BRIDGING THE HELLESPONT: THE SUCCESSOR LYSIMACHUS - A STUDY
IN EARLY HELLENISTIC KINGSHIP

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ABSTRACT

Literary evidence on Lysimachus reveals a series of images which may say more about contemporary or later views on kingship than about the actual man, given the intrusion of bias, conventional motifs and propaganda. Thrace was Lysimachus' legacy from Alexander's empire; though problems posed by its formidable tribes and limited resources excluded him from the Successors' wars for nearly ten years, its position, linking Europe and Asia, afforded him some influence. Lysimachus failed to conquer "all of Thrace", but his settlements there achieved enough stability to allow him thoughts of rule across the Hellespont, in Asia Minor. More ambitious and less cautious than is often thought, Lysimachus' acquisition of empire in Asia Minor, Macedon and Greece from c.315 BC to 284 BC reflects considerable military and diplomatic skills, deployed primarily when self-interest demanded rather than reflecting obligations as a permanent member of an "anti-Antigonid team". Though military prowess brought Lysimachus resources essential for kingship, it has been said that he lacked another vital quality, ability to govern. The evidence, however, suggests that his treatment of his Greek subjects differed little from that of his contemporaries and was in line with precedents set by Alexander and earlier dynasties in Asia. Kingship ritual is crucial to retaining power. Lysimachus presented a convincing image of royalty which emphasised his role as Alexander's dear friend and heir and competed successfully with those projected by his rivals. Finally, Lysimachus failed to achieve the peaceful transition of power to his heirs, a crucial test for
kings. Combined with former allies' fear and envy, this brought about his fall; the resentment of his Greek subjects may be a lesser factor — widespread welcome of Seleucus as "liberator" by the cities of Asia Minor before Lysimachus' death at Corupedium is far from certain.
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On June the 10th 323 BC Alexander the Great lay dead in Babylon. Among the Companions who mourned at his bedside was Lysimachus, son of Agathocles. ¹ When the Regent Perdiccas redistributed the Empire's satrapies after Alexander's death, Lysimachus received the territory of Thrace. ² By 284 BC he was master of an empire embracing Thrace and Pontus, Macedonia, Thessaly, most of Anatolia and the Paphlagonian realm attached to the city of Heracleia Pontica. His power had reached its zenith.

Probably in the following year his greatest enemy Demetrius Poliorcetes, taken prisoner by Seleucus, King of Syria, in 286 BC, drank himself to death. An ignominious end for a man who had worn the diadem and been hailed by the Athenians as the only true god. ³ If, however, immortality is conferred through fame, then Lysimachus lost his last battle against the Besieger. Demetrius' exploits and excesses are preserved for us in the biography of Plutarch. There is no comparable record of Lysimachus' life.

Information, from literature, on Lysimachus' career is restricted to scattered notices in the narratives of the Alexander and Diadoch historians. These themselves are mostly preserved in the works of later historians and epitomators. Then there are Plutarch's biographies of Lysimachus' more favoured contemporaries, the work of

1) Q.C. X.5.8; Arr.Anab. VII. 26.3-4, 6 for Alexander's Bodyguard as with him at the end, though the Metz epitome §106 which makes Lysimachus one of four privileged witnesses to Alexander's last words cannot be trusted; see Heckel, 1988 5, 12, 72-3. 2) See Ch.2. 3) Plut. Demet. 52, Athen.VI.63 = FGrH 76 F 13.
geographers and travel writers like Strabo and Pausanias, chroniclers like Porphyry of Tyre. Finally there is a string of anecdotes, surviving in the writings of Athenaeus, Diogenes Laertius, the moralising works of Plutarch, Seneca and other Roman writers. Some of these may go back to contemporary authors like Duris or Cleitarchus. 

Both the passage of time and the possibility of bias in the sources used by these late writers lead to distortions and some conflict of evidence. The literary evidence on Lysimachus is fragmentary and often suspect. This, together with the fact that written history is essentially interpretation rather than "fact" makes it improbable that an examination of this material will lead us to the "real" Lysimachus. All that can be attempted is to discern the various traditions that developed about the man and the purposes behind them. If major themes emerge which cannot be attributed to a single source tradition, then this is the closest one can get to a "true" portrait.

What then do the literary sources say about his background, his career before and after 323 BC, his relationship with Alexander and his personal character?

FAMILY BACKGROUND

Pausanias and Justin describe Lysimachus as Macedonian by birth. The patronymic, "son of Agathocles" used by Arrian and Porphyry's

4) See Walbank, CAH VII 1984 1-10 for a full discussion of the sources. 5) Just. XV.3.1, Paus. 1.9.4.
description of him as "Thessalus", however, have led to his identification as the son of the Thessalian ἐίλος of Philip II mentioned by Theopompos. Dubbed an intimate of Philip's, he is also, less flatteringly, described as a τεμένος who owed his position to ξολαγεία. The evidence for Theopompos' consistent hostility to Philip and all those around him, however, suggests that this statement should be taken with a pinch of salt. Demetrius' friend, Adeimantus of Lampsacus serves as a useful parallel. Labelled a "parasite" by the literary sources, epigraphic evidence reveals him to be a diplomat of considerable importance. Theopompos himself tells us that Agathocles shared in Philip's councils and was sent by Philip to "deal with the Perrhaebi and take charge of affairs in that area".

Since Arrian, in the Indika, names Lysimachus among the trierarchs from Pella, the problem is most easily resolved by assuming that Agathocles was rewarded for his services with estates there. It seems likely that the family was swiftly assimilated into Macedonian society, with Agathocles' sons growing up with the status of Macedonians. The fact that not only Lysimachus, but also his brothers enjoyed a prominent position in Alexander's circle fits well with the picture of their father as a favourite at the Argead court. The arguments put forward by Merker, challenging both the idea of Lysimachus' Thessalian origin and his connection with

6) Arr. Anab. VI.28.4, Ind. 18.3; Porph., FGrH III 1883 F. 4.4.
7) Athen. VI.259-60 = FGrH 115 F 81. 8) e.g. Athen. VI.55 = Theopomp. FGrH 115. F 209, Demet. De Eloc. 27 = FGrH 115 225c.
9) Athen VI.253a, 255c; Moretti, 1967 13; Robert, 1940 22-8.
10) Arr. Ind. 18.3, Anab. VI.28.4
11) See below.
Theopompus' "parasite" do not seem to me to be conclusive.  

Certainly there is little suggestion that his father's Greek origin proved a millstone round Lysimachus' neck; the anti-Greek prejudice apparently encountered by Eumenes of Cardia is conspicuous by its absence. On the contrary, c.285 BC Lysimachus, at war with Pyrrhus over Macedon, "contrived to subvert Pyrrhus' principal supporters. He reproached them for having chosen as their master a man who was a foreigner".  

Born some time between 361 BC and 351 BC and therefore roughly contemporary with Alexander, Lysimachus was presumably Agathocles' second son. His elder brother Alcimachus was already active as a diplomat and administrator in the first years of Alexander's rule. Possibly identifiable as the honorand of an Athenian proxeny (?) decree of 336 BC, two years later we find him leading an army, empowered by Alexander to "liberate" the cities of Ionia and Aeolis.

Agathocles was well blessed with sons. Lysimachus had at least two other brothers, presumably younger than himself. Autodicus, whose connection with Lysimachus is assured by the King's later dedication of a statue of his sister-in-law Adaea, looked set to follow in Lysimachus' footsteps, with promotion to the Bodyguard at

12) Merker, Chiron 1979 31-5; see Appendix 1 for full discussion.
13) Hornblower, 1981 156-9, 197 sees this presentation as the product of apologia. 14) Plut. Pyrrh.12; Demet.11. 15) See Appendix 1 for the problems surrounding Lysimachus' birth date. 16) Bosworth, 1980 134 for the connection between Alcimachus and Lysimachus' family. 17) Arr.Anab. 1.18.1; Tod.GHI II 1948 180; Hypereides F.77 (Jensen); Bosworth, 1980 134; Schwenk, 1985 27-30, however, is more sceptical about the identification.
Triparadeisus in 321 BC. Justin and Curtius tell the touching tale of the death of Philip, Agathocles's other son; exhausted by the attempt to keep pace, on foot, with Alexander's cavalry pursuit of Sogdian rebels and by the ensuing battle, he dies in Alexander's arms. The sources clash slightly on the details of this incident. In Curtius' account, Philip's devotion to Alexander inspires his persistence in this gruelling endurance test despite Lysimachus' efforts to prevent him. Justin, however, presents him as emulating his older brother; Appian tells a similar story emphasising Lysimachus' powers of physical endurance. In both accounts this episode prefaces the legend of Alexander staunching Lysimachus' wound with his diadem, a story which is likely to represent propaganda postdating Lysimachus' achievement of kingship. This tends to cast doubt upon Justin's whole account of the Philip incident, particularly since it occurs in a chapter devoted to extravagant praise of Lysimachus. If the circumstances of Philip's death are accepted as historical, then Alexander is a more plausible idol and Curtius' account is to be preferred. The presentation of Lysimachus here, as one who clearly did not think "the world well lost for love", even Alexander's, contrasted with the romantic idealism of his brother, is quite consistent with the general picture which emerges of him as a hard-headed pragmatist.

18) Syll 373 usually dated 284 BC - 281 BC, see also Ch.7; Arr.Succ. FGrH 156 F1.37; Errington, JHS 1970 61-71 for the Triparadeisus settlement. 19) Q.C. VIII.2.35-9; Just.XV.3.12. 20) App.Syr.64; Seleucus attracts a similar story; see Ch. 6 for other dreams/portents of kingship. 21) For the possible identity of Justin's source here, see below. 22) See below.
The evidence for Lysimachus' career under Alexander, though fairly limited in extent, falls into two main categories. Some references apparently serve merely to underline his prominent position as a member of the élite, both in military and social terms. Others, hinging mainly on his relationship with Alexander, imply a greater interest in presenting Lysimachus in a certain light. The value of these statements for an assessment of his character may often be questionable. They must be seen in the context of certain literary traditions, whose aims, both in relation to Lysimachus himself and to Alexander, must be considered.

Nor can the "uncontroversial" evidence, relating to Lysimachus' military ability and his membership of Alexander's inner circle, always be taken at face-value. Ever since Ptolemy's historiographic halo became tarnished23 it has been recognised that information in the Alexander Histories on his future Successors must be seen in the light of the propaganda which they later circulated. Another source of distortion for the events of Alexander's lifetime is the apologetic tradition embedded in Ptolemy and Aristobulus, Arrian's main sources, once regarded as above suspicion.

The various titles by which Lysimachus is described give some indication of his role on Alexander's military staff. There is, however, surprisingly little information as to how, when and why he achieved this position. Arrian, using Aristobulus, names him among

the seven Σώματοφύλακες of Alexander. Although the term has two meanings in Arrian, the context makes it clear that here it designates the small group of officers who formed Alexander's personal staff. Reaching its maximum number of eight with Peucestas' promotion in 325 BC, the Bodyguard included such luminaries as Hephaistion, Perdiccas and Ptolemy. Membership implied service at Alexander's side; men appointed to commands in another theatre of war, or to a governorship were replaced. Porphyry and Appian call Lysimachus ἀποθεότος and ἑπαχριστής; these must be synonyms for Σώματοφύλακτος, referring likewise to his membership of this élite body. Lysimachus' aristocratic background makes it unthinkable that he would have served as a member of the King's Footguard, also called "bodyguards" in Arrian.

Glimpses of the Bodyguard in action are disappointingly rare. Arrian's account of the army split over the Succession in 323 BC places them among τῶν ἑπετών. Lysimachus stands in the second rank, after the μέγιστοι, Ptolemy, Perdiccas and Leonnatus. Curtius' account of Philip's death, where Lysimachus accompanies Alexander's cavalry pursuit of the Sogdian rebels in 328 BC, might suggest that the Bodyguard normally served at Alexander's side in the field. Perdiccas and Hephaistion, however, seem to have held major cavalry commands concurrently with membership. Ptolemy's

25) Tarn, 1948 141. 26) Porph. FGrH III F.3.4, App. Syr. 64; Tarn, 1948 138. 27) Arr. Succ. FGrH 156 F.1. 28) See above. 29) Tarn (1948 139) saw these cavalry commands as a late emergency development due to an officer shortage, but Hephaistion held his as early as 330 BC. (Arr. Anab. III. 27. 4).
leadership of Alexander's crack corps - the hypaspists, Agrianes and archers - on a special mission during the siege of Sangala supports the view that in practice the Bodyguard had a fairly flexible role in Alexander's army. Ptolemy singling out of Lysimachus among those wounded at Sangala may reflect an eye-witness account; perhaps Lysimachus took part in Ptolemy's mission which certainly seems to have borne the brunt of the fighting. Since, however, his name is listed under the total number wounded in the whole operation this cannot be regarded as certain.

The date when Lysimachus joined the Bodyguard is unknown; evidently he was a member by 326 BC. Heckel saw the lack of any reference to his promotion as reflecting membership from the start of the Asian campaign, perhaps even an appointment by Philip. Though Agathocles' position at court was likely to favour his sons' promotion, this idea perhaps lays too much stress on "aristocratic affiliations". Entry to a body whose prestige is reflected by the key positions taken by its members after 323 BC, and which implied service close to Alexander's person surely must have been determined primarily on ability. The explanation for the omission of this detail may simply be that Ptolemy, writing an Alexander-centred history, while naturally concerned to record his own achievements, was not quite so scrupulous about recording each and every promotion as it occurred during the campaign.

This raises the question as to whether the relatively few references to Lysimachus in the Alexander Histories can be ascribed to Ptolemy deliberately obscuring the achievements of a rival Successor.\(^{36}\) Though others may have found themselves victims of the Lagid eraser, Lysimachus probably did not. For example, his omission from the group of notables whose brides at the Susa weddings of 324 BC are named, might seem to support Arrian's suggestion that he held the "second rank" in Alexander's circle.\(^{37}\) This, however, is not Ptolemy's work - Aristobulus is quoted as Arrian's source at the beginning of the passage.\(^{38}\)

On the contrary, Ptolemy is actually the source for the very occasions when he is singled out. Lysimachus squeezes into the first boat making the hazardous crossing of the Hydaspes - with Alexander and the three men dubbed "his Successors" by Dexippus,\(^{39}\) Ptolemy, Perdiccas and Seleucus. This seems almost too good to be true, although the suspicion that Ptolemy later inserted himself and his fellow Successors into suitably prominent positions may be lessened by Perdiccas' inclusion.\(^{40}\) Lysimachus' wound at Sangala has already been mentioned.\(^{41}\) There seems no good reason to doubt the historicity of this event. The fact that Lysimachus gets no mention at all in Diodorus' book on Alexander, probably drawn largely from Cleitarchus,\(^{42}\) lends support for Ptolemy's innocence. Unless one

\(^{37}\) Arr.Anab.VII.4.4-7, Succ.FGrH 156 F 1.2; Anab.VI.28.4.
\(^{38}\) Arr.Anab.VII.4.4 - Chares (Athen. XI.538b-539a) is the other most likely source; since he clashes with Arrian on the bridegroom numbers, it is probable that Arrian used Aristobulus throughout.
assumes that Cleitarchus — admittedly pro Ptolemaic — expunged his patron's rivals even more thoroughly than the royal historian himself, it must be accepted that Lysimachus only reached military prominence in the latter years of the expedition, during the Indian campaign.

Socially, his membership of the close circle around Alexander is suggested by his presence at Medeius' fatal dinner party in Babylon. Though the details given in the Liber de Morte Testamentumque Alexandri are untrustworthy as the product of later propaganda, the author's careful exclusion of Lysimachus from the supposed poisoners of Alexander, rather than a simple denial of his presence there, may suggest that his attendance was a known fact. The historicity of his action in restraining Alexander, along with Leonnatus, Ptolemy and Perdiccas during the famous quarrel with Cleitus may be questionable; Curtius' account might represent an apologia fabricated by the Σωμοτοφύλακες to exculpate Alexander. In Arrian, whose source is usually seen as Ptolemy, Alexander is likewise restrained by companions, but they remain anonymous.

Though it is possible that Curtius added the names to flesh out his account, the sensational treatment of the whole episode and the

43) Brunt, 1983 55. 44) Nearch. FGrH 133 F.10d, Ps-Callisth. III 31.8, Metz epitome § 98. 45) Heckel, 1988 5,10, 34, 72-3 sees the pamphlet (= Ps-Callisth. Recension A and Metz. Epitome §98 ff.) as Polyperchon's work c.319 BC - 318 BC rather than Perdiccas' (e.g. Bosworth, CQ 1974 112, Hammond, 1983 110 ). It gives potential allies against Cassander and Antigonus, like Ptolemy and Lysimachus, royal brides in Alexander's "will" and names them as "innocent" of the poisoning conspiracy. 46) Q.C. VIII.1.46, Arr.Anab. IV.8.1-9.4. 47) Arr.Anab.IV.8.7; Errington's explanation (CQ 1969 238) — that Ptolemy omitted his own name from a disgraceful affair, but then could not allow the names of his rivals to be prominent (in a disgraceful affair!) is not convincing.
emphasis on the inebriation of all concerned suggests a source like Cleitarchus. This tends to reduce the likelihood of apologia. One might also doubt whether Arrian’s account derives directly from Ptolemy – the emphasis on heavy drinking and Alexander’s non-Greek excesses hardly fits an apologetic source. As proof of Lysimachus’ prominence at court, it hardly matters whether the story is fabricated or not. What is important is that the apologists clearly regarded him as a plausible candidate among those restraining the enraged king.**

LYSIMACHUS THE LION-TAMER

Lysimachus’ relationship with Alexander is also the focus of a group of stories which centre on a confrontation with a lion. The sources are confused and often conflicting. Some have Lysimachus thrown to, or shut up with the beast on Alexander’s orders. In several cases, the episode appears in the context of a moral treatise on Clementia or Ira, representing a classic exemplum of the corrupting effects of power and the excesses of tyrants. The fullest version is Justin’s, who apparently follows his source, Trogus, verbatim; here the episode is connected with the death of the philosopher Callisthenes, with Lysimachus presented as one of his

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48) See Brown, A.J.Phill 1949 237, 240. 49) Assuming that the story was fabricated at the time, rather than after Alexander’s death. 50) Q.C. VIII.1.13-17; Pliny N.H VIII.54; Seneca De Ira III.17.2, De Clementia 1.25.1; Paus.I.9.5; Just. XV.3.7-8; Plut. Demet. 27.3; Lucian Dial.Mort.14.4; Val.Max. IX.3. ext. 1. 51) Just. XV.3.7-8; Pomp.Trog. Prol XV. fr. 108b (Seel, Teubner edn. 1956). The central section, at least, of XV.3. is a direct copy of Trogus.
disciples. Seeing his mentor suffering dreadful torture at the hands of the bloodthirsty Alexander he gives him poison to put him out of his misery, thus turning the tyrant's wrath upon himself and leading to the famous meeting with the lion.

How credible is this story? Evidently it emanates from a tradition hostile to Alexander, concerned to present him, particularly in his latter years, as the exemplum of a megalomaniac tyrant. To deny that Alexander - or his Successors - ever resorted to brutal and inhuman treatment of subordinates would, of course, be naive. The similarity, however, between this story and others directed against monarchs, including Lysimachus himself\(^{52}\) does suggest that certain themes - physical mutilation, men caged with or like beasts - came to form a stock-in-trade for the literary treatment of autocrats. The historicity of the individual incident therefore becomes questionable, nor is it necessarily proven by Plutarch, who shows Lysimachus later regaling Demetrius' envoys with the tale of Alexander's wrath.\(^{53}\) Lysimachus may have boasted of a conflict with a lion, but such unguarded denigration of Alexander before the envoys of his greatest enemy - even "in a moment of leisure" - is hardly consistent with his well-attested concern to publicise his veneration for the Conqueror.\(^{54}\)

The sensational details of the story, particularly in Justin, where Lysimachus thrusts his hand into the lion's mouth and tears

52) Athen. XIV.616. See below. For other stories emphasising the cruelty of autocratic rulers see Athen. XIV. 620-1, Seneca De Ira. III.11.4 (Peisistratus), 14.1 (Cambyses), 16.3 (Darius I), 18.1, 2, 3 (Marius, Catiline, Julius Caesar). 53) Plut. Demet.27.3. 54) See Ch.6.
out its tongue, and the emphasis on Alexander's anger - ὅπως ὄψιν (Paus.), iratus (Val. Max., Justin), aegre tulit (Justin) - suggests Cleitarchus, popular among Roman readers in the late Republic and early Empire, as a possible source.55 Alternatively, the theme of man pitted against beast as a public spectacle, which seems to owe more to Roman gladiatorial shows than to anything in Greek life, may have originated in the Roman period. Neither Arrian nor Diodorus include the story: Curtius rejects it as a "fabula".56

It is probable, however, that some version of a "lion story", with Alexander as witness to Lysimachus' heroic feat, was current in the latter's lifetime. Justin's account comes in the context of an encomium which praises Lysimachus for his virtus and the magnitudo of his animus, stressing his pre-eminence over his fellow Diadochs.57 This presents a striking contrast to the judgement of Arrian and Diodorus that Lysimachus was a figure of secondary importance.58 That this encomium was composed in Lysimachus' lifetime is highly probable. The incentive for such a work after his death, with no heir left to promote it does not seem strong.59 The treatment of the lion episode emphasises Lysimachus' intimacy with Alexander and his virtus. Alexander is duly impressed by Lysimachus' courage; as a result he considers Lysimachus carior, the comparative implying a previous affection. In Pausanias too, the stress - after

55) Hammond, 1983 77-78 for Cleitarchus' sensationalism; ibid., 63 on ira as a Cleitarchan feature, 109 on Justin's sources. 56) Q.C. VIII.1.17. 57) Just.XV.3.1. - omnes per quos Oriens domitus est, vicerit... Adeo etiam consensu universorum palman virtutis inter ceteros tulit. 58) Arr.Succ. FGrH 156 F. 1.2, Diod. XX.100.1. 59) See Ch.7 for the collapse of Lysimachus' dynasty.
the lion has been overpowered - is on the respect and honour accorded Lysimachus by Alexander. The similarity of these accounts may suggest a common source. These themes might plausibly reflect a story circulated at Lysimachus' court; the anti-tyrant twist which makes the contest a punishment inflicted by Alexander may have been added later.

The same positive motifs occur in Curtius' story of a lion hunt at Bazaira. Curtius, significantly, sees this event as the core of truth underlying the later legend of Lysimachus in the Lion's Den. Certainly the treatment makes it a plausible product of the Diadoch period, quite possibly emanating from Lysimachus' own court. Alexander and Lysimachus come into conflict when the latter aims at a lion which the king feels is his rightful prize. Interestingly, Alexander is presented as seeking to emulate Lysimachus' own exploit - the single-handed killing of a lion in Syria in which he almost lost his life. Despite the theme of competition, the story is favourable to Lysimachus without being overtly hostile to Alexander - this is consistent with what we know of Lysimachus' public stance towards the Conqueror. Alexander here may be guilty of impetuosity, but there is no mention of the famous ira, and he is praised for his speedy dispatch of the lion. The tone of the passage suggests the rivalry for excellence between men who are on equal and intimate terms. It does not, for instance, lend support to the view expressed by Aelian that Alexander "hated Lysimachus because he

seemed to be a good general" - this again seems to reflect a certain convention which regarded kings as invariably paranoid and jealous of others' excellence.  

The episode of the Bazaira hunt survives only in Curtius, though Diodorus includes it in his list of contents for Book 17. The Syrian hunt mentioned by Curtius is probably to be identified with one at Sidon in 332 BC; the historicity of this event may gain support from the lion hunt depicted on the Sidonian sarcophagus, thought to belong to Alexander's protegé King Abdalonymus. If the image of Lysimachus the Lion-killer is founded on anything more substantial than heroic propaganda - the suspicion of which is heightened by the survival of similar stories about Craterus and Perdiccas - then this is its most plausible context.

The lion-taming episode, then, is valuable in revealing a tradition whose interest was to emphasise both Lysimachus' heroic strength and courage and a relationship with Alexander sufficiently equal and intimate to allow rivalry and even the occasional dispute. Neither Lysimachus' abilities nor his friendship with Alexander are in doubt, but the encomiastic stance of Justin's source makes it likely that these features are exaggerated.

63) Ael.V.H. XII.16; e.g. Tac. Ann. II. 26. 27-8; I Samuel XVIII.8-9 (Saul and David). 64) Diod. XVII. 65) Istanbul Archaeol. Museum, Cat. No.68; Pollit, 1986 38; Palagia, _Boreas_ 1986 141 assumes that it commemorates a real occasion. 66) Plut.Alex.40.4; Ael.V.H XII.39; Moretti, _ISE_ II 1975 no.73. For hunting as a royal pursuit and the lion in Lysimachus' royal iconography, see Ch.6. 67) Hammond, 1983 193, n.14, saw no reason to doubt the historicity of this episode.
LYSIMACHUS - A PHILOSOPHER KING?

Justin links Lysimachus with the philosopher Callisthenes, suggesting that he was "in the habit of listening to Callisthenes and taking his excellence as an example"; this forms merely part of a tradition which suggests that philosophy had a major influence in his life. The summing up of Lysimachus' character in the introduction of his encomium - ut animi magnitudine philosophiam ipsam...vicerit - makes the point explicit.68

On Justin's evidence alone, the figure of "Lysimachus the philosopher" is not to be trusted. Goukowsky suggested that Trogus' source had an interest in presenting Lysimachus as the philosopher-king idealised in Hellenistic kingship theory.69 He identified the source as Onesicritus - this historian's description of Alexander as a "philosopher in arms" may support the identification.70 An anecdote in Plutarch shows Onesicritus at the Thracian court, reading his History to Lysimachus. The episode of Alexander and the Amazon meets with a wry rejoinder from Lysimachus, "And where was I then?"71 Goukowsky surely attaches too much significance to this quip72 - there is no need to see in it any more than an expression of scepticism about a fanciful story - but the suggestion that the extravagant praise of Lysimachus in Justin/Trogus derives from this

court historian is attractive, particularly if Pearson's suggestion, that Onesicritus' book was an Anabasis rather than "The Education of Alexander", is accepted.\textsuperscript{73}

Quite plausibly Lysimachus did have some intellectual interests. Arrian describes him as a pupil of the Indian sophist Calanus; the philosophers Hipparchia, Crates and the "atheist" Theodorus were entertained at his court; Pliny makes a fleeting reference to his interest in botany.\textsuperscript{74}

Is all this enough to make Lysimachus a philosopher-king? Royal entertainment of philosophers is not enough to prove a burning passion for their art. Intellectuals clearly formed part of the desirable trappings of the Hellenistic monarch's entourage. Ptolemy I, in particular, is shown fervently and not always successfully courting learned men.\textsuperscript{75} The best evidence for a real interest in philosophy on Lysimachus' part is the connection with Calanus, since Arrian's source seems to be quite independent of the panegyric tradition found in Justin - the details of Calanus' death in Arrian are quite distinct from those in Plutarch, who clearly is using Onesicritus\textsuperscript{76} and Chares. Arrian's source may be Ptolemy, prominent in the episode, the pro-Ptolemaic Cleitarchus or even Duris.\textsuperscript{77}

Against this, however, there is evidence which explicitly refutes the idea of Lysimachus the sage. Firstly, Carystius of Pergamum

\textsuperscript{73} Pearson, 1960 90. Certainly it is difficult to find a context for the Amazon story in a work on Alexander's early life. 74) Arr. Anab. VII.3.4; Diog. Laert. VI.97; Pliny N.H. XXV.35. 75) Diog. Laert. II.115, V.37,97, VII.24. 76) Plut. Alex. 69; Onesic. FGrH 134 F.17a, 18. 77) Brunt, 1983 492; the Nisaean horse motif might suggest Duris - Schubert, 1914 86 saw it as a sign of his debt to Herodotus.
refers to the King's expulsion of philosophers from his kingdom. The value of this evidence is difficult to assess; though the extant fragments of Carystius hardly inspire confidence, the context in which they are preserved, Athenaeus', should be borne in mind; Athenaeus' selection may give an unbalanced picture of Carystius' writings. Second, and more importantly, Justin's presentation of Lysimachus as Callisthenes' pupil clashes with a reference in Plutarch to hostility between the philosopher and "men like Lysimachus and Hagnon" who objected to his pose as an opponent of tyranny. The source is probably Chares, an eye-witness account for events at Alexander's court and generally considered reliable. Berve wished to dismiss this evidence as referring to Alexander's tutor Lysimachus, citing "the well-known hostility" of Chares for the tutor, the fact that Lysimachus is given no title, and Justin's statement that Lysimachus was Callisthenes' pupil. These arguments are not conclusive. Chares' hostility to the tutor Lysimachus is itself a moot point; even if it were accepted, it is difficult to see why a reference to Lysimachus' opposition to Callisthenes - hardly the most popular man at court - should be seen as proof of Chares' hostility and therefore of the identification of this Lysimachus with the tutor. On the question of title, in his Alexander, Plutarch twice designates the tutor by title, ("the Acarnanian", "the pedagogue") and once makes reference to King

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78) Athen. XIII.610 = FHG IV 1885 358. 79) e.g. Athen. XII.542, XIII.578. 80) Plut. Alex. 55. 81) Though Pearson, 1960 57 doubts that Chares is the source, the story seems to continue directly from that of Hephaistion's clash with Callisthenes for which Chares is cited. 82) Berve, 1926 241. 83) Pearson, 1960 57.
Lysimachus, for an incident after 305 BC. The fourth reference to "Lysimachus" is the one in question; the lack of title is therefore no argument for seeing the tutor rather than the Bodyguard as Callisthenes' opponent. The underlying motives which may cast doubt upon Justin's connection between Callisthenes and Lysimachus have already been discussed.

Arguments in favour of identifying "Lysimachus" as the Bodyguard and future King are as follows. Plutarch's account suggests a context of court faction, with conflict between Alexander's tough Macedonian friends and the previously obsequious philosopher striking fashionable philosophical poses. Our hero is perhaps a more likely associate of Hagnon, best known for his silver studded boots and other flashy accessories, than the timid, elderly tutor. Lysimachus' later career, marked by a distinctly pragmatic attitude to city constitutions, shows little sign of the intellectual distaste for autocratic rule which one might suppose appropriate in a devoted disciple of Callisthenes.

On balance, while philosophic interests on Lysimachus' part cannot be entirely rejected, there are strong reasons to suppose that Justin's emphasis on philosophy as a guiding force in his life is at least exaggerated.

AFTER ALEXANDER

Certainly, if character is reflected in action, the literary

84) Plut. Alex. 5, 24, 46. 85) See above. 86) Plut. Alex 40, Agatharcides of Cnidus FGrH 86 F. 18. 87) See Ch.5.
evidence does not present a man who was primarily an intellectual; anecdotes of life at court suggest a rather rough sense of humour and a temper that could turn nasty. Though clearly capable, when necessary, of subtlety and cunning, the personality which emerges is tough, pragmatic, and ruthless.

For example, Lysimachus' exchange of a beloved and politically useful wife, Amastris, for another still more useful, Arsinoe, is unexceptional for the period, but the sequel shows how thoroughly he had embraced the philosophy that sentiment must always come second to political advantage. Circa 284 BC, he finds it convenient to rekindle the ashes of his love for Amastris, supposedly the victim of matricide, taking up the avenger's sword against his stepsons to seize the valuable city of Heracleia Pontica. His son-in-law Antipater is dispatched when he objects to Lysimachus ceding his Macedonian inheritance to Demetrius in a time buying manoeuvre; Antipater's wife, Eurydice, is imprisoned. Lysimachus gains Paeonia through a pretended restoration of King Audoleon's heir Ariston; the commander who betrays Amphipolis to Lysimachus loses not only his promised reward but also his life. Potentially rebellious allies, the Autariatae, are massacred in their thousands; Lysimachus offers a considerable financial incentive to Seleucus to dispose of the conveniently captive Demetrius Poliorcetes; finally he orders the execution of his eldest son Agathocles.

88) Memn. FGrH 434 F. 5.3; see also Ch. 7. 89) Memn. FGrH 434 F. 4.9, F.5.3. 90) Just. XVI.2.4; Porph. PHG III F. 3.3. 91) Polyaen. IV.12.3, IV.12.2. 92) Polyaen. IV.12.1; Plut. Demet. 51, Diod.XXI. F. 20; see Ch. 7.
Some of these episodes are certainly worth taking seriously. Memnon's account of events at Heracleia is based on the contemporary historian Nymphis. Though the latter's reputed impartiality is probably overstated,3 there seems little reason to doubt his account here. Exploitation of dynastic struggle by a stronger power is a familiar theme, and Nymphis' record of the initially positive reaction in Heracleia to Lysimachus' rule diminishes the likelihood of distortion.34 Justin and Porphyry describe Lysimachus' murder of Antipater in very similar terms,35 suggesting a common source clearly independent of that used by Justin for the encomium of XV.3; the incident is narrated quite bluntly with no attempt to justify or exculpate Lysimachus. Though Diodorus confuses the issue, making Demetrius responsible for Antipater's death, it is difficult to reconcile this version with the general narrative of events of 294 BC.36

Assessment of the three stories told by Polyaenus is more difficult. No sources are cited and the book's stratagem framework means that incidents are presented out of their historical context. The loss of Diodorus' narrative for the years after 301 BC, and with it a possible "control" for the Amphipolis and Paeonia episodes, exacerbates the problem. None of these stories is implausible in itself. The exploitation and discarding of protegés is paralleled by Lysimachus' and Demetrius' treatment of Cassander's heirs and by

93) See Ch.7. 94) e.g. Demetrius in 294 BC, Seleucus in 281 BC - see Chs.4 and 7; Memn.FGrH 434 F. 5.3. 95) Porph.FHG III 688 F.3.3; Just. XVI.2.4. 96) Diod. XXI. F. 7, see also Ch.4.
Polyperchon's use of Alexander's bastard son Heracles in 309 BC. Similarly the use and subsequent disposal of traitors is not uncommon. Pirates who aided Lysimachus' recapture of Ephesus c.286 BC were then given a speedy departure "since they had proved untrustworthy to their friends in Ephesus". Whether or not moral standards were thus tardily recalled seems to have depended on the circumstances and interest of those involved; among the "traitors" who flourished under their new masters are Docimus, the city founder, and Lysimachus' own οὐκοσιολατοδιος Philotaerus. The Autariatae story may be identified with an incident in Diodorus involving the desertion of allies from Lysimachus in 302 BC. Polyaenus' source seems to have greatly increased the numbers involved and placed a massacre where Diodorus, presumably using Hieronymus, records simply a desertion to Antigonus.

On a lighter note, jests and verbal repartee are a recurrent theme in anecdotes showing Lysimachus among his intimates at court. The king mocks gently at Onesicritus' flights of fancy, less gently at Demetrius' enslavement to his mistress, the appropriately named Lamia. He enjoys a joke with his friend Philippides, indulges in rough horseplay with his "parasite" Bithys, endures abuse at the hands of Ptolemy's court jester Sotades, but loses his

97) Plut. Demet.36, Pyrrh.7; Just.XVI.2.4, Porph. FHG III F. 3.3; Diod. XX.20,28. 98) Polyaen. V.19. 99) For Docimus, see also Ch. 3 and Ch. 6; Philotaerus, see Strab.XIII.4.1, Ch.7. 100) Diod. XX.113.3, see also Ch.3; though Hornblower, 1981 74-5 sees Hieronymus as Polyaenus' source in Bk. IV, he himself cites a use of multiple sources and the divergence from Diodorus' account may suggest another source here. The historicity of the massacre is discussed in Ch.3. 101) Plut. Alex. 46, Demet. 25, 27. 102) Plut. Demet.12; Athen.VI.246 = Aristodemus FHG III 310.
sense of humour when Demetrius dubs him *Gaizoblat.* He is similarly unamused when a courtier, Telesphorus, unwisely cracks a joke at Queen Arsinoe's expense; Telesphorus finds himself caged like an animal and horribly mutilated into the bargain. The story is elaborated by Seneca with much emphasis on the mutilation and *fames et squalor et inluvies corporis.* It concludes with a neat moral twist - he who inflicted the punishment as much resembled a beast as his unfortunate victim.104

How far can the anecdotal evidence be trusted to reflect an accurate picture of everyday life at Lysimachus' court? The context for these tales, which appear mostly in Athenaeus' *Deipnosophistai* and the Roman moralisers, requires that much of it be treated with caution. The likelihood of anti-monarchic propaganda is strong. The repetition of certain themes, or actual stories, with reference to several individuals - autocratic rulers seem to be particularly prone to such treatment - suggest the build up of a certain "convention". This diminishes the value of such stories for the assessment of an individual.105

The Telesphorus story certainly seems to fall into this category. Found only in the Roman moralising tradition, its similarity to the tales of cruelty attributed to Alexander and its repetition in Plutarch, in a completely different context with another protagonist,106 tend to reduce its credibility. The

103) Athen. VI.246, Plut. Demet.25 = Phylarch. FGrH 81 F.31; see also below and Chs. 4, 5 and 6. 104) Sen. De Ira 3.17. 105) Saller, *Greece & Rome* 1980 69-82 for the value of anecdotal material as historical evidence with reference to the Principate. See also Ch.5. 106) See above, also Cic. Tusc. Disp. I.4.3; Plut. Mor. 634F, Gulick, 1929 318.
emphasis on the Persian-style mutilation may suggest that if this
type of story did have its roots in Alexander's own time, then it
belongs to a hostile tradition, embodied in writers like Ephippus,
concerned to stress Alexander's adoption of "barbaric" non-Greek
practices and their corrupting effect. Similar stories concerning
Persian kings like Darius and Cambyses abound in the pages of
Athenaeus, some deriving ultimately from Herodotus, perhaps via
Duris.107

Lysimachus, moreover, is not alone in attracting stories which
involve jesting and repartee. Other monarchs - notably Philip II and
Antigonus the One-Eyed - also joke and are the butt of jokes.
Demetrius the Besieger is likewise known for his ready wit.108
Certain themes - notably one which might be called "The Parasite's
Request" - where the King resists or submits to a request for money,
are repeated sufficiently often to raise the suspicion of a
"conventional story".109 Other stories relating to Lysimachus have
no exact parallel. The value of these as evidence for an individual
character trait might seem to gain support from the fact that while
the Antigonids likewise feature as men of wit, stories of this kind
are less frequently attached to Ptolemy I,110 while Seleucus and
Cassander seemingly attract none at all. This phenomenon might be
explained in part by the chance survival of evidence and factors
connected with it. Plutarch's choice of Demetrius as a subject for
biography tends to favour the survival of Antigonid anecdotes.

107) e.g. Athen. III 141; Hdt.III.35, 1.117; Kebric, 1977 44 for
Herodotus as a model for Duris. 108) Plut. Mor. 457B, 458F
(Antigonus): 177D, 177F (Philip II); Plut. Demet.25, Athen. XIV.
6114e, XII. 577-8. 109) See Ch.5. 110) Plut. Mor. 458 B-C.
Both Plutarch and Athenaeus, it seems, drew heavily on Duris of Samos and his brother Lynceus, a frequent guest at royal symposia. The brothers' residence in Athens under Antigonid rule might also account for a preponderance of anecdotes centred on the Antigonids and, by extension, their great enemy Lysimachus.

This, however, offers only a partial solution. The probability that Duris did write on Seleucid affairs suggests that if Seleucus I had attracted "joke" anecdotes, then these would have been available to our sources. As for Cassander, he had effectively preceded Lysimachus as the great bugbear of the Antigonids. One might therefore expect him to be the butt of similar stories, at least for the period between 307 BC and his death in 297 BC.

In conclusion, while some of the stories may be "conventional" - in the sense of their indiscriminate application to several individuals - others seemingly are not. Though the authors of such anecdotes, like all good dinner party raconteurs, may well have improved on their material, there seems no good reason to reject outright the idea that Lysimachus was a man who enjoyed an engagement of wits as much as one with weapons.

111) Manni, 1953 xii-xiii; Kebric, 1977 10,55 for Duris as a source for Plutarch and Athenaeus; Athen.III 100E, 101E-F, IV,128A-B. 112) Kebric, 1977 5-6 dates the brothers' stay in Athens to the very last years of the 4th century. 113) Kebric, 1977 57 sees Duris as the author of the romantic Antiochus/Stratonice episode (Plut. Demet 38). 114) When memory of Cassander's rule over Athens would have been sufficiently fresh for the circulation of stories at the time of Duris' and Lynceus' stay there.
Turning from the anecdotal material to evidence of an apparently superior kind, the narrative of those, like Diodorus and Arrian, who claim to be serious historians,116 a major problem of bias immediately arises. Pausanias116 tells us that Hieronymus of Cardia, the major source for Diodorus, and the basis for the surviving fragments of Arrian's Successors and the more sober passages of Plutarch's Demetrius,117 was hostile to Lysimachus. Twentieth century scholarship has cast doubt both on the reliability of this statement and the context in which it appears.116 It is, nevertheless, worth looking at Diodorus and Arrian, and the appropriate passages of Plutarch, to ascertain whether this accusation is justified, and if so, to discover what forms this bias takes, be it understatement, omission or deliberate distortion. It must, however, be remembered that the origin of denigratory material in a hostile source does not necessarily justify its wholesale rejection, particularly when the source, like Hieronymus, has a reputation for writing serious history of a high standard.119

An examination of Diodorus for Hieronymean bias against Lysimachus is complicated by a number of factors. Firstly, Hieronymus' account is centred on events in which he was personally

involved and on the figures of his patrons, Eumenes and the Antigonids.\textsuperscript{120} Events like Lysimachus’ Thracian campaigns are likely to suffer as a result. Second, there is the question of Diodorus’ compression of his sources to fit the scale of a universal history. His complete omission of Antigonus’ war with Seleucus after 311 BC, known from a fragment of the Babylonian Chronicle series\textsuperscript{121} strikingly illustrates the distortion that can arise from epitomising. Finally, at the very moment that Lysimachus, freed from his preoccupations in Thrace and fresh from victory at Ipsus, embarks upon his programme of imperial expansion, Diodorus’ narrative is largely lost. Book XXI survives only as a handful of fragments. For events after 301 BC, Plutarch’s Demetrius is the main hunting ground for evidence of Hieronymus’ stance towards the King of Thrace.

An analysis of Diodorus’ account yields the following conclusions. On the negative side, the account of the founding of Lysimachia certainly suffers from understatement; one of Lysimachus’ major achievements and an important expression of his claim to kingship\textsuperscript{122} is passed over in one sentence. At the siege of Rhodes in 305/4 BC Lysimachus and Cassander are described unflatteringly as “secondary in reputation.”\textsuperscript{123} Negative statements can be found in other episodes but an assessment of the historical situation, based on other evidence, suggests that these represent no

\textsuperscript{120} Hornblower, 1981 35-6. \textsuperscript{121} Grayson, \textit{ABC} 1975 Chron. 10 Rev. 11.3-43. Left edge 11.1-2. \textsuperscript{122} Diod.XX.29.1; for city-building as a kingly activity, see Ch.6. \textsuperscript{123} Diod. XX.100.1; Hornblower, 1981 56 suggests use of a Rhodian source (Zeno?) here but thinks it possible that Zeno drew ultimately on Hieronymus.
more than the truth. The description of Lysimachus' victory against Seuthes in 323 BC as uncertain; the suggestion that selfish fear rather than genuine εὐνοία motivated the coalition of Ptolemy, Seleucus and Lysimachus in 302 BC; the statement that the Getic chief Dromichaetes decided to release Lysimachus from captivity, preferring his rule to his replacement by other "more formidable kings"; Lysimachus' admission that he miscalculated in embarking upon the Getic campaign all seem to fall into this category. 124

On several occasions, moreover, Hieronymus fails to exploit heaven-sent opportunities to express his supposed enmity. His digression on the Bosporan kingdom mentions Eumelus' aid to the Pontic cities rebelling against Lysimachus but attaches no great praise to it. 125 Nor does the foundation of Lysimacheia prompt the bitter outpouring on the fate of Cardia which Pausanias' remarks might lead us to expect. 126 When Demetrius recovered Ephesus from Lysimachus in the campaign of 302 BC we are told that he "restored it to its former status", but the chance which this might afford for an attack on Lysimachus by the spokesman of the "Liberators" is not exploited. 127 The account of the Autariataean desertion may contain a subtle dig at Lysimachus' meanness, but is not made as much of as

124) Diod.XVIII.14.2, see also Ch.2; Diod. XXI.F.4a - since Hieronymus' history covered events to 272 BC (Hornblower, 1981 103) it seems reasonable to suppose that Diodorus continued to use him for Bk. XXI - see also Ch. 3; Diod. XXI. F.12; see also Ch.2.
125) Hornblower, 1981 61 sees Hieronymus as praising Eumelus, presumably on the basis of the phrase "benefactions". The use of what is a formal term need not, however, indicate Hieronymus' own feelings. 126) Diod XX.29.1, Paus.1.9.7. 127) Diod. XX.111.3; Diod. XIX. 78.2 for Hieronymus' stress on the sincerity of the Antigonid liberation programme. See also Ch.5

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it could be by an overtly hostile source.\textsuperscript{128} Finally, Diodorus recounts Lysimachus' bid for the life of Demetrius, but the fierce criticism of Plutarch's version, which characterises him as \textit{μιψοκο\ χαπ Βαπβπος} is missing.\textsuperscript{129}

On the positive side, Lysimachus' successful crushing of the Pontic cities' revolt is covered in some detail. The swift recovery of Odessus and Istria, decisive victories against the Scythians, Seuthes and Antigonus' general Pausanias are all recorded, as is Lysimachus' diplomatic coup against Antigonus in keeping Byzantium neutral.\textsuperscript{130} His euergetism at Rhodes and its reward - his statue in the agora - are noted; though he is described here as a figure of secondary reputation,\textsuperscript{131} this is offset by the admission that his help was seen as a major source of salvation for the city.

Similarly, the successes of Lysimachus' campaign of 302 BC against the Antigonids are recorded. Though his garrisoning of Sigeum is mentioned, his generosity in leaving free cities which capitulated, like Lampsacus and Parium,\textsuperscript{132} is likewise made clear. His diplomatic coup in winning over Docimus and with him Synnada's rich treasury is not passed over. Neither Lysimachus' use of stratagem, nor Docimus' betrayal of his former master Antigonus, is condemned.\textsuperscript{133} The victories of Lysimachus' lieutenant, Prepelaus are recorded and the effect of these successes on Antigonus made clear.\textsuperscript{134} Antigonus' victory in the skirmishes outside Dorylaeum are not dwelt upon or magnified. While there is no explicit stress on

\textsuperscript{128} Diod. XX.113.2, see also Ch.3. 129) Diod. XXI. F. 20, Plut. Demet.51, see below. 130) Diod.XIX.73.3-10, 77.7. 131) Diod. XX. 100. 1-2. 132) Diod. XX.107.2; Sigeum had resisted. 133) Diod. XX. 107.4. 134) Diod. XX.107.4,5; 108.1-3.
the connection between Lysimachus' successful withdrawal strategy and Antigonus' unwilling recall of Demetrius from Greece, it is not concealed.\textsuperscript{135}

If Hieronymus is guilty of negative bias in his account of these campaigns, then it is largely by means of understatement. Certainly the tone is dry and factual; Lysimachus' exploits are not described in detail or made heroic in any way, while he himself remains very much a two dimensional figure.

There are, moreover, two pieces of evidence which directly contradict Pausanias' statement. Cassander's practice of calling on Lysimachus for aid is ascribed not only to Lysimachus' territorial proximity but also to his ὀρέγη.\textsuperscript{136} On the Getic campaign of 292 BC Lysimachus nobly rejects the advice of his φίλος to save himself from capture by the chieftain Dromichaetes; earlier these Thracians had appealed to Lysimachus' φιλανθρωπία to recover territories lost to him.\textsuperscript{137} Unless one assumes the sudden intrusion of another source into Diodorus' narrative,\textsuperscript{138} it is reasonable to suppose that Hieronymus was fair-minded enough to admit the undoubted qualities of a man for whom he had no personal liking, just as Lysimachus is said to have admired the ship-building activities of his greatest foe Demetrius.\textsuperscript{139}

The search for Hieronymus, and his presentation of Lysimachus, in

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{135} Diod.XX.108.4-5, 109.1,5. \textsuperscript{136} Diod.XX.106.2. \textsuperscript{137} Diod. XXI. F. 12.1. \textsuperscript{138} This is unlikely; the prominence of his Antigonid patrons in the section containing the Cassander episode (Diod.XX.106.2) makes Hieronymus the most likely source. Hieronymus' coverage of the Dromichaetes episode is suggested by the reference to his Theban governorship in the preceding passage. (Plut. Demet.39) \textsuperscript{139} Plut. Demet.20.
\end{itemize}
the pages of Plutarch is complicated by the way in which the biographer draws on stories which clearly come from several sources, within one chapter. Though generally the blatantly "pro-Antigonid" passages can be ascribed to Hieronymus, with Duris responsible for those which present Demetrius in a less flattering light, some grey areas remain. Other factors also contribute to the difficulty of a neat source analysis. It is probable that Hieronymus himself was critical of one side of Demetrius' character. Then there is the question as to how far the moralising passages on the greed for power, the destructiveness of ambition etc. represent Plutarch's own contribution.

Where Plutarch mentions Lysimachus and the source is clearly Hieronymus, the picture is not much different from that in Diodorus. The other kings give Lysimachus no help when Demetrius attacks the Thracian Chersonese soon after the Ipsus victory of 301 BC, considering him "by no means more reasonable (ἐπιπέραυλος) than Demetrius". This might be construed as hostile, but it is off-set by a back-handed compliment - Lysimachus' greater power made him more formidable than Demetrius. The tone here is consistent with the cool Hieronymean assessments of the military and political situation which appear in Diodorus. The treatment of Lysimachus' capture by Dromichaetes is neutral; so is the description of

140) Manni, 1953 vi-ix.; e.g. Demet.17 where praise of Demetrius in the first section suggests Hieronymus, but the story of Aristodemus "the arch-flatterer" which follows it suggests Duris. 141) Manni, 1953, viii, xii; Kebric, 1977 26, 47. 142) Hornblower, 1981 229-32. 143) e.g. Plut. Demet. 52, Pyrrh.7; see below. 144) Plut. Demet. 31.
desertions to Demetrius at Sardis in 286 BC. Though Plutarch emphasises Seleucus’ fear and distrust of Lysimachus in 286 BC, again this probably represents no more than the truth.

On two occasions, where Hieronymus’ account of an incident involving Lysimachus survives both in Diodorus and another source, Diodorus’ version is significantly more restrained. Lysimachus offers Seleucus a handsome bribe to dispose of Demetrius. In Plutarch, he is characterised as παρακατηγόρητος. Diodorus’ account contains no such explicit criticism. Arrian’s narration of the Seuthes campaign criticises Lysimachus for acting rashly in embarking upon the war. Diodorus makes no comment on his action.

There are two possible ways of interpreting this. If Diodorus reflects Hieronymus accurately, then the hostile comments of the other accounts must represent embellishment by their authors or by an intermediate source. Alternatively, Plutarch and Arrian reproduce their source accurately, while in Diodorus negative details have been sacrificed to the demands of brevity. In the first case, it seems likely that the former interpretation is the correct one. The accusation of “villainy and barbarism” seems to be something of a favourite theme in Plutarch, evinced when royalty behaves in a way that is unseemly. After Demetrius’ death his captor Seleucus reproaches himself “for having fallen so far below the standards even of Dromichaetes, a barbarous Thracian”. Antigonus Gonatas tells

145) Plut. Demet. 39; Plut.Demet.46 - the tragic quotation closing the chapter probably comes from Duris, but the opening discussion of Demetrius’ policy, supply problems etc. suggests Hieronymus.
his son Alconyeus "that he was accursed and no better than a barbarian" for defiling the corpse of his defeated enemy Pyrrhus. Though Hieronymus may well be the ultimate source for all three stories, the emotive commentary attached to these episodes contrasts strongly with the cool narration of the Successors' murders and betrayals in Diodorus. The second case is less easy to decide, but the criticism is, in any case, less strong. If this judgement derives from Hieronymus, then it is quite justified, coming from a serious military historian.

On the basis of this analysis, given the limits of the evidence, it must be concluded that, if Lysimachus has suffered at Hieronymus' hands, it is mainly through understatement and the playing down of his achievements. One or two negative comments are balanced by unexpected praise, which cannot safely be attributed to a source independent of Hieronymus. By the same token then, there is no justification for rejecting the criticisms, particularly when these are compatible either with character traits attested by independent sources, or explicable in terms of the political situation. If, for instance, one accepts that Lysimachus was ruthless enough to betray former friends at Heraclea, there is no good reason to reject the account of his attempt to rid himself of his hated foe, Demetrius, simply because it derives from the pen of Hieronymus.

DURIS AND LYSIMACHUS

On the other side, there is the claim that Lysimachus had his own apologist in Duris of Samos.\(^{152}\) In Saitta's eyes, moreover, Duris, unlike Hieronymus, was not above outright falsification of events to put his patron in a better light. Comparing Plutarch with Pausanias for Lysimachus' invasion of Macedon in 287 BC, he notes that whereas Pausanias talks of Lysimachus as defeated near Amphipolis, there is no mention of it in Plutarch.\(^{153}\) He sees Pausanias' source as Hieronymus,\(^{154}\) while Plutarch drew on Duris. The omission is therefore a deliberate falsification by a partisan historian. The tradition which exculpates Lysimachus from responsibility for the murder of his son, Agathocles, has also been seen as Duris' work.\(^{155}\)

If the authorship of these various passages were certain, and they were the only surviving traces of Duris relating to Lysimachus, then the theory that his history actively favoured the King of Thrace might stand. Certain objections, however, can be raised. First, Saitta's confidence in Pausanias' account as superior to Plutarch's is misplaced. Pausanias' whole digression on Lysimachus leaves much to be desired; it lurches from one event to another, with little regard for chronology.\(^{156}\) Pausanias makes it clear that his sources are diverse - often he gives them only the status of

Accordingly the whole account is rife with confusion and error: in the passage in question Demetrius' takeover of Macedon exploits a plea for help from "Alexander and Cassander" - the latter had been dead for at least three years! Second, it is perhaps doubtful whether Plutarch's account represents undiluted Duris. Though the last section of *Demetrius* 44, with its hostile tone and Demetrius' "actor's disguise" certainly suggests Duris, the earlier section is notable for its resounding praise of Pyrrhus; the account of these events in the *Pyrrhus* clearly follows the same source. This may suggest the intrusion of an Epirote source, used either directly by Plutarch or via Duris, perhaps Proxenus of Thebes.

Lastly, the omission of Lysimachus' defeat in Plutarch need not be ascribed to deliberate distortion by a partisan source. Quite possibly Lysimachus did encounter some resistance at Amphipolis - perhaps he was worsted in a clash with Andragathus, the commander who subsequently betrayed the city to him. Whether he actually met Demetrius face to face, as Pausanias implies, is less certain; the rapid loss of morale among Demetrius' army with the news of Pyrrhus' capture of Beroia is hardly consistent with a recent victory on the the scale that Pausanias suggests. If Demetrius was not personally involved in this victory then Plutarch's omission of it may be ascribed to the biographer's selectivity. Plutarch's

157) e.g. I.9.6. (Lysimachus'/Agathocles' capture by Dromichaetes) and I.10.3 (Arsinoe's hatred of Agathocles). 158) See Ch. 4. 159) Proxenus, probably Pyrrhus' court historian, was author of an *HrkgpQTika*: Ziegler, FW XXXIII, 1957 col.1033; FGrH 703; Hornblower, 1981 72, 184 n.12,195. 160) Polyaen.IV.12.2. 161) Paus.I.10.2 says "he was nearly expelled from Thrace"; this suggests that Demetrius' victory allowed him to take the offensive, pursuing Lysimachus into Thrace. See also Plut. Demet. 44, Pyrrh.11.
focus is on Demetrius and his dramatic loss of Macedon - Lysimachus' early defeat was not decisive for this outcome.

Similarly, the theory of an "apologetic tradition" for Lysimachus' last days is questionable. First there is the problem of finding an incentive for such a work, with Lysimachus dead and his dynasty in ruins. Second, the so-called "apologia" hardly places Lysimachus in a positive light. He escapes the charge of parricide only to be presented as a senile and impotent fool.162

In the case of the events discussed above, a preconception that Duris was Lysimachus' apologist - based on the knowledge that Lysimachus tolerated Duris' tyranny in Samos163 - seems to have led to his identification as the source for any evidence that seems to favour the King of Thrace. Other passages which mention Lysimachus, and are more certainly derived from Duris, tell a rather different story.

Evidence is generally ascribed to Duris on the basis of certain "hallmarks", thought to reflect his preference for a "tragic" style of history, his stress on μίμησις and ἡδονή.164 These include: an emphasis on costume and disguise; the use of quotations from tragedy and images and similes from the theatre; an emphasis on the luxury and decadence of kings.165 Since Diodorus probably did not use Duris for his books on the Diadochs,166 most of the evidence comes from Plutarch. Again this raises the problem of deciding at which point the biographer begins to draw upon a story from a different source.

162) See also Ch.7. 163) See Ch.5. 164) Duris FGrH 76 F.1.
165) Schubert, 1914 68,76; Kebric, 1977 15, 33-4, 57-8, 21;
Hornblower, 1981 70. 166) Schubert, 1914 60; Kebric, 1977 60.
and to what extent he himself imitates the mannerisms of that source in an effort to achieve a coherent narrative. 167

Looking for praise of Lysimachus in Duris, Shipley, wedded firmly to the idea of Duris as Lysimachus' "creature", was hard put to find much that was positive. He cites the presentation of Lysimachus as a wit in chapter 25 of the Demetrius, and the touching story of Lysimachus' dog hurling itself onto his funeral pyre. 168 While the aim of the latter tale might be to create sympathy for its subject, the fidelity of animals - Alexander's horse, Xanthippus' dog 169 - is a well-known literary theme. The story's composition after Lysimachus' death also tends to diminish the likelihood of apologia. Shipley's citation of the γαγογορακτ story as a positive treatment of Lysimachus is still more curious. Though Lysimachus gets the chance to sneer at Demetrius' mistress Lamia, the Besieger hits back, casting aspersions on the fidelity of Lysimachus' wife. Athenaeus ascribes the preceding passage, where Demetrius' φιλαρχοι toast Lysimachus as "the treasurer" (γαγογορακτ) to Phylarchus, but it may well derive ultimately from Duris. 170 Here Lysimachus gets very much the worse of the exchange. Not only is he dubbed a eunuch, but unlike the other kings who are similarly insulted, he is unable to laugh it off. If Phylarchus drew on Duris for the other anecdotes which concern Lysimachus, and cast him in a distinctly unflattering

167) e.g. the last lines of Demet. 53 use the "stage image" associated with Duris, but the reference to the "Roman drama" which follows must make it Plutarch's work. 168) Shipley, 1987 180; Plut.Demet 25; Duris FGrH 76 F.55 = Pliny N.H VIII.143; Aelian V.H. VI.25. 169) Arr.Anab.V.19.4-6; Q.C. VI.5.18, IX.3.23; PlutThem.10. 170) Athen.VI.261 = Plut. Demet.25 = Phylarch. FGrH 81 F.31; Kebric, 1977 10; Manni 1953 xii.
light, then the idea of Duris as Lysimachus' spokesman becomes increasingly doubtful. 171

Returning to Duris himself, Lysimachus escapes neither the general criticism of arrogance directed at Alexander's Successors once they become kings 172 nor the judgement that the Kings who followed Alexander were only poor imitations of their master. 173

Direct praise of Lysimachus, which can be ascribed to Duris, then, is notable for its absence, while anecdotes which insult him, either individually or with his fellow kings are quite common. Certainly there is nothing which resembles the encomium of Justin's account. The possibility remains that Duris took a more oblique approach. Is his sustained hostility to Demetrius the result of his position on Lysimachus' payroll? This is possible, but the fact that Lysimachus is also the object of his ridicule tends to argue against it. Other reasons, moreover, can be found for Duris' hostility to the Antigonids. Firstly, the Antigonid "protectorate" of Samos seems to have implied a close supervision of the island, overshadowing the tyranny of his father Kais if it did not coincide with Duris' own rule. 174 Second, the history of troubled relations between Athens and Samos in the 4th century BC may underlie Duris' hostility to the Antigonids and their Athenian supporters. An Athenian cleruchy for over forty years, Samos was restored to the Samians by Alexander's Exiles Decree of 324 BC. 175 Perdiccas upheld the exiles' cause after Alexander's death, but Polyperchon's brief

171) Phylarch. FGrH 81 F.12, 29; see Ch.5. 172) Plut. Demet.18; the comparison with "tragic actors" suggests Duris as a source. 173) Plut. Demet. 41, Pyrrh.8. 174) See Ch.5. 175) Diod. XVIII.8. 3-7. 43
period of Regency revived the threat of renewed Athenian control.\textsuperscript{176} Like any self-respecting Samian, Duris may have feared that Stratocles and his faction might prevail upon their Antigonid patrons to give Samos back to Athens.\textsuperscript{177}

Other evidence which might seem to reflect a less direct expression of favour for Lysimachus is Duris' enthusiastic praise of the King's 
\textit{αἴσχος} Philippides.\textsuperscript{178} Lysimachus' benefactions to the Athenians are mentioned, and an anecdote shows him offering a generous gift to his friend. The emphasis, however, is very much on Philippides - it is through his efforts that the Athenians receive gifts from the king - and Lysimachus is not directly praised. This unusually positive stance towards a royal courtier\textsuperscript{179} might be explained in terms of Duris' personal interest and history. Kebric's portrait of Duris as patriot and moralist\textsuperscript{180} rather than salacious scandal-monger is probably overstated. Nevertheless, it is true that Duris' indignation is directed as much against the Antigonids' Athenian flatterers as against the kings themselves. A particular target of Duris' hostility is Stratocles: Philippides, who is specifically praised for his lack of sycophancy, is known to have been a bitter enemy of this man.\textsuperscript{181} Duris' stay in Athens probably coincided with the period when Philippides' opposition to Stratocles was most vociferously expressed. Such a stance, in

\textsuperscript{176} Kebric, 1977 4-5; Habicht, \textit{Ath.Mitt} 1957 154-274 no.s 3, 13.20; Diod. XVIII.18.9, 56.4, 7. \textsuperscript{177} Seleucus' restoration of Lemnos to Athens in 281 BC serves as a useful parallel. See Ch.7. \textsuperscript{178} Plut. Demet. 12; the hostility towards Stratocles and the quotation from Philippides' comedy suggests Duris as the source. \textsuperscript{179} See Ch.6 for the generally unflattering approach of the literary sources towards the kings' \textit{αἴσχος}. \textsuperscript{180} Kebric, 1977 20-23. \textsuperscript{181} Plut. Demet 12; Edmonds, 1961 179 F. 25, F. 31.
Antigonid-dominated Athens, implies considerable courage. Duris' unexpected praise for Philippides may have stemmed from a genuine admiration.

Lastly, it must be considered whether Plutarch's references to the renown and popularity which Lysimachus enjoyed in Macedon c.287 BC as an erstwhile Friend of Alexander should be rejected as reflecting Duris' bias. Though the emphasis on intimacy with Alexander accords with the tone of Lysimachus' own propaganda, the value that association with Alexander carried in the Diadoch period is an accepted fact. Since, moreover, even Hieronymus was prepared to admit Lysimachus' and formidable reputation, a reference to his high standing in Macedon need not represent bias in an apologetic source.

In conclusion, then, the belief that Duris' history was slanted to favour his patron Lysimachus seems ill-founded. There are serious difficulties in securely identifying the sources for the Amphipolis incident. The idea of an "apologetic tradition" on Lysimachus' last days seems misconceived. Without further examples of discrepancy between Duris and another "superior" source dealing with the same event, this evidence is insufficient to support the idea of consistent pro-Lysimachean distortion in Duris. Direct praise of Lysimachus is rare and this is more than off-set by anecdotes which present the king in a far from flattering light.

Duris' dual role as historian and tyrant makes it likely that his literary presentation of the Diadochs will be even more closely

intertwined with his own experience of events than is usual in historians writing of their own day. The starting point for the belief in Duris as Lysimachus' apologist is presumably that king's "support" for his tyranny. The probability that Duris' family likewise ruled Samos under the Antigonids sets a rather different slant on the affair. If Duris was hostile to one set of "protectors", there is little reason to think his attitude would necessarily be any more positive towards their successor.

CONCLUSIONS

In analysing the surviving literary evidence for its presentation of the Successor Lysimachus, the aim of this chapter was to discern whether any kind of coherent picture of the man and his achievements might emerge. With allowance made for the limited and fragmentary state of the evidence the following conclusions can be drawn.

Family background and personal ability combined to give Lysimachus a head start on his career with Alexander. Though certainly a member of the élite, both socially and as a military man, it is possible that he only achieved real prominence in the last years of Alexander's reign. Military exploits on the Indian campaign may have contributed to this success. Even then he seems to have remained in the "second rank" among Alexander's generals, profiting from being on the spot at Babylon in 323 BC to receive a satrapy. The intimacy with Alexander, emphasised in a tradition which probably reflects Lysimachus' later propaganda, may well be exaggerated, as is the emphasis on him as a "philosopher king".
The evidence for his actions after 323 BC suggest that he was ruthless in the pursuit of ambition. Though success was often achieved through subtlety and stratagem, it is clear that on occasion he was prepared to take a risk and could act impetuously, inspired by passion rather than reason. His reputation as a wit seems not entirely undeserved.

Though it has been claimed that he is the target of negative bias on the part of Hieronymus of Cardia, a major source for the Diadoch period, this seems to manifest itself mainly in understatement. It is unlikely that Hieronymus fabricated incidents which place Lysimachus in a less than ideal light. There is, furthermore, little evidence to support the theory that Duris of Samos wrote as an apologist for the King of Thrace.

The men of letters, of course, do not tell the whole story. The early Hellenistic age sees kings and cities publicise major policy decisions on stone; coins and statues - representing both "real" and "ideal" images of royalty - also commemorate victories and benefactions; shrines, cities and monumental tombs reflect their founders' aspirations to immortality. Public inscriptions, coins, sculpture, painting, city ruins and other archaeological finds serve to complement, supplement and/or correct the evidence provided by the literary sources. The contribution made by this evidence for an understanding of Lysimachus' career will be made clear, where it is relevant, in the following chapters.

185) The most important inscriptions relating to Lysimachus are reproduced in Appendix 5.
"Cum inter successores eius provinciae dividerentur, ferocissimae gentes quasi omnium fortissimo adsignatae sunt". Justin III.15

The glowing terms in which Justin describes the assignment of Thrace in 323 BC to Lysimachus may be suspect, given the panegyric context in which these lines appear. Nevertheless, the record of events in Thrace in the years immediately preceding his appointment supports the idea that he was chosen primarily for a military reputation which may have compensated for a lack of previous experience in government.

MACEDONIAN RULE IN THRACE AND ON THE WEST PONTIC COAST

The first years of Macedonian rule in Thrace are ones of triumph. In 341 BC, Philip II, profiting from dynastic rivalries which had split the once powerful Odrysian kingdom into three realms, finally forced the most powerful of these princes, Cersobleptes, to acknowledge defeat. This action concluded a series of campaigns which brought under Macedon's rule the area between the Nestos River and the Haemus mountains. Philip maintained control through a network of Macedonian colonies, urban centres constructed on

1) Plut. Alex. 46; see Ch. 1. 2) There is no evidence that Lysimachus held any administrative post under Alexander; Tarn, 1948 139 argues that his position as Σεβαστος would preclude any such office. 3) Hammond & Griffith, 1979, 259, 364, 559.
existing fortified sites which probably doubled as garrison towns. In addition he installed or retained those indigenous rulers who could be trusted to be compliant. An obligation to provide troops for Philip's army and the payment of tribute were probable conditions for their "rule".4

The effectiveness of this arrangement in South-eastern Thrace is supported by the fact that Alexander's Thracian expeditions in 340 BC and 335 BC were directed not against Odrysians, but the Maedi in the Rhodopes area and the Triballi in the North-West, beyond the Haemus range.5 Alexander's victory served to reinforce the Macedonian presence between these mountains and the Danube, an area where Philip's influence seemingly took the form of alliances, both with Getaic chieftains and the Greek cities on the Pontic coast,6 rather than the formal control achieved in the south. With the river as a natural boundary between Macedonian territory and the tribes beyond, Alexander's foray to the further bank is best seen as a demonstration of strength, aimed at securing this "frontier" before his departure to Asia, rather than an attempt at conquest beyond the river.7

The value of Thrace, already famed for its mercenaries in the fifth century, as a recruiting ground for Alexander is reflected in the inclusion of Thracians on his Asian campaign. The presence of the Agrianes among Alexander's crack troops is the fruit of his

4) Ibid., Velkov, 1983 233, for colonies at Philippopolis, Cabyle and Beroe; Bengston, 1937 42; Diod. XVI.71.2, Hammond & Griffith, 1979 431. 5) Plut. Alex. 9, Arr. Anab. I.1-5; Archibald, 1984 509. 6) Satyrus, Muller, FHG III 161 for the alliance with Cothelas; Jordanes Getica 10; Diod. XVI.71.2; Justin IX.2.1. Momigliano, 1934 146-7 for alliance with Odessus. 7) Hamilton, 1973 46-7.
friendship with the Thracian dynast Langarus, reflecting the value for Macedon of exploiting rivalries between the indigenous rulers in Thrace. Frontinus suggests that Alexander also saw recruitment as a method of culling Thracian strength at home. Perhaps he aimed also to strengthen Thracian loyalty to himself through shared military experience, glory and the profits of victory. On the administrative side, Alexander's reign sees the appointment of the ἐπαρχής in Thrace. Effectively governor by virtue of his military and administrative powers, he was officially subordinate to Alexander's Regent in Europe, Antipater.

With Alexander's protracted absence in Asia, however, the Macedonian record in Thrace ceases to be a cause for pride. One ἐπαρχής, Memnon, saw Thrace as a recruiting ground for troops with which to assert himself against Antipater. His successor, Zopyrion, embarked upon an ambitious and possibly ill-advised campaign against the city of Olbia, ending in his death and the annihilation of his army at Scythian hands c.325 BC. The first ἐπαρχής' ambition and the second's incompetence created unsettled conditions in Thrace which were fully exploited by the man who was...

10) Memnon - Diod. XVII. 62.5, Berve, 1926 II no. 449, Stahelin PW XV , 1931 cols. 653-4, Beloch, 1925 III 648, sees Antipater, not Alexander as the target of Memnon's rebellion, which may explain his subsequent retention of his post. 11) Zopyrion - Justin XII.2.16; Macrobert Sat.I.11.33; Ziegler, PW Xa 1972 cols. 763-4. Justin may be right to present this as Zopyrion's own initiative; the only basis for Alexander's proposed Black Sea expedition, the alternative context, is his "polite and suitable reply" (Arr. Anab IV.15.6, 16.1) to the Scythian king Pharasmenes' request for a joint campaign. In 323 BC Alexander's next project was Arabia, not the Black Sea. (Arr. Anab. VII.20,22). For this dating, see Q.C. X.1.43, Beloch, 1925 IV 44.
to prove Lysimachus' chief opponent in the early years, the Odrysian dynast Seuthes III.

LYSIMACHUS, SATRAP OF THRACE

It has been suggested that when the Regent Perdiccas created a separate Thracian satrapy in 323 BC his aim was to diminish Antipater's authority.\(^{12}\) Whatever the truth of this, Lysimachus' satrapal appointment was surely justified in terms of military security; in Thrace, Seuthes III's rebellion gained fresh impetus from Alexander's death, while the threat of war in Greece would keep the Regent fully stretched.\(^{13}\) As satrap of Thrace, Lysimachus faced the task of restoring Macedonian prestige in a region which constituted the empire's Northern "frontier" against the barbarian tribes beyond, and provided a vital land link between Macedon and the Asian satrapies.\(^{14}\)

There is considerable disagreement in the literary sources over the extent of Lysimachus' satrapy. Most accounts suggest that it comprised the West Pontic coast as well as Thrace, though it is unclear whether the Greek πόλεις on that coast were officially included.\(^{15}\) Pausanias' estimate is more conservative; "After

Alexander's death, Lysimachus ruled over the Thracians who are neighbours to the Macedonians, those whom Alexander had ruled and Philip before him. Well, these did not comprise a great part of Thrace.  

Although Pausanias' aim of disparaging Macedonian achievement in order to highlight the subsequent Roman conquest clearly raises the question of distortion, Arrian supports the idea of a very much more limited satrapy. Drawing on the reliable Hieronymus, he describes the satrapy as "Thrace and the Chersonese and the peoples bordering the Thracians on the coast of the Euxine Pontus as far as Salmydessus". The suggestion that this represents the actual territory still under Macedonian control, as opposed to the "paper satrapy" delineated by the other sources, and that Lysimachus' task was to transform the ideal into the real, is plausible.  

THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE

Before discussing the extent to which Lysimachus succeeded in meeting this brief, the limitations of the evidence for his rule in Thrace must be mentioned. The literary sources are extremely sparse. Diodorus' account of the first clash with Seuthes breaks off abruptly; apart from the armies' numbers, there is no detail concerning the battle sites, terrain, tactics, disposition of forces etc. The literary tradition then falls silent on Lysimachus' activities in Thrace for the next ten years until the revolt of the

Dobroudja cities in 313 BC. There is virtually no direct information as to the new satrap's administration, nor are we told where he placed his headquarters before the foundation of Lysimacheia in 309 BC. Evidence for the Getic campaigns of the 290s BC is equally scanty, deriving mainly from the fragments of Diodorus XXI, supplemented by scattered references in Plutarch, Pausanias and the anecdotes of the Roman moralising tradition.

Past attempts to account for Lysimachus' actions, particularly for the first decade in Thrace, have therefore resorted to a reconstruction of events, hypothesising where the evidence fails. Beneath these reconstructions lie certain preconceptions as to the probable basis for relations between Macedonian and Thracian, which are automatically conceived as those of ruler and subject. In recent years, the dangers of this method have been fully exposed; excavations in modern Bulgaria have revealed and are still revealing a wealth of numismatic and archaeological finds which necessitate a re-assessment of "the Lysimachean conquest" and of the nature of early Hellenistic Thracian society.

The new evidence from Thrace suggests that the period coinciding with Lysimachus' reign saw remarkable changes in terms of urbanisation and Hellenisation among the aristocracy. At present the bulk of the evidence comes from South-eastern Thrace, but finds

18) Notably Saitta, Kokalos 1955 65 who assumed that "la lotta contro Seute, porto all' assoggettamento degli Odrisi e, con molta probabilita, delle altre tribu trachiche", based on Diod.XIX.73.8, who tells us that Seuthes "had gone over to Antigonus"; Saitta assumes the revolt of a subject, but Seuthes' position might equally have been neutral or that of an "ally".

53
from excavations in north-eastern Bulgaria, where, for instance, a new site at Sboryanovo, in the region of Razgrad, has begun to reveal traces of a major cult centre, suggest that similar developments were taking place among the Getic tribes there. It is reasonable to suppose that the aspirations of the Thracian dynasts which prompted their active co-operation in this process must also have affected the nature of their relations with the Macedonian rulers in Thrace. This is supported by the evidence for the career of Lysimachus' chief opponent in the early years in Thrace, the Odrysian dynast, Seuthes III.

SEUTHES III AND THE ODrysIAN RENAISSANCE

This enterprising individual first takes the stage in 331 BC, when an Athenian inscription honours Rhebulas, son of Seuthes; it seems that another son, Cotys, already enjoyed Athenian citizenship. The text's fragmentary state makes the precise context of this Odrysian diplomacy uncertain. Some see Seuthes as an active participant in Memnon's revolt, striving to win Athenian support for the cause; this, however, implies that when Memnon made terms with Antipater he was able to secure not only his own continued authority but also that of his Thracian associates. More plausibly, Seuthes may have hoped to profit from Memnon's rebellion without actually

19) Diana Gergova gave a preliminary report on the excavations at the I.C.S. in London on 21st November 1989; see also below. 20) Cicikova, 1983 300. 21)IQ II² 349 = Tod, GHI II 1948 no.193. 22) Tod, 1948 268; Diod.XVII.63.1 - the outbreak of Agis' revolt in Sparta forced Antipater to cut short his military operations against Memnon and come to terms.
committing himself to active participation; Archibald sees his approach to Athens as an attempt to tap new sources of support, reflecting Thracian disillusionment in the wake of Memnon's return to the fold. Certainly Curtius suggests that Seuthes bided his time until 325 BC when Zopyrion's defeat signalled the right time for revolt.23

With sons old enough to represent him diplomatically, Seuthes was at least thirty five years old in 331 BC. Perhaps a protege of Philip II, he has been linked with Cersobleptes' branch of the Odrysae, perhaps the brother or cousin whose fund-raising efforts for Cersobleptes are recorded by Polyaeus.24

It is reasonable to assume that by 323 BC he was already established on the site near modern Kazanluk which was to form the nucleus of his city, Seuthopolis. Though Philip's conquests had evidently forced a shift north from the original seat of Odrysian power, probably centred on the river Artiscus, in the neighbourhood of Mezek,25 in terms of defence and economic resources, the new site could hardly be improved. A lofty position, with the waters of the Tonsus on three sides, made the fortified city easily defensible. Fertile terrain supporting an agricultural economy combined with a flourishing trade along the Tonsus and Hebrus river routes, with Greek cities on the coasts of Thrace and Asia Minor and in mainland Greece. Finds from Seuthopolis include Athenian black-glazed ware

and a high proportion of Thasian amphora stamps.\textsuperscript{26}

Seuthes' motives in taking the offensive against Lysimachus on his arrival in Thrace in 323 BC have been connected with the threat posed by the prospect of renewed Macedonian control both over the Hebrus trade route and the West Pontic cities which now constituted Seuthes' main markets.\textsuperscript{27} This assumes, however, that Lysimachus was in a position to garrison the Pontic cities as early as 323 BC, something which is far from certain.\textsuperscript{28}\textsuperscript{29} Though commercial factors may have contributed to Seuthes' decision to challenge Lysimachus' right to the Thracian hinterland, the aspirations which the evidence from Seuthopolis reflects \textsuperscript{29}, suggest that Seuthes' claim to revive the Odrysian kingdom as an independent power on an equal footing with the realms of the Successors was the main issue at stake.

In the past, Odrysian kings had exerted considerable influence both in Thrace and the Greek speaking world beyond. The state's creator, Teres, conquered the region between Salmynessus and the Bosphorus, following the Persians' expulsion from Europe.\textsuperscript{30} By 429 BC, Sitalces ruled an empire comprising all the tribes south and south-east of the Nestus-Danube line and was able to muster a vast army for the planned invasion of Macedon that year. Seuthes I promoted expansion towards the Thracian Chersonese and commanded 800-1,000T p.a in revenues.\textsuperscript{31} Cotys I negotiated with Philip II to fix the Odrysian frontier at the Nestus Valley; he captured most of the Thracian Chersonese, threatening Athenian control of the

Propontis - this probably marks the zenith of Odrysian achievement.\textsuperscript{32} Finds of silver \textit{miklys} in Getic and Triballian territory, inscribed with his name, have prompted the theory that he also promoted a policy of tribal union with the chiefs of north and north-western Thrace.\textsuperscript{33} His most powerful successor, Cersobleptes, held onto the Chersonese and allied himself with the Athenians against Philip II until his deposition by Philip in 341 BC.\textsuperscript{34}. In contrast to less than two decades of firm Macedonian control, Seuthes III had behind him a glorious heritage of over a century of Odrysian achievement.

That he was conscious of this heritage is almost certain. The existence of an aristocratic society, wedded to the manly pursuits of warfare and hunting, which has apparently left no trace of any literary tradition\textsuperscript{35} seems to presuppose an oral tradition of story and song heroising the past; this gains some support from Xenophon; Seuthes II displays knowledge of the legendary exploits of his ancestors and an interest in Odrysian genealogy.\textsuperscript{36}

Small wonder then that Seuthes III saw Alexander's death and the

32) Cotys I - Fol, 1977 144, Hoddinott, 1981 105. 33) The legend \textit{KOTYQX} is followed by names of Thracian settlements. For new examples from the Rogozen hoard, see Nikolov, 15-17, 19, Hoddinott, 25 in Fol et al., 1986, Mihailov, \textit{Epigraphica} 1988 9-40). Plausibly these settlements presented the \textit{miklys} or the silver to Cotys and other Odrysian kings as tribute; subsequently they may have been given as guest-gifts to Triballian and Getic princes, (Venedikov, 1975 10 followed by Ivanov, ACIT II 1980 391). See Hatzopoulos, 1980 52 for Philip II's similar use of precious vessels as guest-gifts. 34) See above. 35) Mazarov, 1977 17, Alexandrescu, \textit{Dacia} 1983 63; see, however, Velkova ACIT 1980 III 149-54, Moldoveanu, DIITK I 1984 223-7 for inscriptions which may reflect the Thracian language and Simeonov, ACIT 1980 III 114-116, for Ovid's penning of verses in Getic (Ex Ponto IV.13). 36) Xen. Anab. VII.2.31; Seuthes claims "kinship" with the Athenians, based on identifying his ancestor Teres with King Tereus of Athens.
prospect of schism in his empire as a golden opportunity to re-establish the Odrysian kingdom as a force to be reckoned with. What then were the resources which he could muster for the attempt?

THE ODRYSIAN ARMY

At his first encounter with Lysimachus in 323 BC, Seuthes was able to raise an army of 20,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry. Though small compared to Sitalces' force of 150,000 in 429 BC and merely a fraction of Strabo's estimate of Thrace's total military resources under Roman rule, they considerably outnumbered the Macedonian forces. The idea that the Odrysae themselves formed the bulk of the cavalry, with infantry recruited from other tribes, is supported by evidence from Seuthopolis which certainly reflects the aristocratic glorification of the horseman particularly associated with the Thracians from the Homeric king Rhesus onwards. Apart from the ubiquitous Thracian cavalier, featured on the reverse of Seuthes' coinage, the main frieze on the tholos tomb at Kazanluk, generally dated to the early third century BC, depicts four-horse chariots at full speed. The Samothracian cult of the Cabeiroi, attested at Seuthopolis, is centred on twin horsemen.

The population of Seuthopolis has not been calculated, but the relatively small geographical area covered by the city (five

hectares) and the spacious layout of its houses has suggested that residence within the city was restricted to the aristocracy and the merchant classes. Beyond the walls, there were further settlements whose inhabitants made a living from agricultural labour; though these may have provided Seuthes with some infantry, the great numbers of foot-soldiers recorded by Diodorus seem to imply the recruitment of neighbouring tribes.\(^41\) Though the precise limits of Seuthes' kingdom are uncertain, Arrian's description of Lysimachus' Thracian satrapy together with evidence from coin hoards and other archaeological finds suggest that his sphere of influence was restricted to the middle and upper reaches of the River Tonsus, extending perhaps as far as the Stryama river to the west and the Sasliyka to the east. By the end of the fourth century at least, an independent dynasty was ruling at Cabyle, c.100 kilometres to the east.\(^42\) The Hebrus Valley may have remained in Macedonian hands, but this supposition rests only on the remnants of "Hellenistic" fortifications at Philippopolis; their connection with Lysimachus\(^43\) is tenuous. A likely source of infantry is the tribes of the Haemus mountains, but whether they represented allies gathered for the short-term purpose of repelling the Macedonian threat, or a long-standing bond, perhaps one of dependency upon Seuthes, is unclear. In terms of Seuthes' influence further afield, there is as yet no

\(^41\) Dimitrov & Cicikova, 1978 7, 10; Hoddinott, 1981 124; 20,000 infantry (Diod. XVIII.14.2) compares favourably with the hoplite forces mustered by Athens in 431 BC (c.16,000, Thuc.II.31), though Diodorus' figure may include light-armed troops too. \(^42\) Arr.Succ. FGrH 156 F. 1.7; Archibald, 1984 511; Domaradzki, Numizmatika 1987 9. IGBR 1731 11.5,11,15,29; Velkov, 1983 233; see Map 1. \(^43\) Suggested by Hoddinott, 1975 85.
evidence comparable to that which seems to link his Odrysian ancestors in guest-friendship with Triballian and Getic chiefs.44

Though the literary evidence is sparse, tomb finds and vase-paintings give some impression of the kind of army which Lysimachus faced in 323 BC. The fourth century Thracian warrior attired himself for battle in a composite cuirass of iron-strips faced with bronze rings and a crescent-shaped iron collar; helmets found at Pletena in the Rhodopes include examples of both the Chalcidian and Phrygian types. The highest ranking soldiers added greaves to this ensemble, but the elaborate silver-gilt examples from Vratsa and Aghigiol, masterpieces of Thracian art, are strictly for the parade ground. The use of bronze armour, knives and arrow-tips similar to ones from Macedonia dated to the reigns of Philip II and Alexander and the Greek Ειπος reflect a readiness to absorb influences from abroad, but home-grown weaponry such as the famous Thracian δουαία still kept its appeal. Though this has been identified as a long pike, of the sort found at Pletena, Sekunda argues that the δουαία was a sickle-spear (δούασπέναος), used, probably by the mountain tribes, to disable cavalry opponents by cutting through the horses' legs.45 If correct, then this section would make the Thracian army effective at close-quarters against cavalry, once the javelin-throwers, slingers and archers had loosed the artillery which made Thracian mercenaries so prized by the Greeks.46

THE CONFLICT OF 323 BC - LYSIMACHUS MEETS SEUTHES

With an army of this calibre, superior numbers and the advantage of advance preparation, Seuthes must have had high hopes of victory; Hieronymus confirms this, judging that Lysimachus took a risk in confronting Seuthes in a pitched battle. In one sense, the gamble paid off; Diodorus ascribes the Macedonian victory to the superior ἀντιπτυχία of their troops. If Saitta is correct to site this battle on the Thracian plain, then the superior discipline and experience of the Macedonian phalanx and cavalry on favourable terrain may explain a victory against heavy odds. The cost of victory was, however, heavy as regards Lysimachus’ already limited manpower, nor was it in any sense decisive.

Diodorus records preparations for a second conflict, but all details have been lost. Previously it was assumed that Seuthes’ disappearance from the literary evidence for the next decade must imply his subjection by Lysimachus, but the discovery of Seuthopolis under the waters of the Tonsus has necessitated a radical re-assessment of Seuthes’ status, his relations with Lysimachus and the whole concept of Macedonian “conquest of Thrace” in the Diadoch period. Coin hoards from the city and nearby, with types ranging from Philip II to Demetrius II show that the city was

47) Arr.Succ FGrH 156 F 1.10. Lysimachus is described as going to war παραβολάς; Diod.XVIII. 14.1-3. Arrian must be mistaken in suggesting that Lysimachus, despite his reputation, was “destroyed”. 48) Saitta,Kokalos 1955 63; Diod. XVIII.14.4. 49) Diod. XVIII. 14.5; Saitta, Kokalos 1955 65.
established and continued to flourish during the years of Lysimachus' "rule" in Thrace. Overstruck coins of Cassander and Lysimachus among Seuthes' own issues show that the Odrysian, whom Diodorus describes as Βασιλέως in both 323 BC and 313 BC, was able to issue coinage without interruption from c.330 BC to 297/5 BC. These coin types and other material evidence from Seuthopolis say much about Seuthes' aspirations to Hellenisation, which in turn may help to define his status in relation to Lysimachus.

**HELENISATION IN THRACE**

The receptivity of the Thracian aristocracy to cultural influences both from the Greek world and the Near East is already reflected in fourth century burial finds. Thracian-made χάνδρα of this period, patterned with scales, or decorated with lozenge or almond-shaped bosses, reflect Achaemenid influence; silver bowls from the Rogozen hoard replicate the form of metalware found in western Asia Minor. The Panagyurishte treasure, a magnificent drinking set in gilded silver, the bulk of which is dated to the late fourth or early third century, reflects a taste for Greek mythology, with scenes showing the Judgement of Paris, and the exploits of Heracles and Theseus. The style, however mixes Greek, Greco-Achaemenid and Thracian elements.

The city of Seuthopolis reflects similar aspirations towards Hellenisation on the part of its founder and evidence previously

thought to reflect Thracian tradition must be re-interpreted rather as a conscious imitation of the Diadochs. While retaining as its core the traditional τύπος of the Thracian ruler, Seuthes' city is purpose-built on the model of the early Hellenistic cities of Greece, Asia Minor and Egypt, with streets laid out in the grid plan developed by Hippodamas of Miletus. The use of sun-dried brick on a stone foundation is paralleled in Greek πόλεις like Olynthus and Mantinea; the χώρων and the spacious houses built in the παστάς and προστάς styles are typical of late classical/early Hellenistic cities throughout the Greek world. The so-called Great Inscription from the palace suggests that Seuthes employed a Greek secretariat and Greek graffiti on pottery and dedications supports the belief in widespread literacy in Greek among the elite who dwelt within the city walls. All this proclaims Seuthes' ambition to build a city which would echo in its sophistication, if not in scale, the cities of the Successors. By the end of Seuthes' reign, Macedonian influence had also begun to make itself felt in Thracian art and architecture; not far from Seuthopolis the tombs at Kazanluk and Koprinka are vaulted in the Macedonian style, with wall-paintings where use of stucco and warm red paint likewise show Macedonian influence as does the five-zone decoration scheme of the θόλος tomb and the pose of the warriors on its corridor frieze.

Like the Diadochs, Seuthes' activity as city founder enabled him

53) See below. 54) Dimitrov & Cicikova, 1978 7-12; i.e. built with a veranda or colonnade running round a central courtyard. 55) Ibid., 22, Cicikova, 1983 298, Archibald, 1984 51. 56) Archibald, forthcoming, dates the tombs to the 270s BC. The warriors' weaponry, however, reflects Celtic influence (Domaradzki, ACIT I 1980 460).
to play the role of patron of the arts; the city itself, Seuthes' own palace with its great stuccoed hall, the tombs at Kazanluk and Koprinka and their painted murals all bear the stamp of high-quality Greek workmanship. On a more extravagant note, Seuthes' imitation of the Diadochs has been thought also to take expression in aspirations to divinity on earth.

SEUTHES - A GOD ON EARTH?

The evidence underlying this belief is as follows. An altar found in the Great Hall of the palace suggests that Seuthes' kingly status involved him also in priestly duties; the Great Inscription identifies the cult as that of the Great Gods worshipped at Samothrace. Accordingly, Seuthes has been credited with the role of king-priest. Combined with finds of portrait coins of Seuthes III and selected literary evidence, this has been seen as signifying Seuthes' claim to divine status in his lifetime.

Both these assumptions are questionable. Although the discovery in recent years of a shrine/palace building dated pre 500 BC, at nearby Cabyle, suggests that priestly duties were a long-established prerogative of Thracian royalty, this need not imply a royal monopoly of the priesthood. Royal performance of some religious rites, such as sacrifice, particularly on the eve of some momentous event, is well attested from Homeric times onward. As regards the

portrait coins, the identification of the bearded, long-haired, laurel-crowned man on the type VII coins as Seuthes III is generally accepted.\(^{63}\) It has, however, been demonstrated that this portrait represents a development from type VI, which shows the bearded laureate head of Zeus on the obverse; furthermore, the Type VII portraits are the latest in the series and may well be posthumous.\(^{64}\) This suggests that rather than deliberately using his coinage to assert a divinity which most of the Diadochs did not presume to claim in their lifetime, the policy of Seuthes and his family was in line with the accepted practice among the Successors.\(^{65}\) As regards the literary evidence, it seems unnecessary to see the King's personal distribution of food at royal feasts as proof of divine rather than royal power. Nor is there any compelling reason to interpret gifts to the Odrysian king as offerings to a god rather than the thinly-disguised tribute to which Thucydides refers.\(^{66}\) Finally there is the central scene on the frieze of the tholos tomb at Kazanluk, which shows a couple seated at table, attended by trumpeters, gift-bearer and grooms. The woman's pose, with bowed head, is suggestive of mourning. Archibald's interpretation of this as a funerary-banquet scene in the Greek/West Asiatic tradition is preferable to the hierogamy theory put forward by Mazarov to support a belief in Odrysian claims to divinity.\(^{67}\)

\(^{63}\) Dimitrov, D. P. & Dimitrov, K., 1983 166, e.g. by Youroukova, 1976 23, Dimitrov & Cicikova, 1978 41-2. \(^{64}\) For the development of royal portrait coins which include divine attributes see Hadley, JHS 1974 50-66; see also Ch. 6; Type VII - Dimitrov, D.P. & Dimitrov, K., ACIT 1980 II 167, Dimitrov, K., 1984 133-4. \(^{65}\) See below and Ch.6. \(^{66}\) As suggested by Popov, ACIT I 1980 339; Xen.Anab. VII.3.22-3, Athen. XII. 531e-532a, Thuc.II.97.4-5. \(^{67}\) Archibald, 1884 469; Mazarov, 1977 53.
Seuthes may have stopped short of proclaiming himself a god but the figure he cuts as city founder is impressive. The enduring settlement of his prosperous and well-defended city and the evidence for the military forces which he continued to have at his disposal, suggests a status rather different from the vassalage or enforced "alliance" which was assumed to be an automatic and necessary consequence of Lysimachus' "conquest" of South-Eastern Thrace. How did Seuthes achieve this enviable position and on what sort of terms?

THE FIRST SETTLEMENT WITH SEUTHES

All details of Lysimachus' second clash with Seuthes in 323 BC are lost, but it is not unreasonable to suppose that this too was indecisive or even that Lysimachus suffered defeat. In either case, Lysimachus may well have considered a continued struggle for the Thracian hinterland too expensive in terms of money and men, deciding to concentrate his energies elsewhere. There is no evidence to suggest that Seuthes had any financial or military obligations to Lysimachus. Presumably some kind of agreement was made which recognised Seuthes' right to rule over the area of the Upper Tonsus. Seuthes' eagerness for the accoutrements of Hellenisation may have facilitated a settlement, together with the recognition that a period of peace would bring increased prosperity.

The many similarities between the Macedonian and Thracian aristocracies, the shared pre-occupation with horses, hunting, 68) i.e. on the West Pontic coast; see below.

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drinking and warfare may be another factor which helps to make the idea of an agreed settlement between the Macedonian satrap and the Thracian dynast comprehensible. In terms of background and shared enthusiasms the gap between Lysimachus and Seuthes was probably far narrower than is assumed by the traditional construction of "Thracian barbarians" conquered by Macedonians whose claims to Hellenisation made them culturally superior.

To the best of our knowledge, the settlement worked for ten years; there is no mention of further Odrysian incursions into the Macedonian section of Thrace. If the construction of his new city kept Seuthes occupied for the years following 323 BC, finally, however, it seems that acknowledgement of his independent status and the possession of an economically and culturally flourishing kingdom did not satisfy his ambitions. When the Greek cities on the West Pontic coast rebelled against Lysimachus in 313 BC, he joined them.

SEUTHES AND THE REVOLT OF 313 BC

Seuthes' decision to participate in the revolt instigated by Callatis in 313 BC should be set in the wider context of the Diadoch wars rather than seen as a response to actions of Lysimachus or a reflection of any long-standing connection with the Greek polis of

69) For the Thracian warrior-elite see Archibald, 1984 404-413; Mazarov, 1977 18-20, 24; Alexandrescu, Dacia 1983 62-66.
70) For Seuthopolis' economic prosperity, see Hoddinott, 1975 95; Dimitrov & Cicikova, 1978 27,31-2; Archibald, 1984 512. For the cultural side, see above.
the Black Sea coast. In particular, the policy of Antigonus the One-Eyed is an important factor. By 315 BC he was master of Asia Minor and, according to Hieronymus, aiming to re-unite Alexander's empire by an appeal to the sympathies of the Greek cities in his rivals' kingdoms. It is probable that Antigonus' primary aim in instigating revolt among the West Pontic cities and providing the rebels with financial and military support was not conquest of Thrace as such, but the provision of a route for attack on Cassander's Macedon. Accordingly, Seuthes may have hoped to profit from Lysimachus' defeat by the extension of his influence in South-eastern Thrace, perhaps over the area round Mezek, which had belonged to the Odrysae before Philip's conquest. Only a major stake of this sort would have justified risking what he already had. The substantial support and alliance offered by Antigonus, which increased the rebels' hope of victory, surely constituted a major factor in influencing his decision.

Hoddinott's discussion of the events of 313/312 BC ascribes a complex and double-dealing role to Seuthes, identifying his troops with the "Thracians" allied to the Pontic cities, who "changed sides" during a military confrontation with Lysimachus, following the latter's recapture of Odessus and Istria. Since Seuthes is subsequently found blocking the Haemus passes against Lysimachus on his march south to confront Antigonus' general Pausanias, this construction demands that the Odrysian leader changed sides once

71) Diod. XVIII.50.5; see Ch. 3 for a full discussion. 72) See below. 73) Saitta, Kokalos 1955 109-110. 74) See below; Diod. XIX.73.8 - Δαίμωνις seems to imply an alliance by or during 313 BC. 75) Hoddinott, 1975 96; Diod. XIX.73.5; see below.
again after his initial capitulation.76 To make this acceptable, either the pliable Thracians of Diodorus' account must represent only a section of Seuthes' army, or we must assume that the Odrysians, following their submission to Lysimachus, were able to return south sufficiently fast to beat Lysimachus to the Haemus passes. Neither explanation seems very satisfactory.

On the basis of new archaeological evidence and a closer look at Diodorus' terminology, a different identity for these faint-hearted Thracians can be proposed. The description of them as τοὺς ὑμορόντιας, in relation to the Pontic cities, and their appearance alongside a Scythian army,77 suggests rather that these Thracians are independent of the Odrysae, occupying territory in the Dobroudja area itself. Excavations at Cape Kaliakra, situated between Callatis and Odessus on the Black Sea coast, have revealed the existence of a fortified Thracian settlement, dated to the Hellenistic period, identified as Tirisis and connected by its nomenclature with the Thracian tribe of the Terizoi. That the settlement goes back at least to the Diadoch period is suggested by Strabo's reference to Lysimachus' establishment of a treasury at Tirisis.78 It seems likely, then, that the Terizoi are the Thracians who capitulated to Lysimachus in 313 BC and that their continued dependence on him permitted his establishment of a treasury in this region of the Pontic coast.

By contrast, Seuthes' status seems to have been little altered by his part in the revolt of 313 BC. Seuthopolis continues to

76) Diod. XIX.73.8. 77) Diod. XIX.73.1. 78) Balkanska, Klio 1980 28-39; Strabo VII.6.1
flourish and the dynast continues to issue his own coinage, with the finest examples, types VI and VII, dated to the period after 305/4 BC when Lysimachus had assumed the diadem. The Great Inscription from Seuthopolis shows Seuthes' family still in power at the end of the fourth century. This is more comprehensible if his part in the conflict of 313 BC is restricted to the hard-fought battle described by Diodorus, where the Macedonian victory was again marginal, than set against the background of defeat and repeated treachery which Hoddinott assumes.

Lysimachus had proved once more his ability to defeat the Odrysians in battle, and the whole campaign of 313 BC to 312 BC represents a military triumph, but again the cost of victory in terms of resources had been high. It is likely that by now Lysimachus was looking to extend his power beyond Thrace; this, combined with the problems posed by Seuthes' military strength and his highly defensible city, may explain why he might prefer to come to an agreement with Seuthes rather than fight another round.

THE SETTLEMENT OF 312 BC

On this occasion, it is possible that the settlement between Lysimachus and Seuthes was clinched with a marriage alliance; Pausanias talks of Alexander, Lysimachus' son by an Odrysian woman. Alexander's active involvement in the campaign of 282 BC - 281 BC

79) For the coins, Dimitrov, D.P. & Dimitrov, K, 1983 167-8, Dimitrov, K., 1984 133-4; IGBR 1731. 80) Diod. XIX.73.9 81) Diod. XIX.57.1. For Lysimachus' demand for Hellespontine Phrygia in 315 BC, (Diod.XIX.51.2-3,73.1) see Ch.3.
suggests that he was a grown man by this time, but it may be better to see him as the child of a marriage in 313 BC, rather than 323 BC, since there is no mention of him among Lysimachus' male kinsmen in earlier campaigns. In return for his Odrysian bride, it is possible that Lysimachus gave a daughter in marriage to Seuthes. The Great Inscription from Seuthopolis, dated to the last years of the fourth century, shows Seuthes' wife or widow, mother of his four sons, acting as Regent when Seuthes was either seriously ill or dead. Her Macedonian name, Berenice, suggests that she is the daughter either of Antigonus or Lysimachus. Mihailov argued for the former, citing the minority status of her sons which Berenice's prominence in the negotiations and perhaps the reference in 1.10 to future grandsons implies, in support of a marriage in 313 BC. Burstein rightly objected to the idea that a marriage alliance between Seuthes and Antigonus could survive after Lysimachus' victories in 313/312 BC, but felt it necessary to argue that the active role played by Berenice's sons in the Great Inscription must imply a marriage before 313 BC. If Berenice is Lysimachus' daughter, then the fact that Lysimachus' first attested marriage, to Nicaia, comes only in 321 BC, may represent an argument against an

82) Saitta, Kokalos 1955 72; Paus. I.10.5, App.Syr. 64. However, Polyaeus (VI.12) calls him the son of Amatis; Diod. XXI. F. 11, Paus.1.9.7, Memm. FGRH 434 F.5.1, Plut. Demet.47-8. 83) IGRR 1731 11. 2,7,17, 36; Hoddinott, 1975 96 stresses that Berenice alone "appears in the conventional ending as the person responsible for seeing the undertaking kept" (IGRR 1731 11. 8-9). 84) Mihailov, IGRR III.2 1964 147-8. 85) Burstein, Anc.World 1986 24 n.33; Berenice's sons are to lead the miscreant Epimenes out of the temple of the Great Gods and hand him over to Spartocus (11.16-18); for discussion of this episode, see below.

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early marriage between her and Seuthes. It could, moreover, be argued that the action involving the Odrysian princes takes place in a formal, ritual context in which minors might participate as a symbol of their future authority. In any case, a late date does not exclude Berenice's connection with Lysimachus; a marriage alliance to seal an agreement in 312 BC is just as likely as one in 323 BC, since Seuthes' position does not appear to have changed substantially.

It is reasonable to suppose that the failure of Antigonus' grand plan, his own personal defeat and perhaps advancing years convinced Seuthes of the wisdom of a quietist policy for the future. Whether Lysimachus demanded a formal guarantee of this as the price of continued rule over his prosperous kingdom on the Tonsus is unknown. Although the very limited nature of the literary evidence inclines one to caution, there is nothing to suggest any further confrontations with Lysimachus after 313 BC. The possibility that Seuthes' dynasty, around the turn of the century, faced troubles of its own, which precluded any further incursions upon Macedonian preserves, may have been a contributing factor.

86) For Lysimachus' exclusion from the seven Companions of Alexander whose Susa brides of 324 BC are listed, see Ch. 1; presumably he is included among the "other Companions" also given Persian brides. (Arr.Anab. VII.4.4-6) but nothing is known of this marriage's duration or of possible offspring. 87) If Berenice was Nicaia's daughter, one must assume an initially "formal" marriage to Seuthes at the age of 6 or 7. If Berenice's child-bearing years started around the age of 12 (c.306 BC) then there is time for her to have borne 4 sons by the end of the 4th century. 88) Diod. XIX.73.9 records a hard-fought battle with heavy losses on both sides, but ascribes victory to Lysimachus.
SEUTHES, SPARTOCUS AND ODYSIAN DECLINE

The Great Inscription from Seuthopolis shows that by the end of the fourth century an independent dynasty flourished at nearby Cabyle, while the state of affairs within Seuthes' own household was not perhaps conducive to future stability. With four male heirs of minor status and a period of regency under the queen, there was strong potential both for outside intervention and dynastic struggle. The contemporary parallels of Thessalonice in Macedon and Amastris at Heracleia Pontica, both murdered by ambitious sons tiring of maternal regency, may be instructive.

Clearly there was some kind of crisis at Seuthopolis, towards the end of Seuthes' reign; the Great Inscription records negotiations involving the release by Seuthes' family of a miscreant, Epimenes, apparently a suppliant in the temple of the Great Gods, with his property, to the dynast at Cabyle, Spartocus. Epimenes' relation to the latter is defined as some kind of bond-service. Mihailov saw Epimenes as a Macedonian agent, perhaps in Lysimachus' pay, engaged in conspiracy against Seuthes; the plot fails and the assassin takes refuge in the temple. The main basis for this theory, apart from Epimenes' suppliant position, is the formula which assures the reader of Seuthes' good health (ΣΕΥΘΗΣ ΥΓΙΑΙΝΩΝ). It does, however, seem curious that if Epimenes' crime

89) Spartocus - IGBR 1731 11.2, 8-10; Porph. FHG III 688 F 3.3, Memn. FGrH 434 F 5.3; see also Ch. 4; for a transcript of the full Greek text of IGBR 1731, as yet unpublished, see Appendix 2; Mihailov IGBR 1731 148, followed by Burstein, Anc. World 1986 23. 90) IGBR 1731 1.2.
were so serious, he would be allowed to escape with his life. Alternatively and more prosaically, the reference to Seuthes' physical well-being may simply denote a legal precedent for Berenice's actions, in the form of an undertaking made by Seuthes while still in good health.\textsuperscript{91} The precise context for the Great Inscription remains, for now, obscure; certainly a recent suggestion that it records not the handing over of a human suppliant, but the transfer of executive power at Seuthopolis to Spartocus is quite untenable, both on linguistic and historical grounds.\textsuperscript{92}

Spartocus, then, cannot be accepted as the new master of Seuthopolis but there is some reason to believe that towards the end of the fourth century Seuthes began to feel the squeeze as other dynasts established themselves in south-eastern Thrace. Apart from Spartocus, whose coin legends, more ambitiously than those of Seuthes, proclaim him \textit{Basilios}, coins were issued by other Thracian rulers who may be contemporary with these two. There is Skotoskos, possibly based at Aenus; other contenders are Sroios and Adaeus. The coins, however, are rare, their dates are much disputed, and as yet there is no clear evidence to establish these princes on a footing equal to that of Seuthes III.\textsuperscript{94} It is probably over-bold

\textsuperscript{91} Hoddinott, 1975 96. \textsuperscript{92} Ogenenova-Marinova, \textit{Klio} 1980 47-8 argued that \textit{kimias} denotes not property, but power or authority. \textsuperscript{93} Velkov, 1983 233. \textsuperscript{94} Youroukova, 1976 27 sees Skotoskos' coinage as contemporary with Lysimachus on stylistic grounds. Sroios' issues have been dated to the 2nd half of the 4th century (Gerasimov, \textit{Num. Chron.} 1957 3-5, Youroukova, 1976 22). Archibald, 1984 514 sees Adaeus as Lysimachus' contemporary since his Seleucid overstrikes are on coins of Antiochus II, not Antiochus III; Dimitrov, K., 1984 130-131 agrees with this dating.
to see them as firm evidence for the "erosion of Lysimachus' power" over the Thracian hinterland; from the Macedonian point of view, the rise of rival dynasts who might preoccupy and curb the expansionist tendencies of a ruler like Seuthes may have been no bad thing. As has been seen, Alexander was able to turn the rivalry of neighbouring dynasts to his own advantage. 

Similarly, Seuthes' influence should not be exaggerated - he has, for instance, been credited with the institution of the *τεχνητά* in Thrace. Though his military and economic resources, the duration of his city's settlement and its defensibility and his ability to direct his own foreign policy all seem to proclaim his independent status, the sphere of his operations was apparently limited to the area immediately in the vicinity of Seuthopolis. His coinage is restricted to bronze, implying a circulation that was mainly local. This need not imply obedience to Macedonian strictures against coining in precious metals, but if the purpose of this coinage were in part the diffusion of "propaganda", promoting loyalty to the Odrysian house, then its impact was limited largely to the confines of his kingdom. In economic terms, Seuthes' coinage presents no competition to the Macedonian royal issues. As regards kingly image, it has been seen that Seuthes follows in the footsteps of the Diadochs, rather than innovating or anticipating their actions. Though Diodorus calls him Βασιλεύς, with reference to events

95) Archibald, 1984 513; for Alexander, see above. 96) Bengtson, Historia 1962 20; Schulten (Rhein. Mus. 1895 534) ascribed it to Lysimachus. 97) Dimitrov & Cicikova, 1978 42. 98) See Ch.5 for Martin's thesis (1985) that the function of coinage in the ancient world is primarily economic, not political. As suggested by Dimitrov & Cicikova 1978 42; see also Ch.6 on coinage as propaganda.
in 323 BC, there is no evidence from Seuthopolis to support the idea that his claim to royalty pre-dated that of the Diadochs by more than fifteen years. The title appears neither on his coins nor in the Great Inscription.99

After their appearance in the Great Inscription, the fate of Seuthes' family is uncertain. Some scholars identify Seuthes' son Sadala with the honorand of a Mesambrian decree; he receives a yearly "gift" of a crown worth 50 staters and grants the city the right to salvage their ships if wrecked on his territory.100 This suggests that he enjoyed some measure of control over Mesambria. The date of the decree is, however, much disputed. Attempts to place it have employed the following guidelines; a reference to 500 staters paid to Sadala, the names of four of his ancestors, Mopsuestios, Taroutinos, Medista, and Cotys, and the lettering style.101

The argument that staters, not minted by Mesambria herself, must imply Alexander's or Lysimachus' coinage and thus a late fourth or early third century date was rightly dismissed by Youroukova,102 who suggested the universally popular Cyzicene stater as an alternative. This makes a date earlier in the fourth century possible. The ancestor list supports the view that Sadala is Odrysian; Cotys and Medista are attested as royal Odrysian names; the non-inclusion of Seuthes is cited by Youroukova in support of a mid-fourth century date; Moretti, however, sees him as the son of the mid-third century

99) IGBR 1731 1.2 calls him simply ΣΕΥΘΟΣ.
100) IGBR no.1731 1.9; Mihailov, IGBR I 1961 no.43.
king Cotys, mentioned in the decree for Rhaescopouris.\textsuperscript{103} The absence of the title \textit{Βασιλεύς} is not firm proof of a date before 306 BC; evidence relating both to Thracian dynasts and to the Diadochs suggests that royal titulature was not rigidly and consistently applied in the early Hellenistic period.\textsuperscript{104} The lettering, adduced by Youroukova in support of an early date, hardly clarifies matters. By comparison with other fourth and third century decrees from the Pontic cities and Seuthopolis\textsuperscript{105}, the letter forms of the Sadala decree are closest to those of the late fourth century Great Inscription. This, however, is not enough to clinch the identification of Sadala with Seuthes' son, since the change in letter forms from the late fourth to mid third centuries is not sufficiently dramatic to permit a very precise dating. On balance, it is difficult to accept the inscription as firm evidence for the establishment by Sadala, son of Seuthes, of a kingdom near Mesambria. A fragmentary inscription, perhaps from Philippopolis, praising an unknown honorand and his brothers, has also been linked with the sons of Seuthes.\textsuperscript{106} The reference to the annual gift of a crown does suggest dynasts rather than diplomats as the honorands, but the link is tenuous to say the least.

Whatever the fate of Seuthes' dynasty, Seuthopolis became vulnerable to attack in the mid third century BC and was destroyed by fire and sword. The Celts, whose degree of penetration into

\textsuperscript{103} For Cotys and Medista, see above; Youroukova, \textit{Epigraphica} 1981 13-14; Moretti, 1975 136. \textsuperscript{104} See above; for Lysimachus without the royal title in an Athenian inscription (\textit{IGII²} 1485a) probably c.299 BC, Burstein, \textit{ZPE} 31 1978 181-5. \textsuperscript{105} \textit{IGBR} I 1961 no.s 102, 103 (4th century); 35 (mid 3rd century); \textit{IGBR} III.2 1731. \textsuperscript{106} Mihailov, \textit{IGBR} III.I 1961 no.1114.
southern Thrace seems, on the basis of recent research, to have been overestimated, are not the certain culprits.\textsuperscript{107} The inferior nature of the settlement which followed until the city's inundation in the last decades of the third century suggests that Seuthopolis never recovered its former status.\textsuperscript{108} It is reasonable to suppose that the death of Seuthes III, architect of the Odrysian renaissance, was followed by a period of political uncertainty, with the dynasty perhaps troubled both by internal strife and by pressure from neighbouring rulers in south-eastern Thrace.

In conclusion then, it seems likely that Lysimachus achieved a working arrangement in south-eastern Thrace whereby the effective independence of dynasts like Seuthes and Spartocus in the upper Tonsus area was the price paid for continued peace and control of the region outlined by Arrian for 323 BC. Nevertheless, the military objective of regaining the ground lost during Alexander's reign had not been achieved and Lysimachus could be accused of failing to show the promise which may have prompted his appointment. Lack of success in south-eastern Thrace was, however, offset by important gains elsewhere. Some time between 323 BC and 313 BC Lysimachus took control of the Greek cities on the West Pontic coast.

\textbf{LYSIMACHUS AND THE BLACK SEA CITIES}

Whether these cities formed part of the "official satrapy" of

\textsuperscript{107} Domaradzki, \textit{ACIT} I 1980 465-6 argues that the belief in a Celtic annihilation of indigenous Thracian "civilisation" is unfounded; Archibald, 1984 515 suggests that the Celts at Tylis did not penetrate to the Thracian interior. \textsuperscript{108} Dimitrov & Cicikova, 1978 58; Cicikova, 1983 299.
Thrace is uncertain; the phrases used by Justin, Curtius and Porphyry are vague, talking of Pontic regions and peoples; there is no specific reference to TioXeic. Certainly they do not fall within the limits of the "actual" Macedonian territory outlined by Arrian. Consequently their appearance in 313 BC, garrisoned by Macedonian troops, must represent a solid gain for Lysimachus in the extension of his authority, as well as breaking new ground for Macedonian rule in this region.

For Philip II, the West Pontic cities' importance lay primarily in the stranglehold they gave him over Athens, commanding as they did a major grain route to Greece. With his usual blend of belligerence and diplomacy, Philip concluded alliances with Odessus and Apollonia, but took up arms against Istria in tandem with the Scythian king Atheas. Whether this amounts to Macedonian "possession" of the Dobroudja region is, however, doubtful. There is no evidence to suggest that the cities were subject to the kind of supervision which "alliance" with Philip entailed for the League of Corinth members.

The condition of the West Pontic cities under Alexander is still more shadowy. Ambitious claims have been made based on Justin's description of Zopyrion as praefectus Ponti; without support from a more reliable literary source or epigraphic evidence, this seems a

109) Diod. XIX.73.1. 110) Hammond & Griffith, 1979 557; Odessus - see above; Apollonia - Justin IX.2.1., Alexandrescu Stud.Clas. 1967 87; Istria - Pippidi, 1971 91. 111) As suggested by Pippidi, ibid. 112) For Macedonian supervision of mainland Greece, with kooskopoi with administrative and judicial powers appointed by the king, garrisons and Macedonian "security officers" at key strategic points etc., see IG IV² 68, Cawkwell, 1978 170-1.
rather slight foundation for belief in the idea of Macedonian administration of the Dobroudja region, let alone the suggestion that Alexander divided the West Pontic region into administrative wards under a κυραγός.\textsuperscript{113} Arrian's account of Alexander's "plans" for a Black Sea expedition leaves it quite unclear whether conquest of the Dobroudja region or an extension of authority beyond it was envisaged; doubts about the seriousness of his intentions have, in any case, already been raised.\textsuperscript{114} Possibly one might infer a stable situation on the West Pontic coast in Alexander's reign from the fact that Zopyrion's target in 325 BC was Olbia rather than these cities, but this may imply simply the existence of amicable relations rather than Macedonian control.\textsuperscript{115}

The means by which Lysimachus took possession of the cities is unknown; Saitta assumed a long and hard war following Lysimachus' "subjection of the Odrysai".\textsuperscript{116} Although such an assumption usefully accounts for the otherwise empty years of Lysimachus' first decade in Thrace, there is no evidence to support it except that garrisoning might suggest subjection rather than voluntary alliance.\textsuperscript{117} This is not, however, a necessary conclusion; Diodorus' narrative shows that cities might be garrisoned as a "protective measure" - in 319 BC the satraps of Lydia and Hellespontine Phrygia garrison their ἄλειμα only in response to Antigonus' aggression; similarly Hieronymus - admittedly a somewhat

\textsuperscript{113} Justin XII.2.16; Pippidi, 1971 91; Saitta, Kokalos 1955 142.
\textsuperscript{114} Arr.Anab. IV.16; see above. \textsuperscript{115} Justin XII.2.16, Macrob. Sat. I. 11.33. \textsuperscript{116} Saitta, Kokalos 1955 145. \textsuperscript{117} Burstein, Anc.World 1986 24 sees the garrisoning as a necessary security measure given the tenuous nature of Lysimachus' control over the Thracian interior.
partisan witness – assures us that the "liberator" Demetrius substituted his own garrison for Cassander's at Corinth at the citizens' wish "for their protection". Faction, which often facilitates foreign occupation throughout the history of the Greek πόλεις, may also have played its part in winning these cities for Lysimachus. A pro-Macedonian party might represent a legacy of Philip II's reign or an expression of discontent with the current regime. Istria, at least, seems to have suffered political upheaval within the recent past and was to experience it again later in the third century. Saitta's theory of a long, tough fight may spring in part from a mistaken belief in the cities as a united federation, reflected in his use of the economical but anachronistic term "Pentapolis". The date at which the Pontic κοινόν was formed is much disputed but most scholars connect it with Roman domination of the West Pontic coast. Though there is communication between the cities later in the third century, reflected in proxeny and citizenship decrees – Dionysopolis grants citizenship to a man from Odessus, Mesambria honours a teacher from Callatis – nothing suggests a formal federal association at the end of the fourth century. Pippidi believes that the revolt of 313 BC may see the first united stance

118) Diod. XIX. 51.1, 52.5-6, XX.103.3. 119) Pippidi, 1971 80 for the δυναμικος wrestling power from the city's oligarchic founders; Justin's "rex Histrianorum" (IX.1.9-13) may be a home-grown tyrant, not a Getic king (Hammond & Griffith, 1979 561); Stoian, 1972 57-60 for internal strife at Istria in the 2nd half of the 3rd century. 120) Saitta, Kokalos 1955 65. 121) Pippidi, BCH 1960 436, Mihailov, IGBR I 1961 307.2. 122) Pippidi, 1971 180; St. Marin, Epigraphica 1948 128 dates the κοινόν's start to c. 200 BC; Danoff Klio 1938 438-9 suggests the 1st century BC; IGRB I 1961 no.s 13, 307.2.
of the West Pontic cities; this gains support from the narrative of Diodorus which reflects the evident fragility of this union.\textsuperscript{123}

The date at which Lysimachus installed his garrisons is likewise unknown; it is not impossible that Macedonian forces took up residence only in 315 BC in response to the threat posed by Antigonid liberation propaganda.\textsuperscript{124} If one favours an earlier date, then the garrisons may represent a justifiable precaution against Thracian attack;\textsuperscript{125} alternatively, hostilities between the Diadochs themselves may have prompted Lysimachus to take a security measure of this kind. Though control of the Pontic grain route was perhaps less significant than in the days of Athenian freedom, the power to hinder or facilitate grain shipments to the cities of mainland Greece was still of value. With it, Lysimachus could aid his ally, Cassander, or cause difficulties to his enemies, the Antigonids, as these two parties disputed the possession of mainland Greece. Conversely, if the cities fell into enemy hands, Lysimachus could find himself open to attack from the rear. Antigonus' proclamation of Greek freedom and autonomy in 315 BC and the part he played in the revolt of 313 BC reflects a recognition of Lysimachus' potential vulnerability in this area.\textsuperscript{126}

What then, did his acquisition of the West Pontic cities represent for Lysimachus in terms of military and economic advantage? From the strategic point of view, control of the coastal \textit{πόλεις} provided Lysimachus with naval bases and a

\textsuperscript{123} Pippidi, 1971 93; Diod XIX.73.; see below. \textsuperscript{124} Diod. XIX.73.1; see above for a possible parallel in Asia Minor in 319 BC. \textsuperscript{125} Burstein, \textit{Anc.
World} 1986 21-4. \textsuperscript{126} Diod. XIX.73.6, see below.
maritime route to the southern Black Sea coast and Paphlagonia. In 302 BC, Cassander's brother Pleistarchus set out from Odessus to bring troops to Lysimachus, based at Heracleia Pontica. He commandeered 120 ships from Odessus for the crossing; this reflects the cities' value to Lysimachus as a source of warships. Evidence for an Istrian war-fleet comes from an inscription recording the city's dispatch of ships to an ally, Apollonia, for war against Mesambria. Though post-dating Lysimachus' reign, it is probable that the city possessed a fleet throughout its history. At Callatis, an inscription of the Hellenistic period honours a citizen for equipping a warship at his own expense.

Commercially too, the West Pontic cities were an attractive acquisition. Archaeological finds in the regions of Callatis, Istria and Tomi reflect a thriving trade, with the cities acting as intermediaries between the πόλεις of mainland Greece and the Aegean area and communities in the Thracian interior. Amphora stamps from Callatis indicate a high level of imports from Thasos, Heracleia Pontica and Rhodes from the mid fourth century, continuing through the third. An oared ship on the bronze coinage of Callatis and the worship of Poseidon and Caster and Pollux at Istria reflect the importance of maritime trade for the cities' prosperity. Dionysus' appearance on coins and an early(?) third century reference to the festival of Διονυσίας Ζευσσική point to

Callatis' domestic wine industry. At Istria, fish from the Danube and Peuke rivers represented a major source of revenues, reflected in the famous inscription which records the city's negotiations with the Getic king Zalmodegicus. Still more lucrative was the slave trade for which Istria was famous.\(^{132}\)

For Lysimachus, the cities of the West Pontic coast represented a rich prize. How, then, were their fortunes affected by his arrival on the scene?

**LYSIMACHUS' GOVERNMENT OF THE WEST PONTIC CITIES**

Lysimachus' reputation as a miser\(^{133}\), combined with the evidence for garrisons in the cities has led to the belief that he squeezed these prosperous \(\text{μόλις εκ} \) dry, subjecting them to harsh government.\(^{134}\) One restriction upon autonomy need not, however, carry with it a host of others; as will be seen, in the context of the Successors' wars, garrisons were a necessary military precaution.\(^{135}\) While the constant warfare of these years makes it likely that the cities lost the freedom to pursue an independent foreign policy, it cannot be assumed that loss of internal autonomy and fiscal oppression automatically accompanied Macedonian occupation.\(^{136}\) Diodorus' reference to the "recovery of autonomy" with the revolt in 313 BC does not in itself warrant such an assumption; removal of the

\(^{133}\) Hoddinott, 1975 52; Pippidi, 1971 77. 135) See Ch.5. 136) Compare for instance, Athenian prosperity in the Lycurcan period when the city was firmly in Macedon's grip. (Ferguson, 1911 10).
garrisons might have been enough to prompt such a statement, particularly when Hieronymus, no doubt anxious to promote Antigonus' "liberation programme", is the likely source. Odessus, at least, was allowed to maintain her war-fleet under Lysimachus' rule, even in the period following the revolt; this argues against the idea of a complete loss of autonomy.\(^{137}\) Though documents from Istria do reflect economic hardship, loans from wealthy proxenoi, and financial pressure applied by foreign rulers, these belong to the later Hellenistic period. The oppressors are Getic chieftains, not a Macedonian king.\(^{138}\) As yet no comparable evidence has surfaced for the period of Lysimachus' rule. It is possible that the cities, particularly if they had offered resistance at Lysimachus' approach, were required to pay \(\chi\psi\rho\omicron\omicron\)\(_{\omicron}\); there is, however, no evidence to confirm this.\(^{139}\) On the basis of Memnon's reference to a common frontier between Tomi and Callatis by 261 BC, Pippidi suggested that Lysimachus organised the territory around the cities into defined \(\chi\rho\omicron\nu\omicron\) worked by \(\lambda\pi\omicron\omicron\omicron\). This is possible; Lysimachus' provisions for Priene c. 286/5 BC may reflect a similar concern for the cities' efficient exploitation of their \(\chi\rho\omicron\nu\omicron\).\(^{140}\) It is, however, equally possible that the Greek colonists themselves, like their fellows in Asia Minor, were responsible for conquest of the land around their cities and the harnessing of its indigenous

137) See above. 138) Pippidi, 1967 554-556 for Getic domination of Istria by Zalmodegicus and Rhemaxos; 549, for Istrian debt to Hephaestion son of Matris, of Callatis. 139) Payment of \(\chi\psi\rho\omicron\omicron\omicron\) was, in any case, hardly unparalleled among Lysimachus' contemporaries; see Ch.5. 140) Pippidi, 1971 78; Memn. FGrH 434 F.13; L.Priene 16 = Welles RC no.8; the interpretation of this text as evidence for Lysimachus' "gift" of royal land and/or \(\lambda\pi\omicron\omicron\omicron\) is, however, uncertain; see Ch. 5.
peoples as a workforce. The exploitation of the Pedieis at Priene and the Mariandynoi at Heracleia Pontica, for example, clearly pre­
dates the arrival of the Hellenistic kings.141

If one attempts to gauge the effect of Lysimachus' arrival upon the general level of prosperity in the West Pontic cities, there
seems little reason to suppose that Lysimachus' reign was a period of economic hardship. Indeed the rise of Callatis to a leading position among the Dobroudja cities has been placed in the last years of the fourth century.142 One benefit of the Macedonian presence may have been protection for the cities' merchants in their trade with the Getae of the Danube valley. This gains support from the evidence we have for the cities' vulnerability to Getic domination after Lysimachus' death.143

Among individual citizens, at least, there is substantial evidence for wealth and the opportunities for cultured leisure which it affords. Callatis' necropolis boasts Greek funerary epigrams of high literary quality, dated to the fourth century BC and terracotta statuettes from Attica remarkable for their artistic execution, dated to the Diadoch period; a third century epitaph from Mesambria shows the influence of Homer's Iliad; burial finds from the Hellenistic necropolis at Tomi include gold jewellery, bronze mirrors and fibulae and an athlete's strigil.144 In the mid-third century BC certain citizens of Istria were in a position to make

141) I.Priene 1 and 3 - the Pedieis were well-established dependents of Priene in Alexander's day; Burstein, 1976 6-11, 15, 28-30 for the Mariandynoi at Heracleia. 142) Pippidi, Studii Clasice. 1973 180. 143) Parvan, 1928 91; for Getic domination, see above and below. 144) Hoddinott, 1975 48; Barladeanu Zavatin, Pontica 1985 98; Mackendrick, 1975 37.
loans of 1,000 and 2,000 staters.145

Evidence of this sort, however, must be handled with care, since tomb finds may represent only the very finest possessions of a small section of the population, rather than items in every day use by the majority of the inhabitants. Furthermore the significance of evidence for great individual wealth, reflected in rich grave goods and funerary monuments of high artistic quality for general levels of prosperity is uncertain. For the Marxist-Leninist historian, riches such as these in the hands of individual citizens must imply impoverishment of the masses.146 Alternatively, the wealth which has bestowed upon these substantial citizens a kind of immortality may reflect a boom in commerce which would benefit men engaged in production and exchange at all levels of society.

Specific evidence relating to Lysimachus' fiscal oppression of the West Pontic cities, then, is lacking. Nevertheless, the traditional belief in his imposition of high taxes upon them persists, finding its origin presumably in a series of anecdotes which proclaim him a miser, in particular one where the "flatterers" of his great enemy Demetrius, in 302 BC, dub him "Treasurer" (Ταξαρωτήτης).147 As will be argued at greater length in later chapters, the value of this evidence as proof of Lysimachus' accumulation of great wealth from taxes in the early part of his reign is doubtful; if anything, the thrust of the insult seems to be

145) Preda, Dacia 1961 303; Poenaru Bordea, 1974 120. Unless extremely nouveau riche, their ability to pay such sums suggests considerable individual wealth also during the Lysimachean period. 146) As exemplified by Stolan, 1972 58, 61. 147) Plut. Demet. 25 = Athen. XIV.614-5; VI.246; Phylarch. FGrH 81.F.65; Hauben, Anc.Soc. 1974 108-113 for 302 BC as the context for the anecdote.
that in the first half of his career Lysimachus was unable to throw money about in the way that kings were expected to. Burstein, for one, sites the origins of this caricature in a period of "fiscal austerity" imposed upon Lysimachus by the limited resources of his satrapy. Though his assessment of the resources of Thrace, or rather lack of them, is perhaps too gloomy, Burstein's theory gains support from the fact of Lysimachus' relative inactivity on the international stage in the first two decades of his reign. Limited resources and a consequent need for care in expenditure need not, however, imply extortionate levels of taxation; as will be seen, it was more often royal extravagance and generosity to friends which was likely to hit the pockets of the king's subjects hard.

FREEDOM AND AUTONOMY IN THE WEST PONTIC CITIES

If, as far as we can tell, the prosperity of the cities did not greatly suffer, what of their autonomy? Is it true that Lysimachus imposed a harsh government on the Greeks of the West Pontic coast?

Given the lack of other concrete evidence, the belief that these cities lost their internal autonomy must rest heavily on the idea that Lysimachus deprived them of the right to strike their own coinage. Istria's distinctive "double-head" type silver coins have been dated to the period from c.410 BC to 310 BC; the termini for Callatis' Heracles types are more difficult to establish since their

148) See Chs. 5 and 6.
149) Burstein, 1984 57-68, Anc. World 1980 74-9; e.g. Xen. Hell. III.2.10 praises the fertile soil, rich pasture land and harbours of the Thracian Chersonese; for Lysimachus' inactivity, see Ch. 3.
150) See, for example, Plut. Demet. 27. and Ch. 5.
iconography may reflect either Alexander's coinage or that of Heracleia; it is, however, believed that the mint ceased to function during Lysimachus' reign. Conversely, the appearance of new types at both Odessus and Callatis has been thought to signal a resumption of coinage with the recovery of autonomy after Lysimachus' death.

As far as the fourth century city types are concerned it could be argued, given the difficulties of dating these series precisely, that one of the foundations for establishing these termini may be the assumption that a ruler like Lysimachus must have deprived the cities of the right to coin. If, however, a general picture of decline in the issue of city types in the last two decades of the fourth century is accepted, this need not be the result of Lysimachus' policy. Martin's argument that decline of city coinage under Macedonian rule should be attributed to its failure to compete, commercially, with the widely accepted Macedonian royal issues, rather than to Macedon's denial of the right to coin will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. In this particular context, Martin's thesis gains support from two pieces of evidence. First, the cessation of city coinage on the West Pontic coast need not represent Lysimachus' punishment for the revolt. Rather it may result from the provision of an alternative source of finance; the period immediately preceding the revolt sees a great influx of coinage from abroad, notably Alexander type staters minted in the

152) Poenaru Bordea, Dacia 1974 116-120 - there are no Callatis staters in the Iarguta hoard, whose contents suggest a burial date pre 313 BC.
cities of northern Asia Minor. Second, when the West Pontic cities start to coin again, later in the third century, the traditional city emblems are abandoned in favour of Alexander or Lysimachus types. It cannot, moreover, be assumed that the appearance of these new types heralds a new age of prosperity and freedom for the cities after Lysimachus' death; the occasion for their issue may be sinister rather than celebratory. The discovery of large numbers of these coins in hoards in Geto-Dacian territory, combined with the epigraphic evidence mentioned above, suggests that these issues were struck in order to pay "protection money" to Getic or Celtic chieftains.

If fluctuations of city coinage on the West Pontic coast do not constitute firm evidence for loss of autonomy under Lysimachus, can signs of constitutional change be detected in inscriptions from the cities? Later in the third century, certainly, democracy or, at least, its institutions were alive and well. Dorian tribe names at Callatis and Ionian ones at Istria and Tomi reflect fidelity to the constitutional forms of the metropoleis. Callatis' eponymous magistrate is the Βασιλέας just as at Megara; the μερισταί who distribute the Istrian public funds recall the board of ἀναπάτται at Miletus. Comparable inscriptions for the Lysimachean period are

153) Poenaru Bordea, Dacia 1974 111-114. 154) Hind, Num.Chron 1970 16 for silver Lysimachus type tetradrachms at Istria; Price, forthcoming, for gold staters and then silver tetradrachms (Alexander and Lysimachus types) at Callatis, starting c.250 BC; Poenaru Bordea, Dacia 1974 116-118 for Alexander type tetradrachms and staters at Odessus, dated from c.279/5 BC. 155) Poenaru Bordea Dacia 1974 120; Price, forthcoming, sees the switch from gold to silver for the payments as a sign that Callatis was beginning to "scrape the barrel". 156) Pippidi, 1971 82-84.
scarce; this might suggest a muzzling of the democracy, were it not for the fact that epigraphic evidence for the fifth and earlier fourth centuries is likewise lacking.

Segre's suggestion that Lysimachus may have tolerated a tyranny at Apollonia was effectively quashed by Robert.\textsuperscript{157} The imposition of a governor at Callatis, not implausible given the city's long and stubborn resistance, might be reflected in the restoration \( \alpha \pi \rho \theta \sigma \tau \alpha \tau \gamma \) in an inscription with lettering which fits the early Hellenistic period.\textsuperscript{158} The text is, however, extremely fragmentary, and the word may alternatively be restored as \( \alpha \rho \pi \theta \sigma \tau \alpha \tau \gamma \), a magistrate frequently found as part of a democratic constitution in Dorian cities.

There is then, no secure evidence to support the belief that it was Lysimachus' abolition of democratic government which prompted the revolt in 313 BC. While possibly the presence of his garrisons in itself was felt to be sufficiently intolerable to prompt rebellion, the timing of the rising suggests that it must be seen primarily as a response to the propaganda of Antigonus.\textsuperscript{159} In 315 BC, at Tyre, this self-styled champion of the Greeks offered "freedom and autonomy", promising liberation from garrisons and from \( \omega \pi \rho \omega \) in prospect, at least, this must have seemed a decided improvement on conditions under Lysimachus.\textsuperscript{160} Factional division

\textsuperscript{157} IGRR I 1961 no.387; Segre \textit{Athenaeum} 1934 7; Robert, 1962 55 - a reference to the \( \gamma \upsilon \omega \alpha \eta \alpha \iota \gamma \upsilon \nu \theta \) of the four cities identifies this city as Apollonia in Lycia, which belonged to such a \( \chi \omega \nu \nu \nu \upsilon \theta \upsilon \upsilon \nu \) under the leadership of Aperil. \textsuperscript{158} Poenaru Bordea, 1964 130 no.15. \textsuperscript{159} Saitta, \textit{Kokalos} 1955 113; Beloch, 1925 IV 101-2 for the chronology. \textsuperscript{160} Diod.XIX.61.3-4; Welles RC 1934 no.11 55-6; no.15. 11. 22-3; see Ch.5 for Antigonus' "liberation" programme.
within the cities may also have played its part in prompting the revolt. Though the governments in the cities may have kept their democratic form, it is likely that they were dominated by Lysimachus' partisans. Those who opposed the latter, either on personal or political grounds, might be inclined to favour the idea of revolt, particularly if it was backed, as seems probable, by promises of military and financial support from Antigonus.

Within the framework of Antigonus' strategic plan, the role which the cities were to play seems to have been that of keeping Lysimachus occupied on the Pontic coast while Antigonus launched an attack, via the Hellespont, upon the heart of his realm in Southern Thrace. How well were they equipped to carry out this task?

THE MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE WEST PONTIC CITIES

Though direct information from the historical narrative is lacking, demographic studies and epigraphic material from later in the third century help to give some idea of the military resources and organisation of the West Pontic cities. The population of Callatis has been estimated at around 3,000; Mesambria, with a similar head count, was able to put 700-800 citizen hoplites into the field. Epigraphic reference to taxiaruchs at Istria and Mesambria for the later Hellenistic period suggests that throughout the democratic period the cities relied upon a core of citizen soldiers organised on a tribal basis. Callatis employed the

military mess system of ὠρόστητοι, reflecting the city's Dorian roots. A decree from Istria, honouring a certain Agathocles, makes reference to a τοκαρύς; the cultivation of specialised light armed troops which this implies may represent a response to the dangerous expertise of the local tribes in such brands of warfare. Concern for the upkeep of the city's fortifications is reflected in the appointment of wealthy and energetic officials whose task is to ensure construction and maintenance of the walls.

Finance for the revolt and the purchase of mercenaries may have come in part from wealthy citizens, the fourth century counterparts of financiers like Diogenes and Dionysius from Istria, and Hephaistion from Callatis, honoured in third and second century inscriptions for loans to the μόλικ. The scale of the revolt and the high stakes involved may have prompted emergency measures such as the appointment of a στρατηγὸς ὀντοχώτος, attested later in the third century, and on the parallel with Olbian resistance to Zopyrion, the arming of freed slaves.

THE REVOLT OF 313 BC.

The revolt got off to a good start, in the summer of 313 BC, with the expulsion of the Macedonian garrisons, evidently not sufficiently strong or determined to resist the citizen militia. The cities formed an alliance and secured the co-operation of the neighbouring

indigenous peoples.\textsuperscript{169} Subsequent events, however, suggest a lack of cohesion and any real sense of unity between the component parts of the rebel forces, which may have contributed to their eventual defeat.

Lysimachus reacted swiftly; the speed of his advance, perhaps a legacy of campaigns with Alexander,\textsuperscript{170} may have caught the cities unaware. At any rate, he was able to employ a strategy similar to that used by Philip II against the Olynthian cities, picking them off one by one.\textsuperscript{171} There is no suggestion that Lysimachus was faced by a united army from the city-states. First Odessus was besieged, then Istria. Evidently the fourth century fortifications, which at Odessus, at least, seem to have consisted of dry-stone walls, proved ineffective against the Macedonian assault. Istrian resistance may be reflected in the destruction of the city walls, revealed by excavations in the sacred area, which has been dated to the end of the Classical period.\textsuperscript{172}

Disorganisation amongst the rebels is likewise the keynote of Lysimachus' encounter with the cities' Thracian and Scythian allies. Their failure to arrive in time to provide effective assistance to the beleaguered cities enabled Lysimachus to take the offensive. Catching them on the march, he appealed to the self-interest of the Thracian contingent, who changed sides, leaving their allies isolated.\textsuperscript{173} Lysimachus' crushing defeat of the Scythians was

\textsuperscript{169} Diod. XIX. 73.1.
\textsuperscript{170} Diod. XIX. 73.3 – as the Loeb translation seems to assume, ἀποκόμισις can imply a rapid march (Liddell & Scott, 1968 1253).
\textsuperscript{171} Philip, see Cawkwell, 1978 85. 172) Odessus, Hoddinott, 1975 50; Istria, Pippidi, 1971 256, though Coja, SCIV 1964 399-400 links this destruction with Philip II's campaign of 339 BC. 173) Diod. XIX. 73.5.
followed by the sustained cavalry pursuit which had been a feature of both Philip's and Alexander's campaigns.\textsuperscript{174}

Callatis proved a tougher proposition. There is reason to believe that the city's long resistance was made possible by financial aid from Antigonus. The Marasesti hoard, which includes a large number of staters minted in the cities of Asia Minor and the Phoenician coast, dated from the mid 320s BC to c. 310 BC has been seen as material evidence for Antigonid backing for West Pontic revolt.\textsuperscript{175} Less compelling, perhaps, is the suggestion that an Attic κέφαλος from Callatis, given to one Naukasamas, a Semitic name, by the members of his στρατός, reflects Antigonus' dispatch of troops from his Syrian territories to Callatis.\textsuperscript{176} At any rate, Callatis was still holding out under siege, as Antigonus' advance forces under Lycus and Pausanias approached the Hellespont, probably in the summer of 312 BC. Their task was to wrest control of Thrace from its satrap. Following in their wake, Antigonus then hoped to sweep through from the Hellespont against Cassander's Macedon.\textsuperscript{177}

For the rebels, this could have been a turning point. Lysimachus faced the prospect of being marooned on the Pontic coast while the enemy took possession of his territory in Southern Thrace.\textsuperscript{178} Again he acted fast. The decision to cut his losses at Callatis recalls Philip's withdrawal from Byzantium in 340/339 BC\textsuperscript{179} and shows the same astute judgement of priorities. A holding force was left at

\textsuperscript{174} e.g. Arr. Anab. II.11.6-7; Hammond & Griffith, 1979 672.
\textsuperscript{175} Poenaru Bordea, Dacia 1974 112. 176) Stefan, 1977 25-32; Calder, Dacia 1979 313 is sceptical about this interpretation.
Callatis to prevent a fresh outbreak of trouble behind him as the main army marched south. Seuthes, whose army threatened to block the Haemus passes against Lysimachus, was defeated before he could be reinforced by Antigonus' general Pausanias. The latter, whose troops were perhaps already unnerved by the swiftness of Lysimachus' volte-face and his unexpected victory against the great Odrysian army, found himself confronting the satrap of Thrace on the Pontic coast. The exact site is uncertain. Diodorus' account is brief and lacks detail, but Lysimachus' enrolment of some of these troops after the death of their general may suggest a good proportion of mercenary troops without a strong allegiance to the Antigonid cause. The ransoming of the rest swelled Lysimachus' coffers.180

These successive victories enabled Lysimachus to secure the Hellespont in anticipation of Antigonus' arrival. Thwarted in his aim of striking at Macedon from this angle, Antigonus switched his tactics; hoping to gain access to the Propontis, the back door to Thrace, he approached Byzantium with an offer of alliance. It was refused. Instead the Byzantines complied with a request from Lysimachus to refrain from action which would harm him or his ally Cassander.181 Lysimachus' recent string of victories may well have influenced the Byzantine decision to stay neutral.

Byzantium's refusal to abet Antigonus' schemes represented a diplomatic victory for Lysimachus'82 to crown those on the battlefield. His success in quelling the revolt of the Pontic cities

180) Diod. XIX.73.8-10; Saitta, Kokalos 1955 69. 181) Diod. XIX.77.7. 182) Perhaps his second; for the possibility that Lysimachus prevented a separate peace between Cassander and Antigonus in spring 312 BC, see Ch.3.
and defeating the Antigonid assault on Thrace and Macedon represents a major victory for the anti-Antigonid coalition. Only Lysimachus' swift reactions and battles won against the odds, however, had prevented Antigonus' attack on Thrace from the Hellespont. The satrap's decision, to found, in 309 BC, his capital Lysimacheia on the site of ancient Cardia, modern Sukruler Tepe, in a position to command the straits, must constitute in part a preventive measure against the recurrence of such a threat.183

Antigonus may have continued to supply financial aid to Callatis, still holding out at the time of the peace negotiations of 311 BC.184 Theoretically, the clause of that treaty which guaranteed autonomy to the Greek cities posed a renewed threat to Lysimachus' control of the West Pontic coast. In practice, all its participants, while recognising the potential of the clause as a pretext for future hostilities, offered the cities the privileges which "freedom and autonomy" implied, when it was politically and strategically affordable, as a reward for loyalty and an incentive for its maintenance.185 Saitta's judgement, that the conditions laid out in the treaty spelled disaster for Lysimachus, surely underestimates the cynicism underlying that document.186

For Callatis, the Peace meant only a temporary raising of the siege. Lysimachus' troops were once more in front of the city in 310/9 BC. There seems no compelling reason to construe their

presence as a response to the threat posed by Ptolemy's liberation programme,\textsuperscript{187} rather than a renewal of the original assault once the Peace of 311 BC had conveniently receded into the past. By the time Callatis capitulated, a large section of the population had fled, taking refuge with the Bosporan king Eumelus.\textsuperscript{188}

As victor in a vicious dynastic struggle following the death of Parisades I, Eumelus was anxious to make himself popular. He set up the Callantian refugees in a new city; this can be ascribed in part to a conscious policy of euergetism, wholly in keeping with the history of the Spartocid dynasty.\textsuperscript{189} Hostility to Lysimachus may have been a contributory factor; Zopyrion's attack on Olbia seems to represent Macedonian encroachment upon the Bosporan preserves. Lysimachus' control of the Dobroudja cities and his consequent proximity to Spartocid territory cannot have been a welcome development for Eumelus.

This mass flight from Callatis might suggest the expectation of heavy penalties. The exact conditions imposed upon Callatis and the other cities are unknown; the long resistance of the former and a comparison with the methods of Lysimachus and other Hellenistic kings in Asia Minor suggest that a heavy indemnity may have been imposed.\textsuperscript{190} The obligation to provide military services which may be implied by Odessus' provision of ships for Pleistarchus in 302 BC, may also represent heavier terms imposed after the revolt.\textsuperscript{191}

\textsuperscript{187} Diod. XX.25.1; Saitta, Kokalos 1955 71, opposed by Will, 1979 309; see also Ch.3. \textsuperscript{188} Diod. XX.25.1-2. \textsuperscript{189} Diod. XX.22-25 for the dynastic struggle and Eumelus' benefactions to Byzantium and Sinope; for Spartocid euergetism see e.g. Tod, GHI 1948 II 193 no.167; IG II² 1485A. \textsuperscript{190} For such indemnities at Miletus and Sardis, see Ch.5. \textsuperscript{191} See above.
The assumption, however, that the Lysimachean period represented the blackest days in the history of the West Pontic cities, after "centuries of autonomy" is dubious.\textsuperscript{192} The reality seems to have been that the cities' relatively small size and their apparent isolation, except in moments of crisis, always rendered them vulnerable to foreign intervention. There is, for example, some reason to believe that Callatis came under Scythian domination in the period before Philip II's defeat of King Atheas in 339 BC.\textsuperscript{193} Payment of "protection money" by Istria, Callatis and Odessus to Getic or Celtic chieftains and the tribute which Mesambria paid to the Odrysian Sadala have already been discussed. A period of tyranny at Istria earlier in the fourth century has already been mentioned, while the epigraphic record for the later Hellenistic period shows the city oppressed by debt, internal strife and food shortage.\textsuperscript{194}

As regards Getic "protection", there are signs that these tribes were already beginning to display an interest in the Dobroujda region during the Diadoch period. Traditionally, Macedonian "oppression", in the person of Lysimachus, has been represented as the unwelcome alternative to "freedom" for the West Pontic cities. It is, however, more likely that instead the cities

\textsuperscript{192} See e.g. Mihailov, \textit{Athenaeum} 1961 38; Pippidi, 1971 93; Hoddinott, 1975 52. \textsuperscript{193} Alexandrescu, \textit{StudII Clasice} 1967 85-91, based on coins minted at Callatis, stamped \textit{ATAIAŁ} and dated to the mid-4th century BC. Pippidi's objections (1971 91) citing a lack of Scythian finds at Callatis and Justin IX.2.5-16 which puts Philip II's campaign straight after Atheas' arrival, are not conclusive. Scythian type arrow-heads have been found in the Callatis necropolis (Preda, \textit{Dacia} 1961 302); Justin may not be reliable in such a context, since his role as epitomator may lead to compression of events. \textsuperscript{194} See above; Pippidi, \textit{Klio} 1963 158-67, \textit{StudII Clasice} 1961 53-66; 1967 554-6; Poenaru Bordea \textit{Dacia} 1974 121.
found themselves the object of competition between Macedonian and Getic "protectors". The basis for this belief is evidence relating to Lysimachus' campaign(s) against the Getae, combined with finds from recent and current excavations in North-Eastern Bulgaria, which suggest that the Getae were already a force to be reckoned with by the end of the fourth century and the beginning of the third.

LYSIMACHUS AND THE GETAE

Prosperity and change in Thrace is not purely a phenomenon of the South-East; the fourth century BC represents also a period of political and territorial expansion on the part of the Getic tribes north of the Haemus mountains. Already organised into some sort of political structure under dynastic rule by the sixth century BC, excavation of Getic settlements reflects a steady expansion out from the hinterland of Histria and Odessus. Dominated by the Odrysa in the mid fifth century, to whom they paid tax and contributed soldiers, the Getae had profited from Philip II's conquest of the latter and his expulsion of Atheas' Scythians from the Dobroudja. By the second half of the fourth century, the Getae occupy sites on both banks of the Danube, between the river's two branches and in the South-West Dobroudja. Some degree of urbanisation by Alexander's day is suggested by the literary sources.

Rich natural resources in the form of agricultural land, pasture, timber and fish, combined with command of the Danubian trade route, served as a basis for Getic prosperity. Magnificent grave goods from princely tombs at sites like Vratsa, Aghigiol, Peretu and Baiceni reflect both the Getic dynasts' wealth and their role as patrons of an emerging original artistic style confined to the North Balkans and known as Thraco-Getic. Gold and silver-gilt armour and drinking vessels with distinctive motifs, dated to the mid-fourth century and found on both sides of the Danube have been seen as the products of a great North Balkans workshop. New evidence from Sboryanovo supports the view that the Getic aristocracy, like their Odrysian counterparts, aspired to a lifestyle of some sophistication and were ready to adopt the latest fashions in art and architecture which reached them from abroad. Finds from the site, thought to be that of a great cult centre, include a gold pectoral dated to the fourth century BC in Thraco-Macedonian style, a Greek inscription recording a dedication to Artemis Phosphorus, and two fine vaulted tombs with stone sliding doors, a feature found previously only in Asia Minor. The smaller of these tombs is remarkable for the use of blocks of stone in two different colours to decorate the arched chamber.

The Getic response to the Macedonians' arrival in the Dobroudja region had been mixed. Philip II's reputation had evidently preceded him and one Getic dynast at least had preferred friendship to

199) Conovici, ACIT II 1980 44. 200) Moscalu & Voievodanu, ACIT I 1980 389. 201) These details were reported verbally by Diana Gergova; the inscription is to be published by Cicikova.

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emnity; Philip added a Getic princess to his long list of wives.202 Alexander, however, at the start of his reign had clearly needed to demonstrate that he had inherited his father's ability along with the throne. His crossing of the Danube and capture of a Getic town, perhaps Zimnicea, impelled the other "independent tribes along the Danube" to seek his friendship.203

Like the Odrysae, it is probable that the dynasts of North-eastern Thrace profited from Alexander's absence and the discomfiture of his deputy Zopyrion. Lysimachus' arrival and the firm hold he took upon the West Pontic cities cannot have been welcome to the Getic chiefs who had established trading relations with the cities and perhaps saw themselves as their natural "protectors".204 A natural fear that Lysimachus would go on to expand his operations into the hinterland would not have been allayed by his defeat of their kinsmen in 313 BC. Though on that occasion the Thracian neighbours of the West Pontic cities made a pact with Lysimachus and perhaps remained dependent on him,205 this need not imply that Getic chiefs further afield likewise abandoned all claims to these Greek cities.

After the events of 313 BC the literary sources fall silent on Lysimachus' actions north of the Haemus until a confrontation with the Getic chief Dromichaetes in the 290s BC which ended, for Lysimachus, in capture and ignominy.206 The motives which impelled

202) See above. 203) Arr.Anab. I.4-5; Hoddinott, 1981 131. 204) For W.Pontic/Getic trade see Irimiaia, Pontica 1973 68-71; Conovici, AGIT II 1980 50; Archibald, forthcoming. 205) Diod. XIX.73.5. 206) Diod.XXI.F 12; Plut. Demet. 39, Mor. 555D; Memnon FGrH 434 F.5.1; Polyaien.VI.12; Paus. 1.9.6; Strabo. VII.3.8, 14; Polyb. F.102.
his crossing of the Danube have been much discussed, but past reconstructions - necessitated by the extreme fragmentation of the literary evidence - of the events preceding this campaign have now become outmoded. In particular, the re-assessment of events in South-eastern Thrace, prompted by the discovery of Seuthopolis, must affect our interpretation of the Getic campaigns. Knowing the difficulties which Lysimachus experienced in the hinterland of South-eastern Thrace, it is no longer viable to see his crossing of the Danube and the war against Dromichaetes as the final stage of "the conquest of Thrace " or "an extension of Greek dominion" beyond the river.\footnote{Niese, 1893 367; Saitta, Kokalos 1955 117.} Saitta's theory of Lysimachus' intense activity along the Danube between 305 BC and 302 BC is unsupported by any firm evidence and, as Pippidi pointed out, in attempting to take and hold territory beyond the river, Lysimachus would have made a move which both Philip and Alexander had recognised as counter-productive.\footnote{Saitta, Kokalos 1955 74, see also Ch. 4; Pippidi, 1971 93.}

If the idea of "conquest " beyond the Danube is abandoned, Lysimachus' campaign in the 290s BC is best seen as a response to Getic actions which encroached upon his interests. The evidence already mentioned for Getic interest in the West Pontic cities after Lysimachus' death supports the view that control of these \textit{kôlêc} was the issue at stake.\footnote{See above; Pippidi, 1971 93; Bengtson, 1987 128 sees the Getae as possible aggressors in the war.} Lysimachus' preoccupation with affairs in Asia after 301 BC may well have encouraged chieftains like Dromichaetes to stretch out a "protecting" hand towards his Greek subjects.
THE WAR WITH DROMICHAETES

The evidence for this episode is fragmentary and uneven in quality; even the date at which Lysimachus first took action against the Getic chief is disputed. The war in which Lysimachus fell captive to Dromichaetes is placed by several sources in the period between 294 BC and 292 BC. Lysimachus' unwillingness to intervene in the dynastic struggle which gave Demetrius the throne of Macedon in 294 BC, is explicitly connected with his preoccupation with the Getic war, perhaps still on the drawing board at this point rather than actually in progress. The King's imprisonment which brought the war to an end is usually dated to the winter of 292/1 BC; his release is placed in the following spring.

Some scholars see this campaign as the second stage of Lysimachus' action against the Getae, following a period of conflict early in the 290s BC. Belief in a first Getic expedition rests on a fragment of Diodorus (XXI.F.11) which records the capture of Lysimachus' son Agathocles by "Thracians". Subsequently they are induced to release him by the hope of regaining territory taken by Lysimachus and by changing circumstances which diminish their prospects of victory, namely "an alliance of almost all the most powerful kings". Pausanias, however, presents this incident as an alternative version of Lysimachus' capture by Dromichaetes in the campaign of 292 BC, an episode which survives in another fragment of

210) Plut. Pyrrh. 6, Just. XVI.1.9., Porph. FHG III F.3.3; see also Ch. 4. 211) Niese, I 1893 367-8; Beloch, IV 1925 225; Saitta, Kokalos 1955 88.
Diodorus.212

On one view, this "alliance" and therefore Agathocles' capture should be identified with the reconciliation of Demetrius and Ptolemy which Seleucus engineered c.297 BC. Alternatively, Niese saw the incident as part of the campaign of 292 BC, while Beloch rejected it altogether as unhistorical.213 If Agathocles' capture is accepted as a separate incident, then a date early in the 290s BC is perhaps more plausible than 292 BC; Niese himself admitted difficulties in identifying the "alliance".214

There is, however, a considerable degree of duplication in the accounts of Lysimachus' capture and that of Agathocles. In both cases, the royal protagonist's capture is followed by an unexpected release, explained by Thracian hopes of recovering territory previously lost to Lysimachus. Another repeated motif is the idea of Lysimachus' peril. Pausanias describes Lysimachus escaping from a position of extreme danger but his son being captured; Diodorus shows him being advised to save himself in a situation of great danger but nobly standing by his army and friends.216

Though Pausanias' account of Lysimachus' activities in Thrace is clearly compressed, this does not in itself justify rejecting his suggestion of two source traditions dealing with the same incident. Likewise, Diodorus' use of a superior source, Hieronymus, does not

212) Diod. XXI. F. 11; Paus. I.9.6, Diod. XXI. F. 12. 213) Saitta, Kokalos 1955 83, Plut. Demet. 32, OGIS 10; see also Ch. 4; Niese, I 1893 367-8; Beloch, IV 1925 225. 214) Niese, 1893 368 cites Paus.1.9.6. for an "agreement between Ptolemy and Seleucus"; the only pact mentioned there, however, is the alliance between Ptolemy and Lysimachus on his return from the Danube. 215) Agathocles - Paus.I.9.6; Diod. XXI. F.11; Lysimachus - Diod. XXI. F.12.
negate the possibility of the material becoming mangled in transition.\footnote{Saitta, Kokalos 1955 117 rejects Pausanias' account in favour of the "superior" Hieronymus.} Moreover, the fragmented state of Diodorus' 21st book makes it impossible to know the context in which the two incidents were recorded. Hieronymus, clearly not an eye-witness of these events,\footnote{Plut. Demet.39 shows that Hieronymus was governor of Thebes at this date.} may have been recording alternative hearsay reports, before deciding which one to accept. On balance, Saitta's belief in a Getic campaign in the early 290s BC, representing the fulfilment of a scheme conceived by Lysimachus as early as 304 BC, but interrupted by the Asian campaign of 302 BC, seems ill-founded.\footnote{Saitta, Kokalos 1955 83, 117.}

The dating of Lysimachus' capture by Dromichaetes may be reasonably secure,\footnote{See above.} but very little is known of the events which preceded it. Though current excavations in North-eastern Bulgaria have raised some hopes of a future solution to the mystery surrounding Dromichaetes,\footnote{See below.} at present he remains a far more shadowy figure than Seuthes III. The fullest source which provides information about his court and kingdom, Diodorus XXI. F.12, must be treated with some caution; sections of the passage are highly anecdotal and the intrusion of conventional literary motifs lessens its value as historical evidence.

Traditionally, Dromichaetes' kingdom has been placed beyond the Danube in the region of the Wallachian plain; the evidence which supports this is the reference to Lysimachus' march across the "Getic desert", presumably to attack Dromichaetes in his own

\footnote{Saitta, Kokalos 1955 117 rejects Pausanias' account in favour of the "superior" Hieronymus.}
In recent years, Daicovicu has suggested a more precise siting for Dromichaetes' capital Helis, in the Arges valley approximately 75 kilometres beyond the Danube. His evidence is a fragment of Polybius, who describes Dromichaetes as "king of the Odryssae". Daicovicu argues that such inaccuracy is uncharacteristic of Polybius, suggesting that "Odryssai" is a miscopying of "Ordyssae"; thus he links Dromichaetes with the tribe located on the river Ordessus (the modern Arges). This is possible, but the new discovery of the great Getic cult centre at Sboryanovo in the region of Razgrad, around 75 kilometres south of the Danube, might suggest that Dromichaetes' centre of operations was rather closer to the river. Though as yet no settlement has emerged which can be connected with the cult centre, the size of Lysimachus' forces on this campaign suggest that he viewed Dromichaetes as a serious threat. This is perhaps more easily explained if Dromichaetes was just beyond the river and threatening to encroach upon Lysimachus' West Pontic possessions than if his kingdom was centred as far away as the Arges valley. If so, it needs to be explained what Lysimachus was doing marching across the "Getic desert" if not to attack his enemy's kingdom on its other side. One solution might be to suppose that Dromichaetes adopted a tactical retreat of the sort that Lysimachus himself used to fox Antigonus in 302 BC.

222) Strabo (VII.3.14) describes the "desert" as "facing that part of the Pontic sea which extends from Ister to Tyras".
223) Daicovicu, 1973 97-100; Polyb. Fr.102 (Teubner); the same spelling occurs in the Suida Lexicon (X-XI.Dromichaetes.)
224) A suggestion made verbally by Zosia Archibald.
225) Polyaeus, VI.12; 100,000 may be too neat a figure to be accepted literally, but certainly a force of considerable size is implied.
deliberately leading the enemy away from his own kingdom and into unfamiliar and inhospitable territory.\textsuperscript{226}

Though the campaign ended in disaster, the literary sources suggest that initially the gods smiled on Lysimachus; the "forts" and "territory" which provided him with his bargaining power in 292 BC\textsuperscript{227} are best seen as the fruits of early success in this campaign, rather than the results of conquest earlier in the 290s BC or proof of a lasting "empire" beyond the Danube.\textsuperscript{228} Though it has been suggested that Lysimachus followed Alexander's route, crossing the Danube at Zimnicea and taking that city,\textsuperscript{229} this perhaps takes him unnecessarily far west, since his starting point would presumably have been Asia or the Thracian Chersonese rather than Macedon.

The turning point came with the crossing of the Getic desert; the sources agree that miscalculation of the problems posed by supply and terrain lay behind Lysimachus' defeat.\textsuperscript{230} Polytenus suggests that the incautious acceptance of a renegade general from Dromichaetes' army may have contributed to the disaster, although the deserter's name, Seuthes, raises some suspicion of muddle and lessens the reliability of this evidence.

On this occasion, Lysimachus was cheated of the chance to meet the enemy in battle; even if he had, there is no reason to think that his victory was guaranteed. The Getae were renowned for their cavalry strength, breeding an elite type of horse equipped to carry

\textsuperscript{226} As suggested by Beloch, IV 1925 225. 227) Diod. XXI. F.11,12; see below. 228) As Saitta claims, Kokalos 1955 74. 229) Hoddinott, 1981 131. 230) Diod. XXI. F 12; Plut. Mor. 555D; Strabo. VII. 3.14; Polyen. VI.12.
a heavily armed warrior. Darius I included a Getic contingent in
his Scythian expedition; the mounted archers in Sitalces' Thracian
army in 431 BC probably reflect a legacy of Getic conflict with the
Scythians; an army of 14,000 men, including 4,000 horse had faced
Alexander across the Danube in 335 BC. Nor could the Macedonians
necessarily have relied on superior tactical skills; Getic
employment of the wedge formation to break through the enemy line, a
favourite tactic of Alexander, represents another lesson learnt from
Scythia.

In the event, the army which finally faced Dromichaetes, perhaps
near Tyras on the edge of the Getic desert, was clearly at its
last gasp. Crushing losses were sustained by Lysimachus, whose
personal surrender is variously ascribed to nobility or thirst!
Among the captives taken to Dromichaetes' capital, Helis, was
Lysimachus' step-son, Clearchus of Heracleia.

For the account of Lysimachus' reception by Dromichaetes and the
circumstances surrounding his release we are largely dependent on
Diodorus XXI F.12. While part of this passage probably derives from
Hieronymus, the reliability of the whole account as evidence for
the constitution of Dromichaetes' "state" and his economic position
is questionable. Thus, Diodorus' account of Lysimachus' fate being
debated between the Thracian assembly and their King is presumably

231) Jordanov, ACIT I 1980 333 for armour from the late 5th century
Ruetz tomb; Alexandrescu, Dacia 1983 71, 89 for horse burials at
233) Parvan, 1928 62; Lane Fox, 1973 75. 234) Tyras - Diehl, PW VII
A 1948 cols. 1850-1863 d. 235) Polyaeum. VI.12; Diod.XXI. F.12; Plut.
Mor. 555D. 236) Memn. FGrH 434 F.5.1; Diod. XXI. F. 12.
237) See below.
the basis for the idea that Dromichaetes led a "military democracy".\textsuperscript{328} This warrior assembly might, however, be analogous to the Macedonian army assembly, whose well attested role in voting upon major decisions of policy\textsuperscript{329} does not alter the essentially autocratic nature of the Macedonian constitution. Here too, in this case at least, Dromichaetes' decision, to preserve the life of his opponent, prevails.

Still less reliable as evidence is the story of the banquet held by Dromichaetes for his royal prisoner, which draws a contrast between Macedonian luxury and Thracian frugality.\textsuperscript{240} The identification of the passage as a literary trope renders it invalid as evidence for Getic wealth, or lack of it. It is, moreover, offset by the splendid grave goods and hoarded treasures from Getic settlements,\textsuperscript{241} which suggest that the aristocracy, at least, did not lag far behind the Macedonian dynasts in conspicuous display both on the parade ground and at the dinner table.

The motives behind Dromichaetes' decision to release his enemy may be worth taking more seriously. The reference to a "more formidable king" who might prove a more threatening opponent than Lysimachus implies a compliment to Demetrius which may well derive from Hieronymus.\textsuperscript{242} Presumably Dromichaetes acted in the knowledge that a balance of power preserved among the Diadochs would prove

\textsuperscript{238} Diod. XXI. F. 12; Daicovicu, 1973 97. \textsuperscript{239} e.g. they were able, on occasion, to determine the succession; Philip II was the assembly's preferred candidate over the child Amyntas; see Cawkwell, 1978 27-8. \textsuperscript{240} Diod.XXI. F.12. \textsuperscript{241} Daicovicu, 1973 97 cites Hdt.IX.82 for a similar banquet where Greek and Persian custom is contrasted; see above. \textsuperscript{242} For Hieronymus as apologist for the Antigonids, see Ch. 1.
less threatening to Getic ambition than the proximity of a neighbour like Demetrius, whose combined control of Macedon and Thrace would render him undesirably strong. In Lysimachus the Getae would have a neighbour with strong reasons for gratitude towards them and an obligation to abide by the terms they could demand; Demetrius might privately thank them for doing his dirty work for him but would be unlikely to express his appreciation in concrete terms.

For Lysimachus, the price of freedom was a daughter given in marriage to Dromichaetes, who seems also to have taken the added precaution, initially, of holding high born hostages like Lysimachus' stepson Clearchus. Lysimachus was obliged also to surrender his possessions "beyond the Danube", a phrase which has been the subject of some dispute. Rather than serving as proof of Lysimachus' mastery of an enduring empire beyond the Danube, it is more reasonable to suppose that these comprised the gains made by Lysimachus earlier in the campaign. Pippidi suggested that he was forced to make a still greater concession - abandoning the West Pontic cities to Getic control; while not inconsistent with the evidence for Getic influence over the cities later in the third century BC, it is difficult to understand Pausanias' phrase, τὰ περὶ ιστρόπος, in this sense since he is describing the deal from Lysimachus' standpoint. It is preferable to suppose that the cities came under Getic "protection" only after Lysimachus' death.

243) Memm. FGrH 434 F.5.1. 244) Paus. I.9.6.; for objections to Saitta's theory (Kokalos 1955 74) of a lasting dominion beyond the Danube, see above.
245) Paus.1.9.6; Pippidi, 1971 93.
CONCLUSIONS

This survey of Lysimachus' achievement in "Thrace" cannot, of course, claim to be in any way complete. Apart from the new evidence still emerging from both South- and North-eastern Bulgaria which may provoke yet another reassessment of his dealings with the tribes there, nothing at all is known regarding his influence in the western regions of his satrapy.

Both in the Danube region and in the South-eastern hinterland of Thrace Lysimachus was obliged to compromise in his dealings with the indigenous tribes. In the early years the cost of military subjection of the Odrysae had proved too high; beyond the Danube problems of supply and terrain were primarily the cause of his defeat. In these areas his achievement fell short of the sort of conquest envisaged by the panegyrist who was Justin's source; he did, however, enjoy greater success on the West Pontic coast, where both conquest and continued control were more easily achieved. Moreover, the establishment of alliance with the Odrysians and Getae and recognition of their dynasts' independence seems to have resulted in sufficient stability in Thrace to allow Lysimachus the freedom to concentrate his energies more profitably elsewhere.246

Finally, on the subject of stability and the reaction of both Greeks and Thracians to the Macedonian presence in Thrace, it must be remembered that the position of the satrapy rendered it at all times potentially vulnerable to pressure from the peoples beyond the

246) See Chs. 3 and 4.
Danube. For example, it took a strong Macedonian king to expel the Scyths, whose presence in the Dobroudja in the late fourth century has been explained as the result of pressure upon them from Sarmatian migration.\textsuperscript{247} Similarly, it is hard to explain the timing of the Celtic invasion in 279 BC as pure coincidence rather than an exploitation of the period of chaos after Lysimachus' death in 281 BC and Ptolemy Ceraunus' seizure of his throne.\textsuperscript{248} To see Lysimachus' fall as a cause for celebration in Thrace is somewhat naive;\textsuperscript{249} the "freedom" gained with his demise merely laid Thrace open to anarchy and then to conquerors of a far less temperate nature.\textsuperscript{250}

\textsuperscript{247} For Philip II's expulsion of the Scyths, see above; Alexandrescu, \textit{Studii Clasice} 1967 85-93. \textsuperscript{248} Just. XXIV.5.1-12; Wil1, \textit{CAH VII} 1984 115 argues that Ceraunus' failure to make a pact with the Dardanians led to their co-operation with the invaders. \textsuperscript{249} As suggested by Parvan, 1928 102-3; Mihailov, \textit{Athenaeum} 1961 38; Hoddinott 1975 137. \textsuperscript{250} For the rule of Ptolemy Ceraunus and its aftermath, see Heinen, 1972; for the Celts, see Nash, 1982, Rankin, 1987 83-102.
This chapter and the next aim to examine the course charted by Lysimachus in the complex political manoeuvrings of a period in which allegiances shift as fast as the protagonists rise and fall. They will also look at the way in which his political choices contributed to the acquisition of his great Hellespontine empire, which foreshadowed those of Pergamum and Byzantium1 and was to make him, by 285 BC, an object of fear and loathing to his contemporaries.2 His aims and aspirations will be considered and the extent to which his success represented the fruits of a consistent and deliberate "policy", as opposed to the rewards of successful opportunism. The methods by which empire was acquired, assessing Lysimachus' abilities as warrior and diplomat, will also be examined.

Before this discussion can proceed, however, an assumption which underlies most modern reconstructions of the Diadoch period must be challenged. In the narrative of ancient and modern historians alike, Hieronymus of Cardia exerts a powerful influence.3 This is nowhere more apparent than in the belief that, after the death of Perdiccas, only Antigonus, and perhaps his son Demetrius, cherished a vision of re-uniting Alexander's empire under their own rule. The other Diadochs, it is thought, had quite different and far more modest aims, namely to be recognised as rulers of a limited

1) Will, CAH VII 2nd edn. 1984 110. 2) Plut. Demet. 48. 3) For the use of Hieronymus in our extant literary sources see Ch. 1.
territory, comprising only a part of the Conqueror's realm. Lysimachus, in particular, is often presented as a cautious and relatively unambitious character. Thus, Will, discussing Antigonus' difficulty in achieving his dream of a united Europe and Asia remarks "ce que réalisera un instant Lysimaque, sera d'une partie et d'un caractère différents de ce qu'avait rêvé Antigonus." The struggle between the "unitarist and particularist tendencies" is seen as a major theme of the period.

A central feature of Hieronymus' narrative is the πλεονεκία of Antigonus, his desire for πάσα ἄργη and τὰ ὀλά. The negative element in such a presentation of events by Hieronymus, the Antigonid protegé, has probably encouraged its uncritical acceptance. Whether this is justified is uncertain; Hieronymus may deplore Antigonus' πλεονεκία, but to depict him as a man in pursuit of a magnificent dream, destroyed by his own ambition, at least makes him a tragic heroic figure, rather than a pitiable failure. Even if this portrayal is accepted as historically true, it need not imply so definitive a contrast between Antigonus and his opponents as those who favour the unitarist/particularist view propose. Explicit evidence for the aims of Antigonus' opponents is limited. A "particularist" stance might be attributed to Ptolemy who refused to accept the guardianship of the Kings after Perdiccas' death and whose early opposition to the central authority is certainly

4) e.g. Tscherikower, 1927 156, 163; Longega, 1968 39; Garoufalias, 1979 36 calls him "the most mediocre of Alexander's Successors"; Bengtson, 1987 70. 5) Will, 1979 80. 6) e.g. Will, CAH VII 1984 29; Roussel, 1938 333. 7) Diod. XVIII.50.2; XX.106.4, Plut. Demet. 28. 8) A tendency criticised by Cloché, 1959 16, though he too admits that such a concept is not absurd.
emphasised, though this in itself need not imply limited ambition. Similarly it is clear that for Cassander, in 319 BC, rule over Macedon and Greece, which he clearly regarded as his rightful inheritance from Antipater, was the prize at stake.  

It is, however, interesting that the phrase τὰ ὅλα, taken to signify the whole empire when used of Antigonus, also appears with reference to the aims and actions of the other Diadochs. In these cases, however, the phrase is translated in such a way as to avoid any suggestion of the empire as a whole. For example, when Cassander summons Lysimachus προς τὴν τῶν ὀλευν κοινοπραγιαν following Antigonus' demand for Cassander's unconditional surrender in 302 BC, the term τῶν ὀλευ is rendered by the translator of the Loeb edition as "their highest interests". Since the view that all Antigonus' opponents aimed, throughout their careers, only at the acquisition of a limited territory seems to derive more from hindsight than any testimony in the ancient sources, the validity of such a working method, based as it is on a circular argument, is questionable.

Furthermore, the neat dichotomy between the Antigonids and their opponents which is presupposed by the "unitarist/particularist" view implies that each Successor had from the outset a clear vision of a goal which remained unchanged throughout four decades of warfare in which territories constantly changed hands and new and often

9) Diod. XVIII.36.6, 39.5, 43.1. for Egypt as "spear-won land" as early as 321 BC. 10) Diod. XVIII.54.2. 11) e.g. Diod. XX.37.4 for the Diadochs' marriage proposals to Cleopatra, ἐξαιτος γὰρ... ὡς τὴν τῶν ὀλευ ἄργην περιστήσων εἰς ἐσομένες; Diod. XX.51.1 - the battle of Salamis οἱ ἐς δυναστεία, ὡς ὡς περὶ τὸν βίου καὶ τῶν ὀλευ μέλλοντες διακινδυνέως. 12) Diod. XX.106.2.
dazzling possibilities arose.13 This is highly unlikely. Such a view owes too much to hindsight and a tendency to see actors in the ancient world as entirely rational, fixed in their purposes and not susceptible to the lure of unexpected opportunities. There is strong evidence to suggest that the aspirations of Lysimachus and Seleucus, at least, were very much less limited than the "unitarist/particularist" view supposes.14 With this in mind, the examination of Lysimachus' political career can begin.

THE EARLY YEARS: 323 BC – 315 BC

If our knowledge of Lysimachus rested solely on the narrative of Diodorus' 18th book, then he might justly be dismissed as a peripheral figure of minor importance. The satrap of Thrace hardly looms large upon the international stage in these years. Burstein's judgement of him as "a follower rather than a leader... who between 323-302/1 campaigned only against the Thracians and the transdanubian Getes and the rebellious cities of his satrapy and their allies... while avoiding anything beyond the most perfunctory involvement in the affairs of Macedon and the Aegean" is, however, too harsh.15 Firstly the campaign against the Pontic cities from 313 BC to 312 BC played a vital part in the war fought by Ptolemy, Cassander, Seleucus and Lysimachus against Antigonus from 315 BC to 311 BC.16 Second, such a judgement lays too much stress on military

13) The classic example is Demetrius' seizure of the Macedonian throne in 294 BC; see Ch.4. 14) See Chs.6 and 7. 15) Burstein, Anc. World 1986 24. 16) See Ch. 2.
action alone as an indication of influence, ignoring the
significance of Lysimachus' possession of the land linking Asia and
Europe.17 If those who held power in Asia and Macedon came to
blows, his support could be invaluable in facilitating troop-
movement and communications between the two parts of Alexander's
empire. Conversely his opposition could represent a major obstacle.

The first years of the Successor period do indeed witness such a
conflict. From 322 BC to 321 BC, the European Regent, Antipater,
supported by Craterus, Antigonus and Ptolemy, fought against the
Chiliarch Perdiccas, who had effectively made himself the
representative of central authority in Asia. In 319 BC, a struggle
arose between Antipater's son Cassander, backed by Antigonus, fast
rising to the position of the most powerful man in Asia, and the new
regent in Macedon, Polyperchon.18 The brief glimpses which we have
of Lysimachus in these years do show him taking sides in these
conflicts, though his co-operation is largely restricted to grants
of access to his strategically important territory and seemingly
stops short of military support on a large scale. The outcome of
events suggests that on both occasions his choice was sound,
contributing to his enhanced prestige and security.

In 323 BC, at Babylon, Lysimachus had received the newly-created
satrapy of Thrace; quite what his reaction was to this assignment
must remain uncertain. That he already had a vision of a
kingdom bridging the Hellespont and specifically asked for Thrace,
as Bengtson suggests,19 seems unlikely. An assessment of the

17) See Will, CAH VII 1984 35; Bengtson, 1987 120. 18) See below.

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situation in Thrace in 323 BC, the limited resources available to Lysimachus on his departure to the satrapy, his early experiences there\textsuperscript{20} and his status in 323 BC as a prominent but not leading figure among Alexander's friends\textsuperscript{21} suggest rather that Thrace would have been looked on as a bit of a dirty job, though not perhaps as dirty as Cappadocia.\textsuperscript{22} The encomium preserved in Justin which presents Lysimachus as the only man militarily capable of such a challenge may contain an element of defensiveness.\textsuperscript{23}

As satrap of Thrace, Lysimachus was officially subordinate to Antipater, the ἀρχηγὸς of Europe. Though potentially such a situation was rife with difficulties,\textsuperscript{24} the evidence suggests that both men, limited, in 323 BC, in their resources and faced with war in their respective territories\textsuperscript{25} recognised that their opponents could only profit from disunity between them. Accordingly they took steps to establish a reasonable working relationship, if not the bosom friendship that Bengtson envisages.\textsuperscript{26} Seibert and Cohen have rightly emphasised the significance of marriage alliance among the Diadochs as a source of security and influence.\textsuperscript{27} Antipater's choice of Lysimachus as a bridegroom for his daughter Nicaea, Perdiccas' repudiated wife, suggests cordial relations between the two and

represents a considerable enhancement of Lysimachus' prestige. Another mark of signal favour, usually overlooked in this context, comes with Antipater's appointment of Autodicus, Lysimachus' brother, to the position of Bodyguard to the Kings at the time of the Triparadeisus settlement in 321 BC. The suggestion that Lysimachus, whose first years in Thrace were not marked by any startling success, owed his tenure of the satrapy in 321 BC to Antipater's friendship is attractive. These signs of a positive relationship make it preferable to see Antipater's scheme for settling several thousand disfranchised Athenians in Thrace as an attempt to relieve Lysimachus' man-power shortage, rather than as an unwelcome assertion of his official superior status. Lysimachus' failure to participate in the Lamian War in support of the Regent may be ascribed to his own shortage of troops and his involvement in the war with Seuthes.

When the Regent became involved in conflicts which took him beyond Europe, the value of Lysimachus' friendship became clear. When Antipater and Craterus crossed to Asia for the war against Perdiccas in 322 BC, it is probable that a short-cut through Thrace greatly facilitated the journey. On another occasion the right of free passage through Lysimachus' territory may have helped Antipater

28) Diod. XVIII.23.1 for Perdiccas and Nicaea; it is generally assumed that she married Lysimachus as Perdiccas' widow. (Berve, PW XVII I 1936 col. 220-1; Beloch, 1925 127). Antipater's likely anxiety to compensate, with another marriage, for the dishonour done his daughter might suggest a date nearer 321 BC than 319 BC. 29) Arr. Succ. FGrH 156 F 1.37; for the Bodyguards of Philip III and Alex IV, see Burstein, ZPE no. 24 1977 223-7. 30) Bengtson, 1987 122. 31) Diod. XVIII.18. 4-5. 32) Roussel, 1938 270. 33) Ibid., 284; a route via Thrace is suggested by Perdiccas' dispatch of Eumenes to the Hellespont to prevent the Regent's crossing (Diod.XVIII.29.1).
to extricate himself from a sticky situation. Returning from Triparadeisus to Macedon with the Kings in 321 BC, he was faced at Abydus with mutinous, unpaid soldiers. A secret night crossing of the Hellespont enabled him to evade their demands.\(^{34}\)

In supporting Antipater against Perdiccas, Lysimachus found himself on the side of those who claimed to represent the interests of the Argead house against a usurper.\(^{35}\) That this reflects any personal feelings of loyalty to the dynasty, now represented by the epileptic Philip and the infant Alexander is highly doubtful. Despite the public emphasis laid on his intimacy with Alexander\(^{36}\) the events following Antipater's death suggest that Lysimachus' allegiance to the Regent was determined primarily by the need to be on good terms with a powerful neighbour. Secure in the knowledge that "all was quiet on the Western front", he would be able to concentrate his energies where they were most needed, first against Seuthes in South-eastern Thrace, subsequently on the West Pontic coast.\(^{37}\)

Antipater died in 319 BC, probably in the autumn. His appointed successor, Polyperchon, found his governorship of Macedon and Europe contested by Antipater's son Cassander, who, according to some sources, had effectively governed Macedon in the last months of

34) Arr. Succ. FGrH 156 F11.45; the exact degree of Lysimachus' participation is uncertain, since the phrase ἵππα τοῖς βασιλεύσι περαίοτα τον Ἑλλήσποντον παρὰ Λυσίμαχον might imply Antipater's reception at Lysimachus' court following this episode or it may simply designate movement into the territory of the Thracian satrap. 35) Antipater's loyalty to Philip's house, whatever his feelings about Alexander, is generally accepted e.g. Will, CAH VII 1984 26. Diod. XVIII.33.3. for Perdiccas' aspirations to royalty. 36) See Chs. 1 and 6. 37) See Ch. 2.
his father's life. The friendship which Lysimachus formed with Cassander is often cited as the exception to a rule of treachery which characterises relations between the Diadochs and their followers, but the origin of this relationship and its precise nature are not generally examined.

Describing Cassander's mobilisation of support for his attempted coup against Polyperchon, Diodorus mentions secret negotiations with Ptolemy and "the other commanders and cities". Subsequently, Cassander crossed to Asia to enlist the aid of a former enemy, Antigonus, now only too glad to have Polyperchon kept busy in Europe while he himself arranged matters in Asia to his own liking. While there is no explicit reference to Lysimachus, an examination of Cassander's movements at this point make it almost certain that he was among the approached by the Antipatrid and that this point marks the beginning of their alliance. Cassander was able to dispatch trusted friends to the Hellespont without arousing suspicion, and subsequently went secretly from Macedon to Asia via the Thracian Chersonese. Such actions certainly suggest the collusion of Lysimachus and this is presumably what Bengtson is thinking of when he says that Lysimachus "received Cassander as a fugitive in Thrace".

38) Plut. Phoc. 30 makes Cassander rather than Antipater (Diod. XVIII.48.2) responsible for the death of the Athenian Demades; Diod. XVIII.49.1 also stresses Cassander's experience in public life. 39) e.g. Thompson, 1968 164; Bengtson, 1987 134 for Lysimachus as "a true friend to his friends". 40) The only full-scale study of Cassander (Fortina, 1965 102) merely cites Cassander's "invariable" habit of summoning Lysimachus in a crisis (Diod. XX.106.4). 41) Diod. XVIII.49.3. 42) Diod. XVIII.50.2. 43) Diod. XVIII.54.2. 44) Bengtson, 1987 122.
By the summer or autumn of 318 BC, there is positive evidence for Lysimachus' active co-operation with Cassander and Antigonus against Polyperchon, who now stood as representative of the Kings. Cleitus, Polyperchon's admiral, was sent to guard the Hellespont against Cassander's return to Europe. After an initial victory over Antigonus on the Bosphorus, he was forced to flee for his life following Antigonus' surprise attack and capture of his camp. He was captured and duly dispatched by the soldiers of Lysimachus.\footnote{Diod. XVIII.72.9.} Since Cleitus had succeeded in winning the allegiance of the Propontis cities shortly before the battle, Lysimachus was acting in defence of his own interests as well as in support of Cassander. The potential vulnerability of Thrace, given a strong enemy presence in the Propontis, is reflected in Antigonus' later attempts to bypass the Hellespont and gain entry to Thrace by the back door.\footnote{See Diod. XIX.77.6-7 and Ch.2.}

What does Lysimachus' choice of Cassander as an ally, and action against Polyperchon say about his own aims? Will's comment that he "was not averse to restoring the union of Macedon and Thrace to his own advantage"\footnote{Will, CAH VII 1984 41.} suggests that, like Antigonus, Lysimachus already had his sights set on Macedon. This, however, supposes that Lysimachus took a very long view. While the sources certainly ascribe lofty aspirations to Antigonus as early as 319 BC,\footnote{Diod. XVIII.50.2; this, however, may be the product of Hieronymus' hindsight; Antigonus' ambitions for $\delta\alpha\nu\gamma$ might more plausibly be placed only after his defeat of Eumenes in 316/5 BC. (Diod.XIX.61.3).} there is little suggestion that Lysimachus had any thought of rule in Macedon before 294 BC.\footnote{Diod. XXI F. 7; Just. XVI.1.19, 2.4; see Ch.4.} It is surely too complicated to assume that

\begin{itemize}
\item 45) Diod. XVIII.72.9.
\item 46) See Diod. XIX.77.6-7 and Ch.2.
\item 47) Will, CAH VII 1984 41.
\item 48) Diod. XVIII.50.2; this, however, may be the product of Hieronymus' hindsight; Antigonus' ambitions for $\delta\alpha\nu\gamma$ might more plausibly be placed only after his defeat of Eumenes in 316/5 BC. (Diod.XIX.61.3).
\item 49) Diod. XXI F. 7; Just. XVI.1.19, 2.4; see Ch.4.
\end{itemize}
Lysimachus, like Antigonus, hoped initially to use Cassander as a pawn, but perceiving Cassander's capability and independent success, then swallowed his disappointment in a suitably philosophical fashion\(^{50}\) and accepted him as an ally on equal terms. The problem of Lysimachus' stance towards Cassander and Macedon is compounded by the uncertainty as to his exact movements in Thrace, but the new construction put on events there by the discovery of Seuthopolis\(^{61}\) makes it most unlikely that at this stage he was in a position to think seriously of Macedon. At this point his attention was probably still fixed on Thrace and the Pontic coast; it was therefore in his interest to have a strong and capable ruler of Macedon, who would fill for him the same role as Antipater.\(^{52}\)

If so, Lysimachus showed himself a better judge of character than Antipater himself who seems to have doubted his son's ability to cope with the regency.\(^{53}\) That his choice was made on the basis of personal observation is possible. Although Cassander had probably taken no part in Alexander's expedition,\(^{54}\) he was in Babylon in 324 BC. Lysimachus may have had an opportunity to remark on the ἐγερσία and ἰμείξια mentioned by Diodorus,\(^{55}\) either then or during the period when Cassander was acting as his father's proxy in Macedon.\(^{56}\) Initially, the decision to support Antipater's son against the central authority may have represented a risk, but the calibre and resources of Cassander's other allies, notably Ptolemy

\(^{50}\) See Ch. I for "Lysimachus the philosopher-king".  
\(^{51}\) See Ch. 2.  
\(^{52}\) Aucello, Riv.Fil. 1957 382 describes Lysimachus in spring 315 BC as "secured on the Macedonian side by the victory of Cassander."  
\(^{53}\) Will, CAH VII 1984 40.  
\(^{54}\) Fortina, 1965 8-9; Plut. Alex.74 for Cassander in Babylon.  
\(^{55}\) Diod. XVIII.75.2.  
\(^{56}\) See n.38 above.  

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and Antigonus\textsuperscript{57} must have reassured Lysimachus as to the high chances of being on the winning side.

By spring 315 BC\textsuperscript{58} Cassander had eliminated all opposition, including the powerful figure of Olympias, Alexander's mother and a bitter enemy of Antipater's house. He established himself as uncrowned king of Macedon, a position consolidated by a royal marriage, the burial of his predecessors, and the foundation of a royal seat.\textsuperscript{59}

The precise terms of the alliance between the rulers of Thrace and Macedon remain uncertain. The assumption that they inevitably co-operated and consulted each other's interests perhaps lays too much weight on Diodorus who refers to Cassander's habit of calling on Lysimachus for aid because of "his proximity and his valour".\textsuperscript{60} It is perhaps more accurate to say that he did this in times of crisis; it is notable that on two occasions at least, in 313 BC and 302 BC, Cassander was prepared to negotiate separately with Antigonus before reverting to this "habitual practice".\textsuperscript{61} At times when their own interests were not directly threatened, it is quite possible that Lysimachus and Cassander took independent lines.

Thompson has suggested that for Lysimachus one of the more tangible advantages of alliance with Cassander was the provision of coined money.\textsuperscript{62} This is possible; the first issues which can be

\textsuperscript{57}) Diod.XVIII.55.2 - "both of them had great forces at their disposal and an abundance of money... and they were the masters of many peoples and cities worthy of note". 58) For the chronology, see Errington, Hermes 1977 494. 59) Diod. XIX.19.52, 61.2-5. 60) Diod. XX.106.4. 61) See below. 62) Thompson, 1968 164-5, citing the firm friendship of Cassander and Lysimachus and the very heavy output of gold and silver Philip II and Alexander types from Pella and Amphipolis.
securely linked with Lysimachus are the Philip and Alexander types minted at Lysimachia after 309 BC; his own Alexander-Ammon/Nike types do not appear until after 301 BC, struck initially from mints in Asia Minor. The deal with Cassander may even have given Lysimachus use of the Amphipolis mint, close to the border of their respective kingdoms, to strike his own issues; Price suggests that issues of Alexander type tetradrachms from that mint, marked with a Δ may be connected with Lysimachus. Such an arrangement, however, could not have come into force until spring 315 BC, when Cassander first took firm control of Macedon. How then did Lysimachus manage for the first eight years in Thrace? Though one might suppose that Antipater provided initial finance, there must have been some disruption in Lysimachus' supply of coined money in the period between summer/autumn 319 BC when the Regent died and spring 315 BC when Cassander could take control of Macedon's mints. Though lack of access to his own mint facilities would not have rendered Lysimachus totally incapable of action, as one might be tempted to assume from a twentieth century standpoint, it may help to explain why he failed to launch or participate in any large-scale military operations beyond his satrapy in this period.

The evidence we have, then, for Lysimachus' relations with his

63) For Lysimachus' coin types, see Ch. 6. 64) A verbal suggestion made by Dr. Price; these Amphipolis Δ tetradrachms are catalogued by Erhardt, N.J.F.A. 1976 86. 65) Diod.XIX.50.1 makes it clear that Monimus and Aristonous held Pella and Amphipolis for Olympias throughout the winter of 316/15 BC. 66) Kraay, 1984 3-18 for the frequent link between issue of coinage by cities or rulers and the need to hire mercenary troops. Will, 1975b 97-102 for the different sources of metal - from mines, precious metal objects, foreign coins - available to cities and rulers for the striking of coinage.
fellow Diadochs for these early years shows him taking care to secure himself on the western front, cultivating good relations first with the powerful Regent Antipater and then with his son Cassander. Though the problems posed by Thrace, and, perhaps, financial difficulties kept him from active involvement in the first Diadoch wars, the significance of his territory as the door from Europe to Asia meant that his support was sought by the combatants. In the first war he found himself on the side of those who claimed to represent "the Kings", in the second he opposed Polyperchon, the self-styled representative of the Argead house. Loyalty to Alexander's house, then, clearly played no part in his decision-making; both times, however, he chose the winning side.

THE WAR AGAINST ANTIGONUS 315 BC - 311 BC.

The very success of the coalition against Polyperchon proved the cause of its collapse. In 318 BC Polyperchon had found a valuable ally in Eumenes, appointed satrap of Cappadocia in 323 BC but outlawed two years later by Antipater for his support of Perdiccas. Commanding the "royal army" in Asia for Polyperchon, Eumenes had proved a sharp thorn in the side of Antigonus. Finally, however, he suffered defeat at Gabiene in the winter of 316/5 BC; Eumenes' troops swelled Antigonus' already considerable resources, and left the latter in control of territory stretching from the Tigris to the Aegean. So great an increase in influence cannot

have failed to disturb Antigonus' colleagues. It is unclear whether
the coalition members had made any formal agreement regarding
division of possible spoils. If so, the aftermath of Gabiene,
which saw Antigonus systematically sweep away any potential
opposition in the Asian satrapies, must surely have dispelled any
hopes that Antigonus' "allies" would get a share of his profits.
Two powerful satraps, Peithon in Media, and Peucestas in Persis,
both, significantly, ex-Bodyguards of Alexander, were eliminated.

The next target was Seleucus; originally an adherent of Perdiccas,
holding a prestigious cavalry command in 323 BC, he had taken
a leading role in the assassination of the Chiliarch and was
rewarded with the satrapy of Babylonia at Triparadeisus. Despite
attempts to conciliate Antigonus, Seleucus found himself forced to
flee from Babylon in spring 315 BC. Taking refuge in Egypt, he
managed to persuade first Ptolemy and subsequently Cassander and
Lysimachus that Antigonus' aspirations to rule a reunited empire
presented a real threat. United action must be taken against him.

The first moves took the form of diplomacy; marching towards
Upper Syria, Antigonus was presented with an ultimatum by his
erstwhile allies. This made demands for considerable territorial and
financial concessions on the grounds that, as colleagues in the

69) The ultimatum of 315 BC might suggest this, but since some its
demands clearly exceeded what was just or reasonable (see below) it
cannot safely be regarded as reflecting the terms of a prior
agreement. 70) Diod. XIX.46.1-4, for Media's resources (horses/
baggage animals/money, Diod. XIX.20; Diod. XIX. 48.5. 71) Arr. Succ.
FGrH 156 F.1.34; Bevan, 1902 31-36, Mehl, 1986 19-28. 72) Diod.
XIX.48.6. 73) Diod.XIX.55-56. 74) Diod. XIX.57.1-2; Just.XV.15.1.2.;
they demanded a share in Antigonus' booty from the war with Eumenes,
Cappadocia and Lycia(?) for Cassander (or Asander?), Hellespontine
Phrygia for Lysimachus, Syria for Ptolemy, Babylonia for Seleucus.

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war against Eumenes, its authors were entitled to a share of the profits of victory. This document has been the subject of much discussion on both juridical and textual grounds. In the context of a work focused on Lysimachus, it is sufficient to say that the ultimatum aimed not merely to prevent Antigonus from further conquests, but to reduce his territories considerably and seriously restrict any attempt at maritime expansion. Some of the clauses were frankly unreasonable, among them the demand that Hellespontine Phrygia should be "returned" to Lysimachus. From a legal point of view, the satrap of Thrace had not a leg to stand on; it is true that Antigonus had seized the territory from the satrap Aridhaeus in 318 BC, but if it were to be taken from him on grounds of usurpation, the satrapy could just as well be assigned to another governor, rather than Lysimachus. What is important here is whether this demand reflects a readiness for territorial expansion on Lysimachus' part, and whether his decision to join the coalition of 315 BC was inspired primarily by that aim rather than by his obligations to his ally Cassander.

Saitta denies that the claim to Hellespontine Phrygia in any way reflected Lysimachus' real aims in 315 BC; he cites Lysimachus' relatively small part in the allied operations before 313 BC, his

75) Notably by Aucello, Riv. Fil. 1957 382-404 who perhaps takes too seriously the allies' claims on Antigonus as participants in the war against Eumenes; Cloché, CRAI 1957 130-8, 1959 143-6, Fortina, 1965 51-7. 76) Cloché, CRAI 1957 132-3; among the satrapies demanded were Lycia (legitimately bestowed on Antigonus) and Hellespontine Phrygia (taken by him outside the context of the war against Eumenes.) 77) Diod.XIX.57.1. 78) Diod.XVIII.51-2. 79) Cloché, CRAI 1957 132. 80) Bengtson, 1987 42 makes the point that Cassander's rise from protegé in 319 BC to virtual ruler of Macedon was bound to bring about a breach with Antigonus.
primarily defensive role in that war, and the limited nature of the action taken by Antigonus against him.\textsuperscript{81} It is true that the ultimatum should probably be seen more as a challenge to Antigonus, and even a pretext for war,\textsuperscript{82} rather than a settlement which Antigonus might realistically be expected to accept; this does not, however, mean that its terms bear no relation to the genuine aspirations of its authors. That Lysimachus was in a position in 315 BC to consider expansion into wealthier and less troublesome terrain is by no means out of the question. The new problems that emerged in 313 BC in Thrace and the West Pontic region are best seen as a response to the propaganda and activities of Antigonus once war broke out. It is probable that by 315 BC Lysimachus had reached some sort of compromise with Seuthes; this and his successful takeover of the West Pontic cities\textsuperscript{83} makes it quite credible that he should begin to look across the Hellespont to a territory which would consolidate his control of the Straits. The fact that Lysimachus did not immediately launch an active offensive against Antigonus is not in itself proof that in 315 BC he had no genuine desire for expansion into Asia. The events of 302 BC suggest that Lysimachus' manpower resources were not sufficient for such an action without the support of his allies.\textsuperscript{84} Furthermore, such a view places too much weight on Lysimachus in isolation, rather than regarding his actions in the context of the coalition's combined operations.

\textsuperscript{81}\textit{Saitta, Kokalos} 1955 66-7. \textsuperscript{82} Will, \textit{CAH VII} 1984 46 describes it as "a poor disguise for ambition and understandably rejected." \textsuperscript{83} See Ch. 2. \textsuperscript{84} See below.
Antigonus, seeking above all to overcome the allied thalassocracy which Diodorus stresses, concentrated his initial efforts on Phoenicia.\textsuperscript{66} Subsequently, while besieging Tyre in spring 315 BC he launched a propaganda war against Cassander. Denouncing the latter for his crimes against the Argead house, Antigonus had himself proclaimed ἐπιμελητὴς of Alexander IV. His simultaneous announcement of Greek autonomy was designed primarily to stir up a reaction in the mainland Greek cities against the oligarchies established by Antipater and now supported by Cassander.\textsuperscript{66} Cassander himself led the operations in mainland Greece in the first two years of the war, with subordinates commanding his troops in Cappadocia and Caria.\textsuperscript{67} It seems probable, therefore, that Lysimachus' "defensive role" represents part of the allied strategy rather than an individual unwillingness for territorial expansion. His effectiveness as an obstacle to a potential Antigonid attack on Macedon, exploiting Cassander's absence, is borne out by his success in securing the straits against Antigonus in the winter of 314/3 BC.\textsuperscript{68} Antigonus' attempt, early in 313 BC, following a victory over

\textsuperscript{85} Diod. XIX.58.1-5; Fortina, 1965 63 - Antigonus aimed to cut Ptolemy off from his arsenals in Syria and Phoenicia. 86) Diod. XIX.61.4; Fortina, 1965 63-4. For the results of this policy see, for example, Diod. XIX.63.- stasis at Argos and massacre of the democrats by Cassander's general Apollonides. 87) Cappadocia - Diod. XIX.57.1, 60.2; Fortina argues (1965 53-4) that Cassander aimed to bar Antigonus from the Aegean coast, thus minimising the threat he posed to Greece. Caria - Diod.XIX.62.5, 68.5-7, Syll\textsuperscript{a} 320; Fortina, 1965 62. Greece - Diod.XIX.63-66, Fortina, 1965 66-9. 88) Diod. XIX.73.6-10, Salitza, Kokalos 1955 68; Hauben, A.J.Phil. 1973 258- 9, sees Cassander's operations in Epirus (Diod. XIX.89.1-2) as simultaneous with Antigonus' presence with a large army near the Hellespont (XIX.77.5-7), citing Lysimachus' role as guardian of the Hellespont and defender of Thrace and Macedon.
Cassander's troops in Caria, to make a separate peace with the latter reflects his recognition of the problem posed by Lysimachus, whom he hoped thus to isolate. Simpson assumes that Lysimachus' subsequent collaboration with Cassander against Antigonus is proof of his inclusion (from the start) in the peace negotiations. This is not necessary. The circumstances of 302 BC provide an exact parallel; prepared initially to negotiate separately with Antigonus, Cassander only summons Lysimachus from Thrace when the terms demanded prove extortionate. Antigonus' own letter to Scepsis hints at some mysterious intervention which caused the breakdown of these talks with Cassander. If the suggestion is correct that it is Lysimachus who lurks behind these cryptic words, then his success in impressing upon his ally the full implications of Antigonus' policy of "divide and rule" marks an important diplomatic victory.

Foiled in his hopes of attacking Thrace directly, Antigonus then turned his attention to the Greek cities on the West Pontic coast, hoping that their revolt would divert Lysimachus from the Hellespont, enabling him to make a direct assault on Macedon. The brilliant campaign in which Lysimachus averted this danger, and the diplomatic coup which followed it have already been discussed.

89) See Diod. XIX.75.6; Welles RC 1934 no. 1. 11.5-8. 90) Simpson, JHS 1954 27. 91) Diod. XX.106.2-3. 92) Saitta, Kokalos 1955 69; Welles RC no.1.11.7-8; the identity of these "meddlers" remains uncertain, (Simpson, JHS 1954 28 thinks that this may simply be Antigonus' way of glossing over his own responsibility for the failure of the talks) but Lysimachus, with perhaps the most to lose from a separate peace, is certainly a plausible candidate. 93) See Ch. 2.
THE PEACE OF 311 BC

The period from 315 BC to 312 BC, then, was one which Lysimachus might recall with some satisfaction. The rejection of the allies' ultimatum and his own demand for Hellespontine Phrygia probably came as no surprise; it should not be seen as in any sense a real setback. Having gained the war they wanted, the allies had no reason to regret enlisting Lysimachus on their side. His military and diplomatic skills had not only saved his own satrapy, an important prize, strategically, but had prevented an Antigonid attack on Macedon. This success served in part to offset Antigonus' victories elsewhere, mainly at Cassander's expense. Antigonus' seizure of Caria early in 313 BC had given him mastery of all the Asian provinces, while his subordinates had deprived Cassander of important possessions in mainland Greece. 94

Lysimachus' victory in Thrace, moreover, marked a turning point for the allies' fortunes. The threat of a renewed Antigonid attack on Macedon was averted by events in other theatres of war. In the spring of 312 BC Demetrius suffered a great defeat at Ptolemy's hands in the naval battle at Gaza. 95 In Babylonia, too, Antigonus found his hands full as Seleucus launched a campaign to recover his satrapy. 96 It is probable that both events contributed to

94) Cassander lost Apollonia, Epidamnus, Chalcis, Thebes and the Phocian cities; his attempted recovery of Apollonia towards the end of 312BC failed dismally. Cloché, CRAI 1957, 134; Fortina, 1965 74-7. 95) Diod. XIX.80-8, Plut.Demet.5; Selbert, 1969 164-175. 96) Diod. XIX.90-1, Plut. Demet.7; App.Syr 64; Grayson, 1975 25-6, ABC 10 11. 1-43; though Diodorus dates Seleucus' "recovery of Babylon" to 312 BC, ABC 10 makes it clear that fighting continued in the satrapy until 308/7 BC. See also Mehl, 1986 115-119.
Antigonus' willingness to make peace.  

The course of the hostilities from 315 BC to 311 BC had shown Antigonus the difficulties posed by a war fought on several fronts. His attempts and near success, in the course of the negotiations, to divide his opponents both reflect his recognition of this fact and expose the essential artificiality of the coalition, whose members were only prepared to unite when their own interests were directly threatened or involved.

Antigonus' letter to Scepsis, dated to 311 BC, suggests that Lysimachus and Cassander were ready in winter 312/11 BC to make a separate peace in Europe, leaving their erstwhile allies in Babylon and Egypt exposed to Antigonus' assault.  

Ptolemy acted fast to get himself included in the Peace. He saved himself, but was forced to abandon Seleucus; it is generally agreed that the satrap of Babylon was not included in the Treaty of 311.  

Fragments of the Babylonian Chronicle series give fleeting glimpses of the warfare which raged from c. 310 BC to 308 BC between Seleucus and Antigonus. The odds against Seleucus should have brought Antigonus a swift victory; instead he was defeated. The brutal impact made upon the population of Babylonia by Antigonus and his army, reflected in Chronicle 10 which speaks of "weeping" and the ravaging of the land,

97) Simpson JHS 1954, 29; Bengtson, 1987, 46. 98) Welles, RC 1934 no.1, 1-8; Simpson JHS 1954 29 thinks that Ptolemy's exclusion from the peace would have meant a full-scale attack on Egypt. 99) Simpson, JHS 1954 30 argues persuasively against a separate treaty with Seleucus, citing the non-inclusion of Seleucus' name in Diod./RC no. I and Ptolemy's failure to cite Antigonus' attack on Seleucus as a pretext for action against him (Antigonus) in 309 BC (Diod.XX.19.3); Errington, 1990 141-2.

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may well have swelled support for Seleucus' cause.\textsuperscript{100} The calculations on which Antigonus had made peace in 311 BC had proved incorrect.\textsuperscript{101}

In 311 BC, however, Seleucus' exclusion must be seen as a concession to Antigonus, in keeping with the clause in the treaty which made him master of "all Asia".\textsuperscript{102} Similarly, the grant of "freedom and autonomy" to Greek cities in Asia and Europe must represent a response to Antigonid pressure. Antigonus had proclaimed the principle at Tyre in 315 BC, and had used it to some effect against Cassander in Greece and Lysimachus in the Pontic region. The theme is prominent in his letter to Scepsis, which presents Greek freedom as a major factor in the decision to make peace; probably copies of the same document were sent to all the Greek cities under Antigonus' sway.\textsuperscript{103}

Nevertheless, to accept the propaganda of that letter and see the peace as a triumph for Antigonus would be mistaken. Welles' judgement on the letter, that Antigonus "utilised an unfavourable peace as a splendid stroke of propaganda" is surely correct.\textsuperscript{104} The treaty of 311 BC represents a compromise for all parties concerned, reflecting the indecisive nature of the war of 315 BC to 311 BC. Though Cassander had to cede any claim to Asian territory, he was granted the title - Πρωτεύοντος of Europe - which he clearly felt to be his inheritance, carrying with it the guardianship of

\textsuperscript{100} Grayson, 1975 26, ABC no.10 11.26-7, 39-40; Will, CAH VII 1984 53 dates the decisive battle to 309/8 BC. \textsuperscript{101} To eliminate Seleucus was Antigonus' first priority in 311 BC (Will, ibid.; Simpson, JHS 1954 29). \textsuperscript{102} Diod. XIX.105.1. \textsuperscript{103} Diod.XIX.105.1; Welles, RC 1934 no.1. 1-8. \textsuperscript{104} Welles, RC 1934 8.
Alexander IV.\textsuperscript{105} In theory his office was limited, ending when the young king reached his majority; whether this really represented a serious problem for Cassander and whether a similar limitation was imposed on the other participants in the Peace have been much debated questions.\textsuperscript{106} Whatever its juridical implications, in practical terms this clause proved the death sentence for Alexander's son. His assassination at Cassander's behest in 310 BC brought sighs of relief all round; the last serious threat to the Diadochs' rule of their individual kingdoms had been removed. Given this reaction, it may not be too cynical to see in this clause of the treaty a tacit agreement as to the elimination of the young king.\textsuperscript{107}

Antigonus, then, was forced to cede the title of ἐπισαλάτις, to which he had laid claim at Tyre.\textsuperscript{108} This and his acknowledgement of Ptolemy and Lysimachus as masters of Egypt and Thrace respectively represents a defeat.\textsuperscript{109}

THE POSITION OF LYSIMACHUS AFTER THE PEACE

"From now on, each of those who ruled over peoples or cities cherished hopes of kingly power, and held their territory as a spear-won kingdom."

Diod. XIX. 105.4

Lysimachus' military and diplomatic success in the recent war had

\textsuperscript{105} Diod. XVIII.54.1, XIX.105.1; Aucello, Riv.Fil. 1957 382,390.
\textsuperscript{106} Fortina, 1965 78; Roussel, 1938 319; Bengtson, 1987 47.
\textsuperscript{107} Diod. XIX. 105.3-4. Welles, RC 1934 7, sees Alexander IV's death as "no more unforseen by Antigonus than, according to Diodorus, it was unwelcome." 108) Diod.XIX.61.3. 109) Diod. XIX. 105.1. 136
won him formal recognition as ruler of Thrace, but the allies' action from 315 BC to 311 BC had not put sufficient pressure on Antigonus to compel his surrender of the Asian satrapies demanded in 315 BC. Hellespontine Phrygia remained in Antigonus' hands and Lysimachus' aspirations towards rule in Asia were still unsatisfied.

It has also been suggested that Lysimachus was hard hit by the concession of the autonomy clause. In Saitta's opinion, "le condizioni di Lisimaco nel 311 erano disastrose"; whereas the autonomy clause naturally favoured the Antigonids, whose very promise of liberty would bring them the allegiance of the cities of Greece and Asia, it represented a potential menace for Lysimachus whose policy for securing his satrapy directly opposed that of the Antigonids.110 Quite apart from the doubts that can be cast upon the theory that Lysimachus and the Antigonids were poles apart in their approach to the government of the Greek cities,111 such an assessment takes the letter of the Treaty of 311 BC far more seriously than any of the participants appeared to do! Lysimachus was not the only ruler who barely paid lip service to its terms. The autonomy clause represented, above all, a means of winning Greek support for any Diadoch who could afford to employ it as a useful pretext for war against an opponent.112 None of the Successors, Antigonus included, had any intention of giving up any real control of the Greek cities in their sphere of influence.113 Lysimachus was neither more culpable than any of his colleagues in his disregard of

the autonomy clause, nor more seriously threatened by it.\textsuperscript{114}

311 BC – 302 BC

Though Lysimachus' first major entry into the arena of the Diadoch wars had proved a personal success, likely to enhance his standing among his contemporaries, the years following the Peace seem to see him retreating once more into the wings.

Barely a year after the treaty had been signed, Ptolemy adopted an aggressive stance towards Antigonus, employing the latter's own autonomy clause against him in the "liberation" of Miletus, Cos and perhaps Iasus.\textsuperscript{116} His invitation to his former allies to renew co-operative action against Antigonus, however, fell on deaf ears. The refusal of Cassander and Lysimachus to take up arms again has been ascribed to that division of interest between the coalition members in Europe and Asia which informed the negotiations of 311 BC. The rulers of Macedon and Thrace, satisfied with the confirmation of their rule in those respective territories, seemingly had no interest in co-operative action when their own interests were not directly threatened or involved.\textsuperscript{116} Saitta saw the relatively limited nature of Lysimachus's known involvement in the wars in Greece and Asia as a withdrawal from international affairs after "the unhappy experience" of the Peace of 311 BC, in order to concentrate on "internal problems".\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{114) See Ch. 2 for Lysimachus' resumption of hostilities with Callatis in 310 BC (Diod.XX.25.1) There is no need to see this, as does Saitta (Kokalos 1955 71) as a response to Ptolemy's liberation propaganda. 115) Diod. XX.19.3, Will, CAH VII 1984 54. 116) Diod. XX.19.2-4; Roussel, 1938 323; Fortina, 1965 85; Will, ibid., 53. 117) Saitta, Kokalos 1955 72.}
Certainly it is quite plausible that Cassander, after his disastrous foray into Asia, had decided, for the present at least, to concentrate his energies on Greece and Macedon, where the prospect of unrest hovered in the wake of recent developments. At home, a reaction among the Macedonians to the disappearance of Alexander IV might create trouble for Cassander; in Greece, the autonomy clause was likely to provoke a reaction against the pro-Antipatrid oligarchs who governed many of the cities. Whether Lysimachus had likewise turned his back on Asia is less certain. The significance of the actions which he took in the years immediately following the Peace, and which may explain his refusal to co-operate with Ptolemy in 310 BC, is not purely "internal". Rather they constitute a response to the recent threat posed by Antigonus' planned invasion of Thrace. In 311 BC Lysimachus may have lifted the siege at Callatis, paying lip-service to the autonomy clause; its resumption, the following year, can be seen as punishment for the city's leading role in a revolt which Antigonus had done his best to foment.  

309 BC saw the foundation of Lysimachia; the absence of any obvious centre of rule has been noted as a curious feature of the Thracian satrapy in 323 BC. Lysimachus' construction of his capital on the site of ancient Cardia, a position commanding the Straits, expresses a determination to prevent a repetition of the

118) Diod.XIX.105.2; Cassander's fears regarding potential support in Macedon for the pretender Heracles in 309 BC (see below) suggest that loyalty to the Argead dynasty was still strong; Diod.XX.28.1 - for the previous effects of the autonomy slogan in Greece, see Diod. XIX.63. 119) Diod.XX.25.1, see Ch. 2. 120) Diod.XX.29.1; Marmor Parium FGrH 239 § 19; Bengtson, 1987 121.
crisis posed by Antigonus' invasion of Thrace in 313 BC.121 Nor was the city's significance purely defensive; the prime position of Lysimacheia as a base for carrying an offensive into Asia is obvious.122

In the context of long-term strategic planning, the city's date of foundation is important. Tscherikower was forced to admit that, within the limits of the evidence, Lysimacheia appears to have preceded Antigoneia in the Troad. Such a proposition was, however, damaging to his concept of Lysimachus as a relatively conservative and retiring figure in contrast to the energetic and ambitious Antigonus. He therefore suggested that Antigonus' other three foundations in Phrygia, the dates of which are uncertain, may have preceded Lysimacheia.123 To base historical judgement on assessments of "personality" in this way, is surely hazardous, particularly in this case where the evidence is so unbalanced.124 There is, moreover, no lack of evidence which reflects Lysimachus' ability to act aggressively and decisively when necessary.125

The siting of Lysimacheia, then, supports the view that Lysimachus had not abandoned the vision of rule in Asia which he had cherished in 315 BC. If this is so, how does one explain his relative lack of participation in the Diadoch wars from 308 BC to 302 BC? The answer may lie partly in his limited resources which would make offensive action against Antigonus outside the context of 

121) Saitta, Kokalos 1955 73. 122) Bengtson, 1987 122; Saitta, Kokalos 1955 73; Tscherikower, 1927 163. 123) Tscherikower, 1927 156. 124) For Hieronymus' focus on Eumenes and the Antigonids and his understated treatment of Lysimachus see Ch. 1. 125) See Ch. 1 and below.
a coalition highly risky,\textsuperscript{126} combined with the preoccupations of his potential allies at this time in areas where Lysimachus' involvement was unlikely to bring him profit. Moreover, by the time the construction of Lysimacheia was well under way, the "coalition" of 315 BC could no longer be counted on. The division of interest between its members in Europe and Asia, which had made itself felt in 311 BC, now took the form of open hostilities between two of them.

In 309 BC, Ptolemy, who had first turned the autonomy slogan against Antigonus in Asia Minor,\textsuperscript{127} now thought it might be profitably deployed in Greece against Cassander.\textsuperscript{128} Lysimachus' policy in this period seems to have been one of narrow self-interest. This should not be surprising; Cassander had shown himself capable of doing the same in 313 BC\textsuperscript{129} and the course of events throughout the Successor period suggests that such a stance was the rule rather than the exception. Quite naturally, the Diadochs worked first and foremost in pursuit of their personal aims; co-operation occurs only when one of their number appears to be growing disturbingly powerful.\textsuperscript{130}

The assumption that the friendship between Cassander and Lysimachus expressed itself in constant co-operation has already been mentioned. Evidence which suggests otherwise is frequently

\textsuperscript{126) Cassander's experiences in Caria may have proved a salutary lesson; for the Asian offensive of 302 BC, Lysimachus' army was substantially reinforced by Cassander and even then he had little chance of success without the aid of Seleucus' troops (see below). 127) Diod.XX.19.3; XX.27.1-3. 128) Diod.XX.37.2. 129) For Cassander's peace talks with Antigonus, see above. 130) e.g. Antigonus in 315 BC, 306 BC and 302 BC (see above and below); Lysimachus in the 280s BC (see Plut. Demet. 31 and 48, and Ch.7).}
dismissed as improbable and elaborate hypotheses constructed to explain any failure of Lysimachus to show himself at his ally's side. Diodorus himself, however, makes it clear that joint action was expected only κατὰ τοὺς μεγίστους φόρους. In 308 BC, certainly, Cassander was in little need of help. Two years before, Antigonus' ambitious nephew Polemaeus had left his satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia in the hands of his friend Phoenix with instructions not to obey Antigonus and defected to Cassander in Greece. In 309 BC Cassander successfully defused the threat posed by Heracles, Alexander's bastard son, whom Polyperchon was championing as successor to the Macedonian throne. Heracles was eliminated in return for Polyperchon's promotion to Στρατηγός of the Peloponnese; Cassander thus killed two birds with one stone, securing Macedon and transforming a potential foe in mainland Greece into an effective instrument. Ptolemy's volte-face and his initial success in Greece - notably he won control of the key cities of Sicyon and Corinth - might have posed a major threat to Cassander; finally, however, Ptolemy's attempt to revive the League of Corinth under his own hegemony failed; in 308 BC he made peace with the ruler of Macedon.

It was not until summer 307 BC that Cassander suffered a major blow. If Plutarch's account is correct, the deal done with Ptolemy, ironically, contributed indirectly to Cassander's loss of Athens,

131) e.g. Saitta's explanation for Lysimachus' failure to fight in the Four Years War (see below). 132) Diod.XX.106.2. 133) Hornblower, 1981 130 suggests that this Phoenix may be the historian of Tenedos, a possible source for Hieronymus; Diod. XX. 19. 2; Fortina, 1965 84. 134) Diod.XX.28.2-3; Bengtson, 1987 54. 135) Diod. XX.37.2.
the "gangway to Greece", which he had held since 317 BC. A fleet sighted off the Attic coast, believed to be Ptolemy's, sailed into the Piraeus unopposed; the discovery that the admiral was Demetrius, implementing the first stage of a major Antigonid programme for "liberation" of the cities of Greece came too late. Demetrius of Phalerum, Cassander's governor since 317 BC departed for Thebes, "the ancestral constitution" was restored and the Athenians hailed the Antigonids as kings and saviour-gods.

What stance did Lysimachus take in relation to Cassander and the Antigonids at this point? Lysimachus had shown himself unwilling to take action against Antigonus in 310 BC, nor is there any evidence for his co-operation with Ptolemy in Asia Minor or Cassander in Greece. More curiously, there is no sign that he took steps to exploit a golden opportunity, the revolt of Polemaeus and Antigonus' consequent loss of his Hellespontine satrapy. Perhaps the timing was unfortunate; Polemaeus' defection came at a time when Lysimachus' priority was probably the securing of the Pontic cities and the construction of his capital. Shortly afterwards, Antigonus sent his son Philip to deal with Phoenix; though no more is heard of these operations, Phoenix' position as commander at Sardis in 302 BC suggests that he capitulated, and was welcomed back into the Antigonid camp.

It has even been suggested that Lysimachus chose to preserve positive relations with Antigonus at the expense of his friendship

136) Plut. Demet.8–9. 137) Plut. Demet. 10.1, 4–5. 138) See above. 139) Diod.XX.107.5; Phoenix' position in Hellespontine Phrygia may have become more difficult with the death of Polemaeus in 309 BC (Diod. XIX.27.3).
with Cassander. The evidence is an Athenian inventory of objects entrusted to the treasurers of Athena and the other gods, traditionally dated to 307/6 BC;\textsuperscript{140} lines 28–9 describe a crown awarded to [Lysimachus, generally identified with the ruler of Thrace.}\textsuperscript{141}

Recently, however, the text has been re-dated by Burstein who thought such a change of stance impossible, given Lysimachus' longstanding friendship with Cassander and his clear hostility to Antigonus by 305/4 BC.\textsuperscript{142} Burstein argues that the year 307/6 BC indicates only the "general period" to which the crowns belong, rather than covering the whole inventory.\textsuperscript{143} He dates the Lysimachus crown to the period after 301 BC, probably to 299/8 BC, taking as his reference points two preceding entries; an ἀπιγέιος crown donated to Athens by Ephesus in line 8 is dated to 306/5 BC, as the first Panathenaic year in which Antigonid-controlled Ephesus could be honouring Athens in this way; the name of a Pontic ruler in lines 21–3 is plausibly restored as that of Spartocus III, enthroned in 304 BC: Lysimachus' crown must therefore be dated post 304 BC and from historical necessity to the period after 301 BC.\textsuperscript{144}

Although the mutual dependence of Cassander and Lysimachus may well have been exaggerated, and the possibility of Lysimachus taking at least a neutral stance is less unthinkable than Burstein supposes

\textsuperscript{140) IG II\textsuperscript{2} 1485a, dated (e.g. Geyer PW XIV 1928 col. 6; Momigliano, Riv.Fil. 1935 315). on the basis of 11.5-6 which refer to the hipparchs of the year of Anaxicrates. 141) Burstein, ZPE no.31 1978 181. 142) Ibid., 181-5; Diod. XX.84.1., 96.3; see below for Lysimachus' aid to Rhodes during the Antigonid siege. 143) Burstein proposes a break in the inventory after line 7 and a change to the Lycurgan system, where each group of objects in the list is marked with a letter of the alphabet (Ferguson, 1932 124.), after line 8. 144) Burstein, ibid., 183-5.}
these arguments do support a re-dating of the text.\textsuperscript{145} The one major obstacle to acceptance of the crown's award after 305/4 BC is the omission of the title \textit{Bokileuc} from Lysimachus' name. Burstein cites Spartocus - also without title - as a parallel case, but this is not wholly convincing. The ruler of a wealthy but semi-barbarian kingdom, whose dynasts performed benefactions as a means of securing Hellenic approval,\textsuperscript{146} is hardly equivalent in stature to Lysimachus, the ruler, in 299/8 BC, of a powerful kingdom comprising Thrace and most of Anatolia.\textsuperscript{147}

Athenian omission of Lysimachus' title from a text intended for public display,\textsuperscript{148} particularly in a year when he had bestowed benefactions on the city and the influence of his \textit{filos} Philippides was at its height\textsuperscript{149} might seem unlikely. Nevertheless a parallel example is provided by a similar inventory, dated securely to 306/5 BC which refers to money brought by Xenocles of Sphettos "from Antigonus".\textsuperscript{150} Although there is a reference to the Antigonids as \textit{Bokileuc} later on the stone, the title is not appended to his name, despite the fact that the stone was published in the months following the Antigonid assumption of the royal title and in the very city which apparently was first to hail him king.\textsuperscript{151} One can only assume that the compilers of this sort of text, at least, were less concerned for correct protocol than modern commentators would like to believe. This is perhaps particularly true of the early

\textsuperscript{145} See above. \textsuperscript{146} Gauthier, 1985 43. \textsuperscript{147} Aymard, 1965 89 (=REA 1948) observes that the royal title is often omitted in Greek city inscriptions dealing with the rulers of these peripheral kingdoms. \textsuperscript{148} Ferguson, 1932 101 for display of such inventories on the Acropolis. \textsuperscript{149} For Philippides, see Plut. Demet. 12, Syll\textsuperscript{a} 374 and Ch. 6. \textsuperscript{150} IGII\textsuperscript{2} 1492B 11.99-103. \textsuperscript{151} Plut. Demet. 10.3.
years of the Successor period before the Hellenistic monarchies had become firmly established.\(^{152}\)

On balance, then, it seems best to assume that Lysimachus' stance towards Cassander underwent no violent change in the period in question. The continuation of positive relations between them gains support from the fact that as enemy pressure mounted against Macedon in 303 BC, Demetrius focused his diplomacy in the areas to the west of Cassander's realm.\(^{153}\) This may well reflect the increased difficulty of an attack from the Hellespont, via Thrace, posed by the new city of Lysimacheia. Certainly the defensibility of the city and its importance as a key to the whole of Thrace is stressed at the time of its rebuilding in 196 BC by Antiochus III.\(^{154}\)

Whether continued friendship with Cassander must necessarily imply Lysimachus' active involvement in all his affairs is, however, less certain. Simpson's comment on the alliance of Ptolemy and Seleucus in 311 BC, "that each should act primarily for himself but with regard to the other man's position",\(^{155}\) might pertinently be applied to Lysimachus and Cassander in the last decade of the fourth century. It is probable that both their connection with each other and with the other members of the coalition was rather looser than is often supposed.

The course of events in the next couple of years certainly supports the belief that the opposition to Antigonus was far from

\(^{152}\) Compare IG II² 1492 11.47-53; the title Ραγκίλειος is scrupulously appended to Alexander's name in the context of dedications made by his wife Roxane. \(^{153}\) Notably in Epirus and Corcyra; see below. \(^{154}\) Polyb. XVIII.50-1, XXI.15. Livy XXXII.39; for the city's treaty with Antiochus I or II, see Ferrary & Gauthier, Journ. des Savants 1981 327-45. \(^{155}\) Simpson, JHS 1954 30.
united. After their unexpected success at Athens in the summer of 307 BC, the Antigonids turned their attention to Ptolemy, who had shown himself dangerously ambitious in recent years. His attempts to exploit Antigonus' own autonomy slogan to win support in Asia Minor and Greece have already been mentioned; he had, moreover, come close to carrying off a royal prize coveted by all the Diadochs. His plans for marriage to Cleopatra, daughter of Philip and sister of Alexander, were only nipped in the bud by assassination of the bride at Sardis, in 308 BC, on Antigonus' orders. In spring 306 BC the struggle for naval supremacy, a major feature of the first coalition war, was at last resolved with Demetrius' dazzling victory at Salamis. Ptolemy retreated to Egypt, giving the Antigonids control of Cyprus, a major source of Lagid naval strength. Celebrating the victory with the assumption of the kingly title, an act which expressed unequivocally a claim to the succession of Alexander, the Antigonids lost no time in taking action to realise that claim. The late autumn of 306 BC saw the launch of a full scale expedition against Egypt which aimed to crush Ptolemy once and for all.

It is probable that it was only at this point that the coalition members, rejecting Antigonus' claim to Alexander's empire and seeing Ptolemy's projected destruction as foreshadowing their own,

156) Areas either controlled by Antigonus or contested by him against Cassander; Diod. XX.19, 27, 37. 157) Diod. XX.37.4. 158) Diod.XX.37.5-6. 159) Diod. XX.52, Plut.Demet. 15-16, Bengtson, 1987 56-8. 160) For the Diadochs' adoption of the kingly title, see Ch.6. 161) Diod.XX.73.5; Plut. Demet. 19; Fortina 1965 94; Will, CAH VII 1984 56. 162) Bengtson, 1987 58, sees the opposition of Cassander and Lysimachus as a serious obstacle to the Antigonid achievement of this dream.
decided on concerted action. Clearly the coalition was again in force, in some sense, by spring 305 BC; after Antigonus, failing to breach the defences of Egypt, had abandoned the campaign, Ptolemy wrote to Seleucus, Lysimachus and Cassander telling them of his success. There is, however, no suggestion that Ptolemy received military aid from the rulers of Thrace and Macedon. This may reflect a genuine unreadiness and disunity at the time of Antigonus' invasion in autumn 306 BC; the desire to expend military resources only in a field where co-operative action could neatly be combined with the pursuit of personal goals may, however, be another underlying factor. Cassander's actions in the following year and Ptolemy's recovery of Coele-Syria in the campaign preceding Ipsus certainly fall into this category.

In the summer of 305 BC, Antigonus renewed the assault on Ptolemy with the siege of Rhodes. Ostensibly neutral but effectively pro-Ptolemaic, the island, a vital link in the trade route between Egypt and Greece, had resisted Antigonus' diplomatic attempts to bring it into alliance with himself. The existence of a revived and active coalition is reflected in the dispatch of Rhodian embassies not only to Ptolemy, but also to Lysimachus and Cassander, asking for help. Ptolemy sent substantial military aid as well as money and supplies. Cassander and Lysimachus contented themselves with sending consignments of grain. Nevertheless their efforts were not without effect, nor did they go unrecognised. The cost of

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the operations at Rhodes to the Antigonids, in terms of time and resources, was high; Demetrius' persistence with the siege is generally regarded as a major mistake.\textsuperscript{168} The Rhodians acknowledged the allies' contribution to their city's safety with cult worship for Ptolemy and statues of Cassander and Lysimachus erected in the agora.\textsuperscript{169} In the summer of 304 BC, the Antigonids abandoned the siege and made terms with the Rhodians; a major factor in inspiring this decision was Cassander's success in Greece in the early phases of what is sometimes called the Four Years War.\textsuperscript{170}

The period which saw Antigonus' opponents deal him this double blow on the battlefield also witnessed their own assumption of the title \textit{Bogileuk} \textsuperscript{171} Saitta has seen this action as marking a turning point in the policy of Lysimachus; as \textit{Bogileuk} he moves from a stance of withdrawal to active participation in the Diadoch wars.\textsuperscript{172} A major obstacle to this idea of a dramatic change of role, however, is Lysimachus' apparent failure to participate in the Four Years War fought by Cassander against Demetrius' troops in Greece.\textsuperscript{173} Though Saitta seeks to explain this in terms of an early campaign against the Getae in the region of the Danube, there is no secure evidence to support the historicity of the operations he envisages. Such a hypothesis seems over-elaborate and unnecessary.\textsuperscript{174}

Instead, the course of events from summer 304 BC to the launch of

\textsuperscript{168} Berthold, 1984, 77. \textsuperscript{169} Diod. XX.100.2; see also Ch.6. \textsuperscript{170} Diod. XX.99.3; Plut. Demet.22 for the terms - Rhodes was to be Demetrius' ally, but without obligation to take up arms against Ptolemy. For the Four Years War, see below. \textsuperscript{171} See Ch. 6 for the probable dates and the significance of this action. \textsuperscript{172} Saitta, \textit{Kokalos} 1955 73. \textsuperscript{173} Diod. XX. 102-3, Plut. Demet.23, \textit{SEG} 26 no.89. \textsuperscript{174} Saitta, \textit{Kokalos} 1955 75.
the Asian campaign in 302 BC suggests that relations between the Diadochs were governed by the same principles which were in force between 310 BC and 306 BC. Lysimachus could not expect to profit sufficiently from the expenditure of his resources in Greece\textsuperscript{175} to justify his participation in the war. Though the terms of his alliance with Cassander may have obliged Lysimachus to send aid in an emergency,\textsuperscript{176} the early stages of the war in Greece saw Cassander in little need of help. Though his first assault on Athens in 306 BC was repulsed by the \textit{pihopros} Olympiodorus with Aetolian help, Cassander's ally Ptolemy held the key positions of Sicyon and Corinth and had evidently handed over the latter by 303 BC.\textsuperscript{177} Cassander made an alliance with the Boeotians; with their help a second assault on Athens very nearly succeeded; the besieged city was only saved by Demetrius' sudden arrival. Polyperchon also enjoyed conspicuous success, on Cassander's behalf, in the Peloponnese.\textsuperscript{178}

303 BC, however, saw events take a turn for the worse, both in mainland Greece, and in areas where enemy influence could constitute a serious threat to Macedon itself. Demetrius won Sicyon and Corinth, and Cassander's influence in the area of the Isthmus was virtually wiped out.\textsuperscript{179} In Epirus, on Macedonia's North-west border, the young king Pyrrhus, hostile to Cassander, made an alliance with Demetrius. The deal was sealed with the Besieger's

\textsuperscript{175} For Lysimachus' policy towards Greece which seems to have confined itself to diplomacy rather than conquest, see Ch.4.
\textsuperscript{176} See above.
\textsuperscript{177} Since Prepelaus held the city for Cassander in that year (Diod.XX.102.1).
\textsuperscript{178} Roussel, 1938 337.
\textsuperscript{179} Plut. Demet. 23; Diod.XX.102-103; Hauben,\textit{ZPE} no.14 1974 10.
marriage to Pyrrhus' sister Deidameia. The threat from the west increased when the Spartan general Cleonymus, then master of Corcyra, rejected Cassander's offer of alliance; that he also refused to join forces with the enemy was presumably some comfort. Diodorus explicitly states that Demetrius saw the elimination of Cassander's generals in Greece as a preliminary to an attack on Macedon itself. Plans for the instrument which would effect this must have already been under way and well publicised in 303 BC; the actual revival of Philip's II's league of Greek states, under Antigonid hegemony, recorded in an inscription from Epidaurus, has been dated to the spring of 302 BC, thus coinciding with the launch of the offensive in Asia. Before this, however, the "alarm" which "the increasing power of the Greeks" aroused in Cassander led to his dispatch of envoys to Antigonus, suing for peace. Only the uncompromising nature of the reply, a demand for Cassander's unconditional surrender, led to the reformation of the coalition which Justin describes.

Saitta, with his hypothesis of a Danubian campaign which kept Lysimachus out of the action against Antigonus until spring 302 BC, saw Cassander's decision to seek peace with Antigonus as the consequence of Lysimachus' inability to bring him aid. Quite apart from the uncertainty surrounding the historicity of this Danubian campaign, such a judgement rests too heavily on the idea

of Lysimachus and Cassander as a team who invariably co-operated regardless of their individual interests. Cassander had exploited the opportunity provided by Demetrius' stubbornness over the Rhodian siege to recover the territory in mainland Greece which he regarded as his dynastic inheritance. Presumably he hoped to gain sufficient ground there during Demetrius' absence to be able to maintain a strong position on the Besieger's return, and the early stages of the war seemed to justify his decision. Nor is it likely that he would wish to share the profits. Thus, while the war was going well, he had no need of, or desire for help from Lysimachus, who in turn had no strong incentive to intervene in an area which his neighbour clearly regarded as his own preserve. In seeking peace with Antigonus as opposed to immediate co-operative action with Lysimachus, Cassander may simply have thought it preferable to save Macedon, even at the cost of his recent gains in mainland Greece, than to expend further resources in a campaign in which success was far from certain. The organisation of the expedition of 302 BC certainly reinforces the view that Cassander, whose prime concern was Macedon and Greece, wished, if possible, to avoid campaigning personally in Asia. In asking for terms in 303 BC he may have hoped that Antigonus, learning from his mistakes in 313 BC, would be prepared to make peace on the basis of the status quo. Instead, Antigonus' exorbitant demands recreated the

187) See above; Bengtson, 1987 66. 188) Diod. XVIII. 54.1. 189) See above. 190) His defeats in Caria (Diod. XIX. 68.5-7) may have contributed to this reluctance. 191) Diod.XX.107.1. The source used by Justin (XV.2.16) and Orosius (Adv. Pag.III.23.42) stresses Cassander's preoccupation with finitimum bellum in 302 BC. 192) See above.
situation of 315 BC and 306 BC; Hieronymus, for one, saw this as a grave error.  

The period from 311 BC to 302 BC, then, is one in which Lysimachus seems initially to have concentrated on strengthening his position in Thrace, achieving the submission of Callatis and the construction of Lysimachia. The location of this capital suggests that his ambitions towards rule in Asia were undiminished; his failure to take action towards this end should probably be connected with the danger of facing Antigonus' superior forces without support from his fellow Diadochs. Since potential allies, like Cassander or Ptolemy, had their eyes set on other targets, notably mainland Greece, Lysimachus seemingly preferred to bide his time, conserving his resources, rather than expending effort in areas of the empire which were already "spoken for". While Cassander held his own in Greece, there was little incentive for Lysimachus' involvement; Demetrius' successes there in 303 BC and Antigonus' avowed intention to wipe Cassander off history's page gave Lysimachus his long-awaited opportunity. In spring 302 BC, the coalition of 315 BC reformed to launch an offensive into Asia.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 302 BC

Twenty years after his appointment as satrap of Thrace, the chance had come for Lysimachus to take a leading role. While it is undeniable that Cassander's potential elimination by Antigonus brought the danger very close to home, it would be wrong to see

Lysimachus' stance at this point as primarily defensive. Whereas self-interest may have determined his staying aloof from Cassander's earlier operations in Greece, the crisis of 303 BC to 302 BC offered a powerful incentive for action; Bengtson rightly stresses Lysimachus' determination to extend his kingdom at Antigonus' expense. His comment, however, that "Lysimachus had nothing to fear from Antigonus" rather overstates the case.195

It is clear from Diodorus' account that it was with Lysimachus that Cassander initially conferred, before envoys were dispatched to Ptolemy and Seleucus.196 If Macedon and Thrace were lost, then both these kings faced the prospect of being the next target for an Antigonid attack; accordingly they agreed with enthusiasm to reform the coalition.197 Subsequent events suggest that Ptolemy, at least, hoped to use the campaign primarily to settle some old scores.198

The coalition strategy aimed to put sufficient pressure on Antigonus in Asia to force Demetrius out of Greece.199 Command of the army which was to cross the Hellespont fell to Lysimachus. Although this plan has been seen very much as Cassander's brainchild,200 the major responsibility which it placed on Lysimachus, particularly in the early stages, makes it scarcely credible that he did not play some part in its formulation. The plan for an offensive in Asia Minor appealed to the self-interest of both kings; its success would give Cassander a much-needed breathing

space in Greece and remove from Macedon the pressure posed by the revived League of Corinth.\textsuperscript{201}

In return for this opportunity to keep his kingdom and concentrate on the \textit{finitima bella} which the sources cite as his reason for remaining in Europe,\textsuperscript{202} Cassander was prepared to grant to Lysimachus the troops whose lack may have deterred him from such an offensive before. For the king of Thrace, the march to Asia in 302 BC carried with it a chance to win the territory there which he had claimed in 315 BC and been denied in 311 BC.\textsuperscript{203}

Cassander's readiness to cede command of the Asian campaign to his neighbour may also have been determined by military considerations. Lysimachus had distinguished himself against heavy odds in 313 BC to 312 BC; it is probable too that he had superior knowledge of campaigning in Asia, gained on the march with Alexander.\textsuperscript{204} Cassander himself had not accompanied the Conqueror and his previous foray into Caria had been conducted by subordinates.\textsuperscript{205} Interestingly, it was one of these, Prepelaus, a distinguished diplomat and soldier, who was appointed, with the title of \textit{στρατηγός},\textsuperscript{206} to accompany Lysimachus to Asia.

On arrival in Asia, Lysimachus sent this lieutenant south with a force of 6,000 infantry and 1,000 horsemen to win over the cities of Aeolis and Ionia while he himself dealt with those on the Asian coast of the Straits before marching into Hellespontine Phrygia.\textsuperscript{207}

\textsuperscript{201} Will, 1979 75, for Antigonus' plan to use the League as the basis for his conquest of Macedon. \textsuperscript{202} Justin XV.2.16, Oros. Adv. Pag.111.23.42. 203) See above. \textsuperscript{204} See Ch.1. \textsuperscript{205} Fortina, 1965, 8, 69; Diod.XIX.68.5-7. \textsuperscript{206} Diod.XX.107.2; for Prepelaus' career, see Appendix III. \textsuperscript{207} Diod.XX.107.3.
By dividing his forces, Lysimachus clearly planned to enforce his authority on as wide an area of western Asia Minor as possible before the enemy was alerted to his presence. Alexander had employed a similar method of conquest through the dispatch of relatively small forces to different parts of the country in his campaign of 333 BC.  

Both commanders enjoyed considerable success in the opening phase of the campaign. Sweeping along the western coast, Prepelaus, though thwarted at Erythrae and Clazomenae, took Adramyttium and wealthy Ephesus, a major naval base for the Antigonids, and won over Teos and Colophon. An inscription from Ephesus, which honours Archestratus, Demetrius' ὀπατηύς in Clazomenae for his loyalty and his "saving of the corn-ships" has been connected with these operations. To my mind, however, it is better placed in the context of the κοινὸς πόλεμος which the Ionian cities fought against Lysimachus after Ipsus. Meanwhile, Lysimachus himself had not been idle, winning over Lampsacus and Parium and taking Sigeum by force.

Nor did the campaign owe its early success to military skills alone. In an age in which stratagem was elevated to an art and Odysseus was perhaps a more popular role model than Achilles, the

208) Arr.Anab. I. 18. 1. Lysimachus' own brother Alcimachus had led the force sent to Aeolis and Ionia; see Ch. I. 209) Diod. XX. 107. 3-4; see Ch. 5 for financial penalties possibly imposed on Erythrae in consequence. 210) OGIS 9. 1. 2 with Dittenberger's commentary. Hauben, 1975 155, however, sets the text in the period of Prepelaus' occupation, with Archestratus' generosity consisting in his refraining from molestation of Ephesian corn-ships while the city was in enemy hands. 211) See Ch. 4. 212) Diod.XX.107. 2. 213) Hornblower, 1981 197-203 for the portrayal of craft as a heroic quality, notably in Hieronymus' treatment of Eumenes.
use of diplomacy to subvert a rival's officers and troops is a common phenomenon. Marching inland, Prepelaus used his persuasive skills to good effect to win over Phoenix, Antigonus' commander at Sardis, the Hellenised Lydian city situated in one of the richest areas of Anatolia and renowned for its grain, wine and gold. The reputedly impregnable acropolis, however, remained in the loyal hands of Philip.²¹⁴

For Lysimachus, the sour taste left by the failure of his siege of Abydus was washed away by his success in laying hands on the royal treasury of Synnada, set high among the volcanic mountains of upper Phrygia.²¹⁵ Its riches fell to Lysimachus with the help of its commander, the ambitious and flexible Docimus.²¹⁶ Lysimachus' war fund, a vital ingredient for success in a period in which mercenary service was at its peak, was further swelled by the capture of "other royal treasuries."²¹⁷ Not only individual commanders, but cities too, were offered positive inducements to desert the Antigonid cause. Lampsacus and Parium, which voluntarily pledged their allegiance to Lysimachus were rewarded with "freedom". Sigeum, which resisted, was punished with the imposition of a garrison.²¹⁸

²¹⁴) Diod. XX.107.3; for the resources of Sardis, Hanfmann, 1983 125; Arr.Anab. I.17.5 for the "extremely strong" position of the acropolis fortress. ²¹⁵) For Synnada, see Ramsay, 1890 40-46, 54. ²¹⁶) For the shady circumstances under which Docimus left Perdiccas for Antigonus, see Simpson, Historia 1957 504-5; see also Ch.6. ²¹⁷) For the cycle of victory → money → purchase of more troops → victory as integral to the success of aspiring rulers in the early Hellenistic period, see Austin, CQ 1986 457-60. These treasuries are not named, but one possible site in this region might be Cotialeon, which was a stronghold in Lysimachus' hands in 282/1BC (Polyaen. VI.12). ²¹⁸) Diod. XX.107.2; see Ch.5 for Lysimachus and the Greek cities.
So far, the invaders had enjoyed the advantage of surprise; when Antigonus, alerted to their presence as he celebrated games at his new capital on the Orontes, unlocked his treasury at Cyinda to pay the great army which set off in pursuit, their position became far more dangerous. From the outset, the coalition strategy carried considerable risks for its proponents; even with reinforcements from Cassander, Lysimachus' army was no match, numerically, for that of Antigonus. Accordingly, his strategy during the summer and autumn of 302 BC reflects the knowledge that he must, at all costs, avoid a pitched battle at this stage. As Antigonus advanced, reconquering en route the cities of Lycaonia and upper Phrygia, Lysimachus withdrew northwards into Hellespontine Phrygia.

For Lysimachus, survival, let alone victory, depended on the junction of his forces with those of Seleucus and, presumably, Ptolemy. Justin suggests that a location was named in the negotiations preceding the invasion. If the plan went awry, of course, Lysimachus ran the risk of finding himself isolated, facing Antigonus' great army alone. How much of a gamble was he taking?

An answer to this question is not easily found, since it depends in part on knowing the exact whereabouts of Seleucus at the time when the alliance was reformed. Following his victory against Antigonus, probably in 308 BC, Seleucus had waged war against the Mauryan dynast, Chandragupta. This ended, after indecisive fighting, in the famous treaty recorded by Strabo; Seleucus ceded all the

219) Diod.XX.108.1-3; Cyinda, see Strab. XIV.5.10, Simpson, Historia 1957 503-4. 220) Saïta, Kokalos 1955 77; Cary, 1951 40 comments on the unique nature of this campaign in Greek history. 221) Diod. XX.108.4-5. 222) Just.XV.2.16.
lands beyond the Indus in exchange for 500 elephants. Though its terms were clearly common knowledge by 302 BC when Demetrius hailed Seleucus as *ελεύθερος* the treaty can be dated only to the period from 305 BC to 303 BC. It is, however, usually assumed that it was from the borders of India that Seleucus had to march in the late spring/early summer of 302 BC. This implies an awesome journey of over 3,000 kilometres, encompassing difficult terrain and involving major problems of supply and accommodation.

Tarn, however, proposed a reconstruction of events which would greatly diminish the danger of Lysimachus' position, suggesting that by 302 BC, Seleucus was already back in Babylon. The basis for this is a Babylonian astronomical text, interpreted by Kugler as evidence for Antigonus' possession of the city in 302 BC. Tarn cites also a fragment of Arrian's *Indika* which describes the dispatch of camel-mounted messengers by Ptolemy son of Lagos to Seleucus Nicator across the "Arabian isthmus". Tarn saw the use of such a route as an emergency measure contingent on Antigonus' possession of the Damascus road. He therefore dated this incident to 302 BC, suggesting that Antigonus sent troops to take Babylon, hoping in this way to force Seleucus to turn back from his march to meet Lysimachus.

This theory has its attractions, not least in that it solves the

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problem of how the kings of Macedon and Thrace communicated with Seleucus in the months preceding the launch of the Asian offensive. Nevertheless, certain objections can be raised. Firstly the context and source of the passage of Arrian are quite uncertain.²³⁰ Secondly, the dispatch of couriers between Egypt and Syria via the Arabian peninsula and then the Syrian desert is not as outlandish as Tarn assumes. Lastly, Kugler's reading of the text to date Antigonus' possession of Babylon to 302 BC is dubious. The observations which precede the reference to Antigonus are dated to the month Nisanu in Year 10 of the Seleucid era (May 302 BC); the entry which follows contains two dates, 18 Duzu (6 August) and 23 Shabatu (7 March) but the regnal dating formula for the year is partially damaged. Kugler assumed that these observations, like those preceding it, belonged to 302/1 BC (Yr.10 S.E.); restoring the formula to read "the 14th year", he argued that this must be Year 14 of the Antigonid era and thus that the text was evidence for Antigonid occupation of Babylon at least from early August 302 BC to early March of 301 BC.²³¹ Kuhrt, however, has pointed out that there is no direct equation between the dates of the two entries, which are separated by two lines, and that Kugler's restoration means that the sign for year (MU) must be omitted; this is not at all usual in Babylonian texts.²³²

From the strategic standpoint, moreover, it makes sense to think

²³⁰) Tarn's argument that this incident "may ... be accepted as fact" as deriving from Hieronymus, since Arrian's sources for the Indika are all "good 4th and 3rd century material", is surely too optimistic. ²³¹) Kugler, 1924 438, LBAT 1216. ²³²) In her forthcoming review of Mehl's book on Seleucus (BO 1990).
that Antigonus' failure to anticipate a coalition reaction to his aggressive behaviour towards Cassander stemmed in part from his confidence in Seleucus' apparent inaccessibility. Diodorus makes it clear that Lysimachus' presence in Asia came as a complete surprise; even on the eve of Ipsus, Plutarch's account stresses Antigonus' confidence in the disunity and ineffectiveness of "the young men's alliance". Similarly both the delay of at least six months before Seleucus' arrival in Cappadocia and Diodorus' explicit statement of his marching "from the upper satrapies" seem to support the view that the Indian border was his starting point. Finally, Seleucus' army, though described as "large" was not remotely of a size to challenge that of Antigonus. This suggests some limitation on numbers imposed by problems of supply, combined perhaps with heavy losses en route, both of which are consistent with the long and arduous journey envisaged by Bengtson. If India, then, was Seleucus' starting-point, it must be accepted that in placing himself in the vanguard of the coalition attack, Lysimachus, often presented as a rather cautious character, was prepared to run great risks for a major prize.

The late summer and autumn of 302 BC saw Lysimachus in controlled retreat before the forces of Antigonus. These events do much to reinforce his reputation as a general of outstanding skill.

233) Diod. XX.108.1; Plut. Demet. 28 - Antigonus' scepticism about the solidity of the opposition was justified to some extent; see below. 234) Diod. XX.113.2-3; Roussel, 1938 343, Wehrli,1968 69; i.e. Persia, Carmania, Arachosia, Paropamisadae, Aria, Drangine, Bactria, India. ( Diod.XIX.14.4-6). 235) Diod.XX.113.4 - 20,000 infantry, 12,500 cavalry, 480 elephants, 100+ scythed chariots; Plut.Demet.28; for numbers at Ipsus, see below; Bengtson, 1987 123.
His handling of the campaign reflects a cool determination combined with the capacity to act boldly and decisively when necessary, exploiting to the full changing conditions of weather and terrain. After consultation with his φίλοι, Lysimachus' plan of action took the form of a series of entrenched camps, where the army dug itself in and faced investment by the enemy.\textsuperscript{236} By this method he engaged Antigonus in time-consuming and unprofitable operations, which utilised resources perhaps better employed elsewhere. Antigonus' preoccupation with Lysimachus in western Anatolia, has, for instance, been thought to explain his failure to effectively defend the routes from Iran against Seleucus' advance.\textsuperscript{237}

Such a strategy, however, must have made considerable demands upon the discipline and loyalty of Lysimachus' troops, involving as it did the prospect of short supplies added to the frustration of inaction. Initially the army camped at an unspecified site in Phrygia,\textsuperscript{238} but finally the pressure put by Antigonus on Lysimachus' supply lines compelled a forced march of 400 stades to Dorylaeum, whose rich resources offered a breathing space. The outcome of a series of skirmishes here against Antigonus' men reinforced the wisdom of avoiding a pitched battle.\textsuperscript{239} By the time famine again threatened, winter, it seems, was fast approaching; under cover of a dark and stormy night the army slipped out of the camp.\textsuperscript{240} Frontinus records a stratagem which should probably be identified with this event, given the emphasis on the triple entrenchment of the camp. It

seems that the troops, after filling this section of the trenches with debris, exited by the back door.\footnote{Frontin. I.V.11. 242) Diod. XX.109.7; Memnon FGrH 434 F.4.9.} Heading towards Bithynia, the army took refuge in the Salonian plain in the neighbourhood of Heracleia Pontica. The city provided the troops with food and their leader with a new wife.\footnote{Diod. XX.109.7; Memnon FGrH 434 F.4.9.}

Lysimachus' marriage to Amastris, Craterus' Susa bride and, in 302 BC, widow of the Heracleian tyrant Dionysius,\footnote{Memnon FGrH 434 F.4.4, Diod. XX.109.7; Saitta, Kokalos 1955 77; Wehrli, 1968 67.} brought him immediate practical advantages. Heracleia gave him possession of a port which would facilitate communications with Thrace, and command of the route which would bring Seleucus from the East.\footnote{Saitta, Kokalos 1955 77; Wehrli, 1968 67.} The marriage may also have had some symbolic importance. Union with a Persian princess, niece to the last Achaemenid Darius III,\footnote{Arr. Anab, VII.4.5.} may have served to reinforce Lysimachus' claim to the territory which Alexander, the last Great King, had "inherited" from the Achaemenid line.\footnote{For Alexander as heir to the Achaemenids, see Ch.6. Compare Demetrius' marriage to Euthydice, descendant of the Athenian Miltiades and widow of Ophellas of Cyrene, which Roussel (1938 330) sees as reflecting a claim to both places.} Though Memnon's assertion of a love-match between the two may be doubted, Lysimachus clearly took great care to show honour to Amastris, installing her, after Ipsus, as his consort at Sardis.\footnote{Memnon FGrH 434 F4.9.}

Lysimachus' success in evading Antigonus in the summer and autumn of 302 BC, and the increased likelihood that he would effect the planned meeting with his allies worked to the advantage of Cassander in Greece. As he gave up the pursuit to make an early withdrawal into winter quarters, Antigonus ordered Demetrius to break off his
operations in Thessaly, where he had enjoyed some success against Macedon's king. The Besieger made peace with Cassander and embarked for Asia.248

Though this development, highly advantageous to Cassander, probably accorded with the coalition plan, it constituted a new threat for Lysimachus. The late autumn and early winter of 302 BC, as he waited in Bithynia for the advent of Seleucus, witnessed a series of reverses which might have proved fatal. Firstly, Demetrius proceeded to recover much of the ground lost in western Asia-Minor. An inscription from Ephesus, dated to 302 BC, which honours the Besieger and bestows a crown and citizenship upon his officer Apollonides must be connected with Demetrius' recapture of the city.249 Though Demetrius also regained control of Parium and Lampsacus, the latter, at least, did not give in without a fight; Polyaeus mentions a military defeat at Lampsacus as a prelude to the defection of Lysimachus' Autaritaeans troops, an incident generally dated to 302 BC. Presumably Lysimachus had either sent these Thracian mercenaries to defend the city, or had left them to protect Lampsacus when it defected to him earlier in the year. In this case they must have fled to him at Heracleia following their defeat.250 An inscription from Lampsacus which honours Nossikas of Thasos for his services to Lampsacene prisoners taken in "the sea-battle" has also been connected with this incident.251 If correct,

248) Diod. XX.109.4-5, 111.1. 249) Syll² 352, Diod.XX.111.3. 250) Polyaeus. IV.12.1; see below. 251) IG XII 354 = Frisch, Inschr. von Lampsakos 1978 no.1, dated by Daux, BCH 1928 46 to c. 300 BC; Cary, JHS 1930 253-4 for a context in 302 BC; the lettering style certainly seems to favour a date nearer the turn of the century than the mid-4th century context suggested by Frisch.
it suggests that Lysimachus' favourable treatment had kept Lampsacus loyal enough to fight for his cause.

Subsequently Demetrius advanced to the Propontis, encamping for the winter at Calchedon. This created danger for Lysimachus in another quarter. His communications with Europe were threatened and only his timely possession of Heracleia gave him a lifeline to Thrace, via the Black Sea. The shrewdness of Demetrius' move is reflected in the fate of the reinforcements which Cassander tried to send his ally at this juncture. Only one third of the 20,000 troops shipped from Odessus, under the command of Cassander's brother Pleistarchus, reached their destination. Of the rest, some suffered ship-wreck in the stormy winter sea, others fell into the hands of Poliorcetes.

This disaster represented a considerable blow to Lysimachus, whose hopes of increasing his limited manpower were dashed still further by subsequent events. Firstly, Ptolemy had shown himself in no hurry to join Lysimachus, instead spending the autumn in the reconquest of Coele-Syria, a project close to his own heart, but not perhaps vital for the coalition victory. While besieging Sidon, he received false news of the defeat of his allies and Antigonus' advance on Syria. He made haste to return to Egypt, though not before he had secured the newly captured cities with garrisons. Seibert thought that the "false report" was little more than a pretext, with Ptolemy's failure to unite with his allies at Ipsus

252) Saïta, Kokalos 1955 78; Roussel, 1938 343. 253) Diod. XX.112.3-4. 254) Diod.XX.113.1; Diod.XX.43.1; Will, 1979 137-86 for Coele-Syria's importance for Egypt's security.
reflecting a long-considered intention. This does not seem over cynical.266

Second, Lysimachus was faced with large-scale desertions among his own troops. Two thousand Autariataean mercenaries, perhaps originally supplied by Cassander,266 defected to Antigonus. With them went eight hundred Lycians and Pamphylians; their recent recruitment from areas which had long been held by Antigonus267 may help to explain their defection. Demetrius' arrival and his recent triumphs may also have played their part. The defection of the Autariatae, however, may have been caused by Lysimachus' own injudicious action; though the identification of this incident with the massacre of Autariatae described by Polyaenus268 is problematic, it seems likely that the two incidents belong to the same campaign. Both emphasise demands for money as the basis of the revolt, and Polyaenus' reference to Lampsacus suggests Demetrius' recapture of the city in autumn 302 BC. If the massacre is accepted as historical, it may represent an attempt by Lysimachus to stamp out incipient unrest with stern measures; in this case, the plan misfired badly. Alternatively, as Saitta suggests, the massacre may follow the revolt, representing punishment for attempted defection.259

This incident suggests that by now Lysimachus may have been running short of funds, despite the wealth of Heracleia;

alternatively the rewards of defection may simply have been too attractive to resist. Polyaenus tells us that the Autariatae had suffered the loss of their ἁμοιαξύνη at Lampsacus. While Lysimachus seems to have been unwilling or unable to make good this loss, Antigonus not only gave them the pay "which they said Lysimachus owed them" but a bonus on top. Such defections by mercenary troops are a common feature of the Successor period, reflecting the instability created by almost constant warfare in which great prizes rapidly changed hands. The problem afflicts all of the Successors and the incident need not be seen as proof of either poor generalship or excessive avarice on Lysimachus' part.

Lysimachus' position was beginning to look desperate; presumably the crisis was resolved by the onset of winter which brought campaigning to an end and by news of Seleucus' arrival in Cappadocia. His army is thought to have wintered in the plain of Phanarodia; from there he commanded the route across Armenia which would enable him to join Lysimachus in the Boli plain, just south of Heracleia.

THE BATTLE OF IPSUS
At this point, the detailed narrative of Diodorus breaks off and little is known of the movement of either side before their arrival on the plain of Ipsus in central Phrygia. The precise site of the

260) This phraseology may suggest that the Autariatae were trying to make good their losses by a convenient fiction, though it cannot be pressed too far. 261) For Eumenes' troops defecting to Antigonus, again following the loss of their ἁμοιαξύνη, see Diod.XIX.43.8-9. 262) Wehrli, 1968 69.
battle, long-disputed, has been plausibly identified with the modern village of Sipsin, just north of the Byzantine fortress of Afyon-Karahisar. With Ptolemy absent and Lysimachus' army depleted by the recent disasters, the coalition forces could not be confident of a victory based on superior numbers. In infantry, indeed, Antigonus outstripped them comfortably, both in terms of quantity and probably quality. There is little reason to think that he had cause to be pessimistic about the battle's outcome. The portents dwelt on by the sources in the hours preceding the battle may originate either in Hieronymean defensiveness, or the later propaganda of Antigonus' opponents, wishing to present themselves as the favourites of the gods.

Against this, the kings of Syria and Thrace could set a slight numerical superiority in cavalry and the "tank division" represented by Seleucus' elephants, which, according to the sources, outnumbered those of the enemy in a ratio of 6:1. Tarn was sceptical of these large numbers, as unprecedented in a Greek army. He saw the 500 elephants, supposedly given to Seleucus by Chandragupta, as the

263) Honigmann, Byzantium 1935 647-50. 264) Plut. Demet. 28; Antigonus had 70,000+ infantry, the coalition had 64,000. Seleucus' 20,000 may have been mostly indigenous troops from his Asian satrapies; the inferior reputation of such troops as infantry is reflected by Achaemenid employment of Greek mercenary hoplites in the 5th and 4th centuries BC. (Griffith, 1935 3,7.) 265) Though Hornblower (1981 221-3) sees Antigonus presented as the victim of his own arrogance, it is quite plausible that Hieronymus should wish his patron to be seen as in part the victim of the gods, like all tragic heroes. 266) For discussion of this aspect of royal propaganda, see Ch. 6. 267) Plut. Demet.28; Antigonus had 10,000 cavalry, the coalition had 10,500; the latter figure is unlikely to be correct since according to Diod. (XX.113.4) Seleucus alone brought 12,500. For elephants as the tanks of the ancient world, see Bengtson, 1987 69.
result of uncritical Greek acceptance of the Indian use of 500 simply to express a large number.\textsuperscript{268} The problem cannot be resolved with certainty, but it could be argued that lack of precedent does not necessarily make something historically impossible; the dubbing of Seleucus as \textit{κλεγμένος ἄρχως}\textsuperscript{269} does, moreover, suggest, if not 500, an unusually large elephant corps. Whatever their precise numbers, the Seleucid elephants appear to have played a decisive part in a battle which could be described as lost by Demetrius as much as won by his opponents.

With the loss of Diodorus' narrative, the only detailed source for the battle is Plutarch's \textit{Demetrius}. It is probably the biographer's selectiveness rather than extreme Hieronymean understatement,\textsuperscript{270} that explains the loss of all detail relating to Lysimachus' role at Ipsus. Plutarch focuses on the events that were decisive for the Antigonid defeat; Demetrius' over-impulsive pursuit of the routed enemy cavalry under Seleucus' son Antiochus left the flank of the infantry centre, led by his father, exposed to attack. Seleucus responded quickly to this unexpected turn of events, placing the famous elephants in such a way as to block Demetrius' return. He then harassed the enemy infantry, crowding it by an encircling movement of cavalry.\textsuperscript{271} It seems as though he aimed at the defection rather than the destruction of the enemy phalanx;

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{268} Tarn, \textit{JHS} 1940, 85-88 identified Strabo's source as Megasthenes. \textsuperscript{269} Plut. Demet.25, Athen. VI.66, Phylarch. \textit{FGrH} 81 F.31. \textsuperscript{270} For understatement in Hieronymus' treatment of Lysimachus, see Ch.1; Tarn \textit{JHS} 1940 87 sees the military understanding of Plutarch's account of Ipsus as derived from Hieronymus. \textsuperscript{271} PLut. Demet. 29, Wehrli, 1968 71.
\end{footnotesize}
since the Successors' armies contained a high proportion of mercenary soldiers, loyalty, beyond a certain point, was misplaced.\textsuperscript{272} His calculations proved correct; a large section of the infantry went over to his side, the others fled. Antigonus, standing his ground with a few followers, found himself the object of a determined onslaught and fell. Demetrius, with 5,000 followers fled to Ephesus, his hopes set on mainland Greece.\textsuperscript{273}

The part taken by Lysimachus at Ipsus must remain obscure, but the recognition that without his masterly campaign of the previous year the battle might never have been fought, came with the division of the spoils. With his eye upon territory in Asia as early as 315 BC, Lysimachus had bided his time and conserved his resources until the time was right; with Antigonus dead and Demetrius a landless fugitive, Lysimachus found himself with the greater part of Anatolia added to his possessions in Thrace.\textsuperscript{274}

\textsuperscript{272) Plut. Demet.29. 273) Plut. Demet.30. 274) See Ch. 4 for the extent of his new kingdom.}
"After the battle had been decided in this way, the victorious kings proceeded to carve up the realm which Antigonus and Demetrius had ruled like the carcass of some great slaughtered beast..."

Plut. Demet. 30

Suitably heroic in its imagery, frustratingly short on detail, Plutarch's description of the division of the spoils after Ipsus is characteristic of the shortcomings of the biographies which are now our major narrative source. Other literary and epigraphic evidence, combined with Plutarch's narrative of subsequent events, has, however, permitted a general reconstruction of the division of Antigonus' realm, although some grey areas still remain.1

As architects of the victory at Ipsus, it was Lysimachus and Seleucus who received the bulk of Antigonus' Asiatic kingdom. Cassander had preferred to concentrate on Greece and Macedon in 302 BC and was presumably content to see Antigonid influence in the Hellenic peninsula wane following the coalition victory.2 Though his brother Pleistarchus was given a kingdom in Cilicia, subsequent events seem to place him in the role of Lysimachus' protégé rather than Cassander's representative; this arrangement may represent a reward for his participation in the campaign of 302 BC, rather than

1) The ownership of Lycia and Pamphylia, for example, is the subject of considerable dispute; see below. 2) See Ch. 3 and below.
a response to Cassander's demand for Asian territory.¹

Ptolemy, however, was surely less than happy to see himself excluded from the spoils, the result of his failure to join his allies on the field. Coele-Syria, which he had made his first priority in the months before Ipsus,⁴ was officially granted to Seleucus, whose new realm, according to Plutarch, stretched from the River Indus to the Syrian coast;⁶ it is probable that the border between his kingdom and that of Lysimachus in Asia was the river Halys.⁶ Appian gives more detail, listing his territories as comprising all of Syria from the Euphrates to the coast, Mesopotamia, Media, Persis, Parthia, Bactria, Arabia, Tapyria, Sogdia, Arachosia, Hyrcania and "the other peoples as far as the Indus".⁷

Compared to this vast expanse of land, Lysimachus' prize, "the whole of Asia Minor north of the Taurus mountains"⁸ might seem limited. These lands, however, in theory at least, gave Lysimachus control of both sides of the Hellespont, and represented a compact realm, advantageous in terms of communication and administration. If, moreover, he had any thoughts of re-uniting the two halves of Alexander's empire, the centreing of his kingdom on the Hellespont, a natural link between his territories in Europe and Asia, left him

3) See below; Diod.XX.112.2 and Ch. 2 for Pleistarchus' shipwreck on the Black Sea; perhaps his later actions were more distinguished! See Plut. Demet. 32 and below for Cassander's apparent indifference to the loss of Cilicia in 298 BC. 4) See Ch. 3. 5) Plut. Demet.32. 6) The Halys had formed the eastern border of Antigonus' kingdom in 311 BC (Meyer, 1925 22) and, earlier, the boundary between the Mermnad and Assyrian kingdoms (Balcer, 1984 95). 7) App.Syr.55. Appian's ascription of the satrapy of Phrygia to Seleucus is generally accepted as a strategic and geographical nonsense; e.g. Meyer, 1925 28, Corradi, 1929, 29. 8) Meyer, 1925 28.
better placed to do so than Antigonus had ever been. In addition, the lands of the central Anatolian plateau and its western coast were rich in men and money, resources which were the mainstay of the Diadochs' present power and the prerequisite for any future expansion.

The victory at Ipsus had in essence given Lysimachus the realm which Antigonus had built up between 323 BC and 318 BC. Diodorus' account of Antigonus' career gives some indication of the potential resources of these lands. Adding Eumenes' satrapy (Cappadocia, Paphlagonia "and the adjacent lands") to his original holdings of Greater Phrygia, Pamphylia and Lycia, Antigonus had been able, in 319 BC, to support an army of 60,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry. He expected, moreover, to be able to mobilise still greater forces "since Asia could provide pay without end for the mercenaries he might muster."

In terms of potential manpower, Lycia and Pamphylia were seemingly a fruitful source of mercenary troops. In 318 BC Antigonus conquered Lydia and Hellespontine Phrygia; shortly before he was expelled, Arridhaeus, the satrap of the latter, could afford to employ over 10,000 mercenaries in the army which he took against Cyzicus. The rich treasuries of Northern Phrygia

9) Will, CAH VII 1984 110. 10) Austin, CQ 1986 454-5. 11) Meyer, 1925 19, Diod. XVIII. 50.2-3. 12) Diod. XX.113.3. If Lycia and Pamphylia "went with" Greater Phrygia, then logically they must have gone to Lysimachus, not Seleucus (as maintained by Segre, Aegyptus 1934 255). The idea of their inclusion in Pleistarchus' "buffer state" (e.g. Meyer, 1925 28) is now outdated (see below). 13) Diod. XVIII.51.
have already been mentioned.  

Asia Minor's proverbial wealth derived in large part from its natural resources; the mountainous Anatolian plateau, a rich source of timber and minerals, cut by great rivers like the Hermus and Cayster and their tributaries, forms fertile valleys and plains. Strabo describes the wide stretch of rich land round Sardis as "the best of all plains"; Sardis itself was already a famous centre for textiles under the Persian kings. The legendary wealth of the Lydian king Croesus was founded on the gold mines of Mt. Tmolus - by Strabo's day the supply was exhausted, but the functioning of the city as a major mint under the Seleucids and probably Lysimachus too, suggests that the mines were still being worked in the early Hellenistic period. The Troad too was rich in precious metals; gold was mined near Abydus and Lampsacus, copper in the central region and the mountains north of Pergamum; Strabo knew the area as a source of "mock-silver" (zinc). The valleys of the Hermus, Cayster and Maeander produced abundant olives and figs; the Caicus valley was the chief granary for Lysimachus' Pergamene successors; Lydia was famous for wine; Northern Phrygia and the Troad produced ship timber, pitch, marble and grapes.

Apart from Sardis, important urban centres in the hinterland included Celaenae, an Achaemenid royal residence, later used by

14) Diod. XX.107.5, see also Ch.3. 15) Magie, 1950 47, Strab. XIII.4.5. 16) Strab.ibid; Balcer, 1984 34-5, 52 for mining there under the Lydian kings; Newell, 1941 242-69; Sardis' history as a major administrative centre makes it a likely mint for Lysimachus, though Price doubts whether the issues linked with Sardis by Thompson (1968 165) are the correct ones (see below); 17) Magie, 1950 43-45, 50.
Antigonus as the centre for his administration, Synnada and Docimeium high in the mountains of Central Phrygia, an area famous for its marble, Colossae in the Lycus valley, described as "populous and prosperous" in the fifth century, and Trales on the eastern border of Caria; these last two cities combined excellent defences with commercial importance.19

That Lysimachus encountered little opposition in the Anatolian hinterland seems probable. With the dissolution of the Antigonid land army after Ipsus, those garrisons remaining must have felt their isolation;20 in such circumstances capitulation would have been the only sensible course. Lysimachus' appearance, with his new queen Amastris, at Sardis, soon after Ipsus, may suggest that affirming control of the Anatolian hinterland and attending to its administration was one of the first tasks at hand.21 Little is known of his dealing with the indigenous communities of the interior22 but it is realistic to suppose that like Alexander and the Achaemenids before him, he would have levied tribute from these cities, many of them industrial centres of some importance.23

Nothing is known of his relations at this time with the independent dynasts of the interior, notably Zipoites in Bithynia and Mithridates in Pontus. Though the former was to cause him

18) Magie, 1950 125,50; Tscherikower, 1925 155. 19) Magie, 1950 127-8. Meyer's theory (1925 32) that Caria passed from Pleistarchus to Demetrius and then to Lysimachus is unnecessary; see n.13 above and below. It may be better to suppose that Caria was officially granted to Lysimachus in 301 BC, although the coastal cities initially remained in Demetrius' hands. 20) As opposed to the cities on the coast which had the support of Demetrius' fleet; see below. 21) Memn. FGrH 434 F.4.9. 22) For further discussion, see Ch 5. 23) For Alexander's levy of tribute at Sardis and in Cappadocia, see Arr. Anab. I.17.7, App. Mith.8.
considerable trouble later on, it is possible that initially relations were amicable or at least neutral. Zipoites had suffered the humiliation of seeing the cities of Calchedon and Astacus, which he coveted, wrested from him by Antigonus, and it is clear from Diodorus' narrative that the alliance he then contracted with Antigonus was not made by choice. For him, any change of rule in Asia Minor was likely to be an improvement. From Lysimachus' point of view, conciliation of the Bithynian dynast, for the present, may have seemed advisable until his position in Anatolia was more secure. Mithridates too had started his dynastic career under the cloud of Antigonus' jealous hostility. In the immediate aftermath of Ipsus, moreover, it seems unlikely that much trouble would come to Lysimachus from this quarter, since Mithridates II had only just acceded to the throne.

In theory, the settlement after Ipsus gave Lysimachus also the Greek cities on Anatolia's western coast. Rightly described as the most valuable possessions of his new territory, control over them was vital for full exploitation of the resources of the interior. The cities of Ionia and Caria, like Ephesus, Miletus and Smyrna not only formed the termini of the trade routes from the interior, but themselves represented major industrial centres. Miletus was famous for textiles, Ephesus for perfumes and other luxury goods; the fame of her sanctuary of Artemis also assured a constant stream of visitors from all over the Greek world and the swelling of the city coffers. The Greek cities on the Asian side of the Hellespont,
Lampsacus, Parium, Sigeum, and above all Abydus, had strategic as well as commercial importance; without them Lysimachus' control of the Hellespont and its traffic was a chimera and communications between the European and Asian sections of his realm were threatened.²⁹.

In practice, however, the situation was not dissimilar to that which had faced Lysimachus in 323 BC; the settlement on paper was very much better than the actual state of affairs. Many of the cities on Asia's coast would have to be wrested from Demetrius' control. How then did Lysimachus fare in this task?

The evidence for Lysimachus' acquisition of the Greek cities in the first years after Ipsus is extremely sparse. Logically one might suppose that cities which had welcomed him in 302 BC, only to be recaptured by Demetrius, might be among the first to capitulate; these include Lampsacus and Parium on the Hellespont and Teos and Colophon further down the coast in Ionia. Generally, the cities on the Hellespont and in the Troad might seem a promising target, since their proximity to Thrace rendered them more vulnerable than those further south whose citizens could hope for protection from Demetrius' fleet. There is, however, no literary or epigraphic evidence to confirm these hypotheses. There are of course the coins, identified with Lysimachus by his lion symbol or the legend, ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΛΥΣΙΜΑΧΟΣ which have been attributed by Thompson.

²⁹) For Abydus as the best crossing point from Europe to Asia see Magie, 1950 82, Held. Epit. FGrH 155 F. 10.45; Diod. XX.107.2-3 for Lysimachus' failure to take the city by siege in 302 BC; in the same year Demetrius' control of these cities and those of the Bosporus had threatened to cut Lysimachus off from his territory in Thrace. (Diod. XX.111.3).
to different mints in Asia-Minor and dated with some degree of precision. For example, coins linked to Abydus and Lampsacus have been dated 301/00 BC - 300/299 BC and 299/8BC - 297/6 BC respectively. Price, however, is critical of the methods by which the Lysimachus coins have been dated and classified. The issues are linked to different mints on the basis of a symbol similar to that used by the city on its autonomous issues (e.g. a bee at Ephesus, a lyre at Colophon). This symbol is, however, often only one of several on the coin, chosen as the one which seemed "dominant" for that particular issue after the coins had been grouped and arranged in a chronological series. There are several striking peculiarities in Thompson's picture of the Lysimachus coinage as it stands; for example, despite Sardis' status as a major trade and administrative centre, the bronze Lysimachus coins which have been linked to that mint are found only rarely. The numismatic evidence, then, cannot by itself support any firm conclusions as to the date at which Lysimachus gained control of these cities in Asia Minor.

Travelling down the coast, the first city where there is evidence for a change of control early in the third century is Priene, where civil disturbances culminated in Hiero's tyranny, established probably in 300 BC. Possibly this coup represents part of the same campaign which saw Lysimachus' unsuccessful attempt to capture Ephesus, but a connection between Lysimachus and Hiero is far from certain. If the installation of Hiero was Lysimachus'

30) Thompson, 1968 163-82; Baldus, Chiron 1978 195-201 for the lion as Lysimachus' emblem (see also Ch.6). 31) Dr. Price imparted this information verbally. 32) I. Priene no. 37 11.65-73, 80-1, 111-12. 33) Polyaen. IV. 7. 4. 34) See Ch.5.
work, then his control of Priene was shortlived. After a rule of three years, probably in 297 BC, the tyrant fell; a decree from Priene honours all those who participated in the recovery of freedom and ordains commemorative celebrations. 35 Also connected with Hiero's departure is a decree restoring honours to a certain Evander of Larisa. 36 Demetrius' friendships with others from that city, Medius and Oxythemis, 37 are well documented and it is not impossible that Evander is yet another Thessalian of that king.

Lysimachus may have profited, if only indirectly, from a temporary change of regime at Priene, but the greatest of the Ionian cities eluded his grasp. In flight from Ipsus, Demetrius had found refuge in Ephesus and it was from her harbour that he set sail for Greece. Though the Athenians refused to admit him, they returned to him his fleet. 38 Combined with control of Cyprus and the Phoenician cities of Tyre and Sidon, this assured him the thalassocracy which Poseidon's image on his new coinage aimed to impress upon the world. 39 For the great trading cities of Asia Minor's western coast, Demetrius may well have seemed a more dangerous enemy than Lysimachus. It may be presumed that fear of Demetrius' wrath combined with other factors - the presence of his garrisons, the self-interest of politicians whose regime had received Demetrius' support, feelings of gratitude inspired by Antigonal benefactions -

35) I. Priene no. 37 11. 80-81, 123-30 for the chronology of these events; I. Priene no.11; Robert, Rev. Phil. 1944 6-9.
36) I. Priene no. 12; Robert, Rev. Phil. 1944 10. 37) Athen. VI. 62, for the altars erected to these two; Plut. Demet. 19 for Medius' friendship with Antigonus; SEG 26 no.89 - Oxythemis receives Athenian citizenship for his cavalry victory over Pleistarchus in 303/2 BC. 38) Plut. Demet. 30,31. 39) Newell, 1927 27-31; see also Ch.6.

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to keep many of the cities loyal to the Antigonid cause. The Ephesian ἄνευς congratulated Demetrius and his officer Apollonides on their recovery of the city in autumn 302 BC, and Lysimachus' subsequent attempt to subvert Diodorus, the garrison commander, was foiled. A likely context for this incident, known only from Polyaenus, is 301 BC, perhaps following Demetrius' departure for Greece.

Demetrius' continued possession of Clazomenae and Erythrae is probable. Both cities had successfully resisted Lysimachus in 302 BC and an inscription from Ephesus praises Archestratus, Demetrius' ορπατηγός in Clazomenae, for his part in protecting corn-ships headed for Ephesus. Dittenberger and Hicks connected this with Prepelaus' attack on Ionia in 302 BC, but a date in the first years of the third century is equally possible. The necessity for Ephesus to be supplied by sea suggests a context of prolonged assault upon the Ephesian χῶρα, a situation which is echoed in the city's debt law c.297 BC. This takes its impetus from serious damage to Ephesian estates as a result of the κοινὸς πόλεμος fought on Demetrius' behalf against Lysimachus. By contrast Prepelaus' occupation of

40) Syll. 352. 41) Polyaen. IV.7.4; Magie, 1950 90; Polyaenus shows Demetrius rushing from Caria to save Ephesus personally; Corradi, 1929 38 dates the episode to 298 BC with Demetrius en route from the Thracian Chersonese to Syria (see below), but over hasty action by Lysimachus, hoping to exploit Demetrius' absence, and Demetrius' return from Caria is equally possible. By 298 BC, moreover, it is probable that Ainetus, not Diodorus, was phrourarch at Ephesus, see below. 42) Diod. XX.107.5, Hicks, GHI 256 no.150; Dittenberger, OGIS 9 = Inschr. Eph. 1452/Inschr. Claz. 505; there is no archon date. 43) Magie, 1950 75 for the fertility of the Ephesian χῶρα which in normal circumstances provided subsistence for her inhabitants; Syll. 364 = Bagnall & Derow, 1984 20 no.9.
The connection between prolonged resistance at Erythrae and Lysimachus' possible imposition of οὐ νοησα on the city has already been mentioned. It is probable that the cities on the Carian coast too, most importantly Miletus, remained under Antigonid control, since Lysimachus' operations in spring 302 BC do not appear to have extended this far.

Consequently, while his new vicinity to Seleucus and the great increase in power and status which both now enjoyed might mean trouble for the future, Lysimachus' real enemy was still Demetrius and his first priority the recovery of the Greek cities still in the Besieger's control. This tug-of-war was to last for fifteen years and, judging from the anecdotes which presumably reflect the propaganda of both courts, the competition for power between the two was further fuelled by strong personal antipathy. The bitter emnity between Demetrius and Lysimachus is repeatedly stressed in the narrative of Plutarch. Demetrius casts aspersions on Lysimachus' virility, Lysimachus sneers at his rival's subjection to an ageing courtesan, Demetrius ripostes with a slur upon the chastity of Lysimachus' wife.

DIPLOMACY IN ATHENS: 301 BC - 299 BC

While Lysimachus' early attempts to wrest Asia Minor's great trading cities from Demetrius may have met with limited success,
diplomatic action taken in a different quarter certainly bore fruit. Plutarch makes it clear that after Ipsus, Demetrius' hopes of a swift revival of influence rested largely on Athens and the other cities of mainland Greece. Confirmation there of loyalty to the Antigonid cause would greatly improve Demetrius' chances of recovering his father's empire in Asia from Seleucus and Lysimachus. Thus, the new diplomatic prominence which Lysimachus enjoys in Athens and elsewhere in mainland Greece after 301 BC, a departure which has been characterised as a "new philhellenic policy" should not be seen primarily as an ideological volte-face, but as a pragmatic move in the context of his struggle against Demetrius.

The first signs of this diplomatic offensive are recorded on an inscription from Athens, honouring Lysimachus' friend Philippides of Cephale and reviewing his political career. Exiled from Athens shortly before Ipsus for his violent opposition to Stratocles and the pro-Demetrian faction, he took refuge with Lysimachus. After the Ipsus victory, Philippides took pains to secure burial for the Athenian dead and ransomed Athenian prisoners at his own expense. If this took place in the immediate aftermath of the battle, then it is likely that the return of the captives singing the praises of Philippides and his patron Lysimachus contributed to a shift of popular feeling at Athens. This, combined with a natural tendency to

49) Plut. Demet. 30. 50) Saitta, Kokalos 1955 80; for discussion of the view (Longega, 1968 29) that this supposed change of stance was inspired by his wife Arsinoe, see Ch. 7. 51) Syll 374 = Burstein, 1985 no.11. 52) For Philippides' public attack on Stratocles at the Lenaia or Dionysia of 302 BC, see Plut. Demet.12; Edmonds, 1961 179 F. 25; Ferguson, 1911 123. Plut. Demet. 12 for his intimacy with Lysimachus. See also Ch.6. 53) Syll 374 11.17-29.
dissociate oneself from the defeated, found expression in the Athenian denial of entry to Demetrius and the fall of Stratocles and his party.\textsuperscript{54} Officially, the Athenians declared themselves "neutral", but an inscription dated to 299/8 BC, honouring Poseidippus for his successful embassy to Cassander, supported by a fragmentary entry in the Marmor Parium for the year 301/0 BC\textsuperscript{55} suggests that they made haste to protect themselves against future assault by Demetrius through alliance with Macedon’s king. Subsequent events show that those who dominated political life in this period included Cassander’s partisans.\textsuperscript{56}

Unwillingness to compete directly with Cassander may have stopped Lysimachus from any comparable intervention in Athenian affairs,\textsuperscript{57} but he was not slow to follow up his diplomatic initiative with generous benefactions. The very gifts he sent, perhaps on Philippides' advice, were designed to remind the Athenians of the disasters which the last years of Demetrius' patronage had brought. Lysimachus' gift of 10,000 medimnoi of corn, distributed to all citizens and a general feeling of prosperity at Athens in the year 299 BC, marked by a dedication to the Goddess Eueteria,\textsuperscript{50} presented a marked contrast to the poor harvests of 302 BC, when hailstones which destroyed the crops were attributed to divine displeasure at the hubris of Demetrius and his Athenian followers. Still more

\textsuperscript{54} Plut. Demet. 30. 55) Syll\textsuperscript{a} 362; Marm. Par. FGrH 239 1.25; Fortina, 1965 115. 56) The need for flexibility among aspiring politicians in this unstable period makes it hard to "place" Athenian politicians in these years even on factional grounds, let alone those of ideology. Nevertheless Cassander's connection with Lachares is well attested; Paus. 1.25.7; Fortina, 1965 118. Philippides of Paiania, proposer of the decree for Poseidippus is another possible protégé. 57) See below. 58) Syll\textsuperscript{a} 374. 11. 12-15; Habicht, 1979 19.
pointedly, Lysimachus' gift of a mast and sail for the πέραλος ship, designed for the Panathenaia of 298 BC, reminded the Athenians of the ill-omened festival of 302 BC; the mast had broken during the procession in which the sacred πέραλος had shown the figures of Antigonus and Demetrius woven in alongside those of the other gods.  

Demetrius was swift to retaliate. If Philippides' benefactions after Ipsus were timed as I have suggested above, then the naval raids which Demetrius made on the Thracian Chersonese, probably in 300/299 BC, may be a reprisal for Lysimachus' diplomatic success at Athens as well as meeting the more practical purpose of building up a new land army. Whether Demetrius was in a position at this point to aim for anything so ambitious as the splitting of Lysimachus' kingdom by the seizure of the Hellespont area is uncertain.

Lysimachus' new prominence in international diplomacy, added to his increased territory and resources, did not go unnoticed by his colleagues. In the context of Demetrius' raids of 299 BC, Plutarch notes a fresh perception of Lysimachus as a newly formidable figure; "the other kings made no attempt to help Lysimachus; they considered that he was by no means more reasonable than Demetrius, and that because he possessed more power he was more to be feared". Such an explanation for Lysimachus' isolation at this point may, however,
owe something to hindsight on the part of Hieronymus, probably Plutarch's source. Seleucus, by reason of his proximity to Lysimachus, may already have cherished feelings of hostility towards him, but at this moment his priority was Coele-Syria and the real enemy was Ptolemy. The latter, as the campaign of 302 BC had shown, was unlikely to stir himself on another's behalf unless there was the prospect of personal profit. Cassander's failure to lend support might be seen as evidence for a breach with Lysimachus, inspired by competition for Athenian favours, but it is equally possible to see Lysimachus' euergetism there as part of a cooperative effort to rout Demetrius from mainland Greece. Within the limits of the evidence, subsequent events at Athens suggest that after these benefactions had had their desired effect, Lysimachus refrained from intervention in Athenian affairs until after Cassander's death. Seemingly he was not prepared to risk conflict with the king of Macedon to promote the interests of his Athenian φίλοι, Philippides and perhaps Demochares. When stasis broke out in 298/7 BC it was Cassander's partisan Lachares who profited from it, dominating Athenian affairs, first as προστάτης τοῦ δῆμου and then as tyrant, until spring 294 BC, while Lysimachus' supporters remained in exile.

The failure of his former allies to bring aid to Lysimachus in

63) See below. 64) See Ch.3. 65) As Saitta, Kokalos 1955 81 suggests. 66) Ferguson, 1911 124, 137; see Ch.6 for Demochares and Lysimachus. 67) Bengtson's description (1987 103) of Philippides as "the most important man in Athens" after Ipsus seems overstated, and the assumption of his return to Athens before 286/5 BC unsupported; see below. For Demochares' exile, Plut. Demet. 24; Smith, Historia 1962, 114-115 for the dates.
the face of Demetrius' assault in 300/299 BC can be seen simply as a reversion to the Diadochs' practice for the period before Ipsus. Unless the situation was critical and the very survival of one ruler was threatened by an enemy whose victory would make him unduly powerful, self-interest prevailed and co-operation was not expected. Following his rebuff in mainland Greece, the threat posed by Demetrius must have seemed greatly diminished and Lysimachus might be expected to deal with him on his own. His isolation was not, in any case, to be long-lasting; in the following year new alliances were formed as repercussions of the Ipsus settlement began to make themselves felt.

THE ALLIANCES OF 299 BC.

Socii...in semet ipsos arma vertunt et, cum de praeda non convenirent, iterum in duas factiones diducunt Justin XV.4.22

Justin's summary of the new line-up of forces two years after Antigonus' death rightly emphasises discontent over division of the spoils as the catalyst. Ptolemy, unnerved by the prospect of imminent conflict with Seleucus over Coele-Syria, offered Lysimachus alliance.\textsuperscript{68} It may safely be assumed that Lysimachus' acceptance of this offer was prompted in part by the sense of his own impotence in the face of Demetrius' fleet, which the recent raids on Thrace had emphasised. Common enemies also made the kings of Egypt and Thrace

\textsuperscript{68) Saitta, Kokalos 1955 81; Roussel, 1938 348; Bengtson, 1987 104. Coele-Syria, Diod.XXI. F.1.5, Polyb. V.67, App.Syr.5, Plut.Demet.31.}
natural allies; Lysimachus was unlikely to welcome any increase in
the power of his neighbour Seleucus, while Ptolemy had long
contested maritime supremacy with Demetrius.69

For Lysimachus, then, the chief advantage of the alliance must
have lain in the hope of Ptolemy's naval support for the recovery of
the Greek cities which Demetrius still held.70 Evidence for
Ptolemy's activities in Caria and perhaps Cilicia in the period from
299 BC to 297/6 BC suggests that Lysimachus was not disappointed.71
Moreover, if Ptolemy decided to challenge Demetrius' control of
Cyprus or the cities of Phoenicia this would effectively divert the
Besieger's energies and resources from the Asian coast, leaving its
cities vulnerable to Lysimachus' attack. In return, it is just
possible that Lysimachus acknowledged, or at least turned a blind
eye to Ptolemy's seizure of certain points on the coast of Lycia and
Pamphylia72 which may have taken place in 302 BC at the same time as
his occupation of Coele Syria.73

The deal was sealed by Lysimachus' marriage to Arsinoe, Ptolemy's
eldest daughter by Berenice.74 To secure kinship with the

69) Diod. XIX. 80-85; XX.50-52; Plut. Demet.4.15-17 for the battles
of Gaza and Salamis. 70) Saitta, Kokalos 1955 81. 71) See below.
72) Regnal dating on a Lycian text (Titul.Lyc. 35) to "Year 4 of
King Ptolemy" might seem to support Ptolemy's occupation of parts of
Lycia before Ipsus, but Bryce, 1986 49-50 is sceptical about this
reading. 73) Meyer, 1925 points out that Lysimachus' lack of a
strong fleet would make it difficult for him to keep control of
Lycia. Segre's dating (Aegyptus 1934 253-68) of SEG 17 no. 639 puts
Aspendus in Lagid control between 301 BC and 298 BC; Bagnall is more
cautious but agrees that Lagid control of Pamphylia (first securely
attested for 278 BC, Robert, 1966a 53-8) could date back to Ptolemy
I. Otherwise Ptolemy's occupation of these coastal cities must be
seen as a provocative and hostile move later on. 74) Plut. Demet.
31, Memn. FGrH 434 F.4.9. Memnon wrongly calls Arsinoe the daughter
of Ptolemy Philadelphus.
Ptolemies, Lysimachus was obliged to renounce Amastris and with her, direct claim to the wealthy and strategically important city of Heracleia. Subsequent events show, however, that Lysimachus had no intention of letting this valuable prize slip from his grasp for long. Clearly he took care, in the interim, to preserve good relations with Amastris and thus ensure his continuing influence over the city which she now governed during the minority of her sons. Memnon emphasises the friendship between the two courts and Amastris' son Clearchus is found at Lysimachus' side on the Getic campaign of 292 BC.

Faced with this combination of the powers to the west and south of his kingdom, Seleucus held out the hand of friendship to the only possible contender, Demetrius. Emboldened by the prospect of Seleucus' support, Demetrius took the opportunity, while en route to Syria, to encroach upon Pleistarchus' kingdom of Cilicia. The immediate purpose of his landing seems to have been a need for funds; the wealth stored in the royal treasuries there, notably Cylinda, is well attested. Despite past depletions, Demetrius was able to clean the treasury out of its last 1200T before going on to Rhosus where the pact was confirmed by Seleucus' marriage to the Besieger's daughter Stratonice.

75) See below. 76) Memn. FGrH 434 F.5.1, Burstein, 1976 83-4 sees Heracleia's relationship with Lysimachus in this period as one of "free alliance". 77) Corradi, 1929 37. That Cassander was not a possibility supports the view that he and Lysimachus were still on good terms; see Will, CAH VII 1984 104. 78) Plut. Demet. 31. 79) Plut. Demet. 32. For Cylinda, see Simpson, Historia 1957 503-4, Bing, Historia 1973 346-8 for its role as an Assyrian royal treasury. For "withdrawals" of 500T, 600T, 10,000T see Diod. XVIII.58.1; XIX.56. 80) Plut. Demet. 32.
In the longer term, Cilicia represented a rich source of ship timber, mineral resources and a number of important naval bases.\(^{81}\) Bengtson suggested that Seleucus, threatened by Pleistarchus' control of the Taurus mountain passes, tacitly approved the conquest of Cilicia which Demetrius completed on his return home.\(^{82}\) Evidence for good relations between Pleistarchus and Lysimachus supports this belief.\(^{83}\) Seleucus had ignored Pleistarchus' appeals after Demetrius' first landing in Cilicia and it was left to Lysimachus to first attempt action against Demetrius and then to compensate the dispossessed prince. An anecdote in Plutarch which refers to Lysimachus' attempt to raise the siege of Soli is usually placed in this context,\(^{84}\) and Robert has plausibly suggested that Pleistarchus' later appearance as dynast of Heraclea on Latmos in Caria is consequent on Lysimachus' grant of the city to him.\(^{85}\) Lysimachus' action on Pleistarchus' behalf has been dismissed as a token expression of good will for Cassander, who was unwilling or unable to risk conflict with Demetrius for his brother's sake.\(^{86}\) It is more probable, however, that Lysimachus acted on his own account; neither the existence of a hostile presence beyond the Taurus,\(^{87}\) requiring extra vigilance in guarding the mountain passes against possible attack, nor the increased resources which possession of

81) Meiggs, *OCD* 1970 1075; Bing, *Historia* 1973 347. 82) Bengtson, 1987 105. 83) See below. 84) Plut. Demet. 20; Corradi, 1929 39; Saitta, *Kokalos* 1955 82. 85) Robert, 1945 161, thus overthrowing the view that Pleistarchus held Cilicia and Caria concurrently as a "buffer state" (e.g. Meyer, 1925 28, though he himself saw this as "an unnatural creation and not easily defensible"). Pleistarchus' authority seemingly extended also to Tralles, Euromus and Hyllarima in Caria (Inscr. Tralles no. 34, Merkelbach, *ZPE* 1975 163 and Hornblower, 1982 64 n.90, 319-20, 368. 86) Corradi, 1929 39. 87) Saitta, *Kokalos* 1955 82.
Cilicia would give Demetrius would be welcome developments. The Soli incident may represent just one episode in a campaign fought by Ptolemy and Lysimachus, of which the other details are lost; Burstein sees the presence of Lagid troops at Aspendus c. 297 BC as reflecting operations against Demetrius in Cilicia. In the face of Seleucus' collusion and Cassander's indifference to his brother's pleas, these operations did not, however, suffice to keep Cilicia out of Antigonid hands.

For Lysimachus, the alliance between Demetrius and Seleucus had another disturbing aspect. The two kings launched a propaganda campaign aimed at the Greeks of Asia Minor. An inscription from Ephesus honouring Nicagoras of Rhodes, sent by Seleucus and Demetrius to announce their alliance and their continued goodwill to the Greeks, is clearly only one of a series sent to the coastal cities. In the same period, Seleucus' son Antiochus is active in strengthening the links forged by his father with the Milesian sanctuary at Didyma, although the precise political implications of this are uncertain.

Following his account of this alliance, Plutarch makes fleeting reference to a treaty made between Demetrius and Ptolemy, through Seleucus' arbitration. This implies previous hostilities between Egypt and Antigonus' son. Corradi's suggestion that Demetrius had

88) Burstein, Anc.World 1980 78. n.54; see also above.  
89) OGIS 10 = Inschr.Eph 1453. 90) OGIS 213 = I.Didyma 479 for Antiochus' gift of a stoa at Didyma c. 299 BC. See Ch.5 for discussion of the political significance of royal dedications etc. to shrines in another king's realm. 91) Plut.Demet.32. Plutarch's account is clearly highly compressed; this peace treaty is generally dated to 297/6 BC (Saitta, Kokalos 1955 82, Burstein, Anc.World 1980 78).
gone on to attack Coele-Syria\textsuperscript{92} is attractive. Demetrius' incentive for making peace may be connected with recent Ptolemaic activity in Caria; Burstein argues persuasively for Lagid possession of Miletus between c.299/8 BC and 295/4 BC when Demetrius' stephanephorate signals his renewed control.\textsuperscript{93} This reconstruction supports the suggestion made above that Ptolemy lent Lysimachus naval support for the conquest of the coastal cities. If, however, Burstein is correct in supposing that Ptolemy returned the city to Demetrius as one of the conditions of the peace of 297/6 BC,\textsuperscript{94} then it seems that, not surprisingly, Ptolemy's anxiety over the possible loss of Coele-Syria outweighed his sense of obligation to Lysimachus.

How did this new development affect Lysimachus? Saitta argues that Seleucus and Ptolemy approved Demetrius' return to Greece in the following year as constituting a blow struck against Lysimachus.\textsuperscript{95} This is not persuasive. Of the three rulers in Asia, it was Ptolemy who consistently cherished hopes of rule in mainland Greece,\textsuperscript{96} whereas Lysimachus' intervention, even as king of Macedon, seems to have been restricted to combatting Antigonid pressure.\textsuperscript{97} Such a theory also ignores the fact that not only Seleucus and

\textsuperscript{92} Based on dating his attack on Samaria, (Euseb. Chron II.118) in 298 BC rather than 296 BC. Seleucus' motives for arbitration are less clear; Corradi's argument that he preferred Coele-Syria - still in Ptolemaic hands - to remain his legally, to its conquest by Demetrius who could then claim it as "spear-won" land, perhaps lays too much emphasis on legal niceties.  
\textsuperscript{93} \textit{I.Milet.139} = Welles BC no.14 11.4-9; \textit{I.Milet.} 123 1.22; Burstein, \textit{Anc.World} 1980 78, following Seibert (\textit{Chiron} 1971 166) for Ptolemy II's "alliance" with Miletus in 262 BC as renewing an earlier dependency upon Ptolemy I.  
\textsuperscript{94} Burstein, \textit{Anc.World} 1980 78.  
\textsuperscript{95} Saitta, \textit{Kokalos} 1955 82.  
\textsuperscript{96} See Ch.3; see Shear, 1978 17 11.18-23 and below for Ptolemy's active involvement in Athenian affairs in 287 BC; his restoration of Pyrrhus (Plut.Pyrrh.4,5) as King of Epirus in 298/7 BC also reflects his interest in mainland Greece.  
\textsuperscript{97} See below.
Ptolemy, but Lysimachus too could hope to profit from Demetrius' departure from Asia. At this point, the conquest of the Greek cities on Asia Minor's western coast, and thus the realisation of the Hellespont-centred kingdom promised by the Ipsus settlement was surely his first priority. Ptolemy, moreover, had a long-standing dispute with Demetrius over Cyprus and Phoenicia. This makes it unlikely that he would actively co-operate with the Besieger against Lysimachus, who at this stage posed far less of a threat to his vital interests. The peace of 297 BC need not be seen as a sinister move directed against the King of Thrace; rather it is a temporary cessation of hostilities, expressing the desire of all participants to maintain the status quo.

In the event, any unease which this combination might have inspired in Lysimachus was soon dispelled by the breakdown of Seleucus' alliance with Poliorcetes. Demetrius' success in Cilicia, followed by his move into Coele-Syria was too conspicuous for Seleucus to ignore. If there had been any agreement that Seleucus was to receive Cilicia, or at least share the spoils, it is clear that Demetrius reneged upon it. Alternatively, in demanding Cilicia, Seleucus may have been testing the water; when Demetrius rejected the role of compliant puppet, the king of Syria effectively declared war upon him with the outrageous request for Tyre and Sidon, rich in trade revenues and central to Demetrius' supremacy at

98) Plut. Demet. 35. 99) Plut. Demet 32; Corradi, 1929 43; Will, CAH VII 1984 104 stresses the serious threat which Demetrius' new naval bases in Cilicia, combined with possession of Tyre and Sidon, posed for Seleucus.
Realising that Demetrius' ambition had in no way been diminished by the chastening experience of Ipsus, the coalition reformed, this time aiming to wipe out all traces of the Antigonid presence in Asia.

Alarm at the prospect of facing their united forces, combined with news of Cassander's death in May 297 BC, followed shortly by that of his young heir Philip, convinced Demetrius that mainland Greece held better prospects for success. His departure for Athens, probably in the winter of 296/5 BC left his cities on Asia's western coast newly vulnerable to Lysimachus' assault.

295 BC - 294 BC: ATHENS, MACEDON AND ASIA

"Just when the whole course of events seemed to be moving in conjunction to increase his power and sovereignty, the news reached him that Lysimachus had seized the cities in Asia which had belonged to him, and that Ptolemy had captured the whole of Cyprus except for the city of Salamis". Plut.Demet.35.

As this passage suggests, the period of less than two years from winter 296/5 BC, when Demetrius sailed to Greece, to the autumn of 294 BC which saw him proclaimed king of Macedon, is one of major upheaval. Important possessions change hands and, at its end, the
split between Europe and Asia seems more strongly marked than at any
time since Antipater's regency from 322 BC to 319 BC.\textsuperscript{104}
Paradoxically, Macedon and mainland Greece, once regarded by the
Antipatrids as their rightful inheritance,\textsuperscript{105} lay in Demetrius'
hands, while Asia, Antigonid for more than twenty years, was divided
among the Besieger's surviving opponents. Ptolemy's capture of
Cyprus and the Seleucid conquest of Cilicia, generally dated to this
period,\textsuperscript{106} also marked a major blow to Antigonid supremacy at sea.

Demetrius' decision to quit Asia and the breakdown of his
alliance with Seleucus left Lysimachus well placed, at last, to
realise fully the kingdom officially assigned to him after Ipsus.
Plutarch's account suggests that he had substantially succeeded in
this by the summer of 294 BC.\textsuperscript{107} Since the biographer's focus is on
Demetrius, details of the campaign are almost non-existent though
epigraphic and numismatic material serve to fill some of the gaps.

Lysimachus' control over all twelve cities of the Ionian
\textit{koivov}\textsuperscript{108} is clearly established by 289/8 BC, the year when Miletus
honours its citizen Hippostratus for his services as \textit{apartnyoc} of
the Ionians.\textsuperscript{109} A second copy of this decree from Smyrna confirms
that city's inclusion in the \textit{koivov} by this date, probably under
Lysimachus' auspices; though the city issued coinage under its new

\textsuperscript{104) Antipater, it seems, deliberately divided the empire, with Asia
entrusted to Antigonus, while the kings returned to Macedon (Diod.
XVIII.39.6-7, Arr.Succ. FGrH 156 F.44, Just.XIV.1).
105) Diod.XVIII.54.3, see Ch. 3. 106) Plut.Demet. 35; Demetrius held
107) Plut.Demet.35,36; since the news reached Demetrius at Sparta,
and it was from the Peloponnese that he marched on Macedon in autumn
294 BC. 108) i.e. Ephesus, Miletus, Myus, Lebedus, Colophon, Priene,
Teos, Erythrae, Phocaea, Chios, Clazomenae, Samos,(Strab.XIV.1.4)
109) Syll\textsuperscript{3} 363.
name, Eurydice, this does not really help to fix a firm date for
the city's conquest.'\textsuperscript{110} A new decree for Hippostratus' successor (or
predecessor) is the first evidence we have which confirms
Lysimachus' possession of Chios.'\textsuperscript{111} Ephesus' appearance under her
new name Arsinoeia in the decree for Hippostratus suggests that the
city's refoundation was completed or near completion by 289/8 BC;
the coinage issued by Arsinoeia runs for eight or nine years, c.289
BC to 281 BC.'\textsuperscript{112} Lysimachus' conquest of Lebedus c. 294 BC is
presupposed by the re-settlement of her citizens at Arsinoeia.'\textsuperscript{113}

It is possible that Lysimachus' task of winning the great Ionian
cities was facilitated not only by Demetrius' absence but by the
high cost of loyalty to him. Financial hardship among the cities is
reflected as early as 299/8 BC with Apollo's stephanephorate at
Miletus,'\textsuperscript{114} while the Ephesian debt law of c.297 BC implies
widespread damage to the citizens' property.'\textsuperscript{115} Though Demetrius
held Miletus at the beginning of 295/4 BC, it probably passed to
Lysimachus soon after.'\textsuperscript{116} Lysimachus' possession of other cities on
the Carian coast, certainly by 287 BC, is suggested by Plutarch's
reference to his "provinces of Lydia and Caria" as targets for

\textsuperscript{110} Syll\textsuperscript{a} 363; Milne (Num.Chron. 1923 3-4) dated the series (7
issues) c. 288 BC to 281 BC, assuming that the girl "of around 18" shown on the obverse is Eurydice, Lysimachus' daughter by Arsinoe.
This is not sound; if Eurydice was Arsinoe's daughter she would not
have been 18 until 281 BC; if it is her portrait, then she is more
likely the daughter of a previous marriage, permitting an earlier
date for the coinage. \textsuperscript{111} SEG 1985 no.926; Forrest, Horos 1985 94-
5. See also Ch.5. \textsuperscript{112} Syll\textsuperscript{a} 368 1.24; Tscherikower, 1927 163;
Burstein, 1982 128. Compare the 5 year construction of Antigoneia-
on-the-Orontes (307 BC to 302 BC) (Diod.XX.47.5, 108.1); Head,
1880 43 dates the series from 288 BC to 280 BC. \textsuperscript{113} Pliny
N.H. VII.3.5. \textsuperscript{114} Burstein, Anc.World 1980 78 saw this as crucial
in determining Miletus' takeover by Ptolemy (see above and Ch.5 ).
\textsuperscript{115} Syll\textsuperscript{a} 364. \textsuperscript{116} Burstein, Anc.World 1980 79.
Demetrius in that year.\textsuperscript{117} The decree for Hippostratus suggests that Lysimachus’ conquest of this stretch of the coast may have extended offshore to the island of Samos, though the first clear testimony for his control there is his arbitration between Samos and Priene c. 283/2 BC.\textsuperscript{118} The belief that Lysimachus ruled Samos as early as 300 BC rests on the uncertain assumption that the tyrant Duris was his protegé.\textsuperscript{119}

In many places, Lysimachus’ conquest of the Greek cities was followed by major reconstruction,\textsuperscript{120} which seems to have occupied his attention to the exclusion of all else. Although it is probable that following the deaths of Cassander and Philip, Lysimachus was careful to reaffirm his links with the Antipatrid dynasty by a marriage alliance, there is no sign of further intervention in Macedon until the crisis of the summer of 294 BC.\textsuperscript{121} Nor are there any signs that he tried to step into Cassander’s shoes as patron of Lachares, whose domination of Athens now began to look increasingly precarious. Opposed by Olympiodorus, whose faction occupied the Piraeus, the one-time champion of the people took the classic step of establishing a tyranny, probably in spring 295 BC.\textsuperscript{122} Although

\begin{itemize}
\item 117) Plut. Demet.46, Meyer’s view (1925 32) that Demetrius took W. Caria from Pleistarchus is unnecessarily complicated; it is simpler to assume that Caria was officially granted to Lysimachus in 301 BC, but that Demetrius initially held onto the coast. 118) Welles, RC 1934 no.7; Sherwin-White, JHS 1985 80. 119) See Ch.5. 120) See Ch.6 for the kings’ personal involvement in city foundations. 121) Porph. FHG III F.3.3, Just.XVI.2.4. If it is correct that Antipater’s matricide in summer 294 BC coincided with his majority (see below), then his marriage to Eurydice more plausibly belongs to the period from 297 BC to 294 BC than the last years of Cassander’s reign. 122) Paus.1.25.7, 29.10; Polyaen.IV.7.5; P.Oxy. 2082 = FGrH 275a II; Habicht, 1979 8 for Lachares’ assumption of the tyranny in Elaphebolion 295 BC. Pausanias incorrectly places it in Cassander’s lifetime.
\end{itemize}
his opponents' hopes had been dashed the previous winter by storms which wrecked Demetrius' fleet as it approached Attica, the breathing space that this gave Lachares was short. Demetrius, meanwhile, had mustered another fleet and gained control of several cities in the Peloponnese. His second assault proved successful and in the spring of 294 BC Athens capitulated.\(^1\) Plutarch makes it clear that the Besieger, supported by the faction in the Piraeus, concentrated on depriving Athens of supplies. Lachares' one hope of salvation was aid from Demetrius' enemies; the fact that he was reduced to pillaging Athena's treasures to pay his mercenaries suggests that if any aid was sent, it was too little and came too late.\(^2\) Though two stratagems in Polyaenus suggest a connection between Lysimachus and Lachares, this is attested only for a later date; the fact that Lachares' flight from Athens took him to Boeotia, rather than Lysimachus' court,\(^3\) diminishes the likelihood of any such link at this point.

For Lysimachus, Ptolemy and Seleucus the first priority in these years was to secure possessions long coveted and closer to home than mainland Greece. A Ptolemaic fleet was sent to combat the Athenian blockade, but its inability to face Demetrius' superior numbers must be explained by Ptolemy's concentration on Cyprus, which Plutarch suggests was still in Demetrius' hands.\(^4\) The only suggestion of

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123) Plut. Demet. 33, 34. Habicht, 1979 4, 6 sees conspicuous honours for Demetrius' officer Herodorus (IG II\(^2\) 646 = SEG 25 no. 86) as a sign that peace had been agreed by 9 Elaphebolion 294 BC.
124) Plut. Demet. 34, P.\(\text{Oxy.}\) 2082 = FGrH 175a IV, Paus. I.25.7; Roussel, 1938 352. 125) Polyaen. III.7.2 and 3; Pausanias, however, has Lachares murdered for his gold in Boeotia (I.25.7); Polyaen. III.7.1 for the flight to Boeotia. 126) Plut. Demet. 33, 35 for news of Cyprus' capture reaching Demetrius in the Peloponnese.
active intervention on Lysimachus' part rests on connecting with
these events a Delian decree for the king's Spartan friend
Demaratus; Dittenberger saw this text as Lysimachus' response to
Demetrius' activity in the Peloponnese after the fall of Athens.\textsuperscript{127}
The only basis for this dating, however, is that this is the only
known possible context for Lysimachean aid to Sparta. The import of
the text is actually the establishment of positive relations between
Lysimachus and Delos, and while the Delians are careful to flatter
Demaratus by emphasising the benefactions of his Spartan forebears,
his nationality may have no direct bearing on the political context
of the inscription.\textsuperscript{128}

Despite literary emphasis on the mildness of Demetrius' settle­
ment at Athens, the product of an apologetic source which,
surprisingly, has gained ready acceptance in many modern accounts,
epigraphic evidence makes it clear that Demetrius established an
oligarchy in the city.\textsuperscript{129} In addition he held both the Piraeus and
the city in a firm grip, with garrisons installed at Munychia and on
the Museion hill.\textsuperscript{130}

Demetrius' recovery of Athens did not directly threaten
Lysimachus, who may have seen it as the necessary price paid for the

\textsuperscript{127) Syll\textsuperscript{a} 381, Plut. Demet. 33. 128) Particularly if Demaratus is
acting primarily as King's Friend rather than Sparta's
representative; see also Ch. 6. There is no evidence to support
Bradford's idea (1977 132) that Lysimachus had requested Demaratus'
restoration to Sparta. 129) Plut. Demet. 34; Hammond & Walbank, 1988
211; Habicht, 1979 7-8, 22-6 cites Olympiodorus' 2 consecutive
archonships, the return of the oligarchic \textit{exarcheo, trittuχ trope}, and
\textit{tropēpho}, epigraphic references to the refusals of Demochares,
Philippides and Kallias to serve under this regime. Henry, ZPE 72
1988 129-136 for single/plural financial officials in Athenian
decrees as still a valid gauge of an oligarchic/democratic climate
for this period. 130) Plut. Demet. 34, Habicht, 1979 29.
completion of his own conquests in Asia. Within a few months, however, developments in Macedon, coinciding with pressure exerted upon his possessions on the Black Sea coast by the Getic tribes, found the king of Thrace with a crisis on his hands.

With the death of the young Philip IV, Macedon had come under the regency of Cassander's widow Thessalonice, whose status as daughter of Philip II seems to have made her rule acceptable to the Macedonian people. This arrangement obtained for less than three years, during which time it is probable that Thessalonice sought or welcomed the alliance of both Lysimachus and Ptolemy. The elder of her two young sons, Antipater, married Eurydice, daughter of Lysimachus; Alexander took Lysandra, Ptolemy's daughter as his bride. That both kings saw in this alliance the basis of a future claim upon the Macedonian throne is not improbable.

In the spring or summer of 294 BC, perhaps coinciding with Antipater's majority, the fragile equilibrium achieved in Macedon was shattered. Enraged at his mother's proposals to ignore his status as heir and divide the kingdom between her sons, Antipater committed matricide and seized the whole kingdom. His brother Alexander did not hesitate to call for aid from stronger forces; Demetrius, preoccupied with the Spartan campaign which followed his

131) See Ch.2. 132) Plut. Demet.37; Errington, 1975 145-7 for the still potent influence of Philip's memory in Macedon in the early Diadoch period at least. 133) See above n.121; Porph. FHG III F.3.3 for Alexander and Lysandra. 134) For Lysimachus' exploitation of this relationship, see below; Ptolemy's interest in Macedon is suggested by his restoration of Pyrrhus as king of Epirus, perhaps soon after Cassander's death. (Lévêque, 1957 127; Will, CAH VII 1984 166). 135) Lévêque, 1957 126. 136) Porph. FHG III F.3.3, Plut. Demet 36, Pyrrh.6, Just.XVI.1.5.
conquest of Athens, was unable to respond immediately and found himself forestalled by his one-time confederate Pyrrhus, now back on the throne of Epirus.\textsuperscript{137} Pyrrhus expelled Antipater from Macedon, installing Alexander as king in return for the western lands which Philip II and Cassander had added to the Macedonian kingdom.\textsuperscript{138}

In other circumstances, it need not be doubted that Lysimachus would eagerly have seized the opportunity afforded by his relationship with Antipater to add Macedon to his Hellespont realm. Quite apart from its resources, in terms of men and money,\textsuperscript{139} it is likely that for all the Successors, Macedon, the homeland, had a special lure.\textsuperscript{140} On this occasion, however, the pleas of his son-in-law fell on deaf ears. Anxious to restore peace in Macedon with the aim of forestalling Demetrius' arrival, Lysimachus contented himself with reconciling Cassander's sons and instructing Antipater to buy Pyrrhus' departure from Macedon at a price of 300T.\textsuperscript{141} In Plutarch's account, Lysimachus resorts to the elaborate stratagem of a forged letter supposedly from Ptolemy, exposing himself to the high-minded reproaches of Pyrrhus on its discovery.\textsuperscript{142} The historicity of this episode is, however, doubtful; the strong pro-Pyrrhan flavour of these passages suggests Epirote propaganda,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{137} See above n.134. \textsuperscript{138} Plut. Demet.36, Pyrrh.6; Lévêque, 1957 127 sees Pyrrhus as acting as Ptolemy's representative at this point. \textsuperscript{139} See below for Demetrius' harnessing of Macedon's resources for the Asian campaign of 287 BC, though Bengtson, 1987 110 perhaps lays too much emphasis on manpower as Macedon's most valuable resource; see Bosworth, JHS 1986 1-12 for decline in Macedonian manpower as a result of Alexander's conquests. \textsuperscript{140} For Seleucus' aspirations towards "Macedon, his land" in the last year of his life, see Ch.7. \textsuperscript{141} Plut.Pyrrh. 6; Just. XVI.1.5. \textsuperscript{142} Plut. Pyrrh. 6, taken at face value by Garoufalias, 1979 36.
\end{itemize}
perhaps written in the light of Pyrrhus' later conflict with Lysimachus over Macedon. Whatever his later feelings about Lysimachus, it is clear that in 294 BC Pyrrhus preferred to make a deal with him which perhaps acknowledged Epirus' ownership of the lands ceded by Alexander, to having Demetrius as his neighbour in Macedonia.

Plutarch makes it clear that Lysimachus' reluctance to commit himself to war in Macedonia at this point was not due to limited ambition, but the result of preoccupations elsewhere. The timing of Antipater's appeal, in summer 294 BC, suggests that initially it was the completion of his conquests in Asia which precluded intervention in Macedonia. Subsequently, pressure from the Getic tribes in North-eastern Thrace, focused perhaps on the West Pontic cities, required preparations for a full-scale campaign. Lysimachus was either already on the march against Dromichaetes or conducting a preliminary campaign to reaffirm control of the West Pontic coast by autumn 294 BC when Antipater was again expelled from Macedon, this time by Demetrius, who had by now wound up his affairs in the Peloponnese. Antipater had at least escaped with his life; his brother Alexander, embarrassed by the arrival of a now unwanted patron was murdered on Demetrius' command at Larisa in Thessaly. The Besieger's subsequent enthronement by the Macedonians perhaps owed less to the speech which sought to justify this action than to the desire for a strong and energetic ruler, after four

years of internal struggle which had seen Macedon's importance in the Greek-speaking world decline. 149

For Lysimachus, the importance of securing the northern sector of his realm against barbarian invasion, whether by arms or diplomacy, was well understood and, at this point, clearly took precedence over Macedonian affairs.150 It is reasonable to suppose that the demands made on his resources by the Getic campaign, in addition to those required to keep his newly conquered possessions in Ionia, precluded military intervention in Macedon for the present. Accordingly, Lysimachus made peace with Demetrius and acknowledged his great enemy as Macedon's king. Clearly this was only a temporary measure; Lysimachus' intention, once the time was right, to contest Demetrius' claim to Macedon is underlined by his welcome of Lysandra, Alexander's widow, to his court. Soon after he tightened the knot that linked his house to Cassander's by her marriage to his eldest son Agathocles.151

The threat posed by Demetrius' new proximity to Thrace was not long in making itself felt. The news in 292/1 BC of Lysimachus' 149) Compare Diod. XXI.1.7 who makes Demetrius the murderer of both brothers; if this is Lysimachean propaganda as Tarn (1913 14) supposes then one must assume that Diodorus' source here is not Hieronymus. Plut.Demet.36; e.g. Macedon had been unable to prevent Demetrius' recovery of Athens. Will, CAH VII 1984 105, sees Demetrius' marriage to Antipater's daughter Phila as a factor which aided his claim to the throne. 150) Events after Lysimachus' death reinforce the accuracy of this judgement; see Ch.2. 151) Just. XVI.1.9, Lévéque, 1957 132, Bengtson, 1987 108. Saitta, Kokalos 1955 122-3 rightly criticises Paus.I.10.3 who puts this marriage before that of Lysimachus and Arsinoe; this is clearly impossible if Lysandra is identified with Alexander's widow, and clashes with Paus. 1.9.7 which puts the marriage close in time to Lysimachus' Getic expedition.
defeat and capture by the Getic chief Dromichætes sent Demetrius racing to Thrace in an attempt to capture the heart of his enemy's realm.¹⁶² Like his father, twenty years before, he failed, but on this occasion, Lysimachus' salvation rested not on his own military expertise, but on the centre of resistance which had formed against Demetrius in central and western Greece, a movement which, however, Lysimachus' diplomacy may have helped to foster.

CENTRAL GREECE 293 BC - 290 BC

Following his success at Athens and in the Peloponnese, it was logical that Demetrius, now king of Macedon and Thessaly, should take steps to complete his conquest of Greece by securing control of Boeotia, the territory which linked his possessions in the north and south.¹⁶³

Though supporters of the Antigonids from 304 BC to 302 BC, with Thebes perhaps the recipient of lavish Antigonid benefactions in that period,¹⁵⁴ soon after Ipsus the Boeotians were in a position to make some kind of claim to independence. Their alliance with the Aetolians, dated by Flacelière, between 300 BC and 298 BC,¹⁵⁵ greatly strengthened their chances. Apart from the military prowess which had made them prized as mercenaries from the time of the Peloponnesian War, the Aetolians had a history of resistance to

Macedonian rule, while their resources and prestige had been greatly enhanced by their recent acquisition of Delphi.\textsuperscript{156} In addition to the wealth and political influence conferred by control of its oracle, Delphi also commanded the route from Phocis to Aetolia.

While the powers of central Greece at the end of the fourth century may initially have felt themselves more at threat from Cassander than from Demetrius,\textsuperscript{157} the danger that this would throw them into the arms of the Besieger seems to have been averted. Cassander's benefactions at Thebes reflect his realisation that diplomacy and euergetism were better weapons than military operations whose effect would merely be alienating.\textsuperscript{158} These presumably aimed also to offset the negative impression made by his recapture of Elateia.\textsuperscript{159}

Lysimachus too seems to have been active in wooing the Boeotians; communications may have been established even before Ipsus. Diogenes Laertius mentions diplomatic visits by Menedemus of Eretria to Lysimachus and Ptolemy. The precise purpose of these embassies is unknown, but they may represent a sequel to the philosopher's unsuccessful plea in 304 BC, asking Demetrius to return Oropus, granted by the Antigonids to Athens, to the Boeotians.\textsuperscript{160} Demetrius'

\textsuperscript{156} Griffith, 1935 81 for Aetolian mercenaries; Diod. XVIII.8.6, 9.5, 11.1, 13.4 for the Aetolian contribution to the Lamian War; Flacelière, 1937 50-2 for the capture of Delphi. \textsuperscript{157} Flacelière, 1937 58. \textsuperscript{158} Syll\textsuperscript{3} 337; Fortina, 1968 115 sees Cassander renouncing a policy of military aggression in mainland Greece soon after Ipsus. \textsuperscript{159} Cassander's recapture of Elateia after its liberation in 301 BC (SEG 18.197) rests on his son Philip's death there in 297 BC (Euseb. Chron. I 241 (Schoene)). \textsuperscript{160} Diog.Laert. II.140; Cloché, 1952 207; Robert, 1960 201 interpreted Menedemus' visit thus; SEG 3.117 shows that Oropus was still in Athenian hands in 303/2 BC.
accusation that Menedemus was plotting with Ptolemy against him lends support to the idea of a Boeotian appeal for help to the opponents of Antigonus. ¹⁶¹ Lysimachus' name has been convincingly restored on the inscription recording contributions to the rebuilding of Thebes; Holleaux cites the parallel of his benefactions at Athens in 299 BC and a similar motive, the sustainment of hostility to Demetrius in mainland Greece. ¹⁶²

By itself, such diplomacy might not have been enough to provoke the active hostility to Demetrius which was already apparent by spring 294 BC, when Lachares sought refuge in Boeotia.¹⁶³ However, Demetrius' successive conquests of Attica, the Peloponnese, Macedon and Thessaly posed a very real threat of encirclement to the Boeotians and Aetolians.¹⁶⁴ This fear is surely the key to the determined resistance to him mounted in central Greece from late 294 BC to 291/0 BC.

In the final event, Boeotian resistance failed, but the demands made upon Demetrius' energy and resources by the war in central Greece were a vital factor in determining Lysimachus' survival. The suddenness of Demetrius' first attack on the Boeotians at the end of 294 BC may have succeeded in isolating them from their Aetolian allies,¹⁶⁵ but the revolt of the following year saw the Boeotians

¹⁶¹) Diog. Laert. II.140. 162) Syll² 337; Holleaux, 1938 37-8 (= REG 1895); SEG 15 nos. 270-71 for proxeny grants from Oropus for citizens of Lysimachia; these are, however, dated only to "the 3rd century BC". Lysimachus' dedication of the statue of Adeia at Oropus (Syll² 374) may belong to a later period in his reign. See Ch. 7. ¹⁶³) Polyæn.III.7.2; Paus.I.25.7; Flacelière, 1937 69. ¹⁶⁴) Plut. Demet.39. ¹⁶⁵) Flacelière, 1937 71.
reinforced by Cleonymus of Sparta and probably by the Aetolians. Polyaeus' account suggests that Lachares had taken a leading role in this rising; Demetrius' victory and Hieronymus of Cardia's installation as ἀρχηγός of Thebes sees the ex-tyrant in flight to Lysimachus. This is not, however, proof of a prior association with the king; nor does it necessarily imply Lysimachus' instigation of the revolt. Lachares' decision to seek refuge at Lysimachia may simply have been determined by Lysimachus' well-publicised hatred for Demetrius. The second revolt in 292 BC, in which Pyrrhus actively co-operated with the Aetolians to aid Boeotia, effectively foiled Demetrius' hopes of taking Thrace. If, as seems likely, Lysimachus needed a breathing space to recover the damages wrought on his manpower and prestige by the Getic campaign, then Boeotia's stubborn resistance, which kept Demetrius busy until the end of 291/0 BC, provided it.

Nor did Boeotia's submission mark the end of Demetrius' troubles in central Greece; Aetolian hostility continued to express itself forcibly, striking at his possessions and his prestige. The Athenian hymn of 291 BC which hails Demetrius as the only true god also appeals for help against the Aetolians who menace Greece like

166) Plut. Demet. 39; Flacelière, 1937 71-2 – since Cleonymus' only possible route from Sparta to Boeotia was via Aetolia. 167) Plut. Demet. 39; Polyaeus.111.7.2. 168) Holleaux, 1938 38 (=REG 1895). 169) See above for Lachares' isolation in 294 BC. To attribute every action to the hidden hand of one of the kings perhaps underestimates the capacity of the Greek states for independent action. 170) Plut. Demet. 39; Cloché, 1952 209; Plut. Demet. 40 for Pyrrhus' invasion of Thessaly which forced Demetrius to divert resources from Boeotia. Plut. Pyrrh. 7 misleadingly places this incident before Demetrius' conquest of Macedon.
the legendary sphinx. According to Plutarch, the latter's prowess prompted comparisons with Alexander among the Macedonians and his dramatic victory in Aetolia against Demetrius' general Pantauchus may well have contributed to the growth of discontent which was finally to ensure Demetrius' fall in Macedon in 287 BC.

In 289 BC, however, Pyrrhus' invasion of Macedon, the sequel to his victory, proved premature; Demetrius expelled him from Macedonia but decided to make peace with the Epirote rather than to prosecute the war further. This suggests that he found these attacks from the west a serious and unwelcome diversion from what was now his major task in hand, the recovery of Asia Minor.

In the winter of 289/8 BC the shipyards of Macedon and mainland Greece were the scene of furious activity as Demetrius gave orders for the construction of a massive fleet. The mints at Pella and Amphipolis worked overtime to issue the coinage required to pay for this and the tens of thousands of soldiers mobilised for a great campaign whereby Demetrius aimed to recover the Asiatic empire of

Following his return from the Danube, little is heard of Lysimachus. Though it is possible at this time that he responded to signs of incipient unrest among the cities of the Ionian χωρὶς with a new administrative system, he seems to have been happy to leave any actual fighting to others. Some scholars date his reconquest of Heracleia to 289/8 BC, but this rests on a preference for Diodorus' evidence over that of Justin and more importantly Memnon. Diodorus refers to the seventeen year rule of Clearchus and Oxathres, Amastris' sons by the tyrant Dionysius who died in 306/5 BC. Justin and Memnon, however, place Lysimachus' recovery of the city after his conquest of Macedon. Saitta dismisses this as an error of chronology due to the use of a common and unreliable source, Theopompus. While Memnon may have used Theopompus as a source for the career of the elder Clearchus, tyrant of Heracleia from c.364 BC to 352 BC, it is probable that for the downfall of his namesake, Amastris' son, he drew on Nymphis, contemporary with these events and unlikely to be mistaken on a factual detail such as

175) Plut.Demet. 43, Pyrrh. 10. Newell, 1927 87-91, 108-111 for an increase in issues from Amphipolis 290 BC to 289 BC and a new "rejuvenated" portrait of Demetrius on tetradrachms from Pella and Amphipolis, replacing the rather too realistic one preceding it! 176) See Ch.5. 177) e.g. Saitta, Kokalos 1955 127-8; Diod.XX.77.1; Trog. Prol. Lib. 16, Just. XVI.3.1, Memn.FGrH 434 F.5.3. 178) Saitta, ibid. citing Laqueur, Lokalchronik, PW XIII 1926 col.1098; possibly Saitta has confused the two Clearchuses.
Lysimachus' status at the time of the takeover. This supports the placing of these events in the year 284 BC.\textsuperscript{179}

The threat to Lysimachus posed by Demetrius' preparations for the Asian campaign, however, called for decisive action. Though the figures given for Demetrius' projected forces are generally regarded as exaggerated, Léveque points out that since the coalition of 302 BC reformed in consequence, the distortion is probably not excessive.\textsuperscript{180} The allied plan, put into action the following spring, aimed to prevent Demetrius completing or launching his Asian armada by a concerted attack on his possessions in Macedon and mainland Greece, thus forcing the Besieger to divert his resources onto several fronts.\textsuperscript{181}

Pyrrhus, in Plutarch's account bombarded by letters from Lysimachus, Ptolemy and Seleucus, reneged on his recent peace with the Besieger to join the enemy.\textsuperscript{182} That he neglected to mention this to Demetrius seems certain; the two-pronged attack which he and Lysimachus launched against Macedon seems to have owed its success largely to Demetrius' concentration of his forces on the eastern front. Here he enjoyed some success against Lysimachus, who was defeated near Amphipolis, but meanwhile Pyrrhus, advancing from the west, reached Beroia without encountering serious resistance. This is generally explained in terms of Demetrius' confidence in his ally

\textsuperscript{179} The date preferred by Burstein, 1976 93-4, who solves the supposed clash in Diodorus' chronology thus; Clearchus' 17 year rule starts in 301 BC while Amastris was absent at Sardis. Diodorus, unaware of Amastris' regency which preceded this, assumed that Clearchus' reign followed Dionysius' death in 306/5 BC. 180) Plut. Demet. 43 (500 ships); Pyrrh.10 (100,000 soldiers, 500 ships); Léveque, 1957 151. 181 Plut. Demet.44; Roussel, 1938 362; Léveque, 1957 153. 182) Plut. Demet.44, Pyrrh.11.
which led him to neglect Macedon's defence on the western front.\textsuperscript{183} According to Plutarch the news of Pyrrhus' capture of Beroia proved decisive;\textsuperscript{184} Macedonian discontent with Demetrius, perhaps exacerbated more by the financial demands which his projected campaign had made on the people,\textsuperscript{185} than by the autocratic behaviour which Plutarch stresses,\textsuperscript{186} came to a head. By the time Demetrius turned south to deal with Pyrrhus, many of his men had deserted to Lysimachus; those who did accompany him to Beroia defected to Pyrrhus before a battle could be fought.\textsuperscript{187} Plutarch suggests that propaganda played some part in this bloodless victory; Lysimachus was careful to remind the Macedonians of his companionship with Alexander, while Pyrrhus exploited a fancied resemblance to the Conqueror. Epirote propaganda later ascribed this strategy to the advice of Alexander himself, appearing to Pyrrhus in a dream!\textsuperscript{188} Attractive terms offered to those who defected were another powerful inducement. Demetrius made his escape, while Pyrrhus was proclaimed king of Macedon.

With Demetrius' departure from Macedon, the two victors found themselves rivals for the throne. The campaign itself had shown that, like his mentor Ptolemy, Pyrrhus had an eye for the main

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{183} Plut. Pyrrh. 11, Demet. 44; Lévêque, 1957 153-4.
\bibitem{184} Plut. Demet. 44. Edson, \textit{HSCP} 1934 239-41 lays great stress on Beroia's significance as the birthplace of the Antigonid dynasty; Lévêque, 1957 156 is sceptical.
\bibitem{185} Roussel, 1938 362, Will, \textit{CAH VII} 1984 108 for the idea that Demetrius saw rule in Macedon largely as a springboard for the recovery of Asia.
\bibitem{186} Plut. Demet. 42. One story at least is conventional; Philip II, whose accessibility is \textit{here} compared favourably with that of Demetrius, is likewise told by a rebuffed petitioner "Don't be King then" (Plut. Mor. 179C 31); Bengtson, 1987 113 is perhaps too credulous of these anecdotes.
\bibitem{187} Plut. Demet. 44, Pyrrh. 11.
\bibitem{188} Plut. ibid.; see Ch.6 for Lysimachus' promotion of his relationship with Alexander.
\end{thebibliography}
chance. Rather than advancing from Beroia to join Lysimachus, at this point hard-pressed, he had halted there to consolidate his possession of western Macedonia. Lévèque's suggestion, that he was not averse to seeing Lysimachus and Demetrius wear each other out, is astute.¹⁸⁹ Faced with Lysimachus' demand for a division of the spoils, however, Pyrrhus was forced to comply. It is unclear whether his patron Ptolemy would have been prepared, at any time, to risk a breach with Lysimachus for Pyrrhus' sake; certainly he would not do it now, when his energies were concentrated on mainland Greece, still a strong card in Demetrius' hand.¹⁹⁰ The fiction of alliance between the two rulers of a now divided Macedon was sustained for the present.¹⁹¹

For Lysimachus, this campaign, probably relatively inexpensive in terms of manpower, certainly economical in terms of time and therefore money, had brought not only the satisfaction of seeing his great enemy deposed, but also the eastern sector of Macedon. This included not only Cassandreia, but also Amphipolis and its gold mines.¹⁹² This city, whose capture had seemingly eluded him in the early stages of the campaign, was taken after Demetrius' flight by stratagem. As Polyaeus tells it, the bribe promised to the garrison commander Andragathus in exchange for Amphipolis was not forthcoming.

¹⁸⁹) Plut.Demet.44. For Lysimachus' defeat at Amphipolis, Paus. I.10.2; Saitta, Kokalos 1955 128 for 288/7 BC as the context for this episode; Lévèque, 1957 157. See also Ch. 1. ¹⁹⁰) Plut.Demet.44; Plut.Pyr rh.42; Shear, 1978 111.18-23 for Ptolemy's fleet in action at Athens and in the Cyclades. ¹⁹¹) The border is usually placed at the R. Axios; Bengtson, 1987 130 rejects Paus.I.10.2 which gives Pyrrhus rule over the Nestians in eastern Macedonia. ¹⁹²) Syll² 380; Just.XXIV.2.1, 3.3 for Cassandreia's value as a stronghold to Arsinoe in 280 BC; for Amphipolis' strategic and commercial value, see Thuc.IV.102.
and Andragathus himself came to a nasty end.  

Now ruler of half of Macedonia, Lysimachus lost no time in disposing of a rival claimant, Cassander's son Antipater. Though originally Lysimachus may have seen his son-in-law as a passport to Macedon, it is significant that during the invasion he laid claim to Macedon in his own right, as Alexander's friend, rather than as patron to Cassander's heir. This presumably reflects the swift decline in prestige of the Antipatrid house. Antipater, now an embarrassment rather than an asset, received short shrift when he dared to protest at the loss of his kingdom. Justin places his death, at Lysimachus' hands, immediately after the king's acquisition of eastern Macedonia.

ATHENS AND CENTRAL GREECE 287 BC

The allies' success in Macedon had repercussions elsewhere. Although Ptolemy had sent a fleet to mainland Greece to rebel-rouse at the time of Lysimachus' invasion of Macedon, it is probably best to see the news of Demetrius' fall there as the catalyst that sparked off revolt in Athens. This climaxed in Olympiodorus' capture of the Museion hill and the expulsion of Demetrius' garrison. Since the city is described as free, democratic and autonomous when

193) Polyaen.IV.12.2; see also Ch.1. 194) Just.XVI.2.4; Porph. FHG III F.3.3 places Antipater's death straight after his flight to Lysimachus in 294 BC - this is probably the result of compression; see Saitta, Kokalos 1955 130. 195) Ferguson, 1911 137 dates it later, identifying Antipater with Plutarch's contributor of funds to Athens in 286/5 BC (Vit. X.Orat. 851E). 196) Plut.Fyrrh.11, Demet.44. 197) Shear, 1978 50; Will, CAH VII 1984 108.
Phaedrus of Sphettus ended his year of office as στρατηγός of the hoplites, Habicht has convincingly argued that the city of Athens was free by late spring 287 BC.\(^{198}\)

Demetrius' initial response was to besiege the city, but he was soon persuaded to make peace. Plutarch's account stresses the intervention of the philosopher Crates and the threat of Pyrrhus' arrival as important factors motivating this decision.\(^{199}\) The Athenian decree for Kallias of Sphettus, however, shows the literary account to be misleading and guilty of significant omissions. It is Ptolemy, through his agent Sostratus, who negotiates a peace with Demetrius; the Athenians participate essentially as his protégés.\(^{200}\)

Under the terms of the peace, Demetrius was persuaded to abandon his claim upon the city of Athens; in return he kept the Piraeus, which the Athenians had failed to capture earlier in the year. The method of subversion, so successful at the Museion, had backfired disastrously and the liberating force was massacred.\(^{201}\) The importance which recovery of the Piraeus assumed, both for Athens and the kings opposed to Demetrius, is reflected in a flurry of diplomatic activity during 286/5 BC. Lysimachus is conspicuous among the benefactors who are thanked for sending corn and money;\(^{202}\) the decree honouring his friend Philippides shows that the specific aim of this euergetism was maintenance of the city's independence and

recovery of the Piraeus and the other forts still in Antigonid hands.\textsuperscript{203} The recent identification of Lysimachus' friend Bithys with the honorand of the Athenian inscription IO II\textsuperscript{2} 808\textsuperscript{204} suggests that the king may have also supplied Athens with military aid.

The years following Athens' liberation see Lysimachus' partisans at last prominent in the city's affairs. Philippides returned home in 286/5 BC; in 284/3 BC, as θυγατέρα, he inaugurated a new festival of Demeter and Kore, to commemorate the recovery of Eleusis from the Antigonids.\textsuperscript{205} Closely involved in this last success was Demochares, another returned exile who quickly assumed a position of prominence; in 286/5 BC he was head of the financial board of administration. His leadership of an embassy to Lysimachus, which bore fruit in the form of gifts totalling 130T,\textsuperscript{206} has been thought to suggest a previous association with the king. In this period the Athenians may also have recovered Sunium and Rhamnus, while Elateia, a key point for entry from the north into central Greece, was liberated by another "friend" of Lysimachus, the Athenian Xanthippus.\textsuperscript{207}

The ultimate success of the "Piraeus recovery scheme" is, however, less certain. As late as 282/1 BC, a decree praising Euthius, ἀπειρωτικός for the previous year, promises further honours in

\textsuperscript{203} Syll\textsuperscript{a} 374 11. 34-5. \textsuperscript{204} A new inscription for Limnaeus from Cassandreia (Hatzopoulos, 1988 38-9) confirms the identification upheld most recently by Burstein, \textit{CSCA} 1979 41, 45-6; see also Ch.6. \textsuperscript{205} Shear, 1978 49-50; Syll\textsuperscript{a} 374 11. 46-50. \textsuperscript{206} Plut. Vit.X.Orat 851 E; Smith, \textit{Historia} 1962 114-5 for Demochares' exile. In support of a connection with Lysimachus, Ferguson, 1911 137 cites the tactful silence of the decree later proposed for him in Antigonid Athens as to his whereabouts in these years. \textsuperscript{207} Habicht, 1979 78; Syll\textsuperscript{a} 361 = SEG 14.461. For Xanthippus' "flexibility", see Ch. 6.
the event that "the city and the Piraeus are reunited", suggesting a certain confidence in Athens at this time that the mercenary garrison could be bought off.\textsuperscript{208} Apparently this confidence was misplaced.\textsuperscript{209} If, as Gauthier suggests, the continuing faith of the garrison soldiers in the Antigonid cause was an important factor,\textsuperscript{210} then it is possible that the news of the death of Lysimachus, an obdurate foe of the Antigonids, at Corupedium in February 281 BC,\textsuperscript{211} may have caused a last minute change of heart.

Following his account of Demetrius' peace with Athens, Plutarch tells us that the Besieger mobilised his remaining troops and set sail for Asia, aiming to recover from Lysimachus "the satrapies of Lydia and Caria".\textsuperscript{212} In this light, the peace which Demetrius made, first with Ptolemy and then with Pyrrhus has sinister implications. Pyrrhus' agreement to a peace that would speed Demetrius on his way to a campaign in Asia at Lysimachus' expense is not surprising. Ptolemy's abandonment of co-operation against Demetrius, even if only temporary, was potentially more disturbing. Though it is probable that Lysimachus had been building up his naval strength,\textsuperscript{213} the speed with which Demetrius reached Asia, via the Cyclades, some of which were already in Ptolemaic hands,\textsuperscript{214} and the ease with which

\textsuperscript{208} The confident tone of the Euthius decree (Meritt, Hesperia 1938 100 no.18) suggests bribery (Gauthier, REG 1979 369-71 ) rather than military assault (Shear, 1978 28-9). Habicht, 1979 95 cites the parallel of Athenian recovery of the Piraeus by bribery in 229 BC. \textsuperscript{209} Habicht, 1979 100 against Gauthier REG 1979 374-8. \textsuperscript{210} Gauthier, ibid. 367-8. \textsuperscript{211} Sachs & Wiseman, Iraq 1954 202-6 for the dating. \textsuperscript{212} Plut. Demet.46. \textsuperscript{213} Just. XXIV.3. for his fleet's victory, in the hands of his successor Ptolemy Ceraunus, against Antigonus Gonatas in 280 BC. \textsuperscript{214} Plut. Demet. 46, Shear, 1978 1.20 for Ptolemy's possession of Andros; Habicht, 1979 65 thinks it possible that by now he had most of the Cyclades; see also Syll\textsuperscript{a} 367, Merker, Historia 1970 143. \textsuperscript{215}
he recovered Asia's coastal cities suggests that for Lysimachus loss of Lagid support had serious implications. For Demetrius, clearly, the opportunity to isolate Lysimachus was the major factor which inspired his peace with Egypt and his acknowledgement of Ptolemy's possession of the Cyclades has been suggested as a plausible quid pro quo.\(^{216}\) At Miletus Demetrius celebrated his long delayed marriage to the princess Ptolemais, but whether this signals anything so positive as a formal alliance with Ptolemy is uncertain.\(^{216}\) It is her mother Eurydice's relationship with Demetrius' late wife Phila, rather than her marriage to Ptolemy that Plutarch stresses; since by now Berenice had replaced her at the king's side,\(^{217}\) the marriage may even represent Eurydice's own initiative.

On the other hand, Shear's suggestion that Lysimachus was protected by his inclusion in a common peace, negotiated at a summit conference in Athens attended by all the kings or their representatives, is unconvincing.\(^{216}\) The argument that Demetrius aimed, in making peace with Ptolemy and Pyrrhus, to reduce the number of his enemies, enabling him to focus on Lysimachus' possessions in Asia is compelling.\(^{219}\) Since Lysimachus' participation in a peace treaty is improbable, it is better to see his Perinthian envoy, Artemidorus, honoured by the Athenian ἀναπαραστάτης in 286/5 BC,\(^{220}\) as working in connection with the Piraeus recovery, rather than

\(^{215}\) Habicht, 1979 64, 65. 216) Plut. Demet.46. 217) Cary, 1951 55. 218) Shear, 1978 50; dismissed by Habicht, 1979 64. 219) Habicht, 1979 64. 220) IG II² 663, 662. For Artemidorus' nationality, see Habicht, Chiron 1972 107, Hicks,IRM 464; Shear himself, 50, connects Artemidorus' "usefulness to an Athenian embassy" with the second embassy of Demochares (see above).
representing the king in negotiations for a common peace.

DEMETRIUS LEAVES THE FIELD - 286/5 BC

"...Demetrius set himself to win over the cities of Ionia. Many joined him of their own accord, while others were compelled to submit". Plut. Demet. 47.

Though Plutarch's account of the early stages of Demetrius' campaign is characteristically vague, the traces of his progress that survive in inscriptions and the stratagem handbooks bear out this picture of a mixed reaction to his arrival. Lysimachus' subsequent imposition of a heavy indemnity on Miletus confirms the city's inclusion among those which welcomed Demetrius with enthusiasm. Ephesus also fell into Demetrius' hands, but the assumption that this was a voluntary defection is undermined by Polyaeus' description of Demetrius' general Ainetus ravaging the city's νάρθες as though on enemy territory. Subsequently Ephesus was recaptured by Lysimachus' officer Lycus, apparently by an elaborate stratagem involving the subversion of pirates previously in Demetrius' service. Priene, likewise, found itself the object of Demetrius' attentions; our evidence comes from a series of beautifully inscribed stones from the anta of the city's temple of Athena Polias. The neighbouring

221) I. Milet 138 11.6-7 - Miletus contracts a loan from the Cnidians to pay the second instalment c.283/2 BC; Burstein, Anc. World 1980 78. 222) Polyaeus, V.7. Demetrius' last Asian campaign is the most likely context for such an action. 223) Plut. Demet. 46. 224) I. Priene no. 14, no. 15 (= RC no.6), no. 16 (= RC no.8); Sherwin-White, JHS 1985 69-89 for these texts as part of an archive.
Magnesians, who had presumably defected to Demetrius, combined forces with Priene's own indigenous Pedieis to ravage the city's xópa and kill many of its citizens. Aid came also from an anonymous force of "soldiers" who have been plausibly identified as those of Demetrius. Forces sent by Lysimachus under the general So[sthenes], however, succeeded in beating off the attack; subsequently Priene voted Lysimachus cult honours for his contribution to her safety and the king commended the Prienean αἰνήκαυτος for its loyalty.226

Following his conquests on the Ionian coast, Demetrius marched inland to Sardis, where the defection of some of Lysimachus' officers gave him possession of the city.226 That his operations extended as far north as the Hellespont seems unlikely, and it is probably best to put the capture of Sestos, described by Polyainus with reference to Lachares' adventures, in another context,227 perhaps Demetrius' march on the Hellespont in 292/1 BC.228 Demetrius' success, was, however, shortlived; it is probable that Sardis, like the rebel cities on the coast, was recaptured soon after by Lysimachus' son Agathocles229 who had been put in charge of this campaign.230 This decision to delegate, whatever its later repercussions,231 proved sound in military terms. The suggestion that Agathocles blocked Demetrius' path to the coast, thus cutting him off from his greatest asset, his fleet, is plausible232. Otherwise, Demetrius' decision to strike inland through Armenia to

225 Welles, RC 1934 43 no.7. 226 Plut. Demet.46.
227 Polyain. III.7.3 describes Lachares' flight to Lysimachela when "the enemy were prevailing at Sestos". 228 See above. 229 At any rate it was again in Lysimachus' hands when Seleucus invaded in 282/1 BC. (Polyain.V.9.4). 230 Plut. Demet. 46; see also Ch.7. 231 See Ch.7. 232 Roussel, 1938 365. 218
the upper satrapies, from where he seemingly intended to pursue some sort of guerrilla warfare, is inexplicable. At the start of his campaign he had had only eleven thousand infantry; though these forces may have been swelled by defections from Lysimachus, a number of troops must also have been left behind to guard the recaptured coastal cities.\textsuperscript{233} At any rate it is clear that numerically he was in no position to risk facing the "strong force" with Agathocles; in these circumstances, the decision to fight on land in the interior must represent necessity rather than choice, something which is supported by the reluctance of his troops to follow him.\textsuperscript{234} Finally famine, disease and natural disaster, which greatly depleted his forces, forced him to abandon this plan and turn south, with Agathocles in hot pursuit. On reaching Cilicia he threw himself on the mercy of Seleucus.

Initially Seleucus was sympathetic and promised support. Though his subsequent volte-face is conveniently ascribed to the influence of his friend Patrocles, this may reflect the apologia of a pro-Selucid source. More cynically, Seleucus' initial pose of friendliness may be explained as a time-winning device while he mobilised the large army with which he then confronted Demetrius.\textsuperscript{235} The latter, thus forced to abandon his conciliatory stance, and to treat Seleucus' land as enemy territory, enjoyed a brief revival of his fortunes, but finally pursued by Seleucus into Cyrrhestica and deserted by his remaining troops, he surrendered.\textsuperscript{236}

For Lysimachus, the welcome news of Demetrius' captivity was

\textsuperscript{233} Plut. Demet. 46. \textsuperscript{234} Plut. Demet. 46-47. \textsuperscript{235} Plut. Demet. 47. \textsuperscript{236} Plut. Demet. 49.
perhaps soured somewhat by the clear hostility of Seleucus, who had refused his offers of help at the time of Demetrius' last stand. Lysimachus' attempt to purchase Demetrius' death was angrily rejected.\footnote{Diod. XXI F.1.20, Plut. Demet. 48,51. 238) Cary, 1951 52; for Seleucus' designs on Macedon, see Ch.7. 239) Lévèque, 1957 167.} As long as Demetrius was alive, there was the danger that Seleucus might use him as a weapon against Lysimachus in Asia, or even as a pretext for an attack on Macedon.\footnote{Plut. Pyrrh.12; Lévèque, 1957 162 stresses the great increase in Pyrrhus' revenues as a result. 241) Edmonds, 1961 247, Phoenic. F.1; Lévèque, 1957 168; Hammond & Walbank, 1988 235 see this as a response to Ptolemy's re-affirmation of close links with Lysimachus (see below).} In the event, Seleucus' fear that Demetrius might prove a double-edged sword apparently prevailed, while the Besieger himself seems swiftly to have abandoned any hopes of his release. It is therefore plausible that it was the news of Demetrius' capture which told Lysimachus that now was the right time to assert his claim to Pyrrhus' kingdom, which now included Thessaly;\footnote{239) Lysimachus himself had persuaded Pyrrhus to break his recent peace with Demetrius and invade this rich territory. 240} Lysimachus himself had persuaded Pyrrhus to break his recent peace with Demetrius and invade this rich territory.\footnote{240}

Despite these outward signs of amity, both rulers of Macedon seem to have taken preliminary steps to fortify themselves, diplomatically, for the oncoming conflict. Phoenicides' comedy The Flute-Players, produced in 284 BC, refers to a "secret treaty" recently made between Pyrrhus and Demetrius' son, Antigonus Gonatas.\footnote{Edmonds, 1961 247, Phoenic. F.1; Lévèque, 1957 168; Hammond & Walbank, 1988 235 see this as a response to Ptolemy's re-affirmation of close links with Lysimachus (see below).} On the other side, Lysimachus' friendship with Pyrrhus' one-time allies, the Aetolians, reflected in inscriptions and the naming of Aetolian cities after Lysimachus and Arsinoe, may pre-date
Pyrrhus' expulsion from Macedon.\textsuperscript{242} In Egypt, Ptolemy II had only just acceded to the throne against a background of dynastic struggle; concerned above all to establish himself securely, he would not risk war with Lysimachus for Pyrrhus' sake.\textsuperscript{243} Despite Lysimachus' reception of Ptolemy Ceraunus, Ptolemy II's displaced rival, Egypt reaffirmed her ties with Thrace; Ptolemy II's marriage to Lysimachus' daughter Arsinoe sealed the deal.\textsuperscript{244}

Pyrrhus was left isolated. Plutarch's account suggests that he felt himself unable to confront Lysimachus' forces in the field,\textsuperscript{245} retreating to Edessa where he holed himself up. Such a course of action by the "new Alexander", and in particular his abandonment of Pella without a fight, is not easy to explain; Hammond's recent suggestion that Plutarch's account has omitted a military confrontation which preceded Pyrrhus' retreat to Edessa is attractive.\textsuperscript{246} Disappointed in Pyrrhus and longing perhaps for the re-uniting of their country under a strong ruler,\textsuperscript{247} the Macedonians swiftly succumbed to the propaganda of Lysimachus, Alexander's companion in arms. In the spring of 285 BC, starved of supplies, and deserted by his Macedonian followers, Pyrrhus retreated to Epirus.\textsuperscript{248} According to Pausanias, Lysimachus followed up his

\textsuperscript{242} Lévéque, 1957 165; Syll\textsuperscript{3} 380 - Cassandreia honours the Aetolian Androbolus c.285/4 BC; Prepelaus is honoured at Aetolian-controlled Delphi c.287 BC, (see Appendix III); for the cities, see Ch.6.
\textsuperscript{243} Cary, 1951 55; 244) Ferguson, 1911 153; Cary, 1950 51; Lévéque, 1957 165; Habicht, 1979 80-81. For the marriage, Schol. Theoc. 17.128.
\textsuperscript{245} Plut. Demet. 41, 44; Pyrrh. 11,12. 246) Hammond & Walbank, 1988 234 - for a similar omission in Plutarch (Lysimachus' defeat at Amphipolis in 287 BC) see Ch.1.
\textsuperscript{247} Bengtson, 1987 130 cites disruption in communications, trade and a break in family ties as reasons for popular discontent with the kingdom's division. 248) Plut. Pyrrh. 12.
victory by invading Epirus and desecrating the royal tombs, but the historicity of this episode is generally doubted.\textsuperscript{249}

Rather, 284 BC sees Lysimachus rounding out his kingdom to its fullest extent, with the seizure of Heracleia Pontica and the annexation of Paeonia on Macedon's North-west border. In both cases, stratagem, diplomacy, and the timely exploitation of weakness caused by dynastic struggle were the key to success. Lysimachus' desire to renew a personal control of Heracleia should probably be connected with the threat posed to the city by an aggressive neighbour, Zipoites of Bithynia. Lysimachus' war with the latter had proved his one distinct failure, set against a string of victories in the first half of the 280s BC.\textsuperscript{250} Rather than lose the link between the Black Sea and his possessions in Northern Phrygia and the shipbuilding centre which alliance with Heracleia gave him,\textsuperscript{251} Lysimachus was prepared to seize the city himself.

The death of his ex-wife Amastris in apparently suspicious circumstances gave him a suitable pretext for intervention. Capitalising on his past friendship with her sons Clearchus and Oxathres, Lysimachus' skill at dissembling, accorded grudging admiration by Memnon,\textsuperscript{252} gained him entry to the city. He then accused his stepsons of matricide and had them executed. Memnon's

\textsuperscript{249} Paus.1.9.7; Léveque, 1957 171 and Hornblower, 1981 Appendix I 246-8 see this story as the result of confusion with Plut. Pyrrh. 26 and Diod.XXII.12 where Pyrrhus' mercenaries sack Macedon's royal tombs. 250) Just.XVI.3.1, Trog. Prol. Lib.16. Burstein, 1976 84, 93 identifies this war in Thraciae with operations against Zipoites, who reconquered "Thynian Thrace" from Clearchus. Memn. FGrH 434 F.6,3, Diod. XIX.60.3, Paus.V.12.7. for Zipoites' victories against two of Lysimachus' generals and the king himself. 251) Memn. FGrH 434 F.8. 4-5, Burstein, 1976 84; see also Ch.7. 252) Memn. FGrH 434 F.5.3.
account suggests that Clearchus and Oxathres had not shared the popularity enjoyed by their father Dionysius. Lysimachus was shrewd enough to exploit this; his restoration of Heracleian democracy won him a brief period of popularity.253

In Paeonia, it is probable that King Audoleon's death in 284 BC was followed by dynastic struggle. Audoleon's participation in the Athenian "Piraeus recovery scheme"254 seems to suppose friendly relations with Lysimachus; this is supported by the fact that his heir Ariston, expelled from the kingdom, turned to the king of Thrace for aid. As Cassander's sons had found in 294 BC, such a course proved perilous; Polyaeus' account255 suggests that no sooner had the young king been enthroned than the forces which had aided his restoration were turned against him, forcing him to flee. This may, however, be due to the compression which the stratagem format tends to impose, and Merker's suggestion that Ariston was deposed only when he proved insufficiently compliant is attractive.256

The addition of Macedon, Thessaly, Heracleia and Paeonia to his possessions in Thrace and Anatolia significantly advanced Lysimachus' position both in terms of resources and prestige.257 In Athens and elsewhere in mainland Greece he enjoyed an influence secured by diplomacy rather than military aggression. He seems to

253) Memn.,ibid.; for subsequent developments at Heracleia, see Ch. 7. 254) Merker, Balkan Studies 1965 48; IG II² 654 for 6,500 medimnoi of corn from Audoleon in 286/5 BC. 255) Polyaeus.IV.12.3. 256) Merker, Balkan Studies 1965 49. 257) For the wealth of Pella's mint, see Newell, 1927 79-80; Strabo VII. F. 34 for the Crenides gold mines and Paeonian wealth. Thessaly was famed for its pastureland and horses; see Cawkwell, 1978 58. For Heracleian resources, see Burstein, 1976 4-5.
have been sufficiently shrewd to recognise that overt attempts at conquest would simply make him the enemy in the place of Antigonus Gonatas, whose continued grip on key points such as Corinth, Chalcis and the Piraeus aroused deep hostility.259

Whether Lysimachus had inherited from Antigonus, along with his kingdom the vision of Alexander's empire united under his own rule, must remain an open question. Certainly in 284 BC, he had come closer to achieving this than any of his contemporaries,260 and his consistent care to promote himself as Alexander's companion and heir may suggest that his ambitions were less limited than is often supposed.260 Among his former friends, Lysimachus could not avoid the odium that comes with conspicuous success, and his enjoyment of this vast empire was to be shortlived. The dynastic struggle which split his court in two and which gave Seleucus his golden opportunity to reach for a kingdom which fell little short of τὰ βασιλεία will be examined in the final chapter. Since, however, it is a commonplace in many modern histories of the Successor period that a major factor contributing to Lysimachus' fall from grace was the harshness of his government of his subjects, the next chapter will attempt an assessment of this problem.

258) It is generally agreed that evidence for Lysimachus' plans for a military conquest of Greece is lacking; e.g. Tarn, 1913 121; Cloché, 1952 210; Will, CAH VII 1984 112. 259) Will, ibid. 110. 260) See also Chs. 1, 6 and 7.
"It is neither descent nor legitimacy which gives monarchies to men, but the ability to command an army and to govern a state wisely, as was the case with the Successors of Alexander."

Lysimachus' possession of the first quality which the Suda deems essential for successful kingship has been amply demonstrated in the last three chapters, which examined his rise from satrap of Thrace to ruler of a vast and powerful kingdom. The swiftness of his fall from these dizzy heights, with the loss of his empire in Asia culminating in defeat at Seleucus' hands and death on the field at Corupedium in February 281 BC, is commonly ascribed to a failure to fulfill the second requirement for basileia.

Lysimachus is generally characterised as a "harsh" ruler, unpopular with the Greek cities within his kingdom, whom he subjected to oppressive taxation.1 "Proverbially avaricious", he piled up the revenues thus extorted in the famous treasuries which earned him the title Γαργυλος,2 and which have been seen as exceptional for the period.3 Other practices, cited in support of the view that it was his unphilhellenic behaviour which finally caused his downfall, are his foundation of new cities by synoecism,

1) e.g. Will, CAH VII 1984 112; Roussel, 1938 367; Bengtson, 1987 127 though here Lysimachus is cleared of avarice for its own sake, with a policy of high taxation set in the context of the firm financial basis needed for administration and extension of power in Anatolia. 2) Plut.Demet. 25. 3) Andreades, 1930 9; see below and Ch.6 for further discussion.
which "destroyed" existing πόλεις and forced their inhabitants to leave their ancestral homes and shrines; his garrisoning of the cities; his suppression of city coinages; his support of tyrannic and oligarchic governments. His regime is often contrasted with that of the 'liberal' Antigonids which preceded it; where the latter saw the Greeks as 'allies', Lysimachus treated them as 'subjects', incorporating them directly into his kingdom, under the administration of a συρατησός.

Despite past attempts to redress the balance in his favour, this view continues to dominate the most recent research, although the evidence is scant and sometimes uncertain. Before examining the material, mostly from Asia Minor, which bears on Lysimachus' relations with the Greek cities within his kingdom, it is worth identifying some of the problems raised by such a task, which are perhaps too often overlooked.

Firstly, it is not constructive to make judgements on Lysimachus' methods of government in isolation from those of his predecessors, and still more importantly, his contemporaries. Shipley, for example, rejecting Geyer's thesis that Lysimachus behaved no worse than the other Diadochs, cites, somewhat emotively, with reference to synoecism, "the cruel side-effects of Lysimachus' 'progress' ", concluding that "he was unlikely to endear himself to the Ionians.

by a wholesale disregard for institutions and traditions".9 That deep feelings were attached to the ancestral city and its temples is undeniable,10 but synoecism can only be cited as symptomatic of unusually harsh government, and decisive, therefore, in effecting Lysimachus' downfall, if the practice were unique to him, or his innovation. Quite apart from the synoecisms of Alexander and the Carian dynast Mausolus earlier in the fourth century,11 the "philhellenic" Antigonus sends letters to the city of Teos,12 proposing a similar scheme, affecting cities in the same geographical region which later "suffered" the synoecisms of Lysimachus, and plainly no more popular.13

Second, the evidence for Lysimachus' dealings with the Greek cities, both literary and epigraphic, tends to give information on the status of individual cities at random and unrelated moments in time. To infer from such evidence an empire-wide policy, applied throughout the reign, seems injudicious. The theory of "oppressive taxation" of the Greeks, for instance, rests largely on two inscriptions from Miletus, both of which are open to re-interpretation.14 Such generalisation satisfies the desire to see a neat administrative system in force in the early Hellenistic

9) Shipley, 1987 176. 10) Viz. the poetic laments for cities like Colophon (Paus.1.9.7) and Ephesus, _FHG_ II 466. 11) Arr. Anab.V.29.3, IV.4.1, V.17.4, Ps.-Call. 1.31.2, Hornblower, 1982 87; ibid., 78-102. 12) Shipley, 1987 174; Welles, _RC_ 1934 no.s 3 and 4. 13) Antigonus' royal title dates the plan later than 306 BC; the allied invasion of 302 BC may explain its non-completion. Welles, 1934 30 sees Teos' request for a larger loan for purchase of grain than that first proposed by Lebedus (no.3 11.72-80) as an obstructionist tactic. 14) Roussel (1938 367) sees _I Milet_, 138, 139 as proof of a general "imposition of heavy contributions." See below for Burstein's reinterpretation.
kingdoms, but pays too little heed to the instability of the Diadoch period and the fierce competition among the Successors to first attract and then maintain Greek support. In such a context, success must rest largely on the ability to be flexible, and to apply the method - be it conciliation or deterrence - most likely to be effective in the particular circumstances. A city's past history, the rivalry of political factions within it, its initial response to the king's approach, its strategic and economic importance, are all factors which might influence its treatment by the monarch.

Thirdly there is what might be called "the snow-ball effect"; the assumption that Lysimachus' government was harsh has induced scholars to read signs of oppression into evidence which may be quite neutral. An inscription from Thasos, where the word ἐλευθεροθέντος was restored and interpreted as a sign of liberation from Lysimachus, is a classic example. Robert sensibly pointed out that the formula ἄµον ἐλευθεροθέντος is quite unparalleled, suggesting a more plausible restoration, Ἐλευ[θερί]ῶν, the name of the Ionian month, representing part of the dating formula in the preamble to the decree.

Then there is the Hellenocentric approach of sources which concentrate, when they deal with problems of administration and government at all, almost exclusively on the Greek cities. This has in turn affected modern historiography, which has tended to see

15) Orth, 1977 12-3 for royal favours designed to win sympathy as an alternative method to brute force. 16) IG XII Suppl. 1939 no.355, Picard, BCH 1921 153; Robert, Rev.Phil 1936 131.
oppressive taxation of the Greeks as the only possible explanation for Lysimachus' evident wealth and reputation as a financier. Other royal resources are largely ignored; Burstein has rightly emphasised the importance of booty and the acquisition of mines as an explanation for Lysimachus' estimated reserves of at least 20,000T. Similarly, revenues deriving from the king's vast tracts of royal land, in terms of cash-crops like wheat, vines and olives, cash-payments from concessionaires and taxes paid by the who worked it, should not be overlooked. Recent analysis suggests that such land continued to be a source of profit to the king even when it was "alienated". The slight evidence we possess suggests that Lysimachus took steps to maximise such revenues and it may have been in this area, rather than in the more politically sensitive sphere of the Greek cities, that he really cracked the whip.

Finally, the view that the cities' mass defection to Seleucus in 282/1 BC expresses simply a reaction against long-term oppression is questionable. This problem will be discussed in the final chapter. Before the dynastic crisis of 283/2 BC, the cities show themselves divided in response to successive "liberators"; some cities welcomed Lysimachus in 302 BC and were duly rewarded; some defected to Demetrius in 287/6 BC, but others remained loyal.

Generally, then, the foundations on which the traditional view of Lysimachus as oppressor par excellence have been constructed are

17) e.g. Andreades, 1930 11. 18) Burstein, 1984 62; for mineral resources in lands acquired by Lysimachus after Ipsus, see Ch.4. 19) Briant, 1982 103-5; for discussion of the traditional view of Hellenistic Asia Minor as a "feudal system", see below. 20) See below. 21) For Seleucus as self-styled benefactor of the Greeks, see Welles, RC 1934 no.9 11.5-6; see also Ch. 7. 22) See Chs. 3 and 4.
not entirely secure. Passing from these broad questions of method and approach, it is time to set Lysimachus' government of the Greeks in Asia in its historical context with a brief look at their relations with the rulers preceding him, the Lydian and Achaemenid kings, Alexander and the Antigonids. In this study the issue of "freedom and autonomy" emerges as a major theme; indeed Lysimachus' tug-of-war with the Antigonids for possession of the Greek cities has been thought to embody a struggle for the survival of the principle of Greek autonomy itself. It is, therefore, worth considering first what "freedom and autonomy" actually meant to the Diadochs' Greek subjects in Asia.

FREEDOM AND AUTONOMY

As Wehrli points out, the slogan undergoes several changes both in form and meaning from its first appearance at the time of the Persian Wars. Prominent both in the literary sources and decrees issued by cities and kings, "freedom and autonomy" is presented as the ideal to which the Greek cities of the Hellenistic kingdoms aspired. By modern commentators it is commonly defined as embracing the broadest powers of action, in terms of internal government and foreign policy. Simpson defines "autonomy" as "the absolute freedom and independence of a city both in its internal government and in its relations with outside powers"; Bikermann cites the ability to make bilateral treaties as a mark of

23) Wehrli, 1968 128. 24) e.g. Diod. XVIII.69. 3-4, XIX.61.4, 105.1, XX.111.2; Welles, RG 1934 no.1. 11. 53-6, no.15 = Inschr.Eryth. no.30 1.34, Meritt, AJPhil 1935 no.1.1.6; Ehrenberg, 1938 35.
sovereignty or juridical independence; Martin, more cautiously, discussing "sovereignty" in relation to coinage, sees it as "the ability to exercise the power to establish and to fulfil some goals in the political, economic, social and other areas of government".26

The ancient evidence, however, makes it clear that such definitions represent an ideal, rather than the real experience of the Greeks in Asia in the Successor period. For them, "freedom and autonomy" essentially designated the grant of certain privileges. Jones' definition of the term as "the enjoyment of one's own ancestral constitution, the absence of a garrison and immunity from tribute"26 is more realistic than those quoted above. Indeed, in practice, even those who define "freedom and autonomy" in ideal terms accept this more limited conception, in looking for the presence or absence of such conditions as a means of assessing the character of a monarch's rule.

How then did the citizens and statesmen of the early Hellenistic πόλεις regard this interpretation of "freedom and autonomy"? Though it may have represented the debasement of an earlier ideal, clearly the privileges thus conferred were highly prized. This is borne out by the cities' practice of selectively publishing decisions which favoured them, in order to secure their continuation under future kings; the recently identified "archive" at Priene is a classic example.27 The kings could, however, revoke or reduce these privileges if political expediency so demanded;28 by the late

third century at least, there is no apparent sense of contradiction
in naming as "autonomous" a city where the payment of tribute or
dating of decrees by the regnal year would seem to belie the term.\(^{29}\)

Such anomalies raise further questions. Is it valid to suggest
that a grant of autonomy was valued primarily by the Greeks as a
mark of respect, a formal recognition of what was due to their
πόλεις? Saitta, for example, admits that conditions for the cities
under Lysimachus differed little from those during Antigonid rule,
but is unwilling to relinquish the traditional contrast between the
King of Thrace and his "philhellenic" predecessors. For him,
Lysimachus' crime was his disregard for Greek sensibilities, an
unwillingness to mask the reality of his rule with formal assurances
of "freedom".\(^{30}\) To accept such a view, one must assume an
extraordinary naiveté on the part of the Greeks, if the repetition
of empty assurances of autonomy sufficed to blind them to the
measures which actually undermined it. From a twentieth century
standpoint such an explanation is not implausible; the exploitation
by government of the short memory, political indifference and
essential optimism of the population, a phenomenon which might be
called, in Orwellian terms, "the chocolate ration syndrome",\(^{31}\) is a
familiar occurrence. It is less certain whether such an explanation
is applicable to the fourth century Greek πόλεις, with its
relatively small number of citizens and a tradition of widespread

29) Allen, 1983 57; Bikermann, REG 1939 344. 30) Saitta, Kokalos
1955 98-101; Shipley, 1987 177 takes a similar line. 31) Orwell,
1949 62; a reduced chocolate ration represented by the government as
an increased one is widely celebrated!
active involvement in public life which is alien to the modern nation-state. A look at the history of the Greek cities in Asia may suggest rather that their statesmen had grown used to accommodating themselves to a succession of rulers whose superior power must be acknowledged and whose very real benefactions32 should be received with gratitude, while accepting that the ideal of "Greek autonomy" in its fullest sense could no longer be achieved.

THE GREEK CITIES BEFORE ALEXANDER

For the ἱστος on Asia Minor's western coast, "liberation" was a familiar concept, touted by a bewildering variety of "protectors" during the fifth and fourth centuries BC.33 Promised in the context of imperial expansion, "Greek freedom" was almost invariably abandoned or betrayed by "the liberators" in exchange for some more tangible prize. 392 BC, for instance, saw Sparta hand over the Greeks of Asia to the Great King; in return he recognised the independence of mainland Greece and the Islands.34 Apart from a period in the 440s BC as "allies" of the Athenians, who themselves organised the cities into tribute-paying districts on the lines of the former Persian satrapies,35 the Greeks of Asia Minor formed an integral part of the empire ruled, successively, by the Mermnad, Achaemenid and Argead kings; it is unsurprising that Appian says "The Ionians and Aeolians are accustomed to obedience, even to barbarian kings."36

32) See Ch.6 for further discussion of this aspect of kingship. 33) e.g. by the Great King, Sparta, Athens and Thebes, finally Alexander; see Wehrli, 1968 128. 34) Lewis, 1977 147. 35) Meiggs, 1972 234-54, especially 242, 246; Balcer, 1986 17. 36) App.Syr.12.
As such, under the Lydian and Persian kings, the cities were included in the empire's regular administrative system. They paid the ἄμορκος which symbolised their subject status, and supplied contingents for the royal army and navy in time of war. As regards internal affairs, the Ionians asked the conqueror Cyrus for the same conditions as had obtained under Croesus; some see this as reflecting a considerable degree of local autonomy; others dismiss it as Lydian propaganda. While the cities lost their right to make war amongst themselves, after the failure of the Ionian revolt in the 490s BC, the seeming paradox of King Artaxerxes' statement in 395 BC, that "the Greeks might have their autonomy as long as they continued to pay the ancient dues" supports the view that the Achaemenid kings were not interested in intervention in the cities' internal affairs for its own sake.

In terms of economic prosperity, however, "subjection" and the peace that accompanied it may have been preferable to the times when the cities found themselves the object of yet another "liberation campaign". Plutarch, Diodorus, the pseudo-Aristotelian Oeconomica and the stratagem handbooks show the cities frequently vulnerable to the depredations of Athenian and Spartan "protectors". Often
the cities came under the control of tyrants and oligarchs, whose rule was promoted or tolerated by the Great King and his satraps as long as it suited their interests.\textsuperscript{44} In the mid fourth century the Hecatomnid dynast Mausolus expanded his "empire" to include Greek πόλεις in Caria and further afield; if the \textit{Oeconomica} is to be trusted, he surpassed even the \textit{οικονομός} Lysimachus in money-making schemes.\textsuperscript{45} The effect of his famed rapacity on the cities' inhabitants is, however, difficult to gauge. Ambitious temple building programmes at Miletus, Ephesus and perhaps Priene\textsuperscript{46} have been cited as proof of "prosperity" among the "Greeks of Asia Minor" in this period,\textsuperscript{47} but this need not mean that the community as a whole was flourishing, merely that some sections of the community enjoyed considerable wealth.\textsuperscript{48}

For citizens of πόλεις which relied heavily on trade for their prosperity, it is probable, then, that neither "liberation" nor "subjection" had quite the same connotations as the orators, pamphleteers and politicians would have us believe. It is likely, too, that this historical experience had to some extent shaped both the expectations of the cities themselves - archives attest an awareness of past conditions and privileges going back several

centuries and informed the attitude of their new rulers.

For the latter, however, probably still more important was the precedent set by Alexander, the Greeks' most recent "liberator". Lysimachus and Antigonus both stressed their right to rule as Alexander's heirs and had practised or observed the art of government in Asia Minor under his regime. Alexander himself had not operated in a vacuum; recent analysis, based on non-Greek evidence, has undermined the traditional view that Alexander and his Successors imposed a Graeco-Macedonian system of administration upon a "barbarian" world perceived as culturally inferior. Alexander's debt to his Achaemenid predecessors must be acknowledged.

THE GREEK CITIES OF ASIA MINOR UNDER ALEXANDER

Though historians may strive for "objectivity", their perceptions are, of necessity, coloured by the preoccupations of their own time. This is nowhere made more clear than in the shift of opinion that has occurred regarding Alexander as the champion of Greek freedom. At the beginning of the 20th century, it was generally assumed that Alexander, whose dynasty claimed Hellenic descent, could not have

49) e.g. The Batinetis dispute (Priene versus Samos) (I.Priene no. 37 11. 73-80, 86-7,101-2, 107-8, 118, 122; Welles, RC no.7 11.8-9) drew on records going back to the 6th century BC. Compare Tac. Ann. III. 59-63 where Ionian cities cite the decisions of Cyrus, Alexander and past Roman commanders, hoping to influence Tiberius. 50) See Ch.6. 51) Arr.1.29.3 for Antigonus as governor of Greater Phrygia; as of Alexander, Lysimachus was presumably well-placed to observe and/or advise on policy decisions at the top (see Ch. 6 for the advisory role of the King's Friends). 52) See, for example, Sherwin-White's excellent article (1987, 1-30) on Seleucid administration in Babylonia.
treated his fellow Hellenes as other than "free allies". This belief perhaps owed more to a background of British and German colonial imperialism and strong nationalistic feelings than to the ancient evidence. This rose-tinted vision was challenged by Bikermann and Ehrenberg, writing in the 1930s as Europe witnessed the rise of a new nation of conquerors. They saw Alexander's attitude towards the Greek cities of Asia as defined primarily by his position as heir to the Achaemenid kings and master of the Asian yāpa, a view which is still generally held today.

Alexander's earliest administration in Asia Minor shows no divergence from the existing system; his nominee, Calas, simply replaces the Persian Arsites as satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, with authority over Greeks and non-Greeks alike. Only later does he take up the "liberator's" sword, inspired perhaps by the actions of some of the Greek cities themselves. Alexander used the "autonomy slogan" to win support from the Greek πόλεις; illustrating his famous flexibility, it represents an intelligent response to circumstances, rather than the ideological mainspring or justification for his invasion of the Persian empire.

Alexander's stance regarding grants of "freedom and autonomy" to the Greek cities is grounded in pragmatism not idealism. At its

53) For a review of this tradition, propounded by Droysen, Kaerst, Wilcken, Berve and Tarn, see Badian, 1966 37-8. 54) Badian, ibid., remarks that "Tarn's view of genuine freedom clearly goes against the evidence". 55) Bikermann, REG 1934 346, 354-5; Ehrenberg, 1938 33. 56) Arr. Anab. I.17.8, Badian, 1966 44. 57) Badian, 1966 45, sees offers of submission from Magnesia-on-Maeander and Tralles (Arr.Anab.I.18.1) as the turning point in Alexander's policy. 58) Compare the propaganda of 334/3 BC - liberation (Diod.XVII.24.1), with that of 335/4 BC at Corinth - revenge for Persian offences against Greece (Diod.XVII.4.9).
fullest extent ἐλευθερία καὶ αὐτοκρατορια entailed democratic government, in place of the oligarchs or tyrants lately favoured by Persia; the cities enjoyed their own laws, they were exempt from the ἀποτομον previously paid to the Great King, free from garrisons and from direct control by the satrap or royal financial officials.69 "Freedom and autonomy" did not, however, represent an acknowledgement of the Greeks' unquestioned right to such conditions; rather these were privileges, accorded by the king's favour and revocable at any time. These could vary from city to city, and there is no question of a uniform grant of this status to all Greek ἀγῶνες.60 Above all, there is a clear connection between the cities' response to the monarch and the conditions subsequently imposed.61 Tyre and Gaza resisted and were destroyed;62 cities which offered submission, including those of Ionia and Aeolis, were granted "freedom and autonomy".63

Moreover, though loyal cities might be rewarded in this way, Alexander's potential rights over his Greek subjects remained the same as those of his Achaemenid predecessors. Though some cities were exempted by royal favour from payment of taxes to the crown,

sometimes called ἀρογ, sometimes the more innocuous αὐρτάκης. Alexander did not relinquish his right to levy such taxes from the Greek cities if he wished or needed to. Chios, for one, was obliged to supply ships at her own expense. Some of the cities were garrisoned, others were placed under the direct supervision of the satrap. The king could grant their revenues as gifts to his φίλοι; Eresus was allowed to judge the fate of its expelled tyrants, but only by virtue of Alexander's δικαστήριο; new laws at Chios were to be submitted to Alexander for approval; at Ephesus, Rhodes, Methymna and Imbros, Alexander's official, Philoxenus, intervenes directly, putting citizens on trial and decreeing their punishment.

Towards the end of Alexander's reign, Philoxenus' reappearance as "commander of Ionia/the seashore" has been thought to reflect tightening control over the Greek cities, further limiting their already precarious freedom. It is, however, possible that this appointment represents a security measure taken in response to

64) This exemption comes only with Alcimachus' mission to Aeolis and Ionia (Arr.Anab.I.18.2) and was not universally granted (Bosworth, 1980 135). Though αὐρτάκης have been seen as a war tax, (e.g. Badian, 1966 49,59, Bosworth, 1980 166 (a one-off payment)), evidence for such a theory is lacking; Sherwin-White, JHS 1985 85-6 suggests, following Allen, 1983 50-3, that by Alexander's time, as later under the Attalids and Seleucids, ἀρογ and αὐρτάκης were terms used interchangeably to denote regular royal taxes. 65) Syll² 283 11. 9-10, Ehrenberg, 1938 24. 66) For garrisons at Chios, and possibly Priene, Syll² 283. 11.17-18, I.Priene no.1 1.15; Badian, 1966 49. For Soli and Aspendus under satrapal control, Bikermann REG 1934 371. 67) e.g. Plut. Phoc.18; compare Plut.Them.29 - Artaxerxes' gifts to Themistocles. 68) OGIS 8 11. 60, 127, 143; Welles RC 1934 no.2 11.12-14. 69) Plut. Phoc 18, Ehrenberg, 1938 33; Badian, 1966 59 sees Philoxenus as a "general supervisor". 70) Ehrenberg, 1938 34.
unrest in Ionia during Alexander's long absence in India, rather than increasing despotism per se. Unrest, disloyalty and official misconduct is attested in other parts of the empire, notably Egypt and the upper satrapies, at this time, and Orontes' hope of being appointed as "overseer of the Aegean shore" after the Satraps' Revolt may serve as a precedent for such an appointment under Achaemenid rule. If this is correct, then Philoxenus' appointment follows the expected pattern of treatment as related to conduct.

To sum up. As a weapon to win Greek support in the first years of his Asian campaign, "freedom and autonomy" had served Alexander well, and there was no reason to cease granting such privileges when he could afford to. After Gaugamela, however, Alexander was undisputed master of the πόλεις. Like his Achaemenid predecessors he regarded them as subjects of the empire; this is reflected in the fact, rightly stressed by Badian, that Perdiccas' division of the empire among its new satraps in 323 BC at Babylon makes no special provision for the Greek cities. No more is heard of "freedom and autonomy" for the Greeks until 315 BC, when Antigonus assumes the role of "liberator."73

Before going on to examine the evidence for Antigonid philhellenism it is worth considering the effect of Alexander's death on conditions for the Greek cities of Asia. The fierce

71) Arr. Anab. VI.27.3-4; VI.29.2; VII.23.6 (Egypt, though Ptolemaic bias against Cleomenes is possible here). Badian, 1966 59 sees Philoxenus' task as specifically to prevent revolution in the cities; Orontes - Diod. XV.91.1; if he realised this hope, as Olmstead (1948 414-21) assumes, then his authority may have extended only to the coastal cities, since as Cook points out (1983 221) Dascyleion and Sardis remained in their former satraps' hands. 72) Badian, 1966 61. 73) Diod. XIX.61.4.
competition between his Successors that continued through the next four decades created a situation closer to that of Alexander's early years in Asia than the last years of his reign. Accordingly the same link between city behaviour and royal treatment might be expected, and indeed the Diadoch period sees attractive inducements offered for defection from a rival; loyalty is rewarded; monarchs strive to show themselves as benefactors of the Greeks. Cities which resist, or defect and are recaptured are likely to be sanctioned, though it is notable that the methods of punishment, though seemingly harsh by the standards of 20th century western democracy, are markedly lenient compared to the standard practice of physical destruction and πανοσία previously employed by both Persian and Athenian conquerors and by Alexander himself.

ANTIGONUS - CHAMPION OF THE GREEKS?

Invoked first and foremost as a weapon in the war with Cassander, who maintained control of mainland Greece with garrisons and the support of oligarchies, Antigonus' proclamation of "freedom and autonomy" naturally emphasised democratic government, freedom from garrisons and from payment of ἄποικος. Carried over from Greece into Asia Minor in the period from 314 BC to 312 BC to win Caria from its satrap Asander, on the enemy side and described by Diodorus as "strong with a considerable number of cities subject
to him", the success of the autonomy slogan is mirrored in the epigraphic record.

The stephanophorate list at Miletus marks the year 312 BC as that which saw the city "free and autonomous" by the grant of Antigonus, with "democracy ... restored". A letter from Antiochus I (?) to Erythrae acknowledges the city's claim to be "autonomous and exempt from tribute" as "under Alexander and Antigonus". An inscription from Colophon listing subscribers for a wall-building project, perhaps initiated under the auspices of Antigonus, refers to "King Alexander's grant of freedom to the ἀνυκός" and praises Antigonus's strenuous efforts to protect the ἀνταρχή of his ancestors. The Prieneans also proclaim themselves ἀνυκότατοι on a series of city decrees, but these may date to the period of Alexander's "liberation" campaign rather than that of Antigonus' government. Subsequently, Antigonus' concern for Greek freedom is used to justify his acceptance of the Peace of 311 BC; Demetrius conquers Athens in 307 BC and most of mainland Greece from 304 BC to 302 BC as "liberator of the Greeks"; his treaty with Cassander in 302 BC included the provision that the Greeks of both Europe and Asia should be free, autonomous and exempt from garrisons.

79) Diod.XIX.62.2. 80) I.Milet. 123 11.2-4; Meyer, 1925 20-21; Welles, RC 1934 no.15 11.34-5; Maier, 1969 no.69 = Meritt, A.J.Phil 1935 358-71; Maier's context (Antigonus' governorship of Ionia from 311 BC to 306 BC) may be preferable to Meritt's (his command of Alexander's "allied forces" in 334 BC). 81) I.Priene no.s 1- 4(1), 6,7. Hiller (1906 4-13) sees the "autonomy" formula ending c.328/7 BC (I. Priene no.s 4(2),8), but his reconstruction of the stephanophorate table rests on the uncertain assumption that Alexander personally dedicated the Athena Polias temple in 335/4 BC. 82) Diod. XIX.105.1; Welles RC 1934 no.1, 11.1, 53-6; Diod.XX.45.5; Plut. Demet.8-9; Diod.XX.102.1; Woodhead, 1981 357-67 (an Athenian tribal decree issued during the 4 Years War); Diod. XX. 111.2.
Though his opponents, notably Ptolemy, followed his lead in proclaiming themselves "liberators", it was Antigonus who really made the autonomy slogan his own. His consummate skill as a propagandist is reflected not only in the positive response of the Greek ἀνεξάρτητος to his promise of "liberation", but also by the conviction of many modern scholars that he, alone among the Successors, was a "genuine Philhellenē". His designation of the cities as his "allies" has been taken to reflect a genuine independence. The careful phrasing of his letters to them, couched in terms of advice and recommendations rather than orders, is cited as proof of Antigonus' tact and sensitivity to Greek feeling. This is frequently contrasted with the brutally direct approach of Lysimachus, his successor in Asia Minor.

Redressing the balance, Wehrli's discussion of Antigonus and the Greeks makes the following points: it is unwise to read into the term σύμμαχος all the modern connotations of the word "ally" - a member of an equal partnership, voluntarily undertaken. In Greek it may mean simply "companion in arms" and precedents such as that of Athens' Delian League, where the term "ally" is a euphemism applied to those who are effectively subject to the ruling power, are important. The view that Antigonus' promotion of Greek freedom stemmed from some longstanding ideological conviction is exposed as false. Wehrli cites Antigonus' earlier co-operation with the

83) For Ptolemy as liberator, Diod. XIX.62.1, XX.37.1-2, Inschr.Iasos no. 2. For Lysimachus' use of the slogan, see below.
84) Tscherikower, 1927 161; Wehrli, 1968 103 for further examples.
85) e.g. Welles RC 1934 no.1 1.44. 86) Saitta, Kokalos 1955 98-99; Shipley, 1987 177; Simpson, Historia 1959 388. 87) Wehrli, 1968 99,126; Bikermann, Rev.Phil. 1939 346.
"unphilhellene" Cassander, rightly stressing Antigonus' need for Greek support against the allied coalition as the motive for his volte-face.\textsuperscript{38}

More important, however, in the context of this study, than the ideological sincerity of Antigonus' "philhellenism" is the extent to which his grants of autonomy, proudly proclaimed by the cities, really represented an advance on the "precarious autonomy" of Alexander's day. Did Lysimachus' methods of government really represent a retrograde step? Wehrli has shown that, as with Alexander, "freedom and autonomy" did not preclude financial obligations, garrisoning and intervention in the city's internal affairs if Antigonus deemed it necessary.

Thus, while Antigonus' "allies" were officially \textit{οιονομανται}, his own letter to Scepsis cites the allies' heavy "expenses" (\textit{δαπανημερα}) as a reason for making peace in 311 BC. The evidence for financial hardship at Ephesus and Miletus in the first years of the third century has already been discussed.\textsuperscript{39} The case of Miletus suggests that privileges like exemption from \textit{τόπος} could be withdrawn subsequent to "liberation"; the burden of "harsh and oppressive taxes and duties" imposed on the city by "certain of the kings" and later lifted by Ptolemy I, may have been imposed, not by Lysimachus, as is often supposed, but by the Antigonids.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{38} Diod. XVIII.55.2 "...Cassander and Antigonus would hold the Greek cities against Polyperchon...since some...were guarded by his father's garrisons and others...ruled by oligarchies"; Wehrli, 1968 126. 89) Welles \textit{RC} 1934 no.1, 1.43; see Ch.4. 90) See below for Seibert and Burstein's re-assessment of I.Milet. 139 11.5-6; also Wehrli, 1968 100. Iasus under Ptolemy I, initially "autonomous, ungarrisoned and exempt from tribute", no longer \textit{καταλληλογιστος} a few years later, provides a useful parallel. \textit{Inschr. Iasos} F1 and 2. 244
Prominent in Antigonus' "autonomy package" was an insistence on exemption from garrisons. It is generally accepted, however, that all the Diadochs applied a double standard on this issue, attacking an opponent's garrisoning policy for propaganda purposes, but with no intention of surrendering their own garrison forces. Wholesale removal of garrisons was clearly unrealistic against a background of constant warfare; for cities of strategic importance, or those which housed a royal treasury or mint, such troops were a military necessity. Antigonus did leave some cities in the Peloponnese ungarrisoned, including the famous "Fetter of Greece", Chalcis. This action is frequently cited as proof of his "sincerity", but in terms of real "freedom", its value was negligible, since he took care to station troops at the Euripus instead. In Asia Minor Antigonus drove Asander's garrison out of Miletus in 313 BC, but the installation of his own troops is attested for cities in Cilicia, at Ephesus, Sardis and Iasus.

If garrisons were a necessary evil, what then of the cities' freedom to conduct foreign and domestic policy under Antigonid rule? Foreign policy, in the sense of an independent initiative to another ruler was likely to be frowned upon, but surely one could expect the Philhellenic Antigonus to allow these "autonomous" cities to conduct their internal affairs without royal interference. Not so. While self-interest ensured that Antigonus' promise of democracy,

91) e.g. Jones, 1939 106; Simpson, Historia 1959 388. 92) Diod. XIX.74.1-2, 78.2; Syll3 328 honours the Euripus garrison commander in 306/5 BC. 93) Diod.XX.19.3; Diod.XX.111.3, Polyain.IV.7; Diod. XX.107.3; Inschr.Iasos no.2, pre 305 BC. 94) e.g. Diog.Laert.II.140 - Demetrius accuses the Eretrians of "plotting with Ptolemy" when they send embassies to Egypt.
widely regarded as inseparable from "autonomy" for the citizens of the early Hellenistic μόνας,
was largely fulfilled, complete independence in the management of financial and judicial affairs was not assured. Despite the careful phrasing, which aims to play down his role as master of the city, Antigonus' letters to Teos regarding the planned synoecism with Lebedus reflect serious interference in city affairs. The new city's laws, drafted by specially appointed νομογράφοι are to be submitted for Antigonus' approval and authors of unsuitable legislation risk punishment at the King's hands.

In the realm of finance, Antigonus feels no qualms about trying to refuse the citizens of Teos and Lebedus their request for a loan to buy grain; though he eventually abandons a scheme to impose on them purchase of his own surpluses, he can be seen regulating the export of corn by both citizens and the inhabitants of the χώρα. Though this particular synoecism seems not to have been completed, the foundation of Antigoneia in the Troad which compelled the mutually hostile peoples of Cebren and Scepsis to rub shoulders suggests that Antigonus' famous sensitivity to Greek feelings was rather more prominent on paper (or stone!) than in practice.

Wehrli has certainly taken off the rose-tinted spectacles through which Antigonus has been seen in the past; Monophthalmus is

95) For the link between democracy and autonomy, Simpson, Historia 1959 385; Wehrli, 1968 129; Bosworth, 1980 135. 96) Welles, RC 1934 no.s 3 and 4; 26 for Antigonus' "affected simplicity of bearing", the expression of the royal will as opinion etc.; see also Wehrli, 1968 86. 97) Welles, RC 1934 26, no.3 11.69-71. 98) Welles, RC 1934 29-30, no.3 11.72-88. 99) Strab. XIII.33. Leaf, 1923 279 applauds Lysimachus' reversal of this decision on economic and cultural grounds.
not the "genuine Philhellene" of tradition. What then of Demetrius, who was the cities' alternative to Lysimachus after 301 BC? The evidence, albeit limited and in the case of Athens at least, perhaps distorted by partisan sources, reveals an equal, if not greater, tendency to make financial demands upon some Greek πόλεις and to restrict their internal autonomy. The only detailed evidence for exaction of ἀποξείν from a Greek city for the Diadoch period is the story that the philosopher Menedemus persuaded Demetrius to reduce Eretrian tribute from 200T to 150T, a staggering amount - Athens' total revenue from allied tribute in her imperial heyday was c.400T p.a. Plutarch refers to an extraordinary levy of 250T upon the Athenians, who were also subjected to an oligarchic government between 294 BC and 287 BC, while Arkesine on Amorgos in Caria and the Nesiote League had to take out loans from Apollo to pay the "contributions" imposed by Demetrius.

"Genuine freedom and autonomy" under the Antigonids, then, is a myth, the product of successful dynastic propaganda, combined with modern preconceptions as to the meaning of certain terms in Greek. It remains to examine the evidence for Lysimachus' government of the Greeks, aiming to establish whether freedom of action in day to day city life was actually diminished under his rule. One might also consider whether his measures stand out either as unprecedented, or uncopied by those who followed him, since the traditional view of

100) See Wehrli, 1968 151-2, 185-6, 193-9 for a detailed discussion; see also Ch.4. 101) Diog. Laert.II.140; Martin, 1985 202. 102) Plut.Demet.27, though the likelihood that the source is Duris or his brother Lynceus (mentioned by Plutarch in the following passage) may reduce the value of this evidence; see Ch.4 for the oligarchy; IG XII 7, 68, 69, 70, Durrbach, 1921 27 no.18; Wehrli, 1968 100-101.
him as a notorious tyrant overthrown because of misgovernment might suggest that he would serve as an object lesson to successors eager to avoid making the same mistakes.

THE GREEK CITIES UNDER LYSIMACHUS

The assumption that Lysimachus' regime in Asia Minor was marked by loss of autonomy across the board, with garrisons, ἀποκ., suppression of city coinage and non-democratic government, must take its origin from the belief that in Thrace he modelled his government on that of Antipater and Cassander in mainland Greece. The validity of this belief has already been questioned in an earlier chapter. Moreover, even if the evidence supported this idea of oppressive government on the West Pontic coast, it would be unwise to assume that Lysimachus automatically applied the same methods in Asia Minor, where he faced the continual threat of competition from Demetrius. The success of Antigonus' "liberation" campaign against Cassander's oligarchies in Greece might also have served as an object lesson.

Certainly the campaign of 302 BC suggests Lysimachus' awareness of the need to woo the cities. Imitating the policy which his own brother had so successfully implemented for Alexander in 334 BC and which had won Caria for Antigonus twenty years later, he offered continued "freedom" to cities like Lampsacus and Parium which defected to him. Those which resisted, like Sigeum, Erythrae and

Clazomenae were punished. Sigeum was garrisoned; the omission of Lysimachus from the list of kings who made Erythrae οὐτοῦμος καὶ ἄφορολογητός suggests loss of tax-exempt status. At Ephesus, however, questions of military security seem to have been balanced by the desire to conciliate so wealthy and powerful a city. Despite its resistance, Ephesus was left "free"; Lysimachus' general Prepelaus acknowledged the Artemis temple's tax-exempt status and freedom from military billeting; it is possible too that the city was given greater control over the sanctuary revenues. As a vital naval base for Demetrius, however, Ephesus could not be left ungarrisoned and her fleet was destroyed.

On entering Asia Minor, then, Lysimachus acknowledged the value of a flexible policy which rewarded the compliant and punished those who resisted. Nor was he unsuccessful; Simpson's view that Lampsacus and Parium were isolated cases and that 'Lysimachus' experience was mostly unfavourable' is too gloomy, ignoring Prepelaus' success in "winning over" Teos, Colophon and the Hellenised Lydian city of Sardis and Lysimachus' gain of Hellespontine Phrygia by the same method. The evidence we have for Demetrius' recovery of the cities later in the year does not suggest a complete pushover; Ephesus, for instance, was "forced" to return to its former status.

107) Diod.XX.107.2,5, Burstein, Anc. World 1980 74; his inclusion of Colophon among the cities which resisted in 302 BC is incorrect. Diodorus (XX.107.5) tells us that Prepelaus was successfully won Colophon over. The resistance mentioned in Paus. VII.3.4-5 comes later, apparently in connection with the proposed synoecism with Ephesus. 108) Welles, RG 1934 no.15 11.34-5. 109) Diod.XX.107.4; Syl1a 353 11.4-5; see also below. 110) Simpson, Historia 1959 405; Diod.XX.107.5,3. 111) Diod.XX.111.3.
Certainly the events of 302 BC do not seem to justify the view that Lysimachus, disgusted by the ineffectiveness of his "liberation" campaign, resolved henceforth upon a repressive regime which denied the cities any freedoms at all. It remains to test this hypothesis by a detailed examination of the available evidence for Lysimachus' intervention in city affairs, in the constitutional, financial, judicial and religious spheres.

TYRANTS AND OLIGARCHS.

Despite the evidence which shows that Lysimachus had no objection to the continuance of democratic government in cities which submitted to him, the long-held view that his appearance in Asia Minor was marked by the widespread installation of tyrants and oligarchs in the πόλεις still has its supporters. Shipley, for instance, recently remarked that "a characteristic peculiar to Lysimachus among the Diadochs was a tendency to support tyrants". As a piece of received wisdom, the association of Lysimachus with non-democratic government is deeply engrained. For example, Cadoux' suggestion of "a change of constitution from oligarchy to democracy" at Smyrna after Lysimachus' death is not only unsupported by any firm evidence for oligarchy at Smyrna, but actually clashes with his earlier assertion that the city, whose "re-foundation" he associates with Lysimachus, was "completely autonomous in name at least and in reality nearly so, especially as regards internal

Logically of course, Lysimachus' position as successor and competitor to the pro-democratic Antigonids might make him a potential supporter of non-democratic government. Strife between rival factions, who then call in opposed external powers, is a dominant motif in the history of the Greek cities both in Europe and Asia in the sixth, fifth and fourth centuries BC. There is, however, nothing to justify the idea that Lysimachus had some sort of ideological predilection for non-democratic government; it would be wrong to assume that any tyrant whose rule might fall in the early third century is invariably his protégé or, conversely, automatically to date inscriptions which refer to tyrants to his reign. Lysimachus did support and co-operate with the Clearchid tyrants at Heracleia Pontica, but so had Antigonus before him. Subsequent events there show that pragmatism rather than ideology informed Lysimachus' approach in these matters; he was happy to co-operate with the democrats at Heracleia when the waning popularity of the last Clearchids gave him the opportunity for a takeover.

What mattered was support; its political coloration was largely

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113) Cadoux, 1938 106-7; ibid., 104; though Smyrna's aid to Colophon in resisting Lysimachus' Ephesian synoecism (Paus.VII.3.1), might have been punished by installation of an oligarchy, it is not proven by CIG 3137 where Antiochus III and Seleucus II confirm the autonomy and democracy presumably acknowledged also by their ancestors. Bikermann, 1938 137 makes the point that a 'grant' of autonomy on a king's accession does not necessarily imply its absence under his predecessor; Allen, 1983 52 n.81 makes the same point with regard to royal grants of exemption from αποφοίτησις. 114) e.g. Hdt. V.70-73 (Athens); Thuc. III.71-82 (Corcyra); VIII.21 (Samos); Xen. Hell. IV.8.20 (Rhodes), IV.8.29 (Lesbos). 115) For Antigonus' "alliance" with Dionysius, Memn. FGrH 434 F 4.6. 116) Memn. FGrH 434 F 5.3; see Ch.4.
irrelevant. It is true that in the last years of Lysimachus' reign Heracleia again came under autocratic rule, this time by the ἐπισκόπος Heracleides of Cyme, the one attested example of such an official in Lysimachus' kingdom. This appointment, however, may have been prompted by considerations of military security; Heracleia and its environs were subject to heavy pressure from the ambitious Bithynian dynast Zipoites in this period. 117

The case of Heracleia, then, suggests that for a ruler like Lysimachus or Antigonus there was little incentive to remove a tyrant like Dionysius, who combined loyalty with a rule that was seemingly neither oppressive nor unpopular.118 In practical terms, however, the active promotion of this type of government might be unproductive if an alternative was available. Tyrants, with the large mercenary forces they invariably require, are expensive to maintain. Tyranny, moreover, is often accompanied by political instability and divisiveness; in a period as volatile as that of the Diadochs, this might too easily be exploited by an opponent. Also, there is evidence that politicians in the cities of Asia Minor, eager to preserve their personal influence, were as prepared to be flexible in the face of a new conqueror as their counterparts in Athens.119 The Ephesian Philainetus, who proposes the decree for Nicagoras of Rhodes, ambassador for Seleucus and Demetrius c.299 BC, is a good example. His continued prominence in public life under Lysimachus' rule is suggested by his proposal of honours for Melanthius of Theangela, a royal official appointed to guard the

117) See Ch.4. 118) Memn. FGrH 434 F 1.2; Burstein, 1976 78. 119) e.g. Xanthippus (see Ch.6); Olympiodorus (Habicht, 1979 27-30).
fortress of Phygela, one of the cities incorporated into Lysimachus' new foundation of Ephesus.\textsuperscript{120}

Where the democrats were prepared to co-operate, there was no incentive to change the constitution for its own sake, nor is there any reason to think that cities which had welcomed Lysimachus and been left "free" suffered any such change subsequently. Insofar as constitutional realities can be inferred from epigraphic evidence, admittedly a problematic affair,\textsuperscript{121} the continuance of democratic forms under Lysimachus is attested for Samothrace, Samos, Priene, Miletus and Ephesus.\textsuperscript{122}

Despite this evidence which reflects Lysimachus' readiness to co-operate with regimes of all political colours, so long as loyalty was assured, the traditional view persists. Shipley, for instance, sees the Samian tyranny of both Duris and his father Kaios as Lysimachus' work. Citing the king's "support" for tyrannies at Ilium, Nisyros and Priene, he concludes that "there is an \textit{a priori} likelihood that it was Lysimachus' takeover that entailed this new regime".\textsuperscript{123} What then is the evidence for Lysimachus' connection with the tyrants in these cities?

Our knowledge of tyranny at Ilium rests on a strongly worded law prescribing severe penalties for anyone attempting to support or uphold an oligarchic or tyrannical regime.\textsuperscript{124} While the main body

\textsuperscript{120} OGIS 10; Robert, \textit{Rev.Phil} 1967 37-40; Phygela's previously independent status is shown by her \textit{tēponomōtitēs} with Miletus. (I. Milet. no. 142). 121) For example, the tyranny of Kaios and Duris at Samos, (see below) makes no impact on the epigraphic record, but Demetrios' oligarchy at Athens from 294 BC to 287 BC (see Ch.4) is reflected in the changed nomenclature of officials. 122) Burstein, \textit{Anc.World} 1980 76. n.34; see below for more detailed discussion. 123) Shipley, 1987 178. 124) OGIS 218 = \textit{Inschr. Ilion} no. 25.
of the text, with conditional clauses and subjunctive verbs, suggests a preventative measure against future or potential dangers, the final section, marked by imperatives, looks more like legislation drafted in the light of experience. Accordingly, its meaning is disputed: some see the law as inspired by Ilian determination to avoid the unhappy experience of neighbouring states subjected to tyranny. Alternatively, the "vague" section has been seen as a blueprint composed by democrats in exile and published following their return to power.

On epigraphic grounds the text has been dated to the early third century BC. Dittenberger noted the similarity of the lettering to that of the Aristodicides dossier, issued under Antiochus I. Though loss of the first lines precludes a certain dating, Bruckner's date of 281 BC has received general credence. For him, the decree follows the expulsion of a tyrant who had been supported by Lysimachus. Nothing in the text connects the tyranny with Lysimachus, but the belief that he was persona non grata at Ilium lends the theory some weight. The evidence for this "unpopularity" is as follows: Ilium decreed cult honours for Seleucus I in 281 BC; Sigeum made a shortlived bid for independence, supposedly in reaction against Lysimachus' synoecism; it is thought that the Ilians had destroyed the walls he had built for the city by the time of the Galatian invasion of 278 BC.

As far as Lysimachus' popularity goes, it could be argued that the cult for Seleucus presents no more than a politic response to a conqueror who had shown himself prepared to brook no resistance,\textsuperscript{130} while archaeological finds and Livy's testimony contradicts Strabo's source Hegesianax regarding the destruction of the city walls.\textsuperscript{131} The synoecism may have been unpopular with the smaller cities whose identity was lost, but the fact that the Ilians punished Sigeum for defecting\textsuperscript{132} suggests that they did not share this feeling. Bellinger has rightly stressed the positive nature of Lysimachus' early relations with Ilium, expressed in conspicuous benefactions; there is no evidence for a change of stance which might find expression in the establishment of a clearly unpopular tyranny.\textsuperscript{133} The Ilian anti-tyranny law has been seen as the product of a period of "great upheaval";\textsuperscript{134} Bellinger has plausibly identified this with the aftermath of Seleucus I's sudden death in autumn 281 BC. Support comes from Ilium's decree for Seleucus' heir, Antiochus I, which shows him preoccupied on his accession with revolt in the Seleucis and unable to attend to Troad affairs for some time.\textsuperscript{136} Events at Priene early in the third century BC,\textsuperscript{136} as well as the upheavals in the Ionian cities at the time of the Macedonian invasion, suggest that periods of transition between rulers or instability when the

130) Sherwin-White, \textit{JHS} 1985 87 n.145 for a parallel instance at Priene; see Ch.7 for the tough line taken by Seleucus when Heracleia Pontica took his promise of independence at face-value. 131) Bellinger, 1961 5 n.25 for Ilium's capacity for defence in 216 BC; Magie, 1950 923 n.16 for traces of early Hellenistic walls found in excavations; Liv. XXXVII 37.2 for the city as walled in the Roman period. 132) Cook, 1973 179. 133) Bellinger, 1961 1-3. 134) Dareste, Haussouiller, Relnach \textit{RIIG} 1898 25-27. 135) \textit{OGIS} 219. 136) See Ch.4 and below. 255
central government faces other threats, are likely breeding grounds for tyranny. Haussoulier objects to this interpretation, arguing that Antiochus is praised for maintaining democracy rather than restoring it. This is not conclusive; the Ilian opposition may have itself succeeded in expelling the tyrant before the king arrived upon the scene.

The second case of "Lysimachean tyranny" rests on a fragmentary inscription from Nisyros, dated only to "the third century" which imposes heavy fines on anyone attempting a burial or placing of a grave monument in certain circumstances; the precise details of these are lost. Its identification as an anti-tyranny law rests on its similarity to clauses in the Ilian decree ordering the obliteration of the names of offenders against democracy from all public records or monuments. The uncertainty as to the date, context and meaning of the Nisyros stone makes it a flimsy piece of "proof" for Lysimachus' support for tyrants.

At Priene, so Pausanias tells us, one of the citizens, Hiero, established a tyranny which was clearly unpopular. Four inscriptions supplement our knowledge of this short-lived regime at the beginning of the third century BC. I Priene 37, which describes the struggle by Prienean exiles based at to Kapion to overthrow the tyrant, also sets the date for Hiero's rule in the

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137) e.g. Arr. Anab.I.17.10, Poly. VI.9 (Ephesus); Welles RC 1934 no.2 (Eresus); Bosworth, 1980 132-3,178-9. 138) Haussoulier, Rev. Phil. 1901 13; as the Prienean opposition had managed to dislodge Hiero (see below). 139) Syll² 1220 = IG XII 3 87. 140) Inschr. Ill. no.25 11.120-30. 141) Paus. VII.2.10 ἀπό τῆς πόλεως οἰκονόμου κατέστρεψεν. 142) Inscr. at the time of Rhodes' arbitration c. 200 BC, the text records the history of the Samos/Priene dispute over the Batinetis area and the Karion fort.
period c. 300 BC to 297 BC. Then there is an inscription recording Ephesus' loan of arms to exiles from Priene, who are probably to be identified with those at Karion. A third decree concerns the establishment of a festival celebrating the "recovery of freedom and autonomy" after Hiero's fall. The fourth text provides for the re-inscription of honours to Evander of Larissa, clearly an enemy of Hiero's regime whose privileges had been cancelled during the tyranny.

The supposition that Lysimachus either tolerated or actively supported Hiero may stem partly from the belief in his anti-democratic tendencies, but rests mainly on the evidence for Demetrius' support for Hiero's opponents. Ainetus, the phrourarch at Ephesus working with the Karion exiles has been identified as a Demetrian officer; Evander of Larisa may be a φίλος of the Besieger; a decree for King Demetrius is cited among the documents issued during the period of exile at the Karion fort.

Demetrius' loss of Priene, presumably in the uncertain period following Ipsus, does not, however, inevitably imply Lysimachus' gain. Hiero may have been an independent operator, perhaps an old enemy of Demetrius' supporters at Priene who exploited their loss of credibility in 301 BC to seize power for himself. Demetrius, eager to regain the city, would be a natural "protector" for the

143) I.Priene no. 37.11.65, 80-81, 123-30; see also Ch. 4.
144) Syll³ 363 = I.Priene no. 494; Holleaux' attempt to redate this text to 286 BC (REG 1916 29-45 ) is not convincing. 145) I.Priene no. 11; see also Ch. 4. 146) I.Priene no.12; see also Ch.4. 147) e.g. Will, CAH VII 1984 88, followed by Shipley, 1987 177. 148) On the basis of Polyaen. V.19; as I suggested in Ch. 4; I Priene no. 37 1.73. 149) As suggested by Kebric, 1977 8, Burstein, 1986 135.
dispossessed and disgruntled democrats. Shipley, however, goes so far as to claim that Lysimachus responded positively to a plea for help from Hiero; the evidence which might seem to suggest this is a reference to "the decrees for King Demetrius and King Lysimachus" in I.Priene 37,150 but Shipley does not actually cite this. Instead he bases his argument on the recapture of Ephesus from Ainetus by Lysimachus' officer Lycus and the fact that Priene was "Lysimachean ... soon after" this episode.151 This is not conclusive. Firstly, it is possible that the clash between Lycus and Ainetus belongs not to this period, but to the campaign of 286/5 BC.152 Second, the precise date at which Lysimachus gained Ephesus and Priene is uncertain but the year 294 BC, suggested by Plutarch's account, is generally accepted.153 By this time Hiero was long gone.

What then of the "decree ... for King Lysimachus"? Must we assume that it was issued by Hiero's faction? If the tyrant was an "independent", then his opponents might naturally appeal to all likely candidates for aid, as Cassander's son, Alexander, had called on both Pyrrhus and Demetrius in 297 BC.154 It is notable too that this decree is mentioned in the same breath as that for Demetrius, together with two appeals to Rhodes, one "concerning the expulsion of the tyrant's party", the other requesting a loan of money, and a decree "concerning the gift of weapons", presumably that from Ephesus.155 Thus the decree for Lysimachus is included in a list of

150) I.Priene 37.1.7; Shipley, 1987 177; Berve (1967 I 423) interpreted the decree as a plea from Hiero, but thought that it received no response. 151) Shipley, 1987 177, n.6. 152) Polyæn.V.19; see also Ch. 4. 153) eg. Roussel, 1938 353; WII, 1979 I 88; Bengtson, 1987 127. 154) Plut. Demet.36. 155) I.Priene no.37 11.77-80.
documents which all seem to come from the exiled party in the Karion fort, containing pleas for help of one sort or another. It seems reasonable then to assume that the exiles applied to both kings, as well as to powerful neighbouring Mægric, for aid. Demetrius responded; Lysimachus, seemingly did not, perhaps because he was preoccupied with affairs elsewhere, or because Demetrius simply beat him to it. The evidence for Hiero's regime, then, supplies no positive proof of a connection with Lysimachus.

If there is no secure connection between Lysimachus and the tyrannies at Ilium, Nisyros and Priene, Shipley's assumption that a priori, the tyrants at Samos must be his creatures, is questionable. Although the precise dates and duration of the tyranny at Samos are far from certain, it seems likely that, as at Heracleia, the regime was tolerated first by the Antigonids and then by Lysimachus. Our knowledge that Duris combined the writing of histories, whose fragments suggest the ancient world's answer to tabloid journalism, with the role of tyrant in his native Samos comes from Athenaeus. Duris spent some time in Athens studying with Theophrastus, probably in the last years of the fourth century; circa 300 BC, he was back in Samos, issuing coinage, but probably in the capacity of mint magistrate rather than tyrant. It is likely, therefore, that his rule begins some time after that date. If he

156) Perhaps in the Hellespont and Troad; control of important strategic points like Abydus would have to be secured before Lysimachus could safely turn his back on them and move south.
was installed by Lysimachus, then the start of his tyranny should probably be postponed to c.295/4 BC.161

Alternatively, Duris, like Hiero, may have exploited the uncertain situation after Ipsus to seize power. It is also possible that Duris inherited the tyranny, either directly or after an interim period, from his father Kaios. This raises the question of Antigonid toleration of autocratic rule at Samos.162 Pausanias tells us that Kaios was victor in the boys’ boxing at Olympia during the period of Samian exile from 365 BC to 322 BC; combined with the appearance of his son Lysagoras as proposer of a decree c. 300 BC, this sets his birth date in the period from c.385 BC to c.350 BC.163 Pausanias’ text, now damaged, may also have named Kaios as tyrant.164 Though the Successor period is notable for protagonists who are remarkably long in the tooth, Shipley’s vision of the aged tyrant, installed by Lysimachus c.296 BC,165 is less satisfactory than Kebric’s reconstruction which sees Kaios, in the prime of life, still remembered for his Olympic victory, come to power when the Samians returned home in 322 BC.166

161) Shipley (1987 177); Will, 1979 90-92 for this dating; it is uncertain when Lysimachus gained Samos but a date close to the acquisition of nearby Ephesus seems likely. 162) Barron, CR 1962 191 for Kaios and Duris as father and son; Kebric, 1977 8 sees Duris either recovering power after Kaios’ death at Ipsus or both tyrants exploiting the period of “autonomy” after Ipsus to solidify their rule. 163) Paus.VI.13.5, Habicht, Ath.Mitt. 1957 no.23, Barron CR 1962 190-2. 164) Barron, CR 1962 190 restores the lacuna to read, τὸν δὲ Καίων [παρορθοῦσι ἐπονομάζοντα] ἐπὶ τῇ οἰκείᾳ τῶν δημοῦ. 165) Shipley, 1987 179. 166) Kebric, 1977 7-8 sees Kaios gaining power as arbitrator in land disputes following the Samian return - compare e.g Clearchus at Heracleia (Justin XVI.4.4-5; Burstein, 1976 48, 58-60); Cylon and Milo of Croton provide parallels for Olympic victors rising to political power.
If correct, then it seems probable that the Antigonids tolerated Kaios' rule as they had that of Dionysius at Heracleia. The fact that the tyranny left no mark on the epigraphic record for the period from 322 BC to 300 BC is no argument against such a conclusion; the same is true for the dated to Lysimachus' reign, where the democratic forms continue to appear. After 300 BC, however, Habicht's analysis suggests a falling off in the number of popular decrees from Samos. This might be interpreted as a sign of Lysimachus' repressive government, but it should be said that many of the 48 decrees assigned to the reigns of Antigonus and Lysimachus are grants of proxeny and citizenship rendered anonymous by loss of the opening lines. Although Habicht is inclined to ascribe the majority of these to the Antigonid period, it seems impossible to draw any certain conclusions as to their date. Of those which can definitely be assigned to the Antigonid period, several arise from a special context, the Samians' return from exile and their desire to show gratitude to those who acted as benefactors during those dark days, while another five concern honours voted for Antigonid officials; it is possible that some of the anonymous texts may do the same. The highly visible presence of Antigonus' officers which is implied by these decrees is compatible with other evidence for fairly close royal supervision of Samos; there was a garrison,

an "officer placed in charge by the king", and possibly military and financial obligations to help with the Antigonid war-effort. By contrast with this "rush of diplomatic activity", the subsequent fall-off of decrees may reflect not so much a muzzling of the democracy as a more laissez-faire attitude on Lysimachus' part.

At Samos, then, as at Heracleia, it is likely that Lysimachus tolerated a regime, already in power under his predecessors, which was autocratic, but not obviously oppressive.

Passing from tyrants to oligarchs, and from Samos to the mainland opposite, it remains to discuss the claims that Lysimachus installed oligarchies at Ephesus and Erythrae. Strabo, describing Lysimachus' refoundation of Ephesus, makes reference to a νευρωνια which was "enrolled" (καταγραφουμεν) and to the Εξειδικευομενοι "who administered the city's affairs". These bodies appear again in two inscriptions which are generally dated to periods of Lysimachus' control and cited as evidence for his establishment of an oligarchic government in his new city.

170) Shipley, 1987 173; Habicht, Ath.Mitt. 1957 no.20; ibid., no.22 for Samians serving in the royal armies, though they may be mercenaries rather than conscripts. Barron, 1966 140 links a large emergency issue of Samian coins with Antigonid operations at Rhodes in 305/4 BC. 171) Noted by Shipley, 1987 174; see SEG I. no.362, Habicht, Ath.Mitt. 1957 nos 20, 21, 22. 172) Burstein, Anc.World 1980 76-7, 1986 138 for a high degree of local autonomy at Miletus and Priene under Lysimachus' rule. 173) Kebric, 1977 9 for the point that "Lysimachus had more to worry about than altering the governments of every territory he acquired, especially if they were co-operative". Shipley, 1987 180 admits that evidence for the unpopularity of this Samian tyranny is lacking; compare e.g. curse-tablets directed against Cassander and his associates in Athens (Jordan, Ath. Mitt. 1980 234-9) and assassination plots against Mausolus (Hornblower, 1982 60, 68-9, Syll² 167).

Before looking at Strabo's evidence, a brief review of relations between Lysimachus and Ephesus, to establish possible motives for imposition of an oligarchy, is in order. The conditions imposed on Ephesus with Prepelaus' conquest of 302 BC have already been described. The statement that the city was left "free" might imply some privileges; exemption from ἄρετη and/or a royal governor are possibilities. Whether "freedom", without the explicit addition of "autonomy", implies the right to democratic government is uncertain. The temple of Artemis was granted ἀρετή and freedom from billeting. Whether these measures were sufficient to offset the penalties also imposed is uncertain. Demetrius did recover the city a few months later, but Diodorus says that Ephesus was "forced" to return to its "former status"; this may suggest that part of the Ephesian population, at least, supported Lysimachus. Demetrius' garrison replaced that of Prepelaus, Lysimachus' attempt to subvert the garrison commander was foiled, and Poliorcetes' continued control of Ephesus over the next few years is attested by decrees praising his officers Archestratus, Nicagoras and Ainetus.

If Ephesus was divided by factional strife, then Lysimachus might have installed an oligarchy when he recovered the city in 294 BC. The financial damage suffered by the city's property owners in the war fought on Demetrius' behalf in the years after Ipsus makes

176) Diod. XX. 111.3, see above. 177) Hornblower, 1982 77 for the "convenient (if questionable) distinction" between freedom, implying right to a foreign policy, and autonomy as covering independence in internal affairs. 178) Syll² 353 11.4-5. 179) Diod.XX.111.3; Antigonus' capture of the city by the fifth column method in 319 BC reflects earlier factional division at Ephesus. Diod.XVIII.52.7. 180) See Ch.4 and above.
this group likely adherents of Lysimachus. The picture is complicated, however, by the evidence that suggests that at least some of those in power under Demetrius bent with the winds of change and welcomed Lysimachus in exchange for continued prominence in public life. Philaenetus has already been mentioned; another possible candidate is Echeanax, a mint magistrate under Lysimachus, who may be identified with the son of the tyrannicide Diodorus; his family background makes him a likely democrat. Such changes of allegiance need not, however, involve a change of constitution. In a period when constant shifts of power demand that city politicians must be, above all, flexible, the difficulties of labelling them firmly as "oligarchs" or "democrats" are notorious.

If not installed at the time of Lysimachus' takeover of 294 BC, an oligarchy might instead represent royal reprisals for the popular resistance offered to the city's refoundation; Strabo tells us that only Lysimachus' flooding of the old city induced the citizens to move! Such a context for the oligarchy would be consistent with a royal policy which mixed rewards and penalties in response to city behaviour.

The history of Lysimachus' dealings with Ephesus, then, suggests that if he did instal an oligarchy there, the most likely context would be either the conquest of 294 BC or the refoundation some years later. Unfortunately, the epigraphic evidence for those

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181) See Ch. 4. 182) See above; Head, 1880 41. 183) e.g. Ferguson, 1911 125, 136-7, Habicht, 1979 27 for contrasting views on the political stance of the Athenians Olympiodorus and Philippides, son of Philomelos. 184) Strab.XIV.21; see also Paus.VII.3.4-5 for active Colophonian resistance to the project.
supposedly oligarchic bodies, the χρηματικά and ἐπίκλητοι, is inconsistent with such a theory. The Ephesian decree which honours Euphronium for his services as go-between with Prepelaus, usually dated to 302 BC, shows that these bodies already existed at the time of Lysimachus' first contact with Ephesus. One solution is to argue that existing institutions only now received the extended powers which Strabo's account seems to imply, but the activities of the χρηματικά and ἐπίκλητοι in this period, seemingly limited to temple affairs, suggest otherwise. The belief that the χρηματικά is an institution attached to the temple, rather than a body governing the city is supported by two pieces of evidence. Firstly, the χρηματικά must submit its decision to the Bouλή and Αμύκω for ratification. Second, it is nowhere to be seen in either the decree which honours Athenis of Cyzicus for supporting a wall-building project which should probably be linked to Lysimachus' refoundation, or a more recently published proxeny decree for two Milesian benefactors, which may also date to his reign, since one of the honorands, Phanodicus, appears again, standing security for Miletus' loan from the Cnidians in 283/2 BC.

How then is Strabo's suggestion that the χρηματικά and ἐπίκλητοι played a central role in city affairs to be explained? Oliver suggests an allusion to the unofficial but powerful influence which the members of these bodies exerted on the direction of city policy.

by virtue of their prestige and their association with the king.\textsuperscript{190} Van Berchem's explanation is less sinister – the discrepancy arises from a sloppiness in Strabo's writing method.\textsuperscript{191}

In conclusion, while it is quite plausible, given the history of his relations with Ephesus, that Lysimachus might have installed an oligarchy there, the existence of the ἱστάλεξις and ἐνταξιάσις, contrary to the traditional belief, does not in itself prove that democracy was overthrown.

Another possible candidate for oligarchy during Lysimachus' reign is Erythrae. Again, the city's recent history is not incompatible with the imposition of such a regime. Erythrae had successfully resisted Prepelaus in 302 BC and may well have remained in Demetrius' possession until 294 BC.\textsuperscript{192} A letter from Antiochus I(? ) confirms the privileges of autonomy and exemption from ἀρνητικός which had obtained under Alexander and Antigonus.\textsuperscript{193} Welles ascribed the omission of Lysimachus' name to Seleucid enmity. This is possible; to wipe a rival's name off the public record or to destroy monuments to his achievement is a well-known political tactic, both in the ancient world and today,\textsuperscript{194} but it is just as likely

\textsuperscript{190} Oliver, 1941 17. \textsuperscript{191} Van Berchem, \textit{Mus.Helv.} 1980 28 cites Strabo's tendency to juxtapose and combine what he finds interesting or characteristic from his sources, without great attention to logic or chronology; thus, though the statement "there was an enrolled council" follows the account of Lysimachus' foundation, there need not be any connection between the two. \textsuperscript{192} Diod. XX.107.4, Welles, 1934 120. \textsuperscript{193} Welles, \textit{RC} 1934 no.15 = \textit{Inschr.Eryth.} no.30; 11.22-3 suggests that gratitude to Alexander had expressed itself in cult honours. \textsuperscript{194} Welles, 1934 120; Holleaux, 1938 37 for the erasure of Demetrius' name from the Theban building inscription (see Ch.4). \textit{Syll.} 167, Hornblower, 1982 69 for defacement of Mausolus' statue; compare the change of street names in the U.S.S.R. when the Brehznev government became publicly discredited; also the recent defacement of Lenin's statues (\textit{Economist} 20/10/1990 3). 266
that Lysimachus would punish prolonged resistance by revoking former privileges.\textsuperscript{195} Did Lysimachus' displeasure with Erythrae express itself also in support of the oligarchy attested early in the third century BC by a decree which concerns a statue of the tyrannicide Philites?\textsuperscript{196} The oligarchs, it seems, had robbed the statue of its heroic and revolutionary aspect by the simple expedient of removing its sword. Plans for Philites' rehabilitation are made under the auspices of a restored democracy.\textsuperscript{197}

Unfortunately, the text cannot be precisely dated; Heisserer places its inscription in the period from 275 BC to 200 BC on stylistic grounds, noting the pronounced serifs (apices) and the letter forms as a "striking contrast" with lettering of the late fourth and early third century. His proposed context for the tyranny, however, is the period immediately after Ipsus; the supposed time lapse between action and inscription is therefore explained by seeing the stele as commemorative.\textsuperscript{198} Such a device seems unnecessary. While a late fourth century date may be ruled out on stylistic grounds, the letter forms \textsuperscript{199} do not seem to preclude inscription early in the third century, while the "Priene archive", probably inscribed in Lysimachus' reign, provides a parallel for pronounced apices in an early third century

\textsuperscript{195} See above and below. For temporary loss of Prienean autonomy, see Appendix IV. 196) Syll\textsuperscript{a} 284 = Inschr.Eryth, no.503. 197) Syll\textsuperscript{a} 284 11.2-6, Gauthier, Rev.Phil. 1982 215-221; Heisserer, Hesperia 1979 287-9 for Erythrae as the stone's place of origin, based on the combination, well-attested for Erythrae, of Εὐρωπόρου and Εὐρόπορος as prominent magistrates. 198) Heisserer, Hesperia 1979 284; 290-92. 199) \(\alpha\) with straight bar; \(\mathbf{M}\) and \(\Sigma\) with hastae sometimes slanting, sometimes straight; irregular \(\Pi\); \(\mathbf{K}\) with short diagonals; circular letters a little smaller; \(\Phi\) with flattened oval.
Heisserer's context for the tyrannicide and its aftermath is, however, attractive. The decree gives an impression of an unstable period in Erythrae's history, with power shifting rapidly between opposing factions. This perhaps suits the uncertain years after Ipsus better than a period when the city was under the firm control of a ruler like Lysimachus who had the financial and military means to keep the oligarchs in power, if he so wished.

To sum up: there is no firm evidence which links Lysimachus with the tyrants at Ilium, Nisyros and Priene. It seems more likely that their reigns belong to the periods of turmoil which followed the great battles between the Diadochs, first Ipsus, then Corupedium. At Heracleia Pontica and Samos, Lysimachus tolerated the rule of tyrants, but this represents a continuation of Antigonid practice rather than a complete change of policy. In the two cases of oligarchy discussed, it is quite plausible that Lysimachus might have imposed such a regime in response to resistance, but the evidence traditionally cited in support of this belief is not conclusive.

TREASURIES AND TAXATION - LYSIMACHUS THE FINANCIER

Central to the view of Lysimachus as the king who stood with his foot planted heavily upon the necks of the Greeks is the belief that

200) Welles, RC 1934 li-liii for the signs which characterise early 3rd century lettering; I.Priene nos. 14,15,16, Sherwin-White, JHS 1985 73, and PI.II and III.
he imposed a system of crushing taxation upon the polis of his realm. Apart from the evidence from Erythrae, discussed above, it is generally assumed that Lysimachus must be the figure who lurks mysteriously behind the veiled reference to "certain kings" who imposed "harsh duties and taxes" at Miletus; this gains support from another decree which sees Miletus taking out a loan from Cnidos to meet the second instalment of a debt owed to Lysimachus.201 The other evidence consists of a handful of anecdotes: Lysimachus is dubbed τατοτατοτατοτατοταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταταtau
high taxation of his subjects.\textsuperscript{204}

This view of Lysimachus has had a considerable influence on subsequent interpretations of the evidence for his rule in Asia Minor. Oliver's explanation of Lysimachus' revival of the Ephesian \textit{ερπουσία} as a financial ploy will be discussed below. Then there are Tarn's comments on Lysimachus' benefactions to Athens c. 286/5 BC;\textsuperscript{205} the idea of Lysimachus' avarice inspires him to phraseology which, though picturesque, turns quite a respectable benefaction by contemporary standards into a handful of small change.\textsuperscript{206} Likewise, evidence which suggests\textsuperscript{207} that the Ephesians were expected to contribute financially to the building of new walls that accompanied Lysimachus' refoundation has been cited as an illustration of his miserly habits.\textsuperscript{208} This conclusion ignores the evidence which suggests that Lysimachus was by no means alone in expecting \textit{μέλικ}s citizens to contribute to public works launched under royal auspices. A subscription list from Colophon, generally dated to the period of Antigonus' rule and perhaps instigated by him,\textsuperscript{209} shows hundreds of citizens and foreign benefactors advancing money for the construction of new city walls. Although these creditors are eventually to be repaid, the funds for this come not from the

\textsuperscript{204} Andreades, 1930 9-11. 205) Tarn, 1913 101 - "the close-locked doors of his treasury opened a little way ....". 206) An initial donation of 30T was followed by another gift of 100T; see Ch. 6 for the sort of amounts regularly involved in royal benefactions. 207) It is only surmised that Athenis' contribution was financial; rather surprisingly, no specific sum is mentioned. 208) Kell, IOAI 1913 IIC 237; Tarn, CAH VI 1928 91. 209) Meritt, A.J.Phil 1935 no.s 1 and 2, 358-378 = Maier, 1958 no.69; 11.7-11 of the text establish a close connection between Antigonus' efforts to emulate Alexander's euergetism, the safety of the Colophonians and the decision to build the walls.
king but from the city revenues.²¹⁰ A similar project at Erythrae, also citizen-funded, may also fall under Antigonus' auspices.²¹¹

In recent years Burstein has done much to correct this view of Lysimachus as a monster of avarice, pointing out that the only explicit description of Lysimachus' government as harsh comes from the none-too impartial lips of Seleucus' κόλαξ. He has also reassessed the Milesian evidence.²¹² Following Seibert, who doubted whether Ptolemy I could actually have made an alliance with a city under Lysimachus' control, let alone dictate financial terms for it, Burstein agrees that Ptolemy must have been master of Miletus at the time.²¹³ The possible dates for Miletus' alliance with Ptolemy are 314 BC, 308 BC or a date in the early 290s BC.²¹⁴ Since Lysimachus was in Thrace until 302 BC and his operations in that year seemingly did not extend to Caria,²¹⁵ he cannot be identified with the author of the fiscal oppression which preceded Ptolemy's arrival. Like the imposition of ἀποκ on Erythrae, Miletus' payments to Lysimachus in the late 280s BC may represent a punitive measure in response to resistance; Burstein suggests an indemnity following defection to Demetrius in 286/5 BC.²¹⁶. The epigraphic evidence, then, is not proof of a uniform system of oppressive taxation exacted empire-wide throughout the reign.

What of the anecdotes? The most famous is the Gazophylax story, which will be discussed in detail in the following chapter,

since its value seems to lie more in what it reveals of contemporary ideas about kingship than in what it tells us about Lysimachus' fiscal policy. Burstein, indeed, has made the point that since Lysimachus was dubbed χρηστός in 302 BC, the story cannot stand as evidence for oppressive taxation of his subjects in Asia after 301 BC. He cites other sources of wealth, notably war-booty and the acquisition of sources of precious metal, to account for the king's ability both to meet his expenses and build up his famous reserves.217

More, however, can be said about the anecdotal evidence. The uncertain value of anecdotes as evidence in history has already been discussed in the opening chapter. Of those pertaining to Lysimachean avarice, the source, in three instances is Phylarchus, whose stance appears to be one of general hostility to monarchs.218 The possibility that he drew on Duris, hardly a byword for accurate and unbiased reporting, as a possible source for the Successor period has already been mentioned.219 The other source quoted, which labels Lysimachus μικρολόγιον is a certain Aristodemus. The most likely candidate is Aristodemus of Nysa, Strabo's mentor; the little that survives of his work shows a penchant for the romantic, dramatic and moralising style of history, but no certain conclusions can be drawn as to a political stance that might bias his work one

217) Burstein, 1984 62. 218) Phylarch.FGrH no.81 F.12 = Athen. XIV.3 (slaves at court); F.31 = Athen.VI.66 (gazophylax); 65 = Athen. III.3 (salt tax). F. 6 = Athen.X.51, F.64 = Athen.II.21, F.20 = Athen.XI.51 for royal drunkenness and luxury; Kroymann, PW Supplement Vol. VIII 1956 col. 477 for affinities with Duris; also Kebric, 1979 10. 219) See Ch. 1.
way or the other. 220

These stories are cited as proof of a meanness seen as exceptional among the Successors, and viewed as the mainspring for a policy in direct contrast to that of his Antigonid predecessors. To treat these anecdotes as pieces of evidence isolated from their literary context is, however, misconceived. A look through the pages of Athenaeus or Plutarch shows that such stories are not confined to Lysimachus - similar tales are told of his contemporaries. Though Antigonus the One-Eyed may chide his "parasite" Aristodemus, 221 for criticising his open-handedness, his grandson Gonatas attracts two versions of the story which might be called "The Parasite's Request". 222 Bion succeeds by persistence, but the other petitioner, a Cynic, is not so lucky; Plutarch adds that Gonatas "was the most adroit and plausible of kings at brushing such importunities aside". In both cases, as in the Bithys story, the sum involved is a talent; this seems to underline the conventional nature of these tales. Likewise, the tale of Lysimachus' plan to impose a salt-tax in the Troad, 223 is paralleled by a story of a similarly unsuccessful attempt by "the generals of Antigonus" to tax the healing waters of the River Aedepsus. 224 As for the story in the Aaxovixa, the reluctance or inability of kings and generals to pay their mercenary troops in full or on time is a well-worn theme.

220) Aristodemus – FHG III 307 = FGrH no. 22; The tone and setting (the Galatian invasion of Ionia) of the story from Bk. 1 of his histories quoted in Parthen. Erot. 8 make Aristodemus of Nysa the most likely author of the Bithys story. 221) Plut. Mor. 182D. 222) Plut. Mor. 531E, 182E. 223) Athen.III.3, Burstein, 1984 60. 224) Athen.III .73.
in literary texts covering the fourth and third centuries BC.\textsuperscript{226}

So much for the anecdotes. Burstein also makes the point that Lysimachus' concern to increase the prosperity of the \textit{polis} and his readiness to spend money in benefactions is well attested.\textsuperscript{226} Andreades, anticipating an argument of this sort, wished to dismiss it on the grounds that this generosity was motivated by political considerations.\textsuperscript{227} This is naive, to say the least; surely the euergetism of Lysimachus' fellow rulers was likewise inspired, at least in part, by thought of the political capital that might accrue? On the positive side, there is also the episode where Lysimachus offers to give anything he owns to the Athenian Philippides, a story usually ignored in this context.\textsuperscript{228}

Taken as a whole, the evidence suggests that though Lysimachus may have lacked the extravagant generosity of Alexander\textsuperscript{229} or Antigonus, he was not pathologically mean in the sense that reluctance to let a drachm slip from his fingers inspired policies that left the cities impoverished and finally proved politically disastrous. Certainly he was keenly aware, as all the Diadochs had to be, of the value of money as a political asset, but this manifests itself in expenditure as much as in accumulation. The infamous offer of 2,000T for the life of Demetrius at once comes to mind; similarly, he instructs his son-in-law Antipater to offer Pyrrhus a hefty bribe to leave Macedon in 297 BC.\textsuperscript{230} Nor, finally,
need it be assumed that a relative carefulness with funds must imply excessive taxation of his subjects. The stories of Demetrius' exploits in Athens, though requiring a certain caution, since the source may well be Duris or his brother Lynceus, suggest rather that it was royal generosity or extravagance which might empty the pockets of a king's subjects. There is, moreover, no such explicit evidence for Lysimachus' heavy taxation of the Greeks as we have for Demetrius. Apart from the story of the Athenians subsidising Lamia's beauty treatments, which may actually be less outlandish than it sounds, there is the information, supplied by Hieronymus, that in Boeotia in the late 290s BC "he levied large sums of money from the people". The high "tribute" demanded of the Eretrians has already been mentioned.

Finally, Andreades' belief in Lysimachus' establishment and maintenance of several treasuries within his kingdom as somehow exceptional for the period is questionable. It is not sufficient to say that Lysimachus is the only Diadoch whose παρακείμενα are explicitly mentioned; after 301 BC, there is little sight of Ptolemy or Seleucus in action within their own kingdoms, as the Antigonid-centred sources concentrate on Demetrius and his opponents.

231) Plut. Demet. 27. 232) Plut. Demet. 27; Briant REA 1985 60 sees this as analogous to the Achaemenid practice of designating certain cities' revenues "for the queen's shoes" or "the queen's girdle". 233) Plut. Demet. 39 - Hieronymus' authorship is assured by the apologetic tone and the reference to his own appointment as governor; Diog.Laert.II.140, see above. 234) Namely at Pergamum (Strab.XIII.4), Sardis (Polyaen.IV.9.4) and Tirizis (Strab.VII.6.1) Andreades, 1930 7 plausibly infers the existence of at least two more, one near Lysimacheia and one in Macedon.
Lysimachus and Pyrrhus. Also, the early years of the Successor period show first Perdiccas and Eumenes, then Antigonus clearly utilising the treasury system of the Achaemenids which Alexander had inherited. The continuity of the system is implied by the very use of the Persian derived words γαλαξίας and γαλαξίας by Alexander and the Diadochs.\textsuperscript{236} Diodorus tells of treasuries at Cyinda, Susa and Ecbatana, another somewhere in Media; in 302 BC Lysimachus took "royal treasuries" at Synnada and other places in Hellespontine Phrygia, previously in Antigonus' hands.\textsuperscript{236} Xenophon's histories show that the treasury system was not limited to the Achaemenid kings, but repeated on a smaller scale by petty rulers in Asia; the Troad cities of Scepsis and Gergis served as treasuries for the Dardanian dynast Mania.\textsuperscript{237} Since later Seleucid history reveals the same system of a number of treasuries in operation, it is hard to credit that Seleucus I did not inherit and continue to use the treasuries which he took from Antigonus between 312 BC and 308 BC and from Lysimachus in 281 BC. The sheer size of the Seleucid empire, even after Ipsus,\textsuperscript{238} seems to demand such a system. If Lysimachus' possession of multiple treasuries is not exceptional, then it is not evidence for exceptional avarice.

Another feature of Lysimachus' administration which is seen as a denial of Greek autonomy is his installation of royal mints in the

\textsuperscript{235} Compare the later term διοξανάλης used by the Ptolemies and Attalids (Rostovtzeff, 1923 386-7). \textsuperscript{236} For Cyinda, see Simpson, \textit{Historia} 1957 503-4, Bing, \textit{Historia} 1973 346-50, Diod. XVI.11.58.1, 62.2, XIX.56.5; Susa, Diod. XIX.12.3, 15.5, 48.6; Ecbatana, Diod. XIX. 46.6; Media, Diod.XIX.20.4; Synnada and Hellespontine Phrygia, Diod.XX.107.3-4. \textsuperscript{237} Xen.Hell. III.1.12 . \textsuperscript{238} See Ch.4.
Thompson suggests that Lysimachean mints operated in at least fifteen cities in Asia Minor and the islands off its coast. Though the doubts raised by Price regarding her methods of classification mean that this analysis of the Lysimachus coins cannot be accepted in every detail, Lysimachus' use of the workshops of some Greek cities in Asia Minor to strike his royal coinage cannot be doubted. Equally, it is undeniable that the king's establishment of his own mint inside the city walls, with the presence of his officials as a constant reminder of royal control, did constitute an interference in the cities' internal affairs. Since this aim of this chapter is, however, to determine whether Lysimachus' methods of government represented a new and unparalleled degree of oppression, his practice here must be compared with that of his predecessors and contemporaries. Once again, the evidence suggests that this was in no sense an innovation. Alexander had likewise established mints in the Greek cities of Ionia; Demetrius, Lysimachus' great rival for the favours of the Ionians, coined at Miletus and at Ephesus. After Lysimachus, Ionian and Aeolian cities such as Cyme, Phocaea and Myrina were the sites for Seleucid mints issuing the royal silver coinage.

239) e.g. Burstein, Anc. World 1980 74 n.14. 240) Thompson, 1968 164-78; see Ch. 4 for the objections raised by Price to this classification of the Lysimachus coins. 241) Thompson, 1968 167; Newell, 1927 83 for Demetrius' Μίλιον appointed as mint magistrates at Pella c. 293 BC. 242) Bellinger, 1963 57-8 sites Alexander's mints at Sardis, Magnesia, Lampsacus, Abydus, Colophon, Miletus and Teos; again, the methodology underlying this precise and detailed picture may be suspect; see Price, forthcoming. 243) Newell, 1927 60-2, 67-70. 244) Bikermann, 1938 229. 277
Closely connected with this topic is the issue of sovereignty and coinage. Those who see royal mints in the cities as an intolerable infringement of autonomy presumably believe that Lysimachus' issue of royal coinage from φόρος mints must entail the suppression of the civic coinage which the cities had issued under Achaemenid rule. It might be said that Philip II and Alexander had set a precedent for such a step; royal monopoly of the right to coin and the compulsory abolition of city coinage, in pursuit of a system of uniform monetary circulation, has been seen as a hallmark of the Macedonian conquerors, expressing their sovereignty over the conquered peoples.246

What, then, is the evidence for the issue of civic coinage under Lysimachus' rule? Cities which continue to produce coinage displaying the city emblems and legends include Ephesus, Smyrna, Priene, Scepsis, Samothrace, and Cyme, while Alexandria Troas and Ilium produce their first civic issues under his auspices.246 Colophon's issues dwindle,247 but this presumably results from the transfer of part of her population to New Ephesus, rather than a suppression order. These issues are, however, invariably restricted to bronze and small denomination silver. Coins bearing the city

symbols, whose importance as an expression of civic pride is often emphasised were effectively limited to small change, circulating only within the immediate environs of the city.

To see this as a sign of Lysimachus' brutal determination to impress his mastery upon the Greeks, in contrast to his more tactful predecessors, would, however, be mistaken. Coinage at Ephesus, for instance, with the production of the city's Attic octobols alongside the royal issues, follows exactly the same pattern under Lysimachus as it had in Demetrius' reign. Silver coinage issued by Ionian cities, like Ephesus, Magnesia, Miletus and Priene under early Seleucid rule is likewise restricted to small change denominations. The limiting of city coinage to local circulation, then, is not a reflection of Lysimachus' unusually harsh rule, but a general phenomenon which begins with Alexander and continues into the Diadoch period and beyond.

This might seem to confirm the view that the Macedonian kings saw the issue of an internationally circulating coinage as a royal prerogative, expressing supremacy, and denied it to the Greek cities. A recent study by Martin has, however, seriously questioned the idea that civic coinage in the ancient world functions primarily as a symbol of sovereignty; the link between sovereignty and coinage originates only in mediaeval political philosophy. On this point, one might add that "the right to coin" does not appear among the traditional privileges of autonomy

248) e.g. Shipley, 1987 176. 249) Newell, 1927 70. 250) Bikermann, 1938 230. 251) Martin, 1985 e.g. 11, 214-6.
requested by cities, granted by kings and published on stone.\textsuperscript{252} Martin's re-assessment of the hoard evidence from Thessaly, usually taken as the classic illustration of Philip II's suppression of city coinage, has effectively undermined the whole idea of a Macedonian precedent for the actions of the Hellenistic kings.\textsuperscript{253} A "policy" of suppressing city coinage has likewise been ascribed to Alexander; Martin shows that under his rule there is often no correlation between the continuance of city coinage and other conditions imposed. The classic case is Rhodes, often cited as possibly the sole exception to Alexander's "rule" of suppression; though Rhodes' history of resistance to Alexander brought the usual sort of penalties - a garrison and a compulsory change of constitution - the city continued to strike civic issues. This is hardly compatible with the idea that a halt in the issue of city coinage is synonymous with a royal denial of autonomy.\textsuperscript{254}

The main theme of Martin's book is that the function of coinage in the late Classical and early Hellenistic periods is primarily economic rather than political, with the "policy" of the Macedonian kings regarding royal coinage determined largely by practical motives; thus Alexander's first priority was to produce a coinage which could be quickly and easily distributed to the troops stationed in Asia Minor, an area of high strategic importance.\textsuperscript{255} Its high quality assured its acceptability in markets throughout the empire and contributed indirectly to the decline of the cities' own issues. With the royal demand pushing metal sources up in price,

\textsuperscript{252} See above for the privileges implied by "autonomy". \textsuperscript{253} Martin, 1985, 6, 13, 48, 57. \textsuperscript{254} Martin, 1985 128. \textsuperscript{255} Ibid., 129.
production of city coinage was viable only for the wealthiest

rcoXsic. At the same time, the competition such issues faced from the
royal coinage cast doubt on the economic wisdom of such a
practice.266

Under the Successors, as Martin admits, there may have been a
change of stance. Anxiety about the legitimacy of their rule might
have prompted an explicit statement of sovereignty through the
suppression of city coinage.267 So blunt a display of supremacy,
however, is hardly compatible with other evidence which shows the
Diadochs competing to woo the cities from their rivals with
benefactions and the concern displayed, particularly by the
Antigonids, to mask the naked truth of royal domination.268 In
Lysimachus' case, it is highly likely that economic, rather than
political, factors played their part in determining the pattern of
city coinage. The widespread acceptability of his royal issues is
reflected both by the prominence of "Lysimachi" in hoards throughout
the Hellenistic world269 and by the issue of posthumous Lysimachus
types by Greek cities like Byzantium and Calchedon for more than
half a century after his death. The attempt by these cities to
produce a civic issue c. 235 BC proved unsuccessful and shortlived;
the reversion to "Lysimachi" c. 220 BC suggests that this "royal
coinage" proved a far more attractive proposition commercially than
the civic issues.260

Ch.6 and above. 259) Rostovtzeff, 1923, 359-90. 260) Seyrig, 1958,
603-625; 1968, 184-5, 187-90; for the continued circulation of
posthumous Lysimachus in the Roman period, see Walbank, CAH VII 1984
18-19.

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To sum up. While the presence of his mint officials in the cities may have been an unwelcome reminder of royal control, Lysimachus' practice was not innovatory; both those who ruled before and after him in Asia Minor did the same. Similarly, the effective limitation of city coinage to local issues is paralleled under Alexander and the Seleucids, and there is reason to believe that this results from economic competition from the royal issues rather than reflecting a deliberate suppression as a statement of royal sovereignty.

KINGS, CITIES AND TEMPLES

Once one leaves the council chamber and the counting house for the temples of the gods, the evidence relating to Lysimachus becomes distinctly sparse. It would be futile to try to draw any conclusions as to a "general policy". All that can be done is to set the available evidence in the context of the general picture that emerges from contemporary evidence for other kingdoms.

Lysimachus' display of royal εὐεργεία and the significance of royal cult as an expression of popular feeling, issues which relate to the concept of kingship in the Diadoch period, will be dealt with in the next chapter. Here, where the subject is government, it remains to discuss the question of royal interference in temple administration and that of the temples' freedom to cultivate relationships with other rulers. Since kingly decisions regarding temples are often cited as evidence for the nature of his rule over cities and their enjoyment of autonomy, or otherwise, it is worth...
discussing briefly the relationship between the temple and the city in whose χώρα it stood.

In one sense, temples on city land can be seen as separate entities,\(^2\text{61}\) traditionally administered by an independent priesthood and able to receive privileges which do not automatically extend also to the city. Thus, while temples are granted the privilege of ἱερά (sacred and inviolable status) by monarchs of Asia as far back as Croesus,\(^2\text{62}\) city ἱερά is first attested in the mid third century and most of the examples post-date 200 BC.\(^2\text{63}\) Similarly, Alexander's decision that Ephesian ἱόπος should in future benefit Artemis rather than the royal purse might appear to favour the temple at the city's expense.\(^2\text{64}\)

Some degree of identification, however, between city and sanctuary is expressed in numerous decrees of the ἱερός which praise a benefactor for his εὐφαφτία towards τὸν ἱερὸν καὶ τὴν πόλιν and by the prominence of officials like the ἴμιστοι who liaise between the sacred and secular spheres.\(^2\text{65}\) In addition, the major role which a sanctuary could have in the city's economic life, as treasury, banking centre and tourist attraction,\(^2\text{66}\) must have bestowed upon its authorities a certain political clout.

Given the wealth of sanctuaries like the Artemision at Ephesus and Lysimachus' reputation as the Great Financier, it is hardly

\(^{261}\) Oliver, 1941 14; Orth, 1977 32. \(^{262}\) Bikermann, 1938 150, 177. \(^{263}\) Ibid., 152. \(^{264}\) Arr.Anab.I.17.10; Bosworth, 1980 132-3 sees this as a privilege for the Ephesians, as against Badian, 1966 45. \(^{265}\) e.g. Keil, JOAI 1913 I. f, 1, m, and n; Engelmann & Knibbe, JOAI 1980 no.2; Syll.\(^\text{a}\) 372 1.3; veamotax - Syll\(^\text{a}\) 353, Robert, Rev.Phil 1967 no.4; Keil, JOAI 1913 III c and e. \(^{266}\) Oliver, 1941 14.
surprising that he has been accused of trying to siphon off the 
gods' revenues for himself. The evidence cited in support of 
this charge is that relating to the Ephesian yepouqía, already 
discussed. Though Oliver clears Lysimachus of installing an 
oligarchic government at Ephesus, his interpretation of the 
yepouqía's function is still somewhat sinister. Aiming to take 
control of the Artemision's funds from the priesthood which 
traditionally administered them, Lysimachus ostensibly transferred 
them to the citizens of Ephesus, as represented by the yepouqía. 
Since, however, this body was to be "advised and restrained" by the 
ёπίχαλλοι, persons whom Oliver sees as royal appointees, Artemis' 
wealth would effectively be brought more closely into royal control, 
admittedly not for immediate appropriation, but as "a reserve in 
case of necessity".

How plausible is this? The traditional view that Hellenistic 
kings regularly deprived sanctuaries of their land and resources has 
long been questioned. Appropriation of sacred funds or treasures 
by rulers or cities is not unknown, but usually represents a last 
resort for those with their backs against the wall. Such action 
could easily attract accusations of sacrilege. Would Lysimachus, 

267) Oliver, 1941 14-15. 268) See above. 
269) Oliver, ibid.; 17 for ἐπίχαλλοι as a term connoting "outsiders who are more or less legitimately present, but as the result of the invitation or appointment by a third party."
270) Broughton, 1951 236-40 for Attalid and Bithynian kings as benefactors rather than predators at Aezani's temple of Zeus, previously cited as the one "secure" example of royal confiscation of temple estates. 271) eg. Phoci's occupation of Delphi from 356 BC to 346 BC, Cawkwell, 1978 64-66, 103, 107-8,110; Lachares at Athens c.296/5 BC, Paus.1. 25.7-8, see also Ch.4. 272) Cawkwell, 1978 65-66 for Greek attitudes in the 4th century towards action which might be construed as "temple robbery".
generally concerned to display εὐγενεία,\textsuperscript{273} and with other resources available to him, have thought it worth alienating the feelings of the Ephesians and his other Greek subjects to secure funds against some future and quite hypothetical crisis? Rostovtzeff, it is true, talks of the Attalid "practice" of appointing trusted courtiers as νεωκόροι in temples "like those at Sardis, Ephesus and Magnesia" in place of their indigenous priests; this might appear to present a parallel for such royal interference in temple administration.\textsuperscript{274} The evidence for this "policy", however, consists of one example - the appointment of Timarchus, ex-πρωτούχος at the Pergamene court, as νεωκόρος at Sardis. The context for this appointment is unknown - the possibility that it was prompted by special circumstances, such as official misconduct by the temple officials, cannot be ruled out.\textsuperscript{275} By itself, it does not justify the assumption of a widespread "policy" applied to other sanctuaries in Asia Minor. Similarly, even if it were accepted that Lysimachus' action at Ephesus was financially motivated, there is no evidence to suggest that he took similar action elsewhere. At Didyma, the obvious parallel, it is clear that Lysimachus allowed the Milesians to administer the shrine and its resources without interference.\textsuperscript{276}

The economic importance of the major sanctuaries and the close ties that often existed between them and the city make it tempting to see royal patronage of temples as primarily political in intent. Sumptuous dedications and grants of privilege to the temple are

\textsuperscript{273} See Ch. 6.  
\textsuperscript{274} Rostovtzeff, 1923 385-9.  
\textsuperscript{275} Compare 2 Maccabees 3.4-40 for corruption among the priesthood at Jerusalem in the reign of Antiochus IV.  
\textsuperscript{276} As Oliver himself admits (1941 13); Burstein, Anc.World 1980 77, see also below.
thought to reflect an attempt to win the city's loyalty. Certainly there is a political element; an inscription recording the first Seleucids' grant of ἀγούλια, ἱκτεία and exemption from taxes to the Plutonium near Nysa,\textsuperscript{277} if correctly restored, serves also as a blatant manifesto of Seleucid philhellenism. In the case of Miletus, however, a purely political interpretation of relations between the Didyma temple and the Seleucid kings has led to some curious conclusions regarding Lysimachus' stance towards the city.

The Milesian decrees from the first years of the third century, honouring Seleucus' queen, Apama, and their son Antiochus for aid for the temple's construction can be discounted from this discussion, since at this date Miletus was not in Lysimachus' hands.\textsuperscript{278} Seleucus I's lavish dedication to the Saviour gods at Didyma, has, however, caused some problems; securely dated by the stephanephorate list to 288/7 BC, it postdates by one year a decree passed by Miletus and its fellow members of the Ionian κοινοῦντα praising Hippostratus, Lysimachus' στρατηγὸς, "of the Ionian cities".\textsuperscript{279} For some commentators, these texts are evidence for Miletus' ability to pursue a more or less independent foreign policy, thus casting a whole new light upon Lysimachus!\textsuperscript{280} It has already been shown that Lysimachus did allow individual cities a fair degree of internal autonomy, but whether Seleucid dedications at Didyma in 288/7 BC are proof of Miletus' freedom to conduct an

\textsuperscript{277} Welles, RG no. 9. \textsuperscript{278} I. Didyma, 479, 480, Orth, 1977 20-23; they do, however, show that Seleucid patronage of Didyma was possible when Miletus was in Demetrius' hands. This may be explained by the short-lived alliance of c.299/8 BC, but see below. \textsuperscript{279} OGIS 214, I. Milet 123 1.29; Syll\textsuperscript{a} 368 - for Hippostratus, see below. \textsuperscript{280} Burstein, Anc. World 1980 74 n.3 for bibliography.
independent foreign policy is less certain. Those who favour a political motive for the dedication see it as a Seleucid attempt to keep Miletus loyal to the anti-Demetrian "alliance". This, however, assumes that Seleucus and Lysimachus were still firm friends, a doubtful proposition by this date. Nor does the tone of the inscription, which is rather brusque, accord with its supposed context. Lastly, those who advance this interpretation must admit that, seen in this light, the enterprise was a dismal failure - Miletus received Demetrius with open arms the following year. Burstein's solution to the problem has a certain appeal. He sees the dedication primarily in a religious context, as a thank-offering for some achievement or aversion of some crisis, the details of which are lost. An explanation of this kind may also throw light on the much-disputed meaning of Seleucus' wish in 11.11-12, that the Milesians should pour libations in connection with his "health and good fortune". Welles thought that libations were to be poured "on behalf of" Seleucus' health and good fortune; Orth saw Seleucid health and good fortune as resultant on sacrifice to the Saviour Gods. Alternatively, the genitive absolute could be seen as causal, with the meaning that the Milesians are to pour libations "since..." or "because we [Seleucus] are in good health", alluding to the King's survival and triumph over some kind of threat.

Quite apart from the traditional connection between dedications and victory, emphasised by Garlan, the city custom of congratulating the monarch on his success and safety in the aftermath of crisis is well attested - obvious examples are the decrees from Priene and Ilium for Lysimachus and Antiochus I respectively. Seleucid patronage of Didyma, then, need not be seen exclusively in terms of the dynasty's political relations with Miletus; nor is this royal patronage of a "foreign" sanctuary unparalleled. Ptolemy II, for example, dedicated his Propylaeon at Samothrace when the city was clearly under Lysimachus' control; the Coan sanctuary of Asclepius maintained relations with the Ptolemies long after they had lost control of the island; Philetairus makes two dedications to Apollo's temple near Aegae when the area is under Seleucid rule.

The sum of the evidence suggests that, despite the political influence which temple authorities might wield, the early Hellenistic kings made no attempt to restrict access to sanctuaries within their kingdoms. Concerned themselves to display their to the gods, it may be presumed that they respected also the rights of their fellow rulers and their subjects to do the same. Thus, protected by their "sacred and inviolable" status, their long tradition of attracting worshippers from all over the known world and the genuine religious feeling which attached to them, the sanctuaries remained, in some sense, truly "international" institutions.

LAW AND JUSTICE

Eudemos may have prompted the kings to a certain tolerance regarding the religious freedom of their subjects, but when it comes to man-made law, the literary tradition paints a dramatic picture of monarchic disregard for city νόμος. Seleucus speaks of "the law which is common to all, that what the king ordains is always right"; Antigonus tells a sophist, "You are a fool to speak to me of justice, when you see me sacking other peoples' cities".292 Although this perhaps reflects more a conventional picture of the autocrat than verbatim reporting, it is true that for the πόλεις, the Successors, like Alexander before them, represented the ultimate source of law.293 While epigraphic evidence suggests that the kings were not quite so prone to flaunt these powers as the literary tradition would have it - it is notable that royal ordinances (proostágymata) are enshrined in the city laws by means of popular decree, at the tactful request, rather than the order of the king294 - the fact remains that their powers of intervention in this sphere were very wide and they did not hesitate to use them when necessary.

Antigonus' actions at Teos have already been discussed.295 Though the king might have some grounds for regarding a city created by synoecism as "his own" new foundation and therefore a special case, its individual citizens, of course, came from Greek πόλεις with a long tradition of drafting their own legislation and

292) App. Syr.61; Plut. Mor.330E. 293) Badian, 1966 39 argues that the traditional distinction between the cities' "juridical" and "actual" status is meaningless since the king is the source of all law. 294) Allen, 1983 175; Welles, RG 1934 no.67 1.16. 295) See above.
governing by it. The dossier from Eresus, dealing with repeated
appeals by exiled tyrants to the crown for restoration, suggests
that in theory the king had the power to overturn city legislation,
though in this case both Alexander and his successors instructed the
suppliants to abide by the μολις decision. The king might
establish a royal tribunal in a Greek μολις - an early example is
Antigonus' δικαστήριον at Cyme in Aeolis. Evidence for a
δικαστήριον Βασιλικόν in Aeolis under Seleucid rule may suggest some
continuity in the system, though the exact function of this judge is
uncertain. At a Seleucid δικαστήριον in Caria a δικας of the king
acts as chief judge; this implies close royal supervision of such
courts, under Seleucid rule at least. There is no specific
evidence for any such tribunal set up by Lysimachus, but the
continuance of this system from the Antigonids to the Seleucids
makes it likely that he too would have employed such methods. Lack
of detailed evidence makes it impossible to assess the extent to
which these tribunals impinged upon the citizens' freedom, but it is
clear that the king or his officials were ready to intervene in
cases where the action of a city or its individual citizens
constituted a major threat to the kingdom's security or
stability. Under Alexander, Philoxenus, the "commander of Ionia"
is active on several occasions in punishing men from the Greek

296) Welles, RC 1934 no.2. 297) OGIS 7 11.1-2. 298) Athen. XV 697D;
Bikermann, 1938 207 sees him as in charge of cases involving "state"
matters; Rostovtzeff, 1910 258 as an itinerant (?) official,
handling suits involving the indigenous population. 299) Bikermann,
1938 207 for [Apoll]lophanes of Rhodes, friend of king [...?]. 300)
The king himself seemingly judged only the most important cases,
such as those involving high treason (Bikermann, 1938 186).
Clearly citizen status gave no protection to such men from the summary execution of justice by the ruler or his officials. Similarly, a city engaged in a prolonged and bitter dispute with a neighbour or some other body might have a settlement imposed upon it by the king. Thus Alexander pronounces upon the ownership of land in Macedonia disputed by Philippi and the neighbouring Thracian tribes; Antiochus II takes it upon himself to settle Aegae's border dispute with Myrina, defining the limits of the city τάπα; a dispute between Teos and the Dionysian guild of ταύτιστα is settled by the decision of Eumenes II. It has been suggested that Lysimachus, likewise, took a "unilateral decision" to change the limits of the city territory of Priene, albeit in a more beneficent fashion, with a gift of royal land and the ἄγοι to work it. The evidence for this "gift" is, however, problematic; since this interpretation hinges on certain assumptions made about the status of the indigenous peoples in the Hellenistic kingdoms, the question will be discussed in the final section of this chapter.

Traditionally when disputes arose within the city community, judges were summoned from a neutral city. The early Hellenistic kings employed the same method, seemingly willing to tread softly where it was possible and to create an impression of continuity with the traditional system of Greek government. Philocles,

301) Polyae. VI.49; Paus. II.37.4; Plut. Phoc.18, Ael. V.H. I.25.
302) Missitzis, Anc. World 1985 3-14 for the long discovered but only recently published inscription recording this settlement; Allen, 1983 18 (the inscription for Apelles son of Metrodorus); Allen, 1983 103-4, Welles, RC 1934 no.53 11.6-8 = I.Perg. no.63.
303) Burstein, 1986 136. 304) Bikermann, 1938 142 for Seleucid practice; see below n.305 and 306, for Ptolemaic examples.
commander of the Ptolemaic fleet in the Aegean c.280 BC resorts to this method when faced with an apparently serious dispute at Myndos, though it is notable that all the cities approached lie within the Ptolemaic sphere of influence. On occasion, however, the royal will could be expressed far more directly; a decree from Calymna awarding crowns for Iasian judges shows that King Ptolemy not only ordered that the δισανταί should be sent but also provided a δισάρρυμα as a guide to settling the dispute.

Evidence for Lysimachus' intervention in the judicial affairs of the Greek cities is restricted to three or four episodes; of these, two concern territorial disputes, an area in which kings seem regularly to have intervened if the dispute had escalated into war between the parties concerned, or threatened to do so. At Samothrace, he restores to the citizens the "sacred χώρα" on the mainland opposite the island, and is responsible for judging and punishing those who had wrongly taken the land. Circa 283/2 BC he arbitrates in the long-standing dispute between Samos and Priene over the Batinetis area and the Karion fort. Despite hints regarding his failing health, and the attempted gamesmanship of the Prieneans, his judgement of the case is generally regarded as notable for its exemplary impartiality. On this occasion, it is clear that royal intervention was prompted by the request of the πόλεις themselves and Burstein has rightly emphasised the significance of the whole episode as reflecting the considerable degree of internal autonomy.

allowed to some cities.\textsuperscript{309} The fragmentary decree which records his settlement of affairs at Priene following the Magnesian attack of 286/5 BC may include provision for punishment of the Pedieis who joined the Magnesians. Lysimachus' personal action here may be explained by the serious nature of their crime which entailed military co-operation with the king's enemies.\textsuperscript{310} By contrast, though he intervenes in a similar fashion to "save" the Samothracians from θυσαθείς who attacked the sanctuary of the Great Gods, he leaves the punishment of these wrongdoers to the citizens.\textsuperscript{311}

Where Lysimachus does intervene, he acts as judge and arbiter himself rather than delegating the task to officials. There is no reason to think that the King's personal involvement was unpopular. Indeed, if the main value of anecdotes lies in their reflection of contemporary attitudes, then the story, told of more than one king, where royal reluctance to deal with petitions personally earns an invitation to abdicate, suggests the contrary.\textsuperscript{312} It cannot, of course, be assumed from these few examples that Lysimachus invariably dealt with such matters personally; as will be seen below, Lysimachus' "προτοπηγής of the Ionians", may well have had powers to intervene in the judicial sphere.

\textsuperscript{309} Burstein, 1986 137. \textsuperscript{310} I. Priene 16; see Ch.4 and below. See above for similar intervention by Alexander's royal officials in the judgment of traitors. By contrast, Mausolus leaves his would-be assassins at Mylasa to be dealt with by the citizens, \textit{(Syll\textsuperscript{a} 167 11.34-46; Hornblower, 1982 60,66.)} \textsuperscript{311} \textit{Syll\textsuperscript{a} 372 11.15-16} \textsuperscript{312} Plut. Demet. 42, Mor.179C; Saller, \textit{Greece & Rome} 1980 82.
SATRAP AND STRATEGOS - ROYAL OFFICIALS AND THE GREEK CITIES

On the basis of the surviving evidence, then, there is little foundation for the belief that on Lysimachus' accession, the Greek cities throughout Asia Minor suffered a significant diminution of their constitutional, economic, religious or judicial freedoms. Those reluctant, however, to jettison the idea of a dramatic contrast, in ideology if not in actual treatment, between Lysimachus and the Antigonids, point to his "direct incorporation of the cities into his kingdom", with the appointment of a στρατηγός ἐπὶ τῶν πόλεων τῶν ἱππει. This is contrasted with the relationship of "alliance" which bound the cities to the Antigonids. It has already been shown that the συμμαχία offered by the Antigonids fell far short of what we would understand by the term "alliance". It remains to discuss what the presence of Lysimachus' στρατηγός implied for conditions of city life and the extent to which this appointment represents an innovation.

It is generally accepted, following Bengtson's lengthy analysis of the changing role of the στρατηγός during the reigns of Alexander and the Diadochs, that in Asia Minor by Antigonus' time, the title of this erstwhile military officer had come instead to designate the governor of the administrative regions which kept the Achaemenid title of satrapy. As such, the στρατηγός combined military with civil powers and might have considerable funds at his disposal.

313) e.g. Saitta, Kokalos 1955 99; Grainger, 1990 161.
Bengtson identified three γρατυνοί in Antigonid Asia Minor. As early as 310 BC Polemaeus governed Hellespontine Phrygia, a satrapy which may later have been combined with Greater Phrygia under Docimus' government, while Phoenix held the post in Lydia.317

The continuance of this system under the Seleucid, Ptolemaic and Attalid kings is attested by inscriptions which supply the kind of information that the literary references to the Antigonid γρατυνοί omit. They show that in Asia Minor, the Hellespont and Thrace, from the 280s BC, at least, the γρατυνός' authority extended to the Greek cities lying within the satrapy and indicate some of the forms which his intervention might take. Under Antiochus I, Meleager, γρατυνός of the Hellespontine satrapy, acts as intermediary between the king and Ilium in connection with royal land granted to Aristodicides of Assos and to be attached to the Ilian Χέρα.318 On another occasion, he "recommends" the royal doctor Metrodorus as a suitable candidate for Ilian honours. Though this has been seen as a thinly disguised expression of the royal will imposed upon a none too eager populace,319 other examples show the γρατυνός acting in an undoubtedly beneficent fashion; Hippomedon, the Ptolemaic governor "of the Hellespont and Thrace" in the second half of the third century supplies the citizens of Samothrace with troops, munitions and money for food when their territory on the mainland near Maroneia is attacked. The citizens do, however, need his

permission to import tax-free grain and he is in charge of settling citizen cleruchs on the ἡσαρία at their request. Corrhagus, governing the same region for the Attalids, acts as intermediary with the king to secure the restoration of a city's laws, ancestral constitution and sacred precincts. It is interesting to note that this successful request for acknowledgement of the city's autonomy and the intervention of the ἄρητηνος are not felt to be mutually exclusive. An inscription from early second century Ephesus shows a certain Demetrius installed as the ἄρητηνος for the surrounding region. There was a Seleucid ἄρητηνος of Cappadocia before 281 BC, another in Cilicia, and a Ptolemaic official with this title governing Caria early in the third century and perhaps before.

The ἄρητηνος, then, turns up in every area of western Asia ruled by the early Hellenistic monarchs, from Cappadocia to Cilicia. His potential powers, as regards the Greek πόλεις, are considerable, embracing the extent and settlement of the city χώρα, citizenship grants, questions of importation and food supply, even the city's status. Bikerman, however, makes the important point that the ἄρητηνος' ability to act as go-between for city and king and to confer privileges that might be thought the prerogative of royalty, does not imply denial of the city's right to deal directly with the...
How then does Lysimachus' στρατηγός of the Ionians fit into this framework? Until recently, only one incumbent of this post was known to us, the Milesian Hippostratus, φίλος of the king and recipient in 289/8 BC of conspicuous honours awarded by the cities of the Ionian κοινόν. Now, another στρατηγός, Hippodamas, also from Miletus, has stepped out of the shadows courtesy of a recently published inscription from Chios.

The formula which expresses the appointment of these men, ἐν τῶν πόλεων τῶν ιόνων κατοικοθείς has suggested a position analogous to that of the regional στρατηγός described above. Hippostratus has therefore been seen as the harbinger of a new era for the Greek cities, which were now placed under close and constant supervision. If, however, the precise title of officials under Alexander and the early Hellenistic kings has any significance, then Lysimachus' στρατηγός differ somewhat from the officials discussed above. The authority of the former is limited to "the cities of the Ionians", whereas the latter are appointed to govern geographical regions like "Caria" or "the Hellespont", terms which presumably presumably embrace both Greek cities and indigenous communities.

The position of Hippostratus and his colleague recalls past instances, under the Achaemenids and then Alexander, when "Ionia"

324) Bikermann, 1938 207 sees this right as an acknowledgement of the city's juridical status as a "state". 325) Syll 368; for the Ionian κοινόν see Caspari, JHS 1915 173-187. 326) SEG 1985 no.926, Forrest Horos 1985 95; see also Ch.6. 327) Bengtson, 1937 II 191 for the direct genitive or ἐνι as designating the στρατηγός as governor, while εὐ signifies a military post. 328) e.g. Meyer, 1925 36; Tarn, CAH VI 1928 91; Roussel, 1938 368.
or "those on the coast" were treated as a separate administrative region, under a "supervisor"; the title given to Alexander's officer, Philoxenus, by Plutarch is ὁ τῶν ἐπὶ Ἡλλάττης στρατηγὸς. Lysimachus' στρατηγοὶ, then, are hardly unprecedented, but some see the return of such officers as a rude shock after Antigonid rule when "alliance" meant freedom from official inclusion in the satrapal system and presumably from direct control by the king's regional governors.

Whether Lysimachus' στρατηγοὶ actually represent such a divergence from Antigonid practice is, however, uncertain. The decree for Hippostratus makes it clear that "the Ionian cities" designates the Ionian χώρα. Bengtson inferred from this that Lysimachus must have appointed similar στρατηγοὶ over the other Greek χώρα, such as those of Aeolis and Ilium. This is questionable; Bengtson's own discussion of Antigonus' administration in Asia Minor warns against looking for an organisation structured down to the last detail; similar caution may be required when dealing with Lysimachus' equally ephemeral kingdom. Study of the successive dynasties ruling in Asia, Assyrian, Lydian, Persian and Macedonian, suggests that in the administrative sphere kings were ready to be flexible and to adopt, where it worked successfully, the methods of their predecessors, rather than imposing a uniform system right across the realm. In Caria, certainly, traditionally a land

329) Bengtson, 1937 II 215-6, for Hippostratus' appointment as inspired by that of Philoxenus; Plut.Alex.22. 330) Salitt, Kokalos 1955 98-9. 331) Syll. 368 11.7-8,19; § 2 1.2. 332) Bengtson, 1937 II 216. 333) Bengtson, 1937 II 208. 334) e.g. Hornblower, 1982 142, Frye, 1962 99 for Achaemenid debts to Lydia and Assyria; see also Ch.6.
of dynasts, inscriptions from Heracleia on Latmos, Tralles, Euromus and Hyllarima dated by the rule of Pleistarchus, Lysimachus' old associate, suggest that here, like Alexander before him, Lysimachus preferred to administer the satrapy by time-honoured methods.\footnote{Robert, 1945 161; Hornblower, 1982 64 n.90, 319-20, 368; Merkelbach, ZPE 16 1975 163, Inschr. Tralles no.34. \footnote{Bengtson, 1937 215. \footnote{Merkelbach, Historia 1970 152 sees the Nesiarch Apollodorus of Cyzicus (IG XI 4 562) as an Antigonid official; see also IG XII 7 for the Nesiarch Bakchon summoning Koan ἄλος to settle affairs on Naxos; Durrbach, 1921 no.18 - Philocles ensures that the League repays a loan to Delos. \footnote{IG IV² 68.11.21-22; Cawkwell, 1978 170-1, Robert, 1940 22-8 for Adeimantus of Lampsacus as ἄλος of the League.}} \footnote{IG IV² 68.11.21-22; Cawkwell, 1978 170-1, Robert, 1940 22-8 for Adeimantus of Lampsacus as ἄλος of the League.}}

Whether or not Lysimachus established a network of στρατηγοί across his kingdom, the precedent for a χοίρος-based system of administration, headed by a royal official, actually lies, as Bengtson recognised, with Antigonus,\footnote{Robert, 1945 161; Hornblower, 1982 64 n.90, 319-20, 368; Merkelbach, ZPE 16 1975 163, Inschr. Tralles no.34. \footnote{Bengtson, 1937 215. \footnote{Merkelbach, Historia 1970 152 sees the Nesiarch Apollodorus of Cyzicus (IG XI 4 562) as an Antigonid official; see also IG XII 7 for the Nesiarch Bakchon summoning Koan ἄλος to settle affairs on Naxos; Durrbach, 1921 no.18 - Philocles ensures that the League repays a loan to Delos. \footnote{IG IV² 68.11.21-22; Cawkwell, 1978 170-1, Robert, 1940 22-8 for Adeimantus of Lampsacus as ἄλος of the League.}} \footnote{IG IV² 68.11.21-22; Cawkwell, 1978 170-1, Robert, 1940 22-8 for Adeimantus of Lampsacus as ἄλος of the League.}} who has been credited with founding the Islanders' League. The system in force under the Ptolemies, with a royally appointed Nesiarch controlling the League council's agenda, with powers to intervene in the members' judicial and financial affairs, is thought to go back to Antigonus' rule.\footnote{Robert, 1945 161; Hornblower, 1982 64 n.90, 319-20, 368; Merkelbach, ZPE 16 1975 163, Inschr. Tralles no.34. \footnote{Bengtson, 1937 215. \footnote{Merkelbach, Historia 1970 152 sees the Nesiarch Apollodorus of Cyzicus (IG XI 4 562) as an Antigonid official; see also IG XII 7 for the Nesiarch Bakchon summoning Koan ἄλος to settle affairs on Naxos; Durrbach, 1921 no.18 - Philocles ensures that the League repays a loan to Delos. \footnote{IG IV² 68.11.21-22; Cawkwell, 1978 170-1, Robert, 1940 22-8 for Adeimantus of Lampsacus as ἄλος of the League.}} \footnote{IG IV² 68.11.21-22; Cawkwell, 1978 170-1, Robert, 1940 22-8 for Adeimantus of Lampsacus as ἄλος of the League.}} Further evidence for χοίρος as a method of control favoured by Antigonus is supplied by his revived Hellenic League of 302 BC; here again the king's ἄλοι play a prominent role in directing League activities.\footnote{Robert, 1945 161; Hornblower, 1982 64 n.90, 319-20, 368; Merkelbach, ZPE 16 1975 163, Inschr. Tralles no.34. \footnote{Bengtson, 1937 215. \footnote{Merkelbach, Historia 1970 152 sees the Nesiarch Apollodorus of Cyzicus (IG XI 4 562) as an Antigonid official; see also IG XII 7 for the Nesiarch Bakchon summoning Koan ἄλος to settle affairs on Naxos; Durrbach, 1921 no.18 - Philocles ensures that the League repays a loan to Delos. \footnote{IG IV² 68.11.21-22; Cawkwell, 1978 170-1, Robert, 1940 22-8 for Adeimantus of Lampsacus as ἄλος of the League.}} \footnote{IG IV² 68.11.21-22; Cawkwell, 1978 170-1, Robert, 1940 22-8 for Adeimantus of Lampsacus as ἄλος of the League.}}

In mainland Greece and the Cyclades, then, areas where the citizens might be thought to have a stronger claim, historically, to "freedom and autonomy" than their Ionian kinsmen, Antigonus had no ideological objections to imposing his will upon the πόλεις through the medium of royal appointees standing at the head of the χοίρος. It
is not implausible, therefore, that Lysimachus' *στρατηγοί* of the Ionians" might represent, not a dramatic contrast with, but actually a continuation of Antigonus' methods. No definite conclusions, however, can be drawn as yet regarding Antigonus' system of administration in Asia Minor. After Alexander's death and before Antigonus' takeover of the satrapies there (between 319 BC and 314 BC), Diodorus' account suggests that the Ionian Greek cities were assigned to satrapies on a regional basis: in 319 BC Arrhidaeus clearly regarded Cyzicus as part of his satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia; later, Miletus and other Carian cities are described as "subject" to the satrap Asander. Under Antigonus' rule, as has been seen, the satrapies of Lydia, Hellespontine, and Greater Phrygia were probably governed by *στρατηγοί* whose authority seemingly extended to the Greek or Hellenised cities of the hinterland, like Sardis and Synnada. The position of the coastal πόλεις, however, remains unclear. If Antigonus were responsible, as seems likely, for refounding the Ionian League, then this and his practice elsewhere might support the theory of their organisation on a *νομον*-based system. There is, however, no direct evidence for a "*στρατηγοί* of the Ionians" under Antigonid rule: the officers called *στρατηγοί*, like Archestratus at Clazomenae or Hipparchus of Cyrene, honoured by the Samians some time between 306 BC and 301 BC, seem to play a purely military role. This may be due, however, simply to the chance survival of evidence; our knowledge of Hippostratus,

after all, rests on one inscription. Evidence for Ionian cities dealing directly with the Antigonid kings does not rule out a απατηγόν. Since inscriptions from Lysimachus' reign show that Hippostratus' presence did not prevent χωρόω cities like Samos or Priene from approaching the king directly.  

In conclusion, Lysimachus' appointment of a απατηγόν, "over the Ionian cities", if not actually a continuation of Antigonus' practice in Asia Minor, is not a method to which Antigonus was a stranger. The decrees which honour Lysimachus' απατηγόν, unfortunately tell us little about the nature or limits of their authority over the Ionians; the decree for Hippodamus is fragmentary and heavily restored; the services for which Hippostratus is praised are obscured in conventional formulae, but the honours he receives, ἀπαλίσια throughout the χωρόω cities and a bronze cavalry statue, suggest benefactions of some magnitude. On an analogy with both the Ptolemaic officials of the Nesiote League and Alexander's officer Philoxenus, it is probable that Lysimachus' απατηγόν had powers, potentially, to intervene in disputes involving financial and judicial affairs. However, the fact that the χωρόω is able to make these grants of ἀπαλίσια suggests that in normal circumstances the league enjoyed a degree of internal autonomy consistent with that already noted for some individual cities. The decree for Hippostratus has even been cited as proof of sincere gratitude.

343) I.Priene 14, 15, 37, Welles, RC 7.  344) Hippodamus also receives ἀπαλίσια, but the loss of the rest of the text leaves it unclear whether his honours are identical to those of Hippostratus.  345) Syll. 368 11.1-8, 12-15. See Ch. 6 for the significance of different honours offered to royal and citizen benefactors.  346) Burststein, Ancient World 1986 20, 1986 137; see above.
towards the στρατηγός since its tone is moderate, containing no exaggerated praise for his patron, Lysimachus, nor the formula τοῦ Βασιλέως ἐπιστελέαντος which betrays a royal order behind an apparently voluntary grant of honours.347 Though such an interpretation is not incompatible with the evidence for Lysimachus' benefactions and his readiness to allow cities which stayed loyal a fair degree of autonomy, the tone of the decree should not be given too much weight. Its moderation can perhaps be explained in part by its relatively early date; as time passed and their dynasties became more firmly established, the Macedonian rulers might naturally grow accustomed to extravagant compliments and and come to expect them while the cities in turn grew more adept at providing them. Also, the emergence of the decree for Hippodamus, seemingly couched in almost identical terms, increases the likelihood that such praise may represent convention rather than a sincere tribute to an individual.

The context in which Lysimachus first appointed his στρατηγός of the Ionians is uncertain, nor is it clear whether the office continued until the end of his reign. Bengtson saw Lysimachus' network of στρατηγοί installed over the the ξοινόνā in response to the military threat posed by Demetrius' fleet, replacing a single στρατηγός with authority over both Aeolis and Ionia. In Bengtson's view, the first incumbent of the latter post had been Prepelaus, appointed when Lysimachus first entered Asia in 302 BC.348 This conclusion seems unjustified. Though Prepelaus bears the title of

with specific responsibility for "the Ionian and Aeolian cities", his task is primarily that of conquest and his administrative powers, as Bengtson himself noted, stem from his military office. His role is best compared to that of Alcimachus under Alexander in 334 BC, who has exactly the same title. There is no evidence that either man, after taking the administrative measures required by conquest, remained in the area with supervisory powers over the cities. Bengtson's identification of So(sthenes), the general active in saving Priene from attack by the Magnesians and Pedieis c. 286/5 BC, as a possible successor to Hippostratus is likewise questionable. Lysimachus' letter to Priene after the crisis refers to his orders to "obey the general So(sthenes)"; Bengtson saw this as a reference to So(sthenes)' recent appointment as of the xóivóy, announced to Priene and the other cities by royal letter. Quite apart from the fact that Hippodamus has now emerged as a possible successor to Hippostratus, it could be argued that So(sthenes)' role is purely military, and that it is in his capacity as the king's trouble-shooter, sent to deal with a specific crisis, that the citizens are instructed to co-operate with him. He is given no title in the inscription, as might be expected if he were indeed the important Strategos of the Ionians, particularly in a letter where Lysimachus

does not hesitate to impress upon the Prieneans the correct protocol.\footnote{333}

If, then, the ἀποταξία of the Ionians cannot definitely be seen as a permanent fixture throughout Lysimachus' reign in Asia Minor, what is the likely context for its establishment? If the phrase τῶν πόλεων τῶν ἱππῶν denotes the full membership of the ἱππού as the emphasis on that body in the decrees for the ἀποταξία suggests, then the office is unlikely to pre-date 294 BC when Lysimachus at last got his hands on the League's more important members like Ephesus and Miletus. Since the language of the decree for Hippostratus, which emphasises his continued ὑπερήφανος and εὐνοία\footnote{334} suggests that his appointment predates the stone's inscription in 289/88 BC by some time, either Hippodamus' period of office was brief, or perhaps more plausibly, he was Hippostratus' successor.

If the ἀποταξία was not set up when Lysimachus acquired the major Ionian cities, it is possible that it represents a response to a specific set of circumstances. Past events suggest that the application of a special administrative system to the Ionian cities - the appointment of "supervisors" like Philoxenus and perhaps Orontes\footnote{335} - was prompted by revolt in the cities or fear of it. If the same is true of Lysimachus' ἀποταξία, then a possible context for its establishment might be c. 290 BC, a period when Trogus hints at some trouble among the Ionian cities.\footnote{336} Though Geyer doubted the historicity of this "revolt",\footnote{337} events at the end of the 290s

BC make such a development quite plausible; Lysimachus had suffered a heavy defeat at Getic hands and only events in central Greece had saved Thrace from conquest by Demetrius. That the Besieger would have tried also to capitalise on Lysimachus' loss of resources and prestige to reconquer his Asian possessions is possible.

To sum up; as officials whose titles proclaim authority over the "Ionian cities", rather than a satrapy of "Ionia", Lysimachus' στρατηγοί seem more akin to the officials heading the Hellenic or Nesiote leagues than the later regional governors to whom they are traditionally compared. As such, they represent no contrast to Antigonus' administrative system. There is no evidence to support the view that such officials were appointed throughout Lysimachus' Asian kingdom or that this στρατηγία remained in force for the whole of his reign. Rather these Ionian στρατηγοί may represent a special security measure to protect an area of high commercial and strategic value which had recently been threatened; if so, then this follows a precedent set by Alexander and perhaps by the Achaemenids too.

LYSIMACHUS AND THE LAOI

So far, this study of Lysimachus' government has focused almost exclusively on his Greek subjects, an emphasis which in part reflects the nature of the Greek literary sources. Where these touch on questions of administration at all, it is on relations between the king and the πόλεις that they concentrate. Direct information
regarding the Diadochs' government of the indigenous peoples of their realms is scarce. Accordingly, it is not perhaps surprising that many modern commentators follow the lead of their ancient predecessors in seeing the government of the early Hellenistic kingdoms almost exclusively in terms of the Greek cities. It is assumed, for instance, that Lysimachus' evident wealth must imply crippling levels of taxation of the Greek cities in his realm.

To see the economy of the Hellenistic kingdoms solely in terms of the royal administration and the Greek cities is to look at a jigsaw with a piece missing. As heirs to Alexander and the Achaemenid kings, the Diadochs found themselves masters of vast tracts of royal land, in extent comprising the greatest part of their kingdoms. These represented rich sources of minerals, timber, livestock and agricultural produce, worked by ἄγοι, indigenous peoples, who had paid taxes, in money, kind and labour to the successive dynasties ruling Asia. Xenophon emphasises the value of such workers to the king, in terms of revenue - Cyrus tells his soldiers not to massacre their prisoners of war since "a peopled land is a prize of great wealth"; the Persepolis Fortification tablets reflect Achaemenid concern to maintain their numbers; Briant has described this indigenous work-force as the "major productive force" in the economy of Achaemenid and Hellenistic Asia. In terms of the economic structure of the Hellenistic kingdoms as a whole, the ἄγοι form a link in a chain of transactions involving also the Greek cities and the king and his officials. Their labour provides raw materials for

the goods manufactured and exported by cities like Ephesus and Miletus. The cities in turn may serve as a market for the surplus produce grown on royal land. Bikermann describes the revenues accruing to the Seleucid kings from royal land as "enormous", and it is the ownership of this land which makes possible royal benefactions to the Greek cities, in the form of grain and money.

What then did the royal land and the Xocoi mean to Lysimachus in terms of revenues and what obligations, on both sides, characterised the relationship between him and his non-Greek subjects? Only two pieces of evidence relate directly to Lysimachus; the uprising of the Pedieis living in the environs of Priene, c.286 BC and an anecdote in Plutarch where a disgruntled peasant in Greater Phrygia sighs for the good old days of Antigonus' rule, suggesting that under Lysimachus and perhaps his Seleucid successors, the Xocoi were subjected to increasingly heavy burdens. Inferences as to his probable methods, however, can be drawn from the practice of his near contemporaries, since the surviving evidence for conditions for the indigenous peoples of Asia Minor suggests a certain continuity. It is increasingly recognised that the Macedonian conquerors, far from imposing, wholesale, a "superior" Greek system of administration upon their Asian kingdoms, were ready and willing to learn from their predecessors,

adopting many features of their administration. The system which the Achaemenids inherited from their predecessors for administration of the royal lands and government of the Λαοί is essentially still in force at the end of the Seleucid era and later. Acknowledging that their empire was composed of disparate forms of community - cities, villages, nomadic tribes and, with the Macedonian conquest, military colonies also - the rulers of Asia maintained these traditional units for purposes of administration and taxation.

The Hellenistic kings show respect for the customs of the non-Greek peoples in the sphere of civil law; royal εὐσεβεία is extended to indigenous sanctuaries as well as to the temples of the Olympians; the king and his officers govern through liaison with local elites, including them in the administrative hierarchy. The precise extent of Lysimachus' Βασιλική βία in Asia is unknown, but evidence for the gift or sale of royal land by his Seleucid and Attalid successors indicates some of the areas it comprised. In the Hellespontine region, Antiochus I was able to grant, in all, 2,000

364) Sherwin-White, 1987 5-6 for features of Seleucid rule which are characteristic of imperialism per se rather than characteristically Greek. 365) Hornblower, 1982 142 for continuity between the Lydian and Persian systems of government; Cook, 1973 367, Briant, 1982 104 (=1973), 151-5 (=1975) on the village as a constant unit and the economic advantages of this unchanging structure to the ruling power; Bikermann, 1938 116 for the system of toll-dues in force from Persian to Parthian rule. 366) Briant, 1987 13, 1982 103-4 (=1973), 150 (= JESHO 1975); 1982 467 (=1981) for the diversity of the Achaemenid empire; see the Mnesimachus inscription (Sardis VII I.1) for the co-existence of villages, παράκτιοι, Λαοί and slaves on one estate near Sardis. 367) Bikermann, 1938 208; Briant, 1987 14; Grayson, 1975 277-8 ABC 13b for Seleucid offerings to Babylon's indigenous sanctuary of Esagila; for further examples, see Ch.6. 368) Briant, 1987 1-31 for central power and local autonomy as complementary rather than mutually exclusive; 13 for collaboration with local elites; Sherwin-White, 1987 6-7 for non-Greeks in high military and administrative positions under Seleucid rule.
hectares of land to his ἀρίστος Aristodicides, who could choose to attach it to the territory of either Ilium or Scepsis. This implies the existence of royal land on the borders of both Gergis and Scepsis, with more between Ilium and Gergis since Aristodicides also receives the fortress of Petra, sited by Cook in the area of the Scamander gorge. Seleucid sales of land to Pitane and Antiochus I's grants of land in the territory of Zeleia suggested to Rostovtzeff that a large part of the fertile coastline of Aeolis and the Troad belonged to the kings. In Hellespontine Phrygia, Philetaerus exempts the Cyzicenes from duty paid on goods taken through his territory, presupposing royal land on the borders of that city. The anecdote in Plutarch, mentioned above, suggests the cultivation of extensive royal lands in Greater Phrygia, a belief which is supported by its largely village-based structure and the relative scarcity of Greek cities. In Ionia, Antigonus was able to reassure the inhabitants of Teos of his possession of corn-rich lands, presumably not far away, whose inhabitants were clearly obliged to pay him ἀριστος. Finally it is possible that the documents which records some kind of settlement made by Lysimachus for the indigenous Pedieis at Priene reflect his possession of royal land nearby in the fertile Maeander valley.

As a source of ready cash, the king might "sell" a portion of royal land to friends, relations or petitioners; Antiochus I


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received 350T for the land sold to Pitane. Alternatively he might "give" land to a faithful follower or to a loyal city. In some cases at least, with the death of the buyer or recipient, the land reverted to the king's possession and could be re-sold. The king was careful to keep track of the lands which temporarily passed to a concessionaire; Antiochus II's sale of land to his ex-wife Laodice shows that all sales contracts were registered in an archive, in this case at Sardis.

Even while temporarily "alienated" by gift or sale, the land continued to be a source of profit to the king. The long-held view of Asia-Minor under Persian and Macedonian rule as essentially "feudal", with land divided into "estates" centred on fortified dwellings, whose holders had complete and undisputed ownership both of this land and the workers "attached" to it as "serfs", was first questioned by Bikermann. In recent years his views have been taken up and developed by Briant, who argues plausibly for a system whereby what was "sold" or "given" was not the land itself, or the workers on it, but its revenues. For purposes of taxation, which

375) Welles, RC 1934 no. 10-12, Sardis VII I.I, Welles, RC 1934 no. 18; OGIS 335 11. 134-5. 376) Briant, 1982 106 (=1973); Hatzopoulos disputes this (1988 31, 34-5), citing land grants by Cassander and Lysimachus in Macedonia (Syll. 332, Hatzopoulos, 1988) which are ἐπὶ δασποικία, granted to the recipient and his descendants. This phrase is not, however, invariably included in land grant texts (e.g. RC 10-12) and Briant, REA 1985 63-4 makes the point that while royal "gifts" of land could be transmitted from generation to generation, as long as the family remained loyal to the ruling dynasty, the king retained the right to revoke his "gift" at any time. 377) Welles, RC 1934 no. 18. 11.27-8, Briant, 1982 102 (=1973); Bikermann, 1938 209 for Seleucid archives also at Uruk and Seleucia-on-Tigris. 378) Rostovtzeff, 1941 507-8, 1185-6, 1195-1197; see Briant, 1982 98-9 (=1973) for full bibliography. 379) Bikermann, 1938 177-9.
they continued to pay, not to the concessionaire but to the king, the λαοί were "attached" to the villages of their birth, although this did not necessarily preclude a physical change of domicile. They were not "slaves" or "serfs"; they remained personally free with property and houses of their own, and a considerable degree of local autonomy, although the demands of royal taxation and of obligatory service to the king might effectively render them dependent upon him.330

Some insight into the precise nature of these burdens upon the λαοί is provided by the mid-third(? century inscription from Sardis dealing with the estate of the concessionaire Mnesimachus.331 The ᾱδικος which the king continues to levy on the villages on Mnesimachus' "estate" is paid partly in money and partly in kind; the λαοί are also obliged to provide certain services (Ἀειτουργία) to the king. Briant suggests this took the form of labour on road-building and other public works.332 A more recently published inscription from Aegae in Aeolis, which seems to deal with an indigenous community also gives detailed information as to the nature of the taxes and services demanded of these peoples. The first surviving lines make reference to a tithe (δεκατία), perhaps to be paid as a "gift" to the king; in addition the people must

380) Briant, 1982 103-7, 116-118 (= 1973), 155 (=JESHO 1975; REA 1985 53-72. 381) Buckler & Robinson AJA 1912 11-82, Sardis VII I.no.1; Mierse, (in Hanfmann, 1983) 125 dates its inscription to c.250 BC, though the reference to "Antigonus" as the donor of the estate to Mnesimachus may suggest a grant before 305 BC (Déscait, REA 1985 97). 382) Briant, 1982 104 (=1973). 383) Malay, GRBS 1983 349-52. Royal responsibility for this community, the absence of the terms ἄνυμος or πόλις and a taxation system recalling that of the Mnesimachus text all support the idea ( 351 n.6.) that this is an indigenous community.
contribute 1/8th of the produce from their fruit trees and 1/50th of their sheep and goats; exemption from tax on the offspring of this livestock is clearly a privilege. The products of bee-keeping and the hunt are also taxed by the king, who is to receive 1/8th of the product of the hives and one leg from each boar and deer.\textsuperscript{36} There is also a reference to \textit{αἰττουργία} "for the army"; it is unclear whether this refers to military service, the provision of military supplies or perhaps billeting.\textsuperscript{384} A reference to \textit{οὶ ἄνο τοιοῦ} among the Pergamene ephebic lists, suggesting the service of non-citizens from the neighbouring villages in the royal army\textsuperscript{385} may favour the first option.

The identity of the king responsible for this inscription is uncertain; Malay dated the stone to the early third century on stylistic grounds and suggested Antiochus I on the basis of his "long reign".\textsuperscript{386} Though the term \textit{βασιλικός}, attested elsewhere in Seleucid documents, might suggest that dynasty, it is also used by the Attalids.\textsuperscript{387} While not directly attested for Lysimachus, there is no evidence that he used another term. The assumption that so elaborate a taxation system implies a reign of long duration is questionable, given the continuity in administrative methods discussed above. Even if it were accepted, is Antiochus' twenty year rule much more likely than that of Lysimachus, whose hold on Aeolis

\textsuperscript{384} Malay, GRBS 1983 352 §A.11.1-9, 12-16. 385) Ibid., 11.16-18 eίς δὲ αἰττουργίας παρέχονταί [πρὸς] στρατ[εύν]; Briant, 1982 102 (=1973) cites the Scythopolis dossier (Landau, Israel Exploration Journal no. 1 1966 54-70) 1.26 for στρατ[εύσ] as a burden from which the villages were anxious to be exempt; see also Xen.Anab. III.2.1, V.2.2, V.5.6. 386) Allen, 1983 176. 387) Malay, GRBS 1983 352. 388) e.g. Welles RC 1934 no.20 1.6, Bikermann, 1938 129; SEG II 1925 no. 580; Allen, 1983 54.
lasted, on the most conservative estimate, around thirteen years? The lettering of the text perhaps favours a late fourth or very early third century date over one in the second quarter of the third, as does the stoichedon style of the first section. Though no certain attribution can be made, on epigraphic grounds there seems no good reason to exclude Lysimachus, or even Antigonus, from authorship of the decree.

The λαοί, then, represented a steady source of profit to the king; in return, he secured their protection in times of warfare or other emergency - Aristodicles is obliged to receive the Ἀγαλλικοὶ λαοί at Petra under such circumstances. The text from Aegae may likewise illustrate the royal administration's concern to protect or redress wrongs done to the indigenous peoples and their property. On this occasion, the king or his officer restores a community to the land and property from which they have been recently dispossessed; a clause which seems to provide for the supply of agricultural equipment at royal expense may suggest a context of devastation by a hostile army. Protection of a similar kind might also be offered by a city to λαοὶ working its νομό. An inscription from Priene honouring the Ἡσαύρων Megabyzus grants him the right of abode in Prienean territory, but prohibits his encroachment upon the sacred villages near Apollonia Salbake against ill-treatment by that city; Ἡσαύρων in 1.5 (B) suggests a royal decree, but the identity of the benefactor is lost along with the first lines.

389) With oblique hastae on the Σ, short diagonal hastae on the Κ, small circular letters, irregular Ν. 390) Malay cites Holleaux, 1938 (II) 53 for some examples of the stoichedon style from the period of Antiochus I's reign, but Austin's general conclusions (1938 124) suggest that the stoichedon style is increasingly rare in the third century. 391) Welles, RC. 1937 no.11.11.23-5. 392) Malay, GRBS 1983 349-52; compare Robert, L & J, 1954 no.166 for royal protection of the sacred villages near Apollonia Salbake against ill-treatment by that city; Ἡσαύρων in 1.5 (B) suggests a royal decree, but the identity of the benefactor is lost along with the first lines.
property of the indigenous Pedieis.\textsuperscript{393}

Though generally a rich source of profit for the monarch, the indigenous peoples could, on occasion, prove something of a liability. Events at Priene circa 286 BC suggest that discontent among the non-Greek peoples might be harnessed by a king's opponents to cause him trouble. Following a violent attack upon Priene's χώρα and citizens by the indigenous Pedieis, acting in concert with the Magnesians and perhaps Demetrius, a fragmentary decree records a royal settlement, most probably issued by Lysimachus. Though the first half of the text is severely damaged, it seems to record provisions as to the status and living conditions of the Pedieis, while the second half concerns the punishment of those who participated in the violence.\textsuperscript{394}

Traditionally the text has been interpreted thus: the fragments which appear to concern the right of the Pedieis to dwell (μοποίσειν) in the villages (κατὰ χώρας), with a reference also to a time limit (?) of "thirty days" and a past gift of the king (δεδόχαμεν), were thought to describe an upgrading of their status from that of serfs attached to the king's land (Βοσιλικοί λαοί), to a position of "greater freedom" as dependents of the Greek city.\textsuperscript{395} The term μοποίσειν is presumably thought to denote a status analogous to that of the Spartan ἄσποι, whose conditions were rather better than those of the helots.\textsuperscript{396} Some scholars think that Lysimachus "gave" the Prieneans, short of labour to work their land,

\textsuperscript{393} I.Priene no. 3. \textsuperscript{394} I.Priene no. 14 11.5-6, I.Priene no. 15 11.13-14, I.Priene no. 16 = Welles, RC 1934 no.8 11.1-9, 11-16; Sherwin-White, JHS 1985 77, 79-80. \textsuperscript{395} Welles, RC 1934 52-3. \textsuperscript{396} For the Spartan system see Forrest, 1980 30-31.
only the λοοῖ. Others assume that the movement of λοοῖ from king to city must imply also a gift of royal land to Priene; this settlement therefore entails a "unilateral decision" by Lysimachus "to define in detail the terms of Priene's relationship with its new subjects".337 Both Welles and Burstein see this "promotion" of the Pedieis as preceding the ructions of 286/5 BC; the latter suggested that the Magnesians had also had their eye on the land "given" to Priene and that this prompted their attack.338 This theory plausibly explains Magnesian participation in the attack, but it is more difficult to understand why an improvement in status for the Pedieis should result in their taking violent action. Accordingly it is best to follow Hiller and Sherwin-White in seeing the clauses which concern the Pedieis' habitat as prompted by the troubles rather than preceding them.339 If the right to ἀξορίσειν does represent an upgrading of status, then it must refer only to those Pedieis not involved in the attack; certainly a clear distinction seems to be made between the Pedieis who are the recipients of this settlement and those responsible for the pillaging of Priene, by the preposition ᾧ in 1.10.

It is, however, questionable as to whether an improvement in the status of the Pedieis is actually the point at issue. Both this and the idea of the Pedieis' "transfer" to Priene along with a portion of royal land rest heavily upon the outmoded belief in the λοοῖ as serfs, "attached to the land" and "subject" to its

successive owners. The verb ἔστησεν can mean simply "to dwell", and Sherwin-White sees the main aim of Lysimachus' pronouncement as defining the Pedieis' proper place of abode (the ἐστῖν), after their unlawful incursion onto Prienean territory. This was done in terms already defined by Alexander who had explicitly stated his ownership of the ἐστῖν and accordingly his responsibility for the indigenous peoples dwelling there; the relevant section of his edict was accordingly now published by the Prieneans as a preface to the decrees which record the crisis of 286/5 BC. If then the Pedieis who attacked Priene were ἀρχαῖοι λαοί, either working royal land outside Prienean territory, or as Welles supposed, detailed by the King to solve a labour shortage at Priene, then Lysimachus' settlement does not constitute interference into Priene's relations with "her subjects". As Alexander's heir and master of the royal land, the Pedieis remain his responsibility and it is only proper that he should take steps to prevent the repetition of such an incident and to punish the transgressors.

If the rising of the Pedieis at Priene is not the result of a specific decision of Lysimachus, as was previously thought, it is perhaps best ascribed to poverty and generally unsatisfactory, and perhaps worsening conditions, something hinted at in Plutarch's Phrygian peasant anecdote, mentioned above. It is possible that Lysimachus' efforts to maximise the exploitation of Anatolia's

400) Liddell & Scott, 1968 1341-2; Sherwin-White, JHS 1985 79, 82. 401) Sherwin-White, JHS 1985 81-2 for the Alexander "edict" as a section of a longer decree, published contemporaneously with the texts below as part of an archive. 402) As Burstein (1986 136) supposed. 403) Plut. Phoc. 29; see above.
agricultural resources led to harder conditions for the ἀγολι̂. The situation was probably exacerbated by the constant warfare which characterises the Successor period. The villagers might see their fields ravaged by armies passing through, their carts and baggage animals requisitioned, or, perhaps still worse, find themselves the unwilling hosts to hungry soldiers billeted on them for a long stay.\textsuperscript{404} Despite these drains on their resources the taxman's demand would remain the same.\textsuperscript{405}

CONCLUSIONS.

In conclusion, the surviving evidence for Lysimachus' government of his kingdom suggests that his methods did not differ greatly from those of his predecessors or contemporaries. Nor is there any suggestion that those who followed him as rulers of Asia Minor regarded him as an awful object lesson, avoiding such practices like the plague. With regard to the Greek cities, consciousness of their strategic and economic value, in the context of fierce competition from his fellow Diadochs, seems to have dictated a policy fuelled by pragmatism rather than ideology, which mixed incentives and deterrents in response to particular circumstances. In the long term, the cities greatly benefited from his policy of synoecism which brought increased stability and prosperity; in more than one

\textsuperscript{404} Mitchell, \textit{JRS} 1976 129 for requisitioning of carts/baggage animals from local communities; Grayson, 1975 \textit{ABC} 10 Rev. 39 for "weeping and lamentation in the land" of Babylonia under the impact of Antigonus' army c.311 BC to 308 BC; Xen. \textit{Anab.} III.2.1, V.2.2, V.5.6. for the unpopularity of scavenging armies; Briant, 1982 143 (=\textit{JESHO} 1975) for the Greek military historian's view of the village purely in terms of food supply. \textsuperscript{405} Briant, 1982 116 (=1973).
case, posterity had good reason to thank him, as the following chapter will show. The indigenous peoples, governed along traditional lines which may have lacked flexibility in the context of the war-torn age, and demanding less consideration in terms of their value as a political force, may have fared less well.
The previous chapters have followed Lysimachus' rise from governor of one of the less desirable satrapies of Alexander's empire to ruler of a large and powerful kingdom, and examined his methods of government. Though topics such as benefaction and city-building have been touched upon in passing, the focus has been largely on his use of military and diplomatic skills and the deployment of monetary and man-power resources in the pursuit and acquisition of power. Traditionally, the study of such methods has often been thought to encompass all that is really central to an understanding of political action.

While, however, the conquerors and rulers of great kingdoms may be able to maintain power through money and military force alone - at least for a time - the processes whereby power changes hands, throughout history and in diverse societies, suggest that such an approach is rarely seen as profitable. Instead the power-holders seek ways to persuade those whom they rule "to acquiesce in a polity where the distribution of power is manifestly unequal and unjust...". Frequently this is achieved in part through ceremonies and rituals which surround the person of the ruler (or ruling group), setting him apart from the mass of his subjects. The importance of such rituals and the media by which the ruler presents himself to his subjects - paintings, sculpture, public inscriptions,

costume, the building of temples and cities and other benefactions - are increasingly acknowledged by historians and anthropologists alike as integral to the successful exercise of power and "central to the structure and working of any society". Similarly there is a growing recognition that the response of the ruler's subjects to this presentation, reflected most obviously in the honours paid to royalty, says much about the way they view the world they live in and how they accommodate themselves to dramatic changes in it.

IDEAS ON KINGSHIP

For the Successors, who transformed themselves from governors of a limited territory, with their authority sanctioned by a central power, into monarchs of independent kingdoms, it was perhaps more than usually important to convey a convincing image of kingship. The fierce competition between Lysimachus and his colleagues to win territories, wealth, and support from courtiers, troops, and subjects, gave the whole business an extra edge. As claimants to power from outside the Argead dynasty, operating in a context of political instability, the kingly image which the new rulers strove to promote predictably lays its emphasis on tradition. Inspiration came from several sources.

Kingship was a subject much discussed by fourth century political theorists like Aristotle and Isocrates. While the impact of such


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theory on events in the Greek-speaking world of the mid-fourth century has been overestimated in some quarters, and it would be naive to imagine Lysimachus and his colleagues with their copies of Aristotle and Isocrates ever at hand, these writers draw a useful portrait of the ideal monarch from within the context of the Greek city-state. To define early Hellenistic kingship wholly in terms of the Greek writings on the subject would, however, be misleading. The reinterpretation and full evaluation of non-Greek evidence from the Near East, unblinkered by what might be called the "colonial approach", has shown that ideas of kingship, both for Alexander and his successors in Asia were strongly influenced by the practices of their Achaemenid predecessors.

Evidence for contemporary ideas of kingship comes also from the work of theorists attached to the courts of the new kings, like Hecataeus of Abdera, Euhemerus of Cardia and possibly Berossus in Babylon. These form a slightly different category. Their beliefs on kingship, though often projected back into the mythical past, may well serve to justify their patron's actions after the event rather than representing the inspiration for them.

The aim of this chapter is to examine, in the context of these

5) Aymard, 1967 73 (=REA 1948) saw the Macedonian monarchic revival as coinciding with a favourable climate of opinion in the Greek ρωμαίοι. Will, 1975 422 is more realistic: he argues that for "certains esprits" (my italics) the political instability of ρωμαίοι life made "...un plus grand continuité et d'une plus grand sagesse dans la direction des affaires" appealing. 6) Kuhrt, 1987a, 49-50, and 1987b 39, 48-50; see also Kuhrt & Sherwin-White, JHS 1991 (forthcoming) for Assyrian, Achaemenid and Macedonian rulers following traditional Babylonian ritual in building work on the sanctuary at Esagila. 7) Euhem.= Diod. VI.1.1-11; Hecat.= Diod. I.46.8, 47.1-49.3, 53. 1-58.3; Murray, IEA 1970 141-71; Kuhrt, 1987a 53-55 for Berossus as a Seleucid protegé.
contemporary and traditional ideas of kingship, Lysimachus' achievement of royal status and the way he chose to present himself to his subjects. Since the Successors operated in an atmosphere of intense competition, Lysimachus' royal propaganda, his benefactions, the cults established for him, his court and the cities which he founded cannot be considered in isolation but must be compared with what is known of the practices of his rivals.

THE ROAD TO KINGSHIP

Alexander's premature death in 323 BC left his empire with no heirs save the epileptic Philip Arridhaeus and the infant Alexander IV, born posthumously. Perdiccas' re-distribution of satrapies at Babylon therefore effectively placed its government in the hands of Alexander's erstwhile μίλων. Loyalty to the new Regent and the good fortune to be "on the spot" may have played their part in determining these appointments. That the empire should be entrusted in a period of interregnum to talented and energetic men who had occupied a privileged position at court was not itself an untoward event. Lysimachus and his colleagues might even be seen as filling the role of the "stake-holders" who traditionally "stand in" in the period between the death of one ruler and the accession of his heir. Unlike many of these "stand-ins", however, their powers were far from being negligible. While it would be wrong to see the

8) Errington, JHS 1970 57. 9) Goody, 1966 10-12. Among the African Ashanti, for example, it is the high court officials including the gunmen and sword-bearers who act as ritual stand-ins on the death of the king.
formation of the Hellenistic kingdoms as the inevitable consequence of the situation in 323 BC, an interregnum always renders the "state" highly vulnerable to change\(^\text{10}\) and this promised to be a long one. Also, the early signs of personal ambition displayed by Perdiccas may have aroused suspicion regarding his integrity as representative of the Argead heirs. Both these factors would increase the likelihood of competition for power among the "stakeholders" themselves.

Though Hieronymus' stress on the aspirations of these men to kingly power from the earliest days of the Diadoch period may owe too much to hindsight,\(^\text{11}\) it is significant that, as the new satraps jockeyed for position, two themes emerge which remain central to the Successors' later claims to royalty. These are an insistence on themselves as heirs to Alexander and an emphasis on ability, primarily in the sphere of war. The importance of military victory as a means of achieving and maintaining royal power has been rightly emphasised by Austin.\(^\text{12}\) Victory brings wealth and personal support; these in turn increase the prospect of further military success.

Thus Leonnatus, who had blood ties with the Argead house, emphasised his physical resemblance to Alexander and adorned himself with royal extravagance.\(^\text{13}\) Where ties of blood were lacking, bonds of matrimony could be forged. Perdiccas, with Alexander's Royal Seal already in his hands, was ready to risk Antipater's wrath, repudiating his daughter Nicaea when the prospect of marriage to

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\(^{10}\) Goody, 1966 10. \(^{11}\) Hornblower, 1981 103, for composition of the history in the 270s BC. \(^{12}\) Austin, CQ 1986 451-8. \(^{13}\) Arr. Succ. FGrH 156 F 178.
Alexander's sister Cleopatra beckoned. Cassander followed victory over Alexander's mother Olympias in 316 BC with marriage to the Conqueror's half-sister Thessalonice. The importance of ability and its rewards, wealth and support, is likewise made abundantly clear. Cassander, "fair and energetic" (ἐπιείξικος ... ἐπεργὼς) wins the support of the mainland Greek cities from Polyperchon who acted in a lazy and stupid fashion (ἀπόφοιτος καὶ ἀπόκοπως). Ptolemy cultivates the goodwill of the Egyptian people: Egypt's wealth buys him soldiers and a devoted circle of φίλοι. By 321 BC he is described as holding Egypt as "spear-won" land. In the following year, Antigonus' vast army, with the revenues of Asia to support and enlarge it, put him in a position to aspire to τὰ ἅλα.

Long before his formal assumption of kingship in 306 BC, the literary evidence shows Antigonus hailed as king by the Persians. Plutarch suggests that Seleucus too, by 306 BC, "had already assumed royal prerogatives when he gave audience to the barbarians". There is little specific evidence regarding Lysimachus' aspirations to kingship but this is probably the result of his preoccupation with Thracian affairs in the first years after 323 BC. Largely excluded from active participation in the early Diadoch wars, he

thus forfeits a major role in this section of Hieronymus' narrative. It would not, therefore, be valid to assume that at this stage kingship held no allure for him. Diodorus tells us that, like his fellow Diadochs, he was a suitor for Cleopatra's hand, while his demand for Hellespontine Phrygia in 315 BC has plausibly been seen as challenging Antigonus' claim to be Alexander's successor in Asia. He took pains to publicise his intimacy with Alexander; the success of this approach is reflected in Demetrius' later perception of him as a more formidable rival than Pyrrhus for Macedon's throne, because he was "known to many through Alexander."

In the years before his assumption of the royal title, Lysimachus' achievement, judged on the criterion of victory as a source of wealth and support, can be summed up as follows. Failure to accomplish a crushing defeat of Seuthes III was presumably offset by the gain of the West Pontic cities. He swiftly and effectively quashed the revolt of these in 313 BC, winning a string of victories, against the cities themselves, their Thracian and Scythian allies, Seuthes III and finally the Antigonid general Pausanias. These brought with them the wealth and man-power essential for the establishment and maintenance of kingly power. Lysimachus' increased prosperity is suggested by his ability, in 309 BC, to build his capital, Lysimachia. Both its name and the very act of foundation reflect aspirations to royal status.

20) Diod.XX.37.4; the aim of these suits is τούτου ὀλευθέρων; the date and context for Lysimachus' initiative are unknown. 21) Diod.XIX.57.1; Ritter, 1965 106; see also Ch.3. 22) See Ch. 1 and below; Plut. Demet.44. 23) See Ch. 2. 24) Diod.XIX.73.10; see Austin, CQ 1986 460. 25) See below. 325
The timing and context of the Successors' formal assumption of the title Basileus underlines the importance of victory and the public support which follows in its wake. Though Cassander's murder of Alexander IV in 310 BC obviously smoothed their path, Diodorus makes it clear that it was Demetrius' victory over Ptolemy at Salamis in 306 BC which prompted the Antigonids to adopt the royal title. Antigonus' στρατεύμα take a prominent role in acknowledging his claim to royal status; we are also told that he was acclaimed as king by τὸ πλήθος. If this term is correctly interpreted as designating the army, then the tripartite foundation of the monarchy, later acknowledged in the epigraphic formula, "King, Friends and Army" is already in force.

Antigonus' opponents were not slow to respond; in the following year Ptolemy's στρατεύμα conferred the title of King upon him. A Babylonian king list shows that Seleucus was king in 305/4 BC; by summer 304 BC Lysimachus and Cassander had followed suit. As both kingship ritual and history make clear, possession and use of royal regalia is closely connected with claims to legitimacy in rule.

26) Diod.XIX.53.4, 105.2,3-4. Freed "of the future source of fear represented by the king", the Diadochs now hoped for kingship and held their satrapies "like a spear-won kingdom". 27) Plut. Demet. 18.1. 28) L.Priene no.14 1.10, no.15 11.6-7 for thanks offered for the safety of "King Lysimachus, his friends and army" c.286/5 BC; compare OGIS 219 11.9-10. 29) Plut. Demet. 18.2-3; App. Syr.34, FGrH 155 F 6; Hauben, Anc.Soc. 1974, 105-6 dates Ptolemy's royal title to 305/4; for Seleucus, see Sachs & Wiseman, Iraq 1954 202-211. Ritter, 1965 106 sees Cassander and Lysimachus as kings by the time they were honoured at Rhodes in summer 304 BC. 30) Goody, 1966 12 for royal regalia's legitimising power.
Though the Successors may have long been kings in all but name, their adoption of the title Ἡρακλέους and their wearing of the diadem is not a mere formality, but marks a moment of supreme importance.

For the Diadochs, the title Ἡρακλέους had the significance imposed on it by Alexander. Connoting barbarism in Classical Greece, the word was seldom used in official documentation and then usually qualified by an ethnic which defines the national quality of the monarch's sovereignty. Alexander's use of it as a pre-name without the article is rightly seen as signifying his claim to the Achaemenid heritage, but the idea that Alexander's title, Ἡρακλέους, also expressed the idea of a monarchy that was above all personal is less compelling. The strong evidence for continuity in royal ideology and kingship practices deliberately fostered by the successive dynasties who ruled in Asia suggests rather that it was the traditional aspect of his kingship which Alexander wished to emphasise.

Closely associated with the Successors' assumption of the kingly title was the wearing of the diadem. Though originally part of the Great King's adornment, it becomes the archetypal symbol of royalty with Alexander. Worn as his official royal headdress, it is thought to have expressed to the indigenous peoples of the empire his status

31) Aymard, 1967 73-84 (REA 1948). 32) Sherwin-White, 1987 9 for Babylonian Kingship used by Achaemenid, Argead and Seleucid rulers to make their rule palatable to the local population; Baldus, Chiron 1987 396-7 for Alexander's use of Darius' seal-ring, continued minting of Persian Darics and other measures aimed at creating an impression of continuity. See also Plut. Alex. 69 and n.3. above.
as successor to the Achaemenid kings. Its potency as a symbol of royalty is reflected in anecdotes attached to both Seleucus and Lysimachus, where their temporary wearing of Alexander's diadem serves as a portent of future kingship.

In modern discussion of the meaning of title and diadem for the Successors, two main points are generally made. Both express a claim to Alexander's Asiatic territories, but whereas for the Antigonids they signify a claim to xοτοαεία, for the other Diadochs they express only the wish to be acknowledged as fully independent kings in a section of the empire and a claim to part of the Asian territory. Since, however, the validity of the contrast traditionally drawn between Antigonid aims and those of their opponents is doubtful, the idea of the "different meanings" of title and diadem is likewise open to criticism. The famous anecdote in Plutarch's Demetrius where the Besieger's πίλος toast his opponents, using titles which express his rejection of their claim to θαυμασία certainly supports this view of Antigonid ambition. The literary evidence, however, makes it equally clear that their rivals' assumption of title and diadem, and their consistent use, subsequently, of the title in official documentation, expresses above all a reaction to and rejection of that Antigonid claim to

they were unwilling to appear inferior in status to Monophthalmus and his son. No statement is made which supports the idea of a more limited territorial objective.

The belief that both title and diadem express a claim to Alexander's Asian empire has also caused difficulties in Lysimachus' case. His clearly attested assumption of both long before the Ipsus victory gave him Antigonus' Anatolian possessions proves an awkward exception to this supposed rule. Various solutions to the problem have been sought. It has been suggested either that Thrace was regarded as part of the Asian empire in the period from 331 BC to its formal emergence as a separate kingdom in 305/4 BC or that the validity of Lysimachus' title stems from his claim to Asian lands in 315 BC and his active pursuit of it in the struggle against Antigonus from 305 BC to 301 BC.

Such solutions are unnecessary; firstly, it may be questioned whether, after Alexander's conquest of an empire which comprised much of the known world, his successors still perceived this inheritance in terms of the strict division between Europe and Asia which modern historians insist on. Second, the concept of a perfectly harmonised pattern underlying the Diadochs' assumption of kingship should be jettisoned. If instead, their action is seen as inspired first by the necessity to stand firm against a rival, and second by the timely show of that support from friends and army

38) See esp. App.Syr.34; Heid.Epit.FGrH 155 F. 6 "The others ... so as not to be outdone by him (Antigonus), also assumed the diadem and called themselves kings..."; Plut.Demet.18; Aymard, 1967 96 on the royal title in documentation. 39) Diod. XX.53.2; Heid.Epit.FGrH 155 F. 6; App Syr 34; Plut Demet. 18.37. 40) Ritter, 1965 106.
which was essential for ἄρειστος. Then the so-called difficulties are resolved.

THE VERY IMAGE OF A KING: PROPAGANDA AND SELF-PRESENTATION

In declaring themselves ἄρειστος the Successors took upon themselves certain obligations in relation to their subjects. They also placed themselves in a new position as regards the gods. Though royal ideology and kingship ritual may vary considerably in their particulars in different societies at different times, certain themes recur consistently. The King is the protector of his people: he must be victorious in war; he builds walled cities as a place of refuge for his subjects. The King stands as a guarantor of order against chaos; he uses his great wealth both to stave off disaster, by propitiatory gifts to the gods, and to relieve his people's distress when they are faced with irresistible forces such as famine, disease, earthquake or enemy devastation. The King has a special relationship with the gods. Often the chosen favourite of a god, he accedes to the throne by divine will and his victories are the proof of divine favour.

41) Ritter, 1965 105 suggests that Lysimachus too would have been acclaimed by his troops. 42) Kuhrt, 1987b 24. 43) Kuhrt, ibid.; see also Burghart, 1987 247 for the fortified capital as one of the 7 "limbs of state" in 19th century Nepal. 44) Kuhrt 1987b 29; Root, 1979 303-8 for the Achaemenid motif of royal hero versus wild beast at Persepolis which gives visual expression to this idea. 45) Isoc. Ad. Nic. 9; Murray, JEA 1970 156; Burghart, 1987 242-3, 255, 261 for the Nepalese king's gifts to his people and the gods in hope of divine approval and victory; 265 for royal embellishment of temples, see also n.3 above. 46) Kuhrt, 1987b 41-3,50 - Babylonian kingship texts stress the god Marduk's choice of the successful claimant; Root, 1979 73, 169-70 - Ahuramazda hovers over the Achaemenid kings.
Closely connected to the idea of the King as a symbol of stability and continuity is the concept of an inherited claim to rule. The Cypriot prince Nicocles, for whom Isocrates wrote a treatise outlining the advantages of monarchy, justified his position with these words: "Teucer originally founded the city... later after it had been lost it was recovered by my father Evagoras... this is to show that I hold my office by natural right". Isoc. Nic. 27. A ruler who cannot claim blood ties with his predecessor, presents himself as his natural heir on the basis of victory, ability, success and the other kingly qualities which themselves reflect divine approval. Nabonidus, who reached the Neo-Babylonian throne as victor in a bloody dynastic struggle declared himself "the real executor of the wills of Nebuchadnezzar and Neriglissar, my royal predecessors!" The failure of the latter's heirs to keep the throne (or indeed their lives) proved the disfavour of the gods; Nabonidus' victory reflected divine purpose.

The line taken by the Diadochs was essentially the same. Promoting their victories and their own heroic qualities, they strove to present themselves as rightful heirs to the kings who had preceded them. Lysimachus and his colleagues emphasised their ties with Alexander, who himself had claimed his "inheritance" from the Achaemenid kings.

47) Isoc. Nic. 27. 48) Kuhrt, 1987a 43, 48. 49) See above, n.3 and n.30. Also Sherwin-White, 1987 10-11 for the Seleucids as the "good successors" to the Achaemenids after a "bad" period of war and chaos (Alexander's conquest and the early Diadoch wars) in the Babylonian "Dynastic Prophecy".
Of the Diadochs, only Ptolemy was bold enough to claim actual blood-ties with the Argead house. One story circulating at his court presented him as Philip II's illegitimate son; the other, which apparently gained official acceptance, promoted the Argead ancestry of his mother Arsinoe.\(^{50}\) The suggestion that the Seleucid court spawned a legend linking Seleucus' wife Apama to Alexander is less compelling.\(^{51}\) Apama's importance seems rather to have lain in her Iranian aristocratic background which helped to make the Seleucid dynasty acceptable to its Persian subjects.\(^{52}\) Since Philip and Alexander had prided themselves on descent from Heracles,\(^{53}\) the Diadochs also strove to establish links with the Argead house through this shared ancestry. Theocritus' panegyric for Ptolemy II presents Ptolemy I and Alexander on equal terms, as descendants of "the strong Heraclid".\(^{54}\) The later Antigonids, certainly, emphasised descent from Heracles; the identification may go back to the earliest days of the dynasty.\(^{55}\)

Lysimachus' approach was rather different. Rather than attempting to claim blood-ties with the house of Alexander, he attracted or, more probably, promoted a literary tradition which stressed his intimacy with Alexander in a friendship based on equal

50) Tarn, JHS 1933 57-9 thought Arsinoe's royal blood was a later fabrication; Edson, HSCP 1934 224 accepts the link as genuine. 51) Tarn, CQ 1929 139. 52) Sherwin-White, 1987 7-8. 53) Nilsson, 1951 101-4; Palagia, Boreas 1986 140. 54) Theoc.Id.17 1.26; Nilsson, 1951 109. 55) Edson, HSCP 1934 214, 217-8, 221 cites Heraclid emblems on Antigonid coinage, Heracles' possible inclusion in Gonatas' Delos dedication, Demetrius dubbed the "false Heraclid" in a Rhodian epigram commemorating the resistance of 305 BC.
ability. The success of this presentation was enhanced by the fact that for most of his career Lysimachus faced opponents who could not claim such a tie. Antigonus belonged to an older generation and had never been part of the élite circle. Demetrius was too young to have served with Alexander; accordingly he tried to obliterate the memory of the conqueror by emphasis on his own dazzling personality and achievements. Pyrrhus, Demetrius' contemporary, did promote himself as a second Alexander; significantly this served to win him Macedonian support against Demetrius, but was not effective against Alexander's comrade-in-arms, Lysimachus. Even Seleucus, Lysimachus' last great enemy, though his contemporary, only reached prominence at court at the very end of Alexander's reign and after; the scarcity of literary anecdotes which stress an intimacy with Alexander suggest that this was a line which perhaps he felt he could not convincingly pursue.

The "lion-killer" legend, a prominent theme in Lysimachus' royal propaganda has already been discussed. Apart from emphasising intimacy with Alexander, this episode features other "royal themes". Superhuman strength and courage, despite Isocrates' emphasis on the less macho heroic qualities, seems to have retained its allure as a justification of royal status. Then there is the motif of the

56) See Ch. 1. 57) Goukowsky, 1978 118. 58) e.g c. 292 BC Demetrius replaced Alexander's coin types with his own; Newell (1927 168) saw this as typically arrogant! 59) Plut. Demet. 41-2,44; Pyrrh. 12. 60) Apart from his presence in Alexander's boat crossing the Hydaspes (Arr. Anab. V.13.1), there is only the diadem episode mentioned above (Aristob.FGrH 49 F.55). 61) See Ch.1. 62) Isoc. Ad Phil.110, ascribes Heracles' surpassing glory to wisdom, lofty ambition and justice rather than strength. 63) App. Syr.57, Edson, HSCP 1934 214 for wild bulls slain by Seleucus and Philip V; Ch.1 for the lion-slaying exploits of Perdiccas and Craterus.
hunt, an activity with specifically royal connotations.\textsuperscript{64} The visual motif of royal hero versus beast as symbolising the king's role as guardian of order against chaos has already been mentioned.

The importance of this episode for Lysimachus is underlined by the prominence given to the lion motif elsewhere in his royal imagery. The lion-protome facing right or left appears regularly on his coinage from the earliest Philip II types minted at Lysimacheia, serving also as the reverse type for some of Lysimachus' later bronze issues. Baldus' theory, based on the protome format, that the lion symbol known from coins represents Lysimachus' personal seal-device, is plausible.\textsuperscript{65} The idea of the lion as Lysimachus' dynastic symbol gains support from its appearance on the coins issued by his son Ptolemy at Telmessus in the mid-third century BC.\textsuperscript{66} Recently Baldus has argued that the lion was the seal device used by Alexander for his European correspondence.\textsuperscript{67} If this is correct, then the lion symbol links Lysimachus to the Conqueror with a double knot. Finally, the name of Lysimachus' massive flagship 

\textit{Aeovroqépos} suggests that, as a lion-slayer, Lysimachus thought of himself as lion-like. Alexander, of course, had done the same.\textsuperscript{68}

Obviously the lion-slayer motif also recalls Heracles, founder of the Argead dynasty. It has been suggested that Lysimachus pursued

\textsuperscript{64} Pollitt, 1986 38-42 for the hunt in royal iconography; see also the Alexander and Satrap sarcophagi from Sidon (Istanbul Mus. Cat.no.s 368 and 367). \textsuperscript{65} Baldus, Chiron 1978 191, 196-8. He cites the parallel use of the Seleucid anchor on the royal seal and coins; the Ptolemaic eagle and thunderbolt (see Davis & Kraay, 1973 pl.13, 14) is another example. \textsuperscript{66} Hill, 1923 211. \textsuperscript{67} Baldus, Chiron 1987 402-6. \textsuperscript{68} Memn.FGrH 434 F 8.5; Baldus, ibid; Killerich, Symbol.Osl. 1988 56-7 for Alexander as lion-like.
this image in another medium, with the identification of a monumental statue head found at Ephesus as a portrait of Lysimachus in the guise of that hero. The marble head, over life-size and of high artistic quality, wears a diadem, into which a wreath of olive leaves is bound. These features, a resemblance to the unbearded Heracles portraits produced by Scopas' circle and the idealised, heroic expression are cited to identify the head as the portrait of a ruler depicted as Heracles. The presence of some "realistic features", such as the lined brow, seen as an indication of age, suggest to the authors a work of the Hellenistic period. The influence of Scopas and Lysippus and the presence of all the distinctive hall-marks of the Alexander portraits are evoked in favour of a late fourth/early third century date. The identification with Lysimachus rests partly on the historical circumstances which make him a likely subject for a monumental statue at Ephesus and partly on "distinctive features" isolated as characteristic of the king, on the basis of coin portraits. Finally a comparison of stylistic details, notably the treatment of the hair, with those on the coin portrait of Seleucus issued by Philetaerus c.283 BC and the portraits of Demetrius Poliorcetes struck in the 290s BC is used to justify a close dating to the period between 285 BC and 281 BC. Lysimachus' presentation of himself in the role of Heracles, at the moment when his power had reached its height, is seen as symbolising his readiness to reach

out and recover the whole empire of Alexander.\textsuperscript{73}

While the general identification of the head as an early Hellenistic ruler portrait is acceptable and Lysimachus' role as the founder of new Ephesus makes him a likely candidate,\textsuperscript{74} the methods by which this "secure identification" is reached are far from sound. Smith has rightly emphasised the difficulty of identifying Hellenistic ruler portraits by stylistic dating and comparison of coin and monumental portraits. He argues that confidence in these methods is ill-founded, based on two mistaken assumptions: firstly that Greek sculpture at all periods reflects a perceptible development in style, as it does in the fifth century; second, that all monumental ruler portraits will echo an "official" type which in turn will be reflected in any surviving coin portrait.\textsuperscript{76} More particularly, arguments based on the idea of certain features as typical of Lysimachus, notably the thick-set skull, and a short nose and chin, assume that Lysimachus placed his own portrait on certain of his coins. This is almost certainly wrong.\textsuperscript{76} Of the two examples cited, one is extremely battered, the other a posthumous minting from Byzantium.\textsuperscript{77} The details on the latter, the hook-like curls on the neck, and the thicker shorter nose, cited as distinctive of Lysimachus may rather reflect a peculiarity of the Byzantine mint.\textsuperscript{76} The Horn of Ammon, clearly visible on the Byzantine example, is also a strong argument in favour of Alexander as the subject. Nor does

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid. 141-2, 147-8.  \textsuperscript{74} See below for Lysimachus' cult at Ephesus.  \textsuperscript{75} Smith, 1988 1, 3-4.  \textsuperscript{76} See below.  \textsuperscript{77} Atalay & Turkoglu, IOAI 1972 139-40 = Brendel, 1928 pl.2 317; Francke & Hirmer, 1964 pl.176.  \textsuperscript{78} Compare Seyrig, 1968 183-200 no.s 5 and 12.  

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the statue's lined brow necessarily represent a "realistic" feature, favouring an identification with the aged king. The lined brow is a regular feature of Alexander's portraits and may be intended, in the physiognomic language of the period, to convey not weariness, but courage.  

In conclusion, all that can be said is that it is possible that Lysimachus pursued, in the medium of monumental sculpture, the identification with Heracles suggested by the lion-slayer image promoted in the literary tradition and on his seal and coinage. Anything more than that is pure speculation.

FAVOURITES OF THE GODS

Divine patronage is an enduring and central theme of kingship. Following a long-standing tradition, the Successors used portents and prophecies to present their victories as sanctioned by the gods and their rule as the inevitable expression of divine will. The images of their divine patrons appear on their coinage; inscriptions echo the idea of divine ancestry; temple-building and dedications express thanks for past favours or hope of future help.

Apollo had prophesied Seleucus' kingship, perhaps as early as 312 BC; in return the Seleucids built him a sanctuary at Daphne and commissioned the magnificent Didyma temple. Seleucid coins from the reign of Antiochus I show Apollo, in prophet guise, on the reverse;

81) Diod.XIX.90.4; Hadley, Historia 1969 142-3 sees this story as a contemporary invention, dating at the latest from 312 BC; Parke, 1985 46 and Fontenrose, 1988 for the sanctuaries.
later Seleucid inscriptions regularly describe him as the founder of their house. The coin types of Ptolemy and Demetrius are likewise thought to express a claim to divine patronage. Ptolemy’s eagle and thunderbolt links the dynasty to Zeus. Poseidon, seated, standing, striding or fighting on Demetrius’ coins is a natural “ancestor" for the Besieger, victor at Salamis and largely dependent on sea-power for the maintenance of his rule. Some monumental and coin portraits of Demetrius show him with bull horns, the attribute of Poseidon.

The issue of coin portraits like these, showing the ruler complete with divine attributes may represent a development from Alexander’s Heracles coinage, which merged the features of the hero with those of the young king. This practice was, however, by no means universal. Only Demetrius and Ptolemy issued these personal portraits in their lifetime. Like Alexander himself, Seleucus probably left it to his followers and descendants to strike a posthumous portrait. There is no evidence that Antigonus or Cassander issued personal portraits in their lifetime, while their ephemeral power precluded a posthumous issue. The same is true of Lysimachus.

Traditionally these portrait coins have been seen as expressing pretensions to divinity, with fear of hubris explaining a reluctance to issue them. Quite why Ptolemy and Demetrius should have been

less concerned to offend the gods than their fellows is left unclear! Smith, more plausibly, sees personal portraits as simply one of several ways to express an assertion of legitimate independent rule; the Diadochs' different circumstances prompted diverse approaches to the achievement of "the most convincing symbol of authority". This view is certainly supported by the different themes favoured on the Diadochs' royal coinage; the chosen images—divine patrons, Victory or the portrait of a predecessor (Alexander)—are all well-established motifs in justifying claims to kingship.

Discussion of the "themes" depicted on royal coinage also raises the thorny question as to how far Lysimachus and his fellow Diadochs intended their coinage to function as "propaganda". It is likely that the main recipients of the Successors' silver coinage and therefore their "target audience" were mercenary soldiers. Since competition for Greek and Macedonian manpower was intense and defection, sometimes by whole armies, frequent, "programmatic" coin types might represent a useful method of attracting and maintaining mercenary support. Recent scholarship has certainly laid great emphasis on the propaganda function of the Successors' coinage.

If it is accepted that coin types may have a "programmatic" element, and that periods of upheaval and "civil war" are perhaps

particularly likely to spawn such coinage, the question still remains as to how effective such "propaganda" was. Studying the evidence for public response to coin types in the ancient world, with particular reference to the Roman imperial period, Crawford concluded that coins probably were examined - if only for forgery! - with some common types sufficiently well-known to attract nicknames, Darics, cistophoroi, etc. Since, however, the recipient's first concern was the coin's acceptability in financial transactions, the main element of the coin type which attracted attention was that which proclaimed on whose authority it was struck. The type, then, is significant largely through its association with a coinage of high quality and reputation and the variety and beauty of Roman coin types may be ascribed to the competitive ambition of Republican annual magistrates, or to the creativity and zeal of artists and mint officials anxious to please an imperial patron. It cannot be assumed that the emperor himself was invariably involved in the choice of design.

The relevance of such factors in assessing Lysimachus' coinage is considerable. What stands out is the consistency of the imagery presented on his coins. Like Cassander and Antigonus he retained Alexander's own types in the years before Ipsus. This need not reflect mere conservatism or a desire not to offend Cassander. A focus on Alexander, who likewise features strongly in Lysimachus'.

94) e.g. Morawiecki, 1983, lays great emphasis on the propaganda aspect of the coinage of the late Roman Republic; Crawford, 1983 51 describes Brutus' "Liberator" coins as "perhaps the most dramatic coin types of antiquity." 95) Crawford, 1983 47-64. 96) Ibid. 59. 97) As suggested by Thompson, 1968 165.
literary propaganda, could have the same meaning as it is thought to
have for Antigonus, an assertion of himself as Alexander's heir.
The anecdote, already mentioned, in which Alexander sanctions
Lysimachus' future royalty by binding his diadem round the head of
his wounded friend sounds the same note.

After the great victory at Ipsus, a new Alexander portrait adorns
the obverse of the gold and silver coinage which Lysimachus issued
until the end of his reign and thereafter makes its appearance on
the posthumous "Lysimachi" issued by the independent cities of
Northern Asia Minor. Showing Alexander in the guise of Zeus
Ammon, it has been described as "the finest portrait head on any
Greek coin" and succeeds in conveying those qualities which
Alexander himself promoted in his own portraiture and which his
successors tried to emulate in both life and art. It has been
suggested that Lysimachus may even have commissioned this portrait
from Alexander's favourite gem-carver Pyrgoteles.

Hadley saw the deified Alexander as an image chosen to promote
Lysimachus' recent victory at Ipsus, more blatantly advertised on
the reverse, where Athena holds a tiny Nike crowning the initial
letter of the king's name. Alexander's image is intended to recall
Demetrius' dream, described by Plutarch, of Alexander abandoning
the Antigonid cause because their watchword does not include his

98) Edson, HSCP 1934 224. 99) App.Syr.64; see above. 100) Thompson,
1968 165; for discussion of the stylistic details of Lysimachus'
101) Seltman, 1955 219; Plut. De Fort. Alex. 331 for Alexander's
"virile and leonine" expression captured only by Lysippus; Pollitt,
1986 33-7 for the influence of the Lysippan Alexander on later ruler
portraits; Plut. Demet.41, Pyrrh.8 for the Successors' attempts to
imitate Alexander's appearance and bearing. 102) Pollitt, 1986 25.

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This idea has a certain scholarly appeal, but if this coin type was intended to fulfil a propaganda function, it surely presupposes an unusually perceptive audience. Similarly Seltman's criticism of the reverse as tasteless and guilty of a "cheap allegorical effect" may be valid on aesthetic grounds, but if the coins were to succeed as propaganda, then only so obvious a "message" was likely to get through.

If this Alexander portrait does reflect Lysimachus' personal choice, then it may be enough to say that in place of an Olympian patron, he chose Alexander, in the guise of Zeus Ammon, as the god who sanctioned his rule. Such a practice is not unparalleled; the coin issued by Seleucus I, depicting a male head with the attributes of Dionysus, probably represents Alexander rather than the king himself. The prominence given to this image by Lysimachus stands out in comparison to the diversity of types issued by his rivals. This might be explained in propaganda terms, aiming to reinforce Lysimachus' image as Alexander's heir. Alternatively the unchanging types may be connected with the swift popularity of "Lysimachi" on the market. If, as Crawford suggests, the consumer associated certain types with reliability then the incentive to replace a familiar and popular design would not be strong.

The significance of the seated Athena on the reverse is less clear. Price sees it as combining a certain fidelity to the

traditional Alexander types\(^{106}\) with a celebration of Ipsus. Could it perhaps represent a compliment to Athens? Lysimachus was active as a benefactor there soon after Ipsus and enjoyed a close friendship with the poet Philippides,\(^{107}\) but it is unlikely that the city formed a major part of his plans at the time that his new coinage was conceived. If Athena's presence has any further significance it may lie in Lysimachus' acquisition after Ipsus of the Troad cities comprising the Ilian \(\kappaοιλυτ\), a federation centred on the worship of Athena Ilias. A bid for its goodwill through the representation of Athena on his coinage is not implausible. Strabo records Lysimachus' active attempts to play the benefactor at Ilium;\(^{108}\) through such activity he might hope both to eclipse the memory of Antigonid benefactions and to promote the idea of himself as Alexander's heir by fulfilment of the Conqueror's promises. His refoundation of Antigoneia as Alexandria Troas marks a similar instance of two birds killed with a single stone.\(^{109}\)

On Lysimachus' gold and silver coinage, Alexander stands alone and unchallenged. It is generally accepted that Lysimachus issued no personal portrait;\(^{110}\) past attempts to identify certain "Lysimachi" as bearing portraits of the king are unconvincing. The condition of the examples cited by Richter and Brendel\(^{111}\)

106) Price, 1974 26-7. 107) See below; see also Chs. 1 and 4. 108) Strab. XIII.1.26. 109) Syll\(^{3}\) 330 for the benefactions of Antigonus' friend and envoy Gargareus the Malusian; Strab. XIII.1.26 for Alexander's promise of games and the sanctuary's embellishment. 110) e.g. Thompson, 1968 165; Smith, 1988 13. 111) Brendel, 1928 314-16; Richter, 1965 Fig. 1755.
leaves much to be desired; the "head of Lysimachus" may simply be an inferior version of the standard Alexander Ammon portrait further distorted by damage. The possibility of a posthumous deified portrait\textsuperscript{112} is seriously diminished by Lysimachus' failure to establish a dynasty with an interest in issuing it. Moreover, given the abundance of Lysimachean coinage which has survived, one might expect the existence of a personal portrait issue to be reflected by a considerably larger sample than the few dubious examples proposed.

While Lysimachus may have passed up the chance to proclaim the kingly qualities which the personal portrait coin afforded later Hellenistic kings,\textsuperscript{113} his presence manifested itself in other, more conspicuous ways in the cities of his kingdom. Apart from inscriptions recording his benefactions and dedications promoting his\textsuperscript{114} his statue adorned the\textsuperscript{\textalpha\gamma\omega\rho\alpha\iota} of several cities. Apart from the statue at Ephesus, discussed above, Pausanias and Diodorus note the presence of monumental portraits of the king at Athens and Rhodes.\textsuperscript{116} An inscription from Priene c.286/5 BC tells us that cult honours for the king included a bronze statue; an inscribed base from the city, restored with Lysimachus' name, may belong to this\textsuperscript{\textalpha\gamma\alpha\lambda\mu\alpha}.\textsuperscript{116}

What then is the significance of such statues? Smith makes several important points: public statuary in the ancient world

\textsuperscript{112} See above for the "example" from Byzantium. \textsuperscript{113} Davis & Kraay, 1973 274 for royal coin legends promoting distinction, divinity, justice, piety, military prowess, ideal family relations. \textsuperscript{114} Paus. I.9.4; Diod. XX.100.3-4. \textsuperscript{115} OGIS I. 1.11; Richter, 1965 257. \textsuperscript{116} Smith, 1988 16 distinguishes the term\textsuperscript{\textalpha\gamma\alpha\lambda\mu\alpha} (cult statues only) from\textsuperscript{\textepsilon\iota\kappa\omicron\nu} (cult or honorific).
"occupied an immeasurably higher position in the scheme of things than today"; royal portrait statues are largely a phenomenon of the Hellenistic age, their number in cities and sanctuaries mirroring the rise and fall of the Macedonian monarchies; the value of royal portraiture in all media lies not so much in the information it gives as to a king's actual appearance, but what it says about contemporary perceptions of Βασιλεία. The monumental portrait statue, the highest honour offered by the Greek νόμος and given only rarely, gives particular expression, in the Hellenistic age, to an aspect of kingship which is universal and eternal, the idea of the king as the giver of gifts, provider of all vital resources.

SAVIORS AND BENEFACTORS

"It was kings who discovered the necessities of life and this is the reason for the bestowal of kingship in early times not on the sons of former rulers, but on those who conferred the greatest and most numerous benefits upon the people."

Euhemerus of Cardia

As friend to King Cassander, the man responsible for the death of the Argead dynasty's last legitimate heir, Euhemerus' motives for emphasising benefaction over the rights of inheritance may not be entirely disinterested! This does not, however, diminish the

117) Smith, 1988, 15,17, 1. 118) Ibid., 9,17, 21-22 119) See above; Kuhrt, 1987b 24, 53 for kings in Babylon and India as providers/ protectors of vital resources like rain, water and women. 120) Euhem. = Diod.VI.1.2.
validity of his statement; the idea of euergetism as absolutely central to kingship long predates the Diadoch period. Evidence from the Persian and neo-Babylonian empires has already been cited. In Homeric Greece, it is "becoming" for those who are "marked out as kings... with power" and who "act as leaders" to offer generous gifts to a guest. For Aristotle, benefaction distinguishes the good king from the tyrant; it is the proper outlet for the great wealth that is characteristic of kings and is rewarded with great honour. His pupil Alexander was famed for his generosity and would not count a man his friend who refused his gifts. Hecataeus of Abdera tells us that unless a king is generous in sharing his riches, he is a good steward, not a good king.

For the Successors, benefaction took the form of gifts of grain and money, the construction of sacred and secular public buildings and costly dedications in the Greek sanctuaries. Through such action, they often hoped to gain immediate or short-term political advantage, to win and keep support at a rival's expense. The grain and gold which Ptolemy, Lysimachus and Cassander heaped on Rhodes in 305/4 BC helped to keep an important naval power out of Demetrius' hands. Gifts from Lysimachus and Ptolemy to Athens in the 280s BC likewise aimed to break the Antigonid hold on the city. Grants of exemption from taxes and other concessions of autonomy might also serve as a means of attack on a rival.

frequently, and not always truthfully, the benefactor contrasts his own generosity with the oppressive behaviour of his predecessors.  

The significance of benefaction, however, goes beyond short-term profit. By acting to relieve distress caused by famine, earthquake or enemy devastation, by honouring the gods to ensure divine favour for themselves and their people, the Successors mirrored the action of those who had successfully ruled before them. In this way they reinforced the idea of themselves as the latest in a long line of kings who stood for prosperity and order. Thus tangible proofs of the king's εὐνοία and ἐπεξεργασία were proffered not only to cities and shrines directly under the king's control but to both Greek and non-Greek recipients throughout the Hellenistic world. Benefaction often goes hand in hand with the acquisition of new territory. Though in crude terms this might be seen simply as a bribe to win the inhabitants' favour, it also reflects the concern of the new incumbent to show himself truly royal, aware of his kingly obligations. Both Cassander's rebuilding of Thebes shortly after his takeover of Macedon in 316 BC and Lysimachus' benefactions at Ilium seem to fall into this category. The former, we are told, was inspired to this benefaction by hopes of "undying glory". Such hopes were not unjustified; though sometimes the visible reminder of a ruler's

128) e.g. I. Milet. 139 11.5-6 contrasts Ptolemaic beneficence with oppressive σόφοι exacted by former kings; Kuhrt, PCPS 1988 63-4 for Cyrus blackening the reputation of his predecessor Nabonidus. 129) Gauthier, 1985 42 for the Diadochs as rival benefactors in an imaginary "cosmopolis". For examples see Ch. 5. 130) Diod. XIX. 53.2; see above.
benefaction is destroyed when he loses power,\(^{131}\) in many cases
cult worship persists and statues remain standing long after the
benefactor's death.\(^{132}\)

Royal μυκτά need not always take the form of gifts; apart from
his role as provider, the king is also the protector and saviour
of his people. This aspect of kingship is reflected in Homeric
epithets; Hector and Achilles are both described as the "shepherd
of the people".\(^{133}\) The almost incessant warfare of the early
Hellenistic period gave particular emphasis to this role. While
the Babylonian Chronicles, for example, show that the Diadochs
could and did wreak havoc on their enemies' land, inflicting
severe hardship on the subject population through destruction of
crops and property,\(^{134}\) they were also in a position to perform
dramatic acts of ἀμνομαχικα saving their subjects from harassment by
enemy troops or the pirates who posed a notorious threat in this
period. The king might also lend aid in the event of internal
unrest within the city.\(^{135}\)

THE REWARDS OF BENEFACTION

Though the payment of such attentions by foreign kings to the
leading cities of Greece was in itself nothing new,\(^{136}\) the new

133) Hom.II.XVI.2; XXI.277. 134) Grayson, 1975 26, ABC 10
Rev.11.39-40. 135) e.g. Plut.Demet.8 - Demetrius' liberation of
Athens in 307 BC; for piracy, see Gabbert, Greece & Rome 1986 156-
63; McKechnie, 1989 101-41. For Lysimachus' acts of ἀμνομαχικα at
Samothrace and Priene, see below. 136) e.g Syll. 206;
Hellenistic rulers' enormous power and wealth enabled their performance of benefactions on an unprecedented scale. While euergetism was in part inspired by political self-interest, there is no doubt that it served to relieve genuine and extreme distress, particularly in times of siege and famine. The Hellenistic kings were thus able to alter dramatically the quality of their subjects' lives. The scale of their euergetism in turn affected the type of honours accorded them and the very vocabulary of city decrees. To designate the Hellenistic kings and to grant them citizenship, the rewards of previous foreign benefactors such as the Spartocid kings, seemed insufficient. Instead they were voted the sort of honours previously reserved for citizen benefactors, such as crowns and statues, objects which themselves varied according to the recipient's position on the "honours scale". The material used for a statue, the use of gilding, an equestrian design, the height of the base and the statue's site all told their own story. Kings generally received statues of the most lavish sort. By the end of the fourth century the greatest royal benefactions were being rewarded with honours which "equalled those of the gods".

Lysimachus' activities in this sphere are well documented; his gifts of grain and money to Rhodes in 305/4 BC were rewarded with a statue in the Rhodian agora. The Athenian decree honouring his Philippides records a sizeable gift of grain, probably

sent soon after Ipsus. Further cash and food subsidies followed in the 280s BC as Athens strove to recover the fortresses still in Antigonid hands. New epigraphic evidence suggests that Lysimachus also sent military aid. Athenian honours for the king included a crown and a statue in the agora. Lysimachus' new temple, games and city walls at Ilium displayed his kingly συγβία, honouring both Athena and Alexander whose promises he thus fulfilled. The city and sanctuary at Samothrace received his military protection against a band of ἀθανείς, probably pirates, bent on pillage and arson. His wife Arsinoe dedicated the magnificent building which bears her name; epigraphic evidence shows that the city also owed the restoration of its sacred ἱερατικα to Lysimachus. At Priene, too, he was able to act as οἰκονόμος, sending troops who repelled an attack by the indigenous Pedieis, the Magnesians and perhaps Demetrius' troops. The citizens' loyalty to the king on this occasion may have won them further favours; the suggestion that the envoys who carried Priene's thanks and offer of cult honours to Lysimachus also delivered a successful request for some improvement in the city's status is attractive. An inscription from Delos honouring Lysimachus'
Demaratus suggests some patronage of the sanctuary there; Lysimachus may also have contributed to Cassander's project for the restoration of Thebes. On the basis of the surviving evidence, both the scale of Lysimachus' benefactions and the sort of honours decreed in return are on a par with those proffered by and to his fellow Diadochs. At Rhodes, his benefactions are overshadowed by those of Ptolemy, but this is explicable given the latter's position as long-standing patron of the city. Lysimachus' gift does, moreover, compare favourably with the donation of Cassander. His financial subsidies to Athens in the 280s BC likewise outweigh Ptolemy's contribution. Like his fellow-Diadochs, he is rewarded with the μεγίστης τιμή previously reserved by the Greek cities for their greatest citizen benefactors and for the gods. A gold crown worth 1,000 staters at Priene and the cult honours offered there and at Samothrace rival those granted to the Antigonids at Athens, Ptolemy at Rhodes and Seleucus at Ilium.

Since benefaction was an essential part of kingship, it should not be surprising that Lysimachus should thus strive to demonstrate his fitness for the throne. The evidence for his euergetism does, however, conflict with the reputation for avarice which has, until recently, been accepted uncritically by most

150) Sylla² 361; Sylla² 337; Holleaux, 1938 7-8 (=REG 1895).
151) Diod.XX.96.3 - Ptolemy, 300,000 medimnoi, Cassander, 10,000 med., Lysimachus, 80,000 med. Diod. XX.98.1,99.2 for Ptolemy's second gift (300,000); he promised as much again but at the same time urged peace. 152) Plut. Mor. 851e-f; Demochares' embassies to Lysimachus secure 130T, an embassy to Ptolemy brings in 50T; see also Shear, 1978 11.23,33,49-55. 153) Gauthier, 1985 45.
154) Diod.XX.100.3; Plut. Demet.10,12. OGIS 212 11.5-25.
modern commentators. A key piece of evidence on this question is the "Gazophylax" anecdote mentioned in the previous chapter. Hauben's detailed analysis aims to clarify the significance of the mocking titles applied to Demetrius' enemies. Though the central point of the anecdote is clearly Demetrius' rejection of his rivals' right to kingly status, Hauben's attempt to discern some coherent pattern in the names chosen is not altogether successful. Though Ptolemy and Agathocles are dubbed "admiral" and "island-dweller" with reference to recent military disasters, the point of describing Seleucus as "elephant-keeper" is harder to fathom - the value of this elephant-cavalry was proved only too clearly the following year at Ipsus. It may, however, be a jibe atSeleucus' abandonment of Indian territory in return for a few elephants.

If then, it is accepted that Demetrius chose these titles to pinpoint some aspect of his rivals' history or circumstances which was potentially a source of embarrassment or shame, the same must be true of that applied to Lysimachus - \( \varphiολομπίατος \). It is usually assumed that it refers to the king's great wealth and his unwillingness to part with even a fraction of it. Hauben, who seems slightly at a loss on reaching Lysimachus, concurs. Remarking only that the king "seems to have had little or no sense of humour", and ignoring Plutarch who clearly sees the thrust of the insult as sexual rather than financial, he concludes that what


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Demetrius' χόλωσις were really attacking was Lysimachus' "proverbial meanness". 160

This argument is, however, marred by circularity, since apart from this same anecdote, the evidence for Lysimachean avarice rests on a handful of other stories whose sources are similarly far from impartial. 160 Given the context — Demetrius' insistence on an Antigonid monopoly of kingliness — it may be better to look at the term γονατίλεια in connection with Hecataeus' remark that "unless a king share his riches generously, he is a good steward, not a good king." 161 In early Hellenistic thought, then, the financial official and the king are seen as directly opposed; concern to conserve financial resources, something which may have been imposed on Lysimachus in the first half of his reign by the relatively limited resources of his satrapy, 162 was not kingly. Rather than alluding to Lysimachus' great wealth, Demetrius may rather be attacking his inability, at this stage in his career, 163 to bestow largesse in a suitably royal fashion. Certainly there is no reason to see in such a title, without supporting evidence, historical proof of life-long Lysimachean avarice, any more than one takes seriously the idea of Seleucus as an elephant-keeper. The evidence for Lysimachus' benefactions is certainly not consistent with such a idea.

HONOURED LIKE THE GODS

"The Egyptians perform proskynesis to their kings and honour them as gods, in the belief that they have not obtained supreme power without the help of divine providence and that such as have the will and ability to confer the greatest benefits share in the divine nature". Hecataeus of Abdera16

Penned by a Ptolemaic court historian, it might be tempting to dismiss this statement merely as an ingenious piece of anachronising, aiming to justify the godlike honours paid to the author's patron. The theme is repeated in Euhemerus' Sacred History, a Utopian work set in the land of Panchaea,166 which presents Zeus and his forebears as kings on earth originally, deified for their benefactions. Like Euhemerus' patron Cassander, Uranus is ἐπιμιγή, while Zeus is a conqueror and traveller, circling the earth five times before dividing his imperia among his friends and kinsmen; he wins undying remembrance and glory and is honoured like a god by many nations.166

Though the parallels between Euhemerus' gods and Alexander and his Successors are obvious, the ideas expressed here cannot be dismissed merely as the product of early Hellenistic apologia. The divinity of the ruler is a consistent theme in diverse societies at all periods of history; the 19th century king of Nepal saw himself as an embodiment of the god Vishnu; in Japan, the part of

164) Hecataeus = Diod.1.46.8 - 49.6.1. Murray, JEA 1970 160 assumes that Diod. 1.53-58 also derives from Hecataeus. 165) For Euhemerus, see FGrH no.63, Diod. VI.1.1-11. 166) Diod. VI. F.1.6; F.1.8; Diod. XVIII.75.
the enthronement ceremony (Daijosai) which is believed to effect
the emperor's transformation into a living god, is still
performed.\footnote{167} There is, moreover, a longstanding connection
between an individual's ability to perform great services and the
perception of him or her as worthy of the kind of tributes which
are paid to the gods. From Homer onwards, the phrase "he is a god
to me" denotes one who has done the speaker a great service.\footnote{168}
Odysseus thanks Nausicaa for saving his life, saying he will pray
to her "as to a goddess".\footnote{169} The same idea underlies the
institution of the hero-cults of the Greek πόλεις, which pay
honour to city-founders, tyrannicides and benefactors. Archetypal
heroes are Heracles and Dionysus, deified, after death, by virtue
of their ἱππατί and achievements.\footnote{170}

Though the link between the city hero-cults and the ruler cults
of the Hellenistic kingdoms is undeniable,\footnote{171} it would be wrong
to see the "godlike" honours decreed to the kings simply as a
quantitative upgrading of the tributes traditionally paid to
citizen benefactors,\footnote{172} representing merely "bigger and better
presents". Such an interpretation denies ruler cult its
significance as an acknowledgement of immortal and universal
power, expressed in the offer of ἵππατι made during the
lifetime of the king.\footnote{173}

\footnote{168} Nock, 1972 145 (=IHS 1928). 169) Hom. Od.VIII. 467-8; see
also Aesch. Suppl. 980. 170) Balsdon, \textit{Historia} 1950 365, Nock,
1972 152. 171) The sharp distinction which Price draws (1984 29,
34-5) between hero and ruler cult is perhaps overstated. 172) The
line taken by e.g. Walbank, \textit{CAH} VII 2nd edn. 1984 88; Gauthier
1985 46, following Nock, \textit{HSCP} 1930 50 and Habicht, 1970 211.
Although in the later Hellenistic period ruler worship also finds expression in dynastic cult established by the king, who himself invests its priests, this comes only with Ptolemy II's inauguration of a festival to honour his father, aiming presumably to ease the succession by encouraging loyalty to the dynasty.\(^1\)

There is no sign of any such institution established by the first generation of Alexander's successors, whose cults, like those for Alexander, represent the initiative of the cities themselves.\(^2\)

Apart from the crowns and statues already mentioned, cult honours for the Hellenistic kings regularly include altars, sacrifices and an annual festival held on the ruler's birthday or the anniversary of his benefaction.\(^3\) A month or a tribe might be re-named after him or members of his family; these last honours had also been paid to the cities' founder heroes.\(^4\)

What then inspired the Greek cities to pay these particular tributes to Alexander and his Successors? From a 20th century standpoint it is easy to be cynical, seeing them merely as marks of empty flattery, inspired by fear or political self-interest. Fundamental to this stance is the argument that the citizens of the Greek polis could not possibly have believed that the kings

\(^1\) Bikermann, 1938 247; Syll\(^3\) 390 11.39-57; Bagnall, 1976 104.
\(^2\) In the same vein Antiochus I built a temple for his father at Seleucia-on-Orontes (Bikermann, 1938 255; Price, 1984 33).
\(^3\) Bikermann, 1938 256; Adcock, 1953 175; Price, 1984 36. 176) e.g. OGIS 212 - Ilium honours Seleucus I with ἀποσφία, an altar, sacrifices and annual games on the 12th day of the month Σελευκείου. See I.Priene 14 15-22 for similar honours for Lysimachus. 177) Plut.Demet. 10,12 for Antigonid tribes and months at Athens; Habicht, 1970 87,91 for Seleucid examples at Colophon and Magnesia-on-Maeander.
The idea of belief as an integral part of religion is, however, a Christian preconception; recent scholarship has rightly urged the need to shed such assumptions when considering Greek religion in general and cult worship in particular. Greek religious practice lays its emphasis not on belief, but on acknowledgement of the gods through payment of the honours which are their due. The relationship between worshipper and god is one of mutual obligation, established by prayer and sacrifice on one side, aid and protection on the other. For the ancient Greeks, living in a world where life was cheap and "the threat of chaos never far away", religious practice represented a "system of responses to those agents of experience which threatened to overturn the sense of an intelligible order."

This reassessment does much to illuminate the payment of godlike honours to Alexander and the Hellenistic kings. Like the gods, these rulers were immensely powerful and potentially unpredictable. They had the same ability to effect great changes in the lives of their subjects, either to wreak destruction, or to protect and save. The instability of the Diadoch period, the high incessant competition for possession of the meant the close impingement of the kings upon the lives of their Greek

subjects in a way that was probably new. Greek religious practice had always been flexible, ready to acknowledge new powers in the world with appropriate honours; accordingly the cities’ response to the appearance of these new and potentially menacing forces was to bring their relations with them into a well-established and intelligible framework.

The context in which cult honours are decreed certainly underlines the idea of reciprocal obligation. In return for his action which ensures survival or brings safety or prosperity, the king expects loyalty and support. The honours which the city votes him can be seen as a pledge of that support; they also serve to acknowledge his godlike powers. The title with which the city acclaims the king underlines the connection between a specific action and the honours he receives. Demetrius' landing in Attica in 307 BC was celebrated with an altar on the very spot to θεός κοινωνάτης; Samothrace erected an altar to Lysimachus as κάλλιστος ἐνεργήτης for his action against the impious pirates. The title proffered by an individual city may appear on coinage

184) Under Achaemenid rule it is likely that the cities suffered little interference so long as they fulfilled their obligations (see Ch.5). I am not altogether convinced by Price (1984 26) who explains the lack of cult honours for the Great King in terms of Greek resentment of Persian rule, contrasted with that of Macedon which was “at least partially Greek”. 185) Gould, 1985 8; Lane Fox, 1986 34-5. 186) Price, 1984 29, followed by Smith, 1988 19. 187) See above for Prienean loyalty bringing further benefactions from Lysimachus. Though Smith, 1988 15-16 sees honorary statues as a tacit expression of the city's dependence on the king's power and wealth, cult honours do not, however invariably reflect direct political dependence (Bikermann, 1938 256; Price, 1984 164).

188) Plut. Demet.10; Scott, A.J.Phil 1934 147, 164; Syll 372 ii.25-6.
minted there, but it is not inevitable that the king, who may also hold other titles won elsewhere, will adopt any of them as "official". The offer of cult honours to the king in his capacity as city-founder again puts emphasis on his powers of action - the city owes its very existence to him.

If it is accepted that Greek religion is not a belief-based system, then the idea that ruler cult was, by definition, sacrilegious, implying a decline in traditional worship, can be abandoned. Royal cult flourished alongside those of the established gods; nor did it preclude the expression of εὐγένεια by the kings themselves. With the exception of Demetrius' supposed antics at Athens, there is little emphasis in the literary sources on royal cult as sacrilegious. Even there, it is the outrageous toadyism of the Athenians and actions which would have been regarded as unthinkable at any period - such as parties in the Parthenon - which is criticised rather than the idea of cult honours as such. The sources for this material are, in any case, hardly irreproachable.

Nor does the available evidence suggest that ruler cult was generally unpopular or resented by the inhabitants of the πόλεις. While some orators and politicians express cynicism over the vote of cult honours, it need not follow that this attitude was common

189) Bikermann, 1938 238-42. 190) See above, and below. 191) Price, 1984 14-5 for a bibliography on this tradition. 192) See above. 193) Plut.Demet.10,11,18,23; Athen. VI.63. Duris or his brother Lynceus are likely sources; see Ch.1 for Duris' attitude towards the Antigonids.
even among the educated classes. For the man in the street, the king's immense wealth and fabled exploits may well have given him an aura of the superhuman, particularly on those occasions when he appeared, literally like a deus ex machina, to avert a crisis. Demetrius' unexpected appearance off the Attic coast in 307 BC before a startled crowd which initially mistook his fleet for Ptolemy's is a fine example. Lysimachus' aversion of the pirate menace at Samothrace is another. Evidence for private prayer and sacrifice to the ruler, reflected in inscriptions and the finds of small-scale, relatively cheap images from domestic shrines argues against a general perception of ruler cult as simply the latest game played by the city's politicians. In addition, the sacrifices, festivals and processions which regularly form a part of cult honours offered the prospect of spectacle and holiday, a welcome opportunity to eat, drink and be merry. The huge popularity of such occasions is reflected in Aristotle's advice to aspiring oligarchs to offer "splendid sacrifices" - and thereby splendid feasting - as the way to the people's hearts!

The abandonment of a Christianising view of Greek religion has yet another consequence. If cult honours acknowledge the ruler's

194) eg. Diog. Laert. VI.63; Hyperides Contra Dem. col. 31; Fun. Or.21; Balsdon, Historia 1950 383 for the late and derivative nature of most of the sources; Lane Fox, 1986 64,66 for intellectual thought as frequently atypical. 195) Plut. Demet.8; Syll² 372 11. 5-12,14-17. 196) OGIS 229 11. 10-11; Robert, 1966b 205-208 for private worship of Arsinoe as Aphrodite Euploia; Smith 1988 11. 197) Cartledge, 1985 101; Lane Fox, 1986 70 for festivals as good for business and "enormous fun". Kuhrt, 1987b 39 for the free flow of alcohol at the Babylonian New Year Festival. Aristot. Pol. 1321A 31.
extraordinary powers of action rather than his innate divinity, then his acceptance of such tributes signifies his recognition of the obligations that go with "godlike" powers, not a belief in his own divine nature. Though literary anecdotes may describe acts of royal hubris, their value is diminished by the hostility of their sources and the impact of a later Roman moralising tradition.198 The Successors' apparent failure to promote their own worship or, often, to adopt officially the divine titles bestowed by the people, together with the individual and specific context in which cult honours are decreed, tend to give these tales the lie.199

Only one story of this sort survives regarding Lysimachus. His boast to a Byzantine embassy that he is touching heaven with his spear meets with the riposte that they had better make tracks before a hole appears in the sky! There are too many stories of "clever replies" to kings for confidence in this anecdote as historical.200 As evidence for divine pretensions it is of little value. The doubts surrounding Lysimachus' pose for a statue as Heracles have already been aired; he avoided the opportunity afforded by coin-portraits to identify himself with some god201 and the known cults established to him all seem to represent a city response to a specific benefaction along the usual lines. At Priene and Samothrace he was honoured for the acts of ἐρήμωσις.

198) See above, n.194. Accusations of Antigonid hubris from Lysimachus' friend Philippides, for example, are unlikely to be impartial. 199) See above. 200) Plut. De Fort. Alex. 338. There are numerous examples, usually involving philosophers - e.g. Plut. Mor. 458B, Diog. Laert. II.115. 201) See above.
mentioned above.²⁰² Though the Samothracians hailed him as κάλλιστος εὐεργέτης, there is no evidence to suggest that he adopted this or any other cult title in an official sense. At Ephesus he was honoured as αὐτός; a silver statue dedicated in the theatre there by a certain Gaius Vibius Salutaris in AD 104 is thought to reflect the revival of his worship as the city's second founder. Demetrius' acceptance of similar honours as the second founder of Sicyon provides a useful parallel.²⁰³ The motive for cult honours paid to Lysimachus at Cassandreia is less clear; two inscriptions from the city - a decree honouring the Aetolian Androbolus and the new land-grant inscription for Limnaeus - are dated by the eponymous priesthood of Lysimachus.²⁰⁴ Evidence for a similar priesthood of Cassander suggested to some scholars that Lysimachus had "inherited" the founder cult of his predecessor. Hatzopoulos' suggestion, however, that these honours may have been prompted by some benefaction, perhaps the extension of the city's territory, is attractive.²⁰⁵

In number, Lysimachus' cults may seem limited in comparison with the plethora established for his rivals. Habicht lists nine known cults for Seleucus I, three of them shared with Antiochus I, five


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for Ptolemy I, at least ten for the first Antigonids. This is not, however, necessarily a comment upon the quality of his kingship; it can be explained in part by his failure to hand on his kingdom to an heir with an interest in promoting his worship. One can compare Ptolemy II's active promotion of the Nesiot League festival for Ptolemy Soter, the continued use of Soter's portrait on Lagid coinage and the titles Λευκος and Θεοι Λευκος to describe him and his consort Berenice on coins and dedications. Similarly, at least two of the cults for Seleucus I, at Nysa and Apollonia in Caria, were established posthumously.

It is also possible, of course, that other cults existed for which the evidence has been destroyed or is not yet forthcoming. Lysimachia, as the monarch's first foundation and European capital is a strong contender. The date of foundation, in 309 BC before his assumption of the kingly title, is no obstacle - Scepsis had voted cult honours to Antigonus two years earlier in 311 BC. Appian's description of Lysimachus' burial there in a temple bearing his name may lend support to this theory. It cannot be safely assumed, as the existing evidence might seem to suggest, that Lysimachus only attracted cult-worship in the latter part of his reign.

206) Habicht, 1970 82-108, 109-23, 42-81. 207) Sylls 390 especially 11. 39-57; Bagnall, 1976 104; Davis & Kraay 1973 pl. no. 19. 208) Habicht, 1970 106-7 no.s 42 b and e. 209) OGIS 6 11.22-7, Welles RC 1934 8-9; App.Syr.64 . 210) The Ephesian cult, presumably coinciding with the city's refoundation c.294 BC (Habicht, 1970 40) is the earliest known example. Those at Cassandreia and Samothrace probably post-date his acquisition of Macedon c.287 BC. Cult honours at Priene are usually associated with the campaign of 286/5 BC (Sherwin-White, IHS 1985 79-80).
Though city foundations are often considered primarily in terms of economic and military motives, the raising of city walls also gives visible expression to the enduring concepts of the king as protector, provider and favourite of the gods. This is demonstrated by the vote of cult honours to city founders and by kingly emphasis on such projects as personal initiatives which express the superior wisdom bestowed on them by the gods. Stories about favourable omens which precede the building project abound. The idea of city building as a specifically royal activity is underlined by Herodotus, who shows the walls of Ecbatana rising the moment that the Mede Darius is "firmly on the throne"; when the building is complete, he introduces "for the first time the ceremonial of royalty."

For the Diadochs the example set by Philip and Alexander could only reinforce this message; the former had marked his gain of Mt. Pangaeus' gold, crucial for Macedon's rise, with the foundation of Philippi; the latter's first youthful victory against the Maedi was crowned with the creation of Alexandroupolis; legend later

ascribed over seventy city foundations to him. Once accepted without demur, it is now recognised that Alexander's still considerable achievement had become exaggerated by Plutarch's day.

The Successors followed suit, with Cassandreia founded as early as 316 BC, the year of Olympias' death and the imprisonment of Alexander IV. Though the first formal proclamation of kingship among the Diadochs came only in 306 BC, the peace treaty of 311 BC had effectively passed the death sentence on Alexander IV, recognising the sovereignty of Alexander's successors in their own kingdoms. Significantly, the following years see the construction of a capital city in every "satrapy": Lysimacheia, Antigoneia in the Troad, Seleucia-on-Tigris and Ptolemais(?). The names of these and others that followed them reflect the significance of royal foundations as lasting monuments to royal achievement and visible expressions of "dynastic glory". For example, four of the known Seleucid foundations from the Diadoch period are named for the king himself, three for his wife Apama; his son Antiochus and his wife Stratonice get one apiece.

Lysimachus too proclaimed his kingship with cities named for himself and for members of his family; apart from his capital on the

216) Plut. Alex. 9; Plut. de Alex Fort. I.328E; App Syr.57.
217) Tscherikower's total (1927 140-145) is 34; Preaux, 1978 401 cites 30 certain foundations and 20 more possibilities. The ascription of 75 cities to Seleucus I (Malalas 230, quoting Pausanias; App. Syr. 57 says 59) may be similarly exaggerated; only 19 have been securely identified (Tscherikower, 1927 165). 218) Diod. XIX.52.1-2,4. 219) Tscherikower, 1927 162.
220) Tarn, CAH VI 1928 429 for this motive for city foundations.
221) Tscherikower, 1927 165; ibid. 156; Plut.Demet.25. Newell, 1927 144-6; 131-5 for Antigonid city nomenclature.
site of Cardia, there were Lysimachblas in Aetolia and near
Atarneus.\textsuperscript{222} Nicaea commemorates his marriage to Antipater's
daughter; Ephesus, refounded c.294 BC is re-named for his queen,
Arsinoe,\textsuperscript{223} who is also honoured with an Aetolian Arsinoeia.\textsuperscript{224} New
Smyrna issues coinage in the name of Eurydiceia; the veiled woman
depicted on the obverse has been identified with Lysimachus' daughter.\textsuperscript{225} Coins from Agathopolis, a city in Mysia, suggest an
eponymous foundation by Lysimachus' ill-fated heir.\textsuperscript{226}

Apart from glorification of the dynasty, the foundation or re­
naming of cities served to express εὐόσμενία for a royal predecessor
or to strike a blow at the prestige of an opponent. Strabo cites
Lysimachus' Alexandria Troas as illustrating the concern of his
Successors to express εὐόσμενία for Alexander. Conveniently, this
action also served to obliterate a memorial to the kingship of
Antigonus, the city's original founder.\textsuperscript{227} The significance of
Lysimachus' building programme at Ilium in this context has already
been discussed.\textsuperscript{228}

The legend surrounding Smyrna's foundation may likewise

\textsuperscript{222}) Tscherikower, 1927 162-3. The Aetolian cities are generally
thought to be Aetolian work, not that of Lysimachus himself.
\textsuperscript{223}) Tscherikower, 1927 162-3. I am not convinced by Burstein's
suggestion (1982 198-9) that Ephesus was named for Arsinoe I,
Lysimachus' daughter. \textsuperscript{224}) Syll\textsuperscript{3} 380, which reflects positive
relations between Lysimachus and Aetolia, and the existence of
Aetolian Lysimachia seem to connect this Arsinoeia to Arsinoe's
years as queen of Thrace rather than Egypt, as wife to Ptolemy II.
Longega, 1968 33-5 for bibliography on this long disputed question.
\textsuperscript{225}) Milne, Num.Chron. 1923 3; the issue of family coin portraits,
however, seems inconsistent with Lysimachus' own avoidance of a
personal portrait. \textsuperscript{226}) Robert, Rev.Phil. 1959 177-8 for the siting
of Agathopolis in Mysia. See Ch. 7 for further discussion.
\textsuperscript{227}) Strab. XIII.1.26; Seleucus I likewise created several
Alexandrias, but razed another Antigoneia to the ground in
founding Antioch (App. Syr.57; Preaux, 1978 405). \textsuperscript{228}) See above.

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illustrate the importance of city-building as an expression of continuity and succession to Alexander. Pausanias tells us that Alexander dreamed of a visit from the Nemeseis who told him to found a new city on Mt. Claros. The oracle at Claros approved the move and the people co-operated joyfully. This idea of Alexander as Smyrna's founder conflicts with all the other evidence which makes Antigonus initiate the scheme and Lysimachus complete it. This legend is generally thought to be unhistorical and has been explained as a local invention. Another possibility is that it originates with Antigonus or Lysimachus, who aimed in this way to present their work as a fulfilment of Alexander's plan. Other evidence shows that both men took pains to represent themselves as heirs to Alexander and the case of Ilium provides a useful parallel.

Since many of the Successors' new cities were created through synoecism, often unpopular initially, the reversal of a defeated enemy's project may have been inspired primarily by strategic or economic factors, but also allowed the victor to assert himself as the city's new founder, with the power, as such, to determine its extent and status. Lysimachus' decision to allow the inhabitants of Scepsis to leave Alexandria Troas is a good example of this practice. In addition, the king might also pose as founder of the

229) Paus.VII.5.1. 230) Parke, 1985 127; Cadoux, 1938 97, however, thinks it possible that Alexander planned to restore Smyrna. 231) See above. 232) See Ch.5 for further discussion. 233) Leaf, 1923 279 applauds the wisdom of Lysimachus' restoration of Scepsis on strategic, commercial and cultural grounds. Cook, 1983 364 criticises Antigonus' original scheme as "too grandiose". 234) Robert, 1951 11.
reinstated city; Cebren, absorbed into Alexandria Troas and subsequently "liberated" by Antiochus I after Lysimachus' death becomes another Antiocheia. 233

If the achievement of "undying glory" was an important factor in the foundation of cities, then Lysimachus perhaps fared better than some of his contemporaries. Though he failed to establish a lasting dynasty and his empire was divided among his enemies, several of his cities still stood as a monument to his achievement a century after his death. The suggestion that this was due to his opponents' relative indifference to his memory, by contrast to the bitter hatred and fear engendered by Antigonus, 236 is not compelling. The literary sources certainly stress the strong negative feelings which Lysimachus' success inspired among his rivals, while Seleucid inscriptions from the campaign of 282/1 BC and the following years may reflect a deliberate programme to blacken his reputation. 237

It is perhaps better to ascribe the survival of Lysimachus' cities to their judicious siting, on both military and commercial grounds and to the excellent workmanship which Tscherikower also comments on. 238 The re-siting of Ephesus brought the city the prosperity which gave her a leading position among the cities of Asia Minor; the name Arsinoeia did not persist, but the debt owed to Lysimachus was recognised by the revival of his cult in the Imperial

235) Ibid, 20; Bean, (in Cook, 1973) no.27, 338. 236) Tscherikower 1927 155-6, 163; his evident admiration for Antigonus perhaps leads him to underestimate Lysimachus' achievement. 237) e.g. Plut. Demet. 44, 48, Pyrrh. 11; Welles RC 1934 no. 9 11. 54-60; see also Ch. 7. 238) Tscherikower, 1927 162-3.
period.\textsuperscript{239} New Smyrna, an Antigonid project completed by Lysimachus, likewise achieved power and prosperity. Nicaea in Bithynia has been described as one of the best examples of the new Hellenistic building style.\textsuperscript{240} Lysimachus' Seleucid successors acknowledged the strategic value of Lysimacheia in Thrace with the treaty signed by Antiochus I(?) promising to protect the city's "democracy and autonomy" and the city's reconstruction in 196 BC by Antiochus III, ambitious "to rebuild a city of such renown".\textsuperscript{241} Livy's description of the Thracian destruction of the city as recent, combined with numismatic finds which suggest the continuation of issues from Lysimacheia from 280 BC to 220 BC gives the city a considerably longer life than Appian suggests.\textsuperscript{242}

While Tscherikower ascribes the durability of Lysimachus' cities to the employment of architects and engineers of considerable skill,\textsuperscript{243} literary accounts of the raising of other royal foundations suggest that much of the donkey work may have been done by the troops - another area in which the army made an essential contribution to the maintenance of kingly power.\textsuperscript{244} Evidence for personal involvement of kings in the construction of their cities\textsuperscript{245}

\textsuperscript{239} Ibid., 164; see above. \textsuperscript{240} Ibid., 163. \textsuperscript{241} See Ferrary & Gauthier, \textit{Journ. des Savants} 1981 327-45 for a redating of this text to the reign of Antiochus I or the early years of Antiochus II, rather than Antiochus III; Liv. XXXII.39, XXXIV. 59; Polyb. XVIII.50-51, XXI.15. \textsuperscript{242} Appian's misleading description (Syr. 1) of the city as destroyed by Thracians after Lysimachus' death may be the result of compression of events. \textsuperscript{243} Bellinger, 1961 133 for the "splendid wall of large hewn stones" attributed to Lysimachus; Cadoux, 1938 for Lysimachus' towered walls at Smyrna; Maier, 1959 no.71 11. 236-42 for the Lysimachean walls at Ephesus. \textsuperscript{244} Compare App. Syr. 58, Liv.XXXII.39. \textsuperscript{245} Diod.XX.147.5 for Antigoneia on the Orontes; App. Syr.58 for Seleucia on Tigris; see also Kurht & Sherwin-White, \textit{JHS} 1991 (forthcoming).
makes it likely that Lysimachus was also on hand to supervise some of these foundations himself, ensuring that they would stand as suitably imposing memorials to his kingship.

**BURIAL AT BELEVI?**

It is possible that Lysimachus planned another, rather more personal monument to his achievement and the glory of his dynasty. Sixteen kilometres from Ephesus, at the modern village of Belevi, stand the remains of an imposing mausoleum. Though little still survives on site except the massive podium, carved from the rock and surrounded by fallen capitals and column drums, restorations based on the surviving fragments identify it as one of a series of funerary monuments in South-west Asia Minor which looked to the Halicarnassus Mausoleum for their inspiration. Though square rather than rectangular in shape and designed on the Doric and Corinthian orders, rather than the Ionic, the Belevi tomb rivals that of Mausolus in scale. Like the Mausoleum, it was planned to stand on a high stepped platform, with statues placed between its columns, crowned with a pyramidal roof, itself the setting for a monumental sculpture group. Where lions crouched above the cornice at Halicarnassus, lion-griffins stood in pairs on the Belevi tomb. The deep square, relief-carved ceiling coffers recall both the Mausoleum and Priene's temple of Athena Pollas, both the work of

246) The sarcophagus and some examples of the lion-griffin figures are now in the Selcuk museum; the Persian servant figure is in the Izmir museum (Cat.no.1084). 247) Waywell, *YAYIA* 1980 5-8. 248) Ibid., 8-10.
the artist Pytheos. Though it seems unlikely that Pytheos himself could have designed the Belevi tomb, it is not impossible that the architect was an artist of his school.

Without an inscription to identify its commissioner, and few dateable finds, the legacy of tomb robbers, a precise date for the Belevi mausoleum cannot be set. The latest dateable sculpture fragment has been assigned to the period from c. 280 BC to 270 BC. Most scholars agree on a broad period spanning the last decades of the fourth century and the first decades of the third, with two or three distinct phases of construction. Some elements of the decoration show a strong Persian influence — palm-leaf capitals identical to those on the gate of Xerxes at Persepolis; the lion-griffins with their sickle-wings; the servant figure in Persian dress from the grave chamber itself. These prompted the suggestion that the tomb was built for some great man attached to the Persian court, perhaps Darius' admiral Mentor of Rhodes or his brother Memnon.

Other considerations, however, weigh against this theory; the vaulted form of the grave chamber and the couch shaped sarcophagus are both features characteristic of early Hellenistic Macedonian

249) Praschniker, 1979 118, 113-114. 250) A 3rd century date would certainly seem to preclude him — see below n. 252. 251) Fleischer, 1979 159. 252) Waywell, YAYLA 1980 5, 9 sees the variations in design from those of the Mausoleum as reflecting a time-lapse of c. 50 years. Though Pollitt, 1986 89-90 favours a 3rd century date, a Seleucid commission initially seems unlikely, see n.256 below. 253) Praschniker, 1979 116; Alzinger, 1979 190 cites Keil for Mentor as the tomb's commissioner; Praschniker, 1979 119 for Memnon.
tombs. These and the scale and splendour of the whole project suggest rather a royal burial of the early Hellenistic period. Lysimachus had both the time and the money to commission the project. Lysimachus' interest in Ephesus is well documented; his re-siting of the city made provision for its future power and prosperity; it is likely, too, that the city served as one of his royal seats in Asia. He was, moreover, Ephesus' second founder and the recipient of cult honours there; in this context, it may be more than coincidence that the Belevi mausoleum was built near the site of an archaic shrine to a local hero, Pixodarus.

The history of the building work, seemingly interrupted after an initial phase of construction is likewise consistent with events in the Diadoch wars. The break-off in the work may plausibly be connected with Seleucus' invasion of Asia Minor and takeover of Ephesus in 281 BC. It is probable that the second phase of building took place under Seleucid auspices; Antiochus II, who died in Asia Minor in 246 BC is a strong contender as the tomb's eventual occupant. The Persian features mentioned above are best

254) Alzinger, 1979 192 draws parallels with the form of tombs at Vergina and at Leucadia; Praschniker, 1979 117; the reclining figure on the sarcophagus lid, however, is thought to belong to the second phase of building. 255) Fleischer, 1979 156. 256) The apparently slow pace of construction, cited by Fleischer, 1979 158 diminishes the likelihood that the whole project could be ascribed to Antiochus II's queen, Laodice, who had only two years available. 257) e.g. Arsinoe and her entourage were resident at Ephesus in 281 BC (Polyaen.VIII.57). 258) For Lysimachus as at Ephesus, see above; Pixodarus - Fleischer 1979, 159, see also Miller, PW Vol. XX2 1950 col.1893. 259) Fleischer, 1979 158; Alzinger, 1979 193; Carter, 1983 34 suggests that the ceiling coffers were carved some time before they were actually set in place. 260) Fleischer, 1979 159; Alzinger, 1979 192-3; Pollitt, 1988 290.
explained as belonging to this second phase, illustrating the eclecticism which is an enduring feature of Anatolian funerary art, blending Greek, Persian and local elements.

Keil's argument that Lysimachus' European-based kingdom made plans for burial at Ephesus unlikely is not decisive. Though Lysimachus' attention in his last years was focused on Macedon and mainland Greece, this does not preclude his commissioning a tomb in Asia Minor at an earlier stage in his career, perhaps when he acquired the Ionian cities c.294 BC. The fact of Lysimachus' eventual burial at Lysimacheia has no bearing on his possible involvement with the Belevi project. This was not a matter of choice, but of necessity; Seleucus would hardly have tolerated the burial of his rival in so conspicuous a monument in Ephesian territory.

In conclusion, while the association of Lysimachus with the unfinished mausoleum at Belevi cannot be regarded as a certainty, there is at least a good possibility that he had hoped to remind the world of his victories and benefactions with a monument which would be as much an object of wonder for future generations as the Hecatomnid Mausoleum proved to be.

"Monarchic rulers appoint large numbers of men as their eyes, ears, hands and feet. For such people as are friendly to themselves and their rule, they make sharers in it. If they are not friends, they will not act according to the monarch's intentions".

Aristotle Pol. 1287b 25

The vital part played by the King's Friends in the conduct of his rule is reflected in the wealth of material devoted to them in the homilies of the fourth century political theorists. From amongst the sayings which emphasise the need for loyal and virtuous friends to act as advisors to the king and refrain from harmful flattery, this quotation from Aristotle is particularly choice. It combines several important themes - the dynamic and versatile role of royal φίλοι in the kingdom's government; the exchange of substantial power and responsibility for loyalty and support; the idea of a special intimacy between King and Friends; the expectation that in the final analysis these "advisors" will pursue the King's interests unquestioningly - with perhaps a greater realism than the lofty sentiments of Isocrates.

The φίλοι of the Hellenistic kings are generally seen as the direct successors of the Argead kings' ἐταῖροι. Although the concept of a group of "friends" who surround the prince from boyhood onward does seem peculiarly Macedonian, royal reliance upon a group

265) e.g. Isoc. Ad Nicoclem 21, 27-8. 266) e.g. Bikermann, 1938 48, Le Bohéc, REG 1985, 93.

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of trusted companions as advisors and agents in war, diplomacy and government finds parallels in Achaemenid history. Darius I's tomb shows the King flanked by his Weapon-bearers; one of them, Gobryas, is revealed by the Behistun Inscription as among those who helped Darius gain the throne. His fellow weapon-bearer Aspathines turns up in Herodotus as a confidant of Darius, wounded while supporting him during the conspiracy of the Magi.\textsuperscript{267} In terms of their function men like these have much in common with Seleucus' friend Patrocles or Lysimachus' Philippides. It is significant that Themistocles, after winning the favour of Artaxerxes, is honoured with the title "Friend of the King".\textsuperscript{268}

The perception of ḥīlōi in the early Hellenistic period as a sine qua non for any self-respecting king is reflected in Hecataeus' attachment of a band of Companions to his legendary Egyptian king Sesoosis.\textsuperscript{269} The new satraps of 323 BC, themselves the erstwhile ḥīlōi of Alexander, who had dazzled their fellows with their golden bridles and silver studded boots,\textsuperscript{270} lost no time in attracting to themselves a similar following of ambitious men. Aiming for the Regency in 319 BC, Cassander forms a faction of his ḥīlōi prior to approaching Ptolemy and others with a view to alliance. In the same year Antigonus summons his Friends to a council and appoints the most outstanding among them to satrapies and strategies.\textsuperscript{271}

The ḥīlōi of the Diadochs are, in modern parlance, true "Renaissance men". They serve as generals, admirals, ambassadors,
garrison commanders, councillors and treasurers. They govern as ἐπιστάτεις or ἐπίσημοι in the cities or as στρατηγοί over an administrative district. Lysimachus' friend Philippides was an accomplished and prolific comic poet. The career of the historian Hieronymus of Cardia as friend to Eumenes and then the Antigonids spanned ambassadorial duties, a spell as councillor to the youthful Demetrius in 312 BC, leadership of a commercial expedition to explore the bitumen resources in the Nabataean desert and appointment as governor (ὁμουσίας) of Thebes. Rightly regarded as one of the vital resources for which the Successors had to compete, φίλοι expected substantial rewards in return for deploying their multifarious talents. Benefits bestowed on friends, Isocrates tells us, are an acceptable area for magnificent display by a monarch. From the King himself came gifts of land, money, goods of high value and entertainment at court; a new inscription from Cassandreia records Lysimachus' gift of 2,480 χλέα of land to a certain Limnaeus and reveals the existence of an estate nearby belonging to his φίλος Bithys. Royal φίλοι could also expect conspicuous honours in the cities where their diplomacy had secured royal benefaction. The Athenians hymned the φίλοι of Demetrius as stars around his sun; Epicurus addressed Mithres, Lysimachus' minister of finance as Healer and Lord.

decrees record edited highlights from the careers of men like Philippides or Kallias of Sphettus, friend and admiral of Ptolemy I, emphasising their patriotism. Crowns, statues and various privileges and exemptions enjoyed in the relevant city constitute a more tangible proof of gratitude.

In ideal terms, sacred ties of loyalty bound King and Friends. There is, for example, the anecdote where Lysimachus' obligations to his ἀνάκτοροι prevent him from evading capture by the Getae. Such loyalty was not unique but frequently the ambitions of these ἀνάκτοροι, combined with the volatile character of the Diadoch period, encouraged opportunism. Instances of betrayal in the face of a better offer are legion. Notable among such "flexible" friends is Docimus. Leaving Perdiccas for Antigonus and then Antigonus for Lysimachus, he seems to have prospered, founding a city named after himself and issuing his own coinage.

Recent scholarship has put much emphasis on the ἀνάκτοροι of the new kingdoms as constituting a ruling class of an entirely new kind, chosen above all for merit and reflecting a greater ethnic and social mix than had been seen at either the Achaemenid or the Macedonian courts. Though the sources do emphasise ability as an

280) Syll 373; Shear, 1978 2-4; Gauthier, 1985 82-8 for the possible context of such decrees. 281) e.g. SEG 26.no.89; SEG 1 no.358; OGIS 10. 282) Diod.XXI. F. 11; compare Jos. Antt. XIII 368 for Seleucus VI's death alongside his ἀνάκτοροι. 283) e.g. Plut. Demet. 49. 284) e.g. Plut.Demet.46; Diod.XIX.87.1, XX.107.3-4; Hornblower, 1981 204-5 for Hieronymean emphasis on Eumenes' rare quality of ἔοικος; Docimus, Tscherikower, 1927 155; Simpson, Historia 1957 504-5. 285) Herman, Talanta 1981 113, following Habicht 1958 1-16.
Important criterion for advancement under the Diadochs, there is no reason to see this as a great innovation. For example, the Lydian Croesus, defeated by Cyrus, is then found as a valued advisor at the Persian victor's side. Greek exiles are likewise prominent at the Achaemenid court, advising the Great King and receiving handsome presents. The Persian Artabazus and his sons were rewarded for their loyalty to the last Achaemenid king with privileged positions at the court of his heir, Alexander. So much for the ethnic mix. As far as the social background of the Kings' Friends go, the position is complicated by the Greek literary penchant for presenting the intimates of Kings as the scum of the earth, the lowest of the low. Though Herman puts much emphasis on this very point when discussing the contrast between the literary and epigraphic depiction of royal φίλοι, rather curiously, he is still ready to accept the idea of "propertyless nonentities" among the intimates of the Diadochs. Certainly this literary convention cannot be seen as inspired by a new egalitarianism at the Successors' courts; Theopompus' presentation of Philip II's Friends as a bunch of ruffians has already been mentioned.

Equally, there is little evidence that the claims of kinship, noble blood or political prominence had really ceased to exert their traditional pull in the recruitment of courtiers. The kinsmen of

286) e.g. Dionys. Halic. XIX.14; royal gifts to "good men" whose ἐπάθη makes them undeserving of poverty is the most fitting way to spend Βασιλικόν πλούτον. 287) Hdt.I.207-8; Plut.Them.29 (Demaratus of Sparta and Themistocles), Arr. Anab.III.23.7-8. 288) Herman, Talanta 1981 108-112, 115. 289) See Ch.1. 290) Herman, Talanta 1981 115 sees a decline in recruitment on "ascriptive" grounds - i.e. Macedonian/Persian nobility or citizens of the Greek ἀριστοκρατία.
the Diadochs, like those of the Achaemenid kings, are prominent figures in the historical narrative. Apart from Demetrius, among Antigonus' generals are his son Philip and his nephews Polemaeus and Dioscurides. Cassander's brother Pleistarchus is rewarded with a kingdom in Cilicia following his co-operation with Lysimachus in 302 BC. Lysimachus' son Agathocles routs Demetrius out of Asia Minor in 286/5 BC; his step-son Clearchus is with him on the Getic expedition in 292/1 BC; Lysimachus' dedication of a statue of his sister-in-law Adaia at Oropus suggests the continued prominence of her husband Autodicus at the Thracian court.231

Likewise the emphasis that Isocrates had put on the desirability of Greek courtiers232 still holds good. A high proportion of the friends of the early Hellenistic monarchs are men from the Greek cities both within and outside their kingdoms.233 Antigonid courtiers, for example, include men from Athens, Miletus, Ephesus, Samos, Chios, Larisa,234 while Demetrius' sneer at the shortage of Greeks at the Thracian court represents a slur upon Lysimachus' kingship.235

Whether this image of Lysimachus as a backwoods king, presiding over a second-rate court filled with courtiers of slavish origin, is anything more than the product of hostile propaganda is doubtful. Certainly he was ready to appoint men of non-Greek origin to the highest positions; Mithres, his minister of finance, is described by

Plutarch as "Syrian", but the name suggests rather Iranian origin. Such an appointment, however, is less controversial than is supposed by the traditional view, which sees the Macedonian rulers imposing a "superior" Greek culture and administrative system upon Asia. Of the Φίλοι sneered at by Demetrius, the name Bithys may suggest Thracian origin; Paris, known only from this anecdote, is perhaps Phrygian. No firm conclusions can be drawn about their social status; the dichotomy between the literary presentation of royal Φίλοι as servile flatterers and early Hellenistic city decrees which imply a more equal informal relationship has already been mentioned.

Lysimachus' "parasite" Bithys provides a striking example of this phenomenon; literary anecdotes present him only as a jester and recipient of wooden scorpions! Though past attempts have been made to elevate him to a more dignified position, identifying him with Bithys, son of Cleon, the honorand of an Athenian citizenship decree, the connection, until very recently, remained uncertain.

296) Burstein, 1985 no.14; Andreades, 1930 13 for Mithres as Syrian following Plut. Mor. 1097B, 1126E. 297) Robert, 1963 82, 217, 291, 519 for the Iranian origin of the name. 298) The idea of the "all-Greek" character of the Successors' courts, most recently advanced by McKechnie, 1989 207, 212, ignores this evidence from Lysimachus' court: for Alexander's appointment of Iranians, see Briant, 1974 101-3; Sherwin-White, 1987 6-7 for non-Greeks in high positions in the early Seleucid and Ptolemaic army/government. 299) For Βιθυς or Βίθυς on inscriptions from Thrace, see Mihailov, IGBR IV 1966 315, no.s 2196, 1962, 2337, 2322. Paris - see Hom.II.VI 1.260,503; VII.1.83; also a Pergamene inscription of the 1st century AD. (Robert, 1963 278.) 300) Herman, Talanta 1981 108-112 sees this as the result of different perceptions of royal service in the Greek Πολιτικ as opposed to the court; the Πολιτικ decrees tactfully avoid any suggestion of a formal master/servant relationship. 301) IGII² 808; most recently by Burstein, CSCA 1980 39-50.
Without a precise date for the inscription, Demetrius II's general Bithys seemed as likely a candidate.\textsuperscript{302} The new land-grant inscription from Cassandreia, mentioned above, greatly increases the odds in favour of Lysimachus' "parasite"; one of the areas of land granted to Limnaeus borders upon the estate of "Bithys son of Cleon". Athenaeus' juggler of wooden scorpions is thus transformed into a landowner and a military man - the phrase \( \varepsilon \iota \varsigma \tau \alpha \gamma \mu \alpha \) in the Athenian decree suggests that Bithys was honoured at Athens in connection with military aid supplied by the King of Thrace c.285/4 BC.\textsuperscript{303}

Of the courtiers in Lysimachus' service who are known to us, non-Greeks are, moreover, outnumbered by a group of Hellenes whose pedigrees easily put them on a par with the \( \varphi \lambda \alpha \omicron \) of his rivals. The best known of these is Philippides of Cephale, with whom Lysimachus seems to have enjoyed a genuinely warm and intimate friendship.\textsuperscript{304} Bitterly opposed to Stratocles, the favourite of Demetrius, Philippides appears to have spent the years of his voluntary exile from 301 BC to 286 BC at Lysimachus' court where he used his influence with the king to secure generous gifts for the city. As was expected of a good \( \varphi \lambda \alpha \omicron \), he was probably at Lysimachus' side for the victory at Ipsus.\textsuperscript{305}

Another illustrious Athenian, Demochares, led two successful embassies to Lysimachus in connection with funds for the recovery of

\textsuperscript{302} As argued by Osbourne, \textit{Anc.Soc}. 1974 97-104; Plut. Arat.34.  
\textsuperscript{303} Hatzopoulos, 1988 38-9,11.8-10; Burstein, \textit{CSCA} 1980 41, 45-46.  
\textsuperscript{304} Plut. Demet.12. See Ch.1 for Duris' atypical praise of Philippides.  
\textsuperscript{305} \textit{Syll} 374; Shear, 1978 49; Diod.XXI. F. 11; Bikermann, 1938 47 - king and \( \varphi \lambda \alpha \omicron \) were expected to stand together in times of crisis.
the Piraeus c. 286/5 BC. It has been suggested that he too may have spent some part of his exile at Lysimachus' court.\(^{306}\) A text from Delos records the presence of a Spartan, Demaratus, at the Thracian court. His patronymic, son of Gorgion, suggests royal rank; the argument that he is therefore unlikely to be an established courtier of the king is not sound.\(^{307}\) In offering friendship to exiled Spartan royalty, Lysimachus would merely have been following in the footsteps of an Achaemenid predecessor.\(^{308}\) Epigraphic evidence from Athens and Ephesus identifies a pair or perhaps a trio of brothers from Perinthus engaged in diplomatic activity on Lysimachus' behalf.\(^{309}\) Two men from Miletus serve in turn as ὀψαντνύοι of the Ionians. Hippostratus' ὀψαντνύοι has long been the subject of discussion; the Chian inscription which recently introduced to us his successor (or predecessor) Hippodamus has been discussed in the previous chapter.\(^{310}\) Their common home town and patronymic\(^{311}\) may suggest yet another pair of brothers among the agents of the Hellenistic monarchs. Moving from Ionia to Central Greece, Xanthippus of Elateia, like Docimus, is a "friend" whose career exemplifies the opportunism which must often have underlain the devotion which officially informed the relation of King and φίλος. In 301 BC he had co-operated with the Athenian Olympiodorus.

\(^{306}\) Plut. Mor. 851e-f; Shear, 1978 20. 307) Dittenberger, Syll\(^2\) 381 followed by Olshausen, 1974 no.6, see also Cartledge & Spawforth, 1989 31; Bradford, 1977 132, see also Ch. 4. 308) Plut. Them. 29, Hdt. VII.101 for Demaratus' namesake at Artaxerxes' court. 309) Inschr.Eph. no. 1464; IGII\(^2\) 662 and 663 honour Artemidorus and his brother(s?), sons of Apollodorus of Perinthus. Habicht, Chiron 1972 107-8 links the three texts. 310) Syll\(^2\) 368, SEG 1985 no.926, Forrest, Horos 1985 95. 311) Assuming that the two different spellings of the patronymic (Ἡπποδήμους (Chios), Ἡπποδήμους (Miletus) reflect only a difference in dialect.
to save Elateia for Demetrius against Lysimachus' ally Cassander; in
285 BC it is as "King Lysimachus' friend" that he expels Demetrius'
garrison from his home-town and liberates Phocis. 312

Regarding the hierarchy and administration of Lysimachus' court,
little specific evidence survives. It is, however, increasingly
recognised that both Alexander and the Seleucids retained many
features of the Achaemenid court structure and protocol. 313
Lysimachus, ruling Thrace and Anatolia as Alexander's heir, may well
have done the same. Certain inferences can therefore be drawn from
our knowledge of those courts as to the likely pattern of life at
Lysimachus' court.

Like the Achaemenid kings, the Successors seem to have moved
their courts among the capital cities of their kingdoms, often
travelling with a large entourage, even on campaign. Demetrius, for
example, scored a major coup at Salamis with the capture of
"Ptolemy's enormous train of attendants, friends and women", while
Lysimachus' last campaign in Asia finds queen Arsinoe and her
attendants installed at Ephesus. 314

Once the court was installed, the King would be woken at daybreak
by his purple-clad φίλοι, probably then remaining in their company
until the day ended with banqueting and entertainment. 315 Though it
is unclear whether these Friends formed any sort of permanent and
formal Council, the evidence suggests that while the king dealt
personally with envoys and petitioners, his most trusted companions

312) Syll 361; Tarn, 1913 118. 313) Lane Fox, 1973 428-30; Sherwin-
White, 1987 2, 6-8, 17, 24-5, 30. 314) Plut. Demet.16; Polyaen.
VIII.57. 315) Bikermann, 1938 32, 34, 47.

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would be on hand to proffer advice.\textsuperscript{316} Alexander had designated one of these \textit{zilo\epsilon} his Chiliarch, or deputy;\textsuperscript{317} there is no reference to such an official at Lysimachus' court, but Mithres' appointment as \textit{\omicron\epsilon\iota\varsigma\tau\iota\varsigma\iota\omicron\nu\eta\omicron\nu\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma\iota\omicron\nu} reflects the existence of some clearly defined "ministerial" posts.\textsuperscript{318}

When the petitioners had departed, other state business awaited in the form of correspondence. Though he could probably rely on his Greek-speaking chancellery staff to draft standard letters of a high literary quality - the surviving examples show no trace of the provincialism that, for example, afflicts the Bithynian secretariat on one occasion\textsuperscript{319} - the evidence makes it clear that Lysimachus would have been expected to deal personally with a great many letters. One anecdote shows Seleucus I groaning, so to speak, under the weight of the royal postbag! Likewise, Lysimachus' personal touch has been discerned in the idiosyncratic opening lines of his letter to Samos.\textsuperscript{320} The completed letter, stamped with the king's royal seal, would then speed towards its destination by means of the courier system perfected by the Achaemenids, with riders posted at

\begin{footnotes}
\item[316] Ibid., 34; Plut. Demet.42 - ideally a king should receive even the humblest petitioner personally; Bikermann, 1938 48, SEG 1.36, Plut. Mor. 184e, Diod. XX.48, Plut. Demet. 47 for the influence which \textit{\omicron\mu\lambda\omicron\eta\omicron\nu} might enjoy as advisors. 317) The traditional equation between this Macedonian Chiliarch and the so-called "Grand Vizier" (\textit{azaparatis}) of the Achaemenid court (e.g. Olmstead, 1948 290; Frye, 1962 98) has now been called into question by Briant (forthcoming) who reinterprets the key Hellenistic text (Diod. XVIII.49.1-3) and argues that \textit{azaparatis in the sense of the King's deputy} is quite unattested in Achaemenid texts. 318) Burstein, 1985 no.14, Plut.Mor. 1097a, 1126e, Diog. Laert. II.10, X.4,28. 319) Aymard, 1967 80-81 (=RE 1948) ascribes the \textit{hapax legomenon of \theta\sigma\iota\iota\xi\nu\upsilon\nu\upsilon\nu\tau\iota\nu\eta\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\lambda\omicron\nu\lambda\sigma} (Welles RC no.25 1.1) to bad style and insufficient Hellenisation. 320) Bikermann 1938 34, Plut. Mor.790a; Welles, RC no.7, 46, 51.
\end{footnotes}
day long intervals along the Royal Roads. 321

When the demands of war or state affairs allowed him leisure, hunting, which exercised the skills needed for battle, was the obligatory sport of kings. 322 Returning from the chase Lysimachus and his companions might enjoy a lavish banquet, with entertainment of all sorts, from dancing to philosophic discourse! 323 Apart from the obligatory wise men, other luminaries resident at his court were the poet Philippides and the historian Onesicritus. 324 Despite the attempts of his rivals to brand him as an oaf, there is no reason to think that Lysimachus neglected his kingly obligation to act as patron of the arts; 325 the exceptional quality of his coin types, and the remains of buildings like the Arsinoeion at Samothrace and perhaps the Belevi Heroon reflect a certain awareness of aesthetic excellence at the court in Thrace; the engraver Pyrgoteles and architects from Pytheos' school may have been among his other visitors. 326

CONCLUSIONS

In almost every area of kingship, then, Lysimachus holds his own against the competition. In the realm of propaganda, he takes his

321) See above for Lysimachus' seal; Frye, 1962 99 for the Achaemenid "postal" service, itself inherited from the Assyrian kings; Mitchell, JRS 1976 129 for the continuity of this system into the Roman imperial period. 322) See Ch. 1 and above. 323) Bikermann, 1938 34; Frye, 1962 98; Lane Fox, 1973 431 for Alexander's dining among 60-70 companions every day. 324) See Ch. 1 and above. 325) Root, 1979 1-18 for Assyrian, Egyptian and Achaemenid rulers as active commissioners of "imperial art"; Crawford, 1983 59 for the Roman emperor as patron of the arts. 326) See above.
own line, promoting himself as hero, warrior king and intimate friend and successor to Alexander. He advances his interests in the Greek cities and promotes himself as protector and provider through generous benefactions which are duly reciprocated with conspicuous honours. His choice of ἀνθρώπων reflects both an awareness of the prestige conferred by illustrious associates and the same readiness as his Argead and Achaemenid predecessors to reward talented individuals of diverse ethnic origins. Though his kingdom proved ephemeral, his cities and his coinage, by dint of their excellence, remained as a memorial to his achievement.

Despite his well attested concern to meet the obligations which kingship entails, there was one maxim which Lysimachus was finally unable to observe: "If kings are to rule well, they must try to preserve harmony ... also in their own household."327 The dynastic struggle which lost him his heir, the support of Friends and Army, his kingdom and his life will be discussed in the following chapter. The circumstances of his death, aged between seventy and eighty years old, fighting at the forefront of his troops, do, however, conform to the image of the king as warrior first and foremost.328 Isocrates advises: "If the king is forced to risk his life, it is better to die honourably than live in dishonour."329 If Lysimachus failed to achieve the continuation of his dynasty, the ultimate aim of royal power, at least his death, unlike that of his...

327) Isoc. Nic. 41. 328) Just. XVII.2.1, Oros. Adv. Pag. 57, Memn. FGrH 434 F.5.7; for the King as warrior, see Isoc. Ad. Nic. 25; OGIS 219 11.7-9; OGIS 332; Austin, CQ 1986 458-9; Burghart, 1987 267-8 for the king's prowess as an important factor in determining the outcome of battle. Compare Arr. Anab. II.11.4 - Darius' flight at Issus leads to general rout and panic. 329) Isoc. Ad. Nic. 37.
great enemy Demetrius, was thoroughly in keeping with what was expected of a king.\

330) Plut. Demet. 52 ascribes the Besieger's death to "inactivity and over-indulgence"!
SCHEMING WOMEN AND SENILE DECAY? - THE LAST DAYS OF LYSIMACHUS

Per idem ferme tempus Hellesponti et Chersonesi regionibus terrae motus fuit. maxime tamen Lysimachia urbs ante duos et xx annos a Lysimacho rege condita, eversa est. Quod portentum dira Lysimacho stirpique eius ac regni ruinam cum clade vexatarum regionum portendebat. Justin XVII.1.1-4

Justin's account, which sees the clouds of doom already gathering over Lysimachus' head in 287 BC, portended by the earthquake which shook his Thracian capital is, in the strictest sense, inaccurate. That year and those which followed it saw his fortunes reach their greatest height, with Demetrius' final eclipse followed by major conquests in Europe. Lysimachus' confrontation with Seleucus on the field of Corupedium where he was to meet his death came only in 281 BC. If the earthquake represented, as Justin has it, a portentum, then divine retribution clearly took its time.

This presentation of Lysimachus' last years can of course be explained by hindsight, combined with a tradition of history concerned to present its protagonists primarily as moral exempla. For Justin, or his source Trogus, events at the end of Lysimachus' reign cast him in the classic role of the tyrant, a foul fiend finally brought to justice by the anger of the gods. This is not an isolated case of literary stereotyping. It will be seen that all

1) See Ch.4. 2) Fontana, 1960 187 for the moralising tendency of Trogus/Justin.
accounts of the dynastic struggle which preceded the Corupedium campaign are highly coloured by literary topoi. Accordingly, it is doubtful whether a search for the "best source", the approach which is generally taken in analysing these events, is actually appropriate.²

While Justin's motives for ante-dating the start of Lysimachus' downfall to 287 BC may be suspect, his choice of that year as a crucial turning point is not entirely unjustified, since the profitable years which followed brought with them certain developments, both at Lysimachus' court and within his rivals' kingdoms, which contributed significantly to the final disaster.

First, the Asian campaign of 286/5 BC brings under the spotlight the King's heir Agathocles, hitherto an almost unseen figure.⁴ His success in routing Demetrius seems to have brought him prominence and popularity among Lysimachus' Greek subjects in Asia Minor.⁵ One might reasonably suppose that his father's supporters there saw Agathocles as a guarantor of their continuing influence once Lysimachus was gone. Victory also brought him the support of a strong group of φίλοι, a traditional and essential asset for successful kingship.⁶ Predictably, when the claim of his young half-brother Ptolemy presented a threat to Agathocles' prospects, these men rallied round him, splitting Lysimachus' court into factions, a development which seriously damaged the kingdom's strength. Second, Lysimachus' very success aroused the resentment

3) See below. 4) Plut. Demet. 46-8, Just.XVII.1.4; see Ch.2 for his part in the Getic expedition. 5) Memn. FGrH 434 F.5.7, see below. 6) See Ch. 6.
of his former ally Seleucus. For the latter, Agathocles' death and the appeal for help from his supporters served as a welcome pretext for war upon his dangerously powerful neighbour.

The Ptolemies' stance towards Lysimachus is less clear, but reasons for envy and mistrust can be found. As heirs to Antigonid thalassocracy, secured through the takeover of a large part of Demetrius' fleet, the key cities of Tyre and Sidon and control of the Nesiote League, the Ptolemies cannot have welcomed signs that Lysimachus was actively extending his naval resources. Though in 302 BC Lysimachus' pitiful shortage of ships had obliged him to commandeer those of the west Pontic cities, by the end of his reign he clearly possessed a fleet of some size. Though it is unclear whether the islands and coastal cities of Asia Minor were obliged to provide him with ships, as some had done for Alexander, the conquest of Macedon in 285 BC brought him the shipyards of Pella where Demetrius had prepared his great armada of 287 BC. Heracleia Pontica's importance in augmenting the Lysimachean fleet emerges from the account of its victory, under his successor Ptolemy Ceraunus, over Antigonus Gonatas. The Heracleian contingent included "fives" and "sixes", not to mention its pride, the massive Leontophoros, with eight banks of oars, supposedly capable of carrying 12,000 marines! Whether this development of naval power came only with Lysimachus' takeover of Heracleia is unclear;

7) See Ch. 4. 8) Just. XVII.1.7 for Seleucus asiam pronum (to make war) ...ex aemulatione gloriae.; Memm. FGrH 434 F.5.7. 9) Tarn, 1913 106; Merker, Historia 1970 150; Will, 1979 94. 10) See Diod.XX.112.1-2. 11) For Alexander's Chian ships, see Ch.5; Plut. Demet. 43, Tarn, 1913 117. 12) Mem. FGrH 434 F.8.4-6. 13) Tarn, 1913 117; Burstein, 1976 84; this figure is surely exaggerated.
possibly his continued friendship with the city after his divorce from Amastris c.299 BC enabled him to use Heracleia as a naval base and shipyard from 301 BC onwards.

Around the same time as his takeover of Heracleia, Lysimachus may also have made moves to extend his influence in the Aegean area. A decree from Delos, centre of the Ptolemaic-controlled Nesiote League, honours Lysimachus' agent Demaratus, and exchanges assurances of ἐυωνία with the King, though whether this should be interpreted as a sinister move is uncertain. 14 Another potential bone of contention was mainland Greece, traditionally an area for Ptolemaic "liberation" campaigns. Lysimachus had increased his diplomatic influence considerably there since Athens' release from Demetrius in 287 BC. 15 Finally, some time after 287 BC, Lysimachus had welcomed to his court Ptolemy Ceraunus, Ptolemy I's dispossessed son, a potential rival to the future Philadelphus and clearly ambitious to recover his throne. 16 Anxious for a quiet life on his accession in 285 BC, Ptolemy II's marriage to Lysimachus' daughter Arsinoe (I) 17 suggests he thought it prudent to renew his alliance with Thrace, but there is no sign that this bore fruit in anything so concrete as military support against Seleucus in 282/1 BC.

14) Syll² 381; Burstein, 1982 209 for Merker's redating of the inscription to the 280s BC; Burstein himself sets this diplomacy in the context of friendly relations between Egypt and Thrace; the fact that the decree's proposer, Aristolochus son of Nicodromus, also proposes a decree for Demetrius "friend of King Ptolemy" (IG XI 4 551) may support this interpretation; see also Bagnall, 1976 153. 15) Burstein 1982, 209; see Ch. 4. 16) Memn. FGrH 434 F.8.2, Paus. 1.16.2; Heinen, 1972 14-16 for Ceraunus' stay with Lysimachus. It seems reasonable to connect his exile from Egypt with the deposition of his mother Eurydice, who was in Miletus by 287 BC (Plut. Demet. 46). 17) Schol. Theoc. XVII 128; Beloch 1925 IV² 130; Macurdy, 1932 110.
THE DYNASTIC STRUGGLE

The evidence for events at Lysimachus' court in the late 280s BC is mainly literary. Amidst the diverse and often contradictory accounts, this much seems clear. The last years of Lysimachus' reign see his court split into two factions. One supported the claim of his official heir Agathocles, presumed to be the son of his marriage to Nicaea. Probably in his late thirties by this time, Agathocles is presented as an accomplished soldier and a popular figure, seemingly an ideal successor to the throne.18 Against him, Lysimachus' current wife, Arsinoe, sought to secure the throne for her eldest son Ptolemy. The precise chronology of events is uncertain, but since the year 286/5 BC sees Agathocles holding a great command and clearly still in his father's favour,19 it is reasonable to place the start of this growing tension after that year. The affair reached its climax with Agathocles' death; both the precise date and the circumstances remain unclear. Memnon sees Agathocles imprisoned by Lysimachus' order on a trumped-up treason charge, after an attempt to poison him had failed. Justin actually does ascribe his death to poison.20 Strabo's brief notice, however, that Lysimachus "beset by domestic troubles, was compelled to kill his son", perhaps suggests a genuine conspiracy.21 Most accounts ascribe to Arsinoe a major role in Agathocles' death, though in some she is chief instigator of the plot, in others

the all too willing accomplice of her husband.\footnote{22} The portrayal of Lysimachus varies accordingly; either he is a helpless old man, putty in the hands of his scheming wife, or the classic tyrant, outraging by his deeds not only the norms of paternal/filial affection but also those of humanity itself.\footnote{23} On Justin's account, the murder was followed by a purge of Agathocles' supporters; those who survived it, including his widow Lysandra, her brothers and her children, fled to Seleucus who was only too happy to take up the avenger's sword.\footnote{24}

The best known of those who defected is Philetaerus, Lysimachus' governor of Pergamum; apparently at odds with Arsinoe, he put himself, together with the high-impregnable fortress and its treasure of 9,000 T, at the service of Seleucus.\footnote{25} The appearance of Alexander, another of Lysimachus' sons, among the refugees\footnote{26} suggests that the dynastic struggle split the court in two, involving even those members of the royal house who did not stand directly to gain or lose the major prize. One might speculate that among those who stayed loyal to Lysimachus were his brother Autodicus and his family; the statue of Lysimachus' sister-in-law Adaea, which the king dedicated at the Amphiaraon at Oropus, in recognition of her δοσίν and εὐβοία may plausibly be dated to the last years of his life, perhaps erected in the course of a diplomatic mission which took Ptolemy, Arsinoe's young son, to

Generally, modern commentators have approached these events by following, from among the confused and conflicting literary accounts, the source deemed to be "the best". Though Corradi, for one, noted "the legendary and romantic character" of the sources for this period of Lysimachus' life, and there is some general recognition of the near impossibility of discovering "the truth" when dealing with topics like dynastic murder and intrigue, these discoveries have made little impact on the method by which these events are examined. Most scholars plump for Memnon, who draws on the third century Heracleote historian Nymphis, although the routes which lead them to him are various. Tarn, for instance, is clearly impressed by Nymphis' "objectivity" - despite Heracleia's later friendship with Ptolemy Ceraunus, Memnon's account does not hesitate to name him as Agathocles' murderer. In her monograph on Arsinoe II, Longega analyses the different traditions and their possible sources at length; for her, Memnon/Nymphis seems to represent the least of three evils, steering a middle course between an "apologetic tradition" which seeks to exculpate Lysimachus entirely, and a "hostile" one which lays primary responsibility for the crime on him. The former, embodied in Strabo and in one of the alternative "stories" mentioned by Pausanias is thought to derive from Lysimachus' protegé, Duris; the latter, reflected in the.

27) Syll 373; the Theban text (Robert BCH 1933 485-91) which is the evidence for Ptolemy's trip is discussed below. 28) Corradi, 1929 59. 29) e.g. Tarn, 1913 124; Burstein, 1982 200. 30) e.g. Will, 1979 100 whose vocabulary (circonvenir echoes that of Memnon (θεραπόντι) Bengtson 1987 134 for Arsinoe as an "evil spirit" over her husband; Burstein, 1976 4 for Nymphis as Memnon's source. 31) Tarn, 1913 125.
account of Justin/Trogus is ascribed to Hieronymus of Cardia.\textsuperscript{32} Though avowedly more sceptical of Nymphis' objectivity than previous scholars, she cites his relative restraint in dealing with the matricide of Clearchus and Oxathres, given his "well-known hatred" for the Clearchid dynasty. While admitting that Nymphis' exile from Heracleia, which she dates to the period of Arsinoe's government, may have led him to place undue emphasis on the queen's part in Agathocles' murder, Longega concludes, nevertheless, that "the version least far from the truth is that of Memnon".\textsuperscript{33} This version of events has Lysimachus fabricating a charge of conspiracy against his son and ordering his death, but at the same time he is presented as a man enfeebled by old age and strongly influenced by the persuasive skills of his determined and ambitious wife.\textsuperscript{34}

Several objections can be made to this view and indeed to the wisdom of attempting to isolate one tradition as encapsulating "the truth". First, the long-held belief in Nymphis' "absolute objectivity", established by Jacoby, must be challenged, since the validity of the examples cited above is questionable. To begin with, it is doubtful whether Nymphis, a leading statesman at Heracleia at the time of her friendship for Ceraunus, did actually accuse him of Agathocles' murder. As Heinen has argued, Ceraunus' subsequent flight to Seleucus, Agathocles' would-be avenger, is hardly consistent with responsibility for the latter's death. He suggests that the "Ptolemy" named in Nymphis' text was actually Arsinoe's son, a far more plausible candidate; the identification of

\textsuperscript{32) Longega, 1968 44-54. 33) Ibid., 50-51, 53. 34) Memn. FGrH 434 F.5.4-5.6.}
the assassin as Ptolemy "the brother of Arsinoe" is the result of a
gloss added by a later author, to whom Ceraunus was a notorious
villain, while Lysimachus' son Ptolemy had long since faded into
obscurity. As for Nymphis' supposed restraint regarding
Amastris' death at her sons' hands, the deed is characterised as an
ἐξέθεσσον δὲ καὶ μιαρότατον έργον, conceived by a μυθον ἰδινῆ καὶ
κακουργίας, strong vocabulary and reminiscent of that used by
Plutarch to condemn Lysimachus' bid for Demetrius' life, in a
passage generally thought to reflect a hostile source.

More generally, to speak of "Nymphis' well-known hatred" for the
Clearchid dynasty is too simplistic. Though his exiled status -
probably the consequence of his descent from those expelled by the
first tyrant Clearchus, rather than the action of Arsinoe's
government, as Longega supposes - makes a position of hostility
probable, it cannot be inferred purely on the basis of his writings.
These present a curiously uneven picture; while the treatment of the
first tyrants Clearchus and Satyrus is vituperative, to say the
least, their successors, Timotheus and Dionysius are praised to the
skies. It is difficult to avoid Burstein's conclusion that
Nymphis "was an original authority" only for "his own time",
presumably the period after the death of Dionysius c.305 BC. The
extreme unevenness of treatment of the preceding years suggests a
somewhat uncritical use of partisan sources. If then, the glowing

35) Heinen, 1972 8-11. 36) Memn.FGrH 434 F.5.2; Plut. Demet.51,
(μιαρήν καὶ ῥάφθης). 37) Burstein, 1976 2-3, Memn.FGrH 434 F 4.1,
4.3. for the exiles' appeals to Alexander and Perdiccas; Longega,
1968 50. 38) Memn. FGrH 434 F.1.2,3; 2.1,2; F.3.1,2. 4.6.

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account of Timotheus' reign, for instance, does not represent the 
exile Nymphis' own interpretation, the foundations for belief in his 
objectivity crumble. Burstein also rightly stresses the distorting 
effect of Nymphis' position as an important Heracleote politician in 
the period after Lysimachus' death. As leader of the returned 
exiles, he would naturally be anxious to emphasise the happiness 
and harmony of Heracleia in this period, and tempted to blacken the 
preceding regime by contrast. The doubts, then, that exist as to 
the superiority of Memnon's account cast doubt also on the viability 
of a search for "the truth" via "the best source."

Longega's grounds for rejecting the alternative traditions may 
also be questioned; the idea of Duris and Hieronymus as the source, 
respectively, of positive and negative traditions on Lysimachus, has 
already been criticised. Such an analysis, moreover, pays too 
little heed to the impact of literary convention upon our sources. 
This is likely to be strong, since these authors are all writing 
several centuries after the event and the subject at issue is 
dynastic struggle, which is, and is perceived as, a classic feature 
of autocratic rule. Conventional motifs may serve as a handy 
padding device for an author whose source is slight or 
unsatisfactory; they may represent an epitomator's attempt at 
creativity; they may be invoked in the service of that moralising 
tendency which seems particularly to afflict Roman authors faced 
with that famous bug-bear, the Tyrant.

For example, it is the moral condemnation of Justin's account

40) Burstein, 1976 3, Memn. FGrH 434 F 7.3; F.16.3 for Nymphis as 
head of an embassy to the Gauls. 41) See Ch. 1.
which has the effect of making Lysimachus the instigator of the crime, with Arsinoe merely his ministra. This need not reflect the hostility of a contemporary Greek source, like Hieronymus. Justin, an author with a strong moralising tendency and well known for "improving" on his original may have added it himself. This is supported by a comparison of Justin's account with the brief summary of his source Pompeius Trogus, which lays the emphasis on Arsinoe's part in the murder, ut Lysimachus occiso filio per novercam Arsinoen... Other proponents of the theory that Arsinoe masterminded the conspiracy are the chronicler Porphyry (3rd century AD), who says that Lysimachus killed Agathocles either at Arsinoe's persuasion or in obedience to her, and Pausanias. This tradition may derive in part from Duris, but it should be noted that the accounts of Memnon/Nymphis and Trogus, drawing on sources, which on Longea's view, had no clear reason to favour Lysimachus, likewise emphasise the influence of his wife. This reduces the probability that the aim of this presentation is apologia. It is, moreover, questionable whether a reputation as a hen-pecked husband and a senile old fool is more enviable than that of an out and out villain. This presentation of events may rather be explained by the influence of what might be called the cherchez la femme school of history, both on Duris himself and the Roman writers who used him.

Pausanias' account, moreover, is rich in conventional literary motifs. Opening his narrative with some philosophical musing on the

theme of Love the Great Destroyer, most famously expressed in the second chorus of Euripides' *Hippolytus*, he goes on to quote diverse sources, without committing himself to belief in any of them. Of the alternative explanations offered for Arsinoe's hatred of her stepson, fear that his accession would mean the death of her children is the more convincing. The suggestion that Agathocles had spurned his stepmother's sexual advances fits too neatly into a classic tragic framework - the obvious example is that of Phaedra and Hippolytus - to be entirely credible. It has, however, provoked its share of scholarly discussion, notably in Macurdy's study of Hellenistic queens.47 Similarly both the presentation of Arsinoe herself and her relations with Agathocles and Lysimachus conform to long established literary stereotypes. Memnon's Arsinoe is a woman "good at getting her own way", a statement made in the context of events before Agathocles' death when the queen bludgeons her reluctant husband with repeated demands for the rich city of Heracleia. Finally, Lysimachus, "whom old age was already making vulnerable" gives in. The historicity of this incident is generally accepted without comment and cited as proof of Arsinoe's overriding influence over her husband.48

It is, however, hard to see how Nymphis might guarantee accuracy here. Unless one assumes that Arsinoe asked for the city in a formal context, as part of the kingdom's public business to be debated by King and council, only an eye-witness source from the most intimate court circle at Lysimachelia could be in a position to

48) Memn. FGrH 434 F. 5.4; eg Roussel, 1938 371.
relay such information. Even then it is likely that the story would be tainted by gossip and rumour. The process by which this matter was settled must remain uncertain, but Memnon's account seems to imply that Arsinoe owed her success to womanly wiles, suggesting perhaps that her demands were made in a less than public context! The suspicion remains that this picture of Lysimachus, the archetypal old fool, helpless in the hands of a young and reputedly beautiful woman, represents a conventional motif, used to fill the gap where accurate information failed our sources. This view is supported by the contrast between this Lysimachus and the man depicted by Nymphis himself at the time of his recent takeover of Heracleia. Far from a man enfeebled by old age, the emphasis there is on the king's subtlety; he is a master of the art of stratagem, renowned for his skill as a dissembler.

The figure of the scheming woman, the power behind the throne, is, moreover, a familiar one in ancient historiography. From Ctesias' Semiramis, through Herodotus, Tacitus and Suetonius, reaching a climax with the monstrous female creations of Procopius' Secret History, she wields influence through beauty and sexual charms. The action which she initiates, or more usually persuades her male partner to take, is, however, almost invariably destructive. Ambitious and determined, stopping at nothing to achieve her ends, she inflicts savage punishment on her enemies. She

49) For the beauty suggested by Arsinoe's coin portraits see Davis & Kraay, 1973 p.120-22. 50) For the dating to 284 BC, see Ch. 4. 51) Memn. FGrH 434 F.5.3. 52) e.g. Diod. II.5.2, 6.5.9, 13.1; Hdt. III.132-6, VII.2-3, IX.109; Tac. Ann. I.5.1, X.1.15, XI.2.5-3, 28, 26.1-28.30; Procop. Anecdota I.11-21, 26-8; III. 6-13; IX. 11-27; XV.1-10, 20-24; XXX. 31-26.
is a witch, an adulteress, a murderer and an unnatural mother.\textsuperscript{63} Most of these characteristics are likewise attached, by one source or another, to Arsinoe.\textsuperscript{64}

Analysing this stereotype, with reference to the Byzantine period, Fisher concludes that it originates in: an assumption of mental and moral frailty in women; male fear of female sexuality and its potential power; the belief that independent action and the achievement of power by women was improper and offensive.\textsuperscript{65} This seems to hold good for all the authors mentioned above. Semiramis, for example, presented initially as dangerously attractive but nevertheless possessed of good qualities, becomes a kind of Gorgon the minute she ascends the throne. Addicted to luxury and fearful that marriage will mean loss of power, she slakes her lust on the handsomest of her soldiers who are then duly eliminated!\textsuperscript{66}

In the case of the Achaemenid empire, at least, recent research has questioned its traditional presentation as a kingdom ruled "from the unwholesome atmosphere of the harem", where "queens decided and kings complied".\textsuperscript{67} If Duris is indeed the source for the tradition which emphasises Arsinoe's part in Agathocles' death, then it is worth remembering that Duris was strongly influenced by Herodotus, and therefore by a tradition of historiography in which kings' wives

and mistresses are prominent.\textsuperscript{66}

Finally, Arsinoe's position as stepmother to Agathocles immediately casts her in another classic role. The wicked stepmother is an archetype of evil in European myth and literature. Ovid, describing the birth of crime in the Iron Age, includes among his gallery of rogues "ruthless stepmothers mixing brews of deadly aconite". Tacitus' famous portrait of the Empress Livia lays great emphasis on her role as stepmother to Augustus' ill-fated heirs.\textsuperscript{66} The very use of the word \textit{noverca} in the Latin tradition of Justin/Trogus immediately associates Arsinoe with poison and intrigue. By contrast, though Memnon also alludes to the idea of a poisoning plot, his account does not emphasise this aspect of Arsinoe's relationship to Agathocles.\textsuperscript{60}

\textbf{KING AND HEIR-APPARENT}

If then, the highly conventional nature of the literary evidence makes it unlikely to yield the "historical truth" concerning the end of Lysimachus' reign, is there an alternative way of looking at these events? One possible approach might be to examine the evidence independent of the literary tradition, and also to look at these events from a different perspective, that of the relationship between power holders and their successors and the problems that can

\textsuperscript{58} Kebric, 1977 18 for Duris as self-styled heir to the tradition of "tragic history" which originated with Herodotus. 59) Ovid. Metam. I 1.14; Tac.Ann. 1.3, 4, 6, 10 - Walker, 1952 482 suggests that Tacitus "weighed the scales against Livia". 60) Memn. FGrH 434 F.5.6.
arise with the transition of autocratic power. This method cannot, of course, guarantee to bring us any closer to "what actually happened" at the Thracian court in the late 280s BC. It may, however, cast fresh light on a series of events which cannot help but seem curious in the context of what we know of Lysimachus' aims and his previous career.

Neither the fact of a succession struggle at Lysimachus' court, with a culling of potential claimants, nor the suggestion that Lysimachus committed murder within his own family are in themselves surprising. Plutarch stresses the remarkable restraint of the Antigonids in keeping their hands relatively clean of the blood of their nearest and dearest, since "the chronicles of almost all the other dynasties are full of examples of men who murdered their sons, their mothers or their wives, while the murder of brothers had come to be regarded almost as axiomatic, as a recognised precaution to be taken by all rulers to ensure their safety."61 Lysimachus himself, clearly not squeamish about such matters, had already removed his son-in-law Antipater and two stepsons, Clearchus and Oxathres.62 In both cases, the action was explicable in terms of profit: Antipater had represented an awkward obstacle to Lysimachus' claim to Macedon; the execution of his stepsons won him control of the wealthy and important city of Heracleia. By contrast, the murder of Agathocles proved disastrous for Lysimachus, both politically and personally.

A king's first priority, if concerned for the growth and future of his realm and his own reputation in posterity, is the choice of

61) Plut. Demet.3. 62) Porph. FGH III F 3.3, Just.XVI.2.4; Memn. FGrH 434 F.5.3; see Ch.4.
an able successor. The removal of Agathocles seems a deliberate breach of this rule. Of course the deposition of a first born son in favour of a younger candidate was not unparalleled. Only a few years before, Ptolemy I had ousted Ceraunus, the son of his marriage to Eurydice in favour of Berenice's son Ptolemy, the future Philadelphus. The latter was, however, adult at the time of his accession, and though Ceraunus' "mad dog" image may be in part the product of a hostile source tradition, his subsequent career hardly reassures us of his fitness for rule. Furthermore, Ptolemy I took steps to ensure a smooth transition of rule by abdicating the throne in favour of his heir two years before his death.

Lysimachus' position was rather different. He may have been unable to predict the massive loss of support after Agathocles' death which finally made his kingdom vulnerable to external attack. Nevertheless, his own recent experience should have warned him that removing a mature, militarily able and popular heir, in favour of an adolescent with younger brothers, who might start his reign under his mother's regency, did not bode well for the kingdom's future. Demetrius had exploited the inherent weakness of just such a set-up in Macedon in 294 BC; Lysimachus himself had done the same to gain control of Heracleia Pontica.

It is of course possible that the sources present Agathocles in a misleading light, giving him what might be called "the Germanicus

63) See Heinen, 1972 3-94; see also end of Ch. 2. 64) Child of a marriage of c.299 BC, Ptolemy was at most 16 yrs old c.283 BC. For his brothers, Lysimachus and Philip, aged 16 and 13 when Arsinoe married Ceraunus in 280 BC, see Just. XXIV.3.5. 65) See Ch. 4.
treatment". Such white-washing might be explained as pro-Seleucid propaganda, designed to reinforce Nicator's pose as Agathocles' avenger in 282/1 BC. Alternatively it might derive from a source whose aim of blackening Lysimachus owed nothing to Seleucid patronage. Since the most likely sources for this material are Hieronymus, Duris and Nymphis, the latter explanation is more plausible. If Agathocles' portrait was gilded in order to tarnish that of Lysimachus, then Hieronymus of Cardia, as protege of Antigonus Gonatas, might seem the most likely candidate. The literary references to Agathocles are, however, fairly restrained, with little that hints at encomia. Justin's account, thought to derive from Hieronymus, says merely that Agathocles was Lysimachus' "best and oldest son" and refers to his successful warfare on his father's behalf. The attempt to create an atmosphere of pathos, with Agathocles described as a "young man", mourned by many, may well be Justin's own addition; similar effects can be seen in the truly purple passages which recount Ptolemy Ceraunus' later murder of Arsinoe's sons. The tone bears little resemblance to the generally rather spare, restrained style of Hieronymus which seems to be reflected in Plutarch's account of Agathocles' Asian campaign of 286/5 BC. Indeed Hieronymus, or his patron Gonatas, would have found themselves on the horns of a dilemma had they

66) A helpful suggestion made by Dr. J. Patterson at a reading of a preliminary paper on this subject. 67) Memn. FGrH 434 F.7.3, Orth, 1977 39-42. It is difficult to see why Hieronymus or Duris should be pro-Seleucid, while Nymphis held a leading position in Heraclea at a time when the city took a determined stand against Seleucid domination. 68) Longega, 1968 51. 69) Just. XVII.1.6, XXIV.3.7-9. 70) Plut. Demet. 46-7.
wished to attack Lysimachus by glorifying Agathocles, since this would highlight the latter's triumph over Demetrius. On these grounds it seems reasonable to conclude that the ability which the sources ascribe to Agathocles must be taken seriously.

What then impelled Lysimachus to commit what looks like an act of political suicide? The literary tradition emphasises the influence of his wife, but this is not altogether trustworthy.\(^71\) Admittedly, from the *cui bono* point of view, Arsinoe had the most to gain from Agathocles' death. Quite apart from her ambitions for herself, or for her sons,\(^72\) Agathocles' accession would quite probably present a serious threat to her life and theirs. That she worked to create tension between the king and his heir is probable, but whether she wielded sufficient influence to be held ultimately responsible for his death is less certain.

Just how much power did Arsinoe have as queen in Thrace? Extravagant claims have been advanced on her behalf, notably by Longega, who not only credits Arsinoe with great influence at Lysimachus' court from the first days of her marriage, but even sees her as a person of some importance as a child in Alexandria.\(^73\) While she stops short of ascribing to Arsinoe the actual planning of Lysimachus' campaigns, Longega sees her as the guiding force behind a "new philhellenic policy" adopted in the years after Ipsus.

\(^71\) See above. 72) Lefkowitz, 1983 51-7 observes that women in literature and history who seem to play a major role in political life almost invariably act on behalf of male kinsmen. 73) Longega, 1968 42-44, on the basis of OGIS 16, which she dates between 308 BC and 306 BC when Arsinoe was 8-10 years old. Greipl's reinterpretation of the text, (*Philologus* 1930 159-68) which sees it as a fragment, not a whole, dating to the reign of Ptolemy II, effectively demolishes this theory.
The evidence on which these suppositions rest is the Delian inscription honouring Demaratus, dated by Longega to 295/4 BC. She sees the inclusion of Arsinoe's name as the focus of Delian ἐὐγενᾶ alongside Lysimachus as politically significant.74 Distinguishing this text from the numerous Lagid inscriptions where queens appear with their consorts as the objects of cult worship, she draws a parallel between this decree and one from Siphnos honouring Ptolemy Philopator's admiral Perigenor. Here Queen Arsinoe III, named without her cult title, is likewise assured of Siphnian ἐὐγενᾶ following Ptolemy's victory at Raphia, a battle in which she was active, exhorting the troops to victory along with Ptolemy's phalanx commanders.75

Again certain objections can be raised. First, the date of 295/4 BC is uncertain and so therefore is the value of the text as proof of Arsinoe's influence in the first years of her marriage.76 Second, Arsinoe III's lack of cult title may be "politically/honorifically" significant, by contrast with the usual appearance of queens in Lagid texts in a strictly "cultic" context. It is, however, uncertain whether the same significance should be given to a similar reference to Arsinoe II as queen of Thrace; the short life of Lysimachus' kingdom means that this text cannot be compared with a standard formulaic presentation of queens in Thrace. Third, though Arsinoe III may have enjoyed a moment of prominence at Raphia, there is no other evidence to suggest that she played an

74) Syll³ 381, with Dittenberger's commentary (615); Longega, 1968 27. 75) OGIS 730 11.5, 13, 19; Polyb.V.83-4; Longega, 1968 27-29. 76) See above, Ch. 4 and Ch.6. 407
important part in ruling Egypt. Longega herself makes the point that, as far as we know, this queen lived the rest of her life "in the shadows". Logically, then, even if the parallel between the Demaratus and Perigenor inscriptions is accepted, one such text does not justify ascribing to Arsinoe II the long-lasting and widespread influence which Longega suggests.

If, moreover, Longega is right in thinking that a queen's inclusion in official inscriptions acts as a gauge of her political influence, then one might expect to see Arsinoe mentioned in other texts of the late 280s, the period when, so the literary sources suggest, her power reached its height. Though Arsinoe receives the tribute of a statue dedicated on Lysimachus' behalf by her son Ptolemy at Thebes, this may simply represent a token of honour and esteem, rather than a reflection of political power; Lysimachus dedicated a similar statue of his sister-in-law Adaea, a woman who is otherwise quite obscure. In the city decrees where Arsinoe's supposed promotion of a philhellene policy might make her inclusion likely, she is conspicuous by her absence. There is no reference to her in Priene's honorary decree for Lysimachus c.285 BC, or in Lysimachus' letter to Samos c.283/2 BC. Nor does she appear in the Samothracian decree for Lysimachus, dated after 287 BC, despite her well-attested patronage of the shrine.

77) For Raphia, see Heinen CAH VII 1984 436-9; Bagnall, for one, doubts whether Raphia is actually the context of the Perigenor text (1976 146) suggesting instead a date in the 270s BC, the reign of Ptolemy II; Longega, 1968 29. 78) Robert, BCH 1933 485-90; Syll* 373. 79) Priene no. 14 = RC no. 7; Syll* 372; OGIS 15 and Fraser, 1958 10, dating Arsinoe's rotunda building at Samothrace to Lysimachus' reign; Just. XXIV.3.9 for Arsinoe's flight to Samothrace in 280 BC.
What are we to infer from this? If inclusion in official documents does not after all reflect a queen's political power, then the Demaratus text loses the significance which Longega gave it. Burstein, for one, sees Arsinoe's inclusion as a politic compliment by the Delian δῆμος to their master Ptolemy's sister at a time when, officially at least, Thraco/Egyptian relations were good. Alternatively, if a queen's inclusion in official texts does signify political influence, then Arsinoe's position in the late 280s BC was very much weaker than the literary tradition would have us believe.

Finally, the idea of Arsinoe as the guiding light behind Lysimachus' "new philhellenic policy" is undermined by evidence for Lysimachus' euergetism towards the Greeks in the years preceding Ipsus. His increased prominence, as diplomat and benefactor, among the Greek states after 301 BC should more probably be ascribed to the great increase in resources which victory gave him than to the influence of his new wife. Nor is it necessary to see the Aetolian foundation of Arsinoeia, paired with a nearby Lysimacheia, as reflecting Arsinoe's active support of Lysimachus' "philhellenism". The practice among Greek city-states of complimenting autocrats through honours voted to their wives, or even mistresses, is well attested. Both the Athenians and the Thebans c.304 BC to 302 BC decreed divine honours for the courtesan Lamia, constant companion of Demetrius the Besieger.

Arsinoe's supposed "possession" of several important cities
within Lysimachus' kingdom has also been seen as a sign of her great influence at court. Lysimachus' "gift" of Heracleia Pontica to Arsinoe has already been mentioned; Ephesus, re-named Arsinoeia some time between 294 BC and 289/8 BC, and Cassandreia have also been numbered among her personal possessions.

There is, however, little evidence to support such a view. The mere naming of a city after Arsinoe is no proof of her direct control. Hellenistic monarchs regularly name cities founded or refounded by themselves after their wives and daughters, without any suggestion that such cities "belonged" to the latter. Arsinoe's "portrait" - if indeed it is - on the coinage from new Ephesus is no proof of ownership. Smyrna, renamed after Lysimachus' daughter Eurydice also issued coinage with an obverse of a veiled woman in similar style. There is no suggestion that Smyrna was ever under Eurydice's personal control. Arsinoe's presence at Ephesus after Corupedium does not prove her "possession" of the city. It simply shows that until rumours of Seleucus' victory were confirmed the city adhered to Lysimachus' cause, presumably through the dominance of his adherents there and perhaps the presence of a garrison.

Again, Arsinoe's control of Cassandreia after Lysimachus' death need not imply her prior ownership of the city, but only her ability to pay for mercenary troops and the existence of a party there who

84) Memn. G H 434 F.5.4; Ephesus - Syll 368 11.25-5, Macurdy, 1932 117, Mehl, 1986 294; I am not convinced by Burstein's suggestion (1982 198-9) that Ephesus was renamed for Lysimachus' daughter, Arsinoe I; Cassandreia - Macurdy, 1932 117, Burstein Anc. World 1980 74 n.16. 85) See Ch. 6; Head, 1880 43-4, Milne, Num. Chron. 1923 3. 86) Polyain. VIII.57; it need not be assumed that Arsinoe fled to Ephesus from Corupedium; she may have travelled there with the fleet (see below) while Lysimachus marched down to Sardis by land.
supported the claim of her son Ptolemy against that of Seleucus.\textsuperscript{67}

Of Arsinoe's supposed possessions, then, only Heracleia Pontica and perhaps its dependencies,\textsuperscript{66} can be accepted with certainty. Even here, it is possible that Lysimachus' "gift" did not entail Arsinoe's full ownership of the city, to govern as she liked, but constituted instead a gift of the city's revenues, just as the Achaemenid kings had designated the revenues of certain cities "for the queen's girdle" or "the queen's shoes".\textsuperscript{66}

In conclusion, the evidence we have affords little support for the view that Arsinoe had sufficient influence not only to inspire an over-cautious husband to adopt a major change in foreign policy - if indeed there was one - but also to induce him to commit an action like the murder of his heir if he had no personal will or incentive to do it. It is possible that the idea of Arsinoe as highly powerful in Thrace stems in part from the knowledge of her later conspicuous position as wife of Ptolemy II in Egypt.\textsuperscript{30} Insofar as royal devotion finds expression in public honours, nothing suggests that Lysimachus' feeling for Arsinoe was comparable to that displayed by Ptolemy II, both during her lifetime and posthumously.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{67} Just. XXIV.2.1, 3.4; Trog. Prol libr1 24; Tarn, 1913 128 for Cassandreian sympathy for Lysimachus; Heinen, 1972 48 sees Arsinoe's claim to Macedon as a serious obstacle to Seleucus in 281 BC. \textsuperscript{68} Though Longega, 1968 37 suggests that Lysimachus "gave" Amastris and Tium to Arsinoe too, Memnon stresses only her desire for them. \textsuperscript{69} An idea suggested verbally by Amelie Kuhrt; see Hdt. II.98, Xen. Anab.I.49, Plato Alcib. 122-3, Briant, REA 1985 59-60; see also Ch.5 for royal "gifts of land" which are actually a gift of the revenues. \textsuperscript{90} Though Burstein challenges also the idea of her as de facto ruler of Egypt (1982 197 - 212). \textsuperscript{91} Robert, 1966b 205-208 for public and private worship of Arsinoe as Aphrodite Euploia; Burstein, 1982 201-2 for "unprecedented" posthumous honours for Arsinoe.
If, then, Lysimachus was not so infatuated with Arsinoe as knowingly to allow her to issue the execution order for his son, the possibility remains that by this time, as Memnon and Pausanias imply, the King had lost his mental grip. Though any attempt to evaluate the sanity of an historical figure is of course fraught with difficulties, some evidence can be advanced which belies this suggestion of senility. Memnon's portrayal of Lysimachus the Schemer shortly before Agathocles' death has already been mentioned. Then there is Lysimachus' letter to the Samian Ἀμνος, discussing his recent arbitration in their dispute with Priene over the Batinetis.92 Clearly the case was highly complicated, involving claims, counter claims, citation of historical documents going back to the sixth century BC and some serious misrepresentation on Priene's part. Evidently the citizens hoped to pull the wool over Lysimachus' eyes. Despite this and the temptation to favour Priene, whose citizens had accorded him conspicuous honours in the past, Lysimachus' decision, awarding the land to Samos, seems to have been correct and just. Though this letter might be explained as the work of aides, Welles' comment on its tone is significant, "although it is perhaps too much to suppose that Lysimachus himself dictated these lines ... certainly nothing in the royal letters is more markedly personal."93 Senility, then, does not seem to be the key which unlocks the mystery of Agathocles' death.

If Lysimachus was neither senile nor gripped by helpless infatuation for his wife, the possibility remains that he knowingly

92) Memn. FGrH 434 F 5.3, see above; RC no.7, c.283/2 BC, 1 Priene no. 37 11.81,126 for the dating. 93) Welles, RC 1934 49, 51.
and deliberately eliminated his heir. How is this to be explained? The literary sources focus on the rivalry between Agathocles and Arsinoe, saying little about the nature of his relationship with Lysimachus, despite the fact that the tensions which can arise between ruler and heir-apparent are notorious. The former is unwilling to relinquish power; the latter is impatient to step into his father's shoes. This phenomenon, of course, is not restricted to the ancient world but occurs in all societies where a system of dynastic rule carries with it the danger of a succession crisis.94

The little that is known of Agathocles' career and his position in the last years of his life suggests that these factors may not be irrelevant. In the prime of life in the 280s BC, Agathocles enjoyed conspicuous military success on Lysimachus' behalf and reaped the expected rewards of victory, notably the adherence of ἀρχηγοί, who included leading men in his father's army.95 Politicians in the Greek cities of Asia Minor may also have flocked to his side, but this is more problematic, since it is unclear how far Agathocles' death served as a pretext for revolt among those opposed to Lysimachus for other, more personal, reasons, such as longstanding political enmity to those of their fellow citizens who had flourished under his rule.

Whether Agathocles received comparable recognition from his father for these services is doubtful. Though his Asian command of 286/5 BC has been thought by some to signify an

94) See Goody, 1966 1-56 and Southwold, 1966 82-126 on succession to the throne in 20th century Buganda, E. Africa. 95) See above.
important governorship there is no literary or epigraphic evidence to support such a belief. There is, for instance, no suggestion that Lysimachus' ابراشیم of the Ionians, Hippostratus and Hippodamus, reported to Agathocles; they are described simply as "friends of King Lysimachus". Similarly, Priene's honorary decree for Lysimachus, generally dated c.285 BC, praises only the king, giving thanks for his safety and that of his army. The ابراشیم Sosthenes is mentioned, but not Agathocles, despite the fact that Sosthenes was probably serving under his supreme command. As Bengtson argued, Agathocles' command of the campaign of 286/5 BC can be explained purely in military terms, given Lysimachus' preoccupations in Europe.

Agathocles' absence from the official documentation of the 280s BC contrasts strikingly both with contemporary Seleucid texts and inscriptions recording Antigonid actions in the period before Ipsus. Demetrius is crowned king at the same time as his father and enjoys cult worship alongside him in many of the cities. Seleucus had given the eastern section of his kingdom to his son Antiochus as early as 294 BC, as well as his own wife Stratonice. Both father and son issue the letter which grants privileges to the Plutonium at Nysa in 281 BC. Babylonian texts give Antiochus the title of "Crown Prince" and show a regnal dating by Seleucus and Antiochus from 292 BC. Ptolemy I's abdication to Philadelphus in 285 BC has already

96) Head, 1880 43, Niese, 1883 I 402. 97) I. Priene no. 14, Sherwin-White, IHS 1985 79-80; Bengtson, 1937 II 227-9. 98) See Ch.6; Plut. Demet. 38 - this marriage was probably politically motivated, aiming to create an impression of continuity and to publicly express Seleucus' confidence in his heir; RC no.9 1.1; Grayson, 1975 26, ARC 11 Obv.5,7,9. Rev.3,6,11; Parker & Dubberstein, 1956 21.
been mentioned. Lysimachus' apparent failure to follow suit in publicly relinquishing a share of power to his eldest son, thus acknowledging him as a partner in his rule, could hardly fail to arouse feelings of frustration and resentment.

The question which then arises is whether these feelings finally found expression in openly subversive action on Agathocles' part. The evidence, unfortunately, is ambiguous. It seems that Agathocles founded a city, named after himself, probably in Mysia, during his father's lifetime. This need not be seen as sinister, although a similar action by Alexander before the death of Philip II has aroused some controversy. One might argue that if a mere like Docimus, Antigonus' governor in Phrygia, was permitted an eponymous foundation, surely such action would be unexceptionable in a prince. On the other hand, the date of Docimus' foundation and his relations with Antigonus at the time are unknown. What is unquestionable is his flexibility in pursuit of ambition. His city-building may represent one aspect of a subversive stance which later found expression in defection to Lysimachus. Our knowledge of Agathopolis comes from coins which carry the city's name and a head on the obverse thought to be a portrait of Agathocles. This of course is not unprecedented; under Achaemenid rule, even the satraps of the empire had issued silver portrait coins. The debate over the "royal monopoly" on the minting of gold

99) See above. 100) Robert, Rev.Phil 1959 172-9 for the city as Mysian. Tarn, 1948 249 thought an eponymous foundation by Alexander while Philip lived would represent "a declaration of independence, the clearest act of rebellion known to the ancient world".
101) Diod.XX.107.4, see Ch. 6. 102) Robert, Rev.Phil 1959 172-9.
coinage is not an issue here, since so far the coins from Agathopolis are restricted to bronze. More disturbing, perhaps, is the fact that the young man depicted on the Agathopolis coins appears to be wearing the diadem, the symbol of royalty worn only by kings. If the head could be securely identified as that of Agathocles, the "portrait" might be seen as a sign of dangerous ambition, particularly since Lysimachus himself avoided the issue of a personal portrait coin. There is, or has been, however, a tendency among scholars to be over enthusiastic in identifying heads on early Hellenistic coins as founder portraits, and the head may simply be that of a deity or hero.

Faced with Lysimachus' reluctance to relinquish power and frustrated in his ambitions for rule, Agathocles may also have come to fear that he would be supplanted by the young Ptolemy. Did he have any real grounds for suspicion on this count? An inscription from Thebes, recording Ptolemy's dedication of a statue of Arsinoe on Lysimachus' behalf, is the only evidence which might suggest Ptolemy's increased prominence at court in the late 280s BC. Seen as part of Lysimachus' diplomatic activity in mainland Greece, the text is generally dated c.284 BC to 281 BC, since Ptolemy, child of a marriage c.299 BC, must have been at least adolescent when he was entrusted with such a task.

103) See e.g. Zahle, 1981 101-9; Hdt.IV.166 (Aryandes); Martin, 1985 119 cites Lampsacus' occasional gold issues under Persian control, apparently without dire consequences. 104) On the diadem, see Ritter, 1965 125-6 and Ch.6; Arr.Anab. VII.22.2-5 suggests that for anyone but the king to wear the diadem was an unlucky portent for the ruler; see Ch. 6. 105) For this restoration and dating, see Robert, BCH 1933 485-90.
There are, however, some epigraphic peculiarities about the text. The lettering, large and evenly sized, with parallel rather than slanting hastae and pronounced apices, does not resemble the style usually associated with the first decades of the third century. On these grounds alone, a parallel might be found in the inscriptions from the Priene archive published c.285 BC, but there is one striking anomaly, the broken cross-bar of alpha, a feature usually seen as characteristic of the late third century and later periods. The possibility that the stone was re-inscribed at a later date was magisterially rejected by Robert, who cited two early parallels for a broken alpha. Though the dating of one of these, the funerary epigram for the Bithynian officer Menas is uncertain, added support for the broken alpha as possible, if rare, in the early third century does come, however, from a more recently published dedication to Pleistarchus from the city of Tralles.

If one remains troubled by the lettering, the only possible alternative is to see the text as a posthumous dedication by Ptolemy in honour of his parents' memory; the formula ὑπὲρ Βασιλέως Αυσιμάχου is not incompatible with such a theory. What is the likely context for such a dedication? After a difficult and dangerous period in which his bid for Macedon failed, Ptolemy finally achieved a position of relative prosperity and influence as

107) Robert, BCH 1933 490; Mendel BCH 1900 380, Peek, 1951 no.1955 — it is still uncertain whether Menas died at Corupedium in 281 BC or at Magnesia in 190 BC; Inschr. Nysa und Tralles I no. 34, Hornblower, 1982 319-20. 108) Fraser, 1957 85 n.21 for Ptolemaic sacrifices offered "on behalf of" (ὑπὲρ) dead ancestors of the living king.
master of estates in the territory of Telmessus in Lycia. In 240 BC, he was granted rule over Telmessus through the favour of Ptolemy III. This might be a possible context for the dedication, with Ptolemy looking forward to a revival of his family's fortunes with a proclamation of its past eminence. There is, however, a major obstacle to acceptance of this hypothesis. Why should Ptolemy of Telmessus dedicate his statue in a Boeotian sanctuary? Coupled with the absence of Arsinoe's cult title, the probability that the dedication is posthumous diminishes. It is probably best to accept the lettering as an exception to the rule. In relation to Agathocles, what is important is whether Ptolemy's Boeotian trip precedes or follows his half-brother's death. The prominence which the stone gives to Arsinoe and her son might reflect the dangerous rise of their faction before Agathocles' death; alternatively it may reflect Ptolemy's new importance afterwards as heir apparent. This cannot be clearly ascertained. In conclusion, while this inscription raises the possibility that Agathocles was being supplanted by Ptolemy before his death, it cannot stand as firm evidence that this was so.

Whatever Ptolemy's position, the evidence discussed above permits the supposition that Lysimachus' great error lay in a

109) Just. XXIV.2.10, Pomp Trog. Prol. lib. 24; Holleaux' identification of Ptolemy of Telmessus with Lysimachus' son (JHS, 1921, 183-98) gains support from Telmessian coins with Lysimachus' lion emblem (Hill, 1923 211). 110) OGIS 55; see also Worrlle, Chiron 1978 201-12 for the suggestion that Arsinoe may have tried unsuccessfully to get Telmessus as a ΔΩΡΟ for her son. The estates may have represented Philadelphus' compromise gift.
reluctance to recognise the claims of the coming generation which spelled out his own mortality. This may have expressed itself in a failure publicly to acknowledge Agathocles' achievements in such a way as to leave the prince confident of his imminent accession. Since Agathocles was a mature and militarily able man, with a strong body of support, frustrated in his ambitions for rule, and perhaps afraid that his long-awaited kingdom would be snatched from him, it is not impossible that he may have tried forcibly to anticipate his inheritance. The accusation of treachery, predictably presented by the sources as trumped-up, may have had some substance, as implied by Strabo's comment that Lysimachus was compelled to kill his son. 111

This reconstruction is, of course, speculative, but it does serve in some measure to explain why Lysimachus, by all accounts a fairly cool customer, with one blow put at risk not only the kingdom he had spent forty years in building, but also his chance, as founder of a successful dynasty, to achieve the immortality that comes with lasting renown.

Following this examination of the mysterious happenings at Lysimachus' court in the last years of his reign and the tensions which may have provoked them, it is time now to look at the impact of these events upon the world outside.

111) Strab.XIII.4.1-2
THE CORUPEDUM CAMPAIGN: SELEUCUS AND THE CITIES

"Lysimachus, however, was justly hated by his subjects because of his son's murder, and Seleucus, learning of these events and considering that it would be easy to deprive him of his power, since the cities were revolting from him, joined battle against him."

Memn. FGrH 434 F. 5.7

Memnon's very cursory account of the events preceding the last great battle of the Diadoch period presents Seleucus' decision to take up arms against his neighbour as the direct consequence of Agathocles' death. A key factor, seemingly, was a wave of feeling against Lysimachus among his Greek subjects, originating, so Memnon implies, in moral outrage at the murder of his heir. Justin lays stress rather on pressure from the surviving members of Agathocles' faction, including leading men from Lysimachus' army, as inspiring Seleucus to make a move which jealousy and ambition were already prompting. Pausanias supports this, though his emphasis is on the part played by Agathocles' widow Lysandra.112

At first sight, there is little that seems contentious in these accounts. To try and isolate one motive for Seleucus' invasion of Asia Minor in 282/1 BC as primary would be futile;113 plausibly all these factors played their part. The suggestion that wide-spread

112) Memn. FGrH 434 F 5.7; Just. XVII.1.7; Paus.I.10.3. 113) Mehl's detailed analysis (1986 284-89) adds little to what the sources say - that envy and ambition had already given Seleucus the will for war; Agathocles' death provided him with the opportunity he was looking for.
revolt among Lysimachus' Greek subjects was prompted by disgust at the King's unnatural murder of his son is, however, questionable, as is the assumption that the cities defected on a large scale before Seleucus' victory at Corupedium.114 Such an idea implies a uniformity of opinion both within each individual city and among the cities as a whole which is belied by a study of the ἱστοεις in Asia Minor at almost any period in their known history. Rather, it has been demonstrated that an enduring feature of that history is an essential pragmatism, a readiness to be flexible and, in the context of struggle between opposing "super powers", to back the likely winner.115 Tied in with this, of course, is the fact that any one city cannot be regarded as a united body, representing one particular opinion or following one policy; instead the ἱστοεις is composed of different groups which pursue their own interests, and whose fortunes wax and wane along with those of their royal patrons and protectors.

Agathocles may have had his supporters in the cities, but it is hardly credible that his personal popularity was sufficient in itself to spark off a united movement of revolt across the kingdom. Modern scholarship favours the idea that the defection of his Greek subjects represents a reaction against Lysimachus' unusually harsh rule, but this is a generalisation which has already been questioned in a previous chapter. What the fragmentary evidence for the period suggests is rather a crisis of confidence in the enduring power of

114) Mehl, 1986 289, 291-2 rightly questions this assumption.
115) See for example Keil, JOAI 1913 235 no.s 11,n,p for Ephesus' shift from Perdiccas to Antipater and Craterus; Arr.Anab. I.18.4 for Milesian wavering between Alexander and Memnon in 333 BC.
Lysimachus' dynasty. It is reasonable to suppose that the news of Agathocles' death travelled through Asia Minor in the following months, carried perhaps by fugitives from Lysimachia en route to Seleucus' Syrian court. Probably these exiles had guest-friends in the Greek cities, who facilitated their journey. For the politicians who had profited from Lysimachus' rule, Agathocles may well have stood as the guarantor of their continuing influence. With his disappearance, and the likely prospect of a succession struggle between the three minor heirs on Lysimachus' death, their futures suddenly looked very much less bright. A change of perception as regards Lysimachus himself may also have taken place. Forty years after Alexander's death, the struggle for the spoils of empire was far from over and the Successors' wars had seen remarkable shifts of fortune among the protagonists in which public opinion had frequently played a crucial part. Accordingly, the importance for a king of maintaining an aura of invincibility and strength cannot be overestimated. It has already been demonstrated that the adherence and continued support of were vital for the achievement and maintenance of kingship. Lysimachus' loss of "friends", first to Agathocles' faction and then to Seleucus is stressed by the sources and must have represented a serious loss of

116) Compare Plut. Them. 26 where Themistocles, on the run with a Persian price on his head, receives aid from his Nicogenes of Aegae. 117) Cassander's Macedon in 294 BC provides an obvious parallel, see Ch. 4. 118) See Ch. 4.
credibility. It is likely, then, that this period began to see the rise of those politicians who, for personal or professional reasons, opposed the men who had been Lysimachus' proteges; naturally they would turn to Seleucus for support. This process can be observed at Ephesus where the existence of a pro-Seleucid faction is attested in the period immediately after the battle of Corupedium. The degree to which such factions were successful in actually seizing control and persuading the 

| άναξ | to defect at this time is, however, uncertain. At Ephesus, οἱ Σελευκιτῶνες clearly lacked sufficient clout to take over the city until their confidence was increased by the news of Seleucus' victory and the imminent arrival of his troops.

Apart from Pergamum, handed over by Phililettaerus, formally at least, some time between the summers of 283 BC and 282 BC, there is no clear evidence for city defections from Lysimachus before his defeat at Corupedium. Ephesus has already been mentioned; Priene's loss of autonomy at the beginning of Antiochus' reign might suggest resistance to Seleucus. Miletus' long-standing friendship with the Seleucid house, her defection to Demetrius in 287 BC and Lysimachus' consequent imposition of financial penalties make it a

119) See Ch. 6; Will, CAH VII 1984 112. Apart from Phililettaerus and Alexander (see above) the identity of these men is unknown; Lysimachus' finance minister Mithres, found in Antigonal captivity at Corinth and Athens c. 280 BC (Epicurus - letter no.14 (Diano, 1946) = Burstein, 1985 no.11) has in consequence been dubbed another Harpalus, but as Gauthier, REG 1979 375-8 points out, the date of his defection is far from clear. 120) Polyaen. VIII.57; the existence of this faction is not in itself a proof of Ephesian suffering under Lysimachus or of Arsinoe's possession of the city as Mehl, 1986 294 suggests. 121) Strab. XIII.4.1, Hansen, 1947 17. 122) Polyaen.VIII.57; see Appendix 4.
likely candidate for revolt. In 283/2 BC, however, its citizens are still concerned to meet these obligations to Lysimachus.\textsuperscript{123} This hardly suggests a context of impending revolution. If Burstein is correct to see a royal stephanephorate as reflecting a recent change of control, then seemingly the city was not in Seleucid hands until 281/0 BC, since Antiochus holds the stephanephorate for the following year.\textsuperscript{124} Samos and Priene, similarly, still look to Lysimachus as their overlord in 283/2 BC, requesting arbitration over the Batinetis affair.\textsuperscript{125} It is of course still possible that these important cities did defect at some point between summer 283 BC and summer 282 BC, if the texts belong to the first months of the magistrate's year of office. The issue of these decrees at the end of that period cannot, however, be ruled out.

THE ROAD TO CORUPEDDIUM

A more likely context for defection among the Greeks might be the period of Seleucus' advance into Asia Minor, when the presence of his troops might prove more persuasive than mere indignation at the news of Agathocles' death. The date at which Seleucus reached Asia Minor is unclear. Mention of the launch of a military campaign involving Greeks in a fragment of the Babylonian Chronicle, dated to the month Sivan in Year 30 of the Seleucid era (June/July 282 BC), seems to suggest that Seleucus had mustered his troops and marched

in the month of Sivan, reaching Asia Minor in the late summer of 282 BC. However, the decisive battle took place only in February 281 BC, an unorthodox season which suggested to Heinen a surprise attack, with Seleucus crossing the Taurus only in winter 282/1 BC. These two pieces of evidence seem at first sight to be irreconcilable; it should, however, be noted that only the left hand side of the Babylonian text survives, leaving a lacuna between the dating formula (Year 30 S.E., month of Sivan) and the description of Seleucus' mobilisation and departure. The launch of the campaign may, therefore, belong to a later month. Possibly, then, Seleucus' attack did catch Lysimachus off guard; alternatively his failure to forestall Seleucus may be explained by difficulties in raising an army of sufficient strength to meet the Syrian king. Though the numbers at Corupedium are unknown, the defection of army commanders mentioned by Justin, combined perhaps with Macedon's enduring manpower shortage, suggests that Lysimachus' military strength was seriously impaired.

It is, however, possible that he had taken some measures in the interim to strengthen his hold on his possessions in Asia. The presence of Lysimachus' fleet, or a section of it, at Ephesus after Corupedium might suggest that advance forces were sent by ship to lend some muscle to his supporters in the key coastal cities. Possibly Queen Arsinoe accompanied them. Such an action might also

make sense of Pausanias' remark—nonsensical in the light of the main army movements—that Lysimachus crossed over into Asia first.\(^{131}\)

Whatever the reason for Lysimachus' delay, Seleucus reached Sardis before the enemy confronted him. Though the Babylonian Chronicle suggests that the Corupedium victory emboldened Seleucus to lay claim to the whole of Lysimachus' kingdom,\(^{132}\) his precise goal at the time of launching his invasion remains unclear. It is futile to spend time discussing Lysimachus' "motivation" for the war. Since the initiative clearly lay with the enemy, he had little choice but to fight if he wished to save his Asian possessions.

Seleucus' route into Asia Minor remains uncertain. The one possible landmark is Cotiaelion in Northern Phrygia, taken by Lysimachus' son Alexander by a double stratagem. His defection to Seleucus makes the campaign of 282/1 BC a likely context for this episode, leading Heinen to suggest that one section of the army took the royal road from Ankyra to Sardis while another went south via the Cilician gates to Western Asia Minor.\(^{133}\) This is perhaps preferable to Corradi's theory that Seleucus took the route which had led him to Ipsus twenty years before, via Cappadocia, which

\(^{131}\) Polyae. VIII.57 for Arsinoe at Ephesus after the battle; there is no need to assume that she fled there from Corupedium; given the existence of a pro-Seleucid faction in Ephesus, it is likely that if she brought news of the defeat or it preceded her, she would have been denied entry to the city; Paus.I.10.3, rejected outright by Heinen, 1972 18,26. \(^{132}\) ABC Chron. 12 Rev.1.3. records his march, in summer 281 BC, on Macedon—"his land"; see also Sherwin-White, JNES 1983 266-7. \(^{133}\) Polyae. VI.12, App.Syr 64, Paus.I.10.3. A context after Corupedium (Mehl, 1986 292) is less likely since stratagem implies the expectation of resistance; Heinen, 1972 27—Grainger, 1990 182 favours the latter of these routes.
relies heavily on the assumption that Seleucus could count on "the sympathy of the Bithynians and cities like Heracleia".\footnote{Corradi, 1929 77.} If these peoples were pro-Seleucid in summer 282 BC, then their sympathy was shortlived; Seleucus faced determined opposition in these very quarters after his victory at Corupedium.\footnote{Mehl, 1986 311-12 suggests that other cities which likewise minted posthumous Lysimachi were possibly members too. He argues plausibly for city autonomy, rather than any specific demand, as the issue at stake.} If Seleucus' army had marched through these lands in 282/1 BC, it seems probable that its presence aroused fear as much as joyful expectation of freedom. Seleucus may have emphasised his role as liberator of the Greeks, a time-honoured practice,\footnote{Mehl, 1986 297 rightly emphasises the uncertainty of a "wave of defection" as Seleucus marched west; Sardis - Polyaen.IV.9. The city's resistance and a position east of Corupedium seem to set this action before the battle (Heinen, 1972 31).} but these events in Northern Asia Minor scarcely reflect an expectation that his rule would be very different from or much preferable to that of Lysimachus.

If the cities of Northern Asia Minor gave Seleucus the thumbs down after Corupedium, how was he received by Lysimachus' Greek subjects before his victory, as he marched towards the coast? Though the evidence is limited, it does not support the view that he was welcomed everywhere with open arms. In the hinterland, both Cotiaeion and Sardis fell by stratagem, the latter only after an unsuccessful siege.\footnote{Welles RC no.9 11.5-8, 10.} It is probable that many of the cities on the coast preferred to adopt their usual tactic of "watch and wait", particularly given the likely proximity of Lysimachus' still
considerable fleet and Seleucus' apparent weakness as regards naval forces. The possibility remains then that defection on a grand scale took place only after Seleucus' victory.

This in turn must cast a different light upon the mushrooming of Seleucid cults among the ἀνατολικὰ on Asia Minor's western coast in the early third century BC, traditionally seen as reflecting a "wave of enthusiasm" for Seleucus, liberator of Lysimachus' oppressed subjects. Habicht likened the reaction to that which met Alexander in 333 BC. The comparison is certainly instructive; it can, however, yield a rather less optimistic conclusion. Arrian's narrative shows that the initial Ionian response to Alexander was uncertain, establishes a close connection between the Granicus victory and the first voluntary submissions, and demonstrates that Alexander was not afraid to take severe reprisals in the event of resistance. That it was the fact of Seleucus' victory which similarly prompted a swift change of stance in the coastal cities is probable. In most cases the cults cannot be precisely dated, but the uncertainty regarding mass defection before Corupedium makes it likely that those whose origin is set in Seleucus' lifetime postdate that victory. At Ilium, moreover, a date in Seleucus' reign rests solely on a connection between the city's anti-tyranny law and

138) Polyaen. VIII. 57, Heinen, 1972 38; Mehl, 1986 297. Seleucus' courtship of Athens on the eve of his invasion of Europe in the summer of 281 BC has been connected with a need for naval support (IG II² 672, Heinen, 1972 44); see also below. 139) Attested at Erythrae, Colophon, Magnesia-on-Maeander, Priene, Ilium and Lemnos. Heinen, 1972 42-44; Habicht, 1970 82-91. 140) Arr.Anab.I.16; 18.1-2,4; 27.4; see also Ch. 5. 141) Habicht, 1970, 82-9 sees the cults at Ilium, Erythrae, Colophon, Priene and Lemnos as probably originating in 281 BC, after Corupedium.
Lysimachus' regime, something which is far from certain.\(^{142}\) Colophon might have been more likely to welcome Seleucus, since its resistance to Lysimachus c. 294 BC may have led to penalties of the sort imposed on Miletus and Erythrae, but acceptance of a Seleucid cult there in 281 BC also implies Colophon's continuing political existence at that date, refuting the belief that Lysimachus, in typically oppressive fashion, "destroyed" the city.\(^{143}\) Doubts about Priene's positive reception of Seleucus in 281 BC have already been raised.\(^{144}\)

There remains Lemnos, seemingly the most clear-cut example of gratitude for Seleucid liberation from Lysimachus, whose harsh treatment of its inhabitants is explicitly stated. Phylarchus tells us that Seleucus received cult honours and libations poured to him as Σατηρ. The credentials of this statement's source - Seleucus' κόλασις on Lemnos - are, however, dubious.\(^{145}\) Furthermore, the context of the island's "liberation" by Seleucus may make it a special case. Performed on the eve of his invasion of Lysimachus' European kingdom, its primary significance is not as an act of benefaction to the oppressed inhabitants of Lemnos, but as a political deal with another power, Athens. Seleucus' return of the Lemnian cities of Hephaistion and Myrina to Athens would presumably guarantee him continued access to Lemnos, sited off the Thracian

142) See Ch. 5. 143) See Ch. 5; Habicht, 1970 88 accepts Colophon's continued existence (Syll. 368, I Priene no. 57, Meritt A.J.Phi 1935 no. 1), but in a sorely weakened state. The suggestion that Seleucus demanded its rebuilding in 281 BC is purely speculative. 144) See Ch. 5 and Appendix 4. 145) Phylarch. FGrH 81 F. 29 = Athen. VI 255; Orth, 1977 37, followed by Burstein, Anc. World 1980 74 n. 5, 1986 133.
Chersonese and therefore of particular strategic importance at this juncture. His hopes of naval support from Athens have already been mentioned.\textsuperscript{146}

The case of Lemnos and the extravagant honours voted to the Seleucid kings by supporters eager to retain the royal favour raises another important issue. Lysimachus' demise and the collapse of his dynasty makes it likely that the evidence we have on events in Asia Minor in this period will be one-sided. Some material, like the manifesto of philhellenism contained in an inscription from Nysa, recording Seleucid benefactions to the Plutonium temple in the period after Corupedium, clearly represents royal propaganda.\textsuperscript{147} Seleucus' role as one in a long line of conquerors acceding to a new kingdom in Asia may also account for some distortion in the presentation of events. Emphasis on a new ruler's beneficence and, by contrast, denigration of his predecessor's regime is a familiar feature of royal propaganda from both the Achaemenid empire and those which preceded it.\textsuperscript{148}

Similarly the "official" nature of the city decrees which constitute most of our evidence must be taken into account. Quite apart from the probability that these were published at the behest of politicians who had come to power through Seleucus' favour, the

\textsuperscript{146} Phylarch. \textit{FGrH} \textit{81 F.} 29; \textit{IG II}² \textit{672}, Schweigert, \textit{Hesperia} \textit{1941} 338-9. Orth, 1977 37 points out that the initiative came from Athens; see above n.138. \textsuperscript{147} Welles \textit{RC} no.9 11.5-10. Welles (56) comments on the contrast drawn by later generations between Seleucus' reign and that of Lysimachus as "clearly the result of his [Seleucus'] deliberate policy". \textsuperscript{148} Kuhrt, 1983 147 for Cyrus modelling his image on that of "the benevolent Assyrian emperor"; 1988 64-66 for the distorting effect of Cyrus' propaganda on modern perceptions of his predecessor Nabonidus.
context in which the Αἰγυπτιακός votes to inscribe certain decisions on stone must also be considered. It is in the city's interest to emphasise royal benefactions and positive relations between king and city. In the present this secures the royal patron's goodwill. Still more importantly it sets a precedent for the city's future treatment at kingly hands.¹⁴⁹ Undercutting the benevolence emphasised by this official documentation is the literary account of Seleucus' response to Heraclea's bid for independence, rightly emphasised by Mehl.¹⁵⁰ For cities which lacked Heraclea's strength and capacity for resistance, cult honours for the victor of Corupedium may represent not so much a comment on Lysimachus' rule as an acknowledgement of Seleucus' very real power to do them, as he chose, either good or harm.¹⁵¹

In conclusion, the evidence for events in the period after Agathocles' death suggests that Lysimachus' loss of support at home led to a shift of feeling in the cities which favoured the rise of Seleucus' supporters. There is, however, little evidence to support a belief in mass defection among his subjects before the battle of Corupedium. Victory turned the tide of city feeling in Seleucus' favour. Even then, events in northern Asia Minor, combined with the propagandist and selective nature of the evidence warn against a too-ready acceptance of the traditional view that the cities' reaction to Seleucus was one of sincere gratitude towards a saviour.

¹⁴⁹ For the selectivity governing the publication of decrees on stone, see Sherwin-White, JHS 1985 74-5, 80; e.g. ΡΟ. no. 14.11.5-7, no. 15 11.22-3. ¹⁵⁰ Mehl, 1986 308. ¹⁵¹ See Ch. 6 for cult honours as acknowledging the king's "godlike" powers.
THE LAST BATTLE

"Ultimum hoc certamen conmilitonum Alexandri fuit..."

Justin XVII.1.9

For Justin, the battle of Corupedium, where the armies of Seleucus and Lysimachus met in February 281 BC, is significant mainly as an illustration of the lengths to which men are driven by ambition. A contrast is drawn between the advanced age of the combatants and the youthful keenness of their aspirations towards ever greater empire. With a glorious over-simplification which would have had any self-respecting Ptolemy turning in his grave, Justin reduces the Hellenistic world to a stage occupied by two men - quippe cum orbem terrarum duo soli tenerent - each striving for domination of the whole.152 This, and the emphasis on Lysimachus and Seleucus as Alexander's companions recalls Hieronymus' presentation of events from 323 BC to 301 BC as the story of a struggle to re-unite Alexander's empire under one man's rule.153

While allowances must be made for Justin's over-developed sense of drama, which leads him to see the battle purely in terms of a great tragic set piece, this presentation of the issues at stake should not be rejected out of hand. The enormous increase in Lysimachus' power in the 280s BC had caused his fellow-rulers considerable unease as to what his next step might be; similarly,

152) Just.XVII.1.11-12. Mehl, 1986 287 sees Trogus' presentation of events as influenced by the great power struggles in the last decades of the Roman Republic. 153) See Ch.3.
Seleucus' actions in Asia Minor after Corupedium lend support to the belief that he may have aspired to ἄλωα. He showed himself determined to secure acknowledgement of his sovereignty in all quarters, and despite signs of reluctance among his troops pressed ahead with the invasion of Europe and his claim to Macedon's throne. The later claim of his successors to a historic right to Lysimachus' whole kingdom presumably reflects the tenor of Seleucid propaganda in 281 BC.165

Unfortunately for the modern historian, Justin's preoccupation with Corupedium as a moral example leads him to omit any details regarding the actual battle! We are told nothing of numbers, terrain, arrangement of troops, nor of the tactics which brought Seleucus victory, only that Lysimachus died in action - moriens non instrenue. Memnon adds only the information that the King fell at the hands of a Heracleote, Malacon, presumably an exile or a mercenary.166 Evidence independent of the literary tradition has secured the dating and site of the battle. A Babylonian king-list dates Seleucus' death "in the land of the Khani" to the period between August 25th and September 24th 281 BC. Since Justin tells us that seven months elapsed between Corupedium and his assassination, Corupedium must have been fought in February 281 BC.167 It seems

154) See above; Corradi, 1929 79-81 criticises his insistence on the submission of powers like Heracleia and the Bithynian and Cappadocian dynasts as unrealistic; ABC Chron.12 Rev.1.4 for mutiny among Seleucus' troops en route to Europe; ibid.,1.3 for "Macedon, his land", Memn. FGrH for Seleucus' wish to end his days in Macedon. 155) e.g. App.Syr.12, Liv.XXXV.16, Polyb. XVIII.51.4. 156) Just.XVII.2.1; Memn. FGrH 434 F. 5.7; Mehl, 1986 299 makes the point that an official Heracleote contingent is precluded by Arsinoe's control of the city at this time. 157) Sachs & Wiseman, Iraq 1954 202-205; Mehl, 1986 298.
preferable to accept the precise information of this Babylonian text against another from Uruk whose dating by Seleucus' reign suggests that news of his death had not reached Babylon in December 281 BC. Dating by the regnal years of a king who may have died even several years before is not an unknown phenomenon and one which seems particularly to occur in periods of transition and dynastic instability.\textsuperscript{159} An epitaph for a Bithynian officer, Menas, killed in a battle at Κόπον Νεσίου, by the waters of the River Phrygios, together with Polyaenus' account of resistance at Sardis preceding the battle, have established its site as the well-used plain to the west of Sardis.\textsuperscript{160} As yet further evidence which might add to our knowledge of the battle is slight and too uncertain by its nature to yield any firm conclusions. Whether, for instance, Bithynians and/or elephants made a significant contribution to Seleucus' victory remains uncertain!\textsuperscript{160}

The last evidence concerning Lysimachus, like the events of his final years, smacks strongly of legend and literary convention. The tale of his faithful hound which stayed beside his body on the field and then hurled itself onto his pyre clearly became proverbial among Roman writers. It recalls, among others, the story of Xanthippus' dog, equally famous for fidelity.\textsuperscript{161} On a grimmer note, Pausanias

tells us that the hatred of his daughter-in-law Lysandra pursued him after death; like Polynices, or the Argive warriors in Euripides' Supplices, Lysimachus was in danger of being denied burial. Seleucus' sense of propriety, combined with the entreaties of Lysimachus' son Alexander prevailed against Lysandra's desire for vengeance. If Lysimachus had dreamed of burial in a hero's tomb at Ephesus, then it was not to be. Instead his body began the long journey back to Thrace for burial near Lysimacheia, perhaps along the same road which had taken him to his satrapy, at the start of his great adventure over forty years before.

162) Soph. Antig 11.25-30, Eurip.Suppl. 11.120-130; Paus.1.10.4; presumably feelings of filial piety had overcome Alexander's previous resentment (see above). 163) For Lysimachus as the possible commissioner of the Belevi Mausoleum, see Ch. 6; Paus.1.10.4; App. Syr. 64.
APPENDIX 1 - LYSIMACHUS' THESSALIAN ORIGIN

An article by Merker¹ has challenged both the idea of Lysimachus' Thessalian origin and the identification of his father with Philip II's crony Agathocles. Analysing Arrian's list of trierarchs in the Indika,² Merker argues that while Lysimachus' fellow trierarchs from Pella all appear to have Macedonian names, the trierarchs whose origin is clearly Greek all hail from Amphipolis. He infers from this that Philip's "policy" was to grant new citizenship only in Amphipolis; as a resident of Pella, Lysimachus could not be the son of a Greek father. Additional evidence adduced in favour of Macedonian origin are the statements of Justin and Pausanias to that effect and Lysimachus' own stress on it in a propaganda war against Pyrrhus.³ Finally he makes the point that the probable birth dates of Lysimachus and his brother Alcimachus (361 BC and pre 370 BC respectively) precede the earliest possible date for the Thessalian Agathocles' elevation to Macedon's aristocracy - that is, Philip's accession in 359 BC. Merker supposes that Agathocles' sons' Thessalian origin would be made explicit in their nomenclature in the sources. Since there is no sign of this, Lysimachus' father cannot be the Thessalian nurgn of Theopompus' account.

Various objections can be raised to this. Firstly the validity of generalising a "royal policy" from so small a statistical sample

¹ Merker, Chiron 1979 31-35. ² Arr.Ind.18.3-10 = Nearch. FGrH 133 F.1. 18.3-10. ³ Paus. I.9.5; Just.XV.3.1; see Ch. I.
- 33 names in all⁴ - might be questioned. The idea of such a blanket policy perhaps owes more to a modern system of bureaucratic administration than to the realities of life in Macedon in the fourth century BC. It makes no allowance, for instance, for personal feeling as the motive for action. Even if one were to accept the hypothesis that Philip generally assigned new citizens to Amphipolis, his attested affection for Agathocles⁵ might have prompted him to keep him and his family close at hand in Pella.

The evidence of Justin and Pausanias, and Lysimachus' own emphasis on Macedonian birth c 285 BC must be seen in their correct context. As will be argued, below, it is quite possible that Lysimachus was born after his father had been granted land in Pella. In this case, as a "second-generation" immigrant his Macedonian status is not in question; nor need it negate the possibility of a Thessalian father. Alternatively he was born Thessalian, "becoming" Macedonian in his infancy or youth. In this case, given the suggestion in Plutarch that Macedonian origin was deemed important as a claim to kingship there, it would naturally be in the interest of Lysimachus himself and sources which represent the "official record" of his reign to present him as Macedonian, even if it were not technically true at the time of his birth. Merker himself admits that Justin's statement occurs in the context of "a passage of immoderate praise for Lysimachus".⁶ The context for Pausanias' comment is the lion-taming episode discussed in chapter one; his

⁴ Some of the evidence is in any case unclear; the Macedonian identity of 2 of the Pellan trierarchs is "probable", not certain. The idea that new citizens were invariably consigned to Amphipolis rests on 3 names. ⁵ Athen. VI 259-60. ⁶ Merker, Chiron 1979 33.
account of this is sufficiently close to that of Justin to suppose a common, and apologetic, source. It should also be remembered that when Lysimachus himself wields the weapon of Macedonian birth it is in the last years of his life, probably more than two generations after Philip's grant of citizenship to Agathocles. What matters in this context is the Macedonian perception of his family as one closely associated with the Argead house and its achievements - it is not only Lysimachus' Macedonian status but his connection with Alexander that is stressed. If anyone remembered his father, then the fact of Agathocles' boon-companionship with Philip probably outweighed the memory that he had originally come from Thessaly, particularly when Lysimachus' rival, the Epirote Pyrrhus, was so much more obviously a "foreign intruder".

Finally there is the question of nomenclature and the identity of Agathocles. Merker places Lysimachus' birth in 361 BC, favouring Hieronymus' evidence over that of Justin or Appian who imply a date in 355 BC or 351 BC respectively. While Hieronymus' reputation as a historian of high standing is not to be denied, he is not infallible when it comes to the ages and birth dates of his protagonists. In the case of Demetrius Pollorctes, despite a position in the Antigonid household which might be thought to afford him accurate knowledge, Hieronymus' sums do not add up.

Similarly, if, as is generally thought, Hieronymus is Justin's source for Lysimachus' last days,\(^{14}\) then he has recorded two disparate figures for Lysimachus' age in 281 BC and hence his birth date. Beloch\(^{15}\) accepted Justin's figure as representing an average of three uncertain numbers. The fact that his is not a suspiciously nice round number is perhaps another argument in its favour! Accordingly it cannot be argued with certainty that Lysimachus' birth preceded his father's Macedonian citizenship.

That the same is true for his brother Alcimachus is perhaps less likely, but Merker's belief that foreign birth must invariably reflect itself in nomenclature in the literary sources seems in any case to be misconceived.\(^{16}\) The case of Nearchus, Alexander's admiral, similarly a naturalised Macedonian, proves the point. Though his Cretan lineage is mentioned at a later point in the Indika,\(^{17}\) in the trierarch list he is named only as "son of Androtimus"; in the Anabasis moreover, he is first introduced as "Nearchus son of Androtimus" and thereafter referred to only by his first name,\(^{18}\) with no mention of his Cretan origin. The description of Alcimachus in the same work - his one and only appearance in the literary sources \(^{19}\) - by name and patronymic forms an exact parallel. The fact that there is no reference to his Thessalian origin here does not automatically make him Macedonian.

\(^{14}\) Alternatively the source may be Lysimachus' court historian Onesicritus (see Ch.1) who might be thought as least as well placed to get his facts right. \(^{15}\) Beloch, 1925 129. \(^{16}\) See Ch.1 for Alcimachus' important diplomatic role in the mid 330s BC. \(^{17}\) Arr.Ind. 18.10. \(^{18}\) Arr. Anab. III.6; IV.7,30; V.5; VI.3,6,13,20,21,28; VII.5,19,25. \(^{19}\) See Ch 1. n. 17 for epigraphic references.
ΑΓ ΟΗΙ ΤΥΧΗΙ ΟΡΚΟΣ ΕΠΙΜΕΝΗΙ
βερενικης και τάν γιονεπειάν
ετοίοιε γιαίνον παρεδοκέν
επιμενήν σπαρτοκαί καί τά
γι'αρχοντα αυτοκαί σπαρτοκος
επι τούτοις τα Γίστα εδοκέν
γι'αρχοντα αιβερενικης και τοις
γιοις αυτης ερριξιμεικαι και θρει
και σατοκαί και ζαδαλικαι τοις
esομενοις δεδοσοαι επιμενη
τοκριαυτον και ταυγαρχυναι
υτοι εις αραντα τον βιου
αρεχα σοαειδει και επιμενην την
πειαν σπαρτοκαί ινοις αν
σπαρτοκος συντασσει κασο αν
δυνηται ειςαγαγετας αν δε οι
βερενικης γιοιεκτου ερου τον
θειμ ταν ζαμοπαικικην εφοι
δικησουει επιμενην κατα
μησι άτροπομ μηθειαλα
αριατω τας καν σπαρτοκαί αυτον
και ταυγαρχυναι αυτου μηδε
ταν ναρχονταλ μηδεμ ερη
αιειςους αν μηθει αδικουντι
γιαν δε τα φαινη και αδικουνερ
του τον εγναμεν ευτια σπαρτοκος
ton δε ορκοντα-υτον γραφηναί
ις τι ευζοιν
και αιανατεοναι
μεγαβυρι εις τοφευριονκαι
στηναργοραρ παρατομ βαμον τον
το 'απολακνος εν δε ευθυνοπολει εις το
εριαν οεταλ ταν μεγαλαν και
στηναργοραν εντιτου διονυσοι ι
παρατομ βαμον ετορκοεσιν δε και
= 'μενουειεν τοις ερκοεσ ειν αυτ
αρχοντα δε βερενικης
ειςα αυτοιου σαρχαιου τερκαυ

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The Great Inscription from Seuthopolis (IGBR 1731)

ΑΓΑΘΗ ΤΥΧΗ ΟΡΚΟΣ ΕΠΙΜΕΝΗ
ΒΕΡΕΝΙΚΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΥΙΩΝ ΕΠΕΙΔΗ
ΣΕΥΘΗΣ ΥΓΙΑΙΝΩΝ ΠΑΡΕΔΩΚΕΝ
ΕΠΙΜΕΝΗΝ ΣΠΑΡΤΟΚΩΙ ΚΑΙ ΤΑ
5 ΥΠΑΡΧΟΝΤΑ ΑΥΤΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΣΠΑΡΤΟΚΟΣ
ΕΠΙ ΤΟΥΤΟΙΣ ΤΑ ΠΙΣΤΑ ΕΔΩΚΕΝ
{ΑΥΤΩΙ ΔΕΔΟΧΘΑΙ ΒΕΡΕΝΙΚΗ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΙΣ
ΥΙΟΙΣ ΑΥΤΗΣ ΕΒΡΗ [ΥΖΙΕΑΜΕΙ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΡΕΙ
ΚΑΙ ΣΑΤΟΚΩΙ ΚΑΙ ΣΑΔΑΛΙΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΙΣ
10 [ΠΡΟΣ?] ΕΞΟΜΕΝΟΙΣ ΔΕΔΟΧΘΑΙ ΕΠΙΜΕΝΗΝ}
{ΣΠΑΡΠΟΙ ΑΥΤΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΑ ΥΠΑΡΧΟΝΤΑ ΤΑ
{ΑΥΤΟΥ ΕΙΣ ΑΠΑΝΤΑ ΤΟΝ ΒΙΟΝ Κ]}
{ΠΑΡΕΧΕΘΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΕΙΣ ΕΠΙΜΕΝΗΝ ΤΗΝ}
{ΧΙΡΕΙΑΝ ΣΠΑΡΤΟΚΩΙ ΗΟΙΣ ΑΝ
15 ΣΠΑΡΤΟΚΟΣ ΣΥΝΤΑΣΗΝ] ΚΑΘ Ο ΑΝ
ΔΥΝΗΤΑΙ ΕΣΑΙΑΓΓΕΛΩΝ ΤΑ ΔΕ ΟΙ
{ΒΙΕΡΕΠΙΚΗΣ ΥΙΟΙ ΕΚ ΤΟΥ ΙΕΡΟΥ ΤΟΝ
ΘΕΩΝ ΤΝ ΣΑΜΟΘΡΑΙΚΙΩΝ ΕΦ ΩΙ ΜΗ ?]
ΑΔΙΚΗΣΟΥΣ ΕΠΙΜΕΝΗ ΚΑΤΑ
20 [ΜΗΘΕΝ] Α ΤΡΟΠΟΝ ΜΗΘΕΝ ΑΛΑΛΑ
{ΠΑΡΑΔΟΤΟΣΑΝ ΣΠΑΡΤΟΚΩΙ ΑΥΤΩΝ
ΚΑΙ ΤΑ ΥΠΑΡΧΟΝΤΑ ΑΥΤΟΥ ΜΗΔΕ
ΤΩΝ ΥΠΑΡΧΟΝΤΩΝ ΜΗΔΕΜ ΠΕΡΙ
ΑΙΡΕΙΣ ΕΙΣΘΕΘΑΝ ΜΗΘΕΝ ΑΔΙΚΟΥΝ ΤΙ
25 ΕΧΑΝ ΔΕ ΤΙ ΦΑΙΝΗΤΑΙ ΑΔΙΚΩΝ ΥΠΕΡ
ΤΟΥΤΩΝ ΕΓΓΝΩΜΩΝ ΕΣΤΟ ΣΠΑΡΤΟΚΟΣ
ΤΟΝ ΔΕ ΟΡΚΟΝ ΤΙΟΥΤΟΝ ΓΡΑΦΗΝΑΙ [ ]
ΕΙ Σ] ΣΤΙ ΗΛΑΣ] ΑΙΘΙΝΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΑΝΑΘΘΗΝΑΙ
{ΕΙΜ ΜΕΓ ΚΑΒΥΛΑΙ ΕΙΣ ΤΟ ΦΩΣΦΡΟΝ ΚΑΙ
30 [ΕΙΙΣ ΤΗΝ ΑΓΟΡΑΝ ΠΑΡΑ ΤΟΝ ΒΩΜΟΝ ΤΟΝ
ΤΟΥΥ] ΑΠΟΛΛΑΘΟΙΣ ΕΝ ΔΕ ΣΕΥΘΟΠΟΛΕΙ ΕΙΣ ΤΟ
[ΙΕΡΟΝ] ΤΙΟΝ ΘΕΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΜΕΓΑΛΩΝ ΚΑΙ [ ]
{ΕΙΙΣ ΤΗΝ ΑΓΟΡΑΝ ΕΝ ΤΩΙ ΔΙΟΝΥΣΟΥ ΙΕΡΩΙ]
ΠΑΡΑ ΤΟΝ ΒΩΜΟΝ ΕΥΟΡΚΟΥΣΙΝ ΔΕ ΚΑΙ
35 [ΕΙΜ] ΜΕΝΟΥΣΙΝ ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΟΡΚΟΙΣ ΕΙΗ ΑΥΤΟΙΟΙΣ
[ ] ΔΩΙΟΓ ΚΑΙ ΑΜΕΙΝΟΝ ΠΑΡΑ ΔΕ ΒΕΡΕΝΙΚΗΣ
[ ] ΕΙΝΑΙ ΑΥΤΩΙ [ΤΙΟΥΣ ΑΡΧΑΙΟΥΣ ΟΡΚΟΥΙΣ]
APPENDIX III - PREPELAUS.

Prepelaus makes his first appearance in 315 BC, successfully winning over Alexander, Polyperchon's son, to Cassander's side. In the following year he co-operates with the satrap Asander in Caria. Antigonus' letter to Scepsis shows him taking a major part, as ambassador with full powers, representing Cassander and Lysimachus, in the negotiations leading to the Peace of 311 BC. In 303 BC he is a leading light among Cassander's generals in Greece; entrusted with command of the key position of Corinth, it is likely that he upheld an oligarchic government there, since his expulsion from the city in that year was effected by Demetrius with the aid of "a faction", presumably democratic.¹

Clearly his rather ignominious departure from Corinth did not substantially damage Cassander's regard for him. As ἀπεσταλὼν on the Asian campaign, it is likely that officially he was subordinate to Lysimachus, but the latter evidently trusted him enough to grant him considerable scope for independent action in both the military and administrative spheres.² His part in the events of 311 BC make it almost certain that he was already well known to Lysimachus and it is possible that their association continued after Cassander's death in 297 BC. An inscription from Delphi which grants ἀποστασία and full accompanying honours to Prepelaus³ has been plausibly dated to 287 BC, a year in which Delphi was controlled by the Aetolians, who were on good terms with Lysimachus.⁴

1) Diod. XIX.64.3, 68.5; Welles RG I = OGIS 5 11. 10-11, 28; Diod. XX.102.1, 103.1,4. See also Ziegler, PW XXII 2 1954 cols. 1836-8. 2) Bengtson, 1937 I 210. 3) Bourget, BCH 1911 486. 4) Syll³ 378; Flacelière, 1937 81; see also Chs. 4 and 6.

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APPENDIX IV - LYSIMACHUS AND THE PROBLEM OF PRIENEAN AUTONOMY

The first years of Seleucid rule show Priene to have lost the autonomous status granted by Alexander, and emphatically stated at the head of city decrees in the following years.\(^1\) The evidence of Sextus Empiricus suggests that autonomy was restored at some point during the reign of Antiochus I, apparently at the request of a citizen high in the king's favour.\(^2\) There is no suggestion that autonomy was restored at the time of Antiochus' accession. Logically this might suggest that Priene lost her autonomy at Seleucid hands,\(^3\) perhaps as a consequence of failing to greet Seleucus I with sufficient enthusiasm in 282/1 BC. This would not be inconsistent with the evidence for positive relations with Lysimachus in 286/5 BC, when Priene votes the king cult honours in return for his protection and is praised by him for her loyalty. It is possible that on this occasion he also granted the city certain important privileges.\(^4\) The fact that the διαφήμισις published these communications in an archive recording decisions favourable to Priene\(^5\) argues against the dismissal of this evidence as mere empty formulae, concealing a relationship based on hypocrisy and fear. Burstein, moreover, has argued convincingly for the actual enjoyment by Priene of a considerable degree of local autonomy in the decade preceding these decrees.\(^6\) Formally, however, he believes that the city was deprived of autonomous status during this period, on

\(^{1}\) L. Priene nos 1, 2, 3, 4(1), 6, 7. \(^{2}\) Sext. Emp. Adv. Gramm. 1.13. \(^{3}\) As argued by Bikermann, 1938 137. \(^{4}\) See below. \(^{5}\) Burstein, 1986 137-8. \(^{6}\) Sherwin-White, JHS 1985 69, 73-5, 78.
Lysimachus' order. The context proposed for this loss of autonomy, the probable resistance of the pro-Demetrian government to Lysimachus in 294 BC, is plausible, but it is doubtful whether this state of affairs continued throughout Lysimachus' reign into the early years of Seleucid rule as is often assumed.

Quite apart from the likelihood that his pose of "liberator" would have impelled Antiochus on his accession to reverse any such decision of Lysimachus, there is the evidence of Lysimachus' letter to Priene. Thanking the citizens for the honours voted to him and for their loyalty in 286 BC, the king appears to be acknowledging, at the point where the text breaks off, some sort of request on the part of the Prieneans. Sherwin-White follows Welles in supposing that the citizens asked for some kind of privileges in return for their recently demonstrated fidelity. Going one step further, she suggests from the juxtaposition of the Lysimachus decrees with the "Alexander Edict", inscribed at the same time, that what was asked for and granted may even have been a return to the status conferred by Alexander. If correct, then Prienean gratitude may have been sufficient to keep the city loyal in 282/1 BC, despite the fact that in the interim the citizens' attempt to pull a fast one on Lysimachus with an unjust claim to Samian land had misfired. Orth sees this incident as the end of the honeymoon period, with defection to Seleucus the following year, reflected in Priene's

7) Burstein, Anc.World 1980 74 n.15, following Orth,1977 103-5. 8) Welles RC 1934 44; Sherwin-White, JHS 1985 78. 9) Sherwin-White, ibid. 10) Welles, RC no.7, see also Chs. 4 and 7.
erection of statues to Nicator and his son some time in the 270s BC.\textsuperscript{11} It is, however, equally possible that the city remained loyal to Lysimachus in 282/1 BC, was deprived of autonomy by Seleucus I as a result, and erected statues of the Seleucid kings to express gratitude at Antiochus' subsequent reversal of the decision.

\textsuperscript{11) Orth, 1977 105, \textit{I. Priene} no.18 = OGIS 215; Sherwin-White, \textit{JHS} 1985 80 makes the point that the decision was not totally adverse for Priene, which was awarded the Karion fort and its \textit{X₄ρ⟩}; 87 n.145 for Prienean acceptance of Lysimachus' decision.}
APPENDIX V - THE INSCRIPTIONS

1) Antigonus' letter to Scepsis  \text{RC} 1 = \text{OGIS} 5

2) Ephesus honours Euphronius  \text{Syll}^a 353 = \text{Inschr.Eph.} 1449

3) Ephesus honours Archestratus  \text{OGIS} 9 = \text{Inschr.Eph.} 1452

4) The Ionian \text{koivov} honours Hippostratus  \text{Syll}^a 368

5) The Ionian \text{koivov} honours Hippodamus  \text{SEG} 1985 926

6) Priene honours Lysimachus  \text{OGIS} 11 = \text{I.Priene} 14

7) Lysimachus' letter to Priene  \text{RC} 6 = \text{OGIS} 12 = \text{I.Priene} 15

8) Lysimachus' (?) letter concerning the Pedieis  \text{RC} 8 = \text{I.Priene} 16

9) Delos honours the Spartan Demaratus  \text{Syll}^a 381

10) Cult honours for Lysimachus at Samothrace  \text{Syll}^a 372

11) Athens honours Philippides  \text{IGII}^2 657 = \text{Syll}^a 374

12) Lysimachus' letter to Samos  \text{RC} 7 = \text{OGIS} 13 = \text{I.Priene} 500

13) Lysimachus' grant of land to Limnaeus

14) Letter of Antiochus I (?) to Erythrae  \text{RC} 15 = \text{OGIS} 223

15) Letter of Ptolemy II to Miletus  \text{RC} 14 = \text{I.Milet.} 139 (11.1-16)
40 λίθον δὲν ὑποκινήθηκε, µὴ µένος αὐτοῦ συν[ορκίστηκε], καὶ διὰ τὴν οἰκετείαν τὴν ἑκάτερ[χωρουσαν ἡμῖν πρὸς αὐτὸν, ἀµα δὲ καὶ ὡς δρόντες καὶ[τ]οῖς ἄλλοις συμμερίζοντος ἐνθολου[µένους ὧπο τε τῆς στρατεύ[σης καὶ τῶν Λισθο[ύλον], ὀµήθη καλῶς ἔχει συνυγόμελα καὶ τάς δήµωσ[ις ποίσασθαι καὶ πρὸς τούτων. συνομολογηθήσας δὲ ἀπεστείλει 'Αριστο[δή]μος καὶ Λισθοῦλος καὶ Πηγήνιαν οὗτο[ι τ]ε δὴ παρεγένοντο λαβόντες τὰ πιστὰ καὶ ο[ί]
1 ἔδοξεν τῷ Βουλή καὶ τῷ δήμῳ ὁ Προγείτων εἶπεν· Ἰδοὺ οἱ κοινοὶ ταῦτα καταστάθησιν· διελέξθησαν ταῦτα ὑπὲρ Εὐφρονίου πολιτείας, δεδόχθαί τῷ Βουλή·

3 ἐπείδη ἔφη Εὐφρόνιος ἵνα γνωρίζω ὑπὸ τῆς γερουσίας καὶ τῶν ἐπικλητών ὑπὲρ Εὐφρονίου πολιτείας, δεδύσθαι τῷ Βουλή·

4 ἀποσταλείς προς πρὸς ἐν τῇ γερουσίᾳ καὶ τῶν ἐπικλητῶν ὑπὸ τὸ στάσμα τῶν ἐρωτῶν καὶ τῆς ἀτελείας·

5 ὡς τῇ θεῶι συνδιοικηθὲν μετά τῆς προσβεβλήματος ὡς ἢ ἂν ἀπέλευσα τῇ θεῶι, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἐν ἄπασι καιροῖς διατελεῖ.

6 χρήσιμως ὡς καὶ κοινῆς τῷ δήμῳ καὶ ἱδίαι τοῖς ἐντυγχάνονσι τῶν πολιτῶν· ἐγνώθησα ἐπανέσαι τῇ ἐν Εὐφρονίου εὐνοίᾳ ἐνεκεν

7 ἦν ἔχει περὶ τὸ τὸ Βουλή καὶ τῇ πόλιν, καὶ δοῦναι αὐτῶν πολιτείαν ἐφίκηκαν καὶ ὑμοὶ ἀυτῶι καὶ ἐγκύνοις, ἀναγράφαι δὲ αὐτῶι τῇ

8 πολιτείᾳ εἰς τὸ τὸ Βουλή ἢ ἁρτέμιδοις οὖ καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ πολιτείαι ἀναγραφεῖται εἰς τῇ ἐπικλήρωσι δὲ αὐτῶι καὶ εἰς ψυλήν καὶ εἰς

9 χιλιαστῶν, ὡς ἀν ἐδώσω πάντες ὑπὸ τὸ δήμος ὁ Ἐφεσιοῖς τοὺς εὐεργετῶν τοὺς εὐεργετῶν τοὺς τὸ τὸ Βουλή καὶ τῇ πόλιν τιμαὶ δωρεαῖς ταῖς προσποροῖσιν.

10 ἔλαξε ψυλήν Ἔφεσιοῖς, χιλιαστῶν Ἀργαδεῦς

EPHESUS HONOURS ARCHESTRATUS OGIS 9 = Inschr. Eph. 1452

1 ἔδοξεν τῷ Βουλή καὶ τῷ δήμῳ Μπαράς ἐπείν ἐπείδη 'Αρχεστράτου Κινκώνος Μακεδών, οἴκετος ἐν τῷ βασαλίῳ διανομή

2 ἐν κλαδιευναίς στρατηγός, πιστὰ περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν παρᾶχηται εἰς τὰ τοῦ βασαλίῳ πολίματα καὶ τῇ πόλει τὰ πλοία τὰ στηριανὰ διελέκτη, δεδΥσθαί τῷ Βουλή καὶ τῷ δήμῳ· ἐπαινεῖται αὐτὸν διελέξθηκεν καὶ εὐνοίας ἦν ἔχει περὶ τὸν βασαλία

3 καὶ τὸν δήμον τὸν Ἐφεσιοῦν, καὶ στεφανίζεται χορευόντα στεφάνιον, καὶ ἀναγγείλει τοῖς υἱοῖς τοῦ τοῦ δημοῦ ἐπικλῆσθαι τοῦ τοῦ δημοῦ τοῖς τοῖς δημοῦ· δοθήσεται αὐτῶι καὶ πολιτείας ἐφίκηκαν καὶ ὑμοὶ· ἀναγράφαι δὲ

4 καὶ εἰς ψυλῆν καὶ χιλιαστῶν· εἴναι δὲ αὐτῶι καὶ προσβλήματος τοῦ τοῦ αὐτῶι· ἀναγράφαι δὲ τὸ τὸ δήμος·

5 τοῦ τοῦ νεωποιῆσας εἰς τοῦ τοῦ 'Ἀρχεστράτου δοὺν καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ πολιτείαι ἀναγγείλεσθαι εἰς τὸν δήμος ὁ Ἐφεσιοῖς τιμάς τοὺς εὐεργετοῦντας αὐτῶι δωρεαῖς ταῖς προσποροῖσιν. έλαξε ψυλῆν — , χιλιαστῶν — — — —
THE IONIAN KOINON HONOURS HIPPOSTRATUS Syll. 368

Εἴδοσεν Ἰάωνον τῶι κοινῶι | ἔπειτα Ἰππόστρατος Ἰπποδόμου Μιλήσιος; 2
φύλοις ἀν τοῦ Βασιλέως Δωσιμάχου καὶ στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῶν πόλεων

5 τῶι Ἰάωνωι  ἐκτελεῖς καὶ φιλανθρόπως καὶ ἴδος ἴδε ἴδες τῶι πόλεωι καὶ κοινῆς ἰσόμενος διαστελεῖ, ἀγαθῆς τύχης, διεδόθη τῶι κοινῶι τῶι Ἰάωνωι, ἑπικέντας Ἰππόστρατον Ἰπποδόμου ἀγάπης ἐνεκεὶ καὶ εὐνοιᾶς ἄν ἔχων διαστελεῖ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸ τὸ Ἰάωνων,

10 καὶ εἶναι αὐτὸν ἀτελῆ πάντων ἐν ἧπερ πόλεις ταίς Ἰάωνοι ταίς αὐτῶν διὰ ἴδιον τῶι Ἰππόστρατοῦ σταθῇ ταῖς τάχις, ἐναὶ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες εἰδῶς ὅτι ἴδους τοῖς καλοῖς καὶ ἀγαθοῖς ἀνάρξας καὶ χρῆσαι παρεγεγερμένους ταῖς πόλεισι τιμῶν διωρεῖς ταῖς προσκοίμοις; ἀπενεχθὲς ἐν ἐκάστῳ τῶι βουλητῶι τα ἔγνωμαν Ἰάωνοι, εἰς ταῖς ἴδιαι πόλεις, ὅπως ὑπάρχῃ.

20 ἐν τοῖς δημοσίοις ἀναγεγραμμένα τα ἔγνωσμα ὑπὸ Ἰάωνοι τὸ διὸ ἐν ὑπάρχῃ ἡ ἀναγράφεις τοῦ βάθρον τῆς εἰκόνος τῆς Ἰππόστρατοῦ ἐκ Πανιωνίως καὶ ἐκάστην τῶι πόλεωι παρὰ αὐτής εἰς στήλην λιθίην, πόλεις ἕρμεθράν, Μίλητος, Ἀρκινέαι 11.

II Milesiarum decreta.

25 ἔπεις Τελεσίου Παντήμου Ἰππόστρατος, ὅ τοι τὴν πρήσθαμα τὸ ἐκ Πανιωνίου κωφοθεν ἔδει τῷ Ἰππόστρατῳ τῇ δήμῳ ἀναγράφεις εἰς τὸ δημόσιον ἕρμεθραν δὲ καὶ ἐπιστάται τῆς εἰκόνος τῆς Ἰππόστρατοῦ τοῦ Ἰπποδόμου κατὰ τόν ὑπήρξαμαι τὸ πρήσθαμα ὑπὸ Ἰάωνοι Ἀρχικόντος Ἀριστοκράτου, Ἀρκινέας Ὀρεάτου.

III ἔπεις Τελεσίου Λαμνώνος. ἔδει τῇ βασιλίσσῃ Ἡρώδηι Πολίου εἰπεν ὅτι αἰ τὴν ἰπποκράτειαν Ἰππόστρατοι τοῦ Ἰπποδόμου ἦν ὑπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶι Ἰάωνοι συνελίεναι κατὰ ταῖς ὅτι δεδοχθὲς τῇ βουλῇ τοῦ τεχνηποίου ἐπιμεληθῆς καὶ ἀπομακρύνθη τῇ ἐργασίᾳ τῆς ὑπερήφανοι καὶ τῆν ἀναγράφην τῶν γνωσθέντων, τῶν ἐκ ταῖς ταξιν τοῦ μὴν τὸν Λαμνώνα ὑπερετεῖ ἐκ τῶν τεχνηποίοις.
Βασιλεύ [Λυσιμάχος].

'Εδώσε τῷ δήμῳ τινὶ στρατηγῷ τοῦ Ἱπποτῷ τὸν Λέωντιδα. Καὶ ἢμερείται ἐν τῷ πολεμῷ τῷ Πριγίναν, καὶ τῶν ἱππωτῶν πρὸς τὸν κυρίον τὸν Πριγίναν, καὶ τῶν ἁλακτικῶν Πελετίας κατὰ τῆς οἰκείας τῆς τὸν δήμου διήγησιν, τῇ πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν ἀνάρξει δέκα, οἵτινες ἀνείπως [κ ς ω] πρὸς αὐτῷ τῷ πολιτικῷ ἀποδώσασιν.


450
LYSIMACHUS' (?) LETTER CONCERNING THE PEDIEIS

I. | --------------------------/ c o t | a
II. | --------------------------(space for a line) — ---------------------------------
III. | --------------------------(space for a line) — ---------------------------------
IV. | --------------------------(space for a line) — ---------------------------------

LYSIMACHUS' LETTER TO PRIENE

RC 6 = OGIS 12 = I.Priene 15

LYSIMACHUS' LETTER TO PRIENE

RC 8 = I.Priene 16
DELOS HONOURS THE SPARTAN DEMARATUSSyll 381

[... έπειδή] τῇ βουλή[...] καὶ τῷ θέμιῳ[,] Ἀριστόκλειος Νικοδόρου[...] εἶπεν·
5 ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρὸ τῆς Ἑρμήν[...], πατὴρ Δημαράτου[...].

CULT HONOURS FOR LYSIMACHUS AT SAMOTHRACE Syll 372

[...] ἐπειδή[...] Βασιλείων λυσιμάχου[...] ἐγκατάλειπε πάσαν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιο[...]μένος τοῦ ἱεροῦ καὶ τῆς πόλεως, τοὺς[...]
5 οἱ ἀπειράσαντες εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ [...] ἐγκατάλειπαν τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῆς[...]

452
α' τῶν προεδροὺς ἔπεσεν Ἱερομνήμων Τεισιμάχου οὐ ἐκ Κολύτης καὶ συμπρόεδρον. ἔδωκεν τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῶν δήμων. Νικήματος Φιλέου Κεφάληθεν εἶπεν· ἐπεὶ τῇ Φιλαπίδης διατελέσκειν ἐν παντὶ καίρῳ ἀποδεικνύεις τὴν πρὸς τὸν δήμον εὐνοιαν καὶ ἀποδεικνύεις πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα Λυσίμαχον πρὸτερον, τὰ διαλεγόμενα τοῖς βασιλεῖς ἐκόμισεν τῶν δήμων διὸ πορεύσασθαι τὰς Ἀθηναίων ἀρχοντας, διελέγθη δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ κεραίας καὶ ίστοιν ὅπως ἄν δοθῇ τῇ θεῷ εἰς τὰ Παναθηναία τῶν πέπλων ἦν κείμεθα ἐπ᾽ Ἐνκύμιονοις ἀρχοντάς· καὶ νικήσαντος Λυσίμαχον τὸν βασιλέα ὑποκρίνεται καὶ ἀνάλογα ὑποκρίνεται, ἐμφανίζεις τοῖς βασιλεῖς καὶ λαβῶν αὐτοῖς ἀφής τόσον τῶν υἱῶν μὲν τῶν μέν τελευταίων τῶν πολιτῶν ἐρασμόν τίς ἐκ τῶν καταχωρισθῶν εἰς ἡγεμονίαν, τοὺς δὲ προσερχόμενος ἀπεισάν ἀφίεντες καὶ ὑπερβολής δοῦσαν ταῖς προσερχόμενοις Ἀθηναίοις χρήσιμος ὦ καὶ τοῖς ἀεὶ περιτυχόνοις Ἀθηναίοις χρήσιμος ὦν καὶ τῶν διατελεῖς καθότι ἄν ἐκαστὸς αὐτὸν παρακαλέσει, καὶ κομμασμένος τὸν δήμον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν διατελέσκειν λέγων καὶ πράξειν τὰ συμφέροντα τεῖς τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίας, καὶ παρακάλεσθαι τὸν βασιλέα βοήθειν κεὶ κράτησαι καὶ σῖτον, ὅπως ἄν διαμένει ἡ δῆμος ἐν εἰς τὴν περαία κομίσηται καὶ τὰ φρούρια τὴν πασίτηταν, καὶ ὑπὲρ τούτων πιὰ τῶν πολλῶν μεμαρτύρησκεν αὐτοῖς ὁ βασιλεὺς πρὸς τοὺς πρεσβεύοντας Ἀθηναίων πρὸς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ χειροτόνησε ἁγιοκτόνησεν ἡ Ἰσαίας ἀρχοντός ὑπῆκουσαι καὶ τῶν ἠδονῶν τῆς τῶν ἁγιωτάτων τῆς τοῦ δήμου υπὲρ τῆς τοῦ πάλαις, καὶ εἰς ταύτα πάντα ἐκ τῶν ἱδίων ἀναλώσας πολλὰ χρήματα τὰς εἰς εὔρηκας ἐδώκει κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ τῆς πάλαις, καὶ τῶν ἁγίων τῶν θεῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς πάλαις, καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἁγίων καὶ τῶν θεῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς πάλαις, καὶ εἰς ταύτα πάντα ἐκ τῶν ἱδίων ἀναλώσας πολλὰ χρήματα τὰς εἰς εὔρηκας ἐδώκει κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ τῆς πάλαις, καὶ τῶν ἁγίων τῶν θεῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς πάλαις, καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἁγίων καὶ τῶν θεῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς πάλαις, καὶ εἰς ταύτα πάντα ἐκ τῶν ἱδίων ἀναλώσας πολλὰ χρήματα τὰς εἰς εὔρηκας ἐδώκει κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ τῆς πάλαις, καὶ τῶν ἁγίων τῶν θεῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς πάλαις, καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἁγίων καὶ τῶν θεῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς πάλαις, καὶ εἰς ταύτα πάντα ἐκ τῶν ἱδίων ἀναλώσας πολλὰ χρήματα τὰς εἰς εὔρηκας ἐδώκει κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ τῆς πάλαις, καὶ τῶν ἁγίων τῶν θεῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς πάλαις, καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἁγίων καὶ τῶν θεῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς πάλαις, καὶ εἰς ταύτα πάντα ἐκ τῶν ἱδίων ἀναλώσας πολλὰ χρήματα τὰς εἰς εὐ
LYSIMACHUS’ LETTER TO SAMOS RC 7 = OGIS 13 = I.Priene 500

55 ἐρεῖ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμετέροις ἀρχιμαζόνα περὶ τῷ ἤτοιν εἰς τῇ ἄροιν ἐκκλησάντων κατὰ τὸν νόμον, γινόμεν δὲ ἔσχισμα
ἀλλεθαὶ τῆς βουλῆς εἰς τὸν δήμον, ὅτι δοκεῖ τῷ βεβαίωθαι, ἐπανεῖσθαι Φιλιππίδου Φιλοκλέους Κεφαλῆς
θεῖν ἀντίθες ἐνεκα καὶ εὐνοιαὶ ἦς ἔχον διατελεῖ περὶ

60 ρῇ τὸν δήμον τὸν Αθηναίων καὶ στεφανώσας αὐτὸν [χ] ῥωσίω στεφάνως κατὰ τὸν νόμον καὶ ἀνείπει τὸν οὗ τὸν στέφανον Διονύσων τῶν μεγάλων τραγῳδιῶν τοῦ ἀγὼ ὁ ὁ, στῆσαι δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰκόνα χαλκῆν ἐν τῶι ἰδεῖς[7] ῥωκαὶ εἶναι αὐτῶι σήτησαι ἐν πρωτανείᾳ καὶ ἥκ

65 γόνων δὲ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου καὶ προεδρια[ν] ἐν πᾶσι [τοίοις ἐκεῖς τῇ πάλαις ἐτίθηνι τῆς δὲ ποίησις τῇ δὴ στεφάνῳ καὶ τῆς ἀναγορεύσεως ἐπιμεληθῆσαι τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς διοικήσεις ἀναγράφαι δὲ τὸν ψῆφο ἀμα τὸν γράμματα τὸν κατὰ πρωτανείᾳ ἐν στήλῃ


in corona

ὁ δή[μος]
'Εφ' ιερέως τοῦ Λυσιμάχου
Τιμησίου, βασιλεύς
Λυσιμάχος δέδωκεν
4 Λυμναίωι 'Αρπάλου ἐμ
πατρικοῖς τοὺς ἀγροὺς,
tὸν τε ἐν τῇ Σερμυλαια
καὶ τὸν ἐν τῇ Ὁλυνθίαι
8 χίλια διακόσια, δὶ γείτον
νέος 'Αγαθοκλῆς Λυσι
μάχου, Βίθως Κλέονος,
καὶ τὸν ἐν τῇ Ὁλυνθίαι
12 ἐπὶ Τραπεζοῦντι, γῆς
ἐνδένδρου πλέθρα τρι
ακόσια ἔξηκοντα, δὶ γεί
τονέος Μένων Σωσικλέους,
16 Πύλων 'Επιτέλους, καὶ
τὸν ἐν τῇ Στρεναιαί,
γῆς ἐνδένδρου πλέθρα
ἐνακόσια καὶ ἁμπέλων
20 εἴκοσι, δὶ γείτονεος Γού
ρας 'Αννύθεος, Χιωνίδης,
Εὐάλκης Δημητρίου, καὶ
αὐτῶι καὶ ἑγκόνοις κε-νας
24 κτήσθαι κυρίοις οὐσι κα[i
πωλεῖν καὶ ἄλλασσεσθα[i]
καὶ διδόναι οίς ἄν βού-νας
λονται. vacat
LETTER OF PTOLEMY II TO MILETUS  

Βασιλεὺς Πτολεμαῖος Μιλησίων τῷ βουλῇ καὶ τοῖς δήμῳ χαίρειν· Ἡθομόνων καὶ Πνήθη καὶ Βοττάς οἱ παρ' ἡμῖν προσβείται τὸ τε φήμασμα ἀπέδωκαν ἡμῖν καὶ τῷ ζητήσασθε τὰς τιμὰς, καὶ τὸν στέρανον ἀνήγερκαν ὑπὸ ἐστεφανώματι. 5

αὐτῇ ἡμῖν, ὑποσχόμεθα καὶ τὸ χρισόν τὸ εἰς τὰ ξένια, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐκλογισμένοι περί τε τῆς εὐσεβείας ἂν διώκωστε καὶ καθάλογον τῆς εὐγνώμων τῶν πλῆθος ἡ λαμπρὰ ἂν πρὸς ἐκατοντάς τοὺς εὐθυγέτας. ἐπὶ δὲ καὶ τῷ προαγοροῦν ἂν ἂν γέγονεν ἂν πάλιν ἂν τοῖς παρα- 10

tεροῖς βιβλευτικοῖς, ἧδων μετὰ πίστις συνυδέθει τὰ καὶ πρωθύπτης φιλικὸς διακατέθηκαν ἡμῖν καὶ (ο)ὓμιν πάσαν τοῖς ἀνή- κουσι πρὸς τιμήν καὶ δόξαν συνανθέν τὰ τῆς πάλιν. τὰς τε δὴ τιμὰς καὶ τὸν στέραν διδάσκοντο οἰκεῖοι, ὑποσχόμεθα δὲ καὶ τὰ ξένια, καὶ ἡμῖν ἐκατονταῖς εὐγνώμονας ὡς ἂν πί- 15

αἰν. ὁμολογήσεις γὰρ καθάλογον ἄγονή ταύτῃ χρησάθηκαν, διὸ καὶ ἂν ἄρθην τε αὐτοὺς διδάσκοντον τῆς πρὸς ἡμῖν ἐνσωματικοῦ, θεωροῦν- 
tές ἀπλάτος καὶ ἀληθινῶς ἂν πάσα πραγματεύσατε καὶ τὸν πολὺ τὸ μάλλον ὑπεπασχέμεθα, κατανοοῦντες τὸ εὐγνώμονα ἡμῖν καὶ ἂν ἂν εἰς ἐνέργειαν μὲν πλεόν, οὐχ ἡμῖν δὲ ἂν τοῖς ψυ- 20

χάμα τοῖς ἀποστοληθέντος ἡμῖν καὶ ἂν τῶν θυλῆτται ἢπο τῆς πραγματικῆς, καὶ ἐπειδὴ οἱ περὶ θεραπέουσαν καὶ Πνήθη καὶ Βο- ττάν ἀπήφανον διότι ἂν τε Ἕλεξενόρου καὶ ‘Ἀντιγόνου αὐτο- 25

θύμοις ἂν καὶ ἀφορολόγητος ἂν πάλιν ἡμῖν, καὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι πράγμα- νοι ἐστεφάνωσι δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς, θεωρούντες τοὺς τῆς κρι- ναντας δικαίως καὶ αὐτοὶ βουλοῦμεν μὴ λείπεσθαι ταῖς εὐθυ- γενεῖσι, τὴν τα αὐτοεσκεφάλος ἡμῖν συνδιατηρήσαμεν καὶ ἀφορ- 

λογήτως ἡμῖν συγχωρήσαμεν τὸν τα ἀλλόν ἀπλάτος καὶ κα- τὸς εἰς τὰ θεραπευτικά συνανθέντος ἄρα ἂν οὐκ ἂν καὶ ἂν- 30

..... καὶ ἂν τὸ ἀλλο πραγματικόν ἂν ἡμῖν ἐπανοίγασιν ἂν ἡμῖν ἐξώθησιν ἂν ἡμῖν ἐξώθησιν. παρακαλοῦμεν δέ καὶ ἡμῖν μημονεύο- 
tάς ἡμῖν ἂν (?) τῇ ἰκτεντοστήν πεῖραν εὐθυμόνων ΑΣΔΙΑ — — — 12—14 — — — Ε εὐθυμοῦ καθάπερ δικαίως ἐστὶ καὶ Υ — — 15—17 — — — τε καὶ τοὺς προγεγεννημένους ἡμῖν ἀπο- λολιθ — 10—12 — ὑπ' ἂν εἰσφέργηθη μημονεύονες αὐξίως. 35

τά δὲ πλεόνα περὶ τούτοις καὶ τῶν ἀλλόν ἂν συνελεύση - 

καμεν ἀναγγελοῦσαν ἡμῖν οὐ προερεχθαί, ὡς διὰ τὰ τὰ ἀλ- 

λίμα ἂν ἐπηράξαν ἐπανοίγασιν καὶ δημίᾳ τὴν συνοπθήν ἃν ἐποιούν- 
tο περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων τῶν δήμων. ἔρωσθε.
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