Heidegger and Money:  
A Phenomenological Investigation

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ABSTRACT

The thesis you are about to read is an application of Heidegger's phenomenological method. What distinguishes my application of this method from all others, is that none of these have ever applied it to money. I however will apply it to money. The first chapter explains the phenomenological method I am going to use, the steps I must follow in order to apply it, and the traditional philosophical attitude towards money. The second chapter discusses Heidegger's theory of intentionality, in relation to both the perceptual comportment and the productive comportment of Dasein. The third and fourth chapters consider the same question -- Why did Heidegger never investigate money phenomenologically? -- from two different angles. The third chapter considers this question in relation to common sense; the fourth in relation to the history of philosophy. The fifth and sixth chapters apply the phenomenological method to money in a way which yields some very basic ontological conclusions about money and its mode of being. The fifth chapter follows those steps in the phenomenological method that have to do with reduction and destruction, while the sixth chapter follows that step in the phenomenological method that has to do with construction. The seventh chapter applies the phenomenological method to value where value is meant in the monetary sense of the word. The last chapter attempts to unify some of the conclusions I have reached in the previous seven chapters by considering money in relation to some of the things Heidegger said about science and technology in the modern age. In doing this I will confront some of the most important questions Dasein has ever had to face. It is not however my intention to offer any kind of a normative response to the questions I will confront. Such a response belongs outside the boundaries of this work.
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List of Abbreviations

Works by Heidegger

The following abbreviations will be used to refer to Heidegger’s works. For the most part the translation by Joan Stambaugh of *Being and Time*, will be the translation we have used instead of the older translation by Macquarrie and Robinson. When we are quoting from the older translation we will indicate this to the reader with a footnote explaining why we have quoted from it. In the case of *Being and Time*, the page references will be to the original German. These page numbers are found in the margins of the Stambaugh translation of *Being and Time*. All translations are those of the translators.

AM *Aristotle’s Metaphysics, [theta 1-3]: On the Essence of Actuality and Force*

BC *Basic Concepts*

BP *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*

BQP *Basic Questions of Philosophy*

BT *Being and Time*

BW *Basic Writings*

DT *Discourse on Thinking*

FCM *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*

HCT *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*

ITM *An Introduction to Metaphysics*

MFL *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*

N4 *Nietzsche, Vol. 4: Nihilism*

PIKCR *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*

PS *Plato’s Sophist*

QCT *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*
List of Abbreviations

Other Works

AE  Applied Economics
AES  Athenian Economy and Society
AET  Aristotle’s Economic Thought
Apo  Plato’s Apology
B  Utilitarianism and Other Essays
CA,II  Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments Vol. II. History of Philosophy
CA,III  Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments Vol. III. Language.
CBT  Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I
COBT  A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time
CPM  The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Mind
CPR  Critique of Pure Reason
D  Daybreak
EAS  Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist
FMM  The Foundations for the Metaphysics of Morals
Frag. 90  Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments.
GA  Greek Architecture
GD  The Grip of Death: A Study of modern money, debt slavery and destructive economics
GM  On the Genealogy of Morals
GS  The Great Sophists of Periclean Athens
GV  The Genealogy of Values
HA  History of Architecture
HAH  Human All Too Human
HC  The Heidegger Controversy
HCM  Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, Art
HGP,III  The History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 3
HGP,V  The History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 5
KPL  Kant’s Philosophy of Law
Philosophers’ error.— The philosopher supposes that the value of his philosophy lies in the whole, in the structure; but posterity finds its value in the stone which he used for building, and which is used many more times after that for building -- better. Thus it finds the value in the fact that the structure can be destroyed and nevertheless retains value as building material. HAH, 201. (Nietzsche’s italics)

There is an important sense in which this quote of Nietzsche’s applies to Heidegger. Accordingly, our aim is to show that it is neither the whole of Heidegger’s philosophy that is valuable nor its structure. Rather, the value of Heidegger’s philosophy lies in the stone which he used for building; his phenomenological method. To show this, we will use Heidegger’s phenomenological method to investigate money. Heidegger himself never used his method to investigate money, rather he used it to investigate such things as language, technology, thinking, time, being, and Dasein, i.e. his word for the beings that we are. Actually no philosopher has ever used the phenomenological method to investigate money. Consequently, a formal justification for what might be regarded as a rather unorthodox move is the first thing we must provide.

Heidegger considers the method of phenomenology to be the method of scientific philosophy: ‘the expression “phenomenology” is the name for the method of scientific philosophy.’ BP, 3. (Heidegger’s italics) An integral part of the scientific method as such is the conducting of experiments. From this it follows that an integral part of the method of scientific philosophy must also be the conducting of experiments. So, how do we conduct an experiment with the phenomenological method? By applying this method to a phenomenon to which it has not been applied before; money. Thus the following interpretation is both a philosophical experiment as well as an exercise in applying the phenomenological method.

To apply the phenomenological method to money requires explicit effort on our part to even formulate the appropriate phenomenological questions, and it is because of this that our

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1 In what follows, we will use Dasein, man, and human being all interchangeably; for as Dreyfus points out in his commentary on Being and Time, one way to understand what Heidegger meant by Dasein is to think of it in terms of human being. For more on this see Dreyfus’ Being-in-the-world. p.14.
Although the first sentence of my abstract states that, 'the thesis you are about to read is an application of Heidegger's phenomenological method,' nevertheless, it is worth pausing to discuss the relation between the method of phenomenology used by Heidegger, and the one used by Husserl, the philosopher whose phenomenological method Heidegger appropriated.

In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger says the following about the difference between his method of phenomenological reduction, and Husserl's method of phenomenological reduction.

We are ... adopting a central term of Husserl's phenomenology in its literal wording though not in its substantive intent. For Husserl, phenomenological reduction, which he worked out for the first time expressly in the Ideas Toward a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy (1913), is the method of leading phenomenological vision from the natural attitude of the human being whose life is involved in the world of things and persons back to the transcendental life of consciousness and its noetic-noematic experiences, in which objects are constituted as correlates of consciousness. BP,21.

More will be said about what Heidegger means by phenomenological reduction, first on pages 13-4, and more substantially in chapter five. What I will do here is explain what Heidegger found objectionable about Husserl's method of phenomenological reduction mentioned above by considering a few remarks of Husserl's in his Cartesian Meditations.

Broadly speaking, Husserl believed that 'great weight must be given to the consideration that, in philosophy, [Descartes'] Meditations were epoch-making ... precisely because of their going back to the pure ego cogito.' CM,4. Heidegger did not deny this. In chapter 5, page 89, we discuss the great weight that Heidegger gave to Descartes' going back to the pure ego cogito, when we discuss how, for Heidegger, one result of the metaphysical changes that Descartes initiated in truth, the meaning of being and the subject, was that the course of history itself takes a different direction. In chapter eight I follow this up with an analysis of the age of self-evolution we are now entering.

The kind of weight that Husserl gave to the consideration that, 'in philosophy, [Descartes'] Meditations were epoch-making ... precisely because of their going back to the pure ego cogito,' was very different to the kind of weight that Heidegger gave to it. For Husserl, contemporary philosophical problems had arisen largely because 'the driving forces emanating from the Meditations of Descartes had lost their original vitality.' CM,5-6 What philosophy needed, according to Husserl, was to 'reawaken the impulse of the Cartesian Meditations.' CM,6. What this involved; renewing with greater intensity the radicalness of the spirit of the Cartesian Meditations, i.e. the radicalness of self-responsibility. Why? Because by doing this, Husserl believed that he could make the meaning of that radicalness of self-responsibility true for the first time by uncovering the genuine sense of Descartes' necessary regress to the ego.

Heidegger on the other hand, did not want to reawaken the impulse of the Cartesian ego, by uncovering the genuine sense of the necessary regress to the ego. Rather Heidegger wanted to overcome Cartesianism by reversing the regress to the ego. For Heidegger, the natural attitude of a person whose life is involved in the everyday world, was the starting point of phenomenology. However to bracket this world and regress to the ego, like Husserl wanted to do with his phenomenological reduction, was a mistake. For the involved world of everydayness was the primordial phenomenon, while the transcendental ego Husserl wanted to regress to, derived from this primordial phenomenon, what Heidegger called being-in-the-world.

Another difference between Heidegger's method of phenomenology and Husserl's, is pointed out by James Morrison in his article Husserl and Heidegger; The Parting of the Ways; 'for Husserl phenomenology [was] a science of consciousness and its objects -- beings.' Heidegger's Existential Analytic, ed. by Fredrick Elliston, p,50. For Heidegger however, phenomenology was a science of being. BP,11.

Where Heidegger and Husserl agree about the method of phenomenology is in the contention that it is descriptive. This suggests another, albeit, negative similarity between Husserl and Heidegger, namely that neither used the phenomenological method to describe moral or political phenomena. Husserl used the method to describe consciousness and to solve certain epistemological problems like the problem of other minds and the problem of the external world. Heidegger used the phenomenological method to describe being and the kind of beings that we are, Dasein.

In chapter seven and eight, I use the phenomenological method to give the kind of description one could give of the moral phenomenon of value. were one to do what neither Heidegger nor Husserl did -- use the phenomenological method to describe a moral phenomenon. (For more on this see the end of chapter 8.)
application of the phenomenological method to money can be formally justified; for as far as Heidegger is concerned, explicit effort applied to the phenomenological method, is all there is to phenomenology. To see this, consider what Heidegger said about phenomenology in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology.

As a method however, the method of ontology is nothing but the sequence of the steps involved in the approach to being as such and the elaboration of its structure. We call this method of ontology phenomenology. In more precise language, phenomenological investigation is explicit effort applied to the method of ontology. BP,328. (Heidegger’s italic)

As long as we apply explicit effort to the phenomenological method in our application of it to money, we cannot be accused of misunderstanding how this method was intended to be understood by Heidegger, namely as a method to be used for philosophizing. Before considering the specific components of the phenomenological method however, we will provide the reader with a preliminary remark concerning the western philosophical tradition’s overall attitude to money. This will help the reader to appreciate what we are up against in applying the phenomenological method to money.

A Preliminary Remark Concerning the Tradition’s Attitude towards Money

As far back as Heraclitus who said, ‘All things are an equal exchange for fire and fire for all things, as goods are for gold and gold for goods,’ Frag. 90 there has been a long and peculiar relationship between philosophy and money. So common is it for philosophers to appeal to money in order to make a philosophical point that citing specific examples of this is time wasted. But what is worth pointing out is that philosophers have appealed to money in order to demonstrate all sorts of things. Kant for instance, in his refutation of the ontological proof for the existence of God, concluded that ‘we can no more extend our stock of [theoretical] insight by mere ideas, than a merchant can better his position by adding a few noughts to his cash account’ A602/B630. On a different note, Nietzsche appealed to money in order to describe the essence of thinking as such when he said:

* Here the reader might find it helpful to see the back of page 8 for a brief account of the differences between Heidegger’s use of the phenomenological method and Husserl’s.
'Setting prices, determining values, contriving equivalences, exchanging -- these preoccupied the earliest thinking of man to so great an extent that in a certain sense they constitute thinking as such.' GM,II,8. (Nietzsche's italics)

What is peculiar about the relationship between philosophy and money is this: philosophers who have shown no reluctance in using money as a means to establishing some philosophical end, have shown considerable reluctance in making it the centre of their philosophical investigations. But to stick money into a philosophical argument without first analyzing it to determine whether it can prove what it is supposed to prove, is surely a philosophically careless thing to do for any philosopher who prides herself on her philosophical rigour; for behind such a move is the uncritical and unexamined assumption that there is nothing unusual about money, and that what can be correctly said about other things can also be correctly said about money. As we will demonstrate in chapter three, this assumption is wrong. Actually with respect to the above mentioned reference to Kant, Marc Shell has pointed out that it was precisely because of Kant’s failure to examine money first, before appealing to it in his refutation of the ontological proof, that Hegel was able to criticize Kant. Hegel did this on the grounds that ‘a coin is different from God; in terms of the attachment of predicates to subjects, they operate differently.’ MLT,139. In the next chapter we will be saying more about the difference between attaching predicates to God and attaching predicates to money.

Why do the many philosophers who appeal to money in order to make a philosophical point, neglect to subject it to a critical analysis first? One answer is that they might see money as being outside the realm of philosophical examination. Accordingly just as a philosopher will leave chemistry to a chemist, so she may think that money ought to be left to an economist to investigate. Moreover the history of philosophy has had little to say about money. So, one might dogmatically conclude, this must be because there is nothing philosophically important or interesting to say about money; otherwise philosophers would have said it.
Marx was not a philosopher that Heidegger ever really took seriously, or perhaps as seriously as he took other philosophers like Nietzsche, Hegel, Kant and so forth. There are two reasons why this paucity of references to Marx by Heidegger would have made including Marx unfruitful for my purposes. First because Marx's conception of production is the complete opposite of Heidegger's. For Heidegger the whole purpose of producing something is precisely because it will be alienated and liberated from the person who produces it. The problem that Marx has with the modern form of production - that the worker is alienated from the product of their labour -- is, in principle, no problem at all for Heidegger; for the whole point of production for Heidegger is so that the product can stand independent from the producer. To complain about this after the product has been released from any dependency relation to the producer as Marx does, defeats the purpose of production as far as Heidegger is concerned. I discussed Heidegger's conception of production more fully in chapter two, in the section on the productive comportment of Dasein, see page, 34ff.

Another reason why I have omitted Marx from this investigation, is that although Marx did conduct a significant critique of economics, he did not actually say very much about the theory of money. Moreover what he did say about money is largely derived from Aristotle's analysis of money. To be convinced of this consider something that Scott Meikle has said with respect to the relation between Marx's conception of money and Aristotle's,

Marx was the first modern author ... to offer an interpretation of Aristotle's economic thought. His debt to Aristotle's analysis of exchange and money is even more evident in A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (London, 1971), 27, 42, 50, 68, 117, 137, 155. Marx's own treatment of use value and exchange value follows the logic of Aristotle's analysis; he employs the same metaphysical apparatus, which distinguishes between categories of quality, quantity, and relation, and his analysis is founded on those distinctions. This reflects a general debt Marx owes to Aristotelian metaphysics, which pervades his work as a whole, and sets him apart from most other modern writers in the social sciences, whose metaphysical debt is usually owing to Hume and the Enlightenment. AET, 15n.

Since Aristotle's conception of money was something that I did spend a considerable amount of time discussing, and since Marx endorses this conception of money, it is possible to argue that omitting Marx's analysis of money can be justified on the grounds that including it would not constitute a significant advance of Aristotle. When these reasons are taken into consideration it should be clear that omitting Marx is not as glaring an omission as it may seem at first.
Obviously this last argument is flawed; for nowhere is it written that money is outside the realm of philosophical examination. Something becomes philosophical because someone, usually a philosopher, decides to investigate it. In fact, until someone does investigate money philosophically it cannot be decided whether there is anything of philosophical importance to it; for it is certainly possible that the reason philosophers have had little to say about money is because they have overlooked something.

Another reason why philosophers who appeal to money to make a philosophical point may not think it necessary to subject it to a critical analysis first, is that ‘money’ is thought to be so familiar and self-evident in what it is, that elaborating on it is unnecessary. Heidegger is no exception to anything we have said so far; for despite his radicality and insistence upon doing violence to both common sense and the tradition, Heidegger remained in complete accord with the tradition as far as the topic of money was concerned. Neither Heidegger nor the tradition subjected money to a rigorous philosophical examination. But one might ask, Why investigate money within the context of Heidegger’s philosophy? Answer; because money is ideally suited for phenomenological investigation. Let us explain why this is.

The phenomenological method is designed to investigate being. This it does by starting with those beings closest to us in everydayness; for like Nietzsche, Heidegger too believes that the beings closest to us in everydayness, ie. so close that we do not even notice them, are the things most in need of philosophical investigation. Heidegger expresses this thought by saying, ‘The more familiar and self-evident the object of [philosophical] questioning is, the more essential is the question involved.’ FCM,174. The precise details of how one uses the phenomenological method to investigate being by way of the beings closest to us in everydayness will be explained in a moment. Here the thing to see is that from the everyday perspective, money is certainly familiar and self-evident to us. Therefore it is essential that we question about it philosophically; for such familiarity is wholly consistent with the fact that money could be unrecognized in its ontological

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2 If one considers Simmel a philosopher then he is obviously an exception to this claim. More will be said about Simmel later. Marx too could be regarded as an exception to this claim. For an explanation of why Marx has been omitted from this investigation, see back of page 10
For Heidegger the familiar and self-evident constitutes a substantial part of the subject matter of philosophy. This leads naturally into the following question: If money is so familiar and self-evident to us, why did Heidegger not subject it to a phenomenological investigation? This question will be examined from two different angles. The first has to do with the common sense explanation of why Heidegger passed over money in his philosophical investigations, the second has to do with those reasons which are bound up with the history of philosophy. These questions will be addressed later in chapters three and four.

To sum up; the following interpretation will demonstrate how Heidegger himself did not pay enough attention to his claim that, ‘What is ontically nearest and familiar is ontologically the farthest, unrecognized and constantly overlooked in its ontological significance.’ BT,43. For just as he criticized Cartesianism because it passed over the phenomenon of the world, (as Heidegger conceived it) so in a similar sense Heidegger's ontology can be criticised because it passed over the phenomenon of money. Of course money is not the only thing Heidegger’s ontology passed over, but it is our intention to make something substantial out of this omission. Moreover because we are using the phenomenological method, we will remedy Heidegger’s omission of money by determining its mode of being. The first step to take is to provide a general remark about both Heidegger’s conception of philosophy and his phenomenological method.

**Philosophizing With The Method Of Phenomenology**

For Heidegger, ‘Philosophy is the theoretical conceptual interpretation of being, of being's structure and its possibilities.’ BP,11. The method of philosophy is the method of phenomenology, ‘The expression “phenomenology” signifies primarily a concept of method. It does not characterize the “what” of the objects of philosophical research in terms of their content but the “how” of such research.’ BT,27. (Heidegger’s italics)
Strictly speaking the method of phenomenology is designed to determine the structure of the being of a being. The being of a being cannot be perceived; for only beings can be perceived. Rather the being of a being is something which remains hidden and must be phenomenologically uncovered. Accordingly, because being is not perceivable, what is uncovered is not seen, it is understood. Another way to explain this last point is to say that although being cannot be seen by the eyes, it can be seen phenomenologically by Dasein’s understanding. The way in which being is understood by Dasein is vague and implicit and needs to be made explicit.3

To understand what Heidegger means by Dasein’s vague and implicit understanding of what it means to be, consider Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Just as Kant’s transcendental philosophy begins with the unquestionable assumption that there is experience, and that the project of transcendental philosophy is to systematically explicate the structure of experience in order to determine how it is possible, so there is a sense in which Heidegger’s philosophy is transcendental as well. The difference between Kant and Heidegger here is that Heidegger begins with what he takes to be the basic assumption that the self, Dasein, understands. What Dasein understands is what it means to be.4 Dasein understands what it means to be by virtue of the fact that it is, i.e. exists. The kind of understanding Dasein has of being is vague and implicit. The job of the philosopher therefore is to make ontologically explicit what Dasein already understands in a vague and implicit way. The project of fundamental ontology is to determine how the understanding of what it means to be is possible.

Formally speaking, three basic components constitute Heidegger’s phenomenological method. First the phenomenological reduction from beings back to being. Every phenomenological investigation must take as its point of departure beings [Seiendes] e.g. trees, tables, unicorns. Strictly speaking, phenomenological reduction ‘means leading phenomenological vision back from the apprehension of a being, whatever may be the

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3 Heidegger sometimes refers to this vague and implicit understanding of being as a pre-conceptual understanding of being. See The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 281.

4 Another way to say this is to say that Dasein has an understanding of being, or Dasein understands being.
character of that apprehension, to the understanding of the being of this being.’ BP,21. The phenomenological reduction we must make, is the reduction from money to its mode of being. This we do in chapter five.

The second component of the phenomenological method is construction: ‘We do not simply find [being] in front of us ... it must always be brought to view in a free projection. This projecting of the antecedently given being upon its being and the structures of its being we call phenomenological construction.’ BP,22. In the sixth chapter we take this step involved with phenomenological construction when we project the antecedently given being we are investigating, money, upon its being and the structures of its being.

The third component of the phenomenological method is destruction.5 By destruction Heidegger means,

a critical process in which the traditional concepts which at first must necessarily be employed, are de-constructed down to the sources from which they were drawn. Only by means of this destruction can ontology fully assure itself in a phenomenological way of the genuine character of its concepts. BP,23.

In the fifth chapter we will also occupy ourselves with this step.

To these three components of the phenomenological method, we can add three others which might be seen as instruments to aid one in following the steps of the phenomenological method. First is the notion of questioning. It is impossible to overstate the importance of questioning to Heidegger’s philosophy. To demonstrate just how important questioning was to Heidegger, consider what he said about it in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology: ‘The only thing that is truly new in science and in philosophy is the genuine questioning and the struggle with things which is at the service

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5 The destruction and the deconstruction that Heidegger speaks about here must not be mistaken for the kind of ‘deconstructionism’ of Derrida. For although it is certainly the case that Heidegger influenced Derrida, it is also the case that what Derrida meant by deconstruction is different from what Heidegger meant.
*3. Saying that Heidegger never ceased to use the phenomenological method could be interpreted to imply that Heidegger did not undergo a change, or a turning in his philosophy like he said he did. Michael Gelven however has pointed out that, Heidegger himself draws attention to the nature of his shifting from the early period, in which existence is stressed, to the later period, in which Being is discussed almost independently of human existential terminology. Heidegger insists, however in the Preface to William Richardson’s *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought* ... that one should not see this shifting as an abandonment of his earlier thinking. He maintains in this Preface that his later thought can only be understood as stemming from his earlier thought; and his earlier thought can only be understood if it is seen as leading toward his later thought. CBT,2n.

When I say that Heidegger never ceased to use the phenomenological method what I mean more precisely is this; that throughout his philosophy there can, more often than not, be found strong evidence of Heidegger using certain elements of the phenomenological method.

His many references and interpretations of what he meant by ‘The Destruction of Ontology’ in *Being and Time* throughout his writings, support my claim; for clearly the kind of destruction that Heidegger is always talking about and trying to clarify, is phenomenological destruction. What other kind of destruction would it be if it were not phenomenological destruction? If Heidegger’s philosophy is looked at methodologically, one might just find that there is as much continuity to Heidegger’s philosophy as there is discrepancy. The continuity in his philosophy would be in the sense that he continued to use the different elements of the phenomenological method I listed in chapter one; phenomenological reduction, destruction, construction, doing violence to the tradition, questioning, and phenomenological seeing i.e. contrasting different relations of being, especially those which we express linguistically with the same means.

Something else to say about the earlier and later philosophy of Heidegger is this; that the simple division between the earlier and later Heidegger is misleading because of the way it ignores the middle period of Heidegger’s philosophy in the thirties and forties when he focused on the truth of being, as opposed to Dasein like he did in the early philosophy, and being like he did in his later philosophy.
In what follows, we too will rely heavily on the notion of questioning; for to use the phenomenological method one must question — it is as simple as that. This is something the reader will have to pay particular attention to throughout the following interpretation.

A second instrument to aid one in philosophizing with the phenomenological method is the notion of phenomenological seeing. The third instrument is Heidegger's notion of doing violence to the tradition and the claims of common sense. In chapter three we will be using both of these methodological instruments to aid our application of the phenomenological method to money. Thus we will be saying more about them at the appropriate time.

A peculiar thing about Heidegger's use of the phenomenological method is that he does not point out when he is performing a phenomenological reduction, when a phenomenological destruction and so forth. Instead, the kind of movement that accompanies philosophizing with the phenomenological method is circular. Heidegger explains this in the following way,

we constantly find ourselves moving in a circle. And this is an indication that we are moving within the realm of philosophy. Everywhere a kind of circling ... anyone who has never been seized by dizziness in the presence of a philosophical question has never asked the question in a philosophical way FCM,180. (Heidegger's italic)

Heidegger never ceased to use the phenomenological method. For example, towards the end of The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger states that in these lectures he has applied the phenomenological method constantly. He goes on to add however, that to

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6 On a similar note Heidegger closes his lectures on the Critique of Pure Reason by saying: 'The meaning of doing philosophy consists in awakening the need for [the genuineness of thinking and questioning] and in keeping it awake.' PIKCPR.293.

7 For the most part, the method I have adopted is that whenever I have asked a question the reader will find that in the next sentence, I answer it. Sometimes I have made this explicit by stating, 'Answer; -- ', while other times I have not.

8 'We cannot now enter any further into the essential and fundamental constituent parts of [the phenomenological] method. In fact, we have applied it constantly.' BP,328.

* To be sure this is a moot point; for some might argue that the later Heidegger abandoned the phenomenological method. For my views on this matter see the back of page 14.
see this more completely would require him to ‘go over the course already pursued ... with explicit reflection on it.’ BP,328. This Heidegger did not do. Instead Heidegger carried on using the phenomenological method in the following set of lectures he gave on Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason.* Now because the lectures wherein Heidegger used the phenomenological method have been published, we can pay particular attention to it. Thus we will be more explicit than Heidegger was when we take those steps concerned with destruction, reduction, and construction. There is little to be gained by saying much more about the phenomenological method and the instruments which help one to follow it; for the important thing is learning how to philosophize with this method. What we must now say something about is what, for Heidegger, constitutes philosophizing.

Strictly speaking, Heidegger denies there is such a thing as philosophy, there is only philosophizing: ‘Philosophy itself -- what do we know of it, what and how is it? It itself is only whenever we are philosophizing. *Philosophy is philosophizing.*’ FCM,4, (Heidegger’s italics). Elsewhere Heidegger says, ‘The point is not to gain some knowledge about philosophy but to be able to philosophize.’ BP,2. Thus if the point of philosophy is, according to Heidegger, to be able to philosophize, an interpretation of Heidegger which facilitates philosophizing can rightly be called a philosophical interpretation of him. A philosophical interpretation of Heidegger is different from a rigorous commentary on his philosophy which merely assesses the logic of his arguments, or criticizes it for a perceived lack of arguments.

There are many ways interpreting Heidegger can facilitate philosophizing. In fact, because phenomenology signifies a method for how philosophical research is to be carried out, any phenomenon can be selected and investigated, as long as it is investigated according to the method of phenomenology. It would be wrong of course to interpret this remark to imply that money is just like any other phenomenon, however one could object that a monetary critique of Heidegger’s philosophy is an act of philosophical violence against it; for money is traditionally considered to be an example of the kind of being that presupposes many of the basic structures Heidegger investigated -- structures such as being-in-the-world, and
being-with-others. Accordingly, to criticize Heidegger for his philosophical neglect of money is a criticism of secondary and not primary importance.

In response to this, we admit that a monetary critique of Heidegger does indeed do violence to his philosophy. The question to ask however is whether this constitutes a philosophical objection to our interpretation. For there is a difference between an interpretation of Heidegger which does violence to his philosophy and one that misunderstands what it is saying. A monetary critique of Heidegger certainly does violence to his philosophy, but if the lesson to be learned from Heidegger is how to philosophize with the phenomenological method, it is difficult to see how using this method to philosophize misinterprets him even if, as a consequence, we end up doing violence to his philosophy. In fact it might even turn out that the way to get the most out of Heidegger’s philosophy is precisely by doing violence to it. In this sense our interpretation of Heidegger could turn out to be an interpretation of primary importance after all.

Actually there is good reason to assume that we should do violence to Heidegger’s philosophy. For Heidegger himself made a philosophical career out of doing violence to the tradition, believing that only by doing so was philosophy possible. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger even said that ‘the existential analytic constantly has the character of doing violence, whether for the claims of the everyday interpretation or for its complacency and its tranquillized obviousness.’ BT,311. (Heidegger’s italics). The problem with the above mentioned objection therefore is that it erroneously assumes violence should not be done to Heidegger. It is an objection a Heideggerian might make, but it is not an objection Heidegger himself could make; for if he did, he would have to renounce his claim that existential analysis constantly has the character of doing violence to what it is interpreting. The only kind of objection Heidegger could raise to our interpretation is from within the confines of his philosophy. Thus it is on the basis of this that we will proceed. Next let us consider some of the things which characterize philosophizing and indicate whether a genuine philosophizing is occurring.
According to Heidegger, there is nothing to guarantee a philosopher that she is philosophizing. At most there are some general signposts which indicate whether she is on the right road to philosophizing. An example of such a signpost: a willingness to confront the perilousness of philosophy itself.

No knower necessarily stands so close to the verge of error at every moment as the one who philosophizes. Whoever has not yet grasped this has never yet had any intimation of what philosophizing means ... In revelling in the idea of philosophy as absolute knowledge, one tends to forget this perilous neighbourhood of philosophizing ... So long as this elementary readiness for the intrinsic perilousness of philosophy is lacking, a confrontation that is a philosophizing will never occur, no matter how many articles are launched against one another in journals. FCM, 19-20.

It is important to see how this quote relates to our interpretation of Heidegger. As was pointed out earlier, no one has applied the phenomenological method to money before. That we are doing something the tradition has yet to do, must be seen as a readiness to confront the intrinsic perilousness of philosophy of which Heidegger speaks. Only this way can we be assured that our confrontation with money will be a philosophizing, and that we are in fact starting out on the correct road to philosophizing.

For philosophizing to occur, we must of necessity stand on the verge of error. Although standing on the verge of error applies to everyone who tries to speak truthfully about something, our case is slightly different. For asking questions which the tradition has yet to ask, ensures that we will constantly be standing on the verge of error. This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that there is no research on the phenomenology of money to confirm or deny our conclusions. Without any independent research to check our conclusions against, even the slightest error could be carried through our entire interpretation and have extremely damaging consequences. To overcome this problem we will question Heidegger's philosophy directly. Examples of the kinds of questions which will bring us into direct contact with Heidegger's philosophy are as follows: Is money equipment as

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9 The way in which our interpretation does confront the perilousness of philosophy and what is involved in doing this will be explained in our conclusion.
Heidegger understands it? Is exchange use? Is the mode of being of money that of readiness-to-hand? The kind of interpretation we are conducting compels us to ask questions of this nature. This said, the next thing to mention are some of the advantages to our interpretation.

The most important advantage to the kind of interpretation we are offering is that it enables us to philosophize. Of course it may not be the only way to philosophize, but it is the way we have chosen. A second advantage to our interpretation is that by applying the method of phenomenology to money, a critique of Heidegger in his own terms will emerge. Accordingly we will find ourselves in a position to challenge some of the things Heidegger said in a language that he would understand, which means to say, in a very basic or fundamental way. A third advantage to our interpretation is that a phenomenological understanding of money will also emerge. The final advantage of focusing on the phenomenological method is this: when we consider Heidegger’s phenomenological method many basic misinterpretations of his philosophy are avoided.

An example of the kind of misinterpretation we are referring to is the one made by Roger Scruton in his book *A Short History of Modern Philosophy From Descartes to Wittgenstein*. Scruton’s misinterpretation is so basic that it is worth exposing, to prevent others from making it. To do this, consider the words ‘phenomenological’ and ‘phenomenology’. These words are ambiguous. On the one hand, ‘phenomenology’ can signify, as it did for Heidegger, ‘a concept of a method’. BT,27. (Heidegger’s italics). Understood in this way, ‘Everything that belongs to the manner of indication and explication, and constitutes the conceptual tools this research requires, is called “phenomenological.”’ BT,37. On the other hand, phenomenological also signifies, as it conventionally does in analytic philosophy, the ‘what it is like aspect of a conscious experience’, or how things seem to a person: ‘In explaining phenomenal consciousness, one can also appeal to conscious properties or qualities, e.g. the ways things seem to us or immediate phenomenological qualities.’ CPM,211.
Scruton’s mistake was to ignore this ambiguity and interpret Heidegger purely in terms of the analytic sense of phenomenological; the what it is like aspect of phenomenal consciousness. How do we know this? Because interpreting Heidegger in terms of the analytic sense of phenomenological led Scruton to make an even bigger mistake; the mistake of thinking that by ‘Dasein’ Heidegger meant a consciousness. We can be sure Scruton thought that this is what Heidegger meant by the term ‘Dasein’ because twice in his interpretation of Heidegger, Scruton interprets ‘Dasein’ in terms of consciousness. First when he says, ‘Phenomena are [for Heidegger] not mere appearances, but those things which show themselves to consciousness’, PDW,256-7, and again when he says, ‘Dasein is the kind of being that characterizes human self-consciousness’ PDW,257. (Scruton’s italic). But this is wrong. Phenomena do not appear to consciousness; they appear to Dasein, and Dasein is not the kind of being that characterizes human-self consciousness. Why? Because Dasein is not a consciousness at all. Heidegger even says this in the lectures Being and Time were based upon, the History of the Concept of Time; ‘Dasein ... is not a subject or consciousness.’ HCT,305. (Heidegger’s italic). Actually Heidegger used the term Dasein precisely because he wanted to get away from the concept of consciousness and conceiving of the subject in terms of a worldless Cartesian ego. His overall reasons for this have to do with his attempt to overcome Cartesianism, which we will not say anymore about here.11

So much then for Scruton’s misinterpretation of Heidegger. The points to emphasize are these. First, that Dasein is not a consciousness; it refers to the beings we are. Strictly speaking it refers to the self, the I. BT,42. Second, focusing on Heidegger’s method of phenomenology helps us avoid this kind of misinterpretation and others as well, but the

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10 Scruton’s italics. Scruton also thinks that Heidegger’s theory of being ‘is in fact a theory of self-consciousness’ PDW,258.

11 In his commentary on Being and Time, Dreyfus points out that even ‘in 1943 Heidegger was still trying to ward off the misunderstanding of Being and Time dictated by the Cartesian tradition’. (Dreyfus,13) with the following quote: ‘To characterize with a single term both the involvement of being in human nature and the essential relation of man to the openness (“there”) of being as such, the name of “being there” [Dasein]” was chosen ... Any attempt, therefore, to rethink Being and Time is thwarted as long as one is satisfied with the observation that, in this study, the term “being there” [Dasein] is used in place of “consciousness.’ (Dreyfus,13). Quoted from ‘Martin Heidegger, “The Way Back Into the Ground of Metaphysics,” in Walter Kaufmann, ed., Existentialism, from Dostoevsky to Sartre, (New York: Meridian Books, 1957)
following quote by Heidegger indicates that there is far more at stake here than simply avoiding these kinds of basic misinterpretations: 'The history of philosophy bears witness how ... all ontological interpretations are more like a groping about than an inquiry clear in its method.' BP,322. Insofar as the following ontological interpretation is an application of the phenomenological method, it is an interpretation which will be clear in its method. Now before we can apply the phenomenological method to money a number of things must be done. The first is to say something about Heidegger's theory of intentionality.
Chapter 2. Heidegger's Theory of Intentionality

Since intentionality will be coming up again in later chapters, the task of this chapter is to clarify in an expository way the relation between Dasein and the structure of intentionality. In doing this, the temporal dimension of Heidegger's theory of intentionality will be omitted from our exposition both here and more generally throughout the rest of this interpretation. Instead, we will limit our discussion of intentionality to two things; the intentional character of perception, and the intentional character of production. To begin with, a remark to indicate just how important the structure of intentionality was to Heidegger.

[Husserl] prepares a new stage, insofar as he shows that intentionality determines the essence of consciousness as such, the essence of reason. With his doctrine of the immanent intentionality of the cogitationes, he brings out the problem's connexion with the basic questions of modern philosophy since Descartes. But just as Brentano leaves the concept of the psyche itself untested, so too, in his idealistic epistemology, Husserl does not further ask the question about the being constituted as consciousness. The insight into intentionality does not go far enough to see that grasping this structure as the essential structure of Dasein must revolutionize the whole concept of the human being. MFL,133. (Heidegger's italic).

Before elaborating any further, there is a terminological point to make about Heidegger's use of the word 'intentionality'. For Heidegger, intentionality and comportment basically mean the same thing. To see this consider the following quotes: 'intentionality constitutes the very structure of comportment itself ... comportment itself ... is in its very structure a

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12 The role that time played in Heidegger's philosophy will not be considered in this thesis; for looking at the structure of Being and Time, shows the temporal analytics to be preceded by the existential analytics. Thus strictly speaking even if we wanted to, we could not attempt to investigate phenomenologically the relation between time and money; for such an investigation could only be undertaken after we have completed the kind of existential analysis of money that is the subject of our present interpretation. To actually investigate phenomenologically the relation between time and money would require that we reinterpret the conclusions we have reached in this interpretation in terms of time and temporality. The present work however is too small to put forward this reinterpretation of our initial conclusions in terms of time.
directing-itself-toward.' HCT,31\textsuperscript{13} '[Intentionality] belongs to the essential nature of comportments, so that to speak of intentional comportment is already a pleonasm and is somewhat equivalent to my speaking of a spatial triangle.' BP,61. In short, comportments are intentionally structured and to talk about one is to talk about the other.

As the above quotes indicate, intentionality is the essential structure of the subject. Three moments make up this structure; the \textit{intentio}, the \textit{intentum}, and the understanding of the mode of being of what is intended in the intentum: ‘Not only do intentio and intentum belong to the intentionality of perception but so also does the \textit{understanding of the mode of being of what is intended in the intentum}.' BP,71. (Heidegger’s italics) The first moment of the structure of intentionality, the \textit{intentio}, in Latin ‘literally means directing-itself-toward’. HCT,29, (Heidegger’s italics). The \textit{intentum}, refers to that which our comportment is directed-towards, the towards which of our directedness. The third structural moment of intentionality, the understanding of the mode of being of what is intended in the \textit{intentum}, basically refers to the implicit understanding of being that belongs to Dasein mentioned in the first chapter. These three moments, which will be explained more fully later, constitute intentionality in its structural totality.

Now because there are many different comportments belonging to the subject -- perception, production, assertion, and feelings -- ‘the [three] moments [\textit{intentio, intentum, and the mode of being of what is intended in the intentum}] are different in each comportment’. BP,58.\textsuperscript{14} For example, if the comportment being analyzed is the perceptual comportment, \textit{intentio, intentum, and the understanding of the mode of being of what is intended in the intentum}, will be described in terms of perception; but if the comportment being analyzed is the productive comportment, the three structural moments will be described in terms of production. To see intentionality in its structural totality, we will consider first the

\textsuperscript{13} Another quote which supports the identification of comportment with intentionality is this; ‘Dasein’s comportments have an \textit{intentional character} and that on the basis of this intentionality the subject already stands in relation to things that it itself is not.’ BP,155

\textsuperscript{14} These are the comportments that Heidegger considered in \textit{The Basic Problems of Phenomenology}, but they are not the only comportments that belong to the subject. For example sleep is surely a comportment that belongs to the subject. Of course to what extent sleep is governed by the structure of intentionality is something that Heidegger never considered.
perceptual comportment. However as a way of leading into this, we will begin with a comment on the kind of interpretation Heidegger gives of perception -- an ontological interpretation -- and how it differs from an epistemological interpretation of perception.

*The Perceptual Comportment*

Historically, the comportment of perception has been interpreted in two basic ways -- epistemologically and ontologically. To understand the difference between the two, we will focus on the phenomenon of hallucinations; for hallucinations play a central role in both interpretations of perception. The epistemological interpretation of perception appeals to hallucinations in order to make something substantial out of the fact that it is always possible for our senses to deceive us by leading us to believe we are seeing real objects when we are not. This observation gives rise to various epistemological problems about how we can come to know anything. Examples of such problems are the problem of the external world and the problem of other minds.

The ontological interpretation of perception appeals to hallucinations in order to demonstrate what must be true if hallucinations are possible. But one might object to this on the grounds that what we have just said makes ontology the same as transcendental philosophy; for a transcendental interpretation of perception which appealed to hallucinations, would also want to determine what must be true about the subject for hallucinations to be possible. But, so the objection runs, ontology and transcendental philosophy are not the same; anyone who thinks they are is mistaken.

Our response to the above objection is to deny that ontology and transcendental philosophy are not the same. Heidegger has pointed out that strictly speaking as far as Kant was concerned, 'Transcendental philosophy denotes nothing but ontology.' BP,128. In defending this interpretation Heidegger quotes a couple of sentences Kant wrote in his essay, *What Real Progress has Metaphysics made in Germany since the Times of Leibniz and Wolff?* The sentences read,
"Ontology ... is the science that consists of a system of all concepts and principles of the understanding, but only so far as they are directed at objects which can be given to the senses and therefore can be verified by experience".\footnote{Kant, Werke (Cassier), vol.8, p. 238. [Kant did not submit the essay in the competition. On the title page in Cassier it is called \textit{Fortschritte der Metaphysik}. Heidegger later refers to it as \textit{On the Progress of Metaphysics}.]} Ontology "is called transcendental philosophy because it contains the conditions and first elements of all our knowledge a priori."\footnote{Ibid.} BP,128, (Heidegger’s italic)

In his \textit{Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason}, Heidegger contrasts the same first sentence quoted above, with another sentence Kant wrote which states Kant’s conception of ancient ontology: ‘By contrast Kant explicitly calls the traditional ontology “the transcendental philosophy of the ancients.”’\footnote{Vorlander (ed.), \textit{Fortschritte der Metaphysik}, p. 84.} PIKCPR,40. Ancient ontology was considered by Kant to be the transcendental philosophy of the Greeks, while he considered his transcendental philosophy to be a form of modern ontology.

One could object to this interpretation of Heidegger’s by saying that Kant never actually published the essay Heidegger has cited, therefore what is said in it about the relation between ontology and transcendental philosophy is not decisive. But something Kant did say in his lectures on philosophical theology, does support the interpretation that, for Kant, transcendental philosophy denotes ontology. At one place in these lectures, Kant elaborates on the relation between God and transcendental philosophy by saying that the concept of God in the sense of ‘an \textit{entis originarii} [original being] as an \textit{ens summum} [highest being]... is the foundation of transcendental philosophy’ LPT,29. Next Kant goes on to list the class of a priori realities that belong to God, and in doing this the identification of transcendental philosophy with ontology comes into sharper focus:

\begin{quote}
\begin{itemize}
  \item a priori realities refer to the universal attributes of a thing in general, they are called \textit{ontological} predicates. They are purely transcendental concepts. To this class of realities belongs God’s possibility, his existence, his necessity, or whatever kind of existence flows from his concept; also the concept of
\end{itemize}
\end{quote}
substance, the concept of unity of substance, simplicity, infinity, duration, presence, and others as well. LPT,51. (Kant’s italic)

According to this quote, a priori realities for Kant refer to the universal attributes of a thing in general. These a priori realities are called ontological predicates, and ontological predicates are purely transcendental concepts. But if ontological predicates are transcendental concepts, this clearly invites us to suppose that ontology is transcendental philosophy. This supposition is further supported by the fact that elsewhere in these lectures, Kant twice refers to the ontological proof for the existence of God as the 'transcendental proof.'

The above quote also indicates that by transcendental concepts, Kant basically means the concepts of possibility, existence, substance, unity of substance, simplicity, infinity, duration, and presence; but all of these are ontological concepts, at least they are within the context of Heidegger's ontology. When Kant predicates these things of God, he is 'only ascribing to [God] what is true of him as a thing in general.' LPT,51. For since there is no doubt in Kant's mind that God is a thing, indeed the most real thing there is, one must ascribe to God every reality which can be predicated of a thing. One important difference between predicating these things of God and predicating these things of an ungodly thing like a coin, is that in predicating these things of God, one must do this without limit; for God is a being that is without limit. A coin however, is always limited to a determinate amount of money; for when we find ourselves dealing with money, the words 'how much' are frequently predominate. We will not follow this argument any further; for our aim was merely to distinguish the ontological interpretation of perception from the epistemological interpretation. This we have done by showing that the ontological interpretation is transcendental in nature and therefore wants to answer the question, What must be true about the subject if it is possible for it to hallucinate? Having explained this we can now

18 First when he says, 'In [the cosmological] proof I presuppose that something exists (hence I presuppose and experience), and thus the proof built on this presupposition is no longer derived from pure reason as was the transcendental proof already discussed [i.e. the ontological proof].’ And again when he says, 'Except for what pertains to its primary source, this cosmological proof is fundamentally just as abstract as the transcendental one.' LPT,35.
take a closer look at the ontological interpretation of perception, how it is able to expose intentionality in its structural totality, and what answer it gives to the transcendental question it wants to answer.

With the three structural moments of intentionality out in the open, Heidegger explains that ‘The task is now to pursue this structure of Dasein’s comportments with particular regard to perception and to ask how this structure of intentionality looks, but above all how it is grounded ontologically in the basic constitution of the Dasein.’ BP,59, (Heidegger’s italics). The questions we must therefore answer are these,

1. What does Heidegger’s structure of intentionality look like when seen in relation to perception?
2. How is the structure of intentionality grounded ontologically in the basic constitution of Dasein?
3. What must be true about the subject if it is possible for it to hallucinate?

Asked in relation to perception, What is the intentio? Because the intentio is the directing-itself-towards, in the case of perception the intentio is the act of perception, the perceiving-of something. What about the intentum? Because every perceiving is always a perceiving-of something, the towards-which of the directedness will be the being that our perceiving is directed-towards, the object of perception, the perceived. What about the understanding of the mode of being of what is intended in the intentum? What Heidegger means here is this: perceiving is always the perceiving-of a being. A being always has a mode of being, and because Dasein already has an implicit understanding of being, it also has an implicit understanding of the mode of being of the being it is perceiving. In the case of perception, the mode of being of the perceived is extantness, or objective presence [Vorhandenheit]. Accordingly, in the case of perception, the understanding of the mode of being of what is intended in the intentum is an understanding of extantness. Extantness will be elaborated more fully when we discuss the productive comportment.

This completes our demonstration of what the structure of intentionality looks like when it
is seen in terms of perception. To sum up: the *intentio* is the perceiving; the *intentum* is the perceived; the understanding of the mode of being of what is intended in the *intentum* is the understanding of extantness. How this structure is grounded ontologically in the basic constitution of Dasein will now be demonstrated by considering the first misinterpretation the intentionality of perception is prone to when it is not seen in its structural totality; the common sense misinterpretation.

*The Common Sense Misinterpretation of the Perceptual Comportment*

The common sense interpretation of the intentional character of perception holds that a perception is directed towards an object of perception, for example a chair, because the chair exists, i.e. is empirically real and is perceivable to the subject. Alternatively, if there is no chair for the subject to be directed towards, there can be no perceptual relation; for the perceptual relation is between two things, perceiver and perceived.

Heidegger locates the source of this misinterpretation in the expression ‘object of perception’; for this expression is ambiguous. On the one hand an object of perception can be a real object. On the other hand an object of perception can be an imaginary object, an hallucination. But in both cases, perception and hallucination, Dasein is directed towards a being of some sort or another. In the case of perception Dasein is directed towards a real being; in the case of hallucinations, Dasein is directed towards an imaginary being. The answer to the ontological, i.e. transcendental question, What must be true about the subject if it is possible for it to hallucinate? is this: the subject must be directed towards *as such* if it is possible for it to be directed towards something imaginary. Because the subject is structured in this way, it is possible for it to hallucinate: ‘I can apprehend something imaginarily only if, as apprehender, I *intend* in general. Only then can intending assume the modification of imaginariness.’ BP,60 (Heidegger’s italics). It is this last remark which demonstrates how the structure of intentionality is grounded ontologically in the basic constitution of Dasein; for to be directed towards as such, means that the structure of intentionality is grounded in Dasein’s basic constitution — basic in the sense of essential.
The common sense misinterpretation of the relation between intentionality and perception is not the only misinterpretation Heidegger considered. Another misinterpretation, the theoretical misinterpretation, will be discussed in a moment, but first a clarification of the mistake common sense made.

Heidegger describes the common sense misinterpretation of intentionality as an erroneous objectivizing of intentionality. The mistake being made by common sense therefore, is to objectivize Dasein by interpreting it in a similar way to the way it interprets the object it is perceiving, for example, the chair. What results is that an intentional relation -- the relation between Dasein and the object it is perceiving -- is erroneously likened to an objective relation, a relation between two objects. Such a move is erroneous because it completely misses the intentional nature of Dasein -- that Dasein is a being that relates itself to things.

In *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* Heidegger says that 'relating-to ... is what is meant by the term “intentionality”'. MFL, 133. But he also makes a fundamental distinction between intentionality and transcendence. For Heidegger further determines intentionality as a mode of ontic transcendence. As ontic transcendence it is transcendence towards beings, it is not transcendence towards being. That is to say, it is not ontological transcendence, i.e., being-in-the-world. To obtain a clearer view of Heidegger's conception of transcendence, we will now consider the second misinterpretation of the perceptual comportment; the theoretical misinterpretation.

*The Theoretical Misinterpretation of the Perceptual Comportment and the Problem of Transcendence*

To be clear about the theory behind this misinterpretation of the perceptual comportment, we will quote Heidegger’s characterization of it directly,

Experiences are intentional and accordingly belong to the ego, or, in erudite language, they are immanent to the subject, they belong to the subjective
sphere. But, according to a universal methodological conviction of modern philosophy since Descartes, the subject and its experiences are just that which is given for the subject, the ego itself, as above all solely and indubitably certain. The question arises, How can this ego with its intentional experiences get outside its sphere of experience and assume a relation to the extant world? How can the ego transcend its own sphere and the intentional experiences enclosed within it, and what does this transcendence consist in? More precisely we have to ask, What does the intentional structure of experiences contribute to the philosophical elucidation of transcendence? BP,61-2.

The last two questions of this quote suggest that the problem of transcendence is at the heart of the theoretical misinterpretation. Accordingly the concept of transcendence is what we must now examine in more detail. What does the word transcendence mean and what does the philosophical problem of transcendence depend on? In The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic Heidegger says,

The verbal meaning [of transcendence] comes from *transcendere* [Latin]: to surpass, step over, to cross over to. Thus *transcendence* means the surpassing, the going beyond. And the transcendent means ... that which requires surpassing in order to be accessible and attainable, the beyond, that which is over against. Finally, that which does the transcending is what carries out the stepping over. The verbal meaning then includes the following: 1) an activity in the broadest sense of the term, a doing, 2) in the formal sense, a relation: the crossing over to X, from Y, 3) something which is to be surpassed, a limit, a restriction, a gap, something "lying between." MFL,160, (Heidegger's italics).

This tells us what the word transcendence means literally, but on what does the philosophical problem of transcendence depend? As Heidegger understands it, 'the problem of transcendence depends on how one defines the subjectivity of the subject, the basic constitution of Dasein.' MFL,161. Heidegger mentions three different versions of the problem of transcendence; the theological problem of transcendence, the epistemological problem of transcendence, and the ontological problem of transcendence.
Which version of this problem is relevant to us here? The epistemological problem of
transcendence, and since this problem has its roots in Descartes, what this problem is will
depend upon how Descartes defined the basic constitution of the subject. In Descartes'
case what is this definition? Descartes defined the basic constitution of the subject as
essentially worldless or isolated from its world. The conception of the subject that
corresponds with this definition is implicitly characterized according to Heidegger 'as a sort
of box with an interior, with the walls of a box, and with an exterior.' MFL,160. Of
course Heidegger admits that the 'view is not put forth that consciousness is in fact a box.'
MFL,160. Hence we might ask, Why the analogy with the box? Because as Heidegger
says, 'Without it, the problem of crossing a barrier or border would be nonsense!'
MFL,161. To understand this more fully, we need to explain the specifics behind the
epistemological problem of transcendence. Remember that this will depend on the box like
conception of the subject, and the definition of the subjectivity of the subject that belongs
with it. Moreover according to the literal definition above, the epistemological problem of
transcendence must also include the following three things,

(1) An activity in the broadest sense of the term, a doing
(2) A relation: the crossing over to X from Y
(3) Something which is to be surpassed, a limit, a restriction, a gap, something “lying
between”

Let us now answer the question, What is the epistemological problem of transcendence? in
a way which highlights these three things. The restriction to be surpassed is the interior
wall of the box, that barrier which it must surpass. The crossing over to X from Y, is the
crossing over to the exterior of the box from the interior. Formally the relation is the one
'that somehow or other maintains a passageway between the interior and exterior of the box
by leaping over or pressing through the wall of the box.' MFL 161. The doing, is the
activity of cognizing in the broadest possible sense of the word. The epistemological
problem of transcendence therefore is the problem of explaining how it is possible for this
passage from interior to exterior to occur, or as Heidegger asks in *The Basic Problems of
Phenomenology*; 'How can the ego transcend its own sphere and the intentional
experiences enclosed within it'. BP,61.

The theory just discussed and the problem of transcendence which accompanies it is something Heidegger disagrees with fundamentally,

we must in principle say that transcendence is not a relation between interior and exterior realms such that a barrier belonging to the subject would be crossed over, a barrier that would separate the subject from the outer realm. But neither is transcendence primarily the cognitive relationship a subject has to an object, one belonging to the subject in addition to its subjectivity. MFL,165.

Heidegger opposes this version of the problem of transcendence because he defines the subjectivity of the subject, its basic constitution, as being-in-the-world. We will now state Heidegger's version of the problem of transcendence in a way which makes explicit the three things it must include,

(1) An activity in the broadest sense of the term, a doing
(2) A relation: the crossing over to X from Y
(3) Something which is to be surpassed: a limit, a restriction, a gap, something "lying between"

The activity in the broadest sense of the term, ie. the doing, is not cognizing, but the activity of existing as such. What is surpassed in this activity is not some interior wall, it is beings themselves:

what Dasein surpasses in its transcendence is not a gap or barrier "between" itself and object. But beings, among which Dasein also factically is, get surpassed by Dasein. Objects are surpassed in advance; more exactly, beings are surpassed and can subsequently become objects. MFL,166.

This requires further clarification. For Heidegger 'transcendence means being-in-the-world.' MFL,168. In his essay The Essence of Transcendence, Christopher Macann has
suggested that transcendence means being-in-the-world in 'that the structure of transcendence can be determined as being-in-the-world.' CA,III,133. On the basis of Dasein's being-in-the-world, beings become manifest to Dasein. In becoming manifest, beings are given to Dasein to take. There are different ways Dasein can take the beings it is given; it can use them, it can study them, it can exchange them, it can make art out of them, and it can use them to create new beings. For Heidegger, beings that are given to Dasein in these ways are surpassed; Dasein goes beyond them. In going beyond these beings, the question arises, Towards what is Dasein going? Heidegger's answer; 'That towards which the subject transcends is what we call world.' MFL,166. (Heidegger's italic) In other words, 'Dasein transcends beings, and its surpassing is surpassing to world.' MFL,182.

Actually this last remark also requires further clarification. In saying that Dasein transcends beings towards world, Macann has further pointed out that in Heidegger's theory of transcendence, the world is not the only thing Dasein transcends towards. For Heidegger's claim that Dasein transcends beings towards world pertains to what Macann calls Heidegger's progressive theory of transcendence, and is distinguished by Macann from what he calls Heidegger's regressive theory of transcendence. The difference between the two theories of transcendence is this: 'the progressive theory can be defined as a transcending of Dasein toward the world or towards entities encountered in the world, the regressive as the transcending of beings towards their being.' CA,III,121, (Macann's italic). Macann also points out that although 'these two sides to the theory of transcendence should stand in complementary relation' CA,III,121 'with Heidegger, the two are often not held in complementary relation each with the other'. CA,III,138. Rather in Heidegger, there is a tendency to emphasize the regressive theory of transcendence. What is significant about this for our interpretation, is the obvious similarity between the regressive theory of transcendence and that step in the phenomenological method where a reduction is made from a being to the understanding of its mode of being, ie. phenomenological reduction. However since we will be saying more about the phenomenological reduction in chapter five, we will continue exhibiting Heidegger's conception of transcendence by explaining the formal relation involved in transcendence; the crossing over to X from Y.
Depending upon which theory of transcendence one considers, the crossing over to X from Y would be either a crossing over of beings to world from Dasein (if one considers the progressive theory); or a crossing over of beings to being from Dasein, if the regressive theory of transcendence is considered. The problem of transcendence that Heidegger addresses is to explain how transcendence is possible, and because Heidegger considers temporality to be ‘the metaphysical essence of Dasein’, MFL, 167, time becomes fundamentally implicated in the solution to this problem. But since we said in the beginning that our account of Heidegger’s theory of intentionality would not consider the temporal dimension of this problem, we will now turn to the productive comportment and exhibit the intentional character of this comportment. But first, we will briefly sum up the relation between intentionality and transcendence.

For Heidegger intentionality is the essential structure of Dasein; transcendence, being-in-the-world is the original or primordial structure of Dasein. Intentionality is an ontic comportment and relates to beings. Intentionality is only possible on the basis of transcendence, being-in-the-world. The problem of transcendence is underneath the problem of intentionality and one must neither confuse the problem of transcendence with the problem of intentionality nor pose the problem of transcendence epistemologically or theologically. For when this is done the result is a ‘tangle of partially and falsely posed problems [that are] continually confused in ontological philosophy and systematic theology’. MFL, 162. For Heidegger, ‘The transcendence of Dasein is the central problem, not for the purposes of explaining “knowledge,” but for clarifying Dasein and its existence as such, and the latter in turn with fundamental ontological intent.’ MFL, 135. This said, we will now turn to the productive comportment of Dasein.

The Productive Comportment

The overall act of production can be described as the producing of some being, the product, from some antecedent being(s), the raw material(s), for some purpose. To demonstrate the intentional character of production, once again the same three things need to be made clear;
the *intentio*, the *intentum*, and the understanding of the mode of being of what is intended in the *intentum*.

Asked in relation to production, What is the *intentio*? In the case of production the *intentio* is the act of production, the producing of something. What about the *intentum*? Strictly speaking, what we are initially directed towards when we produce say, a chair, is not the chair itself since this has yet to be produced. Rather what we are initially directed towards is the outward look of the chair, in Greek, the *eidos* of the chair. 19 What the chair is going to look like once we have finished producing it:

> All forming of shaped products is effected by using an image, in the sense of a model, as guide and standard. The thing is produced by looking to the anticipated look of what is to be produced by shaping, forming. It is this anticipated look of the thing, sighted beforehand, that the Greeks mean ontologically by eidos, idea. BP, 106.

On the basis of being initially directed-towards the look of the chair, we can turn circumspectively towards the different raw materials available, and select which materials in particular will be appropriate for producing the chair we want. Before considering the third structural moment of intentionality, let us expand briefly on this.

When I am building a chair, there is a sense in which what I am directed-towards, the look or *eidos* of the chair, is dependent on me for the kind of existence it has. If I stop thinking about how the chair looks that I have yet to build, in a certain sense, it will disappear. But within the context of the productive act, why I am thinking about the look of the chair in the first place is because I want to produce it. What I want to produce is something I can sit on and thus is independent from me. Accordingly the way or manner in which I am directed-towards the look of the chair is with a view to producing a being which can exist on its own. A produced being, a product, is released from any dependency relation to its producer; it is independent.

19 Outward look is the meaning of *eidos* that Heidegger uses when talking about production. *Eidos* can also mean act of seeing, appearance, shape, form; beauty; notion, idea; kind, species description; nature.
The whereto of my [productive] action, conformable to its own peculiar mode of being, is not tied to this relation but rather is supposed to become, precisely by means of this action, something that stands on its own as finished. Not only is it, as finished, factually no longer bound to the productive relation but also, even as something still to be produced, it is understood beforehand as intended to be released from this relation. BP,113.

Finally there is the understanding of the mode of being of what is intended in the intentum. To determine this we must focus on what is intended in the intentum; the finished product. Products are produced for specific purposes. Beings produced for specific purposes are equipment. The mode of being of equipment is readiness-to-hand: ‘The kind of Being which equipment possesses ... we call “readiness-to-hand” [Zuhandenheit].’ BT,69, (Heidegger’s italics)\(^\text{20}\). What Heidegger is saying therefore is that in the productive comportment, there is an implicit understanding of the mode of being of equipment; readiness-to-hand. Thus the understanding of the mode of being of what is intended in the intentum is the implicit understanding of readiness-to-hand. We can be sure we have interpreted Heidegger correctly on this point because he says,

> The thing to be produced is not understood in productive action as something which ... is supposed to be extant [at hand] in itself. Rather, in accordance with the productive intention implicit in it, [the thing to be produced] is already apprehended as something that, qua finished, is available at any time for use. It is intended in productive action ... as something put here, here in the Dasein’s sphere. BP,114. (Heidegger’s italics)

With this we are brought to the concept of readiness-to-hand [Zuhandenheit]. We will explain readiness-to-hand, (or handiness as it is also translated) from the point of view of the phenomenological method used in Being and Time.

\(^{20}\) Here we have quoted the Macquarrie and Robinson translation of Being and Time. For Stambaugh translates Zeug as ‘useful thing’ and Zuhandenheit as ‘handiness’. We will use both handiness and readiness-to-hand interchangeably throughout the rest of what follows. Occasionally we will also use, ‘useful thing’ for equipment, but for the most part we will follow Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation of Zeug as equipment.
Being and Time asks the question, What does it mean to be? Heidegger argues that this question is both ontically and ontologically prior to all other questions of ontology. Because of its priority, Heidegger identifies the question of being as the fundamental question of ontology. Moreover the question of being can only be answered by way of an analysis of the being that has raised the question; Dasein. Dasein is neither a thing nor a consciousness; it is a way of being. Heidegger analyzes Dasein’s way of being, its existence, by inquiring into what it means to exist in the everyday world. But because there are other beings in the world in addition to Dasein, i.e. equipment, works of art, money, one must also inquire into what it means for these other things to be in the world as well. Thus Heidegger asks, What does it mean to be a piece of equipment in the world? His answer; to be a piece of equipment in the world is to be something ready-to-hand. In Being and Time, Heidegger distinguished readiness-to-hand from another mode of being, extantness, or Vorhandenheit. Strictly speaking readiness-to-hand and extantness are categories which apply to the non-human way of being; the ‘two concepts of being [handiness and extantness] are categories and concern beings unlike Da-sein.’ BT,88 (Heidegger’s italic).

Heidegger considers handiness to be ‘the ontological categorical definition of beings as they are “in themselves”’. BT,71 (Heidegger’s italics). Because Heidegger defines readiness-to-hand in relation to the Kantian idea of a thing-in-itself, this suggests that one way in which we can elucidate readiness-to-hand more fully is by comparing and contrasting it with Kant’s conception of the thing-in-itself. The first similarity we can establish is this. Just as for Kant the difference between the thing-in-itself and an appearance is to be found in the way in which the same being is considered, either as it appears to our sensible mode of intuition, or as it is independent from our mode of intuition, so for Heidegger the difference between readiness-to-hand and extantness is to be found in the way in which that

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21 Vorhandenheit has been translated as ‘extantness’ by Hofstadter, ‘presence at hand’ by Macquarrie and Robinson, ‘occurrentness’ by Dreyfus and ‘objective presence’ by Stambaugh. Throughout this work the only translation of Vorhandenheit we will not use is Dreyfus’. The rest we will use interchangeably.
being is encountered by Dasein in everydayness.\footnote{22} For the Heidegger of \textit{Being and Time}, a being can be encountered either as a being which is ready-to-hand or as a being which is extant. When a being is encountered as extant, we are merely observing it the way, say, a biologist would observe a living organism. When a being is encountered ready-to-hand, we are using it and engaging ourselves with it in some way. In a footnote to \textit{Being and Time}, Heidegger explains that '[handiness] must not be understood as a mere characteristic of interpretation' BT,71 and this is where the footnote is added, 'But only as a characteristic of being encountered.' BT,71.

Another point of comparison between Kant’s conception of the thing-in-itself and Heidegger’s claim about readiness-to-hand being the ontological categorical definition of beings as they are in themselves, pertains to the knowability of both. For Kant, an appearance, (= empirical object, in Heidegger’s terminology, an extant thing\footnote{23}) is the only thing we can know in the sense of experience. A thing considered as it is in itself is ‘unknown to us.’ CPR,28.

What may be the nature of objects considered as things in themselves and without reference to the receptivity of our sensibility is quite unknown to us. We know nothing more than our own mode of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which, though not of necessity pertaining to every animated being, is so to the whole human race. CPR, 36 (Meiklejohn trans.)

To understand the similarity between Kant and Heidegger here we need to distinguish between things made by Dasein and things not made by Dasein; raw materials. With

\footnote{22} There has been some dispute by Kantians over whether this particular interpretation about the relationship between appearance and thing-in-itself is to be understood in the way we have explained it, or whether the thing as appearance is one entity and that the thing in itself is a second and distinct entity. With respect to this dispute Heidegger maintains that the latter interpretation of the thing in itself is incorrect; ‘One of the crudest misunderstandings by the otherwise most accurate and profound of Kant interpretations, that of the Marburg School, consists in its having understood the thing-in-itself as something separate and then in having sought to interpret it away. In the \textit{Opus Postumum} Kant says: The thing-in-itself is no other being than the appearance, but both [thing-in-itself and appearance] only express “another regard (respectus) the representation has to the same object.” The same being can be the correlate of an \textit{intuitus originarius} or an \textit{intuitus derivatus}; the difference resides “merely in the difference of the relationship, how ... the subject ... is affected.”’ MFL,164.

\footnote{23} See PIKCPR,68, for more on Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s conception of the thing-in-itself
respect to things not made by Dasein i.e. raw materials, there is a sense in which Heidegger appears to concur with Kant’s conclusion about not being able to know them. However with respect to the things made by Dasein, i.e. equipment, products, tools, for Heidegger we can know these beings in themselves. The sense in which we can know them is in having an explicit understanding of how they work and the way they are in the world. Let us explain.

For Heidegger, we understand the being-in-itself of equipment because we understand the productive history of a piece of equipment. By productive history we mean all the history that lies behind a product we have built; why it was conceived by Dasein in the first place, the need it was supposed to satisfy, how its design was arrived at, why it must be made out of the specific materials it is made out of, why it must be produced in a certain part of the world, what changes its design may have undergone over time and why. Heidegger’s point is that once we have understood this, there is nothing more we need to know in order to be able to claim that we have an understanding of these beings as they are ‘in themselves’.

Heidegger thinks that only by interpreting the ‘in itself’ in the way just described, can talk about ‘in itself’ have any ontological importance. For the alternative to interpreting the ‘in itself’ in the way just described, is to interpret it in a Kantian way. However the problem with the Kantian interpretation of a being in itself, is that ‘When we are primarily and exclusively oriented towards that which is objectively present, the “in itself” cannot be ontologically explained at all,’ BT,76. Why is this? Because when we consider from a Kantian perspective a being ‘in itself’, what we are considering is not an object of possible experience. And since it is not an object of possible experience, we cannot say anything about it. But according to Heidegger, ‘[if the talk about “in-itself” is to have any ontological importance we must demand an interpretation of the ‘in itself’].’ BT,76. What we have just tried to supply is what Heidegger’s interpretation of the ‘in itself’ is.

It is another question entirely to ask whether those primary beings not produced by Dasein,
ie. the raw materials, can be known in themselves. With respect to this question, there is a sense in which Heidegger seems to concur with Kant’s conclusion about their unknowability; for like Kant, Heidegger does seem to think that, ‘in themselves’ we cannot know these primary beings in that we cannot explicitly understand them the way we understand equipment we have made. However Heidegger’s reason for thinking this is different from the reason Kant had for asserting his claim that the thing-in-itself cannot be known.

To support the above interpretation, consider the following quote from Heidegger’s lecture, *What is Metaphysics*;

we can never comprehend absolutely the ensemble of beings in themselves...

In the end an essential distinction prevails between comprehending the ensemble of beings in themselves and finding oneself in the midst of beings as a whole. The former is impossible in principle. The latter happens all the time in our existence. BW,101.

An essential distinction prevails between comprehending the ensemble of beings in themselves, and finding oneself in the midst of beings as a whole. The part of this distinction that is relevant for us is the part about comprehending the ensemble of beings in themselves. The ensemble or totality of beings as a whole divides up into those that have been produced by Dasein and those that have not been produced by Dasein. In his lectures on Plato’s *Sophist* Heidegger says about those beings not produced by Dasein, that they ‘have an entirely different ontological structure than the ones to which [the productive comportment] relates’ PS,189, ie. equipment we have produced. In what does this difference consist? In the case of those beings Dasein has produced, products and equipment, because Dasein is the one who produced them it can understand them as they are ‘in themselves’. But in the case of the raw materials, a giant question mark hangs over who or what did produce them. We cannot understand the being-in-itself of these primary beings because we cannot understand their productive history. As we interpret Heidegger, it is our ability to understand the productive history of a being that enables us to claim we
can understand some beings as they are 'in themselves'. But since we did not produce those beings which were already there, the possibility of understanding these beings 'in themselves' is, as Heidegger says, 'impossible in principle.' BW,101. Thus Heidegger agrees with Kant's conclusion that certain beings cannot be known in themselves, but not because one would need intellectual intuition in order to be able to experience these beings, but because these primary beings are beings Dasein has not produced.

This concludes our discussion of Heidegger's theory of intentionality. The main concepts we will keep coming back to are readiness-to-hand, or handiness, equipment and the three different structural moments of intentionality. Something worth pointing out about the relation between equipment and readiness-to-hand is this: when Heidegger makes the move from equipment to the kind of being that equipment possess, methodologically speaking, what he is doing is performing the phenomenological reduction from a being, equipment, to its mode of being, readiness-to-hand. In the ensuing interpretation we too must take this step and make a similar phenomenological reduction from money to its mode of being. But before doing this we will first consider the question about why it was that Heidegger passed over money without the slightest mention of the fact that it was something ideally suited for the kind of phenomenological investigation his method conducts. As mentioned before, our interpretation will consider this question from two different angles. First in relation to common sense. Second in relation to the history of philosophy.
Chapter 3 Common Sense Explanation of Why Heidegger Passed over Money.

The question to be considered both here and in the next chapter is, Why did Heidegger pass over money from phenomenological investigation? This question is more difficult to answer than it may at first appear; for Heidegger never explained why he passed over money from philosophical investigation. Rather it was something he just did. It is for us however, a question of fundamental importance to consider since money is a being ideally suited for phenomenological investigation. Why is this? Because money is, from an everyday perspective, certainly close to us. We all know that in everydayness we must pay money in order to acquire the things we need, and that laws exist which prevent us from merely taking these things without paying. Money is also ideally suited for phenomenological investigation because, despite its ontical closeness, it is a being of which there is virtually no ontological knowledge. Consequently for our interpretation to be a rigorous affair, we must consider the following question: Why would a philosopher like Heidegger, so committed to the idea of doing violence to the tradition, and so committed to the idea of drawing ontological knowledge from what is ontically familiar, not only pass up an opportunity to do violence to the tradition by investigating money phenomenologically, but actually concur with it by remaining silent about money?

In this chapter we will consider the common sense explanation of why Heidegger did this, namely that he neglected to investigate money phenomenologically because he considered it to be merely another item of equipment. This is the kind of explanation common sense would offer to account for Heidegger's philosophical silence about money. Why would common sense offer this kind of an explanation? Because there are some common sense reasons for thinking Heidegger might actually subscribe to the view that money is equipment, given some of the things he said about equipment. For example in the History of the Concept of Time Heidegger says: 'The tool has the character of being of 'in-order-to'. HCT,191, (Heidegger's italics). This is reiterated in Being and Time; '[Equipment] is essentially "something in-order-to ...".' BT,68 One common sense argument which can be inferred from this in favor of the conclusion that money is equipment runs as follows.
P1 Everything with the character of being of in-order-to is equipment
P2 Money has the character of being of in-order-to
∴ Money is equipment

Does this argument support the conclusion that money is equipment? No. Why? Because the first premise is false; not everything with the character of being of in-order-to is equipment. Consider the work of art. One could say of a work of art that it too has the character of being of in-order-to. A filmmaker for example, could describe her film as a comedy and say of it that it is in-order-to cheer Dasein up when it is depressed. Similarly an artist could say that her sculpture of a man thinking is in-order-to encourage Dasein to think. So long as one is willing to concede that there is a purpose to art, (and even purposeless art has a purpose), it will have this character of being of in-order-to; but just because an art work has the in-order-to character of being, this does not make it equipment. For a work of art is not the same as an item of equipment, from which it follows that their modes of being are not the same either. Heidegger expressed this conclusion in his essay, *On the Origin of the Work of Art*;

> the work [of art] is not a piece of equipment that is fitted out in addition with an aesthetic value that adheres to it. The work is no more anything of the kind than the bare thing is a piece of equipment that merely lacks the specific equipmental characteristic of usefulness and being made. BW,166.

One can liken art to equipment in a common sense way by saying that the work of art shares with equipment the character of being of in-order-to, but doing this prevents one from seeing the way in which art is, ie. its mode of being. Similarly, one can liken money to equipment by saying that the former shares with equipment the character of being of in-order-to, but doing this prevents one from seeing money’s mode of being. This will be made even clearer when we perform the phenomenological reduction and determine money’s mode of being. What is important about the above mentioned argument however, is that it tells us that the more basic differences between money and equipment are subtle and easily overlooked. Thus to detect them a ‘phenomenological seeing’ must be used to bring them into view. This we shall pursue later.
Common sense thinks that the reason Heidegger passed over money from philosophical investigation was because he considered it to be merely another item of equipment. The second argument in favour of this conclusion arises from our everyday way of speaking about money which reinforces the common sense conception of it as equipment.

The second argument that money is equipment can be inferred from the following quote found in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology: ‘Equipment, taken in its ontological sense ... includes everything we make use of domestically or in public life.’ BP, 292. In its simplest form this second argument would have the same syllogistic structure as the last one.

P1 Everything we make use of in public life is equipment
P2 Money is something we make use of in public life

\[
\therefore \text{ Money is equipment}
\]

The problem here lies with the second premise. Strictly speaking it is false. To see this, first recall what Heidegger said about the phenomenological method doing violence to the everyday way of speaking. The everyday way of speaking about money is to say it is something we use. This is a perfectly valid claim to make; for people can often be heard to say things like ‘I could certainly use the money’, and other similar expressions. These expressions reinforce the idea that money is like other items of equipment we use; they also reinforce the idea that readiness-to-hand must therefore be money’s mode of being. But that it is everyday discourse which is asserting that we use money, is reason enough to think Heidegger would not put forward this argument; for if he did, he would be endorsing a common sense interpretation of money and Dasein’s relation to it as opposed to doing violence to such an interpretation. When common sense claims that we use money just as we use every other item of equipment, the phenomenological method demands of us that we do violence to this claim. How do we do violence to this claim? By pointing out that it obliterates a fundamental ontological distinction. It is because of this that the second premise in the above mentioned argument is false.
In *Being and Time*, Heidegger warns the reader that 'fundamental ontological distinctions are easily obliterated' when 'we express linguistically with the same means, different relations of being'. When seen in relation to the everyday discourse about money, this last claim of Heidegger's certainly raises the question, What fundamental ontological distinction is being obliterated by saying that we use money just as we use equipment? Answer; the distinction between use and exchange.

Strictly speaking, to claim that we use money is false. So far as public life is concerned, we do not use money at all; we exchange it. Kant too regarded exchange as the feature which distinguished money from everything else: ‘Money is a thing which can only be made use of, by being alienated or exchanged. This is a good Nominal Definition, as given by Achenwall; and it is sufficient to distinguish objects of the Will of this kind from all other objects.’ Everyday discourse about money which asserts that we use it, obscures the fact that money is exchanged for the things we need and want. Actually the obfuscation of the use/exchange distinction is even reflected in nineteenth and twentieth century economic interpretations of use value and exchange value. In his book *Aristotle’s Economic Thought* Scott Meikle observes the following with respect to this point.

The distinction between use value and exchange value comes to be progressively elided in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In Mill’s definition, wealth is ‘all useful or agreeable things, which possess exchangeable value.’ The elision goes still further with the subsequent appearance of neo-classical economics ... By the time Alfred Marshall wrote, some twenty years later, the distinction is mentioned ... only to be rejected without argument, and use value itself is dismissed out of hand:

‘The word value’ says Adam Smith ‘has two different meanings, and sometimes expresses the utility of some particular object and sometimes the power of purchasing other goods which the possession of that object conveys.’ But experience has shown that it is not well to use the word in the former sense. The value, that is the exchange value, of one thing in terms of another at any time and place, is the amount of that second thing which can be got there and then in exchange for the first. Thus the term value is relative, and expressers the relation between two things at a particular time and place.

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More will be said about the distinction between use and exchange later, but first there are some superficial objections to consider to our claim that we do not use money we exchange it. One obvious way to object to what we are saying is to provide counterexamples to our claim that money is something we exchange. Thus it might be objected that a person who marks the page in the book she is reading with a five pound note is not exchanging money, but is using it. Similarly the person who uses money as a means to accumulating more money -- the moneylender, the trader, the stockbroker -- is also not exchanging money, but using it.

As a response to these objections, consider what Dreyfus has pointed out about Heidegger's conception of equipment; for Heidegger, 'a piece of equipment ... is defined by what it is normally used for by a normal user in a culture where such objects have an established function' CBT,64, (Dreyfus' italic). Assuming that Dreyfus is correct about this, these two examples do not constitute objections. Why? Because neither the use of money in order to mark a page in a book, nor the using of money as a means to accumulating more money, or for that matter any other counterexamples, can be said to represent normal 'uses' of money by a person in a culture where money has an established function.25 For what the established function of money is in a culture, is as a means of exchange. Because of this, to say that we make use of money is to say something which conflicts with the facts of the matter so far as monetary transactions are concerned within the domain of public life. Money is not just another item of equipment; for what is true of money is that we exchange it while what is true of equipment is that we use it. In fact one could even say that money is radically different from equipment precisely because we exchange it, and that if we cannot exchange it then it is, as Aristotle acknowledges, totally unexchangeable: 'when one currency is replaced by another [as legal tender by the users of it], the first is worthless and of no use to the necessities of life.' Pol,1257b,12f.

Actually what the two counterexamples mentioned above bring out, is the need Aristotle

25 Here of course we must be careful to note that talk of a normal 'use' of money is misleading for strictly speaking what is normal so far as money is concerned is not that it is used but rather that it is exchanged.
recognized in the *Politics* to distinguish between what he called the proper use of money and the improper use of money. According to Aristotle, the moneylender, the stockbroker, the trader and so forth, all use money in a way which is improper; for money was not invented to be used as a means of acquiring more money. Rather money was invented as a means of exchange. Because of this its proper use is to be exchanged, but only for the things that we need ie. food, water, shelter. We shall be saying more about Aristotle’s account of the relation between the use of equipment and the exchange of money later so there is no need to dwell on it here.

Our question asked, Why did Heidegger pass over money from philosophical investigation? We have been analyzing the kind of answer common sense would give to this question, which can be basically summed up like this: common sense takes a common sense conception of money -- money as equipment -- attributes it to Heidegger, and then asks us to believe that Heidegger passed over money from phenomenological investigation because he considered it to be equipment. And since in *Being and Time* Heidegger investigated equipment phenomenologically, to do it again in the case of money would be superfluous.

In opposition to this common sense view we assert the following. First, so far as public life is concerned, money is not equipment because equipment we use; money we exchange. Second it is implausible to suggest that Heidegger would consider money to be equipment; for there is evidence to support the opposite of this, namely that Heidegger would have concluded that the one thing money was not was equipment. The evidence being Heidegger’s awareness of the ease with which fundamental ontological distinctions like the distinction between use and exchange can be obliterated through everyday discourse. Such an awareness suggests that had Heidegger looked at money he most likely would have noticed that the everyday way of speaking about money encourages the obliteration of the use/exchange distinction. However even if Heidegger had actually looked at money and still failed to notice that everyday discourse about it obliterates the use/exchange distinction, there is another reason to think that he would not merely equate money with equipment and
exchange with use, which has to do with the phenomenological method; for the phenomenological method does not allow the assumption that readiness-to-hand is money's mode of being. Why is this? Because to assume that readiness-to-hand is money's mode of being is to formulate a particular thesis about the being of money prior to a phenomenological investigation of it. Such a move is contrary to the phenomenological method Heidegger followed: 'it is ... precluded from the start that phenomenology should pronounce any theses about being which have specific content, thus adopting a so-called standpoint.' BP,20. If it is precluded from the start that phenomenology should pronounce any theses about being which have a specific content, then *ipso facto* we are prohibited from pronouncing that the kind of being money possesses is that of readiness-to-hand. Admittedly this also means that we cannot rule out the possibility that the mode of being of money might in fact turn out to be readiness-to-hand after a phenomenological investigation of the being of money has been conducted, but as we will see in chapter five, the mode of being of money is no more readiness-to-hand than is the mode of being of the work of art.

We can now pause to sum up what we have established. Money is not equipment, nor is its mode of being that of readiness-to-hand. Next we must ask about the phenomenological differences between money and equipment, and use and exchange. Here we will limit ourselves to merely two, but first a comment about the distinction between use and exchange.

The distinction between use and exchange was first made by Aristotle and is, according to Meikle, 'the foundation of economic thought.' AET,8. What this means: without this distinction, economics is not possible. The relevance of this point pertains to our application of the phenomenological method; for by stating that Aristotle was the first to distinguish between use and exchange, we have traced a distinction back to its origins in Antiquity. Thus we can say that we have applied explicit effort to that 'critical process in which the traditional concepts, which at first must necessarily be employed, are deconstructed down to the sources from which they were drawn.' BP,23. Further effort to the process of phenomenological destruction will be made later. In the present discussion
let us now consider in more detail Aristotle’s distinction between use value and exchange value by considering something else Meikle said about it.

[For Aristotle] use value and exchange value fall into different logical categories. ‘Use value’ as a collective term collects substances as substances, that is, as the things they are by nature, and so use value is necessarily qualitatively differentiated and heterogeneous. Exchange value, when it exists, inheres in those same substances, but since the term denotes a quantity it cannot collect them in the same way, as substances. It must do so without regard to differences between them as substances. A quantity is undifferentiated, homogeneous, and lacks species. A difference of logical category is the most basic difference possible, and it is irreducible. AET, 16-17.

Assuming that Meikle is correct about Aristotle’s position on use value and exchange value, several questions converge here which must be kept asunder. First is the question of whether Heidegger would agree with Meikle’s claim that ‘a difference of logical category is the most basic difference possible’. For Heidegger might question this on the grounds that the most basic difference is a difference of ontological category. We will not get sidetracked with a detailed discussion about this; for the relevant question concerns the differences between use and exchange, and how to determine them. We will now proceed with a phenomenological seeing in order to expose some of the differences between money and equipment, and exchange and use.

First Difference Between The Use of Equipment and the Exchange of Money

When philosophizing with the phenomenological method, demonstration of the difference between the use of equipment and the exchange of money is not done by arguing that the former is fundamentally different from the latter. Instead what is required is phenomenologically seeing that the use of equipment and the exchange of money are fundamentally different. As a way of getting the reader to phenomenologically see this, we must contrast money and its exchange with equipment and its use; for phenomenological
seeing is gained through the method of contrasting one relation of being with another. That we have not misinterpreted Heidegger here so far as the notion of phenomenological seeing is concerned, is proved by the fact that in *Being and Time*, Heidegger himself used this same method of contrasting two different relations of being to achieve a similar goal.

Because we are concerned in these analyzes with *seeing* a primordial structure of being of Da-sein [ie. being-together-with] ... and because this structure is fundamentally incomprehensible in terms of the traditional ontological categories .... We shall again choose the method of contrasting it with something essentially ontologically different -- that is, a categorical relation of being which we express linguistically with the same means. BT,55, (Heidegger's italic).

Phenomenological seeing is achieved by contrasting different relations of being. But one might object to this last remark; for contrasting is also a method one can use in traditional forms of argument. What is the difference between contrasting different relations of being for the purposes of phenomenological seeing and the kind of contrasting one uses in traditional forms of argumentation? Obviously the answer to this question depends upon what is meant by 'traditional forms of argumentation.' But rather than try to define this, consider something else Heidegger said about phenomenological seeing in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*.

it is a kind of seeing and comprehending which is alien and burdensome for the ordinary understanding. As for the latter, the realm and field of its success and its failures is that kind of argumentation which is capable of going on indefinitely even though it has long since ceased to see anything. Nobody notices its blindness, especially since the arguing and talking then generally gets even louder. FCM, 232.

Phenomenological seeing and the questioning and comprehending that goes with it, is alien and burdensome for the ordinary understanding because it focuses on and questions those things the ordinary understanding overlooks; that which is self-evident, that which is so close to us in everydayness that we do not notice it, that which we constantly ignore in
favour of 'what are merely the necessary external trappings.' FCM,232. In our case for example, the ordinary understanding overlooked the use/exchange distinction between money and equipment and in doing so erroneously assumed that we use money as opposed to exchange it. But phenomenological seeing does not overlook this; it looks at and asks about the exchange of money. Heidegger warns us that the idea of looking at the self-evident may sound simple enough, but the kind of seeing and comprehending that he is referring to is actually very difficult 'since it does not involve simply gazing or staring at something.' FCM, 232. To understand what it does involve let us now look at the first difference between money and equipment.

The first difference to identify between equipment and money stems from the kind of knowing which belongs to the use of equipment. For Heidegger, the kind of knowing which belongs to the use of equipment is knowing in the sense of knowing-how: 'the nearest kind of association is not mere perceptual cognition, but, rather, a handling, using, and taking care of things which has its own kind of “knowledge.”' BT,67. In the monetary transactions within everydayness, on the face of it, there does not appear to be any kind of know-how involved; for the kind of knowing which belongs to everyday monetary transaction is a simple knowing-that this amount of money purchases that table. This difference between knowing-how to put an item of equipment to use, and knowing-that this amount of money can be exchanged for that object requires closer examination.

A closer examination of this distinction suggests that one still needs to know-how to exchange one thing for another first, before one is in a position to be able to know that the amount of money one has can be exchanged for a table. True enough. But the kind of know-how that belongs to the exchange of beings must be fundamentally distinguished from the kind of know-how involved in putting equipment to use, and producing beings. In his lectures on Plato’s Sophist, Heidegger examined Plato’s distinction between two basic kinds of know-how; productive know-how and appropriative know-how. What is relevant to us here is that exchange belongs to the appropriative kind of know-how, while the kind of know-how which belongs to the use of equipment in the production of beings
belongs to productive know-how. When Heidegger analyzes this distinction of Plato’s, he provides the following diagram as an aid to understanding Plato’s analysis of know-how.  

![Know-how Diagram]

This diagram shows the distinction between the different kinds of know-how and where exchange fits in, namely as a species of appropriative know-how. Appropriative know-how is knowing-how to ‘[grasp something with the hand, bring something close to oneself, appropriate it] ... this appropriation is ... determined negatively by the fact that ... these modes of comportment having the character of appropriation “produce nothing.’” PS, 189. Alternatively, productive know-how is knowing-how to bring ‘something into being which previously was not there, i.e. a potentiality for ποιεῖν, [production].’ PS, 187.

We can determine more clearly the difference between knowing-how to exchange beings and knowing how to use a being like a hammer either to build something or repair it in the following way. If we consider an exchange of beings one of the first things we notice is this: an exchange cannot take place in isolation. I need the presence of the other if I am to exchange my apple for her orange. If the other is absent I cannot make an exchange.  

However the use of equipment can take place in complete isolation from the other -- imagine a hermit in the Himalayas using a hammer to build herself a home. Once this is

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26 Actually Heidegger’s diagram is in Greek. We have take the liberty to translate it into English. See Plato’s Sophist, p. 194.

27 In the sixth chapter we consider an objection to the claim that I need the other in order to make an exchange, but mentioning it here is not relevant to the point we are making about the difference between knowing-how to exchange beings and knowing how to use a being.

* For a clarification of this problem, see the back of page 52.
*4. Of course, one could object to what has been said here by pointing to a different item of equipment like a telephone. It too requires the other as well. But the problem with saying this is that one can think of instances in which one uses the telephone and does not need the presence of the other, like when we do telephone banking, or are plugged into the internet. The point is that a distinction can be made with the use of equipment which is not as easy to make with the exchange of money, namely the distinction between use in isolation, and joint-use. A hermit in the middle of the Himalayas using a hammer is an example of use in isolation, a person talking to her friend on a telephone is an example of joint-use.

In the case of exchange however, to distinguish between exchange in isolation, and joint-exchange is problematic. Why? Because by its very nature exchange in isolation, is enigmatic. How can people have an exchange with themselves? It seems difficult to imagine how exchange can take place in isolation. One needs the other in a peculiar sort of way if one is to exchange with them. Possible objections to this position will be considered in chapter six when we consider the question of whether an exchange can take place between a person and a vending machine.

As we will see in a moment, one way to discuss the problematic distinction between use and exchange mentioned above is to distinguish as Aristotle did in his *Politics* between the proper use of something and the improper use of something. Another way to approach the problematic distinction between use and exchange, is what distinguishes classical from neo-classical economists in the nineteenth century. Scott Meikle has pointed out that here the debate was with whether or not exchange value was reducible to use value, or whether like Aristotle suggested and Marx concurred, exchange value and use value were irreducible and fundamental.

The object of neo-classical theory ... was to show ... that exchange value can be explained in terms of use value. Jenons, Menger, and Walras would all of them have approved of this statement ... no such view could be attributed to Aristotle, any more than to Smith, Ricardo, and Marx, though at best he grasped only intuitively that in Aristotle’s case the most basic reason for this was the irreducible category-distinction Aristotle draws between use value and exchange value. AET,111.

Clearly, the distinction between use and exchange is an old and complicated distinction with a considerable history behind it. However rather than carry on arguing about whether exchange is reducible to use, let us bring into sharper focus the difference between knowing-how to exchange X for Y, and knowing-how to use either X or Y. (Return to page 53 *)
seen we can bring into sharper focus the difference between knowing-how to exchange X for Y and knowing-how to use either X or Y.

The philosopher Adam Smith touched on what one needs to know how to do if one is to exchange beings, when he observed that, 'It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest' WN,119. Smith went on to conclude from this that '[Man] will be more likely to prevail if he can interest [the other’s] self-love in his favor, and show them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them.' WN, 118. In other words, to exchange beings what I need to know-how to do is this: I need to know how to convince, or persuade the other that it is in their own interest to exchange their orange for my apple. Strictly speaking, I need to know how to persuade the other of two things; first, that they actually want or need what I have, and second that they actually do not need or want what they have, or that they want or need what I have more than they want or need what they have. The know-how belonging to exchange therefore is Dasein oriented; it is not oriented around beings whose mode of being is not that of Dasein; it is oriented around existence, the way of being of Dasein, and the kinds of needs Dasein has. Thus the difference between knowing-how to exchange beings and knowing-how to use a being is that knowing-how to exchange beings is a knowing relation between two people, while knowing-how to use a being either to produce or repair something does not need to be a knowing relation between two people; it can be a knowing relation between Dasein and the equipment it is using in order to produce something.

*Second Difference Between Money and Equipment*

A second difference between equipment and money can be phenomenologically seen by considering Heidegger’s lectures on the *History of the Concept of Time*. There he says,

The range of usability of a tool is narrower or wider. A hammer has a wider range of usability than a watchmaker’s instrument, which is tailored
According to this quote, equipment is circumscribed between the two poles of wider use and narrower use. Some items of equipment are designed to perform many tasks while others are designed to perform only a few. Naturally it is always possible for equipment to be used to perform a task it was not designed to perform, but even if a hammer is used to keep a door ajar, it is still being used to perform some specific task. The point to emphasize being, that there is a certain plurality to equipment. Even if an item of equipment is broken and unable to do what it was originally designed to do, this does not necessarily render the item totally useless. For the item of equipment will have other properties which enable it to be used for other tasks. This is what is implied in saying that equipment is circumscribed between the two poles of wider and narrower use.

Money however is not circumscribed between the two poles of wider use and narrower use. There is no plurality to money at all. There is only a singularity, or oneness to money, and if one cannot exchange money for something, it goes from being exchangeable to being totally unexchangeable -- there is no middle ground. Anyone whose money has ever been refused because the other thought it counterfeit will attest to this. With respect to this peculiarity about money, Simmel's explanation for it is that 'money is a thing absolutely lacking in qualities' PM,244. What Simmel concluded however distinguished the methods he used from the phenomenological method; for what Simmel concluded was that money 'cannot, as even the most pitiful object, conceal within itself any surprises or disappointments.' PM,244. Heidegger, as we already know, concluded the opposite; for when we believe what Simmel does -- that because of its apparent lack of qualities, 'We know more about money than about any other object' PM,244, -- we can be sure it is concealing within itself surprises and disappointments, and that we do not know as much as we think about money. Hence the question, What kind of surprises and disappointments does money conceal?
By considering something Heidegger said in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, we can see an example of the kind of surprise that money can offer a philosopher to reflect on. At the same time we will also gain an important insight into the relation between money and equipment which suggests that there is more to it than what common sense takes there to be, namely a mere equivalence between the two. ‘For us two things that are the same are interchangeable, one and the same.’ ITM,138. Now money and equipment are also interchangeable; for a hammer costing five dollars, and five dollars itself, are interchangeable. If Smith takes my five dollar hammer and gives me five dollars in exchange for it, I do not necessarily feel cheated by this; for not only I, but society as such, understands and accepts that a five dollar hammer and five dollars are interchangeable.

The above quote occurs within the context of the chapter on the limitation of being. Here Heidegger distinguishes being from four other concepts; becoming, appearance, thinking, and ought. The particular concept Heidegger distinguishes being from in this instance is thinking. To do this Heidegger turns to what ancient philosophers referred to as the unity of opposites, and the back and forth movement between these opposites. Accordingly, in interpreting this Heidegger asks, ‘What sort of unity is meant in this self-sameness [of two things, that are interchangeable]?’ ITM,138. He is very specific in answering this: ‘We cannot determine this as we please. Here ... unity is never empty indifference; it is not sameness in the sense of mere equivalence. Unity is the belonging-together of antagonisms.’ ITM,138.

The surprising thing is what this quote suggests about the relation between money and equipment, and exchange and use, namely that in their own way they too are an example of the unity of opposites. For in money and equipment, exchange and use, there is a belonging-together of antagonisms. To see this, consider an insight of Simmel’s about money: ‘In its very essence [money] is quite external to things and completely indifferent to their differences, so that each entity can fully absorb it and develop its specific nature to its fullest extent.’ PM,498 (Simmel’s italic). To paraphrase Simmel, money is completely indifferent to the things it measures, represents, and can be exchanged for; but things
themselves, with all their differences, are not indifferent to money. On the contrary, they are completely responsive to money. Different things respond differently to money. How? By having different prices on them. Frequently the differences between a hand-made chair and one that has been mass produced will translate into a different price being attached to the handmade chair. More generally put, beings that are different, have different prices. The antagonism between money and equipment therefore consists in this: money is, as Simmel says, completely indifferent to equipment, while equipment is completely responsive to money. Surely this forms an antagonism; money is totally indifferent to equipment, equipment is totally responsive money.

What we have said here speaks only about the antagonism between money and equipment. What about the antagonism between use and exchange? In the Politics, Aristotle says something which could be interpreted to throw some light on this antagonism between use and exchange when he states: 'Each possession may be used in two ways, both of which belong to the thing itself but not in a similar way.' Pol,1257a,6f. Put more precisely, a thing may be used or it may be exchanged. The example Aristotle gives is of a shoe. There is an appropriate use for a shoe, which is to wear it since shoes were primarily made for wearing; a 'shoe was not [originally] made for the sake of exchange. The same may be said of the other possessions, for the art of exchange extends to all of them'. Pol,1257a,14f. The only thing that is made for the sake of exchange is money. Everything else is made for the sake of use. Here we see a certain antagonism between the use of a being and the exchange of a being. We either use beings or exchange them. We do not do both, at least not at the same time. The way of exchange is different from the way of use, and in the everyday world there is a back and forth movement between beings that are used and beings that are exchanged. The antagonism therefore consists in this: the way of use is antagonistic towards the way of exchange -- use moves equipment in the opposite direction that exchange moves money. For example, if we want to bring equipment close to us in the sense of either possessing or controlling it, we must part with

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28 Of course different things can have the same price on them, but this is a separate point. Our focus is on the fact that the differences between things show themselves to us as different prices.
our money. If we want to bring money close to us in the sense of either possessing or controlling it, we must part with either the things we have built and others will buy in order to obtain this money; equipment, or the skills we have equipped ourselves with that others will give us money for. Put more simply we must give something up, if we are to take something back.

The first surprise we considered -- that the relation between money and equipment turns out to be another example of the unity of opposites -- prompted us to look back to antiquity. Something else which is surprising about money in the sense that we frequently overlook it, can be seen by considering the future of money in the technological age. For with the rise of computer banking and the internet, technology is now able to furnish money with an extension in cyberspace, thereby liberating it from its physical extendedness in space. The distinction between extension in cyberspace and extension in space encourages a distinction between money which is empirically real and money which is electronically real; electronic or emoney for short.

A cashless or coinless society is not the same as a moneyless society. Owing to computers and the internet, a cashless society wherein emoney is exchanged is now a serious possibility. In fact there are a number of reasons for thinking that it is merely a matter of time before a cashless society comes about. First because the cost to banks and other financial institutions to actually process cash is enormous. If one removes coins and currency, one removes the cost of processing coins and currency. Of course the cost of processing electronic money would replace the cost of processing coins and cash, but if the actual cost of the former were estimated to be less than that of the latter, it is reasonable to assume that the move to a cashless society will be a reality sooner or later; for if something is less expensive to Dasein it frequently happens that after a while this something, whatever it is, becomes adopted and standardized by Dasein.

A second reason why it may be only a matter of time before a cashless society will come about is because many people find it more convenient to not have to deal with actual coins
and banknotes in their everyday life. One need only think of the rate at which plastic debit
and credit cards are replacing coins and banknotes to see this. In this regard, there is much
talk today of future Dasein only having to carry around one card in its wallet instead of the
multitude of cards it now carries. This one card will function as a debit and credit card, an
identification card, a library card, an health card, a passport, a house key, a car key and so
forth.

The logic behind this move towards a single card is easy to understand. Why have ten
cards when technology can place all this information on one card. But what the logic
conceals here is this: by making Dasein dependent upon a single card to access the things of
the world, every time Dasein uses this card -- either to purchase something, to check a
book out of a library, to be admitted into the hospital, to be admitted into its place of
employment -- it will be leaving behind an electronic trail of all its movements, all its
purchases, and where and when these purchases were made. This trail can be used to track
Dasein by anyone who knows what electronic code or number to look for. Moreover the
amount of people who will be able to gain access to the right code of a particular Dasein
will increase the more we become computer dependent. The fear therefore is that the move
towards the kind of emoney we have mentioned above, is a move away from the concept of
anonymity itself. Why? Because one thing we take for granted about cash, so much that
we do not even notice it, is the degree of anonymity it enables Dasein to enjoy as to how it
spends its money, where this money allows it to go, and who it spends its money on. Emoney
will put an end to this anonymity because every place where Dasein spends its
emoney, it will leave behind an electronic fingerprint of this transaction.

What are the implications for emoney? One area that would be greatly affected by emoney
would be that of crime. Consider the traditional form of bank robbery. It would become
obsolete; for if there is no money in a bank vault, it cannot be stolen. Of course there
would be a rise in computer bank robbery, but this is the price one must pay for
technological progress. Consider also the crime of kidnapping.\textsuperscript{29} If there is no money, then a kidnapper could not demand ransom money in exchange for the return of the person whom they have kidnapped. Admittedly they could still demand ransom \textit{emoney}, but any kidnapper who did this would not remain at large for long; for \textit{emoney} must be deposited into a bank account. An account that would no doubt be monitored twenty fours hours a day by law enforcement officers who would be watching for any withdrawals from this account. As soon as the kidnapper started to withdrawal \textit{emoney} from this account, the authorities would start to track them through their financial transactions, thus making the apprehension of the kidnapper merely a matter of time. There are many other implications that the move to \textit{emoney} would bring. In fact one could even argue that the introduction of electronic money into the world, could change the world more than the discovery of money itself changed the world, however we will not argue this here. Instead we will now sum up what we have established in this chapter.

Our aim was to consider the common sense interpretation of why Heidegger passed over money from phenomenological investigation. What we have argued is that common sense cannot explain why Heidegger passed over money from phenomenological investigation. In arguing for this, we have established some basic differences between money and equipment, which are; first within everydayness money is exchanged, equipment is used; second there is a singularity to money, there is a plurality to equipment; third the know-how that belongs with money and exchange is a species of appropriative know-how, the know-how that belongs with equipment and use is productive-know. Finally that handiness is not the being of money; for if money is not equipment it cannot have the mode of being of equipment. In the next chapter we will consider the question of why Heidegger remained silent about money in relation to the history of philosophy.

\textsuperscript{29} This example of kidnapping I owe to an article printed in \textit{Time Magazine}, Canadian Edition, April 27, 1998, p. 23.
In this chapter we attempt to explain why Heidegger passed over money from his phenomenological investigations in relation to the philosophical tradition he did violence to; for it is necessary to look at the history of philosophy if we are to apply the phenomenological method correctly. As Heidegger says, ‘philosophical cognition is essentially at the same time, in a certain sense, historical cognition. “History of philosophy,” as it is called, belongs to the concept of philosophy as science, to the concept of phenomenological investigation.’ BP,23. Thus a philosophical explanation of why Heidegger passed over money from phenomenological investigation requires a certain degree of historical cognition. To meet this methodological requirement we can ask our question in relation to the philosophical tradition Heidegger did violence to.

Why Heidegger Neglected to Consider Money Philosophically

Our question of why Heidegger passed over money from phenomenological investigation, cannot be answered decisively. Rather an approximate answer is all we can hope for, one which is better than the rest.

Accordingly, our answer to the question, Why did Heidegger pass over money from philosophical investigation? is for the simple reason that, for the most part, the tradition too passed over money from philosophical investigation. Loosely speaking, what this answer weds us to is the implication that a pre-condition for Heidegger to philosophize about something was that the tradition must also have philosophized about it.
To see that there is more to our answer than *mere* simplicity, first consider the whole of Heidegger's philosophical endeavours. Many agree that Heidegger was a philosopher who thought radically. In his writings, he left no major western thinker untouched. The Pre-Socratics, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Scotus, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Husserl to name the most obvious, were all done violence to by Heidegger. But what did these thinkers say about money philosophically? Very little. Apart from the odd reference to money in the form of a philosophical example, these thinkers glided right over money. A consequence of this; unlike being, there was no philosophical conception of money that Heidegger could use his phenomenological method on. In other words, Heidegger could not do violence to the traditional philosophical conception of money because there was no traditional philosophical conception of money to which Heidegger could do violence. Heidegger's philosophizing was limited both by and to the tradition. The point to highlight therefore is that Heidegger did violence to the tradition from within the tradition; because money was never philosophically analyzed within the tradition to begin with, there was nothing within the tradition Heidegger could interpret. Hence he passed it over.

What objections must we defend our simple answer against? We will consider two. First, one might object that Heidegger never analyzed money philosophically, not because the tradition neglected it, but because he hated the material way of being. Michael Zimmerman has pointed this out about Heidegger in his book *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity*, ‘[Heidegger] hated materialism ... [and] rejected the economic and political values of the Enlightenment.’ HCM,4. Does Heidegger's hatred of materialism explain why he neglected to investigate money phenomenologically? First of all, no one can say for sure why Heidegger neglected money, but hating something could be considered to be a very good reason to think and even philosophize about it. There are many intellectuals and academics today who hate the notion of political correctness. In fact, some even spend much of their time publishing articles designed to expose the contradictions involved in trying to be politically correct. That Heidegger hated materialism therefore does not necessarily account for his philosophical neglect of money; for one can hate something and
Another objection against our explanation for Heidegger's philosophical silence about money attacks what it implies; that a pre-condition for Heidegger to philosophize about something was that the tradition itself must already have philosophized about it. For one might argue that the tradition never actually philosophized about technology either, but this did not prevent Heidegger from philosophizing about it and thus introducing it into the tradition. Our response to this is to deny that the tradition never actually philosophized about technology. To see this consider something else Zimmerman uncovered about Heidegger.

Jeffrey Herf's study *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich* ... demonstrates that Heidegger's account of modern technology was by no means as original as I had once thought, but was in fact greatly indebted to and formed an important part of a long-standing German debate about how industrialism and the related phenomenon of modernity were affecting the German *Geist*. Many participants in this debate were militant nationalists and political reactionaries, who regarded industrial technology, Enlightenment rationalism, and the political ideals of the French Revolution as interrelated aspects of the same "dark force" destroying Germany's traditional values.... Heidegger shared many of these political views. His reading of the works of important "reactionary modernists" greatly influenced both his philosophical conception of modern technology and his decision to become involved in a political struggle against it. HCM,xvii,f.

Not only is Heidegger's philosophical interest in technology a continuation of his analysis of equipment begun in *Being and Time*; it is also in complete accord with his methodological maxim of drawing ontological knowledge from the everyday world. In looking at the everyday world as the source from which philosophical insights must be drawn, Heidegger noticed this long-standing debate about industrialism, modernity, and the German *Geist*. What he did was contribute to it by appropriating in his own philosophical way, many of the things that had already been said about technology. That
his interest in technology happened to appear as a somewhat novel introduction into the philosophical tradition, is more to do with an ignorance of this long-standing debate in Germany than it is anything else.

No doubt other objections could be made to our simple explanation of why Heidegger passed over money, but instead of bringing these up, we will consider a more important question; Why did the tradition itself neglect to consider money philosophically in the first place? Like the question about why Heidegger passed over money, this question too cannot be answered decisively. Accordingly in answering this question we will retain the same standard of simplicity as before.

*Why The Tradition Neglected to Consider Money Philosophically*

To explain why the tradition neglected money philosophically, we must consider the very first encounter philosophy had with money through the sophists. Who were the sophists and what does the word mean? The modern sense of the word is generally derogatory. In his book, *Protagoras and Logos*, Edward Schiappa gives one such derogatory definition of a sophist as a person 'who makes use of fallacious arguments; a specious reasoner.' PL,4. This modern sense of the word must be contrasted with the more original definition of a sophist as 'one who is distinguished for learning; a wise or learned man'.

According to this older definition, not only would Socrates be a sophist, but so would anybody who was proficient at an art. Poets like Homer, sculptors like Phidias, Hippocrates too are all said to have been sophists.

Around the time of the middle of the fifth century the word sophist took on the more definite meaning of 'one who specially engaged in the pursuit or communication of knowledge; esp. one who undertook to give instruction in intellectual and ethical matters in return for payment.' PL,4. Protagoras is generally regarded as being the first sophist in

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31 Schiappa also quotes this from the *Oxford English Dictionary.*
In his *Sophist*, Plato gave six definitions of a sophist and incorporated into four of them the fact that sophists charged for their services. Now giving six different definitions of a sophist is indeed excessive, but Plato's reason for doing this was largely because he planned to contrast the *Sophist* dialogue with another dialogue *Philosopher*, wherein a philosopher was defined. Guthrie points out that 'Passages [from the *Statesmen*, 257a, and *Sophist*, 217a and 253e] leave no room for reasonable doubt that [Plato] planned the *Philosopher.*' HGP,V,123f. That such a dialogue was necessary was largely because prior to Plato, Greek thought was, as Schiappa explains, unfamiliar with

the term "philosopher" ... "The noun *philo-sophia* appears in Plato's *Charmides* and *philo-sophos* in his *Apology* .... It is likely that these words first became professionalized in Plato's Academy. It is reasonably certain that Athenians would regard Presocratic intellectuals such as Anaxagoras and Diogenes as 'sophists,' or as 'meteorologists,' never as 'physicists' or 'philosophers.'" PL,5.32

This explains a little about who the sophists were and what the word means; but how do we characterize the relationship between sophists and philosophers in antiquity? For the most part, as an acrimonious relationship. Philosophers disliked both the sophists and the commercialization of what philosophers seemed to assume they ought to have a total control over; the subject matter of philosophy itself. This contempt for the sophists can be detected in Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. According to Guthrie,

The grounds on which Socrates criticized [the sophists] fee-taking were ... typical of the man. He held (we have this not from Plato but Xenophon) that by accepting money they deprived themselves of their freedom: they were bound to converse with any who could pay their fees, where as he was free to enjoy the society of anyone he chose (Mem.I.2.6,1.6.5). He

32 Schiappa quotes this from (Eric A. Havelock "The Linguistic Task of the Pre-Socratics," *Languages and Thought in Early Greek Philosophy*, ed. Kevin Robb (La Salle, IL: Hegeler Institute, 1983),57.
went so far as to call [sophistry] prostitution, selling one’s mind being no better than selling one’s body. Wisdom was something that should be freely shared between friends and loved ones. (I.6.13). This was how philosophy had been regarded hitherto, especially in the Pythagorean school, of which Plato certainly, and Socrates probably, was an admirer. HGP,III,39f.

Like Socrates, Aristotle too did not think highly of the sophists. For example, he recommended that sophists collect their payments before they taught because if they tried to do this after, ‘nobody would pay them money for the knowledge that they possess.’ NE,1164a,31f. On a slightly more philosophic note, something else Aristotle said about sophistry, which looks back to our claim that philosophers assumed they were entitled to some sort of total control over the subject matter of philosophy, is this:

dialecticians and sophists put on the same appearance as the philosopher (for sophistry only appears to be wisdom, and dialecticians discuss everything) since being is common to all. But clearly [dialecticians and sophists] discuss all things because these are proper to philosophy. Now [sophists] busy themselves with the same genus\textsuperscript{33} of things as philosophy, but philosophy differs from ... sophistry in the kind of life chosen ... sophistry makes the appearance of knowing without knowing. Meta,1004b,16f.

Behind this quote one can detect the unexpressed sentiment of leave philosophizing to the philosophers. But what is this if it is not an implicit assumption by philosophers that they were the one’s entitled to some kind of total control over the subject matter of philosophy? Aristotle’s claim that sophists busy themselves with the same genus of things as philosophy, indicates that both philosophers and sophists were pondering the same questions. But his remark about sophistry making the appearance of knowing without knowing, implies that it is the philosophers who really know, while sophists are merely epigones concerned with making money. Because their interests were monetary, sophists

\textsuperscript{33} The term “genus” here is used in a wider and looses sense; it signifies the various senses of “being”. Aristotle often would rather borrow a known term and use it in a wider or narrower sense than invent a new term. See also Meta, 1024a29-b16.” Translator’s footnote.
should stop pretending to care about truth. To philosophers like Aristotle, the ways in which sophists discuss and analyze the things proper to philosophy reveal their shallowness and genuine indifference about the pursuit of truth. Accordingly they should leave philosophy to those who care about it and let the philosophers decide what is and what is not philosophy.

Aristotle's claim that sophists only appeared to be wise is obviously an insult. But why insult the sophists like this? One reason may have been because the things the sophists taught had very disturbing consequences for those philosophers who were concerned with truth. For example, according to Diogenes Laertius, 'Protagoras was the first to say that on every issue there are two arguments opposed to each other [B6a]; these he made use of in arguing by the method of questioning, a practice he originated.' OS,4. However because the two most influential sophists, Protagoras and Gorgias, regarded arguments as battles to be won or lost -- 'Gorgias already says that one must destroy the opponents' seriousness by laughter, their laughter by seriousness' NAR,133 -- their teachings did not stop at merely informing their pupils that on every issue there were two arguments opposed to each other. Rather since winning an argument was necessary for the kind of success sophistic teaching claimed to provide -- success in being a good citizen -- sophists taught their students, first 'how to defend ... one point of view, then its opposite' GS,76, as well as how to make the weaker argument the stronger. In her book The Great Sophists of Periclean Athens, Jacqueline De Romilly described the kind of disturbing consequences sophistic teaching had on the Athenians in the following way:

Such an ability to defend both points of view suggested a disconcerting unconcern for the truth. If it was a matter of defending opposite points of view equally well, justice was left with no role to play. Besides, the art of twisting arguments rendered the very principle of argumentation suspect. GS,80.

It is easy to see how these kinds of consequences could prove alarming for philosophers who took the pursuit of truth seriously. For this indifference towards arranging words and
concepts in daily discourse, not according to what was true, but according to what was persuasive, had far reaching implications for both the future of the polis, and those who learned how to discourse in this way like orators, rhetors, politicians, merchants, and other sophists. Nietzsche described the kind of influence sophistic education had on antiquity by quoting the orator Diodorus who said: "No one will be able easily to name a higher prerogative than oratory. For it ... is by oratory alone that one individual acquires authority over many; but in general everything appears only as the speaker's power represents it."

NAR,213. To this, Nietzsche added something Callisthenes was reported to have said about being an orator for Alexander the Great, namely

that he held in his hands the fate of Alexander and his deeds in the eyes of posterity. He had ... [come] to win the admiration of men for [Alexander] , and belief in Alexander's divinity depended ... on what he, the orator, made known about his deeds (Arran 4,c.10) ... [Orators] control "opinion about things" and hence the effect of things upon men; they know this. NAR,213. (Nietzsche's italics).

Philosophers too knew that in an oral tradition -- which is what Athens was at the time -- students of sophistry, the future orators, rhetors, sophists, merchants, and politicians, would be the ones who would eventually control opinion about things, and hence the effect of things upon people. If the sophists had, as the philosophers maintained, an unconcern for truth, then the worry was that this unconcern would be impressed upon their students. The danger therefore being that this unconcern for truth in those who would come to control opinions about things, would ultimately lead the polis in the direction of a distopia. This must have been one of the things that led philosophers to insult the sophists the way they did.

Our question asked, Why did the tradition pass over money from philosophical investigation in the first place? Our point of departure was with the first encounter philosophy had with money through the sophists. We are looking for a simple answer to this question which utilizes both what we can and cannot be certain about. Let us assemble
From the very beginning of western philosophy, we know that money was associated with sophistry. Sophistry was the one thing philosophy was not. So much was philosophy not sophistry, that philosophers went to varying degrees to distance themselves from sophistry. Everything from insulting the sophists, to Plato openly opposing Protagoras' doctrine of measurement in the *Theaetetus*, to not accepting a fee for conversing about a philosophical problem. In fact Protagoras' books were even burnt by the Athenians because of his agnosticism towards the Gods: 'Protagoras of Abdera began his book with the words: "As for whether there are gods or not, I do not know what to say." For this the Athenians drove him off his land and from the city and burned his books before the public assembly.' MM,275, [Kant's italics]. That philosophers in antiquity never investigated money philosophically is in perfect accord with their overall dislike towards sophistry. In distancing themselves from sophistry, philosophers distanced themselves from money. That philosophers could afford to do this was because barter was still alive in antiquity and one could largely get by without money, as Socrates obviously did. Now one conclusion this kind of explanation is heading towards, is that a philosophical interest in money simply did not fit with the philosophical way of life, and that is why philosophers in antiquity passed it over.

However true it may be to say that the sophistical way of life did not fit with the philosophical way of life, the problem here is that this explanation is open to the same kind of objection made earlier in relation to Heidegger's hatred of materialism. For the fact that the philosophical way of life looked down on the material way of life could have been a very good reason for philosophers to take a philosophical interest in money.

Actually for a brief moment Aristotle did take a philosophical interest in money both in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics*, and in these few pages are the foundations of economic thought. However no sooner did Aristotle lift the philosophical lid on money, than he slammed it shut again *en route* to what he regarded as more genuine philosophical
problems. It is not very convincing therefore to say that the reason philosophers in antiquity passed over money from philosophical analysis was because a philosophical interest in money simply did not fit with the philosophical way of life; for the fact that the material way of life did not fit with the philosophical way of life did not stop Aristotle from taking a philosophical look at money, as his writings on money, few as they are, clearly demonstrate.

That Aristotle did take a brief philosophical look at money is also significant because of what it rules out, namely another possible explanation which tries to account for the philosophical silence about money in antiquity. Obviously it is wrong to think that ancient philosophers passed over money because it was simply too close to them to notice it. On the contrary, there was enough distance between philosophers and money for Aristotle to notice it, indeed in a way that no other philosopher has.

Perhaps a better explanation of why ancient philosophers passed over money is this. To actually philosophize about money could have encouraged a way of life philosophers considered to be destructive to the \textit{polis}; the way of life of the merchant. Aristotle considered the merchant to be destructive to the \textit{polis} because the merchant viewed everything as a means of making money, and money itself as the end of every activity in the \textit{polis}. Philosophers obviously did not want to encourage this way of life in the \textit{polis}. But one might object; if philosophers did not want to encourage this way of life, then this seems to provide them with an excellent reason to philosophize about money in a way which discouraged it.

To see the problem with thinking this, assume for a moment that philosophers did philosophize in depth about money by spelling out in detail how the mercantile way of life was destructive to the \textit{polis}. Question: What would have been the reaction to this kind of attack on the mercantile way of life? Obviously the merchants would want to defend their way of life. Now to do this, they could either defend it themselves, or they could pay sophists, orators, and, rhetors to write an apology for them. An apology no doubt to be
read aloud in the money markets of the *polis* for all to hear. Such an apology would obviously point to the benefits the merchant’s had provided to the *polis* in the form of all the new goods they imported from far off places. Such an apology would also point out that the *polis* was prospering from their mercantile activity and that this could not possibly be bad for it. Moreover such an apology would most likely mount a counter attack against the philosophers for trying to deprive the *polis* of the benefits the mercantile way of life brought to it. Such an apology might actually go so far as to suggest that it was not the mercantile way of life at all which was bad for the *polis*, but the philosophical way of life which was bad for the *polis*. After all a similar thing happened to Socrates.

Socrates’ philosophical life was considered to be a dangerous influence on both the youth of Athens and the Gods it worshipped. So dangerous in fact that he was sentenced to death. And why was Socrates philosophical way of life considered to be so dangerous to the Athenians that they sentenced him to death? Because when viewed through the eyes of the merchants and politicians who appeared to control the money, anyone who went around doing nothing but persuading both young and old ... not to care for [their] body or [their] wealth in preference to or as strongly as for the best possible state of [their] soul’ Apo,30b, could not be anything but a danger to them; for there is little to be gained by appearing to control something that no one cares about. As soon as people stop caring about money they stop caring about those who seem to control the money, the merchants, politicians, law-makers, and bankers.

What we are getting at therefore is this. Philosophers could have foreseen that openly philosophizing about money and the dangers of the mercantile way of life, ran the risk of backfiring. Philosophical attempts to try and discourage the mercantile way of life could in the end, not only do much to encourage people to pursue this way of life or perhaps the way of life of the sophist, but also do much to discourage the philosophical way of life. Recall the prohibition of alcohol in America. Prohibition did much to encourage people to take up an active relation with the bottle, either in the form of consumer or supplier. But one might object that this last remark is anachronistic in character. But is it? Money in its
own way is just as intoxicating as alcohol if not more so. Moreover we are not being
anachronistic to speak about greed, fraud, counterfeiting and the hoarding of treasure all in
the same breath as we speak about the Greeks. Why should we be anachronistic to think
that the people in antiquity would have responded to any attempt to discourage the material
way of life by actually embracing it, just as Americans did with alcohol during prohibition?
These questions we will not pursue any further. Instead we can sum up our simple
explanation of why money was omitted from philosophy in antiquity in the following way.

Philosophers in antiquity passed over money because were they to philosophize about it,
they probably would have done so in accordance with their overall dislike towards the
things they associated money with; sophistry, mercantilism, greed, fraud, counterfeiting,
and the hording of treasure. Because philosophers were opposed to these things, the way
in which they would have philosophized about money most likely would have led
merchants to defend their way of life. It is possible that such a defense could have resulted
in encouraging the very thing philosophers were initially trying to discourage; the material
way of being, while at the same time discouraging something they wanted very much to
encourage; the philosophical way of life. To avoid this philosophers passed money over as
a topic for serious philosophical analysis perhaps in a sort of ‘less said about it the better’
kind of way. Is this explanation convincing? The answer to this depends upon whether an
alternative explanation could be given, one that not only overcomes the faults in our
account, but is superior to it. This we will leave for someone else.

Next we need to explain why, even after antiquity, money was something philosophers
continued to neglect. How do we account for this? In the following way. In The
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, Heidegger says of the philosophical tradition that it
‘passes down definite propositions and opinions, [as well as] fixed ways of questioning
and discussing things.’ MFL,155. We know that for the most part, money has been
omitted from these definite propositions, opinions, and fixed ways of discussing and
questioning the things the tradition has passed down. This is why it has been neglected by
the tradition time and again. To put it crudely, money was left out of the philosophical loop
at the inception of the western philosophical tradition, and until now has not really had much of a chance to get back into that loop. But as we will see, money has not been totally omitted from what has been passed down by the tradition. It only appears this way because we are not accustomed to seeing money in a philosophical way. We will be saying more about the idea of seeing money in a philosophical way in a moment. As a way of leading into this, we will now ask about the philosophical consequences of the meeting between philosophy and money. Specifically we want to ask about the philosophical way of life, What has become of it?

The Extinction of The Philosophical Way of Life.

Ancient philosophers may also have disliked the sophists because through their philosophical acumen they may have perceived something they knew all too well would come true; that sophistry itself, ie. the teaching of philosophy in exchange for money spelt the very extinction of their philosophical way of life, a way of life that believed in the free exchange of wisdom between friends and loved ones.

Aristotle distinguished philosophers from sophists by virtue of the fact that the life chosen by the sophist was different from the life chosen by the philosopher. Meta,1004b,16f. In his Apology Socrates states that his poverty is a 'convincing witness' that he is not a sophist. Apo,31c. To distance himself even further from sophistry he adds,

If anyone, young or old, desires to listen to men when I am talking and dealing with my own concerns, I have never begrudged this to anyone, but I do not converse when I receive a fee and not when I do not. I am equally ready to question the rich and the poor ... I never promised to teach [people] anything and have not done so. If anyone says that he has learned anything from me, or that he heard anything privately that the others did not hear, be assured that he is not telling the truth. Apo,33a-b.

In short, philosophers in antiquity saw philosophizing not as a job one did and could be
paid for, but as a way of being. Simmel suggested that Plato and Aristotle looked down upon the idea of collecting a fee for their teachings, because ‘to teach or to engage in intellectual work in general for money appeared to be a degradation of the person. As to all those activities that have their source in the core of the personality, it is superficial and unreal to assume that one could be paid for them in full.’ PM,406

The question is, Did the commercialization of philosophy really force the philosophical way of life into extinction? If this question is answered by contrasting ancient philosophy, and the ancient philosopher’s way of being, with contemporary philosophy and the ways of the contemporary philosopher, then it most certainly has. For the philosopher of today has an unmistakable resemblance to the sophist insofar as she is paid, sometimes substantially, for her ability to philosophize in both the written and the spoken word. One implication which must not be overlooked if we are to be philosophically honest here, is that the philosopher, as Plato and Aristotle understood her to be, is dead. In her place a new philosopher has emerged who is paid to philosophize. Of course no serious philosopher today would admit that she is philosophizing purely for the sake of money, but despite this, a momentary reflection on the present situation will reveal how much the practice of philosophy today has turned the practice of philosophy in antiquity upside down.

Not only is it impossible for the philosopher of today to be absolutely free of money -- since money touches everyone -- but in actual fact the philosopher of today must regard herself as extremely fortunate if she is getting paid to philosophize. For if the contemporary philosopher honestly recognizes (i) the number of people who are unemployed and thus dependent upon others for financial support, and (ii) that many people who are employed are employed in jobs they either detest, or are educationally not qualified for, then she would be wise to admit how fortunate she is to be receiving money in exchange for doing something she is supposed to love doing; philosophizing. The idea of a philosopher being grateful for being paid to philosophize is surely something both Plato and Aristotle would find difficult to comprehend. Looked at in this way, the Greeks would have just as hard a time trying to understand us and our philosophy, as we have
trying to understand them and their philosophy.

The philosopher of today must also regard herself as fortunate if she is receiving payment in exchange for philosophizing; for the common sense understanding of philosophy is that it neither offers a service like the kind a medical doctor offers, nor does it produce a useful being such as a computer. Because of this some champions of common sense seriously believe that philosophers ought to be paid exactly what they contribute; nothing. That philosophers manage to get paid for providing neither a service nor a useful thing is, in the eyes of these practical people, nothing short of criminal.

*Heidegger’s Response to the Criticism that Philosophy is Useless*

This criticism of the uselessness of philosophy is one that has plagued it for a long time. Consider Heidegger’s response to it in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*. There he does not respond to it by trying to find some sense in which philosophy is useful, for example by saying that it is useful because it provides the service of aiding reflection which many people endowed with intellectual curiosity find of great value. Heidegger explains why he does not respond like this in the following way.

> You hear remarks such as “Philosophy leads to nothing,” “You can’t do anything with philosophy,” and readily imagine that they confirm an experience of your own. There is no denying the soundness of these two phrases, particularly common among scientists and teachers of science. Any attempt to refute them by proving that after all it does “lead to something” merely strengthens the prevailing misinterpretation to the effect that the everyday standards by which we judge bicycles or sulphur baths are applicable to philosophy. ITM,11-12

Accordingly, it is possible that the above response to the criticism of the uselessness of philosophy -- that it is useful because it provides the service of aiding reflection -- would, in Heidegger’s eyes, merely strengthen the misinterpretation of philosophy to the effect that the everyday standards by which one judges bicycles or sulphur baths be applicable to
philosophy. But what then is Heidegger’s response to the criticism of the useless of philosophy? To begin with, he suggests that it is a criticism based on the erroneous assumption that one must do something with their philosophical knowledge in the same way one does something with their knowledge of medicine and that if one cannot, then philosophical knowledge is useless. About this assumption Heidegger says; ‘philosophy cannot be directly learned like manual and technical skills; it cannot be directly applied, or judged by its usefulness in the manner of economic or other professional knowledge.’ ITM, 8. For Heidegger, the assumption that philosophical knowledge should be useful is mistaken because it is not like medical knowledge at all. As philosophical knowledge, it is not a matter of what we do with philosophy -- it is a matter of what philosophy does with us:

It is absolutely correct and proper to say that “You can’t do anything with philosophy.” It is only wrong to suppose that this is the last word on philosophy. For the rejoinder imposes itself: granted that we cannot do anything with philosophy, might not philosophy, if we concern ourselves with it, do something with us. ITM, 12, (Heidegger’s italic).

To elaborate further on Heidegger’s response to this criticism consider something else he said about philosophy.

Philosophy can never directly supply the energies and create the opportunities and methods that bring about a historical change; for one thing, because philosophy is always the concern of the few. Which few? The creators, those who initiate profound transformations. It spreads only indirectly, by devious paths that can never be laid out in advance, until at last, at some future date, it sinks to the level of a commonplace; but by then it has long been forgotten as original philosophy. ITM, 10 (Heidegger’s italic).

What underlies Heidegger’s response to the criticism that philosophy is useless therefore, is a certain understanding of the relationship between philosophy and the future. For Heidegger one philosophizes for the sake of the future:
All essential philosophical questioning is necessarily untimely. This is so because philosophy is always projected far in advance of its time. Philosophy always remains a knowledge which not only cannot be adjusted to a given epoch but on the contrary imposes its measure upon its epoch.

ITM,8.

Two years after making this remark, Heidegger says about philosophy that it is ‘a knowledge that leaps ahead, opening up new domains of questioning and aspects of questioning about the essence of things, an essence that constantly conceals itself anew.’

BQP,5.

The reason common sense pragmatists object to philosophy the way they do is because they are too myopic and forgetful to realize that philosophical contributions made centuries before will take centuries to ripen; for it is only after time has elapsed that philosophical contributions can be transformed into more accessible problems and understood by the practical world. Thus genuine philosophical contributions will only affect the future since time is required for the practical world and those concerned with it, to catch up with the philosophical breakthroughs that are made.

A concrete example of what we are saying can be seen by considering something to come out of the Critique of Pure Reason. One thing to emerge from Kant’s transcendental deduction is the idea of the transcendental unity of apperception. In the philosophy of mind, John Searle has noticed that what Kant understood by the transcendental unity of apperception two hundred years ago, is today understood in neurophysiology as ‘the binding problem’. The relevance of this example therefore is that it substantiates what Heidegger has said about philosophy and its relation to the future. How? In the following way. To begin with, we have the figure of Kant, a creator who, with his inquiry into how a priori synthetic judgments were possible, initiated a transformation in philosophy itself; the transcendental transformation. The problems opened up by Kant along with the concepts and method employed by him spread indirectly over the ensuing centuries only to

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34 For more on the relation between the binding problem as it is formulated in neurophysiology and Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception, see Searle The Re-Discovery of the Mind' P. 129-130.
show up later in a place where one would expect them to show up; the field of
neurophysiology. Now are neurophysiologists familiar enough with philosophy to
recognize the Kantian origins of the binding problem? Are they philosophically familiar
with what Heidegger described as 'the essential step in the direction of a fundamental
elucidation of the concept and method of philosophy' PIKCR,4, the Critique took? If we
assume they are not, what Heidegger has said about philosophy and its relation to the
future can be firmly substantiated. For such an assumption confirms Heidegger's claim
that something; the transcendental unity of apperception, will at some future date; our
present, sink to the level of commonplace; the binding problem. Something else to see is
that modern neuroscience has forgotten the fact that the binding problem is the result of an
original philosophical contribution handed over to it by Kant; the transcendental unity of
apperception.

*Our Response to the Criticism that Philosophy is Useless*

To return to the objection that philosophy is useless, we can now say the following.
Because we are looking at money philosophically in the way we are, we find ourselves in a
position to be able to give a response to this criticism of the uselessness of philosophy
based on what we have observed about Kant and Heidegger.

We begin with the obvious fact that in many senses money determines us. How? We go
where ever the money is. We go to work where the jobs are being offered. If this requires
a change in address, we change our address. We equip ourselves with skills that we
believe other people are willing to pay for. The more money we make, the more
expensive, or at least changed, our tastes become. We try to make ourselves indispensable
to those who can pay, potential employers or customers, by possessing either skills which
will always be in demand, or products which will always be required. We try to find a job
in an industry which is recession proof. For example people will always produce waste.
Accordingly anyone capable of disposing of this waste can always find a job doing this.
These are but a few of the ways in which money determines us.
In considering the suggestion that money determines us, we are led directly to an unappealing and counterintuitive idea that common sense rebels against; the idea that we do not control money, but that it controls us. In *The Question of Value, Thinking through Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Freud*, James Hans gives another example of the kind of thing Heidegger said controlled us, language.

Most of us would certainly like to think that we control our words rather than the other way around, but Heidegger suggests that this is merely an illusion on our part, akin to the belief that the sun travels around the earth. We instinctively rebel against such an idea and point immediately to the many situations where we can see that we are choosing our language and have control over it. QV.7.

Why this is relevant is because of the similarity between language and money in controlling Dasein. This similarity has its basis in the fact that language and money are both made possible by exchange. The relation between language and exchange is something we will be saying more about later. For the moment let us continue on with our response to the objection that philosophy is useless.

Moving from the claim that money determines us, we come next to the claim that if we inquire into something which determines us, with the view to analyzing it, and seeing more clearly the ways in which it determines us, then we are in effect, preparing the possibility for a philosophical contribution to the understanding of money. Moreover by gaining a philosophical insight into what it means for money to be in the world, others who are concerned with it -- bankers, investors, economists, and just about everyone else in the world -- will have at their disposal a philosophical analysis of money which they can develop, use, and undoubtedly improve upon. This in turn may lead to a more moral relation between Dasein and money.

But one might object. Mathematicians do not worry about the metaphysical status of numbers, psychologists do not worry about whether dualism is true; insofar as philosophy
is often making second-order and conceptual claims, the professionals who apply the mathematical and psychological concepts that philosophers analyze, are not going to be affected in their everyday practice by these philosophical analyzes. A similar thing therefore could be said about a philosophical analysis of money. Moneyworkers, ie. bankers, economists, traders, moneylenders are not going to be affected in their everyday practice by a second-order and conceptual analysis of money. For our claim that moneyworkers could benefit from a philosophical analysis of money to be plausible, we would certainly need to say something about what difference a philosophical analysis of money would make to them.

What do we make of this objection? To begin with, surely the question of what benefits a philosophical analysis of money would provide for those who work with money could only be determined after we have developed such an analysis and the moneyworker has read it and attempted to test the truth of our analysis by acting on it. For our claim that the moneyworker could benefit from a philosophical analysis of money to be plausible, we do not need to talk about the difference a philosophical analysis of money would make to them. Why? Because it is up to the moneyworker who appears to control the effect of money upon people -- bankers, economists, traders, politicians, heads of industry -- to determine what difference a philosophical analysis of money would make. And they can only do this after we have supplied them with a philosophical analysis of money and economic thinking as such. This is something we have yet to do; for the philosophical analysis of money we are referring to is, at this stage, still an idea.

Whether anyone does develop a philosophical analysis of money in a fruitful way, will depend in part on whether the insights gained are genuine and original. But this is not the only thing; for those who work with money, must in the first instance, be willing to expose themselves to philosophical insights about money. They must, as Heidegger suggests, be willing to let a philosophical analysis of money do something with them, and for this they will need to know something about philosophical thinking.
To adopt a philosophical way of thinking about money, moneyworkers will have to abandon their everyday way of thinking about money. We now come to some very important questions. How does a philosopher get the moneyworker to think about money philosophically? What must they do in order to abandon the everyday way of thinking about money and think about money philosophically? Answer; reverse the everyday way of thinking about money. What is the everyday way of thinking about money? Thinking about money in terms of how we make it.

Dasein is always looking for ways to make money. Consider the notion of built-in obsolescence. Here Dasein builds right into the products it sells to its fellow Dasein, design flaws and imperfections which require intermittent adjustment and maintenance of the product it has sold. This creates a market in spare parts which ensures a steady supply of money to the original builder. As a way of maximizing this supply of money, quite often the builder of the design flaw, will be the only one able to supply the constant demand for spare parts.35

Given this we can see a way to think about money which is philosophical. For instead of asking, How do I as Dasein make money? the philosophical question asks, How does money make Dasein? By asking this question we secure an adequate point of departure to think about money philosophically. To understand why this is, we must consider something Hegel said about philosophy which Heidegger felt important enough to quote in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*,

> Philosophy by its very nature is esoteric; for itself it is neither made for the masses nor is it susceptible of being cooked up for them. It is philosophy only because it goes exactly contrary to the understanding and thus even more so to 'sound common sense,' the so-called healthy human understanding, which actually means the local and temporary vision of some limited generation of human beings. To that generation the world of

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35 Tobacco companies who genetically increase the amount of nicotine a tobacco plant will produce in order to strengthen the addiction of smokers is another example of the extent to which Dasein will go to make money.
philosophy is in and for itself a topsy-turvy, an inverted world.36 BP, 14.

The question, How does money make Dasein? is a philosophical question. For this reverses the traditional question the moneyworker, asks about how they are going to make money. But one might object that merely reversing this question is nothing but a play on words. Superficially this may be true. But it is a play on words which ceases to be a play on words as soon as one seriously calls into question the assumption that we make money. Only by calling this assumption into question by really asking about the ways in which money makes Dasein -- for example the kind of Dasein who makes a living building in premature obsolescence into its products for the sake of profit -- do we see that we are not engaged in mere word play, but are in fact asking a philosophical question. Philosophical precisely because unfolding this question will force us to call into question many other assumptions about money we have hitherto taken for granted. Assumptions about money's contingency to Dasein's way of being, as well as the assumption that money has anything to do with morality at all.

Let us return to the problem which the moneyworker must overcome if they are to think about money philosophically. The moneyworker finds the philosophical question offensive, counterintuitive and above all pointless. In their eyes, the philosophical question about how money makes Dasein, is a question which is not answered by telling them how they are going to make money. Because of this it is for them a pointless question. Moreover it offends their common sense belief that they control their money. Since it does not tell them how they are going to make money, they disregard it or treat it as irrelevant. Neither do they answer it, nor do they even ask it. However until the moneyworker poses this philosophical question, all ways of thinking about money philosophically or gaining any philosophical insights about money will be closed to her. In chapter eight we will be looking in more detail at one very literal way in which money will be making Dasein in the

36 In Hegel, *Samtliche Werke*, ed. Glockner, vol. 1, pp. 185-6. [The quotation departs from the cited text in two minute points -- the entire passage is at the top of p. 185, and a comma is omitted after the word "Verstand." The phrase "eine verkehrte Welt," "a topsy-turvy, an inverted, world," anticipates Hegel's later use of it in the *Phenomenology* in a section entitled "Force and Understanding: Appearance and the Supersensible World." Translators footnote, p. 14.]
future.

To be worth anything these remarks must be substantiated in a metaphysics of money which considers the metaphysical character of money as well as offers a critique of the kinds of assumptions economic thinking is based on. In the next chapter we will be saying more about the metaphysical character of money. However the critique of economic assumptions is finally beginning to happen. For hermeneutics is now being used to critique economics. A consequence of this is that economists are now having to ask themselves what kind of questions they are asking, and why it is that they must make some of the implausible assumptions which they do.37

An example of the kind of assumption we are referring to is the one made in the economic theory of purchasing-power parity. In order to check whether different currencies are at their correct level, this theory makes the assumption that ‘an identical basket of goods and services should cost the same in all countries.’38 In other words, the same box of tropical fruit will cost in Fiji what it costs in Alaska. Why? Because from a purely logical point of view, the contents of each box are assumed to be the same. Why does the theory of purchasing power parity make this kind of purely logical assumption? The answer to this question that is relevant to us is found in something Piero Mini said in his book Philosophy and Economics; ‘economics arose exactly at a time when Descartes' epistemology gained nearly universal acceptance and assent.’ PE,10. To this Mini adds that ‘many of the early economists wrote extensively on the theory of knowledge and proved to be followers of Descartes.’ PE,10. What Mini concludes from this is significant from a philosophical point of view, namely that ‘the de facto method of analysis followed by classical economists has always existed [and] ... is embodied ... in [Descartes] Discourse on Method.’ PE,10-11.

The upshot of all this therefore is that economic theory is essentially Cartesian, and that is why the theory of purchasing power parity makes the kind of logical assumption it does

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37 See R. Backhouse, Explorations in Economic Methodology, for more on the relation between hermeneutics and economics.
38 Taken from, The Economist November 1st - 7th 1997. ‘The Big Mac Index Goes East.’ p. 113.
about goods. In what way is economic theory essentially Cartesian? In that it is fundamentally modelled after Cartesianism, employs the same rational methods of Cartesianism, and has the same mathematical bias that Cartesianism has. Now once this is seen, it becomes clear why economic policies developed by governments and other financial institutions which have been based upon economic theory, have consistently proved to be so flawed; because the economic theories which produce these policies are just as worldless as the ego which sits at the foundation of Cartesianism. To be convinced of this consider what Michael Rowbotham has said about the economic theories of modern banking in his book, *The Grip of Death*; ‘these theories do not present money creating in any particular context, but simply examine the process in isolation, as a detached mathematical model. The real world is completely excluded from the conventional model of money creation.’ GD,23.

The theory of free trade is another example of an economic theory which has little to do with the world we live in.

Free trade is almost a religion to economists, but ... the theoretical conditions required by free trade theory are known not to exist. The theory of comparative advantage -- upon which the free trade doctrine rests -- was originally advanced by David Ricardo in 1817. Ricardo argued that three conditions are essential for free trade to proceed to mutual benefit: capital must not be allowed to cross national borders from a high wage to a low wage country, trade between the participating countries must be balanced, and each country must have full employment. Since none of these conditions applies anywhere in the modern world, and since nations are all attempting to pursue an imbalance of trade, how can the theory possibly be expected to operate properly. Certainly, there is an astonishing degree of academic blindness, and a clear preference by economists for studying theory, rather than the real world. GD,180. (Rowbotham’s italics).

The overall criticism that economic theory is open to because of its systematic refusal to look at the existential world, is that it is overtly unscientific; for it attempts to make the

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39 The title of Rowbotham’s book, *The Grip of Death* is a literal translation of the word ‘mortgage’, when the owner of a house pledges his or her house to another with a handshake ... until death.”
world we live in fit its mathematical and rational theories rather than attempting to make these theories fit the world we live in. Thomas Nagel explains what is unscientific about such an approach when he says, 'The first rule of science is not to ignore the data and ... the data are not determined by methods; rather the adequacy of our methods is determined by whether they can account for the data.' MBP, 67. Surely a scientific economics should look at the world we live in as well as the way in which money is in the world and attempt to construct its theories around this. One aim of a philosophical analysis of money therefore would be to try and develop an existential economics. 40 Of course much more could be said about this, but our task was merely to give an idea of how one could begin a philosophical critique of economics and the assumptions it makes based on the fact that economic theory itself is essentially Cartesian.

We began by asking why Heidegger passed over money and ended with the idea of a philosophical critique of economics. We wanted to know why a philosopher like Heidegger, so committed to the idea of drawing ontological significance from ontical familiarity of everydayness, and so committed to doing violence to the tradition, said nothing about money? Our answer to this question was that it was largely due to the fact that the tradition itself said nothing about money. The next thing we will do is apply explicit effort to those steps of the phenomenological method that have to do with destruction and reduction.

40 There are some economists who are now attempting to do precisely this. David Korten is an example of one. What he and other economists are doing is attempting to develop economic policy not around the economic dogma of sustained growth, but around actual people who exist in the real world. See his When Corporations Rule the World, for more about this.
Chapter 5. Phenomenological Destruction and Phenomenological Reduction

Heidegger's Interpretation of Descartes

Hitherto our application of the phenomenological method has done violence to common sense, engaged in the activity of phenomenological seeing, and taken a look at the history of philosophy. In this chapter we will apply the phenomenological method to money in a more direct way by performing first a phenomenological destruction, and then a phenomenological reduction. We will begin by considering Heidegger's interpretation of Cartesianism in chapter three of *Being and Time*; for this interpretation is an example of how Heidegger used the phenomenological method. As an example it can serve as a guide in our own application of the phenomenological method.

We said earlier that when Heidegger applied the phenomenological method he identified neither which element of the method he used, nor the stage where his application of the method was at. He did not indicate when he was performing a phenomenological destruction, a phenomenological reduction and so forth. This is also true of his critique of Cartesianism, but because Heidegger used this method constantly in *Being and Time*, he must have used it in his critique of Cartesianism. Actually we have already seen an example of this when we said that the move Heidegger made from equipment to handiness was the phenomenological reduction from a being, to its mode of being. (See ch.2) The other phenomenological step Heidegger took in his interpretation of Descartes was the one having to do with destruction.

In chapter three of *Being and Time*, Heidegger's aim was to describe in a phenomenological way his conception of the world Dasein is in. It is not this description of the world we are interested in here, nor with how Heidegger's conception of the world differs from Descartes. Rather what we will focus on is the way Heidegger carried out his phenomenological destruction through the act of questioning. Strictly speaking it is misleading to refer to Heidegger's interpretation of Descartes in this chapter as a critique.
A more accurate thing to say is that it is a phenomenological destruction of Cartesianism; a tracing back of concepts to their source in Antiquity. The basic question Heidegger pivots his phenomenological destruction around can be paraphrased as follows: What word appropriately describes the object(s) closest to us in our everyday dealing with the world? Before giving his own answer to this question, Heidegger speculates about how this question would be answered if it were asked, first within the context of Cartesianism, and then within the context of Antiquity.

The Cartesianism answer to the question, What word appropriately describes the objects closest to us in everydayness? is either “things” or “things invested with value” [“wertbehaftete” Dinge]. According to Heidegger, when we understand the things closest to us in this way, we tacitly anticipate objective presence as their kind of being. Because of this, any ontological inquiry that proceeds to ask about the world and the kind of being it has, will always arrive at ‘characteristics of being such as substantiality, materiality, extendedness, side-by-sideness ...’ BT,68. For Heidegger these concepts characterize innerworldly beings, but because they characterize innerworldly beings, these concepts are inappropriate for characterizing the world as such and the kind of being it has. The approach just described, which Heidegger takes to be distinctively Cartesian, always prevents one from seeing the phenomenon of the world and the kind of being it has.

Before explaining his more detailed criticism of the Cartesian ontology of the world -- of which more will be said in a moment -- Heidegger next asks how the Greeks would answer the question he posed, What word appropriately describes the object(s) closest to us in our everyday dealing with the world? Heidegger answers this question on behalf of the Greeks by saying, ‘The Greeks had an appropriate term for “things”: pragmata, that is, that with which one has to do in taking care of things in association (praxis).’ BT,68. (Heidegger's

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41 Oder aber man charakterisiert diese “Dinge” als “wertbehaftete” Dinge. BT,68. Macquarrie and Robinson translate this as ‘But suppose one characterizes these ‘Things’ as Things ‘invested with value’ [“wertbehaftete” Dinge]?’ This does seem closer to Heidegger’s meaning than Stambaugh’s translation of the same sentence which reads, ‘Or else one characterizes these “things” as “valuable.”’ BT,68. For the word construction ‘wertbehaftete’ suggests the idea of sticking or loading value onto a thing, or a thing with value somehow clinging to it. Thus the idea of a thing invested with value is a more literal attempt at a translation than merely calling the thing valuable.
Returning now to the next stage of Heidegger’s interpretation of Descartes, he begins by establishing the fact that Descartes did not perform a phenomenological destruction by tracing the kind of being he attributed to the world, res extensa, back to its ontological source in Antiquity: ‘Descartes ... prescribes to the world ... its “true” being [res extensa] on the basis of an idea of being (being = constant objective presence) the source of which has not been revealed and the justification of which has not been demonstrated.’ BT,96. Heidegger’s claim that the source of the idea of being as constant objective presence has not been revealed by Descartes, confirms our interpretation that Heidegger is criticizing Descartes for failing to perform a phenomenological destruction. When a phenomenological destruction is carried out, the source of this idea of being (being = constant objective presence = res extensa) can be traced back to the ancient concept of substantiality: ‘The idea of being from which the ontological characteristics of the res extensa are derived is substantiality.’ BT,92. More precisely stated, the idea of being as constant objective presence derives from ‘a definite idea of being which is embedded in the concept of substantiality.’ BT,96. The definite idea of being Heidegger is referring to here is the idea of constancy:

what constitutes the being of the res corporea is extensio ... what can change in every kind of divisibility, gestalt, and motion, ... what persists throughout all these changes, remanet. In a corporeal being what is capable of such a remaining constant is its true being, in such a way that it characterizes the substantiality of this substance. BT,91-2, (Heidegger’s italics)

A consequence of Descartes’ failure to reveal the source of this idea of being is that a fundamental ambiguity within the concept of substantia is overlooked, ‘[substantia] sometimes means the being of beings as substance, substantiality, sometimes beings themselves, particular substances.’ BT,90. Heidegger’s main criticism of Descartes is this:
in failing to perform the phenomenological destruction and trace *res extensa* back to its source in the concept of *substantia*, he overlooked the ontological difference between beings and to be. We can be sure about this because of a footnote Heidegger added to his own copy of *Being and Time*. For in *Being and Time* Heidegger states about the ambiguity of *substantia* that ‘behind this slight difference of meaning [between beings and to be] lies hidden the failure to master the fundamental problem of being’ BT,94, and this is where the footnote is added: the ‘ontological difference’ BT,94.

What possible response might Descartes give to Heidegger’s criticism of failing to perform a phenomenological destruction? It is possible Descartes would admit that he did not trace the concept of *res extensa* back to Antiquity. But this was because he did not take himself to be studying the history of an idea but, rather, to be laying the foundations of physics. Because this is what he was doing, Descartes might maintain there was no need for him to trace the concept of *res extensa* back to its source in Antiquity. This response is worth considering because it gives us the opportunity to expose a basic difference between the phenomenological method and Descartes’ method of doubt.

As mentioned before, one assumption which underlies the phenomenological method is that historical cognition is necessary for philosophical cognition. To trace concepts back to their source in Antiquity requires one to move through the history of philosophy. However in Descartes’ method of doubt there is no place for history since we can never be certain that the events of the past happened in the way historians have recorded them to have happened. What lies at the heart of this basic difference between the historicism of the phenomenological method and what we might call the *ahistoricism* of Descartes’ method of doubt is the different attitudes each philosopher had to truth and its relation to certainty. For Descartes certainty was what mattered, indeed so much so that it became synonymous with truth; for Heidegger certainty was only one conception of truth and was to be distinguished from other conceptions of truth such as truth as discovery, and truth as correspondence.
In one of his lectures on Nietzsche, Heidegger argues that Descartes' conception of truth as certitude was accompanied by a metaphysical change in both the meaning of the subject and a change in the meaning of being. One result of these metaphysical changes in truth, the meaning of being, and the subject, according to Heidegger -- 'the course of history itself takes a different direction.' N4,145. In what direction is the course of history headed as a result of Descartes' conception of truth as certainty and the change in the meaning of both the subject and being? In chapter eight we will be returning to this question when we investigate what Heidegger said about the relation between modern science and technology, and Cartesianism, so there is no need to answer it here. Instead we will consider something else that Descartes could say in his defence against Heidegger's phenomenological destruction.

With regard to Heidegger's claim that Descartes did not justify prescribing to the world res extensa as its true mode of being, Descartes might point to his thought experiment with the wax in his *Second Meditation* as some sort of justification. Actually in the lectures upon which *Being and Time* were founded, Heidegger did consider the way in which Descartes proceeded to justify the being of the world as res extensa, but to pursue this in more detail would require a substantial digression into both Heidegger's and Descartes' conception of the world. This we will not do since we have already placed Heidegger's conception of the world and how it differs from Descartes' outside the scope of our present investigation. Instead we will conclude our discussion of Heidegger's interpretation of Descartes by mentioning the other stages of phenomenological destruction that Heidegger outlined for Cartesianism.

1. Why was the phenomenon of world passed over at the beginning of the ontological tradition decisive for us, explicitly in Parmenides; where does the constant recurrence of this passing over come from?
2. Why do innerworldly beings take the place of the phenomenon thus passed over as the ontological theme?
3. Why are these beings initially found in "nature"?
4. Why does the rounding out of such an ontology of the world, experienced as necessary, take place with the help of the phenomenon of
Heidegger explains that in the answers to these questions, 'the justification for rejecting the traditional ontology of the world will have been demonstrated.' BT,100. In the published version of Being and Time, these stages of Heidegger's phenomenological destruction were never reached. The part of Being and Time in which they were to appear, part two, was never published. Accordingly we will now turn to the positive task of applying the phenomenological method to money.

Phenomenological Interpretation of Money. Destruction.

Our application of the phenomenological method to money will begin by performing a phenomenological destruction on Heidegger. This can be done by reconsidering the responses he gave on behalf of Cartesianism and Antiquity to the question we interpreted him to pose earlier: What word appropriately describes the object(s) closest to us in everydayness? In reconsidering these, we will zoom in on those parts of his answers where money first shows itself to us. But one might object that there is something problematic with this last sentence; for have we not already criticized Heidegger for silently passing over money and not saying anything about it? Are we not therefore contradicting our earlier claim that Heidegger passed over money by saying that in chapter three of Being and Time, money shows itself to us? Not at all. For proper employment of the phenomenological method enables us to see the way money is hidden in the different responses Heidegger put forward, the monetary that Heidegger himself exposed to us unbeknownst even to himself. In short, we can use the phenomenological method to see what we know Heidegger himself did not see.

So far as Heidegger's answer on behalf of the Cartesian tradition is concerned, Where does money show itself? It shows itself to us in Heidegger's notion of a 'thing invested with value'; for there is a certain ambiguity involved with the notion of a 'thing invested with value' that Heidegger overlooked. On the one hand, a 'thing invested with value' can
mean, as it did for Heidegger, a thing with functional or useful properties belonging to it. Understood in this sense a 'thing invested with value' is merely a Cartesian way of describing equipment. On the other hand, a thing invested with value is a coin, or bank note. Stated more precisely, *money is a thing invested with value.* Simmel expressed this point by saying that 'money ... is value turned into a substance.' PM, 121. The value money is invested with or has been turned into is exchange value, and exchange value must be distinguished from use value. More about this distinction will be said later so we will not dwell on it here.

We can be sure Heidegger overlooked this ambiguity of a 'thing invested with value' because of what he actually did say in his more detailed criticism of the Cartesian ontology of the world. For in responding to an objection a Cartesian might make against what Heidegger criticized it for -- passing over the phenomenon of the world -- Heidegger said that by a thing invested with value he meant those beings he had already 'characterized ontologically as [equipment ready-to-hand].’ BT,99.

Next we want to consider where money shows itself to us in the response Heidegger attributed to the Greeks. Here we need to be slightly more creative with our use of the phenomenological method; for the matter is not as simple as merely reading off an ambiguity contained in something Heidegger said. Nevertheless the pecuniary is present and it does show itself. For what Heidegger fails to mention with his claim that 'The Greeks had an appropriate term for "things": *pragmata,*’ BT,68, is that *pragmata* is not the only term the Greeks had for “things”. They also had the term *chremata.* We can be certain that *chremata* was a word used by the Greeks because of what Sextus Empiricus said in his *Outlines of Pyrrhonism;* ‘Protagoras, too, will have it that of all things the measure is man, of the things that are that they are, and of the things that are not that they are not [B, I], meaning by “measure” the standard of judgment, and using the word *chremata,* rather than *pragmata* for “things”.' OS,10.42

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42 Actually in his vol. 4 of his lectures on Nietzsche, Heidegger does refer to the Greek terms *khremata,* however even here he fails to acknowledge the monetary sense of this word.
The word *chremata* was also used by Heraclitus in the fragment of his we quoted earlier: ‘All things are an equal exchange for fire and fire for all things, as goods are for gold and gold for goods.’ Frag.90. Heraclitus’ use of *chremata* for things in this quote, provides us with the characteristic we need to distinguish it from *pragmata*. For as the reference to gold anticipates, there is a monetary connotation associated with *chremata* that is generally not associated with *pragmata*. Thus, in addition to meaning a thing that one needs or uses, *chremata* can also mean money: ‘*chrema* (singular) “a thing that one uses or needs. in pl.= goods, property, money, gear, chattels’.

Heidegger’s failure to mention that the Greeks also had another word to describe the object closest to us in everydayness, *chremata*, is significant because of the fact that *chremata* has this monetary sense associated with it. Accordingly, if we take into consideration (i) the fact that money too is a thing invested with value, and (ii) the monetary reference which belongs to *chremata*, and now ask Heidegger’s question, another answer becomes possible. Instead of saying that equipment is closest to us in everydayness, we could easily entertain the possibility that money is closest to us in everydayness. In what sense? In the sense that money secures the everyday Dasein’s future well being.

With the idea of money being closest to us in everydayness, we pull back the lid on something very important; for if we pause to consider how we should proceed phenomenologically here, the obvious way forward is to ask about the Greek word for money. Strictly speaking there is no Greek word for money. *Chremata* is frequently used, but another word for money in Greek is *nomisma*, which means coinage, current coin, usage, currency. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle tells us that *nomisma* derives from *nomos*, which means convention, use, custom or law: “a coin is a sort of substitute (or representative) for need and came into being by convention; and it is because of this that its

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43 Liddle and Scott’s intermediate English-Greek lexicon, column I, p. 894.
44 Although we will not pursue it here, it is entirely possible that substituting money for equipment in Heidegger’s existential analysis of everydayness, could provide one with the kind of opening they need to subject Heidegger’s entire interpretation of Dasein to a fundamental critique. For example, one could argue that money rather than *Das man* is what prescribes the kind of being of everydayness. Moreover one could also argue that trust as opposed to care is the most characteristic existential of Dasein’s being.
name is ‘coin’ (=nomisma), for it exists by regulation (=nomos) and not by nature, and it is up to us to change a given coin or make it useless.’ NE,1133a,29f.

In Ancient philosophy nomos was contrasted with phusis. Phusis is standardly translated as nature. Thus the distinction is between that which exists by convention as opposed to that which exists naturally. This distinction between nomos and phusis, is one of the most important distinctions to influence Ancient philosophy. In fact this distinction has run through and influenced western thought ever since it was first made. The intractable genetic vs. environment debate, which we will be returning to in chapter eight, is merely the latest formulation of it. To give an indication of how influential the nomos phusis distinction was to Ancient philosophy, consider a couple things Guthrie said about it.

The two terms nomos (pl. nomoi) and physis are key-words -- in the fifth and fourth centuries one might rather say catch-words -- of Greek thought ... in the intellectual climate of the fifth century they came to be commonly regarded as opposed and mutually exclusive: what existed 'by nomos' was not 'by physis' and vice versa. HGP,III, p.55.

The nomos-physis antithesis ... will be found to enter into most of the questions of the day. Discussion of religion turned on whether gods existed by physis -- in reality -- or only by nomos; of political organizations, on whether states arose by divine ordinance, by natural necessity or by nomos; of cosmopolitanism, on whether divisions within the human race are natural or only a matter of nomos; of equality, on whether the rule of one man over another (slavery) or one nation over another (empire) is natural and inevitable, or only nomos; and so on. HGP,III,p.57-8.

At this stage we will pause to sum up what has been established. We can regard our reconsideration of Heidegger's answers to the question we interpreted him to pose, ie. What is the object closest to us in everydayness? as performing an act of phenomenological destruction. We began with the ambiguity belonging to his notion of a thing invested with value. On the basis of this ambiguity we traced the side of the ambiguity Heidegger overlooked, money, back to Aristotle in a phenomenologically destructive way. Our result
was to arrive at the nomos-phusis distinction. Before continuing in the direction of a phenomenological destruction, we will first spell out briefly one question that comes up here which is of particular interest to Heidegger.

Our phenomenological destruction has uncovered a distinction which has influenced western thought ever since it was made in Antiquity. The thesis that is latent within this distinction of ancient ontology is worth manifesting here because of the way it relates to the thesis of Modern ontology Heidegger investigated in chapter three of *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. The thesis of Ancient ontology we are referring to is the thesis that the basic ways of being are the being of nature *phusis*, and the being of custom, law, or convention, *nomos*. If we had more time we could compare this thesis with Heidegger’s thesis of Modern Ontology: ‘The Basic Ways of Being Are the Being of Nature (*Res Extensa*) and the Being of the Mind (*Res Cogitans*).’ BP,122. We can consider the kind of comparative study of these theses as work which must be left undone for the time being. We mention it merely to show the wealth of philosophy that can be pulled from money when it is investigated phenomenologically. This said we will continue with our phenomenological destruction by now considering in more detail what Aristotle had to say about the nature of money.

*Aristotle and the Nature of Money*

We want to know what Aristotle said about the nature of money. There are two specific texts we must consider in order to find this out: the *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 5, chapter 5, (NE,5.5) and the *Politics*, book I chapter 8-10. Specifically we want to know whether Scott Meikle’s interpretation that Aristotle believed money to have two natures is plausible. In defending this view, Meikle distinguishes Aristotle’s inquiry into money found in the *Nicomachean Ethics* from the one in the *Politics* on the grounds that the former inquiry is metaphysical (AET,197) while the latter is ethical (AET,198). According to Meikle, these two different enquiries give way to an inconsistency ‘in [Aristotle’s] treatment of money.’ AET,95. The inconsistency is that Aristotle attributes ‘two natures to money, that of a
means and that of an end.' AET,87. The reason Meikle claims this about Aristotle’s treatment of money is because for Aristotle, there are two different ways in which the nature of a thing can be determined -- either by considering the origins of the thing, or by considering the *telos* of the thing. AET,95-6. Let us look at this alleged inconsistency Meikle is pointing to more closely.

Meikle interprets Aristotle’s ‘official position [to be] that [money] has only one of these natures, that of a means of exchange.’ AET,87. This interpretation is based on Aristotle’s claim in the *Politics* that ‘money was invented to be used in exchange.’ Pol.,1258b,4-5. Because money was invented to be used in exchange, it follows that the nature of money is that of a means; for ‘[Aristotle] holds that [origins] are a good guide in identifying the natures of things’ AET,96. To support this interpretation, Meikle appeals again to the *Politics* where Aristotle states: ‘he who considers things in their first growth and origin, whether a state or anything else, will obtain the clearest view of them.’ Pol.,1252a,24. Thus if Aristotle considers the origins of money as the correct way of determining its nature he is, according to Meikle, committed to the conclusion that the nature of money is that of a means; for it is as a means that money was originally invented. Finally, Meikle goes on to add that:

> mainly on the strength of [the quote from the *Politics*, 1258b 4-5, Aristotle] has usually been understood to hold that money is in its nature an instrument or means for the circulation of use values, whose usefulness lies in helping to get use values to where they are needed. AET,95.

So much for the view that, for Aristotle the nature of money is that of a means. Next we will consider Meikle’s claim that Aristotle’s ‘theory equally supports attributing to money the entirely different nature of an end.’ AET,95. Why Aristotle’s theory supports this conclusion is because ‘it is just as typically Aristotelian to find out what something really is by looking for its mature form. What a thing develops into (its *telos* and its final cause) is the nature.’ AET,96. (Meikle’s italic). The evidence Meikle cites to support this claim is also taken from the *Politics*: ‘what each thing is when fully developed we call its nature,
whether we are speaking of a man, a horse or a family.' Pol. 1, 1252b,32. Hence Meikle concludes: 'If Aristotle had chosen to determine the nature of money by [looking at the telos of it], he should have arrived at the conclusion that it is in the nature of money to become an end.' AET,96. Meikle goes on to add that Aristotle even recognized that in some instances money is treated by people as an end in itself. What Meikle is referring to is Aristotle’s analysis of money in the Politics where he claims that the end of arts like the art of finance, is to make as much money as possible. Aristotle is critical of this kind of behavior; for 'using money in this way is ... to make money itself the end, and to make natural ends a means of making money.' AET,88.

This explains the two different arguments which Meikle has attributed to Aristotle that in turn, lead to the two views on the nature of money. The problem is, according to Meikle, that Aristotle ‘gives no reason for choosing the ... view [that the nature of money is that of a means].’ AET,95. We will now put forward a critique of Meikle’s interpretation of Aristotle.

**Critique of Meikle**

Meikle claims that Aristotle’s inquiry into money at NE 5.5 is a metaphysical inquiry, but this remark actually conflicts with the overall kind of inquiry Aristotle described the Nicomachean Ethics as; for in book one of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle described his inquiry ‘as a political inquiry’ NE,1094b,12. Nowhere after this does Aristotle announce that he has changed his inquiry from a political to a metaphysical inquiry. In fact it is just the opposite. Aristotle restates that his inquiry is political several times. First towards the end of book one: ‘And if this investigation is a part of political science, clearly our inquiry will be in keeping with the plan that we adopted at the outset’. NE,1102a,12. And again immediately after his discussion on fair exchange in book 5 chapter 6: ‘The relation of reciprocity to justice has been discussed already. But we must not overlook the fact that the subject of our inquiry is not only justice in general but political justice.’ NE,1134a,23--26.
Why does Aristotle never say that his inquiry is a metaphysical inquiry? Because as Heidegger reminds us, 'Aristotle never had in his possession what later came to be understood by the word or the concept “metaphysics.” Nor did he ever seek anything like the “metaphysics” that has for ages been attributed to him.' AM,1. Hence the question: If Aristotle never had in his possession what later came to be understood by the word or the concept metaphysics, in what sense is his inquiry in NE 5.5 a metaphysical inquiry of money? Meikle answers this by saying that Aristotle’s inquiry is metaphysical in that his aim is ‘to identify what kind of property [exchange value is; what it is, and what order of being it belongs to]’. AET,197. It is in this sense then that Aristotle’s inquiry is metaphysical; for ‘an inquiry aiming to answer questions of this kind is a metaphysical inquiry.’ AET,197.

Now although Aristotle never had in his possession the word or concept “metaphysics”’, it is reasonable to assume that something like Aristotle’s metaphysics is influencing his analysis of money in NE 5.5. Hence Meikle states: ‘[Aristotle’s] metaphysics is not prominent on the surface as he develops his argument in [NE 5.5], but as is usually the case in his inquiries, it underlies his thought and governs its direction.’ AET,13. Meikle clarifies this comment by referring the reader to other metaphysical analyzes Aristotle conducted in both the Metaphysics and the Physics which are similar to the metaphysical analysis Meikle took Aristotle to be conducting in NE 5.5: ‘Exchange value is susceptible to such metaphysical analysis just as place is in Book 4 of the Physics, and abstract mathematical objects in Metaphysics M and N.’ AET,17. This last claim of Meikle’s actually suggests a good way for us to proceed in our critique of him, namely by comparing Aristotle’s analysis of money in NE 5.5 with either the metaphysical analysis of place in book 4 of the Physics, or the metaphysical analysis of abstract mathematical objects in Metaphysics M and N. What we will do is compare Aristotle’s analysis of money in NE 5.5 with his analysis of place in the Physics. Now to do this, it will be necessary to first say something about the analysis of place in book four of Aristotle’s Physics.
Aristotle's Analysis of Place in the Physics

Aristotle begins the Physics by basically repeating what Meikle quoted him saying in the Politics, 1, 1252a,24.

Since understanding and knowing in every inquiry concerned with things having principles or causes or elements results from the knowledge of these (for we think that we know each thing when we know the first causes and the first principles and have reached the elements), clearly, in the science of nature too we should first try to determine what is the case with regard to the principles. Phy,184a11-16 (Aristotle's italics)

After saying this, Aristotle next explains how to determine the nature of a thing from a consideration of its origin. To do this, one should proceed 'from what is more known and clearer to us to what is by nature clearer and more known.' Phy,184a,17-22. (Aristotle's italics). For Aristotle, things that are more known and clearer to us are, paradoxically enough, 'rather mingled'. Phy,184a,22 They are clearer to us in that we are familiar with them however their parts or components are mixed together, and it is because of this that they are 'rather mingled'. Because of this mingling, the parts must be analyzed; for it is only after they have been analyzed that the 'elements and principles [will] become known'. Phy,184a,23. Now what is true of every analysis is that it presupposes a prior synthesis of some sort or another. This prior synthesis is what every analysis must analyze. For this reason Aristotle states: 'in the case of each thing, we should proceed from its entirety to each of its constituents, for it is the whole that is more known by sensation; and a thing in its entirety ... is a kind of whole.' Phy,184a,25-184b,10. The question to answer therefore is this: Did Aristotle actually begin his analysis of place in book four of the Physics by starting from place in its entirety and proceed from here towards its constituents? Evidence that he did reads as follows.

But what actually is place? Here is a way to find an answer. Let us take as premisses all the properties which seem genuinely to belong to place in its own right. This is what we expect to be true of place: that it is the
immediate container of that of which it is the place, that it is not a part of the object it contains, that a thing's immediate place is exactly the same size as it, that it can be left behind by the object and is separable from it, and also that every place admits of the distinction between above and below, and that every body naturally moves up or down to its own proper place and stays there. Phy, 210b,32-211a,5.

Aristotle's reference to 'all the properties which seem genuinely to belong to place in its own right' can be interpreted as evidence to confirm that he did begin his analysis of place with the whole, place in its entirety. Consequently there is some reason to think that in his analysis of place, Aristotle is following the instructions he laid down in book one of the Physics. In further explaining the details of his inquiry Aristotle says:

The aims of our inquiry should be to answer the question 'What is place?' in such a way that we are in a position to solve any difficulties, to attribute to it the properties which are supposed to belong to it, and also to explain why any qualms and difficulties arise. Any exposition which achieves all this, on any topic has succeeded admirably. Phy, 211a,6-12.

This remark of Aristotle's actually gives us something to aim for so far as our critique of Meikle is concerned, namely to determine Aristotle's answer to the question, What is money? in such a way that we are in a position to answer any questions, and explain why any qualms might arise with regards to this answer.

*Comparison Between Nicomachean Ethics 5.5 and Physics Book 4*

So much then for Aristotle's analysis of place in the Physics. It is now time to compare this analysis with Aristotle's analysis of money in NE 5.5 by asking, Does Aristotle begin his analysis of money in NE 5.5, by listing all the properties which seem genuinely to belong to money in its own right? No he does not. Actually it is not even the properties of money that Aristotle is interested in. Rather it is the functions of money that Aristotle analyzes.
Later interpreters of Aristotle have credited him for being the first to expose the basic functions of money. In a remark related to this, Meikle refers to Joseph Schumpeter's work *History of Economic Analysis*, in which we are told that 'three of the four functions of money traditionally listed in the nineteenth-century textbooks of economics can be traced back to Aristotle, namely, money as a medium of exchange, as a measure of value, and as a store of value'. AET,87. Meikle goes on to explain that, 'The absence of the fourth [function of money], as a standard of deferred payments, can hardly be held against Aristotle, since there were no deferred payments in the ancient world.' AET,87. If Meikle is right about the absence of deferred payments in Antiquity, it is reasonable to assume that the three above mentioned functions of money were the only three functions to which money was put by the ancients. If this is the case, then one resemblance between Aristotle's analysis of money in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and his analysis of place in the *Physics* can be seen. For although Aristotle does not begin with money in its entirety, nevertheless he does, in the course of his analysis disclose all the basic functions of money. Insofar as Aristotle does this, he does in fact address money in its entirety. In this sense the analysis of money in NE 5.5 does resemble the analysis of place in the *Physics*.

Of course for the resemblance between the *Physics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* to be even closer, the question, What is money? would have to be answered by Aristotle in such a way that explained why any qualms or difficulties might arise. Did Aristotle do this? To determine this we need to first state what the main difficulty is that arises in the kind of inquiry Aristotle is conducting. Meikle tells us that the main difficulty confronting Aristotle's inquiry is the problem of commensurability, which Meikle explicitly formulates as follows,

if a certain quantity of one product is to have the relation of equality to a certain quantity of another, then the two kinds of products must be 'comparable in a way' (*sumbleta pos*, 1133a,19). This vague relation is more closely defined in due course as 'commensurability' (*summetria*, 1133b,16,18,19,22) ... This commensurability of things that are different by nature ... is the core of the problem which exchange presents to
economics, though it is one which economists have rarely confronted head-on. AET,12-3.

As we interpret Aristotle, he does tell us what money is in a way which addresses the problem of commensurability, but as Meikle interprets him, he does not: ‘[Aristotle] does not know what exchange value [money] is in his technical sense of ‘what x is.’ AET,26.45

Our disagreement with Meikle stems from this problem of commensurability; for as Meikle interprets NE, 5.5, it is impossible to construe the logic of it in any other way than as a metaphysical inquiry whose aim is to explain how different products can be strictly commensurable.

In holding that in exchange, products are related in equations as commensurable quantities, [Aristotle] had to accept that in exchange the beds do not differ in quality from the house. He had then to explain how that is possible; that is what the first question [how different products can be strictly commensurable?] asks, and his whole inquiry is aimed at answering. It is not possible to construe the logic of the chapter in any other way, and to construe it as having primarily to do with ‘holding together’ is not a serious possibility. AET,38.

In opposition to Meikle, we suggest that it is possible to construe the logic of NE 5.5 differently than the way he construed it. To show this requires the following three questions be answered,

(1) If the logic of NE 5.5 is not organized around the problem of commensurability, What is it organized around?
(2) What is Aristotle’s response to the problem of commensurability?
(3) What is Aristotle’s answer to the question, What is money?

45 The reason we equate exchange value with money in this quote is because Meikle identifies the two when he says ‘money is exchange value. Its job is to express the exchange value of each commodity independently of the commodity’s own physical body.’ AET,97.
To answer this question, we must show that NE 5.5 can be construed differently from the way Meikle has construed it. Showing this is made easier because Meikle himself is the one who adumbrates the only other serious alternative as to what NE 5.5 is organized around when he says in the above quote that it is not organized around Aristotle’s notion of holding together.

According to Meikle, the main question NE 5.5 asked was, ‘how [can] different products ... be strictly commensurable in the first place?’ AET,36. However he admits that Aristotle might be concerned with asking an alternative question: ‘how or from what point of view [can] products [be] treated as commensurable enough to allow exchange and the holding together of the polis?’ AET,37. In fact, Meikle even goes to some length to defend this alternative view; for he rightly points out that “‘Holding together’ is ... a matter of serious concern to Aristotle.’ AET,37. But at the end of the day, Meikle dismisses this view by insisting that Aristotle’s main concern was with answering the question: ‘How can products be strictly commensurable in the first place?’ AET,36. We will now show that Meikle was incorrect to do so.

We are interpreting NE 5.5 to be primarily organized around Aristotle’s notion of holding-together. For this interpretation to be taken seriously, Meikle’s alternative question, ‘How or from what point of view [can] products [be] treated as commensurable enough to allow exchange and the holding together of the polis?’ AET,37-8, must be disregarded. Why? Because it still includes the problem of commensurability. The only difference between this alternative question and the main question Meikle interprets Aristotle to be seriously concerned with answering in NE 5.5, i.e., ‘How [can different products be] strictly commensurable in the first place?’ is that the former question does not ask about strict commensurability, but about a commensurability which is not strict. Insofar as it does this, it is a question which still implicitly assumes that Aristotle is concerned with the problem of commensurability. To understand Aristotle’s response to this problem, we must extricate
ourselves entirely from Meikle's assumption that Aristotle was looking for a solution to the problem of commensurability at all. We can begin to do this by noticing the number of times and places Aristotle actually referred to the notion of holding-together in NE 5.5 -- a chapter of less than six pages. First Aristotle says, 'in associations for exchange, the kind of what is reciprocally just which holds men together is ... the one based on proportion; for it is by an action which is reciprocally proportional that a state continues to hold together.' NE,1132b,32-35. Second, 'it is by give-and-take that men hold together.' NE,1133a,3. Third, 'All goods to be exchanged, then, should be measurable by some standard coin or measure ... In reality, this measure is the need which holds all things together.' NE,1133a,26f. Fourth, 'That need holds these together as a single thing is clear from the fact that if the two parties ... do not need each other, they do not make the exchange.' NE,1133b,8f. (our italics)

Admittedly, just because Aristotle mentions holding-together a number of times in a number of different contexts it does not necessarily follow that his inquiry is primarily organized around it. But it is important to see how the idea of holding-together fits in with his analysis of money. For one of the more insightful things about his analysis of money is that for Aristotle, there must be money if the polis is to hold together. Put another way, for Aristotle, money was necessary to man's way of being, his being-in-the-polis. Aristotle's argument for this is in the form of a chain-argument and can be paraphrased in the following way.

If all things can be measured by the same unit, ie. money, then they can be equalized. If everything can be equalized, then everything can be fairly exchanged. If everything can be fairly exchanged then the polis wherein these exchanges take place will hold-together. Therefore there must exist money as the one unit which measures everything; for if there were no one unit which measures everything, then beings could not be equalized, and if beings cannot be equalized, then they cannot be exchanged fairly. Of course beings could still be exchanged unfairly, but the problem here is that if beings were exchanged unfairly, the polis wherein they were being exchanged would not remain a polis for long. A polis
wherein unfair exchanges take place, will fall apart; for if a group of people in a society believe they are being cheated or taken advantage of, either through exchanges which are not just, or by being treated unjustly in relation to another group of people, some manner of social rebellion will ensue. If unjust exchanges continue, the rebellion can and frequently does escalate into violence. Thus a polis cannot hold-together if the exchanges between its citizens are not fair. Aristotle’s point can be summed up by saying that there must be money because without it the polis would fall apart, since there would be nothing to guarantee fair exchanges.

Before continuing with our interpretation of NE 5.5, there is something worth pointing out here about the way in which money holds together the polis. When money is exchangeable for other things, peace as opposed to a state of rebellion is a frequent consequence. So long as Dasein believes it is not being cheated when it pays for beings or, what amounts to the same thing, is paid fairly in exchange for providing beings, relations with others vary from being friendly to indifferent. There is a noticeable lack of hostility between people when money is doing its job and ensuring that fair exchanges are occurring. This pacifying affect that monetary payment has on Dasein has actually been defined into the language of money. Consider the English word ‘pay’. It derives from the Latin pacare, which means to appease, in the sense of appeasing one’s creditors. Pacare itself derives from pacalis which means peace. Let us now answer the two remaining questions;

(2) What is Aristotle’s response to the problem of commensurability?
(3) What is Aristotle’s answer to the question, What is money?

Recall that in answer to the first question, What is the logic of NE 5.5 organized around? we answered; Aristotle’s notion of holding together.
What is Aristotle's response to the Problem of Commensurability?

We must free ourselves from Meikle's assumption that Aristotle was looking to solve the problem of commensurability at all. How can we be confident that Aristotle was not looking for a solution to this problem? Because Meikle's claim about Aristotle's metaphysics governing the direction of his analysis of money in NE 5.5 can be interpreted to imply this: that what Aristotle actually did say in his *Metaphysics* about comparability or commensurability will govern the direction of his arguments about commensurability in NE 5.5. By interpreting Meikle's remark to imply this, it should be clear that one way we can actually determine what Aristotle said about the problem of commensurability in the *Nicomachean Ethics* is by considering what he said about commensurability in the *Metaphysics*. Now if what Aristotle actually said about commensurability in the *Metaphysics* is taken in conjunction with the fact that the *Nicomachean Ethics* is a political inquiry it is reasonable to conclude that Aristotle would not actually take the problem of commensurability seriously. To be convinced of this we need to explain two things; first what for Aristotle does it mean to conduct a political inquiry, second what does Aristotle say about commensurability in the *Metaphysics*?

(i) The *Nicomachean Ethics*, is a political inquiry. NE,1094b,12. Now a political inquiry is, for Aristotle, a practical inquiry and therefore must be distinguished from a theoretical inquiry: 'the branch of philosophy on which we are at present engaged [political science] is not ... theoretical in its aim' NE,1103b,27f. A practical inquiry is distinguished from a theoretical inquiry in the different way in which one conducts each inquiry. A practical, ie. political inquiry is for Aristotle, 'adequately discussed if it is presented as clearly as is proper to its subject-matter.' NE,1094b,13f. For this to happen, precise statements of truth must not be sought. Why? Because the truth of whatever is being discussed in a political inquiry can only be indicated roughly and in outline. Aristotle explains that this is partly due to the fact that the kinds of questions raised within political inquiries are constantly mutating: 'questions of conduct and expediency have as little fixity about them as questions of what is healthful’. NE,1104a,2-4. Aristotle warns the reader that when
examining subjects like politics, the following must be kept in mind,

in discussing such matters and in using [premises] concerning them, we should be content to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and when we deal with things which occur for the most part and use similar [premises] for them, [we should be content to draw] conclusions of a similar nature. The listener, too, should accept each of these statements in the same manner; for it is the mark of an educated man to seek as much precision in things of a given genus as their nature allows, for to accept persuasive arguments from a mathematician appears to be [as improper as] to demand demonstrations from a rhetorician. NE, 1094b,20-25.

We interpret this as Aristotle's admonition not to be overly eristic in a political inquiry. An admonition not to be taken lightly; for Aristotle repeats it two other times. First at NE, 1098a,25f: 'We should also recall what has been stated previously: precision should not be sought alike in all cases, but in each case only as much as the subject-matter allows and as much as is proper to the inquiry', and again at NE, 1104a,1f.: 'all statements concerning matters of action should be made sketchily and not with precision, for as we said at first, our demands of statements should be in accordance with the subject-mater of those statements'.

(ii) The above tells us about the kind of inquiry a political inquiry is, namely a practical inquiry, and a practical inquiry is an inquiry designed to indicate the truth roughly and in outline. Now if this fact is taken in conjunction with what Aristotle actually said about commensurability in his *Metaphysics* it is reasonable to conclude that Aristotle would not be seriously concerned with solving the problem of commensurability. What does Aristotle say about the comparability or commensurability of beings in the *Metaphysics*? He states the following: 'things which differ in genus have no way of proceeding to each other but are far removed and noncomparable.' Meta, 1055a,7-8. How does this statement govern the direction of his inquiry about money in NE 5.5? By constituting a basis in the sense of a background assumption to his response to the problem of commensurability.
From a metaphysical perspective, Aristotle considers beings which differ by genus to be noncomparable. Now if we assume that all the different beings exchanged in everydayness frequently differ by genus, what we can infer is that quite often the beings that are exchanged in everydayness are in fact so different that they cannot be compared at all. And if they cannot be compared at all, to suggest as Meikle does, that Aristotle is looking for the one thing or property which makes all beings commensurable or comparable with one another is simply unreasonable. It would be about as improper for us to assume that Aristotle was looking for this as it would be for us to demand a demonstration from a rhetorician, or to accept mere plausibility from a mathematician; for remember, the *Nicomachean Ethics* is an inquiry designed to indicate the truth roughly and in outline. As an inquiry of this kind, it is unreasonable to think that it is designed to indicate something as precise as the one thing or property all beings have which makes them commensurable with one another, especially when, metaphysically speaking, there is no such property according to Aristotle. The beings which exist and are exchanged on a daily basis -- beings which differ by genus -- are quite often so different that they do not have any one thing in common apart from the fact that they can all be measured by money.

Meikle's question about how different products can be strictly commensurable is a question which can only be answered roughly and in outline. Even before Aristotle asks the question about commensurability in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, his *Metaphysics* suggests that he has already assumed that beings whose differences are great, i.e., differ by genus, are noncomparable and thus incommensurable. Actually it is because of what Aristotle has already said in the *Metaphysics* about beings whose differences are great being noncomparable, that he says in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1133b, 18-20: 'It is true that goods whose difference is great cannot be measured by the same unit but when referred to the needs of men, they become sufficiently measurable.' NE, 5.5, 1133b, 18-20. Why would Aristotle say this in the *Nicomachean Ethics*? Because what he said in the *Metaphysics* about things which differ by genus being noncomparable, actually compelled him to say this -- assuming of course that Aristotle wanted to be consistent. Strictly speaking, it is the things which differ by genus whose differences are so great, that they cannot be measured.
by the same unit.

Meikle however interprets NE, 5.5, 1133b,18-20 differently. Not only does Meikle interpret these lines as proof that NE 5.5 was organized around the problem of commensurability, but also that it was Aristotle's solution to this problem. A solution which, as Meikle suggests, is no solution at all since what Aristotle has admitted, is that he has failed to solve the problem of commensurability: 'Aristotle's admission of failure at 1133b,18-20 has to be taken at face value. It is unambiguous, it cannot be made to mean anything other than what it says, it cannot be wished away, and it is in a way just what we should have expected him to say.' AET,35-6.

From the view point of our interpretation of NE 5.5 NE however, 1133b, 18-20 is ambiguous and can be made to mean something other than what Meikle says it means. Because the overall aim of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, when Aristotle states at 1133b,18-20, that the differences between goods can become sufficiently measurable by the same unit when these differences are referred to the needs of men, he has done precisely that -- indicate the truth roughly and in outline. The truth that he has indicated here is the truth of how beings ultimately acquire a price on them. We come to understand how a being gets its price by referring this being to the needs of men. We must be content with this expression of truth because any other expression of truth cannot be made. For from a metaphysical point of view, it cannot be explained how beings which differ by genus can become sufficiently comparable to be measured by the same unit. They cannot be compared in the first place. That they are compared and equated at all is something that is done in accordance with the needs of men. Things that are done in this basic sort of way, resist theoretical explanation. In his commentary on *Being and Time*, Dreyfus has pointed out that 'in explaining most simple and basic things we finally have to say: "This is what one does."' CBT,155. We interpret Aristotle to be saying that setting prices to beings is another example of something so simple and basic that we finally have to say: 'We need this being to be worth so much.'
What our interpretation of the Aristotle quote from the *Metaphysics* confirms is actually a deep suspicion of Meikle’s. For to be fair to Meikle, he does acknowledge that

The weight of [Aristotle’s] philosophy [is] against a strong expectation of finding commensurability of the kind that would resolve the problem he sets himself in NE 5.5 given the diversity of natures among products and activities, particularly if the commensurating property were thought to be one which products have by nature, *phusei*. AET, 36.

But despite Meikle’s awareness of the unlikelihood of his interpretation, he still chooses to defend the view that the logic of NE 5.5 is organized around the problem of commensurability.

From our analysis however it is becoming increasingly clear that Meikle’s claim about the logic of NE 5.5 being organized around the problem of commensurability is problematic. For what Meikle is asking us to believe is this: in a work designed to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle is being so specific as to look for the one thing or property which makes all beings commensurable with one another. And this despite the fact that his *Metaphysics* suggests that beings which differ by genus, are so different that there is no one thing or property they might have in common that allows us to compare them with each other. Would a thinker like Aristotle really do this? For Meikle’s interpretation to make sense, he would have to give us reasons for thinking that the question of how money can fairly measure all the different excesses and deficiencies of beings, constitutes an exception to Aristotle’s claim that political inquiries can only indicate the truth roughly and in outline.

In answer to question (2) therefore, What is Aristotle’s response to the problem of commensurability, we suggest that his response is that this is a problem not to be taken seriously because it can only be solved roughly and in outline by referring to the needs of men.
What for Aristotle is money? To answer this we need to say something else about the overall character of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle says that it is an inquiry concerned with action: ‘since our present study is not for the sake of contemplation ... we should examine certain things about actions.’ NE,1103,b,26. In accordance with this, NE 5.5 is in part, an analysis of the exchange transaction in the *polis* and the role money plays in holding this *polis* together. Aristotle begins his analysis with the premise that man has needs. One of the things man needs is to exchange. An exchange takes place when each person needs the other. There must be a double need, a need on both sides of the exchange; for ‘if the two parties, whether both or only one, do not need each other, they do not make the exchange.’ NE,1133b,8-9. What Aristotle is exhibiting here is what is decisive in bringing an exchange transaction between men into being. What Aristotle regards as being decisive enough to level down all the differences between the beings that are exchanged, is need, i.e. the needs of men. Money is the representative of this need. With this we hit upon Aristotle’s answer to the question, What is money? According to Aristotle, money ‘is a sort of substitute (or representative) for need.’ NE,1133a,29f. The need that money represents is the need which holds all things in the *polis* together.

That Aristotle is establishing a relation between money and all things is significant from a metaphysical point of view; for such a move confers upon money a metaphysical content and character. The notion of ‘all things’, beings as a whole, not only is a metaphysical notion, but was a much discussed topic amongst ancient philosophers especially in relation to cosmology. Fragment 90 of Heraclitus’ about fire being an exchange for ‘all things’ is one example of this; Thales claim about water being the universal substance out of which ‘all things’ were made, another. If Aristotle really were conducting a metaphysical analysis of money in NE 5.5 like Meikle claimed, then the conception of money as the representative of the need that holds all things in the *polis* together is the more appropriate determination of the nature of money to attribute to him. For by attributing to Aristotle this
conception of the nature of money, we attribute to him a conception of money which is truly on a metaphysical scale, as opposed to a conception of the nature of money which is either political or ethical. Both money as a means to an end as well as an end in itself, are conceptions of the nature of money which are either political or ethical. The view that the nature of money is the need which holds all things in the polis together however is distinctively metaphysical in character. Of all the different conceptions of money that Aristotle disclosed and of all the different functions of money which this disclosure led to, the conception of money as the representative of the need which holds the polis together is the one most often overlooked. This answers the three questions we asked. To sum up the main conclusions of our critique of Meikle, the following can be said.

We agree with Meikle’s claim that Aristotle’s metaphysics governs the direction of his analysis of money in NE 5.5. However we disagree with his claim that the logic of NE 5.5 is oriented around solving the problem of commensurability; for we gave reasons to think that this is a problem Aristotle would not try to solve. Moreover, we also find implausible the claim that Aristotle is inconsistent in his treatment of money; for if Aristotle’s analysis of money in NE 5.5 is a metaphysical analysis of the nature of money, it is reasonable to expect that any determination of the nature of money within this horizon would itself be a metaphysical determination of the nature of money. The two conflicting views that Meikle attributed to Aristotle with respect to the nature of money -- that the nature of money is that of a means or an end -- are not metaphysical in character; they are either political or ethical. However the conception of money as the representative of the need which holds all things in the polis together is metaphysical in character.

What you have just read can be regarded as a substantial part of our phenomenological destruction, but it is not however the last word. Since we are using the phenomenological method to investigate being by way of money, and since money itself is partially constituted by value we must continue with our phenomenological destruction by tracing the concept of value back to its source in Antiquity. We will be saying much more about this in chapter seven. But before doing this we must perform a phenomenological
construction and a phenomenological reduction. A phenomenological reduction from money to its mode of being will be the next step we will take. But before actually taking this step there is an argument we must mention here which, although it may be tempting to advance in relation to the phenomenological reduction from money to its mode of being, would be completely out of order.

It would be wrong to argue in the following manner. Because for Aristotle the nature of money is to represent the need which holds the *polis* together, the mode of being of money must therefore be to represent the need which holds the world together. Such a move is wrong because such a move does not perform a phenomenological reduction at all. Just the opposite: it avoids performing a phenomenological reduction. In fact it is cheating; for no effort is being applied at all to the phenomenological method in doing this. Just because Aristotle may have considered the nature of money to be the representative of the need which holds the *polis* together, it does not follow that for us therefore this, or even something like this, is the mode of being of money. That said we will now apply explicit effort to the phenomenological method by making the reduction from money to its mode of being.

*Phenomenological Interpretation of Money. Reduction.*

In the case of equipment, Heidegger performed the phenomenological reduction functionally by singling out the functional character of equipment as being of primary importance for understanding its mode of being. Were we to perform the phenomenological reduction in this way, then we would make the reduction from money back to its mode of being as follows. Just as readiness-to-hand or handiness [Zuhandenheit] is the being of equipment, so readiness-to-exchange, or exchangedness, is the being of money. From a methodological perspective, the conclusion that exchangedness is the being of money can be traced back to Aristotle, since he was the first to distinguish use from exchange categorically.
Is this a convincing determination of the being of money? We suggest it is; for just as the outward appearance of equipment does not reveal handiness, so the outward appearance of money does not reveal exchangedness. What it reveals is merely a piece of circular metal or a rectangular piece of paper with markings on it. Moreover if we consider the relation between Dasein's implicit pre-ontological understanding of being and the explicit expression of this understanding, then this determination of the being of money can be strengthened; for in saying that what it means for money to be in the world is that it be ready-to-exchange, we do make explicit something we already understood about money implicitly. However for the sake of philosophical rigour we will avoid embracing this conclusion immediately and consider another possibility of what the mode of being of money is. For strictly speaking, in Being and Time, Heidegger did not actually argue for the claim that handiness is the being of equipment, nor did he provide any sort of rigorous justification. Rather Heidegger's phenomenological reduction from equipment to handiness was more dogmatically asserted than it was anything else. Thus to avoid having this criticism made against us, it will be necessary to consider the possibility that the mode of being of money is not exchangedness but readiness-to-circulate, or circulatedness. Why readiness-to-circulate? To answer this, consider something Heidegger said about what phenomenology is supposed to let us see.

What is it that phenomenology is to "let be seen"? What is it that is to be called "phenomenon" in a distinctive sense? What is it that by its very essence becomes the necessary theme when we indicate something explicitly? Manifestly it is something that does not show itself initially and for the most part, something that is concealed, in contrast to what initially and for the most part shows itself. But at the same time it is something that essentially belongs to what initially and for the most part shows itself, indeed in such a way that it constitutes its meaning and ground ... what remains concealed in an exceptional sense, or what falls back and is covered up again, or shows itself only in a distorted way, is not this or that being but rather ... the being of beings. BT,35. (Heidegger's italics)

Based on this quote the following argument can be inferred in favor of the conclusion that
circulatedness is the being of money. To begin with, the circulation of money is something that does not show itself to us. Generally speaking, within the realm of everydayness, no sooner does money come out of the Dasein's own private place where it is kept -- the pocket, the wallet, the cash register, the bank vault -- than it is stuffed into the others own private place where it keeps its money as quickly as possible.

What happens when money goes into hiding like this? One thing that happens is that Dasein passes over money and goes on to fix its eye on those beings that money refers us to, the things that we buy with money; but this is not all that happens. In addition, Dasein walks away from the exchange transaction totally indifferent to where its money goes or to whom it goes. It is handed over to another Dasein and this process of handing over again and again is repeated by Dasein. This process finally terminates when money is lost, destroyed or taken out of circulation by whoever it is that makes this decision. The circulation of money is something that does not show itself to us. But if phenomenology is to let us see that which does not show itself to us, and if the circulation of money is something that does not show itself to us, then this suggests that phenomenology is needed for seeing the circulation of money. Therefore we should be willing to prescribe readiness-to-circulate to money as its mode of being; for what does not show itself to us, what remains concealed, is the being of a being; and if the circulation of money does not show itself to us then it is entirely possible that circulatedness is the being of money.

A further argument could be put forward against the view that exchangedness is the being of money; for in everydayness, the exchange of money is something that we see all the time. People are always seen exchanging money with one another. In this sense exchange shows itself to us constantly, but if phenomenology is needed for seeing what does not show itself to us, and if exchange does show itself to us, phenomenology is not needed for seeing exchange. Because of this we should be suspicious of identifying exchangedness as the being of money.

What are we to make of this phenomenologically? Why, if we have been following the
phenomenological method correctly, which we will assume we have, are we lead to these
two different conclusions about the being of money? Let us take a closer look at what
Heidegger said about the phenomenological reduction,

Phenomenological reduction as the leading of our vision from beings back
to being nevertheless is ... in fact ... not the central component [of the
phenomenological method] ... Pure aversion from beings is a merely
negative methodological measure which not only needs to be supplemented
by a positive one but expressly requires us to be led toward being; it thus
requires guidance. BP,21.

The relevant question to ask here is this: Is the phenomenological reduction, as not being
the central component of the phenomenological method, so unimportant that it does not
matter which mode of being money has, or whether in fact it has two modes of being? To
answer this, let us recall Aristotle’s argument for the necessity of money to man’s way of
being, his being-in-the-polis. By considering something Aristotle said in the context of this
argument, the balance is tipped in favor of the conclusion that exchangedness is the being
of money.

The clue to the discovery of exchangedness as the being of money lies in the following
quote: ‘all things should have a price on them; for in this way an exchange is always
possible, and if so, also an association of men.’ NE,1133b,15f. In this quote we see
Aristotle attributing a certain priority of exchange over associations between men. Aristotle
does not actually say that first there are relations or associations between men and that it is
on the basis of this that exchange between men is founded. Rather it is the other way
around; relations between men are founded on the basis of exchange. To analyze this in
more detail we must separate the idea of prioritizing exchange as such, from what Aristotle
is claiming exchange to be prior to; relations between men. Aristotle’s suggestion that
exchange is what makes possible relations between men is not relevant to the question of
the being of money. Rather what is relevant, what serves as our clue to the discovery of
the being of money, is the priority of exchange as such. Why? Because exchange is prior
One need only look as far as a barter economy to prove this. What this implies is that exchange is the condition for the possibility of money. It is because there is exchange that money is possible. Expressed another way, exchange is the ground or basis upon which money is founded. As the ground upon which money is founded, exchange as such must be prior to money. Put even more simply, without exchange money would not be possible. Ontologically speaking we would say that exchange is an a priori. By considering something Heidegger said in *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* we can explain more fully why it is that exchangedness must be the being of money; for what he says there relates directly to both our question of the being of money and our discussion of Aristotle.

In ancient ontology (Aristotle), being (as idea and genus), or that which defines a being as a being, is said to be ... [earlier] than beings, and something prior in a unique way. As ... prior by nature, it is to be distinguished from ... [what is prior by knowledge], the ... [prior with regard to us]. Being is earlier than beings; this “earlier than,” attributed to being, is a distinguishing “feature,” and it does not apply to ... [knowledge], as the ordering of our conceptualization of beings. Being is earlier than, is that which is essentially “earlier”; it belongs to what is prior, in the language of later ontology: a priori. All ontological questioning is inquiry into and definition of the “apriori. MFL,146.

For Heidegger as for Aristotle, being is earlier than beings. But if being is prior to beings, the being of money must likewise be prior to money. Now because exchange is prior to money and is what makes it possible, it follows that exchangedness must be the being of money. This completes our answer to the question about the being of money. But before taking the next step in our application of the phenomenological method, i.e. phenomenological construction, we will consider one last objection to our answer that exchangedness is the being of money.

One might object to the claim that exchangedness is the being of money on the grounds that everything we have said about exchange equally applies to circulation; for just as beings
were exchanged prior to money so beings circulated prior to money. We can imagine something like a virus circulating amongst a group of people possibly even wiping out an entire segment of the population. True enough. One way to deal with this objection is to distinguish between the circulation of a virus and the circulation of money. From here one could argue that the circulation of money supervenes on its exchange and that it is only because money is exchangeable in the first place that it is able to circulate; for if money was not exchangeable it would at once cease to circulate. Anyone who has ever been caught trying to pass counterfeit money will confirm this. Money circulates only because it is exchangeable.\footnote{Or at least is believed to be exchangeable for something by the person with whom we are exchanging.} In this way one could borrow the concept of supervenience as it is used in the philosophy of mind and apply it to this question about the being of money.
Chapter 6. Phenomenological Construction

The following quote from The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, suggests that the next stage of our interpretation must be devoted to a theoretical conceptual interpretation of the structure of exchange: ‘Philosophy is the theoretical conceptual interpretation of being, of being’s structure and its possibilities.’ BP,11. How do we achieve this? From a methodological perspective we must engage in a phenomenological construction by projecting the antecedently given being we are investigating, money, upon its being, exchangedness, and the structures of exchange. Practically we will begin our examination of the structure of exchange by projecting it onto the structure of intentionality; for as John Caputo has pointed out in his essay The Question of Being and Transcendental Phenomenology, ‘the construction described in The [Basic] Problems of Phenomenology ... is somewhat like Merleau-Ponty’s example of ‘gearing’ ourselves up in the appropriate way so that we can experience the thing as it is.’ CA,II,331. Accordingly, by projecting exchangedness onto the structure of intentionality we will be gearing ourselves up by looking to see if this is the right structure of being that belongs with the being of money. Thus we can ask about the three structural moments of intentionality; the intentio, the intentum and the understanding of the mode of being of what is intended in the intentum. To prepare ourselves for this, we will first say something about the various kinds of exchanges which take place within the context of everydayness.

Barter Exchange and Monetary Exchange

In a traditional barter economy, at least three different things can be exchanged; items of equipment, services performed by Dasein, and food. This gives rise to at least six basic kinds of exchanges.

(1) Equipment can be exchanged for equipment
(2) Food can be exchanged for food
(3) A service can be exchanged for another service
(4) Equipment can be exchanged for a service
(5) Equipment can be exchanged for food
(6) Food can be exchanged for a service

Two questions we must answer here if we are to exhibit the intentional character of exchange by projecting it upon the structure of intentionality are these: What is the mode of being of a service? What is the mode of being of food? With respect to the first question, Heidegger did not explicitly state what the mode of being of a service was, but a service would surely be included in the list of 'to have to do with something, to produce, order and take care of something, to use something, to give something up and let it get lost, to undertake, to accomplish, to find out, to ask about, to observe, to speak about, to determine.' BT,57. Assuming that a service does belong in this list of activities, then the mode of being of a service would have to be concern [Besorgen]; for all these ways of being-in -- undertaking, accomplishing, finding out, asking about, observing, discussing, determining -- have concern as their kind of Being. BT,57.

What about the mode of being of food? This is a question Heidegger completely ignored in his existential analytic of Dasein. Consequently in order to proceed it will be necessary for us to digress briefly and determine this.

Food is a being, What is its mode of being? It cannot be readiness-to-exchange; for although we do exchange food, on an intuitive level, saying that readiness-to-exchange is the being of food simply sounds wrong. We can discover the reason for this by explaining why readiness-to-hand is not the being of food, which is this: food is not something we use, it is something we consume. And with this insight it should be immediately clear what the mode of being of food is; readiness-to-consume, or consummedness. Once this is seen we have a better idea of what the problem is with saying that readiness-to-exchange is the being of food. Simply put, the reason it sounds wrong to say that readiness-to-exchange is the being of food is because it sounds so much more correct to say that readiness-to-consume is the being of food.
Much more could be said about the being of food, however we do not have time to examine objections to our claim that readiness-to-consume, or consummedness is the being of food; for if we tried to fill all the holes Heidegger left in his ontology of Dasein, we would make very little progress in our application of the phenomenological method to money. For our purposes, it is enough to simply determine the being of food in this rather brief way. Having done this we can now proceed with our analysis of the various kinds of exchanges which take place in everydayness by turning to the exchanges which occur in a monetary economy.

In a monetary economy, at least four different things can be exchanged; money, items of equipment, services performed by Dasein, and food. However unlike a barter economy, this gives rise to only four basic kinds of exchanges.

(1) Equipment can be exchanged for money
(2) A service can be exchanged for money
(3) Food can be exchanged for money
(4) Money can be exchanged for money

Another difference worth mentioning between a monetary economy and a barter economy is this: in a barter economy, the mode of being of what is exchanged is either handiness, concern or readiness-to-consume. In a monetary economy we have the addition of another mode of being, the mode of being of money, exchangedness. Thus there are four modes of being which figure into monetary exchanges; exchangedness, handiness, concern, and readiness-to-consume.

Something else we must mention if we are to be thorough in describing the various kinds of exchanges that can take place in a barter and monetary economy, and the kinds of things that are exchanged is this: Dasein itself is exchangeable. Although it may sound barbaric to us to think of instances where Dasein was treated as exchangeable, nevertheless there is a history to both Dasein and money which must not be overlooked merely because it leaves a bad taste in the mouth. There was a time when Dasein was enslaved and had an exchange
Slaves were a most important medium of exchange and standard of value. Their value was kept steady by the fact that a slave was always equal to so many pounds of meat. “If he fell sick and could not work for you, you could eat him.”\textsuperscript{47} The monetary value of a slave could never decline below the “consumption point,” that is the level at which his owner considered it more profitable to eat his money rather than spend it. Later, the realization of the economic value of slave labor conferred on slaves an intrinsic value of a different kind \textit{PriM,165}.

Here Einzig is referring to the slaves taken to the old world from the new. Unlike these slaves, the slaves in antiquity were treated much better than those bought and sold during the colonization of the new world. We cannot say that slaves in antiquity were treated as if they were family members; for as Cohen points out, the ‘Greek[s] had no term for “family,” in the modern sense of a nuclear or extended grouping of people living together.’ AES,85. The closest thing there was to a family in antiquity was the \textit{oikos} or household which was composed of ‘all persons living in a particular house.’AES,85. So important was it to the household when a slave was acquired that ‘a ceremony analogous to that which greeted the entry of a bride’ AES,85, was held. In this ceremony the slave was welcomed ‘into the \textit{oikos} with an outpouring of figs, dates, and other delicacies’. AES,85. The symbolic purpose of this ceremony was ‘intended to portend a “sweet and pleasant” future.’ AES,85. The future being however long the slave actually remained enslaved to the household; for in some instances, the case of bankers in particular, often slaves would not only inherit their masters banking activities, but also their freedom. Quoting from a speech written by the orator Demosthenes and read in court, ‘the speaker ... calls upon the juror’s personal knowledge ... [of the] many examples” of slaves who had been freed by their owners, entrusted with the master’s bank, and married at the owner’s direction to his widow.’ AES,80. Obviously this kind of treatment of a slave is far better than being measured in terms of consumption point and eaten if one falls below the magic number. It is in this sense that the slaves in antiquity were treated better than the slaves in the new

\textsuperscript{47} Johnston, Sir Harry: \textit{The River Congo} (London, 1884); George Grenfell in the Congo (London, 1908).
For the purposes of this discussion we will not say anything more about the idea of buying and selling Dasein, nor will we consider the idea of using Dasein as a medium of exchange. The buying and selling of Dasein that takes place today is much more surreptitious than the kind of buying and selling of slaves that took place in former times. If we look around our world, we do not immediately see retail outlets which buy and sell Dasein. This does not mean however that the buying and selling of Dasein does not take place today. On the contrary it, only means that we must look harder in order to see it. Because of this the buying and selling of Dasein is something which must be examined on its own, but not here. That said, we have now prepared ourselves adequately for exhibiting the intentional character of exchange.

The Intentional Character of Exchange.

With regards to the first structural moment, the *intentio*, we can say that just as every perception is a perceiving-of, so every exchange is an exchanging-of: every exchange is the exchanging-of something for something. What about the *intentum*? Here we encounter a problem. For in the case of perception, the *intentum*, is the perceived, the object of perception, but in the case of exchange the question to ask about the *intentum* is, Which being are we directed towards, the being we are to take or the being we are to give up in exchange for the being we are to take? Is it one? the other? or both? To say we are related to the being we are to take, neglects our relation to the being we are to give up. To say we are related to the being we are to give up, neglects our relation to the being we are to take. One way around this problem therefore is to assert that in a certain sense we are related to both the being we are to give up as well as the being we are to acquire in exchange for the being we are to give up. More will be said about this later.

Finally there is the understanding of the mode of being of what is intended in the *intentum*. To determine this we must ask, What is it that we exchange? In a barter economy what we
exchange are items of equipment, services, and food. Now depending on the kind of exchange taking place -- (i) an exchange of equipment, (ii) an exchange of services, (iii) an exchange of foods, (iv) an exchange of food for a service, (v) an exchange of food for equipment, (vi) an exchange of a service for equipment -- the understanding of the mode of being of what is intended in the *intentum* can be any of the following; the understanding of handiness, the understanding of concern, the understanding of consummedness, the understanding of both consummedness and concern, the understanding of both consummedness and handiness, or the understanding of both concern and handiness.

What we have said about the intentional character of exchange so far applies to barter exchange. In monetary exchange, the first two structural moments *intentio* and *intentum*, will be very similar to what they were in barter. The *intentio* will be the exchanging-of, and the *intentum* will be the beings being exchanged; money, equipment, services, foods. The understanding of the mode of being of what is intended in the *intentum* will likewise depend on the kind of exchange taking place -- (i) an exchange of money for equipment, (ii) an exchange of money for a service, (iii) an exchange of money for food, and (iv) an exchange of money for money. Consequently the understanding of what is intended in the *intentum* could be; an understanding of both exchangedness and handiness, an understanding of both exchangedness and concern, an understanding of both exchangedness and consummedness or an understanding of exchangedness. Which it is all depends on the kind of exchange taking place.

What we have just exhibited is the intentional character of exchange. What are the implications of this? From a terminological perspective we can conclude that exchange too is a comportment of Dasein, just as perception and production are comportments of Dasein. For both perception and production are comportments with intentional characters, thus exchange must also be a comportment of Dasein given the fact that it too has an intentional character. Any reluctance to concur with this conclusion is largely due to the fact that exchange is a comportment of Dasein that Heidegger himself said nothing about. But just because Heidegger said nothing about this comportment, it does not follow that exchange is
not a comportment of Dasein; for there are other comportments of Dasein that Heidegger said nothing about.

Accordingly, since Heidegger said nothing about the comportment of exchange we will. Our point of departure will be with the following remark of Nietzsche’s about the legal subject: ‘the contractual relationship between creditor and debtor, ... is as old as the idea of “legal subjects” and in turn points back to the fundamental forms of buying, selling, barter, trade and traffic.’ GM,II,4. (Nietzsche’s italics). In this quote, What are buying, selling, barter, trade, and traffic fundamental forms of? Nietzsche himself did not answer this question, however we will by saying that buying, selling, barter, trade, and traffic are fundamental forms of life, or to put it in more Heideggerian terms, fundamental ways of being. What makes buying, selling, barter, trade, and traffic fundamental ways of being? Answer; the comportment of exchange and what this implies, namely that Dasein is a being that enters the world ready to exchange with the other, and that it is impossible for Dasein to be in the world and not exchange. Just as an isolated and worldless subject is never given, so a subject that never exchanges is likewise never given.

The claims we have just made are significant, and need further support from a number of more basic angles. The first angle picks up on something we said in the last chapter about Aristotle’s remark that man has needs. Translated into Heidegger’s terminology, Aristotle’s claim can be expressed thus; so far as the meaning of Dasein’s being is concerned, part of what it means for Dasein to be is to be needy. Question: Is Dasein the kind of being that can satisfy all its needs by itself without ever having to involve the other, or is Dasein the kind of being that essentially needs the other in order to satisfy its needs? Here we will assume the latter; that Dasein needs the other in order to satisfy its needs if it is to exist at all. The obvious counterexample here is the case of the hermit, but strictly speaking this constitutes no counterexample at all to our claim. For Dasein is not born a hermit, but rather grows into one, and by the time Dasein has grown into a hermit it has
already had many of its needs satisfied by the other in terms of being fed, clothed, and sheltered.

Now there are two ways in which the other can satisfy Dasein's needs: either unconditionally or conditionally. By the former we mean that the other can satisfy all of Dasein's needs without ever demanding from Dasein that any of their needs be satisfied in return. By the latter we mean that the other can satisfy Dasein's needs on the condition that Dasein satisfy some of the needs of the other. Of the two ways in which Dasein can satisfy its needs, which describes more closely the kind of being Dasein is, and the way in which it exists in the world? We suggest the second; the other satisfies Dasein's needs on the condition that Dasein satisfies the needs of the other in return. The reason for this is because Dasein exists for its own sake first, and naturally tends to look upon the other as a means to its own ends. We will be saying more about this in the next chapter on value. Here the thing to see is that the conditional way in which the other will satisfy Dasein's needs, has the character of an exchange; the satisfaction of Dasein's needs in exchange for the satisfaction of the other's needs.

What is to be concluded from this analysis of the relation between exchange and Dasein's needs? That of all its many needs, Dasein certainly needs to exchange; for Dasein is not capable of surviving as Dasein without exchanging, and that Dasein would not be Dasein if it did not need to exchange with the other. In other words, one of the things that makes Dasein Dasein, is the fact that it needs to exchange. To lend further support to what we are saying about Dasein's need to exchange, we will now examine being-in and being-with in more detail in relation to the comportment of exchange.

*Being-with as Exchanging.*

Being-with is exchanging. What does this mean? Before answering this, let us first consider a comment on Heidegger's conception of being-with [Mitsein]. Strictly speaking, for Heidegger being-with is a relation that runs from Dasein to Dasein. Moreover, in
Being-with, there is a 'sameness of being as circumspect heedful being-in-the-world.' BT, 118. Being-with is not a relation between Dasein and the extant. Dasein is not with the extant; it is with another Dasein. In fact, according to Heidegger, Dasein is always with the other. In the everyday world, a Dasein that is not with the other is never given. But what about when Dasein is alone? Heidegger regards being alone as merely 'a deficient mode of being-with.' BT, 120. Only a being that is so constituted to be with others in the first place, can be alone. These are a few of the main points that Heidegger made about being-with. Of course Heidegger said more about being-with-others than this, but because his interpretation of being-with neglected the comportment of exchange, we will forgo an analysis of what else he said. Instead we will answer the question, What is being-with in relation to exchanging?

In the first instance, being-with-others means exchanging-with-others; being-with-others = exchanging-with-others. For we cannot be with others without exchanging with them. Put another way, exchanging-with is a form of being-with. We do not exchange with the extant; we exchange with others. Now one might object to this in the following way; when I put money into a vending machine to buy cigarettes an exchange is taking place between two beings that are not the same, but between an existent being, Dasein, and one that is ready-to-hand, the vending machine. Thus not only do we exchange with others who are the same as us, but we also exchange with equipment. Thus to say that we only exchange with others is false.49

In response to this objection we need to ask: Is it really an exchange that has taken place between the smoker and the cigarette machine? The answer to this depends on how we define exchange. But if being-with-others is exchanging-with-others, what Heidegger said about being-with will apply to exchange. And if this is the case, we deny that an exchange can take place between Dasein and a machine; for being-with is a relation between Dasein and Dasein. In being-with, there is 'a sameness of being as circumspect heedful being-in-

49 There is a similar objection along the lines of exchanging when one is alone, which we will consider in the next part on Being-in as exchanging.
Similarly, in exchanging-with-others there will also be a ‘sameness of being as circumspect heedful being-in-the-world.’ BT,118

But suppose for the sake of argument one did define exchange in a way which allowed exchanges to take place between Dasein and equipment. How would we respond to this? By saying that this conception of exchange actually implies something quite insane. For most everyday exchanges between Dasein and Dasein, generally include the concept of negotiation over the terms of the exchange. This in turn presupposes that a prior measuring and valuation has already been made by each party involved in the exchange of the things they are intending to exchange with the other, to what extent if any, they might relax these valuations, and whether they will not. Someone who wanted to define the concept of exchange in a way that allowed for exchanges to take place between Dasein and equipment, would either have to deny that the concept of negotiation is normally contained in the concept of exchange, or would have to admit that we can in fact negotiate over the terms of an exchange with a machine. To deny the former is unreasonable since generally speaking existential exchanges do allow for negotiation, and until we develop machines that think, to admit the latter is quite literally insane; for if we actually saw a person haggling over the price of a pack of cigarettes with a cigarette machine, there would be some reason to think the person was, very possibly -- insane.

Being-with is exchanging-with; Dasein exchanges with others. Next we want to consider what is formed as a result of Dasein’s exchanges with the other? To answer this consider something Simmel said about exchange,

The exchange of products of labour, or of any other possessions, is obviously one of the purest and most primitive forms of human socialization; not in the sense that ‘society’ already existed and then brought about acts of exchange, but on the contrary, that exchange is one of the functions that creates an inner bond between men ... It is, therefore, almost a tautology to say that exchange brings about socialization: for exchange is a form of socialization. PM,175.
Here Simmel is using 'form' in the sense of formative or formation. Used in this way, exchange is a formative process. It is through the process of exchanging-with-others that society, or as Heidegger would say, the world is formed. In *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, Heidegger says that man is world-forming. FCM,274. But why is man world-forming? Because the comportment of exchange is a formative comportment which enables it to form worlds. Moreover the comportment of exchange also enables Dasein to form both money and language as well. Let us expand on this last idea of language forming.

In *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger asks his audience to suppose that our indeterminate understanding of the 'meaning of being does not exist and that we also do not understand what this meaning means.' ITM,82. He next asks, 'What then?', and concludes by saying that if our indeterminate understanding of what it means to be did not exist, then 'There would be no language at all.' ITM,82 (Heidegger's italics). Can a similar thing be said about exchange? If there were no exchange would there be no language? If the mutual kind of recognition that occurs between Dasein and Dasein never took place; if Dasein never exchanged one being for another with its neighbour; if everything Dasein needed could be acquired without having to exchange with the other, Would there be any reason on Dasein's part to name beings in the first place and bring them to language? For that matter, Would there be any reason for Dasein to have anything to do with the other at all? Certainly not. For Dasein has needs, and one of its most basic needs is the need to exchange.

To elaborate further, imagine a world where all the people in it could acquire all they needed without ever having to exchange anything amongst themselves. Now imagine that this state of affairs had always been the case for these people; not once have they ever had to exchange anything with anyone. Now ask yourself, how could these people possibly have a language? How could they have money or equipment? How could they have a world in Heidegger’s sense of the word, ie. a referential totality? In fact if such a state of affairs existed would we even say that they were with another? If Dasein did not need to
exchange beings with the other, then it would not. However if Dasein never exchanged beings with the other, there would be no need for it to name beings, and hence no need to form a language. There would be no need to communicate with the other since all the beings it needed could be obtained without ever having to bother or involve the other. If it were possible for a language to form without exchange, it would be impossible for Dasein to say how this could be so. We have discussed what is meant by saying that being-with is exchanging-with and what is formed as a result of Dasein's exchanges with the other. Next we want to discuss the notion of being-in as exchanging.

*Being-in as Exchanging.*

Being-in is exchanging. What does this mean? That insofar as Dasein is in the world with others it is constantly exchanging. In what sense? Linguistically, monetarily, and visually to name three. In everydayness these kinds of exchanges are always taking place. But if these kinds of exchanges are always taking place in everydayness, this means that in everydayness we are always exchanging, and if we are constantly exchanging in everydayness it is reasonable to conclude that being-in is exchanging and that it is impossible to be in the world and not exchange. This gives us one idea as to what is meant by saying that being-in is exchanging.

But one might object to this in the following way. Common sense considers an exchange to be an exchange of objects between two parties. If these conditions are not met ie. if Dasein is alone or is with another but does not have anything to exchange, then an exchange cannot take place and thus the suggestion that being-in is exchanging is false. What is the appropriate way to respond to this objection? To answer this consider something Heidegger said in *Being and Time*,

> In the realm of controversy over principles, one must not only attach oneself to theses which can be grasped doxographically, rather one must take the objective tendency of the problematic as an orientation, even if it does not go beyond a rather common version of that problematic. BT,98.
This quote outlines the kind of response we must give to the common sense interpretation of exchange mentioned above. In accordance with this we will first say, that the thesis we are attaching ourselves to which can be grasped doxographically derives from Heraclitus' cosmological claim about all things being an exchange for fire. Behind our thesis that being-in is exchanging lies Heraclitus claim that 'All things are an exchange for fire and fire for all things just as goods are for gold and gold for good.' Frag.90.

The Heidegger quote also suggests that we take the objective tendency of the problematic as our orientation. What is the objective tendency of the problematic with which we are dealing? Since we are dealing with exchange, the objective tendency of this problem is to interpret it in a common sense way as an exchange of objects between two parties. Accordingly the common sense interpretation of exchange must serve as our point of departure into an examination of exchange, despite the fact that it does not go beyond a rather common version of this problem. How do we go beyond this rather common sense interpretation of exchange? Actually by saying that being-in is exchanging we already have gone beyond the common sense conception of exchange. But we should not let the matter rest here; for we can go much further by now considering the philosophical notion of the given.

Heidegger's position on the given in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* is that, 'What is given to us primarily is the unity of an *equipmental whole.*' BP,163 (Heidegger's italics). This is clear enough. In fact it is so clear in what it is saying that we do not even notice what Heidegger neglected to say. For in thinking the idea of the given through to its proper conclusion, we see that whenever something is given, it is always given to some being, in this case Dasein. Giving is giving-to. No one would deny this; but there is more. For Dasein is definitely not the kind of being who sits back passively and merely allows themselves to be given something. Dasein is not like this. Dasein takes whatever it is given. To be sure, Dasein can also reject what it is given; but only a being that can take something can reject it. Rejecting something presupposes a prior *taking* offence at that which has been given. Taking offence is the precondition for rejecting something being
given. In fact Dasein even takes beings it is not given. Hence the need for laws which prevent Dasein from taking everything it wants.

The point therefore is this. To think of the relation between Dasein and the given in a way where all the focus is placed on determining what is given the whole time ignoring the fact that Dasein is doing just as much taking, is unduly one-sided. Simmel noticed this when he said, 'It is often overlooked how much what appears at first a one-sided activity is actually based upon reciprocity' PM,82. The philosophical preoccupation with the idea of the given is another example of this. The first step to overcoming this error is by respecting the fact that if something is given this presupposes the existence of a being who is not only in a position to make a decision about what it is being given, what to call it, and what not to call it, but more importantly is actively taking that which is being given to it at the same time. And with this we uncover something worth mentioning; that give and take is a mode of exchange. Indeed it is a mode of exchange philosophers constantly make use of. One need only consult a philosophical text to be convinced of this; for in it will be found sentences beginning, 'Given what x has said here' and, 'Given this' as well as 'I take that to mean ...' and 'I take it that ...'. 'Given this' and 'I take it that' are based on the idea of exchange.

Actually this give and take mode of discourse is also very much a part of everyday discourse, idle talk as Heidegger would say. What can be inferred from this is significant; just as Heidegger says about the distinction between beings and to be that 'we are always already moving within the distinction as it occurs' FCM,357, so in a similar sense, insofar as every Dasein speaks and expresses itself, it too is always already moving within an exchange as it occurs, (or as we said earlier, being-in is exchanging.) But one might ask, What is this exchange that Dasein is always already moving within between?

In his Letter on Humanism, Heidegger says, that 'It gives', 'es gibt', where the 'it' Heidegger is referring to is being: 'the “it” that here “gives” is Being itself. The “gives” names the essence of Being that is giving, granting its truth. The self-giving into the open,
Being itself. BW, 214. Being gives. But if being gives, the question is, To whom does being give itself? Answer; Dasein, the being capable of thinking being. Among other things, saying that being-in is exchanging, points to the continual exchange that occurs between Dasein and being, an exchange that continues to take place so long as Dasein is at all. Being gives; Dasein takes. Strictly speaking the correct way to characterize this relation between being and Dasein is as an exchange. The exchange Dasein moves in is between itself and being. But this is the ontological difference between a being, Dasein and being. Thus the very moving within the ontological difference as it occurs has the character of exchanging.

Now one might disagree with this last remark on the grounds that the relation between being and Dasein is not an exchange. For being may give and Dasein may take; but for this to be a proper exchange, Dasein must give something back to being in exchange for what being gives of itself, and being itself must take that which Dasein gives. Only after we have identified what Dasein is giving back to being and what being is taking from Dasein, the objection runs, can we say that, strictly speaking, the relation between being and Dasein is correctly characterized as an exchange.

What is Dasein giving to being, and what is being taking from Dasein? One answer is that what Dasein actually gives to being, is expression to the different modes of being. Dasein makes explicit what the modes of being are of the different beings that it discovers in the world. Dasein does not find the different modes of being already prepared for it and offered to it on a silver platter. They require expression, and for this they require a being to give them expression; Dasein. Dasein gives a being its mode of being. In doing this Dasein gives something to being.

In the last chapter we gave a being, money, its mode of being, exchangedness. We did this not in the sense that prior to our giving money its mode of being, money was without a mode of being, and was a being waiting to be given a mode of being. This is impossible. For insofar as a being is at all it always is in a certain way, which means that it always has
a mode of being. Rather we gave money its mode of being in the sense that we gave expression through language of what this beings mode of being was. We made explicit this beings mode of being. But to explicitly express a beings mode of being is to give something to being, namely expression of one of its modes.

Now if the mode of being we gave to money was the correct mode of being to give to this being -- ie., if exchangedness is the mode of being which fits this being -- then in a certain sense we can say that being took from us, this mode of being. If on the other hand, what we expressed was a mode of being totally inappropriate to this being and the way in which it is in the world, ie. if we erred in our phenomenological reduction by concluding that handiness was the being of money, then similarly we could say that being rejected that which we gave it. Being would resist our forcing exchangedness on money as this beings mode of being. Such resistance by being would make itself visible to us through linguistic expression, specifically in the form of phenomenological objections by Dasein to the claim that exchangedness is the being of money. If such objections fail then we can be confidant in the knowledge that being took this expression of one of its modes from us since exchange as the mode of being of money fits this being perfectly.

Our aim was to support the claims that it is impossible for Dasein to be in the world and not exchange, and that just as an isolated worldless subject is never given, so a subject that does not exchange is never given either. To support these claims we examined first Dasein’s need to exchange, and then the relation between being-in and being-with, and the comportment of exchange. In doing this we went beyond the common sense interpretation of exchange as an exchange of objects between two parties by maintaining that Dasein is always involved in an exchange. First between itself and others, second between itself and being.

Having indicated some of the implications involved in saying that exchange is a comportment of Dasein, we now find ourselves in a position to raise a question of fundamental importance. For earlier we said that from a methodological perspective, what
we must do in performing a phenomenological construction is to project the antecedently
given being we are investigating, money, upon its being and the structures of its being,
exchangedness. We have done this in the case of intentionality but, and this is the question
of fundamental importance: Is intentionality the only structure that constitutes exchange? Is
there another structure, underneath the intentional structure which exchangedness can be
projected upon? As we see it, another structure that exchange can be projected upon is the
structure of symmetry. The justification for this will be given in a moment. But first let us
explain what saying that symmetry is the structure of exchange implies for our application
of the phenomenological method to money.

If symmetry is the structure of exchangedness, and exchangedness is the being of money it
follows that symmetry itself is a structure of being. And because philosophy is for
Heidegger, the theoretical and conceptual interpretation of being and its structures the next
thing we must do is interpret this structure of being. How do we do this? By following a
similar path to the one that Heidegger followed in addressing the question of being in Being
and Time. Just as Heidegger approached the question about the meaning of being by way
of an analysis of Dasein, so we will approach the symmetrical structure of being by way of
an analysis of the symmetry of Dasein. In doing this we will only be able to dip into the
relation between symmetry and Dasein ever so slightly.

A more detailed analysis of the relation between Dasein and symmetry would require not
only an analysis of the asymmetry of Dasein, but it would also involve projecting the
symmetrical structure onto time itself, since 'being is understood and conceptually
comprehended by means of time.' BP,274 (Heidegger's italics). Obviously this cannot be
pursued here. Instead we will limit our remarks about symmetry to two things: the
symmetry of Dasein and the symmetry in Being and Time. Let us now clarify and justify
for the reader the way in which the structure of symmetry constitutes the structure of
exchange.
The Symmetrical Character of Exchange.

The structure of symmetry is where the phenomenological method takes us. By retracing our steps we can see this more clearly. We began with a being, money. From here we made the phenomenological reduction back to exchangedness as this being's mode of being. After this we went on to consider the structure of exchangedness. This led us to the structure of intentionality. We then pointed out a difference between the perceptual experience and the exchange experience, namely that in the perceptual experience Dasein was related to an object of perception whereas in the case of exchange Dasein was related to objects of exchange. Given this it is worth asking, Is this simultaneous directedness towards both the being we are to give up as well as the being we are to acquire, enough to establish a basic difference between exchange and perception? Are perception and exchange governed by the same structure of intentionality? Yes and no. Yes insofar as we can and did show exchange to have an intentional character. No insofar as the structure of exchange also seems to fit with the structure of symmetry. In what way can exchange be projected upon the structure of symmetry? To answer this re-consider the concept of being-with.

We saw that for Heidegger being-with was based on a sameness of being; but a sameness of being is a symmetry of being. For example, if Smith exchanges with Jones a hammer for a saw, not only are the modes of being of the hammer and the saw the same, i.e. ready-to-hand, and therefore symmetrical, but the mode of being of both Smith and Jones is the same; they both exist. Thus the structure of exchange can be projected upon the structure of symmetry in a double way; first insofar as the mode of being of the beings being exchanged is the same, handiness; second insofar as the mode of being of the beings making the exchange, Dasein is the same, existence. The symmetry that exists in exchange therefore is in the modes of being; they are perfectly symmetrical.

We can now update the phenomenological steps we have taken in the following diagram, which is to be read from right to left. The reason for this is to convey the kind of
movement we have made from a being, money, back to its mode of being, exchangedness and then back through to the structures of this being's mode of being.

Structure of symmetry < Structure of Intentionality < Structure of exchangedness < Exchangedness < Money

What we have said in our example about Smith and Jones applies only to barter exchange, and this in only one kind of exchange that can take place in a barter economy; an exchange of equipment. But one might ask, What about the other kinds of exchanges that take place in a barter economy, where is the symmetry there? In the case of an exchange of foods, the symmetry is in the fact that the mode of being of both items of food is the same; consummedness. Similarly in the case of an exchange of services; the mode of being of the services is the same, concern. Thus like an exchange of equipment, there is a perfect symmetry between the modes of being of what is being exchanged. Perfect symmetry however must be distinguished from imperfect symmetry. By considering the other three kinds of exchanges that occur in a barter economy; (i) the exchange of a service for equipment, (ii) the exchange of a service for food, and (iii) the exchange of equipment for food, we can distinguish perfect from imperfect symmetry in the following way.

There is an imperfect symmetry that exists between the modes of being of the beings that figure into these three kinds of exchanges. That is to say there is an imperfect symmetry between concern and handiness, an imperfect symmetry between concern and consummedness, and an imperfect symmetry between handiness and consummedness. The sense in which these modes of being are the same is found in the fact that the beings themselves are interchangeable. If beings are interchangeable this implies a certain degree of interchangeability between the modes of being of these beings. The degree of imperfection will depend upon whether an exchange is possible and if so what the terms of the exchange are i.e. how many apples need to be offered if they are to be exchanged for say, ten hammers.

Turning now to a monetary economy the question is, Where is the symmetry in a monetary
exchange? In the case of an exchange of money for money, the symmetry is in the fact that
the mode of being of the currencies being exchanged is the same, ie. exchangedness. Here
again we see a perfect symmetry between the modes of being. However in the case of the
other kinds of exchanges, where money is actually exchanged for a service, food, or
equipment, there will be an imperfect symmetry between exchangedness, concern,
consummedness, and handiness.

The sameness that exists between the different modes of being of exchangedness,
handiness, consummedness, and concern, is not seen; it is understood. Prior to every
exchange, Dasein already understands a certain sameness in the sense of interchangeability,
to exist between the beings it exchanges in the world. Indeed this is why it exchanges them
in the first place. Built into Dasein's understanding of the interchangeability that exists
between the beings that are exchanged, is an understanding of the interchangeability of
these beings mode of being. To be sure Dasein also understands the difference between the
different modes of being and that for example, strictly speaking no amount of money could
ever be able to compensate for, say, the loss of a Van Gogh painting, or for that matter
years of wrongful imprisonment. But from the practical everyday perspective, it is
necessary for Dasein to glide over this problem, and just simply put a price on what it
must, and on this basis, pay it out.

This completes our clarification and justification of the claim that symmetry fits the
structure of exchange. The next thing we need to do is look briefly at the structure of
symmetry in relation to Dasein. In what way is Dasein symmetrical? From the symmetry
between the two hemispheres of the brain down to the symmetry between the five toes of
each foot Dasein is symmetrical. The technical name for this kind of symmetry is bilateral
symmetry. Moreover if we think of the beating of the heart there is a certain rhythm or
temporal symmetry to it as well. An unhealthy or irregular heartbeat on the other hand
often has a certain asymmetry to it. Cardiologists call this arrhythmia. Simmel described
the relation between symmetry and rhythm in the following way: 'Rhythm is for the ear
what symmetry is for the eye at the start of all formations of raw material.' PM,488.
Something else that Simmel said about symmetry in relation to the beings that we are is that there is a symmetry to language, and that ‘the languages of primitive people are also often much more symmetrical than those of civilized people.’ PM,488.50

Now although one cannot deny the way in which the structure of symmetry pervades Dasein’s being and its way of being, we must not neglect the fact that a closer look at Dasein will always reveal breaks in the symmetry, places where perfect symmetry is not maintained. This is known as symmetry breaking. In the light of this concept, it would not be wrong to describe Dasein as this symmetry breaking structure. Dasein is the being that breaks or transcends symmetry.51 This it does in varying degrees. Why does Dasein break symmetry? Because as Simmel explains, perfect symmetry is oppressive. And this in two respects:

first, in relation to the human subject whose impulses and needs always arise only in a happy, fortuitous harmony with a fixed scheme rather than in a preestablished harmony; and second, and no less significantly, in relation to external reality whose powers and relationships to us can only be forcibly integrated into such a simple framework. PM,489.

Simmel goes on to describe the relation between symmetry, nature and the beings that we are in the following way: ‘With due regard to the different areas of validity, one might formulate this in terms of an apparent paradox: nature is not as symmetric as the mind would like it to be and the mind is not as symmetric as nature would like it to be.’ PM,489. Let us see if we can make sense of Simmel’s paradox. In doing this we will not speak about the mind but Dasein.52

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50 Nietzsche too was aware of the symmetry to language. In a letter to his friend Rohde, Nietzsche, in describing the language of Thus Spoke Zarathustra said ‘My style is a dance, a play of all kinds of symmetries, and vaulting and mocking of these symmetries. And this even extends to the choice of vowels.’ SL,173.

51 As an example of symmetry breaking, consider Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony. If one listens to certain bars of music from the completed version of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony and compares these to the sound of the same lines of music from earlier versions of this symphony, one can hear an obvious example of symmetry breaking. For in the earlier version Beethoven kept ascending in thirds in such a way that merely continued to scale the keyboard. Beethoven recognized that the ascension needed to be broken and did this in a most remarkable way.

52 The reason for this is because to speak about the mind in relation to Heidegger is always a mistake since the concept of the mind is so burdened with Cartesian presuppositions about the subject.
What does it mean to say that nature is not as symmetric as Dasein would like it to be? When Dasein looks at nature in a theoretical scientific way, it is easy to find breaks in symmetry. In the beings that nature produces mutations can frequently be found. These reveal that nature is not always as symmetric as we would like it to be. If nature were more symmetric the theoretical study of nature would be much easier; for it would mean that the symmetrical and rhythmical structures and theories we have developed in order to control nature would work better, in their representation of nature and perhaps might even be more correct. Thus Dasein would like nature to be more symmetric because Dasein controls nature through imposing the structures of symmetry and rhythm on it. Why does Dasein do this? Because according to Simmel, these structures 'are completely rational in origin; [they] facilitate the control of the multitude from one vantage point ... If objects and men are ... arranged symmetrically then they can best be dealt with rationally.' PM,489. Dasein would like nature to be a little more symmetric because that way the control of it would be easier. This should suffice for an explanation of the first half of the paradox.

Next is the claim that Dasein is not as symmetric as nature would like it to be. To interpret this we obviously must allow for a certain degree of personification here. For what Simmel's claim suggests is that nature would like Dasein to be in a certain way, ie. a little more symmetric, but the notion of nature liking anything Dasein does, is pure personification. Strictly speaking nature does not care at all what Dasein does nor does it care to what extent Dasein is symmetric or asymmetric. Nature is completely indifferent to Dasein. Nevertheless if we are going to understand what Simmel was getting at in expressing this apparent paradox we must disregard this kind of objection.

It is entirely possible that Simmel's reason for saying that nature would like Dasein to be a little more symmetric is because a more symmetric Dasein will produce more symmetrical theories about nature when this Dasein is given to the task of theorizing about nature with the view to understanding it. Here we are assuming that like produces like ie. a Dasein that thinks about nature in a more symmetric way will produce a more symmetrical theory. Why would nature want Dasein to produce more symmetrical theories about nature in the
first place? Because theories which are more symmetrical have a better chance of understanding nature than theories which are less symmetrical.

If Dasein comported itself more symmetrically towards nature by developing more symmetrical theories about it, then this would lead to a better understanding of nature. It is for this reason that nature would like Dasein to be more symmetric. Admittedly this interpretation requires that we attribute to Simmel the assumption that nature wants to be understood better by Dasein and it is for this reason that it wants Dasein to be more symmetric. However because of the personification that we must allow for in order to interpret this paradox, such an assumption seems harmless; for to defend our interpretation we must ask, Does the imposition of a more symmetric theory about nature result in a better understanding of nature by Dasein? Evidence that it does can be found in something the physicist Henry Margenau said about the relation between Einstein's theory of relativity and how it improved upon Newton's classical mechanics.

[Einstein's] theory of relativity has greatly sharpened the outlines of [Newtonian mechanics] and has given it a degree of evidence and naturalness which is almost irresistible. For by showing that time may be regarded as a fourth co-ordinate, and by representing the changing universe as a system of world lines, [Einstein's theory of relativity] made the representation both more symmetrical and aesthetically more appealing, and the sense in which particles have position, time, velocity has become even more obvious. EAP,259 (Margenau's italic).

How does this quote defend our interpretation of Simmel's apparent paradox? As we interpret it, Dasein is not as symmetric as nature would like it to be because in lacking symmetry, Dasein's ability to theorize about nature and thus understand nature better is impaired. A more symmetric Dasein is able to understand nature better because a more symmetric Dasein will produce a more symmetric theory about nature. Einstein's mind was more symmetric than Newton's in that the theory of relativity he produced, resulted in 'a more symmetrical and more aesthetically appealing [representation of the changing universe]'. No one would deny that Einstein's theory of relativity unlocked more of
nature's secrets than did Newton's theory of mechanics. Of course Einstein's theory of relativity also made the changing universe far more bewildering than Newton's classical mechanics did, but this implication is not immediately relevant to our present point.

Before concluding this chapter there is one further thing we want to say about symmetry which follows on from this last consideration of the role that symmetry plays in the formation of scientific theories. For one may well ask about the role that symmetry plays in philosophy, specifically about the role it plays in Heidegger. We can respond to this question in a wholly phenomenological way by making explicit the symmetry that is implicit in *Being and Time*.

To make the symmetry that is implicit in *Being and Time* phenomenologically explicit, we must switch languages from English to German; for the point that we want to make is lost in translation from the latter to the former. If we stick to the German we read, *Sein und Zeit*. Gelven has pointed out, that 'Being and Time' is a poor translation of *Sein und Zeit*. A more accurate translation is *To be and Time*. Now one of the most important things to appreciate for understanding Heidegger, is something he appropriated from Aristotle. To be sure it is not the only thing he appropriated from Aristotle, but it is important enough to stand on its own. The insight is that when metaphysics, and the philosophy of language to a certain extent, focuses on the copula, it overlooks something essential. For insofar as it is the copula that the metaphysician focuses on, this is their primary encounter with being. They know being in terms of the copula. However because of this, Aristotle's main point is overlooked. For to the extent that the 'is' is seen and not the verb, 'to be', in its infinitive form, the Aristotelian insight that 'a verb is [a name] ... which includes in its meaning ... time', De Int,16b,5f, is completely obscured. But to ignore this is to ignore both time itself and its relation to being. How does this relate to what we are saying about making explicit the symmetry that is implicit in *To be and Time*?

The title of Heidegger's work, *Sein und Zeit, To be and Time* stares back at us from the page. 'To be' is a verb which includes time in its meaning. Thus at the outset, symmetry
shows itself to us from the very title of Heidegger's book; *Sein und Zeit*; 'To be and Time.' To the left of the 'and' we have *Sein*, 'to be.' 'To be' includes time in its meaning. To the right of the 'and' we have *Zeit*, time. On both sides of the 'and' we have time. But here we must ask, What is this if it is not a strange kind of symmetry showing itself to us? We have the same thing showing up on both sides, of the 'and'; time. More precisely, on the one hand we have before us something which includes in its meaning, time, while on the other hand we have time itself.

What we have indicated here is not an example of perfect symmetry, but neither is it an asymmetry. For an example of asymmetry in line with ontology, the reader need only consider the ontological difference between beings and to be. This is an example of asymmetry. Why? Because being is not a being. As Michael Gelven says in his commentary on *Being and Time*, 'there is no such thing as a "to be".' COBT,21. Beings and 'to be' are not the same. They are incommensurable. Heidegger puts it this way: 'We cannot put being on a level comparable to that of beings. This implies that this distinction is not at all represented or taken note of in the sense of something knowable.' FCM,357. But despite the fact that we cannot put being on a level that is comparable to beings the two are related; for 'Being is always the being of a being.' BT,9. Interpreted like this, it becomes possible to say that the mistake philosophers have made when they have wrestled with the fundamental problem of being, the ontological difference, is to have mistaken in one way or another an asymmetric relation, the relation between beings and to be, for a symmetric relation, the relation between to be and time. One way to investigate further the symmetry that is found in Heidegger would be to examine the structure of symmetry in relation to the actual language Heidegger used to describe being. One need only look at comments like this to see the symmetry that Heidegger thought being in terms of.

'Value does not let Being be Being' QCT,104.

Our aim here was to make explicit in a provisional way the symmetry that is implicit in *Being and Time*. This we have done by showing the symmetry that exists between being
and time, and the asymmetry that exists between beings and to be.

We will conclude this chapter by summing up our application of the phenomenological method to money hitherto. We began chapter one with some opening remarks about the phenomenological method. Chapter two looked at Heidegger's theory of intentionality. Chapters three and four were both concerned with the question of why Heidegger overlooked money -- chapter three from the perspective of common sense, chapter four from the perspective of the history of philosophy. Chapter five performed a phenomenological destruction and a phenomenological reduction on money. Chapter six conducted a phenomenological construction. The next two chapters will continue to apply the phenomenological method. In doing this we will first apply the phenomenological method to value. After this we will attempt to tie some of the things the phenomenological method has enabled us to say about money together by considering what Heidegger said about science and technology.
Chapter 7. Phenomenological Interpretation of Value

Hitherto our application of the phenomenological method to money has avoided the question of value. In this chapter we will apply the phenomenological method to value. The questions we will begin with are these. What is the question of value? What does it ask? What are the ways in which Dasein values beings? What is the sense of value appropriate to an existential starting point of everydayness?

What Does the Question of Value Ask?

In the interpretation of value to follow, we will concur with Heidegger's basic criticism of value in *Being and Time*. Recall that this criticism was directed against those conceptions of value which maintain that value is something that Dasein stamps onto mere things. BT,99. The problem with understanding value in this way, is that it misleads one into thinking that Dasein exists first and then on the basis of this goes on to value, as if to suggest that Dasein could choose to either stamp value onto things or refrain from doing this. Such an interpretation is problematic; for as Simmel has pointed out, 'we cannot in fact take any step or conceive any thought without endowing the objects with values that direct our activities.' PM,84. In what can be regarded as a further explanation of this last remark Simmel also says,

We are rarely aware of the fact that our whole life ... consists in experiencing and judging values, and that it acquires meaning and significance only from the fact that the mechanically unfolding elements of reality possess an infinite variety of values beyond their objective substance. At any moment when our mind is not simply a passive mirror, [of] reality -- which perhaps never happens, since even objective perception can arise only from valuation -- we live in a world of values which arranges the contents of reality in an autonomous order. PM,60.

We will not understand value as something which Dasein stamps onto mere things therefore because in a certain sense, so far as Dasein is concerned, to be is to value. Being
and valuing are different sides of the being that is Dasein. Nietzsche made this point by saying that man is the ‘valuating animal as such.’ GM,II,8. Simmel expressed a similar idea in more erudite language when he said, ‘Both categories [being and value] have the quality of being fundamental, that is irreducible to each other or to other simpler elements.’ PM,61. Spoken in Heidegger’s terminology, being and valuing are equiprimordial. But if being and value are equiprimordial, then we must raise the question of value in the same way that Heidegger raised the *Seinsfrage*. This can be accomplished by retaining the basic form of the *Seinsfrage* and asking, What does it mean to value? Moreover just as Heidegger responded to the *Seinsfrage* by analyzing the everyday way in which Dasein exists in the world, so we must respond to the question of value by analyzing the everyday way in which Dasein values in the world. To do this we must examine what it is that Dasein actually decides to spend its money on in everydayness. For many of the things Dasein is willing to pay for can be interpreted as reliable indicators of what it is that Dasein values; otherwise it would not have paid for them. Similarly the things Dasein does not pay money for can also be interpreted as reliable indicators of what Dasein does not value; otherwise it would have paid money for them. Obviously we cannot consider all the things Dasein spends its money on; for the list is enormous. Instead we must consider one thing in particular. This we will do in the next chapter when we examine the relation between money and science and technology. Before doing this however a number of other things must first be said about value if we are to investigate it phenomenologically. Having stated what the question of value asks — What does it mean to value? — the next thing we must do is consider two of the more basic ways in which Dasein values beings in the everyday world.

*Two Ways of Valuing beings.*

Next we will consider two of the everyday ways in which Dasein values beings; as a means and as an end. Which way of valuing is the initial way in which Dasein values beings as such? If Heidegger is correct and equipment ready-to-hand is that which Dasein encounters first in the world, as opposed to objects present-at-hand, then it follows that the initial way
in which Dasein will value equipment, is as a means to some end. For equipment is, in its very nature, a means to an end. We can be sure about this conclusion because of the fact that it was we who built equipment in the first place, and in doing so we built it as a means to an end.

What about our initial encounter with the other, what does Heidegger say about this? ‘In what is taken care of in the surrounding world, the others are encountered as what they are; they are what they do.’ BT,126. (Heidegger’s italic). One example of encountering the other in terms of what it does comes from the world of ancient banking. Here, so much was the other encountered in terms of being a banker that the Athenians

generally did not differentiate between the banker himself and his banking entity ... clients and others did not in their dealings [with bankers] consistently or necessarily differentiate between the owner and the business, either linguistically or professionally ... surviving evidence establishes clearly the pervasive Athenian practice of equating the banker and his bank, of referring to them interchangeably. AES,63-4.

Initially the other is encountered in terms of what it does. But what does the other do and for whom does it do this? What the other does is its job, that function it performs or service it provides. For whom does the other do this? For both itself and those it is with in the world. For what does the other do this? Among other things, it does this for money. Now insofar as the other is initially encountered in everydayness in terms of what it does, it is encountered functionally or instrumentally. To be sure, it is encountered as an instrument that exists, but even an existent instrument is still an instrument. Thus the relevant question is, If the other is first encountered functionally in terms of what it does, what does this say about the initial way in which we value the other? That our initial way of valuing the other is also as a means and not as an end in itself. In fact it is because Dasein does value the other as a means first, that Kant found it necessary to replace this way of valuing the other with a way of valuing the other which could serve as a foundation for a metaphysics of morals. What Kant seems to be assuming here is that we know
through reason how we ought to value Dasein -- never solely as a means but always at the same time as an end in itself -- based on our initial understanding of how we do in fact value Dasein in the everyday world -- as a means to an end.

To sum up, the initial way in which Dasein values beings as such is as a means. For within the realm of everydayness the initial way in which it values both kinds of beings, those that exist ie. Dasein, as well as those that are extant is as a means to one of its own ends.

*The Sense of Value that belongs to An Existential Starting Point of Everydayness.*

Which sense of value belongs to Heidegger's existential starting point of everydayness? Answer; monetary value. Why is this? Two reasons. First because monetary value is reified in money; it is empirically real, or as Simmel says it 'is value turned into a substance.' PM,121. Accordingly, in money a sense of value which is concrete and measurable finds a position within the everyday world along side every other empirically real entity Dasein encounters.

We have already said that the value reified in money is exchange value, and that exchange value must be distinguished from use value. Exchange value must also be distinguished from qualitative value, and with this we come to the second reason for thinking that monetary value is the sense of value most commensurate with everydayness; for qualitative value is not commensurate with the existential starting point of everydayness. Heidegger too recognized that qualitative value was not commensurate with everydayness when in *Being and Time* he asked: 'What, then does the Being of values or their ‘validity’ ["Geltung"] (which Lotze took as a mode of ‘affirmation’) really amount to ontologically.' BT,99.53 In *Being and Time*, Heidegger did not investigate what the being of values or their validity really amounted to ontologically, but rather left these matters where he found

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53 Here we have resorted to the Macquarrie and Robinson translation; for the Stambaugh translation 'What, then, does the being of values or their “validity,” which Lotze understood as a mode of “affirmation,” mean ontologically?' BT,99, makes no mention of the German Geltung which is central to our point.
them -- in obscurity. Later we will be saying more with regards to Heidegger’s question about the being of values, and how it relates to our question about value, but in relation to money, not validity. First however we will clarify our criticism of Heidegger.

Heidegger can be criticized for not seeing the belonging together of monetary value with his existential starting point of everydayness. What makes this oversight even more bewildering is the fact that Heidegger, a philosopher who relied heavily on etymology and the changing nature of the meaning of words, failed to mention any etymological link between Geltung -- the word he singled out in his interpretation of Lotze, which derives from the German gelten, and means ‘to be valid’, ‘to be regarded as’, ‘to be worth’ -- and Geld, the German word for money. Now it is entirely possible that the reason for this is because, as Edward Andrew has pointed out in his book The Genealogy of Values, Lotze too failed to mention any link between Geltung and Geld. ‘[Lotze was either] too lofty or spiritual to ... see any connection between Geltung and Geld.’ GV,6. We have already mentioned how Heidegger’s philosophizing was limited both by, and to, the tradition to which he did philosophical violence. Rather than critique Lotze’s theory of validity on the basis of the etymological link between Geltung, gelten and Geld, Heidegger instead gave a traditional critique of Lotze.

There is more to our criticism of Heidegger which can be seen by elaborating on the role

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54 We can be sure that Heidegger thought that these matters were obscure because the next sentence in Being and Time after the one we quoted, Heidegger says that these matters are ‘obscure’: “As long as these matters remain obscure, the reconstruction of a thing of use in terms of a thing of nature is an ontologically questionable undertaking, not to speak of the fundamental distortion of the problematic.” BT,99.


56 In this critique, Parvis Emad has noted in his book Heidegger and the Phenomenology of Value, that Heidegger made two very important ‘critical insights into Lotze which are totally absent from the literature on philosophy of value [which Lotze is regarded as founding].’ PV,57. First, the distinctions Lotze draws in his theory of validity about existing and non-existing things, existing and non-existing events, existing and non existing relations and true and untrue propositions ‘overlap one another’ PV,55, in a number of ways. Second, Lotze ‘carelessly passed over the difference between the existence of something and [the truth of something]’ PV,56. Heidegger went on to develop the second criticism more fully by showing that Lotze’s identification of the existence of something with the truth of something led to a conception of truth as constant presence. The problem Heidegger had with this conception of truth is, as Emad points out, it implies ‘that one unduly restrict the “temporal” nature of truth to constant presence.’ PV,57. The temporal nature of truth however is something our interpretation will not go into here. For more on this see Emad’s Heidegger and the Phenomenology of Values.
that money and monetary value play in relation to the everyday world of work. To do this
consider what Adam Smith said about this relation in his *An Inquiry into the Nature and
Causes of the Wealth of Nations*: 'In order to put industry into motion, three things are
requisite; materials to work upon, tools to work with, and the wages or recompense for the
sake of which the work is done.' WN,392. Co-present with the everyday world of work
is money as that for-the-sake-of-which the work is done, a for-the-sake-of-which of
fundamental ontic, and therefore ontological significance. What the Smith quote reveals
is a very basic lack in Heidegger’s description of everydayness in *Being and Time*. For
although Heidegger did take into consideration the idea of materials to work upon and
equipment to work with, in describing the everyday world we live in, there is no analysis at
all of the wages or recompense for the sake of which the work is done.

It is surely significant that Heidegger’s description of the everyday world of work not only
omits the essential role that money plays in keeping this world in motion and holding it
together by ensuring fair exchanges between people; but also for this omission to only be
seriously considered here after decades of philosophers have been interpreting Heidegger.
That said, the next thing to comment on before considering Heidegger’s question about the
being of values is the idea of qualitative value. But before doing this we must consider an
objection to our earlier claim that monetary value is the sense of value which belongs to
everydayness because of its reification in a coin or bank note.

Today, one might argue that most monetary value is not as real and concrete as
everydayness, because most monetary value is not reified in physical coins and bank notes;
it is reified on computer screens in electronic bank accounts. Consequently, the objection
runs, it is wrong to say that monetary value belongs with everydayness because it is as real
as everydayness; for money is reified in an electronic blink, not a physical coin or bank
note. The problem with this objection however is that it overlooks the fact that computer
screens and electronic bank accounts are just as real as the copper, silver, gold, and paper

57 Of course goods and consumables are also used as recompense instead of money. However in a modern
economy, payment in kind is something that employers resort to only as a last resort.
that constitutes the coins and bank notes we spend. There is no reason why this fact should be interpreted to suggest that monetary value is not the sense of value most commensurate with everydayness. Why should it? For the thing to see is this: historically money has always had to be something; cowry shells, cattle, people, pigs, cigarettes -- in Auschwitz bread even acted as money. Just because money is reified on computer screens in electronic bank accounts it does not follow that monetary value must not therefore be the sense of value that belongs to everydayness. The bottom line being that so long as there is money, monetary value will be the sense of value most commensurate with the everyday world of work. How can we be sure? Because it is monetary value that keeps the everyday world of work in motion. Take money away, and you take away the everyday world as we know it.

Money and Qualitative Value.

We will now analyze the notion of qualitative value. As a way of leading into this topic, consider the following example of what we mean by qualitative value. Out walking in a meadow one day, Jonnie’s partner picks a flower and gives it to him as a symbol of her love. Seeing this Jonnie swears to her that he will value the flower ‘for ever’. This is a typical way in which many people understand qualitative value. Perhaps it is not the only way, but it is the way we will consider. What can we say about it? To begin with, Jonnie does not value the flower because it is a particularly beautiful flower, although it might be. Nor does he value the flower because it is an extremely rare flower which can fetch a pretty penny if sold on the black flower market, although this might also be true. Jonnie values this flower because it symbolizes his partner’s love for him. As a symbol of her love, Jonnie feels for this flower in a way which is analogous to the way he feels for his partner. In a certain sense, the flower is an extension or a part of the person who gave it to him. Thus what Jonnie feels for his partner is transferred from her to the flower she gave him and he tends to value it in a way which is analogous to the way he values his partner. If this be so, then perhaps one way to interpret this sense of qualitative value in more detail, is in terms of a feeling Dasein can have for beings.
In *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger draws on Kant’s conception of a feeling in order to phenomenologically elucidate it. For Kant, a feeling is not only a feeling for something, but also a feeling ‘expresses ... a peculiar mode of revelation of the ego. In having a feeling for something there is always present at the same time a self-feeling, and in this self-feeling a mode of becoming revealed to oneself.’ BP,132. In our example, What about Jonnie’s self is being revealed to him in valuing the flower the way he did? Answer; that Jonnie, and by extension Dasein as such, has a capacity for valuing beings in a qualitative way. However something not to be overlooked here is this: Jonnie also has a capacity for renouncing this qualitative way of valuing beings. For Jonnie can always turn around and sell this flower. What this suggests is that the qualitative way of valuing can be quantified, which means to say -- it can be bought and sold.

Expressed in the language of a contest or a game, we would make this last point by saying that money can often trump qualitative value. Whether it does this, depends not on money, but on the person whose hand the money is in, and on the person who is being tempted to renounce their qualitative way of valuing for a certain amount of money. A slightly more philosophical way to think of this idea of quantitative value trumping qualitative value, is in terms of a similarity between epistemological skepticism and its ontological counterpart; ontological cynicism.58 Just as we can be skeptical about knowledge, so we can be cynical about value. How? By asserting that all qualitative value can be quantified or bought and that the only question here is how much one must pay in order to buy it. A stronger claim would be to deny the possibility of qualitative value, just as the radical epistemological skeptic denies the possibility of knowledge, however this is something we will not bother to develop. Instead the question we want to consider is this: If qualitative value can be bought, does it follow that the being who has this capacity for qualitative value, Dasein, can also be bought? But who would dispute that Dasein is a being capable of being bought and sold. And this in two senses; either totally or partially. Slavery is an example of the total purchase of Dasein. Here the whole Dasein is bought, and the bought Dasein often

58 Here we are using the term cynicism in its modern sense as opposed to the ancient sense that had to do with the Greek Cynics.
The second sense in which Dasein can be bought is partial. Here there are varying degrees in which Dasein can be bought and sold. Selling one's intellectual skills or one's labor power are generally regarded by most people as acceptable ways in which we buy and sell parts of ourselves, while the buying and selling of one's sexual organs or the buying and selling of one's internal organs such as kidneys, are regarded by some as socially and perhaps even morally unacceptable things to buy and sell. In the case of the partial buying and selling of oneself, Dasein does have some say in what it is about its self that is being bought and sold, how much it is being bought and sold for, and what, if anything, about its being cannot be bought and sold.

Actually there is a third example of something that Dasein buys and sells which is part of its being that is worth mentioning here, since it is less obvious than the two we have just considered; the buying and selling of that characteristic of Dasein which is its world ie. world in the sense of domestic environment. BT,65. This too can be bought and sold. To explain what we mean consider the following example.

In 1993, South Carolina ... [successfully] bid for a new BMW auto plant. BMW had spent three years assessing offers from 250 localities in ten countries before deciding to place its $400 million facility in South Carolina. According to Business Week, company officials were attracted by the temperate climate, year-round golf, and the availability of a number of mansions at affordable prices. They also liked the region's cheap labor, low taxes, and limited union activity. When BMW indicated that it favoured a 1,000 acre tract on which a large number of middle-class homes were already located, the state spent $36.6 million to buy the 140 properties and leased the site back to the company at $1 a year. The state also picked up the costs of recruiting, screening, and training workers for the new plant and raised an additional $2.8 million from private sources to send newly hired engineers for training in Germany. The total cost to the South Carolina taxpayers for these and other subsidies to attract BMW will be $130 million over thirty years. WCRW,130.
Here we see an example of Dasein selling its community to a corporation. To clinch this sale, not only did Dasein appeal to the temperate climate of its community and the year round golf such a climate offered, but Dasein also threw in cheap labor, low taxes, limited union activity, a number of affordable mansions, and a 1,000 acre tract of land which could be leased for $1 a year. This example of buying and selling that part of Dasein’s self which is its domestic environment is often overlooked by philosophers since it is not the kind of example which generally appears in philosophical discussions on value. This is unfortunate since it is an example which reveals very clearly the kind of relation which exists between corporations and governments, as well as the extent to which Dasein is willing to go to bring money into its community.

The non-stop buying and selling of the different parts of Dasein; its whole self, its partial self, its community, is one of the things that characterizes the everyday world we live in. What it points towards is a very basic ontological feature about being-in-the-world as such, namely that being-in-the-world has the character of measuring; for buying and selling presupposes that an antecedent measuring has already been made by Dasein which tells it how much to buy or sell the being that is for sale. Although Heidegger does not explicitly say that being-in as such is measuring, towards the end of *Being and Time*, he does say something which implies it when he says, ‘taking up a relation itself has the character of *measuring*.’ BT,417. (Heidegger’s italic). How does this imply that being-in as such has the character of measuring? The following argument demonstrates how.

According to Heidegger, taking up a relation itself has the character of measuring. But if taking up a relation has the character of measuring, then obviously taking up a relation with the other must also have the character of measuring; for taking up a relation with the other is merely a mode of taking up a relation itself. In what way does taking up a relation with the other have the character of measuring? When we take up a relation with the other we standardly ask them the following questions: What is your name? How are you? What do

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59 The non-stop buying and selling that characterizes the everyday world also points towards another basic ontological feature of Dasein; that being-in is exchanging, but this we have already discussed in the last chapter.
you do? Who are you? Where do you come from? What town? What province? What country? Where were you born? Where were your parents born? When we question the other like this we measure them; for all these questions are ways in which we try to measure the other ie. measure them in the sense of size them up, or determine how much we can get away with saying to the other without offending them and so forth. The responses the other gives to these questions, are the verbal equivalent to the measurements one might read off a thermometer; for such responses all indicate to the questioner certain things about the other, for example how they are feeling, their state of mind, if they are open-minded, just as the numbers on a thermometer indicate certain things about the weather ie. that now water will freeze, now it will boil and so forth. It is in this way that taking up a relation with the other has the character of measuring.

Once our relation with the other is established and is reaffirmed the more we see the other, our questioning of the other continues and with it so too does our measuring of them. Of course the kinds of questions we ask the other will be different from the questions we initially asked them in the first place. These questions will depend upon the kind of relation that develops between ourselves and the other, ie. whether the other becomes to us husband, wife, friend, enemy, co-worker, or acquaintance. What this means therefore is that not only does taking up a relation with the other have the character of measuring, but also being-with the other as such has the character of measuring; for if we assume that an essential ingredient of being-with the other is questioning them about their own being, either in relation to us, the world, or others in the world, we will continue to measure them in our own subtle way. And if being-with as such has the character of measuring, what follows from this is that being-in must also have the character of measuring; for being-in is being-with. Hence the conclusion; being-in has the character of measuring.

What is implied in saying that being-in is measuring is actually that valuing itself is a mode of measuring. To see this recall what we said about being and valuing, namely that as far as Dasein is concerned, to be is to value. Now if being is valuing, and being-in is measuring, then this implies that valuing too must also be measuring. Valuing as
measuring can be distinguished from other modes of measuring in that valuing is an internalized mode of measuring. Sometimes Dasein measures beings in a way which it insists is such that they cannot be measured by any scale of measurement at all. This it calls qualitative value. But what speaks against the idea of qualitative value which lurks in the background is radical ontological cynicism. Just as the skeptic can always assert that we cannot really know anything, so the cynic can always assert that we can always quantify what we have valued qualitatively.

The connexion between measuring and Dasein’s way of being was first taken seriously in philosophy by Protagoras and is something we will be looking at later in this chapter. There what we have just said about being-in as measuring, will be in with our discussion of Protagoras and what he said about the relation between money and value, but before doing this we will bring some of our conclusions into line with some of those made by Heidegger.

For Heidegger, ‘It belongs to the essence of Dasein that its own being resides in its for-the-sake-of.’ MFL, 186. What this means is that we exist first for our own sake, and that because of this we can go on to be either egoistic or altruistic in our relations with others. Now from the point of view of everydayness, when it comes to relating to everything else that is in the world, Dasein tends to do this in a way which is consistent with the kind of being it is; a being which exists for its own sake. Dasein tends to think that everything which exists, does so for its own sake as well. But to say this is merely a roundabout way of saying as we did, that the initial way in which Dasein values beings is as a means to its own end; for when I, within the context of everydayness, view something as a being which exists for my own sake, I generally disregard whether it is a being which also exists for its own sake as well. For example, if I walk into a store to buy a chocolate bar, I am generally indifferent to the person who sells it to me. Initially she does not strike me as a being who exists as an end in herself. Rather I perceive her more as a means of acquiring my chocolate bar. Similarly she perceives in me a means to the money she needs to stay in business. Of course whether both her and I ought to be this way towards each other is a
separate matter. The point is that our claim about Dasein's initial way of valuing beings as a means to its own ends is in accordance with the fact that we are beings who exist first for our own sake; for in existing in this way we tend to assume that everything is a means to our own ends -- the other included.

Now if Dasein is so constituted that its initial reaction to beings is to regard them all as means to its own ends, What does this tell us about the kind of beings we are? That we are constantly on the look out for beings which can satisfy our own ends and that if we cannot find these beings then we invent and build new ones which can. But a being which relates to beings in this way must have an insatiability for beings. This is true, and we suggest that it is because of considerations like these that Heidegger says in The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic; 'Dasein is in itself excessive, i.e., defined by a primary insatiability for beings -- both metaphysically as such and also existentially, in a factic individuation. This primary insatiability can be seen in a definite, ontic existentiell comportment.' MFL,192 (Heidegger's italic).

In The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, Heidegger did not say which ontic existentiell comportment Dasein's primary insatiability for beings is manifested in. But it is certainly possible that money more than anything else, enables us to see this insatiability Dasein has for beings. Something else worth mentioning here is that the ontological claim about Dasein's insatiability for beings is one of the foundational assumptions of economics: 'It is a basic tenet of economic thinking that man's wants are insatiable. Once he has satisfied the needs of subsistence he raises his sights and continues to do so every time a new level is reached.' AE,1.

It is now time to examine Heidegger's question about what the being of values amounts to ontologically. In doing this we will circumvent the concept of validity entirely; for the nature of our interpretation precludes us from considering validity. Rather we must pursue the question about value in relation to money. The way we will do this is to return to the first formal meeting between money and philosophy by focusing on what Protagoras had to
say about the relation between monetary value and everydayness.

Protagoras, Heidegger and the Question of Value.

The question about value that Heidegger asked in *Being and Time* was, What does the being of values amount to ontologically? This question is not the same question as the one we have asked, What does it mean to value? But because we are assuming that valuing and being are equiprimordial we will continue to use the phenomenological method on value, as if we were using it on being by tracing back the question of value to its source in antiquity - that source being Protagoras. After doing this, we will investigate the structure of the Protagorean formulation of the question of value.

Protagoras is the philosopher we identify in antiquity to make visible the question of value for the first time. To explain how the question of value was revealed to us by Protagoras, we will begin with a few preliminary remarks pertaining to our manner of interpreting him. The fragment to be considered is the well known measurement fragment, which we will interpret in relation to other things about Protagoras the historical figure. Why are we considering the historical figure of Protagoras? Because as Schiappa explains, it has become increasingly clear through the work of scholars such as George Grote and others that, ‘To understand the Sophists ... one must study them on their own terms: as individuals situated in a culture dominated by an oral tradition.’ PL, 12 (Grote’s italic). Focusing on the historical figure of Protagoras helps us to understand him on his own terms. That said, consider now Protagoras’ statement that ‘of all things the measure is man’.

What is stated in the measurement fragment is a metaphysical statement about the essence of man. For Protagoras, man is the ultimate measurer. Ultimate because this being measures all things. Schiappa interprets this fragment to imply that man is such a measurer he will even measure that which is not: ‘[Human beings] measure both what is and what is not.’ PL, 125. Now although we are not disagreeing with Schiappa’s interpretation here, to
elaborate further on the notion of measuring that which is not, would require a substantial digression into the doctrine of non-being. Such a digression would force us to stray from our analysis of the historical figure of Protagoras. This we will not do. Instead we will stick with interpreting the historical figure of Protagoras.

If we keep in mind the fact that Protagoras was the first to teach for a fee, we can infer that in teaching this doctrine, he must have had to defend it against objections and misinterpretations. One obvious objection we can imagine a student of Protagoras' making to this doctrine, is that man is not the measurer of all things because there are some things man simply does not measure. The student might argue that man does not measure the gods, since the gods do not appear and only that which appears can be measured. Whether this would be the exact objection is really beside the point. For the thing to see is that the kind of objection we are attributing to this fictitious student, would be on the level of naivete. The student would not object to Protagoras' statement because he opposed the kind of absolute relativism modern interpreters of the measurement fragment have sensed in it. Were we to think this we would be mistaken. For as Schiappa has also pointed out, it was largely because of 'the precision afforded by Aristotle's analysis [of Protagoras]' PL,129, that Sextus Empiricus in 200 AD was able to say with confidence that Protagoras 'introduce[d] relativity' PL,129. The kind of relativity introduced by Protagoras was totally new to the Athenians, and consequently affected them as all genuinely new ideas do: explosively. We have already mentioned how the Athenians rebelled against Protagoras by burning his books and running him out of their city.

The question to consider is how Protagoras would respond to a naive objection like the one mentioned above? As an educator it is unlikely that Protagoras would merely refute the students objection without giving her the opportunity to participate in this refutation and thus learn something in the process. Rather it is wise to assume that Protagoras would respond to this objection by getting the student to consider all the different systems of measurement and all the different ways in which things can be measured. In fact such an assumption is justified if what Diogenes Laertius said about Protagoras is accurate; for not
only is Protagoras considered by Diogenes to be the first to argue ‘by the method of questioning’, OS,4, but in addition to this, Diogenes also credits Protagoras with being the first to introduce the Socratic type of argumentation. OS,5. If this is accurate, then we can assume that Protagoras would respond to his student’s objection as we have suggested. In proceeding in this way, eventually both the student and Protagoras would come across the monetary way of measurement. Here Protagoras would pause and get the student to consider this way of measuring in particular. How would Protagoras get his student to do this? According to Plato, Protagoras got his students to think about the monetary way of measuring by adhering to the following method: ‘[Protagoras speaks] For this reason I have fixed upon this method of exacting the fee. A pupil of mine pays, if he wants to, the amount I charge. But if he is unwilling, then he puts down instead whatever amount he has declared, under oath, in a temple, the lessons are worth.’ Protagoras, 328b.

Plato’s account of how Protagoras made his money differs slightly from Aristotle’s. For according to Aristotle, ‘Protagoras ... acted on this principle: when he finished teaching any subject he used to tell his pupil to estimate the value of the knowledge that he had acquired, and accepted that as his fee.’ NE,1164a,24f. What is common to both Plato and Aristotle’s account, is that Protagoras left it for his students to determine how much the lessons were worth. Where Plato’s account differs from Aristotle’s is that in Plato’s account Protagoras provides a clue as to how much he thinks his teachings are worth, whereas in Aristotle’s account there is no mention of such a clue and the decision is left entirely with the student.

Protagoras solution to the problem of estimating the value of knowledge was to force his student to solve it for him. We must assume that Protagoras gave this matter serious thought. The fact that he had a method of exacting a fee certainly suggests this. Moreover, the method Protagoras used was, according to Plato, extremely lucrative; ‘Protagoras made more money from this knowledge of his than Phidias who made such notably fine works and ten other sculptors’. Meno, 91d. If it is valid to assume that Protagoras gave serious thought to his method of exacting a fee before he asked his student to think about the
problem he discovered, then the appropriate way to proceed is by considering in more
detail (i) the method Protagoras used to solve the problem of value, and (ii) the problem of
value itself that Protagoras gave his students to solve.

(i) The method Protagoras used to solve the problem of measuring the value of knowledge
was to ask his student to think about it. In this sense Protagoras' solution to this problem
is in part, a thought experiment. Not just any thought experiment, but an extremely
powerful thought experiment. For not only had the student just been taught by Protagoras
as to what the instruments of knowledge were, but also on how to use them. What we
conclude from this is that Protagoras revealed the problem of value to us in the form of a
thought experiment; for it was in the form of a thought experiment that Protagoras got his
student to think about the value of what they learned from him in the first place. By getting
the student to think about the problem of value in this way, Protagoras introduced them to
the fact that money can measure everything; even something abstract like the value of
knowledge and the value of the time it takes to be educated. What Protagoras taught the
student was something very basic; knowledge and education quite literally come at a price.
To be formally educated the educator must be paid. What this implies is that Protagoras
founded the very notion of education on money; for it was in exchange for money that
Protagoras became an educator. We have already mentioned how this move led to the
death of one kind of philosopher and the birth of a new kind of philosopher.

(ii) The problem Protagoras gave his student to solve was that of measuring the monetary
value of knowledge. What did Protagoras do by asking the student to monetarily measure
the value of knowledge? Answered in relation to his student, one thing Protagoras did was
introduce the student to the way of the world. For from the moment the student first
understood and conducted Protagoras thought experiment, they were destined to live the
rest of their life knowing that both the concrete and the abstract, ie. all things can and quite
often will have a price on them and that the way of the world is this: anyone not willing to
pay this price must be willing to forgo these things.
We can also answer the question about what Protagoras did by asking the student to monetarily measure the value of knowledge, in relation to the structure of the question of value Protagoras put to his students. For with Protagoras’ thought experiment, the question of value becomes visible first, as a problem of measurement; since it is the value of knowledge the student is being asked to monetarily measure. Second, Protagoras’ thought experiment makes visible the problem of value as a problem to be solved by the subject; since it is the subject that is the one who is doing this measuring. And third, Protagoras’ thought experiment makes visible the problem of value as a problem with a distinctively pecuniary shape to it; since money is the unit which this knowledge is being measured in terms of.

These three things: measurement, the subject i.e. man, and money, constitute the structure of the Protagorean formulation of the question of value. Our interpretation has already investigated the first structural moment of the Protagorean formulation of the question of value; measuring. This we did earlier with our conclusion that being-in is measuring. Recall that this conclusion was based on Heidegger’s claim that taking up a relation itself has the character of measuring. What remains for our interpretation of value to do therefore is investigate the structure of the Protagorean question of value with respect to the two remaining structural moments: man and money. Let us now investigate the question of value a little further with respect to money.

Protagoras’ thought experiment reveals that the monetary itself constitutes a basic part of the question of value. Here the problems are (i) determining the monetary worth of the instruments and methods of knowledge, and (ii) determining the monetary worth of the time one must devote to become educated in how to use them. In chapter five we argued that Aristotle addressed part of this problem in a general way when he concluded that one determines the monetary worth of something by referring this ‘something’ to the needs of men. What we want to defend here is the claim that the problem of value began as a problem of monetary value whose monetary roots have been effaced over time as the problem evolved into a problem that is now seen primarily in terms of morality and either
the qualitative quantitative distinction, the fact value distinction, or the problem of subjective vs. objective values.

Nietzsche too appears to suggest that a similar thing happened to moral concepts that we are claiming happened to value. Consider the second essay of the *Genealogy*. There Nietzsche asked: 'Have these genealogists of morals had even the remotest suspicion that, for example, the major moral concept *Schuld* [guilt] has its origin in the very material concept *Schulden* [debts].’ GM,II,4. The similarity between what we are claiming about the problem of value beginning as a problem of monetary value and what Nietzsche is claiming about morality should be obvious; just as a moral concept guilt, *Schuld* has its origins in the material concept of debt *Schulden*, so qualitative value has its origins in monetary value.

Another example which confirms Nietzsche's suspicion about the origin of moral concepts is the concept of dignity, or *Wurde* as it is in German. This concept too seems to derive from the monetary. For *Wurde* is distinguished from worth, *Wert* in German. *Wert* is new German and *Werd* is the old German for worth. Both *Wert* and *Werd* are distinguished from *Wurde* on the ground that the former refers to a monetary sense of worth while the latter refers to a sense of worth which, as Kant says, is 'above all price, and therefore admits of no equivalent.' FMM,60. Earlier we said that Kant already recognized how fundamentally inadequate man's initial way of valuing the other was for founding a metaphysics of morals. We now have more of an insight as to why it was inadequate. It was inadequate not merely because man's initial way of valuing the other was as a means to an end, but because man's initial way of valuing the other was as a means to an end which *did* admit of a monetary equivalent. That Kant appealed to the monetary as a way of determining the kind of worth man ought not to have is significant because it implies that the kind of worth man did originally have was a monetary worth. As we will see later there exists historical evidence to support the idea that originally man's worth was monetary. But first let us consider another example of the moral evolving out of the monetary, the moral theory of utilitarianism.
Where did the maximization of happiness and its opposite, the minimization of suffering come from? Answer: the maximization of profit and the minimization of financial loss. Now before one objects to this last claim, consider what Meikle has said about the origins of utilitarianism and why it was thought up in the first place.

Most economic writing has had a particular ethical theory integrated into it: utilitarianism. This theory fitted neatly because it had been designed for this supporting and subordinate role in the first place. The origin of utilitarianism in Bentham was associated with the ambition of providing political economy with a system of ethics, or something that looked like ethics, which could be fully integrated into political economy. AET, 106-7.

According to this, one of Bentham’s aim was to provide economics with a theory of morality; for on its own monetary economics had nothing to do with morality. Hence its need for a theory of morality commensurable with the way in which a monetary economy is. In keeping with our application of the phenomenological method we can explain how the moral evolved out of the monetary by explaining the production of this theory in relation to the structure of intentionality; for production is a comportment of the Dasein and thus has an intentional structure.

The intentio is, in this instance the act of producing the moral theory of utilitarianism. But what about the intentum; towards what was Bentham directed when he was producing this moral theory? Formally the answer to this question is not the product, but the look of the product, what the moral theory is supposed to look like once it has been produced. Now since the product is a moral theory, the intentum must be the look of a moral theory. But where must one look to see this? In Bentham’s case he looked in two different directions; the direction of man and the direction of the economy. Now in looking towards man, Bentham had to make some very basic assumptions about the way in which man is. To understand the assumptions Bentham made about man, consider the third structural moment of intentionality: the understanding of the mode of being of what is intended in the intentum. Remember that this moment boils down to asking about the understanding of the
mode of being of the product; a theory which will create a moral economy. For a theory to be a moral theory capable of transforming the economy into a moral economy, certain assumptions must be made about what it means for man to be moral in the first place; for a theory of morality not based upon certain assumptions about what it is for man to be moral is as absurd as it is impossible. However from a phenomenological perspective, these assumptions must in turn be based upon more basic assumptions about what it means for man to be in general; for if we know what it means to be we can go on to say what it means to be moral, and if we know what it means to be moral, we can go on to say what it means for a theory to be a moral theory. The assumptions about what it means for man to be that Bentham made are found in the first sentence of his An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.

Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do as well as to determine what we shall do ... [Pain and pleasure] govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. B,65. (Bentham’s italics).

According to Bentham, what it means for man to be is either to be in pain or to be in pleasure. Bentham’s moral theory of utilitarianism therefore is based on these two different assumptions about the meaning of Dasein’s being: being in pain, and being in pleasure. With these assumptions made, Bentham then looked to a monetary economy with the view to integrating them into it in such a way that a moral theory would ensue. How did he do this? By substituting the normative concepts of pleasure, good, and happiness for profit; and pain, bad, and suffering for financial loss. Having done this he integrated them into the way in which a monetary economy as a whole is. What he came up with was the maximization of pleasure and the minimization of pain. Just as it is good to maximize profit in the world of money, so it is good to maximize happiness or pleasure, in the everyday world of morality. It is entirely possible that it is in this way that two monetary concepts evolved into moral concepts.
We claimed that the question of value began as a question of monetary value and over time evolved into a question of qualitative value. We now want to broaden this by saying that the original kind of value associated with man was monetary value. To show this we must now investigate the question of value with regards to the third structural moment of the Protagorean formulation of the question of value; man. But first consider an objection to our earlier claim that measurement, money, and man constitute the structure of the Protagorean formulation of the question of value.

One could object to this claim on the grounds that there is a fourth structural moment belonging to the Protagorean formulation of the question of value, namely the Gods. For not only are the Gods frequently thought of as the highest values, but also Protagoras' thought experiment does involve the notion of the Gods. This was evident in Plato's description of it when he told us that Protagoras' method of exacting a fee involved taking his students to a temple and asking them to declare on oath how much they thought the lessons were worth. This they would do if they valued the lessons differently than Protagoras. The method Protagoras employed, relied on the character of the belief his students placed in the existence of temples and oaths, and what stood behind these temples and oaths; the Gods. Accordingly, the Gods too constitute a significant structural moment in Protagoras' formulation of the question of value.

This objection raises an important question which we must address: Which structural moment do we investigate the question of value in relation to, man or God? Because the historical figure we are interpreting, Protagoras, maintained a hard-lined agnosticism towards the Gods, it seems only fair that we do this in the direction of man. However this does not mean that we will totally neglect the relation between value and God. On the contrary, because the sense of value we are concerned with is monetary value, the basic question we will be led to is this: What for man, is the relation between God and money? But before we can ask this question we must first investigate the question of value with regards to man. We will do this by arguing that the original sense of value associated with man was monetary value.
Historically the idea of a human being having a qualitative worth is a fairly recent idea. The slavery that existed in both Antiquity as well as modern times supports this last remark. Something else which supports it is the *wergild*. What is the *wergild*? 'the atonement of murder by money payment, a manbote.' PM,355. The significance of the *wergild* consists in this: so much was the value of man measured in terms of money that not only was it written into the letter of the law, but it was written in so completely that,

In Anglo-Saxon England, a wergild ... was even attached to killing the king; a law set it at 2,700 shillings. Such a sum was, for that period, totally imaginary and impossible to obtain. Its real meaning was that, in order to compensate for the deed, the murderer and his whole family had to be sold into slavery, though even then ... the difference remained so large -- as a mere money debt! -- it could be cleared only by death. Only be resorting to the money fine was it possible to fix upon the person the magnitude of the crime. PM,355.

We interpret the *wergild* as being decisive in establishing the priority of the monetary value of man over the qualitative value of man. How then does the qualitative value that we now associate with man evolve out of this state of affairs? As Simmel sees it, the move away from the monetary sense of value associated with man towards the qualitative sense of value that we now associate with him, first gained momentum with the advent of Christianity and then later with the Enlightenment: '[it is upon the basis of Christianity, and the Enlightenment ... including Rousseau and Kant ... that] 'human dignity' and 'human rights' have developed, [this viewpoint] marks most decisively the development that made every sale of human beings for money, and atonement for their death by money impossible.' PM,362.

Both Christianity and the Enlightenment spread the idea that man's value was qualitative not monetary. But Christianity also spread the idea that evil was rooted in the love of money. Consider the first letter of Paul to Timothy which says, 'those who desire to be rich fall into temptation, into a snare, into many senseless and hurtful desires that plunge men into ruin and destruction. For the love of money is the root of all evils.' (I Tim 6:9-
What interests us here about this quote is how it represents an unusual twist to the traditional problem of evil, a twist which could be interpreted to betray a very covert and no doubt unintended identification of money with God.

On the one hand Paul is claiming that the love of money is supposed to be the root of all evil; but there is another formulation of the problem of evil which suggests that God is the root of all evil; since God is the root of everything, evil included. What is going on here? The same thing, evil, is being traced back to two different origins, God and the love of money. But the love of God is supposed to be diametrically opposed to the love of money; for to love God is good, to love money evil. Surely to suggest that they are not is absurd, or is it? Are God and money really the same? To answer this consider something that Heidegger said, in An Introduction to Metaphysics. There Heidegger warns us that whenever in metaphysics we find ourselves facing two diametrically opposed doctrines like for example, Parmenides’ doctrine of being and Heraclitus’ doctrine of becoming a closer look always suggests that they are in fact saying the same thing: ‘Actually Heraclitus, to whom is ascribed the doctrine of becoming as diametrically opposed to Parmenides’ doctrine of being, says the same as Parmenides.’ ITM,97. But if this is so, then it would surely be wise for us to ask a similar question here, namely, Are God and money really that different after all in the eyes of man?

In Daybreak Nietzsche seems to have confronted the basic question, What for man, is the relation between God and money? The answer we suggest he reached, was that for all intensive purposes God and money were the same. For why else would Nietzsche say that ‘what one formerly did ‘for the sake of God’ one now does for the sake of money, that is to say, for the sake of that which now gives the highest feeling of power and good conscience.’ D,204. To the extent that money provides man with the highest feeling of power and good conscience, Nietzsche realized that money has proved itself to man to be just as useful as God. It is because of this that Nietzsche says that one now does for the sake of money what one formerly did for the sake of God. The God the madman in The Gay Science, tells us about, the old Christian God, is dead. The new God, the God that
modern man now worships is money. And just as man used to sacrifice things to the old God, so man today is more than willing to make sacrifices to his new God. One example of what modern man now sacrifices to his new God money: the family unit.

In earlier times the bible tells of how Abraham was willing to sacrifice his son Isaac to the old God. Today twentieth century man confirms in his actions time and again, that he is more than willing to sacrifice his entire family to his new God, money. To be convinced of this, think of all the modern day politicians, doctors, lawyers, scientists, scholars, artists -- to name the most obvious -- who seem perfectly willing to sacrifice their husbands wives and children, in short the family unit as such, for the sake of money and their career. Instead of spending eighty or ninety hours every week with their family, these people either choose or are compelled to spend it making money for both themselves and their employers. Obviously working this amount of time under the pressures they do and the conditions they work under plays a major role in the destruction of their family. Psychiatrist and psychologists have even categorized this phenomenon as the dysfunctional family. Most of the time however these workaholics only realize they have sacrificed their family to money and that therefore the concept of the dysfunctional family applies to their own situation when it is too late, and their family lies there before them broken, what is left of it, in ruins.

The first example of something man formerly did for the sake of God that he now does for the sake of money was make sacrifices. Another example of something man formerly did for the sake of God that he now does for the sake of money, is erect massive buildings. In his book *Greek Architecture*, A.W. Lawrence tells how the purpose of the Greek temple in Hellenic architecture 'was to house a deity, not to accommodate worshippers.' GA,84. In Gothic architecture a similar concern with God shows itself. Consider what David Watkin said in his book *A History of Architecture*.

the growth of intellectual life in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, culminating in the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas was accompanied by
numerous writings on religious mysticism and spirituality. This fruitful confrontation of spirit and matter was given overwhelming expression in the great cathedrals built in stone yet aspiring heavenwards. HA,126.

Today the buildings that aspire heavenwards are mostly bank buildings which house money not God. For, of the world’s ten tallest skyscrapers half are built in the name of banking or trade, the other half are built in the name of corporations whose ultimate concern is profit. Of course these skyscrapers are significantly different from those that were built in antiquity; for in a certain sense skyscrapers do house worshippers, it is just that today we call them employees, and they do not pray -- they work. These are two examples of the things that man now does for money that he formerly did for the sake of God. But since our aim was to investigate the question of value with regards to man let us bring the argument back to Nietzsche by considering another passage from *Daybreak*. Here Nietzsche goes out on a limb to make a prediction about what the twentieth century man will be like when he says,

Today one can see coming into existence the culture of a society of which *commerce* is as much the soul as personal contest was with the ancient Greeks and as war, victory and justice were for the Romans. The man engaged in commerce understands how to appraise everything without having made it, and to appraise it *according to the needs of the consumer*, not according to his own needs; ‘who and how many will consume this?’ is his question of questions. This type of appraisal he then applies instinctively and all the time: he applies it to everything, and thus also to the productions of the arts and sciences, of thinkers, scholars, artists, statesmen, peoples and parties, of the entire age: in regard to everything that is made he inquires after supply and demand *in order to determine the value of a thing in his own eyes*. This becomes the character of an entire culture, thought through in the minutest and subtlest detail and imprinted in every will and every faculty: it is this of which you men of the coming century will be proud. D,175 (Nietzsche’s italics).

Is this accurate? Are the people who appraises everything in our world today, different from the people who make these things? Do we appraise everything that has been made according to the needs of the consumer? Is our question of questions; Who will consume this and how many? Is this appraisal applied to the productions of arts and sciences, of thinkers, scholars, artists, statesman, peoples, and parties? In regard to everything that is made, Do we inquire after supply and demand in order to determine the value of a thing in our own eyes? Is all of this thought through in the minutest and subtlest detail and imprinted in every will and every faculty? These are questions we will leave for the reader to answer. All we wish to point out is that answering ‘yes’ to them could mean that Nietzsche was correct to think of us as the men of commerce and to think of commerce as the soul of our culture.

We shall now sum up this chapter. We began by determining the question of value by likening it to Heidegger’s Seinsfrage. We then looked at two different ways in which Dasein values beings -- as a means and as an end. We argued that the initial way in which Dasein values beings in everydayness is as a means to one of its ends. After this we defended the claim that monetary value is the sense of value most commensurate with Heidegger’s existential starting point of everydayness. We then traced the question of value back to its source in Protagoras’ formulation of the question of value, and argued that the structure of this question was constituted by man, measurement, and money. The conclusions we arrived at were that being-in was measuring, that the original sense of value that belonged to man was monetary value, and that qualitative value evolved out of monetary value.

In the last chapter we will consider the relation between money, and science and technology. Recall that our reason for considering this has to do with our earlier claim that to examine what it means to value we must look at the things Dasein decides to spend its money on in everydayness, and that since this list of things was enormous we would have to narrow our focus down to one thing. The one thing we narrowed our focus down to was science and technology and its relation to money. However we must narrow our focus
even more; for the relation between science and technology and money is no small topic to examine. Accordingly we must consider one science in particular, and its concomitant technology. Moreover this must be a science that will enable us to throw some light on the question of what it means to value. What science in particular are we going to focus on, and how does it relate to the question of value? These questions will be addressed in the next chapter.
Many sciences could easily be related to Heidegger's writings on technology. Which science in particular are we going to focus on? One which stands out from all the other sciences as the most relevant to both the specific dangers Heidegger identified in modern technology, and the future of Dasein as such. Moreover, the particular science we are referring to has connexions of fundamental importance to the other things which have surfaced in our interpretation; money, equipment, intentionality, production, value, and *nomos* and *physis*.

What science are we referring to? A science which is actually a combination of two other sciences, one largely made possible by the technological age itself. The two sciences it combines are reproductive biology and genetics. Strictly speaking it is known to those who conduct research in this field as the science of reprogenetics. In what follows, we will consider reprogenetics in relation to money, equipment, intentionality, production, value, *nomos* and *physis*. To begin with, a general remark about Heidegger's conception of science within the technological age. Specifically we will look first, at the essential origin of modern science, and then at how a science like reprogenetics is possible.

For Heidegger, it is a 'deceptive illusion ... [to think] that modern technology is applied physical science.' QCT,23. This illusion can be shattered by asking about (i) the essence of modern technology, and (ii) the essential origin of modern science. In *The Question Concerning Technology* Heidegger only asked about the essence of modern technology, however in an earlier essay, *The Age Of The World Picture* Heidegger asked about the essential origin of modern science. It is to this essay that we will now turn.

According to *The Age of the World Picture*, the essence of modern science consists in research. QCT,118. Now since research is always research-of some specific region of beings, science in the modern age is always specialized. We need only think of reprogenetics to see this. It is not reproductive biology, nor is it genetics, it is both, but not merely as the sum total of adding these two sciences together; for strictly speaking it is the
reproduction of Dasein and the genetics of Dasein with which reprogenetics is concerned. This is one of the things that makes the science of reprogenetics so relevant to what Heidegger said about modern technology.

When does science becomes research? When it is able to calculate in advance the future course of a being, or verify a calculation about the past course of a being -- when science is able to do this, then it becomes research. Two metaphysical events underlie the transformation of science into research. The first is when 'What it is to be is ... defined as the objectiveness of representing' QCT,127. The second is when truth is 'defined as the certainty of representing.' QCT,127. Both of these events occurred with Descartes: 'The whole of modern metaphysics ... maintains itself within the interpretation of what it is to be and of truth that was prepared by Descartes.' QCT,127.

Thus it is with Descartes that we see the essential origin of modern science; for according to Heidegger, it is Descartes' conception of truth as the certainty of representing, and his interpretation of what is, as the objectiveness of representing, that forms the basis upon which the whole of the modern age is essentially grounded. But there is more; for with Descartes man also becomes a subject. Not just any subject, but that subject 'upon which all that is, is grounded as regards the manner of its Being and its truth.' QCT,128. To appreciate the significance of this we need to explain the unprecedented character in which man becomes a subject. Within Medieval times for example, man could never have been the being upon which everything else was grounded; for within Medieval times, God was considered to be the cause of beings as such. This implied a certain order of rank amongst beings, a rank 'appointed from the beginning -- and as thus caused, to correspond to the cause of creation.' QCT,130. In finding himself as 'that being upon which all that is, is grounded as regards the manner of its being and its truth' QCT,128, not only does man willingly maintain himself in this role; man actually assumes the responsibility of manning the entire realm of human capability as such. QCT,132. Why does man do this? Heidegger explains that it is 'for the purposes of gaining mastery over that which is as a whole.' QCT,132.
This explains a little about the essential origins of modern science in Descartes. Next we will consider how the science of reprogenetics is possible? Heidegger of course never asked this question, but because reprogenetics is a science, and because science in the technological age is research, the question about how reprogenetics is possible is really a question about how research in the technological age is possible. Heidegger's answer to this question weaves together three interrelated things which work together to make possible research in the technological age; on-going activity, methodology and projection.

The on-going activity of research is the everyday way in which scientific activity comports itself towards the beings it is conducting research on. Looking back to Being and Time, on-going activity can be likened to a kind of scientific everydayness, but with this emphasis: in the technological age, science as research is always conducted within an institutionalized environment. What this implies is that outside the institutional environment science as research does not exist. More will be said about the relation between science and the institution later. The next thing to explain is what Heidegger meant by methodology.

By methodology Heidegger meant the experimental methodology; for scientific research advances by way of the experimental method, ie. the experiments it conducts, the way science interprets these experiments, and the way science binds itself to the sphere it has opened up for the purpose of researching. This last idea of science binding itself to the sphere it has opened up, refers to the kind of obligation a scientist has to the things she is investigating. To explain what he meant here Heidegger appealed to the science of modern mathematical physics. This science is obliged to bind or adhere to the beings it is investigating -- material bodies in motion -- in terms of exactitude, which it does through measuring, number, and calculation. The difference between physics and reprogenetics is that reprogenetics, a science concerned with the living, 'must necessarily be inexact just in order to remain rigorous.' QCT,120.

Finally there is projection. To understand the meaning of projection in this context, we
must explain what the essence of research consists in. For Heidegger, the essence of research consists in 'the fact that knowing [das Erkennen] establishes itself as a procedure within some realm of what is.' QCT,118. Every procedure presupposes what Heidegger calls 'an open sphere in which [procedure] moves.' QCT,118. Without this open sphere for the knowing procedure to move about in, research would not be possible. What is of fundamental importance therefore is the event which opens up this sphere ie. the sphere within which the research procedure moves. Projection refers to the event which opens up this sphere.

In speaking about projection here, two questions arise. First what is being projected? Second upon what is that which is being projected, being projected? To answer these recall Heidegger's example of modern mathematical physics mentioned above. For physics to arise, certain stipulations about material bodies in motion must be made in advance prior to its arisal. Moreover these stipulations must be understood by the stipulator, the scientist, as already being known in advance, and thus not open to question. Examples of the kinds of stipulations being referred to in modern mathematical physics are as follows; 'Motion means change of place. No motion or direction of motion is superior to any other. Every place is equal to every other. No point in time has preference over any other. Every force is defined according to ... its consequence in motion, and that means in magnitude of change of place in the unity of time.' QCT,119.

Let us now answer the above question, What is being projected? in relation to Heidegger's example of modern mathematical physics. What is projected in the event that opens up the sphere in which modern mathematical physics moves, is a plan, sketch, or blueprint. Now what is true of every plan, be it a military plan, a corporate plan, or a political plan, is that it is not empty, but contains many different things, ie. instructions on what to do, when to do it, what the backup plan is if the primary plan fails and so forth. In the case of modern mathematical physics, it is the stipulations listed above that are contained in the plan that is projected. Upon what is this plan being projected? Nature. What is the result of this projection? That after such a projection, 'Every event must be seen so as to be fitted into
this ground plan of nature. Only within the perspective of this ground plan does an event in nature become visible as such an event.' QCT,119. The event which opens up the sphere within which modern mathematical physics moves is the projection of this plan upon nature. This tells us about projection in relation to modern mathematical physics, but what about projection in relation to the science of reprogenetics?

What is being projected in the event that opens up the sphere in which reprogenetics moves? The kind of stipulations that both a reproductive biologist and a geneticist would make in advance about a living being like Dasein with both genetic properties and reproductive capacities. These stipulations would be in accordance with the basic assumptions a reproductive biologist and a geneticist would make about what it means to be a living organism, and what it means to be a gene. The stipulations contained in this plan would then be projected upon Dasein since Dasein is what the reprogeneticist is researching. This should suffice to explain the way in which reprogenetics as science is possible in the technological age.

In what follows, we will see that reprogenetics is one example of the way in which Dasein is now manning the 'realm of human capability' that Heidegger speaks of. Dasein is doing this for the purpose of gaining mastery over one of the most fundamental things about itself that has hitherto proved so difficult for it to master; the reproduction of Dasein itself. The next thing to do is familiarize the reader a little more with the science of reprogenetics.

Introduction to Reprogenetics

To introduce the reader to the science of reprogenetics and its implications for Dasein, consider the following thought experiment by the scientist Lee Silver taken from his book *Remaking Eden Cloning and Beyond in a Brave New World*.

May 15, 2350 ... the extreme polarization of society that began during the 1980s has now reached its logical conclusion, with all people belonging to
one of two classes. The people of one class are referred to as *Naturals*, while those in the second class are called the *Gene-enriched* or simply the *GeneR ich*. These new classes of society cut across what used to be traditional racial and ethnic lines. In fact, so much mixing has occurred during the last three hundred years that sharper divisions according to race - black versus white versus Asian -- no longer exist ... But while racial differences have mostly disappeared, another difference has emerged that is sharp and easily defined. It is the difference between those who are genetically enhanced and those who are not. The GenRich ... all carry synthetic genes. Genes that were created in the laboratory and did not exist within the human species until twenty-first century reproductive geneticists began to put them there. The GenRich are a modern-day hereditary class of genetic aristocrats. RE,4 (Silver's italics).

Silver concludes this thought experiment with the following conjecture,

If the accumulation of genetic knowledge and advances in genetic enhancement technology continue at the present rate, then by the end of the third millennium, the GenRich class and the Natural class will become GenRich humans and the Natural humans -- entirely separate species with no ability to cross-breed, and with as much romantic interest in each other as a current human would have for a chimpanzee. RE,7.

Of course one might object to this thought experiment on the grounds that it is more fiction than fact, therefore an account of the implications of reprogenetics more in line with fact reads as follows.

The growing power of molecular genetics confronts us with future prospects of being able to *change the nature of our species*. [This] is a fact that seldom appears to be addressed in depth. Scientific knowledge may not yet permit detailed understanding, but the possibilities are clear enough. This gives rise to issues that in the end will have to be related to people within the social and ethical environments in which they live ... And the agenda is set by mankind as a whole, not by the subset involved in the science. RE,10 (Silver’s italics).
In this quote taken from the science journal *Nature* a week after the world was introduced to the first cloned mammal, Dolly the sheep, the editors speak about the possibilities of cloning being clear enough. We will investigate such possibilities phenomenologically, but before doing so, we need to explain a little more about the history and nature of reprogenetics.

As Silver sees it, the birth of the first IVF (= in vitro fertilization) or test tube baby 'represented a singular moment in human evolution.' RE,74. Why? Because 'the development of IVF marks the point in history when human beings gained the power to seize control of their own evolutionary destiny. In a very literal sense, IVF allows us to hold the future of our species in our hands.' RE,74-5. IVF enables the reprogeneticist to hold in her hand the human embryo. This implies she has access to what will in the future become Dasein. The fact she has access to the embryo is what is relevant; for having access to it entails that it can be manipulated. Up until the discovery of cloning, the idea of manipulating the human embryo by genetically modifying it in a way which would change the child that was born, was largely science fiction; but because cloning is now reality in mammals, and because we are mammals, there are many reasons for scientists to think it is merely a matter of time before human beings can be cloned. However cloning will not change Dasein's nature. Rather as Silver explains, it is one of the consequences of cloning that will do this: 'There is a final consequence of cloning that is more significant and powerful than any other use of the technology, one that has the potential to change human kind: the genetic engineering of human beings. Without cloning genetic engineering is simply science fiction. But with cloning, genetic engineering moves into the realm of reality.' RE,129.

What is meant by genetic engineering here? 'The process by which scientists alter or add specific genes to the genetic material present in the embryo so that an individual could be born with characteristics that he or she would not have had otherwise.' RE,129. To put it bluntly, genetic engineering opens up the possibility of ordering a custom built Dasein from a reprogeneticist not unlike the way one orders a custom built home from a builder. It is
the ultimate productification of Dasein; viewing it as something to be produced in such a way that it can be updated and improved upon in direct relation to the progress of science and technology. But not only this; Dasein can also be viewed as something to be produced in such a way that it can be updated and improved upon in direct relation to the needs and demands that the technological world places upon Dasein.

Before situating the science of reprogenetics more firmly within some of the things Heidegger said about technology, we will first answer the question we posed at the end of the last chapter about the relation between the science of reprogenetics and the question of value. There we said that one way to determine what it means to value was to look at the things Dasein actually decided to spend its money on; for the things Dasein is willing to pay for can be interpreted as a reliable indicator of what it is Dasein values; otherwise it would not have paid for them.

In the future, one of the things that Dasein will be spending its money on is the services of a reprogenetics clinic. Accordingly, the things that Dasein will pay a reprogeneticist to build into its offspring, can also be interpreted as a reliable indicator of the kinds of things Dasein values; otherwise it would not have paid the reprogeneticist to build them into its offspring. In what follows, we will investigate the kinds of things that Dasein will be paying a reprogeneticist to build into its children as a way of examining our question, What does it mean to value? The first thing to do is explain the relation between reprogenetics and some of the things Heidegger said about science and technology.

_Heidegger’s Conception of Technology and its Relation to Reprogenetics._

In *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* Heidegger says, ‘Productive comportment ... harbors within itself a remarkable breadth of possibility for understanding the being of beings.’ BP,116.

In *Discourse on Thinking*, Heidegger refers to an ‘international meeting of Nobel Prizes
winners,’ DT,52, which took place in July of 1955. In doing this he quotes ‘the American chemist, Stanley [who] had this to say: “The hour is near when life will be placed in the hands of the chemists who will be able to synthesize, split and change living substance at will.’ DT,52.

In his essay, *The Question Concerning Technology*, Heidegger says

> As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, but does so, rather, exclusively as standing-reserve, and man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing but the orderer of the standing reserve, then he comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. QCT,26-7.

What is the relevance of these three quotes and how do they relate to one one another? In the first quote, Heidegger refers to a remarkable breadth of possibility to the productive comportment of Dasein. In the second quote, Heidegger alludes to an example of the breadth of this comportment; the ability of the chemist to synthesize, split and change living substance at will. Our earlier discussion however suggested that one group of scientists who would be doing this would not be chemists but reprogeneticists, and that the living substance they would be doing this to would be Dasein itself. In the third quote, a danger is spotted, a danger that is harboured within the productive comportment which could spell disaster for Dasein. What is the danger? When man himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. But what is standing-reserve? Actually this concept is one Heidegger appropriated from some of the things Ernst Junger said about technology. Zimmerman points out that in *The Question of Being* Heidegger even ‘conceded that his own definitive essay, “The Question concerning Technology,” “owes enduring advancement to the description in Der Arbeiter.”’ HCM,36. Thus to understand what Heidegger meant by standing-reserve and the subsequent danger of taking man as standing-reserve, we will take a closer look at what Junger said about modern technology.

Junger conceived of modern technology in terms of a natural phenomenon; one that affects
the world in a wholly metaphysical way by leaving nothing untouched by it. To describe the impact of modern technology on the world Junger coined the term *total mobilization.* What he meant by this was ‘an act which, as if through a single grasp of the control panel, conveys the extensively branched and densely veined power supply of modern life towards the great current of martial energy. HC,126-7. Although the reference to ‘martial energy’ suggests that total mobilization needs to be understood in relation to war and the military, Zimmerman maintains that this concept is intended ‘to describe the totalizing process of modern technology.’ HCM, 55. By the totalizing process of modern technology, Junger meant the growing process by which life as such is converted into energy. HC,126.

To explain more fully what Junger meant by total mobilization, consider what the energy taken from the living was used for. The answer to this betrays the influence of Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal return on Junger. For the energy modern technology takes from the living is injected by Dasein back into the process of modern technology. Modern technology in turn uses this newly injected energy as a means of unlocking even more energy from even more living beings as such and the whole process begins anew. In this way the modern technological process loops back on itself endlessly.61

Obviously the process of total mobilization by which life is converted into energy does not happen all by itself. On the contrary, a special kind of thinking is required in order to bring it about. In *Discourse on Thinking,* Heidegger describes the thinking that dominates this conversion process of life into energy as follows,

> whenever we plan, research, and organize, we always reckon with conditions that are given. We take them into account with the calculated intention of their serving specific purposes. Thus we can count on definite results. This calculation is the mark of all thinking that plans and investigates. Such thinking remains calculation even if it neither works with numbers nor uses an adding machine or computer. Calculative thinking

61 Recycling is a good example of this. Bottles, can, papers, and other items that are recycled require their own technology and processing plants which must be built first as a place that these items can then be sent, to be cleaned out and made refit for containing the things we consume, and then we put these same bottles can and papers in the recycle bin and the whole process is begun anew.
computes. It computes ever new, ever more promising and at the same time more economical possibilities. Calculative thinking races from one prospect to the next. Calculative thinking never stops, never collects itself. Calculative thinking is not meditative thinking, not thinking which contemplates the meaning which reigns in everything that is. DT,46.

In the technological age all living beings are subjected to this kind of calculative thinking. This is the conclusion Junger came to. As he says, 'the farm worked with machines and fertilized with artificial nitrogen from factories is no longer the same farm [as the peasants farm].' HCM,58. Why? Because, in the technological age, the farmer's field is now perceived by Dasein as a mineral deposit. QCT,14. A tree in the rain forest, a source of rare chemicals to be converted into the latest drug for depression. In both examples, living beings are seen as rich sources of output from which can be extracted, vitamins, proteins, nutrients, compounds, molecules, and the list goes on. These things are then converted through the process of technology into different forms of energy and injected back into the technological process in order to drive it forward even further. When beings are revealed as nothing but sources of energy, then they are revealed as standing-reserve. This is what Junger meant by the term standing-reserve.

Junger believed that man too was to be revealed as standing-reserve, ie., as nothing but a source of energy: 'The Gestalt of the worker mobilizes the whole standing-reserve [Bestand] without distinction.' HCM,58. Why must man too be mobilized as standing-reserve? Because the total mobilization of man is necessary for the technological impulse to be fulfilled. Junger did not believe that man was valuable merely because he was human; man was 'valuable only as an object or as an instrument in the service of attaining the higher values demanded by the technological impulse.' HCM,56. The technological impulse being to build a better more improved man, one more machine like, a man-chine so to speak; flesh and steel. In one of his lectures on Nietzsche, Heidegger described the kind of man Junger thought was needed for the modern technology age in the following way;

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62 We need not worry about what Junger meant by the Gestalt of the worker here; for what is relevant is his claim that what is to be mobilized is the 'whole standing-reserve without distinction'. It is the 'without distinction' part that clinches our point.
'What is needed is a form of mankind that is from top to bottom equal to the unique fundamental essence of modern technology and its metaphysical truth; that is to say, that lets itself be entirely dominated by the essence of technology precisely in order to steer and deploy individual technological processes and possibilities.' N4,117. We will now take a closer look at where Heidegger differed from Junger with respect to the idea of standing-reserve.

The difference between Junger and Heidegger is that Heidegger distinguished fundamentally the mode of being of plants and animals, life, from Dasein’s mode of being, existence. Junger however did not make this distinction. Thus for Heidegger it was one thing to turn the calculative kind of thinking on plants and animals, it was something else entirely to turn it on Dasein. For Heidegger, turning calculative thinking totally on Dasein by converting its way of being, its existence, into energy in order to drive the technological process forward and fulfil the technological impulse, was not the appropriate way to react to the technological age. What Heidegger meant by the concept of standing-reserve therefore was very similar to what Junger meant; natural beings, being revealed as nothing but beings with hidden sources of energy which must be unlocked, transformed, stored up, and distributed. In a moment we will see why Heidegger did not believe that man belonged to the standing-reserve, but first we will say something about the dangers which Heidegger felt technology presented to Dasein.

The danger in modern technology was this: in an age where everything else is seen as standing-reserve it is very easy to see Dasein as standing-reserve as well. What other dangers follow from seeing Dasein as standing-reserve? First, once Dasein is seen as standing-reserve, it becomes more difficult to ever see Dasein in any other way. On the contrary it becomes much easier to see Dasein only as a disposable source of energy. One just needs to think of the ease with which multinational corporations close their plants in the first world only to relocate them in the third world because of the lower wages they can get away with paying, in order to be convinced of this.
Second, if Dasein is seen as standing-reserve, it must therefore be subjected to a series of technological processes in order to unlock, transform, store up, and distribute this energy, just as the sap extracted from the tree in the rain forest must be subjected to a series of technological processes to make its energy available to Dasein in a convenient form. But subjecting Dasein to processes like this, runs the risk of standing in the way of letting Dasein be; for such subjugation is tantamount to equipmentalizing Dasein and not letting Dasein be Dasein.

A third danger Heidegger considered to follow from the technological way of revealing beings as standing-reserve concerns both Dasein and its world. In *Discourse on Thinking*, Heidegger says,

> the decisive question of science and technology today is no longer: Where do we find sufficient quantities of fuel? The decisive question now runs: In what way can we tame and direct the unimaginably vast amounts of atomic energies, and so secure mankind against the danger that these gigantic energies suddenly -- even without military actions -- break out somewhere, “run away” and destroy everything? DT,51.

The decisive question of science and technology boils down to one of containment, and this in two senses. First, the sense of containment Heidegger is referring to here; containing the energy in beings in a way which prevents future nuclear meltdowns like the one that has already occurred in Chernobyl. Second there is containment in the sense of containing the radioactive waste which results from unlocking this energy; the safe storage of materials that will in theory remain radioactive for thousands of years. Something these dangers reveal about technology is that each technological advancement creates new problems. Problems not only like the two just mentioned, but problems of a totally different kind.

An example of the kind of problem being referred to here, is one which is already showing itself in small areas of the population; the problem of geneism. What is geneism? The new kind of discrimination genetic technology now enables Dasein to practice. A discrimination
based not on the color of Dasein's skin, sex, or race; but one based on its genetic constitution. In his book *The Lives to Come: The Genetic Revolution and Human Possibilities*, Philip Kitcher describes the people geneism will be aimed at as the new pariahs. At present, genetic discrimination affects only a small percentage of the population as a whole; but 'As genetic tests are introduced and become routine, the fears felt by the few will become the concern of many. Precise, accurate information about each of us will be generated, recorded, shared with people who are committed to help us -- doctors, counsellors, nurses -- and perhaps with others whose interest is less benign.' LTC,127.

The new dilemma Dasein must face in the growing age of genetic tests is this: 'To refuse the tests would be to forego the benefits they might bring; to take them is to make oneself vulnerable.' LTC,127-8. If Dasein takes these genetic tests to whom will it be making itself vulnerable? Those who hold the money Dasein needs to secure its future-well-being; potential employers and insurers. We can be sure that future employers and insurers will require people to undergo genetic tests which tell them whether their genome is employable or insurable because it is already happening now with insurance companies and certain employers.63 Using this genetic knowledge, the employer or insurer is able to 'winnow out those who are especially bad risks [ie.] ... people whose particular combinations of A's, C's, G's, and T's debar them from jobs and from security, people who also bear the burden of high risks of genetic disease.' LTC,128.

Naturally pressure will be applied to governments to outlaw this kind of discrimination, but the problem here is this: even if laws are passed outlawing genetic discrimination, insurers can circumvent them by simply raising the premiums one must pay on insurance policies to such a high price for those who are of a certain genetic type, that they will simply not be able to afford them. A similar thing will happen with employers; the aptitude tests they require people to pass will be designed from the outset in such a way that those who are of

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63 Here we are using Kitcher's definition of genome meaning 'The totality of the genetic material of an organism. LTC,349.

64 What the A's, C's, G's, and T's refer to in this quote are the genetic alphabet, 'the elementary units that occur in DNA molecules and that determine the specific forms of DNA molecules ... adenine (A), cytosine (C), guanine (G), and thymine (T).' LTC,347.
a specific genetic constitution will simply not be able to pass them. Dasein’s worth will be based not on what it achieves, nor on the fact that it is merely a Dasein, but on what its genetic constitution suggests it should be able to achieve. We could go on with discussing this problem in more detail, but let us return to Heidegger.

What Heidegger concluded from the fact that technological advancements create new problems like genetic discrimination, was that the technological way of revealing never comes to an end. Nor for that matter does it run off into the indeterminate. Rather there is always something to secure and regulate technology. What secures and regulates technology? Heidegger himself did not answer this question, but it could certainly be money; for in *The Question Concerning Technology*, Heidegger says something which suggests that money is what secures and regulates modern technology,

The forester who, in the wood, measures the felled timber and to all appearances walks the same forest path in the same way as did his grandfather is today commanded by profit-making in the lumber industry, whether he knows it or not. He is made subordinate to the orderability of cellulose, which for its part is challenged forth by the need for paper, which is then delivered to newspapers and illustrated magazines. The latter, in their turn, set public opinion to swallowing what is printed, so that a set configuration of opinion becomes available on demand. QCT,18.

We suggest this remark does imply that money is what secures and regulates modern technology; for if it is not profit, ie. money which secures and regulates technology what else could it be? Dasein perhaps? But if we answer this way, we must next ask, What secures and regulates Dasein? And with this question we return to money; for it is money which secures and regulates Dasein. The forester who is commanded by profit-making and is subordinate to the orderability of cellulose. We have already mentioned how money secures and regulates, in a word, determines Dasein; Dasein equips itself with skills that will be in demand and goes wherever these skills can be exchanged for money.65 This tells us about some of the related dangers that modern technology presented to man when

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65 See chapter 4
Heidegger admits that ‘The current talk about human resources, about the supply of patients for a clinic’ QCT,18 suggests that man does belong in the standing-reserve, however he denied this to be the case on the grounds that man is challenged more originally than nature. For not only is man the one who drives technology forward, but more importantly, man is the one capable of pondering what it is doing to itself in driving technology forward. This is significant; for to ponder this fact is to stop thinking in a calculative way and to start thinking in a meditative way. For Heidegger, meditative thinking and what it reveals -- that not everything is a product of human handiwork -- manifest to man the way it is challenged more originally than nature. By seeing himself to be challenged more originally than nature, Heidegger thought that man could see, with the help of art, that he did not belong in the standing-reserve, but was set apart from it fundamentally. In what way did these things set man apart from everything else? Not in the sense of being specific differences which distinguish man from animals; for Heidegger was very suspicious of this traditional metaphysical conception of man: ‘However ready we are to rank man as a higher being with respect to the animal, such an assessment is deeply questionable, especially when we consider that man can sink lower than any animal. No animal can be depraved in the same way as man.’ FCM,194. In the Letter on Humanism Heidegger distanced himself even further from this metaphysical method of defining man ie. the proximate genus and the specific difference, by asking ‘whether the essence of man primordially and most decisively lies in the dimension of animalitas at all?’ BW,203 (Heidegger's italic). Where else would it lie? According to Heidegger in the dimension of the humanitas.

Admittedly what we have said does not tell us the positive sense in which art, meditative thinking, and what this thinking reveals set man apart from everything else. But rather than try and answer this question, assume for a moment that Heidegger is right and that humanitas is the dimension in which the essence of man lies. What then? Would
Heidegger not therefore have to proceed to determine and clarify this dimension in a way which concurs with both man's mode of being; existence and his basic state; being-in-the-world. And in doing this would Heidegger not have to agree that the technological impulse to build a better human being belongs to this dimension of humanitas as much as language, understanding, attunement, falling prey, exchanging, valuing, measuring, and man's insatiability for beings? In short would Heidegger not have to agree that the technological impulse to build a better human being has been with Dasein from the outset and actually grows out of its being-in-the-world, its transcendence. For the technological impulse is to go beyond Dasein and as we have already seen in chapter two, the mere fact that Dasein exists in the world at all is enough to show that it is always thrown, as Heidegger would say, into the activity of going beyond itself. All the technological impulse does is make this explicit in a rather extreme way.

To see this reflect for a moment on the structure of Dasein's transcendence; being-in-the-world. To transcend means 'to go beyond the limits, to surpass', and a close look confirms that as soon as Dasein reaches its limits in anything it does, it immediately begins looking for ways to surpass or go beyond these limits. Dasein has always wanted to be healthier than it is. In ancient times it would consume roots, and berries and cook up many a strange brew in order to achieve this end. Today, Dasein's quest for health is manifest in the endless stream of drugs brought to market which all promise to provide Dasein with a longer, happier, and healthier life. Dasein has always wanted to be more productive than it is; hence it developed the division of labor, and then the assembly line mode of production, and when this proved to limit productivity, Dasein automated this assembly line, thereby removing the inefficiencies to productivity that accompany the human element. Dasein has always wanted to be wealthier than it is; hence it invented interest so it could collect more money than the sum it originally lent to its fellow Dasein, and when a cap was put on the amount of interest it could charge, it invented shares, stocks, bonds, securities, futures, derivatives, and options. And now Dasein wants to go beyond itself in yet another sense; hence it is perfecting a science and a concomitant technology which will enable it to do exactly this. A science which, it should be noted, is accompanied by its own version of
transcendence: technological transcendence. To elaborate on the idea of technological transcendence compare and contrast it with Heidegger's version of ontological transcendence. This can be done by recalling the three things that are included in the idea of transcendence.

(1) An activity in the broadest sense of the term, a doing
(2) A relation; a crossing over to X from Y
(3) Something which is to be surpassed: a limit, a restriction, a gap, something “lying between”

In the case of ontological transcendence the activity was the activity of existing in the broadest sense of the term. With technological transcendence this remains unchanged since existing as such is basic to Dasein. But this is as far as the similarity extends; for with technological transcendence the something which is to be surpassed is not beings, but Dasein itself. The crossing over to X from Y, is not a crossing over of beings to world from Dasein. Rather since there are two theories of transcendence to consider -- the progressive or regressive -- the crossing over to X from Y will be either (i) a crossing over of Dasein to a new world from the old Dasein, or (ii) a crossing over of a being, Dasein to a new mode of being of the Dasein. We will be saying more about this new mode of being of the Dasein later. With respect to the progressive theory of transcendence, the new world will be new in that it will be populated with a new kind of Dasein; one that is not subject to the forces of evolution, but to the forces of self-evolution.

Being-in-the-world therefore is like a platform that the technological impulse uses to launch Dasein beyond itself. Thus to oppose the technological impulse is to oppose Dasein itself and this is why Heidegger says we must not ‘rebel helplessly against [technology] and curse it as the work of the devil’ QCT,26; for technology also harbors within it what Heidegger, quoting Holderlin, calls the saving power. But to recognize the dangers of technology we need to understand where they come from, namely Dasein itself. In the case of reprogenetics, the dangers Dasein is in come from what Dasein will, in a very literal sense, make of itself; for in reprogenetics, we see the productive comportment being turned
back on the Dasein. And just as there are different tools produced for different purposes, so there will be different people produced for different purposes as well. For example parents who want a concert pianist in the family might ask a reprogeneticist to give their child seven fingers on each hand so that she can play the piano more beautifully than those with only five. In *Brave New World*, Huxley brought our attention to one way of producing Dasein; mass produced by the state and controlled chemically. Silver regards this fear as unfounded. As we will see, for Silver, it will not be the state that controls its products chemically, but parents who control their products monetarily, starting in the laboratory of the reprogeneticist.

To conclude, our aim was to explain the relevance of reprogenetics in relation to some of the things Heidegger said about science and technology. We explained this with the help of three different quotes of Heidegger’s about production and modern technology. To appreciate what is involved in the idea of turning the productive comportment against Dasein we need to first consider the relation between money and reprogenetics. After this, we will describe phenomenologically the reproductive element of reprogenetics in terms of the intentional character of production.

*The Relation Between Money and Reprogenetics*

Silver concludes the introduction of his book by saying, ‘There is no doubt about it. For better and worse, a new age is upon us. And whether we like it or not, the global marketplace will reign supreme.’ RE,11 [Silver’s italic]. Let us elaborate on this last claim of Silver’s about the global marketplace reigning supreme.

Global marketplace is just another way of saying money, and as we see it there is a sense in which money has always reigned supreme ever since it was invented. Simmel has pointed out ‘that intellectual energy is the psychic energy which the specific phenomena of the money economy produces.’ PM,429. Given this, one could argue that the money economy is what makes possible the world of thought, and theoretical and intellectual
inquiry as such; for in the world with money, Dasein does not need to go out and actively chase down the basic necessities of life. Instead it will let the other do this, who will then proceed to store up these necessities and simply wait for Dasein to come along and buy them. The consequence of having the basic necessitates of life ready to buy and consume in this way is that Dasein will have more time available to it, not only to wonder, but to do something about this wondering by figuring out the why behind its wonders, and by developing its intellect and powers of reasoning. Time that used to be spent looking for food and building shelter can now be spent thinking about the way the world works. Thus money is what makes possible the world of thought because it buys Dasein the time to think about the world and reflect on the way it works.

In his lectures entitled Basic Concepts, Heidegger defines a basic concept as a ground concept. He defines a ground concept in the following way,

"Ground-Concepts" [Grundbegriffe] means for us here: grasping [begreifen] the ground of beings as a whole. To grasp, however, does not mean that we merely permit ourselves to represent the ground and to have thoughts about it. When we have grasped something we also say something has opened up to us. This means for the most part that we have been transported into what has opened up and remain determined by it from now on. BC,18.

This definition of a basic concept is relevant because it applies to money; for insofar as money opened up the world of thought by buying us the time to think, it transported us into this world where we have remained determined by it ever since. In this sense money is commensurable with Heidegger’s definition of a basic concept. To the extent that money is commensurable with what Heidegger meant by a basic concept in the sense just adumbrated, we say it has reigned supreme ever since it entered the world.

Something else which Silver’s above mentioned statement makes clear, is that science and money will set the agenda in the age of reprogenetics. Science is responsible for setting the
agenda in this coming age, since reprogenetics is a science; but why is money the other thing that will set the agenda? Because, 'The resources required to practice reprogenetics -- precision medical tools, small laboratory equipment, and simple chemicals -- are all available for sale, without restriction, to anyone with the money to pay for them' RE,8. The importance of this point is political; for 'even if restrictions on the use of reprogenetics are imposed in one country or another, those intent on delivering and receiving these services will not be restrained.' RE,8. Why is this? Because 'a reprogenetic clinic could easily be run on the scale of a small business anywhere in the world.' RE,8. What this means; reprogenetics is outside the control of any particular government. However reprogenetics is not outside the control of money. It is just the opposite. Money is in control of this science. Anyone who doubts this might consider the fact that "The British government decided to "reward" the scientist responsible for Dolly's creation, Ian Wilmut, with the withdrawal of all further funds for his research.' RE,92 (Silver's italic). If money was not in some way in control of Dr. Wilmut's research, Why bother to cut him off from it?

Actually a closer look at the wording of this last quote reveals more than one might think; for the word fund derives from the Latin fundus which means bottom, basis, or foundation. What this can be interpreted to mean is that money is obviously an important foundation for science. The British Government assumed that removing the foundation of Wilmut's research, his funds, could put a halt to the advent of human cloning and of course the implications of human cloning. This was clearly naive; for once Wilmut's results were published, the political actions of the government became little more than closing the stable door after the horse had bolted. But what else does this etymological insight reveal about the relation between science and money? Answer; that if necessity is the mother of invention then money must be its father. For scientific discoveries lead to inventions, and not only is money what transforms these discoveries into inventions, but also, money is the vehicle which delivers these inventions from the laboratory of the inventor to the doorstep of Dasein.
An important assumption Silver makes is that a global ban on reprogenetics is unlikely. Is this a realistic thing to assume? Yes; for there will always be a poor country, willing to sell its relaxed policies on cloning and reprogenetics in exchange for the money a reprogenetic clinic will bring into this country. Who will pay for the services of a reprogenetic clinic? Parents, but not just any parents; for as Silver explains, although it may be relatively inexpensive to set up a reprogenetic clinic, to actually pay the fees that this clinic will charge, is something only those parents with sizable incomes will be able to afford. In fact as Silver points out,

within two weeks of Dolly's announcement, a group of investors formed a Bahamas-based company called Clonaid (under the direction of a French scientist named Dr. Brigitte Boisselier) with the intention of building a clinic where cloning services would be offered to individuals for a fee of $200,000. According to the description provided on their web page (http://www.clonaid.com), they plan to offer “a fantastic opportunity to parents with fertility problems or homosexual couples to have a child cloned from one of them.” RE,123.

This leads into the next question, What is it these people will be paying money for? The above quote says that one thing a reprogenetic clinic will offer is the opportunity to have yourself cloned. Another example of what a reprogenetic clinic will offer pertains to organ transplantation. A person who requires say, a liver transplant, would first of all provide the clinic with one of their cells. From this, the clinic could generate liver cells that could in turn be ‘reprogrammed to start all over again to generate another’ RE,92, liver in the image of the original healthy liver. What is philosophically interesting here is that a perfect genetic match could be ensured between the new liver and its recipient. Why? Because the new liver would be a clone of the old liver, and thus there would be nothing for the bodies immune system to reject; all the genetic properties of the new liver would be the same as those of the old liver, thus making it identical in a Leibnizian sense. This would be one of the initial kinds of services a reprogenetics clinic would provide. As people became accustomed to this, the limits of what reprogenetics offered would continue to be transcended. Silver breaks down the possibilities in three different stages. We will
consider these different stages in relation to the structure of intentionality.

*The Intentional Character of Reprogenetics.*

Reprogenetics derives partly from reproductive biology. Reproduction is a mode of production, and production is a comportment with an intentional structure. Accordingly we can analyze the structure of this comportment in the same way we analyzed the productive comportment by asking about the *intentio*, the *intentum* and the understanding of the mode of being of what is intended in the *intentum*. But before doing this, a word about the relation between genes, environments, and the idea of a gene being for a specific trait.

Public opinion is very comfortable today to talk about genes for something. People can always be heard to talk about the gene for intelligence, the gene for eye color, the gene for sexual orientation, the gene for baldness, the gene for aggression, and the list goes on. But as Kitcher says, ‘if we are going to talk about genes “for” traits without any qualification, we have to have in the back of our minds some idea of *standard* genetic backgrounds and *standard* environments, relative to which the locus affects the trait.’ LTC,246 (Kitcher’s italics). By locus is meant ‘a place on a chromosome (or chromosome pair) occupied by a gene (or by two alleles of the same gene).’ LTC,349. By trait is meant a particular manifest characteristic of an organism such as eye color, obesity and so forth. The idea of a standard genetic background is slightly easier to define than that of a standard environment. By standard genetic background Kitcher explains that what most molecular geneticists mean by this is ‘backgrounds containing combinations of relatively common alleles [alleles = the form of genetic material at a locus] (although not necessarily relatively common combinations of alleles!)’ LTC,246.

The problems with defining the notion of a standard environment are many. For example is a standard environment the one Dasein works in, does not work in but lives in when it is not working, the town or city it lives in, or is standard environment the one Dasein spends

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66 Allels being forms of a gene
the most amount of time in? These are questions not easily answered, and as Kitcher suggests the best thing to do is to ask,

What sense of standard environment is being invoked? In what range of standard environments -- some? many? all? does the trait invariably occur in those who bear the gene (and have a standard genetic background)? People who are quick to pose these questions will avoid the most prominent fallacies into which genetalk often sweeps. They will realize that there can be genes "for" forms of behavior that are brought about in complicated ways. LTC, 247.

This said we will now consider the first stage of reprogenetics in relation to the structure of intentionality.

Stage I

In the first stage of reprogenetics, the intentio, will be the producing of Dasein. What about the intentum? In the early days of reprogenetics, parents will be directed towards the image or model of a healthy Dasein; for no parent wants to give birth to a sickly Dasein. Thus in the early days of reprogenetics, parents most likely to give birth to sickly children will benefit most from the services of a reprogenetic clinic. Who are the parents most likely to give birth to sickly children? Parents who carry genes for genetic diseases like Huntington's. In the future, reprogenetics may offer a way of either preventing this gene from being transmitted from parent to child, or failing this, discover a way of preventing this gene from causing the neural degeneration that leads to the death of the person who carries it. At present there is no such treatment available for Huntington's.

So much then for intentio and intentum. What about the understanding of the mode of being of what is intended in the intentum? This question boils down to asking about the understanding of the mode of being of what is to be produced; the healthy Dasein. In this early stage, parents who use the services of a reprogenetic clinic are motivated by a desire to bring their child up to the level of a normal healthy child, one just like the millions of
other healthy children that are born every year. Consequently, parents want a child who does not stand out over and against any other child. They want a child who is \textit{other} in Heidegger’s sense of the word; ‘those from whom one mostly does \textit{not} distinguish oneself, those among whom one is, too.’ BT,118. (Heidegger’s italic). Thus the understanding of the mode of being of the product, the healthy Dasein, will be an understanding of existence; for existence is the mode of being of Dasein and it is Dasein that is being produced. Not any special Dasein, but one which will be just like every other Dasein. In this stage of reprogenetics, we can regard the manner the parents are directed toward the model of the healthy Dasein as concurring with valuing the future Dasein as something to be treated as an end in itself just as one would treat every other Dasein as an end in itself.

\textit{Stage II}

Since the science of reprogenetics will progress, the services a reprogenetic clinic will offer will also progress. Thus the scenario just described will lead to more services being offered by a reprogenetic clinic such as ‘[nullifying] mutations that have a less severe impact on a child, or an impact delayed until adulthood. Predispositions to obesity, diabetes, heart disease, asthma, and various forms of cancer all fall into this category.’ RE,237. What are the three structural moments of intentionality in this stage. For the most part they will be the same as those in the first stage. However there is an important difference which is this: the presence of a slippery slope will come more and more into focus in this second stage. To obtain a fuller understanding of where this slippery slope leads, consider some of the distant (although not so distant) possibilities of reprogenetics. It is these possibilities which, if acted upon, could lead to a change in the nature of Dasein itself.

\textit{Stage III}

In the third stage the \textit{intentio}, will still be the producing of Dasein as such, but the image
the reprogeneticist will be initially directed towards in producing a child, the *intentum*, will be quite different from the one it was directed towards in stage I. In stage III, parents will be motivated by a desire to produce a child that is not only healthy, but will have certain genetic features that make it unlike other children, or at least unlike those that have not been genetically enhanced. Now before we answer the question about the *intentum*, another question to consider is this: What are the types of genes Dasein will select for either enhancement or implantation into the embryo? Initially they will be genes that scientists have successfully managed to link with certain traits in Dasein that both the parents and the culture as a whole invest value in and thus would want their children to embody. However as reprogenetics progresses, Dasein will continue to transcend the limits of this science by going beyond the human genepool as the source from which it can draw in order to build a better Dasein. Let us explain this in more detail.

Silver explains that, ‘One way to identify types of human enhancements that lie in the realm of possibility ... is through their existence in other living creatures. If something has evolved elsewhere, then it is possible for us to determine its genetic basis and transfer it into the human genome.’ RE,237 (Silver’s italic). An example Silver gives; ‘the ability to see into the ultraviolet range or the infrared range.’ RE,237. Thus in terms of the intentional character of production, the image parents could look towards in order to reproduce Dasein does not have to be limited to merely others, but could be directed towards other species as well. This point needs to be emphasized; for under this scenario what began as a desire to produce a healthy Dasein just like all the rest, will be transformed into a desire to transcend Dasein itself by producing beings that are more than their parents. More in the sense that they are capable of seeing or doing more things their parents can see or do because of their genetic constitutions. We now have a clearer understanding of what was meant earlier when the editors of *Nature* said that ‘the growing power of

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67 The Human Genome Project will greatly aid scientists in linking genetic traits with observable personality traits.

68 This raises an interesting question for philosophers who have been mesmerized by Thomas Nagel’s influential essay, *What is it like to be Bat?* For with bat genes, or those genes that are implicated in the bats ability to perceive the world in the sonar way that it does, Dasein might be able to tell you or know in some sense what it is like to be bat.
molecular genetics confronts us with future prospects of being able to change the nature of our species.' RE,10 (Silver’s italic). For implanting animal genes into a human embryo is certainly consistent with the idea of changing the very nature of our species.

To return to the structure of intentionality, the intentum will still be the healthy Dasein parents are initially directed towards. But they will also be directed towards something that will be more than merely a healthy Dasein; it will be a genetically enhanced Dasein. The way parents will be directed towards the genetically enhanced Dasein is as a being that will exist independently of them. However insofar as it is a genetically enhanced Dasein being produced, it will be produced with the intention of being more than a mere Dasein. Parents will be directed towards the image of a being that in some sense stands beyond Dasein. Strictly speaking if reprogenetics really flourishes then it might even be illegitimate to speak about these enhanced beings as Dasein at all. For insofar as they have been enhanced they are not like the beings we are since none of us have been enhanced genetically.

Finally there is the understanding of the mode of being of what is intended in the intentum. What is being produced, the genetically enhanced Dasein is, insofar as it is enhanced, not wholly Dasein. However it is wrong to consider the genetically enhanced Dasein as totally unrelated to Dasein. What this implies is that what is being produced is something that is Dasein-ish. But what is the mode of being of a genetically enhanced Dasein, this being that is Dasein-ish?

Dasein is being enhanced with specific genetic properties it would not otherwise have had were the act of reproduction left entirely in the hands of nature, God or whatever. Insofar as this is the case it is being enhanced for a purpose. Specific genes are being given to it, the purpose of which are to enable Dasein to excel at some art, science, skill, or task, given the appropriate environmental support. Thus Dasein is being produced in such a way that

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69 The idea of something which is Dasein-ish, is one borrowed from Heidegger. In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology he speaks about the world being something that is Daseinish. See BP,166. However the world is not the only thing that can be described in this way. For in another sense an enhanced Dasein is also something that is Daseinish.
is analogous to the way equipment is produced; i.e. for some specific purpose. The mode of being of equipment is readiness-to-hand.

Now if we combine what we said about the enhanced Dasein being \textit{Dasein-ish} with what we have said about Dasein being produced in a way which is analogous to the way we produce equipment, the conclusion is that we have a new mode of being; \textit{readiness-to-exist}. The \textit{readiness-to} part of this mode of being takes into consideration the fact that the enhanced Dasein is being produced the way equipment is produced; a being produced for something. The \textit{exist} part of this mode of being takes into consideration the fact that what is being produced is a being not wholly Dasein, not wholly unrelated to Dasein, but rather something in between, something that is Dasein-ish. As something that is Dasein-ish, its mode of being will not be existence, nor will it be something totally unrelated to existence; rather it will be readiness-to-exist. Accordingly in answer to the question about the third structural moment of intentionality, the understanding of the mode of being of what is intended in the intentum, we suggest that the understanding of the mode of being of the product, the genetically enhanced Dasein, is an understanding of \textit{readiness-to-exist}.

This completes our phenomenological description of the intentional character of reprogenetics. Next we will consider phenomenologically the question of the genetic enhancement of Dasein: Given the kind of being Dasein is, what genes will it select for enhancement, modification or implantation in the future Dasein?

\textit{Eugenics and Money Genes.}

In the third stage of reprogenetics, the future Dasein will be genetically altered with a view to improving it and making it in some sense better than its ancestors. Silver, Kitcher and many others have pointed out that this is what most people find objectionable about genetic engineering because of the implicit assumptions being made on the part of the parents, no doubt under the pressure of society as a whole, about what constitutes a better child. Obviously the fear of eugenics is what lies behind these objections. What is eugenics?
Kitcher defines eugenics as a practice which 'begins with an intention to affect the kinds of people who will be born.' LTC, 193. This is a very wide definition of eugenics since it implicates every pregnant mother who seeks medical advice about her pregnancy as being involved in the practice of eugenics. Why does Kitcher define eugenics in this way? Because according to Kitcher 'eugenics is inescapable.' LTC, 325. A second reason is because this definition is to serve as a basis for distinguishing between the different eugenic practices parents will have to chose from as reprogeneics progresses. Actually, this definition of eugenics is more sharply defined as laissez-faire eugenics and is, according to Kitcher 'already in place.' LTC, 196.

Under *laissez-faire* eugenics, 'citizens are not coerced but make up their own minds, evaluating objective scientific information in light of their own values and goals ... As for the traits that people attempt to promote or avoid, that is surely their own business, and within the limits of available knowledge, individuals may do as they see fit.' LTC, 196. *Laissez-faire* eugenics must be distinguished from the kind of eugenics that people like George Bernard Shaw advocated; utopian eugenics.

Utopian eugenics would use reliable genetic information in prenatal tests that would be available equally to all citizens. Although there would be widespread public discussion of values and of the social consequences of individual decisions, there would be no societally imposed restrictions on reproductive choices -- citizens would be educated but not coerced. Finally, there would be universally shared respect for difference coupled with a public commitment to realizing the potential of all those who are born. LTC, 202.

Whether it is utopian eugenics, *laissez-faire* eugenics or any other concept of eugenics, one thing is obvious; education about the future consequences of eugenics to both society and the individual is of fundamental importance. For one of the things that technological progress frequently brings with it is a reduction in the costs of goods and services available to the consumer. If this happened in the case of reprogeneics, then it would mean that many more people would be able to afford this service. And with this we run into some
questions worth considering. What if science and technology progress to the stage at which all people could afford the services of a reprogenetic clinic? What if it became available on a country's National Health Service? Would all people make use of this service? Actually were one to adopt a hard lined Kantian perspective one could even argue that in the future, it would be the duty of every person to their unborn child to make use of this service.

Society likes to include in the concept of parental duty, the conviction that a parent ought to do the best they can for their child. And with the progress that has been made in medical science and technology, this conviction applies just as much to before a child is born as it does to after a child is born. More and more society looks down upon pregnant women who smoke, drink, or take drugs, not because of the harm it does to them, but because of the harm it does to their unborn child. In fact, in the age of reprogenetics the conviction that a parent ought to do their best for their child, might even apply more to before the child is born than it does after. This said, now consider a parent who decides to refuse all forms of genetic modification to the embryo of their child on the grounds that they are morally opposed to it. Such a move could open this parent up to the criticism that they have not fulfilled their parental obligation of doing the best they could for their child. Why? Because as this child goes through life it will undoubtably find itself being discriminated against precisely because it has not been genetically enhanced. And this in two senses: economically and socially. The child's unmodified genetic constitution may be one that employers find unemployable, and insurers uninsurable, thus cutting the child off from many means of self-sufficiency. Socially people who are not genetically enhanced might be seen in the eyes of people who are, as being inferior and therefore be turned into objects of ridicule and hatred by those who are genetically enhanced. This is the kind of Kantian argument, here sketched in brief, that one could put forward in favor of the notion of obligatory genetic modification. We will not pursue this argument any further; for to do so would take us too far into the field of morality. Rather let us consider another question.

If the services of a reprogenetic clinic became more widely available, would Dasein set up
institutions, no doubt run for profit, which are designed to provide parents with the most appropriate environment to educate their children in, given the genetic material that the reprogeneticist had built into the embryo? Absolutely. For the foundations of such institutions have already been laid. Schools for gifted children as well as schools for children with learning difficulties are two of the most obvious examples of this. Accordingly, an institution which promised to provide parents with the environment most suited to their child’s genome would merely be a logical extension of an institution already in existence.

Parents who want a musical genius in the family, but do not want the aggravation of having to raise it -- the genius is often found to be difficult to raise -- could pay an institution to do this for them. That way they get a well adjusted genius. One immersed and grown in an intellectual environment custom tailored to the specific genius its genetic material is believed to make possible. Here the decisive question is one of matching. The ultimate aim being to achieve the same kind of perfect match between donor and recipient that occurs in organ transplantation in matching a child’s genetic constitution with the environment most suited to it. In fact one could even imagine a new science being opened up here -- the science of environmental genetics. A science devoted to studying the relation between genetically enhanced beings and their environments. What happens when genetically enhanced constitutions are placed now in this environment, now in that environment? What affect does varying the environment have on a certain genetically enhanced constitution and vice versa? In what kind of an environment does a given genetic constitution thrive in? most easily perish in? and so forth -- these would be some of the questions such a science might consider.

Would knowing that such institutions exist of the kind just described, encourage or discourage more parents to seek the services of a reprogenetic clinic? Assume that awareness of such institutions would encourage more parents to play the genetic lottery with their children. If this happened, it would mean that more and more parents would be handing over their children to such institutions. What affect would such a full scale hand
over of children to institutions have on the family unit, already so eroded because of Dasein's willingness to sacrifice it to money? Would parents and children become increasingly alienated from one another? Would the family unit too become as extinct as the philosophical way of life lived by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle?

If we think back to the beginning of this section we see that in addition to eugenics we also referred to the idea of money genes. We will now explain what we mean by money genes. Our discussion is based on the assumption that future parents will have some say in which genes are doled out to their children. What will be the kinds of genes parents will have doled out to their children? We addressed this question earlier from a scientific perspective when we mentioned the possibility of transferring certain genetic features which have evolved in other species into the human genome. Here we want to address this question from a different perspective by suggesting that in another sense the kinds of genes parents will choose to dole out to their children will be genes which reflect the values of the parents. Looked at in this way reprogenetics is a genetic way of building into a child its parents sense of value.

But in yet another sense, the kinds of genes parents will select to have implanted or modified in the future Dasein will be genes which increase the likelihood of their child obtaining worldly success; for just as surely as no parent wants to give birth to an unhealthy child, so no parent wants to give birth to an antisocial, unduly aggressive, or violent child. Accordingly the genes selected by the parents for implantation or modification will, if given the appropriate environmental treatment, be genes which enable the child to excel at something -- running, playing football, math, music, chemistry, physics, languages, beauty, anything like this. Children who excel at any of these activities, if raised in the appropriate environment, will be seen as potentially valuable employees in the eyes of future employers and therefore worth hiring; for competent employees or those who are gifted at something are likely to bring in more money to their place of work, something every employer wants. Thus in a certain sense the genes selected to be implanted into the future Dasein will be money genes, ie. genes which improve the
child's ability to earn money. For success in our contemporary world is virtually synonymous with money and the amount of money one earns.

Of course one might object to this identification of success with the amount of money one actually earns, and from a purely intellectual point of view this is a valid objection. But in the everyday world where money and profit reign supreme, it is the measure of success that matters most to Dasein. No matter how successful Dasein may be in other senses of the word, if it is incompetent at its job or if others are able to do it more affordably, Dasein's fate is to end up being made redundant, on welfare or having to find another job.

To explain the idea of money genes in more detail consider it in relation to intentionality. In being enhanced for something, towards what is Dasein being directed? If for example, Dasein has been enhanced with genes associated with musical ability, then quite naturally Dasein itself will be directed towards music. But there is more. For those who paid money to have Dasein musically enhanced, i.e. its parents, guardians or whoever, will, from the viewpoint of the environment, also direct Dasein towards music. Those in Dasein's environment will work in accordance with the genetic material built into Dasein to direct it towards music, be it the composition of music, its performance or both. In this way there will be two different forces both directing Dasein towards the same thing, the environmental force, and the genetic force. It is at this stage that a potential problem appears. For depending on the people who make up the environmental force, the way in which the musical Dasein will be directed towards music may occur at the detriment of the musical Dasein's well being. Those who surround the musical Dasein may be more concerned with cultivating Dasein's natural abilities in a way which will make them money than they are anything else. To be sure this is a worse case scenario but it is important to spell out what it implies: that Dasein becomes a being produced for the sake of making money for others.\(^\text{70}\)

\(^\text{70}\) Were we to follow Heidegger in coining new words to describe things, it would be more appropriate to refer to this being not as Dasein but rather as \textit{Geldsein}. 
Before concluding this thesis, it will be necessary to sum up the last two chapters wherein value and the science of reprogenetics have been investigated. Chapters seven and eight need to be interpreted as contributing to our use of the phenomenological method to give the kind of description one could give of the moral phenomenon of value. Chapter seven began by concurring with Simmel who held that being and value are equiprimordial. If being and value are equiprimordial, then one can investigate the question of value in a way which is analogous to the way Heidegger investigated the question of being. In accordance with this, we raised the question of value to ask, What does it mean to value? To answer this, we must determine (i) the kind of value that is commensurable with everydayness -- monetary or qualitative, (see page 148f), and (ii) what it is Dasein spends its money on in everydayness; for this is a good indication of what it is Dasein values -- otherwise it would not have spent its money on it.

The list of things Dasein spends its money on in everydayness however is enormous, so we must narrow the focus to one thing; science and technology. However narrowing the focus down to science and technology is also inadequate because science and technology itself is a massive topic to consider. Therefore we must narrow the focus even further by zooming in on one particular science and its concomitant technology -- reprogenetics. Why reprogenetics? Because by looking at this science as an example of something future Dasein will be spending its money on, this will give us a good idea of what it means for Dasein to value in the everyday world. More explicitly put, to find out what it means for Dasein to value, we must look at the children we will be building values into in the future; for in these children will be embodied the values we have asked scientists to plant in them. By looking at the kinds of values we will ask scientists to plant into our children, will be given a good look at what it means for us to value in the everyday world.

This approach to the question of value was all laid out between pages 145 and 158. However because our use of the phenomenological method compelled us to be historical and thus look at Protagoras -- the first philosopher to pose the question of monetary value, (or so we argued) -- we did not return to our analysis of the question of value until the eighth chapter on page 180. The transitional question which links chapter seven to chapter eight is raised at the end of chapter seven when we explicitly narrow the focus from one thing Dasein spends its money on in everydayness, science and technology, to one particular science and its concomitant technology that Dasein spends its money on in everydayness, reprogenetics.

Chapter eight begins by briefly introducing the reader to the science of reprogenetics as the particular science which will be investigated in that chapter. This chapter divides up into the following sections; (i) Heidegger's conception of science, (ii) The Science of Reprogenetics, (iii) The Science of Reprogenetics and Heidegger's Conception of Technology, (iv) The Science and Technology of Reprogenetics and The Global Marketplace, (v) The Intentional Character of Reprogenetics, and (vi) Eugenics and Money Genes.

The salient features of these sections, which are relevant to my phenomenological interpretation of the question of value, are as follows.

(i) the origin of modern science; how a science like reprogenetics is possible,
(ii) the possibilities of reprogenetics; changing the nature of our species, the change from evolution to self-evolution,
(iii) History of the concept of Standing-Reserve, the three dangers of reprogenetic technology, money as that which secures and regulates reprogenetic technology, technological transcendence,
(iv) money as something which determines us, i.e. money as ground concept, reprogenetics determined by money, the business of reprogenetics, the products and services it sells to Dasein,
(v) the first three stages of the science of reprogenetics, the birth of a new being, one that is Dasein-ish, and the mode of being of this new being, readiness-to-exist,
(vi) eugenic practice being institutionalised, how this affects society and the family unit, money genes, i.e. genes selected by parents and implanted by scientists into the embryo for the purposes of obtaining worldly, i.e. financial success.

There is another side to the question of genetic enhancement and the impact it will have on Dasein which we have neglected to consider here, but is a side that could prove to be just as important to the future of Dasein as reprogenetics; the genetic engineering of the food Dasein eats. Foods which are grown from genetically modified seeds are now beginning to become more and more common in our supermarkets. Obviously this too could spell disaster for Dasein, but since it is now time to conclude our application of the phenomenological method to money we must say nothing more about it.
Conclusion.

Our original claim was that the value of Heidegger's philosophy lay in the stone which he used for building it: the phenomenological method. To substantiate this claim the strategy we employed was to apply this method to something it had not been applied to before, money; for the surest way to defend our position is to demonstrate what this method can do. We also said that the application of the phenomenological method to money demonstrated a readiness to confront the perilousness of philosophy. Since no philosopher hitherto has applied this method to money, we want to explain what confronting the perilousness of philosophy involves and what it has to do with philosophizing.

In *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, Heidegger talks about the way Dasein is spun into a primordial turbulence. Looking back to *Being and Time*, being spun into a primordial turbulence seems just another way of describing Dasein's throwness into the world. For Heidegger, philosophizing and the turbulence into which Dasein is spun, are the same; but philosophizing is also the attempt to comprehend Dasein in the midst of this turbulence, and to do this 'without delusion.' FCM 19. Heidegger thinks the truth of this comprehension is both ultimate and extreme, in view of which '[philosophy] constantly remains in the perilous neighbourhood of supreme uncertainty. FCM,19. As we interpret Heidegger, philosophizing is confronting truths about Dasein which are both ultimate and extreme within the perilous neighbourhood of supreme uncertainty; for 'What is ultimate and extreme is what is most perilous and insecure.' FCM,19.

What ultimate and extreme truths about Dasein has our interpretation confronted? To answer this we need a clear idea of what is meant by ultimate and extreme truths about Dasein. Something Nietzsche said provides us with a clue of what is meant by an extreme truth about the beings that we are: 

Mankind mercilessly employs every individual as material for heating its great machines: but what then is the purpose of the machines if all individuals (that is to say mankind) are of no other use than as material for
maintaining them? Machines that are an end in themselves -- is that the
uman commedia?’ HAH,585 (Nietzsche’s italic).

We interpret Nietzsche to mean that mankind willingly employs itself to keep its machines running, and that in doing this the Kantian means ends relation as put forward in the categorical imperative becomes reversed. No longer is man an end in himself and his machines, means to serves his ends. Man’s maintenance of his great machines becomes the end in itself, and man the means to this end, regardless of the cost to any particular individual, group of individuals, or the planet itself. In what Nietzsche said therefore is the counterintuitive idea that ‘in themselves’ machines are neither things mankind uses, nor are they understood ‘in themselves’ when we understand, as Heidegger might suggest, their productive history ie. that they were conceived designed and built by Dasein for a specific function. On the contrary, we understand machines ‘in themselves’ when we realize that they are the ends and that we are only the means to keep them up and running. This is surely an extreme truth about the beings we are, assuming of course that there is some truth to it at all. How does the Nietzsche quote help to explain the way our interpretation has confronted such an extreme truth?

In the course of our interpretation we have seen how Dasein employs every individual as material for heating its great machines, when we spoke about the technological impulse to build a better Dasein; one that ‘lets itself be entirely dominated by the essence of technology precisely in order to steer and deploy individual technological processes and possibilities.’ N4,117. The individual technological process we considered was the one which builds a being that is ready-to-exist and whose energy must be unlocked and injected back into the technological process for the purposes of furthering it. This, we suggest, is an example of the kind of extreme truth about Dasein we have confronted. Next we will explain what ultimate truth about Dasein our interpretation confronted.

Ultimate comes from the late Latin, ultimare which means ‘to come to an end’. Ultimare comes from the Latin, ultimus which means last. The ultimate truth our interpretation
confronted was that slowly, step by step, Dasein itself is coming to an end. First IVF and access to the human embryo. Second, the successful cloning of a mammal. Pretty soon the human genome project will be completed. After this we will see the successful cloning of an organ, then Dasein, then the genetic engineering of a better Dasein. As we enter the age of reprogenetics, evolution is moving in the direction of self-evolution, and we are now looking at the possibility of man-made-man. The ultimate truth we have confronted therefore is that in a very real sense, there could come a day when the last man will be born. He will be last in that he will be the last man to be born free from any genetic alteration. From an evolutionary perspective, the ultimate truth we confronted is that the extinction of a particular species, *homo sapiens*, is on the horizon and coming towards us. No longer will nature determine the genes a person receives. Instead, under the watchful eye of parents, who are in turn under the watchful eye of, as Hegel would say, some local, temporary, and limited generation of human beings, science will interject between man and woman and create a new species of beings: *homo electus* -- beings which will be chosen or selected for specialized tasks.

These are the ultimate and extreme truths about Dasein that our interpretation confronted. In doing so we had to determine the mode of being of a couple of beings ignored by Heidegger, money and the genetically enhanced Dasein, as well as examine the old concepts of symmetry and exchange in new ways. It is in this neighbourhood, according to Heidegger, one must philosophize, and it is in this neighbourhood that our interpretation did philosophize.

We will now conclude by confronting a final ultimate truth about Dasein, and since the metaphilosophical conception of philosophy that drives the phenomenological method, believes that ‘philosophy is always projected far in advance of its time’ ITM,8, the ultimate truth we will confront is one that was projected far in advance of its time. So far in fact that only today are we in a position to appreciate what Nietzsche meant by it when he said,

Private companies will step by step absorb the business of the state: even
the most resistant remainder of what was formerly the work of government (for example its activities designed to protect the private person from the private person) will in the long run be taken care of by private contractors. Disregard for and the decline and death of the state, the liberation of the private person (I take care not to say: of the individual), is the consequence of the democratic conception of the state; it is in this that its mission lies. HAH,472 (Nietzsche’s italics).

The process outlined here of how private companies will step by step absorb the business of the state is today known as privatization and is a concept with which many of us are familiar. Nietzsche’s claim means that as this process continues eventually entire states will become privatized. The result will be that instead of a nation, a group of private companies, or as they are called today multinational corporations will take over the business of the state and Dasein will live happily ever after within the context of a multinational corporation.

How much closer to this ultimate truth are we today than Nietzsche was a hundred and twenty years ago? Too close for some, and not close enough for others. Consider what the authors of Taking Care of Business: Citizenship and the Charter of Incorporation have pointed out: ‘corporations have won more rights under law than people have’ WCRW,53. Actually in America, ever since 1886 when ‘the Supreme Court ruled in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad that a private corporation is a natural person under the U.S. Constitution’, WCRW,59, American corporations have been ‘entitled to the protection of the Bill of Rights, including the right to free speech and other constitution protections extended to individuals.’ WCRW,59.

We come a step closer to this ultimate truth of a ‘world incorporated’ when we notice that the men and women who run the global corporations ‘are the first in history with the organization, technology, money, and ideology to make a credible try at managing the world as an integrated economic unit.’ WCRW,121. We come even closer still when we are confronted with the fact that the people who run these corporations are using these
laws, rights, technologies, ideologies and money to ‘[demand] in essence ... the right to transcend the nation-state, and in the process, transform it’, WCRW,121. Finally if we consider just how powerless politicians today are, and this by their own admission, in controlling the global economy they have created, What do we see? Do we see the ultimate truth that there will come a day when in a very real sense there will be a last government, a last country, a last nation? As Europe enters the age of the single currency, are we in the unique position of witnessing the transformation of the nation-state into that of a corporate democracy? Or as we enter the twenty-first century, is what we are witnessing in the powerlessness of government, and European monetary union, merely the return to the kind of petty politics that Nietzsche thought would be left behind in the twentieth century?
Bibliography


