COVID-19 and public sector capacity

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Abstract: The paper argues that to govern a pandemic, governments require dynamic capabilities and capacity—too often missing. These include capacity to adapt and learn; capacity to align public services and citizen needs; capacity to govern resilient production systems; and capacity to govern data and digital platforms.

Key words: COVID-19, public sector capacity, dynamic capabilities

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1. INTRODUCTION

The COVID-19 pandemic presents a massive challenge to governments world-wide – from the provision of income support to citizens and aid to struggling companies to the strengthening of frontline health services. It also requires an unprecedented level of collaboration between nations – from the race for a vaccine to learning how to test and trace. One of the biggest lessons is that state capacity to manage a crisis of this proportion is dependent on the cumulative investments that a state has made on its ability to govern, do and manage. While the crisis is serious for all, it is especially a challenge for countries that have ignored those needed investments in what we can call the ‘dynamic capabilities of the public sector’ (Kattel and Mazzucato 2018).

In the pre-COVID-19 world, governments were increasingly turning their attention to how to tackle ‘grand challenges’ or ‘wicked issues’ such as climate change, demographic challenges, and the promotion of health and wellbeing (Mazzucato 2018b, c). Behind these challenges lie the difficulties of generating sustainable and inclusive growth. Policy-makers increasingly dedicated their attentions to not only the rate of economic growth, but also its direction (Mazzucato and Perez 2015). Tackling grand challenges requires revitalising private and public investment, innovation and collaboration. It is not about more state or less state, but a different type of state: one that is able to act as an investor of first resort, catalysing new types of growth, and in so doing crowd in private-sector investment and innovation – these are in essence functions about expectations about future growth areas. This requires a new form of collaboration between state and business, and is more about picking the willing than picking winners (Mazzucato 2013).

COVID-19 has magnified and accelerated the need for challenge-led policy frameworks. The pandemic and its aftermath offer an opportunity to rethink our (economic) policy foundations and to align them with the needs of the 21st century. The COVID-19 crisis has underlined the importance of public sector capacity and capabilities to handle emergencies, and the particular capabilities required to solve societal challenges—most visibly the protection of public health. The pandemic has also, however, underlined the importance of public sector as market shaper—not only market fixer (Mazzucato 2016).

The public sector bears responsibility for the long-term resilience and stability of societies, and for shaping public outcomes through policy-making and public institutions. Public sector capacity is typically defined as the set of skills, capabilities and resources necessary to perform policy functions, from the provision of public services to policy design and implementation (Wu et al. 2018).¹ We

¹ See also Karo and Kattel (2018); Kattel and Mazzucato (2018).
argue that the pandemic has shown the areas in which capacities are critical for governments in the aftermath of the crisis and in rebuilding economies and societies: namely, capacity to adapt and learn; capacity to align public services and citizen needs; capacity to govern resilient production systems; and capacity to govern data and digital platforms.

Fundamentally, government intervention is only effective if the state has the corresponding capabilities to act. Far from retrenching to the role of being at best a market fixer and at worst an outsourcer, governments should invest in building their muscle in critical areas, such as productive capacity, procurement capabilities, symbiotic public-private collaborations that genuinely serve the public interest, and digital and data expertise (while safeguarding privacy and security). History shows that without this, governments are not even able to devise good ‘terms of reference’ for the companies to which they outsourc (Schick 2001).

In this article we briefly summarise how governments have responded to the pandemic and then discuss the implications for public sector capacity in the post-COVID-19 world. We argue that to prepare for future pandemics, governments must build dynamic capabilities in the following areas: capacity to adapt and learn; capacity to align public services and citizen needs; capacity to govern resilient production systems; and capacity to govern data and digital platforms.

2. COVID-19 RESPONSES

COVID-19 is a huge test of governments’ capacity to lead societies through crisis. Countries around the world have dedicated US$8 trillion, and counting, to relief packages with fiscal support or credit and equity injections (Gaspar et al. 2020). The crisis has affected a number of countries disproportionately due to different degrees of preparation, foresight and public sector capacities to steer economic activity. Countries like the US and the UK, in particular, have realised how vulnerable their production and public health systems are, and how difficult it is to ramp up production and coordinate supply chains for food, medicine, ventilators, protective equipment and test kits. In these economies, the pandemic has pointed to the damage that managerial reforms in the public sector, such as outsourcing and financialisation of the economy, have caused to the resilience of socio-economic systems. Before the crisis, many corporations in the US and UK, in particular, had been more occupied with financialised practices to maximise value for shareholders, rather than solving societal problems and prioritising their broader stakeholders (Lazonick and Mazzucato 2013).

Other countries, such as Germany and South Korea, have shown much more resilience in their production and health systems, thanks to the capacity of their governments to coordinate private-
sector activity and largely public ownership of critical health system elements. Impressive test capacity in Germany and South Korea was made possible by the existence of public laboratories and the presence of industries that could supply the required safety equipment and chemicals (Chazan 2020 for Germany; Thompson 2020 for South Korea). Countries in Southeast Asia with relatively recent experiences in tackling SARS were quick to respond with large-scale tracking of infections, and the establishment of travel limitations and social distancing rules (Leadbeater et al. 2020). In Germany, learning from managing floods and influenza during the last two decades has led to operational emergency plans and risk analyses for pandemics and floods being available since 2013 (Bouckaert et al. 2020).

There are also success stories in emerging markets. In India, while the national response has been a failure in many ways, the state of Kerala’s successful response to the crisis is also the result of long-term investment in the health sector (including the protocols put in place after the Nipah virus outbreak) and a successful public-private partnership model (Mazzucato and Quaggioitto 2020). In Vietnam, the government was quick to recognize the complexity of the problem, closed its borders early and rapidly spurred the development of low-cost test kits (Klingler-Vidra et al. 2020). Eastern European countries were quick to emulate successful crisis-response practices from Southeast Asia and quickly closed borders, shut down large parts of public activity and often made masks mandatory in public (Shotter and Jones 2020).

Yet many developing countries have been caught in a damaging financial feedback loop unleashed by the pandemic. The global economic breakdown has reduced the export and tourist revenues that are required to service their external debt commitments, and there is a need for internationally coordinated action to help these countries (Ghosh 2020).

In addition to very high and sudden pressure on health systems, the pandemic has also created a dramatic increase in the demand for essential medical supplies, particularly personal protective equipment (PPE) for health workers, ventilators and pharmaceuticals. PPE is vital to protecting health workers from infections and enabling them to do their work safely.

Globally, the World Health Organization estimates that 89 million medical masks, 76 million examination gloves and 1.6 million goggles are needed every month as the world battles the pandemic.² In the UK alone, where 14 million items are used on a daily basis, demand for some items increased 5,000 per cent overnight (NHS Providers 2020). Similar to the story of PPE, the

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² For further details see: https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/03-03-2020-shortage-of-personal-protective-equipment-endangering-health-workers-worldwide.
demand increased dramatically for ventilators and for pharmaceuticals that alleviate the symptoms of COVID-19.

In response to this global crisis, the magnitude of public investment in the health sector has multiplied and gone global. According to one of the most comprehensive (although incomplete) surveys of global R&D funding for COVID-19, public-sector investment from the governments of 28 countries and a supranational union that it captures has totalled $7.7 billion as of 9 June 2020, of which $4.4 billion is dedicated to vaccine development.3

In order to support employment, a wide range of countries have authorised direct payments to firms to subsidise wages – including Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, Estonia, Poland, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, the UK—in order to preserve productive capacity while maintaining household incomes. Automatic stabilising mechanisms, such as existing welfare state systems and labour market institutions, have played key roles in enabling rapid responses. For instance, Germany’s short-term employment scheme, which supports workers’ wages when companies have to reduce work hours (the so-called Kurzarbeit), has enabled the country to keep unemployment from increasing rapidly. By May 2020 there were over 10 million people enrolled in Germany’s employment support scheme (Ojeda-Sierra and Coulton 2020).

Some countries are lending to companies with no strings attached, while Germany and the UK, for instance, are ready to take ownership stakes in ailing companies (Macfarlane and Gasperin 2020). Denmark, for example, has specified that companies receiving state aid cannot be domiciled in any of the EU’s recognised tax havens and that large recipients cannot pay dividends or buy back their own shares until 2021. However, large portions of government support are also being operationalised through central bank operations, where there is often no conditionality attached (Mazzucato and Andreoni, 2020).

Some countries are taking bold action in rethinking the industrial policy space. In Germany, for instance, the government is planning to launch new policies that allow government to buy strategic ownerships in companies, and limit foreign mergers and acquisitions of German companies (Dettmer et al. 2020).

When it comes to data and digital, governments have also performed very differently in the COVID-19 crisis, showing once again that throwing money at the problem is not a viable solution if core capacities and capabilities are not there, or have been outsourced. In East Asia, Singapore – after investing heavily in its government digital service unit – has utilised tracking applications to trace the

3 Policy Cures Research funding tracker is available here: https://www.policycuresresearch.org/covid-19-r-d-tracker.
viral spread; South Korea adopted a very aggressive high-tech tracking approach (a result of completely redrawing its pandemic response legislation after the SARS debacle), but the government also opened up real-time data on mask stocks and pharmacy locations, so that start-ups and citizens were able to build a number of add-on services that helped ensure a more effective and safe distribution (Mazzucato and Quaggiotto 2020). It is telling that many Western governments are very slow to react as their legal and technical infrastructure around data is insufficiently developed. The UK, for instance, is still only testing a tracing app in June 2020.

The lockdown from COVID-19 has shown how deep existing digital divides are by revealing which jobs and services can be provided or performed remotely and which cannot, and it has also created new ones. Education has taken centre stage with the demand for students to continue to be schooled through digital means. However, while education can be delivered remotely – whether through online pre-recorded videos or live sessions – not all students have the same means, quality or availability of access to online services and a proper work environment. While education is far from the only sector with access issues, it reflects the broader problem of global digital inequality in terms of access and the restriction of fundamental opportunities to participate in society under COVID-19.

3. DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR: AGILITY AND RESILIENCE ARE KEY

During pandemics, governments must respond to emergencies by organising rapid responses and mobilising resources. Effective governance requires capacities and capabilities for both agility and resilience (Drechsler and Kattel 2020). Unfortunately, these are not only missing in reality, they are also missing in the theory about government.

Public sector capacity is typically defined as the set of skills, capabilities and resources necessary to perform policy functions, from the provision of public services to policy design and implementation (Wu et al. 2018).\(^4\) The most comprehensive literature review of dynamic capabilities in the public sector to date (Piening 2013) shows that our existing frameworks focus on exogenous sources of dynamism. Similarly, entrepreneurial approach to strategy and leadership in public-sector organisations tends to focus on the importance of individual leaders and teams in driving strategic initiatives (Ongaro and Ferlie 2020). Thus, the capacities associated with the public sector tend to be

\(^4\) See also Karo and Kattel (2018); Kattel and Mazzucato (2018).
narrow and focus on stability (i.e. continuity, transparency, predictability of services and interventions).

Yet, while there is a rich literature about firm-level dynamic capabilities (Teece and Pisano 1994), insufficient attention has been paid to where the equivalent level of public sector capacity comes from and its dynamic evolution over time. Instead, over the years the idea that the public sector should at best fix market failures and seek the same level of efficiency in the private sector has taken hold (Buchanan 2003). An approach wedded to static efficiency and ‘fixing’ does not justify the investment in the internal capabilities to co-create value (Mazzucato 2018a).

This type of thinking has mainly been influenced by public choice theory and the development of new public management (NPM), or new public administration, in US business schools. NPM, which gathered momentum in the 1980s, basically argued that governments should adopt private-sector strategies to maximise value in the public sector (Hood 1991). Several strategies were high on the NPM list. One was introducing some equivalent of the profit motive into the public sector to improve performance – for example, efficiency targets. An example of this kind of thinking was UK legislation in 1990 to create an internal market in the National Health Service (NHS), under which the state became a purchaser instead of a provider of health services and external suppliers could bid against NHS suppliers to provide certain services as part of the NHS.

Another strategy was contracting out, franchising or privatising government services. The purpose here was to address the principal-agent problem: citizens (the principals) could not hold public-sector employees (their agents) accountable in the way shareholders could hold a corporation’s managers accountable – in theory at least. Citizens’ main sanction in a democratic society was voting, which might have only an indirect effect on bureaucrats (and did not apply in autocratic societies) and was a poor substitute for the discipline of the profit motive by which shareholders could judge corporate managers. To the extent that accountability and the discipline of the profit motive were held to be weaker in the public sector than in the private sector, the public sector was likely to be less efficient. And there was the idea that government should limit itself to technical efforts to counter ‘market failure’, such as building codes, which would minimise government failure and enhance public-sector efficiency by introducing market discipline (Lane 2002).

NPM policies were widely implemented in advanced economies in the 1980s and 1990s, in particular in the UK, New Zealand and Australia (Hood 1995). By the mid-1990s, however, concerns were growing about its effectiveness (Drechsler 2005). Yet, as Lapuente and Van de Walle have recently argued, ‘Administrations all over the globe have taken measures in the three main themes of NPM: competition between public and private providers, incentives to public employees and the
disaggregation of public organisations’ (2020). Deregulation, shareholder value and new government practices, such as setting up arm’s-length agencies and outsourcing, did not always work as well as theory said they should. Since then, while there have been attempts at going beyond NPM (Moore 2013), a proper framework has not been developed that can understand how the state is responsible not only for fixing markets but also for shaping and co-creating them—and the capabilities needed to do that (Mazzucato et al. 2020). We argue key capacities and respective dynamic capabilities must be built and nurtured within public sector organisations (see also Meijer 2019).

(i) Capacity to adapt and learn

While the COVID-19 responses have shown how vital both long-term and short-term capacities and capabilities are in the public sector, the last half-century has been characterised by a retrenchment of governments’ ability to adapt and learn as both functions have been increasingly outsourced. Outsourcing in itself is not a problem as long as governments remain capable, if foresight and risk-preparedness capabilities are maintained and if the underlying ‘partnerships’ with the private sector are truly designed in the public interest. The irony is that the extensive outsourcing has even damaged governments’ abilities to structure contracts with well-formulated terms of reference, as the Ventilator Challenge debacle in the UK has shown.

Yet, NPM has failed to deliver on its promise to cut costs. For instance, Hood and Dixon (2015) have found that despite three decades of outsourcing and much-hyped NPM initiatives, civil service staff costs were about the same in real terms in 2012-13 as they had been over 30 years earlier.

Furthermore, all countries have not been equally subsumed by NPM reforms. As Pollitt and Bouckaert argued almost a decade ago, some leading OECD countries have attempted to transcend NPM reforms by supplementing them via returning to key Weberian values such as rule by law, expertise and merit (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; see also Drechsler and Kattel 2009). Prior to the COVID-19 crisis, leading public administrations among developed economies were in essence neo-Weberian (e.g. countries such as New Zealand and Singapore), while many others suffered from the negative effects of NPM reforms. The COVID-19 responses show that countries tend to revert to their dominant existing routines regarding underlying capacities: for instance, while the UK seeks to largely outsource the response to the pandemic, Singapore or Germany rely strongly on public actors.
(ii) Capacity to align public services and citizen needs

Public services have been a frequent target of NPM reforms, in particular health care, since it is often a large, cost-driving branch of the public sector with certain similarities to private services, e.g. production of individual services and a certain scope for standardisation and quantitative monitoring of production. Yet, there is no evidence that such reforms have led to improved outcomes (Simonet 2011). Rather, they have led to a more transactional view of public services that focuses on the ease and efficiency of delivery rather than on satisfying substantive needs or developing human capabilities (Cottam 2018).

The UK has been a forerunner in implementing NPM in the public sector. The UK government has become increasingly reliant on external consultancy for managing the state, particularly since 2002 (Weiss 2019). The NHS has trebled spending on management consultants during 2016–19, despite pledges by successive health secretaries to curb such expenditures (Oliver 2019). The COVID-19 crisis has been used as an occasion to further outsource core public health tasks to private firms, increasing the likelihood that the public sector will learn only limited lessons and become more dependent on the private sector for future emergencies (Garside and Neate 2020).

(iii) Capacity to govern resilient production systems

It is much less discussed that innovation policy as it is practised today and NPM reforms burst on to the (Western) policy stage at the same time in the early 1980s (Rothwell and Zegveld 1981; Sweeney 1985). This was, and is, an uneasy marriage: many of the criticisms of innovation policy, particularly its ineffectiveness in delivering greener and more inclusive growth, have to do with the NPM practices underlying it (Karo and Kattel 2014). This is due to the overall emphasis of NPM reforms on financial cost-efficiency at the expense of, paradoxically, both long-term vision-setting (extending beyond normal/accepted project and performance management frameworks) and the ability to take onboard the uncertainties and risks of innovation (that cannot be ex ante codified into project and performance contracts).

Since the early 1990s, innovation policy focused on short-term efficiencies and fixing market failures (static inefficiencies) has been complemented by increased trade liberalisations. Together, these factors have played a key role in the increased vulnerability of production value and supply chains in many countries (Andreoni et al. 2019). Since the early 2000s, new global rules have become even more stringent and the combined use of intellectual property, dispute regulations and non-tariff barriers have limited the policy space—and hence capacities—of developing and emerging economies (Wade 2003; Andreoni et al. 2019).
(iv) Capacity to govern data and digital platforms

NPM reforms led many governments to outsource their IT functions, which has had a harmful effect on governments’ digital capacities and capabilities. Comparing a range of countries, Dunleavy et al. (2006) found that countries with the most enthusiastic uptake of NPM had fared particularly poorly in exploiting digitalisation, with the UK emerging as ‘a world leader in ineffective IT schemes for government’. By hollowing out public-sector capabilities and bringing in new contractually based risks and barriers to cross-government policy-making, NPM has drastically impaired government IT modernisation.

Today governments are creating platforms to identify citizens, collect taxes and provide public services. Owing to concerns in the early days of the Internet about official misuse of data, much of the current data architecture was built by private companies. But government platforms now have enormous potential to improve the efficiency of the public sector and to democritise the platform economy (Cordella and Paletti 2019). To realise the potential of government platforms, we will need to rethink the governance of data, develop new institutions and, given the dynamics of the platform economy, experiment with alternative forms of ownership. To take just one of many examples, the data that one generates when using Google Maps, Uber or Citymapper—or any other platform that relies on taxpayer-funded technologies—could be deployed to improve public transportation, traffic patterns and other services, rather than simply monetised for private profits.

4. CAPACITY-BUILDING FOR THE POST-COVID-19 WORLD

In order to (re-)build public sector capacities for the post-COVID-19 world, we argue that we need to theorise public sector from a new perspective: government as actively shaping markets rather than simply fixing failures. Such fundamental frameworks matter as they constitute the policy reality within which politicians and civil servants act. Current theoretical frameworks for public sector capacity are derived from neoclassical economic theory, in particular microeconomic theory and welfare economics, emphasising how individuals find optimal solutions via markets. Governments have a role to play if, and only if, markets are proven not to deliver optimal results and need ‘fixing’. In practice, such frameworks take the form of specific policy analytical tools, such as static ex ante cost-benefit analysis, which weigh up monetised benefits and costs (Kattel et al. 2018). Costs (including the costs of potential government failure) are usually defined by their opportunity cost; that is, the value that reflects the best alternative use a good or service could be put to (including a do-nothing/business-as-usual option), with all else (including all other prices) assumed equal, and
with market prices usually the starting point for the analysis (see, for example, HM Treasury (2018, p. 6)).

Such policy frameworks are mostly aimed at preventing costly government failures; by their very nature, they cannot tell us very much at all about proactive market creating and shaping; nor how and what kind of capacities governments should build. This limitation is of crucial importance. Public policies aimed at accelerating innovation and changing its directionality (i.e. towards more sustainable and inclusive growth) create, by definition, new technologies and radically change the prices, availability, and existence of goods and services. Their central purpose is to transform underlying relationships, a wide range of prices and the broader environment (OECD 2015). By always comparing the policy intervention with the status quo and emphasising short-term risks, existing policy frameworks and approaches encourage decision-makers to prefer small-scale, marginal interventions and the development of respective capacities.

Take a green-directed transition as an example: policies must go beyond independent initiatives and discrete approaches, and be characterised by a new lens for economy-wide growth. Markets will not find a green direction on their own. There is not yet a ready-made route that will make multi-directional, experimental, green innovation profitable. Only when there is a stable and consistent direction for investment will regulation and innovation converge along a green trajectory. The transition must be underpinned by long-term, patient finance, which is willing to take risks, and able to mobilise and crowd in other investors (Mazzucato and Semieniuk 2018). To avoid innovation continuing its route of locking to a high-carbon path, and to actively turn our backs on stagnant innovation landscapes, policy must ensure that investments into low-carbon innovation are rewarded. This can be done by using the full array of government instruments – from procurement policy to prize schemes – to ‘pick the willing’: those organisations willing to take on the difficult investment required for a green transition. Governments cannot micromanage this process, as that would stifle innovation, but they can set a clear direction, make the initial high-risk bold investments which crowd in private actors later on, and reward those who are willing to invest and innovate.

Another example is digital technologies. They provide great opportunities to solve grand challenges if governed with a strong sense of public purpose (Perez 2019). The key risk to this potential offered by artificial intelligence and other technologies lies not in the pace of their development, but in how and for what purpose they are designed and deployed (Mazzucato 2019). COVID-19 has brought to the fore long-held concerns about the digital economy: the monopoly power of big tech, the lack of privacy, poor government capabilities, and the digital divide between those with and without access. There is a vast potential for governments to change course and steer digitalisation towards
deliberate ends, and away from the current motives of targeted advertisement and behaviour modification based on monetising personal information. On a fundamental level, the digitalisation of society should be undergirded by revising our social contracts for the digital era with new, adequate rights and new governance structures to uphold them (Bria 2020).

Governments need to counteract the hollowing out of public organisations’ ability to steer and analyse their own domain. The lack of investment in in-house public capabilities has resulted in the loss of institutional memory and an increased dependence on consulting companies. Crucially, talented people are motivated not just by high salaries, but also by the prospect of being able to apply their skills for the advancement of the common good through challenging analytical work. Outsourcing has voided many government agencies of such challenging and motivating tasks. Furthermore, incentives for risk-taking and experimentalism can be put in place in order to foster an environment where failure and learning from failure are not only permissible, but encouraged. Agile bureaucracies require highly motivated, high-capacity (career) civil servants (Drechsler and Kattel 2020).

Perhaps somewhat counterintuitively, investment in long-term skills and capabilities within public organisations provides sources of agility and responsiveness during deep crises and their aftermath. It is no coincidence that another pandemic response success story comes from New Zealand, a country that in the 1980s had fully embraced the new public management outsourcing mantra, only to change course and begin a period of insourcing capacity back into government (Warner 2008). Perhaps not surprisingly, in early June 2020 it also became the first country in the world to be free of COVID-19.

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The contrasting trajectories of the COVID-19 response in the US and UK, and countries such as Germany, New Zealand, Vietnam or South Korea, point to important lessons for the future. Far from retrenching to the role of being at best a market fixer and at worst an outsourcer, governments should invest in building their muscle in critical areas such as capacity to adapt and learn; capacity to align public services and citizen needs; capacity to govern resilient production systems; and capacity to govern data and digital platforms. A broad set of capabilities can be quickly activated in times of ‘forced experimentation’ induced by crises and turned into intentional experimentation for long-term recovery purposes through a challenge-driven approach—that is, public-private partnerships aimed at solving key societal problems, from those related to health to those on the climate or the
digital divide (Mazzucato 2018b). A challenge-driven approach, however, needs new policy frameworks, capacities and capabilities, focusing on market-shaping leadership, skills, tools and methods.

A challenge- or mission-oriented approach, driven by strong public capacity aimed at solving problems, is not synonymous with top-down decision-making, but with the dynamism necessary to create more effective interfaces with innovators across the whole of society, rethinking intellectual property regimes and R&D investments to catalyse the distributed intelligence of the private sector and individual citizens.

At the international level, a challenge- or mission-oriented approach could pave the way for better coordinating mechanisms that accelerate mutual learning and transfer of capabilities. Such a frame could also galvanise a greater level of coordination and collaboration among governments, and trigger new investments in effective mechanisms for multinational governance. The end result of embracing this approach will be the progressive broadening of the options available to policymakers – an essential prerequisite for resilience in times of uncertainty. In times of big crises (from financial to climate and health), lack of choices drastically reduces the public sector’s room to manoeuvre.

In sum, decades of a misplaced focus on privatisation, outsourcing and static efficiency have left many governments with reduced options and capacities in the face of the crisis. Governments require choices, and the capacity to manoeuvre flexibly and with competence. Lessons from successful responses to COVID-19 show that building back better, and preparing for future crises, means investing in core public sector capacities and capabilities, including the ability to interact with other value creators in society – designing contracts to deliver in the public interest. As the saying goes, a crisis should not go to waste: let’s hope it brings on a new understanding of how to develop the dynamic capabilities of the public sector—and why it matters.
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