IRANIAN RESISTANCE TO SOVIET PRESSURE
IRANO-SOVIEIT RELATIONS 1941-1947

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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

This study covers a critical period of Iranian history in the context of Soviet policy towards Iran. The major purpose of the study is to show how Iran survived the war-time Soviet occupation and maintained its independence and sovereignty in the face of a Soviet threat.

The First Section, an historical background, describes the Bolshevik regime's attitude towards Iran, intervention by the Soviets in northern Iran, where they helped the rebel movement set up a revolutionary government, and the conclusion of the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921. This Section also examines Soviet policy towards Iran during the rule of Reza Shah, and the pre-occupation agreements and disagreements between Moscow and Tehran.

In the Second Section, the Anglo-Russian alliance and their joint occupation of Iran are discussed. The objectives of the occupation, and the conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty of 1942, are other subjects in this Section.

The Third Section examines the many aspects of Soviet interference in Iranian affairs which had alarmed both Iran and the Western Allies. This section discusses British and American plans to alleviate the Soviet pressure on Iran, including Churchill's proposal to expel Russian troops from Iran, and Roosevelt's
endeavours to obtain Stalin's approval for the Declaration Regarding Iran at the Tehran Summit.

The **Fourth Section** has been devoted to the Soviet-Iranian dispute over an oil concession, the rejection of Soviet demands, and the intensification of Soviet intimidation. It also shows how at Yalta and Potsdam the Russians refused to commit themselves to a time-tabled evacuation from Iran.

The **Fifth Section** scrutinises the Soviet role in establishing separatist movements, the Red Army's role in preventing Iranian forces entering Azerbaijan, and the formation of two rebel regimes under Soviet protection in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. The section analyses the Anglo-American objection to Soviet plans, and Iran's resort to the United Nations to expose the Soviet-backed rebellions. In addition, the impact of Soviet-Iranian disputes on United States foreign policy is discussed, as are the negotiations of Prime Minister Qavam with Stalin and Molotov.

In the **Sixth Section** the effects are analysed of Qavam's conciliatory policy, America's new initiatives, and the United Nations' debate on the Soviet decision to withdraw. Here, Qavam's tactics to pacify the Russians, negotiate with the rebel leaders and include Communists in the Coalition Cabinet are examined.

Finally, the **Seventh Section** focuses on the results of Qavam's tactics and how the Russians overlooked the
collapse of the rebel regimes and confined their ambitions to an oil concession. However, this Soviet demand was finally refused. In this concluding part, the promotion of American influence in Iran, and Iran’s part in United States’ global policy are discussed.
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<td>AIOC</td>
<td>Anglo-Iranian Oil Company</td>
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<td>APOC</td>
<td>Anglo-Persian Oil Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cab</td>
<td>Cabinet Papers</td>
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<td>C C</td>
<td>Central Committee</td>
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<td>CCFTU</td>
<td>Central Council of Federated Trade Unions</td>
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<td>CDSP</td>
<td>Current Digest of Soviet Press</td>
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<td>COS</td>
<td>Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>CPSU</td>
<td>Communist Party of Soviet Union</td>
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<td>DGFP</td>
<td>Documents on German Foreign Policy</td>
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<td>DPA</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Azerbaijan</td>
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<td>DPI</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Iran</td>
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<td>DPK</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Kurdistan</td>
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<td>FO</td>
<td>Foreign Office</td>
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<td>FRUS</td>
<td>Foreign Relations of the United States</td>
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<td>GTI</td>
<td>Greece, Turkey and Iran</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>MAIS</td>
<td>Military Attaché Intelligence Summary</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEI</td>
<td>Middle East and India</td>
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<td>MEW</td>
<td>Ministry of Economic Warfare</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>No Author</td>
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<td>ND</td>
<td>No Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEA</td>
<td>Near East and Africa</td>
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<td>NMA</td>
<td>National Majles of Azerbaijan</td>
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<td>NP</td>
<td>No Publisher</td>
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<td>OR</td>
<td>Official Records</td>
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<td>OSS</td>
<td>Office of Strategic Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEC</td>
<td>Provisional Executive Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>RIIA</td>
<td>Royal Institute of International Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Security Council</td>
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<td>Supp.</td>
<td>Supplement</td>
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<td>UNO</td>
<td>United Nations Organisation</td>
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<td>WPIS</td>
<td>Weekly Political Intelligence Summary</td>
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INTRODUCTION

Iran's declared neutrality in the war did not prevent the occupation of its territory by Anglo-Russian forces in 1941; and despite Anglo-Soviet assertions that Iran was an ally and not a country under occupation, Iran bore the burden of an occupied state.

This study aims to describe and analyse Iranian resistance to Soviet pressure during and in the immediate aftermath of the World War II. In the course of the occupation, the Soviets tried not only to achieve their wartime objectives but also to gain a foothold for the post-war period in Iran.

During the first two years of occupation, Iran was faced with many instances of Soviet pressure. The Soviets opened consulates in Iranian cities without accepting reciprocation; They ignored Iranian customs regulations and refused to pay the appropriate duties; They took over the Iranian railway and asked Iran to pay for using it; They used onerous security measures in the occupied zone; They supported anti-government activities in the northern provinces and prevented Iranian Government forces from fulfilling their duties regarding domestic disturbances; They imposed unjust agreements on the Iranian Government committing it to deliver grain to the Soviet Union while Iran was itself burdened with food shortages; They took over Iranian arms factories; and they interfered in Iran's parliamentary elections.
Since confrontation with a major military power was impossible, Iranian politicians acquiesced, at this stage, in some of the Soviet demands, hoping that with the evacuation of foreign troops at the end of the war, Iran would have full sovereignty restored. This hope was encouraged by certain developments in Soviet-Iranian relations.

The third year of occupation began with optimism when Stalin took part in the Summit of Tehran, signed the Declaration Regarding Iran with Roosevelt and Churchill, and re-affirmed the Soviet commitment to respect Iran's independence and sovereignty which had already been stipulated in the Tripartite Treaty of 1942. However, the optimism did not last long.

In the autumn of 1944, a Soviet attempt to obtain an exclusive oil concession in northern Iran failed, and Moscow reacted with irritation and outrage.

The Soviet propaganda machines in both Moscow and Tehran launched a hostile campaign against the Iranian Government. Pro-Soviet demonstrations in Tehran, protected and joined by Red Army personnel, demanded that the Soviets be granted the concessions they wanted, and pro-Soviet deputies in the Majles claimed that northern Iran was a Soviet "perimeter" that was needed for Soviet security requirements.

Consequently, five Iranian Cabinets collapsed within fourteen months in the face of Soviet pressure or in the absence of Soviet approval.
However, the major problem for the Iranian Government was not the propaganda of the Soviets but their support of armed rebellion in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. Soviet involvement in Azerbaijan affairs included distributing arms to the rebels; preventing Iranian forces from entering Azerbaijan and restoring the authority of the government; forcing the local garrison to submit to the rebels; defending the rebellion as a democratic movement with legitimate aspirations; supporting the rebel regime with equipment and advisers; and inducing the Iranian Government to make a deal with the rebels even after the Tehran-Moscow rapprochement.

This study re-appraises the movements for self-government in both the Azeri and Kurdish regions, discussing the degree of their popular support and the extent of their Soviet affiliation. It also draws attention to the misrepresentation of the identity and background of the Azerbaijan leader, Pishevari, in some materials published in the West.

In addition, this study discusses various possible objectives behind the Soviet involvement in Azerbaijan, examining whether the aim was an autonomous Azerbaijan, or whether this was just an instrument of pressure to achieve Iran's assent in respect of the oil concession. However, the final Soviet action in Azerbaijan, leaving the autonomous Government at the mercy of Iranian army suggests that Azerbaijan had merely been a tool of
Some recent studies indicate that Soviet policy in the Azerbaijan question originated not in Moscow but in Baku. Iranian observers of the event, some of whom were eyewitnesses, maintain that the uprising of Azerbaijan was masterminded by Mir Jafar Bagirov, the powerful Communist leader of Soviet Azerbaijan.

Bagirov was a chief security officer in the 1920's, prime Minister and party chief in Soviet Azerbaijan from the 1930's, a member of the Military Council of the Trans-Caucasian Front during World War II, and a confidant of Stalin and Beria. According to these new sources, Bagirov had a plan to merge the two Azerbaijans and create a greater Soviet Azerbaijan. To this end, Bagirov not only infiltrated Caucasian immigrants (Muhajers) into Iranian Azerbaijan but also assigned his closest aides for the cultural conversion and Sovietization of this province.

The lack of Western reports on the role of Bagirov was not surprising, since even in Iran information about him, until recent years, was sparse. However, the role of Bagirov in the formation of the Kurdish Republic was analysed by William Eagleton as long as 1963.

According to Iranian Communist sources, Soviet plans for Azerbaijan were so secret and sensitive that even the leaders of Iran's Communist (Tudeh) Party were unaware of them and ignorant of the role of Bagirov. A prominent Iranian Communist Leader, Iraj Eskandari, who
was also a deputy in the parliament (Majles) and a member of the Coalition Cabinet during the crisis of Azerbaijan, wrote in 1988 that he had received his earliest information about the Soviet plan and about Bagirov's involvement years later, when in exile in the Soviet Union. (3)

New material used in this study to illuminate the role of Bagirov in Azerbaijan's affairs consist of the account of six Iranian Communist leaders and activists, who collaborated with the autonomous regime of Azerbaijan or supported it. All these accounts were published in the late 1970's and 1980's. (4)

This study also examines the differences between Soviet and Iranian statements about the Azeri movement, and the Iranian tactics to expose Soviet patronage in Azerbaijan. These tactics bore fruit in early 1946, when the Soviets refused to evacuate Iran on the mutually-agreed date. Later on, the Soviets agreed, either under international pressure or due to the uncertainty of their position and the priority of Soviet plans elsewhere, to negotiate with Iran, but only after Iran had acquired a government that was "friendly" to the Soviet Union. In the eyes of Soviet leaders, Qavam was the persona grata for a dialogue, among the non-Communist politicians of Iran.

In the period under study, Prime Ministers Foroughi, Soheili, Saed, Bayat, Sadr, Hakimi and Qavam employed
different methods to neutralize foreign intrigues and protect Iran's interests. These methods are discussed in various sections of this study. However, it has been noted that among Iranian politicians, Qavam was prominent as the champion of Iranian resistance. He exploited domestic and foreign factors, as well as the arts of negotiation and persuasion, to counter Soviet plans in Iran. Azerbaijan was at the top of Qavam's agenda. Since a military solution had failed, Qavam sought Soviet assistance to solve the problem of Azerbaijan.

This thesis examines the achievements of Qavam, from his negotiations with Stalin to the collapse of the rebel regimes in Azerbaijan and Kurdestan, and the rejection of the Soviet oil concession by the Majles. It also comments on the underestimation of Qavam's success by some Iranian historians, and their tendency to accept the claims for the primary role of the so-called "Truman Ultimatum" which has been disputed in both American and Soviet sources.(5)

This study concludes with a short survey of the post-war power politics and its impact on Iran. Given that Iran was one of the first theatres of the Cold War, the final section shows how the United States, while challenging Soviet influence, advanced its own objectives in Iranian politics. It also examines the controversy between two Iranian political factions: one which believed neutrality was a safer policy, and the other which
wanted Iran to be treated like Turkey and Greece by the United States, in the context of the Cold War.

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This is primarily a study of Iranian policy towards the Soviet Union. Iranian material was of particular significance in explaining how Iranians were affected by the activities of the great powers in general, and Soviet pressure in particular, during and after the war. In this connection, Iranian Communist literature has been used as well as anti-Communist and neutral sources, mostly available at the Iranian National Library in Tehran. Besides Iranian materials, British and American materials have also been used. In addition, the author has endeavoured, to the best of his ability (which does not include the ability to use Russian-language sources) to explore Soviet views on the principal issues.
Proceedings of UN Security Council sessions and Allied conferences, minutes of the negotiations of Soviet and Western leaders, reports of Soviet statements in the British and Iranian press, and the comments of Soviet historians, e.g. Ivanov, Lebedev, Mileykovski, Trukhanovsky have been examined in this regard.
A characteristic of this study is its comparative analysis of Iranian, Western and Soviet views, with reference also to the conflict between the United Kingdom and the United States on certain issues.
NOTES AND REFERENCES


5) See Section Six, Chapter Three.
SECTION ONE

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917 resulted in a new policy towards Iran and the other Asian neighbours of Russia. (1) In the view of western writers, this change was a consequence of the Civil War and the necessity of consolidating the new regime. (2) Soviet historians, however, attribute it to the anti-imperialist policy of the Leninist regime. They refer to a declaration made to the "Muslim Toilers of Russia and the East" as early as December 1917 (by the People's Commissars). (3) The declaration condemned the Tsarist invasion and occupation of foreign countries and denounced the unequal treaties imposed on Asian states, such as the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907 which divided Iran into two zones of influence. (4) The declaration promised the withdrawal of Russian troops from Iran, and confirmed the right of the Iranian people to self-government. (5) In response to these friendly gestures from the Bolshevik leaders, the Iranian Embassy in Russia addressed a Note to the Russian Foreign Commissariat, on 14 December 1917, granting de facto recognition to the regime. (6)

At Brest-Litovsk it was stipulated that the Russian and Turkish forces should leave Iranian territory. The treaty emphasised that:
"upon the basis of the principles of the freedom, independence and territorial inviolability of the neutral Persian state, the Turkish and the Russian Supreme Commanders are prepared to withdraw their troops from Persia. They will immediately enter communication with the Persian Government in order to regulate the details of the evacuation and the other necessary measures for the guaranteeing of the above-mentioned principles.(7)

On 27 January 1918, The Foreign Commissar Leon Trotsky repudiated the Tsarist concessions in Iran. (8) On 30 January 1918, Iran's Charge d'Affaires in Petrograd expressed his Government's pleasure with Soviet policy, and stated its readiness to negotiate new agreements with the Bolshevik regime.(9)

However, the Soviet envoy, Karl Bravin, who reached Tehran in the same month, was not allowed to move into the Russian Embassy. Instead, he stayed and worked at a hotel while Von Etter, the representative of the former regime continued to work at the Russian Embassy in Tehran.(10) Bravin, did not have a letter of credentials from the Soviet Government, but presented a Russian Newspaper which had published the news of his appointment.(11) The ambiguity of Bravin's position and the escalation of the Russian Civil War made Iran reluctant to enter into negotiations with him while the
fate of his Government was at stake. However, Bravin blamed the British legation in Tehran for the failure of his mission. (12) He left Iran for Afghanistan in the Spring of 1918, and was murdered in Ghazni. (13)
Following the Russian Government's renouncement of their privileges in Iran, the Iranian Government addressed a Note to the foreign embassies, abrogating consular jurisdiction (capitulation) in Iran. (14) This privilege had been extended since 1828 to many governments enjoying most-favoured nation status in Iran.
During the Summer of 1918, the Soviet Government made two diplomatic efforts to strengthen its position in Iran. First, on 26 June, the Foreign Commissar, Georgy Chicherin, addressed a Note to the Iranian Embassy in Moscow, reasserting his Government's decision to: 1) annul the repayment of loans; 2) renounce claims on the revenue from Iran's Customs, Telegraph and Post; 3) declare freedom of navigation in the Caspian sea for vessels bearing the Persian flag; 4) annul all Russian Governmental and private concessions; and 5) transfer the Russian "Bank d' Escompte", with its mortgaged buildings and lands, to Iran. (15) The Iranian Council of Ministers issued a statement of gratitude on 27 July 1918, noting that the:
"treaties, agreements, and concessions taken from Persia during the last hundred years by
the despotic Russian Government and its people had been secured from Persia by duress and force, or through illegitimate means, such as threats and bribes, against the interest of Persia.... The Government of Russia has announced as its goal the liberty and integrity of nations, and has in particular repeatedly, officially and unofficially, announced the abrogation of all concessions and treaties which have been taken from Persia by the Russians.(16)

Secondly, the Moscow Government instructed the Commissar Extra ordinary for Transcaucasia Stepan Shaumian, whose headquarters were in Baku, to appoint a new envoy to Iran. He appointed Ivan Kolomitsev, a veteran army officer and former organiser of the revolutionary committee of Anzali (a Caspian city of Iran). (17) Kolomitsev arrived in Tehran in August 1918, when Baku fell to the anti-Bolsheviks. (18) At this time the Iranian Government was under British influence. The nationalist Prime Minister, Samsam-us-Saltaneh Bakhtiari, who had resisted British recommendations to conclude an Iranian-British Treaty, resigned under pressure and in July 1918 a pro-British politician, Vosough-ud-Dowleh, had become the Prime Minister. (19) The British Government guaranteed to pay a monthly pension to Ahmad Shah Qajar as long as Vosough was in office, although the latter's appointment had been unconstitutional. (20)
The British army used Iranian territory to intervene in Russia and support the anti-Communist movements in the Caucasus and Central Asia. (21) General Dunsterville crossed the Caspian Sea and set up his headquarters in Baku; (22) While General Wilfred Maleson was assigned from Mashad to Trans-Capia, and Commodore Norris stationed a flotilla in the Caspian Sea. When the Caucasian states of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan rejected the Bolshevik regime and declared their independence, they received the support of the British expeditions from Iran. (23)

At this time, Iran was too dependent on Britain to pursue an independent policy towards Russia. Vosough's Government refused to recognise Kolomitsev, with the excuse that his letters of credentials were stamped by Shaumian not the Soviet Government. (24) However, Vosough kept silent when British and White Army forces seized the Soviet legation's offices in Tehran, arrested all of its members and exiled them to India. Kolomitsev was the only one who managed to escape. (25)

When Kolomitsev arrived in Iran for the second time, bearing a letter of credentials endorsed by the Soviet Government, he was arrested by anti-Bolshevik Russian officers who were under British command. They executed him in Astrabad (Gorgan) in northern Iran on 14 August 1919. (26) Kolomitsev had also carried a message, dated 26 June 1919, formulated by Leon Karakhan, the Deputy
Commissar of Foreign Affairs, confirming the previous proposals of the new Soviet regime. (27)

Meanwhile, Iran sent a delegation headed by ex-Foreign Minister Moshaver-ul-Mamalek Ansari to the Paris Peace Conference, to present a statement about its losses and damages during the War, and to appeal for compensation. Iran also wanted to recover territories lost to Russia during the past regime. However, the British persuaded the conference to refuse Iran admission on the ground that Iran had not been a belligerent party in the European war. (28) Despite their inability to attend the conference, the Iranian delegation addressed a letter to the conference with the following demands: 1) the abolition of the system of capitulation; 2) the cancellation of all foreign concessions; 3) reparations for damages committed on Persian territory during the war; and 4) the return of Caucasia, ceded in 1828, and Trans-Caspia, including Merv and Khiva, which had been seized later by the Russian Army. Iran also claimed Kurdistan from Turkey, including the cities Diar Bakir and Mosul. (29)

While the Iranian delegation was persuading the Paris Peace Conference to consider its demands, the Anglophile Government of Vosough completed its secret talks with the British envoy Sir Percy Cox, and concluded the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 9 August 1919. This agreement placed Iran's military and financial departments under the control of British advisors. (30)
The Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon, who had initiated the agreement, described as his "great victory" keeping the Russians out of Iran, ensuring the security of India, and consolidating British power in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf. The supporters of Curzon's policy in Britain hailed his success in saving Iran, which allegedly was in a "state of chaos" after the war and needed to rely on the British Government. However, many believed that the fulfilment of the agreement would, in effect, render Iran a British protectorate. The signing of the agreement resulted in massive outcry in Iran. The corrupt leaders of the Government, including Prime Minister Vosough and his Foreign and Finance Ministers, Nosrat-ad-Dowleh Firouz and Sarem-ad-Dowleh, who had received a commission from the British Government, had no choice but to suppress the opposition or resign. They chose the former option and proceeded to arrest and exile their opponents.

The Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919 also caused concern and resentment outside Iran. The Iranian Ambassador in Paris published a statement while the Shah and Foreign Minister Firouz were on an official visit to France, criticising the new agreement and condemning the "imperialistic schemes of Britain in Iran." The Ambassador was subsequently dismissed by the Foreign Minister for his statement, but the French Government
continued to support him as the "legitimate" representative of Iran."(36) The United States envoy in Tehran, John Caldwell, also issued a statement denying his country's consent to the Anglo-Iranian agreement. He also emphasised that the agreement was a violation of Iran's independence and sovereignty.(37) However, the fiercest reaction came from Moscow. The Soviet regime had been outraged by recent Iranian developments, i.e. the claim on Russian territories, the disregard of the Soviet proposals of 26 June 1919, the murder of Kolomitsev, and the conclusion of an agreement with Britain. The Soviet leaders expressed their anxiety and apprehension. They saw British policy as a conspiracy to transform Iran into an anti-Soviet base. Chicherin addressed the Iranian people directly through the Russian press on 26 August 1919. He denounced the Anglo-Iranian agreement as "illegal and shameful", and appealed to the workers and peasants of Iran to topple Vosough and his Cabinet, who had "sold themselves and their people to the British robbers."(38) The hostility between Tehran and Moscow escalated as the Soviets began to send propaganda literature to northern Iran to rouse the people against the pro-British Government.(39) Moreover, Premier Vosough sent a mission to Baku to negotiate political and economic agreements with the anti-Bolshevik Musavatist regime of Azerbaijan.(40)
However, the Republic of Azerbaijan collapsed in March 1920. (41) Furthermore, in pursuit of General Denikin's White Army, a Soviet fleet commanded by Roskolnikov crossed the Caspian Sea and, on 18 May 1920, landed at the Iranian port of Anzali. (42) The British army subsequently retreated from the area. (43)

The first action of Soviet troops was to support Iranian dissidents and anti-government elements. At this time, there were strong provincial revolts against the Central Government in Gilan and Azerbaijan, both adjacent to the Russian border. In the province of Gilan there had been since 1915 a populist movement of opposition to the corrupt Central Government and the continued foreign occupation of Iran. As this movement was based in the forest (Jangal), its members called themselves Jangalis or Forest Brothers. (44) The movement was strong enough to organise surprise attacks on the Government forces for several years. The arrival of the Bolsheviks gave the Jangalis an opportunity to seize power over the whole province. To this end negotiations took place in Rasht between the leader of Jangalis, Mirza Kuchek, and the Bolsheviks, led by Sergo Ordjonikidze. (45) Subsequently a joint revolutionary committee appointed a Council of People's Commissars, in the Soviet pattern, and named Mirza Kuchek Chairman of the Persian Soviet Socialist Republic. In return, Kuchek declared his loyalty to Lenin and the Third International. (46)
Furthermore, under the auspices of the Bolsheviks, the first congress of Iran’s Communist Party was held on 22 June 1920 in Anzali. The founders of the new party were members of the Edalat (Justice) Party, which had been organised by Iranian workers in Baku in May 1917 to support the Bolsheviks. The Edalat Party later merged with the Communist Party, and its leader Nariman Narimanov became the President of the Azerbaijan SSR between 1920 and 1925. The Anzali Congress endorsed the Jangalis Government and supported its plans and objectives.

However, the honeymoon between the Jangalis and the Communists lasted less than one month. Mirza Kuchek, a patriot of strong Islamic orientation, left the city for the forests on 31 July, when a Communist coup replaced him as President with veteran Marxist Ehsanollah Khan. Seyed Jafar Javadzadeh (Pishevari), who later in 1945-46 became the leader of the Azerbaijan separatist movement was made Commissar of Interior.

The new revolutionary Government which had been aided by the Bolsheviks pursued a radical policy of expropriation which alienated not only the middle class but also the peasants and workers.

It is worthwhile, at this point to establish who in Russia was behind Gilan’s developments. Two historians of the Jangali movement who had contact with the rebel regime recorded the arrival in Rasht at the time of the coup of two Soviet officials, the Communist leader
Anastas Mikoyan and the Georgian activist Budo Mdivani. They also asserted that the leader of operations was Blumkin, the representative of the Cheka. However, the Russians did not intend to publicise their activities. To prevent any provocative action by Soviet soldiers, Karakhan sent a cable to the Commander of the Russian fleet in the Caspian Sea advising him to exercise caution in Iranian matters.

Raskolnikov also received a telegram from the War Commissar Trotsky, instructing him that: 1) there should be no interference in Iran's domestic affairs under the name of Soviet Russia; 2) military and financial assistance should be given to the Jangalis under the name of the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan; and 3) the Soviet fleet in the Caspian Sea should carry the flag of Azerbaijan.

Nevertheless, the presence of the Bolsheviks in the north had a critical impact on the Tehran Government. Two days after the Soviet's arrival in Anzali, Chicherin addressed a Note to the Iranian legation in Moscow assuring Iran that the Soviet army would withdraw as soon as the anti-Bolshevik Whites who had fled to northern Iran were suppressed.

However, Chicherin's assurance did not satisfy Iran. The Iranian Government lodged a complaint against the Soviet invasion at the League of Nations. This was the first dispute submitted to the League since its
formation. The Iranian action had been supported by the League's Secretary-General Sir Eric Drummond, who circulated Iran's letter of complaint among the League's delegations.\(^{(57)}\) The Soviet Government, who was not a member of the League, instructed its commercial representative in London, Krasin, to inform the Secretary-General that if Iran withdrew its petition and entered into direct negotiations with Russia, the Russian troops would pull out from Iran.\(^{(58)}\)

However, Iran rejected the Soviet proposal. The Iranian Foreign Minister, Firouz, who was present at the League's General Assembly, stated that his country would not participate in direct negotiations unless the Soviets agreed to stop assisting the Jangalis and to withdraw from Iran.\(^{(59)}\)

The anti-Russian Government of Vosought resigned on the 24 June 1920, when it failed to hold parliamentary election for a new Majles to ratify the Anglo-Iranian Agreement.\(^{(60)}\) The resignation of Vosough was not only the consequence of public resentment against the British agreement, but also the result of the presence of Soviet troops in Iran, and the formation of a rebel regime in the North.\(^{(61)}\)

In August 1920, the New Prime Minister Moshir-ud-Dowleh Pirnia sent a mission led by the former Foreign Minister Ansari to Moscow for negotiations, and to settle Iranian-Soviet disputes.\(^{(62)}\)
In the meantime, under the auspices of the Comintern, the Congress of Eastern Peoples was held in Baku, where Zinoviev, Kirov, Radek, Narimanov, and other party leaders stated the positions and policies of the Russian Communist Party.(63) The Iranian delegation included Avtis Mikaelian (Sultan Zadeh), who had organised the first congress of Iran's Communist Party, Haydar Amou Oghi, Nikbin and Pishevari.(64)

At this Congress, Zinoviev, the leader of the Comintern, invited the People of Russian Central Asia and neighbouring countries, i.e. Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and India, to collaborate with Russian Communists against (British) capitalism and imperialism.(65) However, despite its revolutionary slogans, the Congress condemned the measures undertaken by the radical communists in Gilan.(66)

In Moscow, the negotiations between Ansari and the Soviet representatives, Chicherin and Karakhan, were slow, but showed progress. Meanwhile, there were conflicting opinions about Iranian-Soviet relations among communists. On the one hand, there were local communists, like Sultan Zadeh, who believed Iran was on the verge of a revolution and nothing should stop that process.(67) Sultan Zadeh had compared Iran's condition at the beginning of 1920 with that of Russia before 1917, and stressed that "Iran should be the first country in the East to stand the red
flag of the socialist revolution on the ruins of monarchy."(68)

In Moscow, a prominent Bolshevik K. M. Troyanovski had stated that "Persian revolt may become a key to a general revolution in Asia."(69) Sultan Galiev, the Head of the Department of Eastern Communist Organisations, was in support of revolutions in the East. He criticised the Bolshevik Government's plan to recall the Russian soldiers from Iran instead of utilising them for the cause of revolution in that country.(70) Stalin had a similar idea. In his address to the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party in 1921, he suggested a union between USSR and the Eastern countries in support of revolutionary movements.(71) Besides Stalin, another Georgian Bolshevik, Sergo Ordjonikidze also supported the revolutionary movement in Iran and the intervention of the Red Army for this purpose.(72)

In contrast, Lenin opposed a Soviet-inspired revolution in Iran. He condemned Stalin's Iranian policy at a session of the Politburo.(73) In this connection, Louis Fischer noted a conversation with Chicherin, where the latter "ridiculed Stalin's effort to communise Persia as a poorly disguised form of annexation."(74) Lenin and Chicherin were unwilling to pursue a provocative policy in Iran. They intended to normalise the Soviet relationship with the Iranian Government. The Foreign Commissariat in fact defied the
radical policy of the Commissariat of Nationalities; and Lenin, as the supreme leader, supported the pragmatists against the idealists. Lenin pursued a similar policy in the Comintern, in general, and criticised the leftist tendencies as an "infantile disorder." (75)

Only by Lenin’s personal interference was the way paved for direct Iranian-Soviet negotiations and, consequently, the conclusion of the Iran-Soviet Treaty of 1921. (76)
CHAPTER TWO

IRANO-SOVIET TREATY OF 1921

On 26 February 1921 a treaty of friendship was concluded between Iran and the Soviet Union, which became a landmark in Soviet-Iranian relations. The situation that brought the two Governments together to sign such an accord will be examined closely. (77)

Since June 1920, northern Iran had been under Russian occupation. The rebellious Jangali movement could survive as long as it was supported by the Russian Army. The insurgency in the North had caused economic chaos and political uncertainty in Iranian society. Thus the Central Government could not restore security and order before settling the northern question. In such circumstances, Iran had no choice but to enter negotiation with the Soviets and accept their assurance that after a rapprochement they would pull back their troops from northern Iran. (78) Furthermore, the Soviet regime was the victor in the Civil War and the ruler of Russia, Iran's largest neighbour.

Establishing a stable relationship with the new Russian regime was not merely a necessity, but was also demanded by many Iranians who had campaigned against the Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1919, and sympathised with Soviets anti-imperialist propaganda. (79)
At the same time, Iran's rapprochement with the Soviet regime was in line with the British policy. The government of David Lloyd George, for different reasons, also wanted to have contacts with the Bolsheviks.\(^{(80)}\) Krasin's mission in London had therefore been successful in concluding the Anglo-Soviet Commercial Treaty of 16 March 1921.\(^{(81)}\)

Moreover, the Soviet Government had been convinced that a Soviet intervention in Iran would only encourage Iranian dependence on Britain. Lenin shared this view with his Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Chicherin.\(^{(82)}\) The isolation of the communists in the Jangali movement of northern Iran had already proved this. In contrast, the Soviets could take advantage of the opportunities provided by improving relations with their southern neighbours Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan. First, these countries had to be induced by the Soviets to counter the British plots to infiltrate Russia's Moslem areas, which were nearly ready to resist the communist regime. Second, establishing diplomatic ties would provide a base from which Soviet elements, including the Comintern agents, could incite revolts against the colonial powers in India.\(^{(83)}\) Third, it was too harmful to the reputation of the Soviet Government, renowned as anti-imperialist, to continue its occupation of a weak neighbouring country.\(^{(84)}\) Fourth, the main objectives of Soviet foreign policy were in Europe; and by favouring Asian countries like Iran or by making them
dependent on Russia, Moscow could use them against Britain, its major opponent. (85) Iran and Afghanistan had borders with India, while Iran and Turkey were adjacent to Iraq, a British protectorate since 1918. The Iranian-Soviet Treaty of 26 February 1921 annulled previous agreements imposed by the Tsars, and reaffirmed the existing frontiers between the two countries and their non-interference in each others affairs. In return, Iran undertook not to transfer the properties and concessions restored by this agreement to a third party, and accepted the Russians' right to exploit the Caspian fisheries. However, the most important issue was dealt with in Articles 5 and 6. By virtue of Article 5, Iran and Russia would not tolerate any hostile activity inside their territory against the other contracting party. Article 6 stipulated that:

"If a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation by means of armed intervention in Persia or if such power should threaten the frontiers of Federal Russia or those of its allies, and if the Persian Government should not be able to put a stop to such menace after having been once called upon to do so by Russia, Russia shall have the right to advance their troops into the Persian interior for the purpose of
carrying out the military operations necessary for its defence. Russia undertakes, however, to withdraw her troops from Persian territory as soon as the danger has been removed.” (86)

Before the conclusion of the Treaty, Moscow decided to demonstrate its good intentions towards the Iranian Government. In January 1921, a Bolshevik representative arrived in Anzali and collected the arms previously distributed among the people, and returned them to Russia. However, the Soviet garrison remained in Anzali to pressure Iran to expel the British. (87)

Just four days before the signing of the Treaty, a military coup took place in Tehran which forced the Shah to appoint a new Cabinet. As a revolutionary gesture by the new Government, many Anglophile and aristocratic politicians were arrested. The coup had been led by Reza Khan, an officer of the Iranian Cossack Division, who later became the Shah of Iran between 1925 and 1941.

The new Government annulled the Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 1919, with the consent of the British Embassy which in any case had lost hope that it would be approved. (88)

However, Lord Curzon, who had initiated the Agreement of 1919, was critical of the developments in Iran. He predicted in the House of Lords in July 1921 that Persia would be harmed by the annulment of the Anglo-Persian Treaty and the conclusion of the Russian-Persian
Upon the normalisation of relations between Tehran and Moscow, Iran expelled the representative of the old regime, Sabline. In May 1921, the new Soviet envoy, Rothstein, arrived in Tehran.\(^{(90)}\)

The signing of the Irano-Soviet Treaty was greeted with a mixture of relief and anxiety in Iran. The ending of the disputes between Iran and Russia was a great success for Iranian nationalists. However, the Iranian Majles refused ratification of the Treaty before the withdrawal of Soviet troops. In response, the Foreign Commissar Chicherin made it clear that the Russian troops would remain in northern Iran as long as the British army stayed in the south.\(^{(91)}\) The withdrawal of the British and Russian forces was accordingly completed in May and June 1921.\(^{(92)}\)

Other related questions before the Majles were the interpretation of Articles 5 and 6; the conditional rights of Iran over the returned concessions (Article 13); and the right of transit (Article 20). Notes were exchanged between the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Rothstein that clarified the application of Articles 5 and 6. The Rothstein interpretation made it clear that Russia had intended to deter the White Russians and their British supporters from exploiting Iranian territory in their fight against the Bolsheviks, as had happened in the past. The Soviet envoy, in his
Note of 12 December 1921, asserted that:

"Articles 5 and 6 are intended to apply only to cases in which preparations have been made for a considerable armed attack upon Russia or the Soviet Republics allied to her, by the Partisans of the regime which has been overthrown, or by its supporters among those foreign powers which are in a position to assist the enemies of workers' and peasants Republic, and at the same time, to possess themselves, by force or by underhand methods, of part of Persian territory thereby establishing a base of operations for any attack - made either directly or through the counter revolutionary forces - which they might mediate against Russia or Soviet Republics allied to her." (93)

Moreover, on the conditional return of concessions and right of transit, the Soviet envoy stated that his Government "never sought to place any restriction upon the progress and prosperity of Persia," and accepted "a total or partial revision of Articles, on the lines desired by the Persian Government." (94) Finally, the Majles, convinced by the assurance of the Soviet envoy, ratified the Treaty. (95)

Article 3 had stipulated the return of the village Firouzeh on the Turkemenian border to Iran, in return
for the annexation by Russia of Old-Sarakhs in northeastern Khorasan. However, the Russians occupied the Old-Sarakhs without fulfilling their commitment.(96) Article 6 was repeatedly misinterpreted as the basis of a unilateral right for Soviet intervention in Iran. In the following sections the arguments of Iran and the Soviet Union over the meaning of this article will be reviewed.
The dominant personality after the coup of 22 February 1921 was General Reza Khan, who was appointed the Minister of War after the coup. Reza Khan was a standing member of several consecutive cabinets. He was also able to influence the choice of other members of the cabinets until 1923, when he became the Prime Minister himself. Thus, the signing of Irano-Soviet Treaty of 1921 coincided with the rise of a man who ruled the country until 1941.

However, in the first three months after the coup, the Prime Minister Seyed Zia-od-Din Tabatabaie was in control. In spite of the newly-signed Treaty, the pro-British Zia was reluctant to give an entry visa to Rothstein for fear of his revolutionary activities in Iran. Nevertheless, a protest by the Soviet Government, supported by the internal anti-British sentiments, forced Zia’s Government to issue the entry permission for the Soviet envoy. (97)

Upon his arrival, Rothstein began a political campaign to influence the Government and the people, as well as to harm British interests inside and around Iran. He established good relations with the Shah and his cabinet members. (98) He also had money distributed among a dozen journalists, who later became his instruments for publicity or blackmail. (99) Rothstein’s activities
against British interests in Iran, and his efforts to infiltrate Iraq and India, caused a great deal of concern in London and led to a British complaint to Moscow. (100)

Rothstein's mission in Iran is marked not only by his energetic attempts to influence the Iranian ruling elite, pushing forward the ratification of the Treaty of 1921 and fomenting the anti-British sentiments in Iran and Iraq, but also by his collaboration with the War Minister Reza Khan in suppressing the Jangali rebellion and the revolutionary Republic of Gilan. He was in favour of a centralised and powerful Government in Tehran, rather than a pro-Soviet state in northern Iran. Moscow accepted Rothstein's interpretation of events where he commented:

"You may rest assured that any attempt on our part to start a revolution in any part of Persia would immediately throw it into the arms of the British, who would be received as the saviours of the fatherland." (101)

This assessment corresponded to Kremlin's policy, as Karl Radek wrote: "For the Soviet Government, it is completely unnecessary to create in Persia artificial Soviet Republics." (102)

However, Rothstein failed to persuade the leader of the Jangalis, Mirza Kuchek, to compromise with Reza Khan. Subsequently, to the surprise of Iranian revolutionaries, the Soviet military attaché,
Kalantarov, accompanied the detachment assigned to crush the Jangali Republic, as evidence of Soviet support of the Central Government.\(^{(103)}\)

The episode of the Jangalis ended in December 1921. Kuchek died in a snow-storm when escaping an attack by the Government forces. However, the Communist leaders of the republic were amnestied at the request of the Soviet Government, and permitted to go to Russia.\(^{(104)}\)

Concerning the great powers' rivalry in Iran, the British were displeased with the improvement in Soviet-Iranian relations and the increase in Soviet prestige in Iran. The British Embassy, therefore, tried to foster suspicions in the Iranian Government about connections between the Soviet diplomatic mission and the Iranian Communist Party. But the Iranian Government was reluctant to consider such accusations.\(^{(105)}\)

In 1922 Rothstein was summoned to Moscow, but British allegations against Soviet diplomats continued.\(^{(106)}\)

On 8 May 1923, the British Embassy in Moscow addressed a Note of protest to the Soviet Foreign Commissar for the anti-British activities of Soviet diplomats in Iran and Afghanistan. The Note, which was known as the "Curzon ultimatum", accused the Soviet regime of instigating revolutionary movements in India, via Afghanistan and Persia. It demanded the recall from Tehran of the Soviet Minister Boris Shumyatsky and from Kabul of Raskolnikov, whom the British held responsible
for anti-British activities.(107) In response to British demand, Moscow agreed to recall Raskolnikov, but not, however, Shumyatsky.(108) It is noteworthy that in spite of their contrasting policies, the British and Russians held a similar friendly attitude towards Reza Khan.(109)

In December 1925 Reza became the Shah of Iran. Earlier, on 21 October, the Soviet news agency had refused to sympathise with the Qajar dynasty and stressed Moscow’s "friendly relations with the national Government of Iran under Reza Khan". (110) The Soviet Ambassador K.K. Yurenev promptly acknowledged his Government’s recognition of the new regime. (111) He also gave an address of congratulations on Reza Shah’s coronation, on 25 April 1926. (112) The Russian press welcomed Reza’s accession to the throne, and praised him for unifying the armed forces and improving industry and commerce. (113) In the Soviet analysis, Reza Shah’s regime was a symbol of the anti-imperialist national bourgeoisie in Iran. (114) By their recognition and support of Reza Shah, the Russians were recognising the improvement in Soviet-Iranian relations since his rise to power in 1921 in spite of British influence and intrigue. (115) During the first year of Reza’s monarchy, the Soviet press laid stress on his anti-British background. The Soviet writer Gorka Kriazhin suggested that Reza’s "nationalist" policy against the British influence and
his expulsion of foreign military advisers was of great significance. (116) The former Commander of the Soviet Fleet in the Caspian Sea, Raskolnikov, published an article in Pravda on 11 March 1926 emphasising the "hostility" between Reza's army and the British. (117) The appointment in 1926 of the Iranian Ambassador in Moscow, Ansari, as Foreign Minister was welcomed by Soviets. Yurenev expressed Moscow's pleasure at this appointment to the Iranian press. (118)

In July 1926, the garrison of Maraveh- Tapeh on the border of Soviet Turkmenia revolted against Reza Shah. The Commander of the garrison, Lahak Bavand, declared the formation of a new republic, and begged the Soviets for support. However, contrary to the rebels' expectations, Soviet officials alleged that they were British agents. (119) Following the defection of the rebels to the Soviet Union, Chicherin sent a message to the Iranian Prime Minister Mostowfi, stating that the defectors had been detained by Soviet police in Ashkabad. (120)

Soviet's friendly attitude towards Reza was part of a major Kremlin plan to set up cordial relationships with the Governments of Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey, who might share in anti-British feeling with Moscow. The Soviet Government recommended a better understanding between these three Governments on the one hand, and between them and Moscow on the other. The Soviet-
Turkish Treaty of December 1925 was the first of a series of regional treaties, including the Turkish-Persian Treaty of April 1926, the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of August 1926, the Soviet-Persian Treaty of October 1927, and the Persian-Afghan Treaty of November 1927.

Some historians have commented that the conclusion of non-aggression pacts between the USSR and its neighbours during 1925-1927 was particularly aimed at strengthening the security of the Soviet Union, at a time when Moscow regarded the League of Nations and the signatories of the Locarno Agreement as its enemies.

In addition to the agreement on non-aggression and neutrality, Iran and the Soviet Union signed five more agreements, including the Caspian Fishery Treaty, a trade agreement, a Customs Convention, and a contract regarding the transfer of the pier and dependent installations of Port Pahlavi from Russia to the Government of Iran.

Through the Commercial Agreement of 1927, the Russians not only maintained control of the markets of Iran's northern provinces, but also used their trading power for political aims.

Northern Iran had traditionally been dependent on Russian trade for over a century. Thus, there was controversy over the effects of the trade agreement of 1927. While some analysts viewed it as an instrument of manipulation in the hands of the Russians, others asserted its advantages in allowing Iranians to sell
their goods in Russia.(125)

In 1927, a joint Soviet-Persian Fisheries Company was formed to utilise the resources of the southern Caspian Sea on the basis of a twenty-five year contract, but it became, in fact, a Soviet monopoly. The concession of Caspian Sea Fisheries had been granted to the Russian firm of Lianazov in 1867, and it had not been renounced after the revolution of 1917.(126)

In another contract transferring the Russian installations of Port Anzali to Iran, the latter promised not to transfer those installations to the subjects of a third country.(127)

However, the most important accord of 1927 was the Treaty of Non-Aggression and Neutrality, whereby Iran and the Soviet Union agreed not to introduce military forces into each others territory; to remain neutral if one of them was involved in a war with a third party; and not to take part in a political alliance or economic blockade against the other contracting party.(128) The preliminary negotiations to conclude the agreements of 1927 took a long time, during which the Iranian Court Minister, Teymourtash, visited Moscow and spent two months in discussion with Soviet leaders.(129)

Abdul Hossein Teymourtash was a Russian-educated politician who helped Reza consolidate his power. Since 1925 he had been Reza Shah's closest aide, Minister of Court, and the second-in-command of Iranian
politics. He presided over the Council of Ministers, when the Shah himself was not present.\(^{(130)}\)

Considerable importance had been given in Moscow to the Soviet-Iranian Neutrality Agreement in the wake of a decline in Soviet-British relations. The year of 1926 witnessed another round of conflict between Moscow and London. The Comintern was accused of involvement in the general strike of May 1926 in Britain; while the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in London lodged a protest against the British Government's provocations in Iran and its intrigues to sour Irano-Soviet relations.\(^{(131)}\)

Therefore, when the treaties were concluded, Chicherin with satisfaction pointed out that the new agreements were an instrument against the worldwide anti-Soviet activity of "imperialism."\(^{(132)}\) Meanwhile, Moscow mediated in a dispute between Iran and Turkey over the violation of their common borders by the Kurdish tribes. Izvestia, on 6 October 1927, alleged that "British gold" was responsible for instigating the raids.\(^{(133)}\)

The second congress of the Iranian Communist Party, which was held in Urumieh in Western Azerbaijan in 1927, did not affect Iranian-Soviet relations.\(^{(134)}\) At this time, Urumieh and the surrounding area was under the control of Kurdish rebels, and the priority of the Central Government was the suppression of Kurdish rebellion rather than that of communist activities. In 1927, Iran's claim over Bahrain, a British protectorate, received the support of the Soviet
To the pleasure of Soviet Government, the Iranian police suppressed the Russian emigré organisation in Tehran, in September 1927. The Soviet search for security resulted in non-aggression treaties with its neighbours. The so-called "Litvinov Protocol" was signed in 1929 by Turkey, Iran, Poland, Rumania, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Danzig. As the guarantors of Soviet security, these countries agreed to remain neutral in the event of foreign intervention in the Soviet Union. Moreover, Iran’s refusal to comply with an American-British-French statement, which condemned Soviet policy in China, was appreciated by the Russian Government. However, the defection of a Soviet secret agent in Iran, Georgy Agabekov, and his revelations in the Western press, caused anxiety and embarrassment in Tehran. In his memoirs, published in Europe in 1931, Agabekov described how the Soviet espionage network in Iran, under cover of diplomatic and commercial missions, as well as through some Iranian officials, had penetrated the Iranian Government since the establishment of Irano-Soviet relations in 1921. He also described how the Comintern and OGPU had planned to manipulate Iran’s ethnic and religious minorities. Agabekov’s revelations led to the arrest of hundreds in Iran, a few of whom were executed in 1931. An immediate consequence of unearthing Soviet espionage
activities in Iran was a law passed by the Majles in June 1931, banning all political groups with socialist orientation, and political activities opposing the monarchical regime. Also in 1931, the Iranian Government decided to introduce a law on the monopoly of foreign trade by the state. The purpose of the law was to protect Iran's economy from the Soviet commercial manoeuvres in northern Iran. The Russians activities included dumping Soviet goods in Iranian markets, resulting in the bankruptcy of many Persian merchants, and necessitating the Government's intervention.

Subsequently, Iran's refusal to sign a new trade agreement on Soviet terms and conditions provoked a Russian reaction. Exploiting the weakness of their neighbour, the Soviets closed their borders to Iranian merchandise and brought about economic difficulties in northern Iran. The Soviet Ambassador A. M. Petrovsky, described the prominence of Soviet power to a Western diplomat as follows:

"What counts in Persia is north Persia, and this region is fully dependent on Russia. All north Persian products for export can find their only market in Russia. If Russians stop buying them, Persia will be bankrupt in one month."

There was another reason why Iran intended to settle the dispute with the Soviet Union and sign a new trade
agreement. It was the conflict between Iran and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company over Iranian royalties. Iran was not capable of fighting on both fronts. Therefore, Iranian leaders decided to play the Russian card against that of the British.

The Government of Iran concluded a trade agreement with Russia in 1931. A year later, the Iranian Government issued a statement that it would not grant oil concessions in the northern provinces to a foreign country other than the Soviet Union. At the peak of the Irano-British dispute over oil, Iran's Court Minister Teymourtash paid another visit to Moscow and negotiated with Stalin, Foreign Commissar Litvinov and his deputy Karakhan. This visit resulted in the settlement of the disputes with the Russians, but antagonised the British. At this time, Iran was concerned about a possible British occupation of the disputed Iranian oil fields in the south, which could have led to the occupation of northern Iran by the Russians under the pretext of the Irano-Soviet Treaty of 1921.

However, through the intervention of the League of Nations and the intermediary of its special rapporteur on the Anglo-Persian dispute, Edward Benes, Iran agreed to enter into negotiations with the British oil company, whereupon a new agreement was signed by both parties.
Iran's reconciliation with the British deprived Moscow of the possibility of exploiting the situation. The Soviet press accused Reza Shah of being the representative of "big mercantile capitalists" who just wanted higher prices for oil and "could not solve the tasks of a bourgeois-nationalist revolution."(148)

Coinciding with the Iranian-British rapprochement, a protector of Soviet interests, Teymourtash, disappeared from the Iranian politics.

He was arrested in June 1932, and the Soviet effort to save him failed. Before Teymourtash was murdered in prison, Karakhan visited Iran in September 1933 to present the Shah with an intercession for Teymourtash by Soviet leaders. However, rather than help Teymourtash, this precipitated his death. Subsequently, Karakhan was told that Teymourtash had died in detention.(149)

Agabekov revealed in his memoirs that Teymourtash had disclosed many secret reports to Soviet Ambassadors in "friendly" conversations."(150)

Nevertheless, the head of Stalin's Secretariat, Boris Bazhanov, who defected to the West and published his memoirs in 1983, has confirmed that Teymourtash was the Soviet chief-spy in Iran.(151)

However, before the failure of Karakhan's mission, Iran had joined the ten other Soviet neighbours to sign a "Convention on the Definition of Aggression" with Moscow.(152)
To resist British and Russian influence, Iran had sought another economic partner among the industrial powers. During the 1920's the United States was approached for this purpose; but Americans did not intend to involve themselves in the Eastern hemisphere during the time of their isolationist policy. Next, Iran sought a European country which could meet its industrial needs. Germany was the best alternative, able to supply Iran with industrial goods and help it to defy the Russian economic pressure. After the Nazi takeover, Germany exploited the situation to strengthen its position in Iran's economy.

Iran unwillingly signed another trade agreement with the Soviet Union in 1933, lasting three years. Under this agreement, Moscow continued to maintain favourable trade with Iran; and became Iran's first commercial partner, its share rising to 34 percent of Iran's total foreign trade. (153)

Germany's penetration into Iran coincided with the escalation of an anti-Nazi campaign, led by the Comintern, in Europe. The rise of Hitler in 1933 caused anxiety in the Soviet leadership; consequently the threat of Germany replaced that of the Western democracies in the Soviet perspective.

This shift in Soviet policy was reflected in the Comintern's propaganda. While the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928 stressed an anti-Colonial and anti-Imperialist struggle, the Seventh Congress in 1935
launched an anti-Nazi campaign.

In a statement by this Congress, all Communist parties of the world were instructed to set up "United People's Fronts", with the participation of other anti-Nazi parties, against Fascism and Nazism. Subsequently, Communist propaganda against the western Democracies was suspended.(154)

On the other hand, German prestige had increased in Iran at the cost of Soviet influence. The Germans had become active in the Iranian economy during the Weimar Republic. During the 1920's and early 1930's the Germans administered the Iranian National Bank, operated the domestic airline, and contributed to the construction of Trans-Iranian Railways and several other economic projects.(155)

Germany's advance gave a new dimension to the Anglo-Soviet rivalry in Iran. While the Russians were nervous about the German influence, the British believed that they were "incomparably preferable" to the Soviets in Iran.(156)

Following Hitler's accession to power, Iran became a closer economic partner of Germany. In 1935, Iran purchased more industrial goods and armaments from Germany. It also invited the Germans to construct the new installations of Port Pahlavi, on the Caspian Sea. Subsequently, the Soviet Government protested, accusing Iran of violating the Treaty of 1921 whereby Iran
committed itself not to transfer the installations evacuated by Russia to a third party. (157) Iran was also blamed for employing foreign experts in its northern provinces, thereby endangering the security of Soviet borders. (158)

The Germans intended to please the Iranians, not merely with economic projects but also by satisfying their national pride and ambitions. A German Government declaration in 1936 stated that the Iranian nation was of a pure blood origin, and should be excluded from the restrictions of the "Nuremberg Racial Law" that was applicable to the non-Aryan races. (159)

Official visits by the German and Iranian dignitaries to each other's countries also consolidated the ties between the two countries. In 1936 the German Finance Minister Dr. Schacht paid a visit to Tehran, where he urged the Iranian Government to rely on its economic agreements with Germany, and liberate itself from the enforced conditions of Irano-Soviet trade. (160)

In 1937, the leader of the Nazi Youth Organisation, Von Shirach, arrived in Tehran, with a message from Hitler for the Shah. In addition, the speaker of Majles, Hassan Esfandiarí, visited Berlin, and conveyed a message from the Shah to Hitler. (161)

The coincidence of German-Iranian intimacy and Soviet-Iranian friction caused suspicion and anxiety in the Kremlin; and the Soviet leaders thought that Hitler might have been planning to attack Russia through
Litvinov expressed the Soviet attitude towards the German influence and German activities in Iran to his Tehran Embassy:

"The German Government plans to set up a spy network in Iran, and in the event of a war, will use it against us in the Caucasus." (163)

Over the period 1937-1938 two more events, one regional and another internal, provoked Soviet resentment against Iran. The first was the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty between Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The treaty was signed by the Foreign Ministers of the four countries at the Saadabad Palace in Tehran on 8 July 1937, and was named the "Saadabad Pact." (164) The Pact was regarded as a union of small neighbouring countries to balance the power of Britain and the Soviet Union, and a symbol of cooperation between Moslem countries of the Middle East, to deter the foreign threat. It was to some extent comparable with the Balkan Entente, concluded between Turkey, Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria in 1934. (165) However, the Soviets saw it as a means of bringing Iran and the other partners of the pact into a chain of containment to "encircle and isolate" the Soviet Union, with the guidance of Britain and the United States. (166) The second episode, was the discovery and suppression of a communist group in Tehran in April 1937. The leader
of the group Dr. Taghi Erani had set up the theoretical journal "Donya" (The World) to introduce his socialist philosophy, which became popular with some intellectuals. In a country where there were no political party active, the group represented some sort of cultural-political movement on a limited scale. Erani, a science graduate from Germany, was a teacher, and most of his colleagues were university students or graduates.

Some historians have maintained that the group included the Iranian Communists who had escaped Stalin's purges and fled Russia. But in fact, none of the people who were arrested in Tehran in 1937 had left Russia during the years of the purge. The Iranian Communist leaders in exile, e.g. Sultan Zadeh, were liquidated by Stalin's secret police between 1937 and 1938, and several old members of Iran's communist party, e.g. Pishevari and Ovanesian, had been in Tehran prison since the early 1930s, years before the Erani episode. Several members of Erani's group were young graduates of European universities, working in educational institutions. Erani and fifty-two members of his group, known as "The Fifty-Three" in Iranian political literature, were tried by a court in 1938 for breaching the anti-communist law of 1931. They were given prison sentences of between three and ten years. Moscow reacted sharply to this new development. Pravda, on 13 November 1938, criticised the
Iranian Government for suppressing communists. (171)
The leader of The Fifty-Three died in prison in 1940; However, communist publications reported his murder. Other members of The Fifty-Three were freed after the occupation of Iran in 1941. (172)

The year 1938 also marked a year of hostile exchanges between Iran and the Soviet Union. On the one hand, Iran refused to extend its trade agreement with the Soviet Union. On the other, the Soviets closed their borders to Iranian citizens and exports, and expelled thousands of Iranian nationals still residing on Soviet territory. Each country reduced their consular representation in the other one. (173) Between 1938 and 1939, the Soviet share in Iran's foreign trade fell from 34 per cent to 11.5 percent, while the German share rose from 28 percent to 41.5 percent. (174)

The political and military developments in August and September 1939, i.e the Nazi-Soviet Agreement, the invasion of Poland, and the outbreak of the Second World War, pushed both Iran and the Soviet Union towards a more conciliatory position.

Iran decided to stay neutral during the war. Meanwhile Germany helped Iran and the Soviet Union solve their trade problems. Iran also exploited the new circumstances by demanding more military equipment from Britain, and more financial advantages from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. (175)
Following the outbreak of war, Iran's Prime Minister, Jam, issued a statement on 4 September 1939 announcing that Iran wished "to be neutral between the belligerents" and "would seriously maintain its neutrality". On the same day, Iran's Foreign Ministry issued a "warning" to the foreign nationals in Iran, banning them from demonstrating sympathy with either side. The statement added that otherwise their action would be regarded as a "violation of Iranian law, and incompatible with Iran's neutrality".

Iran's neutrality was a necessity, since the Government had no other choice. Making an alliance with Britain was impossible because of the powerful anti-British feelings in Iran. Even the British Ambassador of the time, Bullard, admitted that "The country was in feeling pro-German." An alliance with Germany was also undesirable for the Shah, because Iran was too dependent on revenue from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Moreover, British forces were stationed to the East and West of Iran, i.e. in India and Iraq.

At the inauguration of the twelfth session of the Majles on 25 October 1939, Reza Shah re-asserted Iran's neutrality in the war, and its intention to continue "reciprocal friendship and respect" with neighbouring countries. Concerning Iranian-Soviet relations he said:

"The recent standstill of trade between the two countries should be blamed on the termination of our commercial agreement, and
we hope that the problems will be solved by goodwill, and through direct negotiation.(179)

Despite the declaration of neutrality, the Shah's appointment of a new prime minister, who reportedly was pro-German, raised suspicions. The new appointee was Dr. Matin Daftari, the former Minister of Justice and, at one time, a local secretary of the German legation in Tehran.(180) This could be interpreted as a tactic designed to put pressure upon the British. Iran and Germany wanted to keep their routes of commercial exchange open, but the routes through the open seas were no longer safe, owing to the British Navy's attacks on German ships. Therefore, both the Iranians and the Germans approached the Russians. Since the consent of Germany was vital to Soviet policies in Poland and the Baltic states, Moscow agreed to the transit of goods between Germany and Iran via its territory. Such an arrangement was made in September 1939, when the Iranian-Soviet dispute had not yet been resolved. (181)

It is a surprising fact that Iran's trade with the Soviet Union fell almost to zero during 1939-1940, while Germany's trade with Iran, through Soviet territory, reached its zenith in the same period.(182) Iran's delicate position persuaded the British Government to comply with Iran's financial and logistical demands. Following negotiations between the Shah and the Chairman of the AIOC Lord Cadman in
September 1939, the company agreed an annual payment of four million pounds to Iran until the end of the war. (183) AIOC feared that Reza Shah might seize the opportunity of the war to cancel the British concession. In October 1939, when a list of requirements by the Iranian armed forces was presented to the British military Attaché in Tehran, London’s response was positive. The Foreign Office recommended that Iranian demands be met in order to assist Iran against possible Soviet invasion, which could endanger the British oil interests in southern Iran and northern Iraq, in the first phase, and British India, in the second. (184)

However, neither Iran nor Britain wished to antagonise the Soviet Union. Iran wished to reduce the tension and settled its disputes with the Soviet Union. The Soviet-Iranian negotiations on commercial relations were resumed in late 1939. Subsequently, a new trade agreement was signed by Iran’s Foreign Minister, Alam, and the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran, Filimonov, on 25 March 1940. (185) In return for the opening of its borders to Iranian imports and exports, the Soviet Government demanded the release of communist prisoners in Iran. The Iranian authorities accepted to release of twenty prisoners, and reduced the others’ sentences. (186) The Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov, stated in his address to the Supreme Soviet on 29 March 1940, that Iran and the Soviet Union continued to
respect their agreement on Non-Aggression. Molotov also referred to the new trade agreement, which would regulate Soviet relations with Iran in the economic sphere.(187)
The Shah, who was trying to maintain a precarious balance between the Big Powers, dismissed his Prime Minister Matin Daftari on 26 June 1940, in order to dispel the rumours of a German link; and appointed a moderate and less colourful politician, Ali Mansur, in his place.(188) There was also evidence of Iran's suspicion of German policy at this time. On 29 June 1940, Iran's Foreign Minister Ameri informed the Iranian Ambassadors in Moscow, Berlin and Ankara of a change in German propaganda on Iran, which had been transformed from "friendly and appealing to threatening".(189) Ameri regarded this change as an outcome of Hitler's victory in Europe. He instructed the Ambassadors to assert, where necessary, that Iran would maintain its neutrality and that Berlin could not "impose its will on Iran, at any cost."(190)
In early July 1940, the Nazi Government published a White Book, containing documents on a British plan to attack the Baku oil-fields through Turkish and Iranian territories.(191) A British denial did not stop the Soviet media from condemning Iran and Turkey.(192) On 5 July 1940, Pravda accused the Iranian Government of joining the "imperialist conspiracy" against the Soviet
Union, and attacked the Shah with similar allegations.\(^{(193)}\) However, when the Iranian Ambassador in Moscow, Saed, met the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Lozovsky to protest, he was told that the attacks were just journalistic articles and did not represent the Soviet Government’s policy towards Iran.\(^{(194)}\)

Less than three weeks later, the Soviet Government resumed its accusations against Iran. On 1 August 1940, Molotov addressed the Supreme Soviet on Soviet foreign policy, and referred to Iran with displeasure. He said:-

"As regards Iran... We cannot ignore one intolerable fact. At the end of March, in the area of Baku - just as happened near Batum - two foreign aeroplanes coming from the direction of Iran were sighted. The Iranian Government deemed it necessary to deny this fact. But in this case too, documents published in the German White Book, provide sufficient explanation.\(^{(195)}\)

Molotov did not name the foreign country to which the aeroplanes had belonged, but his reliance on the German White Book satisfied Berlin and outraged London and Tehran.

In the same address Molotov also complained about the flight of another aeroplane over Batum "coming from Turkish territory". He concluded that the Soviet Union should "intensify vigilance on its southern
frontier." (196) Following this statement, Molotov, delivered a Note of protest to Saed. (197) Although some have commented that the entries in the German White Book were just a pretext for the Soviets to intimidate Iran, there is evidence that the Soviet Government was actually nervous about a possible attack on its oil fields. (198) The Soviet oil authorities had consulted American experts about extinguishing a fire if an air attack took place on the Baku oil installation. (199) Since the outbreak of the war, Iran had come to merit the attention of both the belligerents, Britain and Germany, each with their own war objectives. Britain was concerned to save its oil interests in southern Iran from a Russian threat and, if necessary, to use Iran as a springboard to attack the Soviet Union, which was supporting the German war-machine. Britain had thought that the Soviet Union, with German encouragement, might advance into Iran and occupy the oil fields in southern Iran.

To deter such a threat, one faction in the British Government, including the India Office, suggested a compromise between Britain and the Soviet Union over Iran. This faction urged the Government to divide Iran into two zones of influence and to "encourage her (Russia) to do what she likes in the north so long as she recognises our (British) interest in the
The British Ambassador in Moscow Sir Stafford Cripps also tried to persuade his government to follow a concessionary policy towards Russia. However, Moscow's compliance with such a plan could have led to a Russo-German confrontation and seemed impossible. Another objective of Britain was to deprive Germany of Russian oil. With this aim, the British Government considered from the Spring of 1940 an air-raid on the Baku oil fields. Soviet anxiety about such an attack led it to demand some bases in northern Iran in July 1940, to protect the Baku oil fields. The British Government's anger over Soviet logistical support of Germany was frequently discussed during 1940 by British officials and the Soviet Ambassador in London. Maisky, on the part of the Soviets, tried actively to pacify the British. To launch an attack on Russian oil fields in the Caucasus, British bombers would have had to take off a short distance away, such as in Iran or Turkey. However, the collaboration of Iran was doubtful. Iran and Britain shared a concern about the possibility of Soviet retaliation. Nevertheless, the British had been informed that the Russians only had short-range planes, unsuitable for reaching the oil fields in southern Iran from Soviet territory or from northern Iran. Nevertheless, the Soviet threat was a major source of concern in Iran. As early as April 1940, the Government of the Shah suggested a secret co-ordinated Anglo-
Iranian military plan to strengthen Iran's defensive capability. But the British response was limited to an assurance that they would send forces to defend the oil fields if necessary, and might give Iran some help in the event of a Soviet attack.

However, Molotov’s address of 1 August 1940 intensified British anxiety over Soviet aims in Iran. Sir Stafford Cripps, who was suspicious of the Soviet plans, asked the permission of London to meet Molotov and tell him that Britain was seriously interested in the maintenance of Iran’s integrity and neutrality. On 25 August 1940, London sent him proper instructions in this respect.

During the Autumn of 1940, the Soviet Government decided to allay Iran’s suspicion of a Soviet attack on its territory. This move was based on two objectives: 1) to undermine British credibility as the protector of Iran’s neutrality; and 2) to cover the Soviet-German accord, which had placed Iran in the Soviet zone of influence. In spite of Molotov’s August warning, on 11 October 1940 the Deputy Foreign Minister Vyshinsky conferred with Saed on Soviet-Iranian mutual interests, and told him that the Soviet Government wished to maintain the "best possible relations" with Iran. Saed, who met Cripps later, informed him of the reports he had received about the reduction of Russian troops around the Soviet-Iranian frontiers, and
expressed his confidence in Russia's good faith. (211) Tehran welcomed Moscow's friendly gesture, and in late November instructed Saed to convey the following points to the Soviet leaders:

1) Iran intends to maintain and develop good neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union.
2) The Iranian Government regrets the emergence of problems between the two countries in the past, and wishes to resolve any dispute still remaining. Iran and the Soviet Union should join in establishing confidence on both sides." (212)

Furthermore, Saed was instructed to state that Iran would not hesitate to comply with the "legitimate" demands of the Soviet Union. Thus, the Ambassador was expected to win the confidence of the Soviet leaders in Iran's goodwill and sincerity. (213)

In September 1940, when the Tripartite Pact was signed between Germany, Italy and Japan in Berlin, the question of an air attack on the Baku oil fields was revived in the British War Cabinet. Some British officials, including the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, Cadogan, believed that Britain should use menacing tactics to prevent Soviet participation in the Pact. They feared that, through a new German-Soviet deal, Germany would gain control over the Middle East and Turkey, and Russia would claim exclusive rights to Iran and Afghanistan. (214)
Meanwhile, some British officials, including those at the Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW), advised winning the Russians' favour by concluding a Soviet-British Trade Agreement, something which Moscow had repeatedly demanded. They also urged the British Government to set up a route through Iran for commercial exchanges between Russia and Britain during the war. (215) A second recommendation from the MEW to the Foreign Office came in October, stating that "northern Iran should be given to the Russians as a bribe to win them away from the Axis Power." (216) Nevertheless, the British Government failed to make a deal with the Russians. 

Molotov met Hitler and Ribbentrop in Berlin on 11 and 12 November; and on his return to Moscow, agreed with the German proposal to determine the Four Powers' zones of interest. In his statement of 25 November 1940 addressed to the German Ambassador in Moscow, Molotov confirmed that "the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognised as the focal point of the aspirations of the Soviet Union". (217)

While the British intended to keep the Russians neutral, the Germans desired a Soviet-British confrontation. There were reports that the German Government had suggested more than once in 1940 that the Soviets invade Iran and occupy the oil fields in the south. Such an action could have affected the British oil
supply, diverted British forces from the African fronts to the Middle East, and withdrawn part of the Russian forces from their Western borders for engagement in Iran. (218) Despite the strategic significance of the Persian Gulf and the attraction of the German proposal, an advance into Iran and an attack upon British interests was not a Soviet priority at this time. However, the Iranian suspicion of a Soviet-German conspiracy persisted. Prime Minister Mansur questioned the German Minister in Tehran about reports of a Soviet-German compromise over Iran; and the Iranian Minister in Berlin expressed a similar concern to the German authorities. In both cases the Germans replied that the reports were "merely British propaganda." (219) One last development in this connection occurred in April 1941, when Molotov went to Berlin and offered the Germans a military alliance, in return for complete Soviet control of the Straits, Soviet freedom of action in Iran and Iraq, and a Soviet base in Saudi Arabia, in order to secure Soviet domination in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Aden. (220) On 1 April 1941 a military coup toppled the pro-British Regent of Iraq, and the nationalist Government of Rashid Aali Gilani, containing pro-German sympathisers, took over. However the nationalist regime collapsed on 2 June 1941, following the intervention of British troops stationed in two military bases inside Iraq. Gilani, accompanied by other anti-British leaders including the
Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, fled to Iran. The crisis in Iraq affected Iran’s relations with the belligerents. The Germans encouraged Iran to cancel the concession of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and to supply petrol to the Gilani Government in Iraq. (221) However, Premier Mansur refuted these suggestions and told the German Minister in Tehran that the consequence of such actions by Iran would be the occupation of the oil fields in the south by the British army, and subsequently the Russian occupation of northern Iran under the pretext of Soviet security. (222) On 8 May 1941, Tass denied the rumours about Soviet plans in Iran, i.e. the dispatch of naval detachments to the Caspian Sea and a demand for bases in the event of Turkey’s involvement in the war. (223) The Soviet Government also asserted that it would continue to respect the non-aggression pact existing between the two countries. (224)
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SECTION TWO

IRAN UNDER OCCUPATION: THE SOVIET ROLE
A PRELUDE TO THE RUSSO-BRITISH INVASION.

Following the German attack on Russian territory, the Soviet Union and Britain became partners and eventually allies in the war against Hitler. In support of the new alliance, the United States extended the lend-lease protocol to Russia. The transport of American and British war-materials to Russia was an urgent issue, and Iranian territory could have provided a supply route. Should the Allies decide to set up a supply route, the German influence in Iran could be used as an excuse for occupation. Thus the presence of several hundred German technicians in Iran became a ground for protest by the Allies, in order to exert pressure on Iran.

The supply route was the main objective of the Allies, but they believed that Iran was not capable of cooperating in this matter, or of keeping communications secure on the Allies behalf. On the initiative of the British Government, the plan for the expulsion of the Germans was extended to an Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran. Besides the question of the supply route, the British Government was also concerned about the oil fields in southern Iran, and the possibility of German advance into Iran in the event of a Russian defeat. From 22 June 1941, when German troops entered Russian
territory, Iran was under the threat of aggression from one or other of the belligerents. This became a reality on 25 August 1941, when the Soviet-British troops entered Iran.
A. IRAN'S POLICY AND CONCERNS IN 1941.

As seen in Section one, Iran's policy between the two wars was to reduce its dependence on Britain and Russia, by establishing contacts with a counter-weight. Germany was qualified to meet Iran's industrial needs, while both Britain and Russia were reluctant to cooperate in some of Iran's development projects for their own reasons. Germany - even after the outbreak of the war - was prepared to supply Iran with industrial goods e.g. machinery, tools, and railway stock.

Before the German-Soviet war, Iran feared attack by Russia, and had approached both the British and the Germans in an attempt to strengthen its defences, and deter such aggression. Iran's first approach was to the British Government, which had been mainly concerned about the security of the oil resources in southern Iran. (1) To stop Iran turning to other countries, the British Government granted Iran a substantial credit in 1939 to purchase British products, but when Iran demanded particular industrial goods and armaments which London could not provide, the credit was cancelled (2). However, in response to a similar request, the German Government sent Iran a limited amount of arms and ammunition (3).

Despite their normal relations, a reciprocal suspicion persisted between Iran and the Soviet Union during 1939-1941. The Soviet Union had ensured that bilateral
relations were limited to commercial ties, while Iran intended to reduce these ties and liberate the northern provinces from their traditional economic dependence on Russia. Moscow was also aware that Iran would not hesitate to choose between the Soviet Union and its enemies; and that any power hostile to Russia, such as Britain or Germany, would enjoy the blessing of Iran. The Soviet occupation of Poland, the annexation of the Baltic states, and the meetings in Berlin between Molotov and Ribbentrop in November 1940 to define their zones of interest, had seriously worried Iran.

In the Spring of 1941, the Shah ordered the army to prepare a defensive plan in case of an invasion from the north.(4) However, the Shah’s Government was conducting Iran’s foreign policy on carefully neutral lines, to avoid Soviet suspicion.

Iran’s relations with Britain and Germany during the first half of 1941 were also complex. As mentioned before, the British Government had considered an air-attack on the Russian oil fields in Baku via Iran; an action which could have brought Iran under the danger of Soviet retaliation.

The British attitude towards Reza Shah was contradictory and sceptical. On the one hand, they were worried about the possibility of a secret accord between Germany, Russia and Iran against British interests, i.e. cancellation of the AIOC oil concession.(5) On the other hand, they were reluctant to acknowledge the
Shah's anxiety over the Russian threat, and comply with his eventual demand for the assignment of British forces to northern Iran. (6) The German advance in North Africa, the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean were regarded as a threat directed against British interests in the Middle East, its rule in India, and particularly its oil concerns in Iran and Iraq.

The nationalist coup in Iraq in April 1941, led by Rashid Aali Gilani, posed an immediate danger to the British position in the Middle East. Friction between the British Government and the new Iraqi regime lasted two months, and ended in military intervention by the British Government. It resulted in the collapse of Gilani's regime, the restoration of the old order, and the Anglo-Iraqi defence treaty of 31 May 1941, whereby Iraq granted the right of protection of its frontiers and the Mosul oil fields to Britain. (7)

During the upheavals in Iraq, Iran received the first notification about the German activities in Iran from Britain. (8) The British Government warned the Shah of "playing with fire and endangering his throne as well as his country", and demanded expulsion of a large number of German technicians from Iran. (9) The British Government had undoubtedly been informed of pressure on Iran to act against British interests; consequently it wanted to exert counter-pressure. In the meantime, Iran refused to follow the German recommendation to either cancel the Anglo-Iranian oil concession (10) or
to deliver oil and transport arms to Iraq through Iran. Following the British military intervention in Iraq, the occupation of the Iranian oil fields was feared by the Iranians. But Iran successfully resisted both German and British pressures. However, with an anti-British regime installed in Iraq, the Soviet Union agreed to the German suggestion to establish diplomatic relations with Baghdad.

After the Iraqi operation, the British moved against the Germans in another area of the Middle East. In Syria, a combined British-Free French force seized the air-base which the Vichy Government had put at the disposal of Germany. The Anglo-French operations in Syria and Lebanon were completed on 8 July 1941.

British armed intervention in Iraq and Syria reflected a determined policy to put an end to all German penetration in the Middle East. Later, in his war memoirs, Churchill claimed that after the suppression of the revolt in Iraq and the joint operation in Syria, Hitler's oriental plan had been finished.

Nevertheless, Iran's neutrality was still possible as long as its two great neighbours, Russia and Britain, were not working together.
In 1939, Stalin, commented that the friendship of Germany and the Soviet Union was "cemented by blood" and would "long remain firm". However, the Wehrmacht invaded Russia on 22 June 1941. Subsequently, the war approached Iranian borders and affected Iran's neutral position. The termination of the Hitler-Stalin accord, or, according to the Soviet interpretation, the "end of a period of peaceful cohabitation between the Soviet Union and part of the capitalist world," caused anxiety in Iran. As in the First World War, when Britain and Russia fought together, Iran's fate was at stake. The presence of German technicians in Iran, and their possible threat to Russia, worried the Soviets. The Soviet concept of "an imperialist war, being waged by the Western Allies against Germany" was now modified; and the British threat to the Baku oil fields through Iran was transformed into a German threat, emanating from the same area. On 26 June 1941, the Iranian Government received the first warning from the Soviet Union regarding the German threat to Soviet security in Iran. On the same day, the Soviet Union notified Iran that the Germans were planning a coup to overthrow the Shah. In response to the Soviet warning, Saed presented a Note to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on 27 June, stating
that Iran would strictly maintain its neutrality towards the belligerents. (19)

On 30 June, the Foreign Secretary Eden called on the Iranian Minister in London, Moghaddam, to complain about German activities in Iran. (20) The British Government was taking advantage of the new development to consolidate its hold on the Middle East. It therefore decided to make use of the Soviet suspicion of a German threat emanating from Iran. Britain had approached the Soviet Union about German activity in Iran even before the German invasion of Russia. On 2 June 1941, Eden had told Maisky that the British Government expected Moscow "not to facilitate the German infringement of British interests in the Middle East, especially Iran". (21) Eden also proposed Anglo-Soviet military co-operation in the event of a German invasion of the Soviet Union. (22)

However, Moscow was not disposed to sympathise with Britain. On 12 June 1941, the Soviet Foreign Ministry issued a statement denying the rumours of a disagreement between Germany and the USSR and blaming the spread of such rumours on the British Government and the British Ambassador in Moscow, Sir Stafford Cripps, who had gone to London. (23)

Nevertheless, at the outbreak of the German-Soviet war the presence of the Germans in Iran became a threat in the eyes of the Soviets. On 27 June, Iran assured the Soviet Union of its neutrality in the Soviet-German
conflict. On the same day, Sir Stafford Cripps, returned to Moscow, and began his talks with Soviet leaders on Anglo-Soviet co-operation against Germany. During his conference with Stalin on 8 July, the German threat to Iran was discussed. (24)

During the first two years of the war, the employment of German experts in Iran was neither a secret nor considered incompatible with Iran's neutrality. The Germans were engaged in various sectors of Iranian industry e.g. aviation, railways, port installations, road construction, house building, textile factories, the electrical and arms industries, and telecommunications. (25) According to British documents, the proposal to expel the estimated 5000 German technicians from Iran was first made by Stalin in his talks with Cripps. (26) However, the number of Germans had been estimated at 2000 by the British Government; (27) 10,000 by Maisky, (28) 1200 by the American Minister in Tehran; (29), and 580 by the Turkish Government. (30) A statement by the Iranian Government in August 1941 claimed that among foreigners working in Iran, 690 were Germans and 2590 British. (31)

On receiving the first warnings from the Soviet and British Governments in June, the Shah ordered the closure of the German Club in Tehran and the suppression of Nazi publications. (32) Up to the end of June, the war communiqués from the Allies or Axis had been published in the Iranian press; but with the new
developments in Anglo-Soviet relations, the imposition of censorship was considered. (33)

In the meantime, the Allied press began to publish reports about the German activities in Iran, which were interpreted in Iran as "hostile propaganda". (34) The semi-official Tehran daily, Ettelaat, reflected the Iranian reaction as follows:

"Until a few days ago when Germany was still friendly with Russia, we were cautioned about a Russo-German conspiracy against Iran. Since the German invasion of Russia, the same adventurists have been warning our neighbour - the Soviet Union - of a German conspiracy in Iran. Despite the hostile and contradictory propaganda, Iran has decided to maintain its neutral position." (35)

In reply to a US Government enquiry, the American Minister in Tehran reported on 28 June that there was no mobilisation at the German Embassy in Tehran, but that "Nazi sympathisers - the Fifth Column - might have been active in the German trade offices in Iran." He asserted that the Iranian police was in full control of foreign residents, and that German activities in Iran were unlikely to be effective. (36) Even after the outbreak of Soviet-German war, a serious dispute with the Soviet Union over the presence of German nationals in Iran was not foreseen. The Iranian Prime Minister at this time, Mansur, has explained in his memoirs that
the new Soviet Ambassador, Smirnov, met him early in July 1941, and expressed his Government's satisfaction with Iran's policy. (37) Smirnov assured him that Iran could continue to import goods via Russia, and asked him to facilitate the shipment of Russian cargo which had been unloaded at Iranian ports on the Persian Gulf. (38) A British document, dated 9 July 1941, reported Smirnov's exchange with Iranian officials as follows:

"The Ambassador asked if the Iranian Government would adhere to the Treaty of Commerce between his country and Iran; and was told in reply that the Iranian Government would continue to allow the transit of goods to Russia except military material which was expressly excluded under the Treaty." (39)

The signing of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 12 July 1941 in Moscow intensified pressure on Iran for the expulsion of the Germans. At the meeting of 8 July with Stalin, Cripps won Stalin's approval for a joint Anglo-Russian marche in Iran. (40) Stalin was worried that the Germans might attempt to topple the Iranian regime and bring a pro-Nazi Government into power. (41) While Stalin agreed with Cripps that diplomatic pressure be put on Iran, the British Minister in Tehran had suggested a propaganda campaign aimed at the Shah to force him to expel the Germans. (42) The Indian Government, for its part, suggested imposition of economic sanctions, a policy which the Soviets also favoured. (43)
The first result of the Anglo-Soviet accord was seen on 19 July when the Soviet and British envoys handed Notes on behalf of their Governments to the Iranian Foreign Minister demanding the immediate expulsion of the Germans in Iran. (44) In reply to the Notes, the Iranian Government stated that it regarded the expulsion of the Germans as being contrary to its neutrality. Moreover, the presence of some German technicians was necessary to Iranian industry. However, Iran assured the British and Soviet Embassies of the restrictions imposed on foreigners' activities. (45) Despite this bold reply to the Allies, Iran decided to get rid of the Germans and safeguard its vulnerable neutral position. Mansur recalls that by the end of July, the Shah was convinced that almost all Germans should leave Iran. (46) Such a decision would harm Iran's economy but might also remove an Anglo-Soviet pretext for intervention. Mansur also asserts that he wanted to convince the German Minister, Ettel, that the departure of the Germans would help Iran maintain its neutrality and prevent Allied intervention. (47) However, there was a different report which states that Ettel boasted to Mansur of coming German victory on the Russian front, and suggested that he resist Anglo-Russian pressure. (48) Bullard for his part states that Ettel rejected the Iranian explanation and threatened to break off diplomatic relations if Iran expelled the Germans. (49) According to Mansur, Iran wished to convince the Allies
of its good intentions. He recollects that on 11 August 1941, the Acting Foreign Minister Ameri and the Foreign Ministry's Director-General Sayyah officially informed the British and Soviet Embassies that Iran would expel German and Italian citizens. The Iranian Government hoped that this would put an end to the dispute. There is no mention of this in British or American documents, nor does Mansur explain why Iran did not disclose its intentions. Evidently the Iranian Government underestimated the danger it was under. However, in the Allied view, the occupation of Iran seemed necessary for the security of British oil resources and to safeguard the supply route from the Persian Gulf to Russia. On 19 July, Eden asked the Soviet Government, through Maisky, to consider the joint occupation of Iran. On 28 July, Maisky told Eden of his Government’s readiness to join the operation. Even before consulting the Russians, the British Government finalised its plan for the occupation of Iran, and the project had been approved by the Chief of Staff and the War Office. The COS welcomed the plan to occupy the oil fields, but also suggested that they should not involve the Russians in a military undertaking. The collapse of Russia was foreseen by many British military experts, so they did not wish to be affected by the vulnerability of the Russia fronts. While Britain's main objective in Iran was to safeguard the southern oil fields and the Abadan
refinery,(58) the Russians had been told that the objective was to secure a supply route and to deter the Germans. The British Ambassador in Moscow was left under the same illusion.(59)

On 30 July, Eden told the House of Commons about German activities in Iran, and advised the Iranian Government "to take the necessary measures to deal with the situation."(60) On 6 August, Eden repeated this warning. (61)

The British and Soviet envoys in Tehran conferred on the question of the German activities and the possibility of a coup, supported by Germany, which could push Iran into the Axis alliance.(62) Bullard believed in the possibility of such a coup and realised its likely consequences for the war effort.(63) After the German invasion of Russia, the Soviet Government became more suspicious of the activities of German agents in Azerbaijan, bordering Soviet territory. Moscow also exaggerated the rumours about the German connection with anti-communist Russian emigrés, particularly Dashnaks and Musavatists, and their plans to cross the border and carry out acts of sabotage in Caucasia.(64) There were also rumours that Admiral Canaris, Director of German Military Intelligence (ABWEHR), had been in Tabriz days before the German attack on Russia. Such rumours were published in the Western press.(65)

In the first week of August the Iranian press, which was under state control, answered Allied allegations and
criticised them for publishing reports about the collaboration between Germans and White Russians in Iran. (66) However, the British had supported the allegations for their own reasons. While the German army was successfully advancing into Russian territory, the aim of these reports was apparently to provoke the Russians to co-operate with British plans in Iran. On 14 August, a British report repeated the Canaris story and alleged that he had arrived in Tehran without the advance knowledge of the Iranian authorities, with the aim of provoking "an immediate coup or other activity." (67) Without British support, it is doubtful whether the Soviet Union would have occupied Iran.

Before the Anglo-Soviet accord on joint military action in Iran, Maisky had tried to persuade Eden that the two countries needed only transit facilities from Iran, similar to the Swedish arrangement with Germany in 1940. (68) The British War Cabinet rejected the Soviet proposal, arguing that such a demand might be followed by another one from Germany for similar rights in Turkey. (69)

The terms of a second Note were discussed between Eden and Maisky, while the Soviets confirmed their readiness for military action against Iran in conjunction with the British. (70) This second Note was addressed to the Iranian Government on 16 August, whereby the two Governments asked for the expulsion of 80 percent of the Germans and demanded a reply within three days. (71)
Mansur called on Bullard and asked him if there were other issues beyond the Germans question in the "ultimatum". Bullard answered that his Government's only demand was the expulsion of the Germans."(72)

The Iranian Government instructed its envoys in Britain and the Soviet Union to contact the relevant authorities and enquire about their intentions. Iran's Minister in London, Maghaddam, was told by Eden that all the Allied demands had been stated in the Notes.(73) But a report dated 7 August 1941 from the Iranian Ambassador in Moscow, Saed, was more informative. Saed condemned the British Government for inciting the Russians against Iran on the question of the Germans, and predicted the revival of "the spirit of the Treaty of 1907" which had divided Iran into two zones of influence. He mentioned that on 30 July the Deputy Foreign Commissar Dekanazov had promised to give him an explanation of the Soviet Notes but had not contacted him since.(74)

Saed also objected to Iran's assurance that the rights of the Soviet Union would be respected, although the Soviet Union actually had no such rights. In his view, Iran should only have assured the Soviets that there was no danger to their interests from Iran.(75)

Furthermore, Saed briefed the US Ambassador, Steinhardt, about Iran's problem and about the British incitement of the Soviet Union against Iran. Steinhardt quoted from Saed:
"The British, who condemned Hitler for sacrificing the Baltic States in 1940 to please the Russians, are themselves sacrificing Iran with a similar purpose. The expulsion of Germans is only an excuse for Iran's occupation." (76)

On 19 July, the very day of the first Anglo-Soviet representation to the Iranian Government, the Washington Post published a report about a British plan to occupy Iran. It pointed out that there were only 150 miles of Iranian territory between British troops and Russia, and that the British Government might send troops to Russia via Iran. The Iranian Minister in Washington, Shayasteh, commenting on the Washington Post's report, also quoted State Department officials to the effect that a British attack on Iran was not unlikely. (77)

As to why Britain was so eager to occupy Iran, Churchill has asserted that "the first objective was the capture of the oil fields." (78) As early as 22 July 1941, the British Commander in Iraq "had been ordered to be ready to occupy the oil refinery at Abadan and the oil fields." (79) Churchill had repeatedly stated in his memoirs that "The Persian oil fields were a prime war factor." (80) The British military authorities, disturbed at the speed of the German advance in June and July, feared that Russia might be defeated or remain a passive element in the war with Germany; and that consequently, the Iranian oil wells might fall into the
The opening of a supply route was only a secondary objective of the occupation for the British. Prior to the Anglo-Soviet alliance, Eden had advised the Cabinet "to concentrate a sufficient force in Iraq to protect the Iranian oil fields." He developed this idea when writing to Churchill on 22 July:

"Should Russia be defeated, we shall have to be ready to occupy the Iranian oil fields ourselves; in such an eventuality, German pressure on the Iranians to attempt to turn us out would be irresistible." (84)

On 28 July, the American Ambassador in Baghdad quoted the British Area-Commander as saying that "Iran should expel the Germans, otherwise the British Army will enter Iran during the first week of August to occupy Abadan and the nearby oil fields." (85)

The British sources confirm that by the end of July a unilateral intervention in southern Iran was planned, and not a combined operation with the Russians. General Wavell, the British Commander in India and the Middle East, saw other objectives in the occupation of Iran: to prevent a repetition of events in Iraq, to join hands with the Russians through Iran, and to defend India. (87) The imposition of economic sanctions, instead of occupation, as a way of pressurising Iran to comply with the Allied demand, had been rejected by the Foreign Office and the COS. They speculated that such
sanctions without the threat of force could turn against Britain if Iran, in retaliation, decided to cut off oil supplies. (88)
The same justification was given when the Allies failed to demand a supply route from Iran and did not make an "open threat of forcible action" within their Notes of 19 July and 16 August 1941. (89)

Another cause of concern to the British Government in taking military action against Iran was the reaction of the United States, which might have accused Britain of violating the independence of a neutral country in collaboration with the Soviet Union, comparable to the partition of Poland in 1939. (90) However, in the eyes of American policy-makers in the Summer of 1941, the salvation of the Soviet Union was more significant than respect for Iran's neutrality. Seeking American support for its project in Iran, the British Government initially asked the United States to use its influence in Tehran to secure the expulsion of the Germans; but the Roosevelt administration, which had been suspicious of Britain's desire "to gain additional privileges in Iran" failed to comply with this request. (91)

Thereafter, Churchill made a second attempt. He was informed that following the visit of Roosevelt's envoy, Harry Hopkins, to Moscow in July, the US Government was willing to help the Russians and reduce the hardships that war was imposing on them. Raising the proposal for a supply route through Iran to Russia looked like a
successful tactic to win American consent for the occupation of Iran. (92)

On 16 August, Cordell Hull instructed Dreyfus "not to be involved in the British-Russian demand", but, when the occasion arose, to point out to the Iranian authorities that the German activities would be harmful to Iran. (93)

In response, Dreyfus commented on 22 August:

"I warned Iran of the danger of the Fifth Column. However, I am sure that the Fifth Column is an excuse for Britain's imminent occupation of Iran. Whatever Iran's answer to the Russian-British demand is, Britain and Russia will occupy Iran for military reasons." (94)

While the British and Russians were hiding their true objectives behind the question of the Germans, the Americans discussed with an Iranian diplomat the opening of a military corridor, rather than a supply route, through Iran.

On 11 August, the head of the Middle East Department, Wallace Murray, asked the Iranian envoy, Shayesteh, whether the Shah would "comply with a demand by the British and the Russians to allow their troops to pass through Iran." The Iranian diplomat answered that the Shah would "resist even at the cost of a defeat". (95)

Murray enquired again on 22 August, about a "passage of British troops to Russia," but the answer was "sharply negative." (96) Murray's report to Hull of his
conversation with Shahasteh, clarifies Iran’s position.

"When I asked him if Iran would let the British send arms and ammunition through Iran, he said Iran’s railways did not have the capacity to undertake their transportation. When I asked about Iran’s reaction in the case of occupation, he said an invasion by the British was improbable, but that Iran would defend itself against the Russians." (97)

On 23 August, Shayesteh thought a British invasion probable. When he met Hull, he spoke of the British threat of invasion and asked "what the United States reaction to such an attack would be in view of the principles of international relations". (98) Hull failed to answer directly, but justified British endeavours "to defend themselves before a German offensive." (99) To please the Americans, Britain’s main objective of securing its oil interests was modified to ensuring the survival of the Soviet Union. An American historian wrote that British success in the war was dependent on the support of the "still neutral but strongly anti-Nazi United States." (100) The salvation of the Soviet Union through the occupation of Iran by Anglo-Soviet armies was a policy the Americans approved of. In their Notes of 16 August, both the British and Soviet Embassies had demanded an overwhelming reduction in the number of Germans in Iran, and had asserted that they had no other
purpose than the expulsion of Germans. (101) However, the Soviets pointed out their treaty rights - implying their right of intervention - under Article 6 of the Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1921. (102)

The Soviet Ambassador, Smirnov, joined Bullard to present the Notes, but he was not involved any further. Bullard, on the other hand, with his knowledge of Russian and experience in the Middle Eastern countries, was at the centre of the crisis, representing the Allies and conferring with Iranian officials and the American envoy. In early August he told Dreyfus that British troops had been stationed in Iraq, near the Iranian border; (103) and that if the Iranians did not "comply", British and Russian armies would enter Iran. (104) On 18 August, he told Dreyfus that the Iranians were "seeking a magic formula which could satisfy both parties". (105) He was also pessimistic about a compromise with Iran, and conveyed to the Foreign Office that "Iran would not accept the Allies' demands to reduce the number of Germans." (106)

Bullard's assertion that Iran's compliance with the Allies could have changed the direction of events seems to contradict Churchill's satisfaction with Iran's uncompromising policy. Churchill had instructed the COS that a negative reply from Iran should be used to employ force against Iran, and that "not an hour should be lost." (107)
The Shah was aware that the British, and not the Russians, were pressing for intervention. He sent his Foreign Minister to the British Embassy on 23 August "to assure" Bullard that all Germans would be quickly expelled from Iran. (108) Dreyfus reported to Washington that Iran had abandoned its "previously irreconcilable policy", and was "ready for appeasement". (109)

However, the British interpretation of the event was different. Churchill described the Shah’s last proposal as an "unsatisfactory reply", (110) and "fortunately vague enough to be dismissed." (111) Historians have shown that Churchill feared that Iran might comply with the Allies’ demand, and was relieved when he found an excuse to refuse the Shah’s offer. (112)

Concurrent with these negotiations, the Shah took measures to demonstrate his intention to resist. He ordered a reinforcement of the military divisions in Azerbaijan, bordering Russia, and in Kermanshah, bordering Iraq. (113) He also sent instructions to the army Commander of Khuzestan to defend the oil fields and the Abadan refinery. (114) According to German documents, Iran had had a comprehensive defence plan and was ready to resist an aggressor. (115) Iran was to demand British aid against a German attack, or German aid if the British or Russians attacked its territory. (116) Confident of the effectiveness of such a policy, Mansur told Ettel that Iran’s preparation for
A final action by the Shah which increased the tension, provoked the Allies and decided Iran's fate, was a short statement he made at the military college on 19 August. He told the young officers at their graduation ceremony that their annual vacation had been postponed for reasons which they were to know later and that "the armed forces should be concerned about the situation, and sacrifice their lives if necessary". Both the Shah's order to the army to defend the oil fields and his statement of 19 August were taken seriously by the British Government, who after the invasion claimed the Anglo-Russian military intervention in Iran was not "wholly unexpected" by the Tehran Government.

The Soviet role in the implementation of the British plan was significant; and the strength of Russian pressure alongside the Iranian frontier also played an important part. The readiness of the Soviets to co-operate in a joint operation satisfied Churchill, who also accepted their demand to postpone the plan for a few days, in order to allow the Soviet forces to re-group. The 25th August was fixed as the date for intervention.

The role of the American Government in reducing the tension in Iran was also significant. On 22 August, Secretary Hull assured Shayesteh of the British Government's good intentions, saying that Britain had "nothing against Iran." However, on the same day,
The New York Times described the Allies' position towards Iran more frankly:

"Iran provides a road to Russia over which supplies, both British and American, could be dispatched. Iran is valuable for her oil and may become more so if the Russians have to destroy their oil wells before the advancing Panzer divisions. Thus it is clear that Iran is not something about which the British and Russians are bluffing. In fact, it might be that deep in the heart of these two nations one might almost find a hope that Iran will not accept the protest and will keep the Germans."

The New York Times added that the British and Russians wanted nothing less than to "have the country actually under their military control."(125)
CHAPTER TWO

FROM INVASION TO ALLIANCE

A: INVASION

On 25 August 1941 at 4am, Bullard and Smirnov went to Prime Minister Mansur's residence and handed him two Notes, stating that their joint armies would expel the Germans from Iran. Furthermore, they told him that Soviet and British troops had already crossed the frontier into Iranian territory in order to achieve their objective. The British Note said that Iran had not given "adequate satisfaction to the recommendations of HM Government and the Soviet Union;" therefore the two Governments had decided to "recourse to other measures to safeguard their essential interests." The Note added that their action would be "directed against attempts of the Axis powers to establish their control on Iran." The Soviet Note, put emphasis on the "alien activity of groups of Fascist German conspirators towards the USSR and Iran on Iranian territory, since the treacherous attack of Hitler's Germany on the USSR." It asserted further that German agents under the direction of German Embassy" were organising armed groups "intended for Baku and other most important Soviet border places." The Note did not omit to say that the Soviet Government had been "forced to take the necessary steps to implement its right in accordance with Article 6 of the Treaty of
1921, to introduce its troops on the territory of Iran in self-defence". It ended as follows:-

"The Soviet Government has no designs on the territorial integrity and state independence of Iran. The military measures taken by the Soviet Government are directed solely and exclusively against the danger created by the hostile activities of the Germans in Iran. As soon as this danger has been removed, the Soviet Government, in discharge of its obligations under the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921, will at once withdraw the Soviet troops from the confines of Iran."(128)

Mansur, astonished and helpless, suggested further negotiations to avoid the Allied invasion, but he was told by the two envoys that they were not authorised to negotiate, and would have to wait for instructions from their respective Governments.(129) In his memoirs, Mansur recollected his conversation of 25 August with Bullard, who also acted as interpreter between the Iranian Prime Minister and the Soviet Ambassador.

"I said to him, what do you mean by justice. When the Italian Minister in Athens had presented an ultimatum to the Greek Prime Minister, and gave him three hours before the military intervention, your politicians and media condemned that "injustice" but you did not give Iran even three hours. Bullard
replied that the German Ambassador in Moscow had met the Soviet Foreign Minister at 1 am to declare the break-off of Russo-German diplomatic relations." (130)

Bullard assured the Prime Minister that despite the occupation the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's payments to Iran would be continued. (131)

The Shah was informed by Mansur at 7 am of the Anglo-Soviet presentation; and resorted to diplomatic efforts to stop the military intervention that had actually begun. He invited Bullard and Smirnov to the Palace that same morning and promised to "send away all Germans within one week." The envoys told the Shah that they could only report his offer to their respective Governments. (132)

In the afternoon he received the German Minister Ettel, who was the bearer of a message - dated 23 August - from Hitler to the Shah. The Fuhrer informed the Shah that the German forces had "penetrated far into the Ukraine" and had "reached the area north of the Crimea Peninsula". He assured the Shah that in the course of that summer the occupation of "the entire southern territories of the Soviet Union," would take place, and hoped that "during (that) brief period of danger," the Shah would "resist" Anglo-Soviet pressures. (133) The Shah told Ettel that Iran had been invaded at dawn and that several cities had been bombed. The Shah stated that "the Iranian army was not able to conduct a
successful war against the powerful enemy," but he "did not want to ask Germany for military aid."(134)

However, at the end of the meeting, the Shah demanded that the Germans advise the Turkish Government to use its influence with the Russians and the British to end hostilities in Iran.(135)

In addition, on the same day the Shah sent a cable to the US President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, informing him of the Anglo-Soviet intervention and requesting his support for a "neutral and pacific country". The Shah asked him "to take efficacious and urgent humanitarian steps to put an end to the acts of aggression."(136)

Roosevelt's reply was received on 7 September, stating that the situation should be seen "in its full perspective of world events and developments."(137)

Roosevelt mentioned that the German army sought to extend its full power throughout Europe and Asia; thus he implicitly justified the Anglo-Russian Action. He also asserted that the Soviet and the British had "no designs on the independence or territorial integrity of Iran."(138)

In reply to the Iranian Minister in Washington, who had not been informed of Iran's occupation and demanded American mediation between Iran and Britain, Under-Secretary of State Sumner Wells said on 25 August, "The United States is committed to the best of its ability to assist the defeat of Hitler."(139)

Iran's non-belligerent neighbours, Afghanistan, Iraq
and Turkey, reacted differently to the Iranian situation.

Afghanistan was hosting many German advisors, but the British Government had "no stake such as oil fields and no immediate strategic need" to invade that country. Under such circumstances, the presence of Germans had been preferred to a Russian occupation. Afghanistan was in no position to involve itself with the Iranian problem.

Iraq, since the intervention of the British army and the re-instatement of Abdel Elah as the Regent in June 1941, had no policy other than to follow British orders. Before the invasion of Iran, the Iraqi Government had been urged by the British Ambassador to protest to Iran about the activities of Iraqi political refugees and "their collaboration with the Germans, with reference to Saad Abad Pact." During the military operation of 25 August, Iraqi borders were crossed in the assault on Iranian territory.

Turkey was in a different position. The Turkish Government was suspicious of the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran as pointing to a similar danger for Turkey. On 17 June, only a few days before the German invasion of Russia, Turkey had signed a treaty of friendship and non-aggression with Germany. It was therefore concerned about the consequences of Anglo-Russian collaboration in neighbouring Iran. To dispel Turkish
anxiety, Eden instructed Cripps on 23 July to persuade the Russians to take a conciliatory attitude towards Turkey in the interests of the Allied "long term policy."(144) On British initiative, the Soviet and British Ambassadors in Ankara presented Notes of assurances to the Turkish Foreign Minister.(145)

The British Government also asked Turkey not to mediate between Iran and Britain.(146) Yet the major worry of the Turks was not British but Russian intervention in Iran, which could easily be extended to Turkey. The British Government once again re-assured the Turks that Anglo-Soviet action in Iran would not affect Turkish security in any way.(147)

The Turkish Government was not pacified by this assurance. It sought to stop the intervention. On 24 August, the day before the invasion, the Turkish Ambassador in London proposed that German technicians in Iran be replaced by Americans. According to the US Ambassador in London, however, "Eden plainly gave it no weight."(148) In the first few days after the invasion, the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow together with the Iranian Ambassador Saed, Cripps and the American Ambassador Steinhardt, worked for a solution to stop further military action.(149)

Concurrent with the Bullard-Smirnov presentations in Tehran, the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov dispatched a similar Note to the Iranian Embassy in Moscow.(150) Ambassador Saed, angered by the Soviet actions and by
the Soviets’ reference to Article 6 of the Irano-Soviet Treaty of 1921 as justification for the invasion, stated in reply:-

"Article 6 of the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921 is a proof of the mutual confidence of the two Governments, and of the people of Iran and the Soviet Union, and that Article presents in principle a guarantee of the territorial inviolability of Iran. The circumstances foreseen by Article 6 of the said treaty are specified by its spirit and by its text. Thus, until 25 August 1941, no armed forces of a foreign country have attempted by armed invasion to carry out on the territory of Iran a policy of conquest or to transform the territory of Iran into a base from which to launch a campaign against the Soviet Union."(151)

With reference to the Notes of warning received by Iran in June, July and August, Saed explained the "urgent and extraordinary" measures undertaken by Iran to satisfy its neighbours.

"The last contingency of dangerous persons from the point of view of the Soviet Union would have left the boundaries of Iran on 15 September 1941."(152)

Saed was still hoping, like the Shah, to reach a compromise with the Allies and stop the invasion. In the
same Note, he asked Molotov "to be so good as to stop
the advance of the armed forces on the territory of Iran
with a view to an amicable settlement of the question,"
and "make possible the reasonable carrying out of the
measures taken by the Government to expel from Iran the
foreigners designated in the Note of 25 August in the
shortest time possible." At the end of this Note, Saed
suggested that "in return for expelling from the
territory of Iran the foreigners dangerous to the Soviet
Union and Great Britain, the units of the Red Army
be recalled to the frontiers of the Soviet Union where
they crossed the frontiers of Iran, with as little
delay as possible, and suspend contact with Iranian
troops which defended the inviolability of their
territory."

After sending the Note to the Soviet Foreign Minister,
Saed called on the British Ambassador for the same
purpose.

According to American documents, Cripps told Saed that
"if the Germans were at once expelled from Iran, the
British and Soviet Governments would stop the advance of
their troops and withdraw them;" and when Saed asked for
confirmation from the British Ambassador, Cripps replied
that "while he had not been specifically authorised by
his Government to make the suggestion, he was sure that
the British Government would approve it".

Saed also conferred with the Turkish Ambassador and
asked him to contact the US Ambassador and pass on the
information about his negotiations with Cripps. Furthermore, he asked the Turkish Ambassador "to seek his advice about the proposed Note to Molotov." Cripps had found it "entirely satisfactory."(155)

Saed prepared a telegraphic report for Tehran about his meetings in Moscow and, in particular, his talks with Cripps. But the Soviets failed to transmit his telegram. Cripps advised the Turkish Ambassador to send the cable to Ankara, where it would be transmitted to Tehran.(156)

Neither the Shah’s promise to the British and Soviet Ambassadors, nor the proposals of Saed and Cripps, could stop the invasion of Iran that had started on 25 August. Churchill described the operation as a "brief and fruitful exercise of overwhelming force against a weak and ancient state."(157) Eden’s Private Secretary, Oliver Harvey, called it "naked aggression," of which both Churchill and Eden were rather ashamed.(158)

In Tehran, an extra-ordinary session of the Majles was held on 25 August at 3.30 pm, and Mansur told the deputies that Iran had failed to maintain its non-involvement through the neutral policy which it had pursued. He stated that the British and Russian Governments had disregarded the Iranian Government’s assurance about the departure of all German citizens, and had invaded Iranian territory earlier that day. Mansur added that several cities were under attack and that Iranian warships had been sunk by the British Navy.
in the Persian Gulf, without having returned fire. However, there had been minor skirmishes between Iranian armed forces and the invading troops. He also informed the deputies of the negotiations underway between his Government and the British and Russian envoys. (159)

In a proclamation to the nation, the General Staff of the armed forces announced on 26 August that air-raids had taken place on 13 cities in the north by Russian planes, and on one southern city by British planes, resulting in both military and civilian casualties. The proclamation also described the advance of Russian ground forces in three directions: towards Azerbaijan, Khorasan, and Caspian Sea-Rasht; and British troops in two directions: towards Bandar-e Shahpour-Ahwaz and Qasr-e Shirin-Kermanshah. The military proclamation concluded:

"Our forces, while subjected to sudden attacks, defended their positions to the best of their ability, and stopped the aggressor in the West. The morale of our people in the West and North is excellent; and many volunteers have applied to join the army." (160)

The Russian forces, numbering around 8000 and under the command of General Novikov, reached their objectives in the northern provinces of Azerbaijan, Gilan, Mazandaran and Khorasan. The British commander of operations, General Wavel, stationed his headquarters by the Persian Gulf.
Gulf, and ordered two expeditionary forces under Generals Harvey and Slim to Southern and Western Iran. The British occupied the oil fields in Ahwaz, the Abadan refinery, and the oil installations in Kermanshah. The British Navy in the Persian Gulf under the command of Admiral Sir Geoffrey Arbatnaut sank four Iranian battleships and thus destroyed the whole Iranian Navy. The Commander-in-Chief of the Iranian Navy, Admiral Baiandor, was killed.

The Russian planes dropped leaflets on Tehran and northern cities, accusing the Iranian Government of collaboration with the Germans and demanding the surrender of Iranian forces.

The poorly equipped Iranian army had little chance of resistance, being confronted with the forces of two major military powers. There was no option but to cease resistance. An army commander later wrote:-

"No operational instruction had been given to the armed forces; no authorisation was granted to destroy the railways, roads, bridges; and no rear-ground guard preparations ordered."

The indecisiveness and uncertainty of the Government, expecting a reply to its proposal from the British and Russians, continued throughout the three days of sporadic fighting, during which many army officers in the north fled to the south to escape the fate of Polish officers in Russian-occupied Poland in 1939.
On 27 August, the Shah consulted the Cabinet and decided to dismiss Mansur and appoint a new Prime Minister who could enter new negotiations with the Soviet and British Ambassadors. (165)

On the same day Mansur resigned. He was replaced by the old scholar-politician, Foroughi, who had been Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs until 1935, but had fallen into disgrace. Furthermore, he once had been elected as the President of the League of Nations General Assembly. Foroughi was a veteran politician who had believed in the defeat of Germany since the outbreak of the war. (166)

The appointment of Foroughi and several members of his Cabinet who were "known to be friendly to Britain" aroused optimism in London. (167) However, the acceptability of the new Government to Russians was doubtful. (168) The only reason that they did not reject it was their preoccupation with the rapid German advance, and their reluctance to challenge those whom the British preferred. (169)

At the session of the Majles on 28 August, Foroughi introduced his Cabinet, including the new Foreign Minister Soheili, who was a career diplomat with an excellent knowledge of English and Russian. Soheili was to play an important role in the formation of Iran's policy during the years of occupation. At the same session, Foroughi declared that Iran did not intend to offer resistance to the invaders, and instructed the
armed forces to stop fighting and avoid bloodshed. (170) Ettel described this action as a "unilateral state of truce." (171) On the same day, Soheili sent Notes to the British and Soviet Embassies, informing them that Iranian forces had ceased hostilities. (172) Despite Iran's unilateral ceasefire, the Russians bombed Tehran and committed atrocities in occupied cites. (173) The Shah discussed the Russian actions with Bullard, on 29 August. (174) The Iranian press attacked the Russians, and the Government demanded that the British defend Iran against continued Soviet aggression. (175) Iranian anxiety was shared by London and Washington. On 29 August, Churchill sent a telegram to Stalin in which he welcomed the end of Iranian resistance. He asserted that "even more than safeguarding the oil fields" the objective of occupation had been "to get a through route" to Russia which could not be cut. Churchill then suggested "some kind of terms should be made with the Persian Government..... so as to have a friendly people and not to be compelled to waste a number of divisions merely guarding the railway line." (176) He recommended that "it would be better" for the British and Soviets "not to enter Tehran by force," as all the Allies wanted was "a through route." (177) In Washington, Hull put a proposal before British Chargé Campbell and Soviet Ambassador Oumansky, suggesting their Governments should confirm that the occupation of Iran was temporary, and that the full sovereignty and
independence of Iran, as of other small countries, would be respected and secured after the end of the war. (178) Both of the occupying powers, particularly the Russians, were reluctant to commit themselves about the post-war period; but Hull insisted on the American suggestion and a statement was made accordingly. (179) Soviet-British consultations in response to the Iranian Note of 28 August ended with the presentation of two co-ordinated Notes on 30 August, whereby the following demands were made: 1) Iran should withdraw its forces from the areas under British and Russian occupation; 2) Iran should expel all Germans with the exception of the Legation’s Staff, and 3) Iran should facilitate the transfer, across Iranian territory, of supplies and war materials. (180) In return, the British promised to continue the payment of oil royalties; and the Russians made a similar statement regarding Iran’s revenue from the fishery in the Caspian Sea. They also promised to halt the advance of troops and withdraw them as soon as the military situation allowed them to do so. (181) On the same day, Eden optimistically said in the House of Commons that the "goal" which the Allies sought in Iran was the "collaboration of friends and not an occupation by enemies." (182) However, the optimism in Iran vanished a day later when the Allies, despite their Notes of 30 August, demanded that the Iranian Government hand over the Germans instead of expelling them from the country. This demand met with Iranian resistance. (183)
Two surprising points in the Soviet Note of 30 August were demands for Iran's assistance in the oil operation at "Kavir-e Khurian," a forgotten and inconclusive arrangement between Iran and the Soviet Union, dating from the 1920's; and an extension of their zone of occupation into the region of Semnan, which would cover the oil interest point of Kavir-e Khurian.

In London, Maisky asked Eden to approve the extension of the Soviet zone; and in Moscow, Cripps had been approached by Vyshinsky for the same purpose. Despite Cripps' recommendation that the request be refused, the British Government agreed with the Soviet demand, in return for its freedom of action in arranging a political settlement in Iran. Cripps, like Bullard, was suspicious of Russian plans and activities. He predicted "infinite trouble in future," and insisted on stopping Russian advances beyond the agreed zone. His disagreement with Churchill and Eden over the question resulted in his exclusion from the London-Moscow discussions. It was Molotov who informed Cripps about the Allies' agreement on the division of Zones. Bullard, who shared Cripps' opinion, also faced Churchill's criticism.

Iran, powerless to reject the Soviet demand for an extended Zone, resisted the other demand of the Russians, namely the oil operation in the North. Iran's reply stated that there was "no mention of the Kavir-e Khurian oil deposits" in the Soviet-Iranian treaties.
The talks and accords had been "abandoned" by both sides and "no action to exploit oil had been taken."(191) However, Iran was "willing to enter into friendly discussions concerning the matter with a view to protecting the rights of both parties.(192)
The question of the Germans, their arrest by the Iranian Government and their surrender to the Allies, came up immediately after the delivery of the Anglo-Soviet Notes, on 31 August. Furthermore, the Allies expressed the hope that four legations in Tehran (German, Italian, Romanian and Bulgarian), and the consulate of Finland, be closed soon.(193)
The British Government considered it difficult in terms of international law and the laws of war to seize the German Embassy and arrest its staff through direct action. British records reveal that Churchill suggested that the German Minister in Tehran, Ettel, be kidnapped, and exchanged for the British Ambassador in Belgium, who had been arrested by the Germans and had been in their hands since June 1940; but the Foreign Office objected to this idea.(194)
Churchill urged Eden and Cadogan to make use of the Russian troops to force the Shah to meet the Allies' demands, especially the surrender of the German nationals. He criticised Bullard for his fears about the Russian advance.(195) He instructed Bullard: "Obtain all the facilities we require, bit by bit, by using the leverage of a possible Russian occupation of
Tehran". Churchill, once again, wrote to Bullard: "Dismiss from your mind any idea of a generous policy towards the Germans, to please the Persians or anybody else." He also instructed the Ambassador to secure the capture of the Mufti of Jerusalem who had accompanied Rashid Aali to Iran, and had escaped from British surveillance after occupation.

The Russo-British pressure on the Shah was only one side of the problem. On the other, the Germans put him under pressure not to submit to the Allies' demand. On 7 September, Ribbentrop instructed Ettel that the Iranian Government should be asked to secure the safe departure of all German nationals to Turkey. Ettel was further informed that if Iran failed in this, "an internment by the English" would be "preferred to surrendering the German colony to the Bolsheviks." In the same telegram, it was added that any atrocity committed against German nationals would force a retaliation by German forces against British subjects in Jersey and Guernsey.

**B: ABDICATION:**

On 10 September the Soviet and British Embassies presented an ultimatum to the Iranian Government, and demanded the closure of four Embassies (German, Italian, Romanian and Bulgarian) and the surrender of all German nationals within 48 hours. The Note mentioned that if Iran failed to meet these demands, the Anglo-Russian
forces would advance and occupy Tehran. (200) The Shah complied with the first demand, but refused to surrender the Germans. On the evening of 10 September, the semi-official daily Ettelaat sympathised in its editorial with the four countries whose embassies were to be closed. Ettelaat stated that while the Iranian Embassies were conducting their normal duties in Berlin, Rome, Bucharest and Budapest, Iran had been forced by the invaders to close these four countries' embassies in Tehran, and that the Iranians regretted this development. (201) Iran's resistance to handing over the Germans, and the publication of the emotional article in Ettelaat, which the British officials called "pro-Axis", provoked the anger of the Allies against the Shah, and mobilised their hostile propaganda. (202) On 12 September, Maisky approached Eden and complained about the Ettelaat article, and Iran's unco-operative policy. (203) He conveyed a Soviet message that the Shah should be deposed. (204) Reducing the Shah's power or removing him from the throne was within the power of the British Government, and the Russian troops were considered an instrument to achieve that objective. As early as 29 August, Bullard had told the Shah that he understood the monarch's concern about the Russian advance towards Tehran, but that "there was still a large area to which he could flee". (205) On 3 September, Churchill asserted in his message to Bullard that "unless good results are forthcoming, his (the
Shah's) mismanagement will be brought into account." (206) The old differences between the British and the Shah came to the surface after the ultimatum of 10 September. This was an opportunity to get rid of the Shah.

From 14 September the BBC Persian Service, transmitting from London and Delhi, launched an attack on Reza Shah, condemning his "misdeeds", "cruelty", and violation of the constitution. (207) The British Government, after twenty years of silence, suddenly found that the "selfishness and greed" of the Shah had caused him to be "disliked"; and that after the occupation, "hopes turned to despair when it was learnt that the Shah had not fled". (208) Moreover, the British Government sympathised with Foroughi and his Cabinet, and convinced them that the Shah must go and that there was no certain support for the Crown Prince as a successor. (209) Foroughi was given two choices by the British:
either to abolish the monarchy and appoint himself as the President, or to support Reza Shah's son as constitutional monarch. (210)

The BBC propaganda and the Russian threat were the two humiliating factors which forced Reza Shah to abdicate. Iranian historians believe that hostile broadcasting, against a man who had never tolerated opposition, played the major role in his resignation. (211) However, Bullard asserts that the news about the movement of
Russian troops towards Tehran forced the Shah to resign. (212)

On 16 September Foroughi drew up a draft declaration in which Reza Shah abdicated in favour of the Crown Prince, Mohammad Reza. The next day, a session of the Majles was held to hear the oath of the new Shah. (213)

On the day that Reza Shah abdicated and left Tehran, the Anglo-Russian forces entered the capital. (214) Reza Shah had perceived that the Russian advancement was directed against him personally, and he feared for his safety if interned by the Red Army. (215) Bullard acknowledged this fear, but called it a false perception. (216)

The British documents say that the Allied advance onto Tehran was intended to rid Iran of Axis nationals, and to strengthen the Allied position by utilising the Iranian communication system. They are silent about the fact that the Shah’s abdication was one of the objectives of the invasion. (217)

The occupation forces took over the military installations and the Railway Organisations immediately on entering Tehran, and arrested the Germans, who were later transferred partly by the British to Australia, and partly by the Soviets to Siberia. (218) The Russians specifically named a number of Germans to be delivered to them. (219)

Concurrent with the occupation of Tehran, the Commander of British forces, General Wavel, arrived in the Iranian capital and conferred with the Commander of Soviet
troops, General Novikov, about establishing a defence barrier in north-western Iran, in case of a German advance into Iran from the Caucasus. (220) Churchill himself was behind the idea that Iranian territory should be used to "build up a front behind the natural barrier of the Caucasian mountains." (221)
The accession of the new Shah had not been opposed by the Soviet and British Governments. (222) However, their envoys refused to attend the oath-taking ceremony in the Majles. (223) On 19 September, Bullard and Smirnov extended their Government's formal recognition of the new Shah as the constitutional head of state. Foroughi remained in office with British support, and promised to exclude those Ministers who were not acceptable to the British Embassy. (224)
The Soviets made use of the new situation. Smirnov met Soheili on 19 September and made several proposals, i.e. the transfer of crown properties to the state, the reduction of tax rates, the confirmation of the constitutional right of the people to parliamentary elections, and the acceptance of a degree of self-government for the provinces. Soheili conferred with Bullard about the Soviet demands. (225)
Two elements of the Soviet demands were of particular significance: 1) granting provincial autonomy while the country was under foreign occupation and the Government was powerless to suppress separatist revolts, encouraged by foreign elements; and 2) the right of the people to
parliamentary elections, implying the dissolution of the Majles which had been elected under Reza Shah, just before the occupation. The Government ignored some of the Soviet demands and rejected the others. An excuse was given that the supporters of Germany were strong and would gain in new elections if the Majles was dissolved. The Soviets accepted this explanation. (226)

Some of the Russian proposals were in line with the new Government's policies, directed towards consolidating its position and appealing to public opinion. Already underway was the relaxation of the law, to permit the acceptance of petitions against the ex-Shah, and the enforced annexation of private lands to the Crown Estates. On 23 September Foroughi informed the Majles that the new Shah had transferred the Crown property to the Government, to be utilised "in the service of the nation." (227)

**C: TRIPARTITE TREATY**

Since the intervention of the Anglo-Russian forces, the Iranian Government had attempted to reach an agreement with the forces of occupation, in order to stop their excessive interference in Iranian domestic affairs. The agreement was intended to define the limits of authority and responsibility of the Allies in Iran, and to regularise the relations between the occupation forces and the country under occupation. To the Iranians, such
an agreement would mean the transformation of occupation into some form of agreed presence of foreign troops compatible with Iran's independence and sovereignty. On the other hand, such an agreement would grant the Soviets and British Governments freedom to concentrate on war objectives and the shipment of war-materials through the supply route, while leaving the problems of local policing to the Iranian Government.

In his memoirs, the Shah pointed out that the Treaty was the result of Iran's new foreign policy aimed at ending the neutrality of before the occupation and bringing Iran into co-operation with the Allies. (228) He affirmed that Foroughi deserved "most of the credit" for initiating the new policy. (229) Bullard, without identifying who initiated the Treaty, has written: "They (the Allies) gladly accepted a suggestion that the status of occupation should be replaced by a treaty between Great Britain, Russia and Iran". (230) But according to American documents, Bullard named the British Government as the initiator when he conferred with Dreyfus. On 28 September, Dreyfus reported to Washington as follows:

"The British Minister has informed me that his Government is presenting to the Iranians a draft of a treaty of alliance which will make definite guarantees and give substantial assistance to Iran." (231)
An American analyst has asserted that United States' pressure on the USSR and Britain induced them to sign the Treaty of 1942 with Iran. (232) An Iranian historian provides evidence that the originator of the Treaty was Saed, who had conferred with Molotov and Cripps on ending the occupation and forming an alliance between Iran and the Allies. The proposal had been supported by Cripps and accepted by Molotov. (233). In reply to a Tehran newspaper in 1943, Saed confirmed that he had initiated a proposal on this subject with Cripps and Dekanazov, but credited Foroughi and Soheili with the negotiations and the conclusion of the Treaty. (234)

Bullard received instructions from the Foreign Office to present the proposal to Foroughi, who gave his acceptance on 15 September. (235) Woodward maintains that on 22 September Britain presented a draft of the Treaty to the Soviets. (236) This does not contradict the other theory that gives the credit of initiation to Saed. In fact, Saed presented a general view, whereas the British proposal outlined the details. According to Woodward, the British draft contained several items: "1) The protection of independence and integrity of Iran by the Allies; 2) Full co-operation of Iran, and unrestricted use of Iranian communications by Allies; 3) Withdrawal of troops on the conclusion of peace with Germany, or a year after the signature of the armistice; and 4) Iran's commitment to maintain
relations only with powers who were in diplomatic
relation with Allies." (237)
The negotiations were prolonged and the Treaty was not
concluded until 29 January 1942. The delay has been
blamed, in British documents, on the Soviet and Iranian
Governments. (238) The Soviet objections, or
reservations, are not elaborated on; but one should bear
in mind that in the meantime the British had raised
suspicions among the Russians, by suggesting that they
withdraw their forces from Iran and use them on the
Russian fronts against Germany. (239)
On the Iranian side, Foroughi's Government made several
objections; First, the German army had been advancing
into Russia and getting closer to the Iranian border.
The Iranian people, observing the German victories with
pleasure, outraged in their national pride by the
British and Soviet intervention, were against the
Treaty. The Government for its part was also fearful of
German revenge. (240) Foroughi had briefed Bullard about
the public disapproval of the Treaty because of both
German advances in the proximity of the Caucasus, and
the Russians' behaviour in Iran. (241) Secondly, the
extension of the term of occupation for one year after
the termination of the war was rejected by Iran.
Instead of one year, Iran suggested a term of three
months. (242) Bullard was in favour of shortening the
stay of Soviet troops in Iran. He notified the Foreign
Office that "the retention of the Russians in Persia for
one day beyond the strict minimum should be avoided."(243) Thirdly, it was Iran's intention to enter an "association" rather than "alliance". The major fear, in this respect, was a possible involvement of the Iranian army in the war against Germany. However, Bullard assured the Shah and Foroughi that Iran's army would be "required solely for the purpose of internal security."(244) Fourthly, the Iranian Government did not trust any promise made by the Russians. The British were told that since the first day of occupation, the Russians had undermined the Soviet-Iranian commercial treaties and failed to pay the customs duties for goods they had exported to Iran.(245) Moreover, the Iranians wanted to bargain and gain more, playing one side against the other. The Shah demanded military equipment for the army, while his Government was concerned about "financial and economic assistance, and representation at the peace conference and all other international conferences at which Iran's interests were discussed".(246)

The British Government, as sponsor of the Treaty, chose a policy of intimidation to overcome Soviet and Iranian reluctance. To the Russians, the most important matter at the time was the western supplies which were desperately needed on the military fronts with Germany. The need for a secure supply route was bound to produce a settlement in Iran, and a reliance on the responsibility of the Iranian Government. On 16
September, Churchill implicitly made this point in a message to Stalin: "Our objective should be to make the Persians keep each other quiet while we get on with the war." (247) Also in his letter of 12 October to Stalin, he referred directly to the necessity of concluding the Treaty: "The signing of the Tripartite Treaty is urgent to avoid internal disorders growing with consequent danger of choking the supply route". (248) To facilitate the approval of the Treaty by Iran, both British and Russian armies evacuated Tehran on 18 October. (249)

The Iranian Government itself had been frustrated by problems caused by the occupation, and sought some arrangement with the Allies to reduce them. Pressures from the British and Russians were the prime preoccupations of Foroughi's Cabinet. On 28 September Soheili told Dreyfus:

"Iran has willingly met every demand only to be presented with new ones. Deputies and others are asking when will the Allies stop making demands and do something concrete to help Iran out of its difficulties." (250)

Iran's first intention was to find a solution to cope with the Allies, without making any commitment, but time was not on its side. The British Government resorted to intimidation, stating that Iran should either accept the Treaty or be treated as an occupied country. (251) While the Treaty was under parliamentary
debate, Bullard told Foroughi that if the Treaty was not ratified "in the near future", the British Government could "not be responsible for the consequences". (252)

It is noteworthy that there were public demonstrations in Tehran against the Treaty; and Foroughi, when defending the Treaty in the Majles, was attacked by a member of the public. (253)

The Iranians aimed to prolong the negotiations, to play for time, and to observe military developments on the Russian fronts. (254) Iran actually finalised the process after the German army had failed to seize Moscow, and the United States had entered the war against the Axis. (255)

The Tripartite Treaty was signed by Soheili, Bullard and Smirnov on 29 January 1942. The Soviet and British Governments guaranteed the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Iran. In return, Iran accepted the stationing of Allied forces on its territory. The Allies confirmed that their presence in Iran did not constitute military occupation. Iran guaranteed the Allies an unrestricted right to utilise and control its entire communication network in their war effort. The Allies promised to defend Iran against any attack from Germany or other powers; and reiterated that the Iranian army would be required not to engage German forces but to maintain internal security. Allied censorship of the media, where necessary, was accepted.
by Iran. The most important part of the Treaty, to assure Iranians of the Allies' good will, was Article 5, which asserted:

"The forces of the Allied powers shall be withdrawn from Iranian territory not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or armistices, or on the conclusion of peace between them, whichever date is the earlier. The expression of "associates" of Germany means all other Powers which have engaged or may in the future engage in hostilities against either of the Allied Powers." (256)

The Iranian Government had intended to bring the United States into the Anglo-Soviet commitment regarding: 1) the recognition of Iran's independence during the war, and 2) the withdrawal by foreign troops at the end of the war. On 19 and 20 December, Soheili and Foroughi asked Dreyfus for American adherence to the Tripartite Treaty, and asserted that such an action by the United States would strengthen Iran's position before the Allies. (257)

Secretary Hull was sceptical of the acceptability of the Iranian proposal, but agreed to examine the draft of the Treaty, for further decision. (258) According to some comments, the Americans were reluctant to involve
themselves in Anglo-Soviet policies which had already caused suspicion inside and outside Iran. (259) Upon the conclusion of the Treaty in Tehran, Foroughi exchanged greetings with Churchill and Stalin, and the Shah sent a cable to Roosevelt asking that the United States reaffirm the Anglo-Soviet commitment. (260) The Shah also informed Roosevelt of Iran's complete agreement with the principles of the Atlantic Charter. (261) On 6 February Roosevelt replied that the United States had taken note of the assurances in the Treaty with regard to Iranian independence, and the "ultimate" withdrawal of British and Russian troops. (262) A new era began in Iran's cohabitation with the occupation forces. The old and ill Foroughi, who was not the favourite of the Russians, resigned on 9 March; and Soheili, with the blessing of both Powers, replaced him as Prime Minister. (263)
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SECTION THREE:

FROM INTERFERENCE TO RESPECT IRAN’S SOVEREIGNTY
Chapter One:
The Wartime Problems of the Soviet Union and Iran

With the departure of Reza Shah into exile, Iran entered a new political era. A society that had been ruled by an autocrat and dictator for almost two decades was awakened. The press now enjoyed the freedom to criticise the government, and the Majles changed from a rubber-stamping body into a constitutional parliament able to determine the appointment of cabinets and oversee legal procedures. Political prisoners were released and joined the activists in Tehran and provincial cities. The Justice Department regained its judicial powers, and petitions were lodged at the courts against those officials who had misused their authority against the peoples' fundamental liberties and rights. Consequently, the Chief of the General Police Department, Mokhtari, was arrested and condemned to seven years imprisonment; and a physician-executioner of the Tehran Prison, who had murdered several political prisoners, was sentenced to death. (1)

The Police Department, the most powerful state organisation, which had operated under the direct supervision of the former monarch, announced on 5 September 1941 that people could travel from one city to another without presenting a travel permit, which had previously had to be issued in each city. (2) However, besides these positive gains of the new democracy, there
were chaotic and anarchical tendencies emerging, which were intensified by the presence of foreign troops.
At this juncture, the most rebellious elements were the tribes, which had been disarmed and forced into "settlements" in the past. They attacked government military posts in search of arms and ammunition. Meanwhile, some ethnic groups demanded autonomous status. The economic situation also deteriorated, when the fixed-price system for essential goods collapsed.

Hoarders and profiteers seized the opportunity to make fortunes from the chaos. The Iranian currency depreciated. Above all, self-confidence vanished, and political groups approached the foreign embassies in search of support and guidance.

The Soviets took advantage of these developments in Iran to interfere in Iranian affairs.

A. THE ETHNIC CRISIS

With the occupation of northern Iran by Russian Troops, the Iranian Government lost control over part of its territory. After the mid-September occupation of Tehran and the transition of power, the Soviet pressure on northern Iran intensified. Reports of Russian misconduct in the occupation zone reached Tehran and horrified Iranian officials.

In the Soviet occupation zone, Azerbaijan drew the most attention from the Iranian Government and from foreigners. A British report in early October 1941 referred to the activities of the Red Army, such as
disarming the local police, requisitioning private cars and trucks, and seizing telegraphic communications. (3) In another report, it was stated that the Soviet military authorities, with the excuse that they needed furniture for their headquarters in the occupation zone, had ransacked government departments, schools, and the private houses of those who had fled to other cities. The British report noted that in fact, many of the things taken had been sent to Russia by rail. (4)

The ban imposed by the Russians on the export of foodstuffs from Azerbaijan - the richest agricultural region in Iran - led to shortages in other parts of the country. However, the most serious problem was the incitement of ethnic groups inside the Russian zone. On 19 September 1941, Bullard reported to London that the Russians, due to their distrust of the Iranians, had recruited irregulars from the Armenian minority, and armed them to keep order in Azerbaijan. He added that the local Armenians had held demonstrations demanding the independence of Azerbaijan and its federation with the Soviet Union. (5) Subsequently, Bullard discussed the Soviet-backed activities of the Armenians with the American Envoy Dreyfus. (6)

Bullard’s early reports about Russian behaviour in Iran were not treated with concern at the Foreign Office. On the contrary, Eden stated in a message to Hull that the reports alleging violence and brutality on the part
of the Soviet troops had been "deliberately started by ousted Iranian Officials". (7) However, there was evidence that the British Government was planning to solve the problem without antagonising the Russians. In his message of 16 September to Stalin, Churchill referred to the disorders in Iran and warned that these developments would effect the supply route and would "waste" the potential of the Anglo-Russian troops required to suppress such disorders in the event of them spreading. Churchill also made moves to reach an accord with the Iranian Government which would allow the Iranians to run their internal affairs, and safeguard security with their own forces. (8)

Bullard followed the same policy in his negotiations with Dreyfus. He was well aware of American intentions to supply Russia with urgently-needed materials through Iran. He therefore notified Dreyfus about the difficulties which might appear in utilising the railways and transportation facilities before the situation in Iran was normalised. (9) As an example of Soviet behaviour, Bullard told Dreyfus that a British convoy carrying jute to Russia had been stopped in northern Iran, where the Soviet soldiers confiscated the gasoline the trucks were carrying. (10)

Reports from Dreyfus about the activities of the Russians and their support of separatist movements in northern Iran concerned the State Department. Hull instructed Dreyfus to "keep the Department fully
informed regarding the extent of Russian sympathy towards Armenian and other separatist movements", and to report any indication of "whether the Soviet activities were inconsistent with Soviet assurances regarding the territorial integrity of Iran".(11)

Simultaneously, Hull instructed the US Ambassador in Moscow, Steinhardt, to raise the matter with the Soviet leadership.(12) On 23 September Eden summoned Maisky to the Foreign Office, and expressed his concern at Soviet support of the Armenian separatist movement in Northern Iran. Maisky agreed with Eden that such action would incite the whole Moslem population of Iran against the Allies, while having "a deplorable effect on the Turkish Government as well.(13)

Hull appreciated Eden's undertaking and shared his "apprehension of the effect of Russian sympathy with Armenian separatist movement" upon Turkey.(14) Hull also expressed the concern of the US Government about the political independence and territorial integrity of Iran, "in view of Soviet and British assurances, and in view of the President's message of assurance to the (ex) Shah".(15)

Co-ordinated negotiations began in London and Moscow regarding this question. Eden informed Cripps of his statement to Maisky,(16) and Hull instructed Winant to notify Maisky about American concern over Iran. Moreover, he instructed Steinhardt to approach the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and remind them of
the assurances given in the Soviet Note of 25 August 1941, which had been repeated by Dekanazov in his meeting with Saed on 6 September 1941, and of the reaffirmation of those assurances by President Roosevelt to the (ex) Shah.(17) On 11 October, Steinhardt delivered the message to Vyshinsky, who rejected the charges and blamed German sources for originating the reports about Soviet activities in the occupied zone. Vyshinsky asserted that the Soviet Government intended to maintain "law and order" in Iran, and was aware of the effects of the Armenian separatist movement on Turkey.(18) Consequently, the Soviet authorities in Iran refused the Armenians permission to continue their political demonstrations against the Central Government, but also put pressure on the Iranian Government to deny that the Soviets were involved.(19) On 9 October, the editorial of the Tehran daily "Ettelaat" praised the behaviour of the Soviet occupation forces in Iran.(20) Dreyfus cited the Iranian Foreign Minister, who said that the article was published under pressure from the Soviet Embassy.(21) Following the reaction of the British and Americans, the first Soviet project on Iranian ethnic groups ended in vain. But one might argue that this event provided the Soviets with experience, in preparation for similar projects in the future in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. The Kurdish question became another excuse for Soviet
interference in Iranian affairs. After the occupation of Iran in August 1941, the Kurdish region of Iran was divided into Soviet and British zones. The southern part, under British control, remained relatively quiet during the war, while the northern part of Kurdistan became one of the most troubled parts of the country. Furthermore, many Kurdish people from Iraq crossed the borders and joined their Iranian comrades in the Soviet zone. Iranian provincial divisions had put the northern part of Kurdistan into the province of western Azerbaijan. The provincial capital Rezaieh, with a majority of Azeri-speaking people, also underwent Kurdish disturbances. The first actions of the Kurdish rebels, following the foreign occupation, were armed attacks on the border guard posts, although the region was under control of the Red Army. Meanwhile, a number of Iranian soldiers and gendarmes who had escaped after the collapse of their military posts at the hands of the Kurdish rebels, were captured and detained by the Russian troops. The local garrison, after being surrounded by the rebels, was liberated by Soviet troops. However, the Soviets dispersed the Iranian soldiers and transported the officers outside the Kurdish region. When the Soviet Embassy refused to permit the central government to send forces to the region and end the disturbances, it became obvious that the Kurdish rebellion was in line with Soviet policy in the occupied zone.
In October 1941, a few hundred Iranian soldiers assigned by the local commander of the Iranian army in Kermanshah to suppress the rebellion, were forced by the Red Army to leave the Kurdish cities of Saqqaz and Baneh, where the armed rebels numbered more than four thousand. (25) Subsequently, the rebellion extended to the southern part of Kurdistan. The main city of Kurdistan, Sanandaj, in the British zone, was attacked by the Kurdish rebels. However, the concentration of the Iranian army in the city and intervention of British troops forced them to retreat. (26)

On 9 February 1942, an army detachment assigned from Sanandaj was attacked by Kurdish rebels near the city of Saqqez, and the military commander of Kurdistan, General Amin, was killed in action. (27)

Meanwhile, inside the British zone the Kurdish problem was solved through the mediation of British officers. Moreover, the government had accepted the appointment of the Kurdish chieftains as the governors. (28) Whereas in the Soviet zone the problem continued, due to the Russians' refusal to permit the Iranian army to enter into the region. (29)

The targets of the Kurdish rebels were not only the government forces but also the Azeri-speaking people in western Azerbaijan. In January 1942, following the spread of rumours that Rezaieh had been surrounded by the Kurdish rebels, a large number of the non-Kurdish population of the city fled to Tabriz. (30)
In British reports the migration was regarded as resulting from the Red Army disarming the Iranian gendarmerie and police, and from the distribution of arms among the Kurds.(31)

The Kurdish rebellion not only undermined the security of Iran but also worried the Turkish Government, which had the largest Kurdish minority in the region. In December 1941, the Turkish Government addressed a Note to the British Embassy in Ankara referring to the Kurdish rebellion in Western Azerbaijan, and accused the Soviet Government with "favouring a communist regime in north-western Iran, or even its annexation."(32) Two months later, President Ismat Inonu conferred with the British Military Attaché in Ankara about his suspicions that the Russians were deliberately encouraging the Kurdish rebellion and had been trying to "Bolshevise northern Persia".(33)

Turkish anxiety was justified when a Russian General told the Iranian Commander in Azerbaijan that the Kurds might be used against Turkey "in the event of a showdown" with that country.(34)

When the Iranian Government approached the Soviet Ambassador to request that the Red Army disperse the rebels or permit the Iranian forces to settle the affair, the Ambassador confessed that he had no influence on the Russian commanders, and that his reports to Moscow conveying the messages of the Iranian Government had not been answered.(35) At this point, Soheili decided to take
the matter directly to Moscow, and sent a telegram to Molotov demanding Soviet assistance in restoring order in western Azerbaijan. (36) Eden received a copy of the telegram but did not intervene between the Iranians and the Russians; (37) meanwhile Bullard tried to convince the Turkish Ambassador that the "Kurdish disturbances were not encouraged by Russians". (38) Despite British support of the central government, Bullard did not wish to encourage British intervention against the Kurds, who were also residing in the British zone and in Iraq. He had argued that such British action would enable the Russians to appear as the only allies of the Kurds. (39) This was apparently in contrast with the British policy towards the Armenian question in Azerbaijan.

In response to Iran's request, Molotov advised Soheili that the Iranian Government could dispatch its troops to Western Azerbaijan. (40) Soviet permission to send 500 Iranian troops to the troubled areas, despite the Iranian demand to send 1500, satisfied the governments of Iran and Turkey as a means of settling the Kurdish problem if only tentatively. (41)

B. THE BRITISH INITIATIVE TO REMOVE THE SOVIET THREAT

In September 1941, Stalin asked Churchill to assign twenty five to thirty British divisions to fight alongside Russian soldiers at the battlefront with
German. (42) Churchill responded with the suggestion that the British troops relieve the Soviet divisions stationed in Iran, which could then be used against the German Forces, instead of sending British troops to Russia. Earlier, Churchill had proposed to send British troops to the Caucasus through Iran, and build up a defensive line against the expected German assault on the Baku oil fields and the supply-routes. When Lord Beaverbrook, The British Special emissary conveyed this proposal to Stalin in early October 1941, the latter said that there was war not in the Caucasus but in Ukraine. (43) Then Churchill turned to his second suggestion, to take over Russian duties in Northern Iran with British Forces, and send the Soviet troops back to "defend their own country". (44) Churchill wrote to Stalin: "If you wish to withdraw the five or six Russian divisions for use on the battlefront, we will take over the whole responsibility of keeping order and maintaining and improving the supply route". (45) To relieve Soviet suspicions of his proposal, which had already been indicated by Molotov and reported by Cripps on October 25, Churchill pledged that Britain was not to seek any advantage for itself "at the expense of any rightful Russian interest during the war and at the end". (46) In late October, Stalin reduced his demands, and asked Churchill to send only "one or two fully armed divisions to fight on the Russian front". (47) However, Churchill
insisted on his suggestion. He argued that he could have sent some British troops from Iran to Russia but in that event, the supply route to Russia would have been left without protection. Churchill asked Stalin to choose between troops and supplies across Persia."(48) When Cripps reported the British proposal to relieve the Russian troops from Iran, it caused the suspicion among Soviet leaders that Britain aimed to take advantage of their difficulties and bring all of Iran under its control.(49)

Churchill reacted angrily and drafted a reply which was cabled to Cripps in Kuibyshev on 28 October 1941. He asserted that the Soviet Union had been responsible for its misdeeds during the first stage of the war, i.e., making the pact with Ribbentrop when the Balkans were attacked by Germany, resisting a joint European front against German expansionism and enabling Hitler to destroy the French Army, and ordering the Communists to "hamper" the British war effort. He pointed out that "we did not know till Hitler attacked them whether they would fight or to what side they would be on". Churchill repeated his intention to relieve the Russians in Northern Iran and replace them with "Indian troops fitted to maintaining internal order but not equipped to face Germans".(50) Finally, Churchill rejected the idea of sending British troops to Russia, stating that such a decision would "choke" off the supply route through Iran. (51)
In Churchill's statement to the Russians there was no evidence of his objective to clear Iran of the Soviet presence, but in his letter of 20 October 1941 to President Roosevelt, such a purpose was mentioned implicitly. Churchill wrote to Roosevelt:

"...The best help we can give the Russians, is to relieve the five Russians divisions now crowded into Northern Persia. If these are brought home and used in the battle, I have pledged the faith of Britain to Stalin that no rightful Russian interest shall suffer and that we will take no advantage in Persia at their expense. I do not however, see how in the period mentioned, we can put more than a symbolic force into the Caucasus and the Russians retain a similar representation in Persia.

The Russians much disturbed Persia by their presence, their theories and their behaviour, and the outbreak of disorders would mean that we should have three or four British Indian divisions to keep open the communications from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian".(52)

Churchill's first aim, clearly, was to resist the Soviet demand to send British troops to the Russian fronts, but considering his complaint to Roosevelt, his second aim was to move the Russian forces out of Iran. When the British plan to get rid of the Russian troops failed,
the Iranian question was put forward in the agenda for Eden's talks with Soviet leaders in December 1941. Bullard was called to Kuibyshev to participate in Anglo-Soviet negotiations regarding Iran. (53) In his report of 11 December 1941 about Bullard's mission, Dreyfus referred to the atmosphere of "mistrust" between the Russians on the one hand and the British and Iranians on the other. (54)

It was not beyond the bounds of British speculation that the Soviets viewed the "proximity" of Iran to the Baku oil fields as of comparable significance to that of the "old Finnish and Baltic frontiers with Leningrad," which had resulted in the annexation of the Baltic states and the outbreak of the winter war with Finland. (55) In the British analysis, the Soviet Government might have believed that the war had provided them with "a unique opportunity of making a change" in the geopolitical map of the region. (56)

C. ATROCITIES AND SECRECY

Apart from inciting the Armenians and Kurds, the Soviets were involved in a wide range of activities in Northern Iran, from intimidating the police and other local officials, to organising anti-government groups. In the winter of 1941, a "Liberation Party" was formed in Rezaieh, mostly of Assyrians, Armenians and Kurds, which sought to oust the officials of central government and to form a local government, under Soviet protection, in Western Azerbaijan. (57)
In both provinces of Eastern and Western Azerbaijan, the Soviet commanders ordered the government representatives to reduce the number of Persian-speaking officials. (58) In the same area, the disarmament of the police and gendarmerie posts and the reduction of their staff resulted in a situation of unrest and insecurity. (59) A British report referred to the situation in Rezaieh as follows:

"The chief of police refusing to leave his house for fear of Russians, the Turkish Consul keeping an armoury of weapons in his bedroom, Muslims indulging in threat, French missionaries dreading the repetition of former Christian massacres". (60)

In March 1942, the Iranian Government received reports from Azerbaijan that in Rezaieh the Soviet Consulate had sponsored a "People's Committee", which was inviting people to register for Soviet citizenship; and that in Tabriz, a "Workers Party" had been set up by pro-Soviet elements, which demanded that Azeri-Turkish become the official language of Azerbaijan rather than Persian. (61) To maintain full control over the occupied zones, the commanders of the Russian Army banned the distribution of the Iranian press published outside the Soviet zone in the north. (62) Foreigners who wished to visit Northern Iran had to apply to the Russian Army Headquarters and request special permission. This procedure was extended to officers of the Western Allies.
(British and American), while the Russians had no restrictions placed on their entry into the British zone.(63)

Iran wished to use the presence of Western representatives in the Soviet occupied zone as observers, to check on the Russians. However, the British were reluctant to take the matter so seriously. According to their interpretation, the Soviets' behaviour was "more a manifestation of the Russians general secretivness than evidence of a desire to conceal any particular political design ".(64)

The American attitude was different. When conferring with British officials in March 1943 in London, the Head of the State Department's Near Eastern Affairs, Murray, complained about the Russians' anti-American campaign in Northern Iran. He compared the Soviet policy with the Tsarist policy in the early 20th Century, when Russians forced the expulsion of the American Finance Adviser, Shuster, from Iran.(65)

In March 1942, the U.S. Russian-speaking Consul in Tabriz Bertil Kunihulm, who had been a critic of Soviet activities in Azerbaijan, was recalled from Tabriz at the request of the Soviet Embassy. Smirnov had attributed Kunihulm's difficulties to the fact that he was a "Finn ", and Dreyfus advised the State Department that the Consul's return to Tabriz was not "safe".(66) However, Kunihulm's recall from Tabriz displeased the Iranian authorities, who feared that "arbitrary Soviet
action" might set a precedent by which Russians could "demand or effect removal of any Iranian Official or foreign representative without consulting the Iranian Government". (67)

Relying on the Tripartite Treaty, which prohibited the occupation forces from interfering in Iran's internal affairs and had confirmed their respect for Iran's sovereignty and territorial integrity, the Iranian Government repeatedly protested against Soviet support of the anti-government activities of the Soviet forces in Northern Iran. (68) A significant element of Soviet actions were the operations of their secret agents in Iran. There were reports that a number of anti-communist immigrants from Russia i.e. Dashnaks and Musavatists, had been arrested or had mysteriously disappeared in Azerbaijan and Tehran when the Red Army entered. (69) On 11 December 1941, Dreyfus reported this episode as "the most aggravated incident which the Iranians and others lay at the door of Bolshevik agents". (70)

D. THE WHEAT QUESTION

A major war-time problem of Iran manifested itself in 1942 when the shortage of bread in Tehran and several other cities provoked disturbances among the people. The shortage of wheat was created by several factors:

a] The collapse of the state-collection system after occupation. Through that system, the government had
purchased surplus grain from fertile areas at fixed price, to be distributed in other parts of the country. (71)

b] The early purchase of wheat by the British and Americans in Western Iran, to export to Russia as part of their economic aid. (72)

c] The lack of incentives and shortage of capital for cultivation, as a result of the uncertainty of the situation after occupation. (73)

d] The hoarding of grain to sell at a higher price by landlords, some of whom had British connections. (74)

e] The allocation of trucks and lorries in Iran to transport goods to Russia, thus depriving Iran of its own transport facilities to supply the major cities with grain. (75) Finally, the occupation and isolation of Azerbaijan by the Russians. Azerbaijan had always been the bread-basket of Iran, but since the Soviet occupation, the farmers and grain dealers had been banned from exporting it beyond the province. In fact, the harvest of Northern Iran fell into Russian hands; some was exported to Russia, and some stored for consumption by the Soviet forces. According to a British report, the annual export of wheat from Azerbaijan to Tehran in 1942 had been reduced from 30,000 tons to 3,000. (76) By prohibiting the export of grain, the Russians implicitly imposed a system of compulsory purchase of the harvest in Northern Iran. The Iranian Government was aware that after the German
occupation of the fertile lands in Western Russia and Ukraine, the Soviet Union was deprived of its own agricultural resources, and had therefore appropriated Iranian grain. (77) Even the British realised that the Russians were under pressure for food. (78) The Russian policy was not merely imposing hardship on the Iranians, but also exerting pressure on the British and Americans, who were concerned about the grain supply for southern Iran. (79) Consequently, the Iranian Government approached the governments of Britain and the United States for food aid. (80) The U.S. Government agreed to help, but Iran's food problem, namely the shortage of wheat, was a matter of urgency. (81) On 11 April, Shayasteh complained at the State Department of the Russians' "prevention of food exports from the North", and their "buying up of foodstuffs for export to Russia, thus causing famine among the Iranian population." (82) With the refusal of the Russians to permit the export of surplus wheat from Azerbaijan, The U.S. and British Governments decided to intervene to protect the people of central and southern Iran from famine. In November 1942, each of them promised to send Iran 20,000 tons of wheat within the next few months, but the final amount was later reduced. (83) They also informed the Iranian Government that in the coming months the shipment of war supplies to Russia would be reduced in order to provide the transport necessary to carry wheat to Iran. (84)
Since the grain had not reached Iran, a demonstration took place on 8 December in front of the Majles, against the government. The mob, crying for bread, attacked the government offices and looted the Prime Minister's residence. (85) Subsequently, a battalion of British troops entered Tehran, ostensibly to co-operate with the Iranian security forces to suppress the riot. (86) However, there were other reasons for the British armed intervention, e.g., to force the Majles to submit to Allied demands, among which was the issuing of "a large amount of Iranian currency for the convenience of their troops." (87)

The question of the food shortages provided grounds for the Allies' further intervention in Iran's internal affairs, as well as controversy among themselves. The British Legation suggested the formation of a "food board", incorporating American, British, Soviet and Iranian representatives, to direct food policy. (88) The proposal was turned down by the Soviets. (89)

In December 1942, the Soviets forced the Government to sign a contract with them for the annual delivery by Iran to the Soviet Union of 5,000 tons of wheat, 15,000 tons of barley and 30,000 tons of rice. (90) Most of the promised grain was to be collected from Azerbaijan, but Azerbaijan itself was expecting bread riots. In these circumstances, the American Consul in Tabriz, Kunihulm, advised the government's representative that the grain contract should be cancelled. (91)
Government reacted against this advice and accused Kunihulm of anti-Soviet activities, referring particularly to his suggestion to the Iranians. In this connection, a Note of protest was sent by the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the U.S. Embassy in Kuibyshev. (92) The food crisis relaxed when the US - UK shipment of grain reached Iran in early 1943. (93) However, in April 1943 the Soviet Government surprised the British and Americans by sending 25,000 tons of grain from Azerbaijan to Tehran as a "gift". (94) The Soviets intended to exploit the arrival of wheat in the capital, as a demonstration of their sympathy with the Iranians. The event was announced in advance by the pro-Soviet newspapers, and a row of lorries carrying the so-called Soviet present paraded in Tehran streets. (95) The British and Americans were disgusted by the Soviet gesture to undermine their food-aid to both the Soviet Union and Iran. The British Legation published a statement in Tehran newspapers asserting that the Soviet Union had received, from the Western Allies, many times more than it delivered to Iran, and that the Soviets had been responsible for preventing the transport of grain from Azerbaijan to Tehran. (96) Dreyfus reported, angrily, to the State Department about Soviet opportunism to deceive the Iranian people, and to pose as "The saviour of Iran". (97) He regretted that 30,000 tons of American wheat, at heavy shipment costs, had been delivered to Iran without publicity,
while 25,000 tons of wheat from the Soviet occupied zone had been transported to Tehran for the purpose of propaganda. (98) Dreyfus concluded in his report that the Soviet gesture had "intended to increase Soviet prestige in Iran at the expense of the American and British" just on the eve of the Majles elections. (99)

A British historian has commented that the Soviets created the food shortage in Iran, intending to exploit the situation to lessen the reputation of the Iranian Government and promote instability. (100) However, it should be noted that the Soviet war effort depended highly on the security of the supply route, which could have been affected by the spread of riots. Furthermore, Qavam, who resigned two months after the bread riots and bloodshed of December 1942, was the favourite of the Russians, among the non-communist politicians in Iran. (101)

E. THE CURRENCY CRISIS
Since the Anglo-Soviet intervention, both governments had been in need of Iranian Currency for their expenditures in Iran. However, the Iranian Government resisted their demands to issue a substantial amount of currency notes without gold cover.

For almost a year, the Russian and British Governments used their own resources, receiving rial in return for gold. Meanwhile, they put pressure on Iran to issue notes and lend them as much Iranian currency as they needed, without actual reciprocation during the war.
Bullard entered negotiations with Premier Qavam in September 1942, but was told that the Majles had not approved the proposed currency bill, which would have resulted in a deterioration of Iran's economic situation. Qavam threatened to resign if the Allies insisted on the issue. (102)

The British Government's next step was to threaten "to employ forcible means" if its demand for currency continued to be refused. (103) The Soviet Government agreed to "co-operate" with the British in the currency question, but would not intervene directly. (104) Bullard felt "confused" by the Russians' "aloofness" and asked the Foreign Office to secure Soviet support for his endeavours. On 20 October, Eden approached Maisky for British-Soviet co-ordination. (105)

Concurrent with British pressure on Iran in October, the Soviet Government sent a friendly message to Tehran, expressing its respect for Iran's independence and sovereignty. Furthermore, the Iranian Ambassador, Ahy, was received by Stalin as a courtesy. (106)

British policy, on the contrary, was to employ all means to achieve Iran's submission. Bullard suggested the extension of pressure on the Iranians, asserting that "no wheat should be supplied to Iran before the approval of the currency bill." (107) Iran's Foreign Minister, Saed, described the British action as "pillaging the Iranians". (108)

Bullard also recommended that Qavam obtain emergency
powers from the Majles to pass the law personally or to
dissolve the Majles. (109) However, Qavam refused to
resort to unconstitutional action's. Qavam also mentioned
that if he agreed to do so, he could not foresee the
Russian reaction. (110)
In addition, Bullard, on behalf of the three powers,
conveyed a message to the Shah asking him to dissolve
the Majles, but the Shah refused. (111) According to the
Shah, the British achieved their objectives when a riot
took place against the government's food policy on 8
December 1942. He wrote in his memoirs:

"The British brought their troops back into
the city ostensibly to quell the
disturbances, and thus they intimidated
parliament into meeting their demands." (112)
The British Government gave the United States the
explanation that "the sole reason for the dispatch of
troops was to protect Allied property and military
stores." (113) Regarding British action, the U.S
intelligence reports mentioned that the Russians had
gained from the event by keeping their troops out of
Tehran; and consequently, an "increasing number of the
educated youths had turned toward Russia". (114) A State
Department official made a similar assessment of the
event, and told the British Minister of State in the
Middle East, Richard Casey, on 8 January 1943, that as a
consequence of Russian conciliatory policy "during the
days of turmoil, the Soviet standing in Iran had
improved and that of British had failed". (115) Even the British reports indicated that resorting to harsh measures in December 1943 "allowed the Iranians to believe that their troubles were caused by British". (116)

The Soviet Government presented its currency requirement and succeeded without trouble. On 18 March 1943, the Soviet-Iranian Financial Agreement was signed in Tehran. According to the agreement, Iran had to meet Soviet demands for currency and to finance certain projects of Soviet concern. In return, the Soviet Government promised to pay its debts in gold and US dollars, at the termination of the war. (118)

F. THE ARREST OF IRANIAN NATIONALISTS

During July 1942, when the battle of Stalingrad was at its peak, it was argued that Germany was pursuing two major objectives: to capture the oil fields in the Caucasus and to cut off the Russians' supply route through Iran. (119) The loss of the Lend-Lease supplies, which had been shipped via the Caspian-Volga route, could have resulted in Soviet defeat. (120) However, the German defeat at Stalingrad put an end to that anxiety. In the autumn of 1942, there were rumours that the German Government had ordered sabotage actions against the supply route, through its secret agents led by Franz Mayer, who had been hiding in Iran. (121) Later, it was revealed that Mayer had lived among the Qashqai tribes in Southern Iran, and had master-minded the tribal
attacks on the army garrisons and gendarmes posts.(122) There were also a substantial number of Iranian political and military dignitaries who had been against the Anglo-Russian occupation, but only a few of them may have had contacts with the German agents.

In December 1942, British Intelligence discovered Mayer's sanctuary, after he had fled. Later on, the British Government claimed that a list of several hundred Iranian names, among them generals, former Cabinet Ministers, deputies in the Majles and senior officials, had been found in Mayer's documents.(123) From the Iranian point of view, the list comprised the names of people who did not wish to co-operate with the forces of occupation, without there being, however, any organisational ties between them. But according to the British reports, they were the members of a so-called "Nationalist Party", who had planned to take over the Iranian Government if the German troops had reached the Iranian borders.(124)

The British Government, in the first stages, found it safer to take direct action by arresting those named, and not to consult the Iranian authorities, from whom the secret action could have been leaked. Bullard, as justification, told Qavam that the British had wished to save him from embarrassment by taking full responsibility themselves.(125)

One of the first detainees was Isfahan's Governor-General, General Zahedi. A British Note to the U.S.
Embassy in London on 6 January 1943 alleged that Zahedi was "implicated in serious conspiracy against Allies".(126) That arrest, without the government having been notified, was regarded by Iranian leaders as a humiliation. The Shah himself expressed his indignation.(127) The Iranian Foreign Minister sent a note of protest to Bullard and asked him to warn the Iranian Government in advance about allegations against its officials, and authorise it to arrest any suspect using its own police; but Bullard refused to give a reply.(128) A representation by Dreyfus over Zahedi, at the British Legation, also failed. (129)

In 1943, the number of so-called pro-German suspects increased when the British Intelligence Service claimed that several German Intelligence Officers were dropped by parachute near Tehran, at the end of March 1943, to organise subversive operations.(130)

The arrest of Iranian nationalists angered Iranians. The Chief of the General Staff, General Razmara, resigned in protest at the detention of Iranian officers by the British.(131) Despite an Anglo-Soviet accord on the issue, the Soviet Embassy kept a low profile on this matter, and all the arrests were blamed on the British. Among those arrested and detained in the British camp in Arak, were former Prime Minister Matin Daftari, and charismatic clergyman Ayatollah Kashani, both well known Anglophobes, although neither had any contacts with the Germans.
In line with the Soviet conciliatory policy towards Iran in 1943, the Soviet diplomats in Iran expressed their government’s reluctance to share the British suspicion of Iranians.

According to a report from Dreyfus to the State Department on 16 August 1943, the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires had told him that he could not support the arrest of so many Iranians on the grounds of being suspected of having engaged in pro-German activities "without convincing evidence of guilt". (132)

Some Iranian historians have seen the reluctance of Premier Qavam to co-operate with the British over the arrest of Iranian nationalists as one reason behind his resignation.

Nonetheless, the Russians had intended to support Qavam and prevent his resignation. (133) Qavam’s successor, Soheili, who took up office on 14 February 1943, did not resist the British demands. Bullard gave Soheili a list of 162 suspects, on 29 August. Subsequently Bullard reported to the Foreign Office of his satisfaction with the Iranian Government’s co-operation. (134)

Iran’s declaration of war on Germany, on 9 September 1943, provided more justification for collaborating with the Allied security measures in Iran. (135)

In demonstration of the Anglo-Soviet accord over the suspects, a number of detainees had been transferred to the Russian camp in Rasht. The Soviets, however, released their detainees, as part of a propaganda
campaign. On the occasion of the arrival in Iran of a group of Russian Moslem religious leaders in early 1945, the Soviets announced the liberation of all their detainees. The Soviet action was welcomed by the Iranian press, as a demonstration of Soviet friendship and generosity.(136)

The detainees at the British camps remained there until the end of the war in Europe, but some of them were freed later, only after the surrender of Japan.(137)

G. THE APPROPRIATION OF ARMS FACTORIES

In January 1943, the Soviets asked Iran to sign agreements with them to put several Iranian factories at their disposal. They demanded that the whole production of these factories be put at their disposal, while the responsibility for financing and maintaining them, purchasing raw materials and paying wages was left to the Iranians. One of these factories was a shoe factory in Tabriz, although the country was in need of shoes for its own people and was importing them from abroad.(138) A canning plant in the North was also taken over by the Russians, who agreed to deliver only twenty percent of production to the Iranians. But the most important plant to be appropriated by the Russians was the arms factory.(139)

Unwillingly, Iran complied with the Soviet demand. Prime Minister Qavam, who had signed the agreement to put the arms factory at the disposal of the Russians,
told Dreyfus that his government had been reluctant to sign the contract, but that it was done solely to appease the Russians, who were pressing him on other matters. (140) Dreyfus reported to Washington how "unfair" the contract was. According to this report, the Russians had pressured the Iranians to bring the factory into production. Yet there was a major problem of a shortage of materials. Iran had no choice but to buy materials abroad with hard currency, in spite of a deteriorating economy. (141) The British and American Embassies, which had been involved in formulating Iran's policies to overcome its economic problems, sympathised with the Iranian Government, and understood its weak position. Bullard explained, in his report of 19 September, the burden which the arms factory contract had imposed on Iran. Due to financial hardship, the Iranian Government had requested a loan of $3 million from the United States, and had demanded an advance from the AIOC of £3 million of Iran's royalties. It was in such circumstances that the Soviets forced Iran to finance the arms factory for Soviet purposes. Submission to the Russians would cost Iran £2.30 million annually. (142) Dreyfus was sceptical about Soviet motivations for taking over the small arms factory in Iran, noting that U.S. plants were already engaged in producing huge amounts of arms and ammunition for the Allies. (143) The U.S. army, which was in charge of running the supply route to Russia, had intended to
convert the Iranian arms plant and use it for the repair of railway equipment. (144) Dreyfust therefore interpreted the Soviet take over as a pre-emptive action against the American one. (145)

However, the Shah interpreted the situation differently. He wrote in his memoirs that the Soviets had wanted to dismantle the arms factory and remove the plant to Russia, so Iran's submission to Soviet demands was justifiable. (146)
CHAPTER TWO:
THE EMERGENCE OF A COMMUNIST ORGANISATION;
THE TUDEH PARTY

A. FORMATION

The abdication of Reza Shah, and his successor's commitment to respect constitutional principles, brought an end to dictatorial rule and restored fundamental freedoms including the freedom of association.

Political prisoners were amnestied after the accession of the new Shah to the throne in September 1941. Among the Communist prisoners, fifty two survivors of the Fifty Three were released in September and October 1941.(147)

Several members of the Fifty Three who had been freed in the first phase in September, intended to use the presence of the Red Army to establish a Communist party, and subsequently take over the government. Such an aspiration could be realised only with the collaboration of the Russians.(148)

However, the Tudeh leaders never discussed the Soviet role in the formation of their party. It has been revealed that the Comintern sent instructions to the founders of the party.(149) According to these reports, the party leaders were advised by the contacts of the Comintern to adopt a moderate policy and avoid ideological agitation or anti-western propaganda, due to the Anglo-Soviet alliance.(150)
The formation of the party was announced following a meeting of the founders on 29 September 1941 at the house of Suleiman Mirza Eskandari. He was a distant Qajar Prince and a socialist, who had once been a Minister of Reza's cabinet in the 1920's, but was later disgraced. He was the only popular and well-known politician who joined the party. The other founders were former Communist prisoners. At the same founding session, the Soviet Embassy's Press Attaché Rostam Aliev attended the proceedings as an observer.

The Tudeh (mass) party was founded as a broad-based, freedom movement rather than a Marxist or Communist party. In its first proclamation, the party stressed its democratic and legal principles, i.e., acting within the framework of fundamental law, respecting the constitutional monarchy, supporting the cause of the Allied powers, and inviting national and popular politicians to join the party. It should be noted that the anti-communist law of 1931 which had banned associations with "collectivist ideology" was still on the statute books. Therefore, Tudeh leaders refrained from expressing a Marxist ideology.

Two major points in the Tudeh party's proclamation attracted the British Government's attention: (1) resistance against the restoration of dictatorship (Reza Shah's rule); and (2) campaigning against pro-Nazi propaganda. Thus, the British Embassy consented to the formation of the party.
However, the British had their own local element to fight the pro-German movements. The Hamráhan socialist party, whose leader Mostafa Fateh was the most senior Iranian official at the Anglo-Iranian oil company, joined hands with the Tudeh party in anti-Nazi propaganda. The two parties, under the auspices of the Soviet and British Embassies in Tehran, and with their financial support, began jointly to publish a daily newspaper in January 1941 called Mardom (people) which participated in the campaign against the Axis. (156) In its support of Tudeh in 1941, the British went as far as employing two leading members of the party at the AIOC's Tehran office and the British press and propaganda office (Victory House). (157)

The liberal aspect of the Tudeh party and its cooperation with pro-British elements disappointed the radical faction of the party, who had wished to introduce revolutionary principles. (158)

In general, the party's policy was in line with the Soviet view which wanted to avoid embarrassing the British or alienating moderate Iranians. (159)

The party failed to realise Soviet ambitions for a broad-based political association joined by national leaders and popular politicians as well as traditionalists and middle class Iranians. However, it gradually gained the support of many intellectual and political activists. Even some pro-German youth who had once been impressed by Berlin's propaganda against British colonialism in
the Middle East, changed allegiance to the Tudeh in 1942, after the failure of the German advance into Russia. (160) The Soviet Union was not a colonial power in the Middle East, and its victory raised hopes in reform-minded people in their challenge against the pro-British ruling class. (161) Bullard himself admitted that in the early days of the Tudeh party, public opinion was in favour of the Russians. He commented: "We should work through ruling class, while the Russians have the common people". (162) 

Prime Minister Foroughi's attitude towards the Tudeh Party was unfriendly. He was not a favourite of the Russians either. But his successors, Soheili and Qavam, drew nearer to the party, in order to satisfy the Russians. They granted permission for the party to set up its own clubs and publish newspapers. (163) 

During 1942 and 1943, The Tudeh party became a significant factor in Iranian politics, without however participating in government or parliament. It was also a formidable force that could be used by the Russians. (164) 

In addition to the Tehran headquarters, the party opened offices in the northern provinces of Azerbaijan, Gilan, Mazandaran, and Khorasan, which were all under Soviet occupation. The conservative elements of the government attributed this to Russian support. (165) However, Tudeh historians have offered a different explanation on the party's progress in the north. They refer to better communications between the north and
Tehran and easy access to the Tudeh headquarters there, the concentration of large industrial enterprises in the North which were essential to the labour movement and trade unionism, and the presence of many veteran communists who had been living in the North since the early Bolshevik days.(166)

Southern Iran had been traditionally under British influence and would certainly have given less opportunity to the Tudeh party. Moreover, the Tudeh party had to avoid involving itself with the workers in the southern oil fields and the Abadan refinery, a matter of concern to the British Government.(167)

For the same reason, Tudeh leaders did not propose a Tudeh national congress which might have uncovered the party’s weakness outside the North and Tehran. Instead, the Tudeh Party held a regional Tehran conference in October 1942 to set its policies and program in order.(168) Among the motions approved by the conference were proposals for the amendment of the election law, and the improvement of the living conditions of labourers and peasants.(169)

From late 1942, the party gained so much popularity and strength that at two of the party’s demonstrations in January and February 1943, thousands of Tehran residents gathered to show their sympathy. The occasions were the funeral of party chairman Suleiman Mirza Eskandari and the anniversary of the leader of the Fifty Three, Dr Erani, who had died in Reza Shah’s prison. (170)
A party activist at this time, Khamei, has offered the following reasons for the popularity of the Tudeh party, which was considered the only opposition organisation:

"The Poverty and deprivation of the lower classes, mischief and corruption in the government departments, public hatred of the ruling class, the capability of Tudeh activists in comparison with those of the rival groups, the leadership of the veteran ranks and the faithfulness of the rank-and-file in the party, the appeal to intellectuals and students of Communist tactics, and above all the wide publicity of the Red Army’s victory in Stalingrad".(171)

Praising the role of Tudeh agitators as the main factor in promoting the party’s prestige and influence seems an exaggeration, since the support given by the Red Army to the activists in the occupied zone is overlooked. For example, when a Tudeh agitator was arrested in Mazandaran in 1943, the Soviet commander made a protest to the Governor-General, stating that the imprisonment of Tudeh activists was "illegal and contrary to the friendly relations between Iran and the Soviet Union". The Governor-General answered by condemning the Commander’s interference in Iran’s internal affairs.(172)

In the meantime, the Tudeh party endeavoured to paint a favourable image of the Soviet Union. It justified the
Red Army's intervention in Iran. The official organ of the party "Rahbar" wrote:
"The Red Army entered Iran to save the country from the German threat. The victory of the Red Army at Stalingrad over the German army removed the danger from Iran. The Iranian people should never forget what they owe to Russia."(173)

B. THE TUDEH PARTY AND THE 14TH MAJLES ELECTIONS

From two viewpoints, the run-up to the elections of the 14th Majles was a significant event in Iranian history.
Firstly, it was the first parliamentary election since the fall of Reza Shah. Secondly, the new elections unveiled the hidden struggle between the Soviet Union and Britain, each supporting their favoured candidates. With more than eighty percent of the population living in the rural and tribal areas, the landlords and the chieftains of tribes could play a significant role in influencing the elections. Traditionally, there were friendly relations between the British Legation and the land-owning class, while the Russians had lost their influence after the Bolshevik Revolution. British influence had not therefore been challenged by another foreign power before the occupation. A surprising aspect of the 14th Majles elections was the collaboration between the Soviets and the northern
landlords.\(^{(174)}\) The policy of the Soviet army to conciliate the landlords could have resulted in the victory of Tudeh candidates without any use of force by the Russians.

By the time of the elections in 1943, the rising influence and prestige of the Tudeh party backed by the Russians had shown its effect on Iranian politics: First, Prime Minister Soheili, who had replaced Qavam, and intended to please both the British and the Russians, invited some of the leaders of the party to join his cabinet, but they refused.\(^{(175)}\) Second, the fear that Tudeh candidates might gain victory in all the constituencies in the Soviet-occupied north, and subsequently manipulate the Majles, led to demands for a postponement of the elections. Dreyfus reported on 20 March that "The British and upper class were in favour of postponement of elections".\(^{(176)}\) However, Soheili rejected the suggestion and went on with the election.\(^{5}\)

The strength of the Tudeh Party was so visible that the rightist elements, in consultation with the British Embassy, decided to institute their own political faction, and challenge the leftist movement in the election.\(^{5}\) To that end, a leading politician was needed to gather all the anti-communists and mobilise them against the Tudeh Party. The man chosen was Seyed Zia-od-din Tabatabaie (hereafter Zia), a veteran journalist and politician who had led the coup of February 1921 with the assistance of Reza Khan. He became Prime

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Minister, but went into exile after 100 days in office in 1921. He had spent most of his 22 years exile in Palestine, a British mandate.

In February 1943, an interview by Zia was published in a Tehran newspaper. According to American reports, his statement on Iran's political problems was "widely commented on", by the Iranian press. On the other hand, Zia's appearance was interpreted by the public, the nationalist politicians and the Russians as a British project "to bring back a British tool". Zia's political background was the source of his unpopularity. Both his support of the notorious Cox-Vosough agreement in 1919, and his role in the coup of 1921 which brought Reza Shah to power, were remembered. Even before his return to Iran, the public believed that he was the British nominee for the next government.

Dreyfus reported to the State Department that Bullard denied that his government supported him, but admitted that there had been correspondence between Zia and the Embassy's Oriental Secretary Alan Trott.

Rumours that Zia intended to seek his revenge on the young Shah for his enforced exile by the Shah's father, precipitated some sort of accord against Zia between the nationalists, the intellectuals, the Tudeh Party and the Shah. Both the Shah and the Soviet Ambassador told Dreyfus that they "opposed" Zia. The Tudeh Party organised a public demonstration against Zia on 17
October 1943, when the thousands of people who attended, many of whom were not party members, cheered the Tudeh speakers. (184)

To counter accusations by conservatives, on the eve of the elections, the Tudeh Party announced its full devotion to Iranian nationalism, and denied any Communist affiliation:

"There seems to be an established opinion that the Tudeh Party is an organ of Soviet Communism. Why are some taking such a one-sided view? Why do they think that all Communists want nothing more than the incorporation of their countries into the Soviet Union?

The Tudeh works for the Iranian nation, for the maintenance of our own constitution, for the freedom of Iranian citizens. The Tudeh Party wants to introduce in Iran democratic principles like the ones in America. If our party publishes pro-Soviet articles, it is because the Soviets are fighting well against the Fascists. We are sure that the Soviet Government intends neither to introduce a Bolshevik government into Iran nor to occupy Iran". (185)

However, in the proclamations of some local committees of the party during the parliamentary elections, more revolutionary terms were used, condemning "reactionary
policies" and "dictatorship".(186) The Tudeh Party put up candidates for 30 constituencies, but despite its intensive campaign and Soviet support, it was not able to gain more than 10 of 130 parliamentary seats. Nine of its candidates were elected from the northern provinces, under Soviet occupation;(187) the 10th was a popular lawyer with Tudeh affiliation, Taghi Fedakar, who had organised the independent syndicate of trade unions of the textile factories in Isfahan. He gained 30,000 votes in his constituency, more than any other candidate around the country.(188)

Interference by the Red Army commanders in favour of the Tudeh candidates was criticised publicly.(189) In two cities, Bandar-Þ Pahlavi and Sabzavar, Soviet interference was more obvious.(190) However, critics have asserted that the Soviet style of interference was not to use direct force but to put pressure on provincial officials, landlords and other influential people who needed Russian support to preserve their interests.(191)

Prime Minister Soheili, who arranged the 14th Majles election, wished to appease both the British and the Russians. To that end, he sent instructions to the local authorities to assist some of the Tudeh candidates.(192) This was also in line with the policy of the British, who had advised Soheili to be more accommodating towards the Russians.(193)
The designated leader of the anti-communists, Zia, was elected from the Yazd constituency, before he had returned to Iran. In his election manifesto, Zia made many miscalculations which labelled him a reactionary politician in the eyes of intellectuals, and gave the Tudeh Party an opportunity to attack him. Zia proposed a ban on Western clothing, the introduction of traditional costume for the whole nation, and the imposition of the veil (chador) for all women. Free elections in Tehran and several other cities also presented an opportunity to some independent and nationalist figures to win a seat. Among them was Dr Mohammad Mossadeq, who had been elected as the first deputy of Tehran. He was disliked by both the pro-Soviet faction of Tudeh and pro-British faction of Zia. But the former had planned to make use of his support in the campaign against the latter. During a debate on the credentials of deputies, Mossadeq and the Tudeh faction rejected Zia’s credentials and asked parliament’s permission to speak against him. Mossadeq did not want to be known as a supporter of the Soviet Union or of the Tudeh Party and demanded that Tudeh deputies drop their request to speak and leave the rostrum. They complied, and Mossadeq made a long address about the British role in the coup of 1921, when Zia had been the coup’s political leader. This statement by the "incorruptible xenophobic" Mossadeq offended the pro-British
faction in the Majles, and delighted the Tudeh deputies, who applauded him repeatedly during his speech. (200)

The joint struggle of Mossadeq and Tudeh party against the ultra-right Zia led to a semi-coalition between the Tudeh party and the left-of-centre at this time, which was revived again during the political crisis of 1945. (201)

However, Mossadeq wished to avoid accusations of pro-Sovietism. Therefore, in another session of Majles, he sharply criticised the government policy on trading grain with Russia. He said that in Soviet-Iranian trade the Iranian loss had been intolerable, and that the government "should find ways of compensation." (202)

C. THE FIRST PARTY CONGRESS

The Tudeh Party held its first congress on 1 August 1944, in Tehran. It elected a Central Committee and an Inspection Commission.

At this time, the war in Europe was in its last stages, and the Soviet Union was free to unveil its post-war objectives. Thus, Moscow decided to take a more active part in Iranian affairs. (203) Accordingly, the Tudeh Party moved closer to Communist principles and began to criticise "imperialist associations". (204) The party's slogan of "bread, health, education for all" attracted many people of the middle and working classes who applied for membership. (205) On the other hand, the party was no longer obliged to co-operate with those
elements which it had tolerated during the war-time period of East-West co-operation. According to Tudeh historians, the membership proportions at the time of the first party congress were 75% working class, 23% intellectuals and 2% peasants. These figures have been treated by non-communist historians but with caution. (207)

The Congress appointed the Inspection Commission to formulate restrictions on membership, and purge "undesirable elements". (208) The Congress also approved the Party's statute (assasnameh), and outlined its program. The broad-based character of the party was undermined by the statute, which presented a new definition of the party's principles. The Tudeh Party was introduced as "the party of the oppressed classes, i.e., the workers, the peasants, the freedom-seeking intellectuals, and the artisans". (209) Other principles were stipulated as: the defence of national independence and sovereignty; the struggle against colonial politics, implying British imperialism; friendly co-operation with all democratic countries; the establishment of a national and genuinely democratic regime in Iran; the struggle against economic manifestations of the old social order such as feudalism; and a striving for a centralised and progressive economy based on the protection of the interests of the entire nation. (210)
D. THE FRONT AND SECRET ORGANISATIONS

1. THE TRADE UNIONS

In 1944, Tudeh took decisive action to bring all trade unions under its control and establish an umbrella association to supervise the labour movement in Iran. Prior to this, there had been four active organisations in Iran, namely the Central Council of Workers, the Union of Workers and Peasants, the Union of Toilers, and the Union of Railway Workers. The leaders of all four held a conference under the auspices of the Tudeh Party on 1 May 1944, and merged their organisations into the Central Council of Federated Trade Unions of Iranian Workers and Toilers (CCFTU). According to Tudeh historians, the CCFTU had fifty thousand members upon its formation. The leader of the CCFTU from the beginning in 1944 until 1947 was Reza Rusta, a veteran Communist who had lived and studied in the Soviet Union.

The CCFTU launched a campaign to advertise itself among the leading international trade union associations. It invited the leaders of the Soviet, French, and British trade union associations to visit Iran and the workers organisations. It also applied for membership at the World Federation of Trade Unions in September 1945. During the years of the Tudeh Party's open activity, the CCFTU became the most active front organisation of the party.
In 1944, the Tudeh Party initiated a broad-based press union joined by the party and non-party press, to oppose the Court and the right-wing politicians. To carry out this program, some Communist partisans stayed out of the party and set up the press union, joined by both non-Communist and Communist editors. (215)

Among the total of 60 journals published in Iran in early 1945, 37 were the members of the Tudeh-inspired press union, which had been named the Freedom Front. (216) During the anti-Zia campaign in 1944, the Freedom Front played a decisive role in directing public opinion against the leading figure of the right. A Tudeh leader later wrote that there had been a plot in 1944 to put Zia at the head of the government and subsequently suppress constitutional liberties, but it was aborted by the actions of the Freedom Front to mobilise "democratic elements". (217) Moreover, in 1945 and 1946 the Front made a valuable contribution to the Tudeh party's pro-Soviet policies.

3. THE OFFICERS' CELL

In spite of the legal prohibition of the participation of military staff in political parties, the Tudeh Party secretly infiltrated the army, and recruited a number of officers. Following the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran, a group of nationalist officers had been formed to oppose the foreign invasion. The leaders of this group were detained by the Allies in 1943 and 1944, charged with pro-German activities. In the meantime, the Red
Army's victories and Russian propaganda changed the tide, and many politicised officers leaned towards the Tudeh Party. The party enjoyed the assistance of Russian commanders in Iran, who encouraged the Iranian officers, mostly of junior ranks, to apply for Tudeh membership. The government and high echelons of the army were very sensitive about the issue, but as long as the Red Army was in occupation of Iran, prosecution of the Communist officers in the armed forces was a difficult undertaking. The Tudeh Party used this opportunity to set up its secret military organisation under the supervision of one of its leading activists, Ardashes Ovanessian, who had been trained in Soviet Union. Ovanessian, was a Soviet confidant and a deputy of the 14th Majles, representing Iran's Armenian minority.
A. THE ORIGINS OF THE BIG POWERS' DIFFERENCES OVER IRAN

By the Spring of 1943, there were differences between the occupation forces and the Iranian Government as well as between these forces themselves. Iran was opposed to the prolongation of the presence of foreign troops, in view of the consequences on the everyday life of the people. The expenditure of the occupation forces and their payments to local labour had a great effect on inflation and increased economic hardship. (221)

As mentioned before, the authority of the foreign armies had in effect undermined Iran's internal security. Iran blamed the Russians for their activities in the north: but due to the overwhelming influence of the British, the Iranians believed that their troubles were mostly caused by British officials. (222) Bullard reported in March 1943 that both the British "influence" in the government, and their "unpopularity" with the general public, were growing. (223) The British Government attributed Iran's problems partly to the priority of Soviet needs, which had focused Iran's communications on securing the supply route, and partly to the policy of non-co-operation of the Russians, Americans and Iranians. In the eyes of British representatives in Iran, the Iranians were incompetent at handling their
own affairs, and the Allies should take over the "non-military matters arising out of the invasion." (224) According to the Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office Sir Maurice Peterson, the major reasons behind Iran’s economic problems were the incompetence and corruption of the Iranians, rather than Allied activities. (225) The British also accused the Americans of hypocrisy in standing aside, leaving all the responsibilities in Iran to the British, in order to preserve their "prestige". (226) Moreover, while the British Government had to secure the co-operation of the Russians, it felt that they were "unnecessarily harsh" inside their zone of occupation. (227) Bullard understood that the Russians’ victory in the Caucasus had revived their interests in neighbouring Iran. (228) After the German defeat at Stalingrad, the western Allies considered the German threat to Caucasia at an end, and the presence of foreign troops in Iran no longer necessary other than for the maintenance of the supply route. (229) Bullard was suspicious about Soviet intentions in Iran. In his reports, he indicated the temptations for the Soviets, such as gaining command of Iranian oil resources, gaining access to the warm waters of the Persian Gulf, and achieving the annexation of the Iranian province of Azerbaijan. (230) The Foreign Office instructed Bullard that British toleration of territorial changes in favour of the Soviet Union was limited to Europe and did not include Iran. (231)
Like the British criticism of the Russians, the Americans accused the British of "harshness" in dealing with Iranians. (232) Washington and London had repeatedly blamed one another's envoys in Iran for their lack of co-operation. In December 1942, the U.S. Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, complained to the British Ambassador Lord Halifax that Bullard had been carrying out the wrong policy in spite of Anglo-American co-operation. (233) In January 1943, Wells' complaint was reciprocated by the British Minister of State in the Middle East, Richard Casey; he had similar complaints against Dreyfus, whose reports from Tehran were in turn mostly critical of Bullard. (234)

In January 1943, a U.S. diplomat in Tehran compared the British and Soviet policies in Iran. He wrote: "although Russian policy has been fundamentally aggressive and British policy fundamentally defensive in character, the result in both cases has been interference with the internal affairs of Iran which has created an ingrained distrust of both powers in the Iranian people." (235) The British Government expected its allies to have similar policies to its own in Iran. For the materials and services provided for the Allied forces, Iran had been receiving part of its outstanding credit in hard currency, which was the minimum that the Allies could do to save the Iranian economy. In February 1943, Iran and the United States reached a satisfactory accord on the rate of the dollar, but the
British Government intervened by asking the United States not to offer more favourable conditions than those articulated in the Iranian-British accord. (236) A major dispute between the Allies developed over their approach to Iran's security. Iran and the United States had agreed to improve the Iranian army, police and gendarmerie through the assistance of American advisers, and the Shah as the Supreme Commander of the armed forces was pursuing this line. However, this policy was not favoured by the British. The young Shah's policy of expanding the armed forces was "embarrassing" to the British, who feared that another powerful ruler, disobedient to the British like Reza Shah, might emerge. (237) The Shah complained in his memoirs that the British Military Attaché during the war, General Fraser, "made every possible effort to relieve" him from the command of the army. (238) Moreover, the pro-British politicians under the leadership of Zia endeavoured in the Majles to reduce both the military budget and the Shah's role in the army. (239) Pursuing this policy, Zia went as far as to collaborate with the Tudeh Party against the Court. (240) The Shah, in attempting to gain the consent of the British and Americans for his ambitions, laid stress on two goals: blocking the Russian advance, mentioned in his negotiations with Richard Casey in April 1943; (241) and fighting, if necessary, alongside the Americans and British against the Axis, as raised by him in meetings.
with Churchill in August 1942 and Dreyfus in April 1943. (242)
B. MOVES RELATED TO THE IRANIAN QUESTION

1. HAZHIR'S MISSION.

By the Summer of 1943, the Iranians had become more anxious about the fate of their country in the context of foreign occupation. While the British and the Soviets had consolidated their authority in southern and northern Iran respectively, the U.S. Government had refused to regularise the presence of its troops in an agreement. Iran was in search of a guarantee that the forces of occupation would respect their commitments when war ended, and leave Iranian territory. Iran's primary approach was to the British. It was the British Government who had initiated the occupation of Iran in collaboration with the Russians, and had later invited U.S. forces, without consulting the host country, to take up station in Iran. Consequently the Iranians viewed it as the responsibility of the British Government to solve the problems created by the occupation.

On 12 August 1943 A. Hazhir, the Minister of Roads and Communications, left Tehran for London, with a letter from the Shah to Churchill about developments which "gave rise to some anxiety". (243) Hazhir met Eden and Sir Maurice Peterson at the Foreign Office to discuss a memorandum which he had been assigned to present. He was also received by Churchill on 7 October. (244) During his meetings in London, Hazhir complained that
although Iran had fulfilled its commitments according to the Tripartite Treaty, the Allies were not assisting Iran in solving the problems caused by the occupation. According to Hazhir, they were ignoring their obligations, intervening in Iran’s internal affairs with the use of military force, and undermining the authority of the Iranian Government. Protests were also made about the introduction of U.S. forces into Iran by the British without prior consultation with the Iranian Government. One of the major subjects of complaint in Hazhir’s statement was the Soviet takeover of all Iranian ports, roads and railways in the north, where the Soviets charged the Iranian Government for Soviet help to increase the shipment of goods to Russia, and also made the Iranian railway staff pay fares for their travel.

Finally, Iran demanded a "closer observation of the Treaty" through two undertakings: first, a direct referral of problems which could not be solved in Tehran to London; and second, the establishment of a tripartite committee consisting of British, Russian and Iranian representatives to find common solutions for the current problems. However, Eden refused both Iranian proposals. He argued that the U.S. and UK Governments were working together, through the Anglo-American combined Supply Committee, to import goods into Iran, and that direct reference to London would not solve any problems. He also stated that a tripartite
committee would lead to an unnecessary interference by many authorities in Iranian affairs. Instead, Eden suggested a closer association between Iran and the authorities in charge of supply arrangements. (248) He repeated previous British advice that the Allies could help Iran only as much as Iran could herself. (249)

2. AMERICAN CONCERN

In the Spring of 1943, General Patrick Hurley, the Special Adviser to President Roosevelt, turned his attention to Iran. Hurley who met with Stalin in the winter of 1942 and visited the front in Stalingrad, was later sent on a fact-finding mission to the Middle East. After a short visit to Iran, he sent a report from Cairo to the President, suggesting a greater American role in Iran, while British influence in the Middle East was in "decline". (250) With regard to Iran, Hurley made a four point proposal, i.e. Iran be given assurance regarding its sovereign rights according to the United Nations Charter; Iran be permitted to join the United Nations; the U.S. and UK legations in Iran be raised to the rank of embassies; and the two countries (U.S. & UK) appoint their new Ambassadors in co-ordination with each other. (251) Roosevelt asked Hull to comment on the points. Hull agreed with all but the fourth. He believed in a broader co-operation among the Allies in Iran. (252) Hull had been persuaded by reports from Dreyfus, the Head of Near Eastern Division Wallace Murray, and the
desk officer for Iran John Jerengan, that all Iranian problems originated from the unco-operative relationship between the Allies' representatives in Iran. On 31 March 1943, he instructed Dreyfus to inform the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran that the United States Government was ready to discuss the differences between the two governments over Iran "whether at Tehran, Moscow or Washington". (253) Later Dreyfus reported that the Soviet Ambassador had not shown a "positive reaction" to the proposal. (254)

Concurrent with Hazhir's mission to London, Washington was getting more concerned about Iran, both with respect to Iran's stability and U.S. interests in the region. On 16 August, Hull sent a report to Roosevelt about the critical political and economic situation in Iran, and the necessity for an active American policy. He warned that Iran might "dissolve into chaos at any moment". (255) He emphasised that "in fulfilment of the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the establishment of foundations for a lasting peace throughout the world" and in respect of the policy that no "Great Power" should "be established on the Persian Gulf opposite the important American petroleum development in Saudi Arabia", a diplomatic intervention in Iran was in the interest of the United States. (256)

On 20 August Roosevelt raised the question of Iran with Eden at the Quebec Conference, and asked him how serious the Iranian problems were. (257) Roosevelt's motives were
based on the briefing report presented to him by the State Department. After consultation with Churchill and his own advisers in the Foreign Office, Eden informed Roosevelt that the most urgent problem in Iran was security, and that the Iranian Government was incapable of maintaining peace and order. Eden blamed part of the problem on the lack of American support for the British policy in Iran.(258)

Eden's comments might have been referring back to a security project which had been suggested by the British but rejected by the U.S. Government. During a conversation between the British Commander, General Pawnall, and the American Adviser in Iran, Colonel Norman Schwarzkopf, in July 1943, the former revealed that the British Government had considered recruiting a special Iranian force under the command of British officers - similar to the South Persian Rifles of the World War I - to secure the tribal areas in southern Iran.(259) When Dreyfus reported the conversation to Hull, he reacted negatively, stating that such an action would be "an invitation to the Soviets to create a similar organisation, a counterpart of the old Cossack Brigade."(260) Hull had added that the best way to improve Iran's security was "to concentrate all facilities to organise the Iranian army and gendarmerie under the direction of Ridley and Schwarzkopf". (261)
In addition to the Iranian Government's concern over its relations with the Allies and the restoration of political and economic order, Iran wanted to be on the winning side in the war, and to be represented at the peace conference at the termination of the war. To this end, Iran had to declare adherence to the United Nations Declaration. A major impediment was speculation over the Allies demands upon Iran, such as the introduction of Iranian forces to the war fronts following the signature of the UN Declaration.

The Iranian Government had approached the Allies representatives as early as July 1943, to learn about the obligations and advantages of joining the United Nations Declaration of January 1942. On 3 September, the Allies sent an agreed Note to the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which stated:

1. Iran would join the United Nations, upon the declaration of war against one of the Axis states.
2. Iran would not take on any further economic or military obligations.
3. Iran would enjoy the same rights and advantages as the other 32 United Nations states.
4. Iran would be entitled to join the peace conferences alongside the other United Nations states. (262)
On 9 September, Premier Soheili briefed the Majles about the activities of German agents in inciting revolts against the Government, and Iran's declaration of war against Germany. The Majles approved the Government's decision. Subsequently the Shah signed a royal decree to this effect. The Shah also sent telegrams to Kalinin, King George VI, and President Roosevelt about Iran's decision to join the United Nations.

Iran's Minister in Washington was instructed, on the same day, to sign the United Nations Declaration on behalf of the Iranian Government. On 14 September, Shayasteh signed the relevant documents at the State Department, and Iran formally became a member of the United Nations.

4. ANGLO-AMERICAN PREPARATION

In September 1943, Bullard suggested to Eden that Iran's political and economic problems should be discussed with the Soviets and Americans at the coming Conference of Foreign Ministers in Moscow. In fact, both the British and United States' governments, given their interests in Iran, had already decided to bring the Iranian question before the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers.

The British Government proceeded with this plan, and on 5 October, informed the United States Embassy in London of the points it would raise at the conference. These included further co-operation between the Allied
representatives in Iran, and in particular, the recognition of all the zones of occupation as one administrative and economic unit, under the control of the Iranian authorities; support for the American advisers towards a settlement of Iran's economic problems; the revision of economic contracts which had been imposed on Iran and which had aggravated the economic problems; the rapid withdrawal of the occupation forces after the end of the war; and a declaration to respect Iran's integrity and independence. (268) The British proposals were approved by the U.S. Government on 9 October. (269) Dreyfus was also told that the British would propose a reconsideration of Iran's situation and better co-operation between the three powers. (270)

Eden and Hull, when in Tehran on their way to Moscow, met Premier Soheili and Foreign Minister Saed. Much to Hull's satisfaction, Eden told Soheili that a withdrawal of American advisers from Iran would be disastrous. (271) This lessened U.S. suspicion of British policy in Iran. But from the Iranian point of view, all their problems were the result of foreign occupation, and could only be solved by the withdrawal of foreign troops.

The Iranians, although demanding an early withdrawal of occupation forces, were opposed to a discussion of the question in their absence. According to British sources:

"The Shah who in common with many Persians had
feared that his country's future might be placed on the agenda of the three powers conference in Moscow, was relieved by an assurance from the Soviet Government that Persia would not be discussed at the conference." (272)

In the meantime, Soheili and Saed approached Eden and Hull to ask for the early withdrawal of the Russian and British forces from Iran. Iranian officials emphasised that the situation had changed with the signature of the Tripartite Treaty, and that since the expulsion of German agents from Iran and the German army’s retreat from the Caucasus periphery, Iran did not need foreign protection.(273)

C. THE IRANIAN QUESTION AT THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS.

The Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers was held from 19 to 30 October 1943. The Conference had originally been arranged to discuss problems between the Allies in Europe. However, the Iranian question had been included in the British agenda. When staying in Iran, Eden consulted Bullard about the issue; and he subsequently included two members of the British Legation in Tehran in his delegation to the conference.(274)

Eden’s objectives were to obtain an assurance from the Russians that they would adopt a more co-operative attitude towards their Western Allies in Iran, and would leave the country after the war.(275) Another anxiety of Eden’s was that the pattern of Soviet-style bilateral
treaties, such as that signed the same year with Czechoslovakia, might extend to other Soviet neighbours like Iran. Eden proposed that Britain and the Soviet Union should consult one another before concluding treaties with the countries under occupation. (276)

At the conference session of 24 October, Eden put forward his suggestions relating to the operations of the three powers in Iran. He suggested that a tripartite declaration to reaffirm Allied good intention towards Iran be issued. (277) Hull supported Eden’s proposal and made two additional points: unanimous support for foreign advisers serving in Iran; and a separate statement by each of the three powers pledging that their troops would be reduced in number when the military situation permitted, and that there would be an evacuation of all troops from Iran at the end of the war. (278)

Molotov refused to accept the Eden-Hull proposals. He said that just before the conference, his assistant Kavtaradze, had been told by the Iranian Ambassador, Ahy, that according to the Tripartite Treaty of 1942, Iran should take part at any conferences which were to make a decision about Iran. (279) Molotov also argued that the United States had no agreement with Iran over its status there, so could not involve itself legally in Iranian affairs. (280)

Eden agreed with Molotov that Iran’s representative should be present at the conference when decisions
affecting Iran were made, but said that if the conference made a survey of the Iranian situation leading to a policy favourable for Iran, there was no reason to suggest any legal impediment which might cause Iran to object. (281) Eden concluded that the appointment of a sub-committee to study the situation in Iran would help the Allies co-ordinate their policies. Molotov had previously resisted any proposal which would limit Soviet freedom of action in signing agreements with bordering states. (282) However, he agreed with Eden's proposal that the question could be studied in Moscow and be discussed at the next Allied conference in Tehran, upon consultation with the Iranian Government. (283)

The Moscow Conference's Sub-Committee on Iran, consisted of six members:

**SOVIET UNION**

Sergei Kavtaradze Assistant Commissar of Foreign Affairs

Ivan Smirnov Former Ambassador to Iran

**UNITED KINGDOM**

Adrian Holman Counsellor, Tehran Legation

William Illif Financial Counsellor, Tehran Legation

**UNITED STATES**

George Allen Assistant Director, Near
At the first meeting of the Sub-Committee on 25 October, the British representative proposed two drafts:—
First, a three-power declaration of general support for Iran, stating the intention to withdraw or reduce the non-military units stationed in Iran "in connection with the United Nations War efforts". Second, a draft pledging respect for the territorial integrity of Iran and the withdrawal of all forces after the war. (285)
The American representatives proposed a declaration by all three governments, to complete the Anglo-Soviet treaty with Iran of 1942, asserting that the U.S. forces in Iran were solely technical, and had the sole duty of facilitating the transport of supplies to the Soviet Union. (286)
However, the Soviet representatives called all Western proposals unnecessary. Kavitradze argued that the suggestion to guarantee the territorial integrity of Iran was a repetition of the assurance stipulated in the Tripartite Treaty of 1942. In his support, Smirnov stated that the Iranian Government was satisfied with the previous assurances made by the Allies, and did not expect further guarantees. As the man responsible for interference in the internal affairs of Iran in 1941-1942, he said that no foreign troops had interfered in
Iran's domestic affairs. At the concluding session of the Sub-Committee, the delegates decided to report to the Council of Ministers that there were no fundamental differences between the powers over Iran. Thus, the Anglo-American attempt to issue a new declaration on Iran failed because of Soviet obstruction.

Hull, in his memoirs, complained of the Western Allies encounter with "the rock of Soviet opposition". However, Hull did his best at the end of the conference, to cover up the Allies failure to settle the major issues. To the pleasure of the Soviets, Hall praised the "splendid results of the conference over which Molotov was presiding".

During the Moscow Conference, the Soviets said that the solution of all problems, including that of Iran, were dependant on Anglo-American co-operation in hastening the "Overlord" operation and the end of the war. After the end of the Moscow Conference, Hull sent George Allen to Tehran to inform the Iranian Government that the Russians had promised to carry out their obligations according to the Tripartite Treaty. On 6 November, Allen accompanied by the United States Chargé d'Affaires, Richard Ford, met the Shah and delivered the message. The American interpretation of events pleased the Shah. He told Allen:

"The Soviet attitude might have caused some concern in the past, but during the past two months, there had been a decided improvement,"
not only in the provinces where Soviet troops are stationed but also in Tehran. (293)

However, the British Government was reluctant to confirm the American interpretation, and informed Bullard that the Russians "had not given any explicit assurances about Iran.\textsuperscript{294}"
Tehran was chosen as the venue of the first Allied Summit primarily at the insistence of the Russians, although in 1943, Iran was actually the only country where all the three Big Powers had stationed their troops. When in September 1943 Roosevelt suggested a joint meeting with Stalin and Churchill, Stalin agreed, and proposed Tehran for such a gathering. Stalin also suggested that the Summit be preceded by a conference of their three Foreign Ministers in Moscow. (295)

The Americans tried unsuccessfully to gain Soviet assent to other alternatives for the venue, asserting that Roosevelt was not fit for such a long journey, and that his constitutional obligations as President prevented him from travelling beyond the reach of the Congress. (296)

At the end of the Moscow Conference, Hull once again raised the question with Molotov, and asked him why Marshall Stalin could not fly across the Soviet Union "even for one day and meet the President and Mr Churchill." (297) Hull implicitly suggested Cairo, which had been chosen for the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting at the end of November. Molotov asked why the President could not "fly just a little further and meet the Marshall in Tehran?" (298) Either for his personal
security, with the presence in Iran of Soviet forces and NKVD, or to satisfy his "oriental mind" by having the leaders of two most powerful western governments visiting him on the Russians' "doorstep" in a city which was "largely occupied by Russian soldiers", Stalin insisted on Tehran, and won. (299) Subsequently, it was decided that after their meeting in Cairo, Roosevelt and Churchill would fly to Tehran to meet Stalin.

The British and Americans were reluctant to give any information about the Summit to the Iranian Government. It was only the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, Maximov, who called on Premier Soheili on 21 November, a week before the conference, to tell him about it. He also sent a Note to the Foreign Minister Saed on 26 November to acknowledge the arrival of Stalin and Molotov. (300) Roosevelt and Churchill arrived on 27 November. With the excuse that German agents might be planning to assassinate the Allied Leaders in Tehran, Stalin invited Roosevelt to stay with him at the Soviet Embassy. Roosevelt accepted the invitation. The Summit was also held at the Soviet Embassy. (301)

The question of Iran was included on the agenda, alongside other issues, such as the "Overlord" operation, France, Poland, Turkey, Finland, Germany, prosecution of war criminals and the post-war international system. (302) The question of switching the supply route from the Persian Gulf to the Dardanelle's could have been put on the agenda, but this
was faced with opposition from the U.S Chief of General Staff, General George Marshall, who argued that such a shift would take six months.(303)

At the end of the Tehran Summit, no particular issue was reflected in the statements. In a communiqué signed by Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill on 1 December 1943, only the "determination" of the Allied Leaders over the "destruction of German forces" was stipulated.(304) The three governments agreed not to publicise the issues discussed either at the conference or at separate negotiations. However, Western sources occasionally referred to these issues after the war. The Russians did not publish their own version of the minutes until 1961.(305)

B. STALIN'S OFFER TO THE SHAH

Of the three leaders, Stalin was the only one who called on the Shah. Roosevelt and Churchill stayed at their residences to receive him.(306) Stalin not only impressed the Shah, who found him "polite and well-mannered", but also offered him a regiment of tanks and a squadron of fighter-planes as a gift.(307) However, there was one condition attached to Stalin's present. The tanks had to be stationed in Qazvin, a hundred km to the north west of Tehran, and the planes had to be based at Mashad in north eastern Iran. Both Qazvin and Mashad were under Soviet occupation at that time. Furthermore, both tanks and planes were to remain under
Soviet command, and Russian instructors were to arrive in those cities to train the Iranian personnel. (308)

The Shah later remembered how pleased he was by Stalin's generosity. Equipping and strengthening the armed forces was one of Shah's ambitions. He wrote later in his memoirs: "I was burning to speak of our need for tanks and aeroplanes." (309) Stalin also told the Shah that he should maintain a powerful leadership in command of a strong army. (310)

The Shah consulted his Minister of War and the Chief of General Staff about Stalin's offer. According to British sources, the first reaction of the Iranian generals was to pass the information to the British and American military missions in Iran. (311) Subsequently, an overwhelming campaign led by army commanders and foreign envoys began to dissuade the Shah from accepting Stalin's presents. The generals advised him that Russian tanks were heavy and unsuitable for Iranian bridges and roads; and that Russian fighters were not the sort of equipment that the Iranian Air Force needed urgently. (312) Both the Minister of War, General Riazi, and the Chief of General Staff, General Ahmadi, told the Shah that the appointment of Russian instructors would be a revival of the Cossack Brigade. (313) The Shah was also told that the Iranian detachment, trained by Russians, might be employed as a Soviet instrument "to march on Tehran and back a putsch in favour of a Tudeh Government." (314)
The British advice was that the Shah should have been paying more attention to their assistance in "feeding his people" and American help in providing "boots for his soldiers rather than Russian tanks and aeroplanes." Such an attitude was expected from the British who did not want to see the Shah as the commander of a strong army. But the Americans also intervened to dissuade the Shah from accepting Stalin's gift. On 21 December 1941, General Hurley called on the Shah to tell him that the United States was "furnishing Russian equipment under lend-Lease, because Russia did not have enough equipment for her own necessities". In Hurley's words, both the Russian offer and the Iranian acceptance were wrong. However, the Shah rejected Hurley's criticism. He justified accepting the offer by emphasising the army's need for armaments to contain and suppress the tribal revolts. The Shah also referred to the "re-arming of Iranian tribes by certain foreign influences." He did not mention the British Government by name, but implicitly complained of their connection with the southern tribes. At this time, there was an argument put forward by pro-British politicians that instead of a well-organised army under the Shah and the Central Government, Iran should have tribal, decentralised armies. The major problem relating to Stalin's present was the pre-condition that Soviet officers should supervise the tanks and planes. Iran suggested that before the tanks and
fighter planes were delivered, Iranian officers should be assigned to receive training in the Soviet Union, but the Soviets refused and insisted on their own terms. Iran's subsequent rejection of the Russian present annoyed Moscow, and the Soviet Ambassador left Tehran as a demonstration of discontent.(319)

C. ROOSEVELT AND THE DECLARATION REGARDING IRAN

The Iranian Government had sought an All-Power guarantee of Iran's independence and territorial integrity. Roosevelt became the main supporter of this proposal, and Britain was in favour of such an arrangement. In contrast with their position at the Moscow Conference, an objection this time by the Soviets would have been regarded as unjustifiable. In Tehran, they could not make an excuse such as the absence of Iranian representatives, or the reluctance of the Iranian Government to demand further assurances. According to a British historian, the Iranians themselves proceeded to initiate a "minor diplomatic coup" to bring about the signature of the Three Powers Declaration.(320) In Tehran, Soheili and Saed called on Eden and Molotov to encourage their support for the Iranian proposal. The Shah in his negotiations with Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin brought up the same issue.(321)

On 30 November, Saed sent an aide-memoire to Eden, Molotov and Dreyfus about the text of the statement which Iran wished the Allied Leaders to issue.(322)
aide-memoire said that Iran had endeavoured to the best of its ability to assist the Allied war effort, and bore damages and losses as a consequence. In return, Iran expected the Allies to help Iran's economy to recover, and furthermore, to let the Iranian Government take over the vital installations seized by the Allies and restore Iranian authority over its security forces. The aide-memoire also demanded that the leaders of the Three Big Powers sign a declaration to affirm their good intentions concerning the above issues. (323) Both Roosevelt and Churchill were willing to comply with the Iranian demand for a declaration, but Stalin's view was not so clear. Persuasion was necessary to obtain Stalin's consent. Churchill was not in a position to do this because of his disagreements with Stalin, but Roosevelt was. Roosevelt's intimacy with Stalin during his stay at the Soviet Embassy, and his special interest in Iran, gave him the opportunity to play the key role in the Tehran "Declaration". Regarding Roosevelt's Iranian policy, one should bear in mind that he sent General Hurley as his special envoy to Iran in October 1943 to establish a "greater cooperation between the Western Allies and Russians and cope with the critical situation" in Iran. (324) Hurley was known for his anti-British views and strong ties with U.S. oil companies. (325) Since his first visit to Iran, Hurley had been a critic of British policy there. (326) Following his mission, Hurley stayed in
Iran to join Roosevelt's team of advisers at the Tehran Conference. When Roosevelt met the Shah in the presence of Hurley and Dreyfus on 30 November, they conferred, inter alia, about Iran's economic problems and the British domination of Iran's oil wells and mineral deposits. Many believe that the President raised this issue due to the influence of Hurley. Roosevelt's response to Iran's request for American economic assistance has also been seen as linked to his support for the efforts of American companies to obtain oil concessions in Iran.

While the Iranian Government initiated the Tehran Declaration, it was Roosevelt's instructions and Hurley's advice together with Jerengan's drafting which produced the final wording of the text. Moreover, when the draft text was ready, Roosevelt personally asked Stalin on the evening of 1 December to sign it. The "Declaration Regarding Iran" (see Appendix 2) was an exceptional document signed by the Three Big Powers to guarantee the independence and integrity of a country after the war. It was also the first time that the United States had been involved in such a guarantee. Although the Declaration did not mention the question of troop withdrawals, it satisfied the Iranians by acknowledging their part in the war and promising an Allied contribution to the solution of Iran's economic problems. Furthermore, U.S. participation in the Declaration gave it a greater chance of realisation.
The Declaration was signed on 1 December but was not made public until the three signatories had departed safely from Iran. The first announcement of the Declaration on 6 December was welcomed by Iranians. (332) In his report of 6 December to the State Department, Dreyfus listed different points that had satisfied the Iranians: (1) the U.S interest in Iran's independence; (2) the UK and USSR's renewal of their pledges of January 1942; (3) the reference to the Atlantic Charter recognising the rights of small nations; (4) the consideration given to Iran's economic problems; and (5) Iran's participation in the post-war conferences "along with the other members of the United Nations." (333) Political observers saw Roosevelt’s work to complete the process of the declaration a sign of U.S intentions to take a more active role in Iranian affairs. (334) However, the important question was why Stalin had consented to abandon the Soviet policy followed at the Moscow Conference and signed the declaration. Stalin was satisfied with what he had achieved over Eastern Europe and the Baltic States at the Tehran conference. He was therefore willing to accede to Roosevelt’s demands about Iran. (335) As some historians have emphasised, Stalin realised that the Western Allies were willing to allow an extension of the Soviet sphere of influence "in the Gulf of Finland leading to the Baltic Sea" in order to keep the Soviets away from the warm waters of the Persian Gulf. (336)
On 7 December 1943, Izvestia praised Iran's contribution to the Allied victories, and praised the Declaration Regarding Iran.

The Declaration of the three powers on Iran, made at the Tehran conference, is a brilliant example of such co-operation among the Allied nations. The Declaration is an acknowledgement by the Allied nations of the significance of the help which Iran gave in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, and also acknowledges the necessity for the Allies to afford further economic assistance to the Iranian people. It also announces the determination of the Allied Nations to ensure the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran".(337)

D. TRUSTEESHIP PROPOSAL: AN IRANIAN PORT FOR RUSSIA

American documents reveal that Russian access to the warm waters of the Persian Gulf was being considered by Roosevelt, and that this was mentioned to Stalin during the Tehran Conference.

Since Hurley's report of 13 May 1944, which noted the Russians intention to secure their "long-desired access to a warm-water port", Roosevelt had considered the question.(338)
Although nothing had been included in the minutes of the conference, Stettinus confirmed in his memoirs that one of the issues discussed by the leaders in Tehran was "a warm water port for the Soviet Union". The Americans hoped that such a concession to Stalin would stop him demanding any privileges in the Straits.

At Roosevelt's instructions, Hurley sent him a report on the situation in Iran on 2 December 1943. Then, commenting on Hurley's report, Roosevelt wrote to the State Department and Churchill saying that he had been considering international involvement for change and reform in Iran, and disclosing that he had suggested to Stalin that the USSR take over a port in the Persian Gulf. Roosevelt also suggested that the Trans-Iranian Railway be put under US-UK-USSR trusteeship to secure Russian access to the aforementioned port. In his letter of 29 February 1944 to Churchill, Roosevelt concluded:

"I do not want the United States to acquire a zone of influence, or any other nation for that matter. Iran certainly needs trustees. It will take thirty to forty years to eliminate the graft and the feudal system. Until that time comes, Iran may be a headache to you to Russia and ourselves."

In a memo to the State Department, on 8 December 1944, Roosevelt repeated this idea:
"...The Tehran Government was pretty definite and my contribution was to suggest to Stalin and Churchill that three or four trustees build a new port in Iran at the head of the Persian Gulf (free port), take over the whole railroad from there into Russia and run the thing for good of all. Stalin's comment was merely that it was an interesting idea, and he offered no objection". (344)

Neither the State Department nor Churchill agreed with Roosevelt, and they doubted that Iran would accept the "principle of international trusteeship" which would be equivalent to a "mandatory system" (345). Churchill reminded Roosevelt that his proposal had not been welcomed at the Tehran Conference. He said: "I assume that you had no reply from Stalin to your suggestion for a free port at the head of Persian Gulf. On this point we might await Russian reaction." (346)

Churchill also doubted whether using the Iranian port and the Iranian railway would be useful or commercially viable in the Soviets eyes after the war, and after the "opening of the Black Sea route to the Russian trade." (347)

The State Department's view was reflected in two memos by Wallace Murray, Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs, on 11 and 18 December 1944. Murray, in consultation with the Director of Eastern European Department, Bohlen, commented that proceeding along the
lines suggested by Roosevelt would be a "great mistake", and no action should be undertaken without prior consultation with the British Government.(348) Murray agreed that giving the Soviets a port on the Persian Gulf might prevent Soviet aggression against Iran, but rejected the whole idea for several reasons: first, it was "impossible to make the trusteeship plan attractive to Iran". Murray argued that the Iranians had made the "most strenuous effort with much self-denial" to build the railroad themselves without foreign loans at a cost of $150,000,000 and their ownership of it was "a matter of the most intense patriotic pride"; second, the plan would look to Iran and the rest of the world like power politics and "old-world imperialism"; third, the U.S experts doubted that the Soviet Government would be interested in an international trusteeship, or would participate in such a trusteeship in a "genuine manner" and on the "principles" that Roosevelt had suggested; fourth, the British, who had prevented Russia from obtaining a base in the Persian Gulf, would object to this proposal. According to Murray, the British strength in its empire and "protecting the communications of the Empire between Europe and the Far East" was in the "strategic interest" of the United States.(349) The State Department continued to resist the plan, and it was shelved after Roosevelt’s death without the Iranians ever having been notified about it.
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151) Avery, Ibid., P.380.
152) Khamei, Ibid., P.380.
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155) Khamei, Ibid., P.25.
157) Khamei, Ibid., P.32; Tabari, Ibid., P.48. The
Director of Victory House, Anne Lambton, later taught at London University and wrote books on Iran.

158) Avery, Ibid., P. 381.
159) Khamei, Ibid., P. 28.
160) Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, P. P. 132.
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162) FO. 371/27233E3444/34-5October 1941.
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164) Avery, Ibid.
166) Kambakhsh, Ibid., P. 61.
167) Kamei, Ibid., P. 16.
168) Ibid., P. 37.
169) Kambakhsh, Ibid., P. 56.
170) Khamei, Ibid., P. 92.
171) Ibid., P. 75. Dr. Anvar Khamei, one of the Fifty Three, was a prominent activist in the early years of the Tudeh Party. He abandoned it in 1947, to join a non-Stalinist socialist group formed by Tudeh deserters. His 3 volume book on the history of the Communist movement in Iran has been a source of this study.
172) Ramazani, Rouhollah. Iran's Foreign Policy 1941-1973: A Study of Foreign Policy in Modernising Nations. Charlottesville,
Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq, an educated and veteran politician from the highest echelon
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282) Sainsbury, Ibid., P.81.
283) FRUS, Ibid.
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288) Woodward, Ibid.


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303) Sainsbury, Ibid., p.223.

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SECTION FOUR:

DETERIORATION IN SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS
Soviet objectives in Iran during 1941-1946 were pursued on the one hand by intimidation and extortion, and on the other by conciliation and goodwill. In the previous chapter, we analysed how the Soviet Union imposed its terms and conditions on Iran, in early 1943, through bilateral agreements. We also observed that Stalin was generous to the Shah during his stay in Tehran. An assessment of Stalin’s policy would not be complete if we were to neglect the Soviet institutions set up in Iran during the occupation.

The Soviet Red Cross established a hospital in Tehran which attracted many working class Iranian patients. The Soviet Cultural Centre (VOKS) was opened in Tehran in 1943, to show Russian films, teach Russian, distribute Russian books and journals, and extend contacts with Iranian scholars. The Board of the Centre included distinguished politicians, high ranking officials and university teachers. Under the auspices of the Soviet Cultural Centre in Tehran a group of Iranian journalists and scholars visited the Soviet Republic of Uzbekistan.

The war also brought about an increase in Soviet consular representation in Iran. Before the 1941 Soviet invasion, representation in Iran was limited to only one Consulate in Bandar-e-Pahlavi, equivalent to the Iranian Consulate in Baku. However, in November 1941, the Russians demanded the right to open Consulates in Tabriz, Maku, Rasht, Mashad, Isfahan, Kerman, Shiraz,
Kermanshah and Bandar-e Shahpour. The Iranians allowed two Soviet consulates to be opened in Mashad and Rasht in return for two new Iranian consulates in Tibibisi and Ashkabad. The Soviets sent their consular officials to the two Iranian cities straight away, but delayed considering the Iranian request until the end of the war. (5)

Between 1942 and 1943, the Soviet Government set up a consulate in every northern city, even in several major cities outside the Soviet zone of occupation. These Soviet Consulates soon became involved in political and propaganda activities which increased the Soviet influence in Iran. These included measures such as initiating a poster campaign or intervening in elections for deputies. (6) The extent of Soviet activities in Iran and the extent of Soviet propaganda enjoyed good coverage in the Iranian press. (7) So much so that in 1944 the British Embassy in Tehran reported to London on the numerous articles being published in Iranian newspapers on the mutual "spiritual sympathy" between Iran and the Soviet Union. (8)

The defeat of Germany in the war and the emergence of disagreement within the grand alliance affected the Soviet position in Iran. Stalin's policy in "liberated" Eastern Europe soon worried the Allies, who had previously viewed Stalin with sympathy. However, Stalin was still confident of his strong position in inter-Allied relations. He found Roosevelt very sympathetic
Stalin's plans for other peripheral states came to the surface later. These included territorial and economic gains in neighbouring countries. Such ambitions could be achieved by intimidation and pressure where the Red Army was stationed. Despite Iran's refusal of Stalin's offer of military aid, Iranian-Soviet relations were considered normal up to mid-1944. The Soviet Union did not wish to alarm the Iranians with improper behaviour, and Iran too was cautious not to irritate its great neighbour at this crucial time.

In pursuit of a better understanding with the Soviets, the 14th Majles, at its inauguration in March 1944, asked the Shah to appoint Mohammad Saed as Prime Minister. Saed had a background of long diplomatic service in Russia and the Soviet Union. The previous choice of the right-wing majority of the Majles had been the pro-British Zia, but the Shah had been apprehensive about the Soviet reaction. A British report said: "The Shah is nervous about the effect which Zia's assumption of office would produce on the Russians, and he feels it would be difficult to bring Zia to power, without precipitating a crisis."
CHAPTER ONE:

THE OIL DISPUTE

Iranian politics began revolving around the issue of oil with its discovery in Southern Iran by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in the first decade of the 20th Century. (11) Iranian oil played a great role in the First World War, when the British Admiralty became an APOC share-holder and the Royal Navy shifted to oil in place of coal. (12) During the 1920’s, while Great Britain embarked on a policy of increasing its oil concessions and obtaining a monopoly of all Iranian oil resources, the Soviets showed some interest in exploiting oil in Northern Iran. (13)

From the Iranian point of view, neither the Russian nor the British plan would have served Iranian interests. Furthermore, the Iranian Government was seeking to interest a third power, the United States, in joining the oil operations in Iran. In the 1930’s, a dispute arose between the Iranian and British Governments over Iran’s oil revenue. With the involvement of the League of Nations, the dispute ended in compromise. However, the two sides became wary and suspicious of one another. Consequently, British anxiety over its oil resources in Iran became a major reason behind its preparations for the occupation of Iran in 1941.
The presence of Soviet, British and American forces in Iran between 1941-1946 encouraged the oil companies of these countries to once again campaign for oil concessions. First, the British and American oil companies, backed by their respective governments, exploited Iran's war-devastated economy to present their offers. Later the Soviets entered the competition.

A. OIL AND THE WESTERN ALLIES

According to the oil agreement signed between the Iranian Government and AIOC in 1933, the AIOC's field of operation was restricted to part of South Western Iran. Two years after Iran was occupied, the British were the first to approach Iran for an oil concession outside the AIOC's agreed zone.

In October 1943, the representatives of the Royal Dutch Shell Group arrived in Tehran to negotiate oil concessions in Bluchestan, south east of Iran. However, the Government of Iran was unwilling to grant more oil concessions to British companies. Soheili therefore informed Dreyfus about the matter on 27 November 1943, and expressed Iranian interest in a similar representation being made by the American oil companies. Dreyfus reported to Hull on 23 December that Soheili had shown Millspaugh, the Finance Administrator, the text of the British proposal, and had urged that "American interests act promptly". Hull told Dreyfus in reply that certain American oil
companies were interested. The Standard-Vacuum Company (a joint subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey and the SoCony Vacuum Group) were "interested not only in coastal strip of Bluchestan, but also in other area or areas inland".(18)

The Representatives of Standard Vacuum and Sinclair, another American oil company, arrived in Tehran in February 1944.(19)

The Russians were suspicious of the Western Allies' contest for economic privileges in Iran, and reacted negatively. In late February 1944, a Soviet Embassy official told the Iranian press that if the exploitation of oil in northern Iran was the issue, then the Soviet Government should have priority.(20) This statement expressed Soviet security interests rather than a demand for oil concessions.

The Iranian Government, under the new Prime Minister Saed, set up a special commission to study the Western proposals. It employed as consultants two American oil experts, Herbert Hoover Jr. and A. A. Courtice.(21) Iran was reluctant to make a decision regarding the British and American applications, during the Anglo-American negotiations over world oil resources, which had begun in Washington in April 1944.(22) The presentations and negotiations in Tehran were kept secret by the Government until 10 August 1944, when a Majles deputy raised the question and asked Saed to brief the Majles about what was going on.(23) A second statement at the
same session was made by Dr. Reza Radmanesh, a prominent member of the Tudeh Leadership. He attacked the Government for entering negotiations with foreign companies, and particularly for employing the American Consultants. He said: "I represent my comrades (Tudeh deputies) in opposing the granting of oil concessions to any foreign country. We are convinced that Iran can independently exploit its mineral wealth, with its own people and capital." (24) In reply Saed confirmed that foreign representatives were present in Tehran and were negotiating with the Government over oil concessions, but he denied that any decision had been made. (25) The Iranian press initiated a national campaign against the oil concessions. Azhir, a leftist newspaper edited by the veteran communist, Pishevari, warned against the danger of foreign influence, and urged Iranians not to let foreigners obtain a right to their national wealth. (26) During the course of intensive debates between August-September 1944 over oil concessions, the Tudeh Party joined with nationalists to criticise the Government for entering negotiations with foreign companies. The Soviet attitude towards the question, at this time, was supposedly reflected in the Tudeh statements.
During the 19th century, the sale of concessions to foreigners and wealthy Iranians was one of the sources of income for the kings of Iran. Accordingly, a concession for the exploration of oil was granted by Naser-ad-din Shah (1848-1896) to an aristocrat of the north called Mohammad Vali Khan (Sepahsalar-e-A'zam), who subsequently sold his concession in 1916, to a Georgian called Akakii Khoshtaria. Iran's Prime Minister in 1916 was Sepahsalar and Khoshtaria had depended on the support of the Tsarist Legation in Tehran, and the Russian occupation force in the north to make this deal. Khoshtaria then became unable to make use of his concession, because of the war and the Russian Revolution. In 1918, the Iranian Government under the premiership of Samsam-os-Saltaneh Bakhtiari renounced Khoshtaria’s concession, which had never been approved by the Majles and could not therefore, be legal. The foreign Embassies in Tehran were informed of this decision. However, Khoshtaria ignored the Iranian decision, and just before the fall of the Georgian state into the hands of the Bolsheviks, sold his concession to the British-owned Anglo-Persian Oil Company. His invalid concession was purchased by the APOC, in 1920,
Neither the concession of Khoshtaria nor its transfer had been recognised by the Iranian Government. (31)

By virtue of the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 26 February 1921, the Soviet Government renounced all the concessions which had been attained by the Tsarist regime and its subjects in Iran. According to the same treaty, Iran was not authorised to grant the returned concessions to any other government or its subjects. (32) The APOC’s claim that Khoshtaria was a subject of independent Georgia in 1920, and that the Soviet Government’s decision did not affect his concession, was rejected. (33)

Between 1921-1924, two American oil companies—Standard Oil of New Jersey and Sinclair approached the Iranian Government for oil concessions in northern Iran. However, the negotiations were sabotaged by APOC and resented by the Soviets, and consequently nothing was to materialise, despite the Iranian Government’s desire to comply with the American demands. (34)

One should bear in mind that in the 1920’s there were no proper communications between the southern oil fields and northern Iran, and it was easier and cheaper to import oil to Northern Iran, from the Russian oil fields in Baku. Furthermore, for any oil operation in Northern Iran, the only way to export its product abroad was through Russian territory.
In 1925, a Soviet-Iranian joint venture called the Soviet-Iranian Oil Syndicate was established to explore and exploit oil in a limited area of northern-central Iran, namely Kavir-e-Khurian near the city of Semnan. With the support of the Soviet Government, Khoshtaria returned to Iran and obtained a substantial share in the new company. British documents maintain that Reza Shah and his pro-Russian Court Minister Teymourtash were granted some shares, but according to Iranian historian, Fateh, the Shah granted his shares to the Bank of the Army (Bank-e-Sepah).

The Russians had disapproved of the presence of foreign experts in northern Iran, but following the negotiations of Teymourtash in Moscow in 1926, they permitted Iran to invite French experts to assist in oil exploration in Kavir-e-Khurian. In 1930, French geologists inspected the area and reported that the results of their surveys were unpromising.

In 1932, Iran and the Soviet Union signed a new agreement regarding the Kavir-e-Khurian operations, but no progress had been achieved. Due to the Soviets’ lack of necessary expertise, Iran decided in 1936 to approach the Americans. It must be noted that Moscow had suggested that although any involvement by British firms in northern Iran would not have been looked on favourably, it would not oppose American interests there, despite Article 13 of the Soviet-Iranian Treaty. However, the Americans...
were not negotiating for the field of Kavir-e Khurian. In 1936, an American company Seaboard Oil of Delaware — then being represented by the United States Chargé d’Affaires at Tehran — obtained an oil concession in eastern and north-eastern Iran. This agreement was the foundation for the Amiranian Oil Company. (42) In 1938, the Amiranian gave up its concession, supposedly for commercial reasons. (43) However, Pravda announced that the withdrawal of the Amiranian was due to pressure on Reza Shah by the Soviets who refused to grant permission for American equipment to be transported through Soviet territory. (44) When the Soviets actually abandoned the Kavir-e-Khurian concession in 1936, Iran proposed a revision of the 1925 agreement. In return the Soviets suggested signing a new agreement with Iran. (45) There were no further developments in the matter of Kavir-e-Khurian until Iran was occupied. However, with the expansion of economic relations between Iran and Germany, Iran decided to invite German experts to carry out a survey of oil in the north. The appearance of the Germans in northern Iran alarmed the Soviets. Over the years, starting in 1936, the Soviet Government addressed several notes of protest to Iran over the presence of the Germans in the vicinity of the Soviet border. A Soviet Note dated 16th November 1936 warned Iran as follows:-
"...These specialists are the citizens of a country which is blatantly preparing an offensive war against the USSR and whose leaders publicly declare an extinguishable desire to sever huge territories from the Union". (46)

The Foreign Commissar, Litvinov, reported this issue to the Politburo:

"The German Government plans to set up a spy network and in the event of a war, use it against us in the Caucasus." (47)

Accordingly Litvinov instructed the Soviet Ambassador-Chernikh - to be prepared to use pressure to dissuade the Iranian Government from continuing with the project. (48) The Soviet historian, Ivanov, says that in early 1939, Iran granted a concession to a Dutch company for oil explorations in northern Iran, "adjacent to the Soviet frontiers". (49)

Before the occupation of Iran, Soviet policy was to keep all foreign powers, particularly Germany, away from northern Iran. Whether there was fortune in oil there or not, the oil concession of Kavir-e-Khurian was an asset which the Soviet Government wished neither to develop nor lose.

With the invasion of Iran in 1941, the issue was renewed. In the Note of 30th August 1941, the Soviet Government demanded the assistance of the Iranian Government to "facilitate" the oil operation in the area of Kavir-e-Khurian. (50) This surprised the Iranians.
According to Iranian officials, the fault lay not with Iranian negligence but with the Soviets, who had abandoned the concession. It is not known whether the Soviets tried to carry out an oil survey in Kavir-e Khurian during their occupation of northern Iran, but according to a recent report by the National Iranian Oil Company, Soviet experts drilled two exploratory wells in the coastal area of Mazandaran during 1942-1943. A British analyst also reported that after the occupation of northern Iran, the Russians started "experimental drilling" in several areas without permission from the Iranian Government. Northern Iran under Soviet occupation, between 1941 and 1946, was actually closed to Iranian supervision. Some analysts believe that the Soviet Union were particularly seeking oil fields in Iran, since their own oil industry had been heavily damaged in the war. However, there had been no evidence of an exploitable oil resource in northern Iran.

The search for oil outside Soviet territory, to claim a token of victory in the war, was mentioned in Stalin's writings. He believed that "a redistribution of interests among the world powers, in accordance with their power status", was "necessary to prevent military conflicts in future". The question of the oil resources of the Middle East was raised by Stalin at the Summit of Tehran in November 1943, but Roosevelt and Churchill suggested postponing discussion of the
2. KAVTARADZE'S MISSION

When the oil negotiations between the Iranian Government and the Anglo-American companies became a topic of debate in Tehran, the Soviet Government decided to seize the opportunity and try its luck.

On 6 September 1944, the Iranian Ambassador to Moscow, Ahy, sent a telegraph to Tehran saying that the Soviet Government intended to send a mission headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kavtaradze to Iran. The mission was assigned to negotiate on the question of oil operations at Kavir-e-Khurian. The Iranian Government replied that they would not only be pleased to receive the Russian mission, and negotiate about certain districts of Kavir-e-Khurian, but also hoped that the mutual interests of Iran and the Soviet Union would be considered.

On his arrival in Tehran on 13 September 1944, Kavtaradze stated that he intended to ask for oil concessions in the area of Kavir-e-Khurian to be revived, and to survey the natural resources in northern Iran. The mission visited the northern provinces, and on its return to Tehran forwarded its demands. On 2 October 1944, Kavtaradze had an audience with the Shah, during which he told him that the Soviet Union wanted an exclusive oil concession in the five northern provinces of Iran. Later Kavtaradze met with Saed and made a
formal application for the oil concession. (62) On 6th October Kavtaradze announced the Soviet plan for the northern provinces in an interview with Tehran’s leading daily, Ettelaat, (63) which according to British reports caused "fear and anxiety among all classes." (64) The Soviet demand for an exclusive zone throughout northern Iran coincided with reports being published that the Russians had "evicted" British and American officers from Bulgaria, and caused concern about the future of the Soviet zone of occupation.

The British Embassy shared Iranian concern over the Soviet demands. Bullard considered them as a step towards "making northern Iran into an autonomous Soviet republic" and thought that the "Iranian Government would postpone the grant of new concessions until the withdrawal of foreign troops." (66) Such an undertaking by Iran would itself have been a victory for the Russians, in blocking the extension of Western oil concerns in Iran. The acceptance of the Anglo-American proposals and the refusal of the Soviet one, could in no way be justified. To the relief of Bullard, the Shah told him on 9 October that Iran would not grant any oil concessions until after the war. (67) Bullard’s view that a Soviet oil concession would have jeopardised the authority of the Iranian Government in the north, was supported by Eden. He sent Bullard a telegraph from Moscow on 11 October, stating that neither Britain nor the Soviet Union should compete for new oil concessions.
and "thereby divide the country up into their spheres of influence ".(68)

On 16 October 1944, Saed surprised the Majles by announcing the decision of his Cabinet. He admitted that there had been negotiations underway between the Government and some foreign companies; but on 2 September 1944, the Council of Ministers had made a ruling to the effect that no new concessions should be granted until after the end of the war.(69)

During a press conference on 29 October, Saed justified the ruling on the basis of four major points:-

1) The presence of foreign troops in Iran undermined Iran's decision-making ability.

2) The uncertainty of the world economic situation during the war made it impossible for Iran to take a clear view of its interests.

3) The Anglo-American oil conference of August 1944, and its probable compromise outcome, neglected the interests of the oil-producing countries.

4) Iranian envoys abroad had recommended that the oil negotiations be suspended until after the end of the war.(70)

Saed had then expressed the hope that the Iranian decision would not harm Irano-Soviet relations.(71)

Generally the response of the Majles and the public was in favour of the Government's decision. However many questioned the delay in reaching such a decision and the
Government's abandonment of negotiations with Western oil companies following Soviet involvement. The Government argued that the Soviet Union did not only want a limited oil field but an area of 200,000 square miles of Iranian territory, twice that of the Anglo-Iranian oil company's zone. (72) Furthermore, negotiations over the Soviet concession were not simply taking place between the Iranian Government and an oil company. Since there was no private company in the Soviet Union, the Iranian Government was actually having to negotiate the concession with the Soviet Government. The concession which the Soviets were after concerned obtaining exclusive rights for oil exploration in five provinces. Thus the most significant reason behind new policy was the fear of the Soviets.

Saed had explained to Bullard that accepting the Soviet demand would have meant presenting northern Iran to the Soviet Union. "Once the north had gone the rest of Iran could hardly hold out", Saed said. (73) After Saed's statement at Majles, attacks on him were launched by the Tudeh Party and the Soviet press. (74) On 22 October, Trud, the official organ of the Soviet trade-unions, accused Saed's Government of failing to punish the elements who had disrupted the flow of Allied supplies to the Soviet Union. It stated that the "Iranian Government had not opposed the intensification of subversive work by pro-Fascist elements in Iran". (75)
Trud concluded that "because of Mr. Saed's policies," Iranian relations with the Soviet Union had become "tense and strained." (76) Trud also quoted from the Tudeh newspapers that Saed's Government had been "assigned by the reactionaries to suppress the workers' and democratic organisations," and that such a Government was "harmful to the interest of Iranian people" and had to resign. (77)

On the same day - 22 October-Russian lorries loaded with armed soldiers drove around the neighbourhood where the Majles building stood in order to exert pressure on the deputies who intended to support the Government's decision. (78)

On 24 October, Iranian journalists were invited to a conference at the Soviet Embassy, where Kavtaradze explained Soviet aims in demanding the concession. He revealed that the Soviet plan was not to re-activate the field of Kavir-e-Khurian, but rather to exploit the entire area of northern Iran. According to Kavtaradze, the Soviet-planned zone of concession was "situated in the provinces of Azerbaijan, Gilan, Mazandaram, part of Semnan and some districts in Khorasan, north of Quchan". (79) He contended that the "concession was in the interest of Iranians themselves," and that "the Soviet Union, through this concession, wanted to assist Iran economically." (80) Kavtaradze blamed the Iranian Government for "not giving a single convincing reason" for its decision, and asserted that
Saed's policy had made a "very unfavourable impression in Soviet circles". (81) He concluded that the "disloyal and unfriendly attitude taken by Premier Saed to the USSR excluded the possibility of further collaboration with him." (82) "The Saed Government is moving toward a worsening of relations between our two countries", Kavtaradze declared (83). The pressure on Saed and his Government mounted following the press conference. Anti-Government demonstrations were organised under the protection of Soviet troops.

In Tabriz, the Russians intervened in support of demonstrators, against the local police who tried to maintain order. (84) Movement of grain to Tehran on the Iranian railways was stopped by the Russians. (85) Soviet officials took advantage of broadcasting time on Tehran radio to attack Saed's Government. (86) The Tudeh papers called the opponents of the Soviet concession, "The Fascists who oppose the labour movement in Iran and follow a policy of hostility towards the Soviet Union." (87) On 4 November, Izvestia condemned the "criminal and Fascist elements who influenced Saed's decision to turn down the Soviet oil concession". (88) Izvestia disputed the Iranian claim that the American, British and Russian applications for oil concessions had been treated equitably, and accused Saed of "plain hypocrisy and double-dealing". (89)

The most significant anti-Government demonstration in Tehran was held on 27 October, attended by Tudeh members
Red Army lorries brought people from outside Tehran to the Majles Square, where the demonstrators gathered. This event underlined the shift of the Tudeh Party away from the policy "not to grant concessions" which had been expressed by Deputy Radmanesh on 10 August 1944. The Tudeh papers had actually hinted at this change, just after the arrival of Kavtaradze's mission and before the announcement of the Government's decision that granting concessions to foreigners would benefit Iran.

On 29 October, Saed revealed at a press conference that the Soviets' first demand had only concerned the status of Kavir-e-Khurian and not an exclusive concession for oil in the North; as such, his Government had decided to receive the mission. He reiterated that as long as the British, American, and Russian forces remained in Iran, the Iranian people were against the granting of oil concessions to these Governments or to their nationals. The Soviet censorship in Iran prevented the press from publishing Saed's statement.

According to a British report, the editors of a few newspapers who had supported the Government line, received advice from the Soviet Embassy "to cease opposing the Russian demand, or else they could be faced with the Soviet means of dealing with any one who opposed them." A US intelligence report made the same point: "It appears that crucial point in Russian penetration is at hand, and it is quite well established..."
that the Russians are going to follow through by whatever means are necessary ",(96)
At the 29 October session of the Majles, Mossadeq said that the Anglo-Iranian oil agreement had been used to the profit of the British and to the loss of Iranians in the past forty years. He emphasised that Iran should resist the pressure of the Big Powers and "neutralise their designs" by refusing to grant concessions to anyone. He thought that such a policy of equal refusal of all foreign demands, namely "negative equilibrium ", would be the best alternative to secure Iranian interests. He implicitly supported the Government’s decision, stating that " no Iranian patriot would criticise Saed for his refusal of granting oil concessions to foreign companies and the Russians ",(97)
In addition, Mossadeq suggested that the Government should establish an international company (a joint venture) to provide capital to exploit the oil in the northern provinces, and should sell the surplus of this exploitation to the Russians.(98) Mossadeq’s address pleased the majority - who had previously disliked him - and annoyed the Tudeh Party. The Tudeh newspapers also reflected this feeling.(99)

On 31 October, Ehsan Tabari, a Tudeh ideologist, expressed the party’s partisanship towards the Soviet Union in an article. He wrote: "Every Iranian should accept the truth that northern Iran is located within the Soviet security perimeter, and that the Soviet
Government would never permit other powers to enter this perimeter with an excuse of oil operation. Tabari added:

"At the same time as agreeing that there are British interests in Iran, we are convinced that the Soviet Government has security interests in this country, and we should take this opportunity to strengthen Iran's independence and our democracy."

Tabari concluded: "The Government should urgently enter negotiations aimed at granting oil concessions to the Soviet Union in the North, and to American and British companies in the South." (100)

Developments in Tehran made the Western Powers anxious. Bullard warned the Foreign Office that if Iran was forced to submit to the Soviet demands, then Iran's chance of remaining independent would indeed be minute. (101) In Washington, the State Department proposed a joint US-UK representation in Moscow. (102) Both Governments instructed their embassies to send a Note to the Soviet Government, stating that "sovereign and independent countries such as Iran had the right to withhold or grant concessions in their territory", and that the "principals of the Tehran Declaration should be respected". (103)

The US Embassy Note was sent on 1 November. (104) Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, in accordance with Foreign Office instructions, sent a Note to the Soviet Government on 2 November, saying that Saed's Government had "fulfilled its treaty obligations" and had the "right to expect the
Soviet Union and Great Britain" to do the same regarding Iran. (105) On 3 November, Bullard reported to the Foreign Office about the relaxation of Soviet pressure on Iran. (106) He was even optimistic that the Russians might have dropped their demand for oil concessions. (107) Bullard rejoiced that in the eyes of the Iranians the whole episode was a Soviet diplomatic defeat. (108) There were also popular demonstrations in support of Government policy, which ended in clashes with Tudeh agitators in the streets of Tehran. (109) Bolstered by the Majles, by the nationalist elements who were against granting concessions to foreigners, and by the British and American warning to the Soviets not to interfere in Iran's internal affairs, Saed refused the Tudeh Party permission to hold a mass demonstration to commemorate the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution on 7 November. Tudeh members reacted angrily to the Government's ruling and clashed with the police. Following this the Chief of General Staff, General Razmara, intervened in support of the Government and ordered the military governor of Tehran to close the Tudeh Party headquarters and remove their sign board. (110) The following day, Saed ordered the arrest of several Tudeh activists, including Rusta, the leader of the powerful CCFTU. (111) The previous day Rusta had sent a telegram to Stalin expressing "the sincere regard of the oppressed people of Persia, for the Red Army" who had "saved the Persian nation from the claws of
the blood-thirsty Fascist brigands ".(112)

Two days after the suppression of the Tudeh demonstration, the Soviet Embassy addressed a note to the Iranian Government, claiming that one Soviet officer had been murdered during the events of 7 November and demanding that the murderer or murderers be handed to the Soviet authorities. The Note warned that if the Iranian Government failed to maintain law and order in Tehran and safeguard the lives of Soviets citizens, the Red Army would have to take the matter into its own hands.(113) Since 16 October, the Soviet Embassy had ceased contact with Iranian Government departments, and had only occasionally approached Majid Ahy, the Iranian Ambassador in Moscow, who was in Tehran at this time.(114)

Saed thought that his departure from office might help to normalise Soviet-Iranian relations. Reportedly, the Soviets were seeking a face-saving solution, and Saed's resignation would have satisfied them. One American report suggests that Saed had been told by Kavtaradze at their last meeting: "Moscow at first had offered Finland easy peace terms, but later, after that country resisted, it was forced to accept much less favourable arrangements. Iran should not make a similar mistake."(115) Therefore, at the height of the political tension, Saed decided to deflect the danger away from his country and the entire regime on to himself.

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According to Bullard, Saed was "informed through intermediaries, that if he resigned, Kavtaradze would depart, and demand for oil concession would be dropped."(116) The Shah who was at first against Saed’s resignation, finally agreed with him, in fear of an "extreme action by the Russians".(117) Saed resigned on 9 November, but Kavtaradze stayed in Tehran for another month to pressure the Iranians to accede to the Soviet demands. The Russians greeted Saed’s resignation with open pleasure, and advised Iranian politicians to either comply with them or expect revenge. The official organ of the Red Army, Krasnaya Zvezda, wrote on 15 November: "The fate of Saed has shown that no Government can remain in power which conducts a policy hostile to Soviet interests."(118) For almost two weeks, Iran was without a Prime Minister. The new Premier had to be a politician acceptable to the Russians, and also strong enough to resist their demands. One candidate for the job was Mossadeq, who had received some support at the Majles. However, Mossadeq suggested to the Shah and the Majles, that he should be allowed to return to his seat in the Majles if his premiership terminated before the end of the Majles term. A majority in the Majles rejected this condition.(119) On 23 November, the Majles voted in Morteza-Qoli Bayat.(120) Bayat was an elderly politician of colourless views, and a nephew of Mossadeq. Bayat’s task was a difficult one. He had to pacify the Russians by negotiating, and at the
same time, he had to refuse their demand for oil. Bayat emphasised at meetings with Bullard and the Soviet Embassy Counsellor that he would follow Saed’s policy, since this policy represented the views of the Majles and the people. (121) Bullard supported Bayat’s idea and assured him that Saed’s policy was "understood" in Britain and had won "general sympathy." (122) Commenting on Bayat’s firm stand, Bullard felt that if the Russians were to increase their pressure, Bayat would resign rather than appease them or give them a firm refusal. (123)

3. MOSSADEQ’S BILL

While Soviet pressure on Iran continued, the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States gave further evidence of their sympathy for Iran. On the instruction of London, Clark Kerr wrote a letter to Molotov on 20 November, emphasising British concern about the Soviet pressure on Iran. (124) Eden told the Iranian Ambassador, Taqizadeh, on 23 November about this presentation. (125) The United States Government assigned Avrel Harriman, who was on his way to Moscow from Washington, to stop off in Tehran and investigate the situation. Following this mission, Harriman made recommendations to the Department of State for a plan of action. (126) Harriman also conveyed the administration’s sympathy to the Shah, whom he found "firm but anxious". (127) On 30 November, the American Ambassador
informed Bayat of the United States' démarche in Moscow. (128)

Many Iranians, particularly the nationalist politicians, were worried about a possible British-American-Russian deal at the expense of Iran. Such fears were given credence on 3 November 1944, when the Times editorial justified the "desire of the Soviet Government to look for further oil supplies elsewhere" by relating it to the requirements of Soviet industrialisation. The Times agreed that "the demand for oil concessions in Iran is explicable enough", and asserted that there was "no particular reason why negotiations should have to wait till the end of the war". It even questioned why the British and American Governments had not invited the Soviet Government to their conference in Washington. It blamed them for "provoking" the Soviets into taking action in Iran. It concluded that a "full and frank discussion between the British, Americans and Russians" should take place to decide about world oil concessions. (129) On 2 December 1944, Mossadeq took one of the most courageous actions of his political life, by putting an end to the question of new oil concessions. Taking part in the debate over Bayat's government programme, Mossadeq referred to The Times article. He compared its proposal — collaboration between the Powers to exploit Iranian oil — with the Anglo-Russian division of Iran into two spheres of influence in 1907. (130) He concluded that the Government was obliged
to prevent the Big Powers from sacrificing Iranian interests. Mossadeq introduced his four-article bill on "prohibiting the granting of oil concessions to foreigners" as follows:-

"1. No Prime Minister, Minister, Acting Minister or Under Secretary of State may undertake any official discussion having a legal character, or sign any agreement, regarding a petroleum concession with any foreign national, official or unofficial representatives of neighbouring or distant countries, representatives of oil companies, or any other persons.

"2. The Prime Minister and Ministers may, however, undertake negotiations regarding the sale of petroleum and the exploitation and administration of the oil wells. The Majles must, however, be informed of the progress of the negotiations.

"3. Any person or persons violating the provisions of the first article shall be sentenced to a term of solitary imprisonment from three to eight years, and shall be permanently debarred from Government service."(131)

The fourth article dealt with the jurisdiction of the Attorney-General in prosecuting the offenders.(132)

The Tudeh Deputies demanded more time to study the bill
and its implications. (133) However, this was disregarded, and the Majles approved the bill with an absolute majority. (134)

The following day, another surprising proposal was put to the Majles. Rahimian, the Deputy from Quchan—a city on the Soviet border—proposed the cancellation of the concession given to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in the South. (135) He sought Mossadeq’s support for his proposal. However, Mossadeq refused, arguing that the Majles could not revoke an international agreement without considering its legal implications. (136)

Consequently, the Tudeh Party and other pro-Soviet elements denounced and reproached Mossadeq for introducing the "prohibition bill" and refusing to accept the cancellation of AIOC’s concession. The editor of Azhir, Pishevari, who was to become the future leader of the Azerbaijan autonomous state, wrote: "Mossadeq loves his landed property more than his homeland. He is afraid of people’s freedom as he is of Iran’s friendship with the Soviet Union." (137)

Rahbar, the official organ of the Tudeh Party, suggested that since the adoption of Mossadeq’s bill, the question of oil might be settled not by Iran but by those parties mentioned in the Times editorial. (138)

The day following the adoption of Mossadeq’s bill, Kavtaradze told Harriman, who had been visiting Tehran, that the action of the Majles was unacceptable to the Soviet Government. He maintained that such an action
was directed only against the Soviets and Americans, and not the British who already had a concession. (139)

This argument may have impressed the Americans, who like the Soviets had been deprived of Iranian oil. A Foreign Office report raised this possibility: "while this policy was directed against the extortion of the Soviets of concessions under pressure, it also closed the door to the grant of concessions to the American Oil companies". (140)

Maximov, who was present at the Kavtaradze-Harriman conversation, argued that the Majles, which was dominated by the landed gentry, represented only five percent of the Iranian population. Therefore, the Government of Iran had to become "more democratic". (141) Soviet historians repeatedly stated that the majority in 14th Majles who had supported Mossadeq's bill were "the reactionaries who had been elected by the influence of the Government and the Imperialists". (142)

On 7 December, Kavtaradze accompanied by Maximov called on Bayat. There, Kavtaradze made a sharp attack on the Law of 2 December prohibiting new concessions without touching the old ones. He contended that this law gave the British, who already had a concession in the south, "a more privileged position in the country than the Soviet Union". He also interpreted the Majles' decision as an "anti-Soviet action". (143) Maximov told Bayat that the "Soviet Government was not satisfied with the relations existing between the two countries", and
that the "situation had become more difficult by the passing of the oil concessions bill in the Majles ".(144)
Maximov told Bayat that the Soviet Government had instructed him to put two alternatives before the Iranian Prime Minister: "either the Majles should amend the law or the Shah should use its constitutional prerogative and refuse to ratify it."(145) Bayat stated that the Law did not forbid the Government to negotiate oil sales with foreign powers. Maximov disagreed. He asserted that the Iranian Government was unable to exploit oil because of a lack of capital. Bayat's point that Iran had built its railways without foreign assistance did not satisfy Maximov, who said that the only practical way was that "proposed by the Soviets ".(146)
Bayat failed to get Kavtaradze's approval for further Soviet-Iranian discussion over the dispute. Kavtaradze had already decided to leave Iran.(147) The day before his departure, Kavtaradze invited a number of Majles Deputies to the Soviet Embassy, where he made the following remarks:-

1. The passing of the oil concessions bill was the outcome of "pressure exercised by enemies of Soviet-Iranian friendship such as the late Prime Ministers Saed and Zia ".

2. The bill was "inconsistent" with the existence of foreign concessions in
Iran, and the Soviet Government was confident that the Majles would "correct its mistakes".

3. The concession which the Soviet Government had asked for did not resemble a "capitalist concession". It would help develop the Iranian economy and thus prevent unemployment. In addition, once the concession had expired, all the equipment would become Iranian property. Kavtaradze blamed certain deputies for the problems his mission had faced, and for "creating an atmosphere of hostility to USSR". (148)

Kavtaradze left Iran on 9 December. The memory he left behind was one of a Soviet diplomat who had demanded oil concessions in an "imperialist style". (149) A specialist on Soviet-Iranian relations attributed his unpopularity in Iran to the "exceptionally unpleasant tone designed to intimidate the Iranians". (150) Zia, who had been personally accused by the Soviets and their supporters for the failure of Kavtaradze's mission, repudiated this accusation in his newspaper "Raad-e-Emrouz": "The decision of the Majles was necessitated by the threats and the shortcomings of the Soviet representative, Kavtaradze." (151) Furthermore, as the leader of the majority in the Majles, he pressed
for a firm policy towards the Soviets. Zia asserted: "The Oil Bill should not be amended as long as foreign troops remain on Iranian soil." (152)

Four days after Kavtaradze's departure, a British report commented:

"..We may know more of his Government's intention when he has had time to report to Molotov the negative result of his prolonged discussion with the Persian authorities. One thing alone seems to be certain: he is not going back to Russia as he had doubtless hoped he would, with the oil concessions in his pocket." (153)

However, one British historian considered Kavtaradze's mission a success, in so far as "The Russian intervention had prevented both British and American representatives from obtaining a new concession." (154)

It took the Soviet Government almost two months to reply to the American and British Notes of early November. On 28 December the Soviets replied to the American Note with a sharp criticism of the Iranian Government, which "did not even familiarise itself with the Soviet conditions of the concession ". (155) The Note also complained of the "unsympathetic attitude taken by America with regard to the Soviet-Iranian negotiations regarding the oil concessions ", and denied that such a concession would "affect the sovereignty of Iran ". (156)
The Soviet Government stressed that its demand was not incompatible with the obligations of the Tehran Declaration of 1943, but was "in complete accord with this Declaration which contemplated the necessity of lending economic assistance to Iran by the Allies". (157) According to the Soviet interpretation, the purpose of the oil concession was to supply Iran with such assistance. The Soviet Note described the passing of the Oil Bill by the Majles as a "violation of the Iranian Constitution" and urged that this law "must be revised". (158) Another Note was issued by the Soviet Embassy in London on 29 December in reply to the British Note of 2 November. It complained of the "unfavourable attitude adopted by the British" with regard to the Soviet oil concession, (159) and repeated the points and accusations made in the Soviet Note to the Americans. The Note stated that the "unconstitutional Majles resolution was adopted under the influence of the intrigues of hostile elements such as Saed". (160)
CHAPTER TWO:

THE AFTERMATH OF KAVTARADZE'S FAILURE: SOVIET PRESSURE AND IRANIAN RESISTANCE

Once Kavtaradze’s mission had ended unsuccessfully, the Soviet Government retaliated by not only pressing Saed to resign, but also by mobilising pro-Soviet elements and the Tudeh Party against the whole regime. Such Soviet behaviour created tension and uncertainty in Iranian politics.

The Soviets had failed to force the Majles to back down. Consequently, they decided to end all co-operation with the Iranian Government, and to adopt an uncompromising attitude. For instance, the Soviet Embassy ordered the National Bank of Iran to transfer all Soviet funds deposited there to the Imperial Bank of Persia, which was a British Bank. They also asked the Iranian Government to suppress all the newspapers that had opposed the Russian oil concession. (161)

The Soviets tightened their grip over the occupied zone, and many Iranians who were regarded as hostile to Soviet interests received orders to leave northern Iran. (162)

The Iranian Government was most concerned about the Soviet support of ethnic and separatist movements in the Northern Provinces. The Shah had told Harriman about this concern in December 1944. (163) Shortly after the departure of Kavtaradze, the Tudeh Party distributed
in Tehran a broadsheet containing the demands of the population of Northern Iran for the formation of Provincial Councils. According to this broadsheet, during the first week of December thousands of people attended a demonstration in Tabriz demanding: the creation of Provincial Councils; the trial of former Prime Minister Saed; the formation of a coalition government; the initiation of social reforms; and the maintenance of good relations with the Soviet Union. (164) The British Embassy commented: "It is probable that The Tudeh Party seriously intends to set up Provincial Councils in Azerbaijan". (165) The radical-nationalists, who had opposed the right-wing majority of the 14th Majles during its early stages, joined with the latter to fend off Soviet pressure. Following their co-operation in passing the bill of 2nd December 1944, they had two alternatives: either to challenge Soviet and pro-Soviet elements and risk a confrontation; or to pacify the Soviets without making any concessions to them. The second option, which was supported by the nationalist and centrist factions, prevailed. Prime Minister Bayat was the ideal person to pursue this alternative.
Kavtaradze's departure did not hinder Soviet attempts to pursue basic objectives. The US Ambassador, Leland Morris, reported to the State Department about the Soviet insistence on revising the recent legislation and resuming the oil negotiations. The report quoted Foreign Minister Nasrollah Entezam as saying that according to Maximov, even after Kavtaradze's return to Moscow the "Soviet Government saw no reason to modify its view that the law prohibiting oil negotiations was ill-advised and should be modified."(166)

In the meantime, Bayat continued his efforts to pacify the Soviets. He attempted to persuade them to accept his alternative of Soviet-Iranian co-operation in oil production. According to British reports, while preparing a bill for the formation of an Iranian company to exploit the oil deposit in the North (167), Bayat had held meetings with Foreign Minister Entezam and Ambassadors Ahy and Maximov to discuss a new plan which supposedly would have solved the oil crisis.(168) Reportedly, Bayat had decided that after the formation of the above mentioned company, Iran would invite Soviet experts to collaborate if the necessary experts were not found among Iranians and the nationals of neutral countries.(169) Iran would also have approached the Soviet Union for machinery and equipment, if it were willing to supply it on credit; if not, however, Iran
would buy it on the open market. (170) Afterwards, part of the production would have been sold to the Soviets. The Soviet response to Bayat's project is not known. (171)

Bayat also made several other decisions which should have pleased the Russians. He ordered the police to allow the Tudeh Party to be active again, after having been suppressed in the last days of Saed's Government. The Party re-opened its clubs and organised mass demonstrations. (172) In parliamentary debates the Tudeh deputies launched attacks on the Government, the army, the British and Americans, and the Shah and his family. The same line was pursued by the Tudeh newspapers. (173) In clashes between the anti-communist parties and the Tudeh Party, both sides blamed Bayat's Government of incompetence. There were reports that in Tabriz (Azerbaijan), Mashad (Khorasan), Shahi (Mazandaram) and Isfahan, the Soviet consuls and the Red Army had intervened in support of Tudeh demonstrations. (174)

At a Tabriz demonstration, the leader of the pro-Tudeh "Workers' Union" complained of the interference of the Central Government in the affairs of Azerbaijan. (175). In Tudeh newspapers, the anti-Communist politicians were denounced as "Fascists, tools of imperialists, reactionaries". The official organ of the party suggested they should be hanged, as was
happening at that time in Bulgaria.(176)
The freedom of activity granted to The Tudeh Party during Bayat's Government (November 1944-April 1945) was regarded as "exceptional" by many Iranians.(177) Bayat's second move was to decide to get rid of Millspaugh, the American Administrator-General of Iranian Economy and Finance. Millspaugh's wide range of authority had been criticised by Mossadeq and the Tudeh deputies during the 14th Majles. The Tudeh newspapers accused him of having played a part in the oil crisis.(178) They urged the Government to expel all Western advisers working in Iran.(179)

An American intelligence report in early November 1944 indicated the existence of collaboration between leftists and nationalists against Millspaugh. The report said:" Extreme nationalists, leftists and labour unions, many disgruntled business groups and those that are pro-Soviet or in favour of appeasing Russia, will range in an effort to oust Millspaugh".(180)

The first move was made on 20 December 1944 by Mossadeq, who presented a bill to the Majles to end Millspaugh's mission. Only 30 Deputies, including the eight members of the Tudeh faction, supported him.(181) Millspaugh enjoyed the support of the right-wing in the Majles, who recognised him as representing American interest in the economic development of Iran, and who wished to "draw the United States' attention towards defending Iranian sovereignty against Soviet expansionism".(182) On the
opposite side, Soviet Officials and their accomplices in Iran regarded Millspaugh as an American agent whose mission was to bring the Iranian economy under United States domination. (183) Millspaugh was also accused of bringing the American oil companies and oil experts into Iran to deal with Saed's Government, and sabotaging the Soviet oil concession. (184) Finally, the Government put forward a bill to reduce the "Special Economic Authority" granted to Millspaugh in April 1943. This bill was passed by the Majles on 8th January 1945. (185) Millspaugh resigned and left Iran. However, the termination of Millspaugh's mission did not affect US-Iranian relations. The United States' military missions with the army and gendarmerie continued their contractual services, and the extension of trade relations between the two countries was announced by Roosevelt in March 1944. (186)

A third move during Bayat's Government which pleased the Soviets, was the accusation made in the Majles against the former Prime Minister Soheili and his Minister of Interior, Tadayyon. These charges included rigging the election results of the 14th Majles. The allegation was made by Mossadeq and other supporters of Bayat, who induced the Majles to refer the case to the Supreme Court. The accusation was largely supported by the Tudeh newspapers, who intended to challenge the legitimacy of the Majles. (187)
Bayat's democratic policies failed either to placate the Russians or to satisfy the anti-Communists. On the one hand, The Tudeh Party was not satisfied simply with freedom of action. It also expected the Government to suppress the elements that had acted against the party. The Tudeh newspapers charged Bayat's Government with "incompetence" and accused it of being responsible for the attacks against the Tudeh clubs in several cities. On the other hand, the majority of the Majles deputies were suspicious of Bayat getting too close to the Soviets and giving too much freedom to the Tudeh Party.

Subsequently the Majles majority, led by Zia, asked him to resign. Bayat refused and openly accused Zia and his supporters of being responsible for the deterioration of Iran's relations with her neighbouring countries. On 18 April a majority in the Majles gave him a vote of no-confidence and forced him to leave office, despite him having the support of forty-five deputies including the members of the Tudeh faction.
Following the oil crisis, it became evermore obvious that the pro-Soviet elements supported by the Soviet occupational forces intended to undermine Government authority and take the law into their own hands. The Government was faced with a dilemma. If it were to act in a conciliatory manner, its behaviour could be interpreted as a sign of weakness, and as such it would encourage more disorder and chaos. On the other hand, if it stood firm and imposed its legal authority, it could risk a confrontation with the Red Army. Furthermore, Iranians were well aware that as long as foreign troops, in particular Soviet Troops, remained in Iran, Iranian independence and national sovereignty would not only remain in jeopardy but would also never be fully realised. Therefore, following the victories of the Allied forces in Europe, the Iranian Government demanded the early withdrawal of all foreign troops from its soil. Both the Foreign Office and the State Department were receptive to the Iranian demand. The British regarded political stability in Iran as vital to their interests. As such they viewed the prolongation of the Soviet presence in Iran as a threat to their national interests.

At the meeting of the Allies' representatives in Dumbarton Oaks in September 1944, Sir Alexander Cadogan
stated that Britain was prepared to give in to some of the Russian demands in Eastern Europe, but would not yield in Iran.\footnote{191} The United States took the question of Iran more seriously after the deterioration of Soviet-Iranian relations in the Autumn of 1944. However, there were differences between the US President and the State Department over Soviet intentions in Iran.\footnote{192} United States policy, explained in an instruction by Stettinus to the American Embassy in Tehran in 1944, was that Iran should remain a buffer-state, free of foreign domination, between Soviet and American interests in the Persian Gulf.\footnote{193} Bullard made a similar comment in October 1944, on the significance of Iran as an independent state and buffer to protect British interests.\footnote{194} He had hoped that as soon as the supply route to the Soviet Union was moved from Iran, British troops would withdraw from Tehran and be stationed around the Southern oil fields, until the defeat of Japan and the complete evacuation of Iran.\footnote{195} Bullard also thought that the occupation zone should be reduced. \footnote{196} Soviet pressure was exercised by its troops in the occupied cities. Following anti-Government demonstrations in several cities which were under the protection of the Red Army, the Americans agreed with the British that Iran was right to fear Soviet aggression.\footnote{197}
Nothing but the early departure of the British and American forces could have induced the Russians to evacuate. The British War Office had already expressed its views to the effect that the presence of British troops in the Southern oil fields should continue. It was known to all parties concerned that until the British withdrawal from the South, the Soviets would retain their positions in the North. (198) Bullard was insistent on his view, asserting that "it would be a great gain to Iran if even Tehran were evacuated", since the Iranian Government would be "less exposed to Russian direct pressure". (199) Eden felt that British troops had been kept in Iran to protect the supply route to the Soviet Union, and that the route was no longer indispensable; and that therefore, "some mutual withdrawal" might be suggested. (200)

The Foreign Office had studied the possibility of diverting the supply route from the Persian Gulf to the Soviet ports in the Black Sea. However, the Allied Supply Executive advised that such a diversion was impossible before the end of June 1945. (201) Despite the differences of opinion over a timetable for troop withdrawal and the areas from which they should be evacuated during the first stage, the question of foreign troops in Iran was on the agenda of the British and American Governments during their next Summit. On 21 November 1944, the War Cabinet authorised Churchill
to consult Roosevelt to establish a common policy on Iran. On the basis of Bullard's reports, who wanted the Iranian Government "to re-assert its authority" as soon as possible, Eden wrote Churchill a letter on 1 January 1945 about the "problem to get Russians out of Iran." He agreed with experts that the British and Soviet forces should withdraw Pari Passu from certain areas, and that final withdrawal should be arranged for a date not later than the Treaty period.

Churchill was in favour of this idea although he doubted whether the Russians would agree with it. He thought that this issue should be discussed with the Soviet Government.

On 15 January, Churchill sent a message to Roosevelt, warning about the Soviet pressure on Iran. The message stated: "If the Russians are now able not only to save their face by securing the fall of the Persian Prime Minister who opposed them, but also to secure what they want by their big stick, Persia is not the only place where the bad effect will be felt... we should separately or jointly let Stalin know that we think Persia should be discussed at our next meeting (or by the Foreign Secretaries)."

In the meantime, the Shah sent Churchill a message to demand that the British Government raise three points at the Yalta Conference: "The independence and integrity of Iran in connection with the behaviour of Russians in
the North, the right of Iran to postpone discussion of oil concessions until the withdrawal of foreign troops, and the evacuation of troops especially the immediate evacuation of Tehran." (207)

At the Yalta Conference, both Roosevelt and Churchill were to raise the Iranian question at the plenary session of 7 February 1945. Roosevelt intended to put forward a plan for international economic and technical co-operation to improve Iran's economy, but this idea was dropped at his advisors' suggestion. (208) Churchill suggested at the same meeting that the question of Iran be referred to the Foreign Ministers. (209)

On 8 February, Eden raised the question of Iran at the meeting of Foreign Ministers and put forward two proposals: 1) that the Powers agree to postpone the question of oil concessions in Iran until after the withdrawal of their troops. 2) that they should issue a statement that they would withdraw their forces from Iran before the final date in the Treaty, and as soon as the supply route to the Soviet Union was no longer needed. (210) Eden's proposal was supported by Stettinus but not by Molotov, who denied there was a connection between the occupation and the question of oil. Molotov repeated the Soviet accusation against the Iranian Government. He stated that although there were no negotiations in progress, his Government might raise the question of an oil concession again, and the Iranian
Government might change its opinion once more. (211) On the withdrawal of troops, Molotov said that the Soviet Union stood by the Tripartite Treaty and the Tehran Declaration, but he could study the proposal that a further statement be issued. (212) A Draft Statement prepared by Eden and seconded by Stettin received no positive response from Molotov. (213) The atmosphere of this meeting has been described in the memoirs of Stettinus:

"we closed our Foreign Ministers Conference with disagreement on the Iranian question. Eden and I favoured the issuing of a document on Iran, and Molotov opposed it. Although we both explained that we attached great importance to the Iranian Question, he stated that it was impossible for him to go any further into the Question at this time. This was disappointing to both Eden and me." (214) Churchill and Eden tried again at their meeting with Stalin and Molotov on 11 February to persuade them either to issue a statement asserting the Allies' adherence to the terms of the Treaty and the Declaration, or to include the case of Iran in the final communiqué of the conference to the effect that the Iranian problems had been discussed. Stalin and Molotov objected to both of these proposals. (215) Even a suggestion that the British and United States Military
Representatives in Moscow should discuss the question of foreign troops in Iran with the Soviet military authorities, was rejected by them. (216)

Eliminating any reference to the Iranian question in the documents of the Yalta Conference was a victory for Stalin, who intended to isolate a weak neighbour and demonstrate the superior right of the Soviet Union on its rimland. Surprisingly, at the very same conference, Stalin finalised the fate of another rimland country, Poland, and demanded a revision of the Montreaux Convention, to the detriment of Turkey, and in favour of the USSR. Only within a confidential protocol of the conference, cited in the Stettinus memoirs, was such a reference made:

"Mr Eden, Mr Stettinus and Mr Molotov exchanged views on the situation in Iran. It was agreed that this matter should be pursued through the diplomatic channel." (217)

The Soviet protocol of the proceedings of the Yalta Conference does not mention any discussion regarding Iran. (218)

Stalin became suspicious of the attention paid by the British and American leaders to the question of Iran. (219) He was aware that his ambitions in Iran would be resisted not only by Iranians but also by the West. (220) In the eyes of Iranians, the result of the Yalta Conference, although not encouraging, was not
When Ambassador Taqizadeh questioned Eden on 7 March 1945, he was told of the "informal" reference which had been made at the conference to the position of Iran. Although Eden maintained that he thought "Russians finally understood the concern with which we had watched recent developments in Iran", he could give no assurances regarding the prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran.

Bullard continued to send reports to London on the "disastrous effects of Russian occupation".

The Iranian Government was continuously seeking an opportunity to raise the question of foreign troop withdrawal. It finally managed to broach the matter after the victory of the Allied forces and the end of the war in Europe on 8 May 1945.

On 19 May, the Iranian Foreign Minister Anoushiravan Sepahbodi sent a letter to the British, American and Soviet Ambassadors in Tehran. He congratulated them on their victory over Germany, but demanded the withdrawal of the Allied troops from Iran which "would help the Iranian situation to normalise".

On 30 May, Eden instructed Bullard to inform the Iranian Government that the British Government was considering withdrawing its troops from Iran. It was consulting the American and Soviet Governments accordingly.

Eden also wrote to Churchill saying that he was conferring with the Soviets over a Pari Passu method of starting the Allied Troop
withdrawal from Iran. (226)

Eden wanted the foreign troops evacuated not only from Tehran but from all Iran. He reasoned that if the British troops remained stationed in the South to safeguard the oil-fields, the Soviets would continue to stay in Northern Iran. Eden pointed out that it was more important to get the Soviets out of Northern Iran than to keep the British troops in the South. In addition, he indicated that there was more risk to the oil fields if the Soviets extended their stay in Iran. (227) Eden believed that the Iranian Army could take over the British task of maintaining the security of the oil fields. (228)

Replying to questions in the House of Commons on 6 June 1945, Richard Law revealed that the British Government "desired" to meet wishes expressed by the Iranian Government in the letter of 19 May. Accordingly, London consulted Moscow and Washington on this matter. (229) Neither the Iranian letter of 19 May nor the British Note, which was presented by the British Ambassador in Moscow (230), received a reply from the Soviet Government. (231)

On 8 June 1945, the United States Government issued a statement that since 1st June, part of its forces in Iran had been transferred to the Far East. Also in reply to the Iranian letter of 19 May, it stated that in order to maintain American communications with the
Japanese war-fronts, a number of American military personnel would remain in Iran until the end of the war with Japan. (232)

At the suggestion of the Foreign Office, Churchill included the Iranian question in the agenda of the Potsdam Conference. (233) On 12 July a British Foreign Office briefing observed:

"Our object in raising the question of withdrawal of foreign troops from Persia at forthcoming Three-Party meeting in Berlin is to relax Russian grips on North Persia, which is becoming daily stronger, and if possible get Russian troops out of Persia before the date stipulated by the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty." (234)

The Three delegations arrived in Berlin, with different objectives regarding Iran. The British intended to ensure a Soviet commitment to an early withdrawal of troops from Iran. They thought that the Soviets might either bring northern Iran under their permanent control, or use their force to install a government in Iran which would be obedient to Moscow. (235) The Americans devised a plan which, if agreed upon, would have inhibited British and Soviet forces from intervening in Iranian Internal affairs. (236) But the Russians wanted to play for time in the hope of establishing a future security Zone in Iran as well as in the Balkans. (237)
On 21 July, the British delegation submitted a memorandum containing their proposals on the mutual withdrawal of Allied forces, in three stages:

"1) Complete withdrawal of all forces from Tehran.

"2) British withdrawal from Iran except Abadan and the oil field area, in return for Russian withdrawal from Iran except for a zone in the North.

"3) Complete withdrawal by both Powers". (238)

Stalin wanted to keep to the treaty time-limit, i.e. six months after the end of the war with Japan; however, the Soviet Union had not even entered the Japanese war yet. By this interpretation, the final date of the Soviet withdrawal could have remained unclear, although Stalin would have accepted the eventual withdrawal of troops from Tehran. This was viewed as a concession to the West. (239)

The Chiefs of Staff wanted to retain forces in the Southern oil fields until the end of the war with Japan. (240) As a result Churchill was in effect not against delaying a complete withdrawal. However, he wanted to commit Stalin not only to a withdrawal from Tehran but also to a staged-withdrawal from Iranian territory. Stalin refused to make any commitments except an immediate withdrawal from Tehran. (241)

President Truman, who was at his first Summit with
Stalin and Churchill, supported the British plan. He declared that the remainder of the American troops in Iran would be evacuated within sixty days. Consequently Stalin found himself obliged to say: "To rid the United States of any worries, we promise you that no action will be taken by us against Iran." (242)

At the conclusion of the Potsdam Conference the question of Iran was mentioned in a Protocol, as follows:-

"It was agreed that Allied troops should be withdrawn immediately from Tehran, and that further stages of the withdrawal of troops from Iran should be considered at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to be held in London in September 1945." (243)

Since the Allied Governments were not in agreement over Iran, no major achievements were made at the Potsdam Conference. Consequently the Iranian officials who had vied for the termination of the occupation of Iran by foreign troops at the end of the European War were much disappointed. (244) This was another victory for Stalin at the expense of the interests of an occupied neighbouring country. (245) Commenting on the Iranian discontent with the Potsdam Conference, the London Times wrote on 23 July 1945: "There is evidence that the authority of the Persian Government is being wrecked by the prolonged occupation." (246) When Bullard informed the Iranian Foreign Minister of the Potsdam decision on 2nd August, Sepahbadi told him that Iran had hoped for
much more than the evacuation of Tehran. (247) The Soviet Government failed to send a similar instruction, until a reminder was sent to the Kremlin by the British. (248) Finally, Maximov approached Sepahbodi on 9 August, to report what had been decided at Potsdam. (249) The "immediate" withdrawal of British troops took place a month later. (250), Maximov informed Sepahbodi, on 20 September, of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Tehran. However, in late November, the Iranian Prime Minister stated at the Majles that Tehran was not yet free of Soviet troops. (251)

C. IRAN AND EXTREMISM: SADR'S POLICY

In early May 1945, the Majles voted in Ebrahim Hakimi as the new Prime Minister. Hakimi was an old politician, reputedly pro-British and liberal. (252) However, the British did not think he was "a man of any importance." (253) Hakimi continued Bayat's policy of moderation and tolerance. This policy enabled the Tudeh Party to demonstrate its power and gather thousands of its supporters in mass rallies on the 1 May (The Labour Day); and to commemorate the Allied victory over Germany on 9 May. (254) The police failed to stop the demonstrators, but the right saw the event as provocation. The Shah and the right-wing majority of the Majles decided to show an iron-fist policy, and prevent any further advancement of the Tudeh Party. The
first step was to organise a rightist political party - under Zia - which was named Eradeh-Ye Melli (National Will), to unite the anti-communist politicians, local groupings and tribes against the Tudeh Party. (255) The second step was to replace the weak Government of Hakimi with one capable of resisting Soviet intrigues, and to suppress Tudeh activities. The tide turned to the extreme right. Hakimi, when defending his cabinet program at the Majles, received a vote of no-confidence on 3 June; and Mohsen Sadr (Sadr-ul-Ashraf) was recommended by sixty deputies of the Majles majority to the Shah as Prime Minister. Sadr had previously been a Mulla. (256) He had reportedly passed the death sentence on several constitutional revolutionaries in 1908, while a Judge. During Reza Shah's rule, Sadr had become the Chief of the Supreme Court, and Minister of Justice. Since the abdication of the late Shah and restoration of parliamentary democracy, Sadr was the most reactionary choice to lead the Government. Nevertheless, he was the choice of pro-British politicians. (257) Sadr's appointment was not only fiercely attacked by the Tudeh Party, but helped to unite the centrists and leftists in the Majles against the Government. (258) This minority resorted to parliamentary obstructionism. It prevented Sadr from introducing his cabinet until 25 September. (259)
With the appointment of Sadr, an open dispute broke out between the right and the left, the moderates and the hard-liners, the pro-British and the pro-Soviets. The conflict began on the very first day of Sadr’s appointment. On the one hand, the Tudeh Party issued an appeal to the nation, demanding the formation of a united front against the new Government. (260) On the other, the anti-Communists mobilised their supporters to suppress Tudeh activities. This front was comprised of the court, the clergy, the army and the rightist politicians led by Zia. (261) Among these elements, the role of Zia’s party (National Will), and of the army whose new political-minded Chief of Staff, General Hassan Arfa, was appointed in December 1944, were the most significant. Zia had united the tribal chieftains behind him, and Arfa organised a patriotic grouping of army officers called the "National Movement" to take political orders from him, as well as performing their military duties. (262) Zia’s anti-communist and anti-Russian sentiments were popular in some political circles. He believed that the British were "satisfied with the status quo", and whatever they had gained in the past; "Russian imperialism," on the contrary, desired to "enlarge Russian interference"; if Iranians resisted Soviet pressure, Britain would be "faithful to its pledges and would defend Iran’s independence "; however, if Iranians allowed the northern provinces to be
dominated by Communism, then Britain would also take the Southern Provinces and Iran would be "partitioned". (263)

The right-wing in politics and the military, led by Zia and Arfa, joined together to suppress Tudeh activities in every city of Iran. Where they could not interfere directly because of the presence of Soviet forces, their fellow-supporters took action. They burned down the Tudeh clubs in Shiraz, Isfahan and Yazd. (264) In his memoirs, Arfa is silent about the "National Movement". He mainly describes the restrictions and the surveillance placed on pro-Tudeh officers under his orders. However, he confirms that the National Will Party of Zia, supported by the British and the Americans, was "fortifying and trying to unite the Southern tribes" in order to prepare them to resist and disobey the Central Government once it fell in the hands of communists. (265) In the execution of this policy, the Qashqai Tribes in Fars, the Bakhtiaris in Isfahan, and the Qadikolaies in Mazandaran were used to attack the offices of the Tudeh Party and pro-Tudeh trade unions. (266) The five month rule of Sadr witnessed many clashes between the two factions in various parts of Iran. Sadr attributed these conflicts to the toughening of Soviet policy after he took office, and blamed his predecessor Bayat, who allegedly had wanted to appease the Soviets. (267) Sadr also accused Maximov and the Soviet Embassy staff of being involved in the Tudeh agitations against the Government. Sadr instructed Ahy
to approach the Soviet Government to complain about the behaviour of Soviet officials in Iran. (268)

For the first time since the fall of Saed, the Soviets took overt action against the Government of Sadr. In July, they used the program allocated to them on Tehran Radio to broadcast statements in Persian against the Iranian Government. Sadr reacted vigorously and ordered the suspension of all Allied broadcasting over Tehran Radio. However, after a week of negotiations, these programs were resumed, but the script of every program had to be submitted beforehand to a representative of the Iranian Government for his approval. (269) During the summer, the Tudeh-inspired labour unrest in the textile factories of Mazandaran and Isfahan continued. Thus it was no coincidence that a Soviet trade-union delegation arrived in early July to visit the same industrial areas. (270) The Government forces who intervened to disperse the Tudeh demonstrators in the northern cities were confronted with action by the Red Army. (271) The Iranian Army commanders in Tabriz and Mashad were expelled from these cities by the order of Soviet commanders, allegedly because of confrontations with the Tudeh demonstrators. (272) Zia, as the leader of the Majles' majority, accused the Tudeh Party of seeking to overthrow the Government and of compromising the independence of the country. (273) On 9 July, Pravda
published an article entitled "Reactionary elements increasing their activity in Iran". The article accused the Government of supporting the "pro-Fascist elements headed by Zia", and blamed the ruling class for the problems of the peasants and workers. Pravda claimed that Iranians were disappointed in their Government and had laid their hopes in the "democratic parties headed by the Tudeh Party". (274) In line with the Russian propaganda, the Tudeh Party sought to prove the inefficiency of the Government and the insecurity of its leaders. On 10 July, unidentified people attacked the house of a Tudeh Deputy, Dr. Keshavarz. No one was hurt. Since no political organisation but the Tudeh Party wanted to give the Soviets a pretext to leave their troops in Tehran, this event was taken to be a put-up job by the Tudeh Party itself. (275) Another Leader of the party, Dr. Kianouri, maintained that the foreign troops should not leave Iran unless their legitimate interests were guaranteed. (276) The Tudeh Party had also hoped that the new Labour Government in Britain would support the left in Iran. In its telegram of congratulations to the Labour party, the Tudeh leadership expressed the hope that the new British Government would pursue a policy against the Government of "reactionaries, feudals and fascists" in Iran. (277) However, Bevin's statement of 20 August in the House of Commons in support of the Iranian Government should have left them in no doubt, thereafter. (278)
The Red Army's delay in evacuating Tehran caused suspicion among Iranian politicians, who believed that the Russians would plot either a military coup or a leftist uprising, to install a Tudeh Government before the withdrawal of their troops. Thus, Zia suggested the capital be moved from Tehran. (279) The Government closed all the Tudeh Party offices, and introduced martial law in Tehran and Isfahan. (280) General Arfa, the Chief of General Staff, ordered the arrest of a number of officers who were suspected of pro-Tudeh tendencies in Tehran and provincial garrisons. (281) Arfa maintained that a military uprising was to take place on a given date, when officers affiliated with Tudeh were to seize the strategic points of the town and proclaim a Tudeh Government. (282) Arfa's apprehension was not groundless. The military uprising occurred not in Tehran but in Khorasan province, north-eastern Iran, and within the Soviet zone of occupation. On 15 August, nineteen officers and six soldiers of the Khorasan military division deserted their garrison in Mashad and moved out of the city, with several lorries loaded with arms, ammunition and radio equipment, towards Qonbad-e-Qabus in the Turkmen area. (283) The officers were members of the Tudeh Party, but according to two of the deserters - Tafreshian and Shafaie - neither the Tudeh Party nor the Soviet authorities had influenced the movement. According to Tafreshian, the deserters had been advised by the leader of the movement, Colonel
Eskandani, that the world situation was being re-arranged now the war had ended, and that the Great Powers would accept the status quo in Iran. (284) Thus, the deserters had thought that if they could start a revolt, the Tudeh Party would strengthen its position against the Government and would find a base to seize power. (285) According to Shafaie, the leader of the uprising had said that they had to set up a revolutionary base inside Iran adjacent to Soviet Turkmenia; and that such an action would not be possible after the evacuation of Soviet troops from Iran. (286) Both deserters wrote that only one member of the Tudeh Leadership, Kambakhsh, who was also in charge of the party’s officers’ cell, had approved the revolt. (287)

On their way to Qonbad-e-Qabus, the convoy stopped at Maraveh-Tappeh where a cavalry battalion had been stationed. The deserters deceived the cavalry commander with forged documents and disarmed the battalion. (288) On the second day of the revolt, the convoy reached its destination, Qonbad-e-Qabus, where it was ambushed by the gendarmes. Six of the deserting officers, including their leader Eskandani, were killed on the spot, and seven were arrested, allowing others to escape into hiding. (289) Thus the uprising of the officers ended on 16 August, on only its second day. Prime Minister Sadr presented a report to the Majles about the desertion and
its aftermath. He also emphasised that martial law would be strictly applied in Tehran.(290)
The Soviets refused to comment on the episode. However, Arfa believed that they assisted the deserters. He notes in his memoirs:

"A detachment in pursuit of the deserters was stopped by Soviet forces and turned back. Although they had allowed the fleeing officers to proceed towards Quchan and Bojnourd".(291)

At the time, the Tudeh Party implicitly denounced the deserters, describing them as "angry people who mutinied without a plan", and as men who had "no place in the party".(292) According to Tafreshian, even before the deserters' arrival at Qonbad-e-Qabus, a provincial leader of the Tudeh Party had approached them to say that their action was "a provocation" which would "give an excuse to the Government to suppress the party".(293) The remainder of the deserters, joined by more pro-Tudeh officers who had arrived from Tehran, went into hiding in the Turkmen region. A few days later they crossed the frontier into the USSR in Soviet lorries.(294)

According to Iranian sources, the Soviet Consul in Bandar-e-Shah, Suleimanov, had personally arranged for the officer to cross the border.(295) Later in December 1945, the Russians transported the officers back to
Iran, and assigned them to serve in the autonomous Government of Azerbaijan. Any successful military uprising or coup d’etat managed by pro-Tudeh officers would have certainly brought the Soviet Union into confrontation with the Western Allies, while they all still had their troops in Iran. The Soviet Union’s goal in Iran was to bring the country under its control, through a subservient government in Tehran. However, in pursuit of this objective, Moscow was not prepared for a major political sacrifice. In Bullard’s opinion, the Soviets would neither accept nor support a military action; but they would use their influence to secure the success of the Tudeh Party in the next parliamentary election.

The term of the fourteenth Majles was due to end in March 1946. According to the Iranian Constitution, the election for the fifteenth Majles had to be completed by February 1946 at the latest. Had Soviet troops stayed in Iran until six months after the end of the war, that is, until 2 March 1946, they could have exerted pressure on the Iranian Government to secure for themselves a favourable result in the Majles elections. Such a Majles, filled with Tudeh members or sympathisers, would have asked for the presence of Soviet troops in Iran to be extended. Contrary to Soviet expectations, Iranian politicians - except the Tudeh leaders - tried to keep Iran outside the Soviet sphere of influence. There was for support in the Majles majority extending the
parliamentary session beyond its two-year term,(299) but this was both provocative towards the Russians and unconstitutional. On 11 October, a draft bill concerning the future election was passed by a majority of 89 votes in the Majles. Only 20 votes were cast against. The bill reads:

"As soon as foreign troops have evacuated Iranian territory by virtue of the Tripartite Treaty, the Royal Decree for the election of the fifteenth Majles will be issued."(300)

The Tudeh deputies, afraid of losing their chance of being re-elected following the withdrawal of Soviet troops, demanded that an election be held on or later than February 1946. However, their argument failed to win over the majority. Among the deputies, three Tudeh members-Keshavarz, Kambakhsh, Shahab Ferdous, and a pro-Soviet mulla Hossein Lankarani, gave lengthy speeches against the elections bill. They argued that postponing the election would not only create a constitutional vacuum but also a dictatorial government, ruling without the Majles. They also maintained that even after the withdrawal of foreign troops, the British would continue to influence Iranian politics through their "fifth column" and local elements, who were in control of the 14th Majles. Furthermore, they emphasised that the Soviet Union had helped Iran secure
its independence and freedom, and that the Soviet military presence should therefore not horrify the public. (301)

The election law of 11 October 1945 could be compared in some ways with the oil law of 2 December 1944, in that it prevented Soviet extortion against Iran, using the might of the Red Army. Reporting on the postponement of the election, Bullard wrote: "This measure was clearly aimed against the leftists and radical elements who would benefit from the Russian presence." (302) General Arfa, who, only after Sadr, was the most hated person in the eyes of the communists, writes about the degree of Iranian suspicion of the Soviets:

"The Soviet army was occupying several barracks including the Iranian Air Force Regiment's headquarters. They arranged to leave the barracks suddenly, without telling the Iranian army, and to leave behind arms for the Tudeh party to take after their departure. The army sent people in civilian clothes to take over, but the Soviet army, when informed of the Iranian action, returned and asked for the arms they had left behind." (303)

The Soviet army in the northern Provinces had in several cases intervened in support of people rioting against Iranian policemen and gendarmes who had been assigned to restore order. The Sadr Government at first
complained to the Soviet Embassy of the Soviet army's interference in Iranian internal affairs. However, according to a British report, "liaison between the embassy and Soviet military had never been close." The same report states that at times there was no single Soviet individual responsible for receiving Iranian complaints. In early September, the Soviet Ambassador left Tehran without appointing a Chargé d'Affaires, and all the counsellors disappeared. Thus, in a state of despair, the Iranian Government took its case for the first time directly to the people, and published statements about Soviet misdeeds in the local press. (304) Sadr says in his memoirs that none of his telegrams to Molotov about the activities of Soviet officials in Iran, or his suggestion of sending a negotiating team to Moscow, received a reply. (305) Outside Iran, the question of withdrawing troops from Iran was followed up by the Labour Government, who had won the British elections in the summer of 1945. To the satisfaction of the Iranian Government, on 20 August, only one day after the officers revolt in Khorasan, Foreign Secretary Bevin confirmed in the House of Commons that Iran had allowed Britain and the Soviet Union to use its territory "for the purpose of defeating the enemy." He also stated that "the occupied territory had to be returned to Iran." Bevin asserted that "taking advantage of facilities given by Iranians was
not the policy of British Government," neither did he believe that it was the "policy of other Allies ".(306) Bevin's statement, supported by the opposition Foreign Spokesman Eden, was received in Iran with pleasure.(307) At the Council of Foreign Ministers held in London (11 September - 2 October 1945) Bevin raised the question of Iran in order to commit the Soviets to a timely withdrawal of troops.(308)

It should be noted that there were differences between the Allies over the major questions on the agenda of the London Conference such as Japan, Italy, and the new regimes in Eastern Europe.(309)

In response to Bevin's motion, Molotov opposed the inclusion of the Iranian question on the agenda, but also made a conciliatory statement: He said at the Council session on 22 September:

"The Soviet delegation could make it known that the Soviet Government had carried out the decision of the Berlin Conference, and Soviet troops had already withdrawn from Tehran. As to the withdrawal from all of Iran, the Soviet Union stood by and would continue to stand by the treaty between Great Britain, the Soviet Union and Iran."(310)

On 10 October, Bevin circulated a parliamentary written answer to Eden's question in the House of Commons. The written account revealed Bevin's correspondence with Molotov regarding Iran, before and during the course of the London Conference. According to this statement,
Bevin had written to Molotov on 19 September concerning the change that had taken place in the Allied position. Bevin had urged Molotov to consequently "ask the Council to take note of 2 March 1946, as the date fixed for the completion of withdrawal" from Iran, when the Iranian question was to be dealt with.(311)

Bevin had also suggested that a partial withdrawal begin in December 1945 "to satisfy the Persian Government's natural desire to see as much as its territory as possible be freed, as soon as possible, from the presence of foreign forces."(312) On 20 September Molotov had replied that there was "no need for the question to be discussed in the Council of Foreign Ministers," and that if necessary, the plan for the final withdrawal of troops from Iran could be discussed between them "towards the end of the period stipulated in the Tripartite Treaty."(313)

Before the end of the Conference, Bevin had sent a second letter to Molotov which stated:

"...My colleagues were pleased to learn from me of the complete agreement between us to the date which Allied troops should be withdrawn. That is by March 2 1946, six months after the signing of the Japanese surrender of September 2, 1945. His Majesty's Government are issuing a direction to the British military authorities accordingly".(314)
Molotov's answer to Bevin reads:

"... I would like to tell you once again that in the case of the Soviet Government the question of withdrawing troops from Iran did not in general constitute a special problem, inasmuch, as there is a treaty which makes provision for it. I would ask you to bear in mind that the Soviet Government attached exceptional importance to the strict fulfilment of obligations undertaken." (315)

Pro-Soviet elements in Iran intensified their anti-Government propaganda simultaneously with the proceedings of the London Conference. The Tudeh-dominated press group, "Freedom Front", sent telegrams to Truman, Stalin, and Attlee, asserting that "dictatorship" still prevailed in Iran and that the "Iranian people expected the leaders of great nations to help in their liberation". (316) The Freedom Front sent another telegram to the Council of Foreign Ministers, complaining about Government policies. The telegram said that dictatorship continued in Iran, and the same elements who had co-operated with Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany were depriving the people of free thought, free press and free association. (317)

In support of the Government, the Rightist press group "Independence Front" issued a statement on 18 September, declaring that the Iranian people were strongly opposed to "interference in their affairs by
any country." (318) Reports concerning the diversity of opinions about Iran at the London Conference, and the Soviet reluctance to commit themselves in the Communiqué to the withdrawal of troops, were published in Iranian newspapers as early as 23 September, and they weakened the position of Sadr's Government, which had already become volatile and was experiencing many difficulties. (319)

The supporters of Sadr could not save him in the face of the persistent "obstruction" of the 40-member minority faction in Majles. The minority faction thought that Sadr was not the right man for the job. Moreover, they maintained that the Sadr Government was regarded by the Soviets as undesirable. After all, they believed that without the co-operation of the Soviet Union, Iran's problems could not be settled. (320)

On 21 October, Sadr resigned, and the Majles, once again, recommended Hakimi as Prime Minister. (321)
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2) Lenczowski, Russia and the West, P.198.
3) Fatemi, Ibid.
4) Lenczowski, Ibid., P.446.
5) Eshraghi, Ibid., P.446.
6) FO 371/35095E82/34 - 6 January 1943.
7) WPIS, No.228-16 February 1944.
8) WPIS, No.229-23 February 1944.
9) Mohammed Saed had served in Consular positions in Baku and Tbilisi before and during the Russian Revolution. He became Iranian Ambassador in Moscow in 1938; and in 1942, was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs.
10) WPIS, No.229-23 February 1944.
13) Ibid., PP.36-38
17) FRUS 1943, Vol.4, P.627.
19) Elwell-Sutton, Ibid.

21) Fateh, Mostafa. **Fifty Years of Iranian Oil** (Panjah Sal Naft-e Iran), Tehran, Payam, 1956, P.353.
22) Ibid., PP.360-361.
24) Ibid., PP.158.-159.
26) *Azhir* (Tehran), No. 172, 27 July 1944.
28) Fateh, Ibid., P.330.
29) Ibid., P.345.
30) Klinghoffer, Ibid.
31) Elwell-Sutton, Ibid., P.38.
32) Soviet Iranian Treaty of 1921, Article 13. (see appendix) 33) Fateh, Ibid.
34) Ibid., PP. 330-342.
35) Ibid., P. 347.
36) FO.371/E4498/535/34-1927 cited in
Rezon, Ibid., P. 74.
37) Fateh, Ibid.
38) Rezon, Ibid., P. 90.
39) Fateh, Ibid., P. 348.
40) Rezon, Ibid., P. 326
41) Shwadram, Ibid., P. 89
42) Shwadram, Ibid., P. 95.
43) Rezon, Ibid., P. 324.
44) Pravda, 17 July 1938, cited Rezon, Ibid.,
P. 324.
45) Rezon, Ibid., P. 325.
46) Dokumenty Vneshni Politiko, No. 368,
Vol. 19, P. 585, cited in Rezon, Ibid.,
P. 326.
47) Ibid., P. 328.
48) Ibid.
49) Ivanov, Ibid., P. 90.
51) Fateh, Ibid., P. 348.
52) Non-published Report of NIOC exploration
Division, Tehran, 1986. This matter was
raised in the Note of the Iranian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Soviet
Embassy on 20 Oct 1945.
54) Klinghoffer, Ibid., P.124.
57) Kavtaradze, a Georgian and ex-Trotskyist, had been condemned to death in 1936, but Stalin had personally intervened to pardon him. See Medvedov, Let History Judge, PP.310-311; Kavtaradze was given the job of Deputy Minister in late 1943. See Kazemzadeh,"Soviet-Iranian Relations" Op. Cit, P.56.
60) Fateh, Ibid., P.355.
63) Ibid.
64) WPIS, No.262-11 October 1944.
65) Ibid.
67) FO. 371/40241E6186/6058/34-9 October 1944.
68) FO. 371/40241E6262/6058/34-11 October 1944.
Contrary to this view, on 25 September 1944 Kavtaradze had praised Iran’s efforts to support the Allies, and its contribution to the war-fronts. See Lenczowski, *Russia and the West*, P.217.


Ibid.


Ibid., P.164.


*Soviet Foreign Policy During The*
84) Woodward, Ibid., P.449.
85) Ibid.
86) Ibid.
87) Rahbar (Tehran), 1 November 1944.
89) WPIS, No.266-8 November 1944.
90) Ibid.
92) Rabhar (Tehran), 12 and 14 October 1944.
93) Fateh, Ibid., P.355.
95) WPIS, No.264-25 October 1944.
96) OSS report, Cited in Rubin, Paved With Good Intention, P.24.
97) Cited in Key-Ostovam, Ibid., Vol.1, P.181.
98) Ibid., P.183.
99) Azhir (Tehran), 31 October 1944.
100) Mardom for Intellectuals (Mardom Baraye Roushanfekran), Tehran, 31 October 1944.
101) FO. 371/40241E6515/6058/34-27 October 1944.
103) FO.371/40241E6670/6058/34 31 October 1944.
104) FO.371/40243E7325/6058/34-1 November 1944.

331
105) FO.371/40242E6769.6058/34-3 November 1944.
106) FO.371/40170E6767/94/34-3 November 1944.
107) FO.371/40242E/6783/6058/34-4 November 1944.
109) Fateh, Ibid., P.356.
110) Arfa, Ibid., P.329.
112) WPIS, No.267-15 November 1944.
116) Woodward, Ibid.
117) WPIS, No.267-15 November 1944.
118) FO.371/40242E7164/6058/34-15 November 1944.
120) Zoghi, Ibid., P.219; Elwell-Sutton, Ibid., P.110.
121) FO.371/40241E4177/6058/34-23 November 1944; WPIS, No.269, 29 November 1944.
122) FO.371/40242E7207/6058/34-23 November 1944.
123) WPIS, No.269-29 November 1944.
124) FO.371/40242E7115/6058/34- 20 November 1944.
125) WPIS, No.269-29 November 1944.
126) Woodward, Ibid., P.455.
127) WPIS, No.270 - 6 December 1944.
128) FO.372/40243E7383/6058/34-30 November 1944.
129) Times (London), 3 November 1944.
130) Majles Proceeding, No.1336-2 December 1944.
131) Hurewitz, Diplomacy in The Near and Middle East, P.141-2.
132) Majles Proceeding, Ibid.
133) Key-Ostavan, Ibid., PP.204-221.
135) Ibid., P.223.
136) Ibid., P.232; Elwell-Sutton, Ibid., P.111.
137) Azhir (Tehran), 5 December 1944.
138) Rahbar (Tehran), 10 December 1944.
141) FRUS, 1944, Vol.5, PP.480-481.
142) Ivanov, Ibid., P.99.
143) Sicker, Martin. The Bear and The Lion; Soviet Imperialism and Iran, New York, Praeger, 1988, P.65.
144) WPIS, No.271 - 13 December 1944.
145) WPIS, No.272 - 20 Dec 1944; Woodward, Ibid., P.457.
146) WPIS, No.272 - 20 December 1944;
Woodward, Ibid., P.456.
147) WPIS, No.272 - 20 December 1944.
148) WPIS, No.272 - 20 December 1944.
149) Kazemzadeh, "Russia and the Middle
East" in Lederer, Op. Cit., P.528-
150) Kazemzadeh," Soviet-Iranian Relations",
151) WPIS, No.274 - 3 January 1945.
152) Ibid.
153) WPIS, No.271 - 13 December 1944.
154) Woodward, Ibid., P.460.
156) Ibid.
157) Ibid., P.243.
158) Ibid.
160) Ibid.
161) WPIS, No 270 - 6 December 1944.
162) Ibid.
163) FO. 371/40243E7425/6085/34- 4 Dec 1944.
164) WPIS, No 271 - 13 Dec 1944. 5) Ibid.
166) FRUS, 1944, Vol.5, P.486.
167) WPIS, No 274 - 3 January 1945.

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168) WPIS, No 275 - 10 January 1944.
169) Ibid.
170) Kirk, Ibid., P. 479.

171) A letter from Mossadeq to Maximov, dated 13 March 1945, states that he (Mossadeq) had been informed through a Tudeh deputy that the Soviet Government was not against the formula of selling oil instead of granting a concession. The letter has been published in Key-Ostavan, Ibid., PP.245-249. A reply by Maximov to Mossadeq has not been traced.

172) Sicker, Ibid., P.65.
173) Khamei, The Lost Opportunities, PP.152-3.
174) WPIS, No. 274-31 January 1945; Greaves, Ibid., P.61.
175) WPIS, No.274-31 January 1945.
176) Rahbar, (Tehran), 4 February 1945.
176) Khamei, Ibid.
179) Lenczowski, Russia and the West, P.232.
181) Key-Ostavam, Ibid., P237.
182) Lenczowski, Ibid., P.268. The quotation is chosen from a statement by Zia, the
Rightist Leader.

183) Ivanov, Ibid., PP.100-103.

184) Ibid.

185) Documentary History, P.121.

186) Ibid., P.133.

187) Khamei, Ibid., P.156

188) Ibid.; Sicker, Ibid.

189) Zoghi, Ibid., P.220; Greaves, Ibid., P.59;
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190) Khamei, Ibid., P.162; Zabih, Communist
   Movement, P.92; Abrahamian, Ibid., P.213.

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192) Ibid., P.202.


194) FO 371/40241 E6367/6058/34-16 October 1944.


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218) Beitzel, Ibid.,PP.134-140.
219) McNeill, Ibid.
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240) Sicker, Ibid., P.477; Woodward, Ibid., P.477.


242) Cited in Kumhulm, Ibid., P.273


247) WPIS, No 305-8 August 1945.


250) Yarzdi, Ibid., P.31.

251) Ibid., P.32; FO.371/45452E9218/31/34-7 November 1945.


254) Khamei, Ibid., P.166.
255) Kirk, Ibid., P.482; Azimi, Ibid., P.119.
256) WPIS, No. 279-13 June 1945.
259) Ibid., PP.100-102; Zabih, Communist Movement, P.95-
260) Rahbar (Tehran) 7 June 1945;
261) Lenczowski, Russia and The West, PP.236-244.
262) Kirk, Ibid., P.477.
263) Lenczowski, Ibid., P.245; Kirk, Ibid., P.482-3.
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265) Arfa, Under Five Shah’s, P.337.
266) Ivanov, Ibid., PP.421-3.
268) Ibid., PP.425-6.
269) WPIS, No.302-18 July 1945;
WPIS, No.303-25 July 1945;
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271) Zabih, Ibid., P.98.
272) Arfa, Ibid., PP.329, 341.
273) WPIS, No.302-18 July 1945.
274) Ibid.
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276) Mardom for Intellectuals (Tehran), 3 August 1945.
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281) Arfa, Ibid., PP.343-3.
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288) Shafaie, Ibid., PP.74-6.
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295) Jami, Ibid., P. 264.

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298) Woodward, Ibid., P. 476.

299) Key-Ostavan, Ibid., PP. 119-120.


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312) Ibid.

313) Ibid.

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315) Ibid.

316) WPIS, No. 312-28 September 1945.

317) Ibid.

318) Ibid.

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320) Key-Ostavan, Ibid., P.164.

321) Ibid., P.179; Arfa, Ibid., P.345.
SECTION FIVE

AZERBAIJAN AND THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR
The deterioration in Soviet-Iranian relations which had started with the oil crisis (October-December 1944), intensified during Sadr's Premiership (June-October 1945). When the Soviet attempt to obtain an oil concession and set up a power-base in the north failed, the Red Army's grip on the zone of occupation tightened. In January 1945, Taqizadeh complained to the British Foreign Office that the Russians had steadily increased their pressure on the northern region, refused to allow Iranian armed forces to enter the northern provinces and "terrorised the population into making such manifestations as they themselves desired". (1) One such statement was made by a "Liberation Committee" in July 1945. It demanded the annexation of Iranian Azerbaijan to the USSR. However, British reports mentioned that the existence of this "committee" was in doubt. (2) Towards the end of summer it became more obvious that there was a border line between the Soviet-occupied north and the rest of the country. The Iranian Government had no authority on the Soviet side of the line. (3) When the occupation neared its end, the Russians increased their pressure on the Iranian Government in the occupied zone. They expelled "uncooperative" Iranians from the northern cities. (4) The Russians hoped that with their help, their supporters would gain all the seats allocated to the northern
provinces in the 15th Majles election. Furthermore, they expected the Tudeh Party and its affiliated trade unions to win more seats in Tehran and the industrial cities. However, the postponement of the election obstructed the Soviet scheme. It also increased the conflict between the Right and the Left. The Russian response to resistance from the Tehran Government was to encourage separatist movements in the occupied zone. Although such movements were already active in Azerbaijan and northern Kurdistan, similar movements emerged in other parts of the Soviet zone. In Mazandaran, the Tudeh Party advocated an independent "Tabarestan."(6) Since early 1945 the leftist press had publicised popular demands for the establishing of provincial Councils.(7) The formation of provincial Councils (Anjomanhaye Ayalati) was stipulated in the Iranian constitution of 1906-1907, but the Central Government had never complied with this clause. In mid-summer of 1945, news reached Tehran about a campaign for a provincial Council in Azerbaijan led by the Tudeh party, and the formation of an "Azerbaijan Committee for National Liberation."(8) These moves originated following complaints made by the people of Azerbaijan against Reza Shah’s centralisation programs which had caused disregard of interests in the province, economic hardship and suffering. The problems of Azerbaijan were not isolated, since the whole country
had suffered from the dictatorship before the occupation, and disorder and mismanagement after the occupation. (9)

At this time, the Soviet plan in Azerbaijan was to create a popular front against the Government of Sadr, but the Tudeh slogan of class-struggle in the region was not compatible with this policy. In August, a mob led by Tudeh agitators attacked a village outside Tabriz and killed a prominent feudal, Ligavani, whose son was a deputy of Majles. The Russians disapproved of this action and ordered the provincial leader of the Tudeh Party, Ardashes Ovanesian, to leave Azerbaijan. (10)

In mid-September, the Iranian authorities still viewed the Tudeh party as the only organised accomplice of the Russians in Azerbaijan. Premier Sadr had told Bullard that the Tudeh was consolidating its authority with the support of the Red Army in Azerbaijan. He had further stated that the acting Governor-General of the province had asked to be relieved of his job, fearing a Tudeh take over. (11)

In the meantime, Soviet propaganda changed its direction. The Soviet reports that the people of Iranian Azerbaijan wished to be incorporated into Soviet Azerbaijan were replaced with new reports on the movement of Azeris for self-government within a federal Iranian state. (12) This change of tactic helped the Russians to refute the accusation of expansionism, while still maintaining their lever of pressure in Iran.
CHAPTER ONE

The DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AZERBAIJAN:
FORMATION AND ARMED STRUGGLE

In the chaotic situation of Iran in the Summer of 1945, anything was possible. The formation of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan (DPA) and elevation of its founder took place in early September 1945. According to DPA documents, Pishevari, the editor of a leftist Tehran newspaper called Azhir, left for Tabriz in the last days of August 1945. There he negotiated with one Azerbaijan dignitary, Shabestari, and the head of the Tudeh Party's Provincial committee, Padegan. Subsequently Pishevari and Shabestari issued a declaration, seconded by 48 signatories, announcing the formation of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan (ferghe-ye Democrat-e Azerbaijan) on 5th September 1945.(13) The declaration demanded, inter alia, autonomy for Azerbaijan within Iran; education in the indigenous language instead of Persian; an increase in the representation of Azerbaijan in Majles; and the strengthening of relations between Iran and "democratic governments."(14)

The leader of the DPA, Pishevari, was born Seyed Jafar Javadzadeh in 1893 in the small Azerbaijani city of Khalkhal. At the age of 12 he immigrated with his family to the Russian Caucasus, where he studied. He joined the Baku-based Edalat (justice) party which later merged
Pishevari returned to Iran with the Red Army in 1920 and joined the communist faction of the Jangali Government in Gilan. After the communist coup d'état which ended the one-month rule of charismatic leader of Jangal, Mirza Kuchek, Pishevari joined the cabinet of communist Ehsanollah Khan as Minister of Interior. In the history of Jangali rebellion, Javadzadeh (Pishevari) was one of the four Caucasian Communists in this cabinet who could speak Turkish rather than Persian. Pishevari became the editor of the official organ of the Iranian Communist Party, "Communist", in August 1920. He attended the Comintern's "Congress of the People of the East" at Baku in 1920, one of a dozen of Iranian delegates. During the early years of Reza Shah he was active in journalism and trade unionism, and became known by his pen name "Pishevari", which means craftsman. In 1930, he was arrested and remained in prison until 1940, when he was sent to internal exile in Kashan. Following the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran, Pishevari returned to Tehran and, in May 1943, began to publish a newspaper called Azhir (Alarm). One of the "Fifty-Three", Khamei, who wrote a memoir, has confirmed that when he arrived in prison in 1937, Pishevari had been a prisoner for 8 years and was in very poor health. When the Tudeh Party was established in 1941 by the remainder of the Fifty-Three, Pishevari neither received an
invitation nor applied for membership. The party leaders disliked Pishevari for his educational poverty and great pretensions. Moreover, Pishevari had belittled them for their shortcomings. He wrote about the Tudeh Leaders in October 1944: "They obviously lack the experience and ability of leading a political movement." However, in 1943 the Russians persuaded the Tudeh Party to nominate Pishevari as a candidate for the 14th Majles in Tabriz. Apparently, Pishevari was elected as a result of pressure from the Soviet Consul on the Electoral Committee of Tabriz. In view of this, the Majles refused Pishevari's credentials and he was deprived of his seat.

The Majles was not the only political body which had rejected Pishevari's credibility. At the first congress of the Tudeh Party in August 1944, Pishevari's credential as a delegate were also rejected. During 1944-1945, Pishevari became the front-runner among the pro-Soviet journalists who had criticised both the Government and the nationalists like Mossadegh. With the blessing of the Russians, Pishevari intended to exploit the organisation of the Tudeh Party in Azerbaijan, for his own plans. It was unlikely that the head of the Tudeh Party in Azerbaijan, Amir Khizi, would co-operate with Pishevari's plans. Thus, in June 1945, the Russians replaced Amir Khizi with one of their trusted men, Padegan.

On the 5 September, the day
the DPA was formed, Padegan announced that the Tudeh Party in Azerbaijan had decided to absorb the DPA. According to Ivanov, the number of Tudeh members in Azerbaijan at the time of incorporation was 4000. (29) However, Pishevari had reported their number to be 60,000. (30) At the same time, the leader of the trade unions in Azerbaijan, Biriya, declared that a similar decision had been made by his organisation to join the DPA. (31)

A Tudeh leader later wrote in his memoirs that the party leaders were shocked when the news reached Tehran, since they had not been consulted by either the Tudeh provincial committee or by the Russians. (32) Another party leader who at this time was in charge in the city of Zanjan, recollects that the Red Army commander of the city had persuaded him to follow the pattern of the Tudeh Party of Azerbaijan and merge his organisation with the DPA. (33)

According to one insider, the incorporation of the Tudeh Party of Azerbaijan with the DPA faced some resistance in Tehran, where the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party drafted a declaration in condemnation of this decision. The same observer states that Kambakhsh, who was a confidant of the Russians in the Tudeh leadership, leaked the information to the Soviet Embassy and stopped the publishing of the declaration. (34) The nucleus of DPA membership were the Muhajers (immigrants). They
were partly the Iranians who, after many years of living in Caucasian cities were deported from Russia after 1936, and partly those who entered Azerbaijan from the north after the Soviet occupation. The Muhajers were enthusiastic pro-Soviets who had led demonstrations in to demanding annexation of Soviet Azerbaijan during the occupation of Iran. (35) In February 1943, Bullard reported to London that the Muhajers, supported by the Red Army, had become a vehicle for Soviet and Communist propaganda in Azerbaijan. (36) A prominent Tudeh leader and theoretician, Khalil Maleki, who visited Azerbaijan in 1945 to inspect the situation just prior to the incorporation, reported that the party offices were filled with Muhajers and decorated only with portraits of Stalin. (37) Maleki criticised the provincial Tudeh leadership for banning Persian newspapers and for failing to stop financial extortion carried out by the trade unions. (38) Since the revelation of such activities was contrary to Soviet interests, Maximov instructed the party leaders to recall him from Azerbaijan. (39)

One of the first measures taken by the DPA was selecting a Tabriz newspaper in Azeri-Turkish called "Azerbaijan" as its political and theoretical organ. It was through this paper that the DPA set forth its ideological principles and slogans, such as "Azerbaijan is only for the Azerbaijanis", or "the nation of Azerbaijan will not succumb to the domination of another nation." (40) Later,
in the winter of 1945-1946, Pishevari stated: "Our great and heroic people are different from those in Tehran, Isfahan and other parts of Iran. Our people are not Fars (Persian) and they are different from Persians."(41)

In a very provocative article, entitled "There may be death but not retreat", and known as the political manifesto of the DPA, Pishevari wrote:

"Prior to our recent movement, the people of Azerbaijan had rarely spoken about their nationhood. However, they always recognised themselves as a separate nation, and looked at the Persians as the foreigners under whose rule they were ashamed to live."(42)

The DPA's tone of propaganda not only disgusted the Iranian ruling class, but it also disappointed the liberals and intellectuals who wished to support a campaign for freedom and democracy in the name of the whole Iranian nation.(43) The nationalists and liberals invited the DPA to be a front-runner against dictatorship in Iran, and take the same role that the patriots of Azerbaijan had played in the course of the Constitutional revolution in the early 20th Century.(44) Pishevari responded: "Azerbaijan prefers to be a free Ireland rather than a colonised India, within Iran."(45)

There have been various interpretations regarding the origin of the autonomist movement in Azerbaijan. The
Soviet historian, Ivanov, attributes the grievances of the people of Azerbaijan to the excesses of non-local officials, the imposition of Persian language on the Azeri-Turkish speaking people, and the Central Government's unjust economic policy in Azerbaijan. He fails to mention the Soviet role in the creation of the DPA, but praises the DPA's "counter-reactionary and anti-imperialist" characteristics. (46) Leftist Iranian authors admit the Soviet influence in the DPA, but stress that it was a "genuine mass movement relying on the majority of the population of Azerbaijan." (47) Those Iranian Socialists who left the Tudeh Party after the crisis of Azerbaijan give a different version. According to their personal observations the DPA was created by the party chief and Prime Minister of Soviet Azerbaijan, Bagirov, who was supported by a faction in the Soviet leadership. (48) They asserted that an "autonomous Azerbaijan" was being held hostage by the Russians for oil. (49) A major partner of the DPA, Jahanshahlou, who became Deputy Prime Minister of autonomous Azerbaijan, is convinced that the DPA had been master-minded by Bagirov and Kambakhsh in Baku, and Pishevari had been chosen to carry out the plan. (50) In his memoirs, Jahanshahlou repeatedly refers to the presence of General Salim Atakishiev, the NKVD Minister of Soviet Azerbaijan; Mirza Ibrahimov, the Minister of Culture in Soviet Azerbaijan; and Hasan Hasanov, Secretary of the Azerbaijan SSR Communist Party in
Tabriz. He claims they were the principle supervisors of "Autonomous Azerbaijan ".(51)
The declaration of the DPA enjoyed good coverage in Soviet newspapers. According to George Kennan, the appeal mainly stressed "Iranian oppression in Azerbaijan," and the local people's demand for freedom.(52)
The First Congress of the DPA on 27 September, decided to open a branch of the Democratic Party in every city and town of Azerbaijan. However, the most important decision of the Congress was the formation of a militia called Fedaies (devotees), to implement the DPA's rulings.(53) In spite of its previous resentment, the Tudeh Party's Central Committee sent a representative to this Congress. (54) The DPA had hoped to legitimise its power through the future election of deputies for Majles and provincial councils. Thus, when the 14th Majles postponed the next election until the evacuation of foreign troops, a critical response came from the Tudeh Party in Tehran and the DPA in Azerbaijan. Pishevari said on 20 September that if the Government failed to implement the election on time, the people of Azerbaijan would implement it themselves.(55) The DPA also announced its opposition to the newly appointed Governor-General, Mehdi Farrokh, who had been chosen with the support of a Majles majority. It warned the Government of "bloodshed" if Farrokh arrived. (56) The
DPA summoned an All-People Congress, to determine future reforms in Azerbaijan, which was held on 20 and 21 November. (57) The Congress was attended by 744 delegates from the DPA, civil servants, peasants, landlords, merchants and some clerics. It began its debate on the election of provincial councils within the framework of the Iranian Constitution, but turned to national self-determination and the election of the "National Majles" of Azerbaijan.(58) The All-People Congress renamed itself the «Constituent Assembly» and ordered a general election for the first week of December. For the first time in Iran, women were given the right to vote.(59) Although the developments in Azerbaijan caused anxiety in Tehran, London and Washington, the Soviet media welcomed the actions taken by the DPA. On 20 November, Izvestia condemned the "oppressive treatment of Democrats by the Gendarmerie and by the Black Hundreds organised by the large landowners", and praised the Congress delegates who "desired to assure the democratic rights of Azerbaijan people within the framework of the Iranian state". It denied charges of the DPA's separatism and Soviet interference in Azerbaijan affairs: "The reactionary forces throughout Iran have focused their attack on the Azerbaijan democratic movement, on the pretext that it advocated separation from Iran. The British reports of Russian intervention there, were similarly designed to divert attention from
much more serious disturbances in Palestine, Egypt and elsewhere."(60)

Bullard reported that the Soviet allegation against Iranian forces in Azerbaijan was groundless propaganda, put out to justify the rebellion, and stated:"Persian troops and Gendarmes are too much afraid to hurt anyone."(61)

While preparing itself for the election of the Azerbaijan National Majles, the DPA initiated an armed rebellion against the central government, and planned to attack military and civilian institutions in Azerbaijan. This major armed revolt began in mid-November. However, there were sporadic armed confrontations between DPA partisans and government forces during September and October in some parts of Azerbaijan. One such confrontation had occurred in late September in the city of Maragheh, south of Tabriz.

Here a group of DPA rebels led by Mr Kabiri - who later became Minister of the Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan - declared an uprising against the central government. The military commander of the city arrested Kabiri, but on 30 September Russian forces intervened in support of the rebellion, released Kabiri and put the city commander under arrest. Despite an official protest by the Iranian Government to the Soviet Embassy, the City of Maragheh remained under the control of the DPA rebels.(62) Following the events in Maragheh, the
DPA enjoyed a free hand and resorted to terror to increase its membership across Azerbaijan. Moreover, the arrival of Soviet reinforcements in Azerbaijan in November added to the support of the DPA. (63)

Reports on Soviet military build up, instead of preparation for troop evacuation, worried the Iranian authorities. The Chief of General Staff, General Hassan Arfa, approached Bullard and Murray, to convey a message from the Shah. The message was to the effect that if the Russians sent troops towards Tehran, the Shah and his Ministers would move from Tehran to a city in the South. (64) Arfa records that none of the Ambassadors showed much sympathy. Bullard told him that British pressure on the Russians, to secure their withdrawal, was out of the question. In addition, Murray said: "certainly the Russians would evacuate Iran and Azerbaijan province in due course.... and probably these pessimistic ideas had been spread by arch-reactionaries like Zia." (65)

In mid-November, the Red Army began to distribute arms among the DPA members, with the purpose of a full-scale armed rebellion against the central government. (66) The arms in the hand of rebels had been identified to be those which the Russians had taken from the Iranian army after the invasion of 1941. (67) In addition, among the insurgents were soldiers from Soviet Azerbaijan in civilian clothes. (68) Robert Rossow, the US Acting Consul in Tabriz, who gave an account of this
development both to the State Department and American journals, asserts that the armed struggle—or, as he defines it, coup-d'état—had been masterminded by Krasnykh, the Soviet Consul-General in Tabriz. (69)

The first rebellious action took place on 15 November in the city of Mianeh, on the south-east of Tabriz. The rebels were led by a Muhajer named Gholam Yahya Daneshian, who later became the Commander of DPA's militia (Fedai's) and the most influential military figure of the autonomous regime. The rebels arrived in Mianeh aboard trucks owned by the Soviet transport company Iran-Sutrans. They set up road blocks around the city, cut off communications between Tabriz and Tehran, and attacked the police headquarters and the railway terminal. They murdered a police officer, Captain Rahnama, and executed several anti-DPA people in the city square. The Soviet soldiers present at the scene, stood idle and gave the rebels freedom of action. (70)

Within the next few days, more cities in Azerbaijan, i.e. Ahar, Sarab, Maragheh surrendered to the rebels. (71)

The outrage in Mianeh helped the DPA to take the other towns of Azerbaijan with little or no resistance. The Commander of Tabriz Division, General Darakhshani, reported the fall of the cities to the General Staff on 16 November, and recorded that an attack on his
headquarters was imminent. (72)
Hakimi was still optimistic to find a solution and conciliate the Russians. He appeased them by removing Farrokh as Governor General of Azerbaijan and appointing the former prime Minister, Bayat, who was a favourite of the Russians. Hakimi had hoped that, in this way, the problem of Azerbaijan would be solved by negotiation. (73) Hakimi also dismissed two reputed pro-British top officials, the Interior Minister Fahimi and the Mayor of Tehran Gholamhossein Ebtehaj; he replaced them with two independent politicians, Allahyar Saleh and Mahmoud Nariman who had good relations with the left. Nariman maintained his portfolio of communication beside the mayorship of the capital. (74) The interior portfolio was particularly important since the handling of the forthcoming election was its responsibility.

However, with the armed rebellion in Azerbaijan, Hakimi’s Government had no choice but to implement a military counter-measure, or tolerate disintegration of Iran.
CHAPTER TWO:

THE RED ARMY AND THE REBELLION: INCREASING SUPPORT

Iranians had realised that the rebels in Azerbaijan could not have seized the Government's military posts without the assistance of Russian troops. Thus the Government decided to dispatch auxiliary forces from Tehran to Azerbaijan. It was calculated that such action would end in one of two eventualities: either the reinforcement would reach Azerbaijan and suppress the rebellion, or they would be prevented from fulfilling their mission by the Russians. Then, the world would realise that the Russians were directly responsible for the rebellion. According to General Hassan Akhavi who was the Chief of Military Intelligence at this time, such an idea to expose the Russians came from the Shah and the General Staff of the Armed Forces. (75) On 17 November, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs addressed a Note to the Soviet Embassy, listing several instances of interference by Soviet agents and troops in the events of Azerbaijan. The Note protested to the Soviet Government for undermining the Tripartite Treaty of 1942, which had guaranteed Iran's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. In the Note, the Iranian Government warned that:

"If urgent attention is not paid to these matters, the situation in the northern
regions is such that disastrous consequences might ensue which most certainly would be contrary to the wishes of the two Governments, and to the expressed desire of the USSR to consolidate relations with Iran. Should the Iranian Government not succeed in preventing unfortunate incidents owing to the lack of freedom of movement of its armed forces, it will have the right of imputing responsibility for this failure to the Soviet military authorities." (76)

Expressing hope that the Soviet Government would understand the gravity of the situation in Azerbaijan and the legitimacy of Iran's sovereign right to establish law and order on its own territory, the note disclosed Iran's decision to dispatch reinforcement to Azerbaijan.

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs informs the Soviet Embassy that the Iranian Government has decided to send two infantry battalions, one light tank battalion and one gendarme battalion to Mianeh and Tabriz via Zanjan. It is requested that the Soviet authorities be notified of this decision at the earliest possible moment, so they may be informed of the matter in advance." (77)

Furthermore, the Iranian Minister of War, General Ali
Riazi, called on the Soviet Military Attaché on 17 November and informed him of his Government's decision. The auxiliary column left Tehran on 18 November but was stopped by Soviet forces a hundred kilometres farther at Sharifabad, outside Qazvin. A Soviet officer, Colonel Smirnov, informed the Commander of the column, Colonel Amjadi, that failure to abide by his order would be considered a hostile act against the Red Army. He also threatened to open fire if the Iranian expeditionary force moved further.

The Iranian authorities immediately approached the Soviet Embassy in Tehran. They alleged that the prevention of passage of the expeditionary force was the result of a misunderstanding by the Soviet local commander in Qazvin. Not surprisingly the Soviet Ambassador had absented himself from Tehran, and the Embassy Chargé d’Affaires professed complete ignorance of the rebellion in Azerbaijan. The Soviet Military Attaché stated that he could not answer any question before receiving instructions from Moscow.

When Ahy presented a Note of protest to Molotov concerning the issue on 22 November, the latter expressed his surprise at the allegation that the Red Army troops had refused free passage to Iranian forces. He also assured Iran that the Soviet Government would respect Iranian sovereignty.

The effect of Soviet military intervention against the Iranian army was disastrous for the morale of all
Iranians except the pro-Soviet elements such as the Tudeh Party and the DPA. Two Tudeh deputies defended the Soviet position. Dr. Radmanesh who was also Secretary of the Central Committee, stated that the Soviet Union could not remain indifferent to the intrigues and conspiracies of Iranian ruling circles who, in collaboration with foreign governments, were threatening the security of Soviet Azerbaijan. (83) Another Tudeh deputy, Kambakhsh, who had been the closest to the Russians among the Tudeh leaders, emphasised that the Soviet troops would not evacuate Iran as long as Iran's policy of discrimination against Soviet interests continued. He also alleged that the Iranian Government was a "Fascist dictatorship", and that its existence was contrary to the United Nations Charter which had prohibited the establishment of Fascist regimes. (84) In a short statement on 23 November in the Majles, Hakimi appealed to the deputies to refrain from emotional debate on Azerbaijan and Soviet interference; as such, his direct negotiation with the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires would not be disturbed by a hostile atmosphere in Majles. (85) The Speaker of Majles, Seyed Mohammad Sadegh Tabatabaie, made a similar statement in which he underlined the "seriousness" of the situation and begged the deputies and the public to "stay calm and not take steps to jeopardise Iran's relation with the Soviet Union." (86)
In the meantime, the Iranian Government initiated active diplomatic presentations in London and Washington, and drew world attention to Soviet sponsorship, and not just support, of the rebellion.

Two prominent Iranian diplomats, Seyed Hassan Taqizadeh and Hossein Ala, played a great role in the internationalisation of the Azerbaijan crisis, from November 1945 until December 1946, when the rebel Government of Azerbaijan collapsed.

The Red Army's direct interference in the Iranian crisis in November 1945 caused a change of attitude among the Western powers towards the Iranian question. Following a presentation by Taqizadeh at the Foreign Office, Bevin reported to the House of Commons about the developments in Iran on 22 November. This was followed by an emotional statement by Eden in support of Iran. (87) Bevin also sent a letter to Molotov concerning new developments in Iran. In this letter, which was delivered by Sir Archibald Clark Kerr on 26 November, Bevin emphasised that Iran had the right to move troops in its territory, and that the Soviet Union and Great Britain had pledged, in Articles 1 and 4 of the Tripartite Treaty, to respect this right and not to disturb Iranian administration and security forces. Bevin expressed hope that Moscow would send instructions to the Red Army commanders in Iran to correct their "misunderstanding" and provide free passage for Iranian forces in their territory. (88)
In Washington, Iran's new ambassador, Ala, made his first presentation on Azerbaijan to the State Department, even before presenting his credentials. He talked to Byrnes on 21 November, but the Secretary of State was reluctant to take any action before receiving a report from the American Embassy in Tehran. On 23 November, Byrnes asked Murray for an urgent briefing. Murray tentatively confirmed the Iranian Government's statement; but added that, according to Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, the situation was calm. Murray then decided to send an observer from the Embassy to Azerbaijan. Such a mission required Soviet passes; and in the absence of the Soviet Ambassador, Murray had to wait. However, the Third Secretary of the Embassy, John Jerengan, accompanied by the Deputy Military Attaché crossed the Soviet demarcation line into Azerbaijan, and made their report. Following Ala's Second conversation with Byrnes on the crisis of Azerbaijan, the latter was persuaded to send a protest Note to Moscow. On 25 November, Harriman delivered a Note to Molotov which reflected the United States' views on the Iranian crisis. The Note referred to the Declaration of Tehran signed by Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill, and the assurances given on Iran's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Note stated that:

"The fulfilment of these assurances required that the Government of Iran should have full
freedom, without interference from Soviet, British or American military or civil authorities to move its armed forces through Iran in such a manner as it may consider necessary in order to preserve its authority and maintain international security"(91)

The US Government was sceptical whether the Red Army's conduct in Iran was authorised by the Soviet Government. Thus, the Note "realised" that Russian commanders in Iran had been acting without the sanction of the Soviet Government and "assumed" that Moscow was sending them instructions to respect Iranian sovereignty. It also asserted that the United States would withdraw its forces from Iran by 1st January 1946, and suggested that Britain and USSR do the same.(92)

Truman revealed in his memoirs that he personally was behind the suggestion of complete troop withdrawal before the end of the year.(93)

On 26 November, the Soviet Embassy in Tehran made a reply to the Iranian Note in which it denied the allegation concerning Soviet interference in Iranian affairs. However, the Note re-affirmed the Soviet opposition to the introduction of Iranian reinforcements to Azerbaijan, "in order to avoid bloodshed"(94)

Accordingly, in reply to the American and British Notes, the Soviet Government denied all Iranian allegations. The Soviet Note of 29 November addressed to the American
Embassy in Moscow stated:

"The events which had taken place in recent days in Iran not only do not constitute an armed uprising but also are not directed against the Government of Iran."(95)

The Note praised the declaration of "All-people Congress" of Azerbaijan issued on 20 November for "national autonomy" and blamed the Iranian Government for the altercations.

"The undesirable incidents which have taken place in conjunction with these recent events at various points of northern Iran have been caused by reactionary elements which have opposed the extension of national rights to the population of northern Iran, although there is nothing in these desires of the local population which is unusual for a democratic state."(96)

The Soviet Government also justified the Red Army's prevention of movement of Iranian military detachment towards Azerbaijan.

"The dispatch of further Iranian forces to northern Iran could cause not the cessation but the increase of disorders and likewise bloodshed, which would compel the Soviet Government to introduce into Iran further forces of its own for the purpose of preserving order and of assuring the security
of the Soviet garrison." (97).

The Note argued that the Three-Power Declaration of 1 December 1943, referred to in the American Note, had not limited the "number of Soviet armed forces in Iranian territory" or the "period of stationing of Soviet troops in Iran". The Note claimed that the Soviet Union had the right to maintain troops in Iran.

"The right of introduction of Soviet troops into the territory of Iran was envisaged by the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 26 February 1921." (98)

The American proposal for withdrawal of all forces from Iran by 1 January 1946 was also rejected as Moscow saw "no grounds for the renewed considerations of the question of the time limit for the removal of these forces from Iran." (99)

The Soviet reply to the British Note was similar to its Note addressed to the United States. Here, the disturbances in Azerbaijan were attributed to the shortcomings of the Iranian Government rather than the DPA rebellion and the Soviet intervention.

"The Iranian Azerbaijan population had put forward requests for self-government within the Iranian state and peaceful demonstrations were being held. But the local forces of the Iranian Gendarmerie took action which provoked a series of undesirable incidents."
The Soviet military authorities in no way interfered with the movement of Iranian troops within the area, but the presence of the reinforcements might have increased the disturbances and led to bloodshed."(100)

On 29 November, Ala was given the opportunity to give a personal account of the crisis in Azerbaijan and the extent of the Soviet grip on northern Iran while presenting his credentials to President Truman.(101) Ala had been informed about the Soviet excuse for the prevention of the movement of the Iranian forces. He therefore persuaded Truman that sending 1500 soldiers to strengthen the 6000 Iranian forces in Azerbaijan could in no way disturb the Russians' military supremacy. After all, the Russians already had more than 30,000 troops in Azerbaijan, in addition to the 45,000 in other parts of northern Iran.(101)

The following week, Byrnes repeated the American pledge to observe the Declaration of Tehran. The State Department also made the Notes exchanged between the United States and the Soviet Union regarding the latest developments in Iran public.(103)

On 1 December, Iran sent another Note to the Soviet Embassy which explained the reasons behind sending the detachment to Azerbaijan. The Note, in part, said:

"As regards your statement that the Soviet Union cannot be held responsible for the consequences of the absence of the Iranian
officials in the northern provinces, we are compelled to point out that the presence of officials in these regions can only be useful and effective if Iranian security forces are placed at their disposal and if it is possible to move those forces from localities where they are not required to places where their assistance is needed.

When the hand of Government officials are tied, whereas irresponsible turbulent elements move about freely, and when the security forces of Iran are deprived of liberty of action and communication with the Central Government, it is not to be wondered at that the situation becomes troubled and that Government officials share the lot of the inhabitants of the northern provinces and are exposed to the danger of being assaulted, wounded and murdered. Such unfortunate incidents have, in fact, frequently taken place."

The Note assured that the Iranian forces would not be used against the people, but only to prevent disorder and intimidation.

"Once order was re-established, Government representatives would be able to meet the legitimate grievances of the people of
It was also stated that the dispatch of the reinforcements northward could in no way endanger the Soviet troops, whose numbers were more than sufficient to safeguard their security.

In conclusion, the Note requested, in particular, that "all obstacles in the way of the detachment which has been waiting at Sharifabad with orders to proceed to the northern provinces be removed". Although no reply was received, the pace of events in Azerbaijan moved towards the emergence of an autonomous government.
During the first week of December, elections for the National Majles of Azerbaijan (NMA) were held by the DPA. Many voters who lived in remote villages were transported to the polls by the DPA. According to the Times correspondent, "loads of voters were driven to the polls in American-built Red Army trucks driven by Soviet soldiers in uniform". (107)

In a Soviet-style election, the voters were allowed to choose candidates only from the list provided by the DPA. (108) The NMA was supposed to function both as a constituent assembly and a daily legislative body; however, its first task was to appoint the Council of Ministers. (109)

Meanwhile the DPA had been engaged in the elimination of the last representations of central government in Azerbaijan i.e., the army and the Governor-General's office.

On 7 December, DPA volunteers called Fedaeian (devotees) surrounded the army garrison of Tabriz. On the following day, the Russian commanders prevented the Iranian Commanding Officer in Azerbaijan, General Darakhshani, from moving from his position; and threatened him with retaliation in the event he refused the order. (110) The DPA forces gave Darakhshani an
ultimatum to surrender his army's arms and ammunition. They also offered him and his officers two alternatives following their surrender: either to go to Tehran, or to stay and join the army of the new autonomous government. (111) The reports of Darakhshani to the effect that he had been "practically surrounded by the Soviet forces", caused different reactions in Tehran. Darakhshani had questioned whether he should surrender or resist. The Minister of War General Riazi and Chief of Staff General Arfa sent instructions by wireless that the army garrison should "resist in principle." (112) However, Prime Minister Hakimi sanctioned the surrender. (113) An agreement concerning the surrender of the Iranian army in Azerbaijan and the freedom of Darakhshani and his officers to leave Azerbaijan was signed between the General and Pishevari on 12 December. (114) A few other garrisons outside Tabriz, who were still resisting, received orders from Darakhshani to surrender accordingly. The Soviet media broadcast the news of the surrender in detail. (115)

On the same day, 12 December, Bayat joined his final negotiations with Pishevari, but achieved nothing. Pishevari told him that no Iranian law, which was incompatible with Azerbaijan's autonomy would be respected. He further asserted that the legislative decisions of the Azerbaijan National Majles would take precedence over the bills passed by the Iranian Majles (116) Bayat, unsuccessful in his mission, left

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The National Majles of Azerbaijan held its first session with 101 deputies on 12 December. The Soviet Consul-General was the only foreign representative who attended the inauguration ceremony. The NMA elected Shabestari as its speaker. Pishevari was elected as the Prime Minister (Bash Vazir) of the Autonomous Azerbaijan. At the following meeting of NMA, Pishevari introduced his Cabinet as follows:

Seyed Jafar Pishevari - Prime Minister & Minister of Labour
Dr. Salamollah Javid - Minister of Interior
Jafar Kavian - Minister of the People’s Army
Mohammad Biriya - Minister of Culture
Dr. Hassan Ourangi - Minister of Health
Gholam Reza Elhami - Minister of Finance
Rabea Kabiri - Minister of Communications
Reza Rasouli - Minister of Economy & Trade
Yousaf Azima - Minister of Justice

The NMA approved the Cabinet and elected the Directorate of the Judiciary: Zeinal-Abedin Ghiyami as the Chief of the Supreme Court and Anoushiravan Ebrahimi as the Prosecutor-General. Later Dr. Nosartollah Jahshahloo, who was the leader of the DPA in Zanjan, became the Deputy Prime Minister.

The armed forces of the new regime, comprised of the regular army and the People’s Militia (fedaeis). While
the army was mainly under the command of the Communist officers who had deserted the Iranian army during 1945, the militia was fully under the control of Caucasian immigrants (Muhajers). The Minister of War, previously a baker who had actively collaborated with the Russians during the occupation of Azerbaijan, was appointed a general by the Autonomous Government. Kavian was a confidant of General Salim Atakishiev, the Chief of Soviet Azerbaijan's NKVD, and represented him in the distribution of arms among the rebels during the November uprising. The army's Chief of Staff was Colonel Azar who had joined the rebel officers of Khorasan in the Summer of 1945. He defected with the survivors of the rebellion to Russia; and in December 1945, led them from Russia to Azerbaijan, to serve the autonomous government. The military backbone of the new regime and main executors of the DPA orders were Fedaeis, whose commander was a Russian of Azeri origin, Gholam Yahya Daneshian. He was elevated to the rank of General and Political Deputy Minister of the People's Army. He became the most brutal character in the DPA during its one year rule. His strong force of Muhajers carried out many "revolutionary" executions, tortures, and confiscation of properties. Daneshian was reputed to be looting the treasures of the rich who had fled Azerbaijan, and then transporting them to Russia. However, both the army and the militia were controlled by the political officers who had been
appointed by, and arrived from, Soviet Azerbaijan. Their function was the supervision of military commanders and "political indoctrination of the rank and file". (128) The two Azerbaijan armed forces were identical, both using Russian uniforms and Russian equipment. (129)

The principle programs of the new regime declared at the NMA were: consolidation of Azerbaijan autonomy; formation of a national army; compulsory education of Azeri-Turkish as the national language in schools; protection of private ownership; distribution of state lands among the farmers; confiscation of lands belonging to the landlords who had fled Azerbaijan, and their distribution among the peasants; respect for the rights of minorities; and recognition of the central government and its decisions in cases where they were not incompatible with either the autonomy of Azerbaijan or the decisions of NMA. (130) Despite the DPA expression of non-separatism, a national flag was designed, and Iran's national anthem was abolished in Azerbaijan. (131)

Although the program introduced at the NMA was a de facto separatist plan, no apparent mention of secession had been made. The American Vice-Consul in Tabriz, Rossow, made a concise observation on the case: "unless some sort of energetic action is soon taken, Azerbaijan must be written off". (132)
CHAPTER FOUR

MOSCOW CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS:

BEVIN'S SCHEME

Byrnes and Bevin arrived in Moscow on 15 December to join Molotov for the Conference of Foreign Ministers, which was held the next day. Since the previous conference in London, the situation in Iran had deteriorated in the context of internal and external affairs. An autonomous government had been set up in Azerbaijan, having no links with the central government. The Soviet Union had also revealed its intention to retain forces in Iran beyond the time-limit of the Tripartite Treaty of 1942, in accordance with its own interpretation of the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921. The Soviet objectives in Iran were expressed in an article in Pravda on 17 December signed by Zaslavsky. The article which the Times called "authoritative" and "reflecting Soviet official policy", supported the rebellion of Azerbaijan, and recommended it as an ideal pattern for the whole of Iran.

"The Democratic movement is not confined to Azerbaijan but is spreading through Persia on the impetus given by the defeat of German Fascism and Japanese imperialism." (133)

On the question of Russian troops, the article stated:

"The Soviet-Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1942
clearly defines the tasks, conditions, and length of the Soviet troops stay in Persia, not to mention that under the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921 the Soviet Union has the right to introduce troops into Persian territory. This answer to the question regarding the Soviet troops in Iran, is clearly in conformity with the Treaty."(134)

The publication of such an article in Pravda at this time was not perceived as a coincidence, but a warning that the Conference of Foreign Ministers should not challenge Soviet policy in Iran. On the other side of the dispute, the Iranian Government expected that the conference would consider the Azerbaijan crisis to be a result of Soviet military presence in Iran. Following the failure of Bayat's mission to Tabriz and the establishment of the Azerbaijan Autonomous Government, Hakimi suggested that he and Foreign Minister Najm go to Moscow for negotiations with the Soviet leaders. However, Moscow refused his suggestion stating that the Soviet leaders were engaged with the Conference of Foreign Ministers.(135)

On 13 December, the Iranian Government addressed a Note to the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. It demanded both the conduct of an investigation into the Iranian problem and the presence of Iranian representatives at the
Conference of Foreign Ministers during the process of the investigation. The Note said:

"In view of the fact that the presence of foreign troops in Iran has caused dislocation in all the affairs of the country, has prevented the Iranian Government from carrying out necessary reforms and repairing the damages sustained by Iran during the war, and has deprived the Government of freedom of action in the execution of its programs and plans prepared for the welfare of the nation, it is most essential and urgent that the question of putting an end to this situation should be discussed at the forthcoming Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Moscow."(136)

Referring to the "spirit" of the Three-Power Declaration of 1 December 1943 on Iran, the Note pointed out:

"The Conference should consider and decide upon the complete and immediate evacuation from Iranian territory of the forces of the three Allied Powers concerned. The presence of foreign troops in Iran has weakened the sovereignty of the country, has caused regrettable incidents and hardships, and has disturbed in a marked way the public opinion as well as order in the country and tranquillity of the people, as witnessed by
the unfortunate incidents in Azerbaijan, which are clearest evidence of the dismal results of the stay of foreign troops in the country. No military or non-military reasons exist any longer which justify the further stay of the three Allied Powers, even for one day, in Iran." (137)

The Iranian Government also reminded the Three Powers that according to Article 6 of the Tripartite Treaty, it should be consulted with when issues regarding Iran are being discussed.

"The Government of Iran expects to be fully consulted during the aforesaid Conference, and expects all decisions affecting Iran to be made in agreement with it." (138)

The British and American Foreign Ministers had sought a breakthrough for the Iranian problem. However, it was Bevin who took the initiative to bring the matter to the surface and pushed for a solution. He had believed that the Soviets inspired the developments in Azerbaijan just before the Moscow Conference, in order to confront the British and Americans with a fait accompli. Similar Soviet actions had taken place, in July 1945 in Poland, before the Potsdam Conference. Bevin understood that Stalin was following a policy of applying pressure on neighbouring countries "where the weakness of resistance might open the way to extend Russian
power

(139) Byrnes was not as pessimistic about Soviet policy and intended to take the middle ground between Bevin and Molotov. Thus, when the Conference held its first session on 16 December, Byrnes suggested that the question of evacuation of troops from Iran be dropped from the agenda, but be discussed "informally" between the Foreign Ministers.

(140) Byrnes' conciliatory position was criticised not only by the British, but also by the American Embassy's Minister in Moscow, George Kennan. He later wrote in his memoirs about the Moscow Conferences and Byrnes:

"At the present Conference, his weakness in dealing with the Russians is that his main purpose is to achieve some sort of agreement. He doesn't much care what. The realities behind his agreement, since they concern only such people as Koreans, Rumanians, and Iranians', about whom he knows nothing, do not concern him."

(141)

On 17 December, Bevin conferred with Byrnes over several questions at issue, e.g. Greece, Dodecanese, Turkey and Soviet policy in Eastern Europe and Iran. He told Byrnes that "a desire for oil was at the bottom of the Soviet attitude towards Persia", and that he thought that "Soviet intentions were probably to turn the province of Azerbaijan into a subservient area."

(142) Byrnes expressed some doubt on the first question since the Soviet Union had "enough oil".

(143) He argued that
in order to obtain oil, it was "not necessary for the Soviet Government to intervene in Azerbaijan or to retain troops beyond the treaty date". He maintained that they would "control" the province by underground methods after the troops had been "withdrawn". (144) However, Byrnes agreed with Bevin when the latter suggested a "frank talk" with Molotov to ask what the Soviet intentions were and whether Soviet Union had "territorial ambitions" on its rimlands. (145) Bevin raised the question with Molotov of Russian and British forces in occupied countries and suggested their complete withdrawal. Molotov refused to agree with this idea, asserting that the Red Army's position in occupied countries was a different matter. He stated:

"The presence of the Red Army in these countries in no way hampered the expression of prevailing popular opinion. This had been true in Iran as it had also been true in Austria. The aloofness of the Red Army from the internal affairs in both these countries had been proved in Bulgaria, Hungary, Austria, Finland, and Iran, where the people had been left to settle their own affairs." (146)

Bevin stressed that he did not want to be faced with a fait accompli and Molotov responded that the British did not always take into account Soviet interests in
places bordering the Soviet Union.(147) Bevin and Byrnes asked for direct talks with Stalin, for no one but him was in any kind of position to clarify the Russian policy towards neighbouring states. Meeting Stalin on 19 December, Byrnes raised the question of foreign troops in Iran. He reminded Stalin of the Three Powers' pledge, made at the Tehran Conference in 1943, to respect Iran's "independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity", and referred to the recent protests made by the Iranian Government against the Red Army's interception of Iranian forces on their way to Azerbaijan.(148) According to Charles Bohlen who accompanied Byrnes as interpreter at this meeting;

"Byrnes told Stalin that he could not understand how a country as large and powerful as the Soviet Union, having just emerged victorious from the greatest of all wars, could feel any concern in regards to its tiny, weak, and unarmed neighbour in the south."(149)

Byrnes told Stalin that if Iran filed a petition against the Soviet interference at the forthcoming session of the United Nations, the United States, as a signatory of the Tehran Declaration, would be obliged to support Iran's right.(150) A day earlier, Prime Minister Hakimi had stated in Majles that if his efforts failed to settle the Soviet-Iranian dispute through negotiation,
he was considering bringing the matters before the United Nations. (151)

Stalin told Byrnes that Iran had hostile attitudes towards the Soviet Union and posed a threat to the Baku oil fields. He claimed the right to keep troops in Iran by virtue of the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921, and pointed out that after the expiry of the date stipulated in the Tripartite Treaty of 1942, he would decide to maintain the troops in Iran according to the former treaty, or to withdraw them according to the latter. Stalin blamed the Iranian Government for causing trouble among the Allies. He also argued that the prevention of the Iranian troops' movement towards Azerbaijan was not interference in Iran's internal affairs. (152)

Byrnes wrote in his memoirs of the absurdity of Stalin's justification.

"The more I thought about Generalissimo Stalin's excuse for retaining troops in Iran, the less confidence I had in the Soviet position.... His admission that the question of withdrawal would be examined on the evacuation date, showed that our worries about his fulfilling the Tehran Declaration were justified." (153)

On the same day, at 10 pm, Bevin had a meeting with Stalin. He expressed the anxiety of the British people
and Parliament over Soviet policy towards its neighbours in general, and the "policy aiming at the incorporation of Azerbaijan or making it into a satellite state." in particular. (154) Stalin stated that he had "no idea of incorporating any part of Iran into the Soviet Union and had no intention of impairing the sovereignty of Iran ". He also said that he wanted to "safeguard the oil fields of Baku against diversionary activities." (155) Justifying his policy, Stalin referred to "many extreme nationalists in the Iranian Government" who wished "to damage the Baku oil industry", and who had "plans of long standing for incorporation of Baku in Iran". (156) Bevin did not take Stalin's counter-accusations against Iran seriously; therefore he put forward his proposal for the establishment of a Three-Power Commission to accommodate the Iranian crisis. (157) Bevin explained to Stalin that the election of provincial councils had been provided for in the Iranian Constitution but had never been carried out. He said that since "the Iranians did not seem capable of carrying out reforms by themselves ", the three Powers (US, UK, and the Soviet Union) might "set up a Tripartite Commission to advise and assist them". (158) Stalin agreed to "study the matter and then discuss it". (159) He (Stalin) thought it "possible" that agreement might be reached "on this point". (160) Meanwhile, the Iranian Government pursued its diplomatic campaign in London and Washington, seeking sympathy and
support. In London, Ambassador Taqizadeh issued a strong-worded statement on 18 December, appealing to the British Government as a signatory of the Tripartite Treaty of 1942 which had guaranteed Iran's integrity. He demanded the evacuation of foreign troops from Iran, and argued against the acceptance of the "usurpation of power in Azerbaijan as an accomplished fact." (161)

In Washington, Ala approached the Acting Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, on 20 December to express that more than the sovereignty of Iran, the "effectiveness and prestige of the United Nations" were at stake. (162) He told Acheson that Iran's only hope remained with the United States. He also predicted that Azerbaijan was "only the first move in a series" which would include "Turkey and the other countries in the Near East". Ala warned that without a strong stand made by the West, the history of Manchuria, Abyssinia and Munich would be repeated, and that "Azerbaijan would prove to be the first shot in the Third World War". (163) The next day, Acheson included Ala's remark in a telegram to Byrnes, and hoped that he would impress Stalin with the anxiety of the United States administration over Iran. (164) On 20 December, the Soviet press launched a campaign against Turkey, demanding the annexation of a Turkish eastern province into the Soviet Republics of Armenia and Georgia. (165)
At his second meeting with Stalin, on 23 December, Byrnes once again spoke about American concern over Iran and stated that if the Iranian petition came up at the United Nations, the United States might "easily find itself in opposition to the Soviet Union," and that such a turn would be "unfortunate." (166) Stalin said: "this will not cause us a blush. All that was needed was that the Iranian Government should carry out its obligations and cease to be hostile to the Soviet Union." (167)

Bevin also had a second meeting with Stalin on 24 December. He told Stalin that his proposed commission would consider the demand of the people of Azerbaijan for autonomy, and would set up a closer co-operation between the great Powers in dealing with the Iranian affairs. (168) On Christmas Day, Molotov was more understanding with Bevin’s proposal and offered several amendments that were all except one accepted. Byrnes suggested that the proposed commission should also pursue the acceleration of troop withdrawal. Both Bevin and Byrnes perceived that the idea of the Tripartite Commission had been accepted by the Soviet leadership. (169) However, this optimism did not last long.

On 26 December, when Byrnes raised the question of Iran, Molotov pointed out: "The Iranian case is not on the agenda and cannot be considered." (170) Bevin, who had
been stunned by the Soviet Foreign Minister's comment, sought an explanation. Molotov stated that no agreement had been reached on the question of Iran, and that Bevin should be fully aware of the Soviet position. (171) When a communiqué was issued at the conclusion of the Moscow Conference, Iran was totally excluded. (172)

Various interpretations of the Soviet change of attitude regarding the British proposal came after the end of the conference. The Russians' first perception of the Tripartite Commission might have been of an instrument assisting their plans in Azerbaijan. When they understood this body would rather restrict their power and help Iranians, they rejected it. (173) The Russians probably hoped to engage their Western Allies in "protracted and apparently fruitless" negotiations and claim their own peripheral rights as they did in Eastern Europe. However, when they were faced with opposing western interests, particularly those of the British, they shifted from the joint commission. (174) Pro-Russian newspapers in Iran wrote that the Soviets refused the British proposal because the Iranian Government had not been represented at the Moscow Conference. (175) Nonetheless this is a sympathetic rather than a realistic interpretation of events. No mention of the Iranian right of representation at the Moscow Conference, by the Russians or others, has ever been recorded. The real motive behind the Russian change of mind can be
attributed to the effect of the politics of power within the Soviet hierarchy. The argument in the Kremlin, between 25 and 26 December, concerned the fragility of the Iranian Government and the need to use pressure to achieve a compromise. The Soviet leaders believed that through intimidation and pressure they could impose their conditions and force Iran to agree to direct negotiations. In this way they could achieve their goals such as the retention of troops in northern Iran; the recognition of autonomous Azerbaijan; and, perhaps, help to bring a subservient government to power in Tehran. (176) Under these circumstances they would dominate the whole of Iran in the near future. Sharing it with other powers had no appeal for them. As one Iranian historian stated: "we were saved by Stalin's greed." (177)

The British and American Foreign Ministers left Moscow with anxiety over Iran. Byrnes referred to the Allies' disagreement regarding Iran in a speech at the Department of State.

"At one time, it looked as (if) we might agree on a Tripartite Commission to consider Iranian problems which have been accentuated by the presence of Allied troops in Iran." (178)

Even after the failure of his scheme in Moscow, Bevin did not give up. He decided to win the consent of the Iranian Government to the scheme, and then, make
a second approach to the Russians, with the support of the United States. Bevin hoped that Iranian acceptance of the scheme would make it acceptable to the Russians.(179)

Bullard, who had been present at the Moscow Conference, was assigned to implement this project. Bullard himself was an advocate of provincial autonomy and was in favour of local languages being recognised in Iran. He had reported to London, on the eve of rebellion in Azerbaijan, that Iran was "disintegrating because of over-centralisation ",(180) He thought that the setting up of provincial councils in every province of Iran would disarm the Russians; while insistence on the exceptionality of Azerbaijan would pave the way for its annexation by the Soviets.(181) Within the first days of January, Bullard presented the British proposal to Hakimi and Foreign Minister Mohammad Hossein Najm (Najm-ol-Molk). Najm later remembered that the proposal was written on a piece of paper, which had no letter head, no number, no date and no signature.(182)

Hakimi did not reject the proposal;(183) but asked for the inclusion of two Iranian representatives in the proposed commission, and the exclusion of reference to local languages.(184)

The British Ambassador persuaded Hakimi to withdraw Iran’s petition to the United Nations. Bullard’s objective was to keep the British initiative as the sole
choice for Iran. At his insistence, Hakimi "realised" that Iran's presentation to the United Nations would "infuriate the Russians and embarrass the infant United Nations Organisation without bringing Iran any satisfaction in the end."

Bullard was also successful in convincing the Shah that the withdrawal of Iran's petition from the United Nations would be a rational policy. During Bullard's audience with the Shah on 4 January, the latter "agreed on the wisdom of this decision."

Accordingly, Taqizadeh received instruction from Tehran on 8 January. He approached Stettinus, who was in charge of United Nations procedural arrangements, to postpone Iran's application. Hakimi concealed his negotiations with Bullard from the Cabinet, where three members, Saleh (Interior), Nariman (Communications) and General Mohammad Hossein Firouz (Roads) were against the British proposal.

On 5 January the Persian broadcasting service of the BBC revealed that the Iranian Government was considering the acceptance of the British scheme. The BBC, which had previously attacked the Azerbaijan "separatist rebels", changed its tune. Not only did it accuse the Iranian Government of mismanagement and corruption, but it also emphasised the need for provincial autonomy in all parts of Iran. The BBC also indicated the presence of the American Ambassador at the Hakimi-Bullard meeting. It should be noted that

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Murray had not made any contribution to the British line of argument. (190)

This series of news worried the Iranians. Recollecting the painful memory of the division of Iran into foreign zones of influence by the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907, the Iranian press condemned Hakimi for entering into negotiations with the British. (191) The British initiative, namely the Tripartite Commission, was viewed by Iranians with great suspicion. They saw it as an undertaking to save the British and not the Iranian interest. They considered the fact that on 10 December in the House of Commons, MP Fitzroy Maclean asked Bevin "to show no less energy and determination in defending British interests in Iran than Soviets are showing in defence of Russia". (192)

It is possible that through the influence of the AIOC in southern Iran, the British had intended to create puppet councils around the oil field area, in order to create a counter balance against the Soviet-inspired Government of Azerbaijan. The British had stated that their scheme would help Iran preserve its territorial integrity, but many Iranians believed that it "would have ultimately resulted in the partition of Iran". (193)

In his report of 19 January to the State Department, Murray compared the British interference in southern Iran with that of the Russians in the north. He also conveyed Iranian irritation caused by British
pressure on Hakimi’s Government. Murray believed that the references made in the British scheme to the situation of Khuzestan, the oil field province, and to the teaching of Arabic as Khuzestan’s local language, had justified Iranian suspicion of British ill-intentions. (194)

Iranian suspicion was not groundless. Around mid-January 1946, the leaders of Qashqie and other tribes had gathered at a place near Shiraz to discuss the formation of a confederation of southern tribes. According to the Iranian Chief of Staff, the British Consul in Isfahan, Colonel Gault, was present at this gathering, and agreed to send the tribal leaders’ statement for autonomy to the provisional Secretariat of the United Nations in London. (195) Also in late January, a pretender to the hereditary governorship of Khuzestan, Sheikh Jasseh, who lived in Iraq, crossed the border into Iran and attacked a Gendarmerie post with the assistance of a hundred armed Arabs. According to General Arfa, the Sheikh met with the British Consul in Ahvaz, and planned to occupy that provincial capital. However, when the army launched an attack on his position, Sheikh Jasseh re-crossed the border and fled into Iraq. (196)

Major opposition to Bevin’s scheme was shown in Majles. On 6 January, the Foreign Affairs Committee of Majles called Foreign Minister Najm to further explain matters. But Najm refused to provide adequate information on the
British proposal and related negotiations in Tehran. (197) On 9 January, twenty deputies of Majles, led by Mossadeq, attended a meeting with Hakimi and Najm, to examine an "eleven-item document" which had been handed to Hakimi by Bullard. (198) They criticised Hakimi for negotiating secretly with the British and making decisions without the knowledge of Majles. They also asked him to resign. (199)

On the same day, Mossadeq took the floor in Majles, and gave a long speech against the British scheme which would have put the fate of Iran in the hands of "foreign powers." (200) Mossadeq expressed utmost disagreement with any kind of foreign interference in Iran's affairs. He thanked the Soviet Government for rejecting the scheme at the Moscow Conference. He further blamed both Hakimi and Taqizadeh for the withdrawal of Iran's petition from the agenda of the United Nations. Mossadeq concluded that Iran needed a "neutral government which could stay beyond the suspicion of all its neighbours," and asserted that Hakimi could not represent such a Government. (201) He viewed Hakimi as "incapable" of solving the crucial problems of Iran and begged him to resign. (202)

On 15 January, Hakimi ended his silence and argued that his principle intention for entering into negotiations regarding the Tripartite Commission was to precipitate the termination of foreign occupation. His purpose,
Hakimi said, was to receive the representatives of the Three Powers temporarily and only for a few months; to supervise the early evacuation of foreign troops; to assist the Government in normalising the internal situation; and to observe elections for provincial councils, all in co-operation with the Iranian officials. Hakimi stated that since his Government had not received a reply to its own proposals from the Allies, nothing was finalised and no report had been given at Majles. Hakimi declared that the Iranian Government had finally rejected the Three-Power Commission, and that Iran's complaint would be re-lodged at the United Nations. Hakimi's statement put an end to the existence of the British scheme.

On 21 February, Bevin confessed the failure of his initiative at the House of Commons. He stated:

"One thing that must be done when a small country happens to possess a vital raw material is for Allies to arrange their business so as not to make the small country the victim of the controversy between the big Allies. I think that this is a sound policy. I tried to do it and failed."

(204)
CHAPTER FIVE

THE KURDISH REPUBLIC : AN EXTENSION OF SOVIET INSPIRED AUTONOMY

1. POST-OCCUPATION CONTACTS

Following the Anglo-Russian invasion of Iran, Notes were exchanged between the Iranian Government and the British and Soviet Embassies concerning the zones of occupation. These Notes, dated 30 August 1941, claimed the main Kurdish region in Western Iran as being outside the zones of occupation. However, the Soviet and British armies violated this agreement and divided Kurdistan into their zones of occupation. According to their arrangement, the southern part of Kurdistan, including the provincial capital, Sanandaj, remained in the British zone, while northern Kurdistan, which was adjacent to western Azerbaijan and the major Kurdish city, Mahabab, came under the Russian control. Apart from the similarities between the autonomist movements in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, Azeri and Kurdish societies had completely different social, religious and economic structures. Azeris were Shi'i like the majority of Iranians, and well integrated with non-Azeris inside and outside Azerbaijan. The Kurds, however, were Sunni and could not integrate with others. While Azerbaijan was prosperous in agricultural products and trading with other parts of Iran, Kurdistan had never had such
significance. It was a tribal area, fully under the denomination of feudal-chieftains. There was a tradition of feuding between the Kurdish tribes, and between them and Azeris.

The collapse of the Central Government’s power following the foreign occupation, provided an opportunity for Kurdish tribes to attack and loot the Azeri villages in their neighbourhood. This had frequently happened since September 1941. The Soviet Consul in Western Azerbaijan had tried but failed to stop the Kurdish attacks on Azeris.(205) Consequently, the Central Government compromised with the status quo, and appointed one of the tribal leaders as the Governor of Mahabad.(206)

There was a marked distinction between Azeris and Kurds in their foreign ties. While Iranian Azerbaijan had linguistic ties with Soviet Azerbaijan, the Iranian Kurds sympathised with the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, with whom they had traditionally had cross-border exchanges.

Consolidating their influence in the region, the Soviets accepted the Kurdish oligarchy. Whereas the Soviet plans in Azerbaijan could be carried out by the Tudeh Party, trade unions, immigrants or communist agitators, this role could be played in Kurdistan only by the tribal chiefs, big land-owners and religious leaders. Even with the support of Soviet officials, the Tudeh Party was unsuccessful in opening its branches in
In December 1941, the Soviet authorities arranged a visit for a number of Kurdish dignitaries to Baku. Among the visitors, the most distinguished person, was a hereditary religious Judge from Mahabad, called Qazi Mohammad. He was accompanied by several chiefs from the Dehbokri, Shakkak, Zarza, Herki and Mamash tribes, representing the northern part of Kurdistan. The Kurdish visitors were taken to the cultural and industrial centres of Soviet Azerbaijan in order to be impressed with the achievements of a socialist regime. However, in reality, the main objective of their two-week visit of the Soviet Union was to meet and negotiate with the Communist Party leader of Soviet Azerbaijan, Mir Jafar Bagirov.

During the meeting, Bagirov, who after the occupation of Iran had extended his sphere of influence into Iranian Azerbaijan and northern Kurdistan, emphasised Soviet sympathy for the Kurdish people. He also suggested Azeri-Kurdish unity. However, the major expectation of the guests was neglected. The Russians were reluctant to meet the Kurdish demand for arms, or give them permission to obtain arms from other sources, or to use the Soviet zone of occupation for importing arms. Although the Kurdish leaders returned to Mahabad empty handed, they were under the impression that the Soviet Union was with them.

At that time, it was not known whether the Soviets
would support Kurdish national aspirations and, in particular, the creation of an autonomous Kurdish province in Iran or a Greater Kurdistan. The Russians doubted whether a Kurdish state, uniting the Kurds of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, would be on their side. (210)

Following the Baku meeting, frequent contacts were made between the Kurdish chiefs and Soviet officials, including the head of Azerbaijan SSR’s NKVD, General Atakishiev. (211) However, there is no evidence of any Soviet instigation of a Kurdish revolt before 1945. On the contrary, there are reports indicating that the Soviet authorities had influenced the Kurds to respect the Iranian forces of law and security, while surrendering their arms to the Red Army in their region. (212)

Despite these undertakings, the Iranian Government remained suspicious of Russian intention. Thus when the chief of the Dehbokri tribe was appointed as Governor of Mahabad, the Soviets were consulted. (213) It was also believed that Sadr-e-Qazi, the younger brother of Qazi Mohammad enjoyed the blessing of Soviet officials in 1943 in his election to deputy of Mahabad at the 14th Majles. (214)
2. **THE SOVIET CONNECTION : FORMATION OF THE REPUBLIC**

In September 1942, the Kurdish activists of Mahabad, who aspired to create a Kurdish state, established a nationalist political party. The party was named Komala, short for Komala-ye Zhian-e Kurdistan (Committee for the Resurrection of Kurdistan).(215) The organisation of Komala comprised of secret cells; and the members were under oath to fulfil their commitments.(216) Although the founders of Komala had no Communist affiliation or tendency, their advisers from the Iraqi Kurdish party, Hewa (hope), believed that Soviet support was necessary for the formation of a United Kurdistan. (217)

In 1944, Qazi Mohammad joined the party and subsequently became its leader, without being a member of the Central Committee of Komala.(218)

The Soviet-Iranian dispute in late 1944 resulted in a change in Soviet policy regarding the people of the occupied zone. As such, one of the intentions of the Soviets became to undermine the Iranian Government's authority over its people by providing evidence that the Government was disliked by the Iranians and unfit to preserve law and order across the country.

In March 1945, several gendarmes were killed by Kurdish tribesmen outside Mahabad. In order to prevent the repetition of such attacks, the Government decided to
send a military detachment from the city of Saqqez, in southern Kurdistan, to Mahabad. The Russians stopped the detachment on its way with an excuse that the reinforcements would upset the military balance in their zone of occupation. Instead of increasing the number of troops in the Mahabad zone, the Soviet Embassy suggested that the Government could send reinforcements from Tabriz or Rezaieh (both in Azerbaijan) to the area. In reality, the Soviets had intended to reduce the number of Iranian troops in Azerbaijan, for they refused to allow a detachment sent from Saqqez, which was located in the British zone, to fill the vacuum left by the departure of troops to Mahabad.

It is worth contrasting the Russians' loose control over northern Kurdistan with the consistent interference of the British authorities in the affairs of southern Kurdistan. A British officer, Colonel Fletcher, was so powerful and so closely involved in the local affairs of the region that Iranian officials, even the deputies of Majles, protested against his power. The rivalry between the Russians and the British in Kurdistan was reflected in the 14th Majles. While most of the deputies from the British zone in the southern part of Kurdistan were among the pro-British flank of Zia, the deputy of Mahabad, Sadr-e-Qazi, cooperated with the Tudeh faction.

During the Summer of 1945, the British noted that the Soviet prevention of Iranian troop movement towards the
northern part of Kurdistan had encouraged the Kurdish independence movement. (223) In early September 1945, the Iranian Government complained to the Soviet Embassy. It relayed its deep concern about the disturbances caused by "undesirable elements" in Mahabad; and the restrictions placed by the Soviets on the authority of the Iranian security forces to stop the Kurdish "agitators ", (224)

Around the same time that Pishevari declared the formation of the DPA, Qazi Mohammad and a number of leaders of Komala were invited to Tabriz to discuss the Kurdish national cause with the NKVD General AtaKishiev. There, the Kurdish leaders were told that further negotiations between them and Soviet authorities, regarding the future of Kurdistan, would take place in Baku. (225) Once again Bagirov received the Kurds at Baku in September 1945. However, the atmosphere since their first visit in 1941 had changed. Soviet policy was now to extend its presence in Iran. The Kremlin had believed that an autonomous Kurdistan could be used as another footstep to an autonomous Azerbaijan. However, it should be noted that, in addition to the Soviet plan, Bagirov had his own personal designs for the enlargement of an autonomous Azerbaijan. His ambition was to create a greater Azerbaijan through the annexation of autonomous Azerbaijan by Azerbaijan SSR. Therefore he suggested to the Kurdish mission that
Kurdistan should be part of autonomous Azerbaijan. It should be pointed out that according to the Iranian administrative divisions, Mahabad was located in the province of western Azerbaijan, despite its Kurdish inhabitants.

The mission rejected Bagirov's suggestion. They argued that the principal aspiration of the Kurdish people was the establishment of an independent Kurdish state. Consequently, they maintained that if they were going to be incorporated into another state, their racial, linguistic and cultural ties were more rooted in Iran than in Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, the mission accepted the idea of an autonomous Azerbaijan, in return for Soviet support of Kurdish autonomy. (226)

Bagirov acknowledged Kurdish resentment and agreed that the Soviet Union should back the independence of Kurdistan. Qazi Mohammad presented the Kurdish demands for Soviet financial and military assistance to the Kurdish state. Bagirov stated that the Soviet Union would supply the Kurds with arms to defend their territory and admit a number of Kurdish youth to the military college in Baku.

Finally, Bagirov made a political suggestion. He believed that Komala was no longer a political organisation suited to lead the Kurdish movement. He therefore suggested the abolition of Kamola, and the formation of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (DPK) which would be more attractive to the western
Three factors influenced the decision. Firstly, the creation of an independent Kurdish state was the national aspiration of every Kurd in the Middle East. Secondly, it was an opportune moment for seeking and gaining Soviet support. And thirdly, the Kurds were suspicious that if they failed to take swift action, the Soviets might put the Kurds under the supervision of the Azeris.

On his return from Baku, Qazi Mohammad declared the formation of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (DPK). Relying on his consolidated power, Qazi Mohammad recruited people of the Kurdish upper class to the new party's leadership. Consequently, DPA and DPK came to be comprised of different social bases. The Soviet historian, Ivanov, who proudly refers to the membership of thousands of peasants and workers in DPA, has unintentionally underlined the difference when he refers to the membership of DPK:

"The DPK embodied the tribal chieftains, businessmen, landlords, progressive intellectuals and liberal clergymen."(229)

The DPK held its first congress in Mahabad. The congress convened in the Soviet Cultural Centre, which had been inaugurated few weeks earlier, by the Soviet Consul in Rezaieh, Hashemov.(230)

The inauguration statement was delivered by Qazi Mohammed, who praised the assistance given to the Kurds
by their "Russian brothers" to achieve "democracy".\(^\text{(231)}\) Since political developments in Kurdistan were influenced and enhanced by the events in Azerbaijan, the statements made at the congress were for Kurdish autonomy and against the central government. The speakers demanded self-government, linguistic freedom, and economic reforms.\(^\text{(232)}\)

The first shipment of Soviet arm supplies reached Mahabad in November. Soviet lorries carried 1200 rifles, plus ammunition for the DPK, which was delivered to them by the Soviet trade agent in Mahabad, Babayev. These rifles had been seized from the Iranian gendarme posts by the DPA militia and handed to their Russian coordinators following the rebellion in Azerbaijan.\(^\text{(233)}\)

However, the movement of thousands of Kurdish militants from Iraq towards Iran, at that time, was more significant.

In October 1945, 2000 armed Iraqi Kurds from the Barzani tribe, under their charismatic leader Mulla Mostafa, crossed the border between Iraq and Iran.\(^\text{(234)}\) The Barzanis, who had been engaged in fighting against the Iraqi Government for several years, were pushed by the Iraqis towards Iran.\(^\text{(235)}\) In the eyes of DPK leaders, however, their arrival was seen as an expression of loyalty to the Kurdish movement in Iran. Upon his arrival in Iran, Mulla Mostafa wasted no time in approaching Qazi Mohammad to pledge his support of the Kurdish cause.\(^\text{(236)}\)
The Barzanis fighting force was a "welcome military addition" which invigorated the DPK's position in face of its three adversaries: the Iranian Government, who intended to crush Kurdish separatism; the DPA who wished to commit the Kurdish state's dependence to Azerbaijan; and the Russians, who had been the ultimate patron of the Kurdish movement, but might change their attitude. (237)

The Iraqi Government, in pursuit of ending its own Kurdish problem, urged the Iranian Government to disarm Barzanis and keep Mulla Mostafa under strict control "pending a demand for his extradition." (238) The Iraqis also approached the Soviet Embassy in Baghdad to demand the disarmament of Barzanis inside the Soviet zone of occupation in Iran. However, the Soviets replied that they were not "involved with the maintenance of internal security in Iran." (239)

Since the Barzanis had been settled near Mahabad, within the Soviet zone of occupation, the Iranian Government was unable to act against them without the consent of the Russians. On 19 November, the Iranian Government sent a Note to the Soviet Embassy concerning the border-crossing of Barzanis and the security measures considered to deal with them.

The Note stated:

"As it is highly probable they may disturb law and order in western Azerbaijan and the suburbs of Mahabad, the Ministry of War has
issued instructions to the Iranian army to disarm the aforesaid person (Mulla Mostafa) and his confederates."

The Note also referred to Iranian Government obligations towards the friendly and neighbourly Government of Iraq, and asked the Russian Embassy to inform their military authorities in the region "not to interfere in the activities of the Iranian army" concerning the Barzanis. (240)

The Russians did not reply to the Iranian Note, but decided to use the situation to their own advantage. The Russians were somehow suspicious that Qazi Mohammad might think of reducing their influence in his domain in Kurdistan. Therefore, they decided to settle the Barzani families around the major Kurdish cities of Mahabad, Naqadeh and Oshnoviyeh to act as a watch-dog against both the Kurdish state and the Iranian army. (241) Accordingly, three Soviet officers were assigned to serve as liaisons with the DPK and Kurdish tribes: Kazemov in Mahabad, Samadov in Naqadeh, and Fatullayev in Oshnoviyeh. Kazemov was also in charge of training conscripts who had been called to join the Kurdish army. (242) Eagleton mentions more names of Soviet officers who were involved in Kurdish affairs in Iran, i.e. Yermakov, who was assistant to Atakishiev in Tabriz; Hashemov, the Soviet Consul in Rezaieh; and Namaz-Aliev, who was the resident-agent in
This method of treatment of the Kurdish movement provoked some uneasiness among the rank and file of the DPK, who felt they were being used as tools of Soviet hegemony rather than the Kurdish cause. By the end of November, the DPK received a valuable gift from the Soviet authorities: a printing press to produce Kurdish publications. A new newspaper, "Kurdistan" which became the official organ of the DPK, soon appeared in Mahabad to stimulate Kurdish nationalism, particularly among the youth. Despite his resistance against the dependence of the Kurdish state on Azerbaijan, Qazi Mahammad complied with Soviet instruction to send a delegation of five DPK leading members to the inauguration ceremony of the National Majles of Azerbaijan on 12 December. However, the Kurdish delegation was not treated as the representative of the Kurdish state, but rather of one constituency in Azerbaijan. Thus, the Kurdish leaders soon left Tabriz in resentment. The declaration of autonomous Government by the DPA in Azerbaijan on 12 December, precipitated the DPK's move towards the introduction of a parallel Kurdish state. On 15 December, Qazi Mohammad declared the formation of a Kurdish autonomous state within Iran. The Kurdish declaration embodied the objectives and programs of the DPK, including self-government for Kurdish people; the introduction of Kurdish as the
official and educational language; the election of a provincial council according to the Iranian constitution; the exclusion of non-Kurdish officials from all government departments in Kurdistan; the allocation of all revenue collected in Kurdistan only to the region; the improvement of moral standards, health, economic conditions, education, commerce and agriculture; and the establishment of fraternal relations with the people of Azerbaijan. (248) Qazi Mohammad also introduced a "National Kurdish Directorate" under his own leadership, and emphasised that this "Directorate" was equivalent to the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan. (249)

On 17 December, the last symbol of the authority of Iranian Governments vanished in Mahabad. At a popular demonstration led by the DPK in front of the local Department of Justice, the Iranian flag was brought down from the roof of the Department's building, and in its place the flag of independent Kurdistan was raised. (250)

The climax of the Kurdish separatist movement was on 22 January, when the leaders of the Kurdish Government were introduced at a public ceremony in Mahabad. At this ceremony, attended by Kurdish tribal chieftains and thousands of people, Qazi Mohammad was greeted as the "leader and President of the Kurdish Republic" by his cousin, Seif-f Qazi, who was in the uniform of a Soviet general. Then, Qazi Mohammad, who also had worn a
Russian-style military uniform and Kurdish turban, addressed the audience as the first Kurdish President. (251) In his speech, Qazi Mohammad stated that the Kurds were a distinct nation and had risen to claim their right for self-determination. He referred to the "powerful friends" of the Kurdish people, and thanked the Soviet Union for "moral and material support." He also congratulated the people of Azerbaijan for achieving their own "independence" and expressed hopes that Azerbaijan would support the Kurds. (252) At the conclusion of this ceremony, Qazi Mohammad reviewed the Kurdish national army, whose backbone was Barzani's armed men. (253) The only Russian present there was Yermakov, who watched the proceedings from a nearby jeep. (254)

On the same day, Qazi Mohammad appointed the Kurdish Cabinet, including a Prime Minister (Haj Baba Sheikh) and Ministers of War, Interior, Economy, Trade Education, Propaganda, Labour, Agriculture, Health, Post and Telegraph. A Minister of State was also appointed to handle foreign relations with the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan, and Iran. (255) The most prominent member of the Cabinet was the Minister of War, Seif-e Qazi.

In the view of political analysts, the characteristics of Kurdish separatism were less revolutionary and more democratic. Contrary to the "Democrats" of Azerbaijan, the Kurdish "Democrats" committed no atrocities or
excesses to consolidate their power. In Kurdistan, there were no secret police, no summary trials, no Communist indoctrination, and no Soviet-trained "immigrants ".(256) The paramount objective, declared by the DPK, was not to revolutionise Kurdish society as the Russians expected, but to pursue the prospects for a Greater Kurdistan. Qazi Mohammad's loyalty to the Russians was different from that of Pishevari's. His office was not decorated with a portrait of Stalin, but with the map of Greater Kurdistan, covering the Kurdish inhabited regions of Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Syria and even USSR.(257)

Apart from collaborating with the Russians, Qazi Mohammad sought relations with the British and Americans. He sent an emissary to the British Consul in Tabriz to achieve some kind of recognition; but the British response did not satisfy him.(258) His approach to the United States Consulate brought no better result.(259)
CHAPTER SIX

THE FALL OF HAKIMI AND THE SUCCESSION OF QAVAM

Soviet pressure had forced Saed and Sadr to resign from office. Hakimi had no better chance of survival. The reshuffle of the Cabinet, the preparation for the election of provincial councils, even Hakimi's readiness to go to Moscow could not satisfy the Russians. Hakimi was criticised from both right and left. The left viewed him as a tool of the Majles majority led by Zia, and a defendant of the pro-British policy of Sadr. (260) Pro-Soviet newspapers in Tehran wrote that, although the Soviet Government was prepared to negotiate directly with the Iranian Government, Hakimi himself was an "unacceptable party for the negotiations." (261) The British were also against direct negotiation between Iran and the Soviet Union, assuming that a weak Iranian leader like Hakimi would compromise British interest to the Soviets. (262) British sources viewed that no "positive action" could be "expected" from Hakimi. (263) Bullard believed that he was "useless and futile". (264) Even the Shah and Chief of Staff, Arfa, cautioned Hakimi against further compliance with the Russians. (265) Hakimi's decision to hold elections for provincial councils irritated his conservative supporters who feared such councils in the Russian-occupied northern provinces would be "packed" by DPA and the Tudeh Party.
members and sympathisers. (266)
However, it was Soviet intrigues and provocations which forced Hakimi to resign. In Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, two autonomous governments had already been established; threatening telegrams from Gilan and Mazandaran had been addressed to Hakimi demanding urgent reforms; and so were messages from Khorasan and Gorgan. (267) In a broadcast on 18 January, Radio Moscow reflected the Soviet perception of these disturbances:

"Is it only the people of Azerbaijan who demands the same standards of living and reasonable political freedom as are enjoyed by all nations of Europe? No. The people of Gilan and Mazandaran as well as the vast masses in Tehran are voicing the same demands." (268)

Far from being pro-Soviet, Mossadeg expressed similar views. Commenting on Hakimi's statement against the "rebels" at the Majles, Mossadeg asked: "If the Prime Minister is to describe every region of our country as under rebellion, we wonder in which areas he has kept his authority." (269)

Political tension was aggravated when the autonomous Government of Azerbaijan issued an announcement on 10 January calling all DPA members under 45 to gather the next day at 6am at the Tabriz barracks. Soon, rumours spread that a march towards Tehran had been planned. However, a second announcement put off the
gathering. (270) Arfa comments that the plan included the "advancement of DPA militia and People's Army of Azerbaijan, in co-ordination with other Communist elements of the northern provinces, towards the vicinity of Tehran. As such the supply routes of Tehran would be cut off; a revolt by the members and partisans of Tudeh Party in Tehran, would be launched; and the mobilised forces would capture Tehran from all fronts. (271) An observing journalist described the chaotic situation, in the last days of Hakimi, as follows:

"No relations had existed between Iran and the Soviet Union. Azerbaijan was actually separated from Iran. Government armed forces were expecting a march of Democrats towards Qazvin and Tehran. Rail transport between Tehran and Zanjan had stopped. Every wagon and locomotive that entered Democrat's territory had been confiscated. In Azerbaijan and Zanjan, all banks' assets, as well as commodities in Government stores, were seized .... pro-Tudeh trade unions had displayed a show of power in the cities and their members had overpowered the police force in the capital. The Tudeh party had its own functionaries to implement sanctions, i.e. a Tudeh agitator who was sent to Mazandaran to mobilise an anti-
Government uprising, was arrested at Tehran railway station; but, on the intervention of CCFTU armed members, he was released, and safely caught the train to his destination." (272)

One of Hakimi's last actions to relax political tension was the formation of a 5-member Supreme National Council, comprised of two ex-Prime Ministers, Qavam and Mansur, two former Speakers of Majles, Motamen-ul-Molk Pirnia and Mostashar-ad-Doleh Sadeq, and one elderly politician of the early constitutional years, Baha-ul-Molk Qaragozloo. All the five had enjoyed national respect as independent and experienced statesmen. They did not have a pro-British reputation and thus, they could appeal to the Russians. (273) However, the Council achieved nothing and advised Hakimi to resign. (274)

Hakimi resigned on 20 January, under persistent Soviet pressure. (275) But Soviets attributed Hakimi's problems to his anti-Soviet policy. (276) To deprive Hakimi of diplomatic contacts in Tehran, both Ambassador Maximov and his Counsellor, Yakobov, had been recalled to Moscow. (277) Soviet-Iranian relations had reached such an "impasse" that a change in the Iranian Government seemed to be the only solution. (278)

Qavam was considered to be the only candidate who could end the crisis. The Russians believed he was the only credible, non-communist politician who was qualified to
work with them. When the separatist Government in Azerbaijan was formed, The West failed to introduce a counter-measure at the Moscow Conference. Thus, the Russians seemed to have won the game and could thereby bring into power a politician to serve their interests.\textsuperscript{(279)} They probably found an Iranian "Groza" in Qavam.

One should look into Qavam’s political background to realise why the Russians intended to support Qavam’s return to office. For several times since 1921 he had served as Iran’s premier. He was noted for his realistic policies which included observing the balance of interests among Iran’s great neighbours.\textsuperscript{(280)} He was also famous for his dislike of the Pahlavis. In 1923, he joined a plot against Reza Khan, the powerful Minister of War, who forced Qavam into exile.\textsuperscript{(281)} In the late 1930's Qavam achieved Reza Shah's permission to return home and stay in his estate in Lahijan, near the Caspian Sea. According to British reports, in 1940 he secretly collaborated with some nationalists, who intended to topple Reza Shah with the support of Germany.\textsuperscript{(282)} Following the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran, the same sources pointed out Qavam’s contacts with the Japanese, and also with the Chieftains of Qashqai tribe who had sheltered the German agents.\textsuperscript{(283)} Meanwhile, with Reza Shah’s abdication, Qavam launched a lobbying effort to become Prime Minister. Although
his estate was located in the Soviet zone and his
cordial relations with them caused the British to be
suspicious, Qavam succeeded in convincing them that he
was an independent politician who was not influenced by
the Russians. (284) Bullard informed the Shah on 29 July
1942 that the British Government had no objection to
Qavam's premiership. Subsequently, with the support of
the majority in the Majles, he secured the first term of
his premiership during the post-Reza Shah period. (285)
During his tenure in 1942-1943, Qavam enjoyed the
support of the Allies. But later he was defeated by a
joint conspiracy of the Court and pro-British
politicians. (286) The Americans attributed his "forced"
resignation in February 1943 to excessive British
demands and pressures. (287) However, Qavam had planned
to return to office more vigorously; British officials
blamed the failure of Qavam's successors partly on his
intrigues. Suspecting Qavam's secret activities, the
British even decided to put him under arrest, but failed
to do so for fear of Soviet reaction. (288) During the
election for 14th Majles in early 1944, Qavam's support
was crucial to the success of a Tudeh candidate, Dr.
Radmanesh, in Lahijan constituency. (289)
Following the deterioration of Soviet-Iranian relations
in late 1944, Qavam seemed to be the best choice to form
a new Government, and conciliate the Russians. However,
the Shah, the British, and the majority of Majles were
opposed. Before the appointment of Sadr in Summer 1945,
Qavam was considered by many Iranians to be the only eligible politician who could appeal to Soviet confidence, while serving Iranian interest. During a conversation between the Shah and Murray on 13 July 1945, the Court Minister Ala mentioned that Qavam was the man "needed" in these circumstances, but was faced with the Shah's objection. The escalation of political tension after the rebellion of Azerbaijan, precipitated the downfall of Hakimi and the succession of Qavam. The Russians had made it clear that they would negotiate with a government under Qavam. The Tudeh newspapers showed sympathy towards Qavam, asserting that the choice for Iranians was between the Government of Qavam and a military dictatorship.

In December 1945, 45 deputies of Majles signed a statement, pledging their support for Qavam. They proclaimed that only a politician like Qavam, who had no foreign affiliation, was qualified to take over the Government and settle the Soviet-Iranian dispute. Qavam himself joined the campaign to propagate his indispensability. On 14 December, Qavam told a correspondent of London's Daily Telegraph that the origin of disturbances in northern Iran was public discontent. He stated that the dispatch of military reinforcements to the north, before reaching an understanding with Soviet Government, was unwise. He
asserted that there were "other solutions" for the crisis of Azerbaijan. Qavam added that if he was Prime Minister, he would pursue a "neutral and balanced" policy towards the Allies. In return, he would expect Allied non-interference in Iran's internal affairs. (294) Since Qavam was regarded unfavourably by the Shah and the British, his "sudden" appearance in Tehran in December 1945, and the attendance of politicians at his residence, made the Shah suspicious and the British uneasy. (295) A report by the British Military Attaché in Tehran, dated 21 December, mocked Qavam's candidacy, as follows:-

"Like most Iranians, he is obsessed with the idea of his own cleverness and believes that he can handle the Russians. This is a belief which few outside the ranks of his own countrymen would share." (296) The British considered Qavam's program to be an "appeasement of the Soviet Union". They believed that Qavam would not only grant the northern oil concession to Russians, but he would also hold parliamentary elections before 2 March and the evacuation of Soviet troops. (297) According to British reports, Qavam was the "Soviet Candidate", (298) who was prepared to introduce "a Government subservient to the Russians". (299) The British Embassy in Tehran were concerned about the fate of Zia and his followers. They feared they would be driven out by Qavam as the "tools
Nevertheless, Qavam’s lobbying effort was highly successful. In mid-January, it had become obvious that neither the Shah nor the British Embassy were in a position to stop Qavam’s endorsement by the Majles. The last manoeuvre by Qavam’s opponents was to persuade the majority of the Majles to find a popular candidate to join the campaign. However, the majority itself was split, and a dozen former pro-British deputies had turned to Qavam. Former Prime Minister Bayat, speaker of the Majles Tabatabaie, and Mossadeq were approached by an anti-Qavam faction, but all of them refused to accept candidacy. The only remaining figure to challenge Qavam was Hossein Pirnia (Motamen-ul-Molk). He was an elderly popular statesman and speaker of the Majles in the early 1920’s who had refused to endorse Reza Shah’s accession to the throne and retired from politics. However, Pirnia was ill, and reluctant to enter the contest.

On 26 January, the Majles held a session to elect Hakimi’s successor. Out of 104 votes, Qavam won 52, Pirnia 51, and Hakimi one. Two days later, the Shah, unwillingly, signed the decree (Farman) appointing Qavam as Prime Minister.
Hakimi instructed Taqizadeh to withdraw the Iranian complaint in the UN, in order to ensure the success of the British scheme. In Iran, his action was seen as a political miscalculation. He was criticised not only by a minority at the Majles but also by his own Cabinet Ministers who complained for not being consulted. Consequently, Hakimi changed his policy and sent Taqizadeh further instruction to go ahead with lodging a petition concerning Soviet interference in Iran's internal affairs. Hakimi's second decision, just before his resignation, was approved by the Iranian press as a courageous and patriotic undertaking.

Taqizadeh, the Iranian Ambassador to Great Britain, who was also the head of the Iranian delegation at the first session of the United Nations General Assembly in London, represented Iran in the follow up of the case. Taqizadeh was a native of Tabriz, a champion of the constitutional movement in 1906-1909, and a deputy of the first and second Majles from Azerbaijan. He was a cabinet minister and an ambassador in the 1930's, but refused to return home when Reza Shah recalled him from Paris in 1937. Then, he moved to London and became a lecturer in Iranian studies at the University of London. After Reza Shah's abdication, Taqizadeh was appointed as the Iranian Minister Plenipotentiary (Ambassador from
1943) to the United Kingdom. During his exile in London in 1908, Taqizadeh issued a statement of protest on behalf of the Iranian patriots. The statement argued against Russian intervention in Iranian affairs; the suppression of Iran's constitutional Government; and the bombardment of the Majles by Mohammad Ali Shah and his Russian supporters, namely the Cossack Brigade. After 38 years, Taqizadeh was again chosen to present the Iranian protest against the Russian Government and its puppet regime in Azerbaijan.

At the plenary session of the UN General Assembly on 15 January, Taqizadeh stated that Iran's problems, caused by the Allies, had continued even after the end of the war. He maintained that Iran had placed its entire resources at the disposal of Allies, for which they were "recognised and acclaimed" by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin as the "bridge of victory". According to Taqizadeh, Iran had hoped to attend the UN General Assembly "free from major anxiety", but he could hardly refrain from referring to the "disturbing situation in Iran". He stated: "Iran has been confronted with a great danger of an international character and a situation which is likely to impair the friendly relations among the nations." Taqizadeh directed the attention of the delegates to the fact that they must reserve the right to bring their difficulties before the United Nations, and request that they be
considered "if no early solution was reached". (310) He concluded that consideration of the Iranian case "would constitute a test case of the most explicit kind for the organisation to show its fair spirit in dealing with and protecting the vital rights of its members, and a matter of principle and fundamental issue for the small nations." (311)

Following this address at the General Assembly, Iran intended that its problem be discussed at the Security Council; however, the Council's rules of procedure had not been finalised yet. (312) Furthermore, Iran expected support from Britain and the United States in its challenge against the Soviet Union, another permanent member of the Council. Taqizadeh consulted Bevin and Byrnes as to whether or not Iran should bring the issue before the Security Council. They advised him that "only the most urgent matters" should be considered during the first session. (313) According to Byrnes, both he and Bevin hesitated to offer him more than an explanation of the sensitive conditions of the Security Council at its beginning of existence. (314) Nonetheless, Iran was dissuaded from putting forth its objective.

On 19 January, Taqizadeh approached the Executive Secretary of the United Nations, Gladwyn Jebb, and handed him a Note to be circulated among the members of the Security Council.

The Note stated:

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"Owing to the interference of the Soviet Union through the medium of their officials and armed forces in Iran, a situation had arisen which may lead to international friction." (315)

Indicating the efforts made by the Iranian Government "in accordance with Article 33 of the United Nations Charter", Iran asked the Security Council to "investigate the situation and recommend appropriate terms of settlement", in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 35. (316) Since the adopted date-line for troop withdrawal, which had been fixed six months after the end of the Japanese war, had not yet expired, the Note was confined to the question of "interference". It made no reference to Iran's original demand, namely troop evacuation. (317)

Gladwyn Jebb viewed that the "Soviet Government were deeply wounded" by the complaint, but "had to defend their indefensible case". (318)

In defence of Soviet policy in Iran, the head of the Soviet delegation, Andrei Vyshinsky, resorted to counter-accusation. The Soviet Note, presented to the United Nations Executive Secretary on 24 January, stated:

"... Propaganda hostile to the Soviet Union is growing stronger in Iran and is far from being discouraged by the Iranian Government."
This propaganda does not differ in any sense from the Fascist propaganda which was instigated against the Soviet Union at the time of Reza Shah. Anti-democratic and pogrom activity on the part of reactionary forces in Iran, hostile to the Soviet Union, which is supported by certain influential Iranian groups drawn from the ruling class and the police authorities, creates for Azerbaijan and for Baku a danger of organised hostile actions, diversions, and so forth. Such a situation cannot be tolerated."(319)

The Soviet Note argued that Iran's accusation regarding Soviet armed forces interference in Iranian affairs was "in contradiction to reality and lacked any foundation".(320) The Note also expressed that Soviet troops were stationed in northern Iran "by rights granted" under the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921 and the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1942; that events in Iranian Azerbaijan had "no connection" with the presence there of Soviet troops; that these events were of an "exclusively Iranian and internal nature," and were a "demonstration of the aspiration of the population of northern Iran for national autonomy".(321) Finally, the Soviet Government "categorically opposed" any consideration of an Iranian appeal by the Security Council under Article 35 of the United Nations Charter."(322)
Taqizadeh made a second presentation on 28 January. In his letter to the President of the Security Council, he referred to the inconsistency between the Soviet Government's denial of interference and its admittance of unwillingness "to allow the passage of Iranian reinforcements" within their own territory, because it might have caused "disturbance and bloodshed". Taqizadeh cleverly invoked a Soviet interpretation of international law. The letter continued:

"It is perhaps useful to remind the Soviet delegation of the substance of a well-known speech delivered by Mr Litvinov on behalf of the Soviet Government at the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference at Geneva on 6 February 1933, in which, in a remarkably clear and precise manner, he gave a definition of an aggressor nation. Mr Litvinov said: (..Nor do the following situations allow any nation to become an aggressor: The internal situation in a given state as, for instance, political, economic or cultural backwardness of a given country, alleged maladministration, a revolutionary or counter-revolutionary movement, civil war, or disorders or strikes, the establishment or maintenance in any state of any political, economic or social order.) (323)"
Taqizadeh also demanded an early evacuation of foreign troops from Iran.

"The raison d'etre for the presence of foreign troops in Iran has disappeared, and it is desirable that all foreign troops should leave Iranian territory immediately, thus following the example set by the United States Government as regards its forces. The Treaty provides that foreign troops may remain until six months after the end of the war, but does not require that they shall do so." (324)

The Security Council opened the discussion on Iran's complaint on 28 January. Using the right of explanation, Taqizadeh asked that (1) Soviet interference in Iran's internal affairs, namely prevention of the movement of Iranian troops in their own territory, be stopped; (2) all moral and material support for the rebels in Azerbaijan be withdrawn; (3) all Soviet troops evacuate Iran, in accordance with the Treaty of 1942, by 2 March 1946. (325)

In reply, Vyshinsky stated that the Security Council should not consider the Iranian request, leaving the way open for a solution through negotiation between the Soviet Union and Iran. (326)

Amongst the Western Allies, the degree of concern regarding the Iranian crisis varied. Unlike Byrnes who took a passive position, Bevin took the lead in the
support of Iran. This change of British policy in January 1946 should be mostly credited to Iran. Iranians neglected early opposition to their initiation and insisted on bringing the problem before the United Nations. As such they forced the Western powers to get involved in conflict in support of Iran. Bevin had dissuaded the Iranians from approaching the United Nations a month earlier. However, at the Security Council debate, he became an advocate of the Iranian position. (327)

At the Security Council, Bevin had pursued two aims: to mobilise world opinion against Soviet policy; and to influence United States policy-makers to conduct a more vigorous "handling of the Russians". (328) However, there were some in British political circles who did not share Bevin's views in dealing with the Russians. These circles viewed that no development at the UN should "unrealistically" cause "a division of interest between small and great nations", and damage the "prospect" of the UN Organisation. (329) They did not hesitate to blame Iran's "irresponsible desire to use the first meeting of UNO as the occasion for a demonstration against the policies of the great powers in general, or the Soviet Union in particular". (330)

The newly born Socialist Bloc rose up to defy the British. The first warning came from the Ukrainian delegate who, on 25 January, lodged a complaint against
British military action in Greece and Indonesia. (331) Within the next three days, Vyshinsky made several approaches to Bevin seeking a "package deal" over the Balkans and Iran between Britain and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Bevin refused to compromise his stance on either of the questions. (332)

The conflict between Russia and Britain in early 1946 was not confined to the question of Iran. There were reports that apart from the case of Iran, Vyshinsky sought British recognition of the socialist states of Bulgaria and Romania as a token for dropping claims in against British involvement in Greece. (333)

In his statement on 30 January, Vyshinsky defended Soviet policy in Iran and justified Soviet support of the "democratic movement" in Azerbaijan. He confirmed that the "Soviet High Command protested against the movement of troops" towards Azerbaijan. He refused the Iranian delegate's proposal to place Soviet-Iranian bilateral negotiations under the control of the Security Council. Vyshinsky pointed out that the observation of the negotiations by the UN would not be "in conformity with the dignity of the Soviet Government." (334)

Bevin's response to Vyshinsky's statement was a rebuff of the whole of Soviet policy in Iran. He explained that the presence of Allied forces on the Iranian territory, according to the Tripartite Treaty, did not constitute a military occupation. He maintained that the Allies were obliged to cause minimal disturbance to
the administration and the security forces of Iran.

Bevin stated:

"I was a little perturbed to hear Mr Vyshinsky say that the number of police and soldiers in Azerbaijan was sufficient to keep order; because in the Tripartite Treaty, the sole judge of that, in the British view, was the Persian Government."(335)

Bevin expressed "a sense of gratitude" for what Iran did for the Allies during the war. He also stressed that the Allies owed a "great debt" to make sure that Iran's integrity would be preserved. He emphasised that the Allies should hand back the Iranian territory "intact, with forces gone, and without interference in its sovereignty ". Bevin concluded that Soviet action was a violation of the Tripartite Treaty and undermined Iran's sovereignty.

"Has sovereignty been infringed? the evidence is a little bit conflicting. On the admission of Mr Vyshinsky and by the authority of Russian High Command, Persian troops were stopped from proceeding to Azerbaijan. What was there to negotiate about? Were they or were they not stopped? If they were stopped, then that infringed this treaty."(336)

Vyshinsky's reaction to Bevin's brilliant and emotional address appeared two days later in the renewal of the
Greek question. Most of the British press praised Bevin's "fighting speech" which had "outmanoeuvred" Vyshinsky over Iran. Newspapers acknowledged the influence of Bevin's challenge at the Security Council on the "evolution of British opinion". They also underlined the satisfaction of the people who had long called for "open diplomacy and plain speaking". On the contrary, Byrnes's feeble policy in London was criticised in the American press. Leading American journals such as Newsweek and the New York Times referred to Bevin's address as one of the greatest events in diplomatic history and raised questions about the United States' "Russian diplomacy". According to Stettinus, Bevin's speech was "blunt", with many charges against the Soviet Union. Two influential members of the United States delegation, John Foster Dulles and Senator Arthur Vandenburg became "impressed" with Bevin's outspokenness, but criticised the performance of their own heads of delegation, Byrnes and Stettinus. Byrnes had left London before the Security Council meeting; whilst Stettinus preferred to remain impartial during the debate on Iran. This position helped him to mediate between the conflicting sides, when necessary. Stettinus had actually followed the instruction of Byrnes dated 28 January:

"Our ability to contribute to a proper settlement of the difficulty will be greatly strengthened if we refrain from taking any
action which might imply that we have already formed a fixed opinion with regard the merit of the case."(342)

However, the resistance of Stettinus against the insistence of Vyshinsky to conclude the Council's session without passing a resolution is noteworthy. The assertion of Stettinus that the adoption of a resolution was of "paramount importance to keep world confidence and respect for the Security Council", was accepted. It defied Vyshinsky who had been cautious not to provoke the American delegation.(343)

The Iranian press, excluding Tudeh newspapers, published Bevin's speech. They also commented that this speech was a "demonstration of exceptional sympathy with Iran", which had "erased the historical Iranian suspicion and indignation towards Great Britain ".(344)

Finally, on 30 January, the Security Council unanimously approved a resolution which had been proposed by Bevin for the settlement of the Iranian crisis. The resolution recommenced direct negotiations between Iran and the Soviet Union. It also required the result to be reported to the Security Council, which had maintained the "right to call for information on the progress of the negotiations".(345) At the suggestion of Bevin, supported by Stettinus, the Council "understood" that, until a settlement was reached, the Iranian question would remain on the agenda.(346) However, this was not
formally stipulated in the resolution at the Soviet request. (347) Stettinus made a statement that keeping the Iranian question on the "continuing agenda" was not incompatible with the "dignity of the Council or any of its members". He maintained that the Council could not "divest" itself of the responsibility for the matter that had been brought to its notice. (348) He also stated that the resolution was not "displeasing" to the Iranians. (349)

However, Taqizadeh's perception was not the same. He expressed "appreciation" for the promise made to report the progress of the negotiations to the Council. But he expressed "disappointment" for the lack of any provision in the resolution regarding keeping the Iranian question on the continuing agenda. (350) The first round of discussions on the Iranian crisis at the Security Council in London ended with relative success for Bevin and Taqizadeh in spite of the manoeuvres of the Russian "grand inquisitor", whose appearance could not frighten non-Russian delegates. Nevertheless, Pravda congratulated Vyshinsky and the Soviet delegation for the removal of the Iranian question from the Council's agenda. (351)
CHAPTER EIGHT

QAVAM'S NEGOTIATIONS IN MOSCOW

At his inauguration, Qavam had two major objectives: quietening the political opposition who had enjoyed the support of the British Embassy (352); and enlisting Russian support without alienating his American supporters. (353) This position was paradoxical. The negative vote of Qavam's opponents in the Majles that reduced his majority to one, made him more favourable to the left. However, getting closer to the left would have antagonised his patriotic supporters and the United States. In such a delicate situation, exceptional ability and competence was needed to save the Government. In his first statement to the press on 27 January, Qavam asserted that he would not withdraw the Iranian case from the United Nations, but would open direct negotiation with the Soviet Government "compatible with the provisions of the United Nations Charter". He denied allegations regarding his preference for the Russians or the Americans over the British. Qavam emphasised:

"I am a profoundly patriotic Iranian, and I will do my utmost to promptly re-establish the almost non-existent relations with the Soviet Union through direct negotiations." (354)
On 28 January, Qavam sent messages to Stalin, Churchill and Truman, stressing his desire for good relations on the basis of mutual friendship and respect. Furthermore, in his message to Stalin, Qavam also expressed his readiness to negotiate directly with Soviet leaders.

On the same day, Qavam had arranged separate meetings with Murray and Bullard. He told Murray about his intention to follow up the Iranian petition at the United Nations, and his instruction to Taqizadeh to assign Soheili to arrange negotiation with Vyshinsky. Soheili was a former prime minister who had a good knowledge of Russian. He was at this time, a member of Iran's UN delegation. Qavam's intention of direct negotiation was in line with Byrnes's belief, expressed in his message to Murray on 28 January:

"If the new Government in Tehran agree to enter into direct negotiation with the Russians on the matter, its hand will be greatly strengthened by the fact that its case is pending before UNO."

Qavam believed that the origin of the dispute with the Soviets was the refusal to grant them an oil concession in 1944. He therefore asked Murray what the Iranian response should be if the Soviets repeated that demand. Murray declined to give "a direct answer", but warned him implicitly of the "difficulty involved in the case
of Russians". He stated that since private enterprise did not exist in USSR, Iran had to form a partnership with the Soviet Government, rather than an oil company.(359)

Bullard's animosity towards Qavam was not a secret. In his report to the Foreign Office, he had characterised Qavam's Cabinet as "the worst for ability and honesty since the abdication of Reza Shah" and condemned the "irresponsibility" of those deputies who had supported him.(360) Qavam was clever enough not to exclude Bullard from his diplomatic efforts. When meeting Bullard, Qavam expressed his "admiration for Bevin's attitude" at the Security Council, and hoped that "he may count on the continued support of His Majesty's Government".(361)

On 3 February, Qavam received a reply from Stalin, to the effect that the Soviet Government would welcome an Iranian mission to Moscow for the conduct of negotiations.(362) The Soviet Chargé d'Affaires who conveyed the message told Qavam that the mission's success would be better assured if Qavam himself could head it.(363)

Despite the urgency of the Iranian problems, Qavam delayed the appointment of his Cabinet for three weeks. Qavam's main objective in delaying the appointment was to send a signal to the Russians that if he felt unable to reach an accord with them, he would resign even before setting up a government.(364)
second reason was to neutralise a plot against the new Government in the Majles. Following Qavam's appointment, his opponents managed to re-group, in order to challenge the new Government's program through vote of no-confidence.(365)

On 17 February, only one day before his departure to Moscow, Qavam introduced his Cabinet to the Shah and the Majles. In this Cabinet, Qavam himself held the Foreign Affairs and Interior portfolios. Former Prime Minister, Bayat, was appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance.(366) All the ministers were selected from moderates. One exception was Mozaffar Firourz, who was appointed Political Assistant to the Prime Minister. He was a distant prince from the Qajar dynasty and was hostile to the Shah. The most significant change occurred in the army where Qavam dismissed General Arfa, the Chief of Staff who had been reputed to be pro-British and hostile to the Communists. In his place, Qavam appointed General Agevli, a prominent nationalist officer who had been interned by the British allegedly for "pro-German activities" since 1942.(367) Another gesture to please the Russians, was the lifting of the restrictions imposed on political parties by previous governments. The Tudeh Party was the main beneficiary of this decision.(368)

During the presentation of the Cabinet in the Majles, Qavam stated that he was leaving for Moscow at the
Qavam was going to stay in Moscow until 8 March and return home two days before the 14th Majles ended its term. Qavam was well aware that in his absence the Majles could not discuss the Government program and nobody dared to weaken his position when negotiations were in progress in Moscow. He also knew that upon his return, there would be no Majles to inspect him. Thus, in effect, Qavam planned to get rid of a constitutional obstacle and commence one-man-rule on his return.

Qavam's mission to Moscow included a former foreign minister, two deputies of the Majles, two scholars, the Head of the Tehran Chamber of Commerce, and several journalists. The mission left Tehran aboard a Soviet aircraft, which Bullard called the "OGPU van", and arrived in Moscow on 19 February, greeted by Molotov.

During the first meeting he had with Stalin, Qavam asked for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran in order to pave the way for friendly relations between the two countries. Stalin's response was "very rough" and "uncompromising".

Qavam's first meeting with Molotov had no better result. Molotov accused the Iranian Government of having a "one-sided and discriminating policy" in regard to oil concessions in Iran. Molotov also complained about the activities of anti-Soviet politicians such as Zia who intended to
convert Iran into a base against the Soviet Union. (373) Qavam tried to appease the Soviet grievances by praising the Russian victory in the world war and expressing that Iran saw the Soviet Union as its great neighbour and ally. Concerning oil concessions, Qavam stated that he had no authority to disregard the Oil Bill of December 1944, and that only the Majles was in a position to modify the law. Molotov suggested that the law be changed by a new Majles. He also offered his "help", which implied getting pro-Soviet deputies elected to the next Majles. (374)

Qavam's second meeting with Stalin took place on 24 February. As Qavam later told Murray, he presented three demands to the Soviet leader: withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran before 2 March 1946; Soviet "moral support" for the Iranian Government in the settlement of the Azerbaijan crisis; and appointment of a new Soviet Ambassador to Tehran. On the question of Russian troops, Stalin stated that according to Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921, his country had the right to station troops on Iranian territory. Qavam, as the Prime Minister in 1921, had presented the Treaty for the approval of the Majles. Citing the text and the accompanying Notes, Qavam argued that the Soviet interpretation was not correct, and showed that the Treaty was not applicable to the situation in 1946. Stalin further complained about the "hostile attitude"
of the Iranian Government in 1919 which had approached the Peace Conference in Paris for the re-annexation of Russia's Caucasian territories to Iran. Qavam replied that the head of the delegation was Aligholi Ansari, who later led the first Iranian delegation to Moscow. Ansari and Chicherin had finalised the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921 to which the Soviets "often pointed with pride". (375) On the question of Azerbaijan, Stalin defended the Democrats who had asked only for "autonomy" and not "independence." He refused Qavam's demand for interference in favour of Iran to settle the problem, since Soviet honour was "involved." Qavam noted that no provincial autonomy was allowed under the Iranian Constitution and that he could not allow anything further than provincial councils in Azerbaijan and other provinces. (376) While Molotov had once suggested to Qavam that Iran recognise a modified Azerbaijan autonomous government, Stalin refrained from making such a point. (377) The first round of talks had achieved no result. Qavam, however, realised that the Soviet leaders were ready to compromise on the questions of troops and Azerbaijan if he could promise them oil concessions. Qavam was aware that an oil concession, apart from its illegality, would open the way for the Soviet Government to send forces into Iran with the excuse of protecting its oil interests. (378) On 25 February, Qavam made a further attempt to state
the Iranian position. He sent a memorandum to the Soviet leaders, expressing that: [1] He was not authorised to enter into negotiations on oil concession, according to the law passed by the Majles; [2] Azerbaijan was an integral part of Iran, and the Iranian Government would not submit to the rebels who had claimed autonomy; [3] all the Allied troops should evacuate Iranian territory, according to the Tripartite Treaty of 1942, by 2 March 1946. (379) In reply, the Soviet Government sent Qavam a memorandum, asking him to comply with the following conditions:

1. Soviet troops could stay in parts of Iran for an indefinite period, according to the Treaty of 1921.

2. The Iranian Government would recognise the internal autonomy of Azerbaijan. If the Iranian Government acceded to this request, the Soviet Government offered to take steps to arrange that:-

   a] The Prime Minister of Azerbaijan in relation to the Central Government, would bear the designation of Governor-General.

   b] Azerbaijan would have neither a Ministry of War nor Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

   c] Thirty percent of Azerbaijan revenue would be paid to the Central Government.

   d] All correspondence with the Central
3. The Soviet Government would abandon its demand for an oil concession. Instead, it proposed that an Iranian-Soviet joint stock company be set up with 51 percent of the share owned by the Soviet Union and 49 percent by Iran. (380)

Qavam protested against the Soviet misinterpretation of the Treaty of 1921 in order to justify the retention of troops on Iranian territory. (381) Qavam also reiterated that, before the complete evacuation of troops from Iran, there would not be an election for a new Majles and that only the Majles was entitled to decide on Soviet demand for an oil agreement. (382)

Qavam’s insistence on his firm position, led to the issuing of a statement by Molotov which pointed out that:

1] Since the Soviets’ good intention had been rejected, the proposal for a joint oil company was withdrawn; and the Soviet Government sought an outright concession in northern Iran as it had previously done through Kavtardze.

2] The Soviet Government had intended to help Iran on the question of Azerbaijan. Accordingly it made recommendations both to the Government of Iran and the leadership of Azerbaijan. Since both sides refused these
recommendations, the Soviet Government withdrew its offers.

3] Since the October Revolution, Iran had granted the southern oil to Great Britain, but it had refused to do the same in northern Iran to the Soviet Union. In 1919, the Iranian Prime Minister, Samsam-us-Saltaneh, in letters to the League of Nations, claimed part of the Soviet territory in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and in 1945, a member of the same Cabinet (Hakimi) became Prime Minister to pursue anti-Soviet policies. Thus, the Soviet Government's "anxiety" was a factor in refusing complete evacuation from Iran.(383).

While negotiating with Russian leaders in Moscow, Qavam made frequent contacts with the Chargé d'Affaires of the British and American Embassies, Frank Roberts, and George Kennan. On 24 February, Qavam told Roberts that he no longer expected the Soviet troops to be withdrawn before 2 March, and that the question of Azerbaijan was "very difficult".(384) In a conversation with Kennan, Qavam complained of "tremendous pressure" put upon him by the Russians. He also mentioned that at one point, Stalin and Molotov had told him: "We don't care what the US and Britain think, and we are not afraid of them."(385) Qavam later repeated this conversation to
On 1 March, one day before the deadline, Radio Moscow broadcast a short announcement, which was also published by Izvestia the next day. The announcement stated:

"On 25 February, during discussions with the Iranian Prime Minister, Qavam-us-Saltaneh, he was informed of the decision of the Soviet Government that with effect from 2 March, Soviet troops would begin their evacuation of areas of Mashad, Shahroud, and Semnan in eastern Iran, where the situation is quiet. The Soviet troops in other areas of Iran will remain there, pending clarification of the situation." (387)

This statement caused sharp resentment from Qavam in Moscow and from the Majles in Tehran. On 3 March, Qavam addressed a Note of protest to Molotov, asserting that the final date for the evacuation of the Allied troops, was "definitely and unconditionally" on 2 March. He therefore concluded that the Soviet statement of the previous day was "absolutely incompatible" with the Treaty. Qavam remarked that the British withdrawal had been completed by the Treaty date; and asked the Soviets to fulfil their Treaty obligations accordingly. Qavam concluded:

"I am compelled to protest on behalf of the Iranian Government against the USSR
Government decision, and to insist that orders should be given for the withdrawal of USSR forces as promptly as possible from the whole territory of Iran." (388)

Qavam presumed that the sending of this Note was to be his last action in Moscow; he planned to return home on 5 March. He told Roberts that he was leaving Moscow "empty handed". (389) On the same day of Qavam's protest (3 March), Roberts was instructed by Bevin to send a Note to Molotov regarding Soviet troops in Iran. The British Government, as a signatory of the Tripartite Treaty, regarded delay in the withdrawal of troops as a "breach" of the Treaty. It also asked to be "urgently" informed about the intention of the Soviet Government which was in violation of the Tripartite Treaty. (390)

On 4 March, Qavam approached Kennan to ask for a simultaneous undertaking by the American Government. He also asked Kennan to send an account of his (Qavam's) negotiations in Moscow, by the US Embassy pouch, to Ambassador Ala in Washington. (391) Kennan advised Qavam that since the United States was not a signatory of the Tripartite Treaty, it could not notify the Russians to respect the Treaty. However, he stated that if Iran was to lodge a protest against the Russians on the issue, the United States would be able to support Iran. (392)

The United States intervention in the Soviet-Iranian dispute in supporting Iran was crucial not only for
Iran's future dependence on the United States, but also for formation of the United States Cold War policy. This issue will be discussed in the next chapter.

In addition to Qavam's protest to Moscow, an atmosphere of patriotic fervour seized the Majles, against the Soviet statement of 1 March. On 3 March, Mossadeq took the floor to protest against the Soviet decision. He emphasised that nothing less than the complete evacuation of foreign troops from Iran would be accepted by the Iranians. He urged Qavam to restrict his negotiations in Moscow within the framework of Iranian law, such as the Tripartite Treaty which stipulated the deadline for foreign troop evacuation. He also warned that any decision which goes beyond the confines of those bills approved by the Iranian legislature would be null and void. (393) All deputies present at the session cheered Mossadeq. The Tudeh deputies were absent. (394)

On 5 March Qavam received an invitation from Stalin to stay one more day to attend a banquet at the Kremlin. At the banquet, which took place on 6 March, Stalin and Molotov were very hospitable and complimentary. As such they intended to impress Qavam and assure him of their good intention. The Russian leaders expressed hope that problems confronting Soviet-Iranian relations would be solved soon. (395)

A joint communiqué was prepared before Qavam's departure. After altering some sections, Qavam endorsed
The communique stated that Qavam had several meetings with Stalin and Molotov where issues of mutual interest were discussed in a "friendly atmosphere." (396) It also hoped for further improvement of relations between the two countries, following the assignment of a new Soviet Ambassador to Iran. (397)

On his arrival in Tehran, Qavam told the press that since the Russians refused his request for the withdrawal of their troops, he could not accept some of their demands. Therefore he maintained that his mission was not successful. (398) He repeated that statement at meetings with Bullard and Murray on 11 March. (399)
Due to his war-time meetings with Churchill and Roosevelt, Stalin endeavoured to achieve an assurance that Soviet interests would be protected in the post-war settlements.

In October 1944, in Moscow, Churchill and Stalin reached a compromise on the future of the Balkan countries and the extent of Russian influence in that region. To the satisfaction of Stalin, there was even a British proposal "to change the regime of the Turkish Straits" to one which would be in favour of the Soviet Union. The expansion of Russian territory at the expense of its European neighbours, i.e. Finland, Poland and Romania, was another consequence of the war. In addition, Stalin demanded that all neighbouring countries to Russia be ruled by "friendly" Governments. Iran, though a Soviet neighbour, remained beyond the perimeters of these arrangements. The Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1942, the Tehran Delegation of 1943 signed by Stalin and, finally, Stalin's assurance to Truman at the Potsdam Conference provided guarantees that the Soviet Union would not contemplate a plan against Iran's sovereignty and territorial integrity. On the eve of Soviet-Iranian
dispute over oil concession in October 1944, the US leaders did not suspect that the Soviet Government would either retain its troops in Iran beyond the Treaty deadline, or that they would create a puppet regime in northern Iran as a retaliatory action. However, the State Department received some alarming reports from their diplomats in the Soviet Union. One such report was sent by Harriman on 29 December 1944:

"The Soviets have definite objectives on their future foreign policy, all of which we do not as yet fully understand. While they have recognised the right of the states bordering the Soviet Union to have their independence, they insist upon "friendly" governments. From Soviet actions so far, the terms "friendly" and "independent" appear to mean something quite different from our interpretation. It is interesting to note that in Iran they appear to justify their recent actions by explaining that they know better what the Iranian people want from the Iranian Government, which does not represent the majority of Iranian opinion."(404)

The prime critics of Soviet activities in Iran were not the Americans, but the British. The latter had had historical links and substantial oil interests in Iran, and were intent on maintaining their position. Therefore, their diplomats in Iran were involved in
activities to defuse Russian objectives, such as forming an anti-Soviet faction in the Majles and the Government and mobilising anti-Communist tribes prepared to rebel against a likely pro-Soviet Government.

American politicians did not share the uneasiness of their British colleagues. Instead, they favoured the promotion of "harmony with the Russians". (405) This difference in attitude was evident at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in December 1945. Whereas Bevin insisted on setting the Iranian question, Byrnes sought to "minimise" the Iranian problem by leaving it to be settled in the future. (406) Byrnes believed that he should not "jeopardise" the other achievements of the Moscow Conference because of the question of Iran. (407) This angered many in American political circles who viewed Byrnes's acquiescence to Soviet expansionism in the Moscow Conference as totally unacceptable and abhorrent. After all, the Moscow Conference was held just after the formation of the autonomous Government of Azerbaijan. They believed that such an occurrence in a country, which was not only occupied, but, more importantly, an ally of the Great Powers, deserved more attention than that paid by Secretary Byrnes. Part of an Allied country had been actually separated by direct intervention of Soviet troops. Americans, they maintained, had to apprehend the danger of Soviet expansionist goals and objectives.
vis-a-vis its neighbouring countries and set a limit to them. The tension over Soviet objectives escalated on 20 December 1945, when Soviet newspapers published a letter written by Soviet historians justifying and demanding the annexation of two Turkish provinces to the Soviet Union. (408)

When Truman read the Byrnes communiqué on the results of the Moscow Conference, he admonished his Secretary of State:

"There was not a word about Iran or any other place where the Soviets were on the march. We had gained only an empty promise of further talks." (409)

The press, the Congress, even his own department reacted negatively towards Byrnes' performance. He was criticised for presenting "a sign of weakness" and giving "concession" in Moscow. (410)

In addition to asking "why was nothing settled about Russia's activities in Iran, and its demands on Turkey?", they questioned how, as the sole "possessor" of the atomic bomb, the United States could "appease" the Soviets. (411)

In its 30 December 1945 editorial, the New York Times warned that the Soviet method of settlement in Eastern Europe and the Balkans in 1945 might be applied in the Middle East in 1946. It also maintained that the exclusion of the Iranian and the Turkish questions at the Moscow Conference "left the Russian policy in those
areas unchallenged". (412) The State Department was greatly troubled by reports from the US Vice-Consul in Tabriz, Robert Rossow, regarding the Red Army's grip on Azerbaijan, and the "deeply ingrained terrorism" carried out by Russian officials and DPA members. (413) On 28 December, Loy Henderson, the Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs, prepared a controversial report concerning Soviet expansionist policies towards its southern neighbours. The report recommended the necessity for United States' action, by every means, to restrain the Russians. He suggested that the "United States should do so before the Soviet Union went so far in Iran and Turkey that it could not retreat." (414) Criticism of Byrnes' policy was soon extended to the White House. On 5 January, Truman called Byrnes to the Oval Office, and told him that the United States "ought to protest with all vigour against the Russian program in Iran." Recalling the situation in the Baltic states, Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania, where Russians had acted with a "high-handed and arbitrary manner", Truman referred to the question of Iran.

"When you went to Moscow, you were faced with another accomplished fact in Iran. Another outrage if I ever saw one. Iran was our ally in the war. Iran was Russia's ally in the war. Iran agreed to the free passage of arms,
ammunition and other supplies, running to millions of tons, across her territory from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea. Without those supplies furnished by the United States, Russia would have been ignominiously defeated. Yet now Russia stirs up rebellion and keeps troops on the soil of her friend and ally, Iran."

Truman concluded:--

"Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language, another war is in the making... We should let our position on Iran be known in no uncertain terms... I am tired of babying the Soviets." (415)

Truman also pointed to the situation in Bulgaria and Romania and said that he would not recognise the Governments of "those two police states", unless they were "radically changed". (416) Beyond the question of Iran and Eastern Europe, Truman asked Byrnes to recommend a firm stance on several other conflicting issues, e.g. Greece, Germany, the Black Sea Straits, maintenance of complete United States control of Japan and the Pacific, the rehabilitation and the creation of strong central governments in China and Korea, the return of the United States ships from Russia, and the settlement of Russian lend-lease debts. (417)

Truman's intent to shape a new American foreign policy in dealing with Russians, coincided with the British
Government's intention to share its responsibilities in the Middle East with the Americans. The decline of British power during the war had convinced both Churchill and Attlee that Britain could not confront Russia, in the British sphere of interest, without American support.\(^{(418)}\) Towards the end of the year, policy assessments at the Foreign Office disclosed that Soviet pressure on Iran had put not only the oil fields of southern Iran, but also the integrity of Iraq in danger.\(^{(419)}\) They also viewed that Soviet political and military aggression in Iran had threatened the entire Middle East and India.\(^{(420)}\) To avoid such danger, British diplomats recommended that American help be sought in solving the problems of the region. This could be encouraged on the basis of "principle" or "interest".\(^{(421)}\)

During the last months of 1945, the British Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow, Frank Roberts, had frequently complained that United States' diplomacy was not properly concerned about Soviet intrigue in Anglo-American joint interests. Roberts called the attention of London to the Americans' "diplomatic submission" to the Soviets. He warned that Stalin had planned to isolate Britain, and break its special connection with Iran and Turkey.\(^{(422)}\) The target of the Soviet media at this time was not American "capitalism" but British "imperialism" with particular reference to Iran, Greece
In January 1946, Roberts sent an analytic report to the Foreign Office on Soviet policy towards the Middle East. He concluded that Stalin's policy of supporting minorities in Iran and Turkey was in reality a revival of the Tsarist "liberation mission". He therefore recommended a "resolute" determination by the British to obtain American support in order to keep the Russians out of these two countries. By this time, the State Department had drastically changed its policy and prepared to be receptive towards the British call.

In November 1945, Byrnes was still insisting, at Cabinet meetings, that the British were as bad as the Russians in Iran. But late December, a policy analyst at the State Department expressed that an "implicit" alliance with Britain against the Soviet Union was a necessary component of America's revised policy, in order to safeguard America's vital interests in the Middle East. There was little doubt that the re-shaping of American policy, at the peak of the Iranian crisis, pleased British policy-makers who had awaited this dramatic development. The British Government would be able to save its most crucial interests only if it could secure American support to deter and contain Soviet advancement.

Some British historians believe that Britain had "little influence" in toughening American policy towards the Soviet Union, and that Washington reacted at Moscow's
hegemony "independent of British inspiration". (427) They ascribe the change in American policy to Stalin's "clumsiness" and "greed". (428) However, there are other historians who look at this change as a British "conspiracy" to involve the United States "more intimately" in European and Middle Eastern affairs. (429) Bevin's reasoning at the Security Council during January and early February 1946, regarding the Iranian and Greek problems, was welcomed by the Americans, but outraged the Russians. Some historians have viewed Bevin's promotion of the Iranian complaint as a means of "attaching" the United States to British interests. They have mentioned the role of the American envoy, Stettinus, to persuade Vyshinsky and pass resolutions to back their observation. (430) However, it was Stalin, not Bevin, who provoked American public opinion.

On 9 February, Stalin delivered a pre-election speech that theoretically undermined the East-West wartime co-operation. In spite of his position as one of the Allied leaders, Stalin played the role of an orthodox Marxist, by blaming the outbreak of war on "capitalist" and "imperialist" systems. He claimed that the capitalist bloc was engaged in the encirclement of the Soviet Union. He warned that the problems which had caused the war were still active and, thereby, could cause a revival of a series of "crises and armed conflicts". Stalin asked implicitly for a Soviet share
of the fortunes of war as a condition for peace.

"Perhaps military catastrophes might be avoided if it were possible for raw materials and markets to be periodically redistributed among the various countries in accordance with their economic importance, by agreement and peaceful settlement. But that is impossible to do under present capitalist conditions of the developments of world economy."(431)

Stalin announced that the Soviet Government would implement a new five-year plan to reconstruct its economy and build up its strategic industries so that the country would be "insured against any eventuality".(432)

Stalin's sympathisers in the West interpreted his speech as being directed towards the Soviet people in order to rally their support for the new five-year plan.(433) Many others viewed it differently. The London Times called it "the most warlike pronouncement uttered by any top-rank statesman since V-J day".(434) The New York Times viewed it "disappointing" for those who assumed that Communism and capitalism could co-exist peacefully in the post-war era.(435) In the United States, the Secretary of Navy, James Forrestal, commented that Stalin's speech had proved that the co-existence of democracy and Communism was impossible; and the Supreme Court Justice William Douglas called it the "declaration
of third world war.(436)

This apprehension was aggravated on 16 February when the Soviet spies involved in stealing the secrets of the Atomic bomb were arrested in Canada.(437)

The State Department, having special concern for Soviet developments once again, intended to assess the speech's impact on the future relations of world powers. The best Soviet analyst was George Kennan, then Chargé d'Affaires at the Moscow Embassy, whose "unsolicited critical" analyses had previously made no impression in Washington.(438) The Director of the Office of European Affairs, H. Freeman Matthew, who had considered Stalin's speech, as the "most important and authoritative guide to post-war Soviet society", sent a cable to Kennan asking for "an interpretative analysis of what we may expect in the way of future implementation of these announced policies".(439)

On 22 February, Kennan sent his famous "Long Telegram" to Washington. Within this 8000 word cable, he explained Soviet anxieties and objectives.

According to Kennan, the origin of Soviet expansionism was their "sense of insecurity". Kennan commented, however, that a demonstration of "cohesion, firmness and vigour" by the "western world" would stop them.

"...Imperious to logic of reason, the Soviet Union is highly sensitive to logic of force.

For this reason, it can easily withdraw - and
usually does - when strong resistance is encountered at any point...

When individual governments stand in the path of Soviet purposes, pressure will be brought for their removal from office. This can happen where governments directly oppose Soviet Foreign policy aims (Turkey, Iran)." (440)

While the United States was on the verge of a diplomatic confrontation with the Soviet Union on the basis of this "re-orientation", Kennan's Long Telegram was precisely the authoritative source that his colleagues needed. (441) Kennan's sense of security went even beyond the perception of the United States military. An analysis of the Navy's Secret Intelligence stated in January 1946: "Soviet Russia aimed to establish a Monroe Doctrine for the area under her shadow, primarily and urgently for security; secondarily, to facilitate the eventual emergence of USSR as a power which could not be menaced by any other world power or combination of powers. (442)

This "extreme reading" of Stalin's election speech and international situation was received well and appreciated by those who believed that only "firmness and vigour" could stop the Russian advancement. (443) Kennan's view that the Russians would only understand the "logic of force" was not far removed from Truman's statement that "only one language do they understand:

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On 28 February, Byrnes went to New York to make a speech at the Overseas Press Club. Before leaving Washington, Byrnes met Truman who advised him to "stiffen and try for the next three months not to make any compromise". Thus, in his speech, considered as a new milestone in American foreign policy, Byrnes asserted the principles of the United Nations Charter, in support of the sovereign rights of nations. He stated:-

"The Charter forbids aggression and we cannot allow aggression to be accomplished by coercion or pressure, or by subterfuge such as political infiltration. We will not and we cannot stay aloof if force or the threat of force is used contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter." (446)

Byrnes made it clear which country was the subject of his attention:

"If we are to be a great power we must act as a great power, not only in order to ensure our own security but in order to preserve the peace of the world." (447)

Byrnes hinted at weak countries whose futures were at stake because of post-war occupation.

"We have no right to hold our troops in the territory of other sovereign states without
approval and consent freely given.... We must not unduly prolong the making of peace and continue to impose our troops upon small and impoverished states...We must not conduct a war of nerves to achieve strategic ends."(448)

Byrnes later wrote in his memoirs that the main objective and timing of this speech concerned the Iranian crisis. He wrote:

"The evidence of Soviet willingness to violate the sovereignty of their little neighbour, confirmed the ambition Molotov had expressed to Hitler for the control of the territory south of Baku. These things inspired my speeches beginning in February 1946; speeches which were correctly interpreted as reflecting a firmer attitude towards the Soviet Government, No longer was there any justification for the belief that we were animated by the common purpose of an early peace."(449)

Byrnes' speech served as a self-defence before the powerful Republican members of the US Congress who were the strongest critics of Byrnes' conciliatory approach and policies. Such criticism had been demonstrated in the Senate even before Byrnes' speech. Senator Vandenberg expressed the discontent of many Senators regarding the policy of "compromise" and Byrnes' 462
He raised an exciting question: "What is Russia up to now?" and warned that the conciliatory approach which Byrnes had towards the Russians in Moscow, and at the UN General Assembly in London, had to be discontinued. Vandenberg blamed the Soviet aggression on the US Government's lack of "firmness" and concluded that a coexistence with Russia would only be possible "if the United States speaks just as plainly upon all occasions as the Russians do."

Vandenberg's comments on US-Soviet relations, according to the American press, alarmed "American public opinion" about Soviet Russia. Truman realised that the Republicans might "capitalise" on foreign policy issues at the next congressional election in 1946.

On 5 March, the most significant voice in exposing Communist expansionist goals and objectives was heard from former Prime Minister Churchill, at Fulton, Missouri. In the presence of President Truman, Churchill used the term "Iron Curtain" to define the situation in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe.

Turning to Soviet conspiracy in the Middle East, Churchill went on:

"Turkey and Persia are both profoundly alarmed and disturbed at the claims which are being made upon them and at the pressure being exerted by the Moscow Government."
Churchill's perception of Soviet intentions as well as his suggestion on how to deter Soviet expansionism was not far from Kennan's:

"I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing they have less respect than weakness."

Churchill ended his speech on expressing hope on reaching an understanding with the Soviet Union under the authority of the United Nations. To make it more effective, he suggested a "fraternal association of English-speaking people". Churchill's direct reference to the Soviet Union in such harsh words, shocked the Western world; and alarmed Stalin and his "satraps" in Eastern Europe. If Stalin's "Election Speech" had caused a war of nerves against the western regimes, Churchill's Fulton speech was a counter-attack.

Stalin suspected that Truman knew of Churchill's comments in advance and had agreed with them. This fuelled his nervousness. Truman refused to comment on the Fulton speech, and Byrnes stated that the United States had nothing to do with the speech. However, both of them had full knowledge about it and had received copies of its text before 5 March. In fact, Churchill announced publicly what the American "Administration thought privately."
By refusing to approve the Fulton speech openly, the Americans were in effect playing for time to see Stalin's reaction. They were also trying to avoid aggravating the confusion which Churchill caused by linking anti-Communist deterrence with the Anglo-American alliance. There was still a strong feeling in American society that the United States should not involve itself in British politics. (460)

Stalin's reaction to the Fulton speech was reflected in his interview with Pravda on 14 March. He described Churchill's speech as a "dangerous act calculated to sow the seed of discord among the Allied governments". Stalin justified the position of the new regimes in Eastern Europe by recalling Hitler's use of their territory to attack the Soviet Union in 1941. He also linked the growth of Communism in these countries with the "law of historical developments". (461)

Stalin expressed his anger at Churchill's speech during the meetings he had with the new British and American Ambassadors in Moscow. The British Ambassador Sir Maurice Peterson reported to the Foreign Office: "When I insisted that Mr Churchill had spoken as a private individual, Stalin said: (There are not such private individuals in this country," (462)

During a meeting with the United States Ambassador, General Walter Bedell Smith, Stalin stated that "such a speech, if directed against the United States, never
would have been permitted in Russia. (463) During the same interview, Stalin accused Churchill of planning an Anglo-American plot against the Soviet Union; and recalled that Churchill had "persuaded the United States" to join Britain in the occupation of Soviet territory. When Bedell Smith asked Stalin whether he "really" believed that the United States and Great Britain were in "alliance to thwart Russia", Stalin replied "yes". (464)

In spite of the rigid censorship of foreign news, Stalin allowed the press to publish Churchill's speech. Moreover, in the aforementioned interview with Pravda on 14 March, he stated that he was going "to expose warmongers, without loss of time, and give them no opportunity of abusing the freedom of speech against the interests of peace". (465)

Later, Khrushchev wrote of the effect of Churchill's speech on Stalin who was suspicious of Russia's encirclement. Khrushchev asserted that this suspicion was "one reason for Stalin's obsession with Eastern Europe": "It was largely because of Churchill's speech that Stalin exaggerated our enemy's strength and their intention to unleash war on us," Khrushchev wrote. (466)

Stalin used propaganda, against the Fulton speech, both to justify his views in the Election Speech and to "frustrate" the emerging Anglo-American front. (467) Stalin's suspicion was not unfounded. American policy
was getting closer to Britain's. Truman, who had once secured Soviet troop departure from Tehran at Potsdam, was now increasingly concerned about Iran. Furthermore, many Americans believed that their Government should take any action necessary to thwart the Soviet plans. (468) The Truman Administration thus contemplated the pursuance of a two-pronged policy: to send a direct notice to Moscow and to utilise the United Nations to expose the Russians expansionist objectives. (469) In order to achieve these, the United States therefore encouraged Iran to intensify its protests against Moscow for retaining forces on Iranian territory and to lodge another complaint at the Security Council.

On 4 March, Qavam conferred with Kennan in Moscow and Ala talked to Byrnes in Washington. Both Iranians received assurances that if Iran's negotiations with the Soviet Union failed and Iran resorted to the United Nations for assistance, the United States would then fulfil its international commitment in accordance with the United Nations Charter, and support Iran. (470) On 5 March, Ala addressed a letter to Byrnes asking the United States to "protest in Moscow, against the breach of faith of the Soviet Government in failing to withdraw their forces from the whole north Iran by the second of March 1946". (471) Ala's letter was an excellent, self-assertive statement, which took into consideration the United States' pre-condition that Iran should first make
its presentations. He wrote to Byrnes:

"Your Excellency observed that before taking action, the State Department would need to be informed of the attitude of the Prime Minister of Iran. It is now officially confirmed that Mr Ahmad Qavam, Premier of Iran, protested in writing against the failure of the Soviet Government to live up to its solemn pledge, and would welcome and appreciate American intervention at this critical juncture.... There is no longer any obstacle to prevent Your Excellency from issuing the necessary instructions to your Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow.

..... The Soviet Government are making the evacuation of Iran dependent upon the acceptance by the Iranian Government of certain very important demands. Whereas the withdrawal of foreign allied forces at the end of the war has always been considered unconditional." (472)

In the conclusion, Ala asked Byrnes to "use the great influence of the American Government to obtain the unconditional evacuation of Iran by the Soviet forces". (473)

On the same day, Byrnes sent an instruction to Kennan to
deliver a Note immediately to Molotov. For Byrnes, this was the first opportunity to pursue Truman's directive and carry out a "firm" policy. The US Note that was delivered to the Soviet Government on 6 March, cited Article 5 of the Tripartite Treaty which had established a deadline for the period that foreign troops were stationed in Iran; and to which the Soviet Government had referred to on 29 November 1945. The Note indicated that the Soviet commitment to the Treaty had not been fulfilled.

"The decision of the Soviet Government to retain Soviet troops in Iran beyond the period stipulated by the Tripartite Treaty has created a situation with regard to which the Government of the United States, as a member of the Declaration Regarding Iran dated December 1, 1943, cannot remain indifferent." (474)

Recalling that at the Tehran Summit, the three powers had assured Iran that they would respect its "independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity", the Note asserted further that "the maintenance of troops in Iranian territory by any of the three signatories to the Declaration was contrary to the assurances contained in that Declaration". (475) It also reminded the Soviet Government of a "principle" which had been accepted at the meeting of the Security Council in London.

"The retention by a member of the United
Nations of its troops in the territory of a country which is also a member of the United Nations, without the consent of the Government of that country, is not in accordance with the principles of the United Nations and that the withdrawal of such troops should not be made contingent upon other issues." (476)

The United States Government also expressed its "earnest hope" that the Soviet Government would reaffirm its respect for the Declaration of Tehran and the United Nations Charter "by withdrawing immediately all its forces from the territory of Iran, in order to promote international confidence which is necessary for peace and progress among the peoples of all nations ". The Note concluded with an emphasis on the responsibility resting upon the great powers under the Charter to observe their obligations, and to "respect the sovereign rights of other states". It also requested the Soviet Government to "promptly" advise the United States Government of its decision concerning the withdrawal of troops. (477)

This Note which many historians viewed as a "stiff protest", "uncharacteristically strong" and the "strongest communication made by the United States since the war", (478) was handed by Kennan to Molotov on 6 March 1946. (479)
The British Government had already addressed a Note to the Soviet Government on 4 March, and, as a signatory of the Tripartite Treaty, notified that the deadline for Allied troop evacuation from Iran had passed, and that a proper undertaking by the Soviet Union was expected. (480)

On 6 and 7 March, further reports of Soviet troop movement in Azerbaijan were received at the State Department. According to the American Acting Consul-General in Tabriz, Robert Rossow, the Russians had begun to deploy more tanks and troops in Tabriz. In the following days he reported that more reinforcements were arriving there and leaving in three directions towards the Turkish and Iraqi borders and Tehran. Meanwhile, Rossow received information that the Kurdish Government of Mahabad was "preparing a claim to Turkish Kurdistan". He also had been informed that the Soviet Commander in Tabriz, General Glinsky, had been replaced during the arrival of fresh troops, by Marshal Ivan Bagramian, formerly the Commander of the First Baltic Army. Rossow's view of the Soviet latest military activity is expressed in the following passage:

"I can not over-stress the seriousness and magnitude of current Soviet troop movement here. This is no ordinary reshuffling of troops, but a full scale combat deployment .... All observations and reports indicate
inescapably that the Soviets are preparing for major military operations."(481)
Consequently, the State Department re-analysed the situation. On 8 March Byrnes was briefed about the directions of Soviet military movement, according to Rossow's report, on a map. His reaction was another sign of a new policy of firmness. Edwin Wright from NEA wrote in his notes:

"Mr Byrnes remarked that it now seemed clear the USSR was adding military invasion to political subversion in Iran; and beating one fist into the other hand, he dismissed us with the remark: Now, we'll give it to them with both barrels."(482)

On the same day, the State Department officials dealing with Middle Eastern affairs had a meeting with Under-Secretary Dean Acheson, to discuss the Soviet-Iranian crisis. They recommended a second Note, to be sent to the Soviet Government concerning the latest development. Acheson commented: "Let the USSR know that we are aware of its moves, but leave a graceful way out, if it desires to avoid a showdown."(483) The Note was finalised and cabled to Kennan on 8 March. He delivered it to the Soviet Foreign Ministry the next day.
The Note stated that reports had been received in Washington concerning the arrival of reinforcements from the Soviet Union in Azerbaijan and their
subsequent dispatch towards Tehran and the Turkish and Iraqi frontiers. It was enquired "whether the Soviet Government, instead of withdrawing Soviet troops from Iran", was "bringing additional forces into Iran..", and added:

"In case Soviet forces in Iran are being increased, this Government would welcome information at once regarding the purpose thereof." (484)

Since the dimensions of the new "firm" policy were not yet defined, there is a discrepancy in the vigour of Byrnes' warning to the State Department officials and moderation contained in the Notes addressed to the Soviet Government. At one point, Bohlen advised his colleagues that Iran was not the right place for a military confrontation; and that not only had the United States military been largely demobilised, but also there was no American presence in the region. (485)

Nevertheless the State Department intended to benefit from the domestic advantage of its new foreign policy, and prepare public opinion for a further undertaking. On 12 March, the following short statement from the State Department was published in the American press:

"Additional Soviet armed forces and heavy military combat equipment had been moving from the direction of the Soviet frontier through Tabriz toward the western border of Iran. This Government has enquired of the
Soviet Government whether such movement have
taken place and if so, the reason
thereof."(486)
The American press magnified this report with headlines
such as "Soviet tanks approach Tehran", (487)
Meanwhile, the United States Government decided to send
the battleship Missouri to Turkey, to take home the body
of the Turkish Ambassador who had died a year earlier in
Washington. The Missouri was to be escorted by a task
force towards the Turkish Coast "to show the flag" in
the Eastern Mediterranean. But on 6 March, the State
Department announced that the Missouri would travel
alone. (488) The Secretary of Navy, Forrestal, was
disappointed. As Churchill had stated: "a gesture of
power not fully implemented was almost less effective
than no gesture at all". But, there was still a tendency
in the United States administration for "restraint", and
giving Stalin time to explain the Soviet movements. (489)
There is also a discrepancy between Truman's private and
public statements. On 14 March, he told Harriman:

"There is a very dangerous situation
developing in Iran. The Russians are
refusing to take their troops out, as they
agreed to do in their treaty with the
British; and this may lead to a war". (490)

On the same day, he stated at a news conference that the
situation was not fraught with danger. (491)
The British Government had been promptly informed about Russian troop movements through its diplomats; however, unlike the American Government it did not register any reaction or complaints with Moscow.(492) Murray was astonished at London’s reluctance when he knew that Bullard had sent adequate reports on Soviet movements.(493) Some historians ascribe the British Government’s evasion to the tense atmosphere caused by Labour back-benchers and the British left-wing press in criticising Churchill’s Fulton speech, and their allegations against the Attlee Government in this connection.(494) However, on 14 March Bevin stated at the House of Commons that the British Government would "regret" any settlement which appeared "to be extracted from Persia under duress ".(495) He added that the British Government was still awaiting a reply to its Note of 4 March from Moscow.(496) The Soviet Government refused to reply to either the British or the American Notes. On 15 March, however, the Soviet News Agency, Tass, stated that reports on Soviet troop movement in Iran did not "correspond to reality."(497)
Iran’s second complaint to the United Nations’ Security Council originated in both Tehran and Washington. In Tehran, Qavam had two objectives: first, to secure the removal of Soviet troops by any means available; and second, maintaining Soviet confidence that he was leading a "friendly" Government. He told Murray on 11 March that during his talks in Moscow, he had "made every effort not to provoke the Russians. (498) Qavam had realised that the entire nation saw in him a man who could settle the Soviet-Iranian dispute. When negotiations in Moscow failed, every Iranian except Tudeh members, expected him to report this failure to the Security Council, in conformity with the Council’s resolution of 30 January 1946. According to this view, Soviet refusal to withdraw its troops from Iranian territory by the deadline of 2 March, and the infringement of the Tripartite Treaty, had to be exposed at the United Nations. Qavam’s delicate policy was to approach the United Nations without risking a Soviet retaliation. (499) Thus, Tehran’s uneasiness in keeping silent or taking action was justifiable. Contrary to the situation in Tehran, Washington was under no restraint. The administration represented by
Truman and Byrnes, had a free hand to check the Russians and put the United Nations to test. Through the newly initiated foreign policy, Washington was to enter a diplomatic confrontation with Moscow; a "showdown" which would strengthen the Truman Administration’s position in internal and international affairs.

The question was whether the motive behind the American involvement in presenting the Iranian case at the United Nations, was based on "principle" or "interest". Bohlen believes that the United States "demonstration" was "a clear-cut issue of principle" as well as "power considerations". With a reference to the evolving power-politics, he wrote: "We took a stand in an area remote from normal United States national interests because of realisation that if we did not, we would have to do so in some place much closer to our shores." (500) But, why had the United States failed to take a similar measure to save Eastern Europe? Bohlen finds no ground for confrontation in these countries where the "Russians had installed puppet governments ". Iran was independent of Moscow, also the complainant in the case. (501) Acheson had viewed the Soviet encroachment in Iran as a "threat" to the stability of a part of the world in which the United States had a "genuine economic interest". (502) Truman had justified his stance on Iran as defending both the principle and the interest of the West. As written in his memoirs:
"Russian activities in Iran threatened the peace of the world.... If the Russians were to control Iran's oil, either directly or indirectly, the raw material balance of the world would undergo serious damage, and it would be a serious loss for the economy of the western world." (503)

The American Government, despite its profound intention to raise the Iranian question, took a precaution to avoid an impression of interference in Iranian affairs. On 8 March, Bohlen notified Murray that only an Iranian complaint filed at the United Nations could prepare the ground for the United States presentation. (504) However, it was unlikely that Iran would take such action. In that case, the United States had to act directly and bring up the matter for the consideration of the Security Council. On 8 March, Byrnes informed Bevin that because of the Soviet refusal to reply to the American Note of 6 March, and its continued retention of Soviet troops on Iranian territory, the United States intended to "place the matter before the UN Security Council." Byrnes asked his British counter-part "whether the United Kingdom, as the third signatory of the Declaration Regarding Iran, desired to join the United States in placing the Iranian question before the Security Council." (505) Bevin had intended, apart from Byrnes' suggestion, to use the
Soviet concern over a future Council of Ministers as a counter-measure. He viewed that Soviet concern in other post-war settlements should be exploited for a breakthrough in Iran. He knew of Molotov's interest to finalise what the Soviets had achieved in Eastern Europe, at the next meeting of Council in Paris. In Bevin's message of 9 February to Byrnes, which was delivered by Donald Maclean, the British Foreign Secretary asked for a delay in fixing a date for the Conference of Foreign Ministers, until the United Kingdom and the United States received "some moderately satisfactory reply" to their "remonstration" regarding Iran. (506) Two weeks later, Bevin repeated his demand, urging Byrnes to postpone invitation to the Conference of Foreign Ministers until the time that the Iranian case before the Security Council had been resolved. (507) Upon his return from Moscow, Qavam was faced with opposing pressures from the Americans and the Russians over the question of complaining to the Security Council. Murray was uncertain of what Qavam intended to do. He reported to Byrnes on 11 March that Qavam "did not make a clear statement as to instructions he would give Ala,' nor did he say definitely that he would ask for further immediate consideration by the Security Council." (508) Murray's objective was to secure an assurance that Iran would approach the Security Council definitely. The report of 11 March went on:
... Because Qavam’s attitude did not seem entirely clear as regards UNO action, I arranged audience with the Shah this morning. I told His Majesty that I had no grounds for suspecting the Prime Minister of weakening, but would like him (Shah) to make sure Qavam understood the situation and the vital importance of the Iranian action. I am sure the Shah is completely clear on this." (509)

Murray also noted the Shah’s anxiety regarding a "possible Soviet putsch in Tehran to seize the capital and gain control of the Government." This was caused by rumours that the Red Army had begun moving southward since 5 March and was on its way to seize Tehran. The Shah told Murray that "if this should happen, the Soviets could dictate instructions to Ala, and prevent the Iranian appeal to the UNO, and so make a parallel Irano-American action impossible." The Shah suggested that "in such a case the US and Britain could act on their own initiative on the basis of their obligations, and voice the true Iranian sentiments." (510)

Murray arranged another meeting with Qavam two days later, to emphasise, as Byrnes had done the "importance of action by Iran to speak out for herself in defence of her rights so long as she is free to speak." He also assured Qavam that at the next meeting of the Security Council "Iran could act with advance assurance of US
support which it had not had at the London meeting". According to Murray's report to Byrnes, Qavam agreed with the American view. However the US Ambassador was uncertain about the kind of instruction Qavam would send to Ala; and whether he would keep his word if the Russians applied a "great pressure" on him. Consequently, Murray asked the State Department to approach Ala directly and brief him about Murray's conversation with Qavam in Tehran. He wanted the Department to emphasise the "importance of immediate action, on his (Ala's) part, to get the matter before the Security Council as soon as he receives Qavam's instruction". Murray believed that when the complaint was filed, it would be "easier for Qavam to resist pressure". (511)

As had been predicted, the Russian pressure to bar Iran's action, soon materialised. Qavam sent an emissary on 15 March to the British and American Ambassadors to inform them of this development. Subsequently, Murray reported to Byrnes:

"Soviet chargé called on Prime Minister yesterday and said Soviet Government had heard he planned to make a complaint to the Security Council. The Chargé said this would be regarded as unfriendly and hostile act, and would have unfortunate results for Iran.... Prime Minister replied that the
presence of foreign troops in Iran after expiration of the Tripartite Treaty (deadline) was unconstitutional and that if he had failed to act he would be called to account by his people and eventually by Majles. Further (he) cited fact that (the) case remains before the Security Council which can ask for a report on the basis (of) London decision.

Apparently because of the stout resistance shown by Qavam during their long conversation, Soviet Chargé finally shifted his position slightly and pressed Prime Minister at least to refrain from taking initiative himself and to await request from the Security Council for report."(512)

Qavam also asked Murray, through his emissary, "what support could be expected" from the US and the British Governments "if he took the risk of bringing the complaint to the Security Council". Murray did not give Qavam any assurance but repeated that "Iran's sole frail hope of a solution" lay in a quick appeal to the Security Council.(513)

However, the United States Government, in order to thwart Russian pressure on Qavam, announced that even if Iran failed to complain, the Iranian question would be raised at the Security Council. On 15 March, the
American press were informed that if an action by Iran became impossible, the United States will raise the issue. (514) Such a forceful warning was intended to persuade the Russians that further pressure on Qavam would be fruitless.

At a meeting in New York, on 16 March, on whether the United States would go further if the Soviet Union did not accept a Security Council decision on Iran, the Secretary bluntly stated:

"The answer is simple. The United States is committed to the support of the Charter of the United Nations. Should the occasion arise, our military strength will be used to support the purpose and principles of the Charter." (515)

On the following day, the American and the British Ambassadors conveyed to Qavam a message from their Governments to the effect that Iran should "immediately file an appeal with the Security Council"; and assured him of their "full support to such an appeal". (516) Consequently, Qavam laid rest to his doubts and pursued a two-pronged policy: approaching the United Nations while negotiating with the Russians for the evacuation of their troops. He even became convinced that Iran's position in negotiating with the Russians would be strengthened if the Security Council discussed the Iranian request for the withdrawal of troops. As such,
Iran could use the UN as "bargaining pressure" against the Soviet Union. (517)

On 18 March, the Iranian Ambassador in Washington, Ala, who was also appointed as the head of the Iranian delegation to the United Nations, received Qavam's instruction to submit the second Iranian appeal to the Security Council. Ala promptly addressed a letter to the UN Secretary General, Trygve Lie, and filed Iran's complaint. Ala wrote that the Soviet-Iranian dispute was "likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security"; therefore, on behalf of Iran, Ala demanded that the Security Council, in accordance with Article 35 paragraph 1 of the Charter, consider the situation and take it into consideration at its scheduled meeting on 25 March. Ala's major point was the Soviet refusal to withdraw its troops from Iran on 2 March, a development which had occurred since the Security Council's decision on 30 January. However, the letter added that the Soviet Government "continued to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran through the medium of USSR agents, officials and armed forces." (518)

When presenting the letter, Ala expressed at the UN Secretariat that this action had been made as a constitutional and national duty of the Iranian Government and should not be interpreted as a demonstration of any hostility against the Soviet Union. (519)

Historians have argued over the extent of Ala's
authorisation in presenting the letter and offering the explanation. One historian has viewed that this was "against the instructions of his Government, but enjoyed the full backing of the United States". Another has contended that Ala raised the question at the Security Council when "it was not clear exactly what Qavam wanted him to do". Furthermore, a Tass dispatch reported that Qavam had "reprimanded" Ala for placing the Iranian complaint on the Council's agenda. All these views were based on a wrong interpretation of Qavam's policy and misconstruction of his tactics. Qavam's objective was to achieve the evacuation of Soviet troops from Iran without antagonising the Soviet Government. Iran needed the Security Council to push the Russians out. Otherwise both Qavam and Ala were aware that Iran's interest was to accommodate, not confront the Soviet Union. Ala had pursued the same objective as Qavam. However, the Ambassador enjoyed freedom of speech in the supporting atmosphere of the United Nations, while the Prime Minister lacked such advantages. In the end, the combination of the conciliatory tone of one and the defiant tone of the other proved to be successful. In spite of the aforementioned views, in reality Qavam had respected Ala as "an able and patriotic, although somewhat excitable statesman". 
On 19 March, Ambassador Andrei Gromyko, who was also the Soviet chief delegate to the United Nations, asked the UN Secretary General for the postponement of the Iranian question from 25 March to 10 April. Gromyko justified this request by stating that the Soviets and the Iranians were still negotiating, and that the Soviet delegation was not prepared to take part in the discussions. (525)

On 20 March, the Iranian and American Governments expressed their disagreement with the Soviet request. Ala urged in his letter to Trygve Lie that the consideration of the Iranian complaint should not be delayed. He asserted that since such a delay would harm Iranian interest, the presence of Soviet forces in Iran after 2 March 1946 was not negotiable. (526) Byrnes wrote to Lie that he wanted the Iranian question to be placed as the first issue on the agenda. He also intended to request a report about the Soviet-Iranian negotiations which had been recommended at the previous session of the Security Council. (527) On 20 March Truman endorsed Byrnes' stance and stated that the Iranian problem should be considered at the Security Council without delay. (528) Even a demand personally made by Gromyko, when he met with the President at the White House on 21 March, could not change Truman's decision. Truman believed that Stalin would support the United Nations. (529)
Meanwhile the new Soviet Ambassador, Ivan Sadchikov, arrived in Tehran on 20 March and immediately entered into negotiations with Qavam. Sadchikov offered new Soviet proposals, but also conveyed Stalin's resentment of Qavam's renewed plea at the Security Council.(530) Simultaneously, the Tudeh Party organised street-demonstrations in Tehran against the Government's appeal to the Security Council.(531)

On 23 March, Qavam stated at a press conference that his objective was the evacuation of foreign troops, and that this might be achieved through "direct negotiations or a recommendation of the Security Council". He asserted that Iran's approach to the United Nations should not be interpreted as anti-Soviet.

"While we have approached the United Nations, our intention to maintain friendly and good neighbourly relations with our great northern neighbour has not been changed. Iran's delegate to the United Nations has been instructed to avoid any statements and actions likely to lead to further misunderstandings.(532)

Qavam's statement was misinterpreted in the foreign press. According to their version, Qavam had stated that the Soviets would leave Iran and that Ala's action at the United Nations was without authority.(533) This version was taken as a rebuke against Ala's latest
presentation, and thus, caused complications at the Security Council.

However, at a meeting with Murray on the next day, Qavam of dismissed the misinterpretation of his statement in the foreign media and blamed his assistant, Firouz, for wrongly interpreting his remarks. Qavam's explanations had probably convinced Murray, since Firouz's pro-Russian tendency was not a secret. Previously, in Qavam's absence in early March, Firouz had told the press that the maintenance of Russian troops in Iran was a "friendly gesture". However, the Truman Administration was not expecting Qavam to destroy all his bridges with the Kremlin and rely solely on the United Nations. Truman himself was sending friendly signals to Stalin while urging the Security Council to uphold the Iranian complaint. When Truman received the new American Ambassador to Moscow, Walter Beddel Smith on 23 March for a farewell, he instructed him

"to tell Stalin I held him to be a man to keep his word. Troops in Iran after 2 March upset the theory. Could Stalin do something about it?"

In addition to co-ordinating with Iran, Byrnes had been concerned about the British position. In his message of 21 March to Bevin, he expressed his regret that the British Foreign Secretary was not going to attend the Security Council, since the issue was "necessarily
critical" and might "affect the whole future of the United Nationsil. (537) Bevin realised the anxiety of Byrnes; and on 22 March assured him of his sympathy and full support:

"...I assure you that I am absolutely with you on the fundamental importance for UNO of the Persian issue. My view is that Russian tactics will not be influenced by my presence at the meeting, but I will remain constant. If a real crisis threatening the whole future of UNO were to develop, of course I should try to overcome all difficulties and join you."(538)

The American lobbying for Iran was extended to France. The coalition Government of France was reluctant to risk a confrontation with the powerful French Communist Party over a distant concern such as Iran. However, the French Foreign Minister George Bidault agreed, at the request of the American Ambassador, Coffery, that if there was a "showdown", France would do its part even at the cost of a "rupture with Communists". (539)

On 25 March, when the Security Council convened its session, two favourable signals from Moscow surprised the world. First Stalin stated in a reply to a written request from the President of United Press, that the question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran had been decided on 24 March "in a positive way by an
understanding between the Soviet and Iranian Governments 

Second, a Tass dispatch was broadcast by Radio Moscow, as follows:

"Withdrawal of Soviet troops from areas of Mashad, Shahroud, and Semnan which began on 24 March has been completed. Withdrawal of remaining troops has begun on the basis of an understanding with the Iranian Government on 24 March, and should be completed in five or six weeks if nothing unforeseen should take place."(541)

Stalin's last minute decision did not save the Soviet Government from the United Nations trial which had been carefully planned by the United States. While Byrnes was determined to proceed with a non-violence confrontation, Moscow's strategy of avoidance did not work.(542)

On 26 March, the question of Iran was considered in a debate. Gromyko tried to remove the question from the agenda. He claimed that an understanding had been reached in Tehran between the Iranian Prime Minister and the Soviet Ambassador, and that the withdrawal of Russian troops from Iran had already begun. He therefore concluded that the Council's debate on the question would be meaningless.(543) On the basis of this argument, Gromyko had also told Stettinus that the Soviet delegation "could not attend" the Council's session if the Soviet-Iranian dispute was brought up at
the discussion. Nevertheless, Byrnes disputed Gromyko's offer to amend the agenda. Byrnes knew that the negotiations were under way in Tehran, but no agreement had been reached yet. Thus, he preferred to disregard the negotiations in Tehran and insisted on following up the Iranian complaint. Gromyko had no supported evidence to persuade the Council to accept his statement. Byrnes used this weakness of Gromyko at the Council's session of 26 March to contradict him:

"Today, the representative of the USSR stated that there has been an agreement. If that information is correct, then the USSR Government should have presented to the Council for its consideration a joint statement from the Iranian Government and the USSR Government stating that an agreement had been arrived at and asking that there be no further consideration of the question. The Iranian Government has not withdrawn its letter.... We must put this matter on the agenda; we must give the Iranian Government an opportunity to say whether or not there has been an agreement."(546)

In his rebuttal of Gromyko, Byrnes was assured of the support of Ala who had authority to affirm or deny the conclusion of any Soviet-Iranian agreement. However, Ala
had not been invited to attend the session. Qavam had already informed Ala of his recent negotiations with Sadchikov, but instructed him to say nothing if he was asked about the conclusion of an agreement in Tehran. The last part of Byrnes' statement was more intriguing for the Council. It was to test the honesty of Gromyko's statement. Byrnes suggestion was to consider the case until Iran withdrew it.

"When a member of the United Nations advises the Council that a situation exists which is likely to threaten the peace and security of the world, we can not deny to that nation the opportunity to be heard, to say whether or not there has been agreement, to say whether or not it wishes to withdraw its complaint... We must put this matter on the agenda; We must give the Iranian Government an opportunity to say whether or not there has been an agreement."

The British delegate, Sir Alexander Cadogan, agreed with Byrnes, stating that if there was an "understanding" between Iran and the Soviet Union, both of them should have reported it to the Council. The delegates of Egypt, Australia, the Netherlands and Mexico expressed similar views.

Gromyko tried to impose the Soviet view in his second statement to the session. He accused Ala of acting
without instruction from the Iranian Government in bringing the matter before the Security Council, and Byrnes of being "more Iranian than the Iranians." He insisted that Articles 34 and 35 were not applicable to the question, and that there was no legal basis for placing the Iranian issue on the agenda. (550) The Council concluded its session of 26 March by voting on Gromyko's demand to remove the Iranian question from the agenda. Nine of the eleven members voted against it. The only vote in favour of the Soviet Union was that of Poland. (551)

Finally, Gromyko again pleaded that the debate be postponed until 10 April. At the session of the Council on 27 March, Gromyko stated that the Council should consider Stalin's statement to the effect that a "positive solution" had been reached on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran; and that no further problem remained between the two countries. He threatened that if the discussions regarding Iran were not postponed, the Soviet delegation would not participate in them. Gromyko also opposed the move that Ala should be given a right to express the Iranian view. He asserted that Iran was not a member of the Security Council and could not be represented there. (552)

Byrnes rejected the postponement, stating that such a decision would be to the detriment of a small country which was in "a desperate situation," and had a right to
be heard at the sessions. At this point, The French delegate resorted to a "face-saving" formula to prevent the Soviet withdrawal from the Council. He suggested that a three-man committee comprised of the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States and France be assigned to study various proposals and bring opinions together. However due to the difference of views between the Soviet Union and the United States, the sub-committee failed to achieve a solution. When a second voting took place on the Soviet proposal to amend the agenda and remove the Iranian question, the result was 9 to 2 against the proposal. Only Poland was in favour of the Soviet proposal. Gromyko declared that the Soviet delegation could no longer participate in the meeting. Gromyko and his advisers then walked out of the Council.

The departure of the Soviet delegation, the first of its kind, worried the Western powers, particularly the United States. They feared that "Russia would withdraw from the Security Council's meetings and possibly from the UN as a whole." If the Soviets had upheld such a threat, the United States would have had no choice but to give way to the Russians, or else risk the existence of the United Nations. However, Gromyko's remark that he could not participate in the discussion about Iran, lessened Byrnes' anxiety when he wrote to Acheson on the same day: "the situation was completely in the open but apparently was not as serious as feared."
Within the United Nations bodies, there was an argument whether such a move to force the Russians to walk out, was necessary. Trygve Lie was himself in favour of postponement of the Iranian case in order to leave the door open for Soviet-Iranian direct negotiation. In Lie's view, while Tehran and Moscow were close to a settlement, "a debate in the Security Council would probably intensify rather than ease the dispute." (559) Byrnes and the majority of the Council were against such an interpretation. They were pleased that Gromyko's departure did not stop the Council's debate on Iran. Thus, after the Russians walked out, Byrnes resumed his statement. He maintained that since the Soviet-Iranian dispute had not been settled, the United Nations was the right authority to investigate the situation. He concluded that if Iran was deprived of the right of expression, the United Nations would "die in its infancy, of inefficiency and ineffectiveness." (560) The Egyptian delegate, Mahmoud Fakhri Pasha, followed Byrnes' statement. He stated that since the great powers were granted certain privileges by the UN Charter, they were expected to use them in the right way. He further maintained that the small countries were looking for the Council's decision because they wanted to see the great powers respect their treaty obligations. Fakhri Pasha demanded that the Council invite the Iranian delegate to the session. A vote took place on this proposal with
a result of 8 to 2 in favour. The Polish and Australian delegates voted against. (561)

Ala was invited to the chamber. He presented a report which contradicted Gromyko’s claims. Ala asserted that he knew of no agreement, secret or otherwise, between Iran and the Soviet Union. He also revealed that Qavam had not achieved any result from his negotiations in Moscow, since the Soviet demands were incompatible with the Atlantic Charter, United Nations Charter, and the Iranian Constitution. Since Byrnes had asked whether or not Iran would agree with the postponement, Ala stated that he had no instruction to agree with the postponement. He suggested that the Council should proceed immediately with the case, because Iran was suffering from the illegal presence of Soviet troops, and their interference in its internal affairs. (562) The events of the 27 March, consolidated Byrnes’ position in the US administration and the United Nations Organisation. Truman stated at a news conference on 28 March that he had full confidence in Byrnes and would support his policy. (563) Whereas Byrnes’ insistence on supporting the underdog in the dispute was praised by both the Americans and the British media; Gromyko’s walkout was taken as a defeat for the Soviet policy. The press compared Gromyko’s action with the Japanese withdrawal from the League of Nations after the occupation of Manchuria. (564) The New York Times hailed the Security Council for hearing the Iranian delegate
and called it "a victory for UNO".(565) Another American journal commented:

"If the UN refused to hear the victims of oppression it would betray the world. Better no UN than an ally of aggression."(566)

The Times commented that the Council was "justice bound" to hear both sides of the dispute, not only the great one.(567) Gromyko's unjust behaviour was analysed in the Times editorial:

"It was impossible at one and the same time to assert that there had been an agreement and to refuse to hear the delegate of the Persian Government at the Security Council".(568)

The Times criticised Soviet officials for "clouding international affairs, and in particular, the relations between the Soviet Union and the Western world ". "The cause of doubt resides not so much in the aim of the Soviet foreign policy as in its methods ", The Times said. (569)

The New York Times Correspondent in London reported about the expression of "praise" for Byrnes' courage among the British who had "been the chief target of the Russian war of nerves and political expansion".(570) Bevin, whose policy in regard to British resistance in face of Soviet pressure in the Balkans and elsewhere was endorsed at a meeting of Labour MP's on 27 March,
redirected his attention to the Iranian problem. (571) He instructed Cadogan on 29 March, to "stand firm" against the Soviet tactics at the United Nations, "to back up Byrnes and to fill in any gap in his argument." However, he advised Cadogan to let Byrnes "take the lead" in the confrontation with the Soviets.

"We have up to now borne the main burden of resisting Russian penetration of Persia, and it is obviously in the interest of both ourselves and of the United Nations as a whole, that the United States Government should now bring her full influence to bear in defence of the Charter." (572)

However, both the American and British Governments intended to adopt a policy of moderation in the absence of a Soviet delegation to the Security Council. There were four reasons for this. Firstly, the voting formula that the Security Council had adopted at the San Francisco Conference, could have become an obstacle if the Council were to go ahead neglecting a permanent member. (573) Secondly, the forthcoming Peace Conference in Paris would have been at stake without Soviet co-operation. (574) Thirdly, Byrnes was uncertain about Qavam. Would he follow the United States recommendation to refuse Soviet conditions, or would he submit to the Soviet pressure and withdraw Iran's complaint? (575) Fourthly, Gromyko's absence was declared only as "non-participation" in
the Iranian issue. It was not to be overstated. This was in accord with the Soviet view. The Polish delegate, Dr. Lange, affirmed that Gromyko's walk-out was "an absence not a withdrawal". Thus, the Council came implicitly to the conclusion that the ten remaining members should not give any hard and fast recommendation without hearing the Soviets. (576)

Following a secret meeting of the Council on 28 March, the United Nations officials stated that "a considerable area of agreement was found". (577) The Council meeting on 29 March was held with the hope that a solution acceptable by all parties had been found. Since Gromyko was absent, a Soviet diplomat, Sobelov, who was the United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Security Affairs, attended the meeting. (578) The face-saving formula was presented by Byrnes. He acknowledged that, reportedly, there were negotiations being held between Iran and the Soviet Union. However, he emphasised that the Council had not been informed of the exact "status" of the negotiations. Byrnes asserted:

"Members of the Council must be solicitous to avoid possibility of the presence of Soviet troops in Iran being used to influence or coerce the Iranian Government in its negotiations with the Soviet Government." (579)

He suggested that the Council ask the Soviet and Iranian
Governments to report to the Council, by 3 April 1946, on the status of their negotiations, and confirm that the evacuation of the Soviet troops was not conditional upon the conclusion of other agreements. The delegates of Great Britain, Poland, Australia, Netherlands, and Egypt made statements in support of Byrnes' proposal; and the Council approved it unanimously. (580)

At this point, the Russians were nervous about the double-game played by Iranians in Tehran and New York. In Tehran, Iran's Prime Minister was negotiating with the Russians; and in New York, the Russians were being denounced at the world organisation at the request of the Iranian Ambassador. The Russians wanted Iran to adopt a clear-cut policy, but Qavam did not want it. Should he have stopped the continuance of the debate on the Iranian question at the United Nations, he would have remained lonely and helpless before the Soviet negotiator.

In spite of the pressures from the Soviet officials and the Tudeh Party, Qavam told a correspondent on 30 March that Ala enjoyed his full confidence. Furthermore in a letter addressed to Trygve Lie on 1 April, he officially endorsed Ala. (581)

Nevertheless, in the same meeting of the Council on 29 March, the Polish delegate attempted to discredit Ala by underlining the discrepancy between Qavam's conciliatory interviews in Tehran and Ala's stubbornness at the Security Council. Dr. Lange questioned Ala on whether
he had received any instructions to oppose the postponement. Ala answered that his instructions were "clear and broad" and that he had "thorough discretion" in taking actions "necessary to protect the interests of Iran". Lange further asked whether Ala had received any reports to the effect that the Russian troops were "in process of being withdrawn". Ala replied that he had "no information, official or otherwise, that any Russian troops" had "crossed from Iran into Russia". He then emphasised the Soviet obligation, the one which remained unfulfilled. Lange's next question was regarding a report, in which Qavam had stated that he did not want any outside pressure to be levied on the negotiations between Iran and the Soviet Union. Ala commented that the Polish delegate's perception was not correct; and stated that the Iranians desired the removal of all sorts of pressure. He said "one of the reasons why the Prime Minister instructed me to refer these disputes to the Security Council was precisely his desire to be free from pressure from any government, in conducting the affairs of his office". (582)

The Security Council held its next meeting on 3 April, to examine the report which had been received from the Soviet and the Iranian delegates. Ala wrote to the President of the Security Council on 2 April, that Iran had pursued the Council's resolution of 30 January, to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union, but had
"achieved no positive result. He further maintained that the "USSR agents, officials, and armed forces" were "continuing to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran". Regarding the status of the Soviet-Iranian negotiation, about which the Council was concerned, Ala revealed that Sadchikov had called on Qavam on 24 March and handed him three memoranda on: the evacuation of Iranian territory by Soviet forces; the formation of a joint Iranian-Soviet Union oil company; and the autonomy of Azerbaijan. Ala’s letter continued:

"On 27 March, the Iranian Prime Minister again referred to the proviso and said that the evacuation of the USSR troops must be unconditional, and that he could not agree to the USSR’s proposals on the subject of oil and Azerbaijan. To this, the USSR Ambassador responded that if agreement could be reached on these other two subjects, there would be no further cause for anxiety, and no unforeseen circumstances would take place. This statement has not been clarified. With respect to the other two memoranda, the Prime Minister has outlined his views to the USSR Ambassador. His position is: (a) that as the status of the province of Azerbaijan like that of all other provinces in Iran, is regulated by the Iranian constitution and the law on provincial councils, it is an internal
matter, with which the Iranian Government will deal; (b) that the formation of a stock company with joint participation by Iran and the USSR is a matter to be submitted for approval to the next parliament after the USSR troops have been withdrawn from Iran and elections can be held lawfully for the organisation of the Fifteenth Legislature. This is the present status of discussion on the subject of oil and the future status of Azerbaijan."(583)

Contrary to Ala’s letter, the Soviet report to the Security Council was promising. Gromyko’s letter of 3 April to the President of the Security Council stated that the Governments of the Soviet Union and Iran had reached an understanding on the complete withdrawal of troops in the course of one and a half months. The letter stated:

"The question regarding the evacuation of the USSR troops which was brought before the Security Council on 18 March by the Iranian Government was settled by the understanding reached between the USSR and the Iranian Government. As regards the other questions, they are not connected with the question of the withdrawal of USSR troops. It is well known that the question of an oil concession
or of a mixed joint stock company arose in 1944, independently of the USSR troops." (584)

The difference between the reports of Ala and Gromyko caused much disquiet in Moscow and anxiety in Tehran. The two governments were actually in the final phase of concluding an agreement when Ala’s letter was read at the Security Council. The day before the Council’s meeting, Qavam’s political deputy, Firouz, had told the press that the withdrawal of Soviet troops was not conditional, and that Ala should have informed the Security Council of this matter. (585) Qavam was faced with a complaint from Sadchikov regarding Ala’s letter. He could hardly convince the Soviet Ambassador that he did not instruct Ala to state that the evacuation of troops was conditional upon meeting the other Soviet demands. (586) During a conversation with Murray on 4 April, Qavam even denied giving information to Ala about the recent Soviet proposals; and stated that Ala had gone beyond his instructions. (587)

At the Council’s meeting on 4 April, Ala’s attitude was not the same as the one he had expressed, in writing on 2 April. This change was either the result of Tehran’s instruction or Ala’s own perception that the evacuation of Soviet troops was no longer conditional. (588) Thus, when the two letters were read at the Council, and Byrnes invited Ala to comment on Gromyko’s letter, Ala stated:

"If the representative of the Soviet Union
would be willing to withdraw the condition of unforeseen circumstances which he has attached to the evacuation of Iran; and if his Government gives the Council an assurance that the withdrawal of the whole of the Soviet forces from Iran, unconditionally, is effected by 6 May at the latest, then I would say that Iran would be willing not to press further at this stage consideration of the matter which she has brought to the attention of the Security Council, provided of course that these matters remain on the agenda of the Council for consideration at any time."

Satisfied with Ala's statement, Byrnes submitted a draft resolution which was approved by nine votes at the Council. The Australian delegate abstained. The resolution noted that the Iranian appeal had arisen from the "presence of Soviet troops in Iran". It also mentioned the "assurances of the Soviet Government" that the withdrawal of Soviet troops had already commenced and the "complete evacuation of its troops from the whole of Iran be accomplished within five or six weeks". It further affirmed the presence of Soviet troops in Iran was not "being used to influence the course of negotiations between the two Governments". Finally, the Council decided "to defer further proceedings on the
Iranian appeal until 6 May. At that date the Iranian Government was requested to "report to the Council whether the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the whole of Iran" had "been completed". Furthermore, the Council would at the same time consider what, if any, further proceedings on the Iranian appeal were required. According to this resolution, on 6 May the Governments of Iran and the Soviet Union were to confirm the completion of the evacuation to the Council. The Council would then decide on the next course of action. It also left the way open for the Council to consider, at any time, the question which had remained on the agenda of the Council.

Commenting on the resolution, Ala stated that the people of Iran were willing to "accept the Soviet pledge" to evacuate Iran by 6 May unconditionally. He added that when Soviet troops and equipment were removed, the Iranian Government would be prepared to deal with "all matters of legitimate interest" which affected its relations with its northern neighbour "in a spirit of understanding friendliness ". Ala praised the Council for its "firmness and courage" which "instilled a feeling of confidence among the small nations ". His concluding word was of great significance:

"Iran has received something from the Council which it could not have obtained alone."(592)

The second round of the Security Council debate on Iran (25 March - 4 April 1946) achieved more than the first
one (January 1946). This was due to several factors. Firstly, it was because of the intelligence and shrewdness of Prime Minister Qavam whose position was not comparable with that of the weak and uncertain Hakimi, who was forced to resign when the Council’s debate was going on in London. Secondly, whereas in London the American support of Iran’s plea had been lukewarm, during the second round, the United States intervened decisively on behalf of Iran. Thirdly, in London there was no evidence of a Soviet violation of the Tripartite Treaty concerning the evacuation of troops. However, the Council’s debate in New York put the Russians in defendant box before world public opinion, to explain why they did not fulfil their commitment to evacuate Iran by 2 March 1946. The Fourth factor was frankness and the intransigence of Ala who never missed an opportunity to expose, with a legalistic precision, the Russians misconduct in Iran. The Fifth and final factor was the position of the United Nations Organisation itself. Whereas in January UNO had just been formed, none of its procedures were finalised, and its Secretary-General had not yet been elected; in March-April, it had actually been a solid platform, and was put to test on the question of Iran. Secretary Byrnes tried his chance on this platform and succeeded. Gromyko wanted to intimidate or neutralise it, but failed. Henceforth the United Nations, and its
political body, the Security Council, were to assume their own respectable positions in international strategies and programs.
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SECTION SIX
QAVAM’S ROAD TO CONCILIATION
Qavam returned from Moscow empty-handed; yet he was optimistic about solving the two major problems of Iran, namely the presence of Soviet troops and the rebellious regime in Azerbaijan. Internally, Qavam had to weaken his opponents, whose main base of power was the Majles, in order to protect himself and consolidate his government's position. Externally, he had to continue negotiations with the Russians, while not antagonising the British and the Americans.

Iran's political situation in March 1946 was very delicate. Any miscalculation by Qavam could have potentially ended in great failure or even disaster. On the one hand, a confrontation with the right-wing anti-Soviet politicians could have angered the British, whose ambassador, Bullard, disliked Qavam. (1) On the other, his toleration of the right could have provoked the leftist groups, who, if suppressed, could have caused a stronger reaction from the Soviets.

The cardinal issue was the relationship with the Soviet Union. On the one hand, Qavam intended to convince the Soviets that his government was not "unfriendly"; on the other, he had to pursue the Iranian complaint at the United Nations, which the Soviets regarded as an "unfriendly" act. (2)

In addition to internal inducement, Qavam was being pressured by the Americans to approach the United Nations. The American and British Governments had persuaded Qavam that only through the support of the
United Nations did he have a chance to resist Soviet pressure.(3)
The plight of Azerbaijan had created a major problem. The Iranian Government had lost all authority over its most important province. Militarily, it had failed to secure the province when the Russian troops had stopped Iranian army movement against the rebels. Moreover, negotiating with the rebels on their terms would be viewed not only as appeasement, but also as sacrificing Iranian interest to foreign stooges.
A British specialist on Iran, Anne Lambton, described this complicated Iranian situation in April 1946:

"Many of Persia's internal problems cannot be solved until the problems of her relations with foreign powers, and in particular Russia, have been solved; while at the same time, her relations with foreign powers are affected by the failure to solve internal problems. To put it more plainly, internal chaos and disorder give a pretext, however flimsy, for interference in the internal affairs of Persia by foreign powers."(4)

Lambton, who was the British Press Attaché in Iran during the war, explained how the Russians extended their influence in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan to parallel the British influence in southern and western parts of
Iran, and particularly among the Bakhtiar and Qashaqai tribes. (5)

Another historian, Harbutt, made a similar analysis of Qavam's dilemma.

"Various political factions were badly split. The three great powers stirred the pot, with the Shah and some officials favouring the American influence; the British having power in army and other official circles and among right-wing politicians; the Soviet-supported Tudeh Party threatening revolution or at least a coup, and the nationalists suspicious of foreign influence." (6)

At this point, Qavam's policy had three main objectives. First, he sought to consolidate his position in order to enter negotiations with the Russians. Secondly, he intended to promise to form a joint-stock oil company, conditional upon the approval of the future Majles, in return for the evacuation of troops and the restoration of Iranian control over Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. Lastly, he wanted to play for time and abandon his enforced pledge to the Russians. Qavam understood that, in the end, he could resort neither to appeasement nor to capitulation.
CHAPTER ONE

QAVAM AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF POWER

When Qavam was in Moscow, his opponents in the Majles planned to limit his power. They suspected that Qavam would compromise Iranian interests under Russian pressure and withdraw the Iranian complaint from the United Nations. Sixty deputies, led by Zia, signed a proclamation addressed to the United Nations stating that the Iranian nation desired to follow its petition against Soviet interference in Iran. The anti-Qavam faction was determined to force him to report all his undertakings to the Majles, but Qavam's prolonged stay in Moscow left them little chance.

Qavam's opponents first planned to corner him when he was introducing his Cabinet's program to the Majles by defeating him through a vote of no-confidence. They soon realised that Qavam would resist such a trap. The 14th Majles was to be terminated on 11 March; and there was no prospect for any further elections, as long as foreign troops were present in Iran. Therefore, after 11 March, Qavam would have been free from parliamentary control. A second plan envisioned by Qavam's opponents was to pass legislation to prolong the term of the 14th Majles up until the Soviet troops had been evacuated. This was a real threat to Qavam who hoped to solve Iran's crucial problems without the interference of the Majles.

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The Tudeh Party, which believed Qavam would support Soviet interests during the parliamentary recess, joined Qavam's camp to prevent a parliamentary session.

On 6th March, a demonstration was organised by Tudeh militants and supporters of Qavam in front of the Majles to prevent opposition deputies from getting into the Majles. Several deputies who ignored the barricade were insulted and attacked by the mob. Thereafter, those deputies who dared to go to the Majles, rarely constituted a quorum. (10)

Qavam returned home two days before the termination of the 14th Majles. He held a meeting with some deputies who were permitted to enter the Majles. He allowed one of the deputies who was in his delegation to give a short report about negotiations between the Iranian Prime Minister and Soviet leaders. (11)

Since the Majles was the stronghold of the anti-Soviet politicians, their powerful position would end at the close of session. Consequently, because there were no elections for the new Majles in sight, Qavam would be left secure in power.

This was a matter for Soviet concern. When Qavam was negotiating in Moscow, the French Communist paper, L'Humanité, stated that Qavam's Government was "not yet absolutely secure against a coup d'état by a reactionary feudal conspiracy", (12)
However, the end of the Majles had not met with complete Soviet satisfaction; attacks against Iranian "ruling circles" continued. On 14 March, Izvestia published an article by Nicolai Alexiev, claiming that "inspirers of aggressive plans" against the Soviet Union were "still carrying much influence in determining Iranian foreign policy". Izvestia accused "British agents" of acting through some Iranian politicians. It named Zia as the one who was trying "to make the Soviet Union clash with other great powers". It concluded:

"This situation requires great vigilance on the part of the Soviet Union towards the Iranian ruling circles and their international plan."(13)

A second article by Alexiev on Iran was published in Izvestia on 21 March, in which he again attacked Iranian "ruling circles" allegedly for "seeking to involve Iran in political adventures directed against the Soviet Union". In a warning tone, the article stated:

"Their (ruling circles') reactionary policy in internal affairs has caused dissatisfaction among wide sections of the population. The democratic movement has consolidated itself in Azerbaijan. Quite clearly, therefore, continuation of the policy of reactionary circles of Iran can only aggravate the situation inside the
country." (14)
On 17 March, Kennan believed that unless Qavam was "prepared to accede to major immediate Soviet demands », Moscow would make an effort to bring into power another government which would meet their "immediate and ultimate objectives", namely "continued maintenance of Soviet armed forces in Iran and the granting of oil concessions ". Since the Soviet Government had not yet answered the American Note of 6 March, Kennan thought that Moscow was "waiting for some development" that could "make possible a better answer". (15) Kennan’s view was not unrealistic, since Tehran was expecting a coup by the Tudeh Party and Soviet agents during the Iranian New Year holiday between 21 - 27 March. Following the arrival of Soviet reinforcements to Iran in the first half of March, such suspicion was justifiable. (16) Qavam authorised the American adviser of the Gendarmerie, Colonel Schwarzkopf, to determine security measures for protecting the capital. (17) Murray anticipated on 20 March that Soviet occupation of Tehran was "a possibility", but "unlikely ". Making himself prepared for such an event, Murray asked Byrnes for instructions in this regard. In Murray’s scenario, a Communist coup could have taken place and seized power in Tehran, setting up a new government subservient to the Russians. Similar events in Eastern Europe formed the bases for this apprehension. The Shah and Qavam might ask Murray’s opinion on whether they should leave
Tehran and set up the Government in a safe area, in the event of a Communist Coup; Byrnes advised Murray:

"If the Shah leaves Tehran with his court for the purpose of setting up government at some other place in Iran, you may find it advisable to designate a Secretary of Embassy to accompany him. If, however, he leaves Tehran merely to take refuge elsewhere, it seems to us that it would be preferable not to detail a Secretary to accompany him".

Byrnes added in his message that if the Communist threat and the Shah's fear materialised, the United States would not recognise a new government brought about under duress. (18)

Whether or not the Russians intended to play either of their cards - agitation and threat or negotiation and compromise - Qavam was determined to stay calm. In spite of Soviet pressure, he allowed Ala to follow up Iran's complaint to the United Nations. At the same time (20 March) and much to the Soviets' satisfaction, he ordered the arrest of Zia, who was reputed to be the leading pro-British and an anti-Soviet politician. (19)

The new Soviet Ambassador, Ivan Sadchikov, who had arrived in Tehran the same day, soon called on Qavam to express the pleasure of the Soviet Government for Zia's detention. (20) Tass jubilantly reflected the news of Zia's detention and quoted Qavam as saying that this
decision was not taken under pressure from any side, but on account of "subversive activity represented to the international security of Iran".\(^{(21)}\)

In the meantime, the Prime Minister's political assistant, Mozaffar Firouz, whom Murray named "Qavam's evil genius", made remarks in favour of the Soviets. On one occasion, Firouz stated that the presence of Soviet troops in Iran was a "friendly gesture".\(^{(22)}\)

It should be noted that the position of the Shah had been actually undermined by Qavam whilst in the process of decision-making. For example, Qavam had refused to consult the Shah when he negotiated with the Russians; he had prevented the Majles from deciding about the interregnum before its termination; he had suspended anti-Tudeh newspapers; he had ordered the closure of the headquarters of anti-Tudeh parties; he had ordered the detention of his opponents and same of the Tudeh Party; and he had encouraged the publication of anti-Shah articles in leftist newspapers. The Shah sought the assistance of an elder statesman, Pirnia, to find a solution.\(^{(23)}\)

The Shah, Qavam and Pirnia met at the royal palace on 22 March. Pirnia advised Qavam to consult the Shah if crucial decisions were being undertaken. He also asked the Prime Minister to recommend measures which would guarantee respect for the Shah's constitutional position.\(^{(24)}\)
As the "ruling circles" had lost both their power-base in the Majles and their leader Zia, and as the Court was further marginalised; Qavams' government became regarded by the Soviets as a party with which they could negotiate.
CHAPTER TWO

QAVAM - SADCHIKOV AGREEMENT

Ivan Sadchikov, whose appointment as the new ambassador had been mentioned to Qavam in Moscow, arrived in Tehran on 20 March and began negotiations with Qavam immediately. A two-week bargaining between the two men began in confidentiality.

On 22 March, Murray sent a report to Byrnes, based on information he had received from an Iranian official who was not himself present at the Qavam-Sadchikov meetings. According to this report, Sadchikov had offered Soviet troop evacuation in return for a letter signed by the Shah and the Prime Minister "assuring that arrangements would be made for joint Irano-Soviet exploitation of north oil." Qavam, despite his willingness to continue negotiations, told Sadchikov that if the Soviet Government was to "press" him to take action against the law, his only course would be to resign.(25) Murray emphasised in his report that, in Qavam's view, granting some sort of concession to the Russians was "inevitable" and that Qavam was "considering preparation of an agreement in very general terms" which would "provide in principle for joint Irano-Soviet oil exploitation as an inducement for the Soviets to withdraw troops". According to Murray, Qavam intended not only to "draft the oil agreement very carefully to make troop
withdrawal a condition precedent but also to ask the Soviets to "pledge to the Security Council" that troops would be withdrawn by a "specified date" not more than "six weeks distant". Three days later, Murray sent the State Department a more precise and detailed report based on his personal interview with Qavam. According to this report, Sadchikov had handed Qavam three proposals on (1) withdrawal of troops within five or six weeks; (2) formation of a Soviet-Iranian oil company; and (3) granting of some sort of autonomy to Azerbaijan. Qavam had made counter-proposals regarding troop evacuation and Azerbaijan, since the agreement on joint oil stock needed further specification. Qavam suggested a period of four weeks to evacuate the troops and insisted that a Soviet pledge of "unconditional" evacuation be communicated to the Security Council. On the question of Azerbaijan, Qavam rejected the idea of Soviet "intercession" in such domestic matters, but agreed to enter into direct negotiations with the Azerbaijanis. Sadchikov asserted that if agreement was reached between Iran and the Soviet Union on the issues of oil and Azerbaijan, an Iranian demand for an "unconditional" troop evacuation would materialise.

On 1 April, Qavam had more news for Murray about his bargaining with Sadchikov. With regards to developing joint oil stock, Iran would furnish "no capital but land". The Russians wanted the new Majles to be elected
without delay, so that it could approve the oil agreement within three months after the troop evacuation began. Since it was impossible to complete everything within such a short period, it was extended to six months. The Soviets proposed a term of agreement of fifty years, but Qavam suggested thirty years. Qavam wanted equal shares for both partners, while Sadchikov demanded fifty-one percent for the Soviet Union. Sadchikov asked for the whole of the northern provinces to be allocated to the joint-venture operation; Qavam wanted to exclude the areas bordering Iraq and Turkey. (29)

Sadchikov was delighted that he was reaching his objective on the Soviet oil concession. He thus offered Soviet support to Qavam by using its "moral influence" on the DPA, and assisting Qavam when he entered negotiations with Pishevari for a settlement in Azerbaijan. (30)

Byrnes, who was highly involved in the Security Council's debate on the Soviet-Iranian dispute, sent Qavam a message of appreciation for "keeping the United States closely informed" about his negotiations with the Russians. (31) However, in another message, he asked Qavam to "disavow any condition" which might be attached to the withdrawal of Red Army troops from Iran. (32)

Qavam received the message on 2 April, when he was close to making a deal with Sadchikov. Qavam told
Murray that the American advice had come "too late" and asserted that the Soviet Government would agree to withdraw troops if the Iranian Government accepted Russian terms on an oil deal. Murray insisted that it was not too late and Qavam should remove any linkage between the issues. He tried to convince Qavam that the Soviet "bargaining position" might be weaker than Qavam had assumed. He also maintained that the Soviet Government was "in a very embarrassing position before the Security Council" and needed to end the discussion on the Iranian complaint.

The analyses of Byrnes and Murray were not unrealistic, since Stalin needed to "extract an agreement" from Qavam and make it possible for Gromyko to return to the Security Council with a face-saver. However, Qavam had his own realistic justification. He did not want the Russians "humiliated " because the USSR had a long common border with Iran and would have unlimited opportunities to make trouble for its neighbour. For the time being, Qavam needed to "restore himself with Stalin," in order to secure the evacuation of Soviet troops and the overthrow of the rebel Government of Azerbaijan.

Historians, who appreciate Qavam's shrewdness, believe that the Iranian Prime Minister knew that "even without the excuse of the 1944 law, the Russian concession would never be accepted" by the Iranian legislature. Thus, he had granted nothing but words to the Russians.
analysis of events show that Qavam’s major intention was to articulate Soviet pledges into an agreement without delay. While demonstrating his friendliness towards the Russians, Qavam used Ala’s statements at the Security Council to persuade them that if his government failed, his successor might be tougher in negotiations. (38) Qavam’s political assistant, Firouz, who was a favourite of Russians, later remembered his own interview with Sadchikov at that time.

"I told him that although we desired to have good neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union, we could not continue our policy unless the Soviet Government also showed its good faith. First, it had to withdraw its troops from Iran, immediately; secondly, it had to end its intolerable support of the Azerbaijan Communist movement. . . . I turned his attention to the fact that we would arm the people and then resign, that the country would fall into a state of anarchy, and the Soviet troops would be confronted with armed resistance from the Iranian people." (39)

Finally, Ala’s statement of 4 April to the effect that Iran would negotiate with the Russians only after the completion of troop evacuation on 6 May, warned the Russians that time was not on their side. It implied that if they waited longer, they would either have to
postpone troop evacuation, or proceed with the evacuation but achieve nothing.

Coincidentally, on the same day of Ala’s statement at the Security Council, the United States new Ambassador to the Soviet Union General Walter Bedell Smith had his first meeting with Stalin. During a long conversation, Smith raised the significant question: "What does the Soviet Union want, and how far is Russia going to go?" Furthermore, he put forward issues such as Soviet relations with Iran, Turkey, and the Balkan states; and expressed the United States’ expectations concerning the “principles of the United Nations Charter" and the norms of international relations. "If the people of the United States were ever to become convinced that we were faced with a wave of progressive aggression on the part of any powerful nation or group of nations, we would react exactly as we had always done in the past," Bedell Smith stated.(40)

Stalin replied to every point made by Smith precisely. Regarding Iran, Stalin alleged that Iran had had a hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union since the Versaille Conference in 1919; and that Iran’s position was a threat to the Soviet oil fields in Baku.(41)

The conversation between Smith and Stalin influenced the instructions which were sent that same evening from Moscow to Sadchikov, concerning the signature of a Soviet-Iranian agreement.(42) Consequently, the events in Tehran, New York and Moscow pressured the Russians
and precipitated the conclusion of the agreement proposed by Qavam. The Qavam-Sadchikov agreement was signed at 4 a.m. on 5 April (but was dated 4 April). (43) Previously, Soviet statements had maintained that: Soviet troops had the right to remain in Iran; the presence of their troops was not connected with the Soviet demand for oil; and the autonomous Government of Azerbaijan was the result of a "democratic" movement and not a Soviet instrument of pressure for oil concession. The Soviets had refused to negotiate these three issues. However, they were included in the agreement of 4 April. A joint communique signed by Qavam and Sadchikov was issued on 4 April, as follows:—

"The negotiations between the Iranian Prime Minister and the Soviet leaders which had begun in Moscow continued with the Soviet Ambassador after his arrival in Tehran. An agreement was reached on the following issues.

1. The complete evacuation of the Red Army troops from Iran within 6 weeks from 24 March 1946.

2. The proposal to the Majles of an agreement concerning the formation of a joint Soviet-Iranian oil company within seven months of 24 March 1946."
3. The acceptance that the problem of Azerbaijan was an Iranian internal affair.
As such it would be solved peacefully through consideration for reforms under the existing law, and in a benevolent behaviour towards the people of Azerbaijan. (44)

On the same day, two sets of letters were exchanged between Sadchikov and Qavam. Jointly they were interpreted as an agreement. In the first one, Sadchikov stated that the Soviet army command in Iran had made all the arrangements to complete the evacuation of Soviet troops from Iranian territory within one and a half months of 24 March 1946. In reply, Qavam acknowledged this information. In the second, Qavam and Sadchikov exchanged letters, with similar wording, on the formation of a joint oil stock. Qavam's letter reads as follows:

"In supplementing the oral agreement between us, I have the honour to tell you that the Government of His Majesty the Shah-in-Shah of Iran is agreed that the Governments of Iran and the Soviet Union should form a joint Soviet-Iranian company for the development and exploitation of oil resources in northern Iran, and on following basic conditions:
1. In the course of the first 25 years of the activity of the company 49 percent of the shares will belong to the Iranian side, and
51 percent to the Soviet side. In the course of the second 25 years, 50 percent of the shares will belong to the Iranian side and 50 percent to the Soviet side.

2. The profits made by the company will be divided in accordance with the ratio of the shares each side.

3. The borders of the original territory of the company allocated for production and prospecting work will be those drawn on the map you handed to me during our talk on 24 March this year, excluding the part of the territory of Western Azerbaijan situated to the west of the line running from the point of intersection of the borders of the USSR, Turkey, and Iran and further to the south on the Eastern shore of Lake Rizaiyeh (late Urmia) right up to the town of Miyanduab, as was noticed additionally on the above-mentioned map on April 4, 1946.

At the same time the Iranian Government pledges itself not to grant concessions to foreign companies or to Iranian companies in partnership with foreigners or utilising foreign capital, on the territory to the west of the above-mentioned line.
4. The capital of the Iranian side will consist of the oil bearing lands mentioned in Article 3 which, after the carrying out of the technical work, will possess oil wells, the production of which will be utilised by the company. The capital of the Soviet side will consist of all kinds of expenditure on equipment and wages of specialists and workers necessary for the production and refining of the oil.

5. The period of the activity of the company is 50 years.

6. When the period of the activity of the company expires, the Iranian Governments will have the right to buy out the shares of the Soviet side or to continue the period of activity of the company.

The security of the districts in which the prospecting work is to take place, of the oil wells and all the enterprises of the company, will be effected exclusively by the security bodies of Iran.

The treaty on the organisation of the above-mentioned Soviet-Iranian oil company, which will be concluded subsequently in accordance with the content of the present letter, will be presented for endorsement as soon as the newly elected Majles of Iran starts its
legislative activity, and in any case not later than seven months of 24 March this year." (45)

At a banquet given in honour of Sadchikov on 11 April at the Iranian Foreign Ministry, Qavam stated:

"When I met the great, beloved leader of the Soviet people, Generalissimo Stalin, and observed the magnificence and generosity of the Soviet Government, I was convinced that we should demand everything from them and offer nothing in return. Eventually, this has been materialised."

In reply, Sadchikov pointed out that Qavam's integrity, honesty and capability "were the most significant and effective factor in coming to an understanding between Iran and the Soviet Union." (46)

Pravda welcomed the Qavam-Sadchikov agreement as a success for Soviet diplomacy and stated in its editorial:

"Once again, the Soviet Union objectively demonstrated its inflexible desire to come to mutual understanding with other countries to establish good-neighbourly, friendly relations with other states; and to consolidate international co-operation for the benefit of general peace and security." (47)
Both the Tudeh party and the DPA supported the agreement of 4 April; however, the DPA expressed its reservation regarding Azerbaijan's ability to defend its freedom and national identity. (48)

The United States Government was pessimistic about the consequences of the Qavam-Sadchikov agreement. Acheson believed that it might consolidate the autonomous regime in Azerbaijan. (49)

There were also some misgivings concerning the agreement on oil. In this agreement the boundary of the new concession was extended from the junction of Soviet-Turkish-Iranian borders on the one side to the junction of Soviet Afghan-Iranian borders on the other. It was thus feared that a Soviet zone of influence in northern Iran, distinctly separated from other parts of the country, would be implicitly recognised. In addition, opponents claimed, by the same accord the Soviet Union would, in fact, enjoy a monopoly of sales, because Iran had not been guaranteed a specific amount of profit. (50)

Soviet historian, Ivanov, maintained that on the basis of the Soviet-Iranian oil agreement, Iran would have received a profit much higher than it had received from the Anglo-Iranian oil company. Ivanov viewed that the "AIOC was savagely looting Iran's natural resources and exploiting Iranian manpower; while the Soviet-Iranian oil company's objective was development and promotion of Iran's economy". (51)
However, the British interpretation of the comparison between the Soviet-Iranian oil agreement and the Anglo-Iranian oil agreement was different. A British historian’s analysis was as follows:

"On paper, it seemed considerably more favourable to Persia than the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s concession; but the Persian experience of the Soviet-Persian Caspian Fisheries Company, set up by an agreement of 1 October 1927 for 25 years, and nominally giving the Persian Government a half-share of the capital and half the seats on the board of directors, had not been encouraging". (52)

The Iranian nationalists questioned whether Soviet tactics to obtain an oil interest in Iran were compatible with socialist ideology. They maintained that the Soviet Government had, after all, achieved this interest by use of force. The Soviet Government was also going to transfer capital from Russia to employ Iranian workers. Whenever this happened in countries beyond the Soviet zone of interest, the Russians referred to it as a capitalist form of exploitation. (53)
A day after the conclusion of the Qavam-Sadchikov agreement, the Soviet Government resumed its effort to withdraw the Iranian question from the Security Council agenda. On 6 April Gromyko addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council emphasising that an agreement had been signed between Iran and the Soviet Union, and that Article 34 of the Charter concerning threats to international peace and security had no applicability to the situation of Soviet-Iranian relations. Therefore, Gromyko asked that the question of Iran be removed from the agenda. Gromyko claimed that the Council resolution of 4 April, which had postponed the debate on the Iranian question until 6 May, was irrational. He had tried to discredit the Council's interference in the issue from the beginning.(54)

The representatives of the United States and Iran, not surprisingly reacted against Gromyko's demand. Byrnes instructed Stettinus to point out that as long as the Soviet troops were stationed in Iran without the consent of the Iranian Government, the Council should consider the matter as a danger to international peace and security. Therefore, the Council should postpone its
decision until after the evacuation of Soviet troops. (55) Ala did not wait for instruction from Tehran; and, on his own initiative, asked the President of the Security Council to reject the Soviet demand. (56) Qavam's position was now delicate. On 10 April, he told the American diplomat, John Jerengan, that the Russians might "soon" pressure him to "join in their request" for the withdrawal of the Iranian question from the Security Council agenda. (57)

Byrnes' serious concern with refuting Gromyko's claim and keeping the Iranian question on the agenda was based on two facts: Firstly, he perceived that Gromyko had tried to undermine all Council proceedings and resolutions since 24 March; and, secondly, he had been using the question to demonstrate his new firm policy in defending the UN Charter and in strengthening the United Nations' position in settling international disputes. (58) Thus, Byrnes sent a message to Qavam stating that "any indication of willingness on his part to have the Iranian case dropped from the agenda of the Security Council would be likely to create an impression on world opinion and among members of the Council that Iran wished to have the Council act merely to help it in its negotiations and not because it believed, as it stated, that the presence of troops of another government threatened international peace". Byrnes warned that if Iran complied with the Soviet demand, the members of the Security Council might hesitate to
involve themselves in the future, in supporting other countries' "integrity and independence". Byrnes stated: "If Iran now says it wishes to have the case removed from the agenda before troops are withdrawn, how can it hereafter expect any government to give serious attention to its appeals". He emphasised that the "Council, and not Iran, placed the question on the agenda and did it by unanimous vote". Byrnes advised Qavam that it would be in the interest of Iran and "a United Nations strong enough to maintain peace" to leave the question of retaining or withdrawing "entirely" to the Security Council to decide. (59) Just before receiving this message, Qavam told Jerengan that Sadchikov had approached him to express Moscow's resentment of Ala's letter of 9 April. The Soviet Ambassador threatened Qavam that Iran's insistence on retaining its case on the agenda was an "insult to the Soviet Union", and would lead to "strained" relations. Qavam explained his difficult position to Jerengan and informed him that he had promised Sadchikov he would withdraw the case. (60) When Jerengan met again with Qavam to convey Byrnes' message, an argument took place between them. Jerengan found Qavam "extremely reluctant to risk offending Soviets". Qavam told Jerengan that he needed the "moral support" of the Soviets to achieve a settlement in Azerbaijan. Qavam understood that the Russians might withdraw their troops from Iran, but, at
the same time, "supply arms to the Azerbaijanis, and encourage them to resist". In that case, Iran would be "forced to send troops and precipitate fighting", whereupon the Russians could "assert their right to intervene, to protect the security of their frontiers".(61) Only two days earlier, Pishevari asked the Red Army on Tabriz radio to overthrow the Iranian Government.(62) Jerengan argued that Iran would be left "completely defenceless" after withdrawing its case from the Security Council. He induced Qavam to rely on the United Nations and make it possible for the organisation to become a "real force for security".(63) Jerengan's argument succeeded; and Qavam was once again in favour of the American formula. He instructed Ala that if the Security Council asked him to make a statement on the Soviet request, he should only say that Iran left the matter "entirely in the hands of the Council" for whatever decision it might choose to take.(64)

On 14 April, news reached Sadchikov that Qavam had sent Ala this instruction. Sadchikov made a protest to Qavam. He viewed Qavam's undertaking as "illogical", because he professed confidence in the Soviet Union, but did not support the "Soviet action in asking the Council to drop the Iranian complaint". Qavam had also rejected Sadchikov's statement that troops would be withdrawn "if nothing unforeseen occurred". Sadchikov stated that since the Soviet-Iranian agreement was
signed, and Qavam's "friendly government" remained in power, the Soviet reservation regarding an "unforeseen" situation was no longer applicable. He insisted that Qavam "must direct Ala (to) join in (the) request to drop the question from the agenda". (65)

It is noteworthy that, at this time, Murray was ill and Jerengan replaced him to advise Qavam. The absence of the American Ambassador from Tehran's political manoeuvres was a point that historians observed as favourable to Sadchikov. (66) Persuaded by Sadchikov, Qavam sent Ala new instructions to the effect that, since the Soviet Ambassador had given him assurances that the evacuation would be completed "unconditionally" by 6 May, Iran wished to withdraw its complaint from the Security Council.

When the Security Council opened its session on 15 April to decide on the Soviet request for withdrawal of the Iranian question, the Americans found themselves in a weaker position, because their effort to persuade Qavam had failed. However, they launched a new campaign to retain the question on the agenda. They planned to neutralise Soviet efforts by proving that Iran was under Soviet pressure and, thus, the Council should make a decision on its own initiative. The Americans had Ala on their side. The Iranian delegate enjoyed their legal and political advice by now, and was ready to follow them despite Qavam's clear instruction. (68) In his
letter of 15 April to the President of the Security Council, Ala explained that the situation in Iran was under the burden of Soviet pressure. Ala referred to the letter of 9 April in which he asked for retaining the Iranian Question on the agenda. He continued:

"Yesterday, on 14 April my government instructed me to make the following statement to the Security Council:

[As a result of the signing of the agreement between the Iranian Government and the Government of the Soviet Union, it has been agreed that the Red Army will evacuate the entire Iranian territory by 6 May 1946. Although the Iranian Government does not doubt the complete implementation of this agreement it does not take upon itself to determine the course the Security Council should take.]

This morning, I received a further telegram from my government which reads as follows:

[In view of the fact that the Soviet Ambassador had today, 14 April, categorically reiterated the unconditional evacuation from Iranian territory of the Red Army by the 6 May, it is necessary that you immediately inform the Security Council that the Iranian Government has complete confidence in the word and pledge of the Soviet Government, and
for this reason withdraws its complaint from
the Security Council.]" (69)

Following Ala's presentation, Gromyko made a statement
to the effect that his letter of 6 April, and Iran's
request for the withdrawal of the case, should be
immediately considered. (70) The American delegate,
Stettinus, objected to Gromyko's statement. He asserted
that the Council could not reconsider its resolution of
4 April, since the situation concerning the presence of
the Soviet troops in Iran had not changed. He further
maintained that only after the completion of the Soviet
troop evacuation on 6 May could the question be removed
from the agenda. British delegate, Cadogan, supported
Stettinus. He stated that the Council could not
withdraw the Iranian case before 6 May, when the
evacuation of Soviet troops was to be completed. (71)
Gromyko accused the Western powers of being unwilling to
find a solution to the Iranian case.

"... Certain states consider Iran as a sort
of pawn which may be moved in any direction,
depending upon circumstances and upon the
political game which is being played at the
moment. Efforts to use Iran as small change
in the bargaining game of international
politics can serve no good purpose". (72)

Only the Polish and the French delegates supported
Gromyko. (73)
The next day, the discussion continued while the non-permanent members took an active part. The majority of the Council viewed, like Stettinus, that only the Council, and not the parties of a dispute, could decide to remove or retain a question. The Secretary General, Trygve Lie, tried to solve the case on legal rather than political grounds. There was no reason, he argued, to retain a question on the agenda when the parties to a dispute had withdrawn it. (74) But Lie's argument did not satisfy the majority of the Council who intended to put the matter to vote, and thereby defeat Gromyko. The French delegate M. Bonnet opposed the majority, and suggested that the Committee of Experts examine the case and inform the Security Council of its verdict. (75) The Committee of Experts examined the case, and informed the Security Council of its verdict as follows:

"When a matter has been submitted to the Security Council by a party, it can not be withdrawn from the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized without a decision by the Security Council".

This verdict was determined by the votes of 8 out of 11 experts, and was reaffirmed by the Security Council, on 23 April, with a similar majority. (76) Gromyko, who had been defeated on the removal of the Iranian question from the agenda, considered the majority vote contrary to the UN Charter. He therefore asserted that the
Soviet delegation would not attend the discussion on this issue any further. (77)

In following up the resolution of 4 April, Ala reported on 6 May to the Council that the Soviet troops had withdrawn from the northern provinces. The Iranian Government, however, was unable to confirm the troop withdrawal from Azerbaijan. Ala explained that due to the interference of the Soviets, the Iranian Government was unable to exercise its authority in Azerbaijan, so it could not verify whether or not the Soviet troops had been evacuated. Ala added, however, that the Iranian Government had been informed through "other sources" that the evacuation of Azerbaijan would be completed by 7 May. (78)

On 8 May, the Council held a session, in the absence of Gromyko, to discuss the case. Since the information given in Ala's letter of 6 May had been perceived as inadequate, Stettinus suggested the meeting be postponed until 20 May, when Iran could present a full report on the completion of evacuation. This suggestion was adopted unanimously. (79)

On 20 May, Ala wrote to Lie that the Iranian Government was yet unable to ascertain, through independent investigation, whether Soviet troops had completely evacuated Azerbaijan. Ala informed the Secretary General of other reports concerning Red Army personnel who had remained in Azerbaijan, and military equipment which reportedly was left behind by the Red Army for
use by the rebels. (80) Ala's letter contrasted with his instructions from Tehran. Qavam had asked Ala to state that the Iranian Government had sent an investigation team to Azerbaijan and that it would report the result to the Council. Furthermore, the Russians themselves were anxious to prove that they had withdrawn their troops from Iran; therefore, they offered their assistance to Qavam. The investigating commission was taken to Tabriz by Soviet plane. From there they were taken to six of Azerbaijan's major cities in Pishevari's car, to verify the Russian departure. (81) On 21 May, Qavam criticised Ala's statement for creating a "very bad effect on Soviet-Iranian relations". He ordered him to convey the original statement of the Iranian Government to the Council "without any explanation". (82) Qavam's message, which was conveyed to the Council on 21 May, stated that, according to the investigating commission, there was "no trace whatsoever of USSR troops, equipment or means of transport" in Azerbaijan; and that "according to trustworthy local people, who were questioned in all these places, USSR troops evacuated Azerbaijan on 6 May". (83) On 22 May, Sadchikov met Qavam and handed him a Note to the effect that "according to the information of Soviet military command in the Caucasus region, the evacuation of troops had been completed on 9 May". (84)
However, at the Security Council Session of 22 May, Ala repeated his accusation of Soviet activity in Azerbaijan. He asserted that an army of rebels had been organised by the Soviet Union to challenge the restoration of Iran's authority over Azerbaijan. Ala explained that the Iranian Government had withdrawn its complaint regarding the presence of Soviet troops; but the Iranian complaint regarding Soviet interference in Iranian affairs should continue to be considered by the Council. (85)

Despite Ala's request, the Council was not prepared to consider the Iranian question further. After all, the Iranian Government had withdrawn its complaint on 15 April; and the Iranian Prime Minister had confirmed the completion of Soviet withdrawal on 21 May. Thus, there were no bases to continue a debate, which according to Acheson "might place the Council in a rather ridiculous position". (86) Accordingly, Byrnes instructed Stettinus to declare that the United States Government did not want the Council to "take further action"; but wanted it to "continue to remain seized of the Iranian matter". (87) A proposal by the Dutch delegate, Van Kleffen, to the effect that the Council would adjourn discussion of the Iranian question until a date in the near future", and would "be called together at the request of any member", received nine votes in favour.

The Soviet delegate was absent and the Polish delegate believed that the Iranian question should be removed
When the debate on the Iranian question ended, Ala's position was at stake. During March-May, Ala had allegedly acted on several occasions on his own initiative rather than on Qavam's instructions. Qavam's spokesman, Firouz, had stated that Ala's presentations were "his own personal view, not the views of Iranian Government". Many years later, Firouz repeated his accusation:

"... Discussion in the United Nations forum would only make things worse. Ala was not carrying out our instructions, because he was taking his orders from other parties concerned. He was making provocative statements against the Soviet Government every day".

Firouz did not identify the other parties concerned. The leftist press in Tehran, however, had accused Ala of taking orders from the Shah and not Qavam. The Shah admitted in his memoirs that he had supported Ala in his "brilliant and dramatic presentations". The Shah wrote:

"He (Ala) refused to withdraw our complaint from the agenda of the Security Council. He knew that I wanted the complaint to stand, and he realised that it was because of Soviet pressure that Qavam had requested its
Following Ala's statement at the last meeting of the Security Council, Sadchikov exerted pressure on Qavam to recall him; but Byrnes intervened to stop such an action. The new American Ambassador, George Allen, who had replaced Murray on 11 May, received a telegram from Byrnes, regarding Ala's position:

"We feel that a recall or a repudiation of Ala at this time would impair the ability of the Council to give aid to Iran, and hope Qavam will refrain from taking precipitous action against Ala under Soviet pressure. Ala has told us that, while he may have gone beyond specific instructions in certain instances, he feels he has properly interpreted Qavam's factual cables and has taken action which Qavam would instruct, if Iran were not under Soviet pressure".(93)

Byrnes asserted that Ala had "followed his course of action on own decision," and had not been "influenced by the (State) Department to go beyond his instructions". Thus, the Secretary of State instructed Allen to use his "influence" so Qavam could not "recall or repudiate Ala".(94)

The Iranian Government had to find a formula which would satisfy both the Russians and the Americans. Since Iran had no further business with the United Nations at this time, Qavam dismissed Ala as Iran's representative to
the UN without re-appointing a replacement. The Shah, as head of state, later reinstated Ala as Iran’s Ambassador to the United States. (95) A face saving press-release was issued by the Iranian Embassy in Washington on 29 May, stating that Ala had been instructed by Prime Minister Qavam not to make any further statements to the Security Council on Soviet-Iranian relations. (96)

The most crucial question remaining was concerned with whether Stalin would accept leaving Iran after having repeatedly asserted that the Soviet Union had the right by agreement to station its troops there. Was it the result of Qavam’s conciliatory policy which assured Stalin influence over Iran or did the United States force Stalin to retreat? Was Stalin really concerned about the Security Council debate; or was he truly sensitive to world public opinion? Historians’ interpretations of these events vary. One has stated that Soviet withdrawal was an "apparent result of United States diplomatic pressure"; (97) others give credit to the United Nations and its role in mobilising world public opinion; (98) and some credit the United States’ sole possession of the atomic bomb with the withdrawal. (99) However, it has also been argued that Stalin’s fear of US military power was not behind his withdrawal from Iran; and that he intended to avoid "further deterioration of US-Soviet relations and prevent the adverse consequences in other more important
regions". Another analysis supports this argument. It states that in Stalin's view, a confrontation over Iran with the United States "might well jeopardise his more important moves in Eastern Europe". Other historians have credited the withdrawal to the competence and astuteness of Premier Qavam. In their judgement, both Qavam's conciliatory tactics in negotiations with Russians, and his timely approach to the United Nations helped to achieve the result. They believe that Qavam proved the significance of the Iranians' "international finagling" and "adroit diplomacy". They also emphasise that it was his "astuteness and shrewdness" in addition to pressure by the Security Council, which secured the Soviet withdrawal. According to these analysts, Qavam had made the Soviets believe that he had been on their side and "succeeded somewhere along the line to dupe Stalin as he had never been duped before". In his analysis of the Soviet evacuation, an American historian emphasised two of the most significant factors. He viewed that the "combination of American pressure and Qavam's deception finally worked". The most interesting attribution in this respect, was the so-called "Truman ultimatum". On 24 April 1952, President Truman stated in a radio interview that he had sent an "ultimatum" to the head of Soviet Government, to get out of Iran. He added: "They got out because we were in a position to meet a situation of that
However, a White House spokesman told the press, on the same day, that the "President was using the term ultimatum in a non-technical layman sense".

A Soviet denial of Truman's statement was made less than a week later. On 30 April 1952, Pravada and Izvestia published a Tass despatch, asserting that "no ultimatum had been sent to the Soviet Government".

"... Tass is authorised to state that this remark of Truman's about an ultimatum is an invention from beginning to end and is obviously intended to intensify war hysteria in the USA.

As for the real circumstances connected with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran in 1946, the Soviet troops were withdrawn from Iran in strict accordance with the date fixed for their withdrawal by agreement between the USSR Government and the Government of Iran, as materials published in the press on this matter at that time stated".

Truman repeated his assertion about his role in removing Soviet troops from Iran in an article in the New York Times, on 25 August 1957:

"... The Soviet Union persisted in its occupation until I personally saw to it that
Stalin was informed that I had given orders to our military chiefs to prepare for the movement of our ground, sea and air forces. Stalin then did what I knew he would do. He moved his troops out". (111)

Truman also gave a different version in his memoirs, published in 1956. He claimed that he had instructed Byrnes to send a "blunt message" to Stalin. He then referred to the Note of 6 March. (112)

Contrary to Truman's claim, it has been agreed that both the Note of 6 March, and that of 8 March which was a little stronger, did not mention an ultimatum in wording or meaning. Furthermore, both Notes were addressed to Molotov and not Stalin. (113)

In another book, published in 1960, which contains quotations from Truman, the former President renewed his claim:

"...When Stalin refused to move out of Iran at the time agreed, I sent him word I would move the fleet as far as Persian Gulf". (114)

An American scholar, who wrote on US-Soviet relations during the Truman administration, had an interview with the former President in August 1962. Here, Truman stated that he first sent the Russians a Note to withdraw all their forces from Iran; then, he "warned that unless their withdrawal did commence within a week's time and was completed within six, he would move the fleet as far as the Persian Gulf, and he would send American
No official documents or personal statements have been found in support of Truman's assertion. Several American diplomats who were handling Soviet and Iranian affairs at the State Department in early 1946, have denied that Truman had ever sent such a message to the Soviet leaders. Henderson, who was the head of the division in charge, stated that "Truman never sent an admonitory message to Stalin". Kennan, who as the US Chargé d'Affaires would have delivered such a message to the Kremlin if there was one, recalled nothing to confirm Truman's statement. Among other informed diplomats who denied the existence of the Truman ultimatum was George Allen, who was a deputy director of NEA until April 1946, and US Ambassador to Iran after that. (118)

An official denial of Truman's "ultimatum" was published in the "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946":

"..No documentation on the sending of an ultimatum to the Soviet Union has been found in the Department files, or in the files of the Department of Defence, nor have several highest officers of the Department in 1946 been able to affirm the sending of an ultimatum". (119)

Those historians who have looked closer into the question of the "ultimatum", believe that Truman had
some action in mind which did not materialise; (120) or it resulted from the fact that he had a "tendency to exaggerate" some aspects of his leadership concerning US-Soviet relations. (121) Nonetheless, the theory of the "ultimatum" had a certain appeal to some Iranians who intended to underestimate the role of Qavam, or the significance of the contribution of the United Nations in the solution of the problem. They liked to attribute the victory to the involvement of the United States as the sole atomic power in 1946.

The Shah, who disliked Qavam and admired the American leaders, was among supporters of this theory. He wrote in his memoirs that "on 8 March, Truman sent Molotov a severe warning. As a result, the Russians officially evacuated the province". (122) Several Iranian historians, with nationalistic but anti-Qavam sentiments, have supported the same theory; however, the date of the "ultimatum" in their writings varies from 6 March (123) to 21 March. (124)

There are also analysts who rejected the theory of the "ultimatum", and believed that "Qavam, with a realistic understanding of Soviet demands, secured Soviet confidence and, thus, solved the problem." (125) Some Iranian analysts suggested that both the "American ultimatum" and the "promise of north Iranian oil" were reasons for Soviet evacuation. (126)

The justification of those Iranians who wished to undermine Qavam was founded on personal grounds. Many
disliked Qavam's arrogant character and "imperious manner (127) and many did not forgive his emergence as a rival to Mossadeq in July 1952, when the latter was leading a nationalist government.

An impartial analyst would study the Soviet evacuation in the context of Soviet policy towards Iran, Soviet-American relations, Soviet policy at the United Nations, Soviet foreign policy priorities, and Soviet international developments. Therefore, the Soviet plan of action should be considered as the result of the pressure by the American and British Governments; the Security Council debates and resolutions; the priority given to achievements in Eastern Europe; the war-devastated Soviet economy which could not afford another war; and the skilful negotiations of Qavam in Moscow and his friendly treatment of pro-Soviet elements in Tehran. All these factors combined brought about the evacuation. Otherwise, Truman's "ultimatum" to return the American forces to Iran would only have divided Iran instead of saving it. The stationing of American soldiers beside Russian soldiers in Iran, if that was all Truman intended to do, could have created something like a divided Germany in the Middle East.
CHAPTER FOUR

QAVAM’S AGREEMENT WITH THE "DEMOCRATIC" AZERBAIJAN

Following the Soviet commitment to withdraw troops from Iran, the major problem which remained was the issue of Azerbaijan.

In dealing with the Azerbaijan problem, the Shah and the right-wing politicians believed that the Soviet evacuation had been carried out under pressure from the United States and the United Nations, and that Iran should exploit this opportunity to put an end to the autonomy of Azerbaijan by use of force. (128) In contrast, Qavam believed that the armed forces should be kept as a final resort. He intended to keep his word, contained in the agreement of 4 April, and solve the problem through negotiating with Pishevari and the Soviet Union. (129)

At this point, a move against the right would dampen their criticism and please the Russians, whose cooperation was needed for a settlement in Azerbaijan. On 8 April, the former Chief of Staff, General Arfa, was arrested, charged with plotting against the state and arming "his private guerrillas". (130) Qavam’s spokesman told the press that the right-wing had attempted a coup. (131) Such a coup, if realised, would have put Qavam’s agreement with the Soviets at risk and end the freedom of the left. Thus Qavam was to further present himself as indispensable to the Russians. By mid-May,
Qavam arrested more right-wing politicians. These included politicians who enjoyed the blessing of the Court, and might have sabotaged his plans. Among the detainees were influential deputies of the 14th Majles such as Ali Dashti (Tehran), Jamal Emami (Azerbaijan), Salar Saeed Sanandaji (Kurdistan), Dr. Hadi Taheri (Yazd), Hessam Doulat-Abadi (Isfahan) and Abbas Qobadian (Kermanshah). (132) By "guerrillas", Qavam's spokesman was referring to local landlords in Azerbaijan and Zanjan, who had received arms and ammunition from the army during Arfa's chairmanship of the General Staff to fight the DPA forces. However, it was later revealed that, with Qavam's consent, the army continued sending supplies and training officers to anti-communist tribes until the collapse of the DPA Government. (133)

The British Chargé d'Affaires in Tehran, Harold Farquhar, quoted an Iranian official in his report of 16 April as describing Qavam's conciliatory attitude towards the DPA, and the detention of anti-Soviets as an attempt to bribe the Russians and speed up their evacuation. Furthermore, Qavam's real intention was to encircle Azerbaijan and put an end to its autonomy. (134)

Qavam had assured the British Embassy, through his emissaries, that his government was not to take any action against British interests. (135)

On 22 April, the Government issued a statement regarding
"the ruling of the Council of Ministers on Azerbaijan" which was broadcast on Tehran Radio. According to this statement, the Government confirmed the following rights for the Provincial Council of Azerbaijan, in conformity with the amendment of the 1906 Constitution:

1. The Governor-General of Azerbaijan would be appointed by the Central Government after consultation with the Provincial Council.
3. The official language would be Persian, but at the local departments and courts, both Persian and Turkic-Azeri could be used. Education in elementary schools would be in Turkic.
4. When drawing the state's budget, the Government would pay attention to Azerbaijan's needs for social services, and for reforms in the fields of education and public services.
5. The activities of democratic institutions and trade unions in Azerbaijan would be unrestricted as in the rest of Iran.
6. No action would be taken against the people or the leaders of Azerbaijan for their participation in the democratic movement.
7. The Government would approve an increase in the number of deputies representing Azerbaijan in the Majles, proportional to the true figure of population; and a bill would be submitted to the 15th Majles in this regard. After the bill was passed, the additional deputies would be elected. (136)

The Government's statement was silent about the army and gendarmerie which were the most controversial points in the Tehran-Tabriz bargaining. (137) Qavam enclosed a copy of the Government's statement with an invitation and sent them to Pishevari, Fathali Ipakchian, a deputy of the National Majles of Azerbaijan. (138)

On 28 April, Pishevari arrived in Tehran, accompanied by his deputy Dr. Jahanshahlou, a member of the DPA Central Committee Padegan, and the Kurdish War Minister Seif Qavzi. (139) Qavam met with the Azerbaijani mission twice. During his negotiations with them, Qavam left no doubt that he contemplated a peaceful solution. Sadchikov, who was present at Qavam-Pishevari talks, tried actively to bring about a settlement between the two parties. (140) He encouraged Pishevari to reduce his demands in order to reach an agreement with Qavam. Jahanshahlou remembers that Pishevari was under paradoxical pressure from the Soviet side. On the one hand, Bagirov had instructed him from Baku to insist on the autonomy of Azerbaijan and the formation of an Azerbaijan national army. On the other, Sadchikov
believed that after the evacuation of Soviet troops from Iran, which was already underway, Pishevari's regime would remain defenceless and fragile. Thus, he advised Pishevari to reach a compromise with the Iranian Government in order to secure the interests of Azerbaijan and the safety of the DPA leaders in the future. (141) Such contradictory messages from Russia have been interpreted as evidence of the fissure in the Soviet leadership over the fate of Azerbaijan. Jahanshahlou remarks that Beria's protegé, Bagirov, was forcing Pishevari to resist; while Molotov's man, Sadchikov, was encouraging him to acquiesce. (142) Nevertheless, Pishevari's illusion about his own position and the extent of Soviet protection continued. He stubbornly rejected Sadchikov's advice, and claimed that the concessions given in the Government statement were not sufficient. As Qavam stated in a meeting with the United States Chargé d'Affaires Angus Ward on 4 May, his negotiations with Pishevari were "deadlocked" due to disagreement on three points:

[1] Qavam wanted the "Azerbaijan army to be completely disbanded", and that troops, which were to be stationed there in future, be composed only of "regular conscripts with officers appointed from Tehran". Pishevari refused.

[2] Qavam wanted the "National Majles of Azerbaijan" dissolved and a new election held for the Provincial Council. Pishevari suggested that the existing National Majles just be "bodily converted into the Provincial
Council".

[3] Qavam wanted the Director of Finance appointed from Tehran, and the Provincial Council to appoint a controller to work under the Director of Finance. Pishevari suggested a reverse arrangement. (143) Qavam had not told the entire story to the American Chargé d’Affaires. Pishevari had carried a 14-item proposal concerning the status of Azerbaijan’s autonomy and its armed forces. Qavam was ready to reach an agreement with Pishevari by accepting some of his demands; but the opposition of the Shah, who had the army behind him, thwarted Qavam’s plan and led to failure of the negotiations. (144) After two weeks, the Azerbaijan mission left Tehran aboard a Soviet plane, without achieving any result. (145) However, Pishevari’s morale had fallen since his departure from Tabriz. When leaving Tabriz on 28 April, he had stated that the DPA was prepared to liberate other parts of Iran if the "international situation" permitted, and that Iran should have a "people’s government" similar to that of Azerbaijan. (146) On his return to Tabriz on 15 May, Pishevari stated in a radio broadcast that an advance by the Iranian army into Azerbaijan would be a violation of the Soviet-Iranian agreement of 4 April. (147) He also disclosed that Qavam had intended "in good faith" to comply with the demands of Azerbaijan and yet the Supreme Commander of
the Army (Shah) had not consented to a conclusion favourable to Tabriz.\(^{(148)}\)

In a press communiqué, Qavam blamed the failure of the Tehran-Tabriz talks on Pishevari, whose demands were "unconstitutional".\(^{(149)}\) Qavam reiterated that the election for the 15th Majles would be held only after a settlement on Azerbaijan.\(^{(150)}\)

According to a report from the new British Ambassador, Sir John Le Rougetel, Qavam had warned Sadchikov that he would resign if the talks failed, and that Sadchikov had urged him to stay in office.\(^{(151)}\) In the course of negotiations, the political atmosphere in Tehran and particularly the warnings of Sadchikov, convinced Pishevari that the Russians might abandon him for their own interest.\(^{(152)}\) Pishevari's scepticism had also brought about the emergence of a liberal faction inside the DPA leadership which expressed its disagreement with Pishevari's tough line. According to Jahanshahlou, this faction consisted of the Azerbaijan Minister of the Interior, Dr. Javid, and the Speaker of the National Majles, Shabestari, who were supported by the Soviet Consul, Qolyov.\(^{(153)}\) On his return to Tabriz, Pishevari, suspecting a conspiracy directed against him, threatened to destroy his opponents "like insects".\(^{(154)}\)

While Pishevari was condemning the Iranian regime for refusing his demands, the Soviet troops evacuated Iran; and Moscow continued to approve of Qavam's policies.
On 2 June Moscow Radio broadcast a commentary which stated:

"...The attitude of the Soviet Union towards Iran is of a friendship seldom found throughout history between a great state and a comparatively smaller one". (155)

Such a statement by the Soviets could not be ignored by Pishevari and the DPA leadership. On 5 June, the American Consul in Tabriz, Rossow, reported to Byrnes:

"...All reports, supported by analysis of recent public pronouncements, indicate that the Soviet Union has instructed the Azerbaijan Government to come to terms with Tehran. Both the Azerbaijan Government and the Soviet Union appear to have adopted a definitely defensive policy now with respect to the Azerbaijan problem". (156)

On 11 June, a Government mission led by Qavam's deputy, Firouz, arrived in Tabriz to resume negotiations with Pishevari. This time, the two parties were successful in reaching an accord within two days. A 15-point agreement which was signed by Pishevari and Firouz on 13 June, included the following provisions:

1. The existing National Majles of Azerbaijan would convert into the Provincial Council.

2. The Governor-General would be chosen and appointed by Central Government from the nominees of the
Provincial Council.

3. The Director of Finance would be nominated by the Provincial Council and appointed by the Central Government.

4. A joint commission comprised of the representatives of the Central Government and Provincial Council would be held to make decisions concerning the commanders of army in Azerbaijan.

5. Seventy-five percent of taxes in Azerbaijan would be allocated to the provincial budget.

6. The Central Government would use local labour to extend a railway from Mianeh to Tabriz.

7. The Fedaeis (DPA militia) would be converted to part of the Iranian gendarmerie; and this matter would be finalised by the joint commission mentioned in Article 4.

8. The Central Government would approve the accomplished distribution of state-lands among the peasants; and a joint commission would decide on compensation for private land-owners whose lands had been confiscated and distributed.

9. The Central Government would recommend an increase in Azerbaijan’s parliamentary representation, and a new electoral law based on universal suffrage (to extend the franchise to women) to the 15th Majles.

10. The newly-defined province (ayalat) of Azerbaijan would include the former 3rd and 4th provinces (Eastern and Western Azerbaijan).

11. An administrative council comprised of the
Governor-General and the directors of departments would manage the provincial affairs under the supervision of the Provincial Council.

12. Teaching at the high schools and university of Azerbaijan would be in both Persian and Azeri-Turkic languages.

13. The Kurdish population of Azerbaijan would enjoy the privilege of Article 12, concerning education in Kurdish at elementary schools.

14. Existing city councils in Azerbaijan would continue to function.

15. The agreement would be enforced upon its approval by the Iranian Council of Ministers and the Provincial Council of Azerbaijan.(157)

Several points in the Firouz-Pishevari agreement should be underlined in this analysis: [1] The issue of Azerbaijan's army remained unresolved; [2] According to Article 10 the capital of the "Kurdish Republic" Mahabad, which was in the 4th province, came under the authority of Tabriz; [3] Since Zanjan, a stronghold of DPA, was not part of either 3rd or 4th provinces, it was implicitly excluded from Azerbaijan. After all, the concessions made by the Central Government, were nothing more than an acknowledgement of the status quo. In return Azerbaijan accepted, although nominally, the jurisdiction of the Central Government.
Following the signing of the Tabriz agreement, or more accurately following "modus vivendi" reached, Pishevari dissolved his cabinet. The ministers of Azerbaijan became directors of provincial departments, while the Minister of Interior, Dr. Salamollah Javid, was appointed Governor-General of Azerbaijan by Qavam. The Shah received Javid on 17 June. According to the authority vested in him, Javid appointed Seif-e-Qavzi as Governor of Mahabad. Thus, the entity of the Kurdish Republic, and its president, was undermined. (158) Pishevari did not take an administrative job but remained the Chairman of the DPA and the political leader of Azerbaijan. (159)

Both the Tudeh Party and the DPA celebrated the Tabriz agreement and interpreted it as a victory for the Left. The official newspaper of Tudeh, Rahbar, commented on 13 June:

"Qavam is determined to carry out fundamental democratic reforms in Iran. This has been proved by his actions in recent months. Therefore, it is our patriotic duty to support him with all our strength". (160)

In a similar vein, Pishevari made a radio statement in Tabriz praising Qavam:

"...Now our movement is faced with a new development. Qavam is determined to redirect Tehran's reactionary way to a progressive one in our direction. Hereafter, the whole of
Iran will follow Azerbaijan towards democracy.(161)

However, the enthusiasm of the Tudeh and the DPA had not been shared by the public. The major newspapers of Tehran, reflecting the views of nationalists and liberals, condemned the DPA for its insistence on replacing the Persian language with Turkish; an action which undermined Iranian national unity.(162)

As far as the status of the Azerbaijan armed forces was not specified, the Firouz-Pishevari agreement remained inconclusive. Therefore, Qavam decided to strengthen the army's command with a new appointment. On 3 July, he persuaded the Shah to appoint the distinguished nationalist general, Ali Razmara, as Chief of General Staff.(163) Since being removed from office in late 1944, Razmara had taken early retirement under pressure from his rival and successor General Arfa. Two weeks after Arfa's detention in April 1946, Qavam planned to get Razmara back onto the general staff. At the request of Qavam and The Minister of War, General Ahmadi, the Shah reluctantly accepted Razmara as inspector of the army in the western provinces. This appointment paved the way for Razmara's second term as Chief of General Staff. Qavam believed Razmara to be the man who could reorganise the armed forces and defuse the pressure from Azerbaijan, when necessary.(164) Contrary to Arfa, Razmara had not antagonised the communists in
the past. He had established friendly relations with some of the Tudeh leaders as well as with Qavam’s deputy, Firouz. Thus, in the new political atmosphere, Razmara had field to manoeuvre, while maintaining his nationalist principles.(165)

The representatives of the Iranian army who had accompanied Firouz, remained in Tabriz to proceed with negotiations on the issue of the Azerbaijan army. However, they soon realised that complying with the demands of Azerbaijan went beyond their scope of authority; thus they returned to Tehran without achieving any result.(166)

In July, a delegation from Azerbaijan comprising of Governor-General Javid, President of Provincial Council Shabestari, and the Chief of Azerbaijan Staff “General” Panahian arrived in Tehran to follow up the remaining points of the Firouz-Pishevari agreement. The main objective of the delegation was to combine the Azerbaijan army with the Iranian armed forces on the basis of the following provisions:

1. 160 officers who had deserted the Iranian army and joined the Azerbaijan army would be promoted two ranks.
2. The ranks of 300 non-commissioned officers who had deserted the Iranian army and were promoted as officers of Azerbaijan army would be confirmed.
3. The ranks of 350 Soviet immigrants who had joined the Azerbaijan army, and some of whom were promoted to Generals, would be confirmed.
4. The Central Government would be committed to pay the expenditure of the Azerbaijan army.

5. The commanders of the Azerbaijan army would be appointed by the Central Government, after consultation with the Provincial Council.

6. Conscripts from Azerbaijan would not be transferred to other provinces.

7. Officers of the Azerbaijan army would not be transferred to other provinces; and no officer from any other provinces would be assigned to Azerbaijan without the approval of the Provincial Council.

When these proposals were offered to Qavam, Razmara, who was present at the meeting, severely objected to them. Razmara stated that compliance with them would mean the dissolution of the Iranian army. He asserted that the Iranian army would never return deserters to service without punishment, since return without punishment would provoke the whole Iranian army to rebel. (167)

Razmara's vigorous statement convinced the leaders of Azerbaijan that if they sustained pressure on Qavam and caused his downfall, they would then have the next alternative to face, the uncompromising Razmara and his army. However, Qavam was aware that Razmara could not have accepted any amendment to the army's rules without the Shah's approval.

At this point, Qavam, who was still intending to pacify the Left and play for time, approached the Shah for a
solution. He asked the Shah to use his prerogative as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and let the army accept, at least, part of the provisions suggested by the delegation from Azerbaijan. The Shah's response, which he proudly remembered later at many occasions, was that he would "prefer his hands to be cut off than to sign such a decree". (168)

Despite the rejection of Azerbaijan's demands, Qavam's special connection with Javid and Shabestari prevented a split. They reportedly had been bribed by Qavam in order to appease their revolutionary comrades and remain friendly to Qavam's Government until the end of the Azerbaijan episode. (169)
The Tudeh Party helped Qavam to consolidate his power. As such, they benefited from his policies which increased Soviet influence, weakened the anti-Soviet faction whose politicians were arrested, and suppressed anti-Soviet publications. Qavam's main intention was to pacify the Russians in order to accommodate Iran's political problems. However, this policy helped the Tudeh Party to strengthen its position. According to the party's own interpretation, its freedom of activity was one of the Soviet conditions for settlement in Iran. 

The growth of Tudeh's membership and influence impressed foreign observers of Iranian developments, as well as the Iranian ruling class. The Western powers, particularly the British, who were concerned for their oil wealth in Iran, became more anxious of the ideology and programs of the Tudeh Party. The Party was confident enough to be outspoken on such issues.

In a meeting with two British Members of Parliament, Michael Foot (Labour) and Anthony Head (Conservative), who visited Iran in April 1946, the leaders of the Tudeh Party expressed the following views:
(1). The party wanted a revision in the Iranian Constitution; but before that, it would participate in parliamentary elections.

(2). The party believed that a purge of the Iranian ruling class would help the settlement of Azerbaijan.

(3). The party would agree to grant oil concession to the Soviet Union, but would oppose such a favour to the imperialists. (171)

On his return to London, Foot wrote in the Daily Herald that the Tudeh Party was anti-British, pro-Russian, and undoubtedly the largest political force in Iran. (172)

In May, the American Ambassador, George Allen, commented in his report to the State Department.

"The Tudeh Party is the only large, well-organised, and functioning political machine in Iran". (173)

Le Rougetel sent a similar report to London, stating that the Tudeh Party was the "only coherent political force" which had "almost complete control of the press and labour throughout the country". (174)

On May Day, tens of thousands of the members of the Tudeh Party and the CCFTU paraded in the streets of Tehran. The Tudeh leaders were allowed to use the balcony of a government building (Tehran Municipality) to address the marchers. This was interpreted by many that Tudeh was in control of the Government, and would soon seize power to introduce its own government. (175)
At this time, the party was claiming that its members, trade unionists, and sympathisers numbered nearly half a million of Iran's 16 million population.\textsuperscript{(176)}

While the Tudeh Party enjoyed a profound influence amongst both the intelligentsia and the working class, Qavam contemplated joining the contest and creating a progressive image for himself. He also intended to mollify the Soviets, the Tudeh Party, and the DPA who had been pressuring him for reforms.\textsuperscript{(177)} During April and May, the Council of Ministers approved a number of bills in favour of the peasants and workers. They included a revision of the process of sharing harvests between the landlords and the cultivators; the distribution of state-lands amongst the farmers; the formation of rural development funds; the distribution of Crown Lands among the peasants; and the introduction of a labour law.\textsuperscript{(178)} One Cabinet minister told Le Rougetel that Qavam's main objective from the new reforms was to strengthen the Government's position against criticism from the DPA and Tudeh Party.\textsuperscript{(179)} The Labour Law, which came into force immediately, targeted the industrial working class which had been exclusively supporting the Tudeh Party. This law was to regulate employer-employee relations, and set up the Higher Labour Council composed of representatives of the Government, employers and workers who were represented by the pro-Tudeh CCFTU.\textsuperscript{(180)} The labour law ordained a 48-hour working week, one day off per week,
plus two weeks off per year with full salary, and banned the employment of children under eight. (181) The institution of such exceptional privileges for the working class would have affected every factory and workshop in Iran including the oil fields and installations run by the AIOC. Under the same law, a labour office was opened for the first time in Abadan, in order to receive any complaints from AIOC employees, and so "to wean them from the influence of the Tudeh Party". (182)

However, the Tudeh Party had intended to utilise these new opportunities to strengthen its position and extend its activities.

As we have discussed in the previous sections, the party was restricted from opening its branches in Khuzestan and agitating employees of the AIOC, as long as the war continued. This policy had been pursued because of Soviet dependence on assistance from the Western allies, and the British oil interest in Khuzestan.

Since the outbreak of East-West confrontation at the United Nations over Iran, the Tudeh Party had decided to harm British interests.

The party set up its headquarters in Abadan in early 1946. It soon dominated the trade unions, and mobilised a labour movement against the British management of the Abadan refinery. The party carried out anti-AIOC
propaganda across the oil fields. Furthermore, for the first time, it organised a demonstration of eighty thousand people on 1 May 1946 to celebrate Labour Day in Abadan. (183)

During May and June, a series of minor strikes were organised by the unions which reflected demands for the improvement of living conditions, housing, and general amenities. Qavam instructed provincial officials to maintain order without the use of force. (184)

According to British reports, Qavam pursued a conciliatory line in order to put an end to the strikes. On the one hand, he asked the Tudeh leaders to "instruct" their party members in Khuzestan to refrain from agitation. (185) On the other, he sent a message to AIOC managers to the effect that they should follow a policy of "appeasement". (186)

The company partly agreed to this advice, and decided not only to increase wages, but also furnish new amenities and social services. Fearing a general strike would take place throughout the fields and Abadan, it even granted pay for the duration of the strike. (187)

Meanwhile, anti-British propaganda by the leftist newspapers of Tehran continued. They alleged that the British Government continued to maintain troops in Iran, and that the AIOC had disregarded government rulings such as the Labour Law. A topic frequently discussed by these papers was the misbehaviour of the British oil company towards Iranian workers in the
southern oil fields.(188)
The tense situation in Khuzistan, a result of hardship, shortages, and discrimination, was exploited by the leftist press. The first strike took place in order to obtain such essential needs as drinking water, ice, and fan for those workers who had to work and live in oil fields in the desert.(189) Iranians working in the oil industry were deprived of facilities and privileges that the British and the Arabs had enjoyed.(190). Therefore, the problems were not solely the direct consequences of economic exigencies. When some Indian employees of the AIOC were suspected of taking sides with the strikers, a British official report commented:

"It is hoped that the Indians, who in any case enjoy better conditions than the Persians, will cease association with the Tudeh and settle down". (191)

In his analysis of the situation, Elwell-Sutton, an employee of the AIOC, blamed the British who neglected the "additional stresses that arose from the activities of a foreign employer in a nationalist-minded community". (192)

The Labour Government in London had no concrete solution to the settlement of the labour question at the AIOC. A British parliamentary delegation which visited the AIOC oil fields at this time, to investigate the
situation, recommended "winning over Tudeh trade unionists to British ideas". (193) Within the delegation, Labour MP Jack Jones, who himself was a long-standing trade unionist, believed that the AIOC needed "trained, socially-minded personnel, able to meet the demands suddenly made upon" the company. (194) However, in view of the recent Soviet-Iranian agreement, Bevin suggested a more genuine change in the AIOC. According to him, payments of royalties from Britain to Iran for use of its oil-fields, should be changed and an Iranian-British joint-venture should be established. As such, the charge of exploitation would have been removed, and the workers would have become the employees of the Iranian Government. (195) Bevin advised the Chairman of the AIOC, Sir William Fraser, that a joint Anglo-Iranian oil company on a 50-50 basis would give the Iranians the responsibility to protect their own property. (196) However, Bevin's suggestion seemed unacceptable to AIOC directors who, according to Attlee's view, were "very difficult", "had enjoyed a kind of imperial power", "could not "get out of the habit" and would not "relax their hold and move with the time". (197)

Although the situation was turning into a disaster in the summer of 1946, the AIOC was reluctant to find an urgent solution. In June, the AIOC refused to agree to the provisions of the Labour Law regarding Friday-pay. This refusal was magnified by Tudeh papers which
accused the company of resisting the law and failing to fulfil its agreement with the oil workers. Also Radio Moscow made a broadcast against the AIOC, accusing it of obstructing the trade unions in Khuzestan.

At this point both the AIOC and the unions prepared for a major confrontation. Whilst the AIOC encouraged the Arabic-speaking minority in Khuzestan to stand for their rights as indigenous inhabitants of the province, the oil-workers unions claimed popular support for their campaign against the company.

In mid-June, a provincial council was set up in Ahwaz, under the auspices of the AIOC, to represent the so-called "largely Arab province of Khuzestan". This provided a pretext for the leftist press of Tehran to accuse the British of encouraging a separatist movement in Khuzestan. This accusation was not groundless. According to Elwell-Sutton, some British ex-army officers who had been with the AIOC "were intriguing with the tribes and particularly the discontented Arab minority in the South West". In addition, an "Arab Union" had been formed with a declared objective of opposing Tudeh activities in Khuzestan. This union, financed and armed by the AIOC management, soon launched attacks on the trade unions headquarters and clubs.
Furthermore, the leaders of the "Arab Union" were taken to Baghdad, where they met with the Iraqi Regent, Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister, and asked for the annexation of "Arabestan" (Khuzestan) to Iraq. They also addressed a petition to the Arab League in Cairo against the Iranian Government's maltreatment of them.

However, according to the British, the Tudeh Party was the only organisation responsible for the disturbances in Khuzestan. On 9 June, Le Rougetel complained to Qavam about Tudeh activities. On 23 June, Qavam issued a public statement warning the workers against disorder and disruption of work. On 26 June, Le Rougetel handed Qavam an aide-memoire regarding the situation in the AIOC oil fields. The British Ambassador asked the Iranian Government to ensure that "full protection" was given to the company's employees. He also demanded that "immediate action" be taken against those who were inciting employees "to strike or make violence".

Apparently, all factions in Khuzestan, including the provincial administration, were preparing for a confrontation. The anti-union policy of the Governor-General, Mesbah Fatemi, and the excesses of the security forces in suppressing pro-union demonstrations combined with AIOC negligence of the unions' demands, generated a general strike. The arrest of the top union leader, Ali Omid, was the final straw for the outburst.

On 13 July, the Central Union of Workers and Toilers of
Khuzestan, which was in control of a labour force of one hundred thousand, made a large number of political demands. They included: (1) Removal of the Governor-General Mesbah Fatemi; (2) non-interference by the AIOC in Iranian political and internal affairs; (3) disarmament of tribes in Southern Iran; and (4) payment of wages for seven days a week. (210)

The Central Union also sent a telegram to the Tudeh leadership in Tehran, regarding its other demands for improvement of accommodation, transport, sanitation, and conditions of employment. (211) The general strike began on 14 July throughout the province. The Government declared martial law, but could not prevent a conflict between the workers and the Arabs. Consequently, 17 people were killed. (212) Although all the union leaders were arrested on the same day, the strike succeeded in bringing oil production in the fields and operation at the Abadan refinery to a standstill. (213)

A British report claimed that the Soviet Consul in Ahvaz had made contact with the union leaders the day before the strike, and had offered to supply the Ahwaz labour union "with arms if necessary". (214) The report regarding direct involvement by the Soviets in the oil workers strike was not confirmed. However, the Tudeh papers' allegations against the British persisted. They stated that the "Arab Union" had been created by the British Consul-General in Ahwaz, Alan Trott, and that he
had incited the attacks on the union clubs. (215) Sir Clarmont Skrine, a British diplomat who visited the region during the strike, wrote in his memoirs:

"This was an overwhelming demonstration of the power and solidarity of the Tudeh Party, and a crushing blow to British prestige and economic interests." (216)

However, the Tudeh press maintained that the British officials and the AIOC had deliberately directed the situation towards confrontation and bloodshed, to find a pretext for British intervention. (217) The Tudeh paper, Rahbar, also accused Skrine of organising the attacks on the Tudeh activists and the trade unions headquarters. (218)

Qavam was caught between the Tudeh show of force and the British warning. At the peak of the crisis, Le Rougetel warned Qavam that if the Iranian Government did not fulfil its responsibility to protect British lives and interests, the British Government could "intervene" if necessary. (219) At this point, Qavam's dilemma was how to end the crisis. Condemning the strike would have meant an anti-Iranian and pro-British action; while supporting the strike would be regarded as an affirmation of Tudeh agitations. However, he found it inevitable to ask for Tudeh Party assistance to find a solution. On 15 July, a joint Government-Tudeh delegation comprising of the Prime Minister's assistant, Firouz, Deputy Minister of Commerce, Aramesh, Tudeh
Party First Secretary, Radmanesh, and a CCFTU leader, Jowdat, arrived in Ahwaz to settle the dispute. As the head of the delegation, Firouz was assigned to carry out negotiations with both the union leaders and the AIOC officials. He ordered the release of the Tudeh detainees to ease the tension. During negotiations with union leaders, Firouz promised to remove both the Governor-General and the military commander of Khuzestan and to support the legitimate demands of the unions, if the unions stopped the strike the next day. Meanwhile, he advised the AIOC management to meet the unions demands in the framework of the Labour Law. (220)

Qavam's policy in pressuring both sides to reach a settlement succeeded. At a meeting of thirty thousand workers in Abadan, on 17 July, Firouz stated that Qavam cared about the rights of workers, and that he (Qavam) had expressed confidence in the company's intention to improve workers' living conditions. (221)

The Tudeh party made political capital out of the strike. However, The British Embassy and AIOC were offended by the assignment of Firouz and the inclusion of Tudeh leaders in his delegation, and they were dissatisfied with the delegation's handling of the crisis. The British branded Firouz a "notorious turncoat and double-crosser" who had undermined the local authorities, released the strike ring-leaders, and imposed his own decision on both sides of the
conflict. Le Rougetel complained about Firouz's behaviour in Khuzestan to Qavam. The British Government contemplated organising a military demonstration in order to threaten anti-British elements in Iran. On 17 July, two British warships, Norfolk and Wildgoose, anchored in the vicinity of Abadan. This measure increased the support for the left, since the nationalist press joined the Tudeh papers in condemning British "gunboat diplomacy". While the press called the British action an "infringement of Iranian sovereignty", the Iranian Government addressed a Note of protest to the British Embassy for this "unfriendly act".

A second dispute arose from a British statement broadcast by Delhi Radio on 3 August to the effect that troops had been dispatched from India to the Iraqi port of Basra, in order to be used, if necessary, for the protection of British, Indian and Arab "lives" and to safeguard British, Indian and Arab "interests" in southern Iran.

The dispatch of Indian troops to Basra, as well as the dispatch of British cruisers to Abadan, had been initiated by Bevin who was, on the one hand, a critic of the AIOC's conduct in Iran and, on the other, concerned about British "interests" in Iran as well as the "safety" of British personnel.

Qavam used the occasion to issue a statement to the nation and send another Note of protest to the British
Embassy. In a statement, broadcast on Radio Tehran on 3 August, he said that the affairs of Khuzestan were an "internal" Iranian matter, and that the Iranian Government would "under no circumstances permit foreign intervention". In its Note addressed to the British Embassy, the Iranian Government asserted that the strike had "successfully ended because of the efforts of the Iranian Government", and that the "maintenance of law and order in industrial disputes" was universally "recognised as the exclusive duty of the security forces" of the country. It requested the return of troops from the vicinity of Iran, in order to clear the "misunderstanding" between the two countries.

The British reply to the Iranian protest, on 6 August, stated that the troop movement from India to Iraq was "of concern only to the British and Iraqi Governments" and in connection with "supplies of oil, and the security of the British Empire". The Note, however, appreciated the "prompt and effective action" taken by the Iranian Government to restore order, and denied that any order was given to the troops to enter Iran under any circumstances.

Moscow exploited the situation to expose British "gunboat diplomacy". Furthermore the Soviet papers compared the situation in Khuzestan with British interference in Greece.
Meanwhile Sadchikov responded to the rumours in Tehran concerning Soviet ambitions in southern Iran. In a statement to the press, he denied that the Soviet Union had intended to obtain a port on the Persian Gulf. (233)

In line with Moscow, the British Communist Party criticised the Labour Government's undertaking in Iran, and described it as the "most shameless aggressive imperialism on behalf of big oil monopolies against the freedom of a small country". (234)
CHAPTER SIX

DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF IRAN AND THE

COALITION GOVERNMENT

On 29 June, Qavam announced the formation of a political party under his own leadership. In a statement which was broadcast on Tehran radio, Qavam gave an account of his government's accomplishments within the first six months of its formation in improving the situation in Iran. He particularly emphasised its success in securing the evacuation of foreign troops as the result of "good understanding" between Iran and the Soviet Union. Qavam referred to his negotiations with Stalin in Moscow and the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran as factors in his success.

"Establishment of friendly relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of sincerity and mutual respect have left a good effect on every aspect of the Iranian situation; the question of Azerbaijan was a major problem which has been settled as the outcome of the goodwill of both parties, and has now been concluded in the interests of Iran’s freedom and national unity.\(^{(235)}\)

In concluding his statement, Qavam declared that he was determined to set up the "Democratic Party of Iran" in order to follow up the reform programs through a
democratic institution. Qavam expressed his confidence that the Democratic Party of Iran (DPI) would help the "emergence of a genuine unity among freedom-lovers and freedom-loving political organisations". (236)

When Qavam announced the formation of DPI, there were mainly two active political parties in Iran: the nationwide Tudeh Party, and the local party of Azerbaijan, the DPA. The small Iran Party, comprised of a number of non-communist intellectuals, was of no great significance yet. (237)

In forming the DPI, Qavam pursued several objectives. First, he intended to end the monopoly of the Tudeh Party which was the only nationwide political organisation. Qavam had also been encouraged by the British and the American Ambassadors to support the formation of independent parties which could act as alternatives to the Tudeh. (238) Meanwhile, Qavam intended to avoid antagonising the Soviet Union which was on the side of the Tudeh Party. Qavam's reference to Soviet-Iranian friendship in the preface to his announcement of the formation of the DPI was unusual but purposeful.

Second, the name "Democratic Party" originated during Iran's constitutional history as a nationalist and progressive institution in the early 20th century. The first Chairman of the Tudeh Party, Suleiman Mirza Eskandari, was once the leader of the Democratic Party of Iran before the reign of Reza Shah.
Third, the Democratic Party of Iran would make use of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan's support, whilst attempting to undermine it, or otherwise attempt to completely co-opt the DPA's support. Many Iranian nationalists outside Azerbaijan had already suggested to Pishevari that he should not limit his demands to one province only, but should struggle for democracy throughout Iran. Qavam took the opportunity to adopt the proposal, which Pishevari had failed to do.

Fourth, Qavam was prepared to challenge both the Court and the Tudeh Party in the coming elections for the 15th Majles. To achieve his aim, he needed his own political organisation. The Government's direct interference in the election would face resistance. However, the DPI, supported by the Government, could easily pack the Majles with supporters of Qavam.

The DPI program detailed the internal reforms which had been envisaged. It also covered the issues of Iranian foreign policy, including the "preservation of friendly relations with all the Allies, particularly the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States of America". In addition, the program referred to issues such as political equality for women, which provoked the clergy's opposition. It also asked for the revision of some "irrelevant" articles in the Iranian Constitution which alarmed the Shah.
In spite of Qavam's aristocratic connections and the centrist background of the members of the DPI Central Committee, the party's program seemed too radical for many Iranians. However, Qavam's intention was to challenge the left in its own way. One of Qavam's advisers stated: "The situation forced us to adopt a radical image to compete with the revolutionaries". (243) Qavam had justly foreseen the attraction of a new political body. Not only did government officials and civil servants apply for membership, but a huge number of businessmen and landlords who were frightened of Tudeh's expansion, followed suit. The DPI also received some offers for collective membership. The chieftains of the Qasqai and Bakhtiari tribes demanded that through their own applications, all their tribesmen be admitted to the party. (244)

Qavam's decision to form the DPI was not received favourably by the Tudeh Party. The two sides had by now entered a critical period in their relations. Just before the introduction of the DPI Qavam had issued two communiqués which provoked Tudeh Party resentment. In one of them, the Government had asked villagers to disregard the intrigues of "some political parties" who were inciting them not to pay the landlords' shares of the harvest. The other was a warning to "certain workers organisations" who had "abused the Government's goodwill" and whose activities were against the public interest. (245) The reaction of the Tudeh Party was to
remind Qavam that he owed his position to Tudeh members, and held it "at their pleasure". (246) The Tudeh Party refrained from making immediate comment on the DPI. On 17 July, it revealed its viewpoints. It argued that government privileges should not be confined to one party. It therefore asked that Qavam share the privileges of the DPI with the Tudeh Party, in order to thwart the "conspiracies of imperialism and reactionaries". It also asked Qavam to keep his party in close contact with other "freedom-loving parties". (247)

Meanwhile, the Tudeh Party lobbied to set up coalition with other political parties and with members of Qavam's Cabinet. On 30 June, a day after Qavam's proclamation of establishment of the DPI, the Tudeh organ, Rahbar, published a communique signed by the representatives of the Tudeh and the Iran Parties, announcing the formation of the "United Front of Freedom-Loving Parties". The communique emphasised the two parties' coalition, their co-operation against "imperialism and reaction", and their support of the CCFTU as the "only workers organisation of Iran". (248) The leadership of the Iran Party encountered protests from some party members such as Professor Mehdi Bazargan and historian Hossein Makki, over the coalition with Tudeh Party. However, the party organisation remained intact. (249) In the meantime, Qavam received information regarding a broader Tudeh-
inspired coalition which would include the Tudeh and Iran Parties, DPA, DPK, the local Jangal Party of Gilan, and some leftist groups in Khorasan. This coalition was supposed to secure a majority for the left in the forthcoming election. (250) Qavam's only chance to abort such a plan was to reach an urgent understanding with the Tudeh Party.

On 4 July, it was announced that Qavam had ordered the arrest of his Minister of Commerce and Industry, Ahmad Ali Sepehr (Movarrakh-ud-Dowleh). Sepehr was an ambitious politician who had reportedly had contacts with Tudeh leaders and the Soviet Embassy, and criticised Qavam for the introduction of the DPI to challenge Tudeh. (251) Sepehr also had meetings with the Shah to assure him of his own support against Qavam. (252) Sepehr's activities convinced Qavam that if he (Qavam) failed to deal with Tudeh, his rivals would welcome the opportunity to upstage him. Following the collaboration of the Tudeh party and CCFTU with the Government in ending the oil-workers strike in mid-July, Qavam was one step closer to a coalition with Tudeh. It had been reported that after the strike of Khuzestan, the Tudeh Party asked Qavam for three positions in his cabinet. (253) However, there is evidence that Qavam had considered a coalition with Tudeh, at least five weeks before the strike. Qavam had told Le Rougetel before 9 June that he intended to bring "one or two" Tudeh leaders into the Cabinet "in the hope of sobering them
with responsibility". The British could not accept Qavam's argument. However, the Americans had a different point of view. Allen expressed hopes that Qavam could better handle Tudeh through a coalition government. Qavam was worried about how the Shah would react, if the latter were consulted regarding a coalition with Tudeh. The Shah appreciated Qavam's statesmanship, but did not approve of his appeasement of the left. On 24 July, the Shah bestowed Qavam with the title of "Jenab-e-Ashraf" (most honourable) for his "distinguished services" to the country.

In order to form a new cabinet, Qavam had to present his resignation to the Shah, and be re-invited by the Shah to form another cabinet. However, Qavam avoided this constitutional procedure, and on 31 July just asked his ministers to resign. On 1 August, Qavam introduced his new Cabinet to the Shah which included ministers from the DPI, Tudeh and Iran parties. Three Tudeh leaders, Dr. Fereidoun Keshavarz, Dr. Mortaza Yazdi and Iraj Eskandari, were appointed Ministers of Education, Health, Commerce and Industry accordingly. Allahyar Saleh from the Iran party received the portfolio of Justice. Qavam's political assistant, Firouz, went to the newly-formed Ministry of Labour and Propaganda.

Some Western observers viewed Qavam's coalition government as an attempt to appease the Tudeh Party. For example, Le Rougetel reported to London
that out of eleven ministers, eight were registered or "fellow-travelling Communists."(259)

It has been known that there was a bargaining between Qavam and the Tudeh Party over the power-sharing in the Coalition Government. While the Tudeh asked for five portfolios including those of Interior and Foreign Affairs, Qavam insisted on maintaining both for the Prime Minister in order to resist party politics in foreign relations and the forthcoming elections.(260) Furthermore, Qavam was reluctant to grant the portfolio of Education to Keshavarz a Tudeh leader. He preferred to appoint the professor of paediatrics Minister of Posts and Telegraphs.(261) An argument regarding this point between Keshavarz and Firouz, revealed the involvement of Sadchikov in the formation of the Coalition Government.

Keshavarz wrote in his memoirs the events which took place in the presence of other ministers when Firouz failed to persuade him to accept the portfolio of Posts and Telegraphs.

"...The telephone rang. It was for me. From the other side of the line, the interpreter of the Soviet Embassy, Ashurov, introduced himself. He told me that Ambassador Sadchikov wanted me to accept the job offered by Qavam. Ashurov also conveyed a message in Sadchikov’s words that my admission would be in the interest of the Tudeh party, the
Iranian people, and the Soviet Union.....This made me too nervous. I loudly told Ashurov to ask Sadchikov why the Ambassador let himself interfere in the affairs of our country and our party.

Another Tudeh minister, Iraj Eskandari, who was present there, later stated that Firouz had dialled the number of the Soviet Embassy and after a short conversation had called Keshavarz to the telephone. However, according to Eskandari, Keshavarz was not nervous but pleased that Sadchikov personally called to persuade him. Nevertheless, Qavam submitted to Keshavarz and gave him the portfolio of Education.

Some segments of the Tudeh party disapproved of the coalition. However, the Soviet involvement in this political initiation prevented a split or open opposition. Those dissenting referred to the resolution of the first party congress in 1944 to the effect that Tudeh would not participate in government unless a "genuine patriotic and democratic" government was formed. The question was: Why the party refused a similar proposal from Soheili, but accepted it from Qavam?

The party leadership was accused of undermining its ideological objectives, and changing directions at the behest of Soviet diplomatic manoeuvres.
On 4 August, the Tudeh Party's Central Committee issued a statement to members, justifying its decision to cooperate with Qavam. The statement emphasised that contrary to the previous "reactionary" governments, Qavam had "valued public opinion" and settled the question of Azerbaijan "in a direction that the Iranian people wished". The statement added that participation in government was necessary in order to maintain the security of "democratic movements" and "toilers'interests". It called on the members to maintain "discipline", leave the way open for reforms, and thwart the "intriguers' conspiracies". (267)

Years later, Eskandari revealed the party's other justifications for joining the Coalition Government, which were to safeguard the advantages already gained for the left movement in Iran; to prevent a reversal in the Government's foreign policy; to strengthen the Cabinet's leftist trend; and neutralise the Court's pressure. (268)

According to Eskandari, the Tudeh party had also made its participation in the coalition conditional upon Qavam's acceptance of a "democratic program of agrarian reforms, a final solution to the Azerbaijan question, and free elections". (269) In his memoirs, Kambakhsh, another Tudeh leader, complimented the achievements of the Tudeh Party in the course of the coalition. According to him, the party had enjoyed the Government's support in strengthening the activities of
its organisation; the extension of party activities into rural areas; and conducting the activities of Tudeh trade unions in southern and western Iran (which in the past had been underground) in the open. (270) Nonetheless, there were indoctrinated, hard-core communists in the Tudeh Party who actively sought to sweep into power and set up a "people's republic". (271) The success of the DPA in Azerbaijan was encouraging to those radicals in the Tudeh party who expected eventual victory in Tehran under the auspices of the Soviet Union. However, since the evacuation of the Red Army, the Tudeh leadership had been persuaded by its Soviet supporters to pursue a different route. The first phase towards success consisted of participating in a coalition government. If the circumstances had permitted, the Tudeh Party would have obtained key departments and secured its victory in the forthcoming elections. (272) According to this scenario, a victory in the election like that which had been achieved by communist parties in Eastern Europe, would have paved the way for the party to enter into the third phase. As such, the Tudeh Party would have gained complete control of the Government and established a monopoly of power. (273) A Polish diplomat in Tehran, George Lenczowski, who had been following the developments in Eastern Europe believed that Qavam's coalition Cabinet "had many
characteristics of classical communist infiltration into
the governing apparatus of a non-communist
country". (274) However, this point of view neglected one
significant difference between Iran and Eastern Europe.
The instrument which had secured the takeover by the
communist parties in those countries was the force of
the Red Army and not the coalition. In reality, the
communist parties of Eastern Europe manipulated
coalition governments, because they enjoyed the support
of the Russian forces of occupation; and it was the Red
Army which purged the non-communist political parties in
the occupied countries.
Qavam's invitation to the Tudeh Party to join in a
coalition took place only after the evacuation of the
Soviet troops had been completed.
Qavam's main anxiety was the continuation of the
rebellion in the north. He intended to put an end to
Azerbaijan's semi-autonomy, without risking Soviet
intervention. He thus needed Soviet support and,
thereby, viewed the coalition with Tudeh "as one last
attempt to conciliate the Russians". (275)
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629
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28] For details see Section Five, Chapter Ten.
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31] Ibid., P.390.
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86] Quoted in Harbutt, Ibid., P. 265.
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133] Mehdi Nia, Ibid.,P.440
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135] Ibid.
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SECTION SEVEN:

REVERSAL AND RETREAT
The developments between April and August 1946 bore some success for the Soviet Union and the Left in Iran. From the time of the signature of the Qavam-Sadchikov agreement through to the formation of the coalition Government, the Soviet Embassy influenced every major decision taken in Iran. Furthermore, Qavam used every opportunity to emphasise Iranian-Soviet friendship. The Tudeh Party also enjoyed much freedom including organising daily demonstrations and strikes, and even challenging laws and governmental authority. It was assumed that while Qavam ran the Government's apparatus, the Tudeh Party ruled the streets. The objectives of the rallies were neither important nor clear. One party activist of this time related that on 20 July 1946, the Tudeh Party gathered tens of thousands of people in a Tehran square to demonstrate against the Koumintang in China and Franco in Spain, despite the demonstrators show of disinterest.

Surprisingly, Qavam even paid a visit to the Tudeh Party's headquarter in July, where he listened to Tudeh leaders praise his competence and statesmanship.

Many Iranian individuals and institutions considered Qavam's policy in keeping both the Russian and The Tudeh Party content as the order of the day and as such, followed his example.

In early July, the first Congress of the Iranian poets and writers was inaugurated at the Soviet-Iranian
Cultural Centre, in the presence of Qavam and Sadchikov. All prominent Iranian poets or writers were present. A delegation from the Soviet Union attended the congress. Messages from the Chairman of the Soviet Writers Union, Tikhonov, and the unions of Armenia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Azerbaijan were presented. The speakers, both Iranian and Russian, praised the Soviet achievements particularly in literature. The final resolution of the congress, recommended that the Iranian people "struggle against the remnants of Fascism", "support humanism and genuine democracy", and "expand cultural relations with the progressive democracies of the world, especially the Soviet Union".(5)

Every reform made by Qavam such as the Labour Law, increasing the peasants share of the harvest, the setting up of the Supreme Economic Council was interpreted as a result of the Soviet influence and the Tudeh pressure.

Qavam's "good faith" became a popular term in communist literature of this time, and Russians intended to make as much as possible from this "good faith" policy. In June, they asked Qavam for an agreement concerning an exclusive right for Soviet Airways in northern Iran. In return, the Moscow promised its support of Qavam's Government inside and outside Iran.(6)

On 8 July, Qavam addressed a letter to the Paris Peace Conference, regarding Iran's participation.(7) When this application was being discussed, Vyshinsky made a
statement in support of Iran, praising its contribution to the Allied victory, and reminding the Conference that in the Declaration of Tehran in 1943, the three Big Powers had pledged Iran's participation in the post-war peace conference. Consequently Iran's delegation was admitted to the Conference, and Iran expressed its thanks to the Soviet Union for its support. (8)

At this juncture, there was also an occasion for the Shah to restore his personal contact with Stalin, which had been terminated after Iran's refusal of the Soviet military offer in early 1944. (9) In July, the Shah's twin sister, Princess Ashraf, paid a visit to the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Red Cross. When she was received by Stalin, she presented the Shah's message of sympathy and respect to the Soviet leader. One anxiety of the Shah, at this time, was the possibility of his removal from the throne by a Soviet-Qavam plot. (10)

Besides the anxiety of the Shah, London and Washington were both uneasy about Qavam's preferential treatment of the Soviet Union. However, the British criticism of Qavam was sharper and more pessimistic. In one report of the Foreign Office in June, Qavam was accused of being "inclined to take his orders from Moscow". (11) However, the American comments about Qavam were less sharp. They wanted to prevent Qavam from getting closer to Russians, by not isolating him.
In a personal letter to Allen on 3 July, the Director of NEA, Loy Henderson, advised that Qavam should not grant the Soviet Airways an exclusive right in northern Iran. Henderson maintained that Qavam’s policy of dependence on the Russians would deprive him of American assistance. (12)

In the second letter, Allen was advised to lessen Qavam’s “exaggerated” fear of the Soviet Union. “We should perhaps bring home to him the immediate strength of the United States and the United Nations as compared with the basically weak position of the Soviet Union”, Henderson stated. (13)

Allen himself was nervous of Qavam’s frequent “warm expression of friendship for USSR without any reference to any other nation”. (14)

However, Qavam’s behaviour was based on his own evaluation of the events. When three Tudeh leaders were included in the Cabinet, criticism of Qavam increased. Nevertheless, the outcome of the coalition proved that Qavam had finally been able to weaken both the DPA and the Tudeh. While Qavam’s prestige with Russians was enhanced after the formation of the coalition Government, the DPA significance was reduced. Furthermore, Qavam confronted the DPA with the Tudeh Party who had become a partner in the Government. Qavam also persuaded the Russians that the Tudeh was not a suitable partner in the Government. Only three days after announcing the coalition, Qavam’s DPI organised a
demonstration on 5 August, to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the Iranian Constitution. Following an address by Firouz who called the DPI "the greatest force for freedom not only in Iran but also in Asia", the demonstrators came under attack from members and sympathisers of the Tudeh Party who were armed with knives and clubs. Six were killed and many more injured. (15)

At a time when Tudeh had reached the zenith of its influence, Qavam was preparing its downfall. During the short-lived coalition, Qavam showed that the Tudeh leaders in the Cabinet were neither in control of their followers, nor competent to run their ministries. Their first action in the government departments was the implementation of a sweeping change of personnel. Consequently, this increased the number of their enemies. (16)

In general, the Tudeh Ministers had been impressed by the activities and achievements of the Communist parties in Eastern European countries. As a result, they had many illusions about having the same kind of power. In reality, the DPI had kept the key posts and was prepared to win the election. Moreover, those civil servants who had been dismissed by the Tudeh Ministers, returned to their positions under the protection of DPI. Consequently, they joined the traditional anti-communist elements such as the employers, the landlords and the
businessmen in campaigning against the Tudeh Party. (17) In short, the coalition helped to increase the unpopularity of the Tudeh Party among its own members and the rest of the population. Those members who wanted a "revolutionary" party became disappointed; and the opponents who feared the take over of the government by the Tudeh, mobilised their forces in unity against it. By giving Tudeh a share in the power, Qavam exposed its true nature and precipitated its downfall. Furthermore, he guaranteed the establishment of a "counter-trend" in Iranian politics. (18)
CHAPTER ONE
ANTI-COMMUNIST CAMPAIGN vs. COALITION

The counter-trend against the Left emerged from various directions: (1) The United States; (2) the Shah; (3) The United Kingdom; (4) The southern Iranian tribes; and (5) Qavam himself. In examining the Left’s downfall, one observes a collaboration between the first and second factors, also between the third and the fourth. Contrary to the Soviet and the Tudeh expectation, Qavam made no effort to save his leftist allies.

As early as April 1946, the British Foreign Office considered what counter-measures to take against the Russians and The Tudeh Party. Qavam’s policies had alarmed the British Government which was always fearful of its interests in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.(19) To thwart such a threat, the assistant Under-Secretary, Robert Howe, suggested on 16 April that the British Government "organise and finance an opposition party or parties to keep the Tudeh out of power".(20) Assuming that the Russians had planned to "control the whole of Persia with possible far-reaching effects" on British interests, Howe suggested: "We can adopt Russian tactics and encourage an autonomy movement in South-Western Persia."(21) this proposal was discussed at a Foreign Office meeting, but Bevin vetoed it. He asserted that an intervention in Iran would be "a very dangerous policy", and that he was not "prepared to
countenance" such measures. (22) One crucial point which came into consideration by Bevin was the "reaction of British public opinion and the United States". (23) The plan to safeguard British interests in Iran was not approved at once. However, it was not shelved either. During the months of June and July, Allen sent several reports regarding the British plan to partition Iran between Anglo-Russian spheres of interest. Le Rougetel's support of such a plan worried Allen who believed the "whole basis for the US fight in the UN had been on principle of Iranian independence and against spheres of influence". (24) Since the United States and Great Britain had been known as partners in Iran, Allen argued that such British plans would damage the American prestige. (25)

At the State Department, Acheson agreed with Allen's assessment. Acheson believed that as a result of the British plans, Iran might be "absorbed into Soviet orbit of satellite states", or "divided into foreign-dominated spheres of influence". (26) The United States, he wrote, should resist the accusation that it was collaborating with Britain in "forming a bloc in the Middle East opposed to the Soviet Union". (27)

On 15 July, the State Department issued a new policy-statement. Although the statement affirmed that Iran should remain stable and non-partitioned, it placed emphasis on deterrence and agreed to a British plan to
counter-balance Soviet influence. (28)
The timing of this policy-statement which coincided with
British military demonstrations in the vicinity of Iran,
induced Allen to present his anti-thesis. Allen commented on 21 July that British action in southern
Iran would be counter-productive.

"It will give Soviet propaganda opportunity
to allege that British forces were first to
return to Iran and might establish
undesirable precedent for possible future
Soviet movements on the Caspian or in the
north of Iran.

On the other hand, British action has already
had a salutary effect of correcting wide-
spread impression among Iranians that USSR is
the only power in this part of the world
willing to take firm action to protect its
interest. Numerous adherence to Tudeh have
resulted from this belief". (29)

Nonetheless, the British proceeded with their plan.
After all, they had expected the Tudeh Party to be
punished for its involvement in the oil fields strike,
and not to find its position strengthened.

Qavam, who was aware of the British sensitivity to his
coalition, remained on guard. A British reaction would
have had naturally arisen from the south, which was "a
traditionally British preserve". (30) Following the AIOC
approach to the Arab minority in Khuzestan to suppress
the Tudeh agitators, a British approach to the southern tribes to exert pressure on Tehran was predictable.(31). Among the Iranian tribes, the Bakhtiari tribe had close ties with the British. The domain of the Bakhtiari tribe extended to the AIOC oil fields; and for several decades, the Bakhtiari chieftains received a handsome pension to look after the oil installations and pipelines. In late August, it became apparent to Qavam that the British had masterminded a confederation of Bakhtiari-Qashqai tribes which would declare an autonomous state in southern Iran, covering the provinces of Khuzestan, Fars and Isfahan.(32) Furthermore, Qavam was informed that the British Consul-General in Ahwaz, Alan Trott, had visited the chieftains of the Bakhtiari and Qashqai tribes for this purpose.(33) A report of Le Rougetel to the Foreign Office dated 30 August, remarked that the tribal plan had enjoyed the blessing of the British Embassy. No mention, however, was made of Trott's contacts.(34) Moreover, an official British report, dated 4 September, stated:

"The Bakhtiari and Qashqai are believed to have concluded a mutual defence pact against the Tudeh, and to have been plotting to seize control of Isfahan and Shiraz in order to forestall the possibility of a general election resulting in a Tudeh landslide".(35)
To pre-empt this plot, the Government declared martial law in some southern cities. (36) The Qashqai chieftains who had cordial relations with Qavam, were summoned to Tehran. However, they refused this call, but sent a telegram to express their allegiance to Qavam "in person". (37)

On 8 September, Qavam sent his confidant, Firouz, to Isfahan to suppress the Bakhtiari plot. Upon his arrival in Isfahan, Firouz ordered the arrest of two Bakhtiari chieftains, and personally interrogated them. (38) The Commander of Khuzestan Military district, Colonel Hejazi, who was accused of complicity with the plotters, was also arrested. (39)

Firouz took advantage of this incident to criticise the British and praise the Russians. In an address to the workers in Isfahan, he accused the British Government of violating the Tripartite Treaty, and interfering in Iran's internal affairs. Moreover, he hailed the Soviet Union, particularly for the "sacrifices and heroism of the Red Army". (40)

At a press conference on 15 September, Firouz revealed that the Bakhtiari chieftains had planned, "with foreign help" to seize Isfahan, arrest the military commanders, execute the Tudeh leaders, and set up a "reactionary feudal-tribal Government". (41) However, Firouz's attempt to suppress the tribal revolt was not successful.
The tribal explosion occurred on 20 September when the chieftains of Qashqai tribe sent a telegram to Qavam, expressing the demands of the southern province of Fars. The demands included:

1. Dismissal of the Tudeh Ministers.
2. Handing the provincial departments over to the local officials.
3. Forming Provincial and Town Councils.
4. Increasing deputies from Fars in the Majles.
5. Releasing the Bakhtiari chieftains from detention.
6. Increasing the government expenditure for education and health in Fars. (42)

Simultaneously, the Qashqai and five other major tribes announced their uprising under the banner of the "Southern Movement". They surrounded Shiraz, and captured the garrison city of Kazeroun, Port Boushehr and the entire Persian Gulf coast and part of Khuzestan. In justification of the uprising, the leader of the Southern Movement stated that "communism, atheism and anarchism had endangered the democracy and Islam in Iran". (44)

The Soviet Government and the Tudeh Party reacted angrily. Radio Moscow accused the British Consul-Generals in Ahwaz and Isfahan, Allen Trott and Colonel C. A. Gault, of instigating the rebellion. (45)

The British communist paper, the Daily Worker, alleged that the rebels were financed and armed by the British officials.
"Long and carefully laid British plans to detach the oil fields from Persia and incorporate them in Iraq, appear to be maturing. The tribesmen who have seized ports on the Persian Gulf, are well armed, and it was not their own Government which provided them with sub-machine guns, rifles, and ammunitions. It is known that representatives of these tribes have recently made visits to Basra where British H.Q. is situated.

...An atmosphere of tension is being deliberately built-up. Just the atmosphere in which it will be possible for the British to carry out their threat to send troops across the frontier to protect British lives and property." (46)

The Tudeh papers accused the rebels in Fars of criminal acts against the people, and demanded the Government suppress the rebellion. Qavam was particularly asked to disregard the demand for granting Fars the same autonomous status of Azerbaijan; since in the Left's version, one was "reactionary" and the other "revolutionary". (47) The Tudeh party also believed that the Iranian army was not reliable for such anti-rebellion mission. It suggested that Qavam organise a "national militia" which together with the national army
of Azerbaijan, could suppress the tribal revolt.\(^{(48)}\) In addition, the Tudeh leaders volunteered to arm the trade unions against the rebels.\(^{(49)}\)

Qavam was reluctant to take any of the Tudeh proposals into consideration. A confrontation between the army and the rebels was detrimental to Iran’s security. The rebels could have received foreign aid from the Persian Gulf direction, and the army’s morale to fight against the anti-communist tribes was not strong. Moreover, the Qashqais’ demands for the removal of Tudeh Ministers would have received the support of the Shah, the British and the Americans. Finally the rebel leaders were among Qavam’s allies, and members of his Democratic Party. Therefore, the approach of Qavam’s Government towards the rebellion was conciliatory. When the Acting Governor-General of Fars, General Zahedi, failed to pacify the rebels, Qavam sent a delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister, Nikpay, to negotiate with the rebel leaders.\(^{(50)}\)

Meanwhile, Qavam came under domestic and external pressures for contradictory objectives.

In late September, the Director of the Middle East Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, S. I. Sychev, arrived in Tehran with a message for Qavam. He said that according to the agreement of 4 April, Qavam should have presented the oil bill by 24 October (seven months after 24 March) to the Majles. However, the Majles deputies were not elected yet.\(^{(51)}\)
It was rumoured that Sychev had also suggested to Qavam to withdraw Iran from the Saadabad Pact of 1937, and join in an alliance with the Soviet Union. (52)

On 3 October, Sadchikov delivered a strongly-worded Note stating that Qavam's reasoning for the postponement of elections was "entirely unsatisfactory". (53) Qavam had stated that before the election, the Government should fully restore its authority in Azerbaijan. The Note reminded Qavam that he had promised to present the Irano-Soviet oil agreement within seven months and should fulfil his commitment on time. (54)

The British involvement with the rebels had been closely followed by the Tudeh Party. Under pressure from the Tudeh Ministers, Qavam instructed Taqizadeh to send a Note to the Foreign Office regarding the activities of Trott and Gault. The Note, issued by the Iranian Embassy, asked the British Government to "investigate" the allegations against the two Consul-Generals, and recall them if the allegations were confirmed. (55) However, the British response was a categorical denial of the allegations. (56)

Manipulating the tribal factors was even included in the Soviet plans. According to one report, the Soviet Government had approached the Qashqai chieftains in July 1946, through its newly-opened consulates in southern Iran. It had offered the tribes a large quantity of arms, and support for their autonomy. In return, the
Soviets had asked for an alliance to be set up between the tribes and the Tudeh Party. However, the Qashqai had rejected the Soviet offer. (57) It should be noted that the Qashqai tribe had been in collaboration with the Germans during WW I and the early phase of WW II. The southern rebellion had continued for nearly a month. Qavam tolerated the occupation of southern cities by the tribes, and probably intended to use the event for his own purposes. At this critical juncture, he was afraid of a coalition of all his opponents against him. (58)

In compliance with the Soviet demand, Qavam asked the Shah to issue a decree concerning elections. This was done on 6 October. (59) Qavam also consented to the establishment of an electoral coalition of five parties (DPI, DPA, DPK, Tudeh, Iran), and to the sharing of parliamentary seats. There was an understanding that Qavam's DPI would gain the majority, and all the other parties would solemnly pledge to accept his leadership and adopt his program of domestic and foreign policy. (60)

Moreover, Qavam, tried to persuade the British and Americans of his friendship. His relations with the British were strained since July when British troops were dispatched to the vicinity of Iran and warships stationed in Iran's territorial waters in the Persian Gulf. Qavam had even threatened to appeal to the Security Council against the British Government. (61) However, in early October, Qavam assured Le Rougetel
that his intention was to maintain good relations with the British Government.\(^{62}\) In addition, he withdrew the demand for the recall of the British Consul-Generals who had been accused of complicity with the southern tribes.\(^{63}\)

In a meeting with Allen, Qavam revealed that he was "contemplating a sharp change of policy", because the conciliatory attitude towards Azerbaijan had yielded no favourable results, but had "merely encouraged other sections of the country to make impossible demands".\(^{64}\) Qavam stated that Iran was urgently in need of the United States' assistance.

"To re-establish Iran as a nation and create conditions which would have some permanence, Iran needed immediate assistance along two major lines: military supplies and substantial financial credits. Iran could only look to the United States for these,"\(^{65}\)

Qavam asked for a 250 million dollars credit from the United States. However, Allen told him that the "most Iran could expect in credit from US export-Import Bank" was 10 million dollars, and that selling of American combat equipment was refused even to Latin America and China.\(^{66}\)

In addition, Allen reminded the State Department that there were other possibilities before Qavam if the
United States refused his demands.

"I knew (that) Soviets had already offered him combat equipment to fight southern tribes. I hope he would not yield to obvious temptations to accept this help which would have political strings attached. *(67)*

While the political situation was sharply deteriorating as a result of the rebellion in the south, insubordination in Azerbaijan and uncertainty in Tehran, Allen played an active role in leading Iranian policy into a new direction.

On 6 October, the Shah conferred with Allen about the coming elections. Although the Shah had signed the election decree, he was worried that the future Majles might be "divided between the Soviet spokesmen and deputies loyal to Qavam". The Shah viewed that both groups were "susceptible before heavy Soviet pressure", and consequently would "end Iran's independence". *(68)*

The Shah's solution was to ask Qavam to resign with an excuse that Qavam's DPI was a contestant in the elections, and it would be fair to appoint an interim government to conduct the elections. In his report to Washington, Allen commented that the Shah was concerned about the hostile attitude of the future Majles towards himself and the "western democracies", if the election took place under Qavam and Firouz. *(69)*

When the Shah asked Allen's "advice", the American Ambassador responded that the decision was one that no
foreigner had a right to suggest. However, Allen warned the Shah that if he should "force out (the) present Cabinet and substitute it with a reactionary regime regarded by Iranians as (a) British stooge, (the) result will be short lived". (70)

On 8 October, the Directors of NEA and MEI, Henderson and Minor and Ambassador Ala attended a meeting with the under-secretary of State Acheson, to discuss the "seriousness of the situation in Iran". Ala described Azerbaijan as "entirely under the control of the Democrats" who were "under Russian influence", and that the southern part of Iran was "torn by civil strife". Ala added:

"whatever the degree of British complicity in the southern rebellion, the movement is a normal and natural reaction of the tribes against Russian infiltration into southern Iran and domination over the Central Government. It all goes back to the original sin of Russian aggression in northern Iran. .... Iran (is) now (at) a crossroads, and the next moves may well determine Iran's destiny." (71)

Ala admitted that up to this point, Qavam had followed a "patriotic course, designed to protect Iran's independence". However, Ala was no longer "sure of this". (72) Ala was particularly critical of the
elections at a time when Azerbaijan and part of southern Iran were out of the control of the Central Government. Whereas Communist encroachment in the world had concerned the Americans, Ala expressed his fear in order to impress his audience.

"...The election will certainly have the effect of returning to the Majles a solid bloc of Soviet-dominated deputies from Azerbaijan and possibly from other northern areas. The result of this Soviet bloc will be to give the Russians virtual control of the Central Government and all that it entails. If this course of action is carried through, Iran will have lost a major degree of its sovereignty."

Ala asked the United States Government for assistance for Iran in three ways: (1) re-opening of the Iranian case before the Security Council in order to investigate the situation in Azerbaijan and the south; (2) recommending to the Iranian Government to postpone the elections; and (3) bringing American views to the attention of the Soviet officials; and sending a special envoy to Iran "to express the American Government's viewpoint more fully and clearly than could be done by telegraph". Acheson's response was not positive. However, he expressed, in general, "desires to be of any assistance at this critical time."
One particular concern of the American Government was an aviation agreement underway between Iran and the Soviet Union. Acheson had instructed Allen to warn Qavam of the dangerous result of this agreement for Iran. (75) Eventually, one particular Soviet action relating to this agreement, led to a forceful reaction from Allen to the detriment of the coalition Government. On 30 September, the agreement was to be discussed in the Council of Ministers. Since it was not in conformity with the procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), a delay in its approval was suggested by Eskandari, the Tudeh Minister of Commerce and Industry, in order to find a solution. On the following day, Eskandari was called by a diplomat of the Soviet Embassy who bluntly blamed Eskandari for his delaying proposal. On 10 October the news reached Allen through his Commercial Attaché, Randall Williams, who had been in contact with "authorative sources". (76) On 11 October, Allen called Qavam to accuse him not only of neglecting American advice but also for including a Soviet "informer" in his Cabinet. According to Allen papers, he told Qavam:

"The Iranian Government could not be regarded as master of its own house when its Cabinet members were subject to constant fears that the Soviet Ambassador would undermine their position if they did not carry out his
bidding. If Qavam did not denounce the Soviet action immediately, everybody would consider him among the traitors. *(77)*

In addition, Allen commented in his report to the State Department:

"When such condition existed it was obvious that the present Government of Iran had no freedom or independence, and that we might as well recognise the fact and cease pretending." *(78)*

Three days later, Allen took the matter to the Shah, and advised him to reshuffle the Government because of the involvement of Sadchikov in Iranian affairs of the state. Allen persuaded the Shah to order Qavam to resign; and that if he accepted to ask him to form another Cabinet without Tudeh and pro-Tudeh Ministers. In case of Qavam's refusal, Allen's recommendation to the Shah was the dismissal of Qavam and "sending him into exile, or to put him in jail if he caused trouble".*(79)*

The Shah was confident of the support of the armed forces. Allen assured him that Schwarzkopf, the head of American advisers in the gendarmerie who had been a sympathiser of Qavam would not interfere.*(80)* The Shah was prepared to carry out Allen's recommendation after consultation with his top military advisers including the Minister of War Lt. General Amir Ahmadi.*(81)*
Meanwhile, new developments occurred in Qavam's camp which helped him to comply with the American advice. On 13 October, Qavam commissioned General Zahedi, with full authority, to reach a compromise with the rebel tribes in the South. However, the Cabinet Ministers were not consulted on the issue. Subsequently, on 15 October, Zahedi issued a statement in which he praised the rebellion as the "National Movement of Fars, based on patriotism and intending to safeguard Iran's independence and integrity". (82)

In this statement, Zahedi announced a general amnesty for the rebels, on behalf of the Prime Minister. However, nothing had been promised in the statement other than the formation of a provincial Council and some local reforms in Fars. (83)

The offers were accepted by the leaders of the southern rebellion who in return pledged their loyalty to the Central Government. Thus, the southern rebellion ended on 16 October. (84)

Although the removal of the Tudeh Ministers, previously demanded by the tribes, was not mentioned at the end of the rebellion, there were rumours in Tehran that a secret understanding had been reached between Qavam and the rebel leaders. Even before the dispersion of the tribesmen, the coalition Cabinet collapsed. (85)

Simultaneously, Qavam took several actions to damage the Tudeh Party. On 13 October, he replaced the pro-Tudeh Governor-General of Tehran, Abbas Eskandari with a
member of his DPI. In addition, all members of the Electoral Supervisory Commission were appointed from DPI. These two undertakings could have guaranteed Qavam’s party with the constituencies of Tehran. (86) Following the changes in Tehran, Qavam appointed new governor-generals for several other provinces. (87) The new developments signalled that Qavam no longer wished to share power with the Tudeh Party.

On 13 October, the Tudeh paper, Rahbar, published a complaint that the Government forces were acting against the party and its affiliated trade unions. (88) This article was evidence that the Tudeh Party sought an excuse to break the coalition.

To protest at Qavam's decisions in compromising with the southern tribes, changing of the governor-generals, and packing of the Electoral Commission with the members of DPI, the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party ordered the Tudeh Ministers, on 15 October, not to attend the Cabinet session. (89)

When giving an audience to Qavam on 17 October, the Shah found that the powerful Prime Minister was fully prepared to obey his orders. Qavam assured the Shah of his loyalty and offered to resign and leave the country. (90) As the Shah had no suitable substitute for Qavam at this critical time, he asked Qavam to stay in office and "form a new Cabinet without any Tudeh members". (91)
The Shah also asserted that he wanted Firouz "either in prison or out of the country immediately". Qavam resisted but found the Shah determined and forceful. Thus, he suggested sending Firouz as Ambassador to Moscow to which the Shah agreed, provided that it were done immediately. (92)

Qavam's reshuffling of the Government was supposed to remain secret in order to avoid protests from the Soviets and the Tudeh Party. However, Firouz heard the news from Qavam and passed it on to Sadchikov. Subsequently, Sadchikov made a presentation to Qavam on the evening of 17 October. He accused Qavam of collaborating with the British, and warned him of the consequences of the Tudeh Ministers dismissal. (93)

Qavam returned to the Shah on 18 October, to convey the Soviet warning and his own apprehension, but was urged to ignore the Soviet threat and introduce a new Cabinet as had been planned. (94) On the next day Qavam introduced his reshuffled Government. (95) Regarding the exclusion of Tudeh Ministers, Qavam claimed that they were active to promote their party activities rather than fulfilling their ministerial duties. (96)

Besides the Tudeh Ministers, Qavam also sacrificed his closest aide, the anti-Shah Mazaffar Firouz. Resenting his appointment as the Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Firouz intended to resist his diplomatic exile. However, when he received a warning to the effect that Qavam had ordered his arrest in case of refusal, he
departed for Moscow.(97)

The change of Government was a set-back for the Russians and the Tudeh Party, but a victory for the West in Iran. According to the British, the exclusion of Tudeh Ministers was the "most interesting aspect of the new Cabinet", while Allen called it a "turning point in Iranian history". Le Rougetel, who had been a critic of Qavam's policy in the past, congratulated him on this occasion. He told Qavam that his decision was a "sign that the Persian national spirit is still alive".(98)

Soviet reaction to this event was tolerant. According to Peterson, Pravda disapproved the dismissal of Tudeh Ministers but made "no violent attack" on Qavam.(99)
CHAPTER TWO

THE RE-INTERGRATION OF AZERBAIJAN AND KURDISTAN

The Left accused Qavam of engineering the rebellion in the south, because of his mild treatment of the rebels.(100) However, Qavam intended to use this event as a model to enforce his policy on the rebel regime in Azerbaijan. Qavam believed that when the southern rebels submitted to the authority of Central Government and accepted its sovereignty, the rebellion in the north would die as well.

In his new political plan, Qavam abandoned the Left. He sought support from the Shah and the army on the one hand, and the American and British Governments on the other. However, he intended to persuade the Russians that his new policy would not be directed against them. Therefore the new Minister of Labour and Propaganda, Mohammad Vali Farmanfarmaian, stated at a press conference, which was held shortly after the formation of the Cabinet, that the Government would continue to cultivate friendly relations with the Soviet Union.(101) The Government also released General Darakhshani who had surrendered to the DPA rebels in December 1945, and was imprisoned in Tehran.(102) The pro-British politicians who had been detained since April, were also released. Among them was General Arfa, whose detention was known
as a concession to the Left. (103)

In late October, the Government and the Tudeh Party confronted each other. The conflict began with hostile propaganda and soon turned to physical attacks. The Tudeh headquarters and pro-Tudeh unions clubs were ransacked by the tribesmen and pro-Government mobs in several provinces. (104) The Tudeh Party lost its monopoly of the streets on 27 October, when thousands of the pro-Government demonstrators paraded in the presence of Qavam to celebrate the one-hundredth day of the DPI. (105)

The DPI extended its activities to the trade unions which until then were an exclusive domain of the Tudeh Party. The pro-Tudeh Council of Trade unions (CCFTU) was the most active and influential body of the party. It had been recognised as the sole representative of the Iranian trade unions by the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in September 1946. (106) The French leader of WFTU, Louis Saillant, had paid a visit to Iran in the midst of the labour strikes in July 1946. (107)

The rival Council of trade unions sponsored by the DPI was ESKI. (108) It was established by two DPI activists: Khosrow Hedayat, the director of state railways, and Habib Nafisi, the director of state factories. It soon took control over trade unions in the Government-owned industries. (109) On 10 November, a conflict between the pro-Tudeh and pro-DPI workers in the Tehran railways
ended in bloodshed. When the security forces intervened to restore order, one pro-Tudeh worker was killed. Subsequently, the CCFTU sent a letter of protest to Qavam, and declared a general strike in Tehran on 12 November.(110) However, this general strike, which was planned by the Tudeh Party and was supposed to continue until the collapse of Qavam's Government, failed to attract popular support.(111) The Government of Qavam was successful not only in splitting the labour movement, but also in exploiting the strike as an excuse to arrest many active members of the pro-Tudeh trade unions.(112) On 17 November, the Government issued a statement banning all public meetings and demonstrations in Tehran, including the gatherings of workers in factories.(113) Now Tudeh newspapers attacked DPI, and alleged that all reactionary elements, including the followers of Zia, had assembled in the Prime Minister's party. They also accused the Government of delaying the elections, under the influence of the right-wing politicians.(114) On 12 November, the Soviet media joined the anti-Qavam campaign, and radio Moscow broadcast a violent criticism of the DPI and the "reactionary elements" in Iran.(115) Following the issue of the royal decree for elections on 6 October, the Government had a legal obligation to carry out the elections for the 15th Majles. However, Qavam had been under pressure to postpone the elections due to the
situation in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. Qavam's conciliatory measures had done little to change the situation in these two provinces.

Since the agreement of June 1946, the emissaries from Tabriz regime had been to Tehran on several occasions, to make a deal with the Government regarding the Azerbaijan armed forces and other issues. The advance of the Left and participation of the Tudeh Party in the coalition Government encouraged Pishevari to renew his rhetorics and increase his demands. In spite of his agreement of June with Firouz, Pishevari refused to exclude Zanjan from his territory and return it to the Central Government. (116) In August, Pishevari resumed his extortionist tactics and asked Qavam to "refund the money of the People of Azerbaijan". This implied that a proportion of the monetary reserve of the country had to be transferred to the rebel regime. (117)

Embarrassed by Tehran's rejection of his demands, Pishevari stated as his "final word" in late August, that if Tehran chose the "reactionary way", it had to "continue without Azerbaijan". (118) At the time of this statement, the Tudeh Ministers were still in office. Qavam was irritated not only by Pishevari's statements, but also by his obstructive instructions which were being sent to the delegates from Azerbaijan to Tehran. In a meeting with Le Rougetel on 3 September, Qavam said that no progress had been made in the negotiations.
between the two sides. However, Qavam revealed that the
delegates of Tabriz, Javid and Shabestari, were ready to
co-operate with him, "in spite of Pishevari's
interference". (119)
In September, Pishevari instructed the delegates from
Azerbaijan in Tehran to approach the Tudeh and Iran
parties to form a coalition, stating that their joint
action would have an "important effect on the course of
democratic evolution in Iran". (120)
In the meantime, he sent a message to Qavam stating
that: (1) Azerbaijan was to be exempted from refunding
of 25 percent of its revenue to Tehran; and (2) the
county of Zanjan would not be excluded from Azerbaijan.
Both of these demands were contrary to the agreement of
June. (121) However, the comparable movements in
Khurzestan, Fars and Kermanshah who had demanded the
same privileges as Azerbaijan, influenced Pishevari to
lower his demands. On 23 September, Pishevari stated
that he was not a separatist and that his "demands for
concession" had "always been within the framework of
Iran". (122) In addition, he condemned the southern
rebellion.

"Our enemies are trying to separate
Khuzestan from Iran in order to prevent the
progress of our movement.
Our present aim is to give a legal status to
the freedom we have obtained, and spread it
throughout Iran". (123)
However, Pishevari's bargaining position became drastically weakened when Qavam's Cabinet changed and the Tudeh Ministers were removed. He recalled the delegates of Azerbaijan from Tehran, with an explanation that Azerbaijan had no confidence in the Tehran Government. The DPA newspaper later claimed that the rebellion of the southern tribes had imposed an obstacle to the Tehran - Azerbaijan negotiations. In connection with the Kurdish problem, Qavam used both the Azeri and the Soviet factors. On the one hand, he undermined the "Kurdish Republic" and put Mohabad officially under the administration of Azerbaijan. As such, Qavam exploited the feud between the Kurds and the Azeris in order to turn one against another.

On the other hand, Qavam reduced the Soviet support for Kurdish rebellion to a minimum. Following the Qavam-Sadchikov accords of April 1946, the Soviet liaison officers informed the Kurdish leaders that their attacks on the Iranian army for the cause of expanding the Republics' territory would no longer be authorised. Subsequently, a truce was signed on 5 May, between the representatives of the Iranian army and the Mahabad regime. Nevertheless, some sporadic skirmishes continued, particularly around the Iran-Iraq border. The agreement of June, between the Central Government and Azerbaijan, and the evacuation of the Soviet troops from Iran, demoralised the Kurdish rebels.
who had expected Soviet support until the creation of "Greater Kurdistan". The developments of April-June persuaded the Kurdish leaders to approach Tehran and demand privileges, similar to those given to Azerbaijan. On 25 June, Qazi Mohammad met the Iranian army's General Razmara, at the village of Sara near Saqqez. After this meeting, there were no further clashes between the Iranian armed forces and the Kurdish rebels. Thus the Iranian Security forces enjoyed freedom of movement in the direction of their border posts. (129) Following the understanding with the army, the Kurds turned their attacks on the Azeris. In July, they occupied the city of Maku in western Azerbaijan. However, the Soviet Consul in Rezaieh, Hashemov, mediated between the two parties, and Maku was returned to Azerbaijan. (130) Qazi Mohammad had suspected that the Azerbaijan delegation in Tehran would not consider the Kurdish interest, in the negotiations with the Central Government. Therefore, he decided to go to Tehran and approach Qavam personally in order to obtain some sort of an autonomy for Kurdistan. However, an observer of the Kurdish movement believes that Qazi's contact with Qavam was the result of Soviet advice, and that it was the Soviet Embassy that arranged Qazi's safe conduct to and from Tehran. (131) Qazi Mohammad spent August in Tehran where he met Qavam and General Razmara, now the chief of General Staff. The Kurdish leader sought a
recognition for his "Republic's" autonomy; however, Qavam wanted to put an end to the Kurdish Republic. Had Qazi accepted Qavam's suggestion, Qavam would have offered the formation of a province of Kurdistan embodying all Kurdish areas, inside and outside Qazi's territory, and the appointment of Qazi as the first Governor-General of the new province. Since this plan would have undermined relations between Tabriz and Mahabad, the Soviets were unlikely to approve it. (132)

Furthermore, the Republic of Mahabad had no internal source of revenue, and was financially dependent on Azerbaijan. A senior official of the DPA related that the Kurdish regime had two sources of revenue, both provided by Azerbaijan on the recommendation of the Russians: direct financing from Tabriz; and trade in arms, which were received from Tabriz, and sold to Iraqi Kurds at a high price. (133)

The Soviet Embassy advised Qazi to soften his position towards Tehran, and to improve his relations with Tabriz. Qazi's visit to Tehran was not successful. (134)

Contrary to Soviet advice, the Kurdish-Azeri relations worsened following Qazi's return to Mahabad. In late August, he pressed Pishevari for joint rule over the major cities which had some Kurdish residents in western Azerbaijan. However, Pishevari refused. (135)

In September, the Kurdish army entered Rezaieh where it
occupied an army barrack and several government buildings. Pishevari ordered his army to send them out. Nevertheless, an armed clash was avoided, probably with the interference of the Russians.\(^{(136)}\) In October, Qavam made one final attempt to intensify the Kurdish-Azeri feud. He suggested that the Kurdish towns of Sardasht and Takab be placed under the administration of Azerbaijan, if the city of Zanjan were immediately returned to the Central Government by the DPA. A reaction by the Kurdish Republic was expected.\(^{(137)}\) However, the proposed exchange did not materialise due to the opposition by the army, and the DPA's lack of confidence in Qavam after the collapse of the coalition Government.\(^{(138)}\)

A. FALL OF DEMOCRATIC AZERBAIJAN.

Qavam's policy to bring Azerbaijan back under Iranian authority was assisted by pressure from the Soviet Ambassador for the parliamentary elections. In Qavam's view, the election could be held only in the presence of the Iranian security forces in every constituency, including Azerbaijan and Kurdistan.

In a pre-election speech, Qavam announced that the election would be held very soon. He praised the achievements of the DPI, and condemned the "jealousy and enmity" of the Tudeh Party who had claimed to be the only freedom-loving party in the country.\(^{(139)}\)

He also announced on 5 November that the government
would send inspectors to every part of Iran in order to supervise the legality of the elections, during the course of the balloting. (140) This plan was intended, in particular, to prevent the interference of the DPA in the constituencies of Azerbaijan. However, there was a great amount of apprehension in respect of Qavam's ability to prevent the DPA from imposing its candidates on the people of Azerbaijan. Bevin was among those who expressed pessimism. "The election will, it is to be feared, give a dangerous opportunity to Russia's clients in Azerbaijan to organise the return to the Majles of a solid bloc deputies pledged to support the extreme left, even at the cost of Persia's future independence." (141) Nonetheless, calls for the postponement of the elections throughout Iran or in Azerbaijan, in particular, could no longer move Qavam to abandon his objectives. He had even fixed a date, 7 December, for the election. (142) On 21 November, Qavam sent a directive to all the governor-generals and governors throughout the country stating that the government would send without exception armed detachments, from the gendarmerie and if necessary from the army, to all constituencies. (143) Qavam had informed Le Rougetel and Allen of his decision in advance. In a meeting with Le Rougetel on 19 November, he asserted that there was no chance for the Tudeh Party to secure even one seat in the northern provinces. According to Qavam, his objective was to assert the authority of the Central Government over
Azerbaijan. He emphasised that should the Tabriz regime decide to continue its defiance of this authority, it would be suppressed. Furthermore, he told Le Rougetel that in case of the Soviets' intervention on behalf of the regime in Tabriz, he had planned to make an appeal to the United Nations.\(^{(144)}\) In an interview with Allen on 24 November, Qavam gave further details about his plan. He had previously asked Allen about the course of action that the UN would undertake if the Iranian army entered Azerbaijan and was confronted by a resistance which had the backing of the Soviet Union.\(^{(145)}\) During this meeting, he was more confident and decisive. According to Allen's report, Qavam had planned to send 1000 soldiers to Azerbaijan, "500 to be concerned with the election and 500 to patrol the Soviet border, to seize the Soviet agents or supply coming south".\(^{(146)}\) Qavam was pleased that the Iranian question was still on the Security Council's agenda. He planned to make an "immediate appeal" to the Council whenever fighting started between the army and the rebels. Furthermore, Qavam was prepared to present new evidence regarding the Soviet interference, in case the Soviet Government cited the Iranian statements of April and May, which proclaimed that the Soviet-Iranian dispute had been resolved.\(^{(147)}\) The new policy of Qavam, provided for a greater role to be played by the Shah and the army in Iranian politics.
On 23 November, in a meeting attended by the Shah, Qavam and the army commanders, it was decided to send the army to Azerbaijan.(148)

Since August 1941, the army had been constantly humiliated. It had surrendered to the Anglo-Russian troops; its officers in Khorasan had rebelled; the Tabriz garrison had surrendered to the DPA rebels; and it had been prevented to move towards Azerbaijan in Winter 1946 by the Red Army. Therefore, the army considered the suppression of the rebels in Azerbaijan as a means to exonerate and rehabilitate its pride and dignity. Moreover, Azerbaijan was considered by the nationalist officers in the Iranian army to be a special case. The Minister of War at this time, General Amir Ahmadi, admitted that he had refused to send the army to suppress rebellion in the South, but volunteered to send troops to Azerbaijan.(149) However, the Shah had made a different comment, perhaps with an intention to glorify his personal contribution to the liberation of Azerbaijan. He stated:

"Most of the military leaders - except my Chief of Staff, Ali Razmara - advised me strongly against undertaking a campaign which risked provoking a Russian intervention. Nevertheless, I decided to stand-up to the problem and undertake the re-conquest of Azerbaijan."(150)
To explain his motive for speedy action, the Shah wrote:

"The rebels were hardly any better armed than ourselves, but would soon be receiving reinforcement and up-to-date arms. They had sent tank and air crews to the Soviet Union and these would be ready for action within a year." (151)

In the meantime, Qavam and the army achieved a practical victory without struggle. This victory was the return of Zanjan to the Central Government by the regime of Tabriz on agreed terms. On 21 November, the military forces of the DPA evacuated Zanjan, and the city was officially transferred to the representative of Qavam. (152) However, the Government officials were not in control. There was resistance by a disorganised DPA militia, and sporadic disturbances occurred.

This gave the Government an excuse for sending a military detachment to Zanjan on 23 November. The Commander of the detachment, Colonel Mir Hassein Hashemi, had been ordered to capture the city and put it under martial law. The next day in a statement to the press, Qavam announced the stationing of the army in Zanjan. (153)

Le Rougetel reported to London that the recapture of Zanjan was the first stage of the operations to dislodge the rebel regime of Azerbaijan. (154)
At this point, Qavam also received significant political support from the United States. On 27 November, in an interview with a correspondent of London Daily Telegraph, Allen had this to say about sending of Iranian troops to Azerbaijan:

"It is the well-known policy of the American Government to favour the maintenance of Iran's sovereignty and territorial integrity. This principle is embodied in the United Nations Charter. The intention of the Iranian Government to send security forces into all parts of Iran, including any areas where such forces are not at present in control, for the maintenance of order during the elections, seems to me an entirely normal and proper decision." (155)

On 28 November, Sadchikov called on Qavam to warn him against sending troops to Azerbaijan. However, in diplomatic terms Sadchikov had been instructed by Moscow to give Qavam "friendly advice". (156) In the Soviet view, the dispatch of troops would create "difficulties within Azerbaijan and the Soviet-Iranian frontiers", to which the Soviet Government could not be "indifferent". (157) Sadchikov advised Qavam that it would be "better" for him not to send troops to Azerbaijan. If he did he was warned that the Soviet Government would "be obliged to revise their attitude
towards him personally". (158) Qavam answered that Azerbaijan was part of Iran, and as the head of the Government he was fulfilling his duties to his country. Qavam asserted that if he had abandoned his efforts and stepped aside, any one chosen to succeed him, would do the same. He added that his decision to send troops to Azerbaijan was not a "personal" one, but reflected "public opinion". (159) The following day, Allen was informed about this development. He asked the State Department whether he could advise Qavam that Iran was now "fully justified to notify the Security Council of the recent crisis". (160) Acheson approved Allen’s suggestion in his telegram of 2 December, asserting that Qavam should be resisting Soviet pressure and relying on American support.

"If Qavam should refrain from taking appropriate action to restore the authority of Central Government in Azerbaijan merely because of pressure brought to bear upon him by the Soviet Ambassador, he will be adding to difficulties. If on the other hand, following dispatch by Qavam of troops into Azerbaijan, he should have reason to believe that the Soviet Government is interfering in Iranian affairs by giving support to Azerbaijan movement, and he should bring this matter to (the) attention of (the) Security Council, (the) American Government will be
prepared to pursue (the) matter energetically.  

Moreover, Acheson authorised Allen to assure Qavam that the United States would give its "unqualified" support to Iran. (162)

Acheson had already assured Ala of the same support on 1 December. (163) In addition, Le Rougetel promised Qavam British support if Iran's case was taken back to the Security Council. (164) Nevertheless, British support for Iran's sending troops to Azerbaijan was only given after the troops entered the province. (165) Heartened by Acheson's message, Qavam instructed Ala on 3 December, to inform the Security Council of the situation in Azerbaijan, the Government decision, and the Soviet advice. (166)

The Council's refusal, a few months earlier, to withdraw the Iranian question from its agenda had worked, and Iran was back in the plaintiff box.

On 5 December, Ala addressed a letter to the UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, and the Security Council President, Herschel V. Johnson "in connection with the complaints previously made to the Security Council against interferences in the internal affairs of Iran". (167)

Ala stated that the Iranian Government had been denied the "exercise of effective control in the province of Azerbaijan", and that the removal of the "consequences"
of Soviet interference namely the rebel status of Azerbaijan by "conciliatory means" had failed. He added that military forces should be stationed in all the provinces of Iran in order to maintain security during the election, and that the Soviet Ambassador had advised the Iranian Prime Minister to abandon this plan.(168) Ala expressed hope that the stationing of Iranian troops in Azerbaijan would "not be used as a pretext for hostile demonstrations" by the Russians.(169) Ala did not ask for any action by the Security Council, but believed that the Council, which had kept the Iranian question on its agenda, "might be in a better position to interpret the course of events in Azerbaijan".(170) In line with the Soviet warning, Firouz commented in a message to Qavam that the sending of troops to Azerbaijan would result in catastrophe.(171) Furthermore, the Tudeh Party warned that Iran's military action in Azerbaijan would endanger the security of the Soviet southern border, and might lead to a Soviet intervention "on the basis of the Treaty of 1921".(172) However, the Soviet Government, despite its menacing tone, did not take any serious action to stop Iran. On the contrary, as the British documents reveal, the Russians advised the DPA in November to change its radical policy and "get in line with the Central Government".(173) According to Allen, the Soviets were said to have let the DPA know that the Soviet Government could furnish
them with little more than moral support. (174)

By early December, The British concluded that the Russians were anxious to avoid drawing the international spotlight once more on Azerbaijan. (175)
The Shah and Qavam noted that the Russians were in an "awkward" position between intentions of supporting the puppet regime in Azerbaijan and saving their oil concession. (176) If the Russians let the Iranian Government forces enter Azerbaijan, Pishevari's rule would end; and if they intervened to stop the troops, there would be no elections for the new Majles which had to ratify their oil agreement with Iran. One of the two alternatives had to be sacrificed. (177)

In contrast to Soviet restraint, the rebel regime of Tabriz spent its last ten days in intense anti-Government propaganda and troop mobilisation. (178)

Qavam had informed both Javid and Qazi Mohammad on 30 November that the army was on its way to Azerbaijan and Kurdistan in order to ensue smooth proceedings for the security of the elections. Javid sought a conciliatory measure to prevent army attacks, but Qazi Mohammad responded that elections should be held without the presence of the army. (179)

On 2 December, Pishevari called for a public mobilisation to fight the Government forces. (180)
The next day, he stated that everybody should take "arm or other means" to fight the "enemy". Here, Pishevari
used a significant term which remained in Iranian history to describe his stubborn characteristic: "There is death but no retreat". On 7 December, Pishevari warned the Government of a "bloody and merciless reprisal" in Azerbaijan.

"The people of Azerbaijan are ready to fight. All towns, villages and houses must be converted into fortress. From now on, all Azerbaijanis are soldiers."(182)

The Tabriz Radio compared Qavam with the "German and Japanese Fascists", and invited the nation to replace the "criminal Government" with a "national" one.(183)

Meanwhile, as a pre-emptive action, Javid invited a local electoral commission to supervise the elections in Azerbaijan. However, on 7 December, Qavam annulled this and notified Javid that the elections could not start before the security forces reached their posts.(184)

On 10 December, the army advanced from Zanjan to Mianeh, in the direction of Tabriz. It faced minor resistance, at the mountainous pass of Qaflankuh, by the militia commander and his men.(185)

Moreover, the Tabriz regime under Soviet pressure, ordered its forces to retreat.(186)

While the Iranian Air Force planes were pouring leaflets on Azerbaijan in which the people were asked to overthrow the rebel regime, the Russian advisers of the Tabriz regime made preparations to depart towards the Soviet borders. The heavy artillery which had been
at the disposal of the DPA, was also taken back to Russia. (187) On the arrival of the Iranian army in Azerbaijan, the Government addressed a Note to the Soviet Embassy, assuring that the Iranian action was in no way directed against Soviet interests. (188)

After the fall of Mianeh, the Tabriz regime lost hope of survival.

The Governor-General Javid, and the Chairman of the Provincial Council, Shabestari, both were in favour of surrendering to the Central Government; while the DPA leader Pishevari and the militia Commander Qolam Yahya were against it. (189) However, the final decision was made by the Soviet Consul in Tabriz, Qoliov, who was against resistance. (190) At a meeting of the DPA Central Committee on 11 December, Pishevari resigned from the leadership, and was replaced by Mohammad Biriya, the Director — former Minister-of Culture of the Tabriz regime. Biriya agreed with Javid and Shabestari to relinquish autonomy, and surrender to the Government's army. (191)

In a public meeting on the same day in Tabriz, Pishevari introduced Biriya, as his successor. He then fled to the Soviet Consulate where he took sanctuary. (192) Biriya addressed the people and advised them to welcome the Iranian army on its arrival. He emphasised that the DPA was supporting Iran's independence and territorial integrity. (193)
In the Soviet Consulate, Qoliov told Pishevari and his two assistants, Jahanshahlou and Padegan, that they should take refuge in the Soviet Union, in order to save their lives. The Soviet Consul also informed them that the same evening a Soviet Officer, Kuzlov, would take them from Tabriz to Jolfa on the Soviet border.(194)

Jahanshahlou remembers that at this point, Pishevari blamed the Soviet Consul for the Soviet exploitation of the DPA, supporting it when it was needed, and abandoning it when its services were no longer required. According to Jahanshahlou Qoliov replied: "The one who brought you here is now asking you to leave."(195)

However, those DPA leaders who remained in Tabriz, had a more difficult job.

On 11 December, the new leadership of the DPA, issued the following declaration to the people of Azerbaijan.

"The Democratic Party of Azerbaijan has always been a partisan of the sovereignty and independence of Iran.

Whereas a number of traitors and reactionaries are attempting to falsify the real cause of the Azerbaijan movement for the sake of their own designs, we agreed that the Government troops arrive to control the elections, and thwart the plans of our people's enemies."(196)
Also on 11 December, Javid responded to a telegram of Qavam in which the rebel regime had been advised to surrender, the previous day. In his reply, Javid assured the Prime Minister of "disengagement" in Azerbaijan, and asked permission to go to Mianeh and personally arrange the arrival of the army into Tabriz.(197)

Furthermore, Javid and Shabestari sent a telegram to the Shah, declaring that the people of Azerbaijan were supporting the national unity and the independence of Iran. Shabestari also begged the shah to send proper instructions to the army to ensure good treatment of the Azerbaijani.(198)

Subsequently, the Shah sent an order to the commander of the army detachment to treat the people of Azerbaijan with "compassion", since the "adventurists had failed to resist".(199)

While the Soviet Consul in Tabriz was preparing the flight of the DPA leaders, Sadchikov made one last desperate attempt to save the rebel regime.

The following is what the Shah remembered of that "eventful" day of 11 December 1946:

"The Russian Ambassador in Tehran sent word urgently requesting that I grant him an audience. When he appeared he began to speak in a threatening tone, protesting that our military moves in Azerbaijan were endangering the peace of the world. In the name of his
Government, he demanded that I, as King and Commander-in-Chief, should withdraw my forces. I told him that on the contrary, the situation prevailing until then in Azerbaijan had been endangering the peace of the world, and that I was refusing his demand.

I then produced a telegram I had just received from the puppet regimes designated Governor-General of Azerbaijan informing me that the rebel forces offered their unconditional surrender.

The Ambassador was stunned; apparently he had not yet received the news. Unable to think of anything to say, he departed.®(200)

The difference of conduct between Sadchikov and Qoliov reflected the disarray between Moscow and Baku. Qoliov was in direct contact with Baku and had received the latest instructions regarding the surrender of the rebels and the defection of their leaders. However, Sadchikov was following the delayed instructions from the Soviet Foreign Ministry in Moscow.

On 12 December, the rebel regime lost control of events, and fell apart like a "house of cards".(201)

Subsequently Tabriz was faced with chaos. Those who had suffered during the DPA rule and had waited for revenge, looted the shops and houses of Muhajers (Caucasian immigrants) and killed a number of the DPA officials and
The British Military Attaché reported to London that before the arrival of the Government forces, 421 people were massacred in Tabriz, Rezaieh and Khoy. The Commander of the Government forces, Hashemi, now promoted as a Brigadier-General, was ordered by Tehran to move rapidly towards Tabriz in order to quieten the infuriated population who had taken the law in their own hands. On 13 December the army entered Tabriz, and put an end both to the life of the rebel regime, and the unrest in Tabriz.

The Soviet Consul in Tabriz conveyed a message from Baku to those whose lives were in danger, to flee to the Soviet Union. Subsequently 5000 people including many of the army personnel of the rebel regime crossed the border into Russia.

Both the Shah and Qavam laid claim to the glory of the re-integration of Azerbaijan into Iran. The Shah attributed the "favourable course of events" to his decisiveness against the rebels, while Qavam privately argued that his own credibility in Moscow was behind the relatively conciliatory policy of the Soviets.

In some British reports, Qavam was praised for his "undoubtedly skilful handling of a delicate situation" in Azerbaijan.

However, according to the British Military Attaché, who visited Azerbaijan after the collapse of the rebel regime, the unchallenged victory of the army was the
result of association between the Shah and Razmara, upon whose planning the army "exchanged its role from that of oppressor to that of saviour". (208)

It had been known that Razmara carried out a six-month plan to demoralise the rebels' armed forces and other elements. This plan was accomplished by the officers and soldiers of Azeri origin whom Razmara had chosen within the Iranian army and sent in plain clothes to Azerbaijan. (209) Even Qavam revealed later that his Government had illegally sold export-import licences in 1946 in order secretly to pay the informers who spied in Azerbaijan on behalf of the Government and the army. (210)

The sudden collapse of the rebel regime in Azerbaijan may be attributed to various factors. One general comment of historians is that the DPA regime had failed to win the support of the public. Despite its achievements such as starting the land reform, enforcing the Labour Law, fighting crimes and drug addiction, founding a maternity hospital, a university and a radio station, the regime remained unpopular for the "abuses of its power". (211) Through ruthless terror, the regime tried to impose an immediate control over a traditionalist society in a large area. (212) Some observers tried to clear the DPA, and blame its misbehaviours on the Russians. An Iranian officer, who had worked with the rebel regime, wrote in his memoirs
that the DPA was not in control of its affairs since every department of Azerbaijan had a Russian assistant-director, and that those Russians were rulers of the regime.(213)

It is a historical fact that Azeris in both Iran and Russia had looked towards Iran and Turkey for protection rather than to Russia.(214)

An Iranian analyst has examined various causes of the DPA downfall. He described how the DPA confused its short-term objective – the autonomy – with its long term ideological programs. It started a land reform without sufficient planning and the required manpower to carry it out. It horrified the ordinary people with radicalism and the non-Azeris with anti-Persian slogans. It preached separation from Iran and the division of the national homeland. This was not acceptable to the Iranian people and even a high proportion of the Azeris. It became subservient to the Russians who were reputed to have committed crimes against the people of Azerbaijan since the early 19th Century. It strengthened the fear that Azerbaijan might fall under a total communist rule like much of Eastern Europe. Finally, it underestimated the power of religion, which at the last stage came into action against Pishevari’s Government.(215)

It should be noted that the religious leaders (Ulama) of Tehran had opposed the holding of the elections as long as Azerbaijan was under the so-called Communist
The leading Ayatollah of Tehran, Seyed Mohammad Behbahani, threatened to invite a street demonstration against the Government of Qavam if the elections were not postponed until a settlement in Azerbaijan. Following the fall of the Tabriz regime, Behbahani and forty other leading clergymen of Tehran sent a statement of congratulation and gratitude to the Shah for the army's "self-sacrifice in defence of the country and Islam".

Some doubts have been expressed on the achievements of the DPA regime during the one-year rule. It has been argued that the university of Azerbaijan was little more than a show piece. It had only three lecturers: Dr Jahanshahlou, Biriya and Pishevari himself; the latter two had no university education. It is also maintained that the DPA's land reform was incomplete and conditional upon the rules and taxes imposed on the farmers.

In this connection, a British writer who visited Azerbaijan during the rule of DPA, has written:

"The Azerbaijan peasants drew no distinction between the landlords' agents and the representatives of the Tabriz Government." Furthermore, the Russians compelled the farmers, during this period, to sell them grain and cattle, to the extent that Azerbaijan itself was in danger of famine.
Pishevari's assistant, Jahanshahlou, related that because of shortage of food in Russia in 1946, tens of thousands of cattle were confiscated by the DPA militia from every district of Azerbaijan, and moved towards the Soviet Union.(222)

However, the collapse of the regime in Azerbaijan should be attributed mainly to its abandonment by the Soviet Government rather than its deficiencies and misconduct. What could justify this Soviet final attitude towards the DPA? A Tudeh Party statement, undoubtedly reflecting the Soviet view, produced some justification. According to this statement, the "imperialist" powers contemplated "bringing the war to the immediate frontiers of the Soviet Union, and constituting a grave danger to the world peace and security", through the confrontation between the Iranian army and the troops of Azerbaijan.

Therefore, the statement added, the DPA decision to surrender was based on an "extremely rigorous revolutionary logic, an exact analysis of historic conditions, and a deep corresponding sense of true internationalism".(223)

The Soviet excuse for the abandonment of the rebels in Azerbaijan in 1946 is identical to a previous Soviet justification of abandoning the Jangali rebels of Gilan in 1921. On both occasions, the priority given to Soviet security was the indisputable reason for sacrificing the
Iranian Communists.
The negligence of the Soviet Union which ended with the collapse of the Tabriz regime, surprised and delighted the American officials. The State Department observed that for the first time in the post-war period, a Soviet-sponsored regime had fallen. Nothing like that had happened in Eastern Europe.(224)

Allen's conduct during the crisis was highly appreciated in both Iran and the United States. Allen reported to the State Department that the Iranian Cabinet members and other officials called on him at the Embassy and congratulated him for the end of the rebellion in Azerbaijan.(225)

Allen added in his report that at a social gathering, the Shah had made a flattering and embarrassing tribute to the help given to Iran by the American Government. Others had referred to Azerbaijan as the "Stalingrad of the Western democracies" and the beginning of the turn of the tides against Soviet aggression throughout the world.(226)

Byrnes addressed a personal Note to Allen, appreciating the latter's "admirable manner" in handling the situation. Byrnes viewed the Iranian success in the re-integration of Azerbaijan as "proof of strength and effectiveness of the United Nations in helping those countries which truly desire independence".(227)

However, some American diplomats were not so optimistic about the Soviet policy in Iran. The US Ambassador in
Moscow, Smith, had taken the view that the Soviet failure to assist the puppet regime of Azerbaijan was "strange" and should not be taken as the termination of Soviet ambitions in Iran.

"It must not be thought, however, that the Kremlin will resign itself to this humiliating reverse. It will continue to manoeuvre not only for oil concessions but also for political (and strategic) ascendancy in Iran." (228)

George Kennan shared this point of view. He stated in a conference on 7 January 1947, that the Russians would "take back" Azerbaijan when the oil agreement was approved "because the agreement gives them control in the areas where the wells are located". (229) This school of thought assumed Azerbaijan was regarded by the Soviets as not more than a footstep in the direction of their objectives. A Tudeh Minister in the coalition Government, Eskandari, recalled that after the fall of Azerbaijan he met a Soviet diplomat, Rostam Aliev, and asked his opinion about the latest development in Soviet-Iranian relations. According to Eskandari, Aliev told him that the point at issue in Soviet foreign policy was not Azerbaijan, but Iran. (230)

Before concluding the episode of Azerbaijan, a short look may be cast at the fate of its actors.
Following the arrival of the army in Tabriz, Javid and Shabestari were transferred to Tehran. They lived freely until June 1948, when both were arrested and tried at a military court. The court convicted them for taking part in the rebellion, but also considered their collaboration with Central Government. Javid and Shabestari were condemned to two years imprisonment each. However, the Shah pardoned them and they were subsequently released. (231)

Firouz, who had signed an agreement with Pishevari in June 1946, observed developments in Azerbaijan with irritation. On 8 December, he told Peterson that the army's intervention in Azerbaijan was not for the national interest but rather for "the private interest of a few wealthy people". On 12 December when the rebel regime collapsed, he had a heart attack. The American Embassy was called to send him their doctor. (232) In August 1947, Firouz was relieved from his job, and summoned to Tehran to face charges of "treason and embezzlement". However, he left Moscow for Geneva, and later published a statement against the Iranian Government in Paris. (233)

When the leader of the DPA, Pishevari, arrived in the Soviet territory, he was welcomed by officials of the Soviet Azerbaijan. He was given an office in Baku to handle the affairs of the DPA refugees who had been settled in various parts of Azerbaijan SSR, mainly in Kirovabad. (234) However, Pishevari in exile was self-
critical, and reproached the mistakes of his own regime. He entered into an argument with Bagirov which cost him his life.

According to Iranian emigres in Baku, on one occasion, Bagirov attributed the failure of Pishevari to his contacts with the Iranian Government, and the Iranian supporters of the DPA revolt. Bagirov stated that if Pishevari had broken completely with Iran and turned all loyalty to the Soviet Azerbaijan, the Iranian Government could not have claimed Azerbaijan as part of Iran. (235)

According to the same sources, Pishevari had responded that contrary to Bagirov’s view, the mistake of DPA was failing to unite with Iranian progressive elements, and restricting itself to the changes in Azerbaijan. (236)

In September 1947, Pishevari’s fate was determined in a NKVD-style car accident. It happened when Pishevari, accompanied by Qolam Yahya and Qoli ov, was on his way to Kirovabad, to visit a DPA refugee camp. According to Soviet reports, Pishevari’s fellow travellers were not hurt seriously, but Pishevari died in hospital. (237)

However, Jahanshahlou, himself a doctor, remembers that when he visited the DPA leader at hospital and chatted with him the injuries of Pishevari were not serious; but the next day, it was announced that Pishevari had died of heart failure. Jahanshahlou asserts that the corpse of Pishevari was inflamed with evidence of being
It was also reported in Tehran that when the Iranian Government asked the Soviet Union for the extradition of Pishevari in September 1947, the Soviet Government announced that he had died in a car accident in Baku. Pishevari has been regarded in many historical works as having a "mysterious" personality. Due to lack of thorough information about Pishevari's background, some academics and historians, e.g. Thomas Hammond, George Lenczowski, Miron Rezon, Hugh Thomas have maintained that Seyed Jafar Javadzadeh (Pishevari) was the same Avtis Mikaelian (Sultan Zadeh) who was purged in 1936. Their assertion that Sultan Zadeh was not liquidated, but escaped and reappeared as Pishevari, is certainly a mistake.

Bagirov, who, according to Iranian and Western sources master-minded both the rebellion in Azerbaijan and the murder of Pishevari, did not have a better fate than his victim. However, Bagirov remained in power as the First Secretary of the Communist Party in Azerbaijan SSR and a member of CPSU's Central Committee until 1953. His leadership was not unchallenged.

In 1946, two inspectors from the Central Committee, Ivatchuk and Gusorav, were assigned to investigate Bagirov's "unparty" behaviour, and his "neglect" of Marxist-Leninist education in Azerbaijan. Gusarov who
had been appointed by Georgy Malenkov in December 1946, made such a harsh criticism of Bagirov that the latter approached Stalin personally to remove the inspectors. (242)

Also in 1946, a book written by Bagirov entitled "History of the Bolshevik Organisation in Baku and Azerbaijan" was published in Moscow; in which Bagirov had glorified Stalin's "leadership" during the revolution of 1905 in Transcaucasia. (243)

The Iranian emigres who had met Bagirov after the fall of DPA, indicated that Bagirov was sharply criticising Molotov, for the latter's influence on the Soviet policy in Iran which resulted in the fiasco of Azerbaijan. (244)

During the escalation of the Cold War and the deterioration of Soviet-Iranian relations in 1947, Bagirov ordered the remnants of DPA in Baku to reorganise their party and launch a propaganda campaign against the Iranian Government. (245) Subsequently, the DPA's principle newspaper, Azerbaijan, resumed its publication in Baku. Its main theme was the integration of so-called southern and northern Azerbaijan. In this new edition of Azerbaijan, Bagirov had frequently been mentioned as the "beloved leader and compassionate father of all Azeris". The paper also had asked Bagirov to help the Azeris in Iran to "liberate themselves from the claws of Persian chauvinists". (246) Meanwhile Bagirov, following the path of Beria, became more active
in party politics and rivalry among Stalin's allies. On one occasion in 1951, Bagirov joined the camp of Malenkov against Khrushchev, condemning the latter's plans for Soviet agriculture. (247) At the CPSU's 19th Congress in 1952, Bagirov was elected as an alternate member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of CPSU; a promotion which did not last long. When Beria was arrested on 26 June 1953, Bagirov's tenure also ended. He was stripped of all his posts in July 1953, and was arrested along with his Minister of State Security, General Salim Atakishiev, and several other leaders of Azerbaijan SSR (248).

Following Khrushchev's accusations against Stalin at the CPSU's 20th Congress in 1956, Bagirov's fate came to a close. The party's propaganda machine exposed the case of Bagirov as a provincial model of both Stalin's cult of personality and Beria's criminal measures. The official paper of the Communist Party in Azerbaijan, Bakinsky Rabochy, expressed such views in its editorial on 1st of March 1956:

"It is well known that Azerbaijan had a most repulsive manifestation of the cult of the individual on the part of Bagirov, who surrounded himself with flatterers and sycophants, committed lawless and arbitrary acts, persecuted and disposed of people who displeased him and were honest people dedicated to the Party and the Soviet state,
old Bolsheviks, fighters of the revolutionary movement, active participants of the establishment of Soviet rule in Azerbaijan. \(^{(249)} \)

In addition, the book of Bagirov and the historical works of the Academy of Azerbaijan about Stalin's role came under attack by Soviet historians. G.A. Arutyunov denied, in "Voprosy Istorii" in April 1956, Stalin's leadership in "revolutionary movement and Social Democratic organisation of the Transcaucasus". He asserted that "Stalin was only a member of the Caucasus Union Committee". \(^{(250)} \)

The Military Collegium of USSR Supreme Court, which tried Bagirov in April 1956, accused him of being "one of the most active and intimate accomplices of the traitor Beria", collaborating with Beria against the "outstanding figure of the Communist Party and Soviet State Sergo Ordzhonikidze", and of committing "a number of extreme grave crimes against the State". The Collegium found Bagirov guilty of "high treason", commission of terrorist acts, and participation in a Counter-revolutionary organisation. Bagirov was condemned to death, and executed on 26 May 1956. \(^{(251)} \)

An Iranian refugee in Baku who followed Bagirov's trial, related later that the court avoided any indications to the crisis in Azerbaijan in 1945-1946. Thus, the witnesses were asked to give evidence only
about Bagirov's crimes up to 1938. However, some of the witnesses ignored this order, and mentioned Bagirov's responsibility, with support of Stalin and Beria, in the crisis of Azerbaijan. (252)

Eskandari, a member of Tudeh leadership in exile in 1956, confirms that Bagirov's wilful action in the Iranian Azerbaijan was condemned at the Court. (253)

B. COLLAPSE OF THE KURDISH REPUBLIC

The army's intervention in Azerbaijan against the rebel regime of Pishevari was a prelude to the occupation of Mahabad and suppression of the Kurdish Republic. When the troops gathered at Zanjan, on the eve of the march on Azerbaijan on 10 December, the Shah and Razmara were present there for inspection. It was decided that simultaneous with the march towards Tabriz, the army division in the Kurdish city of Saqqez should advance in the direction of Shahin Dej-Miandoab, towards Mahabad. (254) The situation in Kurdistan was more encouraging, because the Kurdish Tribes were ready to abandon the rebellious regime of Qazi Mohammad and welcome the army. An American diplomat who visited the Kurdish Republic in early December 1946, reported that in addition to the Barzanis who had never been trusted by Qazi Mohammad, only two small tribes had remained loyal to the DPK. (255) The Kurdish tribes disliked the Republic of Mahabad because of its dependence on the Russians, and its urban characteristics which were
Even before the army's movement towards Kurdistan, the major Kurdish tribes had sent emissaries to Tehran in order to express their opposition to the Kurdish regime and pledge their loyalty to the Central Government.

On 11 December, when the army was victoriously advancing towards Tabriz, two powerful Kurdish tribes, Shakkak and Hereky, attacked the DPA forces, in western Azerbaijan. Moreover, on 12 December when an army column reached Bukan in the south of Mahabad, the local tribesmen joined it in marching towards the Kurdish Capital. This joint column arrived at the vicinity of Mahabad on 15 December. On the same day, the only Russian representative in Mahabad, Asadov, left the city. He reportedly told the Kurdish leaders before his departure that since the status of the Republic had become an "international" issue, the Soviet Government could not help them.

On 16 December, Qazi Mohammad, his Prime Minister Haj Baba Sheik, and the War Minister Seif-e-Qazi went to Miandoab, to meet General Homayouni, the Commander of the army division in Kurdistan. During the meeting, the Kurdish leaders declared their unconditional surrender. At the suggestion of Homayouni, Qazi Mohammad returned to Mahabad to prevent any resistance by the armed Barzanis. On 17 December, the army entered Mahabad. This signified the end of the Kurdish Republic, and the re-integration of Kurdistan into Iran.
It was Qazi himself who urged the army to enter the city in fear of an assault by the hostile tribes.(262) Contrary to the people of Tabriz who had welcomed the army with enthusiasm and attacked the elements of the DPA, the people of Mahabad greeted the army coldly and there was no sign of hostility towards the leaders of the Kurdish Republic.(263)

Qazi Mohammad confessed in an interview with General Homayouni that the formation of the Kurdish separatist movement had been imposed upon him by the Russians. However, the army arrested forty-five leaders of the Kurdish rebellion on 21 December. Qazi accepted full responsibility for what had been done under his leadership.(264)

The Barzanis who were expected to fight for the Republic, did not challenge the Government forces. Moreover, their leader, Molla Mostafa, had told an Iranian Kurdish chieftain that the "Kurds had not been defeated by the Iranian army; rather it was the Soviet Union that was defeated by the United States and Great Britain".(265) However, Molla Mostafa entered into negotiations with the Iranian Government. He demanded that in the event that the Iranian Government wanted him to return to Iraq, he and his men should either be granted a pardon by the Iraqi Government, endorsed by the British Government, or permission to stay in Iran.(266)
Nevertheless the negotiations failed after four months and the Barzanis crossed the border into Iraq on 25 April 1947. However, they returned to Iranian territory a month later, and moved northward in the direction of the Soviet border. Despite the heavy preparation of the Iranian army to block the way, the Barzanis reached the Soviet Union, and arrived in Nakhchevan on 11 June 1947. They stayed in Russia as political refugees for eleven years. (267)

In Mahabad, Qazi Mohammad, his brother Sadr-e-Qazi, and his cousin and Minister of War, Seif-e-Qazi, were arrested and tried at a military tribunal. They were accused of treason, rebellion against the Iranian Government, insulting the Iranian army, replacing the Iranian flag by a Kurdish flag, and introducing a Kurdish State. Among their charges were also negotiation with "foreign" officials in Baku, and committing themselves to grant oil concession in Kurdistan to a "foreign" country. The three Kurdish leaders were condemned to death, and hanged on 31 March 1947. (268)

As a remnant of the dissolved Kurdish Republic, there were sixty Kurdish students who were chosen in Mahabad and sent to Baku, to be trained at the Azerbaijan military academy. In spite of the Soviet intention to keep them in Russia for Moscow's future objectives, the Kurdish cadets insisted to return home after the fall of
Mahabad. They were allowed to leave Russia in March 1947. (269)
CHAPTER THREE

THE CRISIS OF THE LEFT; THE VICTORY OF THE RIGHT

The collapse of the DPA regime in Azerbaijan had a disastrous effect on the Tudeh Party which even before this event was seriously in disarray.

One last action by the Tudeh activists to save the party's revolutionary reputation, as well as its resistance against Qavam's anti-left policy, was to plan an armed uprising in the northern province of Mazandaran. On 3 December, the newspapers in Tehran reported an armed attack by the communist workers in Mazandaran on the mining town of Zirab, where clashes between the raiders and the soldiers who were guarding the mines had taken place. (270) It was later found that the raiders, under a veteran communist, Yousaf Lankarani, had killed and injured a number of soldiers, but had failed to seize the mines. Reportedly the raiders had retreated to the jungles of Mazandaran to launch guerrilla warfare against the Central Government. (271) The revolt pursued two objectives:

While the DPA regime in Azerbaijan was weakening under the pressure of the Iranian army, the armed uprising in Mazandaran was an expression of sympathy towards the victims by the revolutionary wing of the Tudeh Party. (272) Moreover, as such, the Tudeh Party intended to demonstrate its active presence in Iran's political scene, in spite of the Government suppression. (273)
However, on 24 December, it was announced by the spokesman of the Government and the new Minister of Labour and Propaganda, Ahmad Aramesh, that the armed uprising of factory workers, which was engineered by the Tudeh Party, had been suppressed. He blamed the Tudeh leaders for "treasonable acts"; and stated that the intention of the "plot" was to destroy the railways and bridges between Tehran and Mazandaran and other northern provinces. 

The headquarters and the clubs of the Tudeh Party in Tehran had already been occupied by the martial law administration on 13 December, a day after the fall of the Azerbaijan regime. The new development gave the Government a pretext to close the Tudeh branches in the north and arrest many of the party activists. 

Subsequently, several members of the Tudeh leadership, including former deputies Kambakhsh, Ovanessian, former Minister Eskandari, and the party ideologist, Tabari, fled the country.

Nevertheless, Qavam did not seize the opportunity to outlaw the Tudeh Party. Apart from the Soviet factor, there were reasons for not taking such a course of action: First, Qavam preferred the party's support to decline because of public and patriotic reaction rather than being forced underground. 

Second, Qavam had thought that he might probably need the support of the Tudeh Party in the future, to
challenge the rising power of the Shah and the army. (279)

To protest against the Government's anti-Tudeh measures, the party issued a long proclamation on 24 December. The proclamation stated that because of the abolition of freedom, imposition of martial law, and prohibition of political demonstrations, the party had decided to boycott the forthcoming elections. (280) The Tudeh leadership was also severely attacked by the rank and file. There was a threat of mass defection. A group of party intellectuals, led by Khalil Maleki, challenged the leadership for its mistakes and misdeeds. They demanded the replacement of the existing leadership with a provisional committee. (281) Accordingly, the party took swift action to reorganise and strengthen its infrastructure. On 25 December, the plenum of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party held a session and decided on: (1) the resignation of the Central Committee as a whole; and (2) the formation of a 9-member Provisional Executive Committee (PEC) to run the party until the next party congress. (282) Since the old leadership was mainly criticised for its support of the DPA and its participation in Qavam's Coalition Government, the PEC elected a new First Secretary who was not involved in either case. He was the former deputy of Majles, Dr. Radmanesh. However, two of the Tudeh Ministers in the Coalition Government,
Keshavarz and Yazdi, were chosen as members of the PEC. (283)

On 5 January, the PEC published the new official organ of the party called "Mardom" (people) to replace "Rahbar" which had been suspended. (284) The most significant action taken by the PEC was the publication of a manifesto on 5 January, to express its repudiation of the party's past policies, and its determination for self-correction and reform.

Furthermore, the PEC confessed to its past errors such as its support of the DPA revolt in Azerbaijan, its one-sided partisanship in foreign policy, its pursuits of a class-struggle in Iran, and its backing of the adventurist and corrupt elements who brought the party into disrepute. The PEC also denounced any rebellion or revolution in Iran, and stressed that in the future the party would seek to achieve its aim solely through legal and parliamentary methods.

The manifesto asserted that the party would respect private ownership and religion, and would not impose a "proletariat regime" or a "people's democracy" for Iran. It added that the party would support "liberty and progress within the framework of Iran's Constitutional monarchy". (285)

There were two controversial points in the PEC's manifesto of 5 January: One was a reference to the "legitimate interests of the Big Powers in Iran". The
other was an assertion that the Tudeh objectives for Iran were a political and economic system similar to those of "Sweden, Switzerland, Britain and the United States". In either of these cases, and in fact, throughout the proclamation, the Soviet Union was not named.(286)

Moreover, the PEC assigned a commission to purge the undesirable elements in the party. It also dissolved the party organisation in Mazandaran for misconduct in the revolt of Zirab.(287)

According to some reports, the PEC also disbanded the party cells in the armed forces, in order to prevent further suppression of the party by the government.(288)

As such, the PEC's policy was moving towards moderation. Despite previous cases of boycotting the elections, a PEC member stated that the party would not discourage its members from voting.(289)

However, the PEC manifesto soon came under attack from the pro-Soviet faction of the party. Only five days after the publication of the manifesto, the party organ "Mardom" published articles criticising the manifesto. Some observers attributed this turn to the pressures from the Soviets who were annoyed at the PEC's position in connection with such issues as foreign policy and Azerbaijan.(290) Kambakhsh who was the Soviet man in the Tudeh leadership in Iran until 1946, and frequently reflected the Soviet views, condemned the PEC's manifesto in his book. He described the manifesto as
revisionist and defeatist. (291)
Consequently, the PEC retreated from its position, and issued a new statement which reincarnated the party's militant and uncompromising policy. The PEC also reiterated the previous ban on participation in the elections due to the "severe prosecution of parties and candidates of the Left, which denied the people, and specially the workers, the chance of exercising a free choice". (292)
The contradictory statements by the PEC prepared the ground for a heated debate, among the rank and file of the party, over the performance of the leadership. In 1947, the factional struggle between the supporters of moderation and militancy influenced the whole party organisation, and paralysed its general activities. Each of these factions published their version of the leadership's criticism, as well as their own theories and solutions to salvage the party. In return the PEC launched a counter-attack against its critics, and defended the party's past achievements. (293)
The first series of the PEC publications emerged in late December 1947, after a radical intellectual, Dr. Eshaq Eprim, who had studied economics with Keynes in Britain, published a pamphlet. (294) It was entitled after Lenin's work "What Is To Be Done?" (Che Bayad Kard?). He blamed the party's setback on two factors: The first factor was the quality of its membership. The second
was its confusion between the economic struggle of the working class represented by the trade unions, and the political struggle of a progressive Leftist party. Eprim also attributed the party’s failure to its reliance on the Soviet Union and international developments rather than its own indigenous forces.(295) In Eprim’s view, Tudeh participation in the 14th Majles and Qavam’s Coalition Cabinet, both recommended by the Russians, deviated from the party’s principles.(296) Eprim proposed the formation of a selective, well-disciplined "vanguard" group as the nucleus of the party organisation. According to Eprim, the broadly-based members, supporters and sympathisers of the party should be separated from this militant group, but follow it when necessary. The exclusive duty of the "vanguard" was the destabilisation of the government and the seizure of power from the ruling class.(297)

In Emprim’s radical theory, an armed struggle to bring the party to power was inevitable. Thus, in the event the "vanguard" was prosecuted by the government and had to go underground, the party itself could survive and continue functioning.(298) However, the party’s leadership rejected Eprim’s vanguardism and the formation of a party within the party.(299) The Tudeh ideologist, Tabari, argued that the pursuit of elitism and vanguardism would alienate the workers, peasants and even the intellectuals from the party. He defended the
party’s participation in the parliament and the
government, stating that in both cases, the party seized
opportunity to propagate its policies and strengthen its
position. Tabari compared the Tudeh undertaking with
the French Communist Party’s participation in the
coalition Government in France. (300)
Another controversial pamphlet entitled "The Tudeh
Party at the Crossroad " (Hezb-e-Tudeh-ye Iran bar
sar-e Dorahi) was published by the reformist Khalil
Maleki and his supporters. This pamphlet demanded a
full investigation into the party’s gains and failures
in the past, and the evolution of democracy and self-
reliance in the party.(301)
The reformists insisted on holding a party congress
since the PEC had terminated its six-month term.
However, the PEC rejected this idea, saying that the
"Soviet comrades" were against holding a congress as
long as the factional challenge in the party
continued.(302)
On 3 January 1948, the Tudeh dissidents including the
vanguardists and the reformists announced their
desertion from the Tudeh Party. They thus formed the
Tudeh Socialist League of Iran.(303) The desertion
manifesto was a pamphlet entitled "Two Strategies for
One Goal" (Do Ravesh Baraye Yek Hadaf), written by
Khalil Maleki. It explained the origins of the split
and the objectives of the League. The mistakes and

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shortcomings of the Tudeh Party were analysed. These were: the lack of democratic rights for members; the corruption and inefficiency of the leadership; the illegality of the PEC; the over-emphasis on the international democratic front; the exaggeration of "historical determinism"; and the under-estimating of the "tremendous democratic forces of the Tudeh masses". (304) Maleki did not criticise Soviet pressure in obtaining an oil concession, or the Soviet-inspired rebellion in Azerbaijan. However, he revealed two years later that his major allegation against the Tudeh leadership was based on its passive obedience of the Soviet policies, and its alliance with the DPA who had threatened to disintegrate Iran. (305) Maleki and other deserters came under attack not only from the Tudeh Party, but also from Radio Moscow, and Soviet newspapers. (306) They alleged that Maleki was a "revisionist", a "traitor" and a "British spy". (307) Writing about the desertion, a Soviet journalist claimed that the British were behind this event. (308) The Soviet historian, Ivanov, refers to Maleki as an "apostate"; a term which has characterised him in Tudeh literature. (309) This reaction proved that the Kremlin would not tolerate the emergence of any socialist group to challenge the Tudeh Party in Iran. (310) The deserters who had been heavily terrorised by the Communist media, were soon forced to dissolve their
Socialist League. (311) Khamei, himself a partner in the desertion, related that in early 1948, the Soviet Union had still enjoyed a degree of credibility among many of the deserters whose campaign against the Tudeh leadership did not signify a defiance of the leadership in Moscow. They had to wait for another few months, to witness how Tito broke with Moscow and exposed the "Soviet imperialism". (312)

Since relations between the East and the West were drastically deteriorating, the Soviet leadership became increasingly concerned to protect the Tudeh Party as its mouth-piece in Iran. Not surprisingly, the Tudeh Party was prepared to pay its debt to its protector. It became more active to glorify Stalin's new ideological campaign, which was directed by Zhdanov. The statements by Zhdanov were translated and published by the Tudeh Party in its daily paper, with a recommendation to the party members that they should accept it as their guideline. (313)

The Tudeh Party returned to its pro-Soviet line; and the PEC, like its predecessor, followed Moscow's directions. (314) However, Moscow's involvement in protecting the Tudeh-affiliated CCFTU was more obvious. Qavam's Government intended to prevent the trade unions from taking part in political activities, and to break their links with the Tudeh Party. Therefore, the Soviet media criticised Qavam and expressed their strong
support for pro-Tudeh trade unions.(315)
However, as a consequence of the post-Azerbaijan crisis in the Left, many workers had shifted from the CCFTU into the pro-Government unions, either intentionally or in fear of losing their jobs.(316) In February 1947, supporters of the Government, under the banner of free trade unions, occupied the CCFTU headquarters; and through the election of a new Executive Committee, excluded Rusta and other Tudeh members.(317)
A report by the British Embassy's Labour Attaché, in late March 1947, describes how the Government sidetracked the Tudeh Party and took over the trade unions.

"The Tudeh trade union movement which twelve months ago claimed 300,000 members, held a monopoly position as representing workers, intimidated employers and forced the Government into granting concessions, is now a very dim shadow of its former self.

The Government, which had been waiting for an opportunity to attack the political and anti-national activities of the Tudeh Party, used the successful conclusion of the Azerbaijan campaign as the occasion for organising trade unions under the aegis of the Prime Minister's Democratic party. There were allegations by the Tudeh unions that their premises and clubs had been invaded and
Defying Communist propaganda, Qavam confidently invited the International Labour Organisation (ILO) to send a delegation to Iran, to investigate the workers social conditions. (319)

The Government published a report about the financial and administrative irregularities committed by the leader of CCFTU, Rusta. (320) Subsequently a three-man delegation assigned by the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) arrived in March. It included a Russian P. A. Borisov, a Lebanese Communist and former delegate to the Comintern, Mostafa Al-Aris, and a member of the British Trade Unions Congress E. P. Harris. (321)

The Iranian Government was well-prepared to receive the delegation. However, the British Embassy was apprehensive about the impact of the delegation’s activities and the revival of trade unionism in the AIOC’s fields of operation. The British maintained certain reservations about the Iranian Labour Law. They believed that the rule preventing the dismissal of employees without the approval of the Ministry of Labour, was not applicable to the AIOC. (322)

Nevertheless, the British were delighted that the pro-Tudeh unions in Abadan had been suppressed, and that the new unions had proclaimed their intention not only to remain free from any political influence but to be only concerned with the protection of the interests of the
workers. Therefore, the British officials in Tehran and Moscow carefully watched the delegation’s plan and contacts. According to a British report, Borisov and Al-Aris had consulted the Soviet trade unions leader, Shvernik, in Moscow about their mission in Tehran.

The delegation interviewed the members of the rival trade unions, the Government representatives and the members of Tudeh leadership. However, the British member of the delegation, Harris, believed that his Russian and Lebanese colleagues were concerned to hear only the Tudeh supporters, in order to strengthen the position of CCFTU leader, Rusta. As a result of the friction between the members of the delegation, Harris arranged a visit to the industrial areas, including Abadan and the oil fields, separately.

The report by Borisov and Al-Aris had praised the pro-Tudeh unions as the "anti-Fascist" organisations who were "in the service of working class". The report also warned the Iranian Government that its treatment of unions would be taken before the United Nations.

"If the Persian Government persists in its policy, and if this unnatural situation in Persia, which resembles that of countries under the domination of Hitler’s regime, continued, then the delegation suggests that the case of the workers’ unions of Persia should be discussed by UNO."
The two-man report had asserted that the CCFTU was the sole representative of the Iranian trade unions. (329) Nevertheless, Harris stated a reservation in the final report of the delegation which was in effect a "sweeping indictment" of the Iranian Government. (330)

He expressed his own views in a separate report which justified some Government actions in connection with the CCFTU. With reference to documents which were in the Government's possession, Harris referred to the correspondence between Rusta and the French Communist Party. According to these documents, the Iranian Government had intended to invite two non-political French Labour experts to advise the Iranian Ministry of Labour. But on Rusta's secret interference, two Communist officials working with the French Communist Deputy Prime Minister, Maurice Thorez, were nominated for the job. (331)

Harris regarded the Tudeh Party as a revolutionary organisation seeking to overthrow the Government by force. He concluded that the Tudeh-affiliated CCFTU was not a pure Trade Unions Council. (332)

In spite of the recommendation made by the WFTU delegation in favour of the CCFTU, the government ordered the arrest of Rusta; and charged him with "undermining the security of the country, co-operating with the rebels and secessionists, inciting the citizens to insurrection and murder, encouraging the armed forces
to mutiny, and espionage.(333) Thus, Qavam put an end to the excesses of the trade unions, and deprived the humiliated Tudeh Party of its most powerful instrument. At a meeting of the Executive Committee of WFTU in Prague, in June, a resolution was passed in condemnation of the "anti-democratic measures taken by the Persian Government against the free and democratic unions and their members". Furthermore, the Secretary-General of WFTU delivered a protest to the Iranian legation in Prague, in which Iran was threatened that its case would be taken to the UN.(334)

However, the suppression of Tudeh and CCFTU could not guarantee the total victory for Qavam's DPI in the election for the 15th Majles.

The situation in Azerbaijan which was under the army's occupation and the martial law administration, was particularly remarkable.

It was expected that after the welcome given to the army by the people, no excess or atrocity would be committed by the Government forces in the province. This expectation was even reflected in a recommendation by Byrnes.

"We hope (that) Qavam will adopt a conciliatory attitude towards the people of the province, and refrain from repressive measures against Russians, Azerbaijanis and Kurds. We believe that granting of general

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amnesty and limiting of punishment to judicial process against a few guilty leaders would have good effect on world opinion and tend to counter Soviet statements that Iran is reactionary.»(335)

Nevertheless, the army tightened its grip over the province, and imposed harsh measures on the population based on security reasons. These measures included the execution of the DPA Ministers Kabiri and Azima, its attorney-General Ebrahimí, and the military personnel who had deserted the Iranian army and defected to the rebels.(336) With the worsening of Soviet-Iranian relations, and fear of Soviet penetration into Azerbaijan, the army forced hundreds of the DPA collaborators into internal exile, and put many suspects under arrest.(337)

A few months after the re-integration of Azerbaijan, the American Consul in Tabriz, Herbert D. Spivack, reported to Washington about the dissipation of people’s goodwill by the army. He referred to the complaints of Azerbaijanis to the effect that the landlords were driven back often with military escort, and that the government did not introduce any social or economic reform in the "only territory in the world ever won back from Communist control".(338)

Meanwhile Qavam, himself joined the critics alleging that the army’s behaviour in Azerbaijan destroyed the friendly feeling of the population towards the
Government. (339)

However, Qavam’s most expedient action was the appointment of a veteran politician as the Governor-General of Azerbaijan in order to check the army’s overwhelming power. This choice was the former Prime Minister, Ali Mansur, a staunch royalist who also had cordial relations with Russians in the past. Qavam was pleased that the situation came almost under control, and even the Soviet Consul-General in Tabriz confirmed a general improvement following the arrival of Mansur in Azerbaijan. (340)

Nevertheless, Mansur refused to follow Qavam’s instructions regarding the elections, and forbade the DPI to open its branches in Azerbaijan. Thus, the army secured the seats of areas under occupation for the royalists. (341) Beyond Azerbaijan, Qavam had used the entire government potentialities to secure the victory of the DPI candidates. However, the Court, backed by the army, intended to secure some seats for its own supporters. Furthermore, the pro-British politicians had resumed their activities with the backing of the British Embassy and the AIOC. They also were hopeful to be represented in the 15th Majles. (342)

Despite the presence of the royalist and pro-British factions, the leading of a campaign against Qavam’s election policy fell into the hand of the nationalists. Qavam’s interventionist conduct had caused many
complaints around the country.

On 12 January 1947, a non-homogeneous group of Qavam's opponents, led by Mossadeq, took sanctuary at the royal palace, to protest against the DPI's abuse of power, the government's interference with the freedom of voters and rigging in ballots to impose its candidates. The protesting group included the former Prime Minister Matin Daftari, the speaker of the 14th Majles Tabatabaei, the leader of Friday prayer of Tehran, Dr. Emami, and a number of academics and journalists and former deputies. They stayed at the palace for four days. However, the Shah who was actively involved in patronising the royalist candidates, refused to support Qavam's opponents openly; and only the Shah's private Secretary received them.(343) The Tudeh Party, despite boycotting the elections, joined the anti-Qavam campaign through the exposure of the officials' misconduct in the course of elections.(344) Nevertheless the DPI secured 80 seats out of a total 136; the royalists won 35; and the rest went to the pro-British politicians.(345) As the result of the Shah-Razmara understanding against Qavam and the presence of the army in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, some of the prominent anti-Qavam politicians such as Matin Daftari, Ambassador Taqizadeh and Dr. Emami, had been elected from the Azeri and Kurdish constituencies.(346) Amongst the royal choices, Matin Daftari and Emami had never seen their constituencies before the elections.(347) The Shah's purpose was to
create a powerful anti-Qavam faction in the 15th Majles for his own interest. He believed that Qavam's intention was taking advantage of Iran's problems for building up his own position, and weakening that of the Shah. A pro-Shah paper wrote, on the eve of the election, that Qavam had plotted to depose the monarch and establish a republic through his subservient deputies in the 15th Majles.

After the suppression of the anti-British trade unions, the election of some pro-British candidates brought further pleasure to the British Embassy. The British reports admired Qavam's handling of the elections and viewed that there was no "justification" for charges against him. The British were also relieved that Mossadeq, "a wild unreliable character", had not been elected.

Commenting on Qavam's popularity, in February 1947, a British report indicated:

"Though he is feared and disliked by the Shah—a dislike which was increased by jealousy of his successful handling of the Azerbaijan situation—the country as a whole, apart from the strident Tudeh minority, appears to be well disposed towards him."

The American position was represented in Allen's refusal to take side with any party, and his assertion that Iran's election was no concern of the foreign
powers. (353) Apart from Qavam's personal influence and his authoritarian manipulation of Government's machinery, it should be remarked that the DPI choices for candidacy were more favourable than those of its rivals. Many of the DPI candidates were selected among young, liberal patriots without foreign connection or independent influence. (354)

The Russians expressed resentment of Qavam's election policy, claiming that none of the candidates represented the "democratic" organisations, and that the 15th Majles was more "reactionary" than the 14th one. (355) However, Qavam's victory over his right-wing and Russophobic opponents could still bring a degree of satisfaction to the Soviets. In Soviet assessment, Qavam was the man who had committed himself to present the Soviet-Iranian oil agreement to the Majles; and it was assured that the pro-Qavam majority of the 15th Majles would ratify the agreement.

However, the Shah and the royalists used the linkage between Qavam's victory and Soviet expectation as the reasoning for their own anxiety. (356)
During the second half of the year 1946, three major developments occurred in the East-West relations: The Soviet Union increased pressure on Turkey and Greece while maintaining its oil demands on Iran; the United Kingdom turned its security commitment in the Near East to the United States; and the United States tightened its defence line around the Soviet bloc, known as "containment". On 7 August 1946, the Soviets suggested to the American, British and Turkish Governments that the Montreux Convention be revised and replaced by a "joint" defence system on the Straits. (357)

According to this proposal, the Black Sea countries, i.e. the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Turkey should together safeguard the Straits. (358)

On 14 August, the Soviet suggestion was discussed at a high level commission in Washington, comprised of Acheson, and the Secretaries of Navy and War. The commission concluded that the Soviet demands in Turkey "would be followed next by infiltration and domination in Greece with the obvious threat to the Middle East"; and that if Russia was not stopped, it would be "difficult even impossible" to prevent Russian domination over Greece and the Middle East. (359) Moreover, the commission recommended the assignment of an American warship to the Eastern
Mediterranean as a demonstration of the United States support of Turkey.(360)

Truman not only endorsed the commission's recommendation, but also expressed his suspicion of Soviet policy with such statement:

"We might as well find out whether the Russians are bent on world conquest now as in five or ten years."(361)

On 19 August, Acheson handed a Note to the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Washington rejecting the Soviet proposal regarding the Straits.(362) The Turkish and British Governments addressed similar Notes to the Soviets on 21 and 22 August.(363) In early September, the American carrier Franklin D Roosevelt accompanied by five other ships sailed into the Eastern Mediterranean; and Washington announced that the US Navy would maintain a permanent presence in that part of the World.(364) Moscow denied having any aggressive plan against Turkey.(365) However, the question of the Straits was brought up in another Soviet Note addressed to Turkey in late September.(366)

Greece was another area of the East-West conflict. A fact-finding commission appointed by the Security Council, reported in April 1947 that three Communist states, Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria had interfered in Greek internal affairs.(367)
In reaction to the Communist offensive, the United States’ attention turned further towards Greece and Turkey. Since the other countries in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe had fallen into Soviet orbit, the American policy-makers looked at Turkey and Greece as the last bastion which deserved the utmost support.(368) Meanwhile, the United States Government intended not to touch the British sensitivity concerning the latter’s dominant position in Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.(369)

However, there was a difference of opinions over the issue in the British Government. The Prime Minister Attlee was in favour of sharing privileges with Russia, withholding the British exclusive responsibility in the maintenance of status quo in the Middle East.(370) In January 1947, Attlee viewed that instead of burdening on the British economy and military in order to secure the British interests in the Middle East, the British Government should "seek to come to an agreement with USSR".(371) Such an agreement, according to Attlee would have included the oil rights in Iran and settlement of the question of the Straits, in line with Soviet contentment.(372) Attlee’s perception was faced with discord from Bevin and the Chiefs of Staff who had believed in defending the British interests against Soviet threat rather than appeasing the Russians.(373) Bevin commented on Attlee’s suggestion that the Russians had pursued a "mission to work for a Communist world,
without an armed conflict", and that if Britain disinterested itself in the Middle East, Russia would "take it over by infiltration". Bevin's counter-proposal was to exploit the United States' interest in the security of the Middle East, and bring the Americans in to take a greater part of the burden. Thus, Bevin suggested an immediate secret negotiation with Washington to emphasise the British-American common interests in the Middle East, particularly in Greece, Turkey and Iran.

However, the British dilemma came to its climax at the worsening of the Greek situation in February 1947. On 21 February, the matter was expressed in a Note to Washington, asserting that Britain could no longer afford the cost of its commitment in Greece. The US administration was receptive. Officials at the State Department commented on the British Note, that the United States should take over the British portion, or be prepared for an Anglo-Soviet compromise leading to Soviet advancement in the "Middle East and elsewhere". The American joint Chiefs of Staff viewed that an Anglo-American joint effort was welcome, not merely to prevent Greece and Turkey from "succumbing to Slav pressure", but to resist communist take-over in certain other countries such as Austria, Iran and China.

Meanwhile, the Truman administration had its own plan for rescuing Greece and Turkey. In January
1947, Byrnes was replaced by General George Marshall, a former Chief of Staff and Ambassador to China. However, the leading of the State Department policy in connection with Russia stayed with the Under-Secretary Acheson, who was given considerable new powers by Marshall. (381)

A conference at the White House, on 27 February, played a crucial role in defining the American new foreign policy.

In the presence of Truman, Marshall and a group of congressional leaders, Acheson made a key statement. He described how the Soviet penetration might de-stabilise the whole security system in the Middle East and Europe, and why the United States should engage itself for the salvation.

"...A highly possible Soviet breakthrough might open three continents to Soviet penetration. Like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran, and all to the East. It would also carry infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt, and to Europe through Italy and France—already threatened by the strongest Communist parties in Western Europe. The Soviet Union is playing one of the greatest gambles in history at minimal cost." (382)

It was at this conference that Senator Vandenberg urged Truman to put the question of Turkey and Greece, which
were under the intimidation of communism, before the "congress and the country". He assured the President of their support.(383)

Less than two weeks later, Truman took an initiative based on the British demand, Acheson's statement, and a report which had been prepared by the President's aide, Clark Clifford.

In an address to the joint session of Congress on 12 March, Truman asked for a 400 million dollar aid to Greece and Turkey, in order to help them in securing their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Truman's reasoning for such help was that the United States should assist those countries who had been the target of foreign aggression.

"I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjection by armed minorities or by outside pressure. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way;"(384)

The Soviet media promptly denounced Truman's speech. The Izvestia condemned it as "a smoke-screen for expansion", and "a fresh intrusion of the United States into the affairs of other states".(385)

The United States' decision to assist Turkey and Greece directly, and not through the United Nations, was a major source of Soviet criticism.

The Soviet journal, New Times, argued on 21 March, that
the "proposed measures for Greece and Turkey cannot be taken as a demonstration of the will of the American Government for international co-operation within the framework of the United Nations Charter". It maintained that the "only lawful and sensible way to assist Greece and Turkey, if the need for that has arisen, is by action undertaken through the United Nations". (386) However, the Soviet^ had a say at the United Nations; and the United States had no intention to offer them a right of approval or veto on its resources and allocations.

B. US AID TO IRAN; SOVIET REACTION.

Iran had requested for American aid to equip its armed forces, and to finance its development program. Both Iranian demands were presented by Qavam to Allen in Autumn 1946, when Iran was preparing to re-possess Azerbaijan. (387) Regarding the military supplies, an early understanding was reached in December 1946, when the United States agreed, in principle, to sell Iran a limited amount of arms "for the purpose of maintaining internal security". (388) Then, Iran sought a loan of 10 million dollars from the American banks to buy the arms. (389)

With the escalation of the Cold War, Iran's position became more significant by early 1947. Thus, both the Departments of State and War supported the Iranian application.
In February 1947, the Truman Administration approved a 25 million dollars credit to Iran for the arms purchase. (390) The Truman Doctrine, on 12 March, opened a new chapter in the United States involvement in the region, and its commitment towards the countries who had sustained the Soviet pressure.

Following Truman's statement concerning the American assistance to Turkey and Greece, Iran had justifiably expected its inclusion in the new United States aid program. At this point, the State Department assured Ala that Iran would be "similarly supported if similar need should arise". (391)

However, a number of arguments were made in this connection. Firstly, the Iranians had questioned why they should not be treated equally by the United States in practice. On 27 March, the Shah conferred with Allen on this issue, and asked him why Americans insisted Iran "make large dollar outlays on a loan basis with interest" for military supplies, while at the same time the United States was giving Turkey and Greece much larger amounts as grants. (392) Whether or not Iran's limited oil revenue was the American excuse, the Shah stated that Turkey was in a better financial position than Iran. (393) An additional source of the Shah's anxiety was his personal position in this connection. Many Iranian politicians, including Qavam, looked at the expansion of the armed forces as the strengthening of
the Shah's power; therefore, they used American discrimination between Turkey and Iran as a pretext to refuse the arms deal. They argued that Iran should resist such discrimination and burden on its economy for some "obsolete weapons". (394) Several months after presenting Iran's original request, Qavam suggested to Allen that Iran should be given military supplies free of charge. (395)

Secondly, the Iranians maintained that the American refusal of Iran's demand would have a negative effect on Iran's security, and consequently would "invite renewed Soviet activity". (396)

Allen's response, in this respect, was that Turkey and Greece were under "immediate" Soviet threat, but the Iranian case was not an "emergency". (397)

The Third Iranian argument was that Iran's exclusion from Truman's statement had left Iran more vulnerable against Soviet threat. According to the Iranian assessment, the United States was prepared even for armed confrontation with the Soviet Union for the sake of Turkey and Greece, while Iran's position in American foreign policy was uncertain.

Allen reflected this Iranian anxiety to Washington:

"If the Soviet Government knew definitely that an attack on Iran would mean armed hostilities with the United States, they (Iranians) feel that the Soviet Union would not attack. They are afraid, however, that
if any doubt on the subject is allowed to continue in the Kremlin, Iran may become the victim of aggression;\(^{(398)}\)

However, the Secretary of State, George Marshall, replied that failure to include Iran along with Greece and Turkey did not mean a lack of interest in Iran. He stated in his telegram of 21 June to Allen that "it would have been impossible for the United States to have included Iran without danger of further aggravating Soviet-Iranian relations".\(^{(399)}\)

Facing Iranian discontent, Allen believed that an American representation to Moscow regarding Iran could be helpful to assure the Iranians of American support, and "might possibly arrest any ideas of aggression against Iran".\(^{(400)}\) Nevertheless, Marshall was not convinced to do something just to satisfy Iran. He commented that there was "no basis" for such representation to the Soviet Union in absence of any complaint by Iran to the United Nations or any "overt Soviet threat or act against Iran".\(^{(401)}\)

However, the United States Government did not intend to neglect Iranian views regarding the Soviet threat in general. Marshall asserted in one of his telegrams to Allen that the United States "should be prepared for stepped up Soviet activities in Europe and the Middle East in the near future".\(^{(402)}\)
Therefore, American policy was not to disappoint Iran, but to generate a sense of confidence and self-reliance in Iranian Government. Henderson had briefed two members of the Iranian arm-purchasing team, Generals Hedayat and Mazhari, on the American aid policy.

"In Turkey and Greece, their independence was threatened by actual civil war or by demands for territory or bases. ...
... The mood of (the) Congress was such that only the states threatened by the Soviets at the moment could be considered. At the moment, there is no Soviet column operating in Iran, nor demands being made upon it."

As a second point, Henderson emphasised that Iran's intention should be to strengthen its internal security, and that the United States would help Iran, in an "intimate association", towards this objective.

There was no doubt that the Iranian army was not able to defend the country in case of Soviet aggression. It was the Communist subversive activities in Iran through the Tudeh party and other anti-government elements which had necessitated the build up of a strong security force to suppress such subversions. Thus, the American objective in military aid to Iran was to avert the internal plots rather than the external aggression.

The State Department expressed that the military assistance to Iran was not aimed at national defence but "effective display of the Central Government's power,"
patrol border areas, and insure quick repression of foreign-inspired uprisings". (406)

An additional point in America's policy was Iran's existing ties and contacts with the Soviet Union. While the Governments of Turkey and Greece were regarded by Moscow as "entirely objectionable", Iran was still in the process of negotiations with Moscow over questions such as a pending oil agreement, and the return of Iranian gold and hard currency from the Soviet State Bank. (407)

On American advice, Iran should resist Soviet pressure, but not to the detriment of its relations with Moscow. When Allen insisted on this point, Qavam agreed that Iran was not identical with Turkey and Greece. (408)

Furthermore, the American Government was concerned to assure Iranians that their country was not on the verge of immediate Soviet aggression. A message from Marshall on 29 July asserted that although a "surprise attack" on Iran was within Soviet capabilities, an "overt act of aggression" against Iran was unlikely. Marshall indicated the Soviet economic and political difficulties which would force the Soviet Government to avoid such action. (409)

If the situation got worse as the result of the Soviet threat, Marshall advised that Iran should approach the Security Council as it did in the past. He recalled that "largely at the United States' insistence", the Security
Council was still seized of the Iranian case. He also viewed that the undertaking of the Security Council regarding the Greek complaint was an assuring factor to Iran.

"In the face of a difficult defensive position imposed on USSR by the Security Council finding of support to (the) guerrilla warfare in Greece, it is not expected that Soviet Government will at this time undertake military action against Iran."

Both Allen and Marshall believed that the Russian threat was not as serious as the Iranians had emphasised. At one point, Allen thought that Qavam was not "genuinely" afraid of Soviet aggression, but exaggerating the matter for his own benefit.

"It is more likely that he wants to keep alive (the) local fear for his own purposes. He would like to be considered the indispensable Persian who alone can maintain friendly enough relations with the USSR to avoid an actual attack. In this way, he retains his position as Prime Minister."

Marshall expressed his suspicion of Qavam for other reasons. He believed that Qavam's intention in pressuring the United States for further commitment, was seeking an excuse for making a deal with the Russians.

"We are wondering whether Qavam, by making requests of a character which clearly..."
be met by us, is not trying to produce a situation which would justify his accession to various Soviet demands on grounds of lack of assurance of the United States' support of Iran against Soviet aggression.\(^{(413)}\)

On 18 November 1947, Allen reported to Washington that among the "extraneous considerations" which induced Qavam not to approach the Majles for the endorsement of arms credit was the "British influence".\(^{(414)}\)

It had been obvious that the pro-British faction in the 15th Majles neither liked Qavam nor the expansion of American influence in Iran. A State Department correspondence with Allen implies that the British diplomats in Tehran might have a hand in this matter.\(^{(415)}\)

However, the new Acting-Secretary, Robert Lovette, notified Allen that the military aid to Iran was in the mutual "US-UK interest throughout the Middle East", and that British policy was generally in favour of the US plan.

"If some British officials in Iran oppose US aid to Iran, it would appear that they fail to appreciate the overall policy of their own Government.\(^{(416)}\)

Nevertheless, Qavam continued his bargain for arms, and did not present the bill of arms credit to the Majles until the end of his premiership, due to domestic
and external oppositions. It was his successor Hakimi, who reduced the credit from 25 million dollars offered by the United States, to 10 million, and received the approval of the Majles on 17 February 1948.\(417\)

However, an important military agreement had been concluded between Iran and the United States in the last months of Qavam's Government.

The "Agreement on the Establishment of American Military Mission in Iran" was signed by Allen and Iran's Minister of War, Mahmoud Jam, on 6 October 1947.\(418\) The purpose of the American mission stipulated in Article One, was the "improvement of the efficiency of the Iranian Army".\(419\)

The mission had various training, advisory, and inspection duties at the Ministry of War, the General Staff, and their subordinate sections and field agencies. However, one certain article of this agreement (Article 24) surprised many Iranian and foreign observers, since it guaranteed an exclusive right for the United States in Iran.

"So long as this agreement, and any extension thereof, is in effect, the Government of Iran shall not engage the services of any personnel of any other foreign Government for duties of any nature connected with the Iranian Army, except by mutual agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of Iran".\(420\)
Qavam kept the conclusion of this agreement secret from the Majles and the public. Even after his resignation, the new government reacted against the press revelation by denial of existence of any such agreement. (421) However, the text of the agreement which had been registered at the United Nations Secretariat, was published in a press release by the Soviet Embassy. (422) The Soviet reaction to the extension of American involvement in Iran was demonstrated in various diplomatic presentations and media condemnation.

Regarding Soviet concerns, Qavam related to Allen that Sadchikov had made a complaint on several issues. According to this account, the Russians were nervous of the Iranian Government's "anti-Soviet and pro-American policy". (423) Reportedly, Sadchikov had referred to the Soviet offers for arms and ammunition which Iran had refused "in an unfriendly manner", but entered into an arms deal with the United States. Furthermore, the Soviet Ambassador had believed that the American military missions, under Generals Robert Crow and Norman Schwarzkopf, were in direct operational control of the Iranian Army and Gendarmerie. (424) An additional Soviet source of embarrassment was Iran's hiring of an American engineering firm, Morrison Knudsen, to make an economic survey in Iran. This survey was to be used as the guideline for Iran's first "seven-year Economic
Plan". (425)

For financing of this project, Iran had demanded a loan of 260 million dollars from the World Bank, with an assurance from Washington that the US Government would support its application. (426)

According to Qavam's citation, Sadchikov had asserted that the "drawing up of the Seven-Year Plan without consulting USSR was not friendly". (427) However, the Soviet media and the Tudeh press were more critical of the Irano-American relations. In late 1946, a Tudeh paper stated:

"American policy has two aims in Iran: economically, it is aiming at a Petroleum concession which will open the Iranian market to American goods; in this way, America will replace Hitlerite Germany in Reza Shah's last years of rule. Politically, American policy aims at establishing military and air bases in Iran in readiness for an attack on the Soviet Union. (428)

In early 1947, the Soviet press accused the United States of having stationed its troops in Iran. The State Department rushed to deny such an accusation. (429) However, the Soviet war of propaganda was aimed at demoralisation of the Iranians.

Following Truman's statement of 12 March regarding American aid to Turkey and Greece, the Soviet press claimed that a secret accord had been reached between
the Americans and the Turks allowing the annexation of the Turkish-speaking province of Azerbaijan into Turkey. (430)

The visit of an American warship, Hyman, of Abadan on 17 May, became another pretext for Soviet attack on American "expansionism", and "showing flag policy". (431)

In August 1947, Pravda published an article written by E.L. Shteinberg, a professor of oriental studies at the Moscow University, opposing Iran's co-operation with the United States in the region.

According to this article, the American military mission in Iran was "threatening the security of the Soviet Union in exactly the same way as did the presence of German agents in Iran in 1941". The article warned Iran that the Soviet Union could not allow its neighbouring state to become a military base for launching an attack on the USSR. (432)

A surprising view expressed by Shteinberg was against the supply-route which actually had saved Russia in the harsh days of the war.

"the United States constructed railroads, highways and airports in Iran under the pretext of helping the movement of supplies into the Soviet Union; whereas in reality these measures of American imperialism were making Iran a military base against Russia." (433)
In another article, on 9 October, Pravda accused Iran of being turned as an "instrument" of the United States policy. (434)

However, the Soviet accusations and threatenings neither stopped American assistance to Iran, nor changed the Iranian attitude towards the United States. In late 1947, the new Division of Greece, Turkey and Iran (GTI) was established at the State Department as demonstration of further attention to the crisis area, and the three countries under Soviet threat. The Iran specialist, John Jerengan, was appointed as the first Head of GTI. (435)

Despite US refusal to supply Iran with free arms, the US Congress approved a 16 million dollar grant for the shipment of purchased arms to Iran. (436)

From the Iranian point of view, the American assistance became even more vital and indispensable after Soviet threats. This was not a policy drafted by the Government and detached from public opinion. This idea was not even confined to the conservative Iranians who believed the "countries such as Iran and Turkey should stand together in view of their proximity to Russia and mutuality to the Soviet threat". (437) The non-communist opposition and radical reformists had expressed similar views. The most popular Iranian journalist of this time, Mohammad Massoud, wrote on 6 February 1948 that as the result of Russian activities during and after the war,
and their menacing Notes and broadcasts, Iran would turn to the United States.

"We are forced by necessity to purchase arms and ammunitions from the United States, and to get closer to Americans. Because we don't wish to be helpless at a sudden Russian attack." (438)

One week later, Massoud was assassinated by the Tudeh Party's death squad. (439)
CHAPTER FIVE

REJECTION OF SOVIET-IRANIAN OIL AGREEMENT

Following the election for the 15th Majles, Qavam had no longer an excuse for shelving the Soviet-Iranian agreement.

However, Qavam was not in a position to make a decision in favour of the Russians without considering the views of the Shah, the Majles majority, the Americans and the British. The Americans, like the Shah, were against the agreement, while the British had different views. None of the parties had expressed their views frankly until they were forced to. Qavam’s party, DPI, had gained the majority of the Majles; but in Iranian politics, any majority was flexible and prone to break up.

Qavam himself preferred revision of previous accord. However, there were contrasting pressures from the Russians and Americans upon him, and both opposed him in such planning. Despite all his capabilities, the old statesman was unable to save the country, without sacrificing both the Russian concession and his own position.

The Anglo-American diplomatic rallies to influence Iran’s policy on oil accord, had began several months before the inauguration of Majles; and reflected a divergence between the two Western allies from the very
According to his report of 27 April to the Foreign Office, Le Rougetel had advised Qavam that it would be "unwise" to repudiate the Soviet-Iranian oil accord and deny the Russians "legitimate access" to the Iranian oil. He had warned Qavam that unilateral action by Iran might cause "grave danger". (440) In the following days, Allen reported to the State Department that Le Rougetel wanted him to make a similar presentation to Qavam. (441)

However, Allen's own ideas were different. He noted that in the British view, the AIOC concession in southern Iran would be safer after the approval of the Soviet concession; and no Iranian Government in the future would nationalise the oil industry if the Russians had a concession too. (442)

Furthermore, Allen believed that if the United States was to follow the British line, the Iranians would find themselves helpless, and would give in to every Soviet demand thereafter. (443)

Allen was aware that any sort of American advice would have a crucial effect on the Iranian decision; therefore, he used his influence to dissuade Iran from bowing to the Soviet ambitions.

Following a Soviet radio broadcast in late January 1947, which accused the American oil companies of "closing their grip on oil resources of Iran and Saudi Arabia", Allen wrote in a report to the State Department that he
could "easily kill the Soviet Union's chance of getting a concession in Iran". (444)

However, the State Department's policy at this point was non-committal. Such policy was reflected in Acheson's instruction to Allen on 4 April. (445)

Nevertheless, Acheson expressed in the same message that the "prime motivation" of Soviet activities in Iran was "political rather than economic". (446) Acheson's pessimistic evaluations proved that this Cold War warrior, although avoiding an interference, was apparently opposed to the Soviet concession.

"We believe that Iran would be following a most dangerous course if it should grant any mineral concession to any foreign government or company before the political situation in the Near and Middle East is clarified, and before Iran is in a position to arrange for development of its mineral resources under its own unquestioned sovereignty." (447)

However, Qavam sought a formula to prevent Soviet antagonism, as long as he could play for time.

Supposing that the new Majles would not approve the oil accord of 4 April 1946, Qavam consulted Allen about a delay in the inauguration of the Majles. Allen advised Qavam that the Majles should be convened "promptly" as a demonstration of the Government's "adherence to the democratic process". (448) Moreover, the Soviet Union
officials, with a different reason, had warned Iran that procrastination of Qavam in presenting the oil accord to the Majles would offend them.(449) Qavam's other choice was to bring the issue before the Majles, and be prepared for its rejection which could result in confrontation with the Soviets. He wanted the United States to "make a declaration of hostilities against Russia, in case Iran should become the victim of aggression in this matter".(450) However, Qavam had not received such guarantee from the Americans, despite Allen encouraging him to be frank with the Russians.(451) Since procrastination would content neither the Russians nor Americans, Qavam revealed in an interview with the correspondent of Le Monde, on 12 June, that the oil accord needed to be modified before being presented to the Majles.

"The circumstances in which we signed the agreement have indisputably changed. We cannot impose our will on representatives elected by universal suffrage and enjoying full freedom of thought and opinion; for if we did, we should risk seeing the very principle of the agreement rejected by parliament. The two parties (Soviet Union and Iran) must therefore take account of these conditions and find an understanding by which the bill laid before the chamber be
presentable and acceptable to the Majles and public opinion," (452)
Qavam reiterated that the Soviet Union and Iran should agree to change the oil accord, in order to make it acceptable both to the Majles and the public. (453) Whether or not the Russians would agree with negotiations for a modified agreement, Qavam sought a justification for postponement of the agreement's submission to the Majles.
In addition, he considered preparing a counter-proposal against the original oil accord, if the Russians complied with the new negotiation. (454)
To consult them on his plan, Qavam approached the Shah, Allen and Le Rougetel. The Shah did not like Qavam's idea, arguing that the Russians might accept the counter-proposal "in order to get a toe in the door", or holding their concession alive "in order to keep the area from being developed by the Iranians themselves". (455) Le Rougetel thought that Qavam should have a counter-proposal prepared, in case the Soviets accepted his idea for further negotiations. (456) However, Allen believed that Qavam's suggestion would be refused by the Russians; and if not refused, the "end result would be prolonged disturbances between Iran and the USSR over the petroleum question rather than a clear cut decision". (457)
In addition, Allen commented that a Soviet petroleum
concession in northern Iran would be "an entering wedge for increased Soviet activities and demands in Iran". (458)

Qavam later revealed his plan which included: (1) to bring neutral geologists from such countries as Sweden and Holland to find out which areas in northern Iran were likely to hold oil resources; and (2) tell the Soviets that the Majles would not approve a concession covering a large area, and that the new agreement should be confined to the "precise locality where the oil wells would be". (459)

Qavam thought that the proposed geological survey would delay the matter "for perhaps two years". (460)

However, Allen repeated his disagreement with any concession to the Russians "no matter how small the concession area might be". (461)

Allen's assessment was supported by the US Ambassador in Moscow.

On 28 July, Smith advised the State Department that Soviet objectives in Iran would extend beyond the oil concession.

"We should certainly not encourage it on the mistaken notion (that) the Kremlin will thus be quietly satisfied. In organisms of this kind both appetite and capacity grow with eating." (462)

Marshall endorsed the assertion of Allen. He saw that Qavam's counter-proposal would constitute
"recognition of a special interest of a single foreign power in a given area (of a) supposedly sovereign nation". (463)

In addition, Marshall speculated that the Soviets would seize the opportunity of negotiation to their own objectives.

"The Soviets may wish (to) prolong negotiations for the purpose (of) focusing world opinion upon Soviet exclusion from (the) Middle East concessions, and pressing for a friendly government in the face of apparent Iranian refusal.″ (464)

Qavam’s challenge between opposing British and American conceptions had certainly a reflection in the Soviet Government either through Iran’s dissenting Ambassador Firouz, or the British diplomatic representation. According to the British Ambassador in Moscow, Sir Maurice Peterson, the Soviet authorities had told Firouz that the Iranian Government would be "wiser" to follow the British lead rather than that of the Americans. (465)

Furthermore, Firouz cited, in a report to Qavam in July, of intimidation from Molotov, to the effect that the rejection of the Soviet oil proposal might put an end to Iran’s independence. (466)

There was evidence that Qavam had threatened to resign before a direct confrontation with the Soviet Ambassador, losing his own credibility with the
Russians. He predicted in an interview with Allen that the Soviet characterisation of him would soon change from the "wisest statesman of the Middle East", a term used by Radio Moscow in April 1946, to the "worst Fascist in the world". (467)

In the meantime, the Shah was tempted to dismiss Qavam, since after the convening of the Majles, the fate of the government would be out of his hands. (468) He was also suspicious that the Majles might keep Qavam in office until finding a solution for the complex Iranian dilemma. (469)

However, neither the British nor the Americans wanted Qavam to go. Le Rougetel saw that Qavam's resignation would imply Iran's refusal of responsibility while an agreement was at issue. (470)

After two months stay in Moscow, Sadchikov returned to Tehran on 10 August, and called on Qavam on 12 August to convey to him a message from the Soviet Government. Sadchikov told Qavam that the Soviet Government had decided that the agreement "should stand as originally signed", and that the Majles would ratify it. (471) He also handed Qavam a text of the original agreement, and stated that following the ratification of the agreement by the Majles, a detailed convention would be drawn up within three months. (472) Sadchikov added that the Soviet Government would judge from the response of the Iranian Government and the Majles to this agreement whether or not Iran wished to have friendly relations
with the Soviet Union. (473)
Qavam responded that if the Soviet position was
irrevocable, he would have no choice but to present the
Soviet proposal to the Majles, in spite of his own
belief that it would be rejected.
At this point, Sadchikov stated that if the agreement
was rejected, the "Soviet Government would immediately
demand an oil concession in northern Iran on the same
terms of the British concession in the south". (474)
Qavam briefed Sadchikov saying that the British
concession had been granted in 1901, under an absolute
monarch and was reviewed in 1933, by a Majles which was
the rubber-stamp of Reza Shah. Qavam emphasised that he
could not force the Majles to ratify the granting of a
concession to the Russians. However, Sadchikov showed
dissatisfaction with Qavam's explanation. (475)
TASS issued a carefully-worded statement on Sadchikov's
presentation, excluding Qavam's response.

"On 12 August, the Soviet Ambassador in Iran,
Mr. Ivan Sadchikov, visited the Prime
Minister Qavam and handed him a draft treaty
on the organisation of a mixed Soviet-Iranian
oil Company in accordance with the Soviet-
Iranian agreement of 4 April 1946.
After agreement with the text and signature
of the treaty, the Iranian Government has to
present the treaty as provided in agreement
for approval by the Majles. (476)

In view of Qavam's conversation with Sadchikov, Allen expressed confidence that the Soviets had realised the impossibility of obtaining an oil concession; and that by insisting on the original agreement, the Russians had made the situation much easier for Iran. Allen assured Qavam that the Soviet Government was "manoeuvring to save face and to obtain as much propaganda value as possible". (477)

However, the American Ambassador in Moscow had expressed a different view. Smith commented that the Soviet undertaking was not merely "diplomatic blundering", but representing their "strong position" before the world opinion. He predicted that the Russians might exploit the situation "either in direction of gaining advantageous concession for themselves in northern Iran or of seriously weakening the British position in the south". (478)

The tense relations between Qavam and Sadchikov continued after the latter's presentation on 12 August. Qavam kept Allen informed that Sadchikov had telephoned him twice on 14 August, "in a petulant and peremptory mood", to ask why Qavam had not sent someone to the Soviet Embassy to sign the new draft of the oil agreement, or why Qavam was using delaying tactics against the Soviet proposal. (479)

On 20 August, Sadchikov called on Qavam, and pressed him for a joint signature of the new draft which was a new
version of the Qavam-Sadchikov accord of 4 April 1946. Qavam offered as excuse that he constitutionally could not sign an agreement until his Cabinet had received a vote of confidence from the Majles.\(^{(480)}\)

On 21 August, Sadchikov sent a message to Qavam to the effect that the latter's "vacillation and evasiveness" was "jeopardising the independence of his country".\(^{(481)}\)

Then Qavam absented himself from his office for several days, for health reasons.\(^{(482)}\)

However, Qavam sent his assistant, Ezaz Nikpay, to Allen, requesting further assurances that Iran would not be left alone.

Allen commented that Qavam as a "patriot" should not be frightened of doing his "duties to his country." He further expressed confidence that the Iranians would not be frightened by Soviet "threatening and bullying", a tactic which failed when the Soviets demanded bases from Turkey in the Dardanelles\(^{(483)}\) Simultaneously, the State Department recommended that Qavam should "not permit himself to succumb to the external pressure but should consider the national interests of Iran".\(^{(484)}\)

This message added that Iran should not "lose confidence in the determination of US and other members of the UN to continue to support the principles of the UN Charter".\(^{(485)}\)

When the new Majles held a quorum in late August, Qavam resigned according to the constitutional procedure, but
was renominated by the Majles. However, he did not introduce a new Cabinet until 11 September. (486)

On 28 August, Sadchikov called on Qavam and handed him a Note in which the viewpoints of the Soviet Government had been expressed. Within this Note, Qavam's refusal to sign the new draft, proposed by the Soviet Government, was regarded as an "indication of the Iranian Government's intention to break the agreement signed on 4 April 1946 by Qavam as head of the Government, and approved by the Shah as head of State". However, according to the Soviet view, the Iranian Government was "bound to obtain the approval of the Majles and to put its provision into action". (487) The Note also rejected Qavam's justification to the effect that the situation had changed since the signature of the original agreement; and accused Qavam of the "same enmity towards the USSR carried out by Reza Shah, and the Governments of Saed, Sadr, and Hakimi". (488) In addition, Sadchikov notified Qavam that if the Majles' approval was obtained for the agreement, Qavam would be considered "among the (Soviet's) most sincere friends and would be helped financially, morally and in every other respect", and if it was refused, Qavam and the Iranians would be regarded as the Soviet Union's "blood enemy and treated as such". (489)

On 15 September, Sadchikov handed Qavam another Note, urging him to abandon "delaying tactics" and take swift action for the approval of the Soviet-Iranian oil
agreement by the Majles. In the meantime, the Soviet media launched a war of propaganda against Iran with many abuses and misrepresentations against the Shah and Qavam.

Further to violent attacks on the Iranian Government, the Soviets recoursed to other measures of intimidation such as military warning. Towards the end of September, news reached Tehran of Soviet troop concentration near the Iranian frontiers in Azerbaijan and Khorasan. In his conversation with Allen on 2 October, Qavam feared that if the oil bill was refused the Soviets might attack Iran. Qavam thought that the Russians would first send "irregular bands" into Iran to create disturbances in bordering areas, and then would follow them with troops under the pretext of maintaining Soviet security, and citing the Article 6 of Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921. Qavam was even suspicious of a Soviet-inspired coup d'état, which would appear as a "spontaneous act of Iranian people", and would enable the Soviets to gain control of all Iranian territory. Nevertheless, Allen believed that the Soviet military activities in the vicinity of the Iranian borders were "merely to impress the Iranians with fear of invasion if the oil proposals were refused". However, the State Department itself was apprehensive of possible Soviet reactions against Iran such as "Greek-
type guerrilla warfare..... involving Barzansis, Mohajers and other Soviet Caucasian elements", or inspiring disturbances in Iranian cities in order to accuse the Iranian Government of a "reign of terror", and divest Iran's military forces from border areas.(495)
Besides his tireless efforts in heartening Qavam, Allen had a great deal of problems with various British anxieties and statements.
The British were anxious that if the Soviet concession was refused, one Soviet reaction could be sabotage against the British oil interest in Iran. Therefore, they intended to prevent the Soviet accusation that the British, with their undeniable influence, had obstructed the granting of north oil concession to the Russians.(496)
The British also predicted that a humiliated Soviet Government might occupy Iran or sponsor a coup, which in both events would put an end to the British concession in southern Iran.(497)
Furthermore, the British were nervous of the Iranian conclusion that if they could undermine their agreement with the Russians, the same could be done with the British agreement. Thus, in the British evaluation, the events were leading towards the elimination of both Russian and British concessions.(498) However, the British statements wavered between sympathising with American views on the one hand, and recommending Iran to conciliate the Russians on the other. The Anglo-
American argument on this issue continued in Tehran, London and Washington, until the decision of Majles put an end to the question.

On 5 August, Le Rougetel, told Allen that the British "oil men" favoured some kind of Soviet oil concession in northern Iran; but he himself was confident that if such a concession were granted, nothing could stop the "dangerous" Soviet activities in Iran. (499) It was perhaps unrelated to Le Rougetel's view that two weeks later Allen expressed his view in support of the British interest in Iran.

When the Shah asked Allen on 19 August about the possibility of putting all Iranian oil developments, including the British area, "under some kind of international participation or supervision", Allen responded that the British had "a valid and legal concession", and that the United States could not "support a move to abrogate a legal right of this kind". (500)

Allen added in his report to Washington that Le Rougetel was worried of expected attempts against the British concession and that the British "counted heavily" on American support in this matter. (501)

At the enquiry of the Iranian Ambassador in London concerning the support Iran might expect from the United Kingdom if the Soviets resorted to aggression against Iran, Bevin referred to British support of Iran in the
past, and recommended Iran's appeal to the Security Council if it was seriously endangered. However, Bevin advised that "Iran should meticulously live up to any undertaking given to the Soviet Union". (502)

According to Le Rougetel's information, Bevin had stated that the "Iranian Government would do well to announce (that) it was prepared to carry out its undertaking and to negotiate the oil concession agreement on terms acceptable (to) both parties". (503) However, Bevin's statement was not appreciated in Washington. The Acting Secretary Lovette told the British Minister in Washington that in the American Government's understanding, the Iranian Government had entered no commitment with the Soviet Union Government (to) grant oil concession. (504)

During the first week of September, Le Rougetel made presentations to the Shah and Qavam, to express the British view, before Iran had made its decision. The British Government advised that if the Majles refused to ratify the agreement of 1946, the refusal should be done in such a way that the door remain open for further negotiations. (505)

On Bevin's instruction, Le Rougetel repeated the British recommendation in a Note addressed to Qavam:

".... The Persian Government should not give a blank refusal and leave the matter at that. If they could not accept the Soviet draft treaty - because it was based on a
provisional agreement made at a time of acute pressure and because it was put forward as a demand - they might leave opportunity for revised and fairer terms to be presented."(506)

What had been overlooked in the British Note, was that Qavam had already offered further negotiations for a modified agreement and the Russians had refused it. One may also surmise that by pressing Iran to negotiate, Bevin intended to induce the Russians to change their obstinate position.

However, the American and British documents guide us to the prevalence of a commitment of Bevin in favour of the Russians.

Following an interview with Le Rougetel, Allen reported to Washington on 5 September:

"It is now evident to me (this is in strictest confidence) that Bevin has wanted to tell the Iranians flatly that (the) British Government thought Iran should ratify the April 1946 agreement without change.

...... Bevin not only retains his hope that Iran and the USSR will enter an oil agreement, but also that Britain should use its efforts to bring this about:μ(507)

Allen's finding was true. It was not a secret to the American Government that Bevin had given a commitment to
Stalin, in March 1947, to support the Soviet proposals for oil in Iran. The Secretary of State, George Marshall, who was also present in Moscow in March 1947, at the Council of Foreign Ministers, had been informed of this matter by Bevin, following the latter's commitment to Stalin. Bevin tried hard to do something for the Soviet oil concession in Iran. However, his major problem seemed to be not only Iranian, but American defiance.

In an interview with the head of NEA, Loy Henderson, on 9 September 1947, Bevin stated that Britain would be relieved to see the Iranians grant some kind of oil concession to the Russians, and that he wanted the United States to understand the UK's position. Bevin thought that Iran's refusal would be blamed on the Western powers and would increase the "tension" between the Soviet Union and the West. Bevin also mentioned that Iran's refusal would render his own "internal position" more difficult.

On 12 September, the Foreign Office spokesman confirmed that the British Government had no objection in principle to the granting of an Iranian oil concession to the Soviet Union, provided it was "freely negotiated by the Persians themselves."

On 15 September, the British Ambassador in Washington, Lord Inverchapel, called on Lovette at the State Department for another attempt to persuade the Americans, and express the British anxiety of a
probable Soviet "drastic action" against Iran.

According to Lovette, Inverchapel asked him "whether or not Iran would be better off by giving Russia a concession in the north". (513)

However, in the Americans' view, a Russian oil concession in northern Iran was the "equivalent of ceding the territory to Russia". (514)

Lovette disagreed with the British Ambassador's suggestion, and uttered:

"The problem........is whether or not Russia should be permitted to take the north by intimidation, or whether the Iranians should make her fight for it and thereby label her as an aggressor." (515)

Finally, Inverchapel admitted that the United States had a "somewhat freer choice in the decision than Britain", because it was not "in Iran with an oil concession". (516)

In the course of British efforts, the Americans suspected that London was not really concerned to reduce the tension, but intended to placate the Russians at the expense of Iran. Therefore, they tried to test the British Government's sincerity by a different suggestion.

In December 1946, the AIOC had signed an agreement with two leading American oil companies whereby it allocated 20 percent of its output available to them for a period
of 20 years. (517) With reference to this contract, an American official suggested in September 1947 that the AIOC could also make the oil available to the Russians. In this way, the British could reduce the Russians' feeling of discrimination. The American proposal was rejected by the British who stated that the AIOC had no surplus oil. (518)

The British diplomatic persuasion was perceived by both the Shah and Qavam as the "weakened British position" in the face of the Soviet threat. (519) The demoralising effect of this policy on Iranian leaders upset Allen who had hardly done much to hearten them.

On 9 September, Allen reported to the State Department about the new atmosphere of Tehran politics; and how the situation had deteriorated, since the British advice.

"The Shah seems resigned to (the) inevitability of the Government making an oil proposal to the USSR in view of (the) British advice. He referred to considerable British influence in (the) Majles. " (520)

Qavam was not less apprehensive. He told Allen that "if deputies felt events were running towards renewed Soviet influence in Iran, they would change their views over night and would hurry to make their peace with the Soviets". (521)

The leakage of news about Le Rougetel's presentations and British views, provoked the Iranian public and press.
On 10 September, Tehran's leading daily, Ettlaat, gave an account of Le Rougetel's advice to Qavam and suggested that a secret agreement was underway between Britain and Russia to define their spheres of influence in Iran. The paper reflected Iranians' suspicion of the revival of the notorious and bitterly resented Treaty of 1907, under which the Russian and British Empires had divided Iran into their zones of influence. (522)
The British, who were uneasy of Allen's activities in frustrating their plans, alleged that the American Ambassador and his staff had contributed to the rumour. (523)
In reaction, Le Rougetel argued that he had put no pressure on Qavam; and that his version was liable to misinterpretation. (524)
He added that in any circumstances the United Kingdom would be ready to support Iran. (525)
Subsequently, Qavam interfered to reduce public tension, and discounted the story of a secret agreement between Britain and Russia over Iran. (526)
At this juncture, Allen played his last card against the Soviet concession. His encouraging speech on 11 September, at the Iran-America Society in Tehran, was one of the important factors which strengthened the Iranian position vis-a-vis the Soviets and the British. Allen Stated:

".... The American Government has frequently
made known its respect for Iran's sovereignty. An important aspect of the sovereignty is the full right of any country to accept or reject proposals for the development of its resources. Iran's resources belong to Iran. Iran can give them away free of charge, or refuse to dispose of them at any price, if it so desires. The United States has no proper concern with proposals of commercial or any other nature made to Iran by any foreign government, as long as those proposals are advanced solely on their merits, to stand or fail on their value to Iran. However, we and every other nation of the world do become concerned when such proposals are accompanied by threats of bitter enmity or by statements that it would be dangerous for Iran to refuse. The United States is firm in its conviction that any proposals made by one sovereign government to another should not be accompanied by threats or intimidation. When such methods are used in an effort to gain acceptance, doubt is cast on the value of the proposals themselves. Our determination to follow this policy as regards Iran is as strong as anywhere else in
the world. This purpose can be achieved to the extent that the Iranian people show a determination to defend their own sovereignty.
Patriot Iranians, when considering matters effecting their national interest, may therefore rest assured that the American people will support fully their freedom to make their own choice. (527)

Encountering open opposition to his policy, Bevin recalled Le Rougetel a week after Allen's speech, and kept him in London until the beginning of November. (528) Three different points could be made on Bevin's objectives. Firstly, Bevin wanted to stop every possible attempt in defeating the Russian concession. He was consistent in his commitment to Stalin by which Prime Minister Attlee had also pressed him to stand. (529) There is evidence in the American documents that Le Rougetel and some of Bevin's advisors at the Foreign Office disagreed with his insistence upon the acceptability of the Russian proposals. (530) Bevin's under-Secretary, William Strang, later praised Iran for not giving way to Soviet demands for oil. Strang commented that "once the Russians were admitted into the country they would disrupt it". (531) Secondly, Bevin intended to deny the Iranians the same assurance which the American Ambassador had given them. (532) Thirdly,
Bevin could have reduced the Soviet suspicion of Anglo-American complicity in Tehran, and of influencing the pro-British deputies, when the oil agreement was rejected.

However, following Allen's statement, the atmosphere in the Iranian press, and in the Majles, became more hostile towards the Soviet oil agreement. A British report of 1 October 1947, reflected the situation as follows:

"The wave of defeatism which was threatened recently seems to have passed, and the Persian people are now unusually united on the oil question." (533)

One of Allen's reports to Washington deliberated the same fervour.

"Iranian people of all classes have been unified on this point more strongly than any subject....The Soviets have certainly solidified opinions against them in Iran.... (and) in pushing Iran definitely into the anti-Soviet camp." (534)

With the same enthusiasm, the Iranian press offered proposals regarding future oil developments. Some papers wrote that Iran might invite international contribution to its oil development, as it had few financial and material resources of its own. However, they suggested that Iran should have the majority of stocks and no foreign country more than 15 percent in
such a joint venture. They commented that all other forms of agreement would entail at least an indirect interference in the internal affairs of Iran by the foreign associates. However, many other papers commented that Iran should develop its mineral resources independently, and urged the formation of a 100 percent Iranian oil concern. In the Majles a number of deputies made statements not only against the Soviet concession, but also against the British oil holdings in Iran. Referring to the Soviet-Iranian accord of April 1946, one of the deputies condemned Qavam for the signature of the "worst agreement in the past hundred years of Iranian history". One other deputy attacked both the proposed Russian concession and the existing British one. Most deputies demanded that a wholly Iranian oil company be formed to exploit Iran's oil resources.

In the meantime, the Government spokesman joined the anti-concession rally.
Within two radio broadcasts on 28 September and 8 October, the Assistant to the Prime Minister and Director of Propaganda, Ebrahim Khajeh-Nouri, expressed his "personal" views about the controversial question of oil.
In his first speech, he stated that Iranians were reluctant to offer an oil concession to the Soviet Union because they did not wish to offend the United States.
He referred to the events of 1943-4 when American companies had approached Iran.\(^{(540)}\)

In the second speech, Khajeh-Nouri commented that in view of the Iranian public opinion and attitude of deputies, the approval of the Soviet concession was "very unlikely".\(^{(541)}\) He also expressed that the American "disinterest" in Iranian oil at this time was "regretted by Iranians who admired the progressive and serious-minded American people".\(^{(542)}\)

Recalling the old game of Iranian politics - to use one power against another- Allen commented:

"By this tactic, the Iranians hope to be able to refuse the Soviet proposals and, at the same time, shift (the) responsibility to our shoulders for their having done so."\(^{(543)}\)

In late September, the Government spokesman announced that the Prime Minister would present a report to the Majles on the oil question, and leave the deputies free to take whatever decision they thought fit.\(^{(544)}\)

Qavam’s willingness to minimise his own role, and leave the decision to the Majles, showed a disregard for the Soviet suggestion.

A Tudeh paper alleged that the submission of a report by Qavam without recommendation was contrary to the promise given in his letter of 4 April 1946 to the Russians.\(^{(545)}\) Moreover, Qavam’s opponents in the Majles had maintained that a report was inadequate, and that Qavam should accept or reject his accords of 4
April 1946 with Sadchikov. (546)

By exploiting the unpopularity of the oil bill, the opposition sought to defeat both the Government and the bill. At the height of anti-concession fervour, the Soviet Embassy in Tehran addressed a statement to the press, on 22 September, to explain the advantages of the Soviet proposed oil agreement to Iran. It claimed that what the Soviets sought was not a concession but a joint oil company in which Iranian representatives would work in perfect equality with the Russians.

The statement added that the joint company would not have its own police force "such as exists in a certain concession in Iran". (547)

It closed with a persuading remark:

"Finally, implementation of this agreement conforms with the principles of strengthening friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Iran." (548)

The reasonable tone of the statement led Allen to comment that if the Russians pursued this line, instead of threatening, they would stand a better chance in obtaining some kind of oil agreement. (549)

On 5 October, Qavam introduced his new Cabinet to the Majles for a vote of confidence, providing that the vote would not imply an approval of the oil bill. The votes in favour were counted 93, to 27. (550) At the same session, Qavam promised to present his report on the oil
question; and expressed hope that if the Majles did not approve his report, the Soviet Government's "friendly attitude" towards Iran would not be affected.(551)

While the refusal of the Soviet oil proposal was definite, the question at issue was Qavam's own fate after rejection. There was controversy in the Majles between the pro-Qavam majority and the minority, comprised of the pro-Shah and extreme right elements, over the wording of a rejection bill.

The majority intended to refuse the agreement of 4 April 1946, and, at the same time, approve Qavam's patriotic undertaking.(552) However, the minority thought that Qavam should be prosecuted for his violation of the Prohibition Law of 2 December 1944, and illegal negotiation with the Russians. They wanted the Majles to refer the case to the competent court.(553)

Furthermore, some enthusiastic nationalists in Qavam's camp wanted to set up a balanced policy, and take action against the British and American concerns when refusing the Soviet one. A young deputy, Hassan Arsanjani, proposed a draft, concerning the nullification of the Qavam-Sadchikov oil accord of 4 April 1946, which included the following points:

"The British oil concession in the south would be re-negotiated to obtain better terms for Iran.

Action would be taken to re-assert the Iranian sovereignty over Bahrain, and
cancellation of the existing oil concession
there.\(554\)

It should be mentioned that Iran had a long standing territorial claim over Bahrain. Furthermore, the concession of oil exploration in Bahrain was held by the BABCO comprised of two American companies, Standard Oil of California and Texaco.\(555\)

Finally, both the majority and the minority of the Majles reached an understanding to the effect that: (1) neither to praise nor prosecute Qavam; (2) to refuse the Soviet proposal; and (3) to ask for a better term from the AIOC.\(556\)

On 22 October, Qavam made a long presentation at the Majles about the origins of the oil accord of 1946, including his negotiations with Stalin and Molotov, in Moscow, and the solution he had sought for the problem of Azerbaijan. Qavam admitted that the oil agreement had been extracted from him under great pressure; however, "it was a governmental not a personal decision". He emphasised that he could not, therefore, "undertake personal responsibility for it".\(557\)

Qavam uttered that what he had done, was "in the best interest of the country", and that "any other patriot" in his place in those days "would have inevitably agreed to such a suggestion.\(558\) He added:

"In striving to realise my heartfelt desire to liberate my beloved country, I endured
throughout this period all kinds of malicious accusations, pressures and difficulties at home and abroad.\textsuperscript{v}(559)

Following this address, Qavam presented the letters exchanged between him and Sadchikov on 4 April 1946, regarding the Soviet oil proposal, without any recommendation, for the decision of Majles. However, Qavam made a final plea, to prevent a hasty action by the Majles. He advised that if the Majles wished to reject the exchange of letters, it should do so in a manner which would not close the door against further negotiations between Iran and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{(560)}

Nevertheless, in spite of Qavam's advice, the majority voted for a decision in the very same session, under a double-priority, and without reference of the case to a parliamentary standing committee.\textsuperscript{(561)}

At this point, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Professor Reza Zadeh Shafaq, who was also a member of Qavam's mission to Moscow in 1946, proposed a five-article draft resolution. This draft, in refusal of the Soviet proposal, was passed by 102 votes against 2.\textsuperscript{(562)}

The Rejection Law which put an end to the Soviet oil aspiration in Iran, reads as follows:

"1. Whereas the Prime Minister, in good faith and in accordance with his interpretation of Article 2 of the Law of 2 December 1944, entered into conversations and
proceeded to the drafting of the Agreement of 4 April 1946, regarding the establishment of a joint Irano-Soviet Oil Company and whereas the Majles does not consider these actions to be in conformity with the actual intent of the above-mentioned Law, therefore the Majles considers the above-mentioned conversations and agreement to be null and void. Article 3 of the Proclamation of 5 April 1946 is also declared null and void by the Majles.

2. The Government is directed to provide scientific and technical means of exploration for the purpose of discovering oil deposits and to prepare, within a period of five years, complete and comprehensive scientific and technical plans and charts of oil-bearing regions of Iran so that the Majles, thus informed on the existence of oil in adequate quantities, will be able to take measures for the commercial exploitation of this national wealth by enacting appropriate legislation.

3. The grant of any concession to foreigners for the purpose of extracting petroleum or any derivative as well as the establishment for this purpose of any company in which foreigners have any interest whatsoever, are
absolutely forbidden.

4. If, following the technical exploration mentioned in paragraph 2 above, it should become established with certainty that petroleum exists in the northern regions of Iran in quantities suitable for commercial exploitation, the Government is authorised to enter into negotiations with the Government of the USSR with a view to selling such petroleum (and) the results of such negotiations shall be reported to the Majles.

5. In all instances wherein the rights of the Iranian people in the economic wealth of the country have been infringed—whether in the matter of subsoil resources, or otherwise, and especially with regard to the southern oil concession— the Government is directed to enter into negotiations and to take appropriate action toward the re-establishment of these rights, informing the Majles of the results obtained."

The Rejection Law pleased the Americans, angered the Russians and worried the British. Allen jubilantly reported the "highly gratifying "action of the Majles, and advised his Government to seize this opportunity:

"I strongly recommend that we take this occasion, following Iran's clear action in
resisting Soviet pressure on oil, to show that we support nations which take resolute actions to defend their own independence. *(564)*

Allen also reported that the omission of any reference to Bahrain from the draft resolution was the result of his own notifications.

"We have frequently emphasised to the Iranians that the American people were opposed to any aggressive designs, whether by the USSR against Azerbaijan or by Iran against Kuwait and Bahrain. *(565)*

However, the attention given to the southern oil question did not bother the influential American Ambassador in any way. The Leftist press of Iran suspected that Allen had already been consulted about this matter. *(566)*

The British were unhappy about the reference to the "southern oil concession" in the Rejection Law, but not shocked. They had expected eventual Iranian pressure for a revision in the AIOC concession in favour of Iran. Qavam had approached the British Government and the AIOC in May 1947, in order to negotiate the increase of Iran's royalty. The AIOC was not unwilling to satisfy Iran. However, it wanted the Iranian Government, in return, to extend the AIOC area of concession. *(567)*

Following the Rejection Law, the Iranian Government paid
further attention to the new developments in the oil producing countries, i.e. the nationalisation of the oil industry in Mexico; and the sharing system in Venezuela where the American companies were paying the government a royalty and an income tax before the deduction of the United States income tax.(568)

Nevertheless, Qavam tried to persuade the British Government of his good intention, and that he had done his best to remove the name of the AIOC from the draft resolution.(569) What had distressed London at this time, was the stirring up of anti-British feeling in Iran. The British argued that they had supported Iran’s independence in the past, and that the Iranian policy of "bogus balance" between the UK and the USSR was unjust.(570)

Thus, The Times, in a leading article voiced against "parallel" between the British and the Russian concessions.

"The British concessions are remote from the capital and are located in provinces and among people too primitive to constitute any danger to Persian autonomy. The northern provinces, on the other hand, control the political as well as the economic balance of the whole country; and any extension of foreign influence in this region might easily encourage separatist movements directed against the Tehran Government.\(^{(571)}\)"
However, the Soviet reaction against the Rejection Law was an intensified campaign against Qavam and the Majles.

The Soviet media commented that the rejection of the oil agreement was engineered by Americans and in the interest of the United States. They also asserted that Qavam’s report to the Majles was in favour of the American and British oil companies, but contrary to his own commitment to the Soviet Union. They stressed that Qavam could easily have prevented the rejection of the Soviet proposal if he had so desired. They condemned Qavam as the "lackey of the dollar", who had prepared a victory for the "dollar imperialism".

The Majles was also accused by the Soviet press, of taking an anti-Soviet character "under pressure from the United States", and of purposing "to please its American and British protectors". In the Soviet press, the deputies were called "puppets" who had received their instruction for the rejection of Soviet oil agreement from George Allen.

In Iran, the Tudeh press joined the anti-Majles campaign. They asserted that the Rejection Law had been dictated by the American Embassy, which intended to kill the Soviet chance and alarm America’s rival, Britain.

On 27 October, the Soviet Ambassador refused to attend the Shah’s birthday ceremony at the Palace; and no
Iranian official was invited on 7 November to the celebration of the October revolution at the Soviet Embassy. However, the official Soviet response to the Rejection Law appeared on 25 November, when Sadchikov addressed a Note of protest to Qavam.

The Note indicated that the Soviet-Iranian oil agreement was signed by the Prime Minister and approved by the Shah "in a special declaration made to Ambassador Sadchikov on 8 April 1946". It maintained that the Iranian Government had "treacherously" violated its undertaking on three points: Firstly, refusing to conclude a treaty for the creation of a joint Soviet-Iranian oil company; secondly, submitting the agreement to the Majles one year after the expiry of the period fixed for such action; and thirdly, denying its support for the ratification by the Majles of a treaty on the creation of a joint Soviet-Iranian oil company, and acting in the Majles against the conclusion of such treaty. The Note complained that Russia had not been treated as an equal foreign power in Iran.

"The Soviet Government moreover, cannot ignore the fact that the decision of the Majles in nullifying the agreement for the creation of the joint Irano-Soviet petroleum company for northern Iran at the same time that the British petroleum concession in the south is maintained, represents an act of categoric discrimination against the
It concluded that the rejection of the oil agreement by the Majles was "incompatible with normal relations between the two countries"; and that Iran should be "responsible for the consequences".

At this point, the question of Soviet oil concession ended, even for the Soviets. However, Soviet intimidation and bullying continued.

On 31 January 1948, the Soviet Government accused Iran of lending itself to American plans for converting Iran into a military base for the United States. It warned Iran that the "existing abnormal situation" was incompatible with the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921.

In April 1948, the Russians curtailed their shipping line in the Caspian Sea and began to dismantle the harbour installations at Iran's port Pahlavi.

Since the beginning of 1948, Moscow had instituted a boycott on trade with Iran, intending to impose economic hardship on Iranians and hamper Iran's development programs. Trading with Russia, which had composed 24 percent of Iran's total foreign trade in 1945-1946, dropped to less than one percent in 1947-1948.

The question of Soviet debt to Iran—eleven tons of gold and eight million US dollars—which had been raised by Qavam, remained unnoticed by Moscow.

Nevertheless Soviet retaliation did not go beyond the
war of Propaganda, and the said economic sanctions.
The only result of the Soviet campaign was furthering
Iranian suspicion of Soviet intentions, and
consolidation of Iran’s nationalist movement.
When the oil episode ended, the strongman of Iranian
politics lost his indispensability. Despite having
been cleared of guilt, Qavam had little chance to remain in office. He had felt even before the
inauguration of Majles, that many DPI deputies who had been elected by his support, would soon turn against
him. (586)
Following the Rejection Law, a rush of resignations prevailed in Qavam’s party. The intrigues of the Court and the army were behind the desertions. (587)
At one instance, the speaker of the Majles, Hekmat, and forty deputies resigned from the DPI and undermined the Prime Minister’s majority. Hekmat was reportedly bribed by the Court, with a royal commitment that he himself would succeed Qavam. (588)
Those who remained loyal to Qavam were cautioned. On 3 December the majority of Majles refused the credential of Arsanjani who had been elected by Qavam’s interference from a northern city and had recently spoken against the AIOC, and the British domination on Bahrain. (589)
The Majles even refused Qavam an opportunity to present his programs. He demanded a secret session of the Majles to be held on 1 December, but failed to obtain a
Subsequently, Qavam resorted to a direct approach to the nation which had been filled with patriotic emotions.

In a radio broadcast on 1 December, Qavam attempted not only to satisfy the Iranian nationalists, but also to mollify the Soviets by appearing to be even-handed in dealing with foreign powers. He warned that Iran should remain neutral between the Great Power blocs.

Qavam declared Bahrain "an inseparable part of Iran", and promised to follow up the Iranian demand for a revision in the AIOC concession.

On 2 December the members of Qavam's Cabinet, who had not been consulted on his statement, resigned in protest. Such a collective action by the Ministers against Qavam was reportedly taken under the Shah's instruction. The strength of opposition, backed by the Shah, obstructed Qavam in forming a new Cabinet. On 10 December, Qavam resigned when the Majles gave him a vote of no-confidence.

Following the fall of Qavam, Hekmat was appointed Prime Minister, but failed to form a Cabinet. Finally on 22 December, Qavam's predecessor, the old courtier, Hakimi, was chosen Prime Minister by 54 votes in the Majles. The nationalist Mossadeg had gained 53.

As the concluding word, it should be emphasised that the Rejection Law was a true demonstration of the Iranian
resistance, and a beginning of the movement for the nationalisation of oil in Iran. A British historian outlined the conjunction of this movement and Qavam's decline as follows:

"Now that the days of war and occupation were safely behind, Persians felt that they could once more assert their dignity and stand up for their rights. Qavam was no longer to be representative of this new spirit in Persia." (598)
NOTES AND REFERENCES


3] Ibid., PP.,389-390.


9] See Section Three, Chapter 2, Part B


14] Cited in Rubin, The Great Powers in the Middle East, P.179

15] FO.371/ 52679E6009/5/34-6

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16] WPIS, No.355 - 14 August 1944.
20] Ibid.
21] Ibid.
22] Ibid.
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25] Ibid.
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28] Ibid.
29] Ibid.
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34] FO.371/52680E8108/5/34-30 August 1946.
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36] Ibid.
38] Kirk, Ibid., P.77.
40] WPIS, No.360-18 September 1946.
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CONCLUSION

During the first decade of the 20th Century, Russia and Britain tightened their domination over Iran, which was nominally an independent country. In 1907, Iran was divided into Russian and British spheres of influence, without Iran itself being consulted.

The Russian atrocities in northern Iran, before and during the First World War, were so monstrous that the fall of the Tsarist regime in 1917 was welcomed by the Iranians.

However, while the old Russian regime had pursued an expansionist objective in Iran, the new Communist Government claimed the right to protect its security in this neighbouring country.

Iran came into the security focus of the new Soviet regime when its territory was attacked from Iran by the British forces during the Russian Civil War.

Thus, when the Red Army entered Iran in pursuit of the White insurgents, it stayed there until 1921, when a treaty of friendship was signed between the Soviet and Iranian Governments. In accordance with this treaty, Iran accepted an ambiguous clause which gave the Soviets a conditional, external right over Iranian territory.

However, during the Second World War, the Soviet Union and Great Britain joined together against Iran. In spite of its neutrality, Iran was occupied by Anglo-
Soviet forces in August 1941, almost two months after the German invasion of Russia. The justification given by the Allied powers for their aggression was the insecurity of the south-Iranian oil resources, which were vital to the British war effort, and the need to set up a supply route through Iran to the Soviet Union. However, the most provocative excuse made by Moscow was that Soviet security was endangered by Iran. After nearly two years of Soviet compromise and collaboration with the German Government, Stalin's regime decided that the employment of some German technicians in Iranian industry was harmful to Soviet security. The Soviets emphasised this in the statement of occupation, which also referred to the Soviet rights under the Treaty of 1921.

While the Soviet intervention in Iran was accomplished with British co-operation, the presence of Soviet troops in Iran turned Stalin's attention towards new Soviet objectives in the occupied country.

Thus, despite the calamitous situation of the Russian war-fronts in the Winter of 1941-1942, Stalin rejected a British proposal that he transfer his divisions from Iran to the German-Soviet front. Providing a Soviet contribution to the protection of the supply route had been Stalin's initial objective. However, there is little doubt that his second aim was to use his troops in Iran to obtain economic and
political benefits, when the occasion arose. Thus, a situation which was designed to serve Soviet security needs became a stage of preparation for expansion. The question raised by many Iranians was why the British collaborated with the Russians to invade Iran, and shared their Middle Eastern supremacy with a power they did not trust. The anti-British coup in Iraq, in the Spring of 1941, proved the vulnerability of the British oil interests in the Middle East.

In August 1941, the Germans were close to the Caucasus, and not too far from the Iranian border. Furthermore, in the British view, the Government of Reza Shah was not only unreliable, but sympathetic to the Germans. A British invasion of Iran would have caused suspicion in the Soviet Union, and resentment in the United States. On the other hand, a joint Anglo-Russian action would satisfy both sides. Although the United States was not at war in August 1941, it was concerned to see the survival of Britain and its new ally. Roosevelt did not answer the Shah's pleas after the invasion for almost two weeks; because in his view, the proposed supply route to save Russia was a priority. The stationing of British troops in the south and Russian forces in the north soon divided Iran into two zones.

In spite of the war-time alliance, Russia was concerned to protect its zone of occupation from Anglo-American
penetration. Not only was the authority of the Iranian Government undermined in the Soviet zone, but British and American officials were barred from the area by restrictive measures.

In reality, the occupation of Iran in 1941 restored the Russian supremacy that had prevailed in Iran before the Russian revolution of 1917.

In historical surveys, it is said that Stalin attempted to regain what Russia had seized under the Tsars and lost after the revolution. This situation could apply to a former Russian dependency such as Finland, or to a territory previously under Russian supervision such as northern Iran.

The significance of northern Iran to pre-revolutionary Russia was taken into account by the British Government. Thus, in the early 20th Century, the British oil concessions had excluded the five northern provinces from the British zone of operation.

In addition to Soviet-inspired disorders, the Red Army’s activities in northern Iran led the Iranian and British Governments to commit the Russians to respecting certain principles regarding Iran’s sovereignty. To this end, the Tripartite Treaty was signed in January 1942, which symbolised Iranian resistance in a legalistic way. Hence forward Iran was recognised as a country in alliance, not under occupation.

The oil controversy in 1944 uncovered another aspect of
Stalin's policy in Iran. However the British and American oil companies had preceded the Soviet approach by demanding oil concessions during the war, although their demands had been restricted to parts of southern Iran. The arrival of the Soviet delegation in Iran, in September 1944, with a request for an oil concession in the northern provinces, was a turning point in Soviet-Iranian relations. The Russians had returned to satisfy an ambition which represented both conceptions of security and expansion.

The boundaries of the Soviet oil concession would have been so extended that the Iranian borders with Turkey and Afghanistan would have gone under Soviet control. Iran was therefore suspicious that the Russians were proposing an economic project to cover up their geopolitical aspirations.

A Soviet economic zone in northern Iran would have excluded that whole area from Iranian rule. Moreover, the Russians could have enforced their own security measures with the excuse of protecting their property and investments. Iran had already had distressing experience of foreign concessions, e.g. an existing British concession in the south. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was the dominant power in the southern province of Khuzestan. The AIOC had its own rules in dealing with Iranian workers and the Iranian Government, and administered the oil fields like a British colony.
Given the Iranian experience with the AIOC, any demand for an oil concession sounded alarming to the Iranians. Moreover, in the case of the Soviet concession, Iran's partner would not have been a commercial firm supported by a foreign power, but a foreign power itself. However, Soviet tactics made the situation more complicated. The pro-Soviet elements in Iran, mainly the Tudeh Party, claimed that northern Iran was a Soviet security "perimeter", and that Iran should consent to the Soviet proposal. The way that Soviet soldiers had marched alongside anti-Government demonstrators in Tehran had shown that Soviet military power had to be taken into account. Nevertheless, Iranians stood firm behind the Government, and preferred resistance rather than appeasement. Thus a bill proposed by Mossadeq was passed by the Majles, banning all negotiations over oil concessions.

When their first attempt failed, the Soviets made a new attempt by creating an autonomous state in the Iranian province of Azerbaijan. This project was carried out by a separatist group, under the auspices of the Red Army; and it was the Red Army which forced the Iranian troops assigned to suppress the rebellion to stay outside the territory of the new puppet state.

When the war ended, Stalin refused to withdraw the Russian troops from Iran. He claimed that the Iranians were hostile to the Soviet Union, and would endanger
Soviet security if the troops were evacuated. The security of the Baku oil installations was mentioned as a particular cause of concern. In defence of the rebellion in Azerbaijan, Soviet officials identified it as a "democratic" movement, which had deserved Soviet support in its challenge against the Iranian Government. In addition, pro-Soviet elements maintained that the Iranian Government was being ungrateful to the Soviet Union, who had defeated Germany and, in their opinion, saved Iran's independence. The Iranian Communists even demanded that the Iranian Government, allegedly "reactionary" and "Fascist", be excluded from the United Nations.

In 1945, the Soviet Government used several instruments to obtain the submission of Iran: diplomacy, the Red Army, the autonomous Government of Azerbaijan, the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad, and the Tudeh Party, whose leaders were a mouthpiece of the Soviets in the Majles. The Soviets intended to bring into power a government which would meet their demands, and a suitable politician who would lead such a government according to Soviet directives.

Qavam was chosen as a collaborator; but the Iranians looked at him as a saviour.

Qavam was welcomed in Moscow, where he was put under pressure by Stalin and Molotov to accept three Soviet objectives: the continued presence of Soviet troops in certain parts of Iran, the autonomy of Azerbaijan, and
an oil concession.
Qavam was no appeaser, but he won Soviet confidence. He took several demonstrative actions in the Soviets' favour, in order to secure the evacuation of Soviet Troops and undermine the autonomy of Azerbaijan. He put the alleged anti-Soviet politicians in prison and agreed to negotiate with the rebel leaders in Azerbaijan. Above all, Qavam promised the Russians a joint-stock oil company, but he made it conditional on the approval of the future Majles.
The evacuation of the Soviet troops was the result of Qavam's tactics, and of international pressure on the Soviet Union through the United Nations. Furthermore, cautious Soviet policy would not have risked a possible confrontation with the United States, or let anything interfere with what had been achieved in the Eastern Europe.
Qavam exploited Big Power conflicts to strengthen Iran's position, and to remove the traces of foreign occupation such as the rebel regimes in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. He also suppressed the Tudeh Party, after the dismissal of the Tudeh Ministers from his Cabinet.
By the end of 1946, the Soviet Government had lost its main instruments of influence in Iran. The only one remaining was the Soviet diplomatic mission, which pinned its hopes on Qavam. In the meantime, the Soviet demands were reduced to having a Soviet-Iranian oil
accord approved by the Iranian parliament. Even this would now satisfy Soviet ambitions in Iran. Since the beginning of the oil crisis, the Russians had complained that they were the victims of discrimination in Iran. They wanted to have the same rights as the British, and to obtain an oil concession in the North similar to that of the British in the South.

However, the situation in which Qavam had been forced to sign the oil accord had changed. In October 1947, the Majles rejected the Soviet oil concession that the Prime Minister had negotiated under duress one and a half years earlier.

Thus, the Soviets failed in their attempt to impose their hegemony on a neighbouring country.

Qavam's management of the oil and Azerbaijan crises was flexible. When circumstances were gloomy, Iran resorted to the logic of patience and conciliation; and when they improved, Iran returned to its position of defiance and frankness.

It should be noted that in its resistance to Soviet objectives, Iran did not stand alone. As a small, weak country, Iran had little chance of surviving a confrontation with a great power. Using one great power against another, and appealing to world sympathy through the United Nations, was the successful policy that Iran adopted.

The United States and the United Kingdom supported Iran against Soviet encroachment during and after the war.
The American and British leaders tried in all three Summits to persuade Stalin to give his word to respect Iran's independence and territorial integrity. At the Tehran Summit, Roosevelt initiated the "Declaration Regarding Iran" for this purpose; and at Potsdam, Truman persuaded Stalin to withdraw all of his forces from Tehran, as the first stage of foreign troop evacuation from Iran. In addition, at the Conferences of Foreign Ministers, the American and British Secretaries raised Iran's problems with reference to the presence and activities of Soviet troops. Accordingly, the most brilliant statements in defence of Iran were made by Bevin and Byrnes at the Security Council sessions in London and New York.

However, the prime object of British policy was to keep the Russians from the oil fields in southern Iran.

The British Government opposed Qavam's coalition Government, fearing a take over by a pro-Russian regime and the subsequent termination of the British oil interest in Iran.

Fearing repetition of an Eastern European scenario in Iran, the British resorted to intrigues and conspiracies to avert the danger. They also campaigned against the Tudeh Party, which was responsible for trade unions provocations in the Anglo-Iranian oil company.

However, the British were not opposed to granting a concession to the Russians. This had to be done through
an Anglo-Russian understanding, and restricted to the part of Iran bordering the Soviet Union. Bevin’s recommendation in 1947 that the door should be left open for Soviet-Iranian oil negotiations was of this nature. Moreover, the British advice respecting Iran’s oil accord with Russia had an additional objective. At this time Iranian nationalism, no less dangerous to British interests than Russian penetration, was emerging. The objective was containment of the new movement. The British realised that if Iranians could easily nullify the Soviet concession, they might also revoke the British one.

The dependence of the Iranian economy on oil revenue had guaranteed a degree of control for the British over the Iranian Government. For this reason, Iran remained a special case when Britain invited the United States to take over its responsibilities in the Near East, i.e. in Turkey and Greece. However, the British expected the United States to assist Iran’s armed forces and to support Iran’s development projects, without harming British rights and influence.

From the Iranian point of view, the United States was welcomed, because it did not have a colonial background and because of its military and economic strength. The United States post-war support of Iran in its dispute with the Soviet Union was not without a politico-economic basis.
During the war years, the United States had gradually increased its interest in the Middle East. It was in a dominant position over the oil resources in Saudi Arabia, and looked to Iran as a buffer between its oil interests and the Soviet Union.

Moreover, in 1943-1944 American companies had approached Iran for an oil concession. However, the negotiations had stopped when the Russians joined the contest. Furthermore, the United States had sent military advisers to improve the Iranian armed forces, and allowed American economic experts to administer Iran’s financial organisations.

At the outbreak of the Cold War, Iran’s strategic and economic significance attracted the increased attention of American policy-makers. Iran’s importance became the grounds for American support.

In the early phase, American leaders notified the Russians that they should respect the Allies’ commitment not to interfere in Iran’s internal affairs, and to withdraw their troops from Iran by the Treaty-date. In the second stage, Americans resorted to the United Nations Charter, and exposed the Soviet interference in Iran at the Security Council. Finally, when Communist expansionism began to alarm the West, Iran, like Turkey and Greece, came into the scope of the United States’ national security program.

The Truman Administration had come to the conclusion
that the removal of Soviet influence in Iran should be a component of the United States' global policy. The American Ambassador in Iran, George Allen, intervened twice in 1946 and 1947 to encourage Iranians to reject Soviet demands. Consequently, Iran acted more confidently to re-integrate Azerbaijan and refuse a Soviet oil concession.

The build-up of the Iranian military with American arms, under the supervision of American advisers, was a demonstration of the United States' interest in Iran's security.

The Soviets' direct intimidation and indirect subversion, through the Tudeh Party, pushed Iran towards an alliance with the United States. Iran admired the United States' "containment" policy represented in the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan and Point Four, as barriers against Soviet aggression. Iran also wanted its defence system to become part of the American-inspired "collective security".

Distressed by the past violation of its neutrality, in both World Wars, and by the threat of Soviet aggression in the future, Iran chose to protect itself through alignment with the United States.

At one point, Iran was justifiably suspicious of possible Anglo-Russian compromise against its own interests. Iran was also too weak to challenge both or either of them by itself. The only remaining choice was to invite American assistance as a counter-balance.
It should be noted that even the Iranian nationalists favouring a policy of neutrality looked at the United States with sympathy. In short, the United States achieved in Iran what the Soviet Union had sought. Nevertheless, some historians have judged Stalin's policy towards neighbouring states differently. They assert that Stalin’s post-war policy was defensive, and that his search for security for his country was justifiable. They also maintain that Stalin was seeking an equilibrium between the Great Powers in the post-war era. It was for this reason that Stalin had demanded the re-allocation of colonial territories, the continued stationing of troops abroad and the re-distribution of world resources.

According to these historians, when the Soviet Union found itself excluded from the Anglo-American arrangements, particularly in the "Agreement on Petroleum" of August 1944, it adopted an offensive policy to obtain an oil concession in Iran.

In the analysis of these historians, it was only to the extent that the Western alliance mobilised itself to frustrate the Soviet plans that the Soviet regime toughened its position towards its neighbouring countries and tightened its grip on Eastern Europe.

They also attribute the failure of East-West post-war co-operation, and the division of the world between two hostile camps, to the United States' ambition for
superiority. They emphasise the flexibility of Soviet foreign policy and cite the case of Iran, which the Soviets evacuated. However, the origins of the Cold War, and the responsibility of the individual Great Powers for it, is a controversial issue.

Nevertheless, an impartial analysis would blame the Soviet failure in Iran mainly on the mismanagement of Soviet foreign policy, and the tactics used to pressurize Iran. A great contradiction between the principles and practice of Communism was exposed in Iran when Stalin demanded a concession similar to that of the British, although the British concession had been criticised in the Soviet media as the worst type of capitalist exploitation.

In addition, Stalin's understanding of Soviet security was detrimental to the security of the Soviet Union's neighbours. In his post-war planning, he intended to keep a chain of "friendly" governments around the Soviet Union. He succeeded in setting up such a security zone in Eastern Europe, but failed in Iran.

There was little similarity between Iran and Russia's other neighbours, whose territories had been used by the German army to invade Russia. Stalin could not claim that Iran had been liberated by the Red Army, since Iran's occupation was initiated by the West in order to help Russia. Iran was the only occupied country in which all the Big Three had been present since 1942; in contrast with Eastern Europe where no foreign troops
except Russians appeared after the German departure. While this Soviet advantage in Eastern Europe had guaranteed its freedom of activity, the Red Army was forced to leave Iran only two months after the departure of British troops. Moreover, one may recall that Iran was not part of the war-time deal between Stalin and Churchill when the two defined their zones of interest in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Stalin's failure to impose a pro-Soviet policy on Iran and Turkey left two weak links in the security chain which he had envisaged setting up around the Soviet Union.

After the last Soviet attempt in 1947, both countries were removed from the scope of Soviet interest. However, Soviet relations with its two southern neighbours remained tense until Stalin's death in 1953. As a result of the Soviet Union's hostile policy towards Iran and Turkey during the 1940's, both countries tended towards the western camp. However, Stalin's successors, Malenkov and Khrushchev, renounced the previous Soviet policy in Iran and Turkey. Less than six months after Stalin's death, Malenkov announced that the Soviet Union was prepared to solve its disputes with Iran. Later, Khrushchev admitted that Stalin had made a mistake about Iran for which the post-Stalin leadership was not responsible.
Nevertheless, Khrushchev's assurance was not sufficient to seduce Iran from the Western camp.
Appendix 1

Soviet-Iranian Treaty, 26 February 1921.

ART. I. In order to confirm its declarations regarding Russian policy towards the Persian nation, which formed the subject of correspondence on the 14 January, 1918, and the 26th June, 1919, the R.S.F.S.R. formally affirms once again that it definitely renounces the tyrannical policy carried out by the colonising Governments of Russia which have been overthrown by the will of the workers and peasants of Russia.

Inspired by this principle, and desiring that the Persian people should be happy and independent and should be able to dispose freely of its patrimony, the Russian Republic declares the whole body of treaties and conventions concluded with Persia by the Tsarist Government, which crushed the rights of the Persian people, to be null and void.

II. The R.S.F.S.R. expresses its reprobation of the policy of the Tsarist Government of Russia, which, on the pretext of ensuring the independence of the peoples of Asia, concluded, without the consent of the latter, treaties with European Powers, the sole object of which was to subjugate those people.

This criminal policy, which infringed upon the independence of the countries of Asia and which
made the living nations of the East a prey to the cupidty and the tyranny of European robbers, is abandoned unconditionally by Federal Russia. Federal Russia, therefore, in accordance with the principles laid down in Article I and IV of this Treaty, declares its refusal to participate in any action which might destroy or weaken Persian sovereignty. It regards as null and void the whole body of treaties and conventions concluded by the former Russian Government with third parties in respect of Persia or to the detriment of that country.

III. The two Contracting Powers agree to accept and respect the Russian-Persian frontiers, as drawn by the Frontier Commission in 1881. At the same time, in view of the repugnance which the Russian Federal Government feels to enjoying the fruit of the policy of usurpation of the Tsarist Government, it renounces all claim to the Achouradeh Islands and to the other islands on the Astrabad Littoral, and restores to Persia the village of Firouzeh and the adjacent land ceded to Russia in virtue of the Convention of the 28th May, 1893. The Persian Government agrees for its part that the Russian Sarakhs, or "old" Sarakhs, and the land adjacent to the Sarakhs River, shall be retained by
Russia.
The two High Contracting Parties shall have equal rights of usage over the Atrak River and the other frontier rivers and waterways. In order to solve the question of the waterways and all disputes concerning frontiers or territories, a Commission, composed of Russian and Persian representatives, shall be appointed.

IV. In consideration of the fact that each nation has the right to determine freely its political destiny, each of the two Contracting Parties formally expresses its desire to abstain from any intervention in the internal affairs of the other.

V. The two High Contracting Parties undertake—

1. To prohibit the formation or presence within their respective territories of any organisations or groups of persons irrespective of the name by which they are known, whose object is to engage in acts of hostility against Persia or Russia, or against the allies of Russia. The will likewise prohibit the formation of troops or armies within their respective territories with the aforementioned object.

2. Not to allow a third party or any organisation, whatsoever it be called, which is hostile to the other Contracting Party, to import or to convey in transit across their countries material which can be used against the other Party.
3. To prevent by all means in their power the presence within their territories or within the territories of their allies of all armies or forces of a third party in case in which the presence of such forces would be regarded as a menace to the frontier, interests or safety of the other Contracting Party.

VI. If a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation by means of armed intervention in Persia, or if such power should desire to use Persian territory as a base of operations against Russia, or if a foreign Power should threaten the frontiers of Federal Russia or those of its allies, and if the Persian Government should not be able to put a stop to such menace after having been once called upon to do so by Russia, Russia shall have the right to advance her troops into the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out the military operations necessary for its defence. Russia undertakes, however, to withdraw her troops from Persian territory as soon as the danger had been removed.

VII. The consideration set forth in Article VI have equal weight in the matter of the security of the Caspian Sea. The tow High Contracting Parties therefore have agreed that Federal Russia shall have the right to require the Persian Government to
send away foreign subjects, in the event of their taking advantage of their engagement in the Persian navy to undertake hostile action against Russia.

VIII. Federal Russia finally renounces the economic policy pursued in the East by the Tsarist Government, which consisted in lending money to the Persian Government, not with a view to the economic development of the country, but rather for purposes of political subjugation. Federal Russia accordingly renounces its rights in respect of the loans granted to Persia by the Tsarist Governments. It regards the debts due to it as void, and will not require their repayment. Russia likewise renounces its claims to the resources of Persia which were specified as security for the loans in question.

IX. In view of the declaration by which it has repudiated the colonial and capitalist policy which occasioned so many misfortunes and was the cause of so much bloodshed, Federal Russia abandons the continuation of the economic undertakings of the Tsarist Government, the object of which was the economic subjugation of Persia. Federal Russia therefore cedes to the Persian Government the full ownership of all funds and of all real and other property which the Russian Discount Bank possesses on Persian territory, and likewise transfers to it all the assets and liabilities of that bank. The
Persian Government nevertheless agrees that in the towns where it has been decided that the Russian Socialist Republic may establish consulates, and where buildings exist belonging to the Discount Bank, one of these buildings, to be chosen by the Russian Government, shall be placed at the disposal of the Russian Consulates, free of charge.

X. The Russian Federal Government, having abandoned the colonial policy, which consisted in the construction of roads and telegraph lines more in order to obtain military influence in other countries than for the purpose of developing their civilisations, and being desirous of providing the Persian people with those means of communication indispensable for the independence and development of any nation, and also in order to compensate the Persian people as far as possible for the losses incurred by the sojourn in its territory of the Tsarist armies, cedes free of charge to the Persian Government the following Russian installation:

[a] The high roads from Enzeli to Tehran, and from Kazvin to Hamadan, and all land and installations in connections with these roads.

[b] The railroad Djoulfa-Tauris-Sofian-Urmia, with all installations, rolling-stock and accessories.

[c] The landing-stages, warehouses, steamships, canals, and all means of transport of the Lake of Urmia.
[d] All telegraph and telephone lines established in Persia by the Tsarist Governments, with all movable and immovable installations and dependencies.

[e] The port of Enzeli and the warehouses, with the electrical installations, and other buildings.

XI. In view of the fact that the Treaty of Turkomantchai, concluded on the 10th February, 1828 (old style), between Persia and Russia, which forbids Persia, under the terms of Article 8, to have vessels in the waters of the Caspian Sea, is abrogated in accordance with the principles set forth in Article I of the present Treaty, the two High Contracting Parties shall enjoy equal rights of free navigation on that sea, under their own flags, as from the date of the signing of the present treaty.

XII. The Russian Federal Government, having officially renounced all economic interests obtained by military preponderance, further declares that apart from the concessions which form the subject of Articles IX, and X, the other concessions obtained by force by the Tsarist Government and its subjects shall also be regarded as null and void. In conformity with which the Russian Federal Government restores, as from the date of the signing of the present Treaty, to the Persian Government, as representing the Persian people, all
the concessions in question, whether already being worked or not, together with all land taken over in virtue of those concessions.

Of the lands and properties situated in Persia and belonging to the former Tsarist Government, only the premises of the Russian Legation at Tehran and at Zerguendeh with all movable and immovable appurtenances, as well as all real and other property of the Consulates and Vice-Consulates, shall be retained by Russia. Russia abandons, however, her right to administer the village of Zerguendeh which was arrogated to itself by the former Tsarist Government.

XIII. The Persian Government, for its part, promises not to cede to a third Power, or to its subjects, the concessions and property restored to Persia by virtue of the present Treaty, and to maintain those rights for the nation.

XIV. The Persian Government recognising the importance of the Caspian fisheries for the food supply of Russia, promises to conclude with the Food Service of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic immediately upon the expiry of the legal period of these existing engagements, a contract relating to the fisheries, containing appropriate clauses. Furthermore, the Persian Government promises to examine, in agreement with the Government of the
Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, the means of at once conveying the produce of the fisheries to the Food Service of Soviet Russia pending the conclusion of the above contract.

XV. In accordance with the principles of liberty of conscience proclaimed by Soviet Russia, and with a desire to put an end, in Moslem countries, to religious propaganda, the real object of which was to exercise political influence over the masses and thus to satisfy the rapacity of the Tsarist Government, the Government of Soviet Russia declares that the religious settlements established in Persia by the former Tsarist Governments are abolished. Soviet Russia will take steps to prevent such missions from being sent to Persia in the future.

Soviet Russia cedes unconditionally to the nation represented by the Persian Government the lands, property and buildings belonging to the Orthodox Mission situated at Urmia, together with the other similar establishments. The Persian Government shall use these properties for the construction of schools and other institutions intended for educational purposes.

XVI. By virtue of the communication from Soviet Russia dated the 25th June, 1919, with reference to the abolition of consular jurisdiction, it is decided that Russian subjects in Persia and Persian
subjects in Russia shall, as from the date of the present Treaty, be placed upon the same footing as the inhabitants of the towns in which they reside; they shall be subject to the laws of their country of residence, and shall submit their complaints to the local Courts.

XVII. Persian subjects in Russia and Russian subjects in Persia shall be exempt from military service and from all military taxation.

XVIII. Persian subjects in Russia and Russian subjects in Persia shall, as regards travel within the respective countries, enjoy the rights granted to the most-favoured nations other than countries allied to them.

XIX. Within a short period after the signature of the present Treaty, the two High Contracting Parties shall resume commercial relations. The methods to be adopted for the organisation of the import and export of goods, methods of payment, and the customs duties to be levied by the Persian Government on goods originating in Russia, shall be determined, under a commercial Convention, by a special Commission consisting of representatives of the two High Contracting Parties.

XX. Each of the two High Contracting parties grant to the other the right of transit for the transport of goods passing through Persia or Russia and
consigned to a third country.
The dues exacted in such cases shall not be higher than those levied on the goods of the most-favoured nations other than countries allied to the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.

XXI. The two High Contracting Parties shall open telegraphic and postal relations between Russia and Persia within the shortest possible period after the signature of the present Treaty. The conditions of these relations shall be fixed by a postal and telegraphic Convention.

XXII. In order to consolidate the good relations between the two neighbouring Powers and to facilitate the realisation of the friendly intentions of each country towards the other, each of the High Contracting Parties shall, immediately after the signature of the present Treaty, be represented in the capital of the other by a Plenipotentiary Representative, who shall enjoy the rights of extra-territoriality and other privileges to which diplomatic representatives are entitled by international law and usage and by the regulations and customs of the two countries.

XXIII. In order to develop their mutual relations, the two High Contracting Parties shall establish Consulates in places to be determined by common agreement.
The rights and duties of the Consuls shall be fixed by a special Agreement to be concluded without delay after the signing of the present Treaty. This Agreement shall conform to the provisions in force in the two countries with regard to consular establishments....

XXV. The present treaty is drawn up in Russian and Persian. Both texts shall be regarded as originals and both shall be authentic.

XXVI. The present treaty shall come into force immediately upon signature....

* Text published in Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, PP. 90-94.
EXCHANGE OF NOTES, 12 DECEMBER 1921*

1. From the Persian Foreign Minister

The Persian Government and the Majles have observed that Article V and VI of the Treaty concluded between our two countries are worded vaguely; the Majles, moreover, desires that the retrocession of Russian concessions to the Persian Government should be made without reverse or condition, and that Article XX should be worded as to allow the Persian Government full powers for the transit of imports and exports. Conversations have taken place with you on these questions, and you have given explanations with regard to Article V and VI and promises concerning Articles XIII and XX, to the effect that if the Treaty were passed by the Majles you would give all your assistance in your power to ensure that the two Articles in question should be revised on the lines desired by the Majles and the Persian Government. The Persian Government and the Majles are most desirous that friendly relations should be re-established between our two Governments, and that the Treaty, which is based upon the most amicable sentiments, should be concluded as soon as possible.

I have, therefore, the honour to request you to give in writing your explanations with regard to the interpretation of Article V and VI, and to repeat

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the promises of support which you have already given as regards the revision of Articles XIII and XX, in order that the Persian Government may be enabled to secure the passing of the Treaty by the Majles. I also wish to ask you to take the necessary steps to repair the error which has been made in Article III, in which the word "Commission" was written instead of "Treaty", as the only Treaty which was concluded in 1831 was a frontier delimitation Treaty, and this is the Treaty referred to in Article III.

2. From the Russian Diplomatic Representative, Tehran

In reply to your letter dated the 20th day of Ghows. I have the honour to inform you that Article V and VI are intended to apply only to cases in which preparations have been made for a considerable armed attack upon Russia or the Soviet Republics allied to her, by the partisans of the regime which has been overthrown or by its supporters among those foreign Powers which are in a position to assist the enemies of the Workers' and Peasants' Republics and at the same time to possess themselves, by force or by underhand methods, of part of the Persian territory, thereby establishing a base of operations for any attacks—made either directly or through the counter-revolutionary
forces—which they might mediate against Russia or the Soviet Republics allied to her. The Articles referred to are therefore in no sense intended to apply to verbal or written attacks directed against the Soviet Government by the various Persian groups, or even by any Russian emigrés in Persia, in so far as such attacks are generally tolerated as between neighbouring Powers animated by sentiments of mutual friendship.

With regard to Articles XIII and XX, and the small error to which you draw attention in Article III with reference to the Convention of 1881, I am in a position to state categorically, as I have always stated, that my Government, whose attitude towards the Persian nation is entirely friendly, has never sought to place any restrictions upon the progress and prosperity of Persia. I myself fully share this attitude, and would be prepared, should friendly relations be maintained between the two countries, to promote negotiations with a view to a total or partial revision of these Articles on the lines desired by the Persian Government, as far as the interests of Russia permit.

In view of the preceding statements, I trust that, as you promised me in your letter, your Government and the Majles will ratify the Treaty in question as soon as possible.

* Text published in Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, P.94.
Appendix 2

Declaration Regarding Iran *

The President of the United States of America, the
Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,
having consulted with each other and with the Prime
Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual
agreement of their three Governments regarding
their relations with Iran.

The Governments of the United States of America,
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the
United Kingdom recognise the assistance which Iran
has given in the prosecution of the war against the
common enemy, particularly by facilitating
transportation of supplies from overseas to the
Soviet Union.

The three Governments realise that the war has
caused special economic difficulties for Iran and
they are agreed that they will continue to make
available to the Government of Iran such economic
assistance as may be possible, having regard to the
heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide
military operations and to the world-wide shortage
of transport, raw materials and supplies for
civilian consumption.

With respect to the post-war period, the
Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problem confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration along with those of the other members of the United Nations by conferences or international economic matters.

The Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran together with all other peace-loving nations in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed.

December 1 1943

CHURCHILL, STALIN, ROOSEVELT

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Kayhan (UK)
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Rahbar (Tehran)
Razm (Tehran)
Zafar (Tehran)


Also in the following cities, a number of British troops had been stationed to supervise the supply-route transportation: 22-Zahedan 23-Birjand 24-Kerman 25-Bushehr 26-Shiraz 27-Isfahan.

(Adopted from Khan-Malek Yazdi: Brawling of Troop Withdrawal)
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