Judy’s narrative, to do with the possibility of autonomy for trainee teachers in light of the new policy emphasis which targets human agency,
and whether there is a missing technology of self, between the governed and the self-governing subject, called the autonomous subject?
June’s narrative of self.

June is a Teaching Assistant in a small Roman Catholic school in a northern London borough. She left school with GCSEs and one A level in Art. She has been sponsored by her school to participate in the partnership programme of Graduate Teacher Status. She is white, married and has a son.

A DfEE paper of 1997, issued in the first term of New Labour’s administration, underpins the Government’s view, ‘that underachievement is the product of inadequacies in the education system’ (p12) A UK Department of the Environment Transport and the Regions paper on Raising Attainment in Education (2000) frames this view in terms of ‘school effectiveness’ and cites the need for ‘better teaching and schooling’. It denotes a political intention to reconceptualise education; from a product of social factors such as poverty which assumes the responsibility is that of the State, to education as a product of ‘inadequacies in the education system’ which assumes the responsibility is that of diverse stakeholders within the system.

In this view, local authorities have to articulate a clear view of underachievement that emphasises the part played by the effectiveness of educational practices in generating attainments. Such a view will encourage schools and teachers to see almost any case of low attainment as a form of underachievement to be addressed principally by improving the quality of education so as to provide ‘better teaching and schooling’. This case by case individualised approach entails ‘identification of large scale patterns of underachievement’ in three areas: the group basis; groups of learners experiencing disadvantage which calls for additional support such as the deployment of Teaching Assistants, the area basis; inner city areas which calls for identification of areas such as through initiatives such as Education Action Zones or Excellence in the Cities, the systemic basis’ wherein underachievement is attributable to a system that is ‘less than totally effective.’ This calls for standardising initiatives such as the National Literacy Strategy. Such an approach enables policy response to be structured around large units of responsible units or stakeholders in the system. The policy response is to establish an infrastructure for intervention strategies by these various stakeholders (highlighted in bold above).
This interventionist approach to structural weaknesses in the education system construes underachievement as something circumstantial implying that ‘capacity’ is not a static given but ‘rather seen as the consequences of ineffective educational practices which prevent the (unknown) potential of learners’ being realised. The implication is therefore that better teaching and schooling might be capable of raising the achievement of large numbers of learners who have previously been regarded as ‘irremedial educational failures’. (Raising Attainment 2000)

The ‘capacity potential’ view of underachievement, coupled with school ineffectiveness theory informs a ‘pursuit of standards’ strategy of New Labour administration in its first term. The then Secretary of State for Education says:

We must have high expectations of everyone regardless of background and gender or circumstances. We must target support to those who need most help to reach those high standards and we must change culture.

(Blunkett 2000)

Policy response to this problem is presented as a ‘multi lever’ stakeholder approach to a complex education system requiring interaction between local authority, school, leaders, teachers, support staff and parents in collaborative project of ‘joined up’ governance wherein the potential (qua capacity qua autonomoy) of the child is the premise. In effect, this premise shifts responsibility for underachievement away from government onto the primary stakeholders ‘schools and teachers’. It serves to legitimise the use of test-based incentives and accountability strategies to tie teacher’s pay to value-added analyses of pupils’ test results, as part of an economistic strategy of ‘standards-based educational reform’ by imposing ‘punishments’ on school administrations if pupils do not achieve standards. It’s rationale, that accountability leads to improved student performance, can be traced directly to the National Commission on Excellence in Education 1983 paper Nation at Risk: The Imperative for School Reform. This paper took the form of a declaration that pupils in the USA were ‘no longer receiving superior education’. It informed the
No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act 2001 in the USA, whose goal was ‘to bring proficiency to grade level’.

In the UK DfEE circular 10/99 on Social Inclusion: Pupil Support, the groups identified as being ‘at risk’ of underachieving are seven:

Those with special educational needs, children in the care of local authorities, minority ethnic children, travellers, young carers, those from families under stress, pregnant schoolgirls and teenage mothers

‘Gifted and Talented’ children may also constitute another group ‘at risk’ according to this logic, given they may not ‘maintain optimum levels of good progress’ if there are not resources in place to facilitate them. In policy that views ‘capability’ as potential ‘Gifted and Talented’ children may be seen as ‘at risk’ of under-achieving.

This is the point of entry for June’s research project report.

In the opening summary June writes

*This report has focussed predominantly on how a child identified as gifted and talented can have those needs met that fall outside of the traditional academic support, in a way that, by allowing greater understanding of those needs, we as practitioners help him to access the full breadth of an education.* (3:10-13)

and

*not all Gifted and Talented children will be lacking in social or communications skills, however it is the FEW that I am looking at, and these are children who fall outside the normal expectations of those around them.* (3:9,10)

and in the Introduction

*there is a need somewhere in the education system for supporting these children* (6:6,7).

The organising idea of June’s report is a problematisation of the lack of understanding about the needs of Gifted and Talented children and the inadequate provision in schools for the support of those children identified as
gifted and talented by government policy. Her focus is on one child, a ten year old boy upon whom she bases her research. Her subject position is one of criticality, in relation to the ineffectiveness of the (schooling) system. She also engages critically with government policy and literature that is too simplistic or ‘ineffectively’ implemented, but endorses the government principle of underachievement as a product of the (unknown) potential of pupils not being recognised and realised.

Her description of gifted and talented children as ‘the FEW’ is a key motif in the report. It construes gifted and talented children as both ‘elite’ and ‘discriminated against’; rather like a minority group that is persecuted. This particular problematisation places the subject of the research, the gifted children, within a complex because contested context of power relations in terms of eligibility and accountability. It enables June to fashion a subject position for herself as advocate in the research process, as representative of the ‘voice’ of the FEW, who according to new policy emphases, are entitled to not have their potential prevented.

The problem posed by June’s research is about the right of freedom from external restraint (the school), to fulfil the potential of gifted and talented children; negative freedom. This problematisation carves out a role for June qua researcher-teaching assistant –citizen- advocate; the approach she has chosen of case study, is in effect an ethnography, as the subject position she selects for herself is to represent the voice of the FEW who cannot speak for themselves. Her objective is to correct misperceptions of giftedness and castigate those who err against the gifted and talented by restraining their right to fulfil their potential.

Other authorities that influence June’s report, apart from the policy makers, are the school in which she works, the university and Work Based Learning as a field of study. She assumes an authority herself in the role of expert support worker and Teaching Assistant who supports the ten year old child thus assuming a subject position position of advocacy, as ethnographer, corrector and castigator.
Another authority that is inscribed by the policy’s problematisation of negative liberty and the policy’s equation of capability with potential, is that of the autonomy of the gifted and talented child who is the subject of June’s research and whose ‘voice’ June ‘represents’. In moral philosophy (Dworkin, 1988) persons enjoy autonomy when they engage a capacity for reflection ‘as a second order capacity to critically reflect upon their first order preferences desires wishes and so forth’ (Dworkin1988:20). In this context the authority of the gifted and talented children’s autonomy is implicated if they are prevented from exercising their autonomy.

June engages with these conceptual and structural authorities in ways that are not always explicit. She makes recourse to academic discourse devices such as; rhetoric, argument, counter argument, cohesives, hedging devices, citation and evidence-based reasoning, and the production of ‘chains of equivalence’ intended to persuade the reader and assessor.

The freedom she is permitted by the looseness of the Work Based Learning portfolio of social science research paradigms, and the morphological looseness of the learning lexicon, enables June to fashion a narrative of self advocacy.

The Report

A close reading of some linked sections of June’s report enables food for thought in relation to a history of the present when considering the way in which

A chain of equivalence is set up between the FEW and the Gifted with recourse to the use of the definite article as a particular rhetorical device. The Gifted may be a much less rhetorical construction if it were to stand alone, than the FEW with its capital letters and inherence of elites and persecution. However once the equivalence is established it is reinforced through a series of chains of equivalence.

For example, in a section which begins Following on from this thought (10:1) which appears to serve the purpose of defining the term ‘gifted’ means as a term of reference in her report, June uses equivalences to both create and reduce
differences. She does so in an attempt to argue her case that gifted children are not being enabled to fulfil their potential by schools. She establishes an equivalence between ‘every child’ and ‘gifted child’ through the use of the term in ‘one child to another (9). Increasingly however ‘child/children’ comes to signify, is equated with ‘gifted child and children’ which leads then to a new distinction (difference) being made between gifted children:

*Some children who, by fortunate circumstances, develop more of their potential seem to meet a different set of social and emotional consequences rather than does the more typical child* (10: 19-21)

Here, *the more typical child* which earlier signified non-gifted children is used to denote *less* gifted children, wherein the discourse now is exclusively about gifted children, amongst whom *the FEW* is the more gifted.

*Some children* (10: 19) refers to those more fortunate ‘gifted’ children who are enabled to reach their full potential and can therefore expect to enjoy the rights to a full education (like every child). Here, an equivalence is made between resources and potential as interdependent: *the Few* who *are* resourced are able to fulfil their potential and therefore become autonomous subjects and citizens in a discourse of entitlement that chimes with the advocacy for an English tradition of rule of law; resources as equivalent to the realisation of potential is equivalent to the capacity to ‘critically reflect upon their first order preferences desires wishes and so forth’ which constitutes autonomy.

Many strands come together in June’s subject position as advocate: a liberal Millsian strand of negative liberty that emerges in discourses of citizenship; a mental health criterion of capacity as autonomy as a threshold of legal subject status i.e. the ‘reflexive subject’ (Giddens 1991); reflective practice as ‘second order capacity’ to make decisions, and accountability. This cluster of associations characterise the New Labour discourse of *rights and responsibilities* which inscribes a teleological effect of ‘joined up governance’.

The fulfilment of potential is the threshold criterion, the ‘yardstick’ of normality, autonomy, citizenship. It is a rule of law logic. Gifted children in this view are just children with rights; ‘typical child’ in June’s report signposts both non gifted
children and the lesser gifted children – the difference is reduced here in order to appeal to the authority of *Every Child Matters* (DfES 2003)

Difference is created through the use of ‘These children’ as a cohesive mechanism, that refers to the equivalence of gifted children with all children, and reinforces the *Every Child Matters* point June is making.

The cohesive mechanism is used again to equate gifted children with a legacy of error by citing the past as an instance, as evidence of (a legacy of) error in relation to gifted children:

*The late 1920s saw an assumption that these children were emotionally borderline neurotics or even psychotics....* (10:21,22)

By inverting the status of normalcy, June uses it to persuade the reader of gifted children’s entitlements; the repetition of ‘child’ and ‘children’ to denote gifted children as equal to ‘normal’ children having the same rights as all children – i.e. the fulfilment of their potential, is a rhetorical gesture. The retroactive construal of the past as a place of error or ignorance *A child prodigy was thought to become an adult imbecile.* (10:23) is a familiar discursive practice of academic discourse, to ‘fit the past for purpose’, in order to cohere it with the possible future outcomes of present acts; something which Zizek refers to as ‘retroactivity’ (Zizek 1991:17).

The following section of chains of equivalence serves to reinforce June’s thesis-statement like problematisation of a moral, political misconstrual (of justice) and her self-appointment as corrector-castigator of this misconstrual. In a cascade of associations June creates an equivalence between knowledge and religion. This equivalence is replicated or reproduced every time *learning* and *the Few* is reiterated as an equivalence between knowledge and religion.

In good, reflexive academic style, June uses a hedging technique to distance herself from any ‘grand claim’ that may be thought to be being made, by Terman, for example, whose findings she cites as evidence for her argument:

*While the limitations of this study must be noted* (10:29)
However, she also uses the term ‘accomplishments’ to counterbalance the distancing effect, within the same sentence, and so underscores her own ‘success’ theme.

While she problematises the inequity of the sample used by Terman: (e.g. the overloading of the participants from higher socioeconomic levels; white, middle class, predominantly male) (10:30,31) thus undermining the value of his findings, she brackets the problematisation, literally, and with the same token-gesture brackets entire social processes to do with class and gender, through nominalisation:

socioeconomic levels –white, middle class, predominantly male

This has the effect of sanitising the bias June identifies in Terman’s findings.

June concludes this section by reverting to the positive discourse markers that support her argument; Terman’s research is still seen as a major accomplishment whose findings remain essentially true (10:33,34)

In terms of academic discourse, the discussion above frames the way in which June has adopted a classic style in presenting evidence-based reasoning and criticality, the two pillars of academic discourse in Higher Education today, with recourse to techniques of argument – counter argument, hedging, cohesives and nominalisations. This highlights the discursive competency of June’s writing, not least as she has not had a formal university education. In this sense, she appears to adopt learner-strategies that she has developed for herself whilst being ‘outside’ a mainstream academic environment.

Although her argument is often contradictory, it is for the most part consciously so. She deploys rhetoric by inverting meaning, reducing difference or attributing a different meaning to the same signifier, to fit these for her purpose, conscious of the (post modernist view about) multiplicity of meanings, or even the arbitrariness of meaning that any signifier can signify. She uses ‘normalcy’ as a powerful educational discourse normatively, to argue that gifted children are both normal and different. She draws on the ideal of equity as a powerful educational discourse underlining or bracketing its significance, depending on its affordance to her argument counter-argument.
In this sense, June fashions another subject position for herself, as the ideal autonomous learner, who can replicate and reproduce the wardrobe of techniques taught in University that constitute ‘good’ academic literacy, without having been through that system.

This section considers the technologies of self that June deploys in the report in relation to different lexicons as genealogies of knowledge; the lexicon of humanist philology, the lexicon of Baconian ideology, the Bildungsroman lexicon, the Social Science lexicon of social construction of knowledge and the contemporary Learning Lexicon.

The kind of technologies of self that June engages with consciously, in terms of a positionality in the research project, are various; the Teaching Assistant in relation to supporting and nurturing a vulnerable child through Art. the therapist of the Gifted child with whom June has an ability to interconnect (15:18, 12:28) ; the researcher whose qualitative approach is shared by teachers advisors and inspectors (12:37) the professional practitioner; we as practitioners help him to access the full breadth of an education (5:12). There is a strong sense in which June sees her role as uniquely able to support child Eddie, both in relation to her own Artistic ability and in relation to her role as Teaching Assistant;

"I feel that the reason I have arrived at my topic of research is because of that, an ability to interconnect with the Gifted child with social and emotional issues, a caring rationality is applied arrived at I believe through my position as a Teaching Assistant – something a Teacher would not have;..." (15:17-20)

June distinguishes between the role of support and the role of teaching in a way that highlights a niche area of expertise:

"Due to my position as a Teaching Assistant and not a teacher (this) would not be possible (16:22,23) I am investigating the role of supporting a Gifted child , not teaching him (17:27,28) A Teacher could achieve this but not a Teaching Assistant and at present this is my role (4:37) My defined knowledge of E the ten year old boy"
brought about by my position in support, has already informed the class teacher (25: 11)

She uses this positionality of the expert to critically evaluate the class teacher’s potential for ignoring her findings, inferring also perhaps the class teacher’s incompetence; My knowledge of her style of teaching, having worked as her Teaching Assistant for the past year, I think allows me some insight into how I feel E could fade into the background if these findings were not discussed...(24:46, 25:1-3).

She uses her position as expert support provider to make recommendations to the Senior Management team, the teaching staff and the parents of E.

In this sense, June presents herself as a confident professional who places herself ‘on a level’ with other professionals and practitioners, who expects to be taken seriously and who feels respected by the School in which she works, where she assumes she will go on to be a teacher; When I am a qualified teacher (5:21).

From this position as niche expert, she identifies a gap between the school policy supporting the Gifted and Talented child, and its practice:

There exists a real need for supporting these able children who, although they may be able to tick all the boxes academically, may display a need for emotional support which at present is not catered for. (6:4)

June tasks herself to address the gap: I feel this piece of research fills gaps in my knowledge, and hopefully, by dissemination that of the senior management of the school (11:25)

The gap between policy and practice is identified also in relation to government:

I feel albeit tentatively that I will discover and add strength to my hypothesis that there is a need somewhere in the education system for supporting these children in this way. (6:6-8) What appears to be forming is a feeling of juxtaposition between what is needed and what is provided. The Government subscribes to a school of thought on what should be done, but in those thoughts there is no room for the truly Gifted child whose own ability acts as a disability (19 6-9)
June puts forward a strong case (20, 21, 22) that identifies the gap she has located as a conceptual, not material one: *in a climate that is all about measurement and always about thinking*… (3:12)

Giftedness should not be conceived in terms of capacity for autonomy: *E seems very determined and confident in his decisions*, not conceived that is as disfunctionality: *it is E’s choice not to engage*, but in terms of potential that is must be fulfilled.

The notion of ‘capacity’ as the ability to take a decision, involving first and second order thinking (critical reflection) is one that informs Mental Health discourses of autonomy. It is this particular interpretation, from a portfolio of possibilities available to the contemporary sphere of Moral Philosophy that Higher Education and the sphere of education more generally, appear to adopt during the period. It connects with the threshold discourse of standards and benchmarking that is part of the quality assurance project prominent at the time.

Hefce required Universities to have learning and teaching strategies that applied learner autonomy, in ways that could be measured. In this context, June’s criticisms appear particularly astute. ‘Capacity’ she argues should not be applied as a threshold criterion that can be quantified *in a climate all about measurement* (3:12) but understood as related to a principle of negative liberty, as potential that should be fulfilled. The correction of this textual error, this wrong idea is the formative imperative ethic in relation to a technology of self that works at the level of subjectivity.

A lexicon of philological terms, words that represent (textual) corruption, characterises June’s writing, especially in discussions of the research process; *uncover, discover, reveal, real, arise, realise*, are verbs she uses in relation to *reality* or *knowledge*, as something recovered, previously unknown or unforeseen. She writes that these are;

*Essential to examine the theoretical assumptions underlying educational research to reveal new perspectives and old prejudices*… whereby new research has uncovered those assumptions feminist research has not just revealed this very different reality but has exposed the bias in previous evidence (17)
The metaphor here of *exposing the bias* as though bias were an impure substance, nominalises bias as some thing bad, hidden and difficult to control, wherein one must *be as aware as possible of the dangers of bias* (17:32). As a metaphor it picks up on those *hidden agendas that may lurk in tangents which propagate from any strategies put in place by an organisation* (7:32) namely the school.

One of those hidden agendas she suggests may be to use *Gifted and Talented* policy as a *cynical move* in answer to those *middle classes looking for a more selective form of state school system* (8:31,32). Even though she is a member of the middle classes herself, and a parent, June positions herself against the policy maker’s ‘cynical move’ the *instigators behind this recent drive* (8:31), and against her own interests potentially, to be advocate for the gifted child and giftedness. In this sense, June inscribes herself through a lexicon of philology as *corrector* of this textual (policy) corruption.

Correction is the task of the craftsman *corrector- castigator* of the manuscript world, the humanist correcteria, or the print workshops of the early modern period (Grafton 2011) the purpose of which is to recover the original text; *uncover, discover, reveal*. June self- fashions herself here as a purist. What is being corrupted by the ‘cynical move’ is both the *real* purpose for policy to support *Gifted and Talented* children, as well as the *real* meaning of *giftedness*.

June’s aim is to liberate the ancient texts of corruption *an assumption these children are neurotics or even psychotics* (10:21) from spurious passages and false interpolations. She tasks herself to *fill in the gaps* (11:26) and emend the errata against (her own experiential) exemplar in order to produce a form of pure empirical standard by which to defend her claim.

The checking (emendo) activity is not only to do with the textual impurities in the text, but also truth. *I intend to do this by rechecking everything I assume* (14:29,30) to achieve the *true sense of the word*, (7:6) that which is *essentially true* (10:33,34) or *most true* (13:20). With recourse to her Learning Diary, where she carries out this emendation, June *holds herself accountable* for the *validity* of her work (12:40,41) that it is *verifiable*. (13:9-14, 13:35).

Historian and linguist Jedd (1989) talks about the way in which the anxiety to restore or correct a contaminated text is invariably marked with political needs.
She describes the way in which Florentine history during the period of the Milanese wars “was revised in such a way as to comply with Florentine political needs” (1989:14). She cites the contribution made by humanist historiographers whose textual analysis developed the thesis that Florence was founded earlier than was formerly supposed, making the city a direct descendent of Republican Rome. The ‘revision’ was made with recourse to the *texts* of Cicero, Catullus and Pliny, whom according to ‘the self proclaimed purists’ humanist scholars, were texts in Latin that were inaccessible to the Milanese. This revision enabled a new identity for the Florentines, as legitimate descendants of republican ideals. Jedd observes that the republican ideal “did not spring from the pages of the Roman authors to its implementation in the struggle against Gian Galeazzo Visconti, but passed through a material relation with the humanists who replicated this ideal in their handling of these texts. The quality and characteristics of this relation became a crucible in which a Florentine political identity and ideology was forged.” (Jedd 1989:29)

The connection between this historical narrative, and June’s narrative is that the work of new identity formation is both ideological and mechanical. The ‘errata’ that had to be ‘expurgated throughout the text’ required the skill of the craftsman involved in painstaking correction:

The lexicon of philology that June borrows from to inscribe herself as *corrector castigator* is most apparent and sustained in the passages below: (13: 18 – 14: 3)

> The conduct of ethically informed social research should be a goal of all social researchers’ (Blaxter 2001:158)

> I believe this to be perhaps at it’s most true within the realms of education and young children. Ethics concern the morality of human conduct’ (Mauthner, Birch, Sessop, Miller, 2002). In relation to social research, *I believe it refers to the moral deliberation, choice and accountability on the part of the researchers throughout the research process. This premise weighed heavily on my mind in observing E – a child who struggles to interact with his class peers and also adults around school may feel even more isolated working on a project away from class. Having given him the final decision of where he wanted to*
work I felt confident in withdrawing him from class. From my observations he seemed more relaxed and ‘less closed’ when working on our own compared to when anyone approached when we worked. Further more I have found myself deliberating on the effect any findings I may discover may have on E and his family – as a mother how would I feel having my child being the topic of a case study? Would I worry about what may be discussed and decided upon because of this study? How will E feel next year without this support for his talent? The implications of this are considered in my recommendations. This worry I have over the possible abandonment E may feel reinforces my belief that this is feminist research. These thoughts made me more determined to focus my accountability towards the child and his family, whilst balancing that with my responsibilities towards the university, my place of work and also myself. If at any time I felt uncomfortable with issues raised in my work I have used the Learning Diary as a vessel for my thought processes which then allowed me to articulate the ideas and so build up part of the complexity, without allowing them to lead the development of the research.

In this sense, it seems fair to say that whilst June adopts more or less consciously an array of subject positions, that serve her to ‘represent the voice’ of the gifted child, the subject effect she experiences in relation to the research project, that she may not so easily self fashion, is that of the castigator, corrector of error. The error in this case is not about her own choices, as with Judy, but about the misrepresentation, of a word giftedness. June’s expressions highlighted in red signpost an ideological (evangelical)application in the fashioning of a new identity formation.

A mechanical application is deployed with recourse to this lexicon of philology that helps to shape the technologies of self and learning June constructs as a project of recovery, and a Baconian lexical legacy of Method, that characterises her subject position and her knowledge claim in terms of discovery.

Verbs such as gather, observe, investigate, explain, probe, build, illuminate are used recurrently to signpost the step by step procedures of the research activity. This lexicon fleshes out the Baconian project of the reform of natural history, as
a subject worthy of academic acknowledgement, in the sixteenth century. Natural history was not taught in the universities which made it undervalued by the academic establishment. Aristotelian methods of philosophising and Platonic syllogisms were the premises of the University curriculum. Bacon’s contention, according to historian Findlen (1997), was that whilst Aristotle and Pliny offered interesting theories and observations about the natural world “they did not teach their readers how to observe the information they collected or what their observations should add up to” (1997:250).

Nothing duly investigated nothing verified nothing counted weighed or measured is to be found in natural history: and what observation is loose and vague, is in information deceptive and treacherous (preface Novum Organum in Works, 4:94, cited in Findlen 1997: 250)

This became the template for a model of good practice that later became known as Scientific Method. Bacon called it Solomon’s House; a temple for the study of arts and sciences. Designed as a pyramid in which a community of researchers worked, Bacon used animal metaphors to explain this order of knowledge workers; at the lowest level were the ants, who did not understand very much but who gathered data. In the middle were the spiders, the philosophers, who spun their webs and had little contact with others. At the top, were the bees, the Baconians, who could digest the pollen and produce honey that is wisdom.

Solomon’s House is a metaphor for many things; Bacon’s vision of a scientific community whose purpose was to gather as much information as possible and use inductive processes to produce knowledge that was based firmly in the world; a community or society that valued rigorous method in its search for knowledge and who applied that knowledge to some useful purpose at the end point; a contrast to the view of knowledge as drawn from older authorities, rather than drawn from the material world; experience. It is a challenge to reform natural history, reform the reading habits of students, reform the university curriculum.

A reform too of the status of natural history as not the play thing of the aristocracy whose penchant for the exotic made their dalliance with nature an effete trivial pursuit according to Bacon. “And therefore knowledge that tendeth
but to satisfaction is but a courtesan which is for pleasure and not for fruit or generation.” (Valerius Terminus Novum Organum Works:3:290 cited in Findlen 1997: 248)

Knowledge must be ordered, masculinised “more manly and useful deportment, severe and original inquisition of knowledge not effeminate but trustworthy” (ibid).

The language of knowledge therefore needed disciplining also, cleansing of the rhetorical style of the Elizabethan court: “First then away with antiquities and citations of testimonies to authors; also with disputes controversies and differing opinions; everything in short which is philological”. (Bacon Parasceve in Works 4:254 cited in Findlen 1997:251) In this sense Baconian Method became the template for Locke’s Simple Historical Method and Scientific Method.

Many of Bacon’s metaphors depicted knowledge in warring terms; he talked about extracting knowledge, by probing the secrets of nature, putting nature on the wrack, in a style that was reproduced by Robert Boyle and other scholars of the Royal Society. The frontispiece of his major work ‘Novum Organum’ is a metaphor for knowledge itself; it shows two mythical pillars of the Greek and the Latin, and a galleon heading out for new continents of knowledge, whilst another is returning. The tag on the frontispiece cites the apocalyptic message from the book of Daniel, about what will happen in the last days of the world: Man will go to and fro and knowledge will be increased.

Whether consciously or not, or whether because this Baconian legacy constitutes a particularly enduring genealogy of knowledge, that is everywhere assumed in English education, there are many normative traces of these metaphors in June’s writing, methods and declarative moods, of a Baconian ideology; verbs such as gather, observe, investigate, explain, probe, build, illuminate are used recurrently in June’s report to signpost the step-by-step procedure of the research activity. I was able to gather information (12:13) I was able to explain (12:15) I was able to probe for clarification (12:17)

The declarative mood of her opening address to the research dimension of the project may also be said to be part of the Baconian lexicon.
The purpose of research (11: 25) is to extend knowledge. ...If the aim is to increase the extent of my knowledge or to make it more complete then hopefully research has been done.

The imagery of the Baconian project of experiment, reform, discovery permeates June’s writing: Build up a picture of my findings, build strategies that help, build that into my action plan, through practice and sheer trial and error, through observations and reading observation can illuminate, armed with knowledge, no lack of evidence, from the outset, newfound knowledge.

Scholars have proposed that the Baconian legacy was less to do with content than ideology (Bragg 2000) as inspiration for the Royal Society, for whom calling themselves a Baconian meant engaging in experiment and observation (unlike Descartes for example). As Findlen notes, Bacon wrote “no lengthy descriptions of flora and fauna no discussions of etymology and other classificatory devices” as with for example Thomas Browne and many other contemporaries.

The restoration of order was at the heart of the Bacon’s program and this was precisely what knowledge and the knowledge making community needed to be disciplined. How else could one create ‘fit assistants’? (Findlen 1997: 256)

June engages these metaphors and notions in her report, and although they have lost their original referents they retain a residue that gives them currency. The notion of probing a witness on the stand for information or probing Nature to ‘yield up her secrets’ extends to a notion of systematic enquiry intent on ironing out individualism and ensuring objectivity in the search for truth or fact is a residue of this enlightenment paradigm that is still traceable in academic enquiry today. Building Solomon’s House as a model of scientific enquiry, (or in Locke’s case, using Master builders to design a new Commonwealth of Learning ) construes learning in terms of something which is incremental, scaffolded, developed from a foundation of experience. The construal remains formative in the self-help learning to learn technologies that characterise the contemporary learning lexicon. It clearly influences the theories of pedagogues such as Piaget (1973) and Vygotsky (1978) who use the ‘building blocks’ and ‘scaffolding’ metaphor in their theories of knowledge acquisition which continue to influence
Education Studies today. In effect, ‘building’ has become so embedded as a metaphor for knowledge construction that it is difficult to think of learning in any other terms.

June however *borrows* the metaphors of the Baconian lexicon that retain traces of *rigour* in the pursuit of knowledge and *building* blocks of experience as knowledge, and *progress* traceable in June’s metaphor of the Learning Diary as a *vessel* for her *thought processes which then allowed me to articulate the ideas and so build up part of the complexity, without allowing them to lead the development of the research.* (14:123)

or as a medium

*if I have made an observation I have questioned it through the medium of my Learning Diary as though by scribing a thought seems to make it more real, and by doing this allows it to be questioned …*

The way in which this image imitates a ceremonial instrument that holds something precious, the sacramental wine, in an act of worship is not dissimilar to *Solomon’s House* as a metaphor for a higher purpose project; that of changing the curriculum and the reading habits of students in University, but on a bigger level change in line with an apocalyptic project for Bacon, or that of changing the way giftedness is thought about in line with shifts in policy emphasis that are shaped by the project of a liberal democracy; the work of new identity formation is both ideological and mechanical.

June, as *corrector - castigator* will hold the erroneous to account, she will be the architect of a new public consciousness where people read signs differently. Things shall be different and a happy ending is assured:

*Primarily it has made other teachers realise things about him they had not and secondly it has produced a vital step forward in his Year 6 and secondary transfer year (25:39-41)*

The numinous quality that is achieved with recourse to these metaphors is reinforced by the 23 counts of the stem of the verb *to believe* where other verbs would serve; *to feel* was used less often than *to believe* but more commonly than *to propose, to suggest, to acknowledge*. The recurrence of *to believe* lends a
heightened modality in terms of June’s commitment as writer to the claim she is making, either to truth or obligation.

*I believe we need to investigate in order to fully understand the gifted and talented child (5:3,4)*

*I subscribe to the belief of educating all children (8:1)*

*This points the believer towards (8:22) I believed this to be (13:20)*

*I believe it refers (13:22)*

*reinforces my belief (13:34)*

*I believed school x (16:9) I believed I would be in a position (16:10)*

**The Social Science Lexicon:**

The auto/biography is a well theorised approach to social science and particularly feminist research. (Stanley 1997) It was selected by June in relation to a range of possible research approaches that make up the portfolio of Work Based Learning as a field of study. It ‘emerged’ as a radicalised technology of learning in the nineteen nineties as part of the social science challenge to scientism. Auto/biography privileges experience as a foundation of knowledge in a way that can easily construe experience as a reflection of reality in the way Bakhtin intimates above.

In this context, flexibility (12:4), lifelong learning (20:45), recommendations (24:37) are the markers in June’s report of a practice turn in contemporary theory (Schatzki Certina eds 2001) that has assumed authority during the 12 year administration of New Labour. It privileges practice, application, output and policy-driven learning.

In many ways her Reflections on Learning coda (25:26) frames, in her succinct way, the role of Reflective Practice in the knowledge-based economy as a normative grammar: It construes reflection as something which happens post festum, an activity that checks and rechecks the past and regulates the self in order to give meaning to current problems, not least by ‘construing them in terms of past problems and future possibilities’; recovery. This ‘type of knowledge’ subscribes to the notion that experience is the foundation of knowledge and reflective practice is a form of personal knowhow, discovery through which one can change or direct self conduct in ways that can be planned for; a type of
knowledge, as we have seen in June’s case, that inscribes agency for action and an evangelical subject position.

In relation to the question rolled over from Judy’s narrative, to do with the autonomy of the trainee teacher, it seems that June is able to sustain a critique of the practice which constrains her through her skill in academic literacy and to make a recommendation for recovery from the problem identified, through the discovery of a new public consciousness about the gifted and talented; a proposal for reflexivity in effect. Her narrative inscribes a circular dynamic that links past and future with recovery and discovery. In this academic context, June clearly shows an academic or ideational resiliency in front of the perceived difficulty she is encountering as a trainee teacher, which in itself amounts to a gesture of capacity, the threshold that defines autonomy. However, I would argue that the gesture also ‘bends back’ (refletere) on itself, unable to transcend the (self perpetuating) terms of reference that define and confine the episteme that June is working within, an old episteme of reflexivity and a new form of governance that necessitates the subject to be resilient or be managed through measures of ‘bare life’, from a distance, by the authorities.

I turn now to the fourth narrative, of Linda - with a view to addressing the main question raised by June’s narrative; namely, can we get outside of the ‘humanist analytic’? What other analytic is available to us? or is reflexivity as far as we can go?
Linda’s narrative of self.

Linda is a Teaching Assistant at a school in the north of London. She is white, a single parent and has two children. She has been sponsored by her school to do a Graduate Teacher Status Programme. She completed her Work Based Learning degree in 2008. The research-based report that I present as a narrative of self by Linda, focuses on the causes of conflict amongst teenage girls in school and responds to Government initiatives to invite intervention strategies designed to achieve conflict resolution.

The ‘governmentality analytic’.

In this section I attempt to analyse Linda’s narrative through a ‘governmentality analytic’ with a view to taking up the questions raised by the former three narratives.

Foucault described governmentality as an ‘open set of practical and ethical possibilities’ (1980). He considered it to be the pre-eminent model of power that has been more successful for example than sovereignty or discipline. He emphasises the strong individualising power of this model of governance and the multiple forms through which power is exercised or accrued. He calls these forms ‘technologies of power’. They are means for developing the behaviour of a population in relation to positive attitudes and attributes that are in line with the aims of authorities. Governmentality is about the ‘conduct of conduct’; shaping the conduct of populations by making it calculable. ‘Technologies of self’ are means that enable individuals to govern themselves, rather than be governed according to a Rule of Law principle. ‘Technologies of self’ are forms of self responsibilisation, acculturation and normalisation that are engaged with by people in order to live according to established norms. ‘Technologies of self’ are engaged with by individuals for personal or societal benefit. They involve a continual self-evaluation with a view to achieving self-actualisation. In this sense, Foucault is concerned with the practices associated with governmentality. The significance of governmentality as a concept is that power is relational rather
than being concentrated in one particular site, as it were ‘from above’. The implication of this concerns resistance if power is diffused. Foucault’s view is that resistance is also diffused whereby power-relations are uneven and to some degree, and in some ways negotiable.

In 1978 Foucault writes

*By this word (governmentality) I mean: The ensemble formed by the institutions procedures analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principle form of knowledge political economy and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security.*

(Burchell 1991:103)

The exercise of power is not however just as collection of forms and agents or the relations between them, it is:

*A total structure of actions to bear upon possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme it contains or forbids absolutely; it is never the less always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action.*

(Foucault 1980:220)

In other words, power is exercised in society through the use of different techniques, practices and mechanisms across different institutions, and diffused throughout social relations.

Foucauldina inspired thinkers (1991) have extended Foucault’s concept of governmentality into an instrument of analysis, a ‘governmentality analytic’. In this sense, the conceptualisation serves both as a mode of governance and a tool to deconstruct it with. Very schematically, I would like to highlight the principles of analysis I have taken from this group of thinkers; From Rose(1988:4) I take
the idea of *regulatory practices which seek to govern individuals in ways more tied to their selfhood than ever before...wherein ...the ideas of identity and its cognates have acquired an increased salience in so many of the practices in which human beings engage* (Rose 1988:4). Methodologically, I have deployed Rose’s five pathways which in many ways fleshes out Foucault’s notions of *ensemble* or *complex form of power* or *total structure of actions to bear upon actions* in a way I can engage with.

From Dean (2010), I take the notion of the reflexive/unreflexive subject to address the point raised in relation to Judy’s narrative about the possibility for autonomy between the governed and self governed subject;

From Duffield (2001), Castel (1991) and Latour (1986) I take the notion of power operating from a distance; Duffield approaches this in relation to proxy wars in the area of Development, Castel in relation to population control and governmentality, Latour in relation to power as constituted via ‘methods of association’ and ‘inscriptions’ of *long distance control* in the area of social anthropology; from Frike in the area of International Relations (2007) I take the notion of *Inclusion as buying into the norms that underpin (global) structures*; from Castel (1991) the notion of ‘prevention’ as a political rationality; from Power (1997) the notion of rituals of (self) verification in relation to practices of reflection; from Fairclough (2006) the notion of *interdiscursivity* which is amplified by Latour’s notion of *connectivity* which is amplified by Kristeva’s notion of *intertextuality*; these are amplifications of Foucault’s notion of governmentality

These writers, with the exception of Kristeva, share a technicist lexicon of analysis; *technologies, instruments, devices, interventions, inscriptions, security, risk assessments, processes, factors, administrations and discursive effects* that articulates narratives about the social administration of strategies for the management of *flows of population* (Castels 1992:281). The writers share a notion of government ‘at a distance’ as a modus operandi for governmentality and an understanding that this form of governance, in practice today in Advanced Liberal Economies, works by ‘dissolving the notion of *subject*, after Foucault.
In this context, I attempt to apply a ‘governmentality analytic’ to a close reading of Linda’s narrative in terms that are more explicit than hitherto. This gaze extends to an evaluation of Linda’s own approach to analysis with a view to testing out possibilities for an alternative approach to the ‘humanist analytic’ in education, as was first theorised by Foucault, after Nietzsche, and then reworked by these post Foucauldian thinkers, into the ‘governmentality analytic’.

The main question I am trying to address through this analytic, carried over from the other three narratives, is in relation to the possibility of resistance (as a form of agency), that according to Foucault is diffused like power, and in this sense indicates power can be negotiated.

**Friendship Project**

Linda’s research-based project was designed to deploy a school wide ‘interventionist strategy’ in relation to teenage girls deemed ‘at risk’ of exclusion in an all girls state school in a borough of north London. The project was called a ‘Friendship’ project and focussed on ways of applying principles of ‘conflict resolution’ to pupil conflict in school. The first section below is an analysis of those discursive formations that shape Linda’s narrative in relation to conflict and resolution as global strategies of governance. The analysis is made in relation to Butler’s (Butler, 1999) notion of ‘speech acts’, specifically here in speeches made by leading politicians, that recycle teleological imperatives through conflict-related strategies and doctrines such as ‘Project Democracy’ (Reagan 1982) ‘Just War’ (Blair 1999) and ‘Nationalism’. These speech acts recycle these genealogies of knowledge across geographical and temporal borders, in a global hegemonic project of Advanced Liberal Democracy, whose doctrinal premise is that democracies don’t go to war. This cluster of recurring genealogies of knowledge in western projects of governance, hails from Kant’s Peace thesis (Kant 1795) in the 18th century. The objective of the section below is to illustrate the normative traces in Linda’s writing of these conflict related genealogies of knowledge.

Unlike the other three narratives, which are informed by the frequency of a keyword; learning in Heather narrative, deviance in Judy’s narrative and belief in
June’s narrative, Linda’s narrative is characterised by a cluster of related words; *reflection, impact, observation, experience, trust*. Whilst *observation* and *experience* are frequent words in all of the narratives, as they are terms of reference in Work Based Learning as a field of study, *reflection* is reiterated most frequently in Linda’s narrative and signifies different things even within the narrative. *Impact* and *trust* are two key terms of reference that characterise the aim of her research project.

One of the normative grammars that is recognisable in her texts, is the soft managerialist ethic of *rights and responsibilities* where perceived opposites are reconciled by the word ‘and’ in a way that inscribes inclusivity, as though ‘and’ extends possibilities, rather than delimits what is governable; *positive intervention and support* (2:5). ‘And’ is used also to pair ideas as co-dependent or co-constitutive; *benefits of conflict resolution and improved communication skills* (2:9) or relational; *conflict among pupils and impact on their learning* (7:22). This cohesive is used in the policy literature Linda consults at school level; *Emotional Literacy and School Improvement Document* (2:15,16); at the borough and government policy level *Life skills and emotional resilience* (2:21) *Emotional well being behaviour and educational achievement* (2:22); as well as in private sector publications of resource pack literature she uses to plan her lessons; *Emotions and Achievement*. (Linda’s bibliography). ‘And’ is used in the same way by political speeches to make certain (rhetorical) equivalences explicit; *An inseparable link between good emotional health and success in learning and achievement* (2:19). This discursive mechanism, exemplified by the *rights and responsibilities* refrain of New Labour policy, that reconciles differences or lends equal currency or associates one term with another, cascades down and across a network of inscriptions for the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Foucault, 2007). It makes Linda’s aim to *identify a link between conflict amongst pupils and how it might impact on their learning*, appear rational (7:2), and her solution to *produce a programme of support aimed at addressing the causes*, appear logical.

Linda’s narrative is rich with this kind of compound structure; *effective supportive initiative* (1:33); here *effective* is synonymous with successful outcomes, *supportive* with pastoral ethics and *initiative* with solution-based, collaborative strategy. These terms, arranged in this order, are emblematic of
specific technologies of government (rather than just two adjectives before a noun). They are compound structures that flatten out difference even whilst exuding an ethos of diversity, as features of an interdiscursive practice that characterises both New Labour’s *inclusive* political discourse and the learning lexicon.

Their emblematic character, similar to the axiom, or the technologies of calculus in the OECD literatures discussed above, designed as a premise for mobilisation. The cohering function of connectives and compounds is emblematic of harmonisation as a teleological project of governance. As emblems, they stand in for meaning not explained but assumed, and in this sense are transferable across spheres of meaning-making and levels of governance.

In effect, what may appear to be the rhetoric of *jus in bello* echoing hollow from sites of conflict and violence located afar (as in contemporary conflict zones of *Yugoslavia, Iraq, Darfur, Syria*) is also a domestic political rationality.

In this way, Prime Minister Tony Blair’s question asked in the aftermath of 9/11 in 2009, *Does anyone believe that Serbia or Iraq would be nations that originate conflict if they were democracies?* echoes Clinton’s State of the Union Address speech of 1994, *Democracies don’t attack each other* and George Bush’s Speech to the Security Council of 2004, *Democracies don’t go to war* and his own speech made previously in Chicago 1999, *Does anyone believe that Serbia or Iraq would be nations that originate conflict if they were democracies?* The speech-acts are a refrain for Advanced Liberal Democracy as a style of governance, the refrain is an innovation on a legacy of enlightenment liberalism traceable to Kant’s ‘Peace Thesis’ of 1795 that asserts a *spirit of commerce is incompatible with war*.

The refrain crosses geo-political and temporal boundaries as an emblem of *domestic* policy response as educational applications (*Every Child Matters, UK 2003; No Child Left Behind Act, USA 2001; No Soldier Left Behind, USA Military Code of Conduct 1955; Conflict Resolution as good governance USA 1980s; Excellence as Organisational Learning, USA 1992, Deviance as Criminology Theory UK/USA 1970s; Inclusion as education policy for Special Needs, USA*.
The theme of this refrain is domestic policy response to risk, whether ‘at risk’, as risk, or risk to good governance – it calls for prevention strategies.

According to Internal Relations analyst Frieke

*The belief that democratic states don’t fight with one another has become commonplace of Western policy. Like the liberal discourse of modernisation, the emphasis is placed on the internal composition of the state rather than the global context. The internal development of democracy is the precondition for common norms and peaceful relations with other democratic states.*

(Frieke 2007:153)

The *internal composition of the state* Fierke infers is the ‘home base’ for liberalism’s inherent reflexivity; just as *peace zones* and *war zones* exist to circumvent or contain risk (on the borders, by proxy) in relation to the notion that ‘underdevelopment is dangerous’ (Duffield 2001:116) considered a potential threat to the stability of liberal democracy. This liberal political rationality *internalises* the causes of conflict, in the belief that conflict is a result of an ‘undeveloped dysfunctional society’ (Fierke 2007:153) In other words, the domestic policy response constures ‘undereducation as dangerous’ transferring the doctrine and the solution over to education by creating replicas; miniature *zones* to contain undeveloped dysfunctional groups of society; EAZs.

This logic assumes that the micro model can straightforwardly *reflect* the macro model; *as if* models were transferable across historical, geopolitical, cultural contexts unproblematically, whether in relation to the processes of industrialisation, human security (immigration law) or human capital (life skills). This is the logic of ‘Project Democracy’ (1985) as a simplified form of democracy, ‘the right kind of democracy’ that ‘has to be brief general in application and easy to understand and communicate’ (Duffield 2001:116)

What is required by ‘Project Democracy’ is the transformation of societies, (historically and specifically Nicaraguan society in 1985). It sees itself as a model for the transformation of Human Security and is apparent in the name and practices of those ‘intervention strategies’ traceable in Linda’s writing. As with the strategies of the three other narratives; *Inclusion Transfer, Gifted and
Talented these are strategies which do not only regulate who is in and who is out in Foucault’s terms, but determine the normative criteria, ‘from a distance’, that decides what makes a subject fit for purpose:

The discursive doctrine of ‘Project Democracy’ is reproduced not only across transatlantic security strategies and speeches over the generations of leaders in the USA and the UK therefore but across domains and across decades. An excerpt from *The American National Security Strategy* of 2002 reads:

*We will defend the peace by fighting terrorist and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.*

(Preface Paragraph 2)

These ‘three pillars’ are aligned in a way that ‘brings together security in a mainly military-diplomatic sense, political economy, human rights and development’ (Fairclough: Lancaster Conference, 2008)

The ‘three pillars’ identified by Fairclough, also chime with, triangulate and delimit the terms of reference in Linda’s project and her aim to deliver; an effective (political economy) supportive (human rights) initiative in the form of a (preventative) intervention strategy to address conflict in schools. (1:33)

The notion of support as a preventative measure to circumvent or contain potential risk shapes Linda’s project in school. It is what Castel calls a ‘diagnostic synthesis’ “a new mode of surveillance of systematic predetection” (1991:282) where the problem is diagnosed in advance and from afar and where if conflict breaks out it is contained also at a distance, in pre designated zones. In a context such as this ‘surveillance dispenses with actual presence, contract, the reciprocal relationship of the watcher and watched, guardian and ward, cared and cared.in the flesh .. .because there is no longer a subject. (Castel 1991: 288)

According to a logic of ‘diagnostic synthesis’ Linda’s aim to produce a programme of support to address causes as opposed to dealing with the effects. (3:23) is an example of ‘good governance’ working in the schooling sector ‘at a molecular level’. It is in line with and contextualises the comment made by the Liberal Democratic politician, which Linda found in her own words encouraging;
“pastoral care is intrinsic to what schools do” (2:26,7). It is consistent with the ‘three pillars’ of American National Security strategy:

I consider this research to be important because I am convinced, based on my experiences in the work place, that positive intervention and support are the most effective way of teaching young people how to resolve conflict. Or preferably, the application of preventative measures, to address concerns and diffuse a situation before it escalate to the next level.

Here Linda (unconsciously) adopts the metaphor of the ticking bomb, diffused through popular culture, as a theme signified by the title of the American TV series 24; one of the favourite story lines is that of Jack Bauer the protagonist, leading an anti-terrorist team on behalf on the President (who stands ‘by the people shoulder to shoulder’) in a lexicon of Human Security and project of ‘red alert’ to rescue an impending ‘biological attack on American soil’ the TV series construes conflict resolution in heroic terms in ways that are reproduced in Linda’s narrative: diffuse a (ticking bomb) situation before it escalates to the next level (explosion) metaphorical signifiers for the securitisation of self in everyday life.

The same lexicon of ‘Human Security’ that intertwines a military vocabulary with a pastoral vocabulary weaves through Linda’s report. Impact (12 times) causes (as viral: 11:38) intervention, investigations, tasks, targets, broken down barriers, risks, accelerated programmes, bullying, fighting, disruption, exclusion, aggression, conflict, conduct juxtaposed with personal (15 times) support, care, help, facilitate, unite, friendship, love, intimacy, holistic, potential, trust, truth ethics.

In this sense, from a governmentality analytic perspective, interdiscursivity works as a ‘method of association’ that makes up the glue of ‘power in actu’ as Latour would say, relationally as Foucault says.

My attempt in this section above has been to present a cameo of how political rationalities of ‘Human Security’ provide representations for processes of education in the UK in ways that position teachers and pupils in relation to conflict, itself a binary composite.
It serves to highlight the extent to which a Human Security doctrine is brought to bear upon the conduct of teachers and pupils in everyday life at school inscribing a securitisation of self subject effect.

Clearly, the July 2005 London Bombing incident of terrorism is of contemporary significance contextually, but this alone seems a tenuous rationale for a move towards securitisation in the schooling sector that began beforehand. It raises the question of the extent to which this direction is influenced by emblematic acts of terror in USA schools possibly, as though an historically specific USA phenomenon can be considered transferable to, or overlayable onto, a UK context of schooling.

**Personalised learning.**

Another technology of power that Foucault writes about in relation to governmentality is pastoral power (Foucault, 1982); which derives from the practice of ‘pastorship’ in the Christian tradition according to Foucault; a practice which may have lost its impact since the seventeenth century, but which nonetheless has *morphed* as a genealogy of knowledge into a form of secular governance “a modern matrix of individualisation or a new form of pastoral power” (Dreyfus 1982:215). This form of power visible in state apparatuses, philanthropic organisations and public and private institutions extends also to the family, the school and the workplace and offers a kind of ‘secular salvation of individuals’. In order to be effective, ‘pastorship’ needs knowledge of the individual; their desires and their needs for ‘the government of souls and lives that is the entire theme of pastoral thought’. ‘Governing the Soul’ (Rose 1999), is the title of Rose’s book, in which he discusses governing to mean governing ‘the conduct of conduct’ in ways that are more or less consistent with the authorities’ goals. In this sense, strategies such as *Personalised Learning, PSHE* and *SEAL* can be seen as technologies of power which aim to ‘govern the soul’ of teenage girls, at a distance.

In an article, entitled *Personalisation: the nostalgic revival of child-centred education*, (Hartley, 2009) educationalist Hartley alludes to a notion of ‘hybrid interdiscursivity’ (citing Fairclough, 2006). The term refers to the way in which
different strategic themes are brought together (such as ‘human rights’, ‘free market’ and ‘democracy’) in a way that creates a chain of equivalence or association in the minds of the population; it relates to Latour’s notion of ‘connectivity’. In this vein, Hartley writes “there is a strong semantic accord between the terms of personalisation and child-centred education” which serves he says as a “rhetorical resurrection of child-centred progressive education”. (Hartley 2009:432). This ‘semantic affinity’ with the ‘pastoral’ as the individualising form of power that Foucault writes about (Foucault, 1982) that concerns itself with the personal lives and conduct of individuals, is likened by Foucault to the ‘shepherd that keeps watch over the flock.’ The semantic link between ‘personalised’ and ‘child-centred’ produces an effect, derived from a legacy of ‘progressive education’ that is an already established ‘good, a form of cultural capital that characterises western liberalism and that works at the individualising level and the totalising level simultaneously; what Foucault refers to as omnes et singulatim (1979:246). For Latour (Latour, 1986), the linking up of ideas and the passing on of that linkage to others, as a means of transmitting and reproducing power effects, is what subjectivises us. The simultaneous inclusiveness and elusiveness of this effect is important to safeguard: There is no single blue print for a school designed for personalised learning (Dfes 2007b,23 cited in Hartley 2009: 430).

The effect is transmitted from a distance; thus, even before PL had ‘touched’ the school, it had been worked on, and worked over, by a range of different policy interpreters and translators. (Maguire et al, 2013:336)

Hartley (2009:428) ascribes a liminal quality to the disparate terms used to define ‘personalised learning’ in terms of a DfES vision. His term ‘liminal’ alludes here, I imagine, to the way in which ‘personalised learning’ works as part of a cluster of simultaneous discourses that are enjoined, wherein a lexicon of war is juxtaposed unproblematically with a lexicon of the pastoral as a token of ‘joined up’ governance; as Hartley illustrates,

impact/dialogue, break down barriers /collaborative relationships, rapid responses/ explore their ideas through talk, relentless focus/ reflect.
This semantic, syntactical connectivity that we have encountered above as a linguistic feature of political speech-acts ‘cascades down’ into Linda’s narrative where ‘personalised learning’ and ‘conflict resolution’ are coupled together in relation to a focus on schoolgirls’ friendships. It is Linda’s desire, as researcher, to get as close as possible to the girls and it is her aim to gain their trust. She adopts a subject position of ‘pastorship’ with a view to gaining an insight into what it means (to her) personally (Linda’s script 6:10); she cites a passage from her literature review that stands for this desire, To understand girls conflicts, one must know the girl’s intimacy, because intimacy and anger are often inextricable. The intensity of girl’s relationships belongs at the centre of any analysis of girls aggression. For long before they love boys, girls love each other, and with great passion .(24:9-13) (my emphasis).

Her research methodology is directed to this purpose. She uses the Focus Group as a way of collecting data from the girls in the form of discussion and written responses to questions she asks on friendship and conflict and resolution. Her rationale for the focus group approach is couched again in a citation, from Kruger: Small focus groups…are easier to recruit and host and they are more comfortable for participants (9:20,21) She writes, Focus group discussion will provide the opportunity to elicit detailed, in depth responses from pupils; analysis of which will provide the basis for subsequent recommendations in my work place. (6: 17-19), and I have witnessed the benefits of the discussion and dissection of a topic, how it generates reflection, analysis and new ideas. And how young people love the opportunity to talk and be listened to (6:22,23).

The style of Linda’s writing is modulated with modal verbs of possibility may, might, could, that indicate a desire for a reflexive commitment to the truth claims she makes, occasionally I appeared to be leading the participants when my agenda was probably at the front of my mind (13:8,9) there is also a more categorical inflection that recurs, my observations of all the participants led me to conclude that they were speaking from their own personal experience (14:18) Is it possible to obtain a true picture of events in school when each contribution is of such a personal nature and is based on what it represents to the individual concerned and her perception of it? On reflection my answer is, yes. (14:23-27).
Linda uses the dialogue of the girls from the transcript to ‘speak for itself’ as an original (truth) source that she reproduces unmediated for the reader, who can then fully experience the essence of what the pupils were aiming to express (14:12). And most categorically of all, she writes, one must stay true to one’s own convictions (5:22,23). Values of trust, freedom, authenticity and utility are linked into the truth claim, I feel confident that those involved view me as someone to be trusted (5:1); reinforce trust from the girls and express their views freely (9:22,23); trust of me should be conducive to eliciting frank and honest discussion (8:24); research is authentic (10:18); and useful (10:19); I was concerned this would elicit a performance rather than an authentic discussion (12:20,21).

The truth claims are linked to the claim that knowledge is based in experience: personal experiences tells me (14:19); experiences of conflict (15:15); based on my experiences (2:5); get something (knowledge) out of the experience (9:10); valuable learning experience (13:6).

When read through the gaze of the governmentality analytic, this desiring subject, who desires to be truthful, trustworthy and useful as the subject of the sovereign (government), appears to be in a double-bind between self-perception and self-deception as there is simultaneously a desiring person but there is no subject. There is a desire to produce something controversial or thought provoking (7:31), but no knowledge, and therefore no means available with which to do so, except that which is produced through the power/knowledge mesh, of educational applications of conflict and violence domestic policy.

This policy apparatus, and a ‘humanist analytic’ being proposed through a discourse of reflective practice claiming to inscribe agency, that is undergirded however by a post humanist post liberal framework of governance at a distance, one that produces actual educational processes that are securitised; these two frames make an illfitting suit. The disconnection between the actual processes of education and those representing them positions Linda a bit like the sorcerer’s apprentice, subject to the accidental forces of alchemy and engulfment.
Through the gaze of the governmentality analytic, the qualitative research practices deploying ‘focus groups’, ‘participant observation’, ‘autobiography’ and ‘ethnography’, advocated by many in the social sciences and those fields that subscribe to experiential learning and reflective practice may be understood as the same gaze as the panoptican with its eye on the personal. By the same token, the feminisation of academic literacies in relation to the personal as a site of knowledge construction and meaning making hails a ‘pastorship’ subject position and a solipsistic reflexivity that obscures power relations by obscuring those structural and historical processes that co-constitute education and substituting them with emblematic formulae designed not to be explained but assumed. So that what is being wheeled out of the analytic commons in University is the means of analysis. In this context, through this lens, Linda’s efforts to ‘elicit the personal accounts’ of the girls friendships may read like a form of policing?

I proceeded to conduct a taped interview (11:24) evident in my line of questioning (11:30) necessary for me to intervene as occasionally pupils went way off task (12:33) their misplaced anger (21:1) I identified at an early stage, pupils who... and they participated willingly once they had been prompted (12:38,39) Without the use of recordings it would have been impossible to have acquired such detailed information soley from note taking (13:3,4)

Even rewards a gift of attractive stationary (13:18) appear as a (dubitable) strategy of control if we gaze through this analytic.

The lexicon of the ‘governmentality analytic’ of rationalities, technologies, flows, calculus, factors, administrative assignations, interventions, grids, regulation, apparatus, matrix and definitions such as a certain way of thinking and acting embodied in all those attempts to know and govern the wealth, health and happiness of populations (Foucault 1980) creates a dystopic effect. It depicts a system, the ‘ultimate bureaucracy’, managed by flows and officials who do not interact with citizens, of distant authorities and systems of knowledge used to control subjects who are not subjects, and specialists who are subordinated while managerial policy formation is allowed to develop into completely autonomous force, totally beyond the surveillance of the operative on the ground who is now reduced to a mere executant’ (Castel 1991:281). Dystopic and surreal. In this sense the ‘governmentality analytic’ evokes a mood of
‘alienation’ such as that evoked in Kafka’s *The Castle* with citizens perceived to be under the constant surveillance of a ‘disinterested’ state, invisible authorities and austere boundaries, boundaries which the protagonist *K*, an outsider and land surveyor, a *translator* of boundaries, tries to redraw; the story ends ominously mid sentence, an *effect* which contributes to the dystopic, surreal character of the novel located in a hinterland landscape.

Surreal too, is the effect of reading off the carnival of lexical fusion that characterises the titles of the policies produced by this technocratic assemblage; *Excellence* and *Enjoyment*, *Emotions* and *Achievement*, *Bridging the gap: Creating Opportunities*, *Realising Potential*, *Achieving Excellence*, *Count MEIn*, *Acceptance of Self*, *Acceptance of Others*, *Their Rightful Place* through the austere lens of the ‘governmentality analytic’ that identifies the orthopraxic complex of processes of *flows, apparatus, grids and calculus* through which governmentality is practised.

Discursively, the nominalisation techne used in contemporary policy literature creates a kind of ‘outcome effect’ which dispenses with process by cutting to the end result that is to be achieved; like the label on an empty jam-jar before the jam is cooked. It is taxonomic, like Thomas Browne’s seventeenth century ‘scientific language’, full of neologisms and syntactical extensions that grab the attention like sensational headlines; it is declarative. It operates as though language were transparent and the naming is all; *as if* saying the word makes it mean what the policy makers want it to mean, like Humpty Dumpty, or even more sinisterly, *as if* naming the thing will make it happen in some kind of Faustian pact with the devil; it is as though there were no gap between the words and the processes they represent. The words are emblems for conduct. It is a *will to power*.

The policy titles listed above are taken from the bibliographies of those Teaching Assistants who graduated at the same time as Linda (2008). They are complemented by the titles of the educational resource packs that proliferated at the time, on line, produced by private companies as support materials designed to dovetail with *Personalised Learning*, *PSHE* and *SEAL* curricular. One such resource advertised on the site that Linda visited and referenced called *Dealing with feeling* (Rae, 2007, see appendix 3) is discussed above. It is proposed as *An Emotional Literacy Curriculum for children aged 7-13*. It consists in 40 lesson
plans: Feeling Angry, Feeling Sad and so on; each lesson plan being a design for an emblematic self.

The formula for emblematic selves that construes learning as behaviour and considers style as preference, was institutionalised in the education sector during the nineteen nineties by the genre of learning style questionnaires such as those of Honey and Mumford (1984); the activist, the reflector, the theorist, the pragmatist. These cardinal allegorical types carry all the echoes and traces of the medieval Morality Play, but they permit colourful and visual performances of self homo mutandis to be played out, offering subject positions which are narrowly prescribed in four cardinal moulds, but which give all the appearance of being self fashioned; this visibility that is emblematic in style is also the visibility of accountability, transparency and audit.

The emblematic titles inferring emblematic selves that are played out across the policy and resource materials are like echoes of the episteme of ‘similitude’ which according to Foucault in The Order of Things characterises the Renaissance era where the world was ‘read like a book’ and the aspiration was to emulate it; seeing as knowing. There are also traces of the enlightenment or Classical age episteme of classification creating, realising, achieving where the aspiration was to represent it. These genealogies of knowledge that in Foucault’s writing denote epistemes that are historically specific, as conceptual rationalities of an epochal outilage mental, are here ‘conjured’ ‘conjoined’ ‘joined up’ ‘enjoined’ in a bonanza of epistemes whose very juxtaposition radiates a kind of ‘inclusivity’ glow or blaze that blows up any kind of historical and conceptual distinction. The titles of policies, resource materials and pedagogies, seek to bring what they name into existence, by the act of naming, in an all ‘inclusive’ style of the lexical hybridity that keeps its object indistinct and therefore unassailable; a techne that inscribes and is inscribed by the learning lexicon as the discursive framework which articulates the postmodern, neoliberal zeitgeist of our times.

What is striking, for me at least, is the contrast between the austere ethic of the ‘governmentality analytic’, the austerity of the orthopraxis of governmentality as a complex process and system of power operating at a distance, and the effusion
of the learning lexicon available to the teaching assistants as the discursive formation that represents this post humanist, post liberal mode of governance.

Through this strange hybridity, the policy of *Personalised Learning* is taken by Linda to the point of intimacy in a way that turns the immaterial process of friendships into a material or at least calculable outcome; by making the girls write things down and by then evaluating what they say Linda submits these ‘inscriptions’, these rituals of self verification produced through the *Worry Box* initiative, to the ‘essential obscurity’ of the audit process (*Power* 1997:27) a system which has fraud as its primary objective.

In the same way that bureaucracy is, according to Weber (*Weber* 1947) “the exercise of control on the basis of knowledge”, the accumulation of knowledge has always enabled rulers to control the lives of the general population, “whether to tax them, conscript them into the army, feed them in times of famine…or verify that parishioners were making their Easter duties of confession and communion” (*Burke* 2000:120,121).

In this sense, if we read *Think about what friendship means to you, within the school environment How important is it to you What affect if any does it have on your learning?*(11:3) through the ‘governmentality analytic’ gaze, we see it as a way of bringing thought to (auditable) action. This, according to Latour (*Latour*, 1986) would be an instance of the way in which power is constituted, as an effect of Linda being “enrolled in the scheme of the powerful…. lending her efforts for reasons of her own” (*Latour* 1986:271); as a mechanism, “an incitement to individuals to construe their lives according to such norms” (*Rose and Miller* 1992:187).

And by the same ‘method of association’, we see the normative function of reflective practice as ‘inscription’, that serves to bring thought to action, in practices ‘passed from personal hand to hand’. Linda facilitates the generation of these inscriptions through reflection as a mirror of reality; *true reflection of what they think* (7:5); as revelation *On reflection I am able to see* (9:27, 11:17); as acognitive tenet in the Lockeansense *reflect on their own thought processes* (15:10); as evidence *evident in their reflections* (15:12). Linda’s recourse to reflective practice as something which is calculable reproduces the truth claim
that reflection is linked to experience, and experience is the foundation of knowledge, and experience is evidence that this is true; “a correlation between fields of knowledge, types of normativity and forms of subjectivity” (Foucault 1981:4) that becomes a technology of government.

Reflective practice is a pedagogical, epistemological, ontological practice, diffused as a technology of learning across the spectrum of academic disciplines in ways that are not always obvious; as a technique for evidencing ‘personalised learning’, in relation to assessment criteria, learning outcomes or quality assurance practices; as a technique for fleshing out content for e learning technologies that enable students to peer review and study at a distance, as a technique for recruitment in the form of the personal statement, the CV, the continuing professional development profile, as personalised content for the promotional literatures of Universities, and as policy (Personalised Learning). The forms reflection takes as an assessable technology of learning are various; the reflective essay, the peer review, the blog, the research diary and course work. It acts as an alternative technology of assessment to the exam and the traditional essay. As an auditable technology it makes learners and learning, teachers and teaching, public relations and assurance quality practices, calculable.

Its capacity for inducing rituals of self verification make it a valuable resource in a system of governmentality which depends on the free autonomy of subjects to self regulate. Reflection lends itself to the wardrobe of ‘identity politics’, ‘self-help industry’, ‘therapy industry’ acting as the cohering agent for these technologies of personal knowhow. It is key to the perpetuation of the ‘humanist analytic’ as Foucault intends it, as the outillage mental of enlightenment liberal humanism that has been appropriated and refashioned made fit for purpose for the project of liberal democracy as governmentality.

So far, I have discussed the various subject positions that Linda has adopted in her report, as uneven: policing the conduct of the girls, radicalising the education of the girls, representing the girls’ ‘voice’, reinforcing the essentialism of identity politics, reproducing constraining methods of governance through strategies of ‘pastorship’ as if this multiplicity of subject positions were a necessary property of the learning lexicon itself.
I’ve deconstructed Linda’s narrative through the dystopic gaze of the ‘governmentality analytic’, identifying a ‘double bind between self perception and self deception’ and identifying ‘reflexivity’ as a feeble tool against the production of knowledge through a mesh of the knowledge /power matrix of governmentality processes in operation.

At the same time however, I want to highlight the tentativeness that recurs in Linda’s report, particularly in relation to making definitive recommendations. I am unsure how to …or whether it would be viable or indeed desirable to do so. This suggests a capacity for uncertainty that is signalled through her use of modal verbs, also in the recommendation section (pages 31,32); a section which usually is written by Work Based Learning students in a declarative modality, but which Linda resists:

to support pupils who may be having friendship issues/time could be set aside/would encourage them/incidents may be reduced/exclusions may reduce adverse affects on learning/may reduce/skills may improve/sense of being supported and less helpless/a possible decrease in conflict/it is to be hoped that this research might provide a support (28:4,5) hopefully support offered will at least help them to cope if they are feeling excluded or isolated. (30:13)

There is also an unevenness in her findings (Linda’s script page 29) another indication of her ability to tolerate doubt as a researcher.

The same critical capacity (or ability to tolerate doubt) is discernable in relation to the scepticism she expresses in the report in relation to a series of institutionalised remedies for ‘fixing’ the conflict resolution issue; the Buddy System, Friendship Monitors and Circle Time are three measures she discards: cannot be guaranteed to work (17:7)

I also sense a genuine political concern on behalf of the girls that she supports in her ‘disconcertion’ at seeing girls responding in ways that are not in their interests as ‘young women’; with an easy acceptance of an unwritten code of conduct which she seemed to have resigned herself to (22:29)

Linda adopts a socialist passivist mother subject position here, which she deploys in the girls’ interests in a politicised way. She reports that despite much
conformity with the research process and aims, she finds that the girls remain sceptical themselves of preventative strategies, and cites them; *I don’t think there is anything that could work really* (22:11)

In her learning diary, Linda confides that notwithstanding the pressure to produce an ‘intervention strategy’ her intention at the end of the project is to support the girls ‘from below’ (below the radar of technologies of government) whilst still providing a ‘soft’ strategy in the form of her own availability; *merely (by) knowing that support is available may help to alleviate worries and anxieties* (31:8).

Her decision to introduce the *Worry Box* as the least invasive of all the strategies, and the (likable) fact that she tells us that this was the suggestion of a year 7 pupil, indicates an awareness of the girls’ position as being ‘acted upon’ by technologies of government. This is reinforced by her ‘truthfulness’ in representing the pupils’ position that teachers cannot be trusted (26:10), that the systems put in place to facilitate conflict resolution are *boring stupid weird* (22:8) that *the school can’t do nothing* (27:13,14) that what’s needed is *someone you can trust* (22:17) - that is (paradoxically), a friend - all of which signal critically and ambivalent rather than compliant intentions towards the pupils she will go on teaching.

In her reflective diary Linda questions the strategies in place to circumvent risk or contain conflict; at a school level and indirectly at a global level;

*Whilst I acknowledge the importance of this there appears to be a vast difference between the academic goals and those relating to the emotional welfare of the pupils* (27:35 – 37) And her criticality of the (hypocrisy of) structural apparatus in place that delimit conflict resolution is apparent when she doubts the (empirically proven) institutionalised practice of ‘exclusions as deterrent’; *I question that theory and hold the view that some pupils resent the school so much for excluding them that one possible outcome is hostility and resentment from the pupils resulting in the possibility of disaffection in school* (27:26).

This resistance to technologies of government is evident also in the way she appears not to think that conflict resolution is necessarily a good in itself;
If girls want to make up and sort things out, that’s fine. Alternatively, if they want to cease the aggression and bad feelings but have no desire to be friends, that is also fine. (31:28).

This could be seen to be quietly questioning the force we have all experienced just recently in (the death of) Mandela, as a global symbol of truth and reconciliation, a force for stability, as the Truth Commission itself, that serves the interests of peace and the utilitarian greater good, but that for some, for whom forgiveness and reconciliation is neither appropriate nor desirable, serves to sweep away the past. In this sense Linda’s resistance is at the level of a citizen. These whispers of reasoned dissent against the forces of heaven, suggest that in terms of what I have defined as a ‘subject effect’, Linda is of the devil’s party. The dissent itself suggests that agency may be possible where critical analysis is not confined to the solipsistic realm of personal experience, but turned towards those structural and historical apparatus, the dispositif that pre empts the experience. However, the way in which Linda actually resolves the issue, is by absorbing the conflict and embodying the solution with her person, by making herself available so that she may help to alleviate worries and anxieties. She becomes the worry box that imbibes the anxiety and thus resolves it; rather like Virginia Woolf’s ‘Angel in the House’ (Woolf 1931) an ideal; on behalf of the girls and the school and the policy makers -she reflexively bends back to stop the gap, the gulf, the draught – by sitting in it herself. In this sense, her ‘subject effect’ may be said to be that of a phantom.

In this section, the governmentality analytic has served me as a critical lens through which to examine certain representations of the education process that are available to Linda in Higher Education as a teaching assistant. These ‘technologies of government’ work, according to the governmentality school of post Foucauldian thinkers (Bouchad 1991) as an ensemble to act as a total structure of actions to bear upon actions. I have articulated some of the ways they work:
In the form of genealogies of knowledge; that circulate as conceptions of knowhow and imperatives for conduct shaping Linda’s narrative in the form of government policy such as *Every Child Matters* and *Personalised Learning*, LEA policy such as *CYPSP* and School based policy such as the *School Improvement Plan* which reinforce and reproduce ‘pastoral power’ strategies designed to intervene in ‘girls at risk’ in a problematics of government that is prevention. Specifically, I have discussed the ways in which these technologies of government interact with technologies of learning such as reflective practice and reflexive research methodologies practised by Linda in relation to her work-based project and University programme.

In the form of the speech acts; of political speeches and international strategies of security and the interdiscursivity between these domains which operate ‘at a molecular level’ to inform the assumptions underpinning Linda’s narrative.

In the form of an emblematic literacy; in relation to the titles of policy and resource materials issued in the domain of education during this period as one that imitates historical genealogies of knowledge of ‘similitude’. I have proposed that this is part of a renewed visual literacy characterising twenty first century policy design, that obscures social processes and power relations by representing them as nominalisations, which appears to inscribe agency, but which, I argue induces passive effects on the part of the subject. I have proposed that this literacy is consistent with the ‘learning lexicon’ as a discursive framework which makes such technologies of government amenable and practicable to its population.

In this way, I have attempted to identify some of the normative traces in Linda’s writing of the conflict and violence related genealogies of knowledge informing domestic policy that represent education processes. I have also attempted to map out some of the ‘intense activity’ that Latour (Latour, 1986) writes about, of ‘enrolling convincing enlisting’ the self to produce inscriptions of self - through these genealogies of knowledge. I do this with a view to illustrating Latour’s (ibid) and Foucault’s (Foucault,1981) notion of power operating not as a cause, but as a (subject) effect; by analysing Linda’s reflective writing as a discursive practice that inscribes an amenable subject effect; one that gets played out ‘by
proxy’, ‘at the border’ of Linda’s own person; and in this sense, presenting an instance of what I have called, the securitisation of self in everyday life.

To this extent, I have also ‘tested’ in some small way, Foucault’s claim that resistance (as well as power) is diffused in an uneven system of power – relations, and may, in small, g/localised ways be used to negotiate power - by framing Linda’s criticality and ambivalence towards the policy she has to engage with as a form of resistance. But I conclude, that Linda remains unable to negotiate power or take agency from her learning - partly in relation to an absence of adequate representations for educational processes within the University to engage with; an absence of conceptual and structural frameworks that may enable the possibility for a negotiating subject effect to emerge.

I turn now to part 3 of this chapter 4, which is a discussion of the subject effects that have emerged from the textual analysis of the four Teaching Assistants’ narratives of self.
Chapter 4 : Part 3

Discussion of the subject effects of the four teaching assistants.

The right kind of subjectivity

This section is a discussion of the subject effects of the four teaching assistants reflective writing highlighted by the textual analysis in Section 3. I want to conduct the discussion by extending Whitty’s point about the way in which disposition can get somehow co opted into policy makers agenda begging the question of the extent to which teacher identities are policy driven.

In order to do this, I need to discuss the policies informing the teaching assistants’ research as genealogies of knowledge with long or short heritages; I then need to discuss the two apparatus that the women engage with necessarily in order to complete their degree; these are the humanist episteme and the governmentality episteme as two frameworks that inscribe often quite conflicting ethics. I do this with a view to exploring the ways in which this ill fitting suit coalesces to produce amenable subject effects. I then want to focus on the splits encountered at a subjective level by all four women in relation to their subject effects.

The highlights from Section 3 and the thesis’ main question of reflective practice why now, why here and in whose interest? organise this discussion. The section ends with a conclusion to this part of the thesis concerned with the case study.

The subject effects:

On one level, the effects are: that June finds professional and personal confirmation; in many ways her self narrative represents the ideal experience of a Teaching Assistant who contributes to the Ofsted report in a significant way, is respected by the school and subsequently takes her place there as a Qualified Teacher. Her workplace is a small faith school in a middleclass catchment area of London, where she has always lived. At a subjective level, June is a kind of ‘organic intellectual’ who fulfils her own project through that of Grow Your Own Teacher; she was awarded the Gerry Fowler prize for Excellence by the University. Although she ends the project in the spirit of an ideal that has been
achieved, in her exit interview she said that she had cried to think that the gifted and talented child she had supported all year would not receive the same support the following year as she would not be with him, although she had ‘enlightened’ (June’s word) the school and his parents as to his condition. Her subject position is that of ‘the evangelist’.

Linda too finds a balance; and in many ways her self narrative represents the strategist able to retain her own ‘devil’s party’ sympathies without sabotaging the system or project. At a subjective level, she has chosen to support the girls on a needs-first, local basis, rather than a policy-first basis. She appears to manage her own risk in relation to this contentious choice, with confidence or conviction which is coloured by an ambivalence about the in/appropriateness of certain structures and processes that appear to constrain friendship rather than facilitate it. As the ‘Worry Box’ is the final object of her research project however, it may be fair to say that the subject position most characteristic of her narrative in the last instance, is that of the (Lockean) ‘nightwatchman’.

Judy makes ‘the right choice’ in the end, or in one of the ends; in many ways her self narrative represents the way in which inherent systemic conflicts are struggled over at the level of the subject. The tension she attributes to the theory/practice ‘split’ habitus of the University vs the Workplace is inherent in a system which operates a strategy of ‘disconnect’ between its truth claims and its orthopraxy. What is visible, to the workplace and the University and in the degree scroll Judy holds for the graduation day photograph, is the success story. Her ‘devastation’ is nowhere overt though it gets written out, reflexively monitored and corrected in her learning diary, managed that is in order to achieve the success just in time. Her overall subject position in this sense is that of ‘the bridge’ across an institutionalised ‘asymmetry of power between the state and the teacher’ (Gray and Whitty 2010:8).

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of ‘the bridge’ across an institutionalised ‘asymmetry of power between the state and the teacher’ (Gray and Whitty 2010:8).

Heather’s testimony as a helpless/expert-eye-witness of child abuse, brings overwhelming ‘evidence’ of the systemic exclusion of those most vulnerable, in a reversal of the needs/rights discourse. In many ways, her self narrative is representative of the way in which Teaching Assistants become identified with the children they support, institutionalised that is by their own institutions which are increasingly hierarchically structured; in Heather’s case this is Special Needs. Her account depicts her as projectively identified with her pupils, un-reflexively able in Dean’s terms, to ‘buy into Inclusion’ as one of the norms that underpin global structures, and unwilling (unlike Judy), to redeem herself ‘just in time’; she exiles herself and adopts a subject position of the ‘buffer zone’ for the implementation of Inclusion policy in her school.

Despite the uneven degree of success across the board, the outcome is positive; they all pass their degree; become employed at full teacher’s rate (although Helen leaves the school she is in and goes on to a new one) and deliver appropriate policy outcomes. They show amenable subject effects.

Taking up now Whitty’s (Gray and Whitty 2010) concern about the extent to which policy determines the identity-formation of teachers, that is, the question of the amenable subject effect in this case, I want to take a detour into those key policy themes and structures that were historically shaping education whilst the women were in training, education processes that give rise to Whitty’s concern.

Clearly, the post 1997 framework of policy developments, enshrined by the Leitch Report of 2006, sought to align education with a workforce remodelling agenda that signals a turn towards employer-facing education, and inscribes the habitus of education in new ways. The turn produced a ‘rupture’ as Gray and Whitty (ibid) identify it, in former conceptualisations of teacher-identity that led to a fragmentation of teaching roles within the profession, into which ‘para professionals’ like Heather, Linda, Judy and June, were inserted: Higher Level Teaching Assistants, Teach First Trainees and Advanced Skills Teachers represent three levels of a sub-strata of support in an increasingly stratified system. The effect of the turn on subjectivity at a structural level was to resignify
teacher identity as ‘professional’ through a transdisciplinary drive towards a single, universal, unifying narrative of ‘professionalism’ that effectively flattens out any alternative model for ‘identity’.

However, their ‘subject effects’ are experienced in ways that are uneven, across and within each narrative of self, as the material, historical and cultural contexts are diverse, as the role of Teaching Assistant is institutionalised differently by the schools, and the four writers are positioned differently in relation to the school and indeed respond differently as individuals even whilst all ultimately presenting an amenable subject effect.

Inclusion.

Heather’s project is conceived within a discourse of needs and social justice that is an established genealogy of knowledge in education. In a very literal way the Special Needs pupils of Heather’s project signal an enduring principle of social and educational policy as a response to society in a view of society as constituted as ‘an intelligible object of knowledge’ that can be known therefore and managed in relation to a liberal discourse of ‘distributional justice’ wherein a distribution of goods or resources can be made according to perceived needs or desert. This distributional ethic attributes a quality of materiality to the notion of ‘goods’ or ‘resources’ at a commonsense level even where they may be non material, such as with needs and rights and responsibilities are more clearly non material; however at a lexical level these terms of reference that characterise a liberal discourse of social justice invariably assume a connotation of something one can/should possess, or not. This empiricist perspective is formative in Heather’s writing. It is the ‘foundation’ upon which she ‘builds’ her case.

The legacy of the term connects ‘needs’ to rights and responsibilities in an egalitarian narrative rehearsed by Locke that we are all moral equals wherein every person has a ‘property in their own person’ and that men are born free and have ‘inaliable rights’ of resistance (Locke, Paine, Jefferson). This egalitarian principle construes material inequality from which need may arise as part of the natural order (Locke 1689), and material goods as something which can be gained as a reward for hard work or provided where it is deemed there is ‘just
desert’. Locke’s thesis joins up the need for enfranchisement and education as economic necessities with the idea of personhood (Locke 1689: Essay;1.4.4.). The individual who has experiences, has reflections, and has a memory which along with bodily continuity has an identity also a fixed and continuous property of personhood. ‘Personhood’ is a cohering principle that essentialises these concepts as primordial sources of individual persons, a fact which gives pre-eminence to the individual over the group or the collective (as in the Hobbesian ‘social contract’ thesis) and that construes the individual as having Special Needs for example. In Heather’s narrative this interiorisation of Special Needs as being in and of the individual pupils, is foundationalist.

A Foucauldian analysis, that would argue that ‘the state’ is a ‘plurality of discursive forms’ or ‘set of articulatory practices’ or is part of an apparatus, is not available conceptually to Heather, as it has not been made so. The difference is between a notion of need as a corporal or material thing to which social policy responds and tries to satisfy and need as an effect of those discursive practices. In this sense, it is fair to argue that in the case of Heather the neoliberal construct of ‘inclusivity’ produces its own object in the form of Special Needs children, which thus legitimises its raison d’être. But Heather is unable to follow this conceptual line through. Her terms of reference are different, interiorised, blurred by an absence of adequate representations for the (actual) processes of education. Had she had another conceptual paradigm to think with, she might have problematised the discourse over the real social conditions of the Special Needs children.

The essentialising ethic of the needs discourse serves to inscribe a singular perspective of need that does not recognise difference; the special needs pupils, as Heather says, are ‘all lumped together’ in one physical space that is bracketed from the mainstream school. The physical marginalisation of the special needs pupils positions them as ‘in deficit’, ‘in waiting’, ‘in want’ of rehabilitation into the norms of society. So categorised, Special Needs people are subject to special surveillance practices, of monitoring mainly, in a climate that problematises difference in terms of risk factors. Like other marginalised groups considered ‘at risk’ for not having sufficient autonomy to manage themselves, they will be managed by systems of sovereign power.
Given this interpretation of events, it is plausible to assume that the concern on the part of sovereign powers is less to do with distributive justice than social cohesion. The categorisation of people into groups serves to mark out who is in and who is out. By locating the problem within these pupils in an essentialist, corporeal way, and construing them as ‘in deficit’ or ‘in want’ of something, and construing the state as having the resources within it to satisfy the needs - there is no thought given to any kind of system of inherited structures, material or discursive, that produce Special Needs pupils as ‘having Special Needs’.

In this way, the empiricism paradigm that Heather enrols herself into, obfuscates the power-relations that are at play. Unable to conceive of alternatives, she seeks to compensate for the abuse of the pupils she supports by adopting the full gamut of subject positions in her writing that are made available by the Needs discourse: to ‘do what it takes’ and ‘turn myself inside out’: the carer, the ofsted inspector, the teacher, in a bid to bring the special needs of these pupils to the attention of the authorities, under the impression no doubt that by doing so she may secure the satisfaction of those needs. When these positionalities are felt to be ineffective, Heather adopts the ‘expert eye witness’ subject position, an appeal possibly to an imaginary higher court of law where the social justice tradition she has been brought up in and knows as a ‘good in itself’ may be upheld. Her intention is to reveal, disclose, expose and denounce the unethical authorities for not meeting the special needs of the pupils she ‘represents’, whom, in the act of bearing witness she confirms as victims as ‘lacking, marginal, powerless, as subjects to be regulated’ and with whom of course she is ultimately institutionally identified with.

In a neoliberal discourse of workfare that believes in ‘empowerment not dependency’ (Green Paper, DSS 1998A:19) inclusivity does not include Special Needs, and does not mean ‘inclusivity’ so much as social cohesion. As Giddens says, inclusivity ‘defines equality as inclusion and inequality as exclusion.’ (Giddens 1998B:102 cited 121D680).

Heather is disempowered in having no other recourse to thinking about her own and the pupils she works with, very real experiences. As Scott says, “there is no power or politics” in the notion of experience as the foundational, originary source of knowledge (Scott, 1999:783).
Deviance

Like ‘needs’, ‘deviance’ carries a high risk factor in terms of the organisation of school populations as a focus of the government’s agenda. Like ‘needs’, it is a familiar genealogy of knowledge that has recently circulated probably within living memory of many academics teaching the teachers, as recently as the 1970s in the fields of Sociology and Criminology. In Judy’s writing Deviance is recycled as a signifier in relation to a lexicon of social responsibility revived in the first decade of the 21st century, in relation to a new mood symbolised by the Terrorist Act 2000. At the time, this Act was strongly opposed by Judges who argued that it was a catalyst for the erosion of civil liberties, a theme that characterised Tony Blair’s administration during its first term in media representations (Green Paper, DSS 1998A:19). Commentary to the effect that this erosion echoed the severe curtailment of civil liberties in the USA immediately after the 9/11 period, in relation to the Patriot Act and Homeland Security Act legislation, circulated in the critical media. It was broached that this new Act produced new laws that facilitated police powers to stop and search in ways that was experienced as ‘a revivial of the old sus laws’ felt to be targeting young Asian men. A series of severe measures such as the ASBO was designed to target or criminalise youth. Reality TV had picked up on the mood and ran programmes featuring ‘Tiny Tearaways’ and ‘Supernannies’ and proposals to take DNA samples from new born babies to add to the national data base, was made by American paediatrician Professor David Olds. In this sense, there was a ‘culture of deviancy’ that was historically specific to that moment in which Judy was writing, that inscribed the notion of deviancy as some thing ‘inside’ certain social groups of people in society.

The policy response was ‘to get tough on crime and the causes of crime’ to eradicate it with preventative measures. This reification of crime and deviance enabled it to be measured and charted and proclaimed as being ‘on the rise’ or ‘decreasing’ in relation to government objectives. Clearly, one of the things that gives the force of materiality is the circulation of and reproduction of the discourse itself.
When Gordon Brown came into office he addressed the political theme of deviancy by ‘devolving more power to the communities’ in the form of ‘social responsibility for global decency and for people having a say in the running of their communities’. To this end he appointed Hazel Blair as Communities Secretary who announced an initiative of National Empowerment Partnership as a way of containing deviancy.

Responsibilisation here was coupled with rights in an emancipatory discourse involving the participant, the partner, the stakeholder, the citizen with rights and (narrowly prescribed) responsibilities in a symbiotic relation.

Deviancy is thus being discoursed in relation to the same social justice notion of distribution that defines needs; what is intended however by the Third Way policy is not the material resources and means of ‘the standard method’ (tax benefit system) but a ‘redistribution of possibilities (Giddens 1988: 101), from an equality agenda to one comprising the trinity of Responsibility Inclusion Opportunity (RIO).

In this sense too, the words used in the policy literatures and policy titles such as ‘inclusivity’ ‘redistributive’ ‘needs’ ‘deviancy’ denote a world of substances, with people in it who must share its material resources, who have substances inside them which must be regulated, and societies which have things inside them such as a state and resources. This imaginary conceived within a binary mode of in/out is related to an early modern enlightenment conceptualisation which proposes an external reality ‘out there’ and an internal bodily experience or sense-perception facility ‘inside’ that strives to know it. In this conceptualisation, Deviancy is ‘envisioned’ as a virus that must be contained, eliminated, prevented. The way in which Deviancy is actually managed at the level of government however is in relation to an abstract discourse of opportunities that may be made ‘possible’ or not. The cameo serves as an example of the way in which power is exercised in relation to a rhetoric that is complicit, wherein words are deployed as emblems of a system whose values are understood to be ‘inclusive’, ‘democratic’ benevolent and so on, wherein actors like Judy enrol themselves, as this is ‘what they want to sign up to’, it is what the emblem of Liberal Democracy stands for, but it is not what is intended or practised by those who govern from a distance. Judy articulates the way in which
she feels manipulated by the complicit rhetoric and the way in which she feels her intentions have been misrepresented by the ‘very powerful words’ of the inclusion discourse; ‘spin’, the deliberate deployment of words that signpost familiar territory, knowns, landmarks in order to send people in a particular direction which then turns out to be somewhere quite different and leaves them disoriented.

**Excellence and Human Rights.**

The policy themes informing June’s narrative are Excellence and Human Rights. Excellence in education is traceable to the 1983 *Nation at Risk: the Imperative for Educational Reform* report made to the Nation and the Secretary of Education, a report of American President Ronald Reagan’s National Commission on Excellence in Education. It opens with the statement *Our Nation is at risk* and identifies a crisis of failing schools in the USA which ‘concerns American prosperity, security civility’. In a proclamative voice it states:

> All, regardless of race or class or economic status, are entitled to a fair chance and to the tools for developing their individual powers of mind and spirit to the utmost. This promise means that all children by virtue of their own efforts, competently guided, can hope to attain the mature and informed judgement needed to secure gainful employment, and to manage their own lives, thereby serving not only their own interests but also the progress of society itself.

(Nation at Risk: the Imperative for Educational Reform 1983)

It calls for a Learning Society necessary to engage with ‘ever accelerating competition, change in the conditions of the workplace ever greater danger and ever larger opportunities for those prepared to meet them.’

It talks of education going ‘far beyond the traditional institutions of learning schools and colleges and extending into every place where the individual can develop and mature in work and life through lifelong learning’. It evokes ‘History’ as ‘not kind to idleness’ it is addressed to the ‘citizens of America’ in a call to ‘patriotism’.
It anticipates the discourses of lifelong learning, workforce development, social exclusion and risk that have been discussed in this thesis in an early lexicon (1983) of neoliberalism that inscribes the RIO values (Lister 2000) as a recipe for self actualisation by virtue of their own efforts. Reagan’s Learning Society in this sense imitates a very Lockean imperative in its modality and ethics, rewarding the committed condemning the idle promising personal salvation and societal progress competently guided. In effect it is the heir to Locke’s ‘Commonwealth of Learning’ of 1683.

Prophetically, the report is referred to as a ‘landmark document in American educational history’. It ushers in the now familiar discourse of failing schools, standards, benchmarks, league tables and calculi for the monitoring of individual progress in relation to a human centred policy emphasis; that is all of the characteristics of the security paradigm in education.

‘Excellence’ is thus imported as a vehicle for reform into UK schooling during the 1980s and into UK universities as a large scale project of reform in the early 2000s when HEFCE (2003) awarded funding to 70 Centres for Excellence in Teaching and Learning (CETLs). The aim of this five years of funding was to ‘embed and extend proven excellence’. The McAlpine and Hopwood commissioned report (2004) notes the way in which Excellence ‘was often used in relation to competition comparison and accountability as a summative judgement about ranking in relation to past evidence’. They note the research ranking in international league tables and national entities such as the Research and Assessment Exercise (RAE) which ranks departments on the basis of publications and increases interdepartmental competitiveness.

The point of this section above is to show that whilst alternative accounts of Inclusion and Deviance were in circulation at the time that Heather and Judy were writing their narratives, they themselves were unable to access them, because of the dominance of the ‘new empiricism’ paradigm which trades in the rhetoric of the ‘security paradigm in education’ by obfuscating the pervasive hierarchy and force of the ‘fundamental architecture of international polices’. This architecture upholds the ideals of distributional justice, RIO and Human
Rights as technologies of governmentality. Heather, Judy and June have the critical ability and academic competency to dis enrol themselves from these schema but do not have an alternative vocabulary or conceptual framework that would have enabled alternative representations of the processes of education and governance they engage in. The effect of this is necessarily that the writers ‘stay enrolled’ and become ‘the bearers of the responsibility of rescue’ and the ‘good humanitarians’; this is the ‘subject effect’ that is ‘manufactured’ as Chomsky would say and made available for them. In this sense there is a symbiotic dynamic at play between the ‘ empiricism paradigm and the new ‘security paradigm in education’ wherein one is conditional upon the other, like rights and responsibilities.

**Conflict Resolution.**

The policy discourse of Conflict Resolution has yet to be embedded in Linda’s case; it is emergent when she begins her research. There is therefore no historical legacy of distributional justice, no historically contingent narrative of deviance in circulation, and no claim to a universal ideal such as Human Rights available for Linda to enrol herself onto. When asked where the Conflict Resolution focus for her project had come from she responded ‘the School’ and when she tried to find models of policy related to ‘good practice’ to inform her project she could only find Anti Bullying literature related to the government’s *Do Not Suffer in Silence* strategy (2004). In this sense, and unlike her peers who were enrolled in the embedded culture of their policy themes, Linda began her work feeling slightly adrift from the mainstream.

The emergence of Conflict Resolution as a policy discourse has been significant in the field of peace studies since the 1990s. It’s applied to such processes as mediation, truth and reconciliation, and post conflict peacebuilding. Here, it is applied to education.

This impression of Conflict Resolution as an emergent policy discourse that’s new as an application to the field of education, is reinforced in relation to an *inferred* sponsored project undertaken by a group of researchers at the Institute of Education in the Social Science Research Centre in April 2006 (Report 1406R).
the aim of which was ‘to find out if planned interventions in school settings improve young people’s personal and social relationships.’ To do so, the team reviewed 10 models: 7 from USA, 2 from Canada, 1 from Australia. No UK study met their inclusion criteria. In effect, they were casting around to find any application of Conflict Resolution in mainstream schools in London. Notwithstanding these limitations, and based on a review of cases outside the UK, the team suggested to policy makers that ‘on the whole interventions in promoting peer mediation, negotiation and conflict resolution skills may produce some positive effects’ (2006:11).

The project indicates all the signs of a reconnaissance study into an area which is not yet established in the UK schooling sector. Its message of the potential cost effective ness of outsourced services provided by paraprofessionals however chimes with a dominant theme of the day in relation to education, that excessive teacher workload was a ‘key contributor to teacher recruitment and retention crisis’ (Blatchford 2011:138). Paraprofessionals such as Teaching Assistants were being employed to reduce teachers’ administrative duties, reduce the need for teachers to cover for absent colleagues and provide time for preparation and planning (PPA time). Blatchford’s report on the Impact of Teaching Assistants on the education sector in the UK (2011) highlights cases where instead of schools employing qualified supply teachers to cover classes they deployed paraprofessional support staff as a way of saving costs (Blatchford 2011:138). The use of paraprofessionals in all areas of the USA economy was the subject of a paper cited in Blatchford, by Giancreco (2005) who argues that an implicit form of discrimination had developed in the schooling sector in the USA where the least able and most disadvantaged pupils received less educational input than others, and were allocated to those staff who had the least subject and pedagogical knowledge. Giancreco argues that there was at the time virtually no national data about the demographic characteristics, learning characteristics, or disability characteristics of pupils receiving support from paraprofessionals in one- to- one contexts; that there was no conceptual or theoretical basis for assigning the least qualified lowest paid often inadequately supervised staff – paraprofessionals or Teaching Assistants to provide the bulk of support to students with the more complex characteristics; that often the hiring of special
education paraprofessionals is done as ‘a quick fix’. (2005:3). Giancreco makes the point that having paraprofessionals assume high level of instructional responsibility presents a ‘double standard’ that ‘likely would be considered unacceptable were it applied to students without disabilities’ (ibid) and that the very provision of paraprofessionals may be part of the problem rather than the solution to the issue of poor standards.

Whilst these arguments cannot be simply transferred across to the UK context of the time, they anticipate the concerns highlighted in the Blatchford report of 2011.

The intention here, is to underscore the way in which policy came into effect before any research was undertaken, wherein senior politicians such as Estelle Morris gave the project of employing Teaching Assistants as paraprofessionals great acclaim, in the education education education campaign (2004) as a ‘problem solver’. In this context, Conflict Resolution ushered the security paradigm in education into the twenty first century, in search of actors to enrol themselves onto its scheme in order that it might become an embedded strata of the global learning lexicon; it was international development policy driven.

Conflict resolution in education had a particular role in the reconstruction of conflict-torn countries and was theorised as ‘education in conflict’. However, a ‘security paradigm’ began to form across sections of international norms and standards for education that brought focus to bear and consensus to the fore on ‘the need for mainstream education to take account of significant world trends and respond to them by living together’ (International Commission on Education for 21st Century Delors et al 1996: 377) A framework of agencies such as UNESCO; Education for All (2002, 2003,2005) UNICEF Lifeskills based education programme (2005) OECD Equity as Outcomes (2002) invert the ‘education in conflict’ dynamic to ‘conflict in education’; a dynamic that privileges the conflict factor over the education factor and an inversion that is tangible in the four narratives of this study.

Whether the ‘naturalseemingness’ of the policy themes that the four women engage with is attributable to; 1) being inherited as tradition, 2) being historically contingent to the moment of writing 3) occupying the place of a
universal ideal, or 4) leveraged into place by the architects of an international apparatus, the effect is quickly embedded as ‘natural seeming’ in each case. What is embedded through the culture of Inclusivity, Deviance, and Conflict Resolution is a security paradigm in education that articulates the ‘good governance’ objectives of the Post Washington Consensus through a shift in policy emphasis towards human centredness.

**Conditions of emergence of Conflict Resolution**

*Conflict Resolution after the Cold War* is a book written by the Committee on International Conflict Resolution (eds Stern and Druckman 2000) which recounts its changing practice ‘in a changing world’ and contextualises Conflict Resolution *after the Cold War* in relation to other ‘epoch making’ phenomena:

> the end of an era of bipolarity a new wave of democratization, increasing globalization of information and economic power… a rash of sometimes -violent expressions of claims to rights based on cultural identity a redefinition of sovereignty that imposes on states new responsibilities to their citizens and the world community.

( Stern and Druckman 2000:1)

It rationalises the need for change in relation to the inadequacy, post Cold War, of former Cold War practices of traditional diplomacy that reflected a state system as the dominant order in world politics; an order which treated international conflict as occurring between nation states. It argues that the ‘shape of organised violence’ has changed since the end of the Cold War, and so must ‘the ways in which governments and others try to set its limits’ (ibid).

The term ‘conflict resolution’ is used broadly by the Committee members to refer to “efforts to prevent or mitigate violence resulting from intergroup or interstate conflict as well as efforts to reduce the underlying disagreements” (ibid).

Conflict theory in education emphasises conflict transformation rather than conflict resolution. According to the editors of *Conflict Resolution after the Cold War*...
War (Stern and Druckman 2000) it takes three kinds of approach; the ‘problem solving approach’ which takes place through workshops and may produce an outcome of reconciliation, by a Truth Commission for example, or a signed agreement between the parties; the ‘structural prevention’ approach which aims at creating institutionalised systems of laws, or rules (such as autonomy arrangements) for establishing peaceful channels for adjudicating new ground; the ‘normative change’ approach defined as “developing and institutionalising formal principles and informal expectations intended to create a new context for the management of conflict” (ibid).

This differs to the Cold War approaches which practised a principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Here, the premise is one of applying universal principles ‘that hold all states responsible to common standards.’ The new international norms of conflict resolution are deployed to ‘regulate or prevent conflict within borders or boundaries’. The norms are registered or stated in international bodies such as United Nations Charter and other related transnational institutions in a project of global integration. The approach ‘presages a more complex multidimensional arena of international conflict in which both state interests and non state actors are an important part of the mix.’ (ibid:7)

The ‘actors’ who enrol themselves as conduits for peace include: NGO’s, Policy makers, diplomats, leaders of groups, educators and other non experts. The editors link conflict resolution to ‘human rights norms (that) have through the operations of (such complexes) provided increasing leverage for the international community to curb organised state violence against minority groups.’ (2000:7)

The central claim of the new policy underpinning the fourth narrative is that ‘the shape of organised violence changed after the Cold War’ (Stern and Druckman 2000:1) to internal ‘civil wars’ and therefore needs a new focus on the ‘causes of conflict’ in order to ‘set its limits’. The main cause it is claimed is poverty and
where there is poverty there is more conflict, an assumption reproduced by the UK White Paper on Globalisation (2000)

Violent conflict is one of the biggest barriers to development in many of the world’s poorest countries. Of the 40 poorest countries in the world 24 are either in the midst of armed conflict or have only recently emerged from it.

In effect, Conflict Resolution has been much contested as a practice that exports liberal peace values that may be seen to be exploitative by some nations. Where Conflict research and application has had success as an emancipatory discourse and practice within within peace keeping processes of global governance, its application in Linda’s case to an education process was not transformative. At best, it may have been palliative, but more probably it was an inadequate representation for education processes and for a teacher to have had to deploy.

**Governmentality analytic; there is no longer a subject:**

Gray & Whitty’s (2010) recourse to ‘habitus’ suggests that the right kind of choice, to take Judy’s refrain, is produced not as an effect of a personalised struggle so much as what Foucault refers to as a system of relationality that is ‘distributed rationally’ in a ‘well ordered dispersion’ that governs from a distance the ‘operative on the ground’, those who enrolled themselves on this pathway. Castel (1991) depicts this system as operating on a utilitarian logic as a form of calculus designed to ‘cover the maximum amount of ground reaching the maximum number of people through the deployment of a unified apparatus’ linked to a ‘machinery’ which involves the state, but is more global. It requires administration ‘to acquire an almost complete autonomy and virtually absolute control’ of the new technocratic technology, writes Castel 1991. He goes on:

> the operative on the ground now becomes a simple auxiliary to a manager whom she or he supplies with information derived from the activity of diagnosis expertise. These items of information are then stockpiled, processed and distributed along channels completely disconnected from those of professional practice using computerised data handling…..practitioners are made subordinate to objectives of
management policy…the manager becomes the genuine decision maker, holds all the cards and controls the game.

(Castel 1991:294)

Written in 1991, this was a shocking analysis of governance in the new world order, nowadays (2014) it may be taken for granted though not necessarily digested in terms of the implications for subjecthood that it prescribes. What is being addressed, says Castel, is;

not people but factors …statistical correlations of heterogeneous elements… that deconstruct the concrete subject of intervention and reconstruct a combination of factors liable to produce risk. Their primary aim is not to confront a concrete dangerous situation but to anticipate all the possible forms of irruption of danger’ in a strategy of ‘Prevention’ which ‘in effect promotes suspicion to the dignified scientific rank of a calculus of probabilities.

( Castel 1991:288)

The system is organised to anticipate all the possible forms of irruption of danger through a strategy of Prevention. It is precisely what Judy and the other Teaching Assistants are putting into place via pre-patterned strategies of Inclusion, Transfer Excellence, Conflict Resolution. These are prevention strategies designed to anticipate the management of children as risk in ways that reflexively involve the Teaching Assistants as the ‘translators’ who diffuse this model, as actors temporarily ‘enrolled’ (Latour 1986) in the Grow Your Own Teacher scheme; this is the austere narrative of the ‘governmentality analytic’ through which lens I have construed Reflective Practice as knowhow sustained by a whole ‘apparatus’ and complex ensemble as a project of governmentality.

Two paradigms: empiricism paradigm and the security paradigm in education

A second aspect to that of subjectivity has emerged from a close reading of the four narratives, which is the confluence of two ‘paradigms’; the empiricism paradigm - that informs epistemological discourses such as experiential learning,
reflective practice, lifelong learning and evidence based learning, that adhere to the notion of experience as the foundation of knowledge, and the security paradigm. The themes that the four writers ‘select’ are in effect themes of ‘good governance’ that has Security as its logic. Inclusion, Deviance, Conflict Resolution. Where they dovetail is in relation to the self as a site of knowledge construction and self regulation. The objective of this section is to consider the way in which these two paradigms converge and reinforce one another in the writing of the four narratives, and also to consider the implications of this convergence for education.

Firstly, I should like to clarify what I mean by paradigm, as not a framework or typology of stages through which knowledge develops, in the sense that has become received after Kuhn, but in a Foucauldian sense of an ‘effect of knowledge’ that is ‘acceptable at a given point in time and specific domain’; that is as a mark, inflection or historical trace, contingent and symptomatic of its times and understood in relation to the dominant, that is power related, episteme; not then a framework or typology of stages through which knowledge develops.

Foucault says

For nothing can exist as an element of knowledge if, on the one hand, it does not conform to a set of rules and constraints characteristic, for example, of a given type of scientific discourse in a given period, and if, on the other hand it does not possess the effects of coercion or simply the incentives peculiar to what is scientifically validated or simply rational or simply generally accepted.

(Foucault 2007:60-61)

The four narratives are written in relation to a re-emergent paradigm of empiricism that characterises Higher Education in the present times. It brings a renewed emphasis on ‘evidence based learning’ and makes available a self-actualising subject position that is contingent on the premise that experience is the foundation of knowledge. It brings an ethic, induced through forms of calculus designed to make knowledge quantifiable, measurable and capable, of producing tangible outcomes that are demonstrable, conclusively definable, and a secure object. It extends this ethic of calculus to the profiling technologies of
students in relation to the subject positions that are made available according to ‘individual preferences’; the learning style questionnaire and other psychometric or econometric technologies of learning that serve as indicators of performance for purposes of classification.

This positivist ethic of the empiricism paradigm has been much problematised in terms of its limitations: ‘the attempt to reduce understanding to observable performance has certain ontological deficiencies (Barnett 1994: 75); it has been pathologised as a desire to return to a former Golden era (Kress 1999) wherein certainty was an ideal of knowledge, and it has been criticised for its technicist performative inscriptions designed to exclude certain social groups (Ball 2013). My critique follows these, in its claim that the empiricism paradigm is a technology of government that seeks to enrol actors into a hegemonic agenda that has need of solid foundations, need of certainist paradigms in a ‘postist’ knowledge based economy, whose apparatus demands the in transience of knowledge. It is this fear I suspect, of ambivalence, inherent in this paradoxical position we find ourselves, that accounts to some degree for recourse to positivist technologies in the form of the revival of an enlightenment ‘paradigm’ of empiricism, and the imperative for ‘evidence based’ learning which dominate in Higher Education. These martial art technologies of knowledge are no doubt deemed those most likely to ‘secure the object’. It is this sfumato zone of ambivalence that accommodates the convergence of the empiricism paradigm with the security paradigm; mutual reinforcement against the intransience and risk that defines our postist era; in this sense both ‘paradigms’ are ‘effects of coercion’ and symptomatic traces of a wider problematic.

This anxiety has raised the question of the ‘real foundations’ of epistemology in education, the real foundations of historical knowledge in History and the real foundations or causes of Poverty and Conflict in Development. Each domain, of relevance to this thesis, reframes an old debate about the possibility of the real; Contrary to the notion that ‘objective reality’ is intellectually archaic in a ‘postist’ era, it would seem that there has been a retrenchment of this veteran discourse of ‘reality’ in Higher Education amongst these disciplines; a seeming encountered in much the same way that Locke experienced a retrenchment of
Scholasticism in reaction to his theory of empiricism in 1697 (Goldie, 2002: Locke’s letter to Molyneux, no 2202)

My analysis of the four narratives in chapter 4 has thus far problematised the taken for granted assumption of the empiricism paradigm in the student writing, as the only paradigm available to them. The experience as a foundation of knowledge epistemology, is premised on reference to an originary point that is the foundation of all explanation. It inscribes a powerful ‘common sense’ adherence to the notion that knowledge and life are built upon people’s experiences, that the individual is prior to experience. (Rorty 1979, Scott 1991) Here the individual is thought of as having experiences rather than experiences being produced through those discursive practices which predate them, or through inherited structures by which subjectivities are co-constituted. It is a concept that assumes actions are explicable in terms of a ‘form, substance or agency outside’ of those actions and it raises the question of referentiality, as I have argued.

The Oxford English dictionary confirms this view of experience as something which is; put to the test- a trial; something which produces proof by actual trial- a practical demonstration; the observation of facts and events considered as a source of knowledge; knowledge gathered from past events whether by conscious observation or by consideration or reflection; as subjective witness which is offered as truth and the most authentic kind of truth; as the ground for all subsequent reasoning and analysis; a particular kind of consciousness which can in some contexts be distinguished between reason and knowledge. Reflection here is defined as a doctrine that proposes ‘the object of study can have its form substance or actions explained in reference to a form substance or agency outside of itself’. It is understood at a common sense level through the powerful metaphor of the mirroring of images between objects or events in the real world. It is often deployed in this sense by the writers of the narratives, as corresponding to experience.

The University confirms the positivist ethic in its adoption of technologies of learning as discussed in relation to the four narratives; the behaviouralist design of the Teaching Observation template and the psychometric design of the Learning Style Questionnaire, the Leadership and Organisational Learning
literature templates deployed in this study by Teaching Assistants and academics; the QAA Learning Outcomes that link to assessment criteria in the (closed) systems of Learning and Teaching and Assessment audits; the staff development, appraisal and recruitment templates that align with international benchmarking systems of league tables and policy emphases, and the profiling calculi of TDA and HEA; the market oriented, employer-facing Memorandum of Agreements between University accreditation and validation schemes and industry via Public Private Initiatives.

This positivist design serves to make knowledge tacit, transferable commodifiable and usable. Its simple method-plain language-for action (historical) tropes makes it easy to understand and disseminate and its ‘can do’ literacy inscribes an ethic of self actualisation. It’s ethos of tangibility and its aptitude for appearances serve a rhetorical purpose as its visual literacies symbolised by the emblem can persuade ‘at a glance’. These are compelling features in a paradigm which espouses a universal claim that experience is the foundation of knowledge, and as such can assume a normative epistemology. One can see its utility to a project of governmentality that seeks to avoid risk.

In terms of the question raised by Gray and Whitty (2010) about the extent to which policy determines the identity formation of teachers, it seems clear that the post 1997 framework of policy developments, enshrined by the Leitch Report of 2006, sought to align education with a workforce remodelling agenda that signals a turn towards employer-facing education, and inscribed habitus of education in new ways. The turn produced a ‘rupture’ as Gray and Whitty identify it, in former conceptualisations of teacher identity that has led to a fragmentation of teaching roles within the profession, into which ‘para professionals’ like Heather, Linda, Judy and June, were inserted; Higher Level Teaching Assistants, Teach First Trainees and Advanced Skills Teachers (Gray and Whitty 2010) represent three levels of a sub strata of support in an increasingly stratified system. The effect of the turn on subjectivity at a structural level was to resignify teacher identity as ‘professional’ through a ‘transdisciplinary’ drive towards a single, universal, unifying narrative of ‘professionalism’ that effectively flattened out any alternative model for identity.
Their ‘subject effects’ are experienced at a subjective level in ways that are uneven, across and within each narrative of self, as the material, historical and cultural contexts are diverse, wherein the role of Teaching Assistant is institutionalised differently by the schools, and the four women are positioned differently to the school and indeed respond differently as individuals. However their endings all strive for the same closure; for justice to be served in the case of the ‘expert eye–witness’, for recognition to be awarded in the case of the ‘right choice’ having being made, for purity in the case of the ‘corrector’, for reconciliation in the case of ‘the devil’s advocate’.

By the same token however, the women engage with the discourse of empiricism with some ambivalence; that is with a criticality that is now brought to bear, now bracketed, even whilst they are encouraged to engage critically.

In effect, the women writers appear to contract into the empiricism paradigm both as reflexive subjects (in Gidden’s sense) and unevenly, as ‘believers’ of its doctrinal narrative. They deploy a range of subject positions to facilitate this split subject effect; the complicit citizen; the pious Christian, and perhaps to this extent can be said to fashion themselves, albeit in accordance with the narrow prescriptions afforded by this current regime. Nonetheless, they never entirely submit to the positivist, certaintist ontology that the empiricist paradigm prescribes, as they succeed in the last instance in out performing their designated ‘level’ (of Gray and Whitty’s template) by becoming professional teachers and not remaining Teaching Assistants.

The question this section above leaves unanswered is about the level of autonomy of the four Teaching Assistants, enrolled on a programme of widening participation, that is fashioned by powerful entities such as the Oxford English Dictionary, the University and Policy makers.
Conclusion to Chapter 4

These analytics privilege difference, historical specificity, and contingency as criteria for criticality and diagnosis in ways that complement the governmentality analytic. They are among the analytics we have in hand as academics to challenge foundationalist paradigms and offer representations that are adequate for contemporary processes of education and governance, but they were unavailable to Heather, Judy, June and Linda. As a result, these writers did not have the conceptual furniture to articulate conceptions of time-space (Harvey 2003) and experience (Rorty 1979, Scott 1991) that are representative of actual processes today, because they were restricted by an early enlightenment ‘humanist analytic’. Just as their predecessors in the seventeenth century had no conceptual apparatus to allow for ‘unbelief’, as Febvre (1988) recounts, so Heather, Judy, June and Linda had no conceptual apparatus to allow for the ‘outilillage mental’ idea that experience may not be the foundation of knowledge, and reflective practice may not enable us to direct self-conduct in ways that can be planned for, and personal agency may be less a question of choice than necessity. Thus in effect, the empiricist premise of the ‘humanist analytic’ serves the policy makers’ human centred emphasis, to induce an ‘asymmetry of power between the state and the teacher’ (Gray & Whitty 2010:8) that subordinates ‘disposition’ to a particular type of good ‘citizenship’ in ways that serve to remodel ‘teacher professionalism’. The notion of critical reflection or reflexivity as checking devices that may allow for an autonomous subject, are part of the discursive power of the ‘humanist analytic’ and empiricist, liberal paradigm: Notwithstanding (Heather’s) critical insight into the way in which certain groups of the school population are managed at a distance, and (Judy’s) reflexive understanding about the way in which language works to reappropriate her intentions, or (June’s) high level of academic literacy and analysis, and (Linda’s) political awareness and robust resistance to pastoral power – each adopt a dominant subject position that reinforces the hegemonic project of social cohesion in relation to a governmental problematic of risk; and do so necessarily. Hence, the respective subject positions of the four writers: ‘the buffer zone’, ‘the bridge’, ‘the evangelist’ and ‘the nightwatchman’, that serve as particular types of good citizenship, reproducing normative grammars of teacher professionalism.
that get disseminated in different ways to the pupils; it is the conduct of conduct.

The struggle involved in this project of governmentality, takes place at the level of ‘subject effect’, wherein splits are experienced by each of the writers in relation to the narrow imperatives that these subject positions inscribe that are in conflict with the alleged ‘truth claims’ of a regime which promises empowerment. This conflict gets played out at the periphery, as we have seen from the narratives, in the ‘buffer zone’ of the writers themselves, at the level of subjectivisation. In this sense, the technology of self we know as the ‘reflective practitioner’ provides the touchstone for the implementation of human-centred policy that, in the context of this case study, seeks to remodel teacher professionalism between 2001-2011.

But their disposition gets co-opted into the policy makers’ interests as Whitty says, as in the end they perform amenable ‘subject effects’ in relation to policy aims. There is a significant transition from resistance to conformism however, which is not fully addressed by Whitty to do with process.

The agency available to the women is marked by the struggle they engage in over terms of reference that the authorities have imposed upon them. These are recorded in their reflective writing which attests to the way in which the battleground in effect is their own conscience. Conscience is what subjectivises in a humanist analytic of western liberal Christian affect.

The struggle is necessarily invisible to the authorities who necessarily stay at a distance from the internal conflict of an individual. The agency or resistance that is a necessary part of this process, is both inscribed and contained by the reflective writings, while the learner worker researcher prepares to make her choice, which she is free to make.

It is a question of faith in a humanist analytic – and choice in a governmentality analytic; but the right choice. Are they, once they have been through the spinning wheel of the conscience via the humanist analytic, resilient subjects? Here, reflective practice as a genealogy of knowledge that was reintroduced into Higher Education in the late 1980s, to coincide with the emergence of a new world order a post liberal episteme of network governance, facilitates the
transition - by inscribing and containing resistance, at a distance, in the conscience of the subject, freemen and women all to make their own choice. Reflective practice as a cog in the machine of the humanist analytic is a valuable mechanism through which a soul can be processed to become an amenable subject. Toleration of resistance is necessarily extended to the individual’s conscience. This is not a matter of indoctrination, the women never lose sight of what or why they are resisting, and they are not forced to conform; it is a however, as Chandler (2013) argues, a matter of necessity that they do so, not freedom.

Necessity over freedom is an ethic of the governmentality as against governance, and gets reinforced by an absence on the part of the University to provide conceptual frameworks or representations that are adequate to engage critically with these educational processes of governance inscribed through policy design. In this sense, they are inadequately equipped to engage in an informed way. As a representation the humanist analytic is a Trojan horse wheeled in as a bastion but hollowed out in effect as a trophy and used as a stratagem for conquering hearts and minds or the soul as Rose calls it, from the inside.

It serves, as a continued foundation for education, that is familiar, a secure protected bastion, that is post modernised by add ons of easy reading literacies that seek not to explain knowledge but to assume it. The clash of episteme imperatives, struggled over by the first generation of learner-worker-researchers in a new epistemic order, makes for an awkward fit technically, but produces a tidy compliant subjects effects in the end.

The ways in which these epistemes are different is discussed further in chapter 5. Suffice to say here, that by retaining the edifice of the humanist analytic it serves as part of a stratagem to produce compliant subject effects.
I turn now to Chapter 5 which develops the themes of this chapter by attempting to diagnose the conditions of emergence of Reflective Practice as a technology of government in relation to a post Cold War rationality of governance that emerged between 1989-1999. Notes for chapter 4

1. These terms of analysis were the subject of a discussion between myself and Neils Hahn, a lecturer in Development Studies at SOAS university, in 2014. I am indebted to Neils who draws on the theory of ‘World Systems’ to articulate a conceptual framework which I have reproduced here. (Hahn 2008). See also Human Rights writers: Goodale, M, (2012), Williams, R (2010), Baxi, U. (2009), Meister R (2011).
CHAPTER 5: CONDITIONS OF EMERGENCE:
Chapter 5 contributes to the genealogy through an attempt to historicise Reflective Practice as a discursive practice in Higher Education, that produces regulatory effects of self-governance. Self-governance appears as the dominant theme in the four narratives of the case study in chapter 4. These narratives of self are responding to a contemporary (2001-2011) governmental problematisation of populations’ conduct, and a corresponding governmental strategy of ‘risk identification risk assessment and risk prevention’ (Castel 1991:287).

The Butlerian (1999) concept of a genealogy, after Foucault (1977) aims to trace the ‘conditions of emergence’ of a subject; be that a person or a technology of government such as Reflective Practice. For Butler, as with Foucault, a genealogy is ‘an enquiry into the conditions of emergence of what is called history, a moment of emergence that is not finally distinguishable from fabrication’ (Butler 1999:15). In this sense, Chapter 5 extends the thesis’ enquiry into those processes and discourses through which a subject, such as Heather, Judy, June and Linda is subjectivised. It does this through a consideration of the conditions of emergence of Reflective Practice in the late twentieth century (1980s -1990s).

I identify below a re-emergence of Reflective Practice as a technology of government, through which the agency of the actor (learner-worker-citizen) is mobilised in ways that facilitate what Foucault (1991) calls the ‘conduct of conduct’ in a project of governmentality. The re emergence refers both to, the post Glorious Revolution (1689) of the seventeenth century, from which there emerged a new hegemonic order of classical Liberalism, and the post Cold War period (1989) of the twentieth century, from which there emerged a new hegemonic order of Advanced Liberal Democracy wherein Reflective Practice, as theorised by John Locke (1689) in the seventeenth century, and Donald Schon (1983) after Kolb (1975) in the twentieth century, serves as an epistemological tenet to legitimise experience as the foundation of knowledge (empiricism). Of significance, is the way in which these theorisations inscribe (humanist) teleologies of progress, freedom, foundations and self-actualisation in relation to a project of governmentality that problematises human conduct as the source of
instability both in the Cold War period of the twentieth century and the
Reformation period. In this sense, Reflective Practice recurs as a technology of
government, to make the hegemonic projects of liberal governance amenable and
practicable to its subjects, via a narrative of ‘regulated autonomy’. It re-emerges
in a twentieth century dispositif as part of a

thoroughly heterogenous set consisting of discourses institutions
architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative
measures, scientific statements, philosophical moral and
philanthropic propositions – in short the said as much as the unsaid.

(Foucault in Gordon 1980: 194)

I identify below, the conditions of this re-emergence with recourse to a
‘governmentality analytic’, after Rose and Miller (1992) that seeks to analyse

Liberal problematics of government as dependent on technologies for
governing at a distance and that are seeking to create locales, entities
and persons able to operate a regulated autonomy.

(Rose and Miller 1992:173)
The Thatcher Administration and the ‘autonomous chooser’

Very schematically, I will outline first, some of the factors that contributed to the conditions of emergence for a new dispositif or apparatus of Reflective Practice. Between 1989 – 1999, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher developed a political rationality of neoliberal economics in relation to a revival of interest in neoclassical economic doctrine;*1 (after Smith and Ricardian principles of economic liberalism 1776) of ‘maximising behaviour’ wherein it is assumed that the individual seeks to maximise their own personal advantage; ‘rational choice’ which presupposes that the individual has the capability to seek their own advantage, and that this is achievable via a market system which produces the ‘optimal distribution of goods. The ‘spread of the market’ is in this sense rendered synonymous with human satisfaction in a discourse that links the pursuit of self interest with market equilibrium. Prime Minister Thatcher sought to reconfigure education in relation to this ‘market place’ political rationality, a factor which I contextualise below with recourse to a brief account of the effects of the Education Reform Act of 1988 on schooling. This reform of education coincided with the emergence of new forms of ‘knowhow’ in the 1980s, such as Public Management Reform, Audit, and Managerialism, that operated as technologies of government in relation to emerging global complexes such as the OECD, whose role in global governance during these years became increasingly strategic. Lifelong Learning emerged as a powerful discursive practice in conjunction. At the same time, the 1989 ‘fall’ of the Berlin Wall acted as a catalyst for hegemonic political rationalities, of Democracy as Peace; a thesis partially indebted to Kant’s essay ‘Perpetual Peace’ from 1795. In relation to these political rationalities, new international governmental technologies formed, as new ‘strategic complexes’ (Duffield 2001:114) which produced new narratives of liberal war. These complexes brought together different agencies and entities whose strategic purpose was to seek ‘consensus representations’ (Duffield 2001:116) in relation to the ‘conduct of conduct’, in fields such as Human Rights, International Relations, Development and Education. Lifelong Learning was the framework for education that inscribed this imperative and cohered this ‘ensemble’ of processes, discourses and practices that made up a set of historically specific conditions for the conduct of population conduct.
Reflective Practice re-emerges at this point as the epistemological rationality which legitimises Lifelong Learning in relation to a tried and tested paradigm of empiricism. Reflective Practice serves also in relation to a shift of emphasis in policy development, away from state models for the management of risk prevention, towards ‘human agency’ (Chandler 2013); the reflective practitioner as the autonomous chooser is the touchstone for an emergent model of governmentality in education that facilitates Reflective Practice as a technology of government. The shift of policy emphasis is best framed by the publication in 1983, of Schon’s seminal book, ‘the Reflective Practitioner’.

To contextualise chapter 5, I relate the conditions of emergence of Reflective Practice as a technology of government through which the agency of the actor (learner- worker- citizen) is mobilised in ways that enable the ‘conduct of conduct’. The effects of this technology of government is discussed in chapter 4, through an analysis of the four narratives; the history of this present–day technology of government and dispositif, is discussed in chapter 6 through an analysis of ‘the Locke effect’ through a study of his Commonwealth of Learning. These three chapters, 4, 5 and 6, explore Reflective Practice in relation to those ‘modern political rationalities and governmental technologies that are linked to developments in knowledge and to the power of expertise’ (Rose and Miller 1992:173). Its re-emergence in the twentieth century is in relation to an historical domain of Liberalism–Neoliberalism-Advanced Liberal Democracy, a ‘domain which has its own rules and processes its own internal forms of self regulation’ (ibid), for which I argue, the ‘reflective practitioner’ as ‘autonomous chooser’ is the touchstone.

**The Education Reform Act (29 July 1988).**

The Thatcher administration had been in power for almost a decade when this Act was passed. ‘Reform’ here denotes a break with its predecessor, the 1944 Education Act; it makes no recall of former normative grammars from a tradition called the ‘bureau professional welfare state’ (Clarke and Newman, 2001). Instead it points to a new settlement that we call Thatcherism or neoliberalism or the ‘New Right’ (Giddens 1998), of minimal government,
autonomous civil society and economic individualism. The Reform Act inscribes a discourse of public participation, accountability and choice in the name of parental rights that are linked to new public management theory and freedom in ways that characterise the ‘Thatcher effect’

To ensure that parents and the community know on what basis the available resources are distributed in their areas and how much is spent on each school to give the governors of all county and voluntary secondary schools and of larger primary schools freedom to take expenditure decisions which match their own priorities and the guarantee that their own school will benefit if they achieve efficiency savings.

(DES, 1987)

The objective of this reform is to produce a coherent system through policy change. The system is made up of structures that came to ‘rely on market principles’ and policies that ‘rely on mechanisms of ex ante regulation’ whereby policies that ‘depend on professional discretion and judgement’ are displaced. (Finkelstein 1997:2). A discourse of change as an assumed good in itself is the driver of the reform. At school level, change takes the form of ‘a pattern of incremental policy adjustment to realign policy structures’ (Finkelstein, 1997:2). Some of the incremental steps identified by Finkelstein are:

1981 Integration of Special Education Needs (SEN)

1986 Restructuring of the Local Education Authorities to give responsibility to governing bodies

1988 Education Reform Act: a framework which was designed to ‘raise standards extend choice and produce a better-educated Britain’ (Haviland 1988) This introduced a National Curriculum, Local Management of Schools (LMS), open enrolment, Grant Maintained Schools, dissolution of LEAs,

1992 Office for Standards in Education (OFSTED), publication of performance tables
Critical response to the market focus of the Reform Act is collected in a volume edited by Flude and Hammer (1990) entitled *The Education Reform Act 1988*. The criticism details the myriad ways in which a ‘package of reforms’ reconfigures education in relation to the ‘market place’ through the ‘pursuit of self interest’ and ‘rational choice theory’, principles that characterise (neoclassical neoliberal) *New Right* policy, seen by these contributors as driving the Education Reform Act of 1988.

**The neoclassical in neoliberal economic theory and practice.**

The impact of the deregulation of the markets that Thatcher brought to bear during this period facilitated financial movement across borders most felt after the fall of the Berlin Wall. It contributed to a major restructuring of the international economy;

> “The growth of interdependency and integration by way of the movement or flows of economic resources and activity across distance space and borders with a concentration on international trade, investment and migration patterns” is an effect of the deregularisation of market.

( Hirst and Thompson 2009:11)

The key changes that Hirst and Thompson identify in the structures of international economy, took place especially in relation to the internationalisation of production; international trade and foreign direct investments (FDI) emerged. Multinational companies were established as the agents responsible for FDI which became increasingly salient to the new financial order. Thompson and Hirst point out that this new system produces a form of capitalism that does not
work on the basis of expansion and incorporation but consolidation and exclusion (ibid:68-70) organised in a ‘distribution’ that ‘is socially and geographically uneven on a world scale’ (ibid: 68).

Deregulation on the other hand was part of the neoliberal doctrine that had been circulating since the 1930s and was espoused by von Hayek and Milton Friedman in the 1940s - that was opposed to communism, socialism and all forms of ‘big government’ according to Harvey (Harvey 2005:157) It ‘formed a steady stream of analyses and political position statements during the 1960s and 1970s, even though it was “scoffed at” by the mainstream’. It began to be taken seriously as an alternative to Keynesianism during the 1970s and was adopted by Margaret Thatcher who was ‘casting around for a better framework for attacking the economic problems of her time’ (ibid). Through its application, says Harvey, Thatcher together with Reagan transformed ‘the whole orientation of state activity away from the welfare state and towards active support for the supply side conditions of capital accumulation’ (ibid). Simultaneously, ‘the World Bank and IMF changed their policy networks to a neoliberal trajectory and ‘South Africa was showcased by the World Bank as a model of privatisation and market liberalisation’ (Harvey 2005: 159). In effect it revived a neoclassical discourse of economics.

It is primarily the ‘rational choice theory’ tenet that inscribes a discourse of the ‘pursuit of self interest’ that characterises so called New Right policy. New Right policy problematises notions that resist opening up the economy to the movements of the market, as interfering with the ‘pursuit of self interest’; this discourse chimes with an philosophical lexicon of ‘negative liberty’ (Berlin 1958), wherein the rights of the autonomous chooser seeking his or her own advantage may be seen to be being infringed.

This ideological discourse of neoclassicism revived by the Thatcher administration contributed to the dismantling of the social, political settlement in the 1990s and early 2000s. The principle that the individual should have the freedom to do whatever s/he wants, chimed with governmental technologies seeking to develop consumer capitalism and political rationalities of human agency in the 1980s.
‘Negative liberty’ and its cognate ‘pursuit of self interest’, as strands of a revived neoclassical doctrine, are amongst the ideological conditions that enable the re-emergence of reflective practice as an epistemological and normative discourse of self governance.

**Emergent knowhow**

A cluster of new knowhow co-emerged in relation to three discrete political rationalities; deregulation, neoclassical doctrine of economics and the triumph of western democracy represented by ‘the fall’ of the Berlin Wall, they were: *Conflict Resolution, Public Management Reform, Corporate Governance, Audit, Governmental Management* and *Managerialism*. These genealogies of knowhow were reproduced and processed through entities such as OECD, which defines itself as the ‘consensus organisation’. Its role in global governance during the 1980s and 1990s has been presented by Woodward (2009) in these terms; ‘the cognitive’ (the incarnation of a community of countries sharing overarching values) ‘the normative’ (the realm of research knowledge and ideas) the legal (the production of international law) and ‘the palliative’ (a lubricant to the wider processes of global governance). (Woodward 2009:6)

I shall take each member of the cluster of knowhow in turn, to summarise the salient points: According to Ramsbottom et al (2011) Conflict Resolution became the orienting device for intervention in conflicts that appeared intractable. By establishing the needs of the parties in conflict for security, recognition and development it enables a space for resolution to be opened up. Conflict Resolution fashions itself during this period as a niche field that differentiates between forms of intervention; softer forms being needed when miscommunication or mistrust is high (i.e. when the subjective elements are strong), and harder forms of intervention needed where substantive interests are at the forefront (Ramsbottom et al 2011:56). Conflict Resolution is a field that went through a phase of reconstruction in this period (1985-2005) ‘finding itself more central to redefining a new world order’ (Ramsbottom et al 2011:55). It engaged with post cold war genealogies of knowledge such as ‘complex systems methodologies of interrelated elements that exhibit non linear relations’ that
can articulate ‘connectivity and interdependence of elements’ and ‘evolution and adaption’ (Ramsbottom et al 2011:58) with which we are familiar today. According to Duffield (2001:117), Conflict Resolution is the device that served in this period for the convergence of Development with Security.

Public Management Reform (NPM) becomes the device for shifting the conceptual and lexical emphasis on ‘government’ to ‘governance’ according to Pollitt & Geert Bouckaert (2011). It involves a

\[move \text{ away from traditional hierarchical forms of organisation and the adoption of network forms; a revision of the relationship between the state and civil society in a more participatory direction; the state thus being superseded by a networked polity'} \text{ where ‘authority is devolved to task, specific institutions with unlimited jurisdictions and intersecting memberships operating at sub and supra national levels.} \]


Pollit and Bouckaert (2011) write that the shift towards a political and economic model was deemed necessary in relation to global processes which considered governments had become overloaded and western welfare was unaffordable and government management should be run more along the lines of a business management model in order to ‘save money increase efficiency, persuade public bureaucracies to act more responsively towards citizens’ (Pollitt 1990). The trend towards new Public Management began, says Pollitt, in response to the global economic downturn in the 1980s, but underwent a ‘personality change’ in the 1990s wherein reform transmuted into governance; partnership joined up government transparency. (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011:7)

The ‘personality change’ Pollit speaks of here can be encapsulated also by the proponents of a major reform programme; Osbourne and Gaebler (1992), two American management consultants draw on the principles of NPM in order to advise the US vice president on reform. They claim that the kind of changes that are emerging are part of a global trend. In their ‘best seller’ book Reinventing Government (Osbourne and Gaebler 1992:325-328) they name their reform as ‘entrepreneurial government’ championing it as the ‘inevitable’ way forward. It identifies principles of performance management, competition in the public
sector, offering choice and quality to the citizen/client, and strengthening the ‘strategic’ as against ‘operational’ role of the centre.

Broadly, their literature identifies a formulaic trope of ‘ten principles for reorganising the techniques of governing’, in the same vogue as the ‘twelve steps’ genre (to recovery or success); ‘simple steps’ that characterise the Change literature or the evangelical Self-Help literature industry, as I have argued elsewhere in the thesis, whether in relation to the individual, the company or the government—it espouses a ‘one size fits all’ blueprint for change.


(Osbourne and Gaebler 1992)

It inscribes an imperative for action. Of particular interest, is point number 8: Anticipatory Government: Prevention rather than Cure where rationalities of global governance are conflated with the evangelical (twelve steps) proverb to produce a common sense effect. It proposes a formulaic set of common features for any form of organisation. The self explanatory titles of the book’s chapters appear to be willing what they are naming to be brought into being (similar to the Feelings resource handbook for Teachers discussed in chapter 4) This ‘simple method’ and emblematic design avoids all complexity, and therefore contestation, as it is intended to be habit forming inscribing an effect of pragmatism and consensus.
Consensus is the device that Corporate Governance uses to fashion itself as knowhow in relation to conflict between investors and managers; a conflict which becomes the more exacerbated by the deregulation of the market. Monks and Minow (2004:310) relate how, at an international level during the 1990s, the World Bank and the OECD ‘joined forces’ as two agencies to create a new agency called the Global Corporate Governance Forum to manage a formal programme of governance assistance. Like the OECD, its remit was to develop governance reform in a relational way ‘strengthening the foundation for individual countries’ long term economic performance’ and ‘contributing to a strengthened international financial system’.

Its task was to create an ‘inventory of governance activity worldwide’ and develop a ‘digest of shareholder and director organisations around the world’ (2004:11: www.sc.com.my). Its ‘initial programme of activities’ included the establishment of ‘Centers of Excellence’ across Africa with Commonwealth Association of Corporate Governance’ (ibid). The lexicon through which the Global Corporate Governance Forum is articulated, and through which it inscribes its ethics of promoting best practice, partnership, bringing together lead players from private and public sectors is that of the Learning Lexicon.

Like Audit, another niche field of expertise, Corporate Governance grew as knowhow in relation to a perceived increased potential for corporate corruption and fraud. The ‘audit explosion’ analysed by Power (1997) as representing a ‘certain kind of rupture in organizational life that draws from long standing practices of financial thinking’ functions as ‘a kind of paradigm which exerts influence over developments in other areas’ (Power 1997:3).

\[
\text{During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the word ‘audit’ began to be used in Britain with growing frequency in a wide variety of contexts.}\n\]
\[
\text{In addition to the regulation of private company accounting by financial audit, practices of environmental audit, value for money audit, medical audit, teaching audit, and technology audit emerged and, to varying degree acceptance}\n\]

(ibid)
Its ‘rise’ as a genealogy of applied knowledge, draws attention, says Powers to ‘the shifting relationship between audit practice and the programmatic goal of detecting fraud’ (Power 1997:9).

The confluence of these genealogies of knowledge into a set of ‘family resemblances’ - that inscribe ethics of accountability and performativity as new core values emanating from the new centres of knowhow, in what is becoming a ‘knowledge based economy’, ‘knowledge society’, ‘learning age’ ‘risk society’, produce ‘far reaching effects on spheres traditionally considered outside the reach of these technocratic processes’ (Pollitt 1993:164).

A case in question is recounted by Pollitt about strategies of knowhow such as Managerialism, that pursue ‘administratively rational ends over substantive goals of justice’ whose ‘horizontal structures and its doctrine and practice that overall control by managers is necessary and desirable’ – increased during the period in question (Pollitt 1993:164). He notes an emergent narrative of personal responsibility deemed to be received with growing enthusiasm ‘among the public service staff in terms of clearer lines of accountability enhanced efficiency and cost consciousness the fostering of leadership and innovation and last but by no means least higher quality and more responsive services for the public’ (Pollitt 1993:164).

Told differently, this narrative of managerialism as the triumph of the ‘Managerial State’ rings hollow:

*Where champions of the managerial state have celebrated its dynamism, our analysis leads us to a different view. What we see is the unstable oscillations of a former state that cannot reconcile the social contradictions and conflicts of contemporary Britain with its managerial calculus.*

(Clarke and Newman 1997:159)

This cluster of knowhow is representative of a much wider web of ‘developments in knowledge’ that link to ‘the powers of expertise’ (Rose Miller 1992:173) As a sample ensemble, they develop expertise in relation to conflict, fraud, (administrative) reform and self governance, and it is easy to link their co-
emergence and development with that of Reflective Practice as the touchstone technology of government for ‘regulated autonomy’.

**Lifelong Learning**


Similarly, though less critically, in his book *Lifelong Learning in action* (Longworth 2003) Longworth dates the early strains of Lifelong Learning to the 1970s, but as undergoing a ‘renaissance’ in the 1990s and as ‘now rampaging around the whole world, from Europe to South Africa and from North America to Japan, like a benign educational plague’ (Longworth 2003:3).

He contextualises twenty first century Lifelong Learning in relation to a ‘millennium catastrophe’ on the one hand

> ‘increasing violence in inner cities…acts of genocide and pathological dictatorship or tribal hatreds the abomination of the destruction of the new York twin towers the growth of fundamentalist ignorance and suppression of rational thought in many religions – unprecedented erosion of human values rendered all the more appalling by the ever more sophisticated weapons of communication and oppression’

( Longworth 2003: 4)

And a force of global potential on the other

> Thanks to inter governmental organisations – UNESCO OECD APEC the Council of Europe, The European Commissions and others – and some of the more enlightened liberal democracies the lifelong learning movement is now rampaging around the whole world, from Europe to
Both writers propose, albeit through very different registers, that Lifelong Learning was ‘reborn’ in the 1990s. My own interest in relation, is less to present that history, than historicise this ‘rebirth’ with recourse to a brief review of the emergence and development of Lifelong Learning, below.

In 1973, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) published a ‘slim unattractively mustard coloured book’ entitled *Recurrent Education: A Strategy for Lifelong Learning* written by Dennis Kallen and Jarl Bengtsson of the CERI staff (1973:6). Its purpose was to ‘clarify the concept and outline the major features of a future education system geared towards the recurrent principle’; Lifelong Learning. It was known as the ‘clarifying report’ and as a branch of ‘permanent education’. It was designed to meet the needs of the advanced societies in the twentieth century, which, it was felt had experienced ‘shortcomings’ in education; a ‘malaise in the French secondary schools’ (Kallen and Bengtsson 1973:8: note 2) and a ‘crisis in youth education’ in relation to work, in Japan, England, Sweden and Germany. It made a proposal for ‘recurrent education’ as the distribution of education over the lifespan of the individual in a recurring way. It construes the recurrent principle as an ‘alteration’ mechanism of formal education (alternating) with other activities, of which the principal one would be work, but which might also include leisure time and retirement’ (Kallen and Bengtsson 1973:7). Being problematised by the clarifying report was ‘the emerging imbalance between supply and demand of highly qualified manpower’ (Kallen and Bengtsson 1973:9) and that ‘knowledge is expanding more and more quickly’ (Kallen and Bengtsson 1973:9) and that ‘the younger generation has had many more educational opportunities than its elders’ (Kallen and Bengtsson 1973:10). These problematisations continue to characterise the *raison d’être* of Lifelong Learning as a discourse and policy response to the ‘Knowledge Society’ (Drucker 1969, cited in OECD document (1973:44) demanding a skilled workforce. The notion of alternation with formal schooling is stressed in the clarifying report, which sees ‘recurrent education’ as topping and tailing the formal sector and providing an alternative sphere for learning. Learning is not identical to education in the clarifying report, rather

*South Africa and from North America to Japan, like a benign educational plague. It is the future – and it is not before time.* (ibid)
‘Learning is an essential characteristic of the living organism necessary for its survival and for its evolution. Man learns in all his life situations. In the more specific sense of gathering knowledge and applying it human learning takes place not only in school but also at home and in the work environment’:

In this context, the concept of lifelong learning assumes a more precise sense in that it accentuates the need for adaptability through a constant registering and processing of information, formation of concepts and development of attitudes and skills, all of which are qualities that have become more necessary in a rapidly changing society than they were in a relatively static society.

(OECD eds Kallen and Bengtsson 1973: 18)

Strategies of On the job training, work- integrated study, supply and demand related, accreditation of informal (experiential) learning, admissions and credit bearing programmes, self financing initiatives, outreach work and developing self reliance are all raised as considerations for the development of this project which is contained within a narrative of ‘Equality of Opportunity’ (Kallen and Bengtsson 1973:35)

It gives a definition of knowledge that remains familiar:

The word ‘knowledge’ stands in this context, however, for more than factual knowledge. It also means the ability to use knowledge in order to discriminate and to judge, which is more a matter of having a set of relevant concepts at one’s disposal than knowing facts. It is not the obsolescence of factual knowledge but the inability to renew one’s concepts and to make appropriate use of them that has the most serious consequences for people’s ability to function in the various situations they are placed. In this context of the work situation, this is the greatest obstacle to participation of workers in self management (OECD Kallen and Bengtsson 1973:45). (my emphasis)

The strategic themes informing the clarifying report circulate in other the reports of institutions from the period such as; Centre for Educational Research and Innovation (CERI) and Trends and Issues publications produced by the OECD in 1975. Here the same themes of recurrent education are couched in similar terms
problematising the inability to renew one’s concepts and to make appropriate use of them and a lexicon of effectiveness choice, flexibility wealth and life chances, adaptability and standards is evident. (1975:10 - 18).

Recurrent education is presented in terms of social and economic insurance and makes references to the risks of a lack of the right kind of knowledge: Work in America (Report of a special task force to the Secretary of Health Education and Welfare ) MIT 1973 and Powerlessness and Knowledge Sociometry 1967 Seeman, M.H.

The association between ‘risk’ and recurrent or permanent education is reproduced more explicitly in a Council of Europe report published in the same year as the CERI report: (1975)

The concept of permanent education attempts to offer a solution to the problem of how to adapt educational systems to present needs – both the economic and social needs of society, and the personal needs of the individual. Such an adaptation, if effected rapidly enough, would forestall potentially dangerous conflicts in society. (1975:1)

And again by Healy representing the OECD in 1998:

There is a new risk of polarisation between those with access to learning and those who are left on the margin (1998:55)

Vocabularies of change as a matter of urgency also circulate through the permanent education/ recurrent education/ lifelong learning policy literatures;

- we are living in a times of unprecedented change. Faced with rapid technological change/ (Healy 1996: 55)
- knowledge is expanding more and more quickly (OECD1973)
- the rising flood of information and to the continual need for new skills (CERI 1975:17)
- the rapid development of knowledge (Council of Europe 1975:24)
- the capacity to cope with change will be the hallmark of the twenty first century (The Learning Age 1.6 1998)
As we can see from this brief review of early policy literature, the themes of Lifelong Learning as a response to risk, and of risk as something that is escalating in relation to a more complex society, circulate across policy platforms, over generations, through networks of associations (such as the OECD, CERI Council of Europe, the DfEE (as was) each of which is increasingly networked with other policy, cultural and economic associations during the 1980s and 1990s. In this sense Lifelong Learning emerges in relation to those other forms of knowhow as part of a complex assemblage and network polity whose connectivity begins to constitute a ‘global education policy field’.

A global education policy field.


> the uproar in countries performing poorly in the PISA survey and the hostile responses to those labelled by the OECD as a ‘harmful’ tax haven are merely two examples of the importance of the normative dimensions of OECD governance.

(Woodward 2009:127)

In a review of Woodward’s book Sellar and Lingard (2013) comment on how the inter-competititvity of this global field is generated and charted through league tables in ways that ‘drive practice forward’. Designated experts from each country work together in focus groups to design and monitor what is effectively ‘epistemological governance’ (2013: 722).

The ‘rise’ of the OECD is in this sense linked to the rise of Lifelong Learning, which ‘functioned steadily’ alongside one another as forms of soft power in an emerging regime of power that governs populations at a distance in relation to applications of the knowhow. The knowhow is a form of what Newman calls ‘calculus’ which encourages populations to renew (their) concepts and to make appropriate use of them. The lexicon of effectiveness choice, flexibility wealth and life chances, adaptability and standards inscribing change as a matter of urgency, has thus been a through-line ethic of Lifelong Learning.
By 2002, Lifelong Learning is protected by the now powerful OECD whose Annual Forum of that year was described by Robert Fox (1999) as ‘civil society at the turn of the Millennium’; a ‘nascent global historic bloc consisting of the most powerful corporate economic forces, their allies in government, and the variety of networks that evolve policy guidelines and propagate the ideology of globalisation’.(cited in Woodward, 2009:114)

As a technology of ‘soft power’ Lifelong Learning operates alongside other ‘leading organs of global power’ (Woodward) on platforms such as the ‘Bologna Agreement’ that exports Lifelong Learning to Europe, and UNESCO that exports it to other continents via the strategic complexes of the global education policy field, that Ball cites as framing ‘a generic set of concepts, language and practices that is recognisable in various forms and is for sale!’ (Ball 2012:115).

1989: Homo Economicus goes to war

1989 is a marker, of the end of one kind of conflict and the start of a new kind of conflict, that subsequently takes an internal not international form. (Cramer, 2006) Thatcher celebrated the event as a triumph of Western system of governance.

After a decade of achievement let us herald the decade of hope...And let us do so in the knowledge that never since the Second World War have hopes – indeed expectations – for peace and progress in the world stood so high. Why?...The short answer lies in the 1980s – in the resolution of the West to defend our freedom and justice and the dawning realisation in the communist bloc that their system simply could not compete with ours.

(Daily Express, 28 December, 1989)

In this sense, the ideal of liberal democracy becomes part of a signifying chain that stretches backwards and forwards within an historical trajectory; it is simultaneously the descendent of classical liberalism laying claim to its genealogical and teleological pedigree, and pioneering. Liberal democracy construed here as ‘free from fundamental internal contradictions’ is bestowed a ‘natural’ status by the classical pedigree, of a ‘God given’ system, by association,
with the Lockean /Jefferson principle of ‘natural rights’ either moral or legal in character (1689/1801). It is a discourse ‘libidinally invested’ as Butler (1999) would say; there is no author of these speech acts, no ‘sovereign autonomy’ in Thatcher’s or Fukuyama’s speeches, they are like disembodied ‘free floating signifiers’ that get performed by the actors, and perform the actors, and enrol new actors.

Implicit in their discourse is the role of the state as minimalist; as ‘night-watchman’ according to Locke’s famous metaphor, as ‘a necessary evil’ according to Tom Pain’s. Implicit also are the Smith/Ricardian principles of ‘economic liberalism’ through a laissez faire doctrine (1776); the Benthamite ‘utilitarianism’ as a calculation of happiness in terms of utility (1789); the Social Darwinist rationality that individuals make what they want and can of their own lives (1884); a revival of economic liberalism or neoclassical economy which mutated in the 1980s into ‘free market conservatism’.

Notwithstanding this kind of tangible triumphalism that accompanied ‘the fall’, Duffield (2001) describes brief optimism that the world was entering a new era of peace and stability in the early post Cold War years, that was undermined then by ‘internal conflicts’, ‘ethnic conflicts’ and ‘regionalised conflicts’, involving humanitarian interventions during the 1990s.

A recent progressive narrative of war that has emerged since the end of the Cold War develops a school of thought\(^5\) that construes conflict as a continuum in relation to the preponderance of conflicts within states or countries.

Duffield critically identifies an alternative hegemonic narrative that emerged in relation to the same phenomenon, wherein conflict is construed in terms of ‘new barbarism’ (Goldberg 1997:35 cited in Duffield 2001:113).

The ‘liberal’ challenge of this hegemonic narrative of war according to Duffield (2001:113) cites underdevelopment as a cause of conflict, which however, it claims, can be remedied if engaged with through strategies of risk management and intervention for the purposes of prevention. The ‘institutional basis’ of this rationale lies in the way in which conflict has been reframed analytically, as something which ‘can be addressed by the disciplines and opportunities of the free market’ (ibid)
new strategic complexes that bring together aid agencies, donor governments, regional bodies, private companies and so on. In short, the developmental position on conflict represents the consensual view among the strategic actors of networks that have emerged in response to it

(Duffield 2001:114).

This ‘consensus representation’ of conflict is summarised by Duffield as a strategic discourse which he encapsulates below with recourse to a representative view from a non-governmental organisation called Saferworld:

In general, wars are more likely to be fought in countries which are poor or experiencing extremely uneven and inequitable economic development; which lack effective political, legal and administrative institutions able to manage social tensions; where human rights violations are wide spread; and where there is easy access to arms.

(Saferworld 1999:68 cited in Duffield 2001:116)

The citation serves to frame another of Duffield’s points that resonates with the project of education and governance more widely about the effects of such brief descriptions of ‘underdevelopment as dangerous’ as eschewing an explanatory role;

their main effect has been to encourage interconnections and patterns of coordination within emerging strategic complexes of global liberal governance. They serve as framework for ‘collective mobilisation’ and the description serves a ‘symbolic rather than informational role’ whereby ‘brief or superficial views on the causes of conflict do not reflect a policy failure’ in this respect. ‘They have to be brief, general in application and easy to understand and communicate

(ibid)

Here, war is not conceptualised via a binary mode as a ‘stand off’ between two frozen Superpowers, its shape is fluid and multiple structured via strategic complexes brought together to give form and meaning to conflict as a
representation .....of consensual view among the strategic actors of networks that have emerged in response to it.

As though it had been produced by the ‘network of actors’, from a distance, as a virtual reality.

This approach brings the system to bear on ‘conflict’ in a way that Duffield suggests imitates the methodology of emergent theories of ‘complexity science’ (Dillon 2000 cited in Duffield 2001:9); quantum theory, bio technology and cybernetics, structures that are non linear and view the world in terms of a ‘living system or organism’ (Duffield 2001:9) of interconnections. Here, the system of connectivity that we saw in relation to Conflict Resolution (above) is the logic and the rationale.

Duffield charts an emergent shift in the logic of Human Rights as conceived originally in legal terms associated with monitoring and enforcement in the field of development prior to the 1990s, but subsequently as a moral force. He argues that the change in policy position did not entail a reform of the aid agency or NGO - to address human rights, but a reform of the aid agency’s concept of human rights to ‘bring it in line with the work that it already does’ (ibid:222).

What is also being reconfigured by this system’s logic is attitudes and beliefs about conflict – a sustained theme of Duffield’s book. The system itself is brought to bear he says in order to produce consensus. It is a classic example of a Foucauldian ‘reversal’ identified as a discursive practice in Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1979) where Foucault argues, the prison system produces (its own object) the criminal.

One of the effects of the reversal Duffield identifies, is a strategy called Do No Harm (Anderson 1996); which he says evaluates the ‘net benefit or harm’ to ‘project partners’ of different courses of action on the part of all the participants (my emphasis). “Such acts can be rationalised as being for the greater good and thus part of a principled or new humanitarianism” (Duffield 2001:222/3).

The discursive effect that Duffield indicates with this story of the ‘new strategic complexes’, is that they serve not to change practice but resignify practice through ‘consensus representation’.
‘Like war’, he writes ‘human rights are just one more thing that liberal development discourse has accommodated and absorbed.’ (ibid).

This kind of Liberal Peace narrative, says Duffield, is a political project in its own right; ‘part of complex mutating and stratified networks’ that are strategic in the sense that they ‘pursue a radical agenda of social transformation in the interests of global stability’; and ‘constitute a network of strategic governance relations that are increasingly privatised and militarised’ (2001:12). This system of connectivity is important to understanding the ‘new wars’ wherein ‘conflict is seen less in terms of having causes that lead to breakdown, as opposed to, sites of innovation and reordering, resulting in the creation of new types of legitimacy and authority’ (2001:6).

The cameo presented above, of Development issues articulated by Duffield, serves to illustrate the ways in which reversals produce exclusions.

Heather’s narrative in chapter 4 also tells a story of reversal, about the effects of the resignification of Inclusion as a policy term and practice. A term of reference used originally in the 1973 Warnock Report to signify the right of children with special needs to access education as a ‘good to which all human beings are entitled’ (OECD 1973:1.7); Inclusion became resignified in the 1997 report Excellence for all children; meeting the needs of special educational needs as a right to be educated in a mainstream school; a reversal of interests whereby the needs of the children were subordinated to the resources available in a discourse of rights that privileges rights over needs. The analogy serves to indicate at best the ‘exclusions prohibitions and limits through which regimes of power come into effect’; what links the three cameo cases is a shift of policy emphasis that a discourse of rights facilitates at the expense of real needs. Another point this comparative analysis hopes to highlight is that resignification, via reversal, is a property of discourse, and produces material effects, as we have seen above through a process of ‘accumulation by dispossession’* (Harvey 2005) as a necessary condition for the emergence of ‘the right kind’ of democracy.

The resignificaction is achieved in each case with recourse to new complex structures which rather than emphasising humanitarianism assistance emphasise developmental structures and initiatives with ‘ameliorative harmonising and

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*Harvey 2005
transformational powers’ deemed to reduce violence and prevent its recurrence. Duffield calls this ‘cultural pluralism’ where

\[\text{difference is not necessarily a source of conflict it can be a site of vibrancy, invigoration and new opportunities for an envisioned social harmony – providing education plays its role and transparent and equitable economic constitutional and civil society mechanisms exist to resolve emerging antagonisms.}\]

(Duffield 2001:115 my emphasis)

In the same way, Refugee policy has changed, rather than emphasising protection, it emphasises the means that is the structures by which the refugee can become ‘self sufficient’ and ‘choose’ to be repatriated in ways it is hoped will prevent the recurrence of dependency. In the same way, Inclusion policy has changed, rather than emphasising an entitlement to the fulfilment of special needs it emphasises a structure ‘the statement’ as having ‘ameliorative harmonising and transformational powers’ to prevent the recurrence of special needs.

These cameos enable me to infer, that parallel discourses and processes in related spheres are also informing the sphere of education, from which I infer a heterogeneous ‘condition’ of a network polity in relation to an emergent project of governmentality in the last two decades of the twentieth century. The lexicons of Liberal Democracy and Liberal Peace that are informed by genealogies of knowledge in circulation in the early modern period; Locke’s Two Treaties (1689) and the eighteenth century Kant’s Peace thesis (1795), draw on a language that is, as Duffield says, directed towards economic and process oriented structures (2001:115); it is the language of the Learning Lexicon as a discursive formation that emerged in relation to these political rationalities and governmental technologies outlined above.

**The Century of the Self**

It would seem that Thatcher saw the satisfaction of the individual’s desire as the motivational force or engine that would regenerate the economy after the economic crisis of the mid to late 1970s. In a documentary entitled *Century of*
Curtis recounts how market research in the USA, funded by industry and finance companies, tapped into a ‘zeitgeist’ of post Freudian and post existential ideas of ‘inner self expression’. This was institutionalised through experimental psychology programmes (such as the Erhard System Training centres) which proposed human potentialism, personal transformation and lifestyle therapies. At the same time this potentialism became a new profit opportunity for capital. The Stanford Research Institute was commissioned to design ‘rigorous tools for measuring’ the desires and values of individuals for manufacturers. Their research was triangulated with Maslow’s theory of a ‘hierarchy of needs’ and was deemed to cohere; a Values and Lifestyle discourse and industry emerged, based on measuring not demographics but ‘motivations and values’ of people. (think of the Honey and Mumford Learning Style questionnaire).

Curtis’s documentary recounts how corporations were thus able to sell things based on individual’s personal style. The psychological research industry led by big businesses re categorised people not according to social class but their inner psychological needs:

*If their primary needs are about security and belonging they are the mainstreamers group. If about status and others’ esteem they are put in aspirers group, if control- the succeeders group…. if self esteem - the reformers group*

(Curtis 2000)

Curtis argues that this ‘new individualism’ was welcomed by the business sector which saw it as a way of driving consumer capitalism. This also fitted with other changes as one industrialist recounts:

*computers allowed for short runs that were economical rather than mass production runs. The fear that the supply side would outstrip demands- that we were producing too much and there would be no market, disappeared, because now we had gone from a conception of market of limited needs and if you fill them they’re filled- to a conception of the market as unlimited ever-changing needs dominated by self expressionism – something which products and services can*
satisfy in an endless variety of ways and ways that change all the time, consequently economies have unlimited horizons

(Curtis 2000).

This unlimited consumer desire helped to regenerate the economy in this sense. A ‘zeitgeist’ of ‘inner human potentialism’ that was developed into a ‘Values and Lifestyle’ industry chimed with both Reagan and Thatcher’s political ethical rationalities. In this sense, desire is a calculable and visible technology of government.

**Education and Risk**

In education one of the main technologies of government that combines ‘methodological individualism’ with enterprise is *Excellence in Schools* (and subsequently in University). Enterprise in this context, as du Gay points out (1991:45) is intended both as a paradigmatic notion of the involvement of ‘business enterprise’ in relation to institutional organisations and the provision of goods and services, as well as enterprise as a ‘quality’ that individuals possess; self reliance, willingness to take risks in pursuit of own goals (happiness); as well as a virtue (John Locke’s *Some Thoughts on Education*). ‘Excellence’ in the UK is the descendent of ‘A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform report’ of American President Ronald Reagan’s National Commission on Excellence in Education. One of its purposes was to gather reliable state level students’ assessment data. It cites one of its targets as being to meet the needs of ‘gifted and talented’ ‘socio economically disadvantaged minority’ and ‘language minority’ students and ‘the handicapped’ and address their ‘needs in relation to constitutional and civil rights.’ It came out of the Excellence in Education movements in 1980s USA. It signalled a federal role in education originally stressed by President Jimmy Carter in relation to concerns about deteriorating American economy and its relationship to the education system where certain areas in the South were perceived as disadvantaged because of the overall low academic achievement of its school population.

American writer Maris Vinovskis (2009) discusses the initiative of the 1983;
A Nation at Risk report in a book called *From a Nation at Risk to No Child Left Behind; National Education Goals*. An early chapter opens in a lexicon of crisis that is more characteristic of war than education:

*By the mid 1980s most of the American public and policy makers believed that the country was threatened by an unprecedented escalating crisis in education*

(Vinovskis 2009:14).

The book reproduces the never explicit concern that future economic well being is dependent upon containing risk in school and other disadvantaged populations. Its policy response is to advocate programmes of incentives and test-based accountability in the 1980s; it provides the templates that came to characterise the culture of Standards in British schools during the 1990s under the New Labour administration.

Read through the screen of 1989 and 2001, along a continuum of conflict, this policy turn to the securitisation of ‘disadvantaged populations’ through interventionist strategies, that was emergent in the USA policy literatures of the early nineteen eighties, clearly understands education in terms of population control through a lens of international conflict. It sets the tone for the narratives of Heather, Judy, June and Linda, imbued as they are, with policy response themes of ‘inclusion’ ‘risk’ ‘excellence’ and ‘conflict resolution’. Strategically, this seminal policy document served as a blueprint for the New Labour administration’s Education Policy.
Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted the ways in which the conditions of emergence for a revival of Reflective Practice at the end of the twentieth century happened in relation to an ensemble of practices, processes and discourses whose relationality Foucault refers to as a *dispositif* in an emergent project governmentality that contained within it the apparatus of Reflective Practice, discussed in chapter 4. It is in relation to this *dispositif* that I intend *the Thatcher effect*, after Rose, after Deleuze “who understands the notion of an effect, such as the Kelvin effect or the Compton effect, as deployed in scientific discourse”: 

*An effect is by no means an appearance or an illusion. It is a product which spreads or distends itself over a surface; it is strictly co-present to, and co-extensive with, its own cause, and determines this cause as an immanent cause, inseparable from its effects*


The ‘Thatcher effect’ is an ensemble of conditions of emergence that I have explored above and summarise below in the following terms:

As a cluster of technologies of self in circulation at the time in the form of *the pursuit of self interest*, *new individualism*, *inner self expression*, *excellence* that inscribed ethics of empowerment, motivation and self actualisation in relation to a ‘Values and Lifestyle’ (Curtis 2000) political policy that at the same time inscribed technologies of self governing, self sufficiency, personal responsibility, and reflexive subjects.

As a significant new set of ‘knowhow’ that emerged in relation to new political rationalities to do with the restructuring of the international economy as an effect of the deregulation of the market. This know-how produced governmental technologies designed to minimise risk and provided strategies for governing at a distance. It constituted a new kind of knowledge, not for explanation but mobilisation.
As an emergent ‘economic architecture’ (Stiglitz 2004) of ‘new strategic complexes of liberal peace’ (Duffield 2001:258) coming together to produce new types of legitimacy such as ‘representative consensus’ (ibid) that changes not practice itself but what practice signifies, and new authorities in the form of ‘leading organs of global governance’ (Woodward 2009:1)

As an emergent new language of lexical hybrids that flatten out difference through necessarily ‘brief description’ whose formulaic blueprints for action accountability and performativity is ‘directed towards economic and process-oriented structures’ (Duffield 2001:115). Inserted into the economic lexicon is a lexicon of conflict in relation to a discourse of risk. War related imagery is deployed in the policy literatures for education in a way that conflates the sphere of education with security.

As an emergent rationality of calculability (Newman 1997); ‘a grandiose dream of absolute control of the accidental that plays on the alternate registers of a delirium of rationality and absolute reign of calculative reason’. (Castel 1991:289)

As an emergent ethos in relation to the ‘ameliorative, harmonising and transformative powers’ of conflict resolution, liberal peace, Democratic Peace, truth and reconciliation, that makes the ‘continuum of conflict’ more amenable to subjects of a global world

As a legacy where the re-emergence of political configurations and historical figurations recur like ‘normative grammars’ or ‘slots’ in the consciousness of western liberalism in relation to historical themes and speech acts of; Just War, Armageddon, Reconciliation

Chapter 5 is a ‘mode of enquiry’ into the ‘conditions of emergence’ of our present history after Butler (1990), to explore the inherited genealogies of knowledge that shape our identities are performative, where the performance pre-exists the performer, where subjectivisation is an effect of (historical) discursive processes and practices. I have undertaken the enquiry with a view to answering the question Reflective Practice as a technology of self why now why here and in whose interests and exploring the effects of Reflective Practice on the
subjectivities of the Teaching Assistants through the _traces_ of their writing. In relation to gender identity formation Butler writes,

_Gender is the repeated stylisation of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being. A political genealogy of gender ontologies, if is is successful, will deconstruct the substantive appearance of gender into its constituent acts and locate and account for those acts within compulsory frames set by the various forces that police the social appearance of gender._

(Butler 1990:33)

The passage exemplifies how Butler understands discursive production to _bring into being what it names_; a recurring theme explored of this thesis. The Learning Lexicon, whose stolid literality and simplifying literacy is just such a ‘highly rigid regulatory frame’ which has ‘congealed over time to produce the appearance of substance’ in ways that are formative, deeply performative, and pre exist the Teaching Assistants of my case study.

In terms of gender-identity formation and risk, this chapter helps to contextualise the subject effects of the four writers of the case study; I think Beck (1992) is right, when he says women often experience economic independence and familial life as a contradiction, in ways that are not the same for their male partners; certainly the women of the case study have experienced themselves as competing in the job market, pursuing _egotistical_ goals in a discourse of _rational choice_ wherein capitalism is construed as an _alluring siren_ (Martin 2002:37) compelling us with its wonders to _participate_ in the risk arena. In this sense a neoliberal ethic of participation that embraces ‘gender diversity’ dissolves gender differences ‘for the greater good’ in ways that preclude participation for those at the periphery. Cooke and Kothari (2001), point out how Participation in risky ventures may be experienced as a tyranny for the recipients of participatory development and Duffield (2001), points to similar exclusionary ethics in relation to victims of Human Rights abuse.

The discourse of Risk is in this sense a condition of emergence for Reflective Practice, as a condition of late modernity, where, according to Massumi
‘individuals experience a constant low-level fear’ (Massumi 1993:24 cited in Lupton 1999:12); in differently similar ways perhaps to the women of the Reformation.

One final emergent discourse must be discussed here as providing the zeitgeist narrative in which this Post Cold War apparatus operated to produce a particular technology of reflective practice in the form of the ‘entrepreneur of the self’. The discourse is what Jessop (2002:95-139) calls, the ‘Schumpetarian Competition State’. By the 1990s, Keynesian economics was in decline and Schumpetarian economics was emergent (Diamond 2006). Schumpeter’s ‘vision’ embraced economics with sociology and history and inscribed a more positive imperative in its theory of ‘creative destruction’ than Keynes’ more pessimistic view that capital was in secular decline as capitalism used up all its investment opportunities (Langoise 2014). According to Schumpeter ‘everything depends on whether …a group or nation… can maximise the creative components (of capitalism) while mitigating the destructive side effects’ (Schumpeter 1954:1171). The principle of Schumpetarian ‘creative destruction’ is premised on a notion of the boundless potential of capitalism as an unending dynamic process of change that is driven by entrepreneurialism, a condition he claims, that leads to ever higher standards of living.

*Without innovations no entrepreneurs; without entrepreneurial achievement, no capitalist returns and no capitalist propulsion. The atmosphere of industrial revolution – of ‘progress’ is the only one in which capitalism can survive* (Schumpeter 1939)

Schumpeter’s emphasis on entrepreneurship came to articulate the zeitgeist of the post cold war settlement, where entrepreneurialism was felt to be synonymous with progress, a new form of democracy and self agency, giving rise to the thesis of ‘public choice economics’.

Economically, Schumpeter argues, the best course of action is to maintain good policies (pro entrepreneurial practices, policies and institutions) and sit out the
destructive phases of ‘creative destruction’ without pumping up the economy with high government/bank intervention and resisting all ‘tinkering’ with the monetary system. The return of liberalism, globalisation and freer trade capitalism under the Thatcher and Regan administrations of the post Cold War period appears thus to witness capital investment opportunities that were hitherto, that is under a Keynesian vision, unthinkable (Langoise 2014).

Jessop construes this embrace of Schumpetarianism as a response to the crisis of Atlantic Fordism, that is the crisis tendencies of the fordist accumulation regime and its mode of regulation, and a subsequent search for a post fordist paradigm. One of the effects of this paradigm-shift to a ‘Schumpetarian Competition State’ is, according to Jessop, the changing role of the state which brings other structural changes: new regulatory frameworks to facilitate labour; market flexibility and mobility within national economic space; modifying institutional frameworks for international trade and foreign direct investment; planning and subsidising spatial fixes that support the activities of financial, industrial and commercial capital within and across borders; promoting new temporal horizons of action and new forms of temporal flexibility; articulating the interlinked processes associated with time-space distantiation and compression in the hope of creating a new spatio-temporal fix; the 24 hour city (Jessop 2002:138-139).

From this brief profile of an emergent and deeply formative discourse during the Post Cold War period, one can see how the imperatives of the Schumpetarian paradigm chime with those technologies of self that twenty-first century Higher Education has come to invest in; the choosing autonomous subject, the autonomous learner, the reflective practitioner and the entrepreneur of the self. Constructivist notions of self-actualisation and choice characterise its zeitgeist whereby strategies of ‘human-centred policy’ and ‘employer-facing education’ simply slide into the fit of ideas.

From here, it is possible to identify a moral form of twenty-first century hybrid-identity, that combines individualism with free market economism and philanthropic activity, in ways that do not jar with present day discourses of ‘extreme poverty’ or the extreme violence of proxy-wars for example; as the ‘extreme’ element becomes filtered, sanitised, popularised and ultimately
emptied of political content through a discursive nexus of narratives such as Schumpetarianism, entrepreneurialism and celebrity culture.

From here, it is possible to see the genealogical threads of such an entrepreneurial technology of self in the seventeenth century Lockean discourse of secular and spiritual self-actualisation, embedded empirically and ontologically in his thesis of empiricism; that construes experience as the foundation of knowledge and reflection as a contingent tenet of cognition, and subscribes to the notion that through reflection one can change or direct self conduct in ways that can be planned for.

I turn now to chapter 6, The Commonwealth of Learning, with a view to contextualising some of the political configurations and historical figurations discussed in this chapter as ‘conditions of emergence’, in relation to an early modern enlightenment project fashioned by John Locke.
Notes and references for Chapter 5.

*1. Perhaps the best contextualisation I have come across of what we mean by neoclassical economic doctrine provided by Ben Colburn is below:

Since the publication of the 18th century of Bernard Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees and Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations it has been argued that allowing unconstrained freedom of exchange between individuals at prices they choose of goods over which they have private property rights, produces a multitude of benefical consequences. Competition between sellers has the effect of increasing quality, reducing prices and eliminating inefficient or unattractive enterprises. The price mechanism indicating an exchange rate at which buyers and sellers are willing to engage in their transactions sends signals to the consumers about how they might efficiently satisfy their preferences and to producers about how they should deploy their productive capacity. In general we are told the market serves with an invisible hand more deft than any coercive coordination of goods and services to everyone’s benefit.


*2. The title is borrowed for its associative relevance, from Homo Economicus Goes to War: Methodological Individualism, Rational Choice and the Political Economy of War Title of a paper given by Christopher Cramer; World Development Vol. 30, No 11, pp1845-1864,2002

*3 Although the Thatcher administration of 1988/9 was against the unification of Germany, wanting to protect Gorbachev as an ally so as to protect England from the effects of rising interest rates, and protect a domino effect of redrawing boundaries (Yugoslavia), Thatcher nonetheless supports this event.

*4. This phrase is borrowed for its associative resonance from Le Monde Diplomatique (English edition) April 2014: 1; in an article entitled Ukraine isn’t Armageddon by Olivier Zajec: “Media treatment of recent events in Ukraine confirms that some in the West see international crises as Armageddon conflicts between good and evil where the meaning of history is enacted rather than as signs of differences of interest and perception between parties open to reason.”
School of thought: Key conceptual themes explored by a team of academics delivering a programme of: Violence Conflict and Development at SOAS University London in relation to progressive narratives of war, development, security and conflict - that have informed the thesis:


2) Democratic Peace Neils Hahn (Lecture 2011)

This refers to the Schengen Border Code which articulates a four tier strategy aimed at balancing control measures with access measures for mixed flows which means refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants and illegal migrants. It is argued by critics within the field that the four tiers do not allow for differentiation of the ‘mixed flows’ so that they should not be pursued simultaneously. For example the categories of illegal or irregular immigrants refugee and asylum seeker are collapsed in the absence of differentiation and may all be to the same person, who would therefore be treated differently according to the processes of the four tiers. The implication is that policies may be contradictory, erring on the side of control over access or rights. The implications is also that these processes appear to be balancing control measure with access measures, but in effect their application results in the blocking of access to a majority, and the channelling of flows ‘offshore’. This dialogue by lawyers and NGO agency workers, on the philosophy of law, is being had in working papers and seminar platforms that are membership based. References may be obtained on permission being given by the speakers and writers concerned.

The Refugee Convention is a declaration of intent towards refugees to which European states signed up in 1951. It sets out definitions of a refugee and refugee rights and procedures for their protection. It requires states to cooperate with UNHCR. It brings in the universal declaration of human rights to its remit. It is a reference for all Refugee Law and subsequent policy instruments.

This point refers to recent policy instruments; the EU Joint Resettlement Programme of 2009, the Regional Protection Programme for Africa and the EU, and the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility from the Commission to the
European Parliament currently under discussion. These projects have a common aim which is to harmonise standards for the protection of refugees and the shared responsibility for them amongst nations and blocks in line in Europe with a concern to protect a single market. They all draw on The Tampere agreement of 1999 as a set of conclusions that have been ratified and identify asylum policy through a codified set of protocols set out in a series of articles. Article 80 discusses the ‘principle of solidarity between EU member states’. All other policy instruments echo the terms of this article including some of those entities not in the EU. In this sense a new discourse of solidarity is in circulation.

*9‘Accumulation by dispossession’

“The implication is that primitive accumulation that opens up a path to expanded reproduction is one thing, and accumulation by dispossession that disrupts and destroys a path already opened up is quite another.”


Sites referred to in the script of chapter 5:

Nation at Risk Report:
https://www3.nd.edu/~rbarger/www7/nationrs.html

Stiglitz

CHAPTER 6: THE COMMONWEALTH OF LEARNING:
In this chapter, I trace the doctrine of experience as the foundation of knowledge to John Locke’s theorisation of empiricism in the seventeenth century, expounded in his book *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1689). The book was much influenced by Locke’s own interest in experimental science and the work of natural scientists such as Robert Boyle, as well as the metaphors and method of Baconian science. Also published in 1689, though written at different times to the *Essay*, was Locke’s *Second Treatise* which articulates a political conception that may be considered an early form of Liberalism; a thesis which legitimises political power in relation to sovereign authority and the right of the subject to resistance. Both of these epistemological and ontological theses are normative discourses which combine an imperative for experience as the foundation of knowledge with the free and equal rights of the knowing subject, in a knowledge/power nexus that has come to characterise academic discourse in Higher Education in the UK today, not least in the form of core academic values: of criticality, reflexivity and evidence-based learning.

I consider aspects of the way in which this particular knowledge/power nexus apparatus emerged and was sustained in the early modern period in relation to a thesis of Reflective Practice as a cognitive tenet of the empiricism paradigm that John Locke articulated. I do this with a view to historicising this formative genealogy of knowledge in relation to the present day apparatus of Reflective Practice that is the subject of this thesis. Historian John Marshall (2006:11) writes

> the development of natural philosophy by the late seventeenth century joined hands with the cause of religious toleration and itself helped to reinforce the notion that this was a time of ‘progress’ and of ‘enlightenment’. The republic of letters drew from notions of a religiously impartial scientific community and from models of scientific enquiry which stressed civility and probability and the impartiality attributed to fact; both were strongly associated in the 1680s and 1690s with the cause of religious toleration and the culture of the ‘republic of letters’.
Here, Reflective Practice is the technology of self that produces the reflexive subject, qua Protestant, qua good citizen and acts as the touchstone for a religious and political hegemonic project; a project characterised simultaneously by a continuum of conflict and liberal peace: In exile, Locke wrote much of his principal theses (1680s); the *Essay*, the *Letter on Toleration* and the *Second Treatise*, against a background of extreme violence. His arguments opposing the absolutist monarchy style of governance adopted in France by (Catholic) King Louis XIV were informed by a conviction that a Catholic King in England would similarly persecute Protestants and violate their rights to property (Marshall 2006:52). France’s moves against Huguenots in the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685) the dragonades removal of Huguenot children at the age of seven from their homes for Catholic education in Poitou in the later 1680s, and the creeping moves, as Locke saw it, towards legal absolutism in England under (Catholic sympathiser) James II, provided the experiential evidence for Locke that his fears, and those of many Whig party members, in England and in exile (De Krey 2005), were legitimate. Theses of the need for ‘impartial law’ was in this sense ‘structurally central to Locke’s *Second Treatise* which attacked the threat to life, liberty and property posed by a loss of ‘impartial justice’’(ibid).

It is in this context, of a ‘continuum of conflict’ experienced in relation to the events of the English Civil War of the 1640s and 50s, and the Thirty Years war that had raged in Europe, the on-going Reformation and The Glorious Revolution (1688/9) we understand Locke’s theorisation being structured through a perspective of an international war between Protestantism and Catholicism, a necessary war thought Locke, that would deliver protestants ‘from popery and slavery’ and determine the ‘security of Christendom’ itself Marshall 2006:92).

**Conditions of emergence for the Commonwealth of Learning**

Historian Pincus (2009) has written a book entitled *1688* in which he charts the build up to the event of the ‘Glorious Revolution’ and its aftermath. He chose ‘to investigate the links between the aspirations and the activities of England’s merchant communities and late seventeenth century politics’ (2009:6). This
hegemonic transformation involved, according to Pincus, a ‘shift from an agrarian to a manufacturing society’ (ibid:8) in which the state must play a role. In this sense, Pincus describes the ‘emergence of a modern state’ (ibid:9) in terms of ‘state craft’ which includes ‘transforming and professionalizing the military’ (ibid:9) the building of which was necessary he writes, ‘to fight a war against the greatest military power in Europe’. (ibid:9) The replacing of (catholic) James 11 with (protestant) William and Mary as monarchs, produced the ‘Declaration of Right’ which formally ‘limited the power of English Kings’ (Absolutism) and also the passing of the ‘Toleration Act’ ‘allowing Protestant

Pincus describes what could be called an ‘emergent new order’ in terms of a political economy symbolised by the establishment of the Bank of England, and a commercial society with a merchant class posing a challenge to the notion that wealth was synonymous with land. (Pincus 2009:366) He cites a shift to an ‘anti French’ foreign affairs orientation (ibid:305) and a (protestant) wing of Williamite Bishops (ibid:400) as dimensions of the new order.

Nowhere more vividly does the ‘emergent new order’ signify, than in the account written by historian Lisa Jardine in her book *Going Dutch* (2008), of the voyage made by William of Orange from the United Provinces of the Dutch Republic to Torbay in November 1688, upon which John Lock had a seat. Jardine describes how the armada is the centre piece of the Glorious Revolution when an English parliament invited William of Orange and Mary to ascend to the throne. Jardine describes how the armada is the centre piece of the Glorious Revolution when an English parliament invited William of Orange and Mary to ascend to the throne. Jardine describes the planning of the intended invasion and the enormous care taken to conceal the details of the amada’s landing or even the content of pamphlets which were to announce the event to England. She highlights how the ‘Declaration’ of William of Orange is, on close reading, compatible with Locke’s Two Treaties of Government which was to be a corner stone of seventeenth century political thought.

In this sense, Locke’s Commonwealth of Learning is a conceptual ship of state within the armada fleet of ships led by William of Orange in 1668; comprising fifty three war ships, an army of over 14,000 soldiers and “five thousand gentlemen volunteers” (Jardine 2008:9). The ‘Declaration’ was a document of constitutional significance. It was edited and translated by Gilbert Burnet who was one of Locke’s frequent visitors to the Conversation Circles he held in
Antwerp, and was written in the temperament and style of address, characteristic of Locke’s writing, that is personal, and reasonable in tone. In this sense, argues Jardine in her book, an invasion was designed to be experienced as a liberation to the English.

Returning from exile, Locke had experienced first hand the secular structures of the Dutch Magistrates who ruled as secular authorities in the Northern Netherlands, with a view to tolerating religious differences so as not to endanger Dutch economic interests. Toleration in this sense was a strategy. A century coming after the watershed events of Peace of Westphalia in 1648 after the English Restoration of 1660 signalled a desire for an end to the intense confessionalisation of protestants and catholics.

It is however this very confessionalisation that has produced a distinct emphasis on interiorisation by the 1680s, both for Catholics in relation to the Reform framed by the Council of Trent (1563) and for Protestants in relation to the Lutheran and then Calvinist emphasis on reading the Scriptures. A new doctrinal awareness characterised everyday life and an intensification of spiritual development served to emphasise the individual across the confessions.

In this sense, Locke’s theory of empiricism which privileges the individual as a site of knowledge construction, chimes with a wide swathe of the population already accustomed to reading or praying in solitude. Locke draws on this old genealogy of knowledge, ‘interiorisation’ to engage the Reader.

The Epistle to the Reader of the Essay

‘The Epistle to the Reader’ in the Essay is written in the second person personal of ‘thee’ and ‘thou’. This intimate address is not unusual amongst addresses to the Reader in seventeenth century publications of books. It adopts some of the characteristic disclaimers in relation to corrections or errors that occur in the production process, but apart from this keeps a serious tone resisting any jocular modality as many addresses to the Reader have. Locke’s Epistle introduces the Reader to his main thesis statement about the notion of the Idea.

Its epistemological thesis is delivered in Book 11 of the Essay where Locke identifies the two foundations of knowledge ‘from which all ideas flow’ as
sensation and reflection. Through sensation the mind receives simple ideas through reflection the mind processes these ideas. Reflection is defined as *perception of the operations of our minds within us* (11.i.4). The notion here is that by turning its gaze inwards the mind perceives its own operations (reflexively) and in this way says Locke; *Stores it self with a new set of ideas, which I call Ideas of Reflection* (11.1.24)

The main subject of four books of Locke’s *Essay* is ‘the Person’. Briefly; Books 1 and 11 set out the premise for a theory (empiricism) that inscribes the Self as a site of knowledge construction; and the premise of ‘simple and complex’ ideas that relate to personal identity. The Person is defined as fully self conscious and capable of knowing itself and ‘can consider itself as it self’. Locke dedicates circa 6000 words in Book 11 (chapter xxvii from 9: 28) for a discussion of the Person. He begins

> We must consider what person stands for; which I think is a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it.

(Andy 1689: 11xxvii, 9)

Book 3 sets out Locke’s theory of language and explores the premise that words can only stand for our own (individual) ideas because the connection between words and ideas is arbitrary and therefore we cannot assume that people mean the same thing by the same word. Book 4 contains his theory of knowledge as something always limited. We cannot claim certainty over our knowledge, probability is all we can achieve, but the senses are sufficient for most of our purposes.

The significance of this summary above is to highlight the emphasis placed on ‘personhood’ in Locke’s *Commonwealth of Learning*. My interest for the purposes of this chapter, is less in relation to the fact that the Person is the fulcrum of Locke’s work than that the Reader is the object of this ‘second order learning project’ of the Commonwealth that is construed around the Person. I am less interested in Locke’s theory of personal identity than his method of
enrolment; less interested in his epistemology than the way the Reader enrolls herself or himself into this ‘new way of ideas’. Historian Forstrom (2010) observes that Identity is theorised by Locke as a way for the reflective individual to have a ‘personal afterlife’; a way to motivate the person to be concerned with their future conduct (2010:131). In terms of governmentality it highlights the way in which the practice of self reflection through a process of interiorisation subjectivises the Reader for spiritual and secular salvation.

The Reader of A Letter

Historian Ashcraft (2006) construes Locke as a revolutionary political exile. It is a seductive account depicting Locke the man in romantic terms as a dissident - a point Locke the Underlabourer harnesses to good rhetorical effect. From Ashcraft one is able to glean the charisma that would have been attributed to Locke the virtuoso gentleman and scholar, traces of which are in Locke’s own addresses to the Reader.

Locke’s Letter (1689) problematises anti-toleration. It was written originally in Latin while Locke was in exile in 1680s. Many of its arguments for freedom of political and religious expression had been rehearsed from exile against Locke’s adversary, Stillingfleet, who supported Absolutism. It too is written in the personalised form of thee and thou and its discourse is about the individual man with rights and responsibilities in an inclusive lexicon that weaves together the principles of toleration, individual liberty, self reflection, government by consent and the right to resistance against governments that endanger the rights of citizens in relation to a form of social contract or commonwealth. He talks of ‘a Christian commonwealth’ as a sphere of tolerance, what we would call a democracy today.

The term ‘commonwealth’ that Locke deploys also to good rhetorical effect, is used by Charles 11 to signify ‘dissenters’ to the restoration of Catholicism to England in 1670s; namely the Protestants, ‘the Commonwealth faction in England’ whose ‘influence’ and ‘activity’ he wished to ‘diminish’ (Ashcraft 1986: 29). Ashcraft relates how, nervous about the ‘Republican scare’ (1669-1670) Charles 11 feared the activities of the ‘Commonwealthmen’ and how
rumours circulated in 1669 that London was full of old Cromwellian soldiers and there was some great and evil design on foot’ (ibid:30) a fear, says Ashcraft, reported by Andrew Marvel Commonwealthmen flock about the town holding dangerous meetings (Marvell cited in Ashcraft:30) Charges levelled by contemporaries that all bankers and merchants were ‘commonwealthmen’, holds according to Ashcraft, some currency given the development of the political and commercial interests of many of the members of this social group (ibid:34). In this case, for many, the term ‘commonwealthmen’ signified an alignment with Republicanism against Stuart Monarchy. In effect, says Ashcraft Locke had been a member of a radicalised group defending parliamentary authority led by Shaftsbury for whom Locke was secretary in the 1660s and having served as a member of Cromwell’s Council of State Shaftsbury ‘had indeed been a republican and commonwealthman’. Ashcraft traces the connections between Shaftsbury, Locke and other Commonwealth officers to the Leveller movement (ibid:248) with a view to identifying revolutionary associations. In this sense the term ‘Commonwealthman’ most probably has a personal politicised resonance for Locke, and a radical resonance for his contemporaries, strains of which would be read off from the term when deployed by Locke in relation to Commonwealth of Learning possibly evoking notions of a ‘new way of ideas’, an alternative kind of settlement, of solidarity and resistance, of the progressive and the cohesive.

In this sense, from Ashcraft’s account, I infer that a potentially rhetorical (historically specific) resonance may have been imparted to the Reader of Locke’s texts, who may well have known of Locke’s ‘revolutionary’ past. ‘Commonwealth’ thus signifies an alternative settlement to the one imposed on people by James I

To this effect, in his Epistle to the Reader of the Essay Locke introduces the idea of a Commonwealth of Learning in slightly heroic terms for times characterised by Heresies and Schisms and Commonwealthmen.

The Commonwealth of Learning, is not at this time without Master-Builders, whose mighty Designs, in advancing the Sciences, will leave lasting Monuments to the Admiration of Posterity; But everyone must not hope to be a Boyle, or a Sydenham; and in an
Age that produces such Masters, as the Great—Huygenius, and the incomparable Mr. Newton, with some other of that Strain, 'tis Ambition enough to be employed as an Under-Labourer in clearing the Ground a little, and removing some of the Rubbish, that lies in the way to Knowledge.

( Locke 1689 Epistle:9)

In this way, with recourse to the discursive formations of the day, Locke self-fashions himself as caretaker of the Commonwealth of Learning clearing the Ground a little and removing some of the Rubbish. Locke is clearing the ground for the new science led by his friends Boyle Sydenham and Newton that brings a different world view outilage mental of learning based on a mechanistic or atomistic conception of the universe. Learning according to this view requires formal procedures for demonstrating its own principles. Scientific procedure is based on observable behaviour in the world which is approached through experiment or observation and involves demonstration to test it in a way that ‘places experience at the end of a logical structure of deduction from an initial hypothesis’ (Dear 1991:143). In this sense the Ground of the new Commonwealth of Learning is being cleared for the new empiricism, and possibly empire.

The Rubbish being removed by caretaker Locke is that of Absolutism; a political and theoretical problem to do with; 1) the idea of the divine right of kings and their entitlement to raise taxes without consent (Filmer 1688: Patriarcha); 2) the idea of a Social Contract where the sovereign political power must be absolute and unchallengeable in order for civility to be managed (Hobbes 1660: Leviathan:3) the embeddedness of Scriptural authority in a form of Scholasticism that perpetuates the world views and values of the ancient regime. Locke’s Commonwealth of Learning aimed to bring about regime change.

Part of the Rubbish which Locke wants to clear away is the ornate and inaccessible language which characterises the ideologies of the ancient regime, that lies in the way to Knowledge. Locke undertakes to establish a culture of toleration, to convert conflict into cooperation through technologies of
government that require willingness and capacity on the part of its citizens to challenge the old order. New forms of self conduct new modes to care for the self fostering new values of toleration were needed to bring stability; this is the task that *Undertaker* Locke appoints for himself; a strategy to put into place a network structure (commonwealth) through a ‘method of association’ (learning) wherein individuals ‘enrol’ themselves as self actualising agents so that ‘the right documents the right devices and the right drilled people’ put together can create a ‘structured envelope for one another’ that ensures ‘their durability and fidelity’. (Law 1986:254) Once again, the touchstone for this seventeenth century second order learning project is the *Reader*.

*The Reader* may be primarily the gentleman’s son deemed by Locke to be the translator of a ‘new way of ideas’, but she is also every one as the touchstone for his project of the Commonwealth of Learning.

Historians Baron and Scola (2010:12) describe some of the physical markers involved in the act of Reading in relation to the keeping of commonplace books which frame the precise ‘mechanisms for enrolment’ Locke devises for his *Reader*. They note that the commonplace acts of the early modern reader take many forms;

*To read with a pen in hand or otherwise marking memorable passages to correct errors or emend the text and cite variant readings; to gloss or interline with technical or rhetorical terms or with translations and citations; to summarise and cross refer; to outline and paraphrase; to make synopses and provide interpretations; to extract maxims from scripture and sermons from prayers and devotions; to move themes arguments topics… recipes and remedies speeches and letters from one transcript to another, from printed book or manuscript to commonplace compilation, notebook or miscellany – these were among the commonplace acts of the early modern reader.*
The Reader is thus acculturated into practices of ‘readerliness’ through techniques of ‘parsing translating memorising and replicating both scriptures and classics’ habits of ‘imitation and admiration’, ‘application and attentiveness’ were formed as ‘bible verses and prayers provided the steady recitative’ against which so many early modern texts were read. (Baron and Scola 2012:12)

At a meta level, there is an industry of ‘frontispieces tables commentary verses indices plates dedications’ and addresses to the Reader by publishers and printers and authors designed to enrol the imaginary Reader into the Commonwealth of Learning.

Historian Jardine (1990) recounts how the Renaissance Reader interacts with the texts in order to ‘act upon’ what was read. ‘Renaissance readers (and annotators) persistently envisage action as the outcome of reading – not simply reading as active, but reading as trigger for action’ (1990:129:40). In this vein, Jardine cites the commonplace book writings of Gabriel Harvey a seventeenth century ‘professional reader’ employed ‘for reading to provide interpretations of textual material’. He read ‘his Livy’ with ‘an eye to political analysis’, so that he could identify different types of Republic suited to different types of action for Young Philip Sydney’s first active service. He read it again differently when he became a lawyer, not for ‘soldiery’ but for practicing law. (1990:129:35) Jardine presses the point that Readers read for action in a goal oriented way. (ibid:30)

After Luther and after Bacon, Locke as ‘translator’ of a ‘new way of ideas’ deploys the self –actualising activity, of reading as ‘the right device’ or ‘mechanism of enrolment’ that is ‘materialised’. In this sense the Reader is the touchstone of the Commonwealth of Learning project of governmentality. The Reader is appealed to by John Locke and others of his circle at the centre who are seeking to ‘control others at a distance’. Before considering the moral epistemological and language dimensions of this political rationality, it is as well to sketch at a practical, even literal level, how the circles at the centre and the Readers at the periphery are connected.

Blurring the boundaries of centre- periphery
In exile, Locke is part of an international and interconfessional community of scholars and activists many of whom are also in exile. In a detailed account of their interactions, Marshall (2006:493-527) describes the processes by which they assisted one another as members of a group from ‘the purchasing of books for others to meeting in conversational circles and discussing ideas of constructively criticising each others’ unpublished manuscripts’ and the founding of new journals in a ‘self-consciously designated, institutionalised, and central form of scholarly interaction and criticism’ in the form of a Republic of Letters.

Marshall (2006:475) details the way in which on one level the exiled community ‘purchased books for each other informed each other of book auctions and new publications and either carried books for each other or employed intermediaries to do so. …’ ‘they arranged for the publication of each others’ tolerationist works and helped to supply editorial assistance and translating assistance for such publications’. Locke’s correspondence shows him involved in many of these exchanges of service (Goldie, 2001). They produced journals with the specific aim of reproducing these discourses of early enlightenment early scientific knowledge early liberalism.

Marshall (2006:493) recounts stories of the exiles meeting in the houses of two of the members of the Republic of Letters that were near to one another; Bayle’s and Furly’s. Furly’s house had a ‘library of 4,400 volumes including many heretical works at the epicentre of the reformation and enlightenment’. Locke made a gift of a bookcase to Furly ‘with bookshelves for all sizes of books inverted by Locke and intended for convenient transportation without removing the books from them’ (ibid).

Furly’s house was a locale for many meetings of the conversational circle of the Republic of Letters known as ‘the Lantern’ and they were known as the ‘heretics of the Lantern’. Members of ‘the Lantern’ were Bayle, Basnage, Burnet, Limborch Le Clerce, Kohs, van Helmont, Furly and Locke, indicating an ecumenical tolerationist group of ‘Quakers Arminians Socinians’ (ibid: 494). The circle provided a ‘series of mutual associations and assistance’. Marshall (ibid:514) highlights the ways in which the critical ethos adopted by the group, of holding everything open to question, examining alternative views and rejecting traditional authority is a republican one where communication and
discussion of scholarship centred on the virtues of the republic; on the duties of citizenship of virtuous participation of liberty and equality amongst its citizens; a Ciceronian ethic of *amicitia*. Marshall recounts that Locke wrote a set of rules that would define the organisation of such meetings. It *required that everyone should sit in a circle in the order of their arrival and speak in order of their seating, removing any notion of socio precedence among the speakers* (ibid). Each individual was for Locke, as Cicero recommended, to focus their comments in discussion on what they had to say to the topic in hand with *everyone endeavouring that their answers may not be onley loose Discourses on the Subject; but that they tend directly to… the Resolution of the Question proposed*. When any member thought *that any appearance of growing warmth is fit to be stopd* they could immediately end any debate. Everyone was exhorted to keep in mind that the meeting was intended as *a serious and impartial enquiry after Truth… with the maintenance of Charity under different Opinions*. Each individual proposed for membership was to testify that *they ‘love’ and ‘seek truth for truths sake; and will do his endeavour impartially to find, and receive it, himself, and to communicate and propagate it to others.* (Marshall, 2000: 515)

From this depiction by Marshall one gleans a sense of the *internal ‘mechanisms of enrolment’* amongst these friends. The rules created for the ‘dry club’ post revolution, were according to Le Clerc, very similar to those created for conversations and conferences in exile in the Netherlands, by Locke; a nice reversal.

In his *Life of Locke* (ibid) Le Clerc writes that Locke had:

> Desired that Mr Limborch and I with some friends, would set up conferences, and that to this end we should meet together once a week, sometimes at one house, and then at another, by turns, and that there should be some question proposed, of which everyone should give his opinion at the next meeting; and I have by me still the rules, which he would have had us observe, written in Latin with his own hand.

(ibid)

As Marshall notes, by discussing the conversational practices in such detail in his book Le Clerc can be seen ‘to be offering suggestions to be imitated by others’.
This cameo, which Marshall provides, of the practices and processes of conversation meetings prescribed by Locke in a ‘set of rules’ with a view to monitoring the conduct of its participants in relation to the discussion of texts they have read together bringing thought to bear not only on the texts but the ways of processing those texts. The cameo frames an instance of the way in which ‘control at a distance’ becomes institutionalised as the model survives the historical moment, itself refashioned from Cicero, and replicated after the revolution as received practice for the conduct of polite conversation and learning in the Commonwealth of Learning. This disciplined conduct contrasts with the critical ethos of ‘holding everything open to question’.

Marshall’s depictions of Locke’s inner circle appear very much as depictions of Locke the Underlabourer, that is in terms of ‘what was important to him in his practices of conversation’ (ibid). He recounts the difference between how Pierre Bayle stresses a ‘reasoned demolition of others’ arguments (ibid:520) compared to Locke’s preference for ‘civility, charity among differing views and silence’. He cites Charles le Vier as recording a very different ethos to that of Locke’s amicitia in the Bayle conversation circle, which:

Dealt freely with the most sensitive matters, such as Religion and politics, Messrs patz (Adriaan van Peters) and de Beauval were ordinarily the attackers, and Mr Basnage often had to undergo violent battles. He did not blush in admitting that he had very much benefited from these conversation & that they contributed to cure him of several prejudices. (ibid:521)

Within this community, Everybody according to Bayle:

... is both Sovereign and under everybody’s jurisdiction. The laws of the Society have done no Prejudice there to the Independency of the State of Nature: in that respect, every particular man has the Right of the Sword, and may exercise it without asking leave of those who govern.

( ibid: 520)

These detailed and colourful inscriptions of polite conduct for Readers and Writers of the Republic of Letters, presented by the historians above are the ‘mechanisms of enrolment’ according to Rose and Miller, the ‘right devices’
according to Law (1986), the ‘methods of association’ according to Latour (1986) the ‘normative grammars’ according to Gramsci and the ‘technologies of self’ according to Foucault, that subjectivise. They serve to make hegemonic projects of liberalism, neoliberalism and Liberal Democracy amenable and practicable to their subjects in ways that enable control from a distance. In this way the systemitization of learning in the Commonwealth is assured by being ‘passed from hand to hand’ a ‘routinization’ according to Weber (cited in Burke 2000:49) that produces the know-how that becomes part of the ‘apparatus’ of political power beyond the state.

Another dimension of this historically produced and contingent apparatus is its material infrastructure that Historians Grafton (2011) and Peacey (2012) describe in terms of those technologies of print and transport that were sufficiently established to enable the growing book trade (Eisenstein 1979) news, networks, and letters to circulate in London (Raymond 2006), England (Whyman 1999) and throughout North Europe (Goodman 1994), out to the peripheries of what was to become the British Empire. The reach of the Commonwealth’s governance is as wide as its diaspora and the forms of transport or communication networks are global. In the seventeenth century modes of transport became increasingly sophisticated; at Sea with the discovery of the compass (1500s) on land with the People’s Post (1516) and the Coach (Whyman,1998). Given these possibilities for connectivity it is easy to imagine that the Reader at the periphery desired all the more to be enrolled; Eliza Lucas born into the planter society of South Carolina was surely just such a Reader keen to enrol herself, situated at a distance from the European cultural centres, she writes in her diary in 1741: *I was forced to consult Mr Locke over and over to see wherein personal identity consisted and if I was the very same Self* (Outram1989: 182).

Eliza Lucas is in this sense representative of the Reader as the touchstone of the Commonwealth of Learning, and it is to she whom John Locke addresses.

The New Empiricism.

Locke also drew on those ‘scientific’ genealogies of knowledge in circulation at the time of natural philosophy or new science.
Genealogies of knowledge embracing an ‘experiential- experimentum- expertus’ trajectory, a ‘matter of fact’ logic, and perceptual metaphors of knowledge such as the mirror and the eye, became the dominant model of knowledge construction and production in the latter half of the seventeenth century in England. In Locke’s work in particular these new genealogies of knowledge converged with earlier genealogies of Scholastic and Classical knowledge, also still in circulation and traceable in Locke’s theory of empiricism. This section explores the ‘new empiricism’, with a view to historicising the way in which the discourse of experience as the foundation of knowledge and reflection as the twin process of interiorisation, became established in the early modern period as a subjectivising discourse that rendered its subjects governable.

The way in which experience was ‘turned into’ Science in the seventeenth century is a subject of much research by historians of ideas (Shapiro 2000) of the history of the sociology of knowledge (Burke 2000) of scientific argument (Dear 1991) of the history and philosophy of science and the history of the disciplines (Kelley, 1997) of the Reform of the Universities in the seventeenth century (Findlen in Kelley 1997).

Certainly the term ‘experience’ became increasingly conflated with the notion of ‘experimental demonstration’ in the discourse of natural philosophy according to these historians (Dear 1991:135). Etymologically, the terms ‘experience’ and ‘experiment’ have the same root and no clear distinction was made between the words ‘experientia’ and ‘experimentum’ in the seventeenth century. In the scientific discourse of the contemporary Royal Society an experiment was understood as

\[
\text{an historical event in which an investigator n experiences the behaviour of a contrived set up or apparatus and uses or might use a report of that historical event as an element in constructing an argument intended to establish or promote a knowledge claim.}
\]

(ibid:138).

The notion of experimentum as something in which ‘all experiences agree’, ‘established from most certain experiences that is common experience’ is an Aristotelian apperception; \textit{omina experimenta consentient quae ex certissimis}
experimentis constant. As a principle its certainty is founded on universal experience the latter itself the product of many memories of the same thing; from perception there comes memory and from memory experience for memories that are many in number form a single experience.

(Aristotle Metaphysics V1.2).

Its ‘certain principle’ is a scholastic notion, contrasted by Dear to highlight its difference to a modern hypothetic-deductive view of scientific procedure wherein ‘experience’ is effectively placed ‘at the end’ of a logical structure of deduction from an initial hypothesis: the hypothesis yields conclusions regarding observable behaviour in the world and experimentum or observation then comes in to confirm or falsify these predictions’ that is as ‘a logically mediated way to confirm or falsify the original hypothesis’ (ibid 143). The difference, says Dear, is that for Aristotle ‘demonstration’ signified ‘to derive conclusions deductively’ from first principles, that is ‘premises already accepted as certain - as with those of Euclidean geometry’ wherein ‘there was no question of testing the conclusions against experience’(ibid).

What is carried over from the Scholastic tradition however is the sense that ‘consensus’ be produced in relation to a multiplicity of instances (of memories); all experiences agree, whilst what is eschewed by the early moderns in their ‘experimental philosophy’ is the Aristotelean notion of universals. What replaces this is effectively a Baconian emphasis on the ‘particular’ of the physical world the ‘little things’ of Natural History in which the systematic collection of information from contemporary society calls for a new approach to Science whereby, as Dear says ‘Aristotelian science does not involve formal procedures for demonstrating its own principles’ as ‘the logic of deductive structure requires that they simply be accepted at the outset’ (ibid).

This cameo above affords an insight into the dynamic of this genealogy of knowledge ‘experientia/experimentum’ on its way to becoming the foundation of knowledge discourse that we recognise today; in terms of its continuity and discontinuity as a genealogy of knowledge – what is clear, is not just the way in which it morphs from one sense and century into another, but the way in which certain strands of its former connotation are rejected and certain other strands
retained, or changed, as it is reconfigured for the purposes of a new hegemonic project; in this case the enlightenment project. The cameo frames ‘the experiment’ as a convention of knowledge in the seventeenth century where in it is perceived that ‘Science’ needs ‘empirical principles’ to deal with the physical world and the enterprise of ‘discovery’ in ways that ‘cannot be intuitively obvious but which have to be rendered acceptable through an appeal to experience’ (ibid: 139).

Thus ‘the experiment’ as a test of hypothesis becomes emblematic of seventeenth century ‘Science’ institutionalised by the Royal Society and embedded via Robert Hook’s term ‘experimentum crucis’ (Dear 1991:133) and then adopted by the Master Builders of the new commonwealth of learning such as Newton.

Shapin and Scaffer (1985) explore the experimental culture of the Royal Society through an analysis of those experiments undertaken in the 1660-70s with recourse to primary documentation from the era, in their book entitled Leviathan and the Air Pump. They analyse the circumstances in which experiment as a systematic means of generating natural knowledge becomes institutionalised. In a quasi Foucauldian approach to ‘subjugated knowledge’ the authors consider the power dynamics that inform this rise of the ‘experimental ideal’ in a discussion of the ways in which Robert Boyle’s programme of experimental philosophy comes to triumph over Hobbes proposals for ‘more causal enquiry based on a quantitative determination of first laws from which to deduce all other phenomena’ (Sargent in Kelley 1997:42); and the ways in which the dispute between Boyle and Hobbes is recorded by Oldenburg as secretary of the Royal Society in ways that marginalise Hobbes, to the effect that Hobbes as a figure ‘subsequently disappeared from the scientific literature’ and was ‘neglected’ because he was opposed to ‘the hero Boyle’. Their appraisal of the ‘asymmetrical handling of rejected and accepted knowledge’ constitutes an attempt to ‘break down the aura of self evidence’ that surrounds the experimental culture of knowledge production, by showing that there was ‘nothing inevitable about the series of historical judgements emanating from that context that yielded a natural philosophical consensus in favour of the experimental programme’. They conclude ‘Given other circumstances bearing upon that philosophical community
Hobbes theories might have found a different reception.’ (Shapin and Scaffer 1985:13)

Shapin and Scaffer’s detailed study of the minutia of primary source materials in the form of records, letters, memos and marginalia appertaining to the experiments conducted by the English experimentalists, and the reconstructions of those experiments that Shapin and Shaffer conduct under the same (as is possible) conditions, tells us a great deal about the ‘apparatus’ (in the Foucauldian sense) of the new emergent order and the doctrine of new empiricism in relation to the respective ortho-praxis of the governmental project of the time and the discourse that made it amenable and operable. Further studies of a different nature, i.e. a biography of Robert Hook (Jardine 2003) portray Hook as someone who was simultaneously an ‘expert eye witness’ and marginalised character at these events, reinforcing Shapin and Shaffer’s account of the ways in which certain genealogies of knowledge and certain knowledge auters were privileged over others in the politics of the knowledge/power nexus of seventeenth century science.

Historian Shapiro (2000) explores a different genealogy of knowledge influencing the rise of the experientia - experimentum ideal in relation to emergent legal discourses which contributed to the evidentiary character of the new empiricism. She traces a transfer of knowledge model from the legal sphere to the philosophical sphere (natural history) to the Scientific community of the Royal Society with its culture of experiment, via Bacon, Lord Chancellor and former lawyer, through a discourse of ‘fact’. Shapiro cites legal methods of fact-determination and the development of a more document-oriented (as against oral) culture, as well as an emphasis on truthfulness and impartiality in knowledge construction as triggers for a preference that became widespread across these spheres for first hand witnesses over (scholastic conventions of) citations and references to authorities (ibid:119). In relation, Shapin and Shaffer (1985: 24-25) recount how this discourse of ‘matter of fact’ was offered by the experimentalists of the Royal Society as the foundation of science, whereby ‘in the system of physical knowledge the fact was the item about which one could have the highest degree of probalistic assurance: ‘moral certainty’’. They recount how Boyle proposed that the matter of fact ‘be established by the
aggregation of individuals’ beliefs’ wherein ‘members of the community of practice had to mutually assure themselves that belief in an empirical experience be warranted’ (ibid:24). In this sense ‘matters of fact’ were ‘the outcome of the process of having an empirical experience, warranting it to oneself and assuring others that grounds for their beliefs were adequate. In that process a multiplication of the witnessing experience was fundamental’ (ibid:25). Shapiro (2000: 86-104) recounts how the discourse of ‘matter of fact’ that was shaping Science, was prevalent also in the reporting culture adopted by news- focussed publications such as newspapers and pamphlets and travel literature reporting both human conduct and natural phenomena. Observational aids such as the telescope and microscope were instrumental to the establishment of fact which developed criteria for the witnessing, credibility of witnesses, and expertise of those involved in the establishment of fact be they juries, judges, scientists, gentleman, writers or painters; to the extent where this concept became widespread and popular (ibid).

Historian Sargent (1989) also addresses the influence of legalistic conventions in order to highlight a nuanced interpretation of empiricism, that whilst grounded in sense perception and restricted to the knowledge of actual and observable phenomena, it is also capable of admitting elements of empiricist and rationalist approaches to the study of nature; Sargent construes Boyle’s epistemology in terms of a ‘moderate philosophy of science’ that could admit probability over certainty, that whilst influenced by Baconian ideology, modified Baconian methodology and was not reducible to it or to Gassendi’s ‘science of appearances’. (1989:40) ‘Quantitative laws linking appearances were not the end point of his science but merely the beginning of a qualitative causal inquiry into the reasons why such regularities appeared’ (ibid:41)

Sargent articulates the way in which the notion of experience was in effect much broader than that associated with sense- perception, by looking to the legal domain for the elucidation of concepts employed by the English experimentalists, that help to account for the rise of this ideal and thus brings nuance to their epistemological justification of experience as the foundation of the new science. Sargent does not challenge the ideal in this sense, like Shapin and Shaffer, so much as account for its potency in historical terms: She notes the
influence of common law on the experiential ideal, which is based on radically
different foundations to Roman law, which, she writes, consists of a dialectically
constructed and codified body of legal doctrines based upon rational first
principles and the citation of authorities; whereas Common Law does not operate
according to a codified system so much as precedent law. (ibid: 42) Precedent
law consists of chronological collections of past cases held in Yearbooks and
Registers of Writs wherein past cases are the points of reference. The lack of
system according to Sargent was not considered a deficiency ‘as it allowed for
expansion to meet new needs and modification to accommodate unusual
cases’ (ibid)

The historical approach of common law was understood to bring more certainty
according to Sargent than the analytical approach of Roman Law, and individual
reason was supplemented by the accumulated experience of actual judicial
decisions collected over hundreds of years. Sargent cites Bacon as saying ‘make
the rule from existing law’ She observes that the perceived danger of the
continental method was that it was ‘overly speculative’ and not grounded in
practice. Sargent cites Chief Justice Hale as saying:

Those judges with the greatest power of natural reason are most
commonly the worst judges that can be because they are
transported from the ordinary measures of right and wrong by
their own overfine speculations, theories and distinctions

(Ibid: 24 footnote 20)

Similarly according to Chief Justice Coke common law is:

not be decided by natural reason but by the artificial reason and
judgement of law which requires long study and experience before
that a man can attain to the cognizance of it.

(Ibid: 24 footnote 22)

Sargent is at pains here to point out that this kind of ‘experience’ indicates not
only sense perception or ‘mere observation’ and is not only an appeal to the
accumulation of facts, but includes interpretation of the facts via experience.
Reason in this sense, she claims is not precluded. (ibid: 25). It is an interpretation
that has much resonance with twenty first century theorisations of experiential
learning.

Sargent’s analysis however highlights another aspect of empiricist discourse,
which is a distrust of ‘overfine speculations theories and distinctions’; what is
being alluded to here by Hale the Whiggish Judge, is the metaphysics of
Descartes, the papal theories of transubstantiation in the Roman (Catholic)
Church, the innatness of Absolutism; ‘overfine speculations theories and
distinctions’ stands for a (protestant) intolerance of the perceived excesses of
the cult of indulgences, the Ivory Tower of the monastries, scholasticism, Stuart
Popery, and the French Court – targets of the Reformation; it is political. In its
intolerance of these ‘metaphysics’ are the seeds of an ‘anti theory’ ‘anti
intellectuality’ strain of which the ‘puritanical turn’ in language that
accompanies the empiricist project is emblematic, with its imperative for the
visible, for plain language, simple method and literal tropes; a strain that
survives to characterise narratives of experiential learning, lifelong learning and
reflective practice today.

The ‘new empiricism’ establishes its legitimacy in the inscriptions of the Royal
Society; its registers, its publications, its lectures and debates, its controversies -
and through the Republic of Letters as centres of a knowledge /power nexus. It
establishes its legitimacy also through the enrolment of its Readers at the
periphery of a nexus of inscriptions that is generated by a new epistolary culture.
It is legitimised also by the discourse of ‘the physical world’ that heralds in the
tropes of ‘new empiricism’ in terms of fact, probability, objectivity,
demonstration, moral certainty, witnessing, multiplicity – tropes that cluster
around a nodal idea of experience as the foundation of knowledge and reflection
as a process of interiorisation so reconfiguring knowledge to fit it for the
purposes of the ‘new world’.

**Reflection and experience as epistemology**

Studies of Locke’s reading materials (Dawson and Ellis, 2013)*3 as well as his
letters (Goldie: 2007) as well as his published work ‘reveal’ the extent to which
Locke’s theorisation of empiricism draws on an established genealogy of
Reflection; as a concept of representation, of knowledge construction, of
philosophical methodology and as a metaphor of the ‘mirror image’ that was in common usage. Particular recourse is made by Locke to Cicero (Dawson and Ellis 2013) whose theory of learning as an incremental process is much reproduced in Locke’s own theorisation of empiricism even in respect to the same vocabulary he deploys. Much looser recourse is made by him to the Augustinian concept of reflection as a process of interiorisation (Herbert 1976: 131-153). Reflection as a ‘mirror image’ is a recurrent theme in the religious philosophy of the apostles of their time, such as Bede (672-735) Gregory (590-604) Augustine (350-430) and Aquinas (1225-74). Reflection as a form of representation is theorised in the philosophy of language literature of the times as part of ‘correspondence theory’ (Rorty, 1979, especially chapter 3); these genealogies of Reflection precede the perceptual metaphor of the Mirror of Nature, and of reflection as a mirroring of images between objects and events in the physical world that informs the discourses of natural philosophy circulating in the seventeenth century.

Locke coheres these genealogical strands of knowledge into a discrete framework in his theorisation of empiricism. He takes the nodal concept of experience through sense perception and links it to reflection as a process of interiorisation that the individual must engage with in order to achieve, cognition. Experience and reflection together form the vehicle for knowledge acquisition. This symbiosis, of the twin tenets of cognition, generates a series of binary modes of perception that embed experience as the foundation of knowledge and reflective practice as the means of processing that knowledge, in one another.

These two (experience and reflection) are fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have or can naturally have do spring; this great source of most of the ideas we have depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I do call SENSATION (11.1.3). The other ‘source of ideas every man has wholly within himself and though it be not sense as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense. But as I call the other Sensation so I call this REFLECTION, the ideas it
Reflection here is afforded a particular status as the self-perceiving and experiencing self. Etymologically, ‘reflection’ derives from the classical latin *reflectere* to turn back, to bend back, and it is in this particular sense of reflexively *turning back* on one’s own thought processes in order to evaluate them, this aspect of interiorisation that Locke devises of reflection - that *embeds* its modern signification. Here the ‘mirroring of nature’ and the ‘self reflexive subject’ conjoin in a reflective act that inscribes a ‘modern’ subjectivity. As Gasche writes

> In giving priority to the humans being’s determination as a thinking being, self reflection marks the human being’s rise to the rank of subject. It makes the human being a subjectivity that has its center I nitself, a self consciousness certain of itself. This is the first epoch-making achievement of the concept of reflection and it characterizes modern metaphysics as a metaphysics of subjectivity.

(Gasche 1986:14)

The *will to selfhood* implicit in this symbiosis of experience and reflection is the spine along which Locke construes a conceptual framework that runs through the spheres of his writing; philosophy, politics, religion, education, language and identity. It will prove the most enduring strain of twentieth and twenty first western philosophy even in the face of post structuralist critique, as the premise of what Foucault calls the ‘humanist analytic’; it is the doctrine that transforms enlightened *Readers* into subjects of the commonwealth of learning.

Just as Luther brought God’s unmediated word directly to the individual and Tyndale brought it directly into their mother tongue, Locke legitimised and extended to everyman, a stake in his own religious and political future, as a matter of self interest. These ‘vernaculars’ of personal agency changed irrevocably the ways in which *Readers* saw themselves in relation to the world.

The word of the bible or the Letter of the ‘gentleman and scholar’ was to be held
up to the *Reader* as a mirror for personal conduct. In this sense Locke, like Luther and Tyndale, fashions himself as an apostle of his age; an age of transformation, one assisted by new technologies of inscription, in the form of *the book, the translation, the experiment, the printing press and the letters from exile* —technologies that enable new typologies of self *agency*. Locke’s project of empiricism emerges in relation to ‘the man the means and the moment’ — an anecdotal framing of the power/knowledge nexus, the ‘established network’ of Rose and Miller, or the ‘apparatus’ of that historically specific time in which *re* emergent genealogies of knowledge from the old world and the early modern period are filtered conflated and become institutionalised as the ‘new empiricism’, as doctrine for the ‘enlightenment’ project of governmentality. It is in relation to this emergent seventeenth century episteme that ‘*self reflection marks the human being’s rise to the rank of subject.*’ (Gashe 1986:14).

**Conclusion to Chapter 6.**

In this way, Locke draws together a confluence of genealogies of knowledge from antiquity, from the late medieval era, and from those in circulation or within living memory of his own times. He pulls these strands of knowledge or traditions of thought together like drawstrings to fashion a Commonwealth of Learning. By recruiting the *Reader* into an already familiar project of interiorisation, and recruiting the men of letters from his conversation circle into his project, which is the diffusion the the new way of ideas, he seeks to flesh the Commonwealth of Learning out in a practical way. He provides a political rationality for the emergent order with narratives of *resistence*, the rule of law, sovereignty and rights, all premised on or around the individual. He reinforces empiricism as an object of enquiry that has shifted away by the end of the sixteenth century from the Aristotelian theories of nature, to one of physical science, with an emphasis on the laws governing nature. Knowledge of the physical world, writes historian of ideas Oakley (2005:41) could no longer be inferred from a set of first principles according to the old order, and therefore required an empirical methodology.
In these ways he practices the Commonwealth of Learning, not as a Utopia but as a model of governance that serves to facilitate a transition to a new set of conceptual furniture and a new order. His political rationality of early liberalism, and epistemology of empiricism, and idiom of reflective practice endures as we have seen and continues to shape Higher Education today in important ways. In this sense, we might say, Locke acts less as an Underlaborer to the Commonwealth of Learning, than as Underwriter.

I turn now to Chapter 7 with a view to discussing the three objects that have emerged from the genealogy of Reflective Practice, and the implications they raise for Higher Education today.
Notes for chapter 6.

1. *A Letter Concerning Toleration* referred to by historians often as the *Letter* (1689). *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* referred to by historians often as the *Essay* (1693) the *Two Treaties of Government* referred to by historians often as *Second Treatise* (1693) *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* (1693) and *The Reasonableness of Christianity* (1695) are those works which Locke, according to his own epitaph, felt best represented his thoughts.

2. Paper given by Lisa Jardine at *History of Scholarship and Reading* conference held at the Warburg Institute 1/2/2013. Permission sought and given to cite the author’s work.

3. Paper given by Dawson and Ellis as part of the *Emphasis* series of seminars at Senate House 15th June 2013 2013. Permission sought and given to cite the authors’ work.
CHAPTER 7

Three objects to have emerged from the genealogy of Reflective Practice.
Reflective Practice; why now why here and in whose interests?

In this thesis, I have undertaken a genealogy of Reflective Practice, in which I claim that Reflective Practice is a technology of government that serves a contemporary project of governmentality to inscribe normative subject effects. The purpose of the genealogy has been to historicise reflective practice as a technology of government with a view to diagnosing a ‘history of the present’, specifically in relation to the field of education in Higher Education today.

The genealogy takes three historical moments for analysis: 1689 symbolising the Glorious Revolution, 1989 symbolising the end of the Cold War, and 2001 symbolising the event of 9/11 - as discursive events that are interlinked through a ‘continuum of conflict’, which act as ‘screens’ through which to rationalise hegemonic political transformations. For the purposes of the genealogy, these three periodisations serve to examine the tradition in which the foundationalist discourse of ‘experience as the basis of knowledge’ and reflective practice as its twin tenet, has been transmitted into contemporary usage.

Three objects have emerged from the genealogy of Reflective Practice; the post empiricism paradigm in education, the security paradigm in education and the learning lexicon. This section addresses each of these three objects in turn, in relation to the orienting question Reflective Practice why now why here and in whose interests? The objective is to identify the way in which these three objects are constituent parts of (the Foucauldian) ‘apparatus’ of present day governance.
The empiricism paradigms and the dis/continuity of a Locken legacy

I have proposed that the empiricism paradigm that informs much theory and practice in Higher Education today and construes experience as the foundation of knowledge is a reductive paradigm that has been appropriated from a seventeenth century discourse of empiricism and serves to delimit knowledge to a utilitarian discourse as *for action*; that deploys reflective practice as an introspective ‘tool’, a technology of self designed to make recourse to the past in ways that are deemed to be ‘usable’ for present and future purposes, and ways that subscribe to an enlightenment conceptualisation of reflection as referential. In this sense, I have problematised its usage in Higher Education as unable to provide adequate representation of those processes, practices and experience of education today that are adequate for our times. I have proposed that it inscribes teleological imperatives of the enlightenment in terms of ethics of progress, freedom and self actualisation that seek to aculturate the subject into a project of governmentality. In this sense, I problematise the continuity of a positivist Lockean legacy that informs Higher Education in ways that are ideolgocal. However, it is also the case that the ‘post empiricism paradigm’ that we engage with in a ‘postist’ era is not the same as the ‘new empiricism paradigm’ of the classical episteme of the seventeenth century, and cannot be talked about as if it were a reflection of that paradigm in a way that is identical to that paradigm. The ‘post empiricism paradigm’ innovates on the ‘new empiricism paradigm’ of the early enlightenment however, as a tried and tested model of epistemology, and appropriates it in a ways that ‘work’ for the present set of conditions through a ‘post’ modern idiom.

The objective is to try to differentiate between the continuities and discontinuities of the Lockean legacy that informs Higher Education, as this diagnosis will produce a discrete object of the genealogy, in the form of a ‘post’ empiricist paradigm. In order to disentangle the paradigms which so often seem to be saying the same thing, I make recourse to a ‘post’ structuralist Derridean
conceptualisation of reflection and compare it to the enlightenment conceptualisation of reflection and see how they interact with one another.

For Derrida (1976,1978,1979), the notion of reflection is conceived in relation to a ‘logic of the re-mark’ that is a movement of endless deferment that functions on a principle of difference between imprints or marks in a chain of a text, which he calls *supplementarity*. As Gashe explains

*Instead of reflecting the chain of the text into itself, supplementarity re marks the chain in the same way as it is itself remarked, that is put back into the position of a mark within the textual chain’ and in this sense acts as ‘the differential character of the texture of marks.*

(Gashe 1986:291)

According to Gashe (1986), a mark is a trace that differentiates it from all other marks wherein each mark as a bearer of meaning ‘must contain an additional tropological movement by which the same mark refers to what demarcates the marks, to the blanks between the marks that relate the different marks to each other (ibid:219).

Conceptually, the chain of re marks is a representational one wherein the sequence effect prevents the possibility of a reflection being identical to itself. Because of the re mark, self representation and self reflection never quite take place. ‘A theme of concept can only designate the text en abyme (as deferred) that is, its representation is the representation of a representation’ (Gashe:291)

Gashe quotes Derrida as articulating this notion in these terms ‘If a text always gives itself a certain extension of its roots, those roots live only by that representation, by never touching the soil, so to speak’ (ibid).

In this view, reflection is perceived in relation to an open movement of postponed meaning, not meaning that can be reappropriated to itself. It inheres the philosophy of deconstruction (Derrida 1978) that sustains that words never simply mean what they have always meant, in a structure of difference between marks. Derrida’s conceptualisation of reflection differs to the mirror image notion of reflection as something which is identical to itself, as referential, an enlightenment notion that continues to influence common sense perceptions.
today. Derrida construes reflection in relation to a chain of meaning in endless derferment *en abyme* that precludes the subject from ever achieving identity with itself, and precludes any self-reflective equation to itself, in a chain of remarks that inscribes *differance*.

It is this concept of differentiability, that serves (me) to account for the relation between a post empiricism paradigm that is *not* identical to the new empiricism paradigm of the seventeenth century; the ‘post’ model is *not* a replica of the original, not a mirror image, so much as a *re mark* and (complicit) *re make*.

The ‘blanks’ between the two paradigms are also sites for new post modern inscriptions: gestures of imitation, bricolage, pastiche, blends, even parody, simalcrum perhaps, but not a reflection of the original.

And so to ask the question, which triggered the thesis, of how an intellectually archaic empirical paradigm continues to inform models of epistemology in Higher Education today, after it has been so well deconstructed and discredited by post structuralist theorists - is to some extent to miss the point – for it both does and doesn’t, that is- it is not inspite of its intellectual archaism, but because of it that the empiricist paradigm endures. The post empirical paradigm in effect creates a new edifice from the shell of the classical empirical paradigm, in a remark that is a discrete *texte*, a re-presentation of the enlightenment empirical paradigm of the seventeenth century - but without *touching its soil so to speak*.

The inscriptions that mark the blanks are precisely that host of postmodernist tropes that I discussed in chapters 4 and 5, that articulate a new set of conditions for intelligibility in the twenty first century; the *drop and drag, the emblematic, the light touch*. So whilst on the surface we have signs that are emblematic of the seventeenth century’s ‘new empiricism paradigm’, that inscribe values of objective reality and Truth, we simultaneously have a set of underlying meanings that seek to bracket those truth values with reflexive hedging signifiers such as ‘so called’ for example.

This play off between the two paradigms brings all the playful irreverence of the anarchic postmodern poetic to bear on meaning making that inheres a necessary ‘light touch’ as it advances its own project. This ‘light touch’ imperative of the post empiricism paradigm is juxtaposed at every moment however with the positivism of the new empiricism paradigm; the literal trope, the puritanical turn.
in language, the ‘Truth’ value – stolid traits that I have sought to illustrate, do endure.

In terms of subject positions, there appears to be a trade off between the subjectivising elements of these competing converging but never identical paradigms, in the form of the performative technology of self; less an earnest subject effect than a complitict one.

Ball (2012) writes about the way in which this discursive formation of performing the self is increasingly part of policy analysis in a way that addresses not only systems of performance management but the work that performance management systems do on the subjectivities of citizens today.

Indeed performativity is the quintessential form of neo liberal governanceality. It is both individualising and totalising. It produces both an active docility and depthless productivity Performativity invites and incites us us to make ourselves more effective to work on ourselves to improve ourselves and to feel guilty or inadequate of we do not. It operates within a framework of judgement within which what improvement and effectiveness is is determined for us and indicated of us by measures of quality and productivity. Performativity is not in any simple sense a technology of oppressions; it is also one of satisfaction and rewards, at least for some. It works best when we come to want for ourselves what is wanted from us when our moral sense of our desires and our desires are aligned with our pleasures.

(Ball 2012:31)

In effect, performativity is the element which best encapsulates the dis/continuity dynamic of Locke’s legacy for education today, by symbolising the re mark of the classical episteme of empiricism via a postmodern appropriation of that episteme in the form of a performance; although education continues to trade in classical epistemic tenets, that construe experience as the foundation of knowledge and reflection in terms of referentiality, it does so selectively and complicitly. The subject in this view performs itself, it does not purport to be identical to that self, but inhabits a plurality of selves. In this sense, the post
empiricism subject is not identical to the classical empiricism subject but is a remake of it that innovates on that foundation of the classical episteme by bringing its own set of historically specific conditions for intelligibility, to bear upon it. The performative ethic thus constitutes a new epistemological tenet for the post empiricist paradigm, perhaps most popularised by the notion of self fashioning. What is retained from the classical episteme and Lockean legacy is a ‘metaphysics of presence’; in relation to a genealogy of knowledge that emanates from Locke’s discourse on personhood in which I stands for the subject as present to itself as if it knew itself and were identical to itself. This genealogical strand has mutated into a post modern self actualising I; the ‘reflective practitioner’, ‘reflexive subject’ ‘entrepreneur of the self’ which has assumed or accumulated as it has travelled, a more Nietzschean will to self ethic that refashions the teleological ethics of the enlightenment episteme, of progress, freedom and self actualisation to fit them for purpose in the twenty-first century. This genealogy of western I knowledge recurs in relation to the historically specific set of conditions that make life intelligible to its subjects. The late twentieth century subject articulates a neoliberal I advanced by Schon (1983) and Kolb (1975) for the purposes of aligning academic discourse with industry. It is given ballast retroactively, by the pioneering I of the early modern settlers (so salient to the contemporary American psyche) who literally staked out their claim to property and selfhood in the seventeenth century colonies; the puritanical I of the commonplace book in the European Reformation; the confessional I of Rousseau; the self expressive I of the Romantic poets and nineteenth century novelists; the utilitarian I of Mills that evolved into the I of the American pragmatists and the twenty first century philosophers of the ‘practice turn’; the existential I of early twentieth century continental philosophy; the consumer I of Thatcher’s consumer capitalism; the personal is political I of feminist theory; the agency I of cultural studies; the self fashioning I of the new historicists; the panoptical I of self surveillance; the superego I of the unconscious; the self regulating I of the audit culture; the I qua ‘sovereign subject’ the I of the self exiled leper or refugee in a human centred project of governmentality that inscribes human security; it has a predominantly Anglo/American genealogy.
The naturalseemingness of the apriori I of the classical and post empiricism paradigms accumulates strength unto itself in this way. Locke was the first to colonise and harness this genealogy of knowledge to the enlightenment project, but Descartes, the ultimate metaphysicist and rival to Locke, institutionalised it through his hypothesis ‘cogito ergo sum’ (I think therefore I am) within a ‘metaphysics of presence’ that endures in a mutiplicity of re marks.

The question of ideology

The question that the section above raises is the extent to which the post empiricism paradigm may be considered an ideological one in a post ideology climate. Foucault’s work problematises the ‘notion of ideology’ (Foucault 1979:36) ‘as in virtual opposition to something like the truth’. Does it operate on a ‘double truth ’ strategy with one narrative strand of an enlightenment epistemology extended to those ‘at the periphery’ who enrol themselves onto government schema, and another narrative strand of governmentality extended to those ‘at the centre’ who seek to direct the conduct of conduct? To what extent does the technicist rationality of the post empiricist paradigm exert a ‘concretisation of thinking’ in the way that the Frankfurt school feared in relation to the mass production of art during the mid twentieth century, for which they were criticised by the poststructuralist and cultural theorists at the end of the twentieth century. Do notions of ‘false consciousness’, ‘façade’, or ‘deception’ have any currency in a posist era? And what critical language can we use to articulate the effects of the discursive character of governmentality, if not that of ideology?

The things that people used to do after work – for example, the so called reproduction of their labour power – are now integrated into production. Reproduction concerns both the so called reproductive labour which includes affective and social activities and the processes of digitl and semiotic reproduction. Post production in a very literal sense is production today.
In terms of a perceptual metaphor for knowledge this extension to a ‘post production’ perspective produces a temporal dynamic that is different to the recovery ethic of the humanist perspective and the discovery perspective of the enlightenment (seeing now is believing) wherein the locus for meaning making is after the event, not in the source or demonstration; this post festum (after the event) imaginary serves as a modern metaphor for reflective practice as a vehicle for the refashioning of experience, or the retroactive resignification of history, that turns a usable past into a viable future. The postfestum imaginary casts reflective practice as a form of intellectual labour power, that which turns straw experience into gold threads of knowledge, a spinning jenny of tacit knowledge into learning outcomes, a ‘labour power’, which in Steyerl’s terms is, ‘now integrated into production’ (my emphasis).

The classical economic metaphor of the labour process that Steyerl deploys in the extract above to articulate her art thesis of ‘post production’ is not I think incidental. It is itself a genealogy of knowledge that is historically contingent and alludes to a distinctive type of labour process that characterises a Fordist economic paradigm, which was transformed in the late twentieth century into a post fordist paradigm; a transformation that took place not least through a reconfiguration of the very labour process Steyril engages with as a metaphor. Sociologist Jessop (2002) notes how (the issue of) ‘wages’ formerly considered to be a source of national demand by the Fordist paradigm becomes resignified in the post fordist paradigm, by being ‘integrated as a cost of production’. This reversal ‘shifts the balance of power from organised labour to productive capital’ (Jessop 2002: 105). A new kind of state emerges as part of the transformation that Jessop calls the ‘Schumpeterian competition state’. It requires more flexible systems of production and labour (flexi labour, regular reskilling) than the Fordist paradigm to secure ‘economies of scope’ that are based on a diversity of products being made available (Jessop 2002: 98). Jessop refers to this ‘new economy’ as the ‘knowledge based economy’. Here, competition is based on improving the quality and performance of products via ‘knowledge intensive processes’; processes that bind the knowledge/power nexus ever more tightly together.
The economic *post* fordist transformational paradigm is in this sense a signifier, as defining of the late twentieth/early twenty-first *outillage mental* as the ‘experientia experimentum’ paradigm of the English experimentalists must have been for our seventeenth century counterparts. Steyerl’s hedged use of the term ‘so called’ in relation to the labour discourse, indicates an inclination to bracket the originary term (as belonging to a problematised Marxist paradigm) even whilst making recourse to it, in a gesture reminiscent of the overture Peter Wright makes in the cameo recounted above, in order to garner better rhetorical effect. Here are instances of rhetoric itself being partially reclaimed in speech acts that value its use for persuasion; formerly considered an art, rhetoric was taught in the medieval University and is re-claimed now as a *posit* signifier in speech acts that make a rhetorical overture to the poststructuralist Derridean principle of ‘both/and’ so as to inscribe openendedness in Steryl’s case, flexibility in Wright’s. What is signalled by the *post festum* imaginary of a postmodern, post fordist, post production poetic in which temporal and spatial flows (of time, knowledge production, monies) are deterritorialised, compressed fragmented, open-ended, is the end of the certaintist paradigm. The subject of this new imaginary according to Steyerl, is in ‘free fall’ - a condition she sees as at once ‘terrifying’ and ‘liberating’, a performative subject position therefore and subversive in its embrace of ‘shifting formations’ that defy the ‘groundedness’ of conservatism (ibid: 28). It signposts a new more in-secure ontology.

It also underscores the extent to which the discourse of Reflective Practice is ideological (as it were) *in nature* whatever way in which it is engaged with; as an act of reflection which may some how access a mirror image of a past or self that corresponds in some real way to an objective present reality or is identical in some enduring way to a present self, as though reflection makes experience transparent to us; that is naively engaged with. Or, as a vehicle for ‘performing’ the self, *post festum* of ‘experience’, in ways that bracket the originary experience with a view to fitting the present self for purpose, as a mode of self fashioning; that is complicitly, as against piously, engaged with.

Yet the *post festum* imaginary that in some way articulates a contemporary ontology inscribes a positionality of agency that *invites* the reflective practitioner
to retroactively shape the past, ‘post production’, to fit it for present purposes, in ways that produce compelling affects of self fashioning. This sense of agency however is necessarily short lived where it involves engaging in a projective identification with a past that is ‘made up’.

**The paradigm**

The second term of reference of this object I have called the ‘post empiricism paradigm’ is ‘paradigm’. The structure of this paradigm is not a Kuhnian paradigm that operates as a typology of stages. It does not function as part of a ‘fixed sequence of stages: puzzle solving anomalies, crisis, revolution, new paradigm etc,’ to construe the ‘scientific mind set as moving from one paradigm to the next’, whereby ‘science passes through a developmental sequence’, and ‘a paradigm shift is accomplished only after the ‘community of scientists’ have decided to pursue a new paradigm’ (Fuller 2000:18).

This perception of the paradigm within a ‘trail blazer’ discourse is described by Fuller as lending a profound appeal to the post Cold War architects of knowledge production. Here, conflict is resolved and so contained within the stages of knowledge production internally. Anomalies that resist the paradigmatic treatment are absorbed at the appropriate stage, pre new paradigm stage, at the crisis stage – or are explained in terms of the ‘incommensurability thesis’ in ways that *seek to contain and resolve crisis* as part of the normal process. This normalising ethic, in Fuller’s words, normalises not just science’s role in contemporary society in relation to Big Science, but serves as a dominant model of knowledge making for other spheres, not least the social sciences (ibid).

The Kuhnian model has been adopted by the University in ways that Fuller claims ‘level disciplinary hierarchies’, ‘overturn inappropriate methodological standards’, and ‘liberate the academy from positivist conceptions of science’ making science amenable to non scientists (ibid). It is in this sense that I intend the term ‘paradigm’, the (Foucauldian) sense of a structure, as a manifestation ‘symptom’ or ‘trace’ of a broader problematic that is historically contingent; that is, in a diagnostic rather than a Khunian progressivist sense.
For example, the staged trajectory of what Fuller describes above, that leads to ‘normal science’ co-incides in education today with the ‘developmental’ schema of cognitive psychology (Skinner; *behaviouralism*) and pedagogy (Vygotsky; *scaffolding*) technologies of learning that have assumed popular appeal since the Cold War, as formulaic schema ‘that reward conformity’ much like the Khunian model.

Schematic too, is the Reflective Practice discourse that seeks to ‘convert a usable past into a viable future’ or the ‘appropriation of history as writable’ only in relation to a *post festum* imperative ‘once the case is closed’ (Fuller 2000:12). These Khunian effects and conceptual models are thus reiterated and reproduced in ways that co-produce the standardisation and regulation of knowledge construction and production across domains. Fuller relates how the seeds of Kuhn’s model were sewn by Connant’s patronage of his work, in an ethos that fostered ‘an aristocratic orientation’ at the University of Harvard in the 1940s. Connant’s vision ‘assigned to elite American universities the unique role of consolidating and protecting the heritage of Western Civilisation, especially as it underwent the twin threats of Nazism and Communism’ (ibid: 382). During the Cold War, says Fuller, Connant believed American Style democracy was at stake and that science based policy proposals were necessary to the perpetuation of its order (ibid:9 ) wherein ‘Big Science’ co-incided with a military and industrial presence that ‘converted science into a scaled up enterprise’ (ibid).

The knowledge/power nexus implicated in this narrative of the Kuhnian paradigm that emerged from the elitist Harvard University in the twentieth century, has many parallels with the knowledge/power nexus implicated in the narrative of the experimentalist paradigm as recounted by Shapin and Shaffer (1985) above, which emerged from the elitist Royal Society in the seventeenth century. The juxtapositioning of these two emergent paradigms from different historical ‘moments’ highlights a meta historical perspective of the power dynamics that recur and are reproduced through history. Patterns are traceable in the ways genealogies of knowledge come randomly into existence, morph in various directions simultaneously, conflate with other genealogical strands, split from them or become subordinated, like genes, or subjugated like knowledgies,
to coincide or not with powerful agendas and form alliances that become institutionalised to form the dominant model.

Fuller notes an attention in the Kuhmian paradigm to the ‘salient aspects of scientific episodes necessary for the recognition of and resolving of paradigmatic tensions’ (Fuller, 2000:257) in a system which serves to ‘advance knowledge to the next stage of development’ in an ‘irreversible trajectory that propels the progress of humanity’ (ibid), a ‘natural trajectory’ that is, ‘internal to the Science’. Fuller’s account of a logic ‘internal to the Science’ invites a parallel with Shaopin and Shaffer’s account of the ‘self evident’ logic of the new empiricism paradigm which according to the English experimentalists rendered it unassailable. The ‘unassailable logics’ of the two historical paradigms inscribe a natural seemingness to the respective epistemological claims that is always historically contingent; an effect that is achieved however as both Shapin and Saffer and Fuller make clear, by a system of exclusions and closures.

Another pattern that emerges from this historical juxtapositioning of epistemes, is the way in which, as Fuller notes, ‘Big Science’ recurrently ‘coincides’ with a military and industrial presence that ‘converts science into a scaled up enterprise’; it is apparent in the post Cold War period (from circa 1989), and again in the post 9/11 period of the neoliberalisation of the University (from circa 2001), as well as in the intensified patronage of the Royal Society by the leaders of the Glorious Revolution (from circa 1689). What is apparent, is the ‘double truth’ of both post/new empiricism paradigms which appear as epistemological on the surface whilst simultaneously articulating the underlying assumptions of a political project of liberalism (Eagleton 1991:19).

Contours of a longer trajectory are thus traceable by the historian, archaeologist, philologist or genealogist, against which patterns emerge of power/knowledge nexus’ that recur, get reinforced, and played out albeit differently in different historical moments of liberal governance, which in order to be operable, say Rose and Miller (1992:200) must produce the subjective conditions under which contractual notions of mutual relations between citizen and society can work. Those who cannot carry out their contractual obligations, (like the leper, the refugee the unreflexivie subject) must be confined under ‘new legitimacy; in this
sense, the reflective practitioner is necessary to the liberal, political project of modernity.

The security paradigm; a continuum of conflict

In relation to this second object, I have proposed that the ‘security paradigm in education’ produces subjects in need of governance in relation to a discourse of ‘underdevelopment as dangerous’ (Duffield 2001:116) as a phenomenon deemed to pose a risk to world peace and stability. An assumption of the security paradigm in education is that such subjects in need call for an authority to defend the rights of the world’s citizens, which is the proclaimed objective of projects such as liberal peace, Democratic Liberal Peace and Liberal Democracy as I have highlighted during the course of this thesis. I propose that the development discourse that emerged in relation to the post Cold War liberal order (Stern and Druckman, 2000) to form ‘a third pillar to US foreign policy on a par with defence and diplomacy’ (Smith 2005:375) serves to legitimise the exceptional power of sovereign authority in a project of good governance, in ways that are sustained by the strategic complexes of international policies, and that this architecture is the lever which brings the ‘security paradigm’ into education in the UK.

The ways in which sovereignty and subjectivity in education are linked to a technology of government defined by Security makes a dark narrative. Agamben (1998) writes about the ‘camp’ as a locus in which the ‘normal life of the political community and juridical order’ has collapsed in relation to the crisis of the ‘nation state’. In its place Agamben claims, there has emerged a ‘state of exception’ where ‘sovereign power and bare life’ have to be renegotiated. He cites Quantanamo Bay as just such a ‘state of exception’; one that is sanctioned by the world, sanctioned because it is still not dismantled. Here the dark narrative of Security collides with a post modern poetic of ‘shifting formations’ that defy the ‘groundedness’ of ‘normal life of the political community and juridical order’. It is the dark side of ‘free fall’.

However, it is in relation to Security as a form of soft power that its influence is most felt in education, that is in relation to ‘worry box’ type of soft power, as
explored in Chapter 4 through Linda’s narrative, where the way in to securitisation in education was through teenage girls’ friendships; a pastoral power and a biopolitical power that personalises learning as a technology of government. The same kind of human centred approaches that shape Development policy and Human Rights as highlighted by Duffield (2001, 2009), shape International Relations as highlighted by Chandler (2013) and shape education policy. A constructed perception of need for individuals to learn, develop and adapt as stipulated by the 1984 Nation at Risk directive and before that the 1973 Clarion Report OECD directive, inscribes adaptive learning behaviour as ‘the ability to renew one’s concepts’ (OECD, 1973:45) through schema of Lifelong Learning, Excellence and Continuous Professional Development. Similarly, the discourses of empowerment, capacity-building and reflexivity that inform the policy domains of International Relations Human Rights and Development inform education. What is being problematised across these domains is populations as risk factors (Castel, 1991). The shift of policy emphasis from the state (Big Government) to society (the individual), that sought to govern through human centred initiatives (Chandler, 2013), accompanied the resignification and reduction of civic rights to Human Rights, that accompanied the shift of the public sector from a non market to a market sphere in the UK (Leys, 2001) and the neoliberalisation of the University in England under New Labour (Bellamy, 2010), between circa 2001-2011. These transformations clustered around a nodal discourse of human agency. The form it takes is an intensified privileging of the autonomous chooser or reflective practitioner in a way that aligns choice with freedom according to a liberal legacy of autonomy enshrined by the rule of law; and risk - according to the political rationality of Advanced Liberal Democracy. The security paradigm in education operates primarily at this level, of soft power, to problematise human agency by assuming humans are in need of securitisation. Educational policy is understood then to be responding to a societal need, which, according to a classical episteme constructs society as an intelligible object, one that can be captured, explained and managed through adequate representations, so as to achieve absolute order. On this human centred basis, the security paradigm seeks to extend security deeper into the sphere of the personal, to girls’ intimate friendships, or students’ learning diaries, or donor beneficiaries’ participation programmes, in an effort to
instil the securitisation of self in everyday life. The incorporation of conflict into mainstream education through initiatives such as conflict resolution has significantly changed the order of priorities, as Duffield claims it has done also in Development and Human Rights (Duffield, 2001:13), to reinforce exclusions and closures.

Positioned in relation to a continuum of conflict, the security paradigm in education (and other domains) is related more to issues of political transformation and globalisation than the eradication of Need or Poverty or Inequity amongst its populations, as inferred by the ‘Inclusion’ principle of policy directives such as Do No Harm, No Child Left Behind, Every Child Matters.

**The Learning Lexicon.**

The third object to have ‘emerged’ from the genealogy of reflective practice is the learning lexicon. I have discussed it variously throughout the thesis, in terms of a syntactically flexible framework that extends out from the stem of the verb ‘to learn’ to give the discourse of learning a simple grammar, in chapter 4; as a discursive formation that articulates the neoliberal agenda of governance, in the sense that Stuart Hall’s metaphor evokes, of an ‘articulated lorry’ that comes apart but stays together, in chapter 5, and as the framework of communication that makes the hegemonic project of Higher Education ‘amenable and practicable’ to its subjects. A discursive formation is not easy to define and so I have characterised it in different ways in terms of its ‘bullet point’ literacy and ‘outcomes’ logic that draw on techne of audit and calculus. Or in terms of its overlapping vocabularies; those recommended by the SEEC criteria for assessment of ‘doing’ words to help academics ‘choose the right terms’; those ‘ameliorative and harmonising’ vocabularies of international agreements found in the liberal peace literature, or those found in the Bologna Agreement and the policy documents underpinning the four narratives of the Teaching Assistants; a vocabulary that articulates the economistic discourse of lifelong learning. I have characterised the learning lexicon as inscribing an ethic of managerialism and a liberal democratic ethos of balance; as framing Third Way ‘RIO’ values through
chains of equivalence such as ‘rights and responsibilities’ with its coercive corollary of enforcement that is hidden between the folds of democracy. I have highlighted a re-generation of historical tropes for action as inherited characteristics of the learning lexicon, that include the Millenarian trope of staged progress and reconciliation and a puritanical strain of stolid literality. In this way I have attempted to delineate some of the characteristics of its discursive character.

What the learning lexicon is not, is a discourse, though it has many aspects of a discourse, not least a capacity to produce the objects it names and it is a discursive practice - but it subsumes or folds into its lexicon all and any discourse, in a way that seems unproblematic, as though the more (conflicting) discourses there are in circulation, the less effective any one of them becomes in challenging a meta framework that seeks harmonisation; Concordia quo unit munit.

Similarly, it is not a knowhow of the kind discussed in chapter 5, though it articulates the knowhow genre. And it is not a fashion, such as ‘upspeak’ – the Californian upwards inflection that appears to leave an ‘open dialogue’ effect at the end of sentences, a dialect or style that originated in California’s high school population, and that now pervades social media wherein even those who have English as a second other language use it, and where professionals ‘contract in’ albeit for the most part unconsciously, to this new form of cool; if the learning lexicon could talk it would be in upspeak.

And it is not a language, though it has many characteristics of being a ‘primitive’ language of the kind Wittgenstein describes in the opening paragraph of ‘Philosophical Investigations’ (1953) and goes on to elaborate in a story about ‘builders’ who call out for a Block, Slab, Pillar as a result of which they are passed those objects, in a way that links language to reality that is obvious and present. It is very like a ‘primitive language’ in this sense, that does not explain but brings into being that which it names as objects; A Poverty Reduction Plan, an Inclusivity policy In such a system of nominalisation the complex processes ‘behind’ the words are not explained, but named. As if there must be ‘an end to explanation at some point’ as Wittgenstein says in this section of ‘Philosophical Investigations’, and as if the cut off point - decided by the architects of
international policies - is manifest in the titles of their policies, which act like calls *for action* or stand for simple obvious truths. Truths - such as those found in the Scriptures when read ‘reasonably’ according to Locke (1695) wherein to misinterpret them is an act of heresy, or as Judy says, to make ‘the wrong choice’. The naming trope brings the object being referred to into *visibility* in such a certaintist if ‘primitive’ system of communication. But the learning lexicon is not quite a language, precisely because ‘the rest of language is abrogated’ *3* in this practice of nominalisation, and people have no way of bringing their thought to bear on it.

The learning lexicon is more of a code (for conduct) a schema into which actors enrol themselves with a view to achieving what is promised by any code; entry. In this sense actors must strive to unlock the code themselves as the learning lexicon is only a framework that provides the ‘opportunity of possibilities’ that Giddens (1991:65) talks about as the ‘new way of politics’. The code works at a linguistic level wherein the mixing and matching of lexicons; war with education (Nation at Risk 1984) serves to confuse and conflate habits of usage where one may expect to find such words or images and breaks down disintction between the spheres so as to create the effect of harmonisation across domains. Harmonisation is the key that unlocks the code and enables entry.

The apparent superficiality of its *simple method plain language for action* style is in this sense deceptive, in the same way that the simplistic nature of the Honey and Mumford Learning Style questionnaire is deceptive; as a technology it deploys simple naming words as part of an articulated system of psychometric testing for profiling purposes. As a *techne*, profiling is not only for the purposes of the work place in terms of recruitment, retention and promotion exercises, but also for surveillance purposes by government, as the Snowdon revelations of GCHQ repositories have highlighted, and for commercial purposes in hundreds of companies that install invisible tracking technology on websites in order to build individual dossiers up which can then be sold on through on line auction information markets.

In this sense, the *simple method- plain language- for action* imperative that the learning lexicon re-inscribes, is not a form of knowhow, or discourse, or fashion, or language so much as a code, for conduct, a framework of policy and
an art of governmentality, that stands for the necessity in this post-modern world of easy forms of encryption.

I have described how the learning lexicon articulates Reflective Practice in multiple ways and operates at a molecular level to enrol reflexive subjects into the securitisation of self in everyday life. It is a product of my genealogy, an object and a fiction; a discursive formation for ‘good governance’ and a cohesive framework whose ‘glue’ as Latour would say, is in the usage.

It is also the slot that Foucault identifies as recurring differently in different eras, compare:

Mr Locke,

‘desired that Mr Limborch and I with some other friends would set up conferences that to this end we should meet together once a week sometimes at one house sometimes at another by turns…. I have by me still the rules, which he would have us observe, written in Latin in his own hand’…

rules that ‘required everyone should sit in a circle in the order of their arrival and speak in order of their seating removing any notion of social precedence among the speakers’, and a commitment to ethics of ‘tolerance civility humanity’ whereby any member who thought that ‘any appearance of growing warmth is fit to be stopd’ they could end the debate or stay silent in line with rules for the ‘amicable improvement of mixed conversation’

(Le Clerc Life of Locke reproduced in Marshall 2006 514-515)

with:

‘The policy makers desire that;

Participants will interact civilly listen actively to each other with attention and respect, not interrupt and allow each other to present their views fully. Speakers will observe time limits to allow genuine balanced dialogue.’

(Rules of ‘Interactive conflict resolution; principles and process: (Stern and Druckman, 2000: 259)
Whether for ‘polite society’ in the midst of the conflict of the Reformation or for professional society in a context of a continuum of conflict, this Ciceronian principle of *amicitia* serves as a civilising ‘technology of government’ designed by those at the centre to influence the conduct of conduct in their respective Republic of Letters; *concordia quo unit munit*.

The effects of the learning lexicon are ideological in so far that there is a difference between its professed teleological values and its praxis. For example, it deploys the ideals of humanism at a teleological level, into which actors enrol themselves at a personal level but it practices a progressive entrepreneurialism that parades as old fashioned social justice, human rights and inclusion. The influence of the learning lexicon is partially exercised through the ‘triumph of English’ as the international language. Whereas the Bologna Agreement for example was intended to develop a multicultural environment, English has become the hegemonic language of that and other international structures designed to *harmonise* the various architectures of global governance. This particular form of colonisation extends to English as the language of instruction in Higher Educations institutions that are not actually situated in anglospeaking countries, such as the Maastrict University.

This English monopoly is a lexical form of soft power through which certain forms of compliance and consent are being ‘manufactured’ as Chomsky would say (after Bernice’s ‘Engineering Consent’ 1928), in which ‘learning’ stands for perfomativity (Ball 2012) and bears the imprint of anglo-american imperialism framed by the Post Washington Consensus.

This particular alchemy of the learning lexicon is not confined to its linguistic devices however, as the learning lexicon inscribes values through inscriptions other than words. As the thesis has discussed, the same kind of reversal mechanism is achieved by the deployment of algorithms to redistribute wealth away from those at the periphery to those at the centre, and tension away from those at the centre to those at the periphery; it is used by the league tables of the OECD and the Bologna Agreement to perpetuate *in equality* between nations and is used by those who engage in psychometric profiling. These instruments of ‘ameliorative harmonising and transformative power’ are part of a discourse that emerged post Thatcher in relation to a Schumpetarian principle of ‘not
destructive capitalism’ but ‘creative disruption’. The discourse is marked by positive sounding terms of ‘innovation’, ‘empowerment’ and ‘freedom’ but often the would be ‘creative commons’ produce what economist Harvey (2003:137) calls ‘accumulation by dispossession’ - a version of Marx’s ‘primitive accumulation’ (1867/1990) that is destructive, and that excludes by shrinking ‘the commons’ of the dispossessed. This is the doctrine of disinterested managerialism and finance capital, where what is toxic, be it conflict or debt, is simply moved on ‘to create a new context’ (Stern and Druckman 2000), turned round, or managed;

In this precise sense, as Duffield says

\[
\text{difference is not necessarily seen as a problem \ldots so much as a site of vibrancy, invigoration and new opportunities for an envisioned social harmony – providing education plays its role} \\
\text{\ldots it is accommodated and absorbed \ldots as just one more thing} \\
\text{(Duffield 2001:115)}
\]

The section above responds in ways that are both explicit and implicit to the orienting question of Reflective Practice; why now (2001–2011) why here (in education) and in whose interests (good governance).
Conclusion to Chapter 7.

In this chapter, I have outlined the ways in which the post-structutalist, post-modernist and post-liberal theorisations of the 20th and 21st centuries have, in effect, deconstructed the epistemological premise of an early modern conceptual framework of empiricism. These deconstructions are themselves a product of the ‘linguistic turn’ (Rorty 1992), a 20th century conceptual framework that radically challenges the notions of reality and epistemology which the early enlightenment model inscribes. The theorisations I have outlined above in this chapter, cast Locke’s theory of empiricism within a logical positivism frame, that subscribes to a scientific conception of philosophy. Today, the ‘linguistic turn’ conceptualisation of reality understands it as being represented through modes of discourse, rather than through a search for essences, and understands meaning to be made in the way in which we use language. Given the rejection of the enlightenment episteme by contemporary philosophers, it begs the question of why Reflective Practice as a tenet of empiricism should continue still now, to sustain such currency in the UK Higher Education sector.

The reason must relates back to the issues raised by Gray and Whitty (2008) about the extent to which policy determines the identity formation of teachers, and by extension it would seem, the extent to which policy determines or even performs as pedagogy. It ‘performs’ as a means to convert a ‘usable past into a viable future’ and produce an ‘intellectual labour power’ which turns experience into tacit knowledge and learning outcomes and inscribe an agentic subjectivity in the learner-worker-researcher, and citizen.

As such, it is possible for policy-makers to circumvent the ‘deconstruction of the episteme’ as argued by those philosophers, linguists and academics, explored above in this chapter, because reflective practice is policy, camouflaged as pedagogy or epistemology. In terms of the interests being served, Reflective Practice then serves a technology of government to audit learning and inscribe a mode of self conduct that enables the student to acculturate into Higher Education. In this sense, it is the policy not the epistemology that makes University amenable, intelligible and practicable to the student.
The point being begged however, by this thesis, is that when Reflective Practice is engaged with as epistemology ‘in good faith’, that is, as advocated to students by tutors, for research based learning, such as was the case of the four Teaching Assistants, it very quickly runs into the kind of contradiction and struggle we have observed in this thesis.

As we have seen, their experience as ‘the bedrock of evidence on which explanation is built’ (Scott 1991:777) is the foundation of a conceptual framework that cannot produce representations of these processes except in relation to experience. And, the very limitations of the experiential paradigm makes it impossible for them to ask questions about the representations and processes they must necessarily engage, ‘without which there would be nothing to experience’. (Scott 1991:777)

The policy-oriented pedagogy of the learning lexicon framework, based apparently on an early modern episteme of Lockean empiricism, therefore cannot provide an adequate representation for the actual processes of education students need to engage with today, and instead it provides an ideological one.
Conclusion to thesis:

The thesis has critiqued the contemporary dominance of Reflective Practice in Higher Education. To this end, it has conducted a genealogy of Reflective Practice which I have presented as a technology of government. The thesis has sought to diagnose the ways in which this technology of government has recurred differently in three historical, hegemonic projects of governmentality, in ways that are reinforcing. It has concluded that these three historical periods, of 1689, 1989 and 2001, are characterised by; an evolving, mutating project of early enlightenment classical liberalism; a market form of twentieth century consumer capitalism; and its mature form of Advanced Liberal Democracy. In this sense, the genealogy has presented a history of the present.

The thesis makes a link between the teleological imperatives of enlightenment epistemology and ontology shaped by Christian eschatology towards reconciliation, and twentieth century imperatives towards conflict resolution, and present day imperatives towards harmonisation. It notes the imperative for these teleological dynamics to produce order in the disorder of things via the reflexive subject as the necessary condition of liberal governance.

The thesis notes how these three historical ‘dispositifs’ interact to reinforce the notion of experience as the foundation of knowledge in models of governmentality that have the ‘reflective practitioner’ as their touchstone.

The thesis has considered the dis/continuities of the Lockean legacy distilled in self reflection as the mark of the human being’s ‘rise to the rank of subject’ (Gasche, 1986:14) through a ‘metaphysics of subjectivity’ (ibid). It has traced the discourse of experience as the foundation of knowledge and reflection as a tenet of cognition to the English experimentalist Republic of Letters, and has proposed that this legacy is innovated upon today by a ‘post empiricism paradigm’ in Higher Education. The case study of four narratives brings home the compelling character of the empirical as a conceptualisation of knowledge, in relation to its ‘common sense’ ‘evidentiary effect’ (Scott 1991) that is immediate and feels familiar. The study of the ‘apparatus’ of Reflective Practice outlined in Chapter 4 and the ‘conditions of its emergence’ in chapter 5 and the influence of its legacy
in chapter 6, serve to bring home the pervasiveness and durability of this problematic conceptualisation of knowledge sustained by Higher Education.

The genealogy has produced three objects, discussed in Chapter 7, in the form of a post empiricist paradigm, a security paradigm of education, and the identification of a learning lexicon.

The post empiricist paradigm offers a contemporary representation of experience, not as the foundation of knowledge but as a knowledge/power effect in the Foucauldian tradition. This offers a representation of reflection not as referential but as iterative, of ideology not as an epistemological but affective phenomenon and of self not as identical to itself but as multiple.

The security paradigm offers a representation of a governmental problematic that is mobilised in relation to a notion of human agency as capacity, not in relation to the humanist enlightenment any longer, but human security.

The thesis has identified a learning lexicon operating as a framework of policy ‘performing’ as pedagogy, to make amenable and practicable to its subjects, the practice of studying and working in the UK.

The genealogy makes clear that we already have the mental tools and conceptual structures available through which to articulate a set of conceptual furniture that is adequate to our times; in the form of a post modern poetic of partiality, fluidity, plurality; a post structuralist theorisation in place of the ‘humanist analytic’ of the enlightenment project, and a ‘governmentality analytic’ as an approach to finding representations of actual processes and practices in education that are adequate to our times.

It also makes clear, we have the methodologies of critique with which to deconstruct the taken-for-granted assumptions embedded in education that inscribe experience as the foundation of knowledge in ways that align subjectivity with governmentality; techniques such as Cultural Political Economy (Fairclough, 2005) as the political application of critical discourse analysis.

We have new conceptual tools for the analysis of the power/knowledge dynamics, such as Latour’s theory of enrolment and governance at a distance (1986), Derrida’s centre-periphery analysis and his philosophical
conceptualisation of the *re-mark* (1981), Hahn’s analysis of world systems and insistence on the relevance of history to any analytic of power (2008). The thesis has argued that these conceptual tools highlight the limits of human-centred approaches for the transformative possibilities that are available to us in the present day, or for making our lives intelligible to us.

In relation to the third object, the thesis argues that the learning lexicon is a ‘borrowing’ of an epistemology from an early modern *outilillage mental*, an essentialising doctrine and inherited cognitive formation that blurs the understanding and obscures the character of the power relations within which our Teachers must work. For when experience is the origin of knowledge, says Scott (1991), then the individual is the evidence upon which explanation is built. She is responsible. In this sense, this re-emergent paradigm of the empiricist episteme inscribes the individual as the touchstone for a 21st century, policy driven, technology of government in education, one that seeks to determine the identity formation of teachers. They, within the limitations of the experiential paradigm are unable to ask (as we have seen) the necessary questions about the discursive practices of governmentality that shape their subjectivity.

The re emergence of this ‘outilillage mental’ of empiricism is not due to a desire to return to a former Golden era (Kress, 1999); nor to a lack of alternative conceptual furniture that could adequately represent today’s complex condition, but rather because the purpose of the learning lexicon is precisely to circumvent such complexity, and serve as a framework for “collective mobilisation” as Duffield (2001) says, that “has to be brief, general in application and easy to understand and communicate” as policy-driven pedagogy. As such, it cannot provide adequate representations for the actual processes of education, but provides an ideological one.


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**Lectures Seminars Conferences:**

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- *Roots and Causes of Conflicts: Greed and Grievance* - Neils Hans
- *Solutions to Conflict: Democratic Peace Human Rights and Free Trade*
  Neils Hans
- *Homo Economicus goes to War* Christopher Cramer
- *Political Economy of Development* Thomas Marios

Brunel University conference on Machiavelli (July 201) entitled: *The Prince: Five centuries of History Conflict*

*From a Nation at Risk to No Child Left Behind; National Education Goals.*