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Persuasion with endogenous misspecified beliefs

Eliaz, K; Spiegler, R; Thysen, HC; (2021) Persuasion with endogenous misspecified beliefs. European Economic Review , 134 , Article 103712. 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103712. Green open access

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Abstract

We study a two-action, two-state pure persuasion game in which the receiver has non-rational expectations. The sender can add ambiguity to his message by pooling it with other messages. This can be likened to selective redaction of the original message. The receiver knows the sender’s message strategy but not his redaction strategy, and uses only the former to draw inferences from the redacted message. We characterize the highest probability of persuasion attainable by the sender under these conditions.

Type: Article
Title: Persuasion with endogenous misspecified beliefs
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103712
Publisher version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103712
Language: English
Additional information: This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions.
Keywords: Persuasion, Misspecified beliefs, Non-rational expectations
UCL classification: UCL
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10125323
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