Revolts in Andalusia, 1647-1652: The Little Ice Age, Markets, and Popular Politics

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I, Frederick Thomas Carnegie-Arbuthnott confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.
Abstract

This work uses a series of urban revolts that occurred in Andalusia, Spain between 1647 to 1652 to investigate the links between past climate, grain markets, and popular politics. It builds on theories about the disruptive impact of Little Ice Age climate in the seventeenth century, advanced by historians such as Geoffrey Parker, and tries to think more concretely about how episodes of extreme climate can help explain episodes of popular unrest. Using data from recent climate reconstructions it finds that there is suggestive evidence that Andalusian cereal harvests were negatively affected by Little Ice Age climate in the mid-seventeenth century. But rather than drawing a simple straight line between poor harvests, high food prices, and revolt, this work tries to drill down into the political economy of grain provisioning in the region, in order to explain why markets were so badly affected by regional crop failures. Using a large range of sources from Andalusia's municipal archives, I take a qualitative approach to investigating market integration in the region, positing that the particular structure of the Habsburg monarchy, which left substantial power in the hands of local municipal governments, was a major factor in increased market disintegration during times of dearth. When local shortages hit, the poorly co-ordinated and often competing policy efforts of both national and municipal governments in Andalusia led to intense competition over grains, a plethora of local and international trade embargoes, and disputes over import tax regimes; which only served to further hinder provisioning efforts. With municipal governments being responsible for provisioning and bread price controls, their failure to uphold either of these responsibilities converted the issue into a political one, which in turn can help shed light on the nature of and participants in popular politics in early modern Europe.
Impact Statement

The primary impact of this PhD is to contribute to the knowledge base and approaches used by environmental historians thinking about the varying impacts of past climate change. It adds to the debate about how the Little Ice Age may have contributed to crisis situations in seventeenth century Europe. Whilst this is valuable inside of academia there is also a clear contemporary societal relevance to this approach, as we begin to think about and experience the effects of man-made global warming in the present day.

This PhD focusses on how the political economy of Andalusia contributed to difficulties in the grain market and how this turned a problem with natural causes (poor weather and bad harvests) into a political crisis in the region. As modern day climate change threatens to force polities around the globe into competition for scarce resources, a view of how past societies succeeded or failed in dealing with similar problems can help to inform current policy and politics. One of the key conclusions of the PhD is that markets need careful and systematic management during times of dearth, which must include successful frameworks for negotiation amongst the various political units that participate in them. The current difficulties in the international supply chains for items such as testing kits and personal protective equipment during the Coronavirus crisis suggest that this is still very much a live concern in modern markets. The aim will be to disseminate the findings of this PhD in an academic context, through publications in journal articles, with the aim of influencing the extensive market integration literature. That literature is overwhelmingly based on quantitative analysis, whilst my research highlights the value of a qualitative approach. The work will also be used to try to influence debate about current modern market management through less scholarly outputs, by pitching ideas to more mainstream media. Furthermore by using this research in my teaching practice going forward, I hope to stimulate students to consider the challenges of future policy responses to climate change.
Finally the PhD also brings to light a number of new sources and pieces of information regarding the revolts of 1647 to 1652 in Andalusia. These have been under-studied in the historiography and arguably deserve a far more prominent place in the history of both Andalusia and Spain. My aim would be to bring knowledge of this local history to a wider audience in Spain. I have already spoken at a public history event in the town of Ayamonte during my PhD and I would hope that more such events would help to bring the study of the political involvement and protest movements of the seventeenth century to a wider audience. Understanding how past societies challenged authority and brought about change is a crucial element of understanding our own roles and responsibilities within a well-functioning modern democracy.
Acknowledgements

Massive thanks go to my supervisors, Alexander Samson and Julian Hoppit for their expert help, unfailing availability, and thought provoking contributions to this project; to the LAHP for funding my PhD; and to the Casa de Velázquez in Madrid for enabling me to spend two months of uninterrupted research in the archives of Andalusia and Madrid. Researching in Spain has been a pleasure and there were countless helpful archivists and librarians along the way who enabled the work to take the shape that it did. Thank you to Ludmilla Jordanova for sparking my interest in early modern Europe, many years ago at KCL, and to my parents for all the support. Fellow PhD students and friends in London, Madrid, and further afield, who have made the past four years so enjoyable and all helped in their own way - Clair, Anelie, Beatriz, Paolo, Ethan, Roland, Ruby, Vinny, Tom, Ollie, Emily, Jonah, Ben, Charlie, Esther, and Andrew - thank you too. Greatest thanks, however, goes to Frankie Kubicki for the support, encouragement, intelligence, and love of the past fourteen years.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Lucena, January 1647

In January 1647 a group of tax collectors, led by a man named Matteo Serrano, made their way to Lucena in Andalusia in the South of Spain. Lucena was a relatively large municipality of around 13,000 inhabitants, and Matteo Serrano and his men had been charged with collecting a tax of 8,000 ducados that the city's residents owed to the royal treasury. Upon arrival, they took up lodgings in a local inn and set about contacting local town officials to begin the collection process. However, as was so often the case in early modern Europe, the arrival of tax collectors was to set in motion a serious episode of local unrest. A few days after their arrival, on the evening of 16 January, a group of around fifty armed protesters smashed down the door to the inn in which the tax collectors were staying, injuring one of them, and forcing the men to flee to a nearby convent for refuge. By the next morning more than five hundred people had allegedly congregated in Lucena's streets, many of them armed and with their faces covered, chanting 'long live the king and death to the bad government and remove these taxes from us'. The crowd demanded the release of two prisoners whose crime had been telling an official that anyone who paid taxes was a 'cabron'; and – later that evening – broke into the houses of the administrador de millones and the keeper of the papel sellado in order to try to destroy their tax records. The city's alcalde mayor (chief magistrate) and a local nobleman, the duque de Cardona, were able to rescue the tax collectors from their convent refuge but, fearing further violence, were forced to give in to demands such as release of prisoners.

1 Cartas de Lucena a la Real Chancillería de Granada, 17 de enero de 1647, Archivo Histórico Nacional (AHN), Consejos 7159, año 1647, número 5.
3 'viva el rey y muera el mal gobierno y quite se nos los pechos', Cartas de Lucena a la Real Chancillería de Granada, 17 de enero de 1647, AHN, Consejos 7159, año 1647, número 5. Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones andaluzas (Madrid: Narcea, 1973), 50–52.
4 Cartas de Lucena a la Real Chancillería de Granada, 17 de enero de 1647, AHN, Consejos 7159, año 1647, número 5.
That same day, the *duque* sent a panicked letter to the President of the *Real Chancillería* of Granada stating that neither he nor the city's officials were safe in their houses.\(^5\)

**1647 to 1652: Revolts in Andalusia and the Struggles of the Habsburg Monarchy**

On its own, this episode would probably merit little more than a footnote in the long history of pre-modern European tax riots. However the events in Lucena were the first in a series of revolts that took place across Andalusia over the following five years, between 1647 and 1652. Violent protests against royal officials and members of local government occurred in over twenty different towns and cities in the region during this period, with armed rebellion taking hold in the three largest cities of Seville, Córdoba and Granada (see Figure 1). The uprising in January of 1647 in Lucena was accompanied that same month by troubles in Ardales and, as winter turned to spring, violence against local and royal officials was reported in Alhama de Granada, Albuñuelas, and Andújar. Other towns such as Loja, Estepa, and Luque also experienced unrest during this period. A year later, in the spring of 1648, there was a major revolt in Granada alongside an accompanying disturbance in Motril. After this was repressed the region witnessed a few years of relative calm; probably more as a result of the devastating impact of the plague of 1649 to 1651 than any amelioration of the political situation. During these years we only have a couple of reports of disturbances, in Torredonjimeno and Vélez-Blanco. However trouble was once again to surface in spring of 1652, with a further spate of revolts, this time encompassing the major cities of Seville and Córdoba. Just as in Lucena, taxes – and other royal attempts at revenue extraction (particularly a disastrous revaluation of the *vellón* currency in 1651) – almost always formed part of the grievances expressed by those involved in these uprisings. However the period 1647 to 1652 in Andalusia was also characterised by repeated food shortages and, in particular, dramatic bread price rises, which proved to be a key motivator in getting people out onto the streets. Surviving tax

\(^5\) Ibid.
records suggest that the region experienced a series of disastrous harvests in the mid-seventeenth century, with the years 1647, 1650, 1651, and 1653 all registering as amongst the worst for grain production in the years between 1587 to 1729. Food, hunger, and fears about spiralling prices all contributed with increasing prominence to the uprisings that took place during this five year period, culminating in the large-scale revolts and bloody repression that occurred in Córdoba and Seville in 1652.

See chapter 2.
It is somewhat surprising that this important period of Andalusian unrest has not attracted more historical attention. Antonio Domínguez Ortiz published an insightful and penetrating book titled *Alteraciones andaluzas* in 1973, yet, despite his hope that this work would serve as a 'point of departure for new research', this remains the sole book-length publication on the topic.\(^7\) For Domínguez Ortiz these revolts were *motines de hambre* or 'hunger riots', brought about primarily by the high price of bread.\(^8\) And whilst he provided a valuable overview of the numerous factors that combined to affect prices in this period – including declining silver shipments from the Americas, plague, monetary revaluations, and taxation – in his view, the true cause of the revolts were the actions of venal, corrupt, and profiteering grain merchants, landowners, and local officials; who took advantage of a series of poor local harvests to artificially increase grain and bread prices.\(^9\)

The only historian to have repeatedly engaged with Antonio Domínguez Ortiz's work in the past few years has been Juan E. Gelabert. His book *Castilla Convulsa* includes the events in Andalusia as part of the difficulties faced by Philip IV's monarchy in Castile in the middle decades of the seventeenth century; and he has since published a further two articles about the *alteraciones*.\(^10\) In contrast to Domínguez Ortiz, Gelabert has tried to reorientate the focus towards the broader political and fiscal situation of Philip IV's monarchy, prioritising the impact of increased taxation and, in particular, the monetary revaluation of 1651, and thus moving away from seeing them as purely motivated by matters of subsistence.\(^11\) Aside from Gelabert's work, the main scholarly output since Domínguez Ortiz has been case studies of the events in individual Andalusian towns and cities during this period.\(^12\) These local studies are often invaluable in adding to our understanding of the

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\(^7\) 'que sirva de punto de partida a nuevas investigaciones', Domínguez Ortiz, *Alteraciones*, 12.
\(^8\) Domínguez Ortiz, 19.
\(^9\) Domínguez Ortiz, 158.
\(^11\) This is most explicit in: Gelabert, ‘¿Motines de subsistencia o materias de Estado?’
\(^12\) Cristina Viñes Millet, ‘El motín de subsistencias de 1650. Sus repercusiones en Granada’, *Anuario de Historia Moderna y Contemporánea* 6 (1979): 109–121; I. A. A. Thompson, ‘Alteraciones Granadinanas: el motín de 1648 a la
unfolding of events across Andalusia, but rarely provide a more general argumentative framework within which to situate the revolts. This absence of attention is curious because a study of these Andalusian revolts provides an opportunity to engage with a number of important historical debates. The Habsburg monarchy's political and economic struggles can most obviously be looked at through the lens of these *alteraciones andaluzas*, as can broader topics regarding popular revolt and political unrest in early modern Europe. These revolts took place during a period of particular turmoil for Philip IV's monarchy. They overlapped with uprisings in Catalonia (1640-59), Portugal (1640-68), and Naples and Sicily (1647-1648); war with France (1635-59) and the Dutch Republic (1558-1648). In Andalusia there had also been recent political turmoil in 1641, when the monarchy uncovered a conspiracy against the king, led by the Duke of Medina Sidonia (although there is little evidence to link the revolts of 1647 to 1652 with this plot).  

It was also a time of chronic fiscal problems, resulting in the suspension of payments by Philip IV in 1647 and 1652. In general the seventeenth century in Andalusia has been seen as a period of demographic, economic, and industrial stagnation (if not outright decline), that linked to the crown's difficulties in raising funds via a fiscal system in which substantial power still lay with the urban municipalities and the

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14 For a summary of this period see: Geoffrey Parker, ed., _La crisis de la monarquía de Felipe IV_ (Barcelona: Crítica, 2006).
nobility. Not only is this context crucial to understanding the causes of the revolts, as Gelabert suggests, but the reactions of both central and municipal governments to the difficulties of the mid-seventeenth century have much to tell us about the overall strengths and fragilities of Philip IV’s monarchy. This study will try to show that we do not have to reject the concept of a subsistence crisis in the region to also prioritise an explanation of the causes of the revolts that focuses on the political and fiscal problems of the Habsburg monarchy. In fact, as we shall see, the very structure of political power under the Habsburg monarchy and the political and fiscal role that municipal governments played in this system has much to tell us about why events unfolded in the way that they did.

The next few sections of this chapter will try to unpack the general ideas and concepts that sit behind this thesis. In terms of a broader historiography, it is near impossible to write about revolts in seventeenth century Europe without addressing the general crisis debate which, whilst now almost seventy years old, still provides a number of potential frameworks within which to help situate and understand the events in Andalusia. One of the more recent branches of that debate, namely the idea that an entire global crisis in the seventeenth century might have been caused by a particularly extreme episode of Little Ice Age climate change, also provides a fascinating new context within which to analyse the revolts of 1647 to 1652. As the work of historical climatologists has developed over the past few decades so has the information available to historians greatly increased with regards to understanding the climate of the past and its potential impact on human society. Given the prominence of subsistence issues in the revolts of 1647 to 1652 this is an element that deserves further investigation. In a sense what follows is, to some extent, an environmental history of these revolts, one which tries to unpack what we know about the climate

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of the region, the impact of the Little Ice Age, and the effect that this may have had on harvests and prices. However this work does not take as a given that a period of extreme climate should necessarily lead to crisis. Rather it uses the climate information to focus on the political economy of the region and how political structures and government interventions helped to turn harvest shortages into a crisis of spiralling bread prices and political unrest. When I started writing this thesis I thought that its key contemporary relevance would be global warming and the current climate crisis. However in finishing writing during the coronavirus pandemic I have been struck by another parallel. As national and local governments around the world have competed to access a limited supply of crucial virus testing supplies and personal protective equipment, we have seen first hand how the impact of a natural disaster can be exacerbated by political and market structures. Overall it has been states with poorly centralised systems and those that have failed to join co-ordinated international procurement efforts that have struggled most to secure the supplies that they need. In the United States this is exemplified by the scramble for testing resources amongst the various states, hampered by a lack of federal leadership and national procurement planning.\(^{17}\) As Doug Burgum, the governor of North Dakota complained: ‘We’re competing against all 50 states, FEMA [the Federal Emergency Management Agency], and other federal agencies’.\(^ {18}\) Equally we have seen the impounding and confiscation of protective medical equipment shipments by countries desperate to shore up their own supplies. ‘Modern piracy’ in the words of Andreas Geisel, Berlin’s interior minister.\(^ {19}\) Replace epidemic disease with harvest failures and virus testing kits with wheat and we could be back in seventeenth century Andalusia; where local municipal governments imposed in an increasingly desperate web of trade embargoes, short-term tax exemptions, and price controls in an attempt to provision their towns and cities in 1647 to 1652. This study leans heavily on works that consider jurisdictional fragmentation and a resulting lack of state capacity as a key


\(^{18}\) Crow.

explanatory factor in the story of poor market integration in seventeenth century Andalusia and Castile; and it tries to use the crisis of 1647 to 1652 as an opportunity to look at the political structures and mechanisms that underpinned these problems. An application of these ideas to the Andalusian grain market will help to clarify some of the issues faced by the monarchy and the region's municipal governments during this period and help us to understand why these problems culminated in revolt. We will also try to think about the individuals who took to the streets in Andalusia between 1647 and 1652, and attempt to link the popular politics of the crowd to these issues of overlapping political jurisdiction, fiscal problems, grain market management and climate-induced harvest shortages.

The General Crisis, State Capacity, and Market Integration

The Habsburg monarchy was far from the only polity to experience difficulties in the mid-seventeenth century. Ever since the 1950s, historians have argued about whether or not one could in fact characterise this period as a time of "general crisis" affecting most of Europe.\(^{20}\) Whereas the problems of Philip IV's rule might be analysed with respect to detailed discussion of policy decisions, regional economic trends, or local social changes, the assertion of a European-wide crisis clearly requires broader structural explanations. Eric Hobsbawm, in launching this debate, used a Marxist framework to posit that seventeenth century Europe had witnessed an economic crisis, brought about by the transition from a 'feudal to a capitalist economy'.\(^{21}\) Whilst this hypothesis was largely rejected by his contemporaries, Hobsbawm's idea of a general crisis of the seventeenth century spawned a plethora of competing theories and reformulations. This debate split relatively early on into two largely separate strands: one that kept the economic focus of Hobsbawm's original argument; and another, spearheaded by the intervention of Hugh Trevor-Roper, that concentrated on


what had otherwise been a minor part of his thesis: namely the cluster of European revolts and revolutions that had taken place in the mid-century. In contrast to Hobsbawm, Trevor-Roper's general crisis was fundamentally a political one: a 'period of revolutions in Europe', evidenced by the English Civil War, the Frondes in France, the 'palace revolution' of the United Provinces, and the revolts of Catalonia, Portugal and Naples. Much like Hobsbawm, his explanatory model for the crisis faced stiff criticism from his peers, with few finding his characterisation of the inherent problem being a conflict between 'court' and 'country' convincing. However, as of yet, no real consensus has emerged around an alternative theory to explain this collection of political conflicts. Instead the debate has often come to centre on whether they were a unique enough assemblage of events to merit the term "crisis"; and whether or not these uprisings were ever truly "revolutionary" in nature. Events in Andalusia were certainly not revolutionary, by any reasonable definition of the term. However it does seem significant that they occurred during a period of increased conflict in both the territories of the Habsburg monarchy, and Europe more generally. Describing the mid-seventeenth century as a period of general crisis is not to deny that there were other times of important and elevated incidences of political conflict in Europe (during the 1590s, for example). Instead, in my view, it can serve as a useful framework for examining the particular set of circumstances that affected the social, political, and economic lives of Europeans in the seventeenth century, and allow for some fruitful comparisons between the similarities and differences that characterised the eruption of revolt in different European nations. This study tries to situate the Andalusian revolts within this Habsburg and European context. In terms of explanatory models,

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23 Trevor-Roper, 31.
however, the economic strand of the general crisis debate has delivered more substantial general
theories of change and rupture than the political one. In this respect more recent historical works on
popular politics, many of which owe a considerable debt to E. P. Thompson's 'moral economy' of
the crowd, arguably have more to tell us about how best to understand the political motivations and
actions of the individuals who took to the streets and participated in the revolts in Andalusia.\footnote{E.P. Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century’, \textit{Past & Present} 50, no. 1 (February 1971): 76–136. This historiography will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5.} As
will be developed further in chapter 5, thinking about the concerns and aims of those who became
involved in the uprisings, and the political culture that underpinned their actions, can help us in
understanding how harvest failures became a political issue in Andalusia; one that greatly
concerned local municipal governments (as well as the monarchy in Madrid) and pushed their
management of the regions' grain market to the forefront of the grievances that brought about revolt
and unrest.

Whilst the protests in Andalusia did not seek 'a radical transformation' of the political or
social order that might be deemed necessary to merit the label "revolutions", this study chooses to
refer to them specifically as revolts rather than riots.\footnote{For a definition of "revolution" see: Robert Forster and Jack P. Greene, ‘Introduction’, in \textit{Preconditions of Revolution in Early Modern Europe}, ed. Robert Forster and Jack P. Greene (Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 1.} This is to emphasise their political nature.
Riots, of course, can also be political; particularly if one adopts Andy Wood's useful definition of
politics as occurring 'where power is reasserted, extended or challenged'.\footnote{Andy Wood, \textit{Riot, Rebellion and Popular Politics in Early Modern England} (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 16.} However, over the course
of the five years between 1647 and 1652, the revolts in Andalusia were characterised by crowds
directing anger at and demanding change from both the representatives of local municipal and royal
government. In Seville, Córdoba and Granada demands were made for the leader of the city's
municipal government to be replaced with representatives of the crowd's choosing. Throughout, it
was the perceived failure of local governments to act appropriately to keep prices low, that formed
the core grievance around which crowds coalesced, with protests often taking place in or around
government buildings. Rebels showed a sophisticated understanding of the political system that they were challenging, producing concrete policy demands that encompassed issues such as the pricing and marketing of goods, taxation, and monetary policy.

These political grievances had economic issues at their core, and the general crisis debate has provided a host of economic interpretations of the seventeenth century crisis in Europe. This has generally been based on three main features: a general stagnation or decline in the European population that contrasts with sustained growth in the sixteenth century; stagnating agricultural prices and production; and a re-orientation of the centres of European long-distance trade and commerce from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic ports of England and the Dutch Republic. All three of these trends can also be evidenced in Andalusia, which appears to have witnessed a similarly unimpressive seventeenth century with regards to demographic growth and agricultural production, as well as suffering the impact of declining trade from the Americas coming through the port of Seville. However participants in the general crisis debate have found little agreement about the reasons behind these trends, with competing theories regarding the importance of Malthusian forces, monetary upheavals, and demand-versus-production-led crises all being advanced.

The sheer scope of the different approaches to, and definitions of, this general crisis has led some to question whether trying to bring this disparate collection of revolts, revolutions and economic crisis into an overarching explanatory model is possible, or indeed desirable. Yet, some

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33 Koenigsberger, ‘Politicians’, 162.
unifying themes can be drawn from the debate. Niels Steensgaard, for example, made a rare attempt to unite both the political and economic branches of the general crisis literature.\textsuperscript{34} He viewed both the demographic and agricultural stagnation of the seventeenth century as a symptom of a demand problem, caused by the increased pressures visited upon European populations by the 'growth of state power and increased fiscal demands'.\textsuperscript{35} For Steensgaard, it was the growing size of the early modern state and huge increases in public expenditure, primarily used to fund ever expanding standing armies, which burdened the European population with greater and greater tax demands. Not only did this depress demand, by reducing people's spending power, but the attempted imposition of new taxes and fiscal reforms by absolutist rulers undermined customary rights and provided the motivation for the spate of revolts and revolutions of the mid-seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{36} He went on to suggest that the 'crisis is therefore the problem of absolutism'.\textsuperscript{37}

Absolutism and its absence has also been used as one of the explanatory factors for the third element of the classic economic general crisis: the emergence of the English and Dutch economies. This view is particularly associated with the New Institutional Economics (NIE) school, which claimed that absolutist and predatory states were the major hindrance to the development of markets, and thus economic growth, in the early modern period. In this framework, both the English (post-Glorious revolution) and Dutch Republic's economies were able to outstrip the rest of Europe during this period due to the fact that their non-absolutist political institutions guaranteed secure property rights.\textsuperscript{38} Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson argue that profits from the Atlantic trade in countries that had such 'nonabsolutist institutions' led to commercial interests pushing for ever

\textsuperscript{34} Steensgaard, ‘The Seventeenth-Century Crisis’.
\textsuperscript{35} Steensgaard, 47.
\textsuperscript{36} Steensgaard, 46–47.
\textsuperscript{37} Steensgaard, 47.
increasing reforms and economic innovations that furthered their economic success.\textsuperscript{39} As Jan de Vries has perceptively pointed out, one can draw clear parallels between these more recent economic theories and Hobsbawm's original formulation of 'forced draughts' fanning Anglo-Dutch social and political change, and economic power.\textsuperscript{40}

It would be plausible to combine the Steensgaard and NIE models and apply them to the Andalusian case, arguing that an absolutist monarchy, desperate for increased revenues, hampered the growth of Atlantic and Mediterranean trade coming through the port cities such as Seville, whilst imposing an ever growing fiscal burden on the region's inhabitants; leading to demographic and economic decline, and political resistance to the imposition of various novel methods of royal revenue extraction. However, crucially, this would rest upon the dual acceptance that a system of absolutist rule existed in mid-seventeenth century Spain, and that this system was also the major cause of the economic problems that affected Andalusia. Both those assumptions are questionable. Rather than a strongly centralised, absolutist monarchy, the Habsburg system of government has tended to instead be characterised by recent research as a 'polycentric monarchy'; with an increasing focus, not just on the differences between the historic territories that made up Spain, but also, importantly, on the large amount of political and fiscal power that remained vested in the individual urban municipalities that fell under Habsburg rule.\textsuperscript{41} A more productive re-interpretation of Steensgaard is hinted at by Sheilagh Ogilvie, who, in an article on the general crisis in Germany, notes the state's struggles to raise revenue in a political system characterised by multiple competing territories and poor 'inter-regional economic integration'.\textsuperscript{42} Bartolomé Yun Caslilla has also

\textsuperscript{39} Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, ‘The Rise of Europe’, 572.
\textsuperscript{40} Hobsbawm, ‘The Crisis—I’, 56; de Vries, ‘The Economic Crisis’, 181–82.
suggested that the Steensgaard model might be nuanced with respect to Castile by not simply thinking of the state extraction of resources as a problem of 'overtaxation' caused by the need to fund the state's military apparatus; but also to consider how a variety of 'dominant groups' such as the nobility and urban patricians were able to profit from the system and extract value that reinforced their social and economic positions.\textsuperscript{43} Much of this ties in with a recent focus by economic historians on the concept of state capacity. Broadly speaking, the idea of state capacity encompasses the ability of a state 'to enforce its rules' and 'to garner enough tax revenues from the economy to implement its policies'.\textsuperscript{44} States that were able to do this successfully (ones with high capacity) are hypothesised to have been able to enjoy higher rates of economic growth over the early modern period. Stephan Epstein has provided one of the more convincing theories for why state capacity was so crucial to economic growth. He argued that, where weakly centralised states were unable to enforce common rules across their territories, the resulting jurisdictional fragmentation hampered the development of markets by raising the costs of and barriers to trade, thus providing a crucial limit to pre-modern economic growth.\textsuperscript{45} As we shall see, in Andalusia, this concept of jurisdictional fragmentation and its effect on market integration, particularly vis-à-vis the grain market, would appear to be a more fruitful avenue than theories of absolutism to think about how the interactions between the economy and the state may have led to the problems of the mid-seventeenth century.

The General Crisis goes Global: The Little Ice Age

Over time, as the general crisis debate grew to encompass an increasing number of different theories and approaches, so too did its territorial scope expand beyond its initial, fundamentally European, focus. In the 1980s Jack Goldstone and William Atwell made attempts to extend the

\textsuperscript{43} Yun Casalilla, ‘Spain and the Seventeenth-Century Crisis’, 309–11.

\textsuperscript{44} Noel D. Johnson and Mark Koyama, ‘States and Economic Growth: Capacity and Constraints’, Explorations in Economic History 64 (1 April 2017): 2.

seventeenth century crisis framework to regions such China and Japan; and in a 1990 a collection of articles in *Modern Asian Studies* wondered whether evidence could be found for a concurrent crisis having taken place across Asia.\(^{46}\) However it is Geoffrey Parker's work that has most explicitly sought to turn this general crisis into a global one. He details harvest failures, hunger, war, and conflict occurring on almost every continent in the mid-seventeenth century, resulting in a global 'demographic, social, economic and political catastrophe'.\(^{47}\) For Parker, who has been working on the topic since the 1970s, the only plausible explanation for this wide-ranging global crisis is the impact of a factor that, by definition, affected the entire Earth system: Little Ice Age climate change.\(^{48}\)

The term Little Ice Age refers to the most recent period of global climate change prior to current global warming. Whilst disagreement remains amongst climatologists about the term and its periodisation, it can generally be defined as a period of cooling that may have begun as early as the fourteenth century in parts of the globe, but for which temperature reconstructions show the strongest evidence in the Northern Hemisphere, and in particular Europe, as spanning from around the sixteenth to the nineteenth century.\(^{49}\) Much like modern day global warming, climatologists also


\(^{47}\) Parker, *Global Crisis*, xxii.


stress that we should think of the Little Ice Age as a more complex phenomenon than just gradually changing, average global temperature. Instead the Little Ice Age’s impact was probably ‘more significant in terms of increased variability of the climate’, which may have come in the form of extreme temperature changes, but also variations in other climatic factors such as rainfall.\textsuperscript{50} Crucially for Parker’s thesis, the seventeenth century appears to have suffered some of the most extreme episodes of Little Ice Age climate and – in his 2013 book \textit{Global Crisis} – he provides a vast array of arguments and examples for how the climate came to have a dramatic impact on human society across the globe.\textsuperscript{51} These range from increased episodes of epidemic disease to frozen rivers creating hitherto impassable crossings for armies.\textsuperscript{52} In addition to the problems caused by climate he invokes a number of themes familiar to the General Crisis debate: most prominently the rise of the ‘fiscal-military state’, leading to progressively more taxation and warfare, all overseen by increasingly absolutist governments.\textsuperscript{53} Nevertheless, hunger, caused by drops in agricultural production resulting from adverse climatic conditions, remains the ‘heart’ of Parker’s global crisis, which manifested itself primarily through high mortality, conflict, and political uprisings.\textsuperscript{54} As evidence for this Parker lists forty-nine ‘major revolts and revolutions’ that occurred in the period 1635 to 1666; one of which is the \textit{alteraciones andaluzas} of 1647 to 1652.\textsuperscript{55} His global crisis has climate change front and centre as its root cause. Yet Parker is aware that the mid-seventeenth century was not the sole period of extreme Little Ice Age climate. To explain why similar global unrest did not follow in the late seventeenth century – which was similarly affected by inclement weather – Parker advances a demographic explanation, arguing that the world was less

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{50} Mann, ‘The Little Ice Age’, 504; Arturo Sousa and Pablo García-Murillo, ‘Changes in the Wetlands of Andalusia (Doñana Natural Park, SW Spain) at the End of the Little Ice Age’, \textit{Climatic Change} 58, no. 1 (May 2003): 208.
\bibitem{51} Parker, \textit{Global Crisis}.
\bibitem{52} Parker, 83, 226.
\bibitem{53} Parker, 34–36, 49–54.
\bibitem{54} Parker, 54, 77.
\bibitem{55} Parker, xix. Parker labelled these events the ‘Green Banner Revolts’, however this name, \textit{el motín del pendón verde}, usually refers to a revolt in Seville in 1521, and as such this label is not used in this thesis: Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, \textit{Historia de Sevilla: La Sevilla del siglo XVII}, 3rd ed. (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 2006), 28.
\end{thebibliography}
vulnerable to resulting crop failures because: ‘fewer - in many regions, far fewer - humans were alive in the 1680s than in the 1640s’.  

Like all the general crisis theories that came before it, Parker’s Little Ice Age induced global crisis has not escaped criticism. Paul Warde has suggested that *Global Crisis* ‘falls short of demonstrating its central thesis’. His main concerns are twofold. First that Parker does not do enough to demonstrate the ‘distinct quality’ of the climate of the middle decades of the seventeenth century, given that most climatological studies of the Little Ice Age focus on century long trends. Second that the demographic explanation for why inclement weather in the 1640s had such a devastating impact is poorly substantiated, with Parker relying on ‘anecdotal’ examples and ‘studies of village communities, rather than aggregate studies of populations’. The demographic element of Parker’s argument certainly seems hard to substantiate when looking at European states. Estimates for England probably come closest to Parker’s characterisation, however even these do not quite match the picture drawn of a substantial fall in population occurring between the 1640s and 1680s. It is estimated that the population of England was around 5.130 million in the period 1641-1646 but had grown to 5.390 million by 1656-1661. By 1686-1691 there had been a decline and this had probably fallen back to an average of 5.109 million. Yet it might be more cautious to view this period in England as one of population stagnation, rather than dramatic decline. In the case of France the available demographic studies are much less favourable to Parker’s argument. The total population in the period 1670 to 1699 has been estimated as being somewhere between 300,000 to 1.4 million people greater than between 1610 to 1639. As we shall see in chapter 2, the

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56 Parker, *Global Crisis*, 54, 590.
58 Warde, 289–90.
59 Warde, 292–93.
61 Wrigley et al., 614.
demographic estimates for Spain and Andalusia are similarly unsupportive of the idea that overpopulation in the 1640s can explain the onset of a crisis caused by harvest shortages. Overall Warde argues that *Global Crisis* suffers from a lack of a systematic methodology in finding causation between climate and events, rather than just ‘the accumulation of examples’. Jan de Vries has been similarly critical of the lack of attention paid to the economy in *Global Crisis*, arguing that Parker makes too simplistic a link between climate, harvest failures and price rises. Nevertheless, despite these criticisms, this study takes seriously Parker's idea that Little Ice Age climate had a role to play in the generating episodes of political unrest in the seventeenth century. Warde suggests that more, smaller scale, local studies would help test the applicability of Parker's thesis, and this work attempts to do so whilst taking into account the criticisms listed above.

**Structure and Argument**

Given the issues with the demographic argument made by Parker, we need to look elsewhere for the mechanisms which might link Little Ice Age climate, poor harvests, and resulting price rises and political unrest in Andalusia. Chapter 2 attempts to look at the existing climatological data to see how strong the evidence is for the middle decades of the seventeenth century having experienced a particularly extreme period of Little Ice Age climate. It then addresses whether or not we have sufficient evidence to posit a link between this climate and the quality of the region's harvests, looking at the relationship between good and bad harvests and grain prices in seventeenth century Andalusia. This chapter is necessarily speculative given the issues with available data, yet there is relatively strong evidence to suggest that the mid-seventeenth century did see a succession of unusually poor harvests and that this did lead to spiralling wheat and bread prices across the region. Chapter 3 asks why. A number of scholars such as Jan de Vries and Slicher van Bath have rightfully

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63 Warde, ‘Global Crisis or Global Coincidence?’, 293.
65 Warde, ‘Global Crisis or Global Coincidence?’, 301.
been sceptical of drawing a straight line between local harvest failures and local price rises, arguing that the early modern European economy had a sufficient level of integration to break these links. Indeed, in the absence of a European or even Spain-wide shortage of grains in the period 1647 to 1652, we should ask why Andalusians were not simply able to import wheat from the rest of Castile or abroad. There were institutions and policies implemented at both a Castilian and local municipal level that were meant to break the link between local harvest failures and price rises. Why these failed is a crucial question that allows us to interrogate two key issues. First is the political economy of the grain market in Andalusia in the seventeenth century. In looking at the relationship between the municipal governments and the monarchy in Madrid we can get some insight into the political working of the Habsburg monarchy and its towns and cities, and how this impacted both attempts to regulate the grain market, and individual towns' and cities' efforts to provision themselves during times of dearth. This, in turn, gives us some insight into problems of market integration in the region, and how jurisdictional fragmentation played a key role in further disintegrating what was an already poorly integrated grain market. This chapter studies these municipal attempts to regulate the grain market using a qualitative analysis rather than the quantitative approaches that currently dominate the field of market integration studies. Taking this different approach allows us to advance some answers about the barriers to market integration in Andalusia, that a lack of reliable quantitative data (particularly when it comes to prices) currently makes difficult.

The second benefit of looking at the grain market in this way is to link what might be thought of as a predominantly economic issue (harvest performance and grain prices) to the political realm. By focussing on the efforts of municipal governments to provision their localities and their relationships with the monarchy in Madrid we can gain further insight into how the issue of rising

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food prices became politicised, and a better understanding of the types of people and groups that participated in the revolts and why. This is the focus of Chapter 5. Current work on early modern food riots and revolts emphasises the need to move away from seeing these events as simply 'knife and fork' politics.\(^\text{67}\) This should caution us against drawing overly simplistic links between climate, poor harvests, high prices, and ensuing crowd actions. People did not just riot due to high bread prices: political grievances had to form part of the picture. In mid-seventeenth century Andalusia the municipal governments were explicitly charged with regulating and moderating the prices of grains and bread. Their failure to prevent the high price rises in the mid-seventeenth century made them a legitimate (although not always deserved) target for popular anger. As John Walter notes, 'the politics of subsistence... could raise more fundamental questions about the basis of custom, the nature of rights, and the proper exercise, or even provenance, of authority'.\(^\text{68}\)

Chapters 4 and 6 detail the narrative of the revolts. They attempt to set out an overview of what happened across the region whilst evidencing the claims made in chapters 2, 3 and 5. This provides the opportunity to update the two main narrative accounts of the revolts that can be found in the work of Domínguez Ortiz and Gelabert.\(^\text{69}\) This is particularly relevant for the 1648 revolt in Granada, where more recent research has suggested a significantly different timeline of events than is included in their books.\(^\text{70}\) A focus on the events in smaller towns across the regions should also help to broaden out the scope of existing studies on these revolts, which have tended to focus on the events in Seville, Córdoba and Granada. A developing trend amongst historians who have thought about the impact of the Little Ice Age and climate change in general has been to move away from episodes of crisis. This is certainly important. Dagomar Degroot, for example, has productively taken up Jan de Vries's call for historians to focus on the stories of adaption to climate rather than

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\(^{68}\) Walter, 11.

\(^{69}\) Domínguez Ortiz, *Alteraciones*; Gelabert, *Castilla convulsa*.

\(^{70}\) Thompson, ‘Alteraciones Granadinas’.
just the 'harm done' in his work on how the Dutch Republic managed to thrive during the peak centuries of the Little Ice Age. Yet alongside places, industries, and people that managed to adapt, there were also times where existing structures (both economic and social) made adaptation difficult, if not impossible. Looking at the organisation of provisioning in the towns and cities of Andalusia we can see that impact of region-wide poor harvests did lead to attempts on behalf of municipal governments to take actions to avert a crisis. However, as we shall see, the measures that they relied on and the jurisdictional fragmentation that existed in Andalusia arguably led to a worsening rather than a bettering of the situation. The conclusion in Chapter 7 looks at how the response to a further bad harvest in 1653 was influenced by the events of 1647 to 1652. It also tries to bring the findings of the previous chapters together to show that an understanding of the potential impacts of the Little Ice Age can help us better understand issues such as the disintegration of the Andalusian grain market and the effect of the decentralised nature of political power in the Habsburg monarchy.

Methodology and Sources

Chapter 2 looks at the existing climate reconstructions for Andalusia, and the harvest and price information that is available for the seventeenth century in order to think about the relationship between climate, harvests, and grain prices in the region. In this sense it is based on synthesising existing work rather than new archival research. It approaches the question statistically whilst being cautious about overanalysing data that is often incomplete, inconsistent, and unavailable at both the desired temporal and spatial definition. As such it uses fairly basic statistical methods, preferring to rely on the graphing of some general trends and the identification of some correlations rather than pursuing a more complex regression analysis. The research for chapter 3 and those that follow is overwhelming based on the Spanish national archives and the plethora of excellent municipal.

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archives that remain dotted around Andalusia. The papers of the Consejo de Castilla in the Archivo Histórico Nacional and of the Consejo de Hacienda in the Archivo General de Simancas are used to represent the views of Philip IV’s monarchy and his advisory councils. These archives also contain numerous letters sent from Andalusia to the monarchy in the mid-seventeenth century, usually on behalf of municipal governments and local notables. All of which can help us reconstruct the events of 1647 to 1652 as well as the views and actions of these Andalusian institutions and individuals. Yet the most important base of documents has come from the various Andalusian municipal archives. These often house a large variety of rich and under-explored sources. The actas capitulares (minute books of town and city councils) provide an invaluable insight into the views and decisions of these local institutions and their officials. With meetings regularly occurring once a week (and often more frequently in times of crisis) these colossal books of meeting notes are filled with information regarding everyday life in the region. These have proved the most helpful documents for reconstructing the measures taken and problems faced by the Andalusian municipalities as they attempted to ensure the provisioning of their localities. Often the decisions that they took required substantial negotiations with the monarchy in Madrid and piecing together some of these correspondences as they crossed a variety of institutions (for example Seville’s tax exemption request in 1652) has required trawling through the records of municipal governments, the Consejo de Castilla and the Consejo de Hacienda. This has been a vastly rewarding task made all the more challenging by the fact that many of the aforementioned consejo documents are yet to be catalogued in a manner that goes much beyond the sorting of letters into bundles based on the year that they relate to. The records of the municipal archives also include some account books of municipal grain stores (disappointingly few survive, with the exception of a group of yearly books from Écija), as well as legal documents and local government orders. Use is also made of the records of two court cases from the Archivo de la Real Chancillería de Granada, which help to illustrate the jurisdictional conflicts that erupted over wheat in the region.
Dóminguez Ortiz based much of his research for *alteraciones andaluzas* on documents from the private family archive of the Conde de Villariezo. Their ancestor Diego de Riano y Gamboa had been president of the Consejo de Castilla in the mid-seventeenth century and, as a result, this private archive houses a lot of the council's correspondence from that time. Unfortunately this collection is currently much less accessible than during Domínguez Ortiz's time and it has not proved possible to consult it during the course of the research for this thesis. Nevertheless a large number these documents were transcribed by Domínguez Oriz and published in *alteraciones andaluzas*. Given this fact, a decision was taken to concentrate on the Andalusian municipal archives, including those outside of the three largest cities of Seville, Granada and Córdoba. This focus on some of the smaller towns in the region was designed to give a different perspective to the aforementioned works of Domínguez Ortiz and Gelabert. Overall, documents from nine municipal archives are cited in this thesis. These were the Andalusian archives that had substantial holdings of mid-seventeenth century documents and which were located in towns where we know revolts took place. The aim was to develop a better picture of the issues and decisions taken at this local level, particularly when it came to the grain market. This is a key element of the research that sits behind the thesis as a whole but in particular Chapters 3, 4, and 6. The thinking behind taking such a qualitative approach to investigating questions of market integration is outlined in full in chapter 3.

A final difficulty has been the work involved in chapter 5, thinking about who participated in the revolts and why. The lack of almost any surviving sources written by or detailing the words or thoughts of the rebels that took action in 1647 to 1652 is understandably problematic when trying to answer such questions. Here use is made of a variety of manuscript accounts, housed in collections such as the Biblioteca Nacional de España, the Biblioteca Capitular Colombina and the Real Academia de la Historia. Of particular note with respect to the revolt in Seville is some

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72 Domínguez Ortiz, *Alteraciones*, 12.
correspondence housed in the *Sección Nobleza del Archivo Histórico Nacional* in Toledo, containing a report sent by local notable Francisco de Torregrosa Monsalve to the *duque de Béjar*. This source seems to have escaped the attention of historians working on the revolts, and offers some interesting insights into the events in Seville in 1652, which are developed in Chapter 6. Finally, the documents of the *Consejo de Castilla* in the *Archivo Histórico Nacional* in Madrid preserve a rare example of a protest poster from 1650 Seville, which has been used in chapter 5 to help develop a better understanding of the political culture that may have existed within the city in 1647 to 1652.
Note on the currency

The lowest denomination coin in Castile during the seventeenth century was the *maravedí*. This thesis mainly cites prices in *maravedís*. Some other commonly used units of currency were the *cuarto*, the *real* and the *ducado*, whose values in units of *maravedís* are listed below. The *maravedís* coins tended to be minted in billon and referred to as the *moneda de vellón*. There was also silver currency in circulation in Castile during this time, which somewhat complicates matters. Silver coins fetched a premium over their *vellón* counterparts, despite theoretically being denominated in the same units. Over the middle decades of the seventeenth century various different legal maximums for this premium were implemented by the monarchy, but the market value a silver coin could be expected to be worth around 50 per cent more than the same denomination of *moneda de vellón*.\(^\text{73}\) All cited prices are in *vellón* in this thesis unless otherwise stated.

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\begin{align*}
a \text{ cuarto} & = 4 \text{ maravedís} \\
a \text{ real} & = 34 \text{ maravedís} \\
a \text{ ducado} & = 375 \text{ maravedís}
\end{align*}
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\(^\text{73}\) For more information, including daily premiums in Madrid, see: Fernando Serrano Mangas, *Vellón y metales preciosos en la Corte del Rey de España (1618-1668)* (Madrid: Banco de España, Servicio de Estudios, 1996).
Chapter 2: The Little Ice Age, Harvests, and Prices in Seventeenth Century Andalusia
Seventeenth Century Andalusia

Andalusia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries exemplified, perhaps better than anywhere else in Europe, two distinct sides to the early modern European economy: one characterised by deepening global markets and expanding international trade, and the other representing a local and traditional agricultural organisation. Most obviously, with respect to the former, Andalusia was home to Seville, the Habsburgs' gateway to the Americas and the port that served as the sole entry point to that continent's treasures until the gradual transfer of responsibilities to Cádiz began in the mid-seventeenth century. The region had long been an important node on the commercial network that linked Europe and North Africa and had, since at least the fifteenth century, been home to a number of Genoese merchants, who had based themselves in cities such as Sanlúcar, Cádiz, and Málaga (at the time under the rule of the Nasrid kingdom of Granada). It had also served as a crucial location for the cross-fertilisation and development of knowledge between Christian, Jewish and Arab cultures, leading to advances in fields such as cartography, trigonometry and arithmetic, and meaning that the region contributed towards the European discovery of the Americas beyond merely serving as the departure point for Columbus's expeditions. The choice of Seville as the official port of the Indies led to a further influx of merchants and financiers, with important groups of Genoese, Flemish and Portuguese nationals establishing themselves in the sixteenth century. The opportunities offered by the arrival and departure of the fleets to the Americas stimulated local industry and raised wages in the city, which attracted artisans and labourers from the rest of Spain, and countries such as France and Portugal. The combination of these new opportunities and the

74 Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, ‘La burguesía gaditana y el comercio de Indias desde mediados del siglo XVII hasta el traslado de la Casa de Contracción’, in América y la monarquía española, ed. Miguel Molina Martínez (Granada: Editorial Comares, 2010), 158.
75 Bartolomé Yun Casalilla, Marte contra Minerva: el precio del imperio español, c. 1450-1600 (Barcelona: Crítica, 2004), 15–16; Manuel Moreno Alonso, Historia de Andalucía (Seville: Ediciones Alfar, 2004), 118.
76 Yun Casalilla, Marte contra Minerva, 16.
77 Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, Orto y ocaso de Sevilla, 3rd ed. (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 1981), 77–78.
78 Domínguez Ortiz, 78–79.
legacy of its pre-Christian conquest past meant that Seville was a remarkably diverse city. Despite the expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492, a number of conversos remained in Seville, with a particularly strong representation from Portuguese families of Jewish descent that took advantage of the Iberian Union in 1580 to expand their business interests into Andalusia. Likewise, whilst the expulsion of the moriscos in 1609 was undoubtedly a traumatic event for the morisco communities (as well as Andalusia's economy) recent research has emphasised that many more moriscos may have remained in or subsequently returned to the region than previously thought. Of course, diversity did not signify anything close to equality of opportunity. Ruth Pike estimates, on the basis of a church census, that just over seven per cent of the city's inhabitants were slaves in 1565. A number of these would have been Moorish or morisco slaves, often referred to as 'esclavos blancos', however the majority, by the end of the sixteenth century, would have been black Africans, as the Atlantic slave trade grew in importance alongside the pre-existing domestic slave trade.

It was not just Seville that was affected by this overseas expansion. In the sixteenth century textile industries in Córdoba, Granada, Jaén and Seville appear to have grown, in large part due to increased demand from the trade with the Americas; with the silk industry forming an important part of the economy of all four cities. The ports of Cádiz and Sanlúcar de Barrameda were also

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79 Domínguez Ortiz, 77.
80 Domínguez Ortiz, 79.
81 There is disagreement about the numbers of moriscos that remained in Spain. Trevor Dadson thinks that up to as many as 200,000 may have managed to avoid expulsion (either by remaining or returning), however Bernard Vincent thinks that the number is likely to have been in the tens of thousands, with a maximum ceiling of around 50,000. We do know, however, that a number did remain in cities such as Seville and Granada in the mid-seventeenth century: Trevor Dadson, Tolerance and Coexistence in Early Modern Spain: Old Christians and Moriscos in the Campo de Calatrava (Woodbridge: Tamesis, 2014), 145; Bernard Vincent, ‘The Geography of the Morisco Expulsion: A Quantitative Study’, in The Expulsion of the Moriscos from Spain: A Mediterranean Diaspora, ed. Mercedes García-Arenal and Gerard Wiegers (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 36.
83 Pike, 171–73.
able to take advantage of their position at the mouth of the Guadalquivir river to benefit from the valuable trade making its way to and from Seville.\textsuperscript{85} Even a small town such as Ayamonte saw a period of economic and demographic growth (particularly after 1580) as its location on the border between Portugal and Spain presented numerous mercantile opportunities; including the slave trade of black men and women (primarily from west-Africa) between Portugal and the trading ports of Seville and Cádiz.\textsuperscript{86} By the end of the sixteenth century over 50 per cent of Andalusians lived in towns of more than 5,000 inhabitants, and around one third lived in cities of 10,000 people or more; it was by far the most urbanised region of Castile.\textsuperscript{87} The region's economy thus became tied to an increasingly international, Atlantic facing, trading system that stimulated and took advantage of growing markets across Europe, and an urban network centred on Seville, which was rivalled only by Madrid in terms of population size in Spain.\textsuperscript{88}

However, in contrast to the section of the economy that was increasingly international and linked to the deepening early modern global markets, large swathes of Andalusia remained heavily focussed on agricultural production. Whilst some of these products found an international market – for example the wine and oil that made up the tercio de frutos de la tierra destined for the Americas; the silk grown in Granada; and the raisins shipped from Málaga – the vast majority of these agricultural goods were destined for local consumption, in markets that often only extended as far as the local town or city, let alone having a peninsula-wide or even Andalusian scope.\textsuperscript{89} The most


\textsuperscript{88} Fortea Pérez, 48–49.

\textsuperscript{89} For the tercio de frutos, see: García-Baquero González, ‘Andalusia and the Crisis of the Indies Trade’, 132–33. For sericulture in Granada, see: García Gámiz, ‘La seda en Andalucía’, 88. The Archivo Municipal de Málaga (AMM) contains documents showing the export of raisins to France, for example in 1648: AMM, Sección de E.C., año 1648, legajo 24, número 1, ff. 12-13.
important products in this respect were wheat and barley. Andalusia's climate was generally favourable to growing these types of grains. Mild winters that ended early and rainfall that fell primarily in winter and spring allowed such cereals to ripen before the hot dry summers, with harvests generally beginning in June. Bread, as in most parts of early modern Europe, made up a huge part of the staple diet. It could account for somewhere between 40 to 60 per cent of a person's average food consumption, probably more for the poor; and agricultural production was therefore similarly heavily weighted towards the growing of the grains that would eventually be milled and baked into bread. Records from the diezmo tax (a tithe levied predominantly by the church) give us some idea of the dominance of wheat and barley in Andalusia. Historian Pierre Ponsot collated the average yearly value of the diezmo between 1641 to 1647 in thirty-one different regions of the kingdom of Córdoba, splitting the totals between: wheat and barley; oil; wine; and menudos (a category that encompassed vegetables and fruits, as well as other agricultural products such as wax and honey). Ponsot's numbers show that, in these areas, 79 per cent of the value of the diezmo came from the harvest of wheat and barley (see figure 2). Whilst we should be cautious about how representative these thirty-one localities were of the kingdom as a whole, similar calculations for the end of the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries in Ponsot's work are less constrained by available data and – based on the survey of over one hundred and forty different localities – put the share at 65 per cent and 86 per cent respectively. Raphael Benítez Sánchez Blanco's work has also shown wheat and barley accounting for up to 82 per cent of the total value of the diezmo collected in one parish in Málaga, with this figure regularly exceeding 70 per cent in others. Studies from

elsewhere in Spain reinforce a similar picture.\textsuperscript{94} As a result of this large agricultural production most of the cities and towns of Andalusia received all of their necessary grain supplies from the lands that surrounded them; only in years of dearth would supplies be sought from elsewhere in Andalusia, other regions of Spain, or abroad.\textsuperscript{95} In a few places, such as Málaga, less productive land in its environs did mean more reliance on imported grain.\textsuperscript{96} However, on the whole Andalusia was largely


self-sufficient when it came to its grain consumption, with the sale and purchase of cereals being, more often than not, a local affair.

This contrast in Andalusia of co-existing economic activities that were centred on global and very local markets respectively was not simply a binary case of internationally focussed, mercantile economies in towns and cities, versus local agricultural production in the countryside. There was clear overlap between these two sectors. The towns and villages of the Alpujarra region, for example, grew much of the silk that was then spun by silk workers in Granada. City-folk in Andalusia were often themselves engaged in agricultural activities, even in the larger metropolises. Isabel Rodríguez Alemán has estimated that around 40 per cent of the working population in Málaga in 1632 worked in the agricultural sector. Urbanisation did not necessarily mean a move away from agricultural activities. It is also worth emphasising that just because some parts of the Andalusian economy were linked into a burgeoning global economic system, did not mean that all sectors could automatically gain easy access to international markets. For example – and this is a point that will be developed in much greater detail in the following chapters – when grain shortages hit the region in the mid-seventeenth century, local municipalities encountered severe difficulties when trying to import grain from the rest of the Iberian peninsula, let alone from overseas.

In the first half of the seventeenth century both of these sides to the Andalusian economy encountered problems. From around 1622 until the beginning of the eighteenth century Spanish trade with the Americas entered a period of decline, as the colonies became increasingly self-sufficient and other European countries began to make inroads into the trade. This had a knock on effect on the commercial and manufacturing sectors of the Andalusian economy. The silk industry

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98 Isabel Rodríguez Alemán, *La población de Málaga en el siglo XVII* (Málaga: Centro de ediciones de la diputación provincial de Málaga, 2003), 114–19.
99 To be discussed in detail in chapters 3 and 6.
seems to have suffered greatly across the region, in part due to the increased competition that it began to face in both Castile and the Americas from goods produced in other European countries, as well as the Portuguese colonies in India, and China. To these issues were added the expulsion of the *moriscos* who had traditionally preserved much of the know-how that underpinned the industry; an inflexible guild system that did not adapt production to changing tastes; and the more general disruptions caused by the monetary revaluations and episodes of plague that affected Andalusia as a whole. Agricultural production also appears to have suffered in the seventeenth century. Whilst the sixteenth century is thought to have seen overall growth in agricultural production across Spain, the seventeenth century has long been seen as a century of decline. As we shall see later in this chapter this characterisation was subject to substantial regional variations. However the work of Pierre Ponsot has shown that, in Andalusia, a sixteenth century trend towards growth in agricultural production began to taper off around 1570. The seventeenth century, in contrast was at best characterised by stagnation, particularly when it came to the production of cereals. We will look at the evidence for changes over a long seventeenth century and the reasons behind these decadal changes in the available *diezmo* data in more detail later. However there is little doubt that the secular agricultural production trends of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were intrinsically linked to demographic ones.

Once again, the sixteenth century is generally accepted to have been a period of growth when it comes to the demography of both Spain and Andalusia. The Spanish population is thought to have grown from around 4,698,000 inhabitants at the start of the century, to around 6,632,000 at its end. Andalusia saw a similar general trend, although with distinct regional differences. The population of the kingdom of Seville appears to have grown substantially, whilst issues such as the

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102 García Gámez, 88.
105 Ponsot, xviii–xix.
106 Rosa María González Martínez, *La población española (siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII)* (Madrid: Actas, 2001), 35.
expulsions of the *moriscos* led to decline in Granada.\textsuperscript{107} Overall, Andalusia probably had around 1,200,000 inhabitants at the end of the sixteenth century.\textsuperscript{108} The demography of seventeenth century Spain has proved more controversial, which is largely due to an absence of reliable state censuses carried out between 1591 and the early eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{109} The broad consensus would suggest that Spain saw at best modest growth, with maybe 7,500,000 inhabitants by 1700.\textsuperscript{110} However this was subject to large regional variations, with substantial decline in Extremadura, Castilla la Vieja, and Castilla la Nueva, being offset by growth in places like Galicia and Murcia.\textsuperscript{111} In Andalusia, much like the picture with regards to agricultural production, stagnation or possibly mild growth seems to have been the story of the seventeenth century. Yet this was also subject to large temporal and geographical variations. The population of the region appears to have declined in the opening two decades, before suffering a further fall in the late 1640s and 1650s, largely as a result of a devastating plague epidemic that visited mass death upon the region between 1649 and 1651.\textsuperscript{112} In between these episodes, there was some recuperation of the losses, and after 1660 a more general period of growth appears to have begun, with one more further dip between 1676 to 1685.\textsuperscript{113} There was also great variation between different cities. Seville saw a marked decline, from around 90,000 inhabitants in 1591, to just over 60,000 at the end of the period. On the other hand Cádiz might have doubled in size in the second half of the seventeenth century, with Málaga also growing from around 15,000 to 20,000 inhabitants over the same period.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{107} González Martínez, 37–38.  
\textsuperscript{108} Rodríguez Alemán, *La población de Málaga*, 58.  
\textsuperscript{112} Rodríguez Alemán, *La población de Málaga*, 60.  
\textsuperscript{113} Rodríguez Alemán, 60.  
\textsuperscript{114} Rodríguez Alemán, 61, 67.
The picture that emerges from an economic, agricultural and demographic perspective is that the seventeenth century was a challenging one for Andalusia. Whilst not a period of outright decline, as earlier histories may have suggested, there was at best slight growth over the course of the century in these three areas; all characterised by large peaks and troughs throughout the period and substantial regional differences. All three of these areas were closely interrelated, although it is hard to untangle the primary direction of causation when it came to something like agricultural production and demography. Yet outlining this general picture of the region is important on multiple levels when it comes to thinking about the revolts of 1647 to 1652, particularly if we are to investigate the claims made by Parker about the centrality of Little Ice Age climate and disrupted harvests in causing unrest in the seventeenth century. As we have seen, the demographic element of Parker's argument – that there were more people alive in the 1640s than the 1680s – does not seem to be true at either the Spain or Andalusian level.\footnote{Parker, \textit{Global Crisis}, 590.} Although one could make such a case for a city like Seville, even here the demographic decline had begun at the end of the sixteenth century, making the 1640s an unlikely decade to think about overpopulation. No doubt the plague of 1649 to 1651 caused a substantial drop in the Andalusian population, but in cities like Málaga, for example, the population seems to have recovered relatively quick from these dramatic losses.\footnote{Rodríguez Alemán, \textit{La población de Málaga}, 66–67.} Overall it seems difficult to make an argument for the impact of the Little Ice Age in mid-seventeenth century Andalusia using the same demographic formulation as found in \textit{Global Crisis}. That is not to say that climate had no impact on the region. Just that population pressure is probably the wrong factor to focus on in order to explain that impact. The rest of this chapter will try to develop this point further, by looking at what we know about the specific impact of the Little Ice Age in seventeenth-century Andalusia, and thinking about the relationship between the climate and factors such as agricultural production and prices in the region.
The Little Ice Age

As we saw in chapter 1, the Little Ice Age is generally (although not uncontroversially) characterised as a period of climate beginning around the fourteenth century and lasting until the nineteenth century, during which the Northern Hemisphere (and parts of Europe most notably) experienced colder average temperatures than the centuries before and after.\textsuperscript{117} However recent work by climatologists stresses that, globally, this period of climate presents a far more complex picture than simply cooling temperatures; which has led to debates about whether or not the label Little Ice Age is appropriate (historians and climatologists at least have debates over nomenclature in common).\textsuperscript{118} Given its ubiquitousness we will stick with the term in this work, even if we accept that it is more productive to think of this as a time of ‘increased variability of the climate’ across the globe; encompassing a far broader spectrum of weather than simply temperature.\textsuperscript{119} Intrinsically tied up with this debate about the nature of the Little Ice Age is the question of why a period of climate change came to pass. Here there also remains a substantial amount of uncertainty and debate. Whilst most would not attribute the onset of the Little Ice Age to a single causal factor, a number of hypotheses have been advanced, including the impact of the earth’s orbital cycles, variations in solar activity, the occurrence of massive volcanic explosions, changes in ocean circulations, as well as human factors linked to demographic and land-use changes.

Over the very long term, changes in the earth’s orbit around the sun probably explain a general cooling trend in Arctic temperatures that climatologists have reconstructed, dating from the first to the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{120} Essentially, as the earth rotates around its rotational axis (once a day) so too does the axis also move in a very slow circular motion. A full cycle takes over twenty

\textsuperscript{117} PAGES 2k Consortium, ‘Continental-Scale Temperature’, 341–42; Marcott et al., ‘A Reconstruction of Regional and Global Temperature’, 1198; Matthews and Briffa, ‘The “Little Ice Age”’, 32; Mann, ‘The Little Ice Age’, 508.
\textsuperscript{118} Matthews and Briffa, ‘The “Little Ice Age”’.
\textsuperscript{119} Mann, ‘The Little Ice Age’, 504; Sousa and Garcia-Murillo, ‘Changes in the Wetlands of Andalusia’, 208.
five thousand years and, over the past two millennia, this gradual shift has meant that the Arctic has received less solar radiation in summer months.\textsuperscript{121} This may have reduced average temperatures by around 0.22 °C every thousand years; a trend which was only reversed in the twentieth century due to the impact of human factors.\textsuperscript{122} However, similar millennial-term cooling trends are not observed in locations outside of the Arctic region. The Northern Hemisphere, for example, was instead dominated by centennial-scale temperature fluctuations, which can be better explained by other factors.\textsuperscript{123} Decreased solar radiation is another factor that has long been advanced to explain the onset of the Little Ice Age. Astronomer John A. Eddy coined the terms Spörer and Maunder Minima to refer to two periods between 1460 to 1550 and 1645 to 1715 (respectively) where both early observations of sunspots and proxy data (carbon-14 measurements in tree rings) suggested an important dip in solar activity.\textsuperscript{124} These Minima coincided with some of the coldest periods of Northern Hemisphere temperature, and Eddy thus speculated that low solar activity might explain the onset of the Little Ice Age.\textsuperscript{125} Recent research, however, has cast doubt on the importance of this factor.\textsuperscript{126} Climatologists increasingly believe that a series of large volcanic eruptions, originating in the mid-thirteenth century, may hold the key to explaining the change to the earth's climate. In 1257 the Samalas volcano on the Indonesian island of Lombok erupted in what is believed to have been the single largest volcanic eruption recorded on earth over the past seven thousand years.\textsuperscript{127} This was accompanied by a further three large-scale volcanic eruptions in the latter half of the century.\textsuperscript{128}

\textsuperscript{122} Kaufman et al., ‘Recent Warming’, 1239.
\textsuperscript{123} Kaufman et al., 1239.
\textsuperscript{125} Eddy, 1199.
\textsuperscript{128} Joanna Sławinska and Alan Robock, ‘Impact of Volcanic Eruptions on Decadal to Centennial Fluctuations of Arctic Sea Ice Extent during the Last Millennium and on Initiation of the Little Ice Age’, Journal of Climate 31, no. 6 (29 November 2017): 2146–47.
It is thought that the effect of these eruptions was to send huge clouds of sulfate aerosols into the stratosphere, which in turn reflected sunlight back to space and reduced the amount of solar energy that reached the Earth's surface. Whilst these clouds only lasted for around one to two years, the cooling that they produced may have had a knock on effect, increasing sea ice in the Arctic ocean, and leading to a ‘a self-sustaining sea-ice/ocean feedback’ in the North Atlantic. A key part of this feedback loop would have been related to the system of ocean currents called the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC). These currents bring warm water in the upper layers of the Atlantic ocean from the tropics northwards, towards the Arctic, where they cool and subsequently sink into the deep Atlantic, before starting to flow back southwards in these deeper waters. Climate models suggest that increased Arctic ice would have slowed the AMOC in the long term and that this can help explain the onset of Little Ice Age type climate. These changes were then amplified by other contributing factors, like the reduced solar activity proposed by Eddy and possibly even human factors such as changing land-use and demographic decline caused by the colonisation of the Americas.

This combination of processes can probably explain the gradual onset of colder temperatures, beginning in the Arctic at the end of the thirteenth century and the colder average Northern Hemisphere temperatures that have been recorded between the sixteenth to the nineteenth century. However their impact was not simply limited to temperature variations. Given the

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134 PAGES 2k Consortium, ‘Continental-Scale Temperature’.
complexity of the Earth's climate system, these changes had a knock on effect on a huge variety of climate and weather systems across the globe. Oceanic circulations are intrinsically linked to atmospheric ones. Changes in the AMOC for example, would have affected the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO): a system that links high and low pressure zones over Iceland and the Azores and which impacts both temperature and rainfall in Northern Europe and the Mediterranean. Changing ocean temperatures also affect the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO), which causes switches between El Niño and La Niña conditions. This 'can alter weather patterns all over the world' due to the huge variations in precipitation and convection that result in the Pacific. It is for this reason that climatologists caution against thinking about the Little Ice Age simply in terms of a centuries long general cooling trend. For large parts of the globe the defining characteristic of this period would rather have been increased variability of climate, encompassing rainfall and wind conditions, as well as short-term fluctuations between hot and cold episodes.

The Little Ice Age in Andalusia

For the above reasons, if we are to think seriously about the climate's impact on the revolts of 1647 to 1652, it is important to be precise about the Little Ice Age conditions that occurred in the region in the seventeenth century. Andalusia is generally defined as having a Mediterranean climate 'characterised by winter rains and summer droughts with a strong soil water deficit in summer. It is a temperate rainy, humid meso-thermal climate with dry subtropical warm to hot summers'. Unfortunately there are comparatively fewer temperature reconstructions available for the Iberian Peninsula, compared to northern Europe, mainly as a result of a lack of natural proxy records (such as suitable tree-ring specimens). A rare exception is a study of tree ring samples taken from the

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136 Degroot, 26.
137 Mann, ‘The Little Ice Age’, 508.
natural park of Sierra de Cazorla, Segura y las Villas, situated in eastern Andalusia to the north-east of Jaén, that reconstructs eight hundred years of past temperatures in the region.\textsuperscript{140} The evidence from Cazorla suggests that there was a period of persistently colder, below average summer temperature that began around 1550 and continued until the early twentieth century, during which there was also a notable lack of warm episodes.\textsuperscript{141} Overall, however, it should be noted that these average temperatures appear to show less extreme variability than comparable reconstructions at more northerly latitudes, and there is some consensus amongst climatologists that Mediterranean latitudes would not have experienced the same severe winter temperatures that characterised the Little Ice Age in northern Europe.\textsuperscript{142}

Instead there is convincing evidence that, in Andalusia's Mediterranean climate, the Little Ice Age would have primarily manifested itself in changing patterns of precipitation.\textsuperscript{143} This is thought to be because changes to the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) would have impacted the areas of high pressure over the Azores and low pressure over Iceland. Differences between these two areas of pressure cause changes to the 'intensity and location of the North Atlantic Jet Stream': when there is a greater than average difference southern Europe tends to experience 'cold and dry winter conditions', whilst a smaller than average difference leads to wet winters.\textsuperscript{144} This process is called the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO), with a 'positive NAO' denoting larger than average differences in pressure and a 'negative NAO' denoting smaller ones.\textsuperscript{145} As such, the feedback-loop described earlier, whereby build up of Arctic ice caused changes to the AMOC, would also have affected precipitation in Andalusia as well as Northern Hemisphere

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{140} Dorado Liñán et al., ‘Eight-Hundred Years’.
\item \textsuperscript{141} Dorado Liñán et al., 82, 87.
\item \textsuperscript{142} Dorado Liñán et al., 87; Sousa and García-Murillo, ‘Changes in the Wetlands of Andalusia’, 208–9.
\item \textsuperscript{143} Sousa and García-Murillo, ‘Changes in the Wetlands of Andalusia’, 208–9.
\item \textsuperscript{145} The Met Office, ‘North Atlantic Oscillation’.
\end{itemize}
temperatures more generally. Fortunately, in contrast to the available information regarding
temperature, the Iberian Peninsula and Andalusia have a far larger wealth of both proxy and
documentary records that have enabled a number of studies to reconstruct Little Ice Age
precipitation.\textsuperscript{146} Climatologist Fernando Sánchez Rodrigo and his collaborators have, for example,
been able to use documentary sources to reconstruct rainfall variability in the southern Iberian
Peninsula over the five hundred year period from 1501 to 1997.\textsuperscript{147} Their study suggests that the
Little Ice Age in Andalusia was characterised by alternating humid and dry periods, with an
accompanying increase in the variability of rainfall; a conclusion that is also supported by lake and
marine proxies from the region.\textsuperscript{148} Overall, a majority of studies agree that the period from 1590 to
around 1650, in particular, was a period of generally wet conditions.\textsuperscript{149} The three most humid
decades during this period were 1591-1600, 1631-1640 and 1641-1650.\textsuperscript{150} After 1650 the
Andalusian climate entered a dryer phase until the late eighteenth century, probably as a result of
the NAO switching from a negative to a positive state.\textsuperscript{151} The second half of the seventeenth century
also experienced unusually large fluctuations between wet and dry episodes, with Sánchez Rodrigo
finding alternating periods of severe droughts and extreme precipitation and flooding occurring
between 1645 and 1715.\textsuperscript{152} Caution is necessary when generalising about the climate in an area as
geographically diverse as Andalusia, which is exposed to both Atlantic and Mediterranean weather
systems, and which contains areas of desert, snowy mountain ranges, and fertile plains.\textsuperscript{153} However,
over the long term it seems likely that colder temperatures and wetter climate did begin to establish
themselves in the region in the fourteenth century, with the end of the sixteenth century and first

\textsuperscript{146} Dorado Liñán et al., ‘Eight-Hundred Years’, 76.
\textsuperscript{147} Sánchez Rodrigo et al., ‘Rainfall Variability’.
\textsuperscript{148} Sánchez Rodrigo et al., 730; Fernando Sánchez Rodrigo, ‘A review of the Little Ice Age in Andalusia (Southern
Spain): results and research challenges’, Cuadernos de Investigación Geográfica 44, no. 1 (20 February 2018): 248;
C. Martín-Puertas et al., ‘Late Holocene Climate Variability in the Southwestern Mediterranean Region: An
\textsuperscript{149} Sánchez Rodrigo, ‘A review of the Little Ice Age’, 253; Sánchez Rodrigo et al., ‘Rainfall Variability’, 730.
\textsuperscript{150} Fernando Sánchez Rodrigo, ‘El clima de Andalucía a través de los registros históricos’, in El cambio climático en
Andalucía: evolución y consecuencias medioambientales, ed. Arturo Sousa, Vincente Jurado, and Leoncio García-
Barrón (Seville: Alfecat Impresores, 2007), 33.
\textsuperscript{151} Sánchez Rodrigo, ‘A review of the Little Ice Age’, 253; Sánchez Rodrigo et al., ‘Rainfall Variability’, 730.
\textsuperscript{152} Sánchez Rodrigo, ‘El clima de Andalucía’, 34.
\textsuperscript{153} Sánchez Rodrigo, ‘A review of the Little Ice Age’, 246.
half of the seventeenth century witnessing the most established periods of both cold and wet, with climate also showing increased variability (especially with regards to extreme wet and dry episodes). The end of Little Ice Age conditions came conclusively towards the end of the nineteenth century, followed by the warming of the twentieth century.

'*Une hirondelle ne fait pas le printemps*'¹⁵⁶

This detailed sketch of the Andalusian climate is important for a number of reasons in terms of thinking about how Little Ice Age conditions might have impacted the region in the mid-seventeenth century. A consistent criticism that has been advanced against grand claims for the impact of the Little Ice Age is the fact that it was a centuries-long phenomenon, and that early modern societies were far more likely to have gradually adapted to the changing conditions, rather than to have allowed them to negatively impact agriculture, the economy, or demography in the long-run. However, as climatologists increasingly emphasise that the Little Ice Age was characterised by more frequent occurrences of extreme climate events and by heightened climate variability, one might argue that this picture provides a less predictable backdrop for stories of adaptation, than the more simplistic view of a centuries-long gradual cooling trend that previously dominated. Equally, if we are to take seriously examples of human adaptation and change in response to the Little Ice Age then we must surely also try to understand the times when people's attempts to cope with, or mitigate the effects of, adverse climate failed.

Nevertheless by focussing on shorter-term events such as times of economic crisis, famine or political unrest, one encounters a number of issues. Firstly, one risks relying on the anecdotal,

¹⁵⁴ Sánchez Rodrigo, 257; Dorado Liñán et al., 'Eight-Hundred Years', 87.
one-off events – freezing winters or great storms – that may reflect little more than a particularly extreme weather event with little connection to the broader climate.\textsuperscript{158} Secondly, there is an inherent difficulty in trying to link the meteorological evidence that we have to other variables such as crop yields, prices, or demographic statistics which often have vastly different temporal and spacial scales.\textsuperscript{159} Linking what we know about climate in Andalusia to the historical evidence about human society in the mid-seventeenth century presents a number of such problems. Many of the climate reconstructions are simply not available at a high enough temporal definition to move beyond making statements about the climate on a centennial, let alone decadal, time-scale; something that is patently problematic in terms of thinking about its impact on the Andalusian revolts that spanned a mere five years. The data that we have regarding population levels, harvests and prices in seventeenth-century Andalusia are also often incomplete and resolutely local in nature (often relating to a single city or town), which again makes comparison to broader, regional climate trends difficult. We can find engaging and often dramatic first-hand accounts of weather events such as droughts, frosts, and storms that contemporaries regularly linked to issues such as harvest failures, floods, and even plague epidemics. However we need to remain careful that in making such connections we do not take for granted that climate suffices as a sufficient or even partial explanation for events that could also have plenty of other complex causes. Finally we need to be aware of the problem of double counting such evidence when using these sources in combination with climate reconstructions that are themselves based on the same documentary data. The rainfall reconstructions carried out by Sánchez Rodrigo and his colleagues, for example, rely on chronicles and records that we will be citing when detailing the events of 1647 to 1652. Where this occurs in the following chapters I have explicitly mentioned that these sources also feed into the rainfall reconstructions (and thus provide some descriptive colour, rather than reinforcing or adding to the evidence provided by the reconstructions).


\textsuperscript{159} de Vries, ‘Measuring the Impact’, 603–4.
Despite these challenges, the study of mid-seventeenth century Andalusia does offer some opportunities. The predominance of rainfall over temperature reconstructions arguably gives us a better chance of making some connections between the climate and human activities. Rainfall changes probably had a greater immediate impact on such activities than temperature: both through the central importance of precipitation to agriculture, and via the broader destructive influence of floods and droughts. In fact, this centrality of rainfall to human life explains why climatologists working on documentary reconstructions for areas such as Andalusia have a far greater wealth of information about precipitation.\footnote{Sánchez Rodrigo, ‘A review of the Little Ice Age’, 250; Fernando Sánchez Rodrigo and Mariano Barriendos, ‘Reconstruction of Seasonal and Annual Rainfall Variability in the Iberian Peninsula (16th-20th Centuries) from Documentary Data’, \textit{Global and Planetary Change} 63, no. 2–3 (2008): 244.} Evidence from the mid-seventeenth century suggests that rainfall variations, floods, and droughts did have a significant impact on Andalusian society. Sericulture, for example, appears to have been severely damaged by the high incidences of flooding that occurred in the region, with resulting knock-on effects on the textile industries of cities such as Seville, Granada and Córdoba.\footnote{Discussed further in chapter 4.} Major flooding in Seville was also a precursor to the outbreak of the plague there in 1649, and we will discuss the difficulties in linking climate and epidemic disease in chapter 6. However the primary impact that will be considered in detail here is perhaps also the most obvious one: the relationship between Little Ice Age climate and cereal growing in Andalusia.

As we have seen, cereals, in particular wheat and barley, were the dominant crop in the Andalusian countryside; and in a Mediterranean-type climate, changes in precipitation are arguably more significant than temperature changes when it comes to short-term yield fluctuations in crops such as wheat.\footnote{Qiang Yu et al., ‘Year Patterns of Climate Impact on Wheat Yields’, \textit{International Journal of Climatology} 34, no. 2 (February 2014): 518–19; Bruno Basso et al., ‘Analysis of Rainfall Distribution on Spatial and Temporal Patterns of Wheat Yield in Mediterranean Environment’, \textit{European Journal of Agronomy} 41 (1 August 2012): 52.} As Pierre Ponsot put it, the Andalusian peasant lived ‘with their eyes raised towards the sky’; with rainfall often proving the crucial difference between a good harvest or
Too much rain (particularly when the crop was close to harvest) would mean a higher yield of straw at the expense of the quantity and quality of edible grain, whilst dry years would reduce both the amount of straw and grains. We are lucky to have a relatively reliable indicator for agricultural performance in Andalusia in the seventeenth century in the form of the records of the diezmo. This tax, levied (primarily) by the church on particular agricultural products, was meant to represent one-tenth of the total produce in any year. It is a valuable source because it remained largely unchanged in both its rate and its collection from the Middle Ages all the way through to its abolition in the nineteenth century. In the case of Andalusia, the diezmo was also, more often than not, collected in specie. This means that the tax on wheat, for example, was paid in bushels of grain, rather than in cash, which helpfully eliminates the need to work backwards from a monetary value to estimate the amount of grain that the tax was originally levied on. A further advantage is that the surviving diezmo documentation in Spain is generally recorded in yearly amounts and separated by individual agricultural product; as well as having been levied by the church ‘village by village or parish by parish’, independently from other taxes. Of course the diezmo figures are not infallible evidence; they remain tax records, and as Braudel eloquently put it, ‘qui dit fisc, dit fraude’. The human propensity towards tax evasion likely means that they chronically underestimate production. However given that we are going to use them to think about trends rather than comparing absolute levels, this should not pose too much of a problem as long as we assume that, in general, levels of corruption and fraud remained fairly constant over the period. Overall,

163 'les yeux levés vers le ciel': Ponsot, ‘En Andalousie occidentale’, 314.  
165 Ponsot, ‘En Andalousie occidentale’, 305.  
166 Ponsot, 304.  
167 This has been a problem in other areas of Spain, such as Valencia, where the diezmo is denominated in a monetary value and an average price of grain has to be used to estimate the agricultural output, see: José Miguel Palop Ramos, ‘El producto diezmal valenciano durante los siglos XVII y XVIII. Aproximación a su estudio’, in Les fluctuations du produit de la dîme: conjoncture décimale et domaniale de la fin du Moyen Age au XVIIIe siècle, ed. Joseph Goy and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie (Paris: Mouton, 1972), 407–17.  
despite the above, the diezmo is generally accepted by historians as being a credible indicator of agricultural production.\textsuperscript{170} The two main sets of diezmo data that exist for Andalusia are Pierre Ponsot's, \textit{Atlas de historia económica de la baja Andalucía} and Rafael Benítez Sánchez Blanco's study of Málaga.\textsuperscript{171} Both these works survey the amount of grain (wheat and barley) collected via the diezmo system, denominated in \textit{fanegas}: a unit of measurement equivalent to around 55.5 litres in volume, or somewhere close to 43kg of wheat.\textsuperscript{172} Pierre Ponsot's work focuses on lower Andalusia; the territory to the south-west of the region, surrounding Seville, Córdoba and Cádiz.\textsuperscript{173} Meanwhile, Rafael Benítez Sanchez Blanco's study is much smaller scale, looking at the records of the Bishopric of Málaga, alongside a further six parishes in the region.\textsuperscript{174}

"Good" and "Bad" Harvests in Seventeenth Century Andalusia

Climatologist Fernando Sánchez Rodrigo has already made an attempt to use data from Pierre Ponsot's work to try to assess how grain production and climate may have been linked in the seventeenth century. As a starting point he tried to identify good and bad harvest years using the diezmo information for the area surrounding Seville (approximately 147km\textsuperscript{2}).\textsuperscript{175} Constrained by gaps in the tax records, he surveyed the period 1587 to 1729, a periodisation which will mainly be maintained throughout the rest of this chapter, in order to give us an overview of a long seventeenth century. Applying a fairly straightforward statistical analysis, he labelled any year during which the yearly diezmo records fell below the lower quartile value of the 143 year period as a "bad" harvest year. "Good" harvest years were adjudged to be those in which the diezmo exceeded the upper quartile figure. The results of Sánchez Rodrigo's study are replicated in figures 3 and 4. As one can

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{Ponsot1994} Ponsot, \textit{Atlas}; Benítez Sánchez Blanco, ‘Diezmos andaluces’.
\bibitem{Ponsot2004} Ponsot, \textit{Atlas}.
\bibitem{BenitezBlanco2004} Benítez Sánchez Blanco, ‘Diezmos andaluces’.
\bibitem{SanchezRodrigo2004} Sánchez Rodrigo, ‘Clima y producción’, 175–76.
\end{thebibliography}
see, this data suggests that Andalusia experienced a particularly poor run of harvests in the 1640s and 1650s. One-third of the thirty "bad" harvest years recorded in the 143 year period between 1587 and 1729 took place in the 1640s and 1650s (with the late 1670s and 1680s also showing
particulary low diezmo numbers). Back-to-back "bad" harvest years – something which had not occurred once during the previous sixty years – took place in 1646 to 1647 and 1650 to 1651. This was no mere statistical problem. Given the lack of multi-year grain storage two bad harvest in a row tended to bring disaster in early modern Europe (we will return to the grain storage issue in chapter 3).176 We can also note that this followed on from a period in the 1620s and 1630s where production was relatively high, which is likely to have been important in terms of people's expectations and experience of the poor harvests of the mid-century.

However, in order for there to have been a true crisis in grain production in Andalusia it stands to reason that an area far larger than the 147km² surrounding Seville would have had to have been affected. The Seville figures that Sánchez Rodrigo used are also characterised by fairly substantial periods of missing data, notably between 1621 to 1626 and 1663 to 1675. In total twenty-four of the 143 years from 1587 to 1729 are missing.177 To try to address these issues, I have undertaken a similar exercise, but using further information from Pierre Ponsot's and Rafael Benítez Sánchez Blanco's work. Rafael Benítez Sánchez Blanco's study surveyed the records of the diocese of Málaga and produced figures for the diezmo collected from six parishes, specifically chosen to give a representative view of the geographical diversity of the region. I have compiled the data from these six parishes into one yearly total (unweighted).178 He also tallied the amount of the diezmo that was specifically set aside for the bishopric of Málaga each year. Both these sets of records include missing data, a total of twelve and fifteen years respectively. But, crucially, they only share 1621 as a missing year in common with Ponsot’s Seville data. Ponsot's work also includes records of the diezmo collected in Écija, Jerez, Carmona and for the Bishopric of Seville from 1587 to 1729.179 This gives a further four areas to include in our study. Unfortunately all of these areas have the

176 Braudel, Civilisation, 1:55.
exact same missing years as Seville. However, Ponsot does also record *diezmo* numbers for a total of eighteen other smaller areas of lower Andalusia for the period 1587 to 1729.\footnote{Ponsot, 188–423.} To create a continuous series for this time-period I have combined the figures for these eighteen areas into a single yearly total labelled 'other areas'. Individual areas within this series do have missing data and I have completed these missing entries with an estimate: where an area has a missing value I have multiplied the previous year's value by the average yearly change of the other available areas. This method of estimation is far from perfect, however using the estimate is more accurate than leaving the value as nil in the summation. Given that no single area ever accounts for more than 30.41 per cent of the yearly totals and that the average over the period is 17.10 per cent, any distortion caused by this method of estimation should be fairly small. There are four years where only between four and six of the eighteen areas have data available, a number that I have judged to be too small to create a reliable estimate. I have thus left these years blank. This means that the 'other areas' series runs from 1587 to 1729 with only the years 1594, 1595, 1600 and 1601 missing. The eight regions of lower Andalusia are as follows.

**From Pierre Ponsot's *Atlas de historia económica*:**

- Seville
- Écija
- Jerez
- Carmona
- The Bishopric of Seville
- 'Other Areas' of Lower Andalusia

**From Benítez Sánchez Blanco's *Diezmos andaluces***:

- Combined six parishes from the diocese of Málaga
- Bishopric of Málaga

In order to survey these eight different regions together I have used the following methodology. First I have calculated the sample standard deviation from the mean for each series. I
have then isolated the years in each area that fall either one standard deviation above the mean (a "good" harvest year) or one standard deviation below the mean (a "bad" harvest year). This isolates the "good" and "bad" harvest years in each of the eight surveyed areas. The main difference to Sánchez Rodrigo's approach is that I use the standard deviation as the cut-off point for judging "good" and "bad" harvests, rather than the upper and lower quartiles. This is essentially just a stricter test, which means that fewer years are designated as "good" or "bad" harvests and more years fall into the middle band of "regular" harvest years (this is graphically represented with respect to the Seville data in figure 3, with the black and green dotted lines). Figure 5 shows the percentage of these eight areas that registered either "good" or "bad" harvest years over the period 1587 to 1729. In figure 6 I have also listed the years in which at least 50 per cent of these eight areas of Andalusia fell outside of the standard deviation cut-offs described above, so as to give a sense of the best and worse years across Andalusia during this period.

Using figures 5 and 6 we can start to draw some broader general conclusions about the grain harvests in Andalusia. It seems clear that there were a series of bad harvests at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This was followed by some improved harvests from around 1610 until the end of the 1630s, albeit with notably bad years in 1616 and 1635. Starting in 1646 we see the first signs of "bad" grain harvests that affected the late 1640s and early 1650s. Between 1638 and 1688 there is not a single year in which 50 per cent or more of the areas surveyed recorded "good" harvests. Whilst poor harvest years returned in the late 1670s and 1680s, it is important to note that the low diezmo numbers from the late 1640s and 1650s were unprecedented in Andalusia in the period going back to 1587, both in terms of the breadth of their territorial scope and the clustering within a relatively short number of years.
Overall the data broadly supports the trends shown by the '5 year average' lines from Seville in figure 3: some bad years at the turn of the sixteenth to seventeenth century followed by relatively good harvests until the late 1630s when a period of decline hit, which lasted until the late 1680s. After this point grain production seems to have recovered steadily until, in 1729, it equalled or even exceeded the levels seen at the start of the seventeenth century. Sánchez Rodrigo points out that this
is a similar long-term pattern to the one that Sebastián Amarilla has documented for the *diezmo* in Leon.\(^{181}\) However similarities to the rest of Spain should not be overstated. There were distinct regional differences in agricultural production, as charted by the *diezmo* during this period. James Casey's study of Valencia shows a decline in the *diezmo* starting around 1609, intensifying from 1620 onwards and then recovering in the second half of the century.\(^{182}\) In Galicia, Antonio Eiras Roel charts growth until 1615, depression from 1615 to 1645, followed by a long period growth from 1645 to 1760.\(^{183}\) Luis María Bilbao Bilbao and Emiliano Fernández de Pinedo's work on the Basque Country actually shows the seventeenth century as a period of overall agricultural growth albeit with some local variations.\(^{184}\) Given the various different climatic and regional socio-political systems that characterised the territory of seventeenth century Spain, these differences should be expected. As we will see in chapter 3, where we will return to this issue to make some important points about the Spanish and Andalusian grain markets, it is significant that not all of the Iberian Peninsula suffered similar dips in agricultural production at the same time. In some years there were concurrent bad harvests in Andalusia and the rest of Castile. The year 1647, for example, was characterised by worries about harvest shortages in both Andalusia and the lands around Madrid.\(^{185}\) In the spring of 1652, however, as Andalusia struggled to deal with the continuing impact of the poor harvests of 1651 there appears to have been a plentiful supply of affordable wheat available in Castilla la Vieja.\(^{186}\)

\(^{181}\) Sánchez Rodrigo, ‘Clima y producción’, 174; Sebastián Amarilla, ‘La producción de cereales en tierras de Léon’.

\(^{182}\) Casey, ‘Structure et développement’, 337.


\(^{185}\) The *Consejo de Castilla* showed much concern about the provisioning of Madrid in 1647: *Consejo de Castilla de 9 de abril de 1647*, AHN Consejos 7225, documento 13.

\(^{186}\) Domínguez Ortiz, *Alteraciones*, 32.
The Impact of Climate on the Andalusian Harvests

Examining the link between this harvest data and the available climate reconstructions is not a straightforward task. Much of the above has focussed on the inherent limitations of the various types of data that we possess, all of which need to be taken into account. These issues mean that it is not currently possible (and may never be) to create a statistical model that definitively proves or disproves the link between Little Ice Age climate in the region and the series of poor harvests of the mid-seventeenth century. Nevertheless, the role of the historian is often to critically assess cases where data or information is incomplete and to advance theories based on what is thought to be the most probable likelihood. The following section deals mostly with identifying correlation between the available climate and harvest data. Correlation does not prove causation. Yet, in an instance where proving causation statistically is not possible, we can still rely on what is generally known about the direction of causation to suggest some conclusions about what this incomplete data represents (particularly wet or dry years are known to affect wheat harvests, for example). In this case it does seem to be possible to posit that Little Ice Age climate did negatively affect harvests over the course of the seventeenth century, particularly in its middle decades, although we must not discount the accompanying impact of other socio-economic factors.

If we simply compare the trends suggested by the Andalusian diezmo data with the climate data, there does seem to be some correlation. The three most humid decades – 1591-1600, 1631-1640, and 1641-1650 – of the wet period that Fernando Sánchez Rodrigo has identified as spanning from 1590 to 1650, all seem to coincide with episodes that show a number of "bad" harvest years in figures 5 and 6. The dramatic lack of "good" harvest years, accompanied by numerous clusters of consecutive "bad" harvest years, that spans the 1640s to the late seventeenth century, also fits what

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might be expected given the extreme annual variability between wet and dry episodes that Sánchez Rodrigo detected in the period 1645-1715.\textsuperscript{188} However, clearly, these types of patterns in the *diezmo* data cannot solely be explained by climatic fluctuations. These tax records, whilst indicative of agricultural performance, would also have been affected by a variety of socio-economic factors. The most important of these may have been demographic changes, with varying population levels affecting not just the total number of taxpayers but also the amount of grain sown in any given year. It is no coincidence that the three periods with the lowest *diezmo* figures also overlap with the three principal episodes of plague that affected Andalusia in the seventeenth century: in 1599 to 1600, 1649 to 1651, and 1676 to 1685.\textsuperscript{189} In order to investigate this impact in greater detail we would ideally need higher definition yearly population figures for Andalusia, as well as actual harvest yield figures, rather than using the *diezmo* as a proxy. The yield of a particular harvest (how much was harvested compared to how much was sown) would tell us more about the impact of climate, given that low *diezmo* figures might simply be a reflection of smaller populations sowing less grain. Unfortunately, as we have seen, both the population and yield of information is not available at sufficiently high definition at an Andalusian wide-level. The exception with respect to yield data is a small study of five grain-growing regions in Córdoba.\textsuperscript{190} This information is only available as a result of an idiosyncratic rental arrangement between the cathedral of Córdoba, which owned the land and its tenants. Rents in these areas were calculated in grain, with an agreement that would proportionally reduce the rents if the harvest was not good and dropped below a pre-agreed level.\textsuperscript{191} To monitor this agreement, yearly records were kept of the amount of grain sown and the resulting harvests, which have allowed Pierre Ponsot to reconstruct yields for this small part of Córdoba. Records exist for forty-five of these areas of farmland and Ponsot selected five, which he felt were

\textsuperscript{188} Sánchez Rodrigo, 34.
\textsuperscript{189} Moreno Alonso, *Historia de Andalucía*, 197.
\textsuperscript{191} Ponsot, 432.
Given that these areas make up a very small part of the province of Córdoba, let alone Andalusia, we should treat these results with caution. However it is interesting to note that they broadly support the findings we have from the diezmos. Figure 7 shows the grain yields for wheat and barley, charted over the period 1611 to 1680 and calculated in hectolitres of grain over hectares of land. Unfortunately, Ponsot’s data does not extend further back than 1611. The chart also ends in 1680, although Ponsot’s data extends all the way to 1840. This is because in 1680 there is a seven-year break of missing data. When the series resumes in 1688 it is at a far higher average level of yield than the century that precedes it. With no clear answer for why yields would jump so much in the space of seven years the possibility remains that there was some change.

Figure 7: Average harvest yields of wheat and barley in five farmsteads in Córdoba, 1611 to 1680.

Data from: Pierre Ponsot, ‘Malthus n’était-il pas prophète en Andalousie?’, 431–446.
in how the yield figures were recorded or calculated. As such I have restricted figure 7 to the years 1611 to 1680. Once again, the years 1647 and 1650 are notable for their poor performance. Both the barley and wheat yields show low levels in 1647 and 1650 that are hitherto unseen in the preceding years. It seems unlikely then that the story of the mid-seventeenth century diezmo figures was simply one of less grain being sown. The fact that 1647 registers as a particularly poor year in both the available yield and diezmo data, well before the outbreak of plague in the region, also suggests that demographic factors alone cannot explain the poor harvest years of the 1640 and 1650s, and puts the focus back on a factor such as climate.

Sánchez Rodrigo has also attempted to investigate the relationship between the Seville diezmo data and his wetness index statistically, to try to quantify the potential impact of climate on harvests in Andalusia. It is based on documentary sources and splits each year into four seasons:

- Winter (December of the previous year, January, February),
- Spring (March, April, May),
- Summer (June, July, August),
- Autumn (September, October, November).  

Each season is then attributed a numerical value between +2 and -2, which represent the following precipitations values:

- Very dry (absence of rain together with information on drops in river and water spring levels): -2,
- Dry (absence of rain without additional information): -1,
- Normal (no news, no comments on impacts): 0,
- Wet (hard and/or constant rainfall): +1,

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-Very wet (rain-induced flood): +2.\textsuperscript{194}

Comparing his climate reconstruction to the agricultural data, Sánchez Rodrigo's first important finding was that, on a century long timescale, climate fluctuations did not explain long-term agricultural changes.\textsuperscript{195} The climate data showed no lineal relationship to grain agriculture, the coefficient of correlation between the \textit{diezmo} figures and the climate reconstruction data was close to zero.\textsuperscript{196} In this respect his work agrees with the scepticism that historians such as Jan de Vries have for the potential long-term impact of Little Ice Age climate change on European society, with Sánchez Rodrigo concluding that over the long term, social economic factors, not climate, were the principal determinants of agricultural changes.\textsuperscript{197} We might thus think of a factor such as demography as being a stronger influence in terms of affecting the general trend line over the course of the 143 year period surveyed (although neither do we have the demographic data to conclusively test this relationship). However, that does not discount the ability of climate to impact year-to-year variations; and Sánchez Rodrigo was able to find some distinct correlations between short-term fluctuations in grain production and adverse weather in the winter and spring months preceding the harvest. Isolating the "bad" and "good" harvest years in the Seville area, using the upper and lower quartile method discussed above Sánchez Rodrigo found that inclement weather (dry, very dry, wet or very wet seasons) in the preceding winter and spring could be linked to 83% of the 30 years with “bad” harvests, compared to just 35% of the “good” harvests years.\textsuperscript{198} If we expand this methodology to include the other seven areas of Andalusia for which Ponsot and Sánchez Blanco have provided \textit{diezmo} data; and look at the "good" and "bad" harvest years as identified using the stricter standard deviation method, this produces a slightly weaker but still suggestive correlation between climate and harvests. Figure 8 shows that, in years in which either 50 per cent or more of the areas showed "good" and "bad" harvest years, 77.27 per cent of the "bad"

\textsuperscript{194} Sánchez Rodrigo et al.
\textsuperscript{195} Sánchez Rodrigo, ‘Clima y producción’, 176.
\textsuperscript{196} Sánchez Rodrigo, 179.
\textsuperscript{197} de Vries, ‘Measuring the Impact’; Sánchez Rodrigo, ‘Clima y producción’, 179.
\textsuperscript{198} Sánchez Rodrigo, ‘Clima y producción’, 179.
years correspond to adverse weather conditions in winter and spring versus only 46.67 per cent of the "good" years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sánchez Rodrigo’s work</th>
<th>Correlation with extreme climate in preceding winter and spring</th>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;Bad&quot; Harvest Years:</td>
<td>83%</td>
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<td>&quot;Good&quot; Harvest Years:</td>
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<th>My data</th>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;Bad&quot; Harvest Years:</td>
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<td>&quot;Good&quot; Harvest Years:</td>
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Such results are inevitably suggestive rather than definitive with respect to the significance of the relationship between climate and harvests. For one, Sánchez Rodrigo's climate reconstruction only contains information on precipitation, as well as some small indicators of storms and frosts. There are no temperature reconstructions that exist at a sufficiently high definition to add in to the analysis. The complex relationship between temperature and the precise timing of precipitation, when it comes to cereal growth cannot hope to be fully represented by the available climate reconstructions. Equally we are working with a proxy to represent harvest yields and also lack accurate annual population figures for Andalusia, which would help to untangle the impact of demographic factors and, in particular the impact of plague. However, given what we know about the likely nature of Little Ice Age climate in Andalusia, and the impact that fluctuations between extreme episodes of wet and dry weather have on cereal growing in Mediterranean climates, it does seems plausible to make a causal link between these two factors. We may also not want to discount the value of first hand testimonies that survive from the period. Whilst none were cognisant of living through a Little Ice Age, many did dwell on the inclement weather and the impact on the harvests (as we shall see in chapters 4 and 6). Clearly, Little Ice Age climate was not the sole factor that affected the growing of wheat and barley in Andalusia, however climate does appear to have
been an important factor with respect to year-to-year crop variations and deserves to be considered a serious determinant in the grain shortages that occurred in the region during the mid-seventeenth century.

**Prices**

In order to begin to think about the possibility of the Little Ice Age climate having an impact on the revolts in Andalusia we need to do more, however, than just make a link to lower grain production. It is the price of foodstuffs, particularly bread, which is referred to time and time again, as one of the key causes of the revolts and, therefore, proving a link between these local harvest failures and a local grain price rises is the next important step in linking climate change and the revolts of 1647 to 1652. Much like with the climate, harvest and demographic information, the availability and reliability of accurate price data for seventeenth century Andalusia remains a problem. The two available sources for wheat prices in Andalusia that span the period 1600 to 1650 are Earl J. Hamilton and Pierre Ponsot’s price series. Both these works are primarily based on the record books of large institutional buyers in Seville, such as religious orders, and show prices in *maravedís* per *fanega*. Earl J. Hamilton's work is the most commonly used in economic studies, however the limitations with his prices are well documented. Hamilton substituted data from other towns when there were gaps in the Seville data and his methodology was specifically geared towards testing his theories on price inflation in Spain. Whilst Ponsot's price series continues all the way through to the early nineteenth century, Hamilton's published Andalusian wheat prices end in 1650. However, recently Ernesto López Losa has reconstructed a price series for 1650 to 1800, based on Earl J. Hamilton’s unpublished papers, taking care to rework the numbers in order to avoid some of the

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201 López Losa, 76, 85.

problems inherent in Hamilton's earlier work. There is also a surviving series of wheat prices that were recorded in Seville's main market between 1649 and 1778 (called *mercuriales*), that was published by the Real Sociedad Patriótica de Sevilla in 1779. One slight complication here is that the *mercuriales* series records four separate prices for each year, rather than a yearly average: a highest and lowest price for both the month of April and June. In order to aid comparison with the other data sets, I have used the average of the two June prices (reasoning that the April prices would be more closely related to the previous year's harvests than the June prices). Notwithstanding these differences between the price series, charting the price of wheat in *maravedís per fanega*, using the

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**Figure 9: Nominal price of a *fanega* of wheat in *maravedís* in Seville, 1587 to 1729.**


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204 Real Sociedad Patriótica de Sevilla, *Memorias de la Real Sociedad Patriótica de Sevilla*, vol. 1 (Seville: Imprenta de Vázquez, Hidalgo y Compañía, 1779), 129–34.
Ponsot, Hamilton, López Losa and the June average *mercuriales* prices, does give us a useful graphic representation of the nominal price movements from 1587 to 1729 (figure 9). Despite some differences, we can see that they broadly follow a similar pattern and that prices spiked drastically in the period of the revolts in Andalusia. During these years wheat prices reached levels that had not been seen in the previous 60 years. In terms of using one of these price series going forward, we will focus on the Ponsot series. It is the only series that spans the entire period 1587 to 1729. It correlates fairly closely with both the mercurials series and the more recent López Losa re-working of Hamilton's prices. And, most importantly for our purposes, Ponsot calculated his price averages on a harvest year basis, rather than a calendar year one. This means that his series records the average price for the period June to May. As such it matches better with the life-span of each wheat harvest that would be collected in the summer in Andalusia and remain on the market until the end of the following spring. On the graph in figure 9 and going forward where a Ponsot price is listed as 1647, for example, this is actually an average of the period June 1647 to May 1648 (during which the summer harvest of 1647 would primarily be being consumed).

Returning to the period of the revolts and the accompanying high prices, Ponsot's data (see figure 9) shows that the 1647 price of 2,312 *maravedís* was over three times higher than the average price for the period 1587 to 1646, which stood at 737 *maravedís*. It was also a full 738 *maravedís* higher than the previous maximum of 1,564 *maravedís*, registered in 1636. By 1653 that 1636 price had been exceeded in three further years, with only 1649 standing out as a year where a *fanega* of wheat dropped below the 1,000 *maravedís* mark. These nominal prices take no account of the impact of inflation of over the 143 year period. However it is worthwhile dwelling on them because, in an era when inflation was still poorly understood and the official legal maximum price of a *fanega* of wheat could remain unchanged for nearly one-hundred years, nominal prices remained the principal point of comparison and reference for the inhabitants of Andalusia.
That said, real prices can also furnish some valuable insights, and Manuel González Mariscal has recently published the first price index reconstruction for Seville spanning from the sixteenth century to the year 1680. In order to use this data we will thus need to focus on a reduced period of time. However if we revalue the Ponsot price series using González Mariscal's price index the importance of the mid-century price rises remains (see figure 10). Using real prices puts more emphasis on the high grain prices seen at the end of the sixteenth century, particularly 1588, 1599, 1593 and 1598, as well as severe price rises in 1617 and 1635-1636. However the years

Figure 10: Real wheat prices in Seville, 1587 to 1680 (1601-1610 Prices).


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1647, 1648, 1650 and 1651 remain as a cluster of high-price years, with similar real prices levels not being reached again until the late 1670s. The negative cumulative effect of repeating, back-to-back periods of high prices on the population and thus the unusual duration of this problem—as shown by the dual peaks of the graph in 1647 and 1651—should also be noted. If we then compare these real prices with the diezmo harvest data for the Seville area we can produce a scatter-plot as shown in figure 11. This shows at best a weak negative correlation between harvest levels and prices. When harvest levels were high, prices broadly went down and vice-versa, although the relationship is not particularly strong. However, there are plenty of obvious reasons why we should not expect to find a simple linear relationship between local grain prices and local harvest levels. Both national and local government took an active role in both legislating and managing the grain market in Andalusia, in order to try to mitigate the impact of local harvest failures on prices. Imports of grain from other parts of Spain, as well as overseas, would also have weakened the link.

Figure 11: Scatter-plot of yearly diezmo data plotted against real prices of wheat. Seville, 1587 to 1680.

Data from: Pierre Ponsot, Atlas; Manuel González Mariscal, 'Precios y niveles de vida'.
between local harvests and prices. Other socio-economic factors, such as changing demography and government monetary policy, also exerted their own influence on price levels in both the wheat market and beyond.

Yet it remains plausible that whilst such policies stabilised price rises in regular years, they might break down during particularly bad harvest years. If we again single out the "best and "worst" harvest years from figure 6 then compare them to the inflation data, we do get some results which suggest that local harvests remained central to price levels in Andalusia, particularly when harvests were either very good or very poor. When it came to inflation, overall, wheat prices showed much greater year-to-year variations than the González Mariscal price index. Average yearly inflation over the period 1588 to 1680 as per González Mariscal's work stood at around 1.5 per cent; although with a maximum value of 55 per cent in 1650 and a minimum (deflation) of -30 per cent in 1680. In contrast, average yearly wheat price inflation in the same period ran at over 8 per cent. Wheat prices were also far more volatile, with a maximum inflation rate of 184 per cent in 1677 and deflation of -54 per cent in 1654. We also have some indications that good and bad harvest years had an important impact on wheat prices, that cannot be explained simply by more general inflationary or deflationary pressures in the Andalusian economy. For example, in the fourteen years between 1587 and 1680 in which the diezmo data recorded "bad" harvests in at least 50 per cent of the surveyed areas in Andalusia, wheat price inflation was, on average, almost 45 per cent greater than general price inflation according to González Mariscal's index. This contrasts to an average difference of 6.95 per cent across the whole period. "Good" harvests also appear to have had a similarly great impact. In the seven "good" harvest years isolated between 1587 and 1680, wheat prices inflation was on average almost 18 per cent lower than general price inflation. All of the above is summarised in figure 12. This suggests that in "bad" harvest years wheat increased in price at a rate far exceeding general inflation. Equally, in "good" harvest years high prices could still
occur for a variety of other economic reasons; however, in general, wheat prices would either increase less or decrease more than other goods (depending on whether or not the year was inflationary or deflationary). We can also get a sense of this relationship by modifying the chart of good and bad harvest years initially displayed in figure 5, and overlaying this with the real prices from figure 10. Figure 13 does this by showing good and bad harvest years, and on the right-hand side axis the difference between the real prices each year and the mean real price for the period 1587 to 1680. Where the black line dips below zero this therefore shows how far the price was below the average for the period (in maravedís) and where the line is above zero, how far above the average price it was. Again we can see the relationship here between harvests and prices. Where the Andalusia harvests recorded a high percentage of low diezmo numbers, prices rose, and vice versa. In simple terms, where there are a concentration of longer red bars the line rises above zero, where there are green bars it dips below. Exceptionally good or bad harvests in Andalusia thus seem to have had an important impact on prices, that government policy along with imports and exports does not seem to have been able to fully mollify. Prices are also a reflection of future expectations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure 12: Comparison of increases and decreases in González Mariscal's general price index and Ponsot's wheat prices, 1587 to 1680.</th>
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<td>All years from 1587 to 1680:</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1) Average inflation / deflation (GM price index)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad harvest years (from figure 6) in period, for which price data exists: (1589, 1602, 1605, 1616, 1647, 1650, 1651, 1653, 1657, 1658, 1659, 1677, 1678, 1680)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average inflation / deflation (GM price index)</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good harvest years (from figure 6) in period, for which price data exists: (1592, 1610, 1614, 1623, 1632, 1638)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average inflation / deflation (GM price index)</td>
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<tr>
<td>-10.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data from: Ponsot, Atlas, 511-516; González Mariscal, 'Precios y niveles de vida'.


and it may well be that as climate became less predictable and poor harvests more frequent, that prices became more reactive to signs of inclement weather and bad news about impending harvests.

**Monetary Revaluations and Inflation**

Despite this relationship between harvests and prices during exceptionally good and bad years, there were clearly a huge variety of other economic factors that influenced the price of wheat, all of which render more definitive pronouncements about the relationship between harvest levels and wheat prices difficult. We have already discussed the problems created by the lack of detailed

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**Figure 13: Good and bad harvests in eight areas of Andalusia compared with real wheat prices from Seville, 1587 to 1680.**

Legend: the black line shows the real price of wheat minus the average real price for the period 1587 to 1680.

Data from: Ponsot, *Atlas*; González Mariscal, 'Precios y niveles de vida'.
Andalusian-wide population figures. Equally important, particularly when we talk about inflation in the seventeenth century, were the multiple currency revaluations of Philip IV's reign. The most common currency in mid-seventeenth century Castile and Andalusia, used for day-to-day transactions, was the *moneda de vellón*; a coinage was made of billon which stood in contrast to the higher value coins minted from silver. During his reign, Philip IV undertook numerous revaluations of the vellón currency, usually as a desperate attempt to raise revenues. Although the picture is complicated somewhat by the circulation of various different types of *moneda de vellón*, these currency manipulations took place in 1628, 1636, 1641, 1642, 1643, 1651, 1652, 1658 and 1659.  

The basic pattern behind these changes can be summarised by examining the events of 1641 to 1642 and 1651 to 1652. Both these episodes began with a revaluation requiring anyone with vellón coinage in their possession to take their coins to a royal mint, where they would be re-stamped with a new higher value. Individuals would then be returned fewer coins but which were now worth the same as their original, larger, haul. The coins that were leftover would make their way into the royal coffers: Javier de Santiago Fernández estimates that this process raised around fourteen million *ducados* for the monarchy in 1641 and eleven million in 1651. Both the currency devaluations of 1641 and 1651 led to a collapse in confidence in the *moneda de vellón* and were accompanied by price inflation, primarily as a result of people's reluctance to accept the coinage, which they rightly feared could have its value altered again in the future. Both measures were also followed by an ensuing revaluation the following year, bringing the coins back to their original value, once the disruptive economic effects of the policies had become clear.


207 A simplistic example: you start with two coins, each worth two *maravedís*. You hand them to the mint and are given back one coin which is now stamped with the value of four *maravedís*.


209 Domínguez Ortiz, ‘Documentos’, 70.

Trying to untangle whether or not poor harvests or monetary revaluations were more important in stimulating the high prices of a year such as 1651 is ultimately very difficult. However we have some circumstantial evidence that suggests that monetary revaluations alone cannot be blamed for the high prices of 1651 and 1652, and that a lack of good harvests was important in exacerbating the inflationary effect of this revaluation on wheat prices. If we look at the years 1641 to 1642 we can observe a period where harvests appear to have been relatively good in Andalusia, and overall wheat prices remained below average in those years (see figure 13). That is not to say that the monetary revaluation had no impact. For example, in July 1642 a local member of the minor nobility in Seville, called don Francisco de Torregrosa Monsalve noted that wheat prices in the city had reached forty reales per fanega (1,360 maravedís), something that he blamed on the changes to the moneda de vellón.\textsuperscript{211} However later that year in September 1642, after a royal order restoring the vellón to its original value, don Francisco wrote that the cost of a fanega of wheat had fallen back down to seventeen reales (578 maravedís).\textsuperscript{212} No doubt that this royal order was a crucial step in controlling price inflation, however, an equally important factor may be gleaned from don Francisco's accompanying comment that the year's harvests had also been good.\textsuperscript{213} The monetary revaluations of 1641 to 1642 do appear to have led to inflation, and wheat price inflation in particular (an increase of 45.52% and 37.43% respectively when it comes to Ponsot's wheat prices for those years).\textsuperscript{214} However this seems to have been mitigated by the fact that prices were starting from a fairly low base when the revaluation of 1641 was put in place (due to a run of better than average harvests) with subsequent good harvests also helping to mollify the impact of this change. We can contrast this with the revaluation of 1651. Again, there is no doubt this caused inflation, particularly in the larger cities such as Seville. As we shall see it also provided a focal point for people's anger and a clear political policy against which popular opinion could build. Yet,

\textsuperscript{211} Correspondencia remitida por Francisco de Torregrosa Monsalve a [Alonso Diego López de Zúñiga Mendoza Sotomayor, VIII] duque de Béjar, 15 de julio de 1642, Sección Nobleza del Archivo Histórico Nacional (SNAHN), OSUNA, C.313, D.70, f. 2; Correspondencia, 23 de septiembre de 1642, SNAHN, OSUNA, C.313, D.74, f. 1.

\textsuperscript{212} Correspondencia, 23 de septiembre de 1642, SNAHN, OSUNA, C.313, D.74, f. 1.

\textsuperscript{213} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{214} Ponsot, Atlas, 512.
without the food shortages created by the successive poor harvests in the late 1640s and early 1650s, it seems unlikely that this alone would have created the very high wheat prices that are evidenced in the spring of 1652.

Conclusion

The analysis of the relationship between climate, harvests, and prices presented here has been deliberately cautious. In an ideal world we would be able to build a comprehensive econometric model to test the impact of climate on prices, factoring in a number of climatic variables (rainfall, temperature, spring frosts, etc), alongside information on imports, exports, income levels, demographic changes, inventory levels, etc. The lack of sufficiently detailed information for all of these elements means that this is not currently a realistic prospect for seventeenth century Andalusia. As Pierre Ponsot pointed out, separating out the true driving force behind grain production, let alone grain prices, from this multitude of natural and human factors may well be an impossible task for the historian. Nevertheless we can still say something about the interaction of these factors given the limited evidence at our disposal. We do have some circumstantial evidence to suggest that the Little Ice Age may have had an important influence on both grain production and prices in the mid-seventeenth century. Climatologists are increasingly specific about the impact of the Little Ice Age in Andalusia, with recent reconstructions emphasising that the mid-seventeenth century was probably characterised by rainfall variations and extreme fluctuations between wet and dry climate, as well as a colder spell. The diezmo figures also suggest that there was a significant decline in wheat and barley production in Andalusia during this period, with a cluster of bad harvest years occupying in the late 1640s and early 1650s. Whilst this was undoubtedly also linked to other factors such as demographic decline, comparison between the diezmo figures and Sánchez Rodrigo’s wetness index reconstruction certainly seems to show that extreme Little Ice Age climate

in the winter and spring preceding the harvest can be linked to the years of extremely poor harvests during the seventeenth century. Whilst we do not have the data to conclusively prove these links statistically, they are what we would expect given what we know about wheat and cereal growing in Andalusia and Mediterranean type climates. Finally the price data can help us link these poor harvests to the spiralling grain and bread prices that we find in the accounts of the revolts of 1647 to 1652. Whilst, again, we must be cautious in our interpretations, it does seem as though the extremely "good" and "bad" harvest years identified in the diezmo data did impact wheat prices in Seville; above and beyond general inflationary pressures in the economy and other contributing factors such as monetary revaluations which would have a broader impact on prices more generally.

This final step of understanding how local harvests impacted prices is arguably the most interesting one. Whilst no one denies that local production would have had an effect on prices there is also a strong school of thought that suggests that economic life in early modern Europe was sufficiently developed to significantly weaken this link. Bernard Slicher van Bath has pointed out that in eighteenth century Sweden prices were primarily determined by international grain prices, rather than local production; and Jan de Vries has argued that across Europe 'trade, markets, inventory formation, and even futures trading' loosened 'greatly the asserted links between weather and harvests and between harvests and economic life more generally.' However as we have seen, these local links appear to have remained strong in Andalusia in the mid-seventeenth century. The pattern of bad harvests that impacted the region was not mirrored across the Iberian peninsula. In fact, whilst there were harvest shortages and dramatic price rises over the winter and spring of 1651 to 1652 in Andalusia, there appears to have been abundant grain in the region surrounding Madrid, with prices remaining low in the capital. We therefore need to ask why consumers in Andalusia struggled to access both domestic and international grain markets when local shortages began to

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218 Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 32.
take hold. On top of this, there were a number of institutions in place across Spain and Andalusia that were specifically designed to break the link between bad harvest years and large bread price increases. Both the monarchy in Madrid and the local municipal governments of Andalusia implemented various levels of grain and bread price regulation, as well as overseeing a system of municipal grain stores, or *pósitos*, that were meant to enable cities and towns to build up supplies that would guard against times of dearth. The story of why these measures failed to avert huge bread price rises in mid-seventeenth century Andalusia sheds light on two interlinked issues: firstly, how power was distributed and negotiated between centre and periphery in the Habsburg monarchy; and secondly, how these jurisdictional issues impacted market integration in the region, influencing the ability of municipalities, institutions and individuals to access grain markets at a local, domestic and international level. It will also allow us to draw some international comparisons, looking at the grain market in places such as England, France and the Dutch Republic, in order to look at how the differences in the organisation of the grain markets in these countries may have contributed to different outcomes with respect to regional abilities to purchase cereals in times of dearth.

Jan de Vries has criticised Parker’s *Global Crisis* for overlooking the role of the early modern economy, reducing it to ‘little more than a direct physical relationship between weather and harvest results’. The following chapter attempts to put the political economy of the Habsburg monarchy and Andalusia front and centre in the story of poor harvests, high prices and political unrest. On one hand this helps to explain why the scepticism from historians such as de Vries and Slicher van Bath about the impact of weather and poor harvests on prices – largely based on their perspective as historians of the Dutch Republic – might be less merited in the case of Andalusia; particularly given the large differences in market organisation and integration that existed between these two territories. On the other hand, paying closer attention to the way in which political entities such as the monarchy and the municipal governments of Andalusia attempted to take action and

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intervene in markets during times of dearth can also help us to understand why political unrest and revolt in Andalusia became the chosen course of action for a populace that viewed the inability of these institutions to formulate a policy response to rising food and bread prices as a political failing.
Chapter 3: The State and the Grain Market
Loja, August 1626

In August of 1626, in a small Andalusian town around fifty kilometres west of the city of Granada called Loja, rising prices started to become a worry for the local municipal government. By the tenth of that month wheat had reached 884 maravedís (26 reales) per fanega in the local market; a full 272 maravedís above the royally mandated maximum price of 18 reales.  

Fearing that prices would continue to rise, the town's council met on 11 August and agreed to send a local official called Bartolomé Ximenez de Castilla to neighbouring jurisdictions, to try to purchase 2,000 fanegas of wheat for the town's municipal grain store (pósito). The written instructions that Ximenez de Castilla received ordered him to travel to a number of local towns, including Martos where he was to enquire about purchasing wheat from the agent of the Fugger family, who owned large grain stores in the region. Any wheat bought was to be moderately priced and 'by no means' be older than the current year's harvest. On 12 August the official set out, heading north of Loja on an excursion that would take him first to the town of Priego de Córdoba and then to a further seven municipalities before his eventual return on 18 August. Figure 14 shows this trip and the wheat prices found in each location. During the seven-day journey the furthest point from Loja that was reached was Higuera de Calatrava, which, given the route taken, was somewhere between 115 to 120 kilometres away, or around 18 leguas (using a conversion of 6.6 kilometres to the legua).

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220 Cuentas que se Tomo a B. Ximenez de Castilla, Jurado de la ciudad D Loja del viaje que hizo para ella a los lugares Comarcanos a comprar trigo para el Posito, Año 1626, Archivo Histórico Municipal de Loja (AHML), legajo 68, pieza 55.

221 Ibid.

222 A branch of the Fugger family (los Fúcares) owned grain stores in Martos and Torredonjimeno which were provisioned by the diezmos from the Mesa Maestral of the Order of Calatrava in the region. More regarding this under the 'Cary-Over and Storage' sub-heading: Geronimo de Pedregosa Escuchas, Juan Pérez de Lara, and Hermenegildo de Rojas y Tortosa, Por Geronimo de Pedregosa Escuchas, familiar del Santo Oficio, y mayordomo de los Fucares en el partido de Martos. En el pleyto con la parte de los Fucares sobre el agrauio quinto de 12[mil]953 fanegas de trigo y 3[mil]572 fanegas de cebada y el agrauio 16 de 532 fanegas de cebada (Granada: Antonio René de Lazcano, 1633), 3r.

223 'por ningun caso', Cuentas que se Tomo a B. Ximenez de Castilla, Año 1626, AHML, legajo 68, pieza 55.

Yet, on this relatively short excursion, Ximenez de Castilla found wheat prices ranging from 544 to 750 maravedís per fanega, compared to a high of 884 maravedís in Loja.\textsuperscript{225}

The only unusual element of the case detailed above is the fact that such good records regarding this trip have survived in the local municipal archive. Almost every town and city of Andalusia had their own municipally run pósito, and efforts to purchase cheaper grain from neighbouring localities in order to replenish these grain stores was a common yearly occurrence. What this example illustrates is quite how local the Andalusian grain market was. More often than not, when shortages struck, supplies were sought from places that were within a day or two’s ride away. Although this could be different in larger port cities like Seville and Málaga, where there was

\textsuperscript{225} Cuentas que se Tomo a B. Ximenez de Castilla, Año 1626, AHML, legajo 68, pieza 55.
easier access to grain markets further afield, longer distance trading was not, as we shall see, without its difficulties, even for these better connected metropolises. The documents from Loja also show the large differences in grain prices that could exist in relatively small areas. Within a 120 kilometre radius of the town, the offer price of a *fanega* of wheat ranged from 544 to 884 *maravedís*: a difference of 340 *maravedís*, or an increase of 62.5% from the lowest price offer.226

These big local price differences provide some information about grain market integration in the region, a topic which has long been of interest to historians thinking about economic growth in early modern Europe. Put simply, in a perfectly integrated market with no barriers to trade, economists would expect prices of the same good to converge and react to similar shocks as people took advantage of local price differences by shifting goods towards areas with higher prices and away from those with lower prices. A fully integrated market is one where ‘the parts are so united by the relations of unrestricted commerce that prices take the same level throughout with ease and rapidity’.227 In practice, of course, even in the most integrated markets there tend to be some costs that keep prices from being exactly equal. The Loja documents provide a good example of some of the issues that impacted market integration in Andalusia in the seventeenth century. Figure 14 shows that the cost of grain was at its lowest in the north, in the town of Higuera de Calatrava, with the price increasing as one headed further south. This is likely to have been due to the town’s proximity to the hinterland to the north of Jaén, which was relatively fertile. The town council of Granada, for example, sent a local official to Jaén, Baeza, and Úbeda to search for cheaper grains when that city experienced its own price rises in 1648.228 We could therefore think of the extra 340 *maravedís* added to the price of wheat between Higuera de Calatrava and Loja as the transaction cost of moving the grain the 18 *leguas* that stood between the two towns. Transaction costs include

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226 Ibid.
228 Testimonio que da Francisco Gomez de Lara es mayor de cauldron de los acuerdos de la ciudad de Granada sobre prouiss[46] de trigo, 19 de junio de 1648, AHN, Consejos 7160, año 1648, número 1, documento 71.
obvious items such as the cost of transportation, but would also encompass factors such as taxes, the cost of gathering information, risk (proxied by insurance costs in more developed markets), and jurisdictional barriers to trade such as regulation.\textsuperscript{229} Almost all of these costs, not just transport, tended to increase with distance when it came to the grain market: risk, gathering information, and jurisdictional barriers to trade were all heavily dependent on the distance that grain needed to travel in the early modern period (the more jurisdictions and customs borders you crossed the higher the potential cost). Transport costs have tended to absorb most of the focus of historians that have worked on early modern market integration. In Spain, for example, David Ringrose famously pointed to poor transport infrastructure as the crucial cause of the country's relatively poor level of market integration.\textsuperscript{230} One of the key problems for the country was its geography: land transport in early modern Europe was dramatically more expensive than water transport, and Spain's interior suffered from both a lack of navigable rivers (just the Guadalquivir and the Ebro) and numerous mountain ranges.\textsuperscript{231} In seventeenth-century Andalusia, there is no doubt that transport costs were an important element of these price differences. However, Regina Grafe has recently questioned the pre-eminence of poor transport infrastructure in explanations of Spain's poor market integration and, as we shall see in the example of Loja and throughout the rest of this chapter, other factors, particularly the patchwork of different municipal jurisdictions that criss-crossed Andalusia, can perhaps better help us understand the issue.\textsuperscript{232}

When Bartolomé Ximenez de Castilla returned to Loja on 18 August, he had yet to buy any wheat. Instead he presented the town council with the list of prices that he had found, and they agreed that he and Mateo de Campo, the \textit{regidor diputado} of the pósito should organise the

purchase and transportation by muleteers of as much wheat as possible from the surrounding towns; on the condition that the total cost was not to exceed 782 maravedis per fanega and that the wheat was to be ‘very good, clean, and new crop from this year’.\(^{233}\) Given that Bartolomé Ximenez de Castilla had reported prices as low as 544 maravedis per fanega in Higuera de Calatrava, the town council was clearly conscious of the transactions costs that would need to be added to this price in order to get the grain to Loja. In terms of transport costs there was a royally mandated tasa, or official price of grain transport at the time, which was meant to stand at 10 maravedis per fanega of wheat per legua.\(^{234}\) Assuming an approximate distance of 18 leguas between Loja and the cheapest wheat in Higuera de Calatrava, this would have added around 180 maravedis to the base price of 544 maravedis, leaving a total of 729 maravedis. Given the agreed maximum cost of 782 maravedis, it seems as though the Loja council was expecting to pay around the tasa rate for transport. Importantly though, this was still 100 maravedis per fanega less than the going cost of wheat in Loja at this time (884 maravedis). Why then were private merchants not taking advantage of these price differences and transporting grain from the north, down to Loja? One reason is that, on top of the cost of grain and transport, Loja’s town council also incurred substantial costs gathering information and navigating the complex system of local grain regulations in the region. They paid Bartolomé Ximenez de Castilla a salary of 4,000 maravedis to make his round trip. In each town in which he stopped he also paid 68 maravedis in fees called the derecho de corredor, which was essentially a payment to an official agent who would accompany him to verify the official price of wheat.\(^{235}\) In total, including some further administrative costs, the trip cost Loja’s council 4,578 maravedis. Because the towns of Andalusia were usually kept well supplied with grain by their hinterlands, there may have been little value for private merchants to invest in the market infrastructure needed to make such exchanges of information and goods cheaper; especially

\(^{233}\) ‘muy bueno limpio y nuevo de la cosecha deste año’, Cuentas que se Tomo a B. Ximenez de Castilla, Año 1626, AHML, legajo 68, pieza 55.

\(^{234}\) Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 34–35.

\(^{235}\) Cuentas que se Tomo a B. Ximenez de Castilla, Año 1626, AHML, legajo 68, pieza 55.
if local governments and their pósitos were going to front these costs in relatively rare situations of dearth. Yet even this sum represented a relatively small portion of the total cost of the proposed purchase of 2,000 fanegas of wheat and cannot alone explain the existence of such large regional price differentials. The fact that wheat was selling at 884 maravedis in Loja, when it could be found for 544 maravedís a couple of day's ride away, thus remains somewhat of a mystery. As we shall examine in more detail throughout this chapter the missing element that can help explain these price differentials is the fact that there were substantial regulatory barriers and risks involved with transporting wheat across Andalusia, all of which became heightened during times of dearth. Thinking about these factors in more detail will help us to understand the issue of market integration in the region and to touch on some broader themes such as state capacity and economic growth under the Habsburg monarchy. Importantly, it will also help us understand the problems that could emerge when local harvest shortages hit and provide an explanatory framework for the potential impact of the Little Ice Age in the mid-seventeenth century that helps to detail the relationship between harvests and prices that was surveyed in chapter 2.

State Capacity, Markets, and Market Integration

One of the great economic questions of the early modern period has been to try to explain why different European countries experienced such different rates of economic growth. Why some economies, such as those of the Dutch Republic and England, were able to grow so fast while others, such as those of France and Spain, fell behind. Over the past few years the concept of state capacity has become an important element in answering these questions. In Noel Johnson and Mark Koyama's conceptualisation, state capacity has two key elements: (1) the ability of a state ‘to enforce its rules across the entirety of the territory it claims to rule'; and (2) its ability ‘to garner enough tax revenues from the economy to implement its policies.’ States that combine these two

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elements are better able to 'collect taxes, enforce law and order, and provide public goods', all of which, they believe, are crucial factors in determining economic growth and development: 'economies governed by strong, cohesive, and constrained states are better able to overcome vested interests and avoid disastrous economic policies, while societies ruled by weak states are prone to rent-seeking, corruption and civil war.'\textsuperscript{237} Market integration is also closely intertwined with these issues. There remain a number of theories about why increased state capacity may have proved so important to economic growth. These include the protection that stronger states may have afforded their citizens from warfare, and the introduction of stable rules of law.\textsuperscript{238} However arguably the most convincing argument comes via a focus on market integration: states with high capacity often end up providing the requisite institutions to govern and regulate markets, and therefore increase market integration by reducing many of the barriers to trade that might characterise a more fragmented polity.\textsuperscript{239} If one subscribes to a 'Smithian' view of early modern economic growth as having been caused primarily by the expansion of local markets across increasing geographical spaces and a resulting increase in specialisation and division of labour, then different levels of market integration (possibly caused by different state capacities) become crucial in explaining the growth of markets and the resulting increase in economic activity.\textsuperscript{240} There are a wealth of studies exploring the different levels of market integration in Europe.\textsuperscript{241} The majority that focus on the early modern period reinforce a similar picture of English and Dutch progress and French and Spanish stagnation as the state capacity literature.\textsuperscript{242} England is often held up as a country that achieved a relatively high level of market integration in the early modern period, whilst Spain has generally been seen as a territory where a fully national market for grains, for example, did not emerge until

\textsuperscript{237} Johnson and Koyama, 1–3.
\textsuperscript{238} Johnson and Koyama, 8–14.
\textsuperscript{239} Johnson and Koyama, 9.
\textsuperscript{240} For discussion of the 'Smithian' nature of focus on market integration see, for example: Federico, ‘How Much Do We Know’, 470; Bateman, ‘The Evolution of Markets’, 447; Epstein, \textit{Freedom and Growth}, 7; Grafe, \textit{Distant Tyranny}, 2.
\textsuperscript{242} For country level summaries of market integration in early modern Europe, see: Bateman, \textit{Markets and Growth}, 41–90.
the eighteenth or nineteenth century (although there is disagreement about the speed of this process).\textsuperscript{243} The late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are seen either as a time of market disintegration or stagnation in Spain, with the beginnings of increased integration only starting to take hold towards the end of the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{244}

Stephen Epstein's work is crucial in terms of theorising why these differences in market integration may have emerged. Epstein argued that the crucial limit to pre-modern growth and the development of markets had been jurisdictional fragmentation, which came about due to the inability of weakly centralised states to enforce common rules across their territories. In making this point he took aim at an earlier, and still very influential, approach to the question of early modern economic growth, which rested far more heavily on the idea of 'constrained states' mentioned by Johnson and Koyama above.\textsuperscript{245} This was the focus of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) school, which posited that the major hindrance to the development of markets, and thus economic growth, in the early modern period had been the actions of predatory and absolutist states.\textsuperscript{246} North and Weingast, for example, had argued that unchecked absolutist royal power in countries such as France and Spain had hindered the development of markets, whilst in England the Glorious Revolution had been a watershed moment that removed the crown's ability arbitrarily to raise taxes and appropriate property, laying the ground for rapid economic growth.\textsuperscript{247} In contrast Epstein argued that rather than strongly centralised absolutist states being the culprit, it was states that were unable to centralise government and reduce 'decentralised rent-seeking' that were to blame.\textsuperscript{248}


\textsuperscript{245} Johnson and Koyama, ‘States and Economic Growth’, 3.

\textsuperscript{246} For a classic example of the NIE view see: North and Weingast, ‘Constitutions and Commitment’.

\textsuperscript{247} North and Weingast, 830–32.

\textsuperscript{248} Epstein, Freedom and Growth, 169.
main source of rent seeking and high transaction costs', which prevented fully integrated markets from developing within these territories. Poorly centralised states, with fragmented jurisdictional powers spread across numerous institutions thus suffered from poor state capacity and therefore poor market integration. That Epstein could challenge the NIE school's views on the role of absolutist monarchies, without much alteration to the basic story of English and Dutch economic growth and French and Spanish economic stagnation, says much about the extent to which the concept of absolute rule had come to be questioned by historians. Perhaps nowhere were these new theories on the limitations of royal power more pertinent than in the case of the Spanish monarchy. Historians such as I. A. A. Thompson and Charles Jago had, since the 1980s, questioned the extent of absolutist rule in Spain, particularly in Castile, which had previously been seen as a stronghold of royal absolutism. However current historiography has gone further, increasingly emphasising the decentralized nature of Habsburg government and even going as far as to characterize the system as a 'polycentric monarchy', particularly with respect to the large amount of political and fiscal power that remained vested in the urban municipalities of Castile.

Using these two strands in the historiography (a decentralised, jurisdictionally fractured monarchy and a slow to develop national market) Regina Grafe has provided the most comprehensive application of Epstein's ideas to early modern Spain. Grafe claims that the autonomy of Spain's towns and cities provide a clear picture of the problems of jurisdictional fragmentation at work, with the resulting plethora of 'local and regional trade and consumption taxes' that they implemented providing a major hindrance to the development of the country's

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249 Epstein, 8, 169.
252 Thompson, ‘Crown and Cortes’; Jago, ‘Habsburg Absolutism’.
253 Grafe, *Distant Tyranny*. 
internal market between 1650 to 1800. Yet Grafe chooses an unlikely good as the basis for work on these markets, focussing on the price of salt cod (*bacalao*). The majority of market integration studies that deal with early modern Europe, and Spain more specifically, focus on the prices of cereals. As Victoria Bateman explains, the rationale for this is based on the availability of price data for this commodity and the fact that the grain market can generally be seen as a good proxy for markets in general. Grain was produced and bought in almost all regions of Europe, and the factors that would affect grain market integration, such as transport costs and institutional changes, would likely be similar for other goods.

However the issue that all of these quantitative studies face, on at least some level in the early modern period, is the availability of quality data. This is particularly true of Spain especially, as we have seen, when it comes to pre-eighteenth century grain prices. It is no coincidence that many of the studies of Spanish market integration start their analysis at the end of the seventeenth century, with authors consistently citing the lack of reliable data prior to this point. Those that do attempt earlier studies, are often forced to rely on the price series published by Earl J. Hamilton in the 1930s.

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254 Grafe, 244–45.
257 Federico, ‘How Much Do We Know’, 484–85.
integration. The prices generally come from institutional buyers whose purchasing power may therefore not truly reflect the market rate; the yearly averages are sometimes based on data from a select few months in the year; and the homogeneity of goods across time and regions is difficult to verify. Perhaps most importantly, the 'Andalusia' series in War and Prices are mostly based on prices from Seville, but Hamilton substituted prices from Cádiz into the series when Seville data was not available. In making such substitutions Hamilton was inherently assuming that the Andalusian market was integrated, and the these two cities had comparable prices. In order to side step these issues Grafe avoids using grain prices altogether. Bacalao, in Grafe's view, is better suited for use in a statistical analysis of market integration for three key reasons. Firstly, grain was susceptible to local production shocks 'caused mostly by weather conditions.' Given the lack of available historical data for local production and weather conditions, it is very difficult to identify these local shocks econometrically, and it is thus near impossible to isolate the impact of other factors such as local taxes or transport costs, which are directly linked to market integration. Secondly, transport costs are often hard to isolate due to the fact that grain was almost always both produced locally and imported in varying quantities, with the provenance unclear in most price series. Finally, with particular reference to Spain, Grafe asserts that the grain market was 'ruled by an exceptional set of political measures such as taxes, quantity interventions and set prices' that were decided at a national rather than local level. As a result, Grafe views bacalao as a good which is more indicative of the Spanish non-grain goods market as it 'better reflects the diversity of local and territorial taxation'.

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260 Grafe, Distant Tyranny, 48.
262 Grafe, Distant Tyranny, 49.
263 Grafe, 41.
264 Grafe, 41.
265 Grafe, 41–42.
266 Grafe, 42.
267 Grafe, 47.
Using these bacalao prices, Grafe argues that the plethora of 'local and regional trade and consumption taxes', combined with the jurisdictional autonomy of Spain's towns and cities was the major cause of slow market integration over the period 1650 to 1800.\textsuperscript{268} In doing so, she dismisses the idea, most famously advanced by David Ringrose, that the major limiting factor to the development of Spain's internal market was poor transport infrastructure.\textsuperscript{269} Grafe's conclusions about the importance of jurisdictional fragmentation to the process of market integration are carefully drawn and she is right to draw attention to the problems that the existing Spanish grain prices series pose. As Federico points out, most statistical analyses of market integration have tended to focus more on measuring the different levels of integration across different territories, rather than investigating the causes behind these differences, often because of the statistical and price data issues that we have already surveyed.\textsuperscript{270} Grafe's move away from the grain market allows her to focus on this latter question. However, it is also possible to question quite how widely bacalao was consumed in Spain during the period of study (particularly in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) and thus quite how representative this good is of the internal market of Spain as a whole.\textsuperscript{271} It is also true that by not looking at grains, due to the 'exceptional set of political measures' which were applied to the market, Grafe does not deal with a vast swathe of jurisdictional issues that would actually lend additional weight to her argument.\textsuperscript{272} Grafe states that grain was 'in principal, subject to national rather than local and regional political economy interventions', however, as will be shown later, it is clear that, in practice, the grain market was subject to both; with the interplay of both national and local jurisdictions having a dramatic effect on the grain trade of the mid-seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{273} Neither can Grafe totally escape the problems generated by the lack of information regarding the various sales tax rates that were applied on goods across the

\textsuperscript{268} Grafe, 244–45.
\textsuperscript{269} Grafe, 109–15; Ringrose, \textit{Transportation and Economic Stagnation}.
\textsuperscript{270} Federico, 'Market Integration', 15.
\textsuperscript{272} Grafe, \textit{Distant Tyranny}, 42.
\textsuperscript{273} Grafe, 42.
different municipalities of Spain. Grafe, for example, argues that local consumption taxes explain the higher prices that consumers in Seville paid for their salt cod, compared to other Spanish cities. However lacking direct evidence of the actual local tax rates in place she is forced to use proxies for these variables in the regression analysis that forms the basis for her argument and then speculate that tax rates explain the differences she finds.\footnote{Grafe, 182–88.} Her conclusion that persistently higher bacalao prices in Sevilla were due to ‘the massive impact of local consumption taxes’ is evidenced through a general statement about the city’s large municipal debt and the subsequent need to impose ‘burdensome’ consumption taxes, rather than any detailed analysis of the precise taxes and rates which were applied during the period in question.\footnote{Grafe, 186.} This is not to criticise Grafe, who does a commendable job of trying to work with the sparse information at her disposal. The reality is that we do not currently have a detailed summary of the taxes in question, something which highlights just how much work remains to be done on detailing the workings of these local markets.

In order to take a different approach to solving some of the aforementioned issues, this chapter will take a smaller-scale qualitative approach to the study of the grain market in seventeenth century Andalusia, focussing primarily on the five year period between 1647 and 1652. This contrasts to the usual focus of market integration studies that normally take a larger-scale approach, cover multiple centuries, and rely primarily on quantitative data and statistical analysis. Guillermo Pérez Sarrión is someone who has taken a similarly non-quantitative approach to studying the national market of Spain and who uses what he calls a ‘micro-analytical focus’.\footnote{Pérez Sarrión, La Península Comercial, 66–70; Guillermo Pérez Sarrión, The Emergence of a National Market in Spain, 1650-1800: Trade Networks, Foreign Powers and the State, trans. Daniel Duffield (London: Bloomsbury Publishing PLC, 2016), 22–23.} Although he takes a view more closely associated to the NIE approach than either Epstein or Grafe, Pérez Sarrión marshals a variety of diplomatic and governmental sources, alongside contemporary writings about trade, to argue that a combination of trade networks fostered by English and French merchants,
alongside centralizing government reforms, did much to foster the development of national market in the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{277} Using a similar method, but a much reduced time-frame and geographical scope, this chapter will mostly use sources from municipal and central government archives to draw its conclusions. Although this inevitably affects the universality of its conclusions, a smaller-scale approach does present some opportunities and advantages. The aim is not to replace the aforementioned statistical and econometric analyses of market integration, but rather to supplement some of the gaps that are inevitably created by the quantitative approach that they take. By looking at the actions of the monarchy and the municipal governments of Andalusia in detail we can both offer some concrete suggestions for how a concept such as jurisdictional fragmentation could impact market integration in the region, and add some much needed detail to the nature of these political interventions and the implementation of local taxes, for example. It will also allow us a way into thinking about the impact of local production shocks caused by local weather conditions, that Grafe highlights are so hard to untangle econometrically in the grain price data.\textsuperscript{278}

We will see how different municipal governments and the monarchy in Madrid ended up coming into conflict over the administration of taxes, and export and import; primarily due to the web of overlapping jurisdictions that characterized the system of government in Andalusia. Overall we will find that, whilst regional taxation was a problematic issue when it came to grain market integration (as highlighted by Grafe), an equally important, if not greater hindrance during episodes of dearth may well have been the proliferation of local export bans that were implemented by municipalities across Andalusia and Castile. We will also think about what these efforts to regulate the grain market can tell us about state capacity in Andalusia. The state, in this conceptualisation, is not a single entity, but the combined workings of the various councils that made up the government in Madrid and the local municipal governments of Andalusia. These institutions had differing

\textsuperscript{277} Pérez Sarrión, \textit{La Península Comercial}, 66–70, 72; Pérez Sarrión, \textit{The Emergence of a National Market}, 19–22, 23.
\textsuperscript{278} Grafe, \textit{Distant Tyranny}, 41.
priorities which did not necessarily always align. In fact a large part of the story in Andalusia between 1647 to 1652 is one of conflict, rivalry and negotiation between these entities, much of which came to a head due to the increasing competition over grain supplies that emerged out of the poor harvests of the mid-century. This provides an opportunity to think about both of the key aspects of state capacity identified by Johnson and Koyama, and throws up some interesting questions. Firstly, as we shall see in more detail, one of the large problems that impacted Andalusia in 1647 to 1652 was the varying ability of the different institutions that managed the grain market to enforce their rules. Following the work of Charles Tilly, one might expect state attempts to regulate and control the grain market to have led to increasing centralisation and thus increased state capacity. Instead, the situation in Andalusia appears to have got more fractured as shortages hit. Secondly, a look at how municipal governments attempted to fund their grain purchases, and the financial difficulties that the monarchy's seventeenth-century revenue-raising methods visited upon these institutions, can also give us some insight into the fiscal problems of the Habsburg monarchy and its struggles to raise sufficient revenues to support its policies.

The rest of this chapter is split into two sections. The first looks at the regular, day-to-day measures that both the monarchy in Madrid and the municipal governments took to regulate the grain market in Andalusia. It outlines the jurisdictional structure that existed between the monarchy and the municipal governments of the region, and looks in detail at the two key measures that were regularly used by municipal governments (in both regular harvest years and dearth) to regulate the bread and wheat market: price controls and the municipal grain stores (pósitos). It also looks at how the monarchy's revenue raising methods put strain on municipal finances in the seventeenth century, reducing the capacity of such institutions to react to episodes of dearth. The second section focuses on the two primary political measures that were turned to when shortages hit between 1647 to 1652

and the price controls and pósito system proved unable to respond adequately: namely the imposition of local export bans and changes to tax policy. It also tries to view this situation in a comparative perspective, looking at examples from other European states such as France, England, and the Dutch Republic. This will show that whilst the shortages of the mid-seventeenth century appear to have led to a worsening of Andalusian grain market integration, the decentralized nature of the Habsburg monarchy cannot stand as the sole explanation for this. The Dutch Republic, for example, provides a comparative example of a state that had a similarly decentralized system of government but which presided over a highly integrated grain market, one that seemed to avoid many of the jurisdictional issues that affected Andalusia. The conclusion will try to think about why this might have been the case.

The Normal Business of Grain Market Regulation and Provisioning

The Monarchy, the Municipalities and the Grain Market

The two main political bodies that regulated the markets for grains and bread in Andalusia in the seventeenth century were the monarchy and the region's municipal governments. Perhaps the most famous and symbolic form of regulation was the royally mandated legal maximum sale price for grains in Castile, called the tasa de granos, which notionally stood at 612 maravedís (18 reales) per fanega of wheat throughout most of the seventeenth century. However, farmers who worked their own land were exempted from the tasa between 1619 to 1699, leaving this maximum price applying only to large landowners and institutions; and all evidence points to the fact that this limit was rarely ever enforced. Whilst the tasa remained a symbolic concept for the inhabitants of Andalusia, who often complained when grain prices rose above that level, this was not a rare

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occurrence. Of more importance in terms of royal policy, was the control that the monarchy exerted over the taxation of grains and the import and export of goods to regions such as Andalusia. The Habsburg monarchy presided over a system of internal customs borders that divided the historic territories of Spain such as Castile, Navarre, Aragon, and the Basque Country; and these different regions were frequently treated as separate grain markets by the monarchy, with taxes and trade embargoes often being imposed between them. International trade embargoes were also seen as a key policy tool in Spain's international conflicts: by the 1640s the country had various import and export bans in place with France, the Dutch Republic, Portugal and North Africa. In addition the government in Madrid had overall control of the import and sales taxes that applied to wheat in Andalusia, of which the three main taxes were called the *alcabala*, the *ciento* and the *almojarifazgos*. We shall return to these measures in more detail later but, importantly, the implementation and administration of these taxes and trade embargoes varied greatly between the different towns and cities of the region, with municipal governments often successfully lobbying the government in Madrid for their own specific exemptions and privileges.

Overall however, it was the municipal governments that took the most prominent roles when it came to the regulation of the wheat and bread markets in Andalusia, and the organisation of provisioning for the region's towns and cities. It is important to note that Andalusia in the seventeenth century had no regional parliament nor specific form of representation with the government in Madrid, and was not a political jurisdiction as such. Administratively it formed part of Castile and matters regarding grain provision that affected Andalusia were usually dealt with at the national level in the *Consejo de Castilla*, with fiscal matters ending up in the *Consejo de Hacienda*. The region was divided into the four kingdoms of Seville, Granada, Córdoba and Jaén,  

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282 The price series in figure 9 regularly show the average yearly price of wheat running at more than 612 *maravedis* per *fanega*.


and the capital cities of these kingdoms sent representatives to the Cortes de Castilla, when these were called by the king. However the Cortes were primarily called to approve new taxes and fiscal measures, and took little to no role in grain trade regulation. This left the municipal governments of Andalusia as the most important political units when it came to managing the grain market. These were usually comprised of a town council, to which local notables were elected each year, whilst the larger and more important municipalities would also have a royal official called a corregidor appointed at the head of the council (in Seville this person was called an asistente). In Castile there were around 80 towns and cities with a corregidor, some 30 of which were in Andalusia. These towns and cities also had certain rights and jurisdictions to rule over their hinterlands, something that became crucial when it came to implementing measures such as banning the export of wheat. The reach of these rights over hinterlands varied depending on the size of the town and city, with a larger metropolis often having jurisdiction over a region that may well have encompassed other smaller towns. The system in Andalusia can thus be conceived of as a three-tiered patchwork of competing jurisdictional competences, whose layers often overlapped geographically. The bottom tier was comprised of the smaller towns, with their jurisdictional rights over the lands that surrounded them. Above this sat the larger cities, whose hinterlands often overlapped with, or even fully included, some of the smaller towns in their localities. Finally, monarchical authority theoretically overlaid these two aforementioned tiers. In times of dearth these municipal governments had a large degree of freedom in terms of the policy decisions that they made regarding their local grain market, including negotiating with the government in Madrid to secure town and city specific exemptions from national policies. This patchwork of different municipal jurisdictions and the relative autonomy from royal power was something that the cities of Castile


286 For details on Seville’s rights to produce grown in its hinterlands, see: José Ignacio Martínez Ruiz, Finanzas municipales y crédito público en la España moderna: la hacienda de la ciudad de Sevilla, 1528-1768 (Seville: Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, 1992), 179–80.
had worked hard to keep following events such as the comunero revolt of 1520 to 1521, in the face of royal attempts to centralise administration. However this led to a very fragmented implementation of different provision policies and grain market regulation across the Andalusian region, with municipal governments taking a locally-centred outlook, unconstrained by any institutions willing to look at the bigger, region-wide picture.

Even in years with no harvest shortages, municipal governments were heavily involved in the day-to-day management of the grain market. They primarily acted in two key ways. Firstly they enforced a system of price control at the local level, which usually targeted the price of bread, rather than grain: setting a fixed weight and price for any loaves sold in the town. As we shall see, these price controls appear to have been far more important than any royally mandated tasa in determining the activities of muleteers, bakers, and consumers in the region. Secondly, as outlined in the example from Loja, these institutions also ran municipal granaries, called pósitos, which were designed to allow municipalities to purchase grain when it was abundant and cheap, after the summer harvest, and then release it at below market prices when shortages might start pushing prices up.

Local Price Controls

Across Andalusia local municipal officials would monitor the prices of grain being sold in their locality, usually in a town's alhóndiga. This was a designated market space where all grain had to be sold, where the local bakers would buy their supplies, and where local town councils would then set a fixed weight and price for the bread that these bakers would produce. Different price regimes thus existed across the region, with the picture further complicated by the fact that different towns and cities had different standard weights for their loaves. The libra (pound - around 460g) was the

288 Viñes Millet, ‘El motín de subsistencias’, 110.
common measure of weight used for bread and examples of one-pound, two-pound and sometimes even three-pound loaves can be found. In mid-seventeenth century Ayamonte – a town situated on the western tip of Andalusia, on the banks of the river Guadiana that bordered Portugal – bread was usually priced around 12 to 16 maravedís for a one-pound loaf of bread, with prices varying according to the time of year. Generally, in the summer months, after a regular harvest, prices would drop to 12 or sometimes even 10 maravedís a loaf, whilst towards the end of winter and during spring, these prices pushed up towards the 16 maravedís level, as supplies began to run low. However, these adjustments depended on the quality of the harvest. In July 1646, after a poor harvest in the region, the official sale price was set at 16 maravedís. In the spring of 1648, following the Andalusian-wide bad harvests of 1647, the official price of bread was set at 28 maravedís a loaf. Even though these prices represent legal limits rather than market prices and it is unclear how diligently they were enforced, the municipal government's willingness to adjust the official prices does suggest that they were representative of the changes in the value of wheat during this period. It also shows that the municipal government was at least attempting to vary prices in a manner concurrent with changing supply levels, making a conscious effort to avoid a situation where legal price limits were too low to induce supply from the town's bakers.

This was a pressing concern for municipal governments given that bakers usually had a fairly slim mark-up on the wheat which they bought. In Ayamonte, when bakers bought directly from the pósito, a baking trial was carried out to discover how many loaves that particular batch of wheat could produce. Prices were then fixed accordingly, with bakers being allocated a fixed profit

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289 See for example: Acta capitular de 16 de febrero, Año 1644; Acta capitular de 30 de noviembre, Año 1644; Acta capitular de 22 de abril, Año 1646; Acta capitular de 21 de julio, Año 1646; Acta capitular de 22 de junio, Año 1648; Acta capitular de 5 de julio, Año 1648; Acta capitular de 1 de febrero, Año 1649; Acta capitular de 25 de julio, Año 1649, Archivo Municipal de Ayamonte (AMA), libro de actas capitulares, legajo 5, año 1637-1668.

290 See for example: Acta capitular de 16 de febrero, Año 1644 y Acta capitular de 25 de julio, Año 1649, AMA, libro de actas capitulares, legajo 5, año 1637-1668.

291 Acta capitular de 21 de julio, Año 1646, AMA, libro de actas capitulares, legajo 5, año 1637-1668.

292 Acta capitular de 19 de abril, Año 1648, AMA, libro de actas capitulares, legajo 5, año 1637-1668.

293 Fines for exceeding the official sale price of bread were repeatedly threatened in the Actas cited above, but it is unclear how often these were successfully enforced.
share. On 30 March 1648, for example, a *fanega* of municipal wheat was found to produce 94 one-pound loaves and the bakers were ordered to sell these at 20 *maravedís* each.\(^{294}\) That would generate total income of 1,880 *maravedís* per *fanega* of which the bakers would pay the municipal government 1,700 *maravedís* and keep the remaining 180 *maravedís* as compensation.\(^{295}\) A fixed fee of around 5 *reales* per *fanega* (170 *maravedís*) seems to have been fairly constant in Ayamonte. However evidence suggests that rather than benefiting from higher fees when wheat prices rose, bakers often found that it was their income that was squeezed in an attempt to placate consumers. In fact, twenty days after the 30 March sale, on 19 April, the town of Ayamonte again looked to sell more bread from its municipal stores. This time the wheat was deemed good to produce 92 loaves per *fanega*, and whilst the resulting bread was to be sold at a higher price of 24 *maravedís* per loaf, the bakers were only to be entitled to a fee worth 168 *maravedís* per *fanega*. In contrast, the municipal government was to be reimbursed 2,040 *maravedís* per *fanega* (a full 10 *reales* more than in March) to reflect the increased price that they had paid for the wheat.\(^{296}\) This system of adjusting the official price of bread based on the price that the local government had paid for wheat was all well and good if all of the bakers' stock came from municipal sources. However, as we shall see in more detail later, this was rarely the case. Bakers often had existing stocks of flour bought from private merchants and could find themselves being forced to operate at a loss due to official bread prices which did not take into account these costs. In Granada in 1648, for example, the revolt in the city was preceded by complaints from bakers who felt that bread prices had been set too low.\(^{297}\)

Jan de Vries has recently argued that the Dutch Republic was one of the first nations to adopt what he calls a 'new system' of bread price regulation in Europe in the 1590s, in which regulators both distinguished between the variable cost of grain and the constant costs of a baker's

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\(^{294}\) *Acta capitular de 30 de marzo, Año 1648*, AMA, libro de actas capitulares, legajo 5, año 1637-1668.

\(^{295}\) Ibid.

\(^{296}\) *Acta capitular de 19 de abril, Año 1648*, AMA, libro de actas capitulares, legajo 5, año 1637-1668.

\(^{297}\) Domínguez Ortiz, *Alteraciones*, 59.
enterprise, and accurately established the number of loaves baked per unit of grain.\textsuperscript{298} He contrasts this to an 'old' system' whereby regulators assumed that a unit of grain would produce an equal weight of bread and adjusted bread prices in direct proportion to grain prices, without taking into account bakers' constant costs.\textsuperscript{299} De Vries thinks that the 'old system' continued to be used in most parts of Europe until well into the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{300} However the example from Ayamonte, with baking trials and fixed bakers fees, clearly displays features of his 'new system'. This (apart from questioning the uniqueness that de Vries attributes to the Dutch Republic's bread pricing system) certainly suggests that the pricing of bread in Andalusia was carried out in a fairly sophisticated manner. Nevertheless, the fact that individual towns set their own local maximum bread prices led to a dense patchwork of differing local prices, that complicated decisions for private merchants trying to figure out where they could sell their wheat at the best prices. This system of bread price controls was also primarily designed to stop profiteering and unjustifiable mark-ups by bakers. It could not, nor was it really designed to, remedy the underlying problem of expensive wheat supplies. As we saw in Ayamonte in April 1648, if the underlying cost of wheat went up, so did the price of bread. Instead the institutions that were meant to mollify the effect of short-term and seasonal wheat price rises on the price of bread were the municipal government grain stores, or \textit{pósitos}.

The \textit{pósito}

The \textit{pósitos} were grain stores, of the type that had existed in Europe since Roman times.\textsuperscript{301} However their official establishment as institutions run by the municipal governments of Castile, distinct from the \textit{alhóndigas} mentioned above, seems to have originated around the end of the fifteenth

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{298} de Vries, \textit{The Price of Bread}, 375.
\bibitem{299} de Vries, 22–31.
\bibitem{300} de Vries, 375–76.
\bibitem{301} de Vries, 7.
\end{thebibliography}
The population increases of the sixteenth century encouraged an ever growing number of municipal governments in Castile to found pósitos, and this century also saw the formalisation of the regulations that governed them, with Philip II issuing laws in 1558 and 1584 that governed their financial structure and governance. These institutions explicitly came under the authority of the local municipalities but these laws tried to give them some sense of financial independence. The officials that ran the pósitos could not manage other municipal funds, and the money and grains that they held could not be used for any other purposes beyond provisioning, particularly not the payment of other municipal debts. At their core was a simple idea: they were to allow municipalities to purchase grain when it was in abundance, after the harvest, and then release it to market at reduced prices later in the harvest year, when shortages might be pushing prices up. The cycle of this harvest year was of crucial importance to the pósito, with sales of municipal wheat generally being required when local supplies began to run low in March, April and May. These institutions were, in theory, meant to be self-funding once founded with some initial capital: sales were expected to be made, at the very least, at cost price, so that the pósito would not lose money, with the grain usually being sold directly to a town's bakers. Proceeds would then be re-invested when the next harvest came around.

The pósitos also sometimes loaned grain directly to residents, rather than selling it to bakers. In the town of Ayamonte, for example, a certain amount was usually loaned out to local farmers in November for them to sow the next year's harvest. In 1646 and 1648 such loans were made on the condition that the grain would be paid back the following year, on the dia de Santiago 25 July, with an additional almud (half a fanega) of wheat and one real (34 maravedís) payable to the pósito for each fanega borrowed. So, although this was a tool used to prevent sowing shortages, it was also

303 de Castro, 103–4.
304 de Castro, 104.
305 Acta capitular de 12 de noviembre, Año 1646 y Acta capitular de 22 de noviembre, Año 1648, AMA, libro de actas capitulares, legajo 5, año 1637-1668.
one that was designed to reimburse the *pósito* for its expenses and, given the 50 per cent return of grain on each *fanega*, help boost next year's supplies. Another advantage of doing this for the *pósito* was essentially to swap grain from a current year's harvest for a future one, without having to worry about storage (more on storage later). It also gave some protection against the financial effects of future price rises, giving the *pósito* a supply of next year's grain at today's prices. José Ignacio Martínez Ruiz notes that these types of loan agreements could also sometimes be forced upon residents by municipalities if there was an abundance of grain and the *pósito* feared making a large loss on its pre-existing supplies, due to low market prices.\(^{306}\) Distributions of grain to residents, free of charge, in times of need, seem to have rarely been considered in the period 1647 to 1652. Municipal governments were expected to manage the *pósitos* on the basis that they were to be financially self sufficient, with the institutions' funds being spent and then recouped through grain sales each harvest year. The distribution of free grain to residents would have inevitably led to financial losses for the *pósitos* and, in turn, reduced their ability to act effectively in future years: a risk that local governments appear to have been very conscious of. The distribution of free grain was something more generally asked of the religious institutions, who were asked to give alms (*limosnas*) when severe shortages were experienced.\(^{307}\) In Ayamonte in 1652, when severe price rises were experienced in the town, the local government did initially approve a plan to loan some of the *pósito*’s grain supplies directly to residents in April of 1652. This seems to have been proposed due to a realisation that, at a cost price of 64 *reales* *per* *fanega*, the *pósito*’s grain supplies were simply unaffordable to its residents at that time. However, the town council was clear to specify that the debts on these loans would have to be settled after the next harvest at a price of 64 *reales*, regardless of future price drops, to ensure that the *pósito* did not suffer any financial loss.\(^{308}\) In any case the plan was abandoned a few days later, in favour of a more traditional sale to bakers,

\(^{306}\) Martínez Ruiz, *Finanzas municipales*, 178.
\(^{307}\) See for example the Bishop of Córdoba, who distributed alms in 1652: British Library (BL), Egerton MS 347, f. 167-169.
\(^{308}\) *Acta capitular de 29 de abril, Año 1652*, AMA, libro de actas capitulares, legajo 5, año 1637-1668.
possibly due to a fear that repayments of these loans might be difficult to collect and thus that this
would negatively impact the pósito’s finances.  

**Carry-Over and Storage**

Apart from the aforementioned grain loans, almost all of the business of the pósito was self contained within one of these harvest years (June to May approximately). Importantly, it seems to have been standard practice for all the grain held by a pósito to be sold off each year, before the arrival of the new harvest. Grain storage in the early modern period has been a controversial issue amongst economic historians. With little direct evidence about how much grain was carried over from one harvest to the next in inventories, historians have often estimated storage based on the behaviour of prices, with varying estimates emerging as to their importance. Wrigley and Nielsen, for example, estimate that there was substantial inter-annual grain storage in England in the early modern period. Others, such as Persson are more sceptical, and the evidence from seventeenth century Andalusia would seem to agree with his assertion that storage carry-over was ‘not substantial’.

In Palma del Río, the *actas capitulares* from the month of May in both 1651 and 1652 show that the town’s pósito sold all of its remaining grain reserves that month. Evidence such as this has tended to be seen as a sign of the severity of the grain shortages that affected the region between 1647 and 1652. To some extent this is true of course, in poor harvest years the pósito was more

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309 *Acta capitular de 7 de mayo, Año 1652*, AMA, libro de actas capitulares, legajo 5, año 1637-1668.
312 ‘el posito desta villa a bendido el trigo que tenia en los graneros de su posito’, *Acta capitular de 25 de mayo, año 1652*, Archivo Municipal de Palma del Río (AMPR), libro de actas capitulares, año 1651-1659; *Acta capitular de 5 de mayo, año 1651*, AMPR, libro de actas capitulares, año 1651-1659.
313 See for example: Rosa María García Naranjo and Juan Antonio Egea Aranda, ‘Crisis de Subsistencias y Conflicto Social. La Política de Abastecimiento Del Consejo de Palma (1597-1601 y 1647-1652)’, in *La Administración Municipal En La Edad Moderna. Actas de la V Reunión Científica de La Asociación Española de Historia*
likely to run out of grain earlier and have more difficulty replenishing supplies. However it appears to have been normal practice for all of a pósito's grain to be sold off before the coming of the new harvest. In Écija, one of the few places where detailed accounts of the town's pósito survive for the mid-seventeenth century, this fact is clearly evidenced. In 1648 and 1649, for example, the pósito's yearly accounts are closed off in the month of June with the following statement: 'and with this the pósito is closed, and no more wheat remains in the said stores'. There were sensible reasons for this lack of inter-annual carry-over, the most important being difficulties in reliably storing grain for lengthy periods of time. Seventeenth-century Spanish granaries generally struggled to store grain for much longer than a year without it rotting, and this risk was clearly a major pre-occupation of the officials managing the pósitos. The actas capitulares of Palma del Río, for example, show that in February 1642 its pósito had to quickly sell its supplies because the wheat it was storing had started to rot and was 'in danger of being lost'. In Écija, in May 1649, seventy four-and-a-half fanegas of wheat was brought to the pósito which was rotten, and thus had to be given away to bakers that very same day. Even if grain was stored successfully, consumers clearly distinguished between different types of grain; something which should caution us against considering wheat as a homogenous good in early modern Europe. We can find many examples of Andalusian buyers expressing preferences for newer, fresher and more local supplies, with Andalusian town councils and consumers making distinctions based on the provenance and age of the grain on sale. As we saw in Loja, Ximenez de Castilla was expressly ordered to buy wheat 'from this year's harvest because in no circumstance is old wheat to be bought'. In Ayamonte, the town council explicitly set different prices for the bread baked from 'wheat from the land' and loaves baked from 'wheat...
from the sea'. Bread made from overseas grain was routinely priced between two to four maravedís cheaper per loaf, presumably to account for the impact of the transportation and storage on the quality of the wheat.\textsuperscript{319} Selling the wheat from the previous harvest, before the arrival of the new one was thus crucial to safeguarding a pósito's financial investment.

Whilst this study focuses on municipal grain stores, evidence from other parts of Castile marshalled by Escrivá, Llopis, and Álvaerz Vázquez suggest that even large landowners and religious institutions rarely stored grain for periods of more than one year.\textsuperscript{320} When they did so, it was usually due to an unexpected inability to sell their grain supplies in an abundant harvest year, rather than as a result of any deliberate policy.\textsuperscript{321} A brief snapshot from the town of Martos illustrates a similar point for Andalusia. When, in 1626, Bartolomé Ximenez de Castilla was sent to buy grain for the Loja pósito he was instructed to visit the agent of the Fugger family in Martos, who owned large grain reserves in the region as a result of their right to the payments of the diezmos from the Mesa Maestral of the Order of Calatrava.\textsuperscript{322} He likely dealt with a man called Geronimo de Pedregosa de Escuchas, who had managed the Fuggers's grain store in Martos since 1615 and who re-emerges in the historical records in 1632 in a legal dispute with the family regarding 12,953 fanegas of wheat and 3,572 fanegas of barley.\textsuperscript{323} The Fuggers accused de Pedregosa Escuchas of poor management of the grain under his supervision, arguing that he had failed to sell wheat and barley dating back to the harvest of 1618, which had remained in the stores and was now so rotten as to be worthless. In his defence, Geronimo de Pedregosa stated that he did not have the authority to sell any grains without the explicit authorisation of the Fugger family and that, despite his frequent protestations, they had repeatedly ignored his pleas to allow him to sell off

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{319} ‘trigo de la tierra’ and ‘trigo del mar’, see for example: \textit{Acta capitular de 19 de abril, 22 de junio, y 5 julio, Año 1648}, AMA, libro de actas capitulares, legajo 5, año 1637-1668.
\item \textsuperscript{320} Escrivá and Llopis, ‘La integración del mercado triguero’, 119–20; José Antonio Álvarez Vázquez, \textit{Rentas, Precios y Crédito En Zamora En El Antiguo Régimen} (Zamora: Colegio Universitario, 1987), 106.
\item \textsuperscript{321} Álvarez Vázquez, \textit{Rentas, Precios y Crédito En Zamora En El Antiguo Régimen}, 106.
\item \textsuperscript{322} \textit{Cuentas que se Tomo a B. Ximenez de Castilla, Año 1626}, AHML, legajo 68, pieza 55; de Pedregosa Escuchas, Pérez de Lara, and Rojas y Tortosa, \textit{Por Geronimo de Pedregosa Escuchas}, 2v.
\item \textsuperscript{323} de Pedregosa Escuchas, Pérez de Lara, and Rojas y Tortosa, \textit{Por Geronimo de Pedregosa Escuchas}.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
the old grains. De Pedregosa claimed that the Fuggers and their accountants had wanted to wait until the old wheat could be sold at a price of 18 *reales* per *fanega*. However grain from these stores was customarily sold at four *reales* less than freshly harvested produce, because 'after it enters the stores it takes on a bad smell, and before long it rots and corrupts'. Farmers thus had to be selling their grain at at least 22 *reales* per *fanega* for the Fuggers to receive their desired asking price; something which had hampered de Pedregosa's attempts to sell. Not willing to compromise on price, the Fuggers had failed to authorise the selling off of grains dating back to 1618, and by the mid-1620s the grain was rotten and infested with weevils. When orders did come to sell, some of the grain had been in storage for eleven years, far longer than the maximum of three years that Geronimo de Pegrosa claimed was the commonly accepted upper limit for grain storage. In fact, de Pegrosa argued that the Fuggers should have been thankful that he managed to sell 5,400 *fanegas* of the rotten old grain by mixing it together with fresher supplies, an act that he said went against his better conscience. Thus, whilst carry-overs were clearly possible they were risky, and any grain stored for longer than a year could be expected to fetch a substantially lower price than a current year's harvest.

The important impact of this lack of substantial grain storage carry-over on the running of the *pósitos* was that there was little opportunity to smooth supply and prices across consecutive harvest years. The inherent weakness of the *pósito* model was that, after a poor harvest, grain would inevitably be more expensive, even in the early months of the year. This meant that, all other things being equal, a *pósito* would be able to afford less grain in poor harvest years than in good ones. This problem was compounded by the fact that the decisions that needed to be taken each year — how much grain to buy, when to sell, and at what price — were anything but straightforward.

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324 de Pedregosa Escuchas, Pérez de Lara, and Rojas y Tortosa, 2v.
325 'luego que entra en los alhories toma mal olor, y a poco tiempo se pica y corrompe', de Pedregosa Escuchas, Pérez de Lara, and Rojas y Tortosa, 3r.
326 de Pedregosa Escuchas, Pérez de Lara, and Rojas y Tortosa, 11r.
much grain was purchased in late summer and the town remained well supplied all the way through to the onset of the next harvest, then the pósito could make a substantial loss, damaging its ability to respond to future crises. This depended, not only on the performance of the local harvest, but also on the availability of grain imported from the rest of Spain and abroad. All of these elements could vary substantially year to year, with unpredictable factors such as the weather playing decisive roles. For example, in Ayamonte on 1 February 1649, the town council became worried that healthy supplies meant that the price of wheat was going to drop and therefore decided to sell a portion of the pósito’s stock at 33 reales per fanega. However, less than a month later, on 23 February the tables had turned. The cabildo stated that ‘due to the heavy rains that have descended... the locality suffers from hunger’. Fortunately the pósito still had some grain reserves, which it then sold at 36 reales per fanega; a substantial increase on the price received just 22 days previously.

A more concrete example can be found in the account books of the pósito of Écija, one of the few institutions for which some detailed (but partial) cost and sale price information has survived for the years 1647 to 1652. These accounts show that between 1648 and 1652, the number of fanegas of wheat sold by the pósito between July and June each year ranged from a low of around 2,431 fanegas to a high of 5,046 (figure 15). As explained previously, the number of fanegas sold each year was probably also very close to the number bought, given the lack of storage carry-overs. In the spring of 1651 there was a clear increase in the amount of grain sold by the pósito, presumably in response to shortages caused by the poor harvest of 1650. However at this stage the pósito was still able to sell its grain at an average price of around 1,080 maravedís per fanega. The accounts only include sporadic cost information, and very little for the 1650 to 1651 harvest year, but the sale price suggests that wheat had been available to buy at a broadly similar

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327 Acta capitular de 1 de febrero, Año 1649, AMA, libro de actas capitulares, legajo 5, año 1637-1668.
328 ‘por la grande aguas que an sobrebenido... el lugar padese hambre’, Acta capitular de 23 de febrero, Año 1649, AMA, libro de actas capitulares, legajo 5, año 1637-1668.
329 Ibid.
330 Cuentas del pósito, AME, legajo 1380, libro 2091, años 1647-1648; Cuentas del pósito, AME, legajo 1380, libro 2092, años 1648-1649; Cuentas del pósito, AME, legajo 1380, libro 2093, años 1650-1652.
cost, given the small mark-up that was usually applied to its wheat. Cost price information is, however, recorded in the accounts from around the end of September 1651, and this can help explain the large drop in wheat sold in 1651 to 1652. Between September to December 1651 the pósito was being required to pay between 1,700 to 1,870 maravedís per fanega of wheat. This

**Figure 15: Wheat sales from the Écjia pósito, 1647-1652.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1647-1648</th>
<th>1648-1649</th>
<th>1650-1651</th>
<th>1651-1652</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total fanegas of wheat sold July to June</td>
<td>2,647</td>
<td>3,154</td>
<td>5,046</td>
<td>2,431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate of proportion of total wheat sales in Écjia over 12 months</td>
<td>1.26%</td>
<td>1.50%</td>
<td>2.49%</td>
<td>1.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total proceeds (Maravedís)</td>
<td>3,675,100</td>
<td>2,217,720</td>
<td>5,496,380</td>
<td>4,013,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average price per fanega (Maravedís)</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasa de granos (Maravedís)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total fanegas of wheat sold mid-March to mid-June</td>
<td>2,431</td>
<td>3,154</td>
<td>5,046</td>
<td>2,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate of proportion of total wheat sales in Écjia over 3 months</td>
<td>4.63%</td>
<td>6.01%</td>
<td>9.62%</td>
<td>4.21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Assuming population of 23,000 and annual fanega consumption of 9.125 per person (this assumption is discussed further in the section to follow on municipal finances).

Source: Cuentas del pósito, AME, legajo 1380, libro 2091, años 1647-1648; Cuentas del pósito, AME, legajo 1380, libro 2092, años 1648-1649; Cuentas del pósito, AME, legajo 1380, libro 2093, años 1650-1652.

meant that by the end of the year the pósito had only purchased 1,803 fanegas of wheat, whereas in the previous year a similar expenditure would have brought in somewhere closer to 3,000 fanegas. The crucial point made by such examples is that, as Concepción de Castro has pointed out, these institutions rarely turned out to be financially self-sufficient, with local government often having to find ways to inject additional capital into their operations during times of crisis. The financing of the pósitos was thus intrinsically bound up with the wider picture of municipal government finances in the seventeenth century, which, as we shall see, was in turn closely related to the Habsburg monarchy's financial situation and its methods and abilities when it came to revenue raising.

### A Worsening Picture in the Seventeenth Century - Declining Finances?

The financial situation of the pósitos, as well as Andalusia's municipal governments, has generally been thought to have been in decline during the seventeenth century. Evidence suggests that

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municipal governments in Andalusia and across Spain began to suffer a dramatic increase in indebtedness beginning around the end of the sixteenth century, primarily as a result of the Hapsburg monarchy’s financial problems. The reason that the crown's profligate expenditure became a municipal problem was due to the fact that urban municipal, rather than national state, revenues tended to be the income streams that creditors of the monarchy were allocated for repayment. In short, in order to finance its expenditure, the monarchy would often secure *donativos* (or donations) from the municipalities and in return these institutions would receive the right to tax various goods and trades. More often than not the municipalities had to borrow the funds to pay the *donativos* and thus the tax revenues that they gained would end up being allocated to these creditors. As a result a large portion of these municipal revenues ended up indirectly funding the monarchy, having been promised to creditors long before they were ever collected. By the last third of the seventeenth century, for example, up to 75 per cent of Madrid's municipal taxes were destined to meet the needs of the monarchy. José Ignacio Martínez Ruiz also calculates that during the seventeenth century the funds available to the municipality of Seville for services and infrastructure dropped by 80 per cent compared to the city's regular expenditure. The lack of surviving *pósito* accounts makes it difficult to know exactly what the impact of this was on the local grain stores, however it seems likely that they also suffered ill effects from this fiscal burden. Martínez Ruiz has attempted to chart the total amount of grain held in municipal grain stores by the city of Seville towards the end of the sixteenth century, and has speculated that there was a general decline in the quantity of grain being purchased each year, as a result of this worsening financial situation - although this is based on snapshots of information found in the city's *actas capitulares*, rather than any account books, which unfortunately do not survive. Mateos Royo, as well as Andrés Ucendo and Lanza García, have also noted a similar decline in *pósito* grain

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332 Grafe, *Distant Tyranny*, 176.
334 Andrés Ucendo and Lanza García, 28.
335 Martínez Ruiz, *Finanzas municipales*, 143.
purchases in seventeenth century Aragón and Madrid, respectively, which they also attribute to worsening municipal finances.\textsuperscript{337}

Whilst more concrete evidence is hard to come by, we can draw some conclusions regarding the purchasing power of the \textit{pósitos} using the account books from Écija. One important question is how the grain purchases made by the \textit{pósito} related to the total amount of grain purchased and sold in the town. A 1631 census – carried out on behalf of the monarchy in Andalusia as part of its attempt to replace the \textit{servicios de millones} and \textit{uno por ciento} taxes with a salt tax – gives us some valuable information on population levels and wheat consumption that we can apply alongside the Écija accounts.\textsuperscript{338} To implement this new tax the monarchy needed to estimate the total amount of salt used in each region of Andalusia and, given that salt was an important ingredient in bread making, royal officials were charged with putting a number on the amount of bread consumed in the region's towns and cities. The 1631 census estimated that Écija had 23,000 inhabitants who would eat, on average, one two-pound loaf of bread a day.\textsuperscript{339} A \textit{fanega} of wheat could be expected to produce, on average, forty loaves weighing two pounds, giving a total estimate of 575 \textit{fanegas} of wheat consumed a day in Écija in the form of bread, or 209,875 \textit{fanegas} a year.\textsuperscript{340} That is the equivalent to 9.125 \textit{fanegas} per inhabitant, per year, which appears to have been more or less the standard estimate used for the purposes of the salt tax census.\textsuperscript{341}

As we have seen in figure 15, the \textit{pósito} account books provide information regarding the sale of wheat in the city for some of the years between 1647 and 1652. The occurrence of the plague


\textsuperscript{338} Fernández de Pinedo, \textit{El censo de la sal}, 11–18.

\textsuperscript{339} Salinas de Andalucía. Acopiamentos del reino de Jaén, del obispado de Córdoba y Sevilla, \textit{Andalucía Tierra Adentro}, Archivo General de Simancas (AGS), Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 3a época, legajo 2911, \textit{Andalucía Tierra Adentro}; transcribed in: Fernández de Pinedo, 233.

\textsuperscript{340} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{341} Ibid, 173-275.
in 1649 to 1651 and the lack of reliable population figures for seventeenth century Andalusia as a whole, makes the direct application of this 1631 estimate to our period somewhat speculative. Making no allowance for potential population loss, these figures would indicate that the Écija pósito was buying and selling somewhere in the region of 1 to 2.5 per cent of the wheat destined for bread production in the town each year. If we assumed that Écija had lost 25 per cent of its population during the plague, in line with Vicente Pérez Moreda's best estimate of the average losses in the kingdom of Seville, this would put the 1650 to 1651 figure at a maximum of 3.2 per cent of the annual wheat destined for bread baking. Either way, on an annual basis, it seems clear that the pósito's purchasing power alone was far from giving it substantial market or monopoly power. However, as we shall see in due course, municipal governments did have recourse to a wide range of regulatory powers which they could use instead of pure purchasing power to affect the local grain market. It is also worth bearing in mind that a pósito's grain sales were concentrated in particular months of the year. In Écija, the vast majority of sales were made in the three months from mid-March to mid-June (see figure 15). If we assume a regular consumption of 575 fanegas of wheat per day in the town, the pósito's share of the market during this three month period rises to between 4.3 and 9.6 per cent. Another way of looking at the figures is that the pósito released enough wheat to keep the town supplied with bread for around four to eight days during these hungry months.

Unfortunately, similar data for the rest of Andalusia is hard to come by. However, if we assume that the workings of the Écija pósito was fairly typical of the region as a whole, then we can draw a tentative conclusion that the pósitos made up a substantial, but relatively limited, share of local grain market purchases and sales; and that they generally released enough grain into the market to be able to counter-act relatively short-term local supply shortages. One city for which we

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do have similar information is Madrid, and Andrés Ucendo and Lanza García have estimated that the Madrid pósito accounted for a similar percentage of the city’s grain purchased in the second half of the seventeenth century: somewhere between 2 and 4 per cent annually. The Madrid figures also show that this was a large drop from the end of the sixteenth century, when the Madrid pósito’s purchases often accounted for around 20 per cent of the city’s annual wheat consumption. This, combined with Martínez Ruiz’s work on Seville, offers at least some further circumstantial evidence that, by the mid-seventeenth century, pósitos in Andalusia were providing a smaller percentage of their localities’ grain consumption than fifty years earlier.

This decline in purchases by the pósitos was not simply caused by the fact that less money was being invested into these institutions, but also because more money was being extracted from them, as the funds that they held for gain purchases proved an alluring source of finance in times of need. Although royal legislation had prohibited the use of the pósitos’ reserves to settle municipal debts since 1558, both municipal governments and the monarchy were often amenable to making exceptions to this rule. A clear example of this can be seen in the town of Loja. In 1632 Philip IV issued a real cédula granting the Loja town council permission to borrow 2,000 ducados (750,000 maravedís) from the reserves of the local pósito, to facilitate the town's purchase of an office of vara de alguacil mayor, which was being sold by the monarchy for a total price of 4,800 ducados (1.8 million maravedís). Part of the attraction of this deal was that the office was accompanied by the right for Loja to levy certain arbitrios (or taxes) and the exception was made on the understanding that this loan would be paid back to the pósito using these future revenues.

343 Andrés Ucendo and Lanza García use a lower estimate of 6 fanegas of consumption per inhabitant, per year. It may be that the average Madrileño ate less bread than townsfolk in Andalusia, however adjusting either Écija or Madrid’s average annual wheat consumption so that they are the same level, simply brings the average percentages somewhat closer together (around the 2 to 4 per cent mark at 6 fanegas per year, with no population loss included in the Écija numbers): Andrés Ucendo and Lanza García, ‘El abasto de pan’, 72–73.
344 Andrés Ucendo and Lanza García, 72.
346 Real Cédula dando licencia a la ciudad para tomar dinero del Pósito para compra Vara Algácil Mayor, Año 1632, AHML legajo 56, pieza 52.
347 Ibid.
Documents from the Loja pósito make it clear that, on top of this initial loan, further borrowings towards the 1.8 million maravedíes were authorised in November 1634 and October 1637.\textsuperscript{348} It is not clear exactly how much of the 1.8 million maravedíes was eventually taken in loans from the pósito but the account books suggest that the entire sum was eventually funded from this source alongside an additional 262,500 maravedíes to pay off the previous holder of the office, leaving a total debt of more than two million maravedíes.\textsuperscript{349} Fourteen years later, in 1646, the pósito was still collecting annual arbitrios in repayment of these borrowings.\textsuperscript{350} This was also far from the only substantial payment that had been paid from the pósito to Philip IV in return for future tax revenues. The 1646 accounts also show the collection of taxes that were awarded to Loja in return for the payment of 12,000 ducados (4.5 million maravedíes) as part of a donativo requested by Philip IV in 1629; funds which also came from the pósito.\textsuperscript{351} This example from Loja demonstrates how royal expenditure was funded through the sale of municipal tax revenues and how municipal funds were essentially appropriated by the monarchy in the first half of the seventeenth century. It also shows how such measures could have a direct impact on the financial health of the pósitos. In the absence of surviving pósito account books that span the transition from mid-sixteenth to mid-seventeenth century, it is hard to quantify the extent to which this financial health declined during this period. However it seems plausible that, by the mid-seventeenth century, the worsening state of municipal finances in Andalusia contributed towards the pósitos having a reduced ability to purchase wheat and grains in the quantities needed to ensure the provision of their localities. This likely made them more vulnerable to periods of extreme weather and poor harvest years.

However, as an explanation for the inability of municipal governments and the pósitos to respond adequately to food shortages and short-term price rises in the period 1647 to 1652, a

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{348} Cuentas que se Tomaron del caudal del Pósito de la ciudad de Loja a Jose de Antonio Pelaez, su Depositario, Desde San Juan de 1641 hasta el Mismo Dia de 1642, Año 1644, AHML, legajo 83, pieza 65, f. 12.
\textsuperscript{349} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{350} Cuentas que se Tomaron a D. Francisco Ruiz Pacheco, del caudal del Pósito del que es Depositario, Un año que se Cumplió el Dia de S. Juan de Junio de 1646, Año 1647, AHML, legajo 84, pieza 109, f. 37.
\textsuperscript{351} Ibid, ff. 37-38.
\end{footnotesize}
general worsening of the *pósitos*’ finances is insufficient on its own. Whilst they may have been more vulnerable to harvest shortages than a century before, it is also clear that at various points in the middle decades of the seventeenth-century, the *pósitos* of Andalusia did have money available to purchase grain but were still unable to do so. In times of crisis, municipal governments were able to secure funds for wheat purchases, often through loans from local notables. Granada, for example, was one of the few cities in Spain that did not have its own *pósito* prior to 1650.\textsuperscript{352} Yet, in 1647, when grain shortages were affecting the city, it was still able to secure interest free loans amounting to 4,000 *ducados* (1.5 million *maravedís*) from its inhabitants, which it then attempted to use to purchase wheat from other locations in Andalusia, in order to remit to the *alhóndiga*.\textsuperscript{353} In Málaga a local *jurado*, Juan Domingo, agreed to loan the city 1,000 *ducados* (375,000 *maravedís*) in May 1652, for the same goal of purchasing wheat ‘outside of this region’.\textsuperscript{354} The key question is thus what happened when local municipal governments did attempt to access the grain market to purchase grain with these funds? What were the effects of the other policies that they pursued to try to ensure that their municipalities remained sufficiently supplied with grain? Municipal governments were in a unique position in that they were purchasing grain in the market, but also had extensive powers to influence and change the rules upon which it operated. The rules and practices that governed imports and exports from local territories, the rest of Spain and abroad, including sales and import taxes, had a dramatic impact on the market during times of dearth. Municipal governments not only felt the effects of this jurisdictional fragmentation when they entered the grain market but they also contributed to it, through their ability to enact their own versions of the aforementioned rules.

\textsuperscript{352} Cristina Viñes Millet claims that the *pósito* founded in Granada in 1650 was the city’s second. However Juan E. Gelabert disagrees and states that Granada had no *pósito* prior to this date. This is supported by documents sent by Granada’s city council to the Consejo de Castilla in 1648, which make it clear that ‘esta ciudad... no tiene possito para su remedio’: Testimonio que da Fran\textsuperscript{c}n Gomez de Lara, 19 de junio de 1648, AHN, Consejos 7160, año 1648 , número 1, documento 71; Viñes Millet, ‘El motín de subsistencias’, 111; Gelabert, ‘¿Motines de subsistencia o materias de Estado?’, 522.

\textsuperscript{353} Testimonio que da Fran\textsuperscript{c}n Gomez de Lara, 19 de junio de 1648, AHN, Consejos 7160, año 1648 , número 1, documento 71

\textsuperscript{354} ‘fuera desta comarca’, 8 de mayo de 1652, AMM, acuerdos municipales, volumen 68, ff. 40v-42v.
Reactions to the Shortages of 1647 to 1652

Market Disintegration

As grain prices started to increase between 1647 and 1652, the municipalities of Andalusia began to experience the limitations of their usual policy options. When the underlying problem was a shortage of wheat, not price gouging bakers, then implementing strict bread price controls could do more harm than good (as we will see in the case of Granada in 1648). Assuming also that insufficient wheat had been bought for the pósito earlier in the year – as was often the case given the unpredictability of harvests, imports, prices and the lack of perfect foresight on behalf of those in charge of these grain stores – then supplies had to be found during times of dearth. On top of the pósitos and price controls, local municipal governments in Andalusia, as in much of early modern Europe, had the power to requisition private stocks of grain and put them on sale in the local market. However, as we shall see, local municipal governments tended to turn to such measures in 1647 to 1652 only when tensions within a town or city had reached or exceeded boiling point, often at the behest of angry crowds. Instead the municipalities principally focussed on managing both imports and exports from their localities. Most obviously, as we have seen in the case of Loja, they sent officials to try to purchase grains from neighbouring regions. In the larger cities there were also efforts made to encourage imports from the rest of Spain and abroad: sometimes by buying grain from foreign merchants or muleteers willing to make the trip down from northern Castile; but also by attempting to manipulate the remarkably complex array of local and national import taxes that applied to the grain market. Perhaps most importantly the municipalities also regularly sought to secure the grain grown in their hinterlands by banning local exports. Looking at these measures in turn, alongside some comparisons with systems of grain market regulation elsewhere in Europe, will help to shed some light on how relationships between the monarchy in Madrid and the various municipalities of Andalusia led to a jurisdictionally fragmented market. It will also show how this
state of affairs exacerbated the problems caused by the run of poor harvests that occurred in 1647 to 1652 by rendering increasingly difficult the purchase of grains in the region.

Imports and Exports

In June of 1652 the corregidor of Bujalance wrote to the monarchy in Madrid, detailing some of the problems that his city had faced in trying to purchase wheat supplies that year.\(^{355}\) Faced with harvest shortages and high local prices, the city council had that summer attempted to buy wheat for its pósito from Castilla la Vieja. However, as the corregidor explained in his letter, the costs of such a transaction had been extremely high, mainly because muleteers had been discouraged from transporting wheat due to the risks they faced of having their grain forcibly requisitioned and purchased at below-market value by local officials en route.\(^{356}\) These seizures of grain from muleteers were the direct result of the export bans that a large number of towns and cities in Andalusia and Castille implemented in this period. Whilst these powers were not new, the series of poor harvests that occurred between 1647 to 1652 had meant that a large number of such bans came to be implemented in this period. In July of 1647, for example, the city council in Granada, worried about the year's poor harvest, banned the export of wheat from its hinterlands and required that all available supplies from the surrounding lands be brought to Granada's alhóndiga so that they could be sold to the city's bakers. They also explicitly requested that all the smaller towns that fell within their jurisdiction stop exporting wheat to other kingdoms.\(^{357}\) In April of 1651, the Écija cabildo ordered that 'no wheat or bread be exported out of the territory', threatening a fine of 600 reales plus the cost of the bread lost to the town for anyone who was caught breaking the rules.\(^{358}\) In April 1652

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355 Carta del corregidor de Bujalance al Presidente de Castilla de 11 de junio de 1652, Archivo del Conde de Villariego (ACV); transcribed in: Dominguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 224–25.
356 Ibid.
357 Testimonio que da Franço Gomez de Lara, 19 de junio de 1648, AHN, Consejos 7160, año 1648 , número 1, documento 71.
358 ‘que no se saque pan en grano ni amasado a ninguna parte de fuera del término', 21 de abril de 1651, AME, actas capitulares, legajo 2, libro 69, año 1651, ff. 55v-56r.
the town council of Osuna took a similar approach, banning both the export of wheat and barley.\textsuperscript{359} Over the course of the following chapters we will see many more such examples.

Whilst this was, in principal, a logical response to local shortages one can quickly see how the banning of exports from numerous localities could lead to problems. Most obviously it provided a barrier to any private merchants seeking to engage in intra-regional trade during the times when it would have been most profitable. Even if ways could be found around these restrictions, their existence certainly increased the risks of transporting grain. And whilst these policies could be effective if there were isolated local shortages, during periods when Andalusia as a whole suffered poor harvests their implementation had the effect of breaking the region into ever smaller fragmented markets. An example of the types of problems this jurisdictional fragmentation caused can be found in a legal case from 1647 in the Archivo de la Real Chancillería de Granada. The case documents a legal quarrel between a group of muleteers from the town of Arcos de la Frontera and the corregidor of Jerez de la Frontera.\textsuperscript{360} The muleteers had been transporting thirty-three-and-a-half \textit{fanegas} of wheat to sell in Sanlúcar de Barrameda, which they claimed to have originally purchased in Arcos de la Frontera. Their route took them through the hinterlands of the town of Jerez de la Frontera where they complained that they were illegally stopped by the town's guards, who confiscated their goods and sold them in Jerez de la Frontera at the \textit{tasa} rate of 612 \textit{maravedís} per \textit{fanega}; far below the 1,836 \textit{maravedís} that they claimed to have paid.\textsuperscript{361} The corregidor of Jerez de la Frontera countered that, due to shortages and rising prices in the town, any export of wheat from the territory had been prohibited, and that the muleteers had failed to carry the required documentation to prove the original provenance of their grain. He instead accused the plaintiffs of having bought their grain in Jerez de la Frontera's territory and having been in the process of

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[359]{\textit{14 de abril de 1652}, Archivo Municipal de Osuna (AMO), libro de actas capitulares, libro 25, año 1649-1660, ff. 207r-209v.}
\footnotetext[360]{Pedro Corona y consortes, vecinos de Arcos de la Frontera, con el concejo de Jerez de la Frontera sobre abasto de trigo, Archivo de la Real Chancillería de Granada (ARCG), caja 14526, pieza 7, año: 1647.}
\footnotetext[361]{Ibid.}
\end{footnotes}
attempting to export it illegally.\textsuperscript{362} It was only forty-eight kilometres as the crow flies between Arcos de la Frontera and Sanlúcar de Barrameda, with Jerez de la Frontera the only major town in between. Where muleteers had to cross numerous territories, the possibility of similar types of disputes multiplied. As such, many municipalities expended substantial time and energy trying to ensure that they could import grain free from interference from neighbouring jurisdictions. This was particularly true of the larger cities, that understandably often had to cast their nets wider to maintain their \textit{pósitos}. In April 1652, for example, Málaga's city council was angered by the fact that, not only was neighbouring Antequera prohibiting the export of wheat to Málaga from its own territory – grain 'which ordinarily should be for the relief of this republic' – but that it was also confiscating wheat that was simply passing through on the way to Málaga.\textsuperscript{363} The city council sent a representative to Antequera to demand that the town cease prohibiting 'the passage to those who bring said grains for the sustenance of this republic'.\textsuperscript{364}

However, if Antequera was overstepping its jurisdictional rights, Málaga's city council was itself far from acting beyond reproach. With the amount of wheat in Málaga dwindling in the spring of 1652, the \textit{corregidor} Pedro de Idiáquez had approached the Bishop of Málaga for help. The clergyman offered up 500 \textit{fanegas} of the church's wheat to the city, the only catch being that these grains were stored in Ronda and Antequera, both of which had banned exports from their jurisdictions.\textsuperscript{365} To get around this problem, a plan was hatched to claim that the wheat was being taken to Málaga for the purpose of supplying the soldiers housed in the city's docks. The council explicitly stated that if they used 'the pretext that [the wheat was] for the sustenance of the soldiers' they judged that 'the prohibition of the export would be lifted'.\textsuperscript{366} The idea was that these towns,

\textsuperscript{362} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{363} 'que ordinaramente suele ser en para el socoro de esta republica', 20 de abril de 1652, AMM, acuerdos municipales, volumen 68, ff. 55r-55v.
\textsuperscript{364} 'no prohíbiesen el pasaje a los que traen dichos granos para el sustento desta republica', 26 de abril de 1652, AMM, acuerdos municipales, volumen 68, ff. 59r-60v.
\textsuperscript{365} 8 de abril de 1652, AMM, acuerdos municipales, volumen 68, ff. 40v-42v.
\textsuperscript{366} 'Para facilitar este yncombeniente esta con determinacion de despachar por estas dos partidas de trigo con pretexto de que son para el sustento de los soldados que estan en las atarassanass con que juzga zesara la
whilst able to ban exports to Málaga, would be unable to prevent the exportation of wheat which was destined for the king's troops and which therefore came under the jurisdiction of the government in Madrid.

Similar issues also impacted access to grain from outside of Andalusia, whether from Spain or abroad. As we have seen the international trade embargoes implemented by the monarchy in the 1640s and 1650s presented a further hurdle for Andalusian municipalities to overcome when looking to purchase grain from abroad, not helped by the fact that both Catalonia (temporarily) and Portugal (permanently) made the transition from internal to external markets in 1640. Soon after conflict with Portugal had begun, for example, Philip IV issued orders prohibiting 'the export of wheat to the kingdom of Portugal' from all parts of Spain. The monarchy also played an important role in regulating the movement of grains between the different regions of Spain. The principle behind this was, in effect, to allow the government in Madrid to be able to stop exports from various regions during times of dearth. However the priority of Philip IV and his government seems to have been keeping Madrid, the capital and home to the court, well supplied. The suspicion is that these types of embargoes were often enacted to the benefit of Madrid and to the detriment of other regions. Military conflicts with Portugal and Cataluña, and the need to provision the troops, put a further strain on this system. In 1646, for example, Philip IV issued a decree forbidding the export of grain from the kingdom of Castile to 'Valencia, Navarre, Aragon, or anywhere else', fearing that the year's poor harvest would otherwise lead to shortages in supplying his military campaigns, 'particularly that of Catalonia'. A year later, in September 1647 when the city of Alicante was suffering its own shortages, its municipal council asked the monarchy for permission to purchase 15,000 fanegas of wheat from Castile; a request that was denied due to fears that it would lead to

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367 *prohiussion de la dicha saca*, Ibid, ff. 41r-41v.

367 *la saca del trigo para el reyno de Portugal*, Carta del Rey de 14 de diciembre de 1640, AHN, Consejos 7257, número 1.

368 *Valencia, Navarra, Aragon, ni otra parte alguna*, *particularmente el de Cataluña*, Decreto del Rey de 10 de agosto de 1646, AHN, Consejos 7158, año 1646.
shortages around Madrid. These national and international trade embargoes were, however, subject to frequent exemptions and alterations granted on behalf of the monarchy. Sometimes these were enacted at a national level based on a general change of policy, but often the exemptions were local, granted in response to specific requests from cities and towns.

Such exemptions generally remained the preserve of the larger port cities such as Seville and Málaga, which often had to use their political connections and influence to negotiate specific dispensations. These were usually granted on a fairly ad-hoc basis, and were normally dependant on being able to convince the monarchy of a desperate and pressing need. Their application certainly lacked consistency. The city of Málaga, for example, was able to secure repeated exemptions to purchase grain from North Africa in 1647, 1648, 1650, 1651, 1659 and 1664, in response to local wheat shortages. In contrast, a request from Seville in the summer of 1647 to be able to import grain from France and Holland was rejected by the monarchy and the Consejo de Castilla. Here the Consejo was particularly concerned about the prospect of wheat being paid for in gold or silver, and the resulting outflow of precious metals being used by the monarchy's enemies to fund their war efforts. A year later, however, this position had softened and the city was allowed to seek grain imports from France and North Africa. When it came to exports, the monarchy was also often torn between conflicting priorities. On the one hand it was conscious of the need to limit exports from Andalusia in times of dearth. On the other, there were a number of territories that often relied on importing Andalusian wheat, in particular in North Africa and the Canary Islands; places which were of strategic importance to Philip IV's monarchy. The tension between these two competing priorities led to a series of see-sawing decisions, with the monarchy changing its policies depending on which area appeared to have the most pressing need for wheat. Ceuta was a fairly precarious

369 Carta del Consejo de Castilla de 10 de septiembre de 1647, AHN, Consejos, 7159, año 1647, documento 65.
371 Carta del Consejo de Castilla de 24 de julio de 1647, AHN, Consejos 7159, año 1647, documento 44.
372 Ibid.
373 Carta del Consejo de Castilla de 11 de agosto de 1648, AHN, Consejos 7160, año 1648, número 1, documento 57.
military outpost that the crown was regularly concerned about losing and, in 1646, it had been granted a four-year license to import 26,400 fanegas of wheat per year from mainland Spain.\textsuperscript{374} In 1648, 'in a year of such barrenness as there has been in Andalusia' the city's provisions contractor (assentista de la provision), Fernando de Montesinos, was instructed by the monarchy to purchase his wheat from Galicia rather than Andalusia.\textsuperscript{375} Initially de Montesinos made a diligent attempt to comply with these requirements but, unfortunately, the boat that ended up transporting 4,000 fanegas of non-Andalusian wheat back to Ceuta was captured by north African pirates, leaving the assentista with no option, so he claimed, but to purchase 3,000 fanegas of emergency wheat supplies from Seville.\textsuperscript{376} The municipal government in the Andalusian port city, however, was less keen on this idea and with the boats chartered and the grain ready to be shipped across the Strait of Gibraltar, the Asistente of Seville prohibited, upon pain of death, that any grain be allowed to leave the city, effectively impounding the ship and its cargo. The ensuing dispute about this matter ended up in front of the Consejo de Castilla and the king in Madrid who, fearing that Ceuta was under threat both 'by sea from the armadas of France and Portugal, and by land from the armies of the moors', agreed that exports of grain from Seville should be permitted.\textsuperscript{377} This did not stop a series of further disputes erupting between Ceuta and other Andalusian port cities in the coming years, with the government in Madrid repeatedly sending orders to Seville, Cádiz, and Jerez de la Frontera in 1650 demanding the end to the impounding of grain destined for the North African outpost.\textsuperscript{378} In contrast, when Tenerife requested permission to import wheat from Andalusia in July of the same year, this was rejected, with the island instead instructed to import from 'outside of the kingdom' because 'the grain harvest is short in Andalusia'.\textsuperscript{379}

\textsuperscript{374} Carta del Consejo de Castilla de 12 de septiembre de 1648, AHN, Consejos 7160, año 1648, número 1, documento 55.

\textsuperscript{375} 'en un año de tanta esterilidad como ha sido en Andaluzia', Carta del Consejo de Castilla de 17 de julio de 1648, AHN, Consejos 7160, año 1648, número 1, documento 55.

\textsuperscript{376} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{377} 'por la mar con armada de Francia y Portugal, y por tierra con las armas de los moros', Ibid.

\textsuperscript{378} Carta del Consejo de Castilla de 12 de septiembre de 1648, AHN, Consejos 7160, año 1648, número 1, documento 55; Carta del Rey de 14 de julio de 1650, AHN, Consejos 7161, año 1650, número 2, documento 23; Carta del Rey de 9 de agosto 1650, AHN, Consejos 7161, año 1650, número 3.

\textsuperscript{379} 'fuera del reino', 'la cosecha de granos es corta en andaluzia', Carta del Rey de 14 de julio de 1650, AHN, Consejos 7161, año 1650, número 2, documento 23.
On top of the layer of intra-regional jurisdictional disputes that occurred between the various Andalusian municipalities when it came to grain exports, we can therefore add an inter-regional dimension which saw areas of Andalusia come into conflict with other parts of Spain. These matters were more likely to be ruled upon and settled by the government in Madrid. However far from pursuing a centralised Spain-wide grain policy, that treated the country as an integrated market, the monarchy actively treated the different regions of Spain as separate grain markets, opening and closing off exports and imports on the basis of political considerations. Equally, whilst cities and towns might receive exemptions to import bans in times of severe need, these measures still posed a barrier to establishing regular trading networks that would help quickly and efficiently supply Andalusian cities in lean years. Of course, we should bear in mind that there was always the possibility of ignoring embargoes and accepting contraband goods, but the repeated requests sent from places such as Seville and Málaga to the government in Madrid, asking for the lifting of import restrictions or exemptions from import taxes, suggests that municipal governments, at the very least, found it much easier to operate with exemptions and permissions in place. In Málaga in 1648, for example, the city council took advantage of their specific exemption from import restrictions to commission an English merchant, Guillermo Haynes to import 6,500 reales de acho de plata's worth of wheat from North Africa; explicitly referencing the real provisión that gave them permission to do so. Similarly contracts drawn up to arrange the purchase of wheat from France in October of 1648, in exchange for exports of Málaga's famous pasa de sol raisins, also referenced the royal permission to import.

380 Obligación a favor de la Ciudad de Málaga de Guillermo Hayne y Rafael Baderno, mercaderes ingleses vecinos de Málaga, de traer trigo de Berbería, AMM, Sección de E.C., año 1648, legajo 24, número 1, documento 12.

381 Poder de Juan Bueno, mercader veneciano residente en Málaga, a favor de Julian Loquete, francés, para embarcar en el navio nombrado San Juan Bautista, surto en el Puerto, ciertas arrobas de pasa de sol, vino y zumaque para llevarlos a Francia, AMM, Sección de E.C., año 1648, legajo 24, número 1, documento 13.
Simply having received royal permission to import grain was also not enough to guarantee the safe passage of wheat imports: local rivalries and jurisdictional disputes between the various Andalusian towns and cities could still play a major role. In fact the ship contracted by the city of Málaga to purchase wheat from France in October 1648, the San Juan Bautista, had been commissioned earlier in the year to buy grain from the Barbary Coast, by some private merchants based in the city. However a storm had blown the ship into the port of Motril on its return journey in June 1648.382 The town of Motril was itself suffering from grain shortages at this time and the prospect of boat carrying 3,066 fanegas of wheat was too good to pass up. Local municipal officials boarded the ship and ‘with many pleas and great insistence’ insisted that the captain sell them at least a portion of his cargo.383 Despite the captain protesting that he had no such authority to agree to a sale, all of the ship’s cargo was unloaded in Motril over the coming days; and although the town council agreed to remunerate the merchants in Málaga, full payment was never delivered, forcing them to pursue a lengthy legal case in the Real Chancillería de Granada for restitution.384 Even foreign imports were thus not out of reach of intra-regional disputes over grain and the complex web of jurisdictions that stretched from the monarchy down to the small towns of Andalusia.

Taxation

The web of import and export bans that came to cover Andalusia in the period 1647 to 1652 was not the only impediment to the purchasing and transportation of grains in the region. Any merchant or muleteer also had to be prepared to navigate a similarly fractured taxation system. Regina Grafe, as part of the rationale for not looking at the grain and bread market in her study of market integration, makes the point that bread, ‘unlike all other commodities in Spain’ was exempt from ‘local consumption and trade taxes’ for the duration of the seventeenth century.385 However importantly –

382 Marcos Prieto y consortes con el concejo de Motril, sobre la compra de trigo para el posito y abasto de la villa, ARCG, caja 2634, pieza 1, año: 1648-1650, f. 42r.
384 Ibid, ff. 42r-42v.
385 Grafe, Distant Tyranny, 44.
and this is a point that Grafe somewhat glosses over – grain was not. Given that it was grain, not bread, that was transported in times of dearth, the existence of these taxes and the fact that they were administered at a municipal level, was an important feature of towns' and cities' responses to shortages. Historians such as Andrés Ucendo and Lanza García, have also played down the impact of taxation on the grain market in Madrid, arguing that the tax on wheat at the end of the sixteenth century rarely exceeded two per cent of the final sale price and doubting that future increases in the seventeenth century were applied with any rigour to cereals. However, taxes on wheat in seventeenth-century Andalusia appear to have been higher than this, particularly when it came to exports from overseas. Both municipal governments and merchants expended much time and energy in the period 1647 to 1652 trying to secure tax exemptions on wheat from the Consejo de Hacienda in Madrid, suggesting that these taxes did have an important impact on the grain market.

There were, in fact, a number of taxes which affected both the production and sale of grain in seventeenth century Andalusia. On the production side there was the diezmo, which as we have seen was a tithe (primarily) levied by the church on certain agricultural products (including wheat and grains) at a rate of 10 per cent. As this fell outside of the jurisdiction of Andalusian municipal governments and was not levied on sales, it will not be considered in more detail here. More relevant for our purposes were the taxes on consumption and imports. The three main taxes that we will look at below are the alcabalas, cientos and almojarifazgos.

The Alcabalas and Cientos

The primary consumption tax that applied to grains was the alcabala: this had originally been introduced in 1342 and, in the seventeenth century, was theoretically levied at a rate of 10 per cent

386 Andrés Ucendo and Lanza García, ‘El abasto de pan’, 67.
on the price of any product sold.\textsuperscript{388} However, since 1536, the monarchy had negotiated the right to levy this tax with the eighteen royal cities that made up the \textit{Cortes de Castilla} (Granada, Seville, Córdoba and Jaén were the Andalusian cities) under a system called the \textit{encabezamiento}.\textsuperscript{389} Essentially the monarchy agreed to receive a fixed yearly payment from each of these eighteen cities, which in turn were left in charge of the administration of the \textit{alcabala} whilst also being able to negotiate the rates at which it would apply in their jurisdictions. The burden of this yearly payment to the monarchy would in turn be apportioned amongst the various territories and towns that came under the jurisdiction of these eighteen cities.\textsuperscript{390} As part of these negotiations, the various regions of the kingdom often ended up charging the \textit{alcabala} at a rate far lower than 10 per cent.\textsuperscript{391} A full study of the various Andalusian \textit{alcabala} rates in the seventeenth century remains to be carried out, but the tentative available evidence has led historians to estimate that the tax was often levied at a rate of 5 per cent or lower across Castile in the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{392}

This system had the benefit to the monarchy of outsourcing the collection of the \textit{alcabala} and guaranteeing a fixed revenue stream, although conversely it reduced the amount of centralised control that the monarchy could exert on the administration of the tax. The cities meanwhile, gained more control over a key revenue stream. In good years the \textit{alcabala} tax collection could yield higher revenues than the agreed fixed payment to the monarchy, and a thus a profit for the local municipal government. However, towards the end of the sixteenth century, the reverse seems to have been a more common occurrence. In Seville, in 1582, for example the city council was forced


\textsuperscript{389} Andrés Ucendo, ‘Castile’s Tax System’, 598.

\textsuperscript{390} Andrés Ucendo, 598.

\textsuperscript{391} Andrés Ucendo, 598.

to take a loan of 20,000 ducados to cover the shortfall between the taxes raised and the amount due to the monarchy.\textsuperscript{393} Indeed, these shortfalls have been seen as a crucial element that contributed to the financial problems of local municipalities at the end of the sixteenth century.\textsuperscript{394} From a market integration perspective, this system also meant a complex patchwork of different tax rates being administered across the various towns and cities of Andalusia.

From the end of the sixteenth century until the second half of the seventeenth century the monarchy was also able to secure a series of further monetary contributions from the \textit{Cortes}, often referred to as the \textit{servicios} or \textit{servicios de millones}. In order to pay for these contributions a number of monetary charges and taxes were implemented on the cuatro especies of wine, vinegar, oil and meat.\textsuperscript{395} However, in 1639, with taxes from these sources failing to produce the hoped-for revenue, a further 1 per cent tax was implemented on all sales of goods, aptly called the \textit{uno por ciento}.\textsuperscript{396} This was followed by the imposition of three further cientos of the same nature in 1642, 1656 and 1662.\textsuperscript{397} Unlike the alcabala, these cientos were charged at a fixed rate across the board in Andalusia. Therefore, in the period between 1647-1652, the applicable indirect taxes on the sale of cereals were the alcabala and the two cientos of 1639 and 1642. In Seville in 1652, we have evidence that on sales of grain the alcabala was levied at 3 per cent, with the addition of the two cientos giving a total tax of 5 per cent on the sale of grain in the city.\textsuperscript{398}

At the same time as these new taxes were being implemented there was also a concerted effort on behalf of the government in Madrid to increase the central control over tax revenues. This was a key feature of the Count Duke Olivares's time in power and these efforts continued beyond

\textsuperscript{393} Martínez Ruiz, \textit{Finanzas municipales}, 213.
\textsuperscript{394} Martínez Ruiz, 220–23.
\textsuperscript{395} Andrés Ucendo, ‘Castile’s Tax System’, 599.
\textsuperscript{396} Andrés Ucendo, 600.
\textsuperscript{397} Andrés Ucendo, 601.
\textsuperscript{398} \textit{Carta de 28 de agosto de 1652}, AGS, Consejos y Junta de Hacienda (CJH), legajo antiguo 985, consultas, decretos y memoriales. 1652; \textit{Acta capitular de 15 de mayo de 1652}, Archivo Municipal de Sevilla (AMS), Sección X, H/1658, actas capitulares, año 1651-1652.
his removal in 1643.\textsuperscript{399} The monarchy and its *Consejo de Hacienda* undertook an increasingly important role in the administration and oversight of the tax regime. The government in Madrid was successful in wresting some control away from the *Cortes de Castilla*, in part by gaining voting positions in the historically *Cortes* controlled *comisión de millones* in 1632, and by 1658 eventually absorbing the *comisión* into the administrative structure of the *Consejo de Hacienda*.\textsuperscript{400} From 1632 onwards, the monarchy also started sending officials called *administradores de millones* to the provinces to oversee local tax collection.\textsuperscript{401} Municipal governments thus had to negotiate changes in local tax collection with these *administradores*, often via representations to the *Consejo de Hacienda*, which oversaw their work and held the power to suggest changes to the local *alcabala* and *cientos* rates to the king in exceptional circumstances.\textsuperscript{402}

The Almojarifazgos

With respect to grain from outside of Andalusia, imports and exports were subject to a customs tax regime referred to as the *almojarifazgos*. The majority of historians who have written about the *almojarifazgos* have been at pains to point out the complexity of the system and the precise workings of the tax in the years 1647-1652 in Andalusia remain fairly obscure.\textsuperscript{403} The *almojarifazgos* were administered in a number of coastal cities and towns across Andalusia, such as Málaga, Sánlucar de Barrameda, Motril and Puerto Real.\textsuperscript{404} There were also posts on the Portuguese border in towns such as Ayamonte, as well as cities in the interior such as Seville and Jerez de la Frontera. In 1620 there were thirty-nine separate localities where the *almojarifazgos* were


\textsuperscript{400} Fernández de Pinedo, ‘Fiscalidad y absolutismo’, 46–47.


\textsuperscript{402} Dedieu and Ruiz, ‘Tres Momentos En La Historia de La Real Hacienda’, 82–83.

\textsuperscript{403} Henri Lapeyre, *El comercio exterior de Castilla a traves de las aduanas de Felipe II* (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1981), 135.

Imports to and exports from the Americas were subject to their own unique regime called the *almojarifazgo de Indias*, which will not be discussed further here. Instead we will focus on the *almojarifazgo mayor*, which was the regime that applied to all other goods traded into and out of Andalusia from the rest of Spain and abroad. This *almojarifazgo* tax regime was not actually a single tax but a collection of different charges and levies, which applied with different rates and exemptions depending on the type of good, their provenance and their destination. These customs taxes included the aforementioned *almojarifazgo mayor*, as well as a number of smaller tax charges, often referred to as *derechos menores*. More often than not the *alcabala* and *cientos* were also charged at the same time as part of this customs regime. Albert Girard lists more than ten separate tax charges which applied as part of the *almojarifazgo* tax regime in Seville in 1666. The most complete information regarding the *almojarifazgos* and the rate at which they were applied across Andalusia in the mid-seventeenth century can be found in a series of documents, produced in 1661 in Seville, as part of an attempt to bring some regional homogeneity to the system.

Figure 16 lists the different taxes and rates that were applied in Cádiz, Sanlúcar de Barrameda, Jerez de la Frontera, El Puerto de Santa María, Vélez-Málagas, Málaga and Puerto Real, using these documents. Unfortunately they do not give a breakdown of the different taxes in place in Seville, but they do provide a comparison between the total customs tax rate that applied there compared to the other listed locations. As we can see from the table, there was considerable regional variation, with total customs taxes ranging from a high of 31 per cent in Seville on certain goods, to a low of 7.25 per cent in Puerto Real. Different goods were also subject to different tax rates. In

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405 For a list of the places where *almojarifazgos* were administered, see: Pulido Bueno, 86.
407 Albert Girard, *La rivalité commerciale et maritime entre Séville et Cadix jusqu'à la fin du XVIIIe siècle* (Paris; Bordeaux: E. de Boccard; Féret & Fils, 1932), 45n17.
408 Acuerdos y autos generales de la secretaría de los reales almojarifazgos Mayor y de Indias de la ciudad de Sevilla y sus puertos (1662-1667), Biblioteca del Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda (BMEH), ESP AGCMH, libro 26037, ff. 43r-50v, http://bibliotecacentral.minhafp.es/record=b1013542~S1*spi
Figure 16: Import taxes in various Andalusian towns in 1661.

<table>
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<th>Town</th>
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<th>Amount</th>
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<td>Los cajones (1.1-2.3)</td>
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Table: Import taxes in various Andalusian towns in 1661.

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>El Puerto</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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**Figure 16 (cont.):**

- **El Alcazár:** map with a map of Andalusia and the towns.
- **Los generos de Berberia y los Beldados:**
- **Puerto del Tajo:**
- **Vélez Malaga:**
- **Málaga:**

Source: Acuerdos y autos generales, BMEH, ESP AGCMH, libro 26037, ff. 43r-50v.
Cádiz for example, imports of cloth of gold, buttons and non-religious paintings from abroad were taxed at 22.75 per cent, whilst goods from the rest of Spain that were imported over land were taxed at 15.75 per cent. These differing regional tax rates have long been seen as an important factor in the rivalry between different Andalusian cities (in particular between Cádiz and Seville) to attract trade to their respective ports. José Ignacio Martínez Ruiz, for example, views Málaga's low total almojarifazgo rate of 11.75 per cent as being a key factor in attracting English merchants to the city.

It is worth noting, however, that the total tax rates shown in the tables, which are also used by Martínez Ruiz, probably substantially under-report the total tax burden on imported goods in Málaga. That is because, unlike in other Andalusian municipalities, the alcabala was not collected in Málaga as part of these customs duties but was instead charged upon sale of goods in the local market. That is important because, as Table 2 shows, the main factor in regional tax variations came from differences in the applicable rate of the almojarifazgo mayor and the alcabala. Whilst the derechos menores fluctuated between a low of 6.75 per cent in Málaga and 8.5 per cent in Cádiz, the almojarifazgo mayor and the alcabala ranged from 3 to 10 per cent depending on the municipality and the type of good involved. It seems likely that the alcabala in Málaga would have been charged at a similar rate once goods were sold in the city’s market, which would bring the total tax burden on a foodstuff such as wheat closer to the 15.75 per cent charged in Cádiz. More precise direct comparisons between places like Seville and Málaga or Cádiz are further complicated by the fact that different municipalities had different rules for how to value the goods imported, before applying the applicable taxes. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the note of caution on Málaga's low

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410 José Ignacio Martínez Ruiz, ‘«A towne famous for its plenty of raisins and wines». Málaga en el comercio anglo-español en el siglo XVII’, *Hispania* 71, no. 239 (September 2011): 677–78.
411 Acuerdos y autos generales, BMEH, ESP AGCMH, libro 26037, f. 39r.
almojarifazgos, it does seem clear that a city like Seville charged considerably higher import taxes than other cities and towns in Andalusia.

The figures hitherto considered have been total import tax rates as they applied in 1661 and, unfortunately, we lack the information to know the precise rates in place between 1647 to 1652. They likely would have been slightly lower across the board. The figures for 1661, for example, all include the tercer uno por ciento that was only introduced in 1656. A pamphlet produced by two Flemish and German merchants in 1666, as part of a dispute about the administration of the almojarifazgos in Seville, suggests that the total almojarifazgo tax rate in 1645 was 22 per cent. It is not entirely clear what type of import this figure relates to, but a number somewhere between 22 per cent and the 26 per cent figure cited in the 1661 document, for the import of 'goods and fruits' from the rest of Spain, seems plausible with respect to the import of wheat in Seville between 1647 to 1652. Importantly, the differences that we have surveyed in tax rates and administration of the almojarifazgos only take into account some of the variations that existed within the territory of the kingdom of Seville. There were also distinct tariffs in place in the kingdom of Granada and neighbouring Murcia, thus further increasing the complexity across Andalusia and beyond. Despite Idelfonso Pulido Bueno having published an admiral overview of the almojarifazgo system in Andalusia during the long seventeenth century, much work remains to be done to outline the precise workings and intra-regional differences of this regime. Notwithstanding these gaps in our knowledge there is substantial evidence that tax policy became a key area of dispute between 1647 and 1652, as various municipalities struggled to attract grain merchants to their city. In spite of the

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414 Acuerdos y autos generales, BMEH, ESP AGCMH, libro 26037, f. 39r.
415 Pulido Bueno, Almojarifazgos, 98.
416 Pulido Bueno, Almojarifazgos.
attempts by the monarchy to implement an increasingly centralised administration of taxes such as the *alcabala*, a number of Andalusian municipalities took matters into their own hands when shortages hit, granting exemptions to import and sales taxes and then seeking retrospective approval from the monarchy, much to the annoyance of the *Consejo de Hacienda*. Further details of these disputes and the wrangling between municipalities that wanted tax exemptions and a monarchy that was concerned to preserve revenues and limit regional tax differences is contained in chapters 4 and 6.

**Conclusion**

The plethora of different taxes and rates that existed across Andalusia no doubt contributed to the lack of integration that economic historians have noted in the region's grain market, causing local price differences and complicating the movement of grains between local jurisdictions. The implementation of local and national export bans during episodes of dearth also caused further problems in this respect. Why were such policies pursued? Contemporaries, such as the *corregidor* of Bujalance, clearly understood the negative effects that the export bans, for example, had on the activities of the region's muleteers. For Epstein, the fact that local governments persisted in implementing these types of 'reciprocal trade vetoes' can best be explained using the prisoner's dilemma paradox from economic game theory.\(^{417}\) Whilst collectively local governments would have been better off co-operating, 'individual towns had no incentive to abolish trade controls unilaterally, since they had no means of ensuring that their counterparts would do the same'.\(^{418}\) Part of the issue for Andalusia when it came to grain market regulation was that, as we have seen, there was no regional administration that sat between the monarchy and various municipal governments. This stood in contrast to countries such as France and England. In France, the kingdom was split into thirty-odd *généralités*, headed by *intendants* who had a responsibility for 'regulating the flow'

\(^{417}\) Epstein, *Freedom and Growth*, 158.

\(^{418}\) Epstein, 158.
of grain within their jurisdictions.\textsuperscript{419} Regional interests were also represented through the powers of the \textit{parlements}, which themselves had certain rights to regulate the way in which bread was sold, to clamp down on private grain hoarding, and to issue \textit{arrêts de règlement} which could embargo the export of grains.\textsuperscript{420} In England there was an administrative structure at county level which dealt with grain shortages, primarily through the actions of Justices of the Peace, who were charged with implementing royal policies such as the \textit{Book of Orders}.\textsuperscript{421} That is not to say that the English and French systems were models of clear, hierarchical, regional jurisdictional subdivision. In France a 'staggering array of local officials' sat beneath the \textit{intendants}, 'each of whom retained considerable autonomy' with respect to regulating local grain supplies.\textsuperscript{422} At the regional level, the \textit{parlements} provided a 'parallel' system of control to the crown's administration and overall 'regional and institutional rivalries' were rife.\textsuperscript{423} In England local municipal government and Justices of the Peace could also often act in the interests of smaller localities (and their own personal gain), despite prejudicial impacts on other parts of their county.\textsuperscript{424} Yet, it does seem important that, in these countries, there was at least some structure in place to consider the impact of harvest shortages and the flow of grain at these regional levels. However, this cannot stand as the sole explanation for the state of affairs in Andalusia. Not least because, whilst England did have an unusually well integrated market by European standards at this time, France suffered from many of the same problems as Spain (although grain market integration in France seems to have improved in the seventeenth century rather than stagnated or declined, as in Spain).\textsuperscript{425} The Dutch Republic also stands out as an example of a state that managed to have a far better integrated grain market than

\textsuperscript{420} Kaplan, 1:20–23.
\textsuperscript{422} Kaplan, \textit{Bread}, 1:18–19.
\textsuperscript{423} Kaplan, 1:18–20, 27.
Spain whilst, as Jan de Vries points out, having a decentralized system of government that left most of the responsibility for setting and implementing a ‘sophisticated’ regulatory regime on grains and bread ‘in the hands of urban magistrates’.\textsuperscript{426} Municipal governments in the Dutch Republic rarely seem to have resorted to local bans on exports of grain, despite possessing the powers to do so.\textsuperscript{427}

De Vries argues that the reticence to implement local export bans in the Dutch Republic arose primarily out of a widespread realisation in the Dutch Republic that bans on exports had the direct consequence of discouraging imports.\textsuperscript{428} Given that this logic was surely not beyond the inhabitants and municipal governments of Andalusia, one might explain the different approach to export bans by looking at the different nature of the Dutch and Andalusian grain markets, which had important differences when it came to their reliance on imported grain. The Dutch Republic, being more heavily urbanised and with an agriculture that had tended to specialise in livestock and dairy production, had been reliant on imported grains since the fifteenth century.\textsuperscript{429} As such, encouraging imports was a far more important day-to-day concern than in Andalusia, where the majority of jurisdictions were usually self-sufficient in grain. In an average harvest year in Andalusia, as long as surrounding areas had sufficient harvests, local shortages were likely to be well managed by banning exports. More severe problems only arose in the case of region-wide shortages, when suddenly a majority of municipalities sought to ban exports. In contrast to the system in Andalusia, the Dutch Republic thus seems to have arrived at a different equilibrium: the default position was a free grain trade where local governments ran the risk of suffering tit-for-tat reprisals if they unilaterally opted to start banning exports.\textsuperscript{430} As Epstein tentatively noted in his conclusion to \textit{Freedom and Growth}: ‘different sets of institutions may have been optimal under different economic conditions’.\textsuperscript{431} However this was not simply a question of economic rationale. The Dutch Republic

\textsuperscript{427} de Vries, \textit{The Price of Bread}, 262–63.
\textsuperscript{428} de Vries, 262–63.
\textsuperscript{429} de Vries, 147.
\textsuperscript{430} de Vries, 42–44, 262–63.
\textsuperscript{431} Epstein, \textit{Freedom and Growth}, 171.
also had a fundamentally different set of institutions which, whilst remaining decentralised, allowed effective negotiation between its municipalities. Whilst a lot of power remained vested in the municipal governments of the Dutch Republic, there were institutional forums whereby representatives from the different municipalities could negotiate amongst themselves. The seven provinces of the Republic had their own estates, to which both the nobility and larger towns sent representatives to discuss matters such as trade and taxation. This contrasted to the situation in Andalusia, where the majority of disputes over grain exports were dealt with by both parties making competing appeals to the monarchy and the Consejo de Castilla in Madrid. As we saw in the cases of Seville and Ceuta, and Málaga and Antequera (with more to come in chapters 4 and 6) this system led to lengthy episodes of appeal and counter-appeal and an inherently adversarial relationships between the region's municipalities.

Similar issues came into play when it came to taxation. The combination of varying tax rates in place across the towns and cities of Andalusia once again contrasts with the situation in England, where import duties had been subject to a standardised 'book of rates' since the early sixteenth century. Yet, once again, whilst in the Dutch Republic the seven provinces each had a high degree of autonomy when it came to local tax measures, there were effective restrictions on their implementation. The Treaty of Utrecht forbade any province to tax other Dutch residents more heavily than its own and negotiation on tax measures was needed at both the Estates General and the provincial estates. This, combined with the heavy reliance of the Dutch economy on overseas trade, led to one of the key import taxes, the middelen te water, being organised so as to apply with standardised rates throughout the entire Republic and for tariffs in general to remain low.

Dutch Republic, more than any other European state, promoted a free trade in grain and, unusually, chose instead to heavily tax the milling of grain into bread.\textsuperscript{436} This stood in contrast to Andalusia where wheat was taxed whilst bread was not. All of the above contributed to fact that both England and the Dutch Republic had relatively well integrated grain markets in the seventeenth century. The situation in Andalusia was closer to that in France, where a complex variety of excise taxes, customs duties, and tolls was riddled with exemptions and provincial differences, hampered grain market integration.\textsuperscript{437}

Overall, the situation sketched out in this chapter, and the details that will follow about the revolts in 1647 to 1652, suggest that the concept of state capacity can be helpful in thinking about this lack of market integration in two ways. Firstly the fiscal problems of the Habsburg monarchy in the seventeenth century had a visible impact on the ability of municipal governments to react to harvest shortages in the mid-seventeenth century and likely reduced the resilience that such institutions usually provided against episodes of dearth. The various disputes that erupted between the monarchy, its councils and the municipalities in Andalusia also evidence the problem that these institutions faced in trying to implement a consistent set of rules across the territory. Something which dramatically affected the integration of the grain market, particularly during the extreme series of bad harvests that hit in the 1640s and 1650s. Yet the importance of this focus is not simply to think about the applicability of concepts such as state capacity or market integration to the Andalusian grain market. A better understanding of these factors can also help to provide us with answers to two of the crucial question regarding the revolts of 1647 to 1652. Firstly, detailing the workings of grain market regulation can help us to understand why the regional harvest shortages had such an important impact on prices in Andalusia, and why importing grains from the rest of Castile, Spain and abroad proved so challenging. It provides a necessary explanatory factor for why

\textsuperscript{436} de Vries, \textit{The Price of Bread}, 47–48.

a particularly severe Little Ice Age climate may have had a drastic impact at this time. Perhaps most importantly, it also provides the link between the providential (weather and harvests), the economic (wheat and bread prices) and the political. It was the work of municipal government in Andalusia and the monarchy, to ensure the proper provisioning of the region's towns and cities, and when they failed and prices began to rise, this became a political issue for the region's inhabitants.
Chapter 4: 1646 to 1648
From such sparks are often lit a fire great enough to engulf a whole kingdom.

News of the unrest in Lucena, that began on the evening of 16 January 1647 (summarised in the introduction), travelled quickly along the chain of officials that eventually led to Madrid. The duque de Cardona and the city's alcalde mayor had written to the President of the Real Chancillería of Granada, pleading for help in suppressing the crowd troubles on 17 January; and the ministers of the Real Chancillería had packaged up these originals and forwarded them on to the king in Madrid on the nineteenth of that month.\(^438\) By 25 January, the issue was being debated in the Consejo de Castilla, where the events in Lucena were treated very seriously.\(^439\) With the revolts of Catalonia and Portugal front and centre in their minds, the ministers cautioned Philip IV that 'from such sparks are often lit a fire great enough to engulf a whole kingdom'.\(^440\) The Consejo went on to warn the king that Castile was so heavily burdened with 'taxes and extraordinary charges' that they feared that more cities and towns could follow Lucena's example if the situation was not dealt with appropriately.\(^441\) They accordingly advised against sending an official to punish Lucena's inhabitants, believing that punitive measures would only fan the flames, and could encourage other places to join Lucena's cause; just as had occurred 'in Castile, in the year 1521'.\(^442\) The allusion to the Revolt of the Comuneros gives an indication of the mood in government in Madrid, where confidence had been shaken by the misfortunes that had been suffered elsewhere on the Iberian Peninsula. The Consejo was also not wrong about the potential for contagion. Whilst news soon arrived that the duque de Cardona had been able to restore order in Lucena, a number of other
Andalusian towns experienced their own troubles in the early months of 1647, although the resulting spread of unrest was initially considerably less dramatic than feared.

In Ardales there had been what the Consejo referred to as, a 'tumulto de jente popular' in January, that had also targetted the collection of taxes. Here, the local inhabitants, allegedly led by a barber called Marcos Vazquez and his brother-in-law Juan de Vera, had attacked the local administrador and escribano with the aim of destroying their tax records. Despite the officials having sought refuge, with their documents, in the town’s capuchin convent, the crowd broke in, capturing the records of the papel sellado (a stamped paper tax) and the dos por ciento. Of the two men, only one made it out alive, with the other apparently drowning in the river behind the convent whilst trying to make his escape. The rebels ceremoniously burnt the captured tax records, with the leaders making demands for the removal of taxes on fish and meat, and the suspension of the alcabalas. The town fell under the jurisdiction of doña Antonia Portocarrero, marquesa de la Algaba. With no armed forces at her disposal the marquesa acquiesced to the rebels’ demands, suspending the collection of taxes; but not before sending pleas for help to the Real Chancillería in Granada and the monarchy in Madrid. Help, in the end, came from an unlikely source: the marqués of Estepa. Despite being seventy-four years old and 'so stricken with gout that he could barely move from the pain', led a hastily assembled militia on the thirty-odd kilometre ride that stood between the two towns, braving poor weather and bad roads to eventually restore order a few days after trouble had first erupted. Between January and March of 1647 the Consejo received reports of numerous similar disturbances. There were problems in Alhama de Granada, where it had been necessary to bring out the Holy Sacrament on to the streets to placate the angry crowds. In

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443 Consejo de Castilla de 15 de marzo de 1647, AHN, Consejos 7159, año 1647, documento 20.
444 Antonio Aguilar y Cano, Memorial ostipense, vol. 1 (Estepa: Imprenta de Antonio Hermoso Cordero, 1886), 189–90.
445 Aguilar y Cano, 1:190.
446 Aguilar y Cano, 1:190.
447 Consejo de Castilla de 15 de marzo de 1647, AHN, Consejos 7159, año 1647, documento 20.
448 'tan agravado de la gota que no podia moverse de dolores', Aguilar y Cano, Memorial ostipense, 1:189–91.
449 Consejo de Castilla de 15 de marzo de 1647, AHN, Consejos 7159, año 1647, documento 20.
Albuñuelas, 'at least one hundred residents' had threatened a tax collector, stabbing him twice in the process. 450 In Andújar fears of an uprising had been stoked by the posting of 'libels against the government in the most public parts of the city'. 451 The records of the Consejo de Castilla also mention troubles in Loja, Montefrío, Comares, Puebla de Riogordo, Luque, Estepa, Carcabuey, and Puente de Don Gonzalo (now called Puente Genil), although, as Domínguez Ortiz has pointed out, very little information survives regarding what happened in these places. 452 Despite the intervention of the marqués de Estepa, tensions also remained high in Ardales. Once the marqués returned home troubles resurfaced and resistance to tax collection continued until at least the end of February. 453

Order was eventually restored in March, as a series of local officials were asked to visit the afflicted areas to restore justice. The corregidor of Málaga was asked to find out what the situation was in Ardales and to then take appropriate measures to apprehend any troublemakers. 454 Meanwhile Gregorio Antonio de Chaves, a judge of the Real Chancillería of Granada, was sent to Alhama to prevent further disturbances. 455 Initially some of the punishments handed down by the forces of order were relatively harsh. The marqués de Estepa executed at least one of the perceived leaders of the revolt in Ardales after his January intervention, whilst three individuals were put to death in Lucena. 456 In Alhama Gregorio Chaves had three ring-leaders sentenced to death and subjected another two to corporal punishment. 457 However the mood in the Consejo de Castilla was far more restrained. They worried that harsh punishments would serve to encourage further troubles, and ordered the corregidor of Málaga to avoid armed confrontation in Ardales at all costs, with a royal pardon eventually being sent out to the inhabitants of both Alhama and Ardales in a further

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450 Ibid.
451 'fixando libelos contra el gobierno en las partes mas publicas de la ciudad', Ibid.
452 Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 48, 54.
453 Consejo de Castilla de 29 de febrero de 1647, AHN, Consejos 7159, año 1647, documento 20.
454 Ibid.
455 Consejo de Castilla de 15 de marzo de 1647, AHN, Consejos 7159, año 1647, documento 20.
456 Aguilar y Cano, Memorial ostipense, 1:191; Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 52–53.
457 Consejo de Castilla de 7 de mayo de 1647, AHN, Consejos 7160, año 1648 , número 1, documento 71.
The king and his Consejo also decided against sending a senior minister or ecclesiastical figure to the region to oversee the repression of the uprisings, on the basis that this would likely heighten rather than lessen tensions.\textsuperscript{459}

Members of the Consejo even displayed some degree of sympathy towards the plight of the inhabitants of Andalusia. They cautioned Philip IV that all of Castile was burdened with such high taxes that 'many places cannot cope' and asked whether it would be possible to suspend the collection of two contributions that had been agreed by the Cortes between 1646 and early 1647: the 300,000 ducados for the jornada de Aragón and the funds for the purchase of 1,460,000 ducados worth of juros.\textsuperscript{460} The king was absolutely clear, however that this was not an acceptable course of action, stating that under no circumstances were the collection of taxes to cease, 'for the bad example that this would cause for the rest of the kingdom that is no less taxed'.\textsuperscript{461} Here the king was probably echoing the opinions of the Consejo de Hacienda who would, no doubt, have also been vehemently opposed to such a suggestion. The Consejo de Castilla also used these uprisings to try to re-open a long standing debate with the Consejo de Hacienda about the use of multiple tax collectors (ejecutores) in a single jurisdiction. The Consejo de Castilla had, since the early 1640s, been concerned about the disruptive impact of numerous tax collectors collecting the various different tax charges that applied across Castile. They had managed to convince the king to publish a real cédula on 5 May 1644 (often referred to as the cédula de Barbastro) that required the

\textsuperscript{458} Ibid; Consejo de Castilla de 25 de enero de 1647, AHN, Consejos 7159, año 1647, documento 5; Consejo de Castilla de 29 de febrero de 1647, AHN, Consejos 7159, año 1647, documento 20; Consejo de Castilla de 7 de mayo de 1647, AHN, Consejos 7160, año 1648, número 1, documento 71.

\textsuperscript{459} Consejo de Castilla de 15 de marzo de 1647, AHN, Consejos 7159, año 1647, documento 20.

\textsuperscript{460} 'muchos lugares no pueden con ellas', Consejo de Castilla de 28 de febrero de 1647, AHN, Consejos 7159, año 1647, documento 96; Consejo de Castilla de 15 de marzo de 1647, AHN, Consejos 7159, año 1647, documento 20. For the decisions of the Cortes, see: Manuel Danvila y Collado, ‘Cortes de Madrid de 1646 a 1647 y de 1649 a 1651’, Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia 16 (1890): 230. Philip IV’s expeditions (jornadas) to Aragón, to oversee the military campaign against the French and Catalan forces between 1642 to 1647, had added substantially to the ruinous expense of this conflict; and the payments authorised by the Cortes to pay for them had proved difficult to collect in regions such as Galicia, as well as Andalusia: R. A. Stradling, \textit{Philip IV and the Government of Spain, 1621-1665} (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 221; Manuel María de Artaza, \textit{Rey, reino y representación: la Junta General del Reino de Galicia (1599-1834)} (Madrid: Editorial CSIC, 1998), 333–34.

\textsuperscript{461} ‘por el mal ejemplo que causarían a los de mas destos Reyes que no estan menos grauados’, Consejo de Castilla de 15 de marzo de 1647, AHN, Consejos 7159, año 1647, documento 20.
concentration of all tax collection in each jurisdiction into the hands of a single executor.\textsuperscript{462} This had provoked outrage in the Consejo de Hacienda who viewed it as a serious threat to the ability of the crown's debtors to collect their dues, and thus feared that it would have a disastrous impact on future attempts to raise revenues.\textsuperscript{463} As a result of these complaints this provision was officially rescinded just months later, by a further royal order on 1 August 1644.\textsuperscript{464} The Consejo de Castilla argued that the unrest in Andalusia had been caused by the fact that some areas were now burdened with '4, 6, 8, 10 and even 12 collectors for the different taxes, with which payment is made impossible, and they cannot cope with the load'.\textsuperscript{465} Once again, the king took the side of the Consejo de Hacienda, wearily replying that: 'In this matter I have reached my decision after many conferences and consultations, and hence there is no reason to introduce any novelties with respect to the cedula de Balbastro'.\textsuperscript{466} There were, however, some concessions made with respect to tax collection, with the administrador of taxes in both Jaén and Córdoba being removed from their posts due to fears that both they and their many deputies were being too harsh on the local population.\textsuperscript{467} These concerns lasted beyond the turbulent spring of 1647, with the Consejo de Castilla successfully lobbying the king in September of that year to avoid sending don Matheo de Villamarín Roldán, alcalde del crimen de la Chancillería de Granada, to Jaén to collect taxes, because 'in his work he is more violent than the current climate permits'.\textsuperscript{468}

Despite these concerns there were to be no further revolts in Andalusia in 1647, once the initial wave of unrest had been suppressed at the end of March. However the monarchy was to be faced with a number of similar episodes in the region over the next five years. The response of

\textsuperscript{462} Gelabert, Castilla convulsa, 220.
\textsuperscript{463} Gelabert, 220.
\textsuperscript{464} Consejo de Castilla de 28 de febrero de 1647, AHN, Consejos 7159, año 1647, documento 96.
\textsuperscript{465} '4, 6, 8 y 10 y 12 executores a la cobranza de diferentes servicios, con que se imposibilitaua la paga y no podian con la carga', Ibid.
\textsuperscript{466} 'En esta materia tengo tomada la resolucion despues de muchas conferencias y consultas, y assi no ay motiuo para hacerse novedad en lo que dispone la cedula de Balbastro', Ibid.
\textsuperscript{467} Consejo de Castilla de 15 de marzo de 1647, AHN, Consejos 7159, año 1647, documento 20.
\textsuperscript{468} 'en su obras es mas violento de lo que permite la calidad de los tiempos', Consejo de Castilla de 9 de septiembre de 1647, AHN, Consejos 7159, año 1647.
central government in 1647 was one that would be emulated right up until the final uprisings in the spring of 1652. In general, it was left up to the local officials, high ranking members of the clergy and nobles of Andalusia to do the work of physically restoring order, acts which often required some level, or at least the threat, of violence. The monarchy proved loathe to sanction widespread violent reprisals against local populations after the initial acts of revolt had been suppressed, although the execution of a small number of ringleaders was usually tolerated, if not encouraged. The granting of royal pardons to the inhabitants of the cities and towns that had risen up in revolt usually followed the exemplary punishment of a handful of individuals who were seen as ringleaders (but maybe, more accurately, simply proved to be convenient scapegoats). The Consejo de Castilla often cautioned that continued fear of reprisals was more likely to provoke further, more widespread, trouble. Until the events of 1652, the monarchy also proved fairly unwilling to make any substantial concessions or major policy changes in direct response to the grievances of the rebels. Instead there was a preference for tinkering around the edges of any grievances, sometimes replacing local officials, as occurred with the tax collectors in Jaén and Córdoba in 1647.

Both Antonio Domínguez Ortiz and Juan E. Gelabert point out, in agreement with the diagnosis of the ministers of the Consejo de Castilla, that the revolts of 1647 were primarily anti-fiscal in nature. The Habsburg monarchy’s finances had been under sustained pressure since 1640, when conflict with Portugal and Catalonia had substantially increased the already heavy costs of Philip IV’s military campaigns. The resulting efforts to extract more tax revenue and manpower (in the form of military recruitment) from Castile had clearly led to increased tensions, which manifested themselves in the attacks on local officials and tax collectors. These military conflicts and resulting expenditures also provide the background to the conflicting priorities of a Consejo de Castilla that was worried about the potential for widespread revolt in Castile and a Consejo de

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469 Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 48–49; Gelabert, Castilla convulsa, 278–79.
470 Stradling, Philip IV, 223.
471 More on this in chapter 5.
Hacienda that was panicking about the need to find additional revenues to pay the monarchy's war debts. In the end these fiscal problems were to come to a head on 1 October 1647, when the monarchy declared its suspensión de consignaciones; a move often referred to as a bankruptcy, but which might more productively be thought of as a forced re-financing, whereby the monarchy converted its high-interest debts into juros: a much longer-paying and lower interest form of state bond.\footnote{Stradling, Philip IV, 225.} R. A. Stradling argues that the events of the previous spring in Andalusia had a not insignificant role in this decision. Before this, the Consejo de Hacienda had been debating whether or not to instead implement an alternative solution to the debt crisis: namely the re-organisation of the monarchy's revenue raising apparatus around a new universal tax on flour. With the Consejo unable to come to a decision on the matter, the king's favourite Luis de Haro was brought in to cast a deciding vote, and he rejected the idea as too risky.\footnote{Stradling, 225.} Stradling suggests that this caution must have been influenced by the eruption of troubles in Andalusia, although it must be said that the idea of heavily taxing a good so crucial to the most widespread and basic of foodstuffs would arguably have been seen as a high-risk policy in almost any European government of the time.\footnote{The exception to this was the Dutch Republic, which managed to find a way to levy substantial taxes on bread during the early modern period, without causing popular unrest: de Vries, The Price of Bread, 2.} Haro would also have been conscious of the failure of an earlier attempt to implement a universal tax. The salt tax – implemented between 1631 and 1632 – had not only failed to raise anywhere near as much money as the system it tried to replace, but its imposition had also caused substantial popular unrest in Vizcaya.\footnote{Gelabert, Castilla convulsa, 17–66; Fernández de Pinedo, El censo de la sal, 57–75.} Whatever the reasons, the decision not to implement a new revenue system based around the taxation of flour, is likely to have been a wise one. As we shall see, there is good evidence that the troubles of 1647, whilst on the face of it primarily revolving around disputes over taxation, were also fundamentally underpinned by poor harvests and high bread prices in Andalusia. Issues that, over the next few years, were to lead to even greater unrest in the region.
Poor Harvests, High Prices, and Jurisdictional Issues

Spring and Summer of 1646

Sixteen forty-six shows up in the diezmo records as a fairly poor harvest year in Andalusia (see figure 5). Whilst not poor enough in a sufficient number of areas to merit crossing into the 'bad' year category, three of the eight areas surveyed had diezmo figures that were one standard deviation below the mean for the years 1587 to 1729. These were the areas around Seville and Carmona, although the other remaining five areas also registered diezmo numbers that fell well below their means for the period. If not disastrous it was most certainly not a good harvest year. Sánchez Rodrigo's rainfall reconstruction data shows that the winter of 1645 to 1646 (December, January, February) had been very wet, with flooding recorded in the region.\textsuperscript{476} In Almería, in the south-east of the kingdom of Granada, large rainstorms and high winds had caused substantial flooding on the Andaraz river in early 1646 which, as we shall see, also severely impacted the region's sericulture.\textsuperscript{477} Spring was a dryer affair, although, on the other side of Andalusia, this caused problems of a different nature, with the western town of Ayamonte, deciding to organise a rogation ceremony to pray for rain on 26 April 1646 because of 'the great need for water'.\textsuperscript{478} Wet conditions returned to Andalusia during the summer months (June, July, August), which coincided inopportunely with the wheat harvest.\textsuperscript{479} By August 1646 a need for water in a place like Ayamonte had become a need for wheat.\textsuperscript{480}

It was not just Andalusia that was affected either. The harvest of 1646 had been short in many parts of the Iberian Peninsula. So much so that Philip IV issued an order in August of that

\textsuperscript{476} Sánchez Rodrigo et al., ‘Andalusian Seasonal and Annual Rainfall’.
\textsuperscript{477} Juan Pinelo, regidor y juez administrador de la renta de la seda de la aduana de Almería, hace información de los daños ocasionados en los morales y moreras de los lugares de su jurisdicción por los temporales de lluvia y viento, Archivo Municipal de Granada (AMG), legajo 1860, pieza 50.
\textsuperscript{478} 'la nesesidad tan grande que ay de agua', Acta capitular de 26 de abril, Año 1646, AMA, libro de actas capitulares, legajo 5, año 1637-1668.
\textsuperscript{479} Sánchez Rodrigo et al., ‘Andalusian Seasonal and Annual Rainfall’.
\textsuperscript{480} 'la nesedidad que ay de trigo', Acta capitular de 8 de agosto, Año 1646, AMA, libro de actas capitulares, legajo 5, año 1637-1668.
year banning the export of all grain from Castile.\textsuperscript{481} Making such a decision was no trivial matter, but rather came at a substantial cost to the royal treasury. Like almost all of the monarchy’s revenue streams, the taxes that applied when moving wheat through the \textit{puertos secos} of Castile to other territories such Arágon and Navarre had already been sold off. At this point in time they were leased to Duarte Coronel Enríquez, a Portuguese individual of Jewish descent who, as part of his contract with the monarchy, was due compensation of eight million \textit{maravedís} in any year in which exports were prohibited.\textsuperscript{482} As such the \textit{Consejo de Hacienda} campaigned against the ban arguing that it was both expensive and pointless: market forces would, in any case, naturally reduce the quantity of exports during times of dearth as demand in Castile absorbed a greater share of production.\textsuperscript{483} This argument ignored the fact that the mechanism through which such market forces would work was, of course, via rising prices in Castile, which was precisely what such a measure was designed to prevent. However the \textit{Consejo de Hacienda} won out in the end, with the king lifting the export ban in January 1647 due to the ‘damage that my royal treasury and \textit{juros} owners have suffered’ as a result of the eight million \textit{maravedís} charge.\textsuperscript{484}

\textbf{Autumn 1646 to Spring 1647}

Neither did this change of policy have anything to do with either improving weather conditions or the prospect of a decent wheat harvest in the summer of 1647. The autumn and winter of 1646 to 1647 was particularly cold and wet in both Castilla la Vieja and Castilla la Nueva, with reports of flooding and livestock freezing to death being discussed amongst the government in Madrid.\textsuperscript{485} In Andalusia the rainfall reconstruction data shows wet conditions in the summer and autumn of 1646 continuing into the first few months of 1647.\textsuperscript{486} One of the documentary sources on which this

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\textsuperscript{481} Decreto del Rey de 10 de agosto de 1646, AHN, Consejos 7158, año 1646.
\textsuperscript{482} Decreto del Rey de 10 de enero de 1647, AHN, Consejos 7159, año 1647, documento 7; Ángel Alloza Aparicio and Beatriz Cárceles de Gea, \textit{Comercio y riqueza en el siglo XVII: estudios sobre cultura, política y pensamiento económico} (Madrid: Editorial CSIC, 2009), 145.
\textsuperscript{483} Decreto del Rey de 10 de enero de 1647, AHN, Consejos 7159, año 1647, documento 7.
\textsuperscript{484} ‘el daño que mi RL Hacienda y los Dueños de Juros han padecido’, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{485} Gelabert, \textit{Castilla convulsa}, 272.
\textsuperscript{486} Sánchez Rodrigo et al., ‘Andalusian Seasonal and Annual Rainfall’.
\end{flushright}
reconstruction is based details rainfall being 'so copious and the winds so strong' around Córdoba in the autumn of 1646 that rogation ceremonies were carried out to pray for relief.\textsuperscript{487} As the year progressed towards 1647 there is evidence that numerous parts of Andalusia started to feel the impact of 1646's unsatisfactory harvest, with a familiar pattern of local competition for wheat and jurisdictional disputes over purchasing and exports rights emerging. When Granada sent officials north to the kingdom of Jaén to try to purchase wheat in 1646, the condesa de García reacted by securing a royal order prohibiting export of wheat from her territories in Garzás and Santo Tomé.\textsuperscript{488} On 4 January of 1647, Palma del Río's council ordered that 'no wheat or barley should be taken out of the town' until the municipality was better provisioned.\textsuperscript{489} The city of Seville also complained to the Consejo de Castilla in February of 1647 that it was being prevented from buying wheat in both the territories of the marqués de Priego and the royally owned lands around Córdoba.\textsuperscript{490} We have already seen, in the case of the muleteers in Jerez de la Frontera, the types of difficulties that such bans could create for those who were looking to transport wheat. It is no surprise then that after the weak harvest of 1646, with jurisdictional disputes between different localities in Andalusia mounting, and with conditions looking poor for the coming harvest in the summer, that high wheat and bread prices became a serious problem at the start of 1647.

This was the situation that sat in the background of the revolts of 1647, where it seems as if high bread prices were a factor that encouraged resistance to tax collection attempts in the region. In Lucena, in particular, the corrupt practices of the local lord of the manor, the duque de Cardona, and wheat shortages combined to heighten tensions in the city.\textsuperscript{491} In the months following the revolt, reports began to trickle into Madrid about the duke's behaviour: a local inhabitant of Lucena, Gonzalo Recio Chacón wrote to the president of the Consejo de Castilla on 3 April 1647 stating that

\textsuperscript{487} 'fueron las aguas tan copiosas y los vientos tan fuertes, que se hicieron rogativas', Luis María Ramírez y de las Casas Deza, Anales de la Ciudad de Córdoba (1236-1850) (Cordoba: Tipografía, 1948), 163–64.
\textsuperscript{488} Consejo de Castilla de 5 de septiembre de 1650, AHN, Consejos 7161, año 1650, número 3.
\textsuperscript{489} Acta capitular de 4 de enero, año 1647, AMPR, libro de actas capitulares, año 1640-1648.
\textsuperscript{490} Gelabert, Castilla convulsa, 272–73.
\textsuperscript{491} Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 49–50; Gelabert, Castilla convulsa, 276–81.
the true cause of the revolt had been ‘the insatiable greed’ with which he carried out his affairs.\footnote{la insaciable codicia', Carta de don Goncalo Recio Chacon de 3 de abril de 1647, AHN, Consejos 7160, año 1648, número 1, documento 71; Juan E. Gelabert is unsure about who Gonzalo Recio Chacón was, but it seems that he was an inhabitant of Lucena, who took a role in local government. He is listed as an alférez mayor and familiar del Santo Oficio in seventeenth century notary documents. He also appears to have had a long running feud with the duque de Cardona. Gonzalo Recio Chacón opposed the building of a new town hall in Lucena in the 1620s (which was supported by the duque) and was subsequently barred from election to the office of regidor of the city by the duque: Gelabert, Castilla convulsa, 277; Françoise Orsoni-Avila, Les esclaves de Lucena (1539-1700) (Publications de la Sorbonne, 1998), 30; Rafael Ruiz de Algar y Borrego, ‘Las Primeras Casas de Cabildo Lucentino (1620-1636)’, Boletín de la Real Academia de Córdoba, de Ciencias, Bellas Letras y Nobles Artes, 387-413, 11 (1979).}

Three other letters arrived around the same time outlining that the duque de Cardona had been hoarding the agricultural produce from his territories, including large amounts of wheat that he was paid as part of his share of the local diezmos. He was then releasing them to the market at inflated prices, whilst using his authority in the region to stop any other sellers from operating: impounding their goods and imposing heavy taxes on their products.\footnote{mezcla de estupidez y temeridad', Gelabert, 277.} As Juan E. Gelabert points out, persisting with such policies during a period of dearth required a special ‘mix of stupidity and recklessness’; and they no doubt contributed towards an atmosphere of popular discontent, that led to the resistance to fiscal impositions that came to the fore in the winter of 1647.\footnote{Sánchez Rodrigo et al., ‘Andalusian Seasonal and Annual Rainfall’.}

**Summer 1647 to Winter 1648**

The relatively harsh repression carried out by members of the local nobility in Andalusia after the uprisings of winter and early spring of 1647 seems to have established an uneasy peace in the region, with no further reports of unrest reaching the Consejo de Castilla that year. However this did not bring an end to the problems caused by bad weather, poor harvests and rising prices. Once again, the rainfall reconstruction identifies the spring of 1647 as particularly wet.\footnote{Sánchez Rodrigo et al., ‘Andalusian Seasonal and Annual Rainfall’.} One of the chronicles that used in this reconstruction, tells us that weather conditions around Seville had begun to look more promising for the harvest at the start of the year, but in May, ‘when the farmer was almost safe’, heavy rainfall and a cold snap ’more severe than January at its worse' turned most of
the wheat in the fields into straw. In Jerez de la Frontera, the annals of Sebastián Marocho, detail that wheat was harvested in May, far earlier than usual June date; and that these grains were so wet that they had to be put into ovens to dry before they could be ground into flour. The diezmo figures for Andalusia corroborate these accounts and suggest that the summer of 1647 saw one of the worst harvests since the end of the sixteenth century (see figure 5). This succession of two disappointing harvests in 1646 and 1647 signalled trouble for the municipal governments of Andalusia, and their records show a surge in activity concerning provisioning as 1647 progressed towards the autumn.

In the larger cities, such as Seville, Granada and Málaga, attention was devoted to gaining exemptions to the international import and export bans that the monarchy had put in place. Málaga had already been able to secure royal permission to import 30,000 fanegas of wheat from North Africa in February of 1647 but in July they were granted a wider exemption, allowing them to import 'from the cities and ports of foreign kingdoms', with the important exception of France. As we have already seen in chapter 3, Seville had their own request to be allowed to import grains from France and Holland rejected in June of 1647. Worried that the city would need additional supplies of wheat and barley to make it through the year, Seville's council had also requested an exemption from import taxes, arguing that there were merchants prepared to ship both wheat and barley to the city from 'the Canary Islands, Hamburg, Sicily, and other parts outside of the kingdom' on the condition that they be exempted from paying both the alcabala and the two cientos taxes until the harvest of 1648.

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496 'cuando el labrador casi estaba seguro', 'un frío tan grande que por enero no lo haze mayor quando mas haze', Francisco Morales Padrón, ed., Memorias de Sevilla (noticias sobre el siglo XVII) (Cordoba: Publicaciones del Monte de Piedad, 1981), 123.
497 Sebastián Marocho, Cosas notables ocurridas en Xerez de la Frontera desde 1647 a 1729, ed. José de Soto y Molina (Jerez de la Frontera: Ayuntamiento de la ciudad de Jerez de la Frontera, 1939), 19.
498 Real cédula de 1 de febrero de 1647, AMM, originales, vol. 17, ff. 646-649; Real cédula de 15 de julio de 1647, AMM, originales, vol. 17, ff. 650-653.
499 Acta capitular de 21 de junio de 1647, AMS, Sección X, H/1655, actas capitulares, año 1647; Carta del Consejo de Castilla de 24 de julio de 1647, AHN, Consejos 7159, año 1647, número 44.
500 'las islas de canarias, anbur, y cicilia y de otras partes de fuera del reyno', Acta capitular de 21 de junio de 1647, AMS, Sección X, H/1655, actas capitulares, año 1647.
arguing that such a measure would be problematic given that the revenues from these taxes had already been promised elsewhere.\footnote{Carta del Consejo de Castilla de 24 de julio de 1647, AHN, Consejos 7159, año 1647, número 44.} The Consejo de Castilla also argued that taxes were not 'the most essential factor to encourage imports nor to moderate the (considerable) shortage', suggesting that at worst they could cause wheat to be sold at 'two or three reales more per fanega, which should not be considered too grievous'.\footnote{‘la parte más esencial para que entren granos ni para moderar (cossa considerable) la carestía’, ‘pues todo podría venir a ser que se vendiesen a dos o tres reales mas, por fanega, que no se deue tener por muy graosso’, Ibid.} This view from Madrid, that taxes were not a particularly important factor, was arguably misplaced. It ignored the fact that, given the intra-regional tax competition, Seville's reputation for high import taxes could prevent grain arriving in the city in the first place, rather than simply adding a few reales to the cost of a fanega. However, this reticence to grant exemptions to royal tax policy was also – perhaps understandably – the default position in the Consejo de Hacienda. Much like the Consejo de Castilla they were keenly aware that the money from these types of revenues had already been promised elsewhere and were also concerned with issues that we might characterise as more directly related to the concept of jurisdictional fragmentation, worrying that similar demands would flood in from other jurisdictions and that the resulting numerous local exemptions would make enforcement and collection of taxes increasingly difficult. This was not only an issue which affected Andalusia. In March of 1652, for example, the king asked the Consejo de Hacienda for advice about a request from Oran, on the coast of North Africa, that provisions be allowed to be imported tax free into the city.\footnote{Carta del Rey de 14 de marzo y respuesta del Consejo de Hacienda de 29 de abril 1652, AGS, CJH, legajo antiguo 985, consultas, decretos y memoriales. 1652.} The Consejo counselled against the idea, stating that the revenues from the taxes had already been set aside 'for the payment of juros and other things which will be lacking if such demands are introduced'.\footnote{‘para paga de juros y otras cosas a que se faltara si se entroducen semjantes pretensiones’, Ibid.} In April of the same year, the Consejo wrote to the king complaining of the number of passports that had been awarded to individuals, granting them permission to export goods from Castile free from taxes, arguing that these were leading to numerous frauds and loss of revenue, as a result of the difficulties
in enforcing specific exemptions.\footnote{Carta del Consejo de Hacienda al Rey de 15 de abril de 1652, AGS, CJH, legajo antiguo 985, consultas, decretos y memorias. 1652.} A similar combination of the need to preserve revenues and a desire to limit the already large regional and intra-regional complexity that characterised their imposition meant that Seville's appeals fell on deaf ears in 1647. The city of Granada also appears to have made a similar request on 5 July with respect to both imports from North Africa and France, and the removal of the *dos por ciento* tax, with similarly negative results.\footnote{Testimonio que da Franco Gomez de Lara, 19 de junio de 1648, AHN, Consejos 7160, año 1648, número 1, documento 71.} However, as the true extent of the shortages in Andalusia became clear this position eventually softened. The import exception request from Seville made its way to the *Consejo de Estado* where, in September, it was agreed that the city would be allowed to purchase grain from French boats.\footnote{Gelabert, *Castilla convulsa*, 273.} Málaga and Granada's city councils were also sent a royal order that same month, giving them similar permission to import from previously banned territories.\footnote{Real cédula de 28 de septiembre de 1647, AMM, Originales, vol. 17, ff. 595-635; Testimonio que da Franco Gomez de Lara, 19 de junio de 1648, AHN, Consejos 7160, año 1648, número 1, documento 71.} As we shall see when we discuss similar tax and import exemptions in 1652 and 1653, the monarchy was susceptible to being pressured into these types of concessions, and the Andalusian cities tried to use this to the best of their advantage. However their patchy and unsystematic implementation limited their effectiveness in terms of encouraging imports. International orders of grain often needed long lead times to arrive and when hit with shortages these cities often required far speedier supplies.

The poor harvest of 1647 led to an intensification of efforts to secure access to local grains, with further jurisdictional disputes erupting between municipalities and landowners in Andalusia. On 15 September 1647 the town council of Palma del Río discussed measures to address the 'great expense of wheat and the price of bread that is growing every day'; and agreed to try to requisition the grain of the local *diezmo*, to prohibit exports from the town, and to carry out a survey of the...
wheat currently owned by local farmers.\textsuperscript{509} In a further sign of these mounting tensions, and as a precursor to the quarrel that we already detailed in chapter 3 between Antequera and Málaga in 1652, the monarchy sent orders to both the alcaldes of the Real Chancillería of Granada and the corregidor of Antequera in September 1647 to request that they cease disrupting the flow of wheat being transported into Málaga.\textsuperscript{510} Presumably Málaga had complained that the wheat that it was buying was being illegally impounded by these officials. These initial orders had little effect. Just a couple of weeks later, the monarchy was again compelled to write to the president of the Real Chancillería of Granada, asking for the reasons why the transport of wheat to Málaga had again been disrupted.\textsuperscript{511} The government of Granada had itself also been busy trying to ensure that it managed to secure its own wheat provisions, banning the export of wheat from both the city and its hinterlands on 2 July 1647.\textsuperscript{512} Between 3 and 7 September the municipal government also sent out orders to the towns of Loja, Archidona, Alcalá la Real and Alhama, demanding that they prevent wheat from being exported out of the kingdom of Granada, and urging them to instead redirect any such exports towards Granada.\textsuperscript{513}

Granada, El Temple and Export Bans

That same month, in September 1647, Granada also ordered an alcalde mayor to go to the lands south west of the city known as El Temple (or El Quempe), to carry out a census of the available grain and to prevent any exports not destined for Granada.\textsuperscript{514} This area of land was a region of around 250 km\textsuperscript{2} which was primarily used for cereal cultivation.\textsuperscript{515} Interestingly, it seems to have had a reputation as an area particularly susceptible to drought but where grains grew well in rainy

\textsuperscript{509} ‘la gran carrestia del trigo y precio del pan que cada dia ba creciendo’, Acta capitular de 15 de septiembre de 1647, AMPR, libro de actas capitulares, año 1640-1648.

\textsuperscript{510} Real cédula de 28 de septiembre de 1647, AMM, Originales, vol. 17, ff. 640-645.

\textsuperscript{511} Real cédula de 12 de octubre de 1647, AMM, Originales, vol. 17, ff. 636-639.

\textsuperscript{512} Testimonio que da Françoí Gomez de Lara, 19 de junio de 1648, AHN, Consejos 7160, año 1648, número 1, documento 71.

\textsuperscript{513} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{514} Actas y embargos de trigo del partido de temple, AMG, legajo 307, año 1647.

conditions, which may explain why it became the focus of attention in Granada after the wet weather of 1646 to 1647. Figure 17 shows an approximation of the area covered by this wheat census. El Temple lay between Granada and the town of Loja, and Granada's claim of jurisdictional rights over the wheat grown in this region may help explain why the Loja town council sent their official north to find wheat in the summer of 1626, rather than attempting to access the grains grown closer-by in El Temple to the east.

In September 1647, over a period of five days, the alcalde from Granada ended up visiting twenty-nine small villages and farmsteads across El Temple, noting the amount of fanegas of wheat owned by each household. The surviving documentation details the name of each householder visited, the amount of wheat that they had harvested the previous summer, and the amount that they had remaining (after payment of taxes and rents, etc.). For example, in Lamala (called La Mahalá today) twelve houses were visited, one of which belonged to a Francisco Vazquez. When the Granadan officials called, Francisco was not at home, so instead they spoke to his wife, Maria Lopez who explained under oath that she did not know how much wheat he had harvested that year but that she did know that he had made trips to Granada's alhóndiga to sell his supplies. The officials were then shown the remaining wheat, which amounted to seventy fanegas. This process was repeated across all of the visited farmsteads and villages, with a number of residents appearing to take their oaths rather lightly. In the cortixo of Tramulas they spoke to a Cristóbal Ximenez who claimed that he had harvested two hundred fanegas of wheat that August, and that after paying rents and diezmos, he was left with seventy fanegas. However, after appraising his stores, the officials noted that the true total appeared to be closer to one hundred. In a sign of the intense competition for wheat in the region, the documents also record that, in the period between the harvest and the

516 Luna Díaz, 231.
517 Actas y embargos de trigo, AMG, legajo 307, año 1647.
518 Ibid.
519 Ibid.
sending of this official, the city of Granada had missed out on perhaps four or five thousand fanegas of wheat that had been exported from El Temple. This had been purchased by muleteers offering the substantial sum of five ducados (1,875 maravedís) per fanega and who were then transporting the grains down to the coast and to Murcia.\footnote{Ibid.} The census of the remaining wheat in El Temple was meant to prevent any further such exports, and Granada's council took similar measures with respect to wheat stored within the city: carrying out a census of some of the wealthier large houses and private grain stores on 5 October.\footnote{Autos en virtud de órdenes recibidas de los Señores de la Junta de prevención de trigo en razón de reconocer el que hay en diferentes..., AMG, legajo 307, año 1647.}
Serious efforts were made to enforce these local export bans. On 6 November 1647 news reached the teniente de corregidor of Granada (an official appointed to assist the corregidor), Miguel de Ochoa Otazo, that some individuals had surreptitiously left the city at around half-five or six that morning with 'many loads' of either wheat or barley that they were illegally taking towards the coast. He immediately dispatched an alguacil (sheriff), Gaspar de los Reyes, to give chase to the contrabandists, with orders to arrest the individuals involved and bring them back to the city. The next day in Pinos del Valle, a village south of Granada, about halfway to the coast, Gaspar de los Reyes intercepted some men who were heading towards the city of Motril with twenty-two fanegas of wheat. They claimed to have legally purchased this in La Manchuela de Jaén but, finding that they lacked the relevant papers to back up their story, Gaspar de los Reyes arrested them, escorting the men, their eight horses, and their wheat back to Granada. However, on return to the city the men's story began to look increasingly credible. Witness testimonies suggested that the contraband grain had been taken from the basement of a house in Granada by someone called Francisco Perez, who had used two or three horses to remove around eight fanegas. Meanwhile, the leader of the apprehended men, Jacinto de Molina from the barrio of San Lázaro, insisted that he had left Granada seven days previously on 2 November, on the orders of the local veintecuatro Antonio González Minel, to buy wheat near Jaén and transport it to the latter's sugar factory in Motril. Sure enough, representations were soon made to the city authorities on behalf of Antonio González confirming this version of events, and the teniente Miguel de Ochoa Otazo was forced to release the men and their cargoes on 12 November. By this point, the eight fanegas of smuggled wheat was long gone, having successfully made its way out of the reaches of Granada's jurisdiction.

However this case once again emphasises the disruption that local export bans visited upon the grain market. Not only did segments of the market turn to illicit smuggling, but the efforts to

523 Ibid.
524 Ibid.
525 Ibid.
526 Ibid.
monitor and prevent exports also caused disruption to perfectly legitimate efforts to purchase and transport grain across Andalusia.

The sincere efforts of the Andalusian municipalities thus, ironically, worked to contribute to the very problem that they were trying to solve, with the ever increasing patchwork of local export bans leading to greater and greater market fragmentation. Unsurprisingly, grain prices in the region remained persistently high throughout the autumn and winter of 1647 to 1648. As Juan E. Gelabert points out, although there were also shortages in Castile during the same period, the harvest of 1647 had been good in Extremadura and Galicia. Yet similar jurisdicational issues prevented the export of grains to Andalusia from these regions: with the marqués de Tabara, for example, banning the export of grains from his territory to Seville. As a result, high wheat and bread prices would persist as a serious issue in Andalusia into the spring and summer of 1648, when the first major city would be affected by the spate of revolts: Granada.

Moving beyond Wheat: Sericulture in Andalusia and the Little Ice Age

It should also be noted that it was not just wheat, grains, and foodstuffs that were impacted by the variations between wet and dry conditions that affected mid-seventeenth century Andalusia. As was summarised in chapter 2, silk-making in Andalusia had, in the sixteenth century, flourished to become an important industry for the region and a valuable source of tax revenue for the monarchy. By the mid-seventeenth century a number of problems had combined to cause substantial decline, but there remained a large base of silk workers active in many of Andalusia's towns and cities. However silk was not just manufactured in the Iberian Peninsula, it was also cultivated. In fact, sericulture in places like Granada, Jaen, Toledo, Murcia and Valencia was an essential component in

527 Gelabert, Castilla convulsa, 274.
528 Gelabert, 274.
529 See chapter 2.
the supply of raw materials to this industry. A hitherto understudied but potentially fruitful avenue of research would be to think about the potential impact of the Little Ice Age on this agricultural activity. The picture drawn below remains, at this stage, rather sketchily drawn. The silk industry in Andalusia is, as a whole, relatively under-researched, particularly when it comes to the agricultural side. And whilst there are undoubtedly opportunities to put together a more complete picture of the region's sericulture and the impact of Little Ice Age climate, constraints of time and capacity means that what follows is limited to some suggestive examples.

The kingdom of Granada was particularly famous for its sericulture, largely based in the Alpujarra, Baja, Guadix and Vega regions. Seville and Córdoba, on the other hand, mostly imported the raw materials for their silk industries, but a large portion of this came from other parts of Andalusia as well as neighbouring Murcia. The key to this silk harvest was the successful cultivation of mulberry trees on whose leaves silkworms feed exclusively. Traditionally it had been black mulberry trees (morales) that had been grown in the kingdom of Granada, but towards the end of the sixteenth century white mulberry trees (moreras) became more commonly cultivated. Given a preference for moist soil conditions (particularly the moreras), these trees tended to be planted along river banks and on irrigated plains (or in the case of the moreras of Granada in more rainy mountainous regions), rather than on agricultural plains that relied solely on rainfall for water. This left many of the mulberry plantations particularly vulnerable to the flooding which, as we have seen from the climate reconstructions became a growing concern in the

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de la Torre and Rey Díaz, ‘La industria de la seda’, 60; Garzón Pareja, *La industria sedera*, 105.


1640s and 1650s. Pedro Miralles Martínez's work on neighbouring Murcia has hinted at the potential impact of this mid-century climate on the region's sericulture. He details numerous catastrophic weather events in this period that negatively impacted Murcia's silk growers: in 1650 their cultivations were hit by spring frosts, drought, and a plague of locusts, which was followed by floods in 1651, 1652, 1653, and 1657; all of which severely disrupted the silk harvest. Silk growing in Murcia took place mostly in the city's market garden. Notes from the Consejo de Castilla outline that this was irrigated by a dam system that distributed water to a growing area 'five leagues long and two-and-a-half leagues wide' and that it was here that one found 'the trees that produce the silk on which are based [the city's] trade and commerce, the incomes of your majesty, the church and others'. The damage caused when the Segura river burst its banks in 1651 was particularly severe: large parts of the city were ruined and the dam on which the market garden's irrigation system depended was badly damaged. Fearing a long-term decline in the important revenue generated by the silk industry, the government in Madrid agreed to provide 3.75 million maravedís worth of funds to help the reconstruction of the dam and irrigation system and the replanting of the mulberry orchards. Unfortunately much of this rebuilding work was to be in vain as another flood in 1653 washed away much of the reconstruction work, forcing the city to make further appeal to the monarchy for financial aid.

We lack a study that surveys whether similar disruption occurred in Andalusia, however the municipal archive in Granada has some promising documents in this respect, which may allow us to draw some tentative early conclusions. The most insightful and detailed record is a report written in

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537 Sánchez Rodrigo, “El clima de Andalucía”, 34.
538 Pedro Miralles Martínez, La sociedad de la seda: comercio, manufactura y relaciones sociales en Murcia durante el siglo XVII (Murcia: Universidad de Murcia, 2002), 60.
539 ‘la guerta que tendra cinco leguas de largo y dos y media de ancho en que estan los arboles que producen la cria de la seda que es en lo que consiste su trato y comercio, el interes de las reales rentas de VM, las eclesiasticas, y las demas’, Carta de la ciudad de Murcia de 3 de septiembre de 1652, AHN, Consejos 7162, año 1652, número 1, documento 37.
540 ‘asolo la mayor parte de esta ciudad y arruyno las obras publicas della rompiendo especialmente la presa de la ciudad’, Ibid.
541 Consejo de 17 de septiembre de 1652, AHN, Consejos 7162, año 1652, número 1, documento 37.
542 Consejo de 21 de febrero de 1656, AHN, Consejos 7163, año 1653, número 3, documento 100.
April 1646 by Juan Pinelo, who was the administrator of the silk tax in Almería, in the kingdom of Granada. The silk tax, or *renta de la seda*, was one of the most important sources of revenue for the Hapsburg monarchy in Granada, with Félix García Gámez estimating that it was worth around forty-four million *maravedíes* per year between 1643-1652. Since 1633 Álvaro Núñez de Lisboa had been in charge of the administration of this tax in the kingdom of Granada and Juan Pinelo was tasked with informing him of the state of affairs that year in Almería. The report contains over fifty pages of testimonies from inhabitants of Santa Fe de Mondújar, Gádor, Rioja, Benahadux, Pechina, Huercal and Viator: the villages that bordered the river Andaraz as it snaked down from the

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543 Juan Pinelo, regidor y juez administrador de la renta de la seda, AMG, C.01860.0050.


545 Juan Pinelo, regidor y juez administrador de la renta de la seda, AMG, C.01860.0050; Garzón Pareja, *La industria sedera*, 233.
south-eastern tip of the Sierra Nevada mountain range, towards its mouth by the port city of Almería (figure 18). It details how an extremely wet winter, characterised by many large rainstorms, had caused huge flooding along this stretch of river in early 1646 (corroborating Fernando Sánchez Rodrigo's climate reconstruction which shows the winter of 1645 to 1646 as having been unusually wet).\textsuperscript{546} These floods had a devastating effect on the region's sericulture. The report estimates that 7.5 million \textit{maravedíes} (20,000 \textit{ducados}) of damage was done to the area's mulberry trees, and that the silk harvests for the year would be somewhere between a third to a quarter of their usual volume. Not only this, but the huge loss of trees was expected to affect harvests for years to come, due to the time it would take for replacement mulberry trees to grow.\textsuperscript{547} Much more research is needed to establish how this climatic disruption affected the silk harvest in Andalusia as a whole, but it seems likely that the excessive rainfall and high incidence of flooding that is recorded across the region during the mid-seventeenth century would have had an impact beyond just Almería.\textsuperscript{548} If this was the case then this would count as a further channel through which the Little Ice Age was able to impact life in Andalusia in the 1640s and 1650s, with the knock on effects on an already struggling silk industry putting further pressures on the silk workers who, as we shall see, were to join the revolts of 1647 to 1652 in large numbers.

**Revolt in Granada, 1648**

The frenetic attempts by the city of Granada to ensure its provisioning in the autumn of 1647 was likely heightened by the fact that, unlike most Andalusian towns and cities, Granada did not have a \textit{pósito}.\textsuperscript{549} As such, the city was more dependant than others on ensuring a steady flow of grain into its \textit{alhóndiga}. The meetings of Granada's town council in late 1647 and early 1648 certainly reflect these concerns. As well as the aforementioned measures taken to enforce strict

\textsuperscript{546} Sánchez Rodrigo et al., ‘Andalusian Seasonal and Annual Rainfall’.

\textsuperscript{547} Juan Pinelo, regidor y juez administrador de la renta de la seda, AMG, C.01860.0050.

\textsuperscript{548} García Gámez, ‘La renta de la seda’, 274.

\textsuperscript{549} It is unclear why this was the case and has been a topic of some debate amongst historians, see footnote 350.
wheat and grain export bans, the city also decided in October 1647 to send local official Juan de Contreras north of Granada, towards the kingdom of Jaén, with orders try to find wheat to buy and remit back to the city.\textsuperscript{550} To fund these purchases they had been able to borrow 4,000 *ducados* (1.5 million *maravedís*) interest-free from local notables and made it clear that they would seek to raise more funds in this manner.\textsuperscript{551} Yet, as the autumn turned to winter, and the winter turned to spring, none of the measures had conclusively resolved the problem of high bread prices in the city. In February of 1648 the town council ordered Juan de Contreras to continue in his commission, rather than come home, and on 17 April 1648 the *cabildo* reported that *fanegas* of wheat were being sold for between 70 to 79 *reales*, around four times the 18 *reales* theoretically imposed by the *tasa de granos*.\textsuperscript{552} April and May were arguably the most challenging months of the year for the town councils and local officials that were in charge of grain supplies. On one hand, months had passed since last year's wheat harvests: supplies would be at their lowest, theoretically prices would be at their highest; and officials often found themselves needing to buy grain. On the other hand, the imminent arrival of the new summer harvest meant that last year's wheat was soon to devalue substantially, and those with large supplies might suddenly find themselves eager to sell. Prices could thus be particularly volatile in these months which, coupled with Andalusia's fractured grain market and the substantial local barriers to the flow of grains and information, meant that decisions over how much wheat to buy and at what price were fraught with risk.

Granada's town council had tried to guard itself against these types of problems. Already, towards the end of 1647, they were worried that wheat bought by the city would be undercut by the arrival of cheaper grains from elsewhere, thus leading to a large loss on their purchases. Rules were therefore brought in regarding the weight of the bread made by the city's bakers. Whilst loaves of

\textsuperscript{550} Testimonio que da Franco Gomez de Lara, AHN, Consejos 7160, año 1648 , número 1, documento 71.

\textsuperscript{551} 'hasta oy tiene la ciudad buscados, quatro mil ducados prestados sin ynteresses y buscara mas cantidades por todos los caminos que se pudiere dando seguridad a quien los prestare', Ibid.

\textsuperscript{552} Ibid.
bread in Granada usually had to weigh either one pound or two (16 or 32 ounces), they stipulated that any bread baked that was not from wheat 'bought and transported by order of city' would have to weigh an additional four ounces per pound (20 or 40 ounces).\textsuperscript{553} As all loaves were to be sold at the same price, this essentially made it more expensive for bakers to produce bread from non-city purchased grain, thus removing their incentive to seek out cheaper supplies. However, even such measures could not solve the problem that came to a head in May of 1648. At this point Juan de Contreras was still in Ubeda, where he had steadily been purchasing grain and remitting it back to Granada. Price variations had already started to make this difficult in April, when, on the 28th of that month, the city council complained that the wheat he had sent was too expensive, and that he should limit himself to paying between 40 to 44 reales per fanega, if the city was to hope to not lose money on the deal.\textsuperscript{554} We can take this as a clear indication that prices had dropped substantially from the seventy-odd reales that wheat had been fetching in the city just eleven days previously.

Things were soon to get worse for the city. By 12 May news reached them that prices in Ubeda had dropped to 26 reales, which given transport costs meant that wheat could realistically be expected to achieve a market value of around 36 reales in Granada.\textsuperscript{555} This put the city council in a difficult position. They still had reserves of wheat that they were selling to the city's bakers at around 50 reales and, not wanting to be undercut by the new supplies, they appear to have taken a series of catastrophic decisions. Firstly, we have a surviving manuscript which suggests that they actively prevented bakers from importing this new, cheaper wheat.\textsuperscript{556} Secondly, in an attempt to placate the bakers somewhat, they effectively increased the price of bread by mandating that loaves should be baked at a weight of one-and-a-half pounds, rather than the usual two. At a fixed price of

\textsuperscript{553} ‘no era de lo comprado y conducido por horden de la ciudad’, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{554} \textit{Acta de 28 de abril de 1648}, AMG, Libros de Actas Capitulares, legajo 18, año 1648, ff. 165r-166r.
\textsuperscript{555} Testimonio que da Franco Gomez de Lara, AHN, Consejos 7160, año 1648 , número 1, documento 71.
\textsuperscript{556} Anonymous, \textit{Granada. Lo sucedido en sus inquietudes, desde el lunes 18 hasta miércoles 20 de este año de 1648}, BNE, Mss 11107, ff. 101-114.
28 maravedíes per loaf, this amounted to consumers paying more per ounce of bread. These measures satisfied neither the bakers, nor the local population. At this price and weight (assuming that a fanega could make around 90 pounds of bread) bakers were still barely generating 50 reales of revenue per fanega of flour (which is what they were paying for their supplies). Many appear to have stopped baking as a result. For Granada's inhabitants, they were now paying significantly more than usual for a smaller loaf, whilst prices in neighbouring areas were starting to drop. We can get some sense of the tensions that were building in the city through the numerous disagreements that took place in the town council between 28 April and 15 May 1648 about whether or not to raise or lower the official weight of bread. During one of these meetings Juan Gonçalez de Salazar, caballero veinticuatro, presciently gave his colleagues the unheeded warning that 'the pitfalls' of selling wheat at elevated prices are well known.

Juan Gonçalez de Salazar was soon to be proven right. Domínguez Ortiz (and Juan E. Gelabert, following his lead) thought that there had been two disturbances in Granada in 1648: one in March and another in May. However I. A. A. Thompson has shown that this is the result of the mistranscription of a manuscript source, and that the sole uprising that year began on Monday 18 May. That morning, groups of people began to gather in three districts of the city, all of which were home to the city's poorer inhabitants, artisans and labourers. Two crowds formed in la Merced and San Lazaro, whilst a large crowd assembled in the Campo del Príncipe – an area where

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557 There has been some confusion over exactly what happened with respect to bread prices in Granada, in large part due to the confusion over whether there were two uprisings or not in the city (more on this later), see: Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 59; Gelabert, Castilla convulsa, 294–95. However, knowing that there was just one, it seems as though a loaf of one-and-a-half pounds (24 ounces) was being sold for 28 maravedíes in May of 1648. The sources are imprecise about this, but if we combine the evidence from some inconclusive town council meeting notes (which discussed setting the weight at both two pounds and one-and-a-half pounds) and a manuscript source which describes bread of 20 ounces being sold at this price, it seems probable that one-and-a-half pound loaves had been ordered: Testimonio que da Franco Gomez de Lara, AHN, Consejos 7160, año 1648, número 1, documento 71; Anonymous, Granada. Lo sucedido en sus inquietudes, BNE, Mss 11107, f. 102v.

558 Anonymous, Granada. Lo sucedido en sus inquietudes, BNE, Mss 11107, f. 102v.

559 'los yncombenientes... son conocidos', Testimonio que da Franco Gomez de Lara, AHN, Consejos 7160, año 1648, número 1, documento 71.

560 Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 59–63; Gelabert, Castilla convulsa, 291–97.


562 BL, Egerton MS 347, f. 156, Anonymous, Granada. Lo sucedido en sus inquietudes, BNE, Mss 11107, f. 103r.
most of the workshops of the city's silk workers were based – chanting 'long live the king and death to the bad government!'\textsuperscript{563} Some of them gathered together with weapons and went looking for the city's \textit{corregidor}, Francisco Arévalo de Zuazo, threatening to kill him.\textsuperscript{564} Another band of rebels broke into the \textit{alhóndiga} and started distributing the wheat housed there.\textsuperscript{565} Others made their way to the seat of local government, the \textit{Chancillería}, demanding bread and brandishing a recently bought loaf that had been illegally baked with a mixture of millet and ash.\textsuperscript{566} The three groups of rebels from San Lazaro, la Merced, and the Campo del Príncipe all appear to have made the removal of the \textit{corregidor} from office one of their key demands and, faced with angry, armed groups roaming the city threatening him with death, Francisco Arévalo de Zuazo went into hiding in one of the city's convents.\textsuperscript{567} The \textit{Presidente} of the \textit{Chancillería} and the Archbishop of Granada seem to have been the two officials who did most to try to restore order in amongst the chaos; the latter having ridden through the city's streets with the Blessed Sacrament in an attempt to restore peace.\textsuperscript{568} However as the scale of the protests became clear it was obvious that they had little option but to acquiesce to the rebels' demands. Despite a collective desire to see the back of Arévalo de Zuazo, each of the three aforementioned districts initially had its own preferred replacement candidate: local judge Francisco Vergara in San Lazaro; a wealthy nobleman of Genoese descent called Vicencio Levanto in la Merced; and a nobleman called Luis de Paz in Campo del Príncipe.\textsuperscript{569} The city's silk workers won the day, seemingly as a result of their greater numbers, and Luis de Paz was instated as the new \textit{corregidor}. Once this was announced, the crowd put him on horseback and he was jubilantly paraded around the streets.\textsuperscript{570} There was some threat of further violence later in the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{563} Anonymous, \textit{Granada. Lo sucedido en sus inquietudes}, BNE, Mss 11107, f. 103r; Domínguez Ortiz, \textit{Alteraciones}, 57.
\item \textsuperscript{564} BL, Egerton MS 347, f. 156.
\item \textsuperscript{565} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{566} Anonymous, \textit{Granada. Lo sucedido en sus inquietudes}, BNE, Mss 11107, f. 103r.
\item \textsuperscript{567} Ibid, ff. 103r-104r.
\item \textsuperscript{568} Ibid, ff. 104r-104v; BL, Egerton MS 347, f. 156.
\item \textsuperscript{570} Antonio de Jesús, \textit{Epitome de la admirable vida del ilustre varon don Luis de Paz y Medrano cavallero de el orden de Calatraua, natural de la ciudad de Granada} (Granada: Francisco Gomez, 1688), 88.
\end{itemize}
day, when a notary and a soldier clashed with some rebels in the Bib-Rambla square, however by
nightfall some semblance of calm had descended on the city, with bread being sold at the much
reduced price of 12 maravedís a loaf.\textsuperscript{571} This temporary calm was put in jeopardy the next morning
when armed members of the nobility and city council rode into Granada, brought Arévalo de Zuazo
out from the convent in which he was hiding, and made their way to the Chancillería. In reaction to
this apparent attempt to re-instate the old corregidor, Granada's inhabitants again took to the streets
and began to start erecting barricades.\textsuperscript{572} After a further tense night, the nobility backed down,
confirming Luis de Paz as corregidor and promising to seek a general pardon for the city from the
monarchy in Madrid.\textsuperscript{573}

The events in Granada followed a similar pattern to many of the revolts that had occurred,
and were yet to come, between 1647 and 1652: trouble starting in the morning, often in a public
square or market, resulting in armed groups taking to the streets, seeking out stores of wheat,
demanding bread price reductions and, importantly, the replacement of local officials. I. A. A.
Thompson emphasised that the revolt in Granada was 'non-revolutionary' and was 'not directed
against the state', 'against the social order', nor based on 'economic' grievances.\textsuperscript{574} Although he
perceptively qualifies these statements by affirming that the revolts showed 'in seventeenth century
Castile a greater potential for fundamental social and political criticism than is often imagined', we
might question his characterisation.\textsuperscript{575} The actions taken by the rebels, in demanding the
replacement of the corregidor and changes to the bread price regime, were a direct form of political
action, aimed at the monarchy's primary representative in the city, requesting action by the state,
and centred on the major economic issue for both the city's inhabitants and its municipal council:
the price of bread. As we have seen, wheat (and bread) provisioning and pricing were a major

\textsuperscript{571} Anonymous, Granada. Lo sucedido en sus inquietudes, BNE, Mss 11107, ff. 106r-106v.
\textsuperscript{572} de Jesús, Epitome, 89–90.
\textsuperscript{573} Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 63.
\textsuperscript{574} Thompson, ‘Alteraciones Granadinas’, 800.
\textsuperscript{575} Thompson, 804.
political undertaking and arguably one of the state's major intrusions into day-to-day life in Andalusia. These were not revolutionary events, but the revolts represented a direct effort by the city's inhabitants to influence the state's actions (both municipal government and the monarchy in Madrid) regarding a major economic grievance. Unlike the eighteenth-century English crowds surveyed by E. P. Thompson, the protesters were not harking back to a disappearing traditional model of grain market regulation. Instead they were demanding changes and actions in a system that was very much operative. These were political events in every sense of the word, even though they aimed at manipulating the existing system rather than tearing it down. I. A. Thompson goes on to say that the revolts were 'deferential', as the choice of the replacement *corregidor* was picked from the governing classes. It is certainly true that when replacement officials were demanded by the crowds of 1647 to 1652, these individuals were invariably of high social status. Yet we might also question the extent to which we can label movements that repeatedly chased royal officials out of town and threatened them with death, as "deferential". Rather than focussing on the lack of revolutionary desires of the rebels, or their lack of ambition to re-engineer the entire social order, it may be more productive to focus on their real attempts to exert political change in a system of government that otherwise severely restricted their capacity to influence it. The choice of Luis de Paz as *corregidor* is characteristic of the actions of the rebels in Andalusia, and tells us something about their thinking.

Luis de Paz was indeed a member of Granada's nobility, but his popularity amongst the rebels can probably be explained by the fact that he had experienced some sort of epiphany in his thirties and had since dedicated his life to alms giving and religious observance. He had also been active in distributing bread to the poor during the city's winter and spring food shortages. Whilst

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579 Casey, *Family and Community*, 27.
Luis de Paz was an extreme example, the rebels in Andalusia frequently asked for local notables who were felt to have the people's interests at heart, to step into leadership roles. On one hand these moves can be seen as a holding up of an example to the rest of the ruling classes; demonstrating the type of ideal behaviour to which they should aspire and were pointedly falling short of. The rebels also chose nobles as their representatives because they needed individuals who at least stood a chance of being confirmed in their posts. This was about manipulating the system to better represent their needs, rather than tearing it down. And pragmatism required that proposed officials have at least a tacit chance of approval by city councils. A similar rationale stood behind the often restrained behaviour of the crowds. Whilst violence against officials, such as the killing of the corregidor, was almost always threatened, it was rarely ever carried out. If the rebels' aim was to eke out some concessions out of local government, they knew that they could not go too far, or risk serious reprisals from the nobility and the monarchy. As we shall see, this restraint occasionally broke down. Crowds actions were not, after all, fully rational events and things could get out of hand. But overall, there was an acknowledgement of the useful limits of popular violence and a recognition that actions would need to be justified within a framework that appealed to the dominant ideology of a social pact that bound a theoretically benevolent monarch to their loyal subjects.580

In many ways, the revolt in Granada, and the tactics described above, proved remarkably effective. Luis de Paz was installed as the new corregidor and, over the next few days, the city both lowered the price of wheat in the alhóndiga and the price of bread on the streets. The city council also expended much energy over the next few days desperately trying to find more affordable wheat to provision the city.581 When news eventually reached Madrid, Philip IV also agreed to issue a general pardon to the inhabitants of Granada, relieved that order had been restored without any

580 This idea is unpacked and developed further in chapter 5.
581 Acta de 29 de mayo de 1648, AMG, Libros de Actas Capitulares, legajo 18, año 1648, ff. 190r-192r.
necessary outside intervention. Some of these achievements proved to be short lived. Luis de Paz resigned from his role not long after taking over (he had always been a reluctant corregidor). However the monarchy chose as his replacement an experienced and trusted official called Álvaro Queipo de Llano, who had already served two terms as Granada's corregidor between 1637 and 1643. Not only was this arguably an improvement on the unpopular Francisco Arévalo de Zuazo, but the new candidate would have had no doubt as to the importance of keeping control of bread prices going forward. It is no coincidence that the city did found a pósito in the years following the revolts and that intense efforts on behalf of the city's authorities managed to keep Granada sufficiently provisioned to avoid further unrest in 1652.

Whilst peace returned to Granada that summer, there was to be some further trouble on the coast to the south of the city, in Motril, where, on 30 August violence erupted as a result of bread shortages. This unrest involved the town's inhabitants as well as soldiers who were stationed in the port. Much like in Granada, members of the nobility and the church attempted to restore order by bringing out the Blessed Sacrament, but to no avail. Eventually, Granada's new corregidor, Álvaro Queipo de Llano, was forced to march some troops down to Motril where he restored order by hanging three of the main culprits and condemning a further four individuals to service in the galleys. Once Motril was pacified, however, Andalusia was to remain relatively peaceful over the next couple of years. Yet, rather than this being the result of the arrival of better harvests, or a more consistent management of the region's grain markets, this lull in the violence was arguably due to the arrival of an even greater threat to daily life in Andalusia: the plague.

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582 Domínguez Ortiz, Alternaciones, 64.
583 Domínguez Ortiz, 64.
585 See chapter 6.
586 Consejo de Castilla de 19 de octubre de 1648, AHN, Consejos 7160, año 1648, número 1, documento 57.
587 Ibid.
Chapter 5: Rebels, Politics, and Participation
The Public Transcript

Before we move on to detailing the plague and the remaining revolts that occurred between 1649 and 1652 in Andalusia, we need to address a question that has so far only been alluded to in this work. We need to think about who was involved in these protests, what their grievances were, and why revolt became the chosen form of political resistance in Andalusia between 1647 and 1652. This will allow us to make some links between these political protests and the broader picture of harvest failures, price rises and government intervention in the grain market; and also to think productively about how we might theorise the connections between a concept as broad and long-term as climate change and short, sharp episodes of political protest.

Prior to the 1970s, historians tended to favour what has been termed the ‘pressure cooker’ model of pre-modern revolt, whereby unplanned and violent protest would erupt when life for the general population became too difficult. As John Walter summarises, in this view ‘protest was reactive and spasmodic, prompted by immediately experienced grievances, concerned with the remedy of specific popular needs and innocent of any wider political objectives.’ The participants were the pre-political, ‘primitive rebels’ that Hobsbawm was still finding traces of in his study of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century social movements. Indeed, even after the publication of E. P. Thompson's classic article on 'the moral economy of the English crowd' – which sought to challenge the picture of a disorganised and unthinking violent mob and replace it with a more rational and indeed politically motivated crowd – there was a tendency to define the political as only pertaining to moments when rebels sought widespread system change or exhibited a nascent sense of class solidarity or egalitarianism. Although altogether more nuanced than the brief outline of these

588 Walter, *Crowds and Popular Politics*, 5.
589 Walter, 5.
591 Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy’. 
trends described above, we can see elements of these views in Domínguez Ortiz's *alteraciones andaluzas*. He wrote for example, that 'at no time was there a call for radical change, either in the institutional or the social arena... From revolts that were born spontaneously in the midst of a desperate people, plans and grand projects were not to be expected.'\(^{592}\) Walter again notes that there is an 'implicit teleology' to these type of views, where revolts are 'judged not by what they achieved in their own terms and context, but by what they failed to achieve or to exhibit'.\(^{593}\) This can account for Domínguez Ortiz's negative assessment that the revolts 'achieved absolutely nothing'.\(^{594}\) Here the Andalusian historian was arguably thinking about long-term improvements to the social situation of those who participated in these uprisings. However if we focus more specifically on some of the concrete political demands that were made during the revolts – the replacement of unpopular local officials, the implementation of price controls on bread, the end to the 1651 monetary revaluation – then, as we shall see, they were in many ways very successful. To view these as merely short-term, limited solutions is to fall into the teleological trap that expects people to have been reaching for the egalitarian, democratic solutions of future revolutionaries. We might also pause to wonder whether most protest movements today would fail a similar test of ambition or "politicalness"; in light of not seeking a radical restructuring of society and economy and instead often focussing on the "mere" opposition to specific government policies.

Contemporary historiography has thus often sought to pay attention to the specific political culture that did underpin early modern crowd actions, even in instances that may at first glance seem of limited scope or significance. Claire Judde de Larivi ère, for example, has stressed the political nature of an episode during which the *podestat* of Murano, near Venice, was pelted with snowballs in 1511; an action she views as intrinsically linked to political concerns about taxation,

\(^{592}\) 'en ningún momento se pidió un cambio radical, ni en el terreno institucional ni en el social... A unas revueltas nacidas espontáneamente en el seno de un pueblo desesperado no había que pedirle planos ni proyectos de gran alcance', Domínguez Ortiz, *Alteraciones*, 155.


\(^{594}\) 'no consiguieron absolutamente nada', Domínguez Ortiz, *Alteraciones*, 136.
wars in Italy, and creeping Venetian dominance. She also cautions against thinking of 'a simple dichotomy between the power of the dominant and the resistance of the dominated', but stresses that the people at all levels of society were involved in the construction and 'configuration of the social and political spaces on the island' outside of periods of revolt. Thus: 'the social, political and legal order is not simply the reflection of the decisions taken by the Venetian institutions, but also the result of successive accommodations between the law and practices.' Much of this work has been inspired by the approach of social scientist James C. Scott, who uses the term 'public transcript' to describe the 'acceptable public version of relationships between dominant and subordinate groups'. The terms of the public transcript are, in the main but not solely, created by the dominant elites, and force subordinates to express themselves in a manner that emphasises their deference and acquiescence to the system. However, alongside this there exist 'hidden transcripts' through which subordinate groups may conceal their true resistance to elite authority. These can encompass a wide range of 'everyday forms of resistance' such as 'foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so on.' In the early modern context Scott's work thus brings political agency into the everyday actions of the people of moderate means or low social status, with these hidden transcripts giving people an opportunity to influence 'the terms of their inferiority'. Episodes of revolt arguably took these actions a step further, allowing a more direct negotiation than the 'everyday forms of resistance'. Yet even these

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597 ‘L’ordre sociale, politique et juridique n’est pas que le reflet des décisions prises par les institutions vénitiennes, mais également le résultat d’accommodements successifs entre la loi et les pratiques.’ Judde de Larivière, 278.
600 Scott, 4–5.
actions took place within the framework of the public transcript. Seeking to negotiate alterations to it, rather than destroy it and start from scratch.

John Walter also argues that, in early modern England, 'the negotiation of the public transcript' was fundamentally shaped by the fact that 'the coercive powers' of the state 'were limited'. Fearing the prospect of popular revolt, this forced monarchs to legitimise their policies within a framework that emphasised the aims of protecting 'their subjects, and in particular, the weak and poor'. This was true of much of early modern Europe and essentially introduced an element of conditionality into the public transcript – subjects owed the monarch allegiance and obedience but were in return promised certain protections – that both sides were cognisant of the need to uphold. Ruth MacKay's work on military recruitment, for example, provides a concrete example of how this type of political negotiation manifested itself in seventeenth-century Castile. She details how even the very poorest members of society were able to resist military recruitment, using petitions and letters to the king, in a manner that exploited their rights within the jurisdictional framework that underpinned royal authority and which emphasised the conditional nature of the pact that bound the king to his loyal subjects. Not only was the monarchy remarkably attentive to the myriad of petitions that pledged poverty as a reason for exemption from military service, but when it was felt that the monarchy was overstepping the limits of this pact, his subjects often chose not to obey orders regarding recruitment: 'the contract between ruler and vassal at some point had been violated, and it no longer bound them.' A lack of obedience was thus justified with reference to, rather than in contradiction of, the public transcript. The proper provisioning of towns and cities and the availability of affordable foodstuffs was undoubtedly one of the key conditional terms of

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607 MacKay, 132–72, 177.
608 MacKay, 172.
this public transcript in early modern Europe. In the context of crowd actions over the high price of bread, this could thus 'offer a strong sense of legitimation for those who engaged in protest'.\footnote{Walter, \textit{Crowds and Popular Politics}, 10.} As Andy Wood cautions we should be careful to qualify some aspects of Scott's theories. We should not think of all forms of deference 'as inauthentic' expressions of the public transcript, under which 'subordinates knowingly concealed a "true" sense of agency'.\footnote{Andy Wood, ‘Subordination, Solidarity and the Limits of Popular Agency in a Yorkshire Valley c.1596–1615’, \textit{Past & Present} 193, no. 1 (1 November 2006): 44, https://doi.org/10.1093/pastj/gtl011.} The social order of early modern Europe was deeply embedded in culture and society and Andy Wood is right to identify how class structures 'limited popular agency' and 'how difficult, dangerous and humiliating it could be for subordinates to "negotiate" the terms of their subordination'.\footnote{Wood, 72.} Equally, whilst rebels could feel strongly justified in their collective actions over matters of subsistence, and appeal to the public transcript to rationalise their actions, this did not preclude them subsequently being subject to draconian punishments. As Braddick and Walter note, people were 'negotiating the terms, rather than the fact, of their subordination'.\footnote{John Walter and Michael Braddick, ‘Introduction. Grids of Power: Order, Hierarchy and Subordination in Early Modern Society.’, in \textit{Negotiating Power in Early Modern Society: Order, Hierarchy and Subordination in Britain and Ireland}, ed. Michael Braddick and John Walter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 42.}

Yet, the idea of the public transcript can be helpful in thinking about the few records that we have of the proclamations and demands of the rebels in Andalusia. The oft repeated, and somewhat contradictory, chant of: 'long live the king and death to the bad government' can be understood as a vocalisation of dissent that simultaneously criticises dominant power whilst affirming a subservience to the ideal of a benevolent monarch (the public transcript). However, as we have seen in the aforementioned quote from Claire Judde de Larivièere, it is also important to acknowledge that early modern Andalusian (and European) society was not simply split dichotomously between the dominant and the subordinate. There were multiple levels of power, and most people were at once subordinate and dominant depending on who they were talking to and what role they were fulfilling.
The role of the *corregidor* or other officials involved in municipal government can stand as a simple example of this fact: dominant in terms of their governing roles, but subordinate to the *Consejo de Castilla* and the monarchy. These different levels of authority gave space for political dissent to take place. We can also understand the ‘long live the king and death to the bad government’ chant as a more direct criticism of local officials and an appeal to the monarchy to intervene on behalf of a town or city's inhabitants. Both these meanings could likely co-exist: the issues that motivated the revolts in Andalusia tended to cover both resistance to policies decided in Madrid (taxation, monetary revaluations), and the specific behaviour and perceived failures of local officials.

The question of who took part in the Andalusian revolts is clearly a crucial part of the puzzle in seeking to answer why they occurred and why the protests took the particular form that they did. Before thinking about the political motivations of the actors in these uprisings and potentially linking their occurrence to wider debates such as the General Crisis or the Little Ice Age, we patently need to know who these people were. As with most early modern revolts this task is rendered difficult by the asymmetric distribution of the surviving documentary evidence that we possess. Almost all of the sources about the revolts of 1647 to 1652 come from individuals or groups involved in their suppression: either being part of official reports sent back to Madrid to inform the monarchy of the uprisings, or the records of municipal governments. The few manuscript accounts that we possess generally come in the form of chronicles or letters written by wealthy individuals who were firmly on the side of the forces of order. We have no surviving account or testimony (either from a court case or trial) from an individual who actively participated in the uprisings. Nevertheless the question of who was involved has formed a key part of the work of historians, since the publication of *Alteraciones andaluzas*. 
Who Participated?

The Socio-Economic Backgrounds

Initially this debate focussed primarily on the socio-economic backgrounds of those involved, with Domínguez Ortiz making the observation that the uprisings were not simply the work of the poorest members of urban society: instead the participants mostly came from the artisan classes. In Seville and Granada there was a strong presence of those involved in the silk industry. In Córdoba the Andalusian historian listed the professions of some of those punished after the revolts as: 'three hat makers, two dyers, two tailors, two blacksmiths, a shoemaker, "a carpenter who made harps", a silk worker, a barber, a lime hauler, a carter, a goatherd, a shopkeeper, an apothecary, a school master and "the keeper of the nunnery of Regina"'.

These were not beggars and vagabonds but people of modest means. Igor Knezevic, for example, points out that at least five of the rebels in Seville appear to have been master craftsmen who had taken on apprentices shortly before the revolt of 1652, with at least one of them agreeing to a relatively expensive lease in April of that year. Nevertheless, neither were these people wealthy individuals. Even the wealthiest artisans in Seville were, on average, poorer than the clergy and local officials, to say nothing of the city's merchants and nobility. Jesús Aguado de los Reyes's survey of the Archivo de Protocolos de Sevilla is instructive in this respect, and is summarised in figure 19. Having analysed eight hundred and ten probate inventories dating from the first half of the seventeenth century in the city, Aguado de los Reyes splits them into five professional groups: artisan, clergy, local officials (government functionaries, administrators, etc.), merchant, and nobility. From the graph we can clearly see that artisans had by far the largest percentage of low value estates, with 97.4 per cent of them falling

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613 ‘dos sombreros, dos tintoretos, dos sastres, dos herrados, un zapatero, un "carpintero que hace arpas", un tirador de damascos, un barbero, un acarreador de cal, un carretero, un cabrero, un hortelano, un tendero, un boticario, un "casero de las monjas de Regina"’, Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 139–40.
614 Knezevic, ‘Lords of the Seven Parishes’, 228.
615 Jesús Aguado de los Reyes, Riqueza y sociedad en la Sevilla del siglo XVII (Seville: Publicaciones de la Universidad de Sevilla, 1994).
616 Aguado de los Reyes, 103.
under the five million maravedís barrier; and the vast majority of these estates came nowhere near that upper limit: their mean value was 1,307,186 maravedís. Although artisans made up 14.4 per cent of the probate documents analysed, they only added up to 2.7 per cent of the total wealth of all eight hundred and ten records. The average value of these artisans' estates can also be contrasted with the fact that a veinticuatroía position in Seville's government was worth over three million maravedís. We should also be mindful that the probate records only capture the artisans who were wealthy enough to leave behind assets on death, and a majority were probably not wealthy enough

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617 Aguado de los Reyes, Riqueza y sociedad.
618 Aguado de los Reyes, 103.
619 Domínguez Ortiz, Historia de Sevilla, 96.
to ever appear in these documents. Overall then, although the artisan class was far from being a poor, destitute group within Seville, it was also some way from being considered a wealthy one.

Wealth is clearly an important way of thinking about the split between those who rebelled in 1647 to 1652 and those who did not. Contemporaries certainly viewed it, at least partially, in these terms. In Ayamonte the rebels were described by the corregidor as coming from a neighbourhood called La Ribera, which stood in contrast to the neighbourhood called La Villa which was home to 'wealthier inhabitants' and had remained peaceful.\textsuperscript{620} References to the revolts being a 'mouimiento de gente baxa'; to 'personas pobres y de moderados caudales' being affected by high bread prices; and to 'gente popular' being those involved in the uprisings abound in the sources.\textsuperscript{621} We also have almost no record of any wealthy or noble participants in the uprisings, beyond some vague references to an 'hombre acaudalado' and an 'hombre principal' being punished in Córdoba and Bujalance respectively.\textsuperscript{622} There seems little to connect these events and the noble plot of 1641, which allegedly saw the Duke of Medina Sidonia conspiring to declare Andalusia as independent from the crown, although it may be that the noble conspirators were cognisant of a growing level of popular discontent in the region.\textsuperscript{623} However, wealth alone cannot explain who joined the rebels and who did not. Professional networks, family ties and local neighbourhood loyalties all contributed to this decision. All of these categories were, of course, intrinsically linked: people's professions, wealth, family ties and the neighbourhood that they lived in were all interconnected. These networks often, but not always, overlapped substantially.

\textsuperscript{620} 'vezinos de mas caudal', Carta del corregidor de Ayamonte, don Pedro de Carvajal, de 27 de agosto de 1652, AHN, Consejos 7162, año 1652, número 3.

\textsuperscript{621} Carta del Cardenal de la Cueva de 3 de junio de 1652, AHN, Consejos 7162, año 1652, número 2, documento 64; Carta de Lorenzo Zentellas, de Priego el 24 de abril de 1652, AHN Consejos 7162, año 1652; Acta capitular de 30 de mayo, Año 1652, AMA, libro de actas capitulares, legajo 5, año 1637-1668.

\textsuperscript{622} Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 140.

\textsuperscript{623} Salas Almela, The Conspiracy.
In terms of professional networks, Igor Knezevic's work on Seville has shown the important role that the Sevillian silk guild, the *Arte de la Seda*, played in using political measures such as royal petitions to protect the interests of the industry in the seventeenth century, whilst also fomenting a culture of communal political action, formalising political grievances (some of which we can clearly see reflected in the demands eventually made by the rebels in Seville), and possibly even serving as a meeting point for the individuals who first led the uprising in the city in 1652.\(^{624}\) Familial links were also intrinsically bound up with professional ones. An industry such as the silk industry was strongly based around family run workshops, with husbands and wives often working together with both sons and daughters.\(^{625}\) Sánchez Mantero, for example, notes that a number of the named participants in Seville were brothers, or otherwise related, and attributes this to the strength of the familial bonds that bound together the guild based textile industries.\(^{626}\) It is also no coincidence that the Feria district became one of the epicentres of the revolt in Seville, given that this northern part of the city was home to a large number of silk and textile workers.\(^{627}\) Industries like the textile sector in Seville contained opportunities to accumulate wealth in good times, but the likelihood is that most people's livelihoods were finely balanced and could tip into crisis in times when work was short or price inflation hit. Similar professional, family and neighbourhood ties bound rebels across Andalusia between 1647 and 1652. In Ayamonte, for example, the *corregidor* noted that it was those 'engaged in fishing and seafaring' who emerged from the La Ribera neighbourhood to cause trouble in the uprising of May 1652.\(^{628}\)

On the other hand, not all professions had such a high degree of overlap between wealth, neighbourhood and family as the Sevillian silk workers. The clergy serves, perhaps, as the best

\(^{624}\) Knezevic, ‘Lords of the Seven Parishes’, chap. 5.


\(^{627}\) Joseph Maldonado Dávila y Saavedra, *Tratado verdadero del motín que hubo en la ciudad de Sevilla en este año de MDCLII*, Biblioteca Nacional de España (BNE), Mss 6014, ff.39-44; Domínguez Ortiz, *Alteraciones*, 102.

\(^{628}\) ‘se ocupan en Pesquería y Marinería’, Carta del corregidor de Ayamonte, don Pedro de Carvajal, de 27 de agosto de 1652, AHN, Consejos 7162, año 1652, número 3.
example of a more complex situation. High ranking members of the clergy, such as the Archbishops in Seville, Granada and Córdoba, unsurprisingly worked as part of the forces of order, although that did not stop Pedro de Tapia, the Archbishop of Córdoba from expressing some degree of sympathy with the rebels' grievances.\footnote{Dominguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 143–45.} However, further down the social ladder, we find a much more mixed ecclesiastical response. In Seville, for example, one of the ringleaders of the revolt, who ended up negotiating demands with the municipal government appears to have been a friar called Bernabé Filgueira.\footnote{The sources spell Filgueiras, Figueyras, or Figueras in various different ways. I have stuck with the spelling used in Alteraciones andaluzas: Dominguez Ortiz, 107.} The sources variously describe him as being either from Portugal or Granada, but there seems little doubt that he lived alongside many of the city's silk workers in the Feria district.\footnote{Correspondencia, 28 de mayo de 1652, SNAHN, OSUNA, C.313, D.57-58, ff. 5-6; Joseph Maldonado Dávila y Saavedra, Tratado verdadero del motín que hubo en esta ciudad de Sevilla este año de 1652, in Memorias de diferentes cosas sucedidas en esta May Noble y Muy Leal ciudad de Sevilla. Copiándose en Sevilla. Año 1696, Biblioteca Capitular Colombina (BCC), 84-7-21 f. 126; Gaspar Caldera de Heredia, Historia arcana de las memorias cronológicas de lo sucedido en nuestra... edad y balance político del estado de nuestra monarquía de España por los años de 1660, Real Academia de la Historia (RAH), 9/5719, ff. 24r-24v; Anonymous, Diario exacto de la sublevacion de alguna plebe de la parroquia de Omnium Sanctorum vulgarmente llamado el barrio de la Feria (Seville: Imprenta de Alvarez I Compañía, 1841), 58.} As a low ranking member of the clergy, his income and wealth was probably comparable to his textile workers neighbours and thus, in his case, wealth levels and neighbourhood ties appear to have been more important than professional ones. In contrast, in Osuna the clergy appear to have remained staunchly opposed to the uprising that took place there in May 1652, which Ramírez Olid attributes to the close links and financial dependence that the clergy there had to the noble house of Téllez Girón, who were important figures in the local municipal government.\footnote{Ramírez Olid, ‘El motín’, 303.}

Neighbourhood ties seem to have been particularly important in the bigger cities such as Seville, whose size and growth had led to more distinct differences between different quarters. We have a description from a Sevillian doctor called Gaspar Caldera de Heredia, who, lived in the wealthier parish of San Nicolás, that details around fifty men in his neighbourhood banding together to fight off looting rebels during the first days of the revolts in 1652.\footnote{Gaspar Caldera de Heredia, Historia arcana, RAH, 9/5719, f. 24r-24v.} Alongside the doctor were
wealthy merchants, such as 'silver buyer' Andrés de Arriola.\textsuperscript{634} A less expected example of neighbourhood solidarity comes from the San Marcos district: a poor neighbourhood which had a reputation for housing smugglers and contrabandists.\textsuperscript{635} Here two unlikely characters emerged as key figures in the suppression of the city's revolts. Francisco Bueno and Francisco de León were two renowned criminals who had a long history of violent encounters with the law, mainly as a result of the business that they carried out smuggling contraband into the city.\textsuperscript{636} When the revolt broke out in Seville they brought together their San Marcos based gang to help restore order, disarming rebel groups and eventually leading their men in the armed charge on the Feria district that brought the revolt to an end. Domínguez Ortiz wondered what incentive they were offered by the city authorities to spring to their defence, however, rather than simply being motivated by the offer of a bribe, the two men's actions may have been based on more complex rationales.\textsuperscript{637} Their interests would appear to have been served by the preservation of the status quo in the city if one supposes that their established illegal activities were profitable and stood to be disrupted by the upheaval presented by a revolt. They also seem likely to have had some form of relationship with the authorities in Seville that had allowed them to escape punishment for crimes going back to at least 1644.\textsuperscript{638} Whatever their true motivations, this example serves as a useful reminder that the divide between rebels and those who resisted the revolts in Seville was more complex than a simple split along lines of wealth. As a broad category, however, wealth or class, and the strength of the ties people had to their local community, still serves as a useful way to think about who participated in

\textsuperscript{634} 'comprador de plata', Ibid, f. 24v. Andrés de Arriola appears to have been a well known, wealthy merchant in Seville. He is listed in documents relating to the trade with the Americas, transcribed in: Domínguez Ortiz, Orto y ocaso, 177–78. And is mentioned as having organised and paid for a dedicatory inscription in the chapel of San Pablo in Seville in: Diego Ortiz de Zúñiga, Annales ecclesiasticos y seculares de la muy noble y muy leal ciudad de Sevilla (Madrid, 1677), 111.

\textsuperscript{635} Domínguez Ortiz, Historia de Sevilla, 126.

\textsuperscript{636} Details regarding the career of Francisco de León can be found in: El fiscal contra el capitán Francisco de León preso en Sevilla sobre ciertos delitos, AHN, Consejos, Legajo 25608, Exp. 3; El conde de Villaumbrosa y Castronovo contra Francisco de León sobre alboroto por introducir vino sin derechos, fraude y otras cosas. Sevilla, AHN, Consejos, Legajo 25712, Exp. 9.

\textsuperscript{637} Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 172.

\textsuperscript{638} El fiscal contra el capitán Francisco de León preso en Sevilla sobre ciertos delitos, AHN, Consejos, Legajo 25608, Exp. 3, ff. 9v-10r.
these uprisings and who did not, but this does need to be supplemented by the other bonds that tied individuals to figures of authority.

**Foreigners and Strangers (Forasteros)**

Overall, the participation of mostly skilled and semi-skilled artisans of modest means in the Andalusian revolts fits the general picture that has been drawn by historians of crowd actions in early modern Europe.\(^{639}\) The absence of the poorest members of society in these types of uprisings can, at least partially, be convincingly explained by the fact that they often lived on the fringes of society, ostracised and set apart from precisely the types of professional, neighbourhood, and familial bonds that are detailed above.\(^{640}\) The example from San Marcos also suggests that, for those who formed part of the criminal underclass, there was little to be gained from the increased attention such actions might bring from the authorities. Thinking further about how the lack of such bonds could impact participation in unrest can also lead us to question a common trope about the rebels in Andalusia, namely that they were primarily foreigners or "strangers"; recently arrived in either Andalusia or the particular town or city where trouble arose. Many of the chronicles written shortly after the revolts, as well as some of the documentation sent to Madrid by Andalusian officials, attribute much of the blame for the revolts to forasteros (meaning strangers, outsiders, or aliens) and Portuguese individuals, particularly in the larger cities of Seville, Granada and Córdoba.\(^{641}\) There is no doubt that the presence of foreigner and forasteros in Andalusia was a cause for concern to some, especially given the ongoing conflict with Portugal, and these contemporary concerns have often been picked up by historians writing about the revolts. However whether or not these outsiders actually took on a significant role in the revolts in 1647 to 1652 can certainly be questioned.

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\(^{640}\) Ruff, 205–6.

\(^{641}\) See for example: *Carta de la ciudad de Granada de 16 de junio de 1648*, AHN, Consejos 7160, año 1648, número 1, documento 71; *Correspondencia, 28 de mayo de 1652*, SNAHN, OSUNA, C.313, D.57-58, f. 2; Anonymous, *Diario exacto*, 35–36.
In the same year that *alteraciones andaluzas* was first published, historian Rafael Sánchez Mantero penned an article about the Sevillian revolt that used some sources that were overlooked by Domínguez Ortiz.⁶⁴² Most importantly he discovered a book published in 1841 that purported to be a reproduction of an anonymous manuscript account of the revolt in Seville.⁶⁴³ This book gives by far the most detailed account of events in the city, including multiple names and occupations of those involved in the troubles and, at times, almost full pieces of dialogue. The manuscript on which it is based has remained lost and we have no reliable information as to when, or by whom, it was written. However the book concurs with other sources, such as Joseph Maldonado Dávila y Saavedra's manuscript in enough places, whilst containing sufficient original information of its own, to give it an appearance of authenticity. Sánchez Mantero took the book at face value, and used the information it contains on the professions of a selection of those involved in the revolts to shed some light on the possible social make-up of the crowd. Having collated information on twenty-four of the named individuals in the text, he noted that eighteen of them worked in the textile industry.⁶⁴⁴ However, in contrast to Domínguez Ortiz, Sánchez Mantero took this as evidence that the majority of those involved in the violence were vagabonds and rootless people of negligible means.⁶⁴⁵ This assertion was primarily based on the fact that only four of the named individuals that he surveyed were natives of Seville, with many coming from Granada, Córdoba and Portugal.⁶⁴⁶ Sánchez Mantero speculated that many of these people must have recently moved to Seville, attracted by the labour shortage that followed the plague in 1649 and pushed there by the decline of the silk industry in the nearby cities of Granada and Córdoba.⁶⁴⁷

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⁶⁴² Sánchez Mantero, ‘Algunos aspectos sociales’.
⁶⁴³ Anonymous, *Diario exacto*.
⁶⁴⁵ Sánchez Mantero, 321.
⁶⁴⁶ Sánchez Mantero, 317.
⁶⁴⁷ Sánchez Mantero, 317–18.
There is no doubt that cities such as Seville, Córdoba and Granada, like all early modern cities, had substantial populations of new arrivals, as a result of both domestic and international migration. However there are good reasons to question the idea of a preponderance of non-Sevillians and Portuguese being present amongst the rebels. For one, Sánchez Mantero's list does not include all of the individuals who are named in the *Diario exacto*. He limited his selection to twenty-four of the most prominent names and if we expand his methodology to all of the named individuals, a different picture emerges.\(^{648}\) Out of sixty-nine names, only twenty-one are explicitly described as not from Seville. For the vast majority (forty-three), no origins are stated, and if we assume that a place of origin was only deemed of interest when non-Sevillian, then this preponderance of outsiders disappears.\(^{649}\) Another factor that seems to contradict this argument is that one of the rebels' demands, as listed in the *Diario*, was that neither 'foreigners nor Portuguese' be allowed to sit on the city council.\(^{650}\) A fact which seems difficult to reconcile with the idea of a revolt led primarily by people not from Seville.

Yet even these revised figures from the *Diario exacto*, which suggest that around 30 per cent of the rebels were non-Sevillian, may well be an exaggeration. The text, like almost all of the available sources about the events of 1647 to 1652, only names people who were subsequently punished by the authorities for their role in the revolt. Whilst the strength of recently arrived migrants' family, neighbourhood and professional ties might make us question their capability to take leading roles in the revolt, it is also plausible that, when looking for individuals to punish, the authorities found it easier to single out non-Sevillian individuals for exemplary punishment, rather than those who had more established roots and networks within the city. As Igor Knezevic points

\(^{648}\) Sánchez Mantero, 316–17.

\(^{649}\) The *Diario exacto* also never makes it clear when these foreigners might have moved to Seville: it names Francisco Hurtado as having been a 'native of Toledo' (*natural de Toledo*), but gives no information as to how long he had been in the city: Anonymous, *Diario exacto*, 35. Knezevic suggests that many of those identified as transient foreigners by the authorities after the revolt may well have actually established substantial roots in the city: Knezevic, ‘Lords of the Seven Parishes’, 198–99.

\(^{650}\) 'estranjeros, ni portugueses', Anonymous, *Diario exacto*, 102.
out, the blaming of forasteros and foreigners for the outbreak of popular revolts was nothing new in seventeenth century Spain: many accounts of the Comuneros revolts of 1521 equally blame the actions of Portuguese nationals or non-natives of the cities in which troubles erupted. The continuation of this trope in the surviving sources that we have regarding 1647 to 1652 can thus arguably be attributed to three factors: the search for scapegoats to punish; a general trend to blame foreigners for unrest; and, in the words of Knezevic, the desire on the part of future chroniclers of the revolts to 'partially exonerate' the native community from which they came. In terms of assessing the writings that repeatedly blame outsiders, we might be minded to follow the views of the Consejo de Castilla, which opined on the matter in September of 1652 with respect to the situation in Córdoba. The bishop of Córdoba had written a lengthy letter to the Consejo with a long list of complaints and worries about the state of affairs in his city; amongst which was the fear that the large number of 'forasteros' and 'portugueses' that lived in Córdoba could revolt once again, and possibly appeal to Portugal for support against the monarchy. The Consejo dismissed these concerns rather warily in a letter to the king, stating that 'in this part the Consejo can only say that in Córdoba there are Portuguese and outsiders, as there are in all cities, and parts of the kingdom, and that being vassals of your majesty they cannot be removed.' The bishop had also followed this up with another trope (one that often accompanies similar anti-migrant sentiments today), namely that a large number of idle young people in the city were causing trouble. These youngsters 'lived scandalously and solicited women' and the only solution was to send them all on military service: 'without admitting them any excuse'. Once again the Consejo was unmoved, dryly advising the

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651 Knezevic, ‘Lords of the Seven Parishes’, 89.
652 Knezevic, 89.
653 Consejo de Castilla de 10 de septiembre de 1652, AHN, Consejos 7162, año 1652, número 1, documento 34.
654 Ibid.
655 ‘en est parte solo puede decir el consejo que en Córdoba abra portugueses y forasteros como los ai en todas las ciudades, y lugares de el reyno, y que siendo vasallos todos de VMgd, no pueden despedirse’, Ibid.
656 ‘viven con escandelo y solicitan mugeres’, ‘sin admitirles escusa’, Ibid.
king that 'to force all the idle youths in the cities to go to war is an unfounded and impractical proposition'.

Moriscos

If the Portuguese and forasteros were often feared and scapegoated as fifth columnists in many parts of Andalusia during and after the revolts, the same can be said of another important minority in the region: the moriscos. The blame attributed by the various authorities in the towns and cities of Andalusia was arguably shaped by each locality's individual social and political situation. Thus in Ayamonte, after the uprising, the fear of further trouble in the town was justified by its corregidor on the basis that the Portuguese in the town outnumbered the Castilians, and that the town was only separated from Portugal by ‘a small sliver of river’. In Seville which – like all big European cities – attracted large amounts of migrants, it was a combination of forasteros and Portuguese who were blamed. In Granada, worries about a remaining morisco population surfaced after the 1648 revolt. Despite the chequered history of the Muslim and morisco population of the kingdom of Granada, post the Christian conquest of 1492, there is good evidence that a substantial morisco population remained in Granada in the mid-seventeenth century, even after the expulsions that occurred after the Alpujarras revolts (1568-1571) and in 1609. Many retained strong links to both sericulture and the silk industry, as did many of the participants in the revolts in Seville, Córdoba and Granada. However, whilst Garrad has shown the links between the silk industry, moriscos, and the Alpujarras revolt in the sixteenth century, there is little to suggest that the events of 1648 were in any sense led by, or directed by the morisco community. Workers from the silk industry as a whole seem to

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657 'obligar a todos los mozos ociosos que ai en las Ciudades a que baian a la guerra es proposicion sin fundamento, e impracticable', Ibid.
658 'un pedaço de rio', Carta de don Pedro de Carvajal a Felipe IV, 27 de agosto de 1652, AHN, Consejos 7162, año 1652, número 3.
have taken a leading role in the uprising, regardless of morisco ancestry or not.\textsuperscript{661} It is also important not to lump all moriscos into a similar grouping. Enrique Soria Mesa's research, for example, has shown that a number of morisco families managed to rise to the top of the silk industry in Granada, accumulating wealth and public offices over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{662} This group, at least, would have been more closely allied to the forces of order, rather than any rebels in 1648. Nevertheless, the fear of a morisco uprising was to surface most potently in Granada in 1650, when rumours began to circulate in the city of a second planned uprising.\textsuperscript{663} Having been tipped off, the city authorities made a number of arrests and, after torturing the suspects, extracted details of a violent plot to kill various city officials, take armed possession of Granada, and then appeal to France and Portugal for support against the monarchy.\textsuperscript{664} The main culprits were identified, in both contemporary reports sent to Madrid and a later chronicle of the events, as moriscos from the Albaicín district.\textsuperscript{665} However, historians have generally tended to wonder whether such an elaborate plot was ever truly afoot, especially given the limited evidence; much of which was provided by suspects who had been tortured, or individuals seeking reward for uncovering the conspiracy.\textsuperscript{666} It is by no means impossible that such a plot was hatched by the morisco community and we should certainly consider the episode as a reflection of the potential for unrest that persisted in the city after 1648. Yet as I. A. A. Thompson has suggested, the blaming of 'outsiders' and the 'enemy within, the moriscos of the Albaicín' may well reveal more about the fears of the city authorities than the true nature of any planned uprising.\textsuperscript{667}

\textsuperscript{661} Domínguez Ortiz, \textit{Alteraciones}, 56; Thompson, ‘Alteraciones Granadinas’, 800.
\textsuperscript{662} Soria Mesa, ‘Los Moriscos Que Se Quedaron’.
\textsuperscript{663} Domínguez Ortiz, \textit{Alteraciones}, 66–68.
\textsuperscript{664} Domínguez Ortiz, 66–68; Thompson, ‘Alteraciones Granadinas’, 804.
\textsuperscript{666} Domínguez Ortiz, \textit{Alteraciones}, 67; Thompson, ‘Alteraciones Granadinas’, 804.
Black Africans and Slaves

A few mentions have survived that shed some light on the experiences of black African and mixed race individuals during the revolts of 1647 to 1652. Research into cities such as Seville and Granada has tended to emphasise the relatively high level of racial diversity that existed amongst their populations in the seventeenth century; in large part due to the significant presence of enslaved individuals, many of whom were black Africans. We lack the demographic information to know the precise number of slaves living in Andalusia in the 1640s and 1650s, but Aurelia Martín Casares estimates that between 2 to 14 per cent of the population of Granada were slaves at various points in the seventeenth century.668 In Seville records also suggest that around 7 per cent of the population may have been slaves in 1565 and, whilst this number had probably declined by the mid-seventeenth century, Alessandro Stella’s work has shown that depending on the parishes selected – and depending on whether you look at baptism, marriage or burial records – this number fluctuated somewhere between 2 and 7 per cent in the first half of the century.669 The presence of slaves was not limited to the large cities. A town such as Ayamonte, for example, exploited its position on the border between Portugal and Spain to become an important link in this domestic slave trade.670 The brief glimpses that we can catch of these individuals during the revolts suggest that, as order broke down across the region, they may have become more vulnerable to instances of violence. In Ayamonte we have testimony regarding the fate of a domestic slave, which suggests that, far from participating in the revolts as a result of their low wealth and social position, many of these individuals were too strongly bound to their owners to do anything but try to protect their property. When rebels in the town attempted to sack the house of the local tax collector (who had already fled town) they were confronted by his slave and, as this man attempted to protect his owner’s property,

668 Aurelia Martín Casares, La esclavitud en la Granada del Siglo XVII (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2000), 15.
he was stabbed to death by the crowd. Antonio Manuel González Díaz makes the important point that he seems to have been the only person to lose his life during the uprising in Ayamonte. In contrast to the restraint that was generally shown by the crowds in 1647 to 1652, who rarely actually murdered the officials that they so often claimed they wanted to kill, the killing of this man seems to have been carried out with little hesitation. The life of a slave was clearly not comparable to that of a local official, either in the eyes of the crowd or the authorities. The incident was treated 'as little more than an anecdote' by the municipal government when it recorded its version of events a few days later.

The colour of one's skin, not just the status of being a slave, could also expose one to violence during such breakdowns in social order. In the Biblioteca Capitular of Seville's Cathedral there is a copy of Joseph Maldonado Dávila y Saavedra's famous manuscript about the revolt in Seville that contains a fascinating addendum to the main text, in the form of a note from an anonymous copyist. In it, the copyist claims to have known don Joseph, been one of his neighbours, and to have witnessed the revolt of 1652; and he provides a rather personal account of where he was and what he saw during the unrest. In it our narrator tells us that he witnessed the murder of a mixed race man. This individual was leading a gang of men involved in the uprising, who were going house-to-house looking for reserves of grain. However, after entering a nobleman's house, a dispute over money erupted, and when their leader suggested that they were not there to steal but to try to find reserves of wheat, the gang turned on him. Shouting that 'it was a disgrace that white men should let themselves be governed subject to a mulatto dog', they stabbed him to death, leaving his body in the courtyard of the house.

Both these episodes in Seville and Ayamonte are indicative of

671 Acta capitular de 30 de mayo, Año 1652, AMA, Libro de Actas Capitulares, legajo 5, año 1637-1668.
672 González Díaz, La esclavitud en Ayamonte, 90.
673 González Díaz, 90.
674 González Díaz, 90.
675 Anonymous, 'Nota', in Memorias de diferentes cosas sucedidas en esta Muy Noble y Muy Leal ciudad de Sevilla. Copiándose en Sevilla. Año 1696, Biblioteca Capitular Colombina (BCC), 84-7-21, ff. 153-156.
676 'era verguenza que hombres blancos se dejasen gouernar sujetandose a un pero Mulato', Ibid, f. 154.
the dangers faced by members of minorities during periods of unrest in early modern Europe. They again remind us that a broad generalisation along wealth lines must be qualified when it comes to thinking about participation in revolts. Who was involved in crowd actions and the different people that suffered the violence that these episodes often visited was not just a simple story of rich versus poor, but one that was intrinsically bound up with the strength of the ties that an individual had to a local community and the religious and racial prejudice that underpinned those societies.

Women

If, as discussed above, the nature of the surviving evidence might overstate the role of the forasteros and Portuguese in the revolts of 1647 to 1652 then the opposite may well be true when it comes to thinking about the participation of women. Women are notable only in their absence in the histories that have been written about the revolts to date and, at first reading, the surviving sources seem to confirm this picture, with precious few direct mentions of women. However this is at odds with much recent work that has shown the frequent participation of women in early modern European crowd actions. Studies of countries such as England, France, and the Netherlands have all shown, perhaps counter-intuitively to what we would expect in a heavily patriarchal early modern European society, that women often made up a substantial portion of the participants in crowds, and sometimes even took on important leadership roles during unrest. Much of this work has focused on women's roles in subsistence riots; with historians hypothesising that, being traditionally charged with managing the household economy, they were both directly exposed to food price rises and often actually physically present in the marketplaces when trouble erupted over


the costs of foodstuffs.\footnote{Hufton, ‘Women in Revolution’, 94–95.} However, it is also clear that women's involvement went beyond mere hunger riots to encompass a wider range of political issues.\footnote{Merry E. Wiesner-Hanks, \textit{Women and Gender in Early Modern Europe}, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 287. For women taking action over taxation in seventeenth-century France, see: Beik, ‘The Culture of Protest’.} Overall, there have been fewer studies of women's involvement in early modern Spanish revolts than the northern European countries mentioned above (with some notable exceptions); and Samuel Cohn Jr points to a similar lack of historical work that mentions women in revolt in Italy.\footnote{Cohn Jr., ‘Women in Revolt’, 213. Some notable exceptions for Spain are: Eva Mendieta Garrote and Isabel Molina Martos, ‘Revolta social en la Edad Moderna europea: Participación y discurso de las mujeres en la Matxinada de la sal de Bilbao (1631-1634)’, \textit{Vasconia}, no. 42 (5 February 2019); José A. Nieto Sánchez and Juan Antonio González Paño, ‘El conflicto social en el Madrid del siglo XVII’, in \textit{Lo conflicto y lo consensual en Castilla: socieda... a Francisco Tomás y Valiente}, ed. Francisco Javier Guillamón Álvarez and José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez (Universidad de Murcia, 2004), 390; Javier Ruiz Astiz, ‘La participación de las mujeres en los desórdenes públicos: análisis de su presencia en la Navarra moderna’, \textit{Sancho el sabio: Revista de cultura e investigación vasca}, no. 33 (2010): 11–34.} An earlier historiography might have explained this with regards to the greater freedoms afforded to women in northern compared to southern Europe.\footnote{This blanket generalisation continues to be repeated, even in relatively recent publications. See for example: Bernard Capp, ‘Gender and Family’, in \textit{The European World, 1500-1800: An Introduction to Early Modern History}, ed. Beat Kümin, 2nd ed. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 38.} However current research would challenge this on two grounds. Firstly there has been much work to counter the stereotype of southern European women having substantially fewer freedoms than those in the north. Allyson Poska's work on Galician peasants and Alexandra Parma Cook's study of the women of Triana (Seville), for example, suggest that Castilian inheritance law afforded women greater financial security than many of their northern counterparts.\footnote{Allyson M. Poska, \textit{Women and Authority in Early Modern Spain: The Peasants of Galicia} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 41; Alexandra Parma Cook, ‘The Women of Early Modern Triana: Life, Death and Survival Strategies in Seville’s Maritime District’, in \textit{Women in Port: Gendering Communities, Economies and Social Networks in Atlantic Port Cities, 1500-1800}, ed. Douglas Catterall and Jodi Campbell (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 41–42.} No doubt differences existed when it came to the legal, religious and customary structures that constrained women's lives, but it seems too simplistic to think of a strict north-south divide to explain an absence from political participation. Secondly, work has often actually explained women's presence in early modern revolts as being, at least partially, a result of their subordinate legal and social status, arguing that this made them less likely to elicit violent
repression from the authorities or to face subsequent prosecution. Instead it seems likely that the absence of women from the histories of the revolts of 1647 to 1652 is more easily explained by the biases of the sources that we have at our disposal, rather than an actual all-male crowd composition. Many of the surviving accounts of the Andalusian uprisings are official state records that come to us either in the form of letters sent to Madrid by local officials, who were often having to report on how they had been chased out of town by angry mobs; or in the record books of town councils who were holding their first meeting after the restoration of order. There was clearly an incentive for substantial self-fashioning in these accounts, which is why we might be cautious about accepting the duque de Cardona's account of five hundred armed rebels in Lucena, or Ayamonte's town council's description of three hundred angry protesters at completely face value. It was in these people's interests to present as imposing a picture of the crowds as possible. The second most common type of source that we have are chronicles of the revolts, almost all written (as far as we know) by members of the upper classes, who were firmly on the side of the forces of order. Once again, much like how these accounts may overstate the role of foreigners in order to preserve a more idealistic view of their local community, they may also omit mentions of women taking part in actions perceived as unseemly. Now, clearly, none of the above is actual evidence of women's participation in the Andalusian uprisings and we should be mindful of Shannon McSheffrey's warning not to go so far in hypothesising about women's roles in revolts that we forget 'the immense strength of the structural barriers that kept women from formal participation in political processes'. However, neither should we take the absence of mentions of women in the surviving

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684 Wiesner-Hanks, *Women and Gender*, 287. This should be caveated with the fact that women in early modern revolts were often subjected to physical abuse and prosecution, yet continued to protest: Wiesner-Hanks, 287; Mendieta Garrote and Molina Martos, ‘Revuelta social’, 12.

685 Cartas de Lucena a la Real Chancillería de Granada, 17 de enero de 1647, AHN, Consejos 7159, año 1647, número 5; Acta capitular de 30 de mayo, Año 1652, AMA, libro de actas capitulares, legajo 5, año 1637-1668.


sources as definitive proof that they had no involvement, especially when a closer inspection does begin to reveal some suggestive details.

In Córdoba an anonymous manuscript source tells us that the revolt was started by a woman shouting in the streets on the morning of Monday 6 May 1652. The biography of Pedro de Tapia, then the bishop of Córdoba, adds the details that she was a Galician woman who was screaming with rage about her child who had died of hunger, and claiming that she wanted to rip the city's corregidor to shreds. As people began to gather around the woman, chanting 'long live the king and death to the bad government', a number of other women apparently exhorted men to join the crowd. Neither the records of Córdoba's actas capitulares nor the official letter sent to Madrid by Córdoba's corregidor have any time for such details, but nor do they exclude this possibility. Juan E. Gelabert wondered whether or not the story about the Galician woman was true, however whilst some of the details from the bishop of Córdoba's biography, such as the dead child, may be the result of some literary licence (there is little evidence of people dying of starvation in 1647 to 1652) there does not seem to be any great reason to doubt the idea of a woman being the focal point for the beginnings of the revolt in Córdoba. There is also some similar evidence from Seville. In a letter of 28 May 1652 Francisco de Torregrosa Monsalve wrote to the Duke of Béjar – for whom he helped manage various properties and lands in and around Seville – describing the revolts as having started when a woman, upset at being charged seven reales for a loaf of bread, began shouting in the square of the Feria about the injustices of the high prices and the bad government that had caused

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688 Anonymous, Relación de lo sucedido en la ciudad de Córdoba en 6 de mayo de 1652, BNE, Mss 2383, f. 225.
689 Antonio de Lorea, El siervo de Dios ... Fr. Pedro de Tapia, de la Orden de Predicadores, Obispo de Segovia, Siguencia, Cordova y Arzobispo de Sevilla... istoria de su apostolica vida y prodigiosa muerte (Madrid: la Imprenta Real por Iuan Garcia Infançon, 1676), 191.
690 Anonymous, Relación de lo sucedido en la ciudad de Córdoba, BNE, Mss 2383, f. 225; de Lorea, 191; Gelabert, Castilla convulsa, 337; Teodomiro Ramírez de Arellano y Gutiérrez, Paseos Por Córdoba, vol. 1 (Córdoba: Rafael Arroyo, 1873), 154–55.
691 Acta capitular de 7 de mayo de 1652 y 8 de mayo de 1652, Archivo Municipal de Córdoba (AMC), Actas capitulares, año 1652, SF/L 00161; Carta del corregidor de Córdoba, vizconde de Peña Parda, 7 de mayo de 1652, ACV, transcribed in: Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 173–74.
692 Gelabert, Castilla convulsa, 337.
them. Whilst the other two main manuscript accounts make no mention of such an occurrence they are also vague enough to accommodate this version of events. The *Diario exacto* does however describe how, later that day, ‘veiled women’ were on the streets, pointing out houses which they believed to contain wheat to the armed bands of rebels who were marauding the city.

All of this suggests that we should take seriously the fact that a large number of the accounts about the revolts use non-gender specific language when describing the people involved: ‘*la gente*, ‘*los vecinos*, ‘*los alborotos*’. We should be careful not to automatically assume that these participants were male. In a non-Andalusian example, some documents detailing unrest in the town of Puebla de Alcocer, near Badajoz in Extremadura on 21 January 1650, give further support for the idea that women may have been excluded from the types of sources that survive about the revolts. A letter sent to the monarchy about the events in Puebla de Alcocer tells us that a group from the neighboring town of Esparragosa de Lares had stormed into the town at midnight, where they had smashed windows of houses by throwing stones and broken into the local prison, seemingly in protest at the presence of a royal tax collector. We do not have much more information about this unrest, beyond this brief description, which makes it difficult to assess the extent to which it could be linked to the concurrent troubles in Andalusia, or whether it should lead us to question Domínguez Ortiz’s assertion that the troubles of 1647 to 1652 barely extended beyond the boundaries of lower Andalusia. However this letter does clearly mention that the group from Esparragosa was comprised of one hundred to one hundred and fifty ‘women and young men’, led

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693 *Correspondencia, 28 de mayo de 1652*, SNAHN, OSUNA, C.313, D.57-58, f. 2.
695 *mujeres tapadas*, Anonymous, 46.
696 For some examples see: *Consejo de Castilla de 15 de marzo de 1647*, AHN, Consejos 7159, año 1647, documento 20; *Acta capitular de 30 de mayo, Año 1652*, AMA, libro de actas capitulares, legajo 5, año 1637-1668; de Lorea, *El siervo de Dios*, 191.
697 *Pleito seguido por el concejo de la villa de la Puebla de Alcocer, contra algunos vecinos de la villa de Esparragosa, por haber causado motín y revueltas en aquella villa*, SNAHN, OSUNA, C.401, D.47.
698 Ibid, ff. 2-3.
699 Domínguez Ortiz, *Alteraciones*, 133.
by a priest. Helpfully for our purposes, the letter is followed by a number of documents that outline the punishments that were imposed on those involved in this revolt. It is striking that, despite the original correspondence making it clear that women played a major role in the disturbance, all of the twenty or so individuals who were variously sentenced to death, the galleons, or banishment were men. This serves to reinforce two important points. Firstly that women were less likely than men to be punished for their involvement in unrest. Secondly that where we have accounts of revolts, such as Joseph Maldonado Dávila y Saavedra's manuscript and the *Diario exacto*, that only contain the names of rebels who were subsequently punished for their actions, they are likely to grossly, if not completely, understate the role of women.

Overall, it is difficult to piece together the precise picture of how widely women were involved in the revolts in Andalusia, but we can say with some certainty that they made up a meaningful portion of the crowds that took action in 1647 to 1652: something that does not come across in the histories previously written about these events. It is, however, also possible that the more violent episodes – the times when armed conflict erupted during the revolts – were predominantly male dominated. Where armed gangs are referred to we find more gender specific language: 'quarenta o zinquenta hombres que todos estan armadoss' in Lucena, a 'quadrilla de quinientos hombres' who raided the royal armoury in Seville and stole four cannons. It would seem sensible to posit that the patriarchal society of early modern Andalusia may have led to the gendering of such actions and that women may instead have more commonly taken on different roles in the revolt: marching, chanting, exhorting, and identifying targets, as we saw in Seville. The evidence is sparse, but if women were active in the early stages of the revolts, they were also probably involved in any planning that may have taken place (to be discussed later). The existence

700 'mujeres y muchachos', *Pleito seguido por el concejo de la villa de la Puebla de Alcocer*, SNAHN, OSUNA, C.401, D.47, f. 2.
701 Ibid, ff. 4-10.
702 *Cartas de Lucena a la Real Chancillería de Granada, 17 de enero de 1647, Archivo Histórico Nacional (AHN), Consejos 7159, año 1647, número 5*; Anonymous, *Diario exacto*, 61.
of such divisions, and the idea that men were more frequently involved in the more violent actions, would also help to provide an additional explanation for the dominance of male prosecutions that supplements the perhaps overly simplistic notion that reduced female legal responsibility was the sole factor at play. Working with such limited evidence makes it difficult to draw absolute distinctions between male and female actions. The reality is probably that, whilst women’s roles were in some ways circumscribed, there were always exceptions and outliers. Revolts were messy affairs. Some evidence from Torredonjimeno emphasises this point. It comes, not from a first hand account but rather the work of a local chronicler in the eighteenth century, who seems to have been passed down much of the information from his grandparents. Whilst we might question its veracity on these grounds, we could also argue that this freed the writer from some of the aforementioned biases that affected the local officials who reported on the revolts in their immediate aftermath. On 24 August of 1649 revolt broke out in Torredonjimeno; led, apparently, by a friar from the Order of Calatrava. During the uprising a crowd chased the town’s alcalde don Alonso Cobo through the streets, sacking numerous houses as they went, until they finally caught up with him between the Hermita de Santa Cruz and the Molino del Rey, on the camino de Jaén. Here the chronicler, Fray Juan Lendínez, informs us that the crowd: ‘killed him with blows from sticks, and stones; in which the women (from what I heard from my grandparents) were the most daring’. Of the six people put to death in the subsequent repression, all were men.

Why did these people revolt?

The Grievances

Thinking about female participation in these revolts can lead us to try to identify some specific reasons for why women may have become involved. The fact that issues of bread prices and

703 Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 65n2; Téllez Anguita, ‘Un motín de subsistencia’, 12.
704 ‘le quitaron la vida con golpes de palos, y piedras; en que las mugeres (según oí a mis abuelos) fueron las más osadas’, Fray Juan Lendínez, Augusta Gemela Ilustrada con los pueblos de su partido hoy villa de Martos (1777), legajos 426-427, manuscript in private collection, transcribed in: Téllez Anguita, ‘Un motín de subsistencia’, 15.
705 Téllez Anguita, 15.
disturbances in food markets were never far from the grievances of rebels across the period 1647 to 1652, seem like text-book versions of the idea that women's traditional roles in the household economy putting them at the forefront of subsistence riots. However it would be overly simplistic to view women's participation in these revolts as purely linked to household management. It might, in fact, be more productive to think about the ways in which these women shared many of the same social ties, motivations and grievances of their male counterparts. As we have seen, the majority of the rebels in Andalusia appear to have been people of modest means who, whilst not being wealthy, did often have a trade or an artisan background. This varied based on the differing characteristics of each town's workforces. So, in Ayamonte the rebels came from the fishing and maritime sectors whilst in the major cities of Seville, Granada, and Córdoba textile workers, in particular from the silk industry, were heavily represented. We know that an industry such as the silk industry in this period in Europe were often based on family run workshops that had significant female workforces. Olwen Hufton, for example, has estimated that in Lyon, France the female workforce outstripped the male by a factor of five. There is less concrete evidence available for a city such as Seville in the seventeenth century, but most historians assume that the female workforce there was important. Alexandra Parma Cook's work on Triana has also shown how wives and other female relatives in port cities were often instrumental in managing the financial affairs of families that were involved in maritime trades, being granted power of attorneys to enter into business contracts and the like whilst men were away at sea. We should thus be careful about trying to separate issues such as disputes over pay in the silk industry and bread prices in the market into either female and male grievances. Women and men would have shared many of the professional ties alongside the family and neighbourhood ties that were discussed above (although, of course, distinct male and

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female networks would have existed simultaneously). Their grievances, in this case, coalesced around similar issues.

What then were the grievances that pushed these men and women of modest means into revolt in 1647 to 1652? These artisans and tradespeople certainly felt the sharp end of many issues that came to impact Andalusian society in the seventeenth century. An important factor was the decline of trade with the Americas and Seville’s diminishing role in this enterprise over the course of the seventeenth century, along with the other problems that impacted industries such as the silk industry in the region (see chapter 2). As we have seen, international trade embargoes with an ever mounting number of enemy states further contributed to the disruption of trade in the first half of the seventeenth century. War with neighbouring Portugal had a particular economic impact on Andalusia which was felt beyond the largest metropolises. The town of Ayamonte, for example, conveniently situated on the border between Portugal and Andalusia, had experienced an economic boom during the union of the two countries, which swiftly came to an end in 1640 when war broke out. Royal revenue extraction to pay for these wars also hit Andalusia’s inhabitants hard, with José Ignacio Andrés Ucendo estimating that 1635 to 1660 was the period during the seventeenth century in which the heaviest burden of millones taxation was imposed upon the inhabitants of Castile. It is also important to note that because much of the crown’s revenue raising apparatus was centred around municipal tax revenues (see chapter 3), a far heavier burden of this taxation fell upon the inhabitants of Castile’s towns and cities, compared to the rural population. Neither were such extractions purely financial. There were repeated military recruitment drives during which towns and cities were required to supply men to join the armies fighting in Portugal and Catalonia. In Palma del Río, for example, the town council records of the 1640s and early 1650s show that the

710 José Ignacio Andrés Ucendo, La fiscalidad en Castilla en el siglo XVII los servicios de millones, 1601-1700 (Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco, 1999), 157–59.
town council was frequently concerned both with the raising of funds to pay for contributions towards the monarchy's military commitments and with conscripting men to be sent to war. Thus in 1642 we find the town council asking for royal permission to extract two hundred fanegas of wheat from the pósito to pay for the 'conducción, flete y gastos de la milicia desta villa'; promising to replace the wheat within a year.\textsuperscript{712} In June of 1643 we can find evidence in the actas of five men being conscripted to the army; whilst in April of 1651 seven men were sent to Córdoba to satisfy a levy of troops being organised by city's corregidor on behalf of the king.\textsuperscript{713} The Consejo de Castilla was cognisant of the pressures that these measures put on the Andalusian population; asking the king in 1648 whether it was sensible, in a year of 'much suffering and the shortage of bread', to conscript men from the kingdoms of Seville and Córdoba for the campaign in Catalonia, when many had already been obliged to serve against Portugal.\textsuperscript{714} All of the above factors combined to mean that the first half of the seventeenth century was a relatively bad time to be a Sevillian silk worker, or an artisan of modest means in Andalusia. It seems undoubtable that the monarchy's military campaigns and resulting fiscal pressures contributed to making people's everyday lives more difficult in the decades leading up to the revolts, and many of these issues sat behind the complaints that came to the fore in the revolts between 1647 and 1652.

Beyond a general picture of declining wages and increased taxation, there were also issues and events more specific to the five year period between 1647 and 1652 that negatively affected the townsfolk of Andalusia. The most destructive of these was undoubtedly the plague of 1649 to 1651, which caused massive mortality in a number of towns and cities.\textsuperscript{715} Antonio Domínguez Ortiz viewed the disruption, terror, subsequent population migrations that occurred as a result of this

\textsuperscript{712} Acta capitular de 5 de junio, año 1643, AMPR, libro de actas capitulares, año 1640-1648.
\textsuperscript{713} Acta capitular de 11 de junio, año 1642, AMPR, libro de actas capitulares, año 1640-1648; Carta del corregidor de Córdoba de 17 de abril, año 1652, AMPR, libro de actas capitulares, año 1651-1659.
\textsuperscript{714} 'mucho padecer y de la carestía del pan', Consejo de Castilla de 8 de febrero de 1648, AHN, Consejos 7160, año 1648, número 2.
\textsuperscript{715} More information in chapter 6.
epidemic as one of the indirect causes of the trouble that followed in places like Seville in 1652. Yet, we might also view it as a factor that actually led to a break in the political tensions and that might help explain the relative absence of revolts between 1649 and 1650, when the disease was at its most potent. Another important issue was the monetary revaluation of 1651. As explained in chapter 2 this was similar to an earlier revaluation in 1641, when individuals were forced to exchange any vellón coinage in their possession for a smaller number of coins, re-stamped with higher values. This meant that, whilst the nominal value of people's cash holdings remained the same, the monarchy was able to pocket the excess coinage. The result of both these revaluations was to lead to a collapse in confidence in the vellón coinage and price inflation. People (rightly) worried that the values might be reduced again in the future and instead began to demand payment in the higher value silver and gold currency pieces that were also in circulation. For example in June of 1642 Francisco de Torregrosa Monsalve (one of the wealthy eyewitnesses of the 1652 revolt in Seville) wrote to the Duke of Béjar advising that he should refuse to accept the settlement of a debt in vellón coinage, as a result of the risks posed by the inflated value that the currency held at that time. As Javier de Santiago Fernández notes, these problems affected those of modest means, like the silk workers of Seville, most severely. It was this class of people who relied almost exclusively on the lower denomination coinage of the moneda de vellón and who did not have access to the much more valuable silver and gold currency pieces, to which the rich could turn to when the moneda de vellón lost its value. In Granada in 1642 we can see the direct impact that this had on the silk industry. That year the high price volatility caused by the currency manipulations led to merchants withdrawing their orders from the city's weaving workshops, putting many of the local silk workers out of work. This resulted in a riot in the Campo de Príncipe square, which was only quietened when the local corregidor loaned money from the city's coffers to help keep the

716 Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 38–39.
717 See chapter 6.
718 Domínguez Ortiz, ‘Documentos’, 70.
719 Correspondencia, 10 de junio de 1642, SNAHN, OSUNA, C.313, D.67, ff. 1-2.
721 Garzón Pareja, La industria sedera, 267.
workshops in business.\textsuperscript{722} The revolt in Seville in 1652 seems to have been preceded by a similar episode. Don Gaspar Caldera de Heredia's manuscript informs us that, following the monetary alterations in 1651, the city's merchants also suspended their orders with the local silk industry, leaving many silk workers and officials out of work.\textsuperscript{723} In a more general sense, the monetary revaluation was also identified as one of the reasons for the high price of bread in both Córdoba and Seville in 1652, with a return to its previous value being one of the demands of the rebels in the latter location.\textsuperscript{724} There is no doubt that it also impacted municipal governments' attempts to purchase grain, as pósitos were forced to pay for grain in silver coins when their funds were often predominantly held in vellón maravedís.\textsuperscript{725} However there are clear limitations to viewing the monetary alterations as the key cause of the unrest in Andalusia. Not least because it does nothing to explain the numerous revolts that occurred prior to 1651. Even in 1652, in a location such as Ayamonte, the monetary alteration is not listed amongst the rebels' grievances in the reports that emerged from the town.\textsuperscript{726} Resistance to the arrival of tax collectors and demands to remove consumption taxes were a more common factor, present throughout the period 1647 to 1652 and particularly prominent in the revolts of 1647. However the price of bread was the most consistent grievance articulated by the rebels during this period, with caps on the maximum sale price of this foodstuff being the most commonly demanded and enforced measure on the part of the rebel groups that took action in Andalusia's towns and cities. These demands were tailored to the existing political system in Andalusia and the ways in which price regulation was meant to work at the time.

Historians of England, such as John Walter, have pointed out that seventeenth century crowd actions

\textsuperscript{722} Garzón Pareja, 267.
\textsuperscript{723} Caldera de Heredia, Historia arcana, RAH, 9/5719, f. 22r.
\textsuperscript{724} Correspondencia, 28 de mayo de 1652, SNAHN, OSUNA, C.313, D.57-58, f. 4; Carta del obispo de Córdoba al presidente del Consejo, 18 de abril de 1652, ACV, transcribed in: Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 171–73.
\textsuperscript{725} The Écija pósito, for example, seems to have had to pay for grains in silver reales de a ocho in May 1652, rather than the customary vellón maravedís. By early June the account books suggest that the pósito had run out of silver coins, having to delay payment of 61 reales de a ocho on 1 June for this reason: 1 de junio de 1652, Cuentas del pósito, AME, legajo 1380, libro 2093, años 1650-1652.
\textsuperscript{726} Acta capitular de 7 de mayo, Año 1652, AMA, libro de actas capitulares, legajo 5, año 1637-1668. It may be that in smaller towns such as Ayamonte there would have been a lower amount of currency in circulation than in the larger Andalusian cities and thus a greater barter economy, meaning that the monetary revaluation had a less drastic impact on prices in these locations.
there were not usually directed against government, but that the politics of food riots were 'triangulated', often targeting the grain dealers and transporters, with the aim of encouraging 'action by the magistrate'. This arguably reflected a desire for increased government intervention at a time when the grain market was becoming increasingly integrated at the national level and decreasingly policed at the local one. In mid-seventeenth century Andalusia we have a different situation: one in which the local government was far more involved in the day-to-day functioning of the grain market and where protests thus directly targeted these institutions in times of dearth. At times actions targeted hoarders, and bakers (as we shall see in Seville for example) but the corregidores and municipal officials were the most consistent and frequent targets of the rebels between 1647 to 1652. Those involved in unrest were cognisant of their municipalities' powers and duties when it came to the provisioning of grain and the crowd actions were designed to ensure that more was done and to make sure that shortages and price rises did not occur.

That is not to say that the inhabitants of the towns and cities of Andalusia were unaware of the problems caused by the harvest shortages that were affecting the region. The poor weather conditions and resulting harvest failures were common knowledge across the region. A chronicle from Seville, for example, which is generally attributed to a shopkeeper named Andrés de la Vega contains detailed descriptions of both weather conditions and their impact on local harvests in the period 1647 to 1652. Yet this did not serve to exonerate municipal governments from blame for the ensuing high prices. Quite the opposite. It was precisely during these types of situations that they were meant to act in the interests of urban consumers. The pósito system had been designed and implemented for just such occasions and people expected that municipal reserves be made available at below market prices. Price controls such as the tasa de granos were invoked and

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728 Walter, 72–73.
729 Morales Padrón, Memorias, 18–19, 115–33.
demanded by local populations, alongside measures such as the regulation of the sale price and weight of bread loaves. As we have seen, much of the heavy burden of taxation that fell on the urban populations of Andalusia had been at least partially devolved down to the municipal level. Thus, alongside a longer-standing anger at increased taxation that was focused on these municipal institutions, people demanded short term reliefs and temporary abolition of consumption taxes. As harvest shortages hit, people demanded more, not less from their local governments. As we have seen in chapters 3 and 4 local government often did try to respond to these problems. However the scale of the harvest failures combined with the plethora of export bans that local jurisdictions rushed to implement to try to protect their local supplies, worsened the problem, by fragmenting the market and severely disrupting the grain trade in Andalusia. This, combined with the fact that many of the pósitos had, by the mid-seventeenth century, been left underfunded and insufficiently provisioned, meant that in many cases municipalities were simply unable to respond. Then (just as now) the fact that the original cause of the crisis (poor weather and harvests) was exogenous to the governmental systems designed to prevent it, was not a sufficient excuse to prevent great public anger being directed towards those institutions.

The Political Culture

The high bread prices (and in 1652 the addition of monetary alterations and the after-effects of the plague) were thus added to the longer-term grievances of increasing taxes, military levies, and declining wages. All of this occurred in an Andalusian society that had a well-developed public, political culture. Michele Olivari has hypothesised that the turn of the sixteenth to seventeenth century saw an expansion across Spain of both the geographic and demographic scope of this political culture and interest in public affairs.\textsuperscript{730} He argues that Philip III’s adoption of a less authoritative approach to political criticisms than Philip II combined with a number of factors that

had been gestating over the previous century. These included the development of a larger university structure with increased geographical coverage and the resulting ‘formation of intellectual nuclei and centres of educated socialization in remote locations’.731 However, most important may have been the increased rates of literacy amongst the popular classes, encouraged by increased attention on primary schooling and a realisation amongst parents of the growing importance of literacy to future career options.732 Whilst there were considerable regional variations to this general trend, improvements in literacy rates seem to have been particularly prominent in urban areas, and amongst the artisan class. Bernard Vincent, for example, has estimated a literacy rate of around 62 per cent of in the artisan workshops of Córdoba at the end of the sixteenth century, and has also shown in survey of twenty five silk workers from the Albaicín in Granada that eighteen of these men could sign their names.733 This all combined with the fact that, by the beginning of the seventeenth century there were more available communication tools than ever to enable the spread of news, opinion, discussion and dissent. Some, such as broadsheets (relaciones de sucesos) and chap-books (pliegos sueltos) had emerged from the development of the printing press, whilst other more traditional measures such as public sermons and the posting of libels in public places arguably had an ever greater reach.734 Of particular note when it came to protests were the pasquines, handwritten posters, that would be stuck up in prominent places: on street corners, in city squares, on church doors, or even inside churches. The city of Seville, for example, was gripped in the second decade of the seventeenth century by a debate about whether or not the Virgin Mary had been conceived without sin. This reached a particular fever pitch in 1615, fuelled by the publication of some song verses – designed to be used as a learning aid in schools – that mentioned the Immaculate Conception.735 The song's popularity outraged those who disagreed with this doctrine.

731 ‘formación de núcleos intelectuales y centros de socialización culta en localidades apartadas’, Olivari, 14–15.
734 Olivari, Avisos, 185–86.
and eventually led to a printed response from the Dominican order in the city, counter-arguing that Mary had in fact been born in original sin. Whilst sermons and religious processions had been organised by the various sides of the debate in prior years to try to mobilise public opinion, in 1615 we have evidence of a widespread campaign involving the posting of handwritten bills, from both sides of the debate, in numerous public places across the city. As Mercedes de los Reyes Peña notes, these posters, alongside the dissemination of pamphlets and anonymous couplets, played a prominent role in this public debate. Clearly there was an audience for the written word that went beyond society's elites. In an episode closer to the nature of the mid-century revolts, in 1600 there had been fears of unrest in Seville when a bill was posted in the Triana district threatening that the moriscos of Seville and Córdoba were planning to rebel and to murder all the Christians. The main concern of the asistente, when informed of this, was not to prevent an uprising, but rather the murder of the city's morisco population. Instead of clamping down on what he clearly saw as an unrealistic threat, he instead had orders read around the city that no one was to harm or speak badly of the moriscos. Triana was anything but a wealthy district, sitting outside the city walls, across the Guadalquivir river from the rest of Seville, and home to the city's shipping and ceramic industries. It is indicative that the poster was both posted and able to have such a far reaching impact even here.

In the mid-seventeenth century we can find multiple descriptions of similar pasquines with more directly seditious messages being displayed in Seville, news of which appears to have soon travelled to other parts of Castile. A worried letter from a Jesuit priest in Madrid in July 1641, discussing the political climate in Spain, informed its recipient: 'that of the pasquin in Seville is

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738 de los Reyes Peña, ‘Un Pasquín Anti-Inmaculista’, 140.
739 Olivari, Avisos, 221.
740 Olivari, 222.
true’. Historians Pascual Gayangos and Juan Díaz del Moral believed that this referred to a poster, pinned up in the church of la Magdalena in Seville, on which was drawn a picture of a woman lying on the ground, unable to get up due to the weight of her uncovered breasts. At the heart of the cartoon was the double meaning of the word pechos in Spanish, which could mean both breasts and tributes (or taxes). The woman in the picture was exclaiming: 'the weight of these pechos does not let me move', with a man standing next to her responding 'well rise up!'. Díaz del Moral cites two further examples of posters put up in Seville in the early 1640s that were critical of the king and supportive of the revolt of Portugal. Discontent and anger about taxes had thus been present in the city, and across Andalusia, for a number of years prior to the outbreak of the revolts. Unfortunately, very few of these pasquines from the seventeenth century survive, even in copies. We are thus left to rely on descriptions such as those provided by Gayangos and Díaz del Moral, which invariably leave out many of the details which could help us build a better picture of the visual language and materiality of these ephemeral objects. They were often torn down rapidly, with rumours then left to swirl about their exact content: it will probably never be possible to truly ascertain to what extent the story of the women and her pechos is accurate or a result of some embellishment. However, we are lucky enough to have one of these pasquines preserved in the Archivo Histórico Nacional in Madrid (figure 20). Bundled up in a pile of correspondence from Seville to the capital dating from 1650 it appears to have escaped the attention of the historians that have so far worked on the Andalusian revolts. The pasquin is accompanied by a letter from Pedro de Zamora Hurtado, the regente of Seville, who was sending it to the monarchy as evidence of the threat of unrest in the city. In it he details how a number of 'posters and signs' had recently been put up in the 'public

740 Pascual Gayangos, ed., Cartas de algunos P.P. de la Compañía de Jesus tomo IV, Memorial Histórico Español: Coleccion de Documentos, Opúsculos y Antiguedades que Publica la Real Academia de la Historia 16 (Madrid: La Imprenta Nacional, 1862), 160–61.
742 Díaz del Moral, Historia de las Agitaciones, 66.
743 'el peso de aquellos pechos no me dejan mover', 'pues levántate', Gayangos, Cartas, 160n2; Díaz del Moral, Historia de las Agitaciones, 66–67.
744 Díaz del Moral, Historia de las Agitaciones, 67.
745 Carta de Pedro de Zamora Hurtado de 25 de octubre de 1650, AHN, Consejos 7144, I.
Figure 20: Pasquín from Seville, 1650.
areas' of Seville; one of which he had ripped down from a door in the plaza de San Francisco, close to the Real Audiencia in the centre of the city.\textsuperscript{746}

The pasquín is not much larger than a sheet of A4 paper and does not show much evidence of the type of considered design that might have been necessary to execute the pechos cartoon. The writing, for example, starts off large and then tails off into a more condensed hand as the author presumably began to run out of space. Rather than thinking of this as a poster primarily designed to

\textsuperscript{746} 'carteles y zedulones', 'partes publicas', Ibid.
encourage people in the city to join an uprising, we might think of it instead as a more direct threat to the local government. The wording of the pasquín is definitely more akin to a warning, threatening the government with the loss of their heads, rather than the more direct incitement to rise up (‘levantate!’) that was meant to have featured in the 1641 poster. The two aims are, of course not mutually exclusive, and there must have been a perceived value in displaying such a poster publicly, and at least contributing to some sense of public disturbance in the city, or else why not just deliver a letter. However in the short term this threat was probably issued in the hope that the government would take action to alleviate high bread prices in the city rather than to immediately foment crowd actions. The fact that the pasquín was posted on a door close to the Real Audiencia would suggest that it was meant to be discovered and read by a local official, with the line ‘whoever takes down this poster will be a bastard rogue’ serving as a direct insult to the regente who tore it down. In this sense it was also aping and inverting the way that ordinances, royal orders, edicts, and proclamations were made public in the period: being read aloud by heralds in the city’s main squares before being posted up in the same locations.\[747\] The text may also contain a tantalising hint of the types of cultural environs of its author. The part that reads ‘del rei abajo no a ninguno’ (below the king there is no one) could be a reference to a popular seventeenth-century play, called Del Rey abajo, ninguno, written sometime before 1650.\[748\] The plot centres on a peasant who thinks that the king has made advances to his wife and, out of loyalty to the monarch, feels unable to take any revenge beyond murdering his innocent spouse. However when he discovers that the culprit was in fact a member of the king's court, he kills this nobleman instead, uttering the lines:

\[749\] no he de permitir me agravie

\[749\] del Rey abajo, ninguno.

\[747\] For discussion of proclamations of orders by Seville’s asistente at the end of the sixteenth century, see: Olivari, Avisos, 217–24.


\[749\] ‘I will not permit myself to be wronged / by anyone below the king’, Francisco de Rojas Zorrilla, Del Rey Abajo, Ninguno (Alicante: Biblioteca Virtual Miguel de Cervantes, 1999), Act 3, Lines 870-71.
Whilst we cannot prove that the play had been performed in Seville by 1650, the known dates of publication, plot, and title make for an intriguing possibility that the author of the *pasquín* was a theatre-goer and was making a reference to a popular play in his poster.\(^{750}\) Of course the possibility that the play's title was simply itself based on a popular saying cannot be ruled out.

Whatever the case, the *regente* in Seville certainly took the poster as a serious threat, outlining in his letter to Madrid the grievances that he felt had led to the posting of the *pasquín*. In a foreshadowing of the issues that were to come to the fore in 1652, Pedro de Zamora reported that currency revaluations, disruptions caused by the plague, and food shortages - 'particularly of bread, which is what afflicts the people most' - had combined to cause unrest in Seville.\(^{751}\) The harvest of 1650 in Andalusia had been a terrible one, largely due to the effects of the plague of 1649 combined with a particularly wet autumn of 1649 and an extremely cold spring of 1650.\(^{752}\) Seville's economy had also been affected by a scandal that had originated in the silver mines of Potosí, where it had come to light, in the late 1640s, that much of the silver coinage produced there had been fraudulently assayed and contained far less silver than required.\(^{753}\) As a result in October 1650, Philip IV ordered, first, that all silver coins from Peru were to be presented to a royal mint to be assessed, melted down, and then re-issued at their true value and, later that month, realising the impracticality of this task, that all coins from Peru would instead be de-valued to three quarters of their value.\(^{754}\) The effect of both the fraud and the monarchy's confused approach was to severely dent any confidence in the value of all Peruvian coinage. As the *regente* noted in his letter of 1650, this was a particular problem for Seville, where Peruvian silver coinage was particularly common, as a result of the city's links to the Americas.\(^{755}\) This combination of poor harvests and problems

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\(^{750}\) Mackenzie, Francisco de Rojas, 77n33.

\(^{751}\) ‘particularmente en el pan que es lo que mas aflije al pueblo’, *Carta de Pedro de Zamora Hurtado de 25 de octubre de 1650*, AHN, Consejos 7144, I.

\(^{752}\) See figure 5 and: Sánchez Rodrigo et al., ‘Andalusian Seasonal and Annual Rainfall’.


\(^{754}\) Vilaplana Persiva, 107.

\(^{755}\) *Carta de Pedro de Zamora Hurtado de 25 de octubre de 1650*, AHN, Consejos 7144, I.
with the coinage, appear to have led to very high bread prices in Seville, which in turn caused the threat of a revolt. A precursor for what was to come in 1652.

Interestingly the Consejo de Castilla was relatively unmoved by the news of the pasquín. In their advice to Philip IV, they argued that no policy changes should be made with respect to the silver coinage, nor should 'credit be given to the imaginations and suspicions of these letters'. Their primary reasoning was that the only group that had cause to complain about the monetary revaluations were the 'rich freighters and merchants' whose businesses would have been affected. They suspected that it was these wealthy individuals who were truly behind the poster campaign, in an attempt to influence royal policy. They advised that the threat of revolt should be disregarded because 'the people cannot rise up over something that does not cause them harm but rather benefits them, since it is well known that the poor, officials, workers, and other members of the public are paid a real de a ocho de Peru for six reales, whereas before the royal order they received one for eight reales'. The argument here was that these lower classes were unlikely to own much silver coinage, and now could in fact now buy it at a cheaper price. When it came to the rich merchants and freighters, neither should the government take seriously the idea that they would revolt: they 'could never find convenience in the breakdown of obedience because this would be to risk the rest of their holdings which rely on the peacefulness of commerce'. Nevertheless, the Consejo agreed that the city should implement nightly patrols to guard against any potential trouble.

756 ‘ni dar credito a las imaginaciones y sospechas de estas cartas’, Consejo de Castilla de 4 de noviembre de 1650, AHN, Consejos 7144, I.
757 ‘es cierto que todo el descontento de Sevilla se reduce a los Cargadores y Comerciantes Ricos por el dano que han tenido en sus caudales y particularmente, el que esperan en los Galeones que vienen navegando’, Ibid.
758 ‘el pueblo no puede alterarse por lo que no le causa daño sino antes beneficio pues conocidamente, la reciuen los pobres, oficiales, traauadores, y demas membros populares en que se les paguen por seis Rs el Real de a ocho de Peru que antes de la prematica le recibian por ocho’, Ibid.
759 ‘nunca puede hallar conveniencia en el rompemiento de la obedencia porque seria abenturar lo restante de sus haciendas que consisten en la cuyiedad del comercio’, Ibid.
760 Ibid.
No uprising was to take place in Seville in 1650. However, given the outbreak of revolt two years later, the Consejo's blasé attitude to these public displays of dissent was arguably misplaced. They were right that the wealthier inhabitants of Seville would have little incentive to become involved in any uprising. However on two key points – that the posters were the work of the wealthy and that monetary revaluations would have little impact on people of modest means – the events of 1652 would appear to prove them wrong. Whilst the Consejo suspected that merchants were behind its appearance, we have almost no evidence to support this view. It was based on the assumption that the silver coinage revaluation was the key grievance in Seville at that time, yet the *pasquin* itself makes no direct mention of this issue, and the regente's letter did stress the importance of other problems, particularly the shortage of bread and meat in the city. As we have seen, harvest shortages and monetary revaluations had interacting influences on the price of bread during this period and it is almost certainly over-simplistic to think of the silver revaluation as only impacting the rich. Circumstantial evidence from the revolts of 1647 to 1652 would also suggest that people of modest means were perfectly capable of being behind just such a public threat. Whilst we have no other surviving *pasquines* from the period, we can find numerous references to other instances in which literacy was weaponised by rebels across Andalusia. In the town of Andújar in 1647, as the first wave of revolts took hold in the region, reports tell us of anti-government libels having been posted in the town's public places. In places like Écija and Málaga, local officials received threats in the form of anonymous letters. In May of 1652, for example, the alcalde mayor of Écija had a 'paper without signature' delivered to his house, threatening revolt due to the 'lack of and high price of bread'. This all occurred in places where the evidence, as we have seen, overwhelmingly points to the involvement of artisans and people of modest means in the revolts.

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761 Carta de Pedro de Zamora Hurtado de 25 de octubre de 1650, AHN, Consejos 7144, I.
762 ‘fixando libelos contra el gobierno en las partes mas publicas de la ciudad’, Consejo de Castilla de 15 de marzo de 1647, AHN, Consejos 7159, año 1647, documento 20
763 The Bishop of Málaga received an anonymous note in June of 1652: Carta del Cardenal de la Cueva de 3 de junio de 1652, AHN, Consejos 7162, año 1651, número 2, documento 64.
764 ‘un papel sin firma’, ‘la falta y precio grande del pan’, 10 de mayo de 1652, AME, Actas capitulares, legajo 2, libro 70, año 1652, f. 82.
There seems little to suggest that it was not these same people, maybe particularly literate artisans, who were behind these messages and the pasquín in Seville in 1650.

To what extent were the revolts pre-planned?

The existence of these posters may also tell us something further about the extent to which the revolts were premeditated and planned events. The reports that we have from Seville in October of 1650 discuss the appearance of a number of 'posters and signs' in the city that month, suggesting that this was unlikely (if not completely impossible) to be the work of a single person.\(^{765}\) It is probable that there were at least some pockets, or small groups, of politically organised individuals in the towns and cities of Andalusia. Igor Knezevic, again, argues that guilds such as the Arte de la Seda in Seville could provide the foundations for just such groupings. He emphasises that this organisation had 'political and communitarian' goals rather than 'merely economic' ones when it defended its members' interests, and that these influences fed into the demands that emerged during the revolt of 1652 in Seville.\(^{766}\) For Knezevic it is no surprise that the revolts in this city were initially started by a group primarily comprised of silk weavers.\(^ {767}\) We will probably never know if a similar or even the same group were responsible for the posters of 1650 but we can certainly consider them amongst the chief suspects. Bartolomé Yun Casalilla highlights a possible, albeit probably later, example of the types of individuals and political figures that may have been involved in such campaigns. He draws attention to the writer, social agitator, and political and economic thinker Francisco Martínez de Mata.\(^ {768}\) Martínez de Mata is primarily known for his writing about the Spanish economy, almost all of which had a particular preoccupation with the plight of the poor and the promotion of the artisan classes.\(^ {769}\) We know little about his biography, but he was likely

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\(^{765}\) 'carteles y zedulones', \textit{Carta de Pedro de Zamora Hurtado de 25 de octubre de 1650}, AHN, Consejos 7144, I.

\(^{766}\) Knezevic, ‘Lords of the Seven Parishes’, 258–60.

\(^{767}\) Knezevic, 261.


\(^{769}\) For a summary of his biography and his works, see: Gonzalo Anes, ed., \textit{Memoriales y discursos de Francisco Martínez de Mata} (Madrid: Editorial Moneda y Crédito, 1971).
born in Motril, where he initially worked as a minor official in charge of raising levies and men for
the galleys (*procurador de galeotes*). His early writings were published in that town in 1648 and
1650, the first of which was concerned with the fate of galley slaves, whilst the second was heavily
focussed on the rights and protections that should be afforded to Spain's artisans and their guilds.⁷⁷⁰
Around this time he moved to Seville where he went on to become an important campaigner
involved with the attempt to create an association called the *Santa Hermandad de los Gremios y
Oficios de Sevilla*, that would serve as a sort of umbrella body for a large number of the city's
guilds.⁷⁷¹ As Yun Casalilla notes, whilst we have a limited details of his precise biography during
this time, he was active in Andalusia during the conflict years of 1647 to 1652 and was busy
establishing links to a silk industry which was heavily involved in the uprisings.⁷⁷² We have no
evidence to suggest his direct involvement in the revolts of 1652 in Seville, but some of the
demands of the rebels there – such as the request that subsidies be made available for poor
tradesmen and the banning of foreigners from membership of the city council – have some clear
parallels to the protectionist and xenophobic remedies that Martínez de Mata proposed for the
country's craft industries.⁷⁷³ Yun Casalilla also points out a fascinating accusation that was levied at
Martínez de Mata by a rival in 1660:

not only does this man walk around persuading everyone he meets to his doctrine, but he has
others as his disciples, who do the same; and some of them publish it with printed papers,
which they give to their acquaintances, and with public posters that he puts up in the square
next to the houses of the town council.⁷⁷⁴

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⁷⁷⁰ Yun Casalilla, ‘Imagen e Ideología’, 236.
⁷⁷¹ Knezevic, ‘Lords of the Seven Parishes’, 262.
⁷⁷³ Yun Casalilla, 245–46.
⁷⁷⁴ ‘no solamente anda este hombre persuadiendo a su doctrina todos los que encuentra, sino que tiene otros como
discípulos, que hacen lo mismo; y unos y otros lo publican con papeles impresos, que dan a sus conocidos y con
carteles públicos que puso en la plaza junto a las casas del Cabildo’, Anes, Memoriales, 489; Yun Casalilla,
‘Imagen e Ideología’, 243.
Whether or not Martínez de Mata or a figure similar to him, such as the friar Bernabé Filgueira, was active putting up posters in Seville in 1650 we will likely never know. However the fact that protesters were using similar tactics and making similar arguments to a figure who is seen as an important political thinker of the time, should reinforce the points we have made earlier about taking seriously the political aims and ideas of those involved in the disturbances of 1647 to 1652.

Behind the revolts we can thus speculate that there may have been some groups that may have had designs on fomenting revolt to advance certain political goals, particularly in larger cities such as Seville. This is a point that will be returned to in chapter 6. However, even if we accept that some organised groups may have helped to foment the revolts, we should not go too far in emphasising the level of premeditation involved in their outbreak. For large sections of those involved the decision to partake in the crowd actions would have been a spontaneous one, potentially encouraged by the initial dissenting actions of a neighbour in the local marketplace or motivated by popular anger at the high price of bread and the political circumstances described above. That's not to say that we need to return to the 'pressure cooker' model of revolts, but merely to note that actions with concrete political aims and examples of restraint from crowds that did not want to transgress certain boundaries, can co-exist alongside a level of chaos and anger that is often inherent in crowd actions.

Crowds were not of a single mind. We can, for example, find contrasting examples of individuals committing unusually violent acts that may have been out of step with the general sentiment, whilst in other cases it is clear that some individuals policed the more violent desires of other participants.\textsuperscript{775} It also seems unlikely that there was any meaningful level of intra-regional organisation or co-ordination involved in the revolts. There was certainly some level of contagion involved in their spread: news of a nearby uprising or a major revolt in one of the big cities could no doubt motivate local populations to take their own actions. But we have almost no evidence to suggest any correspondence or pre-planning taking place between different urban populations in Andalusia prior to their outbreak. It may be that some individuals moved on from one place to

\textsuperscript{775} More on this in chapter 6.
another, fleeing repression and then helping to begin an uprising elsewhere. This was certainly a fear of the authorities and an accusation that was levelled against some participants, but it is unclear to what extent this was more closely linked to the previously mentioned trope of blaming outsiders for a city or town's troubles, rather than being based in reality.

The absence of any meaningful intervention or involvement on behalf of Portugal is also an interesting factor, given that this neighbouring region was at war with Spain for the whole period in question. Evidence would suggest that, rather than having a role in actively encouraging the revolts of 1647 to 1652, the Portuguese seem to have been in the dark about what was going on. In fact in July of 1652, the Consejo de Castilla received reports from Andalusia about the capture of some soldiers who had been sent into Andalusia from Portugal, as part of a spying mission. On 15 June a troop of seven Portuguese soldiers had left Alconchel, near Badajoz, with express orders to ‘find out the state of the unrest in Seville and to capture the government post being sent to Madrid’. Over the next two weeks they made their way deep into Andalusia, successfully capturing a post bag that contained letters from Córdoba, Seville and Granada, taking prisoner a servant of the marqués de Aguilafuente, and attacking muleteers and other travellers that they encountered along the way. They got to within five leguas of Granada before turning back towards Badajoz where they were eventually captured in Extremadura, somewhere in between Jerez de los Caballeros and Fregenal de la Sierra. Despite fears in places such as Ayamonte that Portugal would exploit the tumultuous situation in Andalusia, there is no evidence to suggest that they were able to do this. Nor is there an evidence of organised Portuguese efforts to encourage or foment revolt in the lead up to the troubles. The people of Andalusia were perfectly capable of doing that on their own.

776 Copia de la carta del corregidor de Jerez de los Caballeros de 3 de julio de 1652, AHN, Consejos 7162, año 1652, número 3.
777 ‘de sauer el estado de las inquietudes de Seuilla, y tomar la estafeta que ba a Madrid’, Ibid.
778 Ibid.
779 Ibid.
780 Carta del corregidor de Ayamonte, don Pedro de Carvajal, de 27 de agosto de 1652, AHN, Consejos 7162, año 1652, número 3.
Chapter 6: 1649 to 1652
The Plague, 1649 to 1651

In early 1648, whilst the city council of Granada was busy trying to secure provision of wheat, the spectre of another public danger can be found looming in the council's record books, namely the plague. On 12 May 1648, in amongst the weekly discussions about wheat and bread prices, the council also found time to worry about the 'bad odours' that were emanating from the city's churches as a result of a perceived lack of lime being used to treat bodies during burials. Fearing that this would help to spread disease they agreed to try to limit the number of burials taking place in the smaller inner city churches. These concerns had been aroused due to a plague outbreak in Murcia, news of which had been sent around the municipal governments of Andalusia in late April. When the town council of Palma del Río received this warning from the city of Córdoba they quickly put in place a plan to implement quarantine measures, agreeing to erect a fence around the town, leaving only two entry points which would be guarded to monitor those coming and going. Despite a raft of similar measures being enacted across Andalusia, by early 1649 the plague had firmly established itself, and between 1649 and 1650 massive mortality spread across the region. The city of Seville was particularly badly hit, whilst Málaga, Gibraltar, Cádiz, Huelva, Jerez, Córdoba and Jaén were also severely affected by the epidemic. There are a number of estimates for the precise death toll in Seville. Antonio Domínguez Ortiz (probably positioned at the higher end of plausible scenarios) thought that up to half of its inhabitants may have perished. In the kingdom of Seville as a whole Vicente Pérez Moreda has estimated that 25 per cent of the population may have died, with 35 per cent dying in the city of Córdoba.

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781 Acta de 12 de mayo de 1648, AMG, Libros de Actas Capitulares, legajo 18, año 1648, ff. 181r-182r.
782 A chain of letters had been sent around the region, warning local councils to take precautionary actions. Granada had notified Loja in a letter of 21 April 1648, Seville had sent a similar warning to Osuna around the same time: Aviso sobre la existencia de peste en Murcia, Año 1648, AHML, legajo 84, pieza 157; José Jesús Hernández Palomo, Enfermedad y muerte en América y Andalucía, siglos XVI-XX (Madrid: Editorial CSIC, 2004), 102.
783 Acta capitular de 4 de mayo de 1647, AMPR, libro de actas capitulares, año 1640-1648, ff. 22r-22v.
784 Moreno Alonso, Historia de Andalucía, 197.
Historian Cristina Viñes Millet has wondered whether poor weather conditions and the plague may themselves have been interlinked, with adverse climate aiding the spread of disease.\textsuperscript{787} Whilst Massimo Livi-Bacci has famously questioned the validity of links between subsistence crises and epidemic disease, Little Ice Age climate may have aided the spread of the plague in ways that went beyond its impact on harvest failures.\textsuperscript{788} As we have seen, the rainfall variability that accompanied Little Ice Age conditions in mid-seventeenth century Andalusia also resulted in severe flooding in the region.\textsuperscript{789} Seville was particularly impacted by one of these large floods in April 1649, due to rain that had fallen 'continuously' since the 27 March; whilst at the same time suffering 'cold as if it were January.'\textsuperscript{790} Only after this disaster, did the plague take hold in the city, and it seems probable the worsened public health and sanitary conditions caused by the flood aided the spread of the epidemic. That was certainly the view of contemporaries such as the Sevillian doctor Gaspar Caldera de Heredia, who blamed, at least in part, the 'putrid pollution' in the city, left behind as the flood waters receded, for causing the plague outbreak.\textsuperscript{791} Yet, the plague affected plenty of parts of Andalusia that did not experience flooding, and it does not seem plausible to make an argument that the Little Ice Age was in any way central to the spread of epidemic disease across the region as a whole.

The plague has traditionally been thought of as one of the causes of the revolts that followed in 1652. Domínguez Ortiz, for example, thought that the high death rate in Seville had produced an 'emotive atmosphere' within the city.\textsuperscript{792} A similar case was made by contemporaries, with the bishop

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{787} Viñes Millet, ‘El motín de subsistencias’, 109.
\item \textsuperscript{789} Sánchez Rodrigo et al., ‘Rainfall Variability’, 729.
\item \textsuperscript{790} Morales Padrón, \textit{Memorias}, 116.
\item \textsuperscript{791} 'putida inquinatione civitatis': Gaspar Caldera de Heredia, \textit{Tribunal, Medicum, Magicum, Et Politicum: Pars prima} (Leiden: Johannem Elsevirius, 1658), 508; Francisco de Borja Palomo, \textit{Historia Crítica de Las Riadas o Grandes Avenidas Del Guadalquivir En Sevilla}, vol. 1 (Seville: Francisco Álvarez y C.a, 1878), 302–3.
\item \textsuperscript{792} 'un clima emocional', Domínguez Ortiz, \textit{Alteraciones}, 106.
\end{itemize}
of Córdoba’s biographer describing how he had arrived in the city, post-plague, to find it ‘full of bitterness, sorrow and grief’. The spread of disease also led to more concrete political disagreements. The bishop’s biography informs us that one of the reasons for the unpopularity of Córdoba’s corregidor in 1652 was his failure to make sure that the city’s streets had been fully cleared of the debris and destruction that the plague had left behind. It is also true that the plague did lead to population displacement and migration. During the epidemic in Málaga, a chronicle tells us that a large number of people came to the city from the countryside, seeking shelter and treatment from the plague. And once such epidemics subsided, newly decimated populations often experienced an influx of migrants looking for work; giving some rationale for the repeated complaints about forasteros that we find in the contemporary accounts of the revolts of 1652.

Finally the plague also had a substantial economic effect contributing further to the market disintegration that we have outlined in chapter 3, as towns and cities closed down trade with neighbouring infected areas. A chronicler of the plague in Málaga, for example, put particular emphasis on the great disruption to commerce that the city suffered as a result of trading restrictions that were implemented to try to control the disease's spread. However an equally important effect of the plague may actually have been to put a temporary stop to the revolts that had begun in 1647 and 1648. In 1649, the only record we have of unrest in Andalusia comes from the uprising in Torredonjimeno. In 1650 there was a violent revolt in Vélez Blanco where a group of armed rebels (possibly up to two hundred individuals) barricaded themselves at the top of the hillside town, making their base in one of the town's chapels where they held meetings and refused to pay taxes. Overall, however, the period 1649 to 1651 is notable for the lack of troubles compared to

793 ‘llena de amargura, dolor y desconsuelo’, de Lorea, El siervo de Dios, 179.
794 de Lorea, 189.
795 Juan Serrano Vargas y Vrueña, Anacardina espiritual, para conservar la memoria de auisos, que la Diuina Iusticia... ha embiado a esta ciudad de Malaga, desde que se restauró de Moros, hata todo el año passado de 1649 (Malaga: Librería Anticuaria El Guadalhorce, 1962), 5.
797 Serrano Vargas y Vrueña, Anacardina, 6.
798 More information in chapter 5 and: Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 65n2; Téllez Anguita, ‘Un motín de subsistencia’.
799 Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 65–66.
the years either side of the period. As the plague took hold with intense severity, and daily life increasingly shut down in the region's towns and cities, so too did opportunity for (and inclination to) protest.

A plot in Granada

That is not to say that people's political grievances disappeared during this time. As we have seen, in Seville in 1650 protest posters expressing dissent against local government were posted around the city. In Granada that same year, which unlike Seville, Córdoba or Málaga managed to avoid the worst of the plague epidemic, an alleged plot to foment a further revolt in the city was uncovered and harshly repressed by local government. One of the primary informants who leaked news of this plot to the authorities was a man named Lucas Bermúdez, whose account of this planned uprising gives us some interesting information about how discussion and organisation of revolts may have taken place amongst urban populations in Andalusia. Lucas Bermúdez is described as the 'master of the works of the Archbishopsric of Granada and chief examiner of the masters of that kingdom' in the testimony of his that eventually made its way to the Consejo de Castilla.\textsuperscript{800} In this document he outlined that one evening in July, at eleven o'clock at night he was woken by some shouts outside of his window of his house in the Albaicín district. He made his way down to the street below, where he claimed there were over one hundred men congregating. They asked him to follow them to the 'plaza de los Augustinos descalços', where he was asked to participate in a plot to launch a revolt in the city.\textsuperscript{801} The plotters' actions appear to have been largely motivated by the rumour that the city intended to put an additional tax of four reales on each fanega of wheat. The plan was allegedly to use the occasion of a planned religious procession to launch an uprising, murder city officials, and take control of the city.\textsuperscript{802} As another alarmist letter to the Consejo outlined, the aim of the rebels

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\item \textsuperscript{800} 'maestro mayor de las obras del Arcobispado de Granada y examinador mayor de los maestros de aquel reyno', Carta de Lucas Bermúdez, AHN, Consejos 7161, año 1651, número 4, documento 10.
\item \textsuperscript{801} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{802} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
was to 'leave the rich dead, and the poor, afflicted and bad rich'.

That the Albaicín district, an area home to many of the city's silk workers, was the centre of this alleged plot should come as no surprise given the links that we have drawn earlier between the revolts, this industry, and people of modest means more generally in Andalusia. Some sources suggest that the rebels were hopeful of enlisting up to eight thousand people in their uprising and planned to contact Portugal and France for military help once they had seized the city. However, as we have also noted earlier, it is unclear whether this was actually a widespread plot that posed an authentic threat to the city's government, or whether instead fears whipped up by the combination of the high price of bread, the looming threat of plague, and the previous uprising of 1648 led to an overreaction on behalf of the authorities. Domínguez Ortiz certainly thought that the fact that only five people were eventually executed for their role in this planned uprising should be taken as a sign that the true nature of the plot was far more modest. Equally, as we have seen, I.A.A. Thompson cautions against the assumption that there was major involvement of the morisco community, also suggesting that such accounts may better reflect the fears of the city's officials than reality. Nevertheless the whole episode does indicate the seditious atmosphere that persisted in Andalusia, and the continued concerns over the prices of wheat and bread. It may also help to explain why Granada avoided further troubles in 1652, when Seville, Córdoba and many other smaller towns experienced major revolts. The events of 1648 and the scare of 1650 motivated the town council to not only bolster the forces of order in the city, newly organising eight companies of guards for the defence of the city, but it also led them to found the city's first official pósito: to which a number of the city's residents voluntarily donated 1,571 fanegas of wheat and 6,000 reales. Overall, however, Andalusia was to remain relatively peaceful until the spring of 1652, when the problems of poor harvests, high prices

803 'quedarian los ricos muertes y pobres y la gente dañada y mala ricos y prosperos', Carta de Geronimo Treuino de 2 de agosto de 1650, AHN, Consejos 7161, año 1650, número 2, documento 28.
804 Anonymous, 'Relación de el motín dispuesto en Granada, año de 1650' in Papeles varios del reinado de Felipe IV. Tomo II, BNE, Mss 18196, ff. 169r-171r.
805 Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 68.
807 Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 68–69; Viñes Millet, ‘El motín de subsistencias’, 111; Gelabert, ‘¿Motines de subsistencia o materias de Estado?’, 522.
and monetary revaluations were again to result in numerous uprisings in the region's towns and cities.

The Revolts of 1652

Córdoba

By the summer of 1651, with the plague having subsided in Andalusia, the region was faced with another terrible harvest (see figure 5). The harvest of 1650 had also been poor, with the disruption and death visited by the plague having combined with an unusually wet autumn of 1649 and harsh frosts in the spring of 1650. Once again, the compounding impact of two successive poor harvests was to put severe pressure on Andalusia's grain reserves. In addition to this, the monarchy decided in November 1651 to order the revaluation of the vellón currency. As discussed in previous chapters, the impact of this measure quickly began to be felt in Andalusia as confidence in the moneda de vellón evaporated, and sellers began to demand either payment in silver coins or higher prices if you paid in vellón. This disruption was not helped by the rather inflexible actions of royal officials who had been sent to Andalusia to oversee the revaluation. In Seville, García de Porras y Silva managed to make himself hugely unpopular in just such a role, through his draconian enforcement of the new currency laws and the sentencing to death of individuals that he caught carrying out fraudulent re-stampings of the currency outside of the official mints. Not only this but he demanded the presentation of the account books of local textile merchants to ensure that they did not increase their prices, causing them, in response, to cancel most of their orders which left many of the city's weavers without work. This heightened tensions in Seville and, according to

808 Sánchez Rodrigo et al., ‘Andalusian Seasonal and Annual Rainfall”; Sánchez Rodrigo, ‘Clima y producción’.
809 Domínguez Ortiz, ‘Documentos’, 70.
810 Domínguez Ortiz, 70–71.
811 Domínguez Ortiz, 70–71.
one manuscript source, led to the posting of 'bold posters' in protest against the actions of this official.\textsuperscript{812}

By the start of 1652, upward pressure on grain and bread prices was being felt across Andalusia. Although the summer of 1652 was actually to produce an excellent wheat harvest in the region, this was far from clear at this point in the year. In fact, around Córdoba, the start of the year had been dry enough to warrant a rogation ceremony being held in April to try to encourage rain.\textsuperscript{813} And even if perfect foresight had been possible and a future windfall of grain could have been predicted with certainty, there was no getting away from the fact that there were, at that time severe shortages of wheat across the region. Combined with the important impact of the monetary revaluation, the result was a huge increase in bread prices. In Córdoba popular anger began to focus on the failure of the city's corregidor, the vizconde de Peñaparda, to remedy the problem of expensive bread. Complaints about the corregidor had been sent to the Consejo de Castilla as early as June of 1651, when Córdoba's bishop had written a damning letter claiming that not only had he been negligent in taking anti-plague measures in the city but that he had also profited from the region's food shortages by confiscating grains from local farmhouses and selling it on for profit.\textsuperscript{814} The Cámara de Castilla had actually recommended that the viscount be removed from his post in August 1651 but, for an unknown reason, that did not come to pass.\textsuperscript{815} By Spring of 1652 neither had the corregidor's reputation improved nor had bread prices subsided. On 18 April, the Bishop, Pedro de Tapia wrote another warning to the monarchy in Madrid, this time addressed to the Presidente of the Consejo de Castilla. In his letter he outlined that the city was 'on the brink of

\textsuperscript{812} \textit{atrevidos carteles}, Joseph Maldonado Dávila y Saavedra, Tratado verdadero del motín que hubo en la ciudad de Sevilla en este año de MDCLII, BNE, Mss 6014, f. 6v.
\textsuperscript{813} Ramírez y de las Casas Deza, \textit{Anales}, 167.
\textsuperscript{814} Fortea Pérez, ‘Entre la toga y la espada’, 314.
\textsuperscript{815} Fortea Pérez, 314.
revolt’ due to the high price of bread; bemoaning the lack of municipal government action and the confusion that had ensued after the monetary revaluation.816

Pedro de Tapia did not have to wait long to be proved right. On Monday morning, 6 May 1652, a number of sources tell us that a woman took to the streets shouting about high bread prices and the failures of the corregidor. She was also possibly (accounts differ) holding the body of one of her children who had died of hunger.817 Soon a large crowd had gathered around her, with groups of the city’s inhabitants splintering off into bands of rebels. Some began to attack the houses of Córdoba’s wealthier inhabitants, looking for private stores of grain; whilst others set out in search of the hated corregidor, threatening to kill him.818 The vizconde de Peñaparda, like his counterpart in Granada in 1648, was able to escape to the relative safety of a local convent and many of the local nobility also followed his lead in fleeing the city.819 The bishop, Pedro de Tapia, and a member of the city’s council called Diego de Córdoba, however, ended up amongst the crowds and offered – probably under considerable duress – to accompany groups of rebels around the city looking for grain.820 Another example of rebels seeking to legitimise their actions by co-opting officials and, particularly, religious figures to join them in the requisitioning of wheat supplies between 1647 to 1652. The two men appear to have spent most of the day with the rebels, engaged in this task until they were released from these duties in the evening. By the next morning the rebels were firmly in control of the city and were proclaiming that all wheat should be sold at the tasa rate of 18 reales per fanega, and loaves of bread at 16 maravedís each.821 Much like in Granada in 1648 the rebels turned to a local nobleman to represent their interests during the unrest, requesting that Diego de

816 ‘a pique de un motín de la pleve’, Carta del obispo de Córdoba al presidente del Consejo, 18 de abril de 1652, ACV, transcribed in: Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 171–73.
817 Anonymous, Relación de lo sucedido en la ciudad de Córdoba en 6 de mayo de 1652, BNE, Mss 2383, f. 225; de Lorea, El siervo de Dios, 191.
819 Ibid, 176-77.
820 de Lorea, El siervo de Dios, 191.
821 Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 83.
Córdoba take over the role of corregidor. This decision might be explained by the fact that this man had seemingly been a vocal critic of the vizconde de Peñaparda: asking him, for example, to do more to keep order in the city during a council meeting in September of 1651.\footnote{Anonymous, ‘De Algunos Sucesos Que Tuvieron Lugar En Córdoba (Archivo Del Ayuntamiento de Cordoba)’, in Colección de Documentos Inéditos Para La Historia de España, ed. Marqués de la Fuensanta del Valle, vol. 112 (Madrid: Imprenta de José Perales y Martínez, 1895), 215–16.} Diego de Córdoba reluctantly agreed and, over the next few days, he and the bishop of Córdoba had some success in restoring peace to the city, promising to lower the price of bread and to seek a royal pardon for the actions of the rebels.\footnote{Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 84.} As Domínguez Ortiz has noted, at this point the actions of the rebels in Córdoba appeared to have been a resounding success.\footnote{Domínguez Ortiz, 86.} The monarchy in Madrid not only agreed to the request for a general pardon on 16 May, but also tacitly approved of the removal of the hated vizconde de Peñaparda and hurriedly organised that 6,000 fanegas of wheat be sent from Castilla la Vieja to Córdoba to resolve the shortages there.\footnote{Carta del Consejo de Castilla de 4 de julio de 1652, AHN, Consejos 7162, año 1652, número 2, documento 64.} Whilst this victory was to prove temporary, news of the events in Córdoba were to quickly have an effect in the rest of Andalusia.

**Seville**

Pressure to take action on grain prices had also been building in Seville since the beginning of 1652. The city council had recorded its worry about grain supplies as early as 7 February, when Don Pedro de Vargas, caballero veinticuatro of Seville, raised the issue of the lack of available grain in the city's market, noting that the flow of wheat into the city had been impeded by the many 'areas which have closed off exports'.\footnote{’lugares que tiene serrada la saca’, Acta capitular de 7 de febrero de 1652, AMS, Sección X, H/1658, actas capitulares, año 1651-1652.} By May of 1652 prices in the city had risen to 3,230 maravedís per fanega of wheat, more than five times the notional legal limit of 612 maravedís set by the tasa and on the thirteenth of that month, the city council gathered to discuss the 'need and scarcity of wheat'.\footnote{Acta capitular de 10 de mayo de 1652, AMS, Sección X, H/1658, actas capitulares, año 1651-1652; ’nesecidad y carestia del trigo’, Acta capitular de 13 de mayo de 1652, AMS, Sección X, H/1658, actas capitulares, año 1651-1652.} News had reached them of the revolt in Córdoba that had begun on 6 May and, worried...
that similar trouble might erupt in Seville, the council decided to try to negotiate the removal of taxes on the sale of wheat in the city. Don Luis Federigui, alguacil mayor, and Don Pedro Caballero de Illescas, alcalde mayor, were sent to speak with the administrador of the alcabalas and dos por ciento in Seville, a man called don Joseph de San Vitores de la Portilla, to try to reach a deal to encourage wheat imports. The council also agreed to write to the government in Madrid to make representations about the 'extreme want of wheat' and the need to take actions on taxes. By the following day, they had successfully negotiated with the administrador that, for the next month, no taxes were to be collected on the wheat sold in the alhóndiga of Seville. The city, however, did not get everything its own way, instead it was to reimburse the monarchy for a portion of the taxes foregone. Where the alcabala and cientos levied on wheat usually totalled 5 per cent, the city was instead to pay an amount equal to 3 per cent (alcabala of 2 per cent and cientos of 1 per cent) on the wheat that was sold in the alhóndiga during this period. The almojarifazgos on imports to the city are not discussed in the documents that outline this agreement, however, as we shall see, there is circumstantial evidence that these were not being charged on grain imports either. Despite the monarchy's reluctance to grant such reductions, this deal was subsequently approved by king and the Consejo de Hacienda in Madrid, although one suspects this was in large part due to it being presented as a fait accompli in a month when Seville was to experience its own revolt. Neither the monarchy nor the city council seem to have been particularly delighted with the negotiated compromise, and the willingness of Seville to agree to the payments in lieu of tax emphasises level of desperation that the municipal government felt about the wheat shortages during this period. Given that the revolt in Seville broke out a few days after the adoption of this measure, on 22 May 1652, it proved to be a case of too little, too late. However, there is some evidence that not only did

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829 Ibid.
830 ‘estrema nesesidad de trigo’, Ibid.
832 Ibid.
833 Carta del Consejo de Hacienda de 28 de agosto de 1652, AGS, CJH, legajo antiguo 985, consultas, decretos y memorias. 1652.
it make the city a more attractive destination for wheat imports in the slightly longer term but that the effects of this tax reduction were also keenly felt in other cities and towns across Andalusia.

The outbreak of the revolt in Seville on the morning of 22 May 1652, is relatively well documented. However there is a source that has yet to be explored by these accounts that provides some interesting information about how the revolts unfolded. In the Sección Nobleza del Archivo Histórico Nacional there is a letter from Seville, dated 28 May 1652, from a Francisco de Torregrosa Monsalve, in which he gives a detailed account of the events of the past few days to Alonso Diego López de Zúñiga Mendoza Sotomayor VIII, Duke of Béjar. The letter is part of a series of regular correspondence between Francisco de Torregrosa Monsalve and the Dukes of Béjar, which spans from at least 1632 until 1666, as part of don Francisco's work managing the dukes' various properties and lands in and around Seville. There is not a huge amount of biographical information available about Francisco de Torregrosa Monsalve. From what we can glean, he was a wealthy, well-connected member of Sevillian society. In a document granting a lease on a property, dated 2 July 1639 he is referred to by the title 'alcalde mayor de sacas de Sevilla', a judicial position that oversaw the flow of marketable goods entering and leaving the city. Another document, regarding taking possession of an olive grove in a nearby village, dated 16 September 1642 is the last document we have to refer to him by this title, which suggests he may have moved on from the role sometime after this date. He was also a caballero veinticuatro in Seville, which was the title given to the members of the city's council. He is regularly listed as an

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834 Dominguez Ortiz, Alteraciones; Gelabert, Castilla convulsa; Sánchez Mantero, ‘Algunos aspectos sociales’.
835 Correspondencia, 28 de mayo de 1652, SNAHN, OSUNA, C.313, D.57-58.
837 Escritura de arrendamiento otorgada por Francisco de Torregrosa Monsalve, alcalde mayor de sacas de Sevilla..., 2 de julio de 1639, SNAHN, OSUNA, C.313, D.85, f. 2.
838 Traslado dado por Juan Carranza, escribano público de Sevilla, de la posesión que en 21 de Marzo de 1641, tomó Francisco de Torregrosa Monsalve, alcalde mayor de sacas de dicha ciudad..., 16 de septiembre de 1642, SNAHN, OSUNA, C.313, D.60, f. 2.
839 Originally there had been twenty-four members of the council (hence the name). However by the mid-seventeenth century the sale of such offices was used to raise revenue and there were far more posts than this; whilst (since 1515) you still needed to prove that you were a hidalgo (a person of noble birth) to accede to the role, a
attendee at Seville's town council meetings in the *actas capitulares* of the years 1649 to 1652, and he seems to have continued in this role until at least 1660.\textsuperscript{840} He was, however, absent from the council meetings from 24 April 1652 to 15 June 1652, a fact which is probably explained by the details that he includes in the first few lines of his letter of 28 May to the Duke of Béjar.\textsuperscript{841}

The letter begins almost breathlessly, with Francisco de Torregrosa Monsalve clearly keen to relay the news of the revolts that had occurred a mere six days earlier. Eschewing the normal formalities de Torregrosa Monsalve launches straight into explaining to the Duke that he had not been able to get out of bed, due to illness, since 8 May.\textsuperscript{842} However, he is quick to reassure him that, despite this, he was able to witness a number of the events out of his bedside window and that he had also been able to collect information from other eyewitnesses, including his son-in-law, don Joseph de Avñon who spent the revolts assisting Seville's *asistente*.\textsuperscript{843} He goes on to briefly mention the conditions that he thinks led to the revolt. He writes that, ever since the plague in 1649, the city's population has been comprised of a large amount of 'outsiders' and claims that this had undermined the city's traditional loyalty to the monarchy.\textsuperscript{844} He adds that a combination of hunger and the 'bad example' of events in Cordoba had combined to create the conditions for a revolt in the city.\textsuperscript{845} To round out his introduction he identifies a few ring-leaders of the troubles: the friar Bernabé *veinticuatro* could be purchased for around 8,000 *ducados*: Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, 'La Sevilla Medieval', in *Historia de Sevilla*, ed. Francisco Morales Padron (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 1992), 204; Francisco Morales Padron, ‘La Sevilla del Quinientos.’, in *Historia de Sevilla*, ed. Francisco Morales Padron (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 1992), 252; Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, ‘La Sevilla del XVII.’, in *Historia de Sevilla*, ed. Francisco Morales Padron (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 1992), 304–5.

\textsuperscript{840} AMS, Secció X, H/1733, actas capitulares, año 1649-1650; AMS, Sección X, H/1658, actas capitulares, año 1651-1652; *Testimonio dado por Pedro Calderón de la posesión tomada por Francisco de Torregrosa Monsalve, secretario real y veinticuatro de Sevilla...*, 24 de agosto de 1660, SNAHN, OSUNA, C.313, D.54, f. 2.

\textsuperscript{841} For first and last appearance in this period, see: *Acta capitular de 24 de abril de 1652*, AMS, Sección X, H/1658, actas capitulares, año 1651-1652; *Acta capitular de 15 de junio de 1652*, AMS, Sección X, H/1658, actas capitulares, año 1651-1652.

\textsuperscript{842} Francisco de Torregrosa Monsalve apologises at the end of the letter for this lack of formality, explaining that the scribe who penned it did not realise it was for the duke of Béjar: *Correspondencia, 28 de mayo de 1652*, SNAHN, OSUNA, C.313, D.57-58, ff. 2 & 8.

\textsuperscript{843} Ibid, f. 2.

\textsuperscript{844} 'forasteros', Ibid.

\textsuperscript{845} 'el mal exemplar', Ibid.
Filgueira and four to six men who were involved in the earlier uprisings of Cordoba and Granada, one a tailor and the others weavers.\(^{846}\)

Our narrator tells us that the revolt began at 8am on Wednesday 22 May, at the market in the square of the Feria, after a confrontation between a woman and the local bakers. Upon being charged seven *reales* for a loaf of bread, this woman began shouting that it was a disgrace to suffer such bad government and such high bread prices.\(^{847}\) As this confrontation was taking place the *asistente* of Seville, the *marqués de Aguila Fuente*, arrived on the scene.\(^{848}\) He tried to placate the gathering crowd by asking the bakers to lower their prices, arguing that the summer's harvest was expected to be a good one. However, just as things were appearing to settle down some angry words were exchanged and the crowd, which now numbered five hundred souls, turned on the bakers, killing three of them.\(^{849}\) They then chased after the *asistente* and surrounded him chanting 'long live the king and death to the bad government'.\(^{850}\) Under considerable duress they forced him to accompany them from street to street, house to house, looking for stashes of grain and bread. Soon a number of different groups of rebels were roaming the streets, searching for grain. One of these groups arrived at the house of the Archbishop of Seville, who they forced onto the back of a mule (treating him with great contempt, apparently) and led around in search of wheat. Another group went to the *alhóndiga*, which also happened to house the city's armoury. Here they raided a number of weapons, whilst other rebels roamed the city, using axes to break down the doors of houses that they thought might contain grain.\(^{851}\) Although violence was clearly being used by the rebels, there was also a certain amount of restraint being practised: don Francisco actually notes that when one of the rebels stole a silver jar from a house, he was taken to the city's jail by other members of the crowd, to prove that they were only searching for sustenance. By the evening the *asistente* and the

\(^{846}\) Ibid.
\(^{847}\) Ibid, ff. 2-3.
\(^{848}\) Ibid; Acta capitular de 10 de mayo de 1652, AMS, Sección X, H/1658, actas capitulares, año 1651-1652.
\(^{849}\) Correspondencia, 28 de mayo de 1652, SNAHN, OSUNA, C.313, D.57-58, f. 3.
\(^{850}\) 'viva el rey y muera el mal gouierno', Ibid.
\(^{851}\) Ibid, f. 4.
Archbishop had been released by the crowds, at which point the asistente left town, along with the marquis of Villa Manrique, to go and try to buy supplies of grain from Utrera: a convenient excuse that amounted to little more than the asistente fleeing the city. With a lack of organised resistance from the nobility, the disturbances continued all night. Don Francisco is sparse on the details of this evening, but Gaspar Caldera de Heredia outlines in detail the pitched battles that took place in wealthier neighbourhoods, between rebels and those trying to defend their homes.

The next morning, Thursday 23 May, the rebels from the Feria returned to the alhóndiga and armoury and stole four cannons, which they installed in defensive positions around their new base in the square of the Omnium Sanctorum church. Two hundred of these rebels then proceeded to the Real Audiencia in the square of San Francisco, where they confronted its leader, the regente and demanded action on the high prices. Without having much choice in the matter, given the absence of any true resistance to the rebels, the regente agreed to their demands and an order was circulated around the city proclaiming that the moneda de vellón was to return to its pre-November 1651 value and capping the price of bread at twenty maravedís a loaf. A substantial price cut, given that city council records from 10 May suggest that loaves of bread were being sold for between thirty-six and forty maravedís a few days prior to the revolt. However, even this was not enough to calm matters. Across the river from the Feria further trouble flared up in Triana when an alguacil of the real audiencia, called Gonzalo de Cordoba, shot and killed two locals after a confrontation. This led to a large crowd from Triana attempting to storm the convent of San Pablo, where Gonzalo de Cordoba was rumoured to be have fled. Later that day the rebels made further demands to the regente: that the millones tax and the duties on salt and paper be abolished, and that the alcabala

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852 Ibid, ff. 3-4.
854 Correspondencia, 28 de mayo de 1652, SNAHN, OSUNA, C.313, D.57-58, f. 4.
855 Ibid.
856 Acta capitular de 10 de mayo de 1652, AMS, Sección X, H/1658, actas capitulares, año 1651-1652.
857 Correspondencia, 28 de mayo de 1652, SNAHN, OSUNA, C.313, D.57-58, f. 4.
858 Ibid.
sales tax (on goods other than wheat) be reduced to five per cent. Some of the rebels looted the house of the administrator of sales taxes, burning his paper tax records. Others headed to Seville's prison where they broke down the doors, releasing the women and men imprisoned within and destroying all the paper records held there. A group then went to the Casa de Recogidas, where prostitutes and other women deemed immoral were imprisoned, to release them too. The Real Alcázar in the centre of the city was also stormed, with the rioters unsuccessfully looking for the much hated man in charge of the monetary alteration, García de Porras y Silva, and another official called Juan de Cordoba, threatening to kill them. Like the asistente, both these men had left Seville on the Wednesday, having presciently deduced that their unpopularity in the city would leave them in danger for their lives. By the evening of Thursday 23 May the rebels who had made their base in the Feria district asked that a nobleman called don Juan de Villacis become their nominated leader and that he take over the role of the still absent asistente.

It is difficult to gage the extent to which the actions of the rebels over these two days were organised or pre-planned and to what extent there was much co-ordination between the rebels in the Feria district and those from Triana. On one hand it seems clear that there were various bands of armed rebels who were roaming the city during these two days in a fairly disorganised manner. Francisco de Torregrosa Monsalve does not address this in much detail, but Joseph Maldonado Dávila y Saavedra and the anonymous account contained in the Diario exacto both make it clear that there were disparate groups of rebels, with those in the Feria acting independently of those in Triana. The Diario exacto gives the name of one Juan Ramirez, a shoemaker originally from Málaga, who lived in Triana, and who apparently made himself leader of the rebels there. However beyond this brief detail there is little surviving information about who was involved in

859 Ibid.
860 Ibid, ff. 4-5.
861 Ibid, f. 5.
862 Ibid, f. 5.
863 Maldonado Dávila y Saavedra, Tratado verdadero, BCC, 84-7-21, f. 120; Anonymous, Diario exacto, 43.
864 Anonymous, 36.
Triana and how they were organised. All the account of the revolts centre around the rebels that made their base in the Feria, and it appears that this was the group that made the demands of, and engaged in dialogue with, the regente of the Real Audiencia. As we have already seen, this group was primarily made up of weavers and silk workers, with a priest called Bernabé Filgueira emerging as a possible leader during the uprisings. This group, at least, seems likely to have been involved in planning and fomenting the revolt. As Sánchez Mantero and Igor Knezevic have pointed out, the participants named in the Diario exacto were overwhelmingly weavers involved in the silk industry, with at least five pairs sharing a surname, including Andrés and Pedro Sedillo two brothers who ran their own workshops. Igor Knezevic has done good work on finding some biographic detail for those mentioned by name in the diario, emphasising that examples such as the Sedillo brothers show that those involved in the revolts were both relatively well established in the city and had at least a moderate amount of wealth compared to the poorer transient labourers and forasteros that were often subsequently blamed for such uprisings. Andrés Sedillo had, for example, taken on a female apprentice a month before the revolt and both brothers were master weavers. Strong professional and familial ties were at play in bonding together these individuals, and the beginnings of the troubles in the market at 8am in the Feria were probably less spontaneous than they first appear. The city council had ordered more regular visits by officials to monitor the price of bread in the city's market places on 10 May and the initial commotion may well have been planned to coincide with one of these visits, especially given the conveniently swift arrival of the asistente on the scene. The Diario outlines that a group of twenty-odd individuals had planned the Feria market place intervention that morning, with rumours of unrest having circulated in Seville over the previous few weeks. This ties in with the picture drawn in chapter 5 regarding the culture

865 Maldonado Dávila y Saavedra, Tratado verdadero, BCC, 84-7-21, f. 125; Correspondencia, 28 de mayo de 1652, SNAHN, OSUNA, C.313, D.57-58, ff. 5-6; Anonymous, 75.
868 Knezevic, 198.
869 Anonymous, Diario exacto, 33–34.
of protest in the city, and the presence of such rumours would further explain why the town council
wanted to increase its patrols of the city's food markets beyond the simple fact that bread prices
were unusually high. Torregrosa Monsalve's letter provides quite a different version of the events on
the morning of 28 May than the Diario, with its focus on the protests starting through the actions of
a single woman, but the two accounts are not incompatible. We have no evidence to go on with
respect to her identity, but it is possible that the woman was part of the group named in the Diario.
Someone like Pedro Sedillo's wife, doña Gerónima de Bañales, an older widow to whom marriage
may have been designed for the mutual benefit of securing male ownership of a family workshop,
for example, would fit the picture of a woman with strong links to the neighbourhood, profession
and the group of rebels.\textsuperscript{870}

Regardless of the level of planning, by the Thursday evening, the rebels of the Feria had
secured the appointment of the asistente of their choice, although this victory was to prove short
lived. The nobleman that they asked to assume the role of asistente, Juan de Villacis was initially
reluctant to take up the post but was convinced to do so by the regente and the archbishop on the
proviso that they promised to write to the asistente, who was still absent from the city, asking him to
return. Upon securing this agreement Juan de Villacis headed to the Feria to speak with the rebels,
where he was able to convince them to cease roaming the city's streets in search of grains.\textsuperscript{871} At
nightfall the rebels in Triana had also barricaded themselves in their local neighbourhood and, with
many of the wealthier inhabitants of Seville having organised themselves into small groups to
defend their properties, the night passed off mostly peacefully around the city. By the morning of
Friday 24 May, Juan de Villacis was able to impose a curfew banning people from the Feria from
entering any of the surrounding neighbourhoods.\textsuperscript{872} The asistente also returned to Seville that day
and, along with the archbishop and regente, began to direct efforts to restore order in the city. This

\textsuperscript{870} Knezevic, ‘Lords of the Seven Parishes’, 197.
\textsuperscript{871} Correspondencia, 28 de mayo de 1652, SNAHN, OSUNA, C.313, D.57-58, f. 6.
\textsuperscript{872} Ibid, f. 6.
gave those opposed to the revolt in Seville a chance to form their own guard corps and to fortify the parishes around the Feria and by Saturday negotiations got underway for a full surrendering of arms. In an attempt to placate the rebels the asistente of Seville proclaimed that a royal pardon had been granted, however the group in the Feria refused to trust this offer until they saw an official proclamation to that effect signed by the king.\textsuperscript{873} Since the initial barricading with the cannons on Thursday 23, the number of rebels stationed in the Feria had declined greatly, as many slipped away, probably in fear of reprisals. With negotiations seemingly having reached somewhat of a stalemate, and the counter-revolt forces in the city now strengthened, the asistente and his government decided to use force to bring the situation to a close. A militia was organised, with some of the men led by the aforementioned smugglers Francisco Bueno and Francisco de León; and early on Sunday morning an assault was launched on the Feria. The attack encountered little resistance, with most of the remaining rebels deciding to flee, rather than stay and fight. A few rebels who were manning the stolen artillery pieces were killed during the initial attack and, as many more fled north of the Feria, beyond the city walls into the open fields of the Macarena, they were mown down by waiting cavalry. A number of those captured, who were deemed to be ringleaders, were either hung or shot on the spot, with a further load of prisoners taken to the square of San Francisco and executed by firing squad later that day.\textsuperscript{874}

This left the rebels in Triana as the only remaining pocket of resistance in the city. By Monday morning a sense of fear and self-preservation had obviously taken hold on that side of the river. The Triana rebels urgently sent a messenger to the city authorities informing them that they had captured two escapees from the Feria, who they wanted to hand over to the authorities, and claiming that, far from having had any seditious intentions, they had only armed themselves in order to defend themselves from the on-going revolt. The city's leadership appears to have been

\textsuperscript{873} Ibid, ff. 6-7; Maldonado Dávila y Saavedra, Tratado verdadero, BCC, 84-7-21, f. 134.
\textsuperscript{874} Correspondencia, 28 de mayo de 1652, SNAHN, OSUNA, C.313, D.57-58, f. 7.
only too happy to be able to restore order in Triana without armed conflict, and the rebels there were allowed to disband without any further violence. Francisco de Torregrosa Monsalve ends his letter by estimating that around sixty people were either wounded, killed, or drowned in the river trying to escape the violence of the Feria on Sunday morning. He notes that by Tuesday 28 May it was still a struggle to find enough bread to feed the city, but that the nobility of the city were making great efforts to find supplies and keep prices down. He also adds that the value of the *moneda de vellón* had been restored back to the unpopular pre-revolt level set by Philip IV in November 1651.875

**Bujalance, Palma del Río, Osuna, and Ayamonte**

This violent end to the uprising in Seville marked the beginning of the end of the region-wide troubles in Andalusia, although a number of other towns in the region also experienced similar revolts in the late spring of 1652. In Bujalance we can find some further evidence of the impact of jurisdictional disputes over grains. Protests there had been set in motion in early May after an official from Granada arrived in the town to requisition grain for the city's provisioning. With bread prices running at 52 *maravedís* a loaf this raised the ire of Bujalance's farmers who, on 9 May, gathered together to demand the expulsion of the Granadan official and the lowering of the price of bread.876 In the face of this crowd the official fled back to Granada and Bujalance's *corregidor* desperately tried to placate the protesters: offering to add more wheat to the local *pósito* and to lower the bread price to 32 *maravedís* a loaf.877 This was not enough to restore order to the town. Some rebels demanded that the price be lowered to the 16 *maravedís* that had been agreed in Córdoba; with others clamouring for the forcible removal of wheat from houses of the rich, and the destruction of the town's *alcabala* tax records.878 In the end local landowners and the *corregidor*  

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875 Ibid.
877 Domínguez Ortiz, 123.
878 Domínguez Ortiz, 123.
were only able to suppress the revolt by organising a night-time raid, which arrested twenty-six of the leading rebels as they slept in their houses. 879

In Palma del Río there had also been problems due to wheat shortages. On 11 May the city council had been forced to pay 77 reales per fanega of wheat as they tried to keep their pósito provisioned; and by 25 of that month the city was completely out of grain. 880 On the night of the 26 an armed crowd assaulted the local prison, freeing the prisoners, and attacked the houses of some of the town’s richer merchants. 881 Eventually order was restored, but only after the execution of four rebels and the sentencing to the galleys of a further two. 882 In Osuna grain shortages had also been a major concern of the municipal government. As we have seen, they had banned all exports from their jurisdiction on 14 April, and by 28 April they had been forced to pay 91 reales per fanega to secure wheat from a local landowner, a price that was passed on directly, with no mark up, to the town’s bakers. 883 There is certainly a suggestion that this seller was profiteering from the situation. The grain stores belonged to the minor children of Cristóbal de Valderrama and were administered by their uncle Alonso Fernández de las Casas, who, over the course of a few days before the purchase, had been increasing his asking price from 88 reales per fanega to the 91 reales eventually paid. 884 This serves as a reminder that during these periods of high wheat prices, there were large profits available to the landowners who had grain to sell. However the heart of the problem was not a co-ordinated effort to hoard and profiteer but a genuine region-wide wheat shortage, and it is worth pointing out, in de las Casas’s defence, that during the same period wheat was going for between 100 to 120 reales in cities such as Seville and Málaga. 885 This was little consolation to

879 Domínguez Ortiz, 124.
880 Acta capitular de 11 de mayo, año 1652, AMPR, libro de actas capitulares, año 1651-1659; Acta capitular de 25 de mayo, año 1652, AMPR, libro de actas capitulares, año 1651-1659.
881 Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 118.
882 Domínguez Ortiz, 118–19.
883 14 de abril de 1652, AMO, libro de actas capitulares, libro 25, año 1649-1660, ff. 207r-209v; 28 de abril de 1652, AMO, libro de actas capitulares, libro 25, año 1649-1660, ff. 212r-212v; Ramírez Olid, ‘El motín’, 297–98.
884 Ramírez Olid, 298.
885 Ramírez Olid, 298.
Osuna's inhabitants however, and on 26 May at 5pm a crowd of 'many poor people' took to the streets in the town and stormed the house of the local governor, demanding that bread prices be lowered. They also attacked the house of Alonso de las Casas in an attempt to kill him. He appears to have either fled or not been at home, but a man who was trying to protect his wife was injured in the commotion. That evening a number of the richer houses in Osuna were sacked as the search for grain intensified and a number of prisoners were freed from the local jail. By nightfall the rebels had set up guards to patrol the main town square. As Ramírez Olid notes, the revolt in Osuna appears to have been particularly violent, with at least five people dying in the unrest that followed over the next three days, although in keeping with what we have seen in chapter 5 none of the victims appear to have been high-ranking officials or members of the nobility. Some like 'Gregorio the butcher' were presumably attacked for their role in selling high-priced goods, much like the bakers in Seville on the morning of 22 May. Others, such as a youth called 'Marcos' who was killed in a bar-fight, were probably the result of a more general break-down of order in the town. The repression that followed was similarly brutal. On the morning of 28 May a militia, organised by the governor and the local nobility, stormed the town square where the rebels had set up their base, shooting dead eight or nine of the rebels. Amongst these were two supposed ringleaders, Bartolomé Sánchez and Francisco Marín, whose bodies were hung from the railings of the town hall. Order was thus restored, but as a sign of continuing tensions within the town, armed guards remained on patrol in Osuna for the next three months, until 19 August. Nevertheless, there was some consideration given to the plight of the local population, even after these brutal reprisals, with the town's governor subsidising wheat purchases so that bread could be sold for 32 maravedís per one-pound loaf.

886 'mucha gente pobre', Ramírez Olid, 298.
887 Ramírez Olid, 299.
888 Ramírez Olid, 300–301.
889 Ramírez Olid, 301.
890 Ramírez Olid, 301.
891 Ramírez Olid, 300.
892 Ramírez Olid, 299.
Similar problems took hold in western Andalusia, in the town of Ayamonte. Contrasting the events there to those of Seville, Bujalance and Osuna can help to illustrate the large variances in bread prices that existed across Andalusia. This highlights the lack of market integration in the region, and shows how statistically similar bread prices could have very different impacts in different towns and cities. In Ayamonte, as we have seen, the price of bread was usually capped by the municipal government at 12 to 16 maravedís per one-pound loaf.\(^{893}\) By the spring of 1652, however, the local municipality was struggling to find reasonably priced grain, and bread prices in the town had risen substantially. On 7 May a one-pound loaf of bread was selling for 34 maravedís. Compared to the prices quoted in the other towns and cities impacted by the revolts, this might not seem particularly high. In Seville the accounts of the initial disturbances in the Feria market suggest that a loaf of bread was being sold for in excess of 200 maravedís.\(^{894}\) In Bujalance a loaf was selling for 52 maravedís.\(^{895}\) The price of 34 maravedís was actually close to the amount proposed by both the governors of Bujalance and Osuna as a compromise designed to placate the rebels in their towns.\(^{896}\) Yet in Ayamonte this was seen as a dangerously high price. In part this exemplifies the fact that Seville was a notoriously expensive city compared to other parts of Andalusia (another of the problems with using Earl J. Hamilton's Seville price series to stand in for the Andalusian region as a whole).\(^{897}\) It also emphasises the more general economic differences that permeated the region. Ayamonte had been particularly affected by Spain's war with Portugal, sitting as it did on the river frontier of the two countries, with both economic and demographic depression taking hold in the town in 1640s.\(^{898}\) Anger at a relatively lower price level than elsewhere in Andalusia was probably also a reflection of lower incomes. The municipal government was certainly worried by these

\(^{893}\) See chapter 3 for more details.
\(^{894}\) Correspondencia, 28 de mayo de 1652, SNAHN, OSUNA, C.313, D.57-58, f. 2; Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 102.
\(^{895}\) Domínguez Ortiz, 122–23.
\(^{896}\) Ramírez Olid, ‘El motín’, 299; Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 123.
\(^{897}\) Domínguez Ortiz, ‘La Sevilla del XVII.’, 115.
\(^{898}\) de Lara Ródenas, ‘Procesos urbanos’, 57; González Díaz, La esclavitud en Ayamonte, 133.
prices, organising the sale of the final 170 fanegas of wheat in its pósito on 7 May at a cost price of 64 reales, in order to allow bakers to put the resulting bread on sale for 28 maravedís a loaf. Yet by 28 May, with no further grain available to be released from the pósito, the town's inhabitants took to the streets. Dominguez Ortiz – working from a letter contained in the archive of the Conde de Villariezo – dated the revolt in Ayamonte as having begun on 27 May and wrote that it resulted in the town's corregidor 'don Cristóbal de Castro' fleeing to nearby Lepe. Given the lack of access to this archive (see chapter 1) it has not been possible to double-check this source, however the records of the municipal archive in Ayamonte are clear that the revolts erupted on Tuesday 28 May. It is also clear from the municipal records that there was no corregidor of Ayamonte nor any other government official who went by the last name of ‘de Castro’ in 1652. The corregidor was a man named don Cristóbal de la Vega who was appointed to the position in November 1648. There was also a Cristóbal de Bustos in the town, who served as the administrador de las rentas reales, and the Actas suggest that it was him, not the corregidor, who was forced to flee in May of 1652.

On the night of Tuesday the 28th of May, the actas capitulares tell us that an armed crowd took to the streets of Ayamonte around 7pm, searching for ‘don Cristóbal de Bustos’ who administered the king’s taxes, threatening to kill him. The official was able to hide, eventually fleeing the town at 2 o’clock in the morning and making his way to Lepe. This did not stop the crowd from looting his house and attacking a male member of his household: one of his domestic slaves, who was stabbed. Unrest continued throughout the evening, with members of the

899 Acta capitular de 7 de mayo, Año 1652, AMA, libro de actas capitulares, legajo 5, año 1637-1668.
900 Acta capitular de 30 de mayo, Año 1652, AMA, libro de actas capitulares, legajo 5, año 1637-1668.
901 Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 116–17, note 1.
902 'el martes pasado que se contaron veinte y ocho del presente año', Acta capitular de 30 de mayo, Año 1652, AMA, libro de actas capitulares, legajo 5, año 1637-1668.
903 Actas capitulares, Año 1652, AMA, libro de actas capitulares, legajo 5, año 1637-1668.
904 Acta capitular de 13 de noviembre, Año 1648, AMA, libro de actas capitulares, legajo 5, año 1637-1668.
905 Acta capitular de 30 de mayo, Año 1652, AMA, libro de actas capitulares, legajo 5, año 1637-1668.
906 Ibid.
municipal government spending most of the night patrolling the town in an attempt to restore order. At daybreak the next morning a crowd of around three hundred individuals massed in Ayamonte’s main street. At daybreak the next morning a crowd of around three hundred individuals massed in Ayamonte’s main street. As reports to the Consejo de Castilla would later outline, most of these rebels were from the La Ribera district and were of the poorer sort, engaged in fishing and seafaring; in contrast to the inhabitants of La Villa who were wealthier. The crowd made it clear to local officials that they demanded the removal of the alcabala taxes ‘and that on wheat in particular’, as well as the removal of Cristóbal de Bustos and another local official called Domingo Martin, who were deemed to have been too harsh in their collection of taxes. To avoid further unrest the town council agreed to these demands, suspending all taxes on food supplies brought into the town, organising an audit of all the wheat stored in the private houses, and agreeing to sell bread and wine at reduced prices. All of the above calmed the mood and allowed Ayamonte’s Maestro de Campo and some soldiers under his command to restore order. Unlike in Osuna the revolt in Ayamonte appears to have ended peacefully after these concessions, with no official punishments visited upon any rebels. Once again, the actions of the rebels had been successful in the short term; resulting in the immediate lowering of bread prices and the expulsion of two unpopular local officials.

Écija and San Lúcar

Whilst the events in Palma del Río, Ayamonte, Osuna, and Bujalance complete the currently known picture of the revolts that took place alongside those of Seville and Córdoba in Andalusia in spring of 1652, there were also reports of unrest being threatened in other areas. In Écija, as we have seen from the account books surveyed in chapter 3, the municipal government was forced to provision its

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907 Ibid.
908 Carta del corregidor de Ayamonte, don Pedro de Carvajal, de 27 de agosto de 1652, AHN, Consejos 7162, año 1652, número 3.
909 ‘las alcabalas y la del trigo en particular’, Acta capitular de 30 de mayo, Año 1652, AMA, libro de actas capitulares, legajo 5, año 1637-1668.
910 Ibid.
911 Neither Cristóbal de Bustos nor Domingo Martin returned to their previous roles in the town, with Domingo Martin actually being officially banished from Ayamonte for corrupt practices the following September: Acta capitular de 23 de septiembre, Año 1652, AMA, libro de actas capitulares, legajo 5, año 1637-1668.
pósito in the first few months of 1652 at increasingly steep prices. The local council had been worried as early as 17 January 1652 about grain shortages in the town, noting that 'the bakers have no wheat'.\textsuperscript{912} Over the next three months they periodically agreed to release wheat from the pósito to the town's bakers, who were required to bake 31 loaves, each weighing 3 pounds, per fanega received. The loaves were to be sold for 60 maravedís, giving a return of 1,860 maravedís per fanega to the pósito.\textsuperscript{913} Initially these proceeds covered the pósito's purchase costs, however by the end of April its supplies had run dry and when further grain was purchased it had to pay upwards of 2,040 maravedís (60 reales) per fanega.\textsuperscript{914} Not only this but the pósito was also being asked to pay in silver pesos (a silver coin worth eight reales) rather than the more customary reales de vellón, as a result of the monetary revaluation of 1651 and the declining confidence in the vellón currency. More general problems with the use of vellón in Écija had also been noted in April, with the municipal government asking the corregidor to re-publicise rules that forced people to accept the vellón currency as a valid form of payment.\textsuperscript{915} As a result of these rising costs the price of bread baked from the pósito wheat was adjusted up to 68 maravedís a loaf, giving a return of 2,108 maravedís (62 reales) per fanega.\textsuperscript{916} At just under 23 maravedís per pound of bread, this was still relatively cheap compared to the high prices that we have seen in the rest of Andalusia. However these distributions from the pósito were only being made periodically, and bread baked from wheat that came from other sources appears to have been selling at much higher prices. On 17 April, for example, the council reported that the 'shortage of bread is so great there is not enough for the necessary sustenance of so many neighbours'; with the few loaves that had been available over the previous few days having been sold 'at such excessive prices that the poor had not been able to

\textsuperscript{912} 'los panderos no tienen trigo', 17 de enero de 1652, AME, Actas capitulares, legajo 2, libro 70, año 1652, f. 6v.
\textsuperscript{913} It is not clear where the bakers’ profit came into this. It is possible that the bakers were paid a fixed baking fee (unmentioned in the accounts) or, more likely I think, that they were allowed to keep the proceeds of any loaves they baked in excess of the stipulated 31 loaves per fanega: Ibíd; 4 de marzo de 1652, AME, Actas capitulares, legajo 2, libro 70, año 1652, ff. 36r-36v; Cuentas del pósito, AME, legajo 1380, libro 2093, años 1650-1652.
\textsuperscript{914} Cuentas del pósito, AME, legajo 1380, libro 2093, años 1650-1652.
\textsuperscript{915} 9 de abril de 1652, AME, Actas capitulares, legajo 2, libro 70, año 1652, f. 58v.
\textsuperscript{916} 22 de abril de 1652, AME, Actas capitulares, legajo 2, libro 70, año 1652, ff. 69v-70r; Cuentas del pósito, AME, legajo 1380, libro 2093, años 1650-1652.
afford it'. Over the course of the month of May and June the wheat bought by the pósito would continue to get increasingly expensive, with the town being forced to look increasingly far afield for its supplies. Whereas records from 1648 suggest that the most distant supplies were purchased from the lands surrounding Bujalance and Estepa, on the 10 June 1652 the Écija pósito bought wheat from the 'muleteers of Castile', paying 3,162 maravedís (93 reales) per fanega.

Yet the municipal government also pursued a raft of measures designed to attempt to mollify the impact of these high prices on the town's inhabitants. On 17 April they decided to remove the alcabala and dos por ciento taxes on wheat to try to encourage imports into the town. On 9 May, with 'no wheat arriving into the alhóndiga, nor any idea of from where it could be brought' the council ordered a survey of all the local houses in order to embargo any wheat stores, making it clear that this was to be done 'without exempting any caballeros... the clergy nor any other person'. They were also not beyond using their jurisdictional rights to their advantage. On 11 May news reached the council that muleteers were crossing the fords in the Cortijo de Trejadilla on their way to transport wheat elsewhere. This was the point where the rivers Genil and Cabra met and where Écija's territory (part of the kingdom of Seville) bordered the kingdom of Córdoba. Not wanting to miss this opportunity the town council sent two officials to 'stop the wheat that passes through these fords and to bring it to this town, where the muleteers will be paid what it has cost them'. This was carried out alongside the usual tactics of sending officials to neighbouring jurisdictions to try to purchase grains. The town council even tried to encourage its inhabitants to

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917 'la falta de pan es tan grande que no le ay para el sustento necesario de tanta becyndad', 'y si auido alguno a sido a tan exsessedios precios que la xente pobre no le a podido alcanzar' 17 de abril de 1652, AME, Actas capitulares, legajo 2, libro 70, año 1652, ff. 63v-64r.
918 'harrieros de castilla', Cuentas del pósito, AME, legajo 1380, libro 2093, años 1650-1652; Cuentas del pósito, AME, legajo 1380, libro 2091, años 1647-1648.
919 17 de abril de 1652, AME, Actas capitulares, legajo 2, libro 70, año 1652, ff. 63v-64r.
920 'no entra de fuera ninguno trigo a la alhóndiga ni se sabe de donde se pueda traer', 'sin ecceptuar ninguna de ningun caballero', 'sin ecceptuar eclesiasticos ni otra ninguna persona', 9 de mayo de 1652, AME, Actas capitulares, legajo 2, libro 70, año 1652, f. 80r.
921 'detengan el trigo que pasare por los dichos vados y se traigan a esta ciudad donde se le pagara a los harrieros lo que les ubiere costado', 11 de mayo de 1652, AME, Actas capitulares, legajo 2, libro 70, año 1652, ff. 85v-85v.
922 Ibid.
go out and import grain, proclaiming on 13 May that any inhabitants who wanted to buy wheat from outside of the town were free to go and do so, and that any such wheat would not be embargoed as long as it was not local.\textsuperscript{923} Perhaps most importantly, they did not pass on the pósito’s increasing costs to consumers. They kept the price of the bread produced from this grain at 68 maravedís per three-pound loaf (generating revenues of 2,108 maravedís per fanega) and accepted financial losses for the pósito; which, for example, purchased wheat for 2,788 maravedís per fanega on 23 May and 3,162 maravedís on 10 June.\textsuperscript{924} They also took the unusual step of subsidising bakers’ costs. The 10 May 1652 appears to have been the moment of maximum tension in the town. Despite their best efforts, bread made from non-pósito grain had been selling for 120 maravedís per three-pound loaf in the market, and that day the alcalde mayor had been sent an anonymous letter to his house, warning of revolt in the town if prices did not come down.\textsuperscript{925} The council and the corregidor issued a proclamation that bread would be sold at 68 maravedís a loaf the next day and distributed the remaining wheat in the pósito to some bakers at the requisite cost. However they were keenly aware that many of the town’s bakers had already purchased wheat at a substantially higher cost and, wanting to avoid a situation where those individuals chose to withhold their supply, they agreed to pay them the difference to ensure a plentiful provision of bread the next day.\textsuperscript{926}

No revolt came to pass in Écija. There is, of course, no precise way of determining why that was the case. Plenty of towns in Andalusia did not experience unrest in 1652 and one can think of a vast variety of reasons for why revolt could occur in some locations and not others. Different inhabitants, different social groups, different relationships between the governing classes and the broader population; different economies, occupations, opportunities, and market access; different

\textsuperscript{923} ‘La ciudad acuerda se pregone que todos los vezinos que quisieryan yr por trigo fuera de ella para su gasto lo puedan hacer libremente que no se les sacara de su casa contando que es traído de fuera’, 13 de mayo de 1652, AME, Actas capitulares, legajo 2, libro 70, año 1652, f. 86v.
\textsuperscript{924} 10 de mayo de 1652, AME, Actas capitulares, legajo 2, libro 70, año 1652, f. 83v; Cuentas del pósito, AME, legajo 1380, libro 2093, años 1650-1652.
\textsuperscript{925} 10 de mayo de 1652, AME, Actas capitulares, legajo 2, libro 70, año 1652, ff. 81v-83r.
\textsuperscript{926} Ibid, ff. 84r-84v.
geographies, agriculture, fertility, micro-climate. The list is almost endless. However, the impressive activity of the municipal government in Écija certainly stands out as a possible explanation for why the threat of revolt never materialised in May of 1652. Compared to the records of other municipalities, the *actas capitulares* in Écija are notable for both the frequency with which bread and wheat prices were discussed, as well as the broad range of different measures that were tried to attempt to alleviate the problem. This was probably facilitated by the fact that Écija and its hinterlands was traditionally a strong wheat growing region, and thus may have been less reliant on imports and better placed than others to cope with harvest shortages.\textsuperscript{927} However some other examples from around Andalusia suggest that other municipalities were able to avoid trouble through quick and effective actions. News of the revolts in Seville had apparently started rumblings of discontent in Sanlúcar de Barrameda, but the governor there reported to Madrid that he had been able to calm tensions and keep bread prices low by distributing grain from the *pósito* and granting carters and muleteers the ability to both import grains to the town tax-free and export fabrics and other goods duty-free (thus boosting the profitability of coming to the town with grains).\textsuperscript{928} We will see later how municipal tax-policy may also have helped encourage imports of wheat to Málaga.

Granada also managed to avoid a repetition of the events of 1648. This was likely in large part due to the fact that city's inhabitants had recent experience of both revolt and repression (in 1648 and 1650) which probably dampened enthusiasm for further crowd action. However the city also made serious efforts to make sure that grains remained both accessible and affordable. After the founding of the *pósito* in 1651 Granada's municipal government went to great lengths to make sure that it was sufficiently provisioned until the harvest of 1652: purchasing 2,786 *fanegas* of wheat and 601 *fanegas* of barley through an official named Juan Chacon and borrowing 20,000 *ducados* (7.5

\textsuperscript{927} Isabel Montes Romero-Camacho, ‘Política y economía en la Campiña sevillana: la producción agraria en la comarca de Osuna durante el siglo XV. Aproximación a su estudio a través de las rentas decimales’, in *Osuna entre los tiempos medievales y modernos (siglos XIII-XVII)*, ed. Manuel García Fernández and Juan José Iglesias Rodríguez (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 1995), 138.

\textsuperscript{928} Domínguez Ortiz, *Alteraciones*, 115.
million maravedís) from private individuals to fund these purchases. However by October 1652 the city was having to write to the monarchy in Madrid to request help with paying its debts. Rather than the pósito having been able to recoup these funds when it sold its grains to the city's bakers, it had instead made a loss. Fearing unrest, the price of a two-pound loaf of bread had been set at 64 maravedís in the spring of 1652, with wheat being sold to bakers at a price of 2,754 maravedís per fanega to ensure that they could meet that price level. This was despite the fact that these grains had cost the pósito up to 3,400 maravedís per fanega, plus transportation costs for grains which had often come from as far as fifty to seventy leagues away. The pósito had also subsequently suffered from the revaluation of the vellón currency that had occurred in June 1652, which further lowered the nominal value of the coins that they had received. As a result the municipality requested financial help from the monarchy, the structure of which also sheds some light on the initial founding of the pósito in 1651. To fund this new institution the monarchy had given the city permission to use the income from six local taxes for a period of four years. The right to levy these taxes had initially been granted to the city by the monarchy in 1630 in return for a donativo of 120,000 ducados that had been provided to the king. Each of the taxes were meant to generate an income of around 6,000 ducados a year, and the idea was presumably that this income-stream would allow the pósito to build up reserves of grain in the initial four-year period, and thereafter be run on a self-sufficient basis, surviving on and re-investing its proceeds from grain sales each year. However the permission to use these taxes for the purposes of the pósito had been made conditional on the payment of an outstanding debt of 30,000 ducados that the Consejo de Hacienda claimed was owed to the monarchy. In October 1652, when the pósito's financial problems had come to a head, the city asked for (and was granted, it appears) special dispensation to immediately put the

929 Carta de la ciudad de Granada de 9 de octubre de 1652, AHN, Consejos 7162, año 1652 número 1, documento 44.
930 Ibid.
931 Ibid.
932 Domínguez Ortiz claimed that the city had borrowed 30,000 ducados to buy wheat, but this was a different historic debt to the monarchy and the actual amount borrowed in 1651-1652 was, as we have seen, 20,000 ducados: Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 127.
income from the taxes towards the payment of its pósito debts without having to pay the outstanding 30,000 ducados.\footnote{Carta de la ciudad de Granada de 9 de octubre de 1652, AHN, Consejos 7162, año 1652 número 1, documento 44.}

Thus, although some towns and cities of Andalusia did have some success in avoiding the worst of the wheat shortages and high prices of 1652, they did so at a substantial cost. These were not easy measures to implement. There had to be availability of substantial funding, such as the loans taken out in Granada, and a willingness on behalf of the municipal government for their pósitos to incur large losses on their grain purchases. Neither was this a zero-sum game with respect to regional market integration. When places like Sanlúcar de Barrameda and Seville abolished taxes on grains, they explicitly did so to gain an advantage over neighbouring jurisdictions. Equally, whilst the efforts that were carried out in Écija to intercept and divert muleteers passing through its hinterlands may have been beneficial to the town, they had an offsetting negative impact on the place for which those grains were originally destined. Therefore even the local success stories were themselves a contributing problem to the picture of increased market fragmentation. We will return to a more in-depth analysis of the tax exemptions negotiated by cities such as Seville and Málaga in due course, and look at their impact beyond the spring of 1652. However, first we will look at what happened in the immediate aftermath of the uprisings of 1652.

**The Aftermath**

As we saw earlier, the revolt in Córdoba initially appeared to have been a great success for the rebels. Bread prices had been lowered to 16 maravedís a loaf, a new corregidor of their choice had been installed, and promises had been made regarding securing a royal pardon for all those involved in the uprising. However over the following months this position was to slowly unravel, with violent reprisals eventually being visited on the local population. Much like in Seville, the rebels'
choice of corregidor, Diego de Córdoba, proved to have little solidarity with their cause and, as a sense of self-preservation and a desire to faithfully serve the monarchy took hold, he proved increasingly keen to punish any sign of further unrest. Despite the uneasy peace that had been established by the middle of May, the authorities were still struggling to find sufficient supplies of grain in order to keep bread prices low, as shortages continued to impact the surrounding region.  

This was a concern for Diego de Córdoba who was worried about the potential for further violence if prices were to rise again and who seems to have become increasingly fearful of being assassinated. Tensions in the city, between those who had participated in the revolt and those who had not, also remained high. On 3 June 1652 these boiled over after an inhabitant of the San Lorenzo district was arrested and sentenced to death by the new corregidor for violently confronting a city magistrate. Upon hearing the news a crowd of people from the San Lorenzo district made their way to the municipal government building to protest; only eventually being dispersed by the threat of mass death sentences being imposed by the corregidor. After this episode, and the seeming confirmation of Diego de Córdoba's fears regarding the potential for further revolt, counter-revolutionary methods were stepped up by the city authorities. The corregidor and the nobility in Córdoba organised armed militias which began to patrol the city, and a number of suspected rebels were rounded up and either executed or sentenced to the galleys. The president of the Consejo de Castilla received reports from the city in July that the nobility were using these militias to take draconian revenge on the local population, and that multiple hangings and floggings were being carried out, causing many innocent people to flee Córdoba. The Consejo, in turn, became concerned that the new corregidor was overstepping his authority. Not only did they want to avoid a situation whereby a subjugated population rose up again against local government, but they also did not want the local militias organised in both Seville and Córdoba to

934 Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones, 87.
935 Domínguez Ortiz, 87–88.
936 Domínguez Ortiz, 88–89.
937 Carta de Don Diego de Córdoba al Consejo de Castilla de 4 de julio de 1652, AHN, Consejos 7162, año 1652, número 2, documento 64; Domínguez Ortiz, 89–90.
938 Domínguez Ortiz, 93.
become permanent fixtures outside of royal control. The monarchy wrote to Seville in June, rejecting a request from its Audiencia for a licence to set up a permanent armed guard in the city and, in a meeting of 17 July, they explicitly advised the king that: 'as for the companies that have been formed in Córdoba... it seems to this Consejo that an order should be sent to D. Diego Fernandez de Córdoba so that he removes and suppresses them, as it is not judged to be necessary to keep them'. They urged that the monarchy speed up the already agreed decision to replace Diego de Córdoba with a new man called Sebastián de Corcuera; who would arrive in the city at the end of July, furnished with the long awaited royal pardon for those involved in the revolts. Only after this did tensions begin to subside in Córdoba.

The Taxes on Grains in Málaga and Seville

Another issue that continued to have repercussions in Andalusia and Madrid in the aftermath of the revolts was the collection of emergency grain tax exemptions that had been implemented in cities such as Seville and Málaga. Málaga, like most of Andalusia, had also suffered from grain shortages in May of 1652. As we have seen this was a city that regularly tried to solve its grain supply problems by recourse to overseas imports (often petitioning the monarchy for exemptions to import bans, etc.). Given this fact it is no surprise that it saw itself particularly affected by the decision in Seville in early May to remove import taxes on wheat. On 30 May one of Málaga's residents, Antonio Varenne, made a representation to the municipal government about a ship, docked in the city's port, whose cargo of 4,000 fanegas of wheat had been consigned to him. This was probably

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939 *Carta del Consejo de Castilla de 17 de julio de 1652*, AHN, Consejos 7162, año 1652, número 2, documento 64; Domínguez Ortiz, 95.

940 ‘En quanto a las companias que en Cordoua se han formado... es de parecer el consejo que luego se ynbie horden a D. Diego fernandez de Cordoua para que las quite y suprima juzgando el que no es necesarios conservarlas’, *Carta del Consejo de Castilla de 17 de julio de 1652*, AHN, Consejos 7162, año 1652, número 2, documento 64; *Carta del Consejo de Castilla de 19 de junio de 1652*, AHN, Consejos 7162, año 1652, número 3, documento 20.

941 *Carta del Consejo de Castilla de 17 de julio de 1652*, AHN, Consejos 7162, año 1652, número 2, documento 64; *Carta de Sebastián de Corcuera al Consejo de Castilla de 1 de agosto de 1652*, AHN Consejos 7162, año 1652, número 2, documento 64.

942 30 de mayo de 1652, AMM, acuerdos municipales, volumen 68, ff. 99r-99v; 4 de junio 1652, AMM, acuerdos municipales, volumen 68, ff. 104v-105r.
enough wheat to meet Málaga's total daily bread consumption for around ten days (assuming a population of 16,000, each with a yearly bread consumption of 9.125 *fanegas*).\(^{943}\) Don Antonio claimed that he was under strict orders from his superiors to only disembark and sell this wheat in Málaga if he was allowed to do so 'without paying customs or other duties'.\(^{944}\) If this exemption was not granted he would ship the wheat to 'Alicante, Seville or Cádiz where no taxes on grains are being paid'.\(^{945}\) A sign that, by this point, Seville was far from the only Andalusian city to have removed taxes on wheat. Antonio Varenne's appeal also suggests that these municipalities had waived *almojarifazgo* import taxes, on top of the *alcabala* and *cierzos* exemptions that we saw were negotiated in Seville. Finding themselves with relatively little leverage the Málaga city council agreed to follow suit, so as not to 'give cause to riots and disturbances as have been experienced in other parts of Andalusia'.\(^{946}\) In a similar fashion to Seville, the Málaga municipal council agreed to implement this tax exemption before receiving permission from Madrid, undertaking that the city would foot the bill if royal approval for the reduction was not forthcoming.\(^{947}\) The policy seems to have been a success: don Antonio's ship was soon followed by two others loaded with grain, which had equally been attracted by the prospect of tax free sales in Málaga.\(^{948}\) These originated from Bayonne in France and Barletta in Italy and – if we are to believe the Bishop of Málaga – they arrived just in time to prevent trouble, with the city having witnessed some signs of 'mouimiento de gente baxa', due to bread shortages, just days before.\(^{949}\)

With respect to the grain market, this shows us that tax variations between cities like Málaga and Seville were important in terms of impacting the flow of goods such as wheat in the region,
with both local and foreign merchants making decisions based on these regimes. The vast web of differing import and sale taxes that existed on wheat across the various cities and towns of Andalusia provide a further example of how jurisdictional fragmentation could create a lack of market integration and help account for intra-regional price variations. The differences in the almojarifazgos also produced a system where merchants who were from a specific country, or traded in a particular good, found the most advantageous port out of which to base themselves. However, when a city such as Seville was able to make a change to the system, in this case by abolishing taxes on the sale of wheat, merchants were unsurprisingly willing not only to divert their goods to lower tax jurisdictions, but also to put pressure on local governments to adopt similar measures. The inevitable result of granting a tax exemption to Seville in 1652 at a time of crisis and grain shortage was, as the Consejo de Hacienda had feared, to encourage other localities to ask for and impose similar exemptions. This led to a race to the bottom in terms of wheat tax rates in Andalusia, with evidence showing that Alicante, Cádiz and Málaga all felt compelled to follow Seville's example. Without a regional standard for tax rates the Consejo de Hacienda found itself managing a diverse and complex web of individual exemptions and requests in 1652.

The complexity of the system, and the difficulties that the monarchy faced in enforcing adherence to the negotiated agreements can again be evidenced by turning back to Seville's tax reduction deal. Having removed all taxes on wheat on 14 May, the city saw the outbreak of a revolt less than a week later on 22 May 1652. Given the state of confusion in Seville and in the hope of helping to restore order, the monarchy agreed to extend the tax reduction for a month longer than initially agreed, until 14 July 1652. At the end of this second month of tax-free wheat sales, on 16 July, the administrador don Joseph de San Vítores de la Portilla tried to reimpose the alcabala and two cientos in Seville's market place, but this caused a 'grande alteración'. The muleteers selling

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950 Copia de los libros de la escribania mayor de rentas de su magestad en Madrid a 18 de agosto de 1652, AGS, CJH, legajo antiguo 985, consultas, decretos y memoriales. 1652.
951 Carta de 28 de agosto de 1652, AGS, CJH, legajo antiguo 985, consultas, decretos y memoriales. 1652.
wheat in the *alhóndiga* announced that they would double their prices in response to the reintroduction of taxes (from 1,125 *maravedís* per *fanega* of wheat to 2,250).\footnote{Ibid.} Fearing a re-eruption of the recently placated revolts, the *asistente* of Seville intervened, overruling don Joseph and, much to the *administrador*’s ire, unilaterally ordering that the tax reduction should once again be extended.\footnote{Ibid.}

The city once again wrote to Madrid to try to have this third extension approved, but by the end of August don Joseph’s complaints about the situation were being taken seriously in Madrid. The *administrador* had warned the *Consejo de Hacienda* that, despite the city’s promises to pay a sum equal to 3 per cent of the value of the wheat sold in the *alhóndiga* during the exemption period, payment had not been forthcoming. He had been trying to collect 14,470 *reales* in respect of the period 14 May to 14 June, and 7,948 reales for 15 to 28 June but his requests had repeatedly been dismissed by the *asistente* in Seville.\footnote{Copia de los libros de la escribanía mayor de rentas de su mages tad en Madrid a 18 de agosto de 1652, AGS, CJH, legajo antiguo 985, consultas, decretos y memoriales. 1652.} On 6 August he wrote to the government in Madrid complaining that he had insufficient authority to force the city to pay up, exclaiming that he did not ‘have the powers to go against a *regente asistente*’.\footnote{‘no me hallo con fuerzas para contra un regente asistente’, Ibid.} Instead he asked that the king order that taxes be reinstated in the *alhóndiga*, because ‘neither the council nor the city’ had the resources to pay.\footnote{‘ni la junta ni la ciudad’, Ibid.}

The *Consejo de Hacienda* shared his concerns and wrote to Philip IV, outlining that the temporary tax exemption was now in its fourth month and asking for royal intervention into the continued non-payment of these taxes.\footnote{Carta de 28 de agosto de 1652, AGS, CJH, legajo antiguo 985, consultas, decretos y memoriales. 1652.} The 5 per cent tax not being levied in the *alhóndiga* was worth 8 million *maravedís* a year, and the monarchy was thus potentially foregoing two-fifths of this income, or 3.2 million *maravedís* a year.\footnote{Ibid.} As per usual, the *Consejo* was worried, not just about this revenue stream, but also about the other parts of Andalusia being encouraged to follow suit. In the end Philip
IV agreed to send orders to the asistente in Seville requesting the reimposition of the alcabala and cientos, the payment of the taxes foregone by the city, and the punishment of any muleteers who attempted to hike their prices as a result.\footnote{Ibid.}

This episode shows the different jurisdictional issues that came into play with respect to the alcabalas and almojarifazgos in Andalusia. Whilst tax policy was ultimately decided in Madrid, its implementation had to be negotiated with the municipal governments of the region's towns and cities. The fact that the administrador of the alcabalas in Seville felt unable to overrule the city's asistente is indicative of the delicate balance of power. Although the administrador could appeal to the Consejo de Hacienda for support, this body, in turn, had to get royal approval for its decisions. In the meantime the city of Seville could submit its own appeals to the Consejo and, more directly, to the king. The whole process shows the give-and-take that occurred in these types of negotiations between central and municipal power. In this case both sides compromised to some extent: the Consejo de Hacienda agreed to a tax exemption which clashed with the overall desire to maximise revenues and increase centralised control over local taxation; whilst the municipal government in Seville agreed to reimburse the royal treasury for a portion of the taxes foregone. A desire to reduce jurisdictional fragmentation on behalf of the Consejo de Hacienda was limited by the political reality of needing to negotiate with individual municipalities in Andalusia.

By the end of August, when the king ordered Seville to re-impose its wheat taxes, peace had returned to Andalusia. In large this had been enabled by a draconian repression of the revolts by local authorities in places like Seville, Córdoba and Osuna. This was accompanied by a more moderate reaction in Madrid, where the monarchy was often keen to avoid stirring up further troubles by unnecessarily pursuing the punishment of those involved. Royal pardons were issued to
Seville and Córdoba in June and July respectively. These arrived long after the punishments that were doled in the immediate aftermath of the revolts (and Seville's pardon explicitly contained a list of 57 names that were exempted from forgiveness), however they did signal an attempt to move on from the episode and return back to normality.

Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, as we have seen, was fairly negative in his assessment of the achievements of the revolts. Once life began to return to normal in the summer of 1652 he argued that they had 'achieved absolutely nothing'. None of the rebel-appointed leaders remained in their posts as corregidores or asistentes beyond that summer, their actions secured no long-lasting improvement to the lives of the urban populations in the region, and if there were any decreases in bread prices this was largely due to the arrival of a bumper harvest in 1652. This is probably an overly negative assessment. In the short-term, as we have seen, local populations did manage to secure substantial bread price reductions across the region in 1652. Although the rebels' choices of leaders did not last, neither did the unpopular officials that were removed return. The monarchy sent new corregidores to places like Seville (asistente), Granada, Córdoba and Ayamonte, over the course of the following months. The unpopular monetary revaluation of the vellón currency was also reversed on 25 June 1652. The Andalusian revolts undoubtedly played a major role in this decision, with the monarchy having been served a clear demonstration of the measure's unpopularity. The Consejo de Castilla continued to receive correspondence from cities such as Seville in the aftermath of the revolts, complaining about the problems of high prices, and the monarchy came to view the return of the moneda de vellón to its previous value as the only possible

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960 *Carta de Sebastián de Corcuera al Consejo de Castilla de 1 de agosto de 1652*, AHN Consejos 7162, año 1652, número 2, documento 64; Domínguez Ortiz, *Alteraciones*, 113–14.
961 Domínguez Ortiz, 113–14.
962 'no consiguieron absolutamente nada', Domínguez Ortiz, 136.
963 Domínguez Ortiz, 136.
964 *Pedro de Carvajal* took over as corregidor of Ayamonte on 20 August 1652: *Acta capitular de 20 de agosto, Año 1652*, AMA, libro de actas capitulares, legajo 5, Año 1637-1668. For the replacements in Granada, and Córdoba, see: Fortea Pérez, 'Entre la toga y la espada’, 342–45.
965 Gelabert, *Castilla convulsa*, 361.
way to finally alleviate tensions in the region. Alone, we might count these as fairly impressive achievements of the revolts: ones that arguably made important inroads into the demands that were articulated across the various towns and cities of the region. They showed the enduring influence that popular protests and unrest could have on both local and royal policies and help us to understand why people felt that it was worth the undoubtedly large risk involved in joining such protest movements. There is also evidence that the revolts did have an important impact on the efforts made by municipal governments and the monarchy to provision Andalusia in the coming years. As we shall see in the following chapter this again shows the real political achievement of the revolts, which appear to have forced a far more intensive and co-ordinated response when harvest failures returned in 1653.

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966 Gelabert, 360–61. For complaints from Seville, see: Cartas de Sevilla de 12 de junio de 1652, AHN, Consejos 7162, año 1652, número 1, documento 21.
Chapter 7: Conclusion
1653: The Post Crisis Period

The monarchy appears to have been cognisant that its responses to the grain shortages in 1647 to 1652 had been lacking, particularly in respect to the different export and taxation restrictions that had been granted across Andalusia. Fortunately for both the local municipal governments, the monarchy, and the inhabitants of Andalusia the summer of 1652 brought a bumper wheat harvest.967 However, in early 1653, the king and the Consejo de Castilla remained mindful of the situation in Andalusia. In fact at the request of the Consejo, the king decided to send a royal official to the region in February 1653 to monitor the financial health of the pósitos and to ensure that they were sufficiently stocked in case of future harvest shortages.968 A man named Francisco Zapata, who had recently been nominated to take up a position in the Consejo de Castilla, was chosen for the role.969 Although he appears to have been a rather reluctant appointee, initially protesting that he did not have the funds to undertake the trip and then, despite having been granted 3,000 ducados to cover his costs, repeatedly asking to be allowed to return home to Madrid.970 Nevertheless he does seem to have visited both Jaén and Córdoba, where he claimed success in having left both city's pósitos 'well-stocked', before returning home in October 1653.971

When news of the poor Andalusian harvests of 1653 began to filter through to Madrid in late spring, the monarchy's reaction was also to prove markedly different than in prior years. Where previously the monarchy had been reactive, approving various import and tax exemptions on a case-by-case, city-by-city basis in response to appeals from municipal governments, in 1653 a far more...

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967 Ponsot, Atlas.
968 Carta del Rey de 28 de febrero de 1653 y respuesta del Consejo de Castilla de 8 de marzo ed 1653, AHN, Consejos 7163, año 1653, número 3, documento 92.
969 Ibid. For brief biographical detail on don Francisco de Zapata, see: Janine Fayard, Los ministros del Consejo Real de Castilla (1621-1788): informes biográficos (Madrid: Hidalguía, 1982), 41–42.
970 Carta del Rey de 28 de febrero de 1653 y respuesta del Consejo de Castilla de 8 de marzo de 1653, AHN, Consejos 7163, año 1653, número 3, documento 92; Carta del Consejo de Castilla de 24 de octubre de 1653, AHN, Consejos 7163, año 1653, número 3, documento 61.
971 'mui abastecido', Carta del Consejo de Castilla de 24 de octubre de 1653, AHN, Consejos 7163, año 1653, número 3, documento 61.
consistent policy was pursued. After receiving news of the poor harvests, the king and the *Consejo de Hacienda* sent out a series of orders between 8 July and 17 July, which permitted the cities of Seville, Málaga, Córdoba, Granada, Cádiz and Sanlúcar de Barrameda to import wheat from 'outside of the kingdom, even if from enemy territory', whilst also declaring that any imports from abroad would be free of 'Alcaualas... Almojarifazgos y del primero y segundo uno porciento' until the harvest of 1654.972 There is less conclusive surviving evidence about grain purchases from the rest of Spain, but it seems as if similar provisions in this respect were extended to the same cities. Seville, Córdoba and Cádiz were certainly granted permission to import from the 'Reynos de Galicia, Murcia y otros' without paying 'alcabalas ni unos por ciento del trigo'.973 Wheat sold in the *alhóndiga* of Seville was also exempt from taxes (much like in 1652), with the city being responsible for raising the lost revenue 'by other means'; although this was a more temporary provision than the overseas tax exemption, initially only granted for the two months of August and September.974

However, despite these efforts, the monarchy was far from solving the problems that the Andalusia municipalities faced when trying to access grain markets in Spain and abroad. Ordering foreign wheat remained difficult, with shipments taking long periods of time to arrive. In November 1653, for example, the *asistente* of Seville wrote to Madrid asking for an extension of the *alcabala* and two *cientos* tax exemptions in place in the *alhóndiga*: arguing that the continued removal of taxes on domestic wheat remained necessary because wheat from 'outside the kingdom' had not yet begun to arrive in the city, despite the removal of import restrictions back in July.975 Royal permission to import clearly did not suddenly remove all the barriers that made purchasing from

972 'fuera del reino aunque fuese de tierra enemigos', *Cartas del Consejo de Castilla de 8 y de 10 de julio de 1653*, AHN, Consejos 7163, año 1653, número 2, documento 38; *Cartas del Consejo de Castilla de 10 de julio de 1653*, AHN, Consejos 7163, año 1653, número 2, documento 39; *Consejo de Castilla de 17 de julio de 1653*, Consejos 7163, año 1653, número 3, documento 99.
973 *Carta del Consejo de Castilla de 19 de junio de 1653*, AHN, Consejos 7163, año 1653, número 1, documento 8.
974 'de otros medios', *Carta del Consejo de Castilla de 5 de noviembre de 1653*, AHN, Consejos 7163, año 1653, número 3, documento 57.
975 'fuera del reino', Ibid.
abroad difficult. The same was true of domestic purchases. In July of 1653, the asistente had also written to the government in Madrid to complain about the difficulties that the city was experiencing in purchasing wheat from Castilla la Vieja.976 The main land transport route from Castilla la Vieja to Seville passed through Extremadura, running close to the Portuguese border and the city of Badajoz, which was a key military stronghold in the ongoing war between Spain and Portugal.977 According to the asistente some muleteers who had been transporting wheat to Seville had been stopped by soldiers, taken to Badajoz, and forced to sell their grain there at a loss, on the order of the Maestre de Campo of the army stationed in the city.978 As a result muleteers were now refusing to make the journey to Seville from Castilla la Vieja, which had led to wheat shortages and price increases in the city.979 In this case the Consejo de Castilla sided with Seville's asistente and asked that the king request that the Consejo de Guerra send orders to Badajoz, banning the military from embargoing wheat and hassling muleteers on their way to Seville.980

The other transportation option from Castilla la Vieja was to ship grain from the port of Santander, and it seems that Seville turned to this option following the problems experienced on the road through Extremadura.981 Having agreed a deal with merchant Simon Romero de Isunya to import 20,000 fanegas of wheat this way, familiar problems once again surfaced. Wheat had been purchased in the towns of Boadilla and Mazariegos but the corregidor of the nearby city of Palencia intervened to ban this export from its hinterlands, claiming that he was in possession of a Real Cedula, sent by the Consejo de Guerra, which gave him the rights to regulate all purchases of wheat in the region.982 The Consejo de Castilla again intervened with the king on Seville's behalf, and Philip IV explained that the Consejo de Guerra had given orders to the corregidor of Palencia

976 Carta del Consejo de Castilla de 17 de julio de 1653, AHN, Consejos 7163, año 1653, número 2, documento 33.
978 Carta del Consejo de Castilla de 17 de julio de 1653, AHN, Consejos 7163, año 1653, número 2, documento 33.
979 Ibid.
980 Ibid.
981 Ibid.
982 Ibid.
to carry out strict checks on grain purchases in the region due to fears that amounts were being smuggled into Portugal. Seville's wheat purchase had been caught in the crossfire and the king asked the **Consejo de Guerra** to order the release of the grains on 23 August.  

Jurisdictional problems thus remained a problem in the Spanish grain market in 1653, despite some efforts by the monarchy to take a different approach to the issue of rising prices in Andalusia after the revolts of 1652. Although, there seems little doubt that by taking a more consistent, region-wide approach, the monarchy did help to mollify the impact of poor harvests to at least some extent, it is hard, if not impossible, to quantify precisely how this might have affected grain prices in the region. A variety of factors had changed between the springs of 1652 and 1653, including the absence of monetary revaluations and increased attention from municipal governments and their *pósitos* on provisioning due to the previous year's revolts. However this certainly represented a more joined-up, less fractured approach to the issue from the government in Madrid and it is worth noting that the year 1653 had worse *diezmo* figures than 1651 (figure 5), but does not show up in the wheat price records as anywhere near as expensive a year (figures 9 and 13). Nevertheless, the efforts of the municipalities and the monarchy that year could not solve the fundamental issue that sat behind this jurisdictional fragmentation, which was the way that political power was distributed and negotiated between the numerous towns and cities in Andalusia and the monarchy in Madrid.

**Conclusion**

The political organisation of Spain and Andalusia provides the most comprehensive answer to why such large price increases were registered in Andalusia between 1647 to 1652. Advances in climatological research over the past two decades have greatly increased our understanding of the

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983 Respuesta del Rey a la carta del Consejo de Castilla de 21 de agosto de 1653, AHN, Consejos 7163, año 1653, número 1, documento 19.
possible impact of Little Ice Age climate change in seventeenth century Andalusia, and it seems increasingly plausible that periods of extreme rainfall variations severely impacted the region's wheat harvests in the 1640s and 1650s. All the available information suggests that the harvest failures during this period were some of the worst in terms of both intensity and frequency, since at least the end of the sixteenth century. However local harvest shortages do not fully explain the huge price rises that characterised the Andalusian grain market of the late 1640s and early 1650s. To do so we have to ask why the local and national governments in Andalusia and Madrid were unable to use the plethora of policy options at their disposal to dampen the impact of local harvest shortages on bread prices. Theoretically municipal grain stores could have been used to build up grain reserves to guard against poor harvests and, failing this, we have to ask what prevented localities from importing cheaper grain from Andalusia, the rest of Spain and abroad.

As we have seen the municipal grain store system was hamstrung by two key factors. Firstly, storage issues meant that grain was rarely able to be kept for longer than twelve months, which negated the ability to build up reserves during good harvest years for future use in poor ones. This meant that the pósitos essentially conducted the majority of their business on a twelve month cycle, buying all their grain towards the end of a season's harvest and selling it the following spring, before the arrival of the next harvest. Given that these institutions were meant to be self-financing, this system could not escape the inherent contradiction that, assuming that they began each year with a fairly similar level of working capital, they would actually be able to afford to buy less grain in the summer months of poor harvest years (when prices would be higher) than following good harvests. Secondly, the pósitos' finances were severely affected by the declining state of municipal finances in seventeenth-century Andalusia. As the pósito system struggled to remain self-sufficient it was often reliant on injections of capital from local governments and notables during times of dearth. However, as municipal finances became increasingly burdened with debt, primarily as a
result of the monarchy appropriating funds from municipal revenues to pay for royal expenditure, the pósito became less and less of a priority.\textsuperscript{984} Not only this but the funds that these institutions contained were often used by municipalities to meet other obligations, usually with royal approval, despite this technically being illegal. This left the pósitos of Andalusia unable to respond adequately to the poor harvests of the late 1640s and early 1650s and they failed to build up sufficient supplies in the summer months to be able to mollify the shortages that affected the region, particularly during the late-winter and spring of 1652.

This brings us back to the two key measures of state capacity highlighted by Johnson and Koyama: (1) the ability of a state 'to enforce its rules across the entirety of the territory it claims to rule'; and (2) its ability 'to garner enough tax revenues from the economy to implement its policies.'\textsuperscript{985} If the declining financial health of the pósitos was one way in which the struggles of the Habsburg monarchy to raise sufficient revenues came to impact the region in 1647 to 1652 it was not the only one. We can also turn to the November 1651 monetary revaluation for a further example of this. The revaluation allowed the monarchy to avoid a tricky negotiation with the Cortes regarding the imposition of any new taxes and, on the face of it, promised a simple one-off cash injection to boost the royal finances. In reality the measure not only proved deeply unpopular, but heaped further pressure on the municipal governments and pósitos by further increasing the price of wheat. Faced with grain shortages and rising prices towards the end of the harvest years in the period 1647 to 1652, and with insufficient stores in their pósitos, the local governments of Andalusia therefore turned their attention towards accessing the grain market. Here, Koyama and Johnson's first measure of state capacity came into play. As we have seen whilst Andalusia suffered poor harvests in the years 1647, 1650, 1651 and 1653, the same cannot be said for the rest of Spain, let alone Europe. In fact, in 1652, for example, grain was available at the relatively cheap tasa price

\textsuperscript{984} Grafe, \textit{Distant Tyranny}, 176.  
\textsuperscript{985} Johnson and Koyama, ‘States and Economic Growth’, 2.
in Castilla la Vieja.\textsuperscript{986} The fact that, despite this, prices remained extremely high in Andalusia would suggests that, as is clear in the literature, Spain had a relatively low level of grain market integration (both when it came to inter-regional and international markets).\textsuperscript{987} However, a detailed analysis of the situation in Andalusia shows that high transport costs can only present a partial explanation for why both intra-regional trade within Andalusia and trade with the rest of Spain and abroad proved so difficult. Far more convincing were the institutional barriers to trade caused by jurisdictional fragmentation and the lack of a system in the Habsburg monarchy to enforce common rules across the Andalusian territory.

The issue here was not that of an absolutist monarchy appropriating property and undermining property rights. Quite the opposite. It was instead the lack of a centralising authority or institutions when it came to grain market interventions. Regina Grafe argues that one of the key channels through which this jurisdictional fragmentation had an impact was taxation, as the differing systems and tax rates that existed between the various towns and cities of Spain increased price differentials and hampered market integration.\textsuperscript{988} The evidence that we have seen certainly suggests that the same may have been true of the grain market during normal harvest years, especially given the huge range of different tax rates that existed across Andalusia. However when region-wide grain shortages hit in 1647 to 1652 the most important factor was arguably the system of local export bans put into place by Andalusian municipalities. Different tax rates definitely led to different price levels across the region, but in times of dearth the response of municipal governments in places such as Seville and Málaga when it came to taxes, was at the very least to reduce them, and thus lower barriers to trade. Albeit, this happened in a very ad-hoc manner in 1652 with local municipal governments taking the initiative in a way that increased regional tax differences in the short term. However, when it came to import and export bans, an already

\textsuperscript{986} Domínguez Ortiz, \textit{Alteraciones}, 32.
\textsuperscript{988} Grafe, \textit{Distant Tyranny}, 213.
fragmented system was rendered even more complex and fraught with risk, as a result of the ever
growing number of local trade embargoes implemented on wheat between 1647 and 1652. Even
when the monarchy attempted to take a more joined-up approach to taxes and international trade in
1653, this could not overcome the problems caused by these local trade embargoes.

The structure of local and national government and the specific nature of the Andalusian
grain market were important in pushing municipal governments down this path. The example of the
Dutch Republic highlights that this clash of reciprocal export bans was not the only possible
outcome in a decentralized system. The fact that in normal harvest years most regions of Andalusia
were fairly self-sufficient in grain led to a regular reliance on the use of export bans when local
shortages hit, whilst the monarchy's frequent use of trade embargoes also discouraged regular
attempts to access international grain markets. Less concern was given in Andalusia to the impact of
local export bans on the ability to import than in a country such as the Dutch Republic, which was
far more reliant on international grain.989 Equally, the fact that Andalusian towns and cities
negotiated directly with the government in Madrid when looking for specific exemptions to royal
export bans or tax measures meant that there was little opportunity or institutional forum to enable
negotiation between the towns themselves. When serious region-wide grain shortages hit, as they
did between 1647 and 1652, the end result was the type of sub-optimal equilibrium highlighted by
Epstein, with towns having little incentive to be the sole jurisdiction to pursue a more open trading
policy.990 As Grafe, and J. H. Elliott before her, have pointed out, this decentralized relationship
between centre and periphery was not without its political advantages for early modern rulers and
ruled; however evidence from the grain market suggests that the particular political economy of the

990 Epstein, *Freedom and Growth*, 158.
Habsburg monarchy did create substantial barriers to trade in Spain, with resulting impacts on both market integration and economic growth.\(^{991}\)

It was thus the political economy of the Andalusian grain market that turned a natural disaster into a political crisis. As the municipal governments of Andalusia struggled to implement the variety of policy measures that they had at their disposal, in an attempt to mollify price rises, they were in many cases exacerbating the problems that existed at an Andalusian level. Yet, in the public consciousness there was an expectation that both local and national government could and should intervene to keep wheat and bread prices low: be that via price controls, distributions from the pósitos, or the embargoing of local private grain reserves. When the often genuine attempts by local governments to remedy the situation failed, this did little to placate the region's inhabitants, whose sense of loyalties to the monarchy, the nobility, and local government were bound up within an ideology that explicitly emphasised the reciprocal duties that such institutions had with regards to the provisioning of their subjects. As prices continued to rise political remedies were demanded by local populations, whose quality of life in the mid-seventeenth century had been squeezed by rising taxes and, in sectors such as the silk industry, declining opportunities and profitability.

Here we can see the combination of many of the issues sketched out by Steensgaard in his General Crisis model, albeit with substantial modifications. As the Habsburg monarchy struggled to fund its increasing array of international conflicts in the mid-seventeenth century, increasing pressure did mount on the state's revenue raising apparatus. In Castile this resulted in a growing burden of taxation being implemented at the municipal level, the burden of which fell overwhelmingly on urban populations usually through the imposition of various consumption taxes. However rather than solely focussing on the idea that this increased tax pressure reduced demand

and thus led to economic stagnation, it might be more productive to focus on the way that such
taxes were implemented within the decentralised political structure of the Habsburg monarchy, and
the resulting impact that this had on market integration and hence economic growth. Equally
important, as we have seen was the fact that this decentralised political structure struggled to
implement a consistent set of rules across its territory, with a region such as Andalusia able to
fracture into competing jurisdictions when an episode such as the harvest shortages of 1647 to 1652
arose. Thus, rather than the issue in mid-seventeenth century Castile being a 'problem of
absolutism', the problem was instead the web of competing and overlapping jurisdictional
competences that began with the monarchy, and moved through the larger cities of a region such as
Andalusia, all the way down to smaller towns such as Ayamonte and Loja.992 These were issues of
competing territories and poor 'inter-regional economic integration' of the type highlighted by
Sheilagh Ogilvie.993 When Little Ice Age induced harvest failures arrived in Andalusia, the system
proved unable to remedy the problem of dearth, and in fact contributed towards worsening the
issue. Here again we can link the political and economic sides of the General Crisis debate. Whilst it
remains undoubtable that, as per Steensgaard, the imposition of new taxes and fiscal reforms played
a role in heightening tensions and fomenting political opposition to authority, in places like
Andalusia the focus on jurisdictional fragmentation allows us to add a further explanation to why
revolt broke out in the seventeenth century. As municipalities struggled to react to harvest shortages
and to try to keep prices down, the actions that they turned to often exacerbated rather than reduced
the high prices of grains. As groups such as the artisans of Andalusia felt the effects of squeezed
incomes over the course of the seventeenth century, these price rises imposed another huge burden
on their lives. They reacted with increasing anger at the political institutions that were expected to,
but seemed incapable of, moderating the price of bread. As the municipalities descended into an
increasingly complex web of price competition, tax exemptions, embargoes and jurisdictional

disputes in order to try to secure access to grains, the inhabitants of towns and cities demanded political change, culminating in revolt.

One might think that such stories would be relegated to an early modern past, whose poor market integration and archaic political structures have long since been replaced by our more sophisticated contemporary economic and political systems. The idea of a natural disaster visiting similar problems of market shortages and a resulting collapse in market integration in the contemporary western world would probably have been considered laughable a few months ago. But coronavirus has proved a tragic reminder that market integration is not simply a question of improved transport links, technological progress, sophisticated economic theory, or modern financial instruments that minimise risk and enable the rapid movement of prices. It has at its core a political imperative of co-operation and co-ordination between the states and jurisdictions that are engaged in a market, and a mutual willingness to adhere to a common set of rules. When this breaks down, especially when times of shortage put pressure on actors and localities to bend the rules and protect their own interests above all others, so too does the market, with dramatic increases in prices and patchy, local supply problems taking hold. Neither is this situation rendered any easier when (as with the Andalusian pósitos) it occurs after a prolonged period of reduced investment has severely weakened the various institutions of the state. We should be cognisant that blaming the market, the shortage, or the initial exogenous problem from which this shortage arose, does not always suffice as an explanation when people are deprived of a basic need that they expect the state to provide. The extreme weather conditions and resulting harvest failures did not exonerate the municipal governments of Andalusia from their responsibilities in the eyes of Seville's silk workers or Ayamonte's mariners. It will be interesting to see if we hold our current political leaders to a similarly exacting standard.
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