Bhaskar, V;
Roketskiy, N;
(2021)
Consumer Privacy and Serial Monopoly.
The RAND Journal of Economics
, 52
(4)
pp. 917-944.
10.1111/1756-2171.12396.
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Abstract
We examine the implications of consumer privacy when preferences today depend upon past consumption choices, and consumers shop from different sellers in each period. Although consumers are ex ante identical, their initial consumption choices cannot be deterministic. Thus, ex post heterogeneity in preferences arises endogenously. Consumer privacy improves social welfare, consumer surplus and the profits of the second-period seller, while reducing the profits of the first period seller, relative to the situation where consumption choices are observed by the later seller.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Consumer Privacy and Serial Monopoly |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1111/1756-2171.12396 |
| Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12396 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| Keywords: | Consumer privacy, dynamic demand, endogenous screening, nonlinear pricing. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10121356 |
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