Kant, Animal Minds and Conceptualism

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Abstract: Kant holds that some non-human animals “are acquainted with” objects, despite lacking conceptual capacities (“understanding”). What does this tell us about his theory of human cognition? Numerous authors have argued that this is a significant point in favour of Nonconceptualism—the claim that, for Kant, sensible representations of objects do not depend on the understanding. Against this, I argue that Kant’s views about animal minds can readily be accommodated by a certain kind of Conceptualism. It remains viable to think that, for Kant, (i) humans’ sensible representations necessarily represent objects as temporally structured, in ways that allow us to have thoughts about them, and (ii) such representations are produced, and could only be produced, by the understanding. This allows Conceptualists to maintain that humans’ sensible representations depend on the understanding, while accepting that animals have sensible representations of objects too. We must, therefore, reassess both the warrant for Nonconceptualism and the shape Conceptualist readings must take.

Keywords: Kant, nonconceptualism, intuition, synthesis, animal minds

1. Introduction

The Critique of Pure Reason (“KrV”) advances a rich account of human cognition. Central to Kant’s account are two related ideas:
(1) *Intuitions and Concepts.* Cognition (i.e. thoughts that have objective representational purport) requires us to unify two kinds of mental representation, viz. intuitions (i.e. sensible representations of particulars) and concepts (i.e. general representations).

(2) *Sensibility and Understanding.* Cognition requires the interaction of two distinct mental capacities, viz. sensibility (i.e. the capacity to acquire representations through being affected by objects) and understanding (i.e. the capacity to form concepts and thoughts).

Interpreters of Kant disagree about how these distinctions line up. Does Kant believe that our intuitions require only sensibility, or do they also depend on a contribution from the understanding? The two opposing sides can be characterized as follows:

**Conceptualism:** According to Kant, intuitions depend on the understanding as well as sensibility.

**Nonconceptualism:** According to Kant, intuitions do not depend on the understanding, but are produced by sensibility on its own.¹

Clearly, if we see value in making sense of Kant’s theory of cognition, we need to try and make headway with the Conceptualism/Nonconceptualism debate.

Recently, several writers have tried to do just this by drawing on Kant’s remarks about non-human animals (henceforth “animals”). Kant holds that animals lack the capacity of understanding. Therefore, these remarks promise to shed light on what he thinks sensibility can accomplish on its own. In recent years, something of a consensus has emerged that Kant’s remarks about animals

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¹ See McLear (2014:772) and Gomes (2016:540, 550f.) for this way of framing the debate. I set aside related questions which have also featured prominently in the debate, such as the content of intuitions (Allais, 2009; Tolley, 2013) and their dependence upon concept-possession (Ginsborg, 2008:5; Grüne, 2009:ch.5).
“clearly support Nonconceptualism”.\(^2\) This is because he appears to credit them with intuitions even though they lack understanding.

In what follows, I argue that Kant does credit animals with intuitions, but that an attractive form of Conceptualism can accommodate this. Contrary to the consensus, Kant’s views about animals don’t provide evidence for Nonconceptualism, as they are equally compatible with some forms of Conceptualism. Nevertheless, they impose strict limits on the shape Conceptualist readings must take.

Section 2 explains why we should take seriously the charge that Kant’s views about animals support Nonconceptualism. Section 3 argues that Kant really does ascribe intuitions to animals. I analyse a wide range of texts and argue that, even though the sources are inherently unreliable, the sheer number and coherence of these passages makes it implausible that they are all errata. Section 4 begins explaining how Conceptualists can accommodate Kant’s commitment to animal intuition. I identify logical space for a “Restricted” Conceptualism, according to which humans’ intuitions are produced by the understanding and belong to a kind that could not be produced in its absence. Section 5 argues that Restricted Conceptualism is not only logically possible but *prima facie* plausible. I present evidence that, for Kant, humans’ intuitions are qualitatively different from those of animals. I argue that there is ample *prima facie* evidence that (i) humans’ intuitions necessarily represent objects as temporally structured, in ways that allow us to have thoughts about them, and (ii) such intuitions are produced, and could only be produced, by the understanding. Conceptualists

\(^2\) Allais (2016:8), echoing Gomes (2014:6f.). This consensus has been challenged by two articles discussed below (Land, 2018; van den Berg, 2018). My approach bears affinities with Land’s, but I go beyond his short discussion by motivating a detailed account of how Conceptualists can accommodate animal intuitions; by explaining how the resulting interpretation upholds not just the letter but the spirit of Conceptualism; and by assessing the alternative response of denying Kant’s commitment to animal intuitions.
therefore have an attractive way of upholding the dependence of human intuitions on the understanding while accepting that animals have intuitions too. I conclude (Section 6) by highlighting the substantive differences between Restricted Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism on which future research must focus.

2. From Animal Intuitions to Nonconceptualism?

Why would Kant’s supposed commitment to animal intuitions be thought to support Nonconceptualism? Consider this argument:

*The Argument from Animal Intuitions*

(1) Kant holds that animals lack the capacity of understanding.

(2) Kant holds that animals are capable of having intuitions.

(3) Therefore, it is incoherent to ascribe to Kant the view that intuitions depend on the understanding.

Arguments of this kind are endorsed by Lucy Allais (2009:405–407, 2016:8f.), Colin McLear (n.d., 2011:14, 2014:773) and Anil Gomes (2014:6f.). These authors present the argument in passing, devoting only a few lines to it, but it’s easy to see why they think it poses a problem for Conceptualists. The conclusion is tantamount to a denial of Conceptualism. And the inference has serious intuitive appeal: if the premises are true, the intuitions of animals cannot possibly depend on the understanding; this makes it hard to see how we could go on maintaining that intuitions depend on the understanding. Should we conclude that Conceptualism is false? The only other options are to deny one of the argument’s premises or to question its validity. Before proceeding to my main discussion, let me note the strong textual support for premise (1), which is not typically taken to be controversial.
Although Kant credits animals with more complex mental lives than some of his predecessors did (see Naragon, 1990), he is unequivocal in denying them the capacity of understanding. Kant writes that “a human being has, in his understanding, something more than [“the rest of the animals”]” (MS 6:434; cf. A546/B574, V-Met-K3E/Arnoldt 29:949, 1017). This is elaborated upon in a lecture transcript:

A concept is the consciousness that the [same] is contained in one representation as in another, or that in multiple representations one and the same features are contained. […] Animals indeed compare representations with one another, but they are not conscious of where the harmony or disharmony between them lies. Therefore they also have no concepts, and also no higher cognitive faculty, because the higher cognitive faculty consists of these. (Vo-Met/Mron 29:888)

Animals can identify and discriminate objects by means of mental representations (as we'll see below), but they cannot identify or discriminate dimensions of similarity or difference among objects. This renders them incapable of forming general representations, i.e. concepts. In lacking this ability, Kant states that they lack any “higher cognitive faculty”. In other passages, Kant identifies the kind of consciousness which animals lack as “consciousness of ourselves” or “apperception”, and explains that our capacity for concepts depends on our distinctive capacity for self-consciousness: “animals […] will forgo only those representations which rest […] on the consciousness of oneself, in short on the concept of the I. Accordingly they will have no understanding and no reason” (V-Met-L1/Pölitz 28:277; cf. ibid. 28:278, Anth 7:127, H 7:397, V-Anth/Mron 25:1215, V-Met/Mron 29:878f.).

Kant characterizes the understanding as a “higher cognitive faculty” (e.g. Anth 7:196, Refl 210a 15:81).
Kant clearly and consistently denies that animals possess understanding. It follows that Conceptualists must either deny that Kant really credits animals with intuitions or deny that the Argument from Animal Intuitions is valid.

3. Kant’s Commitment to Animal Intuitions

Is it viable to deny that Kant credits animals with intuitions? Since this remains controversial, I’ll scrutinize the full range of textual evidence, including some passages that haven’t been discussed hitherto (Section 3.1). I’ll then argue that these texts cumulatively amount to very strong evidence that Kant ascribes intuitions to animal, even though they stem from imperfectly reliable sources. Given their number and coherence, it’s highly unlikely that they are all errata (Section 3.2).

3.1 Texts

There are six passages demonstrating Kant’s commitment to animal intuitions. I begin with three attributing intentional states to animals,4 followed by three indicating that these are intuitions. The first comes from the *Jäsche Logik* (1800):

Regarding the objective content of our cognition in general, we may think the following levels, towards which cognition can be elevated in this respect:
The first level of cognition is: to represent something;
[…]
The third to be acquainted with something (*noscere*), or to represent something in comparison with other things, both as to sameness and as to difference;

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4 By an ‘intentional state’, I mean a representation that represents an object. “Intentional” thus corresponds to Kant’s term “objective” in one of its uses (e.g. A320/B376). I suspect that “intentionality” is equivalent to Kant’s notion of a representation’s “relation to the object [Beziehung auf das Objekt]”. However, some have argued that the latter is a narrower notion which builds in the requirement of ‘determination’ by a concept and hence doesn’t cover all representations of objects (see Allais, 2015:155–175). I’ll remain neutral on this issue as far as possible.
The fourth: to be acquainted with something with consciousness, i.e., to cognize it (cognoscere). Animals are acquainted with objects too, but they do not cognize them. (9:64–5)\(^5\)

In normal usage, “acquaintance [kennen]” picks out an intentional mental state. When one is “acquainted with something”, the “something” is the intentional object of this mental state. Kant uses the term “acquaintance [Kenntnis, kennen]” in this sense in various works.\(^6\) Hence, when he asserts that “animals are acquainted with objects”, we have every reason to think he is crediting them with intentional states.

Several further facts confirm this. (a) Kant explicitly characterizes “acquaintance” as a way of “represent[ing]” the thing in question. (b) The remark occurs in the course of distinguishing levels of the “objective content” of “cognition”. Kant consistently affirms that “all our cognition has […] a relation to the object” (Log 9:33; cf. 9:91, A320/B376),\(^7\) never using “cognition” to designate non-intentional states.\(^8\) By introducing “acquaintance” as a level of “cognition” with “objective content”, Kant is classifying it as an intentional representation. (c) Kant also introduces the notion of

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\(^5\) “In Ansehung des objectiven Gehaltes unserer Erkenntniss überhaupt lassen sich folgende Grade denken, nach welchen dieselbe in dieser Rücksicht kann gesteigert werden: / Der erste Grad der Erkenntniss ist: sich etwas vorsstellen; […] / Der dritte: etwas kennen (noscere) oder sich etwas in der Vergleichung mit andern Dingen vorsstellen sowohl der Einerleiheit als der Verschiedenheit nach; / Der vierte: mit Bewußtsein etwas kennen, d. h. erkennen (cognoscere). Die Thiere kennen auch Gegenstände, aber sie erkennen sie nicht.” Emphasis in quotations is Kant’s own unless noted otherwise.


\(^7\) These passages explicitly deploy the term “relation to the object” in a broad sense that covers the intentionality of intuitions (cf. fn. 4).

\(^8\) N.b. Kant uses the term “cognition” to designate two different kinds of intentional state (see below). “[C]ognition in general” at the beginning of the passage appears to be cognition in the broad sense; “cognizing” in the “fourth level” is most likely cognition in the narrow sense.
“acquaintance” in a similar graded list from the pre-‘Critical’ Blumberg Logic (early 1770s), characterizing it in the same way and explicitly describing it as a way of “cognizing” a thing (24:135). Together, this makes a very strong case that the “acquaintance” Kant ascribes to animals is a representation with intentionality.9

The next passage comes from the Wiener Logic (1780–1781). Once again, Kant offers a graded list of types of mental representation:

1. The lowest level is to represent something. When I cognize that which relates to the object, I represent the object.
2. To cognize, percipere, is to represent something in comparison with others and to have insight into its identity or diversity from them. […] For animals also cognize their master, but they are not conscious of this. (24:845f.)10

What Kant here describes as “cognizing” has the same features as “acquaintance” in the previous list. It is an intentional representation which allows for the identification and discrimination of objects. As argued above, Kant’s choice of the term “cognize” indicates that this is an intentional state. This is again confirmed by the context: (a) earlier in this transcript, Kant is recorded as

9 Caution is required concerning the dating of commitments expressed in the Jäsche Logic. The notes on which Jäsche’s text is based span much of Kant’s career, so one can doubt whether a given passage represents Kant’s mature views. However, as noted, Kant uses the notion of “acquaintance [Kenntnis]” in various ‘Critical’-era works. Moreover, the corresponding Reflection (Refl 2394 16:342f.) bears evidence of continued revision, suggesting that it is not a relic of Kant’s pre-‘Critical’ thought. The phrase concerning animals is absent from this Reflection, suggesting that it is drawn from the lost lecture transcript, “presumably derived from […] late in [Kant’s] career”, on which scholars think much of the Jäsche Logic is based (Young, 1992:xviii–xix). Further issues of authenticity are addressed below.

10 “1.) der niedrigste Grad ist sich etwas vorstellen. Wenn ich das, was sich auf den Gegenstand bezieht, erkenne: so stell ich mir den Gegenstand vor. / 2.) erkennen, percipere, heißt sich etwas in Vergleichung mit andern vorstellen, und seine identitaet oder Verschiedenheit davon einsehen. […] Dann Thiere erkennen auch ihren Herrn aber sind sich deßen nicht bewußt.”
affirming that “all our cognitions” exhibit “relation to the object” (in a broad sense that explicitly covers the intentionality of intuitions, 24:805); (b) the “lowest level” on this list already requires “represent[ing] an object”, indicating that these are divisions within the domain of intentional states; (c) Kant explicitly glosses “to cognize” as a way “to represent something”. Therefore, when Kant affirms that “animals also cognize their master”, we have overwhelming reason to think this is a state with intentionality.

Why the discrepancy in terminology between the Jäsch and Wiener passages? The former states that “animals […] do not cognize [objects]” (Log 9:65), the latter that “animals […] cognize their master” (Vo/L-Wiener 24:846). Does this apparent contradiction suggest unreliable transcription? We should not draw this conclusion, because there is strong independent evidence that Kant uses the term “cognition” in two different senses. In the broad sense, “cognition” means a representation that represents an object, e.g. a concept, intuition or judgment, while “cognition” in the narrow sense means an objectively valid synthetic judgment (cf. Grüne, 2009:29; Watkins & Willaschek, 2017:84–7).

Even within the Jäsch passage, Kant uses the term in these two senses: the list as a whole deals with different levels of cognition in the broad sense, while the “fourth level” isolates cognition in the narrow sense. Consequently, we can easily reconcile the two passages: in the Jäsch passage, Kant denies that animals have cognition in the narrow sense, i.e. objectively valid synthetic judgments; in the Wiener passage, he affirms that animals have cognition in the broad sense, i.e. intentional representations.11

Is it significant for our purposes that the Wiener passage denies that animals are “conscious of” “cognizing their master”? In KrV’s “Stufenleiter”, Kant appears to categorize “cognition” and “intuition” as forms of “perception [Perzeption]”, i.e. “representation with consciousness”

11 This is further supported by the fact that Kant translates “cognition” with two different Latin terms in the two passages, viz. “cognoscere” in Jäsch versus “perscipere” in Wiener. Thanks to Reed Winegar for this point.
(A320/B376f.; cf. Log 9:91). Therefore, there is a *prima facie* tension between Kant’s denial that animals’ cognitions are conscious and his affirmation that they are cognitions. However, there are various other passages in which Kant affirms the existence of unconscious cognitions and intuitions.12 Hence, there are good reasons for explaining away the tension, rather than reading Kant as denying the possibility of unconscious cognitions or intuitions. Here are three possibilities for reconciling unconscious cognition with the “Stufenleiter” passage: (i) the passage could be read not as defining “cognition” as “objective perception”, but merely asserting that all “objective perceptions” are “cognitions”. This leaves open the possibility that some cognitions are not perceptions. (ii) Since Kant is interested in multiple kinds of consciousness, perhaps the kind of consciousness that animal (and other unconscious) cognitions lack is different from the kind of consciousness required for cognition (see McLear, 2011). (iii) Perhaps Kant uses the terms “cognition” and “intuition” in a non-standard way in the “Stufenleiter”, e.g. because (general and transcendental) logic excludes unconscious representations from consideration (see V-Lo/Busolt 24:635, Log 9:33). I conclude that the apparent tension in Kant’s attribution of unconscious cognitions to animals can be diffused.

A further remark, in the transcript of Kant’s anthropology lectures of 1784–1785, adds further weight: “Animals do have representations of the world but not of their I. Consequently, they are not rational beings” (V-Anth/Mron 25:1215).13 To have “representations of the world” is to have mental states that are intentionally directed at external things.

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12 Refl 1705 16:88, V-o-L/Wiener 24:805, V-Lo/Busolt 24:635; Anth 7:135, Refl 1705 16:88. Furthermore, copious passages refer to unconscious concepts, which also constitute a species of unconscious cognition (see Grün, 2009:84–102).

13 “Die Thiere haben zwar Vorstellungen von der Welt aber nicht von ihrem Ich. Daher sind sie auch keine vernünftige Wesen.”
Together, these three passages provide robust evidence that Kant ascribes intentional states to animals. Are these intentional states intuitions, as premise (2) of the Argument from Animal Intuitions claims? Since animals possess sensibility but lack understanding, their representations of objects must be sensible representations, so it’s natural to conclude that they are intuitions. This is borne out by three more passages from lecture transcripts:

Animals cannot make concepts, there are sheer intuitions with them (V-Met-L2/Pölitz 28:594).  

Animals are not capable of any concept – intuition they do have (Vo/L-Dohna 24:702).

Now how can we conceive animals as beings below humans? […] We can think of things which are below us, whose representations are different in species and not merely in degree. We perceive in ourselves a specific feature of the understanding and of reason, namely consciousness, if I take this away there still remains something left, namely, sensation, imagination, the former is intuition with presence, the latter without presence of the object.[.] (V-Met/Voekmann, 28:449)

The first two passages simply attribute intuitions to animals. In the third, Kant reflects on the capacities an animal would have by imagining a creature lacking higher cognitive faculties. He states that such creatures would still have the capacity for “intuition with presence […] of the object” and

14 “Thiere können sich nicht Begriffe machen, es sind lauter Anschauungen bei ihnen.”

15 “Tiere [sind] keiner Begriffe fähig — Anschauung haben sie.”

“[intuition] without presence of the object”, i.e. that animals without understanding could still have intuitions.

It’s unsurprising that Kant classifies the cognitions of animals as intuitions: he holds that “besides intuition there is no other kind of cognition than through concepts” (A68/B92f.). This is reaffirmed in the numerous passages in which he presents the contrast between intuitions and conceptual representations as a disjunction, i.e. an exhaustive distinction (A320/B376f., Log 9:91, Refl 1705 16:88, Vo-L/Wiener 24:805). Since animals lack concepts, it follows that whenever Kant credits them with cognitions he must tacitly be crediting them with intuitions.

3.2 Authenticity

I have identified six passages providing evidence that Kant credits animals with intuitions. Let me now discuss the possibility of rejecting these texts as inauthentic. All these passages come from sources of imperfect reliability. Though published in Kant’s lifetime, the Jäsche Logic was not directly written by Kant; it was compiled by a former student of his, using Kant’s marginalia and perhaps one or more lecture transcript. As a result, the consensus is that “one cannot simply assume […] that Jäsche’s manual is a reliable statement of Kant’s views” (Young, 1992:xvi–xviii; cf. Boswell, 1988). The other sources are still more questionable: they are students’ transcripts from Kant’s lectures. They have barely been edited and were certainly not checked for accuracy by Kant.

Discussing the logic lectures, the editor of a recent edition writes, “[O]ne cannot look to [them], in general, for precise, carefully worded formulations of fundamental points” (Young, 1992:xix). I’ve argued that the texts display a commitment to animal intuitions, but it remains possible that in doing so they misrepresent Kant’s views. Would it be legitimate for the Conceptualist to reject the textual evidence as inauthentic?

There are two reasons why this would be inadvisable. Firstly, the evidence from all these sources points in the same direction. I have identified passages from six different works asserting
that animals have representations of objects, and I am unaware of any passage denying this. We would expect any transcription errors to be distributed fairly randomly, pointing in divergent directions. On the contrary, these passages all support the same conclusion, thus rendering it highly implausible that they are all errata. Secondly, historians of philosophy should not be too cavalier about declaring passages inauthentic. Our task is to find the most coherent interpretation of the texts we have, so we should demand positive reason before excluding any passage from consideration. The Conceptualist might reply that these texts are shown to be inauthentic by the very fact (if it is a fact) that they cannot be reconciled with Conceptualism. However, this would simply beg the question against the Nonconceptualist, as well as conceding that the passages provide prima facie support for Nonconceptualism. At this stage, it seems likely that the Conceptualism/Nonconceptualism debate can only be settled by weighing prima facie evidence: no knock-down arguments have been identified by either side. It follows that Conceptualists should be reluctant to concede that they cannot accommodate these passages.

A further possibility is that there are more substantive, less baldly circular reasons for denying Kant’s commitment to animal intuitions. In a recent article, Hein van den Berg (2018) argues that Kant doesn’t credit animals with “objective perceptual awareness” by comparing his views with two of his predecessors, Reimarus (1694–1786) and Buffon (1707–1788). The article highlights some interesting parallels, but its main argument seems to rely on an ambiguous use of its central term, viz. the notion of a “blooming, buzzing confusion”. At best, van den Berg provides evidence that, for Kant, animal representations are “blooming, buzzing confusions” in the sense of being “confused” or “obscure” (2018:7). But he seems to conclude on this basis alone that animals’ representations are “blooming, buzzing confusions” in the further sense of lacking intentionality (2018:8). However, as noted above, Kant holds that some unconscious or “obscure” representations are nonetheless intentional. Therefore, it isn’t legitimate to infer that animals’ representations lack
intentionality from the fact that they are obscure. Without argument to bridge this gap, van den Berg’s case is not compelling.

A different reason for denying the authenticity of the texts is that they are in tension with certain passages in KrV which seemingly state that synthesis according to the categories is a precondition for intentionality. Here are two particularly compelling passages:

All appearances, insofar as objects are to be given to us through them, must stand under a priori rules of their synthetic unity, in accordance with which their relation in empirical intuition is alone possible, i.e., [...] in experience they must stand under conditions of the necessary unity of apperception. (A110, emphasis added)

Without that sort of unity [of consciousness], which has its rule a priori, and which subjects the appearances to itself, thoroughgoing and universal, hence necessary unity of consciousness would not be encountered in the manifold of perceptions. But these would then belong to no experience, and would consequently be without an object, and would be nothing but a blind play of representations, i.e., less than a dream. (A112, emphasis added)

On the face of it, these passages say that without the forms of unity introduced by the understanding, sensible representations would lack intentionality. One might try to reply that Kant is referring to some higher cognitive achievement than mere intuition. However, these are not statements about the objects of “cognition”, “thought” or “experience” (as with some other passages, e.g. A111, A129f.), but about “appearances”, i.e. the objects of intuition (A20/B34, A34/B51, A35/B52).

Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this.

An anonymous reviewer suggests that we might read these passages as concerning objects of experience after all. Kant talks in terms of objects being given “through” appearances, so it’s not totally obvious that the objects in question are themselves appearances (i.e. objects of intuition). If a reading along these lines can be worked out, then there are two ways of diffusing the conflict between these passages and the evidence for animal intuitions. However, I worry that this
Do these KrV passages really conflict with the texts assembled above? I do not believe so. There are good reasons for thinking that Kant is talking here specifically about the preconditions for intentionality in *human* minds. He cannot be talking about the minds of all beings: that would include the divine intellect, to which Kant’s talk of “experience” would be inapplicable. The remaining options are either that Kant is considering sensible minds in general, i.e. both human and animal minds, or that he is only considering human minds. But Kant explicitly signals that he is discussing “how objects are to be given to *us*”, and he talks freely about apperception without signalling that some minds lack this capacity. This strongly suggests that Kant is only making assertions about human minds here. The availability of this reading means that these passages don’t straightforwardly contradict the textual evidence amassed in Section 3.1. Of course, what Kant says about human minds in *KrV* might have ramifications for animal minds—several Conceptualist readers have thought that Kant’s account of human cognition entails that animal minds lack intentionality. But I will argue below that Conceptualists needn’t accept this. For now, suffice it to say that there is no direct conflict.

Pending other substantive objections, we ought to conclude that Kant really does credit animals with intuitions. Therefore, the Conceptualist cannot respond to the Argument from Animal Intuitions by denying either of its premises. The next section begins exploring the one remaining option: questioning the argument’s validity.

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route presupposes a numerical (rather than conceptual) distinction between appearances and objects of experience—that the tree we intuit is numerically distinct from the tree about which we form empirical judgments—which seems implausible for various reasons.
4. The Logical Space for Restricted Conceptualism

This section will argue that there is logical space for maintaining a restricted form of Conceptualism, while accepting Kant’s commitment to animal intuitions. The inspiration for this route comes from John McDowell (1994:114–123). Defending an account of perceptual experience like that ascribed to Kant by Conceptualists, McDowell considers a possible objection: doesn’t his theory, according to which perceptual experience depends on activities of one’s conceptual capacities, entail that animals lack “outer experience”? McDowell responds that animals are capable of a certain kind of experience of outer objects, though one that is radically different from our own. In effect, his version of conceptualism is restricted in scope: he doesn’t hold that all kinds of outer experience depend on conceptual capacities, but he does insist that conceptual capacities play an indispensable role in generating the outer experience of humans. McDowell holds that experiences of the kind we possess depend on conceptual capacities.¹⁹

We needn’t examine McDowell’s views about the difference between animal and human experience; what matters for us is the shape of his strategy. McDowell reconciles two claims: (a) our outer experience depends on conceptual capacities and (b) animals lacking those capacities are nevertheless capable of outer experience. He does so by restricting the dependence claim of (a) to a certain kind of outer experience.

Although McDowell’s response isn’t proposed as an interpretation of Kant, it is clearly germane to our discussion. To see how this relates to the Argument from Animal Intuitions, consider our specification of Conceptualism:

**Conceptualism**: According to Kant, intuitions depend on the understanding.

This formulation is indeterminate in scope and can therefore be understood in (at least) two ways:

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¹⁹ A similar view is defended by Boyle (2014).
Universal Conceptualism: According to Kant, intuitions of all kinds depend on the understanding.

Restricted Conceptualism: According to Kant, intuitions of the kind humans possess depend on the understanding.

Universal Conceptualism is vulnerable to the Argument from Animal Intuitions. If intuition per se were impossible without a contribution from the understanding, then animals would lack intuitions. The importance of this result mustn’t be underestimated. Arguably, the default view among Conceptualists has been that no intentional states are possible without the understanding.\(^\text{20}\) The Argument from Animal Intuitions shows that this is not the correct way to read Kant. However, Restricted Conceptualism upholds the claim that, within the human mind, all intuitions are produced by the understanding. And yet it can be reconciled with the premises of the Argument from Animal Intuitions, because it doesn’t entail that intuitions of whatsoever kind are impossible without the understanding. If Restricted Conceptualism is a viable reading, then Kant’s commitment to animal intuitions does not support Nonconceptualism, but is consistent with Conceptualism.

The logical space for this kind of response to the Argument from Animal Intuitions has already been highlighted by a recent short discussion (Land, 2018). In one sense, this is enough to defang the argument, showing that it is formally invalid. However, more needs to be done to make this response dialectically effective. Firstly, we need some positive motivation for pursuing Restricted Conceptualism before it can be seen as a serious alternative to Nonconceptualism. Secondly, we might suspect that the Restricted Conceptualist is in danger of giving up the spirit of

\(^{20}\) E.g. Ginsborg (2008:65), Bauer (2012:227–229), Griffith (2012:2000–2006). Grüne also holds that intentionality depends on conceptual capacities, but leaves open the possibility that a being could possess a capacity for rule-governed sensible synthesis while lacking the capacity to judge, and hence have intuitions without fully possessing understanding (2009:202f.).
Conceptualism by reducing the dependence of human intuition upon the understanding to the point of triviality. Some Nonconceptualists accept that the understanding makes possible qualitatively different kinds of sensible representation, so something must be said to convince us that Restricted Conceptualism is more than a notational variant of Nonconceptualism. I therefore aim to go beyond Land’s by offering *prima facie* evidence for a detailed version of Restricted Conceptualism and by explaining how this reading upholds not just the letter but the spirit of Conceptualism.  

5. Restricted Conceptualism Defended

I begin by identifying new textual motivations for Restricted Conceptualism (Section 5.1), before setting out a detailed version of the view (Section 5.2). I aim to show that the resulting interpretation is a well-motivated alternative to Nonconceptualism, rather than an *ad hoc* evasion of the Argument from Animal Intuitions.

5.1 Textual Motivations

There are two passages in which Kant suggests that human intuitions and animal intuitions are qualitatively different. These give us *prima facie* reason to take Restricted Conceptualism seriously. The first, which came up earlier, is this:

> Now how can we conceive animals as beings below human beings? […] We can think of things which are below us, *whose representations are different in species and not merely in degree*. We perceive in ourselves a specific feature of the understanding and of reason, namely consciousness, if I take this away there still remains something left, namely […] intuition with […] [and] without presence of the object (*V-Met*/Völckmann 28:449, emphasis added)

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21 The resulting view is very much in line with the account of human cognition Land develops in earlier articles (e.g. 2006, 2011).
Here, Kant apparently states that animals’ intuitions are different in species from our representations. If Nonconceptualism were true, this would be surprising. On that view, there is a class of our representations, namely our (most basic)\textsuperscript{22} intuitions, which float free from the cognitive differences between animals and ourselves. Hence, we would expect Kant to say that the representations of animals are different in species from our concepts, judgments, etc., but of the same species as our intuitions. But this is not what he asserts. Instead of equating animal intuitions with humans’ (most basic) intuitions, his phrasing indicates that their intuitions are “different in species” from any representations we possess, including our intuitions. Therefore, the passage poses a problem for Nonconceptualism.\textsuperscript{23} In contrast, it fits perfectly with Restricted Conceptualism—it supports the idea that our intuitions, in virtue of being generated by the understanding, are qualitatively different from anything animals could possess.

The same idea is repeated in Kant’s manuscript for the Anthropology:

The cow, lacking understanding, may well <perhaps> have something similar to what we call representations (because, in terms of effects, they coincide <greatly> with representations in humans) but which might be completely different from them. \textit{(H 7:397)\textsuperscript{24}}

\textsuperscript{22} Some Nonconceptualists hold that the understanding is involved in converting basic intuitions into more complex intuitions (e.g. McLear, n.d.). But on this view, our most basic intuitions would be untouched by the understanding and hence of the same kind as animal intuitions.

\textsuperscript{23} An anonymous reviewer suggests that, in this passage, Kant is simply denying that animals’ representations are obscure concepts or judgments (as e.g. Meier held). However, this reading doesn’t account for the fact that the passage contrasts animals’ representations with the whole class of our representations, rather than our concepts and judgments.

\textsuperscript{24} “Das Verstandlose [sic] Vieh hat wohl <vielleicht> etwas dem Ähnliches was wir Vorstellungen nennen (weil es den Wirkungen nach mit dem was Vorstellungen im Menschen sind <sehr> übereinkommt) was aber vielleicht gantz davon unterschieden seyn mag[.]”
Here, Kant doesn’t specify what kind of representations the cow “may” have, but given what we saw in Section 3, I see no reason to doubt that he would credit them with sensible representations of objects. Kant is more tentative here, but he still avoids equating the cow’s representations with our own sensible representations. Instead, he raises the possibility that the cow’s representations are “completely different” from our representations. As above, the potential contrast is not between animals’ intuitions and our concepts, but between animals’ intuitions and our representations in general, including—it is implied—our intuitions. Again, the Restricted Conceptualist can readily explain this. In contrast, the Nonconceptualist, who holds that the understanding plays no role in producing our (most basic) intuitions, is faced with a puzzle. Why might the cow’s intuitions be “completely different” from all our representations, if our (most basic) intuitions are independent of the cognitive differences between ourselves and cows?

I don’t want to overstate what these passages show. The Volckmann passage positively affirms that the intuitions of animals are “different in species” from any representations humans possess. However, as noted, “one cannot look to [lecture transcripts], in general, for precise, carefully worded formulations of fundamental points” (Young, 1992:xix). The Anthropology Manuscript passage is from Kant’s own hand, but it is much more tentative, raising the possibility that animal intuitions are qualitatively different without fully endorsing it. Hence, it would be unwise to make a positive case for Restricted Conceptualism based on these texts alone. What the passages do show is that the burden of proof is by no means stacked against Restricted Conceptualism. There is good prima facie reason to take seriously the hypothesis that, for Kant, the understanding is implicated in the production of human intuitions, making them qualitatively different from anything animals possess. I have not come across any evidence that Kant denies the existence of a qualitative

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N.b. the pre-‘Critical’ Kant expresses no reservations about the claim that “an ox has a representation of its stable” (while rejecting Meier’s view that oxen possess concepts) (2:59).
difference between human and animal intuitions. So, if anything, these two passages make Restricted Conceptualism seem more likely than Nonconceptualism.

5.2 Restricted Conceptualism in Detail

I'll now propose a detailed form of Restricted Conceptualism and argue that it is both prima facie plausible as a reading of Kant and genuinely distinct from Nonconceptualism. Since our overall goal is to assess the dialectical efficacy of the Argument from Animal Intuitions, I won't seek to establish whether Restricted Conceptualism is ultimately superior to Nonconceptualism. (That would require evaluating all arguments relevant to the Conceptualism/Nonconceptualism debate.) Instead, I'll draw on an array of prima facie evidence that Nonconceptualists will likely claim is outweighed by other considerations. If I can show that Restricted Conceptualism is prima facie attractive (pending other arguments for Nonconceptualism), this will be enough to show that the Argument from Animal Intuitions is dialectically ineffective.

In short, the position I propose is: (i) humans’ intuitions are produced through synthesis of imagination for which the understanding is responsible. (ii) In animals, merely associative imagination generates intuitions. (iii) Owing to this, the intuitions of animals cannot represent the objective temporal structures (e.g. persistence, succession) that allow us to have thoughts about the objects we intuit. (iv) Animals’ intuitions can still represent objects as bundles of features located in space. They are representations of external things, not merely subjective states. (v) But, since associatively generated intuitions are intrinsically incapable of being taken up into thought, they couldn’t belong to a human mind, the boundaries of which are fixed by the unity of apperception.

(i) It is a familiar part of Conceptualist readings that human intuitions are produced through synthesis of imagination, for which the understanding is responsible. Strong prima facie evidence is
provided by passages like those discussed in Section 3.2, e.g. “all appearances, insofar as objects are to be given to us through them, must stand under \(a\ priori\) rules of their synthetic unity” (A110).\(^{26}\)

To my mind, the most compelling evidence that human intuitions are produced through synthesis of imagination is Kant’s assertion that

without it [i.e. the imagination’s “synthesis of apprehension”] we would not be able to have the \(a\ priori\) representations of space or of time, since these can be produced only through the synthesis of the manifold that sensibility […] provides (A99)

and that without the imagination’s synthesis of reproduction “no whole representation […]], not even the purest and most fundamental representations of space and time, could ever arise” (A102). “Representations” encompasses both concepts and intuitions. Hence, that no representations of space and time can arise without synthesis of imagination entails that no intuitions of space and time can. One might think this evidence is outweighed by other considerations,\(^{27}\) but there is no denying that this is strong \textit{prima facie} evidence that the intuitions of space and time depend on synthesis of imagination.\(^{28}\)

\(^{26}\) N.b. “appearances” designates the objects of intuition, rather than some more demanding state such as judgment or experience (A20/B34, A34/B51, A35/B52), and this quotation describes \(a\ priori\) rules as a condition for objects being “given”, not for some more demanding “relation to the object” (contra Allais, 2015).

\(^{27}\) The most serious motivation for denying that the intuitions of space and time are produced through synthesis is the argument that their whole-prior-to-part structure of mereological dependence is incompatible with being produced through synthesis (see McLear, 2015). This merits further discussion, but see rebuttals by Land (2014), Williams (2018) and especially Rosefeldt (n.d.).

\(^{28}\) In the light of this, there is good reason to read B160–1n as advancing the same position. Nonconceptualists have attempted to explain away B160–1n by claiming that it applies only to geometrical constructions, not to our most basic intuitions of space and time (Onof & Schulting, 2015). But there are no textual grounds for reading A99 passage in this
Plausibly, if pure intuitions require synthesis, so do our empirical intuitions. Kant holds that we must possess pure intuitions of space and time in order to be capable of representing the spatial and temporal relations exhibited by all our empirical intuitions (see A23/B38, A30/B46, A165/B206), which suggests that “synthesis of the imagination” is required to generate the spatial and temporal features of intuitions whether they are a priori or empirical. From this vantage point, it becomes plausible that Kant’s descriptions of the imagination’s “apprehension” of sensible material describe a process through which empirical intuitions are first produced, so that their material features depend on synthesis of imagination too. To be clear, I don’t intend to have established once and for all that, for Kant, intuitions are produced through synthesis of the imagination; we might still conclude that, all things considered, this evidence is outweighed. Nevertheless, there are solid prima facie motivations for thinking this.

There is also good prima facie evidence that, in humans, synthesis of imagination is carried out by the understanding. Kant describes the imagination’s synthesis as “an effect of the understanding on sensibility” (B152) and claims that

It is one and the same spontaneity that, there [in “synthesis of apprehension”] under the name of the imagination and here [in “synthesis of apperception”] under the name of understanding, brings combination into the manifold of intuition. (B162n; see also A79/B104–5, B130, B153)

way and it seriously jars with A102’s emphasis on our “most fundamental representations [erste Grundvorstellungen] of space and time”.

29 E.g. B68, A79/B105, A99, A105, A120, B151, B160.

30 Some Nonconceptualists deny this (e.g. Allais, 2009:294f.; Hanna, 2005:249; Rohs, 2001:222). More recent Nonconceptualist readings tend to accept that synthesis of imagination is the work of the understanding, but deny that intuitions depend on synthesis (e.g. Allais, 2017:32f.; Matherne, 2015:750–6; McLear, 2015:100f.; Tolley, 2013:122f.).
Together, this means there is good *prima facie* motivation for the first part of the Restricted Conceptualism I’m proposing, viz. that human intuitions depend on synthesis of imagination for which the understanding is responsible.

(ii) How can this be reconciled with the possibility of animal intuitions? First, we should note that Kant attributes imagination to animals, and that he explicitly contrasts the imaginative powers of animals and humans. Regarding capacities for “reproductive imagination”, he writes that they can be accompanied by apperception or not. When they are, then they belong only to human beings, when not – then animals also have them. We ought, therefore, to have two different names for these, but for this [capacity] there is only one [name], namely the reproductive power of imagination. (*V-Met/Mron* 29:884)

By claiming that there ought to be two different names for this capacity, Kant is explicitly differentiating two species of it: reproductive imagination with and without apperception. This means that an animal’s imagination can combine sensible material through receptive and associative processes, but not according to “rules of [...] synthetic unity” (*A110*).

Hitherto, Conceptualists have tended to think these kinds of imaginative process could not result in mental representations with intentionality. However, owing to the evidence discussed above, we should consider another possibility: that these associative processes *are* capable of generating intuitions, i.e. singular sensible representations of objects. On this reading, our intuitions depend on the understanding, whereas the intuitions of animals are produced by associative tendencies of the imagination. This interpretative route upholds the claim that human intuitions are produced by the understanding. In doing so, it accommodates the evidence that motivates traditional forms of Conceptualism. However, it also accommodates Kant’s commitment to animal intuitions. Therefore, it amounts to a promising form of Restricted Conceptualism.

31 See note 20.
This is already enough to ensure that Restricted Conceptualism is distinct from Nonconceptualism. Nonconceptualists deny that human intuitions are produced by the understanding (either by claiming that intuitions precede synthesis or that they are produced through a non-intellectual synthesis). But there is more to be said to spell out the difference between human and animal intuitions and amplify the dependence of the former on the understanding.

(iii) I’ve proposed that (there is strong prima facie evidence that) human intuitions are produced by the understanding, whereas animal intuitions are produced by associative imagination. There is good reason to think that this difference in origin leads to an intrinsic difference between animal and human intuitions. Kant holds that sensible representations produced by the understanding exhibit distinctive kinds of unity, specifically with respect to their temporal structure. Plausibly, all intuitions produced by the understanding exhibit one or more of the temporal structures which correspond to the categories, e.g. persistence (corresponding to <substance>, A144/B183), succession (corresponding to <cause>, ibid.). It is in virtue of exemplifying these temporal structures that intuited objects can be subsumed under the categories (A138–40/B177–9).

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32 An anonymous reviewer questions whether Kant holds that our intuitions represent these temporal structures. But Kant talks of “something that persists [being] given in intuition” and characterizes “alteration” as an “intuition” (B291, presumably meaning that alteration is given in intuition). He also writes that “change and simultaneity” are “perceived in apprehension” (B225) and that “something persistent [is represented] in perception” (B275; see also A188/B231, A192/B237, A194/B239, A200/B245, B256, A212/B258f.). The conceptualist, who accepts the prima facie evidence that “apprehension” is the process through which empirical intuitions are generated, ought to read “perception” as equivalent to “empirical intuition” in these contexts. (Kant glosses “perception [Wahrnehmung]” as “empirical intuition” at A180/B222; see also Anh 6:208, MS 7:134.). This indicates that, although the principles of the Analogies express conditions for empirical cognition rather than mere intuition, the arguments for those principles start from the assumption that persistence, succession and simultaneity can be represented in empirical intuition (“perception”). (See Hutton (2019:601) for further discussion.)
Moreover, Kant holds that our thoughts can only have relation to objects in virtue of involving the categories: “no object can be thought without them” (*KpV* 5:136); “by these concepts alone can [the understanding] understand something in the manifold of intuition, i.e., think an object for it” (A80/B106; cf. A51/B75). Thoughts must deploy categories in order to relate to objects, but intuited objects only fall under categories in virtue of the temporal structures they exhibit. Hence, it is in virtue of representing these temporal structures that our intuitions allow us to think about the objects they present.

In contrast, an animal’s associative power of imagination couldn’t possibly produce intuitions of these temporal structures. We can see this by considering Kant’s account of the preconditions for representing *objective* temporal structure: not only of producing intuitions with a certain subjective temporal form, but intuitions that represent objects as having a certain temporal form. The clearest discussion comes in the Second Analogy. Kant accepts that associative imagination can produce representations with *subjective* temporal form (i.e. they can produce a “subjective order of perceptions”), but argues that this is insufficient for representing temporal structure *in the objects* (i.e. they cannot produce representations of an “objective order”). This is because a merely associative combination of sensory material would be “entirely arbitrary” (A193/B238); for any temporal ordering the imagination happens to introduce, it could equally well have produced the reverse order (B233, A201/B246). Consequently, a temporal ordering introduced by associative processes will ultimately be attributable to contingencies about the perceiver, rather than features of the objects perceived. The result is that the temporal dimension of intuitions produced through mere association will not have the semantic significance of representing temporal structure in the objects.

In humans, where the imagination’s combination is led by the understanding’s rules, this combination can be rendered “necessary” rather than “arbitrary”, enabling our intuitions to
represent objective temporal structure. But in animals, nothing can remove the arbitrariness, so temporal structure in the objects can never be represented. It is not that animals intuit objects in the same way we do, and merely lack the concepts to think about them; we intuit objects as temporally structured unities, while animals cannot achieve this cognitive feat. And this difference has important ramifications: we intuit things as structured in ways that allow us to think about them; animals do not intuit things as having this structure. The fact that human intuitions are generated by the understanding makes them qualitatively different from animal intuitions, and no substitute for the understanding could produce intuitions of this kind.

(iv) I’ll now address two objections. Firstly, I’ve claimed that, since the temporal form of animals’ intuitions is introduced by associative processes, it cannot purport to represent objective temporal structure. Doesn’t this undermine the claim that animals’ sensible representations exhibit intentionality at all? In response, note that the argument I’ve given is quite limited in scope: it applies only to representing objective temporal structures. Admittedly, I suspect it generalizes to some other kinds of objective connection, e.g. representing the generality of properties. An animal might associatively link the representations of two objects, but without rules governing which representations belong together, this subjective linkage would not represent the two objects as objectively similar, i.e. as sharing a property. (This agrees with Kant’s claims about animals’ incapacity to form general representations (Vo-Met/Mron 29:888).) But even this broader conclusion

33 I offer a detail account of this in Hutton (2019).

34 Thanks to the anonymous reviewers for raising these.

35 I’ll ignore the complication that animals might have non-temporal and non-spatial “forms” of intuition (see B72). Plausibly, their intuitions must have at least quasi-spatial and quasi-temporal structure: quasi-spatial to allow for discrimination despite qualitative similarity, e.g. tracking a particular tennis ball despite the presence of other tennis balls, and quasi-temporal to allow for re-identification despite qualitative difference, e.g. recognising a particular human whether she is standing or sitting.
does not undermine the intentionality of animal’s mental states. Nothing I’ve argued prevents animal minds from representing particular features (though these may be presented as trope-like qualities rather than instances of universals). The same goes for spatial location: nothing in Kant’s account indicates that placing a feature in space requires representing an objective connection between the contents of different representations. Hence, Restricted Conceptualism can maintain that animals’ intuitions represent external things as spatially located bundles of features. In terms of representational content, this is importantly different from intuiting things as unified complexes bearing general properties. Nevertheless, animals have intentional representations of external things, rather than subjective states devoid of intentionality.³⁶

(v) Now the second objection: Kant holds that humans, as well as animals, possess associative powers of imagination. If associative imagination is capable of producing intuitions within the animal mind, why couldn’t it produce “animal-style” intuitions within the human mind, i.e. associatively generated intuitions that don’t represent objective temporal structures? In response I’ll argue that, necessarily, all human representations meet the conditions for belonging to the unity of apperception. This means that all our intuitions must exhibit the temporal structures corresponding to the categories, and therefore must be produced by the understanding.

³⁶ One passage in KrV suggests that intentionality presupposes representing objective temporal structures: “the first thing that [the understanding] does […] is […] to make the representation of an object possible […] Now this happens through its conferring temporal order on the appearances and their existence by assigning to each of these, as a consequence, a place in time” (A199/B244f.). However, given the context, one can read this passage as referring to the preconditions for representing events rather than for intentionality in general. The surrounding argument pertains specifically to temporal sequence; moreover, while Kant holds that every event is a “consequence”, he does not hold that every “appearance” is (e.g. an object’s heaviness is an appearance but not a consequence of any cause). Compare A194/B239, which initially appears to discuss “relation to an object” in general, before clarifying that the topic is only representation “as far as the temporal relation is concerned”.

28
There is plenty of evidence that Kant’s goal in the Transcendental Deduction is to establish just this. His stated “aim” is to show that “all sensible intuitions stand under the categories” (B143), that the categories apply to “all objects of our senses” (B145), and that there is a “necessary coherency of the understanding with appearances by means of the categories” (A119) (n.b. not just all “thoughts” or “cognitions”, but all “intuitions” and “objects of our senses”). The categories wouldn’t apply to the contents of animal-style intuitions. So, by arguing that all our intuitions must “stand under the categories”, he is ipso facto arguing that our minds cannot contain animal-style intuitions.

It’s a difficult question how exactly Kant reaches this conclusion (equivalent to asking, “What is the argument of the Transcendental Deduction?”). Let me offer one possible reading, underscoring the difference between animal and human minds. Kant can reach the conclusion that all human intuitions fall under the categories via the dictum that “The “I think” must be able to accompany all my representations” (B131). He holds that, strictly speaking, I am a thinking being (see Rosefeldt, 2000:14f.), but doesn’t construe this as an immaterial substance encountered through introspection. Instead the thinking being is picked out procedurally, in a topic-neutral fashion, through the limits of possible self-ascription in first-person thought. This conception of the thinking being’s limits is nicely illustrated by Kant’s account of what it means to ascribe a mental representation to another human: to do so is to judge that it is possible for there to be a first-person thought in which that mental representation is self-ascribed (A347/B405; cf. A353, A354; Rosefeldt, 2000:22–5). This makes it logically impossible to ascribe a representation to a thinking being while denying that he/she could become self-conscious of it (A117n., B131f.; Br 11:52).

37 Nonconceptualists typically maintain that human minds contain some intentional states that are not self-ascribable, and that self-ascribability is a precondition for a representation’s being “cognitively relevant” rather than for belonging to a thinking being at all. (Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for emphasising this.) For my purposes, all that’s needed is
general dictum to sensible representations, we reach the conclusion that “all intuitions are nothing for us and have nothing at all to do with us unless they can be taken up into consciousness” (A116; cf. B132f., B138). But the categories are the “conditions under which alone the manifold [of intuition] can come together in one consciousness”; so all our intuitions must “stand under the categories” (B143; cf. A125). To belong to a human mind, intuitions must represent the objective temporal structures corresponding to the categories, and so they must be produced by the understanding not associative imagination.38

Ascribing mental representations to animals is governed by entirely different rules. It doesn’t involve thinking it possible for the representation to be self-ascribed in a first-person thought; instead, it’s a matter of using analogical thinking to speculate about the causes of the behaviour we observe. For example, Kant claims that we ascribe representations to beavers by observing their dam-building, seeing the similarity with the work of human craftsmen and positing analogous mental causes in the beaver’s mind (KU 5:464; cf. H 7:397). Hence, the criterion for a mental representation’s belonging to an animal mind is simply that it plays a certain causal role within the animal’s life.

One last clarification: if a human’s associative imagination can’t generate animal-style intuitions, what does it do? On the picture I’m defending, our associative processes go to work on a plethora of sensible representations that already stand under the categories. Rather than producing novel representations that don’t adhere to the categories, a human’s associative imagination takes

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38 That Conceptualism can find a sensible argument for Kant’s stated aims in the Deduction seems a point in its favour (Gomes, 2014). In contrast, Nonconceptualists must accuse Kant of arguing fallaciously (Hanna, 2011) or of having more modest aims than the statements I’ve cited suggest (Allais, 2017:33–7).
categorically structured representations and combines these into novel complexes. This combining-into-complexes can be highly idiosyncratic and non-sensical, with the associations deviating significantly from how the empirical world is. Nevertheless, the components of these associations will be unified objects with properties. This account fits with Kant’s views on the cognitive errors to which we are prone. Associative “habit” leads to “prejudice” when we mistake our idiosyncratic combinations for real patterns in the empirical world; but nowhere does Kant worry that we might be swayed by unruly representations that are intrinsically inaccessible to self-consciousness, as animal-style intuitions would be. Rather, he insists that any pernicious influence by associatively generated representations can always be exposed and rectified through reflection (Log 9:75f). In Kant’s view, then, even the most irrational products of humans’ associative imagination will meet the basic preconditions required for self-consciousness, i.e. they will exhibit objective temporal structures corresponding to one or more of the categories.

This completes my proposed version of Restricted Conceptualism, for which I’ve argued there is good prima facie evidence. Necessarily, humans’ intuitions present objects as exhibiting temporal structures which correspond to the categories. Such intuitions are produced, and could only be produced, by the understanding. Animals’ intuitions are produced by associative powers of imagination. At the very least, they present external things as spatially located bundles of features, but they cannot represent any objective temporal structure in these things. Animals not only lack the ability to think; they lack the ability to have intuitions of a kind that would allow intuited objects to be taken up into thought.

6. Conclusion

There is overwhelming textual evidence that Kant credits non-human animals with intuitions. But contrary to what many commentators have thought, this does not provide evidence for
Nonconceptualism. This is because Restricted Conceptualism constitutes a viable reading of Kant. In support of this view, I argued that there is solid *prima facie* evidence that humans’ intuitions are generated by the understanding, whereas animals’ intuitions are generated by merely associative activities of the imagination, and that humans’ intuitions necessarily represent objects as temporally structured, in ways that allow us to have thoughts about them, whereas animals’ intuitions cannot represent these structures. I haven’t tried to establish Restricted Conceptualism outright—that requires an evaluation of all remaining arguments relevant to the Conceptualism/Nonconceptualism debate. Therefore, the main conclusion to be drawn here is a dialectical one: contrary to what many have claimed, Kant’s commitment to animal intuitions provides no evidence for Nonconceptualism. Animal intuitions can be readily accommodated by an attractive and well-motivated form of Conceptualism.

Correlatively, Conceptualists must shift to Restricted Conceptualism and accept that, for Kant, some forms of intentional mental representation are possible in the absence of conceptual capacities. This is the only way for them to deal with the undeniable evidence of Kant’s commitment to animal intuitions. My discussion therefore leads to a reassessment of the bounds within which Conceptualism must operate, as well as a reassessment of the evidence for Nonconceptualism.

Let me finish by highlighting the remaining bones of contention between Restricted Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism. The former upholds the dependence of all human intuitions on the understanding. It holds that all our sensible representations of objects are transformed by the activities of conceptual capacities. The latter maintains that the understanding is not involved in our initial reception of intuitions. It holds that our most basic representations of objects are untouched by our intellectual nature, and hence are no different from what animals possess. Future research should focus on these points of controversy, especially by continuing to examine how Kant thinks intuitions are generated and trying to settle the debate about the aims and argumentation of the
Transcendental Deduction. In all this, Kant’s commitment to animal intuitions should no longer be considered a point in favour of Nonconceptualism.39

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