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I, Amina-Bahja Ekman, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated accordingly in this thesis.
For Ahmed.
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To my dear husband and darling son: Alltid tillsammans.

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To my friends, in London and in Gothenburg, and everywhere in between: Thank you for all your kind words of encouragement, advice and support through such a defining moment in my life. I appreciate you.
ABSTRACT

In contrast to the primordial approach, where Somali society and social relations are described through the usual rubrics of kinship and culture, this thesis argues that Somali society consists of both opposing identities and interests contingent on factors beyond the presumed forms of clan-based interactions. Considering the social relations of a society once described as uniquely egalitarian and homogenous, this view needs critical revision as it fails to consider Somali society as one that is susceptible to change and stimuli emanating from sources other than kinship and culture. Accordingly, the thesis undertakes a critical analysis of the dialectic and causal relationship between identity and class, explored through the perceptions and experiences of inequality of the Gabooye collective of Somaliland.

Using a framework, which includes a critical theorisation of redistribution, recognition and representation to clarify the different structures of inequality and their innate claims for justice, the thesis asks how changes in the Somali political economy during 1969-1988 altered the ‘Rules of the Game’ and the ‘Rules of the Mind’ and accordingly affected the principle of participatory parity for the Gabooye collective. The adapted framework synthesises a critical yet novel understanding of justice where formulations from both the Holy Qur’an and western moral philosophy are used to inform the analysis. Accordingly, this innovative framework is applied as an analytical tool to help uncover the normative spaces for justice in Somaliland and their capacity to address the types of justice claims made from groups that are outside of the traditional clan system.

The thesis presents a definition of the Gabooye of Somaliland as a collective comparable to caste, positioned between the structural understanding of class and the ideological notion of identity and status. This original definition refines the collective’s relationship to both the capitalist class system and the Somali kinship-based order and helps us better to understand the continuing socio-economic effects of changes to the political economy. This is a critical contribution to the contemporary theorisation of Somali social relations.
IMPACT STATEMENT

This research makes the case for the importance of researching marginalised groups in kinship-based societies where the traditions of system hierarchy, of a society once described as united and egalitarian, are strengthening, as a reaction to both external and internal political and socio-economic stimuli, instead of declining (Eno and Kusow, 2014: Besteman, 1999: Walls, 2014). While the notable exploration of Somali clan ideology presented by scholars like Ioan Lewis (1960) has added real analytical value to understanding Somali society, the rigid focus on the dynamics of clan as the sole fabric of Somali society has manifested a stagnant image, or narrative, of Somali identity that do not explain the current state of social relationships. The findings from the research, along with the focus of the research topic, therefore, adds to the gaps in literature on minorities in Somali society currently led by Somali scholars Eno and Kusow (2010: 2014) but also Luling (1984); Besteman (1999); Hill (2010) and as of late Vitturini (2017).

This thesis thus makes the claim that the current issues of inequality experienced by groups that lie outside of the traditional clan lineage in Somali society, such as the Gabooye collective in Somaliland, cannot be redressed if the only mechanisms of justice available are those attached to a primordial ideology, where members of the status quo demarcate the reach of justice.

Hence, the research approach and analysis presented in this thesis are held to provide an interesting methodological contribution to academia and the field of critical ethnography. Such an approach and analysis are important as there is far less scholarship from Somali scholars on Somali issues as there are contributions from non-Somali scholars. The research highlights the experiences of social change and social conflict from a segment of the Somali population, during a time period that have been essential in the historical materialism of Somali society.

Hence, the research provides new dimensions to Nancy Fraser’s (1996) concepts: *Redistribution, Recognition and Representation*; by placing the concepts in the Somali context where social relations are far more dynamic than usually argued; in relation to the philosophical realms of morality, as explored by Immanuel Kant (1784/1963) and
ethics, as explored by Georg Wilhelm Fredrich Hegel (1807:1979), and further conceptualised through both religious and political theory; as indicated by the Holy Qur’an and John Rawls (1974).

This research expands the definitions of class in Somali society established by one single Somali academic: Abdi Samatar (1989). Inspired by Samatar, the research explains Somali social relations from a lens that adopts a critical approach, one that includes an understanding of class as a condition for stratification, as given by Karl Marx (1867/1995) yet the research findings also outline a new approach; one that looks into how the formulations of status groups, as presented by Max Weber (1958), fit within the Somali reality.

These theoretical contributions to the discourses on class and identity as well as the concept of justice in Somali society seeks to sanction a new narrative of Somali society that is not reliant on the portrayal of clan identity alone, but an analysis that also includes the categorisations of caste, as it is argued that the Somali clan system and the Hindu caste system share similar categories of reduction, although they are not the same system of stratification, and the makings of class.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPACT STATEMENT</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF MAPS AND FIGURES</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION</strong></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2. Research problem and context.</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3. Research question and methodology</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4. Thesis structure and theoretical context</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY: RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTION</strong></td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 ABDUCTIVE DESIGN STRATEGY</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2. Research period and research site</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1 Hargeysa, a divided city</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.2 Untangling Daami, home of the Gabooye Collective</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3. Critical Ethnography</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.1 Research methods</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Research sample, saturation, and data collection</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.2 Data analysis and coding</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5. Ethics and limitations to research approach: Positionality and reflexivity for a native researcher</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.1 Going beyond the boundaries of conventional ethnography</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK</strong></td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Social Justice Framework</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.2 A Critical discussion on the relationship between the material and the cultural</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.3 Redistribution or Recognition? Conflicting views on the conceptualisation of capitalism</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2. Claims for justice: redistribution, recognition and representation</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1 The experience of inequality in Somaliland: A matter of the Good or the Right?</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3. ADAPTED FRAMEWORK

3.3.2 IDEOLOGY, HEGEMONY, DOMINATION AND CULTURE: EXPANDING ORTHODOX MARXIST THEORY

CHAPTER 4: PARADIGMS OF JUSTICE, INEQUALITY AND IDENTITY

4.1. CONTRACTARIAN JUSTICE: STATE OF NATURE, LAW OF NATURE AND JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS

4.1.2 UTILITARIANISM AND A THEORY OF JUSTICE

4.1.3. ISLAM AND JUSTICE.

4.2. INEQUALITY: FROM DISTRIBUTION TO RECOGNITION.

4.2.1. TOWARDS AN APPROPRIATE CLASS ANALYSIS

4.3. CRITICAL THEORY AND THE EXPANSION OF THE JUSTICE CONCEPT.

CHAPTER 5: SOMALI HISTORY, SOCIETY, POLITICS AND CULTURE.

5.1. GEOGRAPHICAL, ETHNOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT

5.2. COLONIALISM AND INDEPENDENCE: DIFFERENT ACTORS UTILISING CLAN AS A RESOURCE FOR INFLUENCE AND POWER

5.2.1. SOMALILAND: FROM A BRITISH PROTECTORATE TO AN INDEPENDENT DE-FACTO STATE

5.3 CLAN AND CUSTOMS

5.3.1. SAB AND OCCUPATIONAL CASTE

5.3.2 Defining minorities in Somali society


6.1. Restructuring the Somali Rules of the Game: Challenging Clan and Islam

6.2. Restructuring the Somali Rules of the Mind: Modifying the Somali discourse on identity


6.3 SOCIAL JUSTICE FRAMEWORK: CLAIMS AND PATHWAYS TO JUSTICE IN CONTEMPORARY SOMALILAND

6.3.1. Misrecognition: Clan destruction through exogamy and Islamic identity

6.3.2. Clan and class identity in Somaliland: The dynamics of identity politics

6.3.3.1. A definition of contemporary Somali social relations: The Relationship Between Class, Caste and Clan

CHAPTER 7: ANALYSIS: PART II: IDENTIFY THE INSTITUTIONAL SPACES AVAILABLE TO ADDRESS THE CLAIMS TO JUSTICE FOR MEMBERS OF THE GABOOLEY COLLECTIVE

7.1 Justice as competition

7.2 SHARI’A FOR EMANCIPATION.

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUDING COMMENTS
### 8.1. The Gabooye Collective of Somaliland: The Case for Political Participation and Islamic Moralität as Simultaneous Pathways for Emancipation

References 264

**Appendices** 277

- **Appendix 1: Information Sheet, Somali** 277
- **Appendix 2: Informed Consent Form, Somali** 281
- **Appendix 3: Research Instrument, Somali** 284
- **Appendix 4: Information Sheet, English** 286
- **Appendix 5: Informed Consent Form English** 287
- **Appendix 6: Research Instrument, English** 288
- **Appendix 7: List of Interview Respondents Referenced in the Thesis** 290
- **Appendix 8: List of All Interviews Conducted** 292
LIST OF MAPS AND FIGURES

Map of Somalia___________________________________________________________36
Map of Somaliland________________________________________________________50
Map of Hargeysa_________________________________________________________154

Figure 1: Social Justice Framework________________________________________145
Figure 2: Spaces for Change______________________________________________147
Figure 3: Iterative Abductive Design Cycle________________________________152
Figure 4: Social Justice Framework Nvivo________________________________170
Figure 5: Coding in Nvivo_______________________________________________171

Figure 6: Timeline of Changes____________________________________________201
Figure 7: Social Justice Framework________________________________________203
Figure 8: Spaces for Change______________________________________________247
Figure 9: Social Justice Framework for the Gabooye Collective in Somaliland____254
# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>Danish International Development Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>International Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>National Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Mareehan, Ogaadeen, Dhulbaahante,</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNM</td>
<td>Somali National Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRC</td>
<td>Supreme Revolutionary Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYL</td>
<td>Somali Youth League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYC</td>
<td>Somali Youth Club</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCSD</td>
<td>Somaliland Central Statistics Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1: Introduction

The global economic developments of the past three decades have led to a more unequal world (Lawson et al., 2019: Franzini and Pianta, 2016: Grunzky and Szelenyi, 2007). Recent studies indicate that the income gap between the global rich and the global poor is increasing; as the rich have become richer and the poor even poorer (Lawson et al., 2019). The yearly report on global inequality, conducted by Crédit Suisse and used by the international non-governmental organization Oxfam UK as a response to the annual World Economic Forum in Davos Switzerland, argued that in the advancement of the current uneven economic development, in 2018 the world’s richest 26 people had the combined net worth of half the world’s poorest (Lawson et al., 2019). Oxfam held that between 2017 and 2018 the wealth of the world’s richest grew by 2.8 billion USD per day while the world’s poorest saw a decrease of their wealth by 500 million USD a day (Lawson et al., 2019). That is roughly an increase of 12% on a daily basis for the world’s richest and a decrease of 11% for the world’s poorest (Lawson et al., 2019).

These figures indicate that less than one per cent of the world’s population would own the same combined wealth as the remaining 88% (Lawson et al., 2019). The 2020 report states that the world’s richest 1 per cent have double the wealth of 6.9 million people (Coffey et al., 2020). Oxfam also asserted that economic inequality is one of many factors producing poverty; hence, income distribution is only one form of inequality and therefore income re-distribution alone does not lead to equality (Lawson et al., 2019). For instance, the 2020 report highlights the gendered aspects of the inequality and the extremes of wealth by stating that the combined wealth of the 22 richest men total the wealth of all women in Africa (Coffey et al., 2020). Furthermore, women and girls, especially those from marginalised communities and groups living in poverty, are maintained to constitute the bottom of the global economy (Coffey al., 2020:9). Here the non-governmental organisation advocates for greater and more decisive government policies to address the extreme wealth gap and accordingly the gendered aspects of inequality (Coffey et al., 2020: Lawson et al., 2019).
The overall findings in Oxfam’s annual reports are of relevance for this research and its field of study, as the outcomes of the report highlight the importance of understanding the root causes and the drivers of inequality, such as poverty, in today’s globalised and intertwined societies (Lawson et al., 2019). Yet, these types of reports, and the figures and numbers they support, are indeed challenging as they distort the reality of income inequality specifically yet inequality in general (Galbraith, 2018: Giles, 2016: Salmon, 2015). For instance, the figures indicating that the wealth of the world’s poorest are falling by 11% annually are harder to consider, than the increase of a daily 12% for the world richest, as it is simultaneously held by other economic institutions, like the World Bank, that the global rate of poverty is actually declining (World Bank Group, 2018: Galbraith, 2018: Giles, 2016: Salmon, 2015).

Accordingly, the way Oxfam have defined and measured wealth have been criticised and various economists and political scientists have voiced that the results in the annual Oxfam Global Inequality report are misleading and instead other economic measures show greater global equality, as the number of people living in extreme poverty has actually decreased (Giles, 2016: Salmon, 2015). In the latest reports, wealth has been defined by Crédit Suisse, and accordingly Oxfam, as assets minus debt (Giles, 2016: Salmon, 2015). This creates a misleading understanding of who is poor on a global scale as the negative net worth presented in the reports are mainly from the developing countries, where the majority of the populations have more debt than assets (Lawson et al., 2019: Gailbraith, 2018: Giles, 2016: Salmon, 2015). The 2018 World Inequality Report (WIR) received similar critique. In the report, prominent economists like Piketty and Atkinson, from the World Inequality Lab, underline the same trends in global inequality as Oxfam, however the measures taken are argued more complete¹ than those of Oxfam. The findings in the report are argued to be ground-breaking as it does not rely on data based on individual or household surveys, such as the overtly technical Gini index, when measuring income inequality (Alvaredo et al., 2018: Galbraith, 2018). While this report is academically sounder than that of Oxfam, arguably due to the transparency used in data collection as well as the methodological approach taken, the same areas for critique are

¹ The report argues to be more comprehensive as it uses data from the world inequality data base, a data base set up by over one hundred researchers on income tax records and the income shares of the world’s top and bottom earnings (Alvaredo et al, 2018: Galbraith, 2018).
still there (Galbraith, 2018). The report also makes the claim that the accuracy of the methodology and transparency in data collection can provide different actors with the tools needed to engage in more informed and democratic debate about inequality and hence invoke better public policies (Alvaredo et al., 2018).

Arguing that global inequality has increased proves complicated as it may only be valuable when the different regions and nations are measured (Galbraith, 2018). Applying one measurement to the rise of global inequality is however “superficial” according to Galbraith (2018:330), as the average real income growth of the middle class in both China and India are changing that narrative (Galbraith, 2018). While it is acknowledged that both the Oxfam report and the WIR are of real value, I would add to the critique by arguing that both these reports are missing deeper understandings of the various dynamics of inequality, as both causal and different paradigms of justice, and instead, as mentioned, the focus is on income growth, based on income tax records, and the distribution of wealth. Neither does the analyses give an insight to the current forms of justice struggles and their different demands from the various groups around the world that are experiencing the calculated forms of inequality the reports land in. The focus of economic variables as the centrality of inequality is not a unique one, it has been the traditional way of defining inequality for centuries, and although the arguments above have proven the difficulty in defining inequality in relation to wealth, the biggest takeaway from these types of reports is that; inequality is connected to the distribution of wealth and the wealth of the global rich is rising while its declining for the global poor.

The WIR firmly states that although inequalities differ in speed across the globe, lowest in Europe and highest in the Middle East, the trend shows that inequality as a whole is majorly shaped by national policies and institutions (Alvaredo et al., 2018: Galbraith, 2018). Yet the report overlooks the systemic ways in which both institutions and policies, pushed by international organisations like the United Nations (UN), The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and nations like the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK), actually planted the seed for the rise in global inequality during the 1980s and how economic proceedings, perpetuated in the name of growth, during the past three decades have come to play a major role in key events of today (Galbraith, 2018: Franzini and Pianta, 2016: Goldsmith and Szelenyi, 2007). For instance, the rise of the far-
right in Europe, and Latin America, the populist elections of demagogue leaders or the United Kingdom seceding from the European Union through Brexit. All of these events are effects of a world in crisis, a rise of inequality as well as a reaction from the global working class, on the politics of the redistribution yet also on the lack of recognition. Nonetheless, the solutions in the WIR presented to tackle the gap between the rich and the poor is varied, however the focus is the usual culprits: education, taxing and employment (Alvaredo et al, 2018). While the points raised on the importance of education, especially education geared towards girls and women, raising taxes and proving better employment opportunities are significant, what the report is not telling us is how we are to even out the unfair odds in providing an opportunity for a “good” life for everyone? Furthermore, what are the principles of justice we are relying on if we wish to even out these odds and in so define guidelines for a just and good society?

During the time of writing this thesis, August 2020, we are in the midst of a global pandemic. The spread of the novel Corona virus (Covid-19) reflects the abovementioned gap, and the inherent tension, between the global rich and the global poor and as such the pandemic has highlighted the need for a wider discussion on redistribution as major global developments have throughout history adversely impacted the socio-economic conditions of the already vulnerable. In addition, the pandemic is taking place whilst protest against police brutality and accordingly black oppression, as an outcome of historic and systematic inequality and racism, is spreading across the US, but also across the globe in solidarity with African Americans. The protests are further illustrating the intersectional reach of inequality, as well as its political effects, and thus the need for a remedy that is formulated through the discourse of identity politics, where recognition is at the centre stage. However, it also highlights how the struggle for justice, as voiced by African Americans, requires both redistribution and recognition. Yet is it possible to reach full emancipation for those experiencing inequality as a product of capitalism, whether it be the spread of a contagious virus or the experience of systemic racism, if we move too far from the economy? These are questions that for long have created a strained relationship between the various promoters of progressive politics and social justice.
The question, a moral philosophical matter and one that places morality and ethics at the centre stage of the debate, have been discussed extensively by philosophers and political theorists and, inevitably, it has established differing sites on solutions to the rise of the injustices of the political economy of society: one that sees that we approach equality from the stance of distribution, where we relocate the wealth of the rich to the poor, historically this have been to relocate wealth from the global north to the global south; the other views equality from a sectional perspective, where focus is on culture, difference and identities. Here matters of recognition, self-esteem, self-realisation and emancipation are deemed equally important as those related to material resources to those groups that are demanding both social and political recognition. For instance, the protests in the US are considered demands for social justice, yet they are placed within the rubrics of recognition, for African Americans who have historically been exploited and oppressed through slavery and accordingly suffered institutionalised and systemic racism. However, some social theorists argue that there is a transformation in the discourse of social justice and what we are seeing today is that the prevailing focus of equality, as a matter of economic opportunity and resources, have to an extent been replaced by a view where equality is also a matter of recognition and where identity related struggles of difference is either given primacy or are considered equal to those of economic reasons (Fraser, 1996: Butler, 1997). For instance, scholars like political philosopher and cultural critic Slavoy Žižek (1999), question the need for identity politics, as a concept for analysing justice, altogether. Žižek claims that identity politics, or the politics of recognition, is taking capitalism and its outcomes, such as inequality, for granted (Žižek, 1999: Butler et al, 2000). Žižek maintains that the focus on recognition and subjectivity is diverting attention from class struggle, inequalities of wealth and power, and instead identity and particularities are privileged over justice (Žižek, 1999: Butler et al, 2000).

Post-Marxists, such as Ernesto Laclau and Judith Butler (2000), however, refute Žižek’s claims in asserting that there is a need for a justice model that goes beyond the classic Marxist universalist theory (Butler et al, 2000). Laclau, for instance, gives two explanations of identity politics in his presentation of particularities; a negative one and a positive one. The negative aspect of identity politics, for Laclau, is defined as “pure particularism”, which is furthered explained as a self-conscious politics motivated by achieving a superior position over other particularities (Butler et al, 2000: 209). This form
of negative identity politics considers the subordination of others a form of self-realisation (Butler et al, 2000: Žižek, 1999). Positive forms of particularities and identity politics are when struggles for emancipation and equality go beyond the own struggles of self-realisation and instead are inclusive for everyone who shares the same demands for justice and equality (Butler et al, 2000). For Žižek, however, such an understanding is the pitfall and the trap of identity politics (Butler et al., 2000: Žižek, 1999). Žižek explains that the pursuit for the inclusion of distinct particularities, through the expansion of full rights and opportunities, gives the radical Left the impression that fundamental change is being achieved and that a quest for the Universal is simultaneously being pursued (Butler et al., 2000: Žižek, 1999).

According to Žižek, focusing on particularities is a moral trap as its success is reliant on a re-neutralisation of capitalism that places its framework in the background (Butler et al, 2000: Žižek, 1999). Butler agrees on the importance of addressing capitalism, however, Butler remains critical of how conservative Marxists, like Žižek, misses the link between capitalism and heterosexuality in claiming that gay and lesbian oppression is based on “merely” cultural value patterns and therefore, as they are based on the notion of particularism, are deemed less important (Butler, 1997: 267). Butler refutes the notion that focusing on the cultural aspects of oppression have created a Left that is a self-centred identarian sect, no longer interested in explicating the material and the economic aspects of justice (Butler, 1997: 265: Butler et al, 2000). Instead, for Butler, what these new social movements of identity politics are doing is going beyond the reductionist approach of orthodox Marxism and instead they are introducing new views where the intersectional aspects of inequality, and the remedies of justice, are considered equal to the material (Butler, 1997: Butler et al, 2000).

This thesis is positioned within this juxtaposition. It seeks to explain the formulations of justice that exists within both discourses, that is morality or ethics, and in so doing, to give an empirical and significant account of what social justice might look like in a post-conflict society that is also struggling with realising the conditions for a “good” yet equal society. Hence, the research adheres to the normative framework of social justice carved out by critical theorist and philosopher Nancy Fraser (1996). Frasers’s normative framework redresses claims for redistribution, recognition, (and later representation), as
equivalent issues of justice. Maintaining that joining the different claims for justice, in an analysis that acknowledges the role capitalism plays, can better address the issues of class inequality and status hierarchy.

Somali scholars Eno and Kusow argue that the homogenous and primordial narrative of Somali society, as a society sharing a collective national Somali identity, has created both epistemological and ontological challenges as the construction of what it means to be Somali is based on assumptions. The assumptions, emphasising a fictive selfsame notion, is where “[...] the social boundary of “Somaliness” is created” (Eno and Kusow, 2014: 92). However, the selfsame notion as a theoretical description of Somali society cannot explain why such a homogenous and fundamentally egalitarian nation would adopt a system of stratification and prejudice (Eno and Kusow, 2014). The pursuit of a collective national Somali identity has not only activated a condition for a collective identity crisis, but it has also created an order within Somali society where social differences are not celebrated nor seen as an asset (Eno and Kusow, 2014). If “Somaliness”, or Somalinimo if you will, and what it means to be Somali is constructed from a fixed and primordial outline, one that is proposed and reinforced by those in positions of power, then the moral tone of society is set by the status quo. Meaning, any identity that is considered deviant will fall outside of the fictive boundaries of the true Somali identity. (Eno and Kusow, 2014). Yet, I ask; how can we, having Žižek in mind, discuss justice for those groups in society that are lacking access to political, economic and social justice because of a certain identity without falling into the traps of identity politics? Directed by the will to understand, engage with, and contribute to, the abovementioned arguments and questions on the discourse of identity and class, the research approaches an analysis and a discussion on identity, class, clan and claims for justice in Somaliland.

1.2. Research problem and context.

The above illustrates the reality of the various conflicting ideas on how to define and measure inequality, and what components to link it to. It further indicates that despite decades of research on understanding the mechanics of inequality, there are not only different ways of defining and measuring inequality, and accordingly justice, but also discursive challenges and narratives on how to best tackle it within the prevailing disciplines. Although economic theory has played such a crucial role in the history of
social theory, arguably to the point where the various approaches to the multiple drivers of inequality are dominated by economic measures, the relations of production are not purely economic relations but also understood as social relations carried out in areas where economic activity takes place (Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014).

While the placement of this research is within the field of development studies and political economy, the research is not exclusively concentrated on the economic analysis of inequality, on the basis of income alone. Instead, the focus of this research is on understanding inequality in Somali society by specifically looking at the experience of misrecognition, maldistribution and misrepresentation linked to the differing status orders of identity and class, identified in a specific time in Somali history. This is further explained by focusing attention on members of minority clans in Somaliland. Social kinship orders and the relations they establish are prominent in Somali society, yet it remains a globalised issue as the exploitative mechanisms of capitalism keeps dividing individuals and hence specific segments of the population are kept in constant subordination. Due to weak state governance, as is the case in Somaliland where there is a lack of state-wide social protection schemes such as income security and/or income generating opportunities, resource distribution becomes yet an issue as the boundaries of economic inclusion is delineated by the kinship orders. The research questions and the findings highlight the tension between the claims and the redress for justice for those experiencing the multiple levels of inequality and the placement of identity and class, as categories for remedy, in relation to those claims. Through critical connections to both past and current literature on inequality, understood as a paradigm of justice, the research presents an empirical analysis that places the Somali context and the minority experience of inequality at the centre of the contemporary debate for recognition and distribution, universality and particularity.

Somali society is held to be ideologically egalitarian, both religiously and culturally, it is however also a society that is reliant on kinship relations and clan hierarchy (Lewis, 1960; Samatar, 1989a: Eno and Eno, 2010: Walls, 2015). Eno and Eno (2010) argue that “[...] Somali society remains stratified into a variety of ethnic groups with distinct statuses midwifed by the pastoral section of society that created for itself apocryphal attachment to Arab origin” (Eno and Eno, 2010: 115). These determents have created a hierarchy that
stratifies individuals and groups due to clan affiliation (Eno and Eno, 2010). Minorities in Somaliland are by tradition not considered to be ethnically, culturally or religiously different from members of the majority clan segments in Somaliland, yet they have historically been in a subordinate position to majority Isaaq clans (Eno and Eno, 2010; Eno and Kusow, 2014: Walls: 2015). Members from the Gabooye collective in Somaliland are faced with social, economic and political adversities that are keeping them in a subordinate position to members of the majority clan groups (Somaliland Annual Human Rights Review, 2017). These groups are systematically marginalised, stigmatised and despised due to mythical, and uncorroborated, narratives suggesting their unholy origin and their low status occupations (Eno and Kusow, 2014: Walls, 2015). Although the three groups have different origins, and occupations, and are furthered divided into sub-clans, when viewed as a collective they are all on the fictive boundary of “Somaliness” and therefore they are not allowed to intermarry with other clans (Eno and Eno, 2010: Kusow, 2014).

A review on the state of human rights in Somaliland from 2017 reveals that members of the collective do not enjoy equal rights and protection despite the constitutional rights outlined in the Bill of Rights in the Somaliland Constitution (Somaliland Human Rights Centre, 2017). Correspondingly, the report mentions that collective members, found in the Daami neighbourhood in the capital Hargeysa have limited access to income generating opportunities, state services such as health and education as well as access to the Somaliland justice system (Somaliland Human Rights Centre, 2017). While the Somaliland constitution guarantees equal access to political participation for all its citizens, members from the Gabooye have very little representation in the political domain as clan affiliation dictates political representation in parliament and other governmental bodies (Somaliland Human Rights Centre, 2017 ). Furthermore, Somaliland is a Muslim society and consequently the principles of justice outlined in the Somaliland constitution are built on Islamic regulation, that is Shari‘a. Shari‘a, which means “the path to water” in Arabic, places equality based on distributive justice as the overarching moral objective of all Muslims (Noor, 1998: Hallaq: 2009: Mazlee, 2017). Despite the importance

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2 Article 8 in the Somaliland constitution states that: “all citizens shall enjoy equal rights and obligations before the law, and shall not be accorded precedence on grounds of colour, clan, birth, language, gender, property, status, opinion etc” (Somaliland Constitution, 2002)
of Islamic jurisprudence for the Somali identity, members of minority clans are systematically discriminated and stigmatised despite their Muslim identity and accordingly denied the distribution of equity they are guaranteed in the Shari’a. In addition, the economic exploitation of the means of production is an important sociological descriptor in understanding the general concept of class theory yet it becomes critical in understanding how minorities and minority identity in Somali society both is produced and manifested through a structural condition and status order that sustains both privilege and exploitation. Such a status order keeps members of minority clans in a cycle of poverty and thus an inequality that is harder to overcome as the manifestation of social relations in a society like Somaliland are delineated by both economic and political structures.

1.3. Research Question and Methodology.

The analysis and arguments presented in this thesis are based on primary and secondary and archival data. The primary findings are from data collected through 60 in-depth interviews, supported by in field participatory observations, in Hargeysa between March and May 2018. Archival data was collected in London through different periods in 2018-2019, mainly at the National Archives in Kew, London. The primary findings and the archival data are augmented by relevant secondary data.

The collecting process of all data was directed by the main research question:

_How did changes in the Somali political economy during 1969-1988 affect the principle of Participatory Parity for the Gabooye collective in Somaliland?_

The research question assumes that:

(i) minority clan groups, like the Gabooye collective, in Somaliland are experiencing systematic marginalisation and inequality that is affecting their participatory parity, based on changes in the Somali political economy;
(ii) these changes have primarily occurred during the time period of 1969-1988, a time in Somali history when major structural changes were proceeding and that had the potential to implement the principle of participatory parity;

(iii) due to the changes on the Gabooye collective’s participatory parity, their spaces for justice claims in today’s Somaliland have decreased. Such a decrease is proving to further affect the principle of participatory parity of the Gabooye.

The following questions functioned as subsidiary questions for the main research question:

- What changes in the Somali political economy in 1969-1988 do people in Somaliland perceive to have affected class and clan identity and in what ways?

- To what extent are the changes in the Somali political economy in 1969-1988 perceived to reflect the current socio-cultural, economic and political status of minorities?

- To what extent are the changes in Somali political economy in 1969-1988 perceived to have affected the claims to justice made by minorities?

- What types of claims to justice do members of minority clans in Somaliland make today?

- What kind of remedies, affirmative or transformative, do institutions in Somaliland provide for minorities?

The supplementary questions were used to provide a wider scope for the analysis of the main research question. For instance, the questions were suggested to help uncover the various extents to which both the historical changes and the contemporary claims to justice have affected the participatory parity of the Gabooye collective.
The research question and the sub-questions were supported by the research’s two working objectives which include:

- the tracing of the changes that occurred during the time period of 1969-1988 that are held to have affected the implementation of the Gabooye collective’s participatory parity.

- exploring the different claims to justice that existed within the Gabooye collective as well as the existing spaces for emancipatory change.

The focus of the research thus lies in the exploration of different angles to understanding and analysing inequality and issues related to justice in Somali society by using insights from the field of critical theory on the dialectics of identity and class. The aim of this thesis is therefore to further a discussion on Somali society that goes beyond the primordial description of Somali identity and social relations and instead land in one that is explicating oppression in Somaliland through a logic that considers both identity and class.

1.4. Thesis structure and theoretical context.

This research aims to explore the margins of inequality, as experienced by members of minority clan groups like the Gabooye collective. Scholarship on Somali society has for far too long focused on clan as the only locus of Somali social relations, without considering the causal relationship between clan and class. The focus of this thesis is to rethink Somali identity by moving beyond the current methodology and framework that is available and instead introduce an analysis that combines the two orders of social formation to explain inequality.

Following this introduction, **Chapter 2** starts with a presentation of the methodology with the overarching research objectives, the central research question and sub-questions. Accordingly, there is an overview of the iterative design cycle of this research project and subsequently an explanation to why abduction is the mode of inquiry for this thesis. Critical ethnography is introduced as the practical methodology of critical theory.
following the explanation of the ontology and the epistemology of the researcher. The chapter also presents the logic behind the chosen research methods for data collection and analysis.

In addition, the chapter gives insights into the challenges and difficulties facing a native researcher conducting fieldwork in familiar contexts, through the concepts of emic and ethic and accordingly positionality. As such, the chapter highlights the need and the value in including the experience of the native researcher into the ethnographic methodologies of academic research.

Subsequently, Fraser’s Social Justice Framework is explored in Chapter 3, as it is argued that Fraser has managed to carve out a framework that goes beyond the realm of subjectivity and into that of universality and justice, as she refutes the idea that distribution of justice can be included in a model where recognition is given primacy. In doing so, Fraser unites the politics of recognition with that of redistribution in the concept of Participatory Parity (Fraser, 1996: Fraser and Honneth, 2003). The debate between Fraser and Butler presented in the chapter illustrate the clash within the social justice discourse between those embracing what could be considered a liberal identity consciousness, where all forms of politics, and struggles for oppression, are equated with identity politics, and those with a political consciousness, where struggles for oppression and justice are positioned within the logic of class struggle. Moreover, Anthony Gramsci (1997) is also presented in Chapter 3 as I find the Gramscian theory on hegemony, ideology and dominance to be useful alongside Fraser’s Social Justice Framework in unpacking the questions of spaces of hegemony and dominance.

Additionally, Chapter 3 introduces Besteman and the minority groups of southern Somalia through the political economy of stratification as experienced by the Gosha. Here Besteman states that members of the Bantu group, specifically the Gosha community of the Jubba valley, in Somali society are discriminated on the basis of class and ethnicity (Besteman, 1999). Besteman’s research illustrates the divergence between morality and ethics in that it presents the experience of inequality from the Gosha society in southern Somalia and their claims for recognition based on difference. Which is assumed not to be the case for the Gabooye collective.
The first parts of Chapter 4 present the theoretical core of the research: a literature review defining inequality. The chapter starts with a moral philosophical viewpoint in explaining inequality as a paradigm of justice, followed by a contemporary reasoning adhering to the school of critical theory. The review starts in the contractarian tradition of moral philosophy where the concept of justice is discussed as a phenomenon interconnected with the state, the divine and the individual. The chapter discusses how philosophers like Hobbes (1651/2008) and Locke (1689/1993) were influenced by their time in history and as such their understandings of justice, and therefore inequality, are representations of that. While somewhat similar in their understanding of how to formalise a social contract, there are great differences between the two theories; where Hobbes viewed the State of Nature as a form of moral decay, a state where individuals where free enough to enact violent and selfish acts, Locke held that the State of Nature was the true state of freedom as individuals were free to live their lives without interference (Locke, 1689/1993).

The early contractarian tradition is interesting to review for anyone interested in understanding how theories of justice, morality and ethics have formalised. Yet the tradition becomes highly relevant for the overarching objective of this research as the formulation of a social contract, as presented in it is most basic form within the contractarian tradition, does relates to the Somali Xeer, which functions as a legal charter, as well as a moral agreement, that secures the provision of justice, governs kinship relations as well as property rights. An introduction of Rawls (1974) and his theory of justice furthers this understanding. From this section we also understand that the distributive justice theory presented by Rawls fits rather well with the theory of justice present in Islam through the Holy Qur’an. However, we are also made aware that there are differences in the applicability of the theories and these differences are relevant for the context that is Somaliland. Islamic moral philosophy is also held to be integral to the modern understanding of justice, I would argue in general but also specifically for this thesis as the context explored is structured on the basis of Islamic principles. Justice is a recurring concept in Islamic moral philosophy, and it is considered the guiding principle of the Holy Qur’an and thus the life of any devote Muslim. Understanding how justice is formulated in Islam, as well as its application, is significant as the Xeer is dictated by these formulations.
Chapter 4 highlights the difficulties in formulating a class definition of Somali society as it is a much more dynamic social formation than previously maintained. Somali society has been described by both Somali and non-Somali authors as a society reliant on kinship relations and a society innately prone to violence and anarchy due to its reliance on kinship as its main organising element. As the beginning of this introduction mentions, Somali society has for a long time been described as a homogenous society with one ethnic group of people, speaking the same language and practicing the same religion. What these narratives fail to acknowledge, however, is that the history of the Somali people, as well as the different Somali territories, are far from homogenous.

As mentioned, notable scholars like Lewis have been praised for their extended scholarship on Somali society however Lewis’s work is also at times problematic, as the focus of violence and anarchy, as partly introduced and sustained by Lewis, is a notion widely held even in contemporary times, as the Somali territories are often clustered together and described in the narrative of one single failed state. Other scholars, like Samatar (1992) and Besteman (1999) have gone beyond Lewis’s primordialist view in describing both Somali history and society and instead they introduced concepts connecting issues like poverty and inequality to class dynamics and race. For instance, Samatar invokes a compelling scholarship on the social formation of Somali society by defining class in Somali society as a phenomenon established from both economic and political transformations throughout Somali history. The transformations include:

“(i) the commercialization of the subsistence economy, and particularly livestock, the material backbone of the traditional way of life; and (ii) the imposition of a colonial state on a decentralized social structure, and the creation of post-pastoral democratic nodes of power” (Samatar,1992: 631).

Hence, in order to understand contemporary Somali social relations, it is essential to grasp the outcomes of these two historical transformations. The chapter gives insights to the role of these transformations and accordingly the chapter also functions as the prelude for the analysis presented in Chapter 6.
In addition, the chapter pronounces the conflicting views that exist within the contemporary debate on inequality and what constitutes a just social life and correspondingly how to adequately redress the different types of claims for justice in our contemporary and globalised world.

Chapter 5 presents the reader with a contextual background to the over encompassing case study; Somali society. In this chapter, Somali society is introduced and discussed through a historical lens, yet it is worth mentioning at this introductive stage that this research is not a history thesis, thus the historical presentation given in this chapter reflects the historic relevance of this case study and therefore it does not claim to give a full encompassing account of all of Somali history.

Chapter 4, 5 and 6 confirm the usefulness of critical theory, Fraser’s framework and critical ethnography for this endeavour as it allowed the tracing of the implementation, or the lack thereof, of participatory parity for the Gabooye. The theories explored in the different chapters allows a better understanding of how identities have shifted in Somali society through different time periods. A time period in Somali society that was characterised by changes that have affected the participatory parity of minority clan members in Somaliland. Gramsci’s theories are employed in the analysis in Chapter 6 for the first objective, in tracing the ‘Rules of the Game’ and the ‘Rules of the Mind’, as presented by North (1990) and Balthasar (2018), as the notion of hegemony, ideology and dominance are argued to have affected the potential implementation for the participatory parity of the Gabooye during 1969- 1988 and hence also affected the current implementation.

Chapter 7 presents an analysis of the claims to justice given by the research respondents. Here the experience of the various dimension of inequality, misrecognition, maldistribution and misrepresentation, are reviewed and linked to the changes identified in the previous chapter. The chapter gives the reader a clear insight to the experience of inequality faced by those living in the margins of Somali society. This chapter also explores the spaces that are available in Somaliland in redressing the respondents’ claims to justice as well as placing those claims in the nexus of ethics and morality. All within the Somali context.
The thesis ends with Chapter 8 giving concluding comments. The chapter discusses the significance of this research’s critical approach to exploring Somali history; by using both an analysis and method that goes beyond the heterogenic formulation of Somali society; in defining the causal and dialectic relationship between class and clan in Somali society; as emphasised by the research problem; the lack of participatory parity for the Gabooye collective in Somaliland, and its identified outcomes and key findings; the need for a justice model that encompasses both ethics and morality.

The chapter also discusses how the research’s methodological approach allows for new ways to critically view Somali society and how the findings can allow for designing better developmental practises and policies, both international and national, aimed at targeting inequality in Somali society. The chapter concludes with recommended areas for further research.
Chapter 2: Methodology: Research Objectives and Question

In this chapter I present the objectives, the research questions and the methodology that guide this thesis. The first section of the chapter presents the research objectives and the research questions, followed by an explanation of the research strategy guiding the inquiry. The second section highlights the critical epistemology, ontology and methodology that informs the thesis. The ensuing sections explain the methods used in the field as well as during the process of analysis. The concluding section of this chapter describes the challenges faced as well as the limitations of the chosen methods.

The overarching objective of this thesis was to critically explore and describe how changes in Somali society during 1969-1988 altered clan and class identity. I was also interested in explaining the extent to which those changes were considered to have contributed to the current low socio-economic and political status of the Gabooye collective. The overarching objective was accordingly divided into two objectives covering two stages in time: the past and the present. The effort in the first objective was to:

- trace the transformation of clan and class identity in Somali society from 1969 to 1988, by analysing how the state institutionalised, and socialised, political and socio-economic arrangements that affected the participatory parity of the Gabooye collective.

Within this objective the aim was to gather data on the study population’s perceptions and beliefs on the extent to which those arrangements reflect the contemporary status of the Gabooye collective and correspondingly the claims of justice made by this group.

The second objective was placed in contemporary Somaliland and the aim was to:

- identify the institutional spaces available to address the claims to justice for members of the Gabooye collective.
Accordingly, this objective explored the current spaces as well as obstacles for emancipatory change and justice in Somaliland for members of the Gabooye collective in applying and implementing the principle of participatory parity.

The two research objectives were built on the following inquiry:

*How did changes in the Somali political economy during 1969-1988 affect principle of Participatory Parity for the Gabooye collective in Somaliland?*

The six following subsidiary questions were also used to complement the central research question, to provide another layer to the general inquiry as well as connecting the questions to the theoretical framework:

- What changes in the Somali political economy do people in Somaliland perceive to have affected class and clan identity and in what ways?

- To what extent are the changes in the Somali political economy in 1969-1988 perceived to reflect the current socio-cultural, economic and political status of minorities?

- To what extent are the changes in Somali political economy in 1969-1988 perceived to have affected the claims to justice made by minorities?

- What types of claims to justice do members of minority clans in Somaliland make today?

- What kind of remedies, affirmative or transformative, do institutions in Somaliland provide for minorities?
2.1 Abductive Design Strategy

The design strategy of the research inquiry followed abductive reasoning and according to Peirce (1967) there are three levels, or processes, to the abductive strategy: “initial hypothesis after an examination of data; the use of mental experiments to simplify the hypotheses; a model is abducted to provide a point, a view, or rationale, as an organizing idea to integrate the hypotheses” (Peirce in Blaikie, 2000:114). Pierce held that in contrast to inductive, deductive and retroductive strategies, which are all applicable to both the natural and social sciences, the abductive strategy is exclusive to the social inquiry. For Peirce, no inquiry, practical or scientific, can be based purely on inductive or deductive reasoning. All inquiries are instead reliant on the inferential step of abductive reasoning; hence inductive and deductive approaches are best replaced by the abductive approach (Blaikie, 2000; Psillos, 2011). Ultimately, according to Peirce, a model of inference must therefore start with abduction as the first step, followed by deduction and induction as the final step (Pierce in Blaikie, 2000).

I started out my abductive process with a consideration of a phenomenon, guided by specific observations from time spent in Somaliland. From these observations, or “surprising facts” as argued by Pierce, I then looked to what ontology on social inquiry that could best explain why a certain segment of the Somaliland population were experiencing systematised injustice (Pierce in Blaikie, 2000:116). In the deductive stage of this process, I then placed that ontology in a wider context of inequality, as a concept, and then by approaching a critical framework that explains the dialectics of class and clan during 1969-1988, as different forms of subordination, and their connection in the jurisdictions of morality and ethics in Somali society. The final step in this process, the inductive step, is to test the social inquiry, by deriving perceptions from the study population on the linkages between the changes in the clan and class identity during 1969-1988 and the status of minority clans and relating those perceptions to the theoretical framework. However, as one of the motives behind this research was to move beyond the current reductionist frameworks on the makings of inequality and justice, the focus here was also to modify the social inquiry by placing it in the Somali context. The abductive process enabled me to embark on a critical approach that explores issues of redistribution, recognition and representation, that is normative yet based on a
perspective that acknowledges customary and religious discourses relevant for their context.

The iterative process of research could be illustrated to look like this:

Figure 3: Iterative Abductive Design Cycle, Author, 2020
2.1.2 Critical Constructiveness and Islam

Creswell (2014) uses the term “philosophical worldview”, instead of epistemology and ontology, which are the study of knowledge and the study of reality, to describe “[…] a basic set of beliefs that guide action” (Guba, 1990: 17 in Creswell, 2014). It is further understood as a “philosophical orientation of the world and the nature of research that a researcher brings to a study” (Creswell, 2014:35). Critical theory is guided by a constructivist epistemology that understands the knowledge of reality as socially and historically constructed (Kincheloe, 2005). Focus thus lies on exploring how knowledge is context specific and consequently shapes an object of inquiry (Kincheloe, 2005). From an ontological point of view, however, focus is on uncovering how history and socio-culture influence the object of inquiry (Kincheloe, 2005). As a researcher, I adhere to the concept of critical constructivism as it welcomes critical thinking and seeks to expose the constructed relationship between power and knowledge in understanding the relationship between one’s consciousness and history. However, as a Muslim, the theory of knowledge defined in Critical theory differs from that of Islam. In Critical theory, the construction of knowledge is to a large extent tied to the notion of self-realisation and autonomy. In Islam, the theory of knowledge is comprised of five principles: Unity of Allah (SWT) Unity of creation; Unity of thought (reason and revelation); and Unity of man. Each of these principles are consolidated in the Tawhid, the origin of both Islamic epistemology and ontology (Barazangi, 1996: Mazlee, 2017).

The epistemological foundation of the Tawhid points to the monotheistic core of Islam, the Aqidah, and states Allah (SWT) as the sole creator and source of all knowledge. Social relations and history do not construct knowledge, nor is it self-regulated, but instead imparted to humans by Allah (SWT) through divine revelation (Barazangi, 1996). There are obvious epistemological and ontological dissensions between Critical theory and Islamic moral philosophy that raise questions. The contradiction between the two illustrates the existing contradictions that are present in the overall normative framework of this thesis: ethics and morality. This is also further explored in theory as well as in the empirical analysis. However, while acknowledging the contradiction that exists it is worth noting that I do not put effort in resolving that contradiction in this thesis.
Nonetheless, I see this research as an opportunity to go beyond the perceived dichotomy between western and Islamic discourses. Not only in the study of knowledge and reality but also on the concepts justice and inequality as I do consider both realms of knowledge to have formulations of morality and ethics that are of value in uncovering the extent of inequality in any given society but especially a society like Somaliland where there are assumed inconsistencies in the construction of the ‘good’ and the ‘right’.

Islamic moral philosophy, through the Tawhid, presents principles on social justice meant to guide the consciousness of the individual and the collective in leading a virtuous life free from disharmony. To me, this suggests that while Allah (SWT) is the sole creator and source of all knowledge, humans, when given divine revelation and reason, have the knowledge, the free will and the responsibility to tell wrong from right and accordingly oppose inequality. This reasoning is not far from how the theory of knowledge is constructed within the discourse of critical theory. Accordingly, to me, this is where both traditions come to guide my own view of reality, my understanding of social justice and consequently also the rationale behind this research.

In proposing a critical theory approach to analyse inequality, and accordingly social justice, in Somali society whilst adhering to a theory of knowledge that accepts Islamic metaphysics, there is perhaps an opportunity to overcome the mainstream conviction of the inherent conflict between these structures and instead move forward in finding equitable approaches that adequately consider the claims made by minorities in societies like Somaliland.

2.2. Research period and research site

The research period started in 2016 when I first enrolled in the research degree programme at the Development Planning Unit, however, the most intense and specific period of data collection was between March 2018 and December 2018. The 8-month data collection period included two fieldwork trips to Hargeysa, Somaliland. The first period of fieldwork was March to May 2018. The second fieldwork period was July to September 2018.
The primary research site was the capital of Somaliland, Hargeysa. I chose Hargeysa as the primary site for research as it is the biggest city in Somaliland, both geographically and in population. Hargeysa is also a city clearly divided along clan lines, which makes the capital of Somaliland particularly relevant for this thesis. Reliable census data on the population of Somaliland are hard to come by, however, recent research suggest that Hargeysa is home to 800,000, close to a quarter of the entire population of Somaliland (Kilcullen, 2019). Despite the economic development and political reconstructing of the past 29 years, Somaliland is still only considered a breakaway region of the Republic of Somalia (Kilcullen, 2019; Walls, 2014) Accordingly, the capital of Somaliland is, according to Kilcullen, an invisible city (Kilcullen, 2019). Yet I would argue that the homegrown political settlement of Somaliland, the self-financed rebuilding of the city of Hargeysa and the extensive reconstruction of social, political, and economic life are all factors that make Hargeysa an interesting research site.

2.2.1 Hargeysa, a divided city

As the history and culture of Somali society functions around the organisation of clan and kinship, having the city divided along clan lines is therefore not surprising. While the clan division is not an official\(^3\) one, the clan group’s access, or proximity to material resources such as land and housing but also infrastructure is very well portrayed in each of the five administrative districts: Ahmed Dhagax, Mohamoud Haybe, Ga’an Libax, 26 June, and Ibrahim Kood Buur. Members of stronger clan groups tend to have big houses with compound like grounds and at times service personnel such as domestic workers and private guards working for them. For instance, the area around Jig-Jiga Yar is where the political elite mostly reside and this area, in terms of infrastructure and commercial buildings, is better off than other areas of Hargeysa. The Gabooye reside in the north-eastern neighbourhood of Ga’an Libax called Daami.

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\(^3\) Information relating to clan division in this section is based on the author’s personal knowledge of the city.
Map of Hargeysa (Google Maps, 2021).

Another reason for choosing Hargeysa as the primary site for research was the increasing migration of members of the Gabooye from the rural parts of Somaliland, as well as the increasing number of economic migrants and refugees from bordering countries such as Ethiopia, Somalia, Puntland and as of lately Yemen and Syria. These inflows are expanding Hargeysa into an urbanised metropolis in the Somali peninsula and along with the emerging economic development of Somaliland, where Hargeysa is the central beneficiary of the small level of foreign direct investment that makes it to Somaliland, as well as the epicentre for returnees from the diaspora, the capital therefore makes for a good case of exploring the global rural to urban migration trends and the inherent forms of inequality that follow such trends. As an example, currently the diaspora is suggested to account for over USD 780 million of the inflow of cash to Somaliland and to Hargeysa specifically. The diaspora and the raw financial capital they bring into the country account for 60% of Somaliland’s financial flow (Kilcullen, 2019: Lindley, 2007). The diaspora is largely responsible for a sizable flow of remittances into Hargeysa, and according to Kilcullen, the remittances that are reaching Hargeysa are, in terms of capital,
larger than foreign aid, humanitarian assistance and trade (Kilcullen, 2019: Lindley, 2007). Apart from sustaining relatives in need with paying for household costs, the inflow of remittances also goes to consumer goods and some parts of it also goes back to the diaspora businesses. The diasporas financial strength is contributing to the development of Somaliland. However, the presence of the diaspora also creates an unequal access to resources among the different segments of the population, this furthers the gap of inequality in a country where there is no actual state led development planning and thus no state led interventions to address that gap (Kilcullen, 2019: Lindley, 2007).

Hargeysa is also a city that I know personally, as I was born there, and professionally due to previous research experience. However, during my time in Hargeysa I did utilise the help of gatekeepers in the recruitment process of respondents. Prior to leaving for fieldwork, I was in contact with a group of individuals that were familiar with the research context and therefore could aid me in contacting both potential gatekeepers and respondents of the community and institutions I intended to visit.

2.2.2 Untangling Daami, home of the Gabooye Collective

The word “Daami” can be argued to have several different meanings, however there are few, both academic and non-academic writings, that attempt to provide an actual heritage and meaning to the name. For instance, according to Vitturini travel writings from pre-colonial adventures in the Somali peninsula, and the northern areas specifically, suggest that the name comes from the combination of the two first syllabus of “Daanta Midganka” meaning “home of the Midgan” or ”settlement of the Midgan” (Vitturini, 2017). Vitturini also holds that the name Daami appeared in the travel writings of Swayne (1903), indicating that the presence of the word “Damel” in Swayne’s Seventeen Trips through Somaliland and a Visit to Abyssinia, where Swayne referred to the northern territories of Hargeysa as the “Damel Plain” could refer to the neighbourhood of Daami (Vitturini, 2017).

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4 A gatekeeper is a person from the community of study that stands between the researcher and potential respondents. Through the gatekeeper’s either personal or professional relationship the researcher can gain access to both respondents and research sites that are otherwise unreachable (Creswell, 2014).
On this account, Vitturini suggest that since Swayne’s usage of the word “Damel” is similar to the word “Daami”, Swayne was in fact describing the neighbourhood of Daami as early as 1903. However, as a native Somali speaker I would instead suggest that the word “Damel” used by Swayne more likely refers to the Damal tree, a common tree on the Somali plains used to host a Shir, rather than the name Daami. Again, as a Somali speaker, what is more plausible here is that the word ‘Daami’ is a reference to the open plains in which animal slaughter used to take place. In addition, Eno and Kusow correspondingly observe that the inhabitants of Daami are commonly referred to as “Reer Urayso” (Eno and Kusow, 2010:106). ‘Uray’ means “to stink” or “smelly” in Somali and the word ‘Reer’ relates to family and/or clan. Hence, the smelling connotation of the name could be associated with the smell of decaying animals that used to characterise the area when it was used for animal slaughter, yet the name also reveals the perceived polluting nature of the Gabooye collective.

The name “Fuckin” is also at times used to describe Daami or any given area of Daami. This name relates to the assumption that there is an extent of prostitution that takes place inside of Daami and therefore that specified area is named “Fuckin”. Daami is further known for being a hub for other illicit activities, such as the selling and consumption of alcohol and drugs. This further strengthens the prevailing notion among non-Gabooye members that the Gabooye are on the boundary of “Somaliness” as they are participating in such illicit and un-Islamic acts.

The fact that the city is divided along clan areas was especially useful for me when recruiting respondents as I could target respondents from the Gabooye collective in place while avoiding having to directly ask the clan affiliation of a potential respondent and allow for the geographical area to suggest the respondent’s clan affiliation. However, due to the extent of land plots being sold in Daami to non-Gabooye members, this was not always an easy task.

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Information relating to Somali pronunciation and meanings of words in this section is based on the authors personal knowledge of the language.
2.3. Critical Ethnography

Due to the critical focus of this thesis, critical ethnography naturally became the appropriate methodology. Madison (2004) argues that critical thinking and analysis requires theoretical understanding and that, contrary to conventional thinking, there should not be any tension between theory and method (Madison, 2004). Having already formulated a need for conducting a critical analysis to understand the relationship between class and clan allowed me to navigate between the different strands of social theory that are embedded in critical theory: the ethics that make up moral philosophy as well as the relationship of performance between practice and theory (Madison, 2004). As Madison writes, theory and practice could be considered the same, as theory can be used as a practical method in ethnography through its interpretive or analytical techniques (Madison, 2004).

In both conventional ethnography and critical ethnography, researchers aim to capture the meanings of a specific phenomenon from the views of participants, usually found as a culture-sharing group, by attending to the “logic of living” (Fitzpatrick, 2013). The “logic of living” implies that a researcher must spend a considerable amount of time in the research setting and become familiar with the social spaces of the setting by gaining trust and creating meaningful and reciprocal relationships (Fitzpatrick, 2013). However, critical ethnography goes beyond the “logic of living” by contextualising the social structures of the research setting into wider “[...], socio-historical and socio-political contexts, and, in so doing, directly questioning inequities” (Fitzpatrick, 2013:26).

This research and its methodology have adhered to the principles of critical ethnography and these principles, or tenets, include some of the key characteristics of critical ethnography outlined by May and Fitzpatrick (2019):

a) “Attention to issues of power, in/justice, and in/equity
b) Meaningful question setting
c) Relationships and reciprocity
d) Positionality, reflection, reflexivity
e) Social theory and power
f) An attempt to understand and communicate cultures

g) Time in the setting, “deep hanging out”

h) Qualitative research tools

i) Creating change and challenging inequities” (May and Fitzpatrick, 2019:8)

The methods used in critical ethnography rely on these tenets to gather data on specific issues using a mixture of interviews, observations, field notes, audio and visual documentary methods (May and Fitzpatrick; 2019). However, in contrast to grounded theory, the emphasis in critical ethnography is on exposing existing hidden agendas and power relations in the natural setting by testing the hypothesis derived from the theoretical perspective and the conceptual framework. Corresponding to critical theory, critical ethnography is built on the inference of theories derived from sociology, philosophy, history, and anthropology and according to Kinchloe and Maclaren (2000) critical ethnography is critical theory in practice (Kinchloe and Maclaren, 2000). Thomas (1993) asserts that critical ethnography does not stand in opposition to conventional ethnography, instead it is more inclined towards connecting the wider social structures of society to the relationship between power and knowledge (Tomas, 1993: May and Fitzpatrick, 2019). Accordingly, critical ethnography supplies a subversive perspective to the traditional field of cultural inquiry (Thomas, 1993). According to Fitzpatrick (2013), the focus of exposing social hierarchies and power relations, and placing them in relation to a universalised structure of hierarchy and power relations, is what transforms conventional ethnography into critical ethnography (Fitzpatrick, 2013). Consequently, critical ethnography as a method was advantageous for addressing the objectives of this thesis in simultaneously exploring the dialectics of clan and class identity and their intersection in the Somali context while explaining the structural agendas and power relations formulated during the 1969-1988 that reinforced class and clan identities and accordingly affected the participation parity of the Gabooye collective.
2.3.1 Research methods

Hennink, Hutter and Bailey (2012) assert that qualitative research is an approach that allows researchers to grasp the study population’s experiences, or beliefs, in detail by using a set of qualitative research methods. Methods include in-depth interviews, group discussions, observations, content analysis, personal narratives and visual imagery (Hennink et al., 2012). For Hennink et al. the ‘Design Cycle’ is the first component of the qualitative research cycle, which consists of three cycles: the design cycle, the ethnographic cycle, later referred to by Hennink et al. as the data collecting cycle, and the analytical cycle (Hennink et al., 2012). The first cycle includes four tasks that need to be considered in designing, and eventually adopting, an appropriate research approach:

1) Research Question,
2) Literature and Theory,
3) Conceptual Framework and
4) Fieldwork Approach

The design trajectory of my research corresponded with the ‘Design Cycle’ of the methodological framework on qualitative research. I started the research design process by formulating a research question, guided by a personal interest in the topic and region, yet the purpose of the research was framed by my philosophical worldview. Subsequently, I then refined and reviewed the central research questions, and the added subsidiary questions, using literature and theory on the central themes of my research. The next step was the development of an abductive conceptual framework that synopsises the themes, the guiding theory and the set of research questions that was to be explored in the field and accordingly in this thesis (Hennink et al. 2012). Once the conceptual framework was established, the next task to consider was the practical methods for primary data collection. The methods used in this research were accordingly non-participant observation and in-depth semi-structured key informant interviews and group interviews.
2.3. 2 Non-participant observation: Direct Observation

Early in the design process I decided to use observation as a way of increasing the validity of the study by observing the social behaviours and activities of the study population. This was done in an open-ended manner where focus was on direct observation, by observing in everyday life and making note of the extent social hierarchies and power relations are displayed, rather than directly participating and engaging in the social life of the study population. The non-participation observations were later used in the analysis to link the findings from the observation with the other data findings and the emergent themes. Participant observation is generally used within the field of anthropology as a method to engage deeply in the community and culture set out to research (May and Fitzpatrick, 2019: Fitzpatrick, 2013). As stated, critical ethnography uses “time in the setting” and “deep hanging out” as important tenets to the method, however it does not fully rely on immersion of the research site by the researcher as does conventional ethnography.

The non-participation observation nature of the methodology carried out in the research field reflects this. While I consider it unavoidable to not participate in Somali society, due to my Somali heritage, I did decide early on to conduct direct observation as a method to data gathering rather than full participant observation. I decided against full participant observation as I see it as an impossible undertaking given my known role as a researcher in the communities I wanted to research, but also as I do not consider the culture of my study population to differ much from my own culture. Hence, I did not have a strong urge to “attempt to understand and communicate cultures”, instead I was interested in understanding the study population’s specific beliefs regarding a specific matter. Because direct observation as a method is not reliant on a confined setting or a group, I could apply my method more freely and often. This allowed me to observe the behaviour and relationships of a larger segment of the study population whilst being able to connect that to the specific study population. For instance, I did not live in Daami during my time in the field as I reasoned that living there would only skew the data I would get through both interviews and observations as both my clan identity and researcher position would disconnect me further from the target group and instead provide superficial data. Instead, I lived in another area of Hargeysa and I reasoned that coming and going to the
research site only to conduct interviews and/or to socialise with the individuals I knew in the area would gain me access to data that was “less” skewed. Consequently, I utilised my method of direct observation in the town centre and markets where a majority of members from the Gabooye collective go on a daily basis due to the unambiguous division of labour that requires them to be there. However, due to the nature of social research, where a total disconnect from society is difficult, I also applied direct observation in the area where I lived and in my daily interactions with other people.

By focusing my observation to a setting outside of Daami I feel I could better get a sense of the behaviours and the relationships that I was interested in uncovering. The same type of observation technique was used for the second target group. This focus of direct observation is characterised by the presence of focused ethnography in my methodology. I found in the design stages of the research project that the traditional assumptions of ethnographic field work, for instance longitudinal data gathering, did not apply to my research and hence I used aspects of focused ethnography and incorporated that to the tenets of my critical ethnographic method. Focused ethnography is considered a method on its own within the field of ethnography and as the name suggests, its purpose is useful for researchers that are more engaged in a specific set of questions as well an extent of insider knowledge of the population studied (Morse and Richards, 2002). Through direct observations and my informal interactions, with both members from the Gabooye collective and non-Gabooye members, at times members from my own family, I could gain a better understanding of the strained relationship between members from the Gabooye collective and non-Gabooye members as well as what it means to be a Somalilander along the different status orders. For instance, the challenges of marriage discussed in the analysis. Coupled with my own knowledge of the context, and my own Somali heritage, I consider these interactions as valuable sources of data as they also revealed the extent to which Somali identity, collective and individual, is constructed along clan affiliation.

2.3.3 Key Informant Interviews and group interviews

As mentioned, I used interviews as a method for gathering data as interviews are considered useful for providing historical accounts of a specific event. In the field I
conducted semi-structured face-to-face key informant interviews and group interviews in order to uncover subjective responses on the complex questions the research seeks to address (Creswell, 2011; McIntosh and Morse, 2015). According to McIntosh and Morse (2015), semi-structured interviews are:

[...] designed to ascertain subjective responses from persons regarding a particular situation or phenomenon they have experienced. It employs a relatively detailed interview guide or schedule and may be used when there is sufficient objective knowledge about an experience or phenomenon, but the subjective knowledge is lacking (McIntosh and Morse, 2015: 1).

In addition, key informants are useful when collecting data from various individuals within a community and the purpose of using key informants is to reach individuals within the targeted community who knows what is going on (Given, 2008; Lavrakas, 2008). In designing my research instrument, that is the interview guide, I followed the steps outlined by McIntosh and Morse:

”(a) identify the domain of the topic under investigation including its boundaries,

(b) identify the categories of the topic, and

(c) identify the question stems” (McIntosh and Morse, 2015: 5).

Subsequently, once the interview guide is designed it should be critiqued and tested which I did by circulating the research instrument to individuals with a knowledge of both the language and the research context. While fluent in Somali myself, I felt that in allowing feedback from more experienced researchers I gained valuable insights on how to best approach the process of interviewing vulnerable groups as well as how to best approach the delicate questions in the Somali language. However, as with most research, once out in the field everything does not go according to plan and naturally there were incidents during my time in the research field that required me to rethink my pre-designed research approaches. For instance, it became rather clear in the first couple of weeks of data collection that a majority of women from the Gabooye collective did not
want to be interviewed on their own. This was interesting, albeit problematic as my initial research design relied on an overrepresentation of this specific group for my key informant interviews. However due to reluctance from some of the approached participants I had to reconsider my approach and instead introduce group interviews as a part of the overall method for data collection.

While group interviews are a good methodological approach for getting rich data on everyday knowledge, it is also an approach to data collection that is more dynamic, as it involves more people, and therefore it is an approach prone to more issues. Accordingly, with this in mind I had to design a strategy for conducting interviews in a group setting with multiple respondents and such a strategy included a framework for how to manage a group interview in an equitable way. For instance, I had to be adequately prepared for the dynamics that might arise during a group setting, such as power dynamics relating to status and possible differing clan affiliations. In instances where there were apparent power dynamics between the members of the group, I would do my best to allow for an environment where all participants felt that they could talk freely and be listened to.

Because the research is informed, both in theory and practice, by a critical narrative, the questions in the research instrument concentrated on the study population’s perceptions and beliefs on how the changes that happened between 1969-1988 are reflected in the current status of minorities and correspondingly the claims of justice made by members of minority clans. The research instrument had 19 open-ended questions and most of the interviews were between 40 to 90 minutes, where the average interview was around 45 minutes. However, due to the time constraints of some of the respondents, a few interviews were as short as 7 minutes and others 10 or 15 minutes. All interviews had the same set of semi-structured questions and the interviews opened with general exploratory questions about the meaning of inequality in Somaliland and within the Somali society. This was followed by more questions relating to inequality as an experience and who it affects. However, due to the different target groups and data sets expected, as well as the time constraints of some of the respondents, I had to augment the questions when interviewing the two target groups. For instance, when interviewing government officials, I would instead ask more probing questions relating to spaces for change and claims for justice.
2.4 Research sample, saturation, and data collection

The two objectives of the research firmly guided the selection of the study population, which in the end covered 60 respondents, divided into 2 target groups and accordingly two expected sets of data. The initial primary study population were 50 women and men, represented as 26 women and 34 men, from the Gabooye collective between the ages of 25 and up. I decided to have this group as a specific target group as it was assumed that interviewing them would generate a unique set of data.

The secondary target group were 10 Somali men and women from non-governmental and governmental institutions involved in the promotion of equal rights for Gabooye members. The numerical guideline for the sample size of the study population was decided against the time frame and scope of the research (Bernard, 2000: Creswell, 2014). As previously mentioned, there is also a lack of credible census data in Somaliland and therefore it is difficult to determine the actual size of the population and instead the numerical guideline of the sample size was decided against the time and the suggestions of other samples within the field of ethnographic study, which usually are around 30-60 samples (Bernard, 2000; Creswell, 2014). In addition, sample adequacy is preferred within qualitative research over generalisability (Mandal, 2018). Where quantitative research is focused on generalisability as a method of external validity, that is looking into the extent to which the results of data collected could be reproduced in another setting or another population, sample adequacy within qualitative research is instead used to explore the range of perspectives and opinions from the respondents and hence the richness of the data collected, rather than the representative number of the population and the extent to which various measurements are generalisable to other populations (Mandal, 2018).

It is also argued, by Mandal (2018), that sample adequacy is a way of testing whether saturation of data has been reached or not, as all relevant data of a specific event or phenomenon is gathered (Mandal, 2018). Therefore, due to the absence of a statistical representative sample size, when compared to the rigid statistical tools applied in quantitative research, saturation is often applied as yet a method of quality assurance within the field of qualitative research (Mandal, 2018). Saturation, in its most straightforward description, specifies that the researcher stops collecting data when no
new information is emerging from the different data sets, when there is enough data to replicate the study in another setting and when no new codes are found (Mandal 2018: Fusch and Ness, 2015).

For this research it was reasoned that 60 respondents were the adequate sample size due to the aforementioned reasons. I was aware of the probability of reaching saturation, which I felt I had reached at around 25 interviews, as my sample size and triangulation was designed for that purpose as well as having pre-determined categories from the framework and the extent of homogeneity within the study population. However, I decided to continue with the remaining in-depth interviews and group interviews to ensure that I had a suitable mix of both rich and thick data. I applied density as a way of capturing new perspectives and concepts that could explain the data already collected as well as fill the gaps of data missed. I did so by introducing questions on the relationship between class and clan on a different level than before. For instance, when I asked about class as a concept in Somaliland, the initial data set would indicate that class was an unlikely status order of stratification in Somaliland. However, when I introduced the issue of exogamy between the clans it became clear that the presence of a class structure was more visible than initially held in the first 25 interviews. In deciding to keep collecting data after saturation was reached, I could uncover added dimensions of inequality that I had previously not theorised in my framework, like that of endogamy as a means of power and social stratification through a sophisticated system of cross-class and clan alliances. A system that members from the Gabooye collective have historically been excluded from.

Initially, I looked to recruit individuals with a living memory of the time period at focus and therefore age was set as an integral characteristic in the sampling and recruitment process. Accordingly, it was designed so that the age band would start at 25, however

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6 Triangulation is a method applied for reaching data saturation. Having multiple data collecting methods, such as direct observation, interviews and group interviews in this case, one can easier look into the different aspects of perspectives of the same empirical event or phenomenon (Fusch & Ness, 2015)

7 Density, as a concept, is used by the researcher as a tool to make sure that all the relevant properties of a category have been covered and from that demarcate each category, allowing for a more powerful theory (Mandal, 2018)
after appreciating the need for younger Somalilander’s experience of inequality on the basis of clan affiliation, the age band was set to start at 20, however there was no upper cut off. In rethinking my recruitment characteristics, I could better ensure a mix of perceptions from respondents with a living memory of the changes with accounts from younger respondents on the current status of minority clans as a result of the changes in 1969-1988.

In total I conducted 22 individual semi-structured in-depth key informant interviews and 8 group interviews with the engagement of 48 respondents. Each group had between 2 and 5 members per group and the total of participants from the primary target group was 49 and 11 from the secondary target group. The numbers for the primary target group differ here from the intended 50, and the intended 10 in the secondary target group, as some of the respondents were representative of both groups. For instance, I had members from the primary target group that were also government officials. Additionally, the secondary group ended up being mixed with participants outside of the initial second target group of men and women from non-governmental and governmental institutions. I decided to include a wider assortment of participants from the wider public to introduce new opinions and perspectives as well as avoiding “the shaman effect” which is described as a process in which participants with a specific expertise on a topic might overshadow the data collected (Fusch and Ness, 2015: 1410). For instance, I interviewed government officials and non-governmental representatives within various fields of development planning in Somaliland and while their expertise on the topics were considered valuable for this thesis, having a mix of participants allowed for a more nuanced data set.

I conducted all interviews on my own, however, as mentioned, I was at times accompanied by a local gatekeeper. To adhere to the respondents’ busy schedules and various life circumstances, most interviews were conducted at the preferred time and place of the respondents. For instance, when interviewing respondents from the first target group, interviews took place either in their homes or spaces nearby their homes in the Daami settlement. Respondents in the second data set often preferred being interviewed either at their own offices or at a café or restaurant in the town centre. The interviews were audio-recorded with a digital recorder, unless otherwise agreed, and notes were taken during and after each interview. All interviews except one were
conducted in Somali and once the data was securely transferred, according to UCL Research Ethics Committee’s data transfer and data storage guidelines, it was translated and transcribed from Somali to English. The data was also anonymised using a numerical identification system. Prior to each interview, each participant was asked to read and sign a consent form in Somali, and English where needed, stating the purpose of the research, the required involvement of the participant in the research and the treatment of data collected. Recruited participants that had difficulties reading or writing were instead given an oral delivery of the written consent form and once they agreed to participate the respondents could either mark the consent form with an “X” or sign their name.

The selection process for all respondents was based on a non-probability sampling method, however, as there was a need to apply a sampling strategy that could easily identify respondents from the primary group, while acknowledging the complexities of identifying respondents based on clan affiliation, I consequently had to use a multiple stage sampling method that mixed both purposive and snowballing method. Hence, the study population were divided along the following characteristics: geographical area, gender, and age. Snowballing as a sampling method was useful when recruiting respondents from both target groups, specifically respondents from the Gabooye collective as the success of the method is reliant on respondents informing the researcher about other potential respondents with the same characteristics.

While clan affiliation was an integral variable for defining the primary target group it is also a sensitive variable and I decided to use an objective indicator instead, such as area of settlement, as it is considered a more appropriate category of identification as well as a category often used by Somalilanders. Due to this, the Daami neighbourhood, known as the main living area of the primary target group, functioned as my principal site for recruitment and data collection from this specific target group.

Prior to collecting data in the field, considerable amount of time was spent conducting desk-based research in London in order to identify gaps of information, contextualise the research background and topic yet also to supplement primary data in the field with necessary secondary data. The largest chunk of secondary data for this research is made up of the theoretical framework, which includes a literature review of the concepts of justice and inequality as well a historical background to the Somali case study. However, the secondary data also covers existing literature on the history of Somaliland, where
focus lay on tracing the dialectic relationship between class and clan and inequality and justice.

2.4.2 Data analysis and coding

Data was analysed and interpreted using thematic analysis informed by the adapted Social Justice Framework yet the approach to data analysis was also supplemented by both the critical constructive approach as well as the iterative process of abduction. The critical nature of both my epistemology and ontology allowed me to constantly reflect on the data collected and abduction improved my ability to navigate the placement of the inquiry. Thematic analysis is used for coding qualitative material and it is held as useful in ethnographic methods for identifying and analysing patterns or themes from both primary and secondary data (Boyatzis, 1998; Braun and Clarke, 2006).

The thematic analysis for this research was supplemented with the software programme NVivo 12 to register and code the patterns and themes emergent from the data. As a first step in the analysis process, I focused on identifying codes relating to the main objectives of the research; that is how changes to the identified structures during 1969-1988 altered the current participation parity of the Gabooye collective and the claims for justice from the Gabooye collective and the spaces to address such claims. Through the codes that appeared from the analysis, and registered in NVivo, I then contextualised the themes and sub-themes and related them to the pre-determined codes from the Social Justice Framework (see Chapter 5.1). For instance, in NVivo 12, I had central nodes with the codes S1, S2 and S3. These codes stood for the three main structures of the Social Justice Framework misrecognition (S1), maldistribution (S2) and misrepresentation (S3). In each of the nodes there were sub-nodes signifying the affirmative and transformative elements of each code: clan deconstruction, clan differentiation, income redistribution, income transfer, participation, and representation. I also had a code category labelled “Spaces For Change”. Within this category, I could code findings relating to the areas for change that I was looking into, such as; civil law, customary law, and Shari’a law.
Apart from the codes that were attached to the Social Justice Framework and the Spaces for Change, I also used free nodes to tie the analysis to the literature and not just the framework. I used free nodes to introduce new categories to the theory and literature that I had previously not accounted for into the analysis. At this stage of the research, I coded the appropriate data set to free nodes such as: 

- reification, 
- alienation, 
- subjetivity, 
- universality, 
- false consciousness, 
- division of labour, 
- gender and intermarriage.

Once I had coded the data sets to the nodes, I could see the themes that appeared from the coding and in the end of this iterative process I landed in the following themes: 

- Recognition, 
- Redistribution and 
- Representation.

I also used the framework in the software to trace the free nodes back to the respondents, using the translated interview transcripts and thus establish a wider sense of what each target group had said about a specific free node. For instance, what was the general response around “clan affiliation” amongst individual men and women, groups, and key informants.
Once I had identified my themes, using the codes, I could apply theory from the Social Justice Framework, as my analysis, to trace the structures in society during 1969-1988 that changed and consequently altered class and clan identity and thus affected the participation parity of the Gabooye collective and hence their contemporary status. The framework was consequently used to analyse the type of claims made by minorities in Somaliland, within which spaces, and/or institutions, members of minorities can make claims for justice and how such institutions and or spaces redress their claims.

2.5. Ethics and limitations to research approach: Positionality and reflexivity for a native researcher

There are many elements affecting the potential quality of all qualitative research, however, some of the specific limitations accounted for in this research are the following: data collection methods, participant recruitment, data saturation and the positionality of the researcher. For instance, reliance on gatekeepers as well as key informant interviews are likely to involve difficulty in identifying an informant group that is diverse enough
to be representative of the study population. The snowballing sampling technique, as a whole, is to an extent inherently prone to bias as the process is reliant on respondents referring to individuals they know with similar characteristics and attitudes, therefore the respondents could have inevitably influenced the informants selected and subsequently the data collected. However, there is no way of knowing if the respondents influenced each other or not. Another limitation is saturation. Saturation is recognised as the “gold standard” for validating data within qualitative research. Leading scholars within the field of research methodology, like Fusch and Ness (2015), consider that research without saturation is failed research (Fusch and Ness, 2015).

Correspondingly, Morse (2015) argues that saturation should be present in all qualitative research. While I applied the usage of saturation as a way of ensuring the quality of data collected, and as a means to avoid redundancy in the data, I would argue that the lack of a proper definition of saturation as a concept, and consequently the difficulty in determining when data is authentically saturated, may also affect the quality of data. In addition, having so many different approaches to the usage and the meaning of saturation will confuse any researcher, not just the novice researcher, possibly leading to a lack of rich data or not enough data. Another issue that may affect the quality of qualitative data is having pre-determined, or recognised, labels or categories for coding as this could also lead to biased data sets and to an extent “thin” data. While I am aware of the fact that my framework had pre-determined codes and categories, I maintain that it was the best approach for this research project and this thesis in reaching, not only data saturation but also in highlighting the degree to which the applied approach to data saturation follows the analysis and the theory.

According to Madison (2004), critical ethnography starts with the researcher’s ethical responsibility. Ethical responsibility requires the researcher to have a strong commitment “[...] to address processes of unfairness and injustice within a particular lived domain” (Madison, 2004:5). Ethical responsibility is further described as a “[...] compelling sense of duty and commitment based on moral principles of human freedom and wellbeing, and hence a compassion for the suffering of living beings” (Madison, 2004:4). Guided by ethical responsibility, the researcher feels moral obligation towards changing the conditions and in contrast to conventional ethnography, where normative drives and biases taint the research, critical ethnographers welcome the normative and political
position guiding the researcher as “[…] a means of invoking social consciousness and societal change” (Thomas, 1993:4). The ethical responsibility for me in this research inquiry was in clarifying the prospects, or the spaces, for emancipatory change and justice in Somaliland for members of minority clans, like members of the Gabooye collective.

Accordingly, my role as a researcher, a diaspora Somali with ties to a subsection of a majority clan group did at times limit my interaction with the primary target group and it also raised bias towards the data produced by the respondents as well as data collected by me. While aware of the complexity and the sensitivity of the topics discussed, and the exposure of the respondents in the field, it was at times difficult to experience the level of suspicion that my diaspora identity along with my clan affiliation seemed to generate. As far as possible, I tried not to disclose my clan affiliation, however, as previously mentioned, Hargeysa is a city divided along clan lines and usually stating your place of residence is enough to give away your clan affiliation. While I tried not to disclose my clan heritage, to avoid “corrupting” myself and the research, I found it unethical to lie about my heritage, hence, when asked I would be truthful. In addition, normative motives are welcomed in critical ethnography as the principle of ethical responsibility lies in the constant awareness of one’s positionality (Madison, 2004).

Positionality is a concept used within the field of critical ethnography and Noblit, Flores and Murillo (2004) note that while the purpose for researchers opting for critical ethnography as their methodology, in contrast to traditional ethnography, is in achieving social change, the approach lacks a deeper understanding of the real need for positionality (Madison, 2004). Positionality is defined as a tool of knowledge, and analysis in certain aspects, as it forces researchers to acknowledge the power structures and the biases we constitute and reproduce due to our own identities and relations, and not only the identities, social relations and power structures of those we study (Madison, 2004). Fine (2004) uses Habermas’s outline for social inquiry when discussing the three major positions in qualitative research: the ventriloquist, the positionality of voices and

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8 Habermas’s model for social inquiry included; a) natural science model, where the researcher’s invisibility allows for an empirical analysis and the social world can thus be better measured, predicted and transmitted; b) the historical and the interpretive model is where the social phenomenon is elaborated through philosophy; c) the critical theory model is where social life is politically criticized and exposed and alternative models are introduced to overcome the oppression of capitalism (Habermas in Madison, 2004: 6)
activism. The first position highlights how the researcher, like a neutral and non-existent ventriloquist, only transmits information (Fine, 2004). The second position reflects how the research subjects are the leading actors and how their voices and experiences are in focus (Fine, 2004). While the researcher is present in this scenario, he or she has an exceedingly small role and they are often not addressed. The last point touches on the researcher’s role as a representative advocate for the marginalised in both critiquing and exposing the dominant hegemony and working towards equitable alternatives. (Fine: 2004: Madison, 2004).

As representation always has consequences it is therefore important to allow for what is called “reflective ethnography” to critically unpack how one’s research impacts others as well as the researchers own experience of power and domination. The term “Mojado” was used by researcher Murillo to describe the tensions he experienced with his own identities whilst conducting research in his native Mexico. According to Murillo, “Mojado” which means “wetback” in Spanish, is used in a negative connotation by the Mexican diaspora in the US to describe illegal immigrants that cross over from Mexico (Noblit et al., 2004). “Mojado”, for Murillo, symbolises the distrust and the sense of being an outsider the immigrant experiences from their “own” community once they are in the US. In the research context, “Mojado” highlight the blurred lines that occur when:

Other becomes researcher, narrated becomes narrator, translated becomes translator, native becomes anthropologist, and how one emergent and intermittent identity continuously informs the other (Noblit et al., 2004: 166: Madison, 2004: 7)

I had my own sense of “Mojado” whilst in Hargeysa, although the appropriate word to use in this context would be the Somali word “Qurbo Joog”, a word often used to describe a person that either comes from the outside or lives outside. The “outside” in this context represents the outside of the various Somali regions. The term has negative connotations as it implies that one has left their real “Somaliness” behind in the pursuit of success elsewhere. While I could be considered a “Qurbo Joog”, I do think of myself as a member of the overall Somali community, yet I am also aware that I represent a part of society, through my clan and class identity, that historically have been considered both dominant and privileged. With this membership, and through that position of power, I may have, unwillingly, prolonged the extent of inequality experienced by minority clan members.
The complexities of this made the process of reflection an important and an on-going part of my research methodology. In ethnographic studies the emic and etic perspectives are outlined in such a manner that the emic perspective represents an insider’s view to research, such as fieldwork, and the etic gives a representation of the outsider perspective, such as comparative surveys (Madison, 2004). The emic perspective is held to represent the researcher and the etic the culture that is being studied (Madison, 2004). Traditionally, the two perspectives have been held apart, but I would argue that my research and the complex process of data gathering gives a good example of the need to address the tension between the two perspectives as well as considering better working tools for approaching them at the same time. Kanhua (2000) highlights this relationship in stating that the native researcher almost always approaches the research project from the emic perspective and that:

The native researcher chooses not only a project in which she is deeply situated, whether by geography, tradition, or simply “in-side” experience, but also one in which she is invested in those factors and others as they in-form the “act” of research (Kanhua, 2000: 441).

In the crucial moments of reflection, I often asked myself; am I adding to the oppression of inequality and stratification that members of the Gabooye collective are experiencing, through my inherited proximity to the mechanism that construct the outspoken forms of oppression? In honesty, I did harbour a sense of guilt, daily, talking about the history and the experience of inequality. This was especially noticeable when interviewing a group of young female students who I felt could relate to on many levels yet knowing that due to our differing placement in the clan and class hierarchy, as well as the hegemony of the subject-object positions in research, we are given different opportunities and accordingly we have different experiences of life as young Somali women. At times I also felt silly asking the questions I did because I could tell that it was expected, or assumed, that because of my clan affiliation, my closeness to the mechanism of oppression, that I already knew the answers. I could not help but feel that the research, and my role as a researcher, was not useful to this community in the sense that it might never actually change anything for them. Despite the normative frame of my research project and no matter the reassurance given about the significance of the ensuing thesis; at the end of the day, I was an outsider, at best disguised as an insider, extracting these
very personal stories of inequality and oppression and like many other researchers before me I would also leave.

Charlotte Aull Davis (2004) statement exemplifies these thoughts:

The ethnographer moves on. [But] temporally, spatially and developmentally, the people he or she studied are presented as if suspended in an unchanging and virtually timeless state, as if the ethnographer’s description provides all that it is important, or possible, to know about their past and future (Davis in Madison 2004: (p. 156).

I felt in those instances that perhaps it was even worse having a Somali researcher come and do research on these topics, conceivably because this person actually has an intimate understanding of the issues that are going on, but despite that might not have the capacity to change anything. Instead, I felt that the research and the interviews became a tool for some kind of perverted confirmation of reality and that it was actually reproducing the very thing that the research set out to address. Perhaps this is different for a non-Somali researcher as they may not have the same emotional ties to the questions at hand and still have a sense of being able to change things. Possibly as if their normative responsibility as researchers is tied to their “outsiderness” and mine becomes corrupted because of my “insiderness”. Yet, despite all of this, I would still stress the need for having researchers with ties to the culture they are researching, conduct qualitative ethnographic research, but I sustain that it is not completely unproblematic.

2.5.1 Going beyond the boundaries of conventional ethnography

I would argue that the assumptions as well as the approaches about traditional anthropological ethnography do not hold for my own research approach in the field. For instance, I do not consider it necessary to have to conduct long-term anthropological research, expanding several years, to gain credible and valuable data about a sociological topic. While Murillo adequately mentions the problematic tensions of conducting ethnographic research as a native researcher in his “Mojado”, this is a topic seldom discussed within the field of ethnographic anthropology. As notably stated by Kanuha, ethnography as an anthropological approach to social research was initially used as a tool for scientific research by white male heterosexual researchers, who were unfamiliar with,
not just the areas and people of study but also with anything that was not corresponding with their own identity (Kanuha, 2000). Hence, approaches such as “going native” became essential in gaining access to insights on the “native” and the “savage” (Kanuha, 2000). Yet, what about those researchers that are conducting ethnographic studies on their own communities or social identity groups that they have a historical and social connection to? How do we validate the intimate knowledge of the background and the context we have and are we less credible because we do not need to spend as much time in the field as a researcher that has never been to the area of study?

At the same time, it is often assumed within this field that a researcher familiar with the culture studied would have better access to obtaining data due to a lack of boundaries. However, this is not always the case. While it could be assumed that I would easily navigate the context of my research field, in contrast to a researcher unfamiliar with the same context, because of my intimate knowledge of both context and language, it was far from easy.

A way for me to reconcile with the two perspectives, outsider versus insider, was to constantly affirm and acknowledge the difficulties the research introduced, by allowing reflection as a part of my daily work. Another way was to affirm that the knowledge and skill set that I have as a native researcher differs from that of an outside researcher. While some aspects of conducting research might be difficult, as mentioned above, others are easier and possibly made better because of my knowledge and skills set. A good example of that is the debatable interpretation of Somali words by non-Somali speakers, mentioned earlier in this chapter. To me, this, among many other cases, illustrates the need for researchers like myself, that have adequate language skills and background knowledge to the area of study, in giving more nuanced, and frankly at times more suitable, accounts of reality than those that are presented, and held to be true, by non-local/native researchers. Somali history has for far too long been shaped by non-Somali scholars and while it is acknowledged that the scholarship given by many of the scholars mentioned throughout this thesis are valuable to the field of Somali studies, I would, however, argue that there is a need for not only this type of research, that is research conducted by a Somali researcher, but also the type of critical analysis the research provides of both the case study, the theories and methods used to assess it.
Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework

In this chapter, there will be a detailed overview of Fraser’s Social Justice Framework as this thesis employs the framework for explaining the causal, or dialectic, relationship between class and identity in Somali society and correspondingly the participatory parity of the Gabooye collective in Somaliland. Along with many other critical theorists, Fraser has remained critical of the concept of identity politics as it is held that identity politics is too concerned with reifying repressive notions of communitarian identity, hence Fraser asks a critical question: “Is recognition a matter of justice or self-realisation?” (Fraser and Honneth, 2003: 27). In asking this question, Fraser suggests that there is a dissonance between the two key factors of moral philosophy: Morality and Ethics (Fraser, 1996: Fraser and Honneth, 2003). Matters concerned with justice are framed within the context of morality as they are addressing issues of “the right”. However, matters regarding self-realisation are held to belong in the realm of “ethics” as they are concerned with “the good” (Fraser and Honneth, 2003: 27pp). These two norms are illustrated for Fraser through the works of Kant’s “Moralität” and Hegel’s Sittlichkeit (Fraser, 2003). Fraser argues that because there are two compelling norms to understanding justice, there ought to be two separate solutions to remedy inequality. Fraser therefore promotes remedies for justice that are reliant on distributive aspects of justice, based on a Universal approach. In her work this takes shape in both the Hegelian concept of recognition, which is framed as the intersubjective approach and the Marxists understanding of redistribution which in turn is derived from the subjective Kantian notion of Moralität.

3.1 Social Justice Framework

The core of Fraser’s social justice theory states that claims for redistribution are focused on the abolishment of the underlying economic factors that reinforce group specificity, for example the feminist demand to overcome the gendered division of labour (Fraser, 1996). Claims for recognition, on the other hand, are reliant on the promotion of group specificity. The problem here, as stated by Fraser, is how the politics of recognition and redistribution have contradictory aims. Fraser asserts that the two claims can even work against each other (Fraser, 1996). Fraser uses the exploitation of Marx’s working class to describe the claims for redistribution. The working class, rooted in the political economy
of society, is the group within the capitalist system required to sell their labour power under the exploitation of the capitalist class. The capitalist class is the group benefitting in the capitalist order as they appropriate the surplus productivity of the working class (Fraser, 1996: Fraser and Honneth, 2003). Inequality thus materialises in the lack of distribution between the two classes. The solution for overcoming inequality thus lies in redistribution of the surplus. Gaining redistribution, however, requires restructuring the class structure in its most radical form: abolishing itself as a class. Here, redistribution, through restructuring the class system, is the best remedy for addressing inequality for the working class, not recognition (Fraser, 1996: Fraser and Honneth, 2003).

Furthermore, a group that is rooted in the cultural structures of society, however, only exists as a group by virtue of the dominant social discourse and not by the division of labour (Fraser, 1996: Fraser and Honneth, 2003). These groups are better considered within the lines of Weber’s status group as they are defined by their relations of recognition and not by the relations of production, as are the Marxian classes (Fraser, 1996: Fraser and Honneth, 2003). The structural inequality experienced by these members is therefore rooted in the cultural structure of that society. Since the experience of inequality is traceable to the cultural-valuation structure, the solution to overcome inequality thus lies first in cultural recognition, not first in political-economic redistribution (Fraser, 1996). Here homosexuality is used as an example. Fraser writes that sexuality is a “[...] mode of social differentiation whose roots do not lie in the political economy, as homosexuals are distributed throughout an entire class structure of capitalist society” (Fraser, 1996: 77). However, gay, and lesbian individuals occupy no special position in the division of labour and neither do they have the traits of the collectively exploited class. Instead, their mode of collectivity is based on a rejected sexuality, which is rooted in the ‘cultural valuation structure’ (Fraser, 1996:77).

From this description we can read that while Fraser’s framework is reliant on Marx to explain the makings of classes, the framework breaks down inequality in a manner that does not correspond purely with class. Instead, Fraser argues that the inequality experienced by gay and lesbian individuals in this context is a matter of recognition, not redistribution, as these individuals are victims of an authoritative heterosexism (Fraser,
Because of a social pattern within society that privileges heterosexuality they will experience homophobia (Fraser, 1996: Fraser and Honneth, 2003). The cultural devaluation of sexuality can however transpire to serious economic inequality as the act of discrimination itself can lead to the denial of legal rights and equal protection (Fraser, 1996). For instance, being dismissed from work and/or being denied welfare services (Fraser, 1996). Yet Fraser sustains that inequalities in this context are more rooted in the cultural valuation structure than the political economic one as overcoming inequality becomes a matter of recognition and not redistribution due to the cultural structure traits attached to overcoming that inequality. Only through recognition, by changing the structure of the culture of valuation, can gay and lesbian individuals “[…] revalue a despised sexuality, to accord positive recognition to gay and lesbian sexual specificity” (Fraser, 1996: 78). Yet Fraser acknowledges that socio-economic inequality and cultural inequality reinforce each other dialectically as “[…] cultural norms that are unfairly biased against some are institutionalized in the state and the economy: meanwhile, economic disadvantage impedes equal participation in the making of culture, in public spheres and in everyday life” (Fraser, 1996: 73). The crucial point in Fraser’s framework, however, is that they demand separate solutions: redistribution or recognition, while requiring both claims (Fraser, 1996).

3.1.2 A Critical discussion on the relationship between the material and the cultural

Initially Fraser’s framework proposed only two dimensions, or categories, to describe inequality: socio-economic and cultural, placed under the rubrics of maldistribution and misrecognition (Swanson: 2005: Fraser, 1996; 2003). However, after receiving critique from fellow feminist scholars like Iris Marion Young (1997) and Butler, on how the Social Justice Framework was not encompassing all dimensions of inequality, Fraser eventually amended the framework to include a third dimension; political inequality, that is misrepresentation. Young argued that Fraser’s initial framework, being comprised of only two categories descriptive of inequality, lacked the analytical utility needed to be useful as the framework primarily traces the tension between two forms of justice struggles (Young, 1997: Swanson, 2005). Young’s critique of Fraser’s framework stems in the dualism of her theory of justice. Young writes that Fraser’s analytical framework
opposes both culture and political economy and in doing so Fraser places a too large space between the two. A space that misses the linkages between the two (Young, 1997: Swanson, 2005). For Butler, Fraser’s positioning against identity politics and the framing of issues relating to identity politics as being of a cultural nature rather than socio-economic or political are viewed as problematic (Butler, 1997). While both Fraser and Butler share common grounds in their Marxist feminist approach to inequality, it is within the sphere of identity politics, and how to best approach the challenges of capitalism within that sphere, that the two theorists diverge (Swanson, 2005). According to Fraser, the core of the disagreement is based on their divergent views on Marxism, social feminism and the nature of capitalism (Fraser, 1997: Butler, 1997: Swanson, 2005).

Butler, like Young, advocates for an approach on inequality, and therefore justice, more in line with the intersubjective dimension of justice whereas Fraser, while in agreement of the importance of those aspects, approaches justice from the angle of subjectivity and redistribution. For instance, on the matter of homophobia, Butler refutes Fraser’s argument claiming that the injustice gay and lesbian individuals experience on the basis of their sexual identity should be placed in the cultural spectrum of inequality rather than the socio-economic or the political (Butler, 1997: Fraser, 1997). Butler writes that this form of injustice, and the new movements for social justice, are not “merely cultural” as there is a real space in which struggles for sexual reproduction, or racisms, are compatible with struggles of exploitation or the division of labour (Butler, 1997: 265 Fraser, 1997).

Butler adds that approaching matters of recognition from Fraser’s angle is “identarian”, “particularistic” and actually “factionalizing” (Butler, 1997: 33). What this viewpoint creates is a dissonance between the economic realm and the cultural realm for a Left that is already divided and struggling to make sense of how to best conceptualise capitalism in a growing post-socialist climate (Butler, 1997). Butler reminds Fraser that Marx did not separate the two and that neither should they. The focus on the base, the material and economic structure of society, instead of the superstructure, places issues pertaining to cultural values as secondary and therefore the skewed focus misses the material oppressions that specific groups are experiencing (Butler, 1997). For instance, understanding sexuality as belonging only in the cultural sphere of inequality is a mistake as sexuality has an essential and real place in the political economy. Butler argues
here that reproduction is how sexuality is manifested in politics as well as the material. Reproduction is also tied to heterosexuality and thus deviating sexualities are systematically oppressed as gender regulates the functions of economy (Butler, 1997).

However, homophobia as an issue of injustice is placed in the cultural spectrum of Fraser’s framework as its implications are regulated by societies’ cultural value patterns and not socio-economic or political (Fraser, 1997). Furthermore, Fraser points out that the phrase “a despised sexuality” in her initial analysis was only used to better allow for an imagined, although very real in certain contexts, spectrum of inequality where misrecognition was at one end and other forms of inequalities, such as maldistribution, were at the other end (Fraser, 1997) This hypothetical spectrum illustrated the typical types of inequalities specific groups, or individuals, were prone to experience within such a spectrum (Fraser, 1997: Fraser and Honneth, 2003). Having such a spectrum in the analysis also allowed for the theoretical framing of bivalent identities for those in the middle of the spectrum that require all remedies of injustice. Such as individuals experiencing inequality on the basis of gender and/or race (Fraser, 1997).

By placing the issue of sexuality in the cultural Fraser could further illustrate how homosexual individuals, by virtue of their sexual identity alone, do not constitute an exploitative class, have no specific position within the division of labour and they are spread throughout the class spectrum (Fraser, 1996: Fraser, 1997). Hence, the issues here are about misrecognition and status injury. In addition, Fraser adds that Butler’s claims of placing homophobia within the realm of the mode of sexual regulation of the economy, is not rooted in history as it devalues the role economic structure plays, both in its conceptual role but also as a highly real and practical structure of organisation( Fraser, 1997).
Fraser adds:

“What gets lost is the specificity of capitalist society as a distinctive and highly peculiar form of social organization. This organization creates an order of specialized economic relations that are relatively decoupled from relations of kinship and political authority” (Fraser, 1997: 284).

This passage is noteworthy, not just for the purpose of this thesis as it seeks to entangle social relations in a society regulated both by kinship value patterns and capitalist material patterns, but for the conceptual understanding of how not all struggles for justice are economic or material, or as is the case for Butler’s “[…] misplaced demands of redistribution” (Fraser, 1997: 284). Fraser follows the statement with asserting that if the struggles for recognition, in relation to the mode of sexual regulation being an injustice, was indeed economic, then they are not economic in the same way as struggles for redistribution in relation to exploitation of labour (Fraser, 1997). The placement of these different struggles in the same economic sphere diminishes their differences as well as fostering a false sense that claims that they are struggles that automatically have the same forms of political remedies and synergies (Fraser, 1997).

Yet Fraser is rather clear that in contrast to Butler’s portrayal of her analysis as “neoconservative Marxism”, the arguments presented do not dismiss the struggles of gay and lesbian individuals nor is the theoretical framework proposed placing these struggles as “merely cultural” (Fraser, 1997). Instead, the analysis in the Social Justice Framework allows for an understanding of issues of particularism and identity in a post-socialist condition and how to best overcome the dichotomy that exists within the Left regarding identity politics and class relations (Fraser, 1996; Fraser, 1997: Fraser and Honneth, 2003). Fraser proposes the framework in an effort to approach a critical theory that actually acknowledges the obvious connections of the economic and cultural subtexts of inequality as well as the hidden ones instead of rejecting such an approach. In this thesis, I maintain that Fraser’s framework can help in that regard as it seeks to address both issues equally. Fraser used the oppression of homosexuality to highlight how to overcome the theoretical challenges that exist between notions of the base and the superstructure, the cultural and the material (Fraser, 1997). It is argued, by Fraser, that
being misrecognised, for example due to sexual identity, is a matter of being denied a status as equal to participate in society as a peer (Fraser, 1997). However, it is not misrecognition as an outcome, or consequence, of distributive injustice. The experience of misrecognition in this sense is instead realised by institutionalised patterns of interpretation and evaluation that constitute specific groups or individuals as unequal and unworthy (Fraser, 1997). Yet because these interpretations and patterns have ways of easily accessing the institutional life of any given society, they will cause real harm equal to those patterns related to distributive inequality, thus a state of misrecognition will affect the entire state of participatory parity. Hence, overcoming misrecognition as a dimension of inequality is as important as maldistribution as they both affect an individual’s participatory parity (Fraser, 1997).

Fraser continues to explain that that while misrecognition and maldistribution where concepts easier to converge in pre-capitalist societies, the two dimensions do not necessarily converge in today’s capitalist society. This is because status orders, in pre-capital societies, were more reliant on an individual’s access to material resources and therefore status and class hierarchy had a closer relationship (Fraser, 1997). Instead, they are more likely to be separated as the institutionalised patterns of economic relations actually allow for a comparative separation of “the structurers of prestige”(Fraser, 1997:280). Fraser’s understanding of status presented in the framework is “quasi-Weberian” and not orthodox Marxist (Fraser, 1997: 281). Yet Butler overlooks this key element in the framework completely. Fraser deliberately uses Weber in her theoretical conception of inequality, as a paradigm of justice, to highlight how the true act of misrecognition occurs through the material construction of institutionalised cultural patterns of despising a specific class or person. That is when groups are interpreted, or evaluated, as abjects rather than subjects (Fraser, 1997: 283). Therefore, for Fraser, acts of misrecognition can be material as well as economic. Surely, according to Fraser, this is a given observation, yet the question is how to understand these interpretations?
3.1. 3 Redistribution or Recognition? Conflicting views on the conceptualisation of capitalism

As stated, the framework presented by Fraser allows for an understanding, that is Marxist at its core, yet it is not reliant on Marx’s traditional class theory of the exploited worker, instead Fraser uses Weber and status groups. By applying Weber, Fraser argues that the remedy for individuals experiencing injustice on the basis of sexuality would be to unravel how the economic injustices are consequences of the institutions of misrecognition (Fraser, 1997). Not that the challenges and injustices of having a specific sexuality is contingent on the relations of production (Fraser, 1997). In contrast to Butler’s argument, concerning the relationship of reliance between capitalism and heterosexual conformity, Fraser argues that capitalism does not actually threaten homosexuality, at least not in the way argued by Butler, instead capitalism profits off divergent sexuality (Fraser, 1997). In its place, institutions of religion and culture, that in Fraser’s words are obsessed with status – not profits, are more likely to be threatened by homosexuality than capitalism (Fraser, 1997: 285). The reason given by Fraser is that gay and lesbian individuals are not considered a despised, or even inferior, class in society because their menial labour is still considered useful enough to be exploited, like the case of African Americans during any given time in the United States (Fraser, 1997). Instead, these individuals are despised, by these specific religious and cultural institutions and their value patterns, and not by multi-national corporations, because they are viewed as not having a ‘natural’ place in society (Fraser, 1997). For Fraser, contemporary reality is the opposite: capitalism favours difference and hence there is no relationship of reliance between capitalism and heterosexuality as the primarily accepted sexual identity (Fraser, 1997). Capitalism does not need heterosexuality for benefits of surplus value expansion, instead there is an actual benefit in accommodating individuals that are conducting wage labour outside of the “mode of sexual regulation”, that is the heterosexual family (Fraser, 1997). This is because of the increasing gap between the orders of kinship and economy, the personal and family (Fraser, 1997: 286).

At its core, the debate between Butler and Fraser is about their difference in understanding status, specifically whose status matters most. The debate could further be understood as the two theorists having opposing understandings of the distinction
between the economic and the cultural. Where Butler sees a model for recognition, which is equal to the politics of redistribution as the two forms of injustice cannot be deconstructed or disconnected, Fraser, while acknowledging the injustices of misrecognition as equal to those of maldistribution, presents a theory that makes a historical and thus a conceptual distinction between the two (Butler, 1997: Fraser, 1997). Yet they also present two different understandings on capitalism as a structure. Capitalism in Fraser’s framework relies on a Marxist description where capitalism and the capitalist mode of production are viewed in its “social totality” (Fraser in Swanson, 2005:101). Capitalism, for Fraser, is in relation to the mechanisms of self-interest and market (Fraser, 1997: Swanson, 2005). For Butler, capitalism is also considered a structure, however it is as a structure reliant on reiteration (Butler, 1997: Swanson, 2005). What this means is that a structure only exists when it is recognised and repeated by a large enough number of people (Butler: 1997: Swanson, 2005). Yet structure does not become a structure through the sheer act of being defined as a structure, instead its meaning and practice are constantly and continually created as they are repeated, that is reiterated, through social interactions and relations (Butler, 1997: Swanson, 2005). Furthermore, Butler’s reiteration principle asserts that oppressions can then only be overcome once the repeated practices that constitute a structure stop (Butler, 1997: Swanson, 2005). However, this requires that the involved individuals within said structure are convinced enough to stop the practices that create the oppression and instead engage in more just ones (Butler, 1997: Swanson, 2005).

Although the debate between Butler and Fraser, on how the various forms of inequality, their nature and their remedy, as well as their different conceptualisation of capitalism as an order producing inequality, are enough to place a novice researcher in a state of theoretical confusion, what I find compelling in Frasers normative framework for social justice is how the two main types of inequalities are presented as dialectically appropriate. Fraser presents a theory of social justice that places contemporary issues of identity politics and class struggles within the same realm and without minimising the relevance of each, whilst making a historical and theoretical distinction between the difference of the two, both in terms of concept but also in terms of addressing the claims associated with the two. Having a critical theory of social justice that is normative in its formulation of ethics and morality, that is following both a Hegelian and Kantian
approach, yet theoretically compelling in its application is exclusive in the sense that contemporary theories on social justice tend to place one higher than the other. For instance, I would argue, like the theories and arguments promoted by Butler and Young. Fraser also places the issues of status in the economic order, a methodology which is deemed as useful for the purpose of this thesis when explaining the relationship between clan and class as different orders of subordination. Yet it is important to acknowledge that there are other theorists that like Fraser present normative frameworks that address the multiple issues of inequality without giving primacy to a specific set of justice claims, or at least claim to. Such a framework is presented by Amartya Sen (1980) as the Capability Approach (CA).

Although far from Marx, and consequently Fraser, Sen agreed with Marx on the importance of researching inequality and the structures that prevent people from leading a valuable life (Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014). Sen also agreed that the causes of inequality lie in the unequal distribution of resources. Yet unlike Marx and Weber, and many other influential European scholars, Sen’s work expanded to a global context that also included non-European societies. Sen’s CA, in its most basic form, considers that the totality of a person’s well-being should centre around a person’s capability to function. Function here implies that a person’s beings and doings involve the right to be safe, be educated, be politically active, be respected, be healthy and so on (Sen: 1980; Sen, 1984; Robeyns, 2005:95).

The importance for Sen is not about achieving these rights but more about an individual’s capability to access these functions. Furthermore, a capability becomes a function and having a multiple set of functions, that is capabilities, allows for an individual to be fully realised as a person (Sen:1980; Sen, 1984; Robeyns, 2005). To me, in this context, capabilities are understood as resources. Having enough resources an individual can lead the type of life they want and by having access to these different resources, or sets of capabilities, they are considered to have achieved a state of justice. However, having the resources alone does not naturally transpire into a state of justice and instead an individual need to also acquire the ability to be able to convert these resources into functions (Sen, 1980: Sen, 1984: Robeyns, 2005). There are three different forms of conversions in the CA; personal conversion, social conversion, and environmental conversion (Sen: 1980: Sen, 1984:...
Robeyns, 2005). The first form of conversion relates to an individual’s physical ability to convert a resource into a function. As an example, being physically healthy allows an individual to have better functioning of mobility in society than an individual that is handicapped or of poor health. Having mobility as a resource further allows the individual to engage in society and thus convert the other functions of one’s capability (Sen, 1984: Robeyns, 2005).

Sen formulated the approach as a critique to Rawls and his theory of distributive justice as it was argued to focus too much on primary goods as well as not accounting for the goods needed to fully realise an individual’s well-being and thus the overall human condition (Sen, 1984: Robeyns, 2005). For Sen, such goods included opportunities and income but also self-respect and recognition. For many scholars, Sen’s introduction of capabilities, as functions for an individual’s well-being and how the various forms of conversions needed allow for an understanding on distributive justice that is more diverse than the theory presented by Rawls, is considered an approach good enough to address issues stemming from both misrecognition and maldistribution (Robeyns, 2005). While I do agree that Sen’s capability approach is presenting a broader perspective into the theory of distributive justice that goes beyond the focus of income commodity command or happiness as a utility by providing an assessment of individual well-being not confined to the two, I find that the CA is too thin in its applicability to the Somali context and the specific focus of class and clan in this research. The CA and the conversion factors, I would argue, do not explain the underlying subjective and intersubjective factors that create inequality for the Gabooye collective, as a possible status group with a common class situation, nor does the framework provide an approach on how to analyse possible justice claims in the Somali context as the liberal fountainhead the approach is formulated on, such as the right to choose what opportunities an individual finds valuable, is in my opinion too abstract.

In contrast, Fraser’s logic in understanding the solutions to inequality from the perspective of the different groups placed in the hypothetical spectrums of inequality discussed above is rather straightforward: in the first example, the working class in a political-economic structure, will opt to abolish themselves as a class in order to gain equal distribution and thus equality. In the other example the group, for example gay
and lesbians in a cultural structure, will promote ‘groupness’ as way of getting recognition for their specific group specificity (Fraser, 1996; Fraser and Honneth, 2003). There are, however, cases that are considered ‘bivalent’, that require recognition, redistribution and representation (Fraser, 1996; Fraser and Honneth 2003). In these bivalent cases, for example gender and race, the collectives are differentiated by the virtue of both the political economic structure and the cultural structure. They thus need both recognition and redistribution because their experiences of inequality are traced to both structures of society. In the midst of the spectrum of recognition and redistribution, runs political representation as yet a form of inequality that affects the extent of participatory parity an individual or a group can achieve (Fraser and Honneth, 2003). The types of injustices highlighted above can be solved through one or two ways: affirmation or transformation. Fraser asserts that transformative solutions are about “correcting inequitable outcomes precisely by restructuring the underlying generative framework” (Fraser 2005:74). Affirmative solutions on the other hand, generally, only address types of inequalities that have ascended from the formulation of social interaction rather than critically addressing these relations (Fraser, 2003).

Fraser carved out the framework to illustrate how justice, as a reaction to inequality, could be viewed through two different perspectives: redistribution and recognition. However, as it has been noted in this chapter, after gaining critique from fellow critical theorists and feminists Butler and Young, as well as realising that the two perspectives were not enough to address the intersectional issues of contemporary inequality, Fraser thus added representation as a sphere to reflect the political challenges of inequality. Fraser’s Social Justice Framework is framed to blur out the disconnect between the claims of justice, both theoretically yet also practically. The general thesis here is that there needs to be a framework that considerers the theory of the cultural, or issues associated with recognition, as presented by Honneth and Butler, with a theory of distributive justice, like the theories of justice maintained by Rawls, which will be explored further in the following chapter.
3.2. Claims for justice: redistribution, recognition and representation

As mentioned in the previous section, Fraser argues that claims for distribution are derived from the Anglo-American liberal doctrine associated with Kant and his *Moralität*. The right actions and moral goodness outlined in *Moralität* are universally binding and held independently from an individual’s values (Fraser and Honneth, 2003). As mentioned, Rawls’s conception behind reason and autonomy in *A Theory of Justice* is modelled after Kant’s principle on the relation between reason and rationality. In contrast to Kant’s ‘*Sapere Aude*’

9, reason and rationality in Islam are however understood in a wider context of existence that goes beyond self-realisation and autonomy. Kalin (2012), a Muslim scholar, argues that contrary to populist political explanations, and to some degree academic ones, there is no lack of enlightenment in Islam (Kalin, 2012). Kalin refutes the assumption of the Enlightenment being an exclusive western project as extensive scholarship on philosophy concerning reason; moral, logic, knowledge and contemplation have been produced in the Muslim world throughout history (Kalin, 2012). However, the concepts of these issues, for example reason, are different from those presented within traditional western philosophy. Kalin argues that the idea of reason as a self-regulating principle, as argued by Kant and Rawls, and the acceptance of reason as the only source of both knowledge and truth did not create free individuals nor rational societies (Kalin, 2012). Instead, features of anti-reason have manifested in the new world order that was guaranteed by the Enlightenment (Kalin, 2012). For instance, the contemporary capitalistic imperative with its fixation on individualism, structural violence and imperialism proves the lack of rationality in modern social order (Kalin, 2012). Reason as a concept in Islam is not viewed as a self-regulating principle, instead, as argued by Barazangi (1996) and stated in the Holy Qur’an, reason and revelation were given to humans by God in order to know divine will (moral law). Kalin adds that reason is a gift with which we can explore knowledge about reality yet the final evidence of all truth and knowledge rests with God, and God alone. It is thus unreasonable to assume that reason alone can grant humans freedom and meaning (Kalin, 2012).

9 ‘*Sapere Aude*’ (Latin for ‘Dare to know’) was used by Kant to justify his theory on reason, see Kant, “What is Enlightenment?” in *Kant on History*, ed. Lewis White Beck, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1963)
As we recall, claims for recognition on the other hand are associated with ethics, “the good”, and Hegel’s *Sittlichkeit* (Fraser and Honneth, 2003). Hegel corresponded with Kant on the conception of morality however, for Hegel, Kant’s philosophy did not fully address the breach between moral law and moral action (Hegel, 1807/1979). Hegel’s ‘Sittlichkeit’, is developed in this context as an answer, as moral actions are far more grounded in society and its institutions than by theoretical dualism (Hegel: 1807/1979: Fraser, 2003). As a concept, the Sittlichkeit is outlined as the sphere that addresses the dissension between moral law and moral action. It further explains that claims about self-realisation are reliant on “[...] culturally and historically specific horizons of value, which cannot be universalized” (Fraser and Honneth, 2003: 28). While the political theories presented by Rawls rely on Kantian morality, as does Fraser’s outline for justice, Rawls takes the notion of culture, as highlighted through the overlapping consensus, into better account than both Kant and Hegel. However, I would argue that it is not enough.

3.2.1 The experience of inequality in Somaliland: A matter of the Good or the Right?

Fraser argues that in kin-governed societies with a lack of an autonomous economic institution “[...] the status of subordination translates immediately into (what we would consider to be) distributive injustice” (Fraser and Honneth, 2003: 52). In this case, misrecognition follows maldistribution. In contrast, a marketised society, where the economic structure orders the cultural value of society, will have opposite determinations (Fraser and Honneth, 2003). Here, maldistribution will entail misrecognition, as there are no autonomous cultural value patterns (Fraser and Honneth, 2003). Somaliland makes for an excellent case in studying the status models of subordination, as it is a society where the logic of class and status coexist as clan establishes the principle of distribution; clan thus dictates the class position. Hence, the different models of subordination are combined whilst causally reinforcing each other. Given the philosophically divergent nature behind recognition and redistribution the two concepts would appear to be incompatible (Fraser and Honneth, 2003). However, the objective behind Fraser’s framework is to treat the claims made under both recognition and redistribution as equal issues of justice and consequently bring them together in a normative setting. The
challenge, however, is to explore the spaces in which members of minority groups in Somaliland, a Muslim society, can make adequate claims for justice.

Consequently, it is interesting to explore how inequality and subordination in Somali society is justified under Islamic morality and ethics seeing as Somaliland is an Islamic state. For instance, the status of difference in the south was, according to both Luling and Besteman, primarily based on racial heritage, as Somalis that claimed a ‘Bantu’ identity despite their citizenship, were considered to have a low status in society (Luling, 1984: Besteman, 1999). The combination of “impure ancestry” and their engagement in agriculture was considered inferior to nomadic pastoralism (Besteman, 1999). The claims for justice made by ‘Bantu’ groups in the south could thus be considered claims for both recognition and redistribution, a ‘bivalent case’ as argued by Fraser. The basis for subordination in the south is, according to Besteman:

“[…] that of historical accident (through the misfortune of having been born as non-Muslims and captured as slaves), and not destiny as with the saab” (Besteman, 1999: 124).

Besteman, like Luling, also suggests that the physical features of the Bantu groups are used as additional markers to distinguish them from “ethnic Somalis”. For instance, the usage of derogatory terms like “tiimo jareer” or “san weyn”, meaning ‘hard hair’ and ‘big nosed’ in Somali, in reference to members of the Gosha groups (Besteman, 1999). In addition, terms like “adoon”, meaning slave in Arabic, is further used to separate the “soft haired” and “noble” Somali from the Gosha (Eno and Kusow, 2010: 2014: Besteman, 1999: Luling, 1984). However, the basis for discrimination and thus the inequality experienced by northern minorities could be different. While Besteman presents a significant and convincing analysis on the issues of race, class, clan organisation, ethnic homogeneity and subordination in the Somali context it is primarily done with a strong focus on the subordination of the heritage of the Gosha in the south. It is agreed with Besteman that the previous scholarship on the segmentary lineage, like that of Lewis, of Somali society missed the complexities outlined above. In addition, there is little research today on the experience of stratification and inequality experienced by minorities in the
northern Somali regions. It is therefore important to explore the heritage and forms of subordination and inequality experienced and thus the type of justice that is both needed, and available for these groups. Since members of minorities in Somaliland are not viewed as ethnically or religiously different than members of majority clans it is also of interest to explore the types of justice claims members of minority clans make. Is inequality in this specific context a matter of recognition or redistribution, or is it also a ‘bivalent’ case, as the makings of class function within the clan system?

According to Leeb (2018), the transformative remedies presented by Fraser are meant to change the generative framework that causes inequality by deconstruction, however the placement of these remedies within the liberal welfare state, tells us that such an approach is perhaps more affirmative as it is only targeted at changing the patterns of cultural valuation that is disfranchising the oppressed (Leeb, 2018). Instead, it is argued by Leeb, that Fraser’s method to deconstructing the suggested ‘bivalent cases’, or dichotomies of race and gender, is not an approach that is transformative but rather an approach that operates within the realm of neo-liberal capitalism (Leeb, 2018). Moreover, Leeb makes the claim that neo-liberal capitalism instead capitalises on the shifting and fluid identities that Fraser is defending in her transformation approach, in order to stay persistent (Leeb, 2018). I do agree with this observation, that as a remedy for justice the transformative approach only allows for the excluded and oppressed groups that are in the middle of the inequality continuum, such as members from the Gabooye collective, to be included through recognition in the same realm as their oppressor, which is the capitalist system of production. The remedy of recognition, as such, does not actually challenge the oppression and the enterprise that nourishes it, instead the recognition received is only another form of subordination, hence, the redistribution offered along that structure would then also be tainted by that subordination. Yet I do not agree with Leeb in claiming that Fraser’s transformative remedy is in fact entrenching the ills of capitalism (Leeb, 2018: pp.550-563).

Instead, I argue that being invited to the same realm, as a reforming act, is what is needed in the Somaliland context, albeit a state of illusory politics of equality as suggested by Leeb as the context of inequality is different in Somaliland than the context of inequality in the established liberal democracies presented by Fraser. Indeed, on an ideological
level, I agree that what is needed is a proletarian revolution to tackle the rigid mechanism of capitalism that creates inequality and oppression, such as the exploitative elements of the Somali clan relations, however, I considered Fraser’s framework as such, with the way the transformative and affirmative approaches are currently in place to be useful in their pragmatic purpose: which is tracing, and understanding, the linkages between class and identity in relation to inequality in Somaliland by looking into the claims of justice made by the Gabooye collective. Not necessarily to identify revolutionary pathways for changing capitalism itself as the driving mechanism behind Somali social relations as that is not the purpose of this thesis. Moreover, I do not think that the oppressed in Somaliland, at this moment in time, can afford to be as radical and revolutionary, as suggested by Leeb, by dismissing the real hold the capitalist enterprise has on their identities but also their access to the means of production. Instead, what is needed in this context is a framework that can dismantle the clan dichotomy, by firstly realising a stronger religious and political consciousness and through such a framework question and deconstruct the oppression they are experiencing, by making justice claims accordingly, as active agents within the realm of oppression. Carving out such a framework does however necessitate an understanding of the roles in which hegemony, domination and false consciousness play in the makings of both identity and class.

3.3. Adapted framework

It is maintained in this thesis that inequality is understood as a paradigm of justice. It is further held that inequality is a state of not being equal. Equal in status, rights, and opportunity. Thus, the makings of inequality in this research are understood within the lines of Marx’s theory of capitalist exploitation, that is that inequality is inherent in the capitalist mode of production (Marx, 1867/1995). From this understanding, inequality is produced because different social groups have opposing access to resources and power relevant for their social needs (Marx, 1867/1995). Consequently, inequality is also rooted in the political economic structure of our societies. Introducing a class perspective that acknowledges the role of clan ideology in the construction of the Somali identity can help clarify the structures outside of clan that create inequality.
Marx’s class theory is useful in the analysis of how the division of labour in Somaliland, which is appointed by the clan hierarchy, creates unequal conditions of labour, and thus creates inequality. However, as mentioned, while Marx’s class theory is helpful in both defining and understanding the makings of inequality through the formation of social relations, it was nonetheless framed in a European context with a different mode of production in consideration. It is also acknowledged that a purely materialist understanding of social relations does not work in the Somali context. Therefore, in addition to Marx’s formulation of class, the research also uses analytical insights from Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and ideology. While Gramsci’s intellectual work is positioned within the parameters of Marx’s historical materialism, his theories are considered good additions for analysing the hegemonic and ideological relationship between clan and class identity in Somali society. Fraser’s Social Justice Framework is guiding the analysis in this thesis as it illustrates the juxtaposition for analysing cultural or symbolic inequality while supporting the Marxist definition of inequality. However, because western moral philosophy informs a rather large extent of Fraser’s work, the framework for my research is an adaptation of Fraser’s Social Justice Framework. It is essential to identify the relationship between clan and class, inequality and justice, morality and ethics from a religious and cultural perspective due to their primacy in the Somaliland legal framework and its justice institutions. Insights from Islamic moral philosophy, such as the Falsafah and the Kalam and the Somali Xeer will therefore further Fraser’s framework and help contextualise the findings of the research yet also in exploring how morality and ethics are formulated in the justice claims made by minorities and where they can get redress in the Somali context. Furthermore, insights from Samatar’s analysis of Somali social formations will help place the Marxist theory of class in the Somali context.

3.3.2 Ideology, Hegemony, Domination and Culture: Expanding orthodox Marxist theory

Understanding the role of ideology is key in understanding how the state reproduces the interests of the ruling clan but also how ideology, which in the Somali context is to an extent dialectically informed by the Shari ‘a and Xeer, shape the perceptions of identity within a society, the framework will thus be accompanied by the Gramscian conceptualisation of ideology, domination, hegemony and false consciousness, in
particular the tracing of the changes to the political economy of Somalia that are argued to have affected the principle of participatory parity. However, Gramsci is also relevant for the second objective on the spaces for change. In explicating the causal relationship between class and identity, the universal and the particular, there is a need to give way for concepts that arise within the two dichotomies of domination and hegemony and the general dialectic of historical materialism. I therefore consider Gramsci to be the scholar that extended the Marxist theory of historical materialism and, arguably to have placed, the theory in a context outside of the European experience, hence the theories and concepts of hegemony and domination defined by Gramsci are of relevance for this case study.

Including Gramsci into the adapted framework can help overcome the lack of radicalism found in Fraser’s framework. It is held here that domination and hegemony are interlinked in the Somali experience, through the construction of clan as the basis for social relations in society, both during 1969-1988 and in contemporary Somaliland. Hence, unpacking how clan as a structure operates and enforces domination and hegemony becomes integral for the understanding of consciousness. It is in this understanding of consciousness that the adapted framework becomes more radical than the original framework. Furthermore, because false consciousness operates in the subconscious of those dominated, the theory helps us explain the extent to which members of the Gabooye collective have influence over the making of reality and their own representation. Traditional Marxist theory would suggest that the Gabooye are in this state of false consciousness where their understanding of reality is distorted, however, the Gramscian approach includes ideology to extend the view. This means that the consciousness of the dominated is not only enforced on the subordinated minds, but it is an act of interaction involved. In the adapted framework, the state of false consciousness is ever present and visually it takes the form of the thick lines stemming from each structure, however it is assumed that the notion of false consciousness follows through to the affirmative pathways and not in the transformative.
Principle of Participatory Parity for the Gabooye collective in Somaliland.

**Figure 1: Nancy Fraser’s Social Justice Framework modified by author 2019**

Fig.1 illustrates the three structures \( S_1, S_2, S_3 \) of the Principle of Participatory Parity that contextualise my research. Structure 1 is rooted in the cultural sphere and structure 2 and 3 are respectively rooted in the social-economic and political spheres. Following these structures are the types of inequalities that are likely to follow within each of the sphere. The objective here is to trace the cultural, political and socio-economic arrangements that disturbed the Participatory parity of Gabooye clan members, by analysing claims to justice made, in relation to the three structures of inequality, and how, or if, those have been influenced by the changes in the political economy during 1969-1988.
This figure illustrates transformative changes over affirmative. For instance, the issue of misrecognition here is explored in the status order of subordination among clan and sub-clans. To reach Participatory parity along this structure, it is assumed that transformative remedies must be designed to deconstruct the structure of clan identity rather than reification of group identity. In deconstructing the status model of clan subordination, we can thus change the cultural value pattern without dismissing the other two structures. While the status order of clan subordination is rooted in the socio-cultural structure of society, subordination on the basis of class is based in the economic structure. However, both status orders convene in the political structure.
**Fig.2** illustrates the three identified institutional spaces that either hold both status orders and that can provide affirmative or transformative remedies for the claims made. The figures illustrate the supposed forms of justice that are attached to each of the identified institutions. Yet the Xeer has no other presumed justice remedy in this illustration other than its restorative element. It is however supposed that the Islamic principle of resource distribution through the Zakat, outlined in the Shariʿa, can benefit Gabooye members in gaining transformative remedies relating to the structure of maldistribution ($S_2$).

However, given the close relationship between the structures of inequality, the structures of justice are correspondingly interlinked. Hence, income redistribution through Zakat is conceivably more affirmative than transformative. Possibly when combined with formal justice interventions can the Zakat reconstruct the relations of production. The objective here, however, is to consider the extent to which Fraser’s model can meet the specific challenges faced in the Somali context, and whether it, in its adapted version, can provide a theoretical route towards a more critical discourse on Social justice in Somali society.
Chapter 4: Paradigms of Justice, inequality and identity

There are not only diverse ways of defining and measuring inequality but also discursive challenges and narratives on how to best tackle it within the prevailing disciplines. Although economic theory has played a crucial role in the history of social theory, arguably to the point where social theory approaches and understandings of the multiple drivers of inequality are dominated by economic measures, the relations of production are not purely economic relations but also by social relations. This chapter will therefore focus on the literature of justice and how it has been conceptualised, both in western moral philosophy but also within Islam and the Somali context. This chapter also focuses on the key theories of justice and inequality present within political economy in order to explore inequality as a paradigm of justice. The latter sections of the chapter conclude with a consideration of the need to consolidate a critical theory that embraces an understanding of inequality that addresses redistribution and/or recognition, as equal claims to justice, in a manner sensitive to a general wider global context, yet Somaliland in particular.


Research on inequality has influenced and advanced philosophical concepts of justice and the most notable philosophers on moral and political theory exist within the contractarian tradition. Although the contractarian tradition was on the decline during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, largely due to the influence of both utilitarianism and Marxism, it is still held to be one of the dominant discourses of moral and political theory of the western world (Mapel, 1992). The tradition that was developed and influenced by philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and later advanced by Rawls and Nozick, is still influential within contemporary political thought and consequently for the debate on inequality and its relation to justice in this thesis. In classical political thought, the contractarian tradition is based on the idea of collective choices (Nagel, 1973; Mapel, 1992). These collective choices are used to exemplify the ways in which legitimate political institutions materialise (Mapel, 1992).
The fundamental notion of this concept is that the acceptability of the contractual situation, that is the social contract, is transferred to the principals that were chosen in that specific situation (Nagel 1973; Mapel, 1992). The structure of arguments and assumptions are the same within the contractarian discourse, however, there are disagreements and thus variations of the tradition. Yet three main elements reoccur and therefore unify the main arguments:

“[…] the description of the “circumstances of justice”, a description of the moral constraints built into the initial contractual situation, and a theory of rational choice” (Mapel, 1992: 181-182).

The contractarians all had different understandings of the circumstances of these three elements. Hobbes’s understanding of moral and political theory was for instance heavily influenced by the political uncertainty and war that took place during his lifetime. For this reason, Hobbes’s take on the social contract was primarily founded on a pessimistic base (Mapel, 1992). Hobbes asserted that individuals in an original State of Nature are motivated by egoistic reasons (Hobbes, 1651/2008: Nagel, 1973: Mapel, 1992). In the State of Nature everyone is equal, however because individuals are concerned with preserving their own life, even at the expense of others, conflict, violence, and even death are unavoidable (Hobbes, 1651/2008: Mouritz, 2010: Mapel, 1992). Conversely, Hobbes held that although humans are self-interested, they are also rational beings with a desire for a pleasurable life. Self-interest in combination with rationality will accordingly drive individuals to seek a way out of the State of Nature and towards a more peaceful state that agrees with their self-interest (Hobbes, 1651/2008: Mapel, 1992: Mouritz, 2010). To overcome this war against all, individuals will consequently enter into an agreement with every other individual within that state, promising not to hurt each other (Hobbes, 1651/2008: Mapel, 1992: Mouritz, 2010). However, only agreeing not to hurt each other will not create or maintain a peaceful state (Hobbes, 1651/2008: Mapel, 1992: Mouritz, 2010). Instead, individuals, within the state, must also agree to give up their liberties and be governed by a powerful sovereign (Hobbes, 1651/2008: Mapel, 1992: Mouritz, 2010).
The establishment of a civil society is therefore done collectively and the renouncement of previous rights reciprocally (Hobbes, 1651/2008: Mapel, 1992: Mouritz, 2010). There is also a process for, collectively, appointing one person or a group of persons that has the authority to enforce the social contract and the laws that guide it (Hobbes, 1651/2008: Mapel, 1992: Mouritz, 2010). This process of founding a state, or conversely be willing to submit to a sovereign, is Hobbes’s explication of the social contract (Hobbes, 1651:2008: Mapel, 1992). Hobbes referred to this state as the Leviathan, an unaccountable and God like entity, or state, with absolute authority. There can be no rebellion against the Leviathan as the Leviathan is the one that defines justice; thus, its actions cannot be just or unjust (Hobbes, 1651:2008). For Hobbes, it is only in this phase that society is possible – in the collective conclusion that it is better to be governed by an authoritarian ruler under law rather than being in a State of Nature (Hobbes, 1651/2008: Mouritz, 2010: Mapel, 1992).

For Locke, however, the social contract comes into existence once the populace within a State of Nature agrees to transfer their rights and liberties to the public community, that is political institutions (Locke, 1689/1993: Mapel, 1992). Only once those rights are transferred can a legitimate government be established (Locke, 1689/1993). The established government is legitimate yet limited as it rests on the contract agreed upon between the individuals within the State of Nature. Here the rights and liberties transferred from individuals to the sovereign are done in a more positive manner than for Hobbes. For Locke, individuals willingly give up their rights and liberties so that the founded government, or state, can serve and protect the people (Locke, 1689/1993: Mouritz, 2010). Additionally, the State of Nature for Locke, in contrast to Hobbes, is pre-political but not pre-moral (Locke, 1689/1993: Mouritz, 2010).

In his Second Treatises on Government, Locke argued that the natural condition of humankind, that is the State of Nature, is a state of complete liberty as individuals are equal and can freely live their lives without interference (Locke, 1689/1993). Yet this state of perfection requires individuals to oblige to the Law of Nature (Locke, 1689/1993: Mouritz, 2010). For Locke, the Law of Nature, which is given to humanity by God, necessitates that individuals do not harm others regarding their life, health, liberty, or possessions (Locke, 1689/1993). Locke’s social contract was also heavily shaped by his
religious views as the Law of Nature is grounded on the conviction that all human beings belong to God and since no human being can take away what is rightfully God’s, we as humans are thus forbidden to harm each other (Locke, 1689/1993: Mouritz, 2010).

Because of the Law of Nature and its restrictions, the State of Nature becomes a relatively peaceful state (Locke, 1689/1993: Mouritz, 2010). Locke’s State of Nature is different from Hobbes’s; however, Locke acknowledges that the State of Nature can develop into a Hobbesian State of War. This happens when individuals start stealing from each other and/or try to enslave one another (Locke, 1689/1993: Mouritz, 2010). In Locke’s State of Nature there is no civil authority that individuals can appeal to when in dispute, instead they are motivated by self-interest and a right to defend their own life, within the limitations of the Law of Nature (Locke, 1689/1993: Mouritz, 2010). Hence, if the State of War commences it is more likely to continue, as there is no civil authority to enforce law and order (Locke, 1689/1993). Accordingly, for Locke, the fear of a constant State of War is the reason that individuals are more interested in abandoning the State of Nature and instead agrees to, willingly, contract a civil government to rule and protect (Locke, 1689/1993: Mouritz, 2010).

The role of property is another essential point in Locke’s argument for a social contract and the establishment of a civil government. As mentioned, a State of War will occur once one or more individuals disagree on property rights (Locke, 1689/1993: Mouritz, 2010). For Locke, property is created when individuals combine their labour with raw natural resources (Locke, 1689/1993). For instance, utilising a piece of land for farming purposes. Once an individual start farming land, only then can they make a claim to that specific land (Locke, 1689/1993: Mouritz, 2010). However, the Law of Nature limits how much property, that is land, an individual can claim, that is own (Locke, 1689/1993: Mouritz, 2010). It is, according to Locke, for instance, not allowed to use more of nature than you need, thus leaving others with enough to use as well (Locke, 1689/1993: Mouritz, 2010). From this it can be argued that Locke was supporting an equality of opportunity rather than an equality of outcome (Mouritz, 2010).
Where the protection of private property was the prerequisite for Locke’s argument on the social contract, for Rousseau however, the introduction of private property, in forming a social contract, also presents some of the initial conditions of inequality (Mapel, 1992). It was argued by Rousseau that property corrupts the morality of individuals (Rousseau, 1762: Mapel, 1992). The invention of private property represents humanity’s ‘fall from grace’, the pure State of Nature, as elements of competition, greed, vanity, and inequality are inherent in its acquisition and possession (Rousseau, 1762: Mapel, 1993). The initial conditions of inequalities are thus pronounced in this process, as there are some individuals who have property and some that are forced to labour for those owning property(Rousseau, 1762: Mapel, 1992).

Rousseau regarded that such a division of labour creates social classes and ultimately a divergence between the different classes (Rousseau, 1762: Mapel, 1992). Rousseau furthered this agreement by reasoning that those who have private property will do what they can to protect that property; hence, they will establish a government that can protect their property from those that do not have property, whilst being mindful of the fact that they can acquire it using force (Rousseau, 1762: Mapel, 1992). Governments in such a case are therefore created through a contract only to serve and protect the interests of a few within a certain group (Rousseau, 1762: Mapel, 1992). Although the established government’s intentions are the protection and equality of all, the true purpose instead becomes to maintain the inequalities that private property has created (Rousseau, 1762).

In *The Social Contract* Rousseau therefore sought to understand how humans can be fully and essentially free yet still live together (Mapel, 1992). He believed humans to be essentiality free in the State of Nature but that the advancement of civilisation had replaced our act of serving others for freedom (Rousseau, 1762: Mapel, 1992). Rousseau held that a return to the State of Nature was unthinkable; instead, the purpose of politics must be to regain our freedoms. Rousseau’s social contract is therefore about understanding how we can live free, together, yet it is equally about how not to subordinate one another (Mapel, 1992). Rousseau argued that such a freedom is possible only when individuals give up their individual wills for the good of the collective will, which is created in agreement by equal individuals (Rousseau, 1762: Mapel, 1992).
As mentioned, the development of private property introduces conditions of inequality and for Rousseau the understanding of entering a covenant to protect property rights is the naturalised aspects of the social contract and this naturalisation is responsible for the various conflicts that modern society faces (Rousseau, 1762; Mapel, 1992; Freeman, 2007). Rousseau’s normative contract is however developed as a solution to the troubles that have been produced by the contingent of human social history (Rousseau 1762; Freeman, 2007). Despite the differences between Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, they all agreed that, in this hypothetical thought experiment, all humans are made to be equal by nature and because of that no one has the right to rule over anyone else (Maple, 1993; Freeman, 2007).

Additionally, the only legitimate authority to rule over anyone else is the sovereign authority that is elected in a collective agreement (Mapel, 1992). For Rousseau, the process of coming together as one people, and establishing a government to rule, requires invoking one’s free will (Rousseau, 1762; Mapel, 1992; Friedman 2007). The free will must, however, be used to reconstruct politically and in line with democratic principles that benefit the collective. Only then can humanity overcome the corruption of their social history (Rousseau, 1762; Mapel, 1992; Friedman 2007). However, Rousseau had a more complex view towards the notion of free will, in so far that he viewed majority rule to be tyrannical and hypocritical yet also necessary (Rousseau, 1762; Mapel, 1992; Freeman, 2007).

4.1.2 Utilitarianism and A Theory of Justice

Few philosophers have been as influential to contemporary political theory as Rawls and in ‘A Theory of Justice’ Rawls presents an original principle of justice as an attempt to further the contractarian traditions of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau (Nagel, 1973; Mapel, 1992). Rawls went beyond the traditional contractarian view where justice was previously discussed in relation to feasibility rather than desirability (Kukathas and Pettit, 2006). Prior to Rawls, political theory, as a philosophy and science, was preoccupied with understanding governance and political organisation from the feasible options available in achieving desirable ends (Kukathas and Pettit, 2006). The separation, according to Kukathas and Pettit, was based on the notion that a study of feasibility, understood as economics, was more relevant than the pursuit of purely analysing the ethical (Kukathas and Pettit, 2006). Instead, Rawls’s theory of justice combined a
methodology where both feasibility and desirability were presented as a combined theory of justice, through two principles, yet also a theory where desirability was at centre stage of state governance and political organisation (Kukathas and Pettit, 2006). While Rawls was influenced by the contractarian tradition on the governance of the state and the sovereignty of the individual, Rawls was especially influenced by the moral philosophy of Kant and accordingly carries on Kant’s Vernünftig rationale in ‘A Theory of Justice’. For Kant, the true principles of morality are not forced upon us but rather shaped by the autonomous practice of our reason (Kant, 1784/1963). This Vernünftig nature is thus shaped, and shared, by the one moral law that is valid to us all: the categorical imperative (Kant, 1784/1963: Nagel, 1973: Friedman, 2007). The categorical imperative was for Kant the supreme and standard principle of rationality (Kant, 1784/1963: Friedman, 2007). Rawls, subsequently, argued that individuals have the capacity to reason from a universal point of view (Nagel, 1973: Rawls, 1974). From this it was furthered argued that because of the universal standing point, individuals must also have the moral capacity of judging principles that are not prejudiced (Kant, 1784;1963: Nagel, 1973: Rawls, 1974). Still, an individual’s political and moral standpoints are covered by bias. These points of views are further explored picturing individuals operating within the Original Position (Rawls,1974: Friedman, 2007).

The Original Position is a hypothetical situation that Rawls characterised in the ‘Veil of Ignorance’. The Original Position is influenced by the concept of Vernünftig, yet it is also in many ways an abstract version of the State of Nature (Rawls, 1974: Kukathas and Pettit, 2006). It is also a scrutiny of, as well as an alternative to, Utilitarianism as Rawls held that Utilitarianism fails to consider the distinctions between individuals (Rawls,1974: Kukathas and Pettit, 2006). In the Original Position, individuals, can explore the true nature of justice and its requirements (Rawls, 1974: Friedman, 2007). Rawls argued that individuals are denied knowledge of their circumstances behind the Veil of Ignorance (Rawls, 1974). Circumstances such as race, gender, age, disabilities, social status, and even knowledge about the society they live in (Rawls, 1974). In this hypothetical situation, individuals are without knowledge of their position, yet they are rational in so far that they understand society and its organisation, however they are not interested in the wellbeing of others (Rawls, 1974). It is within these conditions that individuals can choose
the basic principles of a just society, as those principles themselves are chosen under inherent neutral conditions (Rawls, 1974: Friedman, 2007).

According to Kukathas and Pettit there are two avenues in understanding with what knowledge the parties in the Original Position are making their choices; either under a light veil or a heavy veil (Kukathas and Pettit, 2006). The difference in the two veils lies in the individual knowledge of how capacity and talent are determined by chance and probability (Rawls, 1974: Kukathas and Pettit, 2006). In the light veil, a person is knowledgeable about their own capacity and that such a capacity, albeit randomly, will determine one’s place in the basic structure chosen (Rawls, 1974: Kukathas and Pettit, 2006). The heavy veil, however, does not allow such knowledge and the extent of one’s capacity and talent are hidden and thus there is no knowledge of one’s own talent (Rawls, 1974: Kukathas and Pettit, 2006). The point in Kukathas’s and Pettit’s interpretation of the ‘Veil of Ignorance’ lies in the individual knowledge of the extent of probability within capacity and talent, hence the Veil of Ignorance in the Original Position is heavy (Kukathas and Pettit, 2006). This is an interesting interpretation and it is valid for the concepts of justice explored in this thesis. If there is no extent of knowledge present within the Original Position, how can individuals’ conception of justice be morally sound?

Consequently, since there is no knowledge about the personal advantages one could use, for personal gain, within the development of principles, the choices made within that principle are fair (Rawls, 1974: Kukathas and Pettit, 2006: Friedman, 2007). Only once the Veil of Ignorance is lifted will individuals make choices of principles that are from a self-interested point of view (Rawls, 1974: Kukathas and Pettit, 2006). Here, the act of choosing principles is rendered from Kant’s idea of autonomy (Rawls, 1974: Friedman, 2007). Additionally, the principles that would be chosen behind the Veil of Ignorance are called the ‘Two Principles of Justice’ and they determine how civil liberties and economic and social goods are to be distributed within a society (Rawls, 174: Friedman, 2007). Rawls’s First Principle of justice explains that individuals in a society have as much liberty as possible, as long as everyone else within the same society has the same amount of liberty (Rawls, 1974: Kukathas and Pettit, 2006).
The Second Principle is divided in two parts and it goes on to explain how economic and social inequalities can be legitimate and just, again as long as they are equally available for everyone (Rawls, 1974). The first part of the ‘Second Principle’ must ensure that the social structures that shape the distribution of opportunities are done in a manner that adheres to ‘Fair Equality of Opportunity’ (Rawls, 1974). Rawls explains the principle of ‘Fair Equality of Opportunity’ by stating that all individuals within a society must have “[...] the same legal rights of access to all advantaged social positions” (Rawls, 1974:62: Mason, 2006). Rawls illustrates this point by ‘careers open to talent’, meaning there should be no legislation within society upholding discrimination or that sanctions groups to be treated differently (Rawls, 1974: Mason, 2006:2018). In this substantive version of equality, social positions are instead open to everyone and everyone has an equal and fair opportunity at acquiring them (Rawls: 1974: Sachs, 2012; Mason, 2006: 2018). Rawls used this principle to highlight a justification for inheritance tax and free universal education (Sachs, 2012).

The second part of the ‘Second Principle’ is signified as the Difference Principle and it is possibly the most well-known of the principles presented in the Original Position. For Rawls, this principle defends economic inequalities as far as stating that the least advantaged individual within a society is still better off than he or she would be had the arrangements been different (Rawls, 1974: Kukathas, 2006). In brief, the Difference Principle is more concerned with outcome and wealth, through the positioning of Maximin and Maximus10, than liberties and equal opportunities. It necessitates that social and economic inequalities within a society are to be arranged in such a manner that they are of the greatest expected benefit for the least advantageous of a society (Rawls, 1974: Kukathas and Pettit, 2006). The construction of the Original Position therefore supports the ‘Second Principle’, as it is only when the ‘Veil of Ignorance’ is lifted that individuals within a society will accept advantages that are in their favour (Rawls, 1974: Kukathas and Pettit, 2006). Even if that means that they could end up being the least advantageous individual within that given society (Rawls, 1974). Rawls argues that the parties within the Original Position will, by their extent of rationality, always choose the maximin, and

10 Maximin and Maximus are strategic concepts that Rawls expanded from Kant and as concepts they illustrate how to choose between different alternatives based on their least bad outcome (Rawls, 1974: Kukathas and Pettit, 2006).
thus the conservative position, over the maximus and the risky position. Yet it is made clear that these two principles are strongly connected (Rawls, 1974: Kukathas and Pettit 2006). For instance, the ‘Second Principle’ is only possible as long as we satisfy the demands of the First Principle; we cannot, or will not, give up our civil liberties in order to gain greater economic or social advantages (Rawls, 1974: Friedman, 2003).

The Original Position and the Principles of Justice are Rawls’s abstract vision of the social contract (Kukathas and Pettit, 2006: Freeman, 2007). Instead of a covenant agreement, Rawls’s position actually clarifies what individuals must be able to accept under the limitations of justice, in order to live in a just society (Rawls, 1974: Friedman, 2007: Kukathas and Pettit, 2006). The hypothetical thought experiment of Rawls’s has had a significant impact on contemporary liberal ideology and while Rawls presents a more abstract and fundamental way to understand the makings of a just society, his principles of justice are however rather irregular (Kukathas and Pettit, 2006: Friedman, 2007: Wei, 2008). For instance, the First Principle starts with a society that is already unequal and the Second Principle builds on the first principle to justify produced inequalities. Like the abstract methodologies provided by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, Rawls’s two principles do not give a solution on what to expect when one starts with an already equal society. Instead, the principle of Fair Equal Opportunity was designed to correct the social adversities that already exist within a society, as ones’ social class is arbitrary under moral law. However, fair and equal competition ensures that those with “[…] same level of talent and ability, and have the same willingness to use them, should have the same prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social system” (Rawls, 1974: 63). For Rawls, it is only those with the same level of talent within a society that should have an equal chance at success (Rawls, 1974). Yet the theory does not actually challenge the social class structure, the relations of production or self-ownership (Wei, 2008).

Despite Rawls’s influence on the contemporary liberal discourses on justice as a concept, the principles outlined in A Theory of Justice remained the objects of critique for philosopher Robert Nozick (1974). In contrast to Rawls, Nozick was focused on the distribution of property and for Nozick, justice as a concept is comprised by;
(i) justice in acquisition;
(ii) justice in transfer; and
(iii) rectification of injustice.

Justice in acquisition involves the ways in which an individual acquires property rights to something previously not owned (Nozick, 1974: Sandel, 2007). Justice in transfer is about how individuals gain property rights to something, either given or exchanged to them (Nozick, Wei, 2008). The rectification of injustice is about rightfully restoring something to someone in cases of unjust acquisition or transfer (Nozick, 1974: Wei, 2008). Nozick’s idea of justice is accordingly focused on the distribution of justice. It does not matter whether the actual distribution is fair or unfair; it is the process of distribution that matters for justice of equality (Nozick, 1974: Sandel, 2007: Wei, 2008).

Nozick argues that justice is about respecting individual’s natural rights and freedoms, mostly in relation to personal property and self-ownership (Nozick, 1974). With this claim, Nozick’s theory challenges Rawls’s ‘Justice as Fairness’ in asserting that they are derived from individuals’ self-ownership; individuals must be granted the freedom to do what they want with their personal property, that is the means of production, as they own the labour used in producing that product (Nozick: 1974: Wei, 2008). Although Nozick acknowledged the ownership of the labourer in relation to the means of production, it was held that ‘Justice in acquisition’ limits the when and how ownership occurs, when something is justly acquired justice becomes an issue of transfer (Nozick, 1974: Sandel, 2007: Wei, 2008). From this it is therefore held the arrangements of distributive justice restrict individuals’ free actions as they lose the freedom to do with their property as they see fit (Nozick, 1974: Sandel, 2007).

Rawls refuted Nozick’s theory by claiming that inequalities in ownership are unfair as they are results of the arbitrariness of individuals’ social position and natural talents (Sandel, 2007). Individuals’ rights to property can therefore not be decided before a decision is made on the principles of justice, as they have no right to the earnings their talent or abilities earns them (Sandel, 2007). For Rawls, individuals only have a right to the share that is permitted to them within the principle of distributive justice. For Nozick however, individuals’ do have that right and to force them to redistribute their earnings
fails to acknowledge their autonomy (Nozick, 1974; Sandel, 2007). Transfer of property is only just when there exists free consent between involved parties, that is; Whatever arises from a just situation by just steps is itself just”(Sandel, 2007: 61: Nozick, 1974).

Nozick’s conviction of the extent to which the value of justice lies on the liberty of property is not only inconsistent but also ahistorical. For instance, it entails that we must ensure that we all have enough property to be free yet the act of redistribution of property, for example from the rich to poor, is an act of injustice (Nozick, 1974: Sandel, 2007: Wei, 2008). In addition, Nozick asserted that one cannot acquire nor transfer property unjustly, however throughout history, as we know, a great deal of property has been unjustly appropriated through ways of theft and exploitation (Nozick, 1974: Sandel, 2007). However, as there is no way of rectifying initial historic unjust acquisitions of property, and there is also no way to start over in a new just beginning, the theory itself is therefore problematic as it lacks actual application (Sandel, 2007: Wei, 2008). Nozick’s theory on justice is also inconsistent as it is primarily based on the relationship between a person and property; it lacks a focus, and thus an understanding, on the socioeconomic relationship between individuals (Wei, 2008). Although the two relationships are different, it is not feasible that they should both be addressed in the same principle (Wei, 2008).

While I would agree with Rawls that Nozick’s points are inconsistent in the sense that the overt focus of individual responsibility and individual rights through self-ownership is too individualistic and arguably lacks moral direction, I do consider Rawls’s position within the Original Position equally a-historic, as the Original Position assumes an individual without knowledge of their social position nor a conception of justice as a concept (Rawls, 1974). Yet the principle also assumes the same person to be morally sound in so far that they have basic knowledge of society, such as reason and philosophy, and hence their behaviour within the Original Position would be dictated by that knowledge (Rawls, 1984). This contradicts the whole framing of the ‘Veil of ignorance’ within the principle. In agreement with Wei (2008), I reason that Rawls and Nozick only differ in their understanding of the extent of an individual’s right. Up until that point, their arguments are rather similar. Yet, I do consider Rawls’s methodology on moral individualism to be more persuasive than that of Nozick, as well as Hobbes, Locke, and
Rousseau. Rawls’s work on the principles of justice is of interest for the purpose of this thesis as the primary aim is to explain the causal relationship between identity and class, and hence I would argue that applying elements of Rawls’s theory of justice in the analysis will be helpful for that task. Rawls managed to carve out a convincing framework for understanding justice as a concept that goes beyond the early focus of feasibility and instead presented a framework that seeks to combine theories of morality and ethics with philosophy and economics, or feasibility and desirability, under the umbrella of justice (Kukathas and Pettit, 2006). Moreover, I consider Rawls’s Difference Principle to be especially helpful in understanding how members from minority clans, such as the Gabooye collective in Somaliland, are in an unfair social position as the fruitful elements of distributive justice is not to their advantage. Understanding why is crucial and hence Rawls’s theory on justice is deemed useful.

However, Fraser, like Sen, contests Rawls’s principles of justice, for example, ‘Justice as Fairness’, as it can not account for or accommodate claims of recognition as it is too focused on the economic forms of injustice, instead the normative social justice framework is better suited for today’s ‘post-socialist condition’ where inequalities based on difference are a rule rather than an exception. Instead, Fraser’s theory for social justice ensures “[...] socialism in the economy plus deconstruction in the culture. But for this scenario to be psychologically and politically feasible requires that all people be weaned from their attachment to current cultural constructions of their interests and identities” (Fraser, 1997: 31). However, according to Rawls, the comprehensive doctrine outlined in his work on justice is built on a set of values that covers several aspects of human life and each reasonable citizen in a society has these values (Rawls, 1974).

Rawls illustrated the conception of comprehensiveness in his ‘overlapping consensus’, which indicates that all citizens have accepted the concept of political justice and the ways in which the conception regulates other institutions in society (Rawls, 1974). Benhenda (2010) writes that the citizens outlined in Rawls’s doctrine:

[…] endorse this conception for their own moral or religious reasons, which may differ from one citizen to the other. This makes the conception stable, because citizens endorse conception of justice
independently of shifts in the balances of power between different groups of the society (Benhenda, 2010: 197).

The reasonable citizens in Rawls’s society do not rely on the concept of political justice because of their own interests or others but more so on moral convictions (Benhenda, 2010). Additionally, the Rawlsian society is based on a systemic cooperation between fair and equal citizens, the conception of individual and society is thus reliant on the interaction between the two, accordingly all citizens within a society will view themselves as politically autonomous (Rawls, 1974:Benhenda, 2010). Within this society they will also view themselves as having the capacity to make choices, however, the only relevant and valid political claims made are those made within this capacity (Rawls, 1974: Benhenda, 2010). In this view, the religious duty of a Muslim citizen does not warrant them the right to make claims for, as an example, building a mosque. As citizens they can only make the claim to build a mosque by invoking their right to live as Muslims (Benhenda, 2010). The Qutbian 11 doctrines, which are derived from the divine sovereignty outlined in the Tawhid and the Khilafah, do not correspond with Rawls’s view of political autonomy either(Benhenda, 2010). Instead, as mentioned by Baranzangi, individuals are regarded as vice-regents of Allah (SWT), the only sovereign being. Accordingly, individuals “[...] are not entitled to make claims in the name of their capacity of choice, [...] the only claims they can make are in the name of their status of vice-regents of God” (Benhenda, 2010:199).

According to Qutbians, the political claims they might have are a consequence of the duties they owe to Allah (SWT) (Benhenda, 2010). In this view, individuals have no other claims and they are fully free only when they surrender themselves to God and consequently being a slave of God rids them of all alienations and inclinations (Benhenda, 2010). The Qutbian interpretation of freedom and the right to make claims is rather different than the one presented in Rawls’s A Theory of Justice or Fraser’s framework on recognition and redistribution. The concern for Rawls was to integrate modern liberal democracies with the set of values outlined in the comprehensive doctrines (Benhenda, 2010). This integration was furthered illustrated in the notion of ‘overlapping consensus’

11 Sayyid Qutb was a leading Islamic scholar on philosophy and social justice, see Sayyid Qutb, Social Justice in Islam, 2000
(Benhenda, 2010). However, Fraser’s Social Justice Framework aims to integrate multiple dimensions of morality and ethics into a normative framework that works in our ‘post-socialist’ condition (Fraser and Honneth, 2003). Such a framework can perhaps better accommodate for more complex claims that are in relation to an individual, or a group’s, status, such as those suggested by the Qutbian doctrine where the right to make a claim is only reliant on one’s relation to God, and not necessarily the individual’s choice.

4.1.3. Islam and Justice.

The above section featured some of the most influential ideas on moral philosophy, argued as justice and equality. However, they are scripted from a western perspective, and in some cases rooted in a Christian one, such as the arguments of Locke. While the direct Christian formulations of Locke’s Law of Nature are not directly compatible with Somali society, understanding the social contract, as an order for governance and social justice, is relevant for the Somali context. The principles of governance and social justice agreed upon in the Xeer are, interestingly enough, not that different to the previous principles outlined by Rawls. Traditionally, justice in Somali society was served in a manner very much like the principles of ‘Veil of Ignorance’ and ‘Fair Equal Opportunity’ (Mohamed, 2007). However, where the social contract drawn up by Rawls relies on the ‘Veil of Ignorance’ as a way of avoiding unequal conditions and the legitimation of the status quo, the Somali Xeer could be argued to be its opposite. Furthermore, it is understood here that there is no actual diversity or discrepancy between what is considered universal norms, or western norms, and Islamic values, therefore an analysis on inequality as a paradigm of justice necessitates different ways of understanding and therefore analysing justice. Thus, the following section in this chapter will place the concept of justice within Islamic moral and political thought. An understanding of Islamic moral and political thought is important for a wider understanding of justice in general, yet such an understanding is also important as the base of both ethical and moral thought, and the general life of Muslim societies, Somaliland included, lies in the concept of justice.
As mentioned, Islam has influenced Somali society greatly, arguably to the point where societal institutions, such as the Xeer, are designed with heavy influence from Islamic moral philosophy and jurisprudence. For instance, the Somali Xeer functions like a social contract as the parties within the contract, sharing a common ancestor, reasons that a covenant could govern the clans, however, similar to Locke’s treaties, there is an understanding of negative liberty within the Xeer, in relation to private property and external interference (Lewis, 1961: Mohamed, 2007). In addition, the Xeer is designed in agreement with the elements of social contract found in the Islamic teachings on justice (Lewis, 1961: Mukhtar, 1995: Mohamed, 2007). The contract, the ‘aqd’, between the populace and those that govern, is however set up differently within the Sunni tradition of Islam than the Shia. In the Sunni tradition, a caliphate operates as the highest functioning power of the populace and as an institution, the caliphate is legitimised once the populace of that community agrees to enter into allegiance through the ‘aqd’, the contract, by professing their ‘bay’ah’, oath of allegiance (Mukhtar, 1995). In return the leaders of the caliphate correspond with the deliverance and insurance of justice and the rights of the said populace. According to Mukhtar, there was an establishment of both the ‘aqd’ and the ‘bay’a’h’ between the Somali populace of the Horn and a caliphate earlier than the Ajuuran and the Adal kingdoms (Mukhtar 1995). Due to the extent of persecution experienced by newly converted Muslims in cities like Mecca and Medina, along with the ambition by the converts to spread the teachings of Islam worldwide, groups of Arab Muslims migrated in waves from the Arabian peninsula to the Somali coast as early as the first Islamic caliphate, the Rashidun. (Mukhtar, 1995).

The Rashidun caliphate was during that time under the leadership of Abu Bakar, the companion, and the successor to the prophet of Islam, Prophet Muhammed (SAW) (Mukhtar, 1995). In addition, prior to the establishment of a Somali sultanate, the Caliphate of Abbasid, the third caliphate in succession, governed the Somali people (Mukhtar, 1995). Mukhtar writes that the spread of Islam to the Somali peninsula, which occurred through migration and travel during the early days of the religion, transpired through either ‘Hijrah’ (voluntary) and ‘Tijarah’ (trade and commerce) and not ‘Fith’ (conquest) (Mukhtar, 1995). This mode of the imposition is according to Mukhtar key in understanding the relationship between the Somali people and the Arab rulers, and it is also integral in understanding the establishment of the Somali Xeer and its design.
Prior to the Abbasid ruling of the early Somali people, such as at the previously mentioned Proto Garre, the Somali peninsula was under the authority of the Umayyad dynasty, a caliphate ruled by Abdul Malik Ibn Marwad (Mukhtar, 1995). According to Mukhtar, the allegiance the Somalis had with the Abbasid caliphate was not considered a direct conquest as the Somalis voluntarily entered into an ‘aqd’ with the new administration and accordingly gave their ‘bay’ah (Mukhtar, 1995). Mukhtar also indicates that the Somalis did not pose any direct threat to the Abbasid caliphate and thus there was no need for forced conquest as they held their oath and paid their taxes. Yet the oath of allegiance was not realised for the southern areas around Mogadishu where the already established Sultanate of Mogadishu was in constant rebellion against the caliphates (Mukhtar, 1995). Notwithstanding, what these arguments entail is that the elements of a social contract were manifested in Somali society in the advent of Islam and they were later modified to operate and function within the Somali social ordering of kinship relations, property rights as well as the preferred mode of production, which historically has been centred around pastoralism (Mukhtar 1995: Mohamed, 2007).

The concept of justice that the Xeer, as an entity for governance, and the Aqd as a contract, are meant to deliver is derived from the Holy Qur’an and along with the Tawhid, the teachings of the Holy Qur’an, guide the moral and ethical life of a Muslim (Mukhtar, 1995: Mohamed, 2007). The foundation of the Tawhid lies in the monotheistic notion of one sovereign and all-knowing entity (Mazlee, 2017). The Tawhid regulates the rationale and reason for Muslims in applying justice as all individuals are considered equal (Mazlee, 2017). The word ‘Qur’an’ means to ‘recite’ in Arabic, and it is believed by Muslims to be the word of Allah (subhana wa’tala)\(^\text{12}\) as it was delivered to the Prophet Muhammad (SAW). The Qur’an is the holy manuscript of Islam and the Sunnahs and Hadiths contextualises the divine script. They are primarily based on the deeds of the Prophet Muhammad (SAW). For instance, the previously mentioned concept of bay’ah is derived from the first set of oaths of allegiances given to the Prophet during the early days of Islam (Mukhtar, 1995). Moreover, the Tawhid is not only a concept of theology

\(^{12}\) This is an Arabic expression meaning “Glorious is He and He is exalted” and it is used when mentioning Allah (“God”) in Islam. From here abbreviated as SWT.
where the declaration of Allah (SWT) as the one and only God is central but it also a social and political endeavour that reflects on the ambition to create and condition a peaceful and just society where all individuals are free (Al-Qurtuby, 2013: Mazlee, 2017). In short, the Tawhid, as described by Al-Qurtuby, is made up of two dimensions:

“[… ] the unity of Godhead ( “vertical dimension”) and;

the unity of humankind (“horizontal/social dimension”)” (Al-Qurtuby, 2013:317-318).

Accepting these dimensions makes it clear, according to Al-Qurtuby, that the theological tenet of the Tawhid discards all forms of injustice since all humans are free and equal before Allah (SWT) (Al-Qurtuby, 2013). Barazangi argues that the recognition of Allah (SWT) as the one and only, the core of all values and the source of all knowledge, is only possible when the values created are both known and realised (Barazangi, 1996). The concept of justice (adle) in Islam is therefore contingent on the declaration of Tawhid and terms like Al-Qist (fair share ) and Al-Mizan (Scale or Balance) appear frequently in the Holy Qur’an to highlight Allah (SWT) as both the ultimate source of harmony yet also the importance of equilibrium for Muslims in achieving justice and hence Tawhid (Al-Qurtuby, 2013: Mazlee, 2017).

Furthermore, as stated in the Holy Qur’an, and underlined by Barazangi, “[… ] God created one humanity to realize the imperative of creation which means that His norms are for all humans (universal)” (Barazangi, 1996:78, Holy Qur’an, 33:72). Allah (SWT) has trusted humanity with divine will, or moral law, yet the divine will of humans is dictated by a higher order of moral action, that is the freedom to fulfil, or not, God’s will (Barazangi, 1996). In this notion, God grants humans both revelation and rational ability so that they may know divine will. The Tawhid establishes that revelation is the knowledge of what Allah (SWT) wants each individual to fulfil during their time on earth, as a Law of Nature, and rationality refers to the individual sense of logic and reasoning (Barazangi, 1996). Consequently, because the will of Allah (SWT) lies in causal nature and human emotions and interactions, as reflected through the abovementioned dimensions, both revelation and rational ability are needed to discover full divinity. Furthermore,
because of this intrinsic relationship, individuals most have a strong sense of morality in order to grasp the will of God (Barazangi, 1996).

Barazangi writes:

“[…] once God’s will is perceived, the desirability of its content is a fact of human conscience” (Barazangi, 1996: 78).

Al-Qurtuby adds to the discussion on Tawhid by stating that as a concept it is also aimed at the establishment of positive peace. Positive peace, according to Al-Qurtuby, does not only mean the absence of war but also the presence of justice, ‘adl (Al-Qurtuby, 2013).

In the Holy Qur’an it says:

“O David! We did indeed make thee a vicegerent on earth: so, judge thou between men in truth (and justice)” (Holy Qur’an: 38:26);

Moreover, surah An-Nisa in the Holy Qur’an reads:

“O believers! Stand firm for justice as witnesses for Allah even if it is against yourselves, your parents, or close relatives. Be they rich or poor, Allah is best to ensure their interests. So do not let your desires cause you to deviate from justice’. If you distort the testimony or refuse to give it, then ‘know that’ Allah is certainly All-Aware of what you do” (Holy Qur’an: 4:135).

The passages from Surah S’ad and Surah An-Nisa in the Holy Qur’an highlight not only the key role of justice as a concept invoked in the Tawhid but also the call of divine guidance for Muslims, the believers, to stand firm in their roles as viceregents of Allah (SWT). The passage in An-Nisa specifically tells us that upholding justice is far more important than the social relations we keep. Islam is an inherently peaceful and just religion, which becomes obvious when looking into the several Islamic approaches to peace and justice that are available. For instance, the consolidation of Islamic law (Fiqh), Islamic mysticism (Tasawwuf), theology (Kalam), history (Tariiq) and philosophy
(Falsafah) are all designed interventions in the Holy Qur’an to prevent violence by upholding sustainable and positive peace (Al-Qurtub, 2013). Nevertheless, different traditions and cultures within the Muslim world have used the Holy Qur’an to justify divergent views on war and violence (Al-Qurtub, 2013). However, according to Al-Qurtub, the biased views of Islam fail to differentiate Islam from a specific culture of a specific country as well as distinguishing the difference between the actual teachings of the Holy Qur’an and the current politicised discourse of Islam (Al-Qurtub, 2013).

Islamic history and political theory have evolved and developed simultaneously since the fourteenth century (Bowering, 2013). However, the principal foundations of the religion have not changed, and the realms of religion and state still confirm a strong relationship and understanding this relationship is important in explicating the causal relationship between identity and class within a Muslim society like Somaliland. The core of Islamic political thought does not allow for a separation between the spiritual and the temporal (Bowering, 2013). It not only deals with the ethical behaviours and governance of the state, but it equally deals with individuals’ ethical behaviours as well (Bowering, 2013: Al-Qurtub, 2013: Barazangi, 1996). Thus, Islamic moral philosophy and political thought combines an understanding of justice in both its jurisdictive, political, and socio-economic forms (Hasan, 1971: Bowering, 2013). However, despite the embedded relationship between state and religion, spaces for “fluid negotiations” exist as” […] the concepts of authority and duty overshadow those of freedom and the rights of the individual” (Bowering, 2013:4). However, the Holy Qur’an states that it is the primary responsibility of the Muslim state to ensure that the citizens have both their physical and psychological needs met (Noor, 1998). To understand how such a negotiation is to exist, we must firstly untangle the concept of Ihsan in relation to Justice.

In Islam, justice, Adle, is merged with the notion of Ihsan, which is a concept embedded within the Islamic principle of justice, yet it transcends the logic of justice as Ihsan means to give or do something good for someone else out of compassion alone (Noor, 1998: Mazlee, 2017). The combination of Adle and Ihsan ensures both the physical and intellectual growth of a Muslim society as well as how well the two, Adle and Ihsan, are integrated (Noor, 1998: Mazlee, 2017). Ensuring that Adle and Ihsan are present
strengthens the individual *Ibadah* and individual freedom and rights within Islam is thus tied to the conscious act of *Ihsan*, this is an element of intersubjectivity present within the Islamic justice model. Noor (1998) argues that the justice established in the society of the prophet of Islam (SAW), and accordingly many Muslim societies today, illustrates such an integration (Noor, 1998). This basic notion of justice in Islam corresponds very well with the ideas of justice presented by the Greek philosopher Aristoteles. Correspondingly, Aristoteles presented justice as a concept pertaining to distribution, however, the individuals of Aristoteles's society, such as the society described by Rawls, were unequal to begin with. Unlike the egalitarian nature of Muslim societies where individuals are, by the logic of *Tawhid*, already equal (Noor, 1998: Holy Qur’an).

According to Hasan (1971), Islamic egalitarianism, which corresponds with the application of the Tawhid, is the foundation of Islamic societies. Such a society denies the accumulation of wealth by a few and instead functions on equitable distribution as all are deemed equal (Hasan, 1971). Hasan writes that because moral law on socio-economic issues had no support beyond individual conscience in pre-Islam Arabia, the Prophet Muhammad (SAW) introduced the institution of brotherhood, Mu’akhat (Hasan, 1971). The Mu’akhat is based on the command in the Qur’an where all Muslims are to collaborate as brothers (Hasan, 1971). Several of the prophet’s teachings are central to the idea of social justice and thus opposing inequality, such as the constitution of a social contract through the *bay’ah*. There are also hadiths in the Qur’an that give direction on how the Prophet dealt with injustice. For instance, there is a hadith in the Qur’an that mentions how the Prophet introduced the notion of rights towards one’s community as well as the concepts of ethics and morality through acts of solidarity.

The prophet of Islam is reported to have said:

> One who has surplus animal ride should give it to his brother who has no animal ride, and one who has surplus property should apportion it among those who are propertyless. The prophet recounted so many kinds of commodities by which his companions presumed that man has no right in his surplus wealth (Hadith in Hasan, 1971:213).

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13 *Ibadah* is understood as a form of prayer or worship (Mazlee, 2017).
For Hasan, this specific Hadith is adequate enough to resolve class struggle and thus inequality in a society (Hasan, 1971). Hasan also states that the principles of equality, fraternity and liberty were manifested from day one in the early Muslim society established by Prophet Muhammad (SAW) (Hasan, 1971). The Charter of Medina, which was established during the first established community of the Prophet and where Muslims, Idolaters, Jews, and Christians were living as equals, exemplify the principles of equality and accordingly the concept of justice in Islam. The charter, which is considered by many Islamic scholars to be the first declaration of rights for minorities, proclaims that all in the Ummah\textsuperscript{14}, the community established by the prophet (SAW), are equal despite of race, religion, or creed (Hasan, 1971). The following is stated in the Holy Qur’an regarding the importance of community, yet also puts that in relation to the individual Tawhid:

O mankind, indeed, We have created you from male and female and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another. \textbf{Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you.} Indeed, Allah is Knowing and Acquainted (Holy Qur’an, 49:13).

In addition, the principles of equality, fraternity and liberty connected to modern justice were only discovered after the French Revolution of 1789 in the western world (Hasan, 1971). The Muslim society established by the Prophet (SAW) followed his teachings on social justice and accordingly set a model for an ideal society, as illustrated by the Charter of Medina. Yet Hasan, like Hobbes, argues that a completely equal distribution of wealth in a Muslim society is impossible as the act of distribution of wealth, and conversely poverty, lies in the hands of Allah (SWT) (Hassan, 1971). However, while Muslims may lack the supremacy to distribute wealth and poverty, they are commanded to follow the teachings of the Holy Qur’an, in declaring \textit{Tawhid}, in order to lead a just life and accordingly reach a condition of positive peace that favours all equally. Recalling Rawls, the ‘Veil of Ignorance’ within the Difference Principle ensures that each party behind the veil agrees that all opportunities are to be distributed equally unless unequal distribution would see to benefit the worst off in society (Rawls, 1974). As mentioned, the core framework of Rawls’s justice theory argues that a society is only just when those that are

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Ummah} is an Arabic word that means community and it is a word found throughout the Holy Qur’an referring to the unity and equality among all Muslims’.
considered worst off are equally well off (Rawls. 1974: Noor, 2007). The Islamic understanding of inequality, as derived from the Holy Qur’an as a concept that seeks to maintain equilibrium, corresponds with Rawls’s framework in so far that both use inductive logic\textsuperscript{15}. The inductive logic of both theories of justice relies on an understanding that seeks to explain how natural inequalities can be considered advantageous in a society and not necessarily unfavourable (Rawls, 1974: Holy Qur’an).

Furthermore, both the Islamic principle on justice and the Rawlsian theory, which in a sense is similar to Aristoteles’s dialectic on ethics, look into regulating natural inequalities (Noor, 1998). However, the regulation of justice for Rawls relied on public policies to safeguard the share of the disadvantages, the regulation of justice in Islam lies within the Shari’a, as a religious prescription to minimize the natural inequalities (Noor, 1998). The Shari’a outlines how the Zakat, with other alms giving’s like the Saddaqah, regulates the instrumental aspect of social justice in a Muslim society (Noor, 1998: Hallaq, 2009).

The Holy Qur’an says;

\begin{quote}
It is We who portion out between them their livelihood in the life of this world. And We raise some of them above others in ranks (power, status or riches), so that some may command work from others (Holy Qur’an: 43:32).
\end{quote}

The Zakat is commonly understood as a Islamic form of compulsory charity, however, the Zakat is more dynamic as it has a dualistic purpose; at one hand it is tied to spiritual, and ritual ablution in so that it guides the moral obligations and social action of the Muslim individual, as a way to strengthen ones’ Ibadah and ultimately ones Tawhid and unity with Allah (SWT) ; on the other hand, the Zakat regulates the extent of distribution of wealth within a Muslim society by functioning as a tool for intervention in the public

\textsuperscript{15} It is worth mentioning that the argument on the reasoning of Islamic law, as inductive, in this section is assumptive, in its analogous purpose, and not factual. There is, however, a need for a greater comprehensive reading of the moral reasoning, and thus the legal reasoning, of Islamic law in order to further the concept of justice. However, I do acknowledge that there are great scholars within the Ummah already doing this work.
sphere (Hallaq, 2009). For instance, as the Zakat is one of the five pillars of Islam\textsuperscript{16}, not practicing the act of Zakat makes the pursuit of the other four meaningless.

However, Shari’a law is not abstract and it does not apply equally to all as blind justice is rejected within Islam (Hallaq, 2009: Noor, 1998). Inscribing to blind justice as a framework for the distribution of justice within Islam would allow for the rich and strong of a society to stand in par with the poor and the weak (Hallaq, 2009). Moreover, since social justice is legal and judicial in Islam such a framework would be unfavourable. As mentioned, like the Aristotelian theory, distributive justice in Islam is not reliant on equal reward for everyone, regardless of the extent of their social action or contribution to society (Noor, 1998). However, the Islamic principle of equilibrium does ensure that honourable living is given to those in society that due to unfair conditions, such as sickness, age, or disability, can not participate productively in society (Noor, 1998).

In addition, the concept of charity and honourable living entails that capitalism, as a mechanism regulating production in society, is acknowledged as a vehicle of development in Islam. However, the honourable living of the unproductive members of society is regulated by the state through the Zakat and the Saddaqah. This notion, that capitalism and socialism hold spaces simultaneously within Islam, is yet another area that draws to the compatibility between Islam and Rawls’s theory of justice. For instance, Rawls society could be considered a juxtaposition between socialism and capitalism as both structures are given equal importance as means in the provision of justice for the disadvantaged. Although Islam does endorse private enterprise and productive living, which is important in the provision of resources for the unproductive in society, the core of capitalism, such as loans, interest and banking as money generating means for living, are dismissed (Hasan, 1971: Noor, 1998: Hallaq, 2009). Moreover, as mentioned, it is deemed an immorality within Islam that the concentration of wealth should lie in the hands of a few (Hasan, 1971: Noor, 1998). The understanding here is that everything between the earth and the sky belongs to Allah (SAW) and as his viceregents, humans are meant to

\textsuperscript{16} Along with the Tawhid (confession), Salah (prayer), Hajj (pilgrimage), and Ramadan (Fasting), Zakat constitutes the five pillars of Islam (Holy Qur’an).
share and utilise the gifts, whether they be land or capital, that Allah (SAW) have bestowed upon them with others (Hasan, 1971: Noor, 1998).

Of this the Holy Qur’an says:

“So that wealth may not circulate solely among the rich from among you” (Holy Qur’an: 59:7).

Hence, capitalism as a structure for maintaining a just society is disregarded, as capitalism’s characteristic system of rewarding a few goes in stark contradiction with the divine, and normative, view on distribution outlined in the Holy Qur’an. There is also a difference in the understanding of markets. For instance, where the majority of the contractarian theorists discussed in this chapter, including Nozick and Rawls, relied on market economy as the ideology furthering the morality of society, in Islam the market is purely an instrument of regulation and checks, a tool to ensure equilibrium, and hence avoid inequality, rather than a means for maintaining justice (Hasan, 1971: Hallaq, 2009: Noor, 1998). Noor (1998) writes that justice in Islam is to be viewed as a package deal where both the rights and obligations of Muslims are linked to their human equality (Noor, 1998). Hence, the provisions of rights like freedom and liberty and the implementation of obligations, like the Zakat and the Sadaqah, as means to ensure that the worst of are given due living, are all parts of the Ihsan, yet a pathway to strengthening one’s Ibadah and hence one’s Tawhid (Mazlee, 2017: Noor, 1998). In addition to the moral obligations placed on the individual, Noor argues that there are specific conditions for a just Muslim society to succeed;

“a conducive social climate where individuals value both spiritual and material goods;

(b) a participatory political system; and

c) an honest leadership devoted to Islam” (Noor, 1998:19).

Given Noor’s description and the above discussion on Islamic reason on the constitution of a just society, as well as the Difference Principle outlined by Rawls, Somaliland makes for a good case when exploring the rights of minority groups like the Gabooye collective.
Yet, while the work of Rawls proves important for the understanding of the social contract and justice, the understanding of justice in Somali society, or justice in general, does not need to rely on Rawls’s principles alone, as equally pragmatic principles concerning distributive justice are also found in the Holy Qur’an and the philosophy of Islam. In addition, the principles found in the Holy Qur’an and Islamic moral philosophy do not need to be as modified to fit the Somali narrative or the context, as argued we would need to if relying only on Rawls’s liberal-democratic theory. For instance, how would we describe the experience of inequality from the Gabooye collective in Somaliland without an understanding of justice from both a customary and religious perspective? According to Rawlsian theory, all inequalities, social and natural, are equally underserving. If that is the case, how do we, adhering to Rawlsian reasoning, best compensate members from the Gabooye collective? Is it better to mitigate, or regulate, the inequalities by the same structures that are inherently disadvantageous to those that are marginalised? In addition, what types of compensation are to be given to members of an unjust society if their social position in life is believed to be predetermined by God?

Given these questions, I argue that there are elements of incomparability between Rawls’s liberal justice theory and Islam. However, the discussion and arguments in this chapter have also presented interesting points that show how and where the differing philosophies converge, such as the Difference Principle. I would therefore argue that Rawls’s work on justice parallels rather well with some of the makings of justice in Islam, such as the inductive logic behind the equilibrium of justice, and hence arguably the understanding of justice in Somali society.

4.2. Inequality: From distribution to recognition.

The previous section in this chapter outlined justice, as a concept forming the basis of moral philosophy. However, the contractarian tradition, as a dominant feature of moral philosophy, is argued to have; glossed over men’s patriarchal power over women (Pateman, 1988); not accounting for justice within the family and thus missing the gendered structure of society (Okin, 2001); overlooks that race is not only a social construction but also a political one constructed in favour of the liberal white man in order to freely exploit the ‘other’ (Mills, 1997).
Additionally, according to Guidetti and Rehbein (2014), the theoretical approaches to both defining and addressing inequality, as a paradigm of justice, that have advanced both economics and sociology, can be divided into three different traditions: quantitative, structural, and intermediate. The quantitative approach is intricately linked to the development of economics, but it is also linked to sociology as economic theories on inequality have largely been focused on the relationship between inequality and economic growth (Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014).

Furthermore, the quantitative approach to development economics has been influenced by the classic political economists of the nineteenth century, such as Adam Smith (1776/2007), David Ricardo (1815) and further developed within the field of sociology by the likes of Marx and Max Weber (1958) (Guidetti, and Rehbein, 2014). Although Smith did not explicitly address the issue of inequality in his work on economic growth and labour, he did develop a theory where the free market of goods and labour would lead to an increasing division of labour and then economic growth. Thus, implying existing challenges in the connections between the division of labour and economic growth (Smith,1776/2007:Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014: Clarke,1982). Here the overall product would be distributed proportionally among the populace (Smith, 1776/2007: Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014). In Smith’s view, economic growth was the primary goal, making equal distribution secondary (Smith,1776/2007:Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014). Additionally, in Smith’s theory of value, value added is distributed between three classes; rentiers, capitalists, and workers (Smith, 1776/ 2007: Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014). Smith, a libertarian, was the first political economist who not only introduced the differing characteristics of the three classes of the capitalist society but also their different interests (Clarke, 1982). Smith’s focus was on economic growth and not so much on inequality as a result of such growth, yet his work did explore the conflict between capitalists and workers for the determination of wages (Smith, 1776/ 2007: Clarke, 1982: Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014).

Influenced by Smith, Ricardo reformed the labour value theory by developing his own framework analysis where commodities were dependent on the amount of labour contained (Ricardo, 1815: Clarke, 1982:Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014). Ricardo’s purpose
was to address what he viewed to be the difficulties of political economy as a theory for understanding society (Ricardo, 1815; Clarke, 1982; Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014). In Ricardo’s opinion, the answers to addressing these issues rested in the theory of value and hence that the value of a commodity was grounded on the determination of wages, rents and profits. These three sets could only then be comparative shares of a fixed sum of the value (Ricardo, 1815: Marx: 1867/1995, Clarke, 1982: Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014). Smith, Ricardo, and Marx all presented economic analysis on the functions of income distribution among societies’ different classes. Although they did not use inequality as a specific category for their different analysis it is held that they are the first economists to highlight the problems of inequality between capital and labour (Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014).

Subsequently, Marx, however, advanced the classic political economic theory, with strong influence from Smith and Ricardo, as a tool for analysing society by intersecting the classic mechanisms of economy with an analysis on social relationships and behaviours (Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014). Marx did so by developing the theory of surplus value. This theory clarifies that profits are highly dependent on the surplus value that is extracted from the worker, by the capitalist (Marx, 1867/1995: Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014). In this theory Marx also introduces the origins of the classes of capitalists and workers. In Marx’s structural approach, inequality is inherent in the capitalist mode of production and in this view, the capitalist mode of production is built on two main economic parts; substructure and superstructure (Marx, 1867/1995). Marx’s theory on historical materialism, later developed to be dialectic materialism, explains the causal and systemic relation between the structures within the capitalist mode of production (Marx, 1867/1995: Eagleton, 2011). It is understood that class interest and class conflict are the transmission belt that conveys causal influence between each of the different structures. These structures are always bound up with certain social relationships (Marx, 1867/1995: Eagleton, 2011). One social class may own and control the means of production whilst another social class will be exploited by it (Marx, 1867/1995). In contrast to Smith’s theory of the fixed utility-maximizing individual, Marx’s main argument to the notion of class is that inequality exists because different social groups have adverse access to resources and power relevant for their social needs (Marx, 1867/1995: Peet, 1975: Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014). Since each generation pass on social
resources and power to the next generation, the unequal distribution will be reproduced and thus continue to exist within the family and that specific group (Marx, 1867/1995: Peet, 1975: Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014).

Marx’s historical materialism was developed from critical reading of Hegel’s understanding of history and reality as dialectic opponents forming one single entity (Marx, 1844/2007: Clarke, 1982). Hegel considered egoism to be one of the mechanisms driving civil society and the lack of cohesion within a society was problematic for Hegel as there is no one that stands above self-interest and can therefore fully represent the interests of all of societies’ members (Hegel, 1807/1979: Marx, 1844/2007: Clarke, 1982). The state, as an external entity, must instead function as the apparatus for expressing the cohesive interests of all members (Hegel, 1807/1979: Marx, 1844/2007: Clarke, 1982). The logic being that the state stands above individual pursuits and self-interest (Hegel, 1807/1979). Hegel had an ideal understanding of the role and functions of the state - to be the embodiment of universality. For that to be, however, the state must stay separate from the needs and interests voiced by civil society and instead regulate with disinterest (Hegel, 1807/1979: Marx, 1844/2007: Clarke, 1982).

Furthermore, Hegel asserted human history as an inevitable process constantly moving from fragmentation towards completion and real rationality as one (Hegel, 1807/1979: Clarke, 1982). The movement towards self-realisation manifests in the struggle between nations (Hegel, 1807/1979: Clarke, 1982). Marx did not completely disregard Hegel’s dialectic theory; instead, he substituted Hegel’s metaphysical movement of history with economy to explain the historical struggle between classes rather than nations (Marx, 1844/2007: Clarke, 1982). For Marx, the owners of the means of production are the same class that holds the power within the nation state (Marx, 1867/1995: Guidetti & Rehbein, 2014). Here it was argued that inequality could consequently be abolished through economic redistribution between the classes (Marx, 1867/1995). Marx’s assessment on economic redistribution between classes, in my view, corresponds to the Hadiths in the Qur’an, as presented by Hasan, in rejecting the accumulation of wealth by a few and the importance of economic redistribution (Hasan, 1971).
Marx also explained the unequal and structural access to resources and power by reviewing labour and the construction of the wage system (Marx, 1867:1995). For Marx, the wage system is inherent in the income inequality (Marx, 1867/1995: Peet, 1975). Everything from human labour to individual thought is a commodity that can be bought by an employer, for the right price or wage (Marx, 1867/1995: Peet 1975, Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014). Consequently, a worker needs wages to cover basic needs for survival, but also for social wants, to be content with life and correspondingly contribute to the economy (Marx, 1867/1995: Peet, 1975). Influenced by Smith, Marx viewed society as an economic reproduction where the accumulation of capital, through investments in the means of production and labour, is its capitalist form (Marx, 1867/1995: Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014). Since the construction of the capitalist society lies in the conflict between those that have enough money to buy labour and those that have to sell their labour, inequality is thus the surface of the invisible structure that consists in the uneven distribution of capital and labour (Marx, 1867/1995: Peet, 1975; Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014).

Where Nozick argued that self-ownership is the natural principle of justice, for Marx, however, public ownership of property was the solution to the capitalist exploitation of workers as the capitalist system, in which self-ownership exists, betrays Nozick’s principles of justice (Nozick, 1974: Wei, 2008). Marx did not discuss distributive justice in the same abstract manner as Rawls or Nozick, yet the notion of inequality, as a result of a lack of distributive justice due to the growing role of capitalism and its dividing nature, was present in Marx’s analysis of society (Nozick, 1974: Wei, 2008). The principles of Rawls and Nozick do not outline the double relationship that occurs through social division as did Marx (Wei, 2008). Both Nozick and Rawls adhere to the idea that the distributive principles of liberalism are realised through self-ownership, however when applying Marx’s labour value theory, the idea of self-ownership becomes invalid in the occurrence of social division as the relationships of labour between the capitalist and the worker is not contingent on the universal principles of equality and freedom (Marx, 1867/1995; Nozick, 1974: Wei, 2008).
It is within the bounds of status conflict, between those that buy labour and those forced to sell their labour in Marx’s theory of value that the concept of class becomes manifested (Marx, 1867/1995: Olin-Wright 2005). Class became the framework for Marx in understanding Hegel’s historical materialism in its theoretical, and accordingly more practical, form rather than its descriptive and abstract form (Olin-Wright, 2005). Class was also used to understand how to best approach the ideal society, built on normative radical egalitarianism (Marx, 1867/1995: Olin-Wright, 2005). According to Olin-Wright (2005), Marx’s radical egalitarian concepts can be divided into the following three theses:

(i) the radical egalitarian thesis,
(ii) the historical possibility thesis and;
(iii) the anti-capitalism thesis (Olin-Wright, 2005:8).

The first thesis, the radical egalitarian thesis itself, is a state of classness and a condition where the focus is centred around the egalitarian distribution of material conditions of life in society to those that need it the most. According to this theory, it is only through such a distribution that humanity can ‘flourish’ (Olin-Wright, 2005: 8). The historical possibility thesis is where the egalitarian principles of distribution can be organised into a sustainable and productive economy that can provide equal material conditions for all. It is in this thesis where the theoretical conditions of radical egalitarianism can be put into practice and thus create an economically and politically feasible condition where absolute scarcity is abolished, and productivity is increased (Marx, 1867/1995: Olin-Wright).

The third thesis, the anti-capitalism thesis, describes capitalism as the biggest obstacle to achieving Marx’s egalitarian society. In this notion it is suggested that capitalism, as an economic system, is indeed capable of creating a society with productivity that allows humans to flourish with enough materiality (Marx, 1867/1995: Olin-Wright, 2005). However, because of the inherent dynamics of power that are obvious within capitalism’s various institutions, the system instead creates inequality (Marx, 1867/1995: Olin-Wright, 2005). Therefore, capitalism has the capacity of creating Marx’s utopian society as it has the means of increasing productivity, but it is also designed to disrupt the egalitarian mechanism of Marx’s ideal society (Olin-Wright, 2005).
As mentioned, Marx never appropriated terms like “justice” and “morality” in his work, as it was argued that the concept of morality only adhered to the material condition and interest of various actors, however, according to Olin-Wright, the outlined three theses demonstrate Marx’s moral commitment as they constitute the basis for understanding the normative moral commitments to the ideal society but also in understanding the basis for Marx’s class analysis (Olin-Wright, 2005). However, the term class needs to be placed in relation to the other components of the concept to give an analysis that goes beyond its generic description (Olin-Wright, 2005). I agree with Olin-Wright that class, as defined and understood by Marx, is best used as an adjective rather than as a noun as it gives us a better understanding of class in relation to class relations, class structure, class formations, class locations, class interest, class consciousness and class conflict (Olin-Wright, 2005).

For Olin-Wright, class structure and class relation are the two main components of the Marxian class analysis, the other components are however in constant link to class structure and class relations as they gain their meaning from the two. Class relations also determine power and access to resources and the systems of production (Marx, 1867/1995: Olin-Wright, 2005). The Marxist understanding of the systems of production, and their class relations, are suggested to be comprised of different ranges or production skills, and how they are utilised, such as tools, machinery, labour power, land and raw materials and how all these factors, or productions, are used for productive output (Marx, 1867/1995: Olin-Wright, 2005).

Olin-Wright also asserts that viewing the systems of production in this way is very technical, an approach mostly applied by economists, however, if we view the systems of production from a social perspective then the concept would allow for us to understand how the different individuals within the systems of production have varied rights and powers over the inputs of the productions as well as the outcomes (Olin-Wright, 2005). ‘Powers’ in this context are the powers used to gain “effective control and disposition” over the productive resources (Olin-Wright, 2005:9). In addition, “rights” here are applied to emphasise how the usage of powers are legitimised by a state-like entity. Olin-Wright does not distinguish between the two terms and instead they are used interchangeably to show how the rights and powers, when used together, make up the
“the total sum of the social relations of production” (Olin-Wright, 2005: 10). A good example of the effective power or control over rights is how property rights basically are “effective powers over the use of property enforced by the state” (Olin-Wright, 2005:9). The relation between the rights and powers of the individuals in any given contexts establishes class relations, however, as argued by Olin-Wright, it is important to understand that rights and power are only attributes of these relations and they do not necessarily tell us anything about people’s material relations (Olin-Wright, 2005).

Olin-Wright writes:

“to have rights and power in respect to land, for example, defines one’s social relationship to other people with respect to the use of the land and the appropriation of the fruits of using the land productively” (Olin-Wright, 2005:10)

Hence, the social relations of productions also regulate the activities of people, they do not only distribute material resources (Olin-Wright, 2005). It is when people’s access to rights and power, in relation to productive resources, are skewed and not distributed equally that class relations emerge. Yet having unequal access to productive resources does not necessitate skewed class relations. The unequal appropriation and the unequal usage of the profit of the productive resources is what both constitutes the unequal class relations and thus disrupts them (Olin-Wright, 2005).

I find Olin-Wright’s analysis of Marx and especially the formulation of the Marxian class relations to other variables like class location and the connection to productive resources such as property and land to be valid here. Essentially as it is supposed that the Gabooye of Somaliland, are in adverse class relations due to their lack of access to productive resources as well as their descriptive identification of status in relation to other groups access to productive resources. Can Olin-Wright’s understanding of the Marxist theory on class relation support the thesis in approaching a class analysis that can adequately describe the different groups of interest in the Somali context and in Somaliland in particular? In addition, given the contextual background of the Sab and Samaale’s social relations and their historical access to different productive resources, can we argue that class relations in contemporary Somaliland are to be viewed as a form of relations of production or is it merely an issue of culture? In addition, I would argue that there is
room for exploring ‘the Somali issue’ employing a view on inequality that is grounded in a Marxist understanding of class relations whilst relying on Islam and Rawls for the conceptualisation of justice, and the analytical logic, in the Xeer as a social contract. The ensuing chapters of the thesis will ensure to explore these spaces.

4.2.1. Towards an appropriate class analysis

In order to answer the questions asked in the previous section, it is important to firstly test an understanding of class as a descriptive category for social relations in Somali society. The focus of this thesis has identified the need for such an effort and while the overall objective of the thesis have thus far adhered to a Marxist understanding of inequality and therefore class, as it is argued that Marx’s work on political economy advanced classic economic theory and introduced a structural approach to explaining class and thus inequality, it is however also acknowledged that Marx’s theory of the two concepts have not been accepted by political and social justice theorists without criticism. For example, Weber contested parts of Marx’s work and although Weber focused much of his work on historical sociology, primarily occupation and wealth, he contested Marx’s theory on structures and class by asserting that social structures were more complicated than suggested by Marx (Guidetti & Rehbein, 2014).

Instead, Weber argued that, apart from occupation and wealth, more factors must be included in the analysis of inequality and class stratification as there are status groups in a society that are neither capitalist nor workers (Weber, 1946). Weber held that social inequality and social stratification manifests through the following three types; social class, status group and party (Weber, 1946: Waters and Waters, 2016). The first form of inequality is connected to the marketplace, the second, and to Weber the most important type, to the communities, or groups, and the third form of inequality is within the ‘party’, the sphere were power is distributed (Weber, 1946: Waters and Waters: 2016). For Weber, the three types of inequality can only emerge from two forms of stratifications, present in two various parts of society; Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft (Weber, 1946).
The two forms of social stratifications are connected, yet they cannot be mixed as they are different in their placement (Weber, 1946: Gerth and Mills, 1958: Waters and Waters, 2016). The Gemeinschaft is rooted in the emotional sphere of society and it is in this realm where honour, morality, norms, affection, and loyalties are both defined and appointed among the members of the community (Weber, 1946: Gerth and Mills, 1958: Waters and Waters, 2016). The other form of stratification, which is where classes are formed, is rooted in the rational segment of society, the Gesellschaft. In this realm, economic rationality is favoured over the emotional features that characterises the Gemeinschaft (Weber, 1946: Gert and Mills, 1958: Waters and Waters, 2016). Yet Weber makes it clear that although the two forms of stratifications have different descriptions and placement in the Weberian spectrum of inequality, they do underpin each other. For instance, the Gesellschaft is always underpinned by the Gemeinschaft in limiting the reach and the extent the marketplace, and its calculative instruments, have on collectively formulated norms and values, such as citizenship and human rights (Weber, 1946: Gerth and Mills, 1958: Waters and Waters, 2016).

Furthermore, Weber’s status groups are defined by their relationship to power and how the various groups within a community are seeking collective power over other groups (Weber, 1946: Gerth and Mills, 1958: Zurn, 2002: Waters and Waters, 2016). In addition, the status relations of the members of the community are reliant on markers, or symbols, of similarity and belonging (Weber, 1946: Zurn, 2002). These markers are further delineated by the status of honour in Weber’s status thesis. Upholding honour is the unity, or the bond, that establishes the social relations within a community or a group (Weber,1946: Gerth and Mills, 1958). Honour, for Weber, is any form of recognition or esteem, whether it be negative or positive, that we accord another individual (Weber, 1946: Waters and Waters, 2016). Within the status groups, different individuals have differing statuses due to the ways in which they are accorded honour (Weber, 1946: Gerth and Mills, 1958: Waters and Waters, 2016). This understanding of honour in relation to social relations entails that there are groups within the same community that have low status and groups with high status, all in line with the level of social honour that they have been accorded by their community members (Weber,1946: Gerth and Mills, 1958: Waters and Waters, 2016).
Weber’s theory differs from Marx here in that social honour and the *Gemeinschaft* is reliant on community evaluations in gaining recognition where Marx’s classes are reliant on the economy and the market (Weber, 1946: Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014). Weber’s formulation of social structure is established on a notion that is based on a mode of behaviour amongst individuals in a given status group rather than a mode of production. Hence, the behaviours and the norms within a community are more subjective than objective for Weber than for Marx (Weber, 1946: Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014. The biggest take away in this brief exploration of Weber’s social theory is how social relations are not always tied to ownership, or lack thereof, and the means of production (Weber, 1946: Gerth and Mills, 1958). Weber held that there are other factors at play in the makings of inequality, and these are just as important as those that occur within the economic sphere and the capital-labour relation (Weber, 1946: Gerth and Mills, 1958).

Group organisation for Weber is a sociological condition comprised of individuals that form a community or a collective, like that of clan. The basis of the group is made up of members with similar norms and values, like that of a family, friends, or colleagues (Weber, 1946: Gerth and Mills, 1958). While similarity in norms is a prerequisite for Weber’s group structure, the group can still be disintegrated in terms of opinions and members coming and going. In addition, Weber held that classes could form groups but that it would be unlikely as the traditional formulation of a class would not allow for social action as the common class situation, which is a situation reliant on an individual’s relationship to the market or other means of production, is not a universal phenomenon (Weber, 1946: Gerth and Mills, 1958).

Understanding the *Gemeinschaft* and the *Gesellschaft*, as differing features of social stratification, makes it clear that there are varying dimensions of inequality and hence forming a group based on the common class situation, as supposed by Marx, is highly unlikely for Weber. However, Weber did write about class¹⁷ and class consciousness, albeit a different description than Marx. Marx held that class consciousness would

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¹⁷ Classes are different from status groups in the Weberian theory and they emerge as a sub-unit of the *Gemeinschaft*, the orders of the market and the *Gesellschaft*. The ‘Party’ is, however, manifested through both the *Gemeinschaft* and the *Gesellschaft* (Weber, 1946: Waters and Waters, 2016).
develop once the class, that is a group sharing a common situation to put it in Weberian terms, decide to organise around a common interest. However, for Weber, this is only possible when there is a large enough number of individuals within a class and there is no status difference between the members of that class (Weber, 1946: Gerth and Mills, 1958: Waters and Waters, 2016). In addition, the class can reach consciousness when the interest of the class is well defined and understood, but most importantly when the interests of the class is organised and led by a group outside of the given class (Weber, 1946: Gerth and Mills, 1958). Weber’s status groups and honour concept are relevant for the upcoming analysis in this thesis as they provide a nuanced understanding of social relations, group dynamics and the organisation of power.

For instance, the Somali clans do generally share the same norms and values and here I argue that they do constitute a Gemeinschaft, which the establishment of the Somali Xeer further proves. Yet, to me, the clan Gemeinschaft differs from the Weberian status group within the Gemeinschaft. For Weber, members of the community have the ability of movement when it comes to cutting across class relations and class situations (Weber, 1946: Gerth and Mills, 1958). Given this description, the clan composition could be a status group but it only cuts across class relations to a certain extent, as is the assumed case for the Gabooye. Again, for Weber, status of honour is more important in determining communities or groups’ social action rather than classes (Weber, 1946:Gerth and Mills, 1958). This notion is integral for the understanding of class in the Somali context. Here I am bound to ask if the Somali clans are status groups, rather than classes or are they classes that have formed status groups? Is it ‘warped reason’ to assume that the Somali stratification experienced by members of minority clans is emergent out of both the Gemeinschaft and the Gesellschaft, simultaneously? Or is the experience of inequality only associated to the Marxist class description where production and ownership are the main causes of inequality?

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18 Warped reason was used by Weber to describe the linguistic challenges that occur when translating the concepts of Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft, to the English language. Weber held that, the English language, by using terms like socio-economic status to describe social inequality, mixes the two forms of stratification, which are not only different forms of inequality but they are also rooted in separate dimensions; one in abstract emotion and the other in rational calculation (Waters and Waters, 2016:1 ) Doing so creates a warped reasoning as there is only one variable describing the two different qualities of inequality and accordingly the analysis becomes skewed and unnuanced (Waters and Waters, 2016:1.)
In addition, both Weber and Marx wrote about caste within the Hindu society to describe both status group and class. For Weber, the Hindu caste system, which he asserted to be “[…] the construction of radical ethical thought and not the production of any economic condition” (Weber, 1958:131), goes against Mukherjee (2000) and Singh’s (2008) understanding on how the Hindu caste system submerged with the already established colonial structures of subordination, that is a class hierarchy due to the capitalist structure of colonialism, but described as status groups by Weber (Mukherjee, 2000:334). Instead, Weber refutes the notion that there ever transpired a relationship between production and property in ancient India in the advent of British colonialism and instead argued that that the form of injustice practices present was already established under “Brahmanical theodicy” (Weber, 1958: Mukherjee: 2000: 335). According to Weber, the Hindu caste system was already well established and controlled under persuasive elites clinging on to power, such as the Brahman caste groups (Weber, 1958: Mukherjee, 2000). Weber argued that the Hindu caste system operated on such relations, and as stated, not by any connection to economic production (Weber, 1958). In addition, the Indian subcontinent highlighted, for Weber, the explicit and direct relationship between religion and social stratification (Subedi, 2013: Weber, 1958: Mukherjee, 2000). This relationship, underpinned by the ideology of Hinduism, was the condition establishing stratification amongst the Hindu population (Subedi, 2013). Weber used his notion on status groups and honour to further his theory on caste as status and not class. He stated that castes were special forms of status groups and that the caste system was to be considered a closed status of class due to the way identity was formed using endogamy and the notion of pollution (Weber, 1958: Subedi, 2013).

However, Marx described caste as an outcome of economic production as the primitive forms of property ownership transpire into property relations due to the various forms of production that condition them (Marx, 1859/1964: Mukherjee, 2000). These forms do however change once labour, instead of slavery and serfdom, is placed among the conditions of production. The labour relations that emerge would hence exclude serfdom and slaves (Marx, 1859/1964: Mukherjee, 2000). However, Marx claimed that labour relations would eventually submerge with the caste system and that it would have a “[…] analogues negative development” (Marx,1859/1964: 101-102: Mukherjee,2000:335).
According to Mukherjee, labour in the caste system is organised along the lines of the caste hierarchy, for instance, the upper castes, comprised of the priests, are the owners of capital such as land and property and hence they rarely work but if they do engage in labour it is usually mental work or work that is considered “clean” such as priesthood (Mukherjee, 2000). In contrast, the lower echelon of the caste hierarchy, the middle tier and the lower tier, are the ones engaged in actual labour. Usually, manual labour and often polluting labour. For me, this description further correlates with Marx’s theory of labour relations. However, the Marxist description of labour relations in India was refuted by Weber and interestingly enough the Weberian notion of caste gained more support from Indian studies scholars, like Dumont, and according to Mukherjee, the propagation of the Weberian description of Indian social relations have created a state of false consciousness in spreading the idea that caste as a system of subordination is entrenched into the Indian blood, hence Indian culture (Mukherjee, 2000:335). However, Weber is also noted to have asserted that castes were found among the Mohammedans and the Buddhists. (Mukherjee, 2000) Nonetheless, Mukherjee’s argument is interesting as the cultural description of the Hindu caste system is similar to how Somali history and society is usually described, using clan as the overarching narrative. Other scholars, like Subedi, however, add that there has been a shift from previously describing caste as a birth-ascribed hierarchy to the contemporary notion of caste as a power and resource generating tool linked to identity (Subedi, 2013: 51).

Apart from Marx and Weber, contemporary sociological research on inequality and social justice have been influenced and advanced by other scholars like Bourdieu (1984) who have introduced an alternative understanding of inequality that goes beyond capital and labour. Bourdieu’s culturalist rationale on inequality and capital can on the other hand be positioned between both Marx and Weber. For Bourdieu, inequality was conceptualised by using the terms habitus and field. He used these two terms to describe traditionally explained resistances between subject and object, action and structure, determination and freedom (Bourdieu, 1984: Navarro, 2006: Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014). Briefly, Habitus is described as the whole of society and field to be a society outside of society (Bourdieu, 1984: Navarro, 2006). Bourdieu used these terms to explicate how interrelated and inseparable the subject and object are in their structural apparatuses. For
instance, subjectivity can only exist within objectivity and objective structures are only results of subjective actions (Navarro, 2006: Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014).

_Habitus_ is furthered understood as unconscious socialised norms and customs that impact and guide a person’s thinking and behaviours (Bourdieu, 1984: Navarro, 2006: Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014). The notion of disposition is derived from this understanding. The socialised norms and customs that guide personal behaviours are crucial for knowing how to act, and mobilise, within society thus making the understanding of dispositions important for social structures in the same ways economic capital is important (Bourdieu, 1984: Navarro, 2006: Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014). _Fields_ is the different institutional and social arenas in which individuals’ different dispositions are produced. It is also the arena where individuals compete for the access of the different forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1984: Navarro, 2006: Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014). From this, Bourdieu, like Weber, advanced the understanding of capital by expanding it to include factors other than economic resources and material assets. Social capital instead includes cultural and/or symbolic resources such as disposition and education (Bourdieu, 1984: Navarro, 2006: Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014). In Bourdieu’s views, it was crucial to understand the total sum of capital owned by one social class along with the different types of capital, and their power, and how they are acquired through time (Bourdieu, 1984: Navarro, 2006: Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014). This approach to class structure is different from that of Marx, as it does not depend entirely on the modes of production; instead, they are continuous factors that consist of both economic and cultural capital (Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014). Understanding _Habitus_ and _Field_ in relation to the transferable mechanics of social capital allows for an analysis on inequality that investigates the societal power relations between social groups that are hidden in an economic analysis (Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014). Bourdieu’s analysis of inequality is thus significant as it introduces social aspects of inequality that were not calculated for by previous economists, it also shines light on the issues of power in relation to inequality, however, it does not explain where the distribution of resources come from (Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014).
The structural and quantitative approach to class stratification and inequality presented by all the above-mentioned scholars, especially Marx, continues to be influential in contemporary political economy. The understanding of social justice and the aim of addressing inequality by fairer distribution within Islam does to an extent correspond with Marxist tradition of class struggle and stratification, however as the conditions of probability that are at play in the distribution of equal wealth, according to the Holy Qur’an, lie outside of human control, the notion of social justice within Islam actually corresponds more with Rawls and the Difference Principle. Yet I argue here that the Marxist view on the nature of inequality offers a good theoretical lens when analysing the historical materialism of conflict and division between different classes and the economy. However, it is less useful when explaining factors other than individual’s position and the relationship of the means of production (Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014). The classic Marxist paradigm was western focused, as was Rawls’s theory of justice, meaning that the basis for analysis was examined through advanced western societies and not the non-European world (Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014). Such focus fails to address the relations of uneven development between the capitalist centres in Europe and the globalised and colonised nations in the periphery (Guidetti and Rehbein, 2014). However, both Rawls and Marx have proven useful in the formulations of justice and class in this thesis, and while their compatibility with the contextualities of Islamic morality and Somali society vary, it is reasoned here that those formulations will be carried through in the remainder of the thesis.

4.3. Critical theory and the expansion of the justice concept.

Critical theory is the theoretical perspective that informs this thesis and according to Strydom (2011) it is a continuance of abductive reasoning as it” […] prioritizes problems or social pathologies of reason brought to attention by a shift in the objective order of society itself” (Strydom, 2011:164). Critical theory is informed by the philosophical thought of Hegel and Marx and consequently emphasis is on confronting inequality and all forms of oppression (Thomas, 1993; Kincheloe and Lincoln, 2000; Strydom, 2011). Critical theory also refutes the fetishization of knowledge and instead promotes ideology critique of

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19The fetishization of knowledge relates to Marx’s concept on the fetishism of commodities, where the exchange values of commodities are described as fetishized by humans over social relations (Marx, 1867:1995) Similarly, the notion of knowledge, as a constructed entity where plain facts are explained as
the capitalist system, dialectics, social action and emancipatory change (Corradetti, 2014). Secondly, as a critical endeavour, focus is on the “[…] differentiated engagement with the object domain by way of diagnostic analysis aimed at identifying the problem or social pathology together with its conditions in the actual concrete situation as well as the interfering societal structures or real mechanisms to which it could be explained and critiqued” (Strydom, 2011:164).

Critical theory is often separated into three generations and according to Corradetti (2014) the first generation of critical theorists, such as Horkheimer (1895-1973), Adorno (1903-1969) and Marcuse (1898-1979), were concerned with the practicality of Hegel’s dialectics, subjectivity in relation to modernity and universality (Corradetti, 2014). The second generation, like Jürgen Habermas (1973) and Giddens, focused on shifting modernity from Hegel’s notion of subjectivity to that of intersubjectivity (Corradetti, 2014: Vahdat, 2003). For instance, Habermas defined subjectivity as: “the property characterising the autonomous self-willing, self-defining and self-conscious individual agent” (Habermas in Vahdat, 2003:195). In addition, Habermas’s critical work on justice is argued to outline the contemporary avenue of a social contract (Kukathas and Pettit, 2006). The social contract was for Habermas, in contrast to Rawls who viewed it as a heuristic and evaluative economic issue, a political issue (Kukathas and Pettit, 2006). In brief, Habermas sought to understand the social contract from a non-heuristic approach and as such understood the relationship, or the conditions, between ideal speech and communication to be the best way to describe justice, as a collective decision by all involved parties (Habermas, 1973: Kukathas and Pettit, 2006).

The third-generation Critical theorists, such as Alex Honneth (1995) revisited Hegel’s philosophy and the concept of recognition as the foundation of intersubjectivity (Honneth, 1995. Corradetti, 2014). Honneth, a former student of Habermas, invoked Hegel’s view on subjectivity as the moral category for justice. Honneth’s effort within Critical theory has been on remapping the philosophy of the critical tradition in developing a theory of recognition and in so departing from the Frankfurt School of

universal, is held to be fetishized within traditional theory by critical theorist like Habermas (Corradetti, 2014).
Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse and accordingly Marxism (Corradetti, 2014). Honneth’s departure is signified in his critique of intersubjectivity and the notion of distributive injustice as the only way forward for emancipation (Honneth, 1995: Fraser and Honneth, 2003: Corradetti, 2014). According to Honneth, ignoring difference and exclusively focusing on redistribution can instead serve to reinforce injustice by compelling minority groups and divergent identities to ‘fall in line’ with the norms of the dominant group (Honneth, 1995). Therefore, the struggles over a fairer distribution of opportunities, resources and rights should be thought of as struggles for recognition (Honneth, 1995).

In his theory of recognition Honneth focuses on the early writings of Hegel, specifically the Jena manuscripts20, to build his recognition model. However, in contrast to Hegel, where the reflection of “self” is in constant relation to institutions such as the family, civil society, and the state, Honneth shifts the focus to the social sphere (Hegel, 1807/1979: Honneth, 1995). The Hegelian identity model suggests recognition as a form of self-realisation and that self-realisation is not a self-contained matter, but part of the intersubjective process where the perception of ‘self’ is mirrored and transformed in the interaction with others and thus their perception of the self (Hegel,1807/1979: Honneth,1995). For Hegel, the establishment of mutually recognising each other’s ‘self’ becomes the pre-requisite for self-realisation (Hegel, 1807/1979). Recognition in Honneth’s argument, which is nevertheless guided by the ethical constructions of Hegel’s Sittlichkeit, is accordingly positioned as the overarching moral objective of justice yet focus for Honneth lies in exploring the different social relationships that constitute recognition (Honneth, 1995: Fraser and Honneth, 2003: Corradetti, 2014). Honneth’s normative monism examines recognition as a concept that can include recognition of rights and cultural appreciation alongside an altered formulation of economic redistribution (Honneth, 1995: Fraser and Honneth, 2003). Therefore, for Honneth, struggles for recognition must be viewed with the same significance as those for redistribution. If not, groups like those studied here, are most likely to accepts their

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20 The Jena manuscripts are considered incomplete sketches of Hegel in which he focused on the individual, mostly in relation to clan and family. The manuscripts also hold Hegel’s earliest conceptualisation of recognition and intersubjectivity, later presented in the Phenomenology of the Right and the Phenomenology of the Sprit. (Williams, 2000).
inferior positions, due to a lack of self-realisation, and instead accept the demands of the dominant groups (Honneth, 1995: Fraser and Honneth, 2003).

As mentioned earlier, the main parts of Mills’s critique on the stratification that is present within the contractarian circumstances are in line with Marx’s theory on how inequalities are produced, however critical Marxist theory would argue that arguments, like those of Mills, Pateman and Honneth, in favour of identity politics, are neoliberal trappings used to maintain capitalism and thus reinforce inequalities such as racism and sexism (Smith, 2008). It is however acknowledged within both the theory of identity politics and Marxism that all oppression is produced by real inequality (Smith, 2008). Yet, where Marxism as an ideology claims that it is not necessary to have personally experienced oppression in order to commit to opposing it, the theory of identity politics is based on the opposite conclusion; only individuals that have experienced oppression can fight against it (Smith, 2008). It is also implying that everyone else is part of the problem and the oppression one is committed to fighting (Smith, 2008). However, here I oppose as I consider the focus of this thesis, which looks at explaining the causal relationship between the various mechanisms of subordination within Somali society, to be valuable, even as a non-Gabooye member. It is argued that both the theory and methods used in the field and in the thesis uncover both hidden and visible power relationship and the dialectics of both the disadvantaged and the privileged in order to be able to promote egalitarian and inclusive approaches to justice. Hence, I find it necessary to highlight some extent of the oppression members of the Gabooye collective are experiencing in Somaliland, through their own words, albeit without sharing the same experience of oppression, yet as an act of solidarity and with a sense of the ‘Universal’.

Identity politics, usually discursively present in the field of Postcolonial theory, seems to be where Marxism and Postcolonial theory meet on issues involving inequality and exclusion, yet it is also where the dissension is the strongest. Identity politics is usually defined as an umbrella term to describe issues of oppression. Bernstein (2005) writes that as a term, ‘Identity politics’ was initially used by Anspach in the late 1970’s to highlight how individuals with disabilities were challenging the negative societal and personal conception of living with disability. However, as mentioned by Hall (1996), the realm of
identity politics is also considered to encompass overlapping conversations regarding sexuality, ethnicity and politics (Hall, 1996: Bernstein, 2005). Yet, as a social justice movement it has been co-opted by women’s rights matters, minority rights struggles, such as the civil rights movement, multiculturism and issues on sexual identities (Bernstein, 2005). Hence, the reach of identity politics stretches from liberal western societies, right-winged European states to Postcolonial and socialist arenas in the global south such as Latin-America and Africa (Bernstein, 2005). Because of the overlapping notions of identity politics, there are different approaches to categorising identity politics, and as a discourse, at its core, it looks to explain the relationship between identity, culture power and politics (Bernstein, 2005). Such an explanation seeks to go beyond the theory of power that sees class inequality as the only true form of oppression.

Therefore, advocates of identity politics, such as Mills, Pateman and Honneth, have sought to widen the understanding of power, and hence both morality and ethics, by changing the narrative and instead invoke understandings of social relations that go beyond both capital and labour. In addition, the critical focal point of the discourse illustrates that there is a need to further untangle ‘Europe from the Universal’ as the Marxist concept of Universal is ambiguous when relating it to the constructions of hegemony (Balibar, 2004: Sinha and Varma 2017:550). Here I agree and I consider Postcolonial theory to be valuable for such an endeavour. However, as a theory of power, the discourse on identity politics, and the study of the Postcolonial, holds place for essentialism as it excludes the notion of the ‘Universal’ struggle for social justice for a stronger appreciation of the ‘Particular’ as a means for social change, and hence separate identity and culture from the political economy (Sinha and Varma, 2015). In addition, it is further argued, by Mezzadra (2012) that Postcolonial theory, as the holding ground of identity politics; lacks the capacity to deal with capitalism as it takes capitalists for granted (Mezzadra, 2012: Sinha and Varma, 2017). For Hardt and Negri (2000), it is insufficient in conceptualising global power (Hardt and Negri, 2000: Sinha and Varma, 2017). Žižek, as we know, asserts that identity politics, of any sort, functions with the needs of capital as it accepts the global capitalist coordinates (Žižek, 2001). San Juan Jr. (2000) adds to the critique by claiming that the obsessive textuality of Postcolonial theory makes it out-dated and no longer relevant for struggles of justice or emancipation under globalisation (San Juan, 2000: Sinha and Varma, 2017:549-550).
Fraser, a critical theorist and moral philosopher, acknowledges the clash between class interest and identity politics in her now infamous work on social justice explored through the lens of participatory parity; except her analysis sustains that the struggles and claims premiering identity politics from various groups around the globe are done so in a reality of wide-ranging material inequality (Fraser, 1996). Initially set out as a critical response to Habermas’s concept of “public sphere”, the question for Fraser is instead about how to incorporate issues of ‘identity’, ‘difference’ and ‘recognition’ into a socialist imaginary based on the traits of ‘class interest’, ‘exploitation’ and ‘redistribution’ (Fraser, 1996). We are, according to Fraser, faced with a new task of developing a critical theory that addresses the demands of our age: both recognition and redistribution (Fraser, 1996). Fraser states that this would be a theory that defends and acknowledges identity politics in a way that is coherent with the social politics of equality (Fraser, 1996).

The trajectory towards such a critical theory conditions that there are two different ‘types’ of inequalities to acknowledge: socio-economic inequality, as explained by Marx and cultural inequality as analysed within Postcolonial theory. Fraser writes that “[...] cultural injustice include cultural domination (being subjected to patterns of interpretation and communication that are associated with another culture and are alien and/or hostile to one’s own); non-recognition (being rendered invisible via the authoritative representational, communicative and interpretative practices of one’s culture); and disrespect (being routinely maligned or disparaged in stereotypic public cultural representations and/or in everyday life interactions” (Fraser, 1996: 71). Although it is acknowledged that the two types of inequality are different in their discursive review, it is held that they are intertwined as both are rooted in practices that systematically differentiate some groups from others (Fraser, 1996). Socio-economic inequality and cultural inequality reinforce each other dialectically as “[...] cultural norms that are unfairly biased against some are institutionalized in the state and the economy: meanwhile, economic disadvantage impedes equal participation in the making of culture, in public spheres and in everyday life” (Fraser, 1996: 73). The two however, demand separate solutions: redistribution or recognition.
4.3.1 The Makings of the Somali identity: The trajectory of Somali studies

The heterogenous approach argues that the Somali people would be the best succeeding African state post colonialism as they shared one Somali identity through uniformity in ethnicity, language, culture and religion (Kusow, 1994: Eno and Kusow, 2014: Walls, 2015). However, according to Ahmed (1995), four intellectual groups have designed and perpetuated the picture of Somali society throughout history, thus constructing the existing misrepresentation of Somali society (Ahmed, 1995: Teutsch, 1999). Ahmed describes these groups of intellectuals as the historians, Somalis and non-Somalis, colonial anthropologists, Somali poets, and Somali politicians (Ahmed, 1995). The historians, as stated by Ahmed, are responsible for constructing Somali history on certain assumptions; colonial anthropologists are indicted for privileging modernity over tradition: Somali poets for portraying one section of Somali society as common and homogenous; and Somali politicians for the promotion of their political and nationalistic agendas (Ahmed, 1995: Teutsch, 1999).

These groups represented the portrayal of Somali identity and society as homogenous for many decades and according to Eno and Kusow this description of Somali identity and society shaped perceptions of social differences within Somali society as something unfortunate rather than celebrated as a strength and consequently the boundary of Somaliness rests on this principal ontological assumption (Eno and Kusow, 2014: 92). This assumption has created not only ontological problems but epistemological ones as well. One of the main problems identified is the extent to which it has established a condition for Somali scholarship where the focus for understanding Somali society does not lie on explicating internal social differences, such as caste and race, but it has instead focused on: “[...]” rescuing and recreating the supposedly historical moral fibre of the Xeer that held society together prior to the intervention of corrosive Western economic and social structures and the division of the historical Somalilands and their incorporation into several different colonial regions” (Eno and Kusow, 2014: 92).

Samatar adds that writings on the Somali territories started with the western European expansion of travellers and adventures like Richard Burton and then manifested by colonial administrators such as Douglas Jardine (Samatar,1989b). These writings,
according to Samatar, were filled with racial superiority as their purpose was to maintain the unapologetic colonial idea of the “African savage” (Samatar, 1989b: 6). In its overarching aim of incorporating the Somali territories to the growing colonial empire, Somali heterogeneity, in both culture, religion and ethnicity, was manipulated and instead the Somali people, and thus the Somali identity, was introduced as a homogenous one (Samatar, 1989b).

The works of Lewis, such as *A Pastoral Democracy* is maintained to have forwarded the portrayal of the Somali homogenous identity (Samatar, 1989b; Besteman, 1999; Walls, 2014). Through his work on Somali kinship relations in the north, Lewis promoted, and thus academically manifested, the idea that the Somali people were homogenous (Lewis, 1961). However, as noted by Samatar, Eno and Kusow, and later by non-Somali scholars like Besteman and Walls, the writings of Lewis have not been received without critique. Somali and non-Somali scholars alike have questioned Lewis’s work due the emphasis put on the traditional aspects of the Somali society (Walls, 2014). Lewis, while also a recipient of Samatar’s critique, is however not placed in the same low regard as the colonial authors, such as Burton and Jardine, however it is maintained that through the centrality of a primordial approach to Somali history, his scholarship has manifested an imagery of Somali society that misses the material and historical conditions that order kinship relations (Samatar, 1989b). Another scholar critical of Lewis is Besteman. Besteman’s work explores the explicit forms of race that exist within Somali culture by specifically analysing the relations of oppression of the Gosha people of the south. In reaction to the upsurge of biased media coverage regarding the Somali state collapse in 1991, Besteman questions Lewis’s usage of clan and the segmentary lineage as an essential explanation to the Somali history of warfare, political instability and state collapse (Besteman, 1996) Consequently, Besteman asks if pre-colonial Somalis actually “[...] were trapped within destructive spirals of kin-based warfare and feuding?” (Besteman, 1996:123). Instead, Besteman claims, the historical occurrence of warfare and feuding were not endemic to Somalis alone, as an internal dynamic of the clan system, but similar occurrences of violence were spread throughout Africa as a consequence of both global economy and politics (Besteman 1996: Lewis: 1998).
In addition, Walls argues that the biased focus of Lewis neglects the “[...] the importance of radical ‘transformation’ in economic, environmental and political spheres in explaining contemporary Somali society” (Walls, 2014: 35). To Besteman’s inquiry, of the extent to which the Somali people are prone to violence and internal feuding, Lewis replies that warfare actually is endemic to a “[...] pervasively bellicose culture” (Lewis, 1998: 100). Lewis confirms this claim by referencing historical records produced by colonial authors and his own extensive field work in the Somali territories prior to independence. Interestingly, Lewis also confirms his position on the inherent anarchic aspects of the Somali clan system by also referring to contemporary Somali historians and anthropologists that are in agreement with Lewis’s own assessment.

Moreover, Lewis refutes Besteman’s claims that “race” is a category of stratification that is present in Somali society (Lewis, 1998). Instead, Lewis claims that clan lineage stratification is invisible and not connected to genetics or ethnicity (Lewis, 1998). Ethnic differences, and not race, is only applicable to differentiate between the “belligerent” and “freewheeling” pastoral nomadic clans, the Dir, Isaaq, Darood and Hawiye, and in Lewis’s view, the more peaceful Digil-Rahanweyn (Lewis, 1998: 104). The difference between the two groups, according to Lewis, lies in language and clan formation alone. Lewis adds that the construction of the Somali identity, in its basic kinship form, is both biological as well as a cultural product of long social engineering. However, it is clan ideology and the manifested idea of genealogical lineage that actually brings the Somali people together as a people (Lewis, 1998).

4.3.2 Class as social formation in Somali society

Insights from the above debate, and later highlighted the ensuing chapter, proves the dissonance that exists within the different paradigms in Somali studies on how to approach an analysis of Somali society. It has been argued that the primordial tradition of continuously associating Somali society with kinship is problematic and that there is a need for a critical approach that acknowledges other aspects, in connection to clan. For instance, in reaction to Lewis’s statements, which are held as reductionistic, Besteman urges scholars within the field of Somali studies to go beyond the primordial description of contemporary Somali society and instead look into the transformations that have
occurred in the Somali political economy during the twentieth century. Besteman asserts that acknowledging the extent to which the tensions and the changes of the twentieth century, such as the colonial legacy, have had on Somali social relations will help us understand the extent to which the clan system operates on a hierarchal scheme of stratification (Besteman, 1996).

Yet, as stated by Walls, it is difficult to draw attention to Somali custom and history without mentioning the importance of clan and lineage. Mainly as the Somali socio-political structure is emphasised on the genealogical structures of clan groups (Lewis. 1961, 2008: Besteman, 1999, Walls, 2014). Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that Lewis’s scholarship on both the genealogy and typology of Somali clans inhibit problematic primordialist understandings, the major parts of his work on Somali clan, primarily in Somaliland, and the makings of the Somali social identity is still significant for the field of Somali studies and conversely for the arguments presented in this thesis. However, with this thesis I aim to go beyond the primordial and reductionistic analysis already presented and instead embark on a critical understanding of Somali political economy in exploring the causal relationship between clan and class identity.

In addition, while scholars like Luling, Besteman and Eno and Kusow all have presented valuable analyses on Somali society, that suggests a society with social and cultural differences, I would still argue that the analyses given are not effectively and critically explicating social stratification in contemporary Somali society, in relating the systems of stratification to its changing historical and material contexts. Instead, I turn to Samatar’s work on social formation in Somali society, as it is considered more helpful in such an attempt. In contrast to the above scholars, Samatar uses class to unpack Somali society and his class analysis is based on Marx’s definition of class as an analytical category as well as a historical relationship to present an alternative epistemology of social formation in Somali society (Samatar, 1989b). In this sense the historical relationship is described as:

“construed according to an individual’s or groups; (a) location in production, (b) relation to control over the appropriation of the surplus product and (c) consciousness” (Samatar, 1989b:10).
If we revisit Marx, classes are defined by property and not income status and classes are different groups of men and women that share the same position within the division of labour and whom have the same relationship to the means of production in any developed capitalist society (Marx, 1867/1995: Ollman, 1968). The main classes in Marx’s description of a capitalist society are comprised by the bourgeoisie, the proletariat and the landowners (Marx, 1967/1995). The bourgeois, the capitalist, owns capital and therefore can exploit the proletariat by buying their labour power and thus gain profit (Marx, 1867/1995). The proletariat on the other hand are the labourers and they only own their labour power and earn their income by means of their hands, body and thought (Marx, 1867/1995: Ollman, 1968). Initially the capitalist and the proletariat were defined as the main classes in a capitalist society in Marx’s early writings however landowners, who are defined as owning large areas of land, were later included as a central part of the Marxian classes (Ollman, 1968). For Marx, these three classes constitute the framework of modern society and they are defined by the following economic factors: their labour and work, ownership of property and the means of production (Marx, 1867/1995: Ollman, 1968). Moreover, there are other classes that navigate in between the three classes, the petit-bourgeois and the lumpen-proletariat, but not necessarily always within the parameters of capitalism (Marx, 1867: 1995: Ollman, 1968).

In contrast, Samatar argues that there were four classes in Somali society during the transition of the pastoral mode of production: the proletariat and the peasants, the lumpen-proletariat and the small working class made up by merchants and the political elites, that is the state class (Samatar, 1992). Samatar’s analysis does not include the capitalist as a class in the Somali social formulation, however, it is argued that the livestock merchant class, together with the state class, represent the exploitative class here as they have historically appropriated livestock and property from poorer rural pastoralist (Samatar, 1989: Samatar, 1992). Through the process of exploitation, primarily through unfavourable barter trade terms and commercial market goods, this class extracted surplus from the pastoralist and in such created a progression that would come to distort Somali social relations (Samatar, 1992).
On this progression, Samatar writes that:

the pre-market property relations begin to change under the compulsion of the emerging commodity-based economy. Consequently, old forms of inequality are qualitatively changed as the pastoral community begins to splinter into richer, middle and poor pastoralist (Samatar, 1992: 104).

According to Samatar, the traditionalist thesis on Somali society has lacked a comprehensive and systematic class analysis and instead too much focus has been placed on kinship relations to understand Somali social relations (Samatar, 1989b: Samatar, 1992). Instead Samatar presents a Marxist theory on the capitalist mode of production to critically explain the political economy of Somali society. While convincing, this theory, however, corresponds with only one dominant set of social relations in the Somali context. In contrast, Mohamoud (2006) argues that the context in early Somalia differs as “[...] the pastoral mode of production created and recreated the dominance of kinship relations for the simple reason that pastoral economic activity has a very low development of productive force which cannot afford or permit the development of a social structure beyond kinship” (Mohamoud, 2006: 54). During this period, it was kinship relations that regulated the productive forces of the pastoral economy 21 (Mohamoud, 2006). Samatar adds that the Somali kinship system was not the only system of value that regulated social relations during communal times. Instead, the value system of the communal mode of production related to the value system of Islam, such as Shari’ a law. With the emergence and spread of Islam throughout the Somali peninsula these two systems eventually blended thus manifesting the superstructure of the old Somali communal society (Samatar, 1989b: Mohamoud, 2006).

Samatar’s analysis explains that there was a system of public order in place in communal and pre-colonial Somali society (Samatar, 1989a:1992). This system had formalised institutions, the Xeer for instance relies on consensus from a constellation of participants thus inhibiting the institutionalisation of political power (Samatar,1989a:1992). According to Samatar, communal Somali society was based on essential morality as it lacked an authoritarian structure, yet as pastoral production was a community activity,

21 The pastoral mode of production is understood as one of variable communal modes of production (Mohamoud, 2006)).
the moral public order was efficient as a mechanism for social control (Samatar, 1989a: Mohamoud, 2006). During this time in Somali society the dominance of communitarian social relations is what regulated the competition for scarce resources. However, Samatar argues that there was no competition during this period as no group or individual dared to go against the rigid moral public order that premiered communitarianism (Samatar, 1989a: Mohamoud, 2006).

However, in the late nineteenth century the pastoral communal mode of production was submerged under the peripheral capitalism (Samatar, 1989a:1992). As this type of production does not produce surplus nor is fully self-sufficient, pastoral nomads in Somalia, as a coping mechanism, started barter relationships with other regions (Samatar, 1989a: Mohamoud, 2006). They started to trade their livestock and livestock products for grain and clothing with long-distance traders (Samatar, 1989a: Mohamoud, 2006). Mohamoud means that the initiation of international markets put an end to the dominance of the pastoral mode of production in the Somali territories. This imposition had a major impact as the subsistence pastoral mode of production shifted from a community-oriented production to market oriented. The transformation was then intensified in the advent of colonialism (Samatar, 1989a: Mohamoud, 2006).

When Britain imposed political authority over northern Somalia it did so with the intention of seizing livestock meat for military needs (Samatar, 1989a: Mohamoud, 2006). Economic interest from overseas quickly commercialised the livestock production and accordingly pre-capitalist Somalia was incorporated into the world capital system (Samatar, 1989a: Mohamoud, 2006). Livestock and pastoral production that was intended for internal use became commoditised and thus transformed non-exploitative pastoral social relations into peripheral capitalist relations. The transition from a communal moral economy to peripheral capitalism created new interest groups and relations that no longer relied on kinship (Samatar, 1989a. Mohamoud, 2006). The economic gains from the livestock trade undermined the tradition of the communal mode of production and instead introduced more individualistic interests and private pursuits (Samatar,1989a: Mohamoud, 2006). Accordingly, the profits gained from external markets and colonial administration created intermediate social groups that prospered, and the rules of merchant capital encouraged competition and private accumulation (Samatar, 1989a).
According to Samatar, Somali society, prior to colonialism and peripheral capitalism, lacked the social and political arrangements to deal with the process of private accumulation and direct state control. However, once those two factors merged under colonialism, and later advanced by the Barre regime, it unleashed “[…] centrifugal immense forces of destructive forces” (Samatar, 1989a: 159). Samatar argued that these forces lead to a coercive system of class domination, a distortion of the public management of social conflict, the breakdown of the public system safeguarding personal safety and civil rights and ultimately a clash between the state and civil society (Samatar, 1989a). The exploitation of state resources along with the brutal prosecution and violence from the military regime produced even more grievance among the fragmented clan groups, reinforcing the already unequal social relations between clans (Samatar, 1989a).

Samatar’s analysis on Somali pastoral economy is more or less based on classic dependency theory, in so that it explains the historical changes in both the material production and the transformation of Somali society over a period of time. It is an analysis of the old Somali structure that implies that there was a change in the old Somali morality in the advent of colonialism and capitalism and although it is mentioned that such development resulted in the emergence of a new model of Somali class stratification it does not explain the role of existing structures and their developing relation to both the social, political and cultural spheres of modern Somali society. The arguments presented by Samatar can be argued to be romanticising one ideal Somali society, yet I would argue that it is still a significant analysis to consider as it has challenged the prevailing traditionalist approaches that used primordial socio-cultural idiosyncrasies as the only variable to explain Somali society throughout history (Mohamoud, 2006). While I would argue that contemporary Somali social relations are more complicated than the four classes presented by Samatar, he puts forward a considerable analysis that explains Somali social relationships, using a structural and hegemonic systems analysis, much like Marx’ and his successors. The structure of that analysis is applicable in explaining contemporary Somali and therefore it is also considered useful for the analysis of this thesis.
This chapter has presented the differing interpretations of both justice and inequality. The concluding parts of the chapter landed in an understanding of class where a group of different people share the same or similar positions within the division of labour. These groups are linked through their relationship to the means of production (Marx, 1867:1995). In addition, the various groups have different access to the means of production, with some controlling them while others are exploited by them. Exploitation here refers to how the workers, defined within the outline of Marxist class theory, do not get to consume the surplus they produce (Marx, 1867/1995). However, this definition of class does not fully encompass the Somaliland reality. As previously established, members of the Gabooye collective are marginalised in Somaliland due to their clan identity and status being held inferior. This marginalisation places members from the collective at the lower end of the hierachcal kinship order and hence social relations, which is further manifested through the type of occupations they are forced to take. Therefore, the formulation of class that I adopt to understand this context is one reliant on power and domination, between different social groups rather than one focused only on exploitation through the distribution of surplus labour and the appropriation of production. This, however, does not mean that exploitation, as a form of domination, under these rubrics does not occur in Somaliland, they are just framed differently as we will explore in the upcoming chapters. In addition, the formulation of power and domination, in relation of class theory, are hereafter understood in line with Gramsci.

Gramsci held that ideology is used much like a machine to reproduce social structure through politics, religion, and education. For example, the intellectual elites of society, in this case members of majority clans, are essentially embedded in the social structure and for that they enjoy privileges as they reproduce the norms and rules set up by the ruling class (Gramsci, 1997: Simon, 2015). Gramsci argued that these processes of indoctrinating the populace would eventually legitimate and justify class stratification and specific economic and political systems (Gramsci, 1997: Simon, 2015). Furthermore, I consider that Gramsci’s theory on cultural hegemony to be relevant, especially the relations of power in the Somali political economy and civil society and the extent to which the state favoured political and social arrangements of the ruling classes by using strategies of false consciousness and cultural hegemony (Gramsci, 1997: Simon, 2015). Therefore, it is interesting to ask if minority groups such as the Gabooye collective in Somaliland, as
mentioned sharing markers based on culture, ethnicity and language with the majority clans, as suggested by Honneth, have come to ‘accept’ the political and customary values and morals of the majority clans?

While Weber would suggest the Gabooye collective to be a status group in an adverse and stratified relation to the majority clans, there is a lack of organisation, social action if you will, on the basis of common class situation. Marxist theory would instead consider the lack of social action a state false consciousness. For Gramsci, false consciousness suggests that the dominant classes in a society are systematically coaxing the subordinate classes to consider ideals and morals that keep subordinating them. False consciousness as such therefore undermines the level of resistance present within a society, or for a group. However, the concept of false consciousness has come under criticism from contemporary scholars focused on power theory, like Gaventa (2006) and Haugaard (2003). Gaventa suggest the term to be problematic as consciousness is real to the person experiencing it regardless of it being labelled false or not (Gaventa, 2006). Likewise, Haugaard argues that when ‘false’ is placed opposite of ‘true’, the concept becomes elitist and therefore dismissive of the realities and experiences of those groups Marxist ideology is aimed at emancipating (Haugaard, 2003).

Notwithstanding the above critique, which I do acknowledge to be notable, the concept of false consciousness, as initially outlined by Marx and reframed by Gramsci, is however useful for the purpose of this research as it is argued that although Somali society is ideologically egalitarian, the politicised system of the clan allows for inequality based on status and lineage affiliation. The system also allows for an unequal division of resources because of the effective control and disposition, through mechanism of ideology and culture, some individuals or groups have power and rights over said resources, as suggested by Olin-Wright. This is endorsed on an institutional level by the Xeer as the Xeer functions as the social contract between the various groups involved. Yet how do we approach an analysis of class, in relation to an understanding of identity and plurality: how do we consolidate a framework that addresses the dynamics of these objectives?
Chapter 5: Somali history, society, politics and culture.

This chapter introduces the complexities of Somali society, starting with an overview of Somali history, culture, and politics. It is important to place the scope of the thesis and its purpose in the Somali context, not only in providing a background to the issues discussed throughout this thesis, but also as a way of placing both the connections and dissonances of the concepts inequality, justice, class and clan within the literature and the theoretical and analytical frameworks that are guiding it.

The main objective of this research is to understand the internal forces that are at play, argued throughout this thesis as the causal link between the class and clan system, in the makings of subordination for the Gabooye collective as a minority group in Somaliland, by exploring the structures of subordination, their relationship and their scope within Somali society. Yet this chapter does not aim to provide a comprehensive and detailed review of all of Somali history, arguably because the scope of this thesis is not placed within the field of history and the fact that research on Somali history has been done extensively elsewhere, but instead through secondary data focused on reviewing significant historical and political events leading up to the research time period that have shaped Somali society and consequently affected the causal relationship between class and clan identity.

Additionally, the focus of this chapter, and research, is on Somaliland, a non-recognised de-facto state in the northern area of the Horn of Africa. However, because Somaliland was a part of the Republic of Somalia before it declared independence in 1991, the ensuing chapter will begin with a geographical and ethnographical introduction that historically places Somaliland with the Republic of Somalia followed by a summary of the pre-colonial and colonial period of both Somali territories. The following sections of this chapter provides a brief exploration of the post-independence period of 1962 and onwards. However, the section highlighting the time-period between 1969-1988 will be presented in depth in Chapter 6, as it is a part of the analysis.
5.1. Geographical, ethnographical and historical context

It has been argued by various scholars within the field of development studies, African studies and even Somali studies, that the Somali people and the Somali region could have been the best example of a successful African state post-independence (Lewis, 1961: 2011; Walls and Kibble, 2010). This argument centres on the fact that the Somali peoples’ shared sense of ethnicity, religion, political culture, pastoral tradition and language would unite them notwithstanding the fact of being divided, ruled and governed by different colonial governments and accordingly having different colonial experiences (Besteman, 1999). However, this view has been proven insufficient as both the Somali state and society disintegrated in 1991 (Besteman, 1999: Lewis, 2008: Walls, 2014: Fox, 2015). In addition, the prevalence of minorities, like the Gabooye collective, further support that the previous notion of ethnic, religious, and cultural homogeneity to be false.

The Somali peninsula, an area in sub-Saharan Africa usually referred to as the Horn of Africa, is comprised of the non-recognised Republic of Somaliland in the north east, the Federal Region of Puntland in the north west and the Republic of Somalia in the south (Lewis, 2008: Walls, 2014: Fox, 2015). Apart from the Somali territories, the Horn of Africa is also comprised of Djibouti and Eritrea in the north and Ethiopia to the west. The peninsula is an area that has traditionally been occupied by Somali people, who are estimated to have a population of 15 million people (World Bank Group, 2020). However, due to the state collapse of the unified Somali state in 1991, along with a harsh climate pertained to droughts, around 2.1 million Somalis are held to be internally displaced within the borders of the Horn of Africa, and according to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) around 870 000 are registered as refugees and another estimated 1 million is believed to live outside of the Somali territories (UNHCR, 2018: World Bank Group, 2020)

Along with some of the neighbouring countries and regions in Northeast Africa, such as The Afar, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea and parts of northern Kenya, the Somali people are believed to be part of the Cushitic-speaking people (Lewis, 1961: Kusow, 1994). Yet it is difficult to define the ethnogenesis of the Somali people as the Somali language was never a written language and there are no comprehensive descriptions on the Somali people
and their origin (Lewis, 1961: Kusow, 1995). For instance, some historians assert, through Somali oral accounts as well as Ethiopian and Arab travel records, that the history of the Somali people can be traced to the twelfth century (Lewis, 1961: Kusow, 1995: Walls, 2014: Fox, 2015). Yet Kusow (1995) argues that the name Hawiye, a Somali clan living near the Shabelle river in the south, was mentioned by Al-Idrisi in the eleventh century (Kusow, 1995). That is before any reference was made to the ethnic name “Somali” (Kusow, 1995). Most scholars, however, maintain that the earliest writings on the Somali territories suggest that the ethnic word “Somali” was first recorded in an Ethiopian hymn from the fifteenth century, celebrating the triumphs of Abyssinian king Negshus Yesak in overtaking the Islamic sultanate of Adal (Lewis, 1961: Kusow, 1995: Walls, 2014). However, the word “Somali” also illustrates the three defining factors that have proven to be integral to the understanding of the Somali people, their customs and their history: pastoralism, clan and Islam.

For instance, the word “Somali”, can refer to the strong pastoral-nomad tradition of the Somalis, as the word, when broken down to “So” and “Maal”, means “go milk” in the Somali language (Kusow, 1995: Abdullahi, 2001). It could also be understood as a description of the Arabic word “Salaama” which means “became a Muslim” (Abdullahi, 2001:8). This reading of the word Somali reflects the notion that the Somali people, throughout the Somali territories, have had a long relationship with Islam and the Muslim world. For instance, it is a common belief that the Somali forbearers were descendants of the same clan family, the Quraysh, as was the Islamic prophet. The word “Somali” could also be refereeing to the word “Samaale” which is commonly assumed to be the foundational Somali ancestor (Lewis, 1961). All these factors are merged into the Somali self-identification process, history and social life and this mix shows us the difficulty in distinguishing ‘Somali’ from “the real” and the “imaginary”.

Lewis, one of the best-known scholars on Somali social anthropology and in particular Somali kinship relations in the north, writes that the history of Somali origins is obscure and that “historical tradition merges into myth and legend and sets a difficult problem of interpretation”(Lewis,1961:214). Notwithstanding the difficulty in finding a comprehensive and compelling account of Somali people, their history and origin, Lewis still sets out to understand the Somali people and their history. According to Lewis,
Somalis belong to the Hamitic people, along with the Afar, or the Danakil as they were more commonly known as by early Europeans, and the Saho, who together with the Galla, known as Oromos today, and Beja constitute a part of the southern Cushitic people (Lewis, 1961: 2017; Bradbury, 1994). Kusow, in contrast, argues that the Somali people, along with the Oromos and the Afar, actually originate from southern Ethiopia (Kusow, 1994). Fox (2015) adds that the Somali people’s history goes back two thousand years and that the Somalis are descendent from the Proto-Sam, a group belonging to the Eastern Cushites. The Proto-Sam had settled in the southern areas of today’s Somalia and they were believed to be agro-pastoralists scattered around the riverine areas of the Jubba and Shabelle river (Lewis, 1961: Fox, 2015). It was during the first century, that the Proto-Sam came to be known as the Samaale and it is argued that they were the first agro-pastoralists to settle in southern Somalia (Kusow, 1994: Fox, 2015).

While there are fragmentary accounts on the origin of the Somali people, and notwithstanding the “obscurity” in adequately describing the origin of the Somali people by non-Somalis, one factor that is well established in the scholarship on Somali history is the fact that Somalis trace their ancestry agnatically to that of either Samaale or Sab. (Lewis, 1961, Kusow, 2014: Walls: 2014: Fox, 2015). There is also an element of mysticism in the tracing of the agnatic ancestry (Lewis, 1961). However, there are also narratives, mostly in line with the Islamic narrative, as mentioned, that suggest the Samaale forebears were direct descendants of the prophet’s family (Lewis, 1961: Kusow, 1994: Besteman, 1999: Walls, 2014).

The Samaale are held to be pastoral nomads while the Sab are cultivators and agro-pastoralists (Lewis, 1961: Kusow, 1994: Besteman, 1999: Walls, 2014. The division in the agnatic ancestry lineage reflects the different geographical and occupational circumstances between the Somali people (Lewis,1960: Kusow, 1994: Besteman, 1999: Eno and Kusow, 2014). For instance, the northern territories, such as north and central Somaliland, are semi-arid and drought prone areas and therefore the majority of the Samaale have traditionally engaged in pastoral nomadism as their primary mode of production (Lewis, 1961: Samatar, 1989a: Eno and Kusow, 2014). The south, however, is characterised by more fertile land with better water supply thus the inhabitants, the Sab, have engaged more in agro-pastoralism around the inter-riverine areas of the Jubba and
Shabelle river (Lewis, 1960: Lewis, 2008). Somali tradition holds that the majority of the Somali people are descents of the Samaale. This group consists of the four main Somali clans: the Dir, Isaaq, Hawiye and Darood. The four clan groups are further divided into sub-clans. According to tradition the Sab are comprised of the Digil and Rahanweyn (Lewis, 1960: Lewis, 2008: Kusow 1994). Because of the geographical and occupational differences, along with the fictitious belief that the Samaale are decedents of a holy Arab ancestor, the Samaale groups view agro-pastoralists and the Sab as low status Somalis (Lewis, 1960: Kusow, 1994: Besteman, 1999: Eno and Kusow, 2014).

The history and tradition of pastoral nomadism, organised at the interior level by a kinship-based system as well as a superstructure of hierarchy, has shaped the foundation of the Somali identity (Lewis, 1961). Pastoral nomadism signifies a tradition of herding camels, sheep and goats in areas that are considered favourable and the pastoral tradition have immensely influenced almost all aspects of Somali society and it is argued by the majority of scholars that the Somali unit of social relations is to an extent built around this traditional wealth system (Lewis, 1961: 2008). In addition, the Somali people, due to the strong tradition of pastoralism, as well as the strategically geographical location of the Horn of Africa, have enjoyed a long relationship of trade with the Arabian Peninsula. Through the trade of cattle and livestock, such as camels, and resins, like frankincense and myrrh, Somalis were introduced to Islam (Lewis, 1961: Lewis, 2008). Yet Kusow notes that the date of introduction of Islam to the Somali territories poses a debate among historians. Some historians claim that Somalis were introduced to Islam during the fifth century while others assert that the introduction of Islam occurred during the tenth century through commercial trade based on livestock. Kusow, however, maintains that Islam was established in the Somali territories in the late eighteenth century, during the spread of Sufism and the Tariiqa (Kusow, 1994).

Notwithstanding the conflicting arguments among historians, the introduction of Islam established the strong dogma of Islamic descent among the Somalis, furthering the notion of a unique Somali identity in contrast to the neighbouring Christian countries, like Ethiopia (Lewis, 1961: Kusow, 1994: Walls, 2014). It is held that Islamic leader Ahmed Ibrahim al- Ghazi ‘Gurey’ of the Adal Sultanate furthered the notion of organising the Somali people under the tutelage of Islamic ideology in his quest for conquering the
Christian Ethiopian kingdom (Kusow, 1994:Walls, 2014). Yet, Kusow writes that although the notion of an external enemy solidified the Somali identity as a homogenous people, the Islamic identity was never successful in maintaining a unified socio-political Somali people (Kusow, 1994). This is a noteworthy argument for the focus of this thesis as it is assumed that the same lack of unification, in relation to religious identity, still prevails. The Islamic ideology however, as previously mentioned, did manage to create a process of self-identification with an Arab ancestor and through that construct the agnic lineage of the Samaale (Lewis, 1961: Kusow, 1994: Walls, 2014). Kusow argues that the Somali attachment to an Arab forbearer as integral to the Somali identity stemmed from this time in Somali history (Kusow,1994:Walls, 2014). According to Kusow, it was common that Tariiqa leaders would attach their ancestry to that of the Prophet of Islam and accordingly the followers of that leader would do the same (Kusow, 1994). This is especially interesting as the attachment to Arab forbears constructs the base of the Somali Muslim identity, however as the ensuing chapters will examine, this is only true for a specific segment of the Somali population.

Furthermore, the same path to attachment is argued for the establishment of Somali nationalism. While Lewis maintains that while pastoralism and Islam were integral parts in the shaping of a unified Somali people, primarily as an instrument for defeating the Christian enemy in Ethiopia, there was no sense of state formulation in early Somali society (Lewis, 2008). According to Lewis, there was a nation but not a state and instead the clans covered the components of the nation (Lewis, 2008). However, as they did not form a united front, family and kinship formed the basis of political identity (Lewis, 2008). While the homogenous characteristics of the Somali identity is well established, both by Somalis and non-Somalis, there are some academics, such as historical linguist Heine (1978), that have argued that there was no such thing as a Somali people nor a Somali state prior to the Somali occupation as the Horn of Africa was in fact uninhabited (Heine, 1978: Kusow,1994). However, Kusow refutes this notion and instead adds that the Proto-Garre were actually the first Somali ancestors to both discover and inhabit the

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22 Tariiqa is a form of Sufi order of worship and every Somali during that time was believed to adhere to one of the four ways; Qadriyya, Salahiyya, Ahmadiyya and Rafaiyya (Kusow, 1994).
peninsula and as such establish what could be considered a state like ordering (Kusow, 1994).

Kusow writes that the Proto-Garre, after having settled in the region, separated into three subgroups: The Digil and Rahanweyn, the Hawiye and the Dir (Kusow, 1994). Correspondingly, these three groups inhabited different sections of the peninsula; The Digil and the Rahanweyn eventually settled around the Shabelle river, the Hawiye migrated to the central parts of the peninsula and the Dir to the western edges of the Ethiopian border (Kusow, 1994). In addition, the Dir eventually separated into two groups: the Darood and the Isaaq. Therefore, while there may have not been an established Somali state or a unified Somali people, as previously argued by Heine and Lewis, the process of decades, and phases of migration, did establish the Somali clan families with a system of ordering based on socioeconomic and cultural structures, such as pastoralism, as well as their regional whereabouts (Kusow, 1994).

Laitin and Samatar (1987) add to the debate on the Somali state formulation in asserting that a Somali state indeed existed prior to the Somali waves of migration (Laitin and Samatar, 1987). For instance, the Ajuuran dynasty and the Adal sultanate23 furthered the establishment of the Somali state as both forms of ruling manifested a large-scale centralisation to an area previously characterised by regional pastoralism (Laitin and Samatar, 1987: Walls, 2014). According to the two scholars, this was a rare and notable event in Somali history since the ruling of the dynasty and the sultanate led to the expansion of the Somali economy and in so expanded its regional trading capacity, which was at the time consistent of subsistent camel herding (Laitin and Samatar, 1987).

The two kingdoms may have had different governmental structures, yet they are both considered to have functioned as powerful Somali states during the fourteenth century (Laitin and Samatar, 1987). For instance, the two kingdoms formalised and facilitated the Somali trade networks as well as the introduction of taxes (Laiting and Samatar, 1987). However, this observation is also debatable as other Somali historians argue that a camel

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23 The Ajuuran dynasty and the Adal sultanate were two Somali kingdoms during the medieval times that ruled the Horn of Africa from the eleventh century and well into the early stages of European colonial imposition (Laitin and Samatar, 1987: Lewis, 2008: Walls, 2014).
economy was already established in the peninsula,. Yet Laitin and Samatar, maintain that the Somali camel economy was instead concurrent with the introduction of Islam (Laitin and Samatar, 1987: Walls, 2014). While the insights given by the scholars mentioned are noteworthy for the understanding of Somali history and the purpose of this thesis, the different observations and arguments in the available literature on Somali history do exemplify that there is a difficulty in gaining a ‘real’ sense of Somali history as well as the origin of the Somali people. As explored in the previous chapter, this has proven to be difficult, despite the abundance of literature and research on Somali society by both Somali scholars and non-Somali scholars.

5.2. Colonialism and Independence: Different actors utilising clan as a resource for influence and power

During the nineteenth century, with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, Britain and France, the two competing colonial superpowers of the time took interest in the Somali territories. Not long after, the Italian colonial administration took part in the colonial project of the Horn of Africa (Besteman, 1996: Walls, 2014: Fox, 2015). Between the period of 1860 to 1962, the Somali people were divided into five artificial regions under these three European colonial administrations: The Northwest region of the Somali territories, today’s Djibouti, was colonised by the French and it was declared French Somaliland. The territories south of French Somaliland, today’s Somaliland, was declared a British protectorate in 1887 under the name British Somaliland (Besteman, 1996: Walls, 2014). However, unlike French Somaliland and Italian Somaliland, British Somaliland had no colonial settlers and instead the region was used for its strategic location as it was easier for the British administration to provide produce and livestock to the British garrisons of Aden (Walls, 2014). The remaining regions were divided into Italian Somaliland in the south, today’s Somalia, Ethiopian Ogaadeen and the British Northern Kenya (Lewis, 2008: Walls, 2014). The different regions ruled the peninsula under different tactics. For instance, the French and the Italian administrations had a more direct leadership in their colonial regions, whereas the British, in line with their interest in the area as a region only useful for supply, had a looser hand in the administration as well as the governance of the Somalis (Besteman, 1996: Lewis, 2008: Walls, 2014).
The division of the Somali region congregated clan groups that previously had not settled in the same region, such as the northern and western pastoral clan groups the Isaq and the Isaaq, under one administration, such as the British colonial administration (Besteman, 1996). This meant that the southern groups, the agropastoral, the agriculturalist and pastoral clan groups in the south, the Dir, Hawiye and the Digil/Rahanweyn of the Jubba river were to be governed by the Italian administration (Besteman, 1996). However, Britain decided to focus more of its colonial powers on Kenya, as it was regarded a more beneficial and less problematic region and hence in 1925, the British ceded parts of the British protectorate west of the Jubba river to Italian rule. Hence, the borders between Italian Somalia and British Kenya, with mostly Somali inhabitants, further established the Northern Frontier District of Kenya (Besteman, 1996).

The time period succeeding the 1950s gave a rise in Somali mobilisation under the gauge of independence and Somali nationalism, and in the 1960’s when the Colonial administrations were de-colonising, the two former colonial regions, British Somalililand and Italian Somaliland, united as one nation; the Republic of Somalia on 1 July 1960 (Besteman, 1999: Walls, 2014: Fox, 2015). However, the French, Ethiopian and Kenyan regions were separated from the union and their borders are still intact (Besteman, 1999). Reinstating the Somali Ogaadeen\textsuperscript{24} regions to Ethiopian rule was, however, not accepted by the Somali inhabitants of the region who protested and demanded that the Hawd region of eastern Ethiopia was to belong to the new Somali state (Lewis, 2008). The protests, however, were to no avail (Lewis, 2008). The years following the independence were marked by a state of uncertainty as the newly found Somali nation state was left with the task of uniting a people once divided (Besteman, 1996: Lewis, 2008: Walls, 2014). The trajectory towards such an endeavour was put forward by the Somali Republics first government, which was formed by the political elites that ruled in the different colonial administrations (Besteman, 1999: Lewis, 2008). After having the Hawiye affiliated Adan Abdulle Osman as temporary president, the new national assembly appointed the position of President to Darood member Dr. Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke (Lewis, 2008: 2014).

\textsuperscript{24} Tension grew between the Ogaadeen clan and the Isaaq clans during the colonial period, in relation to grazing areas of livestock in the Hawd region between Ethiopia and British Somaliland. The inter-clan tension was further exacerbated due the British administration’s assumed history of protecting the northern Isaaq clans more favourably and hence the Hawd region remains a contested area between the Ogaadeen and the Isaaq (Lewis, 2008).
Walls, 2014). The Sharmarke government was to reflect the republic’s clan division at a national level as closely as possible and accordingly his 14-member cabinet included the former Prime Minister of Somaliland, Mohamed Haji Egal, as the new Minister of Defence for the Republic of Somalia (Lewis, 2008: Walls, 2014).

While attempting to appoint the cabinet on a clan ratio basis there was still tension within the government as well as the public (Sheik-Abdi, 1981: Lewis, 2008: Walls, 2014). For instance, the difference in colonial administration was evident for the government which had trouble agreeing on how to run the new Somali Republic (Sheik-Abdi, 1981. Lewis, 2008). The tensions grew with the referendum that was initiated in 1961. The referendum was to settle the unification of the republic, yet it only manifested the tension further as half of those that voted in the north, around 100,000 in total, were against the unification of Somaliland and Somalia (Lewis, 2008). Despite this fact, the government worked hard on establishing the idea of a union within the different parties of the republic and while the operation was still tainted with clan politics and what Lewis describes as an “[…] awkward and uneven process”, the government managed to establish the union as a real fact and “[…] readjust their alignments correspondingly” (Lewis, 2008:35). However, the positive and democratic state building process of the Republic ended in 1969 when the military staged a coup that assassinated President Sharmarke and left the leader of the military, General Siyaad Barre, as his successor (Sheik-Abdi, 1981: Lewis, 2008: Walls, 2014).

Influenced by the strong waves of pan-Africanism flowing through the African east coast, the first Somali government wanted to unify the Somali people under the guise of a greater Somalia: Somalieweyn (Barnes, 2007: Lewis, 2008). This meant that the ideology of clan was to be left in the past and instead the future for the Republic of Somalia was to be centred around the re-establishment of the Somali nation and the Somali identity as one unified people (Barnes, 2007: Lewis, 2008). This also meant a Somaliweeyn that incorporated the three regions that were viewed, by the new government and the Somali people, to have been appropriated by the colonial administrations and the Ethiopian Empire: Djibouti, The Ogaadeen and Northern Kenya (Lewis, 2008: Walls, 2014). Nationalist mobilisation of a unified Somali people actually came a lot earlier than
independence, in the form of the Somali Youth Club (SYC)\textsuperscript{25}. During the period of post-independence, the SYL was given a significant role within the government’s national assembly as the SYL had nationalist aspirations that were in line with the government’s (Barnes, 2007). Accordingly, the league functioned as tool for disseminating the aspirations of a unified Somali people to the public as well as urging Somalis to collectively participate in the national mobilisation (Barnes, 2007). Yet the league, like the government was plagued by clan politics, and when the expansive aspirations of a Somaliweeyn failed, the league, like the government, reiterated and instead shifted their focused on co-opting the political system for individual as well as clan group reasons (Barnes, 2007: Lewis: 2008).

The colonial administrations of the Europeans did not only separate families and clan groups by arbitrary map drawings in a region of the world where kinship relations and pastoral economy were reliant on regional belonging as the main modes of both survival and production. The different forms of colonial administration, history, languages, culture and practices also introduced and established a divided notion of what it means to be Somali. This division is argued by Mukhtar (1995) and Osman (2007) to have established and constructed a diversity in identities, specifically clan identity, among the now somewhat unified Somalis, and that the cemented notion of diversities would eventually come to function as the main catalysts for future turbulence with clan factions competing for resources (Mukhtar, 1995: Osman, 2007).

However, this argument has been contested by academics within the field of Somali studies that during the post-colonial period argued that the Somali people, due to their homogenous genealogy, culture, language, and religion, had the potential to emerge as a successful state in post-colonial Africa (Osman, 2007: Walls and Kibble, 2010: Walls, 2014). According to Osman, this argument was proclaimed by academics with a homogenous approach to Somali history (Osman, 2007). The approach centres on the acceptance of the Somali people as different from other societies in Africa as; they are all descended from South Arabian ancestors; they all adhere to the same religion and they

\textsuperscript{25} The Somali Youth Club was formed in 1943, the name was later changed to The Somali Youth League, (SYL) in the urban parts of Mogadishu by a group of young men interested in exploring the idea of a ‘Greater Somalia’ introduced to them by the British administration (Barnes, 2007).
all practice pastoralism based on an egalitarian and a communitarian system of authority (Osman, 2007). This notion was not only established among non-Somali academics, but it was also a notion that was manifested by the Somali political elites, mainly from the Majeerteen and the Mudug clans who had an interest in gaining power and hence the ensuing Somali governments of post-colonial Somali society (Osman, 2007). Yet the homogenous approach fails to explain, why a unification of the Somali people would not automatically render a prosperous post-colonial state?

On this, Osman writes that academics that instead adopted an heterogenous approach to Somali history were better suited for the task of unpacking this question. For instance, the heterogenous approach gives a better theoretical understanding to Somali history that is multi-faceted, stratified and not reliant on a single narrative of the Somali Muslim pastoral nomad (Osman, 2007). Instead, theories on political economy, class and ethnicity are introduced to understand and unpack the complexity of Somali society. A society with both settled and unsettled communities, a society with different languages, such as the Maay, Maaha, Juudu and Dabarr, and different ethnicities such as the Gosha, the Benadiri, the Barwani and the Oromo (Osman, 2007: Eno and Kusow, 2014: Walls, 2014). For Osman, this approach can also help us understand the role the administrative rulings and their geo-political interest have had on the establishment of the Somali identity and conversely Somali social relations. For instance, Osman argues that the colonial administrations extracted the wealth of the region and thus new levels of social inequality, in relation to the clan’s access to recourses, were introduced to a region that was previously only reliant on communitarian subsistence livelihoods (Osman, 2007: Mohamoud, 2007). However, due to the extent of extraction of resources that was going to either of the different administrative governances, such as the Aden garrisons in the north, the colonial subjects in their turn exploited the colonial administrations in furthering their access to resources (Osman, 2007).

Understanding the dynamics of clan under the colonial administrations is key in gaining a better take on the formulation of the Somali nation state. For instance, as discussed earlier in this chapter, some scholars argue that prior to Islamic imposition of the Somali peninsula there was no Somali nation state, yet other scholars have refuted this argument and instead suggested that there was a formation of nation state within the structures of
the Somali sultanates and kingdoms such as the Adal and the Ajuuran (Laitin and Samatar, 1989: Ahmed, 1995). In addition, scholars like Barnes, hold that the notion of a greater Somali state was introduced to the Somali people by the British colonial administration (Barnes, 2007). Prior to the colonial imposition there existed, according to Barnes, no ideological incentives to unite the Somali people in the peninsula under one common state. Barnes’s argument is interesting as it is suggested that the idea of a unified nation, with a rigid state identity, was not an organic taking that developed in the Somali psyche but instead one that was introduced, or planted, by external forces that had political interests to consider in the region (Barnes, 2007). For instance, Barnes writes that during the early years of the SYL, the members would take an oath that would not disclose their clan affiliation. The members would only be identifying as Somali. However, this was not well liked by the British administration which had relied on clan in their indirect form of colonial rule (Barnes, 2007: Osman, 2007). The British administration did what they could to continue to foster the clan divisions, for instance by stimulating the tensions between the Isaaq clans and the Ogaadeen clans (Barnes, 2007: Osman, 2007). These arguments and insights are interesting as they allow us to ask if the colonial introduction of the unification was the starting point for the establishment of the current Somali identity, which more or less is solely based on the pastoral narrative, and the extent to which that identity was then co-opted in the name of clan?

Mamdani (1996) writes that while clan is an important social organisation in the Somali social structure, as it affects politics, economics and social status, it is important to distinguish between clan and clannism (Mamdani, 1996). Clan for Mamdani refers to the social organisation of society whereas clannism is the politicisation of the clan structure by elites, for personal gain (Mamdani, 1996). This difference becomes important in understanding how clan became a construct of collective group identity, which was transformed and reinforced under colonial rule (Mamdani, 1996). As mentioned, clan was used during the colonial period as a means of power by both the colonial power as well as Somalis (Mamdani, 1996: Barnes, 2007: Osman, 2007). According to Mamdani, for Somalis, however, it was a means by which they could get access to the state and compete for resources, both through and for the state (Mamdani, 1996). As the arguments presented by Osman, Barnes and Mamdani illustrate, the colonial rulers used clan as a political instrument and kept reinforcing group identity through its courts and politics of
collective punishment for whole clans or sub-clans when individuals misbehaved (Mamdani, 1996: Osman, 2007: Barnes, 2007). Although clan might have been the dominant principle of social relations before colonial rule, the colonial administration transformed the playing field (Mamdani, 1996). It is therefore important to understand the makings of Somali clan in both its diachronic and synchronic subtexts (Mamdani, 1996: Osman, 2007).

As mentioned in the earlier sections of this chapter, the difficulty in defining the measures of Somali history has proven a reality for those interested in understanding the makings of Somali society, whether it is from a perspective focused on the ethnogenesis of the Somali people or the extent of state formation in Somali society. The arguments presented throughout this thesis will however be in line with the heterogenous tradition rather than the homogenous approach. Conversely, the ensuing sections of this chapter will continue to illustrate the difficulties that exist in defining Somali society by engaging in the academic debate over the making of both Somali society and identity.
5.2.1. Somaliland: From a British protectorate to an Independent de-facto state

In contrast to the French and the Italian colonial administration, the British Empire ruled the Somaliland Protectorate with little interest (Walls, 2014). The British initially only approached the region due to its sole potential in providing livestock for the Aden garrison (Forti, 2011). Accordingly, the British drew up a series of treaties with the northern costal Somali clans, primarily the Isaaq but also sections of the Dhulbahante, Samaroon and the Warsangeli, based on an agreement of protection from the British administration. Because of the lack of interest in the development of British Somaliland, the administration decided to intervene as a little as possible into the affairs of the Somalis (Besteman, 1999). Instead, they employed a strategy of indirect rule to ensure stability in the region. The indirect rule was instructed by Somali clan politics in so far that the administration allowed for an amalgamation of their civil laws with Shari’a law and customary law: Xeer (Lewis, 1961: Besteman, 1999: Walls, 2014). The administration quickly became aware of strategically allowing for clan politics to flourish. For instance, the British had a challenging time centralising the nomadic pastoralists, therefore they utilised the mechanism of clan hierarchy to appoint leaders or chiefs of the clans that could assist in facilitating some kind of governance (Mamdani, 1996: Walls, 2014). These chiefs were called Caaqils and their primarily task was to function as a bridge between

The Italian administrative rule in Italian Somaliland, in contrast, was far more rigid and the Italians had a stricter vision of a developed colony (Samatar, 1989a). Where the Italians expropriated land and taxed clan leaders as a way to undermine their powers, the British promoted them. This allowed for the Somali clan system to remain intact and for subjects of British Somaliland to continue to live life according to their customs and traditions (Samatar, 1989a: Besteman, 1996). When Italy was defeated in World War II in the 1940s, the British took over the control and administration of Italian Somaliland and under the British East African Empire the two colonies eventually embarked on a long and challenging trajectory towards democracy and independence (Samatar, 1989a: Besteman, 1996: Walls, 2014). British Somaliland was the first of the two colonies to gain independence on 26 June, 1960. Italian Somaliland became independent a few days later on 1 July 1960 and the two independent countries decided to unify as the Republic of Somalia on the same day under the Act of Union (Besteman, 1996: Lewis, 2008: Walls, 2014).

As stated earlier, hopes were high for the new republic on establishing a successful state, however the differing colonial legacies among the two regions as well as the continuation of clan politics created tension within the government (Sheik-Abdi, 1981: Barnes, 2007). For instance, while the SYL had been integral in the process of independence from colonial imposition as well as establishing the basis for a Pan-Somali narrative, the northern clan groups within the government viewed that the league during the colonial era was only in the service of the southern clan groups and the persistent support for the SYL in the new government, post-independence, would only give way to the interest of the southern clan groups such as the Hawiye and the Majeerteen (Barnes, 2007).

Because of rising tension between the different clan groups, the northern clans eventually abandoned the idea of a ‘Greater Somalia’ and instead there were talks about breaking away from the newly found republic (Lewis, 2008: Walls, 2014). The ensuing years were demarcated by an uprising in the Ogaadeen that furthered the tension between the Somali and the Ethiopian government (Lewis, 2008: Walls, 2014). These events may have
dictated a shift in the leadership of Prime Minister Egal, and President Sharmarke as they were more focused on establishing stability within the region by placing the nationalist ideologies of the previous government on hold (Lewis, 2008). This strategy proved to not be fruitful as the SYL, with their strict nationalist discourse, came out victorious in the last civilian election of the Republic of Somalia in 1969 (Lewis, 2008). Following the election, President Sharmarke was assassinated and Egal’s new position as interim President and his choice in Sharmarke’s successor, a Darood politician, was viewed as corruptive, especially by members of the military and as previously mentioned and as we will further explicate in Chapter 6, in October of 1969 a military coup was staged, starting the era of the Siyaad Barre military regime (Lewis, 2008: Walls, 2014).

Today Somaliland is a self-declared region as it declared independence from the Republic of Somaliland in 1991 following the collapse of the Siyaad Barre military regime (Lewis, 2008; Walls, 2014: Fox, 2015: Kilcullen, 2019). According to the Somaliland Central Statistic Department (SCD) in 2017 the region that defines the Republic of Somaliland was estimated to have a total population of about 3,811,195 million26 (Somaliland Central Statistics Department, 2017). Somaliland is often maintained as the stable region of the Horn of Africa and in contrast to its southern neighbour, Somalia, Somaliland has had more success in its state building objective. The main reason for such success is held by Walls (2014) to be Somaliland’s usage of a locally driven state building process (Walls, 2014). This process has according to Walls involved the components of both discursive and representative democratic approaches to political participation by the various clan groups (Walls, 2014). The idea of an independent northern state was already established by both religious groups and clan factions during the Union, and later by the Barre regime, however with the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, the plan was actually carried out. Through a series of clan meetings focused on resolution between the major

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26 Due to Somaliland’s de-facto state status from the Republic of Somalia it is difficult to gain reliable, and up- to-date, data on the actual population figures of Somaliland, as well as other relevant data such as household income and Gross Domestic Product per capita. Usually, because of this difficulty, official figures of this sort for Somaliland are lumped together with Somalia and thus accurate figures on issues pertaining to inequality, such as income and education, are even more challenging to assess. Furthermore, there is a lack of reach in the national capacity in Somaliland to fully cover such statistics, however the Somaliland government are ambitious in their quest to produce these figures. Hence, the Central Statistics Department, which is operated by the Somaliland Ministry of Planning, estimate in their most recent summary from 2017, ‘Somaliland in Figures’, the GDP of the Somaliland population to cover 675 USD per capita (Somaliland Government, 2017).
clans and the sub-clans, the leaders of Somaliland successfully created a state (Lewis, 2003: Walls, 2014).

While Somaliland is not a recognised state, the internally motivated and driven political settlement of the Somaliland leaders have created a pocket of democracy and stability in the Somali peninsula (Balthasar, 2018: Fox, 2015: Walls, 2014: Lewis, 2007). Since 1991, Somaliland has seen its biggest cities rebuilt and the citizens have directly participated in the state-building process by providing the capital needed to rebuild both the infrastructure and the governance (Lindley, 2007: Kilcullen, 2019). Correspondingly, Somaliland’s citizens have experienced five democratic elections (Walls, 2014: Walls et al., 2018). The most recent election, the 2017 presidential election, was acknowledged and observed by 60 international observers from over 20 countries (Walls et al., 2018). The observation mission regarded the elections peaceful and commended the Somalilanders for their considerable participation throughout the lengthy election process, yet Somaliland remains unrecognised as a sovereign state by the Republic of Somalia and the international community (Walls et al., 2018). Although some scholars argue for Somaliland’s state of non-recognition as a blessing in disguise, as the homegrown formulations of conflict resolution have managed to keep the region safe, the self-declared nation is still faced with challenges (Kilcullen, 2019). The lack of a strong state and the presence of clan hierarchy and its dynamics have solidified a state of free-flowing capitalism where individual capitalists, backed by strong clans, are the leaders of development, not the state.

Accordingly, the private sector in Somaliland is growing while the public sector is still lagging in the provision of basic needs, such as health care, water, sanitation and infrastructure. One reason behind the thriving private sector could be the lack of a broader tax base (Kilcullen, 2019). While the government does tax businesses’, and there is a tax on income at 12 and 6 percent each, the tax generated, however, is far too little to sustain the country’s need for public sector development (Kilcullen, 2019). Many of the private capitalists are from the diaspora and within the bigger cities of Somaliland, like the capital of Hargeysa, the growing presence of the diaspora is creating a divide between Somalilanders that did not leave during the civil war and those that have returned (Lindley, 2007: Kilcullen, 2019). The diaspora, often educated overseas and with strong
capital and resources, return and their presence in cities like Hargeysa and Burao, is argued by the locals to be hiking up the prices of land, housing property and commodity goods for local Somalilanders (Kilcullen, 2019: Lindley, 2007).

This is of course also problematic for those that are already living in the margins of the established clan system where the clan family is meant to provide for you in times of need (Lewis, 2008: Samatar, 1989a: Besteman, 1999: Walls, 2014). Without intervention, such as a system for welfare, from the state, these individuals are left on their own. Because of this, inequality is growing in Somaliland and it is within this growing space that this thesis aims to explore the experience of inequality in Somaliland, by focusing on those that are outside of the systems and institutions that are meant to provide; that is clan, state and religious institutions. The following sections will therefore place this research’s understanding of inequality within the Somaliland context and from the perspective of those within Somali society that are more prone to its adverse dynamics.

5.3 Clan and customs

The previous section was focused on the different Somali regions and their historical and political differences. However, according to both Somali history and custom, the Somali people, when viewed as an ethnic group, belong to clans and sub-clans (Lewis, 2008: Kusow, 1994: Eno and Kusow, 2014: Walls, 2014). It is believed that the Somali people are descendent from the patrilineal Arab ancestor of the Quraysh tribe, the same ancestor as the prophet of Islam, Mohammad (ṣallā ʿlāhu ʿalayhi wa-sallam) (Lewis, 1961: Kusow, 1994: Walls, 2014). The claim to Arab ancestry is, according to Mukhtar, more profound in the northern regions of the Somali peninsula, such as today’s Somaliland. This claim is argued to have developed out of the region’s close proximity to Islamic activity, when compared to the southern regions of the peninsula (Mukhtar, 1995). Because of an increase in pastoral trading activity in cities like Zeila and Berbera to the middle east, northern clan groups, such as the Isaaq, have perpetuated this notion of Arab ancestry throughout Somali history (Kusow, 1994: Mukhtar, 1995). However, corroborating such claims has proven to be difficult as there is not much reliable evidence suggesting that to

\[27\] This is an Arabic expression meaning “Peace be Upon Him” and it is used when mentioning a prophet in Islam. From now on abbreviated as SAW.
be the case. Instead, there are more compelling and contradicting evidence suggesting there was in fact a much smaller presence of Arab activity in the region (Mukhtar, 1995). In fact, according to Mukhtar, some of the medieval Arab travel writers documenting their journeys through East Africa, held Zeila to be an Abyssinian Christian city and not a Somali region at all (Mukhtar, 1995). Others have described the region to be non-Arab and the home of the “blacks” 28, “Bilad Al-Zinj” (Mukhtar:1995: 7).

As mentioned, the Somali clan lineage is divided at the highest level into Samaale clans and Sab clans (Lewis 1961:2008:Eno and Kusow, 2014: Walls, 2014). The division indicates a hierarchal grouping where the Samaale clans are seen as ‘noble’ clans and the Sab clans as ‘commoners’ or ‘lower’ clans (Besteman, 1999: Eno and Kusow, 2014). The notion that the Samaale clans are considered ‘noble’ can be linked to the above statement declaring their holy Arab ancestry (Besteman, 1999: Samatar, 1989a: Eno and Kusow, 2014: Walls, 2014). However, the division also indicates regional belonging and different modes of production (Samatar, 1989a). As mentioned, the Samaale clan groups are argued to be pastoral nomads found throughout the Somali peninsula while the Sab clan groups are confined to the predominantly agricultural and riverine south (Lewis, 1961: 2008: Kusow, 1994: Walls, 2014). However, the term Sab is also used to describe groups belonging to ‘occupational castes’ in the northern territory of Somaliland (Walls, 2014: Eno and Kusow, 2014). Somalis are further organised, at the lowest level, into blood payment groups, Mag or Diya’s. This form of organisation extends to five or seven ancestors and the function of the blood payment group is to settle wrong doings such as death, murder, and other forms of violence by financial compensation (Lewis,1961: Mohamed, 2007: Walls, 2014).

The Somali clan system was described by Lewis, as a pastoral democracy that functions as an institution operating within the boundaries of a social contract, the Xeer (Lewis, 1961: Mohamed, 2007: Walls, 2014). According to Lewis, in the traditional Somali legal system no one was given advantages due to their wealth, status or lineage affiliation and both plaintiff and defendant were instead given equal opportunity to make their case

28 Besteman notes how the reference to Somalis’ as “black” traces back to how North Africans, often of Arab decent, would call all slaves “black” regardless of their complexion (Besteman, 1999: 116). Arguably as slaves converted to Islam, a shift occurred, where “slave” was previously equated with “infidel”, the term “black” became attached to the negative concept of slavery as well as paganism (Besteman, 1999).
(Lewis, 1961: Mohamed, 2007). However, in Somali politics the clan system and the Xeer have traditionally functioned as two dialectically related principles (Mohamed, 2007). As mentioned, the Somali kinship system is based on blood relations but the Xeer orders the ties that the blood relations are grounded on in a public setting (Mohamed, 2007). The Xeer therefore functions as the legal charter of the clan system as it sets the rules of clanship (Mohamed, 2007). Moreover, the Xeer is based on unwritten agreements between clans in order to control disputes and conflicts both between and among clan groups (Lewis 1961:2008: Walls, 2014). Lewis observed that the agreements had “[…] contractual elements having close affinities with those political theories which saw the origins of political union in an egalitarian social contract” (Lewis, 1961:3). These agreements are still demarcated through a common Somali meeting method called Shir. Adult males constitute the Shir and each male is given equal political power to the rest, however heads of households and elders have usually stronger political influence and the Shir is accordingly used as a platform to discuss and mediate disputes drawing on the agreements in the Xeer (Lewis, 1961). While it could be viewed as a system that functions on the makings of deliberative and representative democracy, it is still a patriarchal system where men are promoted over women. Consequently, women have no political representation in the Xeer and therefore they have no visible representation in the Gurti29 or the Shir, they are however represented by their male elders. The same system of exclusion is in place for members of the Sab or the occupational caste groups.

The set of strict and over encompassing codes and agreements in the Xeer are put in place to administrate behaviour, keep security and provide peace and justice within a given Somali community (Lewis, 1961: Mohamed, 2007). However, because of its customary nature and its lack of formality, the Xeer has the flexibility to resolve both fragmentary and continuing events in a practical manner (Lewis, 1961). When disagreement and disputes arise between two clans, for example about blood payment, the process of reaching a consensual agreement is done through the public administration of the Gurti.

29 In contrast to the Shir, the Gurti functions as a higher level of mediation headed by impartial elders (Lewis, 1961: Walls, 2014).
This description of the Xeer and Somali politics agrees mostly with the kinship relations of the pastoral clan groups (Lewis, 1961). The Sab clans have a different way of governing socio-economic and political relationships (Lewis, 1961: Besteman, 1999). In contrast to the nomadic and pastoral Samaale clan groups, the Digil and Rahanweyn clans have historically led a more settled way of life in the fertile south (Lewis, 1961: Besteman, 1999). It is also argued that the Sab clans are more open and fluid in embracing people into clans as their own genealogy suggests a mixed lineage between various Somali clans and Bantu groups (Besteman, 1999). In contrast to the northern pastoral clan groups, where the Diya payment groups are kinship based, the groups and clans in the south hold their political affinity at village level and not at clan level (Besteman, 1999). Here the entire village would function as one Diya paying group even though members of the village are from different clan families (Besteman, 1999). These structures of settlement and mixed villages created a centralised form of governance. Additionally, because established farmlands demand stable settlements, formal and hierarchal institution were formed to govern socio-economic and political relationships (Lewis, 1961: Besteman, 1999).

5.3.1. Sab and occupational caste

The early works of anthropologist Virginia Luling highlight that despite the commonly held idea of the egalitarian nature of Somali society, there were groups that were not equal to the rest of society (Luling, 1984). Post-independence, low-status clan groups in both the northern and southern regions experienced exploitation and violence by noble clans (Luling, 1984: Eno and Kusow, 2014). However, as discussed, there exists a difficulty in defining the exact origin of the hierarchal division between the “noble” and “lower” clans, yet it is a common understanding among most Somalis that the Samaale clan groups, due to their Arab ancestry and nomadic pastoral lifestyle, are considered more appropriate for the Somali imagery than the sedentary settled Sab clan groups (Besteman, 1999: Lewis, 2008: Eno and Kusow, 2014). Conceivably, the nomadic pastoral imagery of the Samaale clan group functions as the symbolic image of the primary Somali identity and thus operates as the main reflection of Somali society (Besteman, 1999: Eno and Kusow, 2014). Yet, discussing ethnicity and minorities within the Somali context is a sensitive issue. The reason given is that Somali society is a lot more ethnically diverse and not as egalitarian as previous declarations (Eno and Kusow, 2014).
Giddens and Sutton (2013) define minorities as an occurrence in any society regardless of the numerical size of the population. In addition, as a group, within a society, minorities are held to have a shared sense of identity, based on, for example, cultural or religious characteristics, and in a disadvantaged and subordinate position (Giddens & Sutton, 2013). However, there is a difficulty in defining minorities in the Somali context. It is difficult for several reasons but ultimately the difficulty, and confusion, lay in the fact that the word “Somali”, can be used interchangeably, as previously mentioned, to refer to various definitions. In this perspective it can refer to both ethnic identity and/or citizenship identity (Menkhaus, 2003). The notion of ethnicity is noteworthy here as it ties in with the understanding of identity and hence the experience of Somali identity from the perspective of minorities.

Ethnicity as a concept is often viewed as a construction of a social group of individuals that perceive themselves to be culturally distinct from others (Hall, 1996). Such distinction can be tradition, language, religion and descent. Additionally, these distinctive attributes are usually the base for identity. In traditional sociological theory, identity was viewed as a subject’s interaction between the “self” and society (Hall, 1996). A subject has an inner core yet the essence of the “self” is formed and modified by an on-going dialogue with the outside world and the identities that exist there. The dialogue with the outside world, and other cultural identities, internalises values and meanings that shape and become part of the social identity of a subject (Hall, 1996). For instance, some groups are considered to be non-Somalis by ethnicity, as they lie outside of the Somali clan lineage, but they are full citizens and therefore still considered Somalis (Besteman, 1999: Menkhaus, 2003). Groups like the ‘Bantu’, Barawani, Benadiri and the Bajuni of south Somali adhere to this description. The ‘Bantu’ groups are the biggest minority group in the south and they are made up of the Gosha, Shabelle, Boni and Shidle. They are however collectively known as the Gosha (Besteman, 1999: Menkhaus, 2003: Walls, 2014). These groups are further affiliated with the Sab clans of Digil and Rahanweyne via a patronship-like relationship called Sheegad, signifying the stratification of clan and status at yet another level (Cassanelli, 2015). Luling’s works indicate that this group was separated from the rest of society on a racial basis (Luling, 1984). The origin of the Gosha is different from the traditional pastoral nomads, the agro-
pastoralists, and the occupational caste groups as most of them are perceived to be descendants of runaway slaves (Luling, 1984: Besteman, 1999: Eno and Kusow, 2014).

The Somali territories served as a point of passage for Indian Ocean slave trade during the nineteenth century (Besteman, 1995:1999). Slaves were brought from other parts of East Africa, such as Mozambique and Tanzania, to Somalia to provide labour on the plantations of the south such as the coastal communities of Mogadishu and the agro-pastoralists’ lands in the wider south west (Besteman,1995:Eno and Kusow, 2014). The slave trade and the labour it generated supported the growing plantation economy and according to Hess (1960) in Eno and Kusow, the Italian Somaliland governor wrote about how the size of the slave population had doubled in size in the inter-riverine regions in the early 1990s, from 25,000 to an estimated 50,000 (Eno and Kusow, 2014). This is relative to the total of the population in those areas, which at the time were estimated to a total of 300,000. It was also noted by the governor that a large number of the slaves had managed to escape from the coast to the Gosha forest (Eno and Kusow, 2014). Hence, the name Gosha was given to these runaway slaves as they established marooned communities in the “dense jungle”, referred to as Gosha (Eno and Kusow, 2014). In the 1920’s slavery was abolished; however, the Gosha fell under the new colonial labour laws on Italian plantations, thus subjugating them to continued slave like conditions (Hill, 2010). Through the ‘Sheegad’, the Gosha where able to align themselves with major clans like the Digil and Rahanweyn and through that get protection in an environment that otherwise did not provide any formal rights or services (Eno and Kusow, 2014: Besteman, 1995: 1999).

In contrast to the Gosha, there are groups within Somali society that are considered ethnic Somalis yet they are still discriminated against as they are considered to fall outside of the traditional clan lineage and accordingly they have a lower status in society (Eno and Kusow, 2014: Walls, 2014). The occupational groups found in Somaliland, known as the collective Gabooye, comprised of the groups the Madhiban and Muuse Dheriyo, Tumal and Yibir-AnaaS, are viewed as the main minority group in this region (Besteman, 1999: Eno and Kusow, 2014: Walls, 2014). The name Gabooye relates to the historical and traditional imagery of the outcast groups as hunter-gatherers. In Somali, the word Gabooye refers to the sack that traditional hunters keep their arrows or spears in. The
early literature on the minority groups of Somaliland is conflicting in such that there seems to be no clear concept of their origin as well as a lack of systemic analysis regarding the distinctive characteristics and traditions of the three groups. In addition, they have historically been grouped together by the classification Sab.

For instance, early writings of Paulishicke (1893) and Kirk (1904) indicate that the Yibir, and generally the Sab, trace their ancestry to the Arabian Peninsula. Paulishicke and Kirke connect the Yibir-Anaas with the ‘Sleb ‘or the ‘Salb‘ of this region (Goldsmith and Lewis, 1958: Lewis, 2017). However, Lewis argues that, in contrast to the claims of the noble Somalis, whom, as mentioned, trace their ancestors to the Quraysh family of the Prophet (SAW), the Sab actually do not claim Arab ancestry. Instead, according to Lewis, the Sab trace their heritage to African bushmen (Lewis, 2017). According to Lewis, the Sab ancestors were found in the bush by Samaale tribes’ men and following the discovery the captured Sab attached themselves with the Samaale in exchange for protection and work. For Lewis, this further establishes the patron-like relationship between the Sab and the Samaale groups (Lewis, 2017).

In contemporary literature, the Gabooye, when viewed as a collective, are divided into the following groups: the Madhiban and Muuse Dheriyo, Tumal and Yibir-Anaas (Eno and Kusow, 2014: Vitturini, 2017). The Madhiban and the Muuse Dhereiyo have historically engaged in hunting, leather tanning and today they are usually engaged in work relating to shoemaking and hairdressing. The Tumal are noted to traditionally have worked as blacksmiths (Eno and Kusow, 2014: Lewis, 2017). The Yibir-Anas, also engaged in leather tanning, hunting and ironsmith, are the smallest of the occupational clan groups and their ancestry is argued to be different than that of Madhiban and Muuse Dheriyo and the Tumal (Vitturini, 2017: Eno and Kusow, 2014).

According to Somali folklore, the Yibir-Anaas trace their ancestry to the Hebrews, much like the Falasha’s of Ethiopia and in similar fashion to the Falasha’s, the Yibir- Anaas are rumoured to practice “magic” and “sorcery” (Eno and Kusow, 2014: ). In addition, their supposed ancestry with the pagan magician Mohamed Hanif makes them subjugated to systemic mistreatment and distrust on a level that transcends ethnicity and culture and

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30 Falasha’s are a minority group found in Ethiopia claiming Jewish ancestry (Kessler, 1985).
instead is based on religious difference (Eno and Kusow, 2014: Lewis, 2017). This is, however, contested by members of the Yibir-Anaas as they assert that they are no less Muslim than any other group in Somaliland. The Madhiban and the Muuse Dheriyo, however, trace their ancestry to a son of Isaaq (Lewis, 2017). The Tuml are, according to Kirk descendent from Hayak, who is held to be a son of Darood (Kirk in Lewis, 2017). However, Hayak’s Darood affiliation remains denied by Samaale members due to acts of exogamy with the Yibir-Anaas and the Madhiban (Lewis, 2017). While there exist different historical accounts on origin, the Gabooye collective have an acknowledged place within the Somali lineage system, and in contrast to the Gosha of the south, there is no wider perception of distinction, ethnically or culturally, from Somalis of the noble clans. Instead, individuals from the occupational caste groups are treated as low-status Somalis due to various different mythical narratives suggesting their un-holy origin, their polluting nature as well as the deplorable and undesired services they have historically carried out for noble Somali clans (Hill, 2010).

5.3.2 Defining minorities in Somali society

While all three groups are considered a collective today, the Gabooye have traditionally only been comprised of the Madhiban and the Muuse Dheriyo. Although the Yibir-Anaas have historically been viewed as non-Somalis, due to their Hebrew affiliation, as it is commonly held that Somalis are categorically Muslim, it is however understood that they experience the same type of exclusion and marginalisation as the other groups within the collective. Nonetheless, the importance in this distinction is that a generic use of an umbrella definition for all “outcast” groups in Somaliland, such as the “Gabooye”, and across all Somali territories, misses the different forms of stigmatisation that each group is subjugated to. While groups that are considered to be outside the boundaries of the Somali clan system may have similar experiences of systematic exclusion and discrimination, the different groups do not have a shared origin nor are they accused of the same hate narratives and therefore they do not experience the same type of hate discourse (Eno and Kusow, 2014). In addition, while there lies true analytical value in understanding the different forms of hate discourse that exist in this context, the conflicting history of the Somali minority groups, as well as the usage of generic definitions such as Sab and Gabooye interchangeably, makes it difficult to give an
adequate overview of their placement as minorities, given the previous definition given by Giddens and Sutton, in Somali society.

The term caste, which has been associated by early Somali scholars with the Somali term “Sab”, has been used in academic literature and elsewhere to describe both the Gosha groups of the south and the different groups of the Gabooye collective in Somaliland. However, according to Todd (1977) the term “caste” was established carelessly by “Africanists” as a descriptor of social relations in Somali society as well as other African societies (Todd, 1977). Caste as a category of academic study has predominantly been found in literature concerning social relations in the Hindu context. Conversely, it has been discussed extensively within the fields of sociology and social anthropology the extent to which it is appropriate to use the term “caste” in non-Hindu context. De Vos and Wagatsuma (1966), however, refute the idea that caste as a descriptor of social relation is inappropriate in other contexts other than the Hindu context, for example the Arabian Peninsula and East Africa (De Vos and Wagatsuma, 1966: Subedi, 2013). Instead, De Vos and Wagatsuma claim that there is a value in explicating the occurrence of caste groups outside of the Hindu context, however such a comparative attempt is only useful in analysing the social structures of stratification and not their cultural patterns and value systems (De Vos and Wagatsuma, 1966: Subedi, 2013). Here I agree, as the Hindu caste is somewhat comparable to the Somali clan system. Both the clan system and the caste system function on social stratification, predominantly through a sophisticated practice of endogamy, as its operating element. However, it is interesting to look into why the Gabooye collective are purposely referred to as a caste while other groups within Somali society are held to be clan groups.

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31 Caste within the Hindu context is usually described as Varna, which is the Sanskrit word for Caste. Moreover, the Varnas are according to Hindu tradition comprised of four groups: the Brahmans, the Kshatriya, the Vaishya and the Shudra (Gurung, 2005).
While there are similarities in the ordering of stratification between the caste system and the clan system, such as the concept of pollution, lineage affiliation through the Gotra\textsuperscript{32} and specific occupations, the implications of stratification within the caste in the Hindu context is slightly different than that of clan within the Somali context. For instance, where endogamy is the main element in the order of stratification through restriction in the caste system, the logic behind the Somali clan ideology essentially promotes inter-clan marriage as it has historically been used as a political and social tool for reconciliation and power-sharing between clans (Lewis, 1961: 2008; Walls, 2014: Eno and Kusow, 2014). However, this is only true for members of Samaale decent. Exclusion and stratification for the Gabooye collective in Somaliland is based on occupational differences and endogamy is thus practiced against them in this regard as a way of further separating them from the “noble” clan groups in Somaliland (Eno and Kusow, 2014). In contrast, the exclusion and stratification experienced by the GOSHA in the south can be argued to be based on ethnicity due to their differing ancestry. Such stratification instead exemplifies the similarities between the southern Somali clan groups and the Hindu caste system in utilising racial categories as additional elements of restriction and thus subordination.

Social stratification is, according to Gupta (2000), based on an ordering within society using one or several different categories. Categories such as caste, clan, race, gender, class or ethnicity (Gupta, 2000: Subedi, 2013). There are various descriptions used to describe caste within the field of post-colonial studies as well as sociology and social anthropology. Ghurye (1950) state that there are six features to the caste system:

i. “segmental division of society;

ii. hierarchy of groups;

\textsuperscript{32} The notion of Gotra operates within the Hindu caste ideology and it is used in a similar matter as clan lineage, that is tracing kinship through a common ancestor (Mandan, 1962: Brough, 1953/2013). Yet it is noted, through the literature and accordingly the discourse on the Gotra, that it is a complex concept to define, on its own yet in relation to the traditional caste system. For instance, Brough writes that the Gotra is the exogamous unit of the Brahmanical ideology and hence the Gotra, as a lineage marker, is utilised as a tool to help one avoid marrying someone from the same Gotra (Borough, 1953/2013). Others, like Karandikar (1929), have, however, argued the Gotra to be a condition utilised by early Brahmans to maintain ritual purity (Karandikar, 1929: Mandan, 1962).
iii. restriction of feeding and social intercourse;
iv. allied and religious disabilities and privileges of the different sections;
v. lack of unrestricted choice of occupation and;
vi. restriction on marriage” (Ghurye, 1950 in Subedi, 2013: 53).

Others like Leach (1960), who like Weber and later Dumont (1972) argue that caste, as an ethnographic category, is exclusively a Hindu social construction, use caste to denote the geographical implications of a localised class system (Leach: 1960: Subedi, 2013). Leach argues that while caste can be used to describe any given class structure outside of the Hindu context, merging class and caste together is problematic as using the concept of “status group”, to explain caste, assumes the nature of the essential sociology of Indian social relations (Subedi, 2013: Leach, 1960). Instead, such a merge creates a biased and inaccurate image of the other forms of social stratification that might exists, such as racism. (Leach, 1960: Subedi, 2013)).

Instead, for Leach, caste is very much like a “[...] system of labour division from which the element of competition among the workers has been largely excluded” (Leach: 1960: 6). Leach’s description highlights that the dominant class in any given society can be analysed as a caste when there is a high level of class endogamy visible amongst that group. Through the practice of endogamy, the dominant class will enjoy an enduring inheritance of privilege and thus there is a continuous barrier between them and other classes (Leach, 1960: Subedi, 2013). Contemporary scholars on Indian studies, like Singh, adhere to this notion by arguing that the single focus on exogamy fails to acknowledge the role access to material resources, such as land and property, have had in the understanding of the Hindu caste system (Singh, 2008). In addition, Singh argues that the focus on a single hierarchy of the caste system, founded on the conditions of purity and pollution presented by Dumont, cannot explain the caste hierarchy as it does not account for conditions related to conflict, mobility and change (Singh, 2008).

Instead, Singh bases this argument on Gupta’s critique of Dumont, on the extent to which lower castes are accepting of their status (Gupta, 2000: Singh, 2008). For Gupta, an analysis on the Hindu caste system from the view of purity and pollution alone, does not account for the social constructions of status as the different castes within the hierarchal
system have opposing views on their status there as well as opposing perceptions on the meaning of hierarchy (Gupta, 2000: Singh, 2008). For instance, the lower castes could label other caste groups as polluting while accepting their own label as equally polluting (Gupta, 2000: Singh, 2008). What this indicates for Gupta, and Singh, is that both lower and higher casts are promoting the notion of purity and pollution as a condition determined by cast status (Gupta, 2000: Singh, 2008). The critique for Dumont lies in that his theory fails to understand that the condition of pollution in this system is reliant on a castes ability to refrain from engaging in occupations that were deemed polluting, not the acceptance of the concept itself (Gupta, 2000: Singh, 2008). The lower caste groups have historically had no other choice but to engage in demeaning occupations, like shoemaking and street sweeping, as they lacked access to other material recourses such as land and property, that inherently carry political power and social status (Gupta, 2000: Singh, 2013). The ideology of the *Varna* states that there is a separation in labour due to one’s placement in the birth ascribed hierarchy, hence it could be argued that Hindus, by virtue of piety like the Gabooye in Somaliland, subscribe to the labels, and accordingly the tasks given within the caste system.

Consequently, due to the placement in this hierarchy, the lower caste groups were coerced into the polluting state. From this view, it is therefore understood that there is a level of upward and downward mobility for both higher and lower caste groups available within the Hindu caste system, and arguably also in the Somali society, however the system is unfavourable as it only allows for upward mobility for the first three groups of the Varna. Yet what Dumont’s single hierarchal understanding of the system, in relation to the concepts of purity and pollution, fails to acknowledge, according to both Gupta and Singh, is that the two different concepts are only manifested in their relation to material resources. Hence, the act of purity and pollution is material and mental, meaning that as concepts they are socially constructed on a highly objective reality that is linked to a caste groups historical rural livelihood (Singh, 2008). Another noteworthy argument from Gupta is how the status of any caste is only relevant in relation to other castes (Gupta, 2000). Meaning, that the status of a lower caste is only manifested once there is another caste group that either defines the lower caste as lower or their own caste group as superior to that caste (Gupta, 2000: Singh, 2008).
Recalling Mamdani, on how the Somali clan system immersed itself into the colonial administrations form of ruling by way of co-option, as a means of access to resources, Mukherjee adds that the Hindu caste system also aligned itself it with the colonial administration. According to Mukherjee, prior to both colonial inference and conversely capitalism, the Hindu caste system, the Jati, which is a sub-division of the Varna, already relied on a form of stratification that was built on occupation (Mukherjee, 2000). However, with the occurrence of British colonialism, the Hindu caste system immersed itself with the colonial class structure, thus adding layers to the structure of the caste system (Mukherjee, 2000). Moreover, the landowners and the moneylenders usually found in the upper tier of the class structure were all from the higher castes, such as the Brahmans and the Kashytras (Mukherjee, 2000). Additionally, it is held that the Brahmans adhere to clan ideology, through the Gotra, in so that they trace their lineage to a common ancestor. The small-scale petty traders which were comprised of caste groups, such as the Vaishays, were in the middle section and the landless and the “tribes”, mainly the Shudra and ‘the untouchables’33, were conversely found in the lower-class tier (Mukherjee, 2000). Mukherjee adds that while not all members of the higher class were comprised of high caste members, the same goes for the middle and lower classes, this relationship highlights how “[...] the Hindu society substantiated this correlation between caste and the capitalist class structure” (Mukherjee, 1959: 58; Mukherjee, 2000: 334). As argued by Gupta, the caste group’s ascribed access to both mental and material labour connects with the notion of a division of labour (Gupta, 2000: Singh, 2008).

In the Somali contexts, groups like the Sab have historically engaged in occupations that are viewed as demeaning by the Samaale, hence their lower status was defined in relation to their ability to acquire enough material resources that would provide a higher status. However, like the Hindu lower cast groups, such as the scheduled and occupational castes the Shudra and the Dalits, the Gabooye collective in Somaliland have traditionally carried out work such as shoemaking, metal working, hair dressing and customary rites for the Samaale. However, as mentioned, each group within the Gabooye collective carry out specific occupations. For instance, the Madhiban and the Muuse Dheriyo are usually

33 Dalits are the fifth caste group of the Varna system. However, they fall outside of the Varna and they are thus considered “untouchables” due to the ritually polluting nature of the menial tasks they are forced to carry out (Gurung, 2005).
engaged in shoemaking or hairdressing, the Tumal carry out metal work and the Yibir-Anas provide customary services like circumcision and spiritual blessings during the birth of children (Eno and Kusow, 2010: Kusow, 2014). Nevertheless, as in the Hindu caste system, these occupations can be argued to have been coerced on the Gabooye as they have historically had no access to owning land and thus, they were left with livelihoods based on services for the noble clans. The lack of ability in refraining from such occupations confirms Gupta and Singh’s assumptions of the importance of land, as both property and a political tool, and the additional connections between the two systems of stratification (Gupta, 2000: Singh, 2008). Singh adds that in understanding the caste system, or systems similar to it such as the Somali clan system, there is a need to also clarify an understanding of how the landed property, found in the traditional feudal system, are also components in the formation of caste in India (Singh, 2008). The feudal system was indeed a system of stratification similar to the caste and clan system as it relied on a single hierarchy where landownership was promoted (Singh, 2008). The Gabooye collective have historically lacked access to land due to their lower status within the Somali clan system. However, this narrative does not convey if their lack of land ownership is based on their contradictory identity as non-pastoralists or if it is mainly due to the occupations they have historically carried out or the narratives suggesting their un-holy origin?

The issue of landownership is further clarified in the fact that Somali tradition indicates that the Gabooye have historically been tied to noble clans and families through a bond like relationship called the Boon, like the Sheegad, commonly utilised in the south, and because of their affiliation with the nomadic pastoralist they are scattered throughout the northern region however they are also found in the southern areas (Walls, 2014). Associating with major clan groups and families is a strategy used by almost all Somali minority groups to secure both resources and protection during troubling times (Menkhaus, 2003: Walls, 2014). However, clan affiliation does not necessarily transpire into equal rights neither within the overall clan structure nor in general Somali society.
While it has been acknowledged in this chapter that a definition of minorities in the Somali context might be difficult, this thesis still puts forward an understanding of minorities in Somali society that is understood, partly in line with Giddens and Sutton, as groups that are defined by a sense of shared identity, language, ethnic and/or religion rather than numerical size (Giddens and Sutton, 2013). It is further understood that minorities, in the Somali context, despite their actual size in the overall population are groups that define themselves as Somalis but due to either racial categories, such as the case of the Gosha or occupational differences, such as the Gabooye collective, are viewed to have a lower status by those groups within society that fall within the clan lineage of the Samaale (Besteman, 1999: Eno and Kusow, 2014).

These groups, mainly the Gabooye of the north and the Gosha and the Benadiris of the south and the coast, are experiencing different levels of inequality, yet they all share stigma and marginalisation based on an ‘otherness’ in relation to the majority clan groups. However, unlike the description given by Giddens and Sutton, on minorities having a specific shared sense of identity, the minority groups in the south like the Gosha have at times claimed other identities than the Somali. This is assumed to be in relation to these groups historic background as slaves brought to the Somali peninsula and as such claiming a different identity as a means of both belonging and undoing. However, it is interesting to ask if the northern minority groups, the Gabooye, are claiming another identity than Somali?

The ensuing sub-sections of this chapter will answer the overarching research question;

*How did changes in the Somali political economy during 1969-1988 affect the principle of Participatory Parity for the Gabooye collective in Somaliland?*

The research question will be answered in this analysis using primary data comprised of interview data and my own observation from the field. The findings from the data will be supported by secondary data on both context and theory. By means of the triangulated combination of data, the analysis focuses on the two objectives:

- trace the transformation of clan and class identity in Somali society from 1969 to 1988, by analysing how the state institutionalised, and socialised, political and socio-economic arrangements that affected the participatory parity of the Gabooye collective.

- identify the institutional spaces available to address the claims to justice for members of the Gabooye collective.

The first step in the analysis will be tracing the identified changes in the Somali political economy during 1969-1988 that are understood to have affected the principle of participatory parity of the Gabooye collective. The second part of the analysis chapter goes through the three structures of injustice presented by Fraser, but in their adapted form; misrecognition, maldistribution, and misrepresentation and how they are interfering with the current realisation of the principle of participatory parity for the Gabooye. This section also analyses the claims of justice that are made under each of the structures. The concluding section of this chapter and the following chapter explains the second objective in describing the limited experience of participatory parity for the Gabooye collective and the existing, and identified, institutional spaces for emancipatory change, in redressing the claims to justice.
During his leadership, General Mohammed Siyaad Barre attempted to consolidate the idea of a collective “Somaliness” and “Somalinimo”, as mentioned by Eno and Kusow, through a well-crafted reform programme reliant on nationalism, modernism and secularism without the accessory of a particular clan identity and thus plurality (Eno and Kusow, 2014; Walls, 2014; Fox: 2015; Balthasar, 2018). Instead, a collective identity, formalised through a process of identity standardisation and institutional standardisation, became Barre’s focus (Balthasar, 2018).

Balthasar writes that Barre’s combination of ‘Rules of the Game’ (Institutional standardisation) and ‘Rules of the Mind’ (Identity standardisation), a progression needed to achieve what is considered a modern state, was actually the best effort in Somali history on state making and nation building (Balthasar, 2018). The extent to which ways Barre was successful in this attempt is debatable, and I would instead argue that his ideological effort to rid Somali society of its accustomed ways backfired and instead solidified the very entity it was aimed at eradicating: clan identity. The interesting question, however, is if Barre was predestined to fail despite his estimable efforts as the ramifications and impacts of a protracted clan legacy, and thus plurality in group identity, were too manifested in the Somali consciousness for one man to change? Yet the most crucial question here, for this thesis, is to ask to what extent Barre’s authoritative modernisation project came to disrupt the public sphere of Somali society, a sphere contingent on kinship relations and Islamic law, and thus the extent to which that affected the potential for implementing participatory parity for minority groups such as the Gabooye? Yet also the extent to which those changes came to affect the current participatory parity of the Gabooye collective in Somaliland? In an effort to answer the latter question, I will present an outline, adhering to Balthasar’s observations, yet with modifications, of the two crucial changes that occurred between 1969-1988 and that are assumed to have led to such a chain reaction:

- The restructuring of the Somali Rules of the Game and;
- The restructuring of the Somali Rules of the Mind.
6.1. Restructuring the Somali Rules of the Game: Challenging Clan and Islam

As mentioned in Chapter 5, General Barre, whom at the time was the head of the Somali National Army, came to power through a coup d’état following the assassination of Postcolonial Somalia’s second democratically elected President Abdirashid Ali Shamarke on the 15th of October 1969 (Balthasar, 2018: Walls, 2014.) During Shamarke’s leadership, the postcolonial state mirrored the colonial state in its political formation and hence the state perpetuated the class and clan relations that formed during colonial governance (Sheik-Abdi, 1981: Mamdani, 1996). Conversely, due to state-wide corruption, rising inflation and civil disorder there was a mistrust in the government and accordingly the citizens of independent Somalia grew tired of the western style democracy, which was implemented for 9 years and under three different leaderships (Sheik-Abdi, 1981). According to Walls, the assassination of Shamarke was the catalyst leading up to the coup rather than its exclusive purpose (Walls, 2014). In one of the interviews, a former Somali diplomat, described the time prior to the military coup and the Barre regime as characterised by chaos and pluralisation as everyone was interested in politics and being a member of the new parliament. The main reason, assumed by the respondent, was the lack of other employment opportunities in Somalia during that time (Interviewee 29, 2018). According to the former diplomat, the political parties before 1969 were not politically different or even reliant on a specific political ideology. For instance, there were around 280 political parties, yet these parties had no actual political motivation apart from difference in party names and flags. Instead, political involvement during this time was all about appropriating political power, individually and for your clan family (Interviewee 29, 2018).

However, the coup and Barre’s ensuing development reform changed that. Following the coup, Barre quickly dissolved all the previous institutions of President Shamarke’s civilian government (Balthasar 2018: Walls, 2014: Lewis, 2007). For instance, Barre disassembled the National Assembly, the Supreme Court as well as all political parties. Instead, The National Assembly was quickly replaced by the newly founded Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) (Balthasar, 2018: Fox: 2015: Walls, 2014: Lewis, 2007). The purpose of the SRC was to ensure that the implementation of the new socialist ideological
framework from the First Charter\textsuperscript{34} of the Revolution of 1969 was followed and enacted by the members of the council in their everyday work (Balthasar, 2018). Barre’s restructuring included a new Secretaries of the State (SOS), a sub-council to the SRC, and the SOS included civilian secretaries assigned to run the governmental organisations (Balthasar, 2018). Balthasar writes that the SOS and the lower administrative cabinets were either an attempt at controlling the masses or a genuine effort in bringing the governance closer to the people (Balthasar, 2018). Regardless of Barre’s intention with the centralisation of the government, the former diplomat recalls that the military regime initially had the support of the public:

The people welcomed them as they believed that change would happen, in terms of politics, culture, work, society – everywhere, that things would change. The military did a lot of things that people had in their minds and they voiced that and said that justice would come. They started to distribute jobs to the people. “… They built factories and they uplifted the workers; they did a lot of things that were towards self-help for the people (Interviewee 29, 2018).

With the establishment of Scientific Socialism as the guiding ideology in the second charter in 1970, the new government embarked on developing Somalia and accordingly introduced a series of approaches to better the economic and social services of the post-colonial nation (Samatar, 1989a; Walls, 2014; Balthasar, 2018). According to Samatar, the SRC mobilised a major “state takeover” and nationalised the most profitable areas of the domestic resources as a first step in their improvement and development plan (Samatar, 1989). The agricultural sector, with the leading industrial plant Società Nazionale per I’ Agricoltura e I’ Industria (SNAI) was the first to be nationalised and following the nationalisation, the SRC focused on developing the overall agricultural sector in order to ensure that there was enough food produced for the sustenance of the Somali people (Samatar, 1989a). The revolutionary council launched its first development programme and between 1971-1973 the focus was to develop the well-being of the Somali economy through its main economic sectors; pastoralism, agriculture, and fisheries (Samatar, 1989a).

\textsuperscript{34} The First Charter of the revolution was adopted in 1969 by the SRC and the pledge from the members was based on fighting for social justice, supporting liberation movements and working against corruption (Sheik-Abdi, 1981)
1989a). There was some success in the take-off of the food-to work programmes, which were designed to halt the growing movement of people to the urban cities from the rural area, as the programme would ensure that there would be more jobs available in the rural areas (Samatar, 1989a). However, Samatar argues that the rural allocations, when compared to the urban service sector, were less successful than their urban counterparts. This was due to a lack of capital investment, technical know-how and the fact that less than 31.1 percent of the profits were generated back to the rural areas whereas over 50 percent of the national budget was allocated to the urban service sector (Samatar, 1989a:).

While the socialist development initiative of Barre and the SRC intensified the pastoral commodification, and thus transformed the Somali pastoral mode of production, which Samatar argues was neglected during the early state formation years, the initiative only furthered a process that was already in place during colonial imposition (Samatar, 1989a). Instead, the initiative was a front designed to uphold the government’s relationship with the livestock traders, accordingly the conditions of the exchange market for the livestock economy were in favour of the traders rather than the pastoralists (Samatar, 1989a). Consequently, while the pastoral commodification of the livestock sector was booming, the adverse pastoral terms of trade were crippling the pastoral herdsmen (Samatar, 1989a). Roughly around 60% of the population were actively engaged in this specific mode of production around the time of the Barre regimes leadership and the majority of the pastoralists had no access to the technology the state had invested in and accordingly they lacked the means needed to improve their systems of production (Samatar, 1989a). Another issue for the pastoralists, according to Samatar, was how the terms of trade were linked to the black-market exchange rate; the pastoralists were the consumers of the merchandise product they were selling and that the traders were reinvesting in. However, they were also forced to pay the increased exchange prices at the black market (Samatar, 1989a). This contrasted with the livestock exports, which were linked to the official exchange market (Samatar, 1989:126).

As argued by Samatar, the transformation of the pastoral economy did transpire into a transformation of social relations as new class relations and property relations were formed. However, in contrast to orthodox Marxist theory, no revolution was in sight, as a form of resistance from the peasant classes that were selling their labour power to the
livestock merchants, towards the capitalist development of the Somali political economy. This explanation of the Somali social relations during this time, however, falls in line with Gramsci, in the sense that the superstructure will employ its power of domination to maintain its status quo, hence the extent of domination is so ingrained in society that revolution will never materialise (Gramsci, 1997: Simon, 2015). This further exemplifies Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. Gramsci held that there were more to dominance and hegemony, as means of capitalism, than class struggle and exploitation. In contrast to Marx’s class theory, and in this context also Samatar, Gramsci instead maintained that there is no single and dominant class that influences the values of the subordinate class. Instead, there is a shifting and unstable alliance of different social classes (Hall, 1985: Gramsci, 1997: Simon, 2015). At one end you have a dominant class that seeks to obtain all thought and behaviour in accordance with their interests (Gramsci, 1997: Simon, 2015). On the other end, there is one dominated, or subordinated, class that maintains, or at least attempts to, the validity of their own definitions of reality (Gramsci, 1997: Simon, 2015).

This creates a struggle over the definitions of the realities that on one hand serve the interest of the dominant class and on the other hand those held by other social classes (Gramsci, 1997: Simon, 2015). To me, this becomes true in understanding why the principle of participatory parity had a real opportunity for implementation during Barre’s leadership but also how such an opportunity got disrupted. The argument here lies in understanding how the structures of politics and culture, interact with the process of revolutionary change (Hall, 1985: Gramsci, 1997: Simon, 2015). For instance, the state as the instrument of domination. Here the state represents the interests of the capital and the dominant class, which during this time was the political elite that was established during the colonial era, by dominating the social institutions within a society used to socialise people into agreeing with the interests of the ruling class. While Barre envisioned an equal socialist Somali society, one without clans and classes, he did use ideology to shape the reality and perceptions of identity within society and hence the state came to reproduce the interests of the existing ruling class. Consequently, ideology was used to restructure the ‘Rules of the game’ and accordingly reproduce social structures through politics, religion and education. However, the social structures that manifested were reinforced by clan and class ideology. For example, the intellectual elites
of Somali society were already embedded in the social structures and for that they enjoyed privileges as they continued to reproduce the norms and rules set up by the ruling class (Gramsci, 1997: Simon, 2015). The idea behind this relies on how the power of the ruling classes, again the Somali political elite, dispersed through clan families, is entrenched in all of society’s institutions, including the religious ones, through the holdings of hegemony and ideology. Hence, in keeping the status quo, the clan hegemony remained and thus the status of the Gabooye collective within that status order remained. Moreover, Barre countered uprising and the possibility of a revolutionary seed being planted in the base by early on removing the opportunity for such. As previously mentioned, Barre had already superseded the administration of Sharmarke and instead replaced it with members of the military elite. Such an act ensured that the state, the military regime, could have direct insight on the activities of the populace and thus continue the domination process and accordingly alter the perceptions of reality.

While Samatar argued that there were severe setbacks in the economic development plan for the pastoral and agricultural sectors, Barre’s overarching development reform not only challenged the Somali political economy in its rule framework, but I would argue that it also changed the outline and function of Somali society through its secular focused modernisation and anti-clan rhetoric. For instance, social events and all forms of collective gatherings and social interaction, such as the Shir, weddings and funerals, were to be held in orientation centres controlled by the state (Dool, 1998: Balthasar, 2018). In addition, Barre’s regime mobilised public lectures on the value of Scientific Socialism for the Somali people during these gatherings and the centres thus functioned as further tools for indoctrination (Dool, 1998: Balthasar, 2018). Hence, Barre co-co-opted the space for revolutionary action to take place and instead ensured that his agenda, by way of coercion, replaced the former way of life, through all sectors of Somali life.

Additionally, Barre’s approaches included laws advancing women’s rights, which at the time was unprecedented, access to education for more Somalis such as members of marginalised groups like the Gabooye collective and Gosha groups in the south, as well as a standardisation of the Somali language in its written form (Walls, 2014). These approaches as well as Barre’s administrative reconstructing were indeed aimed at minimising the reach and power of the clan and instead introduce the state as the single
unifying narrative of the Somali people. As a starting point, Barre changed the name of the nation from The Republic of Somalia to The Democratic Republic of Somalia. This was to emphasise the new socialist direction the nation was taking (Adam, 1995). Prior to 1969, regional names for the different settlements, both rural and urban, of Somalia were appointed, both formally and informally, to demarcate the clan that resided in that area. However, where there had been 8 regions and 47 districts, Barre introduced 7 new regions and 31 districts, all with new names (Balthasar, 2018). In his effort to dismantle the strong hold of the clan, Barre justified the new regional names with their connection to the area of settlement, on spatial grounds, rather than clan (Balthasar, 2018). The new regions were designed to blur the previous clan lines, and thus clan loyalties, and instead promote state building and nation building through cohesion crossing clan lines. In doing so, Barre challenged both the institution of clan as well as clan identity itself (Balthasar, 2018). During this time, in an address to regional judges, Barre stated that:

“Tribalism and nationalism cannot go hand in hand… it is unfortunate that our nation is too clannish: if all Somalis are to go to Hell, tribalism will be their vehicle to reach there” (Barre in Lewis, 1994:222).

In keeping up the momentum of blurring out clan loyalties and clan power, Barre staged an official ceremony and burial of the clan in 1971. Each of the five major Somali clan families were symbolised by a doll like body wrapped in cloth and set on fire before being ceremonially buried as dead corpses (Walls, 2014: Balthasar, 2018). Respondents’ recollection of the ceremony is generally positive, both from members of the Gabooye collective and non-members, as it had a symbolic and factual meaning to the emergence of a new era, an era where clan no longer had a strong hold of Somali society. Of the burial, a respondent commented that:

He was burying the clan ideology. So, he had a party, and they dug a grave, as if it was an actual dead person and it was buried. And he said: that was clan and we have buried it. So, from that day on clan did not exist (Interviewee 27, 2018).
Another critical change during this period was the introduction of the Somali Agricultural Land Law of 1975 (Burman et al., 2014). Barre used the new policy to regulate the Somali agricultural economy and the process of land owning through formalisation of the legislation of inheritance rights (Burman et al., 2014). Prior to the law, land as a resource was regulated through the Xeer, however, the new land law challenged the customary tradition of land allocation and land tenure through customary principles. For instance, land was usually attached to the Deegan35, the clan area, and the land was thus appropriated through clan lineage (Cassanelli, 2014). Smaller clans were as such reliant on bigger clans for access to the land usage and they would traditionally settle, through agreement, within the Deegan of a larger clan. This meant that the clans were free in administrating their claimed land as they saw fit (Cassanelli, 2014). However, through the new land law, the state became both the facilitator and the owner of land in all of Somalia (Burman et al., 2014: Cassanelli, 2014). Here I am inclined to ask if Barre introduced the Land Law as a means to overcome the strong hold kinship relations had on resources, such as land, and instead make them more accessible to all through the state or if it was just a way to exert land as a material resources and place it in the hand of his military regime?

According to Cassanelli (1996) the inflow of direct capital to Somalia, through foreign aid, earnings from livestock export, diaspora remittances and subsidies for military operations, during the 1970’s contributed to an increase in the value of land, as the general wealth of Somalia had increased (Cassanelli, 1996). Again, irrespective of the underlying reasoning for the introduction of the Land Law, the implementation had great ramifications on the Somali political, economic, and social order. For instance, the new policies of the socialist government did not only confront clan as a social, political, and economic institution in society, but it also challenged religious laws and practices. In the adoption of the controversial Family Law in 1975, Barre promoted gender equality and put forward a strong support for the rights of women (Mohamed, 2015). The Family law was drafted on the colonial Italian and British legislations concerning family matters. In issuing the Family Law, Barre wanted to move beyond the amalgamation of customary

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and religious laws, through the Qadis\textsuperscript{36}, that were in place. The new law allowed equal rights to men and women in relation to inheritance of wealth, such as land, in the death of a relative (Mohamed, 2015: Balthasar, 2018). The law also put a restriction on polygamy, a customary practice enacted in Somali society, as well as allowing women to divorce their husbands (Mohamed, 2015). It was stated in Article 1 of the newly adopted Family Code that the Islamic ruling on social justice was only to supplement the new public order and not govern it (Mohamed, 2015). Women were not only included in Barre’s imaginary of the new socialist Somalia, initially they were also held as an integral part of it and referred to as “Hooyoyinka Kacanka”, the mothers of the revolution (Mohamed, 2015). For Somali women, this new status was welcomed as the previous post-independence governments had side lined them, despite their active involvement in the collective quest for independence (Mohamed, 2015: Walls, 2014). Notwithstanding the approval of Somali women, the Family Law was criticised by religious leaders and it was asserted that Barre’s new tactics were going against the nation’s religion: Islam (Mohamed, 2015). As discussed in earlier chapters, Islam and Islamic rulings, such as Shari’a law, have heavily, yet pragmatically, influenced the Somali rule of law and prior to Barre’s modernisation, Islamic ruling had a strong presence in the Somali way of life. When Barre first came to power and introduced his socialist ideology, the religious leaders were hopeful as they saw what the Egyptian leader, President Nasser, had accomplished by merging Islam and socialism (Adam, 1995). However, their hopefulness changed into apprehension when Barre made it clear that:

“Islamic socialism has become a servant of capitalism and neo-colonialism and a tool manipulated by a privileged, rich and powerful class” (Siyaad Barre in Nelson, 1982:115).

Yet in another statement Barre declared that:

“In fact, the structure of our society and the present framework of our economy contain the only possible alternative for a rapid economic and social rise” (Siyaad Barre 1970 in Samatar, 1989: 116).

\textsuperscript{36} The Qadis courts were established after independence and they symbolise the combination of customary law, that is Xeer, and Shari’a law (Walls, 2014).
Barre was convinced that socialism was better equipped to address the societal issues the nation was faced with, such as poverty and famine, and while Barre publicly acknowledged Islam as an important part of Somali life, he asserted that religion was a private matter and that it was best kept that way (Adam, 1995). At the same time, according to Adam, Barre would often liken himself to the Prophet of Islam, as he believed that he was liberating the Somali people in the same manner as the prophet liberated the oppressed and exploited classes of Mecca during his time. For Barre, Islam, although a private matter, was the essence of the new ways of Marxist-Leninism (Adam, 1995: Lewis: 1994). Statements like these, and the abovementioned, were unsurprisingly, considered blasphemous and they further divided Barre and the religious groupings (Adam, 1995). In addition, Barre’s Marxist-Leninism lacked a real bourgeois class to criticise, and in its place, Barre voiced personal and public views, disguised as a form of class analysis, of the political elites and the established religious leaders within that elite (Adam, 1995: Lewis, 1994). Barre urged the religious leaders to be part of the new socialist Somalia and not to go against the changes that were happening (Adam, 1995).

Religious leaders were now more than ever convinced that Barre wanted to abolish the Islamic way of life in Somalia and he received further criticism for his tactics (Lewis, 1994: Adam, 1995). In reaction to the criticism, the military regime imprisoned and executed those involved in criticising the regime and scientific socialism. This further divided the state and the religious institutions. True to his socialist convictions, Barre, however, continued to publicly assert that religion was bad for the development of society (Adam, 1994). Yet Barre also understood the power of the religious institutions, supported by the clan, in Somali society and it was clear that he viewed these institutions as strong holdings where subversive ideas to overthrow the state could manifest (Adam, 1995: Balthasar, 2018). Hence Barre resorted to tactics that ensured to include the religious institutions. For instance, the 1979 referendum where the 114-chapter constitution that the SRC put forward was positively adopted (Sheik-Abdi, 1981). This point further illustrates the many levels of inconsistency of Barres strategy. Not only because the design of the constitution with its 114 chapters mimics the Holy Qur’an that has 114 surahs but it is also inconsistent as the socialist imaginary Barre wanted to uphold was coming undone in combining religion and socialist theory. This was confirmed as the socialist state of Somalia only lasted between 1970-1977, most likely as it was no longer
valuable to continue to adhere to a socialist ideology once Barre had lost the allegiance, and with that the material support, of his strongest socialist ally, the Soviet Union (Adam, 1995: Walls, 2014). Barre had relied on the support of the Soviet Union since he came to power in 1969 and in 1974 the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Somalia signed an official treaty of Friendship and Co-operation (Adam, 1995). The Soviet Union provided Somalia with development aid but also modern weapons and military training, making Barre’s Somali National Army, (SNA) the largest in Africa during that time (Adam, 1995). However, Barre’s quest for a united ‘Somaliweeyn’, by liberating the Somali territory of Ethiopia, the Ogadeen, from the Ethiopians, came to end the friendship between the Soviet Union and Somalia (Adam, 1995: Walls, 2014). The Soviet Union did not condone Barre’s nationalist expansions and they decided that it was more beneficial to support Ethiopia in their new Marxist endeavour (Adam, 1995: Walls, 2014). After the Soviet retraction, Barre joined forces with the United States and gained support. During this time, Barre also decided to re-formulate his Islamic standings and in doing so appealed for Somalia to join the Arab League as the first non-Arab state (Adam, 1995).

The religious elite welcomed this turn, and to an extent so did some segments of the public, as a membership in the Arab League could help offset Barre’s modernist activities (Adam, 1995). However, as Adam argues, appealing for membership in the Arab League had possibly more to do with Barre’s opportunistic plotting rather than a genuine interest for Somalia to belong to the Islamic Ummah. Barre’s leadership involved a socialist remodelling of Somali society and while the modernisation project did not completely refute Islam it did put stronger restrictions on the clan identity (Elmi, 2010). However, despite Barre’s attempts, clan ideology strengthened as clan identity became the main tool for manipulating and consolidating political and economic mobilisation, both by the clan leaders and the state through the military regime (Samatar, 1989a: Samatar, 1992: Kusow,1994: Elmi, 2010). Accordingly, a political class, which was attached to the military regime, emerged and exploited the ideology of clan to appropriate state resources and public property.
From this section I have traced and concluded that during his leadership, Barre restructured the ‘Rules of the Game’ by challenging the standardised institutions of clan and Islam, as described by Balthasar, through the following state making events:

(i) Introduction of Socialism as the leading ideology of the state of Somalia.
(ii) Transformation of the pastoral economy; changes in class and property relations
(iii) New Rule of Law that included laws such as the ‘Land Law’ and Family Law, that went beyond traditional and Islamic laws.

6.2. Restructuring the Somali Rules of the Mind: Modifying the Somali discourse on identity

Barre continued to confront tradition and its institutions by systemically altering the discourses, here language and practices, supporting them. This was done through banning the usage of words that were linked to clan and religion. For instance, words like the Somali ‘Ina adeer’, meaning ‘son or daughter of my uncle, ‘Walaal’, brother or sister, or the Arabic Caaqil, clan elder, were replaced with Jalle’ and Nabad doon (Lewis: 1994: Balthasar, 2018). The words ‘Ina adeer and ‘Walaal’ are words still in use in Somali society and they have traditionally demarcated a person’s kinship ties, and consequently their familiarity, with another person. Regardless of that person being from one’s immediate family or not. Barre introduces ‘Jalle’ to blur out the kinship ties by maintaining that ‘Jalle’ was a more fitting name for a fellow Somali as it means ‘comrade’, a word common in socialist regimes. ‘Jalle’ was used by Barre to emphasise the unity of the state, the nation and the citizen through the ideology of socialism, not kinship or religion. During this time, it was even common practice to refer to the socialist leader of Somalia as ‘Jalle Siyaad’.

Caaqil on the other hand is an Arabic word, which means ‘wise man’, has been used throughout Somali history to denote the clan elders or the lineage chief (Lewis, 1959: Mohamed, 2007: Walls, 2014). The concept of Caaqil is assumed to have been adopted from the Egyptian system of governance during the nineteenth century and the role of a Caaqil at this time was to mediate and negotiate during a conflict between the clans (Lewis, 1959: Mohamed, 2007:Walls, 2014). In the Somali context, the role of the Caaqils
was deemed very useful during the colonial era and according to Walls, Caaqil’s were co-opted by the colonial administrations, both in the north and the south, to work as stipend mediators between the clans for the colonial powers (Walls, 2014). Barre wanted to rid both the clan and religious connotations attached to the word and instead applied the Somali word ‘Nabad doon’, Peace seeker, in its place. The role, however, was the same. A barber from the Gabooye collective recalls this period and stated that:

Siyaad Barre introduced that “Jalle” is your brother/sister. “Jalle is your brother/sister” was used to erase the usage of the word Midgan. So, Siyaad Barre said that we are all brothers and sisters and a people so if you are to call someone say “Jalle” and that replaced “Walaal”, you understand now? (Interviewee 1, 2018)

For this respondent, the introduction of ‘Jalle’ was not only used to create a sense of ‘brotherhood’ and unity among the citizens but it was also a way for members of the minority communities like the Gabooye in the north or the Bantu or Gosha in the south to instead experience a process of identity formation that was based on nation-belonging instead of the traditional discursive mechanism of clan-belonging. From this statement it is therefore argued here that ‘Jalle’, or ‘Comrade’ was preferred by marginalised groups as these words stored a sense of ‘invitation’ to belong rather than separation, when compared to the common derogatory words, such as “Midgan” or “Jareer” that were used. ‘Jalle’ elucidated a wider social tie and connection with the rest of Somali society. The same respondent insisted that members from the Gabooye collective during Barre’s leadership were invited, included and a part of the political and social order as:

[...] the law was that we are all equal however despite that bribes and corruption was all over Africa but if we are to talk about governance during Siyaad Barre’s time, the five highest officers, during the time he was in charge of the government, the clans were a part of that and so were we (Interviewee 1, 2018).

A crucial part of the process of inclusion was the high political positions given by Barre to Mohamed Ali Samatar, a member of the Tumal. Samatar, who had supported Barre in the coup, came to be the Vice president of the Republic of Somalia, Minister of Defence
and later the Prime Minister. Other members of the Gabooye collective were also given prominent positions within the government and other institutions. A female member of the Gabooye collective held that the Gabooye were respected and supported during Barre’s leadership:

“They had their people represented in the Government and the Parliament” (Interviewee 36, 2018).

Having political representation, in line with recognition on the basis of citizenship, and not contingent on clan, through “Jalle” and economic distribution, was a major change for the Gabooye in their otherwise fixed status order as it allowed for members from the collective to experience a potential implementation of their participatory parity for the first time in Somali history. As mentioned by Fraser, political representation is key in the achievement of both recognition and redistribution. And political representation in a kinship-based society, where customary charters regulate economic, political and social activities becomes especially crucial. Within this framework, it is difficult to gain recognition or redistribution if you are not included in the initial process of delineation and “the rules of the game”. In this context, members from the Gabooye were allowed to enter the space of front room performance, and through that they could participate in the formal state-run processes. However, not all respondent shared the same memory of Barre’s inclusion of the minority groups as optimistic. One civil servant, representative of the Tumal, said:

“Siyaad Barre, really, he increased the hate people had for us. This hate he increased. And why? Well because he used us. He made us people he could take advantage of” (Interviewee 17, 2018).

It was further stated by the respondent that:

“[…]” minorities were everywhere, they were... were made into spies that were working for the military regime” (Interviewee 17, 2018).
Another respondent, not a member of the Gabooye collective but a political activist and current employee of the Somaliland government, agreed with the above statement and claimed that Barre’s tactics in including the minorities and burying the clan were only artificial. He also claimed that Barre’s policies for equality and unity was only skin deep and that they did not exist in reality:

That was just artificial, that was not a discourse where the Somali agreed that we have the state, the clan must die, the clan must disappear, that was not actually an evolution that came from the society, that was a more political agenda that did not work even in itself, in that period (Interviewee 42, 2018).

Despite Barre’s modernisation efforts, the changes in the economy and the social relations, there were resistance from various segments of the public. As previously mentioned, there was tension between the regime and the religious institutions, however, there was also an increasing tension between the regime and the clans, specifically the northern clans (Balthasar, 2018; Walls, 2014). Despite the attempts. Barre’s tactics did not bring about any actual change when it came to the reach of the clan. In fact, it is suggested that while Barre was condemning clan in the public eye, he was strengthening his own clan affiliation. It was particularly believed that Barre was strengthening his own clan family, a mix of both his paternal clan side, his maternal clan side and family allies, by building a coalition referred to as the MOD, short for Mareehan, Ogadeen and Dhulbahante (Balthasar, 2018; Walls, 2014). It is also argued that Barre also recruited members from smaller sub-clans and as well as from outcast clan groups such as the Gabooye in his coalition. The northern territories, mainly inhabited by clans from the Isaaq and Issa clan family, felt side lined and marginalised, politically and economically, by Barre’s leadership and his support for the MOD reinforced their belief that Barre was only using the anti-clan rhetoric as a method to gain access to, as well as secure, resources. During 1977-1978, Barre had abandoned the anti-clan rhetoric and instead resorted to a nepotistic patron-like governance that installed members from his own clan family into the government (Balthasar, 2018: Walls, 2014). In this process he rid the civil service sector of the government of all its Isaaq members.
However, one respondent said that Barre’s leadership and clan favouritism did not introduce the usage of kinship relations as a means for allocating resources; that system was already in place. Instead, the respondent supposed, that what northern clans were contesting was Barre’s commitment in disrupting the traditional functions of the clan system. The new way of life, as introduced by Barre is argued here to have been more challenging for the northern clans as they have historically been more conservative and thus reliant on traditional systems of governing their pastoral way of life. The northern clans therefore wanted a return to the traditional ways of governance where Somali social relations were once again regulated by the Xeer and as such a system that would better benefit them (Interviewee 42, 2018).

Another recurring topic, both in formal and informal conversations with respondents, was in relation to the establishment of the Somali National Movement (SNM) and the Gabooye’s involvement in the war and in the bombing of Hargeysa in the outbreak of the civil war in 1988. Some respondents, non-members of the Gabooye collective, asserted that the inequality that members of the Gabooye are faced with in contemporary Somaliland is due to a lingering resentment of their involvement in the Barre regimes killing of members of the Isaaq clan in Somaliland. For instance, a respondent claimed that:

[…] people in Somaliland (the Isaaq) think that the Barre government committed crimes against them and that the minorities (the Gabooye) were part of that system, allied with the Barre regime (Interviewee 27, 2018).

The specified attack on the northern clans, specifically the Isaaq, led to the killings of over 40 000- 50 000 civilians, the death of 10 000 SNM members, the relocation of 400 000 to neighbouring Ethiopia and the displacement of 1.5 million others (The Africa Watch Committee, 1990: World Peace Foundation, 2015). This event is referred to in Somaliland as “Xasuuqi iyo Duqayntii Somaliland”, “the genocide and bombing of Hargeysa”. The data from both target groups suggests that it is commonly supposed among a majority of the Isaaq, that while Barre ordered the full-scale attack on Hargeysa as a way to cripple the insurgency of the growing SNM faction, the attack was in fact operated on the ground by the Gabooye through the SNA and the guidance of Ali Samatar, the Ministry of
Defence and Tumal member. The Gabooye’s loyalty to the Barre regime may to an extent explain the current low status order of the Gabooye, yet it does not necessarily explain why members from other clan groups like the Gadabursi, Warsangeli or the Ogaadeen, whom also were on the side of the Barre regime, are not excluded to the same extent as the Gabooye in Somali society? Instead, the resentment towards Gabooye further strengthens the idea that while the Gabooye may have sided with Barre, their status order among the Isaaq would not have changed and that statements claiming otherwise can be viewed as an excuse to continue the exclusion of this group in society and in further limiting their participatory parity. What is a more feasible explanation for this context, however, is that the Gabooye’s alignment with the Barre regime was a strategy that was needed, as an act of survival in a time when there was a clear uncertainty in the traditional way of kinship relations and alliances. Or in the uncertainty of belonging and dependence. As mentioned, the system of patronage, or the Boon, with the majority clan groups has historically been applied by minority groups in the Somali context in order to gain better protection as well as access to material resources On this, the former diplomat held:

If a clan is suppressed and discriminated then they find another one that is stronger than the clan that was oppressing them. They align themselves with that force that they think will win so most of these clans they aligned themselves with the government. Forcing them to commit these atrocities and this kind of suppressions against other clans (Interviewee 29, 2018)

This could explain the extent to which the Gabooye went in trying to “belong” by attaching themselves to the military government, however it also indicates an extent of dependency, as that level of belonging is only reliant on the “master’s” acceptance, hence the dominated is dependent of the mercy of his master, in this case the mercy of President Barre. However, it does not give much of an explanation to why the Gabooye are reliant on cohesion as a form of strategy for belonging to begin with. Yet, Hall writes that the view of the subject, being single and stable, has changed with the transformative nature of modernity. Instead, the projection and interaction with the cultural world are making for identities that are fragmented and sometimes multiple and problematic (Hall, 1996). Identities are also movable, contradictory, not essential or permanent. They are also formed and transformed in relation to how we as subjects are represented and viewed in
the cultural systems that we are a part of. Similar to Marx’s theory on how human beings embody history as a practice and connect it to their current reality, Hall argues that identities are historically defined (Hall, 1996).

While Barre’s motives for restructuring the rule of law may have been questionable, and his rhetoric and tactics fragmented, he did restructure the very core of Somali rule of law and according to Balthasar, such restructuring was not all negative (Balthasar, 2018). Barre managed to disconnect, to an extent, the clan system, and Islamic rulings from state governance. However, this was not welcomed by the clan elders or the religious leaders (Balthasar, 2018: Walls, 2014). Samatar adds that while Barre attempted to dismantle the clan system that was in place, by restructuring the rule of law and the discourse of the clan, he in fact maintained the class system as the ruling petty bourgeoisie actually operated within the state structure as clan identity became the main tool for manipulating and consolidating political and economic mobilisation, both by the clan leaders and the military regime (Samatar, 1989a: Samatar, 1992: Kusow, 1994: Elmi, 2010).

Yet the impact the Barre regime had on the mindset of the Somali people, throughout the peninsula, is noteworthy here. Barre’s leadership involved a socialist remodelling of Somali society and as mentioned earlier, the modernisation project did not completely contest Islam. It did, however, place restrictions on the bearings of clan identity and while the clan ideology managed to reinforce its reach, the Barre regime and the modernisation project challenged the old institutions, clan and religion, and this was welcomed by the majority of the citizens. Additionally, the government formalised the Somali alphabet and introduced programmes that allowed for better educational access for its citizens, especially women and minorities, as well as providing jobs for the urban unemployed and the youth. The regime also introduced laws and policies, both formal and informal, that gave women and minorities improved agency in both the political, economic, and social arenas. Areas where they had been excluded in the past. Yet in the end, Barre could not stand against the power of the clan and instead he fully resorted to the clan and clan identity as a means of power, dividing and conquering.
As stated by both Adam and Samatar, Barre’s ideology was not coherent as it was too reliant on a rather unique merger of Islam, clannism and social sentiments (Adam, 1995: Samatar, 1989a). These configurations created confusion and did not organise the masses as intended. Again, Barre’s two-way approach, that is shifting the Somali institutions from clan and religion to the state, falls in line with Gramsci’s theory on ideology and hegemony. Barre created a state-wide class that constituted the Marxist idea of the superstructure and within this superstructure Barre tried to reframe the belief system of the base. This was done by invoking restrictions on the core institutions such, as clan and religion, as they regulate language, law, education, media, production, norms as well as trade.

Laitin (1982), a scholar on Somali studies, has employed the theories of Gramsci on the nineteenth century Yorubaland during British imposition. Accordingly, Laitin understands hegemony as a way of political forging, either through elite bargaining or coercion (Laitin, 1982). While Laitin studies on hegemony focused on the Yoruba there are relevant similarities in how changes in one sub-system leads to changes in the overall social systems (Laitin, 1982). The study on the Yoruba highlights how the British used mechanisms of hegemony to change the political system by coercing ancestral forms of politics on a populace that were also adhering to Islamic and/or Christian values (Laitin, 1982). This way of coercing of an alternative politics is argued by Laitin as domination, a means of controlling the populace, and as previously discussed, the same mechanism of political forging and thus coercion occurred during the British imposition of Somaliland. However, the interesting point here is how Barre utilised the same mechanism of political forging and elite bargaining during his post-colonial leadership. Though, instead of relying on clan, Barre used a political ideology, Scientific Socialism, as the main forging mechanism. Barre’s structural changes for the Somali people were all too many, and I agree with Adam and Samatar that they were brought on too soon, as they backfired quickly and accordingly the possibility for establishing a framework for the principle of participatory parity for the Gabooye collective fell with that.
Following the arguments made in the above section, I have traced the following changes in the political economy of the then Democratic Republic of Somalia that are held to have affected the principle of participatory parity of the Gabooye. These changes are held to have restructured the ‘Rules of the mind’ and thus modified the Somali identity by promoting one singular identity, regulated and governed by the state. These events include:

i. Artificial social cohesion through;
ii. Restriction of socio-cognitive elements such as language and social norms by;
iii. Strengthening unified Somaliness through a singular state identity.

Tracing changes
Somali Political Economy between 1969-1988

Figure 6: Timeline over changes in Somali Political Economy

The four blocks in Fig. 6 illustrate the identified traced changes that are argued to have affected the principle of Participatory Parity during 1969-1988. The two first blocks, C1 and C2 illustrate how the Barre leadership used domination to promote ideology and thus gain hegemony, as theorised by Gramsci. This was further utilised to dismantle the post-independent Somali nation state and rebuild it according to a socialist imagery by first restructuring the ‘Rules of the game’, that is altering the core Somali institutions promoting plurality of identity, such as the clan and Islam by invoking changes such as the new Rule of law, and then by restructuring the ‘Rules of the mind’ by modifying the social order and hence the Somali identity through social cohesion, to adhere to an imagined singular identity.

The changes illustrate the events that transformed the political economy of Somalia, yet they also highlight how the window of opportunity, which is argued to have been strongest between C1 and C3, for realising the principle of participatory parity in the end
was co-opted by Barre’s two-folded state-making approach. It is held that due to a lack of coherent strategies for social cohesion the Barre regime failed in unifying the Somali populace under the rubrics of equality and instead clan ideology, where resource allocation and competition is its intersubjective goal, came to win. Accordingly, the lack of coherent social cohesion, due to clan resurfacing as the main feature of Somali social relations did not bring equality in the form of participatory parity to members of minorities, such as the Gabooye collective but also other groups like the Gosha and the Bantu, as their status of Sab in relations to the Samaale clan groups continued to place them outside of the traditional clan lines. Hence, their claims for justice were not incorporated into the imaginary for justice and independence and thus the principle of participatory parity, which is reliant on interacting in society as peers and being able to participate in society on equal terms, was affected.

Consequently, the identified changes that occurred during the traced timeline are meant to adhere to the main structures outlined in the framework. That is, Maldistribution, Misrecognition and Misrepresentation. However, they do not follow a chronological order. Moreover, as there is no fourth structure in the adapted framework, the fourth change stands alone, however it is held as in important structure of change that have come to affect the overall implementation of participatory party for the Gabooye collective.
6.3 Social Justice Framework: Claims and pathways to Justice in contemporary Somaliland

(T) Transformative
(A) Affirmative

Figure 7: Social Justice Framework

The framework illustrates the three structures (S₁, S₂, S₃) of the Principle of Participatory Parity that were adapted from Fraser’s original framework; misrecognition, maldistribution, and misrepresentation. The framework is employed in this section to analyse the identified political and socio-economic arrangements that affected the Participatory parity of Gabooye clan members, by analysing claims to justice made, in relation to the three structures of inequality, and how, or if, those have been influenced by the aforementioned changes in the political economy during 1969-1988. In line with Fraser, the adapted framework in its theoretical form supports transformative changes and claims over affirmative however, the adapted framework will be altered accordingly to the respondents’ claims when the analysis is completed. Yet, misrecognition as a form of inequality is explored in the supposed theoretical framework in the status order of
subordination among clan and sub-clans. To reach Participatory parity along this structure it is assumed that transformative remedies must be designed to deconstruct the structure of clan identity rather than reification of group identity. In deconstructing the status model of clan subordination, we can change the cultural value pattern without dismissing the other two structures. While the status order of clan subordination is rooted in the socio-cultural structure of society, subordination based on class is based in the economic structure. However, both status orders convene in the political structure.

6.3.1. Misrecognition: Clan destruction through exogamy and Islamic identity

In Fraser’s framework, misrecognition, as a form of injustice is based on a cultural value pattern, was constructed by deconstruction and differentiation (Fraser, 1996: Fraser and Honneth, 2003). Fraser used misrecognition to illustrate the two different claims that can be redressed within this structure: the affirmative claim where group reification of their distinctive group identity is the ultimate goal and the transformative claim which seeks to destroy the generative framework adopted within the cultural value patterns (Fraser and Honneth, 2003). In the adapted framework for this research, the structure of misrecognition is constructed by clan as the overarching cultural symbol and hence clan deconstruction and clan differentiation function as the main analytical pathways. Here clan is understood as a form of status recognition, yet the question is to what extent clan identity can function as a tool for recognising status. Findings in the data state that respondents, who identified as a member of the Gabooye collective, are experiencing inequality due to their clan affiliation. Of this a young male respondent said:

The clan system is what has taken away my equality and my rights today, and it gave it away to somebody else. I am man that is a member of the Gabooye clan group (Interviewee 13, 2018).

Secondly, the findings indicate that nearly all of the individuals interviewed from the primary target group are looking for redistributive and representative justice over recognition as a means for gaining justice. It was held by the respondents from this group that there is no need for recognition for a particular identity as they are Somali and most
importantly Muslim. When asked about the type of justice claims sought in this structure, one respondent from the Muuse Dheriyo sub-clan said:

No, the recognition we want is about equal rights, we are Somalis, we are from Somaliland, we are a Muslim community. Same colour, same language, same culture, same religion, no difference. So, despite us being that similar, I still do not have my rights. So, everything you have rights to, since we are equal, whatever you need, I need. Whatever you have right to, I have right to as well. So, despite us being similar (equal) I do not have my rights, but you have yours. But mine is missing (Interviewee 13, 2018).

However, gaining recognition through one’s Muslim identity is recognised as difficult for members of the Gabooye community, as the findings indicate that their Muslim identity comes under scrutiny and is viewed as less important due to the strong presence of hate discourse that suggest that they, the occupational groups, have an unholy (un-Islamic) and hence polluting origin. The main narrative suggesting such is linked to that of a Gabooye ancestor eating an animal that was not slaughtered according to Islamic tradition. This is a well-known tale in Somaliland, and it is usually given as the standard explanation to why the Gabooye are an outcast group. The story, as told by a non Gabooye member, goes:

The inequality and the exclusion that this community is faced with is not because of what happened during Siyaad Barres time or Silaanyo’s regime or Somaliland, this is all culture. Governments change, no problem, but it is culture. The culture that was manifested during that time, that claims that there was two men going on a long journey and they were hungry and searching for food and so they ate the dead animal. When they reached the city, one of them threw up the dead animal and the other did not. Why would he do that? The food had already passed through his body. That’s why it is claimed that this community is different and then the Somalis said, well if they ate the dead animal then we should distance them and not marry from them (Interviewee 13, 2018).
Other well-known narratives on the origin of the Gabooye, as well as the name “Midgan”, which is considered a derogatory name in contrast to the name Gabooye, include the following:

This clan was the Gabooye, or the Midgo, they were very powerful, and they used to kill those under them. The other clans that were oppressed got together and decided to fight back. These stories claim that God is not on the side of the oppressor but in favour of the smaller oppressed groups. So, these groups, that we know today as the bigger groups, fought back and won over the Gabooye, some they killed and some they captured and put in confinement. They were starving them, they planned not to give them water or anything. So, every day one of the Gabooye were dying so they would say “today someone broke”

Yet the narrative suggesting their un-holy ancestry is the most established one. However, members from the Gabooye have a different narrative when describing their own origin and history. Most of the respondent from the Gabooye collective were more versed to discuss the Gabooye history from their assumed positions as hunters:

The Gabooye, this community, in the beginning it was a rural community living in the Door, living by nature. They were hunters and they would make things so they would make a spear and holster, a person would carry the spear and the holster on the back and this the little holster for the spear was called Gabooye. You understand right? That holster called Gabooye became the name people would use to describe them. For example, the man carrying the Gabooye. So, the name came from that. It is not a name that is used for lineage. (Interviewee 13, 2018)

One respondent claimed that the lineage of minority clans, such as the Tumal, is the same as that of the Dir clan, the Biyomal:

There are four brothers... (…) Four brothers are from the same father, Mal. Tumal, Somal, which is Somali, Biyomal and Bajumal. These four were brothers and they came from Mal. Mal is Mal Morbadhle, Maradhere and Hoshal/r. These four were brothers, the eldest was Tumal. Tumal, Somal, Biyomal and Bajumal, that is Tumal. (Interviewee 17, 2018).

In Somal this translates to “Mid baa goay”, ‘Midgo’ for short.
The respondent continued:

 [...] now they are called Biyomal Bin Ahmed but... you can call them whatever, but I am telling you the origin. It was before Islam, before Judaism and before Christianity. They were dynasties. Twelve dynasties, or kingdoms, were run by Tumals, starting from Tumal starting from Tima carro Tucalebuleh. There are twelve kings and a queen from Tumal. Tumal, long story short, Somal became stronger and defeated the government of Tumal and during that era, when they were ruling the country, they were melting iron, iron used to be melted here. Iron and Ore. The second ones, which are Yibro, they were related with Moses, a Jew. The word Yibir, you remember? The language which the Jews speak is Hebrew and they thought what they were saying was Yibir. Yibir means Hebrew, it is the language. (Interviewee 17, 2018)

A female respondent however, claimed that the origin and lineage of the Gabooye is actually causally linked to that of the Isaaq. It was held that:

The history is the same. Isaaq and Gabooye came to the country at the same time. The same way as the Isaaq went one way, we also went one way. We are both descendants from two elders. Sheikh Saxad and Sheikh Muuse. So, each group comes from somewhere. For instance, now, like Asha, Ibado and Awralo, all of those groups have united now, but they have the same father and the same father also divides them. Hawle for instance, that's a Jigjiga family, and Wardhere they are from Dagaxbur, they come from there. Muuse are from here. Madhiban are found all the way between Buuhoodle to Einabo. (Interviewee 36, 2018)

All these statements suggest that there are different stories on the origin of the minority groups in Somaliland, however, the statements also highlight that most respondents from the Gabooye collective do wish for a less fragmented collective identity. Due to the fragmented state of the collective identity, it is therefore widely held by most respondents that a better appreciation of their Muslim identity and for Islam to be the leading ideology in society, instead of the current clan focused, could provide such an identity and hence a better status in society. However, the same female respondent attested to the shifting placement between clan and religion in society by saying:

Now, within in Somaliland, the clan is stronger than the religion because people still believe in the clan ideology and culture and religious ideology is placed lower, so, that is why culture is above religion. (Interviewee 36, 2018).
While Islam could prove to be the solution in overcoming the fragmentation, clan is the continued obstacle in overcoming it. Some respondents believed that the Gabooye would benefit from specific group rights in the form of affirmative action as they cannot compete with members from the Issaq due to their lack of resources and the importance clan affiliation plays in the establishment of social relations. For instance, it was said by one respondent that affirmative action, in relation to education, is necessary as a way to support marginalised groups:

The leaders must give these people affirmative action, that they address them separately, give them scholarship programmes, education support, financial support, in many areas, to forward their human capital, education and empower them as a people. If we look at justice, still they are not accessing the justice as equals. (Interviewee 14, 2018).

However, most of the respondents from the Gabooye collective gave transformative claims as the main pathway in gaining participatory parity. The main suggestion to such a transformation was held to be intermarriage. It was held that allowing exogamy between the Issaq and the Gabooye would lead to the deconstruction of clan identity. On the challenges facing the Gabooye collective, one male respondent held that endogamy was the biggest obstacle:

You cannot intermarry and if you do intermarry, there will be big problems. These communities, the majority clans do not allow their girls to marry them or that they marry girls from them. And if it happens and they have a child, it is very problematic and most of the times violence is involved. Because of it the two people will face a lot of difficulty and even if they are allowed, they will be marginalised or discriminated. If a girl marries a man from that community she is not counted for anymore. (Interviewee 42, 2018).

Because of fear of violence, and at times even the risk of death, for their children, especially young girls, parents from the Gabooye collective advise their children not to engage with the Issaq.
One female respondent, from the Gabooye collective, said that:

Marriage is by one’s own luck regardless of how happy it makes you, but marriage between Isaaq and Gabooye is done with carefulness because there is violence involved if that happens – they fight each other if that happens. Well, our girls do not marry Isaaq men, but our men marry Isaaq women. And even then, they experience violence and abuse. And when they are together, and it can be a woman that is an outcast and then it becomes an issue for us, so we stay clear of it. (Interviewee 36, 2018)

A younger female respondent from the Ciidaagale clan group, an Isaaq sub clan, mentioned the challenges of exogamy when asked about the visibility of inequality in Somaliland. The respondent said:

If I was to say to my family that I wanted to marry a Gabooye man they would kill me. (Interviewee 58, 2018).

The same respondent mentioned that she did not know about the origin of not marrying with the Gabooye, but she understood that it was culture and not religion as religion permits exogamy:

From a religious perspective there is no one that opposes it but from a cultural perspective it is not allowed. It does not matter what I say, today my family will not believe it, that I want to marry that man, they will not allow it. Although the religion is not against it; the culture does not allow it. (Interviewee 58, 2018).

Many respondents from both target groups suggested that endogamy was the biggest obstacle to gaining participatory parity. Members from both target groups also commended the staged wedding that occurred in the Somali territory of Ethiopia during the summer of 2017. According to the respondents, Abdirahman Iley, the then president of the Somali region of Ethiopia, arranged for a big wedding between members of the Gabooye and the Oromo clan group. The event supposedly included a total of 60 individuals where 30 were Gabooye women and 30 were Oromo men:
It happened a while ago in Jigjiga and the president that just left arranged for a big wedding and he made an investment, he built houses and he made jobs and he said that those two that want to marry each other, given consent, can marry and then he arranged for the marriage. He gave them income, built houses and he married 30 families. So, the government plays a role in this community and the community has a role. The role of the government is to help the community overcome the difficulties and for the government to come up with an equitable agenda on intermarriage, the Ministry of Religion should put forward this agenda and state that from this day on this issue is behind us and whoever is seen going against it is a sin” (Interviewee 13, 2018)

Yet some respondents remained suspicious of such an act:

It is possible, but the story has been twisted. So, this man Iley, he married minority girls and boys and he made them interact as he brought together this many girls from this clan and this man boys from this clan and married them. But others then twisted the story by saying that the ones that were married were all from the same clan and no other clans were involved. So, I myself, I do not know anyone in Jigjiga and I have not spoken to anyone from there, because you know you try and investigate when you want to believe something but this I am not sure I believe it (Interviewee 55, 2018).

The statements regarding the big wedding in Jigjiga have proven difficult to confirm as there are no official documents attesting to the event taking place. However, the importance an event where marriage between two clan groups such as the Ogaadeen and the Gabooye, would have on the overall advancement of recognition, through exogamy as a transformative remedy, for the Gabooye collective is not lost here.
6.3.2. Clan and class identity in Somaliland: The dynamics of identity politics

When asked about the importance of clan, in relation to that of the state or religion, many of the respondents interviewed agreed that clan identity is the prominent locus of both Somali history and identity. However, one respondent asserted that Somalis are in constant conflict with their Somali identity, especially the part that interconnects with clan as:

“[… ] ”the double moral is there in Somali personality. Because they do not like the clan but otherwise you cannot live in society without accepting these unwritten laws. (Interviewee 29, 2018).

Consequently, while it is acknowledged that the clan system is problematic, it is also understood that there is a need for the clan, both its anthropological feature, in terms of lineage and history, but also from a practical aspect:

You cannot defend yourself by yourself, you cannot defend your dignity, you cannot defend your property or your family by yourself. There must be some kind of force that you are a part of. If the state is strong enough to do all those things for you, then you don’t need it. (Interviewee 29, 2018).

What this explains is that the contradiction, or inconsistence, that exists between morality and ethics within the fields of moral philosophy and contemporary critical theory, through the concepts of Moralität and Sittlichkeit, is also present within the Somali experience on clan and identity. If we recall Fraser’s argument on the status model of recognition, Kant’s Moralität was held in a higher regard than Hegel’s Sittlichkeit (Fraser and Honneth, 2003). According to Fraser, whom throughout her work has distanced herself form Hegel and contemporary Hegelians, like Honneth, the philosophy of Hegel is “[…].” promoting substantive ends of self-realization and the good life as opposed to the “rightness” of procedural justice“( Fraser and Honneth: 2003:10). Kant’s Moralität, however, is symbolised through deontological ethics and the categorical imperative, which are, according to Fraser, better components for the realisation of justice by making normative claims that are universally binding (Fraser and Honneth, 2003; Zurn, 2003). Yet Fraser’s framework brings the two together in an effort to avoid having to choose between, as put by Zurn (2003), “[…] the distribution of rights and resources to be a
matter of deontological justice and recognition of identity to be a matter of qualitative ethical evaluation” (Zurn, 2003: 524).

In the Somali context, the above account from the former diplomat illustrates the extent to which Hegel’s *Sittlichkeit* is ingrained in the Somali way of life and how the ‘ethical order’, through the intersubjective application of clan identity, is constantly procreated as the strongest mechanism for the promotion of the good life and thus recognition. The pursuit of the “good life” could be argued as one of the reasons to why there was such a resistance from some segments of the population, such as religious groups and clan factions like the SNM, to the changes that occurred during 1969-1988. According to Hegel, ‘the Right’ is found in the ‘Geist’, in the cultural and immaterial (Hegel, 1807/1979). Hegel’s understanding of the Right corresponds rather well with clan ideology as he argued that universal ethics, *Sittlichkeit*, can only be found within the realm of the immaterial, such as culture, family and in some cases the state. Recognition for Hegel is, as previously mentioned, reliant on the intersubjective cognition of others, as the spirit can only know itself in relation to what others think (Hegel, 1807/1979: Khair, 2017). Recognition in the clan context, I would argue, necessitates that you are to an extent only recognised as a person through your clan identity. The other form of recognition is reliant on your relation to Islam. Hence, the mechanism of self-realisation is indeed intersubjective in the Somali context and therefore it highlights the importance of why the clan holds such an integral position within Somali identity making.

Furthermore, Hegel’s writings on Islam imply that he supposed Islamic monotheism to be the purest form of universality, when compared to the tribal elements found in both Judaism and Christianity (Khair, 2007). Interestingly enough, Hegel did write about the ‘Revolution of the East’, as a response to a time period when the ‘West’ was moving towards a more particular spiritual world rather than a unified one, such as the *Tawhid*, that was promoted in the East. Hegel wrote:

[...] the Revolution of the East, which destroyed all particularity and dependence, and perfectly cleared up and purified the soul and disposition; making the abstract One (God) the absolute object of attention and devotion, and to the same extent pure subjective consciousness- the Knowledge of this One alone – the only aim of reality:
Hegel is at the centre of critique for Fraser, yet it is, according to Lauer (2012), arguable whether Fraser’s understanding of Hegel is too narrowly framed as Hegel did in fact promote a union of elements from both morality and ethics (Lauer, 2012). Furthermore, morality, as a principle of justice is not absent in Hegel’s work, as often implied by Fraser (Lauer, 2012). Instead, it is constantly clarified that both morality and ethics are equally important components of justice. Nonetheless, the biggest issue Fraser has with the politics of recognition that has adhered from Hegel’s philosophy is the placement of recognition as the core of justice (Fraser and Honneth, 2003). For Fraser, a theory of recognition, viewed as a claim for justice, should not involve the process of self-realisation as cultural and social conceptions will influence the deontological features of the right (Fraser, 1996: Fraser and Honneth, 2003; Zurn, 2003: Lauer, 2012). Here I do agree with Fraser.

In the later formulations of Hegel’s understanding of particularity and the good life, particularity has been found at the centre stage of Hegel’s Sittlichkeit, as self-realisation is incomparable with universality. This is interesting as Somali society is based on Islam, and therefore so is the Somali clan system, hence connecting Somali clan to Hegel is not as improbable as one would think. For instance, we can apply Hegel in understanding how the promotion of clan identity as the locus of the Somali ‘Geist’ goes in stark contradiction to the Tawhid. While there are valid contradictory elements to the makings of the Somali clan system, in relation to the Tawhid, as well as Hegel’s views on particularity, the norms of both Hegel’s Sittlichkeit, and the ideology behind the Somali clan, are realised on norms of cultural and historical values that are not universally applicable. In agreement with Fraser, I would argue that these norms are only interesting for a particular segment of the population as their values are designed to be preferable to others (Fraser and Honneth, 2003: Lauer, 2012). Fraser opposes the interpretations of Hegel, from Honneth, on how misrecognition, as a form of injustice can only be explained through the lack of subjectivity (Fraser and Honneth, 2003 : Lauer, 2012). This notion suggests that there are only some forms of misrecognition that deserve remedies. These remedies are then reliant on the psychology of those affected by the misrecognition (Fraser and Honneth, 2003: Lauer, 2012).
For Fraser, these judgements imply that the Hegelian recognition model, as promoted by Honneth, overlooks the institutional conditions of misrecognition and instead puts the blame on the ones affected by the misrecognition (Fraser and Honneth 2003). For instance, if the injustice in marginalisation and exclusion, as experienced by members of the Gabooye collective, is active in the psyche of the marginalised and despised minority, then the problem of that marginalisation does not lie in the clan relations of Somali society, but instead in the consciousness of the Gabooye collective. However, if the injustice of that marginalisation is psychological, then the model of recognition, as promoted by Honneth, implies that the Gabooye collective simply need to overcome their trials by whatever means. In other words, they need to “get over it” (Fraser and Honneth, 2003: 31: Lauer, 2012: 5).

What Fraser instead argues for is a realisation of recognition, or misrecognition, as a claim that is reliant on equal opportunity of justice, not a utilitarian scheme where injustices are compared on the best outcome and benefits of those affected and comparative but instead one where all members of a society can pursue individual recognition on equal terms (Burns and Thompson, 2013). This, however, does not suggest that all individuals can be granted equal recognition as the recognition claim under participatory parity is the comparative worth of the person needing recognition (Fraser and Honneth, 2003: Lauer, 2012)

In employing this thinking, it could be argued that the sociological aspects of clan within the Somali identity is the framework that regulates recognition, in its comparative and competitive form, in an undesirable setting. It is here that I am further convinced that the Somali clan ideology corresponds with Hegel’s ethics rather than Kant’s morality. As mentioned, Fraser is not completely discarding Hegel, instead I would argue, in agreement with Lauer, that much of her work on participatory parity could actually directly adhere to Hegel, it is just framed differently and in a twenty-first century context (Lauer, 2012). For instance, both Hegel and Fraser discuss legal status and Fraser’s notion on participatory parity correlates with Hegel’s dialectics of personhood (Lauer, 2012). For Hegel, however, the legal status of a person in an ethical community is reliant on the suspension of divine justice as there is no focus on the individual aspiration of the good (Hegel, 18071 /1979: Lauer, 2012). Hence, in this community everyone is equal as there
are no conflicting value judgments present within that community (Hegel, 1807/1979: Lauer, 2012).

From this, I would further argue that Hegel’s dialectics of personhood correlates with the notion of personhood found in the realisation of the Somali Xeer. Employing Hegel and the formulation of the *Sittlichkeit* could better explain the contradictions on morality and ethics that exists within the Somali clan identity and how its components are correlating to the notion of participatory parity. It also gives a better understanding of the returning claims from many of the respondents, that clan identity is only relevant in presence of a weak state. Meaning, if the state is strong, there is no need for clan and for clan identity as the mechanism for self-realisation and recognition and hence personhood. This was the case during the Barre leadership. The former diplomat adhered to this logic and claimed that:

If the services given by the clan is brought about by the state there will be no need for anyone to depend on his own clan (Interviewee 29, 2018).

Returning to Hegel here would suggest that the idea of personhood during the Barre leadership was altered and thus the extent of self-realisation and recognition, as outlined through the various institutions of recognition such as the Xeer and Islam, was compromised. The changes introduced by Barre included a reshaping of Somali identity and this required a shift in the understanding of Somali identity as separate from clan and the collective of the clan. Identity was instead attached to the collectiveness of the state, under an umbrella of socialism.

At the initial stages of Barre’s leadership, people welcomed the changes and the social cohesion as the state showed to be the provider. However, when the state collapsed, both as a consequence of resistance from clan factions and religious institutions, and in the end Barre’s own preoccupation with maintaining power, the clan could resurface and the formulations of recognition that were once agreed upon during the state control were no longer valid. This meant that the recognition of the marginalised, both women and minority groups, the particular in this context, were disrupted.
6.3.3. Maldistribution: Income redistribution and ‘equal opportunity’

Some respondents, both members of minority and majority clans, asserted that class as a status order that stratifies, and accordingly creates inequality, does not exist in Somali society. Instead, the clan system was held as the underlying reason for all types of inequalities faced by minority groups. These findings suggest that while there is a Somali term for the word class, Dabaqad, it is still challenging to come to terms with an understanding of what class means in the Somali context. A female respondent asserted that:

There is no class system in Somaliland now, it is only clan. The class, where there are different structures, does not exist. It’s only this and that family (Interviewee 36, 2018).

However, regarding the relationship between clan and class and the extent to which class characteristics are present within the clan system, another respondent said:

That’s is about how the clan’s perceptions and their beliefs but it’s more about livelihoods and jobs. For example, if people are divided into groups of classes, economically, you can say it’s a class, but this is not a division based on economy. It is a division based on provision or occupation. And you know for some clans, there some people who have this work or that occupation but it’s not something that is related to economy (Interviewee 27, 2018).

Here there seems to be a disconnect in linking class with occupation. Others, however, understood class and its placement as a real and visible form of social formation in Somaliland but that it is a formation that is unique to Somali society and therefore quite different from class formations anywhere else. A respondent held that:

It is completely different because that class is based on the economy, you know, the status they’ve had for many years, but here If I am Isaaq for instance, I can say if you are small clan, I can say you are lower than me and that is the perceptions in the Somalis existence. If you come from a big clan, the whole small clans are under you, so they can never compete with you, anywhere. (Interviewee 42, 2018).
The same respondent explained that the Somali class system is different from the European class as it is a system based on kinship relations and spatial authority, through practices like the Deegan. The respondent continued and maintained:

That perception exists here, you know, that class, is spatial, not the status of how much or the amount of money you have, like the maybe European class (Interviewee 42, 2018).

However, another understood class to be linked to hierarchy and status with different tiers or groups. A higher, a middle and a lower tier or group. It was held that:

Well, in the past it was clan based and the clan was a name. But now it has changed, and it has become class. For example, since we are talking about Somaliland, we have the middle clan group and they are known as the Isaaq. The middle clan group means the Isaaq (Interviewee 13, 2008)

Another respondent asserted that the issue of class in Somaliland, understood as a system that is based on different groups of people having differing access to resources, will become a problem for the future of the country:

That is another thing that will be more clear now in the next decade, inequality of access. There is a class developing in Somaliland, sort of a class formation and you foresee the class. So, there are people who really cannot survive and get maybe, less than a 1 dollar a day and people who have a huge amount of money (Interviewee 54, 2018).

The respondent continued with saying:

I foresee the class problem. You know, in schools today, the public ones, there is zero quality in education and they are free. People send their children to the private schools which is high in the costs and they are getting… it was said yesterday that the top ten students came from the Nurudiin School, private. Who can have access to that schools? Only those people that have money and good income. So, in ten years we will be having people that have access to the knowledge and people who cannot and when that generation comes to rule this country, for sure there will be class problems and I am giving ten years, maximum twenty years and it will really really be a big problem. If there is no policy today
to change that trend but there is the option to change. (Interviewee 54, 2018).

While it is obvious that there are conflicting and varied views from the respondents on the meaning of class in Somaliland, the majority of the respondents did however agree that there is a hierarchal system in place, one that is separate from the clan system yet a system that functions within the functions of the clan system. For instance, on the basis of occupation, members of the Gabooye collective have historically been franchised into a specific type of occupation. This implies that their occupational status is pre-determined due to their clan identity. A young female non-minority member said that:

You are told that the barbers are from the Gabooye, they are the only ones that do that. The shoemakers are Gabooye and the women that circumcise new-borns are Gabooye, the metalworkers are Gabooye. That is all I know that they have these separate occupations and that was given to them, and it is held that it is only for them and that they are discriminated because of it (Interviewee 56, 2018)

While this statement groups the members of the different occupations under the name Gabooye, the occupations are further divided along sub-groupings within the Gabooye collective. For instance, as previously mentioned, the barbers are most often from the Muuse Dheriyo group. The metal workers are Tumal and those that provide traditional services such as circumcision are often from the Yibir-Anas group. The different groups of the collective have different occupations and it is rare that a member from one group carries out the jobs entitled for another group. For instance, Muuse Dheriyo doing metal work or circumcision. Yet it was held by many of the respondents that an individual from any of the groups can move up the hierarchy in terms of status, from poor to rich. However, one’s placement and movement in the clan system is fixed regardless of one’s movement up the hierarchal status ladder. Yet this may only be applicable to members of the Gabooye collective that engage in an occupation that is somewhat included in the overall economy. It is, however, understood that this is not the case for the Yibir-Anas, whose economic activity is predominantly found in the informal sector as well as the fact that their economic activity is far less active than other groups within the collective, as their extent of occupation is reliant on the need of such services by other clan members. I
would still argue here that class, as a system of stratification, is visible in Somaliland society, as the clan structure and the politicisation of the clan system functions with the makings of a status order that follows the characteristics of class. I do however agree with the majority of the respondents that, on a discursive level, class as a concept for understanding inequality and status order is not as established as that of the clan system.

While Samatar did set out to establish an understanding of the different Somali classes, it is still a huge task that would benefit from further exploration, one that the scope of this thesis cannot undertake and reach in all its complexity, yet an exercise worth exploring. In attempting such an endeavour, I would, in line with Samatar, argue that a Marxian understanding of the concept of class is valid in providing a theory, or a base, of class in Somali society, and how inequality manifests within the various parameters of such a system, that is not only descriptive but also theoretical. As discussed in Chapter 4, Marx used class to explain a framework for understanding history through social change and conflict. This concept is known as historical materialism and while other scholars have addressed the issue of stratification among different groups in society, such as Weber, Marx specifically used the concept of exploitation to further describe class (Marx, 1867/1995: Marx and Engels, 1848/2002). In opposition to the Weberian tradition, where status groups are given the centrality of analysis, if we recall Marx’s, classes are divided into three distinct groups: The capitalist, the landowners, and the proletariat (Marx, 1867/19951: Marx and Engels, 1848/2002: Olin-Wright, 2001).

For the Somaliland context, such a grouping is complex although evident when analysed closely using the adapted framework. Initially we made the assumption that Somali classes could be described using a Marxist description. Here we adhered to the work of Somali scholar Samatar. However, while Samatar does give a compelling description of Somali classes, it does not explain how contemporary Somaliland is constructed. Perhaps we could further our understanding of Somali social relations, through the contemporary context, by also invoking an approach that includes Weber’s theory on status groups and honour. As previously mentioned, Weber’s definition of classes is reliant on their proximity to property and hence the class situation, that is the market (Weber, 1946). For Weber, those that do not have access to either property or the ability to acquire goods at the market, because of serfdom or slavery, are status groups and not classes (Singh, 2008).
This theory of stratification is contrasting Marx who maintained that there would be a
transition in social relations once serfdom transpired into wage labour in the advent of
capitalism and hence the social formations of any given society would be comprised by
classes (Marx, 1859/1964: Mukherjee, 2000). Furthermore, Weber placed an emphasis on
three forms of power; classes, status and party, to illustrate the social formations of a
society (1946). The dynamics of the clan do indicate that there is a tripartite stratification
system, much like Weber’s suggestion. However, Weber used Status of honour to
describe how status groups, sharing the same markers such as ethnicity, religion or
language, use honour to either include or exclude members (Weber, 1946).

I would argue that Weber’s status of honour is present in the Somali kinship order and
the concept is fitting when describing the Gabooye collective and their experience of
inequality. As an example, the Gabooye are marginalised, and to a real extent despised,
by an act of immoral behaviour, carried out by a historic ancestor, that have dishonoured
them and thus placed them further away from the realm of honour. As indicated by
Gupta and Singh in Chapter 5, this act has placed them in a constant state of pollution as
the status of honour is essentially at matter of judgement of worth; those that are deemed
as having honour are given respect (Singh, 2008). Such as the decedents of the ancestor
that did not eat the polluting animal. As this narrative is repetitively kept alive, the
Gabooye as a group are also consequently kept in a dishonoured position and hence
marginalised in society where their material well-being is controlled by those that keep
perpetuating the narrative suggesting their dishonour.

Combining Marx’s class theory with the status of honour can help us further understand
how clan and class have a causal relation in Somali society. However, this is only true for
the Somaliland context where the findings of this research suggest that Gabooye
collective are viewed to fall between the two different status orders of inequality, clan
and class, and not a suggestion to overlook the causal relationship between the two by
reducing class to status. Having this combination here, however, also allows us to
approach issues based on recognition as a matter of justice and not ethics. For instance,
when recognition, as described by Fraser, is understood in its deontological sense, there
is the possibility of applying universally binding justice claims to gain recognition
(Fraser, 1996; Zurn, 2003: Fraser and Honneth, 2003). When recognition is viewed as an
issue of ethics, this becomes more difficult as the good of the group or individual is in favour of the right. Furthermore, understanding recognition as a deontological issue allows for matters of justice related to status to be redressed an analysed equally rather than being compared to other similar injustices (Fraser, 1996; Zurn, 2003; Fraser and Honneth, 2003) In having this understanding, groups that are struggling for recognition, such as the Gabooye collective, can gain better redress for their claims for fairer material resources. Yet the reality for the Gabooye collective differs than the theory on recognition as a matter of deontology as it is presented by Fraser.

6.3.3.1. A definition of contemporary Somali social relations: The Relationship Between Class, Caste and Clan

Samatar used Marx to describe the Somali classes, however, contemporary Somaliland does not have the four classes described. Mainly as pastoralism is not the main mode of production anymore and the division of labour in contemporary Somaliland is different than that described by both Samatar and Marx. For instance, while the Gabooye can be viewed to be exploited through their experiences of exclusion and marginalisation, they are necessarily not an exploited class per se, at least not more so than any other class in Somali society as are the workers in Marxist theory. This is because the Gabooye, due to their low clan status are usually not employed by one capitalist that procures their produced surplus labour as profit. Instead, the majority of the Gabooye workers are considered to be ‘self-employed’ as they are forced to make a living by doing the types of jobs no one else wants, as these un-clean occupations are tied to being lower in status, hence the little profit generated are usually theirs to keep. Although the profit made goes back to other capitalist entities, as the mode of capitalism would allow it, the reality of the Gabooye worker makes the definition of class more complicated. Yet it is acknowledged that a transition has transpired, as suggested by Marx, where wage labour in the urban context have ended serfdom, understood here as the patron-like relationship (Marx,1859/1964). This gives us an understanding of the Gabooye as a distinct status group within a class system. Given this argument, my understanding of Somali social relations therefore starts with class, understood within a Marxist outline. However, I argue that class as such operates within the lines of the clan system.
The clan system is further understood to align with the previously established definition of the caste system, in so that they are considered similar in theory, through the reducing categories of endogamy, but they differ in context. For instance, through exogamy. Where the caste system puts restrictions on marriage as an act that pollutes, the clan system has traditionally utilised marriage as a way of blurring clan lines and instead create greater clan alliances. However, this is not the case for the Gabooye collective as they are still excluded from the acts of endogamy. In addition, both the caste system and the clan system place individuals in birth ascribed hierarchies and both systems also stratify on the basis of purity and pollution (Mukherjee, 2000: Gupta, 2000: Singh, 2008). Although not applied in the Somali context to the same extent as within the Hindu context, the narrative attached to the Gabooye’s history of eating a polluting animal illustrates their perceived polluting nature and hence further places them in a subordinate position. However, there are differences between the clan and the caste. While some groups within the Hindu caste system rely on ancestral lineage, such as the Brahmans whom like the Samaale trace their lineage to a common fictive ancestor, this is not the common caste practice. As mentioned, exogamy between the clan groups has been applied throughout Somali history as a means of gaining power and hence access to scare resources by all the major Somali clans. Furthermore, the act of food restriction was applied in the past, however this is not an act of restriction that is applied within the contemporary Somali clan system. Placing the Somali clan in relation to the caste system allows us to further understand the acts of misrecognition through power and status honour, as it pertains to the Weberian analysis. Hence, class, status and party are all present within the clan.

Given this, I therefore define the Gabooye collective to be a caste within a kinship-based status order. The reality of the Gabooye fit with some of the categories of reduction and stratification presented earlier by Ghurye. These categories and the data confirm that their experiences of inequality are in most cases, if not all, due to the elements of reduction found in some of these categories. Such as endogamy. However, due to the context of their reality, that is Somali society, the clan ideology is strongly rooted within the social relations of the Gabooye collective, hence they are further defined as a caste within a clan system. For instance, the Gabooye rely on the same process of lineage tracing as the Isaaq clan groups. They utilise the practice of Diya in occurrences of resolution and while they are at the receiving end of endogamy, they apply the same
forms of exogamy practiced amongst the Isaaq to strengthen clan alliances among their own collective.

Nonetheless, while clan and caste, as categories of reduction, exhibit similarities in Somali society, class and clan are however not the same status order, yet they operate simultaneously and dialectically. Where class is mobile, the clan is rigid. A person can be a member of the Gabooye collective and due to circumstances out of their control, such as what clan they are born into, their status is perceived as low. Such a reality for the Gabooye is in line with the Marxist understanding of exploitation. Olin-Wright argues that an individual’s extent of skill exploitation is only in direct accumulation of one’s genetic luck, that is the location within the class system that you are born in to (Olin-Wright, 2005). This corresponds with the Gabooye’s fixed status in the clan hierarchy and how such a stagnant position affects their class mobility.

One respondent confirmed this and said that:

It will not change their status. At the same time, even if he becomes the president of the country, and he is the president of Somaliland, over all the clan families, it will not change anything. (Interviewee 17, 2018).

However, the same person, given enough resources and opportunities, can also be a member of a higher class. During the observation phases of this research, it was noted that some members of the Gabooye collective, albeit very few, did belong to an upper-class tier. These individuals had a better class status due to how well they had performed in the economic sector and their access to capital and employment and through that they would have access to better housing opportunities and accordingly their children would have better access to education. This was also confirmed from interviews with members of the Gabooye collective and a respondent maintained that;

If we look at class, socially and their standard and we look at the stratification, they do not have rich man”. You can tell for instance, Dahabshil, he is from this area and he is from this clan, and he is from Togdheer clan but if you look at class he is part of the highest class, so our community, when you look at class we are lower, the social classes,
we are below the line but when we look at clan then we are marginalised.
(Interviewee 13, 2018).

From this it is understood that the class system is in Somaliland today is more advantageous to members of the Gabooye collective, as it offers better mobility within society and ‘equal opportunity’ than the clan system which is fixed. Moreover, the Somali class system is reliant on one’s ability to access resources and opportunities, an ability which they are denied due to their fixed status within the clan system. Here is where clan and clan affiliation become the causal part of class as a status order. The clan dictates an individuals’ access to resources and ‘equal opportunity’ and accordingly clan thus dictates ones’ class position in Somaliland. Hence, the Gabooye are a caste inside a kinship-based status order, reliant on the functions of the capitalist class system for the realisation of their individual access to redistributive resources and hence recognition and political representation. Here, involvement and representation in the political structure might help members of the Gabooye collective to co-opt the political system, which itself is reliant on clan affiliation, to gain that kind of access.

Another interesting point in understanding the class formation of Somali society and the Gabooye placement, is the class location of the Gabooye in the Somali class hierarchy. The relations of production are being challenged for members of the Gabooye engaged in the labour market, especially for the barbers, shoemakers, and the metal workers. As one respondent said, these members are losing their occupations to economic migrants from Ethiopia, such as the Oromo from Ethiopia and refugees from Yemen and Syria. Because these individuals are in need of employment, and they are not as tainted by the stigma attached to these occupations, they are willing to take whichever job they can get. The growing import industry is also affecting the livelihoods of the Gabooye workers. It is more common in Somaliland today to purchase either second-hand shoes or newly imported shoes from the Gulf countries rather than going to a cobbler for either shoe making or repairing already made shoes. The same goes for the metal workers as a lot more pre-made metal goods are being imported, primarily from China. It is argued here that because their relations to production is being changed then their access to the forces of production, that is the means of production and labour, is being challenged thus ultimately changing their mode of production. However, while the changes in their mode
of production has changed, and ultimately placing the Gabooye worker in a state of uncertainty, it is interesting to ask how their class location is in relation to other groups in society?

As discussed earlier, the Gabooye as a collective may have a low social status but in terms of class relations, some of the Gabooye workers that still own their means of production, to an extent, might actually hold what could be considered a middle-class position, in contrast to, for example, internally displaced peoples and refugees and even some of the poorer Isaaqs. This suggests that there exists an asymmetry between labour and capital as the driver of inequality in Somaliland. For instance, the Gabooye do not usually own land, therefore Olin-Wright’s exclusion principle is fitting here. The exclusion principle is simply based on denying the exploited access to and control over productive resources whilst appropriating their “fruits of labour”, hence it is an ongoing cycle (Olin-Wright, 2005: Jakopovich, 2014). However, Olin-Wright avoids the complexities of Marx’s labour theory of value by using “appropriation of the fruits of labour” instead of surplus value which the labour theory of value equates with labour effort (Marx, 1867/1995: Olin-Wright, 2005: Jakopovich, 2014). I would also argue that it is a cycle of domination that proves the oppressor’s power over the exploited and also the continues the reinforcement of hegemony. Therefore, in the case of the Gabooye collective in Somaliland, they might own their means of production, but it is not necessarily without adding productive labour efforts into the capitalist system and thus to the cycle of exploitation.

Yet another interesting point, about class relations, is the emergence of a middle class in Somaliland. The argument here is not that the Somali middle class is something new, although it is argued that the narrative of that group and the makings of class within the Somali system has been in the background of academic research as focus on explaining Somali society has been from a primordial outline. Rather the argument here is that the assumption of an emergent middle class leading the struggle for justice in Somaliland to be unlikely. As previously mentioned, Marx argued that the base, the workers, would eventually rise and a revolution would commence (Marx, 1867/1995: Marx and Engels, 1848/2002). However, as also mentioned, Gramsci viewed class formations differently than Marx and instead argued that a revolution was not necessarily always on the horizon for the exploited (Gramsci, 1997). To me, the Gabooye collective’s experience of
inequality in Somaliland exemplifies this notion. Yet there is in general a lack of political mobilisation based on organised resistance geared towards the forces that dominate and I think that until such consciousness arises, one that is motivated by a politicised agenda for recognition, whilst being based on a universalised justice claim, gaining full participatory parity for the Gabooye collective will prove difficult. Additionally, how cultural hegemony and ideology are related to social relations was the component of “common sense” for Gramsci and subsequently common sense is understood to be the site where the dominant ideology in a society is constructed and manifested (Gramsci, 1997: Simon, 2015). It is also the arena for describing the uncritical and unconscious ways individuals see the world, yet common sense is also the site for where resistance to the dominant ideology forms (Gramsci, 1997: Simon, 2015). I would argue that there currently is no site of ‘common sense’ in Somaliland. Instead, the findings and observations of this research confirm that there are stronger pursuits for individual aspiration in Somaliland, as there is no actual political or ideological loyalty, rather than a class struggle based on the common class situation. Therefore, instead of looking into the existence of a middle class, both political and economic focus, must be shifted towards the institutions and to those with political salience, for example the clan elite, to construct how society should look.
6.3.4. Misrepresentation: affirmative action as a transformative pathway to justice for the Gabooye of Somaliland

Fraser introduced misrepresentation as a form of inequality after receiving critique from Butler and Young. It was held that Fraser’s initial framework did not acknowledge the extent to which a lack of political participation could have on the overall experience of inequality (Fraser, 1997: Swanson, 2005). When Fraser reframed the Social Justice Framework and included political representation, described as misrepresentation, it was argued that misrepresentation occurs in the political dimension of inequality (Fraser and Honneth, 2003). Misrepresentation, as an unequal condition, occurs when there are societal boundaries at place keeping people from participating in political decisions and rulemaking (Fraser and Honneth, 2003). In Somaliland members from the Gabooye collective lack a wider political representation and the lack of representation influences the collective’s level of participating in both local and national political activities. At the moment in Hargeysa, there are currently only a few positions within the government held by members from the collective, however, my own observations indicate that those that hold these positions seem to comply with the system of status quo set by the political elite of the Isaaq and it seems to be a mode of self-preservation rather than a motive to bring change for their social groups. This observation was confirmed by a respondent that stated:

Well in politics it exists but it is usually one man’s activity and how he interacts within society and how he can get ahead, that is how it is connected (Interviewee 55, 2018)

When asked how this was reflected in politics, the respondent replied:

The lowest base of government is the Lower House, forget about the higher government, forget about minister positions or ministries, forget about leadership in the municipalities, we don’t even have a janitor in the Lower House, we are not counted for (Interviewee 55, 2018).

It was held here that politics is a means for personal advancement and not applied as a collective pathway for emancipation. The few members from the Gabooye collective that occupy either political positions within a party or are employed as civil servants within the government have during the process of data gathering distanced themselves from
talking about issues of inequality and the Gabooye collective. The few that have been willing to discuss the topic have stated that no such problems occur. For instance, a respondent holding such a position held the following:

I have not experienced that yet. The clan, you know what clan I belong to, and I work here in this ministry, but I have never experienced that type of treatment, but it is possible that it exists in other places but to be honest, to speak frankly, I have yet to experience that. Most of the time people come to me for advice and whether it is about discrimination, they call for me and we discuss the matters but I have never experienced it but there are a lot of people that have (Interviewee 55, 2018)

Another respondent held that people that hold higher political positions from the Gabooye collective are in these positions because of their strong personalities and their own career advancement. Not because they are Gabooye:

That is why now somebody from Sonsaf is the BOD member, somebody is a human rights commissioner, somebody who already left Sonsaf became the vice minister of planning, he was one of the BOD’s, you know they have those rankings, you know, not because of Gabooye or such but also as personalities they are creating a people that is capable to the marketplace, to the politics, to the market, you know, where society has a dialogue, you know like civil society (Interviewee 42, 2018).

The idea of “strong Gabooye men” in politics was further attested by the previous respondent that said the following about how individual persons from the collective may have the “power” to succeed in politics:

People are of different toughness and if one person experiences discrimination, their spirit its broken. And another person is more self-sufficient, and he will say that: this person is not better than me, he does not possess more knowledge than me, he is not more pious than me. I must fight back despite this person discriminating me. So, that person might get ahead because of that (Interviewee 55, 2018)
It is understandable why there is a need for those aspiring to make a career in politics to distance oneself from the negative stereotypes associated as a trait of the Gabooye. Moreover, if the entire political system is built on local conditioning of intersubjectivity as a form of recognition, then it is also understandable why members from the Gabooye collective that have acquired a position within a higher institution, such as the government, would not want to jeopardise their status. However, the distancing itself furthers the exclusion of members from the Gabooye collective and the current political representation of a few Gabooye members in politics is only of symbolic value rather than representative and substantial. However, as the two other structures, maldistribution and misrecognition, are harder to overcome, perhaps representation, as a form of affirmative action is the pathway in gaining transformative remedies in the two other structures.

The influence of the clan in politics was also a recurring topic. The clan is held here to have a special placement as both the creator and the implementer of political agendas within Somaliland politics. The powerful position of the clan in this dimension makes the clan and clan affiliation a resource that is highly useful:

Say my clan is big, I will have a vote, everybody knows I will have a vote and I will be one of the big persons in the party so, the more you succeed I will be big also (Interviewee 42, 2018)

Having members from your clan group within the government can help you and your clan family in terms of both political representation but also resource allocation. This was mentioned by a member of the Gabooye collective:

The minister or the president...when he says that he is the president of Somaliland, working for all the clan families living here, then where is the equitable justice for this community? The minister, that is sitting in the ministry, when he is giving out jobs and there are 20 workers, he will give most of the jobs to his clan family. He will avoid or give very little to the other clan families. But there is no one giving respect or counting on this community, or even anyone saying: "come, give me this and I will give this to you, and I will do this for you". It does not exist (Interviewee 13, 2018).
Aspiring to be a part of a corruptive political system may not be morally appealing, but the reality is that it is a useful form of political representation that exists in Somaliland and that is the form of representation that the Gabooye is lacking. One respondent held that due to the corruption and political appropriation of elites there is no justice to speak of in Somaliland. The respondent held that if Isaaq men and women are finding it difficult gaining justice, why would there be any justice for lower clan groups like the Gabooye:

First of all, let me tell you one thing, when we talk about justice it is in the courts, forget about the clan system and the Gabooye as a clan, even within themselves as a group there is no justice. Even yesterday there was a man saying that he has a right to a lawyer, you see it is a man within the clan system but there is a fear that this group will rise so if you are not entitled to your rights, there is no justice to talk about. These people, the Isaaq clan in this country, they do not even have justice so what do you think about the people that are beneath them? (Interviewee 1, 2018)

The notion that there is a scarcity of justice in general plays to the reification process of the Gabooye’s political representation. What this implies is that if there is no amount of justice available to attain, hence it is pointless to keep fighting for it.

A male respondent from the Gabooye collective said the following on the subject:

You know, when those kinds of cases occur, first of all if we look at justice from the courts, they have justice and people go there but the issues relating to recognition, if we look at justice, for instance marriage. For instance, if there was this boy from our community, that wanted to marry an Isaaq girl, the boy would be tortured, he would be assaulted, and he would be prosecuted and his family as well, they would face a lot of bad things and then when they go to court, nothing is done for them. So, nothing is done but for the smaller cases, like two families have fought… then its Ok but rights and when abuse and torture occurs, most of the time nothing happens. And those that tortured, they are not jailed, and the settlements given, gives them justice. Mostly, it does not happen. (Interviewee 17, 2018).
Therefore, resorting to self-preservation as a strategy to get ahead and gain some resources is understandable. The few that hold positions in government from the Gabooye collective are all men. This is reflective of the patriarchal structure of Somali society as a whole and historically, within this structure, women have not been promoted enough to hold higher political positions despite their Isaaq clan affiliation. Another noteworthy finding, that further connects the dimensions of gender, politics and self-preservation is the role of the elders. In Somaliland, Caaqils are appointed on a clan selective basis, meaning that each clan group elects their clan elder. The role for the elder is to keep track of the clan constituency by knowing the count of each clan family. Traditionally this role was needed for counting members of the clan but through the advancement of corruption in politics, and the general state of self-preservation, the role has also become corrupted. A respondent held that the best way for young males to get ahead in today’s Somaliland, whether it be in politics or finding employment is through the Caaqil:

This Caaqil is the mastermind of domination… Ok, domination within the clan and also manipulation. He has to do a lot of manipulation to keep his power to... it is sort of a lucrative opportunity for these people. Is like a powerful position (Interviewee 31, 2018).

The statement here suggested a level of gendered male power relations where younger men are in a subordinate position to elder men. Adding the complexity of clan affiliation into these relations. For instance, if younger men are reliant on maintaining a good rapport with the elder men to gain access to better resources, then there lies an interest in maintaining that role and the system that role operates within. It was also held that urbanisation extended the fragmentation of the political will of the Gabooye and because of this there are opposing political interest. Perhaps, once the collective is less fragmented can political representation be achieved? However, the data suggest that one pathway to gaining political representation for the Gabooye could be through greater implementation of Islamic law in Somaliland’s political system. Here I am convinced that such an implementation would mean better representation for the Gabooye in the sense that under Shari’a law, all are equal despite race or creed (Holy Qur’an). Currently the Somaliland system of governance is based on Shari’a law yet the actuality of that is that
Somali customary traditions, by way of the Xeer, are more applicable. While a greater emphasis on the implementation of Islamic law in the political way of life would lead to better representation for the Gabooye, such an implementation would necessarily not transpire into better rights or access to the political arena for those that are experiencing exclusion on an intersectional level, such as Gabooye women.

It was further held that there is no political recognition and thus no political representation of the Gabooye in the Somaliland constitution:

There is a Dastuur [constitution], that is written so that you know where the different clans of Somaliland live and how the resources are to be divided. However, the minorities are not a part of this, the people called the Gabooye are not in the written Dastuur. The Dastuur that was written under consensus in Somaliland, by the clans, they are not a part of it. They are not considered for anything, whether it is governance or ministries, it does not exist (Interviewee 1, 2018).

Article 4 (1) in the Somaliland Constitution, which was adopted in 2000 by the House of Representatives and accepted through a national referendum in 2001, states that citizenship by birth is granted to anyone with a paternal ancestor that lived in Somaliland during 26th of June 1960, or earlier (Somaliland Constitution, 2001: Hashi Jama, 2005). The Citizenship Law in the constitution is clear on the fact that citizenship in Somaliland is pertained to birth right and residency through paternal affiliation, it is therefore different from granting citizenship to someone on the basis of being born in Somaliland (Hashi Jama, 2005). While the minority clans were not included in the formulation of the constitution, or the Somaliland citizenship law in the constitution38, the first time or the second time, the formulation in Article 4 is in a sense actually advantageous for members of the Gabooye as citizenship is not reliant on being a decent of Samaale. Being born Gabooye in Somaliland is enough to gain full citizenship and hence be a Somalilander. However, being a citizen by law does not necessarily transpire into being treated accordingly. As the above accounts indicate.

38 The Somaliland citizenship law has been passed in two waves; the first law was passed in June 1960 with the constitution of the newly independent Somaliland. However, as Somaliland united with former Italian Somaliland a month later, the outlined citizenship law was without effect. The current citizenship law is the second Somaliland citizenship law and it was passed in 2002 along with the new constitution (Hashi Jama, 2005).
In addition, Article 8 on the Equality of Citizens, further reads:

All citizens of Somaliland shall enjoy equal rights and obligations under law and shall not be accorded precedence of grounds of colour, clan, birth, language, gender, property, status, opinion etc (sic) (Somaliland Constitution, 2001: Hashi Jama, 2005).

Moreover, Article 8 (2) states that:

Precedence and discrimination on grounds of ethnicity, clan affiliation birth and residence are prohibited (Somaliland Constitution, 2001: Hashi Jama, 2005).

According to Hashi Jama (2005), the last section of the clause is new and set to cover the adverse traditional practices targeting members of minority clan groups. However, there is no further explanation from Hashi Jama to why this clause was revised to specifically include the treatment of minority clan groups like the Gabooye. Yet it is assumed here that such an inclusion is due to the government’s disposition in underlining that clan and clan rhetoric no longer has a place in Somaliland. Moreover, the articles on equality and citizenship, specifically Articles 4, 8 and 9 appear under the rubric of “General Principles”39 in the constitution, indicating that as laws they are only directive principles and not necessarily justiciable (Hashi Jama, 2005). As such, although promoting the Gabooye collective’s equal rights, the articles are actually not enforceable by law (Hashi Jama, 2005). Hence, adhering to the principles of justice outlined in Shari’a is more operational for the collective as those principles are justiciable in accordance with Islamic jurisprudence. Yet, as the accounts from this section has highlighted there is little regard for the safeguarding of the Gabooye collective’s equal rights, either through civil law or Shari’a law. Recalling the discussion on Hegel and the dialectics of legal status and personhood, that is how legal status is only uphold in a community when it overlooks

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39According to Hashi Jama, the term “General Principles” found in the first part of the Somaliland constitution relates to declaratory Article 50 which was formulated in the 1997 Somaliland constitution (Hashi Jama, 2005). However, as the constitution was revised in 2000, Article 50 was excluded and subsequently shifts occurred throughout the constitution. Therefore, Article 8 on Equality and Citizenship, which was initially under Article 10 in section 1 in ‘General provisions’, was placed under the section 2 in the constitution relating to ‘General principles’ (Somaliland Constitution, 2001: Hashi Jama, 2005).
conflicting claims of justice, for instance those related to divine justice, and instead individuals within that community are granted recognition solely on the basis of their personhood and not on the individual conception of good (Hegel, 1807/1979: Lauer, 2012:26). Such a community values and recognises nothing about its members other than their equal status and according to Hegel, the legal status of individuals within this community is a pre-determined and un-conditioned form of recognition (Hegel, 1807/1979: Lauer, 2012).

However, it is a form of recognition that, although reliant on individual substantiality, is not only abstract but it also relies on the notion that the recognition of individuals as equals suspends the individuality of the members of the community, which according to Hegel is needed for any fully realised person (Hegel, 1807/1979: Lauer, 2012). However, discounting this form of firm recognition allows for the members of the community to continually swing in their relationship to the community, themselves, and the state (Hegel, 1807/1979: Lauer, 2012). Yet the interesting point, and the relevance here, is how Hegel argued that the struggles for recognition is already institutionalised in society (Hegel, 1807/1979: Lauer, 2012). For instance, the demands for equality of all under contemporary law is generally a-historical as it assumes that members, who seek equality and thus recognition, within any given society can only reach recognition through negotiation and accordingly struggle (Hegel, 1807/1979: Lauer, 2012). As such, the struggle for recognition, and its inherited injustices, for some individuals is already pre-determined and accordingly a-historic (Hegel, 1807/1979: Lauer, 2012). As discussed, there is an extent of recognition for the rights of the Gabooye present both in formal law, although mostly in relation to their status as Somaliland citizens, as well as Shari’a, however, the systematic misrecognition of members from the Gabooye collective is still a reality. It could be because the formulations of equality and recognition held within these institutions are value driven, that is derived from culture and religion through the Xeer and Islam, and not founded purely on the basis of personhood as suggested by Hegel. As previously mentioned, the Somali clan ideology fits well with Hegel’s Sittlichkeit, as a sphere of ethical right where custom and tradition demarcate the values of life, yet the question remains; How do members of the Gabooye collective overcome the Sittlichkeit, that is the clan system, as a sphere of ethical right that subordinates them and demand recognition?
In the contemporary debate, Honneth claims that pursuing ‘the Good’ and ‘the Right’ connects to the struggles of recognition, and accordingly the negotiations of recognition, and in his approach asserting one’s rights is to demand that society gives you recognition (Lauer, 2012: Fraser and Honneth, 2003). Yet I do not see how recognition would materialise for the Gabooye collective, from only asserting one’s rights. Instead, I consider Fraser’s approach, that calls for a more inclusive social space in which individuals that are not usually included can participate and thus level the playing field, more suitable for this context. Occupying the spaces where political decisions are made is in this context a better approach for addressing equal status in both the constitution and the Shari’a. As previously mentioned in Chapter 3, the illusory state of equality, as argued by Leeb is an advantageous reality for members from the Gabooye collective in realising their rights. That is gaining political recognition trough reformatory acts first rather than revolutionary acts. That way they can visibly occupy the spaces where political decisions are made. As a starting point. Nonetheless, I do consider both Honneth’s and Frasers arguments to be as a-historical as the argument by Hegel on the condition of recognition, as they both overlook the historic hegemonic relations that are at interplay within the systems of status order in Somaliland and therefore asserting rights or occupying spaces assumes that there is a direct consciousness challenging the sphere of ethical right and thus requesting morality as its redress. However, as the complexities of the data has highlighted, that is not the case.

Still, this section has suggested that the space for emancipatory change for the Gabooye collective, firstly in relation to legal rights but also as in the overall realisation of equality, is best found within the boundaries of Islamic law and hence within the sphere of morality. The ensuing chapter will explore this claim further.
Chapter 7: Analysis: Part II: Identify the institutional spaces available to address the claims to justice for members of the Gabooye collective

Findings in the previous chapter suggest that the principle of participatory parity for members of the Gabooye collective was not reached during 1969-1988 due to changes in the political economy of Somali society. These changes are identified as:

(i) a restructuring of the Somali rules of the game and;
(ii) a restructuring of the Somali rules of the mind.

The findings also indicate that the pathways to change in this context are dynamic and complicated. For instance, the pathways for emancipatory change connected to identity and recognition. When identity is discussed in Somaliland it is usually done from a perspective of political identity, that is, clan affiliations or gender identity. While a discussion on gender relations, gender roles, and the normative ideals that shape the societal framework of the biological and the social gender, is an important one from many aspects, I agree with Žižek on the difficulties of realising a just politics based on identity (Žižek, 2001). In Somaliland, while still not fully mobilised, the emergent presence of identity politics, as a concept for struggles of justice, is conceptualised within the liberal capitalist logic and thus falling into the traps of subjectivity, self-realisation and negative particularities (Žižek, 2001). In accordance with Chari (2015), I do consider that the state in contemporary Somaliland, like many other liberal states, has an ambivalent relationship between the realms of economy and politics (Chari, 2015). There is this aspiration for a free economy with minimal state intervention that tails the ideology of governance in Somaliland. Much like how a free society was described by Locke. Recalling Locke, individuals can avoid the rule of a sovereign authority and the State of Nature given that there are conditions for forming a better civil government that will comply with serving the interests of a free people (Locke, 1689/1993: Mouritz, 2010). Yet, the state in Somaliland is not minimal as the state does govern the economy, however the state is not taking full responsibility for the equal distribution of resources. Instead, the economic distribution that exists within Somaliland is more or less based on full
privatisation and personal responsibility, usually with resources mobilised through clan affiliation. Due to this I reason that the functions of clan operate within the boundaries of this ambivalent relationship. The clan thus appoints itself as the better civil government, as stated by Locke, as it complies with serving the interest of the people. Accordingly, the clan therefore occupies the space for personal responsibility and the clan thus becomes the regulator that operates within both the realm of economy and politics. For instance, it is common that the clan provides security in times of private reconciliation, as mentioned through Diya, but the clan also operates like the state in so that it adjusts the infrastructure of its clan region by providing the material resources needed, for instance building roads and/or the provision of water. Hence, the stronger the clan the better the infrastructure within that clan area. This could explain why the Daami area, home of the Gabooye collective, has the characteristics of an urban slum settlement. Therefore, my question here is if there should be a separation between the economy and the political in an effort to reach full emancipation for those without equal access to neither of the realms?

7.1 Justice as competition

The findings indicate that there is a sense that one’s identity starts and ends within the realm of politics and on the account of someone else’s equality. A respondent illustrates this by describing justice as a competition when explaining the individual experience of inequality in Somaliland:

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40 The United Nations Human Settlement Programme (UN-HABITAT) uses the following operational, and accordingly measurable in relation to household, definition of a slum households, as areas where individuals who live together under the same roof lack; access to adequate drinking water; adequate sanitation facilities; secure land tenure; quality of housing and/or dwelling; and/or adequate living space, that is not overcrowded (UN-Habitat, 2016). The neighbourhood of Daami has the characteristics of an area with multiple slum households. However, in contrast to other areas of Hargeysa, such as State House, which is mostly populated by IDPs and is accordingly considered an informal settlement, the Daami neighbourhood is not specifically characterised by unauthorised or unplanned housing. However, I do acknowledge that the definition of a slum household misses many of the complexities of both informality and legality, as well as access to needs that fall outside of the spatial dimension, hence the proper usage is therefore considered to be an urban slum settlement for this context.
Justice is about them two competing, when it comes to work, it is competition, and you have to know about the competition, that is justice – the competition between them (Interviewee, 20, 2018).

Based on this, I argue that the politics of recognition in Somaliland, understood in its full intersubjective capacity, is at play here. As data from the previous chapter showed, the Somali clan ideology during 1969-1988 was more compatible with Barre’s divide and rule strategies rather than the initially proposed Scientific Socialism. The data also highlighted how the rhetoric of the clan is reliant on the notion of intersubjectivity, as a tool for recognition as argued by Hegel, to endure. For instance, there are several civil society organisations working for justice and equality throughout Somaliland and while many of these organisations are advocating for the political, economic and social rights of Somaliland’s citizens the findings of this research indicate that they are not addressing and including the rights of minorities and their claims for justice into a wider framework of justice. For instance, many of the leading women’s rights organisations in Somaliland are constructed on a feminist ideology, guided by gender equality as the overarching objective, yet many of these organisations are only voicing the experience of inequality from the perspective of women from majority clan groups. The current debate about the women’s quota in the Somaliland Parliament exemplifies how the struggles for emancipation and equality in Somaliland could be considered struggles for self-realisation and particularity as minority women are not sufficiently represented and integrated in the overall campaign for women’s political advancement.

Somali women have historically been excluded from taking part in politics on the same premises as their male counterparts due to both cultural and religious patterns of patriarchal structuring (Walls et al., 2017). A study published in 2017, carried out in all six regions of Somaliland, indicate that while women in Somaliland are given constitutional rights to political participation their political participation is limited as there is no space, whether claimed, visual or invisible, for political leadership for women (Walls, et al., 2017). The research suggests the importance of how clan limits women’s political leaderships as political candidacy usually is secured on a clan affiliation basis. Because of the patriarchal structures that demarcate clan politics, the statistics for women’s candidacy have been historically low; between the 2002 and 2005 local council
elections 9 women ran against a total of 627 male candidates. While the 2005 elections secured 2 female candidates’ seats in the Chamber, the remaining 80 seats were for men (Walls et al., 2017). This emphasises the extent of political exclusion and the limited spaces for political leadership for women in Somaliland. However, this reflects the reality for women from majority clan groups as minority women are seldom even considered a place within those limited spaces. To me, this further indicates that the current form of identity politics, as a form of emancipatory change, in Somaliland, is not a politics encompassing all struggles and demands for justice. Here, the contradiction between ethics and morality becomes clearer. As the politics of recognition is instead focused on difference and subjectivity, these collective organisations and groups are competing over equality as a scarce resource and therefore they are missing the opportunity to build a framework for a broader spectrum of politics and solidarity with other groups within society. When asked about how women’s rights organisations, such as the national umbrella organisation Nagaad, are promoting the rights of minority women, one female respondent from the Gabooye collective involved with social work, asserted that there is no promotion of minority women’s right by women right’s organisations, as these group are only working “[…] for their Isaaq quota but not for us” (Interviewee 36, 2018).

It was perceived by the respondent that there is no solidarity or “sisterhood” between the two women groups as:

[…] it’s all clan. There is no relationship between minority and majority. Only when there is something to gain from us. But otherwise, no they do not do anything for us minorities (Interviewee 36, 2018).

Although I do not agree that women are connected by an unspoken bond of “sisterhood” based on the modality of their similarity in biology, and accordingly sense of shared identity, it is, however, suggested to be an ideal philosophy to implore in Somaliland’s women rights organisations according to the above respondent. Somaliland is a patriarchal society where women from all clans and classes are faced with barriers for social, economic, and political rights. Still, the lack of solidarity and group consciousness becomes interesting in this context as it highlights the level of fragmentation that is connected to the overall Somali identity and social status, as well as the extent to which
self-realisation and particularity, as the negative aspects of Laclau’s particularity, are visible in the everyday life of Somalilanders.

As highlighted above, women lack the support to participate in the political arena, however the situation is exacerbated by the added barrier of both clan and gender identity attached to women that are members of the Gabooye collective. Women from minority groups are faced with adversities on a scale that is more dynamic than women from other social groups – this dynamic is not recognised by the general public or the local non-governmental organisations working on gender equality nor is it recognised by the international donor organisations that fund said organisations. Furthermore, women have different needs as well as views and strategies, yet their clan identity spills over to their class identity, and accordingly their class location, hence adding another dimension to the level of exclusion experienced. Therefore, there is a need of understanding and unpacking practical and strategic gender needs in the Somaliland context. The previous respondent held that because of the lack of support from the bigger rights-based organisation, for instance organisations such as Nagaad, they themselves have to raise funds for their community when they are in need, as no one comes to their aid:

We raise money, for instance 20,000 shilling, 30.00 shillings. For instance, we collect this during Fridays, and we give it to someone. If there is a funeral, we help each other, if there is a need for a doctor’s visit, we help each other. Within our group. (Interviewee 36, 2018).

This becomes particularly interesting as the larger civil society organisations in Somaliland are often operated on donor funding and support from International organisation, such as the United Nations Development Programme, the United States Agency for International Development and the Danish aid organisation, Danida. It is believed by these organisations that the implementation of development interventions needs to be done through local facilitation hence funding is therefore given to established local NGOs through a partnership type scheme and then used for earmarked projects such as those aimed at women’s political participation. However, the head of one of the bigger international aid organisations said that it is difficult to reach the actual needs and wants of marginalised groups as:
people do not have a voice and I think here the civil society is very very established, so you have NAGAAD, you have SONYO, you have SONSASF, SOLJA and these are the ones speaking on behalf of everyone but they are not representing everyone. They really are not, and this is a huge challenge I find, that the smaller groups are not represented, their voice is not heard. And the problem is that when we do not hear their voices, we forget about them, nobody will speak on their behalf (Interviewee 43, 2018).

Yet, it was also asserted by the same respondent that because of the bureaucracy of funding smaller rights-based organisation, it is more practical, easier and, financially more cost-efficient to support an already established organisation since:

our funding is large portion funding, so if we are funding somebody it’s like, for example SaferWorld who then are trickling it down to SONSASF, we can’t go and fund a small minority NGO. We would drown it in money and bureaucracy that’s not how it should be (Interviewee 43, 2018).

The same respondents affirmed that the organisation would fund smaller organisations promoting the rights of minority clan groups but that it was difficult as:

“[…] we don’t have the data. If we had proper research, proper information about the situation of minorities it would be much easier for us to write it into a programme” (Interviewee 43, 2018).

Yet, this statement contradicts the earlier statement about donor bureaucracy making it difficult for smaller organisations as they would be “drowned in money”, suggesting the organisation would lose its capacity to carry out the intended work. In addition, it was indicated that the issue of gender inequality and women’s access to political rights is more important in Somaliland than the overall rights of minorities as:

women are 55 % of this country but still very much struggling with gaining access to a lot of things. So, this is a bigger focus for us than
minority groups, to be quite frank with you. Because it is such a large group. But the minorities, again, it always comes to the analysis of our partners (Interviewee 43, 2018).

This comment highlights a lack of understanding of the intersectional dynamics of inequality. By this logic, minority women, who, as mentioned, are faced with multiple levels of discrimination, are left outside of the justice framework for equal access, as said by the respondent:

“[…] they fall in between these two chairs” (Interviewee 43, 2018).

In a sense, the donor organisations are reinforcing the structures of stratification and the unequal social relations that exist within society by not including the voices of those that are marginalised in the societies they are operating in. Instead, because of practicality and bureaucracy, they are more likely to support and partner with already established organisations, and thus the clan groups directly benefiting from association with them.

7.2 Shari’a for emancipation.

Recalling the three structures of inequality that have been discussed here, misrecognition, maldistribution and misrepresentation, as results of restructuring of the ‘Rules of The Game’ and the ‘Rules of The Mind’, the data as well as the theory applied suggest that the best space for emancipatory change for the Gabooye lies in affirmative political representation, through the sphere of Islam.

At the moment, Somaliland has a governing system based on civil law, Shari’a law and customary law. This means that Somali law is formally based on the constitution, through civil law, however civil law is complemented with Shari’a law and customary law, the Xeer. A respondent working as a civil lawyer for the Government explained:

The Somalis that were alive during colonials’ times and during the English did not know much about governance, they followed and governed themselves according to the Xeer and clan rules. They would apply these laws on cattle and water recourses and share according to clan rules. They were using these laws and were Muslim and then the
colonisers came and they brought their administration, their tradition and formal law. And they (Somalis) had their own laws and tradition. And some parts of traditional law and some parts of Islamic law are compatible with formal law and many things that are not and however the Xeer, Shari’a and formal law got mixed. I don’t know if it’s a good thing that they are mixed but the governmental institutions that were involved in mixing the traditional laws should have made it clearer on how governance is done and followed but that is missing (Interviewee 27, 2018).

When asked about an example to illustrate the mixture of the three laws, the respondent said:

So, all three are parallel. For instance, if you look at the justice institutions, and you have a case you can see how all three are working together in practice. [...] you have a rape case in court and secular law or Shari’a law should be used. The secular law that is in place says that its 5-15 years of imprisonment for rape, without conversation. Shari’a takes it apart and considers whether the rapist, is a boy, is he married, does he have a family or not. The traditional way says it’s shameful to even have this conversation and that the families should reach an agreement and that the boy, and the girl should get married. And that the case must be settled outside of court and let us solve the case through traditional means. When they come to court, they have resolution in mind (Interviewee 27, 2018).

Having three systems makes it complex yet if we only look into the pathways to change, in terms of institutional spaces where minorities can best get redress for their claims of justice, the obvious answer would firstly be civil law. Yet, as the exploration of the Somaliland constitution illustrated in the previous chapter, the implementation of civil law is weak in Somaliland and it is often exceedingly influenced by the Xeer and Shari’a. One example of both the weakness and the complexity of the tripartite system is the implementation of the recent Somaliland Rape and Sexual Offence Act, which was signed in 2014 after a long debate between religious clerks and clan representatives. While both Shari’a and the Somaliland penal code prohibits rape and other forms of sexual abuse, the act is yet to be fully accepted and consequently sexual violence is widespread in Somaliland and the main reason held is that those that commit acts of sexual violence are
rarely prosecuted. This is because, as the respondent stated, the tradition of resolution and mediation in the Xeer allows for a resolution outside of the legal system between the victim and the perpetrator. This further attests to the presence of *Sittlichkeit*, through the aspect of negative freedom\(^{41}\), in the Somali clan ideology.

Shari’a places equality based on distributive justice as the overarching moral objective of all Muslims and though Islamic jurisprudence and ideology is intrinsic to Somali identity, members from the Gabooye collective are systematically discriminated against and stigmatised notwithstanding their Muslim identity and accordingly they are denied the distribution of equity they are guaranteed in the Shari’a. The Xeer, which is grounded on restorative justice paralleled with values of reconciliation derived from the Shari’a, favours forgiveness over formal punishment. As forgiveness is considered an admirable virtue for Muslims it is therefore common that victims of crime, like rape, settle for forgiveness through *Diya* compensation rather than punishment (Abdulkadir and Ackley, 2014). This is challenging for Gabooye victims, whom by tradition are not allowed to marry noble clan members, hence they lack wider clan support, which is supposed to transpire through exogamy, when seeking reconciliation from perpetrators outside of their own clan. While the functions of the Xeer can reconcile crimes for past injustices and establish goodwill between clan families it does not contest the structures that enable injustices between majority clans and minority clans. In addition, in the case of rape and other forms of sexual abuse, the arrangements of reconciliation found in the Xeer are realised upon patriarchal needs and entitlements and arguably such needs are ignoring the gendered nature of crimes like rape. Instead, justice in relation to crimes like rape or sexual abuse is prejudiced by the individual quest for piety and the collective good as Islamic values and opposing identities are established by the clan politics of the dominant groups.

\(^{41}\) In brief, the aspect of negative freedom, or liberty as it is sometimes referred to, maintains that there are no obstacles in the way, or no interferences from other individuals and/or institutions, for ones’ actions (Hegel, 1820/1967).
In addition, the Xeer does not acknowledge rights of minorities, hence it is unlikely, in its current form, to function as the main space for change for members of the Gabooye collective. Yet the Xeer was never designed to govern individual and social interactions, such as wrongdoings on the basis of exclusion, instead it was used as a social contract to govern property rights and resources between clans and accordingly address wrongdoings in relation to loss of property and/or other resources. The Xeer is thus arguably very much like the quasi-contract for self-ownership outlined by Nozick. Yet customary practices, and not so much law, still sets the rulings of social interaction. For example, it is cultural practices, which are prohibited according to the constitution, rather than civil and religious laws that are keeping members of the Gabooye socially separate from members of the Isaaq. The Isaaq are separating themselves from the Gabooye collective through the act of endogamy, and in such avoiding the perceived notion of pollution attached to marrying the Gabooye. Yet the claim for exogamy as a way out of marginalisation by the respondents from the Gabooye collective fails to acknowledge that the concept of exogamy in the first place was founded on the conditions of access to land and property outlined in the Xeer. The unequal access to these resources, which carry both political power and social status as mentioned by Gupta and Singh, indicate that the notion of endogamy and pollution in the Somaliland context is material rather than mental. Historically the Gabooye had only access to certain resources, like land and livestock, through their attachment to members of the Isaaq. Subsequently, they have no resources of their own and therefore it is considered degrading to marry into a family without any valuable resources and a family that historically was working as servants to others.

A respondent explained the act of marrying a Gabooye as a type of fall from grace:

When you go and you ask for the girl’s hand in marriage from her father, he won’t accept it. Because he believes that he will fall in status, that he would be shamed and that he will experience difficulties, that he will be called names and that people will say; “that man gave his daughter to a Midgan. (Interviewee 13, 2018)
The Shari’â, however, does acknowledge the rights of minorities and more noteworthy, the Somaliland constitution is designed in such a way that prevalence should be given to Shari’a law over any other law, for instance Article 5 on religion in the constitution reads:

“The Laws of the Nation shall be grounded on and shall not be contrary to Islamic Shari’a” (Somaliland Constitution, 2001).

Accordingly, Shari’a law is argued here as the most likely pathway for emancipatory change for the Gabooye collective. Islamic law permits marriage between members of the Gabooye and members of the Isaaq, however, Islamic law is overlooked in this context. While it is widely acknowledged in the scripture and the practice that exogamy is fully “halal”, that is Arabic for allowed’, between different clan groups, as long as those engaging in marriage are consenting Muslims, the act in itself is highly despised in Somali culture. According to respondents there are Imam’s in the mosques preaching about the equal value of all Muslims yet they are the first ones to denounce a Gabooye man if he asked for their daughter’s hand in marriage:

The clan has become bigger than the religion. And the person leading prayer in the Mosque, and he is the Sheik and people pray behind him, he is the one that will verbally say it is allowed but they would never allow it themselves. So, that is it. (Interviewee 17, 2018)

One respondent argued that the oppressor, noted here as Isaaq members, is the one that sits on all the knowledge of Islam and its rulings and the lack of knowledge have contained the Gabooye into the state that they are in today. In earlier times, when the Gabooye were attached to the Isaaq, through the Boon system, they were illiterate and did not have much knowledge of the practices and traditions of Islam and instead they adhered to whatever their “masters” said was true.
The respondent said:

The knowledge of Islam is in the hands of the oppressor. You understand? But he who is oppressed have no real knowledge about the religion. It is the oppressor that have the knowledge and he will not tell you the rights and if he tells it becomes obvious that he himself is not practicing the religion correctly. God said that next to God will be the man with the highest virtue, whether he is black or white. But this practice, the elders will not do that. There is a saying, I do not know what to say in English but it goes: “If the hyenas are the judges, goats will never get justice”. So, the elders are the oppressors. (Interviewee 17, 2018).

With the above arguments in mind, how do you then claim justice within the space designed to address your claim, if that space and the actions required for justice are both designed and implemented by those that deny and contest your rights to begin with? Recalling Rawls, is it within the realm of overlapping consensus, where different principles of justice agree to reach stability, that the exploration of actual rights for minorities should be explored? Or do those seeking justice within the Somaliland context need to go beyond the realm of overlapping consensus, as the institutional climate set to reach stability has been systematically co-opted by the ideologies that subordinate them?
The framework initially identified the institutional spaces that either hold both status orders, class and clan, and that can provide affirmative or transformative remedies for the justice claims made by members from the Gabooye collective. The findings discussed in this chapter indicate that the identified spaces for change are the same, however, their capacity in providing change is supposed differently. For instance, initially the framework for change supposed the following forms of justice, as attached to each of the identified institution; *Restorative/Procedural, Distributive and Formal*.

The findings correspond with the assumption that the type of justice found through the space of culture, that is Xeer and its restorative/procedural form of justice, is not considered an ideal pathway for change for the Gabooye collective. Instead, it was supposed that the Islamic principle of resource distribution, such as the compulsory Zakat, would better benefit Gabooye members in gaining transformative remedies relating to the structure of maldistribution. However, as this form of redistribution itself is reliant on affirmative action, regulated through the state, it is a channel for change that is challenging. In addition, the distribution of material resources, and conceivably the reconstruction of the relations of production for the Gabooye becomes contingent on the moral virtue, through the *Ihsan*, of their fellow Somalilanders. Hence regulating the *Ihsan*
of a nation, whilst ensuring that other Muslims uphold their individual *Tawhid* along with other Islamic ideals, is likewise challenging.

Accordingly, most respondents were instead interested in discussing justice and redistribution from the angle of political representation. This pathway in gaining justice, corresponds with the findings relating to their political parity. Appropriately, as it was supposed, the spaces of religion and state, although problematic in certain areas as abovementioned, are held as the avenues that can best give redress for that justice claim regarding redistribution. In addition, instead of an overlapping consensus, Islamic law, or rhetoric, is supposed the ‘right’ channel for change in this context, in contrast to the clan rhetoric and ideology, as linked to Hegel and the *Sittlichkeit*, where conceptions of the ‘good’ through the process of restorative justice, counters parity for all. Hence, the space for emancipatory change for the Gabooye collective of Somaliland is argued to be both found and realised within the sphere of morality and thus the ‘right’. That is the deontology of Shari’a law where the categorical imperative present in the Holy Qur’an, indicating how Islamic obligations and duties are to benefit all, can better redress the claims to justice, such as those attached to redistribution, made by members from the Gabooye collective.
Chapter 8: Concluding comments

This thesis has investigated the question:

How did changes in the Somali political economy during 1969-1988 affect the principle of Participatory Parity for the Gabooye collective in Somaliland?

This question was asked in an effort to explain the dialectic relationship between class and identity in Somali society by looking into the social formation as well as the status order of clan and the experience of inequality by members of the Gabooye collective in Somaliland. The thesis was guided by the following two objectives:

- to trace the transformation of clan and class identity in Somali society from 1969 to 1988, by analysing how the state institutionalised, and socialised, political and socio-economic arrangements affected the principle of participatory parity of the Gabooye.
- to identify the contemporary institutional spaces available in addressing the claims to justice.

The first objective was to trace the changes in the Somali political economy that affected the participatory parity for the Gabooye collective in Somaliland. The assumption leading to this objective was based on both a contextual reading of Somali history as well as personal observations on the status of the Gabooye in Somaliland. As the literature in this thesis has implicitly highlighted, the Gabooye collective in Somaliland are considered a minority clan group based on their Sab heritage. What this implies is that they are considered to have a low status in Somali society, alongside other minority groups, like the Gosha of Somalia, and they have thus historically experienced systematic marginalisation and inequality (Luling, 1994: Besteman, 1999: Eno and Kusow, 2010).
The literature on inequality has provided the research with an understanding of inequality as a paradigm of justice, that falls within the rubrics of morality and ethics, found in both western moral philosophy and Islam, through the exploration of the analogous elements found in Rawls’s theory of justice and the principle of justice found in the Holy Qur’an. In addition, critical theory as the conceptual method, and critical ethnography, as its practical methodology for uncovering power relations, have illustrated the different dimensions of inequality and their interconnections, through the discourses of Moralität and Sittlichkeit.

The findings under **Objective 1** state that two major changes have occurred in the political economy of Somali society during 1969-1988 that have affected the implementation of participatory parity for the Gabooye.

These changes are:

(i) The restructuring of the ‘Rules of the Game’ and;
(ii) The restructuring of the ‘Rules of the Mind’.

As the analysis highlighted in **Chapter 6**, restructuring the ‘Rules of the Game’, the condition of institutionalised regularisation, was necessary in Siyaad Barre’s state-building process to unite the Somali populace under the preface of a commonality, that was the state in this case (North, 1990: Balthasar, 2018). ‘Rules of the Mind’, however, which are linked to the standardisation of identities, was utilised by Barre as it was perceived as integral for the nation building process as one overarching discursive element, such as social relations and specific identities, are set as the status quo (North, 1990: Balthasar, 2018).

These two changes are held as the main structures influencing the participatory parity during that period in time. It is argued that the changes influencing the participatory parity of the Gabooye collective during that specific time has affected the contemporary implementation of participatory parity, as members of the Gabooye collective are experiencing more exclusion and inequality today than they were during Siyaad Barre’s leadership. What this means is that the institutional changes introduced by Barre had
such impacts that they later affected the realisation for participatory parity for the Gabooye collective. Such changes included an altering of the governmental system from a post-colonial state to a socialist national state. These changes were not appreciated by those that were favouring the old system; the religious institutions and the clan fractions. What the findings also signify is that there is a general perception of the Gabooye siding with Barre’s military regime in killing members of the Isaaq clan, it is thus suggested that the Gabooye collective’s current experience of exclusion and inequality is held to connect with this notion.

8.1. The Gabooye Collective of Somaliland: The case for Political participation and Islamic *Moralität* as simultaneous pathways for emancipation

The framework provides two types of approaches to deal with the three forms of justice claims presented in Fraser’s Social Justice Framework and in the thesis’s adapted version: *maldistribution, misrecognition* and *misrepresentation*. Each of the inequalities experienced can either be addressed through an affirmative methodology or a transformative methodology. As mentioned in *Chapter 3*, affirmative methods, usually applied by liberal western institutions, are according to Fraser only addressing the issues on the surface and instead Fraser promotes transformative remedies, which deconstruct and change the generative framing that is causing the inequality to begin with.

The thesis made the assumption that all structures of inequality in the Social Justice Framework would follow the transformative line, as suggested by Fraser. Hence in order to reach full participatory parity, along Fraser’s framework, the Gabooye in Somaliland would need to:

- *Deconstruct the clan by changing the value pattern of society*;
- *Have better income distribution by gaining access to equal means and opportunities*;
- *Participate in policy making through agency and mobilisation.*
The Somaliland experience, however, entails that the Gabooye collective, at this point in time, are claiming redistributive and representative remedies over those attached to recognition. The findings indicate that there is a strong will from members of the collective for a better appreciation of their shared identity with the majority clan members. The Muslim identity falls within the lines of that shared identity as well as being ethnically Somali. It is assumed that once their Muslim identity is better appreciated can the boundaries that separate and restrict them, such as marriage, be blurred. Hence, the act of exogamy was held as the biggest obstacle to gaining that recognition and therefore exogamy was found to be the transformative action needed to deconstruct clan status. Accordingly, the deconstruction of clan status becomes integral for this form of recognition.
However, findings placed in the adapted framework illustrates that justice claims related to both redistribution and recognition require **transformation action** such as **resource redistribution** and **exogamy**. Through the act of exogamy, which is an act of ‘changing the value pattern of society’, between Gabooye clan members and Isaaq clan members, can the clan structure be deconstructed. In addition, by relocating resources, such as land and property, to the Gabooye members through the state, they can have better access to equal means and opportunities, such as better income generating opportunities and education. However, in order to achieve transformative action in **S1** and **S2** would require a stronger state willing to politically implement those actions. Hence, in contrast to how the Social Justice Framework is presented by Fraser, the biggest claim to justice for the Gabooye collective is actually in the political sphere. The lack of political representation, as a result of historical exclusion from the traditional decision-making systems, such as the Xeer, that dictate representation have had an impact on both the representation and the participation of the Gabooye collective in politics. Consequently, this has also had implications on the creation of value patterns in Somali society as they are shaped and manifested through social institutions like the Xeer. Yet the findings suggest that the best pathway to gaining equal political status in **S3**, is through **affirmative action**, such as quota. This finding goes against the assumed pathway, ‘Participation in policy making by agency and mobilisation’, as the appropriate redress for justice. Instead, the majority of the respondents claimed that better political representation through affirmative action, like political quota in the Somaliland parliament, would be the best way for political justice. Such a redress is only possible if the Gabooye collective are allowed visible representative space in parliament.

Such a claim signifies the causal, yet strained, relationship between class and identity in Somaliland. There are currently formulations for emancipation and spaces for change that necessitate multiple pathways for members of the collective at the same time. This is in contrast to a rationale with only one pathway for emancipation and where matters of the ‘right’ and the ‘good’ are placed against each other. Due to the causality of class and identity it is, however, challenging for members of the Gabooye collective to pursue a purely transformative pathway to reach collective justice and emancipation as the construction of what it means to be Somali, socially, politically and economically, is
strongly based on clan identity, individually and collectively. Therefore, it makes more sense to pursue a pathway reliant on affirmative action, such as political quota.

While visibility in the Somaliland parliament is a way of representation, the act as a redress for justice is less transformative for the underlying framework that is keeping members of minorities out of the political arena. Yet, in the Somaliland context it is understood that having justice in the other structures would eventually allow for better political justice. Furthermore, the application of a quota that is designed to include the Gabooye collective assumes that the collective, as a whole, would be represented and that is not necessarily the case. Recalling the discussion from Chapter 7 on spaces for emancipatory change, it was stated that minority women are usually not considered part of the overarching struggle for gender equality. Instead, arguably due to a combination of their low clan status and their class location, minority women were often side lined by the needs of women from majority clans. As mentioned, the collective is comprised by the Muuse Dheriyo, Madhiban, Tumal, and the Yibir-Anas. Currently the Muuse Dheriyo and the Madhiban constitute the larger group of the four and it is presumed that if political quota is given in the same manner as the Isaaq clans divide political power in parliament, that is on a clan family basis, or by class location, as is the case for women, then the Tumal and Yibir-Anas would not be given the same extent of political representation. However, as the collective does not engage in the same categories of stratification and reduction, such as endogamy, like their Isaaq counterparts, it could be that there is a stronger sense of collectiveness, due to the interconnections of exogamy as well as the shared sense of exclusion, amongst the collective. Therefore, it is assumed, that smaller groups like the Yibir-Anas would not have to rely on particular group rights to affirm their political status. Yet it is acknowledged here that this is also challenging.

Transformative remedies such as access to ‘equal opportunities’ to the production forces and income redistribution within the economic sector was held in higher regard rather than affirmative remedies such as income transfers. However, the findings suggest that justice is harder to obtain in S1 and that perhaps it is only approachable once the claims for justice have been adequately addressed in S2 and S3. Yet the findings also suggest a difficulty in overcoming maldistribution, in S2, for members of the Gabooye collective in Somaliland. This difficulty is argued to be related to both the technical and the social
systems of production, which is formed by the cultural patterns set in S1. Recalling Olin-Wright and class location, this further attests to why upward mobility in the class system is easier for members of the Gabooye and hence how income transfers, through individual work, is applied as a tool for such mobility. Not institutionalised income redistribution, for instance through Zakat, as that would only affirm their lower status.

Findings under **Objective 2** of the research indicate that different groups within Somaliland are competing over equality, as if it was a scarce resource, and thus falling into the pitfalls of identity politics as Žižek would argue. Despite these ‘pitfalls’, members from the Gabooye collective in Somaliland are entering the site of common sense, as defined by Gramsci, and raising their voices on the abuses they face. However, there is a lack of wider mobilisation and radical opposition. No Gesellschaft as the Weberian thesis would suggest. This deficiency is suggested to connect to both the collective’s lack of political representation as well as the lack of a wider political ideology outside of the clan rhetoric. Interestingly, Honneth’s justice model adheres to Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony in so that it suggests that the absence of a politics that is focused on recognition, as a mutual intersubjective process of self-realisation, has led minority groups in Somaliland to ‘accept’ the political and customary values and morals of the dominant classes.

However, considering a class perspective, this could be reflected as a state of false consciousness. As mentioned, false consciousness implies that the ruling class, or the dominant class, are persuading the subordinate classes to believe in values and morals that actively keep subordinating them (Gramsci, 2007: Simon, 2015). Also mentioned, the notion of false consciousness itself have been accused to be elitist as it implies that the subordinate classes are manipulated and lack self-interest (Gaventa,2006: Haugaard,2003). Yet I do consider the notion, as a descriptive element for the illustration of a significant time in Somali history, to be useful. However, I also consider the term “common sense” as complementary as it exemplifies the contradictive elements of human social relations, as well as the aspect of consciousness itself as always rational and free.

The findings under **Objective 2** also illustrate how class as a status order in Somaliland is actually preferred over clan, which is the current form of status order. The class order is more flexible for members of minority clan groups whereas the clan order is more rigid
and fixed and thus harder to overcome. The thesis therefore lands in the argument that the concept of class in Somaliland is an interpretation where both a Marxist class description and a Weberian status group fit at the same time. Hence, class in the Somaliland context is defined, using the research findings, as a group reliant on the kinship ordering of the economy as well as the status of honour.

Yet, firstly, I would describe the Gabooye of Somaliland to be comparable to caste, as categories for reduction within the Somali clan system are similar to the Hindu caste system, however, there are also distinct differences as we have discussed. Nonetheless, as a caste the Gabooye collective convene within the kinship-based order of Somali society. Yet, they are reliant on the capitalist class system for upward mobility and thus shifting class locations as the bounds of the clan is fixed. Hence, as the Gabooye are experiencing misrecognition, due to their placement within the clan as a status order, they would need to deconstruct the clan status order in order to gain better individual participatory parity. However, they would need to deconstruct the clan status order whilst staying within the class status order. At least until there is a wider notion of class consciousness. This suggest that the Gabooye’s need for a class membership can be replaced with class awareness, and accordingly a deconstruction of the class status order in favour of a class for itself rather than a class in itself, as maintained by Marx (1867/1995). This notion becomes integral in understanding how the affirmative representation of the Gabooye collective in the political arena can shift from being a politics of intersubjective self-realisation, led by clan rhetoric, to a subjective approach for equality that is instead relevant for the whole collective. This definition and argument, where the Gabooye are placed between a structural understanding of class, as well as a political ideological subjective status position, illustrates the complexities of social relations and how the status orders pertaining to struggles of redistribution or recognition are not always separated in real life.

The focus of emancipation and understanding the dialectics of social formations have also furthered the research and placed the thesis within the contemporary debate on redistribution and recognition, yet from the Somali perspective. This has been important as there is a lack of scholarship investigating the causal relationship between clan and class, as two similar yet different status orders of stratification. In conclusion, the research
lands in a definition of the Gabooye as a caste inside a kinship-based status order, reliant on the functions of the capitalist class system for the realisation of their individual access to justice. Moreover, the research also understands that the emancipatory pathways for the Gabooye collective in seeking justice lies within the realm of religion as the aspect of morality outlined in Islamic law is applicable to the principle of parity for the Gabooye rather than the ethical right of the clan.

The thesis was set out as a normative endeavour and it aims to use the findings of the research to highlight the relevance for policy makers within the field of development, both local and international, interested in understanding social formations in Somaliland, from the perspective of groups that are seldom accounted for in research. In total 60 individuals were interviewed and up to 50 of those were from the Gabooye collective. Gaining an understanding of the experience of misrecognition, maldistribution and misrepresentation from this specific community can help policy makers design and plan for programmes that take the above findings into consideration and thus further the participatory parity of this group and hence work towards improving the overall wellbeing of society as a whole. The findings of this research, such as the definition of the status order of the Gabooye collective, indicate that social relations are not neatly separated into predefined categories such as class, clan or caste, and hence justice remedies for groups that operate within the boundaries of such definitions, at the same time, should reflect that and thus be designed accordingly.

While this research set out with a critical constructivist approach to explain inequality in Somali society, whilst adhering to critical theory as the underlying methodology, it is interesting that the definitions, with basis in the formulations of inequality from a Marxist outline, lands in what could be consider the opposite of its assumptions. That is at its core the separation between morality and ethics. However, as the theme throughout this thesis have centred around the notion of contradictions, it is perhaps not completely unexpected. Moreover, this thesis has put forward a new theoretical approach, and accordingly a theoretical contribution to the field of Somali studies, an understanding of Somali society where Hegel’s *Sittlichkeit*, and the principle of intersubjectivity found in the Hegelian recognition model, are argued to represent the locus of Somali clan ideology. This thesis has maintained that analysing how recognition and self-realisation
are constructed within the realms of kinship relations are integral in uncovering emancipatory pathways for groups that are consider holding divergent identities. Like the Gabooye collective of Somaliland. The thesis has presented yet a theoretical approach, where the formulation of social justice in Islam and the Holy Qur’an are understood to be as pragmatic as the theories of justice outlined by Rawls and other western liberal philosophers. This approach becomes significant when planning and designing equitable approaches for social justice in a society like Somaliland, where neoliberal and religious ideologies are both incorporated in the framework of governance. The discussion on justice has illustrated that in the case of Somaliland, being born Gabooye, albeit born a Muslim, could be considered ‘unfair’ as one’s social position within society goes against the desert-based principle of both Islamic justice and western liberal justice theory. Yet, as mentioned throughout the thesis, both Islamic principle and Rawls’s justice theory do accept a certain extent of inequality, however, both principles reason that a society is only as just as the treatment of the least well-off individuals (Rawls, 1974: Noor, 1998). Hence, according to this description, the treatment of minority clans in Somaliland would define Somaliland as an unjust society as the fruitful outcomes of Islamic law that govern Somaliland, such as justice and consequently equality as well as access to the material conditions premiering an honourable living, are only made available to certain segments of the population.

The limitations of the research include scope. While the target groups were systematically identified to give a representation adhering to the objectives of the research, the scope of the research is still placed in an urban context and thus limiting in its reach. The urban focus of the thesis is, however, justified in that members from the Gabooye collective tend to live in urban cities such as Hargeysa, or Burao, as there are better income opportunities in the cities. However, it is acknowledged that focusing only on urban Gabooye collective members is a limitation in the research process as the perspectives of inequality from members from the rural communities are missed. Even more so from those that are still in a patron-like relationship with Isaaq clan groups throughout the rural regions of Somaliland. Yet the limitations of the research open up for further areas of research. Such areas include the rural context as a framework in understanding the fragmentation of the Gabooye as well as their participatory needs in the rural setting.
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270


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Appendices
Appendix 1: Information Sheet, Somali

Xaashida Xogta Kaqaybgalaha Xogta Bixinaya

Lambarka Kaadhka Ogolaansha Guuddida Anshaxa Cilmi Baadhista Jaamacadda UCL
Waxa lagu siin doonaa nuqul xashida Xogtan ah
Ciwaanka/mawduuca Cilmi Baadhista: Lafa-gurka/Faaqidaada Sinaan-la’aanta Bulshada Somaliyeed ka dhexjirta. Dib-eegista Dabaqaddaha iyo Baadi-sooca Bulshooyink Lahayb Sooco Somaliland

Waaxda: Qaybta Qorshaynta Hormarka

Magaca iyo Xogta Cilmi baadhaha
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Phone: +2520633225675

Magaca iyo Xogta Cilmi baadhaha 1aad/Kormeeraha
Magaca: Dr. Michael Walls
Email: m.walls@ucl.ac.uk

Waxa aan kugu marti qaadayaa in aad ka qaybgasho cilmi-baadhistan, hase yeeshee ka hor inta aynaan bilayabin ama aanad goosan in aad ka qaybgasho; waxa muhiim ah in aad fahanto sababta loo samaynayo cilmi baadhista iyo doorka aad ku yeelanayso. Fadlan si taxadir leh u akhri xogtaan kalana hadal cidda aad u aragto muhiim haddii aad rabto.

Na weydiis haddii ay jirraan waxyaboo u baahan sharaxaad ama xog dheeraad ah aad u baahato. Adiga ayaa xaq u leh in aad waraysigan ogolaato iyo in kale. Aad baad ugu mahadsantahay akhrintaada.

1. Waa maxay Ujeedada Cilmi-baadhistu?

Ujeeddada cilmi baadhistanti waa in la fahmo sida is bedeladdii bulshada somaliyeed ku dhacay sanadhii u dhaxeeyay 1969-1988 u saameeyeen/u bedeleen una xoojiyey qabiilka iyo baadi-sooca dabaqadaha. Cilmi-baadhistani waxa ay si gaar ah u taabanaysaa ama u danaynaysaa fahanka iyo waayo arragnimada laga bartay is bedelada ku dhacay Kooxaha Beelaha Gabooye ee Somaliland. Cilmi-baadhistani waxa kale oo ujeeddadeedu tahay in ay baadhho tabashooyinka caddaladheed ee ay qabaan ama tirsanayaan beelaha gabooye ee Somaliland iyo sida Hay’addaha kala duwan ugu diyaarsanyihiin ay tabashooyinkoodaa wax ka qabtaan.

2. Maxaanu idinku dooranay?

Waxa aanu raadinaynaa 50 Qof oo iskugu jirra rag iyo dumarba, dadooduna ka sarayso 25 jir kuwaas oo ah bulshada Gabooye ee Hargeisa degan. Magacaga waxa na siiyay qof bulshadiina ka mid ah oo naga caawinayay cilmi-baadhista.
3. **Ma Qasabbaa in aan ka qayb qaato?**

Maya. Go’aanka ah in aad ka qayb qaadato iyo in aanad ka qayb qaadan adiga ayaa leh. Haddii aad ogolaato in aad ka qayb qaado, waxa lagu siin xaa shida xogta waxana lagaa codsan in aad saxeexdo foomka ogolaansha xog bixinta. Marka aad doonto ayad joqoon kartaa waray PGA sabab la’aan. Xogta lagaa qaaday ama aad bixisay adiga ayaa lagu weydiin doonaa sida aad jecehay in loo isticmaal.

4. **Maxaa igu dhacaya haddii aan ka qayb qaato?**

Waxa lagu weydiin in aad ka qayb qaado 45 daqiiqo ilaa 90 daqiiqo oo waraysi ah. Waxa kale oo aan ahayn ka qaybgalka waraysiga lagu weydiin maayo. Ka hor waraysiga waxa lagu siin doonaa foomka ogolaansha xog bixinta. Foomkaasina waxa uu xog dheeraad ah kaa siin doonaa nooca xogta lagaa doonayno, sida loo kaydinaayo iyo sida loo faafinayo.

5. **Miyaa layga duubayaa sideese loo isticmaalyaa xogta layga duubo?**

Waraysiga waa lagaga duubi doonaa. Xogta lagaa duubo waxa kaliya oo loo isticmaali doonaa lafa-gurka iyo faaqidaada cilm-baadhistan. Wax kale loo isticmaali maayo iyada oo ogolaansho rasmi ah lagaa helo mooyaane, cid ka baxsan cidda mashruuca cilm-baadhista waddana loo ogolaan maayo in ay hesho xogta lagaa duubay.

6. **Maxaa khasaare iyo khatar ah oo ay igu keeni kartaa ka qaybgalkeedu?**

Ka qaybgalka cilmi-baadhistani lagama yaabo in ay ku keento wax khatar ah ama halis oo aad ka walaacdo.

7. **Maxaa faa ideological ah oo aan ka helayaa ka qaybgalkeeda?**

Wax faaiedo ah oo shakhsi ahaan ka qayb qaatuhu uga helayo ka qaybgalka cilmi-baadhistani ma jirro. Waxase la filayaa ama la rajaynaya in ka qaybgalkaagoo saacido qaabaynta cilmi-baadhiso kale oo mustaqqalka laga sameeyo duroufaha bulshooyinka gabbooye haysta.

8. **Ka waran haddii wax Khaldamaan?**

Haddii aad cabasho ka qabto cilmi-baadhista marxaladda 1aad, waxad la xidhiidhi kartaa qof kasta oo ka mid ah kooxda cilmi-baadhista wadda. Haddii aad dareento in aad cabashadaddii waxa laga qaban ama aad ku qanci weydo waxad la xidhiidhi kartaa Guudoomiyaha Guuddida Anshaxa Cilmi-baadhista ee Jaamacadda UCL oo aad ciwaankan kala xidhiidhi karto: ethics@ucl.ac.uk

9. **Ka qaybgalkaygu Cilmi-baadhistu ma sir buu ahaanayaa?**
Dhammaan xogta lagaa helo inta cilmi-baadhistani socoto, si aad ah ayaa loo ilaalin doonaagga sirmimadeedaa. Lagu aqoonsan maayo. Si xaqiijiyo loona ilaaliyo aqoonsiga xogbixiyaha, waa la isticmaaligii doonaaggo hab aan la magac dhabayn xogbixiyaha oo sir ah. Xogta uu bixiyay xogbixiyuhu waa la tirtiri doonaaga. Sidoo kale dhammaan cajaladaha lagu duubay xogta waa laga masxi doonaaggo marka laga wareejiyo ee la turjumo.

10. Xadka Sirta

Fadlan ogaw in ilaalinta sirta xogbixiyaha la damaanad qaaday si aad ahna loo dhawri doono, haddii aan wax dhibaato ah ama qalad ah la ogaan. Haddii taasi dhacdana waa waxa waajib ah in lala xidhiidho hay’addaha ay khusayso.

11. Maxaa ku Dhico Doona Natiijadda Mashruuca Cilmi-baadhista


Marka cilmi-baadhistaan la dhamaystiro, waa aad fursad u heli in aad a hesho nuqul warbixintkama danbaysta ah oo English ah ama qayb kooban oo Somali ah.

12. Wargalinta Gaarka ah ee Ilaalinta Xogta

Cidda xogtaan dhowraysa waa Jaamacadda London ee UCL. Xafiiska dhowrista xogta ee Jaamacadda UCL ayaan la soconaya dhaqdhaqaqaqyada la xidhiidha raadinta xogaha shakhsiga ah waxana lagala soo xidhiidhi karaa data-protection@ucl.ac.uk. Sarkaalka dhowrista xogta ee Jaamacadda UCL waa Lee Shailer waxana sidoo kale lagala soo xidhiidhi karaa: data-protection@ucl.ac.uk. Xogta shakhsiga ah waxa loo maamulayaan ama loo adeegsan karaa oo kaliya sida lagu shegay wargalinta. Aasaaska sharci ee la adeegsanyo marka xogta shakhsiga ah la adeegsanayaan waa bixinta ogolaanshaha xogbixiyaha. Waxa aad ogolaansha isticmaalka xogtaada shakhsiga ah adiga oo dhamaystiraya foomka ogolaansha xogbixinta ee laguu dhiibay.

13. Xog dheeraad ah haddad u baahato la xidhiidh

Amina-Bahja Ekman iyo Dr. Michael Walls
a.ekman@ucl.ac.uk  m.walls@ucl.ac.uk
+2520633225675

Waad ku mahadsantahay akhrinta xaashidan xogta iyo kaqaybgalka cilmi-baadhistanba
Waxa lagu siin doonaanuqul xaashida xogta ah oo uu la socdo foomka ogolaanshuu
ma doonaysaa in aad ka qayb gasho.
Mahadsanid

Amina---Bahja,

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Appendix 2: Informed Consent form, Somali

Foomka Ogolaansha Xogbixiyaha Cilmi-baadhista

Fadlan dhamaystir foomkan marka aad akhrido xaashida xogta ama aad dhagaysato Sharaxaadda Cilmi-baadhista.

Ciwaanka/mawduuca Cilmi Baadhista: Lafa-gurka/Faaqidaada Sinaan-la’aanta Bulshada Somaliyeyd ka dhexjirta. Dib-eegista Dabaqaddaha iyo Baadi-sooca Bulshooyink Lahayb Sooco Somaliland

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Email: m.walls@ucl.ac.uk
Magaca iyo xogta sarkaalka dhawra xogta

Magaca Data Protection Officer: Lee Shailer
Email: data--protection@ucl.ac.uk.

Cilmi-baadhistan waxa ansixiyay Guidda Anshaxa Cilmi-baadhista ee Jaamacadda UCL: Lambarka Cilmi-baadhista: 12393/001


Magaca Cilmi-baadhaha Tariikh Saxeex

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<table>
<thead>
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<th>Lambarka</th>
<th>Calaamad</th>
</tr>
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| 1.       | • Waxan cadaynaya in aan akhriyay isla markaana fahmay xaashida xogta cilmi-baadhista.  
          • Waxan fursad u helay in aan darso xogta iyo waxa layga doonayaba.  
          • Waxan sidoo kale fursad u helay in aan weydiiyo su’aalaha aan ka jawaabayo, waxaan aan jecelhaye in aan ka qaybgalo waraysi shakhsi ah. |
| 2.       | • Waan fahmayaa in aan awooddo in aan la noqdo xogta aan bixiyo afar todobaad gudahood markii aan waraysgiga bixiyay. |
| 3.       | • Ogolaansha in la ogaado xogtayda shakhsiga ah sida meeshaan deganahay, dadayda iyo lab iyo dhagiikaa kaajay ku saabsan ilaalinta xogta. |
| 4.       | Xogta lagu helo waraysiga waxa lagu haynayaa hab dhaqaysi ah. Dhammaan xogtayda laga helo mid dhawrsan ay ay noqonaysaa (waxa laga saari doonaa wax kasta oo qofka lagu aqoonsanay).  
          • Waxan fahmayaa in xogta shakhsiga ahi noqonayso mid dhawrsan, dadaal kasta oo la sameeyana aan lay aqoonsan doonin.  
          • Waxan fahmayaa in xogtayda lagu ururiyay cilmi-baadhistan si sugan oo magac dhabis lahayn. Suurta galna maaha in aygu aqoonsado ama garto daabacaad kasta oo la sameeyo. |
| 5.       | Waxaan fahmayaa in xogayda ay dib u eegi karaan masuuliytiin xilka ah oo ka socda jaamacaddu. |
          • Waxaan fahsanahay haddii aan waraysgiga ka baxo, in xogtii aan bixiyay la tirtiri doono haddii aadan anigu u ogolaan in la isticmaali karro. |
<p>| 7.       | Waxan fahsanahay khatarta ay yeelan karto ka qaybgalkaygu iyo taageerada aan helay haddii dhibaato i soo wajahdo inta cilmi-i-baadhistu socoto. |
| 8.       | Waxaan fahmayaa in aan waxba laygu siinayn ka qaybgalka waraysigan. |
| 10.      | Waxan fahmayaa in aan faa’iido dhaqale ka heli doonin cilmi-baadhista ama maxsuul kasta ka dhasha mustaqbalka. |
| 11.      | Waan ogolahay in xogta aan bixiyo loo isticmaali karro cilmi-baadhisaha mustaqbalka iyadoon magacayga la adeegsanayn. Tan |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>macnaheedu waxa weeyi cid awood u leh in ay ku aqoonsataa ma jirto marka xagtadaada lala wadaago.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Waxan fahmayaa in xogta iyo maclumaadka aan guubiyo la daabici doono isaga oo warbixin ah waxanana rajaynayaa in aan nuqul kooban ka heli doono. Haa/Maya.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 13. | Waan ogolaaday in waraysigan layga duub, waxanana fahansanahay in codayga la duubay:  
  - La tirtiri doono makra laga wareejiyo.  
  - Ogaw: Xataa haddii aanad ogolayn in cod lagaa duub, wali waad ka qayb qaadan kartaa cilmi-baadhistaa. |
| 14. | Waxan halkan ku xaqiijinaya in aan fahmaya shuruudaha ku soo darista la waraysteeyaasha sida ku cad xaashida xogta ee uu cilmi-baadhuhi u ilaa sharaxay. |
| 15. | Cilmi-baadhaha waan u sheegay cilmi baadhis aan wakhti xaadirkan ku jirro ama aan ka qayb galay 12 bilood ee u danbeeyay. |
| 16. | Waan ogahay ama ka war hayaa cidda aan la xidhiidhayo haddii aan cabsho qabo. |
| 17. | Si iskay ah ayaan uga qayb qaadanayaa cilmi-baadhistan. |
| 18. | Xogta la soo ururiyo waxa loo isticmaali doonaa arrimo cilmi-baadhiseed uun, waana la tirtiri doonaa marka la isticmaalo iyada oo magaca iyo sir-nimadeedba la ilalinayo. Dhammaan canjaladaha la duubay waa laga masixi doonaa marka xogta laga qoro ee la turjumo.  
Waan ku faraxsanaahay in xogta aan idin siiyay lagu kaydiyo kombuyuutar laptop ah iyo/ama xarunta dheexe ee lagu kaydiyo xogaha ee Jaamacadda UCL. |

Haddii aad jeceshay in aanu haysano faahfaahinta halka lagaala soo xidhiidhayo, si ay kuula xidhiidhaan cilmi-baadhayaasha Jaamacadda UCL ee laga yaabo mustaqbalka in ay cilmi-baadhisaa ka sameeyaan kuguna kuguna martiqaadaan in aad ka qaybgasho la socodka cilmi-baadhistaan ama in cilmi-baadhisaha la nooca ah ee mustaqbalka, fadlan calaamadi meesha loogu talo galay calaamadda.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Haa, waxan jeclaan laaha in sidan La iila soo xidhiidho.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maya, ma jecli in la ila soo xidhiidho.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Magaca kaqaybgalaha Tariikh Saxex
Appendix 3: Research Instrument, Somali

Waaxda Qorshaynta Hormarka
Kuliyadda Dhismaha Deegaanka

Ciwaanka/mawduuca Cilmi Baadhista: Sinaan-la’aanta Bulshada Somaliyeed ka dhexjirta. Dib-eegista Dabaqaddaha iyo Baadi-sooca Bulshooyink Lahayb Sooco ee Somaliland

1. Ma ii sheegi kartaa sinaan-la’aanta Somaliland ka jirta?
2. Sinaan-la’aantani xagay ka soo jeedaa asal ahaan?
3. Siday u muuqataa ama loo muujiyaan sinaan-la’aantan ficil ahaan?
4. Yaa la kulma sinaan la’aantan?
5. Maxaad uu malaynaysaa in ay sabab u tahay in dadkani la kulmaan sinaan-la’aan ee dadka kale ula kulmi waayeen?
6. Ma ii sheegi kartaa Qaab-dhismeedka ee qabiilka ee bulshada Somaliyeed?
7. Qabiilku muxu uu tarraa bulshada somaliyeed dhexdeeda?
8. Qaab-dhismeedka qabilka ihi side loga dhex arki karaa bulshada?
9. Qaab-dhismeedka qabiilka aya keenaa sinaan-la’aanta ama caddaalad daradd?
10. Waa maxay xidhiidhka ka dhaxeeya qabiilka iyo shaqada qofka Somaliland gudaheeda?
11. Waa maxay dhibatade uu guu weyn eek u dhacaa ee dadka aan ku jirrin qaabshismeedka beelaha ama kuwa tirddada laga weyneyey?
12. Sinaan-la’aantaas sidee bay xeerkanka dalku uga hadleen ama maxay ka qaban?
13. Ma ii sheegi kartaa muhiimada diinta islaam Somaliland gudaheeda?
14. Ma sheegi karta Quranka kariimka ihi waxa uu ka qabo sinaanla’aanta ama caddaalad darrada?
15. Quraanka iyo Shareecadda islaamku maxay ka yidhahdaan sinaan-la’aanta?
16. Hogaamiyeyaasha diinta iyo kuwa dhaqanka iy doowlada maxeey uu tarran dadka ay sinaan-la’aantu saamaysay?
17. Ma la odhan karaa qabiilka iyo dhaqanka ayaa ka muhiimsan diinta Somaliland dhexdeeda?
18. Wax ma iiga sheegi kartaa taariikhda beesha Gabooye?
19. Ma ii sheegi kartaa xidhiidhka beesha Gabooye la leedahay beelaha kale ee Somaliland?
20. Xidhiidhkani miyuu is bedelay ama isbedel ku yimid?
22. Haddii uu bedelay, ilaa intee in leeg buu bedelay?
23. Miyuu bedeley ku yimi nolosha beesha Gabooye?
24. Haddii uu saameeyay, ilaa intee in leeg buu saameeyay?
25. Gabooye ma koox qabiil ah mise waa arrin la xidhiidha dabaqad? Ama labadaba?
26. Waa maxay tabashooyinka caddaaladeed ee bulshada Gabooye maanta qabaan?
27. Maxay doorka hogaamiyeyaasha siyaasadda ee kor u qaadista caddaalada uu tarran beesha Gabooye?
28. Sidee magdhow looga siiyaa caddaalad darrooyinka ku dhaca oo hay’addaha dawladda Somaliland u siiyaan bulshada la hayb sooco?
29. Xeerarka Somaliland laga isticmaalo ee kala ah Shareecadda islaamka, xeerarka iyo dhaqanka, kee baad u malaynaysaa in bulshad gabooye caddaalad ku heli karto?
Appendix 4: Information Sheet, English

You will be given a copy of this information sheet.


This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee (Project ID Number): 12393/001

Name Amina-Bahja Ekman,
Work Address 48 Gordon Square, LONDON, WC1H 0AG, United Kingdom
Contact Details a.ekman@ucl.ac.uk

We would like to invite you to participate in this research project.

Details of Study:

The objective of the research is to critically explore and describe how changes in the Somali political economy during 1969-1988 have reinforced socio-economic and political status of clan groups in Somaliland thus affecting their Participation Parity. Secondly, this research aims to explore the types of justice claims made by members of from the Gabooye clan group in todays Somaliland and the institutional spaces available to have those claims redressed.

This research is based on in-depth semi-structured individual and key informants interviews with participants from the Gabooye clan group, non-governmental officials and governmental officials in Hargeysa, Somaliland. The interviews will vary across categorisation bands (gender and age) and each interview will be approx. 60 minute, semi-structured and held in Somali and/or English.

Once the research is completed you will have the opportunity to get a copy of the final report in English and/or an abstracted summary in Somali.

All data will be collected and stored in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998.

Thank you for reading this information sheet and for considering taking part in this research.
Appendix 5: Informed Consent Form English

Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and/or listened to an explanation about the research.


This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee (Project ID Number): 12393/001

Thank you for your interest in taking part in this research. Before you agree to take part, the person organising the research must explain the project to you.

If you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or explanation already given to you, please ask the researcher before you decide whether to join or not. You will be given a copy of this Consent Form to keep and refer to at any time.

**Participant’s Statement**

Before agreeing to participate in this research, please ensure the you hear and understand each of the following points:

- The nature of the research has been clearly explained to me.
- I understand that the audio of my interview/participation will be recorded, and I consent to use of this material as part of the project.
- I understand that the information I have submitted will be published as a report and that a copy will be available to me.
- I understand that the confidentiality of my responses and my anonymity will be maintained and it will not be possible to identify me from any publications.
- I agree that my non-personal research data (e.g. age band, gender) may be used by others for future research.
- I am assured that the confidentiality of my personal data will be maintained because all personally-identifying data will be removed.
- Agree that my data, after it has been fully anonymised, can be shared with other researchers.

Signed: 

Date:
Appendix 6: Research instrument, English


1. Can you tell me about the nature of inequality in Somaliland?
2. Does this inequality have an origin?
3. How is it expressed in practice?
4. Who experiences inequality?
5. Why do you think that these individuals are more likely to experience inequality than other individuals or groups in society?
6. What is the function of Clan in Somali society?
7. Are the structures of Clan visible in society, if so how?
8. Do the structures of clan create inequality?
9. What is the link between clan and occupation in Somaliland?
10. What are the main obstacles, socio-economically and politically, for individuals that lie outside of the traditional clan structure?
11. How is inequality addressed in the Xeer?
12. Can you tell me about the importance of Islam in Somaliland?
13. Can you describe what the Holy Qur’an says about inequality?
14. How is inequality addressed in the Holy Qur’an and the Shari’a?
15. What is the role of the religious leaders and clan elders in promoting or obstructing Social Justice for those affected by inequality?
16. Would you say that clan and tradition is more important than religion in Somaliland, if so how?
17. Can you describe the history of the Gabooye?
18. Can you describe the Gabooye’s relationship with other groups/clans in Somaliland?
19. Has this relationship changed and if so, how?
20. Did the changes in the Somali society in 1969-1988 maintain clan and class identity in Somaliland?
21. If so, how?
22. Did the changes in the Somali political economy in 1969-1988 affect the everyday life of Gabooye clan members?
23. If so, how?
24. Are the Gabooye a clan group or is it an issue of class? Or both?
25. What types of claims to justice do members of minority clans in Somaliland make today?
26. What is the role of the political leaders in promoting or obstructing the Social Justice for members of the Gabooye clan?
27. What kind of remedies for injustice do institutions in Somaliland provide for minorities?
28. From which institutions (Xeer, Shari’a or state) do you think that members from the Gabooye can best gain equal rights?
Appendix 7: List of interview respondents referenced in the thesis

All interviews conducted by Amina-Bahja Ekman in Hargeysa, Somaliland between April and September 2018.

Type of interviews: Key individual interviews and group interviews.

Total number of interviews: 22 Individual and 7 group interviews with a total of 38 Participants.

List of interviews and quotes from transcripts used in thesis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview nr.</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Form of interview</th>
<th>Target group</th>
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Codes for sample categorisation and anonymisation

< /” Younger than”
>/” Older than”

KI – Key Informant interview
GR – Group interview
T1– Target Group 1
T2 - Target Group 2
### Appendix 8: List of all interviews conducted

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<th>Interview nr.</th>
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</table>
Codes for sample categorisation and respondent anonymisation

<”Younger than”
/> “Older than”

KI – Key Informant interview
GR – Group interview
T1– Target Group 1
T2 - Target Group 2

Författare: Ekman, Amina-Bahja

Nyttelord: 

Datum: 2021-02-09 19:15:00
Version: 1
Senast sparad: 2021-02-09 19:15:00
Senast sparad av: 
Total redigeringstid: 0 minuter
Senast utskrivet: 2020-08-07 23:06:00
Vid senaste fullständiga utskrift
Antal sidor: 297
Antal ord: 100 942 (cirka)
Antal tecken: 534 998 (cirka)