

## The Errors of Redemptive Sociology or giving up on hope and despair

Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination.

(Foucault, 1984 p. 85)

... the great curiosity of contemporary education is that hope and belief limp on. (A. Allan, 2015a p. 7)

### Abstract

This paper considers the sociology of education (SOE) as a modern human science. It suggests that the SOE is mired in a set of unreflexive, redemptive, Enlightenment rationalities, and explores the messy relationships of the sociology with education that result from this. It argues that the sociology of education has consistently failed to distance itself from the metaphysics, optimism and oppressions of modern schooling. That it has failed to call into question either the basic building blocks of schooling, or what we call education – pedagogy, curriculum and assessment – or the buildings themselves, the spaces of education. The paper concludes by asserting to need for critique rather than simply criticism as a starting point for thinking education differently.

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This short and idiosyncratic paper will consider the sociology of education as a modern human science mired in a set of unreflexive, redemptive, Enlightenment rationalities, and the particular and messy and concomitant relationships of the sociology with education, or more specifically schooling. I will argue that the sociology of education has consistently failed to distance itself from the metaphysics, optimism and oppressions of modern schooling. That it has failed

to call into question either the basic building blocks of schooling, or what we call education – pedagogy, curriculum and assessment – or the buildings themselves, the spaces of education. The sociology of education in whatever form and educational research more generally seem unable to articulate something we might call education other than in these terms - they provide a stultifying grammar for our educational imagination. Indeed, currently the sociology of education teeters perilously between a romantic modernism – *we just have to get it right* - and a pragmatic neoliberalism – *it needs improvement* – both of which tie us, in different ways, to the tired but resilient fantasies of education policy (Clarke 2019). In all of this the sociology of education forgets, changes and misconceives its unstable relation to/with the state and to/with teachers. I begin with the beginnings of the sociology of education in Britain in the 1930s and the struggle between eugenics and sociology to define the problems of and the effective and appropriate means for the management of the population –using population in Foucault’s sense. This I suggest positioned sociology in a redemptive relation to education, as being *for* education and as misrecognising the role of education as a set of technologies of discipline and regulation. The paper then explores the tensions between management and redemption, as realised in sociology’s uneasy and unstable relation with teachers and with the state. The paper then concludes with an argument for doing the sociology of education differently, for critique rather than criticism and for being *against* rather than *for* education. Some of what is said below might be addressed generally to other social sciences.

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In part these reflections are addressed through my own ethical positionings within the sociology to education and in relation to education and various shifts and moments of these positionings over a long career in the sociology of education

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As sociologists of education when we do what we do, we do not normally think about what we are and where we come from. What I mean is we do not think about the sociology of education as a human science that has its origins in and that continues to play its part in the management of the population (Foucault, 2000a). Rather we prefer to objectify the 'problems' we address and their 'causes' – separating of us from them! Specifically, we forget that British sociology of education has its origins in the academic and very political struggles between heredity and environment, between biology and materiality. These struggles were initiated between social eugenics and population studies at the LSE in the 1930s. For its first thirty years the sociology of education, its methods and its politics, were driven by political and epistemological assertions articulated by one side of these struggles - those of the tradition of 'political arithmetic', a term taken from the book *Political Arithmetic: A Symposium of Population Studies*, edited in 1938 by Lancelot Hogben (Hogben, 1938). Hogben was a physiological geneticist, experimental zoologist, medical statistician and one-time Fabian socialist. His collection included two papers by J.L. Gray and Pearl Moshinsky on 'Ability and Opportunity in English Education' and one by David V. Glass and J.L. Gray on 'Opportunity and the Older Universities'. Hogben describes the papers in this section of the book as opening 'a field of enquiry which has been conspicuously neglected and offers ample scope for investigations on class mobility and changing social structure' (Hogben, 1938: 333) – in effect the sociology of education. He also wrote that 'the problem of social arithmetic is then to estimate the remediable wastage due to defective social organization, like schooling, and the loss of social efficiency resulting there from' (Hogben, 1938: 332). In other words, his concern was with the population as a resource to be garnered and nurtured within 'the mundane objectives of the administrative state – social order, economic prosperity, social welfare' (Hunter, 1996, p. 153). This was a relatively new type of political rationality and practice which 'no longer sought to achieve the good life nor merely to aid the prince, but to increase the scope of power for its own sake by bringing the bodies of the state's subjects under tighter discipline' (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 137) - making them 'sober, healthy and competitive' (Jones, 1990 p. 68). What we call education is a complex of power relations concerned with the manufacture and

management of individuals and the population – a key space of regulation or biopower. The school is one of those sites where the body and population meet, where normality confronts degeneracy. The population becomes ‘a sort of technical-political object of management and government’ (Foucault, 2009 p. 70). The body of the learner is ‘the inscribed surface’ of educational events and it ‘bears and manifests the effects of regulating discourses’ (Foucault, 1984 p. 82). Here population is a political and scientific problem and modern forms of ‘government’ take population as their object and in particular, and very specifically in this instance, as Foucault outlines and we shall see, the state turns its attention to ‘the problem of heredity, racial purification, and the correction of the human instinctual system by purification of the race.’ (Foucault, 2003 p. 133; see also pp. 316-318).).

Hogben was an outspoken anti-eugenicist and his book was published in part as a response to a eugenic panic, which was incited in the 1930s around the issue of population decline and social class differentials in birth rates and ensuing debates about appropriate policy responses. One of the contributors to the debate was Enid Charles, Hogben’s wife and a lecturer in his department at LSE, whose book *The Twilight of Parenthood* was re-published in 1936, with the title *The Menace of Under-Population*. Two different versions of population management in relation to the wellbeing of the population were in contest here<sup>1</sup>. On the one side, the eugenicists, believed in the necessity of the exercise of biopower very directly upon specific individuals and their reproductive practices in the regulation of the ‘blood’ of the nation, seeing the use of state power as essential to the ‘life’ of the nation. The eugenicists were concerned that the ‘wrong’ citizens were reproducing while the ‘right’ ones were not, and this was the basis of calls for forced sterilization. They represented and argued for a form of sovereign/disciplinary power which would be enacted directly upon the bodies of those parts of the population deemed to be responsible for the reproduction of dangerous and debilitating traits and behaviours. Ranged against them were, the environmentalists, who trusted to the more subtle disciplines of social welfare aimed at the population as a whole<sup>2</sup>.

As Foucault argues, the modern 'population state' exercises its power, and governs, 'through the administration of life; it is preoccupied with life itself, rather than death' (Foucault, 2009, cited in (Ball, 2013 p. 59). So on the one hand, the eugenicist version of the management of the population is based on exclusion and 'the right to kill', the on the other, the environmentalist/sociological versions argued for inclusion and 'the management of life'. The former, articulated in the series population-government-racism, or *state racism*, or more generally *bio-politics*, that Foucault addresses in his lectures *Society Must be Defended*, led, he argues, directly to some of the worst murderous excesses of the twentieth century – the holocaust. 'What in fact is racism? It is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power's control: the break between what must live and what must die' (Foucault, 2004 pp. 254-255).

Hogben and other environmental materialists argued that better use could be made of the population and the population made better. That is, education was envisioned as a form of social investment that can yield returns both for the individual and society in as much as it both contributes to successful competition in a job market and produces a capable and well-adjusted workforce. Through their advocacy of the raising of the school leaving age and introduction of universal secondary education, anticipating the post-war 'waste of talent' (Crowther Report, 1959) argument, the 'sociologists' were articulating a form of disciplinary/governmental power to be exercised through the institutions of education and the professional knowledge and practices of teachers, and welfare interventions into the lives of uneducated 'poor' families<sup>3</sup>. As Eggleston put it 'The social distribution of education identified by the research of sociologists became re-identified as the social mal-distribution of educational opportunity' and 'Their evidence was used to particularly powerful effect by the advocates of secondary school reorganisation' (Eggleston, 1976 p. 127). Alongside hospitals, prisons, welfare offices and local government, schools literally and in effect constituted the architecture of the modern state, as a 'disposition of space for economico-political ends' (Foucault, 1979 p. 148). That is to say, teachers, social workers, sanitary engineers, doctors were certificated as state actors and enactors of the state, bringing the gaze of the state to bear upon individual

bodies and the population as a whole. Schools via their particular 'arbitrary cruelties' were to assume their intermediary socialising and civilising role between family and work.

The importance of esoteric human science knowledge and experts, like sociologists of education, lies in the generation both of social realities such as the population and the economy and the creation of subjectivities. The play of power evoked and deployed by expertise is integral to both bio political strategies and governmentality. Thus, the modernist institutions of discipline, like the school, drew on existing disciplinary/pastoral/pedagogical practices and new disciplinary knowledges – the psy-sciences as Rose (1998) calls them – to make the population docile and productive.

The 1930s debate, which set the sovereign right to take life or let live against the rights of the modern state to "make" live and "let" die created the basic problematic for and *raison d'être* of the sociology of education and its attempt to explain social class inequalities by social and environmental factors rather than personal and genetic ones, and in relation to these the school was re-envisioned as a means to compensate for society (Bernstein, 1970). This was the *educationalisation* of social problems (Trohler, 2016). Building upon Hogben's research agenda the concerns of the handful of post-war educational researchers (like Floud, Halsey, Musgrove, Swift etc.) were focused upon problems of mass participation in the education system and the debilitating effects, for some children, of economic and material deprivation. The assumption appeared to be that if such extrinsic sources of inequality could be removed or ameliorated the apparently tight bond between educational attainment and social class could be broken; leaving residual differences which could be explained in other ways, such as differential intelligence distribution or selection bias or family practices – little has changed in that respect<sup>4</sup>. Studies done in the 1960s and 1970s shifted away from a straightforward focus on material effects and began to rely more heavily and unreflexively on a social pathology of the working class family and the 'deficiencies of interest and ambition on the part of parents' (Floud, Halsey, & Marton, 1956 p. 188–9). Indeed, to describe these uneven patterns of interest

and ambition Floud coined the term 'la famille educogene'.

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My argument here is that the post-war commitment to mass participation and equity in and through education, and the redemptive relationship of the sociology to education, as a human science, to the educational project of the state continue to define in complex ways the problematic for and *raison d'être* of the sociology of education.

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Within the changing constitution of this problematic the sociology of education has taken up a series different and unstable but always uncomfortable and sometimes contradictory positions in relation to teachers on the one hand and the state on the other. These rest on and reproduce endless cycles of hope and despair driven by the SOE's project of redemption. We are defined in our relation to this hope, in our commitment to the enlightenment project and our refusal to give up on education.

The standard response to educational failure is to provide more education, such that education has become the remedy for its own ills. Yet anomalies (high failure and drop-out rates, irrelevance to state or economy and worldwide 'decline in standards') appear, proliferate and are fostered instead of being overcome as education proclaims. Education is designed to fail; it produces needs, and needy subjects, in order to justify its own necessity. (Deacon & Parker, 1995 p. 116)

One iteration of this commitment to redemption was played out in the 1970s and 1980s, in relation to the disavowal of *political arithmetic*, by the New Sociology of Education (NSE), which as Whitty says, was marked by 'over-optimistic excesses' and a 'naïve possibilitarianism' ((Whitty, 1985 p. 3). The NSE focused on 'radical' and alternative forms of practice linked to the equal worth of

everyday or 'commonsense' knowledge and its conventional, specialised forms, in contrast to political arithmetic's concern with policy and the management of the system. The new sociologists of education argued that social justice had not been well served by the massification of secondary education and that the distribution of social possibilities was not being dramatically 'equalised', but they were unwilling to accept that nothing could be done about it (Green & Whitty, 1994 p. 8). The teacher as a key agent of state education comes into view within the NSE in two ways.

On the one hand, the teacher is imagined by sociology as a technician of hope, as 'The benevolent educator' or romantic educator (A. Allan, 2015b). On the other, the teacher as a technician of school improvement is either a cultural dupe or an agent of oppression. This tension here also exemplifies the oscillation between hope and despair, which bedevils sociology's redemptive project. The SOE in this sense mirrors the position that is being reworked currently within the discourse and practices of the global education reform movement within which global policy actors like the OECD and the World Bank, construe teachers as both heroes *or* villains of education (Avalos, 2014) at the same time. Teachers are the problem and the solution of/for education. Verger, Fontdevila, and Zancajo (2016 p. 4) suggest for example that the World Bank 'frequently portrays teachers as part of the problem concerning quality education that many countries face' and, on the other hand, it 'considers teachers as a very important piece in the quality education puzzle' (p. 4). In the quotidian necessity of classroom life the teacher is burdened with these hopes and demands and must live up to and emotionally and ethically manage 'the contradictions of belief and expectation' (Acker and Feuerwerker, 1997, cited in (Dillabough, 1999 p. 382) with which they are confronted. Despite criticism and despite continual reform: 'A vague romantic impulse remains, which just about sustains the educator. This impulse is the product of a belief that despite it all, education is still motivated by an essential goodness' (Allen 2015 p. 5).

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This uneasy relationship of the SOE with teachers and teaching was also played out in and crucial to the ambitions and growth of the sociology of education as a human science and its role in the management of the population. In the period 1970s-1990s the sociology of education became a key component of teacher education courses. The relation between knowledge, technologies and training provided by the sociology of education became key to the formation of teachers as state professionals. And in this nexus was constructed a relationship of management (of discipline and regulation) between teacher professionalism and the population which drew on social science knowledge. This period was in many ways the heyday of the SOE and its modern iteration in this journal, indicated by the Westhill conferences set up and run by Len Barton and Stephen Parker, and best selling Open University texts, in particular, the course book *School and Society: A Sociological Reader* which was published in 23 editions between 1971 and 1980.

In these ways the SOE plays its part in the constitution of professional expertise of different kinds – filling in the hyphen (power/knowledge) in relation to the teacher and the teacher’s expertise. The SOE, that is, despite its ‘invincible impression of haziness, inexactitude and imprecision’ (Bernstein 1970, p. 355) produces a space in which that ‘strange figure of knowledge’ (Foucault, 1970 p. xxiv) – the learner, appears. The SOE enables claims to be made for knowledges and/or technologies that are productive/critical in relation to a subordinate/productive learner subject - this is in effect an essentialised subject of ignorance, a residualised subject made meaningful only in relation to the teacher and teaching. The SOE was one human science contributing to the generation of knowledge and experts who have rights to define the child and the presentation of such knowledge as ‘true and obvious’.

Foucault points to this in *Discipline and Punish* when he says: ‘The school became the place for elaboration for pedagogy ... the age of the “examining school” marks the beginnings of a pedagogy that functions as a science’ (Foucault 1979, p.187): although it is arguable whether in Foucault’s terms pedagogy has ever functioned as a science. Nonetheless:

In obedience to this faith, educational discourses are premised upon unitary subjects self-consciously engaged in a rational quest for truth within the bounds of a discoverable reality. The teacher is constituted as the pre-eminently active, authoritative and communicative catalyst of knowledge production and reproduction, in relation to whom the learner may be more or less active but always subordinate. (Deacon and Parker 1995 p. 110)

In a similar way the SOE has had and has a number of different real and positional relations with the state. Initially working with and contributing to the formation of the state and the proliferation of biopolitical technologies – providing ‘state numbers’ or fictive realities and policy related research in 1950s and 1960s, calculations used to gain information and knowledge about the population, and to transform territory into a domain of density and vitality – the numerisation of policy and politicisation of numbers (Legg, 2005); a governmental analytics. Subsequently, in a dramatic reversal, in the 1970s and 1980s the SOE was criticising and condemning the state as a repressive apparatus, and thence in the 1990s and 2000s, while not renouncing criticism, defending the state and state education against the depredations of neoliberalism. This latter period sometimes evinces a heady mixture of hope and romanticism, invoking a history of education – a freer, more equitable golden age – that never existed. In effect in the 1990s SOE switched places with neoliberalism to defend the teacher and the state school. In the course of these uneasy relations Margaret Thatcher’s Secretary of State for Education Keith Joseph (1981-1986) sought to eradicate entirely government funding for the social sciences<sup>5</sup>.

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For the most part the SOE thinks itself over and against rather than in relation to the state and the teacher, the state and power and the teacher and power. Both the teacher and the state are objectified and disconnected from the SOE itself.

Embedded in this complicity the SOE and the state share an unspoken commitment to the enlightenment project and in this nexus education itself remains more or less unquestioned both as a universal value and as a particular set of structures and practices – curriculum, assessment and pedagogy – the architecture of education. This architecture is subject to contestation rather than critique (as Foucault defines it: see below) and refusal. As Allen (2017) argues educational critique finds itself trapped, based within an educational good it cannot question because it is committed to its rescue. Given the limits on thought currently imposed by the assumed goodness of education, there is no space in which education may be thought differently, critique is blunted and circumscribed by cycles of hope and disappointment – romanticism is cherished and cynicism is abhorred.

Unfortunately, there is nothing inherently radical, or even progressive, about the pursuit of hope. Indeed, in advanced liberal societies, capitalism depends upon it. These societies operate by stimulating rather than simply directing or repressing the desires of their populations. Under these conditions, obedient subjects are those that have *not* given up hope. (Allen 2015 p.8)

The SOE makes its own particular contribution to the Enlightenment foundations of educational discourses, asserting through its methods and perspectives of interpretation both subject-centred reason and education as a site of reason, and education as a means by which the individual is enabled to develop or unfold toward some absolute form of rational being. The school is one of many sites in which ‘the doctrine of ontological individualism’ (Olssen, 2007 p. 177) is played out. Indeed, ‘Education in the modern world is increasingly being exposed as one of the last tattered bastions of an epoch whose idols of reason, progress and autonomous subjects’ (Deacon and Parker 1995 p. 109). These are illusionary grand narratives that are no more than the erroneous imposition and violence of discourse itself and if we<sup>6</sup> want to distance ourselves from them then we could begin ‘with the analysis of ourselves as beings who are historically determined, to a certain extent, by the Enlightenment’ (Foucault, 2000b p. 34).

## Critique

I will say that critique is the movement by which the subject gives himself the right to question truth on its effects of power and question power on its discourses of truth. (Foucault, 1997 p.47)

If hope and redemption continue to define and distort the possibilities of a critical relationship of sociology to education, then we have yet to face up to the impossibility of education. That is to say, as a human science, the sociology of education ultimately remains mired in its management role and its practitioners refuse to 'strip away the myths and self-deceit of educators, and expose the grim truth of the education process – namely, that it is a core element in the mechanics of modern disciplinarity' (Leask, 2011 p. 59). Of course, at the same time, we constantly and repetitively confuse education with schooling, for, in some ways, very good reasons.

The SOE, generally speaking, eschews forms of critique that might enable us to properly recognise that the things, values, and events that make up our present experience 'have been constituted historically, discursively, practically' (Mahon, 1992), and indeed that the self, our subjectivity and practices are historically produced in and through technologies and relations of power. Rather these things are our tools and presuppositions. What is lacking is a form of critique that challenges the necessity of these constituents in order to produce an 'other side of education', a space of transgression and experiment for education rather than an alternative to what we now have. As Matthew Clarke argues:

Ultimately, 'the other side of education' should not be confused with notions of individual or societal redemption, or of a promised land where the enduring tensions and traumas of education will find resolution. Such notions of reason and redemption through education have led education policy to remain fixated on fantasies, in the shape of purported education 'revolutions'. (Clarke, 2019 p. 144)

Such critique would require a particular and specific set of actions, but it rests upon a permanent orientation of skepticism; 'a mode of relating to contemporary reality' (Foucault in Rabinow (1987: 39) oriented toward a mapping of the contemporary limits of the necessary. However, this is not just a 'gesture of rejection' rather 'we have to move beyond the outside-inside alternative; we have to be at the frontiers' (ibid 45) and think differently. We cannot conceive of alternatives within the discursive possibilities we current inhabit. We are bound by epistemic rules and closures that enable and constrain us to think within certain versions of what is and might be true – the conditions of possibility of modern sociological thought, established practices of remembering and forgetting, an exteriority that is prior to any conscious activity of a meaningful subjectivity. As Foucault explains: 'I think that to imagine another system is to extend our participation in the present system' (Foucault, 1997 p. 230). Geuss (2008: 96) makes a similar disavowal of 'alternative talk' and says 'I reject this line of argument completely: to accept it is to allow the existing social formation to dictate the terms on which it can be criticised, and to allow it to impose a theoretically unwarranted burden of positive proof on any potential critic'. Thus, in seeking to think differently perhaps we should leave behind any desire to find a foundational metaphysics for critical action and indeed strive to escape 'the over-used, colonised lexicon of critical education' (Zalloua, 2004: 239) that draws on what Geuss (2008) calls the 'ethics-first' approach of political theory, one which begins from an 'ideal theory' of how humans ought to act. Of course, all of this is very difficult. According to St. Pierre (2000 p. 78): 'This is the hardest work that we must do, this work of being willing to think differently'.

It is not easy to shuffle off our constraining rationality and embrace 'the power of strangeness' and the inevitability of failure – rather than invest in the comforts of hope. It is not easy to 'resist the obscuring clarity of rational philosophical discourse' (Carroll, 1982: 181) and thus make both our present and our past alien to us. This involves, 'a commitment to uncertainty' (Gordon, 1986, p. 74) - destabilising education, rather than perpetuating it, historicising the teacher and the learner rather than

contributing to their (re)formulation within pedagogy and policy, recognising that we are part of the relations of power of the state rather than set over and against them. Where as, in 'normal' practice, certainty is our epistemological currency and our disciplinary goal.

Instead of offering alternatives a commitment to uncertainty requires the exploration and mapping of limits, and the testing and crossing of them whenever possible – a set of multiple transgressions that allow us 'to peer over the edge of their limits, but also confirms the impossibility of removing them' (J. Allan, 1999: 48). That is, an exploration of ethical heterotopias, real and unreal, where difference is affirmed, 'a sort of simultaneously mythic and real contestation of the space in which we live' <sup>7</sup>. And as Barry, Osborne and Rose suggest this is not simply an 'intellectual exercise': 'Rather what is at stake is the production of a certain kind of experience, a reconfiguring of experience itself (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 1993, p. 6) – that we might name as education<sup>8</sup>. Furthermore, critique in this sense rests on the opposite of hope, what Wenham (2013 ) calls 'the tragic view of the world', according to which conflict, suffering and strife are inevitable phenomena of social and political life that may never be ultimately overcome.

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Perhaps then, rather than live with and perpetuate consolations of hope and promises of reason, rather than accepting the imperatives of biopolitics, we as sociologists of education might, as Ansgar Allen suggests, begin by admitting the absurdity of education, 'and learn to laugh while laden' (Allen 2017 p. 177) and to work with the 'painful ambiguities' that 'are all we have left' (p. 186<sup>9</sup>). That is, we should be against education rather than for it. We should seek to reveal its contingency and make it intolerable rather than seek to improve it. We should seek to re-think the educator and pedagogy not as constituted by skills and knowledges but as the formation of moral subjectivity, a form of politics, and a relation to ethics rather than to truth. This would involve a commitment to fostering ethical learners with a healthy suspicion of the present, while at the same time being able to acknowledge their own fallibility and to set themselves

over and against the prevailing framework of modern education and its carceral forms (see Ball (2017)). Perhaps the *British Journal of Sociology of Education* is one site in which such seeking might be pursued.

The strong cynic will have the boldness to admit that education is so fatally undermined, that if it were to be rescued, it would need fundamental reconstruction. This would entail the reconstruction of society no less, and would involve at its core, the reconstitution of the educator herself. Towards this end, the educational cynic is indispensable, having the strength to bring into question her entire identity as a caring professional. This rhetorically inflated figure, which trades on an increasingly hollow commitment to the social good, would be confronted and disposed of. (Allen 2015 p. 12)

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## Notes

<sup>1</sup> The government committee, the Brock Committee, set up in 1932 to report on the possibility of enforced sterilization to address the problem of policy recommended (in 1934) in favour of a programme of 'voluntary sterilization'. A recommendation that was in fact 'quietly forgotten as the cruelty of compulsory sterilization in Nazi Germany was exposed from the mid-1930s' (King & Hansen, 1999) 83). However, sterilization programmes did become law in Sweden, part of the USA, and other countries (see (Spektorowski & Mizrachi, 2004)).

<sup>2</sup> It is interesting to reflect on those struggles, the Eugenics Society and the re-emergence of the same issues and debates now: see <https://www.theguardian.com/education/2018/dec/06/ucl-launches-inquiry-into-historical-links-with-eugenics>.

<sup>3</sup> We might see this as a first iteration of the current arguments relating education to social mobility.

<sup>4</sup> See <https://www.theguardian.com/science/2018/sep/29/so-is-it-nature-not-nurture-after-all-genetics-robert-plomin-polygenic-testing>, for a review of the work of Robert Plomin and (Gillborn, 2016).

<sup>5</sup> Keith Joseph, then Secretary of State for Health and Social Services argued in a eugenics style speech at Edgbaston in 1974 that: 'The balance of our population, our human stock, is threatened. A high and rising proportion of children are being born to mothers least fitted to bring children into the world...' In the

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controversy that ensued Joseph came to the view that the government was wasting money in support for the SSRC (Social Science Research Council) and later, back in government, set in train the dismantling of the Council. Eventually however, following a Report by Lord Rothschild a change of name was the only immediate consequence (see <https://journals.openedition.org/histoire47> for a full account).

<sup>6</sup> Of course, this 'we' is fictive, controversial and contingent.

<sup>7</sup> "Des Espace Autres," published by the French journal *Architecture/Mouvement/Continuité* in October, 1984: <http://web.mit.edu/allanmc/www/foucault1.pdf>.

<sup>8</sup> That would mean changes to how we teach sociology as well as how we write it and how we conduct our research.

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