
Andrew James William Gow

Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of Slavonic and East European Studies,
University of London

1991
Yugoslav civil-military relations is a function of the interaction of regime legitimacy and military legitimacy. The political and military legitimacy of post-war Yugoslavia was based on themes of national liberation, socialist self-management and a decentralised communist model. In 1971 decentralisation led to a crisis in which regime legitimacy was deficient. Deficiency was restored by the lending of military legitimacy based on its role in the regime's creation and its formal position in the political system to strengthen the federal arm of President Tito. Regime and military legitimacies were functions of each other.

As Yugoslavia slipped deeper into crisis in the 1980s and without the late President's charismatic presence, the army was unable to repeat its role of the early 1970s. Social and political developments had debased the army's legitimacy as a political force. The multiple crisis also challenged the YPA's functional legitimacy. Its leading role in the defence system was weakened by technical inadequacies and diminished morale.

The various threats to its legitimacy explain the military's growing voice in Yugoslav domestic politics in the 1980s. The seeming extension of its role from defence to non-defence issues was no more than apparent. The generals' concern for the
welfare of society rested on an understanding of the effect the crisis of legitimacy had upon the YPA and upon Yugoslavia's wider defence capability. An accumulation of military actions and inactions, however, further dissolved both the regime's and its own legitimacy.

As 1991 began, both regime and military required legitimacy renewal. The functional relationship between the two was evident: the military needed a legitimate regime to serve; but with the spectre of state disintegration increasing, regime relegitimation depended in considerable part on military restructuring and depoliticisation - that is, on military relegitimation.
CONTENTS

ABSTRACT p. 2

CONTENTS p. 4

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS p. 9

PREFACE p. 10

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION p. 15

Yugoslavia p. 17

Civil-Military Relations p. 30

CHAPTER 2 LEGITIMACY AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS p. 42

Civil-Military Relations and Legitimacy p. 43

Legitimacy, Crisis and Crasis p. 52
CHAPTER 3  LEGITIMACY AND CRISIS: THE POST-WAR YUGOSLAV REGIME

Combining Resistance and Revolution:
The Partisan Victory, 1941–1945

Cominform Expulsion

Crisis in Croatia: Tracing the Origins

The Croatian Crisis: Creating a Power Vacuum

CHAPTER 4  THE LEGITIMATING ARMY: PARTISANS AND POLITICS

Formation of the NLA

Military legitimacy in the Post-War Period: the Functional Imperative
Military Legitimacy in the Post-War Period: the Sociopolitical Imperative

The Legitimating Army

CHAPTER 5 THE MULTIPLE CRISES OF THE 1980s:

POLITICS AND THE MILITARY

The Economic Quagmire

Albanian Unrest in Kosovo and After:
Nationalist Preserves and Systemic Paralysis

The YPA and Politics in the 1980s:
Military Legitimacy Circumscribed

The Deterioration of Civil-Military Relations in Slovenia

The Homogenisation of Slovene Politics
On Amending Constitutions in Serbia, Kosovo and Slovenia: Towards Multi-Party Pluralism p.265

CHAPTER 6  CRISIS AND MILITARY LEGITIMACY: THE SOCIAL MATRIX OF DEFENCE p.276

Abolition of the Ljubljana Military District: YPA Restructuring p.277

Critical Aspects of Functional Legitimacy: The Economy p.290

Critical Aspects of Functional Legitimacy: Nationalism p.297

The Social Matrix of Defence: GPD p.309

Defending Yugoslavia in 1941 and the 1990s: The Social Matrix of Defence p.314

CHAPTER 7  THE DISINTEGRATIVE COUNTRY AND RELEGITIMATION: THE END OF TITO’S YUGOSLAVIA p.320
Relegitimation (I): From Party to State p.323

Relegitimation (II): Unionists and Confederates p.328

Relegitimation (III): The Viability of Independent States - or Breaking Up is Hard to Do p.338

Relegitimation (IV): The Marković Option p.352

CHAPTER 8 THE DELEGITMATING ARMY AND RELEGITIMATION: CONCLUSION p.366

Relegitimation and the Military p.367

Legitimacy and Civil-Military Relations p.384

Conclusion p.393

ENDNOTES p.397

BIBLIOGRAPHY p.502
Without the interest and support of Martin Edmonds and Mark Wheeler, who introduced me to civil-military relations and to Yugoslavia, this thesis would never have been begun. Along the way, many others have given time, assistance and opinion — Martin McCauley, John Erickson, Bisi Alaba, Janez Damjan, and Joan Walker I happen to remember, others would have to accept my apologies. My appreciation goes to George Schopflin whose indulgent supervision allowed me enough rope with which to hang myself as I dreamed of a comprehensive study of civil-military relations in Eastern Europe and whose support was forthcoming no matter how unrealistic my ambitions proved to be. That I was able to save myself from this self-created hangman’s noose was thanks first to John Alloock who persuaded me actually to write something on Yugoslavia at a time when I had decided to exclude that country from my work. The faith of Michael Clarke and Lawrie Freedman and their tolerance and encouragement, and the wizardry of Chris Bluth, were essential in the final stages. Some good people suffered for my thesis along the way. One was Duška Primožič whose crazy death prompted me finally to concentrate on Yugoslavia, although her life perhaps should have been enough. It would be hard to thank the Michalskis enough, nor their miraculous Milena whose love and bravery in looking after a wreck gave me reasons and reason. Throughout, the strength and love of my parents was irreplaceable.
A week or two before I was at last about to submit this thesis, my supervisor, George Schöpflin, said something disturbing: "I have a reservation." The problem was that I appeared to have made myself a hostage to fortune by writing something quite so up-to-the-minute. In January 1991, I had amended my thesis to incorporate the elections in Serbia and Montenegro in December, as the results there particularly seemed to affect the issues covered in my thesis. No sooner had I done this and put the whole thing together than Yugoslavia appeared to be (at once) on the brink of total disintegration and of saving itself. The misgivings were not unreasonable. Circumstances and the very reasonableness of that misgiving perhaps warrant some prefatory explanations as to why I wrote so close to the wind.

The final thesis on Yugoslav civil-military relations was perhaps what I intended when I started (which could be allied to Bulgakov's celebration of scribbling, that "manuscripts don't burn"). I first became interested in this topic as an undergraduate at the University of Lancaster, where the twin influences were Mark Wheeler and Martin Edmonds. I even completed a dissertation on it in 1983 for my finals (a few pages of which have been adapted and incorporated in the discussion of the crisis in Croatia at the end of Chapter 3). This formed the core of my Ph.D. application.
However, by the end of the first year of my research studentship, I had evolved the notions of regime legitimacy and military legitimacy and was nurturing ambitions of a magnum opus expounding a theory of civil-military relations in communist systems. Derived from my interpretation of the Yugoslav case, the thesis that civil-military relations should be understood as a function of the interaction of regime and military legitimacies seemed applicable to all communist systems. The scope of research was reduced to Eastern European communist systems. In the following years, I decided to restrict the thesis to non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries, thereby omitting Yugoslavia. This salami slicing approach to my topic owed to the amount of material which needed to be covered to begin to do something with which I would feel satisfied. Dissatisfaction finally drained into despair as I struggled with a 'legitimacy crisis' of my own about the propriety and viability of a thesis on so many countries, the languages of which I knew none once Yugoslavia had been omitted.

This point at the end of 1986 coincided with an invitation from John Allcock to present a paper on Yugoslav civil-military relations at Bradford University. This required my returning to the original topic and all but beginning it three years after I had originally started and with my funding due to run out during the coming year. The paper was developed and published in 1988 in a volume co-edited by John, Marko Milivojević and Pierre Maurer. The material used in that paper contributed to
Chapter Five in the present study as did another published in Slovo in 1989. I spent much of 1988 trying to resist the empirical colonisation of research on Yugoslavia and resisting E.M. Forster’s encouragement to ‘give up your beauties’; instead I clung to the idea of the grand theory, even if trying to achieve a thesis substantial enough to support it looked like taking another ten years.

Even after events at the end of 1988 persuaded me finally to do what was achievable - a thesis just on Yugoslavia - large chunks of theoretical matter were incorporated. When I finished the original complete draft in February 1990, up to twenty thousand words were incorporated on theory which do not appear in this final version. However, they run through it implicitly. In particular, I had been keen to test my theory. To this end I produced arguments for the examination of the quality of a thesis. Good theory I maintained (and still do) has four qualities: explanation, heurism, comparison and prediction. I allude to these in the conclusion to the present thesis. The essential point is that the spirit of my theoretical demands inhabited the present thesis. Which brings us back to that supervisory misgiving. I wanted to cover the topic until the latest possible point in time in order to allow my theoretical aspirations predictive scope. Indeed, I had often joked that I was waiting for the Yugoslavs to finish my thesis for me.
The situation at the end of 1990 made this possible because the need for both regime and military relegitimation was immanent and because the likely paths to a Yugoslav future - together or apart - were broadly clear. I felt able, therefore, to identify the functional nature of Yugoslav civil-military relations and make 'scientific' predictions. By this I do not mean to say what the future holds, so much is beyond my scope, but, on the basis of the conditions identified, what the possibilities are.

One clear prediction made in the conclusion with regard to this is that the functional nature of the civil-military relationship means that regime and military legitimacy depend on each other: they are mutually reinforcing and mutually debilitating. A condition for regime relegitimation is military restructuring; that relegitimation is a condition of the military’s own relegitimation. I am not in a position to predict how or whether either will restore its legitimacy, but I can predict that either both will or neither will.

Therefore, whilst understanding George’s misgiving (and inevitably, sharing it, having put my neck on a line), it seems correct to point out that my thesis does not stand or fall in theoretical terms by a prediction that Yugoslavia will stay together or fall apart - such things are wholly unpredictable because they are so much more a matter of decision than circumstance (and I know far too little psychology to predict the circumstances in which people will inevitably make certain
decisions). Instead, my thesis can be judged to have failed if either the regime or the military in Yugoslavia is re legitimated without a complementary adjustment in the other.

All this still leaves me hostage to fortune, but less so than if I were trying to predict exactly the shape of things to come. As for the shape of things to come, no doubt even before this thesis will have been examined, the analysis made in Chapters 7 and 8 will have required some amendment - although the general thrust that should a Yugoslav break-up occur, it will be either awkward or unnecessary (with the exception of Slovenia), it seems to me, is unlikely to demand revision; nor that military reform has to be an integral part of any improvements.

That said, it would be unrealistic to expect the thesis to be perfect - although I have done all that I can to ensure that the material is correct in presentation and content. If flaws remain, then 'it's a fair cop', as they say.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The present study addresses issues of civil-military relations in Yugoslavia. It is intended to contribute empirically to the body of knowledge on Yugoslavia. It is also intended to add empirically and, more essentially, theoretically to the reservoir of ideas on civil-military relations. In particular, my examination will emphasise one concept which may be considered central in civil-military relations: legitimacy. However, with reference to the regime, the concept will be considerably modified from general usage; moreover, 'legitimacy' will be used to understand the military's actions. An important contingency on this is the light which is cast upon the operational side of military activity. That is, legitimacy, whether that of regime or military institution, indicates defence capability should Yugoslavia become threatened by or involved in a war.

The Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) has played a considerable role in domestic politics. In the 1970s, the military was judged by Dean to
play a more integral part in political affairs in Yugoslavia than in any other European communist state (only the advent of the martial regime in Poland tempered this assessment).\(^1\) Others noted the increasing prominence of YPA generals in the political arena since Tito's death.\(^2\) It is not perhaps the growing physical presence of YPA officers which was significant, but the nature of what they said. In the 1970s, YPA members had clearly become numerically important in domestic politics, but "the actual exercise of its political influence, or the ambitions of individual military figures"\(^3\) were less clear. It could not have been interpreted as "challenging" the party, instead it seemed a "generally conservative",\(^4\) not very critical supporter of the leadership. Indeed, within the party-army organisation, military interest seemed to be confined to defence requirements and there existed "a preoccupation with military-technical tasks".\(^5\)

In the early 1980s there was a marked change. The management of the economy, social order and the political system increasingly became topics for the YPA generals' critical attention.\(^6\) The YPA, at least to outside observers, seemed increasingly to be at the heart of Yugoslav politics. How can we explain this apparently qualitative change in the generals' role? Will they extend their political role and institute military government? What is the effect of economic, social and political matters on military capability? How far can changes in military organisation be related to extra-military factors? Such questions are embraced by just one: how can we understand civil-military relations in Yugoslavia?
This question embraces two discrete fields of study, civil-military relations and Yugoslavia. Various meanings are implied by these terms, forming the basic assumptions which are the foundation stones of the present study. The purpose of this introductory chapter is to give these subjects greater definition in order to pose more fully the question already indicated and propose an answer to it.

Yugoslavia

If Poland is "not so much a country as a state of mind"\textsuperscript{7}, Yugoslavia is a case of multiple schizophrenia. It is a tapestry of paradoxes: little, if anything is straightforward. The "horrible truth" about Yugoslavia is its complexity; "it cannot be simplified...without being distorted out of all recognition."\textsuperscript{8} The country is a mix of contrasting geographies, histories, cultures, religions, languages and economies, the sum of which cannot be comprehended without understanding of the various components. Moreover, it encompasses the political problems of centralism and federalism; of a 'totalitarian', 'Leninist' party in a plural, self-managing, multi-ethnic society; of authoritarianism and liberalism; of moulding theory into practice (and vice versa); of modernisation and underdevelopment - the global North-South division is to some extent focussed here; but more than this, of course, for forty years it has been where East meets West. Because of this, it is understandable perhaps that writing on Yugoslavia, particularly in newspapers, frequently has errors and simplistic
interpretations. Although complexity makes it difficult to get a 'quick fix' on the country, it also makes Yugoslavia a fascinating and fruitful area in which to apply one's study. This has been so for students from many fields, but in particular it has been "an almost ideal laboratory for political sociologists".

Political, sociological, cultural, religious and economic differences within Yugoslav frontiers surely owe something to the country's geography. There is a remarkable diversity of terrain for a small to medium sized country; several physiographic regions converge on Yugoslav territory. Distinct natural regions include the North-Eastern plains on which half the inhabitants of Yugoslavia are to be found - the Pannonian lowlands of Serbia, the Vojvodina's version of the steppelands of the Ukraine and the pusztas of Hungary; in addition, most of the country is covered by mountains - albeit ones of enormous variation in size and type - and along the coast there is a small coastal strip trimmed with thousands of Adriatic islands; between these regions, several intermediate zones are to be found. Concomitant with geophysical diversity is climactic variation: Titograd, for example, has an average monthly temperature 6°C greater than Cetinje only twenty five miles to the East; annual rainfall in the former is half that in the latter.

Differences in climate and relief partly reflect Jugolavia's variation in other regards - for instance, the distribution of economic resources. It may also have played a part in the political and cultural division between East and West which predates the arrival of
the South Slavs ('Yugoslav' means 'South Slav') by three or four centuries. The East-West divide between contemporary Yugoslavs reflects the way their ancestors fitted into a paradigm established in 285 AD by Diocletian and made permanent after another century by Theodosius; the modern line between, in the West, Latin alphabet and Roman church and, in the East, Cyrillic script and the Orthodox church corresponds to the old line separating the Roman from the Byzantine empire.

The tensions which beset Yugoslavia in the late Twentieth century may be traced in the early history of Slav settlement. The schism runs through contemporary Bosnia where Roman Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim populations coexist; to the North and West are the Catholics of Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia and Slovenia; to the South and East are Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia. The South Slavs originated from the area around Kiev in the Ukraine. The exodus which began at the end of the Fifth century saw the ancestors of the Slovenes settle in the Sixth century and between the Seventh and Tenth centuries, the Serbs and Croats. The lands upon which they settled formed part of either the Roman or Byzantine empires. Although both Croats and Serbs had independent medieval kingdoms, and despite Slovene and Macedonian experiences in Slavonic empires, the early Roman or Byzantine religious and cultural imperial imprints remained.12

Muslims constitute the third major religious grouping in Yugoslavia. All are descended from ancestors who converted from Roman Catholicism. The Muslims are in two main areas. Those in the South, in Kosovo and
around its borders are ethnic Albanians who were islamicised by the Turks during the early stages of the Ottoman empire. The Albanians are the only national group in Yugoslavia to be able to claim a link with the pre-Roman inhabitants of the Balkans; Albanian is the only extant language to contain ancient Illyrian vocabulary.\(^{13}\)

The other Muslim population is found in Bosnia. As indicated, the cut-off between Catholicism and Orthodoxy ran through Bosnia. As if this was not the cause of enough difficulties, the Bosnians decided to complicate matters by developing their own heretical church, the Bogomils (‘the beloved of God’) during the Eleventh century. The Bogomils were persecuted by their fellow Christians so much that they happily and quickly embraced Islam when invading Turks overran them in 1463. The legacy of this rapid, voluntaristic conversion was the creation of an anomaly within the Turkish Empire: whereas Turks were brought into other parts of the empire to rule subject peoples (such as Serbian Slavs), a Slav-speaking, Allah-worshipping aristocracy flourished in Bosnia. The existence of this Slav-tongued aristocracy was Bosnia’s distinguishing mark through four hundred years of Ottoman rule. Only in Montenegro, which remained an independent kingdom, albeit a very small one, because of its being inaccessibly mountainous, did another Slav-speaking clan system exist.

For a period of four to six hundred years, the bulk of Yugoslavs lived under imperial rule. Those formerly under Rome were under Austria-Hungary; on the other side of the divide was the Ottoman Empire. During the nineteenth century, the idea of a state in which all the
Yugoslavs would live together was projected in both empires. However, the conceptions of unification were radically different.

The Croats and Slovenes living in the Habsburg Empire were strongly affected by the French revolution - which some of them experienced briefly thanks to Napoleon's troops. Twenty years after Napoleon's defeat, a Croat philologist, Ljudevit Gaj, founded the 'Illyrian Movement' which envisaged the eventual union of the Habsburg Slavs with the Serbs in an 'Illyrian' state. In the shorter term, they sought a politically autonomous Slav region within the Austro-Hungarian Empire - not a separate state.

Whereas the Croats sought national fulfilment through negotiation and constitutional measures, the Serbs turned to armed rebellion. In 1804, a revolt began against Turkish rule. Led by Djordje Petrović (begetter of the Karadjordjević dynasty), it was defeated by the Turks in 1813. After a period of Ottoman legal suzerainty, Serbia became a quasi-independent kingdom under Milan Obrenović (the realm was in reality dependent on Austria for its independence from the Turks). The Obrenović dynasty was troubled and ultimately ousted in 1903, whereupon the Karadjordjević heir, Peter, whose family had constantly disputed Obrenović rule, became King. In the eleven years before the outbreak of World War One, Serbia was the light for disaffected Slavs elsewhere, particularly after the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. In those wars, the Sandžak, Macedonia and Kosovo were annexed.
Serbian efforts had been directed towards national affirmation. For them, the idea of Yugoslavia was not a prime objective; it came some time after the assertion of national identity. The main concerns of suzerain and independent Serbia outside its own borders was for ethnic Serbs living under foreign rule. The Yugoslav idea was weaker than in the Habsburg lands and was understood in terms of a 'Greater Serbia'.

The different aspects of the Yugoslav idea were evident from the beginning. As Banac has pointed out, linguistic policies were the key to national ideologies. Gaj envisaged all the South Slavs giving up something to achieve a single literary language and cultural identity: Illyrian. Croat political positions were based on the idea of concession. Illyrianism proved unattractive to other Yugoslavs.

To Serbs, Illyrianism seemed to be "fundamentally calculated to stop the expansion of Serb national consciousness to its rightful limits." "It is truly remarkable," exclaimed one prominent anti-Illyrianist, that our Serb brethren of Roman dispensation...do not wish to call themselves Serbs, though they speak the Serbian language." This linguistic Serbianism derived from the work of Vuk Stefanović Karadžić.

After the Turkish defeat of Karadjordjević, Vuk had become an exile in Austria. Under the influence there of a Slovene, Jernej Kopitar, imperial censor for Slavonic languages, he worked on the standardisation of the Serbian language; his phonetic Cyrillic alphabet was Gaj's model for a Croat version using Latin script.
However, Vuk, reflecting the view of the philological establishment, saw most South Slavs as Serbs because both Serbs and a majority of Croats spoke the štokavian dialect; other Croats spoke the čakavian and the kajkavian dialects. (The nomenclature of South Slav dialects is derived from the use of što, ča, or kaj to say 'what'.) Vuk and his supporters regarded all stokavian speakers as one nation, irrespective of political, cultural or religious features, that is, as Serbs. For Serbs like Vuk the difficulty was to make Croats "acknowledge that they are Serbs,". Moreover, they rejected the Illyrian idea completely believing it would be "crazy to abandon our famous name and to adopt another one which is dead and today has no meaning for itself." The different conceptions of a South Slav state were carried into the twentieth century. Serbia was a focus for Habsburg Slav aspirations; however, they could not see clearly how its interests might be at variance with their own.

The divergent strands of 'Yugolavism' began to be brought together during and after the 1914-18 war. The first Yugoslav state was a child of the First World War settlement. The opposing conceptions of a Yugoslav state were represented by the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee which was composed of South Slav emigres from the Habsburg Empire. The eventual arrangement was more suitable to the Serbs who, as a sovereign government, were generally in the stronger position. However, had the two groups not been drawn together, in spite of their differences, a Yugoslav state would have been as unlikely as it had been before 1914. Their mutual weaknesses meant that they had to use each other; for a Yugoslav state to appear, they
had to work together. Using the Serbs gave the former Habsburg protagonists of Yugoslavia a Yugoslav state. But, that state was one in which they would not be content.

The new country was formed as a constitutional monarchy; it had liberal-democratic forms and king from the Serbian Karadjordjević dynasty. (The country's name was 'The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes', but, following Banac,21 for convenience it will only be referred to as 'Royal' or 'the first' Yugoslavia.) Democracy worked imperfectly and the South Slavs lived together uneasily for the first decade in the new country's history. In the late 1920s, there was a succession of constitutional, financial and agricultural crises. In 1929, Serbian domination of the defective democracy was succeeded by Serbian King Alexander's declaring a dictatorship. Between then and the war royal government became increasingly unpopular - in 1934, Alexander was assassinated on a visit to Marseilles. Large numbers of peasants could not be employed in a basically agrarian society; the country's socioeconomic structure decayed.22

On the eve of war, Royal Yugoslavia had run out of social, economic and political capital. Faced with the prospect of being crushed by Hitler's army unless Yugoslavia acceded to the Axis, the Regent, Prince Paul signed. A group of predominantly Serb officers, outraged that their country should be so humiliated (and ignorant of the lack of alternatives open to Paul), promptly performed a military coup. This was the signal for Hitler's army to invade and overrun the Yugoslav army inside a week.23
Between 1941 and 1945, there followed a bloody war of liberation combined with a multi-sided civil-war. (See chapter 3.) Victory belonged to communist organised forces, led by Tito. From 1943 onwards, they established a system of government on liberated territory; after the war, they took power throughout the country. The new country was given a federal constitution modelled on that of the USSR. This meant an apparent solution to the Belgrade based centralism of inter-war Yugoslavia as six sovereign republics of different national bases voluntarily joined the new state. However, like its model, it was federal in form, but highly centralistic in practice.

Newly born communist Yugoslavia turned to the Soviet Union for more than a constitutional draft. Its political ties were very close and help was sought to rebuild the economy. In the initial years of the post-war world, Yugoslavia was the Soviet Union’s most faithful and admiring supporter within the Cominform, the Moscow based association through which communist parties everywhere could be Soviet controlled. Various problems resulted in Stalin’s expelling Yugoslavia from the Cominform in 1948. (See chapter 3.) From 1949 onwards, Tito’s regime looked to the West for assistance, but always retained a position outside either the Western or the Eastern camps – fostering the Non-aligned Movement which held its first meeting in Belgrade in 1961.

Yugoslavia’s efforts to be neither Western nor Eastern in its external policies were matched by the development of internal ones which were neither Stalinist nor capitalist. The system of socialist self-management retained socially protective measures whilst introducing
market forms. Concomitant with this was limited political liberalisation. (See chapter 3) Political and economic liberalisation increased incrementally, the changes being codified in fresh constitutions, the last of which came into force in 1974.

The 1974 constitution remained in force in the 1980s. It confirmed the devolution of power to the republics - which meant that they had in reality what the 1946 Constitution had promised in principle. In addition, this constitution gave substantial, but less than complete, power to two provinces within Serbia. Yugoslavia had become a country of six republics - Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro - and two autonomous provinces - Vojvodina and Kosovo. The devolution of power to eight constituent parts of the federation necessarily reduced central authority. The constitution was framed so as to limit the influence of Belgrade as capital of both Yugoslavia and Serbia.

New political structures complemented the constitution. At the federal level, 'head of state' became a collegiate presidency composed of a representative from each of the eight federal entities, an ex officio general and President for Life, Tito - who was 'President of the Presidency', a job which would be rotated annually after his death; a governmental body called the Federal Executive Council came into being which was headed by a prime minister (titled its 'President') and mainly concerned with economic management; a bicameral parliament with a Federal Chamber and a Chamber of Nations and Nationalities; and there remained the League of Communists of Yugoslavia as the leading
force in the system, plus its shadow the Socialist Alliance, both of which had their own presidency of which there was a president. Each segment of the federation followed a similar pattern: the most important individual was the President of the collective Presidency of the republican League of Communists; republican ('state') presidencies and executive councils had presidents of a collegiate leadership; the same structure applied to the republican socialist alliances; finally, republican parliaments were tricameral.  

At the centre of the arrangement was Tito and his personal authority. This web of political offices had been designed to prevent the accretion of excessive power; neither communist nor nationalist demagogues would be given the chance to control the country. Without Tito, this diffuse system left nobody with enough power or authority to act decisively and had nobody who could be held responsible for crisis, chaos and the lack of an adequate political response. After Tito's death in 1980, no individual could assume his role and the collective presidency instituted in 1974 with a view to arrangements after his death was composed of individuals representing republican and provincial interests - which gave it little chance of swift, resolved and authoritative leadership.

Throughout the post-war period, political and economic policy debates in Yugoslavia have been conducted according to a pattern established long before the communist accession to power. The inhabitants of the generally wealthier areas historically and culturally associated with central Europe have consistently favoured greater decentralisation of
power, along with economic and political liberalisation; politicians in the poorer Eastern and Southern parts of the country have tended to back authoritarian centralism and more conservative economic and political controls. Even throughout Tito’s dominion, Croats and Slovenes argued for realisation of those market measures which existed on paper, whilst the Serbs and Montenegrins supported the remnants of the command economy. The economically less developed South wanted redistribution of wealth; the Northern republics sought to secure reinvestment in their own economic infrastructure. The latter demanded greater autonomy from Belgrade; the former urged a tightening of central control.

The mosaic of geographic, political, economic, historical, cultural, linguistic, religious, ideological and international factors which forms Yugoslavia has a peculiar aspect of stable instability. Centrifugal and centripetal tendencies counteract each other in a sometimes chaotic, but relatively stable way. The attempt to create a system which can integrate socialism and the market, federation and central control, and, in addition, so many and varied other features, has been troubled. Yet, as Yugoslavia has stumbled from one crisis to another, there has always been scope for creative ‘muddling through’. To a large extent Tito’s particular abilities were responsible for this. However, whereas Tito could use his personal position to reconcile divergent republican leaderships, his successors have appeared to be increasingly feeble.
Even Tito needed to cultivate support inside the system in order to exert his authority, such as the army. In the late 1960s and the last decade of his life, the military became his most reliable ally, being instrumental in resolving a major constitutional crisis in the early 1970s. (See chapters 3 and 4.) In this period, the army became yet another facet in the "horrible truth" of Yugoslav complexity.

During the ten years following Tito's burial, the conglomeration of contradictions constituting the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia slithered into a compound crisis. The military was increasingly vocal on aspects of the crisis, using its position as Tito's designated protector of the constitution to expand its role and, ultimately, contribute to the growing chaos. (See chapter 5.) By the end of the decade, catalysed by the ending of Soviet hegemony and communist rule in Eastern Europe, the Titoist system was exhausted. Although in the forefront of amending the communist political system for much of the last forty years, Yugoslavia was, in many respects, overtaken by changes in other East European communist states at the end of 1989.

For Yugoslavia, the beginning of the 1990s represents the most critical phase in the country's post-war life. The withering of communist rule outside the country heralded its end within Yugoslavia and the beginning of a grail-quest for a non-communist South Slav state: six republics, two provinces, various national minorities and an army in search of a constitution. The communist solution to the nationalities problem proved to be temporary. In its wake, the country
was faced with the same competition between two polarised Slav conceptions of Yugoslavia passed down through history; to these, the complaints, fears and aspirations of two completely different kinds of Muslim community (in Bosnia and in Kosovo) must be added. The endemic multiple contradiction and complexity which beset the first Yugoslavia and efforts to create it, which produced a vortex of violence in the second world war, and which suffused the second version of a South Slav state and precipitated its demise, immediately cast a doubtful shadow on efforts to constitute a third Yugoslavia and raised the spectre of another chaotic ethnic war. In this phase, an understanding of Yugoslav civil-military relations is essential. This requires us first to explore what is meant by 'civil-military relations'.

Civil-Military Relations

Why do we study civil-military relations? What about the military is of interest and importance in the study of politics? For, it is a fundamental assumption of the present study that this is so. In various ways, the military represents an interesting and important element of a sociopolitical system. As an instrument of that system, it represents a significant area of study in terms of its capability to perform on the system's behalf. The allocation of resources necessary to the maintenance of such a capability is a further reason to study the military in its context. Moreover, given its capability, it is as a potentially powerful element within the system that the
military warrants study. What do we mean by 'civil-military relations'?

Civil-military relations is concerned with the study of the interaction of the military with the civilian sociopolitical system. By military, we may understand those bodies which are responsible for the management of restrained, coercive violence to achieve a political end.25 The terms refers most often to those institutions which are designed to deter or combat external threat to a political community, or to act as an instrument of conquest against another political community.26 In a 'nation state' international system where each state desires a security it can never know because the motives and actions of other states are never certainly 'knowable' and certainly not always friendly, defence is a perceived necessity.27 The military, as prime instrument of such defence, is a given: each state has one.28

However, military does not refer solely to bodies concerned with external activity. Although domestic matters are more commonly tackled by a civilian police force,29 in some cases 'paramilitary' units exist for the use of physical force in internal affairs.30 In this study, such security forces are embraced by the term military.31

Civil refers to that which is not military. However, in terms of a sociopolitical system, this may imply numerous things. When discussing 'civil-military relations', we are usually referring to one aspect of the social-political system. This focus of attention in the
civil-sphere may condition which particular aspect of the military is studied (it should never be assumed that 'the military' refers to a single, identifiable, homogenised entity - it always has divisions; 'military' is normally used as a shorthand term for one particular part of the whole.32 There are various levels at which we may judge civil-military interaction. In terms of discipline, our focus might be political, economic or sociological. A propos of subject, we might study the relationship at levels such as government, institution (that is with, for example, education or industry) or social group (such as class or family). Analyses at different levels will be relevant to each other. Therefore, the present study will draw on information pertinent in other areas of study. However, it will concentrate on civil-military relations at the level of government.

At this level, civil-military relations may be valuably studied in three ways. In two of these, civil-military relations is an aspect of a wider field of political science - one is defence studies, the other, comparative politics. The third is concerned with civil-military relations as a topic in its own right.

Defence analysts study the military operationally and in its political context to gain understanding of its capabilities as an instrument of defence or an implement of threat. International security rests upon informed, well balanced and clear appraisals of military-political structures, ideas and abilities.33
In defence studies, civil-military relations has two particular roles. The first involves civil-military interaction at policy level. Interest lies in policy formation, the part the military plays in the defence decision making process - its input and response to the policy which emerges. For, although, ultimately, the military, in Clausewitzian terms, might operate as an instrument of civil policy, that policy is not framed without military expert advice and opinions - nor without military demands. What the military is told to do, what it wants and what, finally, it gets may be a cause of civil-military harmony or discord. Either of these qualities is likely to have some effect on the implementation of the resulting policy - that is, military capability.

The military's capabilities as in instrument of political will comprise the second level at which study is made. Study of operational capability goes well beyond assessment of armoury available. It necessarily includes analysis of the character or nature of the military. Discord between the chiefs of staff and their political masters may create a sense of unease and distrust which percolates the military as a whole. This will involve a corporate military perception of the value attached to it by civil government. This may be deleterious to morale and, consequently, performance.

Further, the relationship between the military and society as a whole is highly significant in forming the 'character' of a particular armed force. Engels observed acutely that "almost all European armies are the same and in this sense it may be said that any one is as good as
another. But, national character, historical tradition and, above all, different degrees of civilisation create as many diversities and give to each army its peculiar points of excellence and weakness". Whatever we understand Engels to mean by terms like 'civilisation', there can be little doubt that the sociopolitical context of a military affects its nature, as is attested by a more recent author: "the measures which communities adopt for their defence are intimately connected with their internal political structure and in consequence with their traditions and their ideas." 

An obvious corollary of this is the effect on military performance. For example, the United States' failure in Vietnam has been attributed, in part, to the absence of a strong and distinct military tradition and, so, a military oriented upper class. The product of this was alienation. The effect of alienation on the United States' military performance in the future is a remaining concern: "Over the last decade the Army has inherited from society a number of serious social problems. Although the Army has not been the principal source of these problems, they have, nevertheless, negatively affected both its general efficiency in such areas as morale, proficiency and discipline and its combat readiness."

The military is also of interest in comparative politics. If we accept that the link between a society and its armed force explains diversity between one country's army and another's, it follows that comparative study of military forces should illuminate comparative study of general politics. Because the military is a 'given', it can
serve as a focus for sub-system dominant analysis. We may enhance our understanding of a political system by looking at the relationships between the military and civil authorities, and society as a whole. We may fix upon and magnify the military-security organisations in order to judge how, where and under what conditions they fit into the wider system. Thereby, we may learn about that system as a whole. Zinoviev, perhaps, overstated the case with his assertion: "Every people has the kind of military it deserves to have. It may truly be said 'Tell me what kind of army you have and I will tell you what your country is like.'" However, the place increasingly accorded to the military in comparative politics is testimony to the insight offered by study of this kind.

Where the military is of greatest interest and importance to students of politics is when "sub-system dominance" is not an artificial analytic tool but a reality. That is, when the military is perceived as dominating social and political life. 'Militarism' is often the term coined to label such dominance. It is subject to innumerable definitions. If we leave aside its use by some to describe the continuation of one state’s external politics by war, there are, broadly, three ways in which militarism may be understood in a domestic context. Sociologically, militarism refers to the prevalence in society of values associated with the military. In terms of Vagts’ historical analysis, militarism occurs when society is dominated by and generally expresses attitudes, values and even emotions which reflect ultimate esteem for things military, it is a matter of "moods and opinions". Alternatively, the significant feature for an
economist is the proportion of the economy devoted to military spending - whether the terms be manpower, materiel or money.  For, throughout history, technological superiority has usually meant victory in war. In a hostile world, national security concerns demand that resources be deployed to keep up with or outstrip potential aggressors. An economy may easily become dominated by the need to meet this military requirement.

However, it is the third area which has most often proved the focal point for students of civil-military relations. Political science has concentrated on the armed forces influence on, involvement in or occupation of government. This represents the main thread in studies of civil-military relations and is the concern of the present study. Prompted, particularly, by the frequency with which so-called 'developing' states produced coups d'etat in the post-war, post-imperial era, the question which has stimulated students in the civil-military field is this: why do or do not the armed forces become involved in and usurp the governmental process?

The prevalence of military intervention in some polities focussed attention on the military generally. Organisations for the management of coercive physical force exist in almost every state. The assumption made in most civil-military analysis is that the physical force available to the military renders it a potentially independent political actor. At any time, it is presumed, this force might be exerted to the chosen political end of the military. This potential has led the bulk of civil-military students to frame the question in
terms of control: why are some civil authorities more successful than others in keeping the military as a subordinate instrument?\textsuperscript{51}

As noted elsewhere, a vast array of \textit{ad hoc} analyses and generalisations - of variable quality and value - have been made to explain military presence in or absence from government.\textsuperscript{52} Equally, one explanation often necessarily contradicts and excludes another.\textsuperscript{53} However, each resembles the others to the extent that it seeks to explain its case by a single feature.

In some degree, the same is true for attempts to develop a theoretical framework for civil-military study. Such attempts, although never excluding entirely other features tend to concentrate on either characteristics of civilian politics or characteristics of the military. Among the latter, prominent are Huntington's work on military 'professionalism' and Janowitz's writing on military organisation.\textsuperscript{54} With regard to the former, the efforts of Huntington (again) and Finer are notable.\textsuperscript{55} However, neither 'civil' nor 'military' explanations suffice. In some cases a third way is taken; eclectically, both civil and military and the "balance of power" between them are taken into account.\textsuperscript{56}

The present work is informed by the understanding that neither 'civil' nor 'military' explanations are independently sufficient. Each requires the support of the other in civil-military analysis. A military role in politics depends on opportunity; the opportunity to act politically is provided by weakness in the civil sphere; but,
opportunity is not enough to explain a military role: given the opportunity, the way in which a military acts will be determined by 'military' reasons. Finally, it must be noted that the civil-military relationship occurs across a boundary; whether the nature of this boundary is integral, permeable or fragmented will define the context in which civil-military activity occurs.57

In this study, civil-military relations is understood as an area of enquiry in which explanation is determined by three aspects: one, 'civil', one, 'military' and one, the 'hyphen' - the how and where, the boundary across which civil-military business is conducted. Although the approach to be outlined below will obviate the need for separate consideration of the boundary, its importance will remain and should be stressed here. This is the basis upon which our study of civil-military relations in communist systems is founded. Having outlined the subject areas we are seeking to understand, it remains to establish the nature of that understanding.

The aim of the present thesis is to develop and use theory in order to understand the nature of civil-military relations in Yugoslavia. Use of theory is preferred to piecemeal interweaving and interpretation of detail because at the moment of writing the topic furnishes political science with a 'live' experimental subject. Yugoslavia enters the 1990s at the crossroads. For so long, seen as a test laboratory by various kinds of social scientist, the country hovers on the threshold of change. For those interested in the possibilities of theory in the study of civil-military relations, the moment is ripe to assess a
theory's quality: the role the YPA has played in the history the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia gives it central importance as the country takes its bearings for the future. In this volatile situation, as well as providing insight into the YPA's role in particular contingencies in Yugoslavia, the success of an attempt to generate theory in this area can be judged.

The first task in this thesis is to develop the basic conceptual components for the theory - which task will be undertaken in chapter 2. Having considered earlier use of the concept of regime legitimacy in theories on civil-military relations and the weaknesses of those theories, a model is offered in which the core concepts are regime legitimacy and military legitimacy - the former substantially renovated and the latter specifically developed. Based on a notion of crisis, the terms are lexically and logically consistent complements. These concepts will be used, first, to explain the nature and previous course of civil-military relations in Yugoslavia, and, second, to gauge present and future scenarios. This exploration of the subject will endeavour to sustain the hypothesis that Yugoslav civil-military relations should be understood as a function of the interaction of these two concepts.

Subsequent chapters will fill out the concepts in the Yugoslav context. Chapter 3 will examine legitimacy in post-war Yugoslavia until 1971, focussing on critical moments which tested and shaped the regime's legitimacy. The army's role in the Croatian crisis of 1971 is noted, giving rise to Chapter 4 in which YPA legitimacy is explored.
The conclusion of these two chapters is that in 1971 weak regime legitimacy combined with strong military legitimacy produced YPA intervention in politics: the YPA lent its legitimacy to the regime. Chapter 5 considers the two legitimacies during the prolonged multiple crisis of the 1980s before concluding that, although the regime had an ever growing legitimation deficit, the YPA was unable to repeat its role in 1974 because of frailties in its own legitimacy.

Those frailties are assessed in Chapter 6 which concludes that weaknesses in both the sociopolitical and functional imperatives were debilitated during the 1980s. This has implications for the YPA’s political capability, its social position and the country’s defence capability. General decay in the Yugoslav polity has affected the YPA, causing the two imperatives of military legitimacy to fall into a mutually corrosive vortex. The Chapter 7 will address the need for the renewal of regime legitimacy in Yugoslavia as the country enters the last decade of the 20th Century having lost its old communist and Titoist bases of legitimacy. The final chapter will consider the renewal of military legitimacy and then draw conclusions on civil-military prospects in Yugoslavia and on the degree in which the theory employed may be considered successful.

Our goal in this analysis of Yugoslav civil-military relations is to assess the conditions upon which the relationship between civilians and soldiers could be said to be founded as the country enters the 1990s. Achieving this goal will answer the series of questions posed at the beginning of this introduction, summarised by the question of
how we can understand civil-military relations in Yugoslavia. It will attempt to do so by sustaining the thesis that civil-military relations in Yugoslavia should be understood as a function of the interaction of regime legitimacy and military legitimacy.
The field of civil-military relations has a strong record in terms of attempts to devise theoretical interpretations of events which have met with partial success. The progress made in theorising provides a good base and makes efforts to improve easier. From previous work in the area the concept of legitimacy with pedigree. Legitimacy is prominent as a factor in explanations of civil-military relations. However, as we shall see, this has been the case only with reference to regimes - and then not wholly satisfactorily.

The questions posed in the Introduction can be resolved and, at the same time, theory improved, as I will argue, by doing two things. The first is radically to redevelop the concept of legitimacy as a crasis. The second is to introduce a complementary concept of military legitimacy. The conjunctive use of these two concepts will enable us to understand the dynamic of Yugoslav civil-military relations.
We noted in the previous chapter that three elements comprise the subject under scrutiny - civil, military and the boundary which separates them. Of these our principal interest is in that part labelled 'civil'. Although it must be recognised that any theory must consider both civil and military aspects, although attempts to develop theoretical frameworks for the analysis of civil-military relations, whilst never excluding entirely other features, tend to concentrate on either characteristics of civilian politics or characteristics of the military.\(^1\) That is, we are offered either 'military' or 'civil' explanations. It seems to me obvious that neither approach can be satisfactory and we should, therefore, follow those who take a third way in which, eclectically, both civil and military explanations are used - and the "balance of power" between them is taken into account.\(^2\) However, for now, it is consideration of 'civil' explanations which will introduce the concept of legitimacy.

There exist two types of 'civil' explanation. One emphasises attitudes and values, the other is concerned with structure and organisation. In my view, both types can be usefully unified and subsumed under the label legitimacy, as will be argued. To do so, as will be shown in later chapters, is significantly to benefit the theoretical study of Yugoslav civil-military relations.
The *locus classicus* of civil explanations and perhaps of the entire civil-military field is Samuel Finer's *The Man on Horseback*. A seminal work, as far as can be discerned, its author stands by it, still; certainly, writing nearly thirty years after it was first published. Finer's book dominates thinking on civil-military theory.³

Finer begins by noting the characteristic strengths which facilitate military involvement. Such are these that he is forced to ask why military government has been an exception rather than the rule. His answer focuses on normative features. Although he notes that military strengths are offset by certain strengths, the thrust of his work is that the degree of military involvement in politics is a function of the civilian system. Without the opportunity to act, military strengths are deprived of their potency; that opportunity must be civilian weakness.

Finer argues that the reason a military does not get involved in politics is what he calls the "political formula". By this, he means "that widespread sentiment or belief in which the title to govern is granted." ⁴ Where this formula operates - that is, where "the ruler's moral right to govern and be obeyed is generally accepted." ⁵ - the military has no opportunity to intervene. Finer calls this a 'mature' political culture. He has three lesser gradations: developed, low and minimal. Military intervention is most likely where there is a minimal political culture; its likelihood decreases as we move towards the mature category. Thus, Finer's argument might be paraphrased: military
presence in politics is an inverse correlate of political culture: where one is high, the other is low.\textsuperscript{6}

Some criticism of Finer's model has been made. In one case, it is noted that Finer's categories are static: he offers no indication of how transition from one level of political culture to another might occur. Finer does not regard this as a difficulty—it is, for him, perfectly consistent with his objectives.\textsuperscript{7} More frequently cited is the criticism that the analysis tends to be axiomatic: how do we know whether the level of political culture is high or low? We look at the military's role! Thus, we come close to explaining military intervention by military intervention (or non-intervention by non-intervention). Finer, with some justice, rejects such criticism: "This would only be so if I had anywhere stated that the only [original emphasis] evidence for the absence of 'wide public approval' etc., was coups, revolution, violence, etc.;: but this is not what was said."\textsuperscript{8}

Finer clearly seems stung by such criticism. The problem stems from the fact that the book is about military intervention; the overwhelming bulk of the text refers to this phenomenon. Consequently, although the author makes statements on various factors by which the level of political culture may be assessed, they are never substantially 'fleshed out' and, so, easily lost in the welter of prose on military intervention: these are trees obscured by the wood.

If Finer is misunderstood in these ways, such misunderstanding can be explained by the lacunae in his work. Wild incaution is not necessary
to infer from Finer’s book that military intervention indicates low or minimal political culture which, in turn, explains military intervention; neither the chapters on the 'levels of military intervention', nor others, sustain the possibility of weak political culture without military intervention. It is easy (albeit, perhaps, careless) to assume the argument of an internally consistent theory (that is, that military intervention and political culture are inverse correlates - see above). Criticism of Finer must focus on this. The fault is failure to give explicit, extended treatment of the possibility (or the necessary impossibility) of weak political culture without military interruption.

A very similar conclusion to Finer’s (and one endorsed by him⁹) is drawn by the proselyte Huntington. However, Huntington’s analysis also improves on Finer’s in that it is open to the possibility of civilian weakness without military intervention (as will be discussed). The label Huntington picks for this second type of civil explanation is ‘institutionalisation’. This puts emphasis less on attitudes and values and more on structures. However, in stating the "most important distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government",¹⁰ he is probing similar territory to Finer. It is clear that central to any understanding of the civil-military pattern is analysis of the capacities of civilian government.

The capacities of government which concern Huntington are the "adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence of its organisations and procedures."¹¹ Analysis of these features will define what he
calls the level of institutionalisation. Where these qualities obtain, in Huntington’s view, a system will have "effective" political institutions will command support, the scope of which is broad. But, where these institutions are "deficient", government will be weak. In such a situation, the military is likely to intervene. For, it has the opportunity and (at last) the motive to improve matters. Where institutions are effective neither of these factors applies.

Huntington derives two possible arrangements: societies can be either "civic" or "praetorian". Civic society possesses effective political institutions which are "recognised and accepted as the legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflict"; the methods for resolving conflict are agreed. In contrast, the term praetorian operates not in its more common and restricted sense of the intervention of the military in politics, rather, it means "participation not only of the military but of other social forces as well." Where there is an "absence of effective political institutions capable of mediating, refining and moderating group action...[these] social forces confront each other nakedly."

The situations Huntington describes as civic and praetorian, correspond to the higher and lower levels of political culture identified by Finer. If Huntington’s notion of the ‘scope of support’ for institutions considered, there little distance between his version and Finer’s. However, an important distinction exists. Huntington’s analysis permits the identification of civil (or civic) weakness where military participation might occur. This owes to the context in which
he writes. His concern is political systems as a whole and questions of their development and 'modernisation'. His addressing military intervention is incidental rather than essential. Whereas Finer's attention is on military coups per se, Huntington approaches them en route to his conclusions on "political development and political decay". This gives the Huntingtonian assessment an advantage over Finer's. It is possible to avoid the seeming circularity of a low level of political culture explaining military intervention. Huntington widens the scope of examination. His praetorian society is characterised by the open confrontation of various social forces; it is a 'free for all' in which the military may well participate, but also may not. Thus, we are offered the possibility of civil (or civic) debility without military intervention.

This, in turn, brings to the surface another question: if the military may or may not intervene when suitable conditions prevail, why does it, when it does? Huntington answers that it acts as an auxiliary of the middle class. Huntington argues that it does so in two ways. Both are placed in his developmental paradigm. One is to conduct breakthrough coups in the transition from oligarchical to radical praetorianism. In this case, whilst only the few have power, Huntington argues, the military (drawn from "modest social backgrounds") identify with the radical middle classes and support demands for wider access to political power. The military act to catalyse the modernisation of the political system, to usher in middle class politics.
In contrast to this progressive role, the other way in which the military acts is the conservative performing of veto coups. The military acts to constrict a further extension of power to the mass society; it seeks to retain middle class dominion. "As society changes, so does the military. In the world of oligarchy, the soldier is a radical; in the middle class world, he is a participant and arbiter; as the mass society looms on the horizon, he becomes the conservative guardian of the existing order."^{19}

Huntington’s text whilst offering evidence to support his thesis, implicitly opens a flaw in it. He affirms the likelihood of a sequence of coups following the first. Yet, if the first coup is on behalf of the radical middle class against oligarchy, the others must have different causes. Between ousting the oligarchy and guarding against the masses, "there must be a whole range of cases where the military’s motive for intervention is something other than ‘middle-class interest as such [original emphasis]’."^{20} If the military intervene in a ‘radical’ way where ‘middle class politics’ hold sway, it cannot be simply in the cause of (middle) class interest.

Although Huntington’s explanation is forceful in its exploration of civic disorder, its weakness (in contradistinction with his earlier work^{21}) is to explain motive solely in civilian terms. Clearly, class interest has motivated military intervention, but it has not been the only motive. A search for alternative reasons for military intervention, where the occasion exists, leads us to require a military explanation. For instance, it has been argued that soldiers
"cease to identify themselves in terms of their social origins but instead transfer their primary group identification to the military service itself, which has created a new style of life for them" and, so, when they act politically, it owes to "concern for the corporate self-interest of 'the institution' itself".22 This leads to a particular notion of 'national interest': Luckham reports the Nigerian army's desire "to reconstruct government and society in its own image, in accordance with the values of which it was believed to be the unique standard bearer."23 Finer summarises these military explanations of motive thus: "This skein of selective induction, professional training and social code, along with the organisation and often the self-sufficiency of the military establishment, give rise to the narrower corporate interest of the military."24 In short, it is "striking how frequently the coup leader's vision of the ideal turns out to be the values and organisation of the army at large".25

This summary is notably similar to the 'military explanations offered in Huntington's earlier work and, more particularly, in that of Janowitz.26 What becomes evident is that, although the opportunity for military incursion into politics requires a civil explanation, this is not enough; why the military uses the opportunity to intervene where it exists needs a supplementary explanation. Neither 'civil' nor 'military' explanations are independently sufficient. Each requires the support of the other in civil-military analysis. In some instances they have been openly combined.
In essence, such work follows Finer and Huntington in terms of civil explanation. Luckham refers to both to establish the pillars of his civil analysis. By stating the strength of civil institutions as one of four summary variables, Welch and Smith provide a direct echo of Huntington. What Finer calls 'political formula', they call legitimacy. Indeed, they assert: "The legitimacy enjoyed by a government affects the political role of the armed forces far more than any other environmental or internal factor." This conclusion, derived from Finer, has widespread support. Regime legitimacy is essential to the study of civil-military relations. It is by reference to a concept of legitimacy that we will study Yugoslav civil-military relations.

As will be argued subsequently, the concept of legitimacy used will require modification of the traditional consensual view understood in the usage cited is not sufficient. It must necessarily be understood to incorporate an approximation of the 'effectiveness' criterion in Huntington's work. Moreover, it will also be proposed that military element in our theory should not be merely a somewhat nebulous concept of 'military strength' as is found in both the Welch and Smith model, and Luckham's. It will be shown that there is good cause to subsume military explanations under a lexically and logically consistent label of 'military legitimacy'.

Legitimacy is a concept which can be applied to the military to complete our theoretical paradigm. It is the purpose of the present chapter to provide an operational, analytic interpretation, applicable
to regime and military. That is, our essential theoretical concepts must be set out. It is with these concepts that the present work proposes to improve on the weaknesses of extant theories on civil-military relations in order to understand the Yugoslav case.

Legitimacy, Crisis and Crasis

Application of legitimacy to both civil and military elements in our analysis requires a clear and careful interpretation of what it is. However, even where use is relatively well established in civil-military theory, legitimacy remains an uncertain and problematic concept, often used in a purely moralistic way, the concept is not easy to operate scientifically in theory. To do so requires an understanding of what legitimacy is necessarily. That is, to incorporate the concept in theoretical work, legitimacy must be limited to an objective, mechanical role. Our conceptualisation must escape the bounds of the purely affirmative consensual view of legitimacy received in the West. It must necessarily involve notions such as effectiveness, power and strength. A primary requirement of our concept is to fuse the strands of civil explanation found not only in Finer, but also in Huntington. We must also be able to use the term a propos of the military. To do this, we must, first, delineate how we understand legitimacy.
Legitimacy concerns the 'why' of power relationships. Such relationships occur wherever there exists political activity - that is, the resolution of conflicting interests by processes of authoritative resource and value allocation through which it is decided, in Lasswell's well used phrase, 'who gets what, when, how'\textsuperscript{31}. Commonly, power relationships are asymmetrical, involving the domination by one group of another (usually, larger) group; although they are interdependent, the capacity of one group to exact a desired response from another is greater than its counterpart's.\textsuperscript{32} Processes for resolving conflicts of interest usually require an ultimate arbiter in possession of the power ultimately necessary to enforce its authoritative decisions. In a political community such as a nation-state, ultimate power resides, in theory, with the state. In this case, the power relationship is that between those who rule and those over whom such rule is exercised.

The phenomenon of widespread acceptance of information and commands emitted by a relatively small ruling group (or individual) may be labelled authority. If authority describes a division of power in which a small group's will is widely recognised because it originates with that group, legitimacy defines 'why' that will is accepted. It explains, ultimately, why the resolution of conflicting interests is authoritative; as such, it appends to Lasswell's list the question 'why?'. Therefore, we may define legitimacy as that quality in a power relationship by which the relationship may be justified; it is why those with power should and do have it and are able to act on behalf of or make demands on any or all members of the community without
reference to them and why those without power should accept this situation.

However, this definition is not yet enough with which to begin our analysis. It begs an important question: if legitimacy is that quality by which a power relationship may be justified, by whom is it to be justified? To answer this question gives us a more complete understanding of how legitimacy must be understood.

Five groups may be identified with an interest in explaining a particular distribution of power. The first of these is the power holders. Conquerors and usurpers (civil or military) seek to legitimise themselves; old and established rulers endeavour to maintain legitimacy. In short all rulers claim it. That is, they all seek to explain why it is ‘right’ that they should possess the ultimate power with which authoritatively to resolve conflicts and allocate political commodities.

The ultimate mean of resolving conflict is the exercise of coercive violence. Whoever has the greatest available capacity for the exercise of coercive violence has ultimate conflict resolving power. Yet, in the eyes of political actors, to have this ultimate power is rarely, if ever considered enough. In most cases, it is regarded as preferable to avoid the use of violent means. Constant violence would be debilitating and wasteful. So, it is in the interest of those with ultimate power that their decisions should be accepted and implemented without the need to resort to coercive force. To gain this efficiency
and reserve coercive capacity, it is necessary that the tenure of ultimate power should be justified with the possession of ultimate ‘right’. The biggest can be arbiter more successfully if it is best; might is more effective if it has right.36

There are other groups with an interest in the justification of a power distribution. Legitimacy is also significant for those without power - especially, those who deserve it. Implicitly, this means that a part of any theory which legitimises power must also delegitimise the case of other claimants, particularly where a new holder of power must not only present a new ‘rightfulness’ but also argue the illegitimacy of the previous power holders and their claims to legitimacy.37

Beyond those who have power or, would have it, we may identify a third group for which legitimacy is important. This is the supporters of political actors. Power holders require support. Those who affirm their allegiance need reasons to support. Indeed, some analysts argue that the need for rulers to establish legitimacy among their followers is more important than among the greater mass of the political community. Strong support from a band of supporters may be more significant than widespread antipathy.38

However, this sub-group, in the most critical situations is not enough.39 It is the ruled mass which must accept the rulers’ rationalisations of the relationship. Sternberger indicates that Locke was the first to recognise lucidly that even a moral claim to rule
made in terms of 'divine personage' or 'divine right' must be accepted by the community at large; whatever its justifying principles, any type of rule "is based on agreement and on the consent of the people". As will be discovered below, the nature of such agreement may be hard to establish. This difficulty is the concern of the final group with an interest in explaining specific correlations of power: academics.

Academic analysts are qualitatively distinct from the previous categories. Whereas the other groups participate in politics, the academics observe. Of course, we should not be blind to the fact that political analysts may play active roles. In former times, philosophers (and, perhaps, theologians) provided power holders with justification for their tenure. It is important to be aware that modern social scientists continue where the political philosophers ended: purporting to search out the 'truth', they reveal a series of truths which support their own preferences and the prejudices of those political actors of whom they approve, whilst detracting from others. In some cases a value orientation is obvious; the relevant authors develop constructs of what ought to be legitimate. In most cases the underlying values are not directly stated. Usually, though, they may be inferred by a sensitive reading. However, there should be no doubt on the aim of any social scientist: to establish value-free method, to strip our study of subjectivism.

In our attempt to understand political phenomena using an analytic concept of legitimacy, our interpretation must be 'amoral'. It should
be aware of the moral claims made to justify rule; but, it must also involve awareness that these are arguments by which a power relationship may be justified - the justifications claimed may be less important than other de facto pillars of legitimacy. To use the concept analytically, our need is to identify the elements pertinent to explaining particular power relationships. To operate legitimacy scientifically requires us, as analysts, not to judge the moral (or other) rectitude of an authority pattern, only to explain why those with power have it and are able to make demands on the ruled and have them met - or why those demands are not met. Having established how legitimacy should be understood, we must now know how best it can be identified. In order to have a working concept, how can we approach legitimacy?

Legitimacy is commonly used to convey a sense of 'rightfulness'. Frequently, one may hear politicians or (less forgivably) political analysts using the term even more freely merely to approve of something; the bold, moral, seemingly objective statement 'it is legitimate' is preferred to the weak and obviously subjective 'I like it'. This reflects the important moral content of the term when used actively in political life. However, such usage must be reserved for protagonists. For the analyst, this subjective use is relevant only in the objective consideration of the moral claims and charges made by politicians. Consideration of this kind should be part of an operational, objective, analytic concept. As analysts rather than actors, our purpose is to explain authority patterns, not validate
them. Our problem is to establish an approach which will allow us to operate the concept.

The issue of legitimacy may be approached normatively or positively. Normative analysis of legitimacy concerns an observer's application of external criteria of moral validity to a particular division of power. Thus, if we believe that the rightful exercise of power depends on an hereditary principle, the only just rule we will identify is that of descendants of some individual (who, presumably, must have been recognised upon some other basis, such as divine choice). Alternatively, we may adopt a positive stance which involves our observing a power relationship and establishing the bases upon which the relationship is founded. That is, rather than offering our own moral standard of legitimacy, we consider the claims of legitimacy made by those with power and, in addition, the bases upon which the ruled recognise and accept their position. Instead of imposing our own standards of morality; the positive approach involves our being amoral and identifying the nature and terms of the contract between rulers and ruled in a certain case. In the present argument, it is the positive sense which will be applied. Thus, our aim is to achieve a 'value-free' understanding of legitimacy. As will emerge from a review of other attempts to operate legitimacy analytically, this is not an easy task. However, as will be concluded, by seeing legitimacy as a complex of elements constituting a contract between rulers and ruled, a useful, value-free concept may be defined.
Modern discussion of legitimacy and attempts to gain a value-free understanding of it, begin with Weber. Weber's aim was to establish a neutral, value-free way in which to analyze the problem of legitimacy. In one view, Weber does not distinguish legitimate from illegitimate domination, but, recognizes implicitly "the plurality of legitimacies". As an analyst, Weber attempts to avoid a normative judgement by recognizing that more than one basis for legitimate rule may exist. Indeed, he identifies three 'pure types' upon which "the validity of claims to legitimacy may be based". These are rational, traditional and charismatic. The rational type rests on a belief "in the legality of enacted rules" and the right in law of those in authority to make such rules and issue orders. The traditional basis depends on an "established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions" and recognition that authority is exercised in accordance with such traditions. Charismatic legitimacy relies on "devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual" and value patterns associated with that person. The Weberian typology has been subject to many criticisms. Chief among these, I would contend, is the submission that it is 'ruler-centric'. Weber is concerned with the types of claim rulers might make; he does not ascertain "the other, decisive, side of the experience of legitimacy: the view from below" [original emphasis]. Thus, Weber seems to assume "a minimum of voluntary compliance, that is an interest [original emphasis] in obedience." [original emphasis]. The basis of which is belief. Ergo, whatever the rulers' claim, it would seem, the ruled accept and believe. Or, from the other side, we might say,
Weber assumes obedience and lays out the bases upon which such obedience will be formed.

In principle, Weber’s attempt to create a descriptive rather than evaluative legitimacy is consistent with our present cause. Incomplete in that it fails to take sufficient account of the various constituencies with an interest, its attempt to be value-free is commendable. However, as Giddens observes, to try to strip the concept of its usual evaluative moral content is substantially to redefine more commonplace understandings of legitimacy. The stress placed on belief leads to a failure to practice principles; Weber only occasionally sticks to his scientific definition - otherwise he falls back into a more usual evaluative usage. As we consider other attempts to create an analytically useful concept of legitimacy, we should keep in mind both Weber’s attempt to be value-free and his failure to meet his goal.

The Weberian understanding of legitimacy as couched in belief is the founding stone of a school of thought prominent in western political science. With variations, the essential notion is that a (legitimate) consensus is achieved because the dominated believe in the appropriateness of those who dominate. Lipsett writes of the need to "engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society". Easton concludes that to endure a system must have "some moderate belief in its legitimacy." Legitimacy is a matter of "conviction","attitude" and "feelings".
However, to interpret legitimacy as beliefs or feelings or attitudes is to endow it with a (potentially) transient character. Leaving aside the difficulties associated with the accurate assessment of such psychological features, it is not easy to ignore the conclusion that these change - sometimes, overnight. Such changeability renders a most superficial interpretation of such an important concern as legitimacy - which becomes merely the product of the shifting sands of collective mood and whim.

One solution to this problem is suggested within the belief school. This is to identify salient norms - that is the most significant features of the value patterns of both rulers and ruled. Legitimacy, in this case, may be said to pertain to the degree in which 'elite' and 'mass' political culture are consonant. However, as Merquior suggests, this, less than clearing our path, offers only a "blind alley" due to the "difficulty of inferring value-beliefs". To some extent this problem may be handled; but, any solution is fraught with imperfection. Such an analysis could only contribute to partial understanding of legitimacy; it could never amount to a whole conceptualisation.

An alternative is to substitute for credence, credibility. This involves an interpretation of legitimacy which incorporates the notion of power. Stinchcombe offers such an understanding. In his terms legitimacy is not a matter of pure faith or belief. Rather, power is legitimated by the ability to call upon alternative centres of power; the exercise of power is legitimate if "the power holder can call upon
sufficient other centres of power, as reserves in case of need, to make his power effective."\textsuperscript{64} Where such a reserve exists, it is unlikely to be called upon as the power subject is normally aware of the probable consequence of resistance. For example, Stinchcombe cites the authority of a police officer: the officer will be effective, for the most part, because it is highly probable that various third parties (such as other officers or courts of law) will provide support if necessary.\textsuperscript{65} Merquior objects that "legitimacy as a power reserve scarcely deserves its name."\textsuperscript{66} He continues: "Even at its strictest 'empiricalness', legitimacy is a \textit{de jure}, not a \textit{de facto} issue."\textsuperscript{67} There exists, he asserts, no difference between an individual's complying with a police officer's will or that of a Mafia hireling if obedience depends on a formidable power reserve. Yet, should we pronounce the latter legitimate? "Of course not," replies Merquior - this attitude enables us to establish our understanding of legitimacy in sharp focus.

Merquior's response is an example of an author's taking their own prejudice as self-evident fact. Even if we leave aside the cultural features of the Cosa Nostra (although we should recognise that, as a social order it has its own bases of legitimacy) the individual's compliance with the mafia hireling's orders must be considered legitimate; we might even say that the individual has recognised the mafioso's 'right' to demand compliance. Within a given community, the mafiosi have authority; the reasons for that authority - if no more than reserves of coercive violence - are its bases of legitimacy. If mafiosi orders gain compliance, we must judge them to be sufficiently
legitimate for the compliant. If an individual accedes to a demand because of the threat of violence, as outside observers, we must identify and accept violence as the relationship’s internal mode of legitimation. It is not good enough to impose our own external preferences and describe an instance of authority as illegitimate. Moreover, it is, anyway, curious to disapprove of the ‘protection’ methods found in a particular society such as the mafia, when the same method has been the root of all political communities since Xerxes decided that, rather than debilitating occasional raids to gain supplies, it was better to come to an agreement under which farmers would not be ‘turned-over’ if they gave a proportion of what they produced -in effect, paid tax - on a regular basis.68 Today, individuals pay; they pay their dues to gain protection. In one sense, they buy the state’s protection from ‘foreign’ powers; in another, they buy protection from the state’s more punitive capabilities.69

Merquior’s criticism of power based legitimacy is value-laden. He allows only one type of power relationship to be deemed legitimate - one where there is "authority based on free consent."70 The meaning of 'free consent' invites questions. Must everyone consent? How free must they be? (For example, does he mean free from socialisation, misinformation or social pressure?) Aside from these questions, there is a more weighty consideration. To allow only one kind of power relationship to be legitimate is to become a moral critic.71 Social scientists must be aware that legitimacy is contextual, that there exists a plurality of legitimacies.72 To be scientific, we must escape our own prejudice and recognise whatever exists, de facto. No matter
how much we might prefer the idea that the Sun orbits the Earth, if de facto, we observe the Earth’s orbiting the Sun, we must recognise this. Our difficulty is to identify what is there. This difficulty can only be augmented by refusal to allow all possibilities. Legitimacy is the quality which explains all power relationships. We must recognise all explanations of why one group can make demands of a larger group and gain compliant agreement. In the asymmetrical power relationship between rulers and ruled, it is the content of this agreement which concerns us; the reasons for subordinate agreement to meet the demands of superordinates are what constitute legitimacy for the latter.

In this sense, we may identify the weaknesses in Stinchcombe’s model of legitimacy which Merquior’s prejudice leads him to omit. First, if a ruler’s legitimacy may be explained by its ability to call on the support of other centres of power, we also need to explain the reasons why those groups give their support. Secondly, unless we interpret every reason for subordinate compliance as another piece in the superordinate power reserve, the power reserve would not be helpful in a situation where we identified Merquior’s completely free consent. This is to say that, as with ‘authority based on free consent’, authority based on power is not the only explanation of a power relationship; it is only one of the explanatory options.

Legitimacy explains why rulers rule and the ruled accept this situation. Therefore, to consider legitimacy is to consider the nature of this agreement. Our need is to identify the elements of any particular social compact. As one Nobel laureate writes: "Ultimately,
the social contract offers the only bridge between the consent of
those who are governed and the legitimacy of the entity that purports
to exercise the powers of governance. People usually will not have
formally agreed a contract. But, in fact, their very actions
constitute such a compact. Such compacts may be considered "public
goods". In particular, Buchanan argues that "politico-legal order
is a public good; disorder is a public bad". Order derives from
compliance with authority. Such order is a "public capital asset"; the
government seeks the "maintenance of the capital stock through
time". The social compact between rulers and ruled is an asset; its
continuance is a "social capital" investment.

To consider legitimacy in contractarian terms, ironically, brings to
mind the originator of modern thought on legitimacy: Rousseau.
However, whereas Rousseau's *The Social Contract* was the normative work
of a social philosopher, the present understanding of a social compact
qua legitimacy gives the opportunity to create a positive,
analytically useful concept. Unlike Buchanan, we should not be
afraid that any state activity (observed or imagined) may be
interpreted as "a conceptually possible outcome of some sort of
"social contract"". Although we are unlikely to be concerned with
small detail, it is nonetheless the case that to explain anything in
terms of legitimacy is our need. Merquior repudiates the radical legal
positivist position that a law may have any content. However, a
scientific, objective approach to either law or legitimacy must permit
any content whatsoever. If the ruled comply with their rulers' decisions, the ruled accept those decisions; they agree to them, de
facto, a contract has been informally agreed. Whatever the reasons for compliance, by complying they recognise the ruler’s ‘right’ to direct and be followed. If coercive violence is the main reason for compliance, ‘existentially’, analytically, the ruled implicitly recognise their ruler’s legitimacy for that reason. Whenever the ruled comply, they enter into a social contract; whatever constitute the terms and conditions of that contract constitute the ruler’s legitimacy.

To state that legitimacy may have any content is one thing. There remains the problem of determining what that content is. As is evident from the foregoing discussion, the identification of legitimacy is problematic. Having surveyed various attempts to assert or affirm legitimacy, the difficulties are clear. Even to identify it in contractarian terms may lead to ambiguity and a lack of clarity. For these reasons the identification of legitimacy is difficult. Rather than try positively to identify legitimacy, it is easier to dissect its elements in its absence. "At best," Meyer suggests, "we can perhaps sense the lack of legitimacy. That means we can observe legitimacy crises [my emphasis]; periods when it becomes apparent that legitimacy has broken down". It is, therefore, easier to pinpoint its absence in the presence of a legitimacy crisis than to identify its presence. If we anatomise legitimacy crisis, we will be able to identify the key components of the contract between rulers and ruled.

The foremost proponent of a theory of legitimation crisis is Jürgen Habermas. For him, a crisis signifies a "turning point" - in medical
terms, whether or not an organism is capable of recovery; in social scientific terms, "crises arise when the structure of a social system allows fewer possibilities for problem solving than are necessary to the continued existence of the system."\(^8\) Legitimacy is contingent on system integration; system failure leads to a legitimacy deficit. When faced with, for example, an economic crisis, the government must negotiate that crisis successfully to relegate its itself. If it cannot, "it lags behind programmatic demands that it has placed on itself". [original emphasis] The penalty for this failure is the withdrawal of legitimation."\(^8\) All varieties of crisis, therefore, represent a legitimation crisis: renewal of legitimacy is contingent on the need successfully to "steer" through crises as the "scope for actions contracts precisely at those moments in which it needs to be drastically expanded."\(^8\)

We may summarise a legitimacy crisis thus: support is withdrawn and consensus breaks down as social phenomena critically challenge a regime's raisons d'etre - its bases of legitimacy;\(^\) the crisis of legitimacy reflects the "turning point" at which government qua living organism must adapt by effectively managing the critical situation.\(^8\) Environmental support, effectiveness and the bases of legitimacy are the key components which we must consider. Together, these areas of contract must be understood as a crasis - that is, a necessary combination of certain elements.\(^8\) A legitimacy crisis represents a breakdown in this crasis.
Legitimacy may be identified by the non-existence of illegitimacy or legitimacy crisis. That which is not in question is legitimate. However, the identification of a legitimacy crisis enables us to examine the elements which will constitute our explanations of power relationships.

To understand legitimacy crastically is to recognise that it is a combination of elements each of which is necessary and works on the others in a contingent way, in which none can work independently of the others; analytically, each element might be considered individually, but any element alone cannot be understood to constitute legitimacy: legitimacy is the crasis.

The three elements work upon each other. Environmental support is granted where the legitimacy claims of the ruling elite are accepted. However, it is also dependent on the elite's effectively meeting the demands it places on itself in its legitimating ideology and also any demands the mass make (explicitly or implicitly) for their agreement in the social contract. The ruled may tolerate ineffectual performance if they remain attached to the legitimating ideology. However, poor performance will ultimately eat away the ideological capital. Conversely, it is quite clear that effective government will reinforce an attachment to the bases of legitimacy. Equally, it is not necessarily the case that good performance will excuse permanently unacceptable claims on dominion. What is clear is that these co-relationships are so dependent upon each other that it makes no sense to regard them as separate phenomena. Analytically distinct, they are
part of the crastic whole which is legitimacy. Moreover, to view legitimacy this way enables us to satisfy a requirement made earlier. It allows us to combine Huntington's 'effectiveness' and Finer's 'sentiment' in a single concept of legitimacy.

Having used analysis of a crisis of legitimacy to isolate the general elements of that crastic whole, we must now consider its contents - that is, the terms and conditions of the social compact in Yugoslavia. What are the bases of legitimacy? How can we gauge support? What do we mean by effectiveness?

Legitimacy in East European Communist Regimes

Yugoslavia has been Communist ruled for virtually the whole post-1945 era. Although certain peculiarities have distinguished it from other East European regimes, Yugoslavia's status as a communist system means that our analysis should begin with an understanding of the elements of the legitimacy crisis in such systems. This will provide a basis not only for analysing Yugoslavia as a communist regime, but also for considering the ways in which it differs.

East European communist regimes share a number of legitimacy bases. Although there are some features specific to each country, the majority of the bases for legitimacy pertain to all of them. These are revolution, tradition, a corporate cadre, ideology and the structural
features which stem from it and define the system, popular support, nationalism and economic achievement.

The foundation of a communist system is revolution. The nature of that revolution has considerable implications for its future development. With particular reference to the legitimacy crisis, it constitutes a major pillar. Adelman describes three types of revolutionary experience: power gained autonomously without military struggle, power achieved with Soviet military might, and power secured through autonomous military activity. The USSR uniquely exemplifies the first type; Mongolia and the Comecon East European states fall into the second category; the final category incorporates the remainder - among them, Yugoslavia.

The nature of the revolution is important in two ways. First, it affects a state’s sovereignty. Whereas the Soviet Union and the countries which fall into Adelman’s third category have full sovereignty each over itself, those states in the second classification have limited sovereignty - quite clearly, part of their sovereignty owes to the USSR. As a consequence, in these countries, legitimacy is correspondingly partial; the Soviet Union must be considered in any equation of legitimacy. As a penetrative initiator of policy and a key component of a regime’s network of supports, the Soviet contribution in such systems cannot be ignored. Similarly, but to a considerably lesser extent, the situation in its East European satellites may affect legitimacy in the USSR. However, in
the remaining category, sovereignty and legitimacy are, more or less, completely dependent on the indigenous revolution alone.

This means that a propos of the second way in which the nature of revolution pertains to legitimacy, reference can constantly be made to the glorious struggle in these states; leaders can claim that new developments are consistent with revolutionary tradition, with the people’s own great fight. The same is true vis a vis the USSR. However, in the CMEA (or WTO) East European Countries, any references to revolutionary tradition may be severely tempered by the fact that these were not revolutions which swelled from below, but ones imposed from above under Soviet auspices.96

Claims to continue the tradition of a revolution, implicitly or explicitly, invoke the ideology which underpins the revolution itself. Whilst the fact of the revolution and the traditions it creates may be a basis for the legitimation of communist regimes, legitimacy cannot be understood without reference to the Marxist-Leninist ideology which, at least, in part, motivated those who conducted the revolution. It is this ideology which justifies communist regimes in their own eyes.97

Communist systems are ruled by a single party - the communist party - and no opposition competes for the opportunity to govern; they are, therefore, unitarian and non-competitive.98 Thus, they may be distinguished from pluralistic, competitive party-systems which operate in Western liberal-democracies. These distinctions stem from
contrasting guiding principles which reflect divergent views of the roles of the respective parties in history. Whereas the competing parties in a liberal-democracy seek to govern, in effect, to create history, the single party in a communist system is entrusted with the mandate of history.

This mandate derives from Marx’s ‘dialectic of historical materialism’. This states that everything in history is a product of class conflict. The nature of class conflict is such that it eventually reaches a pitch where revolution happens. The last stage in this historical process is the transition from capitalism to communism, in which the bourgeois class is overthrown by the proletariat. In the wake of revolution, for a transitory period, the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ is required.  

This owes to the need for ‘genuine representation’ which is needed because, where there is conflict of two classes – exploited and exploiters – that conflict is moulded by socioeconomic forces. So, "choice by elections of the legitimate power holders is false and unjust because this choice is manipulated" by such socioeconomic forces for true representation of the proletariat, it is necessary to have only one – proletarian – party, all others being suppressed: the communist party.

In fact, no communist system has resulted from this historical process. In each case an admixture of opportunism and ‘creative marxism’ meant revolutions which skipped stages in Marx’s original
However, revolutions ahead of the historical schedule require equally, if not, more so, the dictatorship of the proletariat; likewise, they require the instrument of such dictatorship - the party.

Carrying out the mandate of history makes the ruling parties in communist systems very different in character from those in Western liberal-democracies. Generally, parties perform certain functions. Those most frequently cited in the West are 'interest aggregation' and 'interest representation'. In pluralistic, competitive liberal-democracies, power is diffuse. Various interests are expressed. In varying degrees, these are incorporated by a process of compromise into the policy programme of one (or, in some cases, more) of the parties in the system. Interests are brought together - aggregated - by parties and represented by them. By contrast, in a communist system, ruled in the interest of the working class, theoretically, no other interest is recognised; thus, there are no interests to aggregate. However, in practice, it seems reasonable to assume that, to an unknown and limited extent, some interest aggregation occurs.

There is another aspect of a party's representational function. In representing a polarised interest, it is implicit that a party opposes another pole, that an opposite exists; a complement of the representational function is to be 'anti' something. In competitive Western systems, parties are 'anti' another part of the system. A ruling communist party represents the only legitimate interest in the system - the proletariat. It can have no opposite within the system.
Its opposite is external: the bourgeois class in Western capitalist systems and the threat which infiltration of its values presents to the communist system.\textsuperscript{105}

The absence of opposition and the need to protect against it and reaction gives a ruling communist party one of its most distinctive features: 'democratic centralism'. Power is highly concentrated in the party which is central to the system. 'Democratic centralism' is the principle by which this power is ensured. It is the measure which permits only one possible party line. There is a 'ban on factions' which means that once the party's position is made, all members must adhere to it without dissent. In theory, all officials are 'democratically' elected from below; however, all decisions taken by them - including, ironically, who shall be candidates at elections - are binding on every level below the one at which it was taken. In effect, this means the party is highly centralised, the centre controlling, as far as possible, who does what further away from it.

This has implications for another of a party's functions: leadership recruitment.\textsuperscript{106} Party members are far more closely vetted than their Western counterparts because the nature of being a member is different. In the West, party membership is largely a part-time interest. In communist systems it is essential to gaining employment in positions of authority. The key to this is the nomenklatura system. The nomenklatura is a list of party members approved by the party's secretariat and control commission, who are considered for and ranked according to suitability for posts of responsibility. This means that
all key posts in the state are held by trusted, reliable party members. Throughout the state’s apparatus, down to the level of enterprise management (an enterprise is, of course, part of the state), those in office are party approved.\textsuperscript{107} This means that the communist party’s relationship with the state is at variance with that of Western parties. The latter have no significant contact with the organs of state, except when in government.\textsuperscript{108} The party which rules communist systems has close links with the state: all officials of the state are party members. However, officially, the state is independent of the party and all power is invested in it.\textsuperscript{109} This is clearly established in the constitutions of communist states.\textsuperscript{110} What is also clearly established on the same topic is the ‘leading role’ of the party.

It is the ‘leading role’ which gives ruling communist parties their power. For, although the constitutions declare that parliament is responsible for the appointment of governments, in reality, through control of appointments, the top party bodies choose the government and have it confirmed by a parliament which is of their creation too. The party’s leading role is to ensure that only its interpretation of the world (which is, of course, the ‘working class’ interpretation) operates. It therefore exercises, more or less, direct control of all elements within the system. This includes institutions, such as the press, trade unions and the courts, which in liberal-democracies are considered to be independent of the political authorities.\textsuperscript{111}
Direct control is not only exercised through the appointment of party members to posts of responsibility. It also operates through a system of 'dual' hierarchies. Each ministry or department of state has a duplicate in the party apparat. Thus, for each ministry, there is a corresponding department of the Central Committee of the communist party.112

The foregoing web of ideological tenets and concommitant structural features forms the chief legitimating doctrine in communist systems. It is a particularly strong motivational force among the leading cadres to believe that they are entrusted with and are carrying out the mandate of history. It is an important idea which serves as focal point around which the corporate spirit, essential in the supporting elite, can be formed. As noted above,\textsuperscript{113} it is of key importance for an political system that its elite is strongly committed: "it is necessary that at least a minority believe actively in its principle, with an almost religious fervour ..." writes Ferrero.\textsuperscript{114} Lowenthal calls this important feature "self-legitimation."\textsuperscript{115} Its importance lies in the cohesion it engenders; which cohesion is essential either to promote the leadership's cause with the masses or to resist dissatisfaction in that quarter.\textsuperscript{116}

It has been argued that elite self-legitimation is often more important than consensus between elite and mass.\textsuperscript{117} However, ultimately, the ruler-ruled relationship is fundamental. Because the general mass remains passively accepting, the leader-supporting elite relationship may be sometimes more immediately relevant.\textsuperscript{118} However,
the latter relationship will eventually deteriorate in the face of active mass dissatisfaction; equally, it benefits from active mass approval. Therefore, a fourth base of legitimacy in East European systems is popular support. This is proclaimed through the principle of popular sovereignty; "all state power emanates from the people and is exercised by the people through representative bodies". Brunner argues that this "autonomous consensual" (orig. emph.) thesis is intended to supplement the "heteronomous-teleological-legitimacy doctrine" (orig. emph.) of Marxism-Leninism; however, these are theoretically "mutually incompatible", he continues.

One way in which the leaderships in Eastern Europe have, in practice, tried to resolve this is to provoke mass support by invoking nationalism. Particularly, since the Khrushchev era, the East European leaderships have adopted various stances which emphasise national identity. This is the fifth base of legitimacy in these systems.

Nationalism is an ideology which mobilises by creating heightened awareness of features, such as language, culture, religion, territory and history, which are largely shared by the members of a political community; consequently, this engenders a sense of identity and commitment to that community. After 1956, it was deployed in Eastern Europe, where leaders were keen to emphasise national characteristics, represent national interests (even against the USSR) and establish "a measure of consensus on national interests" between rulers and ruled. In effect, this strong use of nationalism helped partially to resolve the mutually incompatible legitimacy doctrines.
Both, implicitly, are against something. Marxist-Leninist ideology is anti-capitalist; nationalism is anti-others, emphasising its exclusiveness. Theoretically, at least, they may be combined in anti-Western capitalist arguments.\textsuperscript{124} However, this does not preclude nationality based disputes between communist states; when these are with East European neighbours, they may be particularly useful tools with which to mobilise support.\textsuperscript{125}

However, although apparently a strong motivational force, nationalism cannot generate sustained mass support alone or, even, passive acquiescence. The most important base of legitimacy in East European systems is economic success. Economic performance is central to these systems' official values. Marxist theory attributes unequivocal priority to the economy.\textsuperscript{126} Leaders in Eastern Europe and the USSR have always laid great stress on economic performance - note Stalin's and Ulbricht's prophecies of catching-up with and overtaking the USA and the Federal German Republic, respectively - and so do the present ones.\textsuperscript{127}

These bases of legitimacy shared by communist regimes are factors which will help us establish why sufficient support is, or is not, available. Although there may be any number of fragmented sub-groups in the support network, we may place them in three groups. One, the elite cadre, we have discussed already as it has a dual role as both base and support in the legitimacy crisis. The others are the social mass and, where relevant, the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{128}
The approval and support of the Soviet Union vis a vis its satellites is relatively easy to judge. Where East European governments' actions are consistent with Soviet policy, where Soviet support is forthcoming, it is relatively straightforward to assess that 'le Grand Frere' approves. Equally, statements and displays of disaffection (of which the extreme example is Soviet invasion) are easily read. The essential matter is that the occupation of the seats of power and its exercise in WTO Eastern Europe cannot be explained without some reference to the Soviet Union. Like the elite cadre, de facto, the USSR is both legitimacy base and support, in certain cases.

In all cases, as identified earlier, the principal consideration a propos of legitimacy is the relationship between rulers and ruled. We have noted that often the mass is no more than a passive, acquiescent participant in the power relationship. However, in gaining an understanding of legitimacy in any particular context we must identify some means of explaining mass response.

Easton argues that support may be focussed at three levels: authorities, regime, community. The level at which support operates is important. Rose distinguishes legitimacy that is conferred upon government from that conferred upon governors (that is, the 'regime' and the 'authorities' respectively). It may be relatively unimportant if those who hold office are unpopular - they are, after all, transient. But, it is significant if the institutions and structures of government are opposed; that is, if there is no agreement over what should be the proper and accepted division of
authority among various structures capable of wielding power. Even more significant is a lack of consensus at the community level: in such cases there is little or no chance of prolonged stability.

In most instances discussion of legitimacy refers to mass support at the regime level; legitimacy is "associated particularly with ... the governmental structure". However, in treating communist systems we should also note the close identification of governors with government. An implication of this is that disaffection with particular leaders in a one-party state where there is no alternative in opposition may translate into disenchantment with the regime.

We may attempt to assess mass attitudes by using the concept of political culture. Political culture is used in political analysis as "a shorthand term for the emotional and attitudinal environment with which government operates", it is the "psychological dimension of the political system". It refers to the subjective perceptions the population have of political symbols and values. It is therefore a concept we can use to help ascertain popular attitudes to the regime, to determine the popular consensual aspect of regime legitimacy. In this sense, legitimacy obtains when there is a 'consonance' between the bases of legitimacy - the regime's claims, doctrines, actions and values - and the political culture; we must look for "patterns of value agreement".

Political culture is not a concept beyond contention, however. Its definition is subject to a debate which reflects methodological
arguments on how to establish the content of the concept. On one side, the concern of political culture is thought to be values and beliefs - a matter of opinion (the 'subjectivist' view). On the other, behaviour is incorporated in the definition (the 'objectivist' view). The question turns on whether the method used to determine the political culture is survey data on political opinion or observation of political action. In truth, the two are interdependent. Attitudes and behaviour influence each other.

It has been argued by both sides that opinions and behaviour need not and do not always coincide. If we recall that the political culture is an environment of the political system, this point becomes irrelevant. What is important is the environmental response to politics, that is, its impact upon the system. Thus, attitudes are relevant only if expressed and so have impact upon the system. The attitudes likely to have greatest impact are those which are reinforced by the most important mode of expression - behaviour. Ultimately, the best measure of environmental response to politics, the best indicator of political-cultural evaluation of and attitude towards the system is behaviour.

In probing the cultural environment of the political system (no matter the preferred method) emphasis should be on significant features - what Eckstein and Gurr call "salient norms" and Pye names "critical" factors. These will be features with high visibility, which are 'consequential' - that is, they have direct impact on the system's workings and have a degree of permanence. Salient attitudes will be
the product of those experiences which "made a much more profound impact on popular consciousness than others - the 'salient crises' which, in Sydney Verba's words, 'are most likely to form a people's political memory'."\(^{147}\) In the final analysis, to consider the salient features of political culture, we must turn to salient crises. In brief, once more it is in crisis that we can best understand legitimacy.

This perspective is underscored if we look at the remaining element in the legitimacy crisis: effectiveness. For, although it is the purpose and need of any government generally to perform well in all circumstances, one, in particular, is a litmus test of legitimacy: performance during phases which Habermas would label 'critical'. It may be that "Legitimate government is that which does what it has to do, which does it well, which succeeds in achieving the public good", but, this means that, as well as matching its self-set targets and providing 'public goods' during easy periods, government must have the capacity successfully to negotiate crises.

Legitimacy crises may produce "alienation" unless the elite overcomes "popular suspicion and distrust".\(^{148}\) Pye argues that where a gap opens between "desired and actual performance, aspirations and the power to act, words and deeds,"\(^{149}\) the resolution of crisis calls for dynamic leadership.\(^{150}\) The role of "choice and decision-making", he continues, "can be critical in resolving legitimacy crises".\(^{151}\) This is to say that leadership legitimacy depends on its ability to do what is
politically necessary in a given circumstance; in other words to perform well, to be effective.

In essence, this is to identify the system’s capacity to withstand strain by adaptation and incorporation of change. A regime which can adapt to circumstances in order to negotiate crises is an effective one. This capability corresponds to Easton’s notion of "system persistence",152 it also corresponds to the criterion of adaptability, essential in Huntington’s concept of ‘institutionalisation’.153 Effective political institutions are those which can adapt where necessary and which can manage crises.

We have identified several bases of legitimacy common to East European communist regimes - revolutionary tradition, ideology, elite cohesion, popular sovereignty, nationalism and economic success. Support may be identified by the salient actions of those concerned - particularly in times of crisis. It is in the ability to avoid or successfully negotiate crises that effectiveness may best be gauged.

We are now equipped to consider regime legitimacy, in a crastic sense, in the specific case of Yugoslavia. The inclusion of ‘attitudinal’ supports, on one hand, and effectiveness on the other, enables us to combine both Finer’s and Huntington’s explanations of the conditions for a military role in politics in a simple concept of crastic legitimacy. However, it is not enough merely to be able to analyse the opportunity for military insinuation. It is not enough to identify the opportunity to act. We must also explain why the opportunity is used.
Therefore, before applying our concept to particular East European cases, we must outline a 'military' explanation. We must define a concept of military legitimacy.

Military Legitimacy

Civil military analysis cannot rest on on a 'civil' explanation alone. Although regime legitimacy must be deficient for the opportunity to exist for military incursion into the governmental domain, this does not represent a sufficient condition for the occupation of government by soldiers. Any 'civil' explanation must be supplemented by a 'military' component in the study. Thus, having outlined a concept of legitimacy to use in the assessment of civilian political institutions, we must now indicate the parallel concept of 'military legitimacy'.

There are three reasons to develop the notion of military legitimacy. First, the use of such a concept is suggested by the undefined reference to the term, en passant, in work on communist civil-military relations. Secondly, the label is logically and lexically consistent with that applied to the other side of the civil-military divide. Thus, the hindrance of incompatible terminology found elsewhere is avoided. In third place, the use of this concept places some emphasis on both the military's links with its sociopolitical environment and any moral dimension to its role.
Although much of the previous part of this chapter has stressed the need to play down the moral content of the term 'legitimacy', we should remain aware that this content may exist. Whereas its importance vis a vis civilian institutions is commonly exaggerated, its significance for the roles the military play is usually unnoticed. For this reason, the term is preferable to Luckham's "military strength". The two labels address similar aims. However, Luckham's term - resting on the twin pillars of Huntington's notion of "professionalism" and Janowitz's concept of "organisation" - leaves no room for any positive moral aspect to military involvement in politics. The use of military legitimacy facilitates this; the elements of Luckham's 'strength' are, along with other notions, subsumed under the umbrella of legitimacy. Which umbrella also shelters an important component entirely absent in the Luckham model: the importance of the military's links with its sociopolitical environment - that is, class groupings, political movements or 'the nation'.

Finally, a further advantage over Luckham's effort is that this interpretation reduces the number of analytic components from three to two - which is consistent with the need for simplicity in good theory, whilst in no way detrimental. This is because the need to supplement civil and military components of explanation with consideration of the boundary between them is obviated: the civil-military boundary, as will be seen, is a base of military legitimacy - and therefore, contained within the concept. Our present task is to
take the under-used notion of military legitimacy and give it analytic definition.

With reference to the definition of legitimacy made above, we may qualify military legitimacy. It refers to that quality in an army's relationship with its sociopolitical environment by which the relationship may be justified; it is why the army has force and powers which are denied the rest of society; it is why the military can act on behalf of and make claims on the political community.

The legitimacy of any social or political institution must be assessed in terms of its relations to the wider political system. The legitimacy of the military as an institution is determined by its relationship to the political system. Some authors see this as a 'lower level' of legitimacy: "The legitimacy of social institutions, organisations and social roles is a derived or reflected legitimacy."\(^1\) This is to say that military legitimacy depends on regime legitimacy.\(^2\) But, if the concept of military legitimacy is to have significance, it must be separated from regime legitimacy. Military legitimacy is more than a simple function of regime legitimacy. Like regime legitimacy, we may understand the military variant as a crisis, comprising bases of legitimacy, performance (or effectiveness) and environmental approval.

The bases of military legitimacy fall into two types: the functional and the sociopolitical. As an institution with a particular purpose - matters military, concerning the exercise of restrained coercive
violence - military legitimacy must be considered in terms of that purpose - that is, its functional imperative derives from the tasks any military might be expected to fulfil - essentially, protection of the state from external physical threat. This is the military mission.

The key element, therefore, in military legitimacy is the claim that it provides the political community with the defence force it requires and does so efficiently. Conversely, military legitimacy would be very much weakened if the institution were unable to perform this role. In addition, the military should provide optimal physical security. This means that security should be the means to some other end. In Clausewitz’s sense, the military must be an instrument of policy.

The military may fulfil its functional imperative two ways. First, it may latently perform its mission to prevent external attack without actively using its expertise. Secondly - and more obviously - it may engage in the effective use of its skills in violence to counter the similar skills of some other party. Essentially, the accomplishment of its role in either way depends on whether or not the military satisfies the criteria of being a military body. These are the ingredients of military professionalism. Thus, we might expect a legitimate military to be: expert in the management of restrained coercive violence; corporate, as a compliance based, hierarchically ordered organisation with a generally coherent set of political, ethical and moral values which satisfy the ‘military mind’ - which implies the existence of a partially self-selective sub-culture; and,
lastly, responsible - which means that it will behave in the manner expected of it by the state it serves.165

However, although its definitive role and its formal legal-constitutional linkage with a sponsoring political community constitute a functional base for legitimacy, the military is also governed by a sociopolitical imperative. The sociopolitical imperative is the sum of the non-functional demands made upon the military. It is quite conceivable that these may clash with functional requirements. One aspect of military legitimacy is to balance functional and sociopolitical demands. It must be able both to perform its role and, yet, not be alienated from its parent society.

The sociopolitical bases of military legitimacy may be placed in three groups: political activity; agency; and the nature of the relationship between the armed forces and society. A propos of the first heading, whilst all militaries participate in political life, this feature is particularly salient when studying communist systems (such as Yugoslavia). Unlike the notional 'neutrality' of armies in liberal democratic states,166 the military is designated a political function.167 This partially-formalised political role for the military is a systemic peculiarity.

As was indicated in the discussion on regime legitimacy, for each ministry, there is a corresponding department of the central committee of the communist party. The military is no exception to this. It is
this feature of the communist system which gives civil-military relations its particular character.

The "political control system" which operates gives civil-military relations in communist systems its distinctive character.\(^\text{168}\) The chief element in the control system is the Main Political Administration (MPA)\(^\text{169}\) which operates within the Ministry of Defence and at all levels of the military establishment.\(^\text{170}\) It is, however, a section of the Central Committee (CC) to which it is directly responsible. Its chief serves as Deputy Minister of Defence and has the "rights" but not the title of a Secretary of Department of the CC.\(^\text{171}\) Although its authority is always extensive, it fluctuates with events in the wider political scene.\(^\text{172}\) However, albeit that the Ministry of Defence carries out the will of Parliament, because of the party's 'leading role', it is the Department of the Central Committee which actually decides policy.\(^\text{173}\)

The contemporary political control system developed from specific historical circumstances in the Soviet Union - the first communist system and model for the others. A decree in April 1918 instituted 'political commissars' and defined them as the "direct organ of Soviet power in the Army."\(^\text{174}\) The main impetus to their introduction was the large number of ex-Tsarist officers fighting for the Red Army and, consequently, the need to supervise their activities as they lacked a strong ideological bond.\(^\text{175}\)
The MPA’s role has been argued by some to be similar. Assuming the continuing reluctance of officers to embrace the appropriate political line, it is argued that the role of the MPA is indoctrination to ensure political reliability.\textsuperscript{176} But, the power of this argument is limited by two features. The first is the prevalence of party membership among officers.\textsuperscript{177} Although career advancement probably lies behind this, it is, nonetheless, a sign, in the broadest terms, of loyalty to the system and, so, reliability.\textsuperscript{178} Moreover, the extent to which the MPA functions as a control mechanism is significantly challenged by the finding that officers are speedily and unhesitatingly granted party membership and that promotions and appointments are based on military criteria of success.\textsuperscript{179} Where some rigour is shown with regard to admission to the party, normally, such precipitate entry for officers indicates the belief that control is unnecessary; it is assumed that officers are reliable.

Any control function is also clearly impeded by a second factor – the relationship of military command to the MPA. First, the principle of one man command gives formal superiority to the military commander; he is usually senior to his political deputy in rank, age and experience of both the military and the party.\textsuperscript{180} In addition, the notion of ‘control’ is severely constricted by the evidence of career patterns. This suggests that there is considerable interchange of personnel between the MPA and the military command; (the supposed) gamekeepers and poachers frequently switch from one side to the other.\textsuperscript{181} This is because increasingly technical and specialised work has meant greater need for specific knowledge – a commitment to the ‘professional’
acquisition of expertise. In the process, the tasks of education and administration which the MPA seems to perform are regarded as specialisms on a par with any other branch of military activity: "They are soldiers of the Party, and they bear special weapons, but they are soldiers nonetheless."\footnote{182}

The work done by the MPA complements the wider sphere of military activity. Consequently, "the MPA is emmeshed, intricately and irrevocably in that very activity."\footnote{183} These factors indicate that the MPA is not an external institution to monitor and control the military; it is a part of the military apparatus, performing educational, administrative and morale boosting duties, apart from civilian institutions.\footnote{184} In this respect, there is a contrast with the usual practice in communist systems: where party and state are normally strictly separated, in the MPA, the two appear to have combined.\footnote{185}

The extent to which these findings accurately reflect the situation in all communist systems varies.\footnote{186} In Cuba, for example, the civil-military distinction is far less obvious than it is in the USSR.\footnote{187} In the Warsaw Pact (WTO) East European countries, the Soviet connection may mutate the straightforward civil-military relationship.\footnote{188} Nonetheless, the phenomenon of state and party fusion in the MPA is of considerable significance for the civil-military relationship in all communist systems.
The MPA was a political organ, born of the system of separate, dual hierarchies. But, special conditions appropriate to the military meant that this political organ became less a watchdog and more a part of the state institution; its role changed. The MPA has become inseparably allied with the military as a whole in a unique fusion of party organ with state organ. Thus, with the MPA a Department of the party's CC, the party in the army, became the army in the party. It is this feature which gives civil-military relations in communist systems its distinct character.

A civil-military relationship is usually characterised by integral boundaries, in which civil and military are clearly distinct elements, or fragmented boundaries, in which there is overlap between some military and some civil elements at certain points. According to the criteria by which the integrity or fragmentation of boundaries is established (see Chapter 1), the military in a communist system, judged by its structural differentiation, its functional specialisation and its cohesion, is clearly distinct and has integral boundaries between it and civilian authority. This is underlined by the formal intercession between political authority and the military of the state in the form of the Ministry of Defence.\(^{189}\)

Yet, the extremely high incidence of party membership among officers (especially, its universality at the highest levels) would suggest considerable overlap, an absence of formality in the military-civil relationship and, so, considerable fragmentation of boundaries: there is a direct, informal link where officers constitute "the Party in
uniform. This fragmentation clashes with the integrity outlined above (intellectually at least). This conflict is focussed and resolved by the existence of the MPA.

What makes the MPA a singular feature of civil-military relations is that it balances integrity and fragmentation. Usually, where integral boundaries prevail, contact between political authority and the military is indirect and formal. Normally, where boundaries are fragmented such contact may be direct and informal. The MPA creates a channel between the military and political authority which is direct and formal.

Thus, the civil-military relationship in a communist system acquires two distinct properties: it is direct and formal. First, the relationship between the military and political authority is not necessarily mediated by the state - that is the Ministry of Defence: it is direct. Secondly, where direct contact usually derives from association with or membership of a particular social grouping which is partial and informal, in communist systems the direct link is institutional - through the MPA, the military has a specific institutional role in the political process: the relationship is formal. (As the Central Committee is, effectively, the sovereign body of a communist system between party congresses, this formal, direct channel constitutes the approximate equivalent of the military having a formal place in the parliament of a liberal-democracy.)
The importance of this peculiarity should not be exaggerated. In principle it is an important facet. In practice, for the most part, military representation on the party CCs is composed less of MPA delegates than of delegates from basic organisations - that is, informal fragmentation can account for more uniforms on the CC than the formal link.\textsuperscript{191} Moreover, where representation counts most is in the politburo - the executive of government, responsible for policy directives. Here, although soldiers are sometimes members of the politburo - especially as Defence Minister - it is by no means a necessary or commonplace feature.\textsuperscript{192} Mostly, this peculiarity "is of no great moment" because "there are only issues of efficiency",\textsuperscript{193} that is, the MPA is 'military-centric', its attention is turned inwards in attempts to improve performance, concentrating on issues of education, administration and morale.

The direct formal link between army and party is nonetheless significant. Where it is of 'no great moment', there remains latent the possibility that its materialness will increase. It can serve as a channel which brings the military into politics. The Yugoslav constitution indicates how the scope of this formal link may be extended.\textsuperscript{194} The Polish example demonstrates quite clearly the full implications of this formal connection: the military's participation in politics may be vastly extended to the point of implementing martial law and forming the government. But, this does not take the form of a \textit{coup d'état}, bloody or bloodless, which normally precedes military government. It happens legitimately because the military is already a formally recognised and incorporated element in the
political process. The formal link between the military and the political authority of the communist party means that as a political actor, the military is endowed with legitimacy.

The civil-military relationship in communist systems is distinct from that in other systems in that it is direct and formal. The existence of a direct, formal channel between the military and civilian political authority makes the military a legitimate actor in political processes - whether the scope is large or small. This legitimacy has considerable implications for the study of civil-military relations in a communist system. Whereas, in non-communist societies, military involvement in politics presents a question on legitimacy, in communist states, the politicisation of military activity provides a base for the armed services' to act with political legitimacy.

However, whilst this feature distinguishes communist systems, it is not the only sociopolitical foundation of military legitimacy; there are others found in some degree in all political communities. For example, there are the various resources and activities which constitute military agency. Chief among these are the armed services' roles as a symbol of political unity; its contribution to the socioeconomic infrastructure of the state; and its operating as an instrument of education and socialisation.²⁹⁵

Armies may usually be identified with a nation-state. In such cases, they may act as a symbol of national pride vis a vis military traditions and past military activity; for example, Edmonds writes of
the British Armed services that their "exploits" contributed to their legitimacy". There can be little doubt that the heroic achievements of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War or the Partisans’ victory in Yugoslavia (see chapter 4) act as bases for military legitimacy, to furnish communist examples. Moreover, looking backwards at military tradition may also be a platform on which to stand the military as a symbol of present and future security. In this way the army may be used as a symbol of national unity. In addition to its potential value as a symbol of unity, the armed forces may also be an "emulative model"; for example, Bobrow cites the instance of Mao’s China where the portrayal of the military’s willingness to endure hardships was used in an attempt to engender a similar willingness on the part of the mass.

Another way in which the army may be used as an emulative model is in the socioeconomic domain. However, the military’s agency in this area is greater than its symbolic value. In many instances, it is important to be aware of "what the military does that affects the pursuit of economic development". Often, because of what Janowitz calls the army’s "organizational format", in developing economies, the military is better suited than any other social group for the fulfilment of the demands facing a rapidly developing society. With regard to communist systems, military input is considerable.

Although the armed forces’ contribution in the socioeconomic sector may usually owe to military needs (present or potential), its general impact cannot be overlooked. In various areas of construction
and engineering work - from roads, houses, public buildings and irrigation schemes to the establishing of railway and telephone lines - communist armed forces participate in extra-military undertakings which make a big impact on a country's infrastructure and output. At a more sophisticated level, in communist states, the most advanced sectors of the economy are usually related to defence and military-related production. Either as part of the military industrial sector, or as part of a wider 'military-industrial complex' (comprising scientific research and educational institutes, various planning organisations and defence production establishments), the armed services may be identified with the most advanced levels of economic activity.

The military's linkage with the highest level scientific research educational institutions draws attention to another aspect of the armed services' agency: as the school of the nation. In all political systems, the army acts as an educator, imparting technical skill; in communist armed forces this role is augmented by politico-ideological and moral training. In essence, this means a more active and overt process of socialisation than that found in non-communist armies.

The various ways in which the military acts as an agent of political, economic and social integration, are a major base for its legitimacy in communist systems. The last of these, relating to society, leads us to the most significant of the sociopolitical bases of military legitimacy: the relationship between the armed forces and society. The core of this is the congruence of military with community.
It is assumed in many 'liberal' minds that the internal structures and functioning of the armed services should coincide with those outside them.\textsuperscript{207} Whilst it may be that, for liberal-democracies at least, this is not necessarily the best possibility, given the competing claim of an army's functional imperative, it is certainly important than an armed force has an "identity with a society at large".\textsuperscript{208} We must consider as a base of military legitimacy the extent to which the armed force, in organisation and quality, is a reflection of the society it represents.\textsuperscript{209} Army personnel must in an appropriate way embody values widely held in sectors of the political community - and the armed forces' composition must be generally representative of social and ethnic cleavages within society. "The legitimacy of the armed forces...is considered suspect if significant discrepancies exist."\textsuperscript{210}

These are the bases upon which military legitimacy may be founded. As with regime legitimacy, the bases are one element of a crisis in which good performance may provoke active or passive environmental support; or, poor performance may engender active disapproval; or, environmental support may exist in spite of low effectiveness.

The environment from which the armed forces must gain support may be divided into three parts. The first two - the elite and the mass within a society - are relevant to all national military organisations. The third is pertinent only in certain cases where an army operates on behalf of a penetrated system where the client must have minimal acquiescence on the patron's part.
This aspect is clearly presented in one excellent and valuable study. In this work, it emerges that WIO militaries were predominantly beholden to and supported by the USSR. Yet, they were in some degree schizophrenic: although penetrated, they remained in form, if not substance, national armies. This dichotomy results in a bifurcated legitimacy doctrine, the two parts of which have to be ‘dialectically’ integrated. Thus, there were two seemingly contradictory bases of military legitimacy in these countries: internationalism and nationalism.

The system of Soviet control, under the banner of internationalism, emerged in response to nationalism. Originally, there was hostility in the national armies to Soviet presence. In Poland, for example, in 1949, it was necessary that 90 per cent of the senior positions in the Ministry of Defence and the military district commands were Soviet officers. However, it was (and remains) necessary that there should be some nationalist content.

Some nationalist content is inevitable where one military role is to be a national symbol, one of the ‘trappings of national sovereignty’. But, this is not the limit of such a role. The nationalist element is important in generating community support of the military. As stated already, the armed services’ legitimacy is dependent, to some considerable extent, on their congruence with the society which spawns them. Patriotism increases the identification of the populace with the military. Within army ranks, even, it is the fountain-head of political loyalties in the junior cadre. It is a key element in
military socialisation. Socialist patriotism, for practical purposes, disguised the necessary links between East European armies and the SAF; and it proved a solid counterweight to the seeming hollowness of ‘internationalism’.

Support will be forthcoming if either the military performs effectively, in accordance with its functional and sociopolitical bases of legitimacy, or, if there is some attachment to those bases which overarches poor performance. But, in the absence of such attachments, an ineffectual military may lose its legitimacy. For example, Edmonds cites the incipient delegitimation of the British armed forces in the years around 1970. Other instances of breakdown in the social compact between soldiers and the sociopolitical community which sponsors them are the United States’ Army’s difficulties with regard to Vietnam and the French military’s problems arising out of its engagement in that country and its politico-military activity a propos of Algerian independence. Lastly, it seems likely that the Soviet Army’s excursion into Afghanistan has disturbed its legitimacy.

Military legitimacy must be separated from regime legitimacy. The concept refers to the crasis of bases, performance and environmental support with which we may explain the political role of the military. The concept is analytically purposeful as a compliment to crastic regime legitimacy. The relationship between civil and military institutions is a function of the interaction of these two concepts. Weak or non-existent regime legitimacy is a precondition for any
significant or successful military role in executive government. Such a role is not possible where regime legitimacy is sufficient. However, where the conditions exist for military involvement in government, military participation does not necessarily occur. Only if the military organisation has some legitimacy can it intrude in politics with success. If the military does not have the legitimacy to act when circumstances are suitable, it cannot.

The remainder of this thesis will assess the usefulness of these concepts and the related theory by applying them to the Yugoslav case, in order to explain civil-military relations there.
Crastic legitimacy, comprising bases, performance and support is most easily analysed at critical moments. In the present chapter, we will examine Yugoslavia at moments where the regime’s existence was in question. Before Tito’s death in 1980, communist Yugoslavia had three salient experiences: the regime’s revolutionary birth, the Cominform expulsion in 1948, and the ‘Crisis in Croatia’ in 1971. In each case, the regime managed a critical situation successfully on the base of its legitimation principles, thereby, securing support. The two main legitimating principles of the Titoist regime stem from the experiences of the war and 1948 - the revolution itself and the theory of socialist self-management which emerged after the Tito-Stalin split. The partisan revolution was tested by the events of 1948. A key factor in the regime’s survival was the ability to adapt, the product being the self-management system. In 1971, it was that system itself which was put to the test. Then, however, as will be argued, the power vacuum created by self-management and decentralisation meant that the
regime could not negotiate the crisis alone; regime legitimacy was
boosted by military legitimacy.

Combining Resistance and Revolution: The Partisan Victory, 1941-45

Communist Yugoslavia, like the Soviet Union was born of combined
international and civil-war. This similarity is not insignificant in
considering the success of the Partisan movement. Both revolutions
were underpinned by an understanding of the war-politics link,
expressed in the dictum "war is a continuation of politics by other
means".¹ This famous Clausewitzian tenet first identified the
relationship between war and politics: war is one instrument by which
means political goals may be achieved.²

The importance of the war-politics relationship was recognised by the
great communist thinkers.³ However, Marx and Engels modified the
Clausewitzian view that war is a political tool between states,
arguing that wars are fought in the interests of the ruling classes of
those states - which interests in no way correspond to those of the
exploited classes; the war-politics continuum, they suggested, should
be understood in class terms.

The relationship was applied to Communist teaching in two ways. First,
it was concluded that "every 'capitalist war' must be considered
simply as an opportunity for advancing the cause of internationalist
socialism". That is, the chaos created by imperialist wars should be
turned to the advantage of the communist cause. Secondly, the view was
formed that force is the midwife to an old system ready to give birth
to a new one - it can be used to expedite change.

Lenin, specifically concerned with the context for a Russian
revolution, saw that these two ideas had to be fused. The active use
of force could be successful only under the cover of a prolonged
global war. A war of this kind would result in the total social
disintegration - and, so, military defencelessness - of the old
system. In Russia, this would lead to Bolshevik revolution. Lenin’s
paradigm was vindicated in the 1914-18 war.

A similar principle underlay the success of the Yugoslav Partisans in
the Second World War. It inspired the Communist-led group to use
military means to achieve a political end, as I propose to argue.
First, however, I will demonstrate how such a principle was as much
applicable to Yugoslavia in 1941 as it had been in Russia in 1917.
Without the total political and social disintegration of April 1941
the eventual Communist victory would not have been possible. The fall
of Yugoslavia to the Axis invasion was inevitable. However, if prewar
conditions in the country had been satisfactory for a majority of the
people, Yugoslavia’s political and socioeconomic infrastructures would
not have been completely destroyed.

Inter-war royal Yugoslavia was politically weak, chiefly, because of
the unresolved national question. In 1921, the Constitution had
established a centralist system of Serb hegemony. This was against the wishes of Croats, Slovenes and others in the new state. By 1929, it had become necessary to introduce a royal dictatorship in order to preserve the system and, so, Yugoslav citizens lost democratic rights.

The lack of political consolidation in the inter-war period meant that Yugoslavia’s basic social and economic problems were neglected. The Yugoslav idea became increasingly weak, whilst nationalist sentiments of the various nations in the state became increasingly strong. Associated with national consciousness was religion; this widened the gaps between nations. The Serb Orthodox Church was given priority among churches and there was a certain amount of discrimination, particularly, against Roman Catholics who were mainly Croat. The ecclesiastical dimension added to the dissatisfaction of the non-Orthodox population.

Another factor which contributed to the dissatisfaction of the majority of Yugoslavs was the underdevelopment of agriculture. In 1941, about 73 per cent of Yugoslavs depended on the land. This meant that agriculture had to bear the burden of many unemployable people, since the excess peasant population could not be absorbed into an underdeveloped Yugoslav industry. Again, this caused yet wider rifts between different nationalities. This owed to the enormous variations in the level of economic development.

Yugoslavia in 1941 had no national consensus, and no means for resolving even simple problems. Its constituent nations were
dissatisfied with their government and increasingly followed nationalist interests. At the beginning of 1941, this weak state had to face-up to great pressure from Hitler to join the Axis by adhering to the Tripartite Pact. If Prince Paul's government could have relied on its subjects' support, it might have been able to resist Nazi threats. As things stood, the government's only option was to sign the Pact. Two days later the government, stripped of any last film of legitimacy, was overthrown by a military coup - the roots of which lay in outraged Serb national pride, ashamed that Serbia should be subject to the disgrace of giving-in to the Axis. The Axis lost no time in planning the destruction of Yugoslavia, now considered to be an enemy.8

When the Axis invasion came, the struggle against it was short-lived and half-hearted. The majority of non-Serb Yugoslavs had no incentive to fight and die for a state in which they had no stake. The badly organised, badly led, partially mobilised Yugoslav army could not be properly armed and sustained by an underdeveloped agrarian economy.9 Within two weeks, the Yugoslav army was completely smashed and Yugoslavia was partitioned.

A prolonged global war had brought political and socioeconomic disintegration in Yugoslavia, as it had in Russia in 1917. A capitalist war having created the conditions for a communist revolution, the Yugoslav Communists knew that such a revolution would be achieved with force. Such force would require proper direction in
order to achieve its aims. Political and military organisation, therefore, needed to be excellent.

This organisation needed a broad basis which could be supplied by the harnessing of available manpower - the large peasant class. Policies, therefore, of the group using revolutionary force, had to appeal to a majority of Yugoslavs. Initially, the wish of the people had been to resist the enemy invader - continuing a traditional South Slav pattern of resistance to occupation. The creation of a powerful resistance movement was the obvious way to garner and build a power base to conduct a revolution.

The Partisans were not, however, the only resistance group in Yugoslavia. The other main group was the Chetniks, led by Serbian officers, more or less in the interests of the old royal regime. Although the Communists would have preferred to fight with the Chetniks, the differing aims and policies of the two groups led to their polarisation at the end of 1941 - and, subsequently, the Chetnik conviction that the Partisans, not the invader, constituted the real enemy. Tito’s Partisans became the leading resistance movement in the country because of two factors. First, they were wholly committed to freeing Yugoslavia for an eventual Communist takeover and, so, efficiently pursued their aim: political purpose forged military organisation. Secondly, in contrast, their main rivals, the Chetniks, lacked the cohesive discipline fostered by that purpose and organisation.
Before the war, persecution of the Communists by the royal regime had meant their being forced to construct a well-organised network of illegal communications in order to remain a coherent political party. This experience was to become invaluable - in particular, it meant that the Party was thrown into disorganisation by the dissolution of the State. Moreover, the conspiratorial nature of the prewar Party meant that it was particularly well suited to conducting a clandestine resistance movement in the context of what became a guerrilla war against occupation.

The CPY leadership compounded this: they were, in general, politicians, first and military men second. This was of particular importance as the situation meant that it was necessary for them to be diplomatically astute in dealing with the occupying powers and international developments - which had to be turned to the Partisans' advantage.

Another part of Partisan policy was to form mini-states of liberated areas. This was important in winning over the inhabitants in those areas and, so, increasing support for the movements. Essentially, this was a matter of establishing the military-political legitimacy of the Partisans. It also provided practical experience from which to plan the construction of a new Yugoslavia after the war.

The Partisan movement was not without experienced military leaders. Some CPY members had been in Russia at the time of the October Revolution and had experience of revolutionary struggle. Others had
been sent by the CPY to fight in the Spanish Civil War; these had returned with invaluable experience of guerilla warfare fought on rugged terrain.

The CPY also ensured that the Partisans operated with a high level of central control. The basic military strategy and political programme were uniform, and discipline was strict. In particular, punishments for behaviour which would discredit the Partisan movement among the people were severe.11

Central control by the CPY was organised under the cover of the National Liberation Army (NLA) and political leaders were transformed into a military general staff. Later, control was administered under the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ). In effect, the Partisans became the national army of Yugoslavia and, although not without reverses, moved from strength to strength.12

The Partisans made a strong contrast with their principal Yugoslav opponents, the Chetnik movement under the leadership of Draža Mihailović, a Serb officer. This movement’s organisation was at local level - neighbouring groups sometimes having no contact with one-another. The Chetniks lacked cohesion and the character of each group tended to be a reflection of its leader. Each group was tied to its area of origin which meant, in addition, that the Chetniks did not have the Partisan army’s mobility.13
The Chetniks became increasingly undisciplined and disorganised as Mihailović lost any perspective he had on the political dimensions of the war. He was later to defend himself by saying "I am a soldier; politics never interested me". The failure to grasp the political situation underscores the Chetniks' overall failure. At the outset they proclaimed the movement to be one of Nationalist fighters and with allegiance to the anti-Axis Allies.

In conducting a combined war of National Liberation, revolution and civil-war, the Partisans had to deal with another major group: the Ustaše. The Ustaše controlled territory known as 'The Independent State of Croatia' under German and Italian protection. In effect, they were local agents of Axis power. Their aim was to achieve a one-nation state. This meant that a third of the population of the state — those who were not Roman Catholic — would have to be eliminated. The non-Catholics were killed in large numbers; even conversion to Roman Catholicism was not enough, usually to gain clemency and, so, life. The Ustaše, as part of its programme, also acted as Nazi agent in the "mass" extermination of Jews on the territory; this gesture was ludicrous given the minimal numbers involved. The Independent State of Croatia did not have the general support of its population. Neither it, nor the puppet regime in Serbia, led by Prime Minister Nedić, had the support of their people — who were, on the whole, more inclined to fight rather than co-operate with Axis occupation.

Together, the Chetniks, Ustaše and other 'quisling' forces might have posed a greater threat to the hard-earned Partisan victory.
especially, had they received Allied support to crush the Communists and prevent their taking power. The Partisans limited this threat by undertaking a ruthless programme of extermination of their enemies. Such ruthlessness was spawned by the determined struggle towards an idealistic end - the achievement of which they were not prepared to let slip from their grasp. This was revolutionary ruthlessness, reminiscent of the Bolshevik model which inspired the Communist leadership.

The outcome of the combined War of National Liberation and multifaceted civil-war may be distilled to the principal policy goals of the movements: the Ustaše had little interest outside their Croatian estate and within it, assisted by and assisting the invaders, their divisive goals were the elimination of ethnic Serbs and destruction of the Communists; the Chetniks wanted to wait for the Allies and destroy the Communist-led Partisans - they correctly identified Tito's movement as the chief obstacle to the re-establishment of the old, Serb order; the Partisans wanted to conduct a social revolution by engaging as many Yugoslavs as possible in active resistance - they wanted to force the old system to give birth to a new one.

In winning the multi-faceted civil-war, it was immeasurably to the Partisans' advantage that their support had a broad base. The policy of identifying their aims with those of most of the Yugoslav people paid off. The Partisans represented the greatest single force in Yugoslavia. They were attractive to the peasants because they fought, to the intellectuals because of their socially progressive communist
ideology, to women because they offered equal status with men. Most of all, they appealed to all Yugoslavs, irrespective of nationality or religion because they represented a concerted liberation struggle and a federal post-war state.

The Partisans became the leading resistance movement because of their Communist ideology: they saw the war as an opportunity for social revolution. All other factors - the movement's organisation and policies, and the felicitous light into which these were cast by other groups' mistakes - were contingent on the necessary conditions of the right context - the disintegration of the old order and collapse in its legitimacy at the outbreak of war - and the philosophical (or ideological) determination to use war as an instrument of politics, the means to a political end.

Cominform Expulsion

Hardly had the Yugoslav communists completed their first phase of vital activity than the regime's existence was critically challenged again. Only three years after the end of the war, Tito's regime experienced the most profound crisis of identity. The Yugoslav communists were confronted by their ally and model, the Soviet Union. The dispute between them resulted in Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Soviet-led Cominform. Legitimacy enabled the Titoist regime to survive
this critical challenge. Why was Yugoslavia expelled from the Cominform?

The Cominform, formed in Autumn 1947, was ostensibly an information bureau for the Communist Parties of the world. In reality, the Cominform was a means of securing Soviet control over the East European Communist parties. Moreover, its headquarters being situated in Belgrade suggests that the Yugoslavs, in particular, were in need of control. If, as is likely, this was the case, why did the Yugoslavs need controlling? The answer to this question provides the components of the answer to the topic's first "why", components which naturally extend into an understanding of the second "why". To answer it, I shall begin by looking at the 1948 Cominform resolution to disconnect Yugoslavia, as well as that which preceded it.

"The Information Bureau unanimously concluded that by their anti-Party and anti-Soviet views, incompatible with Marxist-Leninism, by their whole attitude and their refusal to attend the meeting of the Information Bureau, the leaders of the Communist Party have placed themselves in opposition to the Communist Parties affiliated to the Information Bureau, have taken the path of seceding from the unified Socialist front against imperialism, have taken the path of betraying the cause of international solidarity of the working people, and have taken up a position of Nationalism".17

Tito had been summoned to appear before the Cominform on May 17 and June 20. He refused to appear - probably believing his life would be
threatened by attendance. On June 28 Yugoslavia was expelled. The Cominform resolution was the culmination of a row that had been brewing since the withdrawal of Soviet advisors in March and a refusal to renew a trade agreement with the Yugoslavs - at least until the year's end. The row had been conducted in correspondence between Belgrade and Moscow.

Tito began the correspondence on March 20, expressing his amazement and hurt at the Soviet withdrawal, and his desire that relations should be patched up. Stalin's reply struck Tito like a "thunderbolt". Tito was "incorrect" in his view that hostility could not have been the real reason for the Soviet withdrawal. It was: Military advisors had been abused and discredited, Stalin said, and civilian advisors had not received cooperation and had been under UDBa surveillance. Stalin proceeded to lay three further charges at the Yugoslavs' door: leading members of the CPY had been spreading rumours that the CPSU was "degenerate", that "Great-power chauvinism is rampant in the USSR" and that this was "laughable" coming from "such questionable Marxists as Djilas, Vukmanović, Kidrić, Ranković and others". Furthermore, the CPY was not truly Marxist-Leninist because it hid behind the People's Front and lacked internal democracy. Finally, Stalin, by implication, accused the Yugoslavs of being "imperialist" because, according to him, they knew that Vladimir Velebit was a British Agent, yet they kept him in the Foreign Ministry. There were ominous comparisons to Trotsky and Bukharin; in effect, Stalin was charging the Yugoslavs with ideological impurity.
In his reply, Tito firmly dug in his heels. "No matter how much each of us loves the land of Socialism, the USSR, he can, in no case, love his country less." Therefore, Tito gave a "nationalist" answer - which, although neither "anti-Party" nor "anti-State", was finally to provoke the Cominform revolution.

Therefore, it is possible to see that Yugoslavia was expelled for a stand of "nationalism", or, rather, for an assertion of independence. This is why they needed controlling: the Soviet Union could not tolerate what amounted in its (and Stalin’s) eyes to a challenge to its role as sole authority in the Communist world, it could not permit independence.

At Ljubljana, in May 1945, Tito made a speech which seems in some ways a prefiguration of 1948 - although it was even more inconceivable then that there could be a split than immediately before it came; "we demand that each shall be master of his own house". It was about this time that a dossier was started in the Kremlin which three years later would be full. On the Soviet side any grudge it felt was filed away. On the Yugoslav side feelings of disappointment or betrayal by the Soviet Union were submerged and passed into a collective subconscious. When in 1948 the varying metals of each side’s arguments were put into the melting pot of dispute, the accumulated grudges emerged on the surface like dross.

In the post-war period differences occurred in three main areas: Yugoslav Foreign and Domestic policies and the question of Soviet
advisors in Yugoslavia. First of all, Yugoslavia’s ambition to include Trieste in Yugoslavia displeased Stalin as it exacerbated his problems in dealing with Great Britain and the United States. Secondly, the Yugoslavs’ internationalism gave Stalin similar difficulties. For, whilst he had abandoned the Greek Communists in their civil war by his agreement to British dominance there, the Yugoslavs did what they could to help the Greeks, thus embarrassing Stalin. Also, in an internationalist vein the Yugoslavs were helping the Albanians. This Stalin disliked because the Yugoslavs were acting without consulting Moscow first, as he lectured Kardelj and Bakarić on the "fact" that they "didn’t consult us [Moscow] about sending the two divisions to Albania". Finally, there was the question of a Balkan Federation. This would have included Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania - with a possibility of including Romania and, if the KKE were victorious, Greece. However, Molotov expressed the division between the USSR and the Yugoslavs and Bulgarians on this point as being "inadmissible either from the Party of the State point of view". Here, the crucial factor was again an expression of independence: the Yugoslavs and Bulgarians had signed a treaty despite Moscow’s advice that they should wait.

In Yugoslavia, the Soviets did not agree with Yugoslav desires for rapid industrialisation. Although, in principle, they agreed on the need for industrialisation, they did not like Yugoslav ambitions. Tito’s regime expected great financial aid from the Soviet Union towards this end. Instead, however, Stalin preferred to keep Yugoslavia primarily agricultural, a bread basket for the Soviet
Union. Likewise, raw materials such as copper and iron were mined, shipped to the Soviet Union and subsequently sold back to Yugoslavia, as goods. Tito wanted lorries; he also wanted them to be built in Yugoslavia. The Soviet line was: "what do you need heavy industry for? In the Urals we have everything you need".24

Lastly, in this post-war phase, there was the question of Soviet advisors in Yugoslavia. As already noted this aspect is of considerable importance in the split. The Soviets tried to persuade the Yugoslavs to run their institutions on the Soviet model. When Soviet officials asked for detailed information of Party or State officials however, they were rebuffed. The question of advisors is particularly telling in the military sphere. The Soviets wanted "to encourage the transformation of the YPA into a conventional fighting force modelled on the Red Army and, in the process, to subordinate it to Soviet control."25 This went against the grain of Yugoslav pride (as will be referred to again). As a final extension of the question of Soviet advisors, it should also be noted that they were piqued that attempts to infiltrate key parts of the regime - the military and the economic, interior and transport ministries, and, of course, the Party - usually met with failure. This was, seemingly, yet another assertion by the Yugoslavs of an independent character.

As these disputes emerged, in turn, they focussed eyes on the War. These disputes were merely extensions of wartime questions. First, there was the question of 'ends and means'. Stalin had wanted the Yugoslavs to wage a 'patriotic and anti-Fascist war, not make a social
revolution".\(^{26}\) It was the Yugoslavs' desire to use the War as a means of achieving social revolution which can be extended into the post-War dispute about the Yugoslav economy. Again, the Soviet attitude on economic relations can be traced to the Yugoslav disappointment that their (somewhat unrealistic) plans for aid from the USSR had not been met. Finally, there was the question of the Red Army. This connects with the post-War dispute over the YPA already mentioned. In that dispute, the emphasis lay in the two armies' wartime roles. The Soviets explained the Yugoslav regime as "due primarily to the presence of the Red Army".\(^{27}\) The Soviets completely negated the heroic role the Partisans had played in ridding Yugoslavia of the Nazis; the only Soviet help had been in liberating parts of the North and Belgrade. Soviet attitudes were "insults to the Yugoslav Partisan ego".\(^{28}\) What is more, these insults were being made by those whose standards were dubious. In the short time the Red Army spent in Yugoslavia it was violent (over 1,000 cases of rape were reported) and drunk and arrogant. As Djilas put it, the British did not "indulge in such excesses".\(^{29}\)

This evidence indicates the differences between the Soviets and the Yugoslavs. The Yugoslavs were, indeed, wanting to follow a different line from Moscow's. In Stalin's words: "Mistakes are not the issue: the issue is conceptions different from our own".\(^{30}\) Tito later recognised this: "They condemned us because we had a different conception of relations between Socialist countries. We wanted equality while Stalin wanted to subordinate our independence in the interest of the policy he was pursuing".\(^{31}\)
However, before continuing, it is essential to note that, at this time, Tito and his men were not aware of the different conceptions. They continued to look to the Soviet Union as the centre of the Communist world. They were not aware of what they were doing.

What in fact happened was a clash of revolutions and 'nationalisms'. Contrary to Stalin's wish, the Yugoslavs had conducted a revolution. The crux of the dispute was whether or not they should build on the revolution they had won inside their national boundaries. The Yugoslavs were expelled from the Cominform for wanting to do this; that is, for 'nationalism'. This was, though, not only a nationalism, it was a nationalism in conflict with Stalin's own 'greater-Russian' nationalism. This is important in seeing how the Yugoslavs did not realise what was happening. The difference of conception was, really, over what "Stalinism" meant. Thus, the question is one of semantics. To the Yugoslavs, Stalinism meant using Stalin's methods to achieve the great things Stalin had in Russia, in Yugoslavia; that is, to follow Stalin's model. What they misunderstood was that in Moscow "...the essence of Stalinism was undivided authority and exclusive loyalty".32

At this stage it is important to take note of the role personal characteristics played in the dispute. There was a clash of vanities. Stalin had spent twenty years as head of CPSU and for the last fifteen of those his authority had been unchallenged. He was used to his every whim being followed - particularly in the flush of wartime success. Stalin was offended and perhaps did not think or listen too
clearly. At the same time, one should be aware of Tito’s ability; more so, when one attaches to it an awareness of his having "the dynamic and magnetic quality of a leader". To reinforce this, one might consider whether or not either’s subordinates would have behaved in the same way? Similarly, would either’s followers have been affected in the same way? I would suggest, too, that the same applied in Yugoslavia - even in times of internal crisis (for example Djilas in 1953-4). Tito’s personal qualities were telling. In so much as there was a clash of nationalisms and revolutions, it was Tito’s nation and its revolution against Stalin’s. This can be emphasised by Stalin’s accusations that Tito’s regime had shown "arrogance" and "conceit".

Essentially, Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform for the leadership’s (especially Tito’s) belief that they had the right to conduct their own revolution. They misunderstood this to be Stalinism in their blind admiration for the Soviet Union. Had they realised, they would probably have wanted to claim the accuracy of the essence of the Cominform resolutions: they wanted to conduct their revolution 'independently'; that is, they were happy to be allied to and receive fraternal help from the Soviet Union, but they wanted to make the decisions alone.

Why did Tito’s regime survive? To answer this I shall discuss some of the factors which guaranteed the regime’s survival. However, these do not tell the complete story. For a that, one must consider the question: why did Tito’s regime resist Stalin?
Milojko Drulović says this: "What was decisive, though, was the fact that the Yugoslav revolution, throughout its entire course, had been independent". Undoubtedly, this is of the utmost significance. That the Yugoslavs had won a revolution against a background of Russian indifference and without its help had been a cause of friction, now it became the source of Tito's legitimacy. Because he had led the people's liberation war, he was a hero. It gave him prestige and support far beyond that of any other East European leader. They were all there with Stalin's support: Tito had put himself there. So, he had his own constituency of support. On the one hand, there was the Party's growth from 12,000 members, at the highest pre-war estimate (of whom, perhaps, only 3,000 survived the war) to a figure somewhere between 500,000 and 800,000. Thus, there was a mass party which had never known another leader and that leader commanded an indelibly loyal following. The small number (14,000) who were disloyal to Tito and supported the Cominform were soon efficiently rounded up by Rankovic's UDBa. Moreover, Tito not only had the Party behind him, but the people. Although having lost a lot of support since the war's end, Tito was able to rally the people's support in taking a stand against the Russians. Indeed, the Soviet slurs on the Partisans' wartime role generated the perfect means for the mobilisation of Tito's support.

In stressing Tito's support in the Party, one might conjecture that Stalin believed that if Yugoslavia were expelled, the Party would feel so ashamed that it would remove Tito to regain Russia's favour. If this is true (and it is supported by the introduction of an economic blockade), it was an enormous miscalculation in the Kremlin. For the
Russians conducted their campaign in the clumsiest of ways. The initial Cominform resolution was issued on June 28 - Vidovdan, a day of immense significance in South Slav history. This was bound to raise nationalist sympathies. Further more, this clumsiness was later repeated when the second Cominform resolution was issued on November 29 - the new Yugoslavia's official birthday. The Soviet Union, evidently, underestimated Tito's support in the Party, and, importantly, that as Dedijer’s mother pointed out, the South Slavs "are very strange people ... so strange a people, we know how to defend this land of ours". Tito was the focal point, the thinking epitome of that "strange people".

The autonomous Yugoslav revolution and the consequent support it received from its independently minded people was a necessary factor in the survival of Tito and his regime. There were several other factors which were contingent. Why was there no Soviet invasion despite the fact that Yugoslavia was bordered by hostile nations? First, the Russian advisors - notably after their friction with Yugoslavia - must have been wary of Yugoslav terrain and the Partisans' experience of fighting and winning a war on it. This should be linked to their character again. As Tito said later: "Every foot of our land is saturated in blood ... but if it is necessary we will saturate it again. Yugoslavia will never be conquered except over the dead bodies of its peoples". Secondly, the Red Army and the Soviet Union were exhausted after the costly war effort - a weakness which will have made them wary of invasion, not only because of the Partisans, but because the United States army was already in Greece.
So, the Russians were, doubtless, wary of precipitating World War Three. Finally, the Yugoslavs were able to turn to the West and receive aid which by the end of 1949 was valued at 50 million dollars.38 This went some way towards alleviating the suffering caused by the Soviet blockade. Yugoslavia's trade with the Soviet bloc fell from over 50% to 14% in the years 1947-49. This blockade is estimated to have cost the Yugoslav economy 430 million dollars.39 In addition to this the Yugoslavs had to endure a drought (it is this which finally, persuaded them to look to the West).

The picture that one should gain from this period of economic blockade and potential military threat - particularly in Tito's turning to the West - is that the Yugoslavs did not panic. Rather they did not act rashly. For some time they continued to look to the Soviet Union for forgiveness and to support Russian foreign policy (for example at the Danube River Conference). Why did they behave this way? Mainly, because there was a belief prevalent among Party members that it was all a "mistake" - hence there were letters petitioning Moscow to come and visit Belgrade and see that all was well. The Party came out of its People's Front closet and set about brutal rapid collectivisation (something which damaged the peasant support of the regime). Here again the semantic misconception of Stalinism applied: the Yugoslavs would prove themselves by adhering to their Marxist-Leninist principles! Tito later said: "We don't have a Siberia, but if we had one, we would have sent people there ..."42
It is worth noting Tito's 1952 assessment of this period. This was that the Yugoslav leaders had continued and increased the 'Stalinist' programme as a conscious policy to cope with Party members. That is, if they had immediately shown their indignation it would have created confusion, disorder and, maybe, even mutiny in the ranks. Tito put it this way: "It was necessary to allow Stalin time to do such things toward Yugoslavia as would move the people to say: 'Down with Stalin'"\textsuperscript{41} This version of what happened is essentially a \textit{a posteriori}, certainly when applied to the leadership as a whole. However, it is not impossible that Tito's 'typical' vigour and pragmatism were at work. Tito's wartime leadership and his later civilian leadership were both notably characterised by his being a vibrating reed in the wind, able to sense any subtle change in the way the wind blows (the most notable instance is the 1966 purge of Ranković). Whether or not what happened was \textit{a priori} for the reasons Tito gave is, however, unknowable, therefore this is only speculation worthy of note.

What really matters here is not whether Tito made a prescient judgement of what was wise conduct or whether he just carried on in an instinctive reaction to trauma; it is that Tito and his men did not panic. By avoiding panic, they were able to give themselves breathing space to assess what had happened.

In fact, what had happened was that they had been presented with an ideological dilemma: either they or the Soviets were wrong. By remaining calm, they recognised the dilemma - first, \textit{a propos} of 'internationalism' and, then, on the domestic front. To resolve it
they went back to school. "To reject Stalin, they had to reaffirm their Marxist faith. First of all, there was a return to Lenin, and, soon after that, to Marx". That is, to justify themselves, they had to prove themselves different from and better than the Soviet Union. This was the beginning of the significant separate road to Socialism that the Yugoslavs trod. The notion that what was important was the absence of panic in the Yugoslav camp can now be modified. This was important, but so, too, was their ability to return to Marxist literature and then to change ideologically.

At the beginning of this section, I suggested that a complete understanding of the question 'Why did they survive?' had to focus on the question 'Why did they resist?'. Having noted the importance of the Yugoslav leaders' characteristics so far - the abilities to stay calm, search their souls and columns of Marx and Lenin, and to change ideologically - it is this question which draws them together into one ability. With reference to the first prefixed quotation, they acted morally.

To explain, they resisted because they had to do so. What happened in June 1948 meant that their political and, probably, physical lives were threatened - this shows in the psychosomatic illnesses which Tito and his followers developed (Tito had his first gallstone problem). Thus, what they did was self-preservation. They did what was necessary.
The conclusion, then, must be that the necessary factors in the regime's survival were its autonomous revolution and the support it had; eventually, the ability to take the decision to accept Western help and tread a new 'socialist' road; and, most importantly, they survived because they had the ability to recognise and do what was necessary, when it was necessary. In brief, the Yugoslav regime survived because it had legitimacy. Moreover, they were expelled from the Cominform because such such legitimacy was indicative of an independence which was inconsistent with the Soviet system. Together, these factors show the regime's ability to legitimate itself. That ability was central to its management of such a critical situation.

**Crisis in Croatia: Tracing the Origins**

For much of the next twenty years, the Yugoslav regime made economic and social progress, establishing its independent communist identity founded on the notions of self-management and non-alignment. However, the introduction of liberalising principles to a political system based on Stalin's highly centralised Soviet Union created tensions. These simmered through twenty years before boiling over into crisis at the end of the 1960s. As the 1970s began, a critical challenge emerged in Croatia. Croatian moves towards independence challenged the regime's and the country's existence. As will be seen, this third critical period in post-war Yugoslav history, regime legitimacy could only be restored with military involvement.
To understand the crisis in the early 1970s we have to be aware that its origins lie twenty or more years earlier. We have also to comprehend a political paradox, which spans the period. This is the persistent evolutionary counterpoint of centrifugal and centripetal forces, evident in the inherent contradiction between the official programme of the LCY to promote self-management and hence, decentralisation on the one hand and, on the other, the League's desire to maintain social relations in which it should be the leading force (by means of education) through Party and People's Committees, Communes and, most importantly for most of the period, the offices of State Security. This counterpoint reflects the essence of the 'Yugoslav Experiment': the process of attempting the fusion of ideology and reality. The process of self-management and decentralisation represents the adaptation of ideology to the reality of the social and the political environments; the fact of the League's continuing role shows the ever present need to mould reality and to educate the people in an attempt to match it, and them, to ideology.

The second reform movement ran through the late 1960s; the reformers having won the round of debate fought in the middle years of the decade. The years 1965 to 1970 were ones of economic and political decentralisation and liberalisation. The reforms were ended in the early 1970s because of economic and nationalities crises. At this time, it was evident that decentralisation had created an effective decision making vacuum. In discussing the origins and course of the second reform movement, what we are doing, in effect, is analysing what gave rise to crisis in the early 1970s and the situation in which
political impotence meant that there was no immediate way in which to resolve them. What were the origins of the second reform movement?

We can approach this question in two ways: that is, when we talk about its "origins" do we mean its 'starting point' or its 'derivation'? If we were to take the first approach we would see its starting point as being the Seventh Congress of the LCY, held at Ljubljana in April 1958. At Ljubljana "sharp divisions within the Yugoslav leadership" emerged which were to crystallise into a clear division between 'conservatives' and 'liberals' by 1960-1961. The principal issue which separated them centred on continued economic development. Both sides agreed that, for continued expansion and modernisation of the economy, the main need was rapid capital accumulation. But, they differed on how this was to be achieved: the 'conservatives' argued for effective central planning; the 'liberals' thought this policy would undermine incentive at the level of the enterprise and result, not in 'accumulation' but in stagnation. The debate focussed on concrete issues - for example, investment, taxation and wages.

These were, essentially, arguments of economic theory. There were also political debates, for example, on what constituted the 'evil' of bureaucracy - for the conservatives it was the alliance between the local Commune's chairman and the managing directors and chairmen of leading local enterprises; for the liberals, 'bureaucracy' meant state control.
The clear division of 1961 must, further, be seen to represent a 
divide between the nationalities of Yugoslavia: broadly speaking, 
there was a correlation between 'liberals' and those of the 
economically developed regions of the North - Slovenia and Croatia. 
Likewise, the poorer Southern Republics would be identified with the 
'conservative' tendency. (This will receive more detailed attention 
below).

The definition of conservative and liberal trends in 1961 was made 
evident as reforms of the economy reflected a liberal ascendancy. 
These reforms, the result of a liberal movement spearheaded by the 
Slovenes, resulted in an increase of the workers' councils' 
discretionary power a propos of income distribution, the freeing of 
prices and a new credit system, in which banks took over from the 
state. However, these reforms were short lived. They were halted, from 
the centre, by Tito as economic difficulties provided the pretext for 
Serb 'conservative', 'centralist' manoeuvring to end them. But, from 
this point on, the debate raged: "a full-blown strategic offensive 
concerning not just the economy but the entire political course and 
future of the smaller nations of Yugoslavia"44 was launched by the 
conservatives. Despite this, however, by 1965, the liberals would once 
more have the upper hand.

The debate, which was focussed in 1958 at the Seventh Congress of the 
LCY and resulted in the temporary reforms of 1961, is, then, the 
starting-point of the second reform movement; the experience of these 
reforms - transitory though it was - meant that the conservative
"strategic offensive" of the years 1961-65 was to be rejoined. In this first sense the origins of the second reform movement lie here.

However, in contemplating the origins of the second reform movement, we must, also, adopt the second approach, in order to have a fuller awareness of their importance in the situation which evolved as a result of it. What is more, this approach is both necessary and more fruitful in attempting to understand the intrinsic tensions of the Yugoslav experiment and the way in which the crisis of 1970-71 was one of legitimacy. It is necessary because the 'starting-point' identified is not specific - it is a debate over several years. This is an indication that a 'starting-point' always has a background, that a starting-point has its own origins. So, we must ask about the derivation of the second reform movement: what gave rise to it? What lay behind its starting point? In discussing these questions we will, inevitably, reveal something of the complexity of the Yugoslav situation.

We can look at the "origins" of the second reform movement, in this further sense (its derivation) in two broad areas: economics and politics. As we have seen, in our look at the 1958-61 debate, the reformers' initial concern was for economic development; so it is here that we shall start our survey of what gave rise to the second reform movement.

Immediately after the Second World War the new Yugoslav regime set about the task of "building socialism",45 This meant that, before the
full fruits of socialism came, it was necessary to rebuild and then industrialise the economy. Thus, with a need to reconstruct rapidly and an ideological imperative of industrialisation and ‘common ownership’, the Yugoslavs set about nationalisation and the institution of a "communal economy".

Under the communal economy, central State control by administrative planning was introduced, following closely the Soviet model. However, although this type of system is useful (as, since the 1948 split with Moscow, the Yugoslavs have stressed) for a short period it should not last. It enables early rapid growth of the economy and, politically, ensures control of economic resources and activity (something of special importance in a planned socialist system).

Once the initial phase of consolidation of power and quick growth has been achieved, problems became evident. First, politically and socially significant, is the growth of a bureaucracy. This creates an ‘elite class’ of administrators who - as individuals or institutions "may lack accountability to the community at large ... if the political system is not responsive to the social needs and values of that community". So, a bureaucratic system grows, characterised often by "privilege, corruption and disincentives". Secondly, economically, production may lose contact with genuine social needs because of distortions created by command planning. That is, supply and demand which, with free interaction, are the ‘signalling’ mechanism of price and profits, can become restricted and misrepresented.
Command planning, in Yugoslav communist terms, was essential. Before 1948, it seemed the only way for them; after, it came to be seen as a 'necessary evil'. But the post-Cominform split mood was to counter these internal problems of the centrally planned economy - at least in principle. In practice, however, the change in style which followed the liberalisation of the economy was not a rational choice made by the Yugoslavs but something which was forced upon them. This was done, first, by the need, after the Cominform revolution of expulsion, to prove the Yugoslav System, both better than and different from the Soviet one and, secondly, by the need to evolve a system "which would enable the economy to work".48

It was these two imperatives which lay behind the introduction of worker self-management in 1950. This innovative move led to some liberalisation of the economic infrastructure. However, the transfer of power from state to worker was more apparent than real as it did not entail effective control - this continued to rest with the state, which played a great role by imposing restraints and limits through taxation and the determination of wages and prices, and 'social control'. Despite liberalisation, there was a substantial residual presence of the centrally planned command economy. By 1954 it was decided that liberalisation had gone 'far enough' for the moment. This was signalled by the 'purge' of Djilas for his avocation of the complete liberalisation of commercial and political life. The centralist 'sentiments' of most Communists would not permit such extensive liberalisation.
Here we can identify one of the tensions, or inherent contradictions of the Yugoslav system: the desire to liberalise restrained by lingering conservative sentiment for central control. As liberalisation continued, gradually, throughout the 1950s (once the Djilas crisis had blown over) the strains of this debate grew, leading to the debate at and following the 1958 Seventh Congress which, in turn, proved the starting point of the second reform movement. However, these antagonisms of freedom and equality in economic spheres, which proved incompatible, need not have been more than a persistent hiccup in the system - for every system has its own difficulties. Even the compounding of economic decentralisation by political need not have posed the momentous questions that it did. The seed of many problems may be seen if, again, we return to the immediate post-war period to look at the political undercurrents which resulted in the second reform movement.

On January 30, 1946, a new Yugoslav constitution was proclaimed. Before the war, Yugoslavia had been a state without a consensus because of persistent nationalities problems; the prewar system was, effectively, a vehicle for Serb hegemonism. Observers agreed that the Yugoslav state should have been formed in 1918 with a federal constitution rather than a Serb dominated centralised system of government. So it was that during the war, the Communists distanced themselves yet further from the prewar regime in the eyes of the Yugoslavs by espousing a policy of federalism.
That federal system comprised the present six Republics of Yugoslavia and its two national provinces. The institution of a federal system meant the end of the old Serbian domination. As one emigre wrote: "One thing must be admitted, they have at least attempted to find an equitable solution for inner relations between the various Yugoslav peoples ...".49 But, as we shall see, the solution to the nationalities problem, in 1946, was to be the engine which produced its re-emergence during the 1960s.

To understand this we must realise that concomitant with economic liberalisation and decentralisation, there was, too, political reform. Immediately after 1946, the Communists claimed to have solved the nationalities problem. If they had 'solved' the nationalities problem, they began, unwittingly, to 'dissolve' it with the introduction of measures of liberalism and decentralisation. At best, it had been "anaesthetised".50

As, in part, the economic path was altered as a reaction to the Cominform expulsion, so, too, the Yugoslav-Soviet split incited political reform. The May 1949 law on the People's Committees had enlarged the prerogatives of political and economic power at District levels of government, rather than at the Federal or, even, Republican one. As administrative decentralisation was extended, many more functions were transferred from Federal to Republican or District levels during 1949 and 1950. Many Federal Ministries responsible for the economy's direct management became irrelevant and were abolished. However, we should stress that this was only the beginning, the seed
which would flower between 1965 and 1970. At this stage decentralisation of political power, as of economic, did not mean the ending of Party control, "the economy continued to be managed from above. This was devolution only from one type of bureaucracy to another, often less experienced and efficient".\textsuperscript{51}

As with economic measures, then, political reforms were "the formality but not the actuality".\textsuperscript{52} However, the "formality", enshrined in law, meant that there was firm ground on which those who favoured further decentralisation could stand. There was a latency: people actually wanted what they were told they had. So, despite brakes applied to reform at the time of the Djilas crisis, liberalisation very gradually continued throughout the 1950s and again, as with economic liberalisation, political liberalisation led to 1958 at Ljubljana.

Before looking, specifically, at the immediate causes of the 1958-61 debate, we should return to the question of nationalism. As already indicated, the liberal-conservative cleavage was also along Republican lines. It is, therefore, appropriate to be aware of the reason for the North-South division a propos of the liberal-conservative axis.

The reason for this division rests in the pre-1918 configuration of the lands which formed Yugoslavia. The Northern territories, Croatia and Slovenia, were part of the old Habsburg empire. Their culture was central European, their religion was Roman Catholicism. Moreover, whilst industrialisation was not great and was overdue under the Habsburgs, it had begun. There was a base upon which such industry as
there was could develop in the inter-war period. More importantly, their education was, generally, of a higher standard, thus ensuring faster adaptation. On the other hand, the Southern lands had been part of the Ottoman Empire, were Orthodox in religion and of a more 'eastern' tendency. There had been attempts - but failure - to industrialise, and illiteracy was widespread. So the national problem centres greatly around this product of history: the North has always been more modernised than the South.

The extent of the gap between North and South can be gauged by some figures showing the proportions of the roles Slovenia and Croatia were playing at the time of the second reform movement. These two Northern republics, in 1965, had 30% of the population of Yugoslavia, 40.4% of its capital assets and represented 46.3% of gross output. On the other hand, the South (Bosnia, Hercegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia (excluding the province of Kosovo)), represented 28.8% of the population, 26.7% of capital assets and only 20.2% of output.

Earlier, we noted that Slovenia had been the spearhead of the reform movement between 1958 and 1961. It continued to be the vanguard of the reform movement after 1961. To understand this, we should note that at the time the reforms came, Slovenia, with 8.4% of the Yugoslav population, was responsible for 20% of aggregate production and 17% of foreign trade; moreover, two thirds of its exports earned hard currency in the West. Slovenia wanted to continue expansion.
These national differences were to assume greater and more ominous significance. But, at first, they were only expressed in terms of economic debate. Overall, during the 1950s, high growth rates had been sustained in Yugoslavia. In the last years of the decade (1957-60), Social Product rose by 62%-12.7% per annum (this in excess of the planned 9.5% yearly growth). However, during 1960, the trend of growth declined. In that year annual growth was 15%; a year later it was 7%. What is more, in part this growth was the result of a high investment rate (32% of Social Product in 1960). Aside from the creation of inflationary pressures, this had meant the need for the funds with which to finance the investment. This had led to a balance of payments deficit which grew to 72 billion dinars in 1960 from 32 billion the year before as the economy slowed. It was because the economy was slowing that a debate on the way forward was given prominence; this debate (as we saw above) had already begun in terms of theory.

Yugoslavia had reached a stage of economic and industrial growth which meant that a re-vitalisation was necessary. The imperatives of technological advancement and the slowing of the economy required that new markets be found, or the existing ones expanded. The obvious way to expand the market was to gear the economy more towards exports. These would bring scarce and valuable foreign currency. It was the Slovenes and Croats who were at the forefront of Yugoslavia’s development: it was their efforts which had brought about the great strides taken during the 1950s. They wanted to liberalise the economy so as to ensure that their progress would not be hampered. When the
conservatives managed to put an end to the 1961 reforms, the fact that their victory was identified mainly with Serbia led to the rise of some 'national' sentiment. Whereas, before, any nationalist feeling had been overshadowed or camouflaged by theoretical economic arguments, now the argument was seen to become polarised along obvious 'nationalist' lines.

The reformers arguments had been conducted primarily in terms of economics. The response from the conservatives, led by the former chief of State Security, Aleksandar Ranković, broadened the range of issues. To repeat Paul Lendvai's words, the conservatives launched a "full-blown strategic offensive concerning not just the economy but the entire political course and future of the smaller nations of Yugoslavia".57 So, in the years 1964-66, the debate was not purely about economics. Nonetheless, as with the economic debate, all others hinged on the juxtapositions of conservatism and liberalism, centralisation and decentralisation, centralism and federalism.

At the Eighth Party Congress in 1964 the reformists won a hollow political victory. Prior to the Congress, the so-called "national key" distribution of top jobs pro rata the strength of the various nations had been highly looked upon, despite, in reality, its being a fallacy.58 At the Congress the composition of the Executive Committee was enlarged from fourteen members to nineteen. The reformist idea behind this was to make its composition more representative. Formerly it had comprised four Serbs, three each Croats, Slovenes and Montenegrins, and one Macedonian. The new composition was six Serbs,
four each Croats and Montenegrins, three Slovenes and two Macedonians. The aim of its becoming more representative was nullified because the Montenegrin Party, with 34,000 members continued to have equal representation with the 218,000 strong Croat Party. Thus the 'liberal' effort by the Northern Republics to weaken the Southern centralist hold by reducing the Montenegrin contingent and strengthening that of the Croats resulted only in a further weakening of their position as Slovenia's representation was, effectively, reduced. Enlargement was effected, but the liberal voice was reduced.

Much of the reason for this lay at the door of UDBa, the State Security Service, run by Ranković - as was the central apparat. For it was Ranković and his Serb associates who were responsible for organisation; and they organised matters to their advantage. These powers were also instrumental in blocking, initially, the 1965 reforms - as they had those of 1961. However, this time the reforms survived centralist attempts to obstruct them.

The 1965 reforms were, principally, economic - although, as we shall see, they were to be followed by wider political changes. They were brought about by the same kind of pressures that had prompted the 1961 reforms: Slovenia and Croatia had reached a stage of growth and development where their aspirations and, indeed, the needs of the all-Yugoslav economy, because of this, required expansion to expand into foreign markets and, reciprocally, foreign investment.
Delayed in 1961, by 1965 the economic reforms were essential. The years of rapid development had made great impact and created social pressures for increased advancement. By the mid-1960s, much in Yugoslav life had changed vastly. Lifestyles and aspirations were more Western European than Eastern (particularly in the more advanced North): 59% or those in employment had completed a full schooling compared with only 20.7% as late as 195859; communications media spread – by 1966 there were 77 radio stations (in that year the number of registered radios grew from 2 to 3 million) and four television channels, broadcasting to 777,000 registered receivers (one per twenty five inhabitants)60 The comment was made that Belgrade was "the only Communist capital with a parking problem".61 Further leaps forward were desired by a 'quasi-consumer society'. The social pressures of this 'consumer society', allied to the imperatives of technological advancement and the need to simulate a failing economy, meant the introduction of the great liberal reforms of 1965.

In the 'great economic reform' of 1965, enterprises were to keep 71% (instead of 51%) of their net product; factories which had been known as 'political factories' (those created and maintained irrespective of profit-making capacity) were to adjust or 'go-to-the-wall'; the dinar was devalued (from 750-1250 to the dollar); price controls were removed; banking and finance were re-defined.62 In practice, although no 'political' enterprise was actually permitted to 'fold', the removal of subsidies was in many cases effected (for example, the State airline, JAT, had its subsidy reduced from 30% in 1964 to 1.8%
in 1967). This meant that many protectionist practices were eradicated, a move which coincided with devaluation of the dinar.

Reset at a realistic rate of exchange, dinar convertibility made export easier. As foreign currency was scarce and valuable this was a boost (particularly in the service industries of Tourism and Catering) in attracting custom. What is more, devaluation also facilitated the new laws permitting up to 49% Foreign Capital ownership in enterprises: foreign investment would bring with it foreign technology. Devaluation was linked too to price decontrol. The former false valuation had produced 'false' profits. Now, a price 'signalling' mechanism was to operate according to supply and demand dynamics. This, however, led to high inflation.

Banking had formerly been a state institution for the centrally controlled distribution of funds. After the reforms, Banks became entities completely independent of the state. Unlike the banks of many West European capitalist states (notably France and the U.K.), Yugoslav banks were not even tied to the Central Bank by law. As extensions of the 'self-management' ethic, they were to function as would any other enterprise - and would do so as they chose, either linked to or independent of the central bank.

However, the main theme of their economic reforms had been to stimulate the economy, essentially by giving greater incentives to economic enterprises by leaving them with more of their funds to dispose of as they decided. In effect, what this implied was that the
distribution of national income should favour working organisations rather than the social community. But the initial trend in this direction soon faltered: attributed an equal share in distribution in 1964, the imbalance in the enterprises favour of 59.7% share in 1966, fell to 57.7% in 1967. Thus, the measure, one of a 'market' system was failing.

This is of some significance: a 'market measure' had been introduced in a socialist system to prompt the economy, and it had not been a great success. What is more though, it did succeed in taking a great deal of the 'social' out of 'socialism'. For, Social Welfare, with the introduction of 'market' notions, had been expected to become 'more profitable'. Social Security had grown faster than the rate of income in the preceding decade (9.48% of Social Product in 1956 to 12.49% in 1965) and there was an aim to reduce its impact on the economy. However, that impact grew, inevitably, as the introduction of competition between enterprises led to mergers or closures which entailed redundancies and consequently high levels of unemployment (despite large numbers of Yugoslavs working abroad - mainly in Western Europe: given this, and the fact that the 19.5 million population figure is 4 million higher than at the war's end, one might only speculate at what the extent of this problem might have been otherwise and, perhaps, the economic blessing which wartime decimation was.

These economic reforms had other effects which suggested that the system was losing touch with some socialist principles of economic equality. Gaps between rich and poor emerged on two levels: first,
individual income differentials in 1969 had increased from 1:4, a
decade earlier, to 1:8\textsuperscript{68}; secondly, despite the setting up of a fund
for the re-distribution of income among the poorer regions, 'national'
incomes grew disproportionately in the North so that the gap between
the richest (Slovenia, per capita income 8,100 dinars) and poorest
(Province of Kosovo, per capita income 1,610 dinars) was extended.\textsuperscript{69}

This second extension might also be seen as an abdication of a
socialist principle in itself: for economic decentralisation was
conducted at the expense of developing the Southern areas. This was a
mistake, also, in pure economic terms. It negated the principle of
economy of scale: that is, in the long term, it should have benefited
the all-Yugoslav economy to develop suitable industry in regions of
large natural resources. This was an advantage overlooked as were many
of the difficulties of the new way in the welter of political and
national developments alongside the economic reforms.

The 1965 reforms were, in Professor Bićanić's words, "a process of the
four D's: Decentralisation, De-stabilisation, De-politicisation and
Democratisation.\textsuperscript{70} The reforms were not allowed to be fully
implemented, at first, due to obstruction from UDBa and the central
Serb dominated administration responsible for their practical
introduction. This stumbling block was completely removed, however, in
1966 with the 'fall of Ranković.'

Tito realised that measures of superficial stabilisation, similar to
those of 1962 could not be used again. Yet there was a need to avert
chaos. For, the blocking measures by Ranković's Serb associates had raised national temperatures. But, Tito was only convinced, it seems, to drop his 'favourite son' by revelations made to him of UDBa's activities a propos of himself. It is said that Tito reluctantly did this because the YPA provided him with proof that UDBa had been taping him.71

A special meeting of the Central Committee was convened at Brioni on July 1, 1966. It was the "most dramatic meeting" in the Yugoslav Communists' history. Tito, "in a voice choked with emotion, arraigned the man he had trusted so implicitly for so many years".73 Although no longer formally head of UDBa, Ranković's demise was symbolic. The Security Service was defamed and subsequently re-organised to prevent it ever again becoming an "inviolable symbol and centre of power".74 With this, the remnants of 'conservative' obstruction were removed. The reforms already in practice were only a beginning. The Brioni Plenum was a catalyst to liberalisation.

The Croatian Crisis: Creating a Power Vacuum

Much of the 'liberal' economic reform was lost behind a dust cloud of excitement with regard to political liberalisation, initiated by the purge of Ranković. This came in two ways: institutional change and electoral reform. Apart from UDBa, three other institutions were altered. First, the LCY itself was revamped. Its top bodies were
broadened. The Federal Executive Committee was replaced as the policy-making body by a Presidium, consisting of thirty five members. The new Executive Committee retained purely 'executive' functions - and its members were barred from operative positions in the State and in other political bodies.

In 1967, there was a comprehensive reorganisation of governmental institutions. A new administration of thirty eight members was formed of which only Tito and three others remained from the previous one. There was an influx of a new generation of Communists to replace the old guard from the war. The ratio of younger men, the new Party professionals, to those whose membership went back that far, was 3 to 1 in a Federal Executive Council composed of seventeen members: the President, two vice-presidents and fourteen others; this was, in effect, the 'Cabinet'.

In the Federal Assembly, the Chamber of Nations' importance was increased by amendments to the 1963 Constitution in 1967 and 1968. Because of its being the only Federal chamber in which the Republics and Provinces were represented on the basis of parity, this was of importance. This was shown to be so when in 1970 a Croatian delegate was recalled by his Republican Party leadership for refusing to accept their guidance. This was a sign that a type of political pluralism had been brought in. The affair demonstrated that Republican representatives to the Federal Assembly had an "imperative mandate". In terms of Bakarić's demand of the middle sixties, the Federation had been 'federated'. The original centralist federal structure had been
transformed into one which meant that each Republic was a 'constituency' of support and instruction to the representatives.

Finally, the YPA was not immune to reform. It too was 'republicanised'. Until 1966 it had been supra-national and insular. However, as a consequence of playing an important role in the dismissal of Ranković, it had come to the forefront of attention and had been opened up to society. That is, it had been encouraged to participate in local communities. As the Federal Assembly began to show itself a place of discussion and argument, so, the defence budget (set with much military advice) no longer received "rubber stamp" approval, but was the subject of debate. Contact between the Army and the people was enhanced in 1969, with establishment of "territorial defence" forces in a plan of all-Yugoslav, "total" defence.

Under pressure from the Republics, the YPA also adopted the aim of securing fully proportional national representation in the ranks. The principle was that 25% of any national contingent in the YPA should be based on "home" territory - the Macedonian YPA even fostered its own language. But, despite its "Republicanisation", the YPA remained the most reliable "all-Yugoslav" institution, as we shall see.

The legitimacy crisis at the beginning of the 1970s had three roots. First, was the fusion of ethnic, geographical, cultural, historical and economic problems which were the 'nationalities' problem, and reflected particularly the North-South divide. The second root was the federal structure given to Yugoslavia by the Communists: although
initially this was a centrally dominated federalism, as Rusinow points out, the extent of the six Republics’ fiscal powers in the Constitution, "was the thin end of a wedge which would one day lead towards confederation". Lastly, there was the 1948 split with the Soviet Union which initiated the counterpoint of tensions which continued to characterise Yugoslavia. As a reaction to the split, the Yugoslavs began their self-managing ‘road to Socialism’, a road which entailed measures of liberalisation. Thus the juxtaposition was set: centralisation or decentralisation, the inherent antagonism of the Yugoslav system.

At the end of the 1960s, those roots had become intertwined. The Federal system, coupled with split-induced liberalisation, gave the more advanced Northern republics a vehicle with which to assert their economic arguments. Ironically, the 1946 solution of the ‘national’ problem proved to be the means for its re-emergence in the 1960s. The reformists argued for measures which would enable the economy’s further growth; their arguments were highly politicised and polemical. Moreover, they were delivered from ‘national’ constituencies, in ‘national’ interests and reflecting long submerged national feelings. These arguments of what was essentially self-interest found fertile ground in the stage of economic development reached by the end of the 1950s. Social and technological imperatives for growth added to a need to revitalise the economy gave a context in which the differences of the Yugoslav system could be expressed and were exposed. The eventual outcome of that expression was to be a victory for liberalism which meant the denial of centripetal forces
in favour of centrifugal ones. Those centrifugal forces almost dispersed Yugoslavia to the wind.

Self-interest, in a national guise, was promoted by the Croatian and Slovenian Parties at the expense of the South. (This is particularly ironic considering the Yugoslav analysis of "[equal] proper relations among Socialist states" at the time of the Cominform expulsion). In terms of legitimacy the significance of this self-interest was two fold: first, it meant that much of the social had been lost along the Yugoslav road to Socialism, particularly given the small regard for maintaining Social Welfare strategies; secondly, the long term opportunity to create a strong, vibrant system according to economies of scale was missed as the Northern republics were consolidated at the expense of Southern regions and perhaps the 'all-Yugoslav' economy - the consequences of this for regime legitimacy would become evident in the 1980s.

Slovenian and Croatian interests were allowed expression as economic liberalisation gave way to the expansion of electoral politics. Electoral 'liberalism', tied to national characteristics, led to unprecedented happenings, first, in Slovenia, then, more explosively in Croatia. Elections with some meaning amid the general atmosphere of liberalisation, particularly with its trait of "neo-confederation", rather than "federation", produced a situation in which the nationalities problem began to assume yet greater importance than had seemed possible in the mid 1960s.
Indeed, in the electoral domain, exciting things had been happening. The 1967 elections saw the voter offered a wider range of candidates. Whereas, in 1965, there had been 64 candidates for 60 seats, now, there were 81. For elections in the Republican parliament, there were 475 candidates for 325 seats. At times there were as many as five candidates to choose from.\textsuperscript{80} The new political environment gave rise to national problems.

First, in 1966, there was a ministerial crisis. The chairman of the Council, Janko Smole, resigned because of a 44 votes to 11 defeat on the issue of workers’ health service contributions. It was to be three weeks before he withdrew his resignation. Nothing of this kind had ever before been seen in Eastern Europe. Then, in 1969, there was a second ‘Slovene crisis’: the Slovene government resigned over the issue of its exclusion from a World Bank loan to Yugoslavia (although again it was later to withdraw). However, Slovenia was not the only place where ‘nationalism’ contributed to political life. As Slovenia defended ‘national interests’ whilst suppressing challenges from other Slovenia quarters, so did the other party leaders. Serbian and Montenegrin leaders were challenged by Church influenced opposition. The Kosovo Party was subject to a "take-over" by ethnic Albanians.

However, the most significant ‘national’ movement was the Croatian. Far greater than the earlier Slovene stirrings, the Croatian movement gained great momentum in 1971. The Croatian party leadership, headed by Milako Tripolo, encouraged the surge of nationalism with the hope of reaping economic benefits for Croatia. However, its political
authority was being undermined by an alternative 'cultural' organisation, Matica Hrvatska, whose membership increased dramatically in a year from 1200 to 30,000.\textsuperscript{81} Such was the impetus of Croatian nationalism that it clearly took on separatist overtones: there was even a demand that Croatia should have membership of the United Nations. Yugoslavia was on the point of being torn apart. Devolution of power to the Republics had created in the centre a vacuum of effective decision-making: who would pull the Croats back into line?

Tito, inevitably was the only one with enough authority to make the Croats heel. In April 1971, he publicly denounced Croatian nationalism. Eight months later - after much indecision - he instigated the replacement of the Croatian Party leaders. An 'anti-nationalist' campaign was begun. But still no move was made to halt or reverse the past ten years trend towards national affirmation. However, by September 1972 there was a call for heightened "ideological and political unity - of action", in the LCY.\textsuperscript{82} In effect, this meant a re-assertion of central control; the Party was to take again its 'leading' role: it would fill the power vacuum.

Neither Tito nor the League really filled the power vacuum. Reassertion of central control ran contrary to the League’s changed character. There was now a younger cadre of bureaucrats not revolutionaries. It was they who had forced and supported the reforms,\textsuperscript{83} it was not the LCY which pushed for Croatia to be disciplined; it was searching for a new role.
As was indicated, Tito hesitated to act during 1971. His ambivalence was "enough to confuse the Republican leadership". It required Tito's authority to quell Croatia, but he was not sure about doing so. It would seem the army (YPA) made him sure, eventually - either by persuasion or with support. In April, at the time of Tito's denunciation of nationalism General Mišković said that "only in cases where the constitutional order was threatened would the army become an instrument for solving internal difficulties". Already there was a suggestion of military involvement. By July, Tito was threatening "I will step in and make order with our Army". After Tito eventually acted, the line had become this: "Our army's primary task is to defend the country from foreign enemies. However, it should defend the achievements of our revolution, if needed, from the internal enemy too". The army did not intervene directly, but it seems to have been intervention behind the scenes by the military which led Tito to resolve the crisis. Tito's statements (and subsequent developments) suggest that the army was "footing the bill for the party".

Although formally the LCY was gaining more central power via amendments to the constitution and regaining its 'leading' role, in effect, (as we shall see in the following chapters), the YPA was adopting a 'leading' role within the LCY itself. This was evident as the YPA's domestic role increased. As this happened, Tito asserted that "The Party not the Army was the guardian of the revolution", and that the Army "was a part of the self-management system and the Party. Indeed, the Party was chief guardian but, the Army was a part of it. That the League was composed of parts is important: it was now
a coalition of eight Leagues - nine if (as Tito implied) we count the YPA - no longer one entity. The search throughout the 1950s and 1960s for a role had been intensified by devolution - now there were eight Parties in search of a role and no-one at the centre with the mettle to provide order. It was the army which filled that central power vacuum (although power decentralisation within a nine-party party was later to be the foundation of crisis in the 1980s as another greater central vacuum was created).

The regime had survived with its legitimacy in tact - or rather enhanced - by military involvement. To understand why this was the case, we must look at the YPA itself and its role in the system. How and why was the YPA the force which filled the central power vacuum in 1971 without resorting to overt intervention. The answer lies in an understanding of military legitimacy.
In the early 1970s, the YPA intervened in political affairs. As will be argued, that action stemmed from the army's legitimacy. Using the concept of military legitimacy established in Chapter 2, the army's role in the Croatian crisis will be examined below. The bases of that military legitimacy are three: the creation and conduct of a communist-led army during the combined war of liberation and resolution; fulfilment of its functional imperative in the post-war period; and the specific requirements of its sociopolitical imperative.

Formation of the NLA

Tito's Partisans won the civil war, in essence, because, in becoming the leading resistance movement, they gained the support of the
majority of Yugoslavs. This gave them the power base from which to defeat their enemies and the motivation to employ whatever measures were necessary to preserve that support and the advantage it gave them. They came to power on a swell of legitimacy for their combined military-political organisation. Military legitimacy came, principally, because the Partisans were in tune with the bulk of the population; victory was dependant on widespread support. Although political and military were inextricably entwined, there can be little doubt that support came mostly because the Partisans were fighting the occupation. In this sense, from the outset, the political organisation and ideas of the emergent 'new' Yugoslavia borrowed military legitimacy - which was, thereby, enhanced.

Central to this was the movement’s development of military organisation. As the combined liberation and civil wars progressed, the Partisan’s military organisation passed through several stages of development, each stage representing the progress of the armed struggle and a step towards the formation of a standing army.

After the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, on 22 June, the CPY began preparations for armed action. On 27 June, the military committee of the CPY founded a General Staff which, on July 4 issued a directive for the organisation of armed formations for the conduct of action against the occupier. Its aim was to harness resistance movements in order to divert German attentions from Russia. Although a full-scale uprising was not initially intended, in some instances, the Communists had to respond to the people’s initiative. Djilas indicates
that although Tito ordered that only small actions should be carried out, that it was too soon for a major uprising, popular feeling was to fight: in Montenegro, "The entire population ...rose up against the invader."\(^3\)

Tito was right: an uprising at this stage was premature. This was evident in the manner of the original revolt. It lacked uniformity — varying according to place, time, intensity and information. At the end of July it was already clear in Montenegro (where the uprising had been strongest) that "our popular insurgent army had fallen apart" apart from its Communist core.\(^4\) However, for another year, in Serbia, Partisan units achieved greater success,\(^5\) epitomising "organisation, sacrifice and self-denial"\(^6\) In Bosnia, there had been a "signal" success; in Croatia, the Partisans weakness was its primarily being drawn from the Serbian population; in Slovenia the Partisans had still not "managed successfully to lead... the struggle"; they had "withdrawn into the forests instead of protecting the people...".\(^7\)

This last assessment only underlines the varied forms Communist led resistance took. Certainly, it perhaps fails to acknowledge the entirely different nature of resistance in Slovenia where a coalition of parties led by the Communist Party of Slovenia had formed as early as 27 April 1941, against the Yugoslav Party’s wishes. Established as the Anti-Imperialist Front, its purpose was to oppose the Axis invasion. After the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union of 22 June (when the whole Yugoslav Party began to organise resistance), it became the Liberation Front (OF).\(^8\) Organised principally in Ljubljana, the
Slovene capital, until its leadership could move to free territory at the end of May 1942, the OF had broad support. Although the Partisan movement, conducting guerilla actions outside the capital, was never so strong in Slovenia [see below], as Djilas writes that "the entire population was not only on the side of the Liberation Front, but participated in the resistance movement." As the war developed, however, the OF was subject to disputes and splits.

The diverse elements of the resistance movement were brought together in September 1941, a representative being sent from every area with an armed formation to a Conference at Stolice. The patchwork of reports highlighted, above all else, "considerable shortcomings as regards the links between the partisan detachments" - which was only emerging as a problem as the movement grew. Indeed, this problem was manifest below this level too - Djilas reports the extreme fragmentation in Montenegro, each town and locality of the former kingdom having its military committee attached to the pertinent section of the party.

The need for greater cohesion met with several responses. The General Staff was renamed Supreme Staff and established clear organisational principles for Partisan detachments: each would have a staff composed of a commander, a political commissar and their assistants; three or four battalions, each made up of three or four companies - a company comprising 80-100 soldiers. An order was issued that "in the shortest possible term...uniform dress with proper insignia on the cap" should be provided (the proper insignia was the famous five pointed red star which was also to appear on the national tricolour,
under which they were to fight ).\textsuperscript{15} Later, a single set of instructions was issued, pertaining to methods for defending liberated territory, taking inhabited targets and training those without experience.\textsuperscript{16}

The next major step came in December, when the 1st Proletarian Shock Brigade was formed;\textsuperscript{17} by the end of the war, there had been 295 brigades. These were elite units - service in them was "the highest honour for every individual fighting man"\textsuperscript{18} - specifically under Communist leadership which could operate wherever necessary. Thus, whilst retaining a national, or territorial character ( in the main ), these were the first formations of an army which could be directed from the centre to perform tasks anywhere.

Prior to this, the military effort depended on local feelings; this led to low reliability. For instance, Djilas describes how Montenegrin peasants who had been fast to rise-up and take action abandoned the cause once the Italians mounted an offensive; "To escape artillery fire, they had abandoned the position. The peasants sped back to their homes, hoping to save their families and animals, and no force on earth could have stopped them."\textsuperscript{19} The territorial specificity of the early partisan detachments meant not only that members might fight only for their own village, but that they were in constant touch with their households, frequently sleeping there. This kind of attachment had awkward consequences in particular if an individual was killed.\textsuperscript{20} To avoid these situations and create a less territorially defined, more flexible military structure, brigades were introduced.
The brigade was the main unit in Partisan military thinking. For the most part, the label referred to the 3-4 battalion units described at Stolice. However, composition of brigades did not always conform to this model. The 4th Proletarian (Montenegrin) Brigade, for example, encompassed five battalions and three platoons - one artillery support, one supplies and one medical and sanitation.\(^{21}\)

The brigades greatest attraction was mobility. The concept of mobile territorial units was, to some extent, an inheritance of the former Royal Army's thinking, a product of the incorporation of some that army's officers in the new movement. It was also a descendant of the Serbian forces in the First Balkan War.\(^{22}\) For aggressive purposes, they could be easily moved around to act alongside smaller detachments, performing a vanguard function - providing both moral and technical models. Although brigades carried the name of a particular area and mainly functioned within certain territorial limits, they were not tied to any particular place. This constituted a measure to combat nationalist or racial difficulties.\(^{23}\) The aim was to create military formations with "true military spirit."\(^{24}\) In practice, only the first two brigades operated throughout the country. Otherwise, brigades were formed and operated more or less in one part of the country (Serbian brigades in Serbia, Bosnian in Bosnia and so forth) - and, sometimes, they were used outside their designated area. Moreover, only the first brigades to be formed were given the labels "shock" and "proletarian"; it was adopted later by others because it was believed to add to their moral-political and fighting quality.\(^{25}\)
Perhaps more important, however, was another factor. Given the nature of the war they were fighting and the terrain on which it was being fought, it was essential that the Communist led forces were not tied down in situations - such as a pitched frontal battle - which would leave them at a disadvantage. Without evading enemy attacks and ensuring "the preservation of one's own vital force", a guerrilla army, such as the Partisans, would soon be overwhelmed by numerically and technically superior adversaries. This meant that they could only attack in suitable conditions.

The founding of the brigade system also reflected the need to seize the strategic initiative and increase offensive activity. It further constituted a notable step towards the creation of an army proper. More than an attempt centrally to co-ordinate the activities of local resistance groups, it was the establishment of a centrally directed combat force. As 1942 progressed, the increment of brigades ( soon after the anniversary of the 1st, there would be 37 of them) and strategic developments produced another logical step in November: the creation of the National Liberation Army (NLA).

In many ways, the Partisans were on the back foot. Now fighting not only the Germans, Italians and the Ustaše, but, also, the Chetniks, they continued to seek, yet, not obtain material support from the Allies. Even in Serbia, the heartland of passionate resistance, they were experiencing difficulties. However, large parts of Bosnia were liberated territory and support was widespread and growing.
At the time of the Stolice conference, there were 14,000 partisans in Serbia. By the end of the year, this figure exceeded 20,000. In the same period, there was an even greater increase in the number of partisans in Montenegro. Between August and the year’s end the force grew from 5,000 to 20,000. By New Year 1942, there were another 20,000 partisans in Bosnia-Hercegovina and 7,000 in Croatia.

In contrast, the Partisan movement was never so strong in Slovenia - throughout 1941, the total of individuals engaged in Partisan detachments in Slovenia did not exceed 700 or 800. One estimate suggests that at the time of the Italian capitulation on 8 September 1943 there were no more than 2,000 Slovenes under arms - whereas the collaborationist White Guard comprised 8,000. A more reasonable figure is 4,500 partisans; but this remains low and only grew significantly towards the war’s close.

Between the end of 1941 and the end of 1942, the total number of partisans went from 80,000 to 150,000. These troops were formed in brigades, partisan detachments and independent battalions (37, 67 and 45, respectively) equipped with most types of weaponry. Their number was such that they had become "impossible to direct." In addition to the organisational imperative imposed by the growth in force size, others arose from the increasing need, with the changing shape of the war, for a more offensive action and a shift from the guerilla pattern to a more frontal system. The possession of substantial portions of the country - about 45,000 km square, mostly
in Western Bosnia\textsuperscript{38} - gave rise to the need to begin "more sweeping operations, for more powerful attacks on the invaders and their Ustaše and Chetnik lackeys".\textsuperscript{39}

To meet these new conditions, the NLA was formed into divisions and corps. In 1942, after the 1st Proletarian Division was formed on 1 November, another seven followed; by the end of 1943 there were another ten. In this period, each division comprised around 3000 troops.\textsuperscript{40} Petelin points out that whereas NLA divisions totalled 3-4000 at this stage - and later would only be 6 - 10 000 strong, those of other armies during the Second World War averaged between 10 000 and 15 000 members.\textsuperscript{41} The relatively small size of NLA divisions can be seen as an advantage: some of the flexibility and manoeuvrability of previous partisan units was retained in the transition to a more formal armed force.\textsuperscript{42} By the war's end, there were 54 divisions, each containing at least 5-6000 personnel; in Serbia, the 25th Serbian and 1st Proletarian divisions had around 13 000 members - several others in that region had over 10 000.\textsuperscript{43}

A division, as a strategic-operational force, brought together the following: three infantry brigades, an artillery battery; signals, reconnaissance scouts, engineers, medical and sanitation - a platoon each. By 1945, some divisions would incorporate, among other things, transport, motorised and anti-tank battalions, as well as field hospitals and construction units.\textsuperscript{44} Its command element was small and simple in its structure, comprising a commander, a political commissar and a chief of staff.\textsuperscript{45} Divisions were established as non-territorial,
strategic entities. They were the first element of the NLA not to bear some territorial label - each division was numbered only - and not to be territorially founded. Divisions were prepared for action in all parts of Yugoslavia, although, in practice, their operations were commonly confined to the regions from which their component parts (battalions and so forth) were drawn and neighbouring areas.\textsuperscript{46} It is, nonetheless, significant that, unlike some of the previous units of the NLA, divisions were never exclusively the preserve of a particular nationality. This feature had a "profound social meaning sense" for, in this way, the guiding principles of brotherhood and unity were fostered - indeed, made a reality.\textsuperscript{47}

Of course, development of the divisions was not always smooth. One example of this is the 31st Division. In the initial period, the divisional command was still organising itself and could not give sufficient help to the component brigades. Therefore, in effect, there was not a radical difference between the new arrangement and the one it succeeded. The variation in quality between the Pre\v\seren Brigade made up of deeply experienced fighters and the others, established with novices, led to the retention of separate identities. A consequence of this was each brigade's keeping its former capability and there being no accretion in the strategic worth of their sum.\textsuperscript{48} Later, the differences between these brigades were reduced and, eventually, after October 1944, this division was already at a level where it was ready to form part of Yugoslavia's future standing army.\textsuperscript{49}
The divisions were designed to act independently or in formation. Therefore, Corps were formed in parallel with divisions to meet the need for large scale action in a broad theatre of operation. Corps were initially organised on a territorial basis. This owed to the communication difficulties experienced in the kind of guerrilla war in which the partisans were engaged. As was the case with other units, the Supreme Command was unable to direct all operations; so, this responsibility had to be devolved.

However, the territory covered by a Corps was not always consistent (as had been the case previously) with administrative or operational regions. The nature of the war meant that, at the beginning, at least, it never left its own territory. However, the corps did not have a permanent profile. At Corps level, between two and four would combine with other partisan units or groups to conduct particular offensive actions. Essentially, the Corps structure enabled the co-ordination and direction of varying elements of the NLA towards specific tasks on the territory covered by the Corps command; afterwards, divisions could be released to act independently or in other formations - or be demobilised.

The Corps was a far more sophisticated organisation than the division. In the early days Corps would range in size from 5000 to 15 000 fighters; by the end they would include 50 000. The co-ordination of such large numbers required a larger, more complex command than the divisions. The corps command - Main Staff, therefore, in addition to the commander, political commissar and chief of staff found at
divisional level, included intelligence, supplies and medical chiefs.51

The final stage in the wartime organisational evolution of the NLA was the creation of four armies. The 1st, 2nd and third armies were announced on 1 January 1945; the fourth followed on 2 March - the day after the NLA was renamed the Yugoslav Army.52 These new structures provided for command of the corps. The armies were large, ranging from 40,000 to 111,000 troops and incorporated several divisions each.53 By 15 May 1945, only two corps remained. These, the 7th and 9th, operated in Slovenia. Their essentially Slovene character probably accounts for their not being assimilated into the Army structure. However, in the closing operations of the war in Western Yugoslavia, they were subordinated by the 4th army command.54

After the close of the war the four armies involved 28 divisions,55 the two corps comprised another five; in all, there were 59 divisions with 261 brigades, 9 regiments and 3 remnant partisan detachments.56 Overall, the Yugoslav Army had around 800,000 soldiers under arms. This was, already, the foundation for the standing army which the post-war state would evolve, eventually to become the Yugoslav People's Army.

In considering the organisational and strategic success of Tito and his movement, one other most important factor must be noted: the formation of a fighting force was supplemented by the development of a
political-economic infrastructure. Each partisan unit had a party organisation. There existed parallel party and military structures.

Political work was important in the NLA - which was, after all, a creation of the CPY. Therefore, after the Stolice Conference, political sections were created. These operated initially at brigade level and below. Later, when divisions were established, they too had political sections. However, these sections did not exist above divisional level (although political commissars were attached to commanders in the corps, armies and Supreme Staff). Political sections were not merely counselling bodies. Their tasks included explaining the party line within the relevant unit of the NLA, organising meetings and conducting courses on. They were also enjoined to secure the political-military integrity and morale of their unit. Moreover, their concerns were not restricted to the strength of the existing unit; these sections were also responsible for the mobilisation of new adherents to the army.

Each unit had a political commissar. This commissar led the brigade political section. Below, each battalion had a commissar who headed a cultural advisory committee of 5-7 members. The same pattern recurred at company level, the committee’s being made up of 3-5 members. These ‘cultural teams’ were charged with various agitprop functions - including both the dissemination of ideology and the reading of poetry.
In addition to establishing the party's leading role and ensuring the internal strength of units, at each level the political commissar was responsible for liaising with the civilian communities. This work could involve the securing of supplies from friendly communities, acting as a link between the national or regional party committees of the CPY (or, in Slovenia, directly with the central committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia (CPS), encouraging the population in Serb areas to fight against the Chetniks, or persuading Croatians, first, that the Partisans were not Serb Chetniks, then, that they should reject Ustase values, and, finally, that the best interests of the Croatian people lay in alliance with the other Yugoslav peoples.

The political commissar's liaison role also involved dealing with the political-military authorities established to govern liberated territories. These authorities were set up on the basis of the First and Second Sessions of the Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), held on November 26-7, 1942 at Bihać and on November 29, 1943 at Jajce.

AVNOJ was the political body in which the "aspirations of the people national and social liberation" were embodied. The AVNOJ executive took responsibility for the setting up and counselling of governmental bodies on free territory. Through these activities, the features of a proto-state evolved. At its Second Session, AVNOJ constituted itself as the country's legislature and established a National Liberation Committee as the First government of a new, revolutionary Yugoslavia.
In addition to the partisans’ always forming a system of government on liberated territory, they also established an economic base to ensure the provision of material support. Djilas, for example, describes the munitions factory in Užice - where he observed all the "virtues and all the faults of Partisan improvisation". However, armaments were not the only commodity required the partisan army. In Slovenia, for example, 1 144 000 kg of provisions - 175 000 kg of flour, 571 000 kg of potatoes, 120 000 kg of beans, 260 000 kg of meat - were required per month. Moreover, an army marches not only on its stomach, but on its feet: the cobblers incorporated by one division supplied 1706 pairs of shoes and carried out 1098 repairs in the eight months to February 1945. Otherwise, supplies were obtained from the vanquished enemy and, in the later stages of the war from the Allies.

Tito and his aides created and shaped an army. They did so with the purpose, initially, of diverting Axis troops from the attack on the USSR, but, mostly, of liberating Yugoslavia from occupation and conducting a revolution. That army was at all stages guided and disciplined by the political objective of military action. The organisation of a fighting force, the

Tito’s Partisans won the civil war, in essence, because, in becoming the leading resistance movement, they gained the support of the majority of Yugoslavs. This gave them the power base from which to defeat their enemies and the motivation to employ whatever measures were necessary to preserve that support and the advantage it gave
them. They came to power on a swell of legitimacy for both their combined military-political organisation. Military legitimacy came, principally, because the Partisans were in tune with the bulk of the population; victory was dependant on widespread support. Although political and military were inextricably entwined, there can be little doubt that support came mostly because the Partisans were fighting the occupation. In this sense, from the outset, the political organisation and ideas of the emergent 'new' Yugoslavia borrowed military legitimacy - which was, thereby, enhanced.

Central to this was the movement's development of military organisation. As the combined liberation and civil wars progressed, the Partisan's military organisation passed through several stages of development, each stage representing the progress of the armed struggle and a step towards the formation of a standing army. The institutionalisation of an army of this kind after the war extended from partisan legitimacy.

**Military Legitimacy in the Post-War Period: The Functional Imperative**

Taking military doctrine as the imperative of functional legitimacy, the post-war evolution of the YPA (including the change from the Yugoslav Army to the Yugoslav People's Army) falls into three phases. In the first of these, the YPA was established as a conventional standing army. In the second phase, the army returned to its partisan
roots, becoming a territorial, militia army. In the final period, the army no longer encompassed the territorial aspect of defence; instead, it became one element in a duplex defence system the two structures being an operational army and territorial defence forces.

Official versions of the post-war development of the armed forces give the dates for the three stages as follows: 1945-58; 1958-68; 1969 onwards. These are the dates when new military doctrines were formally adopted on the basis of new defence laws. However, if account is taken of the three factors said to define military doctrine, a different picture appears.

The military's mission is said to be defined by three factors: military-political trends in the world and Yugoslavia's position in relation to them; internal social, economic and political development; the country's scientific and technical capability with regard to armaments. If these features - including expulsion from the Cominform and the introduction of a self-management based ideology - are related to organisational developments in the army, it emerges that change occurred more incrementally through constant tinkering at various stages.

For example, one interpretation calls the period 1948-55 one of "discovering the most adequate" organisational and doctrinal solutions to the problems faced. Any consideration of what those problems were (externally, how to deal with the threat of a Soviet invasion; internally, what kind of defence force would be consistent with the
new patterns of a socialist self-managing society in the process of proving itself different from and better than the USSR) and the alterations made to deal with them must arrive at one conclusion: changes in the YPA's mission have not been determined by ideological principles; they have reflected changes in the international and sociopolitical environments.

Despite Yugoslav claims that defence has been determined by ideology, matters were clearly the other way around. Moreover, the notion that defence is prime, ideology secondary, has been invoked by at least one senior officer in the YPA to justify the otherwise anomalous period of a standing army. No political movement, conscious of the realities of its situation, would "deprive itself of a large defensive force such as Yugoslavia had at the end of the war, for the benefit of ideological orthodoxy or complete fidelity to Marxist principles", according to a former Assistant Defence Minister.\(^{75}\) Essentially, the formation of a standing army met certain requirements at the end of the war; nor was its creation without profit.

The Yugoslav Army evolved from small groupings to a countrywide operational military institution. After victory in the war, it became necessary to turn the partisans into a "modern army".\(^{76}\) Peacetime conditions meant reductions in force levels and the creation of a permanent, standing army. As with the creation of the revolutionary army in the first place, this was something of which the communists had little experience. Again, the communists had to evolve an army to meet new requirements.
In the first post-war years, it was necessary to decide what to do with a force of 800,000. All partisan detachments - the remnant territorial units - were disestablished and the forces in the main structure of the army greatly reduced. This left the YA about 400,000 strong at the end of 1947. This core was "installed" in barracks, from where it was partially involved in the "struggle" against "traitors and quislings", although perhaps only as last recourse. Otherwise the YA was concerned with its own identity as, during 1946 and 1947, several laws were adopted to institute the new army, including its being formed into three service branches - land army, navy and airforce. The organisation of the army along conventional lines was deemed appropriate to the task of defending the new socialist Yugoslav state from external attack by the "imperialist" (Western) powers and internal counter-revolution.

Western support for anti-communist forces in the Greek civil-war was said to be a manifestation of the 'imperialist' threat: today, Greece tomorrow, Yugoslavia. In reality, Yugoslavia was most likely to fight a local war over disputed territory with one of its neighbours - whether to defend existing borders, or, as has been suggested, to achieve an "enlarged Yugoslavia". A centralised force, capable of rapid and decisive intervention in the event of a war with Italy over the territory around Trieste, with Austria over Carinthia, with Albania over the lands populated by ethnic Albanians - or the assimilation of Albania in a greater Yugoslavia, or with Bulgaria over Macedonia, was most appropriate to Yugoslavia's position in 1945.
Moreover, instituting a regular army met other needs. In peacetime, it was necessary to organise a military institution, the command of which was no longer co-terminous with, but would be responsible to the state and party leaderships. That, at a time when the system was new and needing stable institutions to establish itself and the country in its "bureaucratic-statist" phase, meant the creation of a strong centralised army. This asserted the leadership’s authority in a country prone to fragmentation, whilst eliminating the possibility of local armies forming to fight another civil-war. A consequence of the shift to a regular army would be to take the partisan officer corps and train it into a professional cadre. This cadre would be in charge of a force no longer formed on a volunteer basis, but on the conscriptive military duty of all citizens.

The existence of a standing army provided a framework in which a new, professionally trained, expert army could be given the knowledge and skills to meet the technical demands made on it. In the context of the ‘cold war’, this was held to be particularly pertinent, in order to oppose threats to the new state. The partisan army had never been equipped with state-of-the-art weaponry; now, with the expectation of Soviet aid there was updating to be done, requiring special training.

Finally, to preserve the strength of the new socialist order, in defence as in other areas, the party leadership believed the best policy was to copy the structures found in the Soviet Union. Therefore, although the initial post-war development of a regular
army for open, frontal warfare may seem to be anomalous in the YPA's previous and subsequent association with guerilla types of warfare, it is consistent with Yugoslavia's "statist" (or Stalinist) phase. The army was not an exception as the new communist state began to emulate Soviet structures.

More than the need to satisfy organisational and technical demands, it is the belief in Soviet institutions which explains the adoption of a standing army: the experience of the Red Army of the first "socialist country" was taken to be a "universal solution for socialist countries." The Red Army's assistance was "welcome", its having emerged from the war as a "most effective military force". Using the Red Army as a stencil for the post-war organisation of the YA was a "logical consequence of these factors".87

The building of a conventional army is chiefly explained by Yugoslavia's ties with the Soviet Union in this period. The use of Soviet forms and the strong co-operation between the countries had two benefits, in particular, for CPY. First, close association gave the Yugoslav leadership 'Marxist-Leninist credentials it sought as bases of legitimacy (even if these were later to be rejected in favour of indigenously researched ideological legitimation).88 Secondly, the Yugoslavs really gained from Soviet experience. Not only did Soviet instructors assist in Yugoslavia, but YA officers were sent to military schools and academies in the Soviet Union, where technical military education was way in advance of that available in parallel institutions established by the YA.89
Partisan tradition remained strong, however. This created cross-currents with the conventional pattern being established. These "contradictory trends" were a cause of friction between YA officers and their Soviet counterparts. Various differences contributed to the Tito-Stalin split. These emerged after Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform in 1948.

Ex-partisans, with the memory of a victorious war fresh in their minds, felt they were being ‘taught to suck eggs’ by Soviet advisors. It was hard for experienced Yugoslav soldiers to reconcile uncritical regard for the Red Army with complete disregard for partisan experience. Whereas the Yugoslavs thought in terms of alliance, the Soviet intention was to subjugate the YA. A further dimension was the USSR’s failure to supply modern weaponry, as anticipated by Tito. Instead, obsolete equipment was provided at a high price.

After the Cominform expulsion, the YA found itself in a new position. Although for a year there was a stand-off between the two sides, each hoping the other would see the error of its ways, neither did and tension grew. Yugoslavia’s erstwhile ally was now its principal enemy. The army’s task shifted to deterrence of and defence against Soviet incursion. The YA’s attention was moved away from the Italian border and the Greek civil-war to the South; instead, it was focussed on protection of the Eastern and Northern borders.

The new situation created a twofold need for a re-assessment of military thought and doctrine: one strand was defensive, the other,
ideological. The first priority was to ensure defence against a Soviet attack. In part, international support could be invoked to deter or repel Soviet aggression. This, however, could be no "substitute for a defence policy".\textsuperscript{94} It was necessary to correct military thought and doctrine.

This meant greater reliance on wartime experience in military planning. Although there remained considerable emphasis on conventional military organisation, there was a limited return to partisan thinking. The YA would have to be prepared not only for frontal combat, but for partisan action in case of aggression. To meet the new requirements, military education and training were intensified and a domestic armaments industry became a priority for rapid development.\textsuperscript{95} Moreover, to confirm partial return to NLA practice, during 1949, 149 regiments and 20 independent brigades were formed under the direct command of the YA.\textsuperscript{96}

Yugoslav theorists have explained this change by reference to developments in socialist self-managing ideology.\textsuperscript{97} Territorial defence gave the impression of compatibility with the new theses on which the Yugoslav system was to be based. This change (and subsequent ones), it is said, have led to the "progressive socialisation" of Yugoslavia's defence capability.\textsuperscript{98} However, in reality, as with the idea of self-management, military developments owed to the force of necessity, not intellectual purity.
Both political changes and defence changes were due to the need to counter the Soviet Union. It was serendipitous that a broadly based military structure such as the Yugoslavs already knew from partisan experience was both appropriate to their blend of resources and requirements - and consistent with the new principles on which the country's political life would be based. The territorial defence posture was not, however, assumed to give expression to the new ideology; it was adopted as the best means of using experience to deter or resist a Soviet attack.

Another consequence of the split was the demise of the political commissar. Although commissars had been a feature of the partisan army, conceptually, the office was a borrowing from the Soviet model. If all that was Soviet was to be rejected, political commissars had to go. From 1949 onwards, the commissar's role was diminished as the YA unified its command structure.99

In 1953, following the 6th Congress of the CPY in 1952 at which the theses of the new self-managing system were adumbrated, the political commissar was eliminated. The parallel operational and party vertebrae of command obtained a single form. Either a duplicative irrelevance where the two offices worked symbiotically or "complex [that is, problematic] relations" where they could not, the abolition of commissars represented a more efficient form of command.100 The commissar was replaced by an Assistant to the Commanding Officer with responsibility for "moral-political" questions.101 Thus, party influence remained, but the lines of command were simplified.
To reflect the more 'social' accent on defence and to highlight the severance with the past, on Army Day, 22 December, 1951, the YA changed its name to the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA). The alteration was more symbolic than substantial. As with other aspects of life in the years following the 6th Congress, practice lagged far behind theory in the YPA. The years until 1958 were a period for consolidation and 'discovery'.

The new doctrine of 'All People's Defence', adopted in 1958 [see below] resulted from several years gestation. After Stalin's death in 1953, relations with the Soviet Union became more relaxed, culminating in Khrushchev's visit to Yugoslavia in 1955. Thereafter, a more comprehensive form of territorial defence began to be elaborated.

The further development of defence policy again performed the duplex role of fulfilling defence needs and being consistent with self-management. Self-managing socialism provided an ideological perspective for a "social" system of defence. Moreover, the continued construction of that system brought the YPA ever closer to its original partisan path. In the light of this, basing defence "exclusively", in the 1945-49 period, and "predominantly", between 1949 and 1958, on a standing army was discontinuous with, even a negation of, the history of the Yugoslav armed forces. The shift back to popular defence was consonant with ideology and tradition.

However, the greatest spur to producing the new doctrine was the formation of NATO and in 1955 the WTO. This external factor with
significant practical implications prompted intensive work on organisational issues and the delineation of a new doctrine. Before 1948, the USSR had been Yugoslavia's ally; after the split, because of its opposition to the Soviet Union, the country had received aid from the West - particularly, the United States. The establishment of military alliances led by the United States and the Soviet Union meant that Yugoslavia's position 'in between' was made more difficult. American military aid, which had peaked in 1951 and declined thereafter as Yugoslav-Soviet tension decreased, was discontinued in 1958.

Finding itself outside the main military blocs and without a clear-cut threat from any quarter, Yugoslavia required an appropriate defence policy. Since 1945, the army had reduced its force strength whilst strengthening its fighting capability and improving its firepower. Despite force reductions, Yugoslavia devoted more of its wealth to defence than anywhere else in the world during the early 1950s. Spending levels had been sustained by US military aid. The reduction and cessation of this aid meant cutting the military cloth accordingly.

The new doctrine had to recognise the realities of Yugoslavia's situation. An independent, semi-developed, relatively poor country surrounded by two large military camps, either of which, in theory might invade had limited options. Given its rich vein of territorial experience, elaboration of All People's Defence was an obvious solution. The new doctrine satisfied the country's practical and
ideological demands whilst utilising its resources - knowledge, experience, technology and economy - to effect.
The doctrine worked out over several years was assumed in 1958. By the end of 1959, the YPA had progressed well beyond preparations for frontal war, having formed 126 partisan brigades on a wholly territorial, militia basis. Until this point, although territorial units had been consituted de facto to meet immediate needs, they had not been embraced officially in military doctrine; now, the principle was adopted of "combined open-partisan warfare". The adoption of the new doctrine owed to two things; the need to define Yugoslavia's position between two large military alliances; and the thaws in relations between the two superpowers running those alliances, and between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union - these provided the relative freedom from threat in which such changes could be implemented.
The YPA was organised in strategic echelons. The first of these comprised units maintained at full war readiness. Their main purpose was to deal with a surprise attack, offering resistance which prevent rapid, deep penetration of the country. Secondary echelons were kept on a peacetime footing, to be mobilised in case of war. Finally, partisan units were formed across Yugoslavia for deployment in the rear and for guerrilla combat on territory which might be ceded to the invader. Overall, this was the same structure with which the partisan army had finished the war: large units for action along fixed fronts; other formations of varying size, waxing and waning according to circumstance; and smaller partisan detachments, organised locally, for guerrilla operations on occupied territory and rear support.

This major transformation took some time to complete. Frontline combat units had to be reorganised. The territorial principle had to be widened and its implementation tested. Mobilisation procedures had to
be brought into line with the new system. All of this required practice and intensive schooling before the flexibility and strike capability of the new structures could be realised. This restructuring was not finally accomplished until 1965. 113

Before long, there was another new military doctrine and concomitant re-organisation. 'General People’s Defence' (GPD) came into force in 1969. The Yugoslav armed forces were to get a radically different structure. Territorial defence was emphasised by a division of responsibility. Until this point and in other instances of armed forces based on a territorial principle, sole responsibility for defence had been with the central institution of defence; usually, territorial forces have been integrated with, or adjunct to, the army. GPD divided responsibility between the YPA and sociopolitical communities. 114

According to the 1969 National Defence Law, the Yugoslav armed forces would comprise two coequal elements: the YPA and Territorial Defence. Whereas the YPA would be the responsibility of the federal authorities, territorial defence would be organised by sociopolitical communities - that is, Republics, Autonomous Provinces, Communes and work organisations. This division of duty made defence a specifically civilian affair as well. The new system of defence was all embracing, as was defined in article 1 of the new law: "Every citizen who in war, in an organised way, participates with arms in the struggle against the enemy can be a member of the armed forces of Yugoslavia." 115 Or, as one writer has noted, the Yugoslav Constitution did not "state the
difference between a 'civilian' citizen' and a citizen in uniform: they are all the same in relation to basic rights, freedoms, duties and responsibilities."\textsuperscript{116}

The YPA was the operational force, comprised of active and reserve regular soldiers. Territorial defence units provided defence in depth, being made up from members of work organisations and local and regional communities. The YPA was to be the best trained, best equipped, technically most advanced section of the armed forces; territorial units were to have relatively simple, light weaponry.\textsuperscript{117} Each would perform different roles in the event of war - either separately, or together.

Yugoslav defence planners assumed two possible types of external aggression. The first of these envisaged conflict with one or both of the major military alliances; Yugoslavia would be either subject to invasion by NATO or WTO forces, or it would be involved in a war between the two pacts. Both eventualities would imply the attempted total occupation of the country.\textsuperscript{118}

In either instance, the YPA would be charged with an initial, frontal role. Its chief task would be to delay enemy progress so that reserve and territorial forces could be mobilised. Up to half could be mobilised within six hours; complete mobilisation would take perhaps two days.\textsuperscript{119} Beyond this, its role would be to provide a lead, by example, in the resistance struggle.\textsuperscript{120}
Territorial defence units would conduct guerrilla warfare. Although they might perform a frontal role "independently or in co-operation" with the YPA, defending free territory from enemy attack, for the most part, they would become the main combat force on occupied territory; in particular, territorial units are expected to be significant in resisting airborne assaults - "on the spot", they can engage parachute troops as they land or before they have had time to re-group, whereas regular forces would take time to arrive on site. These units would be expected to use all forms of resistance. According to the Defence Secretary at the time of the introduction of GPD, anyone willing to fight "can defeat the enemy by any means available".

The second scenario developed by Yugoslav strategists envisaged a more limited war with an individual member of NATO or the WTO. In practice, Bulgaria would be the most likely protagonist. In this case, the YPA would have the principal part to play in what would be, essentially, a frontal war; territorial units would provide auxiliary back-up, but, whilst important, this would be secondary.

The Yugoslav armed forces had one further defensive aim. Whereas an external threat was assumed to be a possibility from any source, a more specific internal mission was identified - the resistance of 'counter-revolution'. Externally, no specific enemy could ever be identified. GPD did not "label anyone an enemy in advance. According to our concept, an enemy is everyone - irrespective of bloc or the national flag hoisted - who commits an act of aggression against the country". Internally, those who might commit an act of aggression
were more readily to be identified: 'cominformists' (that is those with Soviet sympathies), Albanian irredentists and Croatian 'Ustaše' and similar 'nationalist' groups.¹²⁶

The appearance of the new doctrine in 1969 can be explained two ways - one political, the other, operational. The first of these appears in semi-official Yugoslav accounts which give a political explanation. Either, the changes amounted to a further step in the progressive socialisation of the country's military capacity or, they were a function of budgetary necessity.

The new arrangement made possible "the socialisation of people's defence" in accordance with the principles of self-management: military organisation was transformed into an armed people",¹²⁷ in which "all factors of a socialist society based on self-management - citizens, work and other organisations from Commune to Federation,... play a role".¹²⁸ "The strength of our doctrine," Defence Secretary Bubanj boasted, "is that it is public and belongs to the people."¹²⁹ Indeed, the 'armed people' pattern of military force developed in Yugoslavia during and after the war was the only one consistent with Marxist-Leninist theory.¹³⁰

As in earlier periods, however much the doctrine was theoretically compatible with self-management, this was a welcome but secondary feature. If 1967 offered a ten year "perspective" on the armed forces progress, that which indicated a continuing need to "work intensively" on "the optimal solution" to problems in that quarter was not the need
to produce a more social form of defence.\textsuperscript{131} Although, in practice, GPD met civilian demands for self-managing principles to be applied to the armed forces, bringing defence into line with the decentralising, confederative tendencies of society at that time,\textsuperscript{132} the changes did not owe to theoretical argument.

The 1969 changes constituted a diminishing of the YPA's institutional status. Where previously it had sole and virtually unquestioned authority in defence matters, it had been reduced to a coequal.\textsuperscript{133} Since the economic reforms of 1965, there had been pressure to introduce a GPD system. At the end of 1966, the military budget was questioned for the first time. If not ideological, certainly, there was economic weight on the military to introduce a less costly system.\textsuperscript{134}

The YPA was not wholly unsympathetic with regard to this matter - although there were inevitable divisions.\textsuperscript{135} However, the system adopted was not favoured by the army. General Ivan Gošnjak, a former Secretary of Defence offered support for a GPD system in which a limited range of functions would be taken over by, for example, communes; however, the YPA would predominate.\textsuperscript{136} This was also the view of Gošnjak's Chief of Staff.\textsuperscript{137}

The system introduced was not the one the YPA wanted. It was compelled to accept that system for military reasons. It was true that the concept of defence had a "very weak point in that work organisations and socio-political communities were not the principal factors
responsible for defence". However, that weakness was not theoretical but, "practical."

Wartime experience had shown that small units operating locally could not be centrally commanded. Were Yugoslavia to be attacked, it would have been highly unlikely that the YPA could achieve full mobilisation before certain areas were occupied by the enemy; certainly it could not have provided anything more than specialist local leadership in the event of territory being seized.

This explanation may be, more or less, teased out of some sources. It is no more sufficient than self-managing or economic interpretations. There was a real operational weakness, but this might have been dealt with along the lines suggested by Gočnjak and Hamović, retaining military sway. It was an immediate force of circumstance which compelled the generals to put aside the "traditional pride, prejudice and acquisitiveness of their profession": the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Curiously, Yugoslav sources absolutely ignore the invasion of Czechoslovakia in discussions of GPD. Yet, it was obviously a jolt to them. The reaction was one of "genuine indignation and shock." Moreover, certain aspects of the 1969 Law imply specific reference to that invasion. It was made clear that no-one would have the right "to accept and recognise the occupation of the country or any part of it." WTO troops entered Czechoslovakia to give 'fraternal assistance' at the 'invitation' of Soviet stooges in the country: no
Yugoslav would legally be able to make a similar 'request' for fraternal help. This was later stated more explicitly: "No one has the right to invite [my emphasis] the enemy's armed forces into the country..." \(^{145}\)

Among various conclusions drawn, the most central was that a very real Soviet threat existed. Thus far, the likelihood of the YPA seeing action had been slim; suddenly, it appeared great. In this circumstance, Yugoslav defence capabilities were brought into question. Although changes had been under discussion for some time,\(^ {146}\) the perception of an imminent possibility of attack made their rapid effectuation a priority.

The generals could not argue; the chance that the armed forces would have to mobilise - allied to the discovery of a weak link in the mobilisation system neutralised any opposition to the changes. The possibility of defects in the practice of territorial defence was not merely an operational concern. The first aim of any defence policy is to deter attack. It was easy to conclude that "if the purpose is really deterrence by means of a credible threat to defend oneself with determination and effectiveness, then reliance on the regular armed forces alone would not only be inadequate but actually dysfunctional."\(^ {147}\)

The need for GPD was accentuated by the Yugoslav assessment of Western responses to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. An assumption in Yugoslav defence thinking had been that external support would be available
should an attack be made. Now, the notable differences between the Czechoslovak and the Yugoslav cases borne in mind, the defence planners had to consider directly that not only might there be an attack, but that it might have to be faced alone.148

Events indicated that Yugoslavia needed a defence policy which would enable the country to resist a massive attack, if necessary, without any assistance. The effectiveness of North Vietnamese contingents against US forces was not overlooked as the YPA considered its own traditions and situation at that time. A credible 'popular' defence policy was immanent. The combined demands of defence budget reductions and the need for effective mobilisation and leadership mechanisms for the territorial elements of the armed forces meant accepting a coequal role in GPD.

The YPA was not content with this configuration. It seems that it re-established some of its esteem later. In 1974 a fresh defence law offered a pronounced modification of the 1969 Defence Law. In the latter, the operational army was the direct charge of the Supreme Command; the territorial defence units were managed by the republican defence staffs.

This was radically altered in 1974, where the Federal President is Supreme Commander of the armed forces: "if the Supreme Commander of the armed forces - or a senior officer authorised by him - decides so, united commands for both YPA and territorial defence can be set up."149 Although a dual structure remained, the YPA's preeminence was
evident - all the more so, given that, the ultimate and titular leadership of the armed forces notwithstanding, de facto, leadership of the YPA and, now, territorial defence units, rested with the Federal Secretary of Defence.

The re-enhancement of the YPA’s position owed little to operational requirements - although it could be said that its role as the ‘leading’ element of the armed forces seems sensible because the defensive posture gains in credibility. The army’s change of status owes even less to the further socialisation of defence - rather the opposite. This must qualify arguments which characterise the shift to GPD as a measure to assure consistency with self-managing principles in the armed forces.

The YPA’s status was improved as a result of its playing a significant role in politics. Another feature thrown into relief by the invasion of Czechoslovakia was the need to avoid internal discord which might encourage an aggressor. The events in Croatia in 1971 appeared for a time to threaten the continued existence of Yugoslavia. This (and perhaps a desire to get even with the Croat ‘liberals’ who had argued for social control of defence) prompted the YPA to involve itself.

Once again, a functional change resulted not from ideological guidance but, from the influence of the external environment and domestic events. The evolutionary pattern of the armed forces evident at each juncture from the emergence of a standing army from the partisans, to the bifurcation of responsibility for defensive tasks with the
instituting of GPD was confirmed. In the post-war period, the Yugoslav military has not been fostered by ideological principles. Throughout it has been shaped by a combination of operational, international and sociopolitical developments.

As will be seen below, the YPA's role during the 'Croatian Crisis' of 1971 was prime. The army's becoming the 'more equal' partner in the Yugoslav armed forces followed this. By playing a political role, the YPA was fulfilling part of its sociopolitical role: that role rested on its socio-political legitimacy.

Military Legitimacy on the Post-War Period: the Sociopolitical Imperative

The sociopolitical imperative of military legitimacy has three segments: the nature of the army's relationship with society; its socioeconomic agency; and its role in politics. The content of this imperative differs widely between types of political system and specific countries. In general, the distinction depends on the degree in which the army is a 'closed' institution. Should it remain in the barracks, uninvolved in political activity, or should it have full competence to engage politically? Should its work be restricted to purely military spheres, or should it be expected to make regular contributions in the domain of socioeconomic development, such as construction work or medical provision?
cohesive, separate military caste, or should it mirror its parent society?

All armies have a socioeconomic role; they differ in the degree of that role. The Yugoslav military’s socioeconomic activity in the post-war years was extensive. This activity fell into three areas: the development of a defence industry, the YPA contribution to the wider economy and the army’s role as an agent of education and socialisation.

The YPA was always involved in the building of Yugoslavia’s defence industry. Although the First Five Year Plan made no provision for defence production, the Tito-Stalin split made it necessary to create a domestic arms industry. Extending partisan tradition and keeping within ideological precepts, the industry which developed was integrated with the wider economy. Thus capacity was always used for military and civilian purposes.

The war had destroyed almost all prewar shipyards and equipment. By 1951, the capacity to produce 20,000 ton ships had been restored. For civilian use, five large ocean-going ships had been built and almost three hundred craft smaller than this. This represented an investment of 25 billion dinars at contemporary prices. In the five years to 1965, output of military industry for the civilian market was worth 200 billion dinars at contemporary prices.
Military industry's production for military purposes was subject to greater secrecy. However, in the 1970s, it was estimated to account for between 55 and 80 per cent of YPA needs. Although Yugoslavia was dependent on external sources for its most sophisticated equipment (for example, it imported MIG-21s from the Soviet Union), the domestic industry has produced, in particular, specialised light-weight armaments appropriate to guerrilla warfare. Military industry also proved an export success. Supplying items which included artillery, coastal defence ships, medium sized submarines and aircraft to non-aligned countries. At 1965 prices, this trade was worth 30 million USD per annum. Beyond the arms-related industry, YPA economic activity has been extensive. In the post-war period of reconstruction the contribution of the army was vast, in areas such as construction, communications, engineering, health and sanitation.

In the immediate post-war period of renewal (1946-7), YPA construction units restored 170,000 damaged edifices, built new accommodation for 25,000 people and erected 90,000 square metres of wall. Between 1953 and 1964, army engineers completed 1900 km of road construction, 254 bridges and 1300 drains. The army collaborated with the PTT to establish a telephone and radio relay network. In the wreckage of war, medical units were formed by the army to work in the civilian community to eradicate disease, in particular, to combat typhoid and malaria. Medical units made major contributions during disasters such as at Skopje in 1963. Other parts of the army played major roles in the operations to deal with the Skopje earthquake. Between August 1 and September 10 the army built 996 flats there.
supply corps provided 50,000 meals a day at that time. Indeed, supplies have been a sizeable military industry since the war. In 1980, military food production was valued at 89,884,000 dinars (contemporary prices); this rendered 28,350,000 profit. Immediately after the war, the army played a big role in feeding Yugoslavia.

Economic activity was important not only in terms of military productive capacity, but for the employment it provided. In 1953, for example, there were 2,650 mechanics, 42,330 drivers, 2,080 electricians, 56,579 telecommunications operators, 7,727 health workers, 2,709 veterinary staff, 37,166 craftsmen and around 70,000 construction workers; totalled, these figures would amount approximately to the force strength of the YPA in the 1980s.

Much of the army’s role in Yugoslavia’s post-war development owed to one factor; it was the best organised and technically most advanced element of Yugoslav society. By carrying-out so much work, the army realised its theoretical position as "a component part of the people" and that "its links with them are manifold and unbreakable." All this confirmed the popular character of our army and the spread of brotherhood and unity between our nations and nationalities. The military’s socioeconomic policy was both a basis for and reinforcement of its legitimacy.

The importance of the army’s role in the community is one of the principal features of military-political education. For both this and more technical education, the army was a "specific school of young
Yugoslavs". The army's educative role dates back to the partisans' literacy campaigns. In addition to work done during military service, soldiers generally acquired skills which they would take into the civilian economy. Between the end of the war and 1963, for example, 101,907 sappers and compressor handlers, 166,270 drivers, 122,832 radio operators, 46,857 mechanics, 7,207 sailors, 79,840 cooks and bakers and 94,673 traffic controllers, electricians, engineers and nurses were trained by the army and later integrated into the Yugoslav economy.

In addition, the military education system created several scientific research centres and prompted work in them which involved 3,500 individuals. Scientific research was the apex of an educational system which meant an officer corps in which 85 per cent were graduates of military academies and 14 per cent of non-military colleges. As important as scientific training, the army provided 'moral-political' education. 62.61 per cent of LC-YPA committee members had attended the army's Political School (a further 11.19 per cent had received political or social scientific education in faculties outside the army).

The result of this education, other political work within the army and, presumably, peer group pressure, was the nurturing of a 'brotherhood and unity' spirit and the 'Yugoslav' idea. In all its activities and in its nature, the YPA attempted to be an army of all Yugoslavs. An emblem of national unity from its creation and in its continued existence, the YPA sought and, to an extent, performed a
symbolic role. A consequence of the YPA’s role as everybody’s army in such a patchwork society as Yugoslavia’s was to make the sociopolitical imperative of being representative of society peculiarly significant.

The character of an army’s principal task, defence from external threat, requires it to be cohesive, which cohesion requires large measures of discipline, achievable only at some distance from the rest of society. The extent to which soldiers are separated from society depends on prevailing values. One country may support the idea of an army’s being more effective the further it is removed from society - without becoming alienated; in other instances, it is felt that soldiers should not be a distinct caste, but a reflection of society.174

The YPA could be considered to have close links with ‘the people’. Whilst the demands of a total military organisation were recognised, the Yugoslav army could not be closed-off from society; in a self-managing, multi-ethnic country the army had to reflect society.175 It was suspected that an army which did not attempt to mirror the complexity of Yugoslavia would pose (latently, at least) a threat to the country’s unity.

In some respects, the YPA was not representative of society as a whole. No attempt was made to mirror the age or gender structure of Yugoslav society. Despite there being a big contribution by women in the partisan struggle - including combat roles - women did not
featured in the post-war army. Women were not eligible for military service under the 1969 conscription law. There were some possibilities for women as reservists; after 1973 there was more scope for females in the army, although most were reported to be unenthusiastic.

The age structure of the YPA cannot be said to have been a reflection of society. However, whereas this might be expected because of the need for younger, fitter men to perform military duties, the discrepancy lies in the other direction. The YPA officer corps was relatively old; in 1964, 94 per cent of high ranking and 75 per cent of low ranking officers in the army-party organisation were aged between 36 and 45 years (membership of this organisation has consistently been put at 95 per cent or more of officers). This indicated a "need for urgent measures" to rejuvenate the officer corps. However, at the end of 1975, about 50 per cent of the party-army cadre in one analysis were pensionable. Presumably, the explanation for this is that a youthful partisan cadre remained in the army until retirement.

In Yugoslav terms class and nationality were the most important components of its social character. As a Marxist-Leninist inspired revolutionary movement, the partisans were keen to establish their worker-peasant credentials. Prewar Yugoslavia had a relatively small industrial workforce, therefore the partisan forces were composed mainly of peasants, on whom Tito's forces were "entirely dependent". Peasants comprised 61.1 per cent of the partisan army workers another 30.8 per cent, and others the remainder - for the
most part the leadership was drawn from this group which included intellectuals and professionals.\textsuperscript{181} In some instances, quite detailed breakdowns can be found of unit composition.\textsuperscript{182} However, class composition of the post-war army is not so freely documented. Ibrahimpsic, for instance, gives figures for the wartime class structure of the army, but not for the post-war era - although he stresses the importance of "class content" in the Yugoslav armed forces.\textsuperscript{183}

More significant than the YPA's class character was its national composition. For analysts, Yugoslav and non-Yugoslav, and for the YPA itself problems of nationality and nationalism are considered to be of utmost importance.\textsuperscript{184} The partisan army's success was, in part, due to its forging 'brotherhood and unity' among distrustful and antagonistic nations.\textsuperscript{185} In the post-war era, it tried to maintain an officer corps composed proportionately of the various nations and nationalities.

Proportionality was important for the prevention of an unrepresentative army. Moreover, it was of practical importance. The defence system, combining regular and territorial elements needed well trained fighters from each ethnic group. It was necessary to have regulars with long-term training rather than just reservists who trained for a year.\textsuperscript{186}

Nationalities were not proportionately represented in the Yugoslav army. The NLA was predominated by Serbs and Montenegrins, who made up 75-80 per cent of the NLA; 15-20 per cent of the NLA was Croat and 3.8
per cent Slovenes;\textsuperscript{187} Serbs were the majority nation in partisan
staffs, followed by "Jews and some Croats and Slovenes".\textsuperscript{188} Efforts to
maintain a national 'key' in the officer corps have not been
evertheless rewarded. Serbs and Montenegrins have continued to figure
disproportionately in the officer corps; other nationalities have
tended to be underrepresented. The percentages of various
nationalities in the political organ of the YPA pro rata their level
in the population demonstrated this: Serbs 64.3 (39 per cent of the
population); Montenegrins, 13.2 (2.5); Croats 11.7 (22); Slovenes 3.2
(8.3); Hungarians 0.3 (2.3); Albanians, 0 (6.4).\textsuperscript{189} Another set of
figures for the full officer corps (including non-party members) gave
similar percentages. Serbs 60.5 (41.7); Croats 14 (23); Slovenes 5.0
(8.5); Montenegrins 8.0 (3.0); Macedonians 6 (7); Muslims 3.5 (6.5);
Albanians 2.0 (6.0); others 1.0 (4.3).\textsuperscript{190}

In addition, breakdowns of generals and the High Command were given.
For generals, the figures were: Serbs 46 per cent, Croats 19 per
cent, Slovenes 6 per cent, Montenegrins 19 per cent, Macedonians 5 per
cent, Muslims 4 per cent, Albanians 0.5 per cent and others 0.5 per
cent. These figures, whilst indicating greater alignment of
nationalities in the higher ranks of the YPA with Yugoslav society as
a whole, also provided further evidence of discrepancies – notably the
vast magnification of Montenegrins in the ranks of generals.

Figures for the High Command showed a more even distribution of jobs
between nationalities. Serbs were under represented in the High
Command (33 per cent) and Croats over represented (38 per cent).
Slovenes (8.3) and Macedonians (8.3) were more or less proportionate to their numbers in the population. Montenegrins were 8.3 per cent - again well over their contingent in Yugoslavia's ethnic fabric. Muslims (4.1 per cent) were fewer than their standing in the Yugoslav community would make appropriate. Albanians and Hungarians are not represented.\textsuperscript{191}

The High Command figures signal efforts in the YPA to ensure that the higher levels were, as far as possible, a reflection of Yugoslavia's national composition. We should bear in mind that the relatively small number of officers in the High Command - perhaps 20-30 - would almost certainly produce distorted figures at any time; these figures seem a reasonable mark of an attempt to maintain the 'key'. This point is borne out by Denitch's fleshing out of the above figures.\textsuperscript{192} Other figures confirmed the national imbalance in the officer corps.\textsuperscript{193} All demonstrated an uneven spread of nationalities. This was a big concern for the army leadership which began campaigns and programmes to increase the number of nationalities with low representation.

One comprehensive set of figures established the severity of this situation.\textsuperscript{194} In 1973, Slovenes comprised 8.2 per cent of the total population. Yet only 3.8 per cent of total YPA personnel, 4.3 per cent of officers, and 2.8 per cent of NCOs were Slovenes. In addition, only 5.8 per cent of the YPA's non-military employees were Slovenian.

It was suggested that "if the number of Slovene officers continues to
decline, Slovenes will soon have almost no cadres at the command level."

The decline was evident in the enrolment figures at military educational establishments. With the exception of the Marshals Tito Airforce School at Mostar, only 10 per cent of the requirement was satisfied by registration at Intermediate Military Schools; there was only a 20 per cent take-up of places at military academies. In one case, for 60 places there were only 68 applicants - of whom only 23 were physically and mentally acceptable. There were no candidates whatsoever from 18 Slovenian opštine. In sum, where there should have been 200 students in military education, there were only 101. Moreover, the position was worsening. In 1969 scholarships were established to attract young people to military schools. At first, there were 200 applicants; by 1973 there were only 3 - despite the bursary's value being 40 per cent greater than elsewhere. Difficulties included tradition, pay and conditions. Problems recruiting Albanians have been said to stem from language and educational difficulties. Equal representation of nationalities was (and would remain) paramount for the YPA. To sustain its tradition of 'brotherhood and unity' and maintain itself as a symbol of 'Yugoslavness', it had to be seen to be the army of all Yugoslavs.

The aversion of nationality discrepancies and divisions was of greatest moment because of the YPA's position in the Yugoslav political system. This extended beyond its symbolic role concerning 'national unity'. As with other communist militaries (the more so
because of Yugoslavia's self-managing ideology) the YPA was not excluded from politics. Soldiers were always an integrated part of the political community. In 1965, 21 active service commanding officers were deputies in Federal or Republican assemblies and in 1957 were representatives in the leading bodies of the socialist alliance. However, the military did not engage in politics with a high profile for most of the post-war period. Instead, the YPA concentrated on its functional and professional development described above. In the mid-1960s, the army began to play a discreet political role in the ouster of Internal Affairs chief Aleksandar Ranković and later in the resolution of the 1971 Croatian crisis.

The Legitimating Army

The essential thing to bear in mind when analysing the party-army relationship in Yugoslavia is that it was never one of discrete, rival institutions: the Yugoslav army was created by the Communist Party to conduct the simultaneous war of national liberation and revolution which began in 1941. The army and the party share the same roots. After 1945, the Partisan Army was transformed into the YPA. It became a 'professional' army, preoccupied with external threat. Initially, that threat was perceived to originate in the West. So, the Yugoslav's turned to the USSR for assistance. Soviet military advisors were posted to Belgrade; Yugoslav officers went to the USSR for training.
The Yugoslavs wanted Russia to help them modernise their military capability.

But, Soviet 'assistance' turned out to be more a question of domination. The Soviets sought to control the YPA and through it, Yugoslavia. This was one of the main causes of the split in 1948 - the first to surface in the dispute. Soviet advisors went back to Russia. The Yugoslavs had wanted advice not incorporation: the Soviets wanted "to encourage the transformation of the YPA into a conventional fighting force modelled on the Red Army and, in the process, subordinate it to Soviet control".199

Open conflict with Moscow meant a real and imminent threat of external invasion: Yugoslavia was under the shadow of a Soviet invasion. A domestic arms industry was set up. By 1952, the YPA had 500,000 men under arms; 25 per cent of national income went towards defence.200 YPA organisation emphasised conventional defence rather than the Partisan tradition.

There was, to some extent, a divorce of party and army. This de facto divorce was emphasised in the wake of the 6th Party Congress in 1952. In re-defining the Party's role in society, its role in the YPA was re-defined. Consequently, Party influence was reduced and the YPA became increasingly autonomous and conventional - and throughout the 1950s, more "professional".201
After the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement of 1955, Defence expenditure was gradually reduced and 200,000 men were demobilised. By the time of the reforms of the mid-1960s, the army had become mostly autonomous. It "remained something of an institutional anomaly - monolithic, hierarchical, centralised - immured against reforms associated with 'self-management'". It had become a 'supranational' institution hermetically sealed off from society. It had become such because the characteristics peculiar to military bodies - organisation, hierarchy, discipline, responsiveness to command - meant it could more easily transcend or submerge political or ethnic differences. It had largely been forgotten in the processes of self-management and devolution.

However in 1968, efforts were made to 'republicanise' the YPA, what was called 'opening to society'. It was encouraged to participate in local communities. Under pressure from the Republics, the YPA adopted the aim of securing fully proportional national representation in the officer corps. Also, the principle that 25 per cent of any national contingent should be based on "home" territory was assumed - the Macedonian YPA command even fostered its own language, where Serbo-Croat had been the army's standard language. Contact between the army and the people was increased by the introduction of Territorial Defence Forces (TDFs) under the new "General Peoples Defence" (GPD) policy.

This was brought in after the Soviet led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. For many years the YPA has resisted such a move. In 1969, the
liberal tide plus Czechoslovakia meant that it could do so no more. Moreover, its independence - not to say its pride - was further diminished as "coequal", joint command structures were set up. Despite 'republicanisation', the YPA remained an 'all-Yugoslav' institution. Because of the GPD policy and the "opening to society", the YPA was brought closer to its roots: the Yugoslav revolution - from the development of which it previously had been isolated.

The so-called 'opening to society' - proved a plank of legitimacy. Contact between the YPA and the people was encouraged - especially by the introductions of the All-People's Defence System. The 'opening to society' processes brought the military onto the political stage; 'opening to society' was itself a base of the YPA's legitimacy as a political actor. When, in 1971, a legitimacy crisis occurred at the centre of the Yugoslav Federation, the army was still a cohesive, supranational institution. But, it had been brought into the heart of socioeconomic and political life. It was placed in a position where it was called upon to assume responsibility for the preservation of the Yugoslav system from domestic threat. In assuming this responsibility it was fulfilling a legitimate role.

Croatian nationalism had taken on separatist tones with demands that Croatia should have its own army and membership of the United Nations. Yugoslavia was on the point of being torn apart: what was to be done? Devolution of power to the Republics had created in the centre a vacuum of effective decision-making: who would pull the Croats back into line? Tito, inevitably was the only one with enough authority to
make the Croats heel. In April 1971, he publicly denounced Croatian nationalism. Eight months later - after much indecision - he instigated the replacement of the Croatian Party leaders. An 'anti-nationalist' campaign was begun. But still no move was made to halt or reverse the past ten years trend towards national affirmation. However, by September 1972 there was a call for heightened "ideological and political unity - of action", in the LCY. In effect, this meant a re-assertion of central control; the Party was to take again its 'leading' role: it would fill the power vacuum.

Yet, the LCY was unable to fill that vacuum - it was populated with the very people who had forced and supported the reforms which led to the crisis. Tito's actions suggest that although, ultimately, his authority counted, it was not he who filled the gap. His hesitation and ambivalence during 1971 were "enough to confuse the Republican leadership." It required Tito's authority to quell Croatia, but he was not sure about doing so.

It would seem that the YPA made him sure, eventually - either by persuasion or support. Chronology suggests the former. In April, when Tito was first denouncing Croatian nationalism, there was already a suggestion of military involvement. By July, he was threatening to
"step in and make order with our army." However, Tito's September visit to Croatia seemed an "apparent endorsement" of what was happening there. It seems that Tito was finally persuaded to act after YPA leaders showed him suppressed television footage at Bugojno in November of the Croatian League's meetings, with only Croatian flags and with nationalist songs and anti-Tito slogans. The army did not intervene overtly but it seems to have been activity behind the scenes which prompted Tito to resolve the crisis. Tito's statements and subsequent developments suggest that the army was "footing the bill for the party."

Although, formally, the LCY was to gain more central power via amendments to the Constitution in 1971 (embodied in the 1974 Constitution) and, in effect, regain its leading role, the YPA was adopting a leading role within the LCY itself. The army was a part of the self-management system and the party. Although, according to Tito, "the Party not the army" was "guardian of the revolution", the army was a part of it.

That the League was composed of parts is important. It had become a coalition of eight Leagues - nine if (as Tito implied) we count the YPA - no longer one entity. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the party had been searching for a role as the Yugoslav system adopted self-management. Devolution intensified its problems - now, there were eight parties in search of a role and no-one at the centre with the mettle to provide order - except, perhaps, the YPA.
Fulfilment of a legitimate political role in these circumstances brought the army back to its roots - the revolution from which, for some time it had been isolated, but with which it had common origins. That revolution had evolved. In 1952, the YPA had been disconnected from a centralised, unified LCY. That party was now a coalition of eight parties. In 1971, as the coalition seemed to be falling apart, the army joined course again with the revolution. The revolution’s legitimacy was weak; the YPA provided the necessary backbone to redress that frailty.

It was able to do so not only because it was formally involved in politics and shared roots with the revolution, but because it was a pan-Yugoslav institution. Its loyalty was not to any one republic but to the Yugoslav Federation. Its own legitimacy - indeed, its own survival - depended on the Federation’s continuation.

The Constitutional amendments of 1971, fixed in the 1974 Constitution, suggest that not only was the YPA dependent on the Federal State, but the Yugoslav Federation was dependent on its 9th Partner - the military. That the military’s role in politics was necessary, integral and legitimate was made perfectly clear in the early 1970s as that role was formalised. The YPA was accorded equal status with the autonomous provinces in the new 166 member Central Committee of the LCY. Thus, it had 15 representatives in the Central Committee. It was clearly a 9th partner.
The regime had negotiated the crisis with its legitimacy restored - even, enhanced - by military involvement. The YPA was an instrument of that regime legitimacy of which it was also a function. It was a function in that its existence was dependent on the regime’s continuation - no regime, no military. Yet, the regime required YPA participation as a binding agent and an instrument of stability and cohesion to ensure continued legitimacy. It was evident that the YPA was an integral part of the Yugoslav political system: once its begetter, it was now, it seemed, its saviour.

The Yugoslav army was not "a classical military organisation". It was, in the Huntingtonian sense, "professional": it was expert, corporate and responsible. However, contrary to the assumptions made by Huntington and others, it was fully prepared to take its allotted place in the socio-economic system, to participate - indeed this was one of its ‘responsibilities’, as Tito affirmed: "It is no longer sufficient for our army to be familiar with military affairs. It must also be familiar with political affairs and development. It must participate". It was not a discrete aspect of the social and political systems, and it knew this.

Nor, in spite of its prominence in domestic politics, was the YPA praetorian. In a praetorian regime, the military from time to time intervene in government - usually imposing or supporting a chief executive who is the military’s choice. The Yugoslav army did not insinuate itself: in a most ‘professional’, responsible way it was doing its duty as a legitimate participant in the Yugoslav polity. It
was a necessary, integral element of the Yugoslav system. This was made perfectly clear in the early 1970s as the YPA’s role as a ‘9th Partner’ in the Federation was formalised in the new Constitution of 1974, drawn-up on the basis of decisions taken at the 20th Congress of the LCY in May of that year.

As five other members of the army were included in the republican and provincial delegations, the total military representation on the Central Committee was 20 - that is, 12 per cent. Furthermore, two generals, Nikola Ljubicic (Defence Minister) and Dzermil Sarac (Army-Party Organisation Secretary) - were members of the Presidium of the Central Committee (the latter, notably, was an ex officio member – so, guaranteeing Army representation). Finally, at the highest level of government, in the Executive Office, Ivan Kuoc, an active duty general, was named as one of the twelve members. Quite clearly, the YPA’s role was significant.

Its role was, though, essentially one within the Federation, as the ‘9th Partner’, rather than within the wider system in general. Its
representation at republican level was considerably less than at federal. The Autonomous Province of Kosovo, with 3 per cent of its Central Committee members from the military had the highest level of YPA participation. The military was not to be incorporated as it had with the "opening to society" of 1968; rather, it was being co-opted on the premise that it would impart a measure of its own cohesion, stability and strength to the Federation.  

As a result of its being accorded recognition as an 'all Yugoslav' '9th Partner', the military regained some of the autonomy it lost with the introduction of GPD. In the new 'unified' defence system, the YPA emerged in a preeminent position: "The shift in the Yugoslav political centre of gravity enabled the YPA to lobby for a redefinition of territorial defence that would restore its authority and central role". The YPA came to the coalition which was the Yugoslav Federation as a member with both the right and the duty to participate in all discussions of major social and political issues. It was wholly appropriate for the YPA to put forward its (usually conservative) views on any topic.  

YPA involvement was as a member of the system, not as an opponent or usurper. The YPA had the might with which to make a physical intervention, but it declined to use it. It was prepared to prod the civilian leadership on the Croatian issue, but it was also well aware of the liabilities in "assuming a more overt political role". It was drawn into the political process because its leadership essentially remained unified whilst "the party leadership passed
through various stages of disarray". But, the YPA never overstepped its welcome: the military had a clear sense of its own role within the system and therefore of its own inadequacies. Seemingly, the YPA was aware of the nature of civil-military relations in Yugoslavia.

The YPA was not a discrete institution; it was not in conflict with the Yugoslav regime; it did not want to be excluded from, nor intervene in and control domestic politics. It could not allow itself to extend its role too far on two counts: first, the existence of TDF units meant that to overreach its legitimate participation could end in civil-war with a ‘people’s army’; secondly, it could not intervene because to do so would threaten its own future survival and that of the system to which it owes allegiance.

In the early 1970s, the YPA (or at least its leadership) became, to some extent, essential in maintaining the stability, cohesion and, most importantly, the authority of civilian political institutions, above all, the LCY. The YPA was well aware of this in assuming the role it did to conserve the Yugoslav system. It had a vested interest in ensuring the Yugoslav state’s survival: it was dependent on it. Recognition of this fact served to make certain that the military would not intervene, physically or, indeed, overtly beyond its allotted role in the system. The YPA recognised the reciprocal, symbiotic nature of Yugoslav civil-military relations.

The nature of Yugoslav civil-military relations was necessarily symbiotic. The YPA was both an instrument and a function of regime
legitimacy. It was a function in that its existence was dependent on
the regime’s continuation; the regime, to continue, had to preserve
its legitimacy. The YPA as an instrument in that the regime’s
legitimacy was dependent on its continuing to play the role it played
after 1971.

The military was dependent on the regime: no regime, no military. In
Yugoslavia, civil authority and political institutions rested on the
principles of self-management and participatory democracy - the
symbols of legitimacy: without them, the regime’s legitimacy would
‘wither’. For the military to usurp civilian power would have been
contrary to those principles; they would have been shattered. So, the
military had to remain subordinate; it had to have an appropriate
sense of role. But, that sense of role was dependent on the regime’s
continuing legitimacy. Above all, to ensure the YPA’s subordination
and loyalty, there had to be a cohesive leadership.

Ironically, the YPA was the binding agent used to generate some
measure of leadership cohesion. Its legitimate presence in civilian
politics was based on the conscious premise that the military imparted
some of its own stability, strength and cohesion. The regime depended
on YPA participation as in instrument of cohesion with which to ensure
continued legitimacy. Yet, the YPA’s existence was dependent on
continuing regime legitimacy; the YPA’s role was a function of that
legitimacy. In Yugoslav domestic politics, the YPA’s strengths were
harnessed and yet its involvement constrained so as not to bare its
inadequacies: the Yugoslav regime both could have its cake and eat
it, it seemed. However, after 1980, Yugoslavia lurched into a polygenous crisis of legitimacy and YPA efforts to perform its political role of restoring systemic equilibrium and imparting legitimacy only to reveal those inadequacies.
There were grounds for optimism vis a vis Yugoslavia’s future after Tito’s death in May 1980. Although many problems were known to be latent – particularly, nationalism – other features since the resolution of the Croatian crisis had fostered regime legitimacy. Among these factors was the codification of decentralising reforms in the 1974 Constitution – which appeared to satisfy national interests by severely limiting central, federal power. Another element contributing to confidence in the regime was relative material prosperity gained during the 1960s and 1970s. Economically and socially, most Yugoslavs had ‘never had it so good!’.

The initial transition from the individual presidency of Tito to his successor collective presidency appeared to be untroubled. This was a further boost to Yugoslavia’s viability. However, the auspicious omens for the post-Tito era disguised the gathering of dark clouds. These stored up economic, nationalist and political difficulties. After
1980, the atmosphere became inclement: a multi-faceted crisis of legitimacy was unleashed.

The Economic Quagmire

After an economic boom between 1976 and 1979, Yugoslavia became locked into an economic crisis. An "artificial prosperity" had been achieved by a combination of rapid modernisation and readily available foreign credits. Western lending peaked in 1978. By 1980, the IMF's terms for granting loans to Yugoslavia had become far more rigorous. A consequence of these measures was contraction of the economy. This was the onset of crisis.

The following decade saw a series of 'stabilisation' plans. The economy was too rocky for these. In each case, the chief aim was sustained reduction of domestic demand to lower imports and release output from domestic consumption for export. However, acute balance-of-payments and debt repayment difficulties were not alleviated. The IMF applied pressure for a big devaluation of the dinar.

This was fiercely opposed by some regional leaders; Bosnia, for example, disproportionately reliant on hard-currency imports for its productive capacity whilst having little corresponding significance in exports, was against exchange rate adjustment. Further dissent on devaluation focussed on the inflationary pressures created by it.
Inflation related fears were not ill-founded. By the end of the 1980s Yugoslavia was experiencing hyper-inflation - facing the prospect of a rate in excess of 1000 per cent.6

IMF pressure increased in 1982. Private lendings to the country had fallen sharply, imports had reduced acutely, yet hard currency reserves were only 1.7 billion dollars (US). This amounted to one month's worth of imports requiring convertible currency. The IMF organised a series of meetings involving itself, the Yugoslavs and various other parties. These produced a de facto rescheduling of the Yugoslav debt in the form of an emergency package. This package ensured a further 6.5 billion dollars (US) of loan to support the agreement between the Yugoslavs and the IMF.7

That agreement was to accept the proposals of the Kraigher Commission. These recommended liberalisation of the economy; its harsh measures included raising interest rates to realistic levels, allowing the dinar to float and making real wage cuts as the effects of inflation were not redressed.8 These measures were only partially implemented, however.

One effect of the limited implementation of a market mechanism was diminishing domestic demand which fell 12 per cent between 1980 and 1983.9 Decreased demand, unsurprisingly, provoked reductions in output growth rate. The Gross Material Product (GMP) growth rate dropped from 7.5 per cent annually in 1978-9 to 0.9 per cent in 1982, and to -1.3 per cent in 1982 and 1983.10 Average annual growth between
1981 and 1985 was 0.6 per cent. Although the 1985–6 period promised reasons for hope (the economy grew 3 per cent), this was not sustained.

The reason for this was the replacement of the government led by Milka Planinc which had been biting the bullet of economic reform by a new Federal Executive Council (FEC) led by Branko Mikulić. Planinc's ouster was interpreted as a victory for conservative forces; her programme of liberalisation (albeit with harsh consequences) was arrested and replaced by a policy of ad hoc responses - which achieved little. Under the Planinc government, the dinar's depreciation had been restricted - in 1982 the annual rate was 75 per cent, but, the following year it fell only 50 per cent. Between the Decembers of 1986 and 1987 annual inflation leapt from 100 per cent to 170 per cent.

Eventually, in 1988, Mikulić's government was compelled to introduce the measures advocated by the IMF almost a decade before: dinar devaluation, real interest rates, free movement of prices as precursor to the lifting of all price controls. These were, however, unsuccessful. Towards the end of 1988, unemployment was approaching 20 per cent, the foreign debt had risen from 19 billion dollars (US) in 1983 to 23 billions, inflation was soaring.

The IMF observed in "disbelief and despair", The FEC could not control price or wage inflation; each fuelled the other. As prices rose, living standards fell and disquiet in the population emerged; an epidemic of strikes erupted in the Country. In 1982 there had been 174
strikes in Yugoslavia. In March 1987, alone, there were 168 of them, embracing 20000 workers. Although most were short-lived, some were not; strikes by mostly Bosnian coal miners at Labin in Slovenia lasted over a month.\textsuperscript{16} An anti-inflation policy resting on the need for pay restraint floundered.

The Mikulić government was swallowed in the swamp of economic crisis; on December 30, 1988 the government resigned en masse.\textsuperscript{17} His successor, Ante Marković, arrived with a strong, liberal, reformist record.\textsuperscript{18} Marković’s first speech held at least one ray of promise – certainly, for those at the IMF: he abandoned the rhetoric of self-management.\textsuperscript{19} Yet, whatever the new prime minister’s attitude to the past and the measures necessary for resolving the crisis, he faced the same impediments as his predecessors – lack of support.

Yugoslavia was undergoing a profound crisis of legitimacy. There had been little faith in or support for the authorities attempts to rescue the economy. Polls found a general decay in popular support. Confidence in the party fell from 49.8 per cent in 1980 to 22.9 per cent in 1982.\textsuperscript{20} Of only 46 per cent of Slovenes familiar with the 1983 economic stabilisation plan, 46 per cent disagreed with it.\textsuperscript{21} Finally, a 1983 poll had discovered that, to Milka Planinc’s alarm, there was little confidence in Yugoslavia’s ability to overcome its difficulties and small hope for the future.\textsuperscript{22} These findings were underlined again in 1986.\textsuperscript{23}
Dissensual dissipation of support for the pan-Yugoslav regime is evident in national and republican divisions. These are manifest in outbursts of nationalism and the inability of the various leaderships, including, ultimately, the federal leadership, to demonstrate commitment to a united Yugoslavia and resolve the country’s grave economic crisis.

Albanian Unrest in Kosovo and After: Nationalist Preserves and Systemic Paralysis

Yugoslavia was precipitated into a critical phase by the outbreak of Albanian nationalism in Kosovo in 1981. In March and April of that year strikers, demonstrations and riots by the Autonomous Province’s majority ethnic Albanian population shocked the country. Arising from student protests resulting in 21 arrests and 35 injuries (12 of which were police officers), the riots became an uprising involving tens or hundreds of thousands of people. Official figures recorded 9 deaths and 257 injuries, whereas other sources estimated mortalities to have been up to 1600. The figure of 1600, suggested by US, Senator Jesse Helms must be judged a gross exaggeration. As Kosovo was closed to journalists and other observers at the time, no reliable independent assessment can be made. When similar disturbances occurred in 1989, reporters were present; there were sizeable discrepancies between official and press figures for casualties (see below). Between the first protests and the end of 1983 thousands of people had been
arrested summarily and sentenced, in the main, to 60 days in prison; 658 Albanians "received sentences ranging from 1-15 years for 'counter-revolutionary' crimes."

The nationalist outburst in Kosovo was allowed because of a blend of ignorance and disinformation. The sum of this was failure to recognise and defuse the problems which were the causes of the Albanian explosion. Even in the wake of rioting, Stane Dolanc impressed on foreign journalists that there was no problem in Kosovo because the problems concerning the Albanian nationality had been solved during the war. In part, this may have owed to the provincial's leadership's persistent refusal to inform Belgrade about the extent of nationalist feeling and organisation. The Kosovan leadership, regarded as 'Yugoslav' - that is, 'non-Albanian' - by the population, but, ethnically, Albanian, for the most part, was aware that it might lose its limited powers if it was thought that a problem existed. Even Serbs in Kosovo were not well informed - the Serbian and Albanian language party dailies carried different coverage, only the latter recognising Albanian discontent. The content of party dailies reflected what the provincial leadership knew; district committees were regularly withholding information from the Kosovan leaders.

Whatever the impediments to a free flow of information, the 'Albanian question' had clearly not been resolved in 1945. Superficial harmony during the 1950s and 1960s made possible the suggestion that the Albanians did not realise that they had a problem until they were told so at the time of the Ranković purge in 1966. Even if underlying
tensions are ignored, the articulation of aspirations to greater self-
determination and republican status as early as 1966 and a series of
demonstrations between 1968 and the 1981 riots were signs of an
unresolved difficulty.31

The Kosovo problem had (and continues to have) two mainsprings. One
was Serbian-Albanian rivalry throughout several centuries; the other
was the post-war socioeconomic development of the Province. Serbs and
Albanians have important historical stakes in Kosovo. For Serbs it is
the bosom of their orthodox Christian church; the seat of the Serbian
Orthodox patriarch was at Peć in Kosovo in the medieval period. Kosovo
Polje is the plain on which Serbs fought Ottoman invaders, thereby
standing for Christendom against the Muslim horde. According to
Serbian mythology, it was only their battle on St. Vitus’ Day, 1389
which saved Europe; the Turkish onslaught was so much reduced that it
lacked the momentum to take Vienna. Of course, the Serbs were defeated
at Kosovo Polje, but, the nobility of having faced up to the
overwhelming Ottoman forces and done battle when defeat was certain,
passed into Serbian self-image and consciousness throughout subsequent
centuries. Another dimension of this pride in defeat was revanchism.
After Kosovo Polje, the Turkish army crushed the Serbian Empire.
Serbian pride required vengeance.

As the Serbian centre of gravity moved to the North, Kosovo became
increasingly populated by Albanians who were islamicised by the Turks.
This process fuelled Serbian lust to regain what they considered was
their’s by right, to evict the newcomers. Animosity towards Muslim
Albanians throughout six centuries has remained intense (whereas the Serbs' close cousins, the Montenegrins, have, at times, shown themselves open to integration with ethnic Albanians.\textsuperscript{32}

Most accounts of the Albanian colonisation of Kosovo stem from a Serbian perspective. The increase in numbers of Albanians inhabiting Kosovo after the Serb exodus is undeniable; however, a more Albanian oriented history would recognise that Kosovo was not a purely Serbian preserve; Albanians claim to be direct descendants of the ancient Illyrians, meaning their predating South Slavs on the territory.\textsuperscript{33}

More poignantly, if the Serb claim to Kosovo rests on its being the cradle of Serbian culture in the middle-ages, a similar Albanian case is found in the modern period. After the Serbs' five century absence, Kosovo again became the nucleus for a national culture. The Albanian national awakening in the latter part of the nineteenth century began in Kosovo. The first Albanian nationalist political movement was formed there in Prizren, in 1878; another group, this time from Priština, successfully secured autonomy from the Ottoman empire for Kosovan lands in 1912.

The Serbian authorities believed these territories should belong to Serbia. Some Serbs, notably, the Social Democratic Party, supported the Albanians, seeing no reason not to help them build an independent state and arguing that failure to assist might quickly lead Serbia's new neighbour to become an enemy.\textsuperscript{34} The Serbian government, however, sent its army to occupy Kosovan lands. Since 1913, with the brief
exception of inclusion in Mussollini’s ‘Greater Albania’ during the war, Kosovo has belonged to Belgrade.

The Serbian occupation was violent and repressive. The Serbs committed large scale atrocities against the Albanians and made other attempts to "dismantle the fabric of their culture and society." These included the denial of Albanian ethnicity and use of Albanian language; they also included a "most brutal" colonisation policy, in which Albanians were stripped of their farms and Serbs and Montenegrins were given great incentives to migrate to Kosovo. Armed resistance continued into the 1920s.

Partisan annexation of Kosovo during 1944 and 1945 brought an end to Kosovo’s short spell as part of ‘Greater Albania’. In line with the tenets of ‘brotherhood and unity’, Albanians were recognised as a distinct ethnic group. However, they were not allowed self-determination, nor to make much contribution to discussions about the new political system which would incorporate them. Indeed, the partisan army repeated the actions of the Serbian military a quarter of a century before; thousands of Albanians perished as a revolt formed against partisan terrorisation.

The long simmering antagonisms in Kosovan history constituted fuel ignited by sparks of socioeconomic development in communist Yugoslavia. The 1981 crisis was a direct product of the Tito regime. There were four major components of the crises.
The first was repression, the absence of political freedoms and a consequent lack of information and public political debate. Although Tito's regime had theoretically, given the ethnic Albanians national cultural rights they had not known in prewar Yugoslavia, in practice, these did not amount to much. With few exceptions, such as Albanian language schools, these rights meant little. Until the fall of Ranković in 1966, the Province functioned as a Serb colony, run as a police state.39

The teaching of specifically Albanian aspects of history and culture was tightly constrained by the Serbs - especially, that which pertained to former unity with Albania-proper. Many Albanians, particularly those living outside Kosovo in Macedonia, Montenegro and narrow Serbia, were intimidated into defining themselves as other than Albanian - 'Yugoslav', 'Muslim' or 'Turk', for example; in some cases they were made to adopt their names with a Slavic ending to give an impression that they were Slavs - this increased their chances of employment.40

This situation engendered underground opposition groups. In 1964, an illegal organisation promoting the idea of an Albanian republic was revealed. The political trial following its discovery ended with 57 people, including the movement's leader, Adem Demaci, in prison for terms of 3–15 years.41 Subsequently, there would be more pro-Albanian groups organising themselves illegally. In 1975 the 'National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo' was uncovered. Formed by Demaci's
supporters, it was accused of conspiracy against "the people and the state".\textsuperscript{42} Sentences for those involved ranged from 4-12 years.

Groups seeking enhanced status for Kosovo and improvement in conditions there have continued to develop. In extreme cases demanding union with Albania, in others demanding republican status for Kosovo within Yugoslavia, and in still others simply demanding jobs, such groups reflect the strength of Albanian disenchantment. As one eminent Yugoslav scholar has commented, "in a healthy political system there is no need for illegal political organisations."\textsuperscript{43}

Illegal opposition groups continued, in spite of the limited realisation, post-Ranković, of some rights. Indeed, much of this added to the difficulties. The loosening of controls allowed the Albanian's in general, to discover how much was wrong with their situation and permitted them to express their discontent. Thus, demonstrations demanded various ameliorations of the position in Kosovo. Often, these were suppressed by the authorities; this gave rise to stronger feelings and more subversive groups making bigger demands. In the three years before 1981, the security services were reported to have found (and dealt with) two separatist organisations.\textsuperscript{44}

An important addition to any assessment of the repressive nature of Yugoslavia, especially, Serb, politics in Kosovo, is consideration of information policy. As already indicated, channels of communication between the various levels of the various authorities and output in newspapers left manifold information lacunae. This became a hot topic
at the time of the 1981 riots. Too often, both before and since the riots, reliable information on Kosovo has been thin. Often "stereotypical" jargon is substituted for useable data.

However much repression and restrictions on information and political activity created and reinforced ignorance, prejudice and antagonism, the economic standing of Kosovo was an unmistakeable cause of the 1981 unrest. Always Yugoslavia's poorest region, it had become proportionately poorer vis a vis the country's richer areas. In 1947, the level of economic development in Kosovo was half the Yugoslav average; in 1980, this had become one quarter. Between 1952 and 1984 a 4.1 to 1 ratio between Slovenia and Kosovo for wealth grew to 6.1 to 1; the gap widened particularly rapidly after 1965. Horvat emphasises this disparity and its exponential character: if there were a 6 per cent growth rate, it would take Kosovo twenty four years to catch up; a growth rate of only 2 per cent would require ninety one years; in both cases, in addition, there would need to be a zero rate of growth in Slovenia throughout the period involved. However, if constant prices from 1972 are used, in 1984, Slovenian per capita social product was 7.67 times larger than in Kosovo.

Massive investment did not ameliorate the situation. In the period 1971-75, Kosovo received $685 million (US) of aid from Federal funds. It received, on top of monies from Belgrade, a further 240 million dollars worth of assistance from World Bank credit to Yugoslavia between 1975 and 1980 - almost one quarter of that total. Yet, Kosovo’s economic condition worsened. The Province’s economic
predicament combined with demographic changes, the third element in
the Kosovan crisis, each in some way amplifying the other.

By 1981, particularly in light of the region’s wealth, Kosovo was
overpopulated. Always poor, the area had nonetheless sustained a pre-
war population of 716,000. In 1981, this figure had more than doubled
to 1,555,000. Even with considerable injections of aid, Kosovo had
difficulty supporting a population of this size.

Parallel with the overall expansion of the population was a big shift
in Kosovo’s ethnic texture. From 1961 to 1981, the actual number of
Albanians leapt from 646,000 to 1,227,000. This doubling meant an
increase in the proportion of Albanians in the region’s inhabitants
from 67.1 per cent in 1961 to 77.5 per cent twenty years later. The
increase in Albanians corresponded with a decrease in Serbs. Serbs
have widely claimed that Albanian hostility has been the cause of an
exodus. However, it is notable that whereas up to a quarter of a
million Albanians emigrated to Turkey for political and economic
reasons before 1966, the exit of Serbs from Kosovo began only after
the mid-1960s.

The Serbs’ leaving Kosovo coincided with the increase in Albanian
expressions of discontentment. More pertinently, this migration
corresponded with rapidly decreasing living standards in the region.
Horvat impresses that the underlying cause of immigration was economic
backwardness; he also urges that the process could not be arrested
without economic development. The violence in 1981 might have
influenced Serbs quitting Kosovo, but could not be judged a sufficient explanation. An official statement in October 1988 put the number of Serbs and Montenegrins to have left Kosovo since the riots at 25,661. This would make the claim of Serbian LC Secretary, Zoran Sokolović, that 31,000 had left in this period an exaggeration. This figure might be a reasonable estimate for the fifteen year period in which a German institute reported that 250,000 Albanians had left Kosovo for other parts of Yugoslavia and other parts of Europe for political and economic reasons.54

It is certain that large numbers of both Slavs and Albanians left Kosovo to look for work. Unemployment in Kosovo was 3.33 times the Yugoslav average; whereas 210,000 people worked in the social sector, 114,000 were unemployed. Unemployment heightened tensions a propos of job distribution. Whereas, per thousand Kosovo inhabitants 258 Montenegrins and 228 Serbs were in employment, only 109 Albanians had jobs.55 In the mid-1960s, when Kosovo’s problems began to be revealed, one in seventeen Albanians had a social sector job, whereas one in four Serbs and one in three Montenegrins were in such work.56 In 1982, although over three quarters of the Kosovan population, they made up only 60 per cent of the work force; the combined total for Serbs and Montenegrins, with only 15 per cent of the total population, was 33 per cent. This situation was even more ethnically disproportionate vis-à-vis positions of responsibility, particularly in the administrative agencies of Kosovo’s sociopolitical organisations where only 54 per cent of the 251 presidents were Albanian and about 38 per cent were Slavs.57
The fourth factor contributing to the crisis was the expansion of education for Albanians. Before the war there were 19 Albanians among the 17,734 Yugoslav students at University; in 1981 there were 26,000 regular students and 37,000 in all attending University in Pristina.\footnote{58} This meant there was a large pool of educated young people with high expectations. The patterns of employment detailed above meant that they could not be absorbed into the Kosovan economy,\footnote{59} leaving aside any language problems, their aspirations could not be met outside the province as other Yugoslavs often failed to recognize their qualifications. The ill-feeling often found in educated, but unemployable, groups was augmented by over representation of Serbs in good jobs in the Provincial administration and economic hardship as inflation bit into already very low living standards.

The Kosovan conflagration began with student protests. Quickly, sizeable segments of the Albanian population joined in what became riots. The combination of a new and large educated Albanian group, demographic patterns of employment, unemployment and ethnic composition in Kosovo, economic backwardness in an ever receding economy, and the absence of free and open discussion of grievances precipitated violent outbursts.

Following the revolt, Kosovo was subject to martial law. Militia and YPA units were moved in to control the province. This was expensive. Armed units remained in Kosovo long after the riots; on the first anniversary of them, the cost of the Reserve Militia’s continuing presence in Kosovo was put at five million dinars per individual per
The martial forces were unwelcome, often being jeered, booed and spat upon by local inhabitants. The armed presence increased hostility.

So, too, did mass arrests and heavy prison sentences. Even outside Albanian confines, these caused disquiet. Mitja Ribičič, a Slovene, wartime party elder wondered if "education" rather than twelve years in jail might be a better way to deal with eighteen year old protesters. Moreover, he added, Kosovo’s problems would only be solved by finding political and economic solutions and the Kosovans’ own hard work. Instead, of the ameliorative measure Ribičič intended, the political solution found was one well tested in communist systems - a purge. A process of "differentiation" was initiated to weed-out the ‘unhealthy’ forces in the party and in society. The Kosovan LC leadership was changed and over 1000 members expelled from it; sometimes whole branches of the party organisation were closed down. In addition, many individuals were forced out of their jobs, including teachers and university lecturers.

The problems in Kosovo did not go away during the remainder of the decade. Indeed, they flared again, in 1989. (See below.) In addition to the sometimes violent and separatist variant among Kosovo’s majority ethnic Albanian population, nationalism has had other manifestations. Serbian nationalism has been a backlash to Kosovo. An otherwise liberally oriented Serbian Academy produced a ‘Memorandum’ in 1985, outlining Serbia’s anomalous position in the SFRY and calling into question the 1974 Constitution, dubbing it anti-
Serb. A group of ethnic Serbs from Kosovo told the Federal Assembly that if it could find no solution, they would solve problems themselves. Unlike their brethren who had left Kosovo, they were determined to stay and fight - with arms if necessary. Serbian nationalist fervour supported the rise of Slobodan Milošević to leadership of the Serbian LC and, then, the Republican presidency. His unabashed nationalist policies saw changes in the Serbian, Vojvodina and Kosovan constitutions, taking away the force of the two provinces' autonomy. These stimulated more riots by the Albanian community and a constitutional crisis throughout Yugoslavia.

A 'Muslim' consciousness had developed in Bosnia; and Slovene nationalism had emerged prominently. Interacting with strong democratic and liberalising trends, Slovene nationalist sentiment became particularly vibrant in response to the growth of Serb nationalism. In response to the 'Memorandum' of the Serbian Academy, the Slovene journal Nova Revija produced a Slovene National Programme. This was suppressed, although its authors were not prosecuted. Slovene feelings were then amplified further by Serb activity in Kosovo.

The centrifugal forces of nationalism amounted to a lack of faith in the SFRY. The lack of commitment to a united Yugoslavia was demonstrated in the inability of the various leaderships, including, ultimately, the federal leadership, to resolve the country's grave economic crisis. Indeed, these republican and national divisions were, in a viciously circular way, cause and effect of the economic
problems. Each regional leadership protected its own interests at the expense of all-Yugoslav requirements. Even where the leaderships could agree on a remedy for economic ills, there was "little real commitment to making it work, because that would have meant the sacrificing of republican interests deemed important by the republican elites".

National and economic difficulties stem from the political system. Faced with various crises, this system seems unable to function adequately. The regime seems unable to operate appropriate 'steering' mechanisms (to recall Habermas); it is unable to 'manage' the crisis. According to Schöpflin, the regime has "neither the instrumentality nor agreement on the criteria for the resolution of conflicts".

It could even be argued that this system caused the crisis. The 3 billion USD deficit in 1979 was a function of financial decentralisation of control on foreign payments. It came as a surprise and was permitted to happen because there was no central view on what was happening. When the first post-Tito financial crisis occurred the system’s complexity and inertia were not understood.

When a Zagreb bank could not repay its $500,000,000 debt, the system was incapable of action. The central bank, because of decentralisation (and without Tito to take short-cuts) could not act without agreement to save the bank. In the wake of rescheduling the Polish debt, Western banks thought the Yugoslav coffers were empty (they were not) and lost confidence in Yugoslavia. As a consequence under conditions of
increasing internal chaos and external fiscal pressure the economy plummeted. The multi-faceted crisis had its root in the political system.

The interlinked crises as a whole constituted a crisis of legitimacy. Discussions on a new constitution began in 1986. Whenever (if ever) this eventually appeared, in establishing a new basis for the regime's legitimacy, it would have to be the instrument of reform and, if effectively achieved, relegitimation. However, with Slovenes and Croatians favouring multi-party reforms and Serbians opposing them, the prospects were not bright. Meanwhile, the multi-faceted legitimacy crisis had become worse and the YPA's voice in the political arena had grown louder.

The YPA and Politics in the 1980s: Military Legitimacy Circumscribed

The Yugoslav crisis of legitimacy and the Polish precedent for martial rule in a communist system led to speculation that a 'Yugoslav Jaruzelski' might appear. In one Slovene's view such a phenomenon was the "only factor able to stop the creeping chaos". The possibility of military rule seems to have been behind Milka Planinc's statement that if her plans were not accepted "a different government" might step in.
Milovan Djilas noted such speculation and the military's greatly increased role, but concluded that it is "not likely that the military will take power." An earlier rejection came from a member of the Croatian Republican Presidency who said that such speculation was made "by people who know nothing at all about our system" and therefore did not understand that the army is "an integral part of the people." This view was echoed by Defence Secretary Branko Mamula. He rejected "certain speculations" (presumably, a propos of a coup) on the grounds that the military role, as a part of the system, was "laid down by the Constitution."

The Constitution was central to the military's role in the political system. In 1971, General Ivan Mišković said that "only in cases where the constitutional order was threatened would the army become an instrument for solving internal difficulties." This seems consistent with YPA activity in Kosovo in 1981. It is also consistent with other military behaviour. The army would only act constitutionally. This meant that it would only usurp the political processes if no civil element remained to protect the Constitution. So long as some central civil authority remained, the army would constitutionally, be the coercively instrumental partner in an alliance. Were Kosovo to erupt again (or similar disquiet emerge in another region) it would be part of the YPA's constitutional role to repress the disturbance and preserve the political order. Only if no 'pro-Constitutional' civil authority remained to lead a 'pro-Constitutional' alliance would military rule become a question. If some central authority remained, the army would be its ally in securing the Constitution. Whilst
constitutional order prevailed, the YPA’s legitimacy as a political actor would stay intact. It would use its coercive might, where necessary, to support party leaders in protecting the Constitution or to supplant them if they failed to maintain constitutional priorities. In the light of this understanding, it is instructive to note Milan Daljević's reminder to the 13th Congress of the LCY in 1986 that the YPA’s political activity was a constitutional role.84

This formalised, legitimate political role was based on the notion that the YPA would ensure a ‘pan-Yugoslav’ voice in politics, inheriting Tito’s mantle when he died. Tito emphasised this: "Brotherhood and Unity are inseparably linked with our army ... I believe that our army is still playing such a role today ... our army must not merely watch vigilantly over our borders, but also be present inside the country ... there are those who write that one day Yugoslavia will disintegrate. Nothing like that will happen because our army ensures that we will continue to move in the direction we have chosen for the socialist construction of our country."85 This role was given substance by the appointment of generals to key posts and their de facto presence in the party leadership.86

Although there had been some suggestion that Tito did not see the army’s role this way,87 it seems unlikely to have been accurate. Certainly, the military believed that it acted in accordance with "constitutional orientations and Tito’s views on the social role of the Yugoslav People’s Army."88 The YPA was conscious of its "responsibility", a feeling which "developed during Tito’s time,
especially during periods when the country experienced problems.". Moreover, "this sentiment continued to grow after Tito's death."\textsuperscript{89}

At the heart of the army's role was its all-Yugoslav character; it was "the army of all the nations and nationalities of the country."\textsuperscript{90} Its pan-Yugoslav outlook was inherited from the YPA's Partisan roots.\textsuperscript{91} It was as a continuation of wartime traditions that the military was involved in politics. The Yugoslav military was "always at the centre of the revolutionary process, neither separated from society nor closed to it."\textsuperscript{92} The embodiment of "brotherhood and unity" or "togetherness" the YPA had remained essentially the same through the rejuvenation of its officer cadre.\textsuperscript{93} "There are no differences between the wartime generations, only small numbers of which remain in the YPA, and the post-war generations," it was asserted, which fact assured "the continuation of the most positive achievements of the national liberation struggle."\textsuperscript{94}

Its pan-Yugoslav character was the basis for the YPA's role as an "integral part of the LCY."\textsuperscript{95} In broader terms, both civilians and soldiers recognised its role as an "integral part of our society."\textsuperscript{96} That role was to bind the various elements of the Yugoslav political mosaic as best they can; the YPA was a cohesive element amid disarray. The army had been, was and would remain "a strong factor of stability in our socialist self-managing system and one of the cohesive factors of Yugoslav society."\textsuperscript{97} Milanko Renovica underlined this in his address to the LCY's 13th Congress. In his passage on the Armed
Forces, the President of the LCY Presidium stressed the "integrity" of the army. 

That ‘integrity’ was the "firm moral-political unity and national and revolutionary character of the Armed Forces and the Army", which had "reaffirmed itself at all critical moments, whenever we [had been] passing through difficulties in our development." Yet, it also entailed the understanding that the army wished "neither to impose nor to remain in the barracks, nor above or beyond society, [for] it [was] already an integral part of the political system." The YPA had an important, legitimate role to play. In Renovica’s words, the Armed Forces were "not a quiet island on which there is no sensitivity to the troubles stirred-up in Yugoslavia. They guard the destiny of this society." 

As guardians of society, the generals could not be a quiet island. They had "resolutely" rejected "any attempt - no matter by whom and where it may be made - to diminish this [i.e. political] role." Indeed, in some ways the role may have been augmented. Certainly, the army has not remained silent. The generals were quick to voice their criticisms.

Understandably, the YPA was worried about "harmful trends, especially the trends emerging from the holes of the vampire like resuscitated nationalism." One senior figure has expressed surprise at the numbers of young people who come into the army imbued with nationalist ideas; he wonders "how young people, born and educated in this society
can succumb to such phenomena.\textsuperscript{105} The economy, too, was an area of concern.\textsuperscript{106} Whilst the YPA has keenly supported the economic stabilisation programme, Mamula has found it "difficult to understand inconsistencies in implementing the agreed policy as well as the pronounced subjectivity of the League of Communists and other organised socialist forces of society. Members of the armed forces react most to the slowness and certain inconsistencies in implementing the agreed policy and to the widely spread phenomena of giving preference to partial interests at the expense of common, general Yugoslav ones."\textsuperscript{107}

Essentially, such criticism was of the party itself. Notably, "members of the army, primarily Communists," reacted to the "behaviour of certain subjects in society, particularly those who should take measures against various violators of working and moral norms, of enrichment without work, favouring someone in the cadre policy and so forth. The current economic and political situation in the country [did not] suffer any compromises in the implementation of the stabilisation programme."\textsuperscript{108} The YPA’s worry was the League’s waning legitimacy through its failures to provide good leadership; it was seen to be losing the trust and confidence of the people.\textsuperscript{109} In brief, The League of Communists had "transform itself and be capable ... of justifying its leading social role also in the new stage of our development."\textsuperscript{110}

Despite YPA chiding, however, little improvement materialised. The YPA was not noticeably effective in performing its political role. It
tried, but did not achieve much. It hectored, yet was unable to catalyse decision-making processes and effect the unity of political will it aimed for. The YPA was not very effective because its role had been circumscribed by weaknesses emerging in its legitimacy.

The 1980s were marked by growing legitimacy problems in Yugoslavia. But, the deepening legitimacy difficulties did not necessarily indicate a yet greater amplification of the YPA’s role, such as, perhaps, a military government. Such an extension of the army’s role would be unlikely because of certain weaknesses which emerged in the YPA’s legitimacy. These weaknesses mean a martial solution is unlikely to be the answer to Yugoslavia’s difficulties in the 1990s. Although the YPA’s voice grows louder, raising the volume is all it can do. As the growing weaknesses identified in Yugoslavia at large impinge on its legitimacy, military action in domestic politics becomes increasingly circumscribed. Moreover, as we shall see, frailties in regime and military political legitimacy affect the YPA’s functional legitimacy; Yugoslavia’s defence capability is increasingly circumscribed by these weaknesses.

These weaknesses may be focussed in four areas: the incremental weakness of the pan-Yugoslav principle; the diminished power of the national liberation struggle as a legitimating doctrine; the YPA’s inability to be socially representative in terms of national proportionality; and a growing anti-military posture among some young people.
YPA legitimacy became constrained, in the first place, because to be all-Yugoslav was not in the 1980s what it was in 1971. Although the YPA tried to carry Tito’s mantle, the role proved too great for it; the army lacked Tito’s full, all-Yugoslav authority. Whereas Tito, especially with the generals’ support, was more than all the others, the YPA was merely ‘another’, an equal. The force of its pan-Yugoslav position had been weakened by the fissive tendencies of the Yugoslav Federal order. The YPA represented ‘Yugoslavism’ as eight other units represent partial interests.

The army was, indeed, a part of the system, not above it; it could only influence as a ninth element, it could not dominate. Where it exerted itself, it was decried as "unitarist" - that is, as advocating something between Serb hegemony and quasi-Stalinist centralism. The army could only be effective if it was in coalition with other centres of political power. This was the case in 1971 with Tito. In the 1980s there was no comparable all-Yugoslav force with which the YPA might ally itself. Without some alliance, the army remains weak. The YPA’s voice in the Yugoslav nonet was not a strong one; its plea for harmony was rejected amid nationalist discord.

As the pan-Yugoslav notion seemed less attractive, so, too, the national liberation war and concomitant revolutionary struggle were less effective as legitimating principles. As Schöpflin argued, they may still have engendered respect among young people for whom they represented the ‘historic’ foundations of the system; but, they had no direct, legitimating appeal.11 Thus, the much valued "links with the
people", an 'historic' feature of the YPA were weakened. One indication of this weakening is the phenomenon of physical attacks on YPA members, such as that at the Split naval school. During 1986 there were at least 30 such attacks.

To some extent these attacks represented nationalist sentiments. Nationalism was also a problem in that proportionality was more important to military legitimacy than it might be elsewhere. For, however much Yugoslav soldiers identified themselves as Yugoslavs, the YPA had to appear to have national proportionality. Although this had been achieved in the High Command, where one analysis yields 38 per cent Croats, 33 per cent Serbs and 8.3 per cent Slovenes, the YPA was predominantly composed of Serbs and Montenegrins. The army was perceived, therefore, as a Serb institution.

The issue of national proportionality could not be easily resolved. This was reflected in the YPA's great concern about difficulties in youth recruitment. Mamula recognised the detriment this might be to the YPA's all-Yugoslav character. He stressed the need to preserve the "officer corps' integrity" by attracting sufficient numbers of Slovenes, Croats, Albanians and Hungarians, of which groups, insufficient numbers registered at military schools. Reduced interest among young people in the military profession" - especially "a poor response from the developed regions of the country" [i.e. Slovenia, in particular] meant "an equal national representation could be jeopardised."
Deficiencies a propos of Slovenes remained acute. Although, as noted, well represented at the highest levels, Slovenes were markedly underrepresented in the YPA as a whole. Figures for 1973 were presented in Chapter 3. Subsequent figures could not have made the YPA leadership more optimistic. Only 3.51 per cent of applications to military academies in 1982 came from Slovenia. Later figures offered consistent findings. Between 1980 and 1985 the percentage of Slovene officers fell from 3.8 per cent to 2.55 per cent. "The situation could only get worse," it was reported, as only 60 per cent of the number of Slovenes needed were attending military schools; only 4.5 per cent of those in military academies were Slovenes.

Explanations for the underrepresentation of Slovenes in the army included "the unfavourable material position of military officers, the lack of motivation towards a military profession among young Slovenes, and the fact that young people in Slovenia have fewer problems finding employment than in any other part of the country." To some extent, material explanations are, however, inadequate. Although not without relevance, such explanations must accompany an awareness of anti-military sentiment seemingly prevalent among Slovene youths.

Aside from objections to the conditions of military service, criticisms of the YPA included the emphasis on drill, alcoholism, disregard for human individuality, exploitative conditions and corruption. Further criticism argued for the YPA to be "depoliticised". 'Depoliticisation' might be expected to have meant the increased "socialisation" of the army, by which we should
understand calls for it to be brought into line with self-management practices. Although there was some encouragement to "make it possible for the greatest number of people to be involved in the collegiate form of work", self-management could not be extended practically; it was inimical to the direct command, hierarchically structured army. An obvious implication of the YPA's moving towards self-management norms, were that to happen, would have been 'republicanisation' - the creation of a separate army in each unit of the Federation (to match their political and economic identities). Such notions had been firmly rejected in YPA quarters.

Other issues concerned linguistic practice within the YPA, and, on the other hand, the YPA's criticism of the Slovene Youth Organisation on matters such as its adaptation of the 'Third Reich' poster for 'Youth Day'. But, the major issue of contention between Slovene youths and the YPA was over conscientious objection and the possibility of performing military service in a civilian capacity.

A proposal which was made by the Slovene Youth Organisation to permit 'conscientious objection', although initially thoroughly rejected at various organisational levels, would not fade away. It was an 'initiative' which struck at the core of Yugoslav defence principles which derive from the Partisan tradition that everyone has an equal duty to fight; this is a constitutional obligation; moreover, no one has the right to surrender.
Although the 'initiative' received some support from the Slovene party leadership, where it and similar demands were regarded as legitimate,\textsuperscript{134} the YPA, unsurprisingly, found them "unacceptable".\textsuperscript{135} The army argued for equality: it could not be right that some families' sons and daughters lay down their lives in defence of the country and not others."\textsuperscript{136} To allow this would be to "legalise privilege" and "incompatible with the principles of a self-managing society."\textsuperscript{137} It would be contrary to the principle of equality under which military service is a "constitutional and legal duty for all psychophysically healthy and capable young men."\textsuperscript{138} The YPA argued detail, as well as principle. One foundation of the Youth proposal was conscientious objection on religious grounds. This was been rejected as insignificant: in the previous 15 years, only 152 people had been convicted for conscientious objection for religious reasons.\textsuperscript{139} Indeed, as far as conscience was concerned, for Daljević, "the most honourable and most noble conscience is the patriotic conscience."\textsuperscript{140}

Perhaps, as Milanko Renovica stated, the publicity made the initiative seem a "key problem" for relations, which "undoubtedly" was not true.\textsuperscript{141} Certainly, although the generals could have won a debate which, in truth, should never have contained a viable challenge, their sensitivity (like a bear with a thorn) led them to make a blundering attempt to 'deal' with their persistent critics from Slovenia. The outcome was concession on the issue of conscientious objection and a further weakening of military legitimacy.\textsuperscript{142}
The Deterioration of Civil Military Relations in Slovenia

During 1988, an unhappy civil-military relationship became wretched. Civil-military relations may be analysed at various levels, of which two are relevant here: one is the relationship between the armed forces and society; the other is that between the military and political elites. I would argue that civil-military relations in Slovenia deteriorated in 1988 not only because the chasm between large sections of Slovene society, particularly the young, and the Yugoslav Peoples Army (YPA) increased but, because, in the course of events, the Slovene political leadership was antagonised and brought into greater harmony with Slovene youth. The catalyst in this process was the trial, in July, of three journalists and a non-commissioned officer for contravening military secrecy. With regard to the army, the decision to prosecute and the way in which it was done, must be judged as bad politics, bad public relations and bad for defence.

The YPA's handling of that trial (which will be discussed below) eased the mutual distrust and criticism which characterised the relationship between the Slovene leadership and its youth. That relationship had developed in the 'liberal' political atmosphere created in Slovenia, in particular, by party leader Milan Kučan. Kučan had promoted the notions of a 'legal state' and 'pluralism' of interests, both of which represented experiments in the rule of a communist party. Under the guardian eye of the party (LCS) and the umbrella of the Socialist Alliance (SAWP), various 'informal' social movements were allowed to
develop. These included religious groups, a Green movement and a re-invented Young Peasants Alliance - which reserved the right to become a party proper if it was not satisfied.\textsuperscript{143}

Prime among these buds of pluralism was the Slovene Youth Organisation and, in particular, its weekly publication \textit{Mladina}. \textit{Mladina} became the forum for the expression of the most radical ideas available. It frequently criticised Republican and state institutions and the political leadership which allowed it to flourish.\textsuperscript{144} Prominent among \textit{Mladina}’s targets was the YPA and its position in Yugoslav society. It was the linchpin of the fracture in the YPA’s relationship with young Slovenes.

Between 1986 and 1988, the YPA was often offended by \textit{Mladina}. In April 1988, General Milan Daljević explained that over a five year period, the Ljubljana Military District Command had kept a file on articles in certain Slovene publications. Of the 407 texts in the file sent to the SAWP the previous month, 267 had appeared in \textit{Mladina} during 1987 - and, of these, only one was considered acceptable. Moreover, Daljević had counted 80 texts in the first three months of 1988, alone, and suggested that \textit{Mladina} had almost become a military magazine.\textsuperscript{145} Although the Editor-in-Chief of \textit{Mladina} suggested a much lower figure,\textsuperscript{146} it is undeniable that, over a number of years, \textit{Mladina} had issued various challenges to the YPA. Throughout 1987 and 1988 a dialogue persisted without any love lost between the magazine and the army’s newspaper \textit{Narodna Armija}.\textsuperscript{147}
For much of the time, debate focussed on the initiative of the Slovene Youth Organisation to permit conscientious objection and the performance of military service in a civilian capacity. The proposal seemed to reflect the lack of interest among Slovenes in military occupations, not to say an anti-military sentiment. However, the concept was anathema to the YPA.\textsuperscript{148}

The relationship between \textit{Mladina} and the military declined logarithmically in the early months of 1988. The editors' sights were firmly trained on Federal Secretary of Defence, Branko Mamula. First, a strongly adverse editorial dealt with Admiral Mamula's visit to Ethiopia, characterising him as a salesman of death for (they presumed) concluding arms deals with a regime which spent money on arms whilst half its population suffered famine.\textsuperscript{149} Then, over a four week period, \textit{Mladina}, equally provocatively, revealed how conscripts had been used to build a "villa" at Opatija for Mamula.\textsuperscript{150} Narodna Armija called it a 'flat' and said it was not for Mamula personally, but for the Federal Secretary of Defence.\textsuperscript{151} The YPA was clearly annoyed. In May, Mamula resigned, seven months before his already announced retirement date, with little explanation; it seems reasonable to judge that the cause was the fallout from \textit{Mladina}'s broadsides.\textsuperscript{152} He was replaced by General Veljko Kadijević.

Constantly, other articles appeared on the military in \textit{Mladina}, as well as a regular flow of anti-military cartoons. During this period, the Managing Editor of \textit{Mladina}, Franci Zavrl and another journalist were indicted for allegedly libelling the YPA in an article in \textit{Teleks}
on the differences between young people and the generals.\textsuperscript{153} There was
even a report that a member of the Slovene Constitutional Commission
was proposing, \textit{de facto}, an independent Slovene Army, which would
remain part of a federated Yugoslav Army.\textsuperscript{154} The divorce between major
currents of Slovene opinion and the YPA was strained to its extreme.
However, the army’s relationship with Slovenes became much worse in
the following months.

On 31 May, Janez Janša was arrested on suspicion of betraying a
military secret. Janša had become a particular irritant for the YPA.
Writing on military matters in \textit{Mladina} over 15 years, his articles
were increasingly critical. At the time of his arrest, Janša was a
candidate for the Presidency of the Slovene Youth Organisation, (this
candidature was maintained until he became ineligible).\textsuperscript{155}
Subsequently, another journalist, David Tasić and a non-commissioned
officer in the YPA, Ivan Borštner were also arrested; lastly, shortly
before the trial, Zavrl was, again, indicted.

These arrests caused much concern among Slovenes. A large protest
rally in support of the accused was organised for 21 June coinciding,
by accident or design, with the opening of the League of Communists in
the YPA (LC-YPA) conference). Called a ‘cultural meeting’, the event,
was "dignified" according to Kucan, who was astounded at reportage of
the meeting elsewhere in the country - particularly that by Belgrade
TV which described escalating nationalism and counter-revolution.\textsuperscript{156}
This reaction from outside Slovenia increased concern there - which
concern was already heightened by the arrests, the lack of information
surrounding them and the rumours which circulated in the absence of detail. In this nervous atmosphere, the Presidency of the ICS demanded that "consistent respect be given to the law and that the public - and thus also the IC be familiarised with all the facts and the legal basis for the initiation of the proceedings [against Janša, Borštnar and Tasić]."\(^{157}\) The Presidency also called, at this juncture, for the founding of a Committee for Human Rights to work within the SAWP. Two days later, the Republican Presidency reported that although there had been no irregularity in the investigation, "concern is caused by the fact that the Slovene public is alarmed, that the feeling of distrust in the institutions of the political system is growing". The Republican Presidency, also, called for full information and the observance of constitutional and legal provisions, particularly with regard to rights and freedom of action. It also specifically urged the SFRY Presidency, as the supreme command of the YPA to ensure that the military court's proceedings would be consistent with the law.\(^{158}\)

The political leadership retained an ambivalence on the Mladina - YPA question. Kučan, at the June LCS Plenum, both stressed the importance of legitimate discussion of issues concerning the YPA and defence and set himself apart from Mladina.\(^{159}\)

The breakwater was the trial itself. Janša, Borštnar, Tasić and Zavrl (JBTZ) were charged under article 224 of the Yugoslav legal code, relating to the disclosure of secret military documents.\(^{160}\) Although Borštnar admitted the offence, at best, the others had only possessed the document. As some lawyers pointed out, Article 224 referred to the disclosure, not possession, of a military secret.\(^{161}\) Neither this, nor
other questions involving legal niceties and 'human rights' matters influenced the trial. Borštnar was sentenced to four years imprisonment, Janka to eighteen months and the other two to six months each. On appeal Zavrl's sentence was increased to eighteen months.¹⁶²

The JBTZ trial had two significant aspects: it was heard in camera and in Serbo-Croat. To a Slovene public convinced that the trial was an army 'frame-up' to get even with Jansa, in particular, and some other Mladina journalists, these aspects of the trial were as provocative as any anti-YPA text in Mladina could have been. Moreover, it was these features which precipitated the qualitative shift in the deteriorating civil-military relationship - that is, it is these two matters which stirred the Slovene authorities. Both moves fuelled the idea that the whole action was anti-Slovene - which impression brought youth and leadership into greater alignment. In this respect, they were mutually reinforcing bad moves - unless the YPA expressly wanted to provoke.

That a military secrets trial should be heard behind closed doors seems clear - as it did in some parts of Yugoslavia.¹⁶³ However, the nature of the document was of considerable concern to many in Slovenia. The political leadership suggested that the contents of the document be made known.¹⁶⁴ This request was denied by the military court on the grounds that to do so would be to commit the crime of which the four were accused - disclosure of a military secret.¹⁶⁵

The document was not, technically, a secret. Tomaž Ertl, Republican Secretary for Internal Affairs (RSNZ), admitted that the document in
question - Ljubljana Military District Command Order 5044-3 (from 8 January, 1988) - had not been marked 'secret'. However, his opinion was that the document would be obviously secret to anyone with knowledge of military affairs. This only fuelled public questions about the document itself. Borštner admitted passing Order 5044-3 - to journalists he thought might be sympathetic. He also stated that he did so because the document constituted a "grave threat" to the Slovene people and their Sovereignty.

It was widely rumoured that the document was a plan to destabilise Slovenia, create a state of emergency, clampdown on the liberal Slovene press and replace the liberal Slovene leadership either with Slovenes sympathetic to the more conservative YPA, or outsiders. This was denied. It was suggested that no such interpretation could be put on the document. Stane Dolanc, perceived by Slovenes as pro-Federation, rather than pro-Slovene, said similar orders to 5044-3 had been made in all Republics and Provinces, and were merely routine.

Mladina alleged that the leadership must have known about the document and the arrests beforehand. This claim was made on the basis of a set of shorthand notes, apparently taken at a meeting in March by Milan Kucan, on which Mladina based a report. That article claimed that these matters were discussed at such a meeting. This was denied - although it was admitted that Kucan and Dolanc had attended a meeting with the Republican security services at which a question from the Ljubljana Military District Command had been discussed. Mladina and
other Slovene leaders asked that the notes of that meeting be made public. That request was refused.  

However, what was discussed at that meeting became an open secret as the copy of Kučan’s shorthand notes from the meeting was circulated in Ljubljana was admitted to be authentic. The notes apparently made it clear that the Military Command had raised the issue of whether the Slovene authorities could contain the situation if arrests of journalists were to provoke public unrest. The notes also showed that Kučan and even Dolanc were opposed to the suggestions made, believing that they were unnecessary.  

Kučan made a statement on the leaked notes, in which he condemned their leaking and said that the interpretations put upon them were incorrect. His rejection of the broad understanding gained from the notes and condemnation of the leak are open to question, but, seem purely formal. Despite his denial of any knowledge concerning the leaking of the notes, suspicion must be that Kučan himself was the most likely source of the leak. If this is so, the purpose of the leak would have to be his desire to make public what, in fact, was popularly understood, thereby confirming it. Certainly, Kučan’s assertion that Order 5044-3 was not discussed at that meeting was true. Ertl admitted that it had not been felt necessary to discuss the imminent arrests and their possible repercussions with Kučan or others, being a routine security matter between the military and the RSNZ which did not concern the political leadership.
The leaking of Kučan's notes from the March meeting appears to have had two purposes. One was to demonstrate Kučan's 'innocence', giving the impression that 'others' (that is, 'outsiders' whether Serbs or soldiers, with their base in Belgrade) were 'attacking' Slovene interests. Moreover, in light of the wide belief that Order 5044-3 contained provision for replacing the Slovene leadership during a state of emergency, Kučan's leaking the notes should be seen as an act of self-protection. In this sense, the second role they had was as a device with which to manipulate the Slovene public. By, at the least, implying that he was threatened because he was on 'the Slovene people's side' and making clear that he had rejected the ideas of arrests and a state of emergency, Kučan was able to strengthen his popular support.

The solidifying of popular support was a benefit of the arrests and the leaking of the notes. Kučan was a remarkably able politician, who manipulated circumstances in his own interest. However, I would argue that his position was, nonetheless, 'honest'. Two things lead to this conclusion. The first of these is the fact that neither Kučan, nor other Slovene leaders, were consulted about the arrests. Given the opposition shown in March to what appears to have been a similar proposition, and the absence of an obligation to do so, it seems likely that the military and the security services decided to proceed without consulting the leadership. This action also implies that Kučan's opposition in March was firm and, presumably, unexpected.
The second reason to infer Kučan’s honesty is his repeated calls for those outraged at the arrests to protest peacefully and avoid anything which would create the conditions for a state of emergency. These calls were echoed by others – particularly the Committee for Human Rights, newly formed with Kučan’s blessing (and maybe at his suggestion) as another strand within the pluralism of the Socialist Alliance. The Committee organised a big ‘cultural meeting’ attended by at least 50,000 in Ljubljana. The ‘meeting’ – effectively a demonstration of solidarity with Jansa et al and a protest against their arrest was restrained and peaceful. It contrasted strongly with contemporaneous protests in Serbia in which noisy crowds marched through the streets chanting – and, even more so, with later Serb protests besieging the local assemblies in Novi Sad and Belgrade and the Federal Parliament. Descriptions of the cultural meeting as ‘subversive’ and ‘counter-revolutionary’ in the Serb news media, whilst the less pacific Serb protests were labelled ‘democracy’ caused consternation among Slovenes.

We may supplement the foregoing assessment of Kučan’s position with reference to events in Kosovo in the first months of 1989. Parallels may be drawn, albeit with some caution between what was widely understood to have been planned vis a vis Slovenia and that which occurred in Kosovo. There, Serbian-imposed changes to the largely Albanian populated Province’s autonomy – pushed through without any measure of moderation – led to popular protest and, subsequently, the declaring of a state of emergency, after which the Provincial leadership was purged. (See below.) In noting the similarity between
the alleged plan for Slovenia and events in Kosovo, it should be
recognised that events in Kosovo were the outcome of Serbian designs and actions; the YPA was used as a repressive force at the behest of political leaders. This contrasts with the idea that it was the army itself which was trying to destabilise Slovenia.

The Kosovan events, nonetheless, showed what might have happened. Also, they affirmed the existence of contingency plans for the imposition of states of emergency (it is not unreasonable to suppose that every army in the world has such plans). This would be supported by Dolanc's statement that orders similar to 5044-3 existed in all Republics and Provinces. If this was so, it would be possible to suspect Kučan of using the existence of such contingency plans to manipulate Slovene sentiments and engender popular support for his leadership. However, the stand he clearly seems to have taken in March, the fact that he was not consulted by the Military Council or, even, the RSNZ, in May and his subsequent behaviour indicate that there was some real threat to his own position and to the Slovene Republic. Later reports in the Italian press confirmed the threat; in accordance with international protocol on military manoeuvres near to borders, the YPA command had alerted the Italian Chief of General Staff of the possibility of the use of force in Slovenia.177

The honesty of Kučan's position, does not alter that he manipulated the situation to his own benefit and that of the rest of the Slovene leadership. The holding of the trial in camera, in spite of the admission that the document had not been marked secret, enabled the
Slovene leadership to align itself with the public. However, the other significant aspect of the trial - its being held in Serbo-Croat - was an even more potent issue around which leaders and public could rally.

**The Homogenisation of Slovene Politics**

If the inferences drawn from rumours and leaks gave credibility to Borstner's assertion that the Slovene nation was gravely threatened, nothing appeared a more concrete piece of evidence that this was the case than the decision to hold the trial in Serbo-Croat. Language is a principal focus of cultural identity. Slovenes, proud of their language and their cultural identity were shocked by this decision.

The issue is not a small one. Article 212 of the Slovene Constitution states that all official business on the territory of the Republic of Slovenia should be conducted in Slovene.\(^{178}\) This was taken to be consistent with Article 3, on "the sovereignty of the people" in each of the Socialist Republics and Article 246, on the equality of languages, of the Federal Constitution. The four, in particular, Franci Žavrl, protested against this.\(^{179}\) The Military Court rejected the protest. The Military Prosecution referred to the Rules of Procedure on Military Courts, arguing that according to Article 21, there, the language used in a Military Court was at the discretion of the Court itself, so long as those whose native-tongue was not that of
the court were given an interpreter; he added that JBTZ were given interpreters.180

The Slovene Presidency took up this protest. It requested the SFRY Presidency, responsible for Military Courts, to rule on the matter.181

The Federal Presidency ruled that the Court was in order - this verdict being made on the basis of "well qualified opinion".182 It is not unreasonable to suppose that the opinion was military, given the tendency to leave military matters to the military. Jože Smole, leader of the SAWP, asked how any book of rules could take precedence over constitutional provisions.183 Certainly, it is hard to understand how an incongruence between a particular legal code, on one side, and the Federal and Slovene Constitutions, on the other, could be resolved in this way. A constitution is, theoretically, the ultimate legal document in any political administrative territory; it supersedes all other legal matters.184 To Slovenes - and to the independent observer - it seems clear that the trials were unconstitutional. This becomes ironic, if the YPA’s constitutional duty to defend and uphold the constitution is borne in mind.185 By breaching the constitution (seemingly) in its conduct of the trial, the army was in dereliction of its duty twice.

Janez Stanovnik, President of the Slovene Presidency, set up a group of delegates from the Slovene Parliament to investigate the circumstances of the trial and its constitutionality. The group concluded that the trial had been improper. Its report was twice been accepted by two of the three chambers of the Slovene Parliament. On
both occasions, it was rejected by the Chamber of sociopolitical Organisations – largely because of the role played there by YPA members. This, in part, contributed to Mladina's exaggeration after the second presentation of the report before the Parliament, that part of a definition of a military dictatorship was having soldiers in parliament. 

Eventually, all chambers accepted the report. For a long time JBTZ did not begin their prison sentences; Kučan and the party leadership, Stanovnik and the Republican leadership and the various elements of the Socialist Alliance – particularly, the Committee – have called for pardons in view of the unconstitutionality of the trial.

The languages issue homogenised Slovene politics more than anything else. Kučan (again manipulating the public from a justified position) asked how any territory in which Slovene was not used in all official areas could be regarded as sovereign. Franc Šetinc, who hitherto had made his speeches in Federal bodies using Serbo-Croat, ended his statement at a Central Committee meeting in Slovene. He later ended an interview, conducted in Serbo-Croat on Zagreb TV – in which he was explaining his behaviour at the CC meeting – by reverting to Slovene. In both cases, he was making the point that Slovene is an official language of the SFRY. He stressed that there were some things which he could only satisfactorily explain in his own language.

The language issue also raised an old question concerning the use of languages in the YPA. Although, according to Article 243 of the SFRY Constitution the equality of languages in the army "shall be
ensured", the reality is that Serbo-Croat is the command language, used in almost all circumstances (reflecting the preponderance of Serbs and Montenegrins among junior officers).\textsuperscript{191} Action had been promised on past Slovene demands for the use of Slovene on Slovene territory. The trial and the questions of language and constitution arising from it re-fuelled such debate.

In the eyes of the leadership and the population the trial was an attack on Slovenes and Slovenia.\textsuperscript{192} The anti-Slovene impression homogenised around the language question. It crystallised the image of the YPA as a Serb institution and reinforced the notion among many Slovenes that 'they' (that is, those from the Southern Republics, in particular, Serbia) were not only a drain on Slovene prosperity, but, also, intent on gaining centralised control over Slovene affairs and depriving Slovenes of their 'freedoms'. The relatively new phenomenon of Slovene nationalism was hardening in face of what was perceived to be an attack by the agents of an ever more vigorous Serb nationalism.\textsuperscript{193}

The perceived proximity of the YPA to that which is Serb was important in the process which unified the elements of Slovene political life. It was, however, mistaken as later developments showed (these will be discussed below) when some amelioration of the civil-military relationship was evident at the elite level. For a period, at least, however, the Slovene leadership was antagonised.
In evaluating these events, it is hard to avoid three conclusions: for the YPA, the trial was bad politics, bad public relations and bad for defence. In only one respect can it be judged a success. That is, the YPA, stung by Mladina's criticisms over a few years and behaving like a bear with a thorn - Jansa - in its foot, wanted to get its own back. This is clear from the sentence given to Jansa - eighteen months in a maximum security prison for dangerous offenders (Borštner, given four years, was directed to an open prison). If this is what was intended, it must be seen as a pyrrhic victory in light of the adverse effects of the trial and the ten month delay before Jansa's going to prison and then, like the others, serving his sentence with little constraint (he served only five months, going home at weekends).  

It is not possible to say whether the decision to hold the trial in Serbo-Croat was intentionally provocative or crass. The outcome indicates the latter; but, provocation would be consonant with the evidence suggesting a desire to create conditions in which to declare a state of emergency and impose martial law. What is clear is that the trial was a bad move politically.

It antagonised the Slovene leadership which had previously defended the YPA against the Slovene youth. This brought the youth and leadership into alignment. Political solidarity set around the combined ideas of Slovene nationalism and 'pluralist' politics. The events in the summer of 1988 emboldened Slovene politicians in their advocacy of more 'liberal' politics, of 'socialism on a human scale', of pluralism. In particular, the initiation of the
Committee for Human Rights, was significant. Operating within the Socialist Alliance, it paved the way for the formation of the Social Democratic Alliance towards the year’s end. In effect, this was a proto-Party and a clear focus of organised opposition to the Communists. Its existence, however, also strengthened the Communist leadership.\(^{196}\)

The trial - in particular, the language question - politicised a majority of Slovenes and encouraged a rise in nationalism. This rise in nationalism at such an important juncture in Yugoslav history, heightening the polarity of Slovenia and Serbia, was not conducive to the agreements required to solve Yugoslavia’s problems. Most of all, it ensured that - albeit in the guise of the liberal policies it advocated - the Slovene leadership was encouraged to take firm stands in the Federal arena.

With regard to the YPA, this meant Slovene obstruction in October and December, first, a propos of constitutional amendments on YPA financing and, secondly, on YPA funding in the budget. At the October Conference of the LCY, agreement was delayed by Slovene refusal to agree to certain amendments prime among which was a provision for emergency funding of the YPA (which had failed to gain adequate resources in previous years owing to the effects of inflation - see Chapter 6). The proposal was to make extraordinary funds available between budgets, the money to be raised by a Federal tax on income. This was rejected by the Slovenes. Eventually, they agreed a compromise in which provision for emergency funding was made
constitutionally possible, but by an increase in purchase tax - which would be a Republican, not a Federal matter. Thus, the YPA could ask for funding - but, such funding would have to be agreed, first, in the Republican and Provincial Parliaments, then, in the Chamber of Republics and Provinces (not in the Federal Parliament).\footnote{197}

The problems likely with this were evident in December when the Federal Budget could not be agreed (leading to the demise of the Mikulić government). An extraordinary decision was taken to ensure YPA funding. Perhaps, this indicates that the apparent Slovene victory, in October, (albeit resting on a degree of ambiguity) meant little. Milan Potrč, leader of the Slovene Parliament, immediately wrote a strong letter to the Federal leaderships, stating that Slovenes had only voted for this in the Federal Assembly because the army would otherwise have been without money and rapidly in a state of chaos; however, he strongly pressed the point that this was improper and that it should have been a matter for the Chamber of Republics and Nationalities.\footnote{198} He was fully supported by a detailed statement from the LCS CC Presidium.\footnote{199} The issue was not further tested.

Slovene acceptance of the vote on emergency funding in the Federal Chamber was symptomatic of the measured accommodation of the YPA and Slovene politicians since the Conference in October. At the Conference, the LC-YPA, had sided with the Slovenes and others in opposing the powerplays of the Serb leader Milošević.\footnote{200} In doing so, the YPA demonstrated that, contrary to beliefs in some quarters,
particularly, in Slovenia, it was not a crude Serb agency. On the contrary, its 'Yugoslavness' was evident.

All this may be evidence that the trial had chastened the army. It may also reflect the effects of the change from Mamula to Kadijević (it is likely that the JBRZ affair sprang from the Mamula era - it is difficult to see how Kadijević, if he were so inclined, might have intervened successfully to save YPA face). It is possible also that Kadijević's hailing from the same village as Stipe Šuvar, LC Federal Secretary, presumably with the connections inevitable in village life, might have played some part. Whatever, the reasons for the army's behaviour at the conference, the YPA clearly was chastened by its experience. This emerged in attempts at better 'PR.' with the Slovenes.

For an organisation with severe difficulties recruiting Slovenes - who were, already, largely uninterested in military service and 'anti-military' - to be seemingly so openly hostile to the Slovene nation, in the Slovene capital, was not a good public relations exercise. Showing its recognition of this (and its contrition for clumsy political behaviour) Kadijević visited Ljubljana to announce that, from Army Day (22 December), in addition to Serbo-Croat, the army newspaper Narodna Armija would be published in the other official Yugoslav languages - Macedonian and Slovene. Moreover, all signs and notices at military installations in the Slovene Republic would be in Slovene, as well as Serbo-Croat. Finally, steps were to be taken to encourage non-Slovene officers serving in Slovenia to learn the
language. For all this, it is hard to conclude that the publishing of Narodna Armija in Slovene after 45 years is enough to combat the damage done by the trial.

The YPA decision to proceed against JBTZ in the manner it did was bad politics, bad public relations and, from its point of view, most importantly, bad for defence. Ultimately, bad politics and bad public relations are bad for defence. The territorial defence system, in which the YPA is the leading element of the Yugoslav Armed Forces, rests on cohesion. Splits of any kind, especially along national lines, are bad news with regard to this. Whatever the army may have hoped to gain, it would be hard to conclude that it was successful. Any success was achieved at a high price, in terms of Slovene relations with the military - particularly, with regard to the question of ethnic tensions within the armed forces and the adverse effect this has on defence capability. Bad relations were exacerbated at both popular and elite levels. The Slovene public became increasingly estranged - the divorce between young Slovenes and the YPA widened further. However, the political leadership, whilst continuing to pursue the matters of Slovene sovereignty and the constitutionality of the trial, showed signs of being able to work with the military, if necessary, at the CC conference in October.

In terms of Republican politics, the homogenisation of Slovene opinion was a direct product of the YPA's actions. Party and youth leaderships finally came together on the same platform in March 1989 in response to Serb policies and behaviour in Kosovo. However, their alignment
with each other was always uneasy - there were soon signs already that
the two were becoming more antagonistic again. The non-party elements
in Slovenia had the scent of success. The events of 1988 pushed the
Slovene leadership to make its liberal, pluralistic philosophy more of
a reality. The substance of this was the formation of, first, the
Committee for Human Rights and, later, the Social Democratic Alliance.
These foci of opposition to the Communists continued to push for the
existence of a multi-party system. Politics in Slovenia continued to
be characterised as 'politics on a human scale', not politics on the
people's scale. This was not the case for long, however. In the
second half of 1989, the Slovene leadership opted to expand its
interpretation of 'pluralism' and to favour a multi-party system.

As Slovenes led the push towards pluralism, the YPA's position became
increasingly awkward. The army's sensitivity to difficulties with
Slovenia showed the effect of anti-military challenges on military
legitimacy. Weaknesses in military legitimacy inhibited any greater
political activity. Only in the most desperate circumstances might
the YPA use force. The generals have persistently said they would
only use force to preserve the constitutional order. What this means
became less and less clear as the debate on a new constitution
progressed through 1989.
On Amending Constitutions in Serbia, Kosovo and Slovenia: Towards Multi-Party Pluralism

For an organisation determined to preserve the constitutional order and "resolute on Tito's path", the question must be: is the new constitution a continuation of Tito's path or a deviation from it? The question grows in interest if one notes the opinion of one military mind that "there is no need to raise the question of the Constitution. There is no dispute about the Constitution." Curiosity is amplified if one considers the logic of arguments which argue that the solution to economic problems lies in political pluralism whilst remembering Mamula's opposition to political pluralism. As late as April 1989, YPA views adamantly opposed 'pluralism'. Later in the year, however, the concept had become more acceptable to the army.

The YPA opposed 'pluralism', believing that it would necessarily mean the undermining of defence preparations. The "non-communist" stances emerging in Slovenia, it was thought, intended depoliticization of the army and its exclusion "from policy in all its aspects". The logical conclusion of this would be a "single-nation army".

The debate sped on with Serbs, under Milošević wanting to retain and strengthen single party rule, whilst Kucan's Slovenes prepared for multi-party elections in their republic in 1990. In both cases, republican constitutions were amended to progress the relevant leadership's programme.
In contrast to Slovene pluralist realities and ambitions for themselves and the rest of Yugoslavia, the Serbs, led by Republican President, Slobodan Milošević, whilst recognising the need for a market economy, also wanted a greater concentration of political power in central hands. This meant a re-assertion of the party’s leading role and of democratic centralism. In effect, because of the Serbs’ being the most numerous of Yugoslavia’s ethnic entities, this would mean giving power to the Serbian Party: thus the aim of the Federal Constitution, as supervised by Tito, to limit Serb hegemonism would be thwarted - and the reason for its being needed in the first place exemplified.210

The 1974 Federal and Republican Constitutions were neither fish nor fowl with regard to Serbia. The establishing within the Republic of Serbia of two Autonomous Provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, impaired the authority and sovereignty of all concerned. Undoubtedly, this was an anomalous constitutional situation. The dual intention was to limit Serbian dominion and to recognise the rights of the majority ethnic Albanian and Hungarian communities in those regions as per constitutional principles derived (notionally, at least, from AVNOJ).211 The autonomous provinces were established within the territory of Serbia, recognising that the areas, although encompassed by the old Serbia, were not necessarily Serbian in character; a large ethnic Hungarian population in Vojvodina and a dominant Albanian community in Kosovo were recognised and given limited, non-sovereign rights to self-determination. The ethnic homogeneity of Kosovo, in particular, should have meant its having republican status along the
same lines as other republics. However, the enormous psychological importance of Kosovo to the Serbs made this unacceptable. The compromise proved to be unsatisfactory.

The indigenous Albanian population wanted complete independence from Serbian authority: the indigenous Serb population did not like the changes which altered their old 'colonial' status in the region. Their complaints became the foundation of a swell of nationalism, both harnessed and encouraged by 'Slobo' Milošević, led to the Serbian constitutional amendments in 1989. The product of these alterations was a 're-unification' of Serbia.

In March 1989, Serbia amended its own constitution. In doing so, it aggregated important responsibilities of its two 'autonomous' provinces - Vojvodina and Kosovo. In this process, control of the mainstays of the provinces' autonomy - including the police, the militia, defence and the judicial system - was transferred to the Serbian authorities in Belgrade. Reactions to the Serbian changes were opposite. Received without significant protest in Vojvodina, where ethnic Hungarians are not a dominant group, the amendments met with great hostility in Kosovo. Resistance by the Kosovan leadership, supported by strikes and mass protests, was brutally suppressed.

Albanian 'irrendentists' and 'counter-revolutionaries' constituted the pretext for Serbia to force the Federal Government to impose martial law in the province. A state of emergency was declared and executed in a way which matched the reported content of the document in the
Ljubljana trial. Local leaders were arrested and replaced with Milosevic supporters.

Protest was brutally quashed. In an incident which bears similarities with later, more publicised events in China - the principal difference being the absence of verifying Western television crews in Kosovo - the militia shot protesters. Although eye-witnesses from the hospital in the Republic's capital, Pristina, estimated 140-180 dead, the official figure was 24. It is alleged that the bodies of the dead were only returned once the families, after considerable intimidation, undertook not to speak about the matter with anyone.213

In the Western regions of Yugoslavia, the repressive acts of the Federal and Republican security institutions caused concern. In Ljubljana, between one and two thousand people attended a rally at the Cankarajev Dom, opposing the state of emergency in Kosovo. Live radio and television relay gave the meeting an even greater audience as Communist leaders, including Kucan and Smole appeared for the first time on a public platform with representatives of the opposition, such as Ivan Oman (leader of the Peasants' Alliance) and Dimitrij Rupel (President of the Social Democratic Alliance). One effect of this was the signing of a petition against the the imposition of a state of emergency in Kosovo by 450 000 people in Slovenia within a day.214

Criticism of Serbian actions did not come from within the country alone. The abuses of 'human rights' in Kosovo (from the removal of political rights through the constitutional amendments, to the violent
suppression of peaceful protest and the process of "isolation" of ethnic Albanians arrested, under which prisoners could be held indefinitely without being charged and were tortured and kept in conditions of degradation. International critics included Helsinki Watch, Amnesty International, the European Parliament and the US House of Representatives, all of which sent delegations to Kosovo.

In the wake of the JBTZ trial and the subjugation of a people equal in size to the Slovenes - albeit, much poorer - the Slovene leaders, overwhelmingly supported by the population, framed amendments to the Republican Constitution. The purpose of this was to make clear the nature of their membership in the Federation and assert their rights. At one stage, the homogenised constituency of Slovene political life appeared to be separating out again. Indeed, the whole Republican leadership was attacked for its weakness in not opposing, first, the Serbian amendments through Federal organs and, secondly, the declaration of martial law in Kosovo.

In particular, Republican President, Janez Stanovnik, was widely criticised for attending the Serbs' celebration of the six-hundredth anniversary of the battle of Kosovo-Polje. That battle, which the Serbs lost to the Turks, is the single most powerful historical symbol for Serbs; in a sense, the Serbs had just 'won back' their ancient prize, the founding place of the Serbian Orthodox church. Stanovnik's presence, therefore, lent a veneer of approval to Milošević and his actions. The publication of the amendments brought the Slovene strands together again. This unity was in face of criticism emanating
from Belgrade, capital of both Serbia and the Federation, fuelled by Milošević and his allies, voiced in the Milošević controlled press in Belgrade.218

The most controversial amendments can be seen to stem directly from the circumstances of the trial and Serb efforts to re-centralise. Prime among them was an unequivocal statement of the condition of Slovenia’s membership of the Federation - on a voluntary basis with the right to self-determination and, therefore, secession. Clear in Yugoslavia’s original post-war Constitution, this was not spelled out in the 1974 version, which spoke only of the Republics’ ‘sovereignty’. Although, in most cases, the concept of sovereignty can only mean one thing - that the sovereign is the inalienable ultimate authority, it appears that, for certain Yugoslavs, the implications of this, enclosed in the Slovene amendment, needed to be spelled out.219 As even a leading element in the more independence oriented opposition made clear, "the amendment on self-determination is merely a threat and part of the psychological war Slovenia is waging against the conservatives in Belgrade".220 One marital partner, having assumed that certain things were, perhaps, self-evident and to be taken on trust, finding their faith betrayed, decided to issue a reminder that it entered the union of its own accord and, if it is abused, can walk out of it in the same way.

Other amendments stemmed from this: a delineation of economic sovereignty; that Federal organs active in the Republic (the YPA included) should respect the equal-rights status of the languages of
the Yugoslav nations and nationalities, in accordance with the Federal Constitution—in effect, use Slovene, not Serbo-Croat; the proposal of a mechanism for dealing with federal breaches of the Slovene Constitution; a provision that the declaration of a state of emergency and the deployment of military forces on the Republic’s territory could only be decided upon by Slovene authorities.  

One controversial amendment emerged for slightly different reasons. When the Slovene Parliament voted overwhelmingly to accept the amendments, there was one notable feature which had not been reported, only two weeks before, in references to discussions on the changes between Ljubljana and Belgrade. This was the removal of the party’s leading role from the newly amended Constitution.  

The late appearance of this clause indicates that, following heavy criticism from Serbia and hyperbolic reports in the Milošević press that Slovenia was about to secede, the Slovenes wanted to make a stand. It was an assertion of the pluralist, ‘liberal’ direction in which the Slovenes believed they and other Yugoslavs should travel together. Moreover, it amounted to a broadside against the Milošević tendency, which was advocating a stronger role for the party in a more centralised Yugoslavia—the implication of this was a type of neo-Stalinism.  

Fundamentally, the amendments were a statement of the future Slovenia wished to share with other Yugoslavs, not a declaration of intent to secede. Indeed, the situation recalls Ivan Cankar’s Bailiff Verney.
The metaphor created by the greatest Slovene writer for his country and his people under the Austro-Hungarian empire retained relevance for their position within Yugoslavia in 1989.223

The Slovene-led push for multi-party pluralism was not only popular at home,224 but garnered support in other republics.225 In response, both Serbia and the YPA shifted stance. Both now favoured the erstwhile Slovene programme of single-party pluralism under the Socialist Alliance. However, the Serb position on pluralism seemed little more than "a lot of words" behind which the reality was a significant "strengthening of the 'leading role' of the LC" and "differentiation" (that is, an ideological purge).226

The YPA, on the other hand, seemed to move (somewhat reluctantly at times) towards a credible stance on pluralism. Although Brovet could get confused addressing Zagreb reservists in July 1989 by declaring the army in favour of pluralism and a strengthening of democratic centralism,227 other statements made it clear that there was distance between the Army and "narrow interests" which called on the YPA to protect them - that is, Serbians.228 Indeed, the Slovene misjudgement of the YPA as a purely Serb enclave continued to be countered by its criticism of Serb and Montenegrin nationalism.229 Although military attitudes to constitutional amendments in Serbia and Slovenia were poles apart, the different nature of the sets of changes makes this understandable.
Whereas the unifying element in the Serbian amendments made some of the YPA’s defence preparation tasks more straightforward, the Slovene changes by making military activity in Slovenia subject to approval by republican authorities were clearly impediments to the army’s doing its job. Nonetheless, the army’s reaction was excessive and in some respects misplaced. As more enlightened opinions in Slovenia acknowledged, in the last two years of the decade, the YPA was caught between two "devils" the Slovenes and Milošević. Although the predominantly Serb and Montenegrin YPA officer corps cannot have been completely immune from the nationalist feelings abroad, especially given the greater proximity of the Serbian leadership’s desire for and the general military receptiveness to greater central authority, the generals moved quite quickly towards accepting the advent of pluralism.

The YPA no longer objected to pluralism although it still maintained that a multi-party variant was anathema and would be a backwards step. Moreover, another senior military figure seemed clearly to acknowledge that reforms were unavoidable, including, a move towards pluralism; furthermore, YPA opposition to a multi-party system was, not unreasonably, based on the fear that "that road would lead to further national, and even nationalistic, divisions in Yugoslavia".

This was a more weighty difficulty than another objection advanced by one of Kadijević’s deputies, Stane Brovet. His objection was that a multi-party system would require a complete restructuring of the army. In the event of war, under the provisions of the laws on GPD,
political sections would be expected to play a role similar to that taken by commissars in the partisan years, acting as local agent of the political authority using the instrument of military force - in effect, directing the military command. The LCY-YPA sections would act with the authority of the LCY-CC. Evidently, the authority of the Communist party could not remain in this way under a multiple party system. It was not difficult, however, to conceive of an non-party agent of the Presidency performing a similar role, or even purely military units acting without local representation of political authority. Certainly, as was pointed out, there had been no great difficulty in other parts of the world. It could not be considered as a serious barrier to the development of a multi-party system.

The YPA, whilst clinging to some of the old dogmas on which its leadership was nurtured and retaining grave doubts about the consequences of pluralism, clearly altered its position. As described earlier in this chapter, the volume of statements by army leaders may have increased, but their impact has decreased; the YPA's capacity to act was restricted because its legitimacy as a sociopolitical actor became increasingly circumscribed. When the army did act in the JBTZ case, this was outside direct political processes - and above all, counter productive. One article in Narodna Armija made it clear that pluralism eventually had to generate multiple parties. The YPA's edging towards acceptance of pluralism signalled the weakness in its political legitimacy. The YPA had be prepared to accept what came. It was most unlikely, therefore, to seize power.
Given the way in which weaknesses in military legitimacy have impeded the YPA's political role, it is appropriate to ask if those same weaknesses and the more general socioeconomic frailties of Yugoslavia had implications for defence. Did they have any impact on functional legitimacy? This is the topic to which we must turn in the next chapter.
Did causes and conditions of the YPA’s political debility, those features which defined the Yugoslav crisis, impose on its functional legitimacy? As will emerge in the present chapter, the answer to this question is ‘yes’. Not only this, but the examination of the topic will show that it was concern for defence in the context of crisis which underlay the generals’ intervening in politics. The YPA’s functional legitimacy was undermined by those factors which characterised the general societal crisis in Yugoslavia and weakened the military’s political legitimacy. The economic crisis affected its first two roles: reductions in funding meant it was less able to maintain technical modernisation and training; national divisions and criticisms of the YPA inhibited its ‘leading role’ in the defence system.

The premise of the YPA’s role, indeed, the validity of the Yugoslav defence posture, rested on cohesive action on the part of all Yugoslavs. The YPA, via TDF, required the support of the people. For
the defence system to work, the YPA had to have good links with the people. Those features, such as national divisions, anti-military attitudes and inadequate national proportionality, which weakened the military politically, in this instance, impaired its functional legitimacy.

This effect was augmented by the adverse effect of botched entries into the sociopolitical arena. In particular, army-society bonds were even further broken down in Slovenia by the trial of Janša, et al. Indeed, the restructuring of the YPA was interpreted as a reaction to damage caused by the trial to military legitimacy. Robert F. Miller, for example, linked the closure of the Ljubljana Army District at the end of 1988 to the "corrosive effects of nationalism". Our exploration of the impact of the Yugoslav crisis on YPA functional legitimacy, may begin therefore with this point. Was the closure of the Ljubljana Army District at the end of 1988 connected with earlier political events in Slovenia, notably the military secrets trial?

Abolition of the Ljubljana Military District: YPA Restructuring

On December 25, 1988, the Ljubljana Army District (LAD) ceased working. All its responsibilities were transferred to a new authority, the Zagreb Military District (ZMD). From a perspective both Slovene and non-military, this appeared suspicious, both the deed itself and the manner of its accomplishment.
The change arrived with no ceremony and little warning. One of the first public signs of change was on Ljubljana TV three days before. A report on a session of the Ljubljana army-party organisation used the nomenclature "military post 3553" instead of the LAD's number, 2050. The LAD Commanding Officer, Major-General Svetozar Višnjić made the new arrangements known in a traditional Army-day interview with Slovene journalists which appeared on 22 December. He said that full details would be issued by the SFRY Presidency.

The SFRY Presidency issued its brief announcement on the eve of a national holiday. The official notice was not expansive. The changes, it explained, owed to improvements in and rationalisation of command and control via technical modernisation in the armed forces, and reductions in the size of the YPA. Indeed, the changes even merited no more than two column inches, purely referential, in the army newspaper.

The 1988 re-organisation differed from earlier YPA changes. (See Chapter 3). Whereas previous major alterations had been widely discussed, the latest changes slipped in almost silently and unnoticed. Detailed information was not forthcoming. Enquiries by a Slovene journalist floundered not because the Republican Secretariat for People's Defence was closed around the New Year holiday, when the official decree was made, but through considerable reluctance by the press office there to explain the changes.
The manner of this notice gave rise to great doubts in Slovenia. Issued on the eve of a holiday (and, coincidentally, at the same time as the Mikulić government resigned) and outstandingly meagre in its content, it caused unease among Slovenes. Unsurprisingly, rumours spread that the IAD had been abolished because of events earlier in 1988. Speculation linked these changes to the trial; it was pointed out that any similar trial in the future would escape the problems experienced with the trial of Janša et al, as it would be held in Zagreb. Clarification of the causes and consequences of the changes, and the implications for political and military thinking were sought.

Did the debilitating impact of the trial on YPA-Slovene relations cause a crisis of military legitimacy profound enough to warrant re-organisation? The re-organisation was clearly not a response to events in Slovenia, however much a non-military Slovene perception might find it so. Evidence of long-term planning and the pan-Yugoslav character of the alterations attest this.

Slovene reaction focussed on the effects of re-organisation in Slovenia and stemmed from a false assumption. The changes meant that instead of the IAD for the whole of the republic (and slightly beyond), there would be two corps, one based in Ljubljana, under the command of Major-General Dane Popović, the other based in Maribor, under the command of Major-General Vukašin Vilottić. These corps would be under the direct command of ZMD.
Much of the Slovene reaction was based on a false assumption of contiguity between the former army districts and political-administrative regions throughout the country and, therefore, that the Slovenes were being 'stripped' of their republican command. Previously, however, only the Ljubljana and Skopje Army Districts had been more or less identical with the Slovene and Macedonian Republics. Otherwise the erstwhile army districts did not follow republican-provincial contours.

In addition, the re-organisation was not limited to Slovenia. Eight former entities (six army districts with headquarters in Ljubljana, Zagreb, Sarajevo, Belgrade, Niš and Skopje, plus a regional command in Titograd and the Naval Command in Split) were reduced to four: Zagreb, Belgrade, Skopje and Split (the latter military district being the Naval Command again). Restructuring removed any vestigial contiguity of political-administrative region and military command borders.11

It emerged that the Slovene Presidency had initially thought the changes were not in line with constitutional arrangements on defence.12 This was based on their presumed effect on the role of republics and provinces in the GPD system. According to the Constitution, sociopolitical organisations - communes, autonomous provinces and republics - along with other groups in society have the "right and duty" to organise defence in their domain.13 The Presidency feared that the role of the republics in organising and leading GPD in the event of war would be changed.
In particular, the Slovene leadership foresaw problems of co-ordination if the YPA command for the Slovene region was now in Zagreb, that is, in a neighbouring republic, Croatia. Along with this, it was thought that re-organisation would diminish the political authority of republics and provinces a propos of the condition of the YPA. Nonetheless, the Slovene leadership was persuaded of the army’s case. On the latter issue, the YPA was under the authority of the Federal Presidency; the republics were responsible for territorial defence. As to the question of co-ordination, they were assured that all agreements on common action would take place only in Slovenia; direct contact with Zagreb would not be necessary. As Soban has commented, practice was likely to show that this would sometimes be unavoidable.\(^\text{14}\) The Slovene leadership was, however, mollified. Kucan told his fellow Slovenes that the re-organisation was purely strategic.\(^\text{15}\)

Another question arising from the new military configuration in Slovenia concerned the commanding officers. The new system corresponded with that operating at the close of the war, there being two corps in Slovenia. It differed in that the wartime corps were led by Slovenes; those in 1989 were not.\(^\text{16}\) The reason for this was not a complete lack of suitable high ranking Slovene officers. For example, General Milan Zorc, a Slovene, was in charge of the Sarajevo Command. A colonel, Milan Gorjanc, was acting Commanding Officer (therefore, filling a general’s position) in Titovo Užice. There was, however, some suspicion of a lack of confidence a propos of Slovene generals.\(^\text{17}\)
The Slovene corps in the latter stages of the war had Slovene generals for one particular reason. The Slovene liberation movement was at least semi-detached from the Partisan movement. The Liberation Front (OF) was specific to Slovenia and forged bonds with Tito's movement; the OF organised a military force in Slovenia. For a period after the war there appeared to be a tradition of appointing a Slovene to the highest YPA office in the region. As Jansa had observed, this tradition had ceased some years before.

It is not clear why that tradition was ended. What is clear is a trend towards centralisation in the YPA and in the Armed Forces as a whole. Already by 1974, the coequality of the two elements of the armed forces in the five year old GPD system, had become imbalanced, the YPA, de facto, having become the senior element. Gradual erosion of regional authority in the Territorial Defence Force (TDF) was completed in 1980 with the establishment of a Council for Territorial Defence. Answerable only to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, which was staffed by soldiers, and of which the minister was always the minister was always the most senior YPA officer, the council's being founded meant a concentration of YPA control; the TDF became an "integral part of the YPA itself". Creeping centralisation within the YPA, culminating with the changes which included the LAD's abolition, was signalled at the end of 1987. At that time the ZMD which assumed the responsibilities of the LAD and its equivalent in Zagreb, was formed. 1988 would appear to have been a transitional year.
Certainly, the restructuring had been in the pipeline for a long time. One source had predicted YPA centralisation believing there would be a tripartite structure. Jansa, the arch YPA watcher, had reported secret plans to disestablish the IAD in February, 1988. The Slovene leadership had agreed to the changes, in principle, a month later. At that time, they had expressed doubts. Above all, Kucan had wanted the public to be informed about the discussions.

It is possible that the speech by Admiral Branko Mamula, then Secretary for Defence, at the Political School in Kumrovec on 18 April 1988 was a response to Slovene doubts. The timing suggests some connection. Whether as a public elucidation of YPA concerns for the benefit of Slovene politicians, or as a veiled, partial response to their suggestion of public debate, or both at once, Mamula signposted military re-organisation. For the first time, he announced changes. Already achieved was the adoption of a new operational and tactical system of (respectively) corps and brigades; others which would give a "new quality" to YPA ability to fulfil its role. Otherwise, Mamula had covered most of the same material previously: in a speech in Zagreb in February 1986 about his book, Savremeni Svijet i Nasa Odbrana, and in that book itself. Implicit references to his 1985 book indicate that restructuring had been in planning for at least three years. The "unfinished tactical exercise "Autumn '87", the first of its kind in Slovenia for thirteen years was almost certainly a test of working plans.
The admiral was presumably addressing his Slovene critics in the section of his speech devoted to the role of republics and autonomous provinces in the defence system, declaring that the "defence of Yugoslavia is indivisible". Each force involved in defence from whatever part of Yugoslavia, he continued, had to be considered an integral part of the armed forces of the country as a whole and of its constituent elements.

Mamula addressed the question of republican-provincial boundaries. Referring to wartime experience, he pointed out that combat could not be contained within these; this had been so in the past and would be so in any future war. Accordingly, in military exercises, units would move from one region to another. There was, Mamula suggested, a need to consider all the parts of the armed forces as a unified whole. (The significance of this is discussed below.)

'Unity' was a central feature in Mamula's thinking. The entire territory of Yugoslavia is one sphere of "united operations". The defence chief detailed what he described as four unities: unity of the whole country as a theatre of operations; unity of the armed forces in that theatre; unity of the armed struggle; and unity of command and control in the armed forces. More centralisation and greater unification of the components of Yugoslav defence is a logical extension of these unities. Why did Mamula think greater unity was of such note?
Centralisation of the YPA was based on three things: strategic-doctrinal perception; operational-technical complexity; and the external conditions of the Yugoslav crisis. First was the Yugoslav calculation of the threat it might face. Manilla's analysis of contemporary developments in military technology and strategy concluded that in the event of war, the country would be subject to a 'unified' attack. Military applications of information technology, new capabilities vis a vis conventional arms and the advent of systems such as electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons created new trends in military thinking and presented, therefore, new questions for countries such as Yugoslavia whose defence doctrines and strategies were framed on the premise that they "cannot keep up with top achievements in the technological race".33

Those trends included merging of the elements of military operations - fire-power, mobility, the various arms of military organisation - and a merging of numerous operations in time and space into a single "unified strategic operation";34 the trends also embraced the quickening of the war process modern technology facilitated, the major implication of which was that the opening period of a war would also be its closing period, the war would be concluded after, perhaps, only one battle. Yugoslavia, it was envisaged, would face a new form of "super-blitzkrieg" in which "the entire area of a limited theatre of operation, such as ours, [could] be subjected to a simultaneous strike".35 Mamula's successor, Kadijević, emphasised these points in a speech to the Federal Chamber of the SFRY Parliament only a month before the restructuring. A synthesis of doctrines (of "in-depth
strike", "combined ground-air attack" and "rapid deep penetration") formed a radical "strategic blitzkrieg doctrine".  

Yugoslav defence planning envisaged a threat in which a unified theatre was central. The potential enemy, therefore, would impose 'unity of theatre' on Yugoslavia's armed forces. The need to respond to attack in a unified theatre explains, in part, increased centralisation of the YPA. However, this YPA analysis of the implications of modern technology did not provide a sufficient explanation. It was arguable that in many cases, new technological developments perhaps favoured "decentralised forces, dispersed in a guerrilla fashion".

The second reason for increased centralisation was a clear need to simplify the GPD system. As Mamula had indicated in his 1985 book, the "duplexity of the armed forces" could produce "structural and functional dualism"; indeed practical inadequacies had "led to the question of the unity of the armed struggle in the whole theatre of operations". Both the YPA and TDF had horizontal and vertical structures. This created problems of coordination. The "first essential characteristic of the system of General People’s Defence and Social Self-Protection which most of all creates command and control problems is its complexity." [Original emphasis] Experience showed, said Mamula, that the system too often found "duplication and parallelism" in the system. This only diminished the effectiveness of command and control.
On exercises, the YPA had found units from two different army districts in one battle zone; in addition TD units had been operational in the same zone. Each of these had had its own command—which, in turn, had been part of a separate hierarchy of command. This stemmed, in part, from the lack of conformity between political-administrative and army district borders; for instance, Ilirska Bistrica (Slovenia) came under the Zagreb AD and Osijek (Croatia) was in the Sarajevo AD. Two armies could be operational in one republic; the naval command spread through the four republics with access to the sea. As ADs tried to fulfil their responsibilities, they inevitably ‘encroached’ on territory which was not perceived as theirs; sometimes this could cause discontent.43

Geographic inconsistencies also affected the composition of zones of military action. In one divisional zone, there could be anything between a few thousand people and over 100,000. Alternatively, these zones could cover the area of two separate communes (and in some instances more).44 The complex of relationships in the previous arrangement involved mobilisation difficulties (albeit ones largely caused by the earlier shifts of authority from local bodies to the YPA). Doctrine required mobilisation of TD units; the number of actors meant complications arose in exercises. It was, therefore, desirable that areas of mobilisation should correspond to units’ areas of operation.45

Mamula and his colleagues sought to rectify these various discrepancies. The new system would enable faster, more effective
reaction at each level of command and control, above all, in the case of an unexpected situation. The YPA’s quick response role was thought to be facilitated by the introduction of new operational (corps) and tactical (brigade) organisations. The YPA could now better fulfil its "strike" function in the event of attack; this improvement strengthened its position as the "basic factor in the prevention of surprise attack". A simplified system would improve Yugoslav defence capability.

It is difficult to judge if command and control actually became less complicated and better put into action. Only time and practice could reveal if the new format would reduce the incidence of overlapping jurisdictions, duplicated functions and contingent headaches. At the highest levels, there was unlikely to be difficulty between the military districts. Within each district, it has been suggested, problems were possible. The military districts created new administrative demands; there had to be a new network of "systems and sub-systems". Each district would have more subordinate units; more units implied more linkages between them - both horizontal and vertical. This aspect of the re-organisation has been connected with a general Yugoslav pattern: "Centralisation in Yugoslavia has never reduced, rather increased, the administrative and technocratic apparat."

Considerable complexity remained. As was seen in Chapter 3, the YPA had been constantly tinkered with in an effort to optimalise defence capability. One major omission in the restructuring was the air force
and air-defence force; during 1989, a fifth military district appeared to meet the need for an air command. Further amendments to iron out other kinks could be anticipated.

Evident complexity remained vis a vis terminology. Whether the label 'military district' was enough to ensure that the new system was differentiated from the old with its 'army districts' could be questioned; terminological inconsistency was likely to create confusion. At the strategic-doctrinal level, Mamula's conceptualisation did not translate well into Slovene: the Serbian words "ratište" (theatre) and "vojište" (battlefield) were both rendered by "bojišće" in Slovene and required "broad" or "narrow" meanings to be appended. A measure of this problem was one Slovene discusant's addressing this topic, but getting the Serbian words the wrong way. Indeed, language issues in general gained in importance from re-organisation. (See below.)

Strategic and technical explanations of re-organisation, if not wholly satisfactory, were consistent with the official statement that it owed to reductions in force size and rationalisation. Several questions remained. The YPA's secret plans, according to a leak, envisaged application of the new organisation in July, 1989; if so, why were changes initiated six months early? Was this merely because arrangements were accomplished before time? Or was it a response to other pressures - such as the events in Slovenia? The fact that, after such long-term planning, implementation of the changes was somewhat botched, suggests that it was not a matter of early completion.
rushed introduction more likely owed to external events; if Slovenes were wrong to think that the LAD went because of circumstances surrounding the trial, it was not impossible that the timing of its exit was connected with that trial.

**Critical Aspects of Functional Legitimacy: The Economy**

The economic crisis made it difficult for the YPA to maintain its standards and modernisation. Reductions in funding struck three areas: arms and equipment; force levels and their nature; and the living standards of the YPA cadre. In effect, during the 1980s, the military had to trim its cloth.

The YPA received reduced funding from 1976 on. Effectively, this meant cutbacks and some changes. For the period 1976-1980, the YPA's budget allocation was set at 6.17 per cent of the social plan. In practice, it received only 5.39 per cent. In 1980, the new 5 year plan foresaw funding at 5.8 per cent of national income. Yet, in the first two years of that period, funding reached only 4.79 per cent. In 1983, military spending was put at 150.58 billion dinars - at 5.09 per cent of social product, 20.9 billion dinars below the planned 5.8 per cent and 3.2 billion dinars below the planned 5.8 per cent which, in 1981 was judged to be the "lower limit" at which the YPA could be funded. After 1983 funding was initially planned annually at that "lower limit". In 1984, spending fell well short of that figure. Later,
both 5.2 and then 4.94 were set as percentages of GDP below which
defence expenditure could not be allowed to fall; however, in 1988,
Kadijevic put the percentage of GDP actually spent at 3.85.56

Of course, a declining Defence/GDP ratio "need not signal a declining
capacity for defence".57 Indeed, in hard currency terms, per capita
spending, although not as high as in 1981, was greater in 1988 than in
1983. Per capita, military spending fell from 129 USD in 1981 to 72
USD in 1983 and 69 USD in 1984.58 These reductions in funding were
compounded by the adverse effects of foreign exchange trends and
inflation.59 However, in 1988, per capita spending was 85 USD.60

Moreover, it was clear that, irrespective of the impact on defence
capability, there were consequences for economic activity. Domestic
cutbacks, in association with global economic conditions, created
problems for the defence industry. The defence sector, which employed
about 77 000 people in 1988, was structured to produce for "Armed
Forces development plans and programs when 6.17 per cent of the
national income was set aside to finance the YPA".61 Reduced
expenditure meant reduced production, leading to problems of
"inadequate use of capacities".62 New economic circumstances,
including liberalisation of a ‘unified’ market, weakened the defence
industry - which had previously out performed other parts of the
economy. There were reports that the army was not the business partner
it was once - in one instance orders were down 40 per cent on the
previous year.63
Funding difficulties generated problems in military planning. It became very hard to obtain goods and services in some parts of the country. "The demands of the development and modernisation of the YPA call for stable, even and long term financing," asserted the generals. Quite clearly, the financing system had "serious shortcomings in the regular payment of approved budgetary funds." However, in spite of "reduced resources" the military was determined not to "economise in attaining the essential aims of training and a high degree of preparedness, but that we must carry out training and education at a considerably higher level." Despite this determination certain changes became necessary.

'Rebalancing' the budget seemed to have had some effect on the Air Force and Air Defence, in particular, restraining its planned modernisation and expansion. In addition, it focussed the army’s attention on its domestic arms industry. Although by 1983, 80 per cent of Yugoslavia’s arms requirement was developed and produced domestically, it was decided that the country should be self-sufficient in this regard by the end of the decade. Although consistent with the Yugoslav concept of General or Total Defence, the attempted move towards self-sufficiency seemed to be a response to funding problems and, especially, the question of foreign currency transactions. On the one side, developing a domestic industry (which is, anyway, YPA controlled), ensured that less precious hard currency would have to be spent.
On the other side, a concentration on this industry also meant foreign currency earnings for the YPA to offset some of the budget cuts. In 1989, fifty enterprises, employing 70,000 people (1.09 per cent of all Yugoslavs in employment) were involved in Yugoslavia's production of military equipment for export. The export performance of military industry was strong in the 1980s, enabling the YPA to assert that "The Yugoslav People's Army does not owe a single dollar abroad, nor does our country's overall indebtedness have any connection with the armed forces". Between 1981 and 1985 these were worth 7.5 billion dollars (US); exports exceeded imports by 3.5 or 4 times. In 1982 the ratio had been only 2.5 to one. Amid the chaos of the Yugoslav economy, this would seem therefore, a notable success.

A large part of the success in foreign currency earnings was due to 'services' supplied - particularly, engineering. Otherwise, innovations, such as the burst-firing stream corrector to improve automatic rifle precision, were an exception to the production of mostly outdated, Soviet designed armaments. However, advances made in technological areas left the Yugoslavs as equals in co-operative partnerships, rather than merely licensee assemblers as they were formerly. In the 1980s, 10 per cent of Yugoslav military needs were produced under licence, with a further 10 per cent imported.

Despite these difficulties, the Yugoslav defence industry tried to continue its advancement and expansion; it was, perhaps, less likely that Yugoslavia would be self-sufficient in defence needs in the 1990s. Certainly, in terms of actual defence, self-sufficiency was a
chimera. Although "the preparation of all economic and other potential for use in war is of special importance," if Yugoslavia had been subjected to attack, it would, perforce, have had to look for outside assistance.

Domestically, the army continued to play a major role in constructing and renewing the country’s infrastructure. Contributions were still made in all the fields outlined in Chapter 4 which formed the YPA’s socio-political legitimacy. In particular construction and engineering work remained important, including the building of roads and bridges. In addition, the YPA’s past activity in these areas was used in efforts presumably intended to underline its sociopolitical role.

Despite the relative success of the defence industry, the cuts had a considerable affect on force levels and the nature of the YPA. A rationalisation programme in "high and higher commands" reduced numbers whilst (it was claimed) increasing efficiency. In absolute terms the YPA was reduced from 252,000 soldiers in 1981 to 210,000 at the end of 1986. At the end of 1988, a further cut of 13 per cent in force levels was announced.

As well as shrinking, the YPA also began to change. A protean institution, it saw the reduction of the period of military service and creeping ‘professionalisation’. Although against the reduction of the term of conscription from 15 months to 12 months, Mamula initially welcomed some reforms. However, the cut in serving time
was not welcome; allied to insufficient funds for reserve officers the change, forced by fiscal constraint, meant a lowering of standards.88

Another change has been the decision to 'professionalise' the YPA partially.89 In direct opposition to then Chief of Staff, Petar Gracanin's assertion that "recruiting professionals ... is not a solution for us" 90 the process of recruiting those with needed special skills for fixed terms began in 1987.91 One commentator has argued that the creation of a professional army espousing 'Yugoslavism' was the YPA leadership's aim.92 Whether or not this is so, it is evident that the initial impetus was necessity: there was a need for the YPA to "tighten its belt".93

'Tightening one’s belt' meant personal denial for army members. In one sense, this meant turning their savings into stabilisation funds.94 In another it meant enduring living standards which at various stages have been said to be "at a level below which we could not go."95 Nonetheless, in 1986, Mamula was able to tell them that the standard of living of regulars had fallen at least 1.5 per cent.96 The standard of living has clearly been an affair of great worry to Yugoslav soldiers. It can have been no great comfort to have been informed that soldiers' living standards were keeping pace with the societal average.97 In 1989, a series of changes included facilitating promotion to the rank of captain and beginning new pay structures, including enhancements for extra duties and overtime payments.98 It seemed unlikely that the material conditions of life in the YPA would ever be what they once were, however.
Aside from the material falls in personal and institutional standards, there was a question about morale. It is feasible that poorly kept and equipped troops would lose their confidence; poor funding "in addition to material and financial damage, ... leads to the moral-political problem of broader social importance for the reputation of the army and the Yugoslav community’s attitude towards it." In other words, this represents possible alienation of the army from society and a weakening of its legitimacy. Reports constantly iterated the high level of moral-political readiness of the YPA. It was doubtful that such levels could be maintained indefinitely without some improvements.

Morale must have been affected by the debate surrounding YPA finances and its economic activity. With two thirds of the federal budget devoted to the army,\textsuperscript{100} in times of fiscal restraint, YPA economic activity came under scrutiny. Annually, the YPA budget was the subject of longer and more difficult debates in the federal parliament, culminating in the near failure to reach agreement at the end of 1988 referred to in Chapter 4. An argument flared in 1989 on the generals’ case. Teodor Geršak, a defence analyst questioned, among other things, Kadijević’s assertion that Yugoslavia’s military spending was the smallest in Europe.\textsuperscript{101} Geršak used SIPRI figures to demonstrate that only Greece of Yugoslavia’s neighbours spent a higher proportion of GDP on defence.\textsuperscript{102} Narodna Armija assumed Geršak (a Slovene) to be a cohort of Janša et al, and was amazed that a reputable, responsible defence journal could publish his article.\textsuperscript{103} Geršak defended himself and continued his criticism.\textsuperscript{104}
There was opinion research support for those who questioned the YPA budget in print and in parliament. In Slovenia, 43.7 per cent thought the army received too much money; nearly 82 per cent believed completely or mostly that the YPA should be financed like education and health only in line with the country's economic level.\textsuperscript{105} There was also strong support for the extensive criticism of the YPA's role in the "worldwide selling of death".\textsuperscript{106} In one opinion poll, in spite of the benefit to the economy, 49.6 per cent thought arms sales should be stopped.\textsuperscript{107} However, whilst opinion in these areas undermined military legitimacy, there was support for some of the army's other socioeconomic activity. For example, 97.5 per cent backed the YPA helping during "catastrophes" and 88 per cent supported its role in building roads and so forth.\textsuperscript{108}

The economic crisis forced the YPA to reduce its size, slow down its modernisation plans and personally affected individual soldiers. This meant its leading role in the defence system was weakened by technical inadequacies and diminished morale. Its leading role was also damaged by the clamour of particularist national voices.

\textbf{Critical Aspects of Functional Legitimacy: Nationalism}

It is significant that the special "thematic" edition of \textit{Vojno Delo} in the first part of 1989 concluded its collection with an article on nationalism in the YPA.\textsuperscript{109} This indicates that the issue was the most
important in military minds. Nationalism, above all else, was deleteriously affecting the army.

The article by Vuk Obradović focussed on two separate manifestations of nationalism in relation to the YPA. The first was Slovene, embracing the mixture of nationalist-liberal criticism of the army originating in Slovenia; the second was the damage caused by Albanian nationalism within YPA ranks. This article, following one on "interpersonal relations" in the YPA, indicated that in its efforts to secure Yugoslav defence preparedness the army was having considerable difficulties with morale and cohesion.

Concern about Slovene nationalism centred on the idea of forming republican based armies. This idea, present in the Croatian demands in 1971, was now found in Slovenia - which had lost its 'national' army in 1945. According to Janez Jansa, the most prominent Slovene thorn in the YPA’s side, "none of us ever took a stand for a republican army". What Jansa had advocated during his candidature for the presidency of the Slovene Youth Organisation, was that each nationality should be able to serve in nationally homogenous units where their own language was spoken. Slovenes would serve with Slovenes, Macedonians with Macedonians and so forth. Obradović challenged this conception for its failure to explain how it might be realised in a "nationally heterogeneous milieu". The only option would involve reducing the role of the Federation to one of merely coordinating the activities of republican armies.
The YPA's opposition to this idea was not further detailed (although inferences may be drawn from the subsequent discussion on Albanian nationalism - see below). There had been some military openness to the issue. The Commanding Officer of the erstwhile IAD, General Svetozar Višnjić, whilst "not an advocate of republican armies" thought there was a need to "consider the multi-national aspect of our country" and "clarify" some matters.115 Another officer, explaining why it was necessary to have a nationally proportionate officer cadre, made the following case: "In the event of aggression, let us say we mobilise a division of Slovenes and appoint as commanding officer a Croat, for example, or a Serb, or a Macedonian. That would not make sense!" This clearly indicated the possibility of an ethnically homogenous unit (division).

The notion of ethnically homogenous units was not without merit. Partisan experience of more or less nationally pure units attests to this - although it could be opposed that TD, not the army, fulfilled this role. More importantly, such a system could have had benefits in terms of unit cohesion.

Cohesion is an ineluctable trait of military success. This is particularly so in cases such as the Yugoslav. As Mamula said at Kumrovec, "Only ... our human factor can play a decisive role in conditions of technical inferiority".117 In another variant of 'people's defence', the "Swiss command has always argued that it is the 'unit cohesion' their system achieves that makes their army too
tough a nut for stronger neighbours to crack". Morale is especially important in systems of 'nations in arms'.

Military experience demonstrates that soldiers fight for their fellows. The regiment, regionally based, where it has been used, has played a major part in this. One author emphasises the totality of the regimental system. Tactical unity in combat is believed to be in ratio with soldiers' knowledge and "sympathetic understanding" of one another. The regiment's organic texture seems to give it strength; it is a focus for loyalty which non-regimented systems lack. Even where a soldier may not know his colonel's name, he will know all about his 'buddies', his comrades in arms and they will fight for each other. Certainly, the "unit cohesion" generated by the regimental system has enabled survival and reformation "with phenomenal speed and effectiveness" even "under brutal casualties"; regiments provide resilience.

The effectiveness of regiments is well established. The regiment is a place where "an ethnic group's primary (and very real) affiliations can be represented and made to feel more at home." It has been argued that ethnic regiments significantly benefit unit morale, National units enable "a sense of esprit de corps to be maintained". It seems self-evident that an ethnically homogenous, regimental system could have improved YPA effectiveness.

In particular, such a system would have resolved the language question to which the YPA was "devoting special attention" in 1989. This
included speeding-up the implementation of a decision to place bilingual signs in barracks, according to LC-YPA chief Admiral Petar Šimić. It also meant publication of Narodna Armija and Front in Slovene and Macedonian, as of Army Day, 1988 and the appearance of Narodna Armija in a mixture of Latin and Cyrillic scripts from 9 February, 1989 (presumably to meet Serbian needs). This seems to have been a response to the demands at the time of the Ljubljana trial (see Chapter 5) that the constitutional principle of the equality of languages be respected. The introduction of Slovene and Macedonian editions of military periodicals appears to have been agreed when Kadijevic visited Slovenia in November, 1988 in an attempt to improve YPA-Slovene relations; at that time there was "discussion about aspects of the implementation of the constitutional principles on equality of languages within the YPA." After a wait of 44 years, the production of non-Serbo-Croat editions of Narodna Armija was swift. As Naša Vojška (since 1945, the paper of the Ljubljana Army District, published in Serbo-Croat) enthused, "only a month after the idea came its realisation, without regard for the problems found in that time by the editors of CGP Delo who will publish Narodna Armija and Front in Slovene."

Despite these efforts to improve the language situation, the issue remained. There was a necessary conflict between the constitutional theory of the equality of languages and greater centralisation. The constitutional provision (Article 243) stated that one of the languages of the nations may be used for command in the YPA. This "flexible formulation" in practice meant that, although Serbo-Croat
was no longer the single, official command language it once had been, the working language in the army was still Serbo-Croat; in the YPA, the principle of equality of languages was to a large extent "relative". The restructuring reduced the number of occasions where Serbo-Croat might not be used, reducing the chance of finding "practical solutions to questions of language equality."

It is the language issue which principally underlay the Slovene opinion that the YPA was disdainful of Slovenes; according to the Slovensko Javno Mnenje (Slovene Public Opinion, a mass survey of 2000 Slovenes conducted annually), 49.5 per cent completely agreed that this was the case, with another 26.8 per cent mostly in agreement. Even more than the discontent the language issue provoked among Slovenes, it also created very practical problems, particularly, it has been suggested, regarding Albanians. Albanian army students in Belgrade were required to spend a preliminary year studying Serbo-Croat to overcome language impediments.

Given the advantages that would seem to have been likely to accrue should the YPA have adopted ethnically homogenous regiments, why was its resistance so adamant? Any explanation must bear in mind the comparative experience of that other multi-national communist military, the Soviet Union's. Between the wars and during the 'Great Patriotic War', the Red Army had ethnic units. Before the war, such units were being disbanded due to the "severe challenge" of Muslim minorities. Yet, national regiments were quickly revived after 1941. These were successful in fairly limited roles; their creation
had been necessary to ensure the military effectiveness of non-Slav soldiers by avoiding "linguistic and cultural problems". In the main, there was a "high level of concern for minority liability". A propos of both the Soviet Armed Forces (SAF) and the Warsaw Pact allies, the Soviets opted for integrated military structures. A multinational force "clearly generates immense difficulties in command, control, communications and logistics, but such an army circumvents the problem of political reliability." The YPA, like its Soviet counterpart, opted to work out the complex of technical difficulties rather than deal with an army composed of national units.

For the Yugoslav generals, concern about unreliable national elements was aroused by Albanian nationalism. Obradović, after discussing Slovene nationalism and notions of a republican based army, turned to the presence of Albanian "terrorism" within the YPA. The worst case of this occurred on 3 September, 1987, when an Albanian soldier, stationed in Paraćin, opened fire in the barracks, killing four and wounding a further five colleagues. This act was generally interpreted as a manifestation of the "counter-revolution" in Kosovo.

At the 17th Central Committee session, in October 1988, Chief of Staff, General Stevan Mirković warned against "soldiers associating on the basis of nationality". He stated that "so far" it had been Albanians who were doing this and in extreme cases, were "oriented towards terrorism". The number of cases of Albanian nationalism and separatism reported grew twenty two fold between 1981 and 1988. Although 220 "illegal groups" were identified during the 1980s,
only 7 per cent of Albanians in the YPA, associated with such groups, were tried. The YPA favoured "work on education"; socialisation was better than prosecution. Only this could ultimately rectify a situation in which "extreme nationalist groups" could "disturb unity in the army".147

Albanian and Slovene attitudes to the YPA, in their different ways, had an immeasurable, but telling, impact on it. Albanian disruptions of units induced YPA commanders to concur in the "universal recognition by military professionals that deviants ... can undermine a group’s cultivated definition of the situation and thereby threaten morale"; "severe unit morale degradation" can result from the acts of a few individuals; and "alienated people bring their social distance with them when they enter military service, and this is not necessarily eradicated".148

Both Slovenes and Albanians may be considered to have become ‘alienated’ from the army in significant numbers. They exhibited characteristics of alienation such as "isolation" (holding a set of values different from those of the army) and "cynicism" (the individual’s willingness to participate in collective undertakings and to sacrifice for the general good - key components of the military ethic - are substantially weakened).149 One Yugoslav military source understood that "nationalism is the result of personal impotence, frustration and doubt",150 all alienating traits. Alienated individuals, lacking morale and debilitating esprit de corps, impair fighting capability. As an eminent British general has affirmed:
"History shows, over and over again, that large numbers, good organisation, up-to-date equipment and sophisticated tactical doctrine are all useless if the soldiers are demoralised ..."\textsuperscript{151}

These problems were manifest in YPA recruitment frustrations. It seemed to been impossible to attract an adequate ethnic intake to officer school; in addition to Slovenes and Albanians, Croats and Hungarians were under-represented.\textsuperscript{152} But, Slovenes and Albanians posed the biggest questions.

In order to maintain the ethnic 'key' standards for Slovenes, Croats and Albanians were dropped to a level where "people are accepted even if they [did] not satisfy the conditions of competition", whereas, "excellent candidates" from other areas were rejected.\textsuperscript{153} This had been the case, particularly with regard to Albanians. In addition to the language question already touched upon, other educational deficiencies were found in Albanian candidates for officer school. They had to study "everything" the army had concluded they did not "know as well as students from other primary [basic] schools", such as maths, physics and chemistry.\textsuperscript{154} Further problems arose: either students failed their preliminary year, or they just passed, but then could not fit-in. In an implicit reference to Kosovans, one military voice said, "Were we to draw-up a single list, then we would not have a single candidate from certain communities".\textsuperscript{155}

Poor recruitment figures for Slovenes were mentioned in Chapter 5. The issues involved were different ones concerning the 'liberal' quest of
an affluent, would-be Western society; but, the effect was equal. Over half all young Slovenes showed no interest at all in a military career, according to one survey.\textsuperscript{156} In 1987, there was not one Slovene enrolled at the Military Academy in Belgrade; there were, in all, 25 per cent fewer Slovenes accepted than in the previous year.\textsuperscript{157}

The YPA bent its rules to try to maintain ethnic proportionality. This had to happen to ensure that future leading cadres were not exclusively Serb and Montenegrin. Because the upper reaches, above all, were dependent on the national key, it was necessary to recruit from all nationalities to form a pool from which to draw. However, there seemed to be little chance of improvement on this. The effects of YPA units conducting 'counter insurgent' action against Albanians in Kosovo would not attract many from that nationality. The fallout from the Janša trial seemed certain to deflate Slovene interest in military occupations further. Matters such as this and the language issue fostered the impression of YPA disregard for Slovenes. In addition, the fact that almost half all Slovenes supported the civilian option for military service, undermined the YPA's position. Perhaps even more discouraging for the generals was the level of faith in YPA capability; as many as 15.9 per cent thought it would not perform successfully in the event of an attack.\textsuperscript{158} The confidence of only half the population (53.3 per cent) on a matter such as this did not suggest a large swell of support (although 58.7 per cent would resist an enemy attack).
Much of this did not bode well for the army. The psycho-social distance of Albanians and Slovenes from the YPA had dysfunctional consequences. According to Westbrook, "there is a negative correlation between socio-political alienation and military efficiency". Alienation is found to "limit seriously the Army’s ability to produce efficient soldiers"; a high level of alienation equates with low morale. This conclusion on the US Army was even more applicable to the YPA: "If a substantial portion of the most capable and well-integrated members of society continue to refuse to serve in the Army, the alienation drain on military efficiency will probably exist to some degree regardless of the internal efforts of the army to combat it." Given the importance of "recognition" in counteracting alienation, prospects were not good. There seems little chance of Slovenes and Albanians according ‘status’ to the military profession and so conferring the ‘recognition’ that might encourage enlistment; more likely in the longer term, perhaps, was erosion of the ‘recognition’ which had backed individuals from other nationalities in becoming officers.

Ultimately, an even greater problem than attitudinal matters for the YPA in maintaining its national proportionality and morale was Yugoslavia’s demographic development. The severe decline in the Slovene birth-rate would diminish even further the small pool from which it had to recruit officers. Conversely, the factorial expansion of the Albanian population was going to bring even greater problems of language, alienation, low-morale and weak unit cohesion; the number of Albanians in Yugoslavia (despite the exodus of 250,000
to other parts of Europe) appears to grow by half every ten years. Unless Yugoslavia took enormous affirmative action not seen previously, the number of malcontents was destined to become vast.

Although the YPA might have tried to create units in which Albanians could be trained in their own language, which would operate on the cohesive principle of identity, it was unlikely to do so. The level of discontent was such that an 'Albanian' republican army could become a potentially troublesome nationalist instrument. Oppressed Albanians might use military might to gain politically, which gain might well imply civil-war.

The YPA could not tolerate proposals, such as Jansa’s, for ethnically complete regiments, in spite of theoretical advantages which might occur. By vehemently countering such initiatives the YPA did not ameliorate its predicament. Increasingly, its intonations of 'brotherhood and unity' had the opposite effect of that desired; as the YPA increased centralisation (among other things to escape the ramifications of nationalist politics) and emphasised 'unity', it lost touch with 'brotherhood'.

Nationalism seriously impinged on the YPA’s functional imperative. To avoid the possibility of being dragged towards republican regiments, as much as for reasons of strategy and command and control, the YPA drew into its centre. In doing so, it invited more stretching on the nationalist rack.
The question of support for GPD has not been widely studied (at least openly - no doubt the Federal Secretariat has considered it). One very valuable light has been cast on the issue by John Allcock.\textsuperscript{164} He has analysed the social supports which underpinned the Partisans' victory. For him that success was linked to particular features of Yugoslav society. He divides these supports under the labels 'recruitment' and 'supply'. Social conditions which sustained the partisan effort, Allcock demonstrates, were not available in the 1980s.

The Yugoslav revolution was essentially a peasant revolution, Allcock argues (in a good tradition\textsuperscript{165}). This provided specific patterns of 'recruitment' and 'supply'. At the time, almost two thirds of the population lived "directly from agriculture". Every Yugoslav economically active in agriculture "supported" roughly two other citizens with food. By 1981, the number of people directly living from the land had fallen to 11 per cent; an agriculturally economically active individual in the 1980s supported nine other citizens. The countryside had been depopulated; the towns had swelled. Yugoslav society had become industrial and urban. There is no longer a rural population, poor and discontent, to furnish "another generation of partisans".\textsuperscript{166}

Not only were people no longer inhabiting villages, but those who did in the 1980s were increasingly aged. The younger, more active
population had left for the towns. Contingent upon this are cultural changes. The communists manipulated the hostility felt by poor, often unemployed peasants towards the bourgeois who lived in the towns. This could no longer be the case.

Allcock’s point that the constituency from which the NLA derived membership and support was no longer available is indisputable. However, as a former Yugoslav defence minister reminded his readers, should it come to a war, Yugoslavs would be fighting one of a different character. This is true not only of the technologies involved, but for the very nature of the war. For all the talk in Yugoslav defence literature about drawing on partisan experience, GPD was necessarily different: in a future war, Yugoslav armed forces would not be mobilising to conduct a revolution, but to protect the status quo; the fight would not be against the system, but for it. More than this, the purpose of GPD was deterrence.

Of course, for GPD to be an effective deterrent, it had also to work. Could Yugoslavia defend itself? Was GPD efficient enough to act as a “detonator” with “unpredictable reverberations”? The question on the social foundations of Yugoslav defence was this: could the mechanisms of GPD successfully mobilise general support? Which is to say, would GPD work?

The social dimensions of Yugoslav defence placed a shadow of doubt on the chances of GPD mobilising successfully. One problem stemmed from the country’s underdevelopment. The number of Yugoslavs working abroad
created major mobilisation problems. In the early 1970s, 90 per cent of Yugoslavs working abroad were eligible for military service. In the event of war or a threat of war, there would be the logistical problem of how to transport all those people due to return. Another problem would concern the willingness of those abroad to go back to Yugoslavia. Alternatively, there could be political difficulties with the West European host countries in which the 6-7 million gastarbeiter are active. This could owe to the involvement of the states in question, or the economic effect of losing a sizeable section of the workforce, or merely because of the chaos moving so many individuals en masse would involve. However, if these potential impediments to mobilisation stemmed from Yugoslavia’s economic weakness, even greater ones resulted from the degree of economic development and industrialisation which had taken place in the communist era.  

The urbanisation of Yugoslav society spawned problems in this area. First, Yugoslavia was now well urbanised; its economic growth depended on industrial towns; what it had to protect, essentially, were towns and cities. GPD’s focus was the mountains where partisan success was cradled. This brought forth a question addressed by Rusinow: would the urban centres be conceded?  

If the towns and cities were to be seriously defended, ‘supply’ would become significant. Whereas ‘recruitment’ is of limited value in exploring the social facets of GPD, Alcock’s second social support of the partisan victory is compelling. Resistance within cities requires supplies. This support may come from “other local inhabitants - by
theft, bribery, or the restriction of their own consumption, or by supplies smuggled in from outside.\textsuperscript{173} To evade the occupier's detecting them, such supplies would be small. From this, it follows that those engaged in active resistance would be few. Their acts of resistance would be of a correspondingly low intensity.

If the industrial conurbations were to be abandoned as GPD implied, the question of supplies remained. Loss of towns means loss of industrial capacity, most importantly, of arms' production. Beyond this, an evident corollary of a large urban population's taking to the hills to become fighters is survival. The relatively inhospitable mountains to which fighters would go had become "less able than they ever were to yield a food surplus".\textsuperscript{174} This would be so with skilled rural dwellers; 'townies' would face considerable unhappiness as they found themselves unable to 'live off the land'.

Another consequence of urbanisation which would register in mountain based resistance is transport. Helicopters might provide some service into and among the mountains, but these would be limited by number, opportunity and vulnerability. There would be little alternative to pack animals, as with the partisans. But, the number of horses in Yugoslavia had fallen, enormously from 1,242,000 in 1955 to 409,000 thirty years later.\textsuperscript{175} This dearth, compounded by urban ignorance of how to handle horses, would constrain partisan-type operations.

Finally, there could be problems mobilising an urban population in the event of attack. The threat of imminent attack might induce chaos in
towns and cities, as was reported in the one major study about this.\textsuperscript{176} Certainly, the complexities of mobilisation for GPD would appear to enhance this possibility. Experience demonstrated that in mobilisation, preparations were not co-ordinated - the appropriate bodies had not achieved the "expected results" in their work.\textsuperscript{177} As a result many people did not know what their GPD role was. 51 per cent of Slovenes say they knew what their role was in GPD;\textsuperscript{178} nearly half the population did not know what to do. In this situation, the complexities of mobilisation could create "panic".\textsuperscript{179} It appears that the mechanisms of GPD would generate support which was both inadequate and confused. Inter-ethnic frictions, as when 500 reservists in Koper, Slovenia, left their positions on exercise to protest against their Serbian officer, would exaggerate this.\textsuperscript{180}

A report in \textit{Mladina} on the reservists' strike during exercises attributed to an officer commanding the group statements in which JBTZ were called "spies" and Jansa was subject to coarse abuse; the new Slovene Alliances were anarchists hiding behind democratic slogans; moreover, the Slovene reservists were told they understood nothing of the Serbs. Although it is common for soldiers the world over to be subjected to any kind of abuse by their superiors, it seems unwise to use this approach with reservists, given the atmosphere in Yugoslavia at the time. Certainly, the fact that the reservists protested and, later, left their positions did nothing to recommend the approach; nor did it augur well for the likely cohesiveness of such units in time of war - and, therefore, for the performance of the territorial defence system as a whole.
It seemed quite possible that Yugoslav society could not provide the supports to sustain GPD. If this were so, GPD, in its present form, was inappropriate for modern Yugoslavia. The implications for YPA legitimacy of having to lead a misplaced defence system were not good. As Yugoslavia entered the 1990s, GPD seemed to be faced with specific social impediments to its operation. Moreover, these were relatively straightforward, to some extent, inevitable features of industrialising society. The big question mark against a successful defence of Yugoslavia was the effect of social crisis. In this sense, any comparison with social conditions in 1941 should focus less on how partisan victory was nurtured, but more on how the old Yugoslavia fell apart, swiftly overrun and abjectly unable to defend itself.

**Defending Yugoslavia in 1941 and the 1990s: The Social Matrix of Defence**

It cannot have escaped defence planners' consideration that in 1941 an economically decadent and nationally divided Yugoslavia fell apart when attacked. The possibility that history might be repeated placed a question mark against the surety of Yugoslavia's defence. Inability to guarantee the country's defence was detrimental to the YPA's functional legitimacy: the YPA legitimated itself by ensuring - through its own immediate activity and the TDF system - defence against external threat; it could only achieve this, should it be necessary, if Yugoslavia itself were strong and united.
Similar weaknesses in Yugoslavia’s political, social and economic infrastructure could be observed in the 1980s to those which characterised the country in 1941. Aleksa Djilas argued that there was also similarity between the Royal Army’s situation in 1941 and the YPA’s today. Like the YPA, he argues, the Royal Army was very large and highly regarded internationally. In the creation of the četnik odredi after 1939, it had even prepared for guerilla war. Yet, the Army’s defence lasted only twelve days and the Chetnik operations were not successful. Djilas believed contemporary Yugoslavia’s defence was equally vulnerable.

However, there exist observable differences between the two periods. These differences permit some confidence in the prospects for defending Yugoslavia. First, the military at the end of the 1980s still had greater social legitimacy than its inter-war predecessor. The inter-war governments lasted 268 months in total. During that period, the defence minister was always a Serb general. Indeed, the 1938, of 165 generals, 161 were Serbs – leaving two Croats and two Slovenes. The YPA’s generals are better proportioned in the High Command. With a spread of 38 per cent Croats, 33 per cent Serbs and 8.3 per cent Slovenes, the higher reaches of the YPA are clearly less Serb dominated than those of the Royal Army. In addition, the top soldier in 1990, Kadijević was a Croat and, although an ethnic-Serb, his predecessor as defence secretary, Branko Mamula was from Croatia and a naval man – which gave him a Croatian profile.
Another difference is inter-nationality morale. The predominating Serb generals in the Royal Army perceived their colleagues from the 'national minorities' as unreliable, subversive German agents. Discipline and morale were undermined by these Serbs suspicious of their fellow officers. As noted above, the YPA, in contrast, carries the banner of 'brotherhood and unity' from the partisan days and is today a repository of 'Yugoslavism'. Against the suspicions debasing the prewar army, we may juxtapose a 'Yugoslav' trust among YPA officers. Greater trust meant greater cohesiveness and higher morale; these made it more likely that YPA officers would lead a fight and, indeed, fight more effectively.

This conclusion, finally, is reinforced by a consideration of the 'guerrilla' similarity between the two periods. The Chetnik idea, although a traditional notion, did not figure in military planning until 1940. A late arrival, it had little support among the highest ranks whose thought was forged in the 1914-1918 war and before. The weakness of conviction in the policy is evident in the position the Mihailovic led Chetniks took when war came: wait for the Allies and then fight. In contradistinction, the YPA was fully committed to its role in leading Yugoslavia's system of GPD. This commitment to a 'guerrilla' defence on a scale far more vast than the Chetnik strategy, and with immensely greater organisation and preparation indicated that, for the time being, albeit sagging, the Yugoslav defence posture remained just about firm enough.
However, although YPA leadership, command and control was likely to be strong, Yugoslavia’s defence position was dependent on the army’s receiving full support. If, in the event of war, there was a dissipation of support for territorial defence along national lines, as intimated above, GPD would not work. As well as YPA commitment and effectiveness, GPD rested on the engagement of all its citizens, of all nations and nationalities. It was the dread that such engagement would not happen as Yugoslavia dissolved in the welter of invasion which prompted YPA generals in their political activity. They wished to secure Yugoslavia in a way in which it was not so in 1941. Although the position was clearly healthier vis a vis the army and its role - the 1980’s Yugoslav defence posture was a fairly strong one - the political, economic and social infrastructure betrayed similar ills. These frailties began to affect the YPA’s functional legitimacy as the technically expert, highly trained, unified, cohesive leading element in the Yugoslav defence forces. This began to weaken YPA capability. That capability could not be maintained without adequate political, economic and social support. More importantly, in the unlikely arrival of war on the Yugoslav doorstep, the weaknesses in the Yugoslav infrastructure raised questions about the system of General People’s Defence. It does not seem unreasonable to share the generals’ implicit view that Yugoslavia could not be guaranteed to remain intact in the face of attack. Although militarily better prepared for invasion than in 1941, Yugoslavia was not necessarily politically, socially and economically any fitter.
Yugoslav civil-military relations, as has been argued, may be understood in terms of regime and military legitimacy. Yugoslavia in the 1980s was faced with a multi-faceted legitimacy crisis. The military's role in that crisis was both prompted and constrained by weaknesses in its legitimacy which emerged during those years. Frailties in regime and military legitimacy suggested that Yugoslavia might fall apart, as in 1941, should it be attacked. Weaknesses in military legitimacy placed question marks over its likely performance in war. Although the difficulties were growing and generated worries for the future, strengths continued to outweigh weaknesses. However, the intensification of nationalist statements increased societal instability and did nothing to reassure anyone that Yugoslavia would hang together if attacked. Prospects, in this regard, resemble 1941, de plus en plus.

To compound this, the YPA's 'immune' system increasingly appeared to be deficient. "Facts of social affairs have a most direct influence on the army" it was reported. The situation was clearly fraught: "Negative features influence the consciousness of YPA members, their mood, motivation and conduct," it was reported. The generals admission that it "would be very dangerous to underestimate its negative effect on YPA members" of nationalist influences was a clear sign that all was no longer well. The army was becoming increasingly alienated. Exactly what this implied for the YPA's likely performance could not be gauged. Certainly, neither this nor the general societal degeneration augured well for the prospect of defending Yugoslavia.
The YPA's legitimacy was weak. Functionally, we have identified various impediments to its effective leadership of a defence system which was open to question. Sociopolitically, the impossibility of immuring itself from the effects of societal crisis and preserving GDP from consequences of that crisis undermined the army's position. As Yugoslav generals had always been very much aware, a country's security results from the social matrix of defence. The YPA faced a crisis of military legitimacy, which, in part, depended on the crisis in regime legitimacy.

Unless the regime's legitimacy could be restored, Yugoslavia's security would be dependent on and better guaranteed by the international situation in which an attack, even on a severely weakened country, seemed ever more improbable. The outcome of a defence relying on Yugoslavia's capability might have been 'too close to call'.
The 1980s saw both regime and military in Yugoslavia delegitimated. As a consequence, both entered the last decade of the century needing to renew legitimacy. 1990 and 1991, therefore must be considered as pivotal years (indeed, fifty years after the Axis turned on the first Yugoslavia and destroyed it, 1991 may be the axis Yugoslavia turns on between self-preservation and self-destruction). Renovation of military legitimacy is largely dependant on regime relegitimation. However, regime relegitimation is impossible without new military legitimacy. How could they achieve this?

The many-sided crisis of the 1980s gave rise to a quest for a new constitution. The new constitution would need to restore political legitimacy in the country. Bases of
legitimacy which had emerged in the past no longer had currency. The key elements in the system's liturgy were apparent in the discussions of legitimacy earlier: the Partisan struggle during the war to create a better Yugoslavia based on the AVNOJ principles of brotherhood and unity and the equality of nations and nationalities; the independent Yugoslav road of socialist self-management and non-alignment after the split with Stalin; a devolved and decentralised political system with power resting in the republics and autonomous provinces; a relatively prosperous and progressive economy in which things would get better, fostered by the political structures and values just mentioned. These decreasingly generated support. Yugoslav politicians presented with the task of drafting a new constitution were, by the end of the decade, being tested to devise a completely new set of arrangements for the conduct of political and economic activity in Yugoslavia - which set of arrangements would necessarily have to accommodate the radically divergent positions adopted by various constituencies in the Yugoslav entity.

In the second half of the 1980s, the terminal condition of the old bases of legitimacy created a need for alternatives. Nationalism, managed initially by the LC authorities in the republics, but later the focus also for opposition parties, became the cornerstone of political
support. This meant that the federal authorities were increasingly devoid of legitimacy, which was devolved almost completely to republican equivalents. The passing of legitimacy from the federation to the republics meant that any third Yugoslavia would be the product of negotiations between representatives of relatively strong republics, not a central creation offered to the country.

The framers of a new constitution had much to do. Legitimation was required at all levels in the political system – authorities, regime and, most distressingly of all, community.¹ A legitimacy deficit with regard to those making and enacting policy (the authorities) is more easily made up than one concerning the way in which policy is framed and achieved (the regime); both these, however, will have much greater chances of restoring legitimacy than a state in which the very community itself is in question – which was clearly becoming the case vis a vis Yugoslavia at the end of the 1980s. The new constitution would have to find a way in which to reconcile the various elements of the Yugoslav federation to living with one another.
Re legitimation (I): From Party to State

The problems confronting those charged with constitutional renovation became clear in the way Titoist and Communist Yugoslavia came to its end in the first two months of 1990. Predictions of Yugoslav disintegration were sparked by events at either end of the country. The Slovene declaration of the right to secede had given rise to such speculation in the latter stages of 1989. Concomitant with a particularly violent outbreak of the recurring troubles in Kosovo, the Slovene party left the federal party, accentuating speculation about a split with the federation itself. The circumstances of the federal party’s break-up demonstrated the extremes any new ordering of Yugoslav politics would have to reconcile.

The LCY was dealt a fatal blow in January when the Slovene delegation walked out of the emergency 14th LCY Congress, called to revitalise and reorient Yugoslavia. At that congress, the LCY began to dissolve and the paths towards a third Yugoslavia began to be opened up. The Slovene exit came after their reform proposals had been defeated in the congress. The proposals centred on the idea of a further federalisation — or, confederalisation — of the LCY into a ‘League of Leagues’; they also included amendments calling for the abolition of provisions for political crimes in
the penal code, the release of existing political prisoners, a ban on torture, and backing for Yugoslavia's seeking full membership of European Community.

Although the LCY had already voted for an end 'Verbal Crime' by deciding to abolish Article 133 of the Criminal Code and had also conceded its monopoly on power, paving the way for multiple-party elections, this was insufficient for the Slovenes. To them, failure to adopt the other amendments constituted a lack of serious commitment to reform: democracy would remain distant whilst political crimes were still possible. Most of all, the refusal further to decentralise the party indicated that other Yugoslavs were still inclined to make the mistakes of the JBTZ trial and remained reluctant to accept the principle of republican sovereignty - which principle was now cardinal for the Slovenes.

Despite having voted to revoke its power monopoly, the LCY did not formally do so because the Declaration of which it and the other proposals above were part was not adopted. The Declaration, the party and the country were put in limbo when the session was suspended and an emergency congress of the LCS called for Friday, February 2. The meeting was put back two days as Ciril Ribičič (who had taken over from Kučan before the LCY Conference, freeing the latter to become a candidate in the presidential
elections in the spring) received an eleventh hour visit from the leader of the LCY-YPA, Vice-Admiral Petar Šimić.\(^2\) The content of their meeting went unreported. Almost certainly, there was a plea from Šimić for a reconsideration. Discussion must have focussed on the implications of a decision by the Slovene communists to disengage from the federal party, particularly with regard to GPD.

At that conference, which took place on Sunday, 4 February, the LCS abolished itself.\(^3\) With this act, *de facto*, the LCY ceased to exist and Yugoslavia became a multi-party system. For the Slovenes, the decision meant that they no longer had a voice in the federal party, which at that stage remained, technically, the only legal party and the 'leading force' in Yugoslav politics. However, the Slovene decision effectively neutered the LCY's leading role and gave a further push towards liberal democracy. The federal party could no longer function as the most important institution in Yugoslavia.

From the ashes of the LCS rose a phoenix-like (LCS) Party of Democratic Renewal. The new party retained the initials of the old party, presumably, to indicate some continuation as well as to keep the advantage of name recognition (particularly with older supporters) in the Slovene elections due in March and April; at the same
time, the change of name proclaimed the party's West German-style social-democratic freshness. The Slovene leadership wanted to give Yugoslavia a chance to become 'West European' - which ambition was reflected in their election slogan 'Europe Now!'

The new name also left an avenue open for the establishment of a new federal party. Both Slovenia and Yugoslavia were now multi-party systems. In the federal parliament sat Communists and Renewal Democrats. In the absence of a 'Slovene' appendage to the new party's name, there remained the possibility of there being Renewal Democrats throughout Yugoslavia sometime in the future.

Slovene actions in this period were undoubtedly influenced by the collapse of communism elsewhere in Eastern Europe. For so long, Yugoslavia - in particular, Slovenia - had been in the forefront of reforming the communist state. Suddenly, Yugoslavia was lagging behind. Under Kúčan's leadership, the Slovenes had made great advances in the process of liberalisation. (See Chapter 5.) Yugoslavia's geostrategic position and Slovenia's situation within Yugoslavia meant that the old formulas and the old ways were due lip service and constrained the advancement of new ideas. Communism's crumbling and utter discrediting in Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Romania made it possible for the reformist Slovene leadership to declare its hand
openly. In declaring multi-party elections and emphasising Slovenia’s right to self-determination, Kučan and his cohort, unlike the majority of communists elsewhere in Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia, were continuing a policy adopted long before.

However, their behaviour now had another dimension. The Slovene leadership’s decision was taken with a view to surviving the Spring elections. Given the outcome of the emergency 17th Conference, not to have distanced themselves from the federation would have invited disaster at the polls in face of an ardently nationalist opposition. Nonetheless, the new name and Ribičič’s statements suggested that the erstwhile communists would be more inclined than their antagonists to follow a wait-and-see-if-Yugoslavia-can-be-healed policy.

The demise of the Slovene party enhanced the role of the state—particularly, of the Prime Minister. The party was no longer central because it was no longer the forum in which representatives from all pars of Yugoslavia could talk to each other. Political dialogue with Slovenes on executive matters would have to take place in some other primary institutional structure. At the federal level, it was Prime Minister Ante Marković who now attempted to reconcile Slovene-Serb differences. All such disputes now had to be dealt with by state institutions, not the party
which was no longer all-Yugoslav. The last LCS, first (LCS)-PDR congress completed the shift from party to state governance. Legitimacy would no longer embrace party rule. The question it left unanswered concerned which state would receive the governmental role: republic or federation?

In the first half of 1990, the basic lines of potential relegitimation were drawn. Three models for the continuation of Yugoslavia emerged in discussions; in addition, a fourth option, the spectre of disintegration loomed - notably, with regard to talk about Slovenia's seceding; such a notion was an obvious corollary of the transfer of legitimacy to republican level. With a view to establishing a third Yugoslavia, the models were associated with particular names: Kučan and Tudjman; Marković; and Milošević and Jović.

Relegitimation (II): Unionists and Confederates

Throughout 20 years, there occurred a process in which authority passed from the centre to the republics in Yugoslavia. The crisis of legitimacy as the country approached the last decade of the Twentieth Century reflected this. Legitimacy, in a vein of nationalism, had
been transfused from federation to republic. Federal government had difficulty in demonstrating that it was in possession of that quality by which it could justify its holding power and its making demands on and acting on behalf of the Yugoslav people. Indeed, the demands made were increasingly not acceded to, as republican governments and representatives withheld both contributions to the federal budget and agreement to legislation. At the same time, they began to question the actions made on their behalf by federal institutions and the rights of those institutions to do so.

In 1990, the transposition of legitimacy from federation to republic was de facto formalised in the holding, at republican level, of the first multi-party elections in Yugoslavia since before the war. These produced cohabitation in Slovenia between a former communist as president in Slovenia (Kučan) and coalition of former opposition parties (the fragile DEMOS) with a relatively weak parliamentary majority. In Croatia, centre-right parties ousted the communists decisively and the leader of the right wing Croat Democratic Community, Franjo Tudjman (a former partisan and general) was elected president and proved to be far more pragmatic than his highly nationalistic campaign rhetoric; the Croats were also responsible for appointing the first non-communist, Stjipe Mesić, to the Federal Presidency. Macedonia produced a
mixed result, with 120 seat parliament containing four sizeable blocs. An alliance of nationalist parties held 37 seats, reform communists, 30, a coalition if two pro-Albanian parties, 25, and a grouping of Young Democrats and Socialists, 18. However, the most prominent Macedonian politician remained its representative on the Federal Presidency, Vasil Tupurkovski.

In Bosnia, results were predominantly along nationalist lines. With Muslim Party for Democratic Action gaining 41 seats in the Chamber of Citizens, followed by 34 for the Serbian Democratic Party and 20 for Croatian Democratic Community (the Bosnian cousins of nationalist parties in Serbia and Croatia); lastly, the reform communists won 13 seats. The distribution of seats was proportional with the ethnic composition of the republic. The Bosnian elections were notable for securing the return to political life of Fikret Abidić, notorious in some parts of Yugoslavia for his part in the Agrokomerc financial scandal of the mid-1980s, but a hero in his own community. Abidić obtained the highest vote in polling for the collective Republican Presidency. In doing so, he finished ahead of his PDA colleague, Alija Izetbegović, who, nonetheless, subsequently became President. (Izetbegović was just one of a crop of seemingly highly able politicians in Bosnia). Finally, the delicate balance of political forces in the republic (and perhaps their maturity) could be measured in the outcome
in the Mostar municipal vote: the CDC gained a majority, but a Serb was chosen as municipal president.

In the remaining republics, Serbia and Montenegro, there were overwhelming successes for the pre-democratic forces. Milošević's not-so-reformist ex-communists won an easy victory against an Albanian electoral boycott and a Serbian opposition led by Vuk Drašković; and the Serbian Socialist Party leader was himself voted in on the first ballot as President of the Republic. His counterpart in Montenegro, Momir Bulatović, on the other hand only secured 40 per cent of first round votes and had to wait for a second ballot for the Republican Presidency. Meanwhile, his (still known as) League of Communists of Montenegro took 85 of the 125 places available in parliament at the first go.4

The process of legitimacy transfer was not complete, however, with Ante Marković's federal government generally retaining support throughout Yugoslavia (Serbia appeared, to some extent, to be an exception in this regard). That support reflected economic policy successes. But, inter-republican squabbles undermined his achievements and hampered their progress. At the centre of Yugoslavia's surviving its critical condition was the competition between federal and republican institutions, and between different republican authorities.
During the 1980s, legitimacy had been denuded at all levels. It therefore had to be restored at all levels — authorities, regime and community. Indeed, the most salient of the Yugoslav crises was the crisis of community. Questions of relegitimation concerned not only how Yugoslavia would organise its future but whether or not Yugoslavs would have a future together. The Slovene disconnection from the LCY, following declarations of its sovereign right to secede the previous Autumn, began speculation which lasted throughout the year, on the break-up of Yugoslavia. Apocalyptic prognostications abounded as Yugoslavia’s valiant attempt to make six plus two equal one came closer than ever to disaster.

In the course of 1990, four ideas could be identified a propos of the future for Yugoslavs. One of these was proposed by the President of the Federal Presidency, Borisav Jović, a Milošević ally. His proposal for a new federation appeared to have support from Serbia and the YPA. The basic points of his outline contained many features of the present federation. However, clauses on the role of federal institutions vis a vis republican indicated the intention to strengthen the former in relation to the latter. In particular, items such as the need for all republics to consent to changes in the borders of Yugoslavia and the "obligatory" nature of Federal documents and laws throughout the federation
whilst government on republican territories was to be nobody else's affair seemed to be designed to maximise central control.\(^5\) This proposal was wholly unacceptable to Slovences and Croatians who characterised it as 'unitarian' and 'bolshevik'.\(^6\) Indeed, to the Slovences, who were not prepared to remain part of a Yugoslavia built on the 1974 Constitution, promoting even greater central control appeared to be a move designed to precipitate the country's disintegration. Instead, they and the Croatians said that they would only stay part of a confederal Yugoslavia - and if could not be achieved, then, they would become independent (see below).

In other parts of Yugoslavia, response was split. Montenegrins favoured the Jović proposal. Bosnians preferred it, but would also accept a confederation of all the existing republics (one suggestion of a Yugoslavia comprised of federal and confederal elements was strongly dismissed in Bosnia).\(^7\) Macedonians, in the guise of its old communist leadership, began by supporting the federal option, but by the time of the elections in that republic, in November, virtually all parties' programmes favoured confederation. The Albanians in Kosovo were more in tune with the confederalists, but their position was complicated by the desire for a confederation which would include republican status for Kosovo. A confederal arrangement, otherwise, would leave them, even more at the
mercy of Serbian repression. When Serbia closed the provincial parliament, its Albanian members stood on its steps and declared Kosovan sovereignty. This action was a symbolic gesture; Kosovo remained under firm Serbian dominion.

The Jović proposal was not liked in most parts of Yugoslavia. Above all, there was no possibility of its being accepted by the Slovenes (aside from its message, the messenger’s association with Milošević and ‘Serbian unitarism’ left little possibility of the proposal’s being well-received). They would not remain part of such a Yugoslavia. They promulgated the idea of a confederal Yugoslavia of sovereign states. Kučan and Tudjman jointly presented a confederal model. Kučan’s republic would only continue to be a part of Yugoslavia on the basis of the principles inherent in that model. For the Croatians and, in particular, for the Slovenes, the question of ‘how to be?’ became less of a question than ‘to be or not to be?’

The Kučan-Tudjman axis produced a discussion document, based largely on European Community (EC) arrangements, which presented options for degrees of confederation. The independence of sovereign states would be the only fixed point, everything else would be a question of voluntarily (the voluntaristic nature of confederation was stressed)
giving up areas of sovereignty and transfer of certain responsibilities to confederal bodies.

Confederal Yugoslavia would be based, according to the proposal, on international principles, values and laws recognising human and property rights, market economies, parliamentary democracy and the right to secede from the federation and the possibility of being expelled from it if confederal courts consistently found a member to be breaching its obligations. Its essential characteristics would be monetary union (as distinct from a single currency), a single market and harmonised infrastructural elements, such as communications networks, separate but co-ordinated armed forces, with the possibility of permanent joint forces (particularly air forces), and separate subjects of international law - and, therefore, foreign relations, although, for certain matters, common or joint diplomatic action would be possible. Its chief institutional features were envisaged to be a Council of Ministers, an Executive Commission, a consultative Parliament and a Confederal Court (all along EC lines); in addition, other bodies, for example, a Development Bank - or even a Central Bank - might be created.

Among politicians and in the press, the proposal met with the mixed response which could have been expected: Slovenia and Croatia were for it, the Federal President,
the generals, Serbia and Montenegro were against it, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia were somewhere in between, with the former leaning towards federation and the latter more interested in confederation. According to a poll published in *Borba*, confederation was supported in each republic by the following percentages: Bosnia-Hercegovina, 12; Croatia, 43; Macedonia, 9; Montenegro, 4; Serbia, 9; Slovenia 49. However, these figures were achieved with a sample of only 70 people in each republic, making their reliability low. Indeed, a radically different result of opinion polling in Slovenia showed around 80 per cent of its population supporting confederation or independence.\[10\]

In truth, the confederalists were offering something likely to be transient. The transitional nature of confederations was recognised on both sides of the debate. The question was: transitional to what? For the anti-confederal pessimists at *Večernje Novosti* (Belgrade), the evidence that, in the past, confederations had not lasted meant that promoters of confederalism were "continuing to bury Yugoslavia with their proposal". This view of transition was supported by *Dnevnik* in Novi Sad which thought the confederal model to be "most probably simply a way of breaking up Yugoslavia."\[11\]
The view of confederation as merely a way to break up Yugoslavia in a gentler, slower, more orderly manner was counter to the hopeful statements of one of its authors. Speaking on RTV LJ, Kučan maintained, like Večernje Novosti, that throughout history, confederal models had only provided transitional solutions. However, for him the proposed model offered opportunity for coexistence and further integration. At the same time, though, he also declared pessimistically that the Serbian authorities were trying to compel Slovenia to secede as soon as possible. He defended the 'Crovene' confederal concept, saying that it was not tabled under the supposition that it would be acceptable to all, but was based on the idea that it "ought to be acceptable for us and our interests", which interests were "no longer ideological". Kučan emphasised his optimism by detecting signs of a mood in favour of confederation emerging in all republics.12

Whereas the confederalists identified federation with the old system of Serb-dominated centralism, federalists understood it as the only sense in which Yugoslavia could continue to exist. Conversely, for the federalists, confederation was code for breaking up Yugoslavia, to the confederalists, it could be seen as a way to enable Yugoslavs to remain together. In other words, the authors of the confederalist proposal (as shown in the thirty seven alternatives suggested in the document) were looking
for an arrangement which would not be against their interests. They were looking for an arrangement which would recognise their interests and at the same time avoid the dissolution of Yugoslavia; the accommodation of those interests within a confederated Yugoslavia was preferable to their protection outside it.

The confederal model had the virtue of attempting to render the de facto situation one which was de jure. Slovenia was going to become an independent sovereign state. The only question to be asked was if this new status would be established within or without a Yugoslav commonwealth. For all their preference for a continuation of Yugoslavia, Slovenes would not remain part of a non-confederal Yugoslavia: federation was unacceptable.

Relegitimation (III): The Viability of Independent States
- or Breaking Up is Hard to Do

A question remained over Slovenia’s ability to become independent. However, two things were to its advantage: the degree of ethnic homogeneity in the population and the relatively autonomous nature of its economy, geared towards international markets and obtaining only around one per cent of raw materials from the pan-Yugoslav market
otherwise these were found locally in the republic, or purchased on international markets. One study distinguished the approximate autarky of the Slovene economy from the more or less dependent one in Vojvodina, although both were prosperous by Yugoslav standards. The study of official federal statistics on internal trade showed that throughout the thirty years it covered, the Slovene economy had, to a very large extent, operated apart from the rest of Yugoslavia.

The large share of Yugoslav export earnings emerging from Slovenia was not even, as was commonly supposed, dependent on the Yugoslav market for cheap raw materials with which to manufacture the goods it sold abroad. Only 1.6 per cent of Slovenia's raw materials were imported from other parts of Yugoslavia. Indeed, the (non-Slovene) Yugoslav market accounted for only 14.8 per cent of total purchases and 21.2 per cent of sales. 80-85 per cent of the Slovene economy was apparently independent of the all Yugoslav market.

Nonetheless, it was clear that secession would add further economic hardships to those produced by economic reform, such as closure and unemployment. The Serb trade boycott of Slovene goods, for example, was reported to have adversely affected one per cent of Slovene GDP; Serbia proper was the destination of under 6 per cent of Slovene
manufactured goods and its province of Vojvodina accounted for another 2 per cent. However, it was not unreasonable to suppose that, in considerable measure, Slovenia's trade with other parts of Yugoslavia would remain largely intact—everybody would continue to do business through necessity and convenience. A more difficult economic problem to be considered in the event of a break-up was Yugoslavia's debt: who was responsible for what share of the $16 billion owed?

If complete independence was viable, albeit at a price for, Slovenia, then it was impracticable for the Croats and others who would be independent but could only become so with the peaceful agreement concomitant with confederation. Most parts of the country were too poor seriously to consider moves to independence. Moreover, even Croatia, easily second to Slovenia in the republican wealth stakes, was too tied to the other parts of Yugoslavia for its economic well-being. Yet, even if the necessity and convenience which could be hoped to soften the dents in an independent Slovenia's economy were to overcome reliance on raw materials from Bosnia (for example), Croatia's ethnic divisions would cause headaches.

Signals of what could be expected were in full evidence in the Autumn of 1990 when parts of Croatia occupied by
ethnic Serbs became no-go areas for the Croatian security forces, as armed mobs barricaded roads and held an unofficial referendum on autonomy.\textsuperscript{17} It appeared to be inconceivable that Croatia could split from the federation without precipitating a war between Croats and the Serbs living on the republic's territory - and, most probably, those living in Serbia proper. These fears were aggravated by Serbian political leadership declarations that it would pursue political autonomy for the Serbs in Croatia if a confederation came into being and that it would seek to 'unify' Serbia if the Croats attempted to become independent.\textsuperscript{18}

Widespread ethnic interpenetration in Yugoslavia meant that blurred boundaries and large minorities could be found everywhere. Apart from Slovenia, the only political division of the federation with over ninety percent of its population being of one ethnic group was Kosovo - which remained an Autonomous Province only in word, all its authority finally removed by amendments to the Serbian Constitution re-integrating both autonomous provinces and 'making Serbia whole again'. The federal authorities more or less washed their hands of the affair, acquiescing in the constitutional changes and backing repressive measures against protest by deploying YPA units in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{19}
Political leaders in the more liberal republics complained and withdrew their national contingents from the federal security forces in the province, which moves were followed by the withdrawal of all federal forces.\textsuperscript{20} This and a federal decision to drop eighteen month old proceedings against erstwhile leader of the LC Kosovo, Azem Vllasi, who was being tried on wholly spurious charges indicated a federal policy shift \textit{vis a vis} Kosovo.\textsuperscript{21} That development probably owed to the democratic changes afoot in some parts of the country and the prospering of more liberal leaderships, on the one hand, and to international pressures, on the other. Both the federal government and the remaining republics wanted to demonstrate to the international bodies which had given so much criticism of the situation in Kosovo, that it was all the responsibility of the Serbs. Whilst, for the far greater part, this was true, the complicity of other Yugoslavs up to that point, could not be denied. In addition, one effect of this policy was to leave the Kosovan Albanians entirely to the mercy of Serbia’s interior forces.

Ethnic Albanians in neighbouring Macedonia got little better treatment. Similar policies to those found in Kosovo were followed by the Macedonian authorities—political trials, dismissals, ‘differentiation’, restrictions on Albanian activities and the types of business they could go into and forceful suppression of
pro-Albanian demonstrations. As the elections in the republic approached towards the end of 1990, the leader of one pro-Albanian party, the People's Democratic Party, noted that they were, at least, better off than their counterparts in Serbia, however; they had been permitted to compete freely in the elections and there had not been killings and arrests.22

Things were at once more complicated yet easier in Bosnia. The complication arose from the diverse nature of the population there – 40 per cent Muslim, 32 per cent Serbs and 18 per cent Croats. Life was a little less threatening, however, because the inhabitants of this Yugoslav crossroads community seemed better able to get along with each other, despite the shadow cast from other republics. This was shown in the wake of the elections held in November 1990, when nationalist parties were successful in almost exact proportion to the size of the ethnic community for which they stood. Immediately the elections were over, the three party leaderships began to form a united front coalition.23 Bosnian political behaviour seemed to imply, in spite of ethnic divisions, a curious, contingent, non-concrete, nebulous, unlabelled Bosnian identity. That identity, rather than being stated, emerged in characteristics such as communication and cooperation.
Yet the claims of those other republics with regard to Bosnia caused some unease. The communist leadership had earlier begun to abandon its support for Milošević in the LCY when it was found that Serbia’s interior forces were, contrary to constitutions, active in the Bosnian republic. The notions of independence and confederation presented dangers to the Bosnians in that the republic might become subject to irredentist claims from other republics. The prospect of a Serbo-Croat conflict elsewhere spilling over into Bosnia could not be ignored.

The Bosnian attitude to the federalist-confederalist debate reflected its delicate position between Serbs and Croats. In declaring itself for either option provided all constituents remained part of Yugoslavia, the Bosnian leadership avoided offending either side, whilst advancing its own prime interest in preserving some sort of Yugoslavia. In so far as it had a preference for federation over confederation, this was an expression of its desire to encounter the least trouble - and the spectre of irredentism if confederation were to be chosen would make trouble more likely than an arrangement in which all the Yugoslav parts remained a whole, thereby obviating discussion of who and what belonged in which state.
During 1990, the biggest factor impeding confederal prospects was Serbia. The Serbian Republic pursued a *contre tout azimuts* policy, antagonising virtually all other sections of Yugoslavia. The conflicts with Albanians, Croats and Slovenes have received attention above, so too have irredentist claims on Bosnia and interference in that republic's internal affairs. In addition, Macedonia was thought of as Southern Serbia, creating unease there. Indeed, only Montenegro failed to be at odds with Serbia. Having antagonised so many people outside Serbia, the idea gained currency in that republic that 'everyone' was against the Serbs - which idea was extended to the World community as criticisms of the Serbian regime and its repressive policy and human rights abuses in Kosovo came from international bodies and foreign governments. For the Serbs confederation appeared not only to be something which undermined Belgrade's influence, but a manifestation of the way in which they were being victimised by the rest of Yugoslavia and the world. Perhaps as much as Slovenes would not accept anything labelled 'federation' because of associations with Serbian hegemony, 'confederal' labels were interpreted as 'anti-Serb' in Serbia (which interpretation was without doubt partially true some of the time).
One more factor obstructing the formation of independent states - whether or not in a confederation - was defence. Restructuring armed forces would present problems - all the more so in face of YPA opposition to such moves. Although the confederalist document addressed the formation of armies in each republic and the utility of some joint forces, there remained other defence system ties, notably, the Yugoslavia-wide arms and technology industries covered by the ministry of defence, which were responsible for $2 billion export trade. The redistribution of YPA resources would provoke major headaches.

The desire to establish common elements of defence was, in effect, recognition of the vulnerability of small states. Not even an independent Slovenia could sustain a full and effective defence force and continue its relatively prosperous life, unless security could be guaranteed. Other republics would have even smaller resources to devote to defence. Moreover, the definition of common security requirements would ease the most dangerous threats faced by any of the Yugoslav republics - actions by their neighbours: it is often better to have a potential enemy on your own side and know what that enemy is doing.
Perhaps the following Yugoslav paradox was emerging as central to the country's future: independence was only likely to be prosperous and successful if the harmonious relations necessary to the construction of a confederation were possible, yet the existence of such harmony would to a large extent obviate the perceived need for independence. Whether the relationship between the republics of Tito's Yugoslavia was to be characterised by federation, confederation or complete separation, the baseline was that tolerance and respect of not only other republics, but national minorities within republics was the only beneficial way forward.

The old Titoist bases of legitimacy had ceded ideological dominion to a variety of nationalisms. These became the foundation of relegitimation, first, for the republican communist parties, and, later, for the majority of parties contesting the democratic elections of 1990. Those elections confirmed the dissipatory tendencies of the previous thirty years in Yugoslavia.

The difficulty, however, with nationalism is its nature. Consciousness of a common identity - usually a blend of ethnic, linguistic and territorial features - is the essence of nationalism. The trouble is that whereas ethnicity provides strategic bonding, it offers little at local level. (At its most extreme, 'strategic', from the
Greek *strategos*, meaning *general*, is the most correct expression of this kind of bonding as it involves defining one's own community *vis a vis* others which are potential enemies against whom wars might be fought; this, of course, is not to say that all nations must go to war with each other.) It is one thing to be motivated to distinguish one's political community from another, something else to deal effectively with good management of political life.

Nationalism, rather like confederation, has limited durability as a mobilising force. Its strength lies in motivating during a period of change. The partial nature of legitimation provided by consciousness of ethnic identity as a policy platform was reflected in the fact that all the parties in the various elections during 1990 espoused concepts such as democracy, independence, civil society and human rights. There was more to politics than nationalism.

Inherent in the political and philosophical tradition of the concepts promoted from most points of the political spectrum in Yugoslavia was the tolerance necessary to democratic politics. Something akin to the system of accommodation of human fallibility and fractiousness Madison described in the *Federalist Papers*,\(^27\) was now being sought by most Yugoslavs (in principle, at least).
Not always evident in that Yugoslav search was the promulgation of policies and undertaking of practical measures to deal with the status of national minorities in ways consistent with the ideas proclaimed.

The gulf between Serbia and the Western republics concerned the idea of 'civil society'. Whereas Milošević and his cronies could be brought to realise that multi-party elections were inevitable, notions of civil society did not appear to be taken to heart. The transfer of power from party to state had to be accompanied by the values of the civil society if the rechtstaat were to replace rule by arbitrary central authority. Moreover, even where the values of civil society seemed earnestly to be espoused, there was room for worry. One example of this was the crass initial handling by the newly elected nationalist authorities in Croatia of the republic's large ethnic-Serb minority.²⁸

The essence of civil society, whether in its old sense as non-authoritarian society, or in the sense developed in places such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Slovenia in the 1980s of non-political society (wherein political referred to anything to do with communist rule), is found in the concepts of citizenship and communication.²⁹ The big problem with nationalism, in the long term, is that political identity is equated with ethnic identity;
another problem is that language functions more as an aspect of identity than as an instrument of understanding.

It was evident that language and education policies would have to be better calibrated to the needs of national minorities than was sometimes previously the case. The crux of this was the need to distinguish between national or ethnic identity and citizenship status. For example, it had to be possible to be both a citizen of the Republic of Slovenia and a Muslim, or a Serb, or an Albanian; likewise, an ethnic Hungarian or Albanian would have to have rights as a citizen of the Republic of Serbia — and so on for all the nationalities in all the republics. Therefore, whilst within a republic, there might be an official language of the majority group, but linguistic proficiency could be allowed to become a prerequisite for citizenship (as was suggested by some Slovenes and Macedonians).

In short, the same conditions existed for the Yugoslav republics to be successful either together, apart, or somewhere in between the two. The establishment of democratic practices and the pursuit of the humanitarian values contained in the documents referred to in the Kučan-Tudjman proposal for confederation (such as the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights) were those essential to renewal and health in any future arrangement of the
Yugoslavs. Adherence to those principles, particularly, demonstrations of tolerance and the granting of rights to minorities in sovereign republics inhabited by citizens was the best way to neutralise the impact of those, such as Milošević, who were taking the nation, wheresoever it was to be found, as sovereign.

By regarding the nation, rather than political-territorial communities as sovereign, Milošević claimed the right to speak for Serbs in other republics, to make appeals to them and to make Serbian communities part of Serbia should the federation cease; by removing any grounds for grievance, authorities in other republics, particularly Croatia, could defuse the potency of Milošević's calls. Similarly, it could be argued, Serbia itself, could only have truly improved prospects once new policies addressing the real need for reform were adopted. In the meantime, the opportunity for a break with the past - which would have offered the prospect of policies of economic re-orientation and the chance for improved relations with other republics, even with ardent nationalists opposing the Serbian President and his party - was missed when Milosevic was elected on a policy of Serbianism. Whilst nationalism provided a partial and transitional basis for relegitimization, other features were required - and this would be increasingly so. Future well-being and durable
relegitimation lay in the establishment of a new political regime the core of which was Western-style democracy.

Curiously, most parties in most republics had broadly similar election programmes, except with regard to nationalist issues. All these shared support for democratic and humanitarian values and practices, for membership of the European Community and the economic reform policy of federal Prime Minister, Ante Marković. In Slovenia in April, this was the case, as it was later in Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. Only in Serbia and Montenegro was this pattern not consistent; yet, even in Serbia, the opposition parties were broadly in line with this trend and Milošević paid lip-service to much of it.

Relegitimation (IV): The Marković Option

It was a paradoxical feature of Yugoslav politics that throughout a year of declarations of sovereignty and consolidation of republican rule, most parties in all parts of the country supported the economic programme of the President of the FEC, Ante Marković. Equally surprising was the extent of the Prime Minister’s
popularity. Marković’s popularity was high, despite his administering harsh economic medicine.

In the first half of 1990, support for Marković as Prime Minister was extremely high, giving a degree of relegitimation at the level of the authorities. Support for Marković assisted the shift from party to state governance, a prerequisite for regime legitimation, which process was further aided by the Prime Minister’s policy successes in the economic sphere. Marković and his government gained credibility and a measure of social and political capital by meeting their self-set demands.

At the end of 1989, Marković revealed a radical reform plan to tackle inflation which was running at 2600 per cent per annum. The central feature of the reform was monetary control. A dinar devaluation gave one new for ten thousand old and made that new one convertible by tying it to the Deutschemark. In addition black market pressure was taken away by allowing Yugoslavs freely to exchange Dinars for hard currency. Finally, perhaps most importantly, wages would be held for six months; at the same time, price restrictions were removed from 85 per cent of commodities, leaving only certain raw materials and essential utilities under control. Alongside the basic monetary policy went the continuing promotion of market criteria, independence of enterprises, equal status of all
forms of ownership (essentially, this meant privatisation) and a profit consciousness.

Marković's accomplishment in merely getting the reforms passed was not small. Only after the Federal Presidency had acceded to the Prime Minister's request for a declaration of support were six of the new laws adopted as temporary measures. Moreover, particulars of the plan received criticism during debate in republican assemblies; those criticisms were then transposed the debate in the Federal Assembly. The programme's most ardent opponents were found in Serbia where it was argued that its adverse effects would be greatest, further devastating Yugoslavia's poorest regions. Serbian opposition was, however, thought to stem most of all from Milošević's desire to ruin Marković. As the very poorest parts of the country - Montenegro, Macedonia and the then still autonomous Kosovo - all voted in favour of the reform because it, at least, held the prospect of a way out of economic crisis.

Performance of the Marković programme in its first six months was dramatically impressive. The month-on-month inflation rate fell: 65 per cent in December; 46 per cent mid-January; 17 per cent in late-January; 8.4 percent at the end of February; in June, it dropped below 0 per cent. At the same time hard currency reserves rose to 7.1
billion USD at the end of February - twice its May 1989 level. Moreover, the country's debt fell to 16 billion USD. Where the policies were most thoroughly implemented, in Slovenia, there began a spate of liquidations; in one week, 230 firms in the republic had their bank accounts stopped and were heading for the 60-day limit on illiquidity at which point bankruptcy would become automatic if payments still failed to be made. Elsewhere, the reforms were practised with various lesser degrees of commitment. In Serbia, there were flagrant breaches of the wage freeze which led to Serbian average income equalling that in Slovenia, despite no increase in productivity. Marković's FEC ordered all excessive payments to be returned over a three month period from March.

The trend towards a looser federation increased with the Slovene split from the LCS and the democratic elections held during the spring, whilst, paradoxically, opening up a greater role for the federal government of Ante Marković. By completing the shift from party to state governance, the Slovenes apparently enhanced Ante Marković's chances of bringing Yugoslavia back from the brink. Indeed, in the first months of 1990, Prime Minister Marković's federal government appeared to be becoming the most important element in the Yugoslav political system.
The enactment of a well designed reform package for the economy, the government's acting as the authority (rather than the party or the presidency) for making executive decisions a propos of matters such as the troubles in Kosovo and Marković's attempts to act as peacemaker between Slovenia and Serbia in February,\(^{35}\) pointed to a shift towards democratic government and recognition of the LCY's terminal condition. Marković's standing also owed something to his not being part of the inter-nationality squabbling all around the country. It was this squabbling, however, which most undermined his prospects for outright success.

The second half of 1990 favoured Marković much less than the first. Further reforms and constitutional amendments were blocked by republican noncooperation. Serbia, again seemed to be the major culprit; but both Slovenia and Croatia refused to assent to essential measures and withheld federal contributions, ostensibly in protest at Serbia's suppression of Kosovan autonomy - although this may be regarded as a pretext.\(^{36}\) Reform of the banking system proved difficult to effectuate in many areas.\(^{37}\) Once the wage freeze ended on 30 June, the pressures which had been building up during the previous two months were released. Further, inflation quickly began to climb again. Unemployment was also on the rise.\(^{38}\) All economic difficulties were exaggerated by international action
against Iraq which had broad ramifications for Yugoslavia. Up to 10 000 Yugoslavs were employed in Iraq and a further 50 000 in Yugoslavia itself working on contracts with Iraq. The overall cost to Yugoslavia ran into several billions of dollars.39

Marković's popularity across the country remained extremely high, reaching up to 79 per cent in pan-Yugoslav opinion polling.40 However, he was unable to convert this personal support into political capital, in spite of spearheading a political movement, the Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia (ARFY). Launched on July 29 in Bosnia where, because of the ethnic mix, he was sure of a good reception, the idea behind the ARFY was to provide an umbrella to shelter individuals and parties from all parts of the country interested in economic reform and a future in which Yugoslavs would live together, not tear themselves apart. It was not formally a party.

However, Marković's popularity notwithstanding, the ARFY fared poorly in the later republican elections where it fielded candidates (it was, of course, formed after the April elections in Slovenia and Croatia - but there is no reason to suppose that it would have been more successful there, given the votes in both cases along national lines). In Macedonia and Bosnia, the ARFY gained some promising results, but was left far behind the nationalist
parties. In Montenegro and Serbia, it made next to no headway.41

Markovic was therefore in a curious position: clearly successful and, it seemed popular, he was unable to confirm this electorally. As federal elections which should have been held before the end of the year were not, Marković did not have to subject his government to electoral vetting, the result of which could not confidently have been predicted to be favourable, in the light of the way the electoral cookie crumbled along nationalist lines in the republics. Therefore, there was some benefit for him in the delay. Marković remained in a position to continue his policy battle against the odds, although, particularly when the odds against included apparent acts of economic guerrilla warfare by Serbia, that position was always (and increasingly) vulnerable.

Without doubt, Marković represented the best, if not the only, real chance of federal relegitimation when legitimacy lay to such an extent with republican regimes. In the confederal-federal debate, Marković was fairly agnostic: for him it did not matter so much whether Yugoslavia was to be labelled federal or confederal, so long as it remained one entity with a single market and currency, and followed the reform programme. In effect, this had to mean something closer to the federal option
than its challenger. Marković expressed this. However, what it meant most of all was his opposition to dismemberment.

The absence of federal elections allowed Marković to persist with his government. This state of limbo - or grace - would continue until arrangements for such elections were made. There seemed little prospect of an early conclusion as the electoral laws would have to be agreed by the various republican leaderships as acceptable to all. It was not easy to envisage this as rapidly achievable because of the deep inter-republican schisms. Marković could not be said to be facing an easy prospect, but he was in a position to guide Yugoslavia which would probably have been denied to him had federal voting taken place.

Markovic was not being offered a clear run. Without support from the republics, his limbo-leadership would be inoperable. Although the absence of a democratic mandate was considered by some to be a factor which would gradually undermine his leadership after parliamentary elections had been held in all the republics, this did not necessarily have to be the case. As long as his own popularity remained buoyant and republican behaviour did not completely torpedo his policies, his government could continue. It would do on the basis of limited (somewhat
negative) legitimation through non-destruction and some degree of support and compliance from the republics which had the power to ruin his economic programme.

It is notable that amid the fog of relegitimation, the passing of so much authority to the republics creating a de facto confederation, the basis of authority was representation of perceived national interests - which in practice merely meant national identity - in most cases, economic policies of the new nationalist parties coming to power were pro-Marković. That is, either similar policies were advocated, or the policy itself was 'support for the reforms'. Even Milošević's newly named Serbian Socialist Party professed the economic reform as its policy, although practice belied this often. Moreover, the various nationalist parties also shared Marković's adherence to the institution of democratic procedures and the aim of gaining membership of the European Community (EC).

Shared policy orientation did not mean complete harmonisation. Each republican government and each party would have points at which its particular interest would mean non-conformity. Each instance of this phenomenon would weaken Marković's chances of success. But in the absence of wholesale disruption, the government and its policies could muddle along, continuing to achieve limited progress. The longer the period in which federal elections
were not held the greater Marković’s room for manoeuvre would grow it seemed and the more likely Yugoslavia would hold together.

It is possible to see the behaviour of a large family growing up in all this. Whilst the various adolescents attempt establish their emerging personalities, some by screaming, shouting and declaring that they are going to leave home, others by demonstrating their insecurities and wanting to hold onto the apron strings, the parents, tried and tested at every point, get on with life, trying to keep the family together, diligently getting on with the serious business of paying the bills and securing the family’s income for the future. With the republican authorities ‘acting out’ as immature teenagers, it is easy to discern in Ante Marković the diligent parent figure doing the hard work.

The lack of any serious alternative economic policy and the shared orientation on democracy and EC membership meant that, in reality, there was a limited federal consensus underpinning Marković’s government, albeit one which could only be perceived through a glass darkly. Like atomic structure, not being readily observable did not mean it did not exist. Perhaps central in this consensus was the common desire for entry into Europe.
'Europe now!' had been the rallying cry in Slovenia in the period before the elections. The confederal model, proposed jointly by Croatia and Slovenia, took the EC as its frame of reference. Everyone in Yugoslavia was persuaded of the virtue of the European option (Serbia included, although the authorities there did not appear committed enough to end the much criticised human rights practices in Kosovo, above all the suppression of its parliament). Moreover, the basic conditions for EC membership seemed to correspond with those on which a viable Yugoslavia would have to be based. "We sincerely hope that Yugoslavia will solve all of its political problems by 1992 and that it will be able to enter the Europe of 1992, said the managing director of one large Belgrade firm, addressing this question.43

The European Community and the idea of a 'new' Europe had a large role to play. (This applies to other democratising former communist regimes.) A summary comparison of the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe suggests that an external carrot is instrumental in assuring stability and the survival of the newly sprung democracy, enabling it to take root. Whereas attempts to establish democracy in Latin America tended to revert to authoritarianism, the experience of Portugal, Spain and Greece was more positive. A major difference between the two cases is the
presence of the outside carrot: all three Southern European countries were encouraged to develop in democratic directions by the promise of accession to the European Community, with the attendant benefits of its vast market, once their shifts to democracy had been confirmed.

The European Community clearly was in a position to play such a role with regard to Yugoslavia. The country was most likely to survive and prosper—and, therefore, re-establish a legitimate political system—if it met the requirements of EC membership: continuation of the single state, market economy, multiple-party electoral systems and legally codified human rights guarantees. Given the desire of virtually all strands of Yugoslav society to join the EC, the promise of EC membership was a decisive factor likely to keep Yugoslavia together and develop the concomitant features mentioned. Developments such as the Pentagonale initiative, involving Yugoslavia with Italy, Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia enhanced this: here was a forum through which accession to the EC could be facilitated for the four non-members. (On the other hand, the Italian and Austrian foreign ministers were first to acknowledge the possibility of recognising independent Yugoslav states.)
There were many reasons inhibiting a parting of Yugoslav ways. In a curious manner, whilst republics became increasingly autonomous, the real limitations on full independence became clearer. Confederation to a large extent could be seen as confirming what, in fact, existed. Nonetheless, it was by no means inconceivable that separation would happen. Slovenia, at least, was capable of achieving this and ever more likely to do so, it appeared. At the end of 1990, following the comfortable return of Milošević in the Serbian elections, a plebiscite on independence in Slovenia found in excess of 90 per cent support for independence in the absence of agreement on confederation.

At the end of the year, the chances of a stable, joint future for Yugoslavs appeared evenly balanced. The Economist Intelligence Unit wished to avoid gloom, but found that "the present balance of political forces in Serbia" made it hard to put the chances for Yugoslavia at more than "50:50". The Marković government's continuing to have some success and its policy orientation towards 'Europeanisation, not Balkanisation', added to the structural impediments to dissolution, were foundations upon which to rebuild Yugoslavia. However, these foundations were reliant on the good will of the republics. Should any republic sabotage the Marković option, particularly by rejecting the European direction,
then Yugoslavia would almost certainly succumb to its divisions.

In some ways, it was possible to discern two phenomena: a Yugoslavia which continued to operate under the federal leadership of Ante Marković; and a set of independent republics (‘states’, as they were increasingly dubbed), functioning on a different plane, as though Marković and the federation did not exist most of the time. We can conceive of federal and republican governments as parallel universes. This seemingly unreal situation could continue as long as necessary so long as there was no decisive intervention, either from federal or republican actors. One actor, in particular, had an important role in this situation: the YPA. Once again its actions could be telling for a fissiparous Yugoslavia.
CHAPTER 8

THE DELEGITIMATING ARMY AND RELEGITIMATION: CONCLUSION

It is notable that in the Autumn of 1990, Narodna Armija was carrying articles on themes such as integration in Europe as a priority of foreign policy, integrity of the country as necessary condition for European acceptance and a factor in European stability, and humanitarian practice in the armed forces. Even if there was a hint of an old vocabulary merely being replaced with a new one, of new formulations being adopted which corresponded closest with the old ideas of unified, federal Yugoslavia, the reality was that those new 'values' were the ones which could provide the secure foundation of a third Yugoslavia.

However, despite signs of support for the European idea, the generals were not otherwise doing much to help Marković, even though he was clearly providing the most serious prospect of Yugoslavia remaining one, something
cardinal for them. Despite the persistent bickering between Slovenia and Serbia, and between the latter and most of the other republics, Marković’s federal government was, with regard to the economy, at least, the strongest since the days when Tito was still holding the reins of power. In the middle of fissive chaos, federal government was pursuing its business to reasonably good effect, given the fragile circumstances. The case for a federal option would have been yet stronger if Marković’s efforts had benefited from YPA approval. Instead, the military seemed to be doing he opposite.

Relegitimation and the Military

Relations between defence minister Kadijević and Marković were cool. Kadijević was reported to be a rare attender at FEC sessions. Moreover, it was suggested the Prime Minister and his Defence Minister disagreed on a number of issues - or at least would have done had they discussed them in cabinet. These included freezing certain military programmes, notably the supersonic fighter project, enforcing call-up in Slovenia, territorial defence armaments, army tanks, painted in the blue of the Serbian interior forces, operational in Kosovo, the intervention of Mig 23s and military helicopters in Croatia, provision
of a guard of honour to Milošević and, the central issue with regard to a democratic future for Yugoslavia, depoliticisation of the military.²

There was speculation that the generals were planning a coup.³ Military behaviour provided some basis for such rumours, although it could not be denied that the Croatian and Slovenian authorities were the chief beneficiaries of them: the positing of such a threat was a sure way of rallying support. In reality, here remained little chance of the YPA seizing power. Its political legitimacy was weaker now than ever vis-à-vis the republics which troubled it most in the North-West. It could threaten intervention and rattle sabres; but these only harmed its case. To take action would have been to obviate any chance for a united Yugoslavia, the generals' primary objective. This was rammed home by the (legally questionable) import of arms from Austria and Hungary by the new republican defence secretaries in Slovenia and Croatia: armed intervention would mean wars of independence.⁴

The import of arms began following two events in Slovenia. One was the transfer of some heavy arms to new locations. This was interpreted as removing equipment from control by republican territorial defence authorities. However, this was a misinterpretation as the armaments in question belonged to the YPA.⁵ The other was the occupation of the
Slovene Defence Ministry building by military police. However, they met no resistance and were said to have occupied an empty building, Jansa and his team having had warning and moved out; they opened for business again a few days later in a new home. The Slovenes responded to these events by ensuring that if it came to pass, they would have the means to fight for their independence.

Military conduct in the North-Western republics undermined the efforts of Marković and others to preserve a federation, despite the army’s frequent declarations in favour of preserving Yugoslav unity. Putative support for Marković was further weakened in November by the formation of a revamped communist party, the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia (LC-MY).

The new party was formed with the support of Kadijević and Brovet, plus retired generals such as Mamula, Bunčić, Mirković and Gračanin, who was Federal Interior Minister; in addition, old stalwarts of the LCY were involved, such as Stipe Šuvar, Raif Dizdarević, Lazar Mojsov and Milan Pančevski. The new party’s purpose was to prevent the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and stem the anti-communist revolution. Although not theoretically inimical to Marković’s ARFY because of that body’s character as an umbrella for everyone wanting to preserve Yugoslavia through reform,
neither was it a boost to the Marković project. Indeed, because it highlighted the military’s political profile, it ran contrary to his attempts to institute a rechtstaat as a key element in the institutionalisation of the legal state would be the depoliticisation (or ‘decommunisation’) of the military.

The major issue confronting both the YPA and its civilian counterparts was depoliticisation. The YPA’s professed aim of encouraging a unified future for Yugoslavs would have been best served by depoliticisation and withdrawal from political prominence. The implementation of such a policy was clearly the best way to lend support to Marković in his attempts to preserve Yugoslavia and generate regime relegitimation. In effect, this meant that regime relegitimation was, in part, a function of military relegitimation; of course, this was reciprocal. Therefore, the military role in politics was crucial to the future development of Yugoslavia.

Depoliticisation of the military was an enormous challenge facing both civilians and soldiers. If Yugoslavia were to develop as a multi-party system, then the generals would have to learn to live without a governmental role. Previously, their political role was founded in the association, both traditional and formal, with the LCY. These were communist generals, operating as party members
in a party-army organisation. Their position would necessarily have to change as the political topography shifted. The traditional association with the communist party could not realistically sustain a continuing political life: as communism dwindled, there would be little role for either communists or soldiers in government (and room would be even harder to find for communist soldiers).

An obvious corollary of this was for a civilian to become minister of defence. Unless another communist regime emerged (republican election returns suggested this to be highly unlikely), a new democratic government would end the appointment of serving officers as Secretary for Defence. As in liberal-democratic states elsewhere, the military would have to become completely subservient to political will. Where political authority changes periodically between the representatives of one set of values and those of another set, the military serving political masters cannot be overtly partial (although it would of course, as is always the case, have its own preferences): military professionalism dictates serving political overlords equally.9

From this point of view, the formation of a new communist party around a core of generals was not likely to be beneficial to either the military or the Yugoslav cause.
Indeed, even in the short term, it was difficult to see what benefit this move could bring; in the long term, it was unlikely to have any whatsoever. It was perhaps a fairly desperate act of generals with problems coming to terms with change and clinging to the past. The army, as was shown in Chapter 4, shared roots with the party. A creation of the communist movement, it was experiencing difficulty in adjusting to the post-communist world.

The YPA’s political role in the past had been founded in its relationship with the communist party. This had been central in its legitimacy as a political actor. As was argued earlier, that legitimacy was limited to acting in concord with another legitimate force within the political system - in reality, this meant within the party. In alliance with Tito, the army had been able to intervene decisively in Croatia in the early 1970s. In the absence of such an ally and with persistent erosion of its bases of legitimacy, the military in the 1980s was unable to perform the same role. In the absence of a ruling party within which the military’s political involvement was legitimised, its political participation was now restricted to the defence minister’s ex officio presence in the collective Federal Presidency. Therefore, the existence of a new communist party was of little relevance in the YPA’s attempt to maintain its political prominence.
It was argued in previous chapters that a telling military intervention relied on military legitimacy becoming allied to another part of the political constellation. Any military intervention would have to have a sociopolitical base. It emerged during 1990 that sympathies within the military were towards Serbian causes. Even if, as in previous years, Kadijevic was not an unreserved Milošević supporter, he was surrounded by some who were. Moreover, there appeared to be a legitimacy crisis forming at the middle and junior rank level where the 70 per cent Serb composition of the 60,000 plus professional officer corps could not be unaffected by political events.

This was demonstrated in two features of the events in the Knin region of Croatia where the local Serb population created a no-go area, conducting terrorist attacks on railway lines. The first of these was the intrusion of two military aircraft which intercepted and turned away helicopters of the Croatian militia heading for the area. Investigations produced the conclusion that this operation had been ordered at a relatively low level by the air base commander. It was an indication of pro-Serbian sentiment among officers in the middle and junior ranks of the officer corps. A similar case was the stealing of YPA armaments by Serbs in Croatia. This seemed only to have been possible with the collusion of local military personnel.¹⁰
This kind of activity at lower echelons, was reinforced by higher level interventions and non-interventions. Non-intervention applied to the military reaction to the suppression of the Kosovan parliament by the Serbian authorities, despite the military leaders' liberal proclamations in favour of preserving Yugoslavia's constitutional integrity and the blatant unconstitutionality of that act. Intervention came towards the year's end with an interview given by Kadijević and the formation of the new party.

In his interview with Danas, Kadijević made statements which clearly positioned the military closer to Serbian opinion than any other. In particular, his stating the intent to deal with "abuses" of the GPD system and the creation of armed militias, acting as paramilitary forces, by the republican governments in Croatia and Slovenia showed this. Yugoslavia would not, according to the Defence Minister, become "another Lebanon". However, he overlooked military complicity in the Knin events and the extent to which those events were central to discussions of the country becoming 'another Lebanon' and the formation of paramilitary forces. Thus, Kadijević appeared to be condemning and threatening the actions of elected and constitutional authorities, whilst continuing to ignore the wholly unconstitutional armed groups in the Serb populated regions of Croatia.11
Kadijević's hardening line clearly owed something to the formation of the LC-MY. There, he was surrounded by a group of ex-generals identified as part of a Milošević clique, Mamula, Mirković, Ljubičić and Gračanin. It was telling that, in addition to the party-army old guard, the new party counted among its luminaries Milošević's wife, Mirjana Marković. Perhaps the most significant thing to come from the new party was the intervention of Stevan Mirković immediately after the party's formation, telling the press in Belgrade that Milošević's Socialist Party was the only party worth voting for in the forthcoming Serbian elections.

Elements from the military elite had clearly begun to align themselves with Milošević. However, in a political system in which republican and federal political authority was invested in state bodies, not party ones, this was futile. Whereas in the past, party disciplinary mechanisms could be invoked and political charges concocted, this was no longer so. Measures against recalcitrant individuals and groups would have to be taken through the institutions of an independent legal system - in the North-Western republics, at least. Any kind of alliance with a particular republican leadership could only serve further to undermine the YPA's all-Yugoslav character and increase alienation in other republics.
Kadijević's own position was hard to define clearly. Whilst turning an occasional blind eye to affairs in Serbia, he had also shown signs of his reluctance to see Milosevic prosper. (See Chapter 5.) Moreover, in his interview with Danas, he gave the first signs of military depoliticisation of the YPA. He did so in recognising that although the communist party had played a great role in forming the army's pan-Yugoslav character, especially through the LC-YPA, with the demise of communism, political organisation within the party was no longer tenable. Members of the armed forces, he said, would be allowed to be members of any legally and constitutionally recognised political party, but that no party would be allowed to organise within the YPA; "concrete measures" in connection with this would, he continued, be announced, "soon". These statements were formally confirmed at the 12 December FEC session, where it was also signalled that depoliticisation of the armed forces would be discussed at a future joint session of the FEC with republican presidents.14

With regard to this, an early sign of depoliticisation came as early as Autumn 1989, when Mirković was replaced as Chief of the General Staff by General Blagoje Adžić. Adžić was the first appointee to the job to be an army career man; all his predecessors had party-army organisation track records. Moreover, unlike with previous
appointments, the press gave no biographical detail about the new man.\textsuperscript{15} However, this kind of depoliticisation perhaps carried with it risks: generals (and lower ranking officers where appropriate) without the political skills and experience of someone like Kadijević, a man tailored to his task, might seek to use the army’s physical capacity for intervention in politics. The emergence of less astute military men was a possibility.

There were, therefore, contradictory signs. On the one hand, generals prominent in the formation of an essentially reactionary political party; on the other, moves towards a necessary depoliticisation of the YPA. That depoliticisation was unavoidable if the disintegration of the country was to be avoided and a democracy was to be established. Moreover, it was the first step to renewal of military legitimacy. If a third Yugoslavia were to be constituted, political legitimacy for the YPA would have to mean its becoming apolitical.

However, depoliticisation would not in itself be enough. Political legitimacy would also require structural changes to satisfy republican and nationalist demands. A corollary of this would be measures which would encourage functional relegitimation. The changes needed had military and political virtues. In addition, attempts to persevere with the old structural arrangements were likely to result in
If Yugoslavia was to remain together, either as a looser federation or as a confederation, it seemed that restructuring would be necessary. That restructuring would have to involve the creation of more regionally based units.

Such was the situation at the end of 1990. At the beginning of 1991, all issues of regime and military relegitimation are in flux. But, as was the case with regime legitimacy earlier in this chapter, the lines along which military restructuring and, therefore, relegitimation could be achieved are not obscure. A model for restructuring which could be adapted is provided by Yugoslavia’s wartime experience.

As was shown in Chapter 4, the Partisan army was formed on an essentially territorial, regimental basis. There seems to be a good case for supposing that such a structure for a peacetime standing army would be workable. Political and socialising functions would be vastly diminished, enhancing the military purpose. Units would be composed of more or less coherent regiments on an ethnic-regional foundation; they would not, however, be ethnically pure – like the wartime units, they would be formed around a national core, but would almost certainly, because of the nature of Yugoslav demography, contain members from different nationalities. There would also need to be elite
units, modern equivalents of (or successors to) the Proletarian Brigades. These would be formed on a multinational basis by volunteers. Such units would comprise national regiments designated to the multinational force. To some extent this could be seen as a parallel with the structure of NATO as a multinational force. However, unlike NATO practice heretofore (which practice may be in the course of changing), it would require co-stationing. That is, perhaps in the vein of British military tradition, units from various regiments would combine to form a larger entity. In this scenario, at divisional level or below, there could be expected to be contributions from Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, Bosnian (and so forth) regiments.

The nationally based units could be treated as regiments of one army, or as republican armies in themselves which make contributions to a collective defence force; that is, either the British model or the NATO model - although in practice, it would be more likely that a hybrid would emerge. Either model would offer the chance to satisfy demands, such as those from Slovenia, that military service should be carried out on home territory, in units where their native tongue is used. (Canada provides something of a model here.) This arrangement would also cater for sentiments of national identity - everybody
would be able to identify their own military, although that military would form part of a pan-republican whole.

The central command and the elite central units would provide overall strategic command. Central command would certainly have charge of units delegated to the multinational force. The degree and circumstances of republican control would correspond with whatever arrangement could be achieved for the establishment of a third Yugoslavia. Command and control arrangements would be a product of whatever negotiations resulted in a new Yugoslavia.

However, with regard to military legitimacy, broad political and social changes do not just affect the YPA. The pan-Yugoslav character of the defence economy is another major factor in restructuring Yugoslavia’s military institutions. The domestically developed M-84 tank has parts made in factories from one end of the country to the other, involving all parts of the country—from Jesenice near the Slovenian-Austrian border to the Macedonian capital, Skopje, and Prizren in Kosovo in the South. Anything other than a federal future for Yugoslavia would automatically concern the army from the military-industry point of view. Defence projects involving more than one republic would have to become cooperative ventures in a confederal Yugoslavia. Should
any of the republics realise independence, the nature of the cooperative arrangement would be more difficult.

No matter which configuration of republics emerges, basic economic and political reforms impact on the defence sector. It has been indicated that the shift to multi-party parliamentary politics and a market economy with all kinds of ownership and property rights, not just social ones, requires changes to be made *a propos* of the defence industrial base. New laws and regulations on commercial activity need alterations in the balance of rights and responsibilities with regard to wartime functioning. In particular, this means that GPD obligations could no longer be on the basis of self-management accords, but would become contracts in law between particular business and state actors. In addition, YPA financing and the whole GPD planning system would be difficult issues with which to deal. Indeed, the scope and complexity of GPD planning indicate the need for a complete overhaul leading to simplification. The goods and services budget would have to lose a significant number of its 1990 total of 3600 items.

One part of the Yugoslav defence system is likely to continue whatever political shape Yugoslavia gains. Apart from the removal of the leading role of the communist party, which must necessarily wither, it seems likely that
even independent republics would retain the relatively cost-effective territorial defence arrangement. The emphasis on this aspect of life could, however, be expected to decline; for example, it is improbable that GPD will remain a core item on many school timetables. The only topic in need of elaboration would be the source of political authority in the event of war. It could be possible that restructuring along the lines indicated above might extend the territorial dimension of defence and, thereby, strengthen military legitimacy. This would be achieved through the more organic links between regular and non-regular units.

Both the sociopolitical and the functional imperatives of military legitimacy require redefinition. There seems little prospect of the 'Yugoslav idea' providing an adequate component of the legitimation crasis, although it could undoubtedly retain some relevance. Whatever, the extent of that relevance, there can be no doubt that the defence of Yugoslavia, rather as in 1941, could not be judged sustainable as Yugoslavia entered the 1990s. The likelihood of concerted common action against an aggressor of the magnitude of Hitler's Germany can be considered far less than a collapse similar to that after the Nazi invasion. An attack by one of Yugoslavia's neighbours would almost certainly result in the particular republic
involved and the army resisting while the other Yugoslavs tried to ignore the matter and go their own way.

Military legitimacy can be given limited fortification in the short term by alliance with one part of the Yugoslav community – as appears to have been the case with Serbia towards the end of 1990. However, such alliances can only be poison for soldiers trying to hold Yugoslavia together. For such an alliance gives them a political and a national profile that can but antagonise other Yugoslavs. Relegitimation for the YPA must mean dangling carrots, not brandishing big sticks. This means willing depoliticisation and restructuring. By embracing these notions, the YPA can enhance both regime and military relegitimation. Failure to do so could destroy any prospect of either surviving. At the beginning of 1991, much depends on whether Kadijević’s tendency to reform or the views of more conservative generals prevail in the YPA.

Chances of survival reduce every time the generals make attempts to assert authority which can only be counterproductive. The more the generals try to take the initiative, the worse they make the situation. The sum of Milošević’s dominion of Serbia and the shadow it casts across the whole country added to sabre rattling senior soldiers has edged the country closer to a break. Attempts
to intimidate Slovenia and Croatia, towards the end of 1990 and as 1991 began, only serve to catalyse dissolution. If the generals end up without a country to defend, it will be largely their own doing.

Legitimacy and Civil Military Relations

Civil-military relations in Yugoslavia is a function of the interaction of regime and military legitimacies. Post-war Yugoslavia was forged on the strength of political and military legitimacy resting with Tito’s communist-led partisans. This legitimacy was attested in the conflict with Stalin of 1948 and the redesigning of Yugoslavia’s legitimating principles in terms of socialist self-management. Over a number of years the notion of decentralised power inherent in the post-1948 revisions became a reality. As a consequence the authority of the federal regime was undermined. This led to the crisis of 1971 in which regime legitimacy was defective. Defects were restored by the lending of military legitimacy based on its role in the regime’s creation, its adherence to the wartime principles of brotherhood and unity, and its formal position in the political system to strengthen the federal arm of President Tito. Regime legitimacy and military legitimacy were functions of each other.
However, as Yugoslavia slipped deeper into crisis in the 1980s, and without Tito's charismatic presence, the army was unable to repeat its role of the early 1970s. Military legitimacy too had been eroded. Intra-Yugoslav disputes and divisions had begun to undermine the YPA as bastion of brotherhood and unity, the war was no longer a strong motivational theme, and in the clamour of competing nationalisms, yet without an ally of Tito's calibre, the generals were impotent in the political vacuum. Social and political developments had debased the army's legitimacy as a political force.

The YPA's functional legitimacy was challenged by the national and economic crises in Yugoslav society. The economic crisis forced it to reduce its size, slow down its modernisation plans and personally affected individual soldiers. This meant its leading role in the defence system was weakened by technical inadequacies and diminished morale. Its leading role was damaged by its failure to be, or to be seen to be, nationally and proportionally representative, whilst a clamour of particularist national voices attacked it as a Serb preserve. Unable to satisfy all these conditions, it was not fully suited to performing its function. The YPA's functional legitimacy was impaired.
It is the various threats to its legitimacy which explain the military’s growing voice in Yugoslav domestic politics in the 1980s. This is why the seeming extension of its role from defence to non-defence issues was only an apparent change. For Yugoslav soldiers, everything was a matter of defence. The generals’ concern for the welfare of society rested, above all else, on an understanding of the effect the crisis of legitimacy in Yugoslavia had upon the YPA as the leading component in the defence system and upon Yugoslavia’s wider defence capability.

As the ‘backbone’ of the defence system, and aware of the importance of morale as a vital factor of military power, the YPA was anxious about a decadent Yugoslavia’s defensive strength. On one side was the question of economic difficulties reflecting on the modernisation of the YPA, its standards and the mood of its members, particularly officers. On another, the issue was one of the importance of the Army’s links with the people whose support was a prerequisite for the efficient functioning of the system of all-people’s defence; the implication of social divisions was that the unified support required for effective defence would not be forthcoming.

The generals’ concern was that the disintegrative processes which developed with the crisis should not be allowed to affect the Army. Although some undesirable
influences infiltrated the YPA, and in spite of broad societal difficulties, until very late in the decade, the general state of the army was said to be politically secure. There was certainly awareness that unacceptable influences should be withstood. In this regard, it was necessary that the army should be above inter-republican or provincial discords, and a guard against nationalism and other sociopolitically unacceptable forms of influence. In short, the prospect of defending Yugoslavia was not favourable if the various constituencies in the country were antagonistic to each other and unable to work together effectively.

The premise of the YPA’s political activity was the desire to assure the internal cohesion, stability and effectiveness of Yugoslavia, because the state of internal security was the first condition for a successful struggle and resistance against invasion. Socioeconomic (and political) stability was understood as the key to strong defence. Conversely, countries were most vulnerable to attack when internal stability was disturbed. In the marxist terminology dear to the generals, the YPA’s role was determined by an awareness that its internal and external functions were ‘in dialectical unity’. If internal tensions within a society increase beyond a certain point, the capability of resisting dangers from outside diminishes. Although, realistically, the threat
of international war was unlikely (and considered to be so), there remained a consciousness in Yugoslavia that internal divisions might be exploited by foreign powers and a belief that this, in fact, was the case - that subversive 'special wars' were being waged within and against Yugoslavia, especially, in Kosovo. However, the YPA's concern must be seen as tacit expression of a greater fear than subversion. That fear concerned what would happen were Yugoslavia to be attacked.

In the final analysis, the YPA appears to have been fighting a losing battle. Its commitment to defending and preserving Tito's united Yugoslavia has blinkered the military. If Yugoslavia breaks up, particularly if that break up involves Slovene secession, the role of the YPA leadership will have been paramount. Without its panicky blunders in dealing first with Mladina, then with the Slovene political establishment, it is possible that events would have taken a different course. Had it taken firmer and more obvious stands against Milošević's constitutional machinations, things might have been different. It is even conceivable that military pressure could have limited the damage done to the federation from that quarter. As it is, an accumulation of actions and inactions led to dissolved legitimacy.
As the 1990s get under way, both regime and military in Yugoslavia have been delegitimated. On the regime side, a notable degree of legitimacy can be found at the republican level, whilst to some extent, the quality is still to be traced, albeit weakly, at the federal level. Whatever Marković's success, his efforts are continually diminished by republican recalcitrance. The actions of any one republic can terminally sabotage the Prime Minister's fragile programme. It cannot be doubted that decisive authority rests with the republics: the federal government is dependent on the support of the republics. Legitimacy at the federal level, such as it is, derives from republican endorsement of its performance and republican agreement that a federal government should exist at all.

Change is ineluctable. Slovene political authority has been established on the basis that the republic will never again be part of a country ruled directly from Belgrade. To a lesser degree, the same may be applicable to Croatia and, perhaps, Macedonia. The only options are these: a very loose federation in which republican sovereignty is paramount and central authority could not be exerted; a confederation; or full independence. Thus, the old Yugoslavia will never be again.

Whatever succeeds, it is unlikely, however, to be decided by Ljubljana. The fate of Yugoslavia will be decided by
the Zagreb-Sarajevo-Belgrade axis. Indeed, to a considerable extent, it will be decided in Belgrade. Responses in the Croatian and Bosnian capitals to Belgrade politics, whether from the Serbian or federal authorities there, will be a large determinant of what occurs. Both republics’ conduct will be shaped by the presence of large ethnic Serb populations. In this sense, it is within the power of the Serbian political leadership to make life easier or harder for its neighbours.

The increasing focus of military attention on Croatia, rather than Slovenia, towards the end of 1990 may have been recognition of the centrality of the triangle just delineated and the possibility that intimidation added to the economic and inter-ethnic bonds could be enough to prevent Croatia from seceding. With Slovenia undoubtedly prepared to leave its confederalist ally behind, the concentration on Croatia may have been a sign that Slovenia was written off, but Croatia was thought to be redeemable.

If this is so, then it bodes ill for the future. It means that, with Slovenia assumed to be out of the picture, the army’s predominantly Serb and still old style communist composition was pushing it to act in the interest of the Serbian and still essentially communist Serbian political leadership, albeit, in many cases, probably with grave
reluctance. Acting, in effect, as a Serbian army, should this be the case, this would seem a recipe for civil war if the Croats, who have (like the Slovenes) created a republican army, in effect, using militia and territorial reservists, are not intimidated into retracting their proclaimed independence. This would be enough to persuade politically more astute officers, like the Defence Secretary, to resist any impetus to bring military might to bear.

It is sure that unless a suitable commonwealth of sovereign states can be accommodated, at least as a temporary measure, Yugoslavia will cease to have the same components. It may cease to exist at all. Even if a unified Yugoslav rump according to Serbian designs survives Slovene secession with Croatia still in its embrace, then it will be an unhappy place, bedevilled by the problems that have beset Yugoslavia since its inception as a Serbian realm. If a Serbo-Croat war is averted, a violent backlash from Kosovo would be ever more threatening as the Albanians, stripped of the support for its human rights demands found in Slovenia, became ever more impatient of their treatment.

Alternatively, if the realities of power distribution in 1990s Yugoslavia are recognised by those in Belgrade and an accord reached which formalises the *de facto*
confederation in existence for some years, whatever title it is actually given, then it possible that Yugoslavia can be reincarnated. That reincarnation would, ironically, need to be along the lines of the Illyrian and Yugoslav movements, whose conceptions of the South Slav state were discussed in the Introduction — which ideas found less favour than Serbian arguments in the talks to establish the first Yugoslav state. In this case, Yugoslavs would be giving themselves breathing space and time to allow the introduction of new blood. In many ways, whatever happens, the present actors on the Yugoslav stage — the Miloševićs, the Kučans, the Kadijevićes, the Tudjmans and the Markovićes — are the past.

Whatever the political outcome — centreless federation, confederation or independent states, relegitimation for the military will mean readjustment and restructuring. If military legitimacy is not dispersed to the corners of Yugoslavia and re-formed in the armed forces of two or more independent states, then it will need to be renewed in a way appropriate to a new Yugoslav context. In that context, both sociopolitical and functional imperatives will demand attention. Relegitimation thus must involve depoliticisation and restructuring.

Restructuring should include development towards a more regionally based regimental system and greater
professionalisation. Relegitimation will also involve consolidation of changes in the defence sector of the economy and de-communisation of the defence system as a whole. This will all require much work. The sooner that work is begun the better.

Conclusion

Throughout this study, I have argued for the use of two concepts in civil-military analysis: regime legitimacy and military legitimacy. Based on an understanding of legitimacy as a crasis, that is, a necessary combination of elements, none of which is sufficient, these are logically and lexically consistent complements. They have been used to sustain the thesis that the Yugoslav civil-military relationship is a function of the interaction of regime legitimacy and military legitimacy.

The thesis has met with a considerable degree of success at the theoretical level. It has defined and developed two new and specific basic concepts. These can be used to guide and structure investigation and analysis. (Although only applied here to the Yugoslav case, they are concepts transferable to any civil-military relationship.) The operation of the two concepts in combination has enabled
explanation of Yugoslav civil-military relations at
different stages and the conditions of change using the
same terms.

The elements of the legitimacy crasis are bases,
performance and environmental support. The crasis, as
defined in chapter 2, is a form of social compact into
which the ruled enter whenever they comply with those who
rule over them. Whatever constitute the terms and
conditions of that contract - including the use of force,
or the threat of its use - constitute the ruler’s
legitimacy. However, the widespread use of force in itself
must always be a signal of the degree in which an
institution’s bases and performance are critically in
question.

The implication of this is that there may be only minimal
legitimacy. What it makes clear is that legitimacy, used
technically to explain a particular power relationship,
rather than morally to justify it, may have no set
content. That content is not, however, easily defined.
What moments such as those in which force is evident do is
provide a particular opportunity to explore the nature of
legitimacy, or illegitimacy. In this way, analysts can
avoid assumptions about compliance and legitimacy by
analysing the mix of bases, performance and support which
is revealed at critical turning points when a social organism's existence is challenged.

Crastic legitimacy is most easily analysed in moments of crisis. This is because legitimacy may only truly be identified by the non-existence of illegitimacy or legitimacy crisis. In a legitimacy crisis, environmental support is removed as social phenomena critically challenge the bases on which an institution claims to be, or may be observed to be, based. At this point, the institution in question must manage the crisis. If it is effective in doing so it will survive. If it proves to be ineffective it will not.

On the basis of this understanding, the present study considered regime and military legitimacies at four salient moments in the history of communist Yugoslavia: its creation during the Second World War; its expulsion from the Soviet bloc in 1948; the 'Croatian crisis' of the early a 1970s; and the general crisis at the end of the 1980s. The second Yugoslavia was built on the strength of political and military legitimacy derived from the partisan struggle. This was the basis for resistance to Moscow in 1948.

In both cases, it was important that Tito and his followers were able to adapt in order to negotiate
challenges successfully by developing new ideological bases. The partisan bases of brotherhood and unity, fighting the Axis, and building a socially progressive and ethnically just communist federation evolved into the anti-Stalinist system of socialist self-management and devolved power. In both the war period and at the time of the split, regime and military legitimacies were mutually reinforcing. The creation of principles for devolved power led to pressures for those principles to be realised. A result of this was centrifugal pressures which in 1971 challenged the continuation of Yugoslavia. Then, military legitimacy, which had been left relatively untouched by devolutionary processes, was called upon to compensate for weak regime legitimacy.

The regime survived by conceding power to the republics whilst reasserting strong party control within them. What this came to mean, in practice, was a heavy concentration of power in the republics at the expense of the federation. This became enormously significant after Tito's death in 1980. Increasingly, republican interests outweighed federal ones. As Yugoslavia plummeted further into multiple crisis in the 1980s, the army's legitimacy was increasingly in question and it was unable to replay its earlier role. At the beginning of the 1990s, the legitimacy of everything Yugoslav was in question. The various principles on which it was proposed that
legitimacy might be restored were poles apart and left little prospect of further adaptation. Although some favoured an evolution which would confirm the shift to republican based authority, too many others wanted to push against the grain. This meant that the continued existence of both the federation and the military required more options for finding a solution than were available.

The positing of the two legitimacy concepts and their inter-relationships lends the theory heuristic qualities, explanatory power and a basis for comparison of different times and situations. These, I would suggest are characteristics of good 'scientific' theory. Another, culminating feature is guidance in prediction. Little, if anything is wholly predictable in a social science. Nonetheless, the identification of regime legitimacy and its military variant and their interaction as the conditions of the relationship provide some grounds for theoretical prediction. For example, the military is unlikely to step successfully into politics unless regime legitimacy is weak and its own is strong. In the contemporary Yugoslav case, neither are strong at the federal level; there is some degree of regime legitimacy at the republican level. Frailties at the federal level were connected to each other and to the growth of republican legitimacy: diminishing federal plus accruing republican regime legitimacy undermined military
legitimacy; YPA attempts to restore its own position by reinforcing the federal regime’s only served further to undo both legitimacy crises. This means that legitimacy renewal for both is reciprocal: the legitimacy of each is a function of the other’s.

As both regime and military seek to adapt to changing circumstances and to establish new bases of legitimacy, the functional nature of their relationship is quite clear. Military legitimacy is dependent on regime revitalisation. Whatever its details, that revitalisation will require profound transformations of the armed forces. Without redefinition of the bases of military legitimacy, regime relegitimation will be virtually impossible. Any chance of a third Yugoslavia embracing its present members recedes the longer it takes for the military to withdraw from politics. Unless change is thoroughgoing and begins to be implemented quickly, it will be too little, too late.

At the beginning of 1991, the military which gave birth to the second Yugoslavia and preserved it once through legitimate intervention in political affairs perhaps still held the power - but only just - to preserve the country again and to be the midwife to the birth of a third Yugoslavia by non-intervention.
CHAPTER 1


2. For example, Slobodan Stankovic’s Radio Free Europe Research papers for the post-Tito years reflect this increase - see especially, "Yugoslav Defence Minister calls the Army the "backbone" of the system", 28 April, 1983 and "Yugoslav military leaders warn against disunity", 25 November, 1983. See also, Milovan Djilas’ article in The Wall Street Journal (Europe), 22 August, 1985.

3. Dean, loc. cit., p. 47.

4. Ibid., pp. 48-50.


7. Quentin Crisp, The Naked Civil Servant.

9. Pavlowitch, op. cit., pp. 17-21, offers examples of this. John Allcock of Bradford University conducted a personal survey of the British press for a year, in which time every piece on Yugoslavia contained at least one error.


12. Constraints on space mean that the medieval Serbian and Croatian empires cannot be discussed. However, their importance in national memory should be emphasised. This is particularly the case with the Serbs whose nationally specific Orthodox Church was founded at this time. On the Slavs in medieval times see Stephen Clissold, ed., *A Short History of Yugoslavia*, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge, 1966; Singleton, op. cit., and *A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples*, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge, 1985; Pavlowitch, op. cit.


15. 'Illyrian' was a misnomer: the Illyrian language had no connection with any of the Slav tongues; as noted, only the Albanians in the modern world have any connection with the autochthonous Balkan population.

16. Banac, op. cit., p.79.

17. Teodor Pavlović, cited ibid, pp.79-80.
18. This linguistic typology placed the kajkavians with the Slovenes to leave only the cakavians of Istria, parts of the Adriatic coast and of most of the islands strung along the littoral as Croats. In their eagerness to encourage integration, Gaj and the Illyrianists abandoned kajkavian; they were pushed into this by the belief that only a national programme could counter intense 'Magyarisation' by their imperial masters.


22. On inter-war Yugoslavia, see the relevant parts of Joseph Rothschild, Eastern Europe Between the World Wars, University of Washigton Press, Seattle, 1974.


25. My use of 'military' is, for the most part consistent with others - many though they are. Where it differs is the understanding that a military exists for political reasons. A mob may operate using various levels of force to coerce, but it does not do so in
a knowingly restrained way to achieve political ends. The political dimension is necessary to a definition of 'military'.

26. The role as an instrument of conquest is rarely found these days.

27. As Foot writes, "the world today exposes those without forces to the will of those with them: no manned weapons, no security,". M.R.D. Foot, Men in Uniform, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1961, p.21. Of course, this was just as true of the world of yesterday - as Machiavelli is witness: "I conclude, therefore, that without having one's own soldiers, no principality is safe; on the contrary, it is completely subject to Fortune, not having the power and the loyalty to defend it in times of adversity." Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. XIII in The Portable Machiavelli P. Bondanella and M. Mufa, eds., Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1979, p.123.


29. The concern of a police force is to enforce laws - that is the set of rules by which a socio-political community is run. In its role as servant and guardian, it helps and protects members of the community from elements within that community who do not keep the law. In contradistinction with the military, which tends to act where community law does not apply and is concerned with security from external threat and preservation of the community as an entity, the police's concern is with internal threats to individuals or groups in the community. Its aim is "the security of person and property [and] the preservation of public tranquility". Instructions to Metropolitan Police recruits, cited in B. Whitaker, The Police, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1964, p.19.

31. It should, of course, be noted that military units whose specific concern is with external matters are sometimes given internal roles.


34. In Clausewitz, the military is an instrument of political will; its function is to compel others to comply with one's own will.
35. This can be seen in works such as M. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1974, or T.W. Wolfe, *The SALT Experience*, Ballinger Publishing Co., Cambridge, Mass., 1979. Although neither is on civil-military relations, as such, both are suffused throughout with references to military involvement in policy formation - the latter, obviously, on the SALT process, the former with regard to the ABM debate.


44. Such usage tends to concentrate on the 'ends' of militarism, Berghaan cites Woodrow Wilson: "The purpose of militarism is to use armies for aggression." (V.R. Berghaan, Militarism: The History of an International Debate, 1861-1979, C.U.P., Cambridge, 1984, p.108). However, this usage is found most commonly in Marxist, particularly, Soviet analyses. One summary suggests that in "the Marxist school of thought one can speak about militarism only when the governing, exploiting class consciously increases
armaments, armed forces and preparations for predatory wars."
(K. Skjelsbaek, 'Militarism, Its Dimensions and Corollaries: An
Attempt at Conceptual Clarification' in A. Eide and M. Thee.
eds., Problems of Contemporary Militarism, Croom-Helm, London,
1980, p.84.) Various Soviet definitions are largely similar:
"Militarism, in the broad sense, is the building up of the
military power of an exploitative state for the purpose of
carrying out a policy of predatory war and suppression of the
resistance of the toiling masses within the country." Great
of Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopedia, A.M. Prokhovov, Editor in
Chief, 3rd Edition, Moscow, 1974); 'militarism' is the "policy of
military growth of an exploitative power with the aim of
preparing wars of aggression and of repressing the exploited
masses within the country." (Sovetskaya Istorishskaya
9, p.436; "Imperialist militarism is a complex social phenomenon
which comprises a system of economic, political, ideological and
directly military measures taken by capitalist nations and
directed toward preparing for and conducting imperialist wars."
Heritage of V.I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War, Moscow,
1972, USAF Translation, U.S. Government Printing Office; finally,
the version which - I believe - draws together and expresses
succinctly the elements contained in the other definitions:
militarism is a "system of political, economic and ideological
means used by the exploiter class in the interests of increased
military might for the achievement of the fundamental aims of
their reactionary internal and aggressive external policies."
Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopedia, Voennoe Izdatepstvo

45. A. Vagts, A History of Militarism: Romance and Realities of a


48. This problem is thoughtfully and clearly addressed between the webs of algebra woven by Lewis F. Richardson. One particular example is his quotation of Earl Grey, writing a propos of the 'Dreadnought' Arms Race between Great Britain and Germany. Grew writes of "differences of opinion in the Cabinet ... not on the principle of national safety, but as to the margin of strength necessary to secure it". In 1909 the crisis was acute: should eight new battleships be constructed or would six or four suffice? Richardson calculates the difference to be £9 million (sterling) in a budget of £63 million - a 14 per cent variation. Lewis F. Richardson, Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of The Causes and Origins of War, Stevens and Sons Ltd., London, 1960, p.79.


50. In 1962, Finer opened his account of the role of the military in politics by noting the prevalence of independent military action in politics in the years preceding. He noted that 11 states were military regimes 'proper'. Twenty years later, he put the tally at 32. (S.E. Finer, op. cit., pp. 1-3; idem 'The Morphology of Military Regimes' in R. Kolkowicz and A. Korbonski ed., Soldiers, Peasants and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1982, pp. 281-239).


53. Ibid.

55. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale U.P., New Haven and London, 1968, ch. 4; S.E. Finer, op. cit.,

56. A.R. Luckham, loc. cit., p.16; see also C.E. Welche and A.R. Smith, Military Role and Rule, Duxbury Press, North Scituate, 1974.

57. Luckham, loc. cit.; Welche and Smith, op. cit.,

CHAPTER 2


5. Ibid., p. 78.

6. Finer expressed reservations about such characterisations, but, nonetheless, accepts them (ibid., pp. 241-2.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., p. 241.


11. Ibid., p. 12.


13. Ibid., p. 78ff.


15. Ibid., p. 195.

16. Ibid., p. 196.


19. Ibid., p. 221.


35. We should be careful in our use of the term 'right'. In one sense it could be taken to mean the perception of 'rightfulness'. Alternatively, it could refer to the accuracy or correctness of an analysis or diagnosis.

36. It is very important to recognise that, in extremis, the principle which legitimates a division of power may be simply 'might is right'; if one is strong enough to get one's own way, this in itself is enough justification. 'Might is right' is one type of morality. More usually, however, might needs to prove itself right. Pascal summarised this process: 'Being unable to make what is just strong, we have made what is strong just.' ["Et ainsi ne pouvant faire que ce qui est juste fut fort, on a fait que ce qui est fort fut juste."] Pascal, *Pensees*, Ed. Michel Autrand, Bordas, Paris, 1976, p. 111.


39. The sudden fall of Romanian dictator, Nicolae Ceausescu, at the end of 1989, illustrates this point. Ceausescu surrounded himself with clique of close supporters and family members, backed by a powerful security service; this edifice collapsed the moment it was widely challenged.

40. Sternberger, loc. cit., p.246. 'Divine Personage' (a god-king for instance) or 'divine right' (a human chosen by a god) are examples of what Sternberger call 'numinous' legitimacy doctrines, which refer to some source outside the power relationship itself, as opposed to 'civil' legitimacy in which claims are internal to the relationship. Another author stresses the externality of non-internal legitimating principles by using the terms 'teleological' opposed by 'consensual' - Georg Bruner, 'Legitimacy Doctrines and Legitimation Procedures in East European Systems' in Rigby and Feher, eds., op. cit.,


43. For example, see Wolin, loc. cit., pp.69-70 and Rigby, loc. cit., p.7, on the underlying values in Weber's work on legitimacy.

44. Of course, there should be awareness of what is, perhaps, my own 'subjectivism' - which is to seek 'objectivity'. This might
otherwise be called 'amorality'. That is, I try to look at the object only with the prejudice that what is there is; in scientific study there is no place for moral right or wrong. Legitimacy or illegitimacy applied to regimes does not mean that they are right ('I approve') or wrong ('I disapprove'); it means there is a reason why they do or do not function stably.


47. Sternberger, loc. cit., p.247.


50. See Merquior, op. cit., ch. 7.
51. Ibid., p.6.


55. Rigby, *loc. cit.*, notes that Weber’s view of legitimacy is deeply imbued with the values of his bureaucratic culture (p. p.7).


58. Ibid.


64. Ibid., p.168.

65. Ibid., pp.159-60.


67. Ibid.


69. This interpretation is perhaps a little simplistic in view of the complexity of modern politics; since the American revolution brought the 'no taxation without representation' notion into widespread practice, there has been an understanding that the ruled control the rulers in democratic societies. To whatever extent this is the case, in essence, the situation remains the same: if one wants to be a member of a community and have a quiet life, unpestered by freelance thugs or the agents of the state on behalf of those who hold power (even if this is 'everybody'), one must pay what is due.


71. Ferrero, op. cit., p.134 writes: "Legitimacy can only be established by a clear, fixed standard of comparison, bearing the same meaning for everyone and uncontroversible in its application." This may be true for evaluation in terms of own moral preferences; however, for scientific observation, the standard must be to identify the mechanical elements which explain a distribution of power - this means no 'fixed' standard of what constitutes legitimacy. (See below.)

72. Cf. Sternberger, loc. cit., p.247; Ferrero, op. cit., p.144. The variety of legitimacies should be self evident from the different interpretations discussed here and found in the literature.


80. Merquior, *op. cit.*, p.3.


82. Paul G. Lewis, 'Legitimation and Crises: East European Developments in the Post-Stalin Period' in Lewis, ed., *Eastern Europe: Political Crisis and Legitimation*, Croom-Helm, London, 1984, suggests that this approach is particularly useful a propos of Eastern Europe. He also, however, supports this by noting that "under the entry for 'legitimation' in the 1933 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences the social researcher is succinctly enjoined to "see Illegitimacy"; anyone who does follow the reference will find that it only bears upon inheritance law.

84. Ibid., p.69.

85. Ibid.

86. Alternative terms to the 'bases of legitimacy' include "legitimating ideologies" (Easton, op. cit., pp. 289-97), legitimating "doctrines" (Bruner, loc. cit., p. 28ff) and "political religion" - an adaptation of Machiavelli’s concept (Carl A. Linden, 'Marxism – Leninism: Systemic Legitimacy and Political Culture' in T. Rakowska-Harmstone, ed., Perspectives for Change in Communist Societies, Westview, Boulder, 1979.

87. This corresponds with the criterion of 'adaptability' which is essential in Huntington’s concept of 'institutionalisation'. See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale U.P. New Haven, 1969, p.13.

88. Merquior uses the adjective cratic in his discussion of Stinchcombe’s 'power reserve' legitimacy. To avoid confusion, that term has been expressly eschewed in the present consideration. Merquior’s catic concerns power; crasis refers to a necessary combination of elements. The former stems from the Greek kratos (power); the latter from the Greek krasis (mixture). Whereas 'bureaucracy' is from kratos, 'ideosyncrasy' is from krasis. However, both words form the same adjectival ending: bureaucratic, ideosyncratic. To avoid any confusion with notions of power and Merquior’s use of "cratic legitimacy", I shall deploy the adjectival form crastic.

89. Ferrero, op. cit., p.135, says that a government is legitimate if power operates in agreement with principles and rules "accepted without discussion by those who must obey".

90. 'Ideology' is used here in the sense of Weberian 'legitimating ideologies'; however, as the present argument contends, we must see these only as one part of legitimacy.


93. 'Sovereignty' is used here to mean that a state's practices and laws are independent of any other state's. It relates to the fact of being the ultimate law-giving authority, subject to no other. (This means a question mark might be placed against Yugoslavia where the sovereignty of federal bodies might be doubted vis a vis the republics - cf. Chs.5 and 7.) Cf. Michael Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Law, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1970, pp. 26-8; and R.M. MacIver, The Modern State O.U.P., Oxford, 1964, pp.9-16 and 487-90.

94. Ultimately, this is underscored by the existence of the 'Brezhnev doctrine'. This is the term adopted by Western analysts to summarise the limits placed by the Soviet Union on its East European 'allies' ability to act autonomously and, therefore, on their sovereignty. (See, for example, Karen Dawisha, Eastern Europe Gorbachev and Reform: the Great Challenge, Cambridge U.P., 1988, p.159.)


98. From Aristotle to the present, it has been recognised that political systems differ with regard to the type of government in operation. Huntington notes the similarity between his typology of political systems and Aristotle's - although each arrived at this point from a different direction. (Huntington, Political Order, p.89; Aristotle, Politics, Edited and translated by John Warrington, J.M. Dent and Sons, London, 1959, pp.103 ff.) In the modern world, government is usually party government. (Cf. R.M. MacIver, op. cit., pp.396-416; Richard Rose, The Problem of Party Government, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1976, pp.2-11.) A political system which is characterised by party government may be called a party system. A communist system is a particular type of party system.

A party system may be competitive or non-competitive, unitarian or pluralistic - there may be one party, or many of them. (Cf. Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham-Powell, Jr., op. cit., pp.205-10 and 220-24; MacIver, op. cit., Ch. XIII; Lewis J. Edinger, Politics in West Germany, 2nd Ed., Little Brown, Boston, 1977, p.168, note 1; Huntington, Political Order, Ch. 7.) Distinctions between party systems might also depend on characteristics (such as the types, sizes or organisational features) of the parties within it. Whether a party system is unitarian or pluralistic, competitive or non-competitive and the characteristics of the constituent parties will depend on the ideological and cultural rationale which underpins the system.

A further type of party-system should be noted - 'dominant', in which more than one party exists but one party dominates
because effective opposition is lacking. The monopolisation of power in India by the Congress Party is an example of this. In effect, such systems approximate a unitarian system. Sometimes more than one party is found in a communist system - for instance, the G.D.R. had four parties alongside the ruling SED in a 'National Front'. However, the minor parties could not act independently, they were 'secondary'. 'Communist Party' is used to denote those parties with power, although they may have other names - such as, the East German 'Socialist Unity Party' (SED).


103. See Almond and Powell, op. cit., Chs. 7 and 8.


105. In respect of this, Schöpflin is wrong to declare 'party' a "complete misnomer" when applied to those organisations in a communist system dubbed thus. He argues that they are in no way a part of anything, that they do not seek to represent a partial
interest in society but, instead, have arrogated to themselves a role as aggregators of most, if not all interactions. Clearly, they are a part of something - the political system in which they operate. Further, they seek to represent a partial interest - the working class. Of course, if cynical (or realistic), the divorce of ideology and practice identified by Schöpflin might lead to a re-characterisation of this representative function: rather than the working class of its theory, in practice the party represents the interests of its own 'bureaucratic' 'new class'. But, the representative function is still performed. Finally, recognition of an aggregative function is recognition of another feature of a party. (However, aggregation is usually understood to be of interests; the possibility, purpose and meaning of 'interaction' is not delineated).

Earlier objection to the use of 'party' vis a vis communist systems was made by Ionescu. His rejection of it was duplex. First, because, etymologically, 'party' is derived from the verb partir - one sense of which is to share or divide - he contends that the term cannot describe anything whole or unique. This is clearly a nonsense objection. By this measure, logically parties in liberal democracies would not qualify (something I am sure Ionescu would not countenance). For, the oft heard electors' cry "they're all the same, anyway" notwithstanding, it cannot be doubted that each party in any liberal democracy is both whole and unique. The second strand to Ionescu's objection is that the admission - albeit understated - of a constitutional role for the party in communist systems implies that there should be more than one party. However, there is nothing which makes clear why there should be more than one party in a system. Mistakenly, Ionescu invokes Stalin to support his case: "As to freedom for various political parties, on this we have our own views. A party is part of a class, its most advanced part!" This brings us back to our rejection of Schöpflin's first point. A party, as part of a class, is a part of a socio-political
system. The sense of Stalin's comment is than an avowedly class based system, led by the party representing that class, has no place for others; it is certainly not an implicit recognition that other parties ought to exist in such systems. Metaphorically, we might argue that the digestive systems of cows and humans perform the same function. However, the cow's digestive process requires four stomachs, whereas human digestion needs only one.


106. On leadership recruitment, see Almond and Powell, op.cit., p.124ff. Whereas membership of Western parties is normally open to all, involving only application, acceptance and payment of subscription fee, the need to protect against opposition and reaction means that ruling communist parties must be more rigorous. Only the right people should be admitted to the party in a communist system. Where liberal democratic parties are open to all, ruling communist parties tend to be a relatively closed elite, operating a 'cadre' policy. To join, a candidate must lodge an application to the appropriate basic organisation, along with a completed questionnaire, a curriculum vitae and references from two party members of more than two years standing, who have known the candidate socially and professionally for one year. If initially successful, the candidate serves a year's probation, after which the whole application process must begin again. (E. Schneider, The GDR: The History, Politics, Economy and Society of East Germany, C. Hurst and Co., London, 1978, p.36.)


111. White, et. al., op. cit., p.4.


113. See note 10.

114. Ferrero, op. cit., p.141.


118. Ferrero, op. cit., p.141.


120. Ibid., p.32-3.

121. Ibid.; Sternberger, loc. cit., calls this 'numinous' legitimacy, pp.244-5 (cf. note 11).


123. Lowenthal, loc. cit., p.103; see also Peter Zwick, National Communism, Westview, Boulder, 1983.


125. For example, the exchanges between Romania and Hungary in 1988 on the former's plan to destroy villages with ethnic Hungarian inhabitants. See unauthored 'Situation of Ethnic Hungarians in Romania viewed with Mounting Concern', RFE, 25 February, 1988.

127. The emphasis in Gorbachev’s *perestroika* was to generate greater effectiveness in the Soviet economy; any social or political restructuring is linked to this purpose. See, for example, Francoise Thom. anders aslund

128. In principle, this means any penetrating, dominant foreign power. In practice, that power was the Soviet Union.


131. *Easton, op. cit.*


134. Examples of a lack of consensus at the community level abound – prominent ones include Ulster, the Lebanon, Palestine and, of course, Yugoslavia.


140. Ibid., p. 27.


144. H. Gordon Skilling, ‘Czechoslovak Political Culture: Pluralism in an International Context’ in Brown, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 119; of course, one cannot expect constant ‘action’ – it is not possible to be implementing one’s beliefs all the time.


146. Ibid.

148. Pye 'Legitimacy Crisis', p.158.

149. Lucien W. Pye, 'Identity and Political Culture' in L.S. Binder, et. al., op. cit., p.105 and 'Legitimacy Crisis', p.144; there is a notable similarity in this to the views of Habermas.

150. Ibid., p.147.

151. Ibid., p.149; see also Idem., 'Identity', p.133-4.


153. Samuel P. Huntington, 'Political Development'


155. For example, Claude Welch and Arthur Smith set the "extent and nature" of political participation and the strength of civil institutions against "military strength"; they then add the "nature" of the civil-military boundary. The first of those notions complicates the analysis; it (and the last) are a hindrance in that they do not 'fit' the other two concepts used. They do not facilitate clear understanding. See Welch and Smith, op. cit., Ch.3.


158. See Huntington, Political Order and Political Change

159. On the need for economy and simplicity in the construction of theory, see S.E. Finer, op. cit., p. 243.


165. See Huntington, Soldier, pp. 11-18 and 60-86.

166. See Huntington, op. cit., p. 71. However, this notion of 'neutrality' is spurious. Any army is always political. Cf. Martin Edmonds, "Armed Forces and Legitimacy in Britain: Emerging Stresses and Dichotomies", paper presented at the Colloque sur les systemes militaires britannique et francais, Toulouse, 1976, p. 5.
167. For example, Soviet military doctrine is a qualitative concept from that understood in Western countries. Whereas, in a Western context, the idea relates specifically to guiding notions in military science, for a Soviet officer, it is understood as a part of the whole social and political system. Mensur Ibrahimović, 'Vojna subordinacija kao determinanta strukture: Princip Organizacije Armije', Zbornik Radova 1, Belgrade, 1969, writes of the military's technical and social roles (pp.66-7). See also Christopher N. Donnelly, Heirs of Clausewitz: Change and Continuity in the Soviet War Machine, Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies Occasional Paper, No.16, London, 1985, pt.III, esp., pp.20-1.

168. Kolkowicz, op.cit., Ch. 4.

169. The party-army organisation here designated 'MPA' has a different title in other communist states. Indeed, MPA is only the most recent name given to it in the USSR. For the purpose of the present discussion, this form will be used to denote the type.

170. Kolkowicz, op.cit., p.84ff.


174. Cited by Kolkowicz, op. cit., p.82.


176. Christopher D. Jones, 'Political Administrations of the Warsaw Pact and the Reliability of the East-Bloc Armed Forces' in Daniel

177. Colton, *op. cit.*, pp.48ff reckons that 75 per cent of all Soviet officers and over 96 per cent of those ranking Colonel or higher are party members. T.M. Forster, *The East German Army: Second in the Warsaw Pact*, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1980, p.167, reports the following party membership figures: 99.2 per cent of all officers, 42.8 per cent of NCOs, 7.2 per cent of other ranks and 37.7 per cent of civilian employees in the army. A Yugoslav figure put membership at 97 per cent among officers, 10 per cent of other troops and 52 per cent of civilian workers in the army. (*Narodna Armija*, 24 April, 1986). Such totals may be considered typical.


186. The foregoing has been based largely on findings a propos of the Soviet Union. Whilst giving an initial idea of the communist civil-military framework, it cannot be said to be a perfect
representation of each case. However, such an understanding of the structure of communist civil-military relations is an adequate starting point.


189. In a liberal democracy, the state is a go-between which separates those who make policy - the government - from those it affects. For example, in the United Kingdom, the Ministry of Defence mediates between the Secretary of State for Defence and the Armed Forces; the Department of Health and Social Security lies between the Secretary of State for that Department and the Health Authorities and Hospitals, and so on. The Secretary of State and those on the receiving end of the policies have no immediate contact.

This is the formal position in a communist system. However, the reality is somewhat modified. Whereas liberal democracies rely on the notion of a permanent, independent, professional and neutral bureaucracy, in a communist system, the bureaucrats are controlled by the party’s nomenklatura system. Indeed, the ‘politicised bureaucracy’ of the state intercedes between those with power, the party elite, and the objects of their policies, the soldiers, enterprise managers and so forth, who will also be party-vetted. See, S.E. Finer, Comparative Government, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1974, pp.69-71; Neil Elder, ‘The Function of the Modern State’ in J.E.S. Hayward and R.N. Berki, eds., State and Society in

190. Perlmutter and Leo Grande, loc. cit., .

191. See Colton, op. cit., pp.26-7; Dominguez, op. cit., p.75, notes that in the years 1962, 1965 and 1975, whereas 'strictly military' representation was 28 per cent, 58 per cent and 32.1 per cent, 'total' military representation was 56 per cent, 70 per cent and 38.9 per cent (respectively). On the other hand, in Yugoslavia, total military representation only slightly exceeded official military representation - A. Ross Johnson, 'The Role of the Military in Yugoslavia: An Historical Sketch' in R. Kolkowicz and A. Korbonski, eds., op. cit., .

192. In the USSR, there have been two Marshalls in the Politburo - Zhukov, briefly, and Grechko from 1973-76. It is clear that these appointments did not mean a military entitlement to a Politburo place, nor did they imply an institutional voice - rather, personal political qualities lead to these officers' elevation (Colton, op. cit., p.253).

In Eastern Europe in 1986, the following were military members of the appropriate politburo in the GDR, Minister of Defence Kessler - whose predecessor Hoffman held the same positions; in Bulgaria, Defence Minister Dzhurov; in Poland, party chief Jaruzelski was accompanied by Generals Baryla, Kiszczak and Siwicki (Minister of Defence); in Yugoslavia, where the party-state division is more important, Defence
Minister Mamula was a senior figure in the government and the head of the equivalent of the MPA, Jovičić, was a member of the highest party body. In Albania, although the Defence Minister in 1987 (Prokup Murra) had a civilian background, his predecessors (Ballaku and Shevn) were military members of the politburo; in 1987, Chief of the General Staff, Kico Mustaqi was a candidate member of that organ. In Romania, CC Secretary Ion Coman was a Political Executive Committee full member in 1987 and Defence Minister, Vasile Milea, an alternate (candidate) member.

Finally, in China, although the Minister of Defence was not a politburo member, in 1983, several other military figures were. These included Marshals Xu Xiangquian and Nie Rongzhen, plus Li Desheng, Commander of the Sheuang Military District, Yang Dezilir, Chief of the Arm General Staff, Zhang Tingfa, C-in-C of the Air Force, and Yu Qiuli, Director of the General Political Department (the MPA equivalent).


195. See George Sanford, op. cit., Ch.2, esp., p.81.


198. See Martin Edmonds, The Armed Services and Society, Leicester U.P., Leicester, 1988, pp.96-8. In a communist context, the GDR’s NVA may be interpreted as particularly performing this function in a delicate situation. Cf. Martin
McCauley, 'Legitimation in the German Democratic Republic' in Paul G. Lewis, ed., _op. cit._, p.60.


200. _Ibid._


203. _Ibid._, pp.122-3


206. This is particularly the case where major nationality issues are found such as in the USSR or Yugoslavia. In another sense, it is peculiarly important in the GDR. See Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone 'The Soviet Army as the Instrument of National Integration' in John Erickson and E.J. Feuchtwanger, eds., _Soviet Military Power and Performance_, MacMillan, London, 1979; Ellen Jones, _Red Army and Society: a Sociology of the Soviet Military_, Allen and Unwin, London, 1985.

207. Van Doorn, _loc. cit._, p.30.


212. Internationalism reflects the need to legitimise the substantial control of WIO armies by the Soviet Union, not national ministries. The particular national armies, it is argued, had been the crucial variables in a contest between the USSR and its East European satellites, the former trying to reduce, the latter trying to increase national autonomy and sovereignty. (Christopher D. Jones, op. cit.,) Whereas Yugoslavia, along with Albania and Romania, rested national sovereignty on their independent military capabilities, sovereignty in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and the GDR was limited by Soviet control of their military establishments. These armies were effectively under Soviet management. Various mechanisms made the national armies part of the Soviet military, using a network of bi-lateral ties formed under the umbrella of multilateral alliance.

Each member of that alliance, the WIO, based its activity on the "socialist coalition doctrine", the essential ingredient of which was unity of command. De facto, this meant unity of command by the Soviet military. In the advent of war, Soviet Armed Forces (SAF) headquarters in Moscow would become Warsaw Pact headquarters. In peacetime, there was a (qualified) Soviet right to appoint personnel in WIO agencies. In practice, this resulted in Soviet control of promotion to senior ranks in the WIO national armies. This necessarily fragmented national control over indigenous armies in Eastern Europe. The various agencies of the Warsaw Pact, therefore, had a 'legitimacy function' for Soviet hegemony. The core of this legitimation was internationalism.
Internationalism served as a supranational principle which, in effect, bound other WTO members to the USSR. In the SAF much is made of the October Revolution and the Great Patriotic War. Particularly, there is emphasis on the the experience of different nationalists fighting at each other's sides, a 'brotherhood in arms.' This was extended in the East European armies, where 'local' material was used, recalling 'revolutionary exploits' and 'wartime struggles' against fascism arm in arm with Soviet comrades. Great emphasis was placed on each country's debt to the USSR, including: the defeat of Nazi Germany and, so, liberation; the training of the army and supplying it with equipment; the sponsoring of 'national' formations on Soviet soil (a propos of Poles, Czechs and Romanians); and protection from imperialist attack or counter-revolution.

Internationalism justified the national armies' operating only in joint exercises: national armies could not be found exercising independently above divisional level. The implication of this is that WTO East European armies did not (or could not) function independently; each national army's capability to act on its own (for example, against the Soviet Union) was severely restricted (if not eradicated) by training which involved only joint exercises at any significant level. This was reinforced by systems of bilateral ties between units and regiments of one Pact member's army and another's; it was more likely that a unit would be used to working with its twin in the SAF and (or) one of the other allies than with other units of its own army. This, whilst enhancing, possibly, the creation of a 'Greater Socialist (or Soviet) Army' also added to the fragmentation of the national armies, further reducing their capacities for autonomous activity.

214. In analysing military legitimacy in WIO East European cases, our understandings would have to incorporate the fact that, in terms of environmental support, there was a dual aspect. Even more so than for the regimes of Eastern Europe, the armed forces' legitimacy included a substantial Soviet dimension. Both civil and military leaders had a compact not only with their own society, but, with the USSR. The national armies of Eastern Europe had to have the support of not only their own community, but, also, of the Soviet Union.

215. Edmonds, 'Armed Forces'.


CHAPTER 3


2. Both are means of conflict resolution. (Cf the definition of this in Chapter 2.)


5. See Rapoport on Lenin in the introduction to Clausewitz, *op. cit.*, p.31ff.

6. The following account of inter war Yugoslavia is drawn principally from Joseph Rothschild's *East Central Europe*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1974.


10. For example, Arso Jovanović who became Chief of Staff in the Partisans; see Milovan Djilas, *Wartime*, p.19 and *Vojna Enciclopedia* (hereafter, *VE*), Vol.4, p.75.

11. For example, Djilas, *op. cit.*, p.15, cites Tito's orders: "...shoot anyone - even a member of the provincial leadership, if he wavers or shows any lack of discipline." According to Ljubo Sirc, examples of lack of discipline were stealing an apple from an orchard or for men and women to be seen kissing each other - see *Between Hitler and Stalin*, Andre Deutsch, 1989, pp.63-4.

uncritical source of both information and references. Throughout VE there are entries on various units and aspects of the war. For an account of the evolution of the National Liberation Army, see Chapter 4.

13. The leadership of the Chetniks was formed from the old Serb officer corps, experienced only in conventional warfare. They were unsuited for conducting the guerilla war which became necessary. Moreover, they were notably unsuitable for providing the leadership required to solve political problems as the war developed.

As the war continued, their political priorities became confused. The Partisans became the main enemy; the Chetniks even collaborated with the occupation forces in order to try to crush the Communists. This action lost the movement support even among the Serb people from which they sprang; equally important, it lost them British support. The British had felt compelled to support the Chetniks as representatives of the royal regime which Britain supported. British assistance was given, instead, to Tito. This played a large part, after 1943, in the Partisans’ consolidation of power. (See Mark Wheeler, Britain and the War for Yugoslavia 1940-1943, East European Monographs, Boulder, 1980, Djilas, op. cit. and for a jolly good read, Fitzroy MacLean, Eastern Approaches, Jonathan Cape, London, 1950.)

A further Chetnik weakness was the interest in re-establishing the old Serb-dominated system. Their support, consequently, was largely confined to the Serb population. The Chetniks could not lead a common Yugoslav liberation struggle. A great strength of the Partisan movement, in contrast, was that it was not exclusively the property of a particular nationalism. It aimed to establish a federal governmental system after the war. The majority of non-Serbs wanted this, following years of oppression under the old Serb-centralist system; and they were prepared to fight for what they wanted.

15. According to the 1931 census, there were 68 000 Jews in the whole of Yugoslavia; on the eve of the war they numbered 70-75 000. Around 60 000 were killed during the war. In Croatia, 124 000 Serbs and Montenegrins (out of 600 000) were killed. See Boguojub Kočović, *Jartve Drugog Svetskog Rata u Jugoslaviji*, Naše Delo, London, 1985, p.119ff.

16. For example in Slovenia, the White Guard; see Mark C. Wheeler, *'Beli Orli in Bela Garda'*, in Dusan Biber, ed., *Konec Druga Svetovne Voje v Jugoslaviji*, Borec, Ljubljana, 1986.


20. Ibid., p.132.


22. Ibid., p.125.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid., p.117.


29. Auty, *op. cit.*, p.291. This was unforgivable to Stalin.


49. Hoffman and Neal, *op. cit.*, p.82.


51. Wilson, *op. cit.*, p.70.


56. *Ibid*.


58. *After ibid.*


61. Ibid., p.139.


63. Moore, op. cit., p.61.

64. Ibid.


66. Ibid, p.9

67. Rusinow, op. cit., p.139.

68. Moore, op. cit., p.11.


70. Lendvai, op. cit., p.159.

71. It is said that Tito reluctantly did this because the YPA provided him with proof that UDBa had been taping him.

72. Fejto, op. cit., p.203.

73. Ibid.

74. Lendvai, op. cit., p.163.

75. Ibid, p.166.

76. Johnson, Twilight, p.12.

77. See Lendvai, op. cit., p.157.


82. Ibid.

83. See Lendvai, *op.cit.*, pp.131-33 and p.166.


85. Ibid., p.177.

86. Ibid., p.176.

87. Ibid., p.178.

88. Ibid., p.184.

89. Ibid., p.178.


CHAPTER 4

1. *Vojna Enciklopedija* (hereafter,VE), Vol.4, p.136; resistance preparations were begun earlier in Slovenia. Where the communist
led Liberation Front took the decision to organise on 22 June, whereas the CPY only made that move on July 4.


4. Ibid., p.54.

5. On the use of the term ‘partisan’ see ibid., p.57.

6. Ibid., p.100.


8. The OF (Osvobodilne Fronta) was a Communist Party of Slovenia (CPS) led coalition was formed from the Anti-imperial Front organised on 27 April 1941 against the axis invasion. The CPS had been criticised by Tito for creating the Anti-imperial Front as this was an action counter to Moscow’s will - and therefore Tito’s. It changed its name afte the 22nd June invasion of the Soviet Union. The OF was a broad based organisation which involved a majority of the population. See Metod Mikuž, Pregled Zgodovine NOB v Sloveniji (Vol I) p.96ff. However, in spite of the degree of popular participation, proportionally few became engaged in Partisan activities - to Tito’s irritation. Indeed, the situation in Slovenia was distinct from that in other parts of Yugoslavia - until the latter stages of the war (as in so much else later) events in Slovenia were separate from those in the rest of Yugoslavia and Slovenia was not present at the first AVNOJ session in 1943, then only an observer at the second a year later. (See


12. Tito, 'Consultation', op. cit., p.82.


15. Tito, 'Order on partisan insignia, saluting and national flags', op. cit., p.84.


23. Ibid., p.35.


25. Anić, loc. cit., p.35.


27. Vf, Vol.4, p.137.


30. On the basis of 6 independent batallions, each with around 3000 fighters (thus, 18 000) plus 17 partisan detachments; see Anić, loc. cit., pp.25 and 28.

31. Ibid., pp.26 and 28.


34. Ibid., p.64, reports 4000 fighters organised in two divisions and 5500 partisans in the whole of Slovenia; this is consistent with

35. VE, Vol.4, p.137.

36. Ibid.


40. VE Vol. 4, p.478.

41. Petelin, op. cit., p.266.

42. Anić, loc. cit., p.48.

43. Ibid., p.65.

44. VE, Vol.4, p.478.


46. For example, Petelin, op. cit.,

47. Anić, loc. cit., p.48.


49. Ibid. pp.272-282.

50. Ibid.; Petelin, op. cit., p.266.
51. Anić, loc. cit., pp.48-9; see the subsequent pages for the development of corps in various parts of the country.

52. Ibid., p.72.

53. Ibid., pp.72-3.


60. On political cultural work see Nikolić, op. cit., pp.31-41.


64. Ibid., p. 427.


66. Ibid., p.613.

67. See Tito, ‘Address at the First Session of the National Anti-fascist Council for the Liberation of Yugoslavia’, op. cit., p.141; for a full study of the partisan economy in one part of Yugoslavia, see Metod Mikuž, Slovensko Partizansko Gospodarstvo, Zavod Borec, Ljubljana, 1969

68. Djilas, op. cit., p.103.


70. Petelin, op. cit., p.396.

71. Anić, loc. cit., p.73.

72. Pantelić, loc. cit.,.


74. Roksandić, loc. cit., p. 161; see also Kovacević, loc. cit., passim.


77. VE vol. 4, p.140.


79. Todorović, loc.cit., p.103.


81. VE, Vol. 4. p.140.

82. The Allies' concerns in Greece were, of course, pursued in line with the Churchill-Stalin accords at Yalta.


84. Ibrahimpišić, op. cit., p.166.


86. Ibrahimpišić, op. cit., p.163-4.

87. Ibid., p.164.


89. Between 1945 and 1951, 9600 YA personnel took qualifications from Soviet military schools and academies - see Milos Prelević, Drustvena Suština Vojne Sile, VIZ, Belgrade, 1972, p.158; on Yugoslav military education, see Djordje Stanić, 'Military Schools of the Yugoslav People's Army', Yugoslav Survey, No.2, 1975.

90. Ibrahimpišić, loc. cit., p.168.
91. Ibid., p.165.

92. Tempo, op. cit., p.31.


94. Ibid., p.149.

95. Todorović, loc. cit., p.104.

96. VE, Vol. 4, p 141.

97. Ibid., p.143; Nikolovski, loc. cit., p.135ff.

98. Lukić, op. cit., p.20.


100. Kovačević, loc. cit., p.12.


102. VE, Vol. 4, p.141.


108. Roberts, op. cit., p.150, cites the report of an American general making a visit to assess the YA in 1951.
109. Ibid., p.149.

110. VE, p.142.

111. Pantelić, loc. cit., p.31.

112. Ibid.


117. VE, Vol.4, p.142; Pantelic, loc. cit., p 32.

118. See Lukić, loc. cit., pp.24-5.


120. Borba, 6 June, 1970.

121. Pantelić, loc. cit., pp.36-7.


123. See, for example, 'Tito's Ljubljana Speech Analysed', RFE, 12 December, 1969.


133. Ibid.


135. Ibid.


139. Ibid.

140. Communications between the Supreme Staff and the Main Staffs presented little difficulty. The real problems lay in communications between the Main Staffs and the corps, divisional and brigade commands. Anic, *loc. cit.*, p.61.


147. Rusinow, loc. cit., p.2.


152. Janowitz, op. cit., argues that in many countries the army is the best educated, most technically advanced and, therefore, best equipped part of the community to provide these.


154. Ibid., pp.87-8.

156. Pejanović, _op. cit._, p.88.


164. _Ibid._, p.479.

165. Pejanović, pp.31-34.

166. Kovacević, _loc. cit._, p.70-71.

167. Pejanović, _op. cit._, p.47.


170. _Ibid._, p.133.

172. Dušan Pekić, 'Neki Aspekti Daljeg Razvoja Oružanih Snaga', Oružane Snage, p. 457; see also Pejanović, pp. 94-107.


175. See Ibrahimpići, op. cit., pp. 192-219, passim.


179. PIC/276, National Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia, Public Records Office, Political Intelligence Command Middle East, June 1944, p. 29.


181. PIC/276, p. 29.

182. For example, Janković, op. cit., pp. 68-9.

183. Ibrahimpići, op. cit., pp. 147 and 198-222.


185. Ibid., p. 144.

187. The Croat figure includes Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

188. PIC/276, p.24

189. Nikolić, op. cit., p.143; these figures appear to be for 1972.


191. Ibid.


196. Illustrovana Politika, 6 April, 1982.

197. Pejanović, op. cit., p.54.


204. A. Ross Johnson, RAND, P 6070, p.10.

205. The Officer Corps was traditionally Serb dominate. Only in the High Command was there proportionality. See Denitch, op. cit., p.114.

206. In 1971, 54 per cent of officers thought "nationalism and chauvanism" the greatest single present danger to Yugoslavia. See Johnson, RAND, P 6070, p.11ff.


RAND p - 4746, (Santa Monica, 1971); Adam Roberts, op. cit., Chs. 5 and 6.


212. Ibid., p.177.

213. Ibid., p.176.


222. Ibid., p.46.

223. Johnson, 'The Role of the Military'.

224. The YPA was not, I believe, co-opted in preparation for the succession to Tito as has been suggested - although this was a contingency. See S.K. Pavlowith "The Grey Area on NATO’s Balkan flank", Survey, Vol. 25 No.3., 1978, p.74.

225. Dean, loc. cit., p.29.

226. The military in fact mostly kept a low profile on non-defence issues.


228. Ibid., p.50.

CHAPTER 5


5. Ibid.


8. Shoup, loc. cit., p.133.


11. EIU, Yugoslavia, No, 1, 1987, pp. 3-5.


15. EIU, Yugoslavia, No. 4, 1988, pp.9-10.


22. NIN, 10 and 17 April, 1983.


27. Biberaj, loc. cit., p.54.


33. Francesco Altimari et al, Albanci, Cankarjeva Založba, Ljubljana, 1984, which is a fairly balanced collection. See also Alex N. Dragniich ans Slavko Todorović, eds., The Saga of Kosovo: Focus on Serbian Albanian Relations, East European Monographs, Boulder, 1984; Ranko Petković, Kosovo: Prošlost i Sadašnjost, Međunarodna Politika, 1989; Vuksan Cerović, Kosovo: Kontrarevolucija Koja Teče, Nova Kniga, Belgrade, 1989, for increasingly pro-Serb (and therefore propagandistic) versions; Arshi Pipa and Sami Rapishti, eds., Studies on Kosova, East European Monographs, Boulder, 1984, is a collection generally more sympathetic to the Kosovo Albanians.


38. Ibid., p.41.


41. Ibid., p.41.

42. Ibid., p.48.


47. Stanković, 'The Kosovo Unrest'.


50. Ibid.


57. Biberaj, loc. cit., p.46.


59. Le Monde, 6 April, 1981.

60. Illustrovana Politika, 6 April, 1982.


64. NIN, 6 August, 1981.

65. See Rusinow, 'Nationalities Policy'.


67. NIN, 9 November, 1986.

68. See Shoup, loc. cit.,

69. See Rusinow, 'Nationalities Policy', pp.148-152


71. Pavlowitch, op. cit., p.146.

73. See Rusinow, 'Nationalities Policy', p.141 ff.

74. Schöpflin, 'Political Decay', p.317.

75. Ibid., p.313.

76. This interpretation is borrowed from an international investment banker involved in handling Yugoslavia's debt.

77. See Shoup, loc. cit.


82. Mamula, Politika, 22 December, 1983.

84. Colonel-General Milan Daljević, Assistant Secretary for Defence and Chair of the Co-ordinating Committee for All-People’s Defence, Narodna Armija, 3 July, 1986.


89. Mamula, Politika, 22 December, 1983.


91. This feature was evident at an early stage. The Partisans "outlook on the nationalities question leads them to regard the movement as Yugoslav in character" was one wartime report. P.I.C./276 National Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia, P.I.C.M.E., June, 1944, p.25.

93. On the transition from a wartime to a post-war officer cadre see the 'Koj je naš oficir?' pieces in NIN, 7 and 14 March, 1976.


100. Daljević, Borba, 22 April, 1986.


103. The entry of former Secretary of Defence Nikola Ljubičić into first the Presidency of the Serb Republic and later the Federal State Presidency may be seen as an extension of the military's role into State bodies; its constitutional role was within the LCY. With no official representation in State organs, it is feasible that an army constituency was being built within them. If such a development occurred, it was probably not intended to be
so, initially. Lipović's swift move from the Ministry of Defence to the Serbian Presidency seemed to be one designed to ensure stability and reliability in the Serb leadership in the wake of Kosovo and the Serb 'nationalist' backlash.


115. See Slobodan Stanković, 'The Yugoslav Army adopts a wait-and-see attitude', RFE, 21 January, 1986 on the importance of 'Yugoslavism' to the YPA. It is worth noting that 10 per cent of delegates to the 8th LCY-YPA organisation conference were declared Yugoslavs, whereas only 5.4 per cent of the whole population were thus designated.


117. Cf Johnson 'The Role of the Military in Kolkowicz and Korbonski, eds., op. cit., p.198; Denitch, op. cit., p.114; Drago Chas Sporer, 'Politics and Nationalism within the Yugoslav People' Army', Journal of Croatian Studies, Vol. XX. 1979, p.127; and the figures for delegates to the LCY organisation in the YPA conference (in percentages: 42.63 Serbs; 14.21 Croats; 10 Yugoslavs; 9.45 Montenegrins; 6.4 Slovenes; 6.31 Macedonians; 5.6 Muslims; 3.15 Albanians; 1.05 Hungarians; and 1.05 'others'; (Borba, 22 April, 1986). There was general agreement that 60-70 per cent of the officer corps was Serb or Montenegrin.

118. Politika, 23 April, 1986.


123. Ibid.

125. Mladina, 19 April, 1984.


128. See Remington, 'Political-Military', note 44.


130. For example, Daljević, Narodna Armija, 1 January, 1987.

131. Cf Tanjug 1643 GMT, 16 January, 1987, translated by SWB, 19 January, 1987 in which it is reported that there are "no obstacles" to the posting of notices in Slovene.


137. Ibid.


142. Changes to the law on military service enabled conscripts who refused to carry arms on grounds of religious belief to perform two years (rather than the usual 12 months) unarmed service instead. Whilst this was short of complete excusing from conscription, it completely broke with basic principles outlined by Daljević. *Borba*, 24 March 1989.


144. See, for example, the editorial by the "Counter-revolutionary Editorial Board", *Mladina*, 18 March, 1988; also, the article which opened up the issues of a possible military occupation of Slovenia and the complicity of Slovene leaders in this at a secret LCY CC meeting - ‘Night of the Long Knives: The Dangerous Games of the Secret State’, *Mladina*, 20 May, 1988.


146. At a meeting in Belgrade, Robert Botteri is reported to have claimed that, in the previous year, of a total of 5000 articles published in Mladina, only 36 dealt with the army. SWB, 9 June, 1988.

147. For a review of its disputes on the YPA, see Mladina, 22 April, 1988.


151. Narodna Armija, 10 March, 1988. This gave rise to a joke 'report' in Mladina when General Veljko Kadjević succeeded, in May, Mamula. In it, Kadjević is asked if he, too, will build a villa; he replies that there is no need - he has one already. Mladina, 20 May, 1988.


154. RFE, 2 May, 1988, reported that Tone Peršek, a member of the Slovene Constitutional Commission, was alleged to have said this by Radio Belgrade.
155. Politika, 9 June, 1988, referring to Jansa's candidacy, said that it should not mean his being placed 'above the law'.

156. SWB, 30 June, 1988.

157. It did so on 6 June, 1988 (Mladina, 21 October, 1988).

158. SWB, 10 June, 1988.

159. SWB, 30 June 1988.

160. For discussion of this Article and the 'Jansa case', see Naši Razgledi, 23 September, 1988.

161. A statement by the Federation of Slovene Lawyers drew attention to this and other matters, SWB, 14 June, 1988. See also the editorial in Teleks, 14 July, 1988.


163. NIN, 10 July, 1988.

164. Ibid.

165. Ibid.

166. Delo, 8 June, 1988. When the JBTZ sentences were made, the reason given for Tasić's only having 6 months was his not having done military service. Borštner was given four years because he was a serving soldier who should have recognised a secret; Jansa was given 18 months because he was an 'expert', and Zavrl because he had done military service and, therefore, should have had some knowledge. SWB, 29 July, 1988.


171. Mladina, 27 May, 1988 published an open letter from various journalists and intellectuals, which included the demand for the official notes of the secret meeting of the CC LCY Presidency on 29 March. This was to establish whether the notes of a meeting held at this time, which had been passed to Mladina were authentic.

172. This is clearly confirmed in a statement on the arrests by Tomaz Ertl, Republican Secretary for Internal Affairs. SWB, 22 June, 1988. For the essential elements of the Kučan notes, see Mladina, 3 June, 1988.

173. SWB, 1 July, 1988


176. SWB, 23 November, 1988; SWB, 30 November, 1988, reports a Radio Belgrade commentary on this.

177. The reports in Il Giornale and La Reppubblica were referred to in Mladina, 13 and 20 October, 1989.


182. SWB, 28 Jul, 1988 - although in this instance the Article cited is not 21, but, 3; ; the SFRY Presidency was asked to re-examine its conclusions Delo, 26 July, 1988.


184. This view was expressed in a report of expert opinion by Miran Potrč, President of the Slovene Assembly, in the Assembly (Ibid.).

185. See Article 240 of the SFRY Constitution.

186. Delo, 30, 31 March and 1 April, 1989; Mladina, 7 and 21 April, 1989.


188. Kučan on RTV Ljubljana's 'Tednik', 28 July, 1988; cited in Mladina, 21 October, 1988. Sovereignty and the homogenisation of Slovene politics were issues addressed at a second big rally in Ljubljana in November (Teleks, 24 November, 1988). From a different viewpoint, the bringing together of the various elements in Slovene politics was recognised in a piece on the trial in Narodna Armija, 4 August, 1988, in which the author complained that there was no difference between Borstner and the Slovene leadership.

189. SWB, 8 August, 1988. Joze Smole made the linguistic-constitutional point by going against his usual practice and speaking in Slovene at an SAWPY session, Delo, 21 September, 1988. Smole also complained about the holding of an SAWPY session on 22 July, the day of the Slovene uprising - therefore, a Republican holiday - against the agreement on holding meetings on national days (SWB, 26 July, 1988). It was later decided that the
SAWP recommend that its delegates should use Slovene when appearing in federal bodies, SWB, 15 November, 1988.

190. See, for example, *Naša Obramba*, Nos. 3, 5 and 7, 1970, and Gow, loc. cit., p.80.


195. ‘Socialism on a Human Scale’ became Kučan’s main theme, alongside the notion of a ‘legal state’.


197. For comments by then Prime Minister Mikulić, see *SWB*, 25 Oct., 1988. For the amendment as finally agreed, see *Delo*, 2 Nov., 1988.


201. Narodna Armija, 17 November and 1 December, 1988; see also Jože Smole’s speech reported in SWB, 15 November, 1988.

202. In saying this, we should note however, the unsubstantiated and unlikely claim that more interest has been shown in a military career among Slovenes during the previous year. SWB, 9 November, 1988.

203. See Gow, loc. cit., pp.82-94.


210. This seems to me clearly to be the case, although, of course, it was never stated as such. It was certainly perceived to be the case in Serbia, where Slobodan Milošević was able to manipulate Serbia's constitutional situation to mobilise mass support by arguing the need to make Serbia "whole" again. (See for example, Milošević, Godine Raspleta, BIGZ, Belgrade, 1989, pp.187-278 passim., esp., p. 264ff.)

212. See Biberaj, *loc. cit.*.

213. See *The Times*, 3, 4, 6, 7, 28, 29, 30, 31 March and 1 April, 1989 - the editorials on 3 and 30 March are especially worthy; Milan Andrejevich, 'Kosovo in Turmoil Again' and 'Yugoslavs React to the Situation in Kosovo as Arrests Begin', *RFE*, 8 March, 1989; *idem.*, 'The Unrest in Kosovo Escalates', *RFE*, 15 April, 1989; *Mladina*, 19 September 1989.


216. An article in *Mladina*, 1 September 1989 suggested that 'homogenisation' had never really occurred.


218. On the Belgrade press an interesting and curious piece in *Nova Hrvatska*, 14 March, 1989. In this article, the apparently systematic substitution of the Slovene President's surname for that of the editor of the Croat nationalist emigre editor of that periodical - Kučan instead of Kučan was used, presumably with the intention of smearing the Slovene leader. See also the attack in *Politika*, 9 March, 1989 on the generally respected Croat weekly *Danas*.


221. Mladina, 12 September, 1989.


223. Indeed, the situation recalls Ivan Cankar’s *Bailiff Yemey*, in which the greatest of Slovene writers created a metaphor for his country and his people under the Austro-Hungarian empire. This metaphor has relevance for 1989.

Bartholomew, the bailiff of the title, has faithfully served Old Sitar for forty years, having built his master’s house and worked every corner of his master’s land. When Old Sitar dies, Young Sitar inherits and immediately stops Yemey from sitting by the corner of the fire in the house, as he always has. When Yemey laughs, thinking this and similar assertions by the brash new master cannot be serious, he is dismissed.

Bartholomew goes to Ljubljana in search of his rights, assuming that, having built the house and lived in it as his own for so long, he cannot be thrown out in this way. There, the courts treat him as a joke figure. He is sure that he has rights, having worked so long on the estate, and asks for justice. He is disappointed. So, he goes to Vienna, convinced that, there, he will see the Emperor, who will dispense justice and affirm his rights. Instead, he is arrested as a vagrant, interrogated by men who do not speak to him in his own language (plus ça change....for German, substitute Serbo-Croat), identified by his papers and sent back.
Broken and without his rights, Bartholomew returns to collect the pipe he left in the house. The book ends with Sitar’s house, the one Yemey built, burning down. The former bailiff, standing with his fists on his hips, watching and laughing, is savaged by the villagers and thrown into the fire.

It is conceivable that the Slovenes’ assertion of their rightful position in the Yugoslav house may be accommodated. If not, then, like the partner in a marriage which has been on the rocks for years and subject to many efforts to save it, reluctantly, the Slovenes may walk out. Like the bailiff in Cankar’s novella, in 1989, they did not want to leave the house, only to have their rights inside it recognised.

Should it come to a matter of secession, the outcome may be ominously pre-figured in The Bailiff Verney. After the secrets trial, Stanovnik described the Republic’s disputing that matter as ‘sticking one’s hand in the fire’. To seek to secede may result in the Yugoslav house’s burning down and the bailiff Kučan’s Slovenia being thrown into the flames - along with the bailiff himself.]

224. Mladina, 9 December, 1988, carried a poll showing 79 per cent believing a multi-party system to be necessary.

225. Shoup, loc. cit.,.

226. This view was expressed by a member of the Tito old-guard, Franc Šetinc in an article in a Slovene military publication - a point, perhaps of some note. See Naša Obramba, No. 10, October, 1989.


229. For example, see FBIS, 8 December, 1988.
230. According to Amendment XXXII, GPD would be organised throughout the whole republic, that is, the autonomous provinces would be effectively left out; moreover, a key phrase declared that defence would be organised "in the interests of the republic as a whole." (Politika, 7 January, 1989.)

231. The Ministry of Defence was responsible for a strongly worded document attacking the Slovene changes. The document, marked 'strictly confidential' was obtained and published by Mladina, 29 September, 1989.


233. Kadijević stated this in an otherwise reformist address to a session of the YPA-LCY Central Committee, Komunist, 14 July, 1989.

234. Vice-Admiral Petar Šimić, Head of the LC-YPA organisation, SWB, 5 December, 1989.


CHAPTER 6

1. Miller did so in a review of M. Milivojević, et al., eds., Yugoslavia's Security Dilemmas: Armed Forces, National Defence and


7. Mladina, 23 December, 1988; Branko Soban, 'Zgolj Vojaško Ali Tudi Politično Dejanje', Delo, 7 January, 1989 (which was a useful guide in writing this section).


11. Soban, loc. cit.,.


13. Article 239.

14. Soban, loc. cit.,.


17. Soban, _loc. cit._.

18. On the OF and its predecessor, see Metod Mikuž, _Pregled Zgodovine NOV v Sloveniji_, Vol.I, Cankarjeva Založba, Ljubljana, 1960. It is interesting to note that the OFs original programme of 22 June called for "brotherhood and peace" between nations, not the Partisans more famous "brotherhood and unity," (quoted by Mikuž, p.154).


22. Soban, _loc. cit._.


27. The speech was published in full in a 32 page pull out 'Aktuelni problemi obrane u odnosu na suvremena kretanja u svijetu i u nas - modernizacija koncepcije opoenarodne obrane' in _Narodna Armija_, 21 April, 1988.


32. Ibid.


34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.


39. Ibid., p.188.

40. Ibid., p.193.

41. Ibid., p.187.


43. Soban, loc. cit.,

44. Mamula, op. cit., p.189.

46. Soban, loc. cit.,

47. Mamula, 'Aktuelni problemi', p.22.

48. Soban, loc. cit.,


50. Soban, loc. cit.,

51. Soban, loc. cit.,


55. According to Jovičić the figure was 4.14 per cent and 4.6 per cent in 1985; Narodna Armija, 24 April, 1986; a more recent figure for 1984 is lower at 3.5 per cent (Borba, 3 February, 1987).


60. Kadijević gave this figure in an interview with Narodna Armija, 22 December, 1988.


70. Mamula, Politika, 22 December, 1983.

71. A further seventy firms worked in the defence industry, with yet another thousand making occasional contributions to the defence sector. Naša Obramba, March, 1989, p.58.

73. Borba, 23 April, 1986.


76. Mamula, Politika, 22 December, 1983.


91. The initial adverts appeared in *Narodna Armija*, 29 January, 1987 - although, the law was changed on 13 February, 1985 (see the Daljevic interview in *Borba*, 27-8 April, 1985.).


104. *Naša Obramba*, February, 1989, p.26ff. The army’s knee-jerk response to things Slovene led to a perception of attacks even in *Naša Obramba*. Gersak defended himself, saying he had lived in Serbia and Slovenia, favoured a modern SFRY, and, with regard to the YPA’s betes noires; "It is true that we live together in Ljubljana, however, I more or less do mot know them, still less, they me." He also asserted that the YPA was his army and that security was best achieved through societal and economic stability - something often said by YPA officers.


108. *Ibid*.


123. Keegan and Holmes, op. cit., pp.52-3.


131. Tanjug, Domestic Service (Serbo-Croat) 17.33 GMT, 10 November, 1988.


133. See Janez Janša, 'Kaj Misli'.


135. Janez Janša, 'Ozki Pogledi'.


137. Illustrovana Politika, 6 April, 1982.


153. *Ibid*.


155. *Ibid*. 


159. Westbrook, loc. cit., p.185.

160. Ibid.


163. From 646,000 in 1961, the total of Albanians (in Kosovo) became 916,000 in 1971 and 1,227 by 1981; Zdenko Antić, 'Exodus of Serbs from Kosovo', RFE, 18 May, 1981.


171. See Allcock, loc. cit., p.303.


177. Mirković, loc. cit., p.23.


179. Mirković, loc. cit., p.25.

180. See Mladina, 10 March, 1989.


183. See Ibid.

184. The naval service has always been more predominantly Croat than has the land Army been a Serb-Montenegrin preserve. Cf Pavlovitch, loc. cit. .


CHAPTER 7

1. See David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, esp. pp.171ff where the author discusses the idea of political community: his definition (political community is the "aspect of a political system that consists of its members seen as a group of persons bound together by political division of labour...[it is found when a] group of members...participate in a common structure and set of processes..." p.177) is borrorwed here.

2. Delo, 2 February, 1990


6. It was described as a "Bolshevik oriented and coloured....broader version of the Constitution of Serbia," *SWB*, 23 October, 1990.


26. Milan Andrejevich, 'Crisis'.


28. Of particular saliency was the Croatian interior ministry’s reorganisation of the police force, including the closure of local police stations in Serb populated territories and new recruitment, creating the belief that the Serbs would be subject to more centralised Croat control; Goldstein, *loc. cit.*, pp.65-6.


31. RFE, 20 April, 1990


33. For the following section, see EIU, *Yugoslavia*, No. 3, 1990, p. 16.

34. EEN 5 March 1990.

35. Delo, 3 February 1990; in 1988, this role was taken by the then LCY Secretary, Stipe Šuvar.


38. EIU, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-17.

39. Ibid., p. 18;

40. Ibid., p. 12.

41. Marković recognised this, but said that the "process of democratisation takes time...", ‘Survey of Yugoslav Trade’.

42. Andrejevich, ‘Macedonia’ highlights the common support of the Macedonian parties for the Marković reforms. EEN, 23 July 1990,
gives an account of Serbia's economic sabotage of Markovic's programme.


44. EIU, *op. cit.*, p.5.

---

**CHAPTER 8**


BIBLIOGRAPHY

PERIODICALS

Armed Forces and Society

Army

Borba

Business (Belgrade)

The Daily Telegraph

Comparative Politics

Danas

Delo

Dnevnik (Ljubljana)

East European Newsletter (EEN)

East European Reporter

East European Quarterly


Financial Times

Foreign Broadcast Information Service - Eastern Europe, (FBIS-EEU)

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
Front
Gorenjski Glas

Government and Opposition

The Guardian

Illustrovana Politika.

The Independent

Kommunist.

Mladina.

Mladost.

Le Monde.

Narodna Armija

Naša Obramba

Naši Razgledi

Neodvisni Dnevnik

New York Times

NIN.

Nova Hrvatska

Nova Revija
Novi List

Obrana i Zaštita

Political Science Quarterly

Politika

Problems of Communism


Službeni List

Soviet Studies

Student

Studies in Comparative Communism

Summary of World Broadcasts, Eastern Europe, (SWB)

Tanjug.

Teleks

The Times

Tribuna.

Večernje List

Vjesnik

Vojnoistorijski Glasnik
BOOKS AND ARTICLES


Ingrid Bakš, Ne čakaj na maj, Republika Konferenca ZSMS, Ljubljana, 1989.


Baraslav Borozan, Umetnost u NOBu, BIGZ, Belgrade, 1977,


Nikola Ćubra, 'Privredna reforma i problemi dogrđnje opštenarodne odbrane', Vojno Delo, No. 3-4, 1990.


Jovan Cvijić, Balkansko Polustrovo, Hrvatski Štamparski Zavod, Zagreb, 1922.


Bogdan Denitch, ed., The Legitimation of Regimes, Sage, London, 1979,


Savo Drljević, 'The Sources of Our Concept of National Defence' *Socialism* (Belgrade), No. 4, 1969.


Slobodan Milošević, Godine Raspleta, BIGZ, Belgrade, 1989.


Oris


PIC/276, National Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia, Public Records Office, Political Intelligence Command Middle East, June 1944.


Dennison Rusinow, 'The Crisis in Croatia', *American Universities Fieldstaff Reports, South Eastern Europe Series*, Vol.XIX, Nos.4-7..


Social Science Research Council, Committee on Historiography, *Bulletin 54: Theory and Practice in Historical Study*.


*Sovetskaya Istoricheskaya Entsiklopediya*, E.M. Zhukov, Editor in Chief, Moscow, 1966.


Rade Suša, 'Naoružani narod - Crvena Nit u Posleratnoj Izgradnji Naših Oružanih Snaga', Vojno Delo, No. 6, 1983.


Bernhard Tonnes, Sonderfall Albanien, Oldenbourg, Munich, 1980.


