Title: Mentalization and embodied selfhood in Borderline Personality Disorder

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Abstract:
Aberrations of self-experience are considered a core feature of Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD). While prominent etiologic accounts of BPD, such as the mentalization based approach, appeal to the developmental constitution of self in early infant-caregiver environments, they often rely on a conception of self that is not explicitly articulated. Moreover, self-experience in BPD is often theorized at the level of narrative identity, thus minimizing the role of embodied experience. In this article, we present the hypothesis that disordered self and interpersonal functioning in BPD result, in part, from impairments in “embodied mentalization,” that manifest foundationally as alterations in minimal embodied selfhood, i.e. the first-person experience of being an individuated embodied subject. This account of BPD, which engages early intersubjective experiences has the potential to integrate phenomenological, developmental, and symptomatic findings in BPD, and is consistent with contemporary theories of brain function.

Keywords:
Borderline personality disorder, mentalization, minimal self, narrative self, interoception
1. Introduction

Selfhood has been considered an organizing construct for theorizing Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) (Kerr et al., 2015). Aberrant self-experience in BPD is characterized by dramatic changes in self-image, shifting goals and values, and feelings of emptiness, dissociation, and non-existence (Gunderson et al., 2018). These experiences are distressing and dangerous: in a qualitative study, Brown et al. (Brown et al., 2002) found that >50% of interviewed women with BPD endorsed disturbances in self-experience as reasons for non-suicidal self-injury.

A prominent developmental account of BPD, the mentalization-based approach (MBA) (Fonagy and Luyten, 2009), appeals to the interpersonal constitution of “self” structure in infancy. The caregiver’s mentalization of the child’s behavior—i.e., the caregiver’s ability to adopt an intentional stance and represent their child as having feelings, desires, and intentions—fosters the child’s capacity to mentalize his or her own internal experience and sense of self. This occurs via the caregiver’s re-presentation, or “mirroring,” of these states during infant-caregiver interactions (Slade, 2005). While the MBA seeks to explain “pathologies of selfhood” in BPD, such as affect dysregulation, identity diffusion, and unstable self-other boundaries, it relies on a concept of self that is not explicitly articulated.

Philosophical approaches to selfhood in BPD have predominantly focused on the “narrative self” (e.g. (Gold and Kyratsous, 2017, Kernberg, 2006, Fuchs, 2007, Jørgensen, 2006)). In this view, the self is a narrative constructed by the individual through the integration of memories, present experience, and future goals into a coherent story. Indeed, narrative coherence is lower in life story interviews of people with BPD compared to non-BPD narrators (Adler et al., 2012). Fuchs (Fuchs, 2007) goes a step further, writing that aberrations in self-experience are “caused by the inability to integrate past and future into the present and thus to establish a coherent sense of
identity” (p.379, italics ours). For some in the phenomenological tradition, BPD is distinguished by disturbances of the “narrative self” while alterations of the more basic aspects of self are unique to psychotic-spectrum illnesses such as schizophrenia (Parnas and Henriksen, 2014). And with regards to the MBA, the “narrative self” may fully account for the implicit conception of self therein, given frequent appeals to “identity,” “representation of self”, and “self-image” (e.g. Fonagy et al., 2002).

However, while fragmented narrative identity is a feature of borderline pathology, anchoring self-disturbance in BPD only on narrative accounts risks minimizing the important role of embodied experience. Abnormal bodily experiences in BPD are common, including bodily dissociation, altered pain perception, and deficits in interoception (awareness and processing of bodily signals) (Löffler et al., 2018). Furthermore, recent empirical and theoretical advancements in mentalization theory highlight the intercorporeality of mentalizing activity, such that embodied subjectivity in early infancy develops through a “co-construction of somatic experience within attuned bodily interactions with the caregiver” (Shai et al., 2014). This suggests that alterations of self in BPD present not just at the level of narrative identity, but in more basic aspects of embodiment.

In this paper, we present the hypothesis that disordered self and interpersonal functioning in BPD result, in part, from impairments in “embodied mentalization” (Fotopoulou and Tsakiris, 2017) that manifest foundationally as alterations in minimal embodied selfhood, i.e. the first-person experience of being an individuated embodied subject. This theoretical expansion of the MBA seeks to further clarify how, mechanistically, early developmental processes may lead to embodied disturbances in BPD.
This account of BPD, which engages early intersubjective embodied experiences and links them to predictive coding models of brain function, has the potential to integrate phenomenological, developmental, and symptomatic findings in BPD. According to predictive coding accounts of brain function, the brain generates probabilistic and dynamic representations by integrating of incoming sensory input (Clark, 2013). By this account, we can construe minimal embodied selfhood as the phenomenological manifestation of interoceptive inference, i.e. the generative representation of one’s physiologic states (Seth and Tsakiris, 2018). Employing the concept of “embodied mentalization,” we will explain bodily self as shaped through infants’ embodied interactions. Progressive integration of interoceptive and sensorimotor signals result in stable representations of self. This process may be impaired by known etiologic risk factors for BPD, including disorganized attachment and neglect (Fonagy, 2000).

In expanding this paper’s main claims, I first review self-pathology as a core clinical dimension of BPD (section 2). In section 3, I elaborate the MBA and argue that it relies on an implicit conception of selfhood that is unarticulated. In section 4, I consider two philosophical approaches to selfhood (i.e. the narrative- and minimal-self, respectively), and claim that while minimal selfhood is undertheorized in BPD, it possesses explanatory utility in mentalization based approaches to the disorder. In section 5, I demonstrate how Fotopoulou & Tsakiris’s (Fotopoulou and Tsakiris, 2017) concept of “embodied mentalization,” can provide a mechanistic account of alterations in minimal embodied selfhood in BPD that is coherent with contemporary predictive coding theories of brain function. In section 6, I consider how this approach is consistent with empirical findings in BPD, and offers a framework to propose novel hypotheses regarding the entwinement of self and interpersonal pathology.

2: Self disturbance and Borderline Personality Disorder
BPD is a severe mental disorder associated with high rates of suicide and self-harm, marked functional impairment, and high cost to the individual and society (Leichsenring et al., 2011). Clinically, BPD characterized by four key symptom phenotypes: self-disturbance, interpersonal instability, emotion dysregulation, and behavioral dysregulation, such as impulsivity and self-harm. Self-disturbance is considered a core feature of BPD, and encompasses unstable or impoverished sense of self, instability of goals and values, chronic feelings of emptiness, and dissociation (Gunderson et al., 2018).\(^1\) First-person accounts attest to this self-disturbance in BPD:

My mind was so murky, making everything seem like a dream. I remember walking around Newbury street, the foggy streetlights danced shadows around an old church. I saw myself in all of them. The hotel room had a TV in the bathroom mirror. I remember staring at myself. My reflection felt as fake as the pixilated figure in the corner. For a moment, we fused (Duffy, 2017).

This description of transitvism captures how self-instability impacts on the relationship between self and the non-self environment. This can be realized, as above, as a dissolution of the self-environment boundary, such that the self is felt as porous or undifferentiated. Self-pathology in BPD also extends into interpersonal settings. Individuals with BPD have a larger preferred social distance in interpersonal settings indicating an experientially enlarged sense of peri-personal space (i.e. the subjective sense of one’s personal space immediately surrounding the body) (Fineberg et al., 2018) (we discuss further alterations of “minimal selfhood” in BPD in section 4.2). Furthermore, an instability in self-understanding extends to instability in thoughts related to others: individuals with BPD are less consistent in attributing personality traits to themselves and others,

\(^1\) Self-disturbance in BPD is captured by the following DSM-5 diagnostic criteria: identity disturbance (markedly and persistently unstable self-image or sense of self); chronic feelings of emptiness; and, transient, stress-related paranoid ideation or severe dissociative symptoms. Other diagnostic criteria include: frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment; a pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships; impulsivity; recurrent suicidal behavior; affective instability due to a marked reactivity of mood; and, inappropriate intense anger.
and more strongly endorse statements probing self-other undifferentiation (Beeney et al., 2016) (we discuss further alterations of “narrative selfhood” in BPD in section 4.1). For Bender and Skodol (Bender and Skodol, 2007), “disturbances in self and other mental representations are fundamental to borderline psychopathology” (p.514). Similarly, Kerr et al. (Kerr et al., 2015) calls for a “reconceptualization” of BPD as “a disorder of self and relationality” (p.346). Interpersonal symptoms can include confusion about self-other boundaries with identity diffusion, projection of difficult affects onto interaction partners. One person with BPD evokes a bodily experience of this confusion (italics added):

When I’m around other people, I can feel their energy. I can feel whether they’re happy or unhappy. I can walk into a room and feel whether there’s tension in the air or if everyone is getting along… Having my own identity issues makes it even harder to be around certain people. I feel other people’s emotions so strongly that sometimes, I believe they are my own (Mae, 2017).

Self, then, is a key concept to characterize symptoms (and symptom patterns) for formulation of BPD. However, as Kerr et al. (2015) note, when used in the context of BPD research and formulation, “a very wide range of concepts of the self has been employed by different writers, researchers and clinicians. [However], the concepts of self have only been defined to a limited extent, with many writers resorting to more ‘common parlance’ or ‘folk psychological’ definitions” (p.340). Kerr et al. (2015) suggest that appeals to the self may cause considerable confusion if clinicians and scientists are working with different implicit conceptions of the term. This concern is especially relevant for developmental accounts of BPD, across behavioral (e.g. (Crowell et al., 2009)) and psychodynamic traditions (e.g. (Klein, 1946, Kernberg, 1985, Fonagy et al., 2002)), that rely on notions of self to articulate how early childhood experiences developmentally give rise to BPD symptomology. For example, in her biosocial developmental
model of borderline personality, Linehan locates the origins of borderline self-disturbance in invalidating care-giver responses to a child’s perceptions and beliefs about the world, resulting in the reliance of the developing individual on others to construct a sense of meaning (Linehan, 1993). In Kernberg’s (Kernberg, 2006) object-relations theory, borderline pathology results from the “pathological consolidation of the internalized world of object relations, reflected in a stable lack of integration of the concept of self and of significant others (p. 980). To delimit the scope of this paper, we examine the articulation of self specifically in the mentalization-based account of BPD. This prominent developmental account of BPD, developed by Fonagy and others (e.g. (Fonagy et al., 2002)), grounds selfhood in the developmentally acquired capacity of an individual to “mentalize” one’s self and others. Furthermore, we believe it holds particular explanatory potential in elucidating alterations of embodiment in BPD (see section 6).

3. Mentalization, attachment, and the development of the self

According to the MBA, unstable sense of self is a core feature of BPD, for which symptoms are not isolated characteristics of the condition, but are etiologically related to core processes in early self-development, i.e. the capacity to mentalize in the context of early infant-caregiver (attachment) relationship’s (Fonagy et al., 2002). Slade characterizes mentalization, “narrowly as the capacity to understand one’s own and others’ behavior in terms of underlying mental states and intentions, and more broadly as a crucial human capacity that is intrinsic to affect regulation and productive social relationships” (Slade, 2005). Importantly, for MBA, mentalization is not an inborn capability; rather, the ability of a developing infant to ascribe meaning to its own affective and behavioral states is a developmental achievement born within early attachment relationships. Infants learn about the mental world, and their own self-states, through the caregiver’s “affective mirroring” of infant behavior during infant-caregiver interactions:
It is through…mothers’ “marking” of their very young infants’ affect displays, producing an exaggerated version of realistic emotion expressions, in which the infant’s state is reflected back to them as a “re-presentation” or proto-symbol, that the child first begins to organize his self experience. The 3-month-old first learns about mental states and about the mental world as he observes them in his caregiver, as representations of his self-state; only then can he begin to recognize them in himself (Slade, 2005).

During embodied interactions, caregivers are attuned to a rich repertoire of non-verbal communication signals from their infants, including hand gestures, facial expressions and bodily movements that reflect aspects of their internals states and explorations of the physical environment. When a caregiver soothes a distressed infant, for example, they reflect the child’s inferred mental state, with framing cues (e.g. raised eyebrows, titled head) and other affect displays (e.g. smiling, mocking) to communicate empathy while acknowledging the individuation of the infant’s developing mind (Fonagy and Target, 1997).

In the MBA, it is posited that the unstable sense of self in BPD originates in “an early psychosocial environment where [infants’] internal experiences were not adequately mirrored.” Internal states then remain “confusing, experienced as unsymbolized, and hard to regulate.” (p.1349) (Fonagy and Luyten, 2009). Affective mirroring sculpts self-other boundaries and the individuation of the infant’s mind because the infant learns that his caregiver can understand his internal state without sharing it (Allen et al., 2006). Furthermore, early infant-caregiver interactions are crucial in that they generalize to later relationships throughout development and adulthood (Cittern et al., 2018). According to the MBA, secure caregiver attachment forms the foundation for fully developed mentalizing capacities and sense of self (Fonagy, 2000).

Secure attachment, in which caregivers form a secure base for infant exploration and discovery, is in part predicated on the caregiver’s ability to reflect on their own and their child’s
mental experience, allowing them to accurately understand and predict behavior. This capacity is known as parental reflective functioning (Luyten et al., 2017). Importantly, parental reflective functioning supports secure attachment not only through cognizing infant mental states, but through promoting embodied interactions with infants that non-verbally communicate parental attunement to their infant’s thoughts and emotions (Shai and Meins, 2018).

Conversely, neglect, trauma, and insecure attachment—in which caregiver responses are inconsistent, ignoring, or aggressive—are associated with “disrupt[ion of] the capacity for mentalization and, linked to this, the development of a coherent self-structure” (Fonagy and Luyten, 2009). Importantly, these adverse early experiences (Widom et al., 2009, Korzekwa et al., 2009), and relatedly, insecure attachment style (Gunderson and Lyons-Ruth, 2008), are risk factors for BPD. Mentalization may be compromised in these settings because of the challenges of integrating the inconsistent beliefs and actions of abusive or poorly attuned caregivers who are less likely to consider, and thereby reflect, the internals states of their children (Ensink et al., 2015). When affective mirroring is absent, or parental mentalization and mirroring are impaired (e.g. in the setting of parental substance use, parental psychopathology, or other psychosocial stressors), the child is left with a sense of self that is unknowable, and experientially empty (Slade, 2005).

3.1. Mentalization and BPD

The central premise of the MBA is that “the failure of mentalizing, in combination with profound disorganization of self-structure, may account for the core features of borderline personality functioning” (Fonagy and Luyten, 2009) (p. 1357). Unstable sense of self arises when infants internalize reflections from caregivers that do not align with their “constitutional” inner states. Fonagy et al. (Fonagy et al., 2002) describe the formation of an “alien” self-representation
within individuals with BPD that corresponds not to their constitutional states, but to the intentional, and often persecutory, mind of a maltreating attachment figure.

According to the MBA, this formation of an “alien-self” underlies the development of canonical BPD defense mechanisms and symptoms. In efforts to stabilize the sense of self, individuals with BPD defensively project this misaligned representation onto the other. Projective identification functions to evoke thoughts and feelings which cannot be tolerated as arising from the self (Sharp and Vanwoerden, 2015). Reliance on splitting (i.e. the formation of distinct idealized and persecutory representations of a single mind) obviates the need to integrate opposing representations of self, and of self versus other. However, split representations of self and of attachment figures can make it difficult to predict the behavior and reactions of others, and engender a sense of chaos, and feelings of anxiety, hopelessness and diminished agency (Fonagy, 2000).

According to the MBA, DSM-5 social symptoms of BPD arise in part from the maladaptive defense mechanisms enacted to cope with an alien self-representation. For example, efforts to avoid real or imaged abandonment are bound up with the individual’s attempt to stabilize the sense of self. Projecting painful and persecutory intentional states onto intimate partners and other attachment figures can also cause anger, resentment, and confusion in the other, and contributes to the volatile interpersonal relationships that are common in BPD. According to the MBA, childhood abuse, maltreatment, or neglect create a developmental environment in which “recognition of the mental state of the other can be dangerous to the developing self” (Fonagy, 2000) (p. 1134). This inhibition of mentalization contributes to emotional dysregulation, such that high arousal states occur in “the absence of symbolic representations of emotions,” and are beyond self-control (Fonagy et al., 2002) (p. 360). People in this situation may focus on the immediate physical reality
as opposed to understood intentions and affects of a social interaction partner, and impulsive behaviors can result, especially in interpersonal contexts (Fonagy et al., 2002). Frantic efforts to avoid abandonment are tragic and common precipitants of self-harm and suicidal acts. Perceived abandonment entails facing and reinternalizing aspects of the alien self which are intolerable; and “suicide represents the fantasized destruction of this alien other within the self” (Fonagy et al., 2002) (p.363). Thus, the MBA seeks to elucidate the etiology of a broad range of BPD symptoms.

4. Locating the self in the MBA

While our brief exposition of the MBA demonstrates the conceptual centrality of the “self,” it also reveals the indeterminacy with which the concept is employed. According to the MBA, pathologies of selfhood in BPD are realized at the level of first-person experience, in the stability of “self-representation,” and in interpersonal contexts. In light of Kerr et al.’s (Kerr et al., 2015) concern regarding the utility of the concept in formulating BPD pathology, it appears that the MBA appeals to the “self and its functions,” without “incorporate[ing] a formal concept of the self” (p. 340). Perhaps one benefit of relying on implicit conception of self is that it enables the MBA to be consistent with a variety of self-conceptions across philosophical and psychological approaches. However, even within philosophical traditions, the conceptual plurality surrounding selfhood has led some to claim that the self does not exist (e.g. (Strawson, 1997)), and that the concept should be abandoned (Metzinger, 2005). If this were the case, then contemporary formulations of BPD, such as that provided by the MBA, may be hindering our understanding of BPD by appealing to the concept of self.

One challenge to locating the self in the MBA is the inherent ambiguity of the concept. As Kyselo (Kyselo, 2014) recently summarized, “models and conceptions of the self are diverse. It is considered a substance or a thing, a concept, a narrative, a system, a process or a function…This
list is not exhaustive but it makes a point: there is no unifying concept of *the self*” (p. 1). Conceptual clarification of the concept is not merely a philosophical concern, but has theoretical and empirical implications for scientific explorations of the self (Kyselo, 2014). It also has the potential to support theoretical advances in the MBA and empirical investigations of BPD. In an influential paper (Gallagher, 2000), Gallagher divides philosophical approaches to the self that have relevance for the cognitive sciences into two important aspects: the “narrative” self, and the “minimal” self. In the following sections, I will explore the application of these approaches to the MBA.

### 4.1. Narrative selfhood and BPD

According to the narrative-self approach, selfhood does not arise merely because an individual persists through time as the self-same physical being, or from an awareness of first-person experience. Rather, in narrative accounts, the self is constituted by the stories we tell about ourselves (Zahavi, 2005). Narrative selfhood arises from the capacity to mentally represent the continuity between past and future selves in a personal life narrative that is both intelligible and meaningful. Individuals behave in a way that demonstrate self-understanding and self-relating, such that the unity narrative selfhood is enacted through lived experience: in the pursuit of goals, in making ethical decisions in accordance with one’s values, and pursuing a life of one’s making (Fuchs, 2007). However, the narrative approach does not entail that selfhood is constructed by the individual alone: our lives are embedded in relationships and larger societal systems of meaning and language that anchor our identities. For Dennett (Dennett, 2017), the narrative self does not reside in the individual alone, but exists as an abstraction, a center of “narrative gravity” that specifies the locus of intersection for the multiplicity of stories about ourselves that we and others enact.
Narrative selfhood has historically been the predominant approach by which self-pathology in BPD is theorized (Fuchs, 2007, Kernberg, 2006, Jørgensen, 2006). Fuchs conceives narrative identity as an achievement of integrating contradictory thoughts, experiences, and desires, into “a coherent, overarching sense and view of [one]self” (p. 379). And in BPD, it is the inability to construct a coherent self-concept that constitutes disordered selfhood in the disorder (Fuchs, 2007). The structure of narrative selfhood is also a central and distinguishing feature of BPD for Kernberg (Kernberg, 2006), who conceptualizes it as a form of “identity diffusion,” characterized by inconsistencies in beliefs, values, and life-goals, difficulties with interpersonal and professional commitments, and unstable representations of self and other.

Deficits in narrative selfhood have also been invoked to account for other clinical features of BPD. For example, Fuchs (Fuchs, 2007) suggests that impulsivity in BPD occurs in the absence of “enduring second-order volitions,” such that individuals with BPD succumb to impulsive behaviors in the moment because they lack an overarching sense of their goals and values to resist in-the-moment urges (i.e. first-order volitions). Unable to integrate coherent mental representations of individuals across time, those with BPD rely on what Fuchs describes as “temporal splitting,” to align their present emotional experience with their representations of self and other. Moreover, it is the this splitting of self and subsequent fragmentation of narrative identity, that for Fuchs, results in the chronic feelings of emptiness endorsed by individuals with BPD, as the present self, severed from its past and future, is experienced as empty and flat.

In considering our discussion above, it is prima facia plausible that the narrative account fully underlies the conception of self implicit in the MBA. For Jørgensen (Jørgensen, 2006), identity diffusion in BPD is a direct result of deficits in mentalization, as it underlies our capacity to understand and represent the emotions, intentions, and goals of ourselves and others. Likewise,
for Fuchs (Fuchs, 2007), the potential for stable narrative identity is realized in early childhooddevelopment: “only if the child’s experiences meet adequate mirroring… by others can they be integrated into a coherent understanding of what it means to be a self with…a basic temporal continuity” (p. 383). Conceiving unstable selfhood in BPD as a temporal instability is consistent with the narrative approach, as well as empirical findings regarding fluctuations in the representations of self and other over time (see section 2). Cognitive perspectives on the narrative approach suggest that the self exists as a dynamic set of mental representations that serve self-monitoring functions and are related to core processes in the formation and maintenance of autobiographical memory (Gallagher, 2000, Dennett, 2017, Prebble, 2013). Indeed, individuals with BPD demonstrate impairments in autobiographical memory, including memory gaps (Korzekwa et al., 2009), and overgeneralization (Startup et al., 2001), such that they are more likely to recall categories of events rather than specific details. Taken together, these theoretical and empirical considerations indicate profound alterations of narrative selfhood in BPD. However, I want to suggest that a reliance solely on the narrative approach risks minimizing self-disturbances in BPD related to embodied experience, and does not fully account for foundational aspects of self-development in the MBA.

4.2. The Minimal self and embodied experience in BPD

The minimal approach to selfhood posits that the self exists independent to, and prior to, one’s mental representations of self, and prior to self-reflection. For Zahavi (Zahavi, 2005), the narrative approach tacitly relies on this more foundational conception of selfhood. Essential to the minimal approach is the commitment to the claim that selfhood is not merely a construction built over time, but rather, an intrinsic feature of conscious experience. Considered phenomenologically, the minimal self exists in first-person experience as a pre-reflective form of
self-awareness such that whenever one has a conscious experience—whether it entails looking at a painting, smelling a flower, or reflecting a conversation with a friend—it is experienced as one’s own (Higgins, 2018). Importantly, minimal approaches do not locate the self in conscious experience abstracted from the physical world and body. Rather, minimal selfhood comprises essential embodied and experiential components, including first-person perspective, self-other boundary, and sense of body-ownership (Gallagher, 2013). The unreflective experience of having a body, what Seth and Tsakiris (Seth and Tsakiris, 2018) call “being a body,” is an essential component of minimal selfhood that “describes a background experience of self… that shades into mood and emotion at one end and into experiences of body ownership at the other” (p. 8).

BPD is associated with disturbances in experiential embodiment. BPD is associated with high rate of body dysmorphia (Dyer et al., 2013), altered bodily pain perception (Schmahl et al., 2010), and dissociation during periods of stress (Korzekwa et al., 2009). People diagnosed with BPD are also more susceptible to illusions of body ownership compared to individuals without mental illness indicating decreased stability of their body schemas (Bekrater-Bodmann et al., 2016; Neustadter et al., 2019b; Becker-Sadzio, 2019; but see Möller et al., 2020 for only trend level differences). For example, in the rubber hand illusion paradigm, participants see a rubber hand touched while they feel their hidden hand touched in the same way. The extent to which they experience the illusion (endorsing that their touch sensation comes from the rubber hand, or for some, even that the rubber hand is their hand) correlates with dissociative experiences (e.g. derealization, depersonalization) (Bekrater-Bodmann et al., 2016).² People with BPD also have

² Of note, increased susceptibility to body illusion paradigms in not specific to BPD. Rather, it is a common finding across several conditions that share symptomatic and clinical overlap with BPD including schizophrenia (Thakkar et al. 2011), body dysmorphia disorder (Kaplan et al. 2014) and eating disorders (Eskkevari et al., 2011). In general, our aim is not that pathologies of embodiment are unique to BPD. Rather, we want to illuminate disturbances of embodiment in BPD, and provide an etiologic account of their development in individuals diagnosed with the condition.
more difficulty identifying their own emotions than do those without mental illness or other personality disorders (New et al., 2012), suggesting that the way they experience their own bodily sensations may be affected. More generally, patients with BPD are known to present with alexithymia, a multidimensional failure of processing bodily signals (i.e. interoception) (Murphy et al., 2018) that in BPD, coincides with a painful felt-unknowingness of inner experience. These findings suggest that self-pathology in BPD manifests not only at the level of narrative identity, but also in fundamental aspects of embodied experience.

Given that the MBA purports to explain self-pathology in BPD, these findings raise the question of whether the narrative approach fully captures the implicit conception of self in the theory. While the MBA appeals to the development of theory of mind, self-image, and mental representation, it also stresses the role of intersubjective embodiment as an essential component of parental reflective functioning and the development of mentalizing capacities in the infant. For example, Slade recognizes that for pre-verbal infants, mental states are first re-presented by caregivers not through “words and play”, but through “gesture and action” (Slade, 2005). Indeed, empirical research of moment-to-moment infant-caregiver interactions suggest that mirroring occurs through interactively contingent attunement of infant and caregiver with regards to facial expression, gaze direction, head orientation, and affect display (Beebe et al., 2016). Some MBA theorists (Shai and Fonagy, 2013) also address features of self-development that correspond to primary components of minimal selfhood, including sense of body ownership and self-demarcation: “We argue that a crucial element in the process of the development of a sense of self is establishing a sense of presence, volume, solidity, and mass. Furthermore, boundaries of the self need to be established to define limits between internal vs. external, me vs. not me, real vs.
imaginary (p. 198).” Thus, it appears that the narrative approach is too limited in scope to provide a conceptional foundation for the self in the MBA.

However, one may object to the idea the MBA can also be utilized to account for the development of minimal selfhood and therefore, the etiology of minimal-self disturbance in BPD, in light of its central thesis: that the self is constituted intersubjectively in early development. For example, Zahavi (Zahavi, 2014) claims that minimal selfhood exists prior to any form of socialization. Even within the MBA, references are made to a “constitutional self” that is genetically programmed and upon which mental representations of self-overlay (more or less) congruently (e.g. (Fonagy, 2000, Bateman, 2006, Fonagy et al., 2002)). This tension is a reflection of what Kyselo calls the “body-social problem” (Kyselo, 2014): “how bodily and social aspects figure in the individuation of the human individual self as a whole” (p.2).” For Kyselo (Kyselo, 2014), “the self as a whole can be either embodied or social, but it cannot be both” (p.3). One reply to this problem is to appeal to Gallagher’s “pattern theory of self”, that conceives different conceptions of self as compatible and related, instead of mutually exclusive (Gallagher, 2013). In this case, minimal and narrative approaches are not mutually exclusive; rather, narrative selfhood supervenes on more foundational (i.e. minimal) aspects of self (e.g. sense of body ownership and self-other boundary). However, this reply leaves unanswered whether early intersubjective experience shapes the development of minimal embodied selfhood. That sociality shapes minimal aspects of self, in addition to narrative aspects, is prima facia plausible. As Higgins (Higgins, 2018) observes: taking seriously the essential, and embodied, infant-caregiver interactions at the earliest moments of life entails “accepting the de facto equiprimordiality of minimal experientialism with a ‘minimal’ form of relational selfhood, i.e. the co-constitution of experience through engagements with others” (p.1). This observation is taken further in Fotopoulou and Tsakiris’s (Fotopoulou and
Tsakiris, 2017) account of “embodied mentalization” (EM), which elaborates how minimal selfhood is constituted within embodied interactions, such that infants’ generative models of sensorimotor signals and physiologic states are co-constructed to form the foundations of minimal embodied selfhood.

5. Embodied mentalization (EM): Mentalization and the predictive brain

Traditional accounts of mentalization conceive it as an inferential process related primarily to theory-of-mind processes and intention-attribution. According to Fotopoulou and Tsakiris (Fotopoulou and Tsakiris, 2017), however, these cognitive abilities actually reflect “advanced forms of more primitive inferential processes of embodied perception and action” which they term “embodied mentalization” (p. 5). EM reflects a reductionist extension of mentalization theory insofar as it grounds the development of self in the intersubjective process of schematizing bodily signals into neurocognitive representations that underlie experiential minimal selfhood. According to EM, proximal embodied interactions beginning in early infancy shape the felt experience of first-person experience along with progressively refined and elaborated representational distinctions between self and other, subject and object, and pleasure and pain (Fotopoulou and Tsakiris, 2017, Ciaunica and Fotopoulou, 2017). Importantly, EM relates mentalization theory to the most essential functions of early infant-caregiver attachment, i.e., the maintenance of survival, and the regulation of bodily states (Bowlby, 2008), such that “the constitution of the self is dependent upon the social mentalization of the body and particularly its homeostatic needs” ((Fotopoulou and Tsakiris, 2017), p. 6). The special relevance of interoception for this process will be discussed in section 5.1. The need to regulate homeostasis is also an organizing principle for predictive coding accounts of brain function, such as the Free Energy Perspective (FEP), according to which the brain generates dynamic representations of our body
and the world, in order to predict the causes of bodily states and the consequences of action for the purposes of survival (Friston, 2010). Thus, considering the application of EM to elucidate self-pathology in BPD has the upshot of linking etiologic accounts of borderline pathology to contemporary theories of brain function.

Within predictive coding accounts of brain function, the brain is a dynamic organ that seeks to render the environment predictable by minimizing surprise and reducing uncertainty regarding the consequences of action (Clark et al., 2018). The brain “discovers” the world by constructing generative models (“beliefs”) about it that are represented as probability distributions regarding the causes of incoming sensory input. According to the FEP, the brain attempts to optimize its model of the world by minimizing “free-energy” (i.e. the upper boundary of surprise under certain simplifying assumptions) through the reduction of prediction error, i.e. the discrepancy between our brain’s prediction (“prior”) and actual sensory input (Bolis and Schilbach, 2018). The brain organizes expectations hierarchically, whereby predictions from higher cortical layers represent more abstract and integrated representations. Importantly, the precision associated with predictions relative to that of prediction errors—the confidence or uncertainty ascribed to prior beliefs or new information—modulates the integration of bottom-up and top-down information flow; e.g. imprecise prediction errors are less likely to update (top-down), precise prior representations. According to the FEP, free-energy can be broadly minimized in two ways: brains can update representations about the world to reduce prediction error (i.e. “perceptual inference”). Second, action (via autonomic/motor reflexes or intentional behavior) can change sensory input as to better align with prior expectations (i.e. “active inference”) (Fotopoulou and Tsakiris, 2017).

Within a predictive coding framework, EM can be restated as an inferential brain process that maintains probabilistic “beliefs” regarding embodied self-states by generating constantly
updating models of the likely causes of sensory signals from both inside the body, and the environment (Fotopoulou and Tsakiris, 2017). Although the stability of one’s sense of self, including sense of body-ownership, is taken for granted in non-pathological situations, what predictive coding perspectives postulate is that representations of bodily-self are probabilistic and therefore malleable. This conceptualization of bodily self-representation is supported by evidence from behavioral paradigms that probe sense of body ownership experimentally. For example, body illusion tasks, such as the rubber hand illusion (RHI) (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998), manipulate the multisensory context in which a virtual, or plastic body part is presented, so as to influence the inferences participants make about whether that fake body part belongs to the self or not. Putatively, during RHI induction, while one visually observes a rubber hand being touched in temporal synchrony with the touch of one’s real (but hidden) hand, bottom-up signals from visual, haptic and proprioceptive modalities are temporarily integrated according to this particular context and this integration results in an updating of one’s beliefs about the rubber hand belonging to the self.

5.1: Interoceptive inference: Linking physiology, emotion, and the minimal self

Importantly, according to the theory of EM, minimal selfhood results from the “mentalization” of bodily signals across exteroceptive and interoceptive sensory modalities. Interoceptive processing in particular links the brain’s role in regulating bodily states to the experience of emotion, and components of minimal embodied selfhood (Palmer and Tsakiris, 2018). Early definitions distinguished interoception from exteroception as the perception of stimuli originating from inside (e.g. visceral sensations), as opposed to outside the body (e.g. vision) (Murphy et al., 2017). However, more contemporary approaches highlight the role of interoceptive signals in encoding information relevant for homeostatic needs, such as cardiac function, and pain,
as well as olfaction, taste and affective touch (Fotopoulou and Tsakiris, 2017). Hierarchical models of interoceptive input enable allostatic regulation (i.e. the maintenance of stability through change) of homeostasis and the prediction of physiologic consequences of future behavior. For example, lower hierarchical levels minimize interoceptive prediction error through autonomic reflexes (e.g. the recruitment of vagal stimulation to control heart rate), while higher hierarchical models that integrate interoceptive and exteroceptive information contextualize interoceptive signal (e.g. hunger) to guide intentional action (e.g. opening the refrigerator) (Ondobaka et al., 2017).

Theoretical (e.g. (Lange and James, 1922)) and empirical perspectives (Tsakiris and Critchley, 2016) also demonstrate how emotions arise from physiological changes within the body. Indeed, researchers have mapped the subjective quality of different emotions onto unique topographies of felt bodily sensation (Nummenmaa et al., 2018). Moreover, the ability to perceive interoceptive signals (e.g. such as felt heart rate) is strongly linked with emotional experience (Badoud and Tsakiris, 2017), while alexithymia has been as proposed as a marker of impaired interoceptive processing (Murphy et al., 2017). Higher hierarchical levels of interoceptive inference are thought to underlie emotional content, and speculatively, the phenomenology of embodied experience. Seth and Tsakiris (Seth and Tsakiris, 2018) propose that exteroceptive modalities, such as vision, engender a phenomenology of objecthood given their role in generating models of the world (what they call “epistemic inference”). However, because models generated by interoceptive inference are more relevant for controlling bodily states (i.e. predicting the consequence of autonomic/motor action on homeostasis) as opposed to “epistemically discovering more about some particular external or internal state of affairs,” they may uniquely relate to the affective and phenomenal character of first-person experience (p.8):

Instead of delivering a phenomenology of objecthood…interoceptive inference plausibly underlies a phenomenology related to the evaluation of the allostatic
consequences of regulatory actions. A non-localized, non-object-based phenomenology associated with both mood and emotion, and with the pre-reflective (i.e., non-reflexive) self-related experience of being an embodied organism (Seth and Tsakiris, 2018) (p.9).

While the relationship between interoception and the phenomenal character of conscious experience remains speculative, interoceptive processing has been empirically linked to naturalized aspects of minimal selfhood, such as sense of body ownership. For example, those with high interoceptive accuracy (i.e. the ability to accurately perceive interoceptive signals) are less susceptible to illusions of body ownership (Tsakiris et al., 2011). Conversely, synchronizing tactile stimulation of the rubber hand (in the case of the RHI) with interoceptive signals (such as heart beat) enhances perceived ownership of it (Palmer and Tsakiris, 2018). What these findings suggest is that interoceptive processing underlies bodily-self representation, and importantly, the stability of self-boundaries.

Through theoretical insights originating in the MBA, EM extends predictive-coding accounts of self by describing how interoceptive inferences underlying minimal selfhood are sculpted by embodied infant-caregiver interactions in early development. Indeed, given the fact that humans are born without a fully developed motor system, infants rely wholly on caregivers for the regulation of bodily states, and the functioning of interoceptive modalities (e.g. those underlying thirst, satiation, and thermoregulation). Furthermore, because infants rely on the social regulation of bodily homeostasis, it follows that “the actions of their caregivers necessarily determine how they come to experience the affective core of their embodied selfhood” (Fotopoulou and Tsakiris, 2017) (p.18). The integration of interoceptive and sensorimotor signals into progressively sophisticated models of bodily states, emotion, and body-schema are shaped by the responses of caregivers, who (ideally) provide continuous interactions that are rich in the
synchronous and contingent sensorimotor attunement that underlie the embodied basis of attachment. Thus, EM provides a theoretical expansion of the MBA to consider how alterations in embodied experience in BPD may be related to core social processes underlying the constitution of minimal selfhood in early development.

We would like to note here that by construing minimal selfhood as the phenomenal manifestation of multisensory integration, we follow a diverse tradition of thinkers that seek to mechanistically ground embodied consciousness in neurocomputational processes (Damasio, 2005, Seth et al., 2012, Blanke et al., 2015, Craig, 2003, Apps and Tsakiris, 2014, Fotopoulou, 2014, Fotopoulou and Tsakiris, 2017). The upshot of this perspective is that incorporates a naturalized conception of minimal selfhood to include empirically tractable phenomena such as sense of body-ownership, peri-personal space, and interception processing. We acknowledge that this mechanistic approach may diverge from a strictly pre-reflective, phenomenological perspectives, and future specialist theoretical and empirical papers could explore similarities and differences between these approaches. One important difference to not here is the fact that within predictive coding accounts of embodied selfhood, the distinction between the minimal self and narrative self are a matter of degree, not of kind, in that both are understood as manifestations of hierarchically organized neural representation (Allen and Friston, 2018). Thus, our approach differs from certain phenomenological perspectives that stipulate a categorical distinction between minimal and narrative selfhood (e.g. (Parnas and Henriksen, 2014).

6. Embodied mentalization and BPD

EM extends the scope of traditional mentalization approaches to theorize not only the dynamics of facial attunement and affective mirroring in the development of self-representation, but the multitude of proximal interactions between infant and caregiver (e.g. hugging, swaddling,
feeding) that shape the very experience of bodily self. Consider how Fonagy (Fonagy, 2000) conceptualizes the impact of maltreatment on self-development in BPD:

The internalization of the caregiver’s image of the child as an intentional being is central. If this is accurate, the child’s emerging self-representation will map on to what could be called a primary or constitutional self (the child’s experience of an actual state of being, the self as it is)...Maltreatment and difficulty in mentalizing preclude such an organic self-image. Internal experience is not met by external understanding; it remains unlabeled and confusing, and the uncontained affect generates further dysregulation (p. 1137).

By this account, self-pathology results from the failure of caregivers to adequately model and reflect their child’s intentional state. However, in considering the etiology of BPD, I want to suggest that alterations in embodied mentalization may impact “the child’s experience of an actual state of being, the self as it is.” Indeed, the very distinction between a “self-representation” and “constitutional self,” dissolves within the MBA once we establish that mentalization sculpts not only the narrative self, but also the foundational features of minimal selfhood that arise from integrated, hierarchical cortical representations of interoceptive and exteroceptive input. In addition, EM provides a framework to consider how the embodied interactions involved in the regulation of bodily and affective states contribute to aberrant interoceptive processing that could contribute to features of self-pathology in BPD.

That embodied mentalization may be implicated in the development of borderline pathology is suggested by recent predictive coding models of attachment security that demonstrate how distinct attachment styles emerge, “from a minimization of free energy—over interoceptive states relating to internal stress levels—when seeking proximity to caregivers who have a varying impact on these interoceptive states (Cittern et al., 2018) (p.1).” The theoretical role of intersubjective regulation of bodily states in attachment security is also supported by evidence that the degree of non-verbal bodily attunement between infant and caregiver distinguishes the
attachment styles of infants at eight months, over and above the cognitive reflective capacities of their caregivers (Shai and Meins, 2018). BPD is predominantly characterized by preoccupied attachment (60-100%), in which parents respond to the proximity-seeking behaviors of infants inconsistently (Korzekwa et al., 2009). According to EM, interoceptive predictions (including those used to regulate bodily and affective states) are formed in part by the actual and expected responses of caregivers to various bodily states (Fotopoulou and Tsakiris, 2017). However, inconsistent caregiver responses, as well as maltreatment and neglect, may affect how those very interoceptive signals are integrated into models of bodily-self and how they are subjectively experienced (Murphy et al., 2017).

Several lines of evidence suggest impairments of interoception in BPD. At the physiological level, people with BPD have reduced vagal regulation of heart rate, which has been linked to emotional dysregulation and the perception of emotional cues (Koenig et al., 2016). Neurologically, BPD is associated with reduced cortical representations of afferent bodily signals (i.e. the neural correlates of bodily self-awareness). Alexithymia, which is common in BPD, has also been linked to low interoceptive abilities (Goodman et al.), dissociation, and adverse childhood experiences (New et al., 2012). Of note, one study (Hart et al., 2012) found no differences in interoceptive accuracy between BPD and healthy controls as measured by heartbeat detection. Löffler et al. (Löffler et al., 2018) hypothesize that while objective interoceptive performance is unaffected in BPD, interoceptive awareness is impaired, such that interoceptive signals are experienced as less trustworthy and meaningfully integrated into cortical representations of self and other.

Within a predictive coding framework, the “untrustworthiness” of interoceptive signals can be understood as a reduction in the precision of interoceptive predictions such that in BPD, there
is less stability in hierarchical models of bodily-self. Within an embodied mentalization framework, interoceptive inference is sculpted by the dynamic physicality of the infant-caregiver dyad, wherein embodied interactions with caregivers putatively modulate the precision ascribed to interoceptive input, and subsequently, affect how those signals are incorporated into more complex representations of emotion and self. Importantly, the emotional attunement of those bodily interactions are shaped by the extent to which caregivers accurately mentalize their children. For example, parental misattribution of their infant’s mental states is associated with less emotionally-contingent tactile behaviors in their infants during dyadic interactions (Crucianelli et al., 2019). In body illusion paradigms in adults, affective congruency of visuo-tactile stimuli in the rubber hand illusion leads to greater subjective embodiment of the rubber hand, suggesting that affective congruency of sensorimotor stimuli play a role in stabilizing sense of embodied self (Filippetti et al., 2019). An ably mentalizing parent responds physically to the infant in an emotionally attuned manner that allows the infant to generate accurate and precise-enough expectations about their own body. Plausibly, known risk factors for BPD, including neglect and disorganized attachment, contribute to the etiology of self-pathology because the inconsistent responses of caregivers compromise the certainty ascribed to the developing, predictive models of interoceptive needs and the exteroceptive (including social) experiences that will satisfy them, thus introducing a fundamental uncertainty about the very foundation of minimal selfhood.

Plausibly, disordered embodied mentalization in BPD contributes to significant alterations in subjective experience. For example, depersonalization (i.e. feeling disconnected from one’s body) and derealization (i.e. feelings of unreality) are common and symptomatic manifestations of stress in BPD (Korzekwa et al., 2009). These dissociative states reflect aberrations in “conscious presence” wherein the content of experience appears unreal or distant. Dissociation putatively
arises from imprecise interoceptive prediction signal (Seth et al., 2012) that disrupts the dynamic correspondence between interoceptive signal and top-down predictions that support typical embodied phenomenology (see section 5.1) (Seth and Tsakiris, 2018). According to the MBA, BPD is associated with a low stress threshold for the activation of the attachment system in lieu of more controlled, cognitive mentalizing capacities (Fonagy and Luyten, 2009). And for those with BPD, activation of a disorganized attachment system in stressful contexts may be associated with a reduction in the precision (certainty) of interoceptive predictions that give rise to dissociative experiences (Seth, 2013). This process may also be mediated by attentional processes that suppress self-awareness (Sierra and David, 2011), that reflect the learned avoidance of expected negative consequences of caregivers who responded ineffectively to emotional reactions and further dysregulated them (Shai and Fonagy, 2013).

Alterations in embodied mentalization may also contribute to interpersonal difficulties. Bodily self-awareness depends on the integration of stimuli in peri-personal space (PPS): the space that immediately surround the body in physical space (Ardizzi and Ferri, 2018), and is central for establishing self-other boundaries in embodied social contexts. BPD is associated with a two-fold increase in preferred interpersonal distance in live dyadic contexts compared to healthy controls (Fineberg et al., 2018). Importantly, interoceptive accuracy, predicts more a narrow subjective sense of PPS (Ardizzi and Ferri, 2018). In BPD, aberrations in interoceptive inference may result in the relative over weighting of exteroceptive signal. This over weighting also underlies increased plasticity of body ownership in illusory body ownership paradigms (Palmer and Tsakiris, 2018). Muller et al. (Müller et al., 2015) suggest that developmentally, “parental invalidation, insecurity, and abuse in childhood may result in an individual with BPD focusing on external cues instead of perceiving, integrating, and interpreting his or her own bodily signals and emotions” (p. 1082).
Thus, people with BPD may prefer greater interpersonal distance in the effort to maintain self-other boundaries in the setting of a porous and unstable self-phenomenology.

Alterations in embodied mentalization may also contribute to deficits in empathy and theory-of-mind in BPD, and are traditionally understood in the MBA to result from impairments in the ability to model intentional states (Fonagy and Luyten, 2009). The capacity to correctly recognize emotions in others is related to the ability to identify interoceptive states in oneself. As Palmer and Tsakiris (Palmer and Tsakiris, 2018) observe, “understanding others…require[s] at least a ‘good enough’ representation of one’s own (interoceptive) state because the key element in representing other’s states is how their states affect us” (p. 23). However, for people with BPD, who are more sensitive to the experience of other’s emotions (Lynch et al., 2006), and more susceptible to emotion contagion (Gunderson et al., 2018), uncertainty regarding the origins of bodily and affective signals may contribute to the dissolution of self-other boundaries in their affective experience of the other as overwhelming and undifferentiated.

6.1 Remaining questions and future directions

While the role of embodied mentalization in the etiology in BPD has yet to be empirically confirmed, EM provides a promising framework to investigate the bodily foundations of disordered selfhood and sociality in the disorder. For example, to clarify how early embodied interactions shape interoceptive processing, future research would be needed to examine the longitudinal association between bodily attunement during infant-caregiver interactions, measures of attachment-style, and developing interoceptive sensitivity in infancy. Furthermore, investigations of embodiment in social and non-social paradigms should include self-report and interview measures, along with varied indices of interoceptive processing across interoceptive domains, to
more precisely characterize how interoception mediates empirically measured and phenomenologically reported bodily disturbance in BPD.

Considering EM as an extension of the MBA also requires further clarification. Within the MBA, mentalization is not a unitary construct, nor is it considered as a stable trait: mentalizing abilities are thought to vary across time, relationships, and under periods of stress. Regarding BPD, future empirical work should consider how the stability of interoceptive inferences fluctuates as a function of stress and interpersonal context. In interrogating the implicit concept of self within the MBA, it was found that mentalization has implications for both narrative and minimal aspects of selfhood. Further work is needed to clarify how alterations in minimal embodiment are linked to identity disturbance, unstable goals and values, and fluctuating evaluations of self and other in BPD. For example, differences may be observed in children of parents that are somewhat more able to provide embodied mirroring without marking and vice-versa, or parents who create environments of high volatility. In such environments, children may not only have difficulties understanding their own bodily and social needs, but they will particularly struggle to respond to unexpected changes in bodily, or environmental conditions. That narrative identity is affected by alterations in minimal selfhood is plausible: inducing out-of-body illusions (in which experiences are had from a third person, rather than first person perspective) in individuals engaged in social interactions, impairs their ability to encode those interactions in memory (Bergouignan et al., 2014). Thus, the relationship between dissociative experiences, impaired autobiographical memory, and incoherence of narrative identity in BPD may result from fundamental alterations in first-person experience during those episodes. As such, mentalization theory is consistent with a “pattern theory of self” (Gallagher, 2013), whereby different aspects of self (from minimal
embodiment to identity) are thought to be related and interdependent. However, these relations require further elucidation.

Alterations of minimal selfhood has been implicated in several conditions that share clinical and symptomatic overlap with BPD, including schizophrenia (Parnas and Henriksen, 2014), post-traumatic stress disorder (Ataria, 2014), and depression (Thönes and Oberfeld, 2015). Further research is needed to clarify how the severity, quality, and etiology of minimal-self disturbance vary across different diagnostic syndromes. For example, it is thought that schizophrenia is associated with more profound and extensive alterations of self-experience than BPD (Parnas and Henriksen, 2014). Moreover, the mechanistic bases of self-disturbance in depression, such as those related to time perception (Thönes and Oberfeld, 2015) and sense of agency (Ratcliffe, 2013) are likely different from the early developmental processes described here. Validated phenomenological tools, such as the Examination of the Anomalous Self Experience (EASE) Scale (Parnas et al., 2005), can help clarify phenomenological disturbances associated psychopathology. Preliminary findings on the relationship between EASE ratings and borderline symptomology are mixed: one study for a correlation between the DSM-5 BPD criterion “identity disturbance” and mean total EASE score (Zandersen and Parnas, 2019), while another found no correlation between EASE score and BPD symptoms (Nelson et al., 2013). However, these studies did not include samples of patients diagnostically confirmed with BPD according to DSM criteria. Furthermore, interview scales and self-report measures may not capture subtle alterations of embodiment such as malleability of body ownership or enlargement of peri-personal space (or subjective time perception in the case of depression), which may not be conscious to the individual as such, but can be provoked under experimental conditions. Importantly, these alterations have meaningful experiential and clinical sequelae. Thus, investigations of alterations
of selfhood in BPD and in psychopathology in general, will benefit from a multi-modal approach that synthesizes findings across different levels of analysis (e.g. phenomenological, behavioral, and neurobiological).

7. Conclusion

Borderline Personality Disorder is a severe mental illness associated with profound disturbances of selfhood that range from fragmentations in narrative identity to fundamental alterations in experiential embodiment. The mentalization based approach (MBA) locates the origins of BPD in the interpersonal development of self-structure, and the capacity to mentalize in early infancy. However, because traditional mentalization theory posits that impaired mentalization develops when formed self-representations misalign with the “constitutional” experience of self, it fails to account for disturbances of minimal embodied selfhood in BPD. To address this limitation, we proposed the hypothesis that self-disturbance in BPD manifests foundationally as an alteration in “embodied mentalization”, i.e., the progressive integration of interoceptive and sensorimotor signals into relatively robust, generative models of selfhood that underlie first-person embodied experience. The upshot of this proposal is that it coheres mentalization theory to contemporary accounts of brain function, and links the development of the self to the necessary interpersonal regulation of bodily states in early infancy. Additionally, it provides novel testable hypotheses regarding the role of interoception in the co-occurrence of self and social pathology in BPD.


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