

Perceptions of peace agreements and political trust in post-war Guatemala, Nepal, and Northern Ireland

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Abstract

A lingering challenge for post-war governments is to (re)gain the trust of their citizens. Indeed, political trust is crucial for understanding both the risk of civil war in the first place and the state-society relationships that emerge afterwards. However, most research on political trust is based on stable Western democracies. Key explanations include institutional performance and cultural factors, including social trust. We argue that in post-war societies, people's perceptions of the very strategies aimed at ending the violence and (re)building the state have an enduring impact on their view of the post-war state. Peace agreements are tools for laying down arms, addressing the wrongdoings of the war, and provide a blueprint for the state's future—and they do so to varying degrees. Yet we have little systematic knowledge of how people react to such agreements and with what consequences. In this study, we examine the association between post-conflict political trust and people's approval of peace agreements. We base our analysis on a set of nationally representative, comparative surveys from Guatemala, Nepal, and Northern Ireland, three cases where long civil wars were ended by peace agreements. We find that individuals' approval of the agreement and the perception that it has been implemented are positively associated with political trust, and that accounting for views of the peace agreement substantially improve on conventional explanations for political trust.

Keywords: peace agreement; political trust; post-conflict; public opinion; Guatemala; Nepal; Northern Ireland

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Introduction

A challenge for many governments emerging from civil war is to (re)establish themselves as credible state authorities and (re)affirm their commitment to their citizens. While people's experiences during the war itself may leave long-lasting scars that shape their confidence in political authorities, equally important, we argue, are people's perceptions of the very strategies aimed at preventing a recurrence of violence and (re)building the post-war state.

A large share of civil wars end with peace agreements,¹ through which the conflicting parties agree on a minimum solution for laying down arms and a rough blueprint for the state's future. Yet such agreements do not always mark the transition into a peaceful post-war period, and many agreements break down or are not implemented in full.² Even an initially 'successful' peace agreement is no guarantee for post-war stability. For example, in September 2015, Nepal's Constitutional Assembly finally passed a new constitution, a key element of the 2006 peace agreement, unleashing several months of political turmoil and strikes, as protesters clashed with the police in the lowland bordering India. The protesters claimed that the constitution fell short of redressing structural discrimination against historically marginalized groups.³ Clearly, perceptions of how the authorities failed to deliver on the promises made in the agreement signed nearly ten years earlier mattered.

¹ Kreutz, "How and When Armed Conflicts End," 246.

² Walter, *Committing to Peace*; DeRouen, Lea, and Wallenstein, "The Duration of Civil War Peace Agreements," 367–387.

³ International Crisis Group, *Nepal's Divisive New Constitution*.

We argue that citizens' perceptions of the provisions within and implementation of a peace agreement are central for understanding their confidence in the post-war state's political authorities. Taking conventional theories of political trust as our starting point, we argue – and show – that these theories fail to adequately explain political trust in societies that have experienced large-scale violence.

Whereas peace agreements are negotiated and ultimately signed by representatives of the government and the rebels, often after many years of violent conflict, their ability to transform a war-torn society hinges on the citizens.⁴ Comprehensive peace agreements describe what the post-war state should look like, how political power should be (re)distributed, and how wrongdoings of the past should be addressed. As such, a peace agreement is an opportunity for (re)establishing political trust – and a sense of legitimacy – in a war-torn state. Indeed, citizens' endorsement of the peace agreement is likely to have a long-term impact on political trust. If people agree with the provisions that were agreed upon to end the violence and transform the state, we expect them to display higher trust in the post-war institutions. Similarly, we expect citizens to hold the post-war authorities accountable if they fail to deliver on promises made at such a critical moment.

To date, researchers have little systematic knowledge about people's perceptions of peace agreements, and how they affect post-war societies overall. The growing conflict literature using survey methods tends to focus on single⁵ – for good reasons, given the challenges and costs associated with conducting surveys in post-war settings. We bring to the table a comparative – and potentially more generalizable – study.⁶ Using a most different case comparative design, we draw

⁴ Cf. Nilsson and González Marín, "Violent Peace," 238–262.

⁵ See e.g., Askvik and Dhakal, "Citizens' Trust," 417–437; De Juan and Pierskalla, "Civil War Violence," 67–88; Wong, "How Can Political Trust be Built?," 772–785; Fisk and Cherney, "Pathways to Institutional Legitimacy," 263–281.

⁶ See also a new project by Sabine Carey at the University of Mannheim:
<http://www.sabinecarey.com/news/2019/1/10/initial-insights-on-perceptions-of-peace>.

on an original public opinion survey conducted in 2016, in three post-war states in different parts of the world: Guatemala, Nepal, and Northern Ireland.

In each of these cases of durable post-war peace, the agreements enjoy widespread support, but our surveys reveal individual-level variation across specific provisions of the agreements and people's perceptions of implementation. We find that individual respondents' approval of the peace agreement and their perception that the agreement has been implemented are associated with higher levels of political trust. Indeed, even years after an agreement is signed, citizens will continue to hold political elites to account for promises made about the state's future at such a critical moment. Our analyses indicate that while conventional explanations for political trust matter also in post-war societies, accounting for views of the peace agreement substantially improves the models.

In what follows, we provide a brief overview of common explanations of political trust, and we develop an argument about the importance of popular views of peace agreements in a post-war society. We then justify the selection of our three cases – Guatemala, Nepal, and Northern Ireland – and describe the survey instrument. In the subsequent section, we present and discuss our empirical findings. We conclude with remarks about relevance for policy.

(Re)establishing political trust in post-war societies

In line with Easton⁷ and Norris,⁸ we conceptualize political trust as an expression of diffuse support. According to Easton, diffuse support 'refers to evaluations of what an object is or represents – to the general meaning it has for a person – not of what it does',⁹ making up a 'reservoir' of goodwill

⁷ Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, and "A Re-Assessment," 435–57.

⁸ Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens*. 2-30.

⁹ Easton, "A Re-Assessment," 444.

that means that people will accept political outcomes even if they oppose them. Political trust, i.e., trust in the executive and the legislative, is therefore a rather general judgment, distinct from the evaluation of day-to-day politics and specific policies.

As noted by Levi and Stoker,¹⁰ ‘trust is relational; it involves an individual making herself vulnerable to an [...] institution that has the capacity to do her harm or to betray her.’ highlighting the challenge of establishing political trust under the best of circumstances – and perhaps particularly so in post-war societies. Indeed, for many post-war societies, a persistent challenge is the absence of trust in the state’s political authorities,¹¹ certainly in settings where state actors are seen as responsible for the conflict in the first place or committed atrocities against civilians.

An added challenge is that other sources of authority may have emerged during the war,¹² which makes the (re)establishment of the rule of law central to the post-war era.¹³

Conventional explanations of political trust

Research on trust in political authorities has primarily focused on stable democracies in the Western hemisphere. Much research suggests that, at the cross-national level, political trust correlates with good governance, wealth, and income inequality, and at the individual level, it is associated with individuals’ perceptions of government performance. Less explored – although a growing field – is research on political trust in post-war states.¹⁴

¹⁰ Levi and Stoker, “Political Trust,” 476.

¹¹ See e.g., Brinkerhoff, “Rebuilding Governance,” 3–14, Schlichte, *In the Shadow of Violence*; Lake, “Building Legitimate States after Civil Wars,” 29–52; De Juan and Pierskalla, “Civil War Violence,” 67–88; Fisk and Cherney, “Pathways to Institutional Legitimacy,” 263–281.

¹² Cf. Marten, *Warlords*; 2012, Staniland, “States,” 243–264; Cheng, “Private and Public Interests,” 63–79.

¹³ Haggard and Tiede, “The Rule of Law,” 405–417.

¹⁴ There is also a growing body of work on related phenomena. See e.g. Blattman, “From Violence to Voting,” 231–247 (political participation); Balcells, “The Consequences of Victimization,” 311–347; Lupu and Peisakhin, “The Legacy of Political Violence,” 836–51 (political identities); Bellows and Miguel. “War and Local Collective Action,” 1144–57; Bauer, Blattman, Chytilová, Henrich, Miguel, and Mitts, “Can War Foster Cooperation?,” 249–274

Common explanations of political trust can be grouped into cultural and institutional ones. These explanations may, in turn, operate on the individual or country level. Macro-level theories emphasize national culture and government performance. The micro-level corollaries of these theories are individual socialization and individual evaluations of institutional performance.¹⁵

Cultural explanations are closely related to theories of lifelong learning,¹⁶ which emphasize that political trust is the outcome of socialization processes. Through repeated interactions, individuals first learn to (dis)trust others, and subsequently transfer this learning to political institutions, so that political trust becomes an extension of social trust.¹⁷

In a post-war setting, socialization is strongly influenced by individuals' conflict experiences.¹⁸ In societies where people have been pitted against one another in violent struggle for years, people may be socialized into entrenched group identities that correspond with the conflict's fault lines, particularly if they experienced violence. Research on social psychology suggests that such divisions will have long-lasting legacies on people's views on other groups,¹⁹ but they may also shape individuals' trust in political authorities. They may see the post-war authorities as responsible for the conflict and blame them for not protecting – or even directly attacking – its own people. As such, victims of war-related violence, particularly state-sponsored violence, may display low trust in political authorities.²⁰ Similar mechanisms may play out on the

(cooperation); Gilligan and Samii, "Civil War and Social Cohesion," 604–619 (social cohesion); and Tellez, "Worlds Apart", 1053–76, and "Peace Agreement Design," 827–44 on attitudes to peace.

¹⁵ Mishler and Rose 2001, "What are the Origins?" 34.

¹⁶ Schoon and Cheng, "Determinants of Political Trust," 619–20.

¹⁷ See also Newton and Zmerli, "Three Forms of Trust," 169–74.

¹⁸ Checkel, "Socialization and Violence," 592–605.

¹⁹ See e.g. Hewstone and Greenland, "Inter-Group Conflict," 136–44; Bar-Tal, "From Intractable Conflict," 351–65; Kelman, "Reconciliation," 15–32.

²⁰ See e.g., Grosjean, "Conflict and Social and Political Preferences," 424–451; De Juan and Pierskalla, "Civil War Violence," 67–88; Hong and Kang, "Trauma and Stigma," 264–286. In our data, about 40 percent report some type of victimization. Among the victims who identified the perpetrator(s), about 45 percent mentioned one or more actors operating on behalf of the government.

insurgent side. Former rebel participants, who were affiliated with organizations that officially challenged the state, are likely to have been socialized to view the state with scepticism.²¹

Institutional theories hold that individual political trust is a rational response to how citizens perceive the policy performance of key institutions.²² So, also in post-war states.²³ In societies that have experienced armed conflict, people are likely to place great emphasis on personal economic and physical security, and such evaluations shape their confidence in the post-war state and regime.²⁴

We expect both cultural explanations – which emphasize social trust and processes of socialization – and institutional explanations – which emphasize people’s evaluations of performance – to be associated with individuals’ trust in political authorities in the aftermath of war. But important, and often overlooked, is people’s evaluation of the peace agreements ending the war.

The role of peace agreements

For post-war political authorities to (re)gain the trust of the citizens, in whose name they rule, is a tall order. Even if the political authorities are not the same as those who ruled during the war – though in many cases they are – it is not a given that they hold the population’s trust. Post-war rulers must (re-)earn the confidence of their subjects, demonstrating that they are ‘the only

²¹ Nussio and Oppenheim, “Anti-Social Capital,” 1001–2.

²² Mishler and Rose 2001, “What are the Origins?” 31.

²³ Grosjean, “Conflict and Social and Political Preferences,” 424–451, Fisk and Cherney, “Pathways to Institutional Legitimacy,” 263–281.

²⁴ E.g., Bakke, Linke, O’Loughlin, and Toal, “Dynamics of State-Building,” 159–173; Wong, “How Can Political Trust be Built?” 772–785.

authority in town.²⁵ Peace agreements offer such an opportunity. Indeed, the very strategies aimed at establishing peace and (re)designing post-war institutions signal to the citizens whether the authorities respond to their needs and are accountable. Specifically, in states where a civil war came to an end through a negotiated settlement – as in Guatemala, Nepal, and Northern Ireland – we claim that people’s perceptions of the agreements and their implementation are likely to shape their confidence in the post-war state’s political authorities.

Peace agreements are potential turning points with long-lasting implications, not only for the post-war state’s social and political order but also for trust in the authorities that are tasked with implementing that order. Indeed, if promises of power sharing, land reform, amnesties, or security sector reform are central to bringing a long-lasting and bloody war to an end, it is reasonable to expect that people’s assessment of such strategies shape their confidence in the post-war authorities. This assessment is twofold, including both people’s *approval* of the content of the peace agreement and whether they think the agreement has been *implemented*. We elaborate on each process in turn.

Consistent with research emphasizing that perceptions of government responsiveness shapes political trust,²⁶ we expect that if people approve of the provisions of a peace agreement – the very blueprint for (re)building the state and correcting the wrongdoings of the war – they are more likely to have confidence in the post-war authorities that are tasked with enforcing those provisions. Peace agreements are compromises agreed upon by actors who used to be – and often still are – fierce enemies. While civil society may be consulted during negotiations,²⁷ it is often

²⁵ See the democratization literature, in which the transition to democracy is seen as complete when ‘democracy is the only game in town’ as phrased by Linz, “Toward Consolidated Democracies.” 14.

²⁶ Wong, “How Can Political Trust be Built?” 772–785.

²⁷ Nilsson, “Anchoring the Peace,” 243–266.

those who fought on the battlefield who must be appeased to reach an agreement and settle the conflict. However, provisions deemed necessary for rebel or government leaders to sign an agreement may be unpalatable for the citizens. Arrangements that seem to reward those culpable of atrocities, such as granting amnesties and government positions to rebel leaders, are often highly controversial.²⁸ For example, a much-disputed element of the peace agreement in Northern Ireland was the early release of paramilitary prisoners. That said, peace agreements also often contain mechanisms aimed at rectifying the wrongdoings of the past that may be more acceptable to the public. Peace agreements may, for example, include political reforms to improve the representation of marginalized groups in decision-making; land reforms that ensure a fairer distribution of economic resources; security sector reforms that professionalize the state's police and military; or transitional justice mechanisms that provide compensation to victims of wartime violence and prosecution of those responsible. Several of the provisions in the 1996 Accords in Guatemala, for example, emphasized the importance of land ownership for tenant farmers and prescribed a land reform as a necessary step to formalize peace in the country, which has one of the most unequal land distributions in Latin America.²⁹ The key here is whether individuals perceive the agreement, which will form the basis of the post-war social and political order, to respond to their needs. Hence, we expect:

H1. Individuals' approval of the provisions in a peace agreement is positively associated with trust in the post-war authorities.

²⁸ Tellez, "Worlds Apart," 1053–76, "Peace Agreement Design," 827–44.

²⁹ Aguilar-Støen, Taylor, and Castellanos, "Agriculture, Land Tenure and International Migration", 124.

Beyond perceptions of the provisions in the agreement, people's perceptions of the implementation of the agreement are part of a continuous process of evaluating the authorities' ability to deliver on their promises. If citizens believe that key provisions of a peace agreement are not implemented as promised, their confidence in the political authorities may wither or fail to recover. That is, people's *perceptions* of performance should be more relevant than more objective performance indicators.³⁰ Consistent with Arthur H. Miller's classic finding that political distrust can be explained by dissatisfaction with government policy making,³¹ we anticipate that if people perceive that a peace agreement is not implemented as promised, they are more likely to negatively evaluate those tasked with implementing it. A parallel here are findings in the literature on policy promises and elections. Margit Tavits, for example, finds that if parties shift their position on value-based, principled issues, voters are likely to punish them, as the parties lack credibility and commitment.³² Deviating from the promises made in a peace agreement may signal to the public that the authorities lack commitment to issues of great importance. Consider the slow implementation of the peace agreement in Nepal, of which Human Rights Watch noted, ten years after the agreement was signed: '[T]he promises of accountability for abuses and the resolution of thousands of disappearances have been broken by Nepal's main political parties, all of which have taken turns at leading the government in the last decade.'³³ Rather than strengthening people's confidence in the post-war state's political authorities, such experiences, accumulating over time, may create disappointment, apathy, and distrust. Thus, we hypothesize:

³⁰ Askvik and Dhakal, "Citizens' Trust," 418.

³¹ Miller, "Political Issues," 951–972

³² Tavits, "Principle vs. Pragmatism," 153.

³³ Human Rights Watch. "Nepal: Decade After Peace."

H2. Individuals' perception that the peace agreement has not been implemented is negatively associated with trust in the post-war authorities.

We recognize the limitations of using cross-sectional data of attitudinal variables to assess causal relationships, including the possibility of reverse causation,³⁴ so the results should be interpreted with appropriate caution. However, provided careful theorizing, this approach can still yield significant insights – and, indeed, as cited above, has done so in the long-standing body of work on public opinion, as well as the growing body of work on political trust in post-war societies. We maintain that political trust, the outcome of interest in our study, is the result of a continuous and cumulative process of evaluation. In our case, the peace agreements were signed several years ago and their implementation has been an ongoing process, which has allowed people to make up their mind through evaluation over time – both when it comes to implementation and what they think about the specific provisions. Whereas these attitudes may change over time, it seems less likely that people's current confidence in the political authorities shape how they think about, for example, the early release of paramilitary prisoners in Northern Ireland, which was central to the peace negotiations leading up to the agreements signed in 1998. Hence, although reverse causation cannot be ruled out in the empirical analysis, the relationship outlined represents a plausible theoretical argument.

³⁴ Van de Walle and Bouckaert, "Public Service Performance," 891–913.

Case selection

We selected three cases for our analysis, Guatemala, Nepal, and Northern Ireland, based on five criteria. We wanted cases that (1) had experienced internal armed conflict, which (2) had ended through a comprehensive peace agreement, (3) and had seen no other armed conflict in the years following the peace agreement, and that (4) formally are classified as electoral democracies (to ensure basic comparativeness of political institutions). Finally, (5) as peace agreements are more common in the post-Cold war period,³⁵ we focused on agreements signed after 1990. Within this population, we selected three cases based on a most different case approach,³⁶ which has two advantages: it can be used to eliminate necessary causes and provide indicative evidence of causal relationships.³⁷ The implication of this is that similar findings across the three cases should be able to travel across a range of different scope conditions. For details, see Online supplemental material A.

The three cases differ on key conflict characteristics (such as type and duration of armed conflict, and duration of post-war peace) and characteristics of the peace agreements. The violent phases in Guatemala (1960–1996) and Northern Ireland (1968–1998) were long. In comparison, the armed conflict in Nepal was more limited in time (1996–2006), and the peace is more recent. Both in Guatemala and Nepal, the opposition groups' official goals were socioeconomic equality, social inclusion, and democratization.³⁸ There is some debate as to whether these two conflicts were ethnic or ideological in nature. In both cases, the insurgents – Communists in Guatemala and Maoists in Nepal – drew on considerable support from marginalized groups: the poor, rural

³⁵ Kreutz, "How and When Armed Conflicts End," 246.

³⁶ Seawright and Gerring, "Case Selection Techniques," 306.

³⁷ *Op. cit.*, 298.

³⁸ Brown, "Nepal," 275–196.

indigenous majority in Guatemala, and a variety of ethnic and caste minorities in Nepal.³⁹ In Guatemala, the indigenous population also suffered the most brutal repression and violence, which was found to be genocidal.⁴⁰ In Guatemala in particular, the state was responsible for most of the violence.⁴¹ ‘The Troubles’ in Northern Ireland was a territorial conflict over Northern Ireland’s constitutional status. The Protestant community, whose members tended to identify as British, wanted to remain within the United Kingdom (‘unionists’) – and were backed by the British Army. The Catholic community, whose members have traditionally been closer to Ireland, wanted to see Northern Ireland reunited with Ireland (‘nationalists’). As in Guatemala and Nepal, important to the conflict dynamics also in Northern Ireland are inequalities between the two communities, with Catholics campaigning to end political and economic discrimination within Northern Ireland. While protracted, the intensity of the armed conflict in Northern Ireland was lower than in the wars in Guatemala and Nepal. Whereas about 3,700 people were killed during the Troubles,⁴² more than 13,000 were killed during the Maoist insurgency in Nepal,⁴³ and more than 200,000 civilians lost their lives during the civil war in Guatemala.⁴⁴

The Guatemalan Peace Accords includes 11 different agreements and is in many ways a radical document, stating the importance of reducing inequalities and expanding political and economic rights. However, the implementation has been slow, and economic and political power remains in the hands of a small elite,⁴⁵ while about 60 percent of the population continues to live below the national poverty line.⁴⁶ Meanwhile, post-war criminal violence is endemic, with one of

³⁹ Adhikari, *The Bullet and the Ballot Box*, 115–117.

⁴⁰ CEH, *Guatemala Memoria del Silencio*, 48–51.

⁴¹ Op.cit., 51–52.

⁴² McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney, and Thornton, *Lost Lives*.

⁴³ Do and Iyer “Geography, Poverty and Conflict,” 737.

⁴⁴ CEH, *Guatemala Memoria del Silencio*.

⁴⁵ Caumartin and Sánchez-Ancochea, ‘Explaining a Contradictory Record’, 158–185.

⁴⁶ World Bank, “Poverty headcount ratio”.

the highest homicide rates in the world.⁴⁷ In Nepal, a key aspect of the agreement was to hold elections for a Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution. The agreement also established that Nepal would be a federal state and called for socioeconomic restructuring, improved minority rights, the end of caste discrimination, and increased female representation.⁴⁸ In Northern Ireland, the 1998 Good Friday Agreement restored a devolved Northern Ireland legislative assembly within the United Kingdom, and included provisions for executive power sharing between the unionists and nationalists – though the implementation of power sharing has been hampered by political deadlock among the main political parties. In the negotiations leading up to the 1998 agreement, the parties could not agree on the highly contentious issue of policing, with the Catholic/nationalist community considering the Royal Ulster Constabulary to be a symbol of a sectarian state, partial to the Protestants/unionist. Indeed, not until 2007 did Sinn Féin, the main nationalist party, officially support the police service, and not until 2010, did Sinn Féin and the Democratic Unionist Party, along with the British and Irish governments, reach agreement about the devolution of policing and justice.⁴⁹

Overall, we believe that our argument holds for all three post-war societies under study. Yet some case characteristics may impact the expected relationships. Because peace agreements are such critical decisions about a conflict-ridden state's future, we expect people's perceptions of these agreement to have long-lasting legacies, though this legacy may fade over time. Thus, the more time has passed since the agreement was agreed, the less relevant it may be for people's assessment of the authorities, especially bearing in mind the young population and low levels of education in Guatemala and Nepal. Nonetheless, in all our cases, several provisions within the

⁴⁷ United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, "Intentional homicide rate".

⁴⁸ International Crisis Group, *Nepal's Peace Agreement*.

⁴⁹ E.g. Perry, "The Devolution of Policing in Northern Ireland."

agreements remain salient political issues. In contrast, the effect of unmet expectations as far as implementation goes may increase over time, as time should have enabled governments to act. While some segments of the population may not think about these issues within the context of a peace agreement signed many years ago, frustration concerning implementation should have had more time to grow in Guatemala and Northern Ireland than in Nepal.

The relatively higher living standard in Northern Ireland may mean that overall, it would take more for dissatisfaction with the peace agreement and its implementation to diminish political trust. Similarly, the relatively higher conflict intensity in Guatemala may enhance the salience of any concerns related to the peace agreement and its implementation, making it particularly pertinent for people's enduring confidence in the political authorities.

Data

We designed the Post-Conflict Attitudes for Peace (PAP) survey to map and compare citizens' perceptions of peacebuilding strategies, post-war developments, experiences of violence, and perceptions of the state's political authorities. The questionnaire is unique for this particular project – and contains a number of new, detailed questions about the peace agreements, peacebuilding strategies, and the post-war period – but to facilitate comparative research, we drew on previous post-war surveys.⁵⁰ The net sample contains 3,229 respondents (1,216 respondents in Guatemala, 1,200 in Nepal, and 813 in Northern Ireland) and was conducted in 2016. The samples are nationally representative with a broad geographical coverage (for example, covering all 22

⁵⁰ In particular, Humphreys and Weinstein, *What the Fighters Say*; Simkus, Albert. “The South East European Survey Project,” 3–14; O’Loughlin, Kolossov, and Toal, “Inside the post-Soviet *de facto* States,” 423–456.

departments and 99 out of 340 municipalities in Guatemala). However, as the sampling was done according to local best practice, the design differs across cases: we relied on a three-stage sampling design in Nepal and Guatemala, while in Northern Ireland, respondents were drawn at random from a national sampling frame. For details, see Online supplemental material B.

Dependent variable: Political trust

To capture confidence in key political institutions, we asked about trust in the legislative and the executive in each case. In Guatemala and Nepal, we asked about trust in the Congress and the parliament and in the government. In Northern Ireland, the questions were adapted to fit the devolved institutions within the United Kingdom. Hence, we asked about trust in the Northern Ireland Assembly, the First Minister, and the deputy First Minister. The questions were all phrased ‘How much trust to you have in [name of institution]: a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or not at all.’ In the analysis, we used the combined score of these variables, rescaled so that a value of 4 corresponds to ‘a great deal of trust’ and a value of 1 corresponds to ‘not at all’. Figure 1 displays the distribution of political trust overall and in each case.

FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

Independent variable: Perceptions of the peace agreement

To measure popular approval of the peace agreements, we formulated a set of case-specific questions about key provisions in the respective agreements. The questions were designed to be answerable regardless of whether a specific provision was implemented. Based on these questions, we used principal component factor analysis to create case-specific scales for overall approval of

the peace agreements.⁵¹ The scales were rescaled to a range of 1 to 5, so that a value of 1 translates into a strong overall disapproval, and 5 indicates strong approval for the composite measure (the same interpretation as for questions about specific provisions). In the main analysis, we rely on the composite measure of approval, but we also run additional, case-specific analyses with the original items.

Table 1 gives an overview of the various peace agreement provisions and provides descriptive statistics about support for each one, as well as the composite measure of approval (in italics). There is some variation within each case, but overall, we observe the highest approval of the peace agreement provisions in Northern Ireland. Notably, all three peace agreements enjoy strong popular support. In fact, only one provision has a mean score corresponding to ‘some disapproval,’ namely the transformation of the National Police into the National Civil Police in Guatemala. In Nepal, the least popular provision is the restructuring of Nepal into a federal state, which has a mean score that translates into ‘neither agree nor disagree,’ while the least popular provision in Northern Ireland was the early release of paramilitary prisoners, which enjoys a score between ‘somewhat disagree’ and ‘neither agree nor disagree.’ That is, there is no strong opposition to any of the key provisions in the three peace agreements.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

⁵¹ The factor analysis supports a one-dimensional solution in all three samples. The scalability of the items is poorer in Nepal than in Guatemala and Northern Ireland (Guatemala: KMO = 0.78, Cronbach’s α = 0.68; Nepal: KMO = 0.58, Cronbach’s α = 0.55; Northern Ireland: KMO = 0.76, Cronbach’s α = 0.73). However, to improve comparativeness, we use the same procedure in all three cases.

Note that several respondents found these questions difficult to answer, which is reflected in a relatively high rate of ‘don’t knows’ (but few refusals). This is particularly the case in Nepal, where only about two thirds answered the question about the establishment of a truth commission. This may reflect the fact that at the time of our survey, the structure and mandate of the commission was controversial; while victims’ organisations welcomed an investigation into the past, they objected to the establishment of three different commissions.⁵² In Northern Ireland, the question about early release of paramilitary prisoners also received a higher rate of ‘don’t knows’ (about six percent), while in Guatemala, the question about land reform received a ‘don’t know’ rate of almost 13 percent. Again, the non-responses seem to reflect uncertainty rather than refusal, as these are complicated more than sensitive questions.

Consistent with our argument, we also measure people’s perceptions of implementation. A clear majority in both Nepal (82.4 percent) and Guatemala (67.4 percent) think that the peace agreement has not been implemented as promised, whereas in Northern Ireland, this is a minority view (34.4 percent). In our analysis, we transform the variable into a dichotomous measure that takes the value of 1 for respondents who think that the agreement has been implemented.⁵³

Other explanatory variables

Building on established explanations for political trust, we include measures of socialization and perceived institutional performance. First, we measure social trust as an additive scale, based on

⁵² Personal communication with members of different NGOs in Kathmandu, September 2015. See also Sajjad, “Heavy Hands,” 25–45.

⁵³ Note that in Guatemala and Nepal, respondents who said that they did not know about the peace agreement (about 36 percent in each case) were routed away from follow-up questions about implementation. These are accounted for by a separate dummy variable ‘Not aware of the peace agreement’.

questions about trust (‘How much do you trust...’) in family, people in the neighbourhood, people of another religion, people of another ethnic group (or caste in Nepal), and people from other areas of the country.⁵⁴ The scale was rescaled so that a value of 1 corresponds to no trust at all in any of the mentioned groups, and a value of 4 corresponds to complete trust in all the mentioned groups.

Further, given how violence may have long-lasting effects through processes of socialization, we include two measures of war-time experiences: victimization by the state and rebel participation.⁵⁵ A dummy variable captures whether the respondent experienced war-related violence conducted by the state, including pro-government militias (N=292), or not.⁵⁶ We control for war-time participation on the insurgent side (N=62) with a similar dummy variable.⁵⁷

We also control for gender (taking a score of 1 if the respondent is male), age, and education, which may affect how people are socialized into (dis)trusting individuals.⁵⁸ Education is measured through a five-point ordinal scale that ranges from no schooling, primary or below, secondary, post-secondary, trade or vocational education, and higher education.⁵⁹

Drawing on the institutional explanations, and assuming that physical and material safety are key concerns after an armed conflict, we argue that these variables are appropriate indicators of *post-war* institutional performance. To measure perceptions of personal safety, we use the

⁵⁴ In Northern Ireland, respondents were asked about people from other parts of the UK and people from the Republic of Ireland.

⁵⁵ In particular, war-time experiences could be associated with both political trust and approval of the peace agreement, leading to a spurious relationship between the two variables of interest.

⁵⁶ The reference category includes victims of other perpetrators or no victimization. Alternative approaches yield essentially the same results, see Appendix C, Table A.

⁵⁷ In all three sub-samples, about eight percent report that they participated actively in the armed conflict. In Guatemala and Northern Ireland, most of them on the government side. In Nepal, most people responded that they participated on the insurgent side. Again, alternative coding strategies produced largely similar empirical results, see Appendix C, Table A.

⁵⁸ Schoon and Cheng, “Determinants of Political Trust,” 619–631.

⁵⁹ The education questions included case-specific categories. Unsurprisingly, the level of education is much higher in Northern Ireland than in Guatemala and particularly Nepal. To be comparable across cases, the education measure is therefore quite rough. The variable is treated as a continuous variable, but dummy coding gives largely similar results.

question ‘Could you tell me how secure you feel these days in your neighbourhood? Do you feel very secure/quite secure/not very secure/not at all secure?’ To assess people’s sense of material security, we measure income as a set of statements describing the respondents’ situation: ‘We can buy everything we need/We have enough money to buy food and clothes, but the purchase of consumer durables is a problem for us/We have enough money only for food/We do not have enough money even for food.’⁶⁰ In addition, we included an evaluation of the country’s economic development: ‘If you should evaluate the economic development in [Guatemala/Nepal/Northern Ireland] in the post-war period, would you say that it has improved, is about the same, or has deteriorated?’ All three variables were reversed for the analysis, so that a higher score is associated with a more positive assessment.

In our analyses of the combined sample, we also include a set of dummy variables to account for differences between the sub-samples, with Guatemala as the reference category.

Analysis and results

We estimate the relationship between perceptions of the peace agreement (both approval and views on implementation) and political trust through a simple ordinary least square regression model, treating the dependent variable as continuous. First, we run a stepwise model for the pooled sample and the case samples. Second, we disaggregate approval of the peace agreements into support for specific provisions and rerun the models. We also run a series of additional analyses (reported in Online supplemental material C).

⁶⁰ In Northern Ireland, the statement was modified to reflect a high-income context: ‘We can buy everything we need/We have enough money to buy food and clothes, but purchasing a home or a car is a problem for us/We have enough money for the most essential, but we can’t afford to go on a holiday/We don’t have enough money even for the most essential.’

Support for the peace agreement and political trust

Table 2 reports the results from the first part of the analysis. Model 1 includes measures of conventional theories of political trust, while Model 2 also accounts for the peace agreement. Models 3–5 report the results from the full model for each case.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

First, our findings show that overall, common explanations of political trust seem to hold also in a post-war context (Models 1–5), but institutional explanations seem more important than cultural explanations. Consistent with previous research, social and political trust are closely related. Also consistent with previous research, perceptions of post-war economic recovery are associated with higher levels of trust (apart from Northern Ireland), as is safety in the neighbourhood (apart from Nepal). In contrast, cultural explanations related to sociodemographic characteristics such as gender and age are not significantly associated with political trust, while higher education is associated with somewhat lower levels of confidence, but only in the pooled sample.⁶¹ In line with our expectation, victimization by the state or pro-government militias reduces political trust (except in Guatemala), while, somewhat surprisingly, former participation on the opposition side is not associated with lower political trust.⁶² Given research suggesting that war-time violence may, under certain circumstances, have positive effects on political outcomes, such

⁶¹ The findings are robust to alternative model specifications, e.g., measuring educational attainment through a set of dummy variables (see Appendix C, Table A).

⁶² Alternative specifications, e.g., including dummy variables to measure all actors in the conflict, yield very similar results, see Appendix C, Table A. Of the different types of wartime experiences (victimization, participation, and both), government victimization is most consistently associated with low political trust.

as political participation,⁶³ our findings underscore the need for future research to disaggregate, both theoretically and empirically, how different experiences of violence shape post-war outcomes.

Secondly, the peace agreements clearly matter for political trust (Model 2). Accounting for perceptions of the peace agreement improves the explained variance from 0.12 to 0.15, i.e., a 25 percent increase, and this increase is not driven by changes in the sample size.⁶⁴ Similar stepwise modelling by country produce a similar increase in explained variance.⁶⁵

According to our hypotheses, people's approval of the peace agreement provisions is positively associated with political trust, while a perceived lack of implementation is negatively associated with political trust. Model 2 provides evidence in line with both propositions, with both coefficients statistically significant on a 0.01 level, with the expected signs, and of moderate size – less important than social trust, but more important than any sociodemographic characteristics or perceived institutional performance. Citizens' approval of the provisions in the peace agreements is associated with higher political trust, with a moderate substantive and statistically significant effect. Hence, what people think about the plan for (re)building the post-war state matters for their trust in political authorities, also several years down the road. Approval of the peace agreement is significantly associated with political trust across the three sub-samples. The peace agreement in Guatemala was 20 years old at the time of our survey, but approval of the provisions in this agreement, which continues to be salient political issues (for example, indigenous peoples' rights), are still associated with political trust. However, consistent with a declining importance over time,

⁶³ Blattman, "From Violence to Voting," 231–247.

⁶⁴ This is tested in Model I in Table A, in which Model 1 is run on the same sample as Model 2. It gives the same R^2 as Model 1.

⁶⁵ See Appendix C, Tables B–D, Models I–III.

the substantive effect is weaker in Guatemala and Northern Ireland than in Nepal, where the post-war state structure is still in the mould.

In Nepal and Northern Ireland, individuals' perception that the peace agreement has been implemented is associated with higher levels of political trust, and again, the substantive effect is larger in Nepal. In other words, consistent with previous research, we find that unmet expectations are associated with lower trust. This association is not statistically significant in the Guatemalan sample.⁶⁶

To corroborate our findings, we ran a series of complementary analyses by sub-sample, reported in Online supplemental material C. First, to assess whether perceptions of the peace agreement differs substantially from people's view of the political system in general, we controlled for perceived political development in the post-war period. As expected, this variable is positively and significantly associated with political trust (except in Nepal), but the associations between perceptions of the peace agreement and political trust are mostly robust (Tables A–D).

Reassuringly, the findings do not appear to be driven by specific groups or regions in any of the cases. In particular, the main findings are robust to the inclusion of indigenous identity or region in Guatemala, caste or administrative units in Nepal, or community background in Northern Ireland. Moreover, the social identity groups do not have significantly nor substantially different levels of political trust.⁶⁷ That is, it is not respondents' identities – even identities that, as in the

⁶⁶ Note that only 17 percent of the Guatemalan subsample believes that the peace agreement has been implemented. It seems likely that among many of these respondents, widespread concerns about corruption, violent crime, and poverty override the positive effect of the implementation.

⁶⁷ In Guatemala, we included a dummy variable for indigenous identity. Due to substantial underreporting, this group is quite small, so the sample is not separated by identity group. In Nepal and Northern Ireland, we accounted for social identity groups in two different ways, by including dummy variables and by splitting the samples into subsamples by (main) castes and community background, respectively. See Appendix C for details.

case of Northern Ireland, correspond to the conflict's 'master cleavage'⁶⁸ – but, rather, assessment of policies that drive their trust in the post-war authorities.

Finally, we distinguished between trust in the legislative and the executive, using both OLS and ordered logit as estimation techniques. The findings show that overall, the association between support for the peace agreement and political trust is mostly similar for trust in the legislative and the executive. The exception is Northern Ireland (see Online supplemental material C, Table D). Here, approval of the peace agreement is positively associated with trust in the Deputy First Minister only, and not with trust in the First Minister or the Northern Ireland assembly. Though we did not ask about specific office holders in the survey, this discrepancy may stem from the fact that, at the time, the Deputy First Minister, Martin McGuinness, was closely associated both with the conflict (a former IRA member) and the peace process (Sinn Féin's chief negotiator). Whether people believe that the peace agreement has been implemented is consistently associated with political trust, regardless of how the dependent variable is measured. Here, the exception is Nepal, where viewing the agreement as implemented is strongly associated with trust in the legislative, but not the executive.

Taken together, both Table 2 and additional analyses clearly support the proposition that popular approval of peace agreements helps explain political trust in post-war societies. In the second part of the analysis, we disaggregate approval of the peace agreement into support for specific provisions.

⁶⁸ Stathis N. Kalyvas, "The Ontology," 476.

Disaggregating support for the peace agreement

The level of controversy surrounding individual provisions in peace agreements varies (see Table 1 above), and people may support some and disapprove of others. Therefore, we replace the composite measure for approval of the peace agreements with the original variables measuring citizens' support for specific provisions, keeping the rest of the model the same as in Table 2, Model 2. We also report results from bivariate regression models. Table 3 summarizes the results.

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

These additional analyses indicate that not all provisions are equally important in shaping people's political trust. In Guatemala, security sector reform seems to be the main driver for the results reported in Table 3. Supporting the provisions on 'civilian and democratic control over the army', 'internal security no longer army responsibility,' and 'transforming the National Police into the National Civil Police' are all positively and consistently associated with political trust. In bivariate models, also supporting 'URNG transformation into a political party' (URNG referring to the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity, the guerrilla movement) and 'formal recognition of indigenous peoples and their rights' are significantly associated with higher levels of trust.

In Nepal, the positive association between approval of the peace agreement and political trust seems to be driven by a desire to fundamentally restructure the state. Supporting 'abolishing the monarchy', 'making a new constitution', 'restructuring Nepal into a federal state' and 'including Maoists in interim power sharing government' are all positively and significantly associated with political trust. These associations hold in both bivariate and multivariate analyses.

Finally, in Northern Ireland, we find that supporting provisions on ‘establishing a devolved, democratically elected NI Assembly’ and ‘establishing a power sharing NI Executive’ are positively associated with more political trust. In bivariate analyses, also a few other provisions are positively associated with political trust, but the substantive effects are weaker.

These additional analyses highlight that the positive association between supporting the peace agreement and having confidence in the post-war authorities is mainly driven by the support for institutional reform – be that the demilitarization of the state (Guatemala), transforming a centralized monarchy into a federal republic (Nepal), or the establishment of power sharing institutions (Northern Ireland).

Conclusion

Theories about violence and its aftermath often make assumptions about what people think and prefer. Indeed, citizens’ perceptions are critical for analyzing the risk of violence in the first place, as well as the interpersonal, intergroup, and state-society relationships that emerge in the post-war era. This article aims to further our understanding of people’s trust in the state’s political authorities in post-war societies, focusing on how the strategies aimed at preventing a recurrence of violence and (re)building the state shape what people think about it.

Conducting public opinion surveys in conflict-ridden and post-war states presents numerous challenges, certainly when trying to assess potentially sensitive questions about relationships of authority, political trust, and experiences of violence. Consequently, relatively few

studies allow for analysis across post-war states.⁶⁹ By developing a public opinion survey conducted in three post-war cases – Guatemala, Nepal, and Northern Ireland – we hope to contribute to comparative scholarship on post-war societies. Indeed, the UN Secretary General’s 2014 report on *Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict* notes that ‘what is most important in some contexts, such as rebuilding societal trust and institutional legitimacy, may be the most difficult to assess,’ emphasizing that the organization ‘will need to expand and improve its mechanisms, including the use of surveys, for evaluation and monitoring progress in these areas’.⁷⁰

Our findings reveal that there are nuances to our argument about the role of peace agreements – some provisions may be more important, while some are more controversial. Specifically, people’s approval of peace agreement provisions calling for institutional reform is positively related to people’s political trust. Yet, overall, we find that people’s perceptions of peace agreements are key to understanding political trust in the post-war order, adding substantial explanatory power to conventional theories of political trust.

While we are confident that our analysis captures a representative snapshot of public preferences in the three cases, our study may be limited by respondents’ unease with some questions, and some questions also required a certain level of knowledge. The study is also susceptible to common challenges with using attitudes to explain attitudes, for example the potential of reverse causation. Here, it is worth noting that the relationship between approval of peace agreements and political trust holds also when controlling for perceived political development in general, which supports our notion that perceptions of peace agreements represent something more fundamental than day-to-day politics. Moreover, the association between approval

⁶⁹ But see e.g., Dyrstad, Karin. “After Ethnic Civil War,” 817–831; Bakke, O’Loughlin, Toal, and Ward. “Convincing State-Builders?,” 591–607; O’Loughlin, Kolossov, and Toal, “Inside the post-Soviet *de facto* States,” 423–456.

⁷⁰ United Nations, *Peacebuilding*, 2014, 7.

of the peace agreement and political trust holds across three very different cases, suggesting that this relationship may exist across a range of different scope conditions. Our most different case approach yields substantial leverage beyond the three cases examined here.

Whereas our study examines the long-term impact of peace agreements on state-society relations in conflict-affected societies, future research should seek to investigate these relationships both during peace negotiations and shortly after agreements are signed. Ideally, one should aim to trace changing preferences to peace processes among different groups over time. Mapping people's approval of peace agreement provisions enables policy makers to be responsive to people's concerns and readjust if need be. Thus, understanding popular preferences may both strengthen the legitimacy of the state as well as improve post-war policies. This was clearly illustrated in the case of Nepal, where the new federal borders sparked months of protests and political turbulence. When a new Constitution was finally passed in 2015, it was also heavily criticized for being less radical and inclusive than the interim constitution⁷¹ – which again shows that people tend to hold politicians accountable to the prescriptions for the future as described in peace agreements.

To conclude, we argue – and find – that people's perceptions of peace agreement provisions and their implementation (or lack thereof) affect political trust. Why does this matter? Confidence in the state's political authorities is critical for post-war states' stability. Indeed, the absence of credible political authorities is likely to foster spirals of violence as groups and individuals within the state (think they) must fend for themselves. Key to establishing a legitimate post-war state authority is inclusiveness. As highlighted by the UN Secretary General's report: 'Where peacebuilding efforts are rooted in inclusive societal consultation and efforts to minimize

⁷¹ International Crisis Group, *Nepal's Divisive New Constitution*.

exclusionary practices, they generate trust and legitimacy in the State and its institutions'.⁷²

'Inclusive societal consultation' is a broad concept, centred on including various stakeholders in the process of negotiating a settlement,⁷³ though a reasonable assessment includes the population's perceptions of the very strategies aimed at building peace, also *after* the agreement has been signed.

⁷² United Nations, *Peacebuilding*, 2014, 7.

⁷³ United Nations, *Peacebuilding*, 2012, 11.

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
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Mean values: Guatemala 2.31, Nepal 2.54, Northern Ireland 2.16, Total 2.36

Figure 1. Distribution of political trust, by country and in pooled sample

Notes: A value of 4 corresponds to ‘a great deal’ of trust in both the legislative and the executive, while 1 means ‘no trust at all’ in any of them.

Table 1. Main provisions in peace agreements in Guatemala, Nepal, and Northern Ireland

Case	Peace agreement / provision	Mean	St. dev	N
Guatemala	<i>The Agreement on a Firm and Durable Peace (1996)</i>	3.739	0.721	962
	Formal recognition of indigenous peoples and their rights	4.328	1.022	1,147
	Truth and Reconciliation Commission	3.981	1.165	1,104
	Civilian and democratic control over the army	3.894	1.184	1,104
	Land reform	3.774	1.222	1,048
	URNG transformation into a political party	2.936	1.451	1,115
	Internal security no longer army responsibility	2.55	1.35	1,101
	Transforming the National Police into the National Civil Police	2.3	1.25	1,137
Nepal	<i>Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2006)</i>	3.691	0.622	787
	Truth and Reconciliation Commission	4.219	0.621	804
	Making a new constitution	4.137	0.828	1,135
	Including Maoists in interim power sharing government	3.908	0.941	1,175
	Integrating Maoists in the Nepali Army	3.707	1.128	1,185
	Abolishing the monarchy	3.003	1.526	1,198
	Restructuring Nepal into a federal state	2.963	1.414	1,132
Northern Ireland (NI)	<i>The Good Friday Agreement (1998)</i>	3.961	0.552	713
	Decommissioning of arms by paramilitary groups	4.431	0.772	784
	Addressing unemployment and employment differences	4.263	0.806	777
	Normalisation of security arrangements/troop reductions	4.239	0.867	778
	Declaration that the majority decides NI's status vis-à-vis UK	4.1	0.968	771
	Establishing a devolved, democratically elected NI Assembly	4.059	0.864	767
	Police reform addressing underrepresentation of Catholics	4.042	0.982	771
	Establishing a power sharing NI Executive	3.986	0.907	772
Early release of paramilitary prisoners	2.621	1.275	759	
Overall		3.788	0.654	2,462

Notes: All answer categories follow a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating strong disapproval of the provision, and 5 indicating strong approval/support.

Table 2. Determinants of political trust, pooled sample

	Model 1 (Full sample, baseline model)	Model 2 (Full sample, extended model)	Model 3 (Guatemala)	Model 4 (Nepal)	Model 5 (N. Ireland)
<i>Socialization</i>					
Social trust	0.365 (12.18)**	0.313 (9.31)**	0.336 (6.77)**	0.322 (4.52)**	0.236 (3.83)**
Gov't victim	-0.072 (1.78)	-0.105 (2.45)*	0.041 (0.47)	-0.153 (2.11)*	-0.128 (2.00)*
Rebel participant	0.058 (0.82)	0.092 (1.26)	-0.310 (1.35)	0.112 (1.33)	0.155 (0.91)
Male	-0.004 (0.16)	-0.046 (1.52)	-0.117 (2.24)*	-0.030 (0.54)	-0.001 (0.02)
Age	-0.000 (0.25)	-0.001 (0.68)	-0.005 (2.56)*	0.003 (1.24)	0.002 (1.21)
Education	-0.020 (1.95)	-0.023 (2.07)*	-0.034 (1.91)	0.000 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.24)
<i>Institutional performance</i>					
Personal safety	0.094 (4.84)**	0.090 (4.31)**	0.123 (3.50)**	0.068 (1.96)	0.079 (1.99)*
Income	-0.016 (0.93)	-0.013 (0.72)	-0.016 (0.54)	-0.068 (1.99)*	0.067 (1.91)
Economic development	0.098 (5.27)**	0.081 (4.04)**	0.063 (2.41)*	0.131 (2.63)**	0.071 (1.57)
Nepal	0.048 (1.21)	0.075 (1.75)			
Guatemala	-0.433 (8.98)**	-0.508 (8.71)**			
<i>Peace agreement perceptions</i>					
Support for PA ¹		0.181 (7.65)**	0.144 (3.87)**	0.235 (5.49)**	0.098 (2.00)*
PA implemented		0.118 (2.90)**	-0.087 (1.25)	0.318 (3.82)**	0.208 (3.36)**
Not aware of PA ²		-0.098 (2.40)*	0.013 (0.23)	-0.173 (2.62)**	
Constant	1.055 (9.87)**	0.668 (5.08)**	0.896 (4.25)**	0.457 (1.47)	0.281 (1.09)
R ²	0.12	0.15	0.13	0.16	0.12
N	2,993	2,347	922	784	641

$p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; ¹ PA: peace agreement; ² Not asked in Northern Ireland, since, presumably, virtually all citizens know about the peace agreement.

Table 3. Bivariate and multivariate regressions of the relationship between specific peace agreement provisions and political trust

Case	Provision	Bivariate	Multivariate
<i>Guatemala</i>	<i>Support for peace agreement (combined)</i>	0.210**	0.144**
	URNG transformation into a political party	0.045**	0.017
	Formal recognition of indigenous peoples and their rights	0.067**	0.037
	Truth and Reconciliation Commission	0.046*	0.021
	Land reform	0.032	0.005
	Civilian and democratic control over the army	0.102**	0.083**
	Internal security no longer army responsibility	0.080**	0.058**
	Transforming the National Police into the National Civil Police	0.045**	0.095**
<i>Nepal</i>	<i>Support for peace agreement (combined)</i>	0.234**	0.323**
	Abolishing the monarchy	0.052**	0.042**
	Making a new constitution	0.136**	0.133**
	Integrating Maoists in the Nepali Army	0.047*	0.027
	Truth and Reconciliation Commission	-0.020	0.003
	Including Maoists in interim power sharing government	0.103**	0.070**
	Restructuring Nepal into a federal state	0.082**	0.057**
<i>Northern Ireland</i>	<i>Support for peace agreement (combined)</i>	0.098*	0.207**
	Establishing a devolved, democratically elected NI Assembly	0.130**	0.073*
	Establishing a power sharing NI Executive	0.150**	0.094**
	Decommissioning of arms by paramilitary groups	0.075*	0.014
	Normalisation of security arrangements/ troop reductions	0.091**	0.019
	Police reform addressing underrepresentation of Catholics	0.090**	0.040
	Early release of paramilitary prisoners	0.025	0.007
	Addressing unemployment and employment differences	0.037	0.012
Declaration that the majority decides NI's status vis-à-vis UK	0.013	-0.013	

Notes: B coefficients only; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$. The multivariate models include the control variables reported in Table 2, Models 2–4.