Kwon, Heejin;
(2021)
Critique of rationalism in the epistemology of modality.
Doctoral thesis (Ph.D), UCL (University College London).
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Abstract
In this thesis, I critically discuss rationalism in epistemology of modality. Rationalism claims that our a priori intuition or conceivability gives us knowledge about metaphysical possibility. I examine this claim by considering Bealer’s moderate rationalism and Chalmers’s modal rationalism. In particular, I argue that Bealer’s moderate rationalism is not successful in responding to Kripke’s and Putnam’s counterexamples which sever the link between a priori intuition and modal knowledge. Also, it is argued that given Chalmers’s modal rationalism, our a priori conceivability entails more than metaphysical possibility from the perspective of our world. After providing some preliminary points in Introduction, I assess Bealer’s moderate rationalism in Chapter 2. Specifically, I argue that our a priori intuition about epistemic possibility concerning property-identities does not give us knowledge about metaphysical possibility. In arguing this point, Russellian and Fregean theories of phenomenal content are discussed. Also, a priori unknowability of necessary properties of a substance is examined. In Chapter 3, I discuss an issue untouched by Bealer’s moderate rationalism: a priori knowability of metaphysical possibility concerning property-possession of a substance. I argue that given Bealer’s moderate rationalism, our a priori intuition does not give us knowledge about metaphysical possibility concerning that. In arguing this point, categoricalism and dispositionalism about the nature of properties are discussed. I examine Chalmers’s modal rationalism in Chapter 4 and argue that our a priori conceivability can entail metaphysical possibility from perspectives of other worlds. Then, I derive a claim that we must be cautious not to commit a modal error of regarding what is not metaphysically possible from the perspective of our world as possible when we depend on a priori conceivability to know metaphysical possibility.
| Type: | Thesis (Doctoral) |
|---|---|
| Qualification: | Ph.D |
| Title: | Critique of rationalism in the epistemology of modality |
| Event: | UCL (University College London) |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | Copyright © The Author 2021. Original content in this thesis is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) Licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/). Any third-party copyright material present remains the property of its respective owner(s) and is licensed under its existing terms. Access may initially be restricted at the author’s request. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10135441 |
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