UCL Discovery
UCL home » Library Services » Electronic resources » UCL Discovery

Why Criminal Responsibility for Negligence Cannot be Indirect

Greenberg, A; (2021) Why Criminal Responsibility for Negligence Cannot be Indirect. Cambridge Law Journal (In press). Green open access

[thumbnail of Why-Criminal-Responsibility-for-Negligence-Cannot-be-Indirect.pdf]
Preview
Text
Why-Criminal-Responsibility-for-Negligence-Cannot-be-Indirect.pdf - Accepted Version

Download (281kB) | Preview

Abstract

A popular way to try to justify holding defendants criminally responsible for inadvertent negligence is via an indirect or “tracing” approach, i.e. an approach which traces the inad-vertence back to prior culpable action. I argue that this indirect approach to criminal neg-ligence fails because it cannot account for a key feature of how criminal negligence should be (and sometimes is) assessed. Specifically, it cannot account for why, when considering whether a defendant is negligent, what counts as a risk should be assessed relative to the defendant’s evidence.

Type: Article
Title: Why Criminal Responsibility for Negligence Cannot be Indirect
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
Publisher version: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/cambridge-...
Language: English
Additional information: This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions.
Keywords: Criminal negligence, gross negligence manslaughter, culpability, tracing
UCL classification: UCL
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10129848
Downloads since deposit
101Downloads
Download activity - last month
Download activity - last 12 months
Downloads by country - last 12 months

Archive Staff Only

View Item View Item