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Partial Aggregation in Ethics

Horton, J; (2021) Partial Aggregation in Ethics. Philosophy Compass , 16 (3) , Article e12719. 10.1111/phc3.12719.

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Abstract

Is there any number of people you should save from paralysis rather than saving one person from death? Is there any number of people you should save from a migraine rather than saving one person from death? Many people answer ‘yes’ and ‘no’, respectively. The aim of partially aggregative moral views is to capture and justify combinations of intuitions like these. These views contrast with fully aggregative moral views, which imply that the answer to both questions is ‘yes’, and with non-aggregative moral views, which imply that the answer to both questions is ‘no’. In this article, I review the most natural and influential ways of developing partially aggregative views and explain the main problems they face.

Type: Article
Title: Partial Aggregation in Ethics
DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12719
Publisher version: https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12719
Language: English
Additional information: This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions.
UCL classification: UCL
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10118032
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