C. G. Jung and the Making of Modern Psychology

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ABSTRACT

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At the end of the nineteenth century, many figures sought to establish a scientific psychology that was independent of metaphysics, theology, biology, anthropology, literature, medicine and psychiatry, whilst taking over their traditional subject matter. It was upon the successful negotiation of these disciplinary crossings that the possibility of psychology rested. In this thesis I show how in the course of his medical, psychiatric and psychotherapeutic career, Jung derived the key problematics of his work from these disciplines, and combined them to form analytical psychology.

The thesis is divided into a series of sections which deal with major problematics in Jung's work. Each section reconstructs the respective nineteenth and early twentieth century contexts that formed the backdrop for Jung's work, and situates in relation to contemporaneous developments in the human sciences. This enables the comprehensive reconstruction of the intellectual and disciplinary development of analytical psychology, together with an evaluation of its place in the medical, psychological and intellectual history of the twentieth century.
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**Acknowledgements**

**Bibliography**
Abbreviations

AMP: Adolf Meyer Papers, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore.


CMS: Jung/Jaffé, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, editorial manuscript, Countway Library of Medicine, Harvard Medical School, Boston.


ETH: Jung Papers, Wissenschaftshistorische Sammlungen, Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule, Zürich.

JO: Jung biographical archive, Countway library of Medicine, Harvard Medical School, Boston.


SFC: Sigmund Freud Copyrights, Wivenhoe.

UCL: University College London archives, London.
Introduction: "The Most Cursed Dilettante"

The twentieth century has witnessed the development of a vast paramedical profession of psychotherapy with its own institutions, distinct from medicine, psychiatry and academic psychology. Prominent among these has been Jung's analytical psychology. For Jung, analytical psychology comprised both a general scientific psychology and a clinical discipline of psychotherapy - the two were inextricably wedded. He held that it constituted the fundamental scientific discipline, upon which other disciplines should henceforth be based. This thesis charts how this came about.

At the end of the nineteenth century, many figures sought to establish a scientific psychology that was independent of metaphysics, theology, biology, anthropology, literature, medicine and psychiatry, whilst taking over their traditional subject matter. It was upon the successful negotiation of these disciplinary crossings that the possibility of psychology rested. More often than not, the questions that psychologists chose to resolve had already been posed in the terms of these prior disciplines.

In 1892, the Swiss psychologist Théodore Flournoy was given a chair in psychology at the University of Geneva. At his insistence, this was placed in the faculty of science, which was the first of its kind. In 1896, reflecting back on
the significance of this event, Flournoy stated:

In placing this chair in the faculty of sciences, rather than in that of letters where all the courses of philosophy are found, the Genevan government has implicitly recognized (perhaps without knowing it) the existence of psychology as a particular science, independent of all philosophical systems, with the same claim as physics, botany or astronomy... One is thus right to consider as historically accomplished, with the same authorization and the high consecration of political power, the long procession by which the study of the soul little by little detached itself, in its own fashion, from the general trunk of philosophy to constitute itself at the state of a positive science. As for knowing up to what point contemporary psychology does justice to this declaration of the majority, and has truly succeeded in freeing itself from all metaphysical tutelage of any colour, is another question. For here not less than elsewhere the ideal should not be confounded with reality.¹

This study unfolds within the hiatus of Flournoy's final qualification. His celebratory claim expresses a sentiment

¹ Théodore Flournoy, Notice sur le laboratoire de psychologie de l'université de Genève, p. 1.
that was widely felt by psychologists in the 1890's. In 1892, in conclusion to his *Text-Book of Psychology*, William James wrote:

When, then, we talk of 'psychology as a natural science' we must not assume that means a sort of psychology that stands at last on solid ground. It means just the reverse; it means a psychology particularly fragile, and into which the waters of metaphysical criticism leak at every joint.... it is indeed strange to hear people talk triumphantly of 'the New Psychology', and write 'Histories of Psychology', when into the real elements and forces which the word covers not the first glimpse of clear insight exists. A string of raw facts, a little gossip and wrangle about opinions, a little classification and generalization on the mere descriptive level; a strong prejudice that we have states of mind, and that our brain conditions them: but not a single law in the sense in which physics shows us laws, not a single proposition from which any consequence can causally be deduced. We don't even know the terms between which the elementary laws would obtain if we had them. This is no science, it is only the hope of science... But at present psychology is in the condition of physics before Galileo and the laws of motion, of chemistry before Lavoisier and the
notion that mass is preserved in all reactions. The Galileo and the Lavoisier of psychology will be famous men indeed when they come, as come they some day surely will...²

It is a moot point whether in the ensuing decades any such progress had indeed occurred - as to whether in Flournoy's terms, the gap between the ideal and the real had lessened, and that the founding separations of psychology from theology, philosophy, literature, anthropology, biology, medicine and psychiatry had successfully taken place. Or indeed, whether psychology today is in any better shape than James' estimation of its standing in the 1890's (gossip, wrangle, prejudices, and so on). Nevertheless, the frequency with which psychologists were likened (or likened themselves) to Galileo, Lavoisier, and Darwin increased dramatically. The assumption that a theoretically distinct discipline of psychology exists today is taken as being so axiomatic - along the lines of 'there are psychologists, therefore psychology must exist' - that to call it into question seems distinctly perverse. However, it is necessary to suspend the assumption of the successful establishment of psychology to historically unravel its attempted formation. Moreover, in many respects, the 'making' of modern psychology is by no means over, which gives a particular

² William James, Text-Book of Psychology, p. 468.
contemporary significance to the history of psychology.

When one considers the attempt of psychologists to separate their discipline out of preexisting disciplines, it becomes evident that one is not simply dealing with single episodes, as is conventionally portrayed in histories of psychology and the obligatory introductory chapters of textbooks of psychology, but with myriad attempts to achieve such ends, and the mode in which these disciplinary crossings were negotiated gave rise to the specific form that particular psychologies took. Within this perspective, the study of the formation of Jung's analytical psychology may be taken as a case history within the wider story of the formation of modern psychology. However, this is not to suggest that it should be taken as a paradigmatic instance. For what is precisely at issue here is the impossibility of any singular encapsulation of the formation of modern psychology.3

3 On this issue, see Roger Smith, "Does the history of psychology have a subject?" and my "Psychology before Psychology? A review of Fernando Vidal's Piaget before Piaget." In this respect, Vidal's study forms the closest parallel to the approach developed here. To date, the historiography of psychology has tended to mirror the concerns of present day psychology - hence the overriding emphasis on the history of experimentation. Thus in Kurt Danziger's landmark study, Constructing the Subject: Historical Origins of Psychological Research, Wilhelm Wundt is accorded an exemplary status, and areas that are peripheralised in psychology today, such as psychical research, get no mention, despite their historical importance in the 'origins of psychological research.' On this latter issue, see Ian Hacking, "Telepathy: origins of randomization in experimental design."
In popular perception as well as the historical field, Jung's name is so closely bound with Freud, that it is hard to even consider Jung without Freud. In histories of psychiatry, psychology and psychoanalysis, Jung's analytical psychology is usually classed as an offshoot of psychoanalysis, as one of the myriad neo-psychoanalytic schools. Whilst following Henri Ellenberger, copious critical work has been done on the 'Freudian Legend,' nothing comparable has been done on what may be termed the 'Jungian Legend' in which Jung is portrayed as the rebel heretic of psychoanalysis, who, out of the perceived shortcomings of psychoanalysis, broke away to form his own school, based on his own 'discoveries.'

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* To cite two early locations in this vein, in his *Contemporary Schools of Psychology*, Robert Woodworth classed Jung's analytical psychology together with Alfred Adler's individual psychology, as 'modifications of psychoanalysis', (pp. 172-192). William McDougall's beginning to his chapter on Jung in his *An Outline of Abnormal Psychology* is typical in this regard: "Dr. C. G. Jung was at one time regarded as Prof. Freud's most influential lieutenant... But like some others of Freud's more influential followers, notably Drs. Alfred Adler and W. Stekel, he has found it increasingly impossible to accept the whole of the Freudian system, and his teaching has diverged widely from Freud's." (p. 188).

Following the logic of this location, one may surmise that as Jung’s analytical psychology was supposedly an offshoot from psychoanalysis, the revisionistic scholarship on the origins of psychoanalysis, coupled with close scrutiny of the break between Freud and Jung, should be sufficient to account for the genealogy of analytical psychology. Indeed, since the publication in 1974 of the Freud-Jung letters, this has generally been the perspective that has been followed. In the plethora of studies of the Freud-Jung relation, commentators have generally been in agreement on one thing – that the period in question marked a crucial epoch in the institutional and theoretical development of psychoanalysis, and what was later to become analytical psychology. The apotheosis of this Freudocentric reading of Jung is represented by John Kerr’s *A Most Dangerous Method: The Story of Freud, Jung and Sabina* 

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To cite only books on the topic: Peter Homans, *Jung in Context: Modernity and the Making of a Psychology*; Robert Steele, *Freud & Jung: Conflicts of Interpretation*; George Hogenson, *Jung’s Struggle with Freud*; Linda Donn, *Freud and Jung: Years of Friendship, Years of Loss*; Duane Schultz, *Intimate Friends, Dangerous Rivals: The Turbulent Relationship Between Freud and Jung*; and most recently, John Kerr, *A Most Dangerous Method: The Story of Freud, Jung and Sabina Spielrein*. Unfortunately, it is indicative that none of these authors appear to have done any European archival research. In the case of Jung, given the dreadful quality of the secondary literature, and the fact that hardly any primary research has been conducted in the vast archival collections that exist, such strategies are not a recipe for success.
Spielrein, in which he attempts to trace psychobiographically the roots of Jung's analytical psychology to his triangular relations with Freud and Sabina Spielrein. For Kerr, the former was simply the offspring of a *menage-à-trois* gone awry. He goes so far as to accuse Jung of bad faith for attempting to disguise this very fact:

> The ultimate break [from Freud] was so painful for Jung - he teetered close to insanity for several years - that afterwards he put as much distance as he reasonably could between himself and this period of his life. Having arrived at last at his own distinctively "Jungian" views, he elected to obscure the essential continuity between his later endeavours and his earlier one. Even more to the point, he deliberately concealed the biographical keys that were needed to make the continuity meaningful.⁸

From such a perspective, Jung's intimations that his psychology may have had any other than Freudian sources have simply been dismissed.⁹

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⁹ To cite but one further example, in his review of the Freud/Jung letters, Paul Roazen wrote: "even though in later years Jung might sometimes prefer to trace his indebtedness to Eugen Bleuler, the Swiss expert in schizophrenia, there can be little doubt of Jung's extended discipleship to Freud." "Jung Heretic," p. 516. For Roazen, sporadic meetings with Freud over a period of six years obviously
The adequacy of this view, in which psychoanalysis features as the key determining context for the emergence of analytical psychology, has been assumed as self-evident and hence has rarely been questioned.\textsuperscript{10} I have elsewhere demonstrated how this location of Jung's work came about and why it represents nothing less than the complete mislocation of Jung and analytical psychology in the intellectual history of the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{11}

\begin{itemize}
    \item Eugene Taylor has presented a parallel and complementary argument in "The new Jung scholarship," principally based upon his work and my earlier work. However, I now hold that the argument for realigning Jung with the tradition of Frederic Myers, William James and Théodore Flournoy, which Taylor presents and which I previously held, whilst a crucial element in resituating Jung's work, is by itself too narrow to encompass it. The elements for such a reconstruction were presented in Taylor's "Jung and William James", "C. G. Jung and the Boston Psychopathologists, 1902-1912," and my "Automatic writing and the discovery of the unconscious" (on Myers) and "Encountering Hélène: Théodore Flournoy and the genesis of subliminal psychology."

    \item Sonu Shamdasani, "The Jungian Legend: Jung's Historiography of Psychology." I have freely drawn from this in this thesis. Recently, a completely other non-Freudocentric reading of Jung has been presented by Richard Noll, who claims that through drawing on a variety of völkish sources, Jung attempted to establish a cult based around his own self-deification (\textit{The Jung Cult: The Origins of a Charismatic Movement}). Noll went on to liken Jung to Luc Jouret, David Kouresh and Jim Jones, and analytical psychology to their cults (Noll, "The rose, the cross and the analyst"). The sole new documentary source for Noll's arguments was a document that I had provisionally identified and which was leaked to him by John Kerr. Some of the details of this episode have been presented by John Kerr in his review of Noll's book, "Madnesses" and in my reply. Noll's reading of the said text is completely mistaken. His
shortage of evaluations of Jung's work. But what has
hitherto been lacking has been an adequate basis for
evaluation, which this work seeks to provide.

Jung's library, still intact in his house in Kusnacht,
presents a panoramic, encyclopaedic vista of human learning,
without parallel in modern psychology. Phillip Rieff dubbed
Jung as "possibly the last as well as the latest" of the
great Protestant erudites. Erudition can be used to
manifold ends. In Jung's case, it was constitutive of a
large share of his work. Towards the end of his life,
surveying and assessing his work, he frankly stated:

I am the most cursed dilettante that has lived. I

work does not stand informed and detailed scrutiny, as has
been amply and comprehensively demonstrated by Sheila
Grimaldi-Craig, Jay Sherry, Robert Segal, Adrian Cunningham,
Alden Josey and George Hogenson in their reviews. More
recently, Noll has gone on record claiming that Jung was
"the most influential liar of the 20th century." (Cited in
Dinitia Smith, "Scholar who says Jung lied is at war with
descendants," p. 9) One wonders what differential criteria
were used to arrive at this assessment. Dinitia Smith
reported that "Mr. Noll has said that he had written to Dr.
Meier and representatives of the Jung estate, asking for
permission to see the notes [of Johann Honegger]... So far,
Mr. Noll said, his requests have been ignored." (Ibid.)
However, the Jung estate has issued the following telling
rejoinder: "So far, Dr Noll has on no occasion been denied
any access to any documents by us. Furthermore, no such
request for access has been submitted to us. Dr Noll and the
community of heirs have never corresponded with each
other..." (Leo La Rosa, letter to the editor, Journal of
Analytical Psychology.)

12 Philip Rieff, The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses
of Faith after Freud, p. 126.
wanted to achieve something in my science and then I was plunged in this stream of lava, and then had to classify everything. That's why I say dilettantism: I live from borrowings, I constantly borrow knowledge from others.\(^{13}\)

This statement took place in the course of Jung's interviews with his secretary Aniela Jaffé that went to make \textit{Memories, Dreams, Reflections}, and it is not surprising that it was omitted, being so far away from prevalent images of Jung.\(^{14}\)

What follows can be taken as an explication of this dilettantism.

If the constitutive separations of psychology from preexisting disciplines cannot be said to have occurred in one single place, it can also be said that they did not occur at a single time. This proposition holds even if one considers the work of a single theorist, such as Jung. Despite the overriding tendencies of nearly all presentations of his work, it did not obey a straightforward linear chronological evolution. Indeed, Jung went so far as to nominate this as the hallmark of his work. In a passage

\(^{13}\) Jung/Jaffé protocols, BA, p. 149.

\(^{14}\) On how this text came to be wrongly perceived as Jung's autobiography, see my "Memories, Dreams, Omissions." Throughout this thesis, where I have cited the published version of \textit{Memories, Dreams, Reflections}, I have tried to locate and compare the citation in the protocols of Aniela Jaffé's interviews with Jung, and various unpublished editorial manuscripts.
that was deleted from Aniela Jaffé's introduction to Memories, Dreams, Reflections, she wrote:

in our talks Jung frequently reverted to problems that seemed important to him, or concerned him deeply, and these recurrent motifs have deliberately been allowed to remain in the text. In regard to them Jung has said: "I am aware that I repeat certain things. I have also done that in my books. I consider things again and again, always from a different angle. My thinking is circular; I circle around questions repeatedly. That method is congenial to me; it is in a way a new kind of peripatetics."

In all likelihood this critical statement of Jung's was omitted when the repetitions that it alludes to were omitted. Given this situation, this work has been envisaged as a cubist portrait. It has more than one beginning and more than one end. Instead of an over-determining context and a teleological development that can be read in reverse, this work presents overlapping chronologies and intersecting planes. Hence no overarching coherence (or incoherence) of Jung's work has been presupposed. Consequently, the same texts are dealt with in more than one place, from more than one angle. It is hoped that the imbrications and

15 Jaffé, introduction, CMS.
interleavings thus established may illuminate the architecture of Jung's work.

This thesis is divided into a series of sections which deal with major problematics in Jung's work. Each of these (which have been somewhat abridged) reconstructs the respective nineteenth and early twentieth century backdrops for Jung's work, and situates it in relation to contemporaneous developments in the human sciences. No doubt, the choice of another set of problematics or points of departure would illuminate other networks. Further sections are underway which will complete the work. Taken as whole, this will enable a comprehensive reconstruction of the intellectual and disciplinary development of analytical psychology, together with an evaluation of its place in the medical, psychological and intellectual history of the twentieth century.

Finally, given the scope of Jung's erudition, an attempt by one individual to historically cover the selfsame terrain must inevitably succumb to the shortcomings of its own forms of dilettantism. If this prevents a final settling of accounts with Jung, it may however establish something of an agenda for future Jung scholarship.
Note

Unless otherwise indicated, translations from the French and German are my own. In the main body of the text, all titles have been given in English. In the case of citations from Jung's works, the extremely free renditions given by Richard Hull have frequently had to be modified. In some instances, these modifications are for the sake of accuracy and points of detail. In others, they have been reworked to a point where they constitute new translations. For ease of reference and comparison, the references have been given to the English Collected Works throughout (except in instances where the text or version in question is not to be found there). Here again, the titles of Jung's works were frequently arbitrarily reworked. As these reworkings in many instances constitute significant distortions, I have given literal versions of Jung's original titles, at the risk of confusion.

16 For a preliminary consideration of Hull's work, see my "Reading Jung Backwards? The correspondence of Michael Fordham and Richard Hull concerning concerning 'The type problem in poetry' in Jung's 'Psychological Types.'"
Section One: The Individual and the Universal

The Personal Equation: From Astronomy to Psychology

In Western philosophy, one of the grounding distinctions has been that between the individual and the universal. For many psychologists at the end of the nineteenth century, the primary question was whether one could form a psychology, which dealt with individual differences and particularities, whilst remaining a science, dealing with the universal.

Jean Starobinski has eloquently demonstrated how much can be gleaned about the changing sensibilities of psychological disciplines through tracing the semantic transformations undergone by particular words or phrases. The 'personal equation' was first nominated to designate a calculus of observational error in astronomy. It became the hallmark of the attempt to develop an objective experimental science of psychology, and then conversely, an epistemological abyss that delimited the selfsame project. Latterly adopted by Jung, it became the leitmotif of the pretension of analytical psychology to be a superordinate science, as the only discipline capable of encompassing the subjective factor that was held to underlay the sciences.

17 See for instance, Jean Starobinski, "The word reaction: From physics to psychiatry."
Its genesis may be briefly narrated.

In 1796 at the Greenwich observatory, the astronomer royal Nevil Maskeleyne noted that there was a discrepancy of nearly a second between his observations of stellar transits and those noted by his assistant Kinnebrook. His assistant was dismissed. 20 years later, the astronomer Bessel, who had an interest in errors of measurement, was intrigued by this incident and sought to see whether this discrepancy could be found in other observers. He found this indeed to be the case. In experiments with another observer and himself, Bessel computed the difference and called it the personal equation. Through further experiments, he found that the personal difference varied and was not a constant figure. There then followed a great deal of increasingly sophisticated experiments in astronomy to study the personal equation.\textsuperscript{18}

These experiments had a great deal of importance for the emergence of experimental psychology. Edwin Boring highlighted the fact that the most active period of investigation on the personal equation was in the 1860's and 1870's, which coincided with the 'birth' of physiological psychology.\textsuperscript{19} Simon Schaffer notes that: "The material

\textsuperscript{18} For an account of the astronomical work on the personal equation, see Simon Schaffer, "Astronomers mark time: discipline and the personal equation".

\textsuperscript{19} Edwin Boring, \textit{A History of Experimental Psychology}, p. 146.
technology of time-keeping and the social technology of the astronomical workshop provided psychologists with excellent models for the scrutiny of the individual." He states that this was because the astronomers had linked time management with the measurement of the performance of simple tasks by individuals. It was this that enabled Wilhelm Wundt to develop means to study mental processes in a quantitative manner in his psychological laboratory in Leipzig. For Wundt, these experiments were:

only explicable on the assumption that the objective times of the auditory and visual impression and the times of the subjective perception are not identical, and that these times show a further difference from one another according to the individual observer.

For Wundt, the astronomical experiments not only demonstrated these phenomena, they provided the instrumental means to research them. In his own account, his famous complication experiment was directly modelled after the astronomical observations. The astronomical research on the personal equation enabled supposedly objective

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22 Ibid., pp. 270-272.
investigations of subjective experiences.

At the end of the nineteenth century, it was often said that there were two popes in psychology with radically counterpoised agendas: William James and Wilhelm Wundt, who formed the two first psychological laboratories at Harvard and Leipzig, in 1874 and 1879 respectively. In 1890, in *The Principles of Psychology*, James wrote a chapter on "The Methods and Snares of Psychology." In this, he depicted fallacies that psychologists were prone to, by reason of being reporters of subjective as well as objective facts. He commenced by recounting the conflicts over the use of introspection in psychology. Whilst conceding that the method of introspection was difficult and fallible, he concluded that its drawbacks were the same for any type of observation, and that "The only safeguard is the final *consensus* of our farther knowledge about the thing in question."23 One may note in passing that it was the subsequent failure of introspective methods to secure such consensus in the protracted debates concerning the existence of imageless thought that did much to discredit the use of introspection in psychology.24

James then dealt with the experimental method, developed by those whom he termed 'prism, pendulum, and chronograph-


24 On the decline of introspection, see Kurt Danziger, "The history of introspection reconsidered."
philosophers' such as Weber, Wundt, and Fechner. He noted that whilst this had transformed psychology, there had as yet been little 'theoretic fruit' from such labours, though he expected such to follow. Finally, he turned to the comparative method. His comments here are worth reproducing at length:

So it has come to pass that instincts of animals are ransacked to throw light on our own; and that the reasoning faculties of bees and ants, the minds of savages, infants, madmen, idiots, the deaf and the blind, criminals, and eccentrics, are all ransacked in support of this or that special theory about some part of our own mental life. The history of sciences, moral and political institutions, and languages, as types of mental product, are pressed into the same service. Messrs. Darwin and Galton have set the example of circulars of questions sent by the hundred to those supposed able to reply. The custom has spread, and it will be well for us in the next generation if such circulars be not ranked among the common pests of life... There are great sources of error in the comparative method. The interpretation of the 'psychoses' of animals, savages and infants is necessarily wild work, in which the personal equation of the investigator has things very much its own way. A
savage will be reported to have no moral or religious feeling if his actions shock the observer unduly. A child will be assumed without self-consciousness because he talks of himself in the third person... the only thing then is to use as much sagacity as you possess and to be as candid as you can.25

With brilliant prescience, this passage critiques what became the pitfalls of much of twentieth century psychology. For what James seizes upon is the fact that whilst many different subjects were being proposed as the exemplary subject for psychology, at an epistemological level, they all shared the same weakness: that none of them could be said to provide an objective standpoint that resolved the question posed by the subjective variation of different psychologists. Here, the personal equation, far from being heralded as denoting a quantifiably ascertainable factor, designated the manner in which investigators manage only to see what they are led to expect by their own preconceptions. The only means of escape from this epistemological solipsism and resultant anarchy that James put forward were sagacity and candour, which by themselves were slender grounds to secure the scientific status of psychology. The epistemological status of psychology was upheld only by the integrity of the psychologist. Rhetorically speaking,

25 Ibid., p. 194.
through using the term of the personal equation to designate this epistemological quandary, James was contesting the supposed advances made by the new experimental psychology.

James considered the misleading influence of speech to be the one of the greatest sources of error in psychology. The attempt to form a distinct scientific discipline of psychology led early on to the confrontation with the problem of language. Not only was the language of psychology parasitical upon that of other disciplines, ranging from philosophy to physiology, it was also heavily reliant on everyday speech. The formation of a distinct language for psychology was seen as necessary for psychology to distinguish itself from neighbouring disciplines, as well as to establish its superior analytic capacity over everyday language. There were numerous attempts to achieve these ends. For the most part, the means adopted was the coining of new concepts, and, in the case of borrowed terms, the attempt to rigidly and restrictively designate their range of connotation. In his Principles of Physiological Psychology, Wundt raised these issues. He argued that at its inception, every science was presented with certain ready-made concepts. In the case of psychology, concepts such as 'mind' embodied particular metaphysical presuppositions.²⁶

²⁶ Wundt, Principles of Physiological Psychology, p. 17. In a translator's note to his edition which was based on the 5th German edition, Titchener stated that he had translated the section from which this passage appears, which was omitted from the 5th edition, from the 4th
He noted:

Language brings us against an array of concepts like 'sensibility', 'feeling', 'reason', 'understanding', - a classification of the processes given in internal perception against which, bound down as we are to the use of these words, we are practically powerless. What we can do, however, and what science is obliged to do, is to reach an exact definition of the concepts, and to arrange them upon a systematic plan.²⁷

James claimed that language, which had not been devised by psychologists, lacked sufficient vocabulary to express subjective facts. Whilst empiricists had emphasised the dangers of the reification of concepts, James stressed the opposite fallacy occasioned by the lack of a word for some given phenomenon, noting, "It is hard to focus our attention on the nameless."²⁸ He claimed that an even more serious defect was caused by psychology's reliance on common speech, in which, for example, "the thought of the object's recurrent identity is regarded as the identity of its recurrent thought."²⁹ Through this, James argued, the

²⁷ _Ibid_, p. 18.
²⁸ James, _The Principles of Psychology_, vol. 1, p. 195.
²⁹ _Ibid_, p. 196.
'continuous flow of the mental stream' (a phrase that pointed forward to his celebrated chapter on 'The stream of thought') was misconceived through the atomist assumption of the existence of discrete ideational entities. By this charge, he stated that he meant to "impeach the entire English psychology derived from Locke and Hume, and the entire German psychology derived from Herbart..." 

The manner in which James tried to circumvent this linguistic problematic was markedly different from Wundt. Rather than attempt to provide rigidly static conceptual definitions of concepts and introduce new terminology, James sought to evoke the realm of subjective facts by stretching the evocative and metaphorical registers of language to the utmost. The language of Principles sought to depict states of consciousness with the precise shadings and nuances with which they presented themselves. An example of this is his celebrated description of the forgetting of a name:

Suppose we try to recall a forgotten name. The state of our consciousness is peculiar. There is gap therein; but no mere gap. It is a gap that is intensely active. A sort of wraith of the name is in it, beckoning us in a given direction, making us at moments tingle with the sense of our closeness, and then letting us sink back without the long-for term. If wrong names are proposed

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30 Ibid.
to us, this singularly definite gap acts immediately so as to negate them. They do not into its mould. And the gap of one word does not feel like the gap of another, all empty of content as both might seem necessarily to be when described as gaps. When I vainly try to recall the name of Spalding, my consciousness is far removed from what it is when I vainly try to recall the name of Bowles... the feeling of an absence is toto coelo other than the absence of a feeling. It is an intense feeling. The rhythm of a lost word may be there without a sound to clothe it; or the evanescent sense of something which is the initial vowel or consonant may mock us fitfully, without growing more distinct. Every one must know the tantalizing effect of the blank rhythm of some forgotten verse, restlessly dancing in one's mind, striving to be filled with words.\textsuperscript{31}

\textit{The Practice of the Personal Equation}

Perhaps the clearest indication of how James understood the role of the personal equation in psychological observation, and attempted to delimit it, is found in his lengthy and detailed study of the medium, Leonora, \textit{Report on Mrs. Piper's Hodgson control}, published in 1909.

Leonora Piper, who first became known to the psychological world through James's publication of his

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 252.
observations of her in his 1886 "Report of the committee on mediumistic Phenomena," was one of the most closely studied individuals of all time. Year after year, lengthy stenographic transcripts of her seances were recorded. The prime figure who dedicated himself to the task of investigating her was the Australian Richard Hodgson, whose earlier investigations debunking Madame Blavatsky's so-called spirit controls had provoked the outrage of the theosophists. However, through his work with Mrs. Piper, Hodgson became a convert to spiritualism. Soon after his death, messages duly came through Mrs. Piper claiming to originate from him. James was duly called in to authenticate these messages. James commenced his report by noting that Hodgson had often quipped that if he died, he would be able to communicate through Mrs. Piper better than anyone else, as he was so familiar with the difficulties this side of the beyond. James then gave an account of his contact with Mrs. Piper, and his evaluation of her phenomena. He noted that whilst Hodgson accepted the reality of Mrs. Piper's spirit controls, Rector and the Imperator Band, he himself tended to view them as dream creations of Mrs. Piper, only having existence whilst she was in a state of trance. James then gave an account of his general preconceptions and adumbrated his reasons for feeling that the chances of Mrs. 

Piper's Hodgson control actually being the deceased Hodgson were exceptionally bad. He concluded by stating, "so much for my personal equation, for which my various hearers will make their sundry kinds of allowance." Further on in the text, James gave a résumé of his views on psychic phenomena, and his epistemological attitude to the nature of evidence. He concluded by noting,

This is as candid an account of my own personal equation as I can give. I exhibited it in my treatment of special incidents in the preliminary report, and the reader will make allowance for it in what is to follow. In the end he must draw his conclusions for himself... 

From this account, it emerges that James included under the rubric of the personal equation the theorist's theoretical preconceptions, the nature of their personal acquaintance with the subjects being investigated and their 'will to believe.' The solution that James put forward was for the theorist to detail all such factors, so that the reader would be in a position to judge their shaping effect on the reported material.

In the following, I intend to show Jung adopted James' 

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33 Ibid., p. 119.
34 Ibid., p. 148.
formulation of the personal equation, and viewed it as one of the most critical issues upon which the possibility of psychology as a science of subjectivity hinged. However, as shall be seen, his attempted solutions differed radically from James.

**Becoming a psychiatrist**

In *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, Jung recounted that his growing scientific interests in his adolescence led him to decide to study science at University. The choice of medicine - which he saw as an established science - was a secondary compromise to enable a livelihood.\(^{35}\) As to his specialisation, he saw the choice as being between surgery and internal medicine. He stated that if he had the funds, he would have opted for the former.\(^{36}\)

Psychiatric textbooks are not renowned for leading to spiritual revelations. However, such seems to have been the case with Jung. He recounted that towards the end of his medical studies, Friedrich von Müller, who was in charge of the medical clinic at the University of Basel, invited him to accompany him to Munich as his assistant. Jung stated that he would have taken up this invitation and devoted himself to internal medicine, had he not started reading Krafft-Ebing's *Textbook of Psychiatry* in preparation for his

\(^{35}\) *Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, pp. 104-6.

state exams. He noted that he had put this off till last as he found his instructor in psychiatry unstimulating. Jung recalled:

I thus read in the preface: "It is probably due to the peculiarity of the subject and the incompleteness of its elaboration that psychiatric textbooks are stamped with a more or less subjective character". A few lines further on, the author called the psychoses "diseases of the person". Then I suddenly had a violent pounding of the heart. I had to stand up and draw breath. I felt an intense excitement, for it had become clear to me in a flash of illumination, that there could be no other goal for me than psychiatry... Here was the empirical field common to biological and spiritual facts, which I had everywhere sought and nowhere found... My violent reaction set in when I read Krafft-Ebing on the "subjective character" of psychiatric textbooks. So, I thought, the textbook is in part the subjective confession of the author, who with his prejudice, with the totality of his being, stands behind the objectivity of his experiences and responds to the "disease of the person" with the whole of his own

37 Ibid., pp. 128-9. A footnote states that Jung read the fourth edition of 1890.
personality.\textsuperscript{38}

Jung's reading of Krafft-Ebing's preface is curious. Following the first sentence that Jung cited, the preface continues:

The present text-book is based upon thirty-three years of observation of the insane, and presents disease-pictures in the light of the author's personal experience. The general correspondence between the author's experience and that of other observers may be taken as a guarantee that in general he has been correct in his observation, and that, notwithstanding the confusing variety of manifestations in "diseases of the person", there are certain fixed laws which permit the establishment of distinct disease pictures.\textsuperscript{39}

Thus Krafft-Ebing presents his own textbook as having achieved a level of objectivity, and overcome the drawbacks of previous psychiatric textbooks. Similarly, in the final sentence, he states that \textit{despite} the variety of manifestations of diseases of the person, he has been able

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 129-30, tr. mod.

\textsuperscript{39} Richard von Krafft-Ebing, \textit{Text-Book of Insanity}, p. iii. This translation was based on the fifth edition, in which the preface was unchanged from the fourth. On Krafft-Ebing, see Renate Hauser, "Sexuality, neurasthenia and the law: Richard von Krafft-Ebing (1840-1902)."
to establish distinct disease pictures, due to their lawfulness. Both of these points should have become apparent when Jung read beyond the preface, where it would also have been clear that the only union of biological and spiritual facts that Krafft-Ebing had in mind was the reductive explanation of religious phenomena in terms of psychopathological categories.  

Jung understood Krafft-Ebing's preface as posing the question, how could psychiatry be a science, given its inescapable subjective character? When Jung came to designate his work as psychology, it was this question that he repeatedly posed of psychology. The series of solutions that he proposed at various stages significantly gave shape to what has become his most renowned work, which hitherto has not been grasped from this perspective.

Individual Psychology.

In 1895 Alfred Binet and Victor Henri put forward a programmatic statement in the newly founded journal, L'Année psychologique, edited by Binet in conjunction with Henri Beaunis, for a new branch of psychology - individual psychology. Binet and Henri were based at the laboratory of

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40 "Not less interesting is psychiatry for theology, since it shows the psychopathic origin of a good many religious aberrations and sects; further, for world history, since it shows the mysterious acts of a good many historic personalities find their explanation in psychopathic conditions." Lehrbuch der Psychiatrie, 1st edition, p. 25. This passage was unchanged in later editions.
physiological psychology at the Sorbonne in Paris, which Beaunis had founded in 1889, and where Binet became the director in 1894.\textsuperscript{41} As John Carson notes, Binet's work at the Sorbonne during this period was 'profoundly affected' by the Wundtian vision of psychology as an experimentally based science.\textsuperscript{42} In their article, Binet and Henri stated that whilst general psychology, which had hitherto prevailed, studied the general properties of psychic processes, the aim of individual psychology was to study the individual differences of such processes.\textsuperscript{43} In this respect, they were parting company with the Wundtian agenda, which had concentrated on attempting to study general, as opposed to particular human capacities. Whilst Wundt contended that only elementary mental capacities were amenable to experimentation, such as processes of perception, Binet and Henri claimed that higher mental processes such as memory, reasoning and imagination were also amenable to experimentation.\textsuperscript{44} They argued that individual psychology was faced with two problematics. First, to identify the

\textsuperscript{41} For information on Binet, see Theta Wolf, Alfred Binet. For information on Henri, see Serge Nicholas, "Qui était Victor Henri (1872-1940)?"

\textsuperscript{42} John Carson, "Talents, intelligence and the constructions of human difference in France and America, 1750-1920", p. 226.

\textsuperscript{43} Alfred Binet & Victor Henri, "La psychologie individuelle", p. 411.

\textsuperscript{44} For Wundt's strictures on experimentalism, see Danziger, Constructing the Subject: Historical Origins of Psychological Research, pp. 34-39.
variable properties of these processes and to determine their variation between individuals. Second, to study the relation within an individual of these various processes, to determine whether any particular ones predominated, and to study their level of mutual dependency. The result of such an analysis would be a precise scientific account of the 'character' of an individual. It was clear that individual psychology was intended to replace the 'prescientific' study of temperaments, characters, humours, etc., and the manifold means that had hitherto been deployed to describe human diversity.

The determination of the dominant processes within an individual quickly took the form of typologies. In a subsequent follow up article, Binet described experiments that they had conducted on a group of school children. The procedure they had devised was to present their subjects with a picture for two minutes, after which they had ten minutes to describe what they saw in as detailed a manner as possible. Their aim was to study the different psychic processes that the same object gave rise to. They classified their results by identifying the dominant psychic processes of each subject. The results of their experiments

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47 Binet, "Psychologie individuelle - la description d'un objet", p. 299.
led them to distinguish between five intellectual and moral types: the describer type, the observer type, the emotional type, the erudite type and the imaginative and poetic type.  

Throughout his career, Binet equivocated on the role of experimental methods in psychology. As Carson notes, Binet, whilst being one of the most active in founding experimental psychology in France, was also one of its sternest critics. He shared this trait with Théodore Flournoy in Switzerland and William James in Geneva. Significantly, in each case, experimental methods were unfavourably contrasted with the detailed study of individual lives in natural settings, and each one held that such studies were intended to yield results of greater practical utility than laboratory based work.

In 1903, in his *Experimental Study of Intelligence*, Binet gave extended descriptions of the observer type and the imaginative type in the form of his study of his daughters, Madeleine and Alice, for whom he gave the pseudonyms Marguerite and Armande. He subjected his daughters to a series of tests, such as soliciting associations to given words. Binet claimed that the results showed two distinct typical forms of reaction. He contrasted these types

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respectively as follows:

The tendency to live in the external world, or objectivism, like the tendency to shut oneself up in one's own consciousness, or subjectivism, characterize very different mental types, and have given rise to very curious consequences for the psychological history of humanity.\textsuperscript{50}

Binet utilised an in-depth clinical study of just two subjects. He argued that what was most needed in psychology was the close detailed observation of subjects over many years, and that in the case of higher intellectual functions, one should study subjects one knew intimately, such as friends and relatives.\textsuperscript{51}

The utilisation of in-depth clinical investigation as the mode of exploring typological differences easily enabled a transition to utilising psychotherapy as the methodological means for the study of individual differences, which is precisely what Jung subsequently attempted.

Differential Psychology

In 1900, William Stern, a privatdozent in philosophy at

\textsuperscript{50} Binet, \textit{Étude expérimentale de l'intelligence}, p. 297.

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 297-8.
the University of Breslau and former student of Herman Ebbinghaus, commenced his *On the Psychology of Individual Differences (Ideas for a "Differential Psychology")* by boldly proclaiming that individuality was to be the problem of the twentieth century.\(^{52}\) Whilst the new experimental psychology had been preeminently concerned with establishing the general laws of mental functioning, Stern argued that the task confronting psychology was the discovery of the principles of individual differences. As Stern understood the task of psychology to consist in the establishment of laws, the task confronting a differential psychology became one of determining the respective types of individuals.

In his consideration of method, Stern considered the problematics of introspection. He argued that the principal problem was that introspection alone could not determine in the case of a given psychic phenomenon whether it was individual or personal. He noted the problem posed by the individual peculiarities of the psychologist, stating: "A psychologist born blind can never understand the constitution of the visual type."\(^{53}\) Stern claimed that these difficulties could be overcome through observation of


\(^{53}\) Ibid., p. 22.
others, preeminently through experimentation.\textsuperscript{54} In contrast to James, for whom the problem of the personal equation beset all methods in psychology, for Stern, it seemed to pertain only to the use of introspection.

Amongst the types that Stern described were the objective and subjective judgement types. In the case of the former, judgements were primarily determined by the outer stimulus; in the latter, by the state of the subject. In 1935, whilst commenting on types of character, Stern returned to his distinction, and noted:

\begin{quote}
Some decades ago I distinguished the "objective" and "subjective" types (note: in my \textit{Psychologie der individuellen Differenzen} 1900); more recently Jung's type designations "introverted" and "extraverted" have come into use.\textsuperscript{55}
\end{quote}

This reference suggests that Stern was making something of a priority claim.

In his autobiography, Stern claimed that even at the time when he wrote this work, he saw the limitations of differential psychology:

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 33.
\textsuperscript{55} Stern, \textit{General Psychology: From the Personalistic Standpoint}, pp. 434-5.
\end{quote}
For real "individuality", the understanding of which I had made my goal, cannot be reached through the channels of differential psychology. For this there are two reasons: one, that differential psychology dissects the unity of spiritual life; the other, that this science, just like general psychology though to a lesser degree, generalizes. For the concept of a "type" is itself a general functional rule for a group of human beings; the relegation of an individual to a type or to several types can never do justice to the ineffable particularity of his individuality.\(^56\)

In his work on psychological typology, Jung would subsequently find himself confronted with such dilemmas.

John Carson notes that by the turn of the century individual psychology "was already fragmenting into a host of unrelated research programs."\(^57\) Part of the problem was that there seemed to be as many typologies as there were investigators, with little common vocabulary, let alone consensus. It is hard to dispel the impression that the different conceptual models were in part put forward to justify the introduction of new terminology to replace that

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\(^56\) Stern, "Autobiography", p. 347. Stern's subsequent elaboration of this view is found in his General Psychology from the Personalistic Standpoint.

\(^57\) Carson, "Talents, intelligence, and the constructions of human difference in France and America, 1750-1920", p. 300.
of other psychologists, and hence to relegate their work to a secondary position. It remains to be seen if, when Jung took up these problematics, he was able to advance them any further beyond the impasse that they had reached.

**Jung's associations research**

In 1903 the Genevan psychologist Édouard Claparède noted that out of the interest in recent years in individual psychology, the question as to whether individual coefficients marked the process of association had grown increasingly prominent. It is not hard to understand this linkage. Given the longevity of the associationist view of the mind in philosophy and psychology, in which association was seen as the defining characteristic of the mind, if there existed distinct mental types, it would be reasonable to assume that such types would reveal themselves by different forms of associative reactions. Second, from Wundt onwards, associations had been subject to a great deal of experimental research, as they seemed to provide a ready means of a quantitative approach to mental processes, easily amenable to laboratory investigation.

In his work on the associations experiment, through

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59 The historical relation between the associationist tradition and the new psychological experimentation is clearly portrayed in Claparède's study (*ibid.*, pp. 11-23).
determining typical associative reactions, Jung attempted to
demonstrate the existence of distinct psychological types.
In their "Experimental investigations on associations of the healthy" (1904), Jung and Franz Riklin stated:

It is also the case, that certain individuals betray an obvious tendency in the experiment to construct relations to the ego or to express highly subjective judgements, that are clear conditioned by wish or fear. Such reactions have something of an individual character and are typical for certain personalities.\(^6^0\)

They claimed that such typical forms of reaction betrayed themselves in the process of association. It followed from this that the associations experiment could be used to determine experimentally an individual's reaction type in a quantifiable manner - for instance, by calculating the number of self-referential or egocentric reactions in a given test.

They claimed that there existed two well characterized types:

(1) A type, with whom subjective, often emotionally stressed experiences are used in the reactions.

\(^{60}\) Jung and Riklin, "Experimental researches on the associations of the healthy," \textit{CW} 2, § 97, tr. mod.
(2) A type, with whom the reactions indicate an objective, impersonal disposition.\textsuperscript{61}

Jung was in effect fusing the Wundtian experimental methodology of the study of reaction times and word associations with the project of individual or differential psychology, as established by Binet and Stern, and combining this with the clinical approach of the French psychology of the subconscious. In such a manner, he was attempting to develop a clinico-experimental method, which he termed experimental psychopathology. The appearance this gave of being able to conduct psychotherapy in a supposedly scientific manner, through adopting some of the procedures of the experimental laboratory, did much to ensure the popularity of Jung's associations research, particularly in America.\textsuperscript{62}

However, this combination of experimental and clinical methods made for an uneasy alliance, as some critics, notably Binet, Janet and Stern realized (see below). The resultant tensions are apparent if one considers Jung's notion of the emotionally-stressed complexes, which were supposed to be revealed by the associations experiment. The only means of establishing whether the complex indicators

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., § 412, tr. mod.

\textsuperscript{62} Further aspects of Jung's associations research and its reception will be dealt with elsewhere.
revealed by the experiment did indeed designate emotionally stressed complexes and not arbitrary associations was the subsequent clinical inquiry to which Jung subjected his subjects. Thus the experimental demonstration depended upon the clinical investigation, and not vice versa.

Jung's methodological shift in this period is usually seen as a move from the associations experiment to psychoanalysis. However, this conflates together distinct transitions. On the first hand, one has the breakdown of the clinico-experimental synthesis he was developing, which led him to opt solely for a clinical methodology. Only secondly did Jung relate his endeavours to psychoanalysis.

**Jung and Binet**

In the winter of 1902 Jung went to Paris to attend Pierre Janet's lectures at the Collège de France. In the unpublished typescript of *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, Jung also revealed a further motive for his trip to Paris:

> Before I went to Paris in the fall of 1902 I had discovered the "feeling-toned complex" and the part it plays in the association experiment. My original intention had been to work on this matter with Binet in Paris. I got in touch with him, and met with warm understanding on his part. But as I considered the project more closely, I was troubled by the fact that I
would have to conduct the experiments in French. For such a task I lacked sufficient linguistic feeling, lacked the ability to make fine distinctions which are particularly important in the case of the French language. Discouraged, I therefore let the plan drop, without, however, feeling confident that it was wise to do so.\textsuperscript{63}

Given the collaborative nature of the associations experiment, several of Jung's papers were co-authored. One could imagine then, if this arrangement had succeeded, that Jung's first major publication could have been co-authored with Binet, and located within the French psychological literature, and most probably published in Binet's journal \textit{L'Année psychologique}.

There may have been further reasons for Jung's abandonment of his proposed research with Binet. In \textit{The Experimental Study of Intelligence}, whilst describing his method to write down twenty words as fast as possible, Binet criticised the use of the associations experiment:

I believe that this test [of the twenty words] is... perhaps much more favourable for the analysis of the association of ideas that the procedure which one habitually employs; in this procedure, which consists

\textsuperscript{63} CMS, p. 189.
in saying a word, and asking the subject to reply with another mode, one only provokes a single association at a time, which is an isolated, unique association, whereas with the test of twenty words one provokes the development of twenty associations which form a chain. This is a very great advantage, because, in the experience of the twenty words, one approaches natural conditions more than in the provocation of an isolated association... our method of written words has another advantage; it is that the subject who writes twenty words is more free, more spontaneous, more left to himself than he who associates in succession a word to the word which one gives him; in the last case, one is constrained to artificial associations, and it is to be believed that one diverts him from thinking naturally."

For Binet, Jung's artificial method would simply lead to the production of experimental artifacts, as it did not adequately deal with the problem of suggestion. It is plausible that Binet expressed a similar sentiment to Jung, when the latter approached him concerning collaborative research on the associations experiment. Jung never replied to (or acknowledged) this criticism.

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Ellenberger noted the close parallel between Binet's types of 'introspection' and 'extrospection' and Jung's 'introversion' and 'extraversion':

Since Binet's book [The Experimental Study of Intelligence] appeared approximately at the time that Jung studied in Paris with Janet, Jung may have read it and then forgot it, and this would be one more example of those cryptomnesias, so frequent in the history of dynamic psychiatry.65

Binet's typology is cited neither in Jung's work on the associations experiment, nor in any of his subsequent work on psychological typology. It is possible that this lack of citation may have had something to do with the circumstances surrounding the abandonment of Jung's proposed research project with Binet.

Similar criticism of Jung's associations experiments to those of Binet were made by Janet, who expressed a sharp critique of Jung's work at the 17th international congress of medicine in London in 1913, which Jung also attended (from a reference in Janet's presentation, it appears that Jung's presentation directly followed his). After criticising Freud's method of free association, Janet stated:

65 Henri Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious, p. 703.
A more interesting method has been proposed by Jung (Zurich). This writer has revived and attempted to use clinically an old experiment of the psychological laboratory... Mayer and Orth, 1901, have observed that associations of this kind are speedy when accompanied by a sentiment of pleasure and are retarded when they arouse a disagreeable sentiment. Jung also found that the associations are always retarded or modified in some way when the stimulus word wakens a distressing sentiment in the subject's mind relative to traumatic memories that are conserved, sometimes unknown to himself.⁶⁶

This description, in which Janet had Jung following Mayer and Orth, challenged the originality that Jung had claimed for himself. Janet's judgement of Jung's method, however, was no more positive than his appraisal of psychoanalysis:

> When the subject is a suitable one, capable of lending himself to the experiment and interested in it, and when his fixed ideas are already known to the experimenter, a suitable list of words can be prepared. Prolonged and abnormal associations can be obtained as reactions to the words which have an association with

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the subject's fixed ideas. I have succeeded in demonstrating this on several occasions. I am not sure that the experiment is a success if the subject's fixed ideas are not known, or when these ideas do not represent memories which play a powerful role. I think clinical errors would be numerous if we attempted to make a diagnosis by this experiment. It has seemed to me that any word whatever which caused a slight emotion, such as surprise, was equally efficacious in causing a lengthened reaction and an alteration in the association... I have obtained retardations of from six to nine seconds by pronouncing abruptly some improper word, such as "merde" or "votre cul" in the midst of a list of serious words, with a subject whose mental state had long been known to me and who had no traumatic memory connected with either of these words. It would be very dangerous to necessarily postulate a traumatic memory simply because of such a reaction. Moreover the majority of patients do not take kindly to experimentation of this kind; their abstraction, their unwillingness or even their eagerness to experiment will cause a retardation in the associations which are much more serious than those caused by their emotional memories.67

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67 Ibid., pp. 13-4. In his revised version of this essay, Janet added: "if we use it as a method of clinical examination we shall expose ourselves, I think, to serious
In this damming critique, Jung's associations experiment collapsed through an elementary failure in experimental methodology, which could have been avoided by a few simple control experiments. Its confirmatory value for the psychoanalytic theory of repression was nullified, as it also confirmed Janet's theory of subconscious fixed ideas, and more or less any fixed idea of the theorist. Its diagnostic value was dismissed out of court. And finally its clinical value, which Jung set much store by, was reduced to a species of iatrogenesis, as its use would lead to the postulation of traumatic memories where none existed.

In 1905 Stern wrote a review of Jung's "On the behaviour of reaction times in the associations experiment," which had been published the same year. Stern focused on an example that Jung gave of a married lady in which he claimed to detect a pregnancy-complex - namely, the fact that she feared that her pregnancy might lead her husband to be estranged from her. Stern argued that Jung's practice of risk. The method, as I have frequently seen in practice, will invariably succeed in furnishing evidence of certain ideas or memories... The observer will thus be enabled to discover traumatic memories in all their patients, even in those whose neurosis has no connexion whatever with such a memory." Psychological Healing: A Historical and Clinical Study vol. 1., pp. 653-4.

The association that Stern commented on was "to despise: mépriser". The passage he cited read: "Once again a long reaction-time and also, a striking rendering of the reaction into French... To despise is for the subject, accompanied by an unpleasant feeling-tone. Immediately after the reaction it occurred to her that her pregnancy might by its various effects cause her to lose her husband's regard.
asking for retrospective clarifications could easily lead one astray, since, solely on the basis of the subject's self-observation, the investigator projected a relation of underlying representations between previously isolated acts of association which may not have in fact been effective in each moment. Due to this, the purported explanations turn into interpolations.⁶⁹

In his reply, Jung conceded that his method was difficult and dangerous, particularly for inexperienced investigators. However, in a manner reminiscent of Binet, he noted:

> For this reason I chose as test persons for analysis only three people whose life and psychological make-up were not only known to me, but were also psychological themselves, and were specifically experienced in the observation of the activity of associations.⁷⁰

Jung indeed could be said to have known the first subject, which Stern signalled out for his remarks, rather well— as it appears to have been his wife, who was pregnant for most

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of 1904 and 1905 with their first two children. No doubt, one could have reason to expect a more impartial witness for a supposedly revolutionary method in psychology and psychiatry. As to the charge of interpolation, Jung stated: "even Freud has been accused of interpreting into a subject's statement more than is in it." He added that when a subject was asked to report what came to mind in connection to an idea, they were of course likely to reply with a 'canalized' rather than a spontaneous association; this applied to any form of retrospective elucidation. However, this hardly replied to Stern's charge: for if any form of retrospective elucidation had such a directing effect on the explanation, retrospective elucidation would be insufficient to establish that the various associations were in fact due to the activation of a particular complex, which Jung required of it.

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71 Jung married Emma Rauschenbach, whose family was extremely wealthy (Jung notes that his subject: "had previously been in rather better financial circumstances and occasionally feels this loss" CW 2, § 605), on 14th February 1903. She joined him in his residence in the Burghölzli. To one association, Jung noted that "The subject recalls that she once read it on one of my association-forms", ibid. Agathe Regina Jung was born on 26th November, 1904, and Anna Margarethe Jung was born on 8th February, 1906.


73 Ibid.

74 John Kerr states that Stern's "criticism of the association experiment had first led Jung to embrace psychoanalysis..." (A Most Dangerous Method, pp. 235-6) without providing any argumentation in support of this view. On the basis of the published record, it appears that Jung
The Personal Equation in Psychoanalysis

A reader of the correspondence between William James and Théodore Flournoy is struck by the gentlemanly tone by which intermeshed personal and professional relations are discussed. Whilst one has the clear sense that they considered their often conjoint positions to be superior to those of their contemporaries, disparaging remarks concerning colleagues do not predominate. There could be no greater contrast than the correspondence between Freud and Jung, which is hard to outclass in terms of the incidence of invective and vitriol that they dished out to their psychological and psychiatric colleagues, and finally, to each other. One of the reasons for this is the employment of a particular style of ad hominem psychological critique, which simply stated, took the form of asserting that a given individual's theorising was fallacious, as the individual felt to his own satisfaction that he had conclusively replied to Stern's criticism. Second, Jung's alliance with psychoanalysis was far more complexly motivated. For Stern's relation with Freud, see Angela Graf-Nold, "Stern versus Freud: Die Kontroverse um die Kinder-Psychoanalyse - Vorgeschichte und Folgen."


There are instances where the published version was deliberately toned down: in his introduction, William McGuire notes that certain passages concerning individuals in Jung's letters had been deleted at the request of his family. (The Freud/Jung Letters, p. xxxvii). On Anna Freud's attempted censorship of the letters, see my "'Should this remain?' Anna Freud's misgivings concerning the Freud-Jung letters."
was neurotic, psychotic or worse (the only remedy being psychoanalysis). What is significant concerning this is that it embodied a particular understanding of the relation of the subjectivity of a psychologist to their theories.

In what follows, this issue will be taken up in terms of the final phase of the relation between Freud and Jung, where it is most markedly prominent. On 15th November, 1912, Jung commented to Ernest Jones,

> Freud is convinced that I am thinking under the domination of a father complex against him and then all is complex-nonsense... He already ceased being my friend, understanding my whole work as a personal resistance against himself and sexuality. Against this insinuation I am completely helpless... If Freud understands each attempt to think in a new way about the problems of psychoanalysis as a personal resistance, things become impossible."

A few weeks later, this issue openly broke out in the correspondence between Freud and Jung. On 29th November, 1912, Freud explained his prior fainting fit in Jung's presence by appealing to "A bit of neurosis, that I still

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77 Jung to Jones, 15th November 1912, SFC.
should take care of." Jung seized upon this admission in his reply, and stated that it ought to be taken seriously. He claimed that it was this factor that prevented Freud from grasping his recent work. Hence Jung's answer to what he took to be Freud's judgement on his work was simply to diagnose Freud in kind. Jung, who stated to Freud that he was writing to him as a friend (despite having just stated to Jones that Freud had ceased being his friend), highlighted the fact that Freud began The Interpretation of Dreams with "the mournful admission of your own neurosis - the dream of Irma's injection - identification with the neurotic in need of treatment, which is very significant." Jung went on to argue that this wasn't simply a personal shortcoming of Freud's, but one that, through a quasi-degenerationist inheritance, afflicted psychoanalysis as a whole:

I am forced to the painful conclusion that the majority of psychoanalysts misuse psychoanalysis for the purpose of devaluing others and their progress by the well known insinuations of complexes... A particularly preposterous bit of nonsense went around, which says, that I wrote my libido theory as the result of anal

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78 Freud to Jung, 29th November 1912, Freud/Jung Letters, p. 524, tr. mod.

79 Jung to Freud, 3rd December 1912, ibid., p. 526, tr. mod.
eroticism. When I consider who cooked up this "theory," then I become fearful for the future of analysis.\textsuperscript{80}

Jung concluded that in this respect, psychoanalysts were as dependant upon psychoanalysis as their opponents were upon authority, and that this protective function of psychoanalysis needed to be unmasked. Freud's counter was to draw attention to a slip of the pen that Jung had written, which provoked an outraged response from the latter.\textsuperscript{81} Jung stated that this revealed Freud's general tactics, which was to sniff out symptomatic actions in those around him, hence reducing them to the status of sons and daughters. As for himself, he stated: "I am namely not in the least neurotic - touch wood! I have namely \textit{lege artis et tout humblement} let myself be analysed, which has been very good for me."\textsuperscript{82} He claimed that as Freud had only conducted a self-analysis as opposed to having had an analysis, he had been unable to escape from his neurosis.\textsuperscript{83} On receiving this letter, Freud wrote to Ernest Jones:

As regards Jung he seems all out of his wits, he is behaving quite crazy... I directed his attention to a

\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Ibid.}, tr. mod.

\textsuperscript{81} Freud to Jung, 16th December 1912, \textit{ibid.}, p. 534.

\textsuperscript{82} Jung to Freud, 18th December 1912, \textit{ibid.}, p. 535.

\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Ibid.}
certain Verschreiben in his letter... It was after this that he broke loose furiously proclaiming that he was not neurotic at all, having passed through a psychoanalytic treatment (with the Moltzer? I suppose you may imagine what the treatment was).\textsuperscript{84}

Freud enclosed a copy of Jung's letter to Ferenczi, and commented that Jung was clearly attempting to provoke Freud, so that the responsibility for the break would be with him. He added:

he is behaving like a florid fool and the brutal fellow that he is. The master that analyzed him could only have been Fraulein Moltzer, and he is so foolish as to be proud of this work of a woman with whom he is having an affair.\textsuperscript{85}

In private, Jung's theoretical developments were simply dismissed through being attributed to neurotic origins. In

\textsuperscript{84} Freud to Jones, 26th December 1912, \textit{The Complete Correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Ernest Jones 1908-1939}, p. 186.

\textsuperscript{85} Freud to Ferenczi, December 23rd 1912, \textit{The Correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Sándor Ferenczi, volume 1, 1908-1914}, p. 446. Jung's pupil, Jolande Jacobi recalled that "I heard from others, about the time before he [Jung] met Toni Wolff, that he had a love affair there in the Burghölzli with a girl - what was her name? Moltzer." Jolande Jacobi interview, p. 110, JO. Moltzer had been a nurse at the Burgholzli. She practised as an analyst, and worked closely with Jung as his assistant.
1913, Jones wrote to Adolf Meyer:

The Jung question is really too involved to explain in a letter. In my opinion he has shown grave signs of defective balance, and there must be something wrong. His new scientific views constitute of course another matter, which must be judged on their merits, but even here they seem to have a suspiciously subjective origin.\(^{86}\)

In these transactions, the mutual accusations between Freud and Jung are symmetrical: both sought to invalidate the other's theoretical position by reducing it to being nothing other than the expression of personal psychopathology. Whilst fully engaging within this dynamic, Jung at the same time attempted to distance himself from it. In 1913 he wrote to Jones:

It is an extremely difficult and even unfair standpoint to reduce a different view to personal complexes. This is the psychology of the "nothing but". It takes of all seriousness and human consideration and replaces it with personal gossip and suspicion.\(^{87}\)

\(^{86}\) Jones to Meyer, 1913, AMP.

\(^{87}\) Jung to Jones, 25th November 1913, SFC. This note bore an additional inscription which was clearly not heeded: "please tear up." As Eugene Taylor pointed out the use of
There are several interlinked problems that Jung was grappling with. As he understood it, the distinguishing trait of psychoanalysis was its total reliance upon the personal equation. In 1911, he wrote:

it is just here that psychoanalysis demands a sacrifice which no other science demands of its adherents: 
merciless self-knowledge. It must always be newly repeated, that the practical and theoretical understanding of analytical psychology is a function of analytical self-knowledge.\textsuperscript{68}

Hence it became axiomatic that the scientific status of a psychological theory could be safeguarded only if the theorist was not neurotic. In this context, freedom from neurosis seemed to designate the fact that one had a 'successful' analysis (whatever that was). Second, even if one was a non-neurotic theoretician (as Jung here claims to be), there was little likelihood of having one's theory generally recognized, as the neurosis of analysts not only impeded them from producing genuine scientific theories, but also from being able to recognize them. Whilst James could

\textsuperscript{68} Jung, "Morton Prince, 'The mechanism and interpretation of dreams': A critical review," \textit{CW} 4, § 156, tr. mod.
appeal to an ethical code as the final court of appeal, no such recourse was possible for psychoanalysis, as it considered itself beyond good and evil, and hence in a superordinate position to all ethical codes. Hence the possibility of theoretical debate within psychoanalysis had, by these terms, collapsed into mutual diagnosis. Significantly enough, it was at this juncture that Jung put forward the proposal that every analyst had to have a training analysis, which subsequently became adopted not only by psychoanalysis, but by the myriad schools of psychotherapy.

Jung appears to have been the first to have set up this practice. In part, this seems to have arisen out of the particular set of working circumstances at the Bürgholzli. During the period of the experimental research into word associations, the staff subjected each other to tests. At the same time, mutual dream analysis was practised. Abraham Brill recalls that at the Bürgholzli,

when one wishes to analyse his own dreams he usually

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89 This is clearly visible from the capsule descriptions of the subjects in Jung and Riklin's "Experimental researches on the associations of the healthy" (1904) CW 2. William McGuire identified Jung as the subject of Ludwig Binswanger's "Über das Verhalten des psychogalvanischen Phänomens beim Assoziationsexperiment" (1907) in "Jung's complex reactions (1907). Word association experiments performed by Binswanger." I subsequently identified Sabina Spielrein as another one of the subjects in Binswanger's paper, "Spielrein's associations: a newly identified word association protocol."
asked someone who had already mastered the technique to control them with him. My own dreams were analyzed mostly by Jung, some by Bleuler, and later by Freud and Ferenczi.\textsuperscript{90}

In 1907, Sándor Ferenczi visited Jung at the Bürgholzi. Towards the end of his life, Jung recalled that he "trained" Ferenczi in psychoanalysis, but that unfortunately, Ferenczi "remained stuck with Freud."\textsuperscript{91} Ferenczi's formal declaration of his separation from Jung was his critical review of *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido.*\textsuperscript{92} Commenting on this review before it had even appeared, Jung pithily wrote to Freud: "Understanding belongs to the most difficult tasks of the transference."\textsuperscript{93} In 1912, in his lectures at Fordham University, Jung argued that success in analysis depended upon how far the analyst had been analysed himself. To be analysed was the only solution:

There are analysts who believe that they can get along with a self-analysis. This is Munchausen psychology,

\textsuperscript{90} Abraham Brill, *Freud's Contribution to Psychiatry,* p. 42. Brill himself attributes the genesis of the institution of training analysis to these practices.

\textsuperscript{91} Jung/Jaffé protocols, BA, p. 331.

\textsuperscript{92} Ferenczi, "Kritik der Jungschen 'Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido'," (1913).

and they will certainly remain stuck.  

Jung compared this necessity with the formal requirements of surgical training:

Just as demand from a surgeon, besides his technical knowledge, a skilled hand, courage, presence of mind, and power of decision, so we must expect from an analyst a very serious and thorough psychoanalytic training of his own personality before we are willing to entrust a patient to him.  

Jung's suggestion was quickly seconded by Freud. The same year, in "Recommendations to physicians practising psycho-analysis," Freud stated:

I count it as one of the many merits of the Zurich school of analysis that they have laid increasing emphasis on this requirement, and have embodied it in the demand that everyone who wishes to carry out analyses on other people shall first himself undergo an analysis with someone with expert knowledge. 

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95 Ibid., § 450.

96 Freud, "Recommendations to physicians practising psycho-analysis," SE 12, p. 116. Freud's paper appeared in
In terms of current practices in psychiatry and psychotherapy, this was a striking departure. Accounts of individuals commencing to practice and hypnotic and suggestive practices often take the form of visiting Bernheim and Liebault, learning induction techniques, watching them work and doing likewise. It would have been unthinkable to have established the hypnotic treatment of the physician as an essential training requirement. It was with the adoption of the practice of training analysis that psychoanalysis differentiated itself from rival forms of psychotherapy, and ultimately ensured its continuance.

What is not realised is that the proposal to establish training analysis was in part put forward to resolve the epistemological problem of the personal equation in psychoanalysis. The training analysis was the only means to assure the transmission of analytic knowledge, through making sure that the 'self-knowledge' of the prospective analyst developed along the prescribed lines.

June, that is, prior to Jung's advocacy of this principle in his lectures at Fordham University. This suggests that it had already been adopted by then.

97 See for example Auguste Forel, Out of my Life and Work, pp. 166-7.

98 The financial benefits of this practice should also not be underestimated. By 1912, Jung had been in private practise for three years. Training analysis played an important role in enabling private practice psychoanalysis to be a viable enterprise.

99 On the further development of this practice; see especially Ernst Falzeder's landmark genealogy of psychoanalysis, "The thread of filiations, or psychoanalysis
The report of the "Korrespondenzblatt" of the International Psycho-Analytic Association noted that between 13th January and 14th March, the discussions of the Zürich group had focused on Jung's libido theory. It carried an 'Autoreferat' of a presentation by Jung's associate Alphonse Maeder, who gave a talk outlining the theoretical differences between Freud and Jung. Up to this point, there was nothing unusual about Maeder's paper. However, he then made the following suggestion as to the essential reason for the divergence between Jung and Freud:

Between Freud and Jung there is yet a deeper difference, than that recently present. In the history of any science there are famously always at least two currents present, which assert themselves and combat. Many speak of different "mentalités": l'esprit dynamique, l'esprit cinématique, l'esprit statique. Ostwald speaks of two types of investigator: the romantic and the classical. The speaker asserted that a difference of this kind existed between Freud and Jung. It is a matter of a primarily (and not necessarily apparent) different conception of the thing. Dr. Jung pointed out in this connection the two types of James: tough and tenderminded types and stressed that James taking effect," which opens a new chapter in the social history of psychoanalysis.
classifies the worldview system of philosophy according to these types, which are connected with the "Temperament."\(^\text{100}\)

The full text of Maeder's presentation has not come to light. However, it is clear from this report that he was claiming that the theoretical differences between Freud and Jung masked a more fundamental difference of "mentalités," akin to Ostwald's discrimination of the romantic and classical types. One can suppose that Jung, through citing James' typology in this connection, did not disagree with this reading.

Jung took up this line of thought at the Munich Psycho-Analytical Congress, which took place on the 7th and 8th September, 1913, where he presented "A Contribution to the Study of Psychological Types" (\textit{CW 6}). In retrospective accounts, Jung stated that the origin of his work on psychological types was an attempt to grapple with the relative validity of the views of Freud and Adler, and to establish a position of his own.\(^\text{101}\) Whilst there is no reason to doubt this, it is also clear that when he took up the topic, he was not taking up an issue that properly belonged


to what had been designated up to that point as the subject matter of psychoanalysis, but rather to the tradition of individual or differential psychology. It is also likely that this would have been apparent to his auditors.

At the outset, Jung contrasted the clinical portraits of hysteria and schizophrenia. He summed up the difference by stating that the former consisted in a centrifugal movement of the libido, whilst the latter consisted in a centripetal one. This centrifugal movement, in which the subject's interest was predominantly directed towards the outer world, he termed extraversion. The centripetal movement, in which the subject's interest was directed towards themselves, he termed introversion.

Jung had first introduced the term introversion in his 1909 lecture at Clark University published under the title "On the conflict of the childish Soul." In commenting on the fantasies in his case (which in private to Freud, he revealed to be that of his own daughter - a fact that brings it into line with Binet's procedure), he stated:

The elegiac reveries expressed the fact that a part of that love which formerly belonged, and should belong, to a real object, is now introverted, that is, it is turned inward into the subject and there produces an
increased fantasy activity.\textsuperscript{102}

Jung added a footnote to the effect that such a process was typical. Thus at the outset, the term introversion denoted an inner directed movement of the libido. Over the next few years, whilst Jung developed his ideas as to what ensued when such processes occurred and broadened the concept of libido from a restrictedly sexual one to a more general notion of psychic energy,\textsuperscript{103} he did not alter his basic view of introversion as designating a process of libidinal movement.

Returning to his 1913 presentation, Jung argued that the existence of disturbances such as schizophrenia and hysteria in which the preponderance of either extraversion or introversion predominated led to the question as to whether there existed 'normal human types,\textsuperscript{4} equally distinguished in such a manner. He stated that the best observations along this line were stated by William James, in his distinction between tough and tender minded philosophers in \textit{Pragmatism}.

James' \textit{Pragmatism} had appeared in 1907. In September and October, Jung had been in America principally to deliver a course of lectures at Fordham University. In his forward to the printed version of these lectures, dated autumn 1912,

\textsuperscript{102} Jung, "On the conflict of the childish soul," \textit{CW} 17, § 13.

\textsuperscript{103} See below, "Freud, Jung and the Libido" in "Body and Soul."
Jung stated that he had taken as his guiding principle, James' 'pragmatic rule.' This suggests that he read James' work sometime that autumn.

James opened his Pragmatism with a chapter on 'The present dilemma in philosophy'. This was the realisation that

The history of philosophy is to a great extent the clash of human temperaments... Of whatever temperament a professional philosopher is, he tries, when philosophising, to sink the fact of his particular temperament.\footnote{James, Pragmatism, p. 19.}

James claimed that the temperament of a philosopher formed their fundamental presupposition and final court of appeal. The particular temperamental difference that he singled out was that familiar in the history of philosophy as the contrast between rationalists and empiricists. He dubbed them tender minded and tough minded respectively. He characterized the former as rationalistic, intellectualistic, idealistic, optimistic, religious, free-willist, monistic and dogmatical; the latter as empiricist, sensationalistic, materialistic, pessimistic, irreligious, fatalistic, pluralistic and sceptical. In addition to philosophy, James argued that these temperamental biases had
great significance in government, art, religion, literature and manners.

The conglomeration of traits was meant to designate the extreme ends of each spectrum. James was not only arguing that such temperamental differences existed, but that they were the ultimate factor in philosophy:

What the system pretends to be is a picture of the great universe of God. What it is, - and oh so flagrantly! - is the revelation of how intensely odd the personal flavour of some fellow creature is.\textsuperscript{105}

For James, philosophical systems, which purported to portray the constitution of the world, were in fact involuntary confessions of the psychological peculiarities of their authors. Put this way, this statement was a reformulation of the notion of the personal equation. The new element that James was adding here was that this equation took on typical forms, such as tough or tenderminded. He was not, however, proposing a vast reductionist psychological taxonomy of culture. His solution to this problematic was itself epistemological: "I offer the oddly-named thing pragmatism as a philosophy that can satisfy both kinds of demand."\textsuperscript{106}

For James, the age old philosophical conundrums could be

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., p. 35.

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., p. 33.
resolved in each given concrete instance simply through invoking the pragmatic rule and by weighing up the resultant practical implications of each position. The form that this intended solution took need not be pursued here. In Jung's reading of Pragmatism, what is significant is the manner in which he rejected James's pragmatic theory of truth precisely to embrace the reductionist psychological programme that James eschewed, to attempt to secure the status of psychology as the fundamental science.

After giving an account of James' types, Jung argued that these descriptions showed that the difference between the types stemmed from different localizations of the libido. He followed this with further parallels, such as Wilhelm Ostwald's division of men into classics and romantics.

107 In his work The Philosophy of William James, which Jung drew from in Psychological Types for his understanding of James's conceptions, Flourney significantly characterized all French Swiss thinkers as "more or less pragmatists without knowing it" (p. 63), and pragmatism itself he characterized as 'philosophic protestantism' (p. 67).

108 In his more extended discussion of James's types in Psychological Types (1921), Jung characterized pragmatism as nothing but a makeshift, which "presupposes too great a resignation and almost unavoidably leads to a drying of creativeness." CW 6, § 541. He stated that the solution to the problem of opposites could not be solved through pragmatism, but only through a positive act of creation which assimilated the opposites, and that it was Nietzsche as opposed to James or Bergson who pointed the way forward in this respect. Whilst it is not clear from this passage what such a creative act might consist in, it is clear that Jung found the relativism of pragmatism unsatisfactory, and felt that what was required was a psychological epistemology that managed to encompass positions traditionally held to be opposed.
Wilhelm Worringer's differentiation of the processes of abstraction and empathy, Nietzsche's contrast between the Apollonian and the Dionysian, Franz Finck's contrast between transitive and intransitive verbs, and Otto Gross' distinction between two types of psychopathic inferiority. It is clear from this that at a descriptive level, there was little new about Jung's classification. However, with his libido theory, Jung claimed to be in a position to give an account for the mechanism that gave rise to such typological differences.

Jung rounded off this survey by turning to psychoanalysis. In contrast to Maeder, who had presented Freud and Jung as counterpoised types, Jung argued that Freud's work presented an example of an extraverted theory, and that Adler's work represented an example of an introverted theory. He concluded by stating: "The difficult task of the future will be to create a psychology, which will be equally fair to both types." This suggests that such a psychology would be able to surpass the conflict between introverted and extraverted theories, through presenting a theory that was not shaped by a typological bias, and hence resolve the problem of the personal

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109 Jung, CW 6, § 882, tr. mod. In his review of Jung's presentation, Ferenczi contested this characterization of the typological differences between Freud and Jung, and contrastingly stated that the critical difference was between a psychology of the unconscious and a psychology of consciousness respectively. "Dr. C. G. Jung, 'Contribution à l'étude des types psychologiques'", pp. 66-67.
equation.

The Zürich School

In 1926 Maeder wrote an article entitled "From Psychoanalysis to Psychosynthesis". In it, he stated that psychoanalysis had become a dogmatic international school centred around a leader, and that it had issued from a Judeo-German spirit (Maeder attributed the Germanic factor to the stress on the unconscious). When transplanted to Switzerland, and Zürich in particular, it had taken on a new form corresponding to the Swiss mentality. Maeder claimed that this new direction represented the essential democratic tradition of Switzerland, and hence allowed the coexistence of diverse tendencies, as represented by the work of Jung, Bleuler, von Monakow, Haeberlin and Flournoy.110

The work of the Zürich school has subsequently been solely represented by Jung. This portrait was doubtless enhanced by the account in Memories, where Jung stated:

After the break with Freud, all my friends and acquaintances dropped away. My book [Transformations and Symbols of the Libido] was declared to be rubbish; I was a mystic, and that settled the matter. Riklin and Maeder alone stuck by me. But I had foreseen my

110 Alphonse Maeder, "De la psychanalyse à la psychosynthèse", pp. 577-579.
isolation and harboured no illusion about the reaction of my so-called friends.\textsuperscript{111}

However isolated Jung may have felt, this account gives a misleading impression of the number of people who remained around him. In point of fact, on July 10th, 1913, the Zürich Psychoanalytical Society voted by 15 to 1 to cede from the International Psychoanalytical Association. In 1914, the now renamed Association for Analytical Psychology had 38 members, and in 1916 when the Psychological Club was formed it had over 60 members.

The tendency to view Jung as the founder of a school of psychology has obscured the extent to which his work was a collaborative enterprise, and the nature of the contributions made by others to it. This tendency is particularly marked in the case of Jung's work on psychological types, and was encouraged by Jung's own retrospective accounts, such as the following:

I saw first the introverted and extraverted attitudes, then the functional aspects, then which of the four functions is predominant... it took me quite a long time to discover that there is another type than the thinking type... There are, for instance, feeling types. And after a while I discovered that there are

\textsuperscript{111} Jung, \textit{Memories, Dreams, Reflections}, p. 190.
intuitive types. They gave me much trouble... And the last, and the most unexpected, was the sensation type. And only later I saw that these are naturally the four aspects of conscious orientation.\textsuperscript{112}

By contrast to this account, which has formed the template of all accounts to date in the Jungian literature, I plan to trace the manner in which Jung's work on psychological types represented the summation of collective research on the type problem.

Types in Dialogue

Jung's pupil C. A. Meier gave the following account of the respective contributions of Jung's colleagues:

It was Dr. Hans Schmid-Guisan who made it clear to Jung that extraversion was not of necessity correlated to feeling as he had originally been advocating, and Toni Wolff was highly instrumental in introducing sensation and intuition as two indispensable orientating functions of consciousness. In particular, intuition was dealt with more critically in those days by Dr. Emil Medtner.\textsuperscript{113}


\textsuperscript{113} C. A. Meier, \textit{Soul and Body}, pp. 244-5.
In his introduction to *Psychological Types*, Jung stated that he had conducted a lengthy correspondence with his colleague Hans Schmid on the type problem and stated that:

I owe a great deal of clarification to this exchange of views, and much of it — though in altered and repeatedly worked over form — has gone into my book. The correspondence belongs essentially to the preliminary work, and its inclusion would generate more confusion than clarity.\(^{114}\)

By 1913, Jung had put forward the existence of two types, which represented the extremes of tendencies present in everyone. What needed filling out was the depiction of these types and how they differed.

Schmid, a Swiss psychiatrist, first met Jung in 1911, and thereafter became a member of the Zürich group of the International Psycho-Analytical Association. In 1913 he started a psychiatric practice in Basel, and was amongst those who sided with Jung when he broke with Freud.\(^{115}\)

Jung's correspondence with Schmid reveals that not only much of the substance of Jung's own letters but of Schmid's

\(^{114}\) Jung, *CW* 6, p. xii, tr. mod.

\(^{115}\) For information on Schmid, see Hans Konrad Iselin, *Zur Entstehung von C. G. Jungs 'Psychologischen Typen'*. 
as well found their way into *Psychological Types*.\(^{116}\)

In his work on the type problem, Jung was attempting to formulate a metalanguage of psychological interaction, that would account for why individuals agreed and why they differed. In the correspondence, the types are strongly delineated: one is either one or the other. Jung identified himself as an introvert, and Schmid identified himself as an extravert. In the course of their correspondence, it quickly became apparent how difficult it was to provide a detailed description of the types, and their relation to each other, that both would assent to. In the language of their correspondence, the introvert did not assent to the extravert's account of introversion and extraversion, and vice versa. At one point, Jung stated, "the Archimedean point outside psychology, with the help of which we could lift psychology off its hinges, is nowhere to be found."

The debate on types between Jung and Schmid did not seem to make for mutual understanding - in fact it seemed to have the opposite effect, of creating an ever widening gulf of misunderstanding. In his final letter to Schmid, Jung wrote:

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\(^{116}\) Schmid's daughter, who later became Jung's secretary, later recalled, "when I first read the correspondence, I was amazed to see that my father, who was younger and certainly not in any case exceptional, had some maturity, I would like to say, that Jung didn't have at that age... [Jung] became aggressive and unfair and my father had to quiet him down." Interview with Marie-Jeanne Boller-Schmid, JO, p. 2.

\(^{117}\) Jung to Schmid, 4th April, 1915, Hull draft tr., p. 2.
"Your letter has confirmed in me the conviction, that agreement on fundamental principles is impossible."\(^{118}\) Jung summed up the basic problem:

It seems to me that one can agree scientifically about the general principles of the types, but not about the more subtle details. For that, language is not absolutely sufficient. Under the verbal signs of concepts, each thinks just what he understands.\(^{119}\)

In this statement, the failure of agreement is put down to the nature of language. For Jung at this juncture, to parody Wittgenstein, there could be nothing other than a plurality of private languages.

**Psychology's Relativity Problem**

From around 1915 onwards, the schisms in the Freudian school, principally those of Adler and Jung, were seized upon by critics of psychoanalysis as refutation of the claims of each school. It was commonly argued that their


\(^{119}\) *Ibid.*, p. 109. The breakdown of the dialogue with Schmid seems to have been part of a wider problem that Jung had with collegiality. Schmid's daughter recalls, "my father was one of a very few who stood up against him. Mrs. Jung used to say that she was really sorry that Jung didn't have any real friends." Interview with Jeanne Boller-Schmid, JO, p. 8.
claims were mutually contradictory, and that there was no means to adjudicate between them - the parting of ways and mutual recriminations were taken as graphic proof of this.

A clear example of this kind is provided by Stern. In 1935 he criticised Jung together with Freud and Adler. He claimed that the common element of their work was that "The 'Unconscious' is elevated into a kind of mythical force that sets up a secret despotism in the individual." He went on to argue that the limitations of this internal dualism within the personality or divided subject may at once be recognized from the fact that the dominant core i.e., the basic urge, is conceived differently by each school of depth psychology: as the sex instinct by psychoanalysis, as the instinct of self-assertion by individual psychology, as the store of super-individual tendencies (inhering in the individual's racial heritage) by Jung's school... The obstinacy and monotony with which the adherents of a given school of depth psychology exploit the same few schemes of interpretation in order to explain everything mental... makes it impossible for the psychologist who is not bound to it by oath to regard

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120 Stern, General Psychology from a Personalistic Standpoint, p. 37.
For Stern, the shortcomings of each of these schools lay in their proclivity for what he termed monosymptomatic explanations, which by their very nature could not do justice to the complexity of individuals, for which polysymptomatic explanations were a prerequisite. For Stern, the internal division between the various schools of depth psychology relativised the truth claims of each of them. He concluded that whilst in a therapeutic or pedagogical context the adherence to such truths might help to bring about a state of suggestibility, they were valueless as psychological theory. This was a snide way of saying that the practical utility of such psychological theories for psychotherapists lay solely in their ability to foster hypnotic induction, all the while denying that this was the case.

Jung's next public statement on the type problem came in 1917 in his *The Psychology of the Unconscious Processes: An Overview of the Modern Theory and Method of Analytical Psychology.* Here, he attempted to deal with the problem posed by the schism in the psychoanalytic movement of the relativity of the claims of each school. He commenced by presenting a case and providing a cogent interpretation of it from a Freudian perspective, and then an equally cogent

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interpretation of the same case from an Adlerian perspective. As to the question as to which of these contradictory theories was correct, Jung claimed that the answer one gave depended upon the relative value one placed upon love or power:

Those for whom power lies at heart rebel against the first conception, but those for whom love lies at heart, will never be able to be reconciled to the latter conception.\(^{122}\)

Jung argued that the difference between Freud and Adler's theories was the outcome of their typological differences.\(^{123}\) In Jung's view, both theories were partially true (when appropriately applied to individuals of the corresponding psychological type). Their error lay in their generalisation. Jung noted:

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\(^{123}\) This characterization was criticised by William McDougall in the following terms: "Could anything be more unfortunate? Freud with his lifelong intense interest in the inner life of man and his highly elaborated system, is classed with those who are not interested in the inner life and cannot make a system. Adler, who has a large popular following and whose voluminous writings are peculiarly lacking in system and order, with those who cannot exert personal influence and who are paralysed by their self-criticism and produce work of finished perfection." "The chemical theory of temperament applied to introversion and extroversion", p. 293. McDougall's relations with Jung, whom he was analyzed by, will be dealt with elsewhere.
The relative rightness of the two hostile theories is explained by the fact that each one draws its material from cases that prove the correctness of the theory.\textsuperscript{124}

Thus for Jung, the criteria for assessing the adequacy of a psychological theory no longer lay in the fact that it was able to cite empirical evidence in its favour, nor in its therapeutic efficacity. The possibility of a psychological theory of personality attaining to the status of a psychological law lay in its providing an encompassing psychological explanation for the differences between psychological theories. In other words, what was required was a psychology of psychology.

Whilst up to now Jung's presentations of psychological typology had consisted of static portrayals of individual temperament, in this text this was augmented with a dynamic portrait in a section entitled, "The development of the types of introversion and extraversion in the analytical process". Here, he stated that what took place in the process of analysis was a development of the contrary (hitherto unconscious) function, which leads to "beyond the type over to individuation, and thereby to a new relation to the world and spirit."\textsuperscript{125} He characterized individuation as consisting in the transit from a one-sided typological

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., p. 392.

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., pp. 440-441, tr. mod.
orientation to a state in which one's capacities for introversion, here equated with thinking, and extraversion, here equated with feeling, became equipotentially developed. An extreme one-sided orientation was seen as the hallmark of neurosis. This implicitly presented a new solution to the personal equation: the magnitude of subjective bias was equated with the degree of lack of personality development. It was only through the process of individuation that one could minimise the subjective bias, and attain what Jung later termed psychic objectivity.

Psychological Types

It was in 1921 that Jung published his magnum opus *Psychological Types*. The first public reference to the work appears to have been in André Tridon's 1919 *Psychoanalysis: It's History, Theory and Practice*, where he wrote:

In a letter dated September 5th, 1919, Jung, asked to define his attitude to the various schools of psychoanalysis, wrote me that he was trying to reconcile the contradictory views through a theory of attitude and a different appreciation of symbolism. He was working on a book on the Problem of Attitude and the Types of Attitude.\(^{126}\)

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It was Jung's description of the psychological types, the introvert and the extravert, that passed over into general usage. In addition, it is perhaps his only work to have given rise to a continued outpouring of experimental studies, by means of questionnaires and statistical tests (part of the curse that James predicted!). *Psychological Types* presented a wealth of erudition. It is possible that Jung had some assistance concerning the historical aspects of the question, which made up the larger share of the book. In an interview, Ernst Harms recalls that he was analysed by Jung for no fee, and that,

> he [Jung] interrogated me about sources on various aspects of typology... There were a lot of things which he naturally had not read that he asked me about, and I had to give him a great deal of information. Of this he made very scanty notes.\(^{127}\)

Jung commenced his work with some reflections on the history of psychology. He stated that whilst there had always been psychology, 'objective psychology' was only a recent development. Jung claimed that the general consensus

\(^{127}\) Interview with Ernst Harms, JO, p. 8. However Harms does not make clear precisely when these discussions took place. Elsewhere, he refers to his "contact with Jung since the early twenties" (*Origins of Modern Psychology*, p. ix), which would suggest that they took place after Jung published *Psychological Types*. 
that observation and experience were sufficient to provide the basis for an objective psychology was fallacious. This was so because conceptions "will always be a product of the subjective psychological constellation of the investigator." Jung designated this as the personal equation:

The effect of the personal equation begins already in observation. One sees what one can best see oneself... the personal psychological equation comes to be prevalent even much more in the presentation or the communication of observations, to say nothing of the interpretation and abstract exposition of the empirical material! The recognition and taking to heart of the subjective determination of knowledge in general, and quite especially psychological knowledge, is a basic condition for the scientific and fair appreciation of a psyche different from that of the observing subject.

For Jung, the possibility of an objective scientific psychology hinged not only upon the recognition of the significance of the personal equation, but of finding a means of evading the infinite regress and relativity that it potentially led to. If all knowledge, if all psychology, is

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128 Jung, CW 6, § 9.
129 Ibid., § 9-11, tr. mod.
determined by one's personal equation, what chance is there of any objectivity, of any means of adjudicating between the claims of rival theories, or any possibility of a unified science of psychology? Jung's attempted solution was to provide a theory of the subjective determinants of the personal equation. Not only would this secure the scientific and objective status of psychology, psychology itself would be a superordinate science, as it alone could provide an explanation of the subjective determinants of all knowledge. Its success or failure hinged upon whether, in its own terms, it could provide a theory of the personal equation that attained to a level of objectivity. This issue was predominant in Jung's treatment of previous typological systems, which takes up the bulk of *Psychological Types*.

Jung took up this issue in his discussion of Friedrich Schiller's work on the type problem:

Schiller himself belonged to a definite type, and was consequently compelled, even against his will, to give a one-sided description. The limitations of our conceptions and knowledge becomes nowhere so apparent than in psychological presentations, where it is almost impossible for us to depict any other picture than the one whose main outlines lie marked out in our own soul.\(^{130}\)

\(^{130}\) *Ibid.*, § 102, tr. mod.
For Jung, the limitations of Schiller's treatment of the subject stemmed from his own typology. He argued that the same was true of Nietzsche, James and previous typologists. In this passage, the problem of the personal equation takes the form of a psychological solipsism. By what means is it possible for the statements of a psychologist to primarily refer to anything other than themselves? In addition, it raises the question as to by what criteria can one differentiate Jung's typology from those that preceded it? The problem of Jung's *Psychological Types* is that it nowhere explicitly provides an answer to the problematic it poses.

Jung's historical presentation of the subject embodied a position concerning the status of psychology. Jung considered the treatment of the type problem in theology, poetry, aesthetics, philosophy, biography, psychiatry and philosophy, and whilst finding useful descriptions and examples, ultimately finds them all insufficient. It is only after this survey of the redundancy of previous thinking on the subject in all these disciplines that Jung provided his own general description of the types. What is striking is that he gives scant account of prior and noticeably similar typological differentiations in psychology. In his introduction to the first edition, Jung also stated that this historical approach was adopted due to the conviction that the psychological views put forward were of a wide
significance and potential application.\textsuperscript{131} Thus this approach served to demonstrate the hegemonic status of psychology, and its almost unlimited range of application.

The narrative voice of the book is of someone who has surmounted the type problem, and is able to survey human history from an Olympian standpoint, and provide an understanding of the hitherto unresolvable conflicts of history through the new standpoint of a psychological typology. It is precisely this tone that the publication of the Schmid letters would have disrupted. In \textit{Psychological Types}, Jung refrained from mentioning his own psychological type, which, given the epistemology of the book, is a significant lacuna.\textsuperscript{132} Consequently, the reader is not provided with a key to read Jung's 'personal equation'. In this respect, his procedure markedly differed from that of James.

Jung concluded \textit{Psychological Types} with an extensive dictionary of concepts. He stated that wide divergences in the meaning of words had led to great misunderstandings in

\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Ibid.}, p. xi.

\textsuperscript{132} In his correspondence with Schmid, Jung designates himself as an introvert. When posed the question as to his psychological type by John Freeman in his "Face to Face" interview in 1959, Jung replied that his superior functions were that of thinking and intuition. (Ed. McGuire and Hull, \textit{C. G. Jung Speaking}, p. 390). C. A. Meier commented, "With his typology book, Jung, in keeping with his own introversion, is attempting a sort of apologia for this attitude." Meier attempted to justify this temperamental bias, by stating that it served to balance the predominant extraversion of Western civilization. \textit{Consciousness}, p. 92.
psychology. He began by noting the limitation of the experimental method in psychology to 'elementary facts.' He claimed that outside of its purview, the role played in experimental psychology by quantification was played by precision of the concept. Given the current state of psychology, a generally agreed lexicon was not a possibility. Hence, Jung argued, it was incumbent upon each psychologist to define their concepts with 'fixity and precision.' In this instance, his linguistic project bore resemblance to that of Wundt. He added a disclaimer that his definitions were meant only to designate his own personal use of the concepts, and that "I would in no way want to say, that this use should have been in all circumstances the only possible one or the absolutely right one."

However, despite this disclaimer, his dictionary was a bold undertaking, for it amounted to conceptually establishing an individual language. Thus alongside redefinitions of general concepts, such as affect, attitude, fantasy, feeling, symbol, etc., he added his own concepts, such as archetype, individuation, persona, anima, animus etc. This linguistic project paralleled the disciplinary

133 Ibid., § 674.

134 Jung's subsequent, work, in particular, his work on alchemy, articulated a markedly different approach to language.

135 Ibid., § 675, tr. mod.
separation of analytical psychology from academic psychology. Far from facilitating communication with other psychologists, Jung's lexicon had the opposite effect: it served to demarcate analytical psychology as a distinct dialect, and tended to encourage either wholesale adoption or rejection. It is ironic that in respect of introversion and extroversion, when the terms became taken up by the psychological community and the general public, they were detached from Jung's conceptual definitions of them.

If a hundred years ago, James could state that ordinary language lacked sufficient vocabulary to express subjective facts, subsequent psychologists have been far from mute in their coining of concepts to fill this lacuna. Regardless of the ontological referents of such concepts, they have undoubtedly transformed subjective experience through shaping the language used to talk about it. In the case of Jung's *Psychological Types*, one can well ask the question as to whether the attempt to replace the manifold language of temperaments and characters with a scientific classification of two main types of personality with eight subtypes, did not ultimately lead to an impoverishment of language and experience.

**Schism in the Jungian School?**

In 1922 Jung's most prominent advocate in the USA, Beatrice Hinkle, published a lengthy article, "A Study of
Psychological Types. Hinkle, a medical doctor who had opened the first psychotherapeutic clinic in America at Cornell Medical College, had been analysed by Jung in 1911, and thereafter translated his *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido* into English.\(^{136}\)

Though her article appeared after Jung's book on types, Hinkle noted at the outset that it had been written prior to reading Jung's work.\(^{137}\) She went on to note that despite the fact that Jung's work had changed, they had both independently arrived at similar conclusions. Her study represented a detailed elaboration of Jung's 1913 paper on the subject. Despite her professed show of solidarity, her study markedly differed from his, and indeed commenced with a criticism of his 1913 formulations.

Hinkle stated that as time went on, the need for more differentiated distinctions became apparent. Concerning Jung's claim that James' classification of the tough and tender minded philosophers corresponded respectively to the extravert and the introvert, she stated:

\[
\text{it became apparent that there were a definite group of extraverts who were are tender-minded as the classic introvert, and contrawise many introvert philosophers}
\]


and scientists who were as tough-minded as the typical extravert.\(^{138}\)

In a similar fashion, she argued that the correspondence that Jung had attempted to establish between Gross' distinction between those possessing shallow and concentrated consciousness and his types did not hold. To remedy this situation, she claimed that the introverts and extroverts were each further split into three categories: objective, simple and subjective. She claimed that the simple types corresponded to Jung's original classification, but that the two other groups made up the majority of persons. Thus she attempted to supersede Jung's original schema. The similarity between her classification and Jung's in *Psychological Types* lay in the fact that Jung had also further subdivided the types, with his classification of the four functions. Whilst some of the descriptions of these subtypes bear some similarity with Hinkle's, their models were markedly divergent.

Thus in 1922, there were two divergent and fully elaborated Jungian systems of psychological types. From Jung's epistemology in *Psychological Types*, the only way to understand the difference between these two systems was by appealing to the psychological type of the author. But in this case, should one use Hinkle's types or Jung's? Whereas

in his work, Jung had been able to relegate earlier type systems to a prepsychological phase, this was not possible in this instance, and furthermore, Hinkle's study presented itself as a development of Jung's earlier work. Her study drew an enthusiastic response from her Jungian colleague Constance Long.\textsuperscript{139} Thereafter, Hinkle's work on types was never cited by Jung, and disappeared from the Jungian literature. Hinkle and Jung's typology were compared by William McDougall. He critiqued Jung's system of the four functions, which to his mind, smacked of faculty psychology, and then stated: "I am disposed to believe that Dr. Beatrice Hinkle has made a more acceptable suggestion towards the establishment of types."\textsuperscript{140} Hinkle and Jung's typologies were also compared by the American psychologist A. A. Roback, who used them to mutually cancel each other out:

\begin{quote}
Sometimes I get the notion that writers on types will incline to make distinctions according to their likes and dislikes. Jung seems to favor the introvert; Hinkle... seems to have a warm spot for the extravert, with the result that she re-casts the Jungian material
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{139} Constance Long, "Review of Beatrice Hinkle, 'A study of psychological types.'"

\textsuperscript{140} William McDougall, \textit{An Outline of Abnormal Psychology}, p. 450.
into a slightly different mould.\textsuperscript{141}

Another attempt to construct a typology based on, but diverging from Jung's, was put forward by J. van der Hoop, a Dutch psychiatrist, and president of the Netherlands Society for Psychotherapy, who had gone to Zürich to be analysed by Jung in 1913. In his later publications, van der Hoop attempted to mediate between Freud and Jung, and relate their work to that of Husserl and Heidegger. In his 1937 work, \textit{Types of Consciousness and their Relation to Psychopathology}, he argued that whilst Jung's typology was an advance on previous typologies, he differed from Jung in his understanding of the functions, and their interrelation.\textsuperscript{142} Van der Hoop finished his book with a chapter entitled, "The Personal Equation." He stated that the problem of the personal equation was much more important in psychology than in the natural sciences, for it was upon this the possibility of attaining any scientific objectivity depended.\textsuperscript{143} He claimed that this was because one's experience of other people was much more influenced by one's personality than one's experience of objects. Arguing that one's orientation took the form of typical attitudes, he


\textsuperscript{142} Van der Hoop, \textit{Conscious Orientation}, pp. 15-20.

\textsuperscript{143} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 317.
claimed that these attitudes made themselves felt in the
different schools of psychology.\textsuperscript{144} After giving a synoptic
typological classification of the various schools, he
focused upon Freud and Jung as his prime exemplars. After
explaining what he termed the peculiarities of Freud and
psychoanalysis through the fact that Freud was an intuitive
extravert, he turned to Jung. He stated that Jung described
himself as a 'thinking-introvert' and gave the following
account of his character and his work:

The experience of his own mental life is for him much
more of a starting-point than it is for Freud, and this
soon led him to consider introversion, not as
pathological, but as a normal phenomenon. His early
work showed, to a greater extent than was the case with
Freud, the influence of certain intellectual systems.
His experiments in association reveal the influence of
the experimental methods of that time. A certain
preference for the concrete is also evident, and is,
moreover, constantly revealed in forthright language;
and it is this which leads me to the assumption that
Jung's subsidiary function is instinct. This need for
concrete instinctual experience is also seen in his
private life. He lives out of doors, travels a great
deal, and welcomes all the pleasures of existence. In

\textsuperscript{144} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 319.
his scientific work, this factor leads to exposition of much concrete detail.

Characteristic of Jung's mental make-up is an interaction between a zest for interesting facts and fairly independent thought-processes, which constantly seek to arrange these facts in an orderly system. It is this make-up which led him from the beginning to direct his interest towards fresh, hitherto unexplored regions, such as the psychoses, or the psychology of primitive peoples. He has done pioneer work in these field, and has approached many new problems. Many people may be surprised at the suggestion that with all this Jung should be regarded as a thinking-type. If he is compared, for example, with Kant, as a typical introvert of thinking-type, it is clear that, in his case, both thinking and introversion are less exclusively involved in his mental make-up... Moreover, Jung's efforts to bring out and develop the other functions in himself has prevented him from always considering orderliness of thought as the most important factor. But in spite of this, a striving after a psychological system of his own prevails pretty clearly over all his work.

In Jung, also, we find important traits which do not obviously fit in with the make-up of a thinking-introvert with instinct as subsidiary function. Men of
this type usually show a very practical and solid intellectuality, with, if anything, a disinclination for speculation. Jung, on the contrary, has from the very beginning shown a tendency to concern himself with the consideration of ultimate issues. As a student, he took an interest, for example, in spiritualism. This element is also seen in certain aspects of Jung's psychology. Side by side with scientific hypotheses concerning the energy of mind, concepts are found, such as those of archetypes and the collective unconscious, which are somewhat remote from actual experience, but are closely bound up with metaphysical speculations. Quite apart from the question as to whether Jung is right in these hypotheses concerning the nature of the mind, we may, from the way in which they are set forth, surmise that the polar aspect of Jung's mind is at work in them. For an individual of thinking-type, with instinct as subsidiary function, the dim field of consciousness lies in the sphere of feeling and intuition. When the influences from these regions make themselves felt, they will not be experienced in clear-cut forms, but, on the contrary, in forms which are nebulous and primitive. If this polar aspect of the mind should come to the fore, we should expect to find intuitions laden with feeling in a primitive, that is to say, concrete form. As a matter of fact, we do find
that with Jung these concrete intuitions are of great significance, both in practice and in theory. In treatment by the Jungian method, the awakening of intuitions associated with emotion by means of drawings, fantasies, visions and dreams, plays an important part. In his theory, these intuitions are represented as the product of archetypes and of special mental impulses, having a fairly concrete existence in the mental life of the individual concerned. Although I regard it as of very great importance that Jung has indicated the significance of intuition and feeling, his descriptions of the forms of these two functions seem to me inadequate, and I consider that the effect of polarity is responsible both for Jung's interest in them and for this insufficiency. Like Freud, Jung is too apt to consider the simple forms in these, for him, newly discovered regions, as their most essential expression. In demonstrating this one-sidedness, I am expressing no criticism of the work of these two scholars. My only aim is to illustrate how complicated the personal equation may become in special cases.\(^{145}\)

The tables were reversed, and the analyst found himself analysed by his former analysand, in what reads as a parody of Jung's own interpretations of individuals in

Psychological Types. Whereas Jung chose Freud and Adler as his examples to show the manner in which the personal equation resulted in a one-sided and partial theoretical perspective, van der Hoop pointedly chose Freud and Jung to demonstrate the same lesson. And worse still, Jung's personal peculiarities were identified as the reason for the shortcomings of his typological system. On this reckoning, Jung's typology - as an epistemological attempt to halt the infinite regress threatened by the personal equation, through the establishment of a psychology of psychologies - was a failure.

The Reception

Psychological Types was greeted with widespread press reviews. The following is a sampling of the English language response to the work, which appeared in translation in 1923. A review in The Spectator stated that in this work, Jung had presented an inclusive philosophical system. The reviewer considered the work to be of considerable value for the practising analyst, but criticised its more general extension, where it was unchecked by practice.

A review in The Saturday Review opened by stating that the importance of the book "lies in the fact that so many

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146 For an account of how anthropologists responded to the text, see below, "Reception of Jung's anthropology" in "The Ancient in the Modern."

147 Anon, "Introvert and Extrovert", p. 54.
will hail it as important." The reviewer criticised the epistemology of the book, which they saw as Jung 'half-admitted pragmatism.' The reviewer stated that such an attitude, by which individuals were seen to be imprisoned within their subjective perspectives, led to an 'incoherent pluralistic universe,' and implied that there was no such thing as truth. Thus the reviewer appeared to identify Jung's position to James' metaphysic of radical empiricism, and to have criticised it on this basis. The reviewer concluded that the new psychology, "in its attempt to create a philosophy fails precisely in the same way as the similar attempt of the old psychology."  

The book received a glowing review in the Times Literary Supplement, which hailed Jung as a great writer, comparing him to Dostoevsky, Shakespeare and Tolstoy. The reviewer stated that Jung's achievement was to have produced a brilliant series of character studies, which enriched our understanding of 'our fellow men.' Conversely, the reviewer stated that the systematic and philosophical aspects of the work, which were unconvincing, could simply be left to one side without loss. 

Middleton Murray commenced his review in The Nation & The Athenaeum by stating:


Ibid.

150 Anon, "Psychological Types", p. 448.
Whatever may be the value finally set on Freud and Jung in themselves, their conflict has a very real symbolical significance. To understand it is to understand, from a new angle, the impasse of the modern consciousness and to gain a fresh vision of the problem which in one disguise or another confronts the man who is aware of himself and his age.\textsuperscript{151}

Middleton Murray stated that the problem of the neuroses arose with the rise of the individual, following the renaissance. He claimed that Freud and Jung, in confronting this problem failed to resolve it, and gave a satirical account of their failure:

One thinks of them as a couple of decent men who smelt a strange smell. One of them went along with a box of matches; the other with an electric torch. And there, issuing out of a very small manhole, was the sizzle and smell of a most unpleasant gas. The man with the matches prised up the lid. Then he struck a match. He was blown to kingdom come. That was Herr Doktor Freud. Herr Doktor Jung, with the torch, has emerged into the daylight with a very green face to tell the trembling story.

\textsuperscript{151} John Middleton Murray, "The tomb of psychoanalysis," p. 920.
Herr Doktor Freud's last audible word was "Sex"; Herr Doktor Jung stammers "Lib-libido". But what "Lib-libido" is, Herr Doktor Jung is frightened to say. He has a queer notion that it is—well, everything. Life itself, the primum mobile.

And the real question is: What is to be done about it? The gas is escaping still... A twittering ghost of Herr Doktor Freud experiments with unlucky patients and changes their neuroses into much more uncomfortable ones. Herr Doktor Jung murmurs that he must make the individual an individual. Each neurotic, he whispers, is unique, and contains the potentialities of a unique being. He is unique already, Herr Doktor; the question is: How can he become a being? And the Herr Doktor rolls a vague and pansynoptic eye over the history of the human spirit, waves a feeble hand towards the East, repeats his special abracadabra, "Extraintroextraintrovertebrate" eleven times, and subsides into his professorial chair. Six-hundred-and-forty mortal pages to tell us that it's all wrong, and not a word of how to put it right. One wonders with what he keeps himself going.

Poor Herr Doktor! It is a tragedy. Not the less for being ours as well as yours. You are an able man; and it must be a grim sort of joke for you to have your English translator enthusiastically expounding the
triumpant merit of your "crowning work", when you know it is your declaration of bankruptcy. But you should have read Dostoevsky, you know, instead of wasting your time, patriotically but absurdly, on Herr Spitteler...
If you had read "The Brothers Karamazov" you need not have wasted all these years. You would have found your old Libido in the Father, its modern perversions in Ivan and Dmitri and Smerdiakov, and the miracle in Alyosha. You could have spent these years in thinking how the miracle must be produced, instead of ending them with a bewildered realization that a miracle is necessary and that you are not Almighty God to perform it...

Under the Great tome "Psychological Types" Jung has buried psycho-analysis. It is an adequate tombstone. Nobody will be able to lift it. Even I am competent to carve the epitaph upon it: "Here lies Psycho-Analysis, which may have helped a few to be conscious of their problem, but which helped nobody to solve it."

But it is a little ironical that the neurotics should know so much more than their doctors. ¹⁵²

For Middleton Murray, it was literature, as opposed to psychology, that could point a way forward.

In The English Review, May Sinclair suggested that it

¹⁵² Ibid.
would be easier to understand the book if the reader read it backwards, commencing with, if not the conclusion, then at least with chapter eleven on definitions.\textsuperscript{153} Again, she critiqued Jung's relativism, which implicated that "There will be no whole of truth, only the half-truths expressed by the two mutually opposing attitudes. And God? God also is purely relative."\textsuperscript{154}

Whilst far from uncritical, reviews such as these nevertheless displayed a grasp of the scale of the historical, metaphysical, theological and aesthetic problems that Jung was grappling with, which was notably lacking in the response from the psychological community, which I now turn to.

In 1924, Max Freyd noted that since Jung's work on psychological types, these terms had been "showered with attention" and that they were "increasing in vogue amongst laymen and may often be encountered in non-technical

\textsuperscript{153} May Sinclair, "Psychological Types", p. 436. This advice was echoed by F. A. Hampton in his review in \textit{Discovery}, who in his review recommended that the reader start by reading the last chapter of definitions, followed by the penultimate, on the general description of the types. (p. 249) Curiously enough, this manner of the text has had a widespread currency, to the extent that it is not uncommon in Jungian trainings for the chapter on the general description of the types to be the only assigned reading from the book, and additionally, the chapter of definitions has been separately published as a paperback by Princeton and Routledge under the title, \textit{Dictionary of Analytical Psychology}.

\textsuperscript{154} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 438.
articles.\(^\text{155}\) Thirteen years later, Gordon Allport echoed this judgement. He noted, concerning the terms extraversion and introversion, that over the past 20 years, psychologists had accorded more interest in these traits than in any others, and that they had found their way into common speech. He wrote: "it was Jung's terms with their transparent etymology that held the day."\(^\text{156}\) It can be said that Jung's work on psychological types was the only aspect of his work to find its way onto the agenda of academic psychology. However, in the process, it was transformed beyond all recognition. The following is based on a survey of English language psychological textbooks and general psychological works in the period following the publication of Jung's *Psychological Types*, up to his death.

In his *Psychology*, Robert Woodworth cited Jung only in reference to his work on psychological types, and then too, to critique it. Woodworth stated that difficulties had arisen in assigning individuals into the right type. He claimed that this had arisen because of the fact that under the type categories of introversion and extraversion, various traits were gathered which by no means necessarily belonged together. In addition, he noted that some advocates of type theory had admitted that there also existed a middle

\(^{155}\) Max Freyd, "Introverts and Extroverts", p. 74.

\(^{156}\) Gordon Allport, *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation*, p. 419.
type, that of the ambivert, and that this class of individuals was large, if not the largest, as had been shown whenever a large group of individuals had been tested.\textsuperscript{157}

In 1930, H. Hollingworth stated in his \textit{Abnormal Psychology: Its Concepts and Theories} that Jung's description of the types was confused, and this was due to the fact that fundamentally, what Jung was depicting were not types at all, but discriminable traits - to which many more could be added than those adumbrated by Jung.\textsuperscript{158} He concluded that Jung's contrast between introversion and extraversion "may have more merit than Jung was able to establish," as for instance represented by McDougall's work, in which these types were reformulated as extremes of a scale of temperament.\textsuperscript{159}

In their \textit{Integrative Psychology: A Study of Unit Response} in 1931, Marston, King and Marston described Jung as a "mystic psychoanalyst of Berne," and critiqued his theory of archetypes as "vague, undefined and very mystical" - a judgement which was shared by many academic psychologists during this period, and indeed, up to this day.\textsuperscript{160} They went on to state that the system of personality which had

\textsuperscript{157} Robert Woodworth, \textit{Psychology}, pp. 558-559.


\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., p. 527.

\textsuperscript{160} Marston, Kay and Marston, \textit{Integrative Psychology: A Study of Unit Response}, pp. 233-234.
received the most popular attention was that of Jung. Whilst they affirmed that his distinction between introversion and extraversion was valuable in psychopathic studies, it was of little use in the study of the ordinary person, whose attention they claimed was "fairly well distributed between internal and external phenomena." They added that Jung's classification offered no objective criterion for the analysis of personality.\textsuperscript{161}

In his 1935 \textit{Objective and Experimental Psychiatry}, Ewen Cameron noted that apart from the application of intelligence tests, the tests that had in recent years attracted most attention were those of introversion and extraversion. In contrast to most writers during this period, following Spearman, Cameron principally attributed the 'discovery' of these types to Müller's work on perseveration, Gross's work on the secondary function, and William Stern's distinction between subjective and objective types.\textsuperscript{162} He stated that in Jung's work these types were considerably more fully described, and that the work on these types in recent years had been directed to "refining these concepts and reducing them to readily manipulable quantitative terms."	extsuperscript{163}

\textsuperscript{161} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 500.

\textsuperscript{162} Ewen Cameron, \textit{Objective and Experimental Psychiatry}, pp. 61-3.

\textsuperscript{163} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 63.
In 1937, Charles Spearman globally critiqued typological theories, including Jung's. His main criticism was that all such projects rested on a traditional faculty view of the mind, and hence were subject to the same criticisms. Spearman specifically reiterated Herbart's charge, namely, "the assumption that the presence of any one kind of ability belonging to a faculty indicates the presence of all other kinds." His second charge was that there appeared to be no way to adjudicate between the claims of rival typologies.

In his *Psychology of Personality*, Ross Stagner stated that Jung's introversion-extraversion dichotomy was an important contribution to personality theory, and that it had generated a great deal of research. However, he noted that the results of such research were 'overwhelmingly against' the notion that everyone could be classified into these terms:

Human nature is too diverse, individuals vary by too slight degrees, and the unique qualities of each person are too important to make this type classification generally useful. It arbitrarily ignores so many other variables that it is unrealistic as means of classifying human beings.

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165 Ibid., p. 205.
Within these texts and in others during the same period, it is clear that by and large the only aspect of Jung's work that was accorded any serious and not purely dismissive attention was his work on psychological types. In the case of the later, Jung's historical, clinical and epistemological methodologies were completely left to oneside, and were replaced by the experimental and statistical methods that held sway in psychology, in the course of which Jung's theoretical understanding of the types was discarded. One is left with the impression that little other than the terms that Jung coined - introversion and extraversion - were left of his work when it was taken up by academic psychologists.

An example of this is provided by J. P. Guilford's 1934 paper, "Introversion-extroversion." Guilford commenced by stating that the subject had been accorded more attention in the last five years than in all preceding years. He noted that much of the investigation had been concerned with the construction of tests and rating scales. In addition, the relation of 'IE' to other dimensions of the personality, physiological variables and environmental factors had been investigated, and that practical applications in vocational guidance had commenced.\footnote{J. P. Guilford, "Introversion-Extroversion", p. 331.} What is striking is that Guilford's synoptic review of the research contains no mention of Jung, and his 115 item bibliography does not
contain a single item by him.

In response to such research, attempts were made to develop psychological type tests and to provide experimental and statistical validation of Jung's work. However, even here, the process of accommodation to the methodology and concerns of the academic psychological community made itself felt. In 1945 Horace Gray and Joseph Wheelwright, who played a prominent part in the development of psychological type testing, noted of the reception of Jung's type theory that "Psychologists... have eagerly sought to grasp its intriguing implications, but have blurred the original proposer's specifications." They set out to correct the misinterpretations that Jung's specifications had been subject to, down to correcting spelling: extraversion, and not extroversion, they chided. Gray and Wheelwright developed a questionnaire for typological assessment, which was widely used. Significantly, they noted: "we have avoided as far as possible entanglement with [Jung's] other psychological principles which may be unacceptable to other

\[168\] For instance, C. A. Meier, one of the founders of the Jung Institute in Zürich, stated, "statistics are the closest we can come to truth in psychology... Academic psychologists are right in wanting things shown to them statistically, and it is we Jungians who have the onus of showing them that our ideas stand their tests." Soul and Body, p. 252.

\[169\] H. Gray and J. Wheelwright, "Jung's psychological types, including the four functions", pp. 266-7.
schools of depth psychology. The outcome of this statement was that not only was Jung's type theory dissociated from the rest of his work, it was dissociated from itself. Of the eleven chapters of the book, ten were effectively discarded, leaving only the chapter on the general description of the types. Even that chapter was reworked to fit in with methodological assumptions then prevalent in academic psychology. It was, as they say in psychology, 'operationalised.' Not surprisingly, the lengthiest section concerning practical applications of the test concerned the military uses, of which the following is an example:

1. Extraverted-sensation should be prized where immediate initiative is in order, as in a combat pilot, or any other man in the heat of attack.
2. Extraverted-intuition seems suitable to a general officer facing fluctuating emergency tactics in the field, or to one, either at the front or the rear, engaged in cooperating diverse services.
3. Introverted-sensation clearly fits a man for exacting individual observation of detail, such as intelligence or code-cracking.
4. Introverted-intuition may be presumed to favour success in research in new guns, tanks, planes; or in

\[170 \text{Ibid., p. } 268.\]
unhurried planning of strategy.

5. The power of thinking indicates assignment to the more abstract duties such as staff-work, or 3 or 4.

6. Nice feeling-judgement fits an officer, commissioned or non-commissioned, to establish warm rapport with other men, loyalty from the less-trained dependent on him, good faith to the more-trained leader. If introversion is present, then command duty with specialist technical units will be indicated, while extraversion indicates rather command with shock troops.\textsuperscript{171}

Jung's pupil C. A. Meier (who was analysed by Jung during this period) claims that for Jung, after the publication of \textit{Psychological Types}, "In actual analytical sessions, typological problems were seldom discussed, yet it was still important to him as the \textit{compass}."\textsuperscript{172} It is possible that this indicates Jung's dissatisfaction with what he had achieved with his typological project. Typology, however, was widely taken up in the Jungian community (and beyond) in the twenties and thirties. In part, it filled the lacuna created by the rejection of the reductive personalistic psychologies of Freud and Adler. For many, the language of

\textsuperscript{171} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 283-4.

\textsuperscript{172} C. A. Meier, \textit{Personality: The Individuation Process in the Light of C. G. Jung's Typology}, p. 69.
typology provided a means for individual differences to be acknowledged and respected. However, there are grounds for suggesting that this was not Jung's sole or primary interest in the subject. In 1934, he responded to reception of his work in his foreword to the Argentine edition. There, after stating that the task of the book was a critical psychology (a term that seems to be an analogue to Kant's designation of a critical philosophy), he wrote:

This fundamental tendency in my work has often been overlooked, and far too many readers have succumbed to the error of thinking that chapter X ("General Description of the Types") represents the essential content and purpose of the book, in the sense that it provides a system for classification and a practical guide to a good judgement of human character... This regrettable misunderstanding completely ignores the fact that this kind of classification is nothing but a childish parlour game, every bit as futile as the division of mankind into brachycephalics and

173 Joseph Wheelwright recalled the first impressions of his wife and himself on reading Psychological Types, which is representative of this: "This book was a tremendously enlightening experience for both of us. It helped us to see why we were having the kinds of misunderstandings we were. We suddenly discovered that I had a developed feeling function, and she had a developed thinking function... So now we had some illuminating concepts to work with." St. George and the Dandelion: 40 Years of Practice as a Jungian Analyst, p. 54.
doliocephalics.... My typology... is not a physiognomy and not an anthropological system, but a critical psychology dealing with the organization and delimitation of psychic processes that can be shown to be typical.\textsuperscript{174}

However, it was too late in the day to have misgivings about how an attempt to formulate a critical psychology in the form of a general psychological typology that resulted in the depiction of eight universal types of human beings, could have ended up being read otherwise. In the decades that followed, psychological typology receded into the background of Jung's work, and the archetypes came to the fore. With this theory, Jung proposed a new solution to the personal equation, through objectifying the personal, which was now conceived as being based upon pregiven universal structures. It remains to be seen whether this turn was more successful.

\textsuperscript{174} Jung, \textit{CW} 6, p. xiv-xv. This foreword was originally published in Spanish in the Argentinean edition of \textit{Psychological Types}. It is not clear what language it was originally written in, and it is not found in Jung's \textit{Gesammelte Werke}. 
Section Two: Night and Day

Our entire history is only the history of waking men; no one has yet thought of a history of sleeping men - G. C. Lichtenberg.

The place of the dream in society

Whilst dreaming is generally seen as a universal phenomenon, the location of dreams differs radically in different cultures. In Western societies in the twentieth century, the cultural location of dreams has been decisively shaped by Freud and Jung. This has taken place through the utilisation of dreams in psychotherapy as an interpretative practice, and through the diffuse dissemination of Freudian and Jungian dream theories in intellectual and popular culture. Whether as wishfulfilments or as compensations, dreams are widely understood to be revelations of the personality that stem from the unconscious, and this view is seen to be the legacy of Freud and Jung.

The Freudian legend would have us assume that the changes wrought in the cultural understanding of dreams in the twentieth century have been brought about through the advent of psychoanalysis, and that prior to Freud, there is

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no significant story to tell, other than a tale of superstition and error. The historical account of the transformation of the understanding of dreams in Western culture would then take the form of cultural histories of the psychoanalytic movement. Indeed, the impression one gleans from such works as Nathan Hale and Elisabeth Roudinesco's respective two-volume tomes on the history of psychoanalysis in America and France is that the broadscale cultural transformations in psychological understanding in the twentieth century can and indeed should be viewed as the derivatives of the saga of the Freudian dynasty.\(^\text{176}\)

According to the Freudian legend, the meaning of dreams was first laid bare in *The Interpretation of Dreams*. The subsequent preeminence accorded to this work and its contemporary neglect - selling only 351 copies in six years - has itself generated a series of reception studies, which have sought to explain this anomaly.

In the public imagination, Jung is primarily associated with the subject of dreams. Hence it is not surprising that when a major multipart television documentary on Jung was screened, it was titled, "The Wisdom of the Dream." In their accompanying volume, the producers Stephen Segaller and

Merrill Berger state: "Carl Gustav Jung, more than any man or woman before him, attempted to understand the meaning of dreams..." A large measure of the public interest in Jung stems from his approach to dreams. The reason for this is that under the guise of a modern scientific psychological theory, Jung valorised the traditional prophetic and mysterious powers of the dream, to a greater extent than any other modern psychologist.

In 1935, whilst in London to present a series of lectures at the Institute of Medical Psychology, Jung gave an interview to the *Evening Standard*, which was titled, "HE PROBES MAN'S DREAMS: Professor Jung Says He is a Practical Psychologist." It commenced with the following admonition:

"Tell your practical English readers that I am a practical man, not a mystic full of crazy theories," said Professor Jung, the famous Swiss psychologist, to me in his London Hotel. 

As an example of his practical outlook, Jung stated:

"The great way to see a man's unconscious mind is

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178 Dudley Barker, "He probes man's dreams: Professor Jung says he is a practical psychologist, *The Evening Standard*, 30th September, 1935."
through his dreams. What a man dreams may be something that happened in the past or something that will happen in the future"... I quoted to him the case of the racing journalist who recently dreamed of the correct result of a big race, and published his result in a newspaper the day before the race. "Undoubtedly it was a prevision of the future," he declared. "I could give you a thousand such examples..."^179

Therein lay the paradox that beset Jung's public self-presentations: how could an empirical scientific psychologist validate the prophetic qualities of dreams, and fail to be regarded as someone who had simply fallen prey to superstition?

Jungian analysis is generally regarded to accord pride of place to dream interpretation. Mary Ann Mattoon, a Jungian analyst, stated: "Jungian analysts, more than any group of psychotherapists, probably, are occupied with dreams, our own and those of our analysands."^180 Within the Freudian tradition, Jung's work on dreams is simply regarded as a reversion to superstition. Within the Jungian tradition, Jung's work on dreams is accorded a second order place to that of Freud's. Whilst Freud, it is claimed,

179 Ibid.
discovered that dreams had a meaning, it was Jung who discovered what their meaning really was. In this respect, the Jungian legend is a branch grafted onto the Freudian legend. From both perspectives, the question of the sources of Jung's understanding of dreams has not arisen, as it has been answered in advance with a one word answer: Freud.

In the following, this assumption will be eschewed. By contrast, I will claim that it is only through understanding the transformations of dream theories in the nineteenth century that one is in a position to grasp the comparative sources of Freud and Jung's dream theories, their respective reception, and consequently, their role in transforming the dream culture of the twentieth century.

Freud's estimation of the epochality of his achievement is encapsulated in his statement in a letter to Wilhelm Fliess, asking whether a plaque would one day be put on the house where he dreamt his famous specimen dream, the Irma dream, bearing the inscription: "In this House, on July 24th, 1895 the Secret of Dreams was Revealed to Dr. Sigm. Freud." The epochality of Freud's discovery was proudly proclaimed by protagonists of psychoanalysis. For example, Ernest Jones stated that it was generally held that The Interpretation of Dreams was Freud's most important work,

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and the one by which he would be principally remembered. This was because it was Freud's most original work, the conclusions therein being "entirely novel and unexpected."\textsuperscript{182}

One of the first to question the originality of Freud's dream theory and its relation to prior dream theories was Freud's great rival Pierre Janet. In 1919, he noted that in contrast to previous researchers, Freud had not concerned himself with the disorders of memory, through which dreams were transformed, nor with how individuals systematised their dreams on waking.\textsuperscript{183} Citing Alfred Maury's statement that in dreams, passions and desires found freer expression than in the waking state and Alphonse Daudet's description of the dream as a safety valve, Janet commented:

\begin{quote}
for these authors, the principle to which they referred was merely a particular law applicable to certain dreams and not to all. Freud has transformed this partial hypothesis into a general principle.\textsuperscript{184}
\end{quote}

Thus for Janet, Freud had simply taken what had been held to be the characteristics of certain dreams, and unrestrictedly applied them to all dreams. This statement was in line with

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{182} Ernest Jones, \textit{The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud}, vol. 1., p. 384.
\item \textsuperscript{183} Pierre Janet, \textit{Psychological Healing}, Vol. 1, p. 605.
\item \textsuperscript{184} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 606.
\end{itemize}
Janet's general evaluation of psychoanalysis, namely, that it had turned partial truths into general errors.

In 1926, shortly after his analysis with Freud, Raymond de Saussure published a remarkable study, "the psychology of the dream in the French tradition," that elaborated this point in greater detail. His stated intention was to reconstruct the work on the dream in the French psychological tradition from 1750, to be able to correctly determine wherein Freud's originality lay. However, through the course of his survey, this originality increasingly diminished. Through depicting precursors of the main elements of Freud's dream theory, he concluded that the problematics that Freud took up concerning the dream had been long established before him, and that there was nothing thematically new in Freud's work. He argued that what Freud had done was to synthesise and limit the work of previous dream researchers. This was because his interest was not the dream per se, but what it could reveal about the affective life of the subject. Perhaps Freud regarded de Saussure's

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185 Raymond de Saussure, "La psychologie du rêve dans la tradition française", p. 18.

186 Ibid., pp. 58-9. In his review of The Interpretation of Dreams, Théodore Flournoy perceptively stated: "Mr. Freud's ideas can be readily understood and their raison d'être and correctness can be perceived much better when one does not lose sight of the special terrain that is both the point of departure and the point of application of his research on the dream: to understand psychopathological processes, in particular the subconscious phenomena of hysteria." (in Norman Kiell, Freud Without Hindsight: Reviews of his Work (1893-1939), p. 167.) Thus for Flournoy,
study, which was written prior to his final 1930 revision of *The Interpretation of the Dreams*, as a particularly severe case of the negative therapeutic reaction. The work made no impact at all, and completely disappeared like a negative hallucination from the Freud historical literature. More notice was taken of Henri Ellenberger's much briefer reiteration of de Saussure's point, almost fifty years later, in *The Discovery of the Unconscious*.\(^{187}\) Despite such works, the epochality of Freud's work on dreams continues to be proclaimed. Melvin Lansky claims:

> Of all great books to have influenced the history of scientific ideas, none in modern times has so dominated the field it founded as *The Interpretation of Dreams*. The written works of Newton, Copernicus, and Darwin - considered apart from the ideas put forward in these works - are mostly of historical interest. The written

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\(^{187}\) Henri Ellenberger, *The Discovery of the Unconscious*, pp. 303-311. In "The prehistory of Freud's dream theory: Freud's masterpiece anticipated", Stephen Kern also argues that "almost every element of Freud's dream theory had been worked out in some way before he published his own." (p. 83) Kern gives examples of Freud's tendentious citation of authors in his opening chapters, and how in several instances, he omitted to cite precisely those aspects that were closest to his theories, such as Hildebrandt's claim that dreams reveal our 'unconscious disposition' and raised the question, "Who is really the master in our house?" (p. 85) - a phrase which was subsequently used by Freud and Jung to indicate the radicality of the advent of the psychology of the unconscious.
works of these authors are not today texts of comparable pedagogical and research interest. Despite its shortcomings, *The Interpretation of Dreams* still holds sway not only as the most essential basic text in psychoanalytic training but also as an introduction to the psychoanalytic conception of the mind.\(^{188}\)

Whilst Freud's originality has been challenged and severely compromised by the rise of revisionistic Freud scholarship over the last few decades, his centrality has curiously remained. Indeed, there seem to be more studies of Freud's own dreams than of the ensemble of nineteenth century dream theories.\(^{189}\)

Part of the problem of placing *The Interpretation of Dreams* is the fact that Freud commenced it with what at first sight appears to be a comprehensive literature review. These chapters continue to taken somewhat uncritically by scholars. For example, in her study of the reception of *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Hannah Decker contends,

On the whole, scientific authorities of Freud's day believed that in dreams human mental activity is in a

\(^{188}\) Melvin Lansky, "The legacy of *The Interpretation of Dreams*", in Lansky ed., *Essential Papers on Dreams*, p. 3.

\(^{189}\) This assessment is based on a study of the main databases and indexes in psychology, psychoanalysis, history, the humanities, modern languages, history of medicine, philosophy and religious studies.
lower and less efficient state and that the higher intellectual faculties are suspended or gravely impaired. These scientists variously regarded dreams as psychic anarchisms, confusions of ideational life, crazy activity or degradations of the thinking and reasoning faculty. They used such adjectives as incoherent, nonsensical or senseless to describe dreams. A dream was considered by most scientists to be a somatic and not a psychic process; it was a bodily reaction to some somatic stimulus that had succeeded in disturbing sleep.\footnote{Hannah Decker, "The Interpretation of Dreams: Early Reception by the Educated German Public", pp. 130-1.}

As source for this view, she cited that 'impartial' student of nineteenth century dream theories, Sigmund Freud. In attempting to explain the lack of continued interest in Freud's dream theories by the educated German public, Decker tried to give reasons why various possible professional promulgators, the psychologists, the physicians and the psychiatrists did not become proponents of Freud's dream theories.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 138-140.} She stated that Freud, who had claimed that the advent of the exact sciences had brought with it a lowering of the estimation of the dream, predicted with "deadly
accuracy what would be the initial response to his book."

Freud's account of prevalent attitudes to dreams is simply uncritically accepted.

What is clearly needed is a general history of dream theories, which would enable an account of how the dream was utilised to establish psychologies of the unconscious in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and how Freud and Jung's dream theories were respectively constituted on this basis.

The Philosophy of Sleep

In 1923 in The Ego and the Id, Freud claimed:

To most people who have been educated in philosophy the idea of anything psychical which is not also conscious is so inconceivable that it seems to them absurd and refutable by simple logic. I believe this is only because they have never studied the relevant phenomena

192 Ibid., p. 140.

193 One partial corrective in this respect in Perez Lavie and Allan Hobson's "Origin of dreams: anticipation of modern theories in philosophy and physiology of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries". They argue that Freud's stress on the psychogenesis of dreams led him to leave out much of the physiological work on dreams, in which they find anticipations of current physiological dream theories. However, it could be said that they fall into the same trap, through being content with utilising history to establish precursors of their own theory, and to legitimate it through a counter-genealogy.
of hypnosis and dreams.\textsuperscript{194}

This statement would lead one to conclude that a study of dreams and hypnosis would lead one to grasp what had been unthinkable by the philosophical tradition, and that psychoanalysis had consequently effected a \textit{bouleversement} of the philosophical tradition.\textsuperscript{195} However, contrary to the impression given by this passage, philosophers had long pondered the subject of dreams, and written about them at length. Indeed, the topic of dreams properly belonged to philosophy, before it was annexed by the emergent psychological disciplines in the later half of the nineteenth century, psychoanalysis among them. As a backdrop for looking at the transformation of dream theories in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it is useful to briefly consider the philosophical background.

Descartes' \textit{Meditations on First Philosophy}, traditionally considered to be the inaugural moment of

\textsuperscript{194} Sigmund Freud, "The Ego and the Id," \textit{SE} 19, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{195} On the question of the relation of hypnosis and philosophy, this statement has been lucidly analyzed by Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen in "The Alibis of the Subject: Lacan and Philosophy." Through a study of the concepts of the cerebral unconscious in nineteenth century psychophysiology (such as Carpenter's notion of unconscious cerebration), Marcel Gauchet concludes that Freud's claim that prior to psychoanalysis it was the rule to equate the psychical with the conscious is "rigorously false." \textit{L'Inconscient cerebral}, p. 32. On Carpenter and dreams, see below.
modern philosophy, commences with a consideration of dreams. Setting out to doubt all that could be doubted, Descartes pondered the fact that in one's dreams, in which one "regularly has all the same experiences while asleep as madmen do when awake," one often mistakenly takes oneself to be in particular material surroundings:

How often, asleep at night, am I convinced of just such familiar events - that I am here in my dressing gown, sitting by the fire - when in fact I am lying undressed in my bed! This led him to the conclusion that there are no clear signs to distinguish being awake from dreaming. Dreams thus figure as the exemplars of the lack of the very certitude that Descartes sets out to establish in the Meditations, which culminated in his speculation that "the sky, the air, the earth, colours, shapes, sounds, and all external things are merely the delusions of dreams" devised by a malicious demon "to ensnare his judgement." Through the course of the meditations, the spectre of the malicious demon was banished, God reinstated, and certitude established through

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the *cogito*. As Georges Lanteri Laura noted, for Descartes, the dream was principally used as an argument that destroyed the authority of sense experience, as opposed to forming an object of research in its own right.\textsuperscript{199} However, whilst Descartes claimed to have been able to differentiate waking thought from the dream,\textsuperscript{200} the precise relations between the two continued to vex subsequent philosophers and psychologists.\textsuperscript{201}

For the Cartesians, dreams were viewed as the form that thinking took in sleep. The Cartesian axiom of the continuity of thought led to the positing of the notion of the continuity of dreaming during sleep. Whilst subsequent philosophers put forward multifarious understandings of dreams, this position was generally held. For instance, in *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, John Locke stated:

\begin{quote}

In his letter to Princess Elizabeth of 6th October, 1645, Descartes distinguished dreams as follows: "thoughts that come from external objects, or from internal dispositions of the body... are called internal or external sensations. Those that depend solely on the traces left by previous impressions in the memory and the ordinary movement of the spirits are dreams, whether they are real dreams in sleep or daydreams in waking life...", *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume III: The Correspondence*, pp. 270-1.

Lanteri Laura noted that for Voltaire, contrastingly, "The phenomena of the dream therefore shows the precariousness of this pretension of human thought to be sufficient to itself and thus destroys the Cartesian desire for a knowledge founded on the autarchy of reflexive thought." "Le rêve comme argument," p. 29.
\end{quote}
"The dreams of sleeping men are, as I take it, all made up of the waking man's ideas, though for the most part oddly put together." Locke put forward a subtractive model of the dream, stating that "dreaming is the having of ideas... in the mind not suggested by any external objects or known occasion..." Thus the dream was generally considered to consist of waking thought, minus some particular factor. This accounted for its lesser epistemological status. Locke noted, "in this retirement of the mind from the senses it often retains a yet more loose and incoherent manner of thinking which we call dreaming."

In the eighteenth century, the continuity thesis and the subtractive model were generally adhered to. Waking thought and thinking in dreams were generally seen to be subject to the same mechanisms. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, thinkers such as Borsch, Mendelssohn and Nudow distinguished between the objective associations of waking and the totally subjective associations of the dream, in which the laws of similarity and analogy took the place of the real relations between things. Dreaming was seen as a secondary form: both in valuation, and in derivation. The key question was one of determining the difference between

203 Ibid., p. 102.
204 Ibid., p. 103.
the two states. This took the form of determining the causes, which, in weakened consciousness, troubled the regular functioning of association.\footnote{This paragraph is based on Albert Béguin's study, \textit{L'Ame romantique et le rêve}, pp. 5-7. The most famous example of the continuity thesis is Denis Diderot's \textit{Le Rêve de d'Alembert}, which would require separate treatment of its own. Javier Moscoso has noted that in terms of contemporary usage, it would be more accurate to translate 'rêve' by 'delirium' than by 'dream.' This observation highlights the desirability of an extended historical semantics of 'rêve,' 'Traum,' 'dream' and cognate terms. It would be interesting to study the ways in which the transformations of the semantic significations of these terms interacted with changing theories and cultural conceptions.}

As an example of such an approach, one may consider the Scottish philosopher, Dugald Stewart. In his \textit{Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind}, he began his consideration of dreams by stating that the best means of ascertaining the state of the mind in sleep was to consider its condition just prior to sleep:

> it seems reasonable to expect, that some light may be obtained, from an examination of the circumstances which accelerate or retard its approach.\footnote{Dugald Stewart, \textit{Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind}, p. 281.}

He argued that the principal characteristic of the state of mind just prior to sleep was the suspension of volitional activities:
in sleep those operations of the mind are suspended, which depend upon volition... when we are desirous to procure sleep, we bring both mind and body, as nearly as we can, into that state in which they are to continue after sleep commences.\textsuperscript{207}

Stewart took this absence of volition to be the principal characteristic of dreaming. He claimed: "all our mental operations, which are independent of our will, may continue during sleep."\textsuperscript{208}

Through explaining dreaming by analogy to the state of mind just prior to sleep, the latter took on an epistemological priority. Stewart argued that the peculiarity of dreams could be simply explained by the fact that in dreams, the association of ideas took place minus the factor of volition:

operation of thoughts in dreams carried out by the same unknown causes as when awake; however, the order is different, as in dreams it depends solely on the power of association; in waking, it depends on association coupled with waking exertion.\textsuperscript{209}

\textsuperscript{207} Ibid., p. 283.
\textsuperscript{208} Ibid., p. 285.
\textsuperscript{209} Ibid., p. 286.
For this reason, he claimed that "Our dreams are influenced by the prevailing temper of the mind." The absence of volition also served to explain the content of the association of ideas:

the scenes and occurrences which most frequently present themselves to the mind whilst we are asleep, are the scenes and occurrences of childhood and early youth. The facility of association is then much greater than in more advanced years; and although during the day, the memory of the events thus associated, may be banished by the objects and pursuits which preys upon our senses, it retains a more permanent hold of the mind than any of our subsequent acquisitions.

He concluded that understanding the function of dreaming had the value of shedding light upon the general functioning of the mind:

I flatter myself, therefore, that this inquiry will not only throw some light on the state of mind in sleep; but that it will have a tendency to illustrate the mutual adaption and subserviency which exists among the different parts of our constitution, when we are in

\[\text{Ibid., p. 287.}\]
\[\text{Ibid., p. 290.}\]
complete possession of all the faculties and principles which belong to our nature.\textsuperscript{212}

The dream, then, was the royal road to the mind. As will be seen, in the nineteenth century, the associationist approach to dreams was carried over by psychology, and constituted one of the major components of the understanding of dreams.

\textbf{Dream Keys}\textsuperscript{213}

In the nineteenth century, dream dictionaries, or dream keys flourished. Whilst their basic format was a direct continuity from antiquity, their interpretations were updated to reflected contemporary social values. The very antiquity of the genre was appealed as witness to veracity of dream symbolism. Benedetto Gentile commenced his 1882 \textit{Book of Dreams or Oneiroscopy} by citing the belief in dream divination held by the Egyptians, the Chaldeans, the Greeks and the Romans.\textsuperscript{214}

The dream keys took the form of classificatory schemata of dream images. The following is series of examples from Gentile:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{212} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 296.
\item \textsuperscript{213} The following four paragraphs are based on Yannick Ripa's exemplary study, \textit{Histoire du rêve: regards sur l'imaginaire des Français au XIXe siècle}, coupled with a survey of nineteenth century dream keys.
\item \textsuperscript{214} Benedetto Gentile, \textit{Livre des rêves ou l'oneiroscopie}, p. 6.
\end{itemize}
To wash one's hands, denotes work.
To look at one's hands, denotes infirmity.
To see a house burn, denotes scandal.
To see a house established, denotes war.\textsuperscript{215}

The dream keys gave the signification of particular images, 
portraying the fate connected to them. Images were often 
arrayed in complex relations. In Raphael's work, one learns 
that:

ANCHOR.— To dream of an anchor in water is a bad omen 
it implies disappointment in your wishes and 
endeavours. To dream of an anchor part in water and 
part out, foretells that you will speedily have a 
voyage. For a young woman to dream of an anchor 
[indicates] she will have a sailor for a husband. To 
dream you see an anchor difficult to weigh is a good 
sign, denoting your abiding prosperity.\textsuperscript{216}

The symbolism they used often drew upon astrological, 
numerological and Kabbalistic traditions.\textsuperscript{217} In the dream

\textsuperscript{215} Ibid., p. 98.

\textsuperscript{216} Raphael, The Book of Dreams: Being a Concise 
Interpretation of Dreams, p. 109.

\textsuperscript{217} For an astrological dream book, see Raphael, The 
Book of Dreams: Being a Concise Interpretation of Dreams; 
for a work drawing from astrology and numerology dream book, 
see D'Albumazar De Carpenteri, La clef d'or ou l'astrologue
keys, images were seen as revelatory of the personality. The dream was attributed a moral and protective function. Particular dreams were seen as critiques of the dreamer's attitude, and as indicating correctives. Rules were laid down as to the interpretation of dreams, such as the reversal of signification: that dreams announced the opposite of what they seemed to indicate. For example, Raphael described dreaming of gallows as "a dream of contrary. You will be lucky in all ways - much trade, much money, much honour, a high position."\(^{218}\) The keys were predominantly conservative and traditional in their formulations.

The interpretation of dreams took place outside of any professional relation. The book laid bare the secret of dreams, and made their decipherment available to all. Thus the dream keys promoted an auto-interpretive dream practice. Alongside this, individuals practised as dream interpreters.

Within the philosophical and medical approaches to dreams in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, attempts were made to provide naturalistic explanations of dreams, which freed them from spiritual interpretations, and in particular, from what were regarded as the superstitions of the dream keys. The scientific explanations were written

\[^{218}\text{fortuné devin; for a work drawing on the Kabbalah, see Gentile, Livre des rêves.}\]

Raphael, \textit{The Book of Dreams}, p. 139.
against the dream keys, which were frequently not explicitly mentioned. However, the relation between these traditions was not simply one of straightforward opposition, as the scientific approach to dreams often covertly drew upon the keys of dreams.

Whilst in philosophy, dreams were principally viewed as mental states, in medicine, dreams were conceived in physiological terms. For example, Pierre Cabanis stated that the characteristics of dreams stemmed from the fact that the action of the external senses was suspended. This had the effect of withdrawing nervous energy to the cerebral organ, which was abandoned to its own impressions or those from "internal sentient extremities," without these being corrected by impressions from external objects.²¹⁹ This served to explain the content of dreams:

The compression of the diaphragm, the work of the digestion, the action of the genital organs often bring back old events, or persons, or reasonings, or images of places one had entirely lost from sight.²²⁰

Cabanis argued that the association of ideas in waking states reproduced themselves in dreams. The continuity of

mental activity in dreams served also to provide a rational explanation of phenomena that were seized upon by the superstitious. He cited the example of Benjamin Franklin, who claimed that he had been instructed on matters that concerned him in his dreams. Cabanis commented:

He did not pay attention to the fact that his keen prudence and his rare wisdom still directed the action of his brain during sleep... In fact, the mind may continue its own research in dreams; it can be led by a certain sequence of reasonings to ideas that it did not have; it can, without its knowledge, make rapid calculations that unveil the future for it, as it does at every instant when awake.\(^\text{221}\)

Cabanis also highlighted the "constant and definite relations" between dreams and delirium, which he claimed was first pointed out by Cullen.\(^\text{222}\) As will be seen, this relation came to play a prominent role in the psychiatric understanding of dreams in the nineteenth century.

In 1809, the philosopher Maine de Biran stated in his "New considerations on sleep, dreams and somnambulism" that the exploration of dreams should be properly seen as a part of physiology. Concerning the relation of dreams to waking

\(^{221}\) Ibid., p. 626.

\(^{222}\) Ibid., p. 602.
thought, Maine de Biran upheld the subtractive view of dreaming. He wrote:

In what can dreams or the images of sleep, [even] the most determined movements and acts of somnambulism be differentiated from the ideas and actions of waking, if it is not precisely by this absence of all judgement, of all reflexion or controlled attention...\textsuperscript{223}

This led him to equate dreams with insanity. However, it is important to note, that even in such physiological accounts, room was given for what one could term psychological factors. Thus Maine de Biran noted in dreams:

the return of images connected to primitive affections... It is thus that the memories or the tableaus of the first youth retrace themselves in our dreams, with all the vivacity and the reality of the sentiment which accompanies them and which gives them so much charm... the association of ideas of the first age are always the most durable, and those which return with the most spontaneity and promptitude in the sphere of the passive imagination.\textsuperscript{224}

\textsuperscript{223} Maine de Biran, "Nouvelles considérations sur le sommeil, les songes et le somnambulisme," p. 85.

\textsuperscript{224} Ibid., p. 101.
The attempt to establish the physiological mechanisms of the dream had the effect of desacralising the dream, and was aimed against the continued popular belief in the prophetic and symbolic powers of the dream. However, there were other developments that set out to reverse these developments.

**Dreams and the language of the soul**

The subtractive model of dreaming, and the view of the dream as a secondary phenomenon were overturned in German Romanticism. In 1821 the Norwegian Heinrich Steffens noted:

> Out of the sick condition of our times arose the silly attempts to explain the dream, the positive product of sleep, in terms only of waking consciousness. This method of explanation saw nothing in dreams except the half repressed thoughts and images of the day.²²⁵

In the place of the subtractive models, positive views were put forward that stressed the poetic qualities of the dream, and its status as a deeper revelation of the essence of being than waking consciousness. What took place in German Romanticism was a reversal of hierarchy between sleep and waking. Rather than seeing the dream as a lower, derivative condition of waking consciousness, it was viewed as a higher

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state. The philosopher/physician Ignaz Troxler (1780-1866) noted: "The dream is thus the revelation of the very essence of man."\textsuperscript{226} The most prominent study of dreams was Gotthilf Heinrich von Schubert's (1780-1860) \textit{The Symbolism of Dreams} (1814). Schubert had studied with Schelling, whom he nominated as the most influential figure in his life.\textsuperscript{227} Schubert stated that in the dream, the soul spoke another language than in waking life, a universal hieroglyphic picture language of symbols. He stated, "we express in this language in a short time more things than we can set out with the help of words during whole hours."\textsuperscript{228} The soul expressed itself more fully in dreams:

\begin{quote}
this language, made of abbreviations and hieroglyphs appears, in many respects, more appropriate to the nature of our spirit than our habitual language of words. This one is infinitely more expressive, richer...\textsuperscript{229}
\end{quote}

Dreams stemmed from the 'poet hidden in us,' and their language was poetic and metaphorical. Consequently, a

\textsuperscript{226} Cited in Béguin, \textit{L'Âme Romantique et le Rêve}, p. 93.

\textsuperscript{227} Volker Roelke, "Jewish mysticism in romantic medicine? Indirect incorporation of kabbalistic elements in the work of Gotthilf Heinrich Schubert," p. 128.

\textsuperscript{228} G. H. Schubert, \textit{La Symbolique du rêve}, p. 61.

\textsuperscript{229} \textit{Ibid.}. 
translation of the language of dreams into the language of waking was necessary. The oneiric language was a natural activity of the soul.\textsuperscript{230} Schubert's valorisation of the language of dreams was also reflected in his ideas concerning the history of language. He claimed that whilst poetry was the original language of the people, prose was a later invention. He viewed poetry as infinitely more expressive, more powerful and more magical than prose. Schubert highlighted the protective function of dreams:

A good part of the oneiric images, which forms a singular contrast with our inclinations and thoughts of everyday life, seem to be the product of the good spirit who protects us... The association of ideas of the moral organ is completely other than that of waking thought, and even radically opposed to it... One of the two faces of Janus of our double nature seems to laugh when the other cries, or sleeps and only speaks in dreams when the other is the most awake and speaks loudly. When our exterior being gives itself freely and joyously to all the pleasures, a voice expresses an inner aversion and a profound sadness comes to trouble our drunkenness... The more the exterior being triumphs with a robust energy, the more the interior being weakens and seeks refuge in the world of obscure

\textsuperscript{230} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 70.
The symbolism of dreams intersected with the findings of archeology in important ways:

Finally, this mysterious language of images which have been particularly observed in the ancient Egyptian monuments and on the strange figures of ancient idols of the oriental peoples present a striking kinship with the metaphorical language of the dream. Through the aid of this kinship, we can perhaps succeed in finding the lost key which would give us access to part of the metaphorical language of nature not elucidated up to now; thanks to this key, we could obtain much more than a simple enlargement of our archeological and mythological knowledge.\(^{232}\)

Whilst the philosophical and physiological tradition had been at pains to set aside and to explain away the popular prophetic and symbolic interest in dreams, as represented by the dream keys, Schubert stated that a great deal of the content of the dream keys was founded on pertinent observations.\(^{233}\) He affirmed the prophetic quality of dreams,

\(^{231}\) Ibid., pp. 100-1.
\(^{232}\) Ibid., p. 75.
\(^{233}\) Ibid., p. 63.
and took such dreams as paradigmatic of the nature of dreaming.\textsuperscript{234} Thus he could be said to have validated the popular dream keys through providing them with a metaphysics.

Schubert's work was widely read, and went through several editions in his lifetime. However, Otto Marx notes that it did not play a significant role in psychiatry.\textsuperscript{235}

Dreams were also valorised in the magnetic tradition. This was to a large extent due to the filiation of dreams with somnambulism. The following are the principal faculties that were attributed to states of somnambulism: the ability to estimate the time, the insensibility to the exterior, the exaltation of the imagination, the development of intellectual faculties, the instinct of remedies, prevision, the communication of the symptoms of the sick, the communication of thoughts, seeing without the help of the senses, the possibility of an influence exercised by a somnambulist on their own organisation, the power of seeing

\textsuperscript{234} Coleridge took exception to the exemplarity that Schubert accorded to such dreams (the temptation to regard a particular class of dreams as exemplifying dreams in general is one that frequently recurs). In marginal notes to his copy of Schubert's work, he stated, "Schubert's prophetic and artistic Dreams form a distinct kind - and ought not to have been confounded with those of proper sleep." Cited in Jennifer Ford, "Samuel Taylor Coleridge on dreams and dreaming," p. 93. Ford's study provides many rich and detailed insights into eighteenth century attitudes to dreams.

\textsuperscript{235} Otto Marx, "German Romantic Psychiatry" pt. 2, p. 22.
into the future and the exaltation of memory. It was held that the dreams that occurred in states of somnambulism were identical to those that occurred in sleep. Through analogy, the properties attributed to states of somnambulism were likewise attributed to dreams. Thus Alexandre Bertrand noted that in somnambulism, there was an absence of self-reflection, attention and the ability to turn back upon oneself to know the state in which one found oneself. He stated that this was comparable to dreams, in which one was affected by a multitude of bizarre and incoherent sensations, which caused us a great deal of surprise in the waking state, but not whilst we were dreaming. He claimed that in dreams and somnambulism, ideas were independent of the will, and that ideas in magnetic crises came about in the same way as in dreams, in which one found oneself dreaming of the person whom one thought of on going to sleep. Bertrand concluded that "somnambulism... hardly merits to be distinguished from dreams, and constitutes not much other than a dream in action." This connection between dreams and somnambulism was later elaborated by the

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237 Ibid., p. 425.

238 Ibid., p. 426.

239 Bertrand, *Traité du somnambulisme et des différentes modifications qu'il présente*, p. 449.

240 Ibid., p. 468.
philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer, who stated:

the dream becomes the connecting link, the bridge, between somnambulistic and waking consciousness. According to this, we must, therefore, first attribute prophetic dreams to the fact that in deep sleeping dreaming is enhanced to a somnambulistic clairvoyance.²⁴¹

The linkage between dreams and somnambulism was subsequently carried over into the linkage between dreams and hypnosis. Auguste Forel, who played a pivotal role in introducing hypnotic suggestion into Switzerland stated:

The three typical characteristics of dream existence are, at the same time, the criteria of hypnotic consciousness. They are: hallucinations of perception, exaggerated feeling and reflex action of the same, and dissociation of the organic logical associations of the engram complexes.²⁴²

Forel argued that in dreams, the stimuli of the senses rarely called forth the normal perception. In this respect,


²⁴² Auguste Forel, Hypnotism, p. 84.
the dreamer resembled the hypnotized individual, with the proviso that when the hypnotiser was present, the former was conscious of his influences.\textsuperscript{243}

**Diagnostic Dreams**

Since antiquity, the principal use of dreams in medical practice was as diagnostic tools. Dreams were taken as disclosive of bodily states. This approach was remained prominent in the nineteenth century, and was presented in 1830 by Robert Macnish in his popular *Philosophy of Sleep*. Macnish held to the subtractive view of dreaming:

\begin{quote}
A suspension (almost always complete) of the judgement, and an active state of memory, imagination, & c., are the only conditions essential to ordinary dreaming...\textsuperscript{244}
\end{quote}

He highlighted the mnemonic function of dreams and was at pains to deny a futural dimension:

\begin{quote}
Dreams, therefore must be held altogether incapable of giving the slightest insight into futurity; but there is one property undoubtedly possessed by sleep - \textit{viz.}, that of sometimes recalling to the mind events which had been wholly obliterated from it, and restoring them
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{244} Robert Macnish, *The Philosophy of Sleep*, p. 50.
with all the force of their original impression.\textsuperscript{245}

The mnemonic function of dreams took on a moral dimension, under the form of conscience:

During the busy stir of active existence, they may contrive to evade the memory of their wickedness - to silence the whispers of the 'still small voice' within them, and cheat themselves with the semblance of happiness; but when their heads are laid upon the pillow, the flimsy veil which hung between them and crime, melts away like an illusive vapour, and displays the latter in naked and horrid deformity.\textsuperscript{246}

However, there was one respect in which dreams could be said to be able to give indications concerning the future, and that was their diagnostic and prognostic function:

Dreams are sometimes useful in affording prognostics of the probable termination of several illnesses. Violent and impetuous dreams occurring in fevers generally indicate approaching delirium; those of a gloomy terrific nature give strong grounds to apprehend danger; while dreams of a pleasant cast may be looked

\textsuperscript{245} Ibid., p. 116.

\textsuperscript{246} Ibid., pp. 94-5.
upon as harbingers of recovery.\textsuperscript{247}

Macnish claimed that particular diseases gave particular characters to dreams: "jaundice tinges the objects beheld, with its own yellow and sickly hue; hunger induces dreams of eating agreeable food."\textsuperscript{248}

A similar position was put forward towards the end of the nineteenth century, by Phillippe Tissié, a French physician in Bourdeaux, in his \textit{Dreams: Physiology and Pathology}. Tissié claimed that "the function of an organ creates a dream in connection with this function."\textsuperscript{249} This gave the dream a prognostic function, as the dream could enable the early detection of a disease. Tissié contended:

\begin{quote}
Affections of the circulatory apparatus are generally revealed by a sentiment of fear, anxiety, breathless anguish; by visual hallucinations, by short, frightening, tragic dreams, by ideas of impending death, by scenes of dying, by carnage, by visions of objects in flames, by sensations of falling, by receiving a wound. Waking is brought about with a start.\textsuperscript{250}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{247} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 68.
\textsuperscript{248} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 69.
\textsuperscript{249} Phillippe Tissié, \textit{Les Rêves: physiologie et pathologie}, p. 201.
\textsuperscript{250} \textit{Ibid.}
Similarly, the physician Maurice Macario argued that the incubation of a disease could provoke dreams. The prodromic value of dreams was due to fact that they exaggerated sensations. Thus in a case of heart disease, one might find dreams of being pierced in the heart by a sword. Macario argued that dreams varied with each type of madness: in 'expansive' monomania, dreams were happy and laughing; in mania they were strange, bizarre and disordered. Following from this, he claimed that one could use dreams to monitor an individual's state of health: a state of normality was indicated by normal dreams, though he did not indicate what exactly was indicated by this designation.

Whilst such works made no mention of the popular keys of dreams, in drawing symbolic connections between specific imagery and bodily conditions, they were clearly reliant upon them. Yannick Ripa noted:

The symbolism of the body takes the relay of the symbolism of the keys... Do the keys not give, through the function of the purport of dreams, veritable diagnostics?... It is certainly right to ask if the adoption of the medical views was not largely

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252 Ibid., pp. 88-90.
facilitated by the striking resemblances.  

There are some indications in nineteenth century psychiatry that dreams were not only seen as disclosive of bodily states, but of psychological states as well. In his *Principles of Medical Psychology* (1845), the psychiatrist Ernst von Feuchtersleben (1806-1849) considered dreams as "the occupation of the mind in sleep with the pictorial world of fancy." He stated that in dreams, as the senses provided the mind with no materials, it had recourse to the store of memory. Following Kant, von Feuchtersleben attributed a teleological function to dreams. In his *Critique of Judgement*, Kant had speculated:

I would ask if dreams (from which our sleep is never free, although we rarely remember what we have dreamed), may not be a regulation of nature adapted to ends. For when all the muscular forces of the body are relaxed dreams serve the purpose of internally stimulating the vital organs by means of the imagination and the great activity it exerts - an activity that in this state generally rises to psychophysical agitation. This seems to be why

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imagination is usually more actively at work in the sleep of those who have gone to bed at night with a loaded stomach, just when this stimulation is most needed. Hence, I would suggest that without this internal stimulating force and fatiguing unrest that makes us complain of our dreams, which in fact, however, are probably curative, sleep, even in a sound state of health, would amount to a complete extinction of life.\textsuperscript{255}

Von Feuchtersleben denied any prophetic quality to dreams: "It is self-evident that the understanding, fettered in dreams, can give no instruction to the understanding when unfettered."\textsuperscript{256} However, he claimed that they could provide a form of retrospective understanding, through their mnemonic function:

that dreams may... become psychologically and even ethically of deep importance as respects an individual, follows from the above-mentioned power of obscured ideas. Through this power, dreams may give a man historical information respecting himself, and hence, according to a favourite expression, 'he may divine

\textsuperscript{255} Immanuel Kant, \textit{Kant's Critique of Teleological Judgement}, p. 29.

\textsuperscript{256} Von Feurchtersleben, \textit{Principles of Medical Psychology}, p. 166.
like a prophet looking backwards.' As when the sun has
gone down, the countless stars, not visible in daytime,
appear on the dark ground of the firmament, so, at the
call of fancy, the forgotten images of bygone days rise
up and show the mind its former shape. This observation
likewise points to the delicate affinity of dreams with
pathological states of mind, where too, as it were,
'the old Adam' appears, and is in every sense
interesting to the psychological physician.\(^{257}\)

Von Feuchtersleben advocated the clinical investigation of
dreams:

dreaming, as the precursor and accompaniment of
diseases, deserves continued investigation, not because
it is to be considered as a spiritual divination, but
because, as the unconscious language of the
coenaesthesia, and of the sensus commune, it often very
clearly shows, to those who can comprehend its meaning,
the state of the patient, though he himself is not
aware of this; and the interpretation of dreams
deserves the attention and the study of the physician,
if not of any one else.\(^{258}\)

\(^{257}\) Ibid.

\(^{258}\) Ibid., pp. 198–9.
However, it is not clear what influence von Feuchtersleben's recommendations had, nor to what extent such 'divining backwards' - which was to become the predominant mode of psychotherapy in the twentieth century - had already become established in psychiatric practice at this stage. Nevertheless, his discussion of dreams indicates that the theoretical presuppositions for the clinical utilisation of dreams as a means of memory retrieval had been established before 1850.

**Dreams and Madness**

Analogies between dreams, insanity and what were regarded as kindred states, such as somnambulism, played significant roles in the nineteenth century. The strength of these analogies was differently conceived: at times a phenomenon was likened to another phenomenon, declared identical to it, or subsumed as a subspecies of it. The significance of these analogies was that they enabled the understanding of one phenomenon via another, even though the precise relations were rarely specified. Further, these analogical chains had the significance that the reconceptualisation of one particular phenomenon often had a knock-on effect all along the chain. This analogical form of reasoning about dreams has survived intact, right up to the present day.

In his *Rhapsodies*, the German physician Johann Reil,
who was the first to coin the term 'psychiatry,' considered dreams as analogous to madness:

In dreams we always wander in appearances of spaces, time and our person. We spring from one part of the world to another, from one century over to another and play each role from king to beggar, that the magical fantasy grants us. Precisely this occurs in madness, which is a dream whilst awake.\(^{259}\)

Reil argued that the character of dreams stemmed from the fact that they were "a product of a partial wakening of the nervous system."\(^{260}\) They shared this characteristic with madness. He stated that in dreams, fantasy was present, either alone, or in conjunction with an individual sense organ.\(^{261}\) He also remarked upon the 'peculiar art' of the dream - that the dreamer seemed only to take on roles connected with their personality. He cited Lichtenberg, who had called this a dramatised reflection.\(^{262}\) Reil did not attribute any therapeutic function to dreams. Indeed, their likeness to insanity precluded their therapeutic utilisation.

\(^{259}\) Johann Reil, *Rhapsodieen über die Anwendung der psychischen Curmethode auf Geisteszürrüttungen*, p. 87.


\(^{261}\) *Ibid.*

In the middle half of the nineteenth century, one of the best known psychiatric textbooks was Wilhelm Griesinger's *Mental Pathology and Therapeutics*. This text was one of the prime representatives of what was characterized as the somaticist approach in psychiatry. Up to Jung's time, Griesinger was associated with the adage that mental diseases were diseases of the brain. In this work, Griesinger dealt the subject of dreams in a section on the analogies of insanity. He stated that our knowledge of insanity was increased through consideration of analogous states, one of which was the dream. A further analogy that he presented was states of magnetic sleep. He argued that in the insane, there occurred states of sensation and motion that resembled dreams. He noted that sometimes in insanity, as in dreams, the sense of time was absent. This analogy was most marked in dreams occurring in the half-waking state. He argued that:

The dream, like insanity, receives its essential colour, its certain fundamental tone, from the governing disposition; which may be determined as well by the mental occurrences of waking life, as by the changes of the organic state during sleep.... The ruling sentiments of pleasure and pain call for their corresponding images, in which objects without form in themselves, become sensuous clothed forms, the reality
of the actual impression is delusive, and what enters from without, throughout the senses, meets in the dreamer, as in the insane man, a centre, preoccupied and filled with the given disposition, and becomes perverted and construed in the sense of the ruling sentiment and ideas.\textsuperscript{263}

Griesinger drew an analogy between one's conduct in dreams, and that of the insane:

The dreamer, like the insane, accepts all, even the most adventurous and foolish, representations as possibilities without particular astonishment, and the veriest absurdity becomes the most unquestionable truth, if the masses of perception which can rectify it remain dormant.\textsuperscript{264}

He observed that ravishing dreams were rare in states of health, and frequent in states of ill-health:

we observe at such times that the ideas suppressed during waking come forth strongly in dreams. To the individual who is distressed by bodily and mental

\textsuperscript{263} Wilhelm Griesinger, \textit{Mental Pathology and Therapeutics}, pp. 107-8.

\textsuperscript{264} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 108.
troubles, the dream realises what reality has refused -
happiness and fortune.

Thus he stated that in dreams and in insanity, one often
found the imaginary fulfilment of wishes, and the reversal
of disappointments. However, in his section on
therapeutics, there was no mention of the subject of dreams,
which seems indicates that they were not therapeutically
utilised. If dreams were likened to insanity, then this
analogy is sufficient to explain why they were not utilised
therapeutically. Dreams were not accorded any special
function, and did not reveal anything other than what was
present in delusionary ideas, and so forth.  

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265 In The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud paraphrased
Griesinger's views on dreams and psychoses, as both being
wishfulfilments, and stated, "My own researches have taught
me that in this fact lies the key to a psychological theory
of both dreams and psychoses." SE 4, p. 91.

266 One of the most persistent analogies was that
between dreams and hallucinations. In 1867 D'Hervey de
Denys stated: "Hallucinations are nothing but the dreams of
a waking man." Les Rêves et les moyens de les diriger, p.
141. Following in this vein, Freud posited that dreams have
a hallucinatory character: "we shall be in agreement with
every authority on the subject in asserting that dreams
hallucinate - that they replace thoughts by hallucinations."
The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 114 However one figure who
challenged this analogy was Janet. He stated, "it is a grave
mistake to confound the dream with suggestion and
hallucination." Psychological Healing, p. 287. He stated
that what was distinctive about a hallucination was not, as
commonly thought, that a subject saw or heard something that
was not actually present, but that a subject acted
impulsively: ie, that the subject behaved as if they had had
been signalled, or as if they had heard abusive language.
Without these behavioural manifestations, a hallucination
would be something incommunicable, and hence unknowable.
The next period, from the mid-century onwards, was marked by the major dream investigators, such as Karl Scherner, Alfred Maury and D'Hervey de Saint-Denys. According to Havelock Ellis, it was Maury in 1861 who inaugurated the modern study of dreams. André Breton described Maury as "one of the finest observers and experimenters ever to have appeared during the nineteenth century." These investigators left to oneside the romantic views on dreams, together with the continuing public interest in the prophetic capacity of dreams. In the dream investigations during this period, the main method used was introspection. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, with the rise of statistical methods in psychology, these came into use in the study of dreams, though they did not become widespread until the middle of the twentieth century. Psychology became increasingly used as a self appellation for such research, which was mainly geared towards establishing taxonomies of the different types of dreams, providing

Contrastingly, he stated that dreams were marked by the absence of such outward actions. Whilst a hallucination was "a tendency activated by a high degree of tension", a dream was "a tendency which is not activated at all." *Ibid.*, p. 287.


268 André Breton, *Communicating Vessels*, p. 12.

269 For example of the application of statistical methods to the study of dreams, see Mary Calkins' 1893 essay, "Statistics of Dreams." On Calkins, see her "autobiography."
explanations of their respective causes, and putting forward physiological explanations of dreaming.

Alfred Maury claimed at the outset of his work that it constituted a work of 'experimental psychology'. Ian Dowbiggèn stated that during this period in France, dreams were charged with cultural and political significance, owing to Romantic exaltation of the dream as a source of creativity and revelation that gave access to truths which were inaccessible in waking states. For Maury, dreams enabled the understanding of cognate irrational phenomena, such as mesmerism and somnambulism. Whilst the magnetists had employed the analogy between somnambulism and dreams to valorise the latter, Maury used it in the other direction, to devalue states of somnambulism and to discredit the practices of mesmerism. For Maury, the analogy between dreams and madness took the form of likening dreams to hallucinations: "dreams are veritable hallucinations."

The following is an example of the taxonomic classification of dreams. Maurice Macario classified dreams into the following types: sensory dreams, dream-hallucinations, dream-illusions, affective dreams, intellectual dreams, prodromic dreams, symptomatic dreams,

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morbid dreams. The classificatory systems of the psychologists and physiologists did not simply impose order on a previously uncharted terrain; rather, they replaced the already established systems of classifications in the dream keys. The latter consisted in classificatory systems of dreams, embedding dream images within a vast semantic network of personal, familial, societal and cosmic significations. By contrast, the classificatory systems of the dream investigators extracted the dream from this semantic network and isolated it as a discrete epistemological object located within the interior of the subject. The dream investigators attempted to purge the dream of this vast social, religious and cosmic network of signification. Whilst the dream keys had focused upon the dream scene as the key identifying factor of the dream, the dream investigators shifted their emphasis to the type of the dream. They attempted to provide explanations not of particular dreams, but of classes of dreams through explaining their function. The relegation of the practice of dream interpretation was an aspect of this endeavour. Through the psychologisation of the dream, the dream became increasingly viewed as disclosive of hidden subjectivity. Maury claimed:

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272 Maurice Macario, Du Sommeil, des rêves et du somnambulisme dans l'état de santé et de maladie.
In the dream, man is thus entirely revealed to himself in his nudity and his native misery. Since he suspends the action of his will, he becomes the plaything of all the passions, against which, in the waking state, conscience, the sentiment of honour, and fear defends us.\footnote{273}{Maury, \textit{Le Sommeil et les rêves}, p. 88.}

Following from this, Maury stated that in dreams "we attribute thoughts and speeches to different personages which are nothing other than our own."\footnote{274}{Ibid., p. 115.} He highlighted the mnemonic quality of dreams: "memory is more present in dreams than in the waking state; and it even sometimes presents a remarkable intensity."\footnote{275}{Ibid., p. 46.} He was at pains to deny any prophetic quality to dreams, contending that we only dreamt of what we had seen, said, desired or done. Thus if dreams were revelatory of the subject, it was a revelation purged of any transcendent dimension.

Ripa argued that the dream studies affected how individuals viewed their dreams during this period. Through a study of 19th century French journals, he stated:

In the large part of the cases, the dream is recounted
in the journal, as an account heard, without its begetter commenting on it. The more one advances in this century, and thus in the physiological or psychological discovery of the mechanisms of the dream, the more the annotations multiply: the diarists, whatever their cultural level, take note that the dream is a magnifying mirror of this self which they pursued through words.\textsuperscript{276}

A work which gives a representative example of the range of issues explored during this period is Henry Maudsley’s \textit{The Pathology of Mind} of 1879. Maudsley listed six causes and conditions of dreams: character and precedent mental experience, impressions on a special sense, the state of the muscular sensibility, organic or systemic impressions, conditions of cerebral circulation, the state or tone of the nervous system.\textsuperscript{277} Under the first category, similarly to Maine de Biran, Maudsley noted the reappearance of thoughts and feelings of the previous day, and childhood experiences.\textsuperscript{278} Under the impact of evolutionary thinking, Maudsley noted that:

\begin{quote}
Under the heading of precedent mental experience,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{276} Ripa, \textit{Histoire du rêve}, p. 115.

\textsuperscript{277} Henry Maudsley, \textit{The Pathology of Mind}, p. 21.

\textsuperscript{278} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 21-28.
albeit not personal experience, one might class instances of what seem to be reversions in sleep to ancestral modes of thought, feeling, and action.\textsuperscript{279}

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the psychogenesis of dreams was reached through different angles. One route was through a delimitation to the psychological components of the dream studied in the physiological tradition. The year after Maudsley's study, the Belgian philosopher-psychologist Joseph Delboëuf cited Maudsley in his study \textit{Sleep and Dreams} and noted that he would limit himself to the purely psychological aspects of the dream.\textsuperscript{280} This epistemological delimitation was closely paralleled by the concurrent attempts to establish psychology as an independent discipline.

Delboëuf set out to study dreams from the double aspect of certitude and memory. He set to one side the 'vulgar superstitious' belief in prophetic dreams, and claimed that dreams were solely made of past events, and shed no light on the future.\textsuperscript{281} After a critical review of recent works on dreams, he recounted the first dream he noted, after

\textsuperscript{279} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 27.

\textsuperscript{280} Joseph Delboëuf, "Le sommeil et les rêves", \textit{Revue Philosophique}, 9, 1880, p. 130. Delboëuf's study was published in book form in 1885, and recently reissued by Fayard.

\textsuperscript{281} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 647.
deciding to write on the topic of dreams. This dream featured two lizards, and a plant that he saw on a wall, an asplenium ruta muralis. On waking, Delbočf assumed that he had made up the name of this plant. However, he was informed that there existed a fern, called the asplenium ruta muraria, which grew on walls, though it looked different.

Two years later, he discovered the source of this image. Whilst visiting a friend, he saw a copy of a herbarium album. He recalled that in 1860, he had written, at the dictation of a botanist, the family and class of each plant beside the name. In this album, he found a picture of the asplenium. The following year, he was leafing through a copy of the Tour du monde at his parents' home, when he came across an engraving of lizards which was the exact representation of the second part of his dream. The journal was dated 1861. Delbočf utilised this dream to draw a general conclusion concerning the permanence of memory traces:

one is authorised to infer that all impressions, even the most insignificant, leave an unalterable trace, indefinitely susceptible to come back to light.\textsuperscript{283}

\textsuperscript{282} Ibid., pp. 133-4.

\textsuperscript{283} Ibid., p. 136. François Duckyearts notes that in comparing Delbočf's work with Freud's \textit{Interpretation of Dreams}, one is stuck by the structural similarity between them. "Les références de Freud à Delbočf," p. 241. He states that both begin with long literature reviews; both
Symbolism and Associationism

If the dream had been purged of a large part of its signification through being reconceptualised as a subjective psychological component of the dreamer, it recovered a range of personal signification through attempts to establish a restricted symbolism of the dream and through associationist psychology. In 1861, the same year in which Maury's study on dreams appeared, Karl Albert Scherner, a philosopher at the University of Breslau, published a study entitled The Life of the Dream. Freud was to hail Scherner as "the true discoverer of symbolism in dreams" — which in one respect, is a highly odd statement, given the longevity of the tradition of symbolic dream interpretation represented by the dream keys. Scherner argued that the psychic activity in

follow this with paradigmatic personal dreams, which are analysed in the light of their theoretical elaborations. Both dreams are presented as the first — (Delboef's as the dream that instigated his research), Freud's as the first dream he interpreted. For both of them, the relation with the neglected thoughts of the day is traced. Both dreams are concerned with scientific issues (botany, chemistry). Both dreams are put forward against an opponent: Delboef against Brillat-Savarin's view on the supposed sensory incapacities of the dream, Freud against his friend Otto's view on the incapacities of psychoanalysis. Duckyearts argues that Freud's work was self-consciously modeled on Delboef's. One is left to pose the question as to whether Freud was also a plagiarist in his dreams!


dreams expressed itself via symbolic language, and that it was possible to interpret this. He argued that whilst asleep, the dreamer possessed a greater sensitivity to bodily sensations. He claimed that these sensations translated themselves into dream images. Hence the greater part of this symbolism was related to the human body. In this respect, Scherner emphasised the significance of the disguised sexual symbolism in dreams. Scherner's restricted code of dream symbolism can be seen as an attempt to free the symbolising activity of dreams from the metaphysical cosmology represented in the dream books.

The arrogation of the authority to designate the symbolic code of dreams had the significance that psychologists, under the guise of a science shorn of superstition, were now in a position to create new symbologies for the culture at large. In the twentieth century, it was principally Freud and Jung who set about this task.

The symbolic understanding of dreams, in whatever form, tended to the establishment of general meanings. Paralleling such transformations of the symbolic understanding of dreams was the significance accorded the multifarious and individual sources of dream imagery, through the tradition of associationist psychology. In 1893, the English psychologist James Sully stated that in waking states, the paths of the association of ideas were not visible due to force of sense impressions and volitional
control. However,

In dream-life both of these influences are withdrawn, so that delicate threads of association, which have no chance of exerting their pull, so to speak, in our waking states, now make known their hidden force. Little wonder, then, that the filaments which bind together these dream-successions should escape detection, since even in our waking thought we so often fail to see the connection which makes us pass in recollection from a name to a visible scene or perhaps to an emotional vibration.  

Thus the apparent unintelligibility of the dream was due to the fact that it laid bare the underlying associative process, which was partially masked in the waking state. Sully drew from this the following conclusion:

It will be possible, I think, after a habit of analysing one's dreams in the light of preceding experience has been formed, to discover in a good proportion of cases some hidden force of association which draws together the seemingly fortuitous concourse

of dream-atoms.\(^{287}\)

There are signs that amongst psychologists, such a practice was not uncommon. On 31st March, 1880, Francis Galton wrote to Sully:

some months ago I was quite troubled with over vivid dreams that I confused with fact; indeed I became rather frightened about it.... [?] told me he went to stay at a house in the North. He went to bed and had an extraordinary dream full of lizards & snakes & got up in the morning full of wonderment about it. Going downstairs he saw a dish of [table]ware with these things on it (you know the dishes I mean) & at once recollected that he had seen it, but had not attended to it, when he went to bed & that the dream was based on it. He is sure that the existence of the dish would have wholly faded from his memory if he had not seen in the morning, but the memory of the dream might well have endured and its incidents have become the origin of associations connecting the [?] with reptiles.\(^{288}\)

In 1893, Sully published another study of dreams, entitled,

\(^{287}\) Ibid., p. 160.

\(^{288}\) Francis Galton to James Sully, 31st March, 1880. James Sully Papers, UCL. Question marks in square brackets indicate indecipherable words.
"The Dream as Revelation." He commenced by noting that in history, there were two opposing views of dreams: the one seeing in them a degree of insight and intelligence far outstripping waking consciousness, reaching supernatural revelation, and the other dismissing them as the simply the phantastic by-products of an idle brain. He contended that:

The modern scientific study of dreaming may be said to combine and to reconcile these antagonistic ideas. It recognizes and seeks to account for the irrational side of dream-life. At the same time it regards this life as an extension of human experience, as a revelation of what would otherwise have never been known.\(^{289}\)

Sully identified three main ways in which the dream could be considered a revelation. First, he claimed that the simplification of the "mature complex pattern of consciousness" brought into prominence forces and tendencies which were usually hidden, such as "nascent and instantly inhibited impulses" of waking life. To illustrate this, he gave examples that designated the manner in which certain dreams could be considered as the culmination of "a vague fugitive wish of the waking mind."\(^{290}\) In this sense he

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claimed that the dream:

strips the ego of its artificial wrappings and exposes it in its rude native nudity. It brings up from the dim depths of our sub-conscious life the primal, instinctive impulses...\(^{291}\)

Secondly, Sully drew an analogy between the phenomena of double or alternate personality, the hypnotic trance and dream. Utilising a notion of the multiplicity of the self strongly reminiscent of William James' model in *The Principles of Psychology*, Sully argued that:

> Our dreams are a means of conserving these successive personalities. When asleep we go back to the old ways of looking at things and of feeling about them... in a way which seems impossible in the waking hours...\(^{292}\)

It was the dream then, that placed one *in statu nascendi*. Thirdly, Sully claimed that dreams gave freer rein to individual characteristics and tendencies. Citing the restricting effect of social life, Sully claimed that "Much that is deepest and most vital in us may in this way be


repressed and atrophied. He held that it was precisely such aspects that were revealed in dreams. Sully concluded that dreams could be considered as an intrapsychic message:

Like some letter in a cipher, the dream-inscription when scrutinised closely loses its first look of balderdash and takes on the aspect of a serious, intelligible message... we may say that, like some palimpsest, the dream discloses beneath its worthless surface-characters traces of an old and precious communication.

**Dreams and the unconscious**

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, concepts of the unconscious increasingly became invoked to explain the phenomena of dreams. One influential place where this occurred was in the work of William Carpenter, through his concept of unconscious cerebration. In a study of what he terms the cerebral unconscious, Marcel Gauchet traced the development of concepts of the unconscious in nineteenth century neurology and physiology. He argues:

> It is though the cerebral unconscious... that the role of the key stone traditionally acknowledged to the will

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in the economy of subjective functioning found itself put into question and subverted.\textsuperscript{295}

Gauchet claims that the prime reason behind the prevailing reticence to integrate this cerebral unconscious, as witnessed by Ellenberger's \textit{Discovery of the Unconscious}, was due to the ideological battle waged by psychoanalysis (and one should add, the dynamic psychologies of the twentieth century), which opposed the organicist approach to mental disorders with a psychogenic approach.\textsuperscript{296}

In his 1874 \textit{Principles of Mental Physiology}, Carpenter commenced his consideration of unconscious cerebration by stating:

To affirm that the Cerebrum may act upon impressions transmitted to it, and may have elaborate Intellectual results, such as we might have attained by the intentional direction of our minds to the subject, \textit{without any consciousness} on our own parts, is held by many Metaphysicians, especially in Britain, to be an altogether untenable and even a most objectionable doctrine.\textsuperscript{297}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{295} Marcel Gauchet, \textit{L'Inconscient cerebral}, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{296} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{297} William Carpenter, \textit{Principles of Mental Physiology}, p. 515.
\end{flushright}
Through extending the notion of reflex action, Carpenter claimed that a large proportion of mental activity took place automatically, and that this automatic action was unconscious. He claimed that under the plane of consciousness, mental actions took place, whose results we only subsequently became conscious of. As a proof of this view, he cited the example of the forgetting of a name, which though conceived differently, was precisely what Freud utilised to similar ends in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life:

A very apposite example of this activity is afforded by a phenomenon, which, although familiar to every one who takes note of the workings of his own mind, has been scarcely recognised by Metaphysical inquirers; namely, that when we have been trying to recollect some name, phrase, occurrence, & c., - and, after vainly employing all the expedients we can think-of for bringing the desiderated idea to our minds, have abandoned the attempt as useless, - it will often occur spontaneously a little while afterwards...

He stated that in such instances, the detachment of attention enabled the cerebrum to work by itself,
undisturbed by the conscious attempt at recollection. In such circumstances, one met with "two distinct trains of Mental action are carried on simultaneously, - one consciously, the other unconsciously;" Carpenter evoked this notion of unconscious cerebration to explain the phenomena of dreams. He claimed that in dreams, which were principally characterized by the suspension of volition, the current of thought flowed automatically:

the reasoning processes may thus be carried on during sleep with unusual vigour and success, and the imagination may develop new and harmonious forms of beauty.\(^3\)

He thus stated that a great part of dreams consisted in the automatic activity of the constructive imagination.\(^4\)

The application of notions of the unconscious to

\(^3\) Ibid., p. 584.

\(^4\) Ibid., p. 587. On the neurologist Hughlings Jackson's views on dreams, see Kenneth Dewhurst, Hughlings Jackson on Psychiatry; on British psychophysiology, see Robert Young, Mind, Brain and Adaptation in the Nineteenth Century; Edwin Clarke and Stephen Jacyna, Nineteenth-Century Origins of Neuroscientific Concepts; Kurt Danziger, "Mid-nineteenth-century British psycho-physiology: a neglected chapter in the history of ideas"; and my "The mind and its disorders in British psychophysiology and neurology in the later half of the nineteenth century."
explain dreams did not only stem from physiological
psychology, but also from idealist philosophy. In 1875,
the German philosopher Johannes Volkelt produced a study
titled The Dream Phantasy. Freud cited Volkelt several
times in The Interpretation of Dreams, and drew upon his
account of the work of Karl Scherner. Freud had this to say
concerning Volkelt's study:

The task of penetrating into the nature of this
[symbolizing] imagination and of finding a place for it
in a system of philosophical thought is attempted by
Volkelt in the pages of his book. But though it is well
and feelingly written, it remains excessively hard to
understand for anyone whose early education has not
prepared him for a sympathetic grasp of the conceptual
constructions of philosophy.

In his study, Volkelt articulated a relation between dreams
and the unconscious, which Freud significantly made no
mention of. Following Scherner, Volkelt stated that there

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303 See below, "Conscious and unconscious."

304 Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, SE 4, pp. 86-7. André Breton accused Freud of plagiarizing Volkelt, which
produced some agitated letters from Freud, of which Breton
commented: "Freud's manifest agitation on this topic (he
writes me two letters a few hours apart, excuses himself
profusely, passes off his own apparent wrong on someone who
is no longer among his friends... only to end by pleading in
favor of the latter an unmotivated omission!) is not likely
to make me change my mind." Communicating Vessels, p. 154.
were two groups of dreams, those that stemmed from the body, and those that stemmed from a mood.\textsuperscript{305} He claimed that in the reproductive phantasy of dreams, the unconscious creative power of the mind showed itself.\textsuperscript{306} The dream phantasy, which operated in the unconscious, seized upon the presenting physical or psychic form, and remolds them.\textsuperscript{307} The dream world and the dream body were both seen as the product of the unconscious dream phantasy.\textsuperscript{308} The dream was not the only product of the unconscious. Volkelt stated: "Also in waking consciousness numerous unconscious processes occur, sudden notions, witty aperçus, all kinds of moods."\textsuperscript{309} Thus the explication of the dream presented itself as paradigmatic for the explication of kindred processes. Volkelt claimed: "the dream ... has itself confirmed, that penetrating understanding will first be possible through the concept of the unconscious".\textsuperscript{310} In conclusion, he postulated that the age-old problems of philosophy could finally be solved through a consideration of dreams:

The riddle of the world, for whose solution

\textsuperscript{305} Johannes Volkelt, \textit{Die Traum-Phantasie}, p. 86.
\textsuperscript{306} Johannes Volkelt, \textit{Die Traum-Phantasie}, p. 88.
\textsuperscript{308} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 156.
\textsuperscript{309} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 158.
\textsuperscript{310} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 167.
philosophers have for a long time often futilely struggled, the dream practically solves every night...
in the dream we are near the innermost world:
admittedly not with what we experience through the dream images, but with what we unconsciously do and are in the dream forming process.\textsuperscript{311}

\textbf{The Dream and the Maladies of Memory}

The latter part of the nineteenth century saw the advent of sciences of memory. Ian Hacking argues that the critical years in which this took place were between 1874 and 1886.\textsuperscript{312} He designates three main branches of the sciences of memory: neurological studies of localisation, experimental studies of recall, and the psychodynamics of memory, upon which he focuses. In Hacking's narrative, the key protagonist in the psychodynamics of memory was the French psychologist Théodule Ribot. Ribot's lasting significance for dynamic psychiatry, he claimed, was through a reversal of the epistemological significance of memory and forgetting:

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid., p. 208.
\item Ian Hacking, \textit{Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory}, p. 198. If these dates seem overly precise, Hacking himself offers alternatives in an earlier paper on the same subject: "It is above all in that period, the 1870s to the 1890s, that there came into being a depth knowledge that there are facts about memory" and "the many sciences of memory... occurred, as I put it, between 1875 and 1895." "Memoro-politics, trauma and the soul", (p. 46 & p. 50).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
whereas in Locke it was positive memory that constituted the idea of a person, in the time of Ribot one understood the memory which would teach us about the unhappy soul in terms of forgetting.\textsuperscript{313}

According to Hacking, it fell to Pierre Janet and Freud, through the psychologisation of the notion of trauma, that psychotherapy became increasingly centred around memory retrieval.\textsuperscript{314} The notion that identity principally resides in not in what one remembers, but in what one forgets, Hacking designates by the term memoro-politics. His claim is that the centrality of trauma and forgetting in modern psychotherapeutics may be genealogically traced back to this period. He argues that what took place within this period was that memory, previously seen as the main criterion of personal identity, became the key to the soul, through being constituted as an object of scientific observation, which would enable the spiritual domain of the soul to be conquered, and a surrogate installed in its place.\textsuperscript{315} In his formulation, the sciences of memory were driven by a secularising imperative. This explanation seems excessively monocausal. First, the commitment to a positivistic agenda

\textsuperscript{313} Hacking, "Memoro-politics, trauma and the soul," p. 150.

\textsuperscript{314} Hacking, \textit{Rewriting the Soul}, pp. 191-6.

\textsuperscript{315} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 198.
for a scientific psychology by no means necessarily entailed a secularising agenda: witness William James, Pierre Janet and Théodore Flournoy. Secondly, it seems more precise to see the formation of sciences of memory and the rise of the mnemonic imperative in psychotherapy as resulting from the confluence of several different currents. One of these was the dream.

Intersecting with Hacking's work, Laura Otis argues that the years between 1870 and 1918 saw the flourishing of the theory of organic memory, principally through the works of Samuel Butler, Ewald Hering, Richard Simon, Théodule Ribot and the Völkerpsychologie of Moritz Lazarus, Heymann Steinthal and Wilhelm Wundt. This theory rested on two main pillars: Jean-Baptiste Lamarck's theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics and Ernst Haeckel's biogenic law, that ontogeny recapitulated phylogeny. Otis claims that proponents of the theory of organic memory identified memory with heredity, and located history in the body: "by envisioning history as something accumulated by a race and stored within an individual, they rendered it potentially accessible." The significance in this context of Völkerpsychologie was that through analogising cultural and individual development, it posited

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316 Laura Otis, Organic Memory: History & the Body in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries.

317 Ibid., p. 2.
that the individual could be conceived of as the repository of cultural memories. Whilst these authors seem not to have paid a great deal of attention to dreams, given that the dream was increasingly conceived during this period in mnemonic terms, the possibility for conceiving dreams as representing cultural memories was clearly available.\textsuperscript{318}

The term psycho-therapeutics was coined by Hack Tuke in 1872.\textsuperscript{319} It became quickly taken up and used as a synonym for the hypnotic and suggestive therapeutics principally associated with Hyppolite Bernheim and the Nancy school. Bernheim conducted significant studies into the role of memory and forgetting in relation to the hypnotic trance, post-hypnotic suggestion, and the implantation of pseudo-memories through suggestion. However, his therapeutics was not geared towards memory retrieval, but towards countering noxious autosuggestions by means of suggestion.

In the 1880's and 1890's, the practice of hypnotic and suggestive therapeutics became increasingly publicly contested, after which it fell into discredit. Several reasons have been put forward for this, principally the dispute between the Nancy and Salpêtrière schools (Janet, Ellenberger) and the forensic battles (Laurence and Perry,)

\textsuperscript{318} Lamarck, to mention one figure, had claimed that "dreams disclose to us the workings of memory," \textit{Zoological Philosophy}, p. 394.

\textsuperscript{319} Daniel Hack Tuke, \textit{Illustrations of the Mind upon the Body}.
Within texts of this period, one also finds strong concerns articulated around the levels of susceptibility of hypnosis in the population and the appropriateness of authoritarian suggestion at different social levels. Taken together, these strands generated an increasing tendency to develop modes of psychotherapy that were more generally applicable, and that obviated recourse to deep states of trance. A clear articulation of these concerns is found in Frederik van Eeden's 1893 paper "Principles of psychotherapy," in which he put forward the maxim that one should seek to use suggestion whilst exalting suggestion as little as possible. The increasing turn towards memory retrieval made the therapeutic investigation of dreams an obvious choice. For one, dreams were ready at hand, occurring in (or at least, being recalled by) most of the population. Second, not only had dreams become strongly associated with the revivification of past events, principally from childhood, they were also linked to the retrieval of forgotten or 'unconscious' impressions, as Delbouef had eloquently argued.

A significant figure in this respect, who took up the

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321 Frederick Van Eeden, "Les Principes de la psychothérapie."
therapeutic investigation of dreams, was Pierre Janet. In 1889 in *Psychological Automatism*, Janet considered dreams from the aspect of spontaneous modifications of the personality. He noted that every night, one had a particular mental life that was distinct from one's waking consciousness. Whilst the ideas of dreams were nearly always borrowed from one's normal life, they were presented and arranged differently.\(^{322}\) Thus, he argued, dreams represented a group of psychological phenomena isolated from the great mass of ideas of our normal life.\(^{323}\) He added that these ideas were sufficiently grouped together to form a simple personality. For most individuals, this tendency to form an independent memory and secondary personality remained rudimentary. However, if one augmented the activity of the dream, one would arrive at a distinct and independent psychological state, akin to a state of somnambulism.\(^{324}\) Thus for Janet, the dream and somnambulism were seen as being on a continuum. The latter was seen as a continued or augmented dream. This enabled the explication of one via the other. He utilised Maury's statements concerning the presence of passion in dreams to explain the relation between somnambulistic states and the waking state:

\(^{324}\) *Ibid.*
In the same way as the unfettering of passions is complete in the dream, in the same way as a dormant inclination regains during sleep the empire it previously had, likewise, weak impressions in one state can become all powerful in another.\textsuperscript{325}

In 1893, before Freud had compared the dream to a hysterical symptom, he extended this analogy to encompass hysteria: "Hystericals are not content to dream constantly at night; they dream all day long."\textsuperscript{326} Janet claimed that the therapeutic significance of dreams was that they often revealed the pathogenic event. He claimed that dreams brought to light subconscious fixed ideas.\textsuperscript{327} He also held that dreams enabled one to monitor the state of the rapport between the patient and doctor.

Janet utilised dreams to extend his notion of the scope and extent of subconscious mental activity, through his notion of subconscious reveries. He claimed that such reveries developed independently of our consciousness and volition, and that they played a considerable role in our lives.\textsuperscript{328} Janet's description resembles Carpenter's depiction of unconscious cerebration. He noted that in these reveries,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{325} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 211.
  \item \textsuperscript{326} Janet, \textit{The Mental State of Hystericals}, p. 201.
  \item \textsuperscript{327} Janet, \textit{Névroses et idées fixes} 1898. p. 362.
  \item \textsuperscript{328} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 392.
\end{itemize}
one often finds

curious psychological work which takes place in us without our knowledge. It is thanks to this subconscious work that we find problems completely resolved which a little time before we did not understand.\(^{329}\)

Janet used the relative preponderance of these reveries as a diagnostic indicator:

these reveries are scarcely conscious, we vaguely know that we have them in us, but we cannot always describe them exactly, because we only retain of them a very confused memory... These phenomena which often exist in the normal person take on an extraordinary importance in the sick... They become completely involuntary and the person is obliged to submit to them without the power to stop them or to modify them; they become more clearly subconscious and leave much more incomplete memories or are even not accompanied by any personal consciousness or any recollection.\(^{330}\)

For Janet, the subconscious was considered as a kind of

\(^{329}\) Ibid., p. 393.

\(^{330}\) Ibid., p. 394.
continued dream. Rosemarie Sands argues that Janet, Charcot and Krafft-Ebing were conversant with ideas that later emerged as essential concepts in Freud's dream theory: Jean-Martin Charcot assumed that the psychological trauma that precipitated a hysterical symptom, such as paralysis, often appeared in the patient's dreams; Pierre Janet believed that the causes of hysteria often were depicted in dreams, and he used dreams to monitor the therapeutic relationship with himself; Richard von Krafft-Ebing thought that unconscious sexual wishes could be detected in dreams.\footnote{Rosemarie Sands, "Pre-Freudian discovery of dream meaning: the achievements of Charcot, Janet and Krafft-Ebing," p. 215.}

Sands' argument further demonstrates the widespread interest in dreams in psychology and psychiatry at the end of the nineteenth century. Interestingly enough, the significance of Janet and Charcot's work on dreams was drawn attention to by Jung in a seminar he gave in 1925. Jung stated that after the Romantic dream literature, the significance of dream interpretation was neglected. Subsequently, he claimed, "it came up again, to some extent, with Charcot and Janet, and then, especially with Freud."\footnote{Jung, \textit{Swanage Summer School}, p. 6.}
Dreams and Psychical Research

The psychogenesis of dreams was also arrived at through the psychological investigation of spiritualistic phenomena. In 1885, the German philosopher and spiritualist Carl du Prel (1839-1899) stated that the principal question for psychology was "... whether our Ego is wholly embraced in self-consciousness". Du Prel claimed that behind the phenomenal ego of self-consciousness, lay a transcendental ego of neo-Kantian lineage, which especially revealed itself in somnambulism and dreams. Hence dreams revealed the transcendental constitution of subjectivity. The significance of dreams for du Prel was that they established the atemporal and aspatial existence of the soul, or in other words, its immortality. In his chapter "On the scientific importance of dreams", du Prel sought to demonstrate the fallacy of the contemporary opinion that dreams were nonsensical:

... the dream has not merely a scientific importance in general, but one peculiar to itself, and that it fills a vacuum, so that analysis of waking consciousness cannot be substituted for it. It will further be shown that metaphysically, also, the dream has a real value,

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and is a door through which we can penetrate into the obscurity of the human enigma. In dream are exhibited other forces of the human Psyche, and other relations of the Psyche to the whole of Nature, than in waking life... To judge dream-life merely by its analogies with waking life is an actual contradiction, for the foundation of the former is an entire negation of the consciousness and self-consciousness which are the basis of the latter.\textsuperscript{334}

Thus for du Prel, the dream presented \textit{cogitationes} without a \textit{cogito}, and hence could not be understood as a secondary derivative of consciousness. On the relation of dreams to waking life, he wrote:

\begin{quote}
 If we analyse our dreams, at first sight, certainly, they seem to contain merely the materials of the waking life thrown together in a disconnected, irregular state, and only the waking life which holds together its rationally-combined representations seems decentralized in dream. But, with closer observation, it is easy to see that dream also has its positive sides, for as it is connected with the displacement of the threshold of sensibility, the sleeper then first experiences influences, formerly remaining below the
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{334} Ibid., pp. 54-5.
threshold, from his own interior bodily sphere; his consciousness thus obtains a new content. On these influences the Psyche reacts with faculties latent in waking life; thus the self-consciousness also receives a new content.\textsuperscript{335}

Thus du Prel claimed that dreams did not solely represent the regurgitation of past experiences, but presented new contents. He conceived them as symbolic self-representations of the psyche. In these statements, one finds a reversal of the hierarchy between sleep and waking, akin to that established within German romanticism, such as in Schubert. As with Romanticism, it was the dream, as opposed to consciousness, which was regarded as truly disclosive of the soul. However, this thesis was now expressed within the language of psychology as opposed to a poetic metaphysics.

Du Prel highlighted two aspects of dreams: their dramatic form, and their healing capacity. He succinctly stated: "Dream is ... a completely accentuated drama."\textsuperscript{336} Hence all the figures in dreams represented facets of the dreamer's personality: "... every dream may be described as a dramatic sundering of the Ego; and the dialogues we seem to carry on in them are in truth monologues."\textsuperscript{337} The analogy

\textsuperscript{335} Ibid., p. 151-2.

\textsuperscript{336} Ibid., p. 102.

\textsuperscript{337} Ibid., p. 112.
between dreams and drama had already been made by Lichtenberg and Coleridge. With du Prel, this analogy became elevated to forming the basis of his understanding of dreams. As regards to the healing aspect of dreams, du Prel reiterated traditional views concerning the significance of diagnostic and prognostic dreams. In addition, he noted that in dreams one found a 'curative instinct' at work.

Another attempt to utilise a psychological approach to dreams as a means of resacralisation was put forward in 1886 by the British psychical researchers Frederic Myers, Edmund Gurney and Frank Podmore in *Phantasms of the Living*. In this text (which was preeminently the work of Edmund Gurney), they studied death bed apparitions and dreams. In an important appendix entitled "Note on a suggested mode of psychic interaction," Myers attempted to put forward a psychological interpretation of such phenomena. As opposed to seeing these as ghosts, Myers argued that they were the result of telepathic transmissions via the unconscious. Telepathy was negatively defined as communication other than through the known channels of the senses.

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338 Lichtenberg referred to dreams as consisting in dramatized self-reflection (cited in Tomlinson, "G. C. Lichtenberg: dreams, jokes, and the unconscious in eighteenth-century Germany", p. 778.) On Coleridge, see Ford's section, "dreams, drama and dreamatis personae" (the latter was the term that Coleridge used to refer to the figures in dreams), "Samuel Taylor Coleridge on dreams and dreaming", pp. 40-49.

339 Myers defined telepathy as: "the communication of impressions of any kind from one mind to another,
of telepathy for these investigators was that it was meant to furnish a mechanism that could ultimately explain the disembodied communications from the dead.

In respect to the understanding of dreams, the telepathic dream had the significance of maintaining that the representations of figures in dreams had an objective external signification, and that dreams contained a level of knowledge outstripping our mental capacities.\(^{340}\)

In 1892 Myers extended his examination of dreams in a study of "Hypermnesic dreams." Here, he considered dreams "... in their aspect as indications of the structure of our personality, and as agencies which tend to its modification."\(^{341}\) In this regard, for Myers, their value resided in the fact that they more accurately revealed the psyche than waking consciousness:

One may even say that with the first touch of sleep the superficial unity of consciousness disappears, and that the dream world gives us a truer representation than ____________


\(^{340}\) Whilst Freud was not averse to accepting the existence of telepathy, he could not accept the existence of the telepathic dream, for to do so would signal the complete collapse of his theory of dreams, as they would represent a species of dreams that were not wishfulfilments, nor subject to distortion and condensation. "Dreams and Telepathy" (1921), SE 18.

\(^{341}\) Reproduced in Frederic Myers, Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death, p. 57.
the waking world of the real fractionation or multiplicity existing beneath that delusive simplicity which the glare of waking consciousness imposes upon the mental field of view.\footnote{Ibid., p. 59.}

The notion that the dream offered a truer representation was coupled with a new form of continuity thesis – rather than see the dream purely as a discrete nocturnal phenomenon, Myers speculated that beneath the surface of our waking or supraliminal consciousness, dreams are going on all the time:

... the dreaming state ... is nevertheless the form our mentation most readily and habitually assumes. Dreams of a kind are probably going on within us both by night and by day, unchecked by any degree of tension of waking thought.\footnote{Ibid., p. 58.}

In the philosophical tradition, dreams, the 'thoughts of sleep,' were generally regarded as the representing the continuation of normal mental activities under the altered state of sleep. Here, Myers radically bifurcated the dream from waking consciousness, and suggested that the dream stems from another level altogether, which he nominated the
subliminal. He claimed that this led to "a shifting of gravity from the conscious to the subconscious strata of [our] being,"\textsuperscript{34} which brought with it the reformulation of the task of psychology as the exploration of the subliminal; the psychology of consciousness was to be built up from this basis. To use a term that Myers appears to have coined, dreams, and cognate phenomena such as automatic writing, crystal vision and post-hypnotic suggestion were seen as psychoscopes, which were to have as revolutionary effects at revealing the hidden and unseen dimensions of the psyche, as the telescope and the microscope respectively.

\textbf{From India to the Planet Mars}

At the close of 1899, Freud published \textit{The Interpretation of Dreams}. It had the misfortune of appearing at the same time as Flournoy published \textit{From India to the Planet Mars}, a study of a spiritualistic medium. The latter work, despite being around twice the size, sold more copies in three months than the former in six years, and swiftly became a best seller.\textsuperscript{345} Flournoy's medium, whom he dubbed Hélène Smith, claimed to be the reincarnation of Marie Antionette, the Hindu princess Simandini and a frequent

\textsuperscript{34} Frederic Myers, \textit{Science and a Future Life}, p. 35.

\textsuperscript{345} I have dealt with formation of this text and its reception at length in my introduction to the 1994 reissue, "Encountering Hélène: Théodore Flournoy and the Genesis of Subliminal Psychology."
visitor to Mars. As well as Martian, she spoke what purported to be Sanskrit. Linguists such as Ferdinand de Saussure and Victor Henry were fascinated by her linguistic productions, and the latter even wrote a whole book on her Martian language. Flournoy held that her spiritualistic romances were analogous to dreams. He explained their formation through a notion of subconscious incubation. He claimed that their content consisted of cryptomnesias, a term that he coined to indicate the unrecognised revival of forgotten memories (Delbouef's asplenic dream would be a good example of such a phenomenon). Developing Janet's notion of subconscious reveries, Flournoy claimed that beneath the surface of consciousness, such memories were constantly being elaborated, and that the productions of the medium simply represented the momentary eruption into consciousness of latent subliminal dreams. Flournoy claimed that such fantasies served two functions: they were compensations for one's difficulties in life, and they had a teleological function. He designated this latter function by the term, teleological automatisms, by which he meant helpful, protective impulses that prepared the future. Significantly, for Flournoy, dreams were not seen as solely concerned with the past, but possessed a futural dimension as well.

In the work of Myers and Flournoy, one finds a shift from viewing dreams as a discrete regional phenomenon to
viewing the psyche as a continuous dream. In this manner, before Freud, the dream was taken as the paradigm for a general psychology of the unconscious. The role of the dream in the constitution of psychologies of the unconscious was pointed out by the French philosopher-psychologist Henri Bergson. The constitutive elements of this lay in the reversal of the hierarchy of sleep and waking, coupled with the formulation of dreams as stemming from or taking place in the unconscious. Bergson described the former shift in the following manner:

... the dream-state will then be seen... to be the substratum of our normal state... [the] reality of the waking state is gained by limitation, by concentration and by tension of a diffuse psychical life, which is the dream-life. In a sense, the perception and memory we exercise in the dream-state are more natural than those in the waking state... it is the awake-state, rather than the dream-state, which requires explanation.\(^{346}\)

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\(^{346}\) Henri Bergson, "Memory of the present and false recognition" (1908), in Mind Energy Lectures & Essays, pp. 126-7. In his Lowell lectures of 1896, James put forward two primary characteristics of dreams: "A 'narrowing' of the field of consciousness, which is a 'negative' quality; and a 'vividness' of the contents that remain, which is 'positive'." Eugene Taylor, William James on Exceptional Mental States: The 1896 Lowell Lectures, p. 17.
Bergson claimed that the significance of the study of dreams for psychology was due to their relation to the unconscious. He predicted that:

To explore the unconscious, to labour in the subsoil of mind with appropriate methods, will be the principal task of psychology in the century which is opening.\(^\text{347}\)

However, this very elevation of the dream into the psychoscope for psychologies of the unconscious paradoxically led to a lessening of interest in the dream itself - the prime interest was no longer that of charting and classifying the multifarious forms of dreams, but one of seeing through the dream, to its invisible substrate: the unconscious.

The Interpretation of Dreams

In his "On the history of the Psycho-Analytic movement," Freud stated that he "did not know of any outside influence" which drew his attention to dreams, and added that he had established the significance of the symbolism of dreams prior to reading Scherner's work.\(^\text{348}\) A few years later in his "Introductory Lectures," he claimed that at the time that he

\(^{347}\) Bergson, "On dreams" in Mind-Energy: Lectures & Essays, p. 103.

took up the study of dreams, the subject was generally held in contempt. Finally, in his autobiographical study, he stated that

psychoanalysis succeeded in achieving one thing which appeared to be of no practical importance but which in fact necessarily led to a totally fresh attitude and fresh scale of values in scientific thought. It became possible to prove that dreams have a meaning, and to discover it... modern science would have nothing to do with them. It seemed inconceivable that anyone who had done serious scientific work could make his appearance as an 'interpreter of dreams.'

Freud triumphantly added that it fell to psychoanalysis to disregard the 'excommunication' which had been pronounced upon dreams. The tendentiousness of such statements has already been demonstrated, as it is clear if one surveys the literature on dreams in the nineteenth century, particularly of the latter half, that rather than being excommunicated, dreams were perhaps one of the most written about subjects in psychology. In addition to works explicitly on dreams, a great deal of general works of physiology, psychiatry and

\[\text{\textsuperscript{349}}\] Freud, "Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis," (1915-6), \textit{SE} 15, p. 85.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{350}}\] Freud, "An autobiographical study" (1925) \textit{SE} 20, p. 43.
philosophy contained sections on dreams. Following the preceding survey, it is possible to suggest that the poor sales and lack of fanfare that greeted *The Interpretation of Dreams* were simply due to its unoriginality, and that there was a great deal less to distinguish it from other contemporary writings on dreams than has hitherto been believed. Indeed, it is possible to argue that in the first decade of the twentieth century, more interest was promoted in the subject of dreams in psychiatry and psychology by the treatment of dreams in works such as those by Flournoy, Janet and Krafft-Ebing. An indication of the relative insignificance of Freud's work on dreams, prior to the institutional establishment of the psychoanalytic movement and its propaganda effort, is provided by the French psychologist, Marcel Foucault, in his 1906 work on the dream. Foucault cited Freud's work in his book. However, his conclusion was as follows:

the life of the dream, even leaving aside the physiological, pathological and sociological parts of

351 In his 1901 review of *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Flournoy wrote: "Some will find that he is sometimes too ingenious and that his interpretation of such and such a dream has been procured as though pulled by the hair. In addition, we must admit that the universality he gives his thesis leaves us perplexed. Without a doubt many of our dreams, under close examination, are only, in effect, 'the disguised fulfilment of a repressed desire'; but that they all are - that is more difficult to concede." in Norman Kiell, *Freud Without Hindsight: Reviews of his Work (1893-1939)*, p. 166.
the problem, is an extremely complicated world. The study can be particularly fecund, because, amongst the causes of the facts of consciousness, the unconscious, or, which comes to the same for me, subconscious, psychological facts, should find themselves in the first line. Now the subconscious world has up to now let itself be penetrated by two principles sides: Pierre Janet has studied it in hysteria and psychasthenia, Flournoy in spiritualism. The observation of dreams furnishes a third means of penetration.\textsuperscript{352}

It is also important to note that whilst there may have been little interest in Freud's \textit{Interpretation of Dreams}, there was a great deal of continued public interest in the subject of dreams. Dream keys continued to be published. Some incorporated elements of the physiological and psychological study of dreams.\textsuperscript{353} Ripa noted that by the beginning of the first world war, the key of dreams of Lacinius, which was first published in 1874, had gone through six editions and sold 10 thousand copies.\textsuperscript{354} Indeed, it rather seems that the \textit{Interpretation of Dreams} was a text

\textsuperscript{352} Marcel Foucault, \textit{Le Rêve: études et observations}, p. 256.

\textsuperscript{353} See for instance Madame de Thèbes, \textit{L'Énigme du rêve: explication des songes}.

\textsuperscript{354} Ripa, \textit{Histoire du rêve}, p. 67.
that was retrospectively perceived as having been an epochal work, by a process of nachtraglichkeit, by which time the text had been vastly expanded, and that this perception was in no small measure a result of the proselytising efforts of the members of the psychoanalytic movement.

A typical example of such efforts is the American psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Isador Coriat's popularizing study of dreams, written in 1913. Coriat claimed that Freud's psychology of dreams was one of the greatest advances in the knowledge of the mind ever made. He claimed that psychologists had previously held that the dream was a senseless group of ideas, and that dreams were regarded as "not worthy of study by any serious individual." Then came Freud who "showed for the first time that the dream was of great importance psychologically and was really the first link in the chain of normal and abnormal psychic structures." Coriat claimed that Freud's work on dreams gave to the physician for the first time a method for the clear understanding of such abnormal mental states as phobias, obsessions, delusions, and hallucinations. The dream had become the real interpreter of human life... and the most potent instrument for the removal of the symptoms of certain

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356 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
His conclusion was that Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams* occupied the same position for abnormal psychology as Darwin's *On the Origin of Species*.

In Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams*, one sees the confluence of the associative and the symbolic traditions. As the dream was made up of the association of given elements, it followed that the practice of soliciting associations would eventually lead back to the basic elements of the dream. The interpretation reversed the process of dream formation. This procedure was generally taken up in psychotherapy, though it increasingly became separated from its theoretical rationale in associationist psychology. Second, Freud made use of a restricted symbolics. In his *Introductory Lectures*, he stated:

> we obtain constant translations for a number of dream-elements - just as popular 'dream-books' provide them for everything that appears in dreams.\(^{358}\)

The separate epistemological basis for the associative and symbolic approach led at times to their separation. Thus

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Wilhelm Stekel, who placed great emphasis on the symbolic approach, largely dispensed with soliciting associations, and directly interpreted the dream symbols. 359

In the first half of the twentieth century, the classificatory project in dream research, together with that of the physiological research into dreams went into a demise. Part of the reason for this was the discrediting of the use of introspection in psychology, and the ascendance of behaviourism. The dream - as the epitome of a private, subjective, unobservable phenomenon - was the behaviourists nightmare. A further reason for the demise of the classificatory and physiological research into the dream was the ascendance of psychoanalysis. If psychoanalysis preserved a residuum of interest in the dream, it was only insofar as it could be utilised as a therapeutic tool. Here again, the introspective study of dreams gave way to their clinical investigation. The contemporary dream researcher Alan Hobson goes so far as to argue that Freud's rhetorical victory over the physiological approach to dreams eclipsed the scientific approach to dreaming of a half a century:

359 Stekel wrote: "A thoroughly adequate psychoanalyst should be so familiar with the language of the dream that he would be able to understand the meaning of any dream without the dreamer's associations... I am able from the manifest content to draw important inferences as to the secret thoughts of the dreamer, and I hope that in a few years I shall do better still." The Interpretation of Dreams: New Developments and Technique, pp. 381-382.
the *Interpretation of Dreams* was antiscientific because Freud so forcefully dismissed all previous writers that he actually aborted an emergent experimental tradition.  

This is perhaps to overstate the case, as psychoanalysis did not play a significant role in establishing the agenda for experimental psychology, and the dismissal of the dream by behaviourism was probably more significant in this respect. For Freud, the psychogenetic understanding of dreams not only separated them from physiology, but from also from metaphysics, spiritualism and religion. As we shall, for Jung, it was precisely these areas that the psychogenetic understanding of dreams was supposed to recuperate.

**Jung**

In 1958, Jung wrote an account of the first 25 years of his life, entitled "From the initial experiences of my life," which was subsequently incorporated in a censored and adulterated form in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*. In this text, Jung recounted the significant role that dreams played in his childhood. In particular, he stated that it was due to two dreams that he opted for a scientific career. In the first dream he found himself in a wood, digging in a burial bound, when he found the bones of prehistorical animals.

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After this dream he realised that he wanted to study nature. In the second dream he again found himself in a wood and saw a giant radiolarian in a pool. He stated that these two dreams decided him overpoweringly for science [Naturwissenschaft]. After narrating another dream, he stated that up till then, he had understood that such experiences came from God, but that now he had taken in so much critique of knowledge that he doubted this. Further contemporaneous indication of Jung's interest in dreams is provided by a page of his diary for 1898 that was published. In an entry for December 1898, we find the following statement:

My situation is mirrored in my dreams. Often glorious, portentous glimpses of flowery landscapes, infinite blue skies, sunny coasts, but often, too, images of unknown roads shrouded in night, of friends who take leave of me to stride towards a brighter fate, of myself alone on barren paths facing impenetrable darkness.

As a medical student, Jung became increasingly

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361 Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, pp. 104-5.
362 Ibid., p. 108.
363 Jung, Diary, cited in Aniela Jaffé, C. G. Jung: Word and Image, p. 27.
interested in spiritualism, in which he read widely. He stated he discovered the works of du Prel at this time. At first, Jung seems to have believed in the observations of the spiritualists, and it was only subsequently, under the influence of Myers and Flournoy, that he came to a more psychological evaluation of the phenomena. The significance of Jung's involvement with spiritualism will be dealt with elsewhere. What is important is that by the time of his reading of Freud, Jung was familiar with the understanding of dreams present in the works of du Prel, Myers and Flournoy as well as Janet, and possibly the German Romantics. Further, their presentation of a psychological understanding of the dream that valorised its traditional prophetic and spiritual aspects in a modern guise would have been something that Jung would have been sympathetic to, as it was congruent with his own value system. Indeed, one can pose the question, to what extent did Jung ever really adhere to Freud's theory of dreams? This question may be approached by closely Jung's statements on the dream in the first decade of his career.

In 1925, Jung stated that he read Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams* in 1900, and that he put it aside as something whose significance I did not fully grasp. Then I returned to it in 1903 and found in
it the connection with my own theories.\textsuperscript{364}

Here, Jung suggests that the \textit{Interpretation of Dreams} only became important for him three years after he first read it, in 1903. Jung's first statement concerning Freud's theory of dreams was a report that he gave at the Bürgholzli on 25th January 1901 on Freud's monograph, \textit{On Dreams}, soon after it was published. This consisted in a straightforward account of Freud's dream theory. Jung concluded, as Flournoy had done, that Freud's approach to dreams was somewhat one-sided, as the cause of a dream could equally be an undisguised repressed fear, as well as a wish.\textsuperscript{365}

Jung's 1902 dissertation, \textit{On the Psychology and Psychopathology of so-called Occult Phenomena}, was a study of the mediumistic productions of his cousin Hélène Preiswerk, closely modelled after Flournoy's \textit{From India to the Planet Mars}.\textsuperscript{366} It contained several passages discussing dreams and Freud's dream theory. Whilst Jung regarded dreams

\textsuperscript{364} Jung, \textit{Analytical Psychology}, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{365} Jung, "Sigmund Freud: "On dreams," (1901), \textit{CW} 18, § 869.

\textsuperscript{366} In Jung's tribute to Flournoy, he stated that it was Flournoy who helped him to see where Freud's weaknesses were, that Flournoy was the only figure with whom he could discuss the psychological issues that preoccupied him, and that he 'adopted' Flournoy's concept of the creative imagination. (Jung, "Théodore Flournoy," in Théodore Flournoy, \textit{From India to the Planet Mars}, p. ix). I have taken up Jung's relations with Flournoy in my "De Genève à Zürich: Jung et la Suisse Romande."
as disclosive of the personality, contrary to Freud, he
didn't think they utilised censorship: "dreams suddenly
present to consciousness, in more or less transparent
symbolism, things one has never admitted to oneself clearly
and openly."367 Citing Janet and Alfred Binet, Jung drew
attention to the relation between dreams and the level of
dissociation, stating that the greater the dissociation of
consciousness, the greater the plasticity of dream
situations.368

Jung explained his medium's dreams by stating that they
consisted in emotionally stressed ideas which had only
briefly occupied her consciousness, and referred to
Flournoy's similar explanations of Hélène Smith's reveries.
Referring to Janet, he added that hysterical forgetfulness
played a significant part in the genesis of dreams - meaning
that unimportant ideas continued working in the unconscious
through dissociation and reappeared in dreams. Here, he
cited Freud's observations concerning how unattended trains
of thought proceed unobserved until sleep.369 Jung designated
budding sexuality as the cause of her dreams, which
represented sexual wishfulfilments.370 Even here, Jung's
position differed from Freud's, as the sexual wish in

367 Jung, *On the Psychology and Psychopathology of so-
called Occult Phenomena*, CW 1, § 97.

368 Ibid., § 117.

369 Ibid., § 119.

370 Ibid., §120.
question was an adolescent one, as opposed to an infantile one.

By 1902, Jung had read Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams* and *On Dreams*, and expressed his differences: dreams were not always wishfulfilments, they were frequently undisguised, the content of dreams was related to the state of consciousness, and if dreams presented wishfulfilments, these were by no means always infantile. These are among the precise charges that Jung would level against Freud's dream theories, from around 1912 onwards, and represented positions from which he never subsequently moved away from.

Jung's next significant study of dreams took place in 1906 in a paper entitled "Association, dream and hysterical symptom," which consisted in a case study. Jung described dreams as symbolic expressions of the complexes. He claimed that the complexes revealed in the associations experiment also constellated dreams. In his analysis of his case, he traced back her dreams to a sexual complex. However, for Jung, any complex, which could date from any age, could be revealed in a dream. Further, whilst some complexes could involve wishes, this was not necessarily so, as is clear if one looks at examples of complexes that Jung gives at this period.

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Psychology of Dementia Praecox

Dreams, and in particular, their analogy to dementia praecox, played a significant role in Jung's 1907 *On the Psychology of Dementia Praecox: An Attempt.* Jung discussed Madeleine Pelletier's linkage between daydreams and mania and stated that the 'manic' did not resemble the dreamer. By contrast, he argued that the analogy was most appropriate with dementia praecox, and cited Reil's analogies between dreams and insanity.\(^{372}\) Jung phrased this analogy in a manner that followed on from a long line of psychiatric theorising: "Let the dreamer walk about and act like a person awake, and we have the clinical picture of dementia praecox."\(^{373}\) However, rather than utilising this well established analogy to demonstrate the unintelligibility of the dream, he utilised it to demonstrate the intelligibility of dementia praecox, through applying the psychogenic interpretation of dreams to it. This transfer was made possible through the increasing psychologisation of the dream in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. To effect this, Jung principally drew upon Flournoy, Freud and Kraepelin.

Jung stated that "Freud, as is known, has finally for once helped dream research onto a green branch."\(^{374}\) As the


\(^{374}\) *Ibid.*, § 122.
concept of expression by similarity of content was fundamental to Freud's dream interpretation, and also to dementia praecox, he gave an example of a dream analysis. The dreamer, he noted, was a friend whose personal and family circumstances were well known to him. The dream featured horses being hoisted up cables. A horse fell, but galloped away dragging a log. A rider on another horse rode in front of it. The dreamer feared that the frightened horse would run over the rider, until a cab came in front of the rider, which slowed down the frightened horse. Jung then gave an account of his analysis of the dream and the dreamer, which ran for several pages. The detail with which Jung presented his dialogue with the dreamer suggests that this analysis may have had a significant pedagogical effect in demonstrating the method of psychoanalytic dream analysis.

Jung claimed that the dream dealt with the problem of the dreamer's wife's pregnancy and the problem of too many children, which restrained the husband. Through presenting the restraint as accomplished, the dream represented a wish, as well as disclosing an "extremely personal matter."375 In a letter to Freud, Jung revealed that the dreamer was himself.376 Whilst in his associations experiments, Jung

375 Ibid., § 132.

presented the tests of individuals that were well known to him, such as his wife, without disclosing their identity, this appears to be the first time in which what he presented as an analysis of an individual was in fact a fictionalised account based on an analysis of his own material.

As Siegfried Bernfeld and Peter Swales have established, Freud had utilised such a technique on numerous occasions, such as in his "Screen Memories" paper, and in his aliquis analysis in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life. Swales has argued that the ingeniousness with which Freud laid bare the hidden secrets of his fictionalised alter ego in the latter instance significantly contributed to what became the prevalent image of Freud - the psychological sleuth. One may see a further significance to these disguised self revelations. In the nineteenth century dream literature, the predominant pattern was the presentation and introspective analyses of one's own dreams. With the increasing psychologisation of dreams, coupled with the notion that dreams were disclosive of hidden secrets of which the dreamer was unconscious, one finds a corresponding decline in the first person reportage of dreams. In the psychoanalytic literature, the dreams reported became almost invariably dreams of patients.

As mentioned earlier, Jung regarded dreams as the

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377 Siegfried Bernfeld, "An unknown autobiographical fragment by Freud," Peter Swales, "Freud, Minna Bernays and the conquest of Rome."
symbolic expression of complexes. He claimed that every affective event became a complex, and that most, though not all, were sexual. As to the formation of dreams from complexes, he noted:

Flournoy has pointed out the roots of the complexes in the dreams of the well known Hélène Smith. I regard knowledge of these phenomena as indispensable for the understanding of the problems here discussed.

The centerpiece of the book was his analysis of a case of paranoid dementia, the case of Babette Staub. Jung subjected her to associations experiments, and then got her to associate to the neologisms that she produced. He stated that she spoke as if in a dream, and that he conducted the analysis just like a dream analysis. He claimed that the three major complexes lay behind her delusions: the complex of grandeur, the complex of injury, and the sexual complex. He stated that her conscious psychic activity was taken up with creating wishfulfilments as "a substitute for a life of toil and privation and for the depressing experiences of a wretched family milieu." In regarding such wishfulfilments

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379 Ibid., § 298, tr. mod.
380 Ibid., § 299.
as compensations, Jung was following Flournoy's interpretations of Hélène Smith's spiritualistic romances.

The third major source that Jung utilised was the work of Kraepelin. In 1906 Kraepelin published a study of speech disorders in dreams. He wrote that:

The peculiar changes which the whole of our mental life undergoes in dreaming have long been a favourite area of introspection, to say nothing of artificial dissection and interpretation.\(^{381}\)

Kraepelin's study was principally based upon his own dreams. He tried to establish a taxonomic classification of the various forms of speech disturbances in dreams, and to draw comparisons with similar occurrences elsewhere. In his view, "the language disturbances in dreams differ considerably in degree, but far less in kind, from those of waking life."\(^{382}\) Thus in dealing with language disturbances in dreams, one was not dealing with a phenomenon that was radically discontinuous with daily life. Among the conditions of waking life that Kraepelin signalled out for comparison were slips of the pen. Most significant was his comparison with forms of insanity. He noted that whilst in the case of


epilepsy, mania, senility, hysteria and idiocy, the kinship was remote, in the case of dementia praecox, there were "remarkable similarities." These similarities had the significance of opening up a reciprocal clarification of the nature of dreams and dementia praecox. Noting the desirability of being able to determine general disturbances underlying his examples, Kraepelin wrote:

If we could obtain some clarity on it, not only would new light be shed on these pathologies; we would probably also be able to benefit from the approaches already derived there for the understanding of dream disturbances.\(^{384}\)

In this respect, the study of one's dreams was particularly valuable, because it enabled one to introspectively study analogous conditions to insanity.\(^{385}\) Thus Kraepelin employed the results of his analysis of his dreams to understand the speech of his patients, of which the following is an example:

If, from the downright amazing external similarity of neologisms in dreams and illness, we may venture

\(^{383}\) Ibid., pp. 123-4.
\(^{384}\) Ibid., p. 134.
\(^{385}\) Ibid., p. 129.
further conclusions about certain correspondences of inner processes, then the immediate assumption is that the patients with speech confusion similarly believe themselves to be speaking meaningfully and intelligibly, just as we in dreams...\(^{386}\)

Jung made several citations to Kraepelin's work on dreams in *On the Psychology of Dementia Praecox: An Attempt*. Whilst citing Freud's view that the dream was a condensation, he referred to Kraepelin's statement that speech disturbances in dreams were connected with a clouding of consciousness and a reduction of the clarity of ideas, stating that his remarks "suggest that he is not so far from the view we have outlined here."\(^{387}\) Jung went on to state that he took for granted knowledge of Freud's important work. He then affirmed that dreams show the special speech-condensations consisting of the contamination of whole sentences and situations. Kraepelin, too, was struck by the resemblance between the language of dreams and that of dementia praecox.\(^{388}\)

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\(^{388}\) *Ibid.*
In a subsequent note, Jung cited Kraepelin's view that in dreams, the formulation of a thought was often frustrated by a subsidiary association. He added, "on this point, Kraepelin's views come very close to Freud's." Kraepelin's linkage between the language disorders of dreams and dementia praecox was utilised by Jung to extend his study of the linguistic expressions of complexes in the associations experiment to dreams and dementia praecox.

The year 1907 marked the advent of Jung's formal affiliation with the psychoanalytic movement, with the founding of a Freud society in Zürich. In the ensuing years, Jung wrote three papers on dreams. In 1909 he wrote a didactic presentation of Freud's dream theories, entitled "The analysis of dreams." The following year he published a paper entitled "A contribution to the knowledge of number dreams." In this, he stated that as the significance of number symbolism had been established by Freud, Adler and Stekel, he intended simply to provide some further examples. One of these is interesting as regards Jung's mode of interpretation. A woman had a dream that consisted simply in

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389 Ibid., § 135, n. 16.
391 Jung, "A contribution to the knowledge of number dreams," CW 4. It is not hard to see why psychoanalysts would have been drawn to this topic, given the prevalence of numerology in the symbology of the dream keys: to displace this tradition, alternative explanations of the significance of numbers in dreams had to be provided.
the line: "Luke 137." After exhausting the patient's associations concerning the numbers, Jung turned to the bible. He stated that as the woman was not religious or well versed in the bible, it was pointless to rely on associations. He looked up Luke 1:37, 13:7 and 7:13, and connected each of them to the psychology of the dreamer. Luke 13:7 narrated a parable in which a man had a fig tree planted which bore no fruit, after which he requested that it be cut down. Jung stated that the fig tree was "since ancient times" a symbol of the male genitals, and that it represented her husband's unfruitful organ, and that the wish to cut it down accorded with her sadistic fantasies. He claimed that the appearance of "Luke 137" in the dream must be regarded as a cryptomnesia, citing Flournoy and his own work. The relation of this to his subsequent methods of dream interpretation will be taken up later.

The following year saw his most stridently Freudian piece on dreams, a critical review of the Boston psychologist Morton Prince's "The mechanism and interpretation of dreams." Prince had presented the results of his dream analyses and claimed that they demonstrated that each dream contained an intelligent

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392 Ibid., § 146.
393 Ibid., §§ 148-152.
394 Jung, "Morton Prince, 'The mechanism and interpretation of dreams': a critical review" (1911), CW 4.
motive. He put this forward as a partial confirmation of Freud's work. However, Prince claimed that not every dream was the fulfilment of a wish - that some seemed to be the fulfilment of a fear or anxiety. Jung reanalysed Prince's dreams, and claimed that Prince's conclusions stemmed from the fact that he had not analysed the dreams thoroughly enough. When the analysis was carried through, all the dreams could be shown to be wishfulfilments. What is curious about this piece is that Prince's position, that not all dreams are wishfulfilments, represents what was in fact Jung's position in his published writings from 1901-1907, and from 1912 onwards. This leads one to suspect whether Jung's position during this brief hiatus was a result of his political involvement with the psychoanalytic movement, rather than representing any deep-seated conviction.

Dreams, Myths and the Collective Unconscious

In 1909, on board ship returning from the Clark conference in America, Jung had the following dream:

I dreamed I was in a medieval house, a big complicated house with many rooms, passages and stairways. I came in from the street and went down into a vaulted Gothic room, and from there into a cellar. I thought to myself that now I was at the bottom, but then I found a square hole. With a lantern in my hand I peeped down this
hole, and saw stairs leading further down, and down these I climbed. They were dusty stairs, very much worn, and the air was sticky, the whole atmosphere very uncanny. I came to another cellar, this one of very ancient structure, perhaps Roman, and again there was a hole through which I could look down into a tomb filled with prehistoric pottery, bones and skulls; as the dust was undisturbed, I thought I had made a great discovery.\footnote{Jung, \textit{Analytical Psychology} (1925), p. 23.}

In his seminar in 1925, Jung stated that Freud's interpretation was that there were individuals connected with Jung that he wanted dead, which Jung did not agree with. He recalled that he thought that the cellar represented the unconscious, but could not make out what the medieval house represented. He stated that he then proceeded to make fantasies concerning the dream.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}} Over thirty years later, to his friend the British psychiatrist E. A. Bennet, he recalled more details concerning this dream. He stated that in reply to Freud's statement that the dream represented a death wish, he suggested that the object of this could be his wife, to which Freud replied, "Yes... it could be that. And the most likely meaning is that you want
Jung was unsatisfied with this interpretation in personal terms. Bennet noted that "Jung felt that Freud's handling of the dream showed a tendency to make the facts fit his theory." Bennet added that as Jung reflected on the dream, he came to see the house as representing the external aspect of his personality... Inside the house - that is, within the mind or the personality - were many layers going back to medieval times and to earlier periods... It occurred to him that the house might represent... the stages of culture... 'It was then, at that moment, I got the idea of the collective unconscious', said Jung.

In his discussion of this dream in the protocols of his interviews with Aniela Jaffé, there occur statements that weren't reproduced in Memories. There, Jung stated that after the dream, he had an idea that it meant a way of portrayal of the psyche, which he didn't tell Freud. He

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397 E. A. Bennet, C. G. Jung, p. 87. In Aniela Jaffe's account in Memories, Jung gave his wife and his sister-in-law as the subject's of his putative death wish. Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 183.

398 Bennet, C. G. Jung, p. 88.

399 Ibid.
further added:

Then I said to myself: I find myself in an old house, as if I had come from an earlier generation to mine...

The ground floor of the dream house gave an impression of being uninhabited, it was museumlike. In the cellar were no barrels, none, empty. But the second floor, where I was, was "lived in" [in English], and it is possible that there was another storey above me. The first floor, that is of historical reference. That had at that time impressed me, that was the historical formulation in Freud, so the Oedipus-Complex, the Pompeian phantasy of the villa of mysteries, Jensen's Gradiva. This was the first sign against which Freud was completely helpless.⁴⁰⁰

He added that it was at this moment that he came to a completely other conception of dreams than Freud, namely

⁴⁰⁰ Jung/Jaffé protocols, BA, p. 107. The significance of this dream is also indicated by the following passage which Jung wrote in 1927: "Perhaps I may be allowed a comparison: it is as though we had to describe and explain a building whose upper storey was erected in the nineteenth century, the ground floor dates back to the sixteenth century, and careful examination of the masonry reveals that it was constructed in the eleventh century. In the cellar we come upon Roman foundations, and under the cellar a choked-up cave with neolithic tools and remnants of fauna from the same period in the lower layers. That would be the picture of our psychic structure." "Soul and Earth," CW 12, § 54.
that the dream was nature.\footnote{Jung/Jaffé protocols, BA, p. 107. If this was in fact the case, Jung kept certainly kept quiet about his new ideas about the dream in his stridently Freudian critique on Morton Prince's paper on dreams, discussed earlier.}

The unconscious has a natural function, which consciousness is completely dependant on. I had long thought this long before I got to know Freud.\footnote{Ibid., p. 108.}

If one draws these accounts together, whilst it is uncertain precisely how long after the dream Jung came to this interpretation,\footnote{The significance of this is that makes it hard to establish whether Jung's interpretation preceded or came after his mythological and cultural researches.} it is clear that he took this dream as indicating that dreams revealed not only personal but also cultural memories. The dream could be considered as the via regia into cultural history.

In Human all too Human, the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche had drawn a far reaching evolutionary connection between dreams and history:

in our sleep and dreams, we go through the work of earlier mankind once more... I think that man still draws conclusions in his dreams as mankind once did \textit{in a waking state}, through many thousands of years: the
first *causa* that needed explaining sufficed and was taken for truth... This old aspect of humanity lives on in us in our dreams, for it is the basis upon which higher reason developed, and is still developing, in every human: the dream gives us a means by which to understand them better. Dream-thought is so easy for us now, because, during mankind's immense periods of development, we have been so well drilled in just this form of fantastic and cheap explanation from the first, best idea. In this way dreaming is recuperation for a brain which must satisfy by day the stricter demands made on thought by higher culture.\(^{604}\)

Thus the transition from sleep to waking could be considered to be a recapitulation of the course of cultural history. For Nietzsche, this analogy between dreams and history designated the formal similarity between the form of thinking in dreams and that prevalent in antiquity. Rather than seeing the thinking in dreams as simply a secondary derivation of waking thought, Nietzsche saw the latter as an evolutionary development of the former.

From around 1907 onwards, psychoanalysts took up the psychological interpretation of cultural history, and mythology in particular. Retrospectively recalling this

period, Jung stated that the customary treatment of mythology in diverse fields mitigated against the recognition of their universality, and it was for this reason that the ethnologist Adolf Bastian’s ideas met with little success.405 He claimed that whilst the process of myth-making was studied in psychology, such as by Wundt in his *Völkerpsychologie*, it had not been grasped that the same process was active in civilized people, and that mythological motifs in fact represented the structural elements of the psyche.406 Jung added that following Freud’s parallel between the Oedipus legend and infantile psychology, the “real working out of mythological material was then taken up by my pupils,” citing works by Maeder, Riklin and Abraham.407 Throughout these works, the analogy between dreams and myths came to play a prominent role. Whilst for Nietzsche, the analogy simply held between the characteristics forms of thinking of each, the psychoanalysts claimed to be in a position to further specify what this thought consisted in.

There were two broad trends in the psychoanalytic investigation of mythology. The first consisted in an applying to the field of mythology the same interpretive

405 Jung, “The psychology of the child archetype” (1940) *CW* 9,1, § 259. On Jung’s relation to Bastian, see below, "Jung and Bastian" in "The ancient in the modern."


models that had been utilised on the individual. Thus in his 1908 "Wishfulfilment and symbolism in fairytales" Franz Riklin stated,

fairy tales are the invention of the directly utilized, immediately conceived experiences of the primitive human soul and the general tendency to wishfulfilment.408

In a similar vein, in his "Dreams and Myths: A study in Folk Psychology [Volkerpsychologie]" of the following year, Karl Abraham described myths as the fantasies of a people, and set out to demonstrate that they could be understood through applying Freud's doctrines.409 Abraham attempted to explain the analogy between myths and dreams by stating that myths were survivals from the infancy of a people. He claimed that

myth is a fragment of the superseded infantile psychic life of the people. It contains, in veiled form, their infantile wishes originating in pre-historic times.410

Thus myths could be considered as the dreams of a people.

408 Franz Riklin, "Wishfulfilment and symbolism in fairy tales," p. 95.

409 Karl Abraham, "Dreams and Myths: A study in Folk-Psychology [Volkerpsychologie]," p. 154.

410 Ibid., p. 180.
In 1910 Herbert Silberer extended these investigations in a study entitled "Phantasy and Mythos." Whilst Abraham sought to apply the principles of psychoanalysis to the province of Völkerpsychologie, Silberer's study began calling into question some of the basic assumptions of psychoanalysis. He commenced with a section on what he termed functional or autosymbolic phenomena. By this he designated the manner in which fantasies, rather than simply being wishfulfilments, represented symbolic auto-representations. Silberer claimed that functional phenomena played an important part in dreams. He then argued that the connecting point between individual and Völkerpsychologie was provided by the analogy between myth and dreams, stating, "Myth is the dream of the people - the dream is the myth of the individual." Silberer cited Haeckel's statement in The Riddle of the Universe, that the biogentic law held for psychology as for morphology, in support of this argument. Utilising his view of the significance of functional phenomena in dreams, Silberer argued by analogy that they also played an important role in myths and fairy tales.

Jung and his co-workers Johann Honegger, Jan Nelken and

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412 Ibid., p. 118.
413 Ibid., p. 127.
Sabina Spielrein, as opposed to simply applying the study of individual psychology to the study of myth and cultural history, sought to apply the latter to the former. In 1911/2 in *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido* Jung cited the passage from Nietzsche cited above, in support of his view that in psychology, the biogenetic law held, and that infantile thought and the dream were simply re-echoes of the thought of antiquity.\(^4\)\(^1\)\(^4\) He attempted to demonstrate that one could find clear indications of the presence of myths in dreams and further, that this took place without the subject's prior acquaintance with the myths in question. Indeed, Jung made his strongest statement for the endogenous origins of myth:

One can say, that should it happen that all traditions in the world were cut off with a single blow, then with the succeeding generation, the whole mythology and history of religion would start over again.\(^4\)\(^1\)\(^5\)

It seems that only the near destruction of the world could provide a test for this claim of Jung's.

**The Dream Problem**


\(^4\)\(^1\)\(^5\) *Ibid.*, § 41.
In a series of publications from 1909 onwards, Jung's colleague Alphonse Maeder put forward a new view of the dream, which was to play a crucial role in the split between the Vienna and Zürich schools. In 1912, Maeder wrote an article in *L'Année psychologique* entitled "On the psychoanalytic movement: a new point of view in psychology." He commenced by giving a historical overview of Freud's work and then continued the story up to the present day with an account of the recent developments by the Zürich school.

Maeder's focus on the question of dreams was significant, given the preeminent significance that Freud attached to his dream book in the edifice of psychoanalysis. After giving an account of Freud's theory of dreams, Maeder claimed that the examination of numerous dreams showed the importance of a factor other than wishfulfilment, which he described as follows:

> The dream has in effect a cathartic action. It gives us a sort of compensation and facilitates up to a certain point the return to a state of affective equilibrium... The analytic observation of a series of dreams of the same time of the same normal individual, proved to me that all the dreams treat of the same subject and give

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416 Alphonse Maeder, "Sur le mouvement psychoanalytique: un point de vue nouveau en psychologie."
an identical solution of a moral conflict, in which the dreamer has been fighting with themselves more or less consciously for some time.\textsuperscript{417}

In commenting on an example, Maeder noted that:

the dreams seem to have prepared the subject to admit the idea of separation, which above all he was not conscious of; they give to the dreamer the solution of a conflict, before the conscious personality, his ego, had laid hold of the problem.\textsuperscript{418}

Thus Maeder was attributing to dreams a wholly other function than that accorded by Freud. He claimed that:

"Dreams inform the analyst of the attitude of the unconscious concerning the conflicts, on its tendency in face of a problem."\textsuperscript{419} If for Freud, dreams were the royal road to the unconscious, Maeder was providing a new interpretation of dreams in which they led to a new conception of the unconscious, and one which did not merely consist of repressed infantile wishes. He claimed that the dream did not merely point to the past, but prepared the way for the future:

\textsuperscript{417} Ibid., p. 415.
\textsuperscript{418} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{419} Ibid., p. 416.
This conception of the function of the dream presents an eminently useful teleological character, which is known to us of numerous automatisms; I recall here the antisuicide teleological automatisms studied specially by Flournoy... We know a similar function, which is the playful function which has been studied with much penetration and from the biological sense by Gross. The conclusion of the German psychologist is that play is an exercise of preparation of future activities, a preparation to serious life... We find in our examination of the function of the dream two of the essential functions of play: the cathartic action and the exercise which prepare certain complex activities... The imagination has a compensatory function par excellence, it gives what reality refuses him.....but it also prepares the future: in creating possibilities, it incites thought to action (the creative imagination). (Footnote: I have just received the beautiful book of Professor Flournoy 'Spirits and Mediums'. The author names precisely his theory: playful or theatrical theory of mediumship. His point of view towards the manifestations of the unconscious present a grand analogy with those developed in these lines. His work, 'From India to the Planet Mars' is equally a beautiful illustration of that which was said
above of fantasies.)

Maeder had rerouted the 'royal road', and argued that rather than starting from Freud in Vienna, it started in Geneva with Flournoy, and its destination was Zürich.

In 1912, in Vienna itself, Alfred Adler wrote a paper on dreams that opened with a question that indicated what was at stake in the new conceptions of the dream, namely, can one see into the future? Adler stated that in everyday life, one commonly acted as if one had knowledge of the future and that the body often made preparations as if it knew the future, which remained in the unconscious. Claiming that Freud's view that the dream was a wishfulfillment was untenable, Adler stated that one could discern in dreams an anticipatory, prescient function. He claimed that dreams attempted to give the solution to the problems that were confronting the dreamer, as well as indicating what the dreamer intended to do. He concluded that the study of dreams leads to a knowledge of a man's lifeline "that unconscious life-line by means of which he strives to dominate the pressure of life and his own feeling of uncertainty."
The same year, Jung also publicly expressed his divergence from Freud's theory of dreams. In his *Attempt at an Account of Psychoanalytic Theory*, whilst discussing the question of dreams, he stated:

Freud's procedure is predominantly analytical. Despite the indisputably great value of this way of looking, however one ought not to adopt this standpoint exclusively, as a one-sided historical view does not take sufficient account of the teleological significance of dreams (stressed in particular by Maeder).⁴²³

For Jung and Maeder, the alteration of the conception of the dream brought with it an alteration of all other phenomena associated with the unconscious.

In 1914, Jung prepared a talk for the Berne Medical

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Maeder's likening of the dream to a work of art expressed what he (Stekel) had written in 1909 in "Dichtung und Neurose"; that in 1908 in *Nervöse Angstzustände* he had shown dreams are often warnings or prophecies; that he gave many examples of prospective dreams in his *Die Sprache des Traumes* of 1911, and also laid emphasis there on the manifest content of the dream, to which the Zürich school protested. He claimed that Adler 'cribbed' his method of interpreting dreams without soliciting associations, and that in his *Die Sprache des Traumes* he had pointed out that the patient's leading aims had to be taken into account in dream interpretation. *The Interpretation of Dreams: New Developments and Techniques*, pp. 57-8.

Congress which was postponed due to the outbreak of the war, which was subsequently published in 1916 in an English translation under the title "The Psychology of Dreams." For many years, this paper was the central source for Jung's view of the dream as it wasn't until 1934 that he published another study explicitly focusing on dreams.

In "The Psychology of Dreams," Jung stated that dreams, like all psychic phenomena, had to be looked at both from a causal-retrospective perspective (Freud) and a prospective-finalistic perspective. In commenting on a dream from this latter perspective he stated:

In this dream we can discern a balancing function of the unconscious, consisting in the fact that those thoughts, propensities, and tendencies of the human personality, which in conscious life are seldom shown to advantage, come into operation in the form of hints in the sleeping state, when to a large extent the conscious process is disconnected... It is evident that this function of dreams signifies a psychological balancing, which is absolutely required for ordered action.

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425 Jung, "The practical use of dream-analysis", CW 16.
From this perspective, Jung argued that Freud's thesis that dreams were wishfulfilments was of limited validity, and that rather than simply having the function of concealment of inadmissible wishes, dreams actively prepared the way for the psychological development of the individual. Thus in some instances, dreams could be seen to perform a moral function. Jung ended this paper with some reflections on the significance of typical themes in dreams. He argued that the typical themes of mythology were found in dreams, with the same significance, which confirmed Nietzsche's statements that from a phylogenetic perspective, the dream was an older mode of thought. He grandly concluded:

> the psychology of dreams opens up for us the way to a general comparative psychology, from which we hope to attain the same sort of understanding of the development and structure of the human soul, as comparative anatomy has given us concerning the human body.\(^{427}\)

For Jung, the dream was the psychoscope for a general psychology of the unconscious. The psychology of the dream led to a dream psychology, the phrase that was used the following year by Jung's disciple Maurice Nicoll, in the

first didactic presentation of Jung's psychology.\textsuperscript{428} Jung's statements in this paper on the prospective, compensatory function of the dream reproduced the position that had previously been put forward by Maeder, down to the same terminology. Aside from passing references to Nietzsche and Saint Augustine, the only reference was to Freud. The historical perspective this suggested was - first Freud, then Jung. If Freud had been the first to understand that dreams had a meaning, Jung was supposedly the first to understand their true significance. Crucially, this mode of presentation - first Freud's views, then Jung's criticisms of Freud, then Jung's views - was one that Jung now came to predominantly employ in presenting his new concepts. It also had the effect of lending credence to the view that the origin of Jung's concepts could be found in psychoanalysis and that there was no other significant source for his ideas.\textsuperscript{429}

What Maeder, Adler and Jung were proposing was a psychological version of the prophetic and diagnostic dream. Whilst they presented their new conceptions as revisions and corrections of psychoanalysis, their views were a great deal closer to those of German Romanticism, du Prel, and the subliminal psychology of Myers and Flournoy. Indeed, in the

\textsuperscript{428} Maurice Nicoll, \textit{Dream Psychology}.

\textsuperscript{429} This approach is systematically followed through in Jung's student, Liliane Frey-Rohn's \textit{From Freud to Jung: A Comparative Study of the Psychology of the Unconscious}. 
case of the latter, Maeder admitted as such. Not only did this other tradition present the basis of the new conceptions of the dream, it also presented the basis for a critique of Freud's theory of dreams. In the case of Jung, one can argue that this shift in effect represented a return to his intellectual roots. This had the additional effect of bringing his dream theories into much greater proximity with the popular conception of dreams and the continued valuation of their prophetic and symbolic power. Rather than presenting his psychology as the unmasker of popular superstitions as Freud had done, Jung began to present it as in some sense validating them, through presenting psychological mechanisms that could go some way towards explaining them.

Neither Maeder nor Jung explicitly cited the conception of the dream in German Romanticism. Significantly in this respect, in a seminar in 1925 Jung stated:

Interest in dreams revived with the psychology of the nineteenth century. One of the best students of the subject was Schubert, who had a very advanced point of view, and a very correct idea of the symbolism of dreams. He rightly maintained that dreams express the most essential things in man, and deal with the most intimate things of life.⁴³⁰

⁴³⁰ Jung, _Swanage Summer School (1925)_ , pp. 5-6.
However, it is not clear when Jung read Schubert's work, and hence how much he may have directly drawn from it.

In 1917 Jung published his *The Psychology of the Unconscious Processes: An Overview of the Modern Theory and Method of Analytical Psychology*, where, as an attempt to resolve the problematic of the personal equation, he attempted to develop a relativistic standpoint in psychology.\(^{431}\) After presenting a dream which he analysed in a traditional Freudian manner he stated,

> When the analytic or causal-reductive interpretation no longer brings anything new, but always only the same in different variations, then the moment has come when another method of interpretation is indicated.\(^ {432}\)

He then introduced a distinction between interpretation on the objective level, in which dream objects were treated as representations of real objects, and interpretation on the subjective level, in which every element concerns the dreamer themselves. In the case of interpretation on the objective level, the dream figures may be taken as objective references to people. Such a perspective had also been taken

\(^{431}\) See above, "psychology's relativity problem," in "The individual and the universal."

\(^{432}\) Jung, "The psychology of the unconscious processes", in *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology*, pp. 420-1, tr. mod.
in the nineteenth century dream literature. Philippe Tissié had given an example of an occasion where after an argument with his sister in which he had been alternatively soft and severe, she dreamed that she had two brothers who resembled one another and who both carried his name, one being friendly, the other bad. Tissié stated that his sister had doubled his character and objectivised it into two persons. As in much nineteenth century dream literature, this was an anecdote that was not used to set up a theory of dreams. The objective level of interpretation is also prefigured in Myers, Gurney and Podmore's study of the telepathic dream in Phantasms of the Living. In the case of such apparitions it was taken that the dream figures did not represent a facet of the dreamer's own personality, but objectively referred to an external person.

What Jung called the synthetic method consisted in the utilisation of a symbolic mode of interpretation. He claimed that the only means of truly elucidating the meaning of the dream images was by tracking down analogies in the field of comparative mythology and religion - a method which he termed amplification. In his example of such a procedure in his paper on number dreams discussed above, he had claimed that the biblical passage had been reproduced by a process of cryptomnesia. Now, by contrast, Jung took the view that, in many instances, what was at issue was the spontaneous

emergence of archetypal contents. The difficulty with this position was that in any given case, to rule out any possibility of cryptomnesia was a theoretical impossibility.

Jung came to revise his paper "The psychology of dreams" on two occasions, in 1928 and 1948. Through these changes the essay doubled in length, though the original essay was preserved as the first section. In his 1928 revision he elaborated his distinction between dream interpretation on the subjective and objective level. He described the former as follows:

The whole dream creation is in essence subjective, and the dream is that theatre in which the dreamer is the scene, the player, the prompter, the producer, the author, the public and the critic.\(^{34}\)

Here, Jung was presenting a dramatic theory of the dream. Such a view had been put forward by du Prel as the basis of his dream theory. Subsequently, Jung went to argue that not only was the basic structure of the dream dramatic, but so also its narrative sequence. In 1945, in "The essence of dreams" he stated that most dreams have the following structure: statement of place, development of the plot,

\(^{34}\) Jung, "General standpoints on the psychology of dreams," CW 8, § 509, tr. mod. In a note, Jung added that Maeder had given examples of this.
culmination or peripeteia, then solution or lysis. Jung's comments concerning telepathy in this paper would certainly have pleased Myers, Gurney and Podmore:

The general reality of this phenomenon is nowadays no longer to be doubted. Understandably, it is very easy to deny the existence of the phenomena without the proof of the existing evidence, but that is unscientific behaviour, which in no way deserves observation.

In his 1928 revision of "The psychology of dreams" Jung also added the following reference to Maeder:

Maeder energetically called attention to the prospective-final significance of dreams in the sense of a purposive unconscious function which prepares the solution of actual conflicts and problems and seeks to portray it through gropingly chosen symbols.

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436 Jung, "General standpoints on the psychology of dreams," CW 8, § 503, tr. mod.

437 Ibid., § 491, tr. mod.. Possibly as a result of realising the issue of priority, Hull omitted the dates of Maeder's articles (whilst retaining the dates of all the other articles cited), which obscures the fact that they preceded Jung's original article by four years.
Further on, whilst discussing the manner in which the compensatory function can become a purposive, guiding function, Jung added: "[as] Maeder in his works mentioned above has shown with success." Jung then came to define his general attitude to dreams as follows:

> As against Freud's known view on the nature of dreams, that they are a "wishfulfilment," I and likewise my friend and collaborator Alphonse Maeder have favoured the standpoint that the dream is a spontaneous self-portrayal, in symbolic form, of the actual condition of the unconscious. Our view coincides at this point with the conclusions of Silberer.  

These belated assertions that his "friend and collaborator" Alphonse Maeder had expressed the theory of dreams that Jung in his 1916 article put forward exclusively as his own suggest, reading between the lines, that a plagiarism dispute may have occurred, and that the references to Maeder may have been added as a correction. Intriguingly enough, in a letter to Ellenberger in which he discusses his relation and subsequent estrangement from Jung, Maeder raised the

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439 *Ibid.*, § 505, tr. mod. A few lines further on, whilst noting researches "expressly referred to by Maeder" that the sexual language of dreams need not be interpreted concretistically, Jung added in a note: "at this point we meet with agreement from Adler." § 506.
issue of the citation and lack of citation of his work in Jung's writings:

Jung was, in his manner, as authoritarian as Freud. He did not know, and did not practice exchanges of viewpoint with his collaborators. He was very soon surrounded by admirers; finally he only had women around him, total admirers. It was he who created the isolation of which you speak. Myself, I did not leave him after the rupture at Munich (a phrase of the autobiography confirms it). But he couldn't accept my independence of spirit. In the first years he cited me often (for example in *Energetik-Seele*), then finally I disappeared totally from his publications..."

We have seen that Maeder explicitly traced his theory of dreams back to Flournoy. However in the very revision in which Jung belatedly credited Maeder's work, he attempted to establish his priority over Flournoy in a strange manner.

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40 In his paper at the psychoanalytic conference at Munich in 1913, in commenting on a dream interpretation, Maeder stated that "The analysis here presented shows that I attach a greater importance to the manifest dream content than Freud has done up to this time. I think Jung is of like opinion, but I have never spoken with him about it specially." *The Dream Problem*, p. 16.

41 Maeder to Ellenger, 15th February 1964, Ellenger archives, Paris. It was in *Über die Energetik der Seele* (1928) that Jung revised his essay on dreams, and in which the citations above are found.
Jung wrote:

I had already in 1906 drawn attention to the compensatory relation between consciousness and the split-off complexes and also emphasized their purposive character. {Footnote: Cf. "On the psychology of Dementia Praecox"} Flournoy had done likewise, independently of my designs. {Footnote: Flournoy "Automatisme téléologique antisuicide" (1908), p. 113ff.}

However, the compensatory and purposive character of the teleological automatisms featured prominently in Flournoy's 1900 From India to the Planet Mars, which Jung cited extensively in his dissertation in 1902. This passage seems a strange way to posthumously cite a figure whom Jung termed his "respected and fatherly friend." One may speculate that the rationale of this citation was that if Jung, as he claims here, was the first to highlight the mechanism of compensation and the purposiveness of split off complexes in 1906, before Flournoy in 1908, and before Maeder, then he would maintain overall priority.

\[42\] Jung, "General standpoints on the psychology of dreams," CW 8, § 488, tr. mod. In his translation, Hull altered the date to 1907, the date of the publication of Jung's On the Psychology of Dementia Praecox: An Attempt.

\[43\] Jung, Symbols of Transformation (1952) CW 5, p. xxviii.
Jung's next published statement on dreams came in 1931, with a paper delivered to the 6th General Medical Congress for Psychotherapy in Dresden, "The practical use of dream analysis." He commenced by stating that the possibility of dream analysis stands or falls with the hypothesis of the unconscious as the aim of dream analysis was to reveal unconscious contents. He claimed that the significance of dreams lay in the fact that they revealed the inner situation of the dreamer, and used a medical analogy to indicate their significance:

I have therefore made it a rule to regard dreams as I regard physiological facts: if sugar appears in the urine, then the urine contains sugar, and not albumen or urobin.\footnote{Ibid., § 304. Jung used similar medical analogies on several occasions. In his \textit{Dream Analysis} seminar in 1928, he stated, "Just as a serious technique is required to make a diagnosis of heart, liver, kidneys, etc., so we had to work out a serious technique in order to read the impartial facts of dreams." p. 4.}

Whilst Jung's theory of dreams was far removed from physiological theories of dreams, in this analogy, he was attempting to appropriate something of the authority and supposed certainty of physiological analysis. From several examples that he presented, Jung argued that dreams

\footnote{Jung, "The practical use of dream analysis," \textit{CW} 16, § 294.}
presented not only the aetiology of a neurosis, but also its prognosis, demonstrating that they were futural as well as retrospective. He claimed that this was especially so as regards the initial dreams in psychotherapy, a position that had earlier been put forward by Wilhelm Stekel:

It frequently happens at the very beginning of treatment that a dream will reveal to the doctor, in broad perspective, the whole programme of the unconscious.\textsuperscript{446}

On a practical level, Jung held that the main problem of dream analysis was that of suggestion. He stated that when

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  \item \textsuperscript{446} Jung, "The practical use of dream analysis," CW 16, § 343. In his response to Jung's presentation, Stekel said "We are all united in this respect, that the lecture of colleague Jung represented the high point of the congress. If I bring here some additional words, it does not indicate a reprimand, but only a small difference in opinion. Jung told us that a man off the street told him a dream, that he had completely correctly interpreted as a suicide tendency. Jung warned the man of undertaking risky mountain parties. To this I would like to object, that in this case I would have invited the man to let himself be analysed by an analyst of his choice. An oppressive guilty conscience drove the man to suicide. I will not enter into the deeper analysis of this dream, which Jung has informed us. One thing is certain: the person concerned suffers under a severe guilty conscience. Not only the person concerned, but all our patients. They are all more or less suicide candidates and pay for their life with their suffering. The lesson of analysis is, to resolve this guilty consciousness that generally (individually tinged) goes back to youthful religious impressions, into the 'generally human,' to decontaminate it and the give back the joy of life to the sick." "Generaldiskussion," p. 251. These remarks take on a certain eeriness in respect to Stekel's own suicide a few years later.
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interpretations were based on a preconceived theory or opinion the therapeutic results were due to suggestion. A fundamental problem for Jung was how to demonstrate that his theories were anything but the results of suggestion. In his view, the analytical approach was superior to suggestive approaches as it made ethical demands upon the patient. He claimed that to avoid suggestion, the doctor should set aside theoretical assumptions and regard any dream interpretation as invalid until it won the assent of the patient:

It should be completely self-evident that he should at that time give up every theoretical assumption and be willing in every single case to discover a completely new dream theory, since an immeasurable field for pioneer work stands open here.**^®


Ibid., § 317, tr. mod. In 1933, Jung expressed himself in even stronger terms: "It is, indeed, good that no valid method [of dream interpretation] exists, for otherwise the meaning of the dream would already be limited in advance and would lose precisely that virtue which makes them so especially valuable for psychological purposes - namely their ability to give a new point of view." "The meaning of psychology for the present," CW 10, § 319, tr. mod. Such has been the suggestive effect of Jung's own dream theories, these opportunities have hardly been taken up in subsequent Jungian psychology, where instead, a plethora of Jungian dream interpretation manuals and 'how to do it' guides have abounded, and have attempted to codify Jung's writings on dreams into a systematic methodology. In many respects, Jung has been as poorly served by his followers as by his critics.
Jung suggested that aside from the axiomatic assumption that dreams added something to one's conscious knowledge, all other hypotheses should be regarded as merely rules of thumb. Due to the fact that dreams revealed the compensatory function of the unconscious, he argued that "every dream is an organ of information and control, and because of that the most effective aid for the building up of the personality."  

Diagnostic Dreams

In 1935 T. M. Davie reported a patient's dream in a paper in the *British Medical Journal* entitled, "Comments upon a case of 'periventricular epilepsy." The dream was as follows:

Someone beside me kept on asking me something about oiling some machinery. Milk was suggested as the best lubricant. Apparently I thought that oozy slime was preferable. Then a pond was drained, and amid the slime there were two extinct animals. One was a minute mastadon. I forgot what the other one was.

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Davie submitted this dream to Jung for his opinion and reported,

He had no hesitation in saying that it indicated some organic disturbance, and that the illness was not primarily a psychological one, although there were numerous psychological derivatives in the dream. The drainage of the pond he interpreted as the damming up of the cerebrospinal fluid circulation.\footnote{Ibid.}

In the discussion following one of Jung's lectures at the Institute of Medical Psychology, the psychoanalyst Wilfred Bion asked Jung to comment upon this case. In reply, he stated that the dream clearly represented an organic disorder, and cited the fact such a view was held by doctors in antiquity and the Middle Ages. However, he declined from going into any detail as to precisely why it was clear that this dream indicated an organic condition, because as a prerequisite, he would have to give a course of four semesters on symbology.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 72-4.} With the rise of modern medicine the diagnostic dream had disappeared from general medical practice - that is, apart from the practice of Jung and his followers, which he at times styled as a branch of medical psychology. His attempt to effect a return to traditional
medical practice in this respect was of a part with his study of alchemy and iatrochemistry during this period, and in particular, with his detailed study of Paracelsus, which attempted to call into question the presuppositions of modern scientific medicine.

Dreams and archetypes

In 1916, Jung had used the term archetype to designate the phylogenetic mythological images, that following Jakob Burckhardt, he had termed primordial images in 1911. These images, he claimed, resided in the suprapersonal or collective unconscious. From around this time onwards, he began to formulate his notion that not only was there a prospective dimension to the unconscious, but that this dimension led to a process of individual development which broadly took typical forms. This he termed the process of individuation, and he claimed that this underlay the process of personality transformation in religious and mystical traditions. What is significant in this context is that dreams were taken as furnishing the main evidence for the existence of such a process. Dreams were Jung's principal psychoscope:

Because dreams are the immensely frequent and normal

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454 See below, "transformations and symbols of the libido," in "the ancient in the modern."
expression of the unconscious psyche, they provide the bulk of the empirical material for the investigation of the unconscious.\footnote{Jung, "The essence of dreams," (1945) \textit{CW} 8, $\S$ 544, tr. mod.}

In his published writings he claimed that it was the study of series of dreams that revealed the individuation process, a general and universal process of personality development which was simply quickened by analysis:

It is therefore possible that the motifs accompanying the individuation process appear mainly only in the first place in dream-series, received within the analytic process, whereas in "extra-analytical" dream-series they perhaps occur only at much greater intervals of time.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, $\S$ 552, tr. mod.}

If we look at the dreams that Jung published, we find that in the main, he explicitly presented dreams as illustrations of his theoretical arguments. Jung he did not publish any lengthy detailed case studies from his therapeutic practice. Indeed, his lengthiest published studies of dreams were by individuals whom he either had not met, or was not dealing with directly. He adopted this
procedure to obviate the charge of suggestion. In his seminars, Jung did present dream analyses at more length, where they were put forward for pedagogical purposes.

Jung's major presentation of the archetypal nature of dreams was in "Dream Symbols of the Individuation Process," a paper initially presented at the Eranos conference in Ascona and also at a seminar in Bailey Island, Maine, USA, and then subsequently enlarged and published as the first part of Psychology and Alchemy. The accounts that Jung gave of the case in his seminar differ significantly from that in the latter.

In the first published version of "Dream symbols of the individuation process," Jung stated that to exclude the factor of his own personal influence, the patient (who was subsequently identified as the Nobel prize winning physicist, Wolfgang Pauli) was treated by a woman pupil of his. Of the four hundred dreams that he studied, only the last 45 took place under his personal observation. He added that "No interpretations worth mentioning were undertaken, as the dreamer, thanks to his excellent scientific training,

Justifying his basing Transformations and Symbols of the Libido on the published article of Frank Miller, Jung recounted: "I was always a bit afraid to tell of my personal experiences with patients because I felt people might say it was merely suggestion, you know. I took that case because I had no hand in it." "The Huston Films," in ed. McGuire & Hull, C. G. Jung Speaking, p. 318. For an analysis of this whole episode, see my "A woman called Frank."
needed no help of any kind." One is left wondering, if the dreamer really need no help of any kind, why he came to be involved in this curious procedure in the first place. In the Bailey Island seminar, Jung stated that the man was 32 years old when he came, and that

he is a highly educated person with an extraordinary development of his intellect, which was, of course, the origin of his trouble; he was just too one-sidedly intellectual and scientific... The reason he consulted me was that he had completely disintegrated on account of this very one-sidedness.\(^{459}\)

Jung's account of what ensued demonstrate his unusual procedures as a psychotherapist:

I saw him at first for only twenty minutes. I instantly perceived that he was in a way a master mind, and I decided not to touch his intellect. I therefore proposed to him to go to my then most recent pupil, a woman who knew very little about my work. She was right in the beginning of her own analysis; but she had a good instinctive mind. She was not a fool, but had a

\(^{458}\) Jung, "Dream symbols of the individuation process," The Integration of the Personality, p. 97.

good deal of common sense, and was, of course, highly surprised when I told her that I was going to send such a fellow to her. Naturally I had to do some explaining. I told her why I was doing it and also suggested to her how to deal with him. I told her I had instructed him to present his dreams to her; that he must write them out very carefully, and that she should listen and nod her head; and, in case she was astonished or puzzled, should say so. She should not, however, try to understand or analyze these dreams. Now she was, of course, quite glad that she had to play a more or less passive role, and astonishingly enough that man incidentally saw the point too. He understood what I told him. I said, "I don't want to influence your own mind, which is valuable. If I should do it for you, you would never be convinced, therefore I shall not even try. You go to this woman doctor and she will listen to your dreams."  

In most people's book, such procedures seem would seem the opposite of non-interventative, non-suggestive therapy, and indeed, resemble Milton Erickson's use of direct and indirect suggestion. The man in question was clearly

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460 Ibid., p. 7.
461 On Milton Erickson's treatment techniques, see Jay Haley, Uncommon Therapy.
directed to note his dreams and tell them to his analyst, who was directed not to analyse them, and how she should react, down to physical cues. In the ensuing discussion, the question was raised by one of the members of the seminar group as to what role the woman doctor played, and whether the same processes would have occurred if he had simply been keeping a record of his dreams.\(^{462}\) Jung replied:

Of course it is quite certain that the presence of that doctor was important and the same development would probably have not taken place if the dreamer had not felt the presence of a sympathetic audience... the role of that doctor was in a way very important, as was the fact that she was a woman. She produced that substance or that secret which is characteristic of women, namely, a productive force, a pregnancy force.\(^{463}\)

In his published version of this paper, Jung stated that the dreams had been abbreviated, for reasons of length and discretion - "personal allusions and complications" having been removed. He added that he applied a similar discretion in deliberately overlooking certain passages in the dreams. In addition to truncating the material in such a manner, he omitted the context of the dreams, and therefore noted that

\(^{462}\) Ibid., p. 37.

\(^{463}\) Ibid., pp. 37-8.
"I treat the dreams to a certain extent as if I had had them myself and were for that reason able on my own part to supply the context." He added that this procedure was admissible due to the fact that he was dealing with several interconnected series of dreams, which were their own context. In addition, he noted that the second part of the study concerned a particular archetype, known from other sources. Whilst the dreams were being dreamt the dreamer was not informed of Jung's interpretations. Though he had taken such precautions, Jung added that he thought that the possibility of influencing such a process was generally exaggerated, as "The objective psyche... is independent in the highest degree". Thus the precautions were not primarily taken to obviate suggestive influence, but to obviate the accusation of suggestive influence.

These statements and the procedure that Jung followed were predicated upon the assumption that there existed an archetypal layer to the psyche which revealed itself in dreams independently of the personal psychology of the dreamer, to such an extent that one was entitled to regard another's dreams as one's own. Such a mode of exposition was hardly likely to convince a sceptical critic, particularly

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464 Jung, "Dream symbols of the individuation process," The Integration of the Personality, p. 100.


466 Ibid., p. 101.
as Jung states that he was omitting so much of the material, which psychologists of other persuasions could no doubt have used to interpret the dreams, without recourse to the theory of archetypes.

In his account in the Bailey Island seminar, Jung went into more personal detail concerning his subject. The following is one example of this. In one dream, the subject dreamer dreamt that his mother poured water from one bowl into another. In his published interpretation, Jung stated that the mother represented the collective unconscious, the water of life.\(^{467}\) Hence the transference of the water of life from the mother to the sister meant that the mother was being replaced by the anima.\(^{468}\) Jung then provided alchemical parallels to the dream images:

The water that the mother, the unconscious, pours into the bowl of the anima is an apt symbol for the living quality of psychic being. The ancient alchemists never wearied of thinking up expressive synonyms for it. They called it the *acqua nostra*, also the *mercurius vivus*, the *argentum vivum*, the *vivum ardens*, the *aqua vitae*, the *succus lunariae*, and so on, by which they meant to characterize a living being not devoid of substance, in

\(^{467}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{468}\) Jung, "Dream symbols of the individuation process," *The Integration of the Personality*, p. 114.
contrast to the incorporeality necessarily attributed to the abstract spirit. The expression: *succus lunariae* points clearly enough to the nocturnal nature of the source, and both *acqua nostra* and *mercurius vivus* (quicksilver) to its earthliness. The *acetum fontis* is a powerful *acqua fortis* that, on the one hand, dissolves all things that have come into being, while on the other it leads to the most enduring of all structures, namely, to the mysterious *lapis*.

Jung presented a rather different interpretation of the dream in terms of the subject's own life in the Bailey Island seminar:

As long as the man of the dreams has his life-giving water... the source of his life in his mother, he is likely to repeat the mother's psychology and to behave more or less like a woman. This was the case with him. On the one side he was boyish and infantile and the good boy in a way; and then on the other side he had no relation except to mothers or to prostitutes. The two things, of course, did not fit together. He had quite a number of so-called love affairs which were not matters of love at all, just foolishness, all to his

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After providing more details concerning the dreamer's love life and relation to his sister Jung then added some of the alchemical parallels, as above. In terms of tone, it is hard to think, in comparing such interpretations of the same dream, that one is reading the same individual, let alone in the same year.

In the twentieth century, the ascendancy of Freud's theory of dreams had the effect of privatising the dream, which was seen to be solely concerned with the intimate sphere of subjectivity, and its all too human concerns. Jennifer Ford noted that in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, "At dinner parties, and at philosophical gatherings, dreams were substantial topics for conversations, precisely because they were not confined to the personal." In the case of Jung, whilst on the one hand, notions such as 'interpretation on the subjective level' can clearly be seen to contribute to this development, on the other, with his notion that some dreams had a suprapersonal source in the collective unconscious, Jung sought to recover the sphere of religious and metaphysical significance that had traditionally been


assigned to the dream. In 1937, Jung again utilised some of Pauli's dreams in his Terry lectures on psychology and religion at Yale University. He presented a historical survey of the attitude of the medieval church towards dreams, considering the views of Benedictus Pererius, Gregory the Great, Athanasius and Kaspar Peucer. He concluded: "In spite of the Church's recognition that certain dreams are sent by God, she is disinclined, and even averse, to any serious concern with dreams." He then presented some of Pauli's dreams, and claimed that they represented the spontaneous emergence of religious symbols, unknown to the dreamer, which demonstrated that the unconscious had a naturally religious function. Dreams then, could lead to a direct religious experience, freed of creed and denomination. The recovery of the traditional spiritual significance, in a modern psychological guise, was complete. In commenting on a dream, Jung sought to justify his utilisation of dreams as evidence for existence of such a natural religious function. He critiqued Freud's view that the dream was a disguise, and stated that it was unjustifiable to impute to the dream an intention to deceive. Following from this, he stated

I hold that our dream is really speaking of religion and that it intends to do so. Since the dream has a

\footnote{Jung, "Psychology and Religion," CW 11, § 32.}
coherent and well-designed structure, it suggests a certain logic and a certain intention, that is, it has a meaningful motivation which finds direct expression in the dream-content.\textsuperscript{473}

Critics would hardly be swayed by this argument. It is one thing to critique the neglect of the manifest level of the dream, and another to use the dream as the basis for metaphysical and theological conclusions. In this instance, no differential criteria are provided as to why a dream of life on Mars should not be accorded the same referential status. As William James would have said, the issue hinges on whether one possessed the 'will to believe.'

\textbf{Children's Dreams}

It is curious, given the centrality of dreams for Jung, that he did not publish a comprehensive work explicitly on dreams. However, in the late thirties, Jung commenced an extensive seminar dealing with the subject of children's dreams and the history of dreams. It is perhaps possible to take these as indications of what Jung may have embarked upon had he ventured on a comprehensive work on dreams.

Jung instructed members of his seminar to collect accounts of children's dreams, and the earliest remembered dreams of adults. The seminars were based on discussions of

\textsuperscript{473} \textit{Ibid.}, § 41.
the cases that members of the group presented. At this stage in Jung's career, this mode of delegating specific research tasks to his students became more common. However, at times the disparity between the agenda that Jung attempted to establish and the subsequent development of Jungian psychology is striking.

In Jung's view of development, consciousness developed out of the collective unconscious. Due to the child's proximity to the collective unconscious and undeveloped personal identity, he held that in children's dreams one found the clearest examples of the spontaneous emergence of archetypes. This constituted a critical test for the existence of the collective unconscious for Jung: for if archetypal motifs were only found in the dreams of adults, then the claim that they had an endogenous a priori source would become somewhat tenuous. Jung claimed not only that the archetypes but also the prospective tendency of the unconscious were clearly revealed in children's dreams. Jung

Against the most obvious charge that the such mythological motifs could be attributed to the widespread practice of reading fairytales, Jung stated: "When we perceive the same [mythological] ideas in a child, we cannot assume that he has discovered them for the first time... sometimes they are there because he has been told fairytales... Children absorb nothing which does not agree with them... Fairytales are important in that they give children expression for their inner contents." Psychological Interpretation of Children's Dreams, (1938-9), p. 58. However, by shifting the question to the functional explanation of such images, the evidential value of the demonstration of such images in themselves was correspondingly negated.
stated, "These early dreams are most important, and it is not unusual for them to give a prophetic picture of a person's whole life." What is striking about this seminar is that contrary to the widely held stereotype (even amongst Jungians) that Jung neglected childhood, it is clear that Jung conducted considerably more research on childhood than Freud, however rudimentary it might have been. To a request that he publish his material on children's dreams by the Jungian analyst Michael Fordham in 1952, Jung replied:

As I told you I know that it is a pity that I never found the time to do more work on children's "great" dreams, but I'm afraid that if I should tackle such a job I would have to do it in a thorough way and for that purpose I would have to elaborate on a much bigger material. This task is definitely too much for me. I cannot think of beginning anything of such a kind as long as I'm not through with the work in hand, namely the Mysterium Coniunctionis. And what with my correspondence and all sorts of urgent things cropping up continually I just cannot see my way to anything so ambitious as a book about children's dreams. This would really be your province and I should like to persuade you to try your hand on such material. You are welcome to my material and I think you are in a position to add

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475 Ibid., p. 1.
more to it. If you try it, you will see that it is no easy thing, but tremendously interesting. For a time I was utterly fascinated by the beauty and profundity of such early childhood experiences. There I observed some of the best examples of autochthonous reconstructions of archetypal ideas. Through your careful investigations of my books you have acquired enough orientation over the already existing material that could assist you in a thorough examination of children's dreams. For most of their collective symbolism you would have the amplifying material ready-made. I'm now at an age when it becomes unwise to continue the great adventure of pioneering research. I must leave the joy and the despair of it to younger forces.⁴⁷⁶

However, neither Fordham nor any other Jungian analyst pursued this topic. Fordham's own work on childhood attempted to dismantle Jung's view of childhood, and to increasingly amalgamate Jungian psychology with Kleinian psychoanalysis.

Jung's seminar on children's dreams alternated with a seminar on older books on dream interpretation from the

Greeks to the present. The seminar took the form of formal presentations of selected texts by members of his seminar group. The following were the texts discussed:

1936-7
Macrobius's commentary on Scipio's dream. = 400ad
Artemidorus on dreams.
Synesius of Cryene, Treatise on Dream-visions. 370ad
Casper Peucer, De Somniis. 1553
Abbe Richard, Theory of Dreams 1750
Franz Spittgerber, Sleep and Death 1865
Yves Delage, Le Rêve 1920

1938-9
Paul Radestock, Sleep and Dreams, 1879.
Philip Lersch, The Dream in German Romanticism, 1923
Stewart Lincoln The Dream in Primitive Cultures, 1935

These seminars appear to have been part of a wider research into the history of dreams that Jung was undertaking at this, though little further information has come to light pertaining to this.

Dreams and Race

Early on, the field of anthropology became a contested ground for the proof of the universality of
psychoanalysis.477 In Jung's case, the anthropology of dreams took on a particular significance, not only to provide proof for the universality of his theories of the dream: for what was crucial for Jung was not the dream per se, but what it revealed - the archetypes and the collective unconscious. For Jung, the psychogenesis of dreams could be taken sufficiently for granted to utilise the dream as the proof for a particular model of the psyche.

In his positing of a phylogenetic layer to the unconscious, a critical question for Jung was to what extent this phylogenetic layer was identical in different races. In 1912, Jung visited St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington D.C. for three days at the invitation of the psychiatrist William Alonson White. In 1935, he stated that the purpose of this visit was to investigate the unconscious of Negroes:

I had in mind this particular problem: are these collective patterns racially inherited, or are they 'a priori categories of the imagination' as two Frenchmen, Hubert and Mauss, quite independently of my work, have called them.478

When asked in 1959 by John Freeman whether in retrospect there was any experience that Jung regarded as a turning

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477 See below, "the ancient in the modern."

478 Jung, "The Tavistock lectures," CW 18, § 81.
point, one of the experiences Jung cited was his sojourn at St. Elizabeth's. To Freeman, he stated that he went there "in order to find out whether they have the same types of dreams that we have."\(^{479}\) Directly after his trip, Jung reported to Freud that he 'analysed' 15 Negroes.\(^{480}\) In 1921, he stated that he had been able to demonstrate "a whole series of motifs from Greek mythology in the dreams of pure-bred Negroes suffering from mental disorders."\(^{481}\) However, Jung only gave one example of this. In 1935 he stated that an 'uneducated' Negro from the south who was 'not particularly intelligent' told him a dream of a man being crucified on a wheel. Jung stated that whilst it quite probable for him to dream of someone being crucified on a cross it was quite improbable of him to dream of someone being crucified on a wheel, which suggested that the image was not a personal acquisition. Jung commented:

Of course I cannot prove to you that by some curious chance the Negro had not seen a picture of sort and then dreamt about it; but if he had not had any model for this idea it would be an archetypal image, because the crucifixion on the wheel is a mythological motif.


\(^{481}\) Jung, Psychological Types, CW 6, § 747.
It is the ancient sun-wheel, and the crucifixion is the sacrifice to sun-god in order to appropriate him... In the dream of the Negro, the man on the wheel is a repetition of the Greek mythological motif of Ixion.\footnote{Jung, "The Tavistock Lectures," (1935), CW 18, §§ 81-2.}

Whilst stating that this case by itself did not constitute proof, Jung claimed that it one was one of the critical experiences that gave him a clue that, as he described in 1952, "It is not a question of a specifically racial hereditary, but of a universally human characteristic."\footnote{Jung, Symbols of Transformation, CW 5, § 154.} On the basis of such instances, Jung claimed that the apparent cross-cultural similarity of motifs in dreams was evidence for a universally human layer of the unconscious, the collective unconscious, which was the source of such images.

One of the earliest extensive anthropological studies of dreams was Stewart Lincoln's 1935 *The Dream in Primitive Culture*. Lincoln, who had attended some of Jung's seminars, attempted to apply psychoanalytic understanding of dreams to primitive cultures. Lincoln discussed Jung's distinction between the individual and 'big' dreams of primitives. Lincoln dismissed Jung's invocation of the collective unconscious to explain the latter class of dreams, which Lincoln redubbed culture-pattern dreams. He argued that Jung
fails to point out that the images of the great cultural visions are collective only for a given culture and not for all mankind. Since these images disappear when a given culture breaks down, it shows that their existence is dependent on cultural tradition and not on a "racial memory." The cultural images are therefore symbols which vary with different cultures and stand or fall with these.\textsuperscript{484}

Lincoln argued that any cross-cultural similarity between such images could be explained by reference to the similarity of the cultural traditions that gave rise to them. Lincoln's critique enunciates a position that was widely held by Jung's critics, not just in anthropology, but in many other disciplines. A few years later, Jung attempted to rebut Lincoln's argument in detail in a seminar.

Jung commenced by stating that he knew Lincoln, and described him as being an amateur who had an insufficient knowledge and experience of psychology. He stated: "One cannot know what a primitive means by 'a great dream', for instance, if one has not oneself had such an experience."\textsuperscript{485} Jung critiqued Lincoln's usage of psychoanalysis, and countered Lincoln's claims with anecdotes of his own

\textsuperscript{484} J. Stewart Lincoln, \textit{The Dream in Primitive Culture}, p. 24.

\textsuperscript{485} Jung, \textit{Psychological Interpretation of Children's Dreams}, p. 70.
encounters with primitives. He noted:

One must feel one's way into the inner life of primitives if one wants to understand them. Theoretical ideas are of little use there. 486

From Jung's previous statement, it seems that this process could only be done on the basis of one's own inner experience. Yet at the same time, he cautioned, "Our own cultural conditions can in no way be applied, as Lincoln has done, to interpret those of the primitives." 487 Jung concluded by reiterating his belief in the existence of the spontaneous emergence of symbols which could not have been transmitted by tradition, and hence could only be explained through the hypothesis of the collective unconscious.

The Multiplicity of Dreams

As noted, through the ascendancy of psychoanalysis, the

486 Jung, Psychological Interpretation of Children's Dreams, p. 71.

487 Ibid., p. 78. Lincoln's work has also been critiqued by contemporary anthropologists of dreams; Barbara Tedlock argues that Lincoln's distinction between individual and culture pattern dreams "did not correspond with the classificatory schemes of the societies he examined; he failed to address the important issue of indigenous dream classification and dream theories. He also failed to distinguish between the dream as an experience in sleep and its narration." "Dreaming and dream research, in ed. B. Tedlock, Dreaming: Anthropological and Psychological Interpretations, p. 21.
late nineteenth century classificatory project in dream research died out. In a significant contemporary study, the cognitive psychologist Harry Hunt argued that as a consequence "Dream psychology, in haste for its own Darwin, has bypassed the necessary foundation of a Linneaus." By contrast, Hunt develops an agenda for contemporary dream research that attempts to continue the classificatory project of nineteenth century research.

In Jung's dream theory, one witnesses the legacy of the classificatory project. The following is his strongest statement in this respect:

There are, it is true, dreams which manifestly represent wishes or fears, but what about all the other things? Dreams may contain ineluctable truths, philosophical pronouncements, illusions, wild fantasies, memories, plans, anticipations, irrational experiences, even telepathic visions, and heaven knows what besides.⁴⁸⁹

Jung's differentiation between compensatory dreams, diagnostic dreams, archetypal dreams, collective dreams, telepathic dreams and 'Adlerian' and 'Freudian' dreams has


already been noted. The following are further categories of dreams which Jung recognized. He nominated certain dreams as reaction dreams, which he described as dreams "in respect of which certain objective events have caused a trauma that is not merely psychic but at the same time a physical lesion of the nervous system."^490 Finally, three further categories of dreams that Jung recognized were the following:

There are also affect dreams, usually affects which have failed to reach consciousness during the day, and there are warning and informatory dreams... Then there are philosophical dreams which think for us and in which we get the thoughts we should have had during the day.^491

In psychology, the period within which Jung wrote can be characterized as the heyday of monocausal explanations of dreams. Jung's position may be seen as an attempt to establish a psychology of dreams that was both historically and anthropologically inclusive, as the only means to establishing a theory that could have universal validity. As noted, Jung's initial attempts in both of these directions

^490 Jung, "General standpoints on the psychology of dreams," CW 8, § 499.

were not taken up by his followers. However, one could argue that it is precisely this attempt to validate the multiple ways in which dreaming has been regarded and the traditional valorisation of dreams, historically and anthropologically, that accounts for the popular success of Jung's work on dreams.

As pointed out earlier, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, interest in the dream shifted from the dream itself, to utilising the dream as a psychoscope, or as the basis for a general psychology of the unconscious. Paradoxically, this elevation of the dream had the effect of cancelling out its privileged status: for if other phenomena were analogised to the dream and could be regarded in the same way, the specific value of dreams correspondingly decreased. As de Saussure noted, Freud's principal interest was in what the dream could reveal about the affective life of the dreamer; once the meaning had been extracted, the dream itself could be discarded as a useless husk. Within psychoanalysis, the number of articles explicitly on dreams increasingly declined. Amongst Jungian analysts, the prominence that Jung (and those attracted to Jungian therapy) attached to dreams assured their continued utilisation as tools in clinical practice, there was little specific interest in the psychology of dreams as a subject, and hardly any attempts to further Jung's work in this
domain, either by elaboration or criticism.\textsuperscript{492}

Whilst the Freudian and Jungian theorists promoted a psychogenic understanding of dreams, divorced from any physiological underpinning, the physiological approach to dreams came back with a vengeance. In the 1950's, Aserinsky and Kleitman's claim to have demonstrated a correlation between the occurrences of dreams and REM [rapid eye movement] sleep was much heralded, and accorded a totemic status by the burgeoning experimental research in dreams. This was because it seemed to provide observable correlates for the process of dreaming, and hence enabled their reinstallation within the agenda of experimental psychology. This was coupled with the resurgence of physiologically based models of dreaming. In this literature, one frequently finds psychological factors accorded a similar secondary position as in the physiological dream theories of the nineteenth century.

Meanwhile, the most venerable tradition of dream literature, that of the dream keys, continues to flourish. Centuries old texts continue to be reissued in popular editions. Whilst the psychological and psychoanalytic investigation of dreams attempted to supersede this literature once and for all, current dream keys have simply accommodated Freudian and Jungian dream theories, and mined

\textsuperscript{492} The one prominent exception to this was James Hillman's \textit{The Dream and the Underworld}. 
them for a new stock of symbolic meanings: penis envy, castration, anima-animus, and so on, have taken their place alongside traditional symbolology. This development seems to ironically indicate the extent to which the contents of the Freudian unconscious and the Jungian collective unconscious have become stock and hackneyed elements of our conscious preoccupations, and hardly indicate anything deep, hidden, or unknown.

Finally, in the eighties, there took place the emergence and rapid growth of the dreamwork movement, which fostered the non-clinical exploration of dreams. Dream groups, dream workshops, attendant literature and dream world wide web pages abound. Proponents of this movement speak of these developments as 'deprofessionalising the dream,' taking it of the exclusive preserve of the professional clinician. Whilst freely drawing from Freudian and Jungian dream theories, the dreamwork movement represents a significant shift in social practice, from an allo-interpretive to an auto-interpretive model. Whilst the work of Freud and Jung dominated the dream in Western societies for much of the twentieth century, with these developments, one finds the

493 For example, in Eric Ackroyd's *A Dictionary of Dream Symbols*, we learn that "a spear may be a sexual symbol, representing the penis" (p. 277) and that "Blue may sometimes symbolize the universal or collective unconscious... the blue sea may also symbolize the unconscious or the feminine (anima, mother or Great Mother)." (p. 94). In 1951, *La Nouvelle clé des songes* written by two authors bearing the name "le vingtième Artemidore" bore an epigraph by Jung on the first page.
locus of dream investigation significantly shifting. Will the psychological investigation of dreams in psychotherapy find itself displaced by a pincer movement, from the experimental physiology of dreams on one side, and the popular symbolic traditions on the other? It is at present too early to draw conclusions as to how these changes will affect the dream cultures of Western societies.
"The soul is, so to speak, the first principle of living things." - Aristotle, *De Anima*, p. 126.

In the twentieth century, the appeal of psychoanalysis and analytical psychology has in no small measure been due to the perception that they have formed new sciences of life, related to, but independent of biology, and that they have formulated the psychotherapeutic situation as a practice through which individuals may draw near to the wellsprings of life, and experience renewal.

In the case of Jung, there is no dearth of testamentary accounts attesting to the latter, of the sort:

I myself felt that my whole life, my whole outlook, were gradually changing for the better... in short that I had become a different person, much more positive and creative than I had been."²⁴

However this section does not propose to map or evaluate such 'varieties of psychological experience,' but to trace the development of Jung's conception of life and its

²⁴ Gerhard Adler on his analysis with Jung, "personal encounters with Jung and his work," *Dynamics of the Self*, p. 88.
transformations.

At the end of the nineteenth century, questions as to the nature of life were critical problematics in philosophy, biology and the emergent attempts to found a scientific psychology, and in the respective claims of each discipline to map out their own distinctive provenance. This cluster of debates has come to be known as the vitalist controversy. However, at anything other than a broad descriptive level, such a catchall designation, like the term vitalism itself, is liable to be misleading. In part, this is a natural consequence of any attempt to provide an atemporal taxonomy of diverse theories in different historical epochs through highlighting one supposedly invariant feature, extricated from its precise location in a given conceptual economy.

Many definitions of vitalism have been given. 'Positive' definitions take the form of asserting the existence of a specific principle of life. W. F. Bynum notes that such

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45 The Crisis in Modernism: Bergson and the Vitalist Controversy ed, Frederick Burwick and Paul Douglass represents a recent work adopting this designation. This volume is framed by the thesis that the vitalist controversy is a crucial context for understanding the emergence of modernism.

46 An example of such a positive description is the following, given by William McDougall, who proposed that the term vitalism properly designated all answers to the 'riddle of life' which "assume that the properties of the living being are due to the presence and working in it of something, some force, energy, principle, factor or agent, of a nature radically different from any that is to be found in the inanimate realm." The Riddle of Life, p. 12.
positive definitions have generally taken either an exogenous or endogenous form. In the former, it is claimed "that some external principle, superimposed into the living body, endows it with some of its vital properties." In the latter, it is claimed "that living organisms possess unique, non-reducible characteristics because of the peculiar organization of the matter composing them." 'Negative' definitions take the form of asserting the irreducibility of life to explanation in physical and chemical terms. With the rise of scientific materialism in the nineteenth century, the term vitalism became frequently used in polemics as a synonym for error and as a term of opprobrium, and this usage is still prevalent today. In his study of vitalism in the nineteenth century, E. Benton notes that the classification of figures in terms of the binary pair of vitalism and non-vitalism does not correspond with their respective positions on fundamental epistemological issues, which it tends to obscure. However, given the frequency of the historical use of the term vitalism as a hetero- and auto-appellation, its use here in this descriptive sense is


498 Ibid.

unavoidable, yet the emphasis is on reconstructing the particular debates in question.

In the following section the principal question that will be pursued is not whether it is correct to class Jung as a vitalist, and hence evaluate his psychology accordingly, but to reconstruct his changing relation with various debates on the nature of life in connection with his attempt to establish the disciplinary autonomy of psychology, and in particular, his positing the existence of a specific psychic energy.

In the nineteenth century, arguments concerning the existence of a vital principle were inextricably bound up with metaphysical and religious issues. An example of an early nineteenth century proponent of vitalism, who would later be important for Jung, was Karl Friederich Burdach (1776-1847). Burdach, who is sometimes described as a romantic physiologist, held chairs in anatomy at the Universities of Dorpart and Königsberg. Between 1826 and 1840, he produced a six-volume work, *Physiology as a Science of Experience*. Burdach claimed that as the goal of physiology was the knowledge of the human spirit, the whole of nature had to be studied. *Physiology* incorporated contributions from his notable assistants, such as Karl Ernst von Baer, Heinrich Rathke and Johannes Müller. Burdach's work demonstrates the theological significance of the positing of a specific life force. He stated that of
this force that

It is an eternal, ideal principal throughout the world which has created every individual thing and harmonised them, in such a manner that nature as a whole is a living thing ... It is also the same force which has created the whole world and produced each living thing.\textsuperscript{500}

Burdach claimed that the basis of organic formation was not a preexistent substance but a formative force [Bildundskraft]. He claimed that no mechanical or chemical theory could fully explain organic formation, and that one had to evoke the existence of a vital principle. This was not a transcendental entity, but a natural creative force. Its existence was taken to constitute evidence of divine design:

Something blind and unintelligent could not create beings which are directed toward determined ends; only an intelligent force can produce an organism.\textsuperscript{501}

Consequently, Burdach claimed that the laws of nature were a


\textsuperscript{501} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 309.
direct revelation of God.

For proponents of scientific materialism, such as Karl Vogt, Jacob Moleschott and Ludwig Buchner, the opposition to the positing of a specific life force was principally against its theological implications. Prominent in the critique of vitalism were the physiologists Emil Du Bois-Reymond (1818-1896) and Carl Ludwig (1816-1895). In 1847, together with Hermann von Helmholtz and Ernst von Brücke, they swore to base physiology on a purely chemico-physical foundation, banishing all recourse to vital forces.

In 1848, in his Researches on Animal Electricity Du Bois-Reymond set out his criticisms against the existence of the vital force. He argued that as all changes in the material world were reducible to motions, thus the concept of a specific life-force [Lebenskraft] separate from matter resulted from an "irresistible tendency to personification" and "a rhetorical artistic concept of our intellect."

In the course of the nineteenth century, vitalistic theories declined. Various reasons have been put forward for this. The development of cell theory was seen to provide the

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502 Frederick Gregory, Scientific Materialism in Nineteenth Century Germany, p. 168.

503 On this issue, see Paul Cranefield, "The organic physics of 1847 and the biophysics of today," and Robert Paul, "German academic science and the mandarin ethos, 1850-1880."

basis of a mechanistic analysis of living functions. The existence of a vital principle was said to contravene the principle of the conservation of energy, and both Robert Mayer and Hermann Helmholtz were resolutely opposed to it.\textsuperscript{505} Darwin's theory of evolution was taken to obviate the recourse to the argument for design in the development of species, and the adaptation of living organisms to their environment was explained by natural selection, as opposed to an inherent teleological principle. In the neo-vitalist Hans Driesch's view (1867-1941), vitalist theories underwent an immanent collapse or self-extermination, through complacency and dogmatism.\textsuperscript{506}

\textbf{Entelechy}

\textsuperscript{505} Robert Mayer claimed that the existence of a vital force or energy had nowhere been demonstrated, and was completely superfluous ("The motions of organisms and their relation to metabolism. An essay in natural science" (1845) in Robert Lindsay, \textit{Men of Physics: Julius Robert Mayer, Prophet of Energy}, p. 115.) Helmholtz recalled that it was the question of the existence of a vital principle that led him to the thesis of the conservation of force; in his view, Stahl's theory, which had been accepted by most physiologists, "treated every living body as a perpetuum mobile." ("An autobiographical sketch" (1891), \textit{Selected Writings of Hermann von Helmholtz}, p. 471). Helmholtz concluded that the positing of a vital principle contravened the principle of the conservation of force ("The application of the law of the conservation of force" (1861), \textit{ibid.}, p. 120).

\textsuperscript{506} Hans Driesch, \textit{History and Theory of Vitalism}, p. 125. Driesch narrated the history of vitalism in terms of a continuous tradition spanning several centuries, though in many respects his own theories have as little resemblance to theories he classes as vitalist as those he classes as non-vitalist.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, varieties of vitalistic theories remerged. Hans Driesch, who became the principal proponent of what was known as neovitalism in the twentieth century, dates the reemergence to the recognition by Wilhelm His and Alexander Goette "that the true process of morphogenesis which appears in the development of the individual requires actual and efficient causes for each single realisation" and the experimental morphology of Wilhelm Roux.

Driesch studied under August Weismann and Ernst Haeckel. Initially a committed mechanist, he announced his conversion to vitalism in 1899. In experiments with sea urchins, Driesch demonstrated that if blastomeres were separated at the two-cell stage, each blastomere could still form a whole larva. Driesch's theoretical interpretation of these experiments went through a series of developments; in essence, he took their significance as indicating the existence of some innate teleological developmental factor.

He presented his views in a systematic form in his Gifford lectures in 1907 and 1908. This context - where a

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507 Ibid., p. 150.


509 On this point, see Frederick Churchill, "From Machine-Theory to Entelechy: Two Studies in Developmental Teleology."
few years earlier, William James had delivered the lectures which became *The Varieties of Religious Experience* - was itself significant, as the lectures had been established with the aim of promoting the study of natural theology.

Driesch claimed that organic individual development could not be accounted for in purely physical and chemical terms, nor by means of causality alone. This necessitated the recourse to an additional factor, which, in honour of Aristotle, he termed entelechy (whilst indicating that he had only borrowed the term, as opposed to Aristotle's understanding of it). He argued that the existence of this principle at the same time secured the autonomy of life, and the disciplinary autonomy of biology. Entelechy underlay the origin of organic bodies and particular actions, and its work was inherently teleological. Driesch wrote:

> entelechy always results in a manifoldness of a typical kind, the single elements of which are beside each other in space, or one after another in time, or both, always in a typical order.

He termed this result 'extensive manifoldness.' Driesch

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511 Ibid., pp. 142-3.

512 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 137.
differentiated between entelechy - "the natural agent which forms the body" - and "the elemental agent which directs it" - which he termed the psychoid. If, as Driesch had claimed, he had established the irreducibility of biology to physics and chemistry, its borders with psychology were less clearly demarcated. He stated that he used the term psychoid to avoid falling into the 'pseudo-psychology' that would follow the use of the terms soul, mind or psyche. The psychoid designated a form of agency irreducible to purely physical terms. He noted that the psychoid was "something which though not a 'psyche' can only be described in terms analogous to those of psychology."\textsuperscript{513} Driesch claimed that clarification of the question of instinct should eventually show that the psychoid constituted the basis of instincts, and that

the usual difference between the "Conscious" and the "Unconscious" would then have to be brought to its legitimate and truly philosophical expression by distinguishing between two different kinds of psychoids.\textsuperscript{514}

Driesch's programme could be described not only as avoiding pseudo-psychology in biology, but as annexing psychology to

\textsuperscript{513} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 82.

\textsuperscript{514} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 83.
Driesch considered the question as to whether entelechy should be considered as a form of vital energy. He concluded that it wasn't, principally because whereas all known energies were quantitative and measurable, "entelechy lacks all the characteristics of quantity: entelechy is in order of relation." Driesch claimed that at an introspective level, entelechy was discernable through the category of individuality. He claimed that individuality came about through a process of individualisation, and that the agent of this process was entelechy.

As Driesch held that the rise of dogmatic Darwinism had been partly responsible for the demise of vitalism, he could not fail to comment on the relation of his views to theories of evolution. He claimed that both Darwinism and Lamarckism were unable to adequately explain evolution. This was because natural selection was a negative principle, which could explain the elimination of particular forms, but not the creation of new diversities. Most critically, he held that Darwinism was unable to explain organic restitution. In conclusion, he correlated the 'unknown principle' 

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515 Ibid., p. 169.
516 Ibid., p. 339.
518 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 262.
519 Ibid., p. 267.
operative in descent with entelechy.

Donna Haraway described the historical significance of Driesch's work as showing the limitations of overly simplistic mechanistic models in biology and paving the way towards the development of nonvitalist organicism in biology.\textsuperscript{520}

\textbf{Jung's Zofingia lectures}

Jung stated that during the course of his medical studies, he became acquainted with neovitalistic theories.\textsuperscript{521} Jung's sympathy with vitalist theories is apparent in his lectures presented before the Zofingia student fraternity. In his 1896 lecture, "Border zones of exact science," Jung embarked upon a determined critique of materialism, stating that "the position of contemporary sceptical materialist opinion constitutes, simply, intellectual death."\textsuperscript{522} In these essays, Jung took up debates between materialism and spiritualism and materialism and vitalism. For Jung, these debates were critically linked. At this juncture, it was only through defending the existence of a vital principle, irreducible to physical and chemical terms, that he could provide an acceptable epistemology for spiritualism that

\begin{footnotesize}
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    \item \textsuperscript{520} Donna Haraway, \textit{Crystals, Fabrics, and Fields: Metaphors of Organicism in Twentieth-Century Developmental Biology}, p. 13.
    \item \textsuperscript{521} Jung, \textit{Memories, Dreams, Reflections}, p. 121.
    \item \textsuperscript{522} Jung, \textit{The Zofingia Lectures}, \textit{CW A}, § 19.
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somehow squared the postmortem existence of the soul with biology.

Jung made several caustic comments against Du Bois-Reymond and other materialists. At one juncture, he prophesied that monuments to Schopenhauer would eventually be built, and people will curse Carl Vogt, Ludwig Büchner, Moleschott, Du Bois-Reymond... for having stuffed a parcel of materialistic rubbish into the gaping mouths of those gutter snipes, the educated proletariat.\(^{523}\)

In "Some thoughts on psychology," the issue of the autonomy of life is connected with Jung's attempt to establish the immortality of the soul. He cited the following statement from Burdach, who he described as "one of the much-despised vitalists":

Materialism presupposes that life which it sets out to explain. For the organization and the blend of components from it derives the life processes, are themselves the product of a life process.\(^{524}\)

\(^{523}\) Jung, "Some thoughts on psychology," (1897), CW A, § 136.

\(^{524}\) Ibid., § 29-30. Jung did not supply the page number of this passage, which actually occurs on p. 526 of Burdach's Der Physiologie.
Burdach's comment occurred in a general critique of materialism, which he had defined as "the assertion that life is nothing but the working of material force." Jung provided the following definition of the vital principle: "the enduring factor in the phenomenal realm... the principium vitæ constitutes, so to speak, the scaffolding on which matter is built up." Jung clearly conceived of this vital principle as an immanent, endogenous principle. He again approvingly cited Burdach, who had stated that:

The matter of our bodies continually changes, whereas our life remains the same, remains on. Corporeal life is embraced in the continual, simultaneous destruction and formation of organic matter. This life is something higher, which dominates matter...

Jung dismissively stated that physiologists were mistaken to attempt to explain life in terms of natural laws, as life existed despite such laws. He then criticised Darwin's theory of natural selection for being incapable of adequately explaining the development of new species, and claimed that in phylogeny, it was necessary to postulate a

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525 Burdach, Der Physiologie, p. 526.
526 Ibid., § 89.
527 Ibid. I was unable to locate the reference for this in Burdach's work.
vital principle. He claimed that this was 'more or less equivalent' to the 'life force' of ancient physiologists, and that it governed all bodily functions and consciousness, to the extent that the latter were dependent upon the cerebral cortex. In a manner that recalled Stahl, Jung identified this vital principle with the soul.

Between Jung's Zofingia lectures and his first publications, there are considerable discontinuities in language, conceptions and epistemology, as the far-reaching speculations on metaphysical issues characteristic of the Zofingia lectures largely disappeared. Jung's early researches at the Bürgholzli were framed in terms of prevalent psychological and psychiatric methodologies, and this goes for his concept of energy. Before turning to this, it is necessary to sketch out the problematic of energy in psychology at this time.

Energy and Fatigue

The development of thermodynamics had a far reaching effect on social, psychological and metaphysical thought in the later half of the nineteenth century. Anson Rabinbach argues that the significance of the principle of the conservation of energy and entropy was that the productive

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528 Ibid., § 31-2.
529 On the metaphorical utilizations of thermodynamics, see Greg Myers, "nineteenth-century popularisations of thermodynamics and the rhetoric of social prophecy."
activities of humans, machines or natural forces were not distinguished. He argues that thermodynamics gave rise to a conceptual and metaphorical chain linking inorganic and organic nature, individual activity and society, which had as its outcome modern productivism: "the belief that human society and nature are linked by the primacy and identity of all productive activity, whether of laborers, of machines, or of natural forces."\(^5\) This development was brought about by the advent of new sciences of work, which set out the measure the physical and mental expenditure of workers and calibrate them to maximal efficiency in requisite settings.

Alongside these developments, the problem of fatigue became increasingly prominent. Rabinbach speculates that judging from the volume of writings on the problem of fatigue at the end of the nineteenth century, there was an epidemic of fatigue amongst workers and students.\(^6\) However it is not clear to what extent the increasing focus on questions of energy necessarily corresponded to, or was occasioned by an increase in the incidence of fatigue; nor, if there was indeed an increase, to what extent it may have in part been an effect of the increasingly theoretical significance accorded to fatigue. Following the constitution of fatigue as a principal social nemesis, the task of


overcoming fatigue preoccupied social reformers, psychologists and psychiatrists.

The problem of fatigue and exhaustion were prominent in the American neurologist George Miller Beard's diagnostic category of neurasthenia, or nervous exhaustion, which had its heyday at the end of the nineteenth century. He stated that "Neurasthenia is a chronic, functional disease of the nervous system, the basis of which is impoverishment of nervous force." Individuals were natively endowed with a fixed amount of nervous force, which obeyed the principle of the conservation of energy. Consequently, excess strain led to a deficit of nervous force, which resulted in a plethora of diverse symptoms.

Experimental psychologists were anxious to demonstrate that the basic conceptions of psychology fulfilled general scientific criteria. In the case of concepts of energy, it would be obvious that psychologists would be concerned to demonstrate that their energy concepts fulfilled the principle of the conservation of energy. According to Wilhelm Wundt,

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\text{the muscular movements of an external volitional act,}
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On Beard, see Charles Rosenberg, "The place of George M. Beard in nineteenth-century psychiatry."
the physical processes which accompany sense perception, association, and apperception, all follow invariably the principle of the conservation of energy.\textsuperscript{534}

He added that this held, despite the fact that the mental values represented by these energies differed. This led Wundt to provide the following differentiation between physical and psychic energy:

The ability to produce purely \textit{quantitative} effects, which we designate as \textit{physical energy}, is, accordingly, to be purely distinguished from the ability to produce \textit{qualitative} effects, or the ability to produce values, which we designate as \textit{psychical energy}.\textsuperscript{535}

Thus Wundt's solution to this problem was nominalistic; psychic energy, which might appear to undergo increases, was merely the qualitative and hence unquantifiable aspect of physical energy.

It was Wundt's student Emil Kraepelin who attempted to establish a quantitative measure of states of fatigue. In

\textsuperscript{534} Wilhelm Wundt, \textit{Outlines of Psychology}, p. 366.

\textsuperscript{535} \textit{Ibid.}. Wundt also dealt at length with the question of the conservation of energy, and its applicability to vital processes and the nervous system, in his \textit{Principles of Physiological Psychology}, pp. 60-67.
his memoirs, Kraepelin recounted how at the end of the 1880's he conceived of constructing an experiment to measure the number of syllables that could be read in a given period of time as an indicator of mental efficiency. He stated that the tests demonstrated the effect of practice and fatigue on performance. Kraepelin expanded these experiments to measure the onset of fatigue in various tasks, which he depicted by means of 'work curves.' He claimed that these experiments enabled the quantification of fatigue.\footnote{Emil Kraepelin, \textit{Memoirs}, p. 45. Kraepelin and Gustav Aschaffenburg studied the effects of fatigue on individual performance in the associations experiment. Aschaffenburg explained the effect of fatigue on associations, and the similar patterns of association in states of mania, as due to increased motor excitation. Jung provided an alternative psychological interpretation of their results in terms of disturbance of attention and suggestibility. Jung, "Experimental researches on the associations of the healthy," (1904) \textit{CW} 2, § 132.} The significance of this for Kraepelin was that it was intended to enable the scientific understanding of the societal problem of 'overburdening,' the traumatic neuroses and psychopathic conditions.

In contrast to Wundt, one psychologist who postulated the existence of a specific psychic energy and asserted that its variations could be quantitatively determined was William Stern. In his chapter on 'psychic energetics' in \textit{On the Psychology of Individual Differences}, Stern stated that psychic life represented a little understood energy system. He left to one side the question of its possible physical
basis, and defined psychic energetics as "the movement of energy developments of the soul [seelischer Energieenfaltung] in its intensity and course." His interest focussed on means to experimentally quantify the fluctuations of levels of psychic energy [psychische Energie] through the course of the day. He drew upon Kraepelin's work, reformulating the problematic in terms of individual differences.

Thus for psychology, the problem of energy was at once a critical epistemological, therapeutic and social question: epistemological, in that the laws of thermodynamics were taken to constitute the template for any scientific concept of energy; therapeutic, in that through the diagnostic category of neurasthenia (and later psychasthenia), loss of energy was seen to characterize the clinical presentation, and the underlying explanandum of the disease; and social, in that augmentation of the capacity for work would resoundingly establish psychology's social charter and mandate.

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537 William Stern, Über Psychologie der individuellen Differenzen (Ideen zur einer "Differentiellen Psychologie"), pp. 119-20. On Stern's conception of differential psychology, see above, "differential psychology," in "the individual and the universal."

538 The title of Richard Ebbard's 1903 work How to Restore Life-Giving Energy to Sufferers from Sexual Neurasthenia and kindred Brain and Nervous Disorders (Neurosis, Hysteria, etc.) is indicative in this regard. For Ebbard, the means in question was suggestion, which, therapeutically applied, had been called 'Psycho-Therapy' or 'Thought-Cure.' (p. 1.)
Libido theory and the therapeutic relation

Jung retrospectively stated that his initial conception of the libido was derived from Schopenhauer's concept of the will. In his *On the Psychology of Dementia Praecox: An Attempt*, the term that Jung came to employ was psychic energy, in the manner of Stern. He argued that a strong complex had the effect of sapping the individual's energy. In 1912, he stated that he had used the term psychic energy in this work as he felt that Freud's libido theory was inapplicable to dementia praecox. It is to the question of the development of libido theory that I now turn, with particular emphasis upon its utilization in the therapeutic context.

Henri Ellenberger noted that prior to Freud, the term libido had been used by Theodore Meynert, Moriz Benedikt, and others.

539 In his comments on Progoff's dissertation in 1952, Jung stated: "To Schopenhauer I owe the dynamic view of the psyche; the 'will' is the libido that is back of everything." Ximena Roelli de Angulo, "Comments on a doctoral dissertation," p. 204. On Schopenhauer, and Jung's reading of Schopenhauer, see below, "conscious and Unconscious."

540 Jung, *CW* 3, § 138. The same year, in "psychophysical investigations with the galvanometer and pneumograph in normal and insane individuals", which he wrote with Frederick Peterson, Jung wrote that "The sequelae of the complex are briefly as follows: Diminution of the entire psychic energy, weakening of the will, loss of objective interest and of power of concentration and of self-control, and the rise of morbid hysterical symptoms." *CW* 2, § 1067. In other words, the complex resulted in fatigue.

541 Jung, *CW* B, § 221.
Richard von Krafft-Ebbing in the sense of sexual desire, and as indicating the sexual instinct in its evolutionary sense by Albert Moll. In Freud's work, the field of application of the term libido far exceeded the domain mapped out by the sexologists, and indeed, encompassed human psychology and psychopathology as a whole.

Peter Swales has convincingly demonstrated that Freud's concept of the libido was principally derived from his experiences with cocaine, and specifically, from his attempt to understand psychoactive drugs in terms of putative sexual chemistry. Another contextualisation of Freud's libido theory has been put forward by Jean Starobinski, in an essay entitled "On the history of imaginary fluids (from animal spirits to the libido)." Starobinski's account is significant not in terms of the derivation of Freud's libido theory, but in terms of its family resemblance, and its function in the therapeutic context. Starobinski argues that Freud's concept of the libido should be situated in the context of imaginary fluids, such as Descartes's 'animal spirits' and Mesmer's 'animal magnetism.' Before taking up Starobinski's points, it is necessary to outline the

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544 Peter Swales, "Freud, cocaine, and sexual chemistry: the role of cocaine in Freud's conception of the libido."
development of the latter notion.\footnote{The next few paragraphs draw from my "Animal magnetism: science, medicine and the psychogenic hypothesis."}

Franz Anton Mesmer's medical thesis at the University of Vienna was entitled "Physical-Medical Treatise on the Influence of the Planets". In it, he put forward the following proposition:

There is a force which is the cause of universal gravitation and which is, very probably, the foundation of all corporal properties; a force which actually strains, relaxes and agitates the cohesion, elasticity, irritability, magnetism, and electricity in the smallest fluid and solid particles of our machine, a force which can, in this report, be called ANIMAL GRAVITATION.\footnote{Franz Mesmer, Mesmerism: A Translation of the Original Scientific and Medical Writings of F. A. Mesmer, p. 14.}

In his "Letter from M. Mesmer, Doctor of Medicine at Vienna, to A. M. Unzer, Doctor of Medicine, on the Medicinal Usage of the Magnet," in which Mesmer put forward the term animal magnetism as synonymous for animal gravity, he gave the following account of his 'discovery.' He claimed that the sun and moon, which act 'like magnets,' have an effect on the body analogous to their effect on tides. By use of
magnets on a female hysterical patient, he attempted to establish and regulate a 'kind of artificial tide.' This procedure induces a severe pain, followed by a burning heat, which then subsided, leaving the patient cured (he termed this state the magnetic crisis). He stated:

I observed that magnetic material is almost the same as electrical fluid, and that it is propagated by intermediary bodies in the same way as is electrical fluid.  

Mesmer claimed that he now realized that many animate and inanimate substances could be magnetized, and that he himself possessed a magnetic quality. In his dissertation on animal magnetism, Mesmer stated that everybody, like a magnet, had two poles, and that diseases were caused by obstructions and congestions in the flow of magnetic fluid. He argued:

Could one not propose... that sympathy - which is nothing other than an inclination, a pleasant impulse we carry towards one another as two magnets are attracted to each other reciprocally - consists of these reciprocal and mutual attractions?

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547 Ibid., p. 27.
548 Ibid., p. 35.
What Mesmer was proposing was a monistic medical physics which explained mental and physical phenomena alike as being grounded in the action of an invisible fluid, animal magnetism. The therapeutic relation was described in quasi-mechanistic terms, which enabled it, in principle at least, to be regulatable.

Pierre Janet characterized the subsequent history of animal magnetism as a conflict between the fluidists and the animists. Whilst the former held that the observed effects were due to the physical effects of a fluid, the latter claimed that they were due to changes in a subject's mental state. According to Janet, the latter "endeavoured to explain the happenings by psychological laws instead of appealing to physical or physiological forces," and hence laid the basis for modern psychology. Starobinski modified Janet's distinction, and stated that the different models were better described as exo-fluidism and endo-fluidism:

We shall say that one thus goes from an exo-fluidism (where the fluid has its source in the magnetiser and goes within the subject) to an endo-fluidism (where according to the laws of an imaginary neurophysiology, the nervous energy is represented as a moving substance, of which the general mass can become

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unbalanced, etc., but always remains in the interior of the individual). The psychological interpretation thus constructs itself on the model of a restrained fluidism.\textsuperscript{550}

Starobinski considers Liébault as an exemplar of such an endo-fluidism. He states that whilst Liébault denied the existence of a material force between the patient and therapist, he spoke of attention in a fluidist manner:

Because attention is first identifiable with the nervous force, it is a substantial energy, a material principle which one could easily confuse with the general agent which Mesmer believed to have discovered with the exception (which is considerable) that attention is human and the general agent is cosmic... attention becomes a substance which accumulates and is displaced, which has its fluxes and its refluxes, its free state and its bound state, in the manner of a gas or a liquid.\textsuperscript{551}

Starobinski argues that the public success of Freud's libido theory, with its progression and regression through

\textsuperscript{550} Jean Starobinski, "Sur l'histoire des fluides imaginaires (des esprits animaux à la libido)," pp. 204-5.

\textsuperscript{551} Ibid., p. 206.
developmental stages, when compared with Liébault's static model of attention, was due to the fact that it represented a metaphorical convergence with contemporary, evolutionary language.  

Also significant in this regard is the fact that in the therapeutic context, Freud set to replace prior notions of the hypnotic rapport with his concept of libido, in the form of the theory of transference. In his autobiographical study, Freud narrated an incident which he claimed revealed to him the libidinal factor at work behind hypnosis. On one occasion a patient awoke from a trance and threw her arms around his neck. Freud stated that his modesty stopped him from attributing the event to his personal attraction. The patient's affections were supposedly directed towards a third person, and transferred onto Freud. Léon Chertok has attributed a decisive significance to this event in the genesis of Freud's concept of the transference, which he argues arose as a defensive gesture to provide cover from the spectre of erotic entanglement that had long hung over the practice of animal magnetism, hypnosis and psychotherapy:

The physician no longer feels himself personally involved in consequence of the libidinal demands of a

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552 Ibid., p. 212.
553 Freud, "An autobiographical study," SE 20, p. 27.
female patient, and he is able to maintain a certain
detachment in his relationship with her...
Psychotherapists, who for a century had been
consciously or unconsciously haunted by the possible
erotic complications of the relationship, could
henceforth feel reassured...

Whether or not this incident had the historical significance
that Chertok attributes to it, it illustrates well the
manner in which Freud reformulated the hypnotic rapport in
terms of libido. Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen notes

(1) that the phenomena of transference is, as Freud
himself admitted, nothing other than the reemergence,
within analysis, of the characteristic relationship
("rapport") of hypnosis... and (2) that this singular
"rapport" with another person, as soon as it is
recognized, is immediately interpreted in analytical
terms, in that the patient's current relationship with
the analyst is understood (and at the same time
derealized) as the displaced representation or

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and epistemological considerations." One might further
conjecture that part of the appeal of Freud's concept of the
transference, as presented in the Dora case, over Janet's
concept of the 'passion somnambulique,' was the implication
that responsibility for therapeutic failures lay on the side
of the patient.
reproduction of an earlier "emotional tie" to a loved
and/or hated dritte Person.\textsuperscript{555}

The significance of these points for Jung emerges when one
considers his own abandonment of hypnosis. He wrote of the
reasons why he abandoned hypnosis in a letter in 1913 to Dr.
R. L öy. Jung stated that he had once practised hypnotic
suggestion with enthusiasm, but then three significant
incidents occurred. On the first occasion, a 56 year-old
'withered old peasant,' when awoken out of a trance, looked
at him tenderly and thanked him for being 'so decent.' He
commented:

This insight filled me for the first time with the
insecure feeling, that the nefarious person had
possibly understood more about the essence of hypnosis,
with the infamous consistency of feminine (at that time
I said "animal") instinct, than I with all the
knowledge of the scientific profundity of the text­
books.\textsuperscript{556}

The next incident concerned a 'pretty, coquettish' seventeen
year-old, who suffered from nocturnal enuresis. Jung said

\textsuperscript{555} Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, "Hypnosis in Psychoanalysis,"
The Emotional Tie: Psychoanalysis, Mimesis, Affect, p. 53.

\textsuperscript{556} Jung, "Timely psychotherapeutic questions: a
correspondence with Dr. C. G. Jung," CW 4, § 579, tr. mod.
that he thought of the 'wisdom' of the old woman, and tried to hypnotise her, whereupon she had fits of laughter. He said that he thought to himself that this was because she had already fallen in love with him. After hypnotising her, the enuresis stopped. He informed her that the next session would be the following Saturday, instead of Wednesday. On that occasion, the enuresis had returned on Wednesday night. He thought to himself "she wants to prove to me that I absolutely must see her on Wednesdays too; not to see me for a whole long week is too much for a tender loving heart."

He asked her to return in three weeks, knowing that he would be on holiday at that time. He was subsequently informed that she had come, that the enuresis had vanished, and that she had been very disappointed not to see him. He concluded, "The old woman was right."

Jung stated that the third incident was the final blow. In a subsequent account of this case, he cited it in the context of his lectures at the University of Zürich, which commenced in 1905. A 65 year-old woman came in on a crutch, and had suffered from pain in her knee for seventeen years, without finding a cure. When he offered to hypnotise her, she went into a state of somnambulism without his

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saying anything. He had difficulty rousing her, and when she awoke, she jumped up and claimed to be fully cured. He stated that he felt embarrassed and simply said to his colleagues "Behold the marvels of hypnotic therapy!" A year later the woman reappeared with a pain in her back. He stated he "saw written on her brow" that she had read the newspaper notice of the recommencement of his course on hypnotism, and the pain in the back was a pretext for seeing him again, and allowing herself to be spectacularly cured, again, which duly happened. He concluded:

As you will understand, a man possessed of scientific

559 In an account of the same case in 1932, Jung stated that he had twenty students present, with whom he was supposed to be demonstrating hypnosis and at this point he thought: "'Now I am in a mess,' and I prayed to God to perform a miracle on her behalf." The Visions Seminars 2, p. 308. Some, no doubt, would have attributed what ensued as divine intervention, or telepathic suggestion.

560 In the context of the clinical demonstrations, such an occurrence appears to have been not at all uncommon. Auguste Forel had described his practice as follows: "I began with those who had already been hypnotized previously, and thus I saved myself from having to prepare new patients. When the new patients' turn arrived, they were, as a rule, already so much influenced that they fell asleep at once." Hypnotism, p. 225. Some of the older patients that Jung dealt with, such as Babette Staub, the subject of his On the Psychology of Dementia Praecox: An Attempt, were already well 'trained' by Forel.

561 In his 1932 account, Jung stated that as he still felt unsure as to how she had been cured, he subsequently questioned her, and it emerged that she had an 'idiot son' who was in his ward - consequently she had looked to Jung as a second son. Jung added that it was due to the reputation he had gained from this case, that his private practice of psychotherapy started. The Vision Seminars 2, p. 309.
conscience cannot digest such cases with impunity. I was resolved to abandon suggestion altogether rather than allow myself to be passively transformed into a miracle-worker. I wanted to really understand what goes on in people's minds. It suddenly seemed to me incredibly childish to think of dispelling an illness with magical incantations, and that this should be the sole result of our efforts to create a psychotherapy. Thus the discovery of Breuer and Freud came as a veritable lifesaver.\textsuperscript{562}

The most striking aspect of these anecdotes is that Jung cites three cases of \textit{successful} cures to justify his

\textsuperscript{562} Jung, "Timely psychotherapeutic questions: a correspondence with Dr. C. G. Jung," \textit{CW} 4, § 582. In his final account of this case, in which he called it his 'first therapeutic experience' and his 'first analysis,' Jung stated that he continued to employ hypnosis in his private practice, but soon gave it up. \textit{Memories}, p. 140-1. It is perhaps significant that Jung's qualms about the use of hypnosis and its erotic components arise in the context of the inception of his private psychotherapeutic practice. In 1907, in a paper he co-wrote with Frederick Peterson, Jung put forward a qualified view on the utility of suggestion, based on diagnostic criteria: "the skilled physician is able to affect by suggestion acute hysterical states, which are nothing but the irradiations from an excited complex, while he fails in dementia praecox where the inner psychic excitement is so much stronger than the stimuli from the environment." "Investigations with the galvanometer and pneumograph in normal and insane individuals," \textit{CW} 2, § 1068. In 1946 however, Jung pointed out the impossibility of an break with suggestion in psychotherapy: "Suggestion happens of its own accord, without the doctor's being able to prevent it or taking the slightest trouble to produce it." The \textit{Psychology of the Transference, elucidated through an Alchemical Series of Images}, \textit{CW} 16, § 359, note 19.
abandonment of hypnosis. His initial statement concerning the wisdom of the old woman surpassing the textbooks is curious, given the longstanding recognition of the erotic and amorous nature of the rapport in the hypnotic literature, which had been most recently discussed by Janet, in his study of the 'passion somnambulique.'\(^{563}\) In the second incident and second episode of the third incident, Jung used suggestion and trance induction with the explicit assumption of their erotic relational components - with success. From the statement quoted above, it appears that one reason for his dissatisfaction with hypnosis was his view that its study would not lead to a psychotherapy grounded in a general psychology. In 1912, Jung stated of Freud's original libido theory that "the correctness of this theory in regard to the neuroses, strictly speaking the transference neuroses, was proven to me later after increased experience in the field of hysteria and compulsion neuroses."\(^{564}\) This suggests that one appeal to Jung of psychoanalysis may have been its utility in defusing the problems posed by the rapport.

Before considering Jung's attempts to reformulate Freud's conception of the libido, it is important to situate it in

\(^{563}\) Janet presented this notion at the International Congress of Experimental Psychology in Munich in 1896 and reprinted in his *Névroses et idées fixes* vol. 1, pp. 113-143. Jung had a copy of this work in his library.

terms of other models of life and energy in psychology and psychotherapy at this time.

The Energies of Men

In 1906, William James presented an address to the American Philosophical Association entitled "The energies of men," which was published the following year in The Philosophical Review. James commenced his presentation by commenting on the gulf between structural and functional psychology - the former designating laboratory psychology, and the latter, the clinical approach, as exemplified by Janet's work. According to James, was that of the amount of energy available for mental and moral tasks. He noted:

Practically everyone knows in his own person the difference between the days when the tide of this energy is high in him and those when it is low, though no one knows exactly what reality the term energy

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565 James's usage of the terms functional and structural psychology should not be confused with subsequent denotations. For the significance of functional psychology for James, I am indebted to conversations with Eugene Taylor.
covers when used here, or what its tides, tensions, and levels are in themselves... Most of us feel as if we lived habitually with a sort of cloud weighing on us, below our highest notch of clearness in discernment, sureness in reasoning, or firmness in deciding. Compared with what we ought to be, we are only half-awake. Our fires are dampened, our drafts are checked. We are making use of only a small part of our possible mental and physical resources.  

For the time being, James, claimed, the vagueness of such terms was unavoidable:

for though every man of woman born knows what is meant by such phrases as having a good vital tone, a high tide of spirits, an elastic temper, as living energetically, working easily, deciding firmly, and the like, we should all be put to our trumps if asked to explain in terms of scientific psychology just what such expressions mean. We can draw some child-like psychophysical diagrams, and that is all. 

In keeping with the concern for functional psychology, James's interest was not one of providing a conceptual

566 William James, "The energies of men," p. 130.
567 Ibid., p. 140.
definition of such an energy, nor with spelling out its relation with physical and neural forces, but with studying the means of its evocation. For James, functional psychology should proceed independently of so-called scientific psychology. The phenomenon of the 'second wind' took on an exemplary status for him, for he claimed that there existed untapped reservoirs of energy in all of us. In the clinical domain, the significance of this was indicated by Janet's cases of psychasthenia, which were characterized by feelings of fatigue, lassitude, and listlessness. James commented: "The way to treat such persons is to discover to them more usual and useful ways of throwing their stores of vital energy into gear."\(^{568}\) As examples of systems which focussed upon the means to release untapped energy resources, James cited the spiritual exercises of Ignatius Loyola, the practices of yoga and the practices of hypnotic suggestion. Suggestion, James claimed, was dynamogenic: "It throws into gear energies of imagination, of will, and of mental influence over physiological processes, that usually lie dormant."\(^{569}\) James' proposal was for an in-depth study and inventory of individual lives, through history and biographies, of the means that different types of individuals had employed to release such energies, akin to what he had accomplished in *The Varieties of Religious*  

Experience. To this day, such a study has yet to be undertaken. However, James' essay was not without impact on psychotherapy.

From the perspectives James outlined in this essay, the key task of psychotherapy lay not in determining the structure or cause of a neurosis, but in finding the means to unlock hidden resources of energy, principally through hypnosis and suggestion. Rather than developing a supposedly scientific vocabulary of energetics, James proposed articulating what lay implicit in the everyday terms of tiredness, elation, vigour, and so forth. At a diagnostic level, this concern with releasing untapped energy resources corresponded to the significance given to exhaustion and fatigue in neurasthenia and psychasthenia.

James's energetics were taken up by the Boston school of psychotherapy, as represented by the presentations at the symposium of the American therapeutic society held at the beginning of May 1909 in New Haven, an event which has been posthumously eclipsed by the Clark conference in Worcester later the same year. In his presentation on "The psychological principles and field of psychotherapy," one of the principles of psychotherapy that Morton Prince highlighted was the utilisation of emotional energy. Prince stated that it was well-known that depressive memories or ideas produced states of fatigue, whilst exalting ideas and memories released energy and brought about well-being.
Referring to James' "brilliant illumination" of this principle in "The energies of men," Prince stated that this principle accounted both for the development of neurosis, and of states of health. He claimed that it was easy to transform energy levels through hypnosis, by bringing certain ideas and memories into consciousness.⁵⁷⁰

Whilst for Prince, the transformation of emotional energy levels was dependent upon changing representations, a different perspective was taken by Boris Sidis in his presentation on "The psychotherapeutic value of the hypnoidal state." Sidis contended that contrary to the 'Germans,' tracing the psychogenesis of symptoms did not lead to cure, and had 'no special therapeutic virtues.' Instead, Sidis claimed that the therapeutic effect of psychotherapy rested upon the access to hidden reserves of energy provided by the hypnoidal state, which he described as a primordial state of sleep: "The therapeutic value of the hypnoidal state consists in the liberation of reserve energy requisite for the synthesis of the dissociated systems."⁵⁷¹ Sidis claimed that the theory of reserve energy had been independently advanced by James and himself, and that it formed the foundation of psychotherapy and psychopathology. As a consequence, it could provide an

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alternative explanation of the therapeutic pretensions of other schools of psychotherapy: "it is highly probable that Freud's success in the treatment of psychopathic cases is not so much due to 'psycho-analysis' as to the unconscious use of the hypnoidal state."\(^{572}\) One could say that for Sidis, in psychoanalysis, the couch had more therapeutic efficacy than the analyst, and the 'talking cure' was really a reincarnation of the 'rest cure.' The significance of Sidis' argument was that rather than claiming to advance a supposedly unique method of treatment as Freud did, he was attempting to account for the efficacy of different modes of psychotherapy.

Both Prince and Sidis utilized generalised concepts of psychological or emotional energy that did not have an exclusively sexual basis. Whilst great attention was played to the alteration of the levels of energy, in practical terms, this energy was not regarded as constant, as the untapped reserves of energy were regarded as being far in excess of energy generally used. The therapeutic retrieval of reserves of energy through the utilisation of hypnosis and hypnoidal states was directly counterposed to psychoanalysis. With the eclipse of the Boston school of psychotherapy, the decline in the use of hypnosis, and the ascendance of psychoanalysis, such energy conceptions played

\(^{572}\) Ibid., p. 132.
an increasingly minor role in psychotherapy.573

Interest

In Geneva, the psychologist Eduoard Claparède put forward a concept of interest in his presentation to the 1905 congress of experimental psychology in Rome, "Interest, fundamental principle of mental activity." In the proceedings of the congress, only an abstract was published. There, Claparède argued that if we undertake to determine through introspection the reason for our actions or the active connections of our thought, we always arrive at the fact that such an action or connection of thoughts interested us. He claimed that consideration of the behaviour of animals led to the same result, as a viable organism was one which adapted itself to the present situation through realizing the most useful action or

573 One notable exception to this general trend was Janet. Whilst Janet's early work played an exemplary role in James "The energies of men," James's essay played an important role in Janet's late work in psychotherapy, as it inspired his concept of psychological mobilisation. Janet described this by invoking the analogy of an industrialist. He stated that in an industrial enterprise, the work done not only depended upon the total capital, but upon how much of it was liquid. At given moments, the amount of available cash may be low, which graphically illustrated the state of patients when they came for treatment. What was necessary was "to restore the power of mobilising the reserves." In the terms of Janet's analogy, the therapist functioned as an accountant, instructing the patient upon how to balance their psychological expenditures with their income. Psychological Healing: A Historical and Clinical Study, pp. 938-9. Janet's energetic model did gain much acceptance, and the current revival of therapeutic interest in Janet has exclusively focussed on his early work.
'mental synthesis,' and hence acted in the line of its greatest interest. This reaction consisted in a 'dynamogenisation' of appropriate processes. He claimed that this explanation enabled one to dispense with an appeal to an intelligent faculty dominating the mind, such as the will or apperception, and allowed a reflexive, reactive conception to be substituted in its place. Claparède suggested that this concept of interest would be able to explain various psychopathological phenomena.\textsuperscript{574} His concept of interest was part of an attempt to ground psychology and psychotherapy in biology. He claimed that only in such a way could one differentiate between normal and abnormal mental phenomena, determine the causes of disease, and apply appropriate 'rational psychic treatment.'\textsuperscript{575}

Claparède developed the application of his concept of interest to the understanding of sleep and hysteria in his "Outline of a biological theory of sleep," which was published in 1905. Here he stated that at a given moment, it was the most important instinct which dominated and controlled the activity of a living being. He formulated this as the law of the 'supremacy of the instinct of the

\textsuperscript{574} Edouard Claparède, "L'Intérêt, principe fondamental de l'activité mentale," p. 253.

\textsuperscript{575} Claparède, "The value of biological interpretation for abnormal psychology," (1906), p. 92.
greatest momentary importance.' As an alternative formulation, he called this the 'law of momentary interest.' It was constitutive of this thesis that several distinct instincts were recognized. In the following paragraphs, he cited the instinct of feeding, the instinct of preservation and the sexual instinct.

For Claparède, interest was a characteristic of waking life. This enabled him to define sleep, from a psychological angle, as a "state of disinterest, of total distraction from the present situation." He extended this notion to hysteria, which he characterized as a state of partial, systematised distraction towards certain objects. He defined the hysterical as someone who escaped the law of momentary interest, and for certain stimuli, presented a 'cramp of disinterest.' Each time a particular object presented itself, it provoked an inhibitive reaction of disinterest. This reaction, he claimed, constituted a defense against something repugnant. He claimed in itself, such a reaction was perfectly normal - only its exaggeration and permanence could be regarded as pathological.

Claparède proceeded to use this model to explain the efficacy of psychotherapy, which, he claimed, consisted in

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577 Ibid., p. 337.
578 Ibid., pp. 338-342.
loosening the 'reflexes of exaggerated mental defence.' He stated that psychotherapy worked by means of suggestion and persuasion, including under the latter term the confidence that the doctor inspired in the patient. He stated that persuasion and suggestion worked through directly provoking a reaction of interest, which released the inhibitive reactions of mental defense.579

Creative Evolution

Whilst Claparède was attempting to ground psychology in biology, the relation of biology to philosophy, and by extension, psychology, was being radically reworked by Henri Bergson. Bergson's significance in the history of psychology has still been insufficiently appreciated, for a preoccupation with psychological problems and the contemporary issues in psychology, not to mention biology and physics, runs throughout Bergson's major works, such as Essay on the Immediate Givens of Consciousness, Matter and Memory, and Creative Evolution as well as his numerous essays and lectures. In The Creative Mind, Bergson gave an overview of his intellectual trajectory. He commenced by stating that existing philosophical systems were not 'cut to the measure' of reality:

579 Ibid., pp. 345-6.
examine any one of them... and you see that it could apply equally well to a world in which neither plants nor animals have existence, only men, and in which men would quite possibly do without eating and drinking, where they would neither sleep nor dream nor let their minds wander; where, born decrepit, they would end as babes-in-arms; where energy would return up the slope of its dispersion and where everything might just as easily go backwards and be upside down.\textsuperscript{580}

What Bergson sought was a thought that snugly fitted around the contours of reality, and it was this quest that initially took him to Herbert Spencer’s evolutionary philosophy. Bergson stated that it was this that led him to realise that accounts of evolution had failed to deal adequately with the question of time. Duration had been measured by the trajectory of a body in motion, i.e., spatially. However, Bergson noted that “the line that one measures is immobile, time is mobility. The line is made, it is complete; time is what is happening, and more than that, it is what causes everything to happen.”\textsuperscript{581} What was thus measured was not duration, but isolated intervals of time. The measure of time was an abstraction. Hence, real time, or

\textsuperscript{580} Henri Bergson, \textit{The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics}, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{581} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 12.
time as it was experienced, escaped mathematical treatment, as its essence was to flow. Bergson claimed that it had been a prevailing turn of thought to conceive of time in spatial terms, and that the categories of Western thought had spatialised time. He contended that this tendency resided in a fundamental trait of the intellect. As Emmanuel Lévinas put it, it was Bergson who was responsible for the "destruction of the primacy of clock time."^582

The elaboration of such perspectives led Bergson to critique widely prevalent psychological doctrines, ranging from the quantificatory programme of experimental psychology, associationist psychology, comparative psychology, theories of multiple personality, and to develop novel modes of understanding problems of memory and heredity, theories of the unconscious, dreams, humour and hypnosis. In psychiatry, Bergson's understanding of temporality was taken up by Eugene Minkowski, where it formed the basis for a new approach to psychopathology.^583 It is worthwhile to indicate Bergson's critiques of quantification in experimental psychology. In his first book

^582 Emmanuel Lévinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo, p. 27. Elsewhere, Lévinas described Bergson's theory of time as duration as one of the most significant contributions to modern philosophy, which and which was further critical to the development of phenomenology. Richard Kearney, "Dialogue with Emmanuel Lévinas," Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers: The Phenomenological Heritage, p. 49.

which appeared in 1889, *Essay on the Immediate Givens of Consciousness*, Bergson put forward a detailed critique of the claims of psychophysics. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Fechner-Weber law, which stated that the magnitude of a sensation could be mathematically derived by multiplying the logarithm of the strength of the sensation by a constant factor, was hailed as a great triumph for the experimental programme in psychology, as it was seen to have successfully demonstrated the possibility of quantifying qualitative states, and demonstrating law like relations between them. As Wundt expressed it,

The relation between sensation and stimulus is of importance because the knowledge of it allows us for the first time in the history of psychology to apply principles of exact measurement to mental magnitudes.\(^{584}\)

Bergson claimed that Fechner's mistake had been to believe in an interval between two successive sensations "when there is simply a passing from one to the other and not a difference in the arithmetical sense of the word."\(^{585}\) Consequently, psychophysics was caught in a vicious circle as:


the theoretical postulate on which it rests condemns it to experimental verification, and it cannot be experimentally verified unless its postulate is first granted. The fact is that there is no point of contact between the extended and the unextended, between quality and quantity. We can interpret one by the other, set up one as the equivalent of the other; but sooner or later... we shall have to recognize the conventional character of this assimilation.586

The work of Bergson's that was significant for Jung was his Creative Evolution of 1907. Bergson commenced this work by stating that the intellect felt most at home with solids, and that logic was the logic of solids. Consequently, the intellect was neither able to grasp the nature of life, nor evolution.

Two predominant modes in which life was understood were through mechanism and finalism, which Bergson criticised in turn. The errors of both stemmed from an over extension of concepts natural to the intellect, which worked by thinking out mechanisms and adapting means to ends. Each failed to grasp the dimension of time. The essence of mechanical explanation, Bergson claimed, was to "regard the future and

586 Ibid., p. 70. More recently, Bergson's depiction of this vicious circle has been called the experimenter's regress by Harry Collins (without citing Bergson) in his studies of experimental replication, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice.
the past as calculable functions of the present, which was only valid for systems artificially detached from the whole. He argued that finalism in fact represented an inverted mechanism, with the simple alteration that it substituted "the attraction of the future for the impulsion of the past." In radical finalism, entities were the resultant of a previously established programme. Consequently, "if nothing is unforseen, no invention or creation in the universe, time is useless again." Bergson's consideration of the shortcomings of radical finalism led him to criticise vitalistic theories, on the grounds that "in nature, there is neither purely internal finality nor absolutely distinct individuality." However, Bergson added that the very rejection of a mechanism implied the acceptance of an element of finalism, as he claimed that

The future then appears as expanding the present, it was not, therefore, contained in the present in the form of a represented end. And yet, once realized, it will explain the present as much as the present explains it, and even more.

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587 Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 37.
588 Ibid., p. 39.
589 Ibid.
590 Ibid., p. 42.
591 Ibid., p. 52.
For Bergson, life possessed an element of finality, as it was directional, without being guided towards preexisting ends. He claimed that science had to proceed on the basis that organic formation was mechanistic, as the aim of science was not to reveal the essence of things, but to supply means of acting upon things. It followed that "living matter lends itself to our action only so far as we can treat it by the processes of our physics and chemistry."^592 Philosophy, however, was not constrained by this imperative. He claimed that the only means by which organic formation could be truly grasped as a whole was through positing "an original impetus [élan original] of life, passing from one generation of germs to the following generation of germs through the developed organisms."^593 This impetus which was responsible for variations in evolution, Bergson termed the élan vital. His claim for the existence of this élan vital was bound up with his attempt to demarcate the normative relations between philosophy and biology, and to defend the autonomy of the former.

If, as Bergson stated, the intellect was characterized by an inability to comprehend life, the same was not true of instinct, which was "moulded on the very form of life" and which "carried further the work by which life organizes

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592 Ibid., p. 93.
593 Ibid., p. 87.
matter." One form that instinct took that was of special significance was intuition, which was "instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely." It was intuition that enabled one to grasp what surpassed the intellect. Bergson claimed that in the present day, intuition had been "almost completely sacrificed to the intellect." The task of philosophy, however, was to seize upon and develop whatever fleeting intuitions were present and then develop them. As Gilles Deleuze comments, Bergson's intuitive method can be stated in the form of three rules of method: 1) "Apply the test of true and false to problems themselves. Condemn false problems and reconcile truth and creation at the level of problems." 2) "Struggle against illusion, rediscover the true differences in kind or articulations of the real." 3) "State problems and solve them in terms of time rather than of space."

The publication of this work was greeted by much acclaim, and Bergson became a celebrity. William James hailed it as "the divinest book that has appeared in my life-time." He wrote to Bergson in rapturous terms, that gives a sense of

594 Ibid., p. 165.
595 Ibid., p. 176.
596 Ibid., p. 267.
597 Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, pp. 15, 21 & 31.
O my Bergson, you are a magician, and your book is a marvel, a real wonder in the history of philosophy... You may be amused at the comparison, but in finishing it I found the same after-taste remaining as after finishing "Madame Bovary," such a flavour of persistent _euphony_, as of a rich river that never foamed or ran thin, but steadily and firmly proceeded with its banks full to the brim.\(^{599}\)

Its significance, James claimed, was that it "inflicts an irrecoverable death-wound upon Intellectualism."\(^{600}\) Whilst Bergson was against what James called intellectualism, he was hardly against the intellect per se, as he was frequently misunderstood to be; he claimed that what was required was a complementary development of both principles. In his reply to James, Bergson stated that he had just begun reading James's _Pragmatism_, which he saw as setting out the programme for the philosophy of the future.\(^{601}\) In a subsequent letter, Bergson referred to his impression that there was a sort of 'preestablished harmony' between their

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\(^{599}\) James to Henri Bergson, 13th June 1907, Ralph Barton Perry, _The Thought and Character of William James_, vol. 2, p. 618.

\(^{600}\) _Ibid._, p. 619.

\(^{601}\) Bergson to James, 27th June 1907, _ibid._, p. 621.
work. It was principally the critical aspect of Bergson's work that James appreciated, expressing some reservations concerning his notion of the *élan vital* and his positing of the 'unconscious or subconscious permanence of memories.'

It has been claimed that with the publication of this work, Bergson became the most popular philosopher of his day: by 1912, 417 books and articles on Bergson had appeared, and by 1914, *Creative Evolution* had run through 16 editions in French and been translated into many languages. Grogin attributes the appeal of Bergson's work to three main factors: its literary qualities (Bergson was eventually awarded the Nobel prize for literature in 1927), its 'revolt against reason,' and its appropriation by the occult revival. Sanford Schwartz appears to be more correct when he claims that its appeal lay in the manner in which it synthesised opposing points of view, such as metaphysics and science and religion and naturalism.

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602 Bergson to James, 23rd July 1908, *ibid.*, p. 625. For James's appreciation of Bergson, see his "Bergson and his critique of intellectualism," *A Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 233-274.


604 Information from R. Grogin, *The Bergsonian Controversy in France 1900-1914*, pp. 81-82.


606 Sanford Schwartz, "Bergson and the politics of vitalism", in Frederick Burwick and Paul Douglass, *The Crisis in Modernism*, pp. 298-9. Schwartz describes Bergson's synthesis as an 'unstable compound,' and accounts for its rapid demise after the first world war to the changing
In his preface to *On the Psychology of Dementia Praecox: An Attempt*, dated July 1906, Jung openly stated that he didn't grant sexuality the psychological universality that Freud did. At the inception of his correspondence with Freud, Jung immediately took up with Freud the possibility of reformulating the libido theory to bring it into closer alignment with contemporary biology and psychology. On 23rd October 1906, he asked Freud:

> But do you not believe, that one can take a number of border points as subspecies of the other basic drive [Grundtriebes] of hunger, for instance, eating, sucking (predominately hunger), kissing (predominantly sexuality)?

The following March, he wrote to Freud that Freud's European cultural climate, which was no longer receptive to notions of an immanent spiritual force in the form of the élan vital or ideas of unlimited progress present in Bergson's notion of perpetual evolution. (p. 299).

In the following, I look at Jung's relation with psychoanalysis to trace his development of the libido concept during this period. The best reading of the mimetic rivalry between Freud and Jung over the concept of the libido is by Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, *The Freudian Subject*, pp. 53-126.


broadening of the concept of libido had opened it to misunderstandings and made the following suggestion:

Is it not thinkable that one keeps the sexual terminology only for the extreme forms of your "libido" for the protection of the presently prevailing reduced concept of sexuality, and one incidentally establishes a less offensive collective concept for all "libidines"?

The following year, Jung proposed to Freud a biological reformulation of hysteria and dementia praecox in terms of nonsexual drives. He stated that in dementia praecox or paranoia "the detachment and regression of the libido have good ground in the self assertion and psychological self-preservation of the individual." Whilst the former remained on the plane of self-preservation, he claimed that hysteria remained on the plane of the preservation of the species. He concluded that "The psychoses (the incurable ones) are probably to be understood as unsuccessful or rather over extended defensive encapsulations." The following year, Jung expressed himself to Ernest Jones in a similar fashion concerning the necessity of bringing the libido theory in

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^o Jung to Freud, 31st March 1907, ibid., p. 25, tr. mod.

^1 Jung to Freud, 20th February, 1908, ibid., pp. 123-4, tr. mod.
I share your opinion entirely, when you say that one must turn one's attention to biology. It will be one of our great future tasks to transfer the Freudian metapsychology into biology. I am already gathering thoughts in that direction. Then we will render Freud an ever greater service than if we charge directly against the resistances of our opponents. The worst is undoubtedly the Freudian terminology. It is not only difficult but also misleading to many since it does not originate from general, elementary biological insights but rather the occasional requirements of psychoanalysis, for instance, the entire sexual terminology. By "Libido," for example is meant the instinct for the preservation of the species and its derivatives (coerced assimilation, etc.), repression, defensive move, defense reflex etc., phantasy wish = preparatory play amongst animals and humans, rehearsals for adaptation etc., identification = imitation drive (for the adoption of defensive positions etc.)

In his Freud biography, Jones cited only a subsequent passage from this letter, in which Jung wrote:

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612 Jung to Jones, February 25th, 1909, tr. Michael Münchow, SFC. Jones' letters to Jung have not survived.
We should do well not to have to burst out with the theory of sexuality in the foreground. I have many thoughts about that, especially on the ethical aspects of the question. I believe that in publicly announcing certain things one would saw of the branch on which civilisation rests; one undermines the impulse to sublimation... The extreme attitude represented by Gross is decidedly wrong and dangerous to the whole movement. Both with students and with patients I get on further by not making the theme of sexuality prominent.\[^{613}\]

\[^{613}\] Ernest Jones, *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud*, vol. 2, pp. 157-8. The context of this statement was Morton Prince's apparent refusal to publish two papers by Abraham Brill and Karl Abraham in the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*. Jung commenced by expressing his regret at this, but added that a valuable lesson came out of it. In the first elided passage, Jung stated it was the undermining of sublimation that the 'Morton Prince people' feared, that he [Jung] did not share Stekel's therapeutic standpoint, and that Freud had no particular views on the matter, and favoured compromise. After the passage cited, Jung stated that since he had "introduced sexuality as the instinct for the self preservation of the species to Monakow, he at least in principal concedes the validity of certain matters."

(Jung to Jones, 25th February 1909, SFC). The neurologist Constantin von Monakow (1853-1930) formed the Psychiatrisch-Neurologischen Verein in Zürich with Paul Charles DuBois (1848-1918). Monakow featured as an important opponent of psychoanalysis, and Jung gives several caustic descriptions of him in letters to Freud (ed. McGuire, *The Freud/Jung Letters*, Jung to Freud, 30th November 1907, p. 101; 27th/November 1908, p. 180; 19th January, 1909, p. 198; 22nd November 1909, p. 268). Concerning psychoanalysis, Monakow later stated that he had confirmed the correctness of the clinical facts observed by Freud and Breuer, Bleuler, Jung and Adler, which were biologically important, without totally accepting their explanations. (*The Emotions, Morality and the Brain*, p. 82). Interestingly in the light of Jung's comments, he identified sexuality with the
Jones' selective citation of this letter gives the impression of an opportunism on Jung's part that, in this instance, is not supported by his consistent opposition to Freud's theory of the libido. Here, opportunism would be more appropriately descriptive of Jones' own position, for earlier the same month he wrote to Freud stating:

I want to be generally recognized in neurology and psychiatry or other fields, so that one's influence will be greater and one will be more readily listened to. A man who writes always on the same thing is apt to be regarded here as a crank... and if the subject is sexual he is simply tabooed as a sexual neurasthenic. Hence I shall dilute my sex articles with articles on other subjects alternately. I also think it is important to give first the more elementary points and to link them with recognised psychological principles, so as to get them accepted.  

Whilst Jung's letter to Jones makes clear Jung's political identification with the psychoanalytic cause, it also shows maintenance of the species (ibid., p. 24). He gave a critical account of the meetings of the Freud society in Zürich that he attended in his Vita mea Mein Leben, pp. 244-5. On the relation of his work to Jung's, see below.

that in private he thought as little of some of its fundamental theories and terminology as its opponents. These letters also indicate that Jung's allegiance to psychoanalysis, understood on a contractual level, was predicated on the assumption that its basic theories were flawed and could be thoroughly reworked.

Jung was not alone in his dissatisfaction with Freud's libido theory. In 1909 James Jackson Putnam wrote that Freud and his colleagues had for years unsuccessfully sought a wider term than the libido that "would include the idea 'sexual' yet without making that word so prominent." To this end, Putnam proposed the term "craving." Two years later, in a presentation before the American Psychopathological Association, Putnam went further, and presented a vastly expanded conception of the libido:

The mind contains a real, permanently abiding element which partakes of the nature of the real, permanently abiding energy of which the life of the universe itself is made... To this real, creative element of the mental life, on which all our striving, all our power of will and the renewal of thought depends, I venture to give the name of psyche generatrix or mens

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615 James Jackson Putnam, "Personal impressions of Sigmund Freud and his work," Addresses on Psycho-Analysis, p. 25.
Putnam claimed that this energy was in accord with the principle of the conservation of energy:

I believe... that one may admit, with Freud, that the principle of the "conservation of energy" can be applied as profitably with reference to mental phenomena as it has been with reference to physical phenomena.  

Jung in turn put forward an expanded conception of the libido in Transformations and Symbols of the Libido published in two parts in 1911 and 1912, and in his lectures at Fordham University in 1912, "An attempt at a presentation of psychoanalytic theory." In the second part of Transformations and Symbols of the Libido, Jung stated that whilst the term libido had been taken initially from the sexual sphere, it had become the most widely used term in psychoanalysis, due to the fact that its "significance is wide enough to cover all the unknown and countless


617 Ibid., p. 80.
manifestations of the Will in the sense of Schopenhauer."\(^{618}\)

He noted that since Freud's *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, the field of application of the libido concept had widened, and that both he and Freud had consequently felt the need to widen the concept of libido. To back up this assertion, he gave a lengthy citation of a section from Freud's study of the Schreber case, in which Freud raised the question as to whether the detachment of the libido from the external world was sufficient to account for the idea of the end of the world. Freud stated:

> we should either have to assume that what we call libidinal cathexis (that is, interest emanating from erotic sources) coincides with interest in general, or we should have to consider the possibility that a very widespread disturbance in the distribution of the libido may bring about a corresponding disturbance in the ego-cathexes. But these are problems with which we are still quite helpless and incompetent to solve. It would be otherwise if we could start out from some well-grounded theory of instincts; but in fact we have

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\(^{618}\) Jung, *CW* B, § 212. Jung added that "Freud's original conception does not interpret "everything sexual", although this has been asserted by critics." Sixteen years later, Jung was to claim that the critics who had charged Freud with pansexualism were quite justified. "On the energetics of the soul," *Contributions to Analytical Psychology*, p. 19.
nothing of the kind at our disposal.\textsuperscript{619}

Freud concluded this passage by stating that it was most probable that the paranoic's altered relation to the world stemmed from the loss of his libidinal interest. Jung took up this passage to argue that the loss of reality in dementia praecox could not solely be explained by the withdrawal of libidinal investments, which would suggest that what Janet termed the 'fonction du réel' was sustained solely by erotic interests. Consequently, he claimed that the libido theory was inapplicable to dementia praecox.

However, Jung claimed that after Freud's \textit{Three Essays}, a genetic concept of the libido had arisen, which had enabled him to replace the term psychic energy, which he had employed in \textit{On the Psychology of Dementia Praecox: An Attempt}, with that of the libido.

Jung then turned to evolutionary history, claiming that it demonstrated that many functions that presently lacked a sexual character were originally derived from the general propagation drive [Propagationstrieb]. Through evolution, part of the energy which had been previously required for propagation became transposed to create mechanisms for allurement and protection, which gave rise to the artistic drive [Kunsttrieb], which then attained a functional

\textsuperscript{619} Freud, "Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (dementia paranoides)", \textit{S.F.} 12, p. 74.
autonomy.

He noted that in nature, the instinct for the preservation of the species [Instinkt der Aterhaltung] and the instinct for self-preservation [Instinkt der Selbsterhaltung] was indistinct in nature, where one only saw a life drive [Lebenstrrieb] and a will to live [Willen zum Dasein].\(^6\) Jung stated that this conception coincided with Schopenhauer's conception of the will. Consequently, libido was related to every form of desire. He wrote:

This view leads us to a libido concept, which extends over the boundaries of the natural scientific formation to expand itself into a philosophical concept, to a concept of the Will in general. I must leave this bit of psychological voluntarism to the philosophers for them to finish. For the rest I refer to the words of Schopenhauer relating to this.\(^6\)

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\(^6\) Throughout his German publications, Jung utilised the standard German biological terminology, in using the term 'Instinkt' to refer to animals and humans, and reserving 'Trieb' specifically for the latter. These distinctions were not maintained in translations of Jung.

\(^6\) CW B, § 223, tr. mod. In his 1952 revision of this text, Jung substituted intentionality for Will, and replaced the sentence concerning psychological voluntarism with the following statement: "As the above quotation from Freud shows, we know far too little about the nature of human instincts and their psychic dynamism to give priority to any one instinct. We would be better advised, therefore, when speaking of libido, to understand it as an energy-value able to communicate itself to any field of activity whatsoever, be it to power, hunger, hatred, sexuality, or religion, without ever being itself a specific instinct." CW 5, § 197.
After an excursus on ancient intuitions of this conception, Jung gave an account of ontogenetic development. He claimed that in childhood, the libido was present in the form of the drive of nutrition [Ernährungstriebes]. New applications of the libido opened up through bodily development, culminating in sexuality. Subsequently, this sexual primal libido [Urlibido] becomes desexualised into new operations. He stated that in the genetic conception, the libido contained not only the 'Rezentsexuelle' but also what had widened into desexualised primordial libido.

Whilst Jung had initially claimed that the libido theory needed to be widened to deal with the psychoses, he now added that his genetic conception of the libido was applicable to the neuroses as well. In Jung's genetic model, there were three phases in the development of the libido: a presexual stage, a prepubertal stage starting from around the age of three to five, and maturity. He recognized a multiplicity of drives and instincts, which were distinct from the libido. This uncoupling of the libido from sexuality and its reformulation as a general principle of psychic energy led him to claim that the concept of libido had the same significance in the biological realm as the concept of energy since Robert Mayer had in the physical realm. Analogously, in his Fordham lectures the same year Jung claimed that the movements of the libido had a close

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622 Jung, CW B, § 218.
analogy with the principle of the conservation of energy, namely, that when a quantum of energy disappeared from a particular activity, it would reappear elsewhere.\textsuperscript{623} Jung went on to claim that with his genetic conception of the libido, psychology fell in line with the conception of energy in other sciences, and publicly stated what he had earlier written to Jones, concurring with the critics of Freud's libido concept:

Just as the older natural sciences were always talking of reciprocal actions in nature, and this old-fashioned view was replaced by the law of the conservation of energy, so here too, in the realm of psychology, we are seeking to replace the reciprocal action of co-ordinated powers of the soul [Seelenkräfte] by an energy conceived to be homogeneous. We thus give space to those correct criticisms that reproach the psychoanalytic school that it operates with a mystical conception of the libido.\textsuperscript{624}

Jung took up the question of the relation of this new concept of the libido with vitalism, which was necessary, given the fact that both Mayer and Helmholtz had been

\textsuperscript{623} Jung, "Attempt at an account of psychoanalytic theory," \textit{CW} 4, § 254.

\textsuperscript{624} \textit{Ibid}, § 281, tr. mod.
resolutely opposed to vitalistic theories, which were supposed to have been repudiated by the principle of the conservation of energy. Jung stated:

It cannot disturb us, if we are reproached with vitalism. We are as far removed from the belief in a specific life-force [Lebenskraft] as from any other metaphysics. Libido should be the name for the energy which manifests itself in the life process and is perceived subjectively as striving and desire. 625

Here, Jung appears not be denying the possibility of reducing life to physical and chemical processes, as he had done in the Zofingia lectures, but solely to be claiming that libido designated the subjective perception of such processes. No longer defending the autonomy of life or championing a vitalistic biology against the claims of materialistic biology, Jung's concern became one of defending the autonomy of the psyche, and the irreducibility of psychology from biology, however the latter conceived of the processes of life.

In his Fordham university lectures in 1912, Jung stated that Freud's concept of libido "is understood in so innocuous a sense that Claparède once remarked to me that

625 Ibid., § 282, tr. mod.
one could just as well use the word 'interest.'" This substitution of interest for libido was itself far from innocuous, as the former term played an important role in Claparède's own work, as depicted above.

Claparède's model of a plurality of instincts which were momentarily motivated by a supplementary factor of interest, corresponded closely to how Jung was reformulating the libido theory. Jung's reference to Claparède indicates that they had personally discussed this matter. In his letter to Freud of 11th December 1911, Jung stated that in his discussion of the question of the libido, it had been unavoidable to introduce some biology. In this respect, his biological reformulation of the libido concept brought it close to Claparède's attempt to ground psychology in biology. In 1914, Jung stated the word interest could be used to designate the wider libido concept, as Claparède had suggested, "if this expression had to-day a less extensive application." It is not clear whether Jung had in mind the widespread general use of the word interest, or Claparède's use of the term, or both, and hence whether the reason that he didn't use the term was to differentiate his concept from

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626 Ibid., § 273.


628 Jung, "On psychological understanding," CW 3, § 418. This sentence appeared in the German edition of Jung's presentation to the Psycho-Medical Society in London on July 24th 1914.
the former or the latter.\footnote{Claparède's views on Freud's libido have a curious aftermath. In his autobiography, Claparède stated that in his introduction to the French translation of Freud's Clark University lectures, which was the first work of Freud to appear in French, "I thought that the best way to explain his libido would be to identify it with "interest." But Freud did not agree." ("Autobiography", p. 77). In fact, Freud was rather upset with Claparède's remarks concerning the libido in his introduction. Freud wrote to Claparède on 25th December 1920 that "It is Jung, and not I, who have made the libido the equivalent of the drive power [Triebkraft] of all the activity of the soul [seelischen Tätigkeiten], and then who combats the sexual nature of the libido. Your assertion does not agree completely with my conception, nor with that of Jung, but constitutes a combination from us both. From me you have taken the sexual nature of the libido, from Jung its universal significance. And thus the pansexualist situation comes about, which only exists in the uncreative fantasies of critics, but which doesn't exist with myself or Jung." (In Mireille Cifali, "Notes autour de la première traduction française d'une oeuvre de Sigmund Freud," p. 299.)}

As Jung had cited Freud's statements in the Schreber case to back up his genetic conception of the libido, the question arose as to what extent Jung's views were to be regarded as divergent. The public response to Jung's views took the form of Ferenczi's review of Jung's Transformation and Symbols of the Libido, Jones and Abraham's reviews of Jung's Fordham university lectures, and Freud's rebuttals in "On the history of the Psycho-Analytic movement" and "on narcissism." The careful orchestration of these responses is evident from the letters that they exchanged between themselves. What also emerges is that the political significance of the theoretical difference between Freud and Jung was by no means constant.
On 12th September 1912, Ernest Jones wrote to Freud after a discussion with Jung's supporters Alphonse Maeder and Franz Riklin that whilst he suspected that some of Jung's views were of "purely personal origin," nevertheless much of this work is in striking agreement with the logical development of the Sexualtheorie that you yourself have gone through in the last years; especially the phylogenetic aspects, the inheritance of repression and perhaps already desexualised (sublimated) tendencies.⁶³⁰

Whilst Freud claimed that Jung had misunderstood his passage in the Schreber case, he initially did not accord much significance to this:

I never obliterated or changed the meaning of the libido, but stuck to my first definition all over... I hope we will have a good talk over it, but to be sure it is all discutable and highly interesting and there is no enmity in it.⁶³¹

Again to Karl Abraham, Freud claimed that the question he

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⁶³⁰ Jones to Freud, 12th September 1912, ed. Paskuaskas, The Complete Correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Ernest Jones, 1908-1939, p. 158.

⁶³¹ Freud to Jones, 22nd September 1912, ibid., p. 163.
posed had been asked "purely dialectically, in order to answer it in the negative." Ferenczi publicly criticised Jung's reading of this passage in Freud in his review, which Freud also repudiated in "On the history of the Psycho-Analytic movement."

Jung's new libido theory provoked an equivocal response in his former chief Eugen Bleuler. On 30th October, 1912 Jones wrote to Freud citing a letter he had just received from Bleuler stating that he had always thought that the libido theory had lacked clarity, and that Jung's work was very important. The following month Bleuler wrote to Freud that his difficulty with Freud's concept of the libido was the manner in which he subsumed under it the eating and sucking of little children, which he could not agree with. After the appearance of Jung's Fordham university lectures, Bleuler stated that whilst he was not convinced by the 'all

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633 Ferenczi disputed Jung's claim that any widening had occurred in Freud's work, adding that he himself "had already once wanted to generalise the concept of libido, and Freud already then expressly protested against it." Ferenczi, "Kritik der Jungschen 'Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido'," draft tr., Michael Münchow, p. 7.


635 Bleuler to Freud, 20th November 1912, Sigmund Freud archives, LC.
powerfulness' of Freud's concept of the libido, he could not accept Jung's 'sexless standpoint,' which probably went too far the other way. He wrote that Jung's concept really had nothing to do with the libido in Freud's sense, and should be separately developed and given a new name. Finally, on reading Freud's "On the history of the Psycho-Analytic movement," Bleuler wrote to Freud that

inspite of the difference in basic psychological concepts and my doubts on pansexuality and your sexual development, I stand infinitely closer to your conception than to the modern Jungian.

Thus between 1912 and 1914, Bleuler's judgement on Jung's genetic conception of the libido grew increasingly negative.

In his 1913 review of *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*, Flournoy welcomed Jung's reformulation of the libido. He stated that in Jung's work, the libido became the equivalent of Schopenhauer's "will to live," Ostwald's "energy" and Bergson's "élan vital." It broke free of the pansexualism with which Freud's libido concept had been charged, and regained its legitimate place alongside the nutritive functions, without losing its capital role in evolution. Whilst Flournoy found Jung's general account of

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636 Bleuler to Freud, 24th July 1913, *ibid.*

637 Bleuler to Freud, 4th July 1914, *ibid.*
human evolution "a little confused," he certainly felt that it marked an advance on the "not less entangled" attempts of the Freuds.\textsuperscript{638} It is interesting to note that prior to Jung's official secession from the International Psychoanalytical Association, Flournoy did not regard him as a Freudian.

Whilst Jung's widening of the concept of the libido appears to have been initially favourably received by Putnam,\textsuperscript{639} he subsequently altered his opinion. In 1915 he stated that Jung had overstressed the significance of the conservation of energy, and critiqued the possibility of a quantitative formulation of the libido:

One does not find that love or reason is subject to this quantitative law. On the contrary, the persons whom most of us recognize as the highest type do not love any given individual less because their love takes in another.\textsuperscript{640}

In the same year, Putnam wrote to Freud on 13th August that "no one has ever shown or has dreamed of showing that mental

\textsuperscript{638} Flournoy, review of C. G. Jung, "Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido."

\textsuperscript{639} Putnam, "Remarks on a case with Griselda phantasies," (1913),\textit{ Addresses on Psycho-Analysis,} p. 190.

forces are really subject to any such law as that of 'the conservation of energy.'" In 1917, Putnam stated that whilst he sympathised with Jung's desire for a broader formulation of the libido, he could not agree with Jung's "rejection of Freud's regression, infantile sexuality and fixation." Jung's reformulation of the libido brought it into closer proximity with general psychology and psychotherapy, as represented by such figures as Stern, Lipps, Claparède, Sidis, James and Prince, and hence overturned the disciplinary autonomy of psychoanalysis that Freud was attempting to establish. In addition, it was welcomed by Flournoy. In the psychological context at this time, it is important to remember that figures such as James, Flournoy, Claparède, Stern and Lipps had higher professional and institutional standings than Freud. Through altering the psychoanalytic emphasis on sexuality, Jung had also gone a long way towards meeting the charges of many of its critics. This linkage was not lost on Freud. On 1st January 1913, he wrote to Putnam, that "For me it seems like a 'déjà vu' experience. Everything I encounter in the objections of these half-analysts I had already met in the objections of


The one crucial, and embarrassing difference was that these charges were now made by the president of the International Psychoanalytical Association, who had previously been, alongside Freud, its most well-known exponent. In terms of strategy, Jung's reformulation of the libido was hence a formidable move, which the psychoanalysts were clearly aware of. On 25th April 1913, Jones wrote to Freud,

I am deeply impressed by the success of Jung's campaign, for he appeals to formidable prejudices. It is, in my opinion, the most critical period that will have to go through.\(^{644}\)

On 22nd November, Freud wrote to Jones:

We know J.s position is a very strong one, our only hope is still he will ruin it himself. You will have to fight him for influence in England and America and it may be a long and hard struggle.\(^{645}\)

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\(^{645}\) Freud to Jones, 22nd November 1913, *ibid.*, p. 242.
It is insufficiently realised that these fears initially proved to be quite well founded. In a comprehensive survey of the reception in the British press between 1912 and 1925, Dean Rapp showed that the works of Jung and his followers consistently received better reviews than the works of Freud and the psychoanalysts. He states that the most frequent charge against Freud was that he had exaggerated the role of sexuality. In the period between 1912 and 1919, he notes that reviewers stated their preference for Jung's wider conception of the libido, which also benefited from the widespread appeal of Bergson's *élan vital* that already existed.

In 1957, Jung retrospectively remarked on the subsequent development of Freud's theories. He stated that Freud "later started to work on concepts that were no longer Freudian in the original sense... He found himself constrained to take my line, but this he could not admit to himself." Indeed, a substantive part of Freud's reworking of his libido concept, from "On narcissism" to *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, which delimited the sexual nature of the libido and its provenance, can justly be regarded as extended.

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attempts at damage control.\footnote{Indeed, the desexualisation of the libido played a prominent part in the subsequent history of psychoanalysis: in America, through the rise of Heinz Hartmann's ego psychology and Heinz Kohut's self, in England with the rise of object relations theory, and in France with Jacques Lacan's reformulation of libido as desire. In such works, citations of Jung were interdicted.}

\textbf{Libido, hormé, élan vital}

Bergson's work had immediately attracted interest from figures involved with psychoanalysis. In 1909, Putnam gave a talk comparing Freud and Bergson's views on the unconscious.\footnote{Nathan Hale in Hale ed., \textit{James Jackson Putnam and Psychoanalysis: Letters between Putnam and Sigmund Freud, Ernest Jones, William James, Sandor Ferenczi, and Morton Prince}, 1877-1917, p. 49. Hale notes that no manuscript for this talk has been recovered.} Nathan Hale notes that in addition to Putnam, William Alanson White and Smith Ely Jeliffe also began to view Freud's libido as one manifestation of Bergson's \textit{élan vital}. One significance of this move was that it shifted Freud's concept of the libido away from the positivist epistemology that Freud placed it, towards one that, whilst receptive to philosophical and spiritual values, remained embedded within a coherent evolutionary and biological framework. After presenting his conception of the libido in \textit{Transformations and Symbols of the Libido} and his Fordham lectures, Jung drew a parallel between it and Bergson's \textit{élan vital}. The indications are that Jung read Bergson subsequent to developing his conception of the libido; the copy of
Bergson's *Creative Evolution* in Jung's library is the 1912 German translation. Jung's first reference to Bergson occurs in a letter to Löy in March 1913. Commenting on the shortcomings of causal and mechanistic explanations of organic formation, Jung stated "I would remind you of Bergson's excellent criticism in this respect."  

On 8th October 1912, in his presentation before the New York Academy of Medicine, whilst announcing that he proposed to "liberate" psychoanalytic theory from "the purely sexual standpoint," Jung stated that "libido can be understood as the vital energy in general." Jung presented a slightly revised version of the same paper the following year before the 17th International Medical Congress, in London, held between 6th and 12th August, 1913. There, after the sentence just quoted, he added the phrase "or as Bergson's *élan vital*." (As noted earlier, Flournoy had stated in 1913 that Jung's libido concept was analogous to Bergson's *élan vital*.)

On 24th July 1914 in a lecture before the psycho-medical society in London, Jung stated that as the term libido, which he had used in his German publications seemed to be misunderstood in English, he proposed to rename it *hormé*,

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651 Jung, "Timely psychotherapeutic questions: a correspondence with Dr. C. G. Jung," *CW* 4, § 665.

652 Jung, presentation before the New York Academy of Medicine, ms., p. 5.

653 Jung, "Psychoanalysis and neurosis", *CW* 4, § 568.
adding that "Hormé is related to Bergson's conception of the 'élan vital.'" This would have served to clearly differentiate his concept from Freud. However, Jung continued to use the term libido in his German publications, and the term hormé was not used at all by his translators, or subsequently by Jung when he wrote or lectured in English.

However, hormé was subsequently used by one individual who attended Jung's lecture in London, William McDougall, who later characterized his psychology as 'hormic.' Concerning the relation between hormé and élan vital, Jung stated:

I am conscious of the fact that, as the conception of

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655 Ernest Jones wrote to Freud on 3rd August 1914, "Jung unfortunately had a great success in his London lecture, and McDougall was so impressed by that he is going to be analysed by Jung... The one progress is that he has a new word "Horme" for Libido, and "prospective psychology" for Ps-A, as conceived by himself." Ed. Paskuaskas, The Complete Correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Ernest Jones, 1908-1939, p. 298. Jones stated that he had read the text as it had been forwarded to him as an editor of the Journal of Abnormal Psychology. In the version that was published, the term 'prospective psychology' does not occur. Jung spoke of a necessity for a psychology which provided prospective understanding, as opposed to merely retrospective understanding. Concerning the term hormé, McDougall, who commended Jung's concept of the term libido over Freud, stated that the use of same word would inevitably led to confusions. He stated: "I regret that Jung did not see fit to adopt this word in place of 'libido', when I urged it upon him many years ago in conversation." An Outline of Abnormal Psychology, p. 27. McDougall's analysis with Jung will be gone into elsewhere.
hormé corresponds to Bergson's "élan vital," so the constructive method also corresponds to his intuitive methods. But I confine myself to psychology and to practical psychological work, realizing that every conceptual formula is psychological in its essence.  

In his German version, Jung called Bergson's élan vital a "Parallelbegriff" to his concept of the libido. Also in the German version of this text, Jung added at this point:

When I first read Bergson a year and a half ago for the first time, found to my great pleasure everything which I had worked out in my practical work had been put in consummate language and in wonderfully clear philosophical style.

Here, Jung stated that what he had discovered through clinical work had been confirmed by Bergson's philosophy, and specifically indicated two points of convergence: that between his concept of hormé and Bergson's élan vital, and between his constructive method and Bergson's intuitive method. Jung differentiated his concepts, by claiming that

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657 Jung, "The content of the psychoses," Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology, p. 351, tr. mod. It is strange that in the version in the Jung's Collected Works, which purports to be a translation of this same text, both of these passages referring to Bergson are missing.
they were purely psychological. He indicated that his reading of Bergson, some time around the beginning of 1913, provided him with a confirmation of the new views he had independently worked out.

Further indication of the impact of Bergson on Jung is provided in his letters to Hans Schmid. From these, it emerges that the area in which Bergson's work had the greatest impact on Jung was on the development of his psychological typology. On 4th June, 1915, Jung wrote to Schmid that:

From Bergson namely I got the concept of the irrational. The unmistakable hypostatisation of this concept in Bergson pleases me. With it we namely gain two principles intimately connected with one another, which are reciprocally conditioned, the rational and the irrational.658

The following year, in a lecture in Zürich, Jung stated: "Special thanks are due to Bergson for having broken a lance for the right of the irrational to exist."659 In Psychological Types, Jung stated that he used the concept 'irrational' "not in the meaning of against reason

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658 Jung to Schmid, 4th June 1915, Hull draft translation, p. 39, tr. mod.

[Widervernünftigen], but in the sense of outside reason
[Außervernünftigen], namely that which is not grounded on
reason.660 Jung added that the irrational consequently
surpassed rational explanation. Bergson does not appear to
have specifically used the term 'irrational.' However, it is
clear that the aspect of Bergson's work that was significant
for Jung in this regard was what James described as his
critique of intellectualism. The charge of irrationalism (as
Jung would have put it, in the sense of Widervernünftigen) is
often made against Jung. What is not realised is the fact
that for Jung, the concept of the irrational derived its
philosophical justification in the Bergsonian delimitation
of the provenance of the intellect, and the recognition that
life exceeded representational consciousness. Using Jung's
terminology seen from a Bergsonian perspective, the key
problematic was rather one of not subsuming the irrational
into the rational.

Jung's correspondence with Schmid was concerned with the
clarification of psychological typology. At this stage, Jung
viewed the introvert as being characterized by the
predominance of thinking and abstraction, and the extravert
as being characterized by feeling and empathy. Schmid's
letter of 24th June 1915 to Jung takes up this distinction,
and reveals the significance of Bergson's work in their
evolving conception of psychological typology. Schmid wrote:

660 Jung, Psychological Types, CW 6, § 775, tr. mod.
When I read Bergson's *Creative Evolution* two years ago, I tried to draw parallels between the impulse of abstraction and the impulse of empathy on the one hand, and Bergson's pair of opposites: vegetable and animal living things and intellect and instinct on the other. If life is everywhere built up on the play of complementary yet opposing tendencies, why shouldn't this be the case in psychology? Like Bergson, I regarded the opposites as originating from a primordial form [Urtypus], which originally combined both tendencies in itself. With continued development everyone only follows more the one tendency and lets the other atrophy... Just as the carbon dioxide and oxygen cycle in the atmosphere is kept constant by an antagonism between the animal and plant world, so, I imagine, psychic development becomes possible only by an antagonism between abstraction and empathy.

"Evolution is never accomplished in the direction of an association, but of a dissociation, never towards convergence, but towards the divergence of efforts."\(^{661}\)

At the same time I always tried to keep clear to myself, that the tendencies into which the primordial tendency [Urtendenz] split itself must be of equal importance, equal value; for Bergson also writes: "The

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\(^{661}\) Bergson, *L'Évolution créatrice*, p. 128. The citation has been rendered in the form given (Schmid omitted the phrase 'of which we speak' after 'evolution.')
elements in which a tendency dissociates lack the same importance and above all the same power of evolving. However "one is tempted to regard them as activities of which the first will be superior to the second and to superimpose itself there, whereas in reality they are not things of the same order, neither have they succeeded one another, nor can one assign them ranks."

Schmid then recounted his temptation to see Jung's standpoint as irrational, and his own as the only rational one, which he now realized was an error, viewing their 'opposites' as 'two divergent solutions to the same problem' "as Bergson has shown of intellect and instinct." He added that:

Altogether we may perhaps still find a few more important parallels in Bergson's work... I would like to apply Bergson's introductory statement (p. 148) to our problem: All the differences we shall establish we must make too pointed (trop tranché), because we wish to define only what is typical in thinking and in feeling, whereas in every feeling there is hidden a

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662 Ibid.
663 Ibid., p. 147. Schmid to Jung, 24th June 1915, Hull draft translation, pp. 43-4, tr. mod.
thought, and every thought is steeped in feeling..."^^\n
Bergson had written:

the distinctions we are going to make will be too
sharply drawn, just because we wish to define what in
instinct is instinctive, and in intelligence what is
intelligent, whereas all concrete instinct is mingled
with intelligence, as all real intelligence is
penetrated by instinct."

What Schmid had done in this citation was to substitute
thinking for intelligence, and feeling for instinct. In
Psychological Types, Jung put forward a model of the psyche
which consisted in the interrelation between pairs of
opposed functions: thinking and feeling, and sensation and
intuition. He defined intuition as perception via the
unconscious. Jung now described thinking and feeling as
rational functions, and sensation and intuition as
irrational functions. Whereas in his letters to Schmid,
thinking and introversion, and feeling and extraversion
respectively had been equated, these terms were now
separated: each of the functions could be either extraverted
or introverted.

\[\text{Ibid., p. 46, tr. mod.}\]

\[\text{Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 136.}\]
Schmid's letter cited above gives some indication of the manner in which Bergson's work may have provided Jung with a model of understanding the relation and opposition between a pair of psychological functions, in addition to the basis for his distinction between the rational and the irrational, and the notion of intuition as a cognitive faculty.

In *Psychological Types* however, Jung put forward a critique of Bergson, in the context of his critique of James's pragmatism. He wrote:

Bergson though has pointed out to us intuition and the possibility of an "intuitive method." But it remains a mere *indication*, as we know. A *proof* of the method is lacking and will also not be so easy to produce, although Bergson may point to his concepts of the "élan vital" and the "durée créatrice" as products of intuition. Aside from these intuitively grasped basic views... the Bergsonian method is intellectual and not intuitive.66

In actual fact, Bergson had explicitly dealt with a form of this critique in *Creative Evolution*. To the argument that any attempt to go beyond intelligence remained within it, Bergson replied that this vicious circle, which had

666 Jung, *Psychological Types*, CW 6, § 540, tr. mod. Jung added that it was Nietzsche who had made far greater use of the intuitive source in *Zarathustra*. 
nevertheless constrained other philosophies, was only apparent. This was because:

all around conceptual thought there remains an indistinct fringe which recalls its origin... we compared the intellect to a solid nucleus formed by means of condensation. This nucleus does not differ radically from the fluid surrounding it. It can only be reabsorbed in it because it is made of the same substance.\textsuperscript{667}

Whilst tracing the impact of Bergson's work on Jung, it is important to note aspects of his \textit{Creative Evolution} that ran directly contrary to the positions that Jung would subsequently adopt. This is starkly apparent in Bergson's critique of forms, which may be taken as a critique of Jung's archetypes, 'avant la lettre':

The Forms, which the mind isolates and stores up in concepts, are then only snapshots of the changing reality. They are moments gathered along the course of time; and just because we have cut the thread which binds them to time, they no longer endure. They tend to withdraw into their own definition, that is to say, into the artificial reconstruction and symbolic

\textsuperscript{667} Bergson, \textit{Creative Evolution}, p. 193.
expression which is their intellectual equivalent. They enter into eternity, if you will; but what is eternal in them is just what is unreal.®®

Primitive Energetics

In 1914, Jung had stated that his concept of hormé and Bergson's élan vital were age-old conceptions of primitive mankind. Among primitive people we find nearly everywhere an identical conception of a dynamic soul-substance or a psychic energy. Its definition corresponds perfectly with the definition of hormé if one is able to overlook the unavoidable difference between civilized and uncivilized expression... Considered from the objective or scientific standpoint, such a concept as hormé would be an impossible regression into primeval superstition. But considered from the constructive standpoint the existence of this concept through illimitable ages guarantees its practical usefulness, because it belongs to those primeval symbolic images which have always helped the process of transformation of our vital energy.®®®

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Ibid., p. 335.

Here, the parallels with primitive conceptions of energy, which assured the therapeutic efficacity of the concept of hormé, at the same time indicated the illegitimacy of the concept from a scientific standpoint. However, Jung was not to rest content with this formulation of the non-scientific nature of his energy concept.670

In 1917, Jung took up the problem of the psychogenesis of Mayer's conception of the conservation of energy. Taking his cue from Mayer's statements that his initial conception of the idea was not logically deduced, but arrived at in a state of inspiration, Jung claimed that "the idea of energy and of its conservation must be a primordial image that lay dormant in the absolute unconscious."671 If these concepts were indeed primordial images, it should be possible to show their emergence in other epochs. Jung claimed that this indeed was the case, and that "Primitive religions, in the most dissimilar regions of the earth, are founded upon this image."672 Here, Jung criticised Tylor and Frazer's interpretation of such phenomena under the rubric of animism, and approvingly cited Arthur Lovejoy's conception of 'primitive energetics.'

Lovejoy had put this forward in 1906 in an article

670 On this issue in general, see below, "the ancient in the modern."


672 Ibid.
entitled "The fundamental conceptions of primitive philosophy." He commenced his article by criticising the concept of animism, claiming that 'primitive philosophy' contained a more important and more pervasive element:

that there is in nature a diffused and inter-connected impersonal energy or vital force, some quantum of which is possessed by all or most things or persons; that the amount of this energy is more or less fixed or limited.  

Lovejoy went on to state that striking events were attributed to this energy, that it was possessed by persons and things in different degrees, that it could be transferred, controlled and regulated by various means, and that the aim of numerous rites lay in its transformation. He claimed that his energy conception was "the most nearly ubiquitous, most all-pervasive and most influential of the notions characteristic of early man's thinking." He then marshalled an array of ethnological data in support of his claim. The manitou of the Algolkins, the oki of the Iroquois, the wakonda of the Dakotas, the mana of the Melanesians, the atu of the Polynesian, the mulungu of the


674 Ibid., p. 361.
Bantu, and the ngai of the Masai were all adduced as but different linguistic and cultural expressions of the same fundamental conception of primitive energetics. As the North American names were most familiar, Lovejoy proposed adopt the term manitou as a generic designation for this energy concept, and manitouism for the belief in this energy.\(^{675}\)

Whilst he did not include the modern notion of the conservation of energy under manitouism as did Jung, the extension was a natural one, as the very terms which Lovejoy used to describe primitive energetics were contemporary ones, such as quanta of energy. What Jung did was simply to provide an explanation for the 'ubiquity' that Lovejoy claimed to have demonstrated through his theory of primordial ideas. Jung's conclusion was that the revival of a primordial idea in the case of Mayer's conception of the conservation of energy was by no means an isolated incident, but simply exemplified the fact that the "greatest and best thoughts" were founded on primordial images.\(^{676}\)

The Energy of the Soul

Soon after the completion of *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*, Jung commenced an extended work on the

\(^{675}\) *Ibid.*, p. 382. For Marcel Mauss' similar attempt to form a generic concept of mana, see below, "Mauss" in "the ancient in the modern."

\(^{676}\) Jung, "the psychology of the unconscious processes," *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology*, pp. 413-4.
question of the libido. This was set aside, and taken up again in 1927, and published the following year. This work, initially titled "The theory of libido," was published in German as "on the energetics of the soul." Jung commenced this essay by noting that as the concept of libido that he had advanced in *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido* had met with misunderstandings, it would be useful to take up its fundamental conceptions. In that work he had presented his libido concept as if it were a broadening of Freud's. Following this, it has generally been taken that his concept of the libido grew out of Freud's, of which it was the revision. However, in "On the energetics of the soul," Jung presented a different account of the antecedents of his concept of libido, and of the problematics that led to it.

Jung noted that physical events could be viewed at from the mechanistic and energic standpoint, which he described as finalistic. He added that "I avoid the expression 'teleological' in order to escape the misunderstanding that attaches to the current conception of teleology, that is, the assumption that teleology contains the idea of an

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677 The information on the history of the text is from H. G. and Cary Baynes's introduction to their translation of the text, which they retitled "on psychical energy." They further state that the work was put to one side due to the "greater importance of the type-problem," though this would not explain why it only appeared seven years after the publication of *Psychological Types. Contributions to Analytical Psychology*, p. ix.
anticipated end or goal." This notion of a directedness without a predetermined goal echoed Bergson's conception in *Creative Evolution*. Jung claimed both the mechanistic and finalistic standpoints were necessary. Raising the question whether psychic events could be viewed from the energetic standpoint, he concurred with von Grot, who had argued that it was valid to posit the existence of a specifically psychic energy. As to the relation of this energy to physical energy, which opened up the problem of the mind-body problem, Jung stated that this could be left to one side, and that the psyche could be considered as a "relatively closed system."  

Jung stated that this raised the question of the possibility of quantitative measurement in psychology, which he answered in the affirmative: "our psyches possess what is in fact an exceedingly well-developed evaluating system, namely, the system of psychological values." He defined values as "energetic evaluations of quantity." He claimed that an objective means of evaluating value-intensities was provided by the associations experiment, implicitly diverging from Wundt's position on the unquantifiable nature of psychic energy.

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679 Ibid., p. 6.

680 Ibid., p. 7. tr. mod.

681 Ibid., tr. mod.
In Jung's initial reports of his associations experiments, whilst he had on occasion employed the term psychic energy, there had been little evidence of an overt concern with energetics. Here, he reinterpreted the significance of these experiments for the measurement of psychic energy. He stated that a complex consisted of a nuclear element and secondary associations. This nuclear element was in turn made up of a component determined by experience, and a component determined by innate disposition. He stated the nuclear element was characterized by the emotional stress, which was an affective accentuation and that "this accentuation is, energetically expressed, a value quantity."\(^{682}\) Jung claimed that the nuclear element created a complex when it had a high energetic value, and that "the constellating force of the nuclear element corresponds to its value-intensity, respectively to its energy."\(^{683}\) He argued that this could be quantitatively determined from the number of constellations that the nuclear element affected, the frequency and intensity of the complex indicators, and the intensity of the accompanying affective phenomena (the latter being experimentally determined by measuring the pulse, respiration, and the psychogalvanic reflex). In each case, Jung was referring to his prior work on the associations experiment, and


reformulating the results in terms of new energic model.

Jung then considered the concept of psychic energy, which he noted had already been advanced by Schiller, and then by von Grot, Theodor Lipps and William Stern. Jung credited Lipps with introducing a distinction between psychic force and psychic energy, though he criticised Lipps's distinction between different forms of psychic energy. Jung claimed that just as much as physics, psychology had the right to build up its own concepts, as Lipps had claimed. He claimed that this right enabled psychology to utilise its own energy concepts, despite the fact that there was no clear way of separating biological and psychic processes. Consequently, he noted:

we may safely conceive a psychic process as simply a life process. With this we enlarge the narrow concept of psychic energy to a broader concept of a life-energy [Lebens-Energie], which subsumes so-called psychic energy as a specific form... The concept of a life-energy has nothing to do with a so-called life-force [Lebenskraft], for this latter, as force, would be nothing other than a specific form of a universal

684 Jung did not give a citation to Lipps's statement, though in all likelihood he had the following statement in mind: "The concept of psychic force and psychic energy... do not and should not correspond with the physical concepts of force and energy. Psychology has the right to establish its concepts according to its own grounds of suitability." Leitfaden der Psychologie, p. 62.
In consideration of the psychological use we propose to make of it, I have suggested that we call the hypothetically assumed life-energy, libido, to differentiate it in such a manner from a universal energy concept, in accordance with the biological and psychological privilege of specific concept formation. With this I will in no way forestall the bioenergists [Bioenergetiker], but only openly show them the aim in which I have employed our use of the term libido. For their use a "bioenergy" or a "vital energy" may be suggested.\textsuperscript{685}

Jung's differentiation between libido as a life-energy and as a life-force may be seen as an attempt to demarcate his libido concept from what he understood to be the hallmark of vitalistic theories. Hence in the following sections, Jung attempted to demonstrate the manner in which his concept of libido fulfilled the requirements of the principles of the conservation of energy and entropy. These sections form a significant attempt by Jung to provide his psychology with a scientific basis. Whilst Jung shared with the neovitalists such as Driesch, the rejection of the mechanistic model and the emphasis on the necessity for a finalistic perspective, Jung differentiated himself from them, in resisting the

\textsuperscript{685} Ibid., p. 17, tr. mod.
reduction of psychology to biology. Having established the autonomy of the psyche, the question of whether life was reducible to physical and chemical terms was no longer of vital importance, as it had been for Jung at the time of his Zofingia lectures. In contrast to Driesch, in "On the energetics of the soul," Jung restricted his considerations to human psychology, as opposed to considering organic life as a whole. Whilst Driesch had claimed that his principle of entelechy wasn't a form of energy, as it wasn't quantifiable, Jung claimed that his concept of psychic energy was quantifiable, if to a limited extent.

Jung noted that an energetic standpoint in psychology would not be possible unless the principle of the conservation of

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686 Here I concur with Marilyn Nagy, who states that Jung "chose the alternatives favored by vitalism - an energetic or final view of the psyche, a relatively closed system, and the possibility of a causal relationship between psyche and soma - for his concept of libido or psychic energy." (Philosophical Issues in the Psychology of C. G. Jung, p. 255.) Interesting in this regard is Richmond Wheeler's statement in 1939 that Jung "has reverted to belief in the autonomy and independence of the human spirit, a view which stultifies mechanism as adequate for the science of human life and so at least keeps the door open for vitalism in general biology." (Vitalism: Its History and Validity, p. 182). However what is important to grasp is how Jung attempted to hold this proximity whilst establish a decisive difference - upon which the autonomy of psychology rested. Nagy presents an informed discussion of Jung's relation to vitalism. Whilst the conclusions presented here differ from hers in many respects, her work represents one of the few significant studies of Jung to date.

687 In his autobiography, Driesch recalled that he met Jung in the 1930's, which he valued, as they had found that they had much in common, especially in matters of parapsychology. Lebenserinnerungen: Aufzeichnungen eines Forschers und Denkers in entscheidender Zeit, p. 274.
energy was applicable. He referred to Busse's distinction between the principles of constancy and equivalence, the former stating that the sum total of energy remained constant, and the latter stating that for energy spent or consumed, a similar quantity of energy appeared elsewhere. For Jung, the former principle constituted a generalised inference of the latter, and hence it was this that was of importance for psychology.

Jung claimed that he had demonstrated the applicability of this principle in Transformations and Symbols of the Libido, and that it had also been demonstrated by Freud's work on sexuality:

Nowhere better than precisely in the relation of sexuality to the whole psyche, does one see so to speak how the disappearance of a quantum of libido is followed by the appearance of a corresponding value in another form.\[688\]

Jung added that Freud's mistake was his overvaluation of sexuality and the inevitable onesidedness of the mechanistic standpoint.\[689\] Jung maintained that the principle of

\[688\] Ibid., p. 19, tr. mod.

\[689\] In a letter to Smith Ely Jelliffe on April 2nd, 1920, Jung had written that Freud's over extension of the concept of sexuality had resulted in an unscientific metaphysical concept "like 'matter' in the famous philosophical materialism of 1870-80." By contrast, he
equivalence had a great practical utility which was known to anyone who had practised 'in this field':

When some conscious value, such as a transference, diminishes, or even disappears, one looks immediately for the surrogate formation, in the expectation of seeing an equivalent value spring up somewhere.  

When such a surrogate formation was not immediately apparent, Jung held that it was nevertheless present, but unconscious, and that careful observation would soon reveal heightened unconscious activity, such as significant dreams or symptoms. Whilst such a principle may well be a useful practical maxim in psychotherapy, Jung's anecdotal evidence would have been unlikely to convince a physicist as a rigorous demonstration that the putative psychic energy claimed that sexuality should properly be regarded as a "subdivision of the creative energy." He characterized Freud's theory as being of a "morbide [sic] character, as it shows that the psyche of its originator only can conceive of a psychology where one instinct prevails to such an extent that it becomes an obsession, an 'idée obsédante,' a morbid religious concept." John Burnham and William McGuire, Jelliffe: American Psychoanalyst and Physician & His Correspondence with Sigmund Freud and C. G. Jung, p. 201-2. This letter indicates the manner in which Jung's concept of psychic energy represented a renewed attempt to combat the materialism that he had opposed in his Zofingia lectures. Jung does not appear to have used the term 'creative energy' elsewhere. On Jung's pathologisation of the personal equation in respect of Freud, see above, "the personal equation in psychoanalysis," in "the individual and the universal."

Ibid., pp. 19-20.
fulfilled the laws of the conservation of energy. Sidis's work could be said to have been based on a contrary maxim—that through psychotherapy, the patient would experience an increase in the availability of energy.

Jung then stated that the libido possessed a further analogy with physical energy, namely a factor of extensity "which cannot pass into a new structure without the transference of parts or characteristics of the previous structure with which it was connected." Jung stated that this principle had been demonstrated in *Symbols and Transformations of the Libido*. He then turned to a consideration of entropy. After a description of Carnot's principles, Jung stated that as the psyche could be regarded as a "relatively closed system," the principle of entropy applied, and that "the transpositions of energy also lead to an equalization of difference." He noted that according to Boltzmann, this process consisted in the transition from an improbable to a probable condition. Jung argued that this was exemplified in the development of a lasting attitude:

> After violent oscillations at the beginning the contradictions balance each other, and gradually a new attitude develops, the final stability of which is the greater in proportion to the magnitude of the initial

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He stated that as the psyche was only a relatively closed system, one did not observe a "complete psychological entropy." Likewise, that in instances where the isolation of the psychological system was more pronounced, the entropy was correspondingly more pronounced, such as was evident in the "dulling of affect" in dementia praecox or schizophrenia.

Jung contended that this manner of speaking was only giving a precise statement of what was generally known:

This way of looking at things has long been familiar. Everybody speaks of the 'storms of youth' which yield to the 'tranquillity of old age'. We speak too of a 'strengthened opinion' after 'battling with doubts', of a 'relief from inner tension', etc. This is the arbitrary energetic standpoint shared by everyone.\(^{694}\)

Thus Jung's libido concept was intended to enable the transition from the 'arbitrary energetic standpoint' to a precise scientific psychological energetics. Whilst James had argued for the independence of functional psychology from scientific psychology, Jung was attempting to ground

\(^{693}\) Ibid.

\(^{694}\) Ibid., p. 29.
the practice of psychotherapy in the latter. The question raised by Jung's attempt to claim that the concept of the libido fulfilled the requirements of the conservation of energy and entropy is whether what was involved was anything more than an analogy, and the metaphorical transposition of the language of physics to psychology, or that to speak of 'psychological entropy' was any less metaphorical than to speak of 'magnetic personalities.' The effect of such metaphorical transpositions was the constitution of the psyche as an autonomous self-regulating system of energy transformations, and the modelling of psychotherapy as a form of thermostat. It is unclear to what extent Jung himself was satisfied by his attempt to demonstrate that the postulates of his psychology fulfilled the requirements of the physical sciences, nor to what extent he applied this thermostatic model in psychotherapy. For the moment, it suffices to indicate that the grand analogy that principally occupied Jung for the ensuing decades was not between the modern sciences and psychology, but between psychology and alchemy, and that his attempt to establish a conformity between his psychology and the modern sciences was the precursor to his alchemical endeavour. In Jung's late work, the most frequently used analogue for psychotherapy - and one which is still deployed by modern Jungians - was the
In the next section on "energism and dynamism" Jung claimed that the theory of energy had a pure and an applied side: as a pure concept, energy was, like the concept of time, a priori. Here Jung was attempting to subsume the concept of energy within a quasi-Kantian epistemology. By contrast, the applied theory of energy dealt with forces. Through its empirical application, a concretized or illustrated content enters into the concept, which gives the appearance that a substance has been posited. He claimed that his use of the term libido was justified by the fact that it was Freud who "was the first to follow out these actual, dynamic, psychological relations." Other parallel conceptions were Aristotle's hormé, Schopenhauer's will and Bergson's elan vital. Jung quickly added that "From these concepts I have only taken the concreteness of description, but not the definition of the concept." He stated that it was his omission of this epistemological clarification in Transformations and Symbols of the Libido that had led to the misunderstanding that he had constructed a vitalistic...
Jung stated that there were four movements of the libido: progression and regression, and introversion and extraversion. Whilst progression represented an adaptation to the environment, the regression led to adaptation to the soul, and demands of individuation. Progression and regression could both take introverted or extraverted forms. Transformations of the libido were accomplished by symbols, which Jung defined as psychological machines for transforming energy. Consequently, the development of individual symbol formation took a preeminent place in Jung's conception of psychotherapy.

Jung concluded this essay with a section on the "primitive libido concept," which expanded his earlier discussion of Lovejoy's primitive energetics. Now, the primitive conceptions, such as that of mana, were regarded as a pre-stage of Jung's psychic energy concept and the energy concept in general. This developmental account enabled Jung to preserve both the kinship between the

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699. Richard Noll claims that from the Zofingia lectures onwards, "Jung never deviated from vitalism throughout the remainder of his career. It was with the vitalistic school of evolutionary biology and its origins in the Naturphilosophie of the Romantics that Jung was always to remain." (The Jung Cult, p. 143.) The foregoing discussion has been sufficient the fallacious simplicity of this characterization.


701. Ibid., p. 50.
primitive and modern conceptions, without regarding the latter as simply designating a reversion to the former, as he had done in 1914. At the same time, this enabled him to maintain that his concept was scientific as well as historically and anthropologically normative.  

Epilogue

Despite Jung's efforts to bring his concept of psychic energy into conformity with what he understood to be the requirements of a scientific energy concept, as well as to establish its anthropological significance, outside of the circle of his followers, this concept did not seem to meet with any interest at all, even critical, with one principal exception. In The Energies of Men, McDougall claimed that due to the purposive nature of human activity, existence of forms of energy other than recognized by the physical sciences is incontrovertible. A necessary postulate "which conforms to laws not wholly identical with the laws of energy stated by the physical sciences." He offered the following equivalent terms for this energy: hormic, mental, and psychophysical. McDougall took up the relations of this


703 McDougall noted that entitling this work after James's essay was intended as a homage to him. The Energies of Men, vi-vii.

704 Ibid., p. 10.
energy to forms of energy recognized in the physical sciences in *The Frontiers of Psychology*, which dealt with problematic issues in the relation of psychology and other sciences. There, he noted that physicists resented the use of the term energy in psychology. He claimed that Freud and Jung were justified in postulating the existence of a "mental or psychophysical energy," just as they were correct in affirming Lamarckian inheritance.²⁰⁵ He justified this by putting forward a psychogenesis of notions of power and energy. Whilst Jung had attempted to argue that his conception of psychic energy legitimately fulfilled the necessary criteria to be regarded as a scientific concept, such as the conservation of energy and entropy, McDougall challenged the status of such concepts themselves. He began with primitive conceptions, claiming that conceptions of power were far older than modern physics. Commencing with terms such as mana, McDougall argued that the attribution of powerfulness to beings was an abstraction from each man's experience of exerting power, in everyday actions.²⁰⁶ Hence modern concepts of power could be traced back to a psychological origin. He claimed that in talking of energy as an entity or substance, physicists were as guilty of hypostasing as primitives with their notion of mana.²⁰⁷ This

reading established the priority of psychology over physics, and hence legitimated the utilisation of energy concepts in psychology. McDougall supported Jung's argument in "On the energetics of the soul" that conceptions of power could be regarded as archetypal. He went further though claiming that the success of his own experiments on Lamarckian inheritance had substantiated Jung's claim. McDougall's energy concepts, however, did not receive anymore interest than Jung's.

Biology and neurology during this period saw the development of organicism and holism. The organicists shared with the neovitalists such as Driesch a rejection with the reduction of biology to physics, together with a concern for wholes and teleology. They differed over the necessity for an additional agency. One figure who featured in these developments was Kurt Goldstein. In The Organism, he put forward views concerning the importance of the principle of the conservation of energy to clinical work which resembles Jung. Goldstein claimed that "The available energy supply is constant, within certain limits. If one

706 McDougall wrote: "in the light of the positive results of my own prolonged experiment on this question [Lamarckian inheritance], I have little doubt that Dr. C. G. Jung is right in regarding our thinking of power or energy as one of the archetypal modes of thinking determined by racial experience and memory." Frontiers of Psychology, p. 110.

709 On these developments, see Anne Harrington, "a feeling for the 'whole': the holistic reaction in neurology from the fin de siècle to the interwar years."
particular performance requires especially great energy expenditure, some other performance suffers thereby."\textsuperscript{710}

Consequently, he argued that "this aspect of differential energy distribution must be taken into full consideration in every symptom analysis."\textsuperscript{711} Goldstein's energy concept overlapped with Jung's. It is not clear to what extent Goldstein was familiar with Jung's concept of psychic energy; he was clearly well versed in psychoanalytic theory, putting forward a detailed critique of its main concepts, particularly the unconscious (without citing Jung).\textsuperscript{712}

Interestingly enough, in his presentation on "The relation of psychoanalysis" before the Allgemeinen Aerztlichen Kongress für Psychotherapie in Bad Nauheim in 1927, Goldstein specifically critiqued the concept of psychic energy. He stated that this concept played a great role in the psychoanalytic literature. He argued that the observation of organic illness had taught the importance of an energetic view, and that a constancy in the amount of disposable force could also be observed. He claimed that this depended upon the "prevailing bodily constitution of the whole organism." Consequently, he contended that it was not useful to speak of psychic energy, because the 'psychic'

\textsuperscript{710} Kurt Goldstein, \textit{The Organism: A Holistic Approach to Biology derived from Pathological Data in Man}, p. 56.

\textsuperscript{711} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 59.

\textsuperscript{712} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 307-335.
only existed in the abstract, and that it was always only a question of an "alteration of excitation in the excitation field of the milieu of the organism." Goldstein did not cite Jung in this paper, though it is hard to imagine that he could have had anyone else in mind (Jung's name, incidently, did come up several times in the proceedings of this congress).

In Zürich, similar developments were represented by the work of Constantin von Monakow. In a work published with R. Mourgue in the same year as Jung's essay "on the energetics of the soul," Biological introduction to the study of neurology and psychopathology, Monakow and Morgue argued that living beings were distinct from machines in that they possessed a compensatory, creative principle of auto-regulation, which they termed hormé (it is not clear whether they were familiar with the fact that Jung and McDougall had used the term in a similar sense.) Monakow and Morgue argued that Freud and most of his disciples had not fully

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713 Goldstein, "Die Beziehungen der Psychoanalyse zur Biologie," in ed. Wladimir Eliasberg, Bericht über den II. Allgemeinen Ärztlichen Kongress für Psychotherapie in Bad Nauheim, 27 bis 30 April 1927, pp. 48-9. Elsewhere, Goldstein stated that whilst there were many clinical phenomena that could be described in psychoanalytic terms, "they are described more simply and with fewer presuppositions in biological terms." Human Nature in the Light of Psychopathology, p. 168.

714 Constantin von Monakow and R. Morgue, Introduction biologique à l'étude de la neurologie et de la psychopathologie, p. x. They cite Jung on two occasions in reference to his concept of psychological types and his association studies respectively, p. 91 & p. 257.
broken away from the intellectualism of academic psychology. Indicative of this was the anthropomorphic character of their concepts, including that of libido. The two figures they singled out for praise were Hughlings Jackson and Bergson. The latter, they claimed, had put forward three notions that were critical for biology: the importance of time for living beings, the duality of instinct and intelligence, and the notion of creative evolution.\footnote{Ibid., p. 4.} They defined hormé as:

\begin{quote}
the propulsive tendency of the living being, with all its potentialities acquired by heredity, towards the future... One must understand under the expression hormé, the tendency towards a creative adaptation of life in all its forms to its conditions of existence leading to assure the maximum of security to the individual, not only for the present moment, but for the most distant future.\footnote{Ibid., p. 33.}
\end{quote}

In psychology during this period, the attempt to critique the 'machine theory' and reintroduce a concern for wholes was represented by the Gestalt psychologists.\footnote{On the development of Gestalt psychology, see Mitchell Ash, "Gestalt psychology in Weimar culture."} In doing so,
they argued for the recognition and significance of 'dynamic factors.' Köhler's discussion of the proximity and distance of these to vitalism carries a resemblance to Jung's:

the concepts to which we have referred... are not in the least related to Vitalistic notions. On the contrary, in the future our dynamic concepts may serve to deal with objections which Vitalism has raised against the scientific interpretation of life. If this happens, the machine theories of life will lose ground - after all, Vitalistic arguments against these theories have sometimes been fairly convincing. But Vitalism will not profit - for from its objections against the machine theory it has wrongly concluded that the main problems of biology cannot be served in terms of natural science.\footnote{Wolfgang Köhler, \textit{Gestalt Psychology: An Introduction to New Concepts in Modern Psychology}, pp. 134-5.}

The paucity of citations to similar conceptions in Jung in the work of organicist biologists, neurologists and gestalt psychologists is an index of the discredit that his work had fallen into in academic circles by the 1920's. Conversely, his lack of citation of their work can be taken as indicative of the extent to which he felt he had successfully created an autonomous discipline of psychology.
Through conceiving of life in terms of psychic energy, the key to the riddle of life had become the regulation of psychic energy.
Section Four: Conscious and Unconscious

For most of its career, psychology was a branch of philosophy. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, in their bid to establish psychology as a science, psychologists sought to emancipate psychology from philosophy. However, this move was intended to establish the hegemony of psychology over philosophy. Philosophers were quite willing to eject psychology from their precincts, whilst maintaining its subordinate status. The struggle to separate psychology from philosophy took many forms, not least of which were the attempts to establish psychology as an experimental discipline. Alongside such endeavours, attempts to theoretically distinguish dynamic psychologies from philosophy centred around the supposed discovery of a whole domain of mental life hitherto occluded by philosophy: the unconscious.

Any study of the history of the unconscious is indebted to Ellenberger's monumental *Discovery of the Unconscious*, and this is no exception. However, as Mark Micale has aptly pointed out, for Ellenberger, "the unconscious mind was not invented, or formulated, it was 'discovered.'" For Ellenberger, different conceptions of the unconscious figure

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719 On this aspect, see Martin Kusch, *Psychologism: A Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge.*

as competing maps to a preexisting terrain. A singular reality underlay the multiple depictions. To grasp the historical constitution of the unconscious, such naturalism needs to be set aside. Without this suspension, the modes in which the unconscious came precisely to be conceived of as a natural object, whose existence could simply be taken for granted, cannot be grasped.

In a landmark study, Michel Henry has studied the generation of the problematic of the unconscious in the philosophical tradition, and its prolongation in psychoanalysis. As Henry argues, the concept of the unconscious made its appearance in Western thought "simultaneously with and as the exact consequence of the concept of consciousness." Thus the progressive expansion of the concept of the unconscious in philosophy was made possible by a progressive delimitation of the concept of consciousness. In Henry's reading of the modern philosophical tradition from Descartes onwards, the philosophy of consciousness, in which the essence of consciousness was conceived in terms of representations, consisted in a failure to take up precisely the path opened up by Descartes' *cogito*, namely that "'I think' means anything but thought. 'I think' means life." Henry pursues


the problematic of life as the other of representation through readings of Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Henry concludes that Freud's conception of the unconscious, far from breaking with the philosophy of consciousness, psychoanalysis paradoxically prolonged it, through conceiving of the unconscious as consisting in hidden representations - the defining characteristic of consciousness in the modern philosophical tradition. One may add that for psychoanalysis, such representations, which were hidden to their subjects, were 'fortunately' accessible to analysts, providing a theoretical justification for the requirement of their costly services. Henry's reading provides a point of departure for considering Jung's relation to the nineteenth century philosophical tradition.

Throughout his career, Jung railed at being called a philosopher, and insisted on his status as an empirical scientist. To Swami Devatmananda, he simply wrote: "I'm not a philosopher, I'm an empiricist." In the following, I will trace Jung's relation to the philosophies that he was closest to, the philosophies of the unconscious.

In the nineteen fifties, an increasing number of works expounding and discussing Jung's work began to appear. One of the earliest academic studies which came out was written by an American student, Ira Progoff. This work was brought...

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to Jung's attention, and we are fortunate to have his detailed responses to it, in the form an interview conducted by Ximena Roelli de Angulo, which constitute an important correction as to how his work was generally being perceived. Jung stated that his own conceptions were "much more like Carus than Freud" and that Kant, Schopenhauer, Carus and von Hartmann had provided him with the "tools of thought." In his dissertation, Progoff had claimed that Jung had derived his concept of the unconscious from Freud. Jung denied this, and added, "I had these thoughts long before I came to Freud. Unconscious is an epistemological term deriving from von Hartmann." In a similar vein, in his 1925 seminar, Jung recounted that his idea of the unconscious "first became enlightened through Schopenhauer and Hartmann."

These philosophers featured prominently in Jung's accounts of his intellectual formation and in his accounts of the history of the progressive discovery of the unconscious. Indeed, these two strands are often merged together by Jung.

Before considering their work, and its significance for Jung, it is important to reconstruct and draw together Jung's accounts of the philosophy of the unconscious.

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725 Ibid, p. 205.
726 Jung, Analytical Psychology, p. 5.
Jung's accounts of the historical development of concepts of the unconscious in philosophy broadly paralleled von Hartmann's account of the same. Indeed, whilst von Hartmann's sequence culminated in his own conceptions of the unconscious, Jung's correspondingly culminated in his own. In 1934, Jung wrote:

There had been talk of the unconscious long before Freud. The idea was already philosophically introduced by Leibniz; Kant and Schelling expressed opinions about it, and Carus elaborated it into a system, which, von Hartmann, influenced to an undeterminable degree by it, followed with his influential *Philosophy of the Unconscious*. He claimed that Freud was uninfluenced by this philosophical background. For Jung, his own avowed affiliation to this trajectory constituted one of the crucial differential factors between his work and Freud's. Within this historical sequence, Jung gave especial importance to the work of his namesake, Carl Gustav Carus. In 1940 he wrote:

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727 Von Hartmann, "predecessors in respect of the conception of the unconscious," *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, pp. 16-42. One significant differences is Jung's stress on Carus.

Although various philosophers, among them Liebniz, Kant, and Schelling, had already pointed very clearly to the problem of the dark soul, it was a physician who felt impelled, from his scientific and medical experience of the world, to point to the unconscious as the essential ground of the soul. This was C. G. Carus, Eduard von Hartmann's crucial predecessor.\textsuperscript{729}

In 1945, Jung described Carus as a psychotherapist \textit{avant la lettre}. In criticising the equation of the psyche and consciousness, Jung wrote:

The medical philosopher C. G. Carus had a clear inkling of this and was the first to set forward an explicit philosophy of the unconscious. Today he would undoubtedly have been a psychotherapist.\textsuperscript{730}

Whilst Jung states here that Carus put forward a philosophy of the unconscious, in 1955-6 he credited him with establishing the basis for a psychology of the unconscious:

\textsuperscript{729} Jung, "The psychology of the child archetype," (1940), \textit{CW} 9, 1, § 259, tr. mod.

\textsuperscript{730} Jung, "Medicine and Psychotherapy", \textit{CW} 16, § 204. In 1946, Jung stated concerning Carus: "We have to close our eyes to his philosophical allure if wish to give full weight to his essentially psychological hypothesis." "Theoretical reflections on the essence of the psyche," \textit{CW} 8, § 361.
the psychology of the unconscious that began with C. G. Carus took up the trail that had been lost by the alchemists... When Carus wrote, he certainly could not have suspected that he was building the philosophical bridge to a future empirical psychology.\textsuperscript{731}

This statement brings out the teleological quality of Jung's historical accounts. These developments only ultimately make sense in terms of the goal they culminated in, namely, the modern psychology of the unconscious. In 1934, he provided the following account of the historical relations between the philosophical and psychological conceptions of the unconscious:

After the philosophical idea of the unconscious, which is chiefly found in Carus and Hartmann, had gone down under the overwhelming wave of materialism and empiricism, leaving hardly a ripple behind it, it gradually reappeared in the scientifically orientated medical psychology.\textsuperscript{732}

In 1940, Jung stated that the recognition of the unconscious psyche began with Leibniz and Kant, and then was expressed

\textsuperscript{731} Jung, \textit{Mysterium Coniunctionis}, \textit{CW} 14, § 791, tr. mod.

\textsuperscript{732} Jung, "Archetypes of the collective unconscious" (1934), \textit{CW} 9, 1, § 1, tr. mod.
with 'mounting intensity' in Schelling, Carus and von Hartmann. The significance of modern psychology was that it discarded the last metaphysical claims of the philosophical psychologists and restricted the idea of psychic existence to the psychological statement, in other words, to its phenomenology.\textsuperscript{733}

In 1939 Jung put forward the following comparison between the philosophical and psychological conceptions of the unconscious:

Such philosophers such as C. G. Carus and Eduard von Hartmann treat the unconscious as a cosmic principle, something like a universal mind without any trace of personality or ego-consciousness. Modern scientists regard the unconscious as a psychic function below the threshold of consciousness, too feeble and too dim to be perceived. In opposition to the philosophers, they are inclined to derive all subliminal phenomena from

\textsuperscript{733} Jung, "Transformation symbolism in the mass", CW 11, § 375, tr. mod. In 1950 Jung stated: "If we discount certain suggestive ideas in Leibniz, Kant, Schelling, and Schopenhauer, and the philosophical excursions of Carus and von Hartmann, it is only since the end of the nineteenth century that modern psychology, with its indicative methods, has discovered the foundations of consciousness and proved empirically the existence of a psyche outside consciousness." Aion, CW 9, 2, § 11.
In Jung's view, consciousness originally arose out of the unconscious. Hence his own position would be aligned with the philosophers, in opposition to the 'modern scientists.' This alignment is further indicated by a statement of Jung's in his abstract of a lecture he gave on "the hypothesis of the collective unconscious" in 1932:

Indications of the concept of an unconscious psychic [Psychischen] are to be found in Leibniz's theory of "petites perceptions", also in Kant's anthropology. In Schelling the "eternally unconscious" is the absolute ground of consciousness. Despite different terminology Hegel's view is similar. C. G. Carus was the first to base a developed natural philosophical [naturphilosophisches] system on the concept of the unconscious. Related features may be found in Schopenhauer. Eduard von Hartmann exalted the unconscious to the concept of an absolute world spirit.\(^\text{735}\)

\(^{734}\) Jung, "The meaning of individuation," in The Integration of the Personality, p. 5.

\(^{735}\) Jung, "The hypothesis of the collective unconscious," CW 18, § 1223, tr. mod. Von Hartmann had stated that Hegel's concept of the Absolute Idea was the same as Schelling's concept of the eternally unconscious. Philosophy of the Unconscious, p. 27.
This sequence raises the question of the significance of Romanticism for Jung. In 1935 Jung wrote a preface to a work by Rose Mehlich, *J. H. Fichte's Theory of the Soul and its Relation to the Present*, in which she had claimed that his psychology was romantic. In his preface, Jung stated:

"Naturally I am familiar with Leibniz, C. G. Carus and von Hartmann, but I never knew until now that my psychology is 'Romantic.'" The rest of his preface was taken up with distancing his work from Romanticism. Mehlich's linking of Jung to Romanticism was cited in Olga von Koenig-Fachsenfeld's work of the same year, *Transformation of the Dream Problem from the Romantics to the Present*, for which Jung also wrote a foreword. Curiously, this time he responded quite differently to the linkage of his work with romanticism. Jung stated that it was undeniable that certain premises of modern psychology were a restatement of romantic ideas. He focussed upon their experiential approach, which he claimed was the hallmark of their attitude to the psyche. He then noted:

The parallelism with my psychological conceptions is sufficient justification for calling them "Romantic." A similar enquiry into their philosophical antecedents would also justify such an epithet, for every

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psychology that takes the psyche as "experience" is from the historical point of view both "Romantic" and "alchemystical." Below this experiential level, however, my psychology is scientific and rationalistic (wissenschaftlich-rationalistisch), a fact that I would beg the reader not to overlook.737

Several years later, Jung again addressed this issue in a seminar on 22nd November, 1938. Commenting on a presentation of Philip Lersch's work, The Dream in German Romanticism, Jung asks:

Can you trace the effects of romanticism upon the later development of psychology? What historical bridge connects the modern mind with romanticism?

Student: Carus.

Prof. Jung: And who was influenced by him?

Student: Eduard von Hartmann.

Prof. Jung: Yes, von Hartmann is the connecting bridge between modern philosophy and romanticism. He was most deeply influenced by Carus... His metaphysical ideas were essentially those of Carus, and Carus is decidedly a romantic. That we speak of the unconscious at all is

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737 Jung, foreword to Olga von Koenig-Fachsenfeld, Wandlungen des Traumsproblems von der Romantik bis zur Gegenwart, CW 18, § 1740, tr. mod.
a direct inheritance of the romantic spirit.\textsuperscript{738}

The fact that most of these statements occur within the decade between 1934 and 1944 gives reason to comment. Two explanations suggest themselves. The first is that these years marked the appearance of an increasing number of comparative works on Freud and Jung, which accentuated the Freudocentric account of the origins of Jung's psychology.\textsuperscript{739} In this context, Jung's statements concerning his philosophical lineage may be seen as a corrective. Secondly, it was during this period that Jung was principally taken up with his historical study of alchemy, and through this, attempting to provide a new account of the development of modern science and psychology.

In these accounts, Jung sometimes refers to Carus and von Hartmann as philosophers, sometimes as psychologists. Further, the weighting of the significance of their work compared with subsequent developments in medical psychology shifts from one to statement to the other. These equivocations indicate tensions within Jung's relation to philosophy. In his comments on Progoff's dissertation, Jung

\textsuperscript{738} Jung, \textit{Psychological Interpretation of Children's Dreams} (1938-9), p. 47.

\textsuperscript{739} Wolfgang Kranefeldt, \textit{Die Psychoanalyse} (1930); Gustav Heyer, \textit{Der Organismus der Seele} (1932); Adler, \textit{Entdeckung der Seele} (1934). Jung wrote prefaces to the works by Kranefeldt and Adler and reviewed Heyer. This mode of endorsement was critical for the establishment of his pupils.
stated that the misunderstanding of his work as philosophy was due to the fact that he did utilise philosophical concepts, to make clear his presuppositions, and to formulate his findings.\(^740\) At different junctures, Jung gave varying descriptions of the relation of philosophy to psychology. Jung stated that due to the fact that the thinking that underlay philosophy was a psychic activity, psychology held a superordinate position: "I always think with psychology of the whole extent of the soul, and that includes philosophy and theology and many things besides."\(^741\) In 1931, Jung stated that difference between philosophy and psychology was that whilst the former took the world as its subject matter, the latter took the subject. He claimed that "Both disciplines cannot do without one another, and the one always supplies the mostly unconscious presuppositions of the other."\(^742\)

At first glance such statements appear to be saying different things: for whilst in the former, psychology encompasses philosophy, in the latter, they are both granted a coequal status. It is possible to provide an interpretation of these statements that reconciles them. It


\(^741\) Jung, "General aspects of dream psychology" (1928/1948) CW8 § 525, tr. mod.

\(^742\) Jung, "The Basic problems of present psychology" (1931) CW 8, § 659.
can be said that Jung's 'philosophical presuppositions' included a psychologizing reading of philosophy that enabled philosophy to be subsumed by psychology. Finally, what should be taken into account in Jung's comments distancing himself from philosophy, is that the 'philosophy' he attempted to distance himself from was precisely that to which he was closest, i.e., the philosophy of unconscious, if one may extend von Hartmann's title to designate the sequence of development that Jung sketched above.

The three philosophers most cited in Jung's works were Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, figures which dominated European philosophy in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. The difficulty in accounting for their specific significance for Jung stems from the widespread diffusion of their ideas throughout European intellectual culture, such that what might be said concerning their impact on Jung would in all likelihood be equally true of numerous other figures. The following is the barest outline of aspects of the work of Schopenhauer and Kant, which were of particular significance for Jung.

Kant commenced his preface to the first edition of The Critique of Pure Reason (1781) by highlighting the fact that it was a peculiarity of human reason that it took up questions which, by its very nature, it was unable to solve. It was precisely through attempting to supersede what was
presented by experience that led metaphysics into error.\textsuperscript{743} In his preface to the second edition, Kant stated that it had been hitherto assumed that our mode of cognition must conform to objects of experience. This assumption, he claimed, had been responsible for the failure of metaphysics. By contrast, he proposed to suggest the reverse, i.e., that objects of experience have to conform to our mode of cognition. This reversal, he famously claimed, corresponded in philosophical terms to Copernicus' replacement of a geocentric with a heliostatic model of the universe.\textsuperscript{744} The question, for Kant, was to determine the form that cognition had to take to make the experience of the world possible. At the outset, Kant distinguished between pure and empirical knowledge. He claimed that whilst it was indubitable that all knowledge commenced with experience, it was by no means the case that it was all derived from experience, as the empiricists such as Locke and Hume claimed. Pure knowledge consisted in the universal \textit{a priori} notions which were not derived from experience. Such notions he termed categories. An example of such a category was the law of causality. In contrast to Hume, who had claimed that the causality arose simply out of the perception of the constant conjunction of consecutive events, Kant claimed that the law of causality must have an

\textsuperscript{743} Kant, \textit{The Critique of Pure Reason}, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{744} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 22.
a priori basis in the understanding, as it could not be derived from experience alone. He stated:

this strict universality of the rule is never a characteristic of empirical rules; they can acquire through induction only comparative universality, that is, extensive applicability.\textsuperscript{745}

The categories constituted the conditions for the possibility of experience. As Kant noted, "only through the representation is it possible to know anything as an object."\textsuperscript{746} Kant provided the following division of the categories. Of quantity: unity, plurality, totality; Of quality: reality, negation, limitation; of relation: of inherence and subsistence; of causality and dependence, of community; and of modality: possibility-impossibility, existence-inexistence, necessity-contingency.\textsuperscript{747}

Coupled with the categories, Kant introduced a distinction between things as they were experienced, which he termed phenomena, and things as they were in themselves, which termed noumena. Phenomena were representations of things which were unknown in themselves.\textsuperscript{748}

\textsuperscript{745} Ibid., p. 125.
\textsuperscript{746} Ibid., p. 126.
\textsuperscript{747} Ibid., p. 113.
\textsuperscript{748} Ibid., p. 266ff.
For Kant, in the 'contest of the faculties,' psychology occupied a lowly place, as he claimed that it could not be a natural science. For Kant, for any discipline to be a science, it had to be founded upon mathematics, which constituted its a priori basis. Kant claimed that mathematics was "inapplicable to the phenomena of the internal sense." In addition, psychology was not an experimental discipline. This was due to the difficulty of self-observation. Kant claimed that because inner experience constituted a temporal flux, it lacked the permanence necessary for observation. In strident terms, Kant cautioned against the practice of self-observation:

to wish to play the spy upon one's self... is to reverse the natural order of the cognitive powers...
The desire for self-investigation is either already a disease of the mind (hypochondria) or will lead to such a disease and ultimately to the madhouse.⁷⁵⁰

Thus Kant's strictures upon self-observation went so far as a nascent psychopathology of psychologists. Kant claimed that the observation of others was also beset with difficulties:

⁷⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 17.
still less does another thinking subject submit to our investigations in such a way as to be conformable to our purposes, and even observation itself alters and distorts the state of the object observed.\footnote{Ibid., p. 8.}

As a consequence, psychology could only aspire to being a natural description of the soul, as opposed to a science. David Leary notes that Kant had inadvertently set out prescriptions that were to be taken up in the nineteenth century by figures who wished to establish psychology as a science:

\[\text{[Jakob Friederich] Fries [1773-1843], argued that psychology can evolve a set of rational concepts to guide its theoretical work; [Johann Friederich] Herbart [1776-1841] devised a mathematical psychology... and [Friederich Eduard] Beneke proposed a set of experiments and ardently advocated the establishment of a truly experimental psychology.}\footnote{David Leary, "Immanuel Kant and the development of modern psychology," p. 35.} \]
Locke, who had claimed that it was not possible to have ideas without being conscious of them, "we can be indirectly conscious of having an idea although we are not directly conscious of it."\textsuperscript{753} He called such ideas obscure. As illustration, he stated that when one saw someone in a meadow, one was not necessarily aware of seeing each of their organs, though without having an idea of these perceptions, one could not be said to have seen a person.\textsuperscript{754} The positing of the existence of such obscure ideas did not play a great role in Kant's work, though it was retrospectively given significance by Jung. Kant's recognition of these obscure ideas followed Leibniz. In his \textit{New Essays on Human Understanding}, Leibniz put forward his thesis of the existence of 'petits perceptiones,' or perceptions which were too small to be noticed. As an example, he noted that when we hear the sound of the waves, it follows that we are affected by the parts that constitute it, ie, the sounds of each wave, which, by themselves, are too faint to be heard.\textsuperscript{755} He claimed that these perceptions, which determined our behaviour without our thinking of them, were responsible for the sense of temporal continuity:

\textsuperscript{753} Kant, \textit{Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View}, p. 18.

\textsuperscript{754} \textit{Ibid}, pp. 18-9.

These insensible perceptions also indicate and constitute the same individual, who is characterized by the vestiges or expressions of which the perceptions preserve from the individual's former states, thereby connecting these with his former state.\textsuperscript{756}

Schopenhauer's philosophical masterpiece, \textit{The World as Will and Representation} appeared in 1819. With the opening lines, Schopenhauer proclaimed that:

"The World is my representation": that is a truth valid with reference to every living and knowing being, although man alone can bring it into reflective abstract consciousness... It then becomes clear and certain to him that he does not know a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that feels an earth; that the world around him is there only as representation, in other words, only in reference to another thing, namely that which represents, and this is himself.\textsuperscript{757}

Such an affirmation can be read as the culmination of the Kantian reinterpretation of Descartes cogito, in terms of

\textsuperscript{756} Ibid., p. 56.

\textsuperscript{757} Schopenhauer, \textit{The World as Will and Representation}, p. 3.
the "I think" that must be capable of accompanying all representations. Schopenhauer claimed that at the same time, the world did not present itself to a pure knowing subject, but to one that was corporeal. For this aspect, Schopenhauer used the term will:

This and this alone gives him the key to his own phenomenon, reveals to him the significance and shows him the inner mechanism of his being, his actions, his movements.\(^{758}\)

Schopenhauer's usage of the term will must be sharply distinguished from both from everyday usage of the term, and from the concepts of the will prevalent in nineteenth century psychology. Michel Henry aptly states that for Schopenhauer, "Will means life's will to live, so that all the essential determinations of Schopenhauer's central concept (will to live) are explained by life, not by 'will.'"\(^{759}\) Thus with his concept of the will, Schopenhauer introduced a radical delimitation of the provenance of representation. The will constituted not only one's innermost nature, and that of animals, but also

\(^{758}\) Ibid., p. 100.

the force that shoots and vegetates in the plant, indeed the force by which the crystal is formed, the force that turns the magnet to the North Pole, the force whose shock encounters from the contact of metals of different kinds, the force of attraction, separation and union, and finally even gravitation.\textsuperscript{760}

All these were, adopting and adapting Kant's terminology, but the multifarious phenomenal manifestations of the noumenal will-in-itself, which was unknowable. Schopenhauer expressed this disjunction between the will and representation by stating that the will was blind, i.e., it was not guided by representations. He claimed that

In outer as well as inner teleology of nature, what we must think of as means and ends is everywhere only the phenomenon of the unity of the one will so far in agreement with itself, which has broken up into space and time for our mode of cognition.\textsuperscript{761}

It was due to this that despite the fact the will was not guided by representations, there existed "a self-adaptation of what exists according to what is yet to come. Thus the bird

\textsuperscript{760} Schopenhauer, \textit{The World as Will and Representation}, p. 110.

\textsuperscript{761} \textit{Ibid}, p. 161.
bilds the nests for the young it does not yet know."\textsuperscript{762} It was the blindness of the will that gave rise to pathos of suffering and tragedy that pervaded Schopenhauer's philosophy, commonly termed his pessimism.

From the 1850's onwards, Schopenhauer's work became increasingly renowned, reaching a peak in the period between 1880 and the first world war, which was the period in which Jung first read his works.\textsuperscript{763}

Carl Gustav Carus (1789-1869) was born in Leipzig. He studied medicine, and was appointed a professor of gynaecology at the University of Dresden in 1814. He wrote on a wide variety of subjects, including comparative anatomy, physiognomy, physiology, symbolism, cranioscopy, comparative psychology and Goethe. He had contact with Oken, Hufeland, Reil, von Humboldt and Goethe. His \textit{Psyche} of 1846 was his best-known work.

This opened with the following frequently cited line: "The key to an understanding of the nature of the conscious life of the soul lies in the sphere of the unconscious."\textsuperscript{764} For Carus, this was because:

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{762} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 160.
\item \textsuperscript{763} Details of Schopenhauer's reception from Bryan Magee, \textit{The Philosophy of Schopenhauer}, p. 262.
\item \textsuperscript{764} Carl Gustav Carus, \textit{Psyche}, p. 1.
\end{itemize}
the greatest part of the soul's life rests in the realm of the unconscious. While we are consciously aware of only a few ideas at a given moment, we create continuously thousands of ideas which we are completely unconscious.⁷⁶⁵

Thus consciousness was dependent upon the unconscious, from which it arose. Consequently, Carus claimed that the key to any genuine psychology lay in the study of the unconscious.⁷⁶⁶ He distinguished several layers of the unconscious. The first layer was the absolute unconscious, which was completely inaccessible to consciousness. This consisted in an originary general level, which prevailed in embryonic development. After the development of consciousness, the formative processes take place in the partial level of the absolute unconscious, which governed physiological processes. The relative layer of the unconscious contained representations which were sometimes conscious. Given how little one is conscious of at any given time, this constituted the largest region of the soul.⁷⁶⁷ For Carus, the unconscious was the primordial source of life. The development of life was teleological: "a certain goal, a foresight, must exist unconsciously towards which life


develops and aspires." He conceived of this goal in terms of the mimetic replication of a primordial image: "something in our soul unconsciously produces a copy of the primordial image (Urbild)." The primordial image was responsible for maintaining and expanding the species, as well as the life of the individual. The unconscious was characterized by the fact that it knew no fatigue, nor disease. Indeed he claimed that the healing power of nature worked through the unconscious. The unconscious possessed 'promethean' and 'epimethean' properties, in that it was oriented towards the future and the past. It was through the unconscious that individuals were connected with the rest of the universe.

Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906) was born in Berlin. He graduated from the University of Rostock, and thereafter pursued a military career. He never held an academic post, and terminated his military career in 1868, due to injuries. His major work, The Philosophy of the Unconscious appeared in 1868, and was widely acclaimed. It went through ten editions in his lifetime. It has been stated that it was the most widely read philosophical work of its time. In this work, von Hartmann attempted to reconcile the tradition of German idealism with the natural sciences. The unifying

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768 Ibid, p. 22.
769 Ibid., p. 23.
concept was the unconscious, and his work consisted in presenting a taxonomic plan incorporating virtually every conceivable phenomena under this rubric.

Von Hartmann stated that it was initially his study of Leibniz, and in particular, his doctrine of petites perceptiones, that led to his work. He presented his work as the culmination of eighteenth and nineteenth century German philosophy, which he refigured through the problematic of the unconscious. Thus following his discussion of Leibniz and Kant, he claimed that his work represented the "elevation of Hegel's unconscious Philosophy of the Unconscious into a conscious one."  

771 In a similar vein he reformulated Schopenhauer's will in terms of the unconscious, stating that as it was free of self-consciousness, it was an unconscious will.  

Over the years, Von Hartmann revised his model of the divisions of the unconscious. In his final version of 1900, he differentiated between the epistemological unconscious, the physical unconscious, the psychic unconscious, the metaphysical unconscious, which had a relative and an absolute layer, and finally, the unconscious absolute spirit. For von Hartmann, the unconscious, rather than consciousness, was primary. Consciousness was viewed as a

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771 Eduard von Hartmann, The Philosophy of the Unconscious, Book 1, p. 28.

772 Ibid., Book 1, p. 29.
product of the unconscious. He claimed that the emergence of the unconscious was not accidental, but represented an inherent teleological striving towards a higher state of consciousness. This ultimately had as its goal the redemption of the world, which consisted in a return to its originary state prior to its commencement.

Von Hartmann claimed that the unconscious formed and preserved the organism, and through instincts, preserved the individual and the species. In his view, there existed a plurality of instincts: the instinct of self-preservation, of shame, of disgust, of modest, of gratitude, of maternal love, and the sexual, sociable, and acquisitive instincts. He held that the principal characteristic of instinct was purposiveness: "Instinct is purposive action without consciousness of the purpose." This purposiveness reached as far as what he termed the clairvoyance of instinct, which was present both in humans and animals. The unconscious was atemporal and aspatial, and never erred. In the psychological sphere, the unconscious provided guidance

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774 Ibid, Book 3, p. 255. Von Hartmann stated that "the raising of consciousness presents itself as the purpose of the animal kingdom." Ibid, Book 1, p. 185.
775 Ibid, Book 2, p. 250.
776 Ibid, Book 1, p 205ff.
777 Ibid, Book 1, p. 79.
through providing hints. All artistic activity depended upon the 'intrusion' of the unconscious.\footnote{Ibid., Book 1, p. 286.} He held that the same was true of mysticism, the essence of which he defined as \textit{"as the filling of consciousness with a content (feeling, thought, desire) through involuntary emergence of the same from the Unconscious."} \footnote{Ibid., Book 1, p. 363.}

For von Hartmann, a principal question concerning the nature of the unconscious was that of "the one or the many?" - whether or not there existed a plurality of individual consciousnesses.\footnote{Ibid., Book 2, p. 223.} On this question, he opted for a monism, claiming that there existed an "everywhere identical unconscious."\footnote{Ibid., Book 2, p. 226.} Thus his concept of the unconscious was ultimately transindividual and collective:

When we, however, view the world as a whole, the expression "the Unconscious" acquires the force not only of an abstraction from all unconscious individual functions and subjects, but also of a collective.\footnote{Ibid., Book 1, p. 4.}

Consequently, this unconscious formed the substratum of all
individual consciousnesses.\textsuperscript{784} His notion of the unconscious as an absolute principle led him to pose the question of its relation to conceptions of God. Given his conception of the unconscious, he stated that to follow the conventional wisdom of the dogma of the conscious God would be to limit his nature, and that whilst his usage of the term unconscious was more or less synonymous with God, he preferred to use the latter in a philosophical context.\textsuperscript{785}

Following from the overriding significance that von Hartmann attributed to the unconscious, human development was dependent upon placing close attention to it:

if he [man] loses the faculty for hearing the inspirations of the Unconscious, he loses the spring of his life... woe to the age which violently suppresses its voice, because in one-sided overestimate of the conscious-rational it will only give head to the latter. Thus it falls irrevocably into a vapid, shallow rationalism.\textsuperscript{786}

At a cultural level, he proposed contact with nature and the arts as counterpoints to maintain the connection with the unconscious. Finally, he claimed that the ultimate goal of

\textsuperscript{784} Ibid., Book 2, p. 230.
\textsuperscript{785} Ibid., Book 2, p. 275.
\textsuperscript{786} Ibid., Book 2, p. 42.
individuality should be:

the complete devotion of the personality to the world-
process for the sake of its goal, the general world-
redemption... TO MAKE THE ENDS OF THE UNCONSCIOUS ENDS
OF OUR OWN CONSCIOUSNESS.\(^{787}\)

By the philosophy of the unconscious, von Hartmann meant a
speculative metaphysical system that subsumed the phenomena
of biology, psychology and even theology under its
provenance. The philosophical conceptualisation of the
unconscious was made possible through a progressive
delimitation of the attributes of consciousness.

At this time, psychologists were attempting to separate
psychology from speculative metaphysics and to establish it
as a natural science. Consequently, von Hartmann's
philosophy of the unconscious - in which the unconscious
stood for a principle that completely subsumed the domain of
psychology under the umbrella of philosophy - came in for
extended criticism from psychologists.

Principal among these was William James, who devoted an
extended section of the *The Principles of Psychology* to a
critique of the concept of the unconscious. In his chapter
on the 'mind-stuff' theory, James dealt with the existence
of unconscious mental states. At the outset, he stated in a

characteristically prescient manner that the distinction between the consciousness and unconsciousness of a mental state was "the sovereign means for believing what one likes in psychology, and of turning what might be a science into a tumbling-ground for whimsies." He set out ten supposed proofs of the unconscious, which he stated were 'most systematically urged' by von Hartmann, and then subjected them to a detailed point by point refutation. What was significant in James's approach was that in each case, while recognizing the existence of the particular phenomenon in question, he demonstrated that they were amenable to other forms of explanation, which were in turn quite distinct from one another. In place of the monistic appeal to the unconscious, what was clearly required was a pluralistic epistemology. James dismissed von Hartmann's work as follows:

Hartmann fairly boxes the compass of the universe with the principle of unconscious thought. For him there is no nameable thing that does not exemplify it... The same is true of Schopenhauer.

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788 William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. 1, p. 163.

789 For a detailed consideration of James's arguments against the existence of unconscious mental states in the *Principles*, see Dennis Klein, *The Unconscious: Invention or Discovery?*, pp. 38-64.

790 Ibid., p. 169.
The previous year, the American psychologist James Mark Baldwin subjected the concept of the unconscious to a similar critique in his *Handbook of Psychology: Sense and Intellect*. Von Hartmann's views were simply dismissed for being metaphysical. Baldwin concluded:

Phenomena called "unconscious mental states" may be accounted for partly from the physical side, as excitations inadequate to a mental effect, and partly from the mental side, as states of least consciousness. Where, in the progressive subsistence of consciousness, these two classes of fact come together we have no means of knowing... As Binet says, if there be unconscious mental phenomena, "we know absolutely nothing about them."\(^{792}\)

Von Hartmann's work also came in for criticism from experimental psychologists. Hermann Ebbinghaus (1850-1909), whose 1885 work on memory *On Memory* was critical in establishing the experimental investigation of memory, wrote his 1873 dissertation as a critique of Hartmann's work: "On Hartmann's philosophy of the unconscious."\(^{793}\) Oswald Külpe


\(^{792}\) Ibid., p. 58.

\(^{793}\) Cited in Dennis Klein, *The Unconscious: Invention or Discovery?*, pp. 31-2.
(1862-1915), a former student of Wundt who played a key role in establishing the experimental study of thought, gave an extended account of von Hartmann's work in his 1902 *The Philosophy of the Present in Germany*, that indicates its contemporary significance. Külpe stated that von Hartmann's system, like that of Schopenhauer, "may be styled a half mythological speculation, like the myths of *Plato*, rather than an extension and completion of scientific knowledge."\[^{794}\]

The 1880's were characterized by attempts to put forward limited, restricted notions of the unconscious, typified by Janet's concept of the subconscious. Ellenberger claimed that the main interest of von Hartmann's work "lies not so much in its philosophical theories as in its wealth of supporting materials."\[^{795}\] Whilst this aspect may account for its broad popular appeal, in my reading of the psychological and psychiatric literature from the 1870's onwards, this aspect of it seems to have been rarely drawn upon, especially by authors who were promoting psychological concepts of the unconscious. For these authors, such concepts had to be radically differentiated from the philosophical concepts of the unconscious that anteceded them, to legitimate their scientific status. In most cases, this was simply accomplished through a denial of parentage,

\[^{794}\] Oswald Külpe, *The Philosophy of the Present in Germany*, p. 189.

and the claim that such conceptions were simply derived from clinical observations.

**Jung and Schopenhauer**

"Psychologically, 'the world' means how I see the world, my attitude to the world; thus the world can be regarded as 'my will' and 'my representation'." Jung, (1921).  

In his remarks on Progroff's dissertation, Jung stated that he read Kant, Schopenhauer, Carus and von Hartmann in his youth, perhaps when he was as young as sixteen. In *Memories*, Jung noted that the great find of his researches in his student years was Schopenhauer. To Jung, Schopenhauer was the first to speak of the suffering of the world - confusion, passion and evil. He felt that Schopenhauer's vision was confirmed both his observations of nature and of human beings. However, he was dissatisfied with Schopenhauer's 'solution to the problem'. He felt that "with his 'Will' he meant God, the creator." Jung stated

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796 Jung, *Psychological Types*, CW 6, § 322, tr. mod.


798 Jaffé, *Memories*, p. 88. In the final essay that he wrote, "Symbols and the interpretations of dreams", Jung referred to the reading of Kant and Schopenhauer as his greatest intellectual adventures. CW 18, § 485.

799 *Memories*, p. 88, tr. mod. Half a century later, in 1947, Jung stated that in Schopenhauer, the unconscious will
that his dissatisfaction with Schopenhauer's theory on the relation of the intellect and the will led him to study Kant, in particular, The Critique of Pure Reason. Here, he found what he took to be the major flaw in Schopenhauer's system, namely, that "he had made a metaphysical statement, he had hypostasised and qualified a mere noumenon, a 'thing in itself'." Jung does not give a date for his reading of Schopenhauer, but in the narrative sequence, it occurs in the context of his experiences at the Gymnasium and prior to his medical studies. The copies of Schopenhauer's works in Jung's library are the 1891 edition.

It is not clear how quickly Jung perceived what he held was Schopenhauer's fallacy of hypostasising a thing in itself, as in his 1898 lecture before the Zofingia society, "Thoughts on the value and nature of speculative inquiry," Jung stated:

the Kantian critique of epistemology left the problem of the Ding an sich unsolved. The first of the post-Kantian philosophers to do an intelligent job of making this problem once again useful to philosophy was Schopenhauer."

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was given as a new definition of God. CW 18, § 359.

800 Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 89, tr. mod.

801 Jung, "Thoughts on the nature and value of speculative inquiry," The Zofingia Lectures, CW A, § 199.
He followed this statement by praising the centrality accorded to suffering by Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, whom he described as the former's intellectual heir. Jung's avowal of the pathos underlying Schopenhauer's work is indicated by the following statement:

Every genuine philosophy, every true religion is wrapped in the earthly garment of pessimism as the only accurate mode of reviewing the world befitting man in the awareness of his nothingness.\(^{802}\)

At the same time, Jung proposed a novel reinterpretation of Kant's thing in itself, namely, that at any given time, the dividing line between noumena and phenomena was provisional and not eternally fixed, and that science increasingly encroached upon the thing in itself.\(^{803}\) Thus Jung claimed that before their discovery, X-rays represented a thing in itself (for Kant, they would have simply represented an unknown phenomenon).

In his 1925 seminar, Jung noted that contrary to his view on the blindness of the will in *The World as Will and Representation*, in *The Will in Nature* Schopenhauer drifts into a teleological attitude... in this latter

\(^{802}\) Ibid., § 229.

\(^{803}\) Ibid., §§ 196-8.
work he assumes that there is a direction in the creating will, and this point of view I took as mine. My first conception of the libido then was not that it was a formless stream so to speak, but that it was archetypal in character. That is to say, libido never comes up from the unconscious in a formless state, but always in images.\(^{804}\)

The linkage that this passage establishes between Schopenhauer's will and the libido is also brought out in one of Jung's statements concerning Progoff's dissertation: "To Schopenhauer I owe the dynamic view of the psyche; the 'will' is the libido that is back of everything."\(^{805}\) These passages suggest that Jung's initial conception of psychic energy was derived from Schopenhauer's concept of the will.

Schopenhauer's *The Will in Nature* was principally taken up with a survey of how developments in the sciences since the appearance of his *The World as Will and Representation* had confirmed the truth of his system. He considered developments in physiology, pathology, comparative anatomy, astronomy, linguistics, animal magnetism, magic and sinology. His discussion of teleology occurs in his chapter on comparative anatomy.

\(^{804}\) Jung, *Analytical Psychology*, p. 4.

He commenced this chapter by noting that as the will was the "ultimate substratum of every phenomena," the organic body "is nothing but the will that has entered the representation, the will itself perceived in the cognitive form of space."\textsuperscript{806} He noted that the suitability of every animal to their environment and the perfection of their organization presented a great deal of material upon which to consider the question of teleology. Schopenhauer critiqued the "physio-theological proof" by claiming that the works of animal instinct, the spider's web, the honeycomb of bees, the structure of termites, and so on, are all of them constituted as if they had originated in consequence of an intentional conception, far-reaching and rational deliberation, whereas they are obviously the work of blind impulse, that is, of a will which is not guided by knowledge.\textsuperscript{807}

In a similar vein in \textit{The World as Will and Representation}, Schopenhauer had stated:

\begin{quote}
All these anticipations, appearing in instinct as well as in the organization of animals, could be brought under the concept of knowledge \textit{a priori}, if a knowledge
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{806} Schopenhauer, \textit{On the Will in Nature}, p. 41. \\
\textsuperscript{807} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 51-3.
\end{flushright}
in general were the basis of them. But this, as I have shown, is not the case; their origin lies deeper than the sphere of knowledge, namely in the will as the thing-in-itself. This as such remains free even from the forms of knowledge...®®®

Schopenhauer was attempting to free the concept of teleology from any theological implications. As an animal's body was "its will itself," "everything in it and pertaining to it must conspire to its ultimate purpose, the life of the animal."®®® In The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer noted that final causes were required to understand organic, as opposed to inorganic nature.®®®

Contrary to Jung's statement, Schopenhauer's views on teleology in The Will in Nature are congruent with those set forth in The World as Will and Representation. However, his perception of a change in Schopenhauer's view is significant, for it denoted his own modification of Schopenhauer's understanding of the relation between will and representation. Jung's modification of Schopenhauer's views on teleology and the blindness of the will may have occurred through his reading of von Hartmann. In his 1925

®®® Schopenhauer, On the Will in Nature, p. 64.
seminar, Jung stated that von Hartmann formulated Schopenhauer's ideas in a more modern way. He states he followed Hartmann, in contrast to Schopenhauer, in attributing 'mind' to the unconscious. In *The Philosophy of the Unconscious*, von Hartmann stated that whilst Schopenhauerians had recognized the existence of the unconscious will, they had failed to recognize that it contained unconscious representations.\(^{811}\) He defined the unconscious will as one which had unconscious representations for its content.\(^{812}\) Further evidence that Jung adopted von Hartmann's reformulations of Schopenhauer's philosophy are found in his 1898 lecture "Thoughts on the nature and value of speculative inquiry," where he stated that

Sarah describes instinct as a stage in the objectification of the Will. So does Hartmann, adding the absolutely essential element of purposeful intention.\(^{813}\)

In Jung's Zofingia lectures, frequent allusions to Kant appear, who he termed "our great master... the sage and

\(^{811}\) Von Hartmann, *The Philosophy of the Unconscious*, p. 125.


\(^{813}\) Jung, "Some thoughts on speculative inquiry," *CW A*, § 182.
prophet of Königsberg who has, not unjustly, been called the last philosopher."\textsuperscript{814} Jung presented himself as holding to Kant's epistemology, which he claimed had endured unaltered to the present day.\textsuperscript{815}

During Jung's psychiatric career, the import of his philosophical readings are not readily apparent. However, they began to reemerge strongly during the period of his secession from the psychoanalytic movement. This reemergence was heralded by the following statement in 1912:

I have come to the realization that the religious and philosophical driving forces - what Schopenhauer calls the "metaphysical need" of man - must receive positive consideration during analytic work.\textsuperscript{816}

The same claim was made by James Jackson Putnam, who had argued in the previous year that unless such "metaphysical needs" were catered for, the therapeutic potential of psychoanalysis would remain limited, as it was precisely difficulties in this domain that brought many patients to analysis.\textsuperscript{817} Jung and Putnam's contentions ran directly

\textsuperscript{814} Jung, "Some thoughts on psychology" (1897), \textit{CW} A, § 77.

\textsuperscript{815} Jung's reading of Kant will be taken up elsewhere.

\textsuperscript{816} Jung, "General aspects of psychoanalysis," \textit{CW} 4, §554.

\textsuperscript{817} James Jackson Putnam, "A plea for the study of philosophic methods in preparation for psychoanalytic work."
counter to Freud's figuration of psychoanalysis as consisting in an outright replacement for metaphysics. For Jung, the problem was how to provide for such needs, and yet maintain psychology as a science. His answer to this took the form of his theory of the archetypes and the collective unconscious. As stated earlier, the dynamic psychologies of the 1880's and 1890's sought to distance themselves from the philosophies of the unconscious through providing restricted psychological models of the unconscious or subconscious that were supposedly derived purely from clinical observation, rather than metaphysical speculation. Such a model informs Jung's early work, up until *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*. From that period onwards, Jung began to argue for an extension of the notion of the unconscious.

Tellingly, one of terms that he initially used to designate this in his 1917 *Psychology of the Unconscious Processes: An Overview of the Modern Theory and Method of Analytical Psychology*, was the "absolute unconscious" - the term that Carus had used. Subsequently, this was discarded in favour of the collective unconscious. Like the concepts of the unconscious of Carus and von Hartmann, Jung's collective

This paper was presented to a meeting of the American Psycho-Pathological Association in Baltimore. The same year, he presented the same argument at the congress of the International Psychoanalytic Association at Weimar, where Jung was present.

818 On this point, see below, "the individual and the collective," in "the ancient in the modern."
unconscious was a transindividual domain that subsumed the physiological, psychological, metaphysical and theological domains under its provenance. Whilst he continued to argue that the notion of the collective unconscious was a non-speculative, empirical notion, it is clear that in this concept, the nineteenth century philosophies of the unconscious came to their final and most lasting expression.
The Ancient in the Modern

Prologue

The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious. These terms constitute Jung's signature concepts, more often than not soliciting instant assent or repudiation, presenting an open and shut case. In both instances, they are responded to, as to something than can be considered known. The reasons for this are not hard to find. Jung himself offered a plethora of definitions. In his wake, there has been no shortage of expository works setting out what these terms are. Finally, there is hardly a work of Jungian, neo-Jungian or post-Jungian inspiration that does not carry their repeated imprint.

It would be hard to characterise an author whose collected works span more than twenty volumes, by economy of expression, or by linguistic parsimony. Yet in some respects, this appears to be the case with Jung. Jung's signature concepts contained many different ideas which attempted to resolve major debates in philosophy, biology, anthropology and comparative religion, and enable the formation of a distinct discipline of psychology. The potential for conceptual confusion spawned by the utilisation of the same terms to cover such a range of issues, suggests that a certain caution is appropriate in assuming that these terms can indeed be considered to be sufficiently known even to be appropriately evaluated. Hence
the following inquiry will not commence with definitions. Rather, it will attempt to reconstitute the debates from which Jung drew and what led to the formulation of these terms—indeed, how and why Jung used the same terms as solutions to distinct questions, and the significance of this combinatory operation.

In 1948 in his inaugural address at the founding of the Jung institute in Zürich, Jung stated that his investigation of unconscious processes:

led, in about 1912, to the actual discovery of the collective unconscious. The technical term itself is of a later date. If the complex theory and the typology had already overstepped the bounds of psychiatry proper, with the hypothesis of the collective unconscious the scope of our researches was extended without limit.

The date seems to refer to Jung's *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*. If there has been a partial acceptance of Jung's theory of complexes and his typology in psychiatry and psychology, it is with the theory of the archetypes and the collective unconscious that psychiatry and mainstream psychology part company with Jung. They are

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819 Jung, "Address on the occasion of the founding of the C. G. Jung Institute, Zurich, 24 April 1948," *CW* 18, §1130-1131, tr. mod.
generally dismissed as a form of mystical obscurantism. However it is only possible to understand the constant refrain of psychologists from the latter half of the nineteenth century onwards that psychology constituted a science on the assumption that in their domain, psychologists (Jung included) felt themselves to be the final arbiters of what constituted science. What such dismissals obscure is the fact that Jung held that the theory of archetypes and the collective unconscious was the only means to secure a truly scientific psychology that could provide the connecting link between diverse disciplines. Whether or not such a claim was justified, at the very least, it requires elucidation.

The Birth of the Human Sciences

The last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth century saw the emergence of the modern disciplines of anthropology, sociology and social psychology, as well as the more short-lived disciplines of crowd psychology and Völkerpsychologie. Whether through studying prehistoric, primitive or modern societies, each of these disciplines attempted to surpass the supposed limitations of individual psychology. In different ways, each sought to establish the preeminent science of the social. Yet the very attempt at disciplinary differentiation and hegemony was bound up with numerous intermeshings and
mutual borrowings.

This clustering provides one of the matrices for the emergence of Jung's analytical psychology, which attempted to incorporate the subject matter of these disciplines under its purview, whilst differentiating itself from them. This section sketches the development of these disciplines, and their relation to the emergence of analytical psychology. During this period, each of these disciplines attempted to establish its own autonomy against the rival claims of the others. In what follows, separate consideration of anthropology, sociology, crowd psychology and *Völkerpsychologie* is utilised for ease of exposition.

The disciplinary separation of anthropology and psychology in the twentieth century obscures the extent of their intermingling in the latter half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twentieth. Indeed, the very identity of these terms was by no means fixed, and the term anthropology also covered what would today be classed as psychology, and vice versa. In the subsequent histories of these disciplines in the twentieth century, such foreign excursions have tended to be looked on askance, and Freud and Jung's voyages into the early history of mankind or into primitive mentality tend to be viewed with as much embarrassment by professional psychologists as by professional anthropologists. However, this repudiation risks obscuring an understanding of what they held to be at
stake in such ventures, and why they undertook them.

What anthropology meant for Jung may be succinctly stated at the outset. Psychology needed anthropology if it was to attain the cross-cultural and transhistorical universality deemed necessary for a science; and anthropology in turn needed psychology in order to be based on a true understanding of human nature. Each was seen as being mutually dependent. This double necessity framed Jung's encounter with anthropology, and indicates that what was at stake was nothing less than the possibility of both psychology and anthropology. It was from this mutual conjunction that Jung's theory of civilization was born. What needs to be traced then, is the history of anthropology from the angle of how Jung came to utilise it.

**Jung and Bastian**

On six distinct occasions between 1936 and 1946, the anthropologist whom Jung singled out for formulating the concept of archetypes *avant la lettre* was Adolf Bastian (1826-1905). Jung described Bastian's elementary thoughts as:

the fundamentally analogous forms of perception that are to be found everywhere, therefore more or less what
we know today as 'archetypes'.

Similarly, he stated that what he called archetypes, "had long ago been called 'elementary' or 'primordial thoughts' by Bastian." Bastian, he claimed, was "The first investigator in the field of ethnology to draw attention to the widespread occurrence of certain 'elementary ideas.'" This proximity between his concept of the archetype and Bastian's ideas led Jung, in the following instance at least, to downplay his originality:

The theory of preconscious primordial ideas is by no means my own invention, as the term 'archetype', which stems from the first centuries of our era proves. With special reference to psychology we find this theory in the works of Adolf Bastian and then again in Nietzsche. In French literature Hubert and Mauss, and also Lévy-Bruhl, mention similar ideas. I only gave an empirical foundation of what were formerly called primordial or elementary ideas, "catégories" or "habitudes directrices de la conscience", "représentations

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821 Jung, "The concept of the collective unconscious," (1936) CW 9, 1, § 89.

822 Jung, "The psychology of the mother archetype," (1938), CW 9,1, § 153.
collectives", etc., by setting out to investigate certain details.\textsuperscript{823}

Here, Jung claims that his contribution simply consisted in putting ideas such as that of Bastian, Nietzsche, Hubert and Mauss and Lévy-Bruhl on an empirical basis. However, at another juncture, Jung seems to reverse this relation, and suggest that it was Bastian's work that supplied some of the empirical support for his theory of archetypes. Positing the existence of general patterns of psychic functioning, independent of tradition and cultural diffusion, Jung stated:

A general proof of the rightness of this expectation lies in the ubiquitous occurrence of parallel mythologems, Bastian's 'folk-thoughts' or primordial ideas.\textsuperscript{824}

By the time that Jung made these pronouncements, Bastian's work had largely fallen into oblivion. The impenetrability of his style in no small measure contributed to this. In 1930 the anthropologist Arthur Goldenweiser said of him:

\textsuperscript{823} Jung, "Psychology and religion (1936), CW 11, § 89.

\textsuperscript{824} Jung, "Medicine and psychotherapy," (1945) CW 16, § 206.
His literary habits were distracting and his lively and imaginative style was vitiated by obscurities. Interminable quotations, which bear witness to an amazing erudition and a stupendous memory, parentheses within parentheses, finally became so overwhelming that even Bastian's friends and disciples could no longer read him. His mind died not of decay but of involution.\textsuperscript{825}

For Goldenweiser, Bastian died through a hypertrophy of scholarship.

Bastian took his doctorate in medicine at Wurzberg. He was the extraordinary professor for ethnology in Berlin from 1873 to 1900, and during the course of his life, undertook many voyages and much fieldwork. This was in part motivated by a desire to salvage as much information as possible concerning primitive cultures before they were permanently transformed by modernization and imperialism.

His major work, \textit{Man in History}, was published in three volumes in 1860. At the outset, he proclaimed that psychology was "the science of the future."\textsuperscript{826} He thought that ethnology was the basis for finding the psychological laws of the mental development of groups. In 1893 he wrote:

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{825} Alexander Goldenweiser, "Adolf Bastian," p. 476.
\end{flushright}
"The goal of modern ethnology is to find an adequate methodology for scientific psychology."\textsuperscript{827} The psychology that Bastian had in mind was close to the \textit{Völkerpsychologie} of Lazarus and Steinthal, whose work he admired, having attended the lectures of the former.\textsuperscript{828}

The leitmotifs of Bastian's work were his concepts of the elementary thoughts [Elementargedanken] and the ethnic thoughts [Völkergedanken]. The former were held in common by all mankind. He described them as follows:

we will find the same tight core of ideas in all places and all times. There are definite analogies in mythological thoughts and the world views amid both the fetishism of the savage and the aesthetics of the civilized... in all these, after removing the cloak of local and temporal variations in language and idiom, we encounter the same small number of psychological kernels.\textsuperscript{829}

These psychological kernels were the elementary thoughts. Whilst the positing of such analogies was not by itself

\textsuperscript{827} Bastian, \textit{Controversen} (1893-4), selected translation in Klaus-Peter Koepping, \textit{Adolf Bastian and the Psychic Unity of Mankind}, p. 170.

\textsuperscript{828} Klaus-Peter Koepping, \textit{Adolf Bastian and the Psychic Unity of Mankind}, p. 55.

\textsuperscript{829} Bastian, \textit{Der Mensch in der Geschichte}, selected translation in \textit{ibid.}, p. 180.
particularly contentious, Bastian's contention that they had a common and universal intrapsychic origin was. He claimed to provide an explanation for such analogies. He argued:

Only when the *elementary ideas* of the savage tribe come into contact with outside stimuli do they develop their inherent potential through a growth process in historical forms of cultural development.\(^{830}\)

Thus historical change was itself explained as consisting in the developmental unfolding of elementary thoughts. The actualisation of the latter in specific cultures led to the formation of the ethnic thoughts:

The *folk ideas* are rooted in the geographical provinces and they represent changes of the psychologically determined *elementary ideas* which have evolved through history.\(^{831}\)

Thus the ethnic thoughts were shaped by geographical and environmental conditions. The totality of ethnic thoughts comprised the thoughts of mankind (*Menschheitsgedanken*). The study of ethnic thoughts was to be the foundation of psychology, and through collecting and comparing them, one

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\(^{830}\) Bastian, *Controversen*, *ibid.*, p. 172.

arrived at the underlying elementary thoughts. It was amongst Naturvölker that the ethnic thoughts were most evident. As these had developed in specific ways in given cultures, one needed to compare materials from different cultures to accurately identify them.

A prime example of such an elementary thought was that of the cross, which Bastian claimed could be found in a myriad of forms in diverse cultures.\(^{832}\) Whilst he acknowledged that migration and diffusion played a role, it was clearly a subordinate one. This involved him in a lengthy polemic with Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904), who is credited with founding anthropogeography. Ratzel strongly criticised Bastian’s concept of elementary thoughts, and favoured explanations based on diffusion. His position became much more influential than that of Bastian. However, Koepping notes that the polemical nature of their exchange tends to obscure the proximity of their ideas in many respects.\(^{833}\) Ratzel claimed that Bastian’s concept of ethnic thoughts hindered the study of geographical distribution. What was at stake here was the status of psychology. For Ratzel, what was needed was an anthropogeography, to use his term. By contrast, Bastian’s notion of the relation between ethnic and elementary thoughts had the effect of grounding

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\(^{832}\) Bastian, Der Mensch in der Geschichte, in ibid., p. 183-5.

\(^{833}\) Koepping, Adolf Bastian and the Psychic Unity of Mankind, pp. 60-68.
anthropology in psychology.

As noted earlier, Jung's citations of Bastian occur in the decade between 1936 and 1946, which makes it hard to determine precisely when he read him, and to what extent Bastian's work could be considered as one of the formative sources of Jung's concept of archetypes. There are no copies of his work in Jung's library. The breadth of Jung's anthropological reading makes it safe to assume that he would have at least encountered references to Bastian's work early on, such as in Edward Tylor's *Primitive Culture.* If Jung had not done so before, it is also likely that he would have read Bastian's work during the course of his preparatory reading for *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido. The proximity of Jung's concept of the archetype to Bastian's concept of the elementary thoughts is readily apparent and was asserted by Jung himself, and hence need not be gone into in much detail. Like Bastian, Jung argued that the universality of mythic motifs could be explained only through supposing the existence of a common intrapsychic source. Similarly, Jung also claimed through their actualisation, archetypes took on specific cultural

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834 See below.

835 The parallelism was also noted by Koepping, in his survey of Bastian's influence, *Adolf Bastian and the Psychic Unity of Mankind*, p. 118.
and historical colourations. As against Bastian, explanations through migration and diffusion were used as counterarguments against Jung's concept of archetypes. In 1940 Jung claimed that the lack of recognition given to the universality of mythic motifs was due to disciplinary compartmentalisation, and the hypothesis of migration, and that it was due to these factors that "Bastian's ideas met with little success in their day." He added that what was lacking then were the "necessary psychological premises."

These statements make it clear that Jung was aware that his theory went against the grain of anthropological orthodoxy, where it would doubtless have been viewed as a reversion to the 'outmoded' Bastian. Indeed, diffusion was commonly appealed to as a repudiation of the existence of archetypes. Yet what enabled Jung to take this stance was the fact that whilst he drew upon Bastian's anthropological work as an empirical support for his theory of archetypes, it was ultimately psychology which held the key to the explanation of the genesis of cultural forms. Hence in the last analysis, anthropology was subordinated to psychology.

**Evolutionary anthropology**

The development of evolutionary anthropology has been well documented, and not surprisingly, the relation of

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836 Jung, "The psychology of the child archetype," *CW* 9,1, § 259.
Freud's *Totem and Taboo* to this background has been assiduously researched. The same has not been the case for Jung. In the following I intend to sketch some of the principal thematics of the evolutionary anthropologists that informed Jung: the doctrine of survivals, the equation of the primitive with the prehistoric, the relation between the modern and the primitive and the use of the comparative method. It has been rightly stressed that it is mistaken to look upon Victorian evolutionary anthropologists as constituting a unitary body with shared doctrines. However, in the case of Jung, it is clear that Jung's relation to their work may be adequately characterized with reference to certain general notions.

**Tylor (1832-1917)**

The best known of the evolutionary anthropologists was Edward Tylor. Tylor was the keeper of the Pitt-Rivers Museum at Oxford, and subsequently became a professor of anthropology at Oxford. Jung had a copy of a German translation of Tylor's 1871 *Primitive Culture*. For Tylor, culture was not a static entity. As the outcome of evolutionary development, the index of culture was temporality. He claimed that the striking uniformity of civilization could be explained by the "uniform action of

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837 On the former, see especially George Stocking, *Victorian Anthropology*, and on the latter, Edwin Wallace, *Freud and Anthropology: A History and Reappraisal*. 
uniform causes," and that the various grades could be regarded as the outcome of evolutionary stages.\footnote{838} Due to the general likeness of human nature, and the circumstances it confronted, Tylor claimed that little significance need be accorded to history or geography, and that "the ancient Swiss lake-dweller may be set beside the medieval Aztec."\footnote{839} Indeed, a window into prehistoric conditions could be provided by considering modern savage tribes which "have in common certain elements of civilization, which seem remnants of an early state of the human race at large."\footnote{840} The stress on the fundamental identity of mental processes led to the positing of what was termed the psychic unity of mankind, and it was this, rather than diffusion, which was invoked to explain the similarities of customs in diverse cultures.\footnote{841}

For Tylor, the progress to modernity consisted in the evolutionary development from "savage through barbaric to civilized life."\footnote{842} Evolution partook of the moral order, and represented a transition from the lower to the higher. Primitives, he claimed, were characterized by the belief in magic, which he claimed stemmed from the misapplication of

\footnote{838} Tylor, \textit{Primitive Culture}, p. 1.  
\footnote{839} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 6.  
\footnote{840} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 21.  
\footnote{841} This term had been employed by Bastian. It is important to underscore the fact that concepts of the psychic unity of mankind were by no means unitary.  
\footnote{842} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 26.
the association of ideas. The error of magic, supposedly, was that primitives behaved as Humeans in reverse: having made mental associations between connected events, they inverted this relation, and falsely believed that mental association was sufficient by itself to indicate connection in reality. Under the heading of magic Tylor included practises such as palmistry, astrology, divination and the interpretation of dreams. Primitives personified, believing in the animation of nature. Primitives were anthropomorphic, attributing events to the beneficent or maleficent volition of Gods, humans, animals. In short, in the form of that notorious phrase, primitives were children. If modernity was the obverse of primitivism, it constituted a fragile balance that was always threatened by a reversion to superstition. The danger of reversion was indicated by the continued presence in modern society of supposedly primitive practices and beliefs, which Tylor termed survivals, defining them as:

processes, customs, opinions, and so forth, which have been carried on by force of habit into a new state of society different from that in which they had their original home, and they thus remain as proofs and examples of an older condition of culture out of which a newer one has been involved.

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843 Ibid., p. 116.
844 Ibid., p. 16.
An example of a menacing survival whose popularity was on the increase was spiritualism, which he claimed was a survival and a revival of savage thought, which the general tendency of civilization and science has been to discard.\textsuperscript{845} Not only did this hold for the belief in the veracity of spiritualistic phenomena, but also for the spiritualist interpretation of them. Consequently "a modern medium is a Red Indian or a Tatar shaman in a dress-coat,"\textsuperscript{846} and a 'wild North American Indian' would feel perfectly at home in a London séance.\textsuperscript{847} Tylor's characterization of the primitive as magical and civilization being constantly menaced by a reversion to barbarity was reiterated by James Frazer (1854–1941) in \textit{The Golden Bough}, which typified the history of civilization as consisting in the transition from the age of magic, to the age of religion through to the age of science, and his graphic depiction of this transition reads like a modern creation myth of culture, as this excerpt from his depiction of the transition from the age of magic to the age of science demonstrates:

He [the primitive] had been pulling at strings to which nothing was attached. He had been marching, as he

\textsuperscript{845} Tylor, "On the survival of savage thought in modern civilization", p. 528.

\textsuperscript{846} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{847} Ibid., pp. 155-6.
thought, straight to the goal, while in reality he had only been treading in a narrow circle... cut adrift from his ancient moorings and left to toss on a troubled sea of doubt and uncertainty, his old happy confidence in himself and his powers rudely shaken, our primitive philosopher must have been sadly perplexed and agitated until he came to rest, as in a quiet haven after a tempestuous voyage, in a new system of faith and practice, which seemed to offer a substitute, however precarious, for that sovereignty over nature which he had reluctantly abdicated. If the great world went on its way without the help of him or his fellows, it must surely be because there were other beings, like himself, but far stronger, who, unseen themselves, directed the course and brought about all the varied series of events which he had hitherto believed to be dependent on his magic. It was they, as he now believed, and not himself, who made the stormy wind to blow, the lightening to flash, and the thunder to roll; who laid the foundations of the solid earth and set bounds to the restless sea that it might not pass.

Evolutionary anthropology was a comparative enterprise. As commentators have noted, the frequent historiographical

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nomination of the 'comparative method' obscures the fact that this term encompasses different forms of comparison. Joan Leopold differentiates three types of comparative method. She describes the first as the "general method of comparison of cultural phenomenon with the intention of pointing up usually structural or functional differences or similarities rather than ancestral relationships." The second she terms the comparative-genetic method, as employed in comparative anatomy and Indo-European comparative philology, which consisted in the comparison of cultural traits thought to be genetically related. Finally, she argues that the comparative method in evolutionary anthropology consisted in a combination of the first two, and aimed at "deriving information about the stages of development of supposedly less known ancient societies from existing societies capable of being more easily observed." As Stocking notes, in evolutionary anthropology, the recreation of typological stages was to circumvent the lack of data.

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850 Ibid.

851 Ibid., p. 59.

Wilhelm Wundt has been canonised as the father of experimental psychology. However, there is a sense in which, in his own estimation, his achievements in the field of Völkerpsychologie took pride of place. In 1920, in his autobiography, he recalled that:

> When I likewise conceived the idea in 1860, to add a sort of superstructure to experimental psychology, that from its original purpose and from the aids at its disposal had to limit itself to the facts of the individual mental life [Seelenlebens], which, starting from these facts as an indispensable foundation, must set as a problem the phenomena of human living together, namely in their beginnings. It now soon appeared to me that this task was the higher one and in truth the proper conclusion of psychology.

This statement neatly presents Wundt's synthetic view of the relation between experimental psychology and Völkerpsychologie: the latter, whilst based upon the former, represented its culmination. The need for a separate discipline to study social life arose, according to Wundt,

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853 Various translations of the term Völkerpsychologie have been given. Perhaps the closest would be 'ethnopsychology.'

because of the restricted scope of experimental psychology, which was unable to study the 'higher' mental functions. Wundt's retrospective statement gives the impression that his *Völkerpsychologie* was conceived and its proper disciplinary position was perceived at the same time, which superimposes the result over the initial conception. The term itself was initially coined by Moritz Lazarus (1824-1903) and Heymann Steinthal (1823-1899), and they were responsible for its initial conception.

Both Lazarus and Steinthal studied under Johann Friederich Herbart at Berlin, and in terms of psychology, considered themselves as Herbartians. Steinthal was a privatdozent in Berlin, and in 1861, Lazarus was given a chair at the University of Berne in psychology and *Völkerpsychologie*. The term itself they coined in 1851, and in 1859 they formed the *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*, which ran until 1890. Amongst those who contributed to it were Wilhelm Dilthey, Franz Bopp, Hermann Cohen, Wilhelm Windelbrand and Adolf Bastian.

Analogies between the individual and society have been longstanding. In Herbart's view,

In every social whole the individual persons are related to one another in almost the same way as the
concepts in the soul of the individual.\textsuperscript{855}

The social could be conceived of as a supraindividual. As Kurt Danziger notes,

Lazarus and Steinthal accepted the Herbartian analogy between the intra-individual and the inter-individual level, but they redefined the latter in depoliticized terms that represented a partial return to Herder's notion of the cultural community.\textsuperscript{856}

For Lazarus and Steinthal, the term for that they used for this entity was the \textit{Gesamtgeist} or \textit{Völkgeist} (the latter had been coined by Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803)). The \textit{Völkgeist} was the principal subject of \textit{Völkerpsychologie}, which had two components - \textit{völkergeschichtliche Psychologie} and \textit{psychische Ethnologie}. Whilst the former dealt with the general psychological functioning of the \textit{Völksgeist}, the later dealt with its concrete embodiment. The \textit{Geist} obeyed general psychological laws. In 1862 Lazarus defined it in the following manner:

\textsuperscript{855} Johann Herbart, \textit{A Text Book of Psychology}, (1816/1901), cited in Gustav Jahoda, \textit{Crossroads between Mind and Culture}, p. 142.  
\textsuperscript{856} Kurt Danziger, "Origins and basic principles of Wundt's \textit{Völkerpsychologie}," p. 305.
The two extreme phenomena through which this objective Geist manifests itself are then these. On the one hand are the purely mental events: views, convictions, opinions, thoughts, feelings, etc.; these are the elements of the objective Geist, inasmuch as they are common among the people, lasting and characteristic. These elements appear as a given to the individual Geist and exerts influence on it, and yet the place and the manner of their existence is only in the personal subjects, in the individual Geister, where through the subject's activity these elements manifest themselves in concrete fashion as the universal within the individual.\textsuperscript{857}

Thus whilst the only place of manifestation of the Geist was in the individual, it itself was a supraindividual factor. Crucially, it could be regarded as a unitary factor, that functioned like a single individual. As Danziger notes, for Lazarus and Steinthal,

the individuals whose common activity created the objective reality of cultural forms were themselves to

\textsuperscript{857} Cited in Ivan Kalmar, "The Völkerpsychologie of Lazarus and Steinthal and the modern concept of culture," p. 679.
be seen as the product of these forms.\textsuperscript{858}

The materials that Völkerpsychologie studied were primarily textual: languages, mythologies, religions, customs and so forth. They viewed myth as the "collective world of representations of the Völk,"\textsuperscript{859} and as the original form of representation of religious feeling. Lazarus and Steinthal were both Jewish, and their Völkerpsychologie was developed against the backdrop of rising German nationalism. They were at pains to separate the concept of Völk from that of race, and to distance themselves from any notion of a hierarchical order of different Völk. Thus individuals of different races could belong to the same Völk. As Lazarus pithily stated, "To me blood means bloody little."\textsuperscript{860}

What did psychology mean to Lazarus and Steinthal, and why did they use it to designate their new discipline? According to James Whitman, the use of the term psychology by Steinthal, Lazarus, Noack, Waitz and Lotze, each of whom had a background in philological disciplines, was in part out of opposition to the materialism of Moleschott, Vogt and

\textsuperscript{858} Danziger, "Origins and basic principles of Völkerpsychologie," p. 305.

\textsuperscript{859} Lazarus and Steinthal (1870), cited in Ingird Belke, Moritz Lazarus und Heymann Steinthal: Die Begründer der Völkerpsychologie in ihren Briefen, p. cxxii.

\textsuperscript{860} Cited in Ivan Kalmar, "The Völkerpsychologie of Lazarus and Steinthal and the modern concept of culture", p. 688.
Buchner. Whitman argues that their utilisation of the term, at the same moment when Weber, Fechner and Wundt were putting forward programmes for an experimental scientific psychology,

enabled philologists and their partisans to reformulate their old practices in terms more in tune with the new understanding of "scientific" without seeming faithless to their forebears within the tradition... the attempt was made to combine the old text-critical use of Psychologie with the natural scientific use, and make of the two strands in the history of Psychologie one social science.  

If language featured prominently as subject matter for Völkerpsychologie, it also played an important role in its appellation. What the term psychology offered then, was, paradoxically, a new lease of life for the older philological disciplines, through laying claim to the rhetoric of scientific modernity. This was achieved through deliberately using the same term, psychology, to designate radically distinct pursuits.

Wundt's turn to Völkerpsychologie was at the same time

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862 Ibid., p. 217.
a repudiation of Lazarus and Steinhhal's conception of it, and polemical exchanges ensued. Wundt's critique of their work was principally directed against the Herbartian psychology that underwrote it, and which he had challenged in his experimental psychology. Chronologically, Wundt's work in this area ran alongside his experimental work. His work was primarily embodied in the ten volumes of his **Völkerpsychologie**. In this context I plan to consider his general conception of the subject, together with his views on history and myth.

In the same year in which Jung published his **Transformations and Symbols of the Libido**, Wundt published his **Elements of Folk-Psychology [Völkerpsychologie]**. These works form an interesting contrast. Wundt claimed that "the basis of a philosophy of history should henceforth be a psychological history of development." He defined **Völkerpsychologie** as dealing with

those mental products which are created by a community of human life and are, therefore, inexplicable in terms merely of individual consciousness, since they presuppose the reciprocal action of many.

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864 Ibid., p. 3.
Thus Völkerpsychologie and general psychology presupposed one another. The psychological laws discovered by Völkerpsychologie did not represent an independent realm of operation, but represented applications of principles valid for individual psychology. If Wundt challenged Lazarus and Steinthal's conception of Völkerpsychologie, there was a straightforward continuity as regards subject matter: languages, mythology, religion and customs again taking pride of place. These latter, according to Wundt, were not the product of an individual, but of the Völkseele.

Wundt's approach may be illustrated by his conception of mythology, an account of which he put forward in his Ethics of 1892. To begin with, Wundt accorded mythology an especial significance in the life of the Völk: "The mythology of a people contains all the elements of their theory of the universe." Thus mythology included theories of nature, religion and morals alongside one another. This inherent plurality of mythology led him to reject the prevalent explanation of mythology as consisting in a (failed) attempt to interpret nature, and indeed, to reject all monocausal interpretations of myth, noting that: "Any one-sided theory of historical phenomena may be expected a priori to prove inadequate to the complexity of real

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life.\textsuperscript{866} At the same time, Wundt put forward a psychological explanation of mythology:

myth-making takes its origin from a single psychological source. It arose from a personifying apperception, the essential characteristic of which is the objectification of one's own consciousness. Where primitive man perceives a movement, he sees a will...

This idea is easily carried over from things that move to things that do not... in the application of the personifying process to the various objects of his environment are contained the very first germs of the most diverse forms of mythological thought.\textsuperscript{867}

The psychological explanation of mythology dealt with the most fundamental processes at work there. Mythology represented the projection of human psychology into external phenomena. The study of mythology was significant because "certain fundamental resemblances" between all races were more marked there, whilst at the same time, the differences in mythologies designated the differences in "fundamental moral character" between peoples.\textsuperscript{868}

In \textit{Elements of Folk-Psychology [Völkerpsychologie]}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{866} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 76.
  \item \textsuperscript{867} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 76-7.
  \item \textsuperscript{868} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 89.
\end{itemize}
Wundt put forward a speculative psychological developmental history of mankind. According to Wundt, mankind went through three main stages: the primitive, totemic, the heroic and finally, humanity. The work consisted in identifying the **Volkseele** of each stage. Wundt reiterated the anthropological equation between the primitive and the prehistoric, and drew upon the former for his knowledge of the latter. The transition through these stages resulted in a progressive individualisation. He summed up the transition to the stage of humanity as follows:

> Humanity, when predicated of an individual, means that he transcends the limits of all more restricted associations, such as family, tribe, or State, and possesses an appreciation of human personality as such; in its application to human society, it represents a demand for an ideal condition in which this appreciation of human worth shall have become a universal norm.\(^66^9\)

The transition to the higher stages did not entail the disappearance of the earlier stages, as witnessed by the continued existence of religions.

Wundt's **Völkerpsychologie** did not survive his death. Several reasons have been given for this. To begin, Wundt's

\(^{66^9}\) Wundt, *Elements of Folk-Psychology*, p. 472.
strictures concerning the use of experimentation in psychology were not adhered to by his students, who sought to expand its purview. From this perspective, Völkerpsychologie would appear to be a relic of the older speculative and metaphysical psychology. Secondly, the subsequent identification of Völkerpsychologie with German nationalism and völkisch movements - which represented a complete negation of Lazarus and Steinthal's vision, led to the subsequent discredit of the former. In 1920, Wundt proclaimed Völkerpsychologie as a German science. As James Whitman notes, "Only with the consuming nationalism of the world war did Völkerpsychologie become völkisch." Wundt's Völkerpsychologie presented a psychological theory that encompassed history, linguistics, sociology, anthropology and comparative religion. The progressive disciplinary development of each of these disciplines mitigated against their unification under a more fundamental psychological discipline. Significantly in this context, one may add that the development of psychoanalysis and analytical psychology, from Totem and Taboo and Transformations and Symbols of the Libido onwards, took over much of the project of Völkerpsychologie, and coupled it with an institutional form

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that ensured its survival, up to the present day.

For Wundt, *Völkerpsychologie* was to form the basis of history. This view was espoused by one major historian, Karl Lamprecht (1856-1915), who was the best known German cultural historian at the turn of the century. Lamprecht had studied with Wundt at Leipzig, where he himself became a professor. His masterpiece was his 12 volume *German History*, which appeared between 1891 and 1909. In this context, the significance of his work lies in the manner in which he attempted to approach history psychologically, which was significant for Jung.

History, Lamprecht proclaimed, was a *völkerpsychologischen* science, "nothing but applied psychology."\(^{372}\) Psychology, having freed itself from metaphysics, and having established itself as a science, could provide the basis for a scientific approach to history, which would enable the depiction of the general laws that underlay historical changes. This he presented in his theory of *dominants*. From *Völkerpsychologie*, Lamprecht took the analogy between the individual and the collective, which enabled him to apply individual psychological models to understand epochal historical changes. For Lamprecht, the character of a given epoch was determined by its *dominant*, and the transition between epochs consisted in the rise and

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fall of particular dominants. This general process was
universal. He described this process in the following way:

If one distinguished in the soul-life, considered from
the historical viewpoint, between the actualities of
rising sensations, aspirations and feelings, and a
feeling which, as it were, governs and regulates them,
a certain dominant would seem to have regulated up to
this time the proceedings of actuality, due to well-
known stimuli and incitations. But on the other hand,
it turns out that this is no longer the case. The new
era with its innumerable stimuli creates other forms of
psychic experience, which remain foreign to the old
dominant. This dominant, so to speak, the very kernel
of the personality, yields its foremost position, or at
least, loses a part of its controlling influence. 873

Certain epochs could be characterised as epochs of
dissociation. Under such circumstances, individuality
yielded to the overpowering influences of a new external
world. This gave rise to new conceptions and the
transformation of the ego. The previous harmony that
governed the personality is sacrificed and individuality
becomes open to the suggestions of the external world.
Lamprecht stated: "it is at the same time more given over to

873 Ibid., p. 119.
the effects of the broad unconscious substrata of the new psychic life. Consequently, new forms of psychic life become conscious. To adapt to the surroundings, a greater breadth of soul was required, which led to the development of a new power of psychological assimilation, and a new dominant of the personality:

the whole psyche is set free, and - a centre of the total personality being created - regains its former self-mastery; it now seeks the highest pleasure of existence by proceeding, considering carefully what is possible, to the most energetic activity of a central dominant.\(^{875}\)

The development of a new dominant ushered in a new epoch. Indeed, since 1890, there had been a new dominant in Europe, which was represented by the predominance of imaginative activity, the increasing importance of the observation of the inner life and symbolism in painting.\(^{876}\)

For Lamprecht, the dominant that characterized an epoch was present in each individual, and historical change in the culture at large was at the same a change in the psychology of the individual. Lamprecht's nomothetic approach created a

\(^{874}\) Ibid., p. 126.

\(^{875}\) Ibid., p. 133.

\(^{876}\) Ibid., p. 111.
controversy in the historical profession, from which his reputation did not survive.877

Crowd Psychology

In 1895, the French crowd psychologist Gustav Le Bon famously proclaimed: "The age we are about to enter will in truth be the ERA OF CROWDS."878 If the age was to be the age of the crowd, than correspondingly, the psychology that would be the psychology of the age was the psychology of crowds. The last quarter of the nineteenth century saw the emergence of crowd psychology, chiefly in France and Italy. Numerous significant studies have reconstructed the development of crowd psychology in its historical context, with particular emphasis on its imbrication with social and political issues. At the same time, a number of important works have studied the significance of crowd psychology in Freud's conception of the political, which was prominently articulated in his "Mass psychology and the analysis of the ego."879 However, their significance for Jung, whilst occasionally noted in passing, has not come in for consideration.

877 Woodruff Smith, Politics and the Sciences of Culture in Germany, 1870-1920, p. 191.


879 See especially Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, The Freudian Subject.
Hypnosis and Suggestion

The last quarter of the nineteenth century has been characterized as the golden age of hypnosis. One significance of the study of hypnotism and suggestion was that it was presented a psychology of the relations between people, and their effects upon one another. In experiments which were conducted, such as getting subjects to commit imaginary crimes, the possibility of the hypnosis-suggestion model for forming a template through which to understand wider social relations, and to provide the psychologist with the authority of a privileged vantage point from which to comment on social issues was clearly grasped. In the famous legal disputations between the Nancy and the Salpêtrière schools, not least of the issues was the attempt of proponents of each school to secure the preeminent right as spokesmen for public morals. Few saw this more clearly than the Belgian psychophysicist, philosopher and hypnotist, Josef Delbouef, in his repeated attacks on the unwarranted arrogation of political power by physicians in these debates.

For these reasons, the hypnosis-suggestion models readily

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880 On this issue, see Jean-Roch Laurence & Campbell Perry, Hypnosis, Will & Memory.

881 Joseph Delbouef, Magnétiseurs et médecins. Extremely vivid and detailed accounts of the conflicts between the schools and the attempt to outlaw stage hypnotists may be found in two letters from Delbouef to Croom Robertson of 18th August, 1889 and 12th April 1890, Croom Roberston papers, UCL.
lent themselves to the understanding of society at large. Whilst the hypnosis-suggestion models formed the basic template for crowd psychology, this sphere of application was not simply a supplementary, exterior terrain to which a supposedly purely clinical model could be exported, as concerns with the social and the political were intrinsic to the hypnosis-suggestion models.

**Imitation**

In 1890 in *The Laws of Imitation* Gabriel Tarde (1843-1904) rhetorically posed the question, "What is society?", to which he replied with one word - imitation. Tarde had studied law in Toulouse and Paris and became a judge in Sarlat in 1875. His early work was in criminology. He subsequently was appointed to a chair at the Collège de France. For Tarde, imitation defined the specificity of the social, and demarcated it from the vital and the physical. In a further statement that was only slightly less brief, Tarde proclaimed: "Society, is imitation, and imitation, is a species of somnambulism." For Tarde, the new psychology of hypnotism provided a template for

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883 Tarde was lecturing at the Collège de France when Jung went there to attend Janet's lectures. There is no evidence that Jung heard Tarde lecture, but it is possible that he may have encountered his work at this time.


understanding society at large. Man in society, he claimed, was a somnambulist, and the social state, "like the hypnotic state, is only a form of dream, a dream of command and a dream of action." The fabric of society consisted in a cascade of successive, mutual, and conflicting hypnotisations. Imitation was broadly understood: it could be both conscious and unconscious, and not only indicated the emulation of a model, but also, under the form of counterimitation, attempting to do the exact opposite. The processes of memory and habit were reformulated as forms of self-imitation. Imitation did not consist in exact replication, as it always introduced differences and hence ushered in new developments. Consequently, Tarde put forward the following definition of the social group:

a collection of beings in as much as they are engaged in imitation between themselves or in as much as, without actually imitating, they are alike and their common traits are ancient copies of the same model.

Through placing imitation at the heart of the social, psychology, or as Tarde sometime styled it, inter-mental psychology, became the preeminent discipline for

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886 Ibid., p. 83.
887 Ibid., p. 290, p. xi.
888 Ibid., p. 73.
comprehending the social. For Tarde, the key to understanding society lay in the explication of the forms of psychological relation between the individuals that made up society. Tarde claimed that "Inter-mental psychology must be to the social sciences what the study of the cell is to the biological sciences."  

**Collective Psychology**

In 1891 an Italian lawyer Scipio Sighele (1868-1913) published a work entitled on the criminal crowd, entitled *The Delinquent Crowd*. Sighele called for a collective psychology, a term which had been coined by the criminologist Enrico Ferri (1856-1929), to study the behaviour of individuals in groups. Sighele claimed that the behaviour of a group could be considered as that of a single individual, citing Auguste Comte's statement that human society should be considered as a single man who has always existed. He derived his principal characterisation of the psychology of groups from Alfred Espinas, who had stated on the basis of his study of societies of animals that:

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890 Scipio Sighele, *La Foule criminelle: essai de psychologie collective*. Citations are to the French translation of his work, from which translations have been made.

it is a universal law in the whole domain of intelligent life, that the representation of an emotional state provokes the birth of this same state in someone who witnesses it.\footnote{Espinas, \textit{Des Sociétés animales}, cited by Sighele, \textit{ibid.}, p. 54.}

Sighele termed this the law of psychic mimetism. As aspects of this, Sighele included moral contagion, social imitation and hypnotic suggestion. Sighele stressed the low moral qualities of the crowd, stating that in crowds, behaviour sank to the lowest common denominator and that "the crowd is a terrain where the microbe of evil develops very easily."\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 60.}

Drawing upon the work of the Salpêtrière school, Sighele held that strong-willed individuals could escape the suggestive effect of crowds. Concerning the morality of crowd behaviour, Sighele developed a notion of collective responsibility. He claimed that in antiquity, responsibility had been conceived of in collective terms, as each group, such as a tribe or a family was considered as an indissolvable individual. The individual, he claimed, was considered not as an organism, but as an organ.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 121.} It was through the process of civilisation that the concept of responsibility had been progressively individualised.
Sighele stated that

when we said that all the crowd should be responsible for the crimes committed by its members, we have only applied the modern theory of collective responsibility, which sees and recognizes not only in the individual, but also in the milieu, the causes of each crime, to a special case which is more evident than the others.\textsuperscript{895}

Collective behaviour was not only the source of crimes, but also of creativity. In 1899, in an essay entitled "the moral problem of collective psychology," Sighele stated that language as well as the legends of all countries were created by the crowd, and were "unconsciously born in the infantile soul of a people."\textsuperscript{896} The role of the creative individual or genius was to reveal what lay dormant in the unconscious: "the genius is the revealer of truths which sleep in the unconscious thought of all."\textsuperscript{897}

\textbf{Le Bon}

Gustav Le Bon became the most widely known of the crowd psychologists. It has been estimated that during his

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{895} Ibid., p. 126.
  \item \textsuperscript{896} Ibid., p. 260.
  \item \textsuperscript{897} Ibid., p. 261.
\end{itemize}
lifetime, his works sold half a million copies. In 1894 he set out his psychological views in *Psychological Laws of the Evolution of Peoples*. In this, the linkage between individual and collective psychology was affected through regarding each race as a single individual. Thus Le Bon claimed that each race possessed a fixed mental constitution. Adopting a Lamarckian position on inheritance, he argued that the members of each race possessed a set of common psychological traits, which were inherited, and which constituted the national character, or the soul (âme) of a people (Le Bon also used the terms 'soul of a race' and 'collective soul'). Following from his stress on the significance of heredity, Le Bon claimed that the soul of a people was largely determined by its dead:

Infinitely more numerous than the living, the dead are also infinitely more powerful than them. They govern the immense domain of the unconscious, this invisible domain which contains under its empire all the manifestations of intelligence and character. It is by its dead, much more than by its living, that a people is led. It is by them alone that a race is founded...

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The extinguished generations do not solely impose on us their physical constitution; they also impose their thoughts.  

Le Bon's unconscious was a hereditary, racial, suprapersonal unconscious. Each individual was constituted by a set of unconscious racial characteristics. The various races were arrayed in rank order, starting with the 'primitive' races (Fuégiens, Australians), passing to the 'inferior' races (Negroes), then on to the 'average' races (Chinese, Japanese, Mongols, Semites), and finally ending with the 'superior' races (Indo-Europeans - least developed being the Hindus). As the constitutional psychological character of each race was fixed, so too, consequently, was their order of rank.

Whilst in *Psychological Laws of the Evolution of Peoples* Le Bon had stressed the significance of fixed, constitutional psychological traits, in his best known work *The Crowd* he also stressed a readily malleable transformative dimension. Le Bon claimed that when individuals gathered in a crowd, new psychological characteristics developed, which consisted in the "substitution of the unconscious action of crowds for the

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conscious action of individuals." The act of gathering into a crowd created an 'âme collective,' into which the individual became submerged. In the crowd, it was the unconscious that dominated, and Le Bon claimed that "The part played by the unconscious in all our acts is immense, and that played by reason very small." Hence to gain access to the unconscious required no prolonged and expensive one to one clinical encounter was necessary: one could simply walk out into the street.

One could with justice reverse Le Bon's statements, and say that for him, the concept of the unconscious was itself modelled after the crowd. For Le Bon, crowds had an inferior mentality, which represented an atavistic return to a primitive condition:

our savage destructive instincts are the inheritance left dormant in all of us from the primitive ages. In the life of the isolated individual it would be dangerous for him to gratify these instincts, while his absorption in an irresponsible crowd, in which in consequence he is assured of impunity, gives him entire liberty to follow them.

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902 Le Bon, The Crowd, p. 5.
903 Ibid., p. 10.
904 Ibid., p. 64.
From the evolutionary anthropologists, Le Bon took over the equation of the primitive with the prehistoric. Crowds were typified by contagion, and no one was free from their sway: "Isolated, he may be a cultivated individual; in a crowd, he is a barbarian." Finally, crowds ineluctably and instinctively placed themselves under a leader.

There were several priority disputes between the crowd psychologists; Sighele accused Le Bon, who had not cited his work, of plagiarism. The relations between the crowd psychologists have been analysed at length. What is of significance here, is that grouped together, their work formed a predominant mode of the psychological understanding of society, and one which gave epistemological priority to individual psychology. Subsequently transformed, they would in turn provide a principal template for Jung's collective psychology.

**Baldwin (1861-1934)**

Within early social psychology, social life was frequently explained in terms of the relations between the individual and the collective, which were envisaged as two competing actors. An example of this is given by James Mark

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905 Ibid., p. 36.

906 Ibid., p. 134.

Baldwin's study of 1910, *The Individual and Society, or, Psychology and Sociology*. Baldwin had played a significant role in the establishment of experimental psychology, founding laboratories at the University of Toronto, Princeton University, and playing a key role in the establishment of *The Psychological Review* and *The Psychological Bulletin*.

In *The Individual and Society*, Baldwin stated that the most cursory examination of social life revealed two principal interests, that of the individual, and that of society. These principles were reflected in the disciplinary distinction between psychology and sociology. Baldwin claimed that it was not the study of the externals of society that could reveal its workings, but the study of the mental life of individuals. Hence psychology took pride of place over sociology, which should be subordinated to it.

Baldwin claimed that human development could be characterized by the interplay of two impulses, that of individualism and collectivism, which were innate tendencies. These were represented by the self-preservation tendencies on the one hand, and social and gregarious tendencies on the other. Principal among the

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908 On Baldwin's career, see Ronald Mueller, "A chapter in the history of the relationship between psychology and sociology in American: James Mark Baldwin."

909 Baldwin, *The Individual and Society, or, Psychology and Sociology*, p. 18.
socialising tendencies were play and imitation. Baldwin's stress on imitation was derived from Tarde, whose work he translated. It was through imitation, Baldwin claimed, that the child learns his capacities and limitations, acquires the riches of social traditions and gains access to culture, and learns to innovate.  

Similarly to Tarde, Baldwin claimed that as the process of imitation did not consist in a pure reproduction, it was through the act of imitation that innovation and creation occurred.  

The competition between individualism and collectivism led to the dangers of oversocialisation and overindividualism. The former resulted in "a softened individual and a weakened social life," and the latter "produces a man whose tendencies are destructive of social interests and injurious to the general welfare." He argued that the competing claims of individualism and collectivism were resolved in a specific type of character, which he described as a tempered individualism: "a tendency to competition, rivalry, self-assertion for personal advancement, tempered by the requirements of the group life as a whole." He claimed that the development of society and the progress of mankind depended upon the fostering of

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910 Ibid., p. 21.
911 Ibid., p. 152.
912 Ibid., p. 86.
913 Ibid., pp. 85-6.
such tempered individualism.

Alexandre Métraux notes that the crowd psychologists were popular until around 1920. With the exception of Tarde, they were successfully excluded from the French university system by Émile Durkheim and his school. With the decline of the psychological concern with hypnotism and suggestion, social psychology increasingly sought to distance itself from the concerns of the crowd psychologists, though significant continuities continued to exist.

Boas

A figure viewed as one of the fathers of modern anthropology is Franz Boas (1858-1942). After training as a physicist, Boas's turn to anthropology was supported by Bastian. In the 1880's he did fieldwork amongst the Eskimos. At the invitation of Stanley Hall, he took up a lectureship in anthropology at Clark University, after which he held appointments at the Field Museum in Chicago, the American Museum for Natural History and at Columbia University. Boas' critiques of the comparative method, of evolutionism and racism in anthropology together with his advocacy of the in-depth investigation of societies did much to set the tenor of modern anthropology. It is useful to look at these aspects of his work, as he elaborated it contemporaneously

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914 Alexandre Métraux, "French crowd psychology: between theory and ideology", p. 279.
with Jung's work, and Jung had some familiarity with it. Further, these issues were critical in the anthropological reception of Jung's work.

In 1896 Boas launched a highly influential attack on the use of the comparative method in anthropology. Boas claimed that this method, as used by Bastian and others, presupposed that the occurrence of similar phenomena in different cultures supplied proof of the "uniform working of the human mind."\(^9\) Thus he argued that the fundamental assumption upon which the comparative method was based was that "the same ethnological phenomena are always due to the same causes."\(^9\) This enabled the explanation of diverse phenomena in different cultures and epochs through a single set of laws, be it Bastian's theory of elementary thoughts or Tylor's theory of animism. For Boas, this axiom was mistaken, as he held that the same phenomenon could develop in different ways in different settings. Correspondingly, he argued that the scope of comparison should be rigorously delimited:

We must demand that the causes from which it developed be investigated and that comparisons be restricted to those effects which have been proven to be effects of


\(^9\) Ibid., p. 273.
the same causes... In short, before extended comparisons are made, the comparability of the material must be proved.\textsuperscript{917}

The implication was clear: rather than appealing to the occurrence of similar phenomena in different cultures to buttress a given theory, the very basis of the comparison had first to be established. For this to be possible, the causes of any given phenomenon in a given society had to be investigated in detail. Boas nominated such an investigation the historical method, which subsequently came to set the tone for the larger share of twentieth century anthropology:

Its application is based, first of all, on a well-defined, small geographical territory, and its comparisons are not extended beyond the limits of the cultural area that forms the basis of the study.\textsuperscript{918}

In 1909 Boas was present with Freud and Jung at the Clark conference. He presented a paper entitled "Psychological problems in anthropology" in which he reiterated and expanded his criticisms of the comparative method. He commented on the relationship between anthropology and psychology, and claimed that anthropologists were also

\textsuperscript{917} Ibid., p. 275.

\textsuperscript{918} Ibid., p. 277.
trying to determine the "psychological laws which control the mind of man everywhere, and that may differ in various racial and social groups." In this respect, anthropology overlapped with psychology, with the difference that it was concerned with anthropological material.

Boas stated that the fundamental problem of anthropology was the question as to whether all races were "mentally equally endowed or do mental differences exist?" Whilst there appeared to be evidence that suggested that the composite features of races differed, he held that there was no justification for hierarchies. Whilst Tylor and Bastian had shown the existence of similar ideas throughout the world, Boas argued that the psychological processes that produced them had not been sufficiently explained. Attempts to explain such process through the comparative method were doomed, due to the lack of adequate comparability. For instance, Boas claimed that totemism did not constitute a single psychological problem and that

the anthropological phenomena, which are in outward appearances alike, are, psychologically speaking, entirely distinct, and that consequently psychological laws covering all of them can not be deduced from

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What was necessary was to discover common processes as opposed to focusing on external similarity. Such an investigation constituted "a direction in which anthropological data may be used to good advantage by the psychologist." In terms of the history of psychoanalysis, Boas's paper could hardly have been more timely, or as the case may be, untimely, coming as it did shortly before Freud and Jung embarked upon their colonisation of anthropological material. For Boas had critiqued in advance what constituted the presuppositions of their endeavours. Given the subsequent development of anthropology, it is not going too far to say that had they heeded Boas's recommendations for the negotiation of the interdisciplinary relation of anthropology and psychology, the fate and reception of their work in anthropology would have been totally different.

Boas' critique of the comparative method went hand in hand with his critique of evolutionary and physical anthropology. He argued that evolutionism was founded on the unproved premise that the "the course of historical changes

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920 Ibid., p. 375.

921 Ibid. Boas had been critical of attempts by psychologists to deal with anthropological materials. In 1904, he criticised Völkerpsychologie, under which heading he included Steinthal, Wundt, Baldwin, Tarde and Stoll, on the grounds that they had failed to adequately elucidate the relations of Völkerpsychologie to individual psychology. Boas, "The history of anthropology," p. 31.
in the cultural life of mankind follows definite laws which are applicable everywhere...""^922 Having undercut the evidential basis for such an assumption, Boas concluded by discarding the Eurocentrism it was coupled with, namely, the view that

our modern Western European civilization represents the highest cultural development towards which all other more primitive types tend, and that, therefore, retrospectively, we construct an orthogenetic development towards our own modern civilization."^923

In nineteenth century physical anthropology, the constancy of the cephalic index in different races - the ratio of width to the length of the skull - was taken as axiomatic. The assumption of this constancy was a critical component which enabled various races to be arrayed in hierarchies. Between 1908 and 1910 Boas undertook an investigation for the US immigration on the bodily form of descendants of immigrants in America. He initially expected that the headform of immigrant children would remain the same."^924 His


^923 Ibid., pp. 281-2.

report was published in full in 1911. In a summary account of it published the following year, Boas put forward his findings that "American-born descendants of immigrants differ in type from their foreign-born parents." The skull sizes of the decedents differed, and the width of their skulls was smaller. Whilst he claimed that the changes could only be explained by environmental factors, Boas did not put forward a definite explanation. Elazar Barkan notes that Boas gave a talk on "The history of the American Race" in which "he speculated on the European's growing resemblance to the Indians in America." Stocking notes that due to the fact that the changes in headform that Boas observed tended to move towards an intermediate form, journalists utilised this to bolster the popular notion that a new homogeneous American "race" was emerging out of the "melting pot" of immigrant assimilation. Boas, however, at this point specifically disavowed the idea that "all the distinct European types become the same in America, without mixture, solely by the action of the new

925 Boas, Changes in the Bodily Form of Descendants of Immigrants.

926 Boas, "Changes in Bodily Form of descendants of immigrants," p. 60.

Collective Representations

In 1927 Daniel Essertier gave the following explanation of the disciplinary rivalry between psychology and sociology:

when the nascent sociology wanted to delimit its domain, it recognized terrains which hadn't been seriously cultivate by anyone, and appropriated them. Now these terrains in reality belonged to psychology. Under the menace of invasion, the latter retook possession of them.\textsuperscript{929}

At first glance, few figures would appear to be as far apart as Émile Durkheim (1858-1917), self-proclaimed founder of scientific sociology, and C. G. Jung. Durkheim appears never to have cited Jung on any occasion, and on the one occasion in which Jung explicitly cited Durkheim, it was simply to state that Marcel Mauss and Henri Hubert were followers of Durkheim, spelt with an umlaut.\textsuperscript{930} Indeed, there

\textsuperscript{928} George Stocking, "The Critique of Racial Formalism," p. 179.

\textsuperscript{929} Daniel Essertier, Daniel. Psychologie et sociologie: essai de bibliographique critique, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{930} Jung, \textit{CW} 9, 1, § 153. Richard Skues, a sociologist and Freud scholar, informs me that as Durkheim was an Alsatian, this spelling may not have been incorrect.
appear to be few disciplines as distinct from each other as analytical psychology and modern sociology, given the almost complete absence of mutual references. Nevertheless, two central terms of Durkheim's sociology, which were critical to his attempt to establish the autonomy of sociology, found their way into Jung's psychology: collective consciousness and collective representations. Before tracing how these taken up by Jung, it is first necessary to sketch out their significance for Durkheim.

Durkheim introduced the term collective representations in his 1897 study, *Suicide*, and in the following year provided an extended justification of it in "Individual and collective representations." What is of particular interest in this essay was the manner in which Durkheim marshalled psychological arguments to argue analogically for the disciplinary independence of sociology. As psychology had emancipated itself from biology, so too, Durkheim attempted to emancipate sociology from psychology. He claimed that collective life, like individual life, consisted of representations. Within psychology, there had been much debate concerning the nature of representations, in particular unconscious representations. Durkheim embarked upon an extended critique of William James' arguments in *The Principles of Psychology* against the existence of unconscious representations, and affirmed the existence of unconscious psychic states. Durkheim claimed that:
within each of us a multitude of psychic phenomena occur without our apprehending them... The experiments of M. Pierre Janet have proved that many acts, while bearing all the signs of being conscious, are not in fact so.\textsuperscript{931}

He concluded that: "our judgements are influenced at every moment by unconscious judgements."\textsuperscript{932} Durkheim is not usually considered as a theoretician of the unconscious, and the concept itself did not play much of an explicit role in his work. In this context, its significance was to support the case for the relative autonomy of representations. If this was so within the individual, the possibility that it might be so outside of the individual was strengthened. As John Brooks comments,

If the relation between collective representations and the social substratum is the same as that between individual representations and the physiological substratum, it follows that collective representations are relatively independent of individual minds.\textsuperscript{933}

\textsuperscript{931} Durkheim, "Individual and collective representations," p. 20.

\textsuperscript{932} Ibid., p. 21.

\textsuperscript{933} John Brooks, "Analogy and argumentation in interdisciplinary context: Durkheim's 'individual and collective representations'," p. 226. Brooks presents a valuable detailed reading of this text, and the significance
Durkheim further clarified his understanding of the term, and its relation to the collective consciousness in *The Rules of Sociological Method*. He claimed that whilst individual consciousness resulted from "the nature of an organic and psychic being taken in isolation, collective consciousness from a plurality of beings of this kind."\(^{934}\) The aggregation of individuals had the effect of producing a distinct "psychical individuality."\(^{935}\) Thus the collective consciousness was made up of collective representations, which expressed how the group thought of itself. Hence these representations generally took the form of myths, legends and religious conceptions.\(^{936}\) For Durkheim, collective representations were not innate, but were the result of history and collective action.\(^{937}\) These concepts provided the key to the autonomy of sociology:

> Social facts differ not only in quality from psychical facts; they have a different substratum, they do not evolve in the same environment or depend on the same


\(^{937}\) Stephen Lukes argues that Durkheim's notion of the social constitution of categories was derived from his reading of the neo-Kantian Renouvier. *Émile Durkheim, his life and work*, pp. 54-7.
conditions. This does not mean that they are not in some sense psychical, since they all consist of ways of thinking and acting. But the states of collective consciousness are of a different nature from the states of the individual consciousness; they are representations of another kind. The mentality of groups is not that of individuals; it has its own laws. The two sciences [sociology and psychology] are therefore as sharply distinct as two sciences can be.\footnote{Ibid., p. 40.}

Not only were sociology and psychology distinct from one another, the latter was ultimately reducible to the former. In 1909, Durkheim argued that

far from sociology, so conceived, being a stranger to psychology, it arrives itself at a psychology, but one far more concrete and complex than that of the pure psychologists.\footnote{Durkheim, "The contribution of sociology to psychology and philosophy," p. 237.}

Thus it is not surprising that Durkheim engaged in polemical battles with psychologists, notably with Gabriel Tarde. The exteriority of social facts, the clear cut divisions between individual and collective representations, clearly ran...
counter to the linkages that the crowd psychologists, social psychologists and Völkerpsychologen each in their own way were attempting to establish. \(^940\)

In his sociology of religion, Durkheim introduced a further bipartite distinction between the sacred and the profane. Religious representations expressed the nature of sacred things, their relations with one another, and with the profane, and religious rites dictated the proper conduct in the presence of sacred things. These distinctions led to a purely exterior definition of religion:

A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden - beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them... by showing that the idea of religion is inseparable from that of the Church, it makes it clear that religion should be an eminently collective thing. \(^941\)

There is no indication that Jung ever read Durkheim's work. His knowledge of Durkheimian notions appears to have been

\(^940\) For his critique of Völkerpsychologie, see his "Sociology and the social sciences" (1903), p. 204; for his critique of Tarde, see his The Rules of Sociological Method.

\(^941\) Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, p. 47.
based on his reading of Henri Hubert, Marcel Mauss and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, all of whom were affiliated with Durkheim.

Lévy-Bruhl

In 1910 Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857-1939) published his The Mental Functions in Inferior Societies. Whilst he went on to publish several more books, the essential themes of his work were enunciated here. He had studied philosophy at the École Normale Supérieure, and in 1896 he took up an appointment at the Sorbonne, where he became a member of Durkheim's school. The Mental Functions began by taking up the Durkheimian problematic of collective representations, which Lévy-Bruhl sought to clarify through a consideration of anthropological material. He defined collective representations as being:

common to the members of a given social group; they are transmitted from one generation to another; they impress themselves upon its individual members, and awaken in them sentiments of respect, fear, adoration... Their existence does not depend upon the individual; not that they imply a collective unity distinct from the individuals composing the social group, but because they present themselves in aspects which cannot be accounted for by considering
individuals merely as such.  

He claimed that the best place to elucidate the general functioning of collective representations was in uncivilized peoples. Dominique Merlilié notes that whilst Lévy-Bruhl held, following Durkheim, that the collective representations were social, his interest, in contrast to the latter's, was in studying their specific mode of functioning, as opposed to their social determination.  

Lévy-Bruhl critiqued the interpretation of primitive mentality in terms of animism by Frazer and Tylor, claiming that they were mistaken in believing that the functions of the mind were the same everywhere, and simply wrongly used by primitives. In contradistinction, he claimed that primitive mentality was fundamentally different from 'our' mentality, as their social groups fashioned their minds in different ways. He claimed that a mistake of the animist school was that it sought to base its explanations on the functioning of the individual mind, as opposed to the functioning of social processes.  

Primitives were typified by having a different type of collective representations, which he described as mystical. By this he meant that they assumed the existence of

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942 Lévy-Bruhl, How Natives Think, p. 13.

invisible forces, influences and actions. Despite his critique of the animist school, there were significant features of Lévy-Bruhl's account that mirrored theirs. First, as he assumed the unity of primitive mentality, he compiled his examples without concern for historical or geographical specificities. Secondly, whilst he disputed their explanations of primitive mentality, his account was no less condemnatory. No good word could be said for the primitive mentality. Finally, Lévy-Bruhl also did not do any fieldwork, and relied solely upon the reports of others.

Lévy-Bruhl stressed the disjunction between primitive and civilized mentality. Due to the nature of their collective representations, "primitives perceive nothing in the same way we do." Not only were their collective representations different from those of the civilized, their representations were connected in a different manner. He formulated this as the law of participation:

in the collective representations of primitive mentality, objects, beings, phenomena can be, though in a way incomprehensible to us, both themselves and something other than themselves. In a fashion which is no less incomprehensible, they give and they receive mystic powers, virtues, qualities, influences, which make themselves felt outside, without remaining where

94 Lévy-Bruhl, How Natives Think, p. 43.
Consequently, he characterized primitives as living in a state of mystical participation. They were indifferent to non-contradiction, less able to abstract and generalize, they neglected secondary causes for mystical ones. The British anthropologist Edward Evans Pritchard credited Lévy-Bruhl with being one of the first, if not the first, to emphasize that primitive ideas, which seem so strange to us... are meaningful when seen as parts of patterns of ideas and behaviour, each part having an intelligible relationship to the others.\(^9\)

One example he gave of primitive mystical participation that became particularly important for Jung was the significance of the sacred objects of the Arunta, drawn from Spencer and Gillen's *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*:

> These things (pieces of wood or stone of an oblong shape, and generally decorated with mystic designs) are most carefully preserved and deposited in a sacred


place which women and children dare not approach...
from the standpoint of logical thought it would be very
difficult to define exactly what churinga are, or are
not. The external souls of individuals; the vehicles of
ancestral spirits and possibly the bodies of these
ancestors themselves; extracts of totemic essence;
reservoirs of vitality - they are all of these in turn
and simultaneously... I may note... the deep religious
respect which surrounds the churinga, the care taken to
preserve them, and the veneration and precaution with
which they are handled... "A man who possesses such a
churinga as the churinga snake... will constantly rub
it with his hand, singing as he does so about the
Alcheringa history of the snake, and gradually comes to
feel that there is some special association between him
and the sacred object..."[^47]

Lévy-Bruhl described the development away from
primitive mentality in social terms. When the individual
began to become more aware of himself, there was less
mystical symbiosis with the group. Consequently,
participations come to be expressed by means of
intermediaries rather than being felt directly. Through this
process, collective representations began to approximate

[^47]: Ibid., p. 93. The quotation in the final sentence is
from Spencer and Gillen.
what we call ideas. Primitives became less impervious to experience, and hence more alive to contradiction. However, this development was by no means continuous, necessary or complete. Mystical participation was a permanent feature of the mind: as concepts had initially derived from collective representations, they retained a mystical residue. This had important epistemological consequences. Lévy-Bruhl claimed that hitherto psychology and philosophy had assumed the homogeneity of the mind. The erroneousness of this assumption was demonstrated by a consideration of primitive mentality. Consequently, the unity of the thinking being posited by philosophers was something to be desired, rather than being given. Further, as rationality developed out of primitive mentality, it was only through studying this that the functioning of rationality could be truly grasped. These arguments lent Lévy-Bruhl's book a polemical cast: an adequate philosophy and psychology could be arrived at on the basis of anthropology.

Lévy-Bruhl's work initially met with success. Dominique Merlié notes this had the unfortunate effect of leading to a spate of vulgarisations which contributed to his work becoming denatured, forgotten and repressed. The main critiques emphasised the inadequacy of his armchair method, the questionableness of his radical differentiation of primitive and modern thought, his assertion of the universality of the former, the tone of condescension and
his evolutionary assumptions. In particular, Lévy-Bruhl's positing of mystical participation as the defining characteristic of the primitive came in for much criticism. In his later works, he dropped the designation 'mystical.' Finally, the posthumously published notebooks of his last years revealed what amounted to a repudiation of much of his earlier work:

I was wrong, in How Natives Think, in wishing to define a character peculiar to the primitive mentality as far as logic is concerned, in believing that the facts, in certain cases, showed this mentality to be insensitive or at least more indifferent than ours to contradiction. Examined without prejudice, the facts say nothing at all, and participation itself involves, in essence, nothing incompatible with the principle of contradiction... (What I had not discerned at the period of How Natives Think) these minds do not differ from ours from the logical point of view, not only in the structure but also in the manifestations of their activity.

I see more and more clearly that the distinction

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949 Lévy-Bruhl, The Notebooks on Primitive Mentality, p. 60.
between the two sorts of experience (although well founded on the feeling that primitive men very obviously have characteristics peculiar to the mystic experience) cannot be rigorously maintained, and that there is for the primitive mentality... only a single experience, sometimes mixed, sometimes almost entirely mystical, sometimes almost entirely non-mystical, but undoubtedly never exclusively one or the other... when I used to say that primitive men do not perceive anything as we do; I should rather have said: do not perceive anything entirely as we do.\footnote{Ibid., p. 188.}

At the end of the day, Lévy-Bruhl himself was his most articulate critic.

Mauss (1872-1950)

Another member of the Durkheim school whose work was significant for Jung was Marcel Mauss, and in particular, his concept of mana. Mauss was Durkheim's nephew, and helped him in founding \textit{L'Année sociologique}. After Durkheim's death, he was the leading figure in French sociology. Mauss put forward his concept of mana in 1902 in a work coauthored with Henri Hubert, though published under his name. For Mauss, magic constituted a collective psychopathology. Frazer had claimed that there were two types of magic -
imitative magic: that things which resemble each other are the same; and contagious magic: that things which have once been in contact with each other are always in contact. In a similar manner, Mauss claimed that there were three laws of magic - contiguity, similarity and opposition: that things in contact remain the same, that like produces like and that opposites work on opposites. Fundamentally though, an originary notion underlay all these forms of magic, the belief in a magical power, which, after the Melanesians, he dubbed mana. He claimed that this was not simply a force or a being, but could also be an act, quality or state. Mana represented the essence of magic, in that it revealed "the confusion between actor, rite and object."\textsuperscript{951} Mauss proceeded to provide a lyrical compilation drawn from diverse societies, to demonstrate the omnipresence of the idea of mana, of which the following is a condensed abbreviation:

\textbf{mana} may be communicated from a harvest stone to other stones through contact... It may be heard and seen, leaving objects where it has dwelt. Mana makes a noise in the leaves, flies away like a cloud or flame... there is mana to make people wealthy and mana used to kill... Mana is the magicians force... Mana is the power of a rite... Mana... causes the net to bring in a good catch, makes the house solid and keeps the canoe

\textsuperscript{951} Mauss, \textit{A General Theory of Magic}, p. 108.
sailing smoothly... On an arrow it is the substance which kills... It is the object of a reverence which may amount to a taboo... It is a kind of aether, imponderable, Communicable which spreads of its own accord... It is a kind of internal, special world where everything happens as if mana alone were involved...

Among the Straits Malays it is known by kramât ... in French Indo-China is known by deng... In Madagascar, we have the term hasina... Among the Huron (Iroquois) it is called by the name orenda... The famous concept of manitou found among the Algonquins is basically the same... According to Hewitt, among the Sioux mahope, Xube (Omaha), wakan (Dakota) also mean magical power and magical qualities... Among the Shoshone the word pokunt generally has the same value... the term naual in Mexico and Central America seems to us to correspond to the same idea... The Perth tribes give it the name boolya. In New South Wales, the tribes use koochie to describe an evil spirit, personal or impersonal evil influences... again we find the arungquiltha of the Arunta... In India it crops us under such separate notions as brightness, glory, force, destruction, fate, remedy, the qualities of plants. And the basic idea of Hindu pantheism, contained in brahman, seems to us to be profoundly connected with it... And indeed, the idea may well have existed without having been
expressed...

kramat, deng, mahope, xube, pokunt, naul, boolya, orenda
koochie, arungquitha, brahman, manitou, makan - Mauss's endless litany, retrieving the existence of mana everywhere, reads like a chant of exorcism - and one that claims not to believe in what it is exorcising. It was not for nothing that Claude Lévi-Strauss noted:

We can see that in one case at least, the notion of mana does present those characteristics of mysterious power and secret force which Durkheim and Mauss attribute to it: it plays just such a role in their own system. There truly, mana is mana. At the same time one wants to know whether their theory of mana is anything other than an imputation to native thought of properties which were implied by the very particular role that the idea of mana was called upon to play in their own.

Mauss claimed that mana was an unconscious a priori category of understanding. In 1909 Hubert and Mauss wrote of the categories:

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Constantly present in language, without there necessarily being completely explicit, they ordinally generally exist in the form of directing habits of consciousness, which are themselves unconscious. The notion of mana is one of these principles: it is given in language; it is implied in a whole series of judgements and reasonings, carrying attributes which are those of mana. We have said that mana is a category. But mana isn't only a special category of primitive thought, and today, by way of reduction, it is again the first form assumed by other categories always functioning in our mind, those of substance and of cause.\(^{954}\)

Following Durkheim, they claimed that such categories were ultimately of a social derivation. As will be seen further on, Jung was to cite or refer to this passage on no less than eight occasions.

**Jung's reading of anthropology**

As Jung did not comment on anthropological issues in his early writings, it is hard to gauge his initial views in this respect. His reading of anthropology was taken up in earnest from 1909 onwards. In *Memories*, Jung recounted that

\(^{954}\) Hubert and Mauss, *Mélanges d'histoire des religions*, pp. xxix-xxx.
his dream of descending into the cellars of a medieval house had awakened his old interest in archaeology, and that he subsequently began to read works on myths. This consequently led him to see the close relationship between ancient mythology and the psychology of primitives, which led him to take up the study of the latter. In the Countway manuscript, this was followed by the following statement:

Freud's simultaneous interest in this field gave me moments of uneasiness, for I thought I saw again on his part that predominance of theory over facts which I was already familiar with.

Jung's anthropological reading at this time led to a reminiscence to which he accorded a preeminent significance. In Memories, he narrated an experience which he described as having marked the climax of his childhood. He recounted that at age of ten, he carved a manikin on his pencil case, and made a coat and bed for him. He also painted a stone, which 'belonged' to the manikin. He hid this figure in the attic, and it provided a great sense of solace for him. At times,

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955 On the significance of this dream, see above, "dreams, myths and the collective unconscious," in "night and day."

956 Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 186.

957 CMS, p. 179.
he would write letters to him in a secret language that he had invented. He did not understand why he did this, but it gave him a sense of security. However in 1910, in the course of preparatory reading for *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*, he came across accounts of the Australian churingas and of a cache of soul-stones near Arlesheim. This reminded him of his manikin and stone, and he stated:

> Along with this recollection there came to me, for the first time, the conviction that there are archaic permanent components of the soul which can have penetrated the individual soul from no tradition.⁹⁵⁸

Jung added that at a much later date, he examined his father's library, which did not contain a single work from which this could have been derived, and his father knew nothing of such matters. At this unspecified date, Jung was clearly investigating whether there could have been a cryptomnesic source for his actions, as Théodore Flournoy would doubtless have suspected. Jung concluded that as a child, "I performed the ritual in the same way as I later saw done by the natives of Africa, they act first and do not know at all what they are doing,"⁹⁵⁹ reiterating the stereotypical equations between modern primitives,

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prehistoric man and children. In his published writings, Jung gave numerous examples of experiences of this kind. It is useful to look closely at this experience, given its prototypical and auto-exemplary character.

As Jung narrates it, this recollection constituted the dawning recognition of the existence of the archetypes. It is gives the impression that his conviction was a spontaneous inspiration, which did not owe anything to his prior reading.

It is highly probable that it was Lévy-Bruhl's work, cited earlier, that was the initial source of Jung's information concerning the *churinga*. This being the case, it poses the question as to the relation of Jung's interpretation of this episode to Lévy-Bruhl's. There was nothing novel in equating the practises of primitives with children. For Lévy-Bruhl, the practises around the *churinga* were examples of mystical participation, which, as we have seen, he claimed was present in modern societies in an attenuated form. For Lévy-Bruhl, what was at issue here was the survival of a particular form of mentality. This would seem to fit in with Jung's statement that he acted in the same way as the natives in Africa. However, Jung also claims that what was important was the similarity of the content of the act, and not just how it was done. In contrast, Jung interpreted this not as designating a spontaneous reinvention of a particular practice, but as indicating the
existence of an atemporal component of the soul. This would seem to correspond to Bastian's concept of the elementary thoughts. It is possible that it was through welding together key concepts of Bastian and Lévy-Bruhl that Jung came upon the conviction of the existence of that which he would subsequently call archetypes.

Transformations and Symbols of the Libido

It was in Transformations and Symbols of the Libido that Jung first attempted to extend psychology to encompass prehistoric, primitive and modern man. The work was subtitled: "A contribution to the history of the development of thought." Jung commenced the work by speaking of the powerful impression made by Freud's reference to the Oedipus legend, likening it to one's first impressions of antique monuments. Its significance, Jung claimed, was that it demonstrated the living presence of the past, and bridged the 'abyss' which separates us from antiquity. This insight taught "an identity of human elementary conflicts, that is independent of time and space."960 It held out the prospect of the mutual illumination of modernity and antiquity:

From the detour through the buried substructure of the individual soul we take hold of the living meaning of

antique culture and we win just precisely that firm point outside our own culture, from where for the first time an objective understanding of its trends becomes possible.\textsuperscript{961}

Whilst psychoanalysis had concentrated on the problems of individual psychology, the time had now come, as Jung saw it, to turn to historical materials, and study how they might illuminate the problems of individual psychology. What Jung was proposing was to radically rework individual psychology on the basis of \textit{Völkerpsychologie}. In a similar manner to Lazarus, Steinthal and Wundt, Jung focused on mythology. Like Wundt, Jung viewed mythology psychologically. Where he different from Wundt's apperceptive theory of myth was in the nature of the subjective contents involved: for Jung, myths were symbols of the libido. He claimed that

\begin{quote}
there must surely be typical myths, which are really actually the instruments of the \textit{völkerpsychologischen} working of the complex [Komplexbearbeitung]. Jacob Burckhardt seems to have suspected this, since he once said, that every Greek in classical times carried a piece of Oedipus in him, and every German a piece of
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{961} \textit{Ibid.}, tr. mod.
In a footnote, Jung cited Burckhardt's letter to Albert Brenner in which he wrote:

What you intend to find in Faust, you will have to find in an intuitive way. — Faust is namely a genuine and legitimate myth, ie, a great primordial image [urtürmliches Bild], in which everyone has to intuit his own being and destiny again in his own way. Let me make a comparison: whatever would the ancient Greeks have said, if a commentator had planted himself between them and the Oedipus saga? To the Oedipus saga there lay an Oedipus chord in every Greek that longed to be directly touched and to vibrate after its own fashion. And so it is with the German nation and Faust.

This passage was of exceptional significance for Jung. He referred to it on several occasions, in a manner which affirmed and augmented Burckhardt's statement. To begin with, Jung subscribed to Burckhardt's reading of the significance of Faust for Germany. In 1945, he stated: "When Jacob Burckhardt says, Faust strikes a chord in the soul of

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962 Ibid., § 56, tr. mod.
963 Ibid., tr. mod.
the Germans, so Faust must have gone on sounding."\(^{964}\) Jung took this to its penultimate conclusion: "Now Germany has suffered the pact with the devil and its unavoidable consequences."\(^{965}\) Secondly, Jung adopted Burckhardt's usage of 'primordial image' [urtümliche Bild] as a conceptual term.\(^{966}\) Werner Kaegi notes that term urtümliche Bild or Urbild did not originate with Burckhardt, as it stemmed from the 17th century, hence Jung's attribution of it to the later is significant\(^{967}\) (indeed, the term 'Urbild' was also used by another figure that was significant for Jung - Carl Gustav Carus, who, interestingly enough, referred to the figure of the 'mothers' in Goethe's *Faust* as 'Urbildern.'\(^{968}\) Kaegi notes that Burckhardt didn't use the term often, but that when he did, it featured in an important art historical context. What appears to have been most significant for Jung was the reference to Faust, given its overpowering importance for him.

It was through his theory of the different types of

\(^{964}\) Jung, "After the catastrophe," *CW* 10, § 434, tr. mod.

\(^{965}\) *Ibid*, § 436, tr. mod. Jung again referred to Burckhardt's comment concerning the relation of Faust to Germany in "Psychology and poetry" (1930), *CW* 15, § 153 and § 159, and in "Paracelsus as a spiritual phenomenon" (1942), *CW* 13, § 154.

\(^{966}\) This will be taken up further on.


\(^{968}\) Carus, *Vergleichende Psychologie oder Geschichte der Seele in der Reihenfolge der Thierwelt*, p. 15.
thinking that Jung articulated the ongoing dynamic relation between the ancient and the modern. In *The Principles of Psychology*, William James had contrasted associative thinking or empirical thought with reasoning or reasoned thought:

> Much of our thinking consists of trains of imagery suggested one by another, of a sort of spontaneous revery of which it seems likely enough that the higher brutes should be capable.\(^{969}\)

In such thinking, the linkages were provided by contiguity and/or similarity, such that

> a sunset may call up the vessel's deck from which I saw one summer the companions of my voyage, my arrival into port, etc., or it may make me think of solar myths, of Hercules' and Hector's funeral pyres, of Homer and whether he could write, of the Greek alphabet, etc.\(^{970}\)

James speculated on the historical relation between these two modes of thought, and claimed that reasoning by analogies preceded reasoning by abstract characters. To illustrate this, he cited some examples of the thought of

\(^{969}\) James, *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. 2, p. 325.

\(^{970}\) Ibid.
savages, such as the following: "The primeval man will say, not 'the bread is hard,' but 'the bread is stone.'"  
Finally James claimed that the historical transition from associative thinking to reasoning was far from complete, and that "over immense departments of our thought we are still, all of us, in the savage state."

Taking his cue from James, whom he had recently met, Jung contrasted directed thinking and fantasy thinking. The former was verbal and logical. The latter was passive, associative and imagistic. The former was exemplified by science and the latter by mythology. In a similar fashion to James, Jung claimed that ancients lacked a capacity for directed thinking, which was a modern acquisition. Fantasy thinking, which was generally called dreaming or fantasising, took place when directed thinking ceased, and to describe it, Jung cited the first passage from James above, emphasising the second half of the sentence (he translated "spontaneous revery" by "passiver Träumerei").

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971 Ibid., p. 364.
972 Ibid., p. 365.
973 Other figures Jung cited were Liepmann, Ebbinghaus, Külpe, Wolff, Nietzsche, Lotze, Baldwin, Hamman, Mauthner, Kleinpaul, Paul and Freud. However, it is arguable that Jung's general sequence bears closest resemblance to James'.
974 Jung's style in Transformations and Symbols of the Libido has drawn criticism from commentators. John Kerr who describes the second part of the work as "totally unreadable" and sections of it as "rambling where they were not irrelevant, impenetrable where they were not rambling, and grotesque where they were comprehensible." A Most Dangerous Method, p. 329. Richard Noll also describes it as
Jung reiterated the anthropological equation between the prehistoric, the primitive and the child, speaking of the "parallel between the phantastic-mythological thinking of antiquity and the similar thinking of children, of the lowly races and of dreams." Consequently, the elucidation of current day fantasy thinking in adults would at the same time shed light on the thought of children, savages and prehistoric peoples.

It is important to grasp that Jung was not simply reiterating this equation, but endowing it with a new determination based upon this model of the two types of thinking. He claimed that this equation was explained by the fact that the biogenetic law, that ontogeny recapitulated phylogeny, held good for psychology, as well as comparative anatomy. Through affirming the validity of the biogenetic law, Jung was not primarily concerned with advancing a biological thesis: rather, his psychological reformulation of the biogenetic law enabled him to link individual unintelligible. *The Jung Cult*, pp. 109-110. Such criticisms may be taken as indicative of the failure of these commentators to understand the text. For *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido* was not only a book on fantasy thinking. It stylistically embodied it. Indeed, to James Henderson, Jung recounted that he wrote the whole thing in state akin to automatic writing. In place of a clear logical sequence of argument, directed thinking, as Jung would have put it, one finds an imagistic sequence. Significantly, this mode of writing was to become one of the hallmarks of Jung's style, reaching its apotheosis in his alchemical work.

psychology with Völkerpsychologie, collective psychology, mass psychology and anthropology. Not only could the findings of individual psychology illuminate the latter disciplines, their findings could elucidate individual psychology, due to the persistence of collective, mythological and primitive thought in the individual. Critically, these other disciplines were subordinated to psychoanalysis, as it was only through psychoanalytic interpretation that the true meaning of their material could be uncovered. Thus psychoanalysis would form a superordinate discipline, whose provenance reached into the prehistory of humanity.

Transformations and Symbols of the Libido was based upon an article published in 1905 by an American woman, Frank Miller, in Flournoy's Archives de Psychologie. For Jung, what was striking about her fantasies was the presence in them of mythological themes. As I have argued elsewhere, whilst Frank Miller herself interpreted these in the manner of Flournoy, through searching out the possible cultural sources for each element, Jung, by contrast discounted any external source, and instead argued that they had an endogenous origin, and represented the emergence of a phylogenetically antecedent mode of thought.976 To demonstrate this, he attempted to establish parallels between Frank Miller's fantasies and a vast collection of

976 See my "A woman called Frank."
myths and customs through utilising a comparative method.

In two subsequent works, Jung explicitly commented on his method. In 1912 in his lectures on psychoanalysis at Fordham University, he stated that "in exploring the unconscious, we proceed in the usual way when conclusions are to be drawn by the comparative method." To illustrate this, he focused on the example of baptism. To interpret baptism, Jung argued, one had to draw together a great deal of comparative material concerning initiation rituals, rites utilising water and in which the initiate is immersed, together with mythology, folklore and superstition. This enabled the discovery of the elements out which baptism was formed and its original meaning. In conclusion, he stated that the analyst proceeded likewise when dealing with dreams.

Jung further elaborated the rationale for this method in 1914 in his presentation before the Psycho-Medical Society in London, "On psychological understanding." He commenced with a consideration of his 1907 work on dementia praecox and Freud's study of the Schreber case, from which he concluded that reduction, which was the essence of analysis, seemed better suited to hysteria than dementia praecox, due to its incapacity to adequately illumine

\[977 \text{ Jung, "An attempt at an account of psychoanalytic theory," CW 4, § 329.} \]
\[978 \text{ Ibid., § 330-1.} \]
symbolism. To illustrate this, he turned to Goethe's *Faust*. He claimed that the issue of its historical or personal determination was of less importance than grasping "the poet's real purpose in his symbolic creation." This could only be accomplished through supplementing the retrospective analytical method with a constructive method which would enable prospective understanding. He provided the following contrast of these modes:

The causal standpoint asks: How has this actual psyche, as it presents itself to-day, been built up?

The constructive standpoint asks: How can a bridge be built from this actual psyche to its own future?

The analytic part of the constructive method consisted in a "reduction to general types of phantasy," which were primarily supplied by mythology. He claimed that the parallel between individual delusions and myths had "become a most important source for the comparative exploration of morbid mentality." What legitimated this comparison was the fact that both were "products of the creative phantasy of the unconscious." (Boas might have raised the question as to whether the assertion of their common source was in fact

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980 Ibid., p. 390.

981 Ibid., pp. 394-5.
derived from their surface similarities).

From this, it emerges that the comparative method served two purposes for Jung, which were interlinked. First, the comparative study of mythologies led to the thesis that what underlay them were certain universal invariant forms, which were called primordial images in 1911, dominants in 1918 and archetypes in 1919. In 1921 Jung stated: "In all probability the most important mythological motifs are common to all times and races." Without the comparative method, what one could call the anthropological component of Jung's theory of archetypes would simply collapse.

Secondly, in Jungian analysis, the comparative method, renamed the constructive method, and later, amplification, furnished a mode of interpretation that enabled an individual to come into an appropriate relation with the archetypes. It was only the establishment of analogies with mythological material that enabled a comprehension of the supposedly non-personal images, and hence fostered the prospective development. At a theoretical level, this involved two comparative operations (though in practice, these were not always distinct). The first level of comparison led to the recognition of the archetypes (as indicated above), and the second consisted in a comparison of these with the specific images that appeared in analysis. With the use of mythological and anthropological material in

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982 Jung, Psychological Types, CW 6, § 747.
the method of amplification, Jung introduced an interdisciplinary mode of interpretation into analysis. The psychic unity of mankind was not only the presupposition of the theory of the collective unconscious. The goal of analysis was to overcome individual alienation through revealing this unity.

The Individual and the Collective

What can one do... when, instead of educating a man for himself, people want to educate him for others? Harmony is then impossible. Obliged to fight either against nature or against the social institutions, one has to choose between making a man or a citizen; for one cannot make the one and the other at the same time.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile.983

For centuries, philosophers, educationalists and social commentators in the West had deliberated on the relations between the individual and society, frequently envisaged under the form of an antimony of conflicting demands. In Transformations and Symbols of the Libido, Jung made his first attempt at providing a psychological model that

983 Cited by Jung, "On the unconscious and its contents," (1916), CW 7, § 455, note 6. This quotation was not reproduced in Jung's original publication of this essay.
encompassed the individual and society, linking individual and collective psychology. What he had yet to elaborate in detail was the mode of their interaction, and how an individual could resolve this conflict. The attempt to establish the normative relations between the individual and society occupied a central position in Jung's social and political vision.

It was in 1916 that he broached these issues at greater length, in several talks presented in Zürich. The first of these, "The conception of the unconscious," was published the same year in French in Flournoy's Archives de Psychologie. In this paper, Jung set out how a resolution of the conflict between collective and individual interests could emerge through considering some of the typical phases of analysis.

Jung commenced by differentiating the personal psyche and the collective psyche. Each individual possessed a personal unconscious, which consisted in "acquisitions of the individual existence, and... psychological factors which might just as well be conscious." Alongside such factors, individuals held collective contents in common. He argued:

just as certain social functions or drives are, so to speak, opposed to the interests of the single individual, so also the human mind has certain

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functions or tendencies which, on account of their collective nature, stand opposed to the individual contents.\textsuperscript{985}

It is significant that in this initial formulation, the positing of collective mental functions occurs precisely under the sign of their opposition to individual interests. These collective functions stemmed from the fact that every individual was born with a highly differentiated brain, which served to explain the similarity of people in different races, as represented by the uniformity of myths. The collective psyche consisted in a collective spirit and collective soul (the terminology here indicating the connection to \textit{Völkerpsychologie}). Like a Russian doll, this collective psyche contained within it limitless smaller collective psyches:

\begin{quote}
In so far as there exist differentiations corresponding to race, descent, or even family, so, beyond the level of the "universal" collective psyche, we find a collective psyche limited by race, descent, and family.\textsuperscript{986}
\end{quote}

However at this juncture, Jung did not lay much emphasis

\textsuperscript{985} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 451, tr. mod.
\textsuperscript{986} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 451-2.
upon these differentiations, and tended to consider the relations of the individual to the collective per se. The implication was that one's relation to the universal collective psyche was of more determining power than one's relation to familial or racial collectives.

Drawing upon Janet, Jung claimed that the collective psyche contained the "parties inférieures" of the mental function, which, as it was inherited and omnipresent, was impersonal. The personal psyche contained the "parties supérieures," that which had been ontogenetically acquired. In primitives, Jung claimed, mental functioning was essentially collective. Progressive individual differentiation resulted in an increased consciousness of oppositions, such as that between good and evil. Individual development proceeded through the repression of the collective psyche, as "collective psychology and personal psychology are in a certain sense irreconcilable."\footnote{Ibid., p. 453.} Thus collective movements were always a threat to the individual. Psychologically, individuals were menaced by their propensity for imitation (under which Jung subsumed suggestion and mental infection):

Human beings have a capacity which is of the utmost use for purposes of the collective and most prejudicial to individuation, and that is imitation. Collective
psychology cannot at all dispense with imitation, without which the organization of the mass and the regulation of the state and society would simply be impossible.\footnote{Ibid., p. 456, tr. mod.}

The centrality given to imitation immediately recalls Gabriel Tarde's *The Laws of Imitation*. At one level, Jung was subscribing to Tarde's account of society as structured by imitation. His one qualification was that imitation hindered individuation. Yet at this juncture, Jung had not specified what individuation was, or who could attain it.

Analysis of the collective psyche revealed several universal attributes, the first of which Jung termed the *persona*. This was

a mask of the collective psyche; a mask which simulates individuality, making others and oneself believe that one is individual, whilst one is only acting a part through which the collective psyche speaks.\footnote{Ibid., p. 457.}

The analysis of the persona led to the dissolution of the individual in the collective. The identification with the collective gave rise to an experience of "Godlikeness," a term which Jung borrowed from Alfred Adler. This dissolution
also released a stream of fantasies of a mythological nature.

When confronted with this situation, there lay the option of attempting to restore the prior condition, which Jung claimed was path taken by Freud and Adler. He contended that their reductive treatments of the unconscious in terms of sexuality and power represented false solutions. Thus the therapeutic limitations of Freud and Adler's analysis were due to their failure to sufficiently resolve the conflict between the individual and the collective. An alternative would be to identify with the collective psyche and be a prophet, which was also unsatisfactory. The failure of these approaches, Jung claimed, was that they respectively allowed the individual psyche and the collective psyche to predominate. The solution lay in a conscious assimilation of the contents of the unconscious. The constructive interpretation of fantasies led to the synthesis of the individual and the collective psyche, and led to the recognition of the "life-line" of the individual, which he defined as:

the resultant of the individualistic and collectivistic tendency of the psychological process at any given moment.  

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990 Ibid., p. 474.
The life-line of an individual defied scientific description. This was because:

to speak of a scientific individual psychology is a "contradictio in adjecto". It is necessarily always only the collective part of an individual psychology that can be the object of science... Every individual psychology must have its own textbook, for the general text-book only contains collective psychology.\textsuperscript{991}

In other words, it was only through reformulating collective psychology, crowd psychology, \textit{Völkerpsychologie} and anthropology that a scientific psychology would be possible. Further manuscripts exist, dated October 1916, which appear to be the basis of talks that were given at the Psychological Club in Zürich.\textsuperscript{992} These manuscripts are brief and highly condensed. In contrast to his earlier paper, no attempt is made to put forward an argument, or to justify the positions.

The first is titled "Adaption." This, Jung claimed, took two forms: adaption to outer and inner conditions. However, within outer conditions, he included "conscious judgements which I have formed of objective things," and the

\textsuperscript{991} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 464, tr. mod.

\textsuperscript{992} Individuals who presented papers to the Club would usually present their papers to the library, and Jung's papers are amongst such talks.
"inner" was understood as designating the unconscious. A neurosis consisted in a disturbance of adaption. Under certain situations in analysis "a demand is raised by the unconscious, which expresses itself to begin with in the extraordinary intensity of the transference." This represented an "overcompensation for an irrationally felt resistance against the doctor" which in turn arose from a "demand for individuation, which is against all adaptation to others." The answering of this demand and the corresponding break with conformity led to a tragic guilt, which required expiation, and called for a "new collective function." This was because the individual had to "bring forth values which are an equivalent substitute for his absence in the collective personal atmosphere." These new values enabled the reparation of the collective. Individuation was for the few: "whoever is not creative enough must re-establish collective conformity with a self chosen society." Not only had the individual to create new values, he had to create socially recognizable values, as

994 Ibid., § 1094.
995 Ibid., tr. mod.
996 Ibid.
997 Ibid., § 1095, tr. mod.
998 Ibid., § 1097, tr. mod.
"society has a right to expect realizable values."\textsuperscript{999}

The second manuscript is titled "Individuation and collectivity." Here, Jung commenced by stating that individuation and collectivity were a pair of opposites related by guilt. Society demanded imitation. Here, however, Jung provided a different estimation of the value of imitation for individuation than he had done in "The conception of the unconscious":

Through imitation, one's own values become reactivated... imitation is an automatic process that follows its own laws... Through imitation the patient learns individuation, because it reactivates his own values.\textsuperscript{1000}

Here, the efficacity of analysis rested on imitation. Jung evaded the consequent charge of analysis simply being a process of cloning or indoctrination by claiming that imitation worked by awakening latent preexisting values. Hence imitation was a form of platonic recollection. Jung's reference to the existence of "laws of imitation" is again suggestive of Tarde's \textit{The Laws of Imitation}.

In his notes to what was in effect the first

\textsuperscript{999} \textit{Ibid.}, § 1098.

\textsuperscript{1000} Jung, "Individuation and Collectivity," \textit{CW} 18, § 1100.
publication of these papers, Richard Hull put forward a biographical explanation apropos the contradiction between Jung's statements on imitation:

This complete volte face points to the ferment of Jung's ideas at this time. It seems that the two equations, individuation = guilt and imitation = individuation, painfully reflect Jung's personal situation at that time. He was torn by opposite "destinies": the necessity to individuate and the necessity to conform and be of social value.\(^\text{1001}\)

To read such papers biographically, however justified, leaves out the fact that Jung clearly intended to describe the means by which any individual could achieve optimal relations with society. The impression of a "complete volte face" is lessened when one bears in mind that in the second account, the imitation that is valorised as fostering individuation occurs within a specific context - Jungian analysis. Arguably, one could say that in social life, imitation hindered individuation through promoting conformity to collective values. Within the setting of Jungian analysis, since the desired 'conformity' was itself individuation, imitation was beneficent - that is, if one

held that individuation was indeed a universal intrapsychic process, and not simply a desideratum suggested by Jung and his co-workers. In either case, it is clear that Jung held that the process of analysis was the preeminent locus in which an individual could resolve the conflicting demands of individuation and collectivity. His model of individuation as a middle way recalls Baldwin's model of tempered individualism.

Whilst Jung had attempted to forge a link between individual and collective psychology, it was clear that solutions to collective problems were best approached through the psychological transformation of the individual. This was the great psychological conclusion that Jung drew from the first world war. In a preface to his 1917 *The Psychology of the Unconscious Processes: An Overview of the Modern Theory and Method of Analytical Psychology*, dated December 1916, Jung proclaimed:

The psychological processes, which accompany the present war, above all the incredible brutalization of public opinion, the mutual slanderings, the unprecedented fury of destruction, the monstrous flood of lies, and man's incapacity to call a halt to the bloody demon - are suited like nothing else to powerfully push in front of the eyes of thinking men the problem of the restlessly slumbering chaotic
unconscious under the ordered world of consciousness. This war has pitilessly revealed to civilized men that he is still a barbarian... But the psychology of the individual corresponds to the psychology of the nation. What the nation does is done also by each individual, and so long as the individual does it, the nation also does it. Only the change in the attitude of the individual is the beginning of the change in the psychology of the nation.\textsuperscript{1002}

War made visible the chaotic unconscious. Whilst collective events could release the demons of the unconscious, the only resolution lay on an individual level. As Jung saw it, for many, this message had sunk in. In his preface to the second edition of this work, dated October 1918, Jung spoke of the growing interest in the problems of the human soul. The war had had the effect of forcing men to look within themselves. In a language that recalled William James's essay, "The moral equivalent of war," Jung asserted: "Every individual needs revolution, inner division, dissolution of the prevailing and renewal."\textsuperscript{1003} This would be achieved through self-reflection and a return of the individual to the "ground of the human essence." Understood in this manner, analysis was to furnish the basis for the new world order.

\textsuperscript{1002} Jung, \textit{CW} 7, p. 4, tr. mod.

\textsuperscript{1003} Ibid., p. 5., tr. mod.
The Psychology of the Unconscious Processes provided an exposition of the collective, suprapersonal, absolute unconscious - these terms being interchangeably used. Jung's usage of the term 'absolute unconscious' formed a direct linkage with Carus.\textsuperscript{1004} Subsequently, the suprapersonal and collective unconscious became dropped in favour of the collective unconscious. Given what has gone before, so widespread were the conceptualisations of collectives through concepts of the unconscious, together with concepts of the unconscious that stressed its transindividual character, that it is actually surprising that the term 'collective unconscious' appears not to have been used before Jung. Frequently dismissed as an individual delusion, or embraced as a creation of creative genius, the concept of the collective unconscious is deeply imbricated with the development of anthropology, sociology, crowd psychology, collective psychology, and Völkerpsychologie, as well as with concepts of the unconscious in philosophy, as sketched out above. So much so, that it is almost fortuitous that it was Jung who first nominated it.

The contents of this unconscious were what Jung in Transformations and Symbols of the Libido had called typical myths or primordial images. He wrote: "There are in every individual, beside personal reminiscences, the great

\textsuperscript{1004} On Carus's concept of the absolute unconscious, see the section, "conscious and unconscious."
'primordial' images, as Jacob Burckhardt once aptly indicated. Jung provided the following definition of them:

The primordial images are the most ancient and the most universal thoughts of humanity. They are as much feelings as thoughts; because of that one can name them original feeling-thoughts [ursprüngliches Fühldenken].

Jung also called the primordial images, dominants:

The collective unconscious is the sediment of all the experience of the world of all time, and is also an image of the world, that has been forming for aeons. In the course of time certain features, the so-called dominants, have been brought out. These dominants are the ruling powers, the gods, that is, images of dominating laws and principles, average regularities in the sequence of images, that the brain has received from the sequence of secular processes.

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1005 Ibid., § 101, tr. mod.
1007 Ibid., p. 432, tr. mod.
Jung's reference to the 'so-called dominants' suggests that he was referring to a usage that was well known. Lamprecht's dominants immediately come to mind. But was Jung familiar with Lamprecht's work? Whilst Lamprecht's renown and the breadth of Jung's reading makes it quite likely, clear evidence of Jung's familiarity with some of Lamprecht's work is provided by the following comment in "On psychological understanding" in 1914:

A famous German historian has given a particularly striking example of the way in which unconscious archaic views influence the conscious judgement. This author assumes it as a natural fact, that mankind once propagated itself through incest; because, in the first human family, there was no choice for a son among women. He only had his sister. This extraordinary theory is based exclusively upon the still existing unconscious belief in Adam and Eve, the first human couple.¹⁰⁰⁸

Nearly forty years later in Answer to Job, Jung again referred to the view that the original human beings propagated themselves through incest, and this time, explicitly attributed it to Lamprecht.¹⁰⁰⁹

¹⁰⁰⁹ Jung, CW 11, § 576.
If Jung did indeed adopt the term *dominants* from Lamprecht, certain reasons suggest themselves for it. Lamprecht's theory of *dominants* provided a psychological model of history which articulated a strong linkage between the individual and the collective. As seen earlier, for Lamprecht, the transition between epochs could be explained through the rise and fall of dominants. If one compares Jung's *dominants* with Lamprecht's, one sees that Jung utilised Lamprecht's general schema of the interrelation between the individual and the collective. For Jung, the *dominants* were located in the collective unconscious. Even this would not be totally incompatible with Lamprecht's model, given his espousal of the unconscious, and the collective nature of the dominants. Where Jung differed was in his identification of these *dominants* with Burckhardt's primordial images, and more generally, with Mauss and Hubert's categories and Bastian's elementary thoughts. Over and above all of these however, Lamprecht's work would have provided a fully articulated psychological theory of history, and that too, by arguably the most renowned German cultural historian. Unfortunately, the increasing discredit accorded to Lamprecht's work mitigated against any rhetorical gains to be made from any overt linkage. This may explain why, after the introduction of the term archetype, Jung dropped the term *dominant*. Curiously, however, after
the war, he began to use it again.\textsuperscript{1010}

\textbf{Jung's reading of Anthropology}

\textbf{Mauss}

In 1912 Jung investigated Negroes at St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington D. C. In retrospect, he stated that the purpose of this visit had been to investigate the unconscious of Negroes:

I had in mind this particular problem: are these collective patterns racially inherited, or are they 'a priori categories of the imagination' as two Frenchmen, Hubert and Mauss, quite independently of my work, have called them.\textsuperscript{1011}

This indicates that Jung read Hubert and Mauss's \textit{Miscellany of the History of Religions} sometime prior to 1912. Jung subsequently stated that his investigation convinced him that these patterns were not racially inherited, but archetypal (chronologically speaking, as Jung was not to employ the term archetype until 1919, it is likely that he would have initially regarded such patterns as a priori categories of the imagination in Hubert and Mauss' sense).

\textsuperscript{1010}See below, "the return of the dominants."

\textsuperscript{1011}Jung, \textit{CW} 18, § 81. On this episode, see above, "dreams and race," in "night and day."
As quoted above, Jung claimed in 1936 that his achievement with his archetypal theory was simply in giving an empirical foundation of what were formerly called primordial or elementary ideas, "catégories" or "habitudes directrices de la conscience", "répresentations collectives", etc.\textsuperscript{1012}

The "habitudes directrices de la conscience" were referred to by Mauss and Hubert, and Jung's spelling of "catégories" in French indicates that he was in all likelihood referring to their categories of the imagination. In this statement, Jung claimed that the concept of the archetype was already present in such formulations. In 1928 he stated that unconscious contained "impersonal, or collective components in the form of inherited categories, or archetypes."\textsuperscript{1013} However, there was no reference in Hubert and Mauss to categories being inherited, and they strictly refrained from biological speculation, stressing the sociogenesis of concepts and customs. On another juncture, Jung stated that he assumed that Mauss and Hubert called these a priori

\textsuperscript{1012} Jung, "Psychology and religion," \textit{CW} 11, § 89.

\textsuperscript{1013} Jung, "The relations between the ego and the unconscious," (1928), p. 139. In a footnote, Jung referred to the passage from Hubert and Mauss cited above.
thought forms categories with reference to Kant. However, as pointed out above, for the Durkheim school, these a priori categories were not timeless, as Jung understood them to be, but were socially constructed.

In 1936 Jung cited Lévy-Bruhl's concept of collective representations, Hubert and Mauss's categories of the imagination and Bastian's elementary or primordial ideas and commented:

> From these references it should be clear enough that my idea of the archetype - literally a pre-existent form - is not exclusively my concept, but is also recognized and named in other fields of knowledge.

This statement indicates the manner in which Jung regarded the concept of the archetype as the pivotal connection between psychology and the human sciences in general. If the

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1014 Jung, "Concerning the archetypes, with special reference to the anima concept," (1936) _CW_ 9 pt.1, § 136. Jung added that "The authors assume that the primordial images are given through language. This assumption is certainly correct in individual cases, but in general it is contradicted by the fact that through dream psychology as through psychopathology a mass of archetypal images and connections become extracted daily which would not even become communicable through the historical use of speech." _Ibid.,_ tr. mod. Hubert and Mauss referred to categories, not primordial images. This is illustrative of the manner in which Jung read other's people's work through his own concerns, which is particularly marked in his readings outside of psychology and psychiatry.

1015 Jung, "The concept of the collective unconscious," (1936) _CW_ 9, 1, § 89, tr. mod.
concept was as widely recognized as Jung claimed, one would have assumed that his own concept of the archetype would have met with little opposition, and would have been welcomed by those that utilised concepts of collective representations, and so on. That this was not at all the case appears in part to have been due to the fact that apart from Bastian, whose work had fallen into discredit at this stage, the others whom Jung cited all belonged to Durkheim's school, and whether Jung realised it or not, their own understanding of categories and collective representations was quite different from what he took them to mean.

Lévy-Bruhl

The main anthropologist contemporary to Jung from whose work he drew was Lévy-Bruhl. It is Jung's relation to Lévy-Bruhl's work that most clearly reveals his views on the interdisciplinary relation between psychology and anthropology. There were two concepts that Jung adopted from Lévy-Bruhl: mystical participation and collective representations. In 1929 Jung described Lévy-Bruhl's nomination of mystical participation as the hallmark of primitive mentality as a "stroke of genius."\(^\text{1016}\) Jung employed this term on numerous occasions, and his use of it may be characterised as consisting in an endorsement, a

redefinition, and an extension of it. To begin with, Jung wholeheartedly accepted Lévy-Bruhl's depiction of primitive mentality in *The Mental Functions*. If Lévy-Bruhl had been criticised for his lack of field work, even after Jung's extended journey in Africa, his depictions of his experiences there could have been more or less been seamlessly incorporated into Lévy-Bruhl's work as supplementary illustrations.\(^\text{1017}\)

Whilst Lévy-Bruhl had made no recourse to any concept of the unconscious, Jung argued that mystical participation was the same thing as projection and unconscious identity.\(^\text{1018}\) In 1921, after stating that he had derived the term from Lévy-Bruhl, Jung defined mystical participation as denoting:

>a peculiar kind of psychological connection with objects. It consists in the fact that the subject cannot clearly distinguish himself from the object but is bound to it through a direct relationship which one can describe as a partial identity. This identity is founded on an *a priori* oneness of object and subject.


The p. m. is a vestige of this primitive condition.\textsuperscript{1019}

Thus Jung subscribed to Lévy-Bruhl's claim that consciousness initially derived from a primary condition of mystical participation, and that the development of civilization could be characterized as consisting in an increasing individualisation.\textsuperscript{1020} Whilst concurring that it was best observed in primitives than in civilized peoples, Jung claimed that there was less difference than Lévy-Bruhl initially claimed, stating that it was "only a shade more characteristic of the primitive than of the civilised. Lévy-Bruhl, unfortunately having no psychological knowledge, was not aware of this fact."\textsuperscript{1021} Jung provided the following description of its different manifestations in primitive and civilized peoples:

As a rule it is found in civilized peoples between persons, seldom between a person and a thing. In the first case it is a so called transference relationship, in which the object (as a rule) obtains as it were a magical - i.e. absolute effect on the subject. In the last case there is either a similar effect of a thing

\textsuperscript{1019} Jung, \textit{Psychological Types}, (1921) \textit{CW} 6, § 781, tr. mod.

\textsuperscript{1020} \textit{Ibid.}, § 12.

\textsuperscript{1021} Jung, \textit{Mysterium Coniunctionis}, (1955-6) \textit{CW} 14, § 817n.
or a type of identification with a thing or the idea of it. 1022

Thus whilst with primitives, mystical participation showed itself in their relationship with their environment, as well with each other, with civilized peoples, it was generally restricted to the personal form.

If primitives behaved like children, it followed that the psychology of one could be transferred to the other. Consequently, Jung argued that "in his early years the child lives in a state of participation mystique with his parents." 1023 This position led Jung to draw a parallel between individual development and the development of mankind: both consisted in the transition from an originary condition of mystical participation to one of conscious individuality, and ultimately individuation:

Every advance, every conceptual achievement of mankind, has been connected with an advance in self-awareness: man differentiated himself from the object and faced Nature as something distinct from her. Any reorientation of a psychological attitude will have to

1022 Jung, Psychological Types, (1921) CW 6, § 781.
follow the same road.\textsuperscript{1024}

This formed Jung's psychological form of the biogenetic law. Coupled with Jung's statement earlier that in civilized people, mystical participation was principally present in relationships, this gave an epochal significance to the practice of psychotherapy, whose "therapeutic effect par excellence" was the dissolution of mystical participation.\textsuperscript{1025} The development sought at an individual level in psychotherapy corresponded with the essential telos of the human race.

\textbf{Travels}

In contradistinction to Lévy-Bruhl, Jung did have first-hand experiences of the primitives that he talked about: in 1920 he visited North Africa, in 1923/4 he visited the Pueblo Indians in New Mexico, in 1925 he travelled in Kenya and Uganda, and in 1938 he was in India.\textsuperscript{1026} Historically,

\begin{flushright}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1024} Jung, "General standpoints on the psychology of dreams," \textit{CW} 8, § 523.
\item \textsuperscript{1025} Jung, "Commentary on "The Secret of the Golden Flower','" (1929) \textit{CW} 13, § 66.
\item \textsuperscript{1026} The continuity between Jung's view of Indians and primitives can be seen by juxtaposing the following statements. In 1918, Jung said of the primitive, "A thought appears to him, he does not think it; it appears to him in the form of a projected sensuous perception, almost like an hallucination, or at least like an extremely vivid dream." "On the unconscious," \textit{CW} 10, § 15. In 1939, after visiting India, he wrote: "An Indian, inasmuch as he is really Indian, does not think, at least not what we call "think."
\end{itemize}
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great significance is generally accorded to the transition from the armchair anthropology of Frazer and Lévy-Bruhl, to the prolonged immersion in other cultures, as represented by Boas and Malinowski. However, in Jung's case, it could be said that his trips took him further away from what were becoming the norms of modern anthropology.

In 1920, he accompanied a friend who was on a business trip to North Africa. His intention was "to see for once the European from the outside, reflected by milieu which was foreign in every respect." In Jung's view, the only means of gaining an understanding of one's own national peculiarities was through becoming aware of how others viewed them. Hence travelling, for Jung, was the *via regia* to a comparative racial psychology.1028

On the one hand, his descriptions of his experience seem to confirm his prior convictions concerning primitive psychology. On the other hand, a significant new element

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He rather perceives the thought. He resembles the primitive in this respect. I do not say that he is primitive, but that the process of his thinking reminds me of the primitive way of thought-production... We should expect such a peculiarity in any civilization which has enjoyed an almost unbroken continuity from primitive times." "What India can teach us," *CW* 10, § 1007. "That is presumably the reason why India seems so dreamlike: one gets pushed back into the unconscious, into that unredeemed, uncivilized, aboriginal world, of which we only dream, since our consciousness denies it." *Ibid.*, § 1011. Perhaps this thesis is only a hallucination...


enters into these descriptions: whilst modern day primitives are still seen to correspond to our prehistoric ancestors, and hence designated a prior stage in the development of consciousness, aspects of their life are valorised, as designating something that has been lost in the transition to modernity. Thus after watching the preparations for a festival in the Sahara, Jung noted:

these people live from their affects, that is to say they are lived by them. Their consciousness... does not reflect; the ego lacks any autonomy... We possess a certain measure of will and directed intention. What we lack is intensity of life.

I did not wish to change, but I had been psychically infected... \(^{1029}\)

Jung's observations also 'confirmed' French crowd psychology: simply being in such a crowd was sufficient to provoke a phylogenetic regression:

The emotional, close to life essence of these unreflective men who live from affects has a strong suggestive effect upon those historical layers in us which we just have overcome, or at least think we have

Jung likened such an existence to the 'paradise of childhood', which, like the latter, "thanks to its naiveté and unconsciousness, sketches a more complete picture of the self." On reflection, Jung noted that aside from his conscious aim of wishing to observe the European from the outside, his unconscious aim had been to discover that part of his personality that had been obscured through being a European. Consequently, he felt that there was a danger that his European personality would be overwhelmed by an invasion from the unconscious, or that he would succumb to "going-black." The same phenomenon recurred five years later on his return to Africa. Jung dreamt of his barber in Chattanooga, Tennessee, curling his hair, to give him "negro hair." He interpreted this as a warning from the unconscious, which indicated that "the primitive was a danger to me. At that time I was obviously "going-black." Consequently, he realised that he had gone to Africa to escape Europe with its problems, and that:

The trip revealed itself as less an investigation of

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1030 Ibid., p. 272, tr. mod.
1031 Ibid.
1032 In English in the original.
1033 Ibid., p. 302, tr. mod.
primitive psychology... than much more to have as its object embarrassing question: What is going to happen to Jung the psychologist "in the wilds of Africa"? A question I had constantly sought to evade, in spite of my intellectual intention to study the European's reaction to the conditions of the primeval world [Urweltsbedingungen].

Jung's geographical voyages were a form of phylogenetic time travelling. In 1923-4, he visited the Pueblo Indians in Taos, New Mexico. He stated that when he was in the Sahara, he had been with a civilization that "has more or less the same relationship to ours as Roman antiquity to modern times." Consequently, "The desire then grew in me to carry the historical comparison still further by descending to a still deeper cultural level." The Pueblo Indians of New Mexico were geographically accessible primitives. Several years later, the anthropologist Ruth Benedict described them as:

one of the most widely known primitive peoples in Western civilization. They live in the midst of

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1034 In English in the original.
1035 Ibid., p. 303, tr. mod.
1036 Ibid., p. 275.
1037 Ibid., p. 275, tr. mod.
America, within easy reach of any transcontinental traveller.\textsuperscript{1038}

In Taos, Jung had a conversation with a Pueblo, Ochwiay Biano (Mountain Lake), which greatly impressed him, and which he referred to on many subsequent occasions. During the course of this conversation, Jung's desire to view the European from the outside was fulfilled. The following is a snippet of their conversation:

I asked him why he thought the whites were all mad. He replied: "They say that they think with their heads."

"Why of course. Where do you think?" I asked him surprised.

"We think here," he said, indicating his heart. I fell into a long meditation. For the first time in my life, so it seemed to me, someone had drawn for me a picture of the real white man.\textsuperscript{1039}

It is not known whether Ochwiay Biano was a reader of Pascal. Subsequently, Jung developed these remarks into a historical classification of the different localisations of consciousness. In his seminars on Kundalini Yoga in 1932 he

\textsuperscript{1038} Ruth Benedict, \textit{Patterns of Culture}, p. 57.

\textsuperscript{1039} \textit{Memories, Dreams, Reflections}, p. 276, tr. mod.
stated:

The Pueblo Indian thinks in his heart, as does the Homeric person, whose spirit is located in the diaphragm... Our psychical localization is admittedly in the head... when emotions become involved, our psychology slips down to manipura [i.e., a lower level].

What impressed Jung most of all about the primitives that he visited was that they seemed to dwell in a mythic and cosmological embeddedness. Of the Pueblo Indian, he said: "Such a man is in the fullest sense of the word in his place." For Jung, the task for the modern became one of regaining this mythic and cosmological embeddedness without sacrificing the gains of modern consciousness. Individuation was conceived as a conjunction which resolved the conflict between the primitive and the modern.

Given Jung's phylogenetic perspective, a journey to Africa, the supposed source of mankind, took on a particular significance. This gave rise to the following insight:

At that time I understood that within the soul from the primordial beginning there has been a longing for light

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1041 Ibid., p. 282, tr. mod.
and an irresistible urge to rise out of its primordial darkness... The longing for light is the longing for consciousness.\textsuperscript{1042}

Jung's journey itself became an imitatio of the supposed origins of consciousness. Concerning his voyage up the Nile, he commented:

The myth of Horus is the story of the newly risen divine light. It would have been told after the deliverance out of the primordial darkness of prehistoric times through culture, that is to say through the revelation of consciousness. Thus the journey from the interior of Africa to Egypt became for me like a drama of the birth of light, which was intimately connected with me, with my psychology.\textsuperscript{1043}

Jung did not elaborate on precisely how this drama was linked to his own psychology. He did however give some indication of the connection between his anthropological excursions and his own psychology in a passage which was omitted from the published version of \textit{Memories, Dreams, Reflections}):

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1042} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 298-9, tr. mod.
  \item \textsuperscript{1043} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 303, tr. mod.
\end{itemize}
My experiences during the years 1913-1917 had burdened me with a tangle of problems whose nature demanded that I should study the psychic life of non-Europeans. For I suspected that the questions put to me were just so many compensations for my European prejudices. What I had seen in North Africa, and what Ochwiay Biano told me, were the first clues to an adequate explanation of my experiences.1044

The years in question, which Jung dubbed his confrontation with the unconscious, were those during which he elaborated his theories of the collective unconscious and individuation. His statement here indicates that what he personally went through could also be conceived as a de-Europianisation or as a globalization. Extrapolating from this, the import for Westerners of the exploration of the collective unconscious could also be conceived of from this perspective. The task was one of reaching a synthesis of the Western and the primitive, without 'going black.' In a further passage that was also omitted from Memories, Dreams, Reflections, Jung reflected upon his impressions on returning to Europe:

1044 CMS, p. 356. Ellenberger once asked Jung why he didn't publish his observations on the Elgoni, to which "Jung answered that being a psychologist he did not want to encroach upon the field of the anthropologist." The Discovery of the Unconscious, p. 739.
It seemed to me that our conventional modes of conceiving and dealing with psychological problems were as inadequate as would be an attempt to use diamonds as road fill. No doubt this sounds exaggerated; but I employ this exaggeration with good reason because it reproduces my state of mind of that time. My modern self-assurance suffered a staggering defeat.

Simultaneously richer and poorer, I returned from these travels to the task of my European existence.

"Tout cela est bien dit — mais il faut cultiver notre jardin," says Candide.¹⁰⁴⁵

During this period, Jung reformulated his views on the task of analysis, setting it within a global and historical perspective. Neurosis was conceived as consisting in a conflict between the primitive and the modern. Not only did Jung claim that primitive mentality survived in the unconscious, he equated the two. Anthropology could be put to a new use — to provide knowledge of the modern unconscious. In a seminar, in 1925, Jung stated:

The understanding of primitive mentality is essential to the dream-analyst. To gain an idea of the working of the primitive mind one should read C. Dennet At the Back of the Black Man's Mind. One should, in fact, read

¹⁰⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 392-3.
this work several times, as the ideas therein are by no means easy to grasp on first becoming acquainted with them.\footnote{Notes by W. B. Crow of Jung's seminars at Swanage, 1925, pp. 9-10.}

These comments suggest that the anthropology of primitives was a key element in the constitution of Jung's concept of the unconscious, the primitive in the modern. Indeed, it is here that Jung's avowal of the significance of phylogenetic inheritance takes on its significance.

Reception of Jung's anthropology

Jung's reliance on Lévy-Bruhl was criticised by specialists who were otherwise favourably disposed to his work. In \textit{Psychological Types} Jung had cited the following anecdote:

A Bushman had a little son upon whom he lavished the characteristic doting affection of the primitives... One day he came home in a rage; he had been fishing and had caught nothing. As usual the little fellow ran eagerly to greet him. But the father seized him and wrung his neck on the spot. Subsequently of course he mourned for the dead boy with the same abandon and lack of comprehension as had before made him strangle.
In 1927 the anthropologist Paul Radin, who had been a student of Franz Boas, critiqued Lévy-Bruhl's work and the equation of the primitive and the prehistoric in his *Primitive Man as Philosopher*. The title itself indicates how far Radin was from Lévy-Bruhl's depiction of the prelogical mentality of primitives. Radin had been invited by Jung to lecture to the Psychological Club in Zurich about American Indian religion, and he also attended Jung's seminar in 1925. He had this to say concerning Jung's citation above:

> No greater distortion of the actual facts could possibly be imagined. And yet Dr. Jung obtained this example from what purported to be a first hand account... They all illustrate the unconscious bias that lies at the bottom of our judgement of primitive mentality, the unconscious assumption of the lack of differentiation and of integration to be found there.

> We know that this lack of stability and integration is a basic assumption in all evolutionary theories of cultural development. This is, however, emphatically not the case with Jung and others who take...

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1047 Jung, *CW* 6, § 403. This quotation has been given in Paul Radin's translation.

his attitude toward primitive mentality. Some other explanation must be sought. What makes for error in our interpretation is a certain mistiness of vision due to that sentimentality from which the northern European finds it so difficult to free himself.\textsuperscript{1049}

Radin went on to add:

The prevalent view to-day among laymen is that they [primitives] are at all times the plaything of their passions, and that self-control and poise are utterly alien to their character... We have seen in fact that even so open-minded and sympathetic a scholar as Jung apparently still accepts this view. That an example like the one used by Jung should in all good faith be given as representative of the normal or even the abnormal reaction of a primitive to a given emotional situation shows the depth of ignorance that still exists on this subject.\textsuperscript{1050}

Unconscious bias, mistiness of vision, sentimentality and plain ignorance were Radin's summations of Jung's views of

\textsuperscript{1049} Paul Radin, \textit{Primitive Man as Philosopher}, p. 40. Jung had in fact not given a source for this anecdote.

\textsuperscript{1050} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 63.
the primitive.\textsuperscript{1051}

In 1931 Jung wrote a foreword to a work by Charles Aldrich, \textit{The Primitive Mind in Modern Civilization}, which was an attempt to develop a psychology of primitives based on Jung's work. Aldrich had studied with Jung in Zurich and also attended his seminar in 1925. Jung took this opportunity to comment on the history of the relation between anthropology and psychology. He stated that in the nineteenth century, anthropology had employed the 'collection method,' which drew together a great deal of material that was, however, insufficiently analysed. Adequate analysis required an interdisciplinary study, of which Frazer's \textit{The Golden Bough} was a 'splendid example.'\textsuperscript{1052} However, the field which had been drawn upon the least was psychology. At the same time, each investigator had drawn upon their own psychology to understand primitives:

- Seen from Tylor's point of view, animism is quite obviously his individual bias. Lévy-Bruhl measures primitive facts by means of his extremely rational

\textsuperscript{1051} William McGuire notes that "Radin was never a Jungian, and it may be that his skepticism was reinforced by the contact with Jung, though they continued to be friends." Bollingen, p. 88. Radin was the beneficiary of fifteen years funding from the Bollingen Foundation, and he collaborated with Jung and Karl Kérenyi on \textit{The Trickster: A Study in American Indian Mythology}.

\textsuperscript{1052} Jung, "Foreward to Aldrich 'The Primitive Mind in Modern Civilization," CW 18, § 1297."
mind. From his standpoint it appears quite logical that the primitive mind should be an "état prélogique." Yet the primitive is far from being illogical and is just as far as from being "animistic." He is by no means that strange being from whom which the civilized man is separated by a gulf that cannot be bridged. The fundamental difference between them is not a matter of mental functioning, but rather in the premises upon which the functioning is based.  

Thus anthropologists had fallen victim to the personal equation, and the fallacy of anthropology lay in its inadequate psychology. However, psychology itself had been of little assistance to anthropology, due to the lack of an adequate psychology. According to Jung, the value of Freud's Totem and Taboo, despite its blatant inadequacies, had been that it showed the possibility of a rapprochement between psychology and the understanding of primitives. Prior to Totem and Taboo, however, Jung himself had tackled this subject in Transformations and Symbols of the Libido. Whereas Freud had applied a preexisting theory, Jung had used, as he put it, a comparative method, which yielded better results for both psychology and anthropology. In this account, an adequate anthropology could only come about if it was based on an adequate psychology, namely, Jung's.

1053 Ibid.
In addition to Jung's foreword, Aldrich's work carried an introduction by Bronislaw Malinowski which forms an interesting counterpart. Before considering Malinowski's introduction to Aldrich's work, it is worth sketching his attitude to psychoanalysis, as represented by his 1928 *Sex and Repression in Savage Societies*. He stated that for a time, he had been "unduly influenced by the theories of Freud and Rivers, Jung, and Jones."\(^{1054}\) The value of psychoanalysis was that it opened up a dynamic theory of the mind, and forged a link between psychology, biology and the theory of society. Malinowski viewed his own work as providing a partial confirmation of psychoanalysis through showing: "a deep correlation between the type of a society and the nuclear complex found there."\(^{1055}\) At the same time it presented a relativisation:

it appears necessary to draw in more systematically the correlation between biological and social influences; not to assume the universal existence of the Oedipus complex, but in studying every type of civilization, to establish the special complex which pertains to it.\(^{1056}\)

\(^{1054}\) Malinowski, *Sex and Repression in Savage Societies*, p. vii.

\(^{1055}\) *Ibid.*, p. 82.

\(^{1056}\) *Ibid.*
Thus in place of the universalism of the psychoanalytic theory, Malinowski was proposing a cultural relativism.\textsuperscript{1057}

In his work, Aldrich cited Malinowski's anthropological critique of the Oedipus complex as providing confirmation of Jung's views. Aldrich argued that Malinowski had presented the case of a society governed by matrilineal descent in which the youth's animosity was directed towards the authority figure, the mother's brother, as opposed to towards the father. This indicated that the Freudian father complex was metaphorical, which was "exactly parallel" to Jung's view, contrary to Freud, that the incestuous longing for the mother was also metaphorical.\textsuperscript{1058}

However, Malinowski's espousal of a form of cultural relativism led him also to reject Jung's theory of the collective unconscious, without citing him by name:

\textsuperscript{1057} Interestingly enough, in a similar manner to Malinowski, Jung also cited his anthropological experiences as a critique of psychoanalysis. In 1928, at a press conference in Vienna, he stated apropos his travels in Africa and New Mexico, "I was able to convince myself that religious ideas are inborn in them, and that religions should not be regarded in any sense as neurotic products, as is now asserted in certain quarters," and "My sojourns among the natives of East Africa and the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico proved to me that the cause of neurosis do not necessarily lie in the repression of the sexual instinct; the repression of any other primary instinct, say of hunger, can produce it just as well." "Three versions of a press conference in Vienna," McGuire and Hull ed., \textit{C. G. Jung Speaking}, p. 57 & p. 60.

\textsuperscript{1058} Aldrich, \textit{The Primitive Mind in Modern Civilization}, pp. 6-7.
We have developed a theory of the plasticity of instincts under culture and of the transformation of instinctive response into cultural adjustment. On its psychological side our theory suggests a line of approach which, while giving full due to the influence of social factors, does away with the hypotheses of "group mind", the "collective unconscious", "gregarious instinct", and similar metaphysical conceptions.\textsuperscript{1059}

In his introduction to Aldrich's work, Malinowski stated that "Between the spheres of psychology and anthropology, there is today a No-man's-land."\textsuperscript{1060} However, in his view, until psychology solved its conflicts between rival schools, anthropology should regard them all impartially, and not ally itself with anyone. Like Jung, Malinowski held that anthropology and psychology could be of mutual benefit to one another. Unsurprisingly, he stressed the potential values of anthropology for psychology:

It is possible, even, that anthropological criticism and evaluation of the excursions into the Science of Man made by these various schools will do something

\textsuperscript{1059} Malinowski, \textit{Sex and Repression in Savage Societies}, p. 277.

\textsuperscript{1060} Malinowski, foreword to Aldrich, \textit{The Primitive Mind in Modern Civilization}, p. xi.
towards clarifying the psychological atmosphere.\textsuperscript{1061} When it came to Jung's work, Malinowski claimed that the contributions of the 'Zurich school for analytical psychology' cannot be ignored by any anthropologist. And the main concept of this School - Racial Unconscious - challenges anthropological criticism for, though it is put forward as a psychological principle, it is so dependent upon cultural evidence that it is perhaps not claiming too much to say that in its final establishment or rejection, the anthropologist will have the last word.\textsuperscript{1062}

Thus if for Jung, the psychologist was to have the last word concerning the validity of anthropological theory, for Malinowski, the situation was reversed. Judging by Malinowski's statements concerning the collective unconscious in \textit{Sex and Repression in Savage Societies}, it is fair to assert that in his view, the anthropological judgement of Jung's 'main concept' was resoundingly

\textsuperscript{1061} Ibid., p. xii.

\textsuperscript{1062} Ibid., p. xiii.
negative.\textsuperscript{1063}

In his publications, Jung did not overtly reply to the anthropological criticisms of his work, but he addressed himself to the criticisms that had been addressed to Lévy-Bruhl's work. As Lévy-Bruhl was the anthropological authority whom Jung most heavily relied upon and who legitimated his own arguments, it would be sufficient to show the weakness of the criticisms of Lévy-Bruhl's work to defend his own.

Whilst in 1929, Jung had described Lévy-Bruhl's nomination of \textit{mystical participation} to characterize primitive mentality as a stroke of genius (see above), and took over the term and used it frequently, in 1930 he criticised the term, in concurrence with Lévy-Bruhl's critics. In a lecture in Zürich, Jung stated:

It seems to me that the word "mystical" is not happily chosen, since for the primitives it is not a matter of something mystical, but of something perfectly natural.\textsuperscript{1064}

\textsuperscript{1063} Malinowski was also highly critical of Lévy-Bruhl's work. On the intricacies of Malinowski's relation to psychoanalysis, see George Stocking, Jr., "Anthropology and the science of the irrational: Malinowski's encounter with Freudian psychoanalysis." Stocking states that in subsequent years, Malinowski grew increasingly of psychoanalysis. (\textit{ibid.}, p. 40). Jung never cited Malinowski's work. He did, however, have an offprint of his 1916 article "Baloma. The spirits of the dead in the Trobriand islands."

\textsuperscript{1064} Jung, "Archaic Man," \textit{CW} 10, § 130, tr. mod.
The following year he wrote:

strange to say, there are not a few ethnologists who still kick against this brilliant idea, for which the unfortunate expression "mystique" may have to shoulder the blame.\textsuperscript{1065}

If Lévy-Bruhl came to drop this term, Jung reversed his criticism of it. In 1948 he stated:

Regrettably this author later again eradicated the perfectly apt expression "mystical." Probably he succumbed to the onslaught of the fools who under the term "mystical" think of their own rubbish.\textsuperscript{1066}

Jung attributed this change to Lévy-Bruhl's fear of the terms 'bad reputation in intellectual circles':

It is rather to be regretted that he made such a concession to rationalistic superstition, since "mystique" is just the right word to characterize the

\textsuperscript{1065} Jung, "Introduction to Wickes's "Analyse der Kinderseele," (1931), CW 17, § 83.

\textsuperscript{1066} Jung, "General standpoints on the psychology of dreams," CW 8, § 508n. This statement was added to the 1948 revision of this paper.
peculiar quality of "unconscious identity."\textsuperscript{1067}

Not only did Jung side with Lévy-Bruhl against his critics, he finally defended the (early) Lévy-Bruhl against the (late) Lévy-Bruhl. Jung wrote:

I take the concept of \textit{participation mystique}... from the works of Lévy-Bruhl. Recently this idea has been repudiated by ethnologist for the reason that primitives know very well how to differentiate between things. There is no doubt about that; but it cannot be denied, either, that incommensurable things can have, for them, an equally incommensurable \textit{tertium comparationis}. One has only to think of the ubiquitous application of "mana", the werewolf motif, etc. Furthermore, "unconscious identity" is a psychic phenomenon which the psychotherapist has to deal with every day. Certain ethnologists have also rejected Lévy-Bruhl's concept of the \textit{état prélogique}, which is closely connected with that of \textit{participation}. The term is not a very happy one, for in his own way the primitive thinks just as logically as we do. Lévy-Bruhl was aware of this, as I know from personal conversation with him. By "prelogical" he meant the primitive

suppositions are often exceedingly strange, and though they may not deserve to be called "prelogical" they certainly merit the term "irrational." Astonishingly enough, Lévy-Bruhl in his posthumously published diary, recanted both these concepts. This is the more remarkable in that they had a thoroughly sound psychological basis.\(^{1068}\)

Even if the anthropologist came to reverse his opinion, the psychologist need not follow suit, as his valuation was based upon the psychological validity of an idea. Hence psychology was not in a dependent relation to anthropology, even in the interpretation of anthropological material. Consequently, subsequent developments in anthropological theory could in no way invalidate the anthropological assumptions of Jung's psychological theories. Given this, it is perhaps not surprising that modern anthropologists, with few exceptions, completely ignored Jung's work.

In the response to Jung's work by the anthropological community, a clear pattern emerges. On the one hand, Jung's anthropological excursions were ignored and his archetypal theory was criticised. The former were seen as being closely bound up with the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 'armchair' anthropology that anthropologists of the

\(^{1068}\) Jung, Mysterium Coniunctionis, CW 14, (1955/6), § 336n. Lévy-Bruhl's diaries had been published in 1949.
twenties and thirties were reacting against. The latter was out of keeping with the progressive valorisation of historical and geographical particularities, and the emergence of modern concepts of cultures. However, Jung did have a seminal influence on anthropology, through his *Psychological Types*.

When the English translation appeared in 1923, it became one of the talking points among anthropologists. In 1924, the application of Jung's type theory to anthropology was the subject of C. G. Seligman's presidential address before the Royal Anthropological Institute, "Anthropology and psychology: a study of some points of contact." Seligman commenced by noting that his anthropological experience had demonstrated to him the greater suggestibility, tendency to dissociation and resemblance to hysteria among primitive people, and yet it could not be stated that they were identical to modern hysterics. The explanation for this, he claimed, was found in Jung's distinction between

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1069 For example, Margaret Caffrey notes that in reply to Edward Sapir's question concerning the possibility of Jung's idea of primordial images to mythology, Ruth Benedict "rejected the archetypal approach to mythology largely because the idea of the archetype harked back to a closed system with fixed laws." *Ruth Benedict: Stranger in this Land*, p. 141. In relation to psychoanalysis more generally, Sapir noted in 1921 that anthropologists were reluctant to give up their sensitivity to the historical particularities of cultures, having but recently acquired it. Cited in Regna Darnell, *Edward Sapir: Linguist, Anthropologist, Humanist*, p. 140.
extraversion and introversion. Seligman accepted Jung's contention that such typological attitudes were innate, and set out about studying how various cultures could be classified into types. While Jung's interest in typology had been its utility as a means of developing a self-reflexive individual psychology, for Seligman, and for other anthropologists, the interest in Jung's type theory lay in its suggestion of the possibility of a differential typology of cultures.

In the West, Seligman claimed, there was a preponderance of extraverts. Seligman cited a personal communication from Jung who disagreed with this. According to Jung, the apparent predominance of extraverts was because they were more conspicuous. In support of this, Jung supplied Seligman with the following figures, which indicate a concern with quantification which is absent from *Psychological Types*:

Of 77 friends, relatives and acquaintances, 34 are introverts and 43 extraverts, while of 70 patients treated during the past year, 39 were extraverts, 25 introverts, the type of the remaining 6 failing to be determined.\(^\text{1070}\)

Seligman, however, contended that this bore out his own view concerning the preponderance of extraverts. In contrast to this, the savages he had studied were extraverts. When it came to civilized peoples, Seligman claimed that the Nordic races were introverted. Concerning the alpine races, Seligman cited a letter from Jung in which he characterized the average Swiss as being "moderately introvert," which seems to indicate some readiness on Jung's part to classify cultures typologically, though he did not explicitly write on this subject. The Mediterraneans, Seligman claimed, were extraverted, and "old speculative India" was introverted. In the far East, Japan was extraverted, while China was introverted.

_Psychological Types_ was reviewed by Edward Sapir. He wrote of the work: "Its one idea is like the intense stare of a man who has found something, and this something a little uncanny." While finding some of it dry, impossible to follow and scholastic, he nevertheless lauded the work as contributing to the loss of "the serenity of an absolute system of values." Sapir's biographer provides a psychobiographical explanation for his interest in _Psychological Types:_

1071 Ibid., p. 29.

1072 Ibid., p. 30.

1073 Sapir, Review of Jung's _Psychological Types_, p. 529.

1074 Ibid., p. 532.
Sapir was fascinated by Jung's concept of introvert and extravert as irreconcilable psychological types. Throughout his life, Sapir felt himself isolated from his fellow humans and failed to see why they did not perceive the world as he did. Jung's "explanation" released him from a previously unacknowledged sense of guilt.1075

Whatever the validity of this explanation, one does find that no small part of the appeal of Jung's typology lay in its personal and interpersonal application. Thus Margaret Mead recalls that in her adolescence,

I was at that point supposed to be an 'intuitive introvert,' which everyone wanted to be because that was what Jung admired the most.1076

She recalled that there had been much discussion of the Jung's Psychological Types among anthropologists:

The idea that there are systematic relationships between universal psychological types was one that she [Ruth Benedict] had been discussing with me and with


1076 Cited in Jane Howard, Margaret Mead: A Life, p. 43.
Sapir ever since I had attended the Toronto meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science in 1924, where there had been discussions of Jung's *Psychological Types* (1923) which had recently been published in English...\(^{1077}\)

She also recalled that Sapir set about classifying the types of their fellow anthropologists. In 1934 Sapir put forward a typology of cultures, in a similar vein to Seligman's:

The socialization of personality traits may be expected to lead cumulatively to the development of specific psychological biases in the cultures of the world. Thus Eskimo culture, contrasted with most North American Indian cultures, is extraverted; Hindu culture on the whole corresponds to the world of the thinking introvert; the culture of the United States is definitely extraverted in character... and sensational evaluations are more clearly evident in the cultures of the Mediterranean are than in those of northern Europe.\(^{1078}\)

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\(^{1077}\) Margaret Mead, *Ruth Benedict*, p. 42. In another reference to this same meeting, Mead stated that "we had all read Jung." Margaret Mead, *Letters from the Field 1925-1975*, p. 322.

\(^{1078}\) Sapir, "Personality," p. 563.
Just as with Seligman's, it is hard to see such a schema as anything other than a restatement of typical racial stereotypes of warm-blooded Mediterraneans and otherworldly Indians, and so forth.

The impact of Jung's typology on Ruth Benedict may be found in her concept of Apollonian and Dionysian culture patterns which she first put forward in 1928 in "Psychological Types in the cultures of the southwest," and subsequently elaborated in Patterns of Culture. Margaret Mead recalled that their conversations on this topic had in part been shaped by Sapir and Goldenweiser's discussion of Jung's typology in Toronto in 1924 as well as by Seligman's article cited above. In Patterns of Culture, Benedict discussed Wilhelm Worringer's typification of empathy and abstraction, Oswald Spengler's of the Apollonian and the Faustian and Friedrich Nietzsche's of the Apollonian and the Dionysian. Conspicuously, she failed to cite—explicitly cite Jung, though whilst criticising Spengler, she noted:

It is quite as convincing to characterize our cultural type as thoroughly extravert... as it is to characterize it as Faustian.\textsuperscript{1080}

\textsuperscript{1079} Mead, An Anthropologist at Work: Writings of Ruth Benedict, p. 207.

\textsuperscript{1080} Benedict, Patterns of Culture, pp. 54-5.
One gets the impression that Benedict was attempting to distance herself from Jung, despite possibly drawing some inspiration from his *Psychological Types*. Benedict explicitly drew from Nietzsche, characterizing the culture pattern of the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico as Apollonian, and of the other cultures of North America as Dionysian.¹⁰⁸¹

In her autobiography, Margaret Mead recalls that in the period that led up to her *Sex and Temperament*, she had a great deal of discussion with Gregory Bateson concerning the possibility that aside from sex difference, there were other types of innate differences which "cut across sex lines."¹⁰⁸² She stated that:

> In my own thinking I drew on the work of Jung, especially his fourfold scheme for grouping human beings as psychological types, each related to the others in a complementary way.¹⁰⁸³

Yet in her published work, Mead omitted to cite Jung's work. A possible explanation for the absence of citation of Jung by Benedict and Mead, despite the influence of his typological model, was that they were drawing up diametrically opposed concepts of culture and its relation

to the personality. Ironically, it is arguably through such indirect and half-acknowledged conduits that Jung's work came to have its greatest impact upon modern anthropology and concepts of culture.

This short account of some anthropological responses to Jung may serve to indicate that when Jung's work was engaged with by the academic community, it was taken to quite different destinations, and underwent a sea change.

The one significant anthropologist who did engage with Jung's work in a sustained manner was John Layard (1891-1974). Layard had studied with W. H. R. Rivers and did his fieldwork in the New Hebrides. Subsequently, he underwent bouts of psychotherapy with many figures, including Rivers, Homer Lane, Wilhelm Stekel, H. G. Baynes, Jung and R. D. Laing. In addition, he practised as an analyst himself. His major anthropological work was his account of some of his field work, *Stone Men of Malekula*, which was published in 1942, and ran to eight hundred pages. In this and subsequent articles, Layard set out to interpret the kinship patterns and social structures of the Vao in terms of analytical psychology. This aspect of Layard's work, and in particular, his work on the incest taboo, was subsequently taken up by Jung. In 1945 Layard wrote a paper on "The Incest Taboo." On receiving it, Jung wrote to Layard: "It came in the right moment and gave me the key to a great puzzle in the
psychology of the transference." The following year Jung made use of Layard's work in his The Psychology of the Transference. Essentially, Layard's work seems to have provided Jung with a model of the interrelation of the endogenous and exogenous forms of the incest taboo. However, Layard felt that Jung had misused his work, and the second edition of Jung's work incorporated Layard's corrections. Evidently, even this wasn't enough, for in the English translation of Jung's work, which appeared five years after Jung's death, Layard had added yet more emendations, incorporated in square brackets, evidently with the approval of the editors of the Collected Works. Jung's anthropological excursions had failed to be taken up by the anthropological community. In the one case in which a professional anthropologist took up Jung's psychology, it appears that he reached a different understanding of Jung's psychology than Jung himself, and the later reached a different understanding of Layard's anthropology, which resulted in an impasse.

**Jung's Psychology of the Political**

In 1921 Jung defined collective psychic contents as "what Lévy-Bruhl calls the représentations collectives of

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1084 Layard Papers, University of California at San Diego.
primitives."^{1085} Jung's constant attribution of this term to Lévy-Bruhl indicates that he did not realise that it actually stemmed from Durkheim. In 1924 Marcel Mauss argued that psychology only studied what took place within individuals, as opposed to the collective representations, which were the provenance of sociology.^{1086} The overpowering significance of collective representations led Mauss to argue that

the contribution of collective representations: ideas, concepts, categories, motives for traditional actions and practices, collective sentiments and fixed expressions of the emotions and sentiments, is so great, even in the individual consciousness - that at times we seem to want to reserve for ourselves all investigations in these higher strata of the individual consciousness.^{1087}

Through adopting the term collective representations, Jung attempted the reverse operation of subsuming the domain of sociology through psychology. In 1928 he stated that the images of the collective unconscious were the collective

\[^{1085}\text{Jung, Psychological Types, CW 6, $§$ 692.}\]

\[^{1086}\text{Mauss, "Real and practical relations between psychology and sociology."}\]

\[^{1087}\text{Ibid., p. 9.}\]
representations. However, a few years later, he provided the following differentiation:

> Without difficulty the expression "représentations collectives," which Lévy-Bruhl uses to describe the symbolic figures of the primitive Weltanschauung, can also be applied to unconscious contents, since it concerns nearly the same thing... The concept "archetype" only indirectly fits the "représentations collectives," in that it only describes those psychic contents, which have not yet been submitted to conscious elaboration.

Thus archetypes formed the basis of collective representations, and the latter designated the condition of the former after they had been subject to conscious elaboration.

While Durkheim had used the supposed existence of the unconscious as one element in his argument as to the existence of representations outside of the individual, collective representations, Jung, interestingly enough, employed something close to a mirror image of the same argument. While stating that outer attractions like offices

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1089 Jung, "On the archetypes of the collective unconscious," (1935) CW 9, 1, § 5-6, tr. mod.
and titles belonged to society, or the collective consciousness, he argued:

But just as there is a society outside the individual, so there is a collective psyche outside the personal psyche, namely the collective unconscious...\textsuperscript{1090}

While Jung referred to the collective consciousness on several occasions, he did not refer to it with anything like the frequency with which he referred to the collective unconscious, and it was with this latter term that his work became preeminently associated. However, for Jung, the concept of the collective consciousness formed a counterpole to that of the collective unconscious, and without it, his concept of the latter, not to mention his social and political thought, are not understandable.

In Jung's social vision, the individual was suspended between the collective consciousness and the collective unconscious. In 1947 he stated that ego consciousness was dependent upon the conditions of the collective or social consciousness, and the unconscious collective dominants, or archetypes.\textsuperscript{1091} This dual dependency resulted in a conflict, for

\textsuperscript{1090} Jung, "The relations between the ego and the unconscious," \textit{CW} 7, § 231.

\textsuperscript{1091} Jung, "Theoretical reflections on the essence of the psyche," (1945) \textit{CW} 8, § 423.
Between the contents of the collective consciousness, which purport to be generally accepted truths, and those of the collective unconscious there is so pronounced an opposition that the latter are rejected as totally irrational.... between the collective consciousness and the collective unconsciousness there is an almost unbridgeable opposition in which the subject finds himself suspended.\textsuperscript{1092}

Thus if subjective consciousness identified with the ideas and opinions of the collective consciousness, the contents of the collective unconscious became repressed. This tendency led ultimately to the absorption of the ego by the collective unconscious, which gave rise to the "mass man, who is always enslaved by an 'ism.'"\textsuperscript{1093} The identification with the collective consciousness and the apotheosis of the masses inevitably led to a catastrophe. The only solution was the avoidance of identification with the collective consciousness, and the recognition of the 'existence and importance' of the archetypes, as "These latter are an effective defence against the might of social consciousness and the mass psyche corresponding with it."\textsuperscript{1094} In this respect, contemporary religion failed the individual, due to

\textsuperscript{1092} Ibid., tr. mod.

\textsuperscript{1093} Ibid., § 425, tr. mod.

\textsuperscript{1094} Ibid., § 426, tr. mod.
the fact that

so far as religion for the contemporary consciousness, still essentially means a denomination, and hence a collectively accepted codified system and represented in dogmatic precepts of religious statements, it belongs more to the sphere of collective consciousness, even though its symbols express the originally effective archetypes.¹⁰⁹⁵

Curiously, Jung's statement here in effect recognizes Durkheim's social definition of religion as descriptive of the pathology of contemporary religion, which had lost touch with the collective unconscious.

These apocalyptic statements indicate why Jung prioritised the study of the collective unconscious over that of the collective consciousness. The dominance of the collective consciousness and the consequent development of 'mass man' in the twentieth century, and the failure of religion to adequately form a counterweight to it was the social pathology of modernity. The only solution lay in the collective unconscious, and ultimately in the fostering of the process of individuation, which alone enabled an individual to differentiate themselves from the collective consciousness and the collective unconscious, thus evading

¹⁰⁹⁵ Ibid., § 426, tr. mod.
the dangers of totalitarianism on the one side, and psychosis on the other. These statements also indicate Jung's understanding of the cultural significance of analytical psychology. Its cultural mission lay in establishing the existence and importance of the collective unconscious, which alone could save the West from catastrophe. While the collective consciousness found its spokesmen in social, political and religious leaders, the collective unconscious found its spokesman in Jung.

Jung's concept of the collective psyche and the collective unconscious drew together several different senses of the term 'collective,' corresponding to his different conceptions of the archetypes. On the one hand, collective was understood to designate the universally human attributes that everyone shared. On the other, collective referred to the functioning of supra-individual entities such as groups or nations. Thus Jung at times referred to the collective unconscious of nations. It was in this second sense that his understanding of the psychology of the political was embodied. Most of Jung's statements concerning collective behaviour occur during the thirties and forties, and the spectre of the rise of Nazism generally furnishes their explicit or implicit context.

Jung's comments concerning behaviour in crowds closely followed the French crowd psychologists. Jung's citations were to Le Bon. In his Tavistock lectures in 1936, referring
to the suggestive and contagious effect of emotions, Jung stated:

The French psychologists have dealt with this "contagion mentale"; there are some very good books on the subject, especially The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind by Le Bon.\(^{1096}\)

On another occasion, Jung suggested that the best way of understanding some of his views on collective psychology was simply to read Le Bon:

One need only read what Le Bon has to say on the "psychology of crowds" to understand what I mean: man as a particle in the mass is psychically abnormal.\(^{1097}\)

Le Bon appears to have provided Jung with a ready made collective psychology. Some of Jung's statements sound like a recasting of Le Bon into his own language:

A group experience takes place on a lower level of consciousness than the experience of an individual.

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\(^{1096}\) Jung, "The Tavistock Lectures", CW 18, § 318. Jung possessed a copy of the 1912 German translation of Le Bon's La Psychologie des foules.

This is due to the fact that, when many people gather together to share one common emotion, the total psyche emerging from the group is below the level of the individual psyche. If it is a very large group, the collective psyche will be more like the psyche of an animal, which is the reason why the ethical attitude of large organizations is always dubious. The psychology of a large crowd inevitably sinks to the level of mob psychology (Note: Le Bon, The Crowd)... the presence of so many people together exerts great suggestive force. The individual in a crowd easily becomes the victim of his own suggestibility.\footnote{1098}

To this classical depiction of the psychology of crowds, Jung grafted Lévy-Bruhl: "the mass is swayed by participation mystique."\footnote{1099} In crowds, the behaviour of the 'civilized' West reverted to the level of primitives. For Jung, as for the crowd psychologists, the masses revolved around leaders:

the great liberating deeds of world history have sprung from leading personalities and never from the inert mass, which is at all times secondary and can only be

\footnote{1098} Jung, "Concerning Rebirth," (1939), CW 9, 1, § 225.
\footnote{1099} Ibid., § 226.
Correspondingly, Jung came to a dire assessment of the resulting consequences:

the group, because of its unconsciousness, has no freedom of choice, and so psychic activity runs on in it like an uncontrolled law of nature. There is thus set going a chain reaction that comes to a stop only in catastrophe. The people always long for a hero...\textsuperscript{1101}

French crowd psychology provided a key template for Jung's reading of the social and political developments in Europe from the 1930's onwards. In 1936 he observed:

Through Communism in Russia, through National Socialism in Germany, through Fascism in Italy, the State became all-powerful and claimed its slaves body and soul.\textsuperscript{1102}

In each case, the state had come to embody itself in a leader. In the ensuing years, Jung increasingly generalised what had come to pass in these specific instances as

\textsuperscript{1100} Jung, "The development of the personality," (1934), \textit{CW} 17, § 284.

\textsuperscript{1101} \textit{Ibid.}, § 303.

\textsuperscript{1102} Jung, "Psychology and National Problems," \textit{CW} 18, § 1324.
designating a pervasive Western phenomenon. In 1941 he simply stated "the State is now making an absolute bid for totalitarianism." For Jung, this meant the total incorporation of the individual by the collective. As to the question of what the State consisted in, Jung stated that it "represents mass psychology raised to the n-th power." These developments raised critical questions as to the location of psychology and psychotherapy. Science, Jung claimed, was increasingly being made to serve the practical ends of the social collective. In subsequent years, he became increasingly critical of the role of science in the modern world (while nevertheless insisting upon the scientific status of his psychology). Not only was science increasingly an agent of the state, it itself contributed to the rising collectivism:

Under the influence of natural scientific assumptions, not only the psyche, but also the individual man, and indeed the individual event in general suffer a levelling and a making indecipherable that distorts the picture of reality into a conceptual average.

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1103 Jung, "Psychotherapy in the present," (1945) CW 16, § 222.

1104 Ibid., § 223.

Indeed, Jung went so far as to claim that "one of the chief factors responsible for de-individualisation is natural scientific rationalism, which robs the individual of his foundations and with that his dignity." Jung's negative assessment of the effect of the natural sciences was his contention that they had no place for the individual, or rather, considered the individual only to subsume them under the rule of generality (presumably, analytical psychology, as the science of individuation, was exempted from this judgement).

Jung maintained that socio-political movements were inevitably opposed to religion, as the religious attitude maintained that the individual was ultimately dependent on higher powers. The State, he claimed had come to take the place of God. However, the organized religions were of little help in this regard, as they too seemed to favour collective action:

They do not appear to have heard of the elementary axiom of mass psychology that the individual becomes morally and spiritually inferior in the mass.\(^{1107}\)

The churches then, required the instruction of Le Bon. As to psychotherapy, one option would for it to turn into a

\(^{1106}\) Ibid., § 501, tr. mod.

\(^{1107}\) Ibid., § 536.
handmaiden of the State. In this scenario, the State would insist that

psychotherapy should be nothing but a tool for the production of publically useful assistants. In this way psychotherapy it would become a goal bound technique [Technizismus], whose single aim can be the increasing social efficiency... The psychological science would be degraded to just researches on the possibility of rationalising the psychic apparatus. As to its therapeutic aim, the complete and successful incorporation of the patient into the State machine would be the criterion of cure.\(^{1108}\)

While some social critics would contend that this is an accurate description of the actual role of psychotherapy in the twentieth century, Jung claimed that such an outcome would represent a complete negation of the developments of modern psychotherapy. Consequently, he claimed that the social and political mission of psychotherapy lay in opposing the development of Statism through the only means of resistance possible - the promotion of psychological individuation and direct religious experience. He was at pains to distinguish this from individualism, which he saw

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\(^{1108}\) Jung, "Psychotherapy in the present" (1945) CW 16, § 225, tr. mod.
as simply a morbid reaction to collectivism. The significance of individuation was that it produces a consciousness of human community precisely because it leads to consciousness makes us aware of the unconscious, which unites all and is common to all mankind. Individuation is a becoming one with oneself and at the same time with humanity...\textsuperscript{1109}

It was through individuation that the conflict between the individual and the collective could be brought to a resolution. It was only through individuation that the agglomeration of individuals could be, instead of an anonymous mass, "a conscious community."\textsuperscript{1110} Hence in individuation, there lay the seeds of a new collectivity.

Interestingly enough, these views resulted in concrete suggestions being submitted by the Jung Institute in 1948 to Unesco. The latter had commissioned memoranda from various psychological organisations concerning means of changing mental attitudes. Jung wrote a memorandum, entitled "Techniques of attitude change conductive to world peace," which formed the basis for the submission by the newly founded Jung Institute for discussion at the 1948 Unesco conference on "methods of attitude change conductive to

\textsuperscript{1109} {Ibid.}, § 227, tr. mod.

\textsuperscript{1110} {Ibid.}.
international understanding." However, it was not included in the conference agenda.

Jung's memorandum provides indication of his aspirations for the Jungian movement, and how he saw its significance for the fate of the West. His suggestion was that a number of individuals should undergo Jungian analysis, which would enable a change in attitude. This would form a "leading minority" whose numbers could be augmented by further individuals undergoing analysis and "by suggestion through authority." The latter was essential, as it was only through suggestion that the masses could be effected. This "leading minority" would form a psychological elite, upon whom the health of the collective would depend, since:

the immunity of the nation depends entirely upon the existence of a leading minority immune to the evil and capable of combatting the powerful suggestive effect of seemingly possible wish-fulfilments.

The return of the dominants

Around the time of the second world war, Jung began to utilise the term dominants again. Now, the dominants

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1111 Jung, "Techniques of attitude change conductive to world peace: Memorandum to Unesco," CW 18, § 1393.

1112 Ibid., § 1400.
referred to archetypes that were in a superordinate role, in an individual, or in a culture. In 1944, he stated that when the collective dominants decayed, unconscious individuation processes set in:

At such a time there is bound to be a considerable number of individuals who are possessed by archetypes of a numinous nature that force their way to surface in order to form new dominants.\textsuperscript{1113}

His most extensive treatment of the dominants occurred in 1955-6 in his alchemical work, \textit{Mysterium Conjunctionis}. There, he described the rise and fall of dominants in a manner which is strongly reminiscent of Lamprecht. In Jung's view,

ruling representations, the so-called dominants, change, and the change, which, as has been said, remains concealed to consciousness, is reflected only in dreams... the aging of a psychic dominant is apparent in the fact that it records expresses the totality of the soul in ever-diminishing degree. One can also say that the soul no longer feels wholly contained in the dominant... this loses its fascination and no longer possesses the soul as completely as

\textsuperscript{1113} Jung, \textit{Psychology and Alchemy}, \textit{CW} 12, § 41.
before.\textsuperscript{1114}

This led to a conflict between the old dominant and the contents of the unconscious, which was resolved through the arising of a new dominant. As an example of a collective dominant, Jung cited the Christian world view in Europe in the Middle Ages. The problem that confronted modern Europe was the inescapable need for a new dominant. Yet for Jung, this could only be founded upon the old dominant of Christianity. He asserted that the ego:

always needs a 'mythical' dominant. But such a thing cannot simply be invented and then believed in. Contemplating our own times we must say that the need for an effective dominant was realized to a large extent, but what was offered as such was nothing more than an arbitrary invention of the moment... a real and essentially religious renewal can be based, for us, only on Christianity.\textsuperscript{1115}

It was to this task, the psychological reinvigoration of Christianity, that Jung dedicated the final decades of his life. It need hardly be stated that such a collective

\textsuperscript{1114} Jung, \textit{Mysterium Coniunctionis}, \textit{CW} 14, § 504-5, tr. mod.

\textsuperscript{1115} \textit{Ibid.}, § 520, tr. mod.
revival as Jung envisaged has not come about, as he was clearly aware. On 2nd September, 1960, Jung wrote to Herbert Read:

I asked myself time and again, why there are no men in our epoch, who could see at least, what I was wrestling with. I think it is not mere vanity and desire for recognition on my part, but a genuine concern for my fellow-beings. It is presumably the ancient functional relationship of the medicine man to his tribe, the participation mystique and the essence of the physician's ethos.\textsuperscript{1116}

Apparently, this was not the only letter in this vein that Jung sent at this time. Michael Fordham recalls that in the same year Jung had written a letter to someone in London which was "an account of how he felt he had failed in his mission - he was misunderstood and misrepresented."\textsuperscript{1117} The letter appears to have been one that Jung wrote to Eugene Rolfe, which contained these statements:

I had to understand, that I was unable to make people

\textsuperscript{1116} Jung to Herbert Read, 2 September, 1960, \textit{Letters} 2, pp. 586-9. Jung's wrote this letter in English, and a photograph of the first page was reproduced on the facing page. As the punctuation has clearly been altered in the transcription, I have restored Jung's original punctuation.

\textsuperscript{1117} Fordham, \textit{The Making of an Analyst: A Memoir} p. 119.
see, what I am after. I am practically alone... I have failed in my foremost task, to open people's eyes to the fact, that man has a soul and there is a buried treasure in the field and that our religion and philosophy are in a lamentable state. Why indeed should I continue to exist?\textsuperscript{1118}

Consequently, Fordham flew out to see Jung, and assured him that the Jungians in London were in a strong position to rebut open misunderstandings and were striving to further recognition of his work.\textsuperscript{1119} To this, Jung looked at Fordham as if I were a poor fool who did not know a thing and dismissed him. On reflection, Fordham stated that his comments had been on a superficial level, and that had he spoken more profoundly, he would have had to tell Jung "that it was the delusion of being a world saviour that made him feel a failure - I had not the stature to do that."\textsuperscript{1120} However, more can be said than this.

It is possible to link Jung's admission of failure to his letter to Herbert Read, which articulates the culmination of his understanding of the relation of the

\textsuperscript{1118} Jung to Eugene Rolfe, 13th November, 1960, in Eugene Rolfe, \textit{Encounter with Jung}, p. 158. Fordham identified the recipient as a member of Analytical Psychology Club in London, which Rolfe was.

\textsuperscript{1119} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{1120} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 120.
primitive to modern, the individual to the collective and the import of analytical psychology for the West. For Jung, in primitive societies, the relation of the medicine man to the tribe was not simply a contingent or arbitrary social arrangement, but corresponded to an archetypal necessity. What was required was to respond the same necessity in modern manner - the result being analytical psychology. For it to succeed in this task, it required the full-scale recognition of the West. Despite ongoing efforts in this direction, it is safe to say that it is unlikely that it will ever achieve this. Judging by these late letters, in Jung's own estimation, analytical psychology had failed in its social and political mission.
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