

# Anywheres, Somewheres, Local Attachment, and Civic Participation\*

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## Abstract

We use data from Understanding Society to evaluate several claims advanced by David Goodhart in *The Road to Somewhere*. We show that geographically mobile individuals are indeed more likely to support Remain in the EU referendum, as Goodhart suggests. But Remainers are no different to Leavers in how attached they are to their local community. And people reporting higher level of civic participation or those who are more trusting are actually less supportive of Brexit. Our findings suggest that the dichotomy between cosmopolitan Anywheres and communitarian Somewheres is a misleading one. Cosmopolitan Anywheres are just as communitarian as Somewheres, if not more so.

## 1 Brexit and cultural value divides

Brexit is said to have revealed some deep value divides in British society. One purported fault line, memorably and provocatively set out by David Goodhart, lie ‘between the people who see the world from Anywhere and the people who see it from Somewhere’ (Goodhart, 2017, p. 3). In this paper,

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we use data from a large-scale and nationally representative survey to assess Goodhart's Anywheres–Somewheres thesis.

## 1.1 Anywheres and Somewheres

As their names suggest, Anywheres are not strongly tied to a particular place, while Somewheres are more rooted in their community. In Goodhart's view, people end up in one or the other of these 'political tribes' partly because of their background and experience. Thus, Anywheres 'generally belong to the mobile minority who went to a residential university and then into a professional job, usually without returning to the place they were brought up' (p. 23). By contrast, many Somewheres have 'left school before doing A-levels ... They tend to be older and come from the more rooted middle and lower sections of society, from small towns and suburbia' (p. 24).

Members of the two tribes also differ in their worldview. Anywheres are 'individualists and internationalists ... they value autonomy and self-realisation before stability, community and tradition' (p. 24). They are 'progressive individualists' (p. 5) who embrace a 'double liberalism' (p. 1). That is to say, Anywheres are social liberals who support human rights and equality for women and minorities. But they are also economic liberals who are market-friendly and they support globalisation.

As liberals, Anywheres see 'people [as] rational self-interested individuals existing apart from strong group attachments or loyalties' (p. 13), and '[t]hose who feel they most belong to their neighbourhood ... are also most likely to have higher levels of attachment to their national identity and their ethnicity. And that is unlikely to be Anywhere graduates' (p. 38).

In contrast, Somewheres are 'social conservatives and communitarians' (p. 5). 'They want some of the same things that Anywheres want, but they want them more slowly and in moderation' (p. 6). They are 'more rooted' ... and have strong group attachments, local and national ...' (p. 24). And while the liberalism of Anywheres is oblivious to the 'harm caused by a slowly disconnecting society' (p. 12), Somewheres 'still believe that there is such a thing as Society' (p. 8).

## 1.2 Influence of the Anywheres–Somewheres thesis

Goodhart's book is quite influential and the imagery of Anywheres vs Somewheres has caught on. For example, in a discussion of how the Labour Party lost the working class, two prominent economists Paul Collier and John Kay argue that Labour MPs 'have become anywheres. And they are slow to understand the sense of place, neighbourhood and community which still matter

to somewheres—who comprise most of the electorate in [the Red Wall seats that Labour lost in 2019]’ (Collier and Kay, 2020, p. 85). And the remedy? Collier and Kay suggest that Labour’s Anywhere MPs ‘should get out more, on buses rather than aeroplanes.’ In other words, focus more on the local community and less on elites ‘in capital cities around the world’ (p. 85).

Labour MP Stephen Kinnock offers a very similar diagnosis of his party’s electoral woes. Kinnock speaks of Cosmopolitans and Communitarians, rather than Anywheres and Somewheres. But the substance of his argument is essentially the same as Goodhart’s. For example, Kinnock’s Cosmopolitans are younger graduates who live in the major cities. They have done well ‘in the fast-changing world and are therefore champions of globalisation and liberalism’ (Kinnock and Jervis, 2018, p. 19). They are transient, social liberals, whose identity is not tied to ‘one particular place or community or activity group’ (Kinnock and Jervis, 2018, p. 19). Communitarians, by contrast, are ‘older, non-graduates, living in smaller towns, who have experienced fast-paced change with a sense of loss’ (Kinnock, 2019). They ‘value familiarity and stability . . . [and] are often more “rooted” and connected to their local surroundings’ (Kinnock and Jervis, 2018, p. 20).

The Blue Labour trade unionist Paul Embery speaks of a ‘rupture between the Labour Party and the working class’ (Embery, 2021a, p. 3). In Embery’s view, the working class ‘is patriotic, often socially conservative, communitarian, rooted, and which places a high value on family, place, social solidarity and cultural stability’ (p. 14). But since the Labour Party has ‘swallowed a poisonous brew of social and economic liberalism’ (p. 3), it ‘saw no space for this “faith, family and flag” nonsense in their shiny, new socially liberal party. They elevated the cosmopolitan over the communitarian, the global over the local, the progressive over the conservative, modernity over tradition’ (p. 22).

Similarly, Labour MP for Dagenham and Rainham, Jon Cruddas, is sceptical of the ‘form of cosmopolitanism [that] asserts a privileged global citizenship over other attachments, such as patterns of work, community or nation’ (Cruddas, 2021, p. 163). But perhaps a little more tentatively than Embery, he raises his concern as a set of questions. ‘Are we attached . . . to a specific rather than global community? . . . are we citizens of somewhere rather than anywhere? Do our concerns tend towards the parochial rather than the cosmopolitan?’ (p. 8).

Collier, Cruddas, Embery, Goodhart, Kay, and Kinnock are not all from the same place on the political spectrum. Indeed, because of their differing views on many issues, the quotes above demonstrate just how potent the Anywheres–Somewheres distinction is in framing political discussion in

Britain.<sup>1</sup>

### 1.3 Left–right, libertarian–authoritarian

Scholars have discussed value differences in Britain in terms that are quite different to Goodhart’s. Many have referred to a libertarian–authoritarian scale, in addition to the conventional left–right divide.<sup>2</sup> For example, Cur-tice (2017) argues that ‘[t]he debate about Brexit does not follow the usual contours of British politics . . . whether someone was “left-wing” or “right-wing” made virtually no difference to how they voted in the EU referendum. Rather, that ballot was marked by a division between social liberals and so-cial conservatives.’ Similarly, Surrige (2019, pp. 6–7) observes that ‘in most general elections between 1992 and 2017 it was the left–right dimension which was most useful for explaining the key voting choice between Labour and the Conservatives. But the EU referendum vote is barely connected to these val-ues at all . . . [Instead,] there are large differences between Labour Leave and Remain voters on the liberal–authoritarian scale and between Conservative Leave and Remain voters on this scale.’

Along a similar vein, Chan *et al.* (2020) use Understanding Society data to assess two Brexit narratives. Under the first narrative, Brexit is a revolt of the economically left-behinds. The second narrative sees Brexit as being driven by an English nationalism, the appeal of which goes far beyond the left-behinds. They find empirical support for both narratives, though the evidence for the left-behind narrative is not always consistent. For example, neighbourhood deprivation does not predict Leave support at all. Nor does social class, once social status is taken into account.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, relative poverty or living in an area that is more exposed to the Chinese import shock does not consistently predict support for Brexit and, where they are significant predictors, the magnitude of the associations is relatively small.

By contrast, there is strong and consistent support for the second nar-

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<sup>1</sup>See also the exchange between Bloomfield (2020a,b) and Goodwin and Kaufmann (2020). The cosmopolitan–communitarian distinction often features in think tanks’ dis-cussion papers (e.g. Cliffe, 2015; Edgar, 2017), newspapers articles (e.g. Bagehot columnist, 2016; Coman, 2021), and the blogosphere too (e.g. Embery, 2021b; Roussinos, 2020).

<sup>2</sup>The libertarian–authoritarian dimension has also been labelled as open–closed, liberal–authoritarian, cosmopolitan–parochial, and so on, see Kitschelt (1994); Evans *et al.* (1996); Ford and Jennings (2020).

<sup>3</sup>Following Weber, Chan and Goldthorpe (2007) treat social class as inequality arising from the labour market and the workplace; and social status as a perceived and often accepted hierarchy of social superiority, equality, and inferiority. They show that while it is social class, not social status, that predicts left–right political attitudes, the opposite is true for libertarian–authoritarian attitudes.

rative. Thus, individuals for whom being British is important are more pro-Leave. But those who see themselves as British rather than English, or those who report omnivorous cultural consumption (which is a behavioural expression of a cosmopolitan outlook) are more supportive of Remain.

Like Goodhart, Curtice (2017), Surridge (2019), and Chan *et al.* (2020) recognise that there is an important value dimension to Brexit. But, unlike Goodhart, they do not claim that Leavers are more rooted or have stronger community attachment than Remainers.

#### 1.4 Testing the Anywheres–Somewheres thesis

Goodhart estimates that ‘Anywheres mak[e] up 20 to 25 per cent of the population, compared to around half for Somewheres (and the rest Inbetweeners)’ (p. 4). But since Goodhart has not specified how he arrives at these figures, it is not clear how researchers are to operationalise the Anywheres–Inbetweeners–Somewheres typology in order to test his claims empirically. Having said that, Goodhart also argues that ‘almost all Anywheres voted Remain ... [and] the values, attitudes, preferences and intuitions of most Leave voters match up with a large part of the Somewhere worldview’ (p. 26). Given this, it seems reasonable to use support for Leave or Remain as a handle to test the Anywheres–Somewheres thesis.

This is the research strategy used by Lee *et al.* (2018). They analyse the early access version of wave 8 of Understanding Society data and report that, net of other covariates, ‘immobile people—proxied by those living in their county of birth—are around 7% more likely to be in favour of Brexit’ (Lee *et al.*, 2018, p. 159).<sup>4</sup>

In a paper that is about religion and Brexit, McAndrew (2020) considers neighbourhood attachment and civic participation as mediating variables between religious affiliation and practice on the one hand and Leave support on the other. McAndrew does not refer to Goodhart at all in her paper. But she reports, in passing, that neighbourhood attachment is *not* correlated with Brexit support, while membership of civic associations is linked to support for Remain (see McAndrew, 2020, p. 878 and Figure 7).

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<sup>4</sup>Related to this, Shuttleworth *et al.* (2021) use data collected between waves 3 and 8 of Understanding Society to examine the association between recent residential moves and Brexit support. They show that, among respondents aged 16 to 25, those who have moved 50 km or farther are less likely to support Leave. But this association is not statistically significant for older respondents.

## 2 Data

### 2.1 Dependent variable

We use data from Understanding Society which is a large-scale and nationally representative household panel survey.<sup>5</sup> Wave 8 (2016–17) of this survey includes the question that appears on the EU Referendum ballot paper: ‘Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?’, and respondents were given the same binary choice: ‘Remain a member of the European Union’ or ‘Leave the European Union’. The response to this question is our dependent variable.

### 2.2 Independent variables

Five predictor variables are of particular interest to us. The first of these concerns geographical mobility, specifically whether the respondents currently live in their county-of-birth (‘stayers’) or not (‘movers’). To construct this variable, we use Geographic Information System to determine whether the respondents’ current neighbourhood (LSOA) falls within the boundary of the county in which they were born.<sup>6</sup> There are multiple definitions of British counties (administrative, ceremonial, historical). County boundaries also change over time. Where there is ambiguity, we choose the largest area covered by each county. Digital boundaries for counties come from the Ordnance Survey and the UK Data Service. Data on digital boundaries for LSOA are taken from CasWeb, an online tool for aggregated Census statistics.

Our measure of geographical mobility is probably very similar to that of Lee *et al.* (2018) who also use Understanding Society data. But there are two operational differences. First, we use the full version rather than the early access version of wave 8 data. So our sample size is about twice as large as theirs. Secondly, to determine whether the respondents’ current residence falls within their county of birth, Lee *et al.* (2018) use local authority district geographies, while we use LSOA. As LSOAs are much smaller geographic units than local authority districts, our procedure should involve less measurement error.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>The Understanding Society data (University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research, 2019) that support the findings of this study are openly available in UK Data Service at <https://www.ukdataservice.ac.uk>. Stata and R Codes used in the analyses are available from the corresponding author.

<sup>6</sup>LSOA stands for Lower Layer Super Output Area. It is the second smallest geographical unit of the UK Census. On average, each LSOA has about 1,500 residents.

<sup>7</sup>There are 404 local authority districts and 42,619 LSOAs in the UK.

The second predictor is a shortened version of the Buckner's neighbourhood cohesion index (Buckner, 1988). In waves 1, 3, and 6 of the survey, there is a battery of eight items that measures how the respondents relate to their neighbours and neighbourhood. The wording of the items are as follows.

1. I feel like I belong to this neighbourhood.
2. The friendships and associations I have with other people in my neighbourhood mean a lot to me.
3. If I needed advice about something I could go to someone in my neighbourhood.
4. I borrow things and exchange favours with my neighbours.
5. I would be willing to work together with others on something to improve my neighbourhood.
6. I plan to remain a resident of this neighbourhood for a number of years.
7. I think of myself as similar to the people that live in this neighbourhood.
8. I regularly stop and talk with people in my neighbourhood.

The response to each of these items is a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 'strongly agree' to 5 'strongly disagree'. We use a summative score that is the mean of the reversed-coded score of the eight items. Thus, higher values on this index denote greater neighbourhood cohesion.<sup>8</sup>

The third predictor is about civic participation. In waves 3 and 6 of the survey, respondents were asked 'Are you currently a member of any of the kinds of organisations on this card?' The sixteen types of organisations listed on the card are: (1) political party, (2) trade unions, (3) environmental group, (4) parents'/school association, (5) tenants'/residents' group or neighbourhood watch, (6) religious group or church organisation, (7) voluntary services group, (8) pensioner group/organisation, (9) scouts/guides organisation, (10) professional organisations, (11) other community or civic group, (12) social club/working men's club, (13) sports club, (14) Women's Institute/townswomen's guild, (15) women's group/feminist organisation, and (16) other group or organisation.

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<sup>8</sup>This version of Buckner's neighbourhood cohesion index has very high internal consistency, with the Cronbach's alpha ranging between .86 and .88 in the three waves.

We count the number of ‘yes’ response to this question. Thus, this variable ranges between 0 and 16. But since relatively few people report membership in a large number of organisations, we top code the responses, so that the values we use in our analysis are: 0, 1, 2, and 3+.

In addition to organisational membership, there is a question about being actively involved in them. Respondents were asked, ‘Whether you are a member or not, do you join in the activities of any of these organisations on a regular basis?’ Thus, our fourth predictor concerns active involvement in civic organisations. Again, we count the number of ‘yes’ responses, with top-coding at 3+ types.<sup>9</sup>

Finally, wave 1 of Understanding Society contains a question on how trusting the respondents are: ‘Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’ The response categories are (1) ‘Most people can be trusted’, (2) ‘Can’t be too careful’, or (3) ‘It depends’. We dichotomise the response by contrasting (1) against (2) or (3).

## 2.3 Control variables

The control variables are the covariates considered in Chan *et al.* (2020), including demographic characteristics (e.g. age, sex, ethnicity, region), socioeconomic characteristics (e.g. educational attainment, social class, social status, poverty status), proxies for cosmopolitan vs insular outlook (e.g. national identity, cultural consumption), and neighbourhood characteristics (e.g. economic deprivation, percentage of foreign-born, exposure to the Chinese import shock). Descriptive statistics of all variables are reported in Table A1 in the online appendix.

# 3 Results

## 3.1 Bivariate associations

Let us start with the bivariate associations between Leave support and the five predictor variables. The top-left panel of Figure 1 shows that Leave support is indeed higher among stayers (54%) than among movers (44%). This supports Goodhart’s view that Anywheres are geographically more mobile.

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<sup>9</sup>Because the questions measuring the Buckner index, membership in civic organisations, or active involvement in civic organisations are included in more than one wave of the panel survey, we have in some cases multiple valid values of these variables. In those cases, we use the most recent one.



It is also consistent with the results reported by Lee *et al.* (2018, p. 150), though our estimates are about five or six percentage points lower than theirs (60% for stayers vs 49% for movers).

The top-right panel shows that, consistent with McAndrew (2020), there is no association at all between the Buckner’s neighbourhood cohesion index and Leave support.<sup>10</sup> Recall Goodhart’s suggestion that ‘[t]hose who feel they most belong to their neighbourhood ... are also most likely to have higher levels of attachment to their national identity and their ethnicity. And that is unlikely to be Anywhere graduates’ (Goodhart, 2017, p. 38).

It is true that ‘people who attach greater importance to being British are more supportive of Leave’ (Chan *et al.*, 2020, p. 838). But it turns out that people’s neighbourhood attachment is practically uncorrelated with how important they think being British is ( $r = .17$ ). This is why Remainers are no different to Leavers in their attachment to the local community.

The middle-left panel of Figure 1 shows a strong association between civic participation and support for Remain. People reporting membership in civic organisations are *less* likely to support Leave. Indeed, as membership rises, Leave support drops significantly and monotonically, from 54% (zero membership) to 48% (one type of civic organisation), 43% (two types), and finally 34% (three plus types).

It might be argued that membership of civic organisation needs not imply social involvement. As Putnam (1995, p. 70) points out, for many members of mass organisations, ‘the only act of membership consists in writing a check for dues or perhaps occasionally reading a newsletter.’ This is a reasonable point in general. But it does not apply in the present case. As the middle-right panel shows, there is a very similar association between Remain support and active involvement in civic organisations.

Finally, the bottom-left panel shows that trusting individuals are less likely to support Leave (43% vs 52%). As trust and civic participation are key indicators of social capital, our finding is that people with more social capital tend to be Remainers rather than Leavers. This does not support the claim that ‘Anywhere progressive individualism’ risks ‘[t]he harm caused by a slowly disconnecting society’ (pp. 11–12).

### 3.2 Multiple logistic regression models

It is very likely that geographical mobility, neighbourhood attachment, civic participation, and generalised trust are each associated with covariates that

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<sup>10</sup>The neighbourhood cohesion index is a continuous measure. But for the purpose of Figure 1, we divide the respondents into ten roughly equal sized groups.




Figure 1: Bivariate associations between Leave support and geographical mobility (top-left panel), neighbourhood cohesion index (top-right panel), membership of civic organisations (middle-left panel), active participation in civic organisations (middle-right panel), and trust (bottom panel)

Table 1: Estimates of key parameters of logistic regression models predicting Leave-support


	model 1		model 2		model 3		model 4		model 5		model 6	
	$\beta$	<i>s.e.</i>	$\beta$	<i>s.e.</i>	$\beta$	<i>s.e.</i>	$\beta$	<i>s.e.</i>	$\beta$	<i>s.e.</i>	$\beta$	<i>s.e.</i>
stayer <sup><i>j</i></sup>	.148**	.049	.148**	.049	.147**	.049	.149**	.049	.160**	.052	.162**	.052
neigh'd cohesion			-.056	.035							-.026	.038
mem of 1 org <sup><i>k</i></sup>					-.066	.055					-.042	.059
mem of 2 org					-.127	.069					-.113	.073
mem of 3+ org					-.325**	.076					-.275**	.082
active in 1 org <sup><i>k</i></sup>							-.007	.055				
active in 2 org							-.112	.074				
active in 3+ org							-.239**	.084				
trust <sup><i>l</i></sup>									-.274**	.049	-.252**	.050
constant	-2.516**	.350	-2.356**	.360	-2.483**	.351	-2.513**	.351	-2.582**	.388	-2.494**	.400
<i>N</i>	11,580		11,575		11,572		11,579		10,215		10,205	
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.134		.134		.136		.135		.138		.139	

Two-tailed tests, \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*  $p < .05$ . Reference category: <sup>*j*</sup> mover, <sup>*k*</sup> not member of or active in any civic organisation, <sup>*l*</sup> not trusting. The regression models reported here control for age, sex, marital status, ethnicity, and other covariates. Full regression results are reported in Table A2 in the online appendix.

are themselves correlated with Brexit support. For example, the labour markets for university graduates tend to be geographically wider than those for non-graduates. As a result, graduates are more likely to have to relocate for work and they tend to live farther away from their parents (Chan and Ermisch, 2015a,b). This might well imply moving away from one's county-of-birth. And, of course, educational attainment is one of the strongest predictors of how people vote in the EU referendum. Similarly, it is well established that civic participation and generalised trust are higher among the better educated (see e.g. Hauser, 2000; Egerton, 2002; Putnam, 2000). Given this, in considering how Leave support is associated with our predictors, we need to take into account educational attainment and other possible confounders. To do so, we control for all the variables considered in Chan *et al.* (2020). But since our estimates for the control variables are very similar to those reported in that paper, we do not discuss them in the main text. Full regression results are reported in Table A2 in the online appendix.

Model 1 of Table 1 confirms that, net of other covariates, geographical immobility is indeed associated with higher level of Leave support. The top-left panel of Figure 2 shows that, at all educational levels, stayers are about three percentage points more likely to support Leave than are movers.

In model 2, we add the neighbourhood cohesion index to the logistic regression model. The relevant parameter is negative, but not statistically significant ( $p = .11$ ). This is consistent with Figure 1 which shows no association between Leave support and neighbourhood attachment.



Note: the predicted probabilities reported here are based on regression models which control for age, sex, marital status, ethnicity, and other covariates, see Table A2 in the online appendix.

Figure 2: Predicted probabilities of supporting Leave by education and by whether living in county of birth, civic participation, and trust

In model 3, we substitute the neighbourhood cohesion index with dummies indicating membership in civic organisations. The finding here is again consistent with Figure 1. People reporting membership in civic organisations are *less* likely to support Leave. The parameter estimates increase monotonically, though only the last parameter, indicating membership in 3+ types of organisations is statistically significant at the conventional 5% level. The substantive magnitude of this association can be seen in the top-right panel of Figure 2. At each educational level, and compared to non-members, those who are members of three or more types of civic organisations are about seven percentage points less likely to support Brexit.

Model 4 shows that being active in civic organisations is also negatively associated with Leave support. The bottom-left panel of Figure 2 shows that, at each educational level, those who are active in three or more kinds of organisations are about five percentage points less likely to support Leave.<sup>11</sup>

Generalised trust is also negatively associated with Leave-support (see model 5). The bottom-right panel of Figure 2 shows that, net of the covariates, trusting individuals are about six percentage points less pro-Leave.

Finally, in model 6, we include geographical mobility, the Buckner’s index, membership in civic organisations, and trust in the same model.<sup>12</sup> The estimates of model 6 are very similar to those of models 1, 2, 3, and 5. Overall, the results of the multiple logistic regression models are broadly the same as the bivariate associations of Section 3.1, though the magnitude of the associations are, as expected, a little smaller.

## 4 Summary and discussion

In this paper, we use Understanding Society data to assess some of the main claims that Goodhart advances in *The Road to Somewhere*. We show that people who stay in their county-of-birth are indeed more likely to support Leave (see also Lee *et al.*, 2018). Given this result, and also given the well-documented educational gradient in Brexit support, there is some truth to his claim that the Brexit ‘divide is about education and mobility’ (Goodhart, 2017, p. 20).

But what explains the association between geographical immobility and

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<sup>11</sup>This could partly be explained by the opportunity structure of civic engagement, as there are more voluntary organisations in less deprived areas (Clifford, 2012), and ‘there is a positive relationship between the number of charities operating locally and the likelihood of volunteering’ (Mohan and Bennett, 2019, p. 950).

<sup>12</sup>As membership and active involvement in civic organisations correlate quite highly with each other ( $r \approx .76$ ), we do not use them together in the same regression model.

Brexit support? Both Goodhart (2017) and Lee *et al.* (2018) argue that they are causally linked. Thus, Lee *et al.* (2018, p. 144) suggest that ‘immobile voters are more likely to have built location-specific human and social capital and consequently to hold a less pluralistic and more place-bound identity.’ It follows that ‘[h]ad more of the British electorate moved away from the place they were born in . . . then the EU Referendum outcome may have been different’ (Lee *et al.*, 2018, p. 159). Likewise, Goodhart’s argument is that the experience of moving away from one’s home town helps make someone an Anywhere.

The causal claim is probably true to some degree. As Bjarnason *et al.* (2020, p. 1817) argue, ‘relocation typically exposes movers to a greater variety of worldviews . . . [and] increases the likelihood of positive intergroup contact . . .’ These changes might well affect people’s attitudes and behaviour. Having said that, we suspect that there is a good deal of selection and self-selection in geographical mobility that, in turn, might be associated with people’s outlook and worldview. For example, Shuttleworth *et al.* (2020) report that individuals scoring high on the personality trait of openness to new experience are more likely to make a long-distance move of at least 50 km. Chan (2019) report that openness is correlated with cultural omnivorousness, which is a strong predictor for Remain-support (Chan *et al.*, 2020).<sup>13</sup> Bjarnason *et al.* (2020, p. 1814) also argue that ‘those who had stayed put tended to be less trusting, less open to change and to hold more conservative social and political attitudes.’ In practice, it is likely that causal and selection processes are both at work.

We also show that Remainers are just as attached to their neighbourhood as Leavers. Indeed, so far as trust and membership of (or active involvement in) civic organisations are concerned, Remain-supporters are more socially engaged than Leave-supporters. These findings are inconsistent with Goodhart’s characterisation of Anywheres as people with ‘wide but shallow attachment’ (p. 11), who lack ‘strong group attachments or loyalties’ (p. 13), and are unlikely to ‘feel they most belong to their neighbourhood’ (p. 38), or that it is Somewheres, not Anywheres, who ‘still believe there is such a thing as Society’ (p. 8).

In the Introduction of the paperback edition of *The Road to Somewhere*, Goodhart writes that ‘Anywhere is a metaphor. Obviously, Anywhere people come from somewhere but the majority of “leavers,” in the sense of leaving their home town for university and/or career and not returning, can still be quite rooted in *new* places and networks. Indeed, they are often connected

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<sup>13</sup>Similarly, the educational gradient of Brexit support can be interpreted in various ways, and there is no need to accept Goodhart’s particular take.

to strong ‘chosen’ communities in Liberal Anywhere hot-spots like Brighton or Stoke Newington ...’ (Goodhart, 2017, p. xii).

This revised position, it must be said, does not sit comfortably with the much stronger claims that he makes in his book. Furthermore, the concession that Goodhart makes is that Anywheres in certain hot-spots *can be* quite rooted in their communities. The empirical evidence of this paper is stronger than that. What we show is that Remainers are, *generally speaking*, just as attached to their community as Leavers; and that, if anything, Remainers are more trusting and more involved in civic associations. It bears repeating that these results remain robust even after an extensive set of control variables has been taken into account.

Also worth noting is that other scholars have reported corroborating evidence. For example, Giuliano and Wacziarg (2020) show that Trump supporters in 2016 are less likely to be members of civic organisations. Herreros and Criado (2009) analyse data from European Social Survey and report that generalised trust is associated with more positive attitudes about immigration and migrants.

Goodhart (2017, p. 1) sees Brexit as a ‘backlash ... against the [Anywheres] “double liberalism” ... that has dominated politics, particularly in Britain and America, for more than a generation.’ Kinnock (2019) argues that ‘Brexit was a Communitarian backlash against a Cosmopolitan ruling class that had been refusing to listen for 40 years.’ Collier and Kay (2020) also argue for shifting influence and focus from the cosmopolitan Anywheres to the communitarian Somewheres.

We agree with much of Collier and Kay’s (2020) critique of market fundamentalism. And there is no denying that regional imbalance is a real and pressing issue. Many parts of the UK, including Kinnock’s Aberavon constituency and many of the Red Wall seats, are badly in need of investment. But our findings suggest that the dichotomy between cosmopolitan Anywheres and communitarian Somewheres is a misleading one. Cosmopolitan Anywheres are just as communitarian as the Somewheres, if not more so.

As being British or, more precisely, English is of particular importance to Leave-supporters (Chan *et al.*, 2020), Somewheres are better described as nationalists than as communitarians. Some support for this view can be found in Mattinson (2020), which is based on interviews and focus groups with residents in three Red Wall seats. Mattinson reports that voters in these areas are strongly patriotic, but they feel neglected; they are very proud of their own town, but they also recognise its long-term decline. These findings are broadly in line with those reported by other commentators. What is interesting, though, is Mattinson’s observation that feelings of *local* decline could paradoxically swell the heart with *national* pride. ‘If Red Wallers

believe that their own town is in decline and feel little sense of belonging either to nearby cities or the capital, it is perhaps not surprising that they look to the country as a source of pride' (Mattinson, 2020, pp. 79–80). She then quotes a former Labour MP who observes that '[c]ommunity matters to people round here, but when they think about community they're thinking about the whole country' (p. 80).

This brings to mind Benedict Anderson's (2006) discussion of nations as 'imagined communities'. Nations are literally '*imagined*' because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion' (Anderson, 2006, p. 6). Seen in this light, the difference between Leave-supporting Somewheres and Remain-supporting Anywheres lies not in how they relate to the actual communities that they live in; but rather in the fact that English nationalism holds much greater appeal to the Somewheres.

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## A Supplementary tables

Table A1: Descriptive statistics

category	%	<i>N</i>
EU attitude		
remain	51.5	13,573
leave	48.5	
Gender		
male	46.9	14,677
female	53.1	
Marital status		
couple	54.8	14,655
single	26.2	
sep/div/wid	19.0	
# children in household		
0	75.3	14,677
1–2	21.0	
3+	3.7	
Race/ethnicity		
white	92.6	14,670
asian	3.7	
black	1.6	
others	2.1	
Region		
North East	5.1	14,677
North West	12.0	
Yorkshire and the Humber	9.9	
East Midlands	8.0	
West Midlands	9.7	
East of England	10.4	
London	10.6	
South East	14.4	
South West	10.4	
Wales	3.1	
Scotland	6.5	
Educational attainment		
degree	26.8	14,675
further edu	13.1	
a-levels	19.0	
gcse	19.5	
sub-gcse	10.0	
no qual.	11.7	
NS-SEC		
higher man/prof	11.8	14,167
lower man/prof	26.7	
intermediate	14.4	
self-employed	9.6	

	l.super/tech	7.4	
	semi-rout/rout	30.9	
income < 60% median	no	80.8	14,677
	yes	19.1	
National identity	British	26.5	14,677
	English	39.8	
	other national	8.4	
	Brit/Eng	20.2	
	others	5.2	
Cultural consumption	Univores	57.8	14,677
	Paucivores	28.7	
	Omnivores	13.4	
Living in county-of-birth	Stayers	53.9	13,089
	Movers	46.1	
Membership in civic organisations	0	45.4	14,667
	1	29.1	
	2	14.7	
	3	10.7	
Active in civic organisations	0	58.7	14,676
	1	23.5	
	2	10.4	
	3	7.4	
Trust	yes	38.2	12,656
	no	61.8	
continuous variables	mean	s.d.	<i>N</i>
days before vote	16.2	38.2	14,677
days after vote	235.2	195.0	14,675
age	52.8	17.6	14,677
age-squared/100	30.9	19.2	14,677
social status	0.0	0.4	14,085
Chinese import shock index	0.3	0.1	14,677
Townsend index 2011	-0.1	3.4	14,657
$\Delta$ Townsend 2011–2001	0.7	1.1	14,623
% foreign-born 2011	10.8	11.7	14,677
$\Delta$ % foreign-born 2011–2001	3.4	4.6	14,648
British identity	7.4	2.9	14,398
neighbourhood cohesion	3.6	0.7	14,630

Table A2: Logistic regression models predicting Leave-support

	model 1		model 2		model 3		model 4		model 5		model 6	
	$\beta$	s.e.	$\beta$	s.e.	$\beta$	s.e.	$\beta$	s.e.	$\beta$	s.e.	$\beta$	s.e.
# days before	-.003**	.000	-.003**	.000	-.003**	.000	-.003**	.000	-.003**	.000	-.003**	.000
# days after	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	-.000	.000	-.000	.000
age	.043**	.009	.044**	.010	.045**	.009	.043**	.009	.050**	.011	.052**	.011
age-squared/100	-.031**	.008	-.031**	.008	-.031**	.008	-.030**	.008	-.035**	.009	-.036**	.009
female <sup>a</sup>	-.151**	.050	-.143**	.050	-.161**	.050	-.151**	.050	-.164**	.053	-.170**	.054
single <sup>b</sup>	.002	.071	-.006	.071	-.005	.071	-.001	.071	-.040	.077	-.053	.077
sep/div/wid	.014	.058	.009	.058	.010	.058	.010	.058	.007	.061	.003	.062
1-2 children <sup>c</sup>	.127	.067	.134*	.068	.135*	.067	.133*	.068	.096	.073	.107	.073
3+ children	.430**	.133	.438**	.134	.441**	.133	.442**	.133	.463**	.142	.479**	.142
Asian <sup>d</sup>	-.535*	.229	-.526*	.229	-.532*	.229	-.539*	.228	-.510*	.256	-.496	.257
Black	-.260	.245	-.258	.246	-.245	.245	-.255	.246	.106	.265	.128	.265
Others	-.762**	.263	-.756**	.262	-.751**	.263	-.763**	.262	-.635*	.278	-.626*	.278
North East <sup>e</sup>	-.421*	.167	-.420*	.167	-.413*	.166	-.419*	.166	-.363*	.178	-.355*	.178
North West	-.317*	.144	-.314*	.144	-.311*	.143	-.312*	.143	-.289	.153	-.285	.153
Yorkshire	-.250	.145	-.251	.145	-.248	.145	-.248	.145	-.271	.156	-.272	.155
East Midlands	-.244	.156	-.244	.155	-.238	.155	-.238	.155	-.221	.166	-.216	.165
West Midlands	-.229	.145	-.235	.145	-.222	.144	-.222	.14	-.214	.155	-.210	.155
East of England	-.149	.140	-.152	.140	-.140	.140	-.140	.140	-.152	.150	-.145	.150
South East	-.250	.131	-.257	.131	-.243	.131	-.243	.131	-.264	.141	-.262	.140
South West	-.118	.139	-.119	.139	-.112	.139	-.110	.139	-.092	.149	-.085	.148
Wales	-.536**	.181	-.534**	.181	-.539**	.181	-.531**	.181	-.556**	.196	-.560**	.196
Scotland	-.969**	.177	-.969**	.177	-.981**	.177	-.971**	.177	-.948**	.189	-.959**	.189
further edu <sup>f</sup>	.603**	.077	.605**	.077	.588**	.077	.594**	.077	.584**	.081	.573**	.082
a-levels	.672**	.075	.674**	.075	.641**	.076	.658**	.075	.606**	.079	.583**	.080
gcse	.787**	.077	.788**	.077	.750**	.078	.769**	.077	.783**	.081	.756**	.082
sub-gcse	.903**	.096	.899**	.096	.858**	.097	.877**	.097	.846**	.102	.808**	.103
no qual.	.763**	.102	.774**	.102	.698**	.104	.732**	.103	.729**	.109	.681**	.111
lower salariat <sup>g</sup>	-.016	.080	-.016	.080	-.026	.081	-.017	.080	-.019	.084	-.029	.084
intermediate	.085	.099	.081	.100	.070	.100	.079	.099	.089	.105	.076	.105
self-employed	.068	.115	.074	.115	.044	.115	.063	.115	.030	.121	.010	.122
manual supervisor	.057	.141	.054	.141	.060	.142	.051	.141	-.025	.150	-.022	.151
routine	.042	.112	.042	.112	.025	.112	.035	.112	.014	.118	.000	.118
social status	-.633**	.109	-.636**	.109	-.623**	.109	-.624**	.109	-.691**	.115	-.685**	.115
inc < 60% median	.049	.063	.049	.063	.040	.063	.045	.063	.074	.067	.067	.067
import shock	.488*	.220	.477*	.220	.478*	.220	.491*	.220	.403	.232	.390	.232
Townsend 2011	.015	.010	.014	.010	.013	.010	.015	.010	.005	.011	.003	.011
$\Delta$ Townsend	-.023	.025	-.023	.025	-.025	.025	-.024	.025	.000	.027	-.001	.027
% foreign born	-.019**	.005	-.019**	.005	-.019**	.005	-.019**	.005	-.017**	.005	-.017**	.005
$\Delta$ % foreign born	.018	.010	.017	.010	.018	.010	.018	.010	.013	.011	.012	.011
English <sup>h</sup>	.434**	.059	.427**	.059	.432**	.059	.434**	.059	.456**	.063	.452**	.063
Scottish/Welsh/(N)Irish	.118	.112	.119	.113	.124	.113	.120	.112	.159	.120	.167	.120
Brit/English	.210**	.067	.206**	.067	.203**	.067	.211**	.067	.233**	.071	.224**	.071
all others	.057	.125	.055	.125	.062	.126	.055	.126	.180	.134	.186	.135
Strength of Brit identity	.103**	.009	.105**	.009	.103**	.009	.104**	.009	.104**	.009	.105**	.009
paucivore <sup>i</sup>	-.266**	.053	-.264**	.053	-.249**	.053	-.253**	.053	-.238**	.056	-.224**	.056
omnivore	-.763**	.073	-.758**	.073	-.718**	.074	-.732**	.074	-.730**	.078	-.689**	.079
stayer <sup>j</sup>	.148**	.049	.148**	.049	.147**	.049	.149**	.049	.160**	.052	.162**	.052
neighbourhood cohesion			-.056	.035							-.026	.038
mem of 1 org <sup>k</sup>					-.066	.055					-.042	.059
mem of 2 org					-.127	.069					-.113	.073
mem of 3+ org					-.325**	.076					-.275**	.082
active in 1 org <sup>k</sup>							-.007	.055				
active in 2 org							-.112	.074				
active in 3+ org							-.239**	.084				
trust <sup>l</sup>									-.274**	.049	-.252**	.050
constant	-2.516**	.350	-2.356**	.360	-2.483**	.351	-2.513**	.351	-2.582**	.388	-2.494**	.400
N	11,580		11,575		11,572		11,579		10,215		10,205	
R <sup>2</sup>	.134		.134		.136		.135		.138		.139	

Two-tailed tests, \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*  $p < .05$ . Reference category: <sup>a</sup> male, <sup>b</sup> married or cohabiting, <sup>c</sup> no children, <sup>d</sup> Whites, <sup>e</sup> London, <sup>f</sup> degree, <sup>g</sup> higher professionals or managers, <sup>h</sup> British only, <sup>i</sup> univore, <sup>j</sup> mover, <sup>k</sup> not member of or active in any civic organisation, <sup>l</sup> not trusting.