HOMERIC MORALITY

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TO
IAN AND MY PARENTS
Abstract

This thesis is an attempt to answer two questions on Homeric morality. One is whether the Homeric gods are concerned with 'justice' in human society and another is what mechanism controls the social behaviour of Homeric man. Observation of human and divine behaviour, and lexical examination of terms which are considered to reflect some moral ideas, are the main grounds of argument. Part I mainly deals with the problem of morality, or rather immorality/amorality, of the gods. Part II concentrates on the morality of Homeric man. In Part I, it is shown that the gods distribute good and bad fortune to men not in response to their moral behaviour, but as required by fate, and therefore do not function as the guardians of justice in the human world. Men, however, believe that the gods are concerned with human morality. Part II describes various forces and motivations that affect human behaviour, such as fate, honour, revenge, shame, respect and pity. It is shown that human behaviour is restrained not only by man's faith in the moral gods, but by an assortment of many different forces, social and emotional.
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Introduction

This thesis is an attempt to answer two questions on Homeric morality. One is whether the Homeric gods are concerned with 'justice' in human society (this question inevitably calls for the definition of 'justice' in Homer which is dealt with in Chapter 5) and another is what mechanism controls social behaviour of Homeric man. Although this work falls into two parts and each part mainly deals with either of the questions, the two parts are closely connected and have many overlapping elements. While pursuing these questions, I have examined a number of passages from the Iliad and the Odyssey to form my own views of specific problems first, and then to compare them with my predecessors' views most often in footnotes. Although my discoveries are mostly nothing other than rediscoveries of my predecessors' discoveries, I have been able to take advantage of a dissertation solely devoted to these questions which has allowed me to discuss some major problems in the subject at a greater length than they have. By presenting and discussing all relevant passages in each problem, I have striven to give firmer grounds for supporting or criticizing their views which are often only briefly touched upon or based upon a highly selective collection of evidence. How far I am successful in reinforcing, modifying, refuting or coordinating traditional views of traditional problems is for the readers to judge.

'Morality', of course, is a very general term and may require definition. In this work, I use the terms 'morality' and 'moral' rather loosely, in reference to the way men and gods behave in their dealings with others at one time, and at another in reference
to their system of values by which they define what they should or should not do. Some readers may complain at this point that by defining the terms this way, I have already taken a stance against B. Snell and his followers who do not think Homeric man is capable of consciously choosing whether to behave in one way or another. Snell says:\(^1\)

... Homer's man does not yet regard himself as the source of his own decisions; that development is reserved for tragedy.

Homer lacks a knowledge of the spontaneity of the human mind; he does not realize that decisions of the will, or any impulses or emotions, have their origin in man himself. What is true of the events in the epic holds also for the feelings, the thoughts and the wishes of the characters: they are inextricably linked with the gods.

I will be the last to deny that there is much truth in his statement. I have even produced a good example of divine control of the human mind in Chapter 3 where I describe Athena's total control of the behaviour and psychology of Penelope and her suitors. However, this is a view from above, from the view-point of the gods, the poet or his audience/readers. Homeric men themselves will, though they probably think that the gods are ultimately responsible for everything, seek revenge or ask a compensation from the person who has harmed them himself instead of the gods — they will never dream of suing the gods for the damage done by any

\(^1\) *The Discovery of the Mind* (tr. T. G. Rosenmeyer, Oxford 1953), p. 31.
human beings. Although I am not getting into the problem of 'free will' except in passing, I believe that I have made it sufficiently clear that Homeric man is expected by his society to be capable of abiding by certain social codes and, in failing that, is regarded as responsible for the consequences. I have tried to describe what fulfills the functions of our conscience in Homeric man, namely, what restrains him from anti-social behaviour. Whether it is conceived as an external or internal force is not a matter of my chief concern. However, I must point out that certain human feelings, such as $\alpha i\beta o\varsigma$ and $\varepsilon\lambda e\varsigma$, are never explicitly described as a result of divine intervention (cf. Chapter 9). Therefore I have some reservation in accepting Snell's statement that Homer completely lacks a knowledge of the spontaneity of the human mind.

Finally, the term 'we' may also require definition, because when I say 'we', someone may complain that I have not been brought up in the Western system of moral values and therefore, strictly speaking, I cannot identify 'my' views with those of Westerners, the most likely readers of this work because of the language in which it is written. Again, I use the term in a rather loose way. By 'we', I sometimes mean 'we who are familiar with English/a Western language' when I talk about English/Western expressions or conventions. At other times, I mean 'we readers of Homer' or 'we human beings in general' with no strong association with a specific culture or time. But most of the time when I say 'we', I do not mean 'we Westerners', or 'we Orientals', or 'we classicists', but 'we citizens of the modern world in which a global consensus is gradually being formed on the matter of what is just and what is unjust under direct and indirect, crossed
influence of major religions, philosophy and science, and through shared experience of sufferings and prosperity'. We have come to talk more and more about 'our planet' and less and less about 'my country' and 'their country'. It is my conviction that in this world of ours, the classics of every part of the world, including Homer, is 'our' classics for any member of humanity, more so than ever in human history.
Part I    Morality of the Homeric Gods
Chapter 1 Moral functions attributed to the gods

As many critics have observed, the Homeric gods do not appear to be interested in morality or justice in the human world.\(^1\) Moreover, they are notorious for deceiving each other or committing adultery among themselves or with mortals. Still we cannot help counting religion as the basis of human morality in Homer, because we find a number of passages in which it is said (mostly by human characters) that Zeus, \(\theta\epsilon\delta\varsigma\) or \(\theta\epsilon\omicron\iota\) watch over human morality in some ways.\(^2\)

In this and following chapters, we will examine such passages in order to see what sort of moral functions are expected by men to be fulfilled by the gods and which ones are actually fulfilled by them. By doing so, we hope we will find the relation between human and divine morality in Homer.

Zeus and other gods

We examine the cases with Zeus and the ones with the gods in general together, because, when Homeric man talks about Zeus, he often thinks of him as the representative of the will of


2 cf. B. Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind*, p. 25: 'And could anyone deny that, when all is said and done, Zeus upholds the sacred order of the world?'; G. S. Kirk, *The Songs of Homer* (Cambridge 1962), p. 291 referring to the *Odyssey* in contrast with the *Iliad*: '... the gods are frequently referred to as rewarding the just and punishing the unjust ....'; H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1971, 2nd ed. 1983) p. 27: 'He [Zeus] defends the established order (*dike*) by punishing mortals whose injustices disturb it....'
the gods as a whole. On the other hand, when he talks about 'the
gods' he cannot but have in mind the pantheon with Zeus as its
head.3 Hence we often find such expressions as 'Zeus and other
gods'.

The interchangeability of 'Zeus' and 'the gods' is well
illustrated in the following passage:

λαοὶ δὲ ἀρχαντα θεοὶ δὲ χεῖρας δύοσχοι
δώσα της εἰσοεχεν Ἀχαῖον τε Τρώαν τε
"Zeus pater, I δῇ δέ μεθέμμεθα κόσμοτε μέγιστο,
ὅπποτέρας τάδε ζεύγα μετ' ἀμφότεροι συμπέρασκε,
τὸν δὲς ἀποφύλλενον δώσα δέμου "Δίωσ εἶςω
ὑμῶς ἀδ φιλότητα καὶ ὧρα πιστὰ γενέσθαι" (Il. 3. 318-23)

We can safely assume that, in effect, the Achaeans and Trojans
all prayed to Zeus — above all in the capacity of Horkios4 — but it
did not matter to the poet either to refer to Zeus as himself or as
'the gods'. Similarly we can see 'Zeus' and 'πᾶσι θεοῖσι' exchanged
at Il. 7. 411-412 and Od. 17. 50-51 = 59-60.5

Zeus Xeinios

The moral function of the gods, especially Zeus, referred to
most often is that of the guardian of hospitality, that of Zeus
Xeinios. In the Iliad, Menelaus appeals to Zeus Xeinios for the
punishment of Paris who betrayed Menelaus' hospitality by
abducting Helen (3. 351-354) and rebukes the Trojans for not
having feared the wrath of Zeus Xeinios (13. 624-5). This is the
ultimate justification for the expedition of the Achaeans and for

4 See note 14.
which Diomedes can confidently declare that they have come with a god: σὺν γὰρ θεῷ εἰληθοῦσιν (II. 9. 49). They have also been given a good omen at Aulis for the outcome of the war (II. 2. 324-9).6

In the Odyssey, Zeus as Xeinios is referred to more often. It is said, 'πρὸς γὰρ Διὸς εἰσὶν ἀπαντεῖς ἔξινοι τε πτωχοὶ τε,' by Nausicaa (6. 207-208) and by Eumaeus (14. 57-58). The latter also says that he entertains his guest (the disguised Odysseus) because 'Διὰ ξείνιν δείσας αὐτῶν τ' ἔλεαρων.' (14. 389). It is notable that the humanitarian motivation goes side by side with the divine sanction. Similarly, when Menelaus scolds his herald for asking his master whether he should welcome the strangers or send them away, he reminds his herald that they themselves have benefited from the hospitality of others during their journey and hints that Zeus can change their fortune again (Od. 4. 31-35). A purely human sense of reciprocity and the fear of divine sanction are seen side by side.

The belief that Zeus protects strangers and guests and punishes those who do not observe the rule of hospitality seems to deter potential offenders. In his false story (but without doubt a credible one), Odysseus in disguise says that an Egyptian king protected him because 'Διὸς ὑπίζετο μὴν / ξείνιον, δὲ τε μάλιστα νεμεσσάται κακὰ ἔργα' (Od. 14. 283-4). It is interesting to see here that the authority of Zeus Xeinios is thought to be valid even in non-Greek societies. It is consistent with the recurrent theme of a

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6 A passage quoted by Plato (Alcib. ii 149 d) located at II. 8. 550-2 also implies the wrath of the gods at the Trojans being in the wrong:

θέσειν τῆς δ' οὖ πο τε θεῷ μᾶκαρες δατέουσα,

οὐδ' ἐθελον μᾶλα γὰρ σοιν ἀπήχετο Τλίον ἱπη,

καὶ Πρίαμος καὶ λαὸς ἐγκυμονεῖν Πρώμοιο,

though it overgeneralizes the situation. Some gods — Apollo, Artemis, Leto, Aphrodite, Ares and Xanthus (cf. II. 20. 38-40), at least — are in favour of the Trojans.
traveller just arrived in a foreign land wondering if the residents there are 'φιλόξευνοι καὶ σφυν νόσος ἐστὶ θεουργὸς' (Od. 6. 121; 9. 176; 13. 202 cf. 8. 576). The phrase virtually equates guest-welcoming to god-fearing. The underlying thought is that travellers are supposed to be protected by the gods everywhere in the world.

When Antinous has thrown a foot-stool at Odysseus (in disguise), Odysseus curses him saying (Od. 17. 475-6):

\[\deltaλλεν ποὺ πτωχᾶν γε θεοὶ καὶ θρωνύς ελεύθερον.\]

'Αντίνοον πρὸ γέμαν τέλος θανάτου κιχαίη.

The syntax is conditional, but it obviously alludes to the widely-believed Zeus Xeinios. Therefore this threat is strong enough to make other suitors reproach Antinous (17. 483-7):

\[\'Αντίνος, οὐ μὲν καὶ θαλαίς διόσπρην ἀλήθεια,\]

\[οὐλήμεν, εἰ δὴ ποὺ τὸς ἐπουράνιος θεὸς ἔστι,\]

\[καὶ τε θεὸς θεοῖον ἕοκτεν ἀλλοπαθικά,\]

\[παντῶσι τελεθομένες, ἐπιστραφάν πάλης,\]

\[ἀφροίταις ἰβραύν τε καὶ εὐστρεφήν ἐφορᾶσθε.\]

This is one of the most explicit doctrines in Homer of the moral concern of the gods with human behaviour. It must be noted, however, that unlike Eumaeus or Menelaus, the suitors, who do not have humanitarian motivation to treat visitors kindly, ignore this doctrine, though they are obviously aware of it (17. 485-7). The awe of the gods does not seem to work efficiently without the support of purely human goodwill. Do the gods, then, actually walk around in disguise to punish arrogant men and reward god-fearing ones in Homer?

After having entertained Odysseus splendidly, the Phaeacians send him home in their ship. Before his departure, they pray to Zeus so that they can safely send him home (Od. 13.
51-2), because escorting a guest home is part of good hospitality (cf. *Od.* 8. 544-5, 14. 517, 19. 315-6). On this particular occasion, however, it incites the wrath of Poseidon for his personal grudge against Odysseus and they are going to be punished for it, and it is, surprisingly to the believers in Zeus Xeiniós, on the recommendation of Zeus himself (13. 154-158). Being pious towards Zeus Xeiniós does not help them at all.

When Odysseus and his companions have escaped from the cave of the Cyclops, he taunts the giant from his ship now far out at sea (*Od.* 9. 477-9):

καὶ λίγην σε γ' ἵμαλη κατέρρευσα κακὰ ἄγνα
σχέτλε, ἐπεὶ θείων οἶχ ἀγ' ὦσ· οἰχὶ ὀδόν
ἐσθέμεναι· πῶς Ζεὺς πᾶσακαὶ θεό θάλα.

He says that the Cyclops has been punished by Zeus and other gods. Certainly, he requested hospitality from the Cyclops appealing to the authority of the gods and Zeus Xeiniós (*Od.* 9. 269-271). He and his companions also prayed to Zeus when two of their comrades were being eaten by the giant (9. 294-5). However, the poet does not describe Zeus on Mt. Olympos hearing their cry nor allows Odysseus to have an encouraging omen from the gods. The hero is left completely on his own to overcome this deadly crisis with his own courage, strength and resources. His desperate situation is described most effectively at 9. 295 even as he is praying to Zeus:

ὅρχαλθε ἐχε θυμόν.
which is painfully ironical for the 'πολυμηχανός' Odysseus.7 There is no sign of divine aid. Odysseus manages to save his companions and himself with his own device. If he says that Athena may grant him glory (9. 317), that δαιμών gave him great courage (9. 381), or the Cyclops was punished by the gods, it only reflects his piety to attribute his hard-won success to them. But we all know that the gods have played no part in this incident. Even Odysseus himself, recalling it later, says to his companions that their successful escape was due to his 'ἀδρετή, βουλή and νόσος' (Od. 12. 211-2) and says to himself — therefore this must be what he honestly believes — that his 'μῆτις' rescued him out of the cave of the Cyclops (20. 20-1). Moreover, his justifiable defence against the Cyclops' monstrosity incites the wrath of Poseidon who is going to send him a host of ordeals over ten years. Zeus, though credited by Odysseus for his successful revenge against the Cyclops, is later said by the same hero to have not accepted his thanksgiving but devised the ruin of his ship and companions (9. 550-5). Zeus does nothing which we would expect from a 'moral' god, such as to remind the furious Poseidon that his son not only violated the code of hospitality, but also insulted the gods by boasting that (Od. 9. 275-6):

οὐ γὰρ Κύκλωπες Διὸς ἀληχόου ἀλέγουσιν
οἰδὲ θεῶν μακάρων ἐπεὶ ἡ πολύφερτο εἶμεν.

No human character would be spared from deadly divine punishment for such a boast, as we know well from the examples  

of Niobe (Il. 24. 602-9) and Ajax the son of Oileus (Od. 4. 499-510), but the Cyclops seems to be somehow immune from divine anger. He is punished only in the eye of Odysseus; the narrative itself, i.e. the omniscient perspective of the poet, does not show us the Olympian gods at all interested in telling him off.

Zeus' own son, Heracles, is also said, in the digression to recount the origin of Odysseus' bow, to have killed his guest once (Od. 21. 27-8):

\[ \delta \mu \nu \chi \epsilon \omega \nu \varepsilon \alpha \tau \alpha \nu \kappa \alpha \tau \varepsilon \kappa \tau \varepsilon \alpha \nu \delta \varepsilon \alpha \ ο\delta \varepsilon \alpha \ ο\delta \varepsilon \kappa \tau \varepsilon \zeta \varepsilon \varepsilon \nu \]  

Since the word 'σχετλίος' often has a reproachful tone, we may take this passage as the poet's moral comment. Heracles killed his guest in his own house and it was a monstrous deed. The poet, however, does not tell us that he was punished for it by Zeus Xeinios. Instead, we are told in the Iliad that he died due to Hera's wrath, which can be nothing but her old grudge against his mother Alcmene and Zeus' love for her (18. 117-9):

8 Another interesting example is Heracles whose case we will examine next. He is not punished for competing with the gods in archery while another human challenger, Eurytus, is punished by Apollo (Od. 8. 224-8).

9 e.g. Il. 5. 403, 'σχετλίος, αλεν αλτρός ...'; Il. 8. 361, 'σχετλίος, αλεν αλτρός ...'; Il. 16. 203-4, 'σχετλίε ... ναλέες'; Il. 17. 150; Il. 24. 33, 'σχετλίοι, δηλίμωνες ...'; Od. 4. 729, 5. 118, 9. 351, 478, 12. 279, 23. 150. The fact that σχετλίος is often coupled with other reproaching terms may mean, however, that the word itself is not necessarily a word of reproach. For an investigation into its origin, see F. E. Horowitz, 'Greek skhéllos, Sanskrit kṣatriyah, and the Indo-European image of the warrior' in Studia Linguistica 29 (1975) 99-109. He suggests on Il. 22. 38-45 (pp. 103) that 'skhéllos in this passage means "warrior", in the fullest sense of the word: one who overcomes all resistance, who is restrained by no will but his own, and who is best exemplified by Achilles in the Iliad, just as he is by Indra in the Rigveda.' See also E.A. Havelock, The Greek Concept of Justice (Cambridge, Mass. 1978), p. 183: '... schetlos and atashalos, to which it is difficult to attach any consistent meaning more precise than "excessive" or "extravagant", "wanton" or "reckless", or, as we say, "shocking", a term which lacks reference to any objective standard. They denote persons or actions which exceed the bounds of what is allowable.' Tentatively, I translate (when I do) σχετλίος as 'appalling', 'impossible', etc.
We also know that, despite the murder of his guest (if it was not the poet's ad hoc allegation), he remained 'dearest' to Zeus until the end of his life and even afterwards, because he is now a son-in-law to Hera and raised to the status of divinity, though his ghost is seen by Odysseus in the Underworld (*Od*. 11. 601-4):

\[
\text{Tān dē met' elasvάpria bǐn Ἠρακλείνι.}
\]

\[
\text{etōlov autós dē met' deánptovai théoi.}
\]

\[
\text{πέπεται ἐν θάλισ καὶ ἔχει καλλίσφωρον Ἡθύν}
\]

\[
\text{παιδα Διὸς μεγάλου καὶ Ἡθύς χρυσόπεδου.}
\]

There is, after all, no sign of the wrath and punishment of Zeus Xeiniós. Is it not the case, then, that those who would feel indignation at Heracles' behaviour at all, if any, are only the audience? And the poet knew it. Since the hero is never going to be punished, he had to make his own moral comment to satisfy his audience who were apparently more morality-conscious than the Olympian gods.

As we have seen from the examples above, the 'moral' record of 'the gods of guests and beggars' is not very splendid. Zeus Xeiniós is certainly recognized among men as the protector of guests. The belief usually works as a guarantee of hospitality for visitors to foreign lands, and pious men are grateful to Zeus for his protection. In the narrative, however, we do not see the gods themselves standing up for such blameless hosts as the Phaeacians against Poseidon's personal grudge, nor punishing murderers of their guests, like the Cyclops and Heracles. The only possible example of divine punishment of offenders against ξεινία
are the fall of Troy, though not directly depicted in Homer, as the result of the abduction of Helen by Paris,\textsuperscript{10} and Odysseus' successful revenge against the suitors with obvious divine aid (especially from Athena).\textsuperscript{11} We will discuss the implications of these instances in detail later.

Zeus Hiketesios

Zeus is Hiketesios as well as Xeinios and his functions as one or the other are often overlapping. Odysseus claims that he and his companions are 'ικέται' to the Cyclops (\textit{Od.} 9. 269) when he requests ξεινίον and he says, 'Zeus δ' επιτιμήτωρ ικέταων τε ξείνων τε' (270). When Odysseus wakes up on Ithaca and mistakenly thinks that he has been deserted on a foreign land by the Phaeacians, it is to Zeus Hiketesios that he prays for their punishment (\textit{Od.} 13. 213). They have not, of course, deceived him and Zeus is not said to have heard nor ignored the prayer.

Penelope reproaches Antinous at \textit{Od.} 16. 421-32 for two offences against Zeus Hiketesios: he does not care for ικέται and he is plotting the murder of the son of Odysseus who once helped Antinous' father as a suppliant. Being ungrateful to one's benefactor on the side of a suppliant is, Penelope implies, as much against divine law (423 'οὐδ' ὀσίη') as rejecting suppliants. Her argument does not move the suitors. Neither does Zeus himself

\textsuperscript{10} cf. E. Ehnmark, \textit{The Idea of God in Homer}, p. 100; Lloyd-Jones, \textit{The Justice of Zeus}, pp. 7-8; G. S. Kirk, \textit{The Iliad: A Commentary} (Cambridge 1985) on \textit{II.} 4. 31-49: '... this [the fall of Troy] has been made inevitable by Paris' offence against hospitality, which is protected by Zeus ξεινίος himself, and by the Trojans' condoning of it by receiving him and Helen.'

show any reaction to the suitors' treatment of 'îκέται' except, as in
the case of ξεινία, the fact that they do get killed in the end may be
interpreted as their punishment. Whether it can be taken as a
divine punishment or not will be discussed later.

Zeus is not the only god in whose name men can supplicate,
and other gods may be chosen in accordance with the occasion.
For example, Telemachus appeals to the Ithacans to fear the anger
of the gods at the suitors' misdeeds and check them from
inflicting nuisance on his house, by calling upon Zeus and Themis,
the goddess of the assembly (Od. 2. 66-9; cf. Il. 20.4):

\[
θεῶν ὑποδείσατε μὴν;
\]
\[
μὴ τιμητατρέψωσιν διασφάλισμα κακὰ ἔργα
\]
\[
λόγῳ τινες Ζηνὸς Ὀλυμπίων ἤδε Θεμίστος;
\]
\[
ἡ τι ἀνθρώπων ἄγορας ἤμεν λιῆς ἤδε καθῆς:
\]
The appeal fails to move the suitors, though it earns pity from
others.

When, as a member of the embassy, Phoenix tries to
persuade Achilles to give up his wrath and return to the battle, he
appeals to the goddesses called 'Λιταί' whom we do not hear of
anywhere else (Il. 9. 502-512):

\[
καὶ γὰρ τε Λιταί εἶναι Δίὸς κοίραι μεγάλοια
\]
\[
χαλὰ τε μυτητὲ τε παραβιάσατε τὰ ὀφθαλμά
\]
\[
αὐτὰ τε καὶ μετὸπος "Ἀτης ἀλέγουσι καῦσαι.
\]
\[
ἡδὲ Ἀτη σεβασμὸ τε καὶ ἀρτίτος, οὐκεκα πᾶσαι
\]
\[
pολλὰ ὑπεκπροθέει φθάνει δὲ τε πᾶσιν ἐνὶ αἷον
\]
\[
βλάπτουσιν αὐτούποισ αἰ 8 ἐξεκέντονται ὁμοσα
\]
\[
δὲ μὲν τι αἰσχύνεται κοίρας Δίος ἀμφοτέρος
\]
\[
τὰ δὲ μὲν ἄρα ἤμεον καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖν ἐικομένῳ
\]
\[
δὲ δὲ καὶ ἀνθίπται καὶ τε στερεῷς ἀποείη
\]

21
Δίται are certainly novel goddesses, but their identification as 'Zeus' daughters' reveals the nature of this passage. This is only an allegorical or mythological retelling of the good old story of Zeus Hiketesios as the guardian of suppliants. However, whether Zeus sends "Ἄτη to men as retaliation for slighted Δίται or not is quite another matter. We will come back to this question as we discuss the function of ἀτη later. Here we can only say that we have no obvious example of Zeus in his own person dispatching "Ἄτη to punish those who slighted suppliants.

Although, generally speaking, the gods seem rather slow in hearing the call of suppliants for protection and therefore they can be disappointed sometimes, there is one remarkable example of an immediate divine action in response to human appeal to 'ἰκετής' status. After drifting in the sea for two days and nights, Odysseus lands on Scheria through the mouth of a river. As he swims into it, he prays to the river-god to accept him as his suppliant (Od. 5. 447-450):

\[
\text{ἀλλόος μὴν ἔστι καὶ ἄλλαττος θεός,}
\]
\[
\text{ἀνθέραι ἐς πάσα ίκται ἀλώμενος, οἷς καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν}
\]
\[
\text{οὐν τε βόων σά τε γούσα ικάνω πολλά μογήμας.}
\]
\[
\text{ἄλλ' ἔλεαρε, διὰς ἱκέτης εἰ τοί εὐχαιρεῖν.}
\]

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12 Scholion bΤ on 502 gives as one of the possible reasons why the Litai are said to be Zeus' daughters: '... ἄδι τὸ "Zeus ἐπιτυμήσας ίκται" (κ. 270)'. Cf. ed. H. Erbse, Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem II (Berlin 1971); This is, in fact, the only example of supplication in the Iliad appealing to the authority of Zeus. Cf. V. Pedrick, 'Supplication in the Iliad and the Odyssey', TAPA 112 (1982) 129ff. Pedrick does not discuss the allegory of the Litai in her article on the ground that 'The retribution envisioned is otherwise alien to both epics, and suits Phoenix's arguments rather than any theology' (132, n. 29).
Then the river checks its stream at once to let him in, without being annoyed about the possible complaint from Poseidon or being prompted by Athena who, as we know from the passages before and after this (5. 427, 437, 491, etc.), is apparently accompanying him secretly. Odysseus appeals to the god's sympathy as well as to his status as suppliant. This seems to be a standard tactic of a suppliant, as we see Priam also supplicates to Achilles saying (Il. 24. 503):


\[
\text{διλ' αἰδείω θεοίς: Ἀχιλῆι αἰτῶ τ' ἐλέησον}
\]

So, we have at least one clear example of a god caring for suppliants. We do not know for certain, however, that Zeus Hiketesios always stands by suppliants and avenges them on their behalf. It may be for this uncertainty that suppliants appeal to the emotion of those to whom they supplicate as well as the authority of Hiketesios.\(^{13}\)

Zeus Horkios

Another major function of Zeus is that of Horkios, though the title itself is never mentioned in Homer.\(^{14}\) The Achaeans and the Trojans make a truce before the duel of Menelaus and Paris,

\[^{13}\text{cf. J. Roisman, 'Some social conventions and deviations in Homeric society', in Acta Classica 25 (1982), 35-41; He observes (p. 36): '... not every supplication in the epics ended successfully .... Nausikaa advised Odysseus to come to Arete as a suppliant. She would help him, he was told, if she liked him (Od. 6. 313-5).' 'The success of the supplication, then, was ultimately dependent upon the will of the supplicated.'}\]

\[^{14}\text{But cf. Διός ἄρκια Ι. 3. 107. G. S. Kirk, The Iliad, on ΙΙ. 3. 276-8 thinks, though he mentions this phrase, that Zeus is called upon 'not specifically as ἄρκιος', but 'as supreme and highest god.' He also points out that 'Zeus is involved in his local form, envisaged as overseeing events at Troy from his sanctuary on Mount Ida.' I would rather say that Zeus is called upon as supreme god and ἄρκιος and god of Mt. Ida which should be a closer image to this complex divinity as his believers see in their mind's eye. And I believe that it is also this complexity that Kirk tries to draw our attention to in his note.}\]
sacrificing one sheep each for the Earth, the Sun, and Zeus (II. 3. 103-4) and they pray to Zeus and other gods (II. 3. 107 'Διός θρήνα'; 298 'Zeus and other gods'; 318 'the gods'; 320 'Ζεύς πατέρα'. For the interchangeability of 'Zeus' and 'the gods' see above.). When Menelaus has been shot by Pandarus and the truce is thereby broken, Agamemnon says that Zeus will destroy Troy himself, if not the Achaeans, for their deception (II. 4. 164-8) and declares that the victory of the Achaeans is now certain (II. 4. 234-9):\(^{15}\)

\begin{quote}
'Αργείων μή πώ πι μεθέπε θυήδασ δλιτής
οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ ζευνέσσαι πατήρ Zeiς ἐσσετ θρήνας,
ἀλλ' οἷῷ περ πρότεροι ὑπὲρ θρία δηλήσαντα,
τῶν ἄνω αὐτῶν πέρενα χρόνα γιντες ἔθουταν,
ἡμέρις αὖθι δόλυνσι τε φίλας καὶ νύμα πέκναι
ἀβαμεν ἐν νήσουν, ἐπὶ πολλὴτριον θλιμεν.
\end{quote}

Since we know the result of the war, it is possible to argue that the Trojans are punished for their breach of the truce. However, if Zeus is also Ξεινίος, the city of Troy must have been already condemned by the breach of ξεινίη by Paris. Still, it is certainly possible to argue that, since the abduction of Helen is in such a remote past and therefore lacks dramatic immediacy, this episode of the broken truce has been introduced to put the Trojans in the wrong within the scope of the Iliad.

On the other hand, if we look at the details of the incident, we are faced with a serious question on the function of Zeus Horkios. After the two armies have prayed to Zeus to make their truce, the poet reports that Zeus did not accomplish it (II. 3. 302):

\begin{quote}
'Ως ἔφαν, οἷς ἀρν πὼ σφυν ἐπεκραίανε Κρονίων.
\end{quote}

\(^{15}\) cf. II. 4. 270-1.
and so says Hector at II. 7. 69. Moreover, it is Zeus himself who sends Athena to cause the truce to be broken (II. 4. 68-72). If it is the case, it is impossible to argue with any seriousness that Zeus is the guardian of oaths. Neither does the poet get himself into the absurdity of describing Zeus as being indignant at the breakers of the truce. What we see here is not the portrait of Zeus Horkios as the defender of justice. All we see is the pitiable irony of human beings swearing by Zeus, naively believing that he will protect the honest and punish liars, without knowing that they are being led into their ruin through the trick of the very same god.

This is the only example of broken oaths in the Iliad. The truce for the burial of the dead made at 7. 411-3 is kept in peace. The audience is expected to believe Agamemnon's oath (that he has not had intercourse with Briseis) to Zeus, the Earth, the Sun, and the Erinyes (19. 258-65). The oaths to Zeus at 7. 76-86 before the combat between Ajax and Hector and at 10. 329-331 of Hector concerning the reward to Dolon both become void because their conditions are never met.

In the Odyssey, the most common formula of an oath made to Zeus is to him as Xeinios rather than Horkios

\[
lττις υπὸ Ζεὺς πρῶτα θεῶν δεξίθη περὶ τραπεζά
\]

\[
lττις Ἠ Ὀδυσσῆς οἰμόνος, ἐν ἀφυκών
\]

(14. 158-9, 17. 155-6, 19. 303-4, 20. 230-1), in each case said by a guest of the household of Odysseus. We can assume that guests tend to make an oath to Zeus Xeinios under whose protection they are rather than the god in any other capacities.

25
In two other cases of oaths in the *Odyssey*, Zeus is not explicitly called upon. When Telemachus bids Eurycleia to remain silent about his departure from Ithaca, she makes an oath to 'θεος' (2. 377). When the companions of Odysseus make an oath not to harm the cattle of Helios before landing on their island (and this is going to be the only oath broken in the epic), it is not even said that they have sworn by any divinity (12. 304):

 αὐτὰρ ἐπελθοῦσαν τε τελευτηδὲν τε τὸν ὄρκον

though we can probably assume that it has been made either to Zeus or the gods in general.

After this oath is broken, i.e. when the companions have slaughtered the cattle and started cooking their meat, there appears an ominous miracle (12. 394-6):

 τῶν 8 αὐτῶν ἐπείτα θεὸς πέρα προῆγαν

δύτηος μὲν μὲν κρέας 8 ὀμφαὶ ἀξέλοια μεμύκει

ἐπταλέα τε καὶ ὀμφαὶ βοῶν 8 ὃς γέγενες φανῇ

This can be taken as a reaction of the gods against the breach of the oath. However, Helios, who is a god of oaths himself, does not seem to be annoyed about the broken oath itself. He appeals to Zeus and other gods for the punishment of Odysseus' companions, not as the breakers of an oath, but as the destroyers of his property (12. 377-383). Zeus promises Helios to smash up their ship (12. 387-8) and he fulfils it (12. 403-419). Later Odysseus says that he was hated by Zeus and Helios (19. 275-6), obviously because of his companions' disastrous feasts, and not because of the breach of their oath as such for which Odysseus himself is not responsible. Helios' personal grudge must be the one and sufficient reason for the death of the companions and the wreck of their ship.
In conclusion, we must say that Zeus is not acting as Horkios in Homer at all. It is only men who believe in Zeus and other gods as the guardians of oaths. The gods not only often fail to acknowledge a breach of an oath, but sometimes even provoke it deliberately.16

Protection of the dead

Another important function attributed to the gods in general is to protect the dead and secure their right of burial. Homeric man takes the dead seriously, probably much more than we do, because of his awe of the gods as their guardians.17 Hence, a funeral is a good enough reason for a brief truce (II. 7. 408-13, 24. 656-8). The unburied dead can appear as ghosts to demand their burial as Patroclus' ghost does in Achilles' dream (II. 23. 71). Even if we do not believe in the reality of the ghost in the dream, this episode shows how Achilles conceives the situation of the dead yet unburied. When Odysseus and his companions meet Elpenor's ghost in the Underworld, he also demands his funeral appealing to the authority of the gods (Od. 11. 72-3):

16 At the end of the list of μετὰ τῶν to the oath made by Agamemnon at Il. 3. 276-91, we find a pair of chthonic deities who are supposed to punish perjury in the Underworld (278-9): "... καὶ οἱ ὑπὲρερχεν καμάντας / διηρέουσος τίνωσθον, δῆς κ' ἐπικοροκον ὀμόσσην." In another oath of the same hero at Il. 19. 258-65, the same function is attributed to the Erinyes (259-60): "...Ερινύες, αὐτὴ ὑπὸ γαλαν ἀπόροσον τίνωσται, δῆς κ' ἐπικοροκον ὀμόσσην." Punishment after death is testified in Od. 11. 576ff, but there is no evidence for punishment for perjury. In the world where the skill of theft and perjury is believed to be a divine gift (Od. 19. 395-7), it is difficult to imagine such a fate of liars after death. Can Hermes be so malicious to lead as Psychopompus his protégés to the place of their punishment after their death? In the Hymn, he does perjure, but carefully chooses a less significant object (προδύραια) than the Styx as his 'μέγας δροκάς' (383). For the views that the gods do not tolerate perjury, E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, p. 32; M. I. Finlay, The World of Odysseus (London 1977), p. 109.

17 However, he is almost entirely free of any fear of the dead themselves. cf. R. S. J. Garland, 'Geras Thanonton: An investigation into the claims of the Homeric dead', BICS 29 (1982), 70-1.
The gods do seem to be concerned with the right of the dead. Hector, mortally wounded by Achilles, pleads with the victor to return his body to his family for his burial, only to be told that his body will be fed to dogs and birds. To this pitiless reply, Hector warns Achilles (Il. 22. 358-360):

> ἔστιν ἐὰν ἑλέσωσιν ἐνὶ Σκαυρῷ πόλιν.

Achilles, knowing his fate well himself, is unmoved (365-6) and not affected by the last two lines. However, the first line quoted above soon comes true. When Achilles has been maltreating Hector's body day after day by dragging it behind his chariot, the gods (except Hera, Athena, and Poseidon) are said to pity Hector and to be considering an actual interference (Il. 24. 23-4):

> τὸν δὲ ἐλεαρεσκοῦν μάκαρες θεοὶ ἑλορὰντες,
> κλέψαι δὲ ὀμίσεικουν ἐδόκοιτον Ἀργεφάντην.

Apollo, the constant patron of Hector, is, of course, furious (24. 33ff) and says Achilles should fear the gods' wrath (24. 53-4):

> μὴ διαβότης ἔπει διοδοτέωμεν αἱ ἡμῖν
> καθὼς γὰρ δὴ γάϊαν δεικτέει μενεάτων.

By this Zeus, if not Hera, is moved, and he summons Thetis to Olympos and bids her carry his message to Achilles that the gods, especially Zeus himself, are angry at him (24. 113-5; cf. 134-6):

> ἔστιν τὰ σεισμάτα οἱ εἰπεῖ θεοὶ: ἐμὲ δὲ ἐξόχα πάντων
> ἀθανάτων κεχωλόταθι, ὅτι φρεσὶ μανομένῃν
> "Εκτὸς ἔχει παρὰ νησὶ κορώλαν οὐδ' ἀπέλυεν.
Meanwhile, Hector's body is protected from decay by Apollo (24. 18-21, 411-23). Priam, on the way to Achilles' hut to ransom his son's body, is delighted to hear it, and he knows the reason for the miracle — the abundant offerings Hector used to make to the gods. Talking to the reporter of the news, he says (24.425-7):

\[
\omega \tau κως. \chi \beta \sigma \gamma θαν καὶ έναλομα δάφα διδομαι. \\
\alpha \theta ακτοις. \epsilon \pi ν \pi \pi ν \epsilon \mu \mu \epsilon \pi \pi \epsilon \chi \nu \pi. \\
\lambda ν \beta ε\tau \nu \epsilon n \mu \eta \nu \sigma \theta \eta \nu \chi \mu \iota \nu. \\
\alpha \omicron \mu \eta \nu \gamma \alpha \rho \tau \mu \eta \chi \epsilon \mu \eta \chi \epsilon \iota \eta \alpha \iota. \chi \iota \iota \omicron \omicron \nu. \\
\text{And he is right. It is exactly for this reason that Zeus decides to intervene in this affair against Hera's argument that Hector's τιμη is not as great as Achilles' (24. 66-70):}
\]

\[
\alpha \omicron \mu \eta \nu \gamma \alpha \rho \tau \mu \eta \chi \epsilon \μ \eta \chi \epsilon \iota \eta \alpha \iota. \\
\text{οὐ \gamma \alpha \iota \iota \omicron \omicron \nu.} \\
\text{οὐ \gamma \α \rho \τ \μ \τ \ψ \ε \psi \iota \iota \omicron \omicron \nu.} \\
\text{οὐ \γ \α \ρ \τ \μ \τ \ψ \ε \psi \iota \iota \omicron \omicron \nu.}
\]

This, however, is a limiting factor of the gods' moral function. It seems to imply that they do not protect all the dead, but only the ones from whom they have received a lot of gifts. The complication here is that the gifts themselves are not always the guarantee of divine favour — because the gods can ignore or refuse to receive the gifts, if they happen to hate the offerer (cf. \textit{Il.} 6. 311, \textit{Il.} 8. 550-2). All we can say for sure is that the gods do care for the dead whom they like. The best example is the special treatment of the body of Sarpedon. It is treated by Apollo and carried off to Lycia by Sleep and Death by the order of the hero's father Zeus (\textit{Il.} 16. 683).

\[18\text{ cf. 22. 170-2.}\]
In one striking example, the paradigm of Niobe recounted by Achilles to Priam, the gods are said to have buried the bodies of the Niobids by themselves after the bodies had been lying unburied for nine days (II. 24. 612). It was, however, due to Zeus who changed the people into stones that the bodies remained unburied (610-11) and, no doubt, it was an intended delay to increase the mother’s woe as punishment. Therefore, the burial by the gods here should simply mean the termination of their anger — as that of Achilles' with which it is compared — rather than their favour. This example only illustrates the fact that the gods can deprive the right of burial of the dead or give it back to them as they please.

It may be because of this uncertainty of the belief in the gods' protection of the dead as well as suppliants that Priam appeals to both the gods' wrath and human feeling when he pleads with Achilles to release Hector's body, as we have already seen (II. 24. 503-4):

\[\text{ἄλλως ἄλλεοι θεοῖς Ἀχιλῆι αὐτῶν ἔλησον}
\[μυραμένος σοῦ πατρὸς\]

and it proves to be a successful move. Achilles was more moved by Priam's sorrow as a father than by the divine concern. Achilles offers hospitality to the king of Troy purely out of his sympathy, not prompted by Zeus' message through Thetis.


20 cf. II. 24. 507, 511, 518-21; See also C. M. Macleod, *Homer: Iliad: Book XXIV* (Cambridge 1982) on 518-51: 'Achilles' first words are an expression of the wonder described at 480-4 and also a warmly felt response to Priam's speech.'
Here again, the gods seem rather unreliable. But, as in the case of Eumaeus as a host, the awe of the gods works best side by side with human sympathy which has basically nothing to do with the gods.21

Zeus, δίκη and θέμις

Zeus is concerned with human justice more directly, in a sense, as the patron of kings whose obligation is to uphold δίκη and θέμις. Men in Homer in general seem to believe that the gods are the guardians of justice, as we can see from the view of Eumaeus (Od. 14. 83-4):

οὕμεν σχέτλια ἔργα θεί μάκαρες φιλέουσιν;

ἀλλὰ δίκην πίουσι καὶ αἰσχμα ἔργα ἀφρώπιτως.

By saying 'σχέτλια ἔργα', he is referring to the conduct of the suitors in Odysseus' house, and if indeed we could see the Olympian gods described as disgusted at their behaviour and punishing them, we would have the strongest evidence for their concern with human justice. We will investigate this matter later as we have already promised in our examination of the function of Zeus as Ξεινίως.

Another passage suggesting Zeus' concern with δίκη is in Nestor's words. He attributes the cause of disaster the Achaeans met on their way home to the gods' wrath (Od. 3. 130-135):

αὐτὸ ἐπεὶ Πρᾷμοι πώλησι κατέργασεν αὐτῷ,

βῆμαν 8 ἐν νήσοις, θεὸς 8 ἀκάτωσεν Ἀχαιῶς.

21 R. S. J. Garland, BICS 29 (1982) 71: The predominant motive for performing duties on their behalf seems to have been a humanitarian concern for their welfare, reinforced by an ill-defined belief that attending to their needs was right and proper. ... the rites embodied by the geras thanonton were performed retrospectively in recognition of services rendered by the dead during their lifetime, and prospectively in expectation of receiving similar treatment from relatives and friends oneself.'
He thinks that Zeus made the Achaeans suffer because 'not all of them were behaving according to δίκη (οὐ δίκαιοι)' alluding to the rape of Cassandra by Ajax the son of Oileus — hence Athena's wrath. In this case, however, Athena's initiative seems to override the function of Zeus as the god of justice. At any rate, Zeus' intervention in the matter is only Nestor's guess, and apparently he himself does not find this 'punishment' fair, because shortly afterwards, he uses a reproachful term for Zeus' management of the fate of the Achaeans (Od 3. 160-1):

Zeis δ ομ πιμμβειτο νάστοιν,

σχέτιος, καὶ β έρν ἄρακ κακὴν ἐπὶ δεύτερον αὐτις.

When suggesting the negotiation with Achilles through an embassy, Nestor starts his speech saying that Zeus entrusted Agamemnon with the sceptre and 'θέμιστες'(Il. 9. 96-9):

'Απετέλη θιδιστε, διαὶ 'ἄφρων' Ἀγαμεμνον,
ἐν σοὶ μὲν λῆξιν σεό δ᾽ ἀφετις, οὕνεικα πολλὰς
λαϊῶν ἐσοὶ διὰ καὶ τοι Ζεις ἐγγυδιε
σκῆπτρον το ἡ δὲθμισται, ἔνα ἀφία βουλεύρθα.

22 Scholia HEV and Eustathius think that other Achaeans are found guilty of not checking Ajax from the deed, while Scholion Q. thinks that they are simply considered collectively responsible for the crime of Ajax alone; cf. ed. C. W. Dindorf, Scholia Graeca in Homeri Odysseam (Oxford 1855) and Eustathius, Commentarii ad Homeri Odysseam (Leipzig 1825) ad loc. J. S. Clay's interpretation of the wrath of Athena directed towards Odysseus in person (The Wrath of Athena, Princeton: 1983, pp. 186-212, esp. p. 209) is extremely interesting in the context of the whole of the Odyssey legend, but I do not think it is applicable within the context of the Odyssey, composed by, as Clay says, 'Homeros Philodyssey' (pp. 34-53), for we know Athena's whole-hearted devotion to her protégé. cf. Chapter 3.
Achilles also, when talking about the sceptre, says that Zeus entrusts kings with θέμιστες (II. 1. 237-9):


Such is the origin of kingship as seen by human characters. However, a king's prestige seems to rest on his honour and power rather than his behaviour. For example, in Iliad Book 1, Nestor tries to persuade Achilles, now terribly angry at Agamemnon, not to quarrel with the king, appealing to the Zeus-given authority of kings (1. 278-9):

οδ ποθ ἄφιοις ξημορὲ τιμὸς

οἰκιτοῖχος βασιλεὺς, ὥτε Ζεῖς κύδος ἔδωκεν.

Agamemnon's prestige is exceptionally great because his sceptre is literally handed down to him from Zeus through his ancestors (II. 2. 101-7). And this is unaffected by his wrong deed.

When Odysseus checks the Achaeans from rushing towards their ships to go home, he says kings' τιμὴ derives from Zeus and threatens them with the kings' fierce anger exercised through their authority:

θῆμος δὲ μέγας ἐστὶ διοτρεφέων βασιλῆων.

τιμὴ δὲ Διὸς ἐστὶ, φίλει δὲ ἐμνητεα Ζείς. (II. 2. 196-7)

οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκορανὴ ἐλὸς κόρανος ἐστὶν.

ἐλὸς βασιλεὺς; ὥδη ἐκ Κράνου πᾶς δικαλομιστευ

σκιητρόν τ ἦ θέμιστας, ἔνα σφίς βουλεύσα. (II. 2. 204).

But does Zeus actually take an action against the breach of θέμις or against unjust kings?
There is a much discussed passage in a simile in which Zeus appears to show his concern with θέμιστος and δίκη (ll. 16. 384-8):

ώς 8 ὑπόλαυσαν πᾶσα κελανηθέρᾳ τὰς
ἡματὶ ὅπωρνَ ὁτε λαμβρότατον κέει ὑμῖν
Ζεὺς, ὅτε δὴ διέρεσεν κοπεσθείμονος χαλεπή
αἱ βλέπειν ἄφοραικόλος κρῶνος θέμιστος,
ἐκ δὲ δίκην ἐλάτωσε, ἥλων δὲν οὐκ ἄλγουσεν.

This has often been discussed as the only possible example of Zeus' indignation at human injustice expressed in the narrative. Because the lines 387-88 seem very similar to Opera 218-221, interpolation or Hesiodean influence has been suspected.23

However, there is nothing un-Homeric about the picture of Zeus given there, if we compare it with another one showing him as a weather god raging over the misconduct of men. When the Achaeans have built their fortification without offering hecatombs to the gods, he is said to thunder all night long (ll. 7. 476-81):

παννόχιοι μὲν ἑπειτα κἀρθη κατάμωντες 'Ἀχαιοί
δε τραχτὰ τρόπος ἐκ κατὰ πτόλεως ἐπίδοιοροι:
παννόχιοι δὲ σφιν κακὰ μὴθετο μητίτεα Ζεὺς

23 cf. Interpolation is suspected by P. von der Mühll, Kritisches Hypomnema zur Ilias (Basel 1952) p. 247; H. Munding, 'Die Bewertung der Rechtsidee in der Ilias', Philologus, 105(1961) 161f, 106 (1962) 60f.; F. Krafft, Vergleichende Untersuchungen zu Homer und Hesiod (Göttingen 1963), p. 77, n.1; W. Leaf in his comment on 387-8. Hesiodean influence is suggested by Wilamowitz, Hesiodos: Erga (Berlin 1928) p.66; Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, p. 52, n.16; M. M. Willcock, The Iliad of Homer XIII-XXIV (Hampshire and London 1984), on 387, 'The thought is closer to Hesiod than to Homer.' Eustathius only says, on 388, 'Hesiod also has much to say about this sort of injustice...' Among those who consider it genuine but 'new' or 'unique': K. Latte, 'Schuld und Sünde in der griechischen Religion', ARW 20 (1920/1) 259 = Kleine Schriften 6 (with n. 8); P. Chantraine, 'Le divin et les dieux chez Homère' in Fondation Hardt, Entretiens Tome I (1952), 75-6; W. K. C. Guthrie, The Greeks and their gods (London 1950) p. 125. Against them, H. Lloyd-Jones, The Justice of Zeus, p.6 says, '... the doctrines expressed in the simile of the flood and in the speech of Phoenix are in fact perfectly consistent with the theology of the Iliad as a whole.' For my own view, see Chapter 5.
This is Zeus' reaction towards men who have forgotten the formalities due to the gods. And observing offerings and libations due to the gods is exactly what Homeric men will consider the most important \( \theta \varepsilon \mu \iota \varsigma \). Therefore, we can count this passage as the second example of Zeus' concern with \( \theta \varepsilon \mu \iota \varsigma \). As for the first example here, however, we do not know what sort of \( \delta \iota \kappa \eta \) and \( \theta \varepsilon \mu \iota \sigma \tau \varepsilon \varsigma \) are in question. As we will see later these two terms can signify even quite 'immoral' customs as well. We shall come back to the passage and its interpretation later.

Murder and adultery

Lastly, let us briefly see the gods' reaction towards murder and adultery. In the biblical morality, 'Thou shalt not kill.' is one of the principal articles of the God-given law. In Homer, on the contrary, murder itself does not normally attract anything more serious than fines or banishment, still less divine punishment. The only exception is the episode of Meleager. We are told that his mother cursed him, calling upon Hades and Persephone for murdering her brother, and the Erinyes heard her prayer (\( I l. \, 9. \, 566-572; \) the punishment itself is not described). Similarly, 'Thou shalt not commit adultery.' does not seem to be a god-given moral

\[ \text{mqepalea } k\tau u p\epsilon \omega n \; t o i s \; \varepsilon \kappa h l a r\epsilon n \; b\delta o s \; \beta r\eta \]
\[ \text{ovon } b \; \varepsilon \kappa h t h p\alpha \; \chi a m p\delta i s \; \chi \epsilon \omega n, \; o b\delta e \; t h s \; \epsilon \iota \iota \eta \]
\[ p r \nu \; m\epsilon \eta \epsilon, \; p r \nu \; \lambda \epsilon \iota \gamma i \; \iota t p e m e n e t \; K r o u k a w \]

24 Others consider the storm to be the god's warning for the coming day's battle, either for both the Achaeans and Trojans (Leaf 1900, on 7. 478, Eustathius on 7. 476-81) or for the Achaeans alone (M. M. Willcock, The Iliad of Homer I-XII, 1978, on 478).

code in Homer.  

We all know that Zeus himself is a regular adulterer, to begin with. In this case again, we have one exception involving the Erinyes: Phoenix's father cursed his son for having relations with his concubine, calling upon the Erinyes and the gods; Hades and Persephone are the executors this time (Il. 9. 456-7). We can conclude from these cases that the gods normally do not punish murderers and adulterers unless it involves one's senior family members and the latter appeal to the gods for retaliation.

There is one possible example of the gods' disapproval of atrocious weapons. In the story told by Mentes-Athena, it is said that Odysseus asked Ilus for the poison to smear on his arrows, but the latter did not give it to him, 'because he feared (νεμέσιζετο) the gods' (Od. 1. 260-3). It testifies the belief that the gods can be angered by cruel method of killing even in the battlefield. However, we are told in the very next line that Mentes' father gave it to him instead and evidently did not invite divine anger after all. We again fail to trace the sign of divine concern here.

So far, our impression is that the gods' moral functions do not meet much of human expectation. The only definite instance of divine concern with morality (respect for suppliants) is the prompt reaction of an anonymous river-god to Odysseus' prayer. As for morality of men, especially when hospitality and supplication are concerned, a purely human sense of sympathy plays an important role along with the fear of divine sanction.

26 Neither is 'Thou shalt not steal.' divine law, since Hermes himself is the god of thieves. Autolycus, endowed by Hermes with the mastery of thieving and swearing (Od. 19. 395-7), knows, however, that stealing and lying invites the grudge of men, if not divine anger (Od. 19. 407-8).
Pious Homeric men seem to believe in the gods' morality sometimes much more than the latter deserve as we have seen in the case of Odysseus' escape from the Cyclops' cave and the breach of the truce prompted by Zeus.

However, we are left with the following possible cases of the gods' moral concern to be examined in detail:

1. the fall of Troy
divine punishment of the offenders against ξεινή?

2. the death of the suitors
divine punishment of the offenders against ξεινή and δίκη?

3. Phoenix' allegory
Is Ἀτη the punishment of those who reject suppliants?

4. the rain-storm of Zeus
his indignation at 'crooked judgements' by men?

We will discuss these questions in the following chapters.
Chapter 2  The fall of Troy*

Paris and Helen

There is no question about the direct cause of the Trojan war. The abduction of Helen by Paris is repeatedly alluded to as the cause by a number of characters (II. 2. 161-2, 356, 3. 100, 136-8, 156-7, 351-2, 6. 328, 355-6, 19. 324-5, 22. 114-6, 24. 763-4, Od. 4. 145-6, 11. 438, 17. 118-9, 22. 227-9) and once by the poet (II. 24. 28).

Naturally, the pair are much resented by both the Achaeans and the Trojans, especially by the latter whose city threatens to be destroyed by the war. The hatred of both parties is expressed most strongly when Paris has disappeared in the middle of the combat with Menelaus and nobody can find him (II. 3. 453-4):

οὐμέν γὰρ φιλότητι ὑπὲρ Ηέλεων, ἐλ πεῖ τόθε
Ἰουν γὰρ οὐν πάσῳ ἀπίθετο κτρὶ μελαῦῃ

Even his brother Hector wishes that Paris had never been born (II. 3. 40) or that he dies immediately (II. 6. 281-2). Although we know that his brotherly love would not let him hate Paris completely, these wishes do contain some profound bitterness. Unlike Hector, whose strong sense of responsibility for the Trojans will lead him to his almost suicidal encounter with Achilles, Paris does not take his responsibility seriously (cf. II. 6.

* A version of this chapter has been published in *Bungaku-Kenkyu Ronshu* [Journal of Literary Studies] vol. 7 (A volume in the honour of Professor S. Yaginuma on the occasion of his retirement from the University of Tsukuba, ed. Tsukuba Society of Comparative Literature, Tsukuba, Japan, 1990) 43-51.


2 3. 40 δαγόνος = unborn. cf. Leaf ad loc.
523-5). He tries to hide away from Menelaus (II. 3. 30-32) and just after having escaped from the single combat with Menelaus by a divine hand, he fancies nothing but making love with Helen (II. 3. 441-6). He stubbornly refuses to return Helen when there still seems to be some hope to save Troy by doing so (II. 7. 362). Helen knows his character well by now and complains about it bitterly (II. 6. 350-1):

\[ \text{αὔρως ἐπειτὶ ὄρεθλον ἀμείωνος εἶναι ἄκουτις.} \\
\text{δὲ ἴση νέμεσιν τε καὶ ἀλοχεα πόλι' ἀμφώπωλ.} \]

Paris does not seem to have any sense of guilt at all about the disaster he has brought into his city and, although the audience knows his end, there is no prospect or recollection of divine punishment of Paris in his own person in the epics of Homer.³

Helen herself is far more regretful than Paris about the consequences of their marriage. By the time in which the Iliad is set, i. e. the last year of the war, she has started longing to go

³ The comment of Helen at II. 6. 353 and the fact that the word \( dτη \) is used to describe Paris' conduct ("Αλέξανδρον ἑνεκ' \( dτη \)' II. 6. 356, 24. 28) do throw some shadow over his future. The same phrase is read in Menelaus' speech at II. 3. 100 by Zenodotus whom Aristarchus criticizes maintaining, 'ἐσται ἀπολογοφεῖνος Μενέλαος δι' \( dτη \) περίπεσεν ὁ 'Αλέξανδρος', and reads 'ἀρχής' instead of '\( dτη \)' (W. Leaf on II. 3 100). For the same reason, he reads '\( dτη \)' at 24. 28 spoken by Helen. Aristarchus' interpretation presupposes that \( dτη \) is a god-sent disaster for which the person hit by it is not entirely responsible, and therefore Menelaus should use a stronger term not involving any divine influence. Against his opinion, W. Leaf notes, '\( dτη \)', however, is often = \( σίν \), and regarded as deserving moral condemnation; see e.g. I 510-2; and certainly Achilles is not 'apologising' for Agamemnon in A 412.' They are both making a valid point. As we will see later (Chapter 4), \( dτη \) does come from the gods sometimes (e.g. II. 19. 87-90) and, nevertheless, does not cancel out the responsibility of those who have done something wrong under its influence (e.g. II. 19. 137-8), as Helen knows well. Calling her foolish conduct the '\( dτη \) sent from Aphrodite' (Od. 4. 261-2) scarcely eases her remorse. cf. Heubeck-West-Hainsworth, A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey Volume I on 4. 261; E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, pp. 2-8; J. M. Bremer, Hamartia (Amsterdam 1969), p. 104. However, as in her case, \( dτη \) does not always attract punishment.
back to Sparta (II. 3. 139-40, Od. 4. 259-261). She is fully aware of her responsibility for the catastrophic war and the thought, as well as the hostility of the Trojans (II. 24. 768-775), seems to torment her (II. 3. 176 \(\tau\delta \ \kappa\alpha\iota \ \kappa\lambda\alpha\iota\ou\sigma\alpha\ \tau\epsilon\tau\iota\kappa\alpha\)). Whenever she talks about the war, the epithet she gives herself is the 'bitch' (II. 6. 344, 356, Od. 4. 145) and, unlike Paris, it is she herself who often wishes she had died before all this happened (II. 3. 173-4, 6. 345-8, 24. 764). Even the web she is weaving depicts the battle between the Achaeans and the Trojans (II. 3. 125-8). No doubt she cannot get it out of her head at any time.\(^4\)

It may be because of her deep repentance that she gets more sympathetic treatment than Paris at least from Priam (II. 3. 164-5) and Hector (II. 24. 767-772). And later, after all, she will be welcomed in Menelaus' house again as a happy wife. She is not punished in any obvious way, but suffers only from her own regret.

The Olympian scenario

It is, however, not only this 'naughty pair' who are blamed for causing the war. The gods' hands are lurking behind the scene already when a carpenter builds ships for Paris to visit Sparta (II. 5. 62-4):

\[\delta \ \kappa\alpha\iota \ '\alpha\lambda\varepsilon\zeta\alpha\iota\nu\omega\ \tau\kappa\kappa\tau\iota\mu\alpha\tau\sigma\\nu \ \varepsilon\lambda\iota\sigma\sigma\ \kappa\omicron\rho\chi\epsilon\kappa\alpha\kappa\omicron\upsilon\; \alpha\iota\pi\alpha\iota\ \kappa\alpha\kappa\omicron\upsilon \ \tau\rho\iota\kappa\epsilon\sigma\sigma\iota\upsilon\ \iota\gamma\nu\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\ \iota\tau\upsilon\nu\upsilon\iota\; \varepsilon\pi\iota\ \epsilon\pi\iota \ \theta\epsilon\iota\upsilon \ \epsilon\kappa \ \theta\epsilon\sigma\varphi\alpha\tau\alpha\ \iota\theta\iota.\]

\(^4\) cf. C. H. Whitman, *Homer and the Heroic Tradition*, pp. 117-8: 'Helen's great web is woven with pictures of the war for her sake, and becomes in an instant the symbol of her self-conscious greatness and guilt, paralleling her speeches to Hector, Priam, and Aphrodite.'
The gods' ultimate responsibility for causing the war is felt by both parties involved and others alike. It is stated by Priam (Il. 3. 164-5), Helen (Il. 6. 349), Achilles (Il. 24. 547-8), Telemachus (Od. 1. 348 'Zeus alτιος', 17. 119), Alcinous (Od. 8. 579-80), and Sirens (Od. 12. 189-90). Looking back to the incident ten years after the war, Helen says that she left her home and family because of the 'dτη' sent by Aphrodite (Od. 4. 261). Penelope also sees a god's hand and 'dτη' at work in the shameless flight of Helen (Od. 23. 222-4).

On the other hand, when we turn our eyes to Olympian scenes, we see the complexity of contending divine interests. Hera and Athena are the principal contrivers of the fall of Troy (Il. 4. 20-21, 8. 457-8, 448-9 18. 364-7). They have even sworn never to save the Trojans under any circumstances (Il. 20. 313-317). Troy falls with the trick of the wooden horse inspired by Athena (Il. 15. 70-1, Od. 8. 493, c.f. 13. 386-8) and the Achaeans win the final battle with her aid (Od. 8. 519-20). When the two armies have made the truce, it is Hera who angrily opposes the idea of saving Troy by letting it be accomplished (Il. 4. 25-9). We know the reason for the hatred of the two goddesses, that is, the judgement of Paris alluded to at Il. 24. 29-30.

On the other hand, Zeus, who is supposed to be ultimately responsible for the destiny of Troy, is in fact reluctant to destroy the city as he says in his reply to Hera's protest against the truce criticizing her (Il. 4. 31-8):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{δαμοῦν ἔγνωσε Πραμὸς Πράμεσο} & \text{πτοῖδας} \\
\text{πόσα κακὰ βῆκον δὲ δοπερχὲς μενεάνεις} & \\
\text{'Ἰλίον ἐξαλατάξαι ἔκτιμενον πτολεθρον,} & \\
\text{εἰ δὲ σὺ γε ἐσελθοῦσα πίλας καὶ τέξεα μακρά} & \\
\end{align*}
\]
And he goes on to say that since he has yielded to Hera's request this time, she should give way in her turn when he wishes to destroy her favourite city (40-3). Troy is Zeus' favourite, because it is a generous giver of offerings to him (44-9):

\[\ldots\]

Therefore, the Olympian scenario of the Trojan war we see here can be summarized as follows: Paris the prince of Troy hurt the personal pride of Hera and Athena. As the two goddesses demanded retaliation, Zeus reluctantly arranged to destroy the city of Troy.

The plan of Zeus

But that is not all that Homer tells us about Zeus' motivation. Here we must examine the much discussed phrase 'Διὸς δὲ ἐτελείετο βουλή' in the opening sentence of the Iliad (1. 1-7):

\[\ldots\]
'What is this plan of Zeus?', asks G. S. Kirk as he summarizes the problem and gives his answer, 'Probably, as Aristarchus seems to have argued (Arn/A supplemented by D), that implied by Zeus's promise to Thetis at 1. 524-30 to avenge the slight on her son Akhilleus by favouring the Trojans. Aristarchus (Arn/A) also criticized the 'fictions' of recent critics, ol νεώτεροι, chiefly perhaps the idea that Zeus's plan in the Iliad was identical with that signified by the same phrase in the post-Homeric Cypria, frag. 1. 7, namely to lighten the over-burdened earth by means of heavy casualties at Troy.'

Within the scope of the Iliad, Aristarchus may seem right. The same word 'βούλη' is repeated at the beginning of Book 2 where Zeus decides on the plan to fulfil his promise to Thetis (1. 537, 540, 2. 4, and in the plural 'βούλαι' at 15. 53-70, though his plans here extend to the fall of Troy itself. cf. also 8. 370). However, the 'βούλη' of Zeus as the cause of the war itself is not entirely post-Homeric, if we take the Odyssean example of 'Zeus' plans' into our consideration. In Phaeacia, Demodocus the bard sings the episode of the quarrel between Odysseus and Achilles which pleased Agamemnon, because it had been prophesied as a good omen (Od. 8. 73-82). The passage closes as follows (79-82):

6 cf. R. Scodel, 'The Achaean wall and the myth of destruction', HSCP 86 (1982), 47. Even about the poet of the Iliad, we must rather say with Scodel (loc. cit.), that 'Homer is not ignorant of the Cyclic and Hesiodic explanation of the war, but he turns them to his own purpose', i. e. by putting the wrath of Achilles, instead of the war as a whole, as the cause of many deaths. See also G. S. Kirk, 'Greek Mythology: Some New Perspectives' in JHS 92 (1972) p. 79.
According to this account, 'Zeus' plans' — whatever they are — had already been laid down at the preparatory stage of the expedition. Since they are plural 'plans' it is more difficult to reduce them into one particular plan such as his promise to Thetis. They may include a number of casualties, the destruction of Troy, and even the hardship suffered by the Achaeans on their way and at home. Precisely because this passage is not in the Iliad, the narrative can put the war in a broader perspective possible only in retrospect to human eyes. All is done and gone — and as looking back, men can only say that everything, after all, was Zeus' plan. The breach of oaths, the abduction of Helen, the judgement of Paris ... each of these events can be a candidate of 'the cause' of the fall of Troy, but the whole plan of Zeus never fits in human logic of morality. If all of these were prompted by some gods, all within the plan of Zeus, there is no point in arguing that the fall of Troy is the punishment of the Trojans for their such and such deed. Zeus' function is much more complicated and his plan much more long-termed than just to prompt or punish one wrongdoing or two.

7 cf. J. Irmscher, Götterzorn bei Homer, p. 47, n. 3: 'Ich möchte trotz Wilamowitz, Die Ilias und Homer, 1916, 245, daran glauben, daß der Hörer der Ilias etwas von der Sage um einen großen Zeusplan zur Dezimierung des Menschengeschlechtes gewußt hat, den Proklos am Ende seines Kyprienexzerptes angibt (fr. 1 Bethe: Homer, II, 1922, 154).' In the same perspective, Euripides employs both interpretations of 'Δίος βουλεύματα' in Helen 35-6, namely, to lighten the overburdened earth and to make Achilles famous (38-41).
Troy in its 'historical' context

This view is further confirmed by putting Troy in its 'historical' context. The current war is not the first Trojan war. The city was once attacked and sacked by Heracles because its former king Laomедon rudely refused to give his horses to Heracles after the latter had done some service for him (Il. 5. 638-42, 648-51, 14. 250-1). The king had treated even the gods, Poseidon and Apollo, in the same insolent manner; Poseidon (and Apollo at Il. 7. 452) built the city wall of Troy which the god is still proud of despite his hatred towards the Trojans (Il. 7. 452-3, 21. 446-7) and Apollo herded the king's cattle (21. 448-9) only to be unrewarded and driven away by the king's threat (21. 450-7). The sack of Troy by Heracles, however, must be considered his personal vengeance rather than the consequence of the general anger of the gods, because, despite this cheating by Laomедon, Apollo has remained favourable towards the Trojans, a fact mysterious to Poseidon (21. 441-3) as well as to the audience. Moreover, Troy has been reinhabited since then and flourishing again. The last blow to the city, even if it was a divine punishment, was not meant to terminate the life of the city entirely. The same is true with the current crisis.8 As we can overhear from the Olympian conversation over Aeneas, who must be rescued from the hands of Achilles, the coming fall of Troy is not the end of it either (Il. 20. 300-8):

\[\text{διλ' ἁγεθ ἡμεῖς πέρ μου ἵππες θαυμάτων ἀγάμων.}\]

---

8 We can catch a glimpse of the last day of Troy, on fire from top to bottom (Il. 21. 374-6, 22. 410-1). But we are also told what will happen after the war. The gods will completely destroy the fortification built by the Achaeans, a gloomy reminder of the war, to restore the peaceful landscape of Troad (Il. 7. 458-63, 12. 17-33) and the glory of the Trojan wall built by Poseidon and Apollo (Il. 7. 452-3).
We are not told why Zeus hates 'Priam's lineage' — perhaps because of the insolent Laomedon, or because of Paris, or it may only reflect Hera's vote against Priam's family (This word is addressed to Hera, after all). In any case, Zeus' far-reaching plan is laid out already for the re-establishment of the future Troy. Such is the complexity of the 'plan' of Zeus. Within this grand scheme, it is obvious that the fall of Troy is nothing as simple as a punishment for a crime, but an event in the course of history designed far beyond human expectations by Zeus as the distributor of fate.9

9 cf. B. Fenik, Homer and the Nibelungenlied, 1986, p. 24. For the relationship between Zeus (and other gods) and fate, see Chapters 6 and 7.
Crimes of the suitors

Since there can be no 'punishment' without crimes, let us first recount what sort of crimes the suitors have committed in the house of Odysseus. Most of the charges are listed in Odysseus' angry declaration of his revenge against the suitors (Od. 22. 35-41):

\[
\text{δικαίως, ὅμιλος ἐξέφασκεν ὑπότροπον ὄικος ἱκέται.}
\]
\[
\text{δήμον ἀπὸ Τρώας, ὅπις μοι κατεκήρυκεν ὄικον.}
\]
\[
\text{διστήριν ἐξ γυναικὸς παρευθείσῃ βίαις.}
\]
\[
\text{αὐτοῦ ἐς ζώντος ὑπεμάζασθε γυναῖκα.}
\]
\[
\text{οὔτε θεὸς δείχνατε, οἵ οἱρανὸν εἰρίν ἔχουσιν.}
\]
\[
\text{οὔτε τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἱέμεσιν κατόπτοσθεν ἔσεσθαι:}
\]
\[
\text{νῦν ἦμι καὶ πᾶσιν ὀλέθρου πέλατ' ἐφήσσατω.}
\]

The order of the charges seems to follow the magnitude of actual damage done to Odysseus and his house. The consumption of his property, obviously the most serious material damage, is listed first. It is specially documented by the poet at 14. 13-20, namely, only 360 males against 600 females in Eumaeus' stock of hogs. Eumaeus gives a complete list of livestock of Odysseus (100-4) and the pace of consumption (93-4, 105-8).

This accusation, however, by no means calls for the death penalty on its own. The suitors can make amends for the loss, and they do offer to do so at the last moment (22. 55-9). Odysseus' reply to the offer shows that it is no longer a matter of accountancy (22. 61-64). The reason for the deadly vengeance must be sought elsewhere.
The second of their charges concerns their relations with Odysseus' slave-women (37). Its psychological implications are easy to see. It is an obvious insult to the queen who should be the only woman the suitors are in love with and, in any case, it is shameless and outrageous conduct (cf. 19. 92 μέγα ἐργον; 22. 424 ἄναδελη).

Beside that, however, there is a more serious social implication in the conduct. As is clear from many examples in the Iliad and the Odyssey, the master of the household — and he only — has the right to have intercourse with his slave-women, because they are potential mothers of his heir or even potential legal wives (eg. Briseis at II. 19. 297-9; the mother of Megapenthes, the heir to Menelaus at Od. 4. 11-12). Therefore, the suitors' affairs with the slave-women of Odysseus are an intrusion into his patriarchal right and a threat to his lineage (hence those women must be disposed of afterwards). A suitor would be allowed to do so only after he has won the hand of the queen.

This charge on its own, however, is not quite enough to justify the murder of all the suitors. After all, the slaves are just another sort of livestock. As we see from the compensation offered by Agamemnon to Achilles for his heartache for Briseis which includes seven slave-women (II. 9. 128, 638),'damage' done to slave-women can be compensated by giving a larger number of women back under normal circumstances. Even if it is not acceptable, the charge applies only to a relatively small number of the suitors. Even such 'reasonable' suitors as Amphinomus (18.

\footnote{Note the scornful comment of Ajax, 'Just for one girl' (9. 637-8).}
125) and Leodes (21. 146-7, 22. 313-9) are not spared. This charge, therefore, cannot be the decisive reason for the death of all the suitors.

Their proposal to Penelope comes next (38). It is not listed first, no doubt, because it has not yielded any actual result yet and also because there is basically nothing criminal about wooing Penelope provided her husband is dead. Penelope's remarriage was recommended even by Odysseus before he left for Troy (18. 269-70), by her parents (19. 158-9), and by Telemachus (19. 533-4, 20. 341-2) and she is considering it seriously herself (16. 73-7, 19. 524-9). From the suitors' point of view, the fault is entirely on Penelope's side. If she had chosen her new husband promptly, there would have been no waste of property over years nor tearful nights. It was only her love that prolonged the suffering of the house of Odysseus. Things went wrong for the suitors only because Odysseus was alive — the fact not known for certain to anybody. In fact, their proposal to Penelope was the only acceptable excuse for lingering in the house of Odysseus (21. 70-2). Therefore this cannot be the principal reason for their death either.

The general statement in the following two lines (39-40) that the suitors did not fear the gods nor the anger of the people, probably roughly refers to their rude and sometimes violent treatment of the visitors to the house of Odysseus and their plot to murder Telemachus. For example, after killing the suitors, Odysseus says (22. 413-6):

\[ \text{ποίοσ} \text{ δὲ μοι ἐξήμασε} \text{ θεῶν καὶ σχέτια ἔργα} \]

Contrast 'αὐτοῦ ζωντος' (38).
He thinks their treatment of ξείνη is the cause of their ruin brought to them by the μοίρα of the gods.

Likewise, Penelope, without yet believing that it was her returned husband who killed the suitors, says (23. 63-6):

ἀλλὰ τὶς ἄθανάτων κτεῖνε μηνοτήρας ἀγανίσ;
ἐξ’ ἀγαστάσμενος θυμαλγέα καὶ κακά ἔργα
οὐ τινὰ γὰρ πέσον ἐπιχθόνων ἀθρόως,
οὐκακὸν οὐδὲ μὴν ἔσθλον, διὰ σφέας εἰσαφίκτο.

Therefore, in the eyes of Odysseus and Penelope, at least, the suitors were punished by the gods for their breach of the rule of ξείνη, though in human terms, we would (and without doubt the suitors would) never expect to be killed merely for our 'bad manners'.

Why does Odysseus kill the suitors?

On the other hand, whether the suitors' behaviour has incited divine anger or not, the immediate necessity which makes the deadly encounter between Odysseus and the suitors inevitable is quite another matter. That is the suitors' real motivation for lingering in the house of Odysseus, namely, to gain the kingship of Ithaca or at least to have a share of the enormous wealth of Odysseus' estate (2. 335-6, 16. 384-5), even through violence, if necessary. For not only do they plot to kill Telemachus, but they go so far as to say that even if Odysseus himself returns, they will manage to kill him (2. 246-51). Eurymachus, in his attempt to make the dead Antinous their
scapegoat, ironically reveals their real intention most clearly (22. 48-53):

\[
\text{ἀλλ’ ὄμεν ἢθηκεῖται δὲ αὐτὸς ἐπλετο πάντων.}
\]

\[
\text{'Αντίκοσος οὕτος γὰρ ἐπήλευν τάξε ἔργα,}
\]

\[
	ext{οὐ τι γάμου τόσον κεχηριμένος οἶδὲ χατίζων.}
\]

\[
\text{ἄλλ’ ἄλλα φρονέων, τὰ οὐκ ἐτέλεσεν Κρονίων.}
\]

\[
\text{ἄφρ’ ἰάκης κατὰ δήμον ἐκτιμῶντος βασιλεύοι}
\]

\[
\text{αὐτός, ἀπὸ σοῦ παίδα κατακτῆσαι λοχήρας.}
\]

Therefore, even though what they have already done does not seem enough to justify their capital punishment, Odysseus has no choice but to kill them or he will be killed. Thus his reply to EURYMACHUS' plea (22. 61-7):

\[
\text{Εἰρήμαχε, οἶδ’ εἶ μοι πατρίδα πάντ’ ἀποδάετε,}
\]

\[
	ext{δόσα τε νῦν ἦμι ἔστι καὶ εἶ ποθὲν ἄλλ’ ἐπιθέετε.}
\]

\[
\text{οἶδ’ κεν ὡς ἐπὶ χεῖρας ἡμᾶς λίθαιμι φάνοι}
\]

\[
	ext{πρὶν πᾶσαν μνημόσυνα ὑπερβασίσθην ἀποτάσαι.}
\]

\[
\text{νῦν ἦμων παράκειται ἐναυτὸν ἂ μάχεσθαι}
\]

\[
\text{ἡ φεύγει, δὲ κεν θάνατον καὶ κήρας ἀλίζῃ}
\]

\[
\text{ἄλλα τυ σοφίᾳ φεύγεσθαι δόματι αἰτῆν ὀλιβρον.}
\]

Although it is an inevitable self-defence for Odysseus to kill them, unfortunately, there is no legal transaction to cancel out the murder committed by Odysseus by the 'intention' of the suitors to kill him. In other words, despite what they have done, their families are still under an obligation to avenge their death.\(^3\) He is fully aware of the danger of killing so many men from powerful

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families (20. 42-3, 23. 118-22). Other Ithacans cannot stop the suitors' angry kinsmen (24. 462-6), because it is a purely private matter between the suitors' families and Odysseus', just like the nuisance inflicted on his house by the suitors. He kills the suitors for his personal defence and revenge, and likewise their families seek revenge for their personal losses. The anger of the gods is not involved in this chain reaction of vengeance. In this affair, the gods — more specifically Athena — are needed by Odysseus only to win the battle against many and to break the chain of bloody feud in the end. Or can we still say that the gods punished the suitors using Odysseus as their executioner?

Certainly, Odysseus and Penelope would say so (22. 413-6, 23. 63-7). Laertes will also see the hand of the gods behind his son's triumph (24. 351-2). As we see in the accord by Amphinomus' ghost of the fate of the suitors, they also think that some god with malicious intention to them (κακός δαλμὼν 24. 149) brought Odysseus back home and assisted him in killing them (24. 182).5

Zeus' attitude towards human sufferings

We also know the intention of the gods themselves. In the Olympian scene at the beginning of the Odyssey, Zeus talks about the recent Aegisthus affair. Despite the warning from the gods with good intention, he seduced Clytemnestra, killed Agamemnon, and now Orestes has duly retaliated against him (1. 35-43). The parallel between this incident and the case of Odysseus'
household is intentional. As the story develops, we come across more references to the former in comparison with the latter (1. 298-302, 3. 193-200, 303-16, comparing Telemachus with Orestes; 24. 192-202, contrasting Penelope with Clytemnestra). After Zeus concludes his statement with the reference to the fate of Aegisthus, Athena takes up the story saying (1. 46-7):

καὶ λίγην κεῖσε γέ έν οὐκόπτε κεῖται δέλθρο

ώς ἀπέλοιπο καὶ ἄλλος ὅπς τολμήτα γέ βέζοι,

and the audience will soon realize that 'anybody who does such things' points to the suitors in the Odyssey.⁶ They are trying to marry Penelope, to kill Odysseus and Telemachus, and to rob them of their property and kingship, ignoring all human and divine warnings. If so, this proclamation of Athena echoes her own plan which will unfold in the course of the story, as Zeus says to her (5. 23-4 = 24. 479-80):

οὐ γὰρ δὴ τούτον μὲν ἐμοῖλευσας νῦν αὐτή

ώς ἦτοι κεῖσας Οὔδεσις ἀποτιθεται ἐλθώ.

Odysseus' homecoming and vengeance against the suitors is entirely in the charge of Athena. Although the other Olympian gods except Poseidon are said to pity Odysseus for being detained far away from home so long (1. 19-20), they do not seem to care for what he has to suffer at home. Even Zeus takes a detached attitude towards human affairs, if we judge by his first speech (1. 32-43):

"Ὡ πότερ, ὅλον δὴ νῦν θεοῖς βροτοὶ αἰτύωμαι.

ἐξ ἡμέων γὰρ φαιον κἂ νύμενα ἀλλ᾿ ὅτι αὐτῶ

αὐτὴν ἀπασταλήσων ὑπὲρ μέρους διγένων γνῶνοιν.

First he washes his hands of human sufferings. He may be responsible for distributing 'μόρος' or 'μοῖρα', namely a lot, to men i.e. their birth, status, and all that is given to and expected from men of such a stature, but not for what they do beyond their lot.7 Aegisthus may be of noble birth, but he is not entitled to seduce the wife of the king, nor to kill him, a much greater man than Aegisthus himself. Zeus sent Hermes to warn him not to go beyond his 'μόρος', but he did not listen. He has now paid for what he has done at the hand of Orestes.

The fact to be noted here is that the gods' participation in this matter is only limited to warning Aegisthus. Zeus does not say that Aegisthus has committed a crime nor that he punished him. All he says is that Aegisthus became out of control, but was finally subdued by Orestes. It is a striking denial of Zeus' interest in punishing men directly or even sending his 'agent' to do so. He may be considered to lay down the course of events as the

7 cf. Heubeck-West-Hainsworth on 1. 32-3; For further discussion on μοῖρα and μόρος see Chapter 7.
distributor of fate, 8 but it is always men themselves who get into trouble or who take their own revenge.

A good example is the fate of the companions of Odysseus, which is also in a sort of parallel to that of the suitors. They are said to have perished due to their own 'ἀπασβαλί'αι, just as the suitors (22. 317, 416, 23. 67, 24. 458), in the poet's condemning comment at the beginning of the epic. Odysseus tried hard to save them, only in vain (1. 5-9):

Their fate, however, was already sealed as early as at their departure from Ithaca for Troy, as Halitherses prophesied (2. 171-6):

They are destined to die one way or another before coming home again. When, where, and how are, however, up to their behaviour and, despite predestined fate, they are entirely responsible for inviting their death by eating the cattle of Helios, ignoring the warnings (11. 112-3, 12. 139-40, 271-6, 298-301, 320-3). Zeus

8 For example, it is by 'μοῖρα θεῶν' that Clytemnestra yields to Aegisthus' seduction (Od. 3. 269), from Nestor's point of view.
must have set their destiny from which they have no escape. Nevertheless, it is their own 'διασαλία' (echoing in Zeus' complaint at 1. 34), not Zeus, which is to be blamed. When they insisted on landing on the island of Thrinacie, then, was it not this cruel trap of fate that Odysseus sensed? (12. 295):

καὶ τὸν δῆλον οὐκ οὐκ ἔχεις ἀμβλύτετο δαίμων.

Neither is Odysseus himself by any means free from the hand of fate. Again, as Halitherses prophesied (2. 175-6, see above), he is destined to return home in the twentieth year after leaving Ithaca. Troy is fated to fall in the tenth year of the war (Il. 2. 328-9) and a further ten years of wanderings await Odysseus. It is fixed from the beginning. However, it is Odysseus and he alone who is responsible for the delay of his homecoming caused by his action against the Cyclops and by his failure to restrain his companions from killing the cattle of Helios which leads to the loss of his ship. And Zeus might say, 'Don't blame me. I write scenarios, but it is you who choose to play your role as you do!' That is his attitude. In fact, he shows exactly the same attitude towards his daughter Athena, when he says (24. 481):

ἐξέσον ὅπως ἔθελες ἐρέω ἐπὶ ταῦ ἀσπέσουσαν.

Athena and Odysseus

On the contrary, Athena seems extremely keen on plunging into the middle of human affairs for the sake of Odysseus (cf. her delightful confession of her itch for fighting beside him and his son at 16. 170-1). Unlike other deities who come into the story to assist Odysseus only in one episode or two (e.g. Calypso in Book 5,

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9 For the problem of μορφα and 'free will' of men, see A. W. H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, pp. 22-3, and Chapter 7 for my own view.
Circe in Books 10-12, Hermes at 10. 277-306, Leucothea at 5. 333-53), she actually plans the victory of Odysseus and his son and leads them to it almost step by step.

First of all, she moves Zeus to let Calypso release Odysseus (1. 48-62), reminding him of the abundant sacrifices he received from Odysseus which Zeus himself certainly appreciates (1. 65-7) and of the hero's career as a righteous king (5. 8-12).

From then on, she works non-stop to assist Odysseus and his family. She changes her form into Mentes and then into Mentor to encourage Telemachus to confront the suitors in the public meeting and then to visit Pylos and Sparta. She even prepares the ship and crew for him in the form of the young man himself, and then, in the disguise of Mentor, escorts him to Pylos (Books 1-3). Both as Mentes and Mentor, she reveals her divine identity by miraculous departures (1. 319-20, 3. 371-2) to reassure Telemachus of the success of his enterprise. She also sends a dream to console Penelope who is lamenting Telemachus after his secret departure (4. 805-29).

Meanwhile, Odysseus departs from Ogygia on his hand-made raft, but it gets wrecked in the storm stirred up by Poseidon on its way to Scheria (Book 5). Athena comes to rescue him just in time (5. 382-7, 427, 437) and after his safe landing on Scheria, puts him to sleep (5. 491-3). Then she appears in Nausicaa's dream and arranges her meeting with Odysseus which leads to his meeting with the Phaeacians (Books 6-7). She even guides him in person in the disguise of a Phaeacian girl, though apparently he recognises her true identity (13. 322-3).10 She

10 Aristarchus rejects this passage as incoherent with the scene in Book 6, but the omission of this line would spoil the thrilling match of cunning
transforms herself twice more in Scheria, once into the herald of Alcinous to advertise Odysseus (8. 7-15) and once into a cheering spectator of Odysseus in the games (8. 193-8). Thereby she makes sure that Odysseus is liked by the Phaeacians and goes home loaded with their gifts (13. 120-1, 302).

As soon as Odysseus has arrived in Ithaca, she appears to him, first in the form of a shepherd and then in her 'conventional' form (Book 13). She tells him what the situation is at his home, gives him all the instructions, and transforms him so that nobody will recognize him, as destined (2. 175).

Then she goes to Sparta straightaway (13. 339-40), and instructs Telemachus to go home (15. 9-42). She speeds up his journey by sea by sending a fair wind (15. 292-4).

She appears to Odysseus again (16. 155) to restore his true appearance temporarily so that he can reveal his identity to his son. Then and afterwards she continuously gives him instructions, encouragement, and even more conspicuous support (17. 360-3, 19. 33-4, 20. 47-8, 22. 205-6, 226-35, 255-6, 272-3, 297-8, 24. 443-9) until the battle with the suitors ends.

Meanwhile she entirely controls Penelope's psychology (18. 158-62, 19. 478-9, 21. 1-4), her sleep (18. 187-97, 19. 603-4, 21. 357-8, 22. 429), and probably her dreams, too (19. 535-53, 20. 87-90), both for her own sake and for facilitating Odysseus' job. Penelope does not need the goddess's help, however, to recognize her husband.

After the happy reunion of the husband and wife, Athena does such a special service to them as to delay the dawn so that

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between the goddess and the mortal as portrayed by J. S. Clay in The Wrath of Athena, pp. 201-2.
they can both talk to one another and sleep to their heart's content (23. 241-6, 344-8). On the following day, she recovers Laertes' dignity (24. 367-9) and encourages the three generations of heroes to confront the families of the suitors (24. 502-3, 516-9). It is she, too, who brings peace to them in the end (24. 529-32, 542-4, 546-8).

This synopsis of the 'aristeia of Athena' shows how faithful and powerful an ally Athena is to Odysseus, as she herself claims to be:

{oide syv eimai}

Παλλάδ' Ἀθηναίην κούρην Δίως. η τε τοι αἰεὶ
ἐν πάντεσσι πάνους παρλοταμαὶ ἡ ἕῳ παῖδεσσῳ
καὶ δὲ σε Φαῦκεσσι φιλον πάντεσσιν θυῖα (13. 299-302)

οντῆλει, καὶ μὲν τὰς τε χερελὰς πελεθὰ ἐταρξί
δς περ ὑμητὰς τ ἑστὶ καὶ οὐ τὰσα μιθεα οἷον
αὐτὸν ἐγὼ θεὸς εἶμι, διαμπερές ἢ σε παῖδεσσῳ
ὑπάπτονα πάλας (20.45-48)

Indeed, we now know what Nestor talks about when he says to Telemachus (3. 218-222),

ἐλ γαρ σ ὡς εἴθελοι φιλέειν γλαυκώτας Ἀθηνῆ
ὡς τότ' Οὐσιότης περικείμενο κυδάλμιο
δήμῳ ἐν Τρώων, ἐκ πάσχεμεν ἄλγε' Ἀχαιόι—
οὗ γαρ πο θεοὶ ἀναφανδά φιλεύτας
ὡς κεῦρ ἀναφανδά παρθηματο Παλλάδ' Ἀθηνῆ—

Odysseus is Athena's very special protégé.11 She loves him immensely probably not so much because he is a pious and

11 cf. J. S. Clay, op. cit. pp. 42-3; She is even his mother-figure according to Locrian Ajax.(Il. 23. 783).
generous giver of offerings to the gods as because she admires his cunning and cleverness which the goddess and the hero have in common (13. 287-99) and his self-control (13. 330-2): 12

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{αἰὲν τοὶ τοιοῦτον ἐνὶ στῆξασι νόημα} \\
\text{πῶσε καὶ οὐ δίκαια προλεπὼν δίστημον ἑάντα,} \\
\text{οιον \ έπειτίς \ ἐσσι \ καὶ \ οὐχίουος \ καὶ \ ἐχέφωροι.}
\end{align*}
\]

Can we not, then, read the Odyssey as a story of friendship between the goddess and the hero? Odysseus is destined to face a host of troubles, but Athena just cannot leave him on his own, out of her love. She is, certainly, the best example of the gods in the disguise of foreigners visiting men to inspect their 'ὑβρισ' and 'εὐνομί' (17. 485-7), for she visits the house of Odysseus in the form of Mentes and does show her indignation at the overbearing suitors (1. 252). She is, however, not so concerned about justice in general as about justice to Odysseus. She speaks for him and his human supporters before Zeus; He has been a good worshipper of the gods (1. 60-2, speaking for Eurycleia at 19. 363-8) and a righteous king (5. 8-12, speaking for Mentor 2. 230-4) and therefore deserves a much better lot than what he has now. She also cares for Telemachus' good reputation (κλεος ἐσθελον) for which she sends him to Pylos and Sparta (1. 95, 13. 422-3). Telemachus' journey has basically nothing to do with the 'punishment' of the suitors and is, in fact, not included in the 'scenario' of Zeus as recited by Teiresias (11. 100-37). It can be therefore nothing but the goddess's personal favour to Telemachus.

It is true that Odysseus thinks that he is acting as the agent of the gods of justice by carrying out his personal vengeance. On

the other hand, from Athena's point of view, she is acting as his agent entirely out of her friendship and is not in any sense using him to achieve her purposes. If either of them can ever be considered serving the other, it must be Athena who serves her human friend, not vice versa.

However, since the fate of Odysseus — or the scenario of Zeus as we call it — is already laid out, Athena cannot do anything for Odysseus until 'the year the gods spun for Odysseus to go home' (1. 16-7). And, after all, a goddess and a man cannot be equal friends. Athena, capable though she is, does not always act for the immediate benefit of Odysseus, because she knows the whole 'scenario'. If we may further explore this theatrical metaphor, she is the stage director and Odysseus an actor who has to improvise most of his actions. While he only has to do his best in playing his part, she must also direct other characters, especially his antagonists, as convincingly as the hero so that his profile will be even further elevated.

For example, she suggests that Odysseus should beg food from the suitors to see 'οἱ τινὲς εἶσαι ἑναίσιμοι οἷς  ἐδέμητο' (17. 363), only to let him suffer further humiliation, for she has no intention of saving any of the suitors (17. 364), even such 'ἐναίσιμοι' ones as Amphinomus (18.155-6).13

Moreover, she deliberately stirs up the suitors to taunt Odysseus so as to increase his suffering (18. 346-8 = 20. 284-6):

13 For Odysseus' appreciation of his virtue, cf. 18. 125, 394-6; H. D. F. Kitto, Poiesis: Structure and Thought (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1966), p. 146:
'Amphinomus took the gold cup from Odysseus' hand and went back to his seat, much perturbed. But this did not save him, for Athena had marked him down to be killed by a spear thrown by Telemachus. — We feel sorry for Amphinomus, as Homer clearly did, but he had touched pitch, and God is no respector of persons.'
In fact, most of the suitors' violence to 'ξείνοι' for which they are made fatally guilty, according to Odysseus and Penelope, was directed at Odysseus himself and prompted by his appearance made so miserable and helpless by Athena. Therefore, the transformation of Odysseus was the beginning of Athena's trick to exploit the haughtiness of the suitors to lure them into more serious offences against ξείνι' and thereby to give Odysseus a personal and moral justification for the most severe retaliation.

She is no doubt just being cruel to be kind to Odysseus, but we cannot help suspecting that she sometimes finds some pleasure in her control over the course of events. In the battle between Odysseus' party and the suitors, her theatrical cruelty reaches its height. After encouraging Odysseus and Telemachus in the form of Mentor, she disappears immediately to prolong their struggle (22. 236-8):

"H ma kai oΩ πόνω πάνταν δύον έπεραλκέα νύπτιν,
άλλ' έτι φα σφέες τε καί άλκης περίπτηεν
ημέν Οδύσσης η' ιδο καθαλλικό.

Then the suitors throw their spears all at once at Odysseus' party. In their first attempt, Athena waves all their spears aside (22. 255-6):

"Ως έξαθ, οδ, άφα πάντες σκάλπουσαν ώς εκέλευ,
ημεναι τά να σάρα ἐπώσα θηκεν' Αθηνή.

In their second attempt, however, she makes a few successful, but not mortally, to give an impression to the characters and the audience that there is still some real danger
for our hero — a technique familiar to us through adventurous television series (22. 272-80):

As a matter of fact, these dramatic effects were needed and intended by the poet. However, by attributing control over the whole event to Athena, the poet put her in an ultimate divine detachment from her human friend — however dearly might she love him. She has already given him all the directions and encouragement he needs, and now she must give him some danger which he must face on his own so that his glory is his, not hers.

It is the view of Odysseus that the suitors were punished by the gods for their wantonness. But he does not know that not only his victory but also his enemies and the justification for destroying them were provided by Athena and therefore she was not as interested in the 'punishment' of the suitors (who had not quite done much that deserves the death penalty yet, at least in the beginning of the epic) as in giving Odysseus and his son great glory. Odysseus is too special and so is Athena's love for him, ironically, to ensure that this miraculous divine aid is available to
all righteous men in the world or that 'anybody who does such things' as the suitors will be punished in the same manner.
Chapter 4  Phoenix's allegory

Supplications in the *Iliad*

In the Litai allegory of Phoenix, Zeus is described as avenger of the Litai, of suppliants, and benefactor of those who respect them (*Il. 9. 508-12*):

\[\delta\varepsilon\mu\varepsilon\nu\tau\nu\varepsilon\mu \varepsilon\varphi\varepsilon\tau\alpha \kappa\omega\iota\rho\alpha\sigma\sigma \Delta\iota\omega\varepsilon\upsilon\delta\sigma\sigma\nu\lambda\iota\sigma\varsigma\varepsilon\varsigma.\]

\[\tau\omicron\nu \delta\varepsilon\mu\varepsilon\nu \delta\mu\nu\tau\alpha\nu\kappa\alpha\iota \tau\omicron\varphi\alpha\nu \varepsilon\lambda\omicron\nu\epsilon\omicron\mu\nu\epsilon\omicron\nu\kappa.\]

\[\delta\varepsilon \delta\kappa \alpha\iota\nu\tau\alpha\iota\tau\alpha \kappa\alpha\iota \tau\epsilon \delta\sigma\iota\varepsilon\varepsilon\iota\eta \varepsilon\omicron\nu\alpha\sigma\varsigma \varepsilon\iota\nu\omicron\sigma\tau\alpha\varsigma.\]

\[\lambda\alpha\omicron\sigma\omicron\nu\tau\alpha \delta\varepsilon\alpha \tau\iota \gamma \varepsilon \Delta\iota\alpha \kappa\rho\omicron\iota\omicron\omicron\omega\alpha \kappa\omicron\omicron\sigma\tau\alpha\varsigma\iota.\]

\[\tau\omicron\nu \lambda\alpha\iota\nu \delta\iota \eta \epsilon\omicron\nu\sigma\sigma\alpha, \tau\omicron\nu \beta\lambda\alpha\beta\delta\beta\iota\iota \epsilon\omicron\nu\alpha\sigma\varsigma \epsilon\omicron\nu\alpha\sigma\varsigma.\]

It has been argued, however, that Zeus is not considered the protector of suppliants anywhere else in the *Iliad*. Victoria Pedrick maintains, 'For the heroes of the *Iliad* supplication operates strictly on a human level, commanding respect only so far as custom and human sanctions compel.' If so, Phoenix's allegory presents another difficulty among others in the unity of the epic. Pedrick even excludes the Litai allegory from her examination of supplications on the ground that 'The retribution envisioned is otherwise alien to both epics, and suits Phoenix's arguments rather than any theology.'

Her observation seems generally sound and it is tempting to follow her path. However, before we make any decision, we do need to examine the Litai allegory in the light of the Homeric

1 'Supplication in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*' in *TAPA* 112 (1982) 129.
3 V. Pedrick, ibid., 132, n. 29.
doctrine of supplication observed elsewhere to understand its nature. If it is alien to the rest of the corpus, in what way?4

Zeus is called Hiketesios (Od. 13. 213) and clearly regarded by mortals as patron of supplicants (Od. 7. 165, 181, 9. 270, etc) in the *Odyssey*. In this epic, the majority of suppliants are foreigners asking for protection and hospitality, and their supplication is usually successful (except Odysseus’ to the Cyclops and to Aeolus on his second arrival). When Odysseus arrives in Alcinous’ palace as a suppliant, the king even says that a guest/suppliant is like one’s brother (8. 546-7).

Another category of suppliants, namely, those in battle, are, however, not always successful. In a false story of Odysseus (pretending to be a Cretan), he claims that he successfully supplicated to an Egyptian king in battle after the defeat of himself and his crew, and the king pitied him, took him home and protected him (14. 278-84).5

Odysseus himself, however, ruthlessly kills Leodes when the latter supplicates for his life, claiming that his conduct in the house of Odysseus has been reasonable (22. 310-19). Shortly after this, Odysseus does spare Phemius and Medon who have also supplicated to him and to Telemachus respectively, but that is because he acknowledges their innocence. His criterion here is quite clear. 'An enemy must be killed.' He is determined to kill

4 For a full list of supplication passages in Homer, see J. Gould, 'Hiketeia' in *JHS* 93 (1973) 80, n. 39.
5 V. Pedrick thinks that 'Zeus is imagined as protecting the suppliant even in battle' (ibid. 133) in this passage. However, if we look at the passage closely, Zeus is not involved in the supplication itself. The king spares the suppliant out of his pity (14. 279 μ’ ἐλέησον) and took him to his palace on his chariot (280 ἐς δίψυχον ἐς μ’ ἐκαστὸς ἀρχάοι). Then, therefore, the suppliant had acquired ξένιος status. That is the reason why the king did not yield to the demand for the life of the man in awe of Zeus Xeinios (14. 283-4), rather than Hiketesios.
all the suitors, whatever their excuse may be and even if they resort to the claim of suppliants. Of course, in his eye, they are the offenders against Zeus Xeiniōs/Hiketesios themselves, but at this point, his rage seems to be beyond such reasoning. Telemachus even fears Odysseus may have killed Medon in his rage (22. 359-60).

If that is the case in the Odyssey where suppliants in other contexts are generally kindly treated, it is no surprise to find in the Iliad, where the business is war, that the majority of supplications are unsuccessful. Most of the suppliants in this epic are the Trojans or their allies asking for mercy of an Achaean warrior and they are all killed. Dolon is killed by Diomedes even as he tries to take a posture of a suppliant (10. 454-7); Adrestus (6. 63-5), who has nearly successfully supplicated to Menelaus, and the sons of Antimachus (11. 143-7) by Agamemnon; Tros (20. 463-72) and Lycaon (21. 116-9) by Achilles who did once spare Lycaon and others (21. 77, 100-2). The observation of Pedrick that 'No warrior in the Iliad is ever stopped from rejecting an enemy's plea for his life by fear of Zeus.' is quite accurate. However, this does not automatically mean that the notion of divine protection of suppliants does not exist in the Iliad as a whole as she assumes on the ground that Hiketesios is never mentioned in supplications.

First of all, we must not forget that war is not a lawsuit. In battle, killing is the business, not appeals and hearings. The absence of appeals to Zeus seems rather due to the double standard of human morality universally observed even to this

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6 Pedrick, ibid. 133.
7 Pedrick, ibid. 129, 135.
day: one in peace, another in war. If you kill a man in time of peace, you will be a criminal. If you kill hundreds on the battlefield, you will be a hero. We must remember, sad to say, that killing enemies in battle is basically a good thing, the very heart of the heroic virtue. How can you, then, incite divine anger when you are doing something good, winning glory? If a warrior kills more enemies, it means more honour. More honour means a bigger prize. A suppliant in battle therefore stands a chance of success only by offering his opponent splendid ransom which will outweigh the prize the latter will get by killing him. This scheme sometimes works, but obviously, when the supplicated warrior happens to be bloodthirsty or seeking revenge rather than profit, it doesn't. See the poet's dry comment on Tros trying to supplicate to Achilles (20. 466-8):

\[ \text{nepos, oide to fhi d o pu peisa thei emelle} \]
\[ \text{oiv gar ti glykthimou anhp iv oide phanofhiv} \]
\[ \text{dlaamal epimeiav} \]

This is the sort of situation we see in most of the Iliad. This is only the confirmation of the well-known human reality: There is no use looking for ethics of sanity where the war-god governs.\(^8\) In the world where moral values are reversed, pleading alone is not enough to make a valid \(\iota k\epsilon\tau\eta\sigma\).\(^9\)

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\(^8\) cf. \textit{Od.} 11. 537 '\'\epsilon\mu\mu\iota\epsilon \delta\epsilon \tau\varepsilon \mu\alpha\iota\nu\varepsilon\tau\alphai \'\Ar\nu\sigma\'; cf. Heubeck-West-Hainsworth on \textit{Od.} 5. 447: '\'\alpha\ld\delta\iota\sigma\omega\sigma: the claim of the suppliant, except in the heat of battle, was absolute against other men, and sanctioned by \textit{Ze\upsilon\delta \iota \kappa\epsilon\tau\nu\sigma\iota\sigma\} (xiii 213) ...' (my Italics); Even in the successful example of war-time supplication in the \textit{Odyssey}, i.e. a fictitious episode of Odysseus saved by the king of Egypt, we see the 'ethics of war'. While the pious king protects the helpless enemy in awe of \textit{Ze\upsilon\sigma} Xe\iota\nu\iota\iota\sigma\ (14. 280), other angry Egyptians still demand his life (14. 281-2).

\(^9\) See how different Hector the family man (e.g. \textit{II.} 24 767-72) is from Hector the warrior (e.g. \textit{II.} 24. 739).
This explains why Lycaon is the only supplicant in battle who claims to be 'like a ἱκέτης'. He claims that he shared a meal with Achilles sitting next to him when he was his captive (21. 74-7):

γενέσθαι τῷ Ἀχιλλῃ πάλιν ὁμοίως ἀλέκου καὶ ὁ ἐκέφυρο
ἀπ᾽ τοῦ ἵππος ἱκέταο διοτρεφεῖς ἀλδοῖον
πῷ χάρις σοι πρὸς τὸν παντῷ παῖτην Δημήτριος ἀκτήματοι
ἡμαί πρὸς μεν ἑλεῖς ἐκτιμήθης ἐν ὀλίγῳ

'I am your (sort of) ἱκέτης, because ...,,' he explains. The fact that Lycaon claims to be 'as good as' a ἱκέτης to Achilles alone means that he is not actually one, and the fact that the claim needs an explanation shows that it is far from being obvious. This clearly shows that holding one's opponent's knees in battle alone does not make a ἱκέτης. Therefore Lycaon in his desperation tries to introduce the ethics of peace forcibly into his relationship with Achilles. This episode is good evidence for the existence of some respect for ἱκέται in the Iliad as in the Odyssey. ἱκέτης is αἰθοῖος (to be respected) and also apparently under some divine protection, more specifically, the deities of food and hospitality. Even διοτρεφεῖς immediately followed by ἱκέται might be the sign of underlying association of Zeus with ἱκέτης.

Lycaon's supplication fails largely because of Achilles' determination to avenge his friend's death, but it must fail also because Lycaon cannot claim to be a genuine ἱκέτης. His claim depends on the shaky logic, 'A captive is like a guest'. On the

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10 ἄρτος = as good as; cf. W. Leaf, Homer: The Iliad, ad loc.
11 W. Leaf, referring to the parallel custom of the Arabs, maintains that 'The mere breaking of bread under another man's roof entitles to the position of a supplicant, even though the intention to protect be absent.' (op. cit. on 21. 75). cf. Scholion b'T ad. loc. But Achilles is fully aware of the fact that Lycaon once was his captive as we know from his monologue, and that is precisely what drives him to try to 'kill him again'. The bread they shared simply was no hindrance at all to Achilles. Similarly, Odysseus does
other hand, a genuine guest-friend relationship can successfully introduce 'the morality of peace' into the battlefield as we know through the Glaucus-Diomedes episode (6. 212-33). Therefore, we must assume that Zeus' capacity as Hiketesios has a valid force among humans also in the Iliad, so far as the functions of Xeinios and Hiketesios overlap.

Achilles, naturally, does not incite divine anger by killing his pseudo-ικέτης Lycaon, except the wrath of the pro-Trojan river-god Xanthus (21. 146-7). However, even the god himself cannot help admitting that Achilles is acting ruthlessly (αἰσθανάτης ρέετις 21. 214) because the gods themselves always stand by him (215). This being the case, we must conclude that the gods in general, including Zeus, do not act as the protectors of suppliants on the battlefield.

Under more peaceful circumstances, however, Zeus does seem to expect men to respect suppliants. As he predicts Achilles' treatment of Priam, he says (24. 156-8=185-7):

{o}ut' αυτος κτενει απο ι διλος παντας εριη;
{o}ut' γαρ εστι δρων ομι δεκονος ομι διλημων.

not hesitate to kill the suitors who have eaten under his roof. Here again, some might like to quote the Egyptian episode of Odysseus as an example of the protection guaranteed to a captive. However, the king obviously treats the Cretan (Odysseus' assumed identity) not as his captive, but as his guest, for the man is even given property by the king and other Egyptians. That is by no means what every captive can expect from his enemy. Achilles' attitude, however, is not that of a bloodthirsty killer, but a man who has renounced the joy and warmth of life. He calls Lycaon 'φίλος' (106), not because they once shared bread, but because they are dying together. 'He tells him, quite tenderly, that the common bond between them is not life, but death. In a strange and difficult sense, Achilles, by killing Lycaon, accepts him,' G. K. Whitfield, The Restored Relation: A Study of the Supplication Theme in the Iliad (Diss. Columbia 1967), p. 151; From a slightly different angle, C. Daude, 'Homère: un humanisme pessimiste' in Actes du Congrès, Association G. Budé, VIIe Congrès, Aix-en-Provence(Paris 1964), p.554: '... cette mort imminente va faire de Lycaon le frère d'Achille et de Patrocle, et c'est pourquoi, du fond même de son amertume, Achille appelle «mon ami» celui qu'il va tuer (21. 106).'}
The implication of this passage is straightforward. Those who kill ἰκέται are mindless, thoughtless, and wrongful, and ἰκέται should be treated kindly. What must be noted here is the way Zeus expresses his expectation. His tone is not that of the declaration of the guardian-god of suppliants saying, 'He must fear me, Hiketesios.' Instead, it is a relaxed expression of his trust in Achilles' humanity: 'He is a thoughtful enough man to treat a suppliant kindly,' as if it were solely a matter of human morality over which Zeus has no direct censorship. Therefore, we cannot consider it to be unmistakable evidence of Zeus as avenger of suppliants, while it does show that in the Ἰλιάδ, too, the respect for suppliants is a well-established moral obligation among human beings recommended, if not imposed on, by divine authority.

Achilles does not fall short of Zeus' expectation. He treats Priam kindly as an unhappy father like his own, despite his ever unquenchable wrath at Hector as the killer of his friend Patroclus which once comes to the verge of outburst (24. 559-70). To Priam's hasty request to see his son's body and refusal to accept Achilles' hospitality, Achilles answers by saying that he is returning the body (though reluctantly) because of the gods' instruction and that he is aware of the divine escort which has brought Priam to his hut unnoticed by others (24. 563-7). Therefore do not upset me any more, he says (569-70):

οὐδὲν ἐπὶ δίκαιον ἐπὶ
καὶ ἰκέται περὶ ἑαυτὰ, Διὸς ὁλίγοις ἔφεμος.

12 But in fact, Achilles' release of Hector's body is his κόθος bestowed by Zeus. Cf. II. 24. 110.
'δε' after 'Διός' separates two concerns: 1) lest he kill a suppliant and 2) lest he offend against the instruction of Zeus. These two find their echoes in the god's prediction. Achilles tries not to offend (δλιτωμαι) against Zeus' instruction just as the god expects Achilles not to be 'δλιτημων' and Achilles is restraining himself from harming an ἱκέτης just as Zeus expects (ικέτεω πεφιδησται δνδρός). Since the word ἱκέτης is specifically introduced in both passages, we must assume that Priam deserves protection as an ἱκέτης per se to some extent. The gods' message to Achilles is therefore to make sure that he will not fall back into the 'morality of war' which can emerge at any moment within his heart swollen with anger.

This example, again, does not make clear the status of Zeus, whether he actually acts as the god of suppliants or not, but at least it leaves the possibility of some divine concern for suppliants open. Thus it also leaves a channel open between Phoenix's Litai allegory (where Zeus is clearly the avenger of suppliants) and the rest of the Iliad (where, it has been claimed, he is not).13

Phoenix's speech

Let us now go back to the speech of Phoenix. What sort of supplication is he talking about? After he has recounted his

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13 There is one example of divine wrath against a man who has rejected a suppliant, i.e. Agamemnon rejecting Chryses who has asked the king to release his daughter (I. 1. 11 ff.). However, although Chryses is described with a term of supplication (15 λισσετο), he pleads in his capacity of a priest of Apollo rather than a suppliant (21), and the Achaeans are punished for Agamemnon's insult to Chryses' priesthood by Apollo on his priest's request (1. 35-52). Therefore, the issue here is solely Apollo's τιμη, not the right of a suppliant.
'history', he urges Achilles to restrain his great spirit because even the gods are appeased by gifts (9. 499-501):

\[ \text{kai mev tis thueosi kal exiwlis phanrpi} \]
\[ \text{lophi tis kalos tis paraaptwad akatmato} \]
\[ \text{losozena, ste kev tis uperbithi kai aphi} \]

Clearly this is a new category of supplication. It is neither a request for protection and hospitality by a \( \zeta eivovos-ike\tau\eta\) nor a plea for one's life in battle nor an attempt to ransom one's child (dead or alive). It is a supplication for pardon by those who have done something wrong.

This exactly matches the present situation — probably so designed. Agamemnon slighted Achilles, but now, here they are, he has sent Achilles' closest friends as the embassy to offer him splendid gifts and ask him to return to the battle. There is only one exact parallel to this situation in the \textit{Iliad} — the paradigm of Meleager, also recounted by Phoenix (529-99). It is almost the exact parallel not only to the present supplication, but to the main structure of the 'Song of Achilles' as a whole. Meleager is the supreme warrior by whose aid the Aetolians have held the Courtes back. But he withdraws from the battle, angered by his mother's curse. Then the Courtes start pressing hard the city of Aetolia. He receives three supplications for returning to battle, one from the elders and priests of the city offering presents, another from his family, and another from his friends, but he refuses them all. Finally, when the enemies have started climbing the walls and setting fire to the city, he yields to the tearful plea of his wife recounting the misfortunes the citizens have to suffer, and returns to battle. Although he saves the city, it is too late. He receives no reward.
Like Meleager, Achilles withdraws from the battle leaving the Achaeans in severe military difficulty. He also receives a set of three supplications. He is supplicated to first by Odysseus, as the official envoy from Agamemnon offering gifts — corresponding to the Aetolian elders and priests in the same function, then by Phoenix as Achilles' 'nurse' — corresponding to Meleager's family, and by Ajax as a friend who tries to persuade Achilles with the logic of friendship.14 Achilles, like Meleager, does not listen. He will change his mind, like Meleager, only when the enemies have started climbing the wall and setting fire to the Achaean ships, and with the tearful plea of Patroclus. However, the parallel ends there. It is Patroclus, not Achilles, who goes back to battle to drive back the hard pressing enemies. Achilles does get gifts in the end (as promised by Athena at Il. 1. 213-4) — though they are meaningless to him after the death of Patroclus.

Probably the most striking point of comparison between the two is that both groups of supplications completely miss the point. The promise of gifts from Agamemnon means absolutely nothing to Achilles — the fact not recognized by any of the members of the Embassy. The point of Achilles' long angry speech of refusal is compressed in the following two lines (386-7):

\[ \text{\textit{odé kev òs eti thmión éión peísei 'Agyaménou,}} \]
\[ \text{\textit{prón ý adó pásan émòi òrmon, thmalyeá lúthuy.}} \]

Remember, this is said \textit{after} the offer of splendid gifts from Agamemnon. The offer obviously has not made any difference to the situation at all. Achilles does not feel he has had a due

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apology or the restoration of his honour.\textsuperscript{15} That is the full stop. All the following persuasion based on the same offer, though it has some emotional impact on Achilles, must fail.\textsuperscript{16} Instead, he gets even more infuriated. Is his reaction unreasonable?

It is obvious to the audience/reader that, though having agreed to send the Embassy to Achilles, Agamemnon has hardly changed his attitude towards Achilles through the closing lines of his speech (\textit{Il.} 9. 158-61):

\begin{quote}
\textit{διηθήτω—'Αλήθες τα φιλίχως ή δόξασθος}
\textit{τού νεκρού καὶ τε βροτοῖ τε θεων ἔχωστο σαμαίνω—}
\textit{καὶ μοι ὑποστήτω δόσοι βασιλεύτερος εγώ}
\textit{ἡ δόσοι γενεφ προγενήστερος εΰχομαι εύωλ.
\end{quote}

There are no 'sweet words' (\textit{ἐπεσει μειλιχίοισιν} 9. 113) as recommended by Nestor. Instead, we hear a typical boast of his higher rank and his implicit displeasure with Achilles' haughtiness.\textsuperscript{17} 'If he remains stubborn after this, he will be as hateful as Hades to me.' — knowing Achilles so well, he certainly suspects that it is a possible situation. We readers might think that there is no way for Achilles of knowing what Agamemnon's actual feeling is like, and judge Achilles' reaction to the Embassy accordingly, thinking that Achilles should not be so obdurate.\textsuperscript{18} However, in fact, Achilles acts as if he knew exactly what

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\textsuperscript{15} cf. S. E. Bassett, \textit{The Poetry of Homer} (Berkeley 1938), p. 201: '... Achilles now recognizes the claim of friendship, but feels that the slight upon his honour still remains, since his best friends misunderstand the real point at issue.'


\textsuperscript{17} cf. S. E. Bassett, 'The \textit{Αμαρτία} of Achilles' in \textit{TAPA} 65 (1934) 59-62; D. E. Eichholz, 'The propitiation of Achilles' in \textit{AJP} 74 (1953) 144.

Agamemnon said when despatching his envoys. When rejecting the offer of compensation, Achilles replies (9. 312-3):

εξάφος γάρ μοι κείνος ὁ Ἀτίσσο πᾶλαν
δὲ ξεπεραμένει γειτονύμης φρεατίῳ διὸ δὲ εὐη.

It strikes the reader as a bitter, sharp irony. For Achilles, too, Agamemnon is 'as hateful as Hades,' because 'he has one thing in mind and says another,' which is exactly what Agamemnon is doing now through the Embassy. The second line does not make much sense on its own, except for someone who has heard what Agamemnon said. Although sending an embassy on behalf of him to lure Achilles back to the battle, there is no word of apology, no change of attitude on Agamemnon's side. Instead, he still thinks Achilles' pride as hateful as Hades, insisting that he is superior to Achilles. Although Odysseus does not report this last part of Agamemnon's speech, Achilles probably knows Agamemnon well enough to sense it from the list of gifts full of royal pride. For such a person, Achilles is fully justified to react with these ironical lines. Although Achilles cannot have direct knowledge of exactly what Agamemnon said, the reader is directed by the poet to see the statements of the two heroes in an unmistakable symmetry which leads us to judge Achilles' rejection utterly justifiable.

Meleager's anger is also never resolved. His mother cursed him praying for his death, because he killed her brother — how? It cannot be anywhere but in the battle between the Aetolians and the Couretes. He has been fighting for the Aetolians when his

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mother, one of the closest to him, curses him, wishes his death, honouring her brother (despite the fact that he was on the enemies' side) more than her son and thereby causing Meleager's distrust in his family, injuring his honour, shattering all the meaning of his heroic life and his life itself. That is his condition when the Aetolians come to supplicate to him, promising gifts, but thinking only about their own safety, without resolving the cause of his anger itself. It is no coincidence that the poet put the supplications of his family in the order as it stands: his father, sisters, and mother. His mother comes last because she is the one who is angry at him herself and only when she is desperate to survive, she comes and pleads with her son whose own life she has already destroyed. The lines lead naturally into his even more infuriated refusal after his mother's all too selfish plea (9. 584-5):

\[
\begin{align*}
poll\delta\;\delta\;\tau\nu\;\gammae\;\kappaa\sigma\gamma\nu\eta\tau\alpha\tau\iota\nu\;kai\;\pi\omicron\nu\nu\;\mu\nu\iota\tau\iota
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\ell\lambda\iota\varsigma\sigma\omicron\omicron\omicron\theta\;\delta\;\mu\delta\lambda\lambda\omicron\;\alpha\nu\alpha\nu\tau\omicron
\]

Similarly, the three sent to Achilles, who are among the closest to him, fail to see the situation from his point of view. They only think about the life of the Achaeans and themselves. 'Your injured honour is nothing compared with the lives of those who slighted you.'\(^{20}\) — That is the only message Achilles hears from the triple supplication which he could not accept. Nobody in his society could. This may be his only mistake, if there is any.

Putting the two stories of Phoenix, the Litai allegory and the paradeigma of Meleager, together, his message seems to warn

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\(^{20}\) On the contrary, of course, he has specially asked Zeus to restore his honour \textit{through} the death of many Achaeans. In his eye, the Achaeans who did not check Agamemnon from dishonouring him, share the king's responsibility. cf. \textit{II}. 16. 18, '\textit{\upiota\perp\beta\alpha\omicron\alpha\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\nu\zeta\;\epsilon\nu\nu\kappa\alpha\;\alpha\phi\omicron\omicron\iota\}'.
Achilles that he will be punished by ἀντιτατον, if he does not accept their supplication. Then, should we say, as many do, that Achilles is in fact punished by ἀντιτατον resulting in the loss of his beloved friend, because he has rejected the supplication of the Embassy?

One point must be noted. Just as Meleager is not said to be affected by ἀντιτατον, but loses his reward through his anger (χόρλος 9. 565), Achilles is said to be affected only by his anger (18. 108-11 etc), not by ἀντιτατον. Can we still say, nevertheless, that he has been punished by ἀντιτατον? If so, in what way? To prepare ourselves to answer these questions, let us next investigate the nature of ἀντιτατον in Homer.

ἀντιτατον in Homer

Although we have two outstanding examples of personified "Ἀτατον (the allegory of Phoenix: Il. 9. 504 ff, and the story of Agamemnon: Il. 19. 91 ff), the other instances of ἀντιτατον do not invest the image of the goddess "Ἀτατον with any personality. In Il. 16. 805, ἀντιτατον is nothing but a physical effect on Patroclus caused by Apollo, though it is said to 'seize' him. It would be very awkward if we had to imagine the god, after hitting Patroclus, hastily calling the goddess "Ἀτατον to come to 'seize' him.

ἀντιτατον may be talked about as if it could be personalized. There are such expressions as 'Alexander's ἀντιτατον' (Il. 6. 356, 24. 28), 'his ἀντιτατον' (Agamemnon's, Il. 1. 412, 16. 274; Eurytion's caused by wine, Od. 21. 302), and 'my ἀντιτατον' (Agamemnon's, Il. 9. 115). If each person can have his own ἀντιτατον, or even ἀντιταται, ἀντιτατον cannot be considered a fully personified deity, but a sort of psychological phenomenon. Odysseus says he was lulled 'into ἀντιτατον (ἐλέγχα ἀντιτατον) at
Such an expression also points to \( \vartheta \tau \eta \) as a condition of a man, rather than an external force creating the condition.

The noun \( \vartheta \tau \eta \) and its cognate verb \( \vartheta \delta \omega \) are used most often to describe a state of mind of someone who makes a certain mistake. A person under the influence of \( \vartheta \tau \eta \) can commit murder (\( \text{II. 24. 480-1} \)), can undertake an unsuccessful adventure (\( \text{Od. 15. 233} \)) or a rewardless war (\( \text{II. 2. 111, 8. 237, 9. 18} \)). Patroclus is in the state of \( \vartheta \tau \eta \) (\( \vartheta \delta \delta \sigma \theta \eta \)) when he goes too far into the Trojan forces, against Achilles' advice, to be killed by Hector (\( \text{II. 16. 685} \)). Paris led Helen to Troy by his \( \vartheta \tau \eta \) (\( \text{II. 6. 356, 24. 28} \)) and she followed him by \( \vartheta \tau \eta \) sent by Aphrodite (\( \text{Od. 4. 261; cf. 23. 223} \)), causing a disastrous war between the Trojans and the Achaeans.

It is because of \( \vartheta \tau \eta \) that Agamemnon makes his most serious mistake, i.e. he seizes Achilles' war-prize Briseis, so causing him withdraw from the battle (\( \text{II. 1. 412, 9. 115, 16. 274, 19. 88} \)) resulting in great loss of lives of the Achaeans (\( \text{II. 19. 134-6} \)). It is with this \( \vartheta \tau \eta \) of his that Agamemnon compares \( \Lambda \tau \eta \) who once made even Zeus make a mistake by being deceived by Hera's trick (\( \text{II. 19. 95-133} \)). In his story, \( \Lambda \tau \eta \) is fully personified, said to be the eldest daughter of Zeus (\( \text{19. 91} \)), but apparently out of her father's control. Therefore, after realizing his mistake, which will result in the lifetime of ordeals of his beloved son Heracles, he seizes her by her hair, hurls and flings her out of Mt. Olympos (\( \text{19. 126-9} \)). This picture of the Zeus-Ate relationship is evidently very different from that in Phoenix's speech.

\( \vartheta \tau \eta \) is also observed in some sort of carelessness or forgetfulness. Oineus forgets to make an offering to Artemis (\( \text{II. 9. 537} \)) thereby inviting her punishment, and Agastrophus does
not keep his chariot at hand at a crucial moment (Il. 11. 340), both being in the state of δτη (δάσατο).

How and why δτη comes to men is an interesting and difficult question. Zeus, though once hit by "Aτη himself, is said by men to be the author of δτη at Il. 19. 270 and falsely at Il. 2. 111, 8. 237 and 9. 18, and as we have seen, Phoenix says that he sends "Aτη to punish men who spurn Διται, a moral argument about the origin of δτη not paralleled anywhere else in Homer.

At Il. 19. 270-4, accepting Agamemnon's explanation that it was Zeus, Moira and Erinys who sent "Aτη to him (19. 87-8), Achilles says that Zeus sent δται to Agamemnon because the god wanted to kill many Achaeans. Modern readers might ask themselves, 'But was it not Achilles himself who wished the death of many Achaeans?' (cf Il. 1. 409-10). In his mind, however, the whole cycle of events — Agamemnon's δτη, Achilles' wrath, and its disastrous consequences including the death of Patroclus — was planned by Zeus who sent δτη to Agamemnon to start his plan working. This view is apparently shared by the poet who says, 'Διός δέ ἑτελεῖετο βουλή' (Il. 1. 5) immediately after sketching the disaster of the Achaeans caused by the quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles. Certainly it so happens that Agamemnon is hit by δτη (to slight Achilles) just after having rejected Chryses' supplication — a formula presented by Phoenix. However, as we have seen above (note 13), he does not offend against the Litai, but against Apollo, and is duly punished for it by the god through the plague and in the end successfully appeases the god after making up for his offence. The effect of his δτη, on the other hand, lasts much longer than the Chryses incident. We
can find no moral explanation why Zeus should send such δτη to Agamemnon and cause the subsequent events.

At *Od.* 15. 233-4, Erinys alone is said by the poet to be responsible for Melampous’ δτη. This δτη also resists moral analysis, for his adventure is successful in the end within the plan of Zeus (*Od.* 11. 297). We must assume that it was sent simply to start the god’s plan working.

Similarly, we cannot see the reason, moral or otherwise, why Aphrodite sent δτη to Helen (as Helen claims) to let her run off with Paris to Troy (*Od.* 4. 261-2). Surely not to destroy her favourite people? All we can say for certain is that the goddess stirred Helen’s love for Paris which Helen later recognizes as δτη.

The δτη which Patroclus experiences at *Il.* 16. 805-6 is a physical and mental ‘stupor’ — as W. Leaf calls it — and quite explicitly described by the poet as the effect of Apollo’s stroke. The god’s immediate purpose in causing it must be to make Patroclus an easy prey to Hector. However, it is not a punishment. It is simply his destiny, part of the plan of Zeus, that he is killed by Hector (*Il.* 15. 64-5, 16. 849).

If the gods do send δτη to us for no obvious moral reason, not as punishment for crime, but just as they please, what can we do? We certainly find some sense in Agamemnon’s lamenting excuse at *Il.* 19. 90-4:

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dilla πινεν βέβαιος, θέσ' διὰ πάντα πελευτᾷ
πρέοσα Διός θυγάτηρ Ἀτη ἡ πάντας ἀδάσσα.
οἰλαμώνη πημέν θ' ἀπαλά πάλας ὁμορ ἐν ὀλθεί,
πολυτταί, ἄλλ’ ἄρα ἢ γε κατ' αὐθών κράταστα βαλεί
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21 W. Leaf, ad loc.
The situation looks most pathetic for Odysseus at Od. 12. 372. Being stranded on the island of Thrinacie with no food left, he goes out of the sight of his companions to pray to the gods for any clue how to get out of their desperate situation (12. 336-8):

χείρας νυφήνον, ἐν ἐπι σκέπας ἑν αἰμόνα

τράμων πάντες θεοὶ Ὀλυμπων ἔχουσιν

οἷς ὀξα μαί γλυκῶν ὕπνου ἐπὶ βλεφάρωσιν ἐχειαν.

In response to Odysseus' prayer, the gods (according to him) send 'γλυκῶς ὕπνοις' (which he calls 'νηλεῆς ὕπνοις' later at 12. 373) which leads him to disaster. He goes back to where his companions are and knows that they have slaughtered the cattle of Helios. He cries out (12. 372-4):

Ζεῦ πάτερ ἡλιοῖς μῦκας θεοὶ αἰὲν ἑάτες:

ἠμε μάλις ἐξ ἐπι ημικράτε νηλεῖ ὕπνοι

οἷς ἐταῳ μέγα ἐργον ἐμπιπάσαντι μένουτες.

The gods sent him sleep which was sweet when it came, but later Odysseus, having discovered the disaster it has caused, calls it δη. It can hardly be his mistake, but rather a misfortune which has fallen on him. What he sees here is the 'blessed gods' as arbitrary dispensers of δη.23

We do not know, however, how far we can take this image of 'happy, cruel gods' seriously, for, in a similar situation elsewhere, Odysseus blames only his companions and himself. On the way to (in fact, very close to) Ithaca from Aeolia, his companions open the bag of winds through their misconception

23 cf. J. M. Bremer's observation in Hamartia, p. 111-2: 'The Homeric conception of ἀτε relates the error to an arbitrary and malicious interference of the gods with human action, causing infatuation in man and resulting in disaster.'
that it contains some gifts from Aeolus, while Odysseus is asleep. Then their ship is blown back by the released winds to the island of Aeolus, this time to be sent away coldly. Odysseus explains his situation to Aeolus in this way (Od. 10. 68-9):

\[ \delta\alpha\sigma\delta\nu\mu\ '\varepsilon\tau\alpha\rho\omicron\ i\kappa\alpha\kappa\omicron\ \pi\rho\zeta\ \tau\omicron\omega\iota\ \tau\epsilon\iota\nu\omicron\oslash\ ] 

\[ \text{oikhelios}. \]

Here '\(\delta\alpha\sigma\delta\nu\ \mu\epsilon\)' means more or less 'brought me to ruin (\(\delta\tau\eta\))' and he says it is due to his sleep and \(\varepsilon\tau\alpha\rho\omicron\ \kappa\alpha\kappa\omicron\) — which should be translated as 'useless companions' rather than 'wicked companions'.\(^{24}\) It is clear from his recollection, looking back to this event in his narration, that he considers himself also responsible, apparently because of his untimely sleep (10. 27):

\[ \alpha\nu\tau\omicron\nu\ \gamma\alpha\rho\ \delta\pi\omega\lambda\lambda\upsilon\epsilon\theta\ \alpha\phi\rho\alpha\delta\omicron\tau\eta\nu. \]

but does not blame the gods at all this time.

We get more suspicious about the gods' responsibility for \(\delta\tau\eta\) when Elpenor says (Od. 11. 61):

\[ \delta\sigma\epsilon\mu\varepsilon\ \delta\alpha\mu\iota\omicron\nu\oslash\ \alpha\iota\sigma\ \kappa\alpha\kappa\omicron\ \delta\kappa\iota\phi\alpha\upsilon\omicron\oslash\ \alpha\nu\oslash. \]

Even though '\(\alpha\iota\sigma\aomicron\ \kappa\alpha\kappa\omicron\) of some god' is ultimately responsible for his accidental death, it is obvious that he drank too much wine and fell from the roof because of that. His \(\delta\tau\eta\) can hardly be the responsibility of anybody but himself. Antinous the suitor also points out the effect of wine which brings forth \(\delta\tau\eta\), referring to the episode of a drunken Centaur (Od. 21. 293-302; 296 \(\delta\alpha\sigma\', 297 \delta\alpha\sigma\nu, 301 \delta\alpha\sigma\omicron\oslash\zeta, 302 \delta\tau\eta\)).

Another testimony of \(\delta\tau\eta\) of completely human origin is at II. 10. 391. Having been caught by Odysseus and Diomedes, Dolon blames Hector:

\[ \text{---} \]

\(^{24}\) For the meaning of \(\kappa\alpha\kappa\omicron\), see Chapter 10.
By saying 'πολλήσιν ἄτησι' Dolon means nothing more than an inviting promise of reward and glory for his adventure. We have already seen other examples of ἄτη as motivation towards unsuccessful adventures at Il. 2. 111, 8. 237, 9. 18 and Od. 15. 233.

ἄτη of Locrian Ajax at Od. 4. 503 ff (503, 509 ἄσθνη) is definitely not sent by the gods. He boasts that 'δέκητι ὑπενθυάεων μέγα λαίτμα θαλάσσης.' (504). Hearing this, Poseidon, who has had no bad intention towards him until then, brings him the final destruction.

Having seen the examples above we can now conclude that all ἄτη is a temporary state of mind (including sleep) which brings a person into unfortunate situations, regardless whether it comes from the gods or men. The only common factor of the examples seems to be that they all result in misfortunes.

25 cf. W. Leaf on 10. 391: 'ἄτηαι is so far peculiar here that it is used of 'blinding', deception, of a purely human origin; ἄτας ἔφη τάς ἐπι κακῶι ὑποστρέφεισι, Schol. BT. In every other instance it conveys the idea of some divine or mysterious blindness.' Dodds (op. cit. p. 19, n. 20) does not accept that this passage is an exception, maintaining that ἄται means 'a symptom of Hector's own condition of (divinely inspired) ἄτη and not that 'Hector's unwise advice produced ἄτη in Dolon,' on the ground that ἄται as 'acts productive of infatuation' is 'a unique psychology' and 'a unique use of ἄται. His interpretation has two major problems. First, ἄτη always involves disastrous consequences for the person who acts under its influence, whereas the present situation is Dolon's disaster and not Hector's. Therefore, even if Hector's suggestion was a strategic error, Hector cannot be considered the victim of ἄτη. If it is to be interpreted as Dodds proposes, that Hector was hit by ἄτη but not affected by it himself, we are indeed dealing with a unique use of ἄτη. Also in this context, it is difficult to visualize 'many' ἄται on Hector's side. Secondly, although Dodds has successfully eliminated two possible meanings of ἄται here, namely, one as 'temporary blinding of mind (produced in Dolon)' and as 'acts productive of infatuation', but failed to take account of another aspect of ἄται, i.e. as 'deluders', agents causing mental malfunction, themselves. If we interpret πολλαί ἄται here as Hector's many words of dazzling promises (which caused Dolon lose his head), all the difficulty is dissolved. It seems, therefore, by far the best to take the ἄται as 'producers of infatuation'.

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In other words, even if one makes a mistake in conduct or judgement, if he does not meet any obvious misfortune, it is never regarded as ὀτρη. Agamemnon's moaning that Zeus sent ὀτρη to him to lead him to Troy for nothing (II. 2. 111, 8. 237, 9. 18) is a good example. It is, in fact, not ὀτρη that made him come to Troy because he will win the war eventually, but for the time being everything seems a failure to him — hence, he thinks, his decision must have been ὀτρη.

On the contrary, though he is regretful about his quarrel with Achilles already shortly afterwards and says it is a hardship sent by Zeus (II. 2. 375-78), he does not call his state of mind at the time of the quarrel ὀτρη until he sees its disastrous consequences (9. 115, ὀτρης 116 ὀδοτημη, 19. 88 etc).

A disastrous result of a mistake or of misconduct comes first, and then the state of mind which has brought forth the result is retrospectively called ὀτρη — that seems to be the Homeric logic.

In sum, ὀτρη is a temporary state of mind which causes unfortunate consequences. It can be sent from some deity (not only Zeus), be caused by men, or come by itself out of nowhere, often for no obvious reasons. It can be just a phenomenon or a personified goddess. This peculiar nature of ὀτρη seems somewhat easier to grasp if we compare it with a similar case of shaky personality, that of ὑείπος.

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26 cf. E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, p. 5: '... ὑείπος is a state of mind — a temporary clouding or bewildering of the normal consciousness.' I find Dodds' analysis of ὀτρη in Homer generally sound and accurate except that he does not make it explicit that ὀτρη is defined by its consequences, not by its origin.
Zeus sends a false dream to Agamemnon (II. 2. 6 ff), again to start his plan working. He summons and addresses the Dream as a fully personified being (οἶλε Ὀνειρε 2. 8). Editors will naturally choose to spell "Ονειρος" with a capital O here (2. 6, 8, 16, 22, 56). However, when Nestor refers to the very same dream as 'the dream', they choose to spell 'τὸν Ὕνειρον' with a small o (2. 80), because it is conceived as an everyday experience common to all human beings. In no other instance of dreams in Homer is there any further indication that "Ονειρος" has any personality.

Like ἀρη, Ὕνειρος claims 'multiple authorship'. Penelope's dream at Od. 4. 804 ff is an 'εἴδωλον' sent by Athena. Another one at Od. 19. 535 ff of an unknown origin is a different sort of dream from the one above or the one Zeus sends to Agamemnon. Unlike the previous examples, it is not a 'dream-figure' standing at the bedside to deliver a message, but a dream-scene in which Penelope herself is involved. In other words, this Ὕνειρος is her experience and not a divine or human figure.27 At Od. 20. 87, she says that some god sends her ὡνειρατα κακα. One of the 'woeful dreams' she has just had is the vision of her husband sleeping beside her. This figure itself (which she calls ὡναρ at 20. 90) could be "Ονειρος" the god sent by Athena or by some other god, but such a singular imagery would not be consistent with the plural 'ὁνειρατα'. Evidently Penelope is thinking of plural dreams, perceived as new each time, sent by some god to disturb her mind, rather than a single dream-god visiting her again and again. Her story about the double gate of dreams (19. 562 ff) also confirms the plurality of dreams. We all have many dreams;

27 We see another example of a dream-experience in the simile at II. 22. 199-200. See also Od. 21. 79.
some are true and others false; some are sent by some gods, and others come from no known source.\textsuperscript{28}

If we think of the similarity between the two phenomena $\delta \tau \eta$ and $\delta \nu e i r o s$, the analogy we can draw from the usage of $\delta \nu e i r o s$ is significant for understanding that of $\delta \tau \eta$. Zeus or other gods can send $\delta \tau \eta$ or $\delta \nu e i r o s$ to men to achieve their purposes. Both of them are something we experience frequently and in both of them our rational mind does not function as normal. We know what exactly has happened only after having recovered from either sort of experiences. Then we often think that we have acted or thought in a different way from what we would normally do.

Because of this mysterious nature they have in common, both are often, but not always, believed to be god-sent by the Homeric characters and described as such by the poet. However, because of their obvious functional names, they fail to acquire full personality, and because of their ubiquity, the Homeric man or the poet does not seem to find it necessary or possible to pinpoint how and why every single $\delta \tau \eta$ or $\delta \nu e i r o s$ visits a person.\textsuperscript{29}

Conclusion

From the discussions above, we can conclude the following: (1) that Zeus does seem to care for suppliants to some extent. (2) that $\delta \tau \eta$ does not necessarily come from the gods. (3) that the gods, including Zeus, sometimes do send $\delta \tau \eta$ to men to achieve

\textsuperscript{28} On dreams in Homer, see Dodds, ibid., pp. 104-7.

\textsuperscript{29} cf. R. D. Dawe, 'Some reflections on Ate and Hamartia', \textit{HSPh} 72 (1967) p. 100: 'The division of responsibility between men and gods has long been properly understood to be an irresolvable problem in Homer .... ... the Homeric poets did not recognise any contradiction between assigning responsibility for a particular event to the gods in one line and to men in the next.'
their causes. This makes the Litai-Ate 'theory' of Phoenix possible, if not entirely convincing. When he says that "Ατη always goes ahead of Λίται", he is referring to the common and arbitrary nature of her visits: 'She goes everywhere and harms men.' (Iliad 9.506-7), without suggesting any punitive motivations. Then, his hypothesis seems to go, since Zeus is the god of suppliants and capable of mobilizing δραταί, he may well one day punish those who spurn suppliants using δραταί. However, while it seems possible, it is never proved by any evidence in Homer. This being the case, it will be safer for us to read it as an expression of human expectation of divine justice and protection, a persuasive 'theory' of Phoenix, than a well-established theology. We may, on the other hand, separate ourselves from those who claim that the concept expressed there is completely alien to the rest of the epic. Unless it was acceptable to the audience at least as a possible theory, it would not have found its place in its context.

Finally, we must discuss one of the most popular interpretations of the Litai-Ate allegory of Phoenix, that it symbolizes what happens to Achilles in the following course of events. Those who hold such a view argue that 'Achilles is obdurate to the pleas of the envoys, and is then himself smitten by Atē, for instead of helping the Achaeans out of their great crisis he sends his best friend into the battle, where he is killed'.

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30 e.g. H. Fränkel, *Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy* (tr., New York 1951), p. 63; C. M. Bowra, *Tradition and Design in the Iliad* (Oxford 1930) p. 17: 'The theme is how Achilles' temper leads him both to disaster and to moral degradation.'; H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus*, p. 27: '... both Agamemnon and Achilles receive rough justice for their injustice to each other and the rest of the Achaeans perpetrated during their quarrel.'; J. A. Arieti, 'Homer's LITAE and ATE,' *CJ* 84 (1988) 4: '... when Achilles refuses the Litae in Book 9, he is in the grip of Ate ....'
We have now come back to the question whether Achilles is actually hit by $\ddot{d}r\eta$. There is no statement by any characters or by the poet that Achilles is ever affected by $\ddot{d}r\eta$. Why? We can only assume that because he is not. What is often forgotten by those who maintain to the contrary is that not all misfortunes or mistakes are the result of $\ddot{d}r\eta$.

For example, Hera has deceived Zeus not only by $\ddot{d}r\eta$. In the $\tau\alpha\tau\eta$ story recounted by Agamemnon, Zeus declares Eurystheus king instead of Heracles ($ll. 19. 95$ ff) by being deceived by Hera, and the agent of the deception is $\tau\alpha\tau\eta$. In another similar situation, the agent is sleep. Having had Zeus put to sleep by $\pi\nu\nu\sigma$, Hera stirs a storm to blow Heracles' ship far off course ($ll. 14. 249-256$). After he has woken up and seen what has happened, Zeus hurls around the gods in a rage and, just as he throws $\tau\alpha\tau\eta$ to the ground in the other episode, he might have thrown $\pi\nu\nu\sigma$ into the sea (14. 258). True, untimely sleep is sometimes associated with $\ddot{d}r\eta$ as we have seen ($Od. 10. 68, 12. 372$), but neither this episode nor the '$\pi\nu\nu\sigma$' episode following it, also engineered by Hera with the help of $\pi\nu\nu\sigma$ (14. 161 ff), claims that Zeus is affected by $\ddot{d}r\eta$. What, then, is the difference between the two Heracles stories? The only significant difference we can see is that the unfortunate consequences of the $\tau\alpha\tau\eta$ episode are irreversible, while those of the $\pi\nu\nu\sigma$ ones are reparable. Therefore, $\ddot{d}r\eta$ seems to be what leads to major disaster with irreversible, or, at least, very grave, consequences.

This seems to enhance the view that Achilles' loss of Patroclus is the result of his $\ddot{d}r\eta$. It is indeed the most irreversible disaster. Then, why is its cause not called his $\ddot{d}r\eta$? We must now go back to another aspect of the definition of $\ddot{d}r\eta$. It is a state of
mind, malfunction of mind, which prompts misjudgement or misconduct. What misjudgement can we find in Achilles through the course of losing Patroclus? When sending out his friend to the battle? Before he sends his friend out, he specially emphasizes the heart of his advice (II. 16. 83):

πείθεο δ’ οι τοι ἐγκυμύνθων τέλος ἐν φρεσιθείω

That is (87):

ἐκ νην ἔλθος λέναι πάλιν

He says, even if Zeus gives you glory, you should not continue fighting. Do not get carried away by victory, do not go to the city, lest some god, especially Apollo, intervene (87-94). I completely fail to see any misjudgement in his instruction. He knows exactly what will happen, what will cause what, if Patroclus does not follow his instruction. His advice is completely logical and blameless. And when he sees the first bad sign of the reversed charge on the battlefield, he recalls the prediction of Thetis that one of the bravest Myrmidons will be killed before Achilles himself. From this divine knowledge, he deduces what has happened (18. 12-4):

ἡμᾶλα δὴ πέθυκε Μενούτιον ἄλκιμος υἱὸς:

σχέτλιος ἂν ἐκλέγετο ἀποκλείμενον δημον πῦρ

οὐ τίτιν νῆσος ἤκοι, μὴ ἔκτοτε Ἰξίῳ μάχεσθαι.

The absolute clarity and accuracy of his reasoning are even tragic. It is a tragedy of perfect knowledge, not that of Sophoclean irony. Despite the perfect clarity of his mind and his sound perception of the situation at the time when he sends Patroclus out, he loses his friend. Why? Because he could not predict that Patroclus would be affected by ἀτη of an unknown origin (16. 685), be carried away, and ignore Achilles' advice. Achilles also knows, in theory,
that it is Patroclus who is to blame (σχετλιος — he is impossible!). However, he blames himself, out of love, out of sorrow, and out of his responsibility to protect his friend.\textsuperscript{31} 'I should have been there defending him!', he blames himself. Indeed, now, for the first time, his mind is blinded by love, refusing to see the fact that there was little danger for Patroclus and therefore Achilles was not needed provided Patroclus did not go too far. It is Patroclus' δτη which destroyed him.

Is Patroclus' δτη, then, the punishment of Achilles for his refusal to the Embassy's plea? It is certainly another popular interpretation.\textsuperscript{32} But which event to follow this has not been ordained in advance? Achilles is destined to live a very short life (with a false choice of long and less glorious life — false as we can tell from what Thetis says to Zeus; 'Please give honour to my son who is destined to be short-lived.' \textit{II.} 1. 505-6). It is fated that his death shortly follows that of Hector. Hector is to die by the time of the fall of Troy at the latest (because Aeneas will be the only royal survivor) which is imminent in any case, since Troy is destined to fall in the tenth year of the war. And Achilles is to see the death of the 'best of the Myrmidons' under the Trojan wall. Everything is pre-ordained, including the death of Patroclus before Achilles'. Whatever Achilles does, his loss of Patroclus was inevitable.

\textsuperscript{31} cf. S. E. Bassett, \textit{The Poetry of Homer}, p. 201: 'Like all noble natures, he forgets the shortcomings of others, and thinks only of what he believes to be his own.'

\textsuperscript{32} e. g. A. Thornton, \textit{Homer's Iliad}, 135-6: 'According to the plea of the goddesses of supplication to Zeus (I 512), Blind Madness 'follows' Achilles, and it does so by attacking his 'substitute', his beloved friend Patroclus. ... The death of Patroclus is the punishment (I 512) which Zeus inflicts upon Achilles for rejecting the supplications of the Embassy and of Patroclus, ....'
On the other hand, despite his self-accusation, Achilles knows what was responsible for his absence at the crucial moment for his friend: Agamemnon's δτη which caused Achilles' anger. Achilles wishes the anger disappeared from the world completely, in his wailing regret. However, he never says 'I am sorry that I became angry.' His logic is 'I am sorry that he angered me.' (18. 111) He expresses his regret for Agamemnon's δτη again later (19. 270-3). It is by no means Achilles' δτη — even after the 'disaster' he does not perceive any. Thus his disaster does not fulfil another condition of δτη. He does not look back and see he acted in a wrong way. No. His anger at Agamemnon was, at least in his perception, an inevitable and automatic consequence of Agamemnon's δτη. Even blinded in tears, Achilles does not make any concession on this point. He simply sees no more point in making fuss about his so far still-injured honour. Although he does not want any compensation himself (19. 147 ff), he does receive it in the end, because it was obvious to everyone that Agamemnon was to blame (19. 172-83).\(^3\) He is not angry at the king any more, simply because it does not matter now.

Instead, Achilles blames himself for his ignorance, not of logical possibilities, but of something impossible to know — the fate of his friend, predicted by Thetis in an obscure way, fixed a long time ago and inescapable. What can be, then, more tragic than Achilles' situation? He must blame himself forever for not being capable of something impossible. It is not δτη, a temporary malfunction of mind, but the eternal blindness of humanity that failed Achilles. If Zeus has accomplished it all, he has done it as

\(^3\) cf. Poseidon's comment on Agamemnon at II. 13. 111:'\(\deltaλλε \ καλ \ πημπαν \ ετημιμον \ απτος \ εστιν.'
part of his ever inscrutable $\beta\omega\nu\lambda\nu$ and in accordance with $\mu\omicron\omicron\io\varrho\alpha$, not as punishment through $\delta\tau\varsigma$.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{34} See the poet's report on Zeus' reaction to Achilles' prayer at 16. 249-50 emphasizing his ignorance. And also his comment that Zeus' $\nu\omicron\sigma\varsigma$ is stronger than men's (16. 688). The dying Patroclus himself says that $\mu\omicron\omicron\io\varrho\alpha$ and Apollo are ultimately responsible for his death (16. 849). Cf. G. S. Kirk, \textit{The Songs of Homer}, p. 379-80: '[The poet] is emphasizing the power and the pathos of fate, the way in which Achilles's anger involved those he least expected to involve, and the inevitability of retribution once Patroclus has exceeded his orders and his nature.' The relationship between $\mu\omicron\omicron\io\varrho\alpha$ and Zeus will be examined in Chapters 6 and 7.
Chapter 5 The rainstorm of Zeus — δίκη and θέμις

At ll. 16. 386-8, Zeus is said to be angry at those who decided on σκολίαι θεμιστές and 'expelled' δίκη. The usage of the words θεμιστές and δίκη here is peculiar, because this is the only passage in Homer in which 'θεμιστές' can be crooked or straight and δίκη is 'expelled' as if personified. Since these remind us of the recurrent phrase 'crooked δίκη/δίκαιο' in Hesiod (Works 219, 250 σκολίαι δίκησιν, 221 σκολίης δίκης, 264 σκολίεων δικέων. cf. Works 36 ιθείης δίκης, 225-6 δίκας ιθείας, Theogony 86 ιθείης δίκησιν, fr. 286. 2. δίκη ιθεία) and the expelled Δίκη at Works 220-4, Hesiodean influence has been suspected.1 If the passage is indeed influenced by or even interpolated from Hesiod, the image of Zeus depicted here cannot be taken as a genuine Homeric view of the god. In order to tackle this problem, we must examine the usage of δίκη and θεμιστές both in Homer and in Hesiod.

δίκη in Homer

Whatever the etymology or original meaning of δίκη might be, it is obvious from Homer's usage of the word and its cognates that it does not mean in Homer what we call 'justice' in English.2

1 cf. Chapter 1, n. 23.
2 For the etymology of δίκη, see LfGrE (as related to 'δείκνυμι' and with the basic meaning 'Weisung' or 'Weiserin') and literature cited there among which I find L. R. Palmer's 'The Indo-European Origins of Greek Justice' in TPPhS (1950) 149-168 most systematic and convincing. Palmer analyses δίκη as from *deik ="mark, point, show" and deduces that its original meaning was 'to show' the boundary mark'. In conclusion (p. 168), he says that δίκη, αίσα, μοίρα, νέμεσις, and δαίμων are all expressions of the world view of IE origin, that the order of the world 'was the result of an elemental act of apportionment whereby each component of the universe, gods, men, and natural objects had its allotted portion, the boundaries of which might not be transgressed without grave results.'
The most striking example is at *Od.* 4. 690-2 where unreasonable (*ἐξαισιος*) words and deeds and favouritism of kings are said to be 'δίκη of god-like kings' (δίκη θείων βασιλέων). This δίκη can only mean 'typical behaviour' quite apart from moral evaluation. Likewise, when Athena miraculously lights up the passage through which Odysseus and Telemachus take weapons away from the hall, Odysseus says that this is the δίκη of the gods (*Od.* 19. 43), their typical behaviour. The focus is on the fashion of the act, not the moral motivation.

To a much-tried wanderer away from home for many years, the recounting of his experience brings fresh woe — that is also δίκη, a typical thing to happen (*Od.* 19. 168). For servants ever afraid of their arrogant young masters, it is δίκη to give 'a small but welcome gift' (*Od.* 14. 58-9) to their guests. These examples of δίκη are not things which must happen in a moral sense, but things which tend to happen to a specific category of people or gods.

δίκη can, however, be something inevitable at times. The dead become ghost-like *ψυχαί* — that is the δίκη, most typical — since inevitable — behaviour, of mortals (*Od.* 11. 218-222). This δίκη is almost synonymous with *μοῖρα* or *αἬσα*, i.e. one's lot. It is part of natural law, not moral law.

Zeus certainly is depicted as a distributor of δίκη as well as that of *μοῖρα/αἬσα*, but δίκη in the general sense of decision rather than justice. At *II.* 1. 542, he is criticized by Hera for making a decision (δικαζείμεν) secretly with Thetis. At *II.* 8. 431, too, she is sarcastic about Zeus' δίκη — decision — on the fate of the Trojans and the Achaeans (δικαζείτω). On these occasions he is not acting as a moral judge.
δίκη as typical behaviour, or a lot particular to certain category of people, however, does take on a moral overtone. Comfortable retirement is the δίκη, what is suitable, what must be given, i.e. right, of a noble man in his old age (Od. 24. 255). If he is not in a good condition, it is negligence of somebody responsible for looking after him (δεργιή of his master is a possible — though rejected— reason for Laertes' poor clothing).

Penelope rebukes her suitors for their manner of proposal (Od. 18. 275-9):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{μυστηρίων οὐχ ἦσσε δίκη τὸ πάροιχε τέτυκτα} \\
\text{αὐτῷ τῇ ὠπάγουσα βᾶς καὶ ἱφια μῆλα} \\
\text{κούρης δαιτα φλοίου, καὶ φυλακ δώρα διδοῦσιν.}
\end{align*}
\]

Clearly her point is based on the good traditional way of courtship, the manner required from people in her suitors' position. This δίκη means good behaviour. Since their behaviour is not in accordance with the moral δίκη of suitors or guests (Od. 14. 90-91 οὐκ ... δικαιῶσ), they are not δίκαιοι (Od. 2. 282).

When Nestor says Athena was angry at the Achaeans because not all of them were δίκαιοι (Od. 3. 133), he is alluding to the impious deed done by Locrian Ajax i.e. the rape of Cassandra in the sanctuary of the virgin goddess. When Odysseus thinks he was deceived by the Phaeacians, he says they were not δίκαιοι (Od. 13. 209). Disappointing visitors — even beggars — is not δίκαιον (Od. 20. 294, 21. 312). Agamemnon, who has wronged Achilles, is advised to be 'δικαιότερος' hereafter (II. 19. 181) and to entertain

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3 cf. Chapter 1, n. 22.
Achilles so that Achilles will have what he is entitled to (δίκη), in this case, his full status restored in the Achaean camp (Il. 19.180). δίκη or δίκαιος in these examples clearly deals with a sense of justice, what is right or wrong.

On the other hand, while the statement 'He is not δίκαιος.' in general is a strong moral reproach equivalent to 'He is unjust.', its counterpart 'He is δίκαιος.' does not seem so much a matter of being just in a sharp contrast with unjust, as that of knowing social conventions well and consequently behaving politely, wisely and agreeably. Nestor, for example, is a typical 'δίκαιος' man. Telemachus describes him as follows (Od. 3. 244-5):

Νέστορι, ἔτει περὶ οἶδε δίκαιος ὅπερ φρόνιμοι ἄλλων

τρὶς γὰρ δήμου φασίν ἀδιάκοσμαι γένει ἀθρόω.

Nestor knows δίκαι and φρόνις better than any other people because he has lived longer than others. Obviously 'δίκαι' here is something one gains through experience which we can naturally assume to be the knowledge and manners to deal with the world, in other words, knowledge of what tends to happen and what must be done in given situations. It is a collection of much broader knowledge than merely to tell right from wrong.

His son Peisistratus, young though he is, is also δίκαιος in the same way as his father. He pleases Athena-Mentor with his polite manner when offering her a goblet of wine before her younger companion (Od. 3. 52-3):

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4 Concerning 179-80, G. Nagy points out the correlation of the word δίκη with the concept of making fair allotments (βάλομαι) and with διάς (related to βαίνομαι itself and often mentioned as 'an equal διάς'). cf. The Best of the Achaean (Baltimore and London 1979) p. 128-9. His point, in short, would be that δίκη implies that each person has his fair share of honour (τιμῆς). See also Palmer op. cit. 160--1, 166.

5 F. Krafft, Vergleichende Untersuchungen zu Homer und Hesiod, pp. 77-8 presents similar observations.
'δική' implied in δικαίος here is little more, in effect, than good manners.

When Beggar-Odysseus has been badly taunted and teased by the suitors, Telemachus reproaches them and calls it a day (Od. 18. 406-9):

\[\text{δαμάσω, μαίνεσθαι καὶ οὐκέτι κείμενος θυμός}
\begin{align*}
\betaροτίνα οἴδη ποτήρα θεῶν νύ τις ἵμμι φοβώμενι
\text{ἀλλ' εἰ διαλείπεις κατακείμενος ὅκατ' ἄντες.}
\end{align*}
\[\text{ἀπότεθεν θυμὸς δίωγεν δικαίος ὅτιν' διώγει.}

While other suitors are enraged by his statement, Amphinomus persuades the others not to answer with violent words to the words said 'in accordance with the social convention' (18. 414 ἀπεθέντι δικαίῳ), no doubt both in content (visitors must be protected; the possible effect of wine and divine stimulus) and in manner (his subtle way of making his point especially in the last half line). The same use of δικαίος recurs in an identical situation in 20. 322 (18. 414-7 = 20. 322-5).

Such a combination of awareness of social rules and good manners to practise or express them seems to be the essence of being δικαίος. The coupling of δική/δικαίος with πεπνυμένος (Od. 3. 52), φρόνις (Od. 3. 244), and νοημών (Od. 2. 282, 13. 209) also suggests that δική is as much a matter of modesty as of knowledge. If that is the case, it is no surprise that the δικαιότατος tribe of men happen to be called the Ἄβιοι, the Non-violent or Non-forcible. The wise tutor of heroes Cheiron is δικαιότατος of the Centaurs (Il. 11. 832), not at all like Eurytion who has the manner of beasts (Od. 21. 295-8).
A traveller just arrived in a foreign land wonders whether residents there are δίκαιοι or not (Od. 6. 120-1 = 9. 175-6 =13. 201-2):

ἡδ ου νῆρασται τε καὶ δῆροι οὐδὲ δίκαιοι,
τε φιλάξεινοι καὶ σφυν νός ἐστι θεουδής.

(Od. 8. 575-6):

ἡμὲν δοκι χαλέποι τε καὶ δῆροι οὐδὲ δίκαιοι.
οὐ τε φιλάξεινοι καὶ σφυν νός ἐστι θεουδής.

The sign of 'δίκαιοι' people is their hospitality and awe of the gods. Those who are not δίκαιοι are χαλέποι, ὑβρισταί, and δῆροι. It is clear from this contrast that the 'δίκαιοι' are thoughtful, polite people with the knowledge of social conventions such as the custom of ξεινία. On the contrary, the 'non-δίκαιοι' are harsh, arrogant and not 'civilized', i.e. ignorant of social rules such as that of ξεινία. It is in this very same way that the Cyclopes are δῆροι and ignorant of δίκαιοι or θεμιστες (Od. 9. 215). They are 'wild' in the way wild animals are. They are ignorant of agriculture, and rely entirely on rich natural resources endowed by the gods (9. 107-11).6 They have no social institution such as διόρατος or θεμιστες, but each one keeps order in his house (9. 112-5). Since they know nothing about social institutions or rules compelling them to fear the gods, to respect ξεινιοι, or to be considerate to others, they are said to be ignorant of δίκαιοι — but if they are not 'δίκαιοι', neither are they 'unjust'. They are literally δίκη-less, lacking the social structure

based on the human sense of δίκη. If there is no law, there is no crime. That may explain why Polyphemus is not punished by the gods despite his treatment of the visitors to his cave. We may even call it his 'δίκη', his typical behaviour faithful to his nature.

However, men cannot accept the idea that the gods can approve such a non-human 'δίκη'. Odysseus condemns the Cyclops' brutality saying that the gods have punished him (Od. 9. 477-9). Eumaeus, referring to the suitors who are ὑπερφιάλοι (Od. 4. 790, 13. 373, 14. 27, 15. 315, 16. 271, 18. 167, 20. 12, 291, 23. 356, etc.) like the Cyclopes (9. 106), expresses his faith in the moral gods (Od. 14. 83-84):

οὖμεν σχέτλα ἔργα θεομάκαρες φιλέωσιν,

ἄλλα δίκην πόνοι καὶ αἰσχμα ἔργα φθοράπως.

According to him, the δίκη which the gods approve is of the same nature as αἰσχμα ἔργα, moderate behaviour, namely the δίκη as the command of social conventions and good manners.

When δίκη is brought into the ἀγορή, however, the dichotomy is not social-natural, but straight-crooked, dichotomy within the social δίκη. It is no longer a matter of fairly flexible 'moderate' and 'wise' behaviour, but a decision between right and wrong, just and unjust in a sharp contrast, often involving bitter

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7 For the contrast between Odysseus' morality and that of the Cyclops see M. I. Finley, The World of Odysseus, p. 101: 'Behind the fairy-tale, clearly, there lay a distinct view of social evolution. In primitive times, the poet seems to be suggesting, man lived in a state of permanent struggle and war to the death against the outsider. Then the gods intervened, and through their precepts, their themís, a new ideal was set before man, and especially before a king, an obligation of hospitality: 'all strangers and beggars are from Zeus' (14. 57-8). Henceforth men had to pick a difficult path between the two, between the reality of a society in which the stranger was still a problem and a threat, and the newer morality, according to which he was somehow covered by the aegis of Zeus.'
contention. We have a typical example of such scenes on the shield of Achilles (II. 18. 497-508):

λαοὶ δὲ ἀγορηκέαν ἀβρακτα ἐθάντα δὲ νείκος
ἀρφεί, διὸ δὲ ἀνάγλυχοι ἐνείκουν ἐνείκα ποιῆσιν ἀνέφοιμον ὁ μὲν ἐξεῖσεν πάντα ἀποδόθαι
δῆμῳ πυφαύσκων, δ' ὀφαλῶς ἐμθὲν ἐλέσθαι.

ἀμφω δὲ λεώθην ἑπὶ ἱστορα πείραρ εἰλέσθαι.

λαοὶ δὲ ἀμφοτέρους ἐπήτυους, ἀμφὸς ἀφυγότες
κηρυκεῖς δὲ ύπα λαῖν ἐφήτυνος, ἀδὲ γέρουτες

καὶ ἐπὶ ἐκείστωσιν. λίθως ἀρματεῖν κόσμῳ
σκήπτρα δὲ κυρίας ἐν χερῶ ἔχουσὶν ἀρχομένων
τοῖς ἐπείτ' ἔπαιμον ἀμφοτήριον ἀδὲ ἰδιαίτερον.
κείτο δὲ ἐν μεσόσοις δῶχ χρυσῶν τάλαντα
τριὼδεῖς δὲ μετὰ τοῖς δίκην ἱδώντατα ἐδοκεῖν

That there is more than one degree of fairness in this system is clear from the expression 'δίκην ἱδώντατα' (508); δίκη that is very fair, reasonably fair, slightly unfair, grossly unfair, and so on. There is even a prize for the 'most straight' judgement to encourage the elders to be as fair as possible and possibly even to counteract bribery. It is a strikingly realistic account of the institution of justice with no idealistic hero-king present. It is a description of a non-heroic society possibly contemporary with the poet.

The heroic society, of course, is not free from the conflict between just and unjust. When Antilochus has claimed his right (δίκη II. 23. 542) to the second prize of the chariot race which Achilles intends to give to Eumelus, Menelaus claims his right because he has finished third only due to Antilochus' cheat. He can no longer tolerate the situation since Antilochus himself does
not tolerate the unfair degrading of prizes. Menelaus reveals the cheating of Antilochus and first calls for judgement by the Achaean (573-4):


Then he changes his mind and decides to be a judge himself (579-85) knowing that the matter is crystal clear:


It is indeed a straight (ἰθεὶα 580) judgement. Without bullying with his authority, he puts Antilochus in a dilemma, confession of his misconduct or a false oath which is a serious offence against the god and would in any case decisively remove him from the favour of Menelaus. There is no real choice. Antilochus apologizes, offers compensation and returns the prize to Menelaus (587-97).

This dissolves Menelaus' anger and he regains his typical generosity. He forgives the young man saying that his youthful recklessness temporarily overcame his wisdom (604), expresses his appreciation of his and his family's credit (607-8) and gives the prize back to him (609-11):


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8 For this interpretation of δικάσω (579), see J. H. Kells, 'Euripides, Electra 1093-5, and some uses of δικαζεῖν, in CQ 10 (1960) 133-4.
This is his final judgement. It is not strictly a 'straight' judgement in the sense of 'an eye for an eye'. He does not take compensation, nor the prize he is entitled to, but forgives Antilochus for nothing. Only a short lecture is enough: 'You were not yourself at that time. Don't do it again.' It is not a punitive sentence, but corrective enough through the enhancement of the good relationship between the two. After all, Menelaus is more concerned about what others will think of him (575-8). His relation with other Achaeans is as important as that with Antilochus. So he chooses to show his generosity 'so that they may know my heart is not arrogant (ὑπερφίλαος) or harsh' (610-11). He must not look as if his heart is 'ὑπερφίλαος', an adjective for non-δίκαιοι people like the Cyclopes and the suitors who do not know δίκη. By doing so, Menelaus restores the complete harmony in the community. This is the typical δίκη of Homeric heroes. Its aim is not to pursue exacting punishment for crime, but most of all to seek the good for both parties involved and the whole society. The sharp contrast between just and unjust does appear in a bitter dispute, but is kept short-lived. Menelaus' considerate way of handling this matter is the sort of δικη

9 I. M. Hohendahl-Zoetelief, in Manners in the Homeric Epic (Leiden 1980) p. 53 and pp. 143-4, thinks that this explanation may appear to be Menelaus' 'diplomatic, perhaps even a logical, mistake,' for he looks like lacking modesty. However, from the poet's point of view, this comment is necessary to show that Menelaus' ultimate concern is to consolidate his relationship with the whole community, not only with Antilochus.
10 It is interesting to compare with this observation the account of K. J. Dover on the concern of a later Greek jury in Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle, (Oxford 1974) p. 158: '... the question which a lawsuit or an indictment posed to a Greek jury was ... 'What action in respect of this situation is likely to have the best consequences for the strength of the community?'
approved and praised in the Homeric society. Extenuation is by no means a modern invention.

If we look further around, we see many such examples of δίκη, judgement, in the funeral game, a rare occasion on which we see the 'morality in peace' at work in the Iliad.

Achilles' initial decision to give the second prize for the chariot race to Eumelus, who lost by an accident, is a good example (23. 536-8):

λοίπον ἄριστον ἐλαίει μάλαξας Ἰπποὺς
ἀλλ' ἔργο δέν μεν ἔβλιον ὡς ἐπειτέεις.
δεῦτερόν τίποτα πρώτοις περέσθω Τυκέως ὦς.

It is not a 'straight' judgement at all. It is far from our idea of 'fair play'. We find it unfair as Antilochus does. A loser is a loser. Nevertheless, all others applaud Achilles' decision (539). Why? Because it establishes the best social unity. It can certainly be argued from this passage that a man is valued for what he is rather than what he does in the Homeric society, and therefore despite his failure in this particular performance Eumelus gets the prize for his unchanged value. It may be so. But if so, there is little point in the competition to begin with. The motivation for Achilles' decision is simple. He pities the best charioteer humiliated and disappointed by the accident (αἰτεῖται 534). The sentiment seems to be shared by others, too, judging by their reaction to his suggestion. Eumelus does not get the prize exactly for being what he is — otherwise he should have received the first prize instead of the second, but for the sake of good social relationship among heroes, each with some share of honour. In their society, Achilles' slightly 'bent' δίκη is far more welcome than Antilochus' 'straight' δίκη based on sharp dichotomy between
success and failure. Even Antilochus is not opposed to giving some other prize to Eumelus and knows that Achilles will be praised for doing so (548-52).

The same δίκη is in function when the superfluous prize goes to Nestor. Achilles gives it to the old man not because he is a great athlete, but precisely because he is not (621-3), and nevertheless deserves honour for other reasons, namely his δρετή especially in counsel, his status as δγαθός, and his age. He himself knows the reason for the award and that he is entitled to it (647-50):

Achilles' courtesy even deserves blessings of the gods. The observation of the social structure and respect to elders is the heart of δίκη of Homeric heroes.

The extreme case of such consideration for social harmony is the last and aborted competition of spear-throwing. The only volunteers are Agamemnon and Meliones. Then Achilles gives the first prize to Agamemnon with no competition, saying that everybody knows that he is the best (891 δριστός) in this game.

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11 Hohendahl-Zoetelief, op. cit.p. 116, thinks that this is only Nestor's interpretation and Achilles gives the prize in fact as a consolation rather than an honour. When we consider, however, that this episode immediately follows Menelaus' final speech to Antilochus in which he especially mentions the credit to Nestor and his sons as the reason to let Antilochus go with the second prize, there is no doubt about Achilles' (and audience's) awareness of honour due to the old man, whatever the face value of Achilles' words might be.

12 Note that this is an adjective he insistently reserves for himself in the bitter quarrel with Agamemnon in Book 1 (244, 412), because the question which of the two is the best of the Achaeans was the real issue over which
Is it, then, a good example of a man valued for what he is? It may be so. But if Agamemnon's superiority is beyond doubt and his victory 100% sure, the performance would not affect the distribution of the prizes. However, if they do play, it may affect the social harmony. If by any chance Agamemnon loses, his pride will be hurt and, temperamental as he is, he may spoil the occasion. On the other hand, even if he wins, Meliones may not please Agamemnon if he challenges the king with high spirit. It is above all Achilles' precaution for Meliones and the rest of the company knowing what the great king's temper is like. We may not call it a 'straight' judgement, but if it does not lead to the good of the society with everyone happy with his deserved honour, what is the point of making it straight?¹³

There is little doubt in that this same principle is applied in kings' judicial δίκαιοι, too. The fallen Sarpedon is remembered as a king who has protected (ἐπτυντ) Lycia with his 'δίκαιοι' and 'σθένοις' (Il. 16. 542). σθένοις must be his defence force to keep his people physically safe and δίκαιοι must be his administration to maintain good order and social unity within his kingdom which is indeed the best defence for any countries.

Minos is the king and judge among the dead (Od. 11. 569-70). But his judgements are not the 'Last Judgement' as in Christian eschatology. He is acting exactly like a living king, settling disputes to restore social harmony among the dead. We

¹³ We know how unfortunate an inconsiderate 'straight' judgement can be through the judgement in the contest between Odysseus and Ajax (Od. 11. 545-7). The δίκη of Athena and some Trojans ruined the life of a supreme hero. The winner Odysseus himself regrets it most bitterly and wishes he had never won (548). What hurts most is that the judgement destroyed not only Ajax' life, but his friendship with Odysseus for ever.
can tell this because δίκαιοι are not imposed on the dead by the judge, but 'sought' by them (11. 570 οἱ δὲ μὲν δῆμι δίκας εὑρόντο ἀνακτά). The judge is there above all to serve the good of his people. When hanging above Charybdis, Odysseus may have had a 'flash back' of his old days when he was such a 'civil servant' (Od. 12. 439-41):

...Ἡμοί δέ ἐπὶ τὸν ἄστην ἄφαρον ἀνείποητην

κρύον ἄεικα πολλὰ δικαζομένων αἰτήματι.

Τῆς δὲ τά γε δοῦρα Χαρίβδιος ἔξειφάδην.

The sight of his life-saving timber must have been no less welcome than dinner after a long working day.

Athena gives us testimony of what sort of king Odysseus used to be in Ithaca (Od. 5. 8.-12):

μή τις ἐπὶ πρόξεως ἀθλείας καὶ θῆμος ἔστω

σκυπτῳδοὺς βασιλείας, μὴ δὲ φρεσκὰ ἀλομα εἰδὼς,

ἄλλα καὶ ταῖς μείνησις ὁδοφόρος θείοισι

λαῖῳ δορὺ ἀκανθός, πατήρ δὲ ἄσπις ἄρτον.

He was a model of a good king. He was kind (ἀγανὸς), as mild (ἔπιος) as a father to his people, and moderate/reasonable-minded (φρεσκὰ ἀλομα εἰδὼς). This is the way a king should be. Straight but strict judgements cannot be at home in such a king's law-court. Notably, δίκη never means 'penalty' or 'punishment' in Homer.14

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14 When Lloyd-Jones says (The Justice of Zeus p. 27), '... just as the Trojans will finally receive rough justice in return for their aggression against Menelaus, both Agamemnon and Achilles receive rough justice for their injustice to each other and the rest of the Achaeans perpetrated during their quarrel,' he obviously does not define the term 'justice' or 'rough justice' according to the Homeric use of the word δίκη, as he implicitly admits in his new edition (1983, p. 166), but according to his own notion of justice, i. e. strict punishment for crime.
The Beggar-Odysseus describes what a good king's reign is like in a simile to praise Penelope (*Od. 19. 109-14*). The *eudikη̃* (111) or *eunyeσσιν* (114) of a king allows him to rule over many mighty people. Nature itself responds to his virtue with abundant fruit of the land and sea. This may be taken as the gods' reward to the righteous king, just as the rain-storm is the punishment of those who chose 'crooked ordinances' at *Il. 16. 384-8*. However, we have no direct evidence of such reward in the narrative. Moreover, we know that the Cyclopes, who do not know any *dikη̃* or *θεμις*, enjoy the same nature-given abundance (*Od. 9. 109-111*). Such prosperity cannot be taken as evidence for the gods' constant support for righteous men.

Odysseus' virtue as a king is certainly acknowledged by Athena, but, as we have already seen, she has so many other reasons to protect Odysseus that we cannot conclude from his case that Zeus or other gods reward good kings for their good *dikη̃* or punish them for their bad one. Zeus loves Sarpedon as his son, not as a good king, but in any case he cannot save his son from his destined death. Being a good king does not help Sarpedon at all.

However, after all, it is not bad at all to be a *baasilēν* (*Od. 1. 392-3*). Honour and wealth always seem to be the reward of kings, good or bad. Even the young Telemachus, who has not yet started his career as a *baasilēν*, is already respected as *dikasπολος* and entertained by his people (*Od. 11. 185-6*).

The only 'reward' from the gods to a righteous king we know of is that of Minos, that is, the eternal office of judge among the dead! This seems to be the best a king can expect from the

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15 See below for a detailed discussion of the passage.
gods for being a good judge. It may not be tempting enough to
deter earthly kings from bad but profitable behaviour.

In sum, δική is a normal way of life, a way an individual or a
society usually is (hence often 'should be'). It is generally a
human matter rather than a divine concern and not necessarily a
compelling model of behaviour. It is a job of kings to decide what
the 'way' should be about disputed matters. δική can be modified
by the authority of a king to achieve the aim of harmony in
society. Although he may be sometimes subject to favouritism
(Od. 4. 690-2), a Homeric king in general seems to serve his
people well with his reasonable judgements, δικαι. The δική in the
court of elders which we see only in 'digressions' or similes, on
the other hand, seems more liable to injustice, for the βασιλης
need some immediate reward to be encouraged to be fair.

δεμισ in Homer

When used to describe 'typical' behaviour, δεμισ is almost
synonymous with δική, except that in general the former is more
inevitable and less subject to amendments.16 One may say that
Penelope's sorrow for her missing husband, which is labelled δεμισ
(Od. 14. 130), is just another human sorrow like a wanderer's
renewed sorrow in remembering his hardships, which is called
δική (Od. 19. 168). However, the latter is something one could do
without and had better be overcome. On the other hand, when a
woman is in Penelope's position, it is not only natural for her to
shed tears for her husband, but is expected from her by the

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16 There is no clearly 'immoral' usage of δεμισ in Homeric epics, but there
is one example in the Hymn to Apollo (540-1): η' τι τηθσιν έπος έσυσται τ'η' τι έργουν. / οδης θ. hiatus δεμις ειτι καταδηπτων ανθρωπων.
society. The speaker who describes Penelope's lament as 'θέμις' has at the back of his mind the social norm 'A wife should lament her lost husband.' If she does not, it is not only unusual, but blameworthy. We can confirm it by the parallel case of the funeral custom of antiquity which is undoubtedly an example of θέμις itself. Wailing and lamenting for the dead is not just allowed or natural, but compulsory, especially for females.17

Similarly, when Agamemnon's ghost says that it is θέμις that Telemachus will welcome his father with his embrace (Od. 11. 451), there is an underlying social norm, 'A son should love his father.' If he does not, it is not only unusual, but morally unacceptable.18

One may find an 'immoral' example of θέμις in Agamemnon's oath that he has never laid his hand on Briseis (II. 9. 132-4; cf. 274-6, 19. 175-7):

ἐπὶ δὲ μεγάν ὥρκον φροίμαι

μὴ ποτε τῆς εὐνής ἐπιβῆμενα τῇ μεγήνα,

ἡ θέμις αὐθρότων πέλει, αὐθρών ἡθ γυνακῶν.

In this particular context — talking about Agamemnon sharing a bed with Briseis whom he robbed of Achilles — the θέμις does look

17 See the poet's cynical comment on the slave-women of Achilles pretending to be lamenting for Patroclus (II. 19. 301-2).
18 This and the preceding example of θέμις concerning members of families may remind some readers of the suggestion that θέμις is the law within a family and δίκη the law between different families. Cf. E. Benveniste, Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes (Paris 1969), p. 102; G. Glotz, La solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminel grec (Paris 1904), esp. pp. 21-2. These are probably part of evidence for such a suggestion, but, as far as Homer and Hesiod are concerned, it is obvious that the hypothesis simply does not work except in these examples. θέμις, above all, is a public affair closely connected with ἄγορη (cf. II. 20. 4, Od. 2. 68-9). For further criticism of the view of Glotz and Benveniste, see G. C. Viachos, Les Sociétés politiques homériques (Paris 1974), p. 335: '... Thémis, installée dans l' agora et rendue publique, symbolise désormais une justice parfaitement objective et rattachée à l' institution commune de la Cité.'
immoral. However, if taken out as an independent maxim, it can be read as a solemn statement of natural law. Reproduction and preservation of species is the utmost necessity of all living creatures including human beings. Being natural law, it is certainly not moral, but amoral. It is beyond good or bad. And its inevitability is even more tense than affection between husband and wife or father and son. Thetis' advice to Achilles when he is in suicidal despair is to eat and to sleep with a woman (which is good, she says) (ili. 24. 129-31). Sexual intercourse, either with one's wife or concubine, is nothing immoral in itself in the Homeric world.

There are some other examples of ἰδιορέσ as non-moral customs or habits. Achilles says it is ἰδιορέσ for the Achaeans to come to visit Achilles' hut for holding counsels (ili. 24. 652). This ἰδιορέσ could be just a habit, though it may well be a formal agreement, a sort of social rule.

It was not ἰδιορέσ for Achilles' god-made helmet to fall on the ground until Patroclus borrowed it (ili. 16. 796). This ἰδιορέσ may be taken as the will of the gods, for the helmet is a divine product, but the 'will of the gods', as in this case, is not always 'moral' in human terms. Amphinomus volunteers to kill Telemachus if 'it is the ἰδιορέσ of Zeus' (Od. 16. 409). Although it turns out not to be the case, it is supposed to be possible that the gods might produce such ἰδιορέσ as their ordinances. This usage of ἰδιορέσ seems to carry a meaning close to 'oracle'.

It is said that it is not ἰδιορέσ for human beings to confront Poseidon in the battle (ili. 14. 384-7):

ἀφεί καὶ αὐταὶ Ποσειδών ἐνοχόθων,

ὅθεν ἔφη παντίκες ἔχων ἐν χειρὶ παχέῃ.
There is grammatical difficulty in interpreting τῇ in line 386, whether we can read it as 'with him (Poseidon)' rather than 'with it (αἵρος)', along with the peculiar usage of 'μυγὴναί', but it is clear enough that the horrific sight of the god is what matters here.\(^{19}\) R. Hirzel's interpretation of this οὐ θέμις as 'not advisable' seems to fit better than 'not allowed'.\(^{20}\) In either case, those who advise or allow would be ultimately the gods.

Some θέμιστες are, of course, definitely moral codes. One of them is ξεινία, the code of host-guest friendship. Hospitality is the θέμις for guests (I. 11. 779 ξεινία ... ἀ τε ξεινίας θέμις ἐστίν Od. 9. 267-8 ξεινίαν ... ἀ τε ξεινίας θέμις ἐστίν.) If you disregard visitors, it is 'οὐ θέμις' (Od. 14. 56-7). It is equally θέμις to reciprocate hospitality (Od. 24. 285-6). The goddess Themis herself is a model of a good host(ess) quick in welcoming (I. 15. 87-9). It is θέμις for Nestor to give as much information as he has about Odysseus to his guest Telemachus who has come to his house for it (Od. 3. 187). The ultimate authority who guarantees this θέμις to guests is Zeus. Therefore if a man happens to be hated by the gods, it is no longer θέμις to entertain him or assist his journey (Od. 10. 73-4). The suitors of Penelope are accused of being δδθέμισταν (θέμις-less) mainly because of their violation of the θέμις of ξεινία — damaging their host's property and harassing the visitors to the house (Od. 17. 363, 20. 287).

Religious customs form another major category of θέμις. Libation before prayer to the gods is θέμις (Od. 3. 45). It is θέμις to

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19 W. Leaf, ad. loc.
make an oath to Poseidon when a man gives testimony on a matter of horses (II. 23. 581-5). For Achilles, it is not θέμις to wash himself before completing funeral rites for Patroclus (II. 23. 44).

And, most importantly to our inquiry, θέμις is law and legislation through public assemblies. Hence Themis is the goddess of the assembly. She summons the assembly of the gods on behalf of Zeus (II. 20. 4). In the assembly of the Ithacans, Telemachus appeals to the citizens to check the suitors from wasting his property, in the names of Zeus and Themis as the gods of assembly (Od. 2. 68-9), who are both the gods of ξειώμη, too.

Zeus is believed to grant 'σκῆπτρον' and 'θέμιστες' to βασιλής (II. 2. 205-6, 9. 98-9) and they in turn are supposed to protect θέμιστες in the capacity of δικαστόλοι (II. 1. 238-9). However, that θέμις is not a monopoly of a monarch is clear from the frequent coupling of ἄγορα and θέμις (II. 11. 807, Od. 9. 112, 215). θέμις, whether it is a moral code or a custom of a community, is something legislated or preserved in assemblies of nobles (βασιλής) or even common people. Freedom of speech itself is guaranteed as θέμις in a public assembly (II. 2. 73, 9. 33). Even a beggar's claim that it is θέμις for him to speak out in a private conversation may be a reflection of this system (Od. 16. 91). True, Thersites is punished for his rudely frank rebuke of Agamemnon (II. 2. 265-6), but such a speech seems to be his routine practice (II. 2. 213-6), and the very fact that such a man can still speak out boldly is the sign of considerable tolerance. Even Odysseus' physical punishment and threat of more do not suggest any more than temporary disgrace (2. 261-4). Thersites
is hated most of all for disturbing constructive discussions, thereby abusing the very \( \theta\epsilon\mu\iota\varsigma \) which allows him to speak out.

King Minos is a single judge in the Underworld giving \( \theta\epsilon\mu\iota\varsigma \) to the dead (\( \theta\epsilon\mu\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\upsilon\omega\nu\tau\alpha \text{ Od. 11. 569} \), but he is there to listen to what they say first and then to give \( \delta\epsilon\kappa\alpha\iota \) (570) while others surround him, listening to his judgements. \( \theta\epsilon\mu\iota\varsigma \) is always a public matter.

As part of his compensation to Achilles, Agamemnon promises seven cities as his daughter's dowry. He describes how the residents there would honour Achilles (\( \Pi. 9. 154-6, \text{ almost } = 296-8 \)):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ἐν δ ὀψρεσ ναύοι πολύρρησις πολυβουτα}, \\
\text{ἀκέε δαπάνη θεῖν ὄς τιμήουσιν} \\
\text{kai o� ὀπδ σκήπτρῳ λιπαρᾶς τελέουσι βέμοστας.
\end{align*}
\]

Since they are completed 'under his sceptre', it is obvious that these \( \theta\epsilon\mu\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\varsigma \) have something to do with law and custom under the king's protection. It seems most natural to take the last line as referring to the residents' faithful practice of religious rites, orderly assembly, respect to the king, and good manners in general — just about everything moral \( \theta\epsilon\mu\iota\varsigma \) implies\(^{21}\).

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\(^{21}\) The line 156=298 has been interpreted variously. Scholion bT 'λιπαρᾶς δὲ τὰς βέμοστας καλῶν τοῦτο δῆλον ὅτι τὸ κράτειν καλῶς εὐθαμοιναν ἔγει; Scholion A ὑπ' αὐτῶν βασιλεύειν εὐπροκάς βιώσονται, οὐ δὲ δὲ βασιλέα — λαμπροῦς φόρους τελέσοναι; Leaf (The Iliad ad loc.) follows Scholion bT (taking \( \theta\epsilon\mu\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\varsigma \) as 'his ordinances'): 'will fulfil his pleasant ordinances'; M. L. West' suggestion (Hesiod: Theogony, Oxford 1966 on 901) for the meaning of \( \lambda\iota\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\delta \) 'perhaps "such as attend prosperous εὐνομία", seems to follow the first suggestion of Scholion A cited above; T. B. L. Webster, From Mycenae to Homer\(^2\) (London 1964), p. 106 (cf. p. 121), referring to the Linear B tablet As 821 as read in the first edition of Documents in Mycenaean Greek, follows Scholion A's alternative interpretation 'λαμπροῦς φόρους τελέσοναι': 'beneath his sceptre pay their shining dues. Themis is only used here in this sense but is found with the same meaning on Knossos tablets; 'shining' suggests that olive oil was one of the dues as at Knossos. The passage has preserved a very clear Mycenaean memory.'; Webster's discussion is interesting on its own right, but unfortunately, the reading 'τι-μι-το' is now retracted by Chadwick in the second edition. cf. Documents in Mycenaean Greek\(^2\) (Cambridge 1973), p. 168 and p. 420. Besides, as Leaf (ad

114
As we have already seen, the Cyclopes have no public life; They have no public ὑγοραῖ or θεμιστές (Od. 9. 112, 215), and the only θέμισι they have is that within their own families (9. 114). Since their 'θέμισι' is nothing like the social rules of men, in Odysseus' eye, they are δθεμιστοὶ (9. 106, 189, 428). However, again, they are not out-law since they have no law to step out of. They are only literally law-less.

Where law, θέμισι, exists, however, the community expects its members to observe it. Even in the Olympian world, Hera complains that Ares is 'οὐ κατὰ κόσμον' (Il. 5. 759; like Thersites at 2. 214) and that he does not know any 'θεμιστα' (5. 761), referring to his violent manner in killing the Achaeans. Then Zeus suggests sending Athena to punish him (5. 765-6). But the gods are never serious in quarrelling with one another over human business.

Nestor says that a man who likes strife within a community is 'ἁφρήτωρ δθεμιστός ἀνέστιος' (Il. 9. 63), namely, outside membership of a clan, outside the reach of social rules, and even outside one's own family.22 It is the most isolated state for a human being we

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22 Contrast Peleus' advice to Achilles at Il. 9. 255-8, that if he keeps a friendly disposition and avoids quarrels, he will be honoured by the Achaeans (τίωσι).
can think of, since even the Cyclopes are not 'dévêstioi'. Thus ðémiß is considered a fundamental basis of social life. It is believed that an dðémißotos attitude will eventually lead a man to misery, letting him lose all gifts from the gods. The Beggar-Odysseus tells Amphinomus that his present 'misery' is the result of his violation of ðémiß in the past (Od. 18. 138-42):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{kai gar evai po't émeiòon en ðéstron ðépos evai,} \\
pollà d apástrai éreia bêkai káptei eikai, \\
patrei t ðémiotóntos kal ðémiotai kai ygratouai. \\
tými tis po'te páiían áfr ðémiotous eti \\
abli' o'ge suqèdara ðeiv évexi òpti évòvèv.
\end{align*}
\]

This is of course a lie, but it reflects part of Odysseus' own experience, because he who once won great glory in Troy has been reduced to the status of a wanderer for ten years due to his companions' dòsòbal'cai (1. 7) to harm the cattle of Helios and his own dòsòbal'cai to have lingered in the cave of the Cyclops (10. 437) leading to the most disastrous consequences, especially the giant's curse on him. In this context, he is not necessarily talking about divine punishment for crime, because his dòsòbal'cai which changed his fortune was rather a mistake due to his daring spirit than a moral error and he does not consider himself to have been punished by the gods for any crime, but is talking about the changeability of human fortunes at the mercy of the gods.

ðikh and ðémiß in Homer

Putting the observations above together, we may be able to sketch ðikh and ðémiß in Homer as follows: ðémißotes are law or customs which have already existed in human society for a long time and often believed to be god-given. It is the king's duty to
protect them with his administration of δίκη. δίκη is an application of θέμιστος. For example, it is a compelling rule, θέμιστος (what should be done), to entertain a guest, and the fulfilment of that requirement, i.e. hospitality, is δίκη (what is usually done). The performance may not always match the ideal requirement, as in the case of a poor host like Eumaeus, but the requirement itself is unchanged. Similarly, what θέμιστος defines as right is supposed to be unchanged (like love among family members, religious customs, or sometimes even direct orders from the gods), but different individuals can have different interpretations of θέμιστος. That is the time when the king should intervene and decide which is right in the light of θέμιστος, and his decision is called δίκη.

δίκη as judgement aims above all to dissolve conflicts within a community, and its value is measured not in terms of exacting punishment but by its result that should ensure the most desirable social relationship in the future. Consequently, δίκη is fairly flexible and can be given in more than two shades of fairness. Sharp dichotomy between 'just' and 'unjust' in jurisdiction does not seem common.

23 cf. R. J. Bonner and G. Smith, The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle, (Chicago 1930) p. 10: 'δίκη strictly represents the application by the human agent of the θέμιστος, which comes from the gods.' Their interpretation of θέμιστοςτος, however, differs from mine, taking it 'pronouncements of the king' (p. 9).
24 cf. G. Ronnet, 'Θέμιστος et δίκη chez Homère et chez Hésiode' (résumé) in REG 87 (1974) XXIII: (θέμιστος-δίκη opposition is) 'celle d'une réalité statique, l'ordre établi, et d'une virtualité dynamique, l'absolu moral, qui se concrétise au gré des détenteurs d'autorité.'
Those who ignore \( \theta^\epsilon\mu^i\sigma^e^s \) are called \( \delta\theta^\epsilon\mu^i\sigma^o^t^o^i \), and those who do not perform \( \delta^i^k^h \) are criticised for not being '\( \delta^i^k^a^o^i^o^i \)'. But those who are \( \delta^i^k^a^i^o^i^o^i \) are so not by being righteous as against evil, but by possessing the command of proper \( \delta^i^k^a^i \), social manners as well as rules. There is no indication, apart from a dubious example of Athena's support for Odysseus, of the gods' concern for men's administration of \( \theta^\epsilon^\mu^i^s \) and \( \delta^i^k^h \). It certainly seems that the rainstorm of Zeus is a unique example in Homer of divine anger expressed against the violation of \( \theta^\epsilon^\mu^i^s \) in jurisdiction.

\( \delta^i^k^h \) and \( \theta^\epsilon^\mu^i^s \) in Hesiod

In Hesiod, \( \delta^i^k^h \) and \( \theta^\epsilon^\mu^i^s \) are more closely connected with Zeus than in Homer. Symbolically he marries \( \theta^\epsilon^\mu^i^s \) and becomes the father of \( \Delta^i^k^h \) in the \textit{Theogony} (901-2).\textsuperscript{25} In general, however, the \( \delta^i^k^h \) in this epic is basically the same as Homer's, namely that of heroic kings.

The Muses give their divine gift to the Zeus-nourished kings at their birth (81-90):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{δοτώντα} & \text{ ἀτήσιον} \ Διός \ κοιραί \ μεγάλου \text{n}\n\text{γενόμενον} & \text{ ἑορτάσω} \ διορθέσθων \ βασιλέων, \\
\text{τῷ μὲν} & \text{ ἐπὶ} \ γλώσσῃ \ γλυκέρῃ \ κελουμέναι \ ἐφαντάθη. \\
\text{τό]δε} & \text{ ἐκ} \ στάματος \ θειεῖλης \ οἴ]δε} \ \text{τέ} \ \text{λαοῖ} \\
\text{πάντες} & \text{ ἐς} \ \text{αὐτὸν} \ \text{φράοι} \ \text{διεκρύνοντα} \ \text{θῆμιστας} \\
\text{Θέετρη} & \text{ δίκη} \\
\text{δί} \ \text{ἀσφαλέως} \ \text{ἀγορεύων} \\
\text{αἴ]δι} & \text{ καὶ} \ \text{μέγα} \ \text{νεῖκος} \ \text{ἐπισταμένῳ} \ \text{κατέπαυσεν} \\
\text{τό]νδε} & \text{ γὰρ} \ \text{βασιλέ]ς} \ \text{ἐξέφρονε} \\
\text{βλαπτομένοις} & \text{ἀγορῆ} \ \text{μετάποτα} \ \text{ἐργα} \ \text{τελεύσι}
\end{align*}
\]

\textsuperscript{25} On \( \lambdaιπαρήν} \ \text{Θ]ε}μίν (901), cf. M. L. West, \textit{Hesiod: Theogony} (Oxford 1966), ad loc. and our discussion above on \textit{Il.} 9. 156-298.
This picture clearly points to a heroic king born with prestige. Persuasion with soft words above all is a clear sign of heroic δίκη which reminds us of Nestor (cf. II. 1. 249).

The king has another divine patroness. Hecate also is sitting beside him when he gives judgements. But she helps common men, too, at the assembly (434, 430):27

\[\text{δεπερασαυλεωσ παν οιδουσ καθε,} \quad 434\]

\[\text{δε τη φορηλασα, μεταπρεπει δυ κ' ἑθηθιων.} \quad 430\]

Nereus is the model of a good king, a born 'elder'. He is truthful, gentle, and never forgets θεμιστες, knowing right and mild counsels (233-6):

\[\text{Νηρέα δ' ἄφευθε και ὀληθα γείναι Πάντος,} \]
\[\text{πρεσβύτατον παιδων αὐτάρ καλέουσα γέροντα,} \]
\[\text{οὖνκα νυμηρίς τε καὶ ἤμιος, οἷοθ̄οθεμιστων} \]
\[\text{λήτεται, ἀλλὰ δίκαιαι καὶ ήμα δήθεα οἶδεν.} \]

The association of seniority and δίκη is also observed in Nestor's figure in Homer.

We see Zeus himself establishing θεμισ as the king of the gods. While recruiting the force against his father's regime, he distributes honours to cooperating gods in the way 'as is θεμισ.' (395-6):

\[\text{τὸν δ' ἐφαθ δῶτις θῆμισ ὑπὸ Κράνου τῆδ' ἀφεραστος:} \]
\[\text{τιμῆς καὶ γεράων ἐμπισητήσαν ἐκδέμες ἑστιν.} \]

This is an anachronistic usage of θεμισ, because while when a man says 'It is θεμισ,' it means that it has been a long-established

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26 On the similarity of 84-7 and Od. 8. 170-3, see M. L. West, on 84ff.
27 For this order of lines cf. M. L. West, ad loc.
custom, here Zeus is distributing new offices to the gods just now. The poet says 'ἡ θέμις ἐστὶν' from his own point of view.

In the Shield of Heracles, too, θέμις comes from Zeus. On one occasion his θέμις is an order to Amphitryon to conquer the Taphians and the Teleboans to avenge his brothers-in-law (17-9) which is a unique example of violent punishment directly prompted by the gods in the Homeric-Hesiodic tradition (Shield 20-2):

πῶς γὰρ ὁ δίκτυα τοι ἐπὶ μόρφωροι ἔριν
tὸν δὲ ὁπίζετο μῆν, ἐπείγετο δ ὁ τάχιστα
ἐπελέγα τοῦ μέγα δρόμου, διὸ δίδειν θέμις ἑν.

θέμις also takes the meaning of 'destined' comparable to αἰσχρὰ (Il. 16. 707, Od. 5. 113, 23. 315), μοῖρα (Od. 4. 475, 5. 41, 114, 345, 9. 532), μόριμον (Il. 20. 302), or μόρσιμον (Il. 5. 674, 19. 417) in Homer, when Athena tells Ares that it is not fated for him to kill Heracles (Shield 447-8):

ὅπως τα θέμις ἐστὶν ἀπόκλυτα πείρεα δίσαι.
Ἡρακλῆς κτείναντα, Δίος ἀφανικάθιον ἔλθε.

Hospitality is a δίκη (lot, right) of guests as in Homer (Shield 83-5):

ἐκέτο δὲ Ἐρείοντα καὶ Ἡμίχθην παινόπεπλοι.
αἷμαν ἠπάξόμενο καὶ ἀφιετέα πάντα παρεῖχοι.
ἡ δίκη ἐσθ ἐκέτητο θανὸν δ ἀφανήθαι μᾶλλον.

Apart from more intensified relationship between the gods, especially Zeus, and δίκη and θέμις, the definition of δίκη and θέμις does not seem very different from that in Homer.

But it is in the Works specially that δίκη/Δίκη and θέμις are inseparable from Zeus and take on strong moral colourings. In this poem, wherever they are mentioned, they are above all Zeus'
business. The *Works* begins with the theme of Zeus as the watch-god of human morality (5-10):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{βέα μὲν γὰρ βραδεί, βέα δὲ βραδοῦντα χαλέπτει,} \\
\text{βέα δὲ φρίγηλον μνυθεί καὶ διήλον δέξει,} \\
\text{βέα δὲ θ' ιθύει σκολιόν καὶ διήφρα κόρφει}
\end{align*}
\]

\[\text{Zeis υψαμμέτης, δς υπέρτατα δίματα ναλεί} \]

\[\text{kλίδα ισών ἄνω τε, δικὴ δὲ χρύς θέμιστας} \]

\[\text{τύχη} \]

We already find a reminder of 'σκολιὸς θέμιστας' in this passage. A 'crooked' person is straightened by Zeus, and we must 'straighten' θέμιστας with δίκη. Here, the roles of θέμις and δίκη are somehow reversed from what we see in Homer. Here, the former is something man can fiddle with and present for divine inspection while the latter is the basis of justice applied to 'straighten' our particular conduct. The moral role played by Zeus is unmistakably clear which is also very different from the general Homeric atmosphere.

After his lecture on good and bad "Ερίς, the poet invites his brother to settle their dispute (35-39):

\[
\text{άλλ' αὖθι διακρινόμεθα νέκυς} \\
\text{λθέιπτε δίκτης, αὖ δ' ἄκα Dao elon φρυστα} \\
\text{φυμὲν γὰρ κλήρον ἐκαστάθη, ἄλλα τε πολλὰ} \\
\text{ἀρπάζων ἐφέρεις μεγα κυδαλῶν βασιλῆς} \\
\text{διαφθορίους δὲ τίρε ἰδίκην ἐθέλουτι δικασταί.}
\]

Here, δίκαι, instead of θέμιστας as in Homer, come from Zeus, though apparently only 'straight' ones.\(^{28}\) Then an amazing revelation: the poet's brother seems to have bribed the βασιλῆς, for they are

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accused of being 'δωροφάγοι' for deciding on 'such a δίκη'.29 Here we see very human βασιλής instead of an idealistic hero-king. There is a clear contrast between the fair and god-given δίκη and the crooked man-made one.

There is, however, a remnant of the age of righteous men. The race of gold became δαίμονες after their euthanasiac death and watch over δίκαιοι in this world (121-6):

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ τούτῳ γένος κατὰ γαῖα κάλυψε.
τοῖς μὲν δαίμονεσ εἰσὶ διὸς μεγάλοι διὰ βουλῶς
ἐσθιολ ἐπιχάνοικοι, φύλακες θυρών ἄνθρωπων.
οἱ δὲ φυλάσσοντι τε δίκας καὶ σχέτλια ἔργα
ἡδρα ἑσοφόμενοι πάντη φοιτώτες ἐπὶ ἀλαν.
πλουτοδόται καὶ τούτῳ γέρας βασιλῆς ἔσχον.

The contrast between δίκαιος and σχέτλια ἔργα reminds us of Eumaeus' words (Od. 14. 83-4). The idea that divine beings are watching us is also common in both.30 The responsibility of these δαίμονες as guardians of justice and general welfare is called the 'kingly' honour. They are the kings as we know in Homer who administer δίκαιοι wisely with their flexible application for the common good.

This race is followed by the race of silver who do not observe θέμις. Zeus is angered by them and clears them away (134-9):

ἐβριν γὰρ ἀπάσθαλον οἷς ἐθάνατο
ἀλλὰ δὲν ἀπέχειν, οἷς ἀδικητῶς θεραπεῖειν
ἡθέλον οἷς ἐρέσθεν μακάρων λεοῖς ἐπὶ βωμῷς.

29 M. L. West ad loc. against the interpretation of 'δωροφάγοι' as an honorary epithet of all kings.
30 However, lines 124-5 are rejected by critics as interpolated from 254-5. Cf. M. L. West, ad loc.: 'these spirits are δαίμονες, ἑσθιολ, πλουτοδόται, not a secret police.'
They did wrong to one another (134-5), but, according to the poet (138-9), it is not the reason for the divine anger. Zeus punished them because they did not pay honour to the gods, an important 'θέμισι' of mortals. As in Homer (II. 7. 478-9), the gods do take action against men who neglect this particular θέμισι, connected with their τιμή.

After the self-destructive race of bronze, Zeus made the race of heroes. They are 'δικαίοτερον καὶ ἀρείον' (158) than their immediate predecessors. There is no illustration of their 'righteousness'. Those who have survived the Theban and the Trojan wars enjoy their eternal happiness on the Islands of the Blessed (170-3), but we are not specifically told that it was the reward for being δίκαιοι. They may well have been given such a reward because they are half-divine (160 ημιθεοί) and related to the gods as Menelaus was (cf. Od. 4. 563-9).

Zeus made the fifth generation of men, race of iron. This race, contemporary with the poet and the audience/readers is also bound to be destroyed by Zeus some day (180-1). The poet recites a parade of vices prevailing in this world. There is no longer θέμισι or δίκη as in good old days. There is no longer harmony between father and children, between guest and host, among friends, and among brothers — the poet's own bitter experience (182-4).

In this world men do not respect their aged parents, but rebuke them with harsh words (185-6). The poet condemns such men with strong words: 'σχέτλιοι, οὐδὲ θεῶν ὅπιν εἰδότες.'(187). This
reminds us of Homer’s comment on Heracles who murdered his guest (Od. 21. 28):³¹

σχέτλιος, οἶδὲ θέων ὁμν Ἀλδέσατ, οἴδε τράπεζαν,

and the rainstorm passage (II. 16. 388 θεῶν ὁμν).

In Homer, even such a grave offender against god-given θέμις is not punished, despite the poet’s condemnation. In Hesiod, the poet claims that harassing one’s aged parents alone is enough to invite ὁμν from the gods.

In the age of iron, men do not reciprocate the care their parents have given them when the latter are aged. The poet calls them 'χειροδίκαι' (189), because their δίκη is in their hands (192 δίκη ἐν χειρὶ), i.e. might is right. They plunder each other’s city (189), they do not appreciate any man who is εὐφροσύνης, δίκαιος, and ἀγαθὸς, and they praise 'κακῶν ἔρθην καὶ ὀβρὶν ἄνερα' (191-2).³² The oath which served well among Homeric heroes as a means of 'straight judgement’ does not work in such a society (193-4):

βλάψεῖ δ ὁμνὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον φῶτα
μῦθοι σκολιὰς ἐνέπω, ἐπὶ δ ὁρκον ἀμείπται.

The ‘crooked words’ also echo the Homeric passage with σκολιὰς θἐμιστάς (II. 16. 387).

The reversed list of these evils, on the other hand, would tell us what good δίκη and θέμις consist of: harmony in the family and among friends, respect for elderly parents, peace, true oaths,

³¹ F. Krafft’s remarks (Vergleichende Untersuchungen zu Homer und Hesiod, p. 80, n. 1) on grammatical and phraseological difficulties in Hesiod’s line (187) make us heavily inclined to believe that it is modelled on Homer’s line (21. 28), not the other way round.

³² cf. M. L. West on 191:’ἀγαθὸς: here in a moral rather than a class sense, since κακῶν contrasts with it, as ὀβρὶν ἄνερα with δικαίου.’; ὀβρὶν: apparently qualifying ἄνερα, as if it were ὀβριστῆν. He is Hybris incarnate.'
righteousness. The support for these values are Ἀκλωγε (restraint from inside individuals) and Νέμεσις (pressure from the outside world), who will eventually abandon human beings (197-200).33 Their exit also reminds us of the expulsion of δίκη at II. 16. 388.

The following two lectures, one addressed to Perses (213-47) and another addressed to 'βασιλη' (248-73), are the heart of Hesiod's 'δίκη'-doctrine. In both of them, δίκη and its derivatives are persistently repeated and cluster together. The phrase 'crooked judgements' (σκολιήσι δικησιν etc.) appears five times and the adverb σκολιῶς twice (once with 'δικας ἐνέποντες' 262). The phrase 'straight judgements' also appears once (δικας θελας 225-6). It looks as if the poet was obsessed by the idea of crooked or straight judgements. According to him, whether δίκαι are straight or crooked is a matter of great concern for Zeus. The belief that Zeus or Dike will punish those who give crooked judgements and reward those who give straight ones is expressed again and again.

Dike brings mischief to men who have expelled her (219-224):

aiûn aîp têxî 'Oîkos afma σκολιήσι δικην

τῆς de δίκης μᾶς ἐλκυμένης ἡὲν ἀδρές ἀγνοί
dωροφέροι σκολιής de δίκης κρύως θέμοτας

ἡδ ἐπεται κλαίοντα πολὺν καὶ ἱδεα λαῖων.

ἡρὰ ἐσταμένη κακῶν ἀδροῦτοι φέρουσα,

αὶ τέ μιν ἔξελοντα καὶ oîk θείαν ἐνεμαν.

M. L. West on 200: 'Ἀκλωγε καὶ Νέμεσις: Both are forces that inhibit wickedness, one working from inside, the other, public disapproval, from without.' For Homeric Ἀκλωγε and Νέμεσις see Chapter 9.
His bitter 'δωροφα'γοι' again (221). The rest of the line is another strong reminder of 'σκολίας κρίσιν θέμιστας' (II. 16. 387). Lines 220 and 224 echo 'ἐκ δὲ δίκην ἐλάχιστοι' (II. 16. 388).

On the other hand, if people give δίκας θείας (225-6) to both strangers and countrymen, they will be rewarded richly by Zeus (227-37). Their city and people prosper, Zeus maintains peace for them, neither famine nor δτη follows those who are ἰθνίκαι, but they happily till their land. Nature also responds to their virtue, producing wealth in abundance — the earth yields for them plenty of fruit in fields and mountains, their sheep are laden with wool, their women bear children as virtuous as their parents, and they do not need seafaring or trade because their land produces everything they need. This is the ideal world for peasants like the poet himself, with a different system of values from that of the heroic age. For heroic kings, war was an essential part of their life where they could demonstrate their worth, ἀρετή, and win τιμή — being 'δγαθός' meant above all being a good warrior competent in plundering other people's cities (Remember the heroic epithet πτολιπορθος.) But Homer does have a parallel of a righteous king's reign endowed with nature's blessings in a simile (Od. 19. 109-14) and does present the dark side of heroic values through the voice of Eumaeus who says that even warriors to whom Zeus allows to plunder a foreign land will fear divine anger deep inside (Od. 14. 85-8).

In the following lecture to the judges (βασιλῆς), the poet warns them of divine punishment (δίκη 249) for giving 'crooked judgements.' (249-55):

ἐγγίς γὰρ ἐν δικαίωμασιν ἑώτες
ἀδάνατοι φραζόμεναι δοκοι σκολίας δίκην

126
Here are, again, the same complex of 'crooked judgements' and 'the δπις of the gods' as in Il. 16. 387-8 and another of δίκη and σχέστικα ἔργα as in Eumaeus' belief (Od. 14. 83-4). The general idea of 'divine patrol' of this passage reminds us of the doctrine of the gods disguised as guests roaming about on the earth to watch over ἔθις and εὐνομία of men (Od. 17. 485-7).

The goddess Dike herself, described at 222-4 as in charge of punishment, is a reporter of human vices to Zeus at 256-64:

The poet's bitter resentment against the bribed judges is expressed again in 'δωροφάγοι' in line 264, as in 39 and 221. The picture of Dike here reminds us of that of the Litai at Il. 9. 508-12 and no doubt that is one of the reasons for the suspected 'lateness' of the speech of Phoenix.34 We have concluded in

34 D. Aubriot, 'Les Litai d' Homère et la Dikê d' Hésiode' in REG 97 (1984) 1-25, however, illustrates the fundamental difference between the Litai of
Chapter 4 that Phoenix's Litai-allegory was a possible theory, not established doctrine. Does Hesiod present his theory of divine punishment as proven truth?

Another lecture to Perses starts with the reward of Zeus for being just (274-285). The poet says that it was Zeus who gave δική to men which is δρίστη (279-80). This δική, however, is not simply knowledge of customs and good manners as that of Homeric heroes. The poet continues (280-85):

εἰ γὰρ τίς κ' ἔθη τα δίκαια ἄφηρε ταί
gennikos, πομέν τ' ἄθεον διδαὶ εἱράπτα Ζεὺς
d' ἐκ μαρτυρίαν ἄθεων ἐπάρκοις διάσας
φεύγεται, ἐν δὲ δικήν φιλάμασι, ἀπεισοῦν δαπαθή
tou δὲ τ' φαύροτηρί γενεθμετάμπο ἐλευθερᾷ
adphóς δ' εὐάρχου γενεθμετάμπον ἀθέων.

It is obvious that he is still thinking about unjust judgements and false testimonies. For the poet of the Works, δική is above all a matter of just or unjust, good or bad. He is convinced that Zeus must punish the unjust and reward the just. Here is a very clear-cut image of Zeus as the supreme authority of human morality in the world. The god appears again at 333 as the avenger of suppliants, guests, orphans, and aged fathers, and he is also supposed to punish men who have relations with their brother's wife (327-35). An amazing range of moral functions are

Homer and Dike of Hesiod, as well as their similarities. While the Litai rejects rigidity (p. 22), Hesiod's Dike demands 'straight' sentences in a sharp contrast with 'crooked' ones (pp. 14-15). p. 15: 'Donc l'image, d'un texte à l'autre, est portée de sens opposés: Homère blâme la rigidité tandis qu'Hésiode loue la rectitude; l'un invite à suivre un principe intangible, l'autre proche la souplesse de concessions opportunes présentées comme des compromis positifs et non comme des compromissions.' This observation drawn from the comparison of the Litai and Dike, interestingly, seems to echo my own observation above of two different moral climates, one dominant in Homer and another dominant in the Works.
attributed to the god, with no *paradeigmata* given. The tone is very similar to that of the moral speeches of Phoenix, Eumaeus, and the Beggar-Odysseus which are expressions of human faith or hope in the moral actions of the gods in defence of the weak and wronged. Does Hesiod have any firmer ground than those characters in Homer on which to claim that the gods do protect us?

The trouble in accepting Hesiod’s words as the announcement of theological truth is that he does not speak with the detached authority of Homer which gives us an impression that the poet is omniscient in the world he creates. Instead Hesiod speaks as a character in the narrative himself. What he tells us is only what he believes. Despite his opening invocation of the Muses, he estranges himself from the goddesses by his address and request to Zeus (8-10) with an emphatic εγώ at line 10:

... ἐγὼ δέ Πέρσην ἐπεβέβη αὐτοῖς μυθηραυμὶ.

He claims that what he is going to tell his brother is truth, but at one point, he makes it absolutely clear that he is not speaking as a mouthpiece of the Muses, but telling what he ‘believes’ to be true, again with an emphatic εγώ (270-3):


There is little doubt about the strength of the poet’s faith in the moral support of Zeus, but he does not pretend to be an omniscient divine poet to declare it as truth. He is just another common human being like ourselves who can only 'believe' or
'hope' that the gods will never let justice wither away in this world. It is not a prophecy, but a creed.

Homer and Hesiod

This seems to explain why the content and the tone of the *Works* echo so often those of Homeric characters — specifically humble ones. Hesiod of the *Works* has taken up only the most human level of narrative from Homer. Neither the invocation to the Muses nor heroic detachment from the narrative seems at home with him. The poem is filled with his personal addresses (which are kept to a minimum in Homer) and personal feelings, in short, his 'ε'γαφ

Homer seldom talks in that way. Most of the time his narrative is under the Muses' control as he claims. He makes us aware of his presence only when he talks to the Muses or some of his characters in the narrative, but never showing his own strong feelings.35 He makes very few comments, moral or otherwise, on his characters. Since he has both human and divine eyes to look at the events in the world, he does not and should not say 'I believe that the gods will do this and that.' Instead, he has an authority to announce anything as truth learned from the Muses: 'The gods will do this and that.'

Therefore, he expresses human hopes and beliefs in the morality of the gods only in the mouth of his characters. And from what they say, we can peep into the most human side of the poet, usually hidden behind his role as a divine singer. He knows

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35 On Homer's detached attitude observed even in his direct addresses to his characters, see N. Yamagata, 'The Apostrophe in Homer as Part of the Oral Technique', *BICS* 36 (1989) 91-103, especially Conclusion.
the agony and helplessness of the weak and humble as much as Hesiod of the *Works* does. He knows the feeling which makes Eumaeus believe that the gods value 'δίκη' and 'αλήμα ἔργα' (*Od*. 14. 84), makes Philoetius hope that one day some god will bring his master back home and avenge all the wrongdoings of the suitors (*Od*. 21. 200-1), makes a beggar (the much-tried Odysseus) confess that the gods humiliated him for the wantonness of his young days (*Od*. 18. 138-42), makes Phoenix worried about Achilles' heroic pride which overrides all human compassion (*Il*. 9. 510-4), and makes old Laertes cry aloud in triumph (*Od*. 24. 351): O heavenly gods, you are indeed there protecting us!36

I have no reason to doubt that Homer was capable of feeling for the characters he had created, or that he was as much human as Hesiod. If the passages with Phoenix and Laertes are declared 'later additions' or 'interpolations' and should be removed because of their moral sentiment, we must also remove the Beggar-Odysseus and Eumaeus who give similar moral lectures to almost everyone they meet. We may suspect, then, that most of so-called 'Hesiodean' elements in Homer are in fact the reflection of the morality of common people of Homer's day, or possibly his own moral opinions.37 He cannot express them as Hesiod does because of the narrative scheme he is working on. He must

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37 cf. E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the irrational.*, p. 32: 'And once we are told that Zeus is angry with men who judge crooked judgements. But that I take to be a reflex of later conditions which, by an inadvertence common in Homer, has been allowed to slip into a simile.'; G. M. Calhoun, 'The divine entourage in Homer', *AJP* 61 (1940) 272, 'the speeches of characters ... create at least an illusion of contemporaneity.'
behave as a divine mouthpiece and should never say, 'I believe in Father Zeus, omnipotent and omniscient ...' etc. in his own person. He is also bound by traditional themes, phrases and other conventions to give heroic grandeur to his narrative, but, as has been observed by many, he seems to feel freer in introducing objects and people of his own time into similes and descriptions. Then why not contemporary religious beliefs? And why not in the speeches of characters? We hear doctrines of divine concern for human morality from the mouth of Eumaeus, Odysseus and even a suitor. Also it is not unusual for the poet to describe angry gods punishing men (II. 21. 522-4; II. 5. 746-7 = II. 8. 390-1 = Od. 1. 100-1) or Zeus sending storms (II. 5. 87-92 damaging to crops; 12. 278-86; 16. 364-5) in digressions, and especially in similes, though without giving the reasons. If that is the case, it is nothing strange if we find a public assembly of the 'age of iron' (as we see also on the shield of Achilles), the human expectation of divine punishment of those who do not practise straight δίκη (which we see in the speeches of Eumaeus, Odysseus, et al.), and the storm sent by Zeus, all together in a simile. It is true that Homer is generally very reserved when it comes to the matter of morality, but, though very occasionally, some moral comments do slip out of his mouth, like the one on Heracles (Od. 21. 28). It may be possible to reject one such passage or two as non-Homeric, but not all moral remarks of Eumaeus, Odysseus,

38 cf. A. Platt, 'Homer's similes' in JP 24 (1896) 28-38; as indirect evidence for the poet's relative 'freedom' in similes, digressions etc, cf. G. P. Shipp, _Studies in the Language of Homer_ (Cambridge 1972), especially Introductory pp. 3-4, where he summarizes his argument that 'late' or otherwise 'abnormal' linguistic features are abundantly found in similes, digressions, descriptions, poet's comments, and especially in the Odyssey, in the lessons of morality.
and other characters nor all 'anachronistic' similes. It is certainly more practical to assume that the poet does present the contemporary moral climate at times along with contemporary landscapes and institutions through the windows of similes, speeches, and ekphrases.

Let us now look at the rainstorm simile itself in the light of the observations above (II. 16. 384-8):

\[\text{Up to the word 'Zeus', it is just another description of storms caused by the god which are not uncommon in similes. The rest of line 386 indicates that there are plural men responsible for } \theta\epsilon\mu\imath\omicron\sigma\tau\varepsilon\varsigma \text{ instead of a single hero-king. They have deliberately, 'forcibly', decided on 'crooked' } \theta\epsilon\mu\imath\omicron\sigma\tau\varepsilon\varsigma. \text{ In Homer } \theta\epsilon\mu\imath\omicron\sigma\tau\varepsilon\varsigma \text{ are god-given customs supposed to be protected by the judges. We see Zeus actually send a storm to the Achaeans who have ignored a } \theta\epsilon\mu\imath\omicron\sigma\tau\varepsilon \text{ directly connected with } \tau\iota\mu\eta \text{ of the gods (II. 7. 478-9). Are the } \theta\epsilon\mu\imath\omicron\sigma\tau\varepsilon\varsigma \text{ here also connected with their } \tau\iota\mu\eta? \text{ Then it will be altogether natural for Zeus to be angry and take action. But '}\beta\iota\iota\eta' \text{ suggests conflict among men rather than offence against the gods. So it seems more likely that someone's claim or right (}\delta\iota\kappa\eta\text{) has been dismissed by the pressure of the judges who have perverted}\]

\[\text{39 The verb } \kappa\rho\iota\nu\omega \text{ is not strange for object } \theta\epsilon\mu\imath\omicron\sigma\tau\varepsilon\varsigma, \text{ if we think of the nature of } \theta\epsilon\mu\imath\omicron\sigma\tau\varepsilon\varsigma, \text{ rules and customs which have existed for a long time and are always ready for consultation. The judge must 'choose' relevant codes and precedents on each occasion from the unwritten corpus of local rules. cf. T. B. L. Webster, From Mycenae to Homer}\textsuperscript{2}, p. 26.\]
the long-standing customs. By so doing, they have created a bad precedent which is destined to be part of theus hereafter, thereby distorting the whole system of theus. And if, as Eumaeus says, the gods hate σχέτλια ἔργα and honour δίκη and αἶσμα ἔργα (Od. 14. 82-3), and therefore one can expect δίπα (82) of the gods for not performing δίκη, 'ἐκ δὲ δίκην ἐλάσσωσιν, ἰδοὺ δὲ ὁ ὀφῆ ἀλέγοντες' is only a condensed version of the same doctrine that the gods get angry at those who abandon the way they should behave.40

Whatever the passage exactly means, the world we see through this 'window' is the same one as Hesiod's world in the age of iron. This is the world of sharp distinction between good and bad, just and unjust, fair and unfair judgements. Men in charge of jurisdiction are no longer idealistic heroic kings. People who happen to suffer under their injustice have no means to protect or console themselves, except murmuring their belief that the gods are watching them and will one day punish the unjust. Since they have no direct contact with the gods, the best they can do to prove their belief is to associate nature's violence with divine anger. The mainstream of Homeric epics present, on the other hand, the world of hero-kings under divine protection who rule

40 Many have been disturbed by the peculiar expression 'expelling δίκη' which contains a seed of personification, but this sort of half-completed personification is not uncommon elsewhere in Homer; e.g. II. 9. 513, 16. 805, 24. 49, 480. Some scholars may like to attribute all such lines to a 'late' stage of composition, but that itself would not be sufficient to cast doubt on their authenticity, as it is the case with II. 16. 388. For the 'expulsion' of δίκη, see also E. A. Havelock, The Greek Concept of Justice, p. 137; Having said all this, I still feel that I am left with difficulty in explaining away all the problems involved in 387-88, but what I hope I have shown is that the moral sentiment expressed in the lines is not necessarily alien to Homer, and therefore cannot be taken as sufficient reason on its own to label them as 'Hesiodic'. It is possible to make sense of them within the Homeric context. There is even an argument that it is Hesiod who borrowed the verses from Homer. cf. L. Bertelli, 'Note critiche ad Hom., II 384-93 e ad Hes., Erga 221, 224, 264', Atti della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino 101 (1966-67) pp. 371-93, especially pp. 384-9.
their people reasonably fairly with their heroic common sense. This distinction, largely due to the difference in motifs and narrative styles, is also found in Hesiod himself, if he composed both the Works and the Theogony. While in the former, we see mainly the poet’s personal (and desperate) hope in divine justice, in the latter, we find the world of ideal kings described in heroic detachment.

This seems to conclude our quest. If the rain storm simile is Hesiodic, it is so only in the way the Theogony is Homeric. The epic poets seem to have two levels of moral climate ever ready to alternate, one of the age of heroes and another of the age of iron. Whenever Homer describes his (and our) own age of iron, he switches to the world where all the vices we know exist, where there is no heroic king who protects his people like a father, and where the weak and wronged have no hope of getting justice done except through Zeus and the gods. However, in Homer — unlike Hesiod —, this world is confined to small slots of similes, descriptions, digressions and moral speeches and not allowed to burst into the mainstream of the narrative where we all hope to see the legendary grandeur of the heroes’ age when men are much freer and greater, capable of protecting their rights with their own swords, while the gods enjoy their carefree life, not

41 For the question of authorship of the Works and the Theogony, see G. P. Edwards, The language of Hesiod in its traditional context (Oxford 1971) p. 195: ‘Although the Theogony and the Works and Days are for the most part widely separated in their subject-matter, we have found nothing in their language to suggest that they must be of independent authorship.’
much disturbed by the sufferings of men's generations which flourish and fall like leaves of trees.*

* This chapter was indirectly inspired by a series of events that took place in China in June 1989 when I was drafting it. The occasion forced me to question my own view of justice in society and to think more seriously than ever about justice, law and social order. Without this new perspective, this chapter would not have taken its present form.
We saw a clear example of moral indignation of Zeus at human injustice in the last chapter. Although it is located in a simile where the poet tends to describe social conditions contemporary with himself, it still obliges us to examine in full what causes divine indignation in Homer, before we can say whether the gods have any sense of moral indignation or no such sense at all.

Divine τιμη

There is no doubt that the gods are angered when their τιμη is damaged or challenged, especially by mortals. Most notably they get angry at and take action against men who forget to make them due offerings (II. 9. 533ff Artemis at Oeneus, Od. 4. 351ff the gods at Menelaus). This is so well known that it is the first cause to be suspected whenever men sense divine anger at work (II. 1. 65, 5. 177-8). The gods also take revenge when their property is damaged (Od. 12. 348, 376 Helios at the companions of Odysseus), when their sanctuary is defiled (Od. 3. 135ff, 4. 502, Athena at Locrian Ajax), when their priests are insulted (II. 1. 9ff. Apollo at Agamemnon), when mortals compare themselves with the gods in some skill or in well-being (II. 2. 595-600 the Muses at Thamyris, 24. 605ff Apollo and Artemis at Niobe, Od. 8. 224-8 Apollo at Eurythus), and when they are threatened with direct violence (II. 2. 781-2 Zeus at Typhoeus, 6. 130-40 the gods at Lycurgus, 21. 456-7 Poseidon and Apollo at Laomedon, cf. Apollo's warnings to Diomedes at II. 5. 440-2 and to Patroclus at II. 16. 707-11, anger of Poseidon at Troy at II. 24. 25-7). They
can be angered also by disobedience of men or lesser gods (Il. 3. 413 Aphrodite angry at Helen; cf. potential cases: Il. 15. 121-2 Zeus at Ares and other gods; Od. 5. 146-7 Zeus at Calypso; Od. 13. 148 Zeus at Poseidon).

Their sense of honour is very human in logic and excessively divine in the scale of retaliation. Hera and Athena are angry at Paris for his judgement at their beauty contest, and as retaliation, they are determined to destroy the whole city of Troy (Il. 4. 24ff; cf. Il. 24. 25-7). Poseidon is angry at the Phaeacians (Od. 13. 173) only because they have helped a man whom the god happens to hate. Their punishment is the termination of their seafaring tradition. What they have done is completely in accordance with human moral codes and with what men believe to be a god-given θεικός i.e. ξεινία. Yet the patron of ξεινί α Ζευς himself authorizes Poseidon to punish them saying (Od. 13. 143-4):

ου καὶ πατρὸς ἐμὸς ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης τῆς θείκης κάρτει εἴπαν
οὗτοι τειχικαὶ ἐξοπλισμοὶ ποτὲ αἰεὶ

As far as we know, the Phaeacians are peaceful, non-violent people (cf. Od. 8. 246-9). Therefore, the θιη and κρατός mentioned here must be their 'competence' especially their sea-faring, not physical violence against Poseidon. But that is enough to hurt the god's sensitive pride. Alcinous realizes this when the god's punishment has just begun (13. 172-4; cf. 8. 565-6):

ωντόποι, ἡμᾶλα δημε παλαιότατα θέσεθας ἱκάνει
πατρὸς ἐμὸς ὁς φάσιν Ποσειδῶν ἀφίκεσθαι

1 For various interpretations of their actual punishment, see S. E. Bassett, 'The fate of the Phaeacians', CP 28 (1933) 305-7; ed. W. B. Stanford, The Odyssey of Homer2 (Hampshire and London 1965) on 13. 156-8.
Such unreasonable jealousy of the gods is felt also by Penelope. She says that the gods' jealousy prevented Odysseus and her from enjoying the flower of their life together (Od. 23. 210-2). The gods somehow resent continuous human happiness and successes.

The gods are indeed jealous beings. They often become jealous at one another as well. Zeus may get angry if his wife goes somewhere far without his permission (Il. 14. 310-1). Hera, in her turn, used to be furious at Heracles (Il. 18. 119), Zeus' son by a mortal woman. And Zeus, in his turn again, is furious at her for harassing his son (Il. 14. 256, 266). Hephaestus is angry at his unfaithful wife and her lover (Od. 8. 276, 304). Such reactions as these are fairly understandable since mortals feel exactly the same way.

But their jealousy goes even beyond the bondage of marriage. Calypso complains that male gods are always jealous and cruel when goddesses have liaisons with mortal men (Od. 5. 119, 122, 129), while the other way round is far more common and tolerated (except by the wife of the god concerned). Jealousy, in any case, is not a specially divine manifestation of the claim for their τιμή, however justifiable it might be. Mortals seem far more tolerant of their spouse's infidelity judging by the case

2 There is some clumsiness of the plot in this episode. The gods are talking about 'not honouring Poseidon' as their reason for punishing the Phaeacians, while the prophecy talks about Poseidon's 'jealousy' of the unfailling escorts of travellers by the Phaeacians. This clumsiness may be explained, as J. Irmscher, Götzerronz bei Homer, p. 60, says, as due to the poet's attempt to combine two independent stories, 'die Lokalsage vom versteinerten Schiffe (163) mit dem Poseidonzorn gegen Odysseus in Verbindung zu bringen.'

of Helen welcomed back to Menelaus' palace after the war caused by her elopement.

Divine nepotism and favouritism

Another major cause of divine anger is also a very 'human' one. The gods become angry at opponents of their favourite mortals who are often their offspring.

The Odyssey — at least half of it — is all about the wrath of Poseidon at Odysseus who blinded the god's son Polyphemus (Od. 1. 20-1, 68-9, 78, 5. 284, 339-40, 423, 6. 330-1, 11. 102-3, 13. 342-3; cf. Aeolus' guess at 10. 74-5, Eumaeus' guess at 14. 366). Odysseus blinded Polyphemus, who had brutally killed six of his companions, in self-defence, but no such circumstances are taken into Poseidon's consideration. Neither do the other gods try, on this ground, to dissuade the angry god from his ruthless revenge on Odysseus. The god's anger is even extended to the Phaeacians who entertain Odysseus and send him home. It is a purely emotional, irrational example of divine anger, utterly human in motivation, and hideously divine in effect — ten years' delay of Odysseus' journey home.4

4 Some may argue that Odysseus is guilty of taunting Polyphemus saying that even Poseidon would not be able to cure his eye (9. 520). However, the god, invoked as the father of the giant, has the obligation of revenge for his son, regardless of the circumstances, just as the families of the suitors assume their responsibility for revenge on Odysseus, knowing well that the suitors have been in the wrong. Besides, Poseidon seems as indifferent to Odysseus' words as to Polyphemus' brutality against Odysseus' companions. I do not think Odysseus' triumphant words have increased the justification for the god to punish him. cf. G. Bona, Studi sull' Odissea (Torino 1966) pp. 45-6; F. Focke, Die Odyssee (Stuttgart and Berlin 1943), p. 168: 'Die Schuld des Odysseus aber besteht einzig und allein darin, daß er einen Sohn des Poseidon blendete. Einzig deshalb zürnt ihm der Meergott.'; Heubeck-Hoekstra, A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey Volume II (Oxford 1989) on 9. 500-5: 'Odysseus does provoke the curse laid on him; but it is carelessness, not ὑβρις or a breach of a law which requires punishment.'
In the *Iliad*, Poseidon is angry when Zeus causes defeat of the Achaeans whom he supports (13. 16, 15. 227), not to mention when his grandson is killed (13. 206-7).

Athena in human disguise shows indignation at the suitors of Penelope in the *Odyssey* (1. 252, 22. 224-5), because they are enemies of her protégé. No other god is described as angry at the behaviour of the suitors. As a war-goddess, her raging spirit against men whom she wants to destroy is almost proverbial (*Il.* 5. 747 = 8. 391 = *Od.* 1. 101; Ares and Athena *Il.* 17. 398-9). In the *Iliad*, she is angry at the Trojans (eg. 5. 191) and anybody who works against the Achaeans, even at Zeus, who bans divine interference in the war (8. 460). She is angry at Apollo when he interferes with the chariot-racing of Diomedes, one of her protégés (23. 391).

Apollo, in his turn, is angry at the Achaeans, especially Diomedes (5. 444, 23. 383 where he is racing against Trojan horses nurtured by Apollo. cf. 2. 766), and at Athena (10. 517) for helping them, because they are enemies of the Trojans whom he supports. He is angered by a cowardly retreat of the Trojan allies, too (4. 507).

Hera seems to foster more vehement wrath in her heart against her enemies than any other gods. When Hector exults in a favourable tide of the battle, her angry shiver shakes the whole of Mt. Olympos (*Il.* 8. 198-9). Since she is angry at his killing of Achaean warriors and since she favours Achilles, she is the one angered by Apollo's accusation against Achilles of his maltreatment of Hector's body (*Il.* 24. 55). Like Athena, she is angry at Zeus who appears to be favourable to the truce between two armies (*Il.* 4. 24) and who orders the gods not to help them in
fighting (*II. 8. 461, 15. 103-4*), and, unlike Athena (*4. 23, 8. 460*), she cannot help speaking out against Zeus' policy in her anger. To other gods than Zeus, her anger often proves to be dangerous. When she gets angry at Xanthus who has nearly drowned Achilles, she sets Hephaestus upon him until his stream boils up (*II. 21. 328-84*). When she is angry at Ares, she sets Athena upon him (*II. 5. 762-3, 21. 412-3*). In the 'Theomachia', only she and Athena are involved in actual fighting, and successful. Athena beats Ares and Aphrodite under Hera's instruction (*21. 403-34*). Hera beats Artemis (*21. 479ff*).

Xanthus is the only god who is angry at Achilles' merciless killing of Trojan youths (*II. 21. 136, 146, 212, 306*), but is checked by Hephaestus as we have seen. Ares who rages in the battlefield as a war-god (*17. 399*) shows more 'human' anger at the death of his son (*15. 138*) which even (allegedly) endangers his life, but he is checked by Athena from taking any revenge on behalf of his son.

These examples of 'divine' anger as we have seen above are all too human when we look at them through their perspective, in terms of their personal grudge, personal losses, etc. However, if we look at them in their broader context, we notice a strange order behind them.

μοῖρα and divine anger

First, the gods expect their share of τιμή, due honour, from human beings. And their τιμή is part of universal order, μοῖρα. Poseidon has the same share of τιμή (*II. 15. 189*) as Zeus (*186 ὁμότιμον*) which means that he has the same μοῖρα as his brother (*195; 209 ἵσιμοι καὶ ἡμὶ πεπρωμένον ἀληθι. It is θέμισ for men to pay*
due honour to the gods and it is the gods' μοῖρα to receive it. If men neglect this duty, it is not only against θε'μισ in human terms, but also against μοῖρα in divine and cosmic terms.

The gods are especially ruthless in punishing men who challenge them because it is not mortals' lot (μοῖρα) to compete with immortal gods (Il. 6. 128-41, 22. 8-13). And all of those who receive eternal punishments in the Underworld are such challengers to the gods (Od. 11, 576-600). The gods' apparently 'personal' anger caused by offence against their τιμή, in fact, corresponds to a higher order, universal law of the world, i.e. μοῖρα. It is by μοῖρα that the gods are immortal and men mortal, and the abyss between them must not be bridged. Men are allowed to enjoy divine privileges only after they are deified, like Heracles (Od. 11. 602-4) and Leucothea (Od. 5. 335). As far as they are mortal, they are never allowed to be equal to the gods in any respect. Perhaps, this, to some extent, explains the general divine jealousy towards divine-human liaisons.

Even so, Poseidon's wrath at the Phaeacians still looks excessive. To our eyes, their competence in seafaring does not seem to affect the god's honour very much. However, it is also a case of μοῖρα if we take a close look at it. It has been prophesied long before the event that one day they will lose Poseidon's favour in one way or another (Od. 8. 565-6, 13. 172-4). It is, after all, their μοῖρα, an inevitable fate. Odysseus' visit may not even be the real reason for their punishment, if it is a direct cause. In this sense, the god's anger perfectly keeps pace with

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5 cf. II. 5. 406-15, though despite Dione's condemnation, Diomedes survives the war and goes home safely according to Od. 3. 180-2. Zeus, at least, is not angry at Diomedes as much as he is at Ares judging from his reaction towards Ares' complaint (5. 888-91). See also II. 5. 440-2.
Moreover, he is very careful in trying to keep himself within the plan of Zeus, the administrator of μοῖρα; he is quite prepared to give up his wrath at the Phaeacians if it was not authorized by Zeus (Od. 13. 148). Zeus allows Poseidon to take his revenge because it is the time set by μοῖρα to terminate Phaeacian seamanship.

Poseidon's wrath at Odysseus seems equally unreasonable at first sight, but here again, we see μοῖρα at work, behind the scene. Already at the time when he leaves for Troy, it has been prophesied that he will not come back to Ithaca until the twentieth year after his departure (Od. 2. 175-6). It does not matter if the cause is blinding the Cyclops, inciting the wrath of Poseidon, or any other, provided he does not go home until then. Poseidon, Helios and Zeus work together to fulfil this μοῖρα of Odysseus. Poseidon's anger at Odysseus and Helios's anger at his crew are both described like human emotion, but completely in accordance with the course of μοῖρα.

On the other hand, it is equally μοῖρα for Odysseus to go home eventually (Od. 5. 41-2, 113-5) and to take revenge upon the suitors (11. 118-20). Therefore, Athena's rather excessive love and care for Odysseus, her indignation at the suitors, and her malicious plots against them all perfectly keep pace with μοῖρα. At the very end of the story, she says that Zeus would be angered by further bloodshed in Ithaca after delivering his order for making

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6 cf. Heubeck-Hoekstra on 9. 550-5: 'But there is no question here of Zeus being hostile to Odysseus; we are simply told that he did not accept the offering. He must let events take their course in accordance with Moira, which has ordained that Odysseus should return only after twenty years, and so he gives thought to destroying Odysseus' fleet and companions. ... Poseidon's desire for revenge is in accordance with fate, and we must therefore expect Zeus to fulfil Poseidon's wishes, although he has just saved Odysseus....'
peace (24. 544). Zeus could be angered not because he is a pacifist, but because peace-making at this very moment is his plan, and it is μοῖρα.

And it is, after all, μοῖρα that the Trojan war is caused, fought, and ended in the way it is through the plan of Zeus, or μοῖρα, and the gods' involvement in the war on either side, the Trojan or the Achaean, is an integral part of the scenario. Although driven by their purely 'human' sense of honour, anger, and affection, the gods perform their roles prescribed by μοῖρα, e.g. Apollo handing Patroclus to Hector, Athena handing Hector to Achilles etc. Men might describe their misfortunes as the result of divine anger (II. 6. 205, 18. 292, 21. 83, Od. 11. 560) or divine jealousy (Od. 23. 210-2) which may be right, but their anger, however unreasonable and unfair it might look to human eyes, is always a manifestation of fate. The gods may be driven by their divine instinct to get angry, but at least sometimes act out of their knowledge of the course of μοῖρα. Apollo is angry at Patroclus trying to scale the Trojan wall (II. 16. 711) because it is not aισχρό (707) for him to take the city. Heracles died due to μοῖρα and Hera's wrath (II. 18. 119). The gods work for μοῖρα sometimes even against their personal feelings. A good example is Poseidon's rescue of Aeneas, because it is fated (μορίμοιον II. 20. 302) that he will survive the war and rebuild Troy. If he was killed, Zeus would be angry (20. 301). On the other hand, if Zeus

8 Of course, from the poet's point of view, these 'fates' are what the tradition says, the legendary 'facts' that he cannot change. cf. E. Hedén, Homeriche Götterstudien (Uppsala 1912) p. 177; P. E. Eberhard, Das Schicksal als poetische Idee bei Homer (Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums XIII-1, 1923); G. M. Calhoun, 'The Divine Entourage in Homer' in AJP 61 (1940) 260.
saved Sarpedon or Hector out of his personal feeling, other gods would be angry (16. 443, 22. 181), though it seems that he has power to save them against υοπά. We will see the relation between Zeus and υοπά in detail in the next chapter.

In short, divine anger is υοπά-oriented, not morally-motivated. This explains why human expectation of moral performance of the gods is often frustrated. Since it is the gods' plan to destroy the suitors of Penelope in the end, the human guess that the gods must be angry at the suitors' wantonness (Od. 2. 66, 20. 169, 215, 23. 63-4) looks as if it is verified. On the other hand, since it is fated that Heracles will become a god and enjoy divine privileges, the divine δνισ towards his murder of his guest (Od. 21. 28), despite the poet's comment, does not affect him. Zeus sends storms and damages crops whenever it is υοπά for him to do so, regardless of moral virtue or vice of men. Therefore it is up to human beings to interpret a storm as sheer misfortune (Il. 5. 91) which Zeus is said to send to men so often (Il. 24. 525-33) or divine punishment (Il. 16. 384-92).

Among themselves, however, the gods seem to have morality of the kind common among men. First of all, the gods normally do not like quarrels among themselves. It is said that the gods were once vexed at violence of Zeus to Hera (Il. 15. 21). When Ares, wounded by Diomedes and Athena, complains to Zeus, the father expresses his displeasure with Ares' warlike character and scolds him as 'Δλοπρόσαλλος' (Il. 5. 890-91). But Zeus is not really seriously angry. After all, you are my son, he says, and has his son's wound treated (5. 895-9). The conclusion of this episode is ever the same divine happiness (906):

πορ έδι Κρονίων καθέποτε υαλω.
Zeus and Hera are most frequently at odds with each other, but, rather typical of an old stable couple in ennui, Zeus confesses that he is now so used to his wife's disobedience that he no longer feels anger (Il. 8. 407-8). They seem to have grown out of dish-fighting.

Hephaestus is angry at his wife and her lover Ares (Od. 8. 304) and calls other gods to come and see the trapped pair. The goddesses do not come, but male gods do. One of them makes a light-hearted moral comment (329):

οὐκ ἀφετάκακα ἔφιγα κρύβει ταῖς βραδιγίς ὦκι

and says that Ares should pay an adulterer's penalty (332 τὸ καὶ μοιχάρι ὀφελλεῖ). While other gods are making fun of the naughty pair, Poseidon alone is concerned about his nephew's honour, asking Hephaestus to release him, saying that he will guarantee due payment of Ares' penalty (347-8, 355-6). On his request, Hephaestus releases the two. It seems that among the gods, too, adultery is a crime and the offender must pay a penalty. It looks fair enough so far. But are they really serious about it? Hermes even wishes to be in Ares' position, in bed with Aphrodite, even with a tighter trap and a bigger audience (339-42). Poseidon is the only serious person in the scene not because of moral indignation at Ares, but because of pity on him in a shameful show. The ending of the story is as usual. The god and the goddess go to their respective place of cult, where the goddess is washed and splendidly dressed by the Charites, to shine in glorious beauty again (Od. 8. 362-366) — there is no trace of shame or remorse, but the unchangeable Olympian happiness.

Despite mock-moral statements and mock-legal transactions, there is an overwhelming air of light-heartedness
among the gods. No quarrel, no discord is a serious matter among
the gods. They respect each other and try to avoid, at least to
minimize, fighting against each other especially over human
matters (Il. 21. 379-80, 462-7, 498-501, Od. 6. 329-31, 13. 148,
341-3). Nothing should spoil their heavenly banquet ringing with
laughter and music (Il. 1. 573ff). Divine society is basically
problem-free and there is no need for moral codes or law apart
from divine instinct for their common happiness. \( \mu \sigma \rho \alpha \) which
often appears as ruthless reality of life to human beings is merely
the basis of mutual respect and eternal happiness of the gods.
They are happy as they are and they are what they are thanks to
the \( \mu \sigma \rho \alpha \) they hold. Therefore, they never trespass beyond \( \mu \sigma \rho \alpha \)
themselves, nor allow mortals to do so. They must defend and
maintain the present distribution of \( \mu \sigma \rho \alpha \) which is the basis of
their privilege and welfare. No wonder they are most furious
when men threaten their \( \mu \sigma \rho \alpha \).

This will lead us to a brief conclusion to our quest for divine
morality. The gods do have some sense of morality, but its focus
is always on \( \mu \sigma \rho \alpha \). Unless what \( \mu \sigma \rho \alpha \) bids coincides with moral
virtue of men, the gods do not behave as (or rather appear to be)
defenders of human morality.
Part II  Morality of Homeric Man
Chapter 7  Fate, gods, and men

So far, we have mentioned fate, μοίρα or αἰσχρό, occasionally in relation to divine morality, and mostly treated it as identical to Δίος βουλή. Certainly Zeus looks at times like an administrator and distributor of μοίρα. We see, however, such examples in that the gods including Zeus yield their personal desires before μοίρα. What exactly is the relation between μοίρα and Zeus (and other gods)? 1 Does μοίρα control every event and every step of divine and human conduct? If so, it is impossible to talk seriously about moral responsibility based on conscious control of behaviour by men or gods. In this chapter, we examine the use of the words μοίρα, αἰσχρό and their cognate words in order to see the relation between fate and divine and human characters in the epics.

μοίρα and the cognate words

The primary sense of the μορ- component in μοίρα, μόροσ and other related words (μελρομαι etc.) is a 'divided portion' or 'share'.

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1 On the problem of the relation between the gods and fate, the following lines of opinions have been proposed and reproposed: (1) fate is identical with the will of the gods or of Zeus; (2) the gods are only the instruments of fate; (3) the gods and fate belong to two separate spheres of religious principles which the poet failed to coordinate into a coherent system; (4) fate is only the poet's plan or what the legend says i. e. the plot of the poem. cf. E. Ehnmark, The Idea of God in Homer, p. 74; E. Leitzke, Moira und Gottheit im alten griechischen Epos (Göttingen 1930), pp. 65-7; S. Eitrem, 'Moirai' in RE 15-2, (1932) 2453-60.

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without necessarily any good or bad connotation. The best examples to illustrate its 'neutrality' are:

\[
\mu\omicron r\alpha\iota\nu\iota a\iota\nu as 'parts' of night in II. 10. 253:
\]

\[
\tau\alpha\nu \delta\omicron \mu\omega\rho\alpha\nu\iota\tau\eta\gamma\tau \delta\varepsilon\pi \mu\omicron r\alpha\lambda\epsilon\iota\pi\tau\tau\eta i
\]

\[
\mu\omicron r\alpha\iota as a fraction of one's property in Od. 4. 97:
\]

\[
\Delta \upsilon \delta\phi\e\ell\omega\nu\tau\tau\gamma\tau \pi\varepsilon r\xi\omega\iota\nu \varepsilon\nu \delta\iota\mu\alpha\sigma\iota \mu\omicron r\alpha\nu
\]

\[
\nu\alpha\lambda\iota\iota \iota, \ldots.
\]

And \[
\mu\omicron r\alpha\iota as the part of field in the hands of the Achaeans in II. 16. 68:
\]

\[
\ldots \chi\iota\rho\iota\nu\iota \delta\iota\gamma\iota\nu\varepsilon\tau \mu\omicron r\alpha\nu \varepsilon\chi\omega\nu\tau\varepsilon\iota\iota.
\]

The meaning of 'share' is particularly clear from the usage of \[
\mu\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\omicron\omega\mu\alpha i \text{ (have a share of) in the active and the middle (II. 1. 278, 9. 616, 15. 189, Od. 5. 335, 11. 338, all with \tau\iota\mu\iota\varsigma and \alpha\iota\delta\omega\varsigma), and of \epsilon\mu\omicron\omega\rho\omicron\omicron\iota\varsigma \text{ ('sharing in' Od. 8. 480, with \tau\iota\mu\iota\varsigma). The meaning of 'division' is transparent in the usage of \delta\iota\mu\omicron\omicron\omicron\omega r\alpha\iota\omicron\omicron\mu\alpha i (Od. 14. 434).} \]

\[
\mu\omicron r\alpha\iota, \text{ most often an undesirable portion like the doom of death, can sometimes be a good portion as in \mu\omicron r\eta\gamma\epsilon\nu e\nu\iota\varsigma \text{ ('a child of Fortune' II. 3. 182), \sigma\mu\omicron\omega\rho\omicron\omicron\iota \text{ ('without a share in bathing' II. 18).}}
\]

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2 For the etymology cf. W. Krause, *Glotta* 25 (1936) pp. 146-7; E. Boisacq, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque* (Heidelberg 1950) \mu\omicron r\alpha\iota, \mu\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\omicron\omega\mu\alpha i; H. Frisk, *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* (Heidelberg 1960) \mu\omicron r\alpha\iota, \mu\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\omicron\omega\mu\alpha i; P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque* (Paris 1968-80) \mu\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\omicron\omega\mu\alpha i.
489, Od. 5. 275; 'without good luck' II. 6. 408, 24. 773, δυσάμμορος ('most luckless' II. 19. 315, 22. 428, 24. 727). But who 'divides' and distributes such 'portions'?

When men talk about a μοῖρα of booty (II. 9. 318, Od. 11. 534) or food (especially a portion of meat; Od. 3. 40, 66, 8. 470, 14. 448, 15. 140, 17. 258, 335, 19. 428, 20. 260, 280, 281, 293), the distributors are naturally men. Such distribution can be considerably arbitrary at times (as Achilles' complaint at II. 9. 318-9 or Eumaeus' generous serving of a chine — the portion of the highest honour as at II. 7. 321 — to a beggar at Od. 14. 437 shows) but generally follows the rule that each person receives his due portion according to his worth and status. Also for the lack of μοῖρα of αἵδως (οὐ άἵδως μοῖραν ἔχουσιν. Od. 20. 171), human distribution (an individual's choice to be shameless etc.) should be considered responsible.

The gods, too, once divided their property among themselves. The three sons of Cronos, Zeus, Poseidon, and Hades, divided the world into three μοῖραι, portions (II. 15. 189-93). Zeus' portion is the Heaven, Poseidon's the Sea, Hades' the Underworld (therefore each of the three is ἵσομορος 209), and the rest, the Earth, is the common property of all the gods. In this scheme of distribution, as is clear from the way Poseidon puts it, the three gods are the distributors of their own μοῖραι. They do not call in the goddess Moira or the like, except that they decided their respective portions by lot.

When μοῖρα and the preposition are coupled, they serve as an adverbial phrase such as within/beyond a proper portion i.e.

properly/not properly. When something is done in good order, it is done 'κατά μοιράν' (II. 16. 367 (negative), 19. 256, Od. 3. 457, 4. 783, 8. 54, 9. 245, 309, 342; fairly Od. 16. 385). When someone speaks properly or in due order, he is said to speak 'κατά μοιράν' (properly; II. 1. 280, 8. 146, 9. 59, 10. 169, 15. 206, 23. 626, 24. 379, Od. 2. 251 (negative), 3. 331, 4. 266, 7. 227, 8. 141, 397 (negative), 496, 13. 48, 15. 170, 203, 17. 580, 18. 170, 20. 37, 21. 278, 22. 486; in due order; Od. 10. 16, 12. 35, 13. 385) or speak 'ἐν μοιρῆ' (properly II. 19. 186). Antinous has been shot dead by Odysseus 'ἐν μοιρῆ', within his due portion i. e. deservedly (Od. 22. 54). The opposite to 'κατά μοιράν' (properly) is 'παρά μοιράν' i.e. 'beyond portion' (Od. 14. 509, negative). 'κατά μοιράν' is used also with other verbs as ἐρέξας (Od. 9. 352, negative), ὑποκρίνατο (Od. 15. 170) and ὑποσχόμενος τελέσειν (Od. 15. 203) meaning 'doing something properly or reasonably'. In other words, κατά μοιράν means either 'with every portion in its proper place' i. e. 'orderly' or 'within one's lot' i.e. 'behaving suitably to one's position or status,' referring to the portions of fortune men hold. Such phrases seem to refer to certain standards of propriety in the human society which are obviously under human control, since one can choose whether or not to behave 'within one's lot'. This is one indication of the existence of moral responsibility expected

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4 Odysseus reproaches the Cyclops who has eaten some of his companions, for behaving 'οὐ κατά μοιράν' (Od. 9. 357), but obviously, the giant, being no social animal, does not judge himself according to any social code which would tell him what is his 'due portion' and what is the boundary between proper and improper behaviour.

5 cf. A. W. H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility (Oxford 1960) p. 21; B. C. Dietrich op. cit. p. 210 points out that in the Iliad, in every instance in which a person is said to have spoken 'κατά μοιράν', he shows awareness of the superior position (due to either age or political influence) of another. As he observes, this κατά μοιράν that 'relates to a certain prescribed conduct, or accepted custom' is much more common in the Odyssey.(p. 225ff).
from each individual in the society. Everyone is expected to behave and be treated in accordance with his due 'portion'.

But when we come to the most frequent use of μοιρά, that connected with the death of mortal men, it is obviously beyond human control. μοιρά is often synonymous with death (Il. 4. 517, 6. 488, 12. 116, 15. 117, 18. 120, 22. 303, Od. 2. 100, 3. 238, 11. 560, 17. 326, 19. 145, 24. 29, 135) and sometimes coupled with death itself (θάνατος καὶ μοιρά Il. 3. 101, 17. 478, 672, 22. 436; θάνατος καὶ μοιρά κρατάῃ Il. 5. 83, 16. 334, 853, 20. 477, 21. 110, 24. 132; φόνος καὶ μοιρά Od. 21. 24). The meaning of portion as the life span or death is widely observed in other cognate words of μοιρά as μόρος (see below), μόρσιμος (Il. 5. 674, 15. 613, 19. 417, 22. 13, Od. 10. 175), αἰνιγμόρος (Od. 9. 53, 24. 169), ὠκυμόρος (Il. 1. 417, 505, 18. 95, 458, Od. 1. 266, 4. 346, 17. 137, cf. Il. 15. 441, Od. 22. 75). There are also such expressions as 'It is μοιρά to die.' (Il. 16. 434, 17. 421 23. 80) i.e. it is one's given portion (fate) to die. μετρομαί in the passive conveys the same meaning (Il. 21. 281, Od. 5. 312, 24. 34). There is also, naturally, its opposite, 'It is not μοιρά to die.' (Il. 7. 52; cf. Il. 20. 302 'destined, μόριμος, to flee'; Od. 5. 345 'μοιρά to be saved'.) or 'It is not μοιρά to kill' (μόρσιμος Il. 5. 674). But who is the divider of such portions?

Zeus is twice regarded as the author of a specific μοιρά of death (Il.15. 117 μοιρὰ Διός by Ares7, Od. 11. 560 by Odysseus) and

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6 L. Pearson, Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece (Stanford 1962), p. 69: 'In the Homeric poems one of the most important limitations on human conduct is the "due portion" that must not be exceeded, the moira beyond which a man must not go if he is to avoid disapproval or nemesis on the part of gods and men.'

the unfortunate Lycaon says that μοῖρα has handed him to Achilles, as probably being hated by Zeus (Il. 21. 83). According to Patroclus, μοῖρα and Apollo are primarily responsible for his death (Il. 16. 849). Heracles is killed by 'μοῖρα and Hera's wrath' (Il. 18. 119). For Achilles' death, an unspecified 'θεὸς μέγας' is said to be responsible along with μοῖρα, that is almost certainly Apollo (Il. 19. 410). When Odysseus says that the suitors were killed by 'μοῖρα θεῶν' and their own 'σχέτλα έργα' (Od. 22. 413), he clearly has the gods in general in mind collectively as dispensers of the portions (fortunes) to men. There are other sorts of μοῖραι as fate such as μοῖρα to go home (Odysseus, Od. 5. 41, 114, 9. 532, cf. Od. 11. 139 ἐπέκλωσαν θεοὶ αὐτοῖ; Menelaus Od. 4. 475-9 depending on his hecatomb to the gods), to sleep (Od. 19. 592 given by the gods)\(^8\), or to marry (μορφὴμος Od. 21. 162) most of which are considered given by the gods. Melampus is held as a prisoner by 'θεοῦ μοῖρα' (Od. 11. 292), but will be saved later and the whole episode is concluded by the phrase 'Διός δ’ ἐτελείετο βουλή' (11. 297). Clearly men believe that at least some of μοῖραι come from the gods, and it is confirmed by the statements of Ares (Il. 15. 117) and Xanthus (Il. 19. 410).

However, while Nestor thinks that it was μοῖρα θεῶν that changed Clytemnestra's mind to betray her husband (Od. 3. 269), Zeus himself expresses a completely opposite view (Od. 1. 32ff) complaining that men wrongly blame the gods as responsible for

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\(^8\) cf. ed. W. B. Stanford, *The Odyssey of Homer*, on 592-3: "For the immortals have assigned a proper portion to everything, for the benefit of mortals on the grain-giving earth" This enunciates one of the dominant principles of early Greek theology and ethics, the principle of the Just Portion, μοῖρα...."
their misfortunes, whereas men suffer beyond 'μόρος' through their own folly (Od. 1. 34):

*σφηνων ἀπαθαλίην ὑπὲρ μόρου διγε' ἔχουσιν.*

and gives the very same example of Aegisthus having seduced Clytemnestra and murdered Agamemnon beyond 'μόρος' (ὑπὲρ μόρου Od. 1. 35). These passages pose two questions: 'Are the gods really responsible for men's fate?' and 'Can men act *beyond* fate?'

Zeus is said by Penelope to know all 'μοῖραν τ' ἀμορίην τε καταδηντῶν ἀνθρώπων' (Od. 20. 76).9 As she says, as far as μοῖρα of men is concerned, he seems to know everything, if we judge from his conversation with other gods over such characters as Sarpedon, Hector, or Achilles. But 'knowing' fate does not necessarily mean that he is always the author of it.

As we have already seen, μοῖρα in Homer, as more frequently in later tradition, is sometimes personified. In his speech at II. 19. 78ff, Agamemnon claims that Zeus, Moira and Erinys are responsible for his δτη. In this context, although some editors put

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9 μοῖραν τ' ἀμορίην τε has been interpreted in two ways, either 'fortunate and unfortunate lot' or 'what is destined and what is not'. cf. U. Bianchi, *ΔΙΟΣ ΑΙΣΑ* (Roma 1953) p. 43 (1); B. C. Dietrich, op. cit. p. 230. Analogy from an English pair 'fortune and misfortune' may speak for the former, but the problem of this argument is that English 'fortune', though it can mean any fortune, happy or unhappy, primarily means a happy lot, while μοῖρα on its own always evokes the connotation of misfortune. It is difficult to determine, but I am inclined to take μοῖρα as 'what is destined' in a neutral sense, because, in Homer, man is aware of the fact that often both happy and unhappy consequences come from a single μοῖρα, lot. For example, having been born as a prince is probably fortunate for Astyanax until he will be dashed to death from the citadel. As Achilles says, there is no unmixed happiness in this world (II. 24. 530). In such a world, the expression for a purely happy lot is difficult to accommodate.
μοῖρα and ἐπιβίτις respectively, μοῖρα has to be taken as a personified divine power, because it is put beside Zeus and Erinys who is, like Zeus, a legitimate divinity with her cult-history going back to Mycenaean records. Although μοῖρα is not explicitly said to be a goddess or a daughter of Zeus, it is obvious here that this μοῖρα is not just an inanimate portion, but a more active agent.

The image of μοῖρα as the spinner of fate which is common in later tradition also appears in Homer at Il. 24. 209-10:

...μοῖρα κραταίη

γιγαντεύσει ἐπένθη τῶν....

10 cf. Linear B tablets KN Fp 1+31, KN V 52+8285 cf. KN Fh 390; M. Ventris and J. Chadwick, Documents in Mycenaean Greek, no. 200 (p. 127, pp. 305-7), no. 208 (p. 411, p. 476); J. Chadwick, The Mycenaean World, (Cambridge 1976) p. 98; J. T. Hooker, Linear B: An Introduction (Bristol 1980) pp. 152-3; For ἐπιβίτις as personality, not abstraction: A. Heubeck, 'ἐπιβίτις in der archaischen Epik', Glotta 64 (1986) p. 162. E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the irrational, p. 7, objects to the view that μοῖρα is personified here: 'I am sure it is quite wrong to write Moira with a capital "M" here, as if it signified either a personal goddess who dictates to Zeus or a Cosmic Destiny like the Hellenistic Heimarmene. As goddesses, Moirai are always plural, both in cult and in early literature, and with one doubtful exception they do not figure at all in the Iliad. 29. II. 24. 49.' As he argues, it is probably less misleading to spell μοῖρα here with a small 'μ' to avoid such later associations as he refers to, but it is a minor issue. Even spelt with a small μ, the fact remains that it is personified in this line. As for the number of Moirai, I do not think it is necessary to bother. For example, although the poet addresses θέα (II. 1. 1, Od. 1. 10), μοῖσαι (II. 2. 484, 491) and μοῖσα (Od. 1. 1) indiscriminately, no one has ever raised a serious question about the number of the Muses. The same applies to ἐπιβίτις/ἐπιβίτις. It is quite common to invoke one out of a set of goddesses. For a systematic argument for Moira/Moirai as deities, see B. C. Dietrich, op. cit., pp. 194-9; For personification of moira, see also Eitrem, op. cit. 2458; W. F. Otto, The Homeric Gods (tr. by M. Hadas, New York 1954) pp.268-9. E. Hedén, Homerische Götterstudien (Uppsala 1912) pp. 148-9. Otto, and Dietrich think that Moira was originally a goddess of death, and other uses of μοῖραι developed later. However, as we see in this chapter, the idea of one's 'due portion' is widespread not only in relation with death, but in many aspects of life, and expressed not only with the word μοῖρα, but with ἀλόγα and μοῖρος which are never fully personified and have no sign of popular cult, and even with δίκη and θέμιστος, and the notion may go back to IE origin cf. Chapter 5 n. 2 and the section 'δίκη in Homer' and L. R. Palmer, 'The Indo-European Origins of Greek Justice', TPhS (1950) 149-68, esp. 168. It is probably pointless to try to argue which has a greater antiquity, the idea of μοῖρα as a due portion or Moira the goddess of death.
This μοίρα is comparable to αἰσια and Κλωθες in the same function (Il. 20. 127-8, Od. 7. 197). Interestingly, the gods themselves are also spinners sometimes (Il. 24. 525 said by Achilles; Od. 1. 17 said by the poet; Od. 11. 139 said by Odysseus; Od. 20. 196 said by Philoetius; δαίμων as the spinner of fate Od. 16. 64 said by Eumaeus; cf. Od. 3. 208). The plural μοίραι appears only once at Il. 24. 49 in Apollo's speech in which they are said to put an enduring heart into men. But what is the status of μοίραι? Are they 'portions' (fortunes) given by the gods, or the givers of portions themselves? The word like μοιρηγενετις (Il. 3. 182) suggests μοίρα as the giver of fortunes.11 On the other hand, the spinning of the gods or the portrait of Zeus as the giver of human fortunes (e.g. Il. 24. 527-530) suggests that he is in charge of dispensing fate. Zeus is the author of fate certainly in the eyes of human characters, but the case is much more complex in the eye of the poet. As we saw in the last chapter, the gods have various, often contending, personal intentions which strangely keep in pace with the course of μοίρα. The fact seems to point rather to the overall dominance of μοίρα over the gods than the other way round. It is certainly possible to say, in a paradoxical way, that μοίρα 'is in the last resort identical with the will of Zeus,'12 but only in the sense that the gods, including Zeus, always follow the course of μοίραι and never seriously want to do anything against them.

11 However, it is not necessary to take the μοίρα implicit in the word as personified. For example, G. S. Kirk, The Iliad: A Commentary I on 182-3 renders it as 'born with (favourable) destiny'.
We also have to examine the expression 'ὑπὲρ μοῖραν' closely when Poseidon says to Aeneas who is about to stand against Achilles (Il. 20. 335-6):

&iota; άκαταφιήσαι, δι' ου συμβιβήσεαι αυτώ
μήκαι ὑπὲρ μοῖραν δὲ μον"Αίδως εἰςαφίκησαι.

The phrase 'ὑπὲρ μοῖραν' means, in general, 'beyond what is allotted', and therefore, in some cases, 'beyond what one is entitled to' as in the case of Aegisthus (Od. 1. 35). In this particular example, however, the phrase can be taken in no other way but as 'beyond your fate', because Aeneas' fate is explicitly told to the audience at 20. 302 by Poseidon himself:

μόριον δέ οὖ πέρι ἀλέσθαι.

The god intervenes to prevent the event from occurring in contradiction to destiny.

This example, on the other hand, seems to suggest that it is considered possible for men or gods to go beyond fate, though it always remains potential or rhetorical concern and is never realized. Before we discuss this matter in detail, we must go through the usage of μόρος and other related words where we will face this same question.

μόρος in Homer

The usage of μόρος corresponds to that of μοῖρα especially in its gloomy senses. μόρος is, above all, the fate of death (Il. 18. 465, 19. 421, 21. 133, 22. 280, 24. 85, Od. 1. 166; with θάνατος: Od. 9. 61, 11. 409, 16. 421, 20. 241) or such hard luck as to visit the

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13 cf. W. Leaf's comment on Il. 2. 155 (ὑπέρμορα): 'a rhetorical expression only: nothing ever actually happens in Homer against the will of fate, as a god always interferes to prevent it.'

All other examples of μόρος are found in the phrases 'ὑπὲρ μόρον' or 'ὑπέρμορα' (ὑπέρ μόρα?). Two of the examples have already been mentioned (*Od*. 1. 34, 35): Zeus thinks that men suffer 'ὑπὲρ μόρον' because of their own folly as Aegisthus dared to seduce Clytemnestra 'ὑπὲρ μόρον'. It is also the gods, Zeus and Apollo specifically, who think of 'the fall of Troy ὑπὲρ μόρον' as a possibility (*II*. 20. 30, 21. 517). Odysseus could have died 'ὑπὲρ μόρον' before he reached Scheria had Athena not helped him (*Od*. 5. 436) and the Argives could have gone home 'ὑπέρμορα', had Hera not moved Athena to intervene (*II*. 2. 155).

It is not always easy to tell what this phrase, 'ὑπὲρ μόρον' means. It is clear that μόρος in *Od*. 1. 35, and therefore also in *Od*. 1. 34, does not mean 'fate', because it was not fated for Aegisthus to refrain from seducing Clytemnestra and from murdering Agamemnon. These incidents must happen because the poet is conditioned by the legend which says so. After all, it was μοῖρα θεῶν that Clytemnestra yielded to Aegisthus' seduction (*Od*. 3.

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14 Both ὑπέρμορον in *OCT.*
Therefore Zeus cannot mean that Aegisthus did what he did 'beyond his fate.' 'ὑπὲρ μόρον' at Od. 1. 35 must therefore mean 'beyond one's lot' i.e. beyond what is allowed in one's position. Clytemnestra was not available to him as his 'share' — she was a wife of a much greater man than he was — and it was certainly not a legitimate right of any man to kill the king in conspiracy with his queen. What Zeus expresses here is a clear moral responsibility of a man. 'ὑπὲρ μόρον' at Od. 1. 34, on the other hand, seems to mean 'beyond one's portion' (of sufferings) in a sense almost synonymous with 'more than necessary.'

Other examples of 'ὑπὲρ μόρον' point to incidents which might happen before the appointed time. The fall of Troy (II. 20. 30, 21. 517), the return journey of the Argives (II. 2. 155), and death of Odysseus (Od. 5. 436) are all to come some day, eventually, even if they are not narrated in the main line of the story. Therefore, even if these incidents did happen before the appointed time, it would not violate the fundamental order of the world, unlike such events as the sun going down to the Underworld to shine there or a man killing a god, which are absolutely inadmissible in the Homeric cosmology.

It is also the case with Poseidon's remarks on Aeneas (II. 20. 302). He is, being a mortal, to die sooner or later, but it was just

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15 Although Zeus himself blames Aegisthus, and it is a comment by a human figure, Nestor, since he has now gained the full account of the event, his testimony can be treated as valid as that of the poet. What has happened is, after all, what was ordained in advance. We all share the gods' knowledge in retrospect. For this 'simple fatalism' of Homer, see M. P. Nilsson, Geschichteder griechischen Religion2 I (München 1955) pp. 367-8; S. Eitrem, 'Moira' in RE XV-2 (1932) 2455: 'Was geschieht, mußte geschehen, und schließlich hat es Zeus so gewollt —.'
not so destined for him to be killed by Achilles on that particular day.

We can conclude from the above that if we understand 'μόρος' in 'ὑπέρ μόρον' or 'μοῖρα' in 'ὑπέρ μοῖραν' as fate, this fate is not so firmly destined as the basic structure of the Homeric universe and therefore it is potentially possible for somebody to go beyond it. On the other hand, we never hear such statements as 'The kingship of Zeus might have been overturned υπέρ μοῖραν.' or 'The House of Hades could have been exposed to the sunlight υπέρ μόρον.' Whenever it is suggested that somebody might go beyond 'μοῖρα' or 'μόρος' (in the sense of fate), it is just a matter of a timetable — dying, going home, or sacking a city before the appointed time. The gods have to intervene only to make sure that the timetable is duly kept. The 'portion' implied in μοῖρα or μόρος here can be considered the length of time that one is given before a certain event takes place. μοῖρα as death also seems to be based on the same idea — μοῖρα is the portion of lifetime or the end of it which is, in the mythological image, portioned out by the spinner/s (either μοῖρα or the gods).

The idea of μοῖρα connected with an appointed time is also seen in such examples of the usage of μοῖρα at Od. 3. 269 (Clytemnestra changes her mind), Od. 4. 475 (Menelaus' homecoming) and Od. 11. 292 (Melampus' adventure). Compare also 'the year the gods spun for Odysseus to go home' (Od. 1. 16-7).

18 Otto, op. cit. p. 271: "not until" is the characteristic note of Moira, .... ... anything that goes beyond fate does not abolish but only accentuates it. The language of the formula is not "contrary to fate", but "beyond fate".'
Many examples of μοῖρα simply mean a 'portion' or a 'share' with 'no metaphysical overtones'. But the usage of μοῖρα and μόρος in such expressions as 'ἐν μοίρῃ', 'κατὰ μοῖραν', 'ὑπὲρ μόρου' suggests μοῖρα/μόρος as a certain moral standard, what one is supposed to meet in one's position or status. This μοῖρα/μόρος is something one can go beyond, yet should confine oneself within. Such usage of these terms clearly indicates the existence of freedom of choice and moral responsibility of human beings. Men do have a choice to behave within or beyond their due portion. That is the reason why Zeus can claim that men suffer for their own δτασθαλία by going beyond 'μόρος'.

In other examples of μοῖρα, μόρος and other μορ- words, the component μορ- means a portion as fate. We observe at least two types of μοῖρα as fate in Homer: one is a μοῖρα which cannot be changed by any means and another is a μοῖρα which could be driven away from its original course under certain circumstances. Thus it is absolutely impossible (οὐ τοι μόρομος) for Achilles to kill Apollo (II. 22. 13), but it is possible for Aeneas to be killed by Achilles 'ὑπὲρ μόρου' (II. 20. 30). Homer talks about the possibility

20 cf. B. C. Dietrich, Death, Fate and the Gods, p. 218: 'A remarkable proof also of the advance of thought evident in Homer, is that the crime was committed by a mortal man of his own volition, not through some whim and influence of the gods. Man can stay within his own limits, but he may also transgress them, that is if he is prepared to suffer the consequences, to pay for his deeds in full.' Ehnmark (op. cit., p. 96) further argues that, since each person has his due portion, μοῖρα, 'The violation of another person's rights is regarded as an offence against the gods, and is punished by them, since it endangers the order established by fate.' But as it is obvious from Zeus' detached comment on Orestes' revenge on Aegisthus, the god has not 'punished' Aegisthus, but rather, it is the world order regulated by μοῖρα — each person has and defends his due portion — that compelled Orestes to stand up against the aggression towards his honour, due portion. The gods have only warned Aegisthus of this inevitable rule of the world (cf. Chapter 3). Even if we agree to call the violation of another person's rights as 'ὑβρίς' as Ehnmark does, there is no sign in Homer that the gods punish men because of their ὑβρίς.
that things can happen beyond ροιμακτος only when they are destined or natural to take place sometime. If an incident itself is happening anyway, the timetable can be adjusted.  

The gods and ροιμακτος

Adkins thinks that Zeus seems to be able to overset Fate and save Hector at Il. 22. 178ff. I agree that Zeus probably has a choice to save Hector, but only in the sense that he can reset the time for Hector's death, not that he can cancel Hector's absolute ροιμακτος that he, being mortal, is to die sometime. In theory, man could die before his appointed time without timely divine intervention; another could be saved and survive for a while beyond the time originally set for his death, again, with divine intervention. In the sense that divine intervention is sometimes necessary to prevent events from happening beyond ροιμακτος, we can say that the latter is dependent on the former. However, the fate that all men will die sometime cannot be changed even by the

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21 For the flexibility of ροιμακτος cf. Adkins, op. cit. p. 18 on Polyphemus' prayer to Poseidon (Od. 9. 532-5): 'This passage illustrates the nature of the belief in θεια. If Polyphemus can pray in these terms, he must believe that even if it is θεια for Odysseus to return, it need not be θεια for him to return at a particular time or in a particular condition.' The timetable of ροιμακτος, however, is in fact kept all the time. Thus Il. 6. 487 ου γαρ τις μ' ύπερ αλοιμα δανέι "Αδην προκάθει ου Τρις, ου γαρ πω πατομονμεθ', ευνομηνοι περ., μετ' 'Αδην δοκιμοι, πριν μυρια ημαρ έπελθη.  
22 op. cit. p. 19. However, Adkins' explanation for Zeus' decision that he does not save Hector 'because it is a shameful thing to do,' has no ground in the context. Hera simply warns him that he might face an unpleasant (possibly violent) opposition from other gods if he acts as he likes or, worse still, that there is fear that if Zeus sets a bad example of modifying distributions of ροιμακτος at will, others may follow it, thereby disturbing the general order of the world. It is a matter of Olympian power politics on the one hand and that of the world order on the other, but not that of shame. cf. Otto, op. cit., p. 276: 'Thus the primeval and popular belief in personal powers of fate was supplanted by the idea of an irrefragable order and destiny which is a factual datum for the living and personal gods and exists independent of them. Hence the only consequence that may be expected of a possible disregard of the fact is a disruption of order.'; C. Voigt, Überlegung und Entscheidung (Meisenheim am Glan 1972) pp. 83-4.
gods (Od. 3. 236-8). So in the reproach of Hera to Zeus (Il. 22. 179-81):

\[ \text{ἀνέφα Ὀητὴν ἐόντα, πάλαι πεπρομένον αἰτή} \]
\[ \text{ἄψ ἔθελες θανάτου δυσσέος ἔξαναλίσατε;} \]
\[ \text{ἐπὶ ἀπόρια πάντως ἐπανέκμεν θεοὶ ἄλλα.} \]

the point that other gods would not approve his action is not so powerful as the argument implied in the first two lines: 'He is destined to death anyway. If you cannot give him an eternal life, what is the point in letting him die a little later than now?'

An appointed time for a certain \( \mu oīpα \) could be adjusted by the gods since they 'spin' man's timetable of life (as testified by the poet at Od. 1. 16-7), but the \( \mu oīpα \) itself — such as death of a man — cannot be cancelled. The gods have great enough power to quicken the sunset (Il. 18. 239-40) or to delay the sunrise for a while (Od. 23. 241-6), but not to keep it away forever, because it is an unchangeable \( \mu oīpα \) for the sun to rise again to shine over the earth (Od. 12. 385-6). They can exile hostile gods to the bottom of Tartarus, but cannot kill them, because, by an absolute \( \mu oīpα \), they are immortal.

The gods have no power or authority to overcome such absolute \( \mu oīpαί \), nor do they wish to, because it is by this same system of \( \mu oīpαί \), the present order of the world, that the Olympian gods get their very power and authority.24

\( \alphaɪσα \) and the cognate words:

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23 cf. S. Eitrem, op. cit. 2454 'Nach II. XX 127 kommt es den Göttern zu, die Schicksalstunde der Menschen zu bestimmen — das Schicksal selbst aber, der Tod, steht fest.'

The basic meaning of the word 'αὐσα', like μοῖρα, is a portion, share, or lot and is virtually a synonym with μοῖρα, except that αὐσα seems to mean rather a portion 'measured' than 'divided'. This difference of nuance does not show very much in the usage of the words αὐσα and μοῖρα themselves, but it is significantly clear between their derivatives.

Like μοῖρα, αὐσα as a measured portion per se, does not necessarily have any moral connotation. For example, in his angry rejection of Agamemnon's offer of compensation, Achilles says that he values Agamemnon 'in the measure of straw' (ἐν καρός αὐση Ίl. 9. 378).

As a portion, αὐσα is almost indistinguishable from μοῖρα. It can be death (Ιl. 6. 487, 16. 441, 22. 61, 179; θανάτων αὐσα Ίl. 24. 428, 750) or life span (Ιl. 1. 416, 24. 224, Οd. 11. 61) and in a single example of personified Αὐσα, she spins one's fate of death (Ιl. 20. 127-8). This image is probably the result of the association of αὐσα and μοῖρα.

αὐσα can also be a portion of good things, like hope (Οd. 16. 101, 19. 84), booty (Ιl. 18. 327, Οd. 5. 40, 13. 138), or territory (Ιl. 15. 209 ἵσομορος by ὄμη αὐση). It can be what a man is going to experience (either good or bad) in the future (Ιl. 5. 209, 16. 707, 22. 477, Οd. 5. 113, 206, 288, 7. 197, 9. 52, 13. 306, 14. 359, 15.

25 For the basic meaning 'measure', cf. W. Leaf, The Iliad of Homer2, on 1. 418; Hedén, op. cit. p.156-7. To me Leaf's hypothesis seems to explain the various use of αὐσα and its cognate words most systematically. As it will be obvious from the following, it is a variation of the view that αὐσα is an 'equal portion' (cf. E. Boisacq, op. cit., αὐσα) because the divider must 'measure' the portions in order to make them equal. This connotation of equality is not prominent in the semantic range of μοῖρ- words. For other suggestions on the etymology of αὐσα, see W. Krause, Glotta 25 (1936) 145-6, 'given portion'; αὐσα in H. Frisk, op. cit., P. Chantraine, op. cit., and Lfg E:: 'part' etc.

26 Here I have no intention to get into the philosophical question, whether hope is good or bad for men, posed by the jar of Pandora.
276, 19. 259, 23. 315) or the destiny a city is going to meet (Od. 8. 511).

As we have seen, Αἴσχος spins a man's fate (Il. 20. 127-8), but Κλωθες are also said to spin Αἴσχος (Od. 7. 197). Zeus is said to be a dispenser of Αἴσχος at Il. 9. 608, 17. 321 (ὑπὲρ Διὸς Αἴσχος),27 Od. 9. 52, but his actual involvement in Αἴσχος is clear only in the two examples in the Iliad. At Od. 9. 52, κακῇ Διὸς Αἴσχος means little more than 'bad luck'.

Since Αἴσχος is a measured portion and often more specifically 'destiny', its derivatives also carry either of these meanings. Αἴσιος (Il. 24. 376) and παραίσιος (Il. 4. 381) are related to Αἴσχος as fate. Αἴσιμος and έναίσιμος are either 'being measured out' (hence often 'destined, fateful') or 'within measure'. Interestingly, this seems to explain why one of the κήρε becomes 'αἴσιμον ήμαρ' after being measured on Zeus' golden scales (Il. 8. 72, 22. 212). Αἴσιμον here means 'destined' as well as 'measured'. These passages show that Zeus is involved in the process of measuring out man's fate of death, even though this measuring may only be a formality to confirm what has already been destined long before.28 One's

27 Ἀργείων δὲ κε κύδος ἔλον καὶ ὑπὲρ Διὸς Αἴσχον / κάρτει ... σφετέρω 'ὑπὲρ Διὸς
Αἴσχον' means 'beyond the portion (extent) measured and allowed by Zeus i.e. beyond Zeus' intention'. As usual, it is prevented from happening by divine (Apollo's) intervention.

28 But it does not make clear what exactly is the role of Zeus in forming μοῖραι of individuals. cf. Pottscher, op. cit., p. 22ff, esp. 24: 'Zeus mag das Schicksal ahnen, die letzte Erkenntnis holt er bei den χρύσεια τὸλαντα ein.;' M. P. Nilsson, Geschichte, p. 366: 'Mit Hilfe der Waage konstatiert Zeus wessen Los das schwerste ist, wie der Verteiler der Portionen die Waage ansieht, um einem jeden den rechten Anteil, einen größeren oder kleineren, zuzuteilen.'; In my opinion, since Zeus already knows the outcome of the combat of Hector and Achilles, the Kerostasia is to make sure that the time is right, that Hector's portion of life has been exhausted (rather like Death holding an hourglass). For, if he dies before his time, that is beyond μοῖρα, a sort of situation that the gods would try their best to prevent. The scales, I should imagine, will stay balanced until the exact
death (Il. 9. 245, 21. 100, 291, Od. 16. 280), the course of life (Od. 15. 239), or even the course of hunting in which the life at stake is that of game (Il. 15. 274, 21. 495) is α'σιμος, measured and fated. Omens which reveal fate are ἐναίσιμος (Il. 2. 353, Od. 2. 159, 182).

α'σιμος, ἐναίσιμος and their antonym ἕξαισιος (beyond measure) refer to a variety of measures. There is a measure for offerings to the gods, hence ἐναίσιμα δῶρα δθανταῖς (Il. 24. 425-6) i.e. due offerings to the gods. There is a measure for servants' labour; hence ἐναίσιμα ἔργα ἐσθαί (Od. 17. 321) i.e. to do assigned work. There is a measure for time; hence ἡλθον ἐναίσιμον (Il. 6. 519) i.e. came in time. There is a measure for drinking wine; hence ἀσίμα πίνω (Od. 21. 294) i.e. drink within measure.

There seem to be also measures for human mind. There is a measure for intelligence or sanity; hence a person who is reasonably intelligent is α'σιμος (fem. Od. 23. 14), ἐναίσιμος (Il. 6. 521) or his mind is ἐναίσιμος (φρένες ἐναίσιμοι Od. 18. 220). Penelope's trick of the web failed because she mismeasured the situation (ἐναίσιμον οὐκ ἐνόσσο Od. 2. 122). α'σιμα or α'σα combined with prepositions, like μολφα, often points to a measure by which the propriety of one's word or deed is judged. When a person persuades others with a well-measured or fair argument (i.e. an argument with its portions/components put in due order) it is approved with the expression α'σιμα παρειπών (Il. 6. 62, 7. 121), or α'σιμα εἰπάς (Od. 22. 46). To pay back all the penalty to balance the damage — so that each party will have a fair portion of τιμή — is

time comes. Another example of the Kerostasia at Il. 8. 68-72 can be interpreted in the same way. If it is to measure time, that also explains why the poet takes pains to specify the time when Zeus produces the scales (8. 68, 22. 208).
τίσειν ἀλόμα πάντα (Od. 8. 348). When one says something rightly or properly, he says it κατ’ ἀλόμα (‘within one’s measure’ II. 6. 333, 10. 445, 17. 716) and if not, he says it ὑπὲρ ἀλόμα (‘beyond one’s measure’ II. 3. 59, 16. 780). It is recommended to be ‘within measure’, i.e. moderate, in everything (Od. 7. 310, 15. 71).

Moderate and polite people are said to 'know the things within measure' (ἀλόμα ὁδα II. 15. 207, Od. 2. 231 = 5. 9, 14. 433; ἐναίσιμον νοεῖν Od. 7. 299). These expressions imply the existence of the measure for social behaviour. But what is the αἴσθησις of human behaviour in the Homeric world?

As the king of Ithaca, Odysseus never did anything 'beyond measure' (ἐξαισισιν Od. 4. 690); being as kind to his people as a father, he is considered 'φρέσιν ἀλόμα εἰδῶς' (Od. 2. 231 = 5. 9). When he is asked why he does not eat anything at Circe's table, he replies that anyone 'ἐναίσιμος' would have no appetite until his comrades are rescued (Od. 10. 383). Calypso guarantees him her help for his journey home without deception saying that she has 'ἐναίσιμος νόος' and her heart is not αἰδήρεος but ἐλεημόν (Od. 5. 190-1).

When Achilles maltreats the dead body of Hector, Apollo criticizes him for not having 'ἐναίσιμοι φρένες' (II. 24. 40). Thetis's

29 But ὑπὲρ ἀλόμα can also mean quite literally 'beyond measure' i.e. excessively, unexpectedly (II. 16. 780). cf. Leaf, ad loc.
request to Zeus for honouring her son through the death of many Achaeans is called 'ἐξαίτιος ῥῆ (II. 15. 598), a request beyond measure, by the poet.  

These examples point to ἀλὰ as the measured limit for human and divine mind beyond which one cannot go without being cruel. We have no way of knowing whether the gods or the goddess Ἀταία has 'measured out' such ἀλὰ, but it certainly exists and the gods expect each other and human beings to act within such ἀλὰ, as Apollo's reproach of other gods and Achilles at II 24. 33ff shows. This sort of ἀλὰ is a source of divine morality more intelligible to men than harsh μοῖρα or ἀλὰ that drives angry gods to ruthless persecution of mortals.

Conclusion

Whether harsh or mild, μοῖρα and ἀλὰ determine the patterns of behaviour of both men and gods. Everyone acts according to his given portion, κατὰ μοῖραν or κατὰ ἀλὰν— that is the fundamental moral logic we see in the usage of the two words and their derivatives. At the same time, it compels that everyone should be given his own portion, for if not, it disturbs the universal order. Although the 'portion' can be as amoral as one's birth as a mortal or god, or a moral 'common sense' to tell you

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30 cf. Leaf, ad loc.: 'ἐξαίτιος, going beyond measure (A 418), i. e. unreasonable. The poet thus speaks explicitly as a Greek partisan.'

31 cf. Dietrich, op. cit. p. 227-8: 'The phrase κατὰ μοῖραν, then, with its parallel ἐν μοῖρῃ and antonym πάρῃ μοῖραν gives proof of the lively appreciation — in direct speech as well as in the narrative — of a propriety that became specialized in certain spheres of social life. It seems to evidence an unwritten standard, according to which personal conduct and social intercourse were directed. The underlying significance of this μοῖρα is not one of fate, but it is intricately connected with that ethical concept μοῖρα in Homer which stands for a particular due portion, either of material goods, or of a keenly felt idea of honour.'
how to speak and act properly, the gods and men do share the same moral criterion — that is, that we all must act within the limit of one's share, within measure. This rule sometimes drives the gods to ruthless punishment of mortals who slight their 'portion', honour, even unknowingly. But on other occasions, it tells both men and gods to be compassionate with others. Therefore, ability to behave in a way considerate to other members of one's society, the so-called 'quiet' or 'co-operative' excellences\(^\text{32}\), have the same firm common ground as the \(\mu\ol\rho\alpha\) as the universal order before which even the gods give way.

\(^{32}\) Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, p. 6ff.
Chapter 8  Honour and revenge

τιμή

The universal law of μοίρα is that everyone has his own portion, either good or bad. One aspect of this law is that one must endure whatever sufferings fate gives as one's lot. Even the gods are not exempted from this law. Although they are immortal and generally happy, they must endure the loss of their mortal offspring or occasional injury caused either by other gods or by mortals. Another aspect of the law is that everyone has a claim to one's due portion in his community.¹ And this portion, usually good and desirable, is called τιμή.²

Unlike μοίρα, however, τιμή is not a strictly fixed sum of portion. Since it depends on acknowledgement by others, it could be increased, decreased, or even completely taken away by others.³ For example, if a man fails to make a due offering to a god, either intentionally or unintentionally, the god's τιμή is injured. If a god's τιμή is injured by a man, he must take action to punish the man in order to restore his τιμή and to warn others to learn a lesson from it. The gods are ever happier if honoured

¹ Thus, if any person is not given his portion, it means that he does not (have to) belong to the community, just as Achilles withdraws from battle when his prize, an important part of his τιμή, has been taken away by Agamemnon. cf. L. Bottin, 'Onore e privilegio nella società omerica', Quaderni di Storia 10 (1979) 74ff: 'I beni prodotti o acquisiti collettivamente vengono distribuiti a tutta la comunità. L'esclusione dalla spartizione equivale all'esclusione dal gruppo.'

² I translate τιμή as 'honour' in the following for the sake of convenience only. τιμή is the basis of one's status in a community consisting of material property, political influence and respect from others. cf. A. W. H. Adkins, 'Honour' and 'Punishment' in the Homeric Poems' BICS 7 (1960) 29.

³ cf. J.-C. Riedinger, 'Remarques sur la TIMH chez Homère' REG 89 (1976) 256: '... on peut acquérir l'honneur (II. 16, 84: ἄρησι), l'augmenter (II. 1, 510: ὑφελλωσί; cf.: μᾶλλον II. 9, 257; Od. 18. 161), ou encore le voir perdu (II. 8, 163) ou diminué (II. 16, 90).'

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more by men by more offerings and prayer. The same is true with men. They always want to receive more τιμή from others either in a form of material goods or respect, as much as their status would allow them to expect. Problems arise when someone wants to increase his τιμή without considering the τιμή of others, as Agamemnon robbed Achilles of his war-prize, or Paris carried off the wife and treasure of Menelaus. In such cases, the man whose τιμή is affected must try to restore it either by getting material compensation or by violent vengeance. Or else, his τιμή might be challenged also by others (whether they are foreign enemies or malicious neighbours) who do not hesitate to take advantage of his incapability of self-defence. τιμή is a focal point of Homeric morality through which men and gods define their friends and enemies and thereby determine their behaviour towards others. In this chapter, we will examine how τιμή is exchanged among them under normal circumstances and how they try to regain their τιμή once it is damaged.

Honour as observed in the usage of τιμή, τιμάω, τίω, ἄτιμάω, ἄτιμαξω, ἄτιμη, ἄτιμητος, ἐπτιμητωρ.

The gods and τιμή

Generally speaking, the gods honour and respect one another. Although they sometimes quarrel or fight with one another, the damaging effect is kept to a minimum. There is a hierarchy within the divine society, and senior gods are more respected by younger ones (II. 21. 468-9, 498-9, Od. 6. 329-30, 13. 141-2, 341-2). Zeus is at the top of the hierarchy as the patriarch. However, his two brothers, Poseidon and Hades, hold
equal portions of territory to Zeus' and therefore, in this respect, they hold equal τιμὴ. Poseidon is not pleased when prohibited by Zeus to fight for the Achaeans, because he thinks he is equal in honour to Zeus (δυστιμοσ II. 15. 186). Zeus must also yield to Thetis' petition to honour her son Achilles in order not to injure her τιμὴ (II. 1. 515-6). It is also he who disapproves of Hera's attitude towards Apollo when she scolds him fiercely (II. 24. 65). Despite her higher status, she is not allowed to dishonour other gods. However, no trouble in heaven is serious; When Aphrodite dishonours her husband Hephaestus (Od. 8. 309) by her affair with Ares, she is put on a shameful show, but not punished in any other way.

The most important τιμὴ of the gods is their immortality which is guaranteed by μοιρα. When originally mortal beings are said to have won a share of the honour of the gods, as in the cases of Ino-Leucothea (Od. 5. 335) and the Dioscouroi (Od. 11. 302-4), it means that they have acquired immortality above anything else. It is also the case when Hector wishes he had as much honour as Athena or Apollo (II. 8. 540, 13. 827), though the wish itself has only the rhetorical function of emphasizing the certainty of the following clause and is in fact 'the wish without desire.' Some heroic men attain valour (δρετη) which almost matches the gods', e. g. Diomedes injuring Ares with Athena's support or Hector raging unafraid of either men or gods, but inevitable old age and weakening await them. Since the gods never age or die, their τιμὴ, δρετη, and βίοι are greater than those of men (II. 9. 498).

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4 However, Zeus complains about Poseidon's claim to be his equal (II. 15. 167). There is, of course, difference in the status between the two and therefore in their τιμὴ.

Divine τιμή, however, depends largely on honour paid by men to them. The gods have no τιμή without human worship. Poseidon is angered by the Phaeacians because of their kind treatment of the god's enemy Odysseus, and says that since they, mortals, do not respect him, he is no longer honourable (τιμητικός) among the gods (Od. 13. 129). Therefore he must punish the Phaeacians (Od. 13. 144). For the same reason the gods punish severely those men who have failed to make due offerings (which are the γεράπαστα of the gods Il. 4. 49) to them (Il. 9. 533ff, Od. 4. 351ff). On the other hand, since the gods are so much in need of human worship, abundant offerings are often a bargaining chip for men. Chryses has his prayer heard by Apollo by reminding the god of his generous offerings (Il. 1. 39-41). Hector was most loved by the gods because of his constant offerings to them (Il. 24. 66-70). Zeus does not abandon Odysseus, though he is hated by Poseidon, for the same reason (Od. 1. 66-7).

Since this is the contract between men and gods, a human failure is sometimes looked upon in the same light as the result of failure to pay due honour to the gods. Antilochus says, in claiming his right to the second prize of the chariot race which Achilles has offered to the loser Eumelus, that Eumelus deserves the result because he has not prayed to the gods as he should have done (Il. 23. 546-7). On the contrary, Odysseus, who does pray to Athena, wins the foot race in a lucky way (Il. 23. 770). Similarly, Teucer, who does not pray to Apollo, fails to shoot the target in the archery competition (Il. 23. 863-5), while Meliones

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6 The same logic in other prayers: Il. 15. 372-4, Od. 4. 764; in a request from one god to another Il. 1. 503-4; from one mortal to another Il. 22. 83-5, Od. 3. 98-101 = 4. 328-30.
succeeds because he prays to the god promising offerings (872-3). The gods get flattered when they are relied upon, as Athena is so pleased when Menelaus prays to her first of all the gods (Il. 17. 568-9) that she gives him strength in return (569).

No great enterprise, therefore, should be embarked on without offerings and prayer to the gods. The Achaeans break this rule when they build a great fortification without making any offerings to the gods. Against this insolence, though unintended, Zeus expresses his anger with thunderstorm (Il. 7. 478-9), and because of Poseidon's protest, the wall will be destroyed and forgotten in the near future (Il. 7. 459-63, 12. 17-33).

Therefore men honour the gods. The gods, on the other hand, honour only a limited category of men. They honour most, next to themselves, their own offspring and priests, and kings and heroes who are often their descendants. Singers are also supposed to be under the patronage of the gods, especially the Muse (Od. 8. 73, 480-1, 22. 345-8). By this assumption men honour them (Od. 8. 480, 13. 28) and hold 

\[\alpha\i\delta\omega\varsigma\] towards them (Od. 8. 480).

The priests are honoured among men 'like the gods' (Il. 5. 78, 16. 605) because they are, obviously, the representatives of the gods, and failure to honour them will be directly taken by the gods as an offence against their own τιμη. So they do take action to protect the τιμη of their priest as we see in the case of Chryses (Il. 1. 43ff, 454).

There is also no doubt that the gods honour their descendants, kings and heroes. The defeat of the Achaeans by Hector is the clearest sign of the τιμη which Zeus grants Achilles as his favour to Thetis (Il. 1. 353, 505, 508, 558-9, 2. 3-4, 8. 372, 9.
Zeus cannot save his son Sarpedon at the destined moment of his death, but he lets it rain with blood in honour of his son (II. 16. 460). He cannot save Troy and Hector either, but he does say that he has honoured Troy (II. 4. 46) — and that is because of the τιμή the city gives him (48-9) and because of his love for the line of his son Dardanus (II. 20. 304) — and gives honour and glory to Hector while it is still possible (II. 15. 612, 17. 99). Agamemnon is honoured by the Achaeans and the gods because of the sceptre (and the authority) inherited from Pelops to whom Zeus gave it. The gods even thunder in the battlefield in his honour (II. 11. 45-6). The gods sometimes appear in person to men whom they honour. Athena often appears in person to help many heroes, among whom Odysseus and his son (Od. 3. 379) above all, and so do Poseidon and Apollo. A god’s attendance increases a hero’s valour and glory (e.g. Diomedes in Iliad 5) or at least keeps him clear from the doom of death (e.g. Paris in Iliad 3 and Aeneas in Iliad 5 both saved by Aphrodite).

Just as they honour senior members among themselves (Od. 13. 141-2), the gods honour elders among heroes (II. 23. 788). It is so stated by Antilochus in a joking fashion, but it has a good ground to be taken seriously. Athena did intervene to assist Odysseus in the race in which Antilochus finished last, and the heroes of Nestor’s generation were greater than contemporary ones (II. 1. 260-1).

The gods are said to honour/value δίκη and ἀλεξμα ἐργα by Eumaeus (Od. 14. 84). As we analysed in Chapter 5, it is a belief more at home with wishes of non-heroic figures both in Homer and Hesiod than with the ‘reality’ we see in the Homeric epics.
Certainly Athena helps Odysseus to take revenge on the suitors, and the righteous hero does triumph in the end, but not because he is righteous, but because he is honoured by the gods thanks to his heroic strength and cunning character (cf. Chapter 3). Non-heroic figures can hardly expect such τιμή from the gods. The gods' favouritism becomes conspicuous, if we have a look at a case of family tragedy obscured by the grandeur of heroic adventure of Odysseus.

Not all of his companions perished because of their 'δτασθαλίαι', especially not the ones eaten by the Cyclops. It was due to Odysseus' curiosity and greed (ὄφρ' αὐτῶν τε ἔδομι, καὶ εἰ μου ξείνα δοῖν Od. 9. 229) that he and his companions stayed in the cave of the Cyclops and had the most deadly encounter with the giant. Odysseus himself regrets later that he did not listen to the plea of his companions to go back to the ship immediately (9. 228):

ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐ πλήμη. ἦτ' ἐν πολύκροιον ἦν.

This mistake is also bitterly criticized by Eurylochus as his 'δτασθαλίαι' (10. 437), the same verdict as on his companions who eat the cattle of Helios and on the suitors of Penelope.

Those six who perished in the Cyclops' cave were among the best twelve of the crew whom Odysseus had specially chosen (9. 195-6), apparently the most valorous, courageous and trustworthy of all. We are told that one of the last two victims of the Cyclops was called Antiphus and was the son of Aegyptius who stands up first in the assembly of the Ithacans (2. 15-20). The old man has three other sons, but still cannot forget Antiphus and sheds tears for him in public as he recalls the departure of his son with Odysseus' fleet (23-4). That is bad enough.
Moreover, we know that another son of his, Eurynomus, is among the suitors (2. 21-2), who will be killed by Odysseus in the end. It is entirely Odysseus' fault that the old man loses his eldest son. Another one is killed by the same man in person. Although the second one probably deserves his death, the sorrow of the father is the same, and there is absolutely no consolation or compensation for the death of the first one. It is surely for this 'injustice' that the aggressive father of Antinous, Eupeithes, raises his cry, shedding tears among other bereaved (24. 426-9):

\[
\text{ἄφωλα, ἡμέγα ἐργον ἀνὴρ ἐκ μητρὸς Ἀχαιοῖς}
\]
\[
\text{τοῖς μὲν σὺν νήσοιν ἑρμὸν πολέως τε καὶ ἐσθλοῖς}
\]
\[
\text{ἀλεσε μὲν νῆρας γλαφυράς, ἀπὸ δὲ ἀλεσε λαοῖς,}
\]
\[
\text{τοῖς δὲ ἐλθὼν ἐκτεινὲς Κεφαλλήμων ὑπὸ φλωτοὺς.}
\]

And he is killed by Laertes. All others are hushed by Athena who proclaims Zeus' amnesty: Odysseus is excused from paying for any of his δτασθαλίαν or killing. There will be no compensation or consolation for the bereaved like Aegyptius. This is the δίκη of the gods, the way they do things, the injustice of which the poet did not fail to hint at.

Another humble figure, Phoenix, urges Achilles to honour (II. 9. 513-4) and stand in awe of (αἴδεσεται 508) the goddesses called Litai, on the same ground as men honour other gods, i. e. if you honour them, they will honour you, and if you do not, they will punish you. Achilles apparently is not impressed by his argument. But is Achilles punished for not honouring these goddesses? It is certainly common to interpret Patroclus' death as Achilles' punishment for rejecting the embassy's plea, but as we saw in Chapter 4 (Conclusion), whatever Achilles did, the loss of Patroclus was inevitable. In the example of Phoenix's Litai
allegory, too, we see the gap between the 'reality' of the heroic world and divine behaviour and the belief of humble people who think that the gods behave in an intelligibly moral manner.

Men and τιμη

Men honour the gods with prayer and sacrifice. The case is somewhat different, however, when people honour somebody 'like a god', a very common expression for heroes and priests. Achilles, Agamemnon, Aeneas and Thoas are honoured 'like a god' among their people, by the Argives or by the Trojans (Achilles II. 9. 302-3, Od. 11. 484 ἵσα θεοῖν; Agamemnon II. 10. 33; Aeneas II. 11. 58; Thoas II. 13. 218; cf. Hector II. 22. 434-5), and Odysseus by the Phaeacians (Od. 5. 36, 19. 280, 23. 339), not with worship but with gifts, prizes and other material honour (e.g. food and wine at banquets). Many of the examples of this expression are repeated formulaic expressions (θεός (ὃς) ὡς θεός δημώ II. 5. 78, 10. 33, 11. 58, 13. 218, 16. 605, Od. 14. 205) and therefore they may be conventional exaggerated expressions just conveying the meaning 'he was much honoured.' It is clear in the case of just a wealthy man with splendid sons, who is said to be honoured like a god (Od. 14. 205).7

But when priests are said to be honoured among men 'like a god' (II. 5. 78, 16. 605), it may be taken literally to some extent, since they are obviously the representatives of the gods and failure to honour them will be directly taken by the gods as an offence against their honour. And the gods do take action to

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7 cf. Od. 7. 10 θεός ὡς δῆμος ἱκουν, 8. 173 θεός ὡς εἰσαόδων, also II. 12. 312, Od. 3. 246, 4. 160, 6. 309, 7. 71, 15. 520, etc.
protect the honour of their priests as we see in the case of Chryses.

Similarly, men honour singers (Od. 13. 28) because they are regarded as inspired by the Muses (Od. 8. 480-1, 22. 346-8), and described by the poet as such (8. 73). It would be surprising if a poet who sings (Il. 2. 484-92):

\textit{Εἴπητε μή μοι, Μούσαι Ὅλυμπα δόματ' ἔχουσαι —}
\textit{ἡμεῖς γὰρ θεαὶ ἔστε, πάντες τε ἐν τοῖς πάντα.}
\textit{ἡμεῖς δὲ κλέος οὐν ὀκούμεν οὐκέ πιέμεν —}
\textit{oι τυχεὶς θερμάκες Δαναώ καὶ κόρανοι ἕραν θλήθιν 8 οὐκ ἔγώ, μιθήσομαι οὐδ' ἀκούσω.}
\textit{οὐδ' εἷμαι δέκα μὲν γλώσσαι, δέκα δὲλ στόματ' εἰλεν.}
\textit{φωνὴ 8 ἀρφητεσ' κύλλεων δὲ μαι ἦπορ δεῖν.}
\textit{εἷμαι Ὅλυμπας Μούσαι. Διὸς αἰγαλόχοο}
\textit{θυγατέρες, μητραίοι ὁποὶ ἐπὶ Τιλιόν ἤλθον}

did not believe in the reality of the Muses and that a poet's talent and inspiration came from them. Even if they did not, it was assumed as the reality within the world of poetry.

Kings' honour is also god-given, coming from Zeus (Il. 1. 278-9, 2. 197, 17. 251). Agamemnon is confident that the Achaeans and Zeus honour him even if Achilles does not (Il. 1. 175)\(^8\), because of his sceptre and authority handed down from Zeus (Il. 9. 38) for which he holds the honour of commanding all the Achaean force (Od. 24. 30). Kings' τιμή, of course, comes with their duties. As we have seen, they are judges for their people. In war, they are expected to be supreme warriors. Kings' honour

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\(^8\) But of course, as Nestor rightly remarks, even the gods honour Achilles (Il. 9. 110).
and their military duties are well illustrated in the words of Sarpedon addressed to Glaucus at *Il.* 12. 310-21:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ Γλαύκη, τὴν δὴ ἡμᾶς τετυμήμεσθα μᾶλλον } & \quad 310 \\
\text{ ἔσθη τε κρέατων τε ἵκε πλεῖον δεπάσον } & \\
\text{ ἐν Λυκίη πάντες δὲ θεοῖς ὡς ἐλπορόωσ } & \\
\text{ καὶ τέμενος νεμόμεσθα μέγα Ἑάνθου παρὶ ὄχθας: } & \\
\text{ καλὸν φυταλίζει καὶ φροίρης πυτοφόρον. } & \\
\text{ τῶν νῦν χρή Λυκίους μέτα πρῶτος μέν ἕντας } & 315 \\
\text{ ἐστάμεν ὡς μάχῃς κανατείρης ἀντιβολήτα τα } & \\
\text{ δόξα τις ὅθε εἴη διὰ Λυκίων πίκα θρησκευόν } & \\
\text{ 'οὐ μᾶν φιλεῖες Λυκίνιν κάτα κοιμανόντουν } & \\
\text{ ἡμέτερος βασιλέως, ἔδωκεν τε πίόνα μῆλα } & \\
\text{ ὁδὸν τ ἐξαιτοῦ μελιτέα, ἀλλ' ἕφακα καὶ ζῆ } & 320 \\
\text{ ἐσθήλη ἐπει Λυκίου μέτα πρῶτος μάχονται.' } & \\
\end{align*}
\]

Their *τιμή* is supplemented by *τέμενος* from their people (313 cf. *Il.* 6. 194; *δωτι'νη* *Il.* 9. 155, 297), by more share of meat and wine than others get at the banquet (311), and by being looked at like the gods (312). Therefore if one becomes a king, he will be more honoured as well as wealthier (*Od.* 1. 393). Their *τιμή* always includes material property and rule over a group of people. It can be inherited (*Il.* 20. 180-1) or shared among kindred and friends (*Il.* 9. 149-55=291-8, 616, *Od.* 4. 174-77). Holders of kingly *τιμή*, on the other hand, have the obligation to defend the *τιμή* of their community — including property and people — by their valour and administration of *δίκη* (*ἐφύτω δίκησι γε καὶ σθένει* *Il.* 16. 542).9 They must always fight at the front in the battlefield

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9 The phrase clearly indicates that a king must possess both 'cooperative' and 'competitive' excellences in order to 'defend' his kingdom. (For the terms 'cooperative' and 'competitive' excellences, cf. A. W. H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, pp. 6-7.)
and win glory (315-6, 318 \( \omega \) \( \delta \kappa \lambda \varepsilon \varepsilon \varepsilon \gamma \); cf. \( I I . \) 6. 444-6) defending and increasing the interests of their people and themselves against external threats. As \( \delta \kappa \alpha \sigma \pi \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \) they protect \( \theta \varepsilon \mu \iota \sigma \tau \varepsilon \) of Zeus (\( I I . \) 1. 238-9) and solve domestic problems.

The honour of a king may be threatened if he is not strong enough to perform the duty of defending his people. Achilles in Hades fears that his father might be dishonoured because of his old age and weakness (\( O d . \) 11. 496-7, 503). Telemachus' right to his father's throne is threatened by the suitors of Penelope because he is not strong enough to take up his father's role as the head of his house and his community.

For a hero/ nobleman (\( \alpha ^{\prime} \gamma \alpha \theta \omicron \omicron \)\( \zeta \)), whether he is a king (\( \beta \alpha \sigma \iota \lambda \varepsilon \nu \zeta \) or not, military valour is an essential source of \( \tau i \mu \eta \). It is his duty to defend his household (\( \omicron \lambda \kappa \omicron \sigma \) consisting of his family, other dependants like slaves and refugees (\( \lambda \kappa \epsilon \tau \alpha \iota \) and property. What can happen if a household lacks such protector is depicted in the \( O d y s s e y \). Since Telemachus is powerless before the suitors, his property — the most important part of his \( \tau i \mu \eta \) — is consumed at their will until Odysseus comes back to remove them. A hero must help also his kindred and friends who are not members of his household when their life and/or \( \tau i \mu \eta \) is threatened. Had Telemachus had brothers or other close kindred to help him, he would not have suffered from the suitors' wantonness (\( O d . \) 16. 115-7). The Trojan war is an example of such occasions on that kindred and friends get together to defend a man's \( \tau i \mu \eta \). Agamemnon leads the whole army on behalf of his younger brother whose \( \tau i \mu \eta \) is to be won back from Troy. And apparently many heroes joined the enterprise because of their guest-friendship with the Atreidae as well as because of spoils which
will increase their material τιμή, rather than being bound by their oath to protect Helen.\(^\text{10}\)

Their duties being chiefly military, heroes are honoured most for their valour and heroic achievements (Diomedes II. 8.; 161, Paris II. 6. 521-2; Deikoon II. 5. 536; Sthenelus II. 4. 410). Supreme warriors, therefore, should be more honoured than ordinary soldiers, or it will cause resentment (II. 9. 314-9, 13. 460-1). Of course, their honour is inseparable from their royal or divine descent (Achilles II. 24. 57-9, 66; Diomedes II. 14. 126-7).

There are no supreme or even good warriors described among commoners in the epics, and no doubt there were not any in reality either, because commoners could not afford an expensive set of armour nor leisure to practise military skills. And, as a rule in the Homeric world, nothing is more effective than divine blood in the veins in making a man strong.

The importance of τιμή for heroes is best-illustrated by the very themes of the two epics. Achilles' anger is the result of the damage done by Agamemnon to his honour (II. 1. 171, 244, 355-6, 411-2, 2. 239-40, 9. 110-1, 647-8, 13. 113, 16. 58-9, 274) and that is a good enough reason for sacrificing lives of many. The

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\(^{10}\) It seems certainly the case with Achilles. However, it is very difficult to trace the legendary 'fact' about Achilles' connection with Menelaus and Helen. If the cause of the divine beauty contest was an apple thrown into the wedding banquet of Peleus and Thetis, Achilles may not have been even born when Paris abducted Helen, unless the goddesses had waited for years until Zeus appointed Paris the judge, or Paris had waited for years until Aphrodite fulfilled her promise to give him Helen. If Achilles is bound by any oath to do with Helen, it would be his father's, since Peleus is more likely to have been among Helen's suitors than his son. δρεπανον which Nestor mentions at II. 2. 339 apparently does not mean specific oaths, but the agreement of alliance and therefore even if any of the members of the alliance goes home, he will not be an 'oath breaker'. cf. D. Cohen, 'Horkia' and 'horkos' in the Iliad', RIDA 27 (1980) 52-3: 'Being autonomous kings, they can, as Achilles says he will do, leave Troy if they wish, and thus Nestor does not threaten them, or attempt to coerce them.'
Trojan war itself is an expedition called for to regain the τιμή of Menelaus, i. e. Helen and his stolen treasure supplemented by recompense (Il. 1. 159, 3. 286, 459, 5. 552, 17. 92, Od. 14. 70, 117). In the Odyssey, the suitors are all killed because they damaged the τιμή of Odysseus so badly, by dishonouring Odysseus (16. 274, 20. 167, 21. 99, 427, 22. 370, 23. 28), Penelope (14. 164, 18. 144, 24. 459), Telemachus (14. 164), Odysseus' household (16. 431), and all the visitors to his house (22. 414-5, 23. 65-6).

Distribution of τιμή is not as egalitarian as that of the μοϊρα of death. For example, wretched wanderers (Il. 24. 531-3) or immigrants (Il. 9. 648, 16. 59) have very little τιμή in the Homeric world. However, within the class of heroes, everyone does have a decent τιμή and should be guaranteed it by other members of the class, as far as they want to remain friends. We have already seen how careful Achilles is in dealing with various degrees of τιμή of his comrades at the funeral games.¹¹ Even a great king like Agamemnon does not have a right to rob τιμή of his lesser associate like Achilles.¹² A member of the aristocratic warrior

¹¹ cf. Chapter 5.
¹² Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, p. 51. He thinks that as far as Agamemnon is successful in his military duties he can do whatever he likes, such as taking Briseis from Achilles. Of course, Agamemnon can take Achilles' prize because he is ἄγαθος i. e. militarily superior, but only if he is prepared to make Achilles an enemy. To be sure, making an enemy by itself is not a moral error by any means in the Homeric society. Therefore, Agamemnon is not 'wrong', and therefore not censured, provided his intention was to do without Achilles in the expedition — which he does choose as his course of action at the height of the quarrel. But his conduct is not justified if he considers and would like Achilles to be his φίλος, friend or ally. Adkins' assertion that Agamemnon may do this to Achilles apparently derives from confusion of two distinct moralities in Homer, one to deal with friends and another to deal with enemies. As far as Agamemnon considers Achilles as his ally, he must respect Achilles' τιμή. If the Homeric society is so dangerous (as Adkins emphasizes) that military strength is vital for survival, the act of discarding the most valued ally for a trivial reason ought to be most severely criticized and effectively prevented. After all, Achilles must have refrained from killing Agamemnon partly for the same reason. In the end, Agamemnon is told
class should have a due portion of \( \tau \iota \mu \eta \) in his group or he may break off from it and become hostile, as Achilles nearly attacked Agamemnon after his humiliation by the king. Agamemnon is in command of the whole Achaeian army, not as an absolute monarch, but as a manager of a business.\(^\text{13}\) He must pay wages to his partners in a reasonable proportion to their ranks and work, or they may quit their job. It is the case even with Odysseus' cowherd who contemplates leaving his master's house which is plagued by the suitors, and finding some other employer (Od. 20. 218-3). Moreover, war is a serious business. One risks one's own life which is irreplaceable once lost. Although living in the world of fiction, Homeric heroes never forget nor let us forget that (Il. 9. 408-9):

\[
\text{αθέρος δὲ ψυχῇ πάλιν ἔλεεων οὔπε λειτῇ}
\]
\[
οὐδὲ λειτῇ ἐπεὶ δὲ κεφὲν ἀμελεῖται ἔρκος ὄδημων.
\]

So if the director of this dangerous business wants to be successful, he must reward his partners sensibly. And we see Agamemnon's normal mode of management when he encourages his generals in Iliad 4 as he tactfully appeals to their sense of honour.

To Idomeneus (4. 261-4):

\[
\text{εἴ περ γέρο τ' ἄλλοι γε κάρη κοιμάνεσ' Ἀχαῖοι}
\]

that he should be 'δικαιότερος' hereafter, that is, to behave in a way more considerate to fair distribution of \( \tau \iota \mu \eta \) within the community (cf. Chapter 5, 'δίκη in Homer'). cf. S. E. Bassett, 'The 'Ἀμαρτία of Achilles', TAPA 65 (1934) 61; H. Lloyd-Jones, The Justice of Zeus, p. 26: '... by depriving him of his prize, Agamemnon has neglected an obligation implicit in his whole relation to the partners in the expedition, that he will respect the time of his subordinates.'

\(^{13}\) cf. Il. 16. 53 where Achilles calls himself an equal (\( \tau \iota \nu \ δίκαιον \)) of Agamemnon.
His message is, 'Since I honour you (σε τίω 257) so much, be a warrior as you claim to be (264).'

**To the Aiante (285-291):**

Αλαντ', Ἀργεῖων ἤγητορε χάλκοχιτών,
σφάλ μὲν — οὐ γὰρ θεὸν ὀπροφίθμεν — οὐ πι κελεύω
αὑτῷ γὰρ μάλα λαὸν φημίνην ἰδι μάχεσθαι.
αὐ γάρ Ἵστε τε πάτερ καὶ Ἀθηνάη καὶ Ἀπόλλω,
τόιος πᾶσιν θυμὸς ἐν στήθεσι γένοιτο
τόις τάξιν ἠμένει πόλις Πράμμοι δικαστας.
χερσίν ὡμέτρηται ἀλοιπό τε περίκειοι τε.

The message is quite flattering: 'I am completely satisfied with your work. I wish others were also like you!'

**To Nestor (313-6):**

ὦ γέρου, εἰθ, ὡς θυμὸς ἐν στήθεσι φιλοισιν,
ὡς τοι γούωθ δεποτα, βὴ βε τοι ἐμπεδος εἰν
ἀλλά σε γήρας τετεὶα ἤμοιον ὡς ἐφελὲν τις
πεδίων ἀλλοι ἔχειν, οὐ δε κουροπήροια μετέταται.

'You excel all in your fighting spirit. If only you could become young again instead of some useless man!'

**To Menestheus and Odysseus (338-48):**

ὦ ὑλὲ Πετεύο διοστρέφος βασιλῆς,
καὶ σύ κακοῖα δολοιοι κεκασμένε, κερδολεόφρον,
τίπτε καταπτώσοντες αφήστατε, μήμετε δὲ ἄλλοις.
You are first to be invited to my banquet, so you ought to be first to fight. What are you doing here?, he reproaches. When Odysseus replies in anger denying his allegation of being lazy, he explains that his reproach was not really meant, and promises to compensate afterwards for his words (362 ὅπειραν ἀπεσόμεθα). He is doubly cautious not to injure his generals' pride and honour.

To Diomede and Sthenelos, Agamemnon uses the glory of their fathers as a stimulus for their τιμὴ. He deliberately underrates Diomedes' valour (399-400):

τοῖς ἔν Τιθέν Αἰτάλιος ἄλλα τῶν ὦν
γενέσθαι εἰς χέρεσι μάχη τον ἔχῃ τὸ ἀκραία

Although the reproach incites Sthenelos' anger, Diomedes gets Agamemnon's message (413-8; 413 οὐ γὰρ ἔγω νομεσῶ Ἀγαμέμνων). The king is only encouraging them to κόσος (415) which is his as well as all the Achaeans'.

Such are the normal tactics of Agamemnon. He uses three main arguments to encourage his generals: 1) I always give you a great share of τιμὴ. Therefore you must do your work. 2) I am happy with your achievement. I wish others, too, were like you. 3) Your father was a great warrior. Why don't you fight as he
did? All of these appeal to heroes' sense of honour in a quite positive way. Even in his reproach 3), it is done through the praise of the heroes' fathers. It is an exemplary management of his personnel who follow him utterly on a voluntary basis and because of the fame and other (material) τιμη they hope to get out of the operation. In one case, it took him and Menelaus a whole month to recruit a reluctant hero to join the expedition (Od. 24. 118-9). It is clear that even a great king like Agamemnon cannot mobilize a great number of heroes without being sensitive to their sense of honour. 'Cooperative excellences' — as Adkins calls them — are essential in his leadership.

Considering this delicate social relationship among the Achaean heroes, Agamemnon's failure to honour Achilles and acknowledge his contribution is almost unthinkable. It is certainly an exceptional blunder on Agamemnon's side and therefore later classified as δρη.

In Iliad 1, Agamemnon's behaviour is doubly unusual. First of all, he refuses to respect Chryses' priesthood, and return the priest's daughter. It is, as we have seen, common sense in his society that the gods and their priests as their representatives should be respected, or the gods will severely retaliate against those who do not. All the Achaeans approve Chryses' request accordingly, except Agamemnon. He is so blind to what he is doing when he rejects the priest's plea, and will pay for it dearly by many lives of his army. As the result of the argument between Agamemnon and Achilles, prompted by Calchas' pronouncement that Agamemnon should return Chryses his daughter and give compensation to Apollo, Agamemnon makes another unusual mistake by disgracing Achilles in public by
taking his war-prize Briseis. The implication of the event is no less serious than, say, a company director's withdrawal of bonus from the bank account of a senior executive of his company. Achilles' angry reaction is completely justifiable. By far, he has done the largest and most difficult part of work (II. 1. 165-6, 9. 316-7, 322-3) and yet has received fewer prizes than Agamemnon (II. 1. 166-8, 9. 330-3). He has no personal reason to hate Troy (1. 152-7) but has been fighting solely for the sake of the τιμή of Agamemnon and Menelaus (1. 158-9, 9. 337-9). Nevertheless, Agamemnon could not care less about it (1. 160). Agamemnon treats him, he says, not like a warrior of his status, but like an immigrant with no τιμή (9. 648, 16. 59), which is the worst possible humiliation to a half-divine hero.

Since Agamemnon's insult to Achilles is so unusual, the damage done to Achilles' τιμή can in no way be repaired easily. Achilles resorts to an equally unusual measure to protest. The τιμή that Achilles asks of Zeus via Thetis is not simply a material τιμή (which is already promised by Athena at II. 1. 213-4). When he rejects Agamemnon's first offer of recompense saying (II. 9. 607-8):

οὔτιμε ταῦτας
χρεώ τιμής φρονέω δε τετμηθήσαί Διὸς αληθ

he implies that the defeat of the Achaeans by Hector has brought him a greater τιμή than the one Agamemnon offers. What Achilles wants is 1) Agamemnon's humiliation and sincere apology and 2) the full recovery of Achilles' position as the foremost warrior in the Achaean camp. Achilles has an opportunity to recover 2) when the Embassy comes and when Patroclus urges him to save the Achaeans in Iliad 16, but 2) should not come before 1). So he
waited until Agamemnon's pride is completely crushed — but, in the meantime, he loses his dearest friend.

Heroes need heroic honour and if it is not given, there will be heroic retaliation. But as far as a hero gets his due honour from his comrades and friends, he will honour them, too. Achilles honours Patroclus just like himself (II. 18. 81-2 τίον .../ίσον ἐμὴ κεφαλὴ; 20. 426 μοι ἐταίρον ... τετιμένον cf. 23. 94 where he calls Patroclus ἡθείη κεφαλῆ), and after Patroclus, Antilochus (Od. 24. 78), Automedon and Alcimus (Il. 24. 574-5). Patroclus, in his turn, honours Achilles more than anybody else, and, after him, Automedon (Il. 16. 145-6). We know how deep and strong is the affection of Achilles towards Patroclus from his agony after his friend's death. The τιμη he pays Patroclus comes from the very depth of his heart and has nothing to do with the social status of the heroes. Similarly, Ajax and Teucer have honoured Lycophron as much as their parents (Il. 15. 439), and when his honoured friend Podes (Il. 17. 576) is killed, Hector is covered with 'the dark cloud of woe' (591).

Friends and comrades, however, can be turned into enemies if a conflict involving τιμη occurs among them. We have seen the most conspicuous example of Agememnon and Achilles in which Achilles could have killed Agamemnon, had Athena not intervened (Il. 1. 188ff). Achilles warns Phoenix that even he, who brought up Achilles, could become an enemy to Achilles if he continued to stand by and speak for Agamemnon (Il. 9. 613-4). Instead, he says, come home with me and 'take half of my τιμη.' (9. 616). We can make out from this a very clear definition of a friend and an enemy. An enemy is a person who does not give
you τιμή and/or takes it away from you. A friend is a person who
gives you τιμή and/or shares it with you.\textsuperscript{14}

It is through the conflict over τιμή (Achilles' divine armour
as the prize for the greatest Achaean warrior) that the good
friends Odysseus and Ajax are separated for ever (\textit{Od.} 11. 544-6).
Menelaus and Paris, too, were once a host and a guest until the
latter robbed of the former of his τιμή. On the other hand,
Diomedes and Glaucus renew their ancestral friendship, even
when their armies are fighting against each other, by giving fresh
τιμή to each other (6. 232-6).\textsuperscript{15} It is in this sense that I call τιμή
the focal point of Homeric morality through which a man defines
his friends and enemies.

To be a host or a guest is a beginning of making friends.
Although the sight of strangers at your door may not always
please you, it is not θέμιες to dishonour them (\textit{Od.} 14. 56-7). One
ought to feel ashamed of having his visitor standing outside one's
doors for a long time even if he is a complete stranger (\textit{Od.} 1.
119-20). One must honour one's guests earnestly (προφρονέως ...
τίεν \textit{Il.} 6. 173) and with affection (ἐνδικέως φιλέων καὶ τιμεῖν \textit{Od.} 15.
543, 17. 56). The guests deserve αἴδως (αἴδοις: ξείνος \textit{Od.} 9. 271,
19. 316; ἵκετης \textit{Il.} 21. 75, \textit{Od.} 5. 447-8, 7. 165, 181) and τιμή,
because they are supposed to be under the protection of Zeus
Xeinios/Hiketesios, who is the 'ἐπιτιμήτωρ ἱκετῶν τε ξείνων τε' (\textit{Od.} 9.
270).\textsuperscript{16} Though there is no direct evidence of the god's concern

\textsuperscript{14} cf. The saying 'κομάτα τα τῶν φιλῶν'; J.-C. Riedinger, \textit{REG} 89 (1976) 248: 'Les
liens d'amitié sont des liens d'honneur réciproque.'

\textsuperscript{15} And, theoretically, even Hector and Ajax, having exchanged 'parting
gifts' after their interrupted duel, could develop friendship (φιλοτής)
between them (\textit{Il.} 7. 301-2).

\textsuperscript{16} As Adkins rightly argues in \textit{BICS} 7 (1960) 25, ἐπιτιμήτωρ does not mean
'avenger', but the one 'who gives τιμή (to someone)'.

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with suppliants and guests, Homeric man usually performs his duty as a host faithfully. If the host is wealthy, the τιμη of the guest will include quite substantial entertainment such as the slaughter of a bull each day (Il. 6. 174). If the host's living is as modest as Eumaeus', his guest will at least get the best part of the meat (Od. 14. 437-8). A beggar with no useful skill might be less welcome than noble guests or δημοσιοργοι from whom some returns can be expected (Od. 17. 382-7), but seems nevertheless guaranteed a minimal support for existence from others with better fortunes, as Eumaeus says to a most wretched beggar (the disguised Odysseus) who has come to his house (Od. 14. 56-8):

εὖώ, οὖμα θῆμις ἑστι, οὐδὲ κακῶν σέθεν ἔδωκεν

εὖών αὐτῷ πρὸς γὰρ διὸς ἔλογον ἄπαντες

εὖώρε τε ητὺχό τε

Even the arrogant suitors (except Antinous) pity and feed the Beggar-Odysseus at his first appearance (Od. 17. 365-8).

Reception of visitors is a duty. But to have a distinguished visitor is a host's honour (Od. 11. 338) and pleasure, and it may develop into a long-lasting guest-friendship, handed down to the descendants of the host and the guest, unless either of them dies without leaving a son to inherit the obligation of entertainment (Od. 3. 353-5, 24. 283-6). Parting gifts, ξείμα or ξεινία, exchanged by friends or given to the guest by the host, are very important to seal their friendship. They increase the wealth and τιμη of their recipients, and thereby the giver is acknowledged as a friend = τιμη giver. They also serve as tokens when one claims guest-friendship to somebody. Although Diomedes does not know his grandfather Oeneus nor does he even remember his father Tydeus, he owns the golden goblet given to Oeneus by
Bellerophon and knows its history (II. 6. 218-222). And no doubt Glaucus has confirmed Diomedes' claim of guest-friendship by his own knowledge of the history of the crimson belt which was presented by Oeneus to his grandfather Bellerophon. But the significance of parting gifts is not only material or formal, as we can tell from what Menelaus says to Telemachus at Od. 4. 590-92:

> αὐτὰρ ἐπείτα
> δύσως καλὸν ἔλεισον, ἵνα σπένδησα τῷ θεῶν ἑλίθηνει μεμνημένος ἤματα πάντα

'So that you will remember me always.' (ἡματα πάντα here seems to mean both 'toujours' and 'tous les jours') — It is a voice of sincere friendship and wish for everlasting love between him and Telemachus and between their families. Menelaus gives Telemachus his most valued (τιμηστατον 15. 114) treasure, because he values this friendship so much. Telemachus, indeed, will always remember his host in return (Od. 15. 372-4).

Genuine affection, without doubt, is inseparable also from τιμή which one pays to one's own family members. As the gods honour their divine kin or human descendants, men honour their family. It is not very often stated explicitly, probably because it is taken for granted, but we can find the evidence of the τιμή paid to one's own family in such expressions as 'A honoured B like his own son.'17

Men usually honour their parents (II. 15. 439; mother Od. 7. 69-70, 18. 161-2), children (especially legitimate sons; II. 9. 142, 13. 176, 15. 551, Od. 14. 203, 15. 365), brothers (II. 22. 235),

17 cf. J.-C. Riedinger op. cit, 248.
wives (Od. 1. 432, 7. 67, 69-70, 18. 161-2) and occasionally their bastard sons (Od. 14. 202-3), sons-in-law (Il. 13. 176) and nephews (Il. 15. 551). Family members also deserve αἰδωσ (mothers Il. 22. 82, Od. 8. 420; fathers-in-law Il. 3. 172; mothers-in-law Il. 22. 451; wives Il. 6. 250, 21. 460, Od. 3. 381, 451, 10. 11, 17. 152, 19. 165, 262, 336, 583). We are probably allowed to assume that such τιμη and αἰδωσ originate from natural, spontaneous affection towards one's family. Family bonds are always strengthened by sharing an οἶκος, property attached to it, and its good or bad reputation, in other words, by sharing the same τιμη. On the other hand, even family members can become enemies if one robs τιμη of another. One of such cases, a conflict between brothers over kingship of Thebes, is the cause of the first expedition against Thebes alluded to at Il. 4. 378ff.

Either in a family or in a community, elders are generally honoured in the human world as well as in the divine one, as we see in the Achaeans' respect towards Nestor (Il. 23. 648-9). On the other hand, even a king could be dishonoured if he ages without an heir to protect him (Od. 11. 496-7, 503). This decline does not occur in the divine world since the gods never age or die.

There is another category of human τιμη which is not shared by the gods. Men honour, or rather value, wealth which is the basis of their τιμη. Gold (Il. 18. 475, Od. 8. 393, 11. 327) and treasure (Od. 1. 312, 4. 614ff, 15. 114ff) are highly valued, and a wealthy man is honoured 'like a god' (Od. 14. 205-6). On the contrary, men tend to dishonour immigrants who are often with no status or property (Il. 9. 648, 16. 59), a wretched wanderer (Il. 24. 533), and a person in unseemly clothes (Od. 14. 506). This is the sheer reality of the human world which is not humanitarian,
but all too human. The gods, on the other hand, do not seem to care about wealth, since everything they possess is just so valuable (to a human eye) as the first-class treasure in the human world.

Both gods and men honour their family and kin. Men honour the gods, but the gods do not always honour men. Kings, heroes, priests and probably singers are honoured by both gods and men, but it is not certain that the gods protect guests and hosts as men believe. Like the gods, men honour also elders but only if they remain powerful either on their own or through their sons, because valour, as well as δίκη, is an essential attribute of an ἄγαθος to maintain his τιμή. Likewise, widows and orphans who have no powerful male in their family to guarantee their τιμή (e.g. by providing necessities out of his property and making them respected among fellow members of the community because of his ἀρετή), they can be dishonoured (Iliad 22. 487ff). Wealth and poverty, which are never permanent, also affect the τιμή of men. The τιμή of the gods, on the other hand, never changes because they do not know death, old age or poverty.

Revenge, recompense and penalty as observed in the usage of τίσις, τίκω, ἀποτίκω, τίμημαι, ἀποτίμημαι, τίτος, ἄντιτος, and ποιη.

It has been debated whether the τιμή family and the τίσις family (including ποιη) are etymologically related. Adkins connects the two groups of words with the idea of τιμή by

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18 E. Benveniste, Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes, 2. pp. 50-55; P. Chantraine, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque, τίκω; H. Frisk, Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch, τίκω and τίω.
maintaining that τινεσθαι is 'to get back τιμή for oneself,' despite his
taking the view that τιμή and τινεσθαι derive from different
roots.\footnote{Adkins, \textit{Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece}
(London 1972), p. 15; ibid. \textit{BICS} 7 (1960) p. 27.} Although, as we will see later, the case is not so simple as
Adkins' generalization, the two groups of words do have an
overlapping area, not because they sound similar, but because
τιμή often is the object of the verbs τίνω and ἀποτίνω. For example,
Agamemnon in his oath before the duel between Menelaus and
Paris declares that, if Menelaus wins, the Trojans should pay τιμή
to the Achaeans (\textit{ll.} 3. 285-6 τιμήν ... ἀποτίνεμεν; 288-9 τιμήν ...
τίνειν). The idea close to 'paying τιμή back' is observed in the
following passages: Hector, when urging his horses, says that they
should pay for the care of Andromache (ἀποτίνετον \textit{ll}. 8. 186);
Hephaestus feels obliged to return the service to Thetis who once
protected him (\textit{ll}. 18. 407 ζωάγρια τίνειν); Mentor-Athena says to
Odysseus that he will pay for the friendship of Odysseus by
assisting him in the battle against the suitors (\textit{Od}. 22. 235
ἀποτίνειν); If Telemachus returns Penelope to her father's house
so that she can remarry, he must also return her dowry, property
to secure a bride's τιμή, in full (\textit{Od}. 2. 132 ἀποτίνειν); Eumaeus says
that he does not reward (i.e. return τιμή to) his guest for his lip
service (\textit{Od}. 14. 166 τίσω).

τιμή can be recovered from another source than that which
one has given or lost it to. Alcinous and other noble Phaeacians
give additional gifts to Odysseus, but instead will later collect

\footnote{Adkins, \textit{Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece}
(London 1972), p. 15; ibid. \textit{BICS} 7 (1960) p. 27.}
compensation from their people (Od. 13. 15 τισόμεθα). Achilles, when persuading Agamemnon to give up Chryseis without immediate compensation, reassures the king that the Achaeans will pay him back three or four times as much once Troy is sacked (Il. 1. 128 δποτείσομεν). Ares, having been surprised in bed with Aphrodite, must pay her husband Hephaestus penalty (Od. 8. 332 μοιχα'γρια; 348 τίσειν). Since what matters here is that Hephaestus will get due compensation (αλσιμα πάντα 348) rather than that Ares will be punished, Poseidon can offer to pay the penalty (Od. 8. 356) if Ares does not. In all of these cases, τίνω/δποτίνω can readily be interpreted as 'giving/getting τιμή back.'

However, when it comes to revenge, punishment, or penalty between two hostile parties instead of arbitration within a friendly company, the function of τινεσβαί changes. For example, if one's brother is killed, what one loses is not simply τιμή, and therefore one will surely see his revenge of his brother's death in a different light than getting back his stolen property or suspended honour.20 What one tends to seek is punishment of the offender through his suffering rather than recovering one's particular losses.

That punishment is not just recovery of τιμή is illustrated in Agamemnon's oath before the duel of Menelaus and Paris (Il. 3. 284-91):

εἰ δέ κ' Ἀλέξανδρον κτεταύθης Μενελαος.

20 Besides, revenge is not only for the bereaved, but also for the dead. cf. G. Glotz, La solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminel en Grèce, pp. 113-4; p. 113: 'La vengeance du sang est d'abord une satisfaction posthume pour la victime: le mort «se réjouit en son coeur» de ne pas aller seul chez Hadès; et, plus est nombreux le cortège des ennemis immolés à sa gloire, plus grande est sa joie.'
First of all, Menelaus must kill Paris in order to avenge himself (II. 3. 28, 351, 366). The idea of Agamemnon's oath is that if the Trojans return Helen and the stolen property to Menelaus and give such compensation to the Argives as is appropriate as a trophy of victors and makes their expedition worthwhile\textsuperscript{21}, his army will be satisfied with it and there will be no more war, but if the Trojans refuse this condition despite Paris' defeat and thereby continue to despise the τιμὴ of the Achaeans, Agamemnon will get 'ποινὴ' from them by force. In other words, in the latter case, he no longer tries to get τιμὴ, material compensation, just for its sake, but seeks the capital punishment of perjurers first. Once the truce is broken by the Trojans, Agamemnon does not heed gains and losses of τιμὴ any more. He rejects any offer of ransom and insists on death to all Trojan males, including even unborn ones (II. 6. 57-60). He is not a merchant who would think, 'Let us get ransom and increase our τιμὴ. Let us save infants as slaves so that we can sell them later.' τιμὴ is one thing, ποινὴ is another, sought in different motivations. ποινὴ can sometimes be material compensation, but human emotion always goes beyond financial calculation.

\textsuperscript{21} cf. Benveniste op. cit. p. 55: '... il implique la reconnaissance du pouvoir royal et l'attribution d'honneur qui l'accompagne.'
Ajax's story to persuade Achilles to give up his anger, ironically, reveals that anger cannot always be removed by material ποινή alone, though the emphasis of his argument is that one should overcome one's anger nevertheless (II. 9. 632-6):

... καὶ μὲν τὸς τε καστιγήτος φονῆρς
ποινήν ἢ δὲ παυώσ ἐδέξατο πεπνητός
καὶ β ὅμοι ἐν δημωμέναι αὐτοῦ πόλιν ἀποτείχος.
τοῦ δὲ τ ἑπτήται κραδίθη καὶ θυμὸς φήμῃ
ποινήν δεξαμένῳ

It is clearly acknowledged here that there is something in human anger which cannot be resolved just by increasing one's τιμή.

Therefore, normally, murder of a family member or a close friend calls for deadly vengeance. τίνυσθαί/τίνεσθαί above all is to get emotional satisfaction through giving suffering which is equal to or greater than that one has received from one's enemy back to the enemy's party (II. 15. 116, 16. 398, 17. 34, 18. 93, 19. 208, 21. 134, 22. 271, Od. 9. 317, 24. 434-5, 470; cf. II. 11. 142).

It is certainly true that Orestes won fame (Od. 3. 204, κλέ’ος) and got his royal heritage back by avenging his father's death (Od. 3. 197-8, 203) and in that sense won his τιμή back. But, as far as Aegisthus is concerned, his τίσις (Od. 1. 40) would not have been complete if he only returned the throne to Orestes and went into exile. He must pay for his murder of Agamemnon by his own life (Od. 1. 43, 3. 195). In other words, what the murderer 'pays' is not simply the τιμή of the avenger.

It is also the case with Odysseus' deadly vengeance upon the suitors. They have not killed anybody yet (though plotting against Telemachus' life) and do offer Odysseus compensation which will not only repay the damage but actually increase his
material τιμή (Od. 22. 55-59; 57 τιμή), but for Odysseus, even the whole of their property is not enough payment for what they have done to him and his household (Od. 22. 61-4). So he refuses the offer of greater property than he originally had. Moreover, killing of the suitors means risking his own life under the threat of their kinsmen's vengeance, and in principle he could even lose all his τιμή by going into exile. It is not a step a sober accountant would take. Nevertheless, he must kill them all, because he will be avenged, paid off, only when he gets emotional satisfaction from their most miserable death. Therefore their death, and it only, is what they pay (Od. 14. 163, 22. 64, 23. 57, 24. 352) and what Odysseus is paid (Od. 1. 268, 3. 216, 5. 24, 11. 118, 13. 193, 386, 15. 177, 16. 255, 17. 540, 20. 121, 23. 31, 24. 326, 480, 482; Telemachus Od. 3. 206). Although he is pious enough to check his tongue, his joy after the revenge must be no less than that of Eurycleia who nearly cries out in triumph (Od. 22. 407-8). Penelope, too, would have been rejoiced at the sight of the bloody avenger Odysseus (Od. 23. 47-8).

Vengeance, whether socially justifiable or not, is a dark desire to give physical or psychological pains to a person who has caused one some displeasure. It is a negative feature of humanity that still lingers long after the establishment of modern laws which prohibit personal vengeance. Heroes with no such modifying convention in their society are generally ruthless in avenging themselves on their enemies. Achilles, not at all satisfied with just killing Hector, drags his victim's body behind his chariot day after day, until Apollo, who criticizes him to be 'as savage-minded as a lion' (Il. 24. 41), moves Zeus to stop him. Peirithous avenged himself on the Centaurs who had disturbed
his wedding (II. 2. 743 ἑπείσαρο) and he and his men mutilated the face of one of them called Eurytion (Od. 21. 299-301). The unfaithful goat-herd Melanthius is punished (Od. 22. 168, δποτισς) by torture and mutilation (Od. 22. 172-7, 187-93, 475-7). Even the most sensible of the Achaeans, old Nestor, talks in revengeful terms when urging the army to avenge themselves (τείσασβαί) by taking Trojan wives into bed (II. 2. 354-6). Agamemnon, as we have already seen, goes so far as to say that even unborn babies of Troy, in so far as they are male, should not escape death (II. 6. 57-60). Most horrifying though pitiful, however, is the passion of Hecuba as the mother who has lost her dearest son. She wishes to bite at Achilles' liver and eat it in revenge for Hector (II. 24. 212-4). In her mind, there is no more queenly honour or dignity, but only a single desire of vengeance fostered in her sorrow and dark despair.

Vengeance is often performed in the name of the gods. Agamemnon says that Zeus will let perjurers pay their penalty either by their own lives or by their wives and children (II. 4. 161-2). Some gods are certainly supposed to punish perjurers in this world and others in the underworld (II. 3. 276-9, 19. 258-60), but there is no passage to testify this function of the gods in Homer. The belief only serves as a convenient justification for the renewed attack of the Achaeans against Troy. Odysseus believes that it is the gods who punished the suitors (Od. 22. 413;

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22 Eating one's enemy raw is the ultimate temptation for an avenger, but never actually happens in Homer. Achilles wishes if he could be so wild as to eat Hector raw (II. 22. 346-7) and Hecuba, who herself wishes to eat him raw, calls him ὑμηγτής (24. 207). On Hera's wrath at the Trojans, Zeus wonders if she will be satisfied only by eating Priam, his children and other Trojans raw (II. 4. 35-6). cf. J. Griffin, Homer on Life and Death, p. 20.
cf. 1. 267-8, 3. 205-6, 20. 169; Telemachus 17. 51 Ζεῦς ἀντίτα ἔργα τελέσση, but as we have seen, the death of the suitors is rather divine favour to Odysseus than divine punishment on them (cf. Chapter 3).

On the other hand, clear examples of divine punishment mostly deal with the gods' own τιμή (cf. Chapter 6). For Agamemnon's insult to Chryses' priesthood, Apollo sends plague to the Achaeans (II. 1. 42ff). Helios demands that Zeus punish the companions of Odysseus for killing his cattle (Od. 12. 378 τίσαι) and threatens to go to and shine in the underworld otherwise (Od. 12. 382-3). Helios does not accept τιμή which the starving crew of Odysseus promise to pay afterwards (12. 345-7), but wants their immediate destruction. He does not take account of their desperate situation, but seeks revenge for its own sake.

When Odysseus mistakenly thinks that he has been dumped on a foreign land by the Phaeacians, he calls upon Zeus Hiketesios for their punishment saying that the god punishes wrongdoers (Od. 13. 213-4; 214 τίνυται δς τις ἀμαρτη). It would have been interesting to see if Zeus actually took action upon this call of an ἄκετη, had this situation been true. But even without any evidence for the function of Hiketesios, we know well what sort of ἀμαρτη Zeus actually punishes. Ironically, he allows Poseidon to punish the Phaeacians precisely because they have escorted Odysseus to his home safely. Their assistance to Odysseus is taken by Poseidon as an offence against his τιμή. Therefore the Phaeacians have their punishment (τίσις Od. 13. 144). Divine punishment is as malicious and merciless as human vengeance. One logical doctrine is that of Ἄτη as avenger of the Λιταῖ (II. 9. 512 ἄποτείσση), but as we have seen, ἄτη does not function on such a
principle at all. ἐρινυσ/ἐρινὺς, however, seem to be effective divine avengers in certain cases which we will examine in the next chapter.

Avengers demand more than just getting lost τιμη back, but full emotional satisfaction — often even by risking their own lives or τιμη —, and it is normally accepted in the Homeric morality. Only when one goes too far — like Achilles maltreating Hector's dead body day after day — the gods may intervene to stop. Odysseus, who once paid dearly for his boast after blinding the Cyclops (Od. 9. 500ff), knows it well, and does not boast over the bodies of the suitors. However, the dark passion of vengeance is shared by the gods, too. There is no universal principle to check cruelty in the name of vengeance.
Chapter 9 Forces that restrain human behaviour

We have seen how we can formulate the Homeric sense of morality in terms of μοιρα and in terms of τιμη. Each individual has his due portion and is expected by the society to stay within it. If this rule is broken, some sanction is usually applied. If one dishonours, injures, kills, or in any other way wrongs someone else, and if the latter or his kinsmen are capable, revenge is usually expected. This prospect, without doubt, is a very powerful deterrent force against violence and other wrongdoings. But fear of vengeance is only one of many forces that restrain human desire to act egoistically against the interest of others. In this chapter, we will examine other such forces that keep human behaviour 'within one's due portion.'

Divine punishment

We have examined the morality of the gods extensively and seen how unreliable they are in punishing wrongdoers (cf. Part I). They often turn a blind eye to outrage done by their protégés and sometimes punish the innocent like the Phaeacians or the Niobids. Although pious men, often battered by misfortunes, believe in fair justice of the gods and fear their punishment, divine sanction in general is not much feared by men of high birth. Achilles cruelly rejects Hector's last plea to return his body to his family, despite his warning against divine μήνιμα (II. 22. 358). Heracles kills his guest and gets away with it (Od. 21. 27). The suitors insult their host and his guests unafraid of Zeus Χεινιός. It is indeed well said by Odysseus (Od. 18. 132-3):

οὐμὲν γὰρ ποτὲ φησὶ κακόν πείλεσθαι ὀπίσθωσιν.
But there is one divine power revered and feared universally and definitely in action as an avenger, namely, ἐρυνὺς.

As we have already pointed out, unlike μοῖρα or αἰσχρα, ἐρυνὺς is primarily a deity on her own right, not a personified idea, as we can see her name among Mycenaean deities on Linear B tablets.\(^1\) In Homer, too, they are active deities who are even given handmaids by the Harpies (Od. 20. 78).

ἐρυνὺς are most frequently described as avengers of mothers, fathers, and other elder family members. In four out of six such cases, they are avengers of a mother. Meleager's mother calls on Hades and Persephone to give death to her son who has killed her brother, and it is ἐρυνὺς who hears her prayer (Il. 9. 571-2). ἐρυνὺς here must be the avenger not only for the mother's grief, but also for the blood of her kinsman, for, by killing his uncle, Meleager has slighted the tie of blood between him and his mother. Oedipus suffers from his mother's ἐρυνὺς, because he is ultimately responsible for her death by having killed his father/her husband and having married her (Od. 11. 280). The power and function of ἐρυνὺς are proved by such firm examples and they are truly dreaded as such, probably more than the Olympian gods.\(^2\) Telemachus says that he will never send his mother away against her will because he fears that she might call on ἐρυνὺς as well as that he might get νέμεσις from people (Od. 2. 135-7).

ἐρυνὺς watch over the family tie also among the gods. Athena, after beating Ares, taunts him saying that he has been

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\(^1\) cf. Chapter 7, n. 10.

\(^2\) We get the same impression from Aeschylus' Oresteia.
punished by his mother's ἔρινθες (II. 21. 412), though neither the 'punishment' nor 'ἔρινθες of Hera' can be taken seriously in this context. However, when Iris persuades Poseidon to obey Zeus' order saying that ἔρινθες always follow seniors (II. 15. 204), both of them take the goddesses' authority seriously. Elder members of a family must be treated with respect even among the gods, or they may call on ἔρινθες.

The only example of a father's ἔρινθες appear at II. 9. 454 in Phoenix's story about his father's curse on him. Phoenix is cursed to be childless because he has had relations with his father's concubine. It is not only an insult to his father, but could be regarded as violation of the natural order, because it is not natural that a father and a son share the same female as their sexual partner (as Oedipus did). ἔρινθες here are the avengers of a father and also the guardians of the natural order.3

The activities of ἔρινθες as avengers are widely acknowledged and have the most powerful deterrent effect at least against intra-familial crimes. It seems to be because of this authority of the goddesses that the Beggar-Odysseus tries to connect his case with the power of ἔρινθες when cursing the suitors (Od. 17. 475):

ἄλλ' εἶπεν ἄριστος υἱός θεός ἔρινθες ἔστω,....

3 One interesting thing about this episode is that, when Phoenix contemplates killing his father in anger, what prevents him from doing so is not (at least explicitly) his fear of ἔρινθες, but that of φάτες and ἅρτεος of people and getting a name of 'patricide' (II. 9. 460-1 cit. Plutarch De aud. poet. 8). Judging from the Oedipus episode, we can still easily believe that ἔρινθες would have haunted him, had he dared to kill his father. On the other hand (if such pedantry is of any use), it is possible to speculate that, if he manages to kill his father without giving him time to call upon ἔρινθες, their power may not be deployable, for, somehow, successful curses seem to involve repeated invocations. cf. II. 1. 35, 9. 454, 567-9.
Although the syntax is hypothetical, we can surely take these 'θεοί' seriously. It is a firmly established belief of Homeric man that Zeus Xeinios is the protector of wanderers and foreign visitors, and even some of the suitors believe that the gods visit men in the disguise of mortal visitors to monitor how ξείνωι are treated (Od. 17. 485-7). If there are in fact 'θεοί' for beggars, the ἐρινύαι Odysseus talks about here must be the agents avenging beggars on behalf of such gods or the gods themselves in the capacity of avengers. As we have noticed, it is ἐρινύαι who hears the prayer addressed to Hades and Persephone in one case (II. 9. 569-72), and in another, Hades and Persephone are said to have heard the prayer addressed to ἐρινύαι (II. 9. 454-7). These two examples suggest the general tendency of grouping together the gods of the Underworld, but also indicates the possibility for ἐρινύαι as an avenging agent on behalf of other deities. This must be the reason why Odysseus could say 'if there are any ἐρινύαι for beggars by any chance, ....'

In two passages, ἐρινύαι is said to send ἄτη to men. In his speech admitting his mistake in dishonouring Achilles, Agamemnon says that Zeus, Moira and Erinys sent ἄτη to him (II. 19. 87-8). In his eye, these three deities acted as a team in giving him misfortunes. ἄτη sent to Agamemnon, however, is not punishment, and not even the repentant Agamemnon views it that way. As we saw in Chapter 4, ἄτη may be allotted by Zeus, Moira, Erinys or virtually by any gods if they wish, and men's moral virtue or weakness has little to do with its distribution.

4 For the connection between Persephone and Erinys see M. D. Petruševski 'ΔΗΜΗΤΗΡ-ΕΡΙΝΥΣ-ΠΕΡΣΕΦΩΝΗ' in ZAnt 21 (1971) 621-33; For the Erinyes as agents, cf. Scholion b7 on II. 9. 571: 'πῶς δὲ Ἀιδήν εὐπαλεῖται, ἢ δὲ Ἐρινύς ἐξεται, δηλοντι ὡς ὑπηρέτης.'
Therefore it is no surprise for us to hear that ἐπινύς sends δτη to Melampus (Od. 15. 234) who turns out to be a successful adventurer in the end within the plan of Zeus (Od. 11. 281-97). Obviously Melampus is not 'punished' with δτη. Here, ἐπινύς is not an avenger, but an agent of Zeus to accomplish his plan.

ἐπινύς are also the guardians and witnesses of oaths along with Zeus, Gaia, and Helios (II. 19. 259). It is understandable for men to call on a deity from the Underworld along with the earth and the heavenly gods, to make sure that the powers of the whole universe witness a solemn oath, especially when we think of the gods' practice of making μέγιστος ὀρκος by the Styx (II. 2. 755, 14. 271, 15. 37-8). Again, a pair of chthonic deities, who are probably Hades and Persephone, are said to fulfil the same function as ἐπινύς on another occasion, namely to punish perjurers in the Underworld (II. 3. 278-9). We have no direct evidence for the validity of this belief, but there is no doubt that the addition of such chthonic deities to the list of divine witnesses would increase its deterrent force against perjury.

The most striking activity of ἐπινύς in Homer is in the episode of the horse Xanthus of Achilles (II. 19. 407-18). The horse is granted a human voice by Hera and predicts its master's approaching death. After its speech, ἐπινύς stop its voice. This passage is usually cited to exemplify the function of ἐπινύς as the guardians of the order of nature. The examples we have seen so far of ἐπινύς in this function are all concerned with human relations. This is the only example to suggest the control of ἐπινύς over the world outside the human sphere.

But why do they stop Xanthus' voice? If their duty is to keep the horse behaving within the realm of speechless animals,
it is too late to stop it talking after it has already spoken. Do they stop its voice to prevent it from being 'un-horsely' for too long or to prevent Achilles from knowing too much about his own destiny? Or do they simply act as agents of Hera? It is difficult to determine. In any case, we must be careful not to extend the office of ἐρυμησες too much only because of this example which is by no means enough to prove that they have control over the whole universe including all human and non-human spheres.

The major reason for us to be reserved in the interpretation of this episode is the parallel between the Achilles-Xanthus episode and the Adrastus-Areion episode which suggests a connection between ἐρυμησες and the horse Areion, which is said to have brought Adrastus to safety from Thebes in the Thebaid and is said to be a son of Poseidon and Demeter-Erinys. If we consider this multiple connection of Demeter-Erinys-Harpy and know that Xanthus itself was born from a Harpy, the parallel is too close to be ignored. Therefore it will be sensible for us to bear in mind that 'The identification of Xanthus with Arion, and the latter's intimate association with the Erinyes, could easily have been responsible for their appearance here.'

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5 cf. E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, p. 7; If it is unusual for Homeric horses to talk, it is perfectly normal for them to understand human speech. cf. Il. 8. 184ff, 23. 417-8, 446-7.
7 cf. Pausanias VIII. 25. 4-10.
8 Scholia on Il. 23. 347.
10 Dietrich, ibid., p. 237.
In our observation, therefore, the ἐπιβύς or ἐπιβύες are primarily the avengers for bloodshed or other offences within a family, and agents of higher gods who guard oaths and possibly social codes of hospitality. In the latter capacity, they can send ἀτη to men in order to cause some action to start, but not to punish somebody. Their actual deterrent force, however, seems effective mostly against intra-familial offences. One of the solemn oaths witnessed by ἐπιβύς is broken and the most insolent of the suitors are not scared by a beggar's call on ἐπιβύες.

νέμεσις

νέμεσις is justified anger or 'public disapproval'. Roughly speaking, it is caused when one sees someone (sometimes oneself) 'going beyond one's lot', doing something considered not appropriate for one's position in the society, which most often means acting against θεμίς and δίκη. The noun νέμεσις is not used for divine anger, but its cognate verbs can be used to express divine indignation either at men or at other gods. However, νέμεσις is most often human indignation in contrast with divine anger as in the statement of Telemachus at Od. 2. 130ff. He says if he sends his mother back to her father's home (135-7):

μήπωστε συνεργάτες φήρει τὸν ἐπιβύς

ἀκουόντα προσφυγνούν τον νέμεσις δὲ μοι καὶ ἄνθρωπων

ὡς τοιαύτη:

12 cf. M. Scott, 'Aidos and Nemesis' Acta Classica 23 (1980), p.25: 'Nemesis is derived from the verb nemein which implies to 'divide, distribute or assign'. It is concerned with assigning to people and situations their correct due. It is concerned with maintaining the due order of things'; G. S. Kirk, The Iliad: A Commentary, on 3. 156.
13 Unlike in Hesiod (Th. 223, Op. 200), there is no sign of deification / personification of νέμεσις in Homer.
The divine avengers *epivues* are contrasted with public criticism. Divine sanction and *ne mesis* are coupled also at *Od.* 22. 39-40 when Odysseus counts up the sins of the suitors:

\[\text{o} \; \text{theis} \; \text{delexantes, o} \; \text{it} \; \text{pavon epi} \; \text{xousu.}
\]

\[\text{o} \; \text{the} \; \text{tv} \; \text{anaphonten ne mesi} \; \text{katidosthen epesvai.}\]

The suitors have met so much *ne mesis* from the family of Odysseus and the community, but have not heeded it at all, just as they do not care about 'the gods and Erinyes of beggars' invoked by Odysseus (*Od.* 17. 475). In this, they stand in a sharp contrast with Telemachus who refrains from an apparently logical, but selfish act of sending his mother back to her father's home, fearing *epivues* of his mother and *ne mesis* of people. Obviously, the suitors are bad examples of men, and Telemachus is a good one. One must naturally avoid public disapproval in order to be regarded as a good person. Even if a man is a strong fighter, if he acts shamelessly, not regarding *ne mesis*, he can be discredited. This is the case with Paris. He is an excellent warrior who is destined to kill Achilles, but shows little enthusiasm in fighting in the war that he alone is responsible for (e. g. *Il.* 3. 36-7). Therefore his wife Helen complains that Paris does not know *ne mesis* nor *aloxea* of people (*Il.* 6. 349-51):

\[\text{aupi} \; \text{epe} \; \text{täge y} \; \text{thei kado} \; \text{takuranta}
\]

\[\text{anôs epe} \; \text{boxelov f民宿ovos eunu akouisa.}
\]

\[\text{ sfis ne mesi} \; \text{te kai aloxea pola anaphonton.}\]

Far from being ashamed as he should be, he even seems to resent (i. e. to feel *ne mesis* towards) the Trojans for their indignation at

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14 As we will see later (Chapter 11), *aloxos* and its cognate words such as *aloxos* are very strong terms to express *ne mesis* directed towards anti-social behaviour concerning both 'cooperative' and 'competitive' values.
him, according to Hector (Il. 6. 326), though Paris himself denies it (335-6):

{oβταί ἔγνω Τρώων τόσον χάριν οδέ νεμέσσαι

ημὲν ἐν θαλάμῳ θέλον χεῖ προτραπέσθαι.

As we know, however, this is a poor excuse just after his lustful hour with Helen, and therefore it cannot be believed. We are inclined to believe Hector's observation of Paris' normal attitude and behaviour.

However, he is an exception. Usually, responsible warriors refrain from cowardice and laziness in battle regarding social pressure from outside (νέμεσις) and inner sense of shame (αἶδως) as in the reproach of Poseidon to encourage Achaean heroes (Il. 13. 119-22):


In this context, νέμεσις and αἶδως are almost synonymous. νέμεσις is public disapproval as well as one's awareness of it (as it is here) which in turn is what αἶδως basically is.

The verbs νέμεσις(σ)α'ω and νέμεσις'ζομαι and the adjective νέμεσις(σ)ητός further illustrate when Homeric man feels νέμεσις either at others or at oneself.

One feels νέμεσις when someone's τιμή is damaged or threatened by a man of a lower rank. The Achaeans feel νέμεσις against Thersites (Il. 2. 223) who criticizes Agamemnon with sharp words of reproach. As the result, he gets punished by Odysseus (246-67). What Thersites says is mostly an echo of Achilles' complaint, which is fair enough on its own right, but
their society does not allow a soldier of a low status to criticize kingly heroes so rudely. Similarly, the suitors are most infuriated when a beggar wants to join their contest of the bow (Od. 21. 285), fearing that his attempt, if successful, might discredit their valour.15

Interestingly, within the divine society, the gods feel νέμεσις when their τιμή is slighted by a superior god, not by mortals or lesser gods. Poseidon feels νέμεσις at Zeus' domineering commands (Il. 13. 16, 353, 15. 211, 227) and Hera feels νέμεσις at the dominant rule of Zeus (Il. 15. 103). This seems to reflect slight difference between divine and human laws. In the human world, class difference must be kept clear. In the divine world, each member seems to have an equal right (cf. Il. 4. 57-8). Namely, there is only one 'class' in divine society, and trying to suppress another individual's intention is what deserves public disapproval. On the other hand, the class-division between the gods and men must be kept clear. If a god accepts hospitality

15 M. Scott, op. cit. p. 26: 'Indirectly, any offence against the classified society is an offence against any member of that society, high or low, because it threatens the security of established arrangements.' These 'established arrangements', in my opinion, are nothing other than θέμις and δίκη, customs and 'the way things normally should be' in general. I am puzzled by Scott's insistence on 'non-moral' nature of αἴδως (p. 24) and νέμεσις (p. 26) and the dominance of 'arete-standards' as the only effective moral concepts. Her own analysis of these terms actually tells us much more than her restatement of Adkins' theory. For example, she says in p. 26, '... like aídos, nemesis is not a rigid moral concept,' yes, because their points of reference θέμις and δίκη are not rigid moral concepts themselves. As she rightly continues (pp. 26-7), 'It is dependent on the emotional sensitivity of the individual and also on his concept of the due order, offences against which will cause nemesis. Unlike fixed morality, it will adapt to individuals and to circumstances.' This flexibility is a characteristic of Homeric δίκη as we saw in Chapter 5. But there is a broad consensus in the society. At least every member of Homeric society seems to agree on what is 'οὐ θέμις or 'οὐ νέμεσις', for example.
from mortals undisguised, it can be a matter of νέμεσις (II. 24. 463-4).\(^\text{16}\)

νέμεσις is also felt, as we have already seen, at military shortcomings. One feels νέμεσις when a brave hero does not join the battle (II. 13. 119, 293) or when one fails to protect one's fallen comrade's body and armour (II. 16. 544, 17. 93, 254). Since heroes receive τιμή in exchange for outstanding military performances, cowardice naturally is regarded as what we would call breach of the contract.

Another category of behaviour likely to be met with νέμεσις is an offence against the convention of ξεινίη. If one does not fulfill one's duty as a host, one deserves νέμεσις. Telemachus feels νέμεσις towards himself if he does not welcome a visitor at once (Od. 1. 119). He complains about the manners of the suitors to a newly arrived guest, but is aware that this guest might feel νέμεσις towards him who should not sound like a mean host (Od. 1. 158). The host can also receive νέμεσις if he either keeps his guests longer or sends them away against their wish (Od. 15. 69; cf. Od. 18. 409). For this reason, Telemachus cannot get rid of the suitors.

The conduct of the suitors, on the other hand, certainly deserves νέμεσις, because it is an offence against ξεινίη to behave arrogantly and rudely in their host's house and exploit his hospitality (Od. 1. 228, 21. 147; cf. Od. 2. 64, 138, 4. 158). Other people of the community also ought to feel νέμεσις at the suitors (Od. 2. 239). It does not seem to work, however, very strongly

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\(^{16}\) However, it is all right with the Phaeacians (Od. 7. 201-3) and the other way round, namely, cases in which men accept divine hospitality, as we see Circe and Calypso entertain Odysseus with no fuss.
on the suitors and their families as a restraining force from selfish conduct. On the contrary, for a sensible guest like Odysseus (disguised), it deserves νέμεσις even to moan about one's own misfortune in someone else's home (Od. 19. 121). The effect of νέμεσις seems to be connected with the belief in Zeus Xeiniōs. Some suitors are opposed to Antinous' violence towards a wanderer (Odysseus) because they believe in the gods of hospitality. But others, including Antinous, obviously do not fear the gods at all (Od. 22. 39). The pious Odysseus believes that Zeus feels νέμεσις towards κακὸν ἔργα like killing a guest (Od. 14. 284), though we have seen that the god did not take any action against the guest-killer Heracles. Man's faith in Zeus Xeiniōs and νέμεσις connected with it seem to be independent of what the god really cares for.

Behaviour contrary to other social conventions also invites νέμεσις. It is θέμις to give the funeral rites to the dead, and if one fails to do so, one deserves νέμεσις. Penelope tells her suitors that she will get νέμεσις from others (νέμεσης Od. 2. 101, 19. 146, 24. 136) if she leaves her husband's household without preparing a proper funeral cloth for her aged father-in-law.

Sexual behaviour is controlled by νέμεσις, but only to some extent. If a man approaches a virgin openly, the public will direct νέμεσις towards both of them (Od. 6. 286-8). Therefore Nausicaa has to avoid 'being seen' together with Odysseus. Helen knows that if she sleeps in the middle of the day with her husband who has just escaped from a combat, she will receive νέμεσις from others (νέμεσης ἄνω II. 3. 410). But, in the end, she yields to the power of Aphrodite (418-20) and joins Paris in bed. The goddess is described here as an amoral force which overrides the
restraining force of *νέμεσις*. Similarly, Zeus cannot control his desire for Hera, who is equipped with Aphrodite's love-charm, despite Hera's protest that making love outdoors in the middle of the day is 'νεμέσσοντον' (*II*. 14. 336). In either case, however, the actual *νέμεσις* can be avoided by keeping the act secret. Accordingly, *νέμεσις* does not work as a force against secret adultery. Helen fled with Paris in Menelaus' absence, and Aphrodite and Ares make love in Hephaestus' absence. There is no absolute sense of guilt in this world as far as adultery is concerned. Helen has such a heavy sense of guilt about her elopement with Paris because of the death and misery of many caused by her act rather than for its own sake.

One's appearance is more important than one's substance in the world in which public criticism is felt as the most powerful sanction. The extreme case is that of clothing. If a king is dressed in rags it is a matter of *νέμεσις* (*Od*. 22. 489) and he can be dishonoured (*Od*. 23. 115-6).17

Unpleasant words and deeds in general cause *νέμεσις*. One feels *νέμεσις*, for example, when one hears criticism of one's own brother (*II*. 10. 115) or an ominous thing about one's future (*Od*. 21. 169), or is woken up in the middle of the night (*II*. 10. 145). Therefore, cautious speakers often apologize in advance saying 'Do not feel *νέμεσις* towards me if I ...,' when one has to say or do something unpleasant to others (μην *νεμέσσα* *II*. 10. 145, 16. 22; cf. *II*. 15. 115, *Od*. 1. 158; *II*. 9. 33 ςυ δὲ μην τι χολωθῆς). Admission of

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17 cf. E. Block, 'Clothing makes the man: A pattern in the *Odyssey*' in *TAPA* 115 (1985) 1-11; She quotes B. Fenik (*Studies in the Odyssey*, pp. 61f, n. 1) in p. 2: 'For Homeric society what a person wore represented in a real, not just a symbolic, sense what he was. A king without his proper raiment is not a king ....'
νέμεσις on one's side, as we say 'Excuse me,' works as a verbal buffer in difficult communications.

There is one example in which one feels νέμεσις in front of the gods when one provides poison for atrocious weapons (Od. 1. 263). As we saw in Chapter 1, this νέμεσις works on some individuals but not on others, just as νέμεσις towards an offence against ξεινία. Mentes' father does not fear the gods when he gives the poison to Odysseus, nor are the gods described as feeling νέμεσις towards him.

Another indication that νέμεσις controls human behaviour is in the recurrent phrase 'οὐ νέμεσις,' denoting such and such act is not blameworthy. Interestingly, it is often applied to borderline cases rather than positively commendable acts. It is not blameworthy that the Trojans and Achaeans have fought the ten-year war for Helen, say the Trojan elders amazed at her divine beauty (Il. 3. 156). The miserable war, of course, is not desirable to them, and they are eager to return this ruinous beauty to the Achaeans, but at least, they admit, it has a good enough reason.

Similarly, Agamemnon tries to convince his generals that removing their ships off-shore for their safety is not cowardice, if not desirable (Il. 14. 80):

οὐ γὰρ τῆς νέμεσις φυγέων κακὸν ὅπδε ἀνά νάκτα

This plan, however, is met by Odysseus' νέμεσις (82 ὑπόδρα ἱδὼν προσεσφή) and rejected as dangerous (84 οὐλόμενε) and suitable only for an inglorious army (84).

Penelope complains that Phemius' songs of the sufferings of the Danaans give her fresh woes (Od. 1. 340-2). Telemachus, however, justifies the bard's choice of themes, saying that it is not blameworthy for singers to sing about topical matters to entertain
people (*Od*. 1. 350). The suitors are not happy about Penelope's tricks to postpone her decision to marry one of them, but Agelaos admits that it was not blameworthy for her to do so provided there still was hope that Odysseus might come home, since that would have been better (*Od*. 20. 328-31). In most of these cases, ὅν νέμεσις is applied to something not desirable to one party, but not to public disapproval.

Similar situations are observed in the use of negative plus νέμομαι / νέμησα ό / νέμησητός. The Achaeans' complaint about the prolonged war is not pleasant to Agamemnon, but no object of νέμεσις (*Il*. 2. 296). Achilles' anger at Agamemnon itself is not commendable, but nothing blameworthy until the latter offers compensation (*Il*. 9. 523). Menelaus does not want to leave Patroclus' body to Hector's plunder, but thinks it will not invite νέμεσις if he avoids someone with divine backing (*Il*. 17. 100-1). Agamemnon should not feel νέμεσις towards himself (thinking that he is humiliating his own kingly status) by making amends for his own error (*Il*. 19. 182). Peisistratus does not object to (*Od*. 4. 195) lamenting the dead, except at the dinner table. Nobody enjoys being scolded by his mother, but Telemachus admits that Penelope's reproach is fair enough (*Od*. 18. 227). A visitor (Odysseus disguised) would rather not see his hostess sobbing, but he does not object to it (*Od*. 19. 264). Odysseus' declaration of vengeance is more than unpleasant to the suitors, but Eurymachus admits that his indignation is justifiable (*Od*. 22. 59).

These examples seem to imply that, when an act which is not desirable to one party is classified as ὅν νέμεσις, the party that finds it undesirable cannot push the matter very far to give their interest priority. In this sense, ὅν νέμεσις is a manifestation of
social tolerance and a cooperative attitude which yields to interests of others, however undesirable to oneself, provided the values of the society as a whole allow the act. νέμεσις functions as a neutral reconciliator or at least a buffer between parties with contending interests. One tries to avoid νέμεσις, and tolerates things which are not subject to νέμεσις. Thus, in these two ways, νέμεσις works as a restraining force on behaviour.

αιδώς

αιδώς, shame, respect or fear is another restraining force on behaviour, not coming from others, but felt inside oneself, with implicit or explicit external pressure. When αιδώς is felt towards the public, such state of mind can be also described as feeling νέμεσις.18 However, the real difference between νέμεσις and αιδώς is that, while νέμεσις can be felt by others as well as by oneself towards one's shortcoming, αιδώς can be felt only by oneself.19 It is always internal, and public pressure can do nothing about those who are incapable of feeling αιδώς, like the suitors of Penelope (Od. 1. 254, 13. 376, 20. 29, 39, 171, 386, 23. 37).

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18 U. von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, Der Glaube der Hellenen I (Berlin 1931), p. 353ff defines αιδώς in this aspect only. As W. J. Verdenius, 'AIΔΩΣ bei Homer', Mnemosyne 12 (1944), p. 49-50, rightly argues, αιδώς is not conscience in a modern sense, but conscience in reference to the public, 'Öffentlichkeit des Gewissens'. However, G. Murray, The Rise of the Greek Epic (London 1934), p. 84 convincingly pictures αιδώς as a feeling functioning almost in the same way as our 'conscience': 'But suppose no one sees. The act, as you know well, remains νεμεσιτόν — a thing to feel nemesis about: only there is no one there to feel it. Yet, if you yourself dislike what you have done and feel αιδός for it, you inevitably are conscious that somebody or something dislikes or disapproves of you. You do not look at the sun and the earth with peace and friendliness. Now, to an early Greek, the earth, water, and air were full of living eyes: of theoi, of daimones, of keres. ... And it is they who have seen you and are wroth with you for the thing which you have done!' Eumaeus certainly will agree with Murray (cf. Od. 14. 402-6).

19 At least in the epics of Homer. cf. Hymn to Demeter 214; N. J. Richardson, The Homeric Hymn to Demeter (Oxford, 1974) ad. loc.
\textit{aiðως} is felt towards the public in many situations similar to those in which one feels \textit{νέμεσις}. As we have seen in one example, one feels \textit{aiðως} as well as \textit{νέμεσις} when one runs away from the battle (\textit{Il.} 5. 530-1, 787, 6. 442, 8. 228, 13. 95, 122, 15. 502, 561-3, 657, 661, 16. 422, 17. 95, 336, 22. 105). The same feeling can be described as \textit{δέος} in one case (\textit{Il.} 15. 657-8), the same fear of public reproach as implied in \textit{νέμεσις} and \textit{aiδως}.

When one behaves against \textit{θεμύς} and good manners, one expects \textit{νέμεσις} from outside and should feel \textit{aiδως} inside. Telemachus would not dare to send his mother away from home fearing her \textit{ἐπινύθες} and the \textit{νέμεσις} of the public (\textit{Od.} 2. 135-7) and also feeling \textit{aiδως} inside (\textit{Od.} 20. 343).

Telemachus reproaches the Ithacans who look on the suitors' outrage without trying to stop them, saying that they should feel \textit{νέμεσις} at the suitors (\textit{Od.} 2. 64) and \textit{aiδως} about themselves before neighbouring communities for their allowing the suitors' act (65) and that they should fear divine anger (66), the same triplet which restrains Telemachus from driving his mother away. It does not, however, work as efficiently on the Ithacans, especially not the kinsmen of the suitors.

In the divine world, too, \textit{νέμεσις} and \textit{aiδως} towards the public come (or go) together. When Ares nearly dashes out into the battlefield to avenge his son's death, he is aware of the obvious consequences, the \textit{νέμεσις} of other gods (\textit{Il.} 15. 115) as well as Zeus' \textit{χολος} and \textit{μήνις} (117-8, 122). As expected, Athena reproaches him saying that he has lost his \textit{νόος} and \textit{aiδως} (129), namely, intellect to perceive the situation rightly, and respect (\textit{aiδως}) towards Zeus' authority and consideration (\textit{aiδως}) towards other gods who would be affected by Ares' action. If he is fully
aware of νέμεσις of other gods, he should have felt αἰδος inside and restrained himself.

Unseemly behaviour or appearance which is subject to νέμεσις, that is, against good manners and social convention, also evokes αἰδος. One feels αἰδος when one is seen weeping (Od. 8. 86; cf the lamenting Thetis' hesitation to join other gods' company Il. 24. 90-1). Words or deeds that have even the slightest hint of sexual implication are especially prone to cause αἰδος. αἰδος is felt when 'αἰδος' is exposed, hence the name (Il. 2. 262, 13. 568, 22. 75)20, when a naked man is seen by girls (Od. 6. 221-2), when one sees a couple in bed (Od. 8. 324), when a lady joins her suitors' company all by herself (Od. 18. 184) and when a virgin talks about her imminent wedding (Od. 6. 66). Contact between the two sexes is restricted to a minimum in this society. αἰδος seems to deter men and women from open sexual behaviour very efficiently.21

The majority of the uses of αἰδος and its cognate words, however, refers to person-to-person relationships rather than individual-public relationships. When αἰδος is felt towards a particular person, it translates better as respect than shame, and is often coupled with love (φιλοτης) or awe/fear (δεος).

One feels αἰδος towards someone superior to oneself, either in status, prowess, wealth or seniority. The heralds of Agamemnon with the unwelcome mission of collecting Briseis feel

21 However, as M. Scott, op. cit. p. 25 points out, men are regularly bathed by women in Homer. See Scott's perceptive analysis of Od. 6. 221-2. No doubt, it is not nakedness per se, but nakedness in certain contexts is felt to be αἰδος-provoking. For example, we do not normally associate bare legs of athletes running in a competition with sexuality.
fear (ταρβήσαντε) and αἰδώς towards Achilles (II. 1. 331), because they are conscious of the unfairness of Agamemnon's order (in this sense they feel νέμεσις towards themselves, too), of Achilles' temper, and also of his higher rank. Achilles is respected and feared by his companions, too. Hermes pretending to be one of Achilles' men says that he fears and respects Achilles (II. 24. 435 δείδουκα καὶ αἰδέομαι). Patroclus describes him as 'αἰδώτας νεμεσητός' (II. 11. 649), a man who arouses αἰδώς and νέμεσις in others — grammatically this will be the most straightforward reading — in other words, Patroclus says, 'I feel αἰδώς and νέμεσις in front of him'. νεμεσητός is most often interpreted as 'prone to anger' (μεμψίμοιορς — Aristarchus), but that will suggest that Patroclus is always frightened of Achilles' temper which surely is not the case. It is equally unlikely that Patroclus is playing with an oxymoron, 'He is respectable-blameworthy.' which sounds utterly out of context. I would rather propose to take αἰδώτας and νεμεσητός, being closely combined in asyndeton, as synonymous, for νέμεσις and αἰδώς can equally mean internalized anticipation and avoidance of νέμεσις from others (cf. II. 13. 122). What Patroclus says here, then, will be something like 'I cannot help respecting him and blaming myself when doing anything he might find inappropriate.' He is not talking about Achilles' unreasonable temper, but his voluntary avoidance of situations which might cause justifiable anger (νέμεσις) in Achilles.

Agamemnon must be respected as a king (II. 4. 402 βασιλῆς αἰδώτατο), and therefore Diomedes respects (αἰδεσθείς) him and does not protest against his harsh words to Diomedes and Sthenelus. It is this courtesy, on the other hand, that makes Agamemnon anxious when Diomedes is about to choose a partner for the
night-raid. Agamemnon has to advise Diomedes not to choose a militarily inferior man because of his respect to the person's higher rank (*Iliad* 10. 237 ἀλὸδομενός 238 ἀλὸδοι), fearing that he might choose Menelaus for the sake of courtesy. Indeed, Menelaus is respected very much among the Achaeans, mainly because of his powerful family background. He is respected even by Nestor who, when complaining about him to Agamemnon, admits that he is φιλὸς and αἰδοῖος to Nestor (*Iliad* 10. 114). 'φιλὸς' as well as 'αἰδοῖος' probably reflects Menelaus' amiable character and the truly friendly relationship between him and the old man (cf. *Odyssey* 15. 151-3).

A master is always an object of respect and fear for his servants. Eumaeus respects Odysseus so much that even in his absence, he refers to him as his 'master', not 'Odysseus' (*Odyssey* 14. 146). But this respect has an affectionate tone as well. His respect for Odysseus is so deep because the latter 'loved and cared for' him (*Odyssey* 14. 146-7 μ' ἐφίλει καὶ κηδετὸ θυμῷ). The members of Odysseus' family are also αἰδοῖοι to him (*Odyssey* 15. 373)22, especially Telemachus, whom he 'respects and fears' (*Odyssey* 17. 188 αἰδέομαι καὶ δείδια) as his master. However, he loves his young master as much as he loves Odysseus, as we can see in his emotional welcome to Telemachus (*Odyssey* 16. 23), especially his addresses to Telemachus, 'γλυκερὸν φδὸς' (23) and 'φίλον τέκος' (25). This happy combination of αἰδῶς and φιλότης is what eventually wins him true friendship of Odysseus on equal terms (*Odyssey* 21. 214-6).

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22 I take αἰδοῖοι here to include both Odysseus' family and visiting strangers who are all 'Würdige' of his respect. cf. C. E. von Erffa op. cit. p. 16.
On the other hand, while Penelope should be *aιδοῖῃ βασίλεια* (*Od*. 18. 314) to her servants, twelve of her maidservants dishonour her (*οὐ τίνοςαι* *Od*. 22. 425) having shameless affairs (*δυαίδειη* 22. 424) with her suitors. Their lack of *aιδοiership* towards their mistress costs them their lives in the end. These two cases, Eumaeus' and the maidservants', indicate that the virtue of servants consists of *aιδοiership, δεόσ* and ideally also *φιλοτησ* for their masters. How lazy servants can become in their master's absence is illustrated by the poor treatment Argos the dog gets from Odysseus' servants (*Od*. 17. 319-21). That happens if their only motivation for hard work is *δεόσ* towards their master. Man loses half of his efficiency in work once enslaved (*Od*. 17. 322-3), because of lack of motivation. Eumaeus does not undergo such deterioration because of his *aιδοiership* and *φιλοτησ* towards his master's family.

Elder or senior persons are treated with *aιδοiership* as well as *τιμη* within a family or a community, not necessarily because of their actual strength or power, but virtually for the sake of their age itself which, of course, is accompanied by more experience and, generally speaking, by wisdom. For a young man like Telemachus, it is a highly *aιδοiership*-evoking experience to meet and talk to such a grand old king as Nestor (*aιδοşim* *Od*. 3. 24; cf. 3. 14). For Helen, Priam is her 'φιλωσ ἐκυρωσ', *aιδοῖοσ* and *δεινωσ* (*Il*. 3. 172).

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23 They must be disposed of because, firstly they injured *τιμη* of Penelope and Odysseus so much and secondly because they are, at least nominally, potential sexual partners of Odysseus (or Telemachus), and therefore if they bear children of the suitors, they could be the threat to the line of Odysseus. If they were brought up as Odysseus' bastard children and Telemachus died prematurely, they might end up inheriting his *τιμη*, while if brought up as the suitors' children — especially by their mothers who used to be the suitors' lovers —, they might one day become avengers of their fathers. cf. Chapter 3.
For Andromache, Hecuba is her 'αἶδοιν ἐκυρῆ' (II. 22. 451). Fathers- and mothers-in-law should be ideally treated with φιλότης as well as αἴδως by their sons- and daughters-in-law, but φιλότης is not always generated between in-laws, as we know well from our direct experience and the famous conflict between Hecuba and Helen or between Priam and Aeneas. In default of φιλότης, αἴδως works as the only keystone to sustain family harmony.

αἴδως is felt towards a stronger or senior person among the gods as well. Apollo refrains from fighting against his uncle Poseidon because of αἴδως (αἴδετο II. 21. 468). Similarly, Athena does not openly help Odysseus until he reaches Ithaca because she feels αἴδως towards Poseidon (αἴδετο Od. 6. 329). Hera is the wife of Zeus, the patriarch of the gods and men, and therefore she is respectable, αἴδοιν (II. 21. 479). For Calypso, Hermes is 'αἴδοισ τε φιλος τε' (Od. 5. 88), presumably because of his close tie to Zeus. Judging from an extremely formal reply of Hermes (εἴρωτάς μ' ἐλθόντα θέα θεόν 97), the two gods certainly respect each other on the ground of their equal divine right. Calypso's 'αἴδοισ', therefore, must be wholehearted. 'φιλος', however, does not sound more than a word of courtesy. Hermes is φιλος — or rather ξείνος to her — in so far as he is entitled to have ξείνια in her residence, but he rudely confesses that he did not want to come this far himself (Od. 5. 99-102) which is unthinkable if they were really 'φιλοι' to each other.24

24 J. Griffin, Homer on life and death, pp. 59-60 sees a good intention in Hermes' words. Certainly this statement can serve as an apology for him to have come to deliver an unwelcome message from Zeus to Calypso, and indirectly prepare her to accept Zeus' command in a less imposing way. Yet, his personal grumble about the bleakness of his itinerary has gone too far to be a disguised kindness of a sensitive person. He can only mean that he would have been reluctant even if he were to deliver good news.
However, the gods do have sense of αἰδώς with warmly felt φιλότης towards their benefactors. For Hephaestus and his wife, Thetis is αἰδοίη, φιλη, and δεινη (Hephaestus Il. 18. 394, 425; Charis 386), for she once saved him from hardship and also, as the consequence, there is a ξεινή-relationship between her and them. Hephaestus' welcome is warm, and he is willing to meet her request, to make Achilles' new armour.

The goddess is a benefactor of Zeus, too (Il. 1. 396-406). Therefore, Zeus gives τιμη to Achilles at her request and finds a solution to the divine dispute caused by Achilles' treatment of Hector's body in the way honourable to Achilles (Il. 24. 110), because of the god's αἰδώς and φιλότης for Thetis (111). Hera makes up a story of tension between Oceanus and Tethys in order to borrow Aphrodite's love-charm, and says that Hera will be called αἰδοιη and φιλη by them if she dissolves their marriage crisis (Il. 14. 210).

These examples show that the gods do have a warmly-felt sense of gratitude towards their allies and respect and love derived from it, just as Eumaeus respects and loves his master for the latter's love and care for him.

Power, either based on political influence or on wealth, and seniority are obvious sources of αἰδώς, respect and fear, because if one upsets stronger persons, they could be dangerous and δεινως, while if one wins their hearts, they will be φιλος and beneficial. Respect towards one's benefactors is also important in a similar way, for if you do not show due gratitude to your benefactors, nobody will help you in the future. Simple dynamics of wealth and power behind αἰδώς are described repeatedly by Odysseus in his typical, sobering frankness. He happily accepts the
Phaeacians' offer of more presents as their gratitude for his longer stay, saying that if he returns home with fuller hands, he will be αἰδοίωτερος and φιλότερος there (Od. 11. 360). In this philosophy, even φιλότης depends on wealth. He makes up a story of his presumed identity in Ithaca in which he says that his father was respected by others 'like a god' because of his wealth and sons (Od. 14. 205) and that he himself became δείνος and αἰδόιος (14. 234) when his household became richer.

However, we must not be misled by what is only the personal and ad hoc theory of life of Odysseus and draw a cynical conclusion that wealth and power alone cause αἰδός towards a person in Homeric society. The best evidence to refute it, ironically, is the treatment Odysseus himself receives among the Phaeacians and from Eumaeus, the very same people to whom he preaches with his sobering truth of life. Odysseus becomes φιλός, δείνος and αἰδόιος among the Phaeacians, thanks to Athena behind the scene (Od. 8. 21-22), but on the human plane, solely due to the charm of his personality. He wins their heart and almost the hand of the princess before he reveals his identity (Od. 7. 312-5). Alcinous is impressed not by the wealth or the high status which this wandering stranger simply does not have, but the wisdom and refined manners of the man.25 More remarkably, the recognition of Odysseus' worth comes before the display of his athletic skills in Book 8. Alcinous, whose principle is 'διαίην δ' αἰσχυννα πάντα' (Od. 7. 310), finds a man with the same philosophy as his in Odysseus (312 τα τε φρονεστάντα κα τέγω περ). Odysseus is respected as a man who acts 'within one's lot' by another who

does the same. This refutes another theory of Odysseus that it is physical strength (βίη Od. 14. 503) that wins a man the φιλότητα and αἰθωσ of others (505) without which he is dishonoured (ἀντιμέτώπωσι Od. 506). He, of course, proves to be wrong, as he hopes, with Eumaeus, too. Eumaeus is greatly impressed by the stranger's story (concluded with the above theory of life) which is a tactful request for a blanket, and reassures him that he will provide him with all necessities (14. 510-1). Eumaeus praises his story by saying (509):

\textit{οἴδε τι πω παραμοιράνεσ νηστείας ἔτεινες.}

'You have said nothing beyond μοιρα or useless.' One is applauded when one speaks 'within μοιρα', appropriately to his status and to the circumstances.

Odysseus may be a happy exception, as envied by his companions (Od. 10. 38-9), guided by a divine guardian, but there is a strong moral message in both of these episodes. Man does not win αἰθωσ only by his wealth or physical strength, but by good manners and thoughtful words, in other words, masterly knowledge and application of θέμισ and δίκη. Elderly persons are respected, no doubt, mostly for these moral values which they tend to acquire through their experience. Such values will surely win genuine φιλότητα as well as αἰθωσ to their owner like Odysseus. He himself, in fact, believes in and defends such moral values on one occasion (Od. 8. 169-73):

\textit{ἄλλος μὲν γὰρ εἴδος ἄκαθοτερος πέλει ἀν' ἄλλος θεὸς μορφήν ἔπεσε σπέρμα. οἱ δὲ τὶς αὐτῶν περιπέμπει λεύσσουσιν ὃς ἀφαλέως ἄχορεύει. αἴθως μενίσχε μετὰ δὲ πρέπει ἄχορεύων. ἐρχόμενος δὲ ἀνά διότι θεὸν ὡς εἰσορέωσιν.}
It is, in fact, *aiδος* itself that wins the *aiδος* and *τιμή* of others as if towards a god (172-3). We can clearly see here that Homeric man is not ignorant of what we would hail as moral virtues, such as modesty, wisdom and thoughtfulness (what Adkins would call 'quiet virtues'), and they are not at all of minor importance. In the time of need as Odysseus is in now, they are vital for survival.

The cases of *aiδος* towards one's benefactors, past, present or potential, and those who deserve respect on their virtues are fairly natural phenomena, connected with admiration of something superior to one which is deeply rooted in human mentality. *aiδος*, however, is felt not only towards those who are obviously respectable to one. An extreme case is *aiδος* due, as a rule, towards any suppliants and guests.

Suppliants as foreign travellers are normally in a weaker social position than their hosts. Even if they are politically powerful or wealthy at home, they are alone and defenceless in a foreign land. If they are killed abroad, their kinsmen would not be able to avenge their death without knowing what has happened to them. The killer can easily get away with it. Therefore *aiδος* towards them is not so instinctive as the examples we have already seen. On the other hand, anyone would like to be protected by his host under a reliable agreement. It is not difficult to imagine the reason for the development of the code of hospitality, that of mutual obligations between *ξεινος* and *ξεινοδόκος*, out of general necessity. To secure the safety and hospitality to every traveller anywhere in the world, some international law is required. In the world of Homer, as in later Greece, the law is the belief in Zeus Xeinios/Hiketesios. Guests are *aiδοιοι*, because they are under the protection of the god. It is
towards this god, through one's guests, that one feels *ai\δως*.\(^{26}\) Therefore a murderer of his own guest, a most serious offender against the code of hospitality, is condemned by the poet this way: 'οχετλιος (Appalling)! He did not feel *ai\δως* (*ai\δεσατο*) towards *θεων δίς* nor *τραπεζα* (*Od. 21. 28*).\(^{27}\)

In the land of the Phaeacians who believe in this code, Odysseus is guaranteed their *ai\δως*, presumably with or without his personal charm. Nausicaa readily helps him as a naked, shipwrecked wanderer, though her first impression of him is 'an ugly man' (*Od. 6. 242*). On his arrival at the royal palace, even before he starts his remarkable story of wanderings, the Phaeacians offer a libation to Zeus 'who attends suppliants who deserve respect (*ai\δοιοι λεταλ*)' and accepts this *λετης* as their *ξεινος* (*Od. 7. 164-5 = 180-1*). For Alcinous, a guest-suppliant is like one's own brother who deserves escort home and loving gifts (*φιλα δώρα*) which the hosts give out of love (*φιλεοντες*) (*Od. 8. 544-7*). By this stage, Odysseus has already consolidated his position as a distinguished guest, and that must be the main reason for the emphasis on willing *φιλότης* added to compulsory *ai\δως*. This is said, however, before Odysseus reveals his identity. Therefore Alcinous is not expecting any returns. A mere wanderer can be accepted as a guest of the royal palace and be welcomed with *ai\δως*, thanks to the Phaeacians' piety towards Zeus Xeinios, and

\(^{26}\) cf. M. Scott, op. cit. p. 19: 'The values placed under the protection of the gods must be felt by the society to be worthy of such protection.'; Another factor arousing *ai\δως* for strangers is the fear of something mysterious. cf. M. Scott ibid.: 'The element of fear of the unknown involved in the feeling about strangers would be represented, too, in legends of gods in disguise asking for hospitality, who, if turned away, would have had the means of taking a harsh revenge.'; W. J. Verdenius op. cit. p. 52 thinks that this is the reason for *ai\δως* towards strangers.

\(^{27}\) For οχετλιος see Chapter 1, n. 9.
their_aίδως_is_enhanced_further_by_their_φιλοτης_prompted_by_Odysseus'_personality.

The_same_combination_of_the_awe_of_Zeus_and_personal_love_is_observed_in_another_host_of_Odysseus,_Eumaeus._When_Eumaeus_thinks_that_his_guest_is_making_up_a_nice_story_of_Odysseus'_imminent_return_to_improve_his_treatment,_he_tells_his_guest,_the_disguised_Odysseus_(Od._14._388-9):

{oυ γὰρ τοινεκ έγώ σ αιδσουμαι οίδε φιλήμω
αλλά διὰ θείου δείας αιτάν τ' ελεάμωns.

The_first_line_is_a_negative_sentence,_but_in_effect,_it_negates_only_the_reason_for_him_to_do_what_he_does,_namely,'I_do_feel_aίδως_and_φιλοτης_towards_you,_but_not_because_you_say_that.'_This_he_does_because_'I_fear_Zeus_Xenios_and_pity_your_own_self.'_Fear_of_Zeus_alone_might_be_enough_toCause_aίδως_towards_a_wanderer,_but_the_φιλοτης_that_Eumaeus_feels_towards_his_guest_arises_from_his_personal_feeling,_pity,_towards_a_helpless_fellow_human_being._aίδως_felt_merely_as_a_rule_may_have_the_same_effect_in_material_terms,_but_could_not_be_as_willing_and_warm_as_his_aίδως_mixed_with_pity_and_love_towards_Odysseus.

Penelope's_case_is_a_good_example_to_show_that_aίδως_towards_a_guest_develops_φιλοτης_only_when_the_host(ess)_finds_his/her_personal_commitment_in_the_person._Ever_since_Odysseus_left_Ithaca,_Penelope_has_not_entertained_visitors_(though_she_considers_them_aίδοιοι)_herself_(Od._19._316)._aίδως_alone_is_not_enough_for_her_to_overcome_her_distress_at_performing_her_duty_of_hospitality._However,_as_soon_as_the_unusual_beggar_(Odysseus)_tells_her_a_story_of_friendship_with_Odysseus,_she_changes_her_attitude._The_'beggar'_tells_her_that_he_entertained_and_sent_off_Odysseus_as_a_dear_and_respected_friend_(ζεινον...φιλον_τε...aίδοιον

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As is clear from this example, not all ἔξενοι are promoted to be φίλοι.

Thus αἰδως towards suppliants/guests is a shaky thing without the support of φιλότης. Supplicants, however, cannot demand φιλότης which they are not primarily entitled to. Instead, they try to strengthen the αἰδως felt as a rule by an appeal for pity. For example, when taking refuge from the sea into a river, Odysseus prays to the river-god, claiming that he is the god's ἱκέτης and therefore αἰδοῖος (Od. 5. 447-8) and pleading to him, ἐλέαιρε' (450). As we will see later in this chapter, ἐλεος is another force which restrains one from doing harm to others and makes one beneficial towards others. Especially when it comes to supplication to an enemy, ἐλεος is a vital element, because, as we have seen, no enemy supplicating for life on the battlefield is considered to be under the protection of Zeus. Lycaon, supplicating Achilles for his life, says that he is a sort of ἱκέτης (if so αἰδοῖος) because he had eaten bread with Achilles before. On this ground, he asks for αἰδως and ἐλεος from Achilles: μ' αἰδεο καὶ μ' ἐλέησον (II. 21. 74-5). Although Achilles' tone is slightly familiar ("φίλος" 106), the logic does not work on the enemy determined to kill with no more room for ἐλεος in his heart.

Knowing such an Achilles on the battlefield, Hector gives up his initial idea of supplicating Achilles for his life, concluding that
Achilles would not pity nor respect him (II. 22. 123-4 ἐλεησεῖ, αἰδέσεται). Hecuba tries to dissuade Priam from going to see Achilles to ransom Hector's body by stating the same fear (II. 24. 207-8):

ἀμυντής καὶ ἀπόστος ἄνθρωπος, οὐ δὲ ἐλεησεῖ,
οὔδὲ τι ὀλίγος ἀλλοτροφός.

Note the adjectives that she attributes to Achilles. He is man-eating and faithless. A proper human being should have the feelings of ἐλεος and αἰθως, but, no. Achilles is only a sub-human creature, as savage as a beast in her eye, and not without a good reason. Nevertheless, Priam has a hope that Achilles might have some respect and pity for his old age even as the enemy is dragging Hector's body around behind his chariot (II. 22. 418-20 ...
 ... αἰδέσεται ἡ δ' ἐλεηση/γηρας), for as we have seen, old age itself deserves αἰθως. Although he has received a decisive encouragement from a divine omen, his actual appeal to Achilles is still on the human plane — an appeal to human feeling as well as to respect for divine protection (II. 24. 503):

οὐλ' αἰθῶν θεοίς, Ἀχλεῖον αὐτῶν τ' ἐλέησον.

As a suppliant, Priam is considered, at least by men in general, to be under divine protection. However, since his kingdom is at war with Achilles' army, he is an enemy to Achilles who is not entitled to mercy if met in battle — even his old age would not save his life on the night of the capture of Troy. Therefore, Zeus secures Achilles' 'morality in peace' in advance for the old man so that the hero will hold αἰθως towards his suppliant. At the same time,

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28 Elsewhere ἀμυντής is applied only to animals which eat dead human bodies: birds of prey (II. 11. 454), dogs (II. 22. 67), fish (II. 24. 82). cf. II. 21. 127 for body-eating fish.
Priam tries his best to evoke Achilles' human feeling of pity. *αἰδωσ* and *ἐλεος*, two forces that keep one away from violence and roughness, must function together to change the angered Achilles. What changes the ruthless killer of Lycaon and Hector into a sympathetic host of Priam is the combination of divine interference and Achilles' recognition and identification of the sorrow of two fathers, his and his victims'. *αἰδωσ* does not work without divine authority, and it often needs the support of *ἐλεος*, too.

The divine authority behind *αἰδωσ* does not have to be Zeus. Phemius' supplication to Odysseus is successful, because, as a singer, he is under the patronage of the Muses (*Od. 22. 344*) and therefore deserves *αἰδωσ* (*Od. 8. 480*). Chryses' supplication to Agamemnon to ransom his daughter is not successful in the first instance, but *αἰδωσ* and *τιμή* towards him are restored in the end, because of the undeniable authority of Apollo that he has behind him (*Il. 1. 23, 377*).

By whatever god you claim to be a suppliant, the claim must be genuine in order to work. When protesting against Achilles' blunt rejection of reconciliation with Agamemnon, Ajax desperately appeals to Achilles' duty of hospitality (*Il. 9. 640*):

*ἀδεσσοί μὲν ἄρειν.*

In fact, Achilles does hold *αἰδωσ* and also *φιλετης* towards the members of the embassy in their capacity of his guests and friends. He has welcomed them warmly, provided them with refreshment, as is due to visitors. But their errand is another matter. They cannot demand that Achilles throw away his pride and resolution, even his life, as dinner-time entertainment. Any diplomats, ancient and modern, should know how they would
often be disappointed in their negotiation after ravishingly entertained by foreign dignitaries.

Another unsuccessful suppliant, Leodes, also fails to relate himself to divine protection. He appeals to Odysseus' sense of \( \alpha \iota \delta \omega \varsigma \) and \( \epsilon \lambda \epsilon \omicron \omicron \varsigma \) (Od. 22. 312) saying that he has been a good guest in the house trying to stop others from outrage and that he has been the libation-offerer among the suitors, thereby trying to claim the protection of Zeus Xeinios and other gods. The fact remains, however, that he has been consuming Odysseus' property every day, abusing the convention of \( \xi \epsilon \iota \nu \iota \eta \). Moreover, he has been the leader of all those amorous prayers to win Penelope, which, to Odysseus' eye, is another unforgivable abuse of divine authority. Leodes cannot deserve \( \alpha \iota \delta \omega \varsigma \).

Interestingly, Odysseus' 'supplication' to the Cyclops fails in the same way, in a sense. Odysseus and his crew had no desperate need for shelter or food at that time. They had access to fresh water and plenty of goats on the neighbouring island (9. 116ff). They stayed in the cave just out of his curiosity and greed, in the hope that the resident of this enormous cave might give him some present (Od. 9. 229). They were not obviously in a 'pitiable' condition. Moreover, since they have helped themselves to the Cyclops' cheese (Od. 9. 231-2), they are, technically, thieves. The 'host' is obviously unhappy to see them. Any man, even a reasonable one, would not be happy to find strangers already in his home in his absence, instead of waiting at

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29 Of course, the motive for this expedition itself is Odysseus' curiosity (9. 174-6). We should call it an irresponsible curiosity, if he really sensed, as he claims, that they were going to meet '\( \alpha \nu \theta \rho \alpha \ ... \ \mu \epsilon \gamma \alpha \lambda \nu \nu \ \epsilon \pi \epsilon \iota \mu \epsilon \nu \varepsilon \nu \ \alpha \lambda \chi \iota \nu \iota \iota \iota \iota \iota \iota \iota \iota \iota \iota \iota \)'. Or is this statement just a retrospective analysis of his instinctive caution?
the threshold until invited as guests. Such 'guests' should be extremely lucky with their host not to be declared intruders. Odysseus immediately senses that his 'host' is not pleased, but instead of humbly begging with the word 'έλεης', which is necessary even towards a man with much gentler manners, he preaches to his host what he ought to do for them and tries to impress him with divine authority (Od. 9. 269-71):

\[
\text{λιθίνα γερματε, θεοίς βέβαις δὲ τοίχημεν.}
\]

\[
\text{Ζείς δ' ἐπιτιμήθηρ πετάων τε κεῖσαιν τε,}
\]

\[
\text{ζεύς, καὶ θεοῖσιν ἤμι αἰδολοιόν ὑπήκει.}
\]

It is not very impressive diplomacy itself. However, even if he spoke more humbly and asked for his host's έλεος, he still would have failed, because the Cyclops' mind has no έλεος at all, nor does he fear or respect the gods. Odysseus' logic collapses, because the Cyclops does not acknowledge the divine authority necessary to evoke αἰδως.30

Suppliants, singers and priests are not very strong in terms of wealth and political power, but have divine authority behind them which causes the sense of αἰδως in others. In this sense, this category of αἰδως is also connected with fear of something/somebody stronger than oneself. However, there is

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30 Odysseus Tsagarakis interprets Od. 9. 270-1 as follows: 'In addition to πτοχοί, αίδοιοί enjoy divine support; these are needy people at large; they are not to be found in battlefield.' (Nature and background of major concepts of divine power in Homer, Amsterdam, 1977, p. 23). His reading of αἰδολοιόν as an independent substantive from ξείνοιαν is unusual to say the least, but even if it is possible to read this way, his interpretation of αἰδολοι is a tautology, for needy people are αἰδολοι because of divine protection. In other words, 'αἰδολοι' are, by definition, those who enjoy divine support. I completely agree with his last part of the sentence that αἰδολοι are not to be found in battlefield, if he means that men in battlefield are not αἰδολοι, i.e. not under divine protection, not that men in battlefield are not considered needy.
another category of \(\alpha i\delta\omega\varsigma\)-recipients who are not obviously under divine protection — women.

Any woman other than slaves can be described as \(\alpha i\delta\omega\varsigma\eta\) either as a wife (\(Il.\ 6.\ 250,\ 21.\ 460,\ Od.\ 3.\ 381,\ 451,\ 10.\ 11,\ 17.\ 152,\ 19.\ 165,\ 262,\ 336,\ 583;\) cf. Hera as '\(\Delta i\omega\varsigma\ \alpha i\delta\omega\varsigma\\eta\ \pi\varphi\delta\kappa\omicron\upsilon\tau\iota\varsigma\) \(Il.\ 21.\ 479\)') as a mother (\(Od.\ 8.\ 420;\) cf. \(Il.\ 22.\ 82\)), as a virgin (\(Il.\ 2.\ 514\)), or as a house-keeper (\(Od.\ 1.\ 139,\ 4.\ 55,\ 7.\ 175,\ 10.\ 371,\ 15.\ 138,\ 17.\ 94,\ 259\)). We can fairly assume that the underlying cause for \(\alpha i\delta\omega\varsigma\) towards women is basically the same as that towards exposed sexual contacts. In Homer, as in many other cultures, when a man and a woman who are not supposed to get into sexual contact are left alone, face to face, they tend to feel embarrassed.\(^{31}\) In Homer, women are clearly observed from men's point of view; hence they are 'to be respected (by men),' i. e. not to be treated with overt sexual interest, either seriously or jokingly.\(^{32}\) However, the specific meaning of \(\alpha i\delta\omega\varsigma\eta\) changes according to a woman's status.

A wife is \(\alpha i\delta\omega\varsigma\eta\) as 'somebody else's wife' (\(Il.\ 6.\ 250,\ 21.\ 460,\ Od.\ 3.\ 451\)), as one's hostess (\(Od.\ 17.\ 152,\ 19.\ 165,\ 262,\ 336,\ 583\)), or even as one's own wife (\(Od.\ 3.\ 381,\ 10.\ 11\)). \(\alpha i\delta\omega\varsigma\) towards another man's wife seems to be common sense, but that towards one's own cannot be explained without taking into our account the sacred nature of matrimony. After all, wives have a goddess of marriage as their guardian.\(^{33}\) Penelope is patiently waiting for

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31 The best Homeric example will be the possible indignation of Nausicaa if caught by Odysseus by her knees (\(Od.\ 6.\ 147\)).
32 I see no ground for taking \(\alpha i\delta\omega\varsigma\varsigma\) applied to women as 'züchtig' as many do. e. g. C. E. von Erffa op. cit. p. 16.
33 Hera does not show her activities as the marriage-god very often, but she seems to be able to arrange marriages (\(Il.\ 14.\ 267-8\)) and to dissolve marriage crises (\(Il.\ 14.\ 208-10\)) at times. She can also interfere with childbirth (\(Il.\ 19.\ 117-9\)).
her missing husband, 'feeling aιδως towards their wedlock and rumour of people (Od. 16. 75, 19. 527)'. What ties her to Odysseus is first of all her affection, but secondly, aιδως felt towards the sanctity of wedlock and νεμεσις of people. However, divine protection of marriage is not the only factor in aιδως towards a wife. As for the public, we can attribute their aιδως towards a lady of an oikos to the power of her husband. As for her own husband, the most important factor will be his own love for her which also generates his τιμη towards her, and possibly also her dowry and her family’s power.34

A woman as a mother is respected by her sons and daughters despite the fact that her sons' social status is technically higher than hers as potential heads of the household. Nevertheless, she is respected because she is older and because she bore them. It is this tie that enables parents to call ερινυς on their children should they ever forget the fact. And it is through this tie that Hecuba tries to persuade Hector to avoid fighting with Achilles, exposing her breast and saying (II. 22. 82-3):

"Εκτορ, τέκνων ἐμῶν, ταξέ τ’ αἰδεο καὶ μ’ ἐλέσουν
αὕτη; ....

He must respect her motherhood, symbolized and summarized in her breast, and pity herself for her feeling. Motherhood with a divine guardian behind it can claim a higher command of aιδως, but yet what Hecuba emphasizes here is her innermost sorrow and misery for which she asks for pity (ἐλέησον). She implores

34 That dowry makes a divorce difficult is observable in Telemachus' statement at Od. 2. 132-3. An interesting case of a husband's respect for his wife's father is Alcinous' extraordinary respect for his wife who almost shares his kingship because, apparently, he respects her late father who was his elder brother and the first to succeed to the throne had he lived to do so (Od. 7. 63-8).
him most powerfully by provoking \textit{ai\delta\omicron\omicron\omicron} and more emotional \textit{\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\omicron\omicron}\omicron at the same time in one action.

For virgins, we cannot find divine protectors at all. Athena, though herself a virgin, is clearly a patroness of warriors and not of virgins. Artemis, another virgin-goddess and worshipped as the patroness of all unmarried creatures — including human virgins — in later tradition does not clearly emerge as the protector of virgins in Homer. She is called on by Penelope wishing a chaste death rather than remarriage, but as the goddess of sudden death rather than the goddess of chastity. Virgins in Homer deserve \textit{ai\delta\omicron\omicron\omicron} in the sense that they should be protected by the household and the community. If a man approaches a virgin openly, the public will direct \textit{\nu\epsilon\mu\epsilon\omicron\omicron\omicron} towards him as well as the girl (\textit{Od.} 6. 286-8). It is mainly for the social pressure that she must be treated with controlled behaviour, with \textit{ai\delta\omicron\omicron\omicron}.

It is almost certain that there is no special guardian deity for the house-keeper. If she is respected by the members of the \textit{o\i\kappa\omicron}\omicron and by the guests, it must be because of her position as the deputy of the hostess. \textit{ai\delta\omicron\omicron\omicron} which she enjoys depends entirely on the goodwill of her master and mistress. Also it is unlikely that \textit{ai\delta\omicron\omicron\omicron} towards her has anything to do with the requirements for controlling sexual desire and so on, because a house-keeper is often too old to be sexually attractive. \textit{ai\delta\omicron\omicron\omicron} towards her is probably a tribute to her professionalism.\textsuperscript{35}

Female members of a household — not to mention house-keepers — are powerless and helpless on their own as we know from Penelope's hardship due to the suitors with no \textit{ai\delta\omicron\omicron\omicron} (\textit{Od.} 1.

\textsuperscript{35} cf. M. Scott, op. cit. p. 32, n. 25.
Mothers can call ἐρινɵες on their children when the former are wronged by the latter (II. 9. 571-2, 21. 412, Od. 2. 135-6, 11. 280), and wives can possibly expect protection from marriage gods at a marriage crisis. In other contexts, however, women in general are defenceless against male aggression. Therefore, the αἰδως towards them must have some support of human initiative. For wives, it may be their dowry or their paternal influence as well as love that make their husbands feel αἰδως towards them. For unmarried daughters and house-keepers, not much more than the affection of their fathers and their masters respectively can be expected as their support. It must be also the case with wives and mothers in daily life. Here, in αἰδως towards women, we may be allowed to detect a sign of a social code somewhat comparable with 'ladies first.' As in the case of suppliants/guests, we can count this category of αἰδως as generated by mostly human feeling and only partially augmented by divine sanctions.

Finally, dead bodies also seem to deserve αἰδως. When accusing Achilles of maltreating Hector's body, Apollo says among the gods (II. 24. 44-5):


This really is the most extreme case of αἰδως towards the helpless. Nothing, nobody is as helpless as dead bodies. But, everyone would like his body to be properly treated with funeral honours.

36 Line 45 is rejected by Aristarchus and most modern scholars because it is identical with Hesiod's Opera 318, and irrelevant in this context. See below.
so that he can enter the House of Hades. When he is in need, however, he is absolutely powerless. Thus the universal law, that the dead deserves \textit{aidōs} and \textit{eλeos}, even if it is one's enemy (cf. \textit{Il}. 7. 409-10) seems to have developed. Although Hera, Athena and Poseidon are not indignant at Achilles' conduct, other gods have continuously pitied Hector (\textit{eλeaiρεσκον \textit{Il}. 24. 23) . If the case gets even worse, as Apollo suggests, the gods might have felt \textit{νέμεσις} towards Achilles (μη ... \textit{νεμεσηθέωμεν 53}).³⁷

As we saw in Chapter 1, the gods are not constant in protecting the dead, but among humans the belief that the gods are guardians of the dead is firm enough to control their behaviour (\textit{Od}. 11. 73) under normal circumstances. Achilles ignores Hector's warning, because, as Apollo says, he has lost normal human feeling, \textit{aidōs} and \textit{eλeos} towards the helpless. Just as Hecuba describes him as a savage, sub-human being (\textit{ωμηστης. \textit{απτος} \textit{Il}. 24. 207), Apollo says his mind is not '\textit{εναλισμοι}' (\textit{Il}. 24. 40) and like that of a wild lion (λέων δ ὦς \textit{δφηα ολδεν 41). Indeed, Achilles in this scene has every sign of being 'beyond', or rather 'below', his lot. He is not living up to the human moral ideal of having 'mind within measure', with \textit{aidōs} towards those under divine protection and \textit{eλeos} towards the helpless.

If possesion of \textit{aidōs} is not as highly valued as that of \textit{dpetη}, lack of \textit{aidōs} is a serious moral defect always associated with highly anti-social offences or inhumanity. Agamemnon is accused by Achilles of not having \textit{aidōs} (\textit{Il}. 1. 149, 158, 9. 372) when he made his most serious moral error of insulting Achilles and robbing him of his prize. The suitors of Penelope who have no

³⁷ cf. Chapter 1, 'Protection of the dead'.

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sense of \( a\text{i}\delta \omega \varsigma \) whatsoever come to deserve the severe punishment by Odysseus in the end. The twelve slave-women who have had shameless relations (\( d\nu\text{ai}\delta \varepsilon \varepsilon \eta \) Od. 22. 424) with the suitors are also punished. Only beggars are allowed to live without \( a\text{i}\delta \omega \varsigma \) (Od. 17. 347, 352, 578), though only to some extent (Od. 17. 490), for, otherwise they cannot sustain themselves. It is really a subhuman living condition.

Interestingly, inanimate objects, stones and rocks (II. 4. 521, 13. 139, Od. 11. 598) and the war-god \( K\nu\delta\omega \mu \varsigma \) with no personality (II. 5. 593) are also 'without \( a\text{i}\delta \omega \varsigma \). Once man has lost his \( a\text{i}\delta \omega \varsigma \), he steps out of the sphere and 'measure' of man, and approaches the world of senselessness. In other words, \( a\text{i}\delta \omega \varsigma \) is what makes man a human, instead of a lion or a rock.

Then, a question concerning II. 24. 45 arises: How does \( a\text{i}\delta \omega \varsigma \) harm people as well as benefit them? It is not unlikely that this line was borrowed from Hesiod (Works 318), or it was a common proverbial expression.\(^{38}\) It is, however, interesting to find this 'Hesiodic' line in one of the most moralizing passages in Homer. As I stressed in Chapter 5, Homer does present 'Hesiodean' moral sentiment from time to time especially in this sort of context. We have no decisive evidence against such lines as genuinely Homeric.\(^{39}\) If this line is to be read in the extant text, we must try to make sense of it in the context of the extant Homeric corpus rather than by borrowing the context from Hesiod. We


\(^{39}\) It may be also worth noting that Plutarch quotes this line as from Homer (De vitioso pudore 2, 529d) rather than from Hesiod. It might mean that at least in later antiquity the line was better-known as a Homeric line rather than a Hesiodic or an anonymous proverb.
have seen only positive effects of *aiðως* so far, notably provision of hospitality to the needy and honour to a man of *aiðως*. What can be its negative effect? We have mentioned, in passing, two such examples.

*aiðως* is not a useful thing for a beggar (*οὐκ ἄγαθή Od. 17. 347, 352; *κακὸς aiðοίος ἀνήπτυς 578*), because it does not achieve his only aim of life — to survive with whatever sustenance he can get. He must throw away his shame, and step forward to beg. He needs boldness. When boldness is vital for survival — such situations are not only limited to a beggar's life, but also very common in battle, for example — indeed *aiðως* can be harmful.

In another example, in fact observed on two identical occasions, Telemachus asks his host to tell him the truth about his father, however painful it might be, without feeling *aiðως* or *ελέος* towards him (*Od. 3. 96 = 4. 326*):

\[μη ἔηι μι αἰθήμενος μεμελίσσεομηθ᾽ θεαῤῥων\]

Even *aiδως* out of pity and affection is sometimes useless or harmful. If Telemachus remains ignorant of Odysseus' death, if it is the truth, he should continue to suffer in empty hope for ever. The truth might be painful at this particular moment, but will terminate the prolonged pain of Telemachus and his family. When *aiδως* works as a force against the courage to tell necessary truth, it can also do harm to men. If we do read the line in question (*Il. 24. 45*) in its Homeric context, we must read it as referring to *aiδως* against necessary courage.

One last thing to be noted about *aiδως* is that it is always felt in inter-human relationships. *aiδως* is never directly felt towards
deities. Although it often has its ultimate authority in divine
powers and men fear divine anger at an offence against ἥλιον, it is
only pious men who see the gods in the background. The gods
themselves are not depicted as actually demanding αἰδώς. The
feeling, therefore, never comes to men as an imposed, inevitable
fear, but rather arises from awareness of their human existence
in front of another human being as helpless as they themselves
once were or might be sometime in the future. Strong and proud
men tend to lack αἰδώς most, because they do not find people to
fear or respect in terms of their power or wealth, have never
been physically affected by νεμέοις of the public or σὺνιος of the
gods, namely, never been punished by others by force or
experienced a drastic downfall of their fortunes (which every
Homeric man would attribute to divine anger, if not the poet
himself), and therefore do not find it necessary to reserve αἰδώς of
others in case of their own need. αἰδώς is awareness of human
fragility and limitation which is a part of humanity necessary to
confine oneself within one's measure, one's lot. If one ignores its
voice or lacks it completely, one will inevitably arouse νεμέοις in
others, and may eventually in the gods, too.

σέβας

σέβας is awe or fear, sometimes nearly synonymous with
αἰδώς in the Iliad, denoting either one's consciousness of νεμέοις or

40 Even in an apparent exception at II. 9. 508 where Phoenix argues that
one should feel αἰδώς towards the Litai, the person, in this case the
Embassy, who entreats one is the person towards whom αἰδώς should be
directly felt and the goddesses are only the authority in the background.
As with νεμέοις, Homer, unlike Hesiod (Works 200), never deifies αἰδώς.
41 Verdenius (op. cit. p. 60) quotes Wilamowitz, Der Glaube der Hellenen I
356: 'Im Menschen selbst sitzt sie. Kein Gott hat sie gefordert, kein Gott hat
sie gegeben.'
consideration towards the helpless. Iris urges Achilles to protect the body of Patroclus, saying that if he loses it to the Trojans, it is Achilles' disgrace (II. 18. 178-80):

\[
\text{ἄλλη διαμετὰ τοῦ κέντρο τοῦ σέβασθε σε θυμάσθαι}
\]

\[
\text{Πάτροκλος Τροίας καὶ τοῦ μελπμέρα γενέσθαι;}
\]

\[
\text{σοὶ λύβη αἰκέν πῶς νέκας ἁρχυμένος ἐλθῆ}
\]

If the Trojans get hold of his friend's body and feed it to dogs, it is his great cause of shame. Therefore Achilles should feel σέβας and take action, shrinking from such disgrace, even if he has no armour. This is σέβας connected with νέμεσις.

At II. 4. 242, Agamemnon uses the verb σέβομαι in the same way as αἰδέομαι when encouraging the Argives:

\[
\text{Ἀργείου λάμροκε, ἐλεγχέτε, ὡς νόηστε,}
\]

σέβας implied here is the sense of shame (αἰδώς) felt towards the public, the fear of νέμεσις, as the addition of 'ἐλεγχέτες' (you objects of public reproach!) makes it clear.

There is another category of σέβας corresponding to another aspect of αἰδώς — the force that restrains one from harming a person in a weaker position than one and supposed to be under divine protection. When Achilles killed Eëtion, Andromache's father, he duly cremated and buried the king's body complete with his armour, feeling σέβας (II. 6. 417). This σέβας seems to reflect his respect for Eëtion's status and possibly special divine favour the king had enjoyed — as we know from the nymphs' attendance at his funeral (420).

King Proetus, when he hears his wife's false accusation of Bellerophontes that the young man has tried to seduce her, is seized by wrath, but does not dare to kill Bellerophontes because of σέβας (II. 6. 167 σεβάσσατο). This σέβας apparently comes from the
human awareness that bloodshed, by any name, is an act of going beyond one's μοῖρα. Since the king does have a clear intention to kill him anyway (168 σήματα λυγρα), he seems to fear only shedding blood by his own hand.42 It is more like lack of courage, one category of αἰδώς which may harm oneself. And indeed, this attempted murder by somebody else's hand fails.43

In the Odyssey, σεβάς is most often astonishment or admiration. Nestor and Helen are seized by σεβάς as they look at Telemachus looking so much like his father (Od. 3. 123, 4. 142). This σεβάς is simply amazement. Odysseus is seized by σεβάς, amazement and admiration, when he watches the dance of the Phaeacian youth (Od. 8. 384). The σεβάς that Telemachus feels towards the palace of Menelaus is probably of the same sort (Od. 4. 75), great admiration, but possibly with some reverence as if towards something divine, because he wonders if the palace of Zeus is just like this.

This factor is more clearly observed in the σεβάς which Odysseus feels towards Nausicaa in their first meeting. He suspects she might be a goddess or a nymph. Artemis, perhaps? Therefore his σεβάς towards her stature (Od. 6. 161) has a sense of reverence as well as admiration. He goes on praising her appearance comparing her to a young palm tree which he once saw in Delphi, and augments the description of his feeling of awe which prevents him from touching her knees, with verbs ἀγαματι,

42 It is also possible, though less likely considering religious overtones σεβάς sometimes take, that this σεβάς only means fear of the man himself and his strength.
43 Is it not this kind of αἰδώς/σεβάς felt towards direct bloodshed in spite of the intention to kill what made the parents of Oedipus expose him and let him survive to cause disaster both to them and to himself (cf. Od. 11. 271-4)? αἰδώς; indeed, helps some and destroys others.
τεθνα and δελδια (168). This kind of religious 'awe' is never expressed with the word αιδως. This is a feeling which restrains man from approaching something divine, whereas αιδως is always felt towards human beings.

σεβας can function as a restraining force from cruelty or bold actions, like αιδως. The true difference between the two rests in that σεβας alone has the meaning of reverence towards something wonderful, most notably divinities. αιδως endows a person with modesty, pity and thoughtfulness, but not religious piety as such. While lack of αιδως is severely criticized, possession of αιδως is less often praised as the sign of good moral quality.

ελεος

The forces we have seen so far are all based, ultimately, on some sort of fear (δεος) of somebody stronger than oneself or at least capable of imposing sanctions on oneself, whether they are the gods, the public, or individuals. ελεος, on the contrary, has no powerful authority behind it. It is an emotion which spontaneously arises from one's heart, without any compulsion by external forces. It is always directed towards someone in a weaker or less fortunate position than oneself. In that sense, one has a choice whether or not to feel ελεος towards the person and act accordingly. Even if one does not pity anybody, there is no danger of retaliation from any quarter. On the other hand, because of such a situation over which one has the full control, it is the utmost hallmark of one's moral quality — whether one is capable of restraining selfish desire or passion and staying within 'one's lot.'
ελεος tends to be felt towards a person in an extreme want, like the wanderer-Odysseus, whose call for ελεος (Od. 6. 175) Nausicaa readily accepts, and whom Eumaeus entertains because of his awe of Zeus Xenios and because of his pity for the man himself (Od. 14. 389). Even most of the arrogant suitors pity the 'beggar' Odysseus and generously give him portions of food at his first appearance (Od. 17. 367). Penelope, too, entertains the 'beggar' out of pity (Od. 19. 253) until she is told that he once was a host of her husband which adds αἰδως and φιλοτης to her feeling towards the man. Diners at a banquet may pity an orphan and give him some food, though not necessarily generously (Il. 22. 494). Old men also are likely to attract ελεος because of their physical weakness (Il. 10. 176, 22. 419).

ελεος is felt when someone close dies. One feels ελεος towards one's fallen friends and comrades (Il. 5. 561, 610, 17. 346, 352, 23. 110, Od. 11. 55) or dead family members (Od. 11. 87). The sorrow of the bereaved also evokes ελεος in others. Hector's wife and parents all try to stop him from risking his life, by asking him to pity them for their sorrow and hardship resulting from his death (Il. 6. 431, 22. 59, 82). A widow's lament for her husband (Od. 8. 530) and Priam's lament for Hector (Il. 22. 408) are pitiable. Hector pities his wife as he imagines her sorrow and hardship after his death (Il. 6. 484). Priam's desperate plea to Hector not to engage in the suicidal encounter with Achilles is also described as pitiable (Il. 22. 37).

Weeping in general evokes ελεος. One may pity and spare an enemy supplicating in tears (Od. 14. 279-80). Odysseus weeps as pitiable as a widow as he listens to Demodocus' song of Troy (Od. 8. 531), remembering his own sufferings. Tears that
Odysseus and Telemachus mingle after the son has recognized his father are, no doubt, tears of joy mixed with long-suffered sorrow, but the sight of the two weeping would be pitiable (Od. 16. 219). Even the cries of sparrow chicks being attacked by a bird of prey (Il. 2. 314) sound pitiable to human sensitivity.

The gods also have the sense of pity. Zeus pities the Trojans, especially Hector (Il. 15. 12), or the Lycians, especially his son Sarpedon (Il. 16. 431), when they are in danger. He pities the horses of Achilles (Il. 17. 441), the Myrmidons, and especially Achilles (Il. 19. 340) when they lament Patroclus. He also pities Priam who has lost his son Hector and tries to ransom his son's body. Out of pity, the god sends him a messenger (Il. 24. 174) and an auspicious sign (301) to encourage him, sends an escort (332) to assist him and makes him 'φιλόσ' and 'ἐλενος' for Achilles (309). The gods, except Hera, Athena and Poseidon, pity the maltreated body of Hector (Il. 24. 23), especially Apollo (19) who protects it from decay. Apollo, ever sympathetic towards the Trojans, criticizes Athena for not pitying them at all (Il. 7. 27). Hera (II. 8. 350) and Poseidon (II. 13. 15, 15. 44), on the other hand, pity the Achaeans in trouble.

Despite the anger of Poseidon, all other gods start pitying Odysseus for his long detention away from home in his final year of wanderings (Od. 1. 19). From then on, Odysseus overcomes all difficulties thanks to the ἐλεος of many deities — even Circe, who has tried to ensnare Odysseus and his companions, pities them crying in the joy of rescue and reunion, and offers them

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44 Those who argue that Patroclus' death and the sorrow for it have been intended by Zeus as the punishment of Achilles will have difficulty in explaining the god's 'pity'. Why does Zeus try to ease Achilles' suffering if it is punishment?
entertainment and rehabilitation from their long journey (Od. 10. 399), Calypso helps his homecoming with her pity-knowing heart (Od. 5. 191 ἐλεημον), Leucothea helps him out of pity (Od. 5. 336), and finally an anonymous river-god responding to his appeal for αἰθωσ and ἔλεος, delivers him into safety (Od. 5. 447, 450). At his home, Athena pities Penelope's lament for her husband and sends a dream to encourage her (Od. 4. 828).

Although the gods always take sides and represent the interests of different groups of men (or gods), the gods as a whole, especially their head Zeus, ultimately cover all sides with their sense of pity. Therefore man has fair hope that there may be some gods who pity him if properly requested. This hope makes man believe that prayer is worthwhile.

The gods, of course, do not pity or help men 'beyond μοῖρα'. This is one thing about their morality. Athena does not pity the Trojan women praying for her pity offering a present (Il. 6. 94, 275, 309), because it is μοῖρα for Troy to fall. We know that Poseidon would not pity the Phaeacians for their offerings, because their punishment is fated (Od. 13. 182). The Achaeans pray to Zeus to pity them and help them persuade Achilles (Il. 9. 172), but he does not, because it is his βουλή to honour Achilles through their suffering and probably to prepare a chain reaction of deaths of three heroes, Patroclus, Hector and Achilles. Zeus does pity his son Sarpedon, but does not save him against his fate (Il. 16. 431ff).

The gods do know pity and may yield to human request — this is the basis of the Homeric religion. Since man has no power to threaten or force the gods to do anything for him, the best he can do is to pray to the gods, offering τιμή and appealing through
his own helplessness to their sense of pity. Of course, they may not be moved by offerings and may not help him even if they pity him, if destiny is set otherwise. ελεος of the gods may not be enough, but it is essential.

The situation is not very different when one's fortune rests on some mortals stronger than oneself, in so far as ελεος is essential but not guaranteed. Odysseus fails to make the Cyclops pity him and his companions (Od. 9. 349, 23. 313), because the giant's heart is νηλεης (Od. 9. 272, 287, 368). Tros (Il. 20. 465) and Lycaon (Il. 21. 74) also fail to make Achilles pity them, because he is so enraged at Patroclus' death (Il. 21. 100-105). Priam and his driver are in constant danger in their enemy's camp. Their life depends on the ελεος of a passer-by (Hermes disguised Il. 24. 357) and that of Achilles (Il. 22. 419, 24. 503-4) who might not have pitied Priam as Hecuba had suspected (Il. 24. 207) without divine intervention. Odysseus accepts Phemius' plea for mercy (Od. 22. 344), but not that of Leodes (312) for whom, not being under divine protection of any sort, Odysseus' ελεος would have been the only hope for survival. But does ελεος have no power behind it to enforce individuals to be merciful — as in the case of αιδως? Is ελεος totally a private matter which makes no difference to our life whether we hold it towards others or not?

It is not necessarily the case. Although it does not have divine guarantee, extreme lack of ελεος is commonly met by criticism and indignation, in other words, νεμεις. Achilles is repeatedly criticized for not pitying the Achaeans by refusing to fight for them. Phoenix advises him not to make his heart νηλεης (Il. 9. 497). Ajax accuses him of being νηλης (Il. 9. 632). Nestor accuses him of not having any pity for the heavy casualties of the
Achaeans (*II.* 11. 665). His companions' criticisms are more severe. Patroclus says that, since Achilles is so pitiless, his parents must be the sea and a rock, instead of a goddess and a hero (*II.* 16. 33-5). The Myrmidons do not go that far, but they say his mother must have nursed him with gall (*χολος* *II.* 16. 203-4). In the eye of the dying Hector, Achilles' heart is 'iron-made' (*II.* 22. 357). As these examples show, he is viewed as being inhuman, stepping out of his measure as a human being.

Although ελεος — as αλως — is an emotion and a private matter which the public can do nothing about, it is considered an essential element of humanity. Like human characters, pro-Trojan gods are also angry at Achilles' lack of pity. Scamander is angry at his merciless killing of Trojan youths (*II.* 21. 146-7). But his attack on Achilles is countered by Hera, ironically because of Achilles' prayer for the gods' pity (*II.* 21. 273). Apollo complains about Achilles' inhuman, lion-like heart, without ελεος or αλως (*II.* 24. 44), but that is countered by Hera (56-63), again. As the river-god complains that the gods always stand by Achilles whatever he does, he is immune to divine anger as far as his lack of pity is concerned.

As Achilles does at *II.* 21, 273, man can accuse the gods for lacking ελεος when he thinks that they are not fair on him. Philoetius complains to Zeus for his apparent lack of pity for his master Odysseus (*Od.* 20. 202). In fact, all the gods including Zeus, except Poseidon, pity Odysseus (*Od.* 1. 19), but it seems that it would have been a legitimate appeal, had they indeed not cared for him.

Interestingly, greedy consumption of food and drink in somebody else's home is also classified as 'lack of ελεος' as well as
lack of αἰθωσ. Eumaeus describes the suitors’ daily feast and criticizes them as (Od. 14. 82):

οὐκ ὀπίσθα φρονέωτες εἰς φρεσὺν οὐδ’ ἐλεητῶ.

Since ἁπί is primarily the gods’ anger, this can be interpreted as 'not fearing gods nor pitying their host.' Similarly, though out of an ignoble motivation, Antinous reproaches other suitors for giving away ruthlessly what belongs to the host to a beggar (οὐδ’ ἐλεητὺς Od. 17. 451-2). Being considerate in using other people’s property is conceived as a sort of ἐλεος in the Homeric language. And this ἐλεος is what the suitors consistently ignore. Their lack of ἐλεος may not be the only reason for Odysseus’ vengeance, but one thing is clear — those who do not know αἰθωσ or ἐλεος do not deserve it themselves. Odysseus does not feel obliged to have αἰθωσ nor ἐλεος towards the suitors in the last moment, the only forces which might have hindered him from killing them.

A man lacking pity, like one lacking αἰθωσ, steps into the non-human, inanimate world. The day of death is νηλεης ἦμαρ (Il. 11. 484, 588, 13. 514, 15. 375, 17. 511, 615, 21. 57, Od. 8. 525, 9. 17). The cutting edge of bronze, which sheds blood without feeling anything is νηλεης χαλκός (Il. 3. 292, 4. 348, 5. 330, 12. 427, 13. 501, 553, 16. 345, 561, 761, 17. 376, 19. 266, Od. 4. 743, 8. 507, 10. 532, 11. 45, 14. 418, 18. 86, 21. 300, 22. 475). A tight bond is νηλεης δεσμός (Il. 10. 443). The horror of the Cyclops is in his νηλεης θυμός (Od. 9. 272, 287, 368) which is as indifferent to human pains as death or weapons. Also as indifferent to

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45 If you think this use of ἐλεος is strange, imagine a visitor to your house who borrows your telephone, calls somebody on the other side of the earth, and talks on and on cheerfully. Is he not incapable of feeling for you?

46 Contrast the Beggar-Odysseus’ consideration towards his host Eumaeus (Od. 15. 309).

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Odysseus' suffering is his 'cruel' sleep (νηλέτ ofday Od. 12. 372) which leads him and his companions to a disaster. Human mind should not lack ἔλεος, not because there will be divine punishment (which is not guaranteed anywhere), but because it is part of human nature. If man lacks it, he will be 'beyond his lot'.

However, there are times when one has to suppress one's ἔλεος. When Telemachus has to know the truth, however sad it could be, Nestor and Menelaus should tell it to him without hiding anything out of αἰσθήσεις or ἔλεος (Od. 3. 96, 4. 326). When the official mourning period is over, one should bury the body of the deceased with a hardened heart (II. 19. 229 νηλέεις θυσίαν). The disguised Odysseus pities his wife weeping for him without knowing that he is right in front of her, but he cannot show his emotion until the revenge on the suitors has been completed (Od. 19. 210). And most sadly, Hector must suppress his pity for Andromache (II. 6. 484) and his parents. He cannot yield to Andromache's plea to pity her and Astyanax (II. 6. 407, 431) or listen to his parents' pitiful pleas to pity them (II. 22. 59, 82) and to stay in safety, because he is the foremost warrior in charge of defending his country. If he does not fulfil his role, he will be met by νέμεσις of people towards which he feels αἰσθήσεις (II. 6. 442, 22. 105). ἔλεος must be suppressed when working against θέμις, αἰσθήσεις and νέμεσις. It is, on the other hand, the truest voice of our mind. Therefore, when it works with θέμις, αἰσθήσεις and νέμεσις, like when one receives a stranger as one's guest, it gives sincerity, warmth and love to one's every step, which is a happy fulfilment of humanity.

One can be just and honourable without ἔλεος, or sometimes one must do without ἔλεος in order to be just and honourable, but
when doing so, the human mind is uneasy. Achilles does not
offend against divine law, but only defends his right and honour
when refusing to fight for the Achaeans. However, by doing so,
he is unhappy and uneasy, even before he loses Patroclus. 47
Hector dies a glorious death by the hand of Achilles, but his glory
is empty because he could not pity and protect his family (Il. 6.
444-65). 48 For the lack of ελεος, no divine punishment is
necessary, because the human mind, when suppressing ελεος,
punishes itself by unhappiness. The greatest unhappiness of all,
though, is that, if one ignores the voice of ελεος inside, one is
denied the ελεος of others when it is most needed, a fact that the
suitors of Penelope do not learn until too late. 49

Conclusion

The behaviour of Homeric man is controlled by an
assortment of forces both external and internal, rational and
emotional. Awe of the gods and fear of retaliation and criticism
from men seem to work most strongly, but they are often
combined with some other forces. When Eumaeus receives a

47 For the signs of Achilles' uneasiness — or that he 'feels bad', see J. A.
48 cf. J. Griffin op. cit. p. 102: 'The Homeric hero is anxious for glory, and
he faces the full horrors of death. But as there is no posthumous reward
for the brave man in the other world, so the consolation of glory is a chilly
one.' 'These terrible events produce glory, but we are not dealing with
heroes for whom that is an adequate reward.'
49 Hesiod, who is obsessed by the justice of the gods and their punishment,
ever talks about ελεος. In his extant corpus, there is only one example of
the use of a cognate word of Ελεος, namely Ελεον at Works 205, used in the
sense of 'pitiable' for a nightingale caught by a hawk. His moral world sits
entirely on δίκη, θέμις, νέμεις and αίθως and is completely void of ελεος. The
poet does not preach to his brother with the doctrine of Ελεος. His Zeus does
not know ελεος. Is this perhaps a sign of the poet's more 'advanced' sense
of justice and morality? See the remark of E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the
Irrational, p. 35, that in later Greek literature 'there was little room for
pity in either [gods or men]. That was not so in the Iliad.'
beggar as his guest, he does so in awe of Zeus Xeinios, but also out of pity. When Telemachus refrains from sending her mother away, fear of divine punishment, fear of public opinion and his own respect for his mother join forces. \(\alpha i\delta \omega s\) mixed with \(\epsilon \lambda e o s\) often generates \(\phi i\lambda \sigma \tau \eta s\) and warm human relationships. When man lacks \(\alpha i\delta \omega s\) and \(\epsilon \lambda e o s\), however, even if he is successful in social terms he is not happy deep inside.

Man's behaviour is seldom controlled by a simple motivation. Different shades of mixture of fear and love are ever present. The combinations of \(\delta \epsilon o s\) and \(\alpha i\delta \omega s\), \(\nu \epsilon \mu e s i s\) and \(\alpha i\delta \omega s\), \(\alpha i\delta \omega s\) and \(\epsilon \lambda e o s\), \(\alpha i\delta \omega s\) and \(\phi i\lambda \sigma \tau \eta s\) etc. are very commonly used to express various feelings. Roughly speaking, fear is felt towards hostile (or potentially hostile) men (or gods) and love is felt towards friendly (or potentially friendly) men (but not gods). However, \(\epsilon \lambda e o s\) goes beyond the boundary of enemies and of men and gods. It is widely believed that the Greek virtue is to help friends and harm enemies, and we saw its reflection in the last chapter dealing with \(\tau i m \eta\). However, as Book 24 of the \textit{Iliad} most eloquently tells us, \(\epsilon \lambda e o s\), pity and sympathy, the force that moves the gods, joins all humans together and can override hostility, is an essential part of humanity in the Homeric world. All 'good' characters in the epics possess this quality, and it is through his \(\epsilon \lambda e o s\) towards Priam, his enemy, that Achilles, who has been continuously criticized for lack of \(\epsilon \lambda e o s\) in the rest of the epic, wins his greatest \(\kappa \delta o s\) (\textit{Il.} 24. 110).

\(\epsilon \lambda e o s\) wins man eternal glory — perhaps Penelope summarizes this moral sentiment in this passage (\textit{Od.} 19. 328-34):

\[\ldots \delta \varphi r o w t a o \mu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \n
Unfeeling, harsh (\textit{d}π\textit{η}ν\textit{ης}) men are hated, and ones who have been nice to everyone (\textit{d}μ\textit{υ}μ\textit{ω}ν lit. 'not to be blamed by anybody') are praised for ever. This is the definition of \textit{κλε'ος} and \textit{ε'σθλος} in the 'morality of peace'. 
Chapter 10  Good and bad

So far we have described what is good and what is bad in Homeric society in an indirect way through examining what sort of conduct is criticized or praised. In this chapter, we will examine the words denoting 'good' (δαρμός, εσθολός, etc.) and 'bad' (κακός etc.) themselves to see what sort of conduct, persons or objects are considered 'good' or 'bad'. Our chief interest will be to see if the image of the 'good' person we have built so far— e. g. one who knows δίκη, behaves within one's μοίρα, fears divine anger and νέμεσις of people, and has αίδως and ἐλεός — will match the image of δαρμός/εσθολός.

The etymology of neither δαρμός nor εσθολός is known, but they are almost exact synonyms by use. The former has δμείνων and δρείων as its comparative forms, δριοτός as its superlative form, and δρετή as the noun corresponding to it. Since εσθολός has no corresponding noun and its comparative or superlative forms are not used in Homer, we may consider δαρμός and εσθολός to share comparative and superlative forms and δρετή to be the corresponding noun. It was once speculated that the root δρ- in δρετή, δρείων and δριστός might be related to δινήθος which would make an interesting parallel case with vir-virtus in Latin in which manliness is the original concept of goodness, this hypothesis is now rejected.1

1 E. Boisacq, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue gréque4, δρέακω.
Whatever the etymology might be, the basic meaning of ἄγαθος seems to have much in common with English 'good'. Therefore a man classified as ἄγαθος is expected to be good in some way. However, just as a gentle-man may not always be gentle, there is some split between a man called ἄγαθος and his quality as we will see in the following.


dπετη

dπετη means all sorts of 'goodness', but its most prominent usage is as a warrior's competence in war. It is used for the prowess of the Danaans (II. 11. 90), Achilles (II. 11. 763), Hector (II. 22. 268), Diomedes (II. 8. 535), Meliones (II. 13. 275), Oeneus (II. 14. 118), Periphetes (II. 15. 642), Odysseus (Od. 4. 725, 815, 8. 237, 239, 12. 211, 18. 205), Odysseus and Telemachus (Od. 24. 515) and the suitors of Penelope (Antinous and Eurymachus Od. 4. 629, 21. 187; others 22. 244). Prowess mainly consists of physical strength (βενη), and therefore can be increased by joining that of two persons together (II. 13. 237), but may be augmented also with wise counsel (βουλη) and tact (νόος), as in the case of Odysseus (Od. 12. 211) and Periphetes (II. 15. 642; πόδες, μάξεσθαι, νόος are three aspects in which he claims his dπετη). Old Nestor's dπετη, of course, largely depends on his βουλη.2 The fact that ambush is considered to reveal the best of dπετη (II. 13. 277) also seems to indicate that dπετη does not consist merely of physical strength but also of courage, patience, and foresight (cf. the night

2 For the importance of competence in council as part of prowess, see M. Schofield, 'Euboulia in the Iliad' in CQ 36 (1986) 6-31.
raid of Odysseus and Diomedes in *Iliad* 10 and the courage of Odysseus and Neoptolemus in the Wooden Horse described at *Od.* 4. 271-88 and 11. 523-32).

*dpert* changes according to a man's physical and mental conditions and, above all, to divine favour (*II.* 20. 242, *Od.* 18. 133). *dpert* is not something automatically inherited from a noble father by his son, but is granted to individuals by the gods (*II.* 1. 290). However, even if one was born with *dpert*, one cannot retain it satisfactorily when divine favour is on one's enemy's side or, naturally, in one's old age as we know well from Nestor's constant complaint (e. g. *II.* 23. 627-45).

The same is true with *dpert* as competence in specific skills. Competence in chariot riding (*II.* 23. 374, 571) rests on horses' natural strength and the charioteer's skill (*II.* 23. 319-25), but even the combination of the best skill and the best horses does not bring victory to Eumelus who is regarded as 'weperos' (*II.* 23. 536), because he lacks divine favour (23. 391-3). On the contrary, Diomedes survives an accident caused by Apollo and wins the race because of Athena's help (23. 388-400). *dpert* in running (*II.* 20. 411) is also seen to be affected by divine interference in the foot-race (23. 770-4).

*dpert* is a source of prosperity. In one of his false stories, Odysseus describes how he, as a bastard son of a rich man, was left with little property after his father's death but managed to marry a wealthy woman because of his *dpert* (*Od.* 14. 208-13). The content of his (i.e. of the man who Odysseus pretends to be) *dpert* is worth attention. He was not useless (*dpofolis* 212) nor cowardly (*phugopptolimos* lit. battle-fleeing 213) which alone
suggests his *dperér* as being prowess in battle. He elaborates the description of his character as follows (216-27):

> ἤμεν θάρσος μοι Ἀρης δ’ ἔδωκαν καὶ Ἀθήνη
> καὶ ἡξημαρχίαν ὅποτε κρώνουμι λόγουνε
> ἄνδρας φροντίδας, κακὰ διαμενέσσα φυτεύων,
> οὔ ποτὲ μοι θάνατον προπόδαστε θυμὸς φημὴν.
> ἄλλα πολὺ πρῶτιστος ἐπτάλημεν εὐχές ἔλεεκον
> ἄνδρας διαμενένων δ’ εἰς με εἶχες πάθεσιν.”
> τόδε εἰ ἐν πολέμῳ ἔργον ἐν μοι οὐφιλον ἔσχεν
> οἴδα οἰκωφελής ἂν τε φέρει αὐλαί τέκνα,
> ἄλλα μοι αἰεὶ νής ἐπηρετῆς φιλαί ἠραν
> καὶ πόλεμω καὶ ἰκονεῖς ἐξήστοι καὶ ἁστολ.
> λυχρὰ τά τ’ ἀλλουσίον γε κατακρηγῶν πελούται.
> αὐτὰρ ἐμοὶ τά χίλ. ἔσχε τα ποιο θεὸς ἐν φρεσκ θήκεν

It is a very clear illustration of what a warrior’s *dperér* is like. He does not engage in any productive or constructive labour. In an economic sense, he is completely useless. He engages only in adventure and piracy, and by the wealth gained in this manner, he becomes *deinos* and *aídos* in his homeland (*Od. 14. 234*). This story illustrates another aspect of such *dperér*. However strong one might be, the gods can change one’s fortune (300ff) and one can fall into misery. This idea is repeated later in Odysseus’ warning to Amphinomus with a strong moral message (18. 130-42). No creature is more fragile than man, because:

> οὔμεν γάρ ποτὲ φήσι κακῶν πελεσθαι ἀπόσιω
> ὃς *dperér* παρέχωσι θεοὶ καὶ γονώτ’ φαιρή
> ἄλλ’ ὅτε δὴ καὶ λυχρὰ θεοὶ μάκαρες τελέσσαι,
> καὶ τὰ φέρει δεκαζόμενος τετλητῆ θυμὸ(132-5).
Clearly, *dpēτη* is conceived as the basis of well-being which the gods can give or take away at their will. Therefore, one must not be wanton (*dθεμίστιος*), but must modestly enjoy good fortune while it is there (141-2).

The *dpēτη* of the Phaeacians is not warlike. It consists of the swiftness of feet (which is more of use in dancing than in battle in their case cf. *Od.* 8. 372-84) and skill in seafaring (*Od.* 8. 244, 247). However, they lose Poseidon's favour in the end because they injured Poseidon's *τιμή* unknowingly (13. 128-30, 143-4), and that seems to terminate their *dpēτη* as the basis of their prosperity which Odysseus before his departure wishes to last for a long time for them (13. 45). This episode formally follows the pattern of Odysseus' moral lecture above, that those who exulted in *dpēτη* could be subdued by the gods, but Poseidon's motivation for changing the fortune of the Phaeacians is not related to their moral behaviour viewed in the human context. The only thing we can be sure about is that the gods change man's *dpēτη* at will by their own logic which is inscrutable to mortals.

*dpēτη* as goodness-usefulness in any field changes according to one's fortune. In slavery, men have only a half of their natural *dpēτη* i.e. efficiency, because they do not work voluntarily (*Od.* 17. 322-3). Penelope says that her feminine *dpēτη* — chiefly beauty — (*Od.* 18. 251, 19. 124) is lost ever since Odysseus left, despite the presence of so many suitors who acknowledge it (*Od.* 2. 206). If it is not enjoyed by her husband whom it is meant for, her beauty is of no use, and therefore her usefulness, *dpēτη*, as a woman — to please her husband — is lost. She also means that her beauty has been eroded by too much sorrow. Menelaus' *dpēτη* which makes
him superior to Antilochus (II. 23. 578) is superiority by birth granted by the gods. \( \sigma \rho \epsilon \tau \eta \) is always subject to the gods' discretion.

The gods, whose \( \tau \iota \mu \eta \) is perpetual, alone have unchangeable \( \sigma \rho \epsilon \tau \eta \) and \( \beta \iota \eta \) — strength and superiority (II. 9. 498). The horses of Achilles are without equal in \( \sigma \rho \epsilon \tau \eta \) (II. 23. 276) which will never weaken because they are immortal. One has to be either divine oneself, or to be under divine protection to keep one's \( \sigma \rho \epsilon \tau \eta \).

There is, however, another category of human \( \sigma \rho \epsilon \tau \eta \) which lasts forever. It is Penelope's \( \sigma \rho \epsilon \tau \eta \) i. e. chastity (Od. 24. 193, 197) which will be remembered by generations of men through songs. It is the \( \sigma \rho \epsilon \tau \eta \) of Eumaeus (Od. 14. 402) providing generous hospitality to his master in disguise which will win him fame (\( \epsilon \upsilon \kappa \lambda \epsilon \iota \iota \eta \)). Winning fame by abiding by \( \theta \epsilon \mu \iota \varsigma \) and \( \delta \iota \kappa \eta \) is another path to the eternal \( \sigma \rho \epsilon \tau \eta \).

The eternal glory of \( \sigma \rho \epsilon \tau \eta \), either that of prowess or of cooperative virtues, is the substitute for immortality in the Homeric world. The agony of Homeric man, however, lies in the fact that one cannot guarantee divine favour (which is essential for keeping one's \( \sigma \rho \epsilon \tau \eta \)) only by behaving within one's lot, i. e. performing one's duties and not taking more than one's due share both in war and in peace. The gods may or may not appreciate one's good behaviour, like the Phaeacians' hospitality which turns into their ruin in the end, while the gods often overlook outrage committed by their favourite humans. The lack of cause-and-effect connection between moral goodness and \( \sigma \rho \epsilon \tau \eta \) as the result of divine favour creates internal tension of the word \( \sigma \rho \epsilon \tau \eta \) and related terms, because one can be anti-social i. e. bad for the
society and can still be a man of $d\gamma\theta\delta\zeta$ i.e. a man of a high status and prowess. This tension seems to reflect, to some extent, the split between morality in war and that in peace which acknowledge different qualities as 'excellence', and also the morality of the gods which does not always appear to be 'moral' to human eyes. In other words, the gods cannot be the measure for the moral virtue recognized among men.

$d\gamma\theta\delta\zeta$

$d\gamma\theta\delta\zeta$ applied to persons

Those described as '$d\gamma\theta\delta\zeta$' in Homer are mostly wealthy princes and noblemen who are excellent warriors in battle. Achilles (II. 1. 131, 19. 155, 21. 280, 24. 53), Agamemnon (II. 1. 275, cf. 3. 179), Menelaus (II. 4. 181), Diomedes (II. 10. 559), Tydeus (II. 14. 113), Peleus (II. 21. 109), Hector (II. 21. 280), Nestor (II. 23. 608), an opponent of Paris called Euchenor (II. 13. 664), his father called Polyidus (II. 13. 666), an opponent of Menelaus called Podes (II. 17. 576), and King Alcinous' son called Laodamas (Od. 8. 130, 143) are all classified as '$d\gamma\theta\delta\zeta$' with no qualification, not preceded by any particular deeds or characters to be commended, except that Euchenor and Podes are '$d\phi\nu\epsilon\iota\delta\zeta$' and Agamemnon is 'βασιλεύς' as well as '$d\gamma\theta\delta\zeta$' (II. 3. 179) and that Diomedes is described as $d\gamma\theta\delta\zeta$ when killing enemies of high rank ($d\nu\alpha\xi$ II. 10. 559 and $d\pi\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\omicron$ 560). In fact, Achilles is called $d\gamma\theta\delta\zeta$ most often in speeches criticizing him (II. 1. 131, 19. 155, 24. 53). This seems to suggest that the word $d\gamma\theta\delta\zeta$ in describing heroes has lost its power of commendation, somewhat like 'gentle' in the word 'gentleman', and come to be used as a word to register a
person in the ruling class which is wealthy and influential enough to mobilize hundreds or even thousands of people for military defence or expeditions like the Trojan war, if necessary. This interpretation of $\delta \gamma \alpha \theta \sigma s$ as the label for a social class is further confirmed by the use of '$\delta \gamma \alpha \theta \eta$' for a woman. To be $\delta \gamma \alpha \theta \eta$ seems to be almost the same as to be 'a wealthy man's daughter' ($O d$. 18. 276). It also corresponds to the statement by Odysseus in the disguise of a beggar that '$\chi \varepsilon \rho \eta \varepsilon s$' do all sorts of humble jobs for '$\delta \gamma \alpha \theta \sigma i$' ($O d$. 15. 324). Penelope defends the beggar-Odysseus from the resentment of the suitors caused by his wish to try the bow, by saying, '$\pi \alpha \tau \rho \delta s \delta \varepsilon \xi \delta \gamma \alpha \theta \sigma \rho \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon s \varepsilon \delta \chi \varepsilon \tau \tau \iota \varepsilon \iota \mu \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon \iota \alpha \upsilon \delta s$' ($O d$. 21. 335). It is particularly clear here that '$\delta \gamma \alpha \theta \sigma s$' suggests nothing but noble birth.

However, in principle, $\delta \gamma \alpha \theta \sigma s$ is expected to be $\delta \gamma \alpha \theta \sigma s$ in its literal sense, i.e. a man who possesses $\delta \rho \varepsilon \tau \iota \iota$, and in most cases $\delta \gamma \alpha \theta \sigma i$ are indeed men of prowess. It is also true in the Olympian world where Zeus is $\delta \gamma \alpha \theta \sigma s$ ($I l$. 15. 185) among all his brothers and sisters because he is strongest. Heroes' prowess is illustrated in many examples of the usage of $\delta \gamma \alpha \theta \sigma s$ with modifying terms.

Menelaus ($I l$. 2. 408, 586, 3. 96, 4. 220, 6. 37, 10. 36, 60, 13. 581, 593, 17. 237, 246, 560, 651, 656, 665, $O d$. 3. 311, 4. 307, 609, 15. 14, 57, 67, 92, 97, 17. 120), Diomedes ($I l$. 2. 563, 567, 5. 114, 320, 347, 432, 596, 855, 6. 12, 122, 212, 7. 399, 8. 91, 145, 9. 31, 696, 10. 219, 241, 283, 11. 345, 14. 109), Ajax ($I l$. 15. 249, 17. 102), Hector ($I l$. 13. 123, 15. 671), and a son of Priam called

Polites (II. 24. 250) are 'βοήν δύαθος'. Teucer is 'δύαθος ἐν σταδίην ύπερινη' (as well as 'ἀριστος Ἀχαίων τοξοσύνη' II. 13. 313-4) and Polydeuces is 'ποξ δύαθος' (II. 3. 237, Od. 11. 300). Hector wishes that his son may one day become 'βιήν δύαθος' (II. 6. 478) as himself. Patroclus, though not a princely leader, is 'δύαθος θεράπων' of Achilles (II. 16. 165, 17. 388) by his valour which is by no means inferior to that of other kingly δύαθοι.

As we have already seen, an ambush is believed to reveal who is really a man of δρετή, i. e. a true 'δύαθος' (II. 13. 284). When Poseidon says in the disguise of Thoas that Idomeneus and he know how to face 'δύαθοι' (II. 13. 238) or when Odysseus says that Eurymachus considers himself a great man because he has never met 'δύαθοι' (Od. 18. 383), they talk about δύαθοι as valorous warriors. Achilles would be happier killed by Hector than drowned in a river, because if Hector kills him, both the victor and the victim are δύαθοι (II. 21. 280), and he will die a glorious death at least.

As we saw above, however, δρετή is never a permanent quality. When divine favour is not on one's side, one, either a brave man or a coward, is equally useless (II. 17. 631-2). Therefore, Odysseus prays to Athena to be his 'δύαθη ἐπίρροθος' (II. 23. 770). This δύαθη should mean both 'mighty' herself and 'effective' in making him mighty. In the case of Podaleirius and Machaon who are called 'ιπτηρόν δύαθω' (II. 2. 732), however, it is more natural to think that they are called so because they are
'good doctors' than because they are 'valorous doctors' or 'noble doctors' even though they might well be so.

All the examples of ἄγαθος above imply, eventually, some sort of usefulness, most often in battle. The only exception to be pointed out is a statement of Achilles that any man who is ἄγαθος and ἔχεφρων will love his wife (Il. 9. 341). It is probably right to take this ἄγαθος as the label of a noble man, since no man of a humble status is described as ἄγαθος anywhere in Homer, but the emphasis is not on the prowess or status of ἄγαθος, but on his way of life, perhaps rather similar to the gentleness we would expect from a 'gentleman'. As we saw in the last chapter (see the section 'αἰδώς') women deserve respect by convention, namely θεμίσ and δίκη, and abiding by this rule is naturally part of behaving as ἄγαθος.

ἄγαθος applied to objects and conduct

By and large, objects or conduct are ἄγαθος when they are useful, profitable and/or satisfactory to the party affected by them and, unlike the case of persons, can be safely rendered as 'good' in English: good life (Od. 15. 491), good meat (Od. 14. 441), good hospitality (Od. 24. 286), good feast (Il. 23. 810, Od. 15. 507), good news (in negative as 'bad news' Il. 9. 627), good care (κομιδή Od. 24. 249), and so on. Ithaca is good as 'κούρωτος' (Od. 9. 27) and as 'αἰγύπτιος καὶ βουβάτος' (Od. 13. 246). Eumaeus' homeland Syrus is good as 'εὐβοτος εὔμηλος, όλυππυρός' (Od. 15. 405-6).
It is good to stop fighting at the fall of night (*Il*. 7. 293), to make love (*Il*. 24. 130-1), to make offerings to the gods (because they are rewarded and useful *Il*. 24. 425-6), to leave a son to revenge one's own death (*Od*. 3. 196). It is not good, practical or efficient, to have many rulers (*Il*. 2. 204), and *alδwς* is not good for a beggar (*Od*. 17. 347, 352). A friend's persuasion is good i.e. effective (*Il*. 11. 793, 15. 404). "Good intention" or 'good outcome' is rendered as *dγaθόυ* or *dγaθά*, which mean 'good' in the sense that they are beneficial to the one affected by the outcome of the conduct, as in 'εἴς *dγaθόυ* (*Il*. 9. 102, 11. 789) or 'dγaθά *φρονέων* (*Il*. 23. 305, 24. 173, *Od*. 1. 43). In the expression *dγaθά* ῥέζεσκον, too, *dγaθά* is good for the one who is affected by this conduct. (*Od*. 22. 209)

The gods give men both good and bad fortune, 'dγaθόυ *τε κακόν τέ' (Zeus at *Od*. 4. 237, the Muses at *Od*. 8. 63; 'May Zeus give *dγaθόν*.' *Od*. 2. 34). Proetus foretells both good and bad fortune for Menelaus (*κακόν τ' *dγaθόν τε* *Od*. 4. 392). In these examples, too, 'd'γaθόν' or 'κακόν' are good or bad from the viewpoint of the recipients of such fortune. They do not suggest that the originators themselves are morally good or bad.

When we come across such an expression as 'αἱματός εἶς *dγaθοῖο* (*Od*. 4. 611, said by Menelaus to Telemachus), however, we are brought back to the world of heroes where being 'dγaθός' means belonging to a specific social class with specific

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4 In this particular case, it seems to mean that it is satisfactory (effective) in the eye of the one who persuades rather than in the eye of the one persuaded. However, in the Homeric morality, friends are least likely to make harmful advice, and therefore we can expect that their effective persuasion will normally turn out to be beneficial to the persuaded as well.
responsibility, like knowing θέμις and δίκη — being polite, for example — and fighting courageously in battle. Then it would be more accurate to imagine Priam as a man with kingly, noble features suitable to an 'ἀγαθός' than just good-looking at Il. 24. 632 (δψις ἀγαθη). When Bellerophontes rejects the queen's temptation by 'ἀγαθὰ φρονέοντα', the poet seems to mean not just that he has adjudged its 'good outcome', but also 'in a noble way', thinking in a responsible way suitable to an 'ἀγαθός' (Il. 6. 162 where he is also δαιφρων, an owner of a heroic spirit.). This must be the case also with Clytemnestra's 'ἀγαθὴ φρένες' (Od. 3. 266) which she had held until she yielded to Aegisthus' temptation, and with Penelope's 'ἀγαθὴ φρένες' (Od. 24. 194) praised by Agamemnon's ghost. As for 'ἀγαθὴ φρένες' of Eumaeus (Od. 14. 421) and Amphinomus (Od. 16. 398), however, the emphasis is on their moral quality rather than on their noble birth.

An interesting example is that Zeus' φρένες are criticized as not ἀγαθαι by Athena. She complains that Zeus is hard on the Argives whom she cares for, having forgotten how she once helped his son Heracles (Il. 8. 362-9). Her verdict on her father is (Il. 8. 360-1):

άλλα πατὴρ οἶμὸς φρέοι μανεται οὐκ ἀγαθή.

σχέτλος, ἀλέν διτρός, ἐμὼν μνεών ἀπερευῖς.

The addition of διτρός especially suggests moral condemnation. She obviously criticizes Zeus' moral defect — being forgetful of his benefactor — with the word 'οὐκ ἀγαθός'. Zeus is ἀγαθός among the gods (Il. 15. 185) because of his status, but that does not stop him being 'not good' in a specific context. Any noble person should be
nice to his benefactor — that is Athena's argument, and on this
ground, Zeus certainly does not behave \( \text{\textit{dyadlos}} \)-like at the moment.

Having seen these examples in which \( \text{\textit{dyadlos}} \) does take on a
moral overtone, we must not fail to observe the distinction
between \( \text{\textit{dyadlos}} \) in reference to a class title and \( \text{\textit{dyadlos}} \) as a term of
commendation in specific situations, either in the sense of 'nice' to
somebody or in the sense of 'behaving nobly, suitably to his
status as \( \text{\textit{dyadlos}} \).^5

\( \text{\textit{e\sigma\theta\lambda\sigma\varepsilon}} \)
\( \text{\textit{e\sigma\theta\lambda\sigma\varepsilon}} \) applied to persons

\( \text{\textit{e\sigma\theta\lambda\sigma\varepsilon}} \), as an exact synonym of \( \text{\textit{dyadlos}} \), covers the same range
of meanings. It denotes noble, competent, valorous, useful,
and/or beneficial.

\( \text{\textit{e\sigma\theta\lambda\sigma\varepsilon}} \) — like \( \text{\textit{dyadlos}} \) — often means a man of wealth and noble
birth. Peleus is \( \text{\textit{e\sigma\theta\lambda\sigma\varepsilon}} \) as well as \( \text{\textit{boule\phi\rho\rhoos}}, \text{\textit{d\gamma\rho\eta\tau\eta\sigma}} \) and \( \text{\textit{i\pi\pi\lambda\lambda\tau\tau\eta}} \)
(\textit{II. 7. 125-6}), which are administrative or military qualities
(expected to be) inherent in kingship. One automatically assumes
that a public meeting is summoned by \( \text{\textit{e\sigma\theta\lambda\sigma\varepsilon}} \), a man of high
standing (\textit{Od. 2. 33}). The beautiful princess Nausicaa is naturally
courted by many \( \text{\textit{e\sigma\theta\lambda\sigma\circ}} \) of Phaeacia (\textit{Od. 6. 284}). Telemachus and
Peisistratus are both \( \text{\textit{d\nu\vartheta\rho\o\nu \text{\textit{e\sigma\theta\lambda\o\nu}} \text{\textit{p\a\i\o\de\ς}}}} \) (\textit{Od. 4. 236}). Telemachus
as \( \text{\textit{e\sigma\theta\lambda\sigma\varepsilon}} \) gets a very special treatment in the palace of Nestor. He
is washed by a princess (\textit{Od. 3. 464-5}), and at the banquet served

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^5 A. W. H. Adkins, \textit{Merit and Responsibility}, p. 30ff seems to me to base his
argument for the overwhelming importance of 'cometitive excellences' on
the assumption that \( \text{\textit{d\pe\tau\tau}}, \text{\textit{a\gamma\delta\theta\o\o}} \) etc. are 'the most powerful words of
commendation used of a man' \textit{at any time}, and therefore as far as one is
recognized as '\( \text{\textit{dyadlos}} \)' in one's society, one cannot be discredited or
censured in any way for any anti-social behaviour. The examination of
the terms in this chapter, I hope, will prove that it is not the case.
by ἐσθλοί, men of noble birth (Od. 3. 471). Indeed, he is from a noble family. Odysseus is often referred to as his ἀπή ἐσθλὸς (Od. 1. 115, 2. 46, 71, 3. 98, 379, 4. 328, 16. 214), which probably means valorous as well as noble father. Odysseus' father is also ἀπή ἐσθλὸς (Od. 23. 360) and his grandfather Autolycus also was ἐσθλὸς (Od. 19. 395). Kinsmen of ἐσθλὸς are naturally assumed to be ἐσθλοί. Therefore when Odysseus weeps while listening to the song of Troy by Demodocus, Alcinous asks him whether he has lost his relative or brother who is ἐσθλὸς (Od. 8. 582, 585). Hippocoon is King Rhesus' ἄνέψιος ἐσθλὸς (Il. 10. 518-9). When a noble man kills his kinsman, it is a great problem, because his victim is also of a high status probably with a powerful family background and the killer can expect retaliation from the bereaved family. An Epeigeus who is ὁδ τι κάκιστος (Il. 16. 570) himself once killed his ἐσθλὸς ἄνέψιος had to go into exile (Il. 16. 573). Achilles sacrifices twelve noble (ἐσθλοί) Trojans in the honour of Patroclus (Il. 23. 175, 181) — what matters here is the victims' status rather than their valour.

ἐσθλὸς and κακὸς are often coupled in a generalizing statement meaning 'anybody'. Either κακὸς or ἐσθλὸς, every man has a name (Od. 8. 553), every man sleeps (Od. 20. 86), and no one can escape μοῖρα of death (Il. 6. 489). Zeus dispenses happiness either to ἐσθλοί or to κακοί at his will (Od. 6. 189). The suitors of Penelope did not respect any man visiting the house of Odysseus, either κακὸς or ἐσθλὸς (Od. 22. 414-5, 23. 65-6). We do not hear about any category in-between. Apparently, ἐσθλοί are

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6 On 'ἀπή ἐμὸς ἐσθλὸς Ὀδυσσεύς', see O. C. Cramer 'Ulysses the good?' in TAPA 104 (1974) 77-80.
the ruling class and *kakoi* include all the rest. In this particular case, the word for 'good' or the one for 'bad' only means 'splendid/not splendid in respect of birth', and does not have a tone of commendation or denigration. Here these terms have nothing to do with actual display of *dpeq* of men so classified.

If there is no moral specification for the 'kakos' in a social scale, apart from not being *ēsblōs*, there certainly seems to be some for the *ēsblōs*. When Antinous has reproached Eumaeus for bringing a beggar to the house of Odysseus, Eumaeus answers by criticizing him for not speaking properly (*Od*. 17. 381):

'Αντίωθ', οὐμέν καλά καὶ ἐσθλὸς ἐὼν ἄρρητεις.

'καὶ ἐσθλὸς ἐὼν' seems to imply that a man of noble birth is normally expected to talk more nicely — in the sense of 'nice to the listener's ears'. The underlying idea is that *ēsblōs* manner should be *kaloś*, which will become more prominent in later Greek as in the phrase 'kaloś ἱαγαθός'.

Related to this is the idea that *ēsbloi* have a placable mind. When persuading Poseidon to follow Zeus' instruction, Iris says that *phrēnes* *ēsblōn* are placable (*strepταί* *Il*. 15. 203), and Poseidon yields to her persuasion, admitting that she has spoken properly (*κατὰ μοίραν* 206). Apparently, to have a flexible, placable mind is considered part of the quality of being noble and is acknowledged among the gods. The same argument is tried with Achilles by Phoenix who says that Achilles should show respect to the Litai, for the mind of *ēsblοi* is placated by *τιμή* (*Il*. 9. 514). It obviously contains a tacit message to Achilles himself — 'If you are *ēsblōs*, you should soften your feeling by the *τιμή* we have brought to you.' The same idea is more clearly expressed by Poseidon in human
disguise when encouraging the Achaeans. He suggests negotiation with Achilles (again, apparently), and says that Achilles should and will yield to the plea of the Achaeans, since \( \phi \rho \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon \varepsilon \sigma \theta \lambda \omega \nu \) are \( \delta \kappa \varepsilon \sigma \tau a i \) (II. 13. 115).\(^7\) \( \varepsilon \sigma \theta \lambda \delta \sigma \) is expected to be a gentle, reasonable man. This use of \( \varepsilon \sigma \theta \lambda \delta \sigma \) corresponds to the image of a 'good man' we have seen, i. e. knowing \( \delta \varepsilon \kappa \eta \) and behaving within one's lot.

However, as in the case of \( \delta \gamma \alpha \theta \delta \sigma \), the most important quality expected from an \( \varepsilon \sigma \theta \lambda \delta \sigma \) is his valour. In time of peace, this quality is developed and displayed in games, as the Phaeacian youths who are probably inexperienced in battle are called \( \varepsilon \sigma \theta \lambda \delta \iota \) in the context of their games (\( O d. \) 8. 110), while the noble spectators are called \( \delta \rho \iota \sigma \tau o i \) (108). The suitors of Penelope are presumably also inexperienced in actual battle, but are competent (\( \varepsilon \sigma \theta \lambda \delta \iota \) enough to fight against Odysseus (\( O d. \) 22. 204). When a person is called \( \varepsilon \sigma \theta \lambda \delta \sigma \) in battle, it most certainly means a man of valour. For Odysseus and Telemachus, Zeus and Athena are the mighty allies (\( \varepsilon \sigma \theta \lambda \omega \) \( O d. \) 16. 263). Nestor advises Agamemnon to arrange the army according to their clans so that they can tell who is \( \varepsilon \sigma \theta \lambda \delta \sigma \) and who is \( \kappa a k o \delta \) (II. 2. 365-6), i. e. who is valorous and who is cowardly. He arranges his army in such a way that \( \varepsilon \sigma \theta \lambda \delta \iota \) surround \( \kappa a k o \iota \) so that the latter cannot run away but are forced to fight (II. 4. 298-300). When the battle intensifies, the

\(^7\) The lack of the reference to the Embassy in Book 9 in this statement, of course, can certainly be taken as evidence for the late addition of Book 9, but Achilles himself expects more sincere apology and placation from Agamemnon even when the ambassadors are negotiating with him (II. 9. 387), and he does accept Agamemnon's explanation (if not apology as we call it) and presents in the end.
Achaeans exchange their shields so that ἐσθλοὶ will have ἐσθλὰδ ones — more effective, but heavy ones — and χείρωνες will have χείρεια ones — less effective, but light ones (II. 14. 382). Prominent heroes are not only ἐσθλοὶ themselves, but have ἐσθλοὶ ἔταιροι (Pandarus' II. 4. 113; Ajax's II. 13. 709-10; Sarpedon's II. 16. 327; Odysseus' Od. 5. 110, 133, 7. 251, 23. 331; cf. Od. 24. 427). Patroclus reproaches Meliones for fighting with words instead of arms with his enemy despite being ἐσθλὸς' (II. 16. 627).

ἐσθλὸς should be a man of action. ἐσθλὸς is a warrior who works hard in battle (πολλὰ ἐφορχῶς) and κακὸς is an ἑργὸς warrior (II. 9. 319-20). ἐσθλὸς though he is, Achilles is useless if he does not fight for the Achaeans (II. 11. 665). Achilles' sorrow over Patroclus' death is particularly deep because Achilles, ἐσθλὸς though he is, could not protect his friend (II. 16. 837). He kills many ἐσθλοὶ ὑοὶ of Priam (II. 22. 44, 24. 204-5, 520-1), including Hector (who is ἐσθλὸς II. 22. 158, 176), because Achilles is 'μέγ' ἄμετρων' than Hector (II. 22. 158). Hector knows how ἐσθλὸς Achilles is and that he is much χείρων than his opponent (II. 20. 434). Yet he stands against Achilles because he must strive for κλεος and not to be κακὸς (II. 6. 443-4), but ἐσθλὸς. κακὸς is not a verdict on a fallen hero killed by a stronger one, but that for a coward. And, who knows, since ὁρισθῇ is controlled by the gods (II. 20. 242-3), Achilles might turn out to be a loser (II. 16. 860-1). And after their duel, the dying Hector prophesies that one day, ἐσθλὸς though he is, Achilles also will be killed by Paris and Apollo (II. 22. 359-60). As we can see from some of above examples, ἐσθλὸς denoting a man of valour has two antonyms — χείρων and κακὸς. Hector may be χείρων (with less divine gift of ὁρισθῇ)
compared with Achilles, but not *kakós* (not performing his role as a warrior). Even Achilles would prefer being killed by Hector, another *d'yaðós* like himself, to being drowned in a river (*II*. 21. 279-80), for, then, he will die an honourable death at least. What we see here is a system which does value good intention despite failure distinguished from cowardice.⁸

Therefore it is no wonder that victims of heroes on the battlefield are often described as *ēσθλóς*. And no doubt that increases the glory of the victors. Diomedes kills many *ēσθλοι* (*II*. 5. 176) and so does Patroclus (*II*. 16. 425). Antilochus' victims, Thalysiades (*II*. 4. 458) and Mydon (*II*. 5. 581) are both *ēσθλóς*. Antiphus' victim Leucus is Odysseus' *ēσθλóς* *ēταῖρος* (*II*. 4. 491). Glaucus' victim, a Myrmidon called Bathycles is *ēσθλóς* *ἀνήρ* (*II*. 16. 600). Aeneas' victim called Leocritus is *ēσθλός* *ēταῖρος* of Lycomedes (*II*. 17. 344-5). Menelaus' victim Podes is *ēσθλός* *ἐνι προμαχοίσι* (*II*. 17. 590). Achilles' victim called Iphition is *ēσθλός* and *'πολέων ἡγητῶρ λαῷ*, and a son of a nymph (*II*. 20. 382-4). Another victim of the hero called Demoleon is *ēσθλός* *δλέξητις μάχης* (*II*. 20. 396). In one of his old adventure stories, Nestor boasts that he killed Itymones who was *ēσθλός* (*II*. 11. 672-3).

Any *ēσθλός*, heroic warrior, has a limit to his *dρετή*. *ēσθλός* though he is, Aeneas would be killed by Achilles if he challenged him (*II*. 20. 312). *ēσθλός* though he is, Odysseus could be in danger when surrounded alone by his enemies (*II*. 11. 471). Even the

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⁸ In this respect, Adkins' label for Homeric society 'results culture' is misleading. Despite his defeat, Hector dies as *ēσθλός*, not as *'kakós'*, and his death is not *αἰσχρός*. We may also note that despite the most inglorious outcome of the chariot-race, Eumelus remains *ἀνήρ ὁριστος* (*II*. 23. 536). Failure despite good intention does not discredit a man, provided his good intention and *dρετή* are known to the public. cf. *Merit and Responsibility*, 35, etc.
mighty Ajax cannot advance when blocked by many Trojan ἐσθλοι (II. 5. 624). Danger of death in battle is a natural part of the warrior’s life. μοῖρα subdues both ἐσθλος and κακος (II. 9. 319). Therefore an ἐσθλος is not discredited by failure, unless it is due to his cowardice.⁹ The fallen Protesilaus who was ἐσθλος is still much missed by his troops because of his valour by which he was ἀπειλων than his brother who now is their leader (II. 2. 707-9). The Trojans lament many of their fallen ἑσθλοι (II. 24. 167; cf. II. 6. 452). They are obviously remembered with respect, not contempt, for the valour that they possessed and exercised. There is no sign that their defeat in battle is considered αἰσχρος. On the other hand, despite his being ἐσθλος, Aeneas has not been satisfactorily rewarded by Priam presumably for personal (the clash of their characters?) or political reasons (Aeneas being from another line of the royal family) (II. 13. 461). Success and failure are not the only factors which give honour and disgrace to ἐσθλοι in the Homeric society.

An interesting example of the use of ἐσθλος is that applied to Odysseus as Telemachus’ father. Telemachus dreams of his πατὴρ ἐσθλος coming home and regaining his τιμή (Od. 1. 115-7). For him, the loss of his πατὴρ ἐσθλος is a double misfortune (κακὸν ἐμπέσεων ... δοια Od. 2. 45-6), for sorrow for his father’s death is topped with the troubles (κακα Od. 2. 71-4) inflicted by the suitors whom Odysseus would have warded off had he returned home. As we

⁹ cf. G. S. Kirk, The Songs of Homer, p. 374: ‘Then with Hector and Achilles and Patroclus and Ajax there was no sense that being beaten was in itself disgraceful, or that the duel was a crucial test of virility. The epic sense of fate prevented this. A man would die when fate or the gods willed it; his part was to do his best, to fight honourably ....’
have seen, Odysseus is ἑσθλός as a member of the ruling class, and
that meaning should be present also in the recurring phrase 'πατήρ ἑσθλός'. However, for Telemachus, his father is ἑσθλός most of all as
an efficient defender of his house and family. When Telemachus
entreats Nestor and Menelaus to tell him his father's
whereabouts, Odysseus is again imagined as a competent warrior
and counsellor (Od. 3. 98-100, 4. 328-30). Therefore, even when
he welcomes his father with tears of joy, Odysseus is 'good', not in
the sense that he is 'nice' to his son, but that he is 'efficient' in
fighting off his enemies. Nestor also mentions Odysseus as
Telemachus' πατήρ ἑσθλός and as a warrior honoured by Athena
(Od. 3. 379). For Penelope, too, Odysseus is 'πόσις ἑσθλός', not as a
'nice' husband, but a 'valorous' husband. He is her 'πόσις ἑσθλός
θυμολέων' (Od. 4. 724, 814), who excelled among the Danaans in all
kinds of δρέπανος (725, 815) whose κλέος reaches all over Greece (726,
816). For Odysseus' family, what is most missed is the military
dρέπανος of Odysseus to defend their house now so helpless and being
consumed by intruders.

Man can be ἑσθλός — competent — in skills other than
fighting. The Trojan elders are good orators (Il. 3. 150-1).
Telemachus' ship has a good crew (Od. 2. 391 ἑσθλοὶ ἔταιροι). A
competent guide is ἡγεμών ἑσθλός (Od. 15. 310). Eumaeus is a good
swineherd (Od. 15. 557). Odysseus' sheep are guarded by good
shepherds, ἀνέρες ἑσθλοὶ (Od. 14. 104). Herds' skill is partially
military, for they need competence in defence against theft as
well as herding skills. Therefore it is not surprising that they are
ἑσθλοὶ.
In one example we have already seen (*Od.* 19. 334), εσθλος is used of a man whose behaviour and mind are blameless (332), particularly concerning his treatment of his guests. Such a man will win κλεος (333) and his guests will all say that he is 'εσθλος' (334). Although the most immediate meaning of εσθλος here should be good, useful in the eye of the affected party i.e. his guests, in his capacity as a host, it also implies that he duly plays his role as an εσθλος expected by his society. εσθλος can point to cooperative virtues expected from the ruling class δγαθοι/εσθλοι, just as in the case of δγαθος.

Objects, animals and conduct are in general 'good' when they are competent/useful/good to persons affected by them. εσθλος is applied to good fortune (εσθλον in contrast with κακον *Il.* 1. 106-8, 24. 530, *Od.* 15. 488), splendid banquets (*Il.* 1. 575-6, *Od.* 18. 403-4), good health (μενος εσθλον lit. full bodily strength *Il.* 5. 516), treasure (*Il.* 9. 330, 24. 381, *Od.* 4. 96, 15. 91, 159, 19. 272), useful information (*Il.* 10. 448), effective medicine (φρυμακα εσθλα *Il.* 11. 830-1, *Od.* 4. 227-8, 230, as protection from κακδ — *Od.* 10. 287, 292), good horses (*Il.* 23. 348), property (*Od.* 2. 312-3), good wagons (*Od.* 9. 241-2), good offerings to the gods or the dead (*Od.* 10. 523, 11. 31, 12. 347), fair wind (as a 'useful companion' *Od.* 11. 7, 12. 149). Conduct and functions of mind are also judged according to their usefulness. It is good, useful to pray to Zeus (*Il.* 24. 301; cf. 425 'It is δγαθον to give offerings to the gods.'), It is good, helpful for a messenger to have reasonable thought (*Il.* 15. 207). A plan is good when profitable (*Il.* 9. 76, 12. 212 εσθλα φραζωμενω, 18. 313, ). When one loses one's 'competent mind'

10 cf. Chapter 9's conclusion.
(φρένας εσθλός I. 17. 470), one makes a 'useless plan' (νηκερδής βουλή 469). Competence in reasoning is expressed in such phrases as νός εσθλός (II. 13. 732-3, Od. 7. 73), νόμα εσθλόν (Od. 7. 292), and φρένες εσθλαί (Od. 2. 117, 7. 111). ὁμφροσύνη of a husband and wife is εσθλη and is stronger and better (κρείσσον καὶ δρείον) than anything else (Od. 6. 181-6). This 'goodness' is commended in its strength and benefit in managing one's household. We may consider it to be a moral virtue, but in Homer its merit is judged solely in terms of its practicality.

When Penelope says that her suitors speak εσθλά to Telemachus while plotting κακά against him, εσθλά means good, pleasant things and κακά are bad, harmful things probably both in the eye of Telemachus, not primarily morally good or bad things as judged by the society. Conduct morally condemned by the public would be classified as an object of 'νέμεσις' rather than κακά.

On the other hand, when Telemachus says to the suitors that he can tell εσθλά from χέρεια (Od. 18. 229, 20. 310), he means what is suitable or unsuitable for εσθλός, a man of high status. In this contrast of εσθλός and χέρεια, εσθλός refers not to profitable effects, but to the noble quality expected from the aristocracy, εσθλοί. There are some other such uses of εσθλός. The glory suitable for εσθλοί is κλέος εσθλόν (II. 5. 3, 273, 9. 415 <cf. 413, κλέος δφθιτοί>, 17. 16, 143, 18. 121, 23. 280, Od. 1. 95, 3. 78, 380, 13. 422, 18. 126, 24. 94). It is mostly the result of their valour, but Amphinomus' father has κλέος εσθλόν for his reasonable character and wealth (Od. 18. 126) rather than his physical δρετή. Nausicaa will gain φάτις εσθλή (Od. 6. 29-30) when she fulfils all of her virginal duties at home. This is partly the virtue depending on her δρετή =

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usefulness, and partly the discipline required from noble persons. Alcinous praises Odysseus' *φρένες ἑσθλαί* (Od. 11. 367) — a noble or reasonable mind fitting for ἑσθλοῖ. However, when the Achaeans say Odysseus has done many ἑσθλαί (Il. 2. 272), these refer to his military *δρετή* rather than his noble birth. Heroic might is ἦς ἑσθλή (Il. 12. 320-1). Patroclus is on one occasion referred to as κλέος ἑσθλόν ἧμιόχοιο (Il. 23. 280), his glory itself. Military *δρετή* suitable for ἑσθλός is rewarded with μοίρα καὶ γέρας ἑσθλόν (Od. 11. 534) or δόσις ἑσθλή (Il. 10. 213) and κλέος (212), noble prizes and glory.

*ἄμεινων* and *δρεῖων*

*ἄμεινων* and *δρεῖων*, both comparative forms of *ἄγαθος*, are used most often to compare two persons. When it is said that A is *ἄμεινων* or *δρεῖων* than B, it means that A is stronger, a greater warrior, than B, rather than that A's birth is nobler than B's, because we sometimes find such expressions as 'A is *ἄμεινων*/*δρεῖων* than A's father/brother (Father — Briareos Il. 1. 404, Periphetes Il. 15. 641, and Hector wishes Astyanax may one day become *ἄμεινων* than himself Il. 6. 479; Brother — Protesilaus Il. 2. 707, Idomeneus Od. 19. 184). We also hear that few sons are *δρεῖων* than their fathers (Od. 2. 277).

Achilles is most frequently described as *ἄμεινων* than somebody else, and that is one of the reasons why we know that he is the best of the Achaeans. He is stronger than Agamemnon (*μεγ. * *ἄμεινων* Il. 2. 239), Menelaus (*πολλῶν * *ἄμεινων* Il. 7. 114), Hector (Il. 22. 158), Patroclus (Il. 11. 787, 16. 709, 22. 333) and he says no other Achaean can rival him in battle, though others are *ἄμεινονες* than he in *ἀγορῆ* (Il. 18. 106).
We also know that Hector is stronger than Menelaus (II. 7. 111), Patroclus much stronger than Lycaon (II. 21. 107), Agamemnon much stronger than Aegisthus (Od. 3. 250) and Ajax stronger than Hector (II. 11. 543). Pandarus is better than anybody else in Lycia as an archer (II. 5. 173). Nestor claims that the heroes of old days were stronger than Achilles or Agamemnon, but used to listen to his advice (II. 1. 260). Dione says that Diomedes will meet a stronger opponent than Aphrodite one day (II. 5. 411). Many warriors stronger than Ascalaphus have been killed (II. 15. 139). Patroclus encourages the Aiantes to be even braver than usual (II. 16. 557). Odysseus and his companions are attacked by the Ciconians from inland who are stronger than the ones of the town (Od. 9. 48). The Beggar-Odysseus might meet a stronger opponent than Irus (Od. 18. 334). Some gods are also stronger than others. Athena boasts that she is stronger than Ares (II. 21. 410-1) after beating him in the preceding scene.

There are a few other examples which need closer examination. Agamemnon, in his encouraging taunt to Diomedes, says that Diomedes is a lesser warrior than his father Tydeus and _dmeλνων_ only in _dγορῇ_ (II. 4. 400). Protesting against this, Sthenelus claims that the Epigonoi are _μεγίστα dμελνων_ than the first Seven against Thebes (II. 4. 405) who were not successful. However, the reason Sthenelus gives for his claim is basically that the Epigonoi followed the gods' instruction in the siege of Thebes. Therefore there is no objective evidence for the relative _dφετή_ of the Seven.

11 Although the authenticity of the line itself is doubtful, the fact is clear from their two encounters at _Iliad_ 7. 244ff and 14. 402ff.
and of their sons to tell which are in fact \textit{dmei\'noves}. All we know is that the Epigonoi were successful because of some divine support which always increases one's net \textit{dpe\'tni}.

At \textit{II}. 10. 237, Agamemnon urges Diomedes to choose the best (\textit{dpe\'ristos}) man as his companion of the night adventure who should be \textit{dpe\'i\'n}, better in prowess, not in social status. Agamemnon, we are told, has Menelaus in mind when he says Diomedes should not choose somebody only because he is \textit{basileu\'teros} (\textit{II}. 10. 239). Here we see the contrast between \textit{dpe\'i\'n} = stronger and \textit{basileu\'teros} = nobler. On the other hand, Menelaus is '\textit{pro\'teros kai dpe\'i\'n}' than Antilochus (\textit{II}. 23. 588; cf. 605) where the context suggests nothing more than that Menelaus is higher in rank than Antilochus. The same ambiguity is most prominent when Ajax tells Idomeneus to shut up in front of his 'betters' (\textit{dmei\'noves} \textit{II}. 23. 479), where it may mean either 'higher in rank' or 'better in skill (in judging at a chariot race)'.

After Hector has scolded Paris for being lazy in his bed-chamber with Helen while other Trojans are fighting, Helen wishes she had married a man '\textit{dmei\'nwn}' than Paris, a man who knows \textit{v\'e\'me\v{s}\i} and \textit{a\'i\'s\v{e}a} (\textit{II}. 6. 350-1). Obviously she is not talking about his birth or prowess, but about his attitude. He should fight bravely in the war for which he is responsible, but he does not. That is not fitting for a man of his status, an \textit{a\'y\'ath\v{o}s}. She wishes he were more \textit{a\'y\'ath\v{o}s}-like in his responsibility as a warrior. Telemachus probably also uses the word \textit{dpe\'i\'n} in a moral sense, 'morally superior', as well as in the sense of 'stronger' at \textit{Od}. 20. 133 when saying that Penelope has a tendency to honour a lesser man but dishonour a better one, for
he has in mind the suitors on the one hand and Odysseus on the other. Odysseus, as we know, is superior to the suitors in every respect.

When applied to a man's physical appearance, *dpelvν dpelei*ν means 'nobler' or 'more beautiful'. Laertes looks better i.e. more kingly after having a bath (*Od.* 24. 374). The dead body of Patroclus (*Il.* 19.33) miraculously gets more presentable as time passes because of divine protection.

*dpeleioν* is used as an adverb, better, only once in the expression that Penelope will know Odysseus 'better' — more properly — soon (*Od.* 23. 114).

All other examples of *dpelvν dpeleioν* are translatable as 'better' in the sense of more useful, effective, or competent for the party affected: better horses (*Il.* 10. 556-7), a better seer (*Od.* 2. 180), a better watch (*σκοποζ* *Od.* 22. 156), a stronger fortification (*Il.* 4. 407), a better idea (*Il.* 9. 104, *Od.* 5. 364; *μυθον* *Il.* 7. 358, 12. 232; *μητις* *Il.* 9. 423, 14. 107, 15. 509), a wiser thing to do (*Il.* 1. 116, 217, 274, 11. 469, 19. 56, *Od.* 1. 376, 2. 141, 7. 51, 14. 466, 22. 104), better old age than early years (*Od.* 23. 286). Mist is more convenient than night for thieves (*Il.* 3. 10-11). To attack in a great number is more effective (*Il.* 12. 412). To fight and survive is the better *νδος* and *μητις* than anything else (*Il.* 15. 509) and one's own prowess is the better fortification (*Il.* 15. 736) than anything else.

As in the last two examples above, *dpelvν dpeleioν* are used in some expressions with a character of maxims or moral teachings. Peleus advises his son by saying that *φιλοφρονις* is better (*Il.* 9. 256) than *χαλος* (260). Odysseus tells Medon that *ευργεςις* is far
better than $\kappa\alpha\kappa\omicron\epsilon\rho\gamma\iota\eta$ (Od. 22. 374). It is better to be moderate in everything, 'αλσμα πάντα' (Od. 7. 310, 15. 71). Nothing is better and stronger than the unanimous mind of a husband and wife (Od. 6. 182). This last group of examples commend 'quiet virtues', but still on the ground of $\delta\rho\epsilon\tau\eta\iota$ as usefulness and competence.

Finally, when Apollo criticizes Achilles' maltreatment of Hector's body as 'οὐ μὴν οἰ τὸ γε καλλίον οὐδέ τ' δμεινον', it seems that it is the word 'καλλίον' that carries strong moral condemnation — it is not seemly, and the word $\delta\mu\epsilon\iota\nu\omicron\omicron$ seems to refer only to Achilles' interest judging from the god's following comment — it is not profitable for him (because the gods may be offended) (Il. 24. 52-4).

$\delta\rho\iota\sigma\omicron\omicron$

As the superlative of $\delta\gamma\alpha\beta\omicron\omicron$, the literal translation of $\delta\rho\iota\sigma\omicron\omicron$ will be 'the best'. Once we start translating the occurrences of $\delta\rho\iota\sigma\omicron\omicron$ as 'the best', however, we soon discover that it does not always work.

For example, at least several Achaean heroes are called 'δριστός of the Achaeans': Achilles (Il. 1. 244, 412, 16. 274, 'Αργείων Il. 16. 271-2, 17. 164-5), Agamemnon (Il. 1. 91, 2. 82, 580), Diomedes (Il. 5. 103, 414; cf. Il. 5. 839), Patroclus (ωρίστος 'Αχαίων II. 17. 689) and Ajax ('δριστός' after Achilles Il. 2. 768-9; cf. Il. 2. 761; in appearance after Achilles Od. 11. 469-70, 24. 17-8).
When the Achaeans choose the opponent for Hector by lot who must be "Ἀχαιῶν δὲς τίς δριστὸς' (II. 7. 50), they pray that may it turn out to be either Ajax, Diomedes or Agamemnon (179-80). Apparently, each of these three is considered by the Achaeans equally 'δριστὸς'. Therefore, we must understand 'δριστὸς' applied on its own to a hero as 'one of the best' rather than the best.

But in what sense are the δριστοι 'best'? We see the same ambiguity as with ἄμεινων and ἀπέλων. Nestor believes in the message of the dream of Agamemnon, because he is δριστὸς (II. 2. 82) i.e. highest in rank among the Achaeans. On the other hand, when the poet answers his own question to the Muse, 'Who is δριστὸς?', by saying that it is Ajax because Achilles is absent (II. 2. 761-9), he means that Ajax is the strongest warrior after Achilles.

As is evident from these examples, δριστος, like ὁμοθῆς, is a word to describe a class of people who are considered noble by birth and expected to be excellent warriors. Most of such expressions as 'δριστὸς among such and such people' imply that the person so described is (one of) the bravest and noblest i.e. the leader of the people: Periphas (II. 5. 843) and Thoas (II. 15. 282) among the Aetolians, Acamas among the Thracians (II. 6. 7), Euphorbus among the Trojans (II. 17. 80-1), Schedius among the Phocaeans (II. 17. 306-7), Patroclus among the Myrmidons (II. 18. 10), Asteropaeus among the Paeonians (II. 21. 207), the sons of Merops among their country (II. 11. 328), Hector (II. 21. 279, cf. II. 24. 384) and Alcathoon (II. 13. 433) in Troy, and Sarpedon (II. 16. 521-2), obviously among the Lycians.
If one is of noble birth and has the qualities necessary to be a good warrior — wealth, physical strength, skill in fighting, courageous character, and, perhaps, clever counsel and eloquence, too —, one is ἀριστος not only in war but also in peace. For this reason, Eurymachus is ἀριστος among the suitors (Od. 15. 521) and Antinous among 'young men in Ithaca' (Od. 22. 29-30; cf. 17. 415-6 where he looks ἀριστος' and king-like.) even though they may never have fought in battle.

ἀριστος is, of course, used in its literal sense 'the best' from time to time. Calchas (Il. 1. 69) and Helenus (Il. 6. 76) are the best among seers (οἰωνοπόλων δχ' ἀριστος) and Polyphides was once the best prophet (μάντες βροτῶν δχ' ἀριστος Od. 15. 252-3). The craftsman who made the shield of Ajax is the best leather-worker (σκυτοτόμων δχ' ἀριστος Il. 7. 221). Teucer is the best in archery (Il. 13. 313-4). Diomedes is the best warrior among the participants in the chariot race (Il. 23. 357) and, according to Nestor, the best counsellor among those of his age (Il. 9. 54). Eumelus is the best (ἀριστος) charioteer (Il. 23. 536). Hector is the best and bravest son of Priam (Il. 24. 242). Athena, impressed by Odysseus' cunning story, says that he is 'βροτῶν δχ' ἀριστος ἄρπντων / θευτή καὶ μυθοίς' (Od. 13. 297-8) — ἀριστος here is unmistakably superlative as we know it to be true through the whole of the Iliad and the Odyssey. He is indeed the best partner of Diomedes to be chosen for the most dangerous night adventure (Il. 10. 236).

In the funeral game for Patroclus, Achilles invites the two best boxers to fight (Il. 23. 659) and the best boxer is Epeius (Il. 23. 669). The best two in close combat (Il. 23. 802) are also
invited and Ajax and Diomedes stand up; of them the latter is declared the winner only by Achilles' judgement after a close match. Agamemnon is said to be 'δριστος' in the strength of arms by Achilles (II. 23. 890-1) and declared the winner without any actual competition. This is a remarkable passage in which Achilles acknowledges Agamemnon as a man of δρετή for the first time, and his judgement is to promote good relationship among the Achaeans as well as between Agamemnon and himself.\footnote{cf. Chapter 5, pp. 105-6.} In the Phaeacian games, Euryalus is the best in appearance after Laodamas among the participants in the foot-race (Od. 8. 116), and Clytonaus is the best in running (Od. 8. 123). A rock which Hector throws against the gate of the Achaean fortification is so great that it requires the two best men — strongest men — of a community to raise (II. 12. 447). Penelope is urged to choose 'whoever is the best' as her new husband (Od. 11. 179, 16. 76, 18. 289, 19. 528; cf. 20. 335). People say that Antinous is δριστος in speech and counsel (Od. 16. 419-20) which Penelope does not agree to.

δριστος can be an effective word of reproach when combined with such words as νείκος — 'the best in quarrel' (II. 23. 483) or as εἰδος 'the most good-looking (and useless in fighting)' (II. 3. 39, 13. 769 of Paris; II. 17. 142 of Hector).\footnote{cf. Χορούντως δριστος at II. 24. 261.}

When Zeus is said to be the 'δριστος' of the gods (θεὼν ἥριστος
II. 13. 154; II. 14. 213 by Aphrodite; ἐν δθανατοις θεοῖς II. 15. 107-8; ἄνδρων ἦδε θεῶν II. 19. 95-6 by Agamemnon; θεῶν ὑπατος καὶ δριστος
II. 19. 258, 23. 43, Od. 19. 303 in the oaths by Agamemnon,
Achilles and Odysseus respectively), it means, undoubtedly, that he is both the strongest and the highest in rank. When Zeus says that Poseidon is 'πρεσβύτατος καὶ δριστός' (Od. 13. 142), therefore, he means that Poseidon is 'the oldest and the highest' after Zeus himself. However, when we hear that Apollo is 'θεών δριστός' (Il. 19. 413), it only means, again, he is one of the greatest gods, but not the highest. The application of the word is very much the same with both men and gods, used as one of the best at one time and as the best at another.

The plural δριστοί can be translated in various ways: the bravest (sc. men), strongest (sc. men), noblest (sc. men), chiefs etc. The meaning of the word 'δριστοί' is the combination of all the above. δριστοί, who are referred to as διαθοι as well, are the noblest part of the population supposed to be the best in all the activities entrusted to them, i.e. leadership and prowess in war, wise counsel in meetings, fair judgement among people under their influence. The emphasis, however, differs in the two epics. Generally speaking, δριστοί are the most valorous warriors in the Iliad, and in the Odyssey they are a prosperous aristocracy in peace.

The examples of δριστοί translatable as 'brave warriors' (with emphasis on their valour) are: Agamemnon's troops (Il. 2. 577); Hector's troops (Il. 2. 817, 12. 197 cf. λαὸν δριστόν Od. 11. 500 of the Trojans and their allies); Diomedes and others (Il. 5. 780); Aeneas and Hector (Il. 6. 78, 17. 513); the strongest of the Lycians (Il. 6. 188); the Achaeans (Il. 6. 435, 11. 658-9, 825-6, 13. 117, 128; the Argives Il. 3. 19, 8. 229, 9. 520; the Danaans Il. 5. 541;
the leaders — of the Achaeans understood — II. 7. 285, 13. 42); the Trojans (II. 10. 560, 11. 258, 12. 13, 13. 740, 751, 836, 18. 230); Odysseus and Diomedes (the best two of the Achaeans II. 10. 539); the Pylian warriors killed by Heracles (II. 11. 691); Hector and Polydamas (II. 12. 89); Glauces and Asteropaeus (II. 12. 103); Polypoetes and Leontes (II. 12. 127); the bravest/chiefs of Trojans and their allies (Polydamas, Aeneas, Agenor, Sarpedon, Glauces II. 14. 424-5); the bravest/chiefs of the Achaeans (II. 15. 296, 16. 23, 17. 368, 377, 509, Od. 1. 211); the strongest of the gods (Hera, Poseidon, Athena II. 20. 122-3); two brave warriors (Aeneas and Achilles II. 20. 158); the bravest sons of Priam (II. 24. 255, 493); the bravest who died at Troy (Ajax, Achilles, Patroclus, Antilochus Od. 3. 108); Nestor's sons (ἑριστός πινυτός τε καὶ ἐγχεσιν Od. 4. 211); the bravest Achaeans in the Wooden Horse (Od. 4. 272, 278, 8. 512, 11. 524); the three strongest of Menelaus' companions (Od. 4. 409); the strongest men for ambush (by Aegisthus Od. 4. 530; by the suitors 4. 778); Antinous and Eurymachus (Od. 4. 629, 21. 187); Telemachus' crew (Od. 4. 666); Odysseus and Achilles (the bravest of the Achaeans Od. 8. 78); the best twelve companions of Odysseus (Od. 9. 195); the bravest (surviving) suitors (Od. 22. 244); the bravest/noblest of the Trojans and the Achaeans who died in the battle over Achilles' body (Od. 24. 38); the bravest in battle (Od. 24. 507).

In the following examples, ἑριστός is translatable as chiefs or nobles with emphasis on their social status rather than on their valour: the Achaeans (II. 9. 3, 10. 214, 273, 326); the Trojans (II. 10. 300); the Trojan and Achaean chiefs (II. 3. 274); Glauces' ancestors (II. 6. 209); the noblest of the sons of Ithaca (the suitors
the noblest courting Penelope (Od. 1. 245, 2. 51, 16. 122, 251, 19. 130); the noblest of all Cephallenians killed by Odysseus (Od. 24. 429) who look like the noblest of a whole city (Od. 24. 108); the noblest among the Phaeacians (Od. 6. 257, 8. 91, 108); the priests of the highest rank (II. 9. 575); Euryalus beats all the 'dριστοι' (Od. 8. 127); 'dριστοι' in Pylus were afraid of Ereuthalion, but Nestor was not (II. 7. 150); the ambush will tell who is brave and who is cowardly among dριστοι (II. 13. 276ff.). The last two examples above are particularly significant in their implication that 'dριστοι' can be cowards sometimes. In this case, dριστοι as the marker of a class is separated from its basic meaning, those who are bravest.

The examples of dριστοι applied to 'the best' in certain functions other than as warriors are: the best carpenters (II. 6. 314-5); the best at dancing (II. 24. 261 as reproach, Od. 8. 250, 383); the best crew (Od. 8. 36); the best at sailing (Od. 8. 247); the best witnesses (the gods II. 22. 254-5).

When a woman is described as 'dρίστη', it usually means that she possesses excellent feminine dρεται, i.e. usefulness as a woman, such as beauty and skill in textile production.14 Alcestis (II. 2. 715), Laodice (II. 3. 124, 6. 252), her sister Cassandra (II. 13. 365) are all dρίστη in form (eίδος). Most understandably, one would be most willing to fight to win the hand of the most beautiful daughter (or, one of the most beautiful daughters) of a king (II. 13. 365, 378).

14 This meaning is not attested in the use of dγαθή for a woman in Homer. cf. Od. 18. 276.
The best women' on offer to Achilles (II. 9. 638) are most probably as beautiful as skilled in hand because that is the *δρετή* of a maidservant. On the other hand, when Athena advises Telemachus to entrust 'the best maidservant' (Od. 15. 25) to guarding his property, the meaning of 'the best' is more specific i.e. best for this purpose, most trustworthy.

The only example of *δπι'αρτη* meaning 'highest in rank' is Hera's claim to be *θεδων δπι'αρτη* (II. 18. 364). She means that she is the highest among the goddesses because she is the wife of Zeus, but not that she is the most beautiful of all, even if she does believe so, as we hear in the episode of the Judgement of Paris.

An object or an animal is described as *'δριστος'* when it is the best/most useful of the sort: the best horses (II. 2. 763, 10. 306, Od. 3. 370); the best cattle (Od. 12. 343, 353, 398, 18. 371); the best cow (II. 17. 62; the best sterile cow Od. 10. 522, 11. 30); the best ram (Od. 9. 432); the best goat (Od. 14. 106), the best pig (Od. 14. 19, 108, 414, 20. 163, 24. 215); the best ship (Od. 1. 280, 2. 294, 16. 348; ships and the crew Od. 7. 327-8); the best armour (II. 15. 616); the best shields (II. 14. 371); the best chest (Od. 8. 424); the best spot to land (Od. 5. 442, 7. 281); the best outcome (II. 3. 110, Od. 3. 129, 9. 420, 23. 117); the best treatment (II. 6. 56); the best conduct (II. 2. 274); the best idea or counsel (*δριστα*: II. 9. 103, 314, 12. 215, 344, 357, 13. 735, Od. 13. 154, 365, 23. 117, 130; *δριστον* Od. 5. 360; *βουλη*: II. 2. 5. 7. 325, 9. 74, 94,-5 10. 17, 14. 161, Od. 9. 318, 11. 230, 24. 52; *μητης*: II. 17. 634, 712, Od. 23. 124-5); the best omen (II. 12. 243 '... is to fight for one's fatherland.'

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\textit{dριστός}, on the whole, is not very different in meaning from \textit{d'γαθός} except that the former puts more emphasis on particular excellences rather than on the class difference.

\textit{dριστεύς}

\textit{dριστεύς}, a cognate noun of \textit{dριστός}, is virtually synonymous with \textit{dριστός} as a masculine noun. An \textit{dριστεύς} is a nobleman who is the highest in rank and supposed to be the bravest in his community. Achilles (\textit{Il.} 17. 203), Teucer (\textit{Il.} 15. 489), Diomedes and Agamemnon (\textit{Il.} 5. 206), and the best men for ambush (\textit{Od.} 14. 218, 15. 28) are all \textit{dριστής} in the sense of 'the bravest men'. In the same sense, Paris is criticized for not being one (\textit{Il.} 3. 44-5). Other heroes are mentioned as \textit{dριστεύς} as chiefs or noblemen, with emphasis on their social status: Achaeans (\textit{Il.} 1. 227 — also 'the bravest', 2. 404, 7. 73, 159, 184, 227, 327, 385, 9. 421, 10. 1, 117, 15. 303, 19. 193, 23. 236, \textit{Od.} 24. 86; Danaans: \textit{Il.} 17. 245); Achaeans and kings (\textit{Il.} 9. 334); Odysseus (\textit{Od.} 21. 333, 24. 460); the nobles of the Phaeacians (\textit{Od.} 6. 34); the noblemen of Hellas and Phthie (\textit{Il.} 9. 396); wives and daughters of noblemen (\textit{Od.} 11. 227); the suitors of Penelope (\textit{Od.} 21. 153, 170).

\textit{dριστεύω}

The cognate verb of \textit{dριστός}, \textit{dριστεύω}, has the same ambiguity as \textit{dριστός}. Its literal meaning is 'to behave as \textit{dριστός}' (i. e. to fight bravely) or to be 'the best'. We can see the combination of the meanings 'to fight bravely' and 'to be the best' in the following examples: the encouragement of Glaucus' father (\textit{Il.} 6. 208);
Peleus' encouragement to Achilles (II. 11. 784); of Hector (II. 6. 460); of Odysseus (II. 11. 409); of Moulius (II. 11. 746); of Pyraechmes (II. 16. 551); of Apisaon (II. 17. 351).

The examples in which we seem to find only the meaning 'to be the best' are: of the crew of Telemachus (Od. 4. 652); Nestor is 'ever the best in counsel' (II. 11. 627). The examples in which we see only the meaning 'to fight bravely' are: of those faced Hector (II. 7. 90); of Odysseus (II. 11. 409); of Machaon (II. 11. 506); of Teucer about to shoot an arrow (II. 15. 460).

\(\text{kakós}\)

\(\text{kakós}\) applied to persons

\(\text{kakós}\), when applied to persons, works as an exact antonym of \(\text{dýaðós} \) or \(\text{eúðlós}\), for it has a double meaning 'lowly, not noble' and 'useless, not valorous', with a few exceptional cases in which it is used to denote moral wickedness — just as \(\text{dýaðós} \) or \(\text{eúðlós}\) is very occasionally used to commend moral goodness.

\(\text{kakós}\) as 'cowardly' or 'weak', i. e. 'bad' in terms of military competence, is often contrasted with \(\text{dýaðós} \) or \(\text{eúðlós}\) in military contexts, as in Nestor's advice at II. 2. 365-6 and his arrangement of his troops at II. 4. 298-9. It is the behaviour of \(\text{kakoí}\) to escape from battles (II. 8. 94, 11. 408) and it is 'not a cowardly action (\(\text{kakón}\)'), i. e. a brave one, to defend one's comrades (II. 18. 128-9). Ambush is a good test for telling \(\text{kakós}\) from \(\text{dýaðós}\) among 'dýrístoi' (II. 13. 276ff). \(\text{kakós}\) is sometimes coupled with \(\text{dýalkis}\) and almost synonymous with it (II. 8. 153, Od. 3. 375). Heroes hate to be called \(\text{kakoí}\) (II. 17. 180, Od. 21. 131 '\(\text{kakós} \) \kai \(\text{dýkus}\') or to be threatened as if they were \(\text{kakoí}\) (II. 2. 190, 15. 196 Poseidon).
They especially fear criticism for being κακός from a less valiant and/or noble person (*ll. 22. 106ff, Od. 21. 324ff; cf. Od. 6. 275ff)*.¹⁵

Circe can make a man 'κακός καὶ δύναμις' (*Od. 10. 301, 341*), an expression which presupposes the assumption that virtue (virtus) equals manliness. From Polyphemus' point of view, Odysseus is a weakling (*ὀλέγος τε καὶ ὀφθιανὸς καὶ ἀκικός* *Od. 9. 515*) even though Odysseus surpasses him by tricks. This indicates that heroic valour mostly consists of physical strength and that cleverness alone cannot make a hero.

As we have seen in the survey of ἀγαθός and ἀρετή, human valour is not permanent, but liable to divine interference. Mentor-Athena guarantees that Telemachus will never be a coward (κακός *Od. 2. 270, 278*). Here the audience knows her intention to give glory to him. Nestor also knows that Telemachus will never be 'κακός καὶ ἀναλκής' because a divinity whom he rightly identifies as Athena looks after the young man (*Od. 3. 375-8*). At II. 17. 631-2, with divine favour on their side, the Trojans gain more power than usual and every Trojan spear, thrown by either κακός or ἀγαθός, hits its mark.

Brave heroes in particular feel bitter about lack of discrimination between κακός and ἀγαθός. Achilles complains that he is not fairly rewarded for his hard work, by making a rather roughly rounded statement that both κακός and ἐσθλὸς get the same reward (*ll. 9. 319*). And, as Hector reminds Andromache, no man,

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¹⁵ In the parallel case with Nausicaa (*Od. 6. 275*), 'κατωτέρος than she' can, of course, only mean 'lower in status than she'.
either $\kappa\alpha\kappa\omicron\sigma$ or $\epsilon\sigma\theta\lambda\omicron\sigma$, can escape $\mu\omicron\iota\rho\alpha$, the fate of death (II. 6. 488-9).

A person who is 'not $\kappa\alpha\kappa\omicron\sigma$', i.e. $d\gamma\alpha\theta\omicron\sigma/\epsilon\sigma\theta\lambda\omicron\sigma$ ought to be a good athlete in the time of peace, for the physical strength effective in war should be kept at hand all the time. Therefore Odysseus has to prove that he is 'ou $\kappa\alpha\kappa\omicron\sigma$' by joining the Phaeacian games to gain his hosts' respect (Od. 8. 214).

$kakoi'$ are also contrasted with $d\gamma\alpha\theta\omicron\omicron$ as a noble, wealthy class of people who are supposed also to be excellent warriors. Somehow, the heroic virtue is believed to be inherited, to some extent, as well as wealth in the Homeric world. Therefore Ajax exults over his fallen enemy, saying that he is not 'kakos' nor 'kakos $\epsilon\zeta$', i.e. not born from cowardly-lowly ancestors (II. 14. 472). Diomedes relates his genealogy to show himself as a worthy man before producing his counsel, as if one's noble birth itself guaranteed one's ability as a counsellor (II. 14. 126-7). It is stated elsewhere, however, that many sons are less valorous ($kakoi\upsilon$) than their fathers (Od. 2. 276-7).

Those who are not $kakoi'$, i.e. $d\gamma\alpha\theta\omicron\omicron$, seem also to have a conspicuously noble appearance as we can judge form what is said about Mentes-Athena by Eurymachus (Od. 1. 411), about Telemachus and Peisistratus by Menelaus (Od. 4. 64), and about Odysseus, who is also 'φυη ... ou $\kappa\alpha\kappa\omicron\sigma$' at Od. 8. 134, by Nausicaa (Od. 6. 187). Only occasionally we find such a figure as Dolon who is '$\epsilon\iota\delta\omicron\sigma$ $\kappa\alpha\kappa\omicron\sigma$', but with some heroic virtue as, in his case, excellence in running (II. 10. 316).
Just as 'οὐ κακὸς' are 'ἀγαθός', 'οὐ κάκιστος' means 'ἀριστος', one of the best people. Epeigeus among the Myrmidons (Il. 16. 570), Antilochus among the Argives (Od. 4. 199-200), and Antinous among the suitors (Od. 17. 415-6) are so described.

Those labelled as 'κακὸς' are usually not greatly welcomed as visitors by anybody. That can be seen in Melantheus' bitterly contemptuous description of Eumaeus leading a beggar (Odysseus) (Od. 17. 217), presumably referring to their humble appearance. When the suitors are criticised for not respecting either κακὸς or ἑσθλὸς (Od. 22. 415, 23. 66), however, it means they do not respect anybody. As we have already seen in reference to ἑσθλὸς, the phrase 'κακὸς and ἑσθλὸς' is used in the sense of 'everybody', including all who are not ἑσθλοῖ in the κακὸς category (cf. Od. 6. 189, 8. 553).

The expression 'οὐ κακὸς' is often just a circumlocution of 'ἀγαθός' = noble as we have seen. There is, however, one example of 'οὐ κακὸς' applied to the humble cowherd of Odysseus, who, unlike Eumaeus the swineherd, has no claim to noble descent as far as we know. He is praised for his loyalty to his missing master with the expression 'οὖτε κακῶν οὔτε ἀφρονὶ φωτὶ ἑουκας' (Od. 20. 227). There seem to be two ways of interpreting κακὸς in this sentence. One is to take the word as referring to his excellence in the capacity of a servant — 'You do not seem a bad (i. e. disloyal) servant (to your master). Another is to take the word as referring to κακὸς as 'lowly' in status — 'You do not sound like a man of a low status (which in fact you are), but like a nobleman (who is supposed to know all good manners and social codes). In
either case, it is obvious that 'οῦ κακός' is used here to commend a 'quiet' virtue.

When Hera accuses Apollo of associating with the Trojans by calling him 'κακῶν ἑταρεῖ' (Il. 24. 63), she seems to mean nothing more than 'You friend of those who are bad to me, i.e. my enemies. Hera obviously resents the Trojans because of Paris' judgement and the harm he has done to her favourite heroes (after all, Helen, the pride of the Achaeans, was born in the goddess' sacred city, Argos), and it is because of him that she thinks that the Trojans deserve the fall of their city.

When used attributively, κακός is often readily translatable as 'bad' with such connotations as harmful, useless, incompetent, in other words, bad to the affected party. Thus ἐέδυνται κακοὶ (Il. 13. 382) will be 'bad (grudging) givers of dowry', ἦνιοχοὶ κακοὶ (Il. 17. 487) 'bad (incompetent) charioteers, κακὲ τέκνα (Il. 24. 253) 'bad (useless) children', κακοὶ νομῆς (Od. 17. 246) 'bad (neglectful) shepherds'. Similarly, when the companions of Odysseus who have opened the bag of winds and caused disaster are described as ἑταροὶ κακοὶ (Od. 10. 68), they are bad more in the sense that they did harm (κακὰ) to Odysseus in effect (They have all been blown back to Aeolia), than in the sense that they did it with bad intention. They are rather useless than wicked. When Ares is called τυκτόν κακῶν (Il. 5. 831), ill-born, this κακῶν probably means, again, 'harmful', as is natural to a war-god, rather than intrinsically 'wicked'.

However, when Clytemnestra is alluded to as κακὴ γυνὴ (Od. 11. 384), a 'bad' woman who killed Agamemnon, moral condemnation is obviously present. She is not only 'harmful, bad'
to her husband, but did not behave in a fitting way to a noble
woman, ἀγαθή.\(^{16}\) κακὸς is used also in such reproaching expressions
as 'cowardly shames!' (Iliad 2. 235, 5. 787, 8. 228), 'useless doll!' (Iliad
8. 164), and 'coward bitches!' (Iliad 13. 623), all addressed to
warriors who are not in fact κακοὶ. These are also examples of
moral condemnation, because, for ἀγαθοὶ, being useless as warriors
means not fulfilling their duty.

κακὸν and κακὰ as neuter nouns

κακὸν and κακὰ as neuter nouns are translated as 'evil',
'troubles', 'sufferings', 'sorrows', harm', etc. The weight of the
meaning is seldom on the moral 'badness' of the originators of
κακὸν/κακὰ — hence the originators are often not named — but on
the painful (physically and/or figuratively) and harmful effect on
its sufferers.

The difference in meaning between singular κακὸν and plural
κακὰ is often negligible, but it is sometimes significant particularly
when we find them both together in a single context. For
example, when Achilles accepts Priam as his guest and talks to
him consolingly, he says that Priam has suffered 'πολλὰ κακὰ' at Iliad
24. 518 and that he expects 'κακὸν ἄλλῳ' at Iliad 24. 551. Here, κακὰ
sums up many troubles including Hector's death Priam has
suffered so far and κακὸν refers to one other specific trouble to
come i.e. the fall of Troy. See also Odyssey 6. 173—175 and Odyssey 12.
208-209.

On the other hand, while Artemis sends a wild boar to Oeneus' domain as 'κακόν' (II. 9. 533) which sums up the whole incident, the specific troubles caused by it are 'κακὸς πολλὰ' (540). Bearing such subtle but discernible differences of usage in mind, let us examine the examples of κακόν and κακὸς separately.

κακόν

As the worst we human beings can suffer is normally considered death, κακόν is very often used in the sense of (accomplished, imminent, or possible) death. The examples of κακόν used as 'death' are: the fall of Troy (II. 2. 380, 13. 454; cf. alluded to at II. 24. 551); of the Achaeans (death, defeat) (II. 8. 541, 9. 250, 13. 89, 120, 828, 14. 80, 81, 15. 700, Od. 3. 152); the fall of Calydon (II. 9. 599 prevented); of Hector (II. 11. 363, 20. 450); of Patroclus (II. 11. 604, 17. 410); of Cleitus (II. 15. 450); of Euphorbus (II. 17. 32); Hippothous (II. 17. 292); of Aeneas (II. 20. 198); of Lycaon (II. 21. 39, 92); of a Priamid (in fact, Hector) (II. 22. 453); of the suitors' families (Od. 2. 166, 24. 462); of Aegisthus (Od. 3. 306); of Odysseus and his companions by the Cyclops (Od. 9. 423); caused by Charybdis (Od. 12. 107, 221); caused by eating Helios' cattle (Od. 12. 275); of the suitors (Od. 15. 178, 16. 103\textsuperscript{17}, 17. 159, 18. 154, 20. 351, 367, 23. 67).

\textsuperscript{17} Odysseus in the disguise of a beggar says he would bring κακόν to the suitors, if he were young. In reality, of course, he means it, and he means their death.
An interesting phenomenon is that sometimes the author of κακός is identified with κακός (evil=death) itself as in:

κακός ἠλυθε δίος Αχιλλεύς (II. 21. 39) for Lycaon, and
κακός ἠλυθε δίος Ὀρέστης (Od. 3. 306) for Aegisthus. 18

Its implication is highly significant in the context of Homeric psychology. The killer comes as death — this equation is made possible only when the event of killing is perceived by the victim himself. From the observers' point of view, Aegisthus' 'κακός' is nothing 'bad' but a glorious heroic achievement by Orestes. He comes as 'κακός' only in Aegisthus' eye and not in ours. This illustrates the point made earlier in this section — κακός is something 'bad' only in terms of the effect on the affected party, and does not therefore carry any moral evaluation of its originator.

For Telemachus and Penelope, the κακός they suffer at home is twofold (Od. 2. 45-6). One is that Odysseus is missing (possibly dead) and another is that the suitors of Penelope are wasting Odysseus' (and Telemachus') property (Od. 4. 697). The suitors even plot death against Telemachus, and all of these seem almost beyond endurance for Penelope (Od. 20. 83ff). Indeed, the suitors themselves are κακός, a great trouble to Telemachus and Penelope (Od. 15. 375-6). But for the first half of their κακός, Odysseus' absence, nobody knows who is responsible for it except the gods (and the omniscient poet and his audience). We know that it was the gods, more specifically Poseidon, who delayed Odysseus' return to Ithaca. However, we also know that Poseidon's

18 cf. κακός = the wild boar at II. 9. 533, κακός = Chimaera at II. 16. 328-9, δόλων κακός = Scylla (Od. 12. 87).
intention is to take revenge on Odysseus and not directly on his family. Their κακόν is not specially sent to them by any god, but merely the consequence of Odysseus' κακόν, his absence from home. Suppose Penelope acted like Clytemnestra i. e. married another man — which would not be at all impractical — Odysseus' κακόν (particularly his death) would not have been her κακόν to such an extent as it is.¹⁹ κακόν of man may be sent by the gods, but it becomes κακόν only when it is acknowledged by him as such. What matters is, again, only the recipient's reaction to it.

Just as much as the suitors are κακόν for Telemachus, he is becoming their κακόν (Od. 4. 667) himself, plotting κακόν against them (Od. 2. 304) in his turn. And as we have already seen, their death brought by Odysseus and Telemachus is the ultimate 'κακόν' for the suitors (though, like Orestes' revenge upon Aegisthus, κλέος for the two). There is no moral evaluation to compare κακόν of one party with another's. They are both κακόν in equal terms.

In the following examples, κακόν can be interpreted as danger or harm: punishment from Agamemnon on the Achaeans (Il. 2. 195); the war for all the Trojans (πάσι κακόν Il. 5. 63); somebody's 'mischief' (Il. 5. 374, 21. 510; done by a beast Il. 15. 586); a wild boar sent by Artemis (Il. 9. 533); punishment from Zeus on other gods because of Ares' disobedience (Il. 15. 134); Ajax's difficulty in battle (Il. 16. 111); wasps teased by children (ξυνόν κακόν Il. 16. 262); Chimaera (Il. 16. 328-9); not intended by Iris to Priam (Il. 24. 172); punishment from Achilles (Il. 24. 436); of Priam asleep in Achilles' hut (Il. 24. 683); which pirates bring (Od. 3. 74, 9. 255); which Odysseus might meet (Od. 16. 173); the

¹⁹ cf. Athena's comment on 'feminine nature' Od. 15. 20-23.
sanction on the suitors from the Ithacans (Od. 16. 381); Odysseus-beggar has not done (Od. 17. 567, 18. 15); punishment on Irus (Od. 18. 73, 107); Eurymachus threatens to bring to Odysseus (Od. 18. 389); punishment of Eurytion the Centaur (Od. 21. 304).

κακόν as sorrows and misfortune (less drastic than death and serious threat to life) are seen in the following examples: of Briseis especially over Patroclus' death (Il. 19. 290); heirlessness of Peleus (Il. 24. 538); misfortune which Odysseus wishes not to visit the Phaeacians (Od. 13. 46); misfortune which men do not foresee in their good days (Od. 18. 132); good and bad fortune (+ ἐσθλὸν Il. 24. 530; + διαθέσει Od. 4. 237 that Zeus gives to man; Od. 4. 392 of Menelaus; Od. 8. 63 of Demodocus; Od. 15. 488 that Zeus gives to Eumaeus).

There are a few other unpleasant things and occasions regarded as κακόν: rude words (Il. 4. 362); disgrace (μέγα κακόν) that Odysseus would get if he escapes from the battle (Il. 11. 408); troubles caused by Zeus among the gods (Il. 15. 109) paying a huge dowry back in order to return one's mother to her father's home (Od. 2. 132).

κακά

κακά, like κακόν, is used in the sense of death, though not as often. Naturally enough, it refers to the death of a single person more rarely than κακόν. κακά is used in the sense of (plotted, intended) death in the following examples: of Bellerophon (Il. 6. 157); of Telemachus (plotted by the suitors Od. 3. 213, 16. 134, 17. 66, 499, 596, 18. 232, 21. 375); of the suitors (plotted by Odysseus Od. 14. 110, 17. 465, 20. 5, 184; plotted by Telemachus
of Agamemnon (plotted by Clytemnestra \textit{Od}. 24. 199); of Priam (not plotted by Hermes in disguise \textit{Il}. 24. 370); men plot against one another \textit{(Od}. 16. 423); men and lions or wolves and sheep plot against each other \textit{(Il}. 22. 262-4).

\textit{Kakad} is often destruction and many casualties (devised, intended, caused) especially in battle. Such examples are: of both the Achaeans and the Trojans (devised by Zeus \textit{Il}. 7. 70, 478); of the Achaeans \textit{(Il}. 2. 234, 3. 99, 8. 356, 10. 52, 12. 67, 16. 424, 22. 380); of the Trojans and their allies (by Diomedes \textit{Il}. 5. 175, 10. 486; by Patroclus \textit{Il}. 16. 373, 783, 18. 455; by Neoptolemus \textit{Od}. 11. 532); of the Achaeans on their way home (by \textit{delta}i\textmu ow \textit{Od}. 3. 166); of Odysseus and his companions (by \textit{delta}i\textmu ow \textit{Od}. 12. 295); of one's enemy \textit{(Od}. 14. 218, 17. 289); destruction of Achaean ships \textit{(Il}. 15. 503); the sufferings and fall of Troy \textit{(Il}. 2. 304, 4. 21, 28, 8. 458, 18. 367, 22. 61, \textit{Od}. 3. 118).

\textit{Kakad} in the sense of harm (done or intended by known originators) are found in the following lines: to Calchas by Agamemnon \textit{(Il}. 1. 105); by Paris to the Trojans \textit{(Il}. 3. 57); by Paris to Menelaus \textit{(Il}. 3. 351); by anybody to his host \textit{(Il}. 3. 354); to Hera by the Trojans \textit{(Il}. 4. 32); by the wild boar sent by Artemis \textit{(Il}. 9. 540); to Heracles plotted by Hera \textit{(Il}. 14. 253, 15. 27); to the Trojans by Hector \textit{(Il}. 18. 312); to Ares plotted by Hera \textit{(Il}. 21. 413); to Poseidon and Apollo by the Trojans \textit{(Il}. 21. 442); to Telemachus (by Icarius, if he returns his mother) \textit{(Od}. 2. 134); to Odysseus by Poseidon \textit{(Od}. 5. 340); to Ares and Aphrodite by Hephaestus \textit{(Od}. 8. 273); to the Cyclops by Odysseus \textit{(Od}. 9. 316, 460); to Odysseus by Circe \textit{(Od}. 10. 286, 317); to Odysseus and his companions by Circe \textit{(Od}. 10. 431); to people by the Phoenicians.
(Od. 14. 289); done by one's stomach (Od. 17. 287, 474); to Ares by Zeus (Od. 18. 27); by the suitors (Od. 20. 314, 22. 264, 316); to Peirithous' house by Eurytion (Od. 21. 298).

κακά as troubles or misfortunes (with originators not directly specified) are also found in many passages, especially referring to Odysseus' sufferings: of Odysseus (Od. 1. 234, 2. 174, 5. 377, 6. 175, 7. 213, 8. 137, 184, 11. 482, 13. 131, 14. 243 (false), 270, 15. 176, 16. 205, 17. 284, 439, 18. 123, 20. 53, 200, 21. 207, 400, 23. 101, 169, 287 — κακών γίνεσθαι); of Odysseus and his companions (Od. 11. 104, 111, 12. 138, 209, of Odysseus' companions (Od. 10. 189, 374, 12. 271, 340)20; that Calchas prophesies (Ili. 1. 106, 107); of the Achaeans (at Troy Ili. 14. 89, Od. 3. 113; on their way home Od. 3. 116); of Helen (and Troy) (Ili. 6. 349); of Menelaus in the battle (Ili. 17. 105); toil of wrestling (Ili. 23. 735); of Priam (Ili. 24. 518); woes of man in general (Od. 1. 33, 4. 221); diseases (ἡμέρα κακών) (Od. 17. 384); of Penelope sent by a δαίμον (Od. 18. 256, 19. 129); sleep lets people forget both ἐσθλόν and κακά (Od. 20. 85-6).

There is one example in which κακά means 'pollution'. At Od. 22. 481, it is said that sulphur is the 'cure of pollution (κακών ἄκος)'. Sulphur is used after the killing of the suitors by Odysseus. It must have had a ritual meaning in the purification of the hall where they were killed, but there is no sign of 'purifying' Odysseus himself as a murderer. Their murder disturbs Odysseus only because of the fear of vengeance. Being an avenger himself, he is not a criminal or polluted in any sense. This κακά means only physical pollution of the place and does not convey any moral conviction on murderers.

20 Od. 10. 374 κατά in OCT.
κακός applied to objects

κακόν and κακὲ often being 'death', it is not surprising that κακός is the most common adjective used in connection with death or fate. We find such expressions as θάνατος κακός (II. 3. 173, 16. 47, 21. 66, 22. 300, Od. 22. 14, 24. 153), κηρ κακή (II. 16. 687), κακαὶ κηρὲς (II. 12. 113, Od. 2. 316, 23. 332), κακὸς ὀίτος (II. 3. 417, 8. 34, 354, 465, Od. 1. 350, 3. 134, 13. 384), μοῖρα κακή (II. 13. 602), κακὸς μόρος (II. 6. 357, 21. 133, Od. 1. 166, 11. 618), κακή αἴσα (II. 1. 418, 5. 209, Od. 19. 259), δαίμονος αἴσα κακή (Od. 11. 61), κακὴ Διὸς αἴσα (Od. 9. 52), and κακὸν ἡμαρ (II. 9. 251, 597, 20. 315, 21. 374, Od. 10. 269, 288, 15. 524).

Most of these expressions are simply synonymous with death. These terms which κακός modifies are, of course, often synonymous with death themselves, but the addition of κακός gives them more powerful impact. It can be almost translated as 'deadly'. And this translation is also appropriate to the examples applied to the objects directly leading to death, such as 'deadly war' (II. 1. 284, 4. 15, 82, 13. 225, 16. 494, Od. 22. 152, 24. 475), 'deadly strife' (II. 3. 7, 11. 529, Od. 3. 161), κυδομὸς κακός (II. 11. 52-3, 538-9), Διὸς μάστιξ κακή (II. 13. 812), κλόνος κακός (II. 16. 729-30), κακὸς κόναβος (Od. 10. 122). Panic leading to defeat is φυία κακή (Od. 14. 269, 17. 438). All these terms refer to struggles in battle. There are several other examples of κακός as deadly. The plague sent by Apollo to the Achaeans is νοῦς κακή (II. 1. 10) and his arrow which brings the plague is κακὸν βέλος (II. 1. 382). The
deadly message which Bellerophontes carries is σήμα κακόν (Il. 6. 178). κακὸς δαίμων who brings Odysseus back to Aeolia (Od. 10. 64) is a deadly god for the suitors (Od. 24. 149). The monster Scylla is πέλαγος κακόν (Od. 12. 87) and δθάνατον κακόν (118). The darkness which Theoclymenus sees surrounding the suitors in the hall of Odysseus is κακή ἀχλίσ (Od. 20. 357), a sign of their ensured death.

κακός also emphasizes the words referring to sorrow and sufferings, such as κακὰ κῆδεα (Il. 18. 8, Od. 1. 244, 6. 165, 15. 344), πῆμα κακὸν (Od. 5. 187, 10. 300, 344), κακὸς πόνος (of battle Il. 17. 401), ἐλκός κακὸν (Il. 2. 723), ὀδύναι κακαὶ (Il. 5. 766, Od. 9. 440), and κακὴ βουβρόστης (Il. 24. 532). Nothing is κακώτερον, i.e. nothing gives more sorrow and pain, than Patroclus' death to Achilles (Il. 19. 321) the news of which is κακὸν ἔπος (Il. 17. 701 painful news), the sea to man (Od. 8. 138), or wanderings to man (Od. 15. 343). Lamentation is also bad i.e. sorrowful, and it gets worse (κακίου) if given no break (Od. 18. 174, 19. 120).

Something ominous or leading to misfortune can be also crowned with κακός, such as κακὸν δναρ (Il. 10. 496), ὄνειρατα κακὰ (Od. 20. 87), φλέγμα κακὸν (Il. 21. 337), κακὸν σήμα (Il. 22. 30), ὄρισ κακὸς (Il. 24. 219), and δώρα κακὰ (Il. 24. 528). Things leading to harm in general are often modified by κακός. Achilles' wrath is μὴ νις οὐλομένη (Il. 1. 1-2) and κακὸς χόλος (Il. 16. 206). Zeus' deception of Agamemnon by a false dream is κακὴ ἀπατὴ leading to the Achaeans' difficulty (Il. 2. 114, 9. 21). Stormy winds are κακὴ ἀνέμοιο ψυέλλα (Il. 6. 346, Od. 10. 54) and ἀνέμος κακὸς (Od. 5. 109). Strife leading to sorrow and misfortune is ἔρις κακῆ (Od. 3. 161).
Poisonous herbs are κακὰ φάρμακα (II. 22. 94, Od. 10. 213). A plan or suggestion leading to harm is βουλή κακῆ/κακῆ βουλή (Od. 10. 46, 12. 339, 14. 337), κακὰ κέρδεα (Od. 23. 217) or κακὸς νός (Od. 13. 229). Folly that invites misfortunes is δτασθαλίαι κακαί (Od. 12. 300, 24. 458).

Special attention should be paid to the phrase 'κακὰ έργα' found in the following lines: II. 15. 97 Zeus does to the Achaeans; II. 21. 19 Achilles' attack on the Trojans; II. 23. 176 Achilles' sacrifice of twelve Trojans for the dead Patroclus; Od. 2. 67 the gods may be offended at κακὰ έργα by the Ithacans; Od. 9. 477 the Cyclops' own deeds fall upon himself; Od. 14. 284 killing of a guest; 16. 380 the suitors' plan to kill Telemachus against which the Ithacans may take action; Od. 17. 158, 23. 64, 24. 326 of the suitors; Od. 17. 226, 18. 362 begging — base habits; Od. 20. 16 of Odysseus' maidservants sleeping with the suitors; Od. 8. 329 referring to adultery 'οὖκ δρετὰ κακὰ έργα'. In the three Iliadic examples, κακὰ έργα does not mean anything more than 'harmful, destructive deeds', with no moral overtone. In the Odyssey, on the other hand, some examples seem to carry a moral accusation, particularly for the suitors. The examples at Od. 2. 67, 14. 284, and 23. 64 are set in the context of the belief that the gods will punish evil deeds, here specifically the offence against ξεινία. At Od. 9. 477, Odysseus reproaches the Cyclops saying that the gods

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21 κακὰ έργα in the poet's comment on Achilles' sacrifice of twelve Trojans at II. 23. 176 has often been regarded as the poet's moral condemnation on the hero, e.g. G. Murray, The Rise of the Greek Epic (London 1934), p. 141, but I do not see the reason for making it an exception while it makes perfect sense if we read it, like many other examples of κακὸς, as 'intending harm to them', without any moral condemnation. Intending harm for one's enemy is nothing to be condemned as is clear from another example at II. 21. 19.
have punished him. The example at *Od.* 16. 380 is in Antinous' own words fearing possible community sanctions on the suitors for their 'harmful deeds'. It does not necessarily mean, however, that the suitors have any sense of guilt about plotting death against Telemachus. It is more plausible that Antinous describes their plot as 'deeds harmful to Telemachus', 'bad, deadly' from the view-point of Telemachus alone, as in the well-attested usage of the word *kakós*, without moral overtone. However, the suitors are aware that what they are doing may be met by public indignation and may create a dangerous situation (*τι *κακόν* *Od.* 16 381) for them eventually. It is a sort of awareness of *νέμεσις*, but Antinous' reaction to it is not to avoid it by restraining himself, but to bury it by doing greater harm. It is far from what we can describe as the sense of guilt or shame. The examples at *Od.* 17. 226 and 18. 362 said of begging must point to the 'lowly' social status of a beggar, and therefore have nothing to do with moral vice. The example at *Od.* 8. 329, though said as a joke, sounds like a moral teaching, implying 'If you harm others, it does not benefit you in the end.' The same idea recurs in Odysseus' message to Medon that *ἐνεργεσία* is far more profitable than *κακοεργία* (*Od.* 22. 374).

*kakós* is anything unpleasant to the party affected. Therefore an unkind or rude attitude or conduct are described as *kakós*. Achilles' stubborn heart is *κακός ὀμός* to the Achaeans (*II.* 9. 636-7); harsh or rude words are *κακόν ἐπος* (*II.* 24. 767) or *ἐπεα κακά* (*II.* 5. 650, 23. 492-3, *Od.* 24. 161 cf. *εἶ* *τι* *κακόν* νῦν ἐξηται *II.* 4. 362-3); shortage or excess of hospitality is *κακόν* (*Od.* 15. 72-3); Odysseus' cowherd says that to leave Odysseus' household while
his son is still alive is κακόν (Od. 20. 218-20). These examples reflect evaluation of human conduct from specific points of view.

κακός sometimes describes objects which show inferiority typical of lowly people like base, poor, unseemly, corresponding to such meanings of ἀγαθός/ἐσθιλός as noble and wonderful. It is often used of poor clothing: σπείρα κακά (Od. 4. 245 of Odysseus), κακά εὔματα/εὔματα κακά (Od. 11. 191 of Laertes; 14. 506, 17. 24, 19. 72, 23. 115, 24. 156 of Odysseus), ῥάκος κακόν (Od. 13. 434, 14. 342), κακά εὔμενος (Od. 19. 327). Filthy smoke to make Odysseus look like a 'κακός' is κακός καπνός (Od. 13. 435). Spiders' webs which make an unused bed look miserable are κακὴ δράγμα (Od. 16. 35).

As we have seen above, begging is κακά ἔργα (Od. 17. 226, 18. 362), not in the sense that it is an evil of the society, but that it is a job of a κακός, a miserable person.

κακός is applied to 'useless, cowardly' persons, items, and conduct as an antonym to ἀγαθός/ἐσθιλός meaning 'useful, competent, valorous'. κακοὶ δόλοι (II. 4. 339) are not 'bad' tricks, but cowardly tricks, characteristic of cowardly, inglorious persons. Sarpedon is taunted by his opponent saying that he has a κακός θυμός, cowardly heart (II. 5. 643). It is κάκιον, harder (more harmful to Achilles) to help the Achaeans when their ships are set on fire, Phoenix says to Achilles, trying to persuade him to join the battle again (II. 9. 601-2). It is not κακόν, it is profitable, to be a king (Od. 1. 392; not κάκιστον 391). ἀνεμώλια βείειν is κακόν, useless (Od. 4. 837, 11. 464). The neighbouring island to the Cyclopes' would be 'οὐ κακὴ', not fruitless, if cultivated (Od. 9. 131). αἰδοῖος ἀλήτης is κακός, i. e. a shy beggar does not gain much (Od. 17. 578).
An abstract noun formed from *kakós*, *kakótēs*, is very often synonymous with the neuter noun *kakóv* or *kakê*, when it means 'sufferings', 'death', 'destruction', etc. The only meaning of *kakótēs* which is not found in the usage of *kakóv* and *kakê* is 'cowardice'. This aspect of *kakós* is, however, well represented in the usage of *kakós* describing persons, as we have seen.

*kakótēs* means or implies death in the following passages: *Od.* 5. 414 of the possible death of Odysseus; *Od.* 9. 489, 10. 129 death to be avoided by Odysseus and his companions; *Od.* 3. 175, death to be avoided by Nestor and his crew; *Od.* 16. 364 death escaped by Telemachus; *Od.* 17. 364 destined death of the suitors; *Od.* 23. 238 death avoided by safe landing. Casualties caused by Diomedes (*Il.* 11. 382), which is his glory from the Achaeans' point of view, are described as *kakótēs* by Paris. On the other hand, casualties to be caused by Glaucus and Sarpedon are *kakótēs* for the Achaeans (*Il.* 12. 332). Damage done to Menelaus by Paris (*Il.* 3. 366) is also *kakótēs*. Any damage, whether or not it is a glorious thing in somebody's eye, is *kakótēs* for the affected party.

*kakótēs* means troubles and sufferings in the following examples: of Odysseus (*Od.* 5. 290, 379, 8. 182, 13. 321, 17. 517); of Telemachus at home (*Od.* 4. 167); disease (*Od.* 5. 397); of Argus the dog (*Od.* 17. 318); *kakótēs* makes a man older than his age (*Od.* 19. 360); Zeus throws men into *kakótēs* (*Od.* 20. 203); Zeus gave Agamemnon and Menelaus *kakótēs* at their birth (*Il.* 10. 71).

*kakótēs* means 'cowardice, weakness' in the following examples: possible cowardice of the Achaeans (*Il.* 2. 368); of the
Achaean leaders who have held their host back (II. 13. 108); of the Trojan elders who have held their host back (II. 15. 721); of the Ithacans who failed to check the suitors (Od. 24. 455). In contrast with the highest virtue of heroic courage, it is treated as the worst moral defect for Homeric man.

**kakós**

*kakós* reflects almost all the spectrum of meaning of *kakós*. It is generally translatable as 'badly' in various senses, such as rudely, unkindly (II. 1. 25, 379, Od. 17. 394, 23. 56), hatefully i.e. intending great harm (II. 5. 164 Diomedes kills two sons of Priam; Od. 18. 168 the suitors intend harm to Telemachus; so Achilles intends *kakós* érga at II. 23. 176), terribly or exceedingly (implying unpleasant excess) (Od. 2. 203 Telemachus' property being devoured terribly; Od. 2. 266, 4. 766 the suitors are terribly overbearing; Odysseus suffers terribly Od. 16. 275); painfully, wretchedly (II. 5. 698 Sarpedon gasps out his breath, 9. 324 life goes for a parent bird; Od. 18. 75 Irus terribly frightened), disadvantageously (II. 9. 551 the war goes for the Couretes); unluckily (Od. 22. 27); miserably and shamefully (II. 21. 459-60 May the Trojans perish in misery!; Od. 9. 534, 11. 114, 12. 141 May Odysseus go home in misery!; Od. 24. 250 Laertes miserably clothed), shamefully and empty-handed (II. 2. 253 the Achaean could leave Troy ingloriously).

**kaków**

*kaków* means 'I put (someone) in the state of being *kakós*.' Hence, it means 'bring into trouble', 'maltreat', 'disfigure', and so
on. The Pylians are oppressed (κεκακωμένοι) by the Epeians (II. 11. 689). Heracles once brought troubles (ἐκδικώσε) to the Pylians (II. 11. 690). The gods have brought troubles (ἐκακωσατε) to Odysseus (Od. 20. 99). Laertes is distressed by his misfortune (κακού κεκακωμένον Od. 4. 754). Odysseus has been disfigured (κεκακωμένος) by brine (Od. 6. 137). The gods can disfigure a man at their will (κακώσαι v. s. κυθήναι Od. 16. 212).

Conclusion

Who is the 'good' man in the Homeric society?

We have gone through all examples of ὅγαθος, ἀθλός, κακός and their major derivatives in order to see the whole range of meanings which these words cover and also to see the proportion of the usage of the terms in different shades of meaning. The overwhelming majority of the examples points to the observation that δρετή of Homeric man consists of his physical strength, i. e. excellence in battle. This δρετή is closely connected with his noble birth and wealth which alone can afford him expensive and effective weapons and armour.

The class of people called ὅγαθοι/ἀθλοί/δριστοι with such δρετή are, indeed, good, useful people for the community, because they will defend their territory against the aggression of other communities and, whenever opportunity arises, they can plunder other communities and increase the property of their own as well as the community's, more specifically, of those who fight under their command. In this context, a man useful in battle is a good man, a man like Achilles and Ajax, for example, who fights
fiercely and ruthlessly in battle, with his tremendous might and courage. He may be short-tempered or blunt in speech, but as far as he is 'useful', he is 'excellent'.

However, in time of peace, the most useful thing for the community is its harmony which, as we saw in Chapter 5, is maintained by θέμις and δίκη administered by διαθοῖ in the capacity of βασιλῆς. Although a man of noble birth and wealth will not lose his title διαθοיס by murdering someone in the community or by violating other social codes such as ξεινί (as the suitors of Penelope do), he is perceived by the community as not behaving in a suitable way for an διαθοῖ. From our small collection of sporadic examples of διαθοῖ and related terms referring to good and bad behaviour in peaceful contexts, we can reconstruct what kind of manner is appropriate to an διαθοῖ in time of peace. He is expected to entertain his visitors generously, to talk politely, to care for his wife, and to have an understanding, placable mind.

This corresponds to the image of the 'good' man depicted in previous chapters. The problem in discussing Homeric morality, however, is that this type of moral virtue does not have a name of its own. All of these chivalrous attributes are only an auxiliary part of heroic δρετῆ, and when the word δρετῆ (διαθοῖ etc.) is used, it always evokes as its primary meaning the warrior's virtue, prowess and aggressiveness. Heroes' characters are therefore inevitably double-sided. They talk nicely, respect ladies and foreign visitors, behaving in every respect like modern 'gentlemen' in their court life. In time of war, however, they have tough spirit to shout in dirty words, to rape women, and to slaughter enemies supplicating at their knees and even young.
children. All of these are part of one concept, \( d\rho e\tau \eta \) of the warrior class.

As far as the line between his friends and his enemies is clear, and as far as he recognizes you as a friend, an \( d\gamma a\theta o\delta \) is indeed 'good' to you, namely, useful, helpful, and pleasant to deal with. In this sense, the use of the word \( d\gamma a\theta o\delta \) for persons is not different from that for objects which generally denotes the goodness as observed by the affected party. However, once you are registered as his enemy, he will become a source of your \( kak\omicron\nu \). Friends can change into enemies ever so suddenly, once the situation concerning \( \tau i\mu \eta \) between them goes wrong. An \( d\gamma a\theta o\delta \), however, will remain \( d\gamma a\theta o\delta \) even though he is your enemy, in so far as it is his class title. As a result, the word has nothing to do with what he does and the effect you get from the particular person. Therefore \( d\gamma a\theta o\delta \) cannot function as a term of moral commendation valid in a peaceful context. To be reasonable to one's friends is part of being \( d\gamma a\theta o\delta \), but the word is used in that sense extremely rarely. When the poet especially wants to commend good aristocratic manners, he must resort to other expressions as \( \pi e\nu\nu\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\omicron\) (\( Od. \) 4. 204, 18. 125 etc.), \( \epsilon\pi\pi\tau\eta\omicron\) (\( Od. \) 13. 332, 18. 128) or \( \delta\mu\upsilon\mu\omicron\omicron\) (esp. \( Od. \) 19. 109, 332)\(^{22}\) or a whole passage to specify the sort of \( d\rho e\tau \eta \) he means. As we say in previous chapters, there is no doubt that polite manners, thoughtfulness, etc. have a high profile in Homeric morality, but Homeric man does not have an exact word for it.

\(^{22}\) But see \( \Lambda\gamma\iota\sigma\theta\omicron\ d\mu\nu\mu\nu \) said without any commendation on his 'quiet virtue'. cf. A. A. Parry, \textit{Blameless Aegisthus} (Leiden 1973).
Who is the 'bad' man in the Homeric society?

κακός and its related terms are even less useful as moral terms than δ'γαθός and its related terms. κακοί are very often simply 'not δ'γαθοί', denoting either 'everybody except the ruling class' or 'cowardly men (not behaving like brave warriors)'. The latter of course contains a moral reproach, but not in the sense that the persons labelled as κακοί are criminals. Another category of κακοί are those who possess κακόν/κακά, namely miserable, unfortunate. They are to be pitied, not to be condemned. The fourth category of κακοί are those who bring κακόν/κακά to somebody else. They are harmful and cause pains to the party affected who would indeed criticize them for being 'bad'. However, κακός is not a criminal, for there is no law to criminalize those who harm others. He is simply described, either by the poet or by the affected character, as harmful (κακός) to him/her/me etc. There is no objective moral observer (such as the Christian God) to judge the harm done to this particular person to be good or bad. Even the poet does not take up this role when he simply says 'A did κακά to B'. It is up to us, either to sympathize with A and say that B is justly punished or to sympathize with B and say that A has unjustly harmed B.

Similarly, when something other than persons is δ'γαθός, it is good only in the eye of the affected party (such as users or recipients of the object), and if it is bad, it is bad, again, only in the eye of the affected party.

The only constant logic we see throughout the usage of the words related to δ'γαθός and κακός, whether applied to men or items, is that anything useful, profitable for the affected party is
'good' and anything which is not useful or positively harmful for the affected party is 'bad'. The most significant implication of this nature of Homeric good and bad is that one and the same person or thing can be described as 'good' and 'bad' at the same time, depending on the perspective of the speaker. δυαθοι' are categorically 'good' for the community, and therefore always retain the title, but when they are cowardly in actual battle, they could be called κακοι'. Telemachus is κακον for the suitors, but by doing κακον to them, he wins κλεος ἔσθλον and becomes a grown-up ἔσθλος. The Greek terms δυαθος and κακος can be translated as good and bad respectively only in reference to a specific point of view, to whom it is good or bad.

Beside this relativity, there is another factor which makes the use of the terms amoral. One gets born into either one category or another, according to one's lot, and if one possesses an exceptional δμη, either in physical strength or in certain skills, it is considered to be a gift of the gods. And the gods dispense δμη to men in their own way, guided by their favouritism and nepotism, certainly not because of men's observance of δικη and θεμις. Possession of δμη is not the proof of one's moral quality. It could be, partially, a sign of piety, for, the gods do value offerings, but piety does not help the Phaeacians when Poseidon decides to take their δμη away. The gods grant δμη — competence, but whether δυαθοι behave in an suitably aristocratic manner or not does not seem to concern them.

The most outstanding characteristic of δμη is that it is double sided, being the ability to be good to friends on the one hand and bad to enemies on the other. Therefore δυαθος or κακος
means different things for different people and in different contexts. Homer does not judge who is the good man and who is the bad man, but he offers us the comprehensive view of the human world where glory of one party often means sufferings of another.
"γαθός and κακός mean 'good' and 'bad' respectively for the party affected. There is another pair of words, καλός and αἰσχρός, to describe 'good' and 'bad' situations. The point of reference of these words, however, is not the effect of the object so described, but its appearance, namely, whether it looks good or bad. These words presuppose the speaker's aesthetic judgment, and could be used to commend or to criticize certain behaviour. In this chapter, we will examine the use of καλός and αἰσχρός and their derivatives in detail in order to see what is considered seemly or unseemly in the Homeric world.

καλός

The primary sense of καλός is 'beautiful', i.e. looking good. It is undoubtedly a reflection of the speaker's aesthetic judgement. The majority of examples of καλός point to external beauty of persons, animals or material objects.

The noun κάλλος is most often used to denote beauty of persons. It can be either masculine (II. 3. 392, 6. 156, 20. 235, Od. 6. 237, 15. 251, 18. 219, 23. 156) or feminine beauty (II. 9. 130, 272, 389, 13. 432, 23. 742, Od. 6. 18, 8. 457, 11. 282). It is used twice for material objects, once for a luxurious mixing-bowl (II. 23. 742) and once for a sort of divine cosmetics to maintain or recover beauty (κάλλος ἀμβρόσιον Od. 18. 192-3). There is no mention of 'beauty' of abstract idea or conduct.

The adjective καλός is used to describe masculine (II. 3. 169, 21. 108, Od. 1. 301, 3. 199, 6. 276, 8. 310, 9. 513; καλλίων Od. 10. 396; καλλίστος II. 2. 673, 20. 233, Od. 11. 310, 522) and feminine


In many of the examples, καλὸς reinforces the grandeur of heroic life, but in some, it describes beauty of the nature or

1 ἕρεα καλό with a variant reading ἕρεα λευκα. cf. OCT ad loc.
usefulness of tools. Persons, animals and material objects described as "καλός" are, all in all, pleasant figures or objects to look at, and at the same time expected to function well. In other words, good appearance is generally taken as a hallmark of good quality. Paris, however, is καλός in form (II. 3. 44-45) and therefore, says Hector, could be taken for the best warrior (ἀριστεύως ιός) of the Trojans by the enemies, while that is in fact questionable. Similarly, a good form of a dog is not always the guarantee of its competence in hunting (Od. 17. 309-10). καλός denotes primarily agreeable appearance, and the indication of quality only to a limited extent.

καλός refers not only to objects pleasant to the eyes, but also to the ears. Divine singing voices are invariably beautiful (II. 1. 604, Od. 5. 61, 10. 221, 24. 60) and it is καλόν, agreeable, to listen to the song of a bard of god-like voice (Od. 1. 370-1, 9. 3-4). However, there is no example of καλός applied to pleasant taste, smell or touch. Therefore we can conclude from this that Homeric sense of beauty, like its English equivalent, works dominantly in the realm of sight and at times that of hearing, but not normally elsewhere.

The visuality of the sense of καλός is inherent in the sense of honour as well. The ghost of Odysseus' mother reports to her son how Telemachus holds his καλόν γέρας (Od. 11. 184), retaining his estate (185), and being invited to banquets which (186):

ἐπέσυκε οὐκοστόλον ἀνεπολεγίμεν.

The attendance at banquets is conceived as something 'seemly' or a proper situation to 'look at' (ἐπί + ἑφωκα). The sense of shame is also dominated by καλός by sight. When imploring Hector not to face Achilles alone, Priam recounts the misery that an old man
like him will face at his death in contrast with a young man's death (II. 22. 71-76):

\[\textit{nēmōde te pant' ēpēouchèn}\]

\[\textit{φοιταμένῳ δεδαιμένῳ ἀξίω χαλκῷ} \]

\[\textit{kēsthai: pánta de kalá thei vàn peri òti fainή} \]

\[\textit{ἄλλ' òte dé polián te kóri polián te γένειον} \]

\[\textit{αἶδοι 'αληχύμως κύκες κταμένῳ γέφυτος}.\]

\[\textit{τούτῳ δὴ οὐκτιστον πέλεται δειλόις βροτοῖσιν}.\]

Even dead, everything is seemly for a young warrior, but an old man's dead body is most terrible to look at when being disfigured — made \textit{αἰ'σχρός} — by beasts. There is no consideration of the circumstances in which a man dies. All that matters is the appearance of the body.

To retain one's dignity is certainly part of aristocratic duties on the other hand. A princess and her family are supposed to be dressed in beautiful (\textit{καλὰ}) clothes (\textit{Od.} 6. 27), not unseemly (\textit{ακηδέα}) ones (26) at her wedding. For a king like Odysseus, it is an object of \textit{νέμεσις} (\textit{Od.} 22. 489) to be dressed in rags, once he has revealed his true identity. \textit{καλὸς} in social contexts is very close in meaning to English 'seemly', as 'acceptable' or 'commendable' in the eye of the public. It is set in a perspective involving values of the community which is often different from that of an individual who judges human conduct in terms of \textit{ἀγαθὸν} and \textit{κακὸν} on the ground of his own interests.

For example, death in general terms is \textit{κακὸν} for Hector as for any other man, but if he is to die in an honourable combat, his death is \textit{καλὸν} in the public eye. As he himself says, using the word '\textit{δείκης}', a synonym of \textit{αἰ'σχρός}, it is not 'unseemly' to die in defence of one's country (II. 15. 496-7):
It may be *δ'μεινον* (*Od*. 2. 141) for the suitors to continue consuming Odysseus' property, but it is not *καλόν* (*Od*. 2. 63), not seemly, in terms of social codes.

As we see in these examples, *καλόν* as a neuter adjective is sometimes used to describe seemly or unseemly behaviour. In the Theomachy, Poseidon urges Apollo to begin their combat, for it is not *καλόν* for an elder person, who knows things better, to start aggression (*Il*. 21. 439-40). On the contrary, Menelaus is much offended when challenged by Panthous who is much younger and less experienced than him, and says that it is not seemly (*καλόν*) for one to exult insolently (*Il*. 17. 19) to the extent that even a leopard, a lion or a wild boar would not (20-21). Menelaus apparently finds the young man's speech lacking aristocratic grace. It is his 'aesthetic' comment, his opinion on what is socially proper or improper. Similarly, when a young Phaeacian called Euryalus taunts Odysseus for being reluctant to join the games, Odysseus angrily replies (*Od*. 8. 166):

*εδώ, οὐκ *καλόν* ἔστιν: ἀπασθέλω ἄσθι ἔουκας.

The way the young man has talked is not seemly — not considered proper in the social convention, namely, *θέμις*, and by speaking in that manner, he looks like a wanton man.

In an example we saw in our discussion of *ἔσθλος*, Antinous who has complained about Eumaeus' introduction of a beggar into Odysseus' house is criticized by Eumaeus for not speaking properly (*Od*. 17. 381):

*οὐμὲν καλὰ καλ ἔσθλος ἐὼν ἄφορεύεις.*
We can probably paraphrase this line with its social implications as follows: 'I admit that your social status is high (compared with mine), but I dare say that what you have said is not socially acceptable and not suitable for a man of your status.' Certainly the phrase 'ἔσθλος ἐὼν' does not imply that an ἔσθλος qua ἔσθλος has a right to speak insolently, but quite the reverse. There is an invisible higher authority which we may call θέμις or δίκη, in more familiar terms 'customs' or 'good manners', behind Eumaeus' statement. It is evident from this passage that ὑγιάτος/ἔσθλος is not a moral term, but καλὸς is.

The connection between θέμις/δίκη and καλὸς can be seen in other examples in which καλὸς is used for behaviour of characters. Antinous requests Penelope to receive presents from the suitors saying it is not καλὸν to refuse them (Od. 18. 287). This reflects the custom of present-giving as part of courting just mentioned by Penelope as 'δίκη' of the suitors (275-9). What Antinous means by saying it is 'not καλὸν' is that it is 'not in accordance with δίκη/θέμις', echoing Penelope's earlier statement. Namely, since it is δίκη for the suitors to give presents to the courted lady, it is also δίκη for Penelope to receive them, and if she does not, it is not socially proper.

ξείνη, another category of δίκη/θέμις, also comes into the definition of 'propriety'. Ctesippus (though with a malicious intention) and Penelope say that it is neither καλὸν nor δίκαιον to disappoint a visitor to Telemachus' house (Od. 20. 294-5, 21. 312-3). καλὸς and δίκαιος are used synonymously in this sentence. In other words, deeds in accordance with δίκη are 'seemly', καλὸς.

Another example involves a manner at a public assembly. After Achilles has spoken, renouncing his wrath at Agamemnon,
Agamemnon stands up where he has been sitting (or still remains seated) and says (II. 19. 79-80):

εστάθης μὲν καλὸν ἀκούειν, οἴκε ἐοκεν

ιββῆλλεν.

The rest of line 80 has been an object of dispute which obscures the meaning of this sentence, but we can be sure at least that he is talking about a certain aspect of manners at a public assembly, to speak and to listen in an orderly fashion. Again, καλὸν is contrasted with ἐοκεν, both connected with sight.

Achilles talks about another δίκη, the way friends should behave to one another, when complaining that Phoenix among the Embassy speaks for Agamemnon and not for Achilles. He says (II. 9. 615):

καλὸν τοι σὺν ἐμοὶ τὰυ κτῆτευς καὶ ζημὲ κτῆτη

The idea is that it is not seemly to betray one's friend and work for his enemy.

Telemachus' long absence from home is not καλὸς (Od. 15. 10), an object of νεμεσίς, because it means his negligence in his duty of defending his home and family.

Further examples of καλὸς denoting 'seemly' are found in the use of καλὸν as adverb and καλῶς. καλὸν as an adverb, of course, primarily means 'beautifully', and is in fact used most often in this sense in the expression 'sing beautifully' (II. 1. 473, 18. 570, Od. 1. 155, 8. 266, 10. 227, 19. 519, 21. 411). It indicates completeness or accuracy in the example at II. 24. 388 where Priam says that the stranger has recounted Hector's fate accurately (καλὰ'). These examples focus on the agreeable and

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2 For the dispute over the meaning of the whole passage, see W. Leaf on II. 76-80.
desirable effect of things that are done 'beautifully', rather than 'righteously'.

The rest of the examples convey moral evaluations. For warriors, it is not seemly to desist from the struggle of battle (II. 13. 116). It is not seemly, therefore, for Paris to have retired from battle in resentment at the other Trojans (II. 6. 326). On the other hand, It is not seemly for Zeus to fight with his wife and daughter (II. 8. 400). These are matters of νεμεσίς.

When Antinous grudges a morsel of food for a beggar and tells the other suitors not to be so generous as they are with the beggar, Telemachus reproaches him, starting with ironical words of gratitude (Od. 17. 397):

'Αντώνις, ἢ μεν καλὰ πατήρ ὡς κτεβαί υίος,
which reminds us of his words to Athena-Mentes at Od. 1. 307-8:

ξεύγ. ἢ τοι μὲν ταύτα φλα φρονέων φορεῖες.

ὡς τε πατήρ ὡπαιδί καὶ οὐ ποτὲ λήσιμαί αὐτῶι:

The superficial meaning of this sentence is that what Antinous has said is agreeable to Telemachus, but what he in fact means is that 'What you have said is not καλόν.' Antinous is criticized again later by his fellow-suitors for maltreating the beggar-Odysseus (Od. 17. 483-4):

'Αντώνις, οὐμὲν καὶ ξαλός δύστημον ἀλήθην.

οὐλόμεν εἰ δὴ ποῦ τις ἐπουράνος θεὸς ἐστὶ.

The idea of καλὸς here is connected with θέμις that commands us to protect foreigners on the one hand, and is in contrast with οὐλόμενα, connected with possible divine anger, on the other. It is an act condemned by both human and divine societies, according to the speaker.
The only example of καλός is also used in the context of the convention of ἐπιεύνης. Telemachus complains that his house is being consumed 'not in a seemly way' (οὐ καλὸς Od. 2. 63) i.e. not in accordance with θέμις and δίκη, which, in Telemachus' opinion, ought to cause νεμεσίς and αἰδως within the community (64-5).

The superlative καλλιστος is used only for most beautiful men, women, animals and material objects. The comparative of καλός, καλλίων, on the other hand, is very often used in reference to morally becoming situations. It means literally 'more beautiful' only at Od. 10. 396 (of masculine beauty) and at Od. 18. 255 = 19. 128 where Penelope says that Odysseus' return would have made her situation far more praiseworthy. καλλιον means 'more seemly, more pleasant in the eye of the observer' at Od. 6. 39 (Riding on a wagon is more suitable than walking for a princess.) and at Od. 17. 583 (It is more seemly for Penelope to talk to the beggar in the absence of the suitors.).

Some other examples of καλὸς point to θέμις concerning ἐπιεύνης. After dinner, Nestor thinks it is a more appropriate (καλλιον) time - than before the meal, presumably - to ask his visitors their names (Od. 3. 69). Similarly Alcinous advises Odysseus after dinner and entertainment that it is 'better' (καλλιον), more in conformity with θέμις, to reveal his identity and homeland, for, after all, he has to tell his escorts where his home is (Od. 8. 549). It is more seemly, more appropriate for the guest to sleep in the host's house than on his ship (Od. 3. 358). It is not καλλιον nor does it ε'οικε that a suppliant remains sitting in the ash of the hearth (Od. 7. 159). It is much more appropriate that both guests and hosts enjoy the banquet and entertainment than that only one party does (Od. 8. 542-3). These are particularly good
examples to show that things connected with good manners and
customs are described as kalos.

A single Iliadic example of Καλλιον is used in Apollo's
criticism of Achilles' maltreatment of Hector's body (II. 24. 52):

οὔμιν οἷό τό γε κάλλιον οὐδέ τ' ὀμεῖνον.

This juxtaposition of κάλλιον and ὀμεῖνον is instructive of the
difference between kalos and ὀμαθὸς. He means that it is neither
seemly nor profitable/honourable for Achilles to maltreat the
lifeless body of Hector. Besides, this act could incite νέμεσις among
the gods (53), as νέμεσις is often directed to conduct which is 'not
καλὸν'. ὀμαθὸς is connected with the value of ὑπερήμη and presence of
τιμή, while kalos is connected with the value of δίκη/θέμις and
absence of νέμεσις.

αἰσχρὸς

kalos and αἰσχρὸς can be regarded as antonyms, but in a
similar way to the way that graceful and disgraceful can be
considered antonyms. While the former of both pairs is mainly
concerned with visual beauty, often beauty of material objects,
the latter is almost exclusively concerned with human behaviour.

αἰσχρὸς and its cognate words are never applied to material
objects. Its superlative αἰσχυρός is applied to a physically 'ugly'
man, namely Thersites, at II. 2. 216, but even then, it is preceded
by a description of his disorderly manners which make his words
ἀκοσμα (213) and make him quarrel with kings 'οὐ κατὰ κόσμον'
(214). He is not only ugly, but also unseemly in behaviour.

The word αἰσχρὸς is most often applied to cowardice and
negligence in war. Agamemnon says that it is αἰσχρόν for the
Achaean army not to have captured Troy after fighting against a
population so outnumbered for as long as nine years (Il. 2. 119).
It is disgraceful, because it will be seen as the result of the incompetence and negligence of the Achaeans. Odysseus expresses a similar view at Il. 2. 298, that it is αἰσχρόν to go home without capturing Troy after so many years of war. He criticizes Agamemnon again later when the king has completely lost his confidence and seriously suggests evacuation of the ships, saying that he is only worthy of generalship of an δεικέλιον στρατόν, an unseemly, inglorious army (Il. 14. 84). Although the situation is less serious, Poseidon echoes the same concern when speaking to Apollo in their encounter (Il. 21. 436-8):

Φοβε, τὴν δὴν Ἀιδώνιον, οἶδὲ θοίκεν

ἀφείστων ἑπάρκην τὸ μὲν ἀλώχοιον αἰθῆρα ἡμῖν

τὸ μὲν ὅμως ὤμοιον δίοις ποτὶ χαλκοβάτης δὲ

It is not seemly (ὁυ ἔοικεν) to stand apart from one another like cowards, and it is even more unseemly to go home without fighting at all. It is not so shameful to fight and be defeated as the result, but to be a coward and useless fighter, κακὸς, is αἰσχρόν. Therefore Hector reproaches Paris, as often as three times with αἰσχρὰ ἐπεα i. e. words which pour shame on others, when he spots his brother running away or staying away from battle (Il. 3. 38, 6. 325, 13. 768).

The adverb αἰσχρῶς is twice used to describe a person rebuking somebody else with unseemly words. One example is at Il. 23. 473 where Ajax rebukes Idomeneus starting a quarrel between them which is to be settled by Achilles who says it is not seemly, 'ὁυ ... ἔοικε' for them to exchange bad (κακὸς) words (492-3). αἰσχρῶς here refers to the manner of Ajax's speech as an object of νέμεσις. The same is true of another example at Od. 18. 321 where
Melantho rebukes the beggar-Odysseus with harsh words, urging him to go away. This is countered by Odysseus' verdict 'κύνι' i.e. 'shameless bitch!' (338). αἰσχρῶς clearly describes a manner considered improper, an object at which αἰδώς should be felt by the individual and νέμεσις should be felt by society.

The noun αἰσχρός denotes objects or manifestation of νέμεσις, public indignation. Helen notices the absence of her brothers, the Dioscouroi, among the Achaeans and wonders if they did not come fearing αἰσχρεα and ὀνείδεα they might get because of her, their sister, whose elopement was the cause of all the troubles (Il. 3. 242), and is referred to as ἔργον δεικές (Od. 23. 222), an unseemly deed.3

Paris also receives many αἰσχρεα from the Trojans (Il. 6. 524-5) which distresses Hector, but Paris himself does not seem to care. Both Hector and Helen are annoyed by his indifference to his own responsibility and Helen wishes she had married a better man than Paris who (Il. 6. 351):


The close connection between νέμεσις as public indignation and αἰσχρεα as its expression is very clear in this line. In these examples, αἰσχρεα denotes the expressions of νέμεσις which imposes disgrace upon their recipients.

αἰσχρός is applied also to objects of νέμεσις. Menelaus rebukes the Trojans (more specifically Paris), calling them 'κακάλ κύνες' i.e. 'shameless creatures' and saying that they have no shortage of λοβή nor αἰσχρός by which they have done outrage (λοβήσασθε) to him (Il. 13. 622-3). Clytemnestra's murder of her husband

3 cf. W. Leaf ad loc.: ἀἰσχρεα, ὀνείδεα in objective sense, the insults and revilings of men.
Agamemnon, says the ghost of Agamemnon, is a great cause of  
αὐξόει, not only to her, but to the whole of womankind (Od. 11.  
433-4). The same incident is described with a synonym of αὐξόει,  
deικτής, too. Clytemnestra's adultery (Od. 3. 265) and murder of  
her husband (Od. 11. 429; cf. 4. 533) are both ἐφαγα δεικτή, ugly  
deeds. Furthermore, Agamemnon calls her κυνώπις (dog-faced,  
shameless Od. 11. 424) and says she is κυντέρου (more dog-like,  
shameless 427) than any other women. As the use of 'dog-words'  
(which are almost the strongest possible terms of rebuke in  
Homer) indicates, such extreme cases of αὐξόει and δεικτή as above  
are considered deeds not of human beings, but of subhuman  
creatures.4

As Menelaus is indignant at his guest's outrage, any breach  
of ξεινῆ is considered a serious matter of αὐξόει. Having observed  
the insolent manners of the suitors at Odysseus' house, Mentes-  
Athena asks Telemachus who would not feel νεμεσί (νεμεσόσησαίτο)  
when looking at such αὐξεά (Od. 1. 228-9).5 When they start  
teasing the beggar-Odysseus with taunts and violence, Penelope  
reproaches Telemachus for not checking them, saying that such  
outrage at home might result in his own disgrace, if the guest is  
harmed (Od. 18. 225):

σοὶ κ᾿ αὐξόει λαβῇ τε μετ᾽ ἀφρότατοι πέλατα

4 For 'dog-words' as terms of rebuke, cf. M. Faust, 'Die künstlerische  
Verwendung von κυν "Hund" in den homerischen Epen', Glotta 48 (1970) 8-  
31, esp. 26.
5 A. W. H. Adkins would argue (cf. Merit and Responsibility, pp. 41-42) that  
it is Telemachus' condition that is αὐξόει in this passage as in the  
following example of Penelope's reproach. However, we have another  
keyword, νεμεσί, to point to the direction of denigration. While Penelope  
at 18. 225 feels νεμεσί at Telemachus, Mentes-Athena feels νεμεσί at the  
suitors. The audience of any age should have known whose conduct was  
against θέμις and δίκη, and deserved νεμεσί, and therefore deserved to be  
classified as αὐξόει, unpleasant to the eye of the public.
This \( \alpha^\prime \sigma^\chi\omicron\omicron \) is clearly the result of \( \nu^\epsilon^\mu^\epsilon^\sigma^\iota^\varsigma \) directed towards Telemachus' shortcomings as a host.

When Eurycleia guesses the reason for which the beggar-Odysseus refuses to have his feet washed by younger servants, she says that he must be trying to avoid the \( \lambda^\omega^\beta^\eta \) and \( \alpha^\prime \sigma^\chi^\epsilon^\alpha \) from them (\textit{Od.} 19. 372-4). In this case, the beggar is not the owner of the \( \lambda^\omega^\beta^\eta \) and \( \alpha^\prime \sigma^\chi^\epsilon^\alpha \), but their victim. The maidservants are nothing but 'shameless bitches' (\( \kappa^\upsilon^\nu^\epsilon^\varsigma \) 373) in Eurycleia's eye. The behaviour of the suitors and their mistresses among Odysseus' maidservants is further condemned as 'unseemly' repeatedly with the word \( \delta^\epsilon^\iota^\kappa^\eta^\varsigma \) (of the suitors \textit{Od.} 16. 107 \( \delta^\epsilon^\iota^\kappa^\epsilon^\alpha \ \epsilon^\rho^\gamma^\alpha \); 109 \( \delta^\iota^\kappa^\epsilon^\lambda^\iota^\omega^\varsigma \); 20. 308 \( \delta^\iota^\kappa^\epsilon^\iota^\alpha^\iota^\) ; 317 \( \delta^\iota^\kappa^\epsilon^\alpha^\epsilon^\rho^\gamma^\alpha \); 319 \( \delta^\iota^\kappa^\epsilon^\lambda^\iota^\iota^\varsigma \); 394 \( \delta^\iota^\kappa^\epsilon^\alpha \); of the maidservants 22. 432 \( \delta^\iota^\kappa^\epsilon^\alpha \)).

The verb \( \alpha^\prime \sigma^\chi^\nu^\nu^\omega \) basically means 'I put someone in a state of \( \alpha^\prime \sigma^\chi^\rho^\omega \)' and its use tells us what sort of behaviour disgraces man. It denotes disfigurement of dead bodies at \textit{Il.} 22. 75 and 24. 418. Therefore it is also disgrace, a matter of \( \sigma^\epsilon^\beta^\alpha^\varsigma \) and \( \lambda^\omega^\beta^\eta \), to let the dead body of one's friend be disfigured by enemies (\textit{Il.} 18. 178-80). Self-disfigurement is a means of mourning (\textit{Il.} 18. 24, 27), as temporary renunciation of the joy and pride of one's life in the honour of the dead. Attaching \( \alpha^\prime \sigma^\chi^\omicron^\omicron \) to oneself by this means is part of \( \theta^\epsilon^\mu^\iota^\varsigma \).

If bloody strife occurs among the suitors, that would disgrace Penelope's wedding (\textit{Od.} 16. 293, 19. 12). The adultery of Aphrodite and Ares disgraces Hephaestus (\textit{Od.} 8. 269). However, the greatest disgrace for the warrior class is to get a bad name of being coward and lacking \( \delta^\rho^\epsilon^\tau^\eta^\iota \). Therefore fathers instruct their sons to be brave and not to disgrace the honour of their family (\textit{Il.} 6. 209, \textit{Od.} 24. 508, 512). Menelaus is offended
by Antilochus' trick which forced him to finish third in the chariot race, especially because it defiled his ἄρετή (ὡς χυνα ... ἑμὴν ἄρετήν II. 23. 571). In his attempt not to let the beggar-Odysseus try the bow, Eurymachus complains to Penelope that if the beggar does succeed in stringing the bow, someone κακώτερος might insult the suitors (Od. 21. 323). Penelope answers that it is no ἐλέγχεα compared with the disgraceful deeds that the suitors have already done to their host's household (331-3). They can never expect ἐνκλείαι among people. Accusing someone falsely to make him an object of νέμεσις is also αἰσχύνειν. Antinous complains that Telemachus accuses the suitors wrongly, putting disgrace on them (αἰσχύνων Od. 2. 86).

Just as one can feel νέμεσις towards oneself, αἰσχύνω in the middle can denote 'be ashamed' i.e. imposing shame on oneself. Irus says, though probably not wholeheartedly, that he feels ashamed of removing an old beggar (Odysseus) from the house of his host by force (Od. 18. 12). Odysseus explains (in his diplomatic lie) why he did not follow Nausicaa to the palace of Alcinous, saying that he was afraid and ashamed (αἰσχυνόμενος) to do so in case he might anger Alcinous (Od. 7. 305). αἰσχος implied in these expressions is a strong sense of νέμεσις felt towards oneself.

As we have seen, καλὸς and αἰσχρὸς belong to the sphere of αἶδως and νέμεσις, but δ'αθός and κακὸς belong to a completely different set of values. When one chooses between things δ'αθόν and κακὸν, the question is 'Which is more useful, profitable?', but when one chooses between things καλὸν and αἰσχρόν, the question is
'Which is more becoming for a person of my position?' Of course, the two questions can mean the same thing in many cases, since honour and fame are eventually one's profit, and also doing $d\gamma\alpha\theta\omicron$ itself often means living up to heroic ideals, playing one's role expected by society. However, the grounds of judgement are significantly different. One is more concerned with what others would think of oneself, while the other is to promote one's own interest, sometimes even in defiance to the society's.

This explains why we find Homeric characters describe anti-social behaviour as 'not καλόν' rather than 'not $d\gamma\alpha\theta\omicron$', for the former means 'not becoming', 'a matter of public disapproval', while the latter only means 'It is not good for you.' or 'It is not good for me.'

Homeric man does possess, therefore, terms to commend good manners and to criticize bad, anti-social behaviour. Like νεμεσίς, 'οὐ καλός' and 'αισχρός' work as fairly effective terms of condemnation to deter one from behaving in anti-social manners in time of peace or in unheroic manners in time of war. Homeric morality centres around public opinion, how others will view one's behaviour, and in this context, καλός and αἰσχρός are more relevant signs than $d\gamma\alpha\theta\omicron$ and κακός of the evaluation of one's behaviour in society.

The terms 'οὐ καλός' and 'αἰσχρός', however, share the limitation of νεμεσίς that they function only within the reach of the public eye, and only on those who are capable of feeling αἰδώς. In principle, if nobody sees you to say it is unseemly, it does not

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6 I consider this question to be functionally equivalent to the question implicit in modern morality, 'What is my duty in these circumstances?' which Adkins claims to be impossible in Homeric morality (op. cit. p. 2).
matter what you do. Or whatever people say, if your social standing is high enough, you can just ignore their voice, as Paris always does. In so far as you are strong enough and lack αἰδωσ responding to νεμέσις, whether others complain about your laziness in battle or about a breach of θέμις, you are not affected. Paris is the best counter-example to refute the thesis of Adkins that 'quiet virtues' can be ignored by strong warriors because 'competitive virtues' that they possess are so much more important that they make 'quiet virtues' irrelevant.7 The truth is that, if a man is strong and shameless enough like Paris, he can ignore even 'competitive virtues', because nobody dares to punish him. However, even Hector wishes Paris' death, and no Trojan would help him escape from Menelaus. The fact that Agamemnon, Paris, or the suitors of Penelope can behave in defiance to their community does not mean that the community thinks 'quiet virtues' are irrelevant.

We began our sketch of Homeric morality with the observation of behaviour of the gods which led us to the conclusion that the gods cannot be relied upon as the protectors of justice in the human society. Divine behaviour is mostly unpredictable because the gods dispense fortunes of mortals according to μολότα which has nothing to do with moral virtues of individuals. Men know for certain only that the gods will take action against those mortals who injure their own honour, whether knowingly or unknowingly. Therefore men try their best to honour the gods and not to offend them. The gods do take heed of men's worship and are favourable to them sometimes, but that is the case only when μολότα permits. Although Zeus is fond of Troy and appreciates its piety, he cannot save the city from its ruin, since it is ordained to be destroyed in the current war. True, he reluctantly yielded to his wife's demand to destroy it, but he would not have done so had it not been μολότα of Troy. The gods' morality is μολότα-oriented and has little to do with human behaviour. However, human characters believe that the gods reward righteous and pious men and punish bad ones. As a result, the readers or the audience see the ironical picture of pious men and indifferent gods in the epics which was to become the object of criticism by many later Greeks.

One common principle that rules both men and gods is the idea that each individual has his own 'lot' (μολοτα/α\text{\textdollarα}). Each man and each god has his own position in his own society. Each position gives the individual certain responsibilities and privileges. Behaviour suitable to one's position is praised and
that unsuitable is criticized by society. Each person is entitled to his share of honour as his lot. If one damages another person's honour, τιμη, the latter will take revenge on the former. Homeric man calls a person who shares his τιμη a friend and one who damages his τιμη an enemy. It has often been said that in Greek morality, virtue is to help one's friends and harm one's enemies, but that is tautological, for friends are, by definition, those who help and benefit one another and enemies are, by definition, those who harm one another.

Responsibility of Homeric man (the aristocracy especially) among his friends in time of peace is greatly different from that among his enemies in time of war. The fact that the warrior-class is called ἀγαθοὶ is based on the assumption that they are useful members of the community. Their responsibility is to solve conflicts within their community as judges in time of peace, and in time of war to fight in the front rank to defend the community or to enrich it through getting as many spoils as possible.

Homeric moral rules in peace are fairly clearly defined by θεμισ and δικη. They are manners and customs concerning offerings and festivals for the gods, marriages, funerals, reception of visitors, public meetings and so on. They regulate how an individual should behave towards other members of society. They are not written law, but are known in full to mature members of the aristocracy, and the aristocracy as a whole has an obligation to hand them down to posterity. They have such universality that whenever one person says that such and such is δικη/θεμισ, the listener normally accepts it without contention. The aim of the king as administrator of δικη and θεμισ is to maintain the harmony of his community. Therefore, the behaviour of a
member which harms other members of the community or which
goes beyond the boundary of one's lot allotted by \( \theta\varepsilon\mu\iota \) and \( \delta\iota\kappa\eta \) is
met by the community's \( \nu\varepsilon\mu\varepsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma \), and the person himself will feel
(or be supposed to feel) \( a\iota\delta\omega\varsigma \). Behaviour in accordance with \( \theta\varepsilon\mu\iota \) and \( \delta\iota\kappa\eta \) is praised as \( k\alpha\lambda\varsigma \) (rather than \( d\gamma\alpha\theta\delta\varsigma \)), beautiful, seemly,
and that against them is met by \( \nu\varepsilon\mu\varepsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma \) and criticized as \( a\iota\sigma\chi\rho\delta\varsigma \)
(rather than \( k\alpha\kappa\delta\varsigma \)), ugly, unseemly.

The virtue of heroes is to keep pace with \( \theta\varepsilon\mu\iota \) and \( \delta\iota\kappa\eta \),
fearing anger of the gods and criticism of people (\( \nu\varepsilon\mu\varepsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma \)), and
having \( a\iota\delta\omega\varsigma \) towards people around them. However, this virtue is
conceived only as part of warrior-virtue, \( d\rho\varepsilon\tau\eta \)', and has no
separate name of its own. This side of \( d\rho\varepsilon\tau\eta \), which will become
the dominant meaning in later Greek philosophy, is not
highlighted in the epics of Homer. However, the central themes of
the epics themselves illustrate that violation of \( \theta\varepsilon\mu\iota \) and \( \delta\iota\kappa\eta \) does
not pay even when the offender was \( d\gamma\alpha\theta\delta\varsigma \) and needed by the
community. Agamemnon acts in the most thoughtless way
towards Achilles and gets into trouble. Paris abducts his host's
wife and invites war against his country. The suitors of Penelope
who have been consuming Odysseus' property in defiance to all
\( \theta\varepsilon\mu\iota \) and \( \delta\iota\kappa\eta \) of society pay a very dear price in the end. A
remarkable thing, however, is that in all of these cases, although
the Achaeans, the community of Ithaca or, in the case of Paris'
offence, the Trojans, know that the deed concerned is an offence
against \( \theta\varepsilon\mu\iota \), and feel \( \nu\varepsilon\mu\varepsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma \) towards it, they cannot step forward
to punish the offender because they lack a social convention to do
Helen is ashamed of her elopement with Paris and knows that she deserves public indignation, but there is nobody, no institution to punish her. She only suffers from her own sense of shame and people's accusation. Sanctions on those who damage the τιμή of others are usually revenge from the affected party itself. The Trojan War, despite its magnitude, is still the private vengeance of Menelaus in its nature and if he dies, the cause of the conflict will disappear with him.

Therefore man is restrained from egoistic behaviour by the collection of different forces including fear of divine sanctions, fear of revenge, fear of public indignation (νεικεσίς), sense of shame and respect (αἰτιός) towards senior or stronger members of the community or persons under divine protection. Women, who are not strong nor under divine protection are also protected by the sense of αἰτιός of the community by convention. Homeric man also has a sense of ἐλεος towards weaker and helpless members of the society in general.

The virtue of man in peace, in short, is to behave politely and suitably to the position which he holds in society, to honour the gods, to be thoughtful to those whom he deals with (especially persons in weaker positions such as ladies, elderly men, and foreign visitors) to try to win a good name and avoid a bad name from the society, and to be a good and understanding judge to his people. Those who are under the protection of such an aristocrat are supposed to have their own virtue, that is to behave suitably

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1 cf. Adkins, op. cit. p. 60, n. 22: 'But everything depends on feeling, not organization; normally each household must look after itself, and the suitors can rely on being undisturbed.'
to their position, to be loyal and grateful to the head of their house, and perform their household task.

In war, however, the virtue required from heroes is completely different from that in peace. Patroclus, who pleads with Achilles to pity and save the Achaean army and who used to console the captured Briseis gently, is a bloodthirsty killer on the battlefield trying to scale the city wall of Troy. Hector, another humane figure, who is such a loving husband, father, son and even brother-in-law (to Helen) in his family life, becomes a ruthless killer in battle. And it is precisely for his cruelty in battle that Andromache and the Trojans lament his death so much. Here, on the battlefield, to be mild with or cowardly in front of one's enemies is the object of *νέμεοι* and *αιθώσ*. One does not have to fear Zeus' punishment even if one kills a supplicating enemy. Dirty words thrown at one's enemies are not counted as the sign of bad manners. However, even in time of war, moral rules remain those of the time of peace among one's own comrades.\(^2\) It is utterly wrong to assume that morality of war is at work even in one's own camp. It is an unthinkable moral mistake of Agamemnon that he takes away Briseis from Achilles. It is such a shocking event almost beyond belief that it serves as the beginning of the extraordinary story to follow. If this sort of incidents were commonplace among heroes, any military expeditions, either great or small, would be bound to fail. Even a band of thieves need justice among them. The behaviour of the suitors in the house of Odysseus is also an unthinkable example of

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\(^2\) See Peleus' double advice to Achilles that he must fight bravely and excel among his comrades in battle (*Il. 11. 784*), but among his friends, *φιλοφροσύνη* is better than quarrels and will make him more honoured (*9. 256-8*).
defiance against ἑμείς. Therefore they are going to meet an extraordinary end by the hand of Odysseus. It is fair to say that the social system of Homeric society lacks a necessary police force to enforce θεμίς and δίκη, especially when the head of the community as arbitrator is absent or unreasonable himself, but it is obvious that neither Agamemnon's behaviour against Achilles, nor the suitors' behaviour in the house of Odysseus, nor any behaviour which annoys another member of one's own community, is justified by public opinion, as both Agamemnon and the suitors know well themselves. The society as a whole does not believe that might is right and that the strongest man can do anything he likes.

The problem, therefore, is that punishment of any offenders against social codes is left to the hand of the party affected. Capable heroes will take revenge themselves, but when a powerless person is wronged by a stronger one, all he can do is to pray to the gods and hope that they will one day punish the person who has wronged him. The poet himself, however, does not seem to share the belief that the gods are avengers for the righteous and wronged. The gods, in 'reality', give good and bad fortunes to men according to individuals' 'lot', μοῖρα, and that is the gods' δίκη and θεμίς, that is their justice, which does not often coincide with what human beings believe to be just. Nevertheless, men can still believe in the gods and the effect of offerings, because they know that the honour of the gods heavily depends on the offerings and respect that men pay them, and that the gods and men share the sense of pity. Homeric man has such sensitivity as to pity even his enemy on the battlefield as a helpless fellow human being sometimes, if not often. Achilles
knows that Agamemnon was in the wrong and that the Achaeans should suffer to make the king realise his own wrongdoing, but he is uneasy when letting them die and being criticized by Patroclus and others. It is this Achilles who sympathizes with Priam as an unhappy father like his own and treats him kindly.

Homer's morality consists of two major subcategories, divine morality based on μοῖρα and human morality based on θέμισ and δίκη, and the latter is further divided into morality in peace among one's friends and that in war among one's enemies. However, there is one, though small, element which overrides the boundary between men and gods and that between friends and enemies, namely ελεος, which is an outstanding characteristic of Homer and is completely absent in Hesiod. We are moved by the Hector-Andromache scene in Iliad Book 6 and by the pitiful pleas of Priam and Hecuba to their son Hector who is about to face Achilles, because here we see the dilemma of Hector who has to choose the morality of war which commands him to die gloriously rather than his true feeling which urges him to pity his family and live.

Homer never criticizes the double-sided morality of heroes. He anticipates unknowingly, however, that heroic morality, which demands the best of gentleness and the worst of cruelty from a single individual, will bankrupt some day, by describing the unhappiness of Hector who lives, kills, and dies in the name of glory, Achilles' sympathy with Priam, and the ugliness of the arrogant suitors exulting in their power. Homer cannot imagine a world without war. The shield of Achilles tells us most eloquently that war and peace coexist in his world all the time. However, he knows that each war is only a passing event and,

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although each individual is also a passing being, friendship between families survives wars and deaths of members of the families. Glaucus and Diomedes promise to be a host and a guest to each other one day when they have gone home after the war. Men's generations are like leaves of trees which flourish in one moment and die away in the next, but as far as the family tree lives, it produces new lives to inherit heroic names and virtues. Although Nestor has lost Antilochus in the war, his younger son makes good friends with the son of his former comrade Odysseus. Achilles in Hades longs for any miserable life on earth rather than kingship in the underworld, but is delighted by the glory and valour of his son who, though Achilles himself does not know it, is going to marry the daughter of Menelaus. The continuation of life, family and friendship is bright hope for a dying hero (probably more so than his eternal glory won in battle) and is guaranteed through δίκη and θέμις that regulate fair exchange of τιμή and αἰδώς among friends and members of a family. As far as there is life, there always is hope in Homer. Even Troy is going to be rebuilt by Aeneas and his offspring. On the other hand, the poet does not fail to describe the irreparable misery of the bereaved, of widows, orphans, and parents who have lost their sons, of terminated family trees.
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